Immigrant Political Incorporation : The Role of Hometown Associations [1 ed.] 9781593327446, 9781593327217

Citation preview

The New Americans Recent Immigration and American Society

Copyright © 2013. LFB Scholarly Publishing LLC. All rights reserved.

Edited by Steven J. Gold and Rubén G. Rumbaut

A Series from LFB Scholarly Vonderlack-Navarro, Rebecca. Immigrant Political Incorporation : The Role of Hometown Associations, LFB

Copyright © 2013. LFB Scholarly Publishing LLC. All rights reserved. Vonderlack-Navarro, Rebecca. Immigrant Political Incorporation : The Role of Hometown Associations, LFB

Immigrant Political Incorporation The Role of Hometown Associations

Copyright © 2013. LFB Scholarly Publishing LLC. All rights reserved.

Rebecca Vonderlack-Navarro

LFB Scholarly Publishing LLC El Paso 2014 Vonderlack-Navarro, Rebecca. Immigrant Political Incorporation : The Role of Hometown Associations, LFB

Copyright © 2014 by LFB Scholarly Publishing LLC All rights reserved.

Copyright © 2013. LFB Scholarly Publishing LLC. All rights reserved.

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Vonderlack-Navarro, Rebecca, 1976Immigrant political incorporation : the role of hometown associations / Rebecca Vonderlack-Navarro. pages cm. -- (The New Americans: recent immigration and American society) Includes bibliographical references and index. ISBN 978-1-59332-721-7 (hardcover : alk. paper) 1. Immigrants--United States--Societies, etc. 2. Immigrants--Political activity--United States. 3. Mexicans--Political activity--United States. 4. United States--Emigration and immigration--Social aspects. 5. Mexico--Emigration and immigration--Social aspects. 6. United States--Emigration and immigration--Government policy. 7. Mexico-Emigration and immigration--Government policy. I. Title. JV6403.V65 2014 305.868'073--dc23 2013034592

ISBN 978-1-59332-721-7 Printed on acid-free 250-year-life paper. Manufactured in the United States of America.

Vonderlack-Navarro, Rebecca. Immigrant Political Incorporation : The Role of Hometown Associations, LFB

Table of Contents

Acknowledgments ............................................................................... vii Introduction

........................................................................................ 1

Chapter 1: The Bi-national Path to Immigrant Political Incorporation: Theoretical and Methodological Considerations...................................................................... 9

Copyright © 2013. LFB Scholarly Publishing LLC. All rights reserved.

Chapter 2: Mexico Unbound: Chicago’s HTA Growth through Early 2001 .......................................................................... 39 Chapter 3: Conflicting Tendencies: Post-9/11 Politics and HTAs' Nascent U.S. Political Engagement, 2001-2005 ................ 65 Chapter 4: "I think we're at the start of a social movement": HTA Mobilization for U.S. Immigrant Rights, December 2005 to March 10 2006 ..................................... 87 Chapter 5: May Day Opens Doors: Mobilization and Participation, May through November 2006 .................... 109 Chapter 6: "Today We March, Tomorrow We Vote": CONFEMEX's Interest Group Consolidation, December 2006 to November 2008 ................................. 137 Chapter 7: Future Considerations for Immigrant Mobilization and Politics ....................................................................... 187 Appendix: Interview Subjects ............................................................ 195 References

.................................................................................... 205

Index

.................................................................................... 219 v

Vonderlack-Navarro, Rebecca. Immigrant Political Incorporation : The Role of Hometown Associations, LFB

Copyright © 2013. LFB Scholarly Publishing LLC. All rights reserved. Vonderlack-Navarro, Rebecca. Immigrant Political Incorporation : The Role of Hometown Associations, LFB

Copyright © 2013. LFB Scholarly Publishing LLC. All rights reserved.

Acknowledgments

First and foremost, I would like to thank Dr. William Sites. It is hard for me to put into words what this intellectual journey has meant to me. He helped me take on the topic of immigration, an issue that has long been important to me, and ground it in theory and scholarly rigor. And while the voyage was not easy, his constant support and encouragement were always on hand. El Jefe, I will miss your mentorship dearly. Second, I extend deep gratitude to the Chicago Confederation of Mexican Federations, CONFEMEX, for making this research possible. Community leaders from Aguas Calientes, Michoacán, Durango, Zacatecas, Guerrero, Hidalgo, Guanajuato, Oaxaca, and Jalisco all provided valuable insight into their organizations’ development. In particular, I would like to thank Claudia Lucero who opened her heart and her life to me and who continues to inspire me through her community work. I am also indebted to Chicago consular leaders Dante Gomez and Rebecca Aguilar for sharing their great knowledge with me. I was significantly inspired by the many leaders from the original March 10th Committee who helped mobilize Chicago in the historic mega-marches and who were kind enough to speak with me and help advance this project. I was also greatly informed by leaders within the National Alliance of Latino and Caribbean Communities. May their cross-border efforts continue to bring social justice for migrants. Third, I would like to thank numerous faculty at the University of Chicago for their thoughtful insights: Dr. Virginia Parks, Dr. Robert Chaskin, Dr. Christopher Boyer, and Dr. Jennifer Mosley. I am also thankful to Dr. Michael Peter Smith and Dr. Roger Waldinger who provided thoughtful comments to other papers based on this larger body of work. I have benefited immensely from your vast knowledge and experience in the areas of immigration and organizing. vii

Vonderlack-Navarro, Rebecca. Immigrant Political Incorporation : The Role of Hometown Associations, LFB

Copyright © 2013. LFB Scholarly Publishing LLC. All rights reserved. Vonderlack-Navarro, Rebecca. Immigrant Political Incorporation : The Role of Hometown Associations, LFB

Copyright © 2013. LFB Scholarly Publishing LLC. All rights reserved.

Introduction

Dramatic increases in Mexican immigration to the United States during the past twenty years have sparked growing public and academic debate surrounding the political incorporation of immigrants. Mexican hometown associations (henceforward, HTAs) in U.S. cities have come to be recognized as an important resource to help newcomers sustain transnational ties by participating in cultural events and philanthropic infrastructure projects geared towards the homeland. HTAs also have come to exert influence on local elections in their hometowns in Mexico while fostering important paisano network connections in the U.S. (Goldring 1998, 2002; Rivera-Salgado 2002; R.C. Smith 1995, 1998, 2006; Alarcon 2002; Orozco & Lapointe 2004; Portes, Escobar, and Radford 2007; M.P. Smith and Bakker 2008; Zabin and EscalaRabadan 1998). Yet recent activities in Chicago, including an HTA leadership role in the dramatic 2006 and 2007 marches for immigrant rights, suggest that this kind of organization has the potential to become a significant agent of U.S. political incorporation as well as one that helps maintain transnational ties to Mexican society. In general, however, research on HTAs has not paid sufficient attention to why many of these organizations have shifted to include bi-national Mexico and U.S.-focused activities. Of the research that does explore their emerging US-focused activities, there is still not sufficient analysis as to what encouraged HTAs to unify and eventually emerge as a contentious actor in response to government threats. Throughout U.S. history, newcomers have organized mutual aid societies to maintain important cultural links and provide significant social support in an often unwelcoming new land. Mexican immigrant hometown clubs are no different. They have long served to aid new arrivals, celebrate hometown traditions, fight xenophobia and 1

Vonderlack-Navarro, Rebecca. Immigrant Political Incorporation : The Role of Hometown Associations, LFB

Copyright © 2013. LFB Scholarly Publishing LLC. All rights reserved.

2

Immigrant Political Incorporation

discrimination, organize soccer clubs, and cultivate links with fellow countrymen here in the United States. At times, HTAs pooled resources to support philanthropic projects back in their hometown villages, such as renovating a local church, paving a deteriorating road, or providing an ambulance to a local health clinic (Chicago Mexican Consular materials 1999; Gomez 2000; Gomez and Aguilar 2005). By the late 1980s and 1990s, when Mexican immigrants’ individual and collective remittances provided them with economic clout in their hometowns, many HTAs began to receive recognition from Mexican political elites as potential financial and political resources (Goldring 2002). The significance of Mexican immigrants and their growing organizations to Mexican politics would only escalate moving into the 2000s when Mexican President Vicente Fox overhauled consular programming and nationalized outreach efforts to support the growth of HTA activities (M.P. Smith and Bakker 2008; Fitzgerald 2006; R.C. Smith 2008). Throughout the Midwest, HTAs have considerably increased in number (from a meager 35 in 1995 to over 340 by 2008) and in organizational scale by developing into state-level federations. By 2003, nine of the city-based federations and 175 HTAs joined together to form the Midwest confederation called CONFEMEX, la Confederacion de Federaciones Mexicanos (Chicago Mexican Consular materials 2009). In 2006, CONFEMEX took a leadership role in the marches for immigrant rights, with the Michoacán federation headquarters serving as the city’s crucial planning hub. This and other recent HTA actions in Chicago suggest that this traditionally Mexicanfocused organization may have transformed into a significant agent of U.S. political incorporation even while maintaining its ties to Mexican society. The rise of Chicago HTAs’ political influence offers a unique opportunity to analyze the shift towards bi-national activities—that is, the broadening of agendas to include retaining stake and influence in Mexico (e.g., lobbying for absentee voting rights, allocating remittances for local economic development, and organizing events to maintain their cultural Mexican identity) and U.S. integration activities (e.g., ESL classes, immigrant rights concerns, and more recently, citizenship and voter registration drives). Nonetheless, research to date has failed to pay adequate attention to the broader political and economic circumstances on both sides of the Mexico-U.S. border that caused many HTAs to move beyond their Mexican-focused activities. Further, they fail to examine the critical

Vonderlack-Navarro, Rebecca. Immigrant Political Incorporation : The Role of Hometown Associations, LFB

Copyright © 2013. LFB Scholarly Publishing LLC. All rights reserved.

Introduction

3

and multiple state influences that encouraged HTAs to transform into temporary vehicles for U.S.-focused mobilization. This case study, therefore, poses two related questions. First, why did CONFEMEX eventually shift from a Mexico-focused agenda to a bi-national Mexico-U.S.-focused agenda, and how has this shift affected the political activities of the confederation? Second, why did CONFEMEX and its HTA base embrace contentious activism and how has this step impacted immigration policy and politics for HTAs as organizations, as well as the immigrant leaders themselves? HTAs have been largely conceptualized through “transnationalist” lenses. Such paradigms, which emphasize sending-society political ties, do not successfully elucidate the evolution of Chicago HTAs’ activities because they neglect to give adequate consideration to the U.S. political environment and how it has come to influence HTA activism. Using a social movement approach, this project shows that interaction with multiple government entities in both Mexico and the United States, including national and state-level actors, played a primary role in CONFEMEX’s eventual recourse to social mobilization. By examining how the varied governmental actors worked at different times to repress, endorse, or reincorporate CONFEMEX, we can see how the changing form and direction of HTA activism—not only popular mobilization but more recently, interest-group consolidation—represent immigrant leaders’ responses to changing and contradictory state projects in an era of neoliberal globalization. That is to say, at key moments certain government actors have encouraged CONFEMEX to move in one direction while others have pushed the confederation toward a different path. To fully clarify the argument, the study draws on three theoretical literatures: social movement paradigms, political economy and globalization, and theories of the state. First, social movement paradigms guide the analysis of Chicago HTAs and their strategic decisions and organizational evolution. Political process approaches within the social movement literature highlight the opportunities, threats, and tensions faced by Chicago’s HTA leadership confederation as its political agenda grows to include both Mexico- and U.S.-oriented political activity. Conceptions of political incorporation have largely assumed that the legal vulnerability and social marginality experienced by many immigrant groups render them unlikely to engage in contentious politics. Social movement theorists, by contrast, have developed a number of concepts (e.g.

Vonderlack-Navarro, Rebecca. Immigrant Political Incorporation : The Role of Hometown Associations, LFB

Copyright © 2013. LFB Scholarly Publishing LLC. All rights reserved.

4

Immigrant Political Incorporation

opportunity and mobilizing structures, framing processes, repertoires of contention) that help explain mass mobilization by seemingly marginal social groups (Tarrow 2005, 23; McAdam, Tarrow and Tilly 2001, 4647, 95-98). However, these theoretical concepts have not been extensively applied to immigrant political activity. This in-depth case study finds that many Chicago HTAs and their broader coalitions generally function as interest groups. At significant moments, however, HTAs can transform into vehicles of social mobilization as they relate to both the Mexican and U.S. nation states. As this research will show, various government entities—sending and receiving states, national and local governments—function simultaneously to facilitate, constrain, or co-opt HTAs’ activism. Through a political process approach, the study is able to make sense of both HTA actions and state projects as dynamic and interactive political forces. A deeper understanding as to why Chicago HTA activism has significantly changed also calls for a review of literatures that highlight the contextual influences of the political economy of globalization and the changing realities of state-migrant relations. Viewing HTAs through the lens of political economy illustrates how HTAs and their coalitions formed within an evolving context of neoliberal economic globalization. Theorists of globalization show how capital expansion, market integration, innovations in technology, and travel and information flows have created a new international economy where nation-state powers and their borders seem to hold diminished importance and where immigrants—mobile labor—emerge as crucial social actors (Sassen 1991, 1998; Friedman 1995). Such theorists have used a conception of globalization to explore the economic and macrostructural forces that have created bifurcated economies, with immigrants overrepresented in the lower end of the labor market (Sassen 1991, 1998; Friedman, 1995; Massey, Durand, and Malone 2002). Between Mexico and the U.S. more specifically, the political economy literature sheds light on how processes of economic restructuring within both countries since the late 1970s have repositioned immigrants at the center of national development: the U.S.’s considerable demand for low-end flexible labor increasingly supplied by undocumented immigration; the intensified post-NAFTA integration of the U.S. and Mexican economies, characterized by highly asymmetrical interdependencies and resulting escalation of Mexico-toU.S. immigration; and the role of immigrant remittances as an integral

Vonderlack-Navarro, Rebecca. Immigrant Political Incorporation : The Role of Hometown Associations, LFB

Copyright © 2013. LFB Scholarly Publishing LLC. All rights reserved.

Introduction

5

source of Mexico’s financial livelihood (P. Smith 1996; Wise 2006; Massey et al., 2002; M.P. Smith and Bakker 2008; Waldinger 2001; Peck and Theodore 2001; Bluestone and Harrison 2000; Peck 2004). It is within this context of heightened globalization and Mexico-U.S. economic integration that Mexican immigrant HTAs proliferated in number and their organizational strategies took shape. Third, theories of contemporary states pose a challenge to accounts of political economy that perceive nation-state powers to have lessened in significance. A growing number of scholars of international immigration point to the fundamental role of nation states in shaping immigration and patterns of political incorporation (Bloemraad 2005, 2006; Joppke and Morawska 2003; Waldinger and Fitzgerald 2004; Zolberg 1999; Alba and Nee 2003; Aleinikoff 2001; Hazan 2006). Furthermore, within the current immigrant rights struggle, the relationship between state and movement involves multiple state actors: Mexico and U.S. nation-state agendas, national and local state agendas. This study argues that different sets of governmental officials within both Mexico and the U.S. have engaged in contradictory migrantrelated strategies, perceiving immigrants variably as a source of financial remittances, a supply of undocumented labor, a threat to the nation’s security agenda, or when convenient, as an emerging potential voting bloc. Through the integrated application of the three theoretical literatures we can understand how the complex of forces—HTA strategies, economic restructuring, states’ projects—have led to the quite substantial changes in the agenda and activities of Chicago’s HTA leadership confederation. This study attempts to comprehend Chicago HTAs’ growing Mexico-U.S. bi-national repertoires of action as a result of multi-step, organizational reactions to different state actors at varied historical moments. Using a bi-national approach centered on the multifaceted relationship between neoliberalizing states and social movements, it explores the development of Chicago HTAs’ political agenda, organizational form, and activities as they relate to various levels of governmental officials and political projects within both Mexico and the U.S. The study begins by investigating the intensified political legitimacy conferred upon CONFEMEX by the Mexican government’s diaspora repatriation programs in the 1990s. It continues by examining the contrasting post-9/11, U.S. anti-immigrant politics and various Illinois state-government programs that began courting Mexican HTAs

Vonderlack-Navarro, Rebecca. Immigrant Political Incorporation : The Role of Hometown Associations, LFB

Copyright © 2013. LFB Scholarly Publishing LLC. All rights reserved.

6

Immigrant Political Incorporation

as voting constituencies back in 2005. The final sections of the book center on the activities of CONFEMEX in the wake of a qualitatively new level of anti-immigrant pressures that emerged in U.S. national politics in 2005. Concentrating attentively on the Chicago’s HTA confederation's reaction to the passage of the Sensenbrenner bill (HR4437) by the U.S. House of Representatives in late 2005, the study examines how CONFEMEX became one of Chicago’s leading sponsors of the 2006 immigrant rights marches. Further, it looks at how the organization cultivated closer political relationships with other immigrant groups as well as state and local officials in Illinois. The study then traces post-2006 to 2008 political developments and HTAs’ evolving repertoires of action to explore how CONFEMEX would come to operate as an important interest group and agent of U.S. political incorporation for Chicago’s Mexican immigrant community, a process that also created significant intra-organizational tensions. Overall, by situating Chicago HTA developments in a historical context, the study moves beyond a reification of HTA activism as solely focused on Mexico. Instead, the historical focus enables a deeper comprehension of HTAs’ distinctive transformation in both identity and activism towards bi-national concerns as they interact with multiple government entities in both Mexico and the U.S. The political context includes Mexican emigrant inclusion efforts, U.S. national policy disputes over immigration reform, and Illinois state programs for immigrants. By employing a historical investigation, the study is able to illustrate the complex and evolving relationship between Mexico and U.S. neoliberal restructurings and immigrant organizational responses. The project is a multi-method, case study focused on the political involvements of various Chicago Mexican hometown associations. This study has employed archival research, direct observation, and keyinformant interviews to explore the emergence and development of CONFEMEX, Chicago’s HTA confederation. A multi-method, case study approach has enabled the study to be flexible and open-ended, to triangulate between a plurality of data sources, and to provide a longitudinal view of Chicago HTAs’ development over time (Snow and Trom 2002). Theoretical scholarship, along with secondary historical literatures, were also used to reconstruct the post-1970s economic structures, migration patterns, and state projects that shaped the major political conditions during the evolution of HTA organizational capacities, agendas, and activities. Archival sources included Chicago

Vonderlack-Navarro, Rebecca. Immigrant Political Incorporation : The Role of Hometown Associations, LFB

Introduction

7

Mexican consular publications and records, HTA federation and CONFEMEX meeting minutes, newspaper archives, protest flyers, and pamphlets. Analysis of recent organizational developments draws from direct observation within the leadership circles of CONFEMEX (20052007) as well as interviews with past and present HTA federation leaders, Mexican and U.S. government officials, and local immigrant activists. Interviews with former and current HTA leaders encompassed ten federations (Aguas Calientes, Chihuahua, Durango, Michoacán, Jalisco, Hidalgo, Zacatecas, Guanajuato, Guerrero, and Oaxaca); other interviewees were selected because of their significant involvement with Chicago HTA developments over the past 20 years.

Copyright © 2013. LFB Scholarly Publishing LLC. All rights reserved.

Overview of Chapters Chapter one presents a theoretical overview of the difference between the transnational and assimilation theories commonly used to conceptualize HTAs and their state-level federations. Challenging dominant transnational conceptualizations of immigrant HTAs, the chapter considers the organizations’ increasing tendencies to participate in U.S.-focused politics, particularly in regard to immigrant rights. It also examines how social movement activities may serve as a process for the political incorporation of immigrants into the U.S. Conversely, assimilation theories have traditionally understood political incorporation as resulting from long-term and linear processes of immigrants’ interaction with host states and with local institutions that facilitate inclusion and citizenship (Bloemraad 2005, 2006; Alba and Nee 2003; Gerstle and Mollenkopf 2001; Mollenkopf and Hochschild 2010). While such processes continue to be relevant, recent research suggests that certain changes in the economic and political environment—from new kinds of state policies to new immigrant activities—may significantly accelerate naturalization and electoral participation by immigrants even as these processes do not sever migrant ties to their sending society. Chapter two examines the emergence and early development of Chicago HTAs in response to political and economic restructurings in both Mexico and the U.S. The analysis focuses in particular on the post-1970s dynamics of Mexico-U.S. immigration and the intensifying significance of migrant HTAs for Mexico’s evolving state projects. By considering the importance of Chicago’s long-standing Mexican

Vonderlack-Navarro, Rebecca. Immigrant Political Incorporation : The Role of Hometown Associations, LFB

Copyright © 2013. LFB Scholarly Publishing LLC. All rights reserved.

8

Immigrant Political Incorporation

diaspora for Mexico’s governmental migrant-repatriation projects from the late 1980s through early 2001, we come to see not only how HTAs quickly developed within and around the city, but also how the organizations began over time to acquire a certain amount of political autonomy. Chapter three explores the emerging bi-national focus of Chicago HTAs that developed from 2001 to 2005. Following the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, the political course between Mexico and the U.S. would significantly change as Mexico lost its diplomatic clout with the U.S. The resulting rightward shift in U.S. immigration policy resulting from the “war on terror” would eventually catalyze an expansion in both Mexican state and HTA strategies to include domestically-focused activities aimed at safeguarding their members’ political standing in the U.S. HTAs’ emerging bi-national agendas were further encouraged by growing attention from the Illinois state government, which began to court CONFEMEX as part of a broader Democratic party bid for Latino electoral support. Chapter four examines CONFEMEX’s recourse to popular mobilization. The chapter traces the events that led to CONFEMEX’s central role within the historic immigrant rights march on March 10, 2006. This period represents the most dramatic change in Chicago HTA activity as it reconstructs the strategic developments that ensued following the passage of the Sensenbrenner bill in December 2005 until March 2006. Chapter five examines CONFEMEX’s continued leadership in the historic May Day rally of 2006 and the various state responses to immigrant mobilization up until the November congressional elections of that same year. As a new leader in the U.S. immigrant rights movement, CONFEMEX faced new challenges. HTA leaders faced difficult choices when it came to responding to the growing attention they were receiving from Illinois politicians and advocacy groups. The confederation also had to decide on its position within the new U.S.based oppositional movement field. Chapter six focuses on the time period between December 2006 to early 2008 and explores how and why CONFEMEX came to prioritize interest group strategies over popular mobilization as the most practical avenue for gaining political power. As the confederation aimed to mobilize votes for the upcoming 2008 U.S. presidential election, state actors in both Mexico and the U.S. would further encourage CONFEMEX to channel its political leverage within institutional politics.

Vonderlack-Navarro, Rebecca. Immigrant Political Incorporation : The Role of Hometown Associations, LFB

CHAPTER 1

Copyright © 2013. LFB Scholarly Publishing LLC. All rights reserved.

The Bi-national Path to Immigrant Political Incorporation: Theoretical and Methodological Considerations

Mexican immigrant hometown associations (HTAs) consist largely of first-generation immigrants organized around cultural activities. The goal is to preserve heritage, provide collective remittances and infrastructure development to members’ hometowns in Mexico, and build political capital within sending states. HTAs have been depicted in scholarship as transnational organizations where immigrants’ energies—intensified and facilitated by this era of globalization and Mexican state outreach—concentrate on sustaining social and political membership ties with their country of origin. In other words, while HTAs may be based in U.S. cities, they are often seen as occupying a socio-political sphere distinct from the host society and its state actors. Moving beyond the "assimilation versus transnational" debate that commonly conceptualizes HTA activities, this chapter reviews contributions from literatures on the political economy contemporary states, and social movements. The study’s integrated theoretical framework better illuminates how HTAs (generally understood as interest groups created by the Mexican state) have been influenced by multiple state contingencies in both Mexico and the U.S. over the past two decades. As a consequence, for brief moments HTAs served as “vehicles of mobilization” that reverted quickly back to their interest group functions. 9

Vonderlack-Navarro, Rebecca. Immigrant Political Incorporation : The Role of Hometown Associations, LFB

10

Immigrant Political Incorporation

Copyright © 2013. LFB Scholarly Publishing LLC. All rights reserved.

HTAs and the Assimilation versus Transnational Debate Classic assimilation paradigms believe that over time immigrants to the United States would inevitably sever ties to their homeland and gradually shift political allegiances to the host country (Park and Burgess, reprinted 1969; Handlin 1959; Warner and Srole 1945; Gordon 1964). Even more recent work in this vein tends to see political incorporation as a more or less linear (if often prolonged and uncertain) process shaped largely by host country institutions (Mollenkopf and Hochschild 2010; Bloemraad 2006; Alba and Nee 2003; Gerstle and Mollenkopf 2001). Yet transnational frameworks developed in part to understand a somewhat surprising and fairly recent aspect of the contemporary migration experience: immigrants today often sustain enduring ties to multiple levels of their sending states and society (Schiller et al. 1992; Guarnizo and M.P. Smith 1998; Guarnizo 2001; Portes, 2001; Portes et al. 2007; Guarnizo et al. 2003). Mexican immigrant, self-organized hometown associations (HTAs) and their state-level federations have offered a useful case for empirically supporting the transnational framework and for challenging conventional notions of assimilation (Goldring 1998, 2002; RiveraSalgado 2002, R.C. Smith 1995, 1998, 2006; Alarcon 2002; Orozco & Lapointe 2004; Portes et al. 2007; M.P. Smith and Bakker 2008). More nuanced transnational conceptions of HTAs have considered that as the U.S. government turns increasingly punitive towards immigrants, immigrants face moments when they must prioritize U.S.focused politics as a means to solidify their status in the U.S. and attempt to gain political power. These more multi-faceted understandings also acknowledge that numerous Mexican political actors may have a stake in supporting immigrants’ growing U.S. political activity—their secured political standing in the United States is necessary to ensure continued transnational activity, particularly projects that stimulate continued remittance flows back to Mexico (Guarnizo 2001, 244). The transnational approach, however, does not provide an adequate explanation as to why Chicago’s HTA leadership became one of the city’s central leaders in the 2006 immigrant mobilizations, to the extent that the Michoacán federation headquarters served as Chicago’s central planning hub. Nor is there compelling evidence to suggest that HTAs embraced a leadership role in the marches simply because government

Vonderlack-Navarro, Rebecca. Immigrant Political Incorporation : The Role of Hometown Associations, LFB

Copyright © 2013. LFB Scholarly Publishing LLC. All rights reserved.

The Bi-national Path to Immigrant Political Incorporation

11

actors in Mexico or its consulate in Chicago encouraged them to do so. Instead, both theoretical and empirical work suggest that the most recent developments in Chicago’s HTA leadership activity must be understood within the framework of the U.S. political environment and how these political forces have come to influence immigrant HTA leadership over the past decade, transforming both identity and activism. Only very recently have scholars concerned with immigrant transnational research begun to consider more fully the critical influences of states and politics within both sending and receiving societies on immigrant organizations. A growing number of scholars do make the argument that transnationalism and assimilation are not contradictory processes for immigrants and their organizations (Waldinger and Fitzgerald 2004; M.P. Smith 2007; M.P. Smith and Bakker 2008; Fitzgerald 2008; Guarnizo et al. 2003; Levitt 2003; Morawska 2003; Portes et al., 2007). However, several years ago Roger Waldinger and David Fitzgerald (2004) criticized “the absence of any concerted effort to analyze the relationship between immigrant transnationalism and receiving states and civil society actors” (1181). This gap continues to impede our understanding of HTA evolution and development. For example, heavily guided by the transnational approach, Robert C. Smith (2008) pays little attention to recent migrants’ burgeoning U.S.-focused activity in his analysis of Mexican immigrants’ battle for absentee voting rights and Mexico’s expanding migrant-repatriation programs. In a brief paragraph within a quite extensive study of Mexico’s intensified diaspora engagement initiatives, Smith explains that migrants were more interested in participating in the 2006 marches than in participating in Mexican presidential elections because taking to the streets remained relatively easier than the cumbersome absentee voting opportunities extended by the Mexican government (730). His argument presumes there were no complications in expecting undocumented immigrants to march in public to demand their rights. Research on Mexican immigrants has started to analyze how political environments in both Mexico and the United States can shape migrant associations. In a recent paper, Waldinger (2009) examines two divergent cases of Mexico’s diaspora engagement: the matricula consular, which benefited millions of undocumented immigrants with a valid source of documentation, and the Vote from Abroad, whereby

Vonderlack-Navarro, Rebecca. Immigrant Political Incorporation : The Role of Hometown Associations, LFB

Copyright © 2013. LFB Scholarly Publishing LLC. All rights reserved.

12

Immigrant Political Incorporation

few emigrants possessed the appropriate credentials to participate. In general, his analysis is convincing: the divergent outcomes stem from the fact that the matricula provided immigrants with a “source of leverage” in their host society, while expatriate voting involved a more burdensome effort aimed at trying to reconnect emigrants as members of a homeland they left behind. While often illuminating, Waldinger’s study does not examine how the broader (and highly asymmetrical) relationship between Mexico and the United States might influence the way each state relates to Mexican emigrant/immigrant populations. This possibility suggests the need to resituate the study of migrant political associations within a longer-term framework focused on the changing interests of Mexican and U.S. state actors. In the case of Chicago HTAs, such a framework might usefully begin by examining the post-1970s economic and political restructurings in both societies and the new position of migrants within state strategies and governance projects over subsequent decades. Meanwhile, a somewhat different and quite welcome line of investigation within transnational research comes from the work of Michael Smith and Matt Bakker (2008; also Smith 2007) who challenge the often rigid division of domestic ethnic politics and diaspora politics. Their ethnographic work on various California federation leaders reveal how some customarily transnational migrants are now becoming involved in local Get-Out-The-Vote and immigrantrights focused campaigns while also remaining connected to Mexico. Their focus on this “second face of transnational citizenship” (167) raises several theoretical points to consider: immigrants’ political engagement in both Mexican and U.S. politics can function simultaneously; migrants’ political capital garnered within the sending country can be eventually used as a resource within the host society; and early transnational researchers’ overreliance on translocal connections (R. Smith 1998; Goldring 1998) undermines the potentially influential role of state actors at multiple levels within both Mexico and the U.S. Overall, Smith and Bakker point to the significant need for further examination of federations’ growing engagement within the U.S. political realm and what this might entail for the development of national identities in this new global economy. What is necessary, therefore, is a new theoretical lens that focuses sufficient attention on the complicated influences of the U.S. political environment—anti-immigrant political threats combined with the

Vonderlack-Navarro, Rebecca. Immigrant Political Incorporation : The Role of Hometown Associations, LFB

Copyright © 2013. LFB Scholarly Publishing LLC. All rights reserved.

The Bi-national Path to Immigrant Political Incorporation

13

political legitimacy conferred by local political leaders interested in attracting new voting blocs—in order to view how U.S. state projects have significantly altered many HTA activities. More broadly, this new framework needs to account for how migrants’ continued action is likely to be suppressed or supported by different state actors on both sides of the border. For example, studies on the immigrant mobilizations of 2006 highlight how the central thrust to launch the protests came from innovative organizational networks involving immigrant associations, labor unions, churches, politicians, and media outlets (Codero-Guzman et al. 2008). They do not, however, explain how protests emerged in areas that lacked such organizational connections (Benjamin-Alvarado, DeSipio and Montoya 2009). Furthermore, the inclination within such studies to view HTA activity as a rising form of “civic binationality” (see, for example, Fox and Bada 2009) marginalizes the centrality of government actors in shaping the political landscape that spurred the 2006 marches. At its core, social mobilization involves a dialectic between migrants’ activism and state responses, as states are likely to respond to collective insurgency with either repression or endorsement of activists’ cause. A state’s reaction also contributes to how quickly immigrant activism can become institutionalized and accommodated by the state (Tarrow 1998). Indeed, the 2006 mobilizations were about more than just the criminal provisions of the Sensenbrenner bill (in addition to studies already cited, see Barreto et al. 2009; Pallares and Flores-Gonzalez 2010). A comprehensive analysis of the 2006 mass mobilizations must consider the political and economic factors that preceded the movement’s emergence. In addition, when considering the specific leadership role of Chicago HTAs in the 2006 insurgence, one must consider how HTA action was strongly influenced not only by Mexico’s migrant-reincorporation programs and policies, but by the threat of the United States’ post-9/11 anti-immigrant politics as well. Further, local state actors pursued new immigrants as voting blocs and recognized their organizations as politically-entitled interest groups. It is possible that the weaknesses of the HTA literature also stem from the relative neglect of Chicago-area HTAs. This study’s close examination of Chicago HTA growth and development illustrates a dynamic interplay between migrant activism and various cross-border state projects. The general research on Mexican HTAs focuses primarily on organizational developments in California (Goldring 1998,

Vonderlack-Navarro, Rebecca. Immigrant Political Incorporation : The Role of Hometown Associations, LFB

Copyright © 2013. LFB Scholarly Publishing LLC. All rights reserved.

14

Immigrant Political Incorporation

2002; Rivera-Salgado 2002; M.P. Smith and Bakker 2008; Zabin and Escala-Rabadan 1998; R.C. Smith 2003), New York (R.C. Smith 1995, 1998, 2006), and on the east coast more generally (Portes et al. 2007). Inadequate attention has been paid to Chicago’s particular developments, despite the fact that Chicago and the broader Midwest has an advanced organizational capacity and the second highest number of clubs after California. Research that considers Chicago HTA developments either provides a descriptive overview of their growth, as well as the expansion of development projects within Mexico (Alarcon 2002; Orozco and Lapointe 2004; Orozco and Rouse 2007) or an indepth analysis of early federation development and homeland-oriented activities (Boruchoff 1999). A significant exception is research conducted by Escala-Rabadan, Bada, and Rivera-Salgado (2006) which investigates the growth of both California and Chicago-based HTAs. The work thoughtfully considers how the associations have expanded their agendas to prioritize concerns in both Mexico and the US and sheds important light on their ability to function as political actors interacting with various government entities on both sides of the border. As a consequence, these authors contend, migrant ethnic and social networks learned to adapt to a new social and political environment. Yet involvement in U.S. political networks does not, by itself, explain how Chicago’s HTAs came to occupy a leadership role in the 2006 marches. A more integrated theoretical framework set in a historical context, in turn, might better explore the dynamics of interaction between state actors and immigrant organizations, illuminating more explicitly how political opportunities and threats influence the capacities and strategic orientations of HTAs. Organizational developments grounded in a historical analysis that considers the critical influences of both Mexico and U.S. neoliberalizing state projects illuminates the various contextual processes that have served to influence Chicago HTAs’ ongoing strategies: multi-decade corporate restructuring and deindustrialization, the vast rise of contingent migrant labor, extensive Mexican immigration, local politics and migrant accommodation, and early Mexican state repatriation projects within the city. Over time, many HTAs have responded to varying U.S. and Mexico state projects by increasing in size, federating and eventually confederating, affiliating with other advocacy groups, engaging in demonstrations about

Vonderlack-Navarro, Rebecca. Immigrant Political Incorporation : The Role of Hometown Associations, LFB

Copyright © 2013. LFB Scholarly Publishing LLC. All rights reserved.

The Bi-national Path to Immigrant Political Incorporation

15

immigrant rights, developing relationships at U.S. state and local levels, and sometimes taking positions in local U.S. government. In order to examine the evolution of many Chicago HTAs to include both Mexican and U.S. political activities along with the capacity to mobilize contentiously, research needs to consider the macro-level changes that led to the dramatic shift in HTA activities. This entails a consideration for HTAs’ interaction with both Mexico and U.S. state projects. Although generally downplayed in transnational HTA scholarship, when the relationship between HTAs and U.S. state projects are considered, a complicated and contradictory political context emerges. This context includes Mexican immigrants who have come to play a crucial role in the U.S. economy and are often seen as significant economic contributors as well as policies that criminalize undocumented Mexican immigrants as lawbreakers. At the same time, there are selective instances when immigrants are seen by national and local politicians as potential voting blocs. The following sections provide the broader conceptual framework of this study. Three major scholarly literatures are reviewed: the political economy of globalization, theories of the state, and social movement paradigms. The study’s integrated framework offers the essential theoretical tools to understand how Chicago HTAs’ mounting U.S.-focused activities, as well as their eventual surge into popular mobilization, resulted from the organizations’ long-standing interactions with various cross-border state projects. Post-Industrial Globalization, Internationally Integrated Markets, and Porous Nation-State Boundaries: the Rise of Transnational Immigrant HTAs Examining HTAs through the lens of political economy helps illustrate how HTAs developed within the evolving context of neoliberal economic globalization. Studies of neoliberal globalization can reveal post-1970s patterns of capital mobility, market integration, and free trade within an international economy where nation state authority and territorial boundaries seem to hold decreased importance (Sassen 1991, 1998; Friedman 1986). Studies of immigration from the perspective of globalization have explored the economic and macro-structural forces that have led to the establishment of two-tiered labor markets in the United States, with unauthorized immigrants dominating the lower tier

Vonderlack-Navarro, Rebecca. Immigrant Political Incorporation : The Role of Hometown Associations, LFB

Copyright © 2013. LFB Scholarly Publishing LLC. All rights reserved.

16

Immigrant Political Incorporation

(Sassen 1991, 1998; Friedman 1986; Massey 1999; Massey et al. 2002). These studies tend to highlight the influence of globalization and immigration in large U.S. cities that from the 1970s onward have been transformed into hourglass service-sector economies that also served as key ports-of-entry for immigrants (Sassen 1991, 1998; Freidman 1986; Massey et al. 2002; Harrison and Bluestone 1998).1 In response to changes in the global economy, social movement paradigms have begun to challenge realist assumptions of nation state agency, which tend to analyze social movement activism as inherently constrained by national borders. Transnational social movement paradigms provided unique insights into innovative forms of grassroots agency (including migrant organizing) within the contemporary era of globalization. While early social movement research shed light on organizational strategies to garner resources and take advantage of potential political opportunity structures within domestic politics, transnational scholars explore how factors of globalization created new forms of political opportunities and alignments in the international arena (Smith and Bandy 2005; Jenkins 1995). Transnational social movement scholars consider how activist identities and organizational constituencies are no longer restricted by national identities, as innovative forms of cross-border solidarities form (J. Smith and Bandy 2005; Bandy and J. Smith 2005). Furthermore, the framing processes used by transnational movements can often reflect the reaction to threats posed by various global projects and supra-state governmental organizations such as the World Trade Organization, the growth of multi-national corporations, and alliances against the North American 1

See Durand, Massey, Charvet (2000) for an overview of how the geography of Mexican immigration to the U.S. significantly shifted post-IRCA. While metropolises continue to be a great attraction for Mexican newcomers, particularly Los Angeles, Chicago, Houston and Phoenix, immigration is also growing in rural, agricultural areas. Florida, Georgia, Idaho, Minnesota, Nevada, New York, New Jersey, North Carolina, Oregon and Utah are all new destination states. By the mid-1990s, however, single, male, working-age Mexican migrants who initially worked in U.S. agricultural industries were already heading for better paying urban employment opportunities. In addition, the growing number of urban-bound male migrants were often meeting with a growing number of female migrants heading towards cities as well.

Vonderlack-Navarro, Rebecca. Immigrant Political Incorporation : The Role of Hometown Associations, LFB

Copyright © 2013. LFB Scholarly Publishing LLC. All rights reserved.

The Bi-national Path to Immigrant Political Incorporation

17

Free Trade Agreement (J. Smith 2002; Levi and Murphy 2006; Foster 2002). Globalization factors also point to important changes in scalar and spatial dynamics influencing community activism (particularly migrant activism) that connects local issues with transnational concerns (Tarrow 2002, 2005). Nevertheless, transnational theorists have criticized globalization theories as universally "top-down;" in response they have developed “from below” paradigms that highlight immigrant actors and the importance of locality within the global processes that shape immigration (Guarnizo and M.P. Smith 1998). The work provides important analytic attention to immigrants’ sustained connection to multiple levels of their sending states and society by identifying contemporary immigrants and their organizations’ ability to maintain significant relationships, communal life, and political and economic activities that span between two nation-states (Schiller et al. 1992; Guarnizo and M.P. Smith 1998; Goldring 1998, 2002; R.C. Smith 1995, 1998, 2006). The transnational theoretical orientations are important for understanding HTAs. Arguably, there are aspects of transnationalism and Mexican state outreach towards HTAs and its growing diaspora that are uniquely different and unprecedented. Theorists tend to agree that this current wave of immigrants can experience transnational life with greater intensity and ease due to improvements in technology that have enhanced communication and travel in ways not even imaginable for previous immigrant groups (Guarnizo 2001; Morawska 2001; Portes et al. 2007; for an exception see Fitzgerald 2008). Joppke and Morawska (2003) also argue “New, however, is that transnational identities and involvements, which immigrants have always been enmeshed in, are now considered legitimate and no longer repressed by nationalizing states” (2). Besides increasing acceptance of multicultural identities, advocates for highlighting the recent uniqueness in transnational immigrant activities are quick to point to recent and significant legislative changes of sending governments, especially dualcitizenship laws and absentee voting rights, that serve to incorporate their diaspora and maintain their political and economic loyalty (Guarnizo et al. 2003; M.P. Smith and Bakker 2008; Koopsman and Statham 2003). Such laws enable immigrants to assimilate and gain citizenship status in the U.S. without relinquishing their transnational

Vonderlack-Navarro, Rebecca. Immigrant Political Incorporation : The Role of Hometown Associations, LFB

18

Immigrant Political Incorporation

rights in their country of origin. Guarnizo (2001) describes the implication of such dual citizenship practices:

Copyright © 2013. LFB Scholarly Publishing LLC. All rights reserved.

…a nationalism that does not promote the return to the home country but rather encourages them to become citizens of the receiving society in order to strengthen their position there, remit more money ‘home,’ consume national exports, and advocate their state of origins interests in the United States…they [sending state actors] guarantee migrants’ role as a reliable source of economic and political support of their ‘homeland.’ The increased and increasing reach of the state thus also suggests its growing dependence on its overseas citizens (244). The transnational paradigm highlights how contemporary immigrants and their organizations can maintain ties to the homeland with an intensity and ease not possible for previous waves of newcomers (R.C. Smith 2006; M.P. Smith and Bakker 2008). Furthermore, the transnational paradigm illustrates immigrants’ potential to hold multiple political allegiances and national identities and suggests that the intensity of transnational ties can actually increase over time spent in the host society (Guarnizo et al. 2003). Transnational conceptions of HTAs provide important considerations for understanding migrant agency and state responses. When conceived as transnational organizations, HTAs are migrant clubs whose energies are intensified by this era of global market integration and Mexican state outreach and no longer limited by national boundaries. Their activism concentrates on sustaining social and political membership ties with their country of origin, connecting migrants both “here” and “there." As such, transnationally-led studies of HTAs tend to either minimize the state, failing to make it central to their analysis (Portes, Escobar, and Arana 2008; Orozco and Lapointe 2004; Orozco and Rouse 2007), or more commonly, they analyze HTAs almost entirely in relation to their sending states (Goldring 1998, 2002; R.C. Smith 1995, 1998, 2006; Fitzgerald 2006). The sending state’s diaspora reincorporation initiatives are explained as “deterritorialized nation-building” (M.P. Smith and Bakker 2008, 28, quoting Basch et al. 1994). This is to say that a nation-state’s actions expand beyond its borders as a means to cultivate and maintain the

Vonderlack-Navarro, Rebecca. Immigrant Political Incorporation : The Role of Hometown Associations, LFB

Copyright © 2013. LFB Scholarly Publishing LLC. All rights reserved.

The Bi-national Path to Immigrant Political Incorporation

19

economic and political loyalty of resident citizens residing abroad. Even when HTAs’ emerging U.S.-based activism is given attention (see M.P. Smith and Bakker 2008, 167-183; Rivera-Salgada et al. 2005; Fox 2005), there remains a need for comprehensive analysis of how HTAs and their state-level federations function within the structures of U.S. cities where they are located and how they might be employing local resources, networks, and, most importantly, structures of political power. Thus, in contrast to conventional theories of assimilation built around the notion of sovereign nation-states into which immigrants will inevitably incorporate, transnational theorists point to the role of sending states as they extend beyond their borders to include their emigrants as national members. If nation-states and citizen identities become less defined by national borders, as transnational and global theories suggest, what does this mean for contemporary understandings of immigrant political incorporation into the host society? Recent transnational theorists observe that emigrants who participate in transnational political activity are not deterred from U.S.-focused politics and in fact are often engaged in these politics (see M.P. Smith 2007; M.P. Smith and Bakker 2008). However, this tells us little about how multiple state actors on both sides of the border will shape contemporary immigrants’ political incorporation into the U.S. and what the asymmetrical interdependence between neoliberalizing states implies for immigrant political incorporation. Considerations for Sending and Receiving State Agencies: Implications for Immigrant HTA Organizing and Incorporation into the Host Society While scholars of transnational dynamics and neoliberalism downplay attention on the state, a growing number of scholars of international immigration point to the essential role of host nation-states in shaping immigrant incorporation and activism (Bloemradd 2005, 2006; Joppke and Morawska 2003; Waldinger and Fitzgerald 2004; Zolberg 1999; Alba and Nee 2003; Aleinikoff 2001; Hazan 2006). This work argues that even in a global society, states continue to play a central role in shaping immigrants’ political incorporation. It also points to the critical role played by multiple state projects in influencing HTA developments. For example, Aristide Zolberg (1999) argues the agency

Vonderlack-Navarro, Rebecca. Immigrant Political Incorporation : The Role of Hometown Associations, LFB

Copyright © 2013. LFB Scholarly Publishing LLC. All rights reserved.

20

Immigrant Political Incorporation

of both sending and receiving states is an essential component in theorizing international migration as immigration in and of itself is “the transfer of a person from the jurisdiction of one state to that of another” (81). This includes not only the movement across borders “…but also the rules governing the acquisition, maintenance, loss, or voluntary relinquishment of ‘membership’ in all its aspects, political, social, economic, and cultural” (81). In other words, the movement of populations from one territory to another is innately political. As Joppke (1998) states, “There seems to be no significant migration episode, past or present, in which states have not had an active, rather than reactive, hand” (6). The state, in fact, has always played an active role in shaping immigration through labor-recruitment policies and guest worker initiatives. Further, even the immigration of asylumseekers and refugees is a direct outcome of problems occurring during the maintenance or construction of nation states. Zolberg (1999) emphasizes the principal role of U.S. policy in influencing Mexico-U.S. immigration. In his historical analysis of Mexican immigration he contends that the objective of U.S. policy towards Mexican immigrants has not been to bar their physical entry, but to prevent their social and political incorporation into the U.S. “Mexicans tended to return home when no longer needed, and in any case, their illegal status made it easy for American authorities, whenever they wished, to expel them without complicated legal procedures” (Zolberg 1999, 77). This resonates with the work of DeGenova (2005) who describes this process of U.S. state action as maintaining undocumented Mexican immigrants in a vulnerable state of “deportability—the possibility of deportation” (8). Thus, the question for immigrant HTAs’ evolving activities is no longer if both sending and receiving state agencies influence immigrant activism (Zolberg 1999; Waldinger and Fitzgerald 2004), but how both Mexico and U.S. nation-state projects function to shape and reshape immigrant activism and incorporation. State-based and globalization theories of immigration offer various insights into understanding the evolving agendas and activities of Chicago HTAs that are particularly relevant to this study. Classic conceptions of assimilation and political incorporation view ethnic organizations, like immigrant HTAs, as potential vehicles for integration. While initially they may serve to conserve ethnic identity, eventually they will aid in incorporation processes to the new host society. Transnational theories, in turn, draw

Vonderlack-Navarro, Rebecca. Immigrant Political Incorporation : The Role of Hometown Associations, LFB

Copyright © 2013. LFB Scholarly Publishing LLC. All rights reserved.

The Bi-national Path to Immigrant Political Incorporation

21

on important aspects of globalization, suggesting that research should no longer view sending and receiving states in isolation; rather, interstate connections (heightened through market integration) present implications for the types of organizations immigrants form. Furthermore, the kinds of ties immigrants make and sustain with their sending societies are qualitatively different and of a different scale than previous waves of immigrants (M.P. Smith and Bakker 2008; R.C. Smith 2006). However, transnational research downplays the ways the host nation state might catalyze HTAs to interact with U.S.-based politics and institutions, particularly through political opportunity structures or threats. Transnational theory is not especially helpful in exploring the potential of HTAs to serve as mobilizing structures capable of responding to U.S. government action with both contentious and normative political activity (Alba and Nee 2003; McAdam et al. 2001). By leaving out host nation-state projects, transnational scholarship prevents a full understanding as to why sending states that experience a large emigrant exodus to another country might create, reshape, and strengthen diaspora outreach strategies over time. The intense transnational ties, in turn, can also serve as mechanisms for integration into the host society, as my research will show. What remains necessary in the study of contemporary immigration is a more nuanced conception of nation-state agency within the global era and how it relates to immigrant HTA activism. Peter Evans (1995) theorizes nation states as having their own agency in encouraging their country’s economic transformation. According to his argument, nation states play a fundamental role in stimulating their nation’s capital accumulation and entrance into the international system in a time of economic neoliberalization. In contrast to globalist arguments that downplay state agency, “the nation-state is not so much withdrawing as redirecting its attempts at economic intervention—e.g. using the state to create a more welcoming environment for inward investment” (Pierson 1996, 171). As states enter the global system, they assume a place in the interstate hierarchy, posing important implications for their evolving state-migrant relations. In addition, as states begin to coordinate economic efforts, some states become stronger and others weaker from such arrangements. In the case of this study, the entrance of Mexico and the United States into the global system—particularly through the neoliberal restructurings of their political economies post-

Vonderlack-Navarro, Rebecca. Immigrant Political Incorporation : The Role of Hometown Associations, LFB

22

Immigrant Political Incorporation

1970s—created specific implications for how their state projects relate to immigrant HTAs. For this case study, the organizational developments of HTAs need to be understood in the context of the extensive restructuring of the political economies of Mexico and the United States. Specifically, how Mexico’s post-1970s development came to be predicated on mass out-migration, both for return remittance flows and for internal political stability. As for the United States, its own restructuring increasingly took the form of an hour-glass economy resting upon the backs of highly exploitable immigrant labor, much of which came from Mexico. The result was not only an increasingly integrated bi-national economy but also an evolving, contradictory political context. This was a context where rural Mexican citizens who were relatively disempowered at home were selectively re-engaged by the Mexican government through their communities in Chicago, particularly through migrant HTAs. It was also a context in which these migrants, as workers in Chicago, found themselves marginalized politically except when they were selectively targeted as immigrant voting blocs by partisan strategists.

Copyright © 2013. LFB Scholarly Publishing LLC. All rights reserved.

Mexican Immigrant HTAs as Potential Vehicles for Social Mobilization Social movement paradigms highlight the opportunities, threats, and tensions HTAs face as they grow and interact with government entities on both sides of the Mexico-U.S. border. As those government actors work to support, suppress, or (re)incorporate HTAs’ activism, HTAs respond with selective instances of popular mobilization, or more commonly, through strategies of interest-group consolidation. It is through this study’s modified political process approach that we can understand immigrant leaders’ responses to shifting and cross-cutting state projects in an era of neoliberal globalization. This section briefly reviews various perspectives within the social movement literature that aim to elucidate why social movements emerge. Specific attention is given to grievance theories and resource mobilization models, as well as a central point to this study of contemporary cross-border migrant agency—a modified political process model. Dominant political science and historical research agenda prior to the 1960s understood political processes largely in terms of decisions made by political elites or institutional actors. In response, emerging

Vonderlack-Navarro, Rebecca. Immigrant Political Incorporation : The Role of Hometown Associations, LFB

Copyright © 2013. LFB Scholarly Publishing LLC. All rights reserved.

The Bi-national Path to Immigrant Political Incorporation

23

social movement researchers in the 1960s developed a “research from below” paradigm to recognize non-normative forms of political action and disruption by marginal groups (McAdam et al. 2001, 15). Early social movement researchers rebuffed the notion that oppositional struggles to state rule were merely an emotional, irrational response by uninformed, lower-stratum masses. Rational action theorist Mancur Olson (1965) introduced the “free rider” problem associated with mass mobilization (i.e., individuals recognizing that they can benefit from collective action without themselves having to participate in it), arguing that while individuals might share common concerns, this does not translate into coordinated collective resistance. He contended that rational individuals will not participate in collective resistance except in instances of quite discernable circumstances that convince protestors that mobilization is worth their effort. His work sheds important light on why individuals would choose not to take part in collective protest, but much still remains to be understood within the social movement literature, however, as to why individuals would, in fact, choose to participate in collective resistance. Grievance models, in turn, explained individual’s decisions to participate in mass protest as a response to feelings of anger and a will to change their current circumstances. Relative deprivation is central to this model, as discontent arises as one group feels they are unjustly treated when compared to another group within society. Out of this model derived the concept of collective action frames where a group “specifies a sense of injustice, moral indignation, and outrage about the way authorities are treating a social problem” (Klandermans 2001, 271272). The discourse and symbolism that evolves within framing processes is innovative and changing as state actors, media, and protestors construct and reconstruct their current circumstances. Grievance models provide important insight into understanding how discontent emerges as well as the interactive nature of how issues become framed by protestors and the state. Resource mobilization theories, meanwhile, drew important analytic attention to how groups mobilize, gather resources, garner expertise, unify their bases, and strategize their action tactics (such as exposure to media outlets, interaction with political authorities, and third parties) as well as how these mechanisms are important for movement success (McCarthy and Zald 1977; Jenkins, 1983). Overall, this perspective contends that a group’s ability to amass resources is a

Vonderlack-Navarro, Rebecca. Immigrant Political Incorporation : The Role of Hometown Associations, LFB

Copyright © 2013. LFB Scholarly Publishing LLC. All rights reserved.

24

Immigrant Political Incorporation

key determinant of a group’s ability to mobilize and form a successful opposition. In their attempt to show that protest is more than an irrational disruption, resource mobilization models tend to downplay the emotionally-charged and dynamic forms of contention that can play an important role in protest politics (McAdam et al. 2001, 15). Protest is indeed distinct from interest group politics, as it often occurs by marginal groups outside of conventional politics who lack many resources (Piven and Cloward 1991, 437). According to Piven and Cloward (1991), contentious activity often occurs without planning: “Riots require little more by way of organization than numbers, propinquity and some communication” (446). Contrary to the expectations of resource mobilization models, when groups make efforts to formalize into an organization and focus energy on gathering resources from elites through more conventional means of political participation, they run the risk of pacifying involvement in disruptive action. Instead, community actors may have the tendency to prioritize strategies pleasing to outside funders and undermine potentially more effective forms of claims-making that challenge institutional politics. But what is most problematic about the resource mobilization models, however, is that by placing emphasis on a social movement’s ability to garner resources, resource mobilization theory is driven by an analysis that focuses on the internal dimensions of a social movement. Not given sufficient attention is the broader political environment and how it can be a crucial influence on social mobilization, along with the premise that social mobilization influences the broader political environment (Klandermans 2001). For low-income, disenfranchised groups that lack political resources and power (as is the case for much of Chicago’s HTA base of undocumented immigrants) disrupting institutional rules and procedures may be their only avenue for acquiring real political power. It is through successful opposition that state actors have to pay attention to marginal groups, often responding with repression, concessions, or co-optation (Piven and Cloward 1991, 451-452). Therefore, a more in-depth understanding of collective action, whether contentious or normative, was needed to analyze the role of political institutions and how alignments or de-alignments can stimulate opposition. While Lipsky (1968) began this line of discussion by drawing attention to the dynamic interaction between the political

Vonderlack-Navarro, Rebecca. Immigrant Political Incorporation : The Role of Hometown Associations, LFB

Copyright © 2013. LFB Scholarly Publishing LLC. All rights reserved.

The Bi-national Path to Immigrant Political Incorporation

25

environment and social movement activity, Piven and Cloward’s seminal book, Poor People’s Movements: Why They Succeed, How They Fail (1977), used a structural theory of causation to show how political institutions can condition mobilizing. Their work provided crucial insight into the way political instability can be an optimal time to use disruption as a means to advance a movement’s claims. In addition, they argued that while political institutions influence collective action, collective action can in turn influence political processes and future electoral strategies (Piven and Cloward 1997). The work of Doug McAdam provided important advances within social movement research through the introduction of the political process model in his piece Political Process and the Development of Black Insurgency (1982). The model offered critical insight into factors both external and internal to social movements. In contrast to resource mobilization frameworks, McAdam considered institutionalized political processes as vital to an analysis of a social movement’s emergence and sustainability. He also argued that movements be understood as a multi-stage process, considering within his analysis events that condition insurgency as well as factors that might cause a movement’s decline. McAdam introduced three interrelated elements that contribute to the genesis of insurgency: the structure of political opportunities, the vigor of indigenous organizations, and the extent to which minority groups hold “shared cognitions” about their plight and the potential to change their current circumstances (59). The first element, the structure of political opportunities, involves particular instances of political instability or shifting political conditions where insurgency could threaten the status quo. In some situations, the state can play a critical role in furnishing legitimacy to a movement. The second element for popular mobilization is indigenous organizational strength. Political opportunities alone are not enough to incite protest. Indigenous or minority communities must have sufficient resources to trigger social unrest and take advantage of political prospects. Indigenous resources include strong associational networks in which to integrate, communicate, and recruit movement participants. Organizational leaders are also necessary to direct movement goals. The third element for popular mobilization is a cognitive liberation among insurgents. This entails a change in collective consciousness where people begin to question the political system as unjust, demand that change occur, and recognize their own power for creating change.

Vonderlack-Navarro, Rebecca. Immigrant Political Incorporation : The Role of Hometown Associations, LFB

Copyright © 2013. LFB Scholarly Publishing LLC. All rights reserved.

26

Immigrant Political Incorporation

As the social movement continues to ebb and flow, the sustainability of the movement becomes influenced by a fourth factor: how state leaders and the broader, multi-organizational field respond to the movement. Insurgents generally face a difficult choice of how to sustain insurgency and whether or not they should. On the one hand, insurgents can continue the pursuit of non-institutional tactics, or even “revolutionary” goals. On the other hand, the movement’s survival might depend on reform-oriented, institutionalized tactics. While less likely to face political repression, directing insurgency into more conventional institutionalized channels can threaten a movement’s cooptation or cause a loss of support from the movement’s base. Therefore, by adopting moderate reforms the overall effect of the movement can become compromised. Recognizing the difficulty of a movement’s continued existence, McAdam contends, “insurgents must chart a course that avoids crippling repression on the one hand and tactical impotence on the other. Staking out this optimal middle ground is exceedingly difficult. Yet failure to do so almost surely spells the demise of the movement” (58). By choosing participation within political institutions versus confronting them, insurgents might lessen state opposition but at the same time limit their own power to demand change from authorities. Since McAdam’s seminal work, political-process-oriented, social movement theorists have to date come to a general agreement around the following conceptions of collective protest: 1) Political opportunities or threats: the essential role of the state (political alignments or cleavages, ideological leanings and bargaining styles of political elites, and institutional structures) in configuring oppositional responses. Opposition can develop in reaction to stagnant aspects of the state or changing sociopolitical conditions (Jenkins and Klanderman, 1995; McAdam et al. 2001; Tarrow 2002). 2) Mobilizing structures: daily network connections or formal organizations that can be transformed into resources for collective action (McAdam et al. 2001). 3) Cultural framing processes: the active use of language and symbols by protestors to construct an issue and evoke an

Vonderlack-Navarro, Rebecca. Immigrant Political Incorporation : The Role of Hometown Associations, LFB

The Bi-national Path to Immigrant Political Incorporation

27

emotional response. Framing processes are crucial to the formation of collective identities serving to unite diverse people into a single movement and can also be hampered or encouraged by political opportunity structures or threats (Benford and Snow 2000; Fisher and Kling 1997; Melucci 1994).

Copyright © 2013. LFB Scholarly Publishing LLC. All rights reserved.

4) Repertoires of Contention: the strategies or actions a group employs at any given moment. Strategies usually are innovative and changing (e.g., vigils, marches, violence, etc.) in order to make political claims (McAdam et al. 2001). Instead of viewing each concept as static and separate, more recently Doug McAdam, Sidney Tarrow, and Charles Tilly’s Dynamics of Contention (2001) set the social movement concepts into motion by illustrating their interactive and conditional nature. Guided by their synthesized framework, this study is especially influenced by political process models. Political process models understand the relationship between the political arena (political parties, interest groups, and other political institutions) and collective strategies to be interactive, innovative, and ongoing (Tarrow 1988, 428). Given that the state governs how goods are distributed in society, it is the “simultaneous target, sponsor, and antagonist for social movements as wells as the organizer of the political system and arbiter of victory” (Jenkins and Klandermans 1995, 3). For this study in particular, the relationship between the nation state and collective action—or evolving state-migrant relations—is central to the understanding of immigrant HTAs’ growing activism. This study employs a modified “political process” model that looks at the interaction between HTAs and multiple state actors—in Mexico and the United States—over the course of a decade and a half. Three modifications or extensions to the model are made to better depict the idiosyncratic dynamics at play in this particular case of Chicago HTAs. The first modification is to the concept of “political opportunity structure.” Although social movement scholars have recently revised this longstanding notion of political conditions so as to recognize the importance of threat as well as opportunity (see e.g., McAdam, Tarrow, and Tilly 2001; Reese 2005), the historical circumstances under which

Vonderlack-Navarro, Rebecca. Immigrant Political Incorporation : The Role of Hometown Associations, LFB

Copyright © 2013. LFB Scholarly Publishing LLC. All rights reserved.

28

Immigrant Political Incorporation

threats become catalytic are not well understood in the general literature and have not been sufficiently explored with respect to the U.S. immigrant rights mobilizations. The study aims to unpack how the specific threat of the Sensenbrenner bill came to serve as an impulse, not an impediment, to mass protest for Chicago’s HTAs. A second modification concerns the concept of social movement organization. More generally, the notion that mobilization is centrally driven by social movement organizations (or SMOs) has been subjected to a number of criticisms over the years (Piven and Cloward 1977; Cloward and Piven 1999; Clemens and Minkoff 2004). Yet the idea persists within the field. Too much of this research, however, focuses on the supposedly distinctive characteristics of a particular organizational entity in ways that distract from a core insight of the classic political process model: at certain moments, even highly conservative organizations (churches, civic associations, interest groups, service providers) can engage in mass mobilization. As Cloward and Piven (1999) contend, organizations themselves cannot be relied upon to promote disruption because it calls into question their “legitimacy, resources, and access to centers of power." Participation and even leadership for collective resistance (as is the case for Chicago HTAs) that sprang from “exceptional conditions” over time would not be a sustainable repertoire of action for the organization (172). What this study argues is that it was the Chicago HTAs’ evolving relationships with various state actors over a fifteen-year time period that led these originally conservative and generally non-confrontational organizations to do something that was otherwise challenging to grasp: they embraced and even led a momentous instance of contentious mobilization. As Cloward and Piven observe about a much earlier historical moment that gave rise to the Montgomery bus boycott of 1955: It was one of those infrequent moments when masses of poorer people were ready to mobilize and defy the authorities. What leadership cadres did was suggest a simple way that people could vent their anger and express their hope (172). An important task for analysts, therefore, is to explain the unusual sociopolitical circumstances that lead organizational entities typically wedded to “normal politics” to facilitate surges in mass mobilization.

Vonderlack-Navarro, Rebecca. Immigrant Political Incorporation : The Role of Hometown Associations, LFB

Copyright © 2013. LFB Scholarly Publishing LLC. All rights reserved.

The Bi-national Path to Immigrant Political Incorporation

29

A third modification to this model is the examination of the issue of political conditions in a historical context, where the relationship between the state and a movement involves multiple state actors. The analytic tendency of conventional social movement theory is to study movements as contained within national borders, which stems from a realist understanding of nation-state agency. Realist conceptions of nation states theorize government agency as the maintenance of internal security and order over its territory. In terms of the international arena, realists view nation states as fundamental actors with stronger power than market-driven or supra-state governmental organizations (Pierson 1996; Evans 1995). The model assumes a world where national societies are enclosed entities and political identities are singular, mutually exclusive, and discrete. Realists’ theoretical claims were salient during the 1940s-80s Fordist period when many nation states took a non-interventionist stance in international political affairs and assumed an inward, Keynesian-inspired focus on state regulated economic development. This line of thought conceptualizes social movements as an interaction between state and society that occurs within a sole nation state. Traditional immigrant assimilation and political incorporation models are based on a realist understanding of nation-state agency. They understand immigrant politics as associated with one nation state. The dominant political incorporation models referred to earlier (e.g., Warner and Srole 1945; Handlin 1959) conceive integration processes largely as a linear succession: the more time an immigrant spends in the host society, the higher the likelihood of cutting ties to the homeland and acquiring political loyalty to the new host society. The realist assumption of a bordered nation state applied to HTA social movement activity understands these organizations as similar to mutual aid societies of past generations: a space to maintain culture and traditions and to battle a xenophobic environment, quite possibly with contentious political activity. But, nonetheless, they are organizations that eventually assist in the incorporation processes within the new host society.2 With the onset of post-industrial globalization and mass 2

Mexican immigrant organizations did function much like mutual aid societies during the 1940s up until the early 1980s as they evolved in a political context with relatively little proactive Mexican government outreach to maintain economic and political loyalty to the homeland. Indeed, the democratic rights

Vonderlack-Navarro, Rebecca. Immigrant Political Incorporation : The Role of Hometown Associations, LFB

Copyright © 2013. LFB Scholarly Publishing LLC. All rights reserved.

30

Immigrant Political Incorporation

immigration, however, nation states were no longer viewed as bounded entities. As migrant remittances grew increasingly valuable to various sending states, particularly in the case of Mexico, governments took various actions to cultivate links to their diaspora with an effort to maintain emigrants’ political allegiances. Hence, in contrast to realist assumptions of the state and immigrants’ linear assimilation patterns, the study’s modified political process model challenges the notion that immigrants’ political allegiances are an inevitable linear process easily contained within the host nation. A further complication to the study’s modified political process model, however, is that a country’s state strategies are often far from monolithic. Particularly in the case of Mexico and the U.S., in each society different sets of government officials have pursued divergent migrant-related projects. At certain moments, these divergences become especially striking if we examine the political behavior of national versus state and local officials; at other moments, certain government officials recalibrate their own political interests and take a somewhat different strategic approach, which has implications for migrant organizations on the ground. In order to capture such complex and shifting dynamics, then, it is necessary to develop a framework of analysis that traces the evolving political strategies of multiple government actors over several decades on both sides of the MexicoU.S. border. The modified political process model enables this study to employ a bi-national approach to the complex relationship between of the diaspora and Mexico’s economic dependence on remittances were not of great concern to the Mexican nation state agenda within this time period. Instead, the Mexican government conceived of migrants and their organizations as largely detached from the homeland (Hazan 2006, 85; M.P. Smith and Bakker 2008; Cano and Delano 2007). During the 1900-1930 period, the Mexican diaspora, who left Mexico largely because of political reasons, took interest in Mexico’s revolution and post-war reconstruction efforts. During this period, in contrast, there was interaction between the Mexican government and expatriates within the U.S. By the 1940s, however, migrants tended to be poor rural migrants leaving Mexico for economic reasons. These migrants were not targeted by Mexican state outreach programs with the specific interest of maintaining their economic and political loyalty to the homeland (Hazan 2006).

Vonderlack-Navarro, Rebecca. Immigrant Political Incorporation : The Role of Hometown Associations, LFB

The Bi-national Path to Immigrant Political Incorporation

31

neoliberalizing states and evolving HTA activity. The model brings novel sensitivity to the political conditions that spur migrant mobilization, with particular attention to the influences of political threats. The model highlights how generally conservative organizations (such as Chicago’s confederation of HTAs) can garner political clout “‘outside of normal’ and ‘against normal politics’” (Piven and Cloward 1991, 437). And finally, the modified model not only considers the influence of both Mexico and U.S. state influences on HTA activities, but disaggregates how national versus local government actors can pursue often contradictory migrant-related agendas.

Copyright © 2013. LFB Scholarly Publishing LLC. All rights reserved.

Mexican HTAs’ Bi-national Activism in a Global Era: An Integrated Conceptual Frame The broader conceptual framework for this study employs theoretical insights from three major scholarly literatures—economic restructuring, contemporary state projects, and social mobilization models—as well as from the increasing body of research on the transnational politics of Mexican immigrant organizations. The framework allows the study to give sufficient consideration to the broader historical, political, and economic conditions on both sides of the Mexico-U.S. border that have driven many HTAs to expand beyond their homeland-oriented activities into temporary vehicles of U.S.-focused popular mobilization. The theoretical exploration thus leads us to the study’s main questions: first, why did Chicago’s confederation of HTAs eventually shift from a Mexican-focused to a bi-national, Mexico-U.S.-focused agenda, and how has this shift affected the political activities of the confederation? Second, why did the confederation and its HTA base come to embrace contentious activism, and what have been the impacts of this step for immigration policy and politics for HTAs as organizations, and for immigrant leaders themselves? To answer the study’s focal questions, this project proposes the following claims about the Chicago HTA confederation: First, multiple nation states’ agencies—Mexico and U.S. states, national and local states—would come to influence the activism of the HTA confederation. Nation states, both sending and receiving, are vital to understanding HTAs’ evolving organizational frames and repertoires of action. Not only does each individual nation state “…change the actors, the connections among them, the forms of claims making and

Vonderlack-Navarro, Rebecca. Immigrant Political Incorporation : The Role of Hometown Associations, LFB

Copyright © 2013. LFB Scholarly Publishing LLC. All rights reserved.

32

Immigrant Political Incorporation

the prevailing strategies in contentious politics” (Tarrow 2005, 3), but the long-standing, unequal and shifting interstate dynamic between Mexico and the U.S. also shapes political opportunity structures and immigrant activism. Furthermore, to understand Chicago HTA development, it is necessary to unpack the various state influences. A study of Chicago HTAs’ growing U.S.-based activism must remain sensitive to the separate influences of national versus local politics, especially as the United States’ tendency to download responsibility to the local level can impact how local government actors work to facilitate or constrain immigrant integration (Ellis 2005; Sites 2003). To explore this claim, the study starts by examining the enhanced political legitimacy granted towards Midwestern HTAs by the Mexican government’s diaspora reincorporation programs during the 1990s, and in particular, by Chicago-based consular support. The project continues by investigating the contrasting influences of a threatening post-9/11 U.S. anti-immigrant politics and a quite different—and powerfully legitimating—set of Illinois state-government programs that since 2005 has courted Mexican HTAs as voting blocs. Second, the expanding repertoires of HTA activity would, in turn, transform many of the organizations. As a result of organizational and reportorial changes, many HTAs begin to serve as agents of political incorporation in the U.S. In response to shifting state projects, Chicago HTAs greatly expanded their repertoires of action by growing in size and ambition, coordinating with immigrant rights groups, participating in U.S. immigrant rights protest, and cultivating connections at the U.S. state and local levels. In this process, many reshaped their agendas and priorities to encompass local, national, and transnational concerns. Furthermore, the study concentrates attentively on the reaction of immigrant organizations to the passage of the Sensenbrenner bill by the U.S. House of Representatives in late 2005. The study analyzes how the HTA confederation, CONFEMEX, became one of Chicago’s leading sponsors of the 2006 immigrant rights demonstrations, as well as how the confederation developed closer relations with other immigrant groups and with state and local officials in Illinois. The confederation’s transformation into a vehicle of mobilization would propel its agenda to include both contentious and normative U.S.focused political activities. And third, the study’s focus on the confederated entity, CONFEMEX, remains sensitive to intra-organizational diversity.

Vonderlack-Navarro, Rebecca. Immigrant Political Incorporation : The Role of Hometown Associations, LFB

The Bi-national Path to Immigrant Political Incorporation

33

While HTAs and their confederation over time managed to mobilize within both Mexico and U.S.-focused campaigns, various HTAs and federations would come to serve as arenas of internal contentions between various leaders and between leaders and their base. In particular, by exploring the post-2006 political developments and governmental projects in relation to HTAs’ evolving repertoires of action, I show how CONFEMEX would come to operate as an important interest group and agent of U.S. political incorporation for Chicago’s Mexican immigrant community (though not without also grappling with considerable intra-organizational strains).

Copyright © 2013. LFB Scholarly Publishing LLC. All rights reserved.

Research Strategies and Study Design This multi-method case study focuses on the political involvements of Chicago’s Mexican hometown associations Included within the study are three research strategies to explore the emergence and development of CONFEMEX, Chicago’s HTA confederation (relates to Creswell 1997, 61-64, 87, 109-137; Klandermans and Staggenborg 2002, ixxviii).3 The first strategy provided a reconfiguration of the relationship between political economy Mexico-U.S. immigration, and state restructuring in order to conceptualize the historical conditions that spurred Chicago HTAs’ evolution within the neoliberal transformations of Mexico and the U.S., with special attention on Chicago developments. It seeks to show that from the late 1970s to 2000, two trends emerged: (1) pressures for structural adjustment and economic transformation in Mexico caused economic polarization, out-migration, and the emergence of emigrant remittances as an integral source of the country’s financial livelihood; along with this emigrant outreach initiatives—especially to HTAs—emerged to secure their economic and political loyalty to the homeland (P. Smith 1996; Wise 2006; 3

Klandermans and Staggenborg’s edited volume Methods of Social Movement Research (2002) discusses the usefulness of conducting multiple methods within studies of social movements as a means to include varying perspectives into their emergence and development. They also point to the appropriateness of in-depth interviews “in developing theoretical ideas about complicated processes” (xv). Case studies, in general, are especially useful for the reconstruction of organizational developments and social movement processes over time.

Vonderlack-Navarro, Rebecca. Immigrant Political Incorporation : The Role of Hometown Associations, LFB

Copyright © 2013. LFB Scholarly Publishing LLC. All rights reserved.

34

Immigrant Political Incorporation

Massey et al. 2002; Goldring 2002; M.P. Smith and Bakker 2008); (2) the United State’s vast demand for a flexible labor force was chiefly satisfied by an ever-increasing, undocumented immigrant population under conditions of increasingly restrictive immigrant legislation culminating in an intensified post-NAFTA integration of the U.S. and Mexico economies (Waldinger 2001; Peck and Theodore 2001; Massey et al. 2002; Bluestone and Harrison 2000; Peck 2004; P. Smith 1996). It shows how the neoliberal economic climate gradually altered the political opportunity structures in both Mexico and the U.S. encouraging HTAs to respond with various types of political action— both contentious and normative political activity (McAdam et al. 2001; Nicholls and Beaumont 2004). This historical investigation thus illustrates the interactive nature between political-economic restructuring and immigrant organizational responses. The second research strategy within the case study was to reconstruct a historical account of HTAs, state-level federations, and confederation development(s) specifically in Chicago, with particular emphasis on developments from the 1990s to 2005. Through analysis of historical archives (e.g., protest flyers, federation pamphlets, various meeting minutes, Chicago Mexican consular publications and records, and newspaper archives) the study could identify significant moments of change in HTA agendas and repertoires and thereby highlight conditions under which these moments emerged and how CONFEMEX responded. The third research strategy explored recent organizational developments from 2005 to 2008 through two qualitative methods: two years of direct participant observation within the leadership circles of CONFEMEX and key informant interviews. The two years of direct participant observation within the leadership circles of CONFEMEX (June 2005 to June 2007, with less frequent observations up until the November 2008 elections in the U.S.) provided access to a momentous time period of CONFEMEX organizing. This allowed an analysis of CONFEMEX’s external relations with other Chicago immigrant activists and politicians to launch the mobilizations, along with how they related internally to mobilize their base. Participant observation was also conducted for a shorter time period (September 2005 to December 2006) with the Chicago chapter of the National Alliance for Latin American and Caribbean Communities (NALACC). NALACC, a cross-border immigrant rights organization, represented not only

Vonderlack-Navarro, Rebecca. Immigrant Political Incorporation : The Role of Hometown Associations, LFB

Copyright © 2013. LFB Scholarly Publishing LLC. All rights reserved.

The Bi-national Path to Immigrant Political Incorporation

35

CONFEMEX but more than 85 other Latino immigrant groups based in the U.S. and Latin America concerned with transnational immigration issues. CONFEMEX was one of the co-founding members of NALACC, and certain Chicago federation leaders participated within NALACC’s national leadership. Field activities included note-taking at monthly CONFEMEX and NALACC meetings, volunteering at numerous transnational and immigrant-focused events, observing communications through e-mail listservs of both organizations, and participating in public demonstrations and HTA festivals. The various meetings and activities attended included bimonthly meetings between CONFEMEX leaders and consular officials, planning meetings of various homeland-oriented festivals, protest demonstrations, a diverse array of cultural events (rodeos, beauty contests, dance and music celebrations, artistic exhibitions), development projects in Mexico, community voting in Mexican elections, and CONFEMEX’s internal voting procedures. The direct participant observation made it possible to analyze how CONFEMEX made its decisions. As a volunteer organization with a formal leadership structure, the first form of decision-making established statues, code of processes, and monthly meetings, meaning many decisions were made through normative majority-wins voting. The second form of decision-making emerged through an informal practice of consensus-building whereby certain leaders would lobby other leaders, generally behind-the-scenes, to conform to their agenda. This second form of informal decision-making—often quick and reactive to arising political conditions—made field observations a crucial form of data collection as it provided direct access to informal conversations that illuminated various leader alliances and interpersonal dramas or conflicts. The participant observation facilitated the analysis of evolving leadership dynamics in response to the broader political environment and potential arenas of contention between leaders. Frankenberg (1991) describes the usefulness of participant observation: “It gives you an idea of the interaction and the interrelationships of social relations in a group, and a sense of process in which you cannot get in any other way” (52). The study relied on two types of participant observation as defined by Herbert Gans (1991): research participant and total researcher. The research participant “participates in a social situation but is personally only partially involved, so that he can function as a

Vonderlack-Navarro, Rebecca. Immigrant Political Incorporation : The Role of Hometown Associations, LFB

Copyright © 2013. LFB Scholarly Publishing LLC. All rights reserved.

36

Immigrant Political Incorporation

researcher” (54). This often meant that while at a festival, protest, or indepth interview, I would maintain my researcher role by often guiding conversation in a way that it related to my study’s interest. The second role, that of total researcher, “observes without any personal involvement in the situation under study” (54). This is also referred to as the “passive observer” and reflects my strategy of note-taking during monthly meetings. The study also included 31 key informant interviews conducted from May 2008 to February 2009 with past and present Chicago hometown federation leaders, government officials from Mexico (Chicago-based Mexican Consular Officials), and officials and activists in the U.S. (an Illinois Official of Blagojevich’s Office of New Americans Policy and Advocacy, local immigrant activists, and Illinois NGO leaders) that interact with CONFEMEX (See Appendix 1 for description of interview subjects). The use of semi-structured interviews within social movement research is especially helpful for the “exploration, discovery, and interpretation of complex social events and processes” (Blee and Taylor 2002, 93). All of the federation leaders interviewed had previously or were currently serving on the executive committees of their federation, and the interviews were inclusive of all ten of the federations that were at one point in time part of CONFEMEX: Aguas Calientes, Chihuahua, Durango, Michoacán, Jalisco, Hidalgo, Zacatecas, Guanajuato, Guerrero, and Oaxaca. The other interviewees were selected because of their significant involvement with Chicago HTA developments over the twenty-year time period. A limitation to this case study is that participant observation and interviews were not conducted with the sizable base of HTAs in Chicago and the broader Midwest. Because of the focus on the leadership circles of CONFEMEX, one could argue that the viewpoint of the rank-and-file were not fairly represented within the study and that the analysis was biased towards federation leaders who tend to have a better socioeconomic position and legal status here in the U.S. than their member base. While a valid critique, the federation leadership in Chicago has been much more consistent than their base membership, whose informal structures can cause their base to wax and wane in participation. Many of the leaders studied had been part of their HTAs and federation since they began, providing a longitudinal window into how the organizations grew and changed over time.

Vonderlack-Navarro, Rebecca. Immigrant Political Incorporation : The Role of Hometown Associations, LFB

Copyright © 2013. LFB Scholarly Publishing LLC. All rights reserved.

The Bi-national Path to Immigrant Political Incorporation

37

Moreover, because of the relative stability of federation leadership, they have been the direct targets of various state projects over their organizational evolution due to their ability to disseminate information and to generate volunteers for various events, a fact that was time and again validated by other state and community leaders. By focusing on Chicago’s HTA leadership confederation, the study is still able to talk about the base as understood by CONFEMEX leaders and offers a unique perspective by providing one of the only research accounts of how multiple federations have coalesced within one U.S. locality to fight for change in both Mexico and the U.S. The case study of CONFEMEX provides what Snow and Trom (2002) refer to as a “critical case,” where the focus of the study provides a unique opportunity for analyzing with great detail relevant theoretical and empirical concerns (158). As such, the analysis of CONFEMEX offers what is underrepresented within the immigration literature: how using the lens of a social movement might better inform how we think of hometown federations and various state-migrant projects that have advanced on both sides of the border. This not only deepens our understanding of this unique HTA confederation and its agency in contesting or negotiating broader political circumstances, but also broadens our understanding of how nation states manage their emigrant/immigrant politics. Overall, the three methodological strategies within the case study complement each other, facilitate triangulation, and provide the means for adequately addressing the study’s main questions (Creswell 1997; Klandermans and Staggenborg 2002; Blee and Taylor 2002). First, why did CONFEMEX eventually shift from a Mexican-focused to a binational, Mexico-U.S.-focused agenda, and how has this shift affected the political activities of the confederation? Second, why did CONFEMEX and its HTA base come to embrace contentious activism and what has been the impact of this step for immigration policy and politics, for HTAs as organizations, and for immigrant leaders themselves? The overview of the larger Mexico-U.S. political economy spurring Mexican immigration provides the necessary context for understanding Chicago HTAs’ evolution over the past twenty years. This background allows for the participant observation and in-depth interview portion to provide close analytic attention to particular key moments in the 2005 and 2006 time period and the resulting leadership developments thereafter. This will clarify how the marches and

Vonderlack-Navarro, Rebecca. Immigrant Political Incorporation : The Role of Hometown Associations, LFB

38

Immigrant Political Incorporation

Copyright © 2013. LFB Scholarly Publishing LLC. All rights reserved.

responses by Mexican and U.S. government officials have promoted many HTAs’ dual focus on both U.S. and Mexican-oriented concerns.

Vonderlack-Navarro, Rebecca. Immigrant Political Incorporation : The Role of Hometown Associations, LFB

CHAPTER 2

Copyright © 2013. LFB Scholarly Publishing LLC. All rights reserved.

Mexico Unbound: Chicago’s HTA Growth through Early 2001

Chicago’s hometown associations proliferated throughout the 1990s. As a result of steady migration flows to the city and increased attention from multiple levels of the Mexican government, HTAs significantly expanded in size and purpose. By the end of the decade, HTAs were not simply passive vehicles for Mexico’s state projects; rather, they exerted their own independence from the Mexican government and rose to become important political agents in their own right. Scholars have given considerable attention to the substantial growth of HTAs throughout the U.S. as a primary example of how the Mexican state has aimed to institutionalize the diaspora’s transnational social and political practices (Goldring 2002). Robert Smith (1998) and Luin Goldring (1998), for example, highlight the cross-border political practices conducted through hometown clubs that contributed to the development of translocal communities. Their work draws attention to Mexico’s transforming state-emigrant agenda as various government officials and programs strategically reached out to their diaspora in the U.S. to encourage their organization into HTAs and foster their participation within public works projects, cultural events, and at times, political campaigns. Thus, HTAs have come to be largely conceptualized as new agents within Mexico’s de-territorialized nation state formation (M.P. Smith and Guarnizo 1998). That is to say, within this contemporary era of globalization and Mexico’s democratization, migrant HTAs grew to be more than co-opted state-civil society partners within Mexico’s corporatist machine. Indeed they negotiated a 39

Vonderlack-Navarro, Rebecca. Immigrant Political Incorporation : The Role of Hometown Associations, LFB

Copyright © 2013. LFB Scholarly Publishing LLC. All rights reserved.

40

Immigrant Political Incorporation

certain amount of leverage and claims-making within Mexican politics, particularly at the translocal level, constructing communities, transnational identities, and political agencies that span nation-state borders (R.C. Smith 1998, 2006; Goldring 2002). Michael Peter Smith and Matt Bakker (2008) further the analysis of HTA expansion by drawing noteworthy attention to the specific context of Mexico’s political and economic neoliberal transformation. Their work highlights historical, sociocultural, and institutional factors that encouraged the Mexican state to form unparalleled state-emigrant partnerships with HTAs. In turn, HTAs and their broader organizations have increased their own agency within specific Mexican political spaces beyond translocal levels, transforming into significant interest groups and electoral constituencies advocating for national-level absentee voting legislation. These various studies of how migrants participate in cross-border political spaces and negotiating transnational citizenship practices serve as an important prelude to a Chicago-focused case study of HTA developments. The work helps to understand how Chicago’s HTAs greatly proliferated over the course of the 1990s as a result of broad political and economic changes in Mexico that caused Mexican governmental officials to build diaspora organizations in and around the city to fit their various neoliberalizing state interests. In addition, an analysis of Chicago HTAs’ initial growth offers a useful critique to traditional assimilationist understandings of immigrants’ political incorporation, as Chicago HTAs were not the target of local political integration projects or typical immigrant machine politics. Rather, they grew in number and ambition through their interplay with the Mexican state. There remains a lack of understanding, however, as to how various HTAs and federations developed and came to work together within Chicago. Chicago has long been a principal target for the Mexican state’s migrant-reincorporation projects, yet has received relatively little scholarly attention. HTA research has largely analyzed organizational developments in California and New York with scant attention to how Mexican state-migrant relations have functioned and developed within other U.S. localities. This case study of Chicago HTA and federation growth differs from the dominant HTA literature in two distinct ways. First, in order to understand Chicago HTAs’ extensive evolution during the 1990s, attention is given to Chicago’s Mexican consular

Vonderlack-Navarro, Rebecca. Immigrant Political Incorporation : The Role of Hometown Associations, LFB

Copyright © 2013. LFB Scholarly Publishing LLC. All rights reserved.

Mexico Unbound: Chicago's HTA Growth

41

programming, which served as an important vehicle to channel the emerging political opportunity structure ushered in by Mexico’s neoliberal revolution. Even while migrants actively contested consular control over their organizational activities, this local semi-autonomous apparatus of the Mexican state played an important function in encouraging Chicago HTA growth and unity. Early access to the Mexican state during this time period cultivated a considerable sense of political efficacy within the emerging organizations. HTAs developed a norm of political engagement through negotiating agendas and projects with Mexican authorities. As a consequence, many HTA leaders gained an important level of confidence when it came to participating in political actions. Second, Chicago HTA and federation leaders not only negotiated within Mexico’s growing state projects, but they garnered significant political agency when they pushed back against the Mexican state. By the late 1990s, HTA leaders united together with other local activists to resist the Mexican national government’s imposition of a car deposit increase on vehicles crossing the MexicoU.S. border. Out of their brief defiance, a new and increasing sense of political agency to work together outside of government control was born. Thus we begin to understand how Chicago’s HTAs and federations had the potential to be more than mere third-sector voluntary organizations, as they briefly embraced protest activity against what they perceived as an unjust political threat from the Mexican state. The chapter begins with an overview of the neoliberal restructurings in Mexico, the U.S., and Chicago from the 1970s through 1990s. The account provides a historical context for the changing Mexico and U.S. governance strategies and how they would eventually come to relate to migrant HTAs. Next, the chapter explores early Chicago HTA developments and growing political agency from the late 1980s through early 2001. The analysis investigates the organizations’ emerging political capital within Mexican politics, a resource they would later come to use within U.S. politics. Neoliberal States and New State-Migrant Agendas The emergence and growth of Chicago’s HTAs occurred within a specific context of extensive transformation in the political economies of the United States and Mexico from the 1970s forward. The multi-

Vonderlack-Navarro, Rebecca. Immigrant Political Incorporation : The Role of Hometown Associations, LFB

42

Immigrant Political Incorporation

Copyright © 2013. LFB Scholarly Publishing LLC. All rights reserved.

decade restructuring period resulted in new state projects with various political implications for emigrant/immigrant populations residing in large U.S. cities such as Chicago. By the late 1980s and into the 1990s, organized HTAs grew to become focal components of Mexico’s nationbuilding efforts. Over the course of the decade, as a result of extensive political attention, HTAs would themselves begin to flex their political muscle and define their agendas in new ways. U.S. Neoliberal Restructuring. Following the international economic crisis of the 1970s, service production employing low-wage immigrant labor became one of the fastest-growing sectors of an increasingly hourglass-shaped U.S. economy. The popular use of immigrant contingent workers, especially predominant within newly developing urban service sectors, was accompanied by the outsourcing of manufacturing, attacks on organized labor, and increased economic polarization within the U.S. Along with the political and economic restructuring spearheaded by the Ronald Reagan and George H. Bush presidential eras, migration flows escalated during the 1980s, with the undocumented population from Mexico estimated between two and four million by the end of the decade (Waldinger and Lee 2001). In the lower reaches of the labor market, Mexican immigrant workers in particular came to dominate a range of employment niches—from domestics to bus boys to landscapers—in metropolitan regions such as Los Angeles and Chicago (Lim 2001; Rosenfeld and Tienda 1999; Peck and Theodore 2001; Massey et al. 2002).4

4

Mexican immigration had spread to new destination areas by the late 1980s, and this would continue to be a significant urban trend. See Durand, Massey, Charvet (2000) for an overview of how the geography of Mexican immigration to the U.S. significantly shifted during the late 1980s. While metropolises continued to be a great attraction for Mexican newcomers (particularly Los Angeles, Chicago, Houston and Phoenix), immigration would also grow in rural, agricultural areas. Florida, Georgia, Idaho, Minnesota, Nevada, New York, New Jersey, North Carolina, Oregon and Utah became new destination states. By the mid-1990s, however, single, male, working-age Mexican migrants initially drawn to U.S. agricultural industries quickly headed for better-paying, urban employment opportunities. In

Vonderlack-Navarro, Rebecca. Immigrant Political Incorporation : The Role of Hometown Associations, LFB

Copyright © 2013. LFB Scholarly Publishing LLC. All rights reserved.

Mexico Unbound: Chicago's HTA Growth

43

While migrant labor flowed from Mexico to the U.S., immigrant legislation from 1986 onward was designed to inhibit the flow of undocumented immigrants. In particular, the 1986 Immigration Reform and Control Act (IRCA) became the first U.S. policy primarily directed at preventing undocumented immigration (DeGenova 2005; Zolberg 2006). Part of IRCA included an amnesty provision to an estimated three million undocumented immigrants in the United States; the majority (81 percent) was of Mexican origin (Zolberg 2006).5 While the consequences were unintended, IRCA (and other immigrant-related policies that followed) had several unforeseen outcomes: rapid expansion of undocumented Mexican laborers in the informal economy; an overall drop in wages; increased income polarization and worsened U.S. labor market conditions; and large sums of wasted government funding targeted at security and border control (Massey et al. 2002). Punitive immigrant legislation and undocumented immigrant flow increased throughout the 1990s. The U.S. federal government began the decade by instituting the Immigration Act of 1990, which included a new cap on migrants petitioning for family reunification, a new visa program for countries with low sending rates (i.e., not including Mexico), and increased border patrol measures (DeGenova 2005).6 Despite such legislation, Mexican immigration continued to rise and by the mid-1990s, Mexicans constituted 14 percent of U.S. legal migration and 40 percent of undocumented migration (Zolberg 2006). At the height of the neoliberal revolution, U.S. President Clinton authorized the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) in 1994 with Mexico and Canada. While this extensive trade liberalization measure promoted further international market integration, free flows of capital, addition, the growing numbers of urban-bound, male migrants met with a growing number of female migrants headed towards cities as well. 5 The legislation also fortified border patrol measures, strengthened the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS), created sanctions for employers who hired undocumented immigrants and an H-2 temporary worker program for agricultural production, a measure strongly pushed by farm lobbies. 6 The law enhanced deportation regulations, limited due process rights, and took the granting of citizenship rights outside of the court’s jurisdiction and limited it to the federal office of the attorney general.

Vonderlack-Navarro, Rebecca. Immigrant Political Incorporation : The Role of Hometown Associations, LFB

Copyright © 2013. LFB Scholarly Publishing LLC. All rights reserved.

44

Immigrant Political Incorporation

and increased access for foreign direct investments, it paradoxically did not address the flow of labor that the agreement would further stimulate (Massey et al. 2002). By 1996, Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) estimates indicated that the number of undocumented immigrants in the U.S. was between 4.6 and 5.4 million. Immigration from Mexico comprised half of all undocumented flows (Waldinger and Lee 2001). Soon after the U.S. moved towards economic integration with its southern neighbor, the U.S. government continued to support efforts to militarize the border and limit the rights of newcomers. The Personal Responsibility, Work Opportunity, and Medicaid Restructuring Act (PRWOMRA) of 1996 aimed to hinder undocumented immigrants from means-tested and social security programs, and more extensively, limit accessibility for legal immigrants (Massey et al. 2002). The law was soon followed by the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act (IIRIRA) of 1996, which focused largely on expanding enforcement, toughening sponsorship regulations and civil and criminal consequences for those who entered the country illegally, as well as limiting the rights of the undocumented in their ability to question INS decisions and deportations in federal court (Zolberg 2006). The combination of NAFTA, which intensified the economic integration of the U.S. and Mexico and increased their asymmetrical interdependence, and the restrictive legislation caused undocumented migration streams to escalate. By the early 2000s, there were more undocumented immigrants in the U.S. than documented, and more than half of the undocumented immigrants came from Mexico (Fry 2006). In an evolving, contradictory political context, Mexican immigrants in particular found themselves scapegoats for America’s ongoing economic problems while the legalization of their status was increasingly supported by business elites. Latino communities also found themselves selectively targeted with nativist backlash or as attractive voting blocs by both Democratic and Republican political strategists (Zolberg 2006; Ellis 2005). In line with national trends, Chicago experienced its own multidecade restructuring post-1970s. The political and economic changes resulted in a segmented labor market where Mexican immigrants came to occupy a central position in the city’s low-end labor supply. Corporate restructuring and deindustrialization processes, the emergence of the city’s high-tech service sector economy, and the predominant use of temporary migrant labor within downgraded

Vonderlack-Navarro, Rebecca. Immigrant Political Incorporation : The Role of Hometown Associations, LFB

Copyright © 2013. LFB Scholarly Publishing LLC. All rights reserved.

Mexico Unbound: Chicago's HTA Growth

45

manufacturing, manual labor, and informal labor markets all contributed to the extensive escalation of the city’s Mexican immigrant population, which mushroomed to six times its former size (Squires et al. 1987; DeGenova 2005; Peck and Theodore 2001; Tienda and Raijman 2000). By 2000, Chicago had the second largest urban concentration of Mexican immigrants after Los Angeles: 1.1 million in the greater Chicago area and 625,000 within the city, comprising 18.3 percent of the city’s total population (DeGenova 2005). The great multi-decade surge of Mexican immigrants transformed Chicago. In particular, the immense enlargement in Chicago’s Mexican immigrant population was heavily concentrated in specific Chicago neighborhoods (DeGenova 2005; Squires et al., 1987). Chicago’s lower west side—Pilsen (La Dieciocho or 18th Street) and South Lawndale (La Villita or Little Village)—from 1960 to 1990 experienced great spikes in their Mexican immigrant population growing from 7,000 to 83,000, reaching 101,000 by 1990. Within Pilsen and Little Village, Mexican immigrants comprised 92 percent of the Latino population. Mexican immigration also occurred in Chicago’s historically Puerto Rican neighborhoods (Humboldt Park, West Town, and Logan Square) where between 1970 and 1980 the population quadrupled in size. By 1990, Mexicans equaled the number of Puerto Ricans in these neighborhoods, and by 2000 Mexicans began to demographically dominate. Beyond Chicago, the entire state of Illinois experienced a surge in Mexican newcomers. Following the relocation of various downgraded manufacturing industries, Mexican immigration began to heavily concentrate within various Chicago suburbs (coming from both the city and straight from Mexico). Between 1970 and 1980, the suburban Mexican immigrant population quadrupled in size from 25,555 to 113,000. By 2000, it would quadruple again to 461,000 (DeGenova 2005). As a result of the significant demographic rise of Mexican immigrants, migrants’ social and political integration would eventually become of great concern to both city and state-level officials. Chicago’s growing Mexican immigrant community would also influence local politics. Various Latino immigrant political constituencies—particularly Mexican immigrants—during the 1980s and 1990s would unite into an important army of political loyalists in

Vonderlack-Navarro, Rebecca. Immigrant Political Incorporation : The Role of Hometown Associations, LFB

46

Immigrant Political Incorporation

support of Chicago’s powerful political machine (Lutton 1998).7 Their rise to political power, however, was also accompanied with the 1990s’ surge of new arrivals, a population that was largely undocumented and marginalized from the city’s formal political channels. Parallel to these socio-demographic and political changes, hometown clubs became accessible and alternative organizations of social support for many recently arrived Mexican immigrants. While predominantly focused on Mexico throughout the decade, their early mobilization set the stage for their later recognition by local and state-level politicians in Illinois who came to see HTAs’ potential as state-society partners and voting constituencies now that Mexican immigration had expanded from a city- to a state-wide concern.

Copyright © 2013. LFB Scholarly Publishing LLC. All rights reserved.

Mexico’s Neoliberal Restructuring. In the interim, as the U.S. and its large urban centers dramatically changed, Mexico’s post-1970s neoliberal revolution was also set in motion. The drastic changes led to Mexico’s increased dependence on out-migration and remittance flows as the twin apparatuses of national income generation and the maintenance of political security. Propelled by the international prioritization of “structural adjustment” policies, Mexico began to actively support trade liberalization and export-led 7

Long before the contemporary emergence of HTAs, Chicago was an important destination for Mexican immigrants and a hotbed for their political mobilization. Despite their early arrival (as early as the 1900s), it would not be until the 1980s that Chicago’s Mexican immigrant community would begin to create formal influence within Chicago’s urban political scene. Due to its continued population growth, by the 1990s the Mexican immigrant community became a highly regarded electoral constituency. Propelled by Richard M. Daley (1989-present), “the country’s longest-serving big-city mayor,” concerted efforts were made to appeal to Mexican voters within his campaigns (Bernstein 2008, 10). Under a new era of neoliberalism, state devolution, and urban managerialism, Daley was well aware of the increasing importance of Latino (mainly Mexican and Puerto Rican) community-based leaders and the need to cultivate their ties to the state in order to support his ambitious gentrification agenda. By the early 2000s, as the Mexican immigrant population and contemporary HTAs continued to expand, Daley and other municipal and state leaders were on the lookout for Mexican immigrant political allies and potential voting constituencies.

Vonderlack-Navarro, Rebecca. Immigrant Political Incorporation : The Role of Hometown Associations, LFB

Copyright © 2013. LFB Scholarly Publishing LLC. All rights reserved.

Mexico Unbound: Chicago's HTA Growth

47

production over the course of three decades, which encouraged the privatization of various state projects, an upsurge of maquilladora industrial activity, heightened levels of unemployment, and ultimately, an escalation of out-migration (Massey et al. 2002; P.Smith 1996; Wise 2006; Morton 2003; Fairbrother 2007). Mexico’s response to an altering international economy was accompanied by a remarkable shift in the political establishment. The long-standing Partido Revolucionario Institucional (PRI), which had politically dominated national and local politics since the early twentieth century, continued to govern authoritatively moving into the 1980s. The single-party regime continued to utilize import substitution industrialization strategies as a means to promote and protect domestic manufacturing sectors. The Keynesian-inspired strategy included protectionist trade policies and public sector subsidies that progressively relied on deficit spending (McMicheal 2004; Massey et al. 2002; Morton 2003). Despite rising disapproval from businessman with links to international trade who were unhappy with the vast public sector expansion, the PRI sustained its political rule and social order through corporatist-style governance structures. Under this system, various sectors of Mexican society—working and middle-class, domestic industrialists, peasants and organized labor—were compensated for voter loyalty and politically incorporated by PRI patronage schemes (Morton 2003). Threats to the PRI’s control would become ever more apparent with the debt crisis of the early 1980s. As a result of the economic turmoil, international agencies (such as the International Monetary Fund, the World Bank, and private foreign lenders) began to acquire political authority over their statist-nationalist counterparts, as did elite technocrats within Mexico’s political bureaucracy who mobilized domestically. Throughout the decade, a new national economic development strategy took precedence that focused on cutbacks in public spending, agrarian reforms, measures to deter inflation and monitor the country’s deficit, privatizing state-owned enterprises, dismantling trade tariffs and barriers to foreign investment, and promoting export-led development (Fairbrother 2007; Morton 2003; P. Smith, 1996; Massey et al. 2002). Mired in economic instability and facing both external and internal pressures for reform, PRI Mexican President Carlos Salinas de Gotari (1988-1994), a Harvard-educated technocrat, fully embraced global economic restructuring measures. His

Vonderlack-Navarro, Rebecca. Immigrant Political Incorporation : The Role of Hometown Associations, LFB

Copyright © 2013. LFB Scholarly Publishing LLC. All rights reserved.

48

Immigrant Political Incorporation

modernization agenda included propelling a multi-year struggle to marshal domestic business groups in support of free trade, and he soon began trade liberalization negotiations with the U.S. and Canada, which resulted in NAFTA in 1994 (Fairbrother 2007). Among the many outcomes of the far-reaching neoliberal changes, the economic destabilization and fiscal austerity measures implemented during this time period intensified Mexico’s economic polarization, further spurring out-migration from its poorest sectors and deepening the country’s growing dependence on labor export and return remittance flows (Wise 2006). Meanwhile, by the mid-1990s, in reaction to the growing political competition, the PRI attempted to regain its plummeting authority through a series of measures either strengthening pre-existing state-society alliances or creating them. This involved: 1) fortifying ties between business elites and bureaucratic technocrats who had much to gain through free market development measures; 2) decentralizating state welfare funds (particularly through its National Solidarity Program) within poor urban and rural sectors to pacify potential opposition to the PRI’s modernization agenda (Fairbrother 2007; Nash and Kovic 1996; Morton 2003); and, 3) establishing an unprecedented state-emigrant reincorporation agenda that specifically targeted emigrant HTAs in the U.S. as resources for collective remittances to subsidize government development projects and provide potential political influence. Political party opposition to the PRI also grew from both the left, Partido Revolucionario Democratico (PRD), and the right, Partido Accion Nacional (PAN), which served to disassemble the patronage governance structures of the PRI. By the end of the decade, it was evident the Mexican state had shifted into a multipartisan democracy with the election of PAN presidential candidate Vicente Fox in 2000 (Goldring 2002; M.P. Smith and Bakker 2008).8 8

Mexican state efforts to engage its diaspora began as early as the Mexican Revolution of 1910. Alarmed by the country's underpopulation, the government initiated efforts to foster repatriation and stop labor emigration. Labor out-migration became formalized again under the Bracero Program meant to aid in U.S. labor shortages. The 1970s witnessed some growth in consular protection, the promotion of Mexican cultural centers within the U.S., and attention towards the Chicano movement and migrant rights. These diasporic inclusion precursors, however, would change dramatically with the escalating economic and political importance of Mexican emigrants and their

Vonderlack-Navarro, Rebecca. Immigrant Political Incorporation : The Role of Hometown Associations, LFB

Mexico Unbound: Chicago's HTA Growth

49

Overall, the sweeping economic changes that took place in both Mexico and the U.S. post-1970s onward led to new state projects that would come to have an important impact on emigrant/immigrant organizations. More specifically in Chicago from the late 1980s to early 2001, the Mexican state would revamp its diaspora-reincorporation programs within the city, fueling local HTA organization-building efforts and granting HTA leaders a growing sense of political legitimacy. As a result, emerging migrant leaders would begin to create their own influential voice within various Mexican-related statemigrant projects.

Copyright © 2013. LFB Scholarly Publishing LLC. All rights reserved.

Expansion of Chicago’s HTAs and Their Emerging Political Autonomy Chicago’s HTAs were not always important components of Mexico’s neoliberal projects. The immigrant associations emerged as early as the 1960s as important venues of informal social and cultural support with fellow paisanos (countrymen) who at times fundraised to support development projects in their hometowns. Up until the 1980s, the clubs largely remained outside the purview of either Mexico or U.S. state interests. With the expansion of migration to the U.S., the passage of IRCA (which granted a large number of geographically concentrated immigrants in Chicago legal status), and the increasing importance of remittances to economic life in many Mexican pueblos, immigrant HTAs began to receive attention from Mexican political elites as significant resources of financial and political support. By the late 1980s and through the 1990s, the Mexican government initiated various outreach efforts through its consular offices to immigrant HTAs to facilitate their growth, spur their coalescence into broader state-level federations, and expand their philanthropic community-development projects in hometowns in Mexico (Goldring 2002; Chicago Mexican Consular materials 1999; Gomez and Aguilar 2005).9 By the end of the remittances, which ushered in an overhaul of expatriate programming and policies (Laglagaron 2010). 9 Aware that some clubs were providing numerous benefits to their hometowns, including electrification, school construction, and other infrastructure projects, such clubs began to receive public recognition from the Chicago Mexican consulate as early as 1987 as a means to further cultivate connections to their

Vonderlack-Navarro, Rebecca. Immigrant Political Incorporation : The Role of Hometown Associations, LFB

Copyright © 2013. LFB Scholarly Publishing LLC. All rights reserved.

50

Immigrant Political Incorporation

1990s, organizations that had begun the decade looking very much like mutual aid societies of an earlier era would be recognized as significant players in Mexico’s domestic politics. Mexico’s political party rivalries played a significant role in early steps to link Chicago’s migrants to the homeland. Keenly aware of Chicago’s growing immigrant community and their political potential, the left-of-center PRD presidential candidate of Mexico, Cuauhtémoc Cardenas, campaigned in Chicago in 1988, re-igniting the discussion among immigrants concerned with dual-nationality and absentee voting rights in Mexico (Fox 2005).10 By the early 1990s, Chicago migrant activists began to mobilize and educate themselves on the legalities of absentee voting. Seeing an opportunity to court new voting constituencies with emigrants across the border, both the National Action Party (PAN) and the Revolutionary Democratic Party (PRD) intensified their ties with the diaspora that same year, promoting the protection of emigrants’ rights (Chicago Consular Materials 1999). By 1994, more than 800 local migrants in Chicago held symbolic elections for the Cardenas-Salinas presidential campaign, illustrating their growing organizational savvy and sustained political interest in their homeland (elections were held in Chicago, Texas, and California). A feature propelling Chicago’s eventual influential role in the Vote from Abroad movement was that all main Mexican political party activists— representing PRI, PRD, and PAN—agreed to set aside their ideological differences in order to work together in the coordination of the symbolic elections, forming a collective voice in advocating for voting

homeland, including clubs Almealco and El Postero both from the state of Guerrero (which lead in early club formation in Chicago), along with club Ciudad Hidalgo from the state of Michoacán (Chicago consular materials 1999). Just a year after the passing of the 1986 IRCA and with a large number of geographically concentrated Chicago immigrants granted legal status, Mexican politicians increasingly began to view the U.S.’s Mexican diaspora community in Chicago as a potentially important resource for Mexico. 10 Some local Mexican political party activists claim migrants were discussing absentee voting rights as early as 1982 before the PRD campaign, but the conversation had greatly intensified by 1988 (Interview with Chicago emigrant Vote from Abroad activist, April 18, 2009, Chicago, IL).

Vonderlack-Navarro, Rebecca. Immigrant Political Incorporation : The Role of Hometown Associations, LFB

Copyright © 2013. LFB Scholarly Publishing LLC. All rights reserved.

Mexico Unbound: Chicago's HTA Growth

51

rights. Chicago’s unity made it a considerable force within the movement.11 Mexican President Carlos Salinas de Gortari (1988-1994), whose election was very much contested, visited Chicago in the early 1990s to promote Mexican national interests with the growing emigrant community. His visit was arguably driven by the threat of Cardenas’ strategic outreach and political popularity with the ever-growing diaspora, as well as migrants’ enhanced political organizing capacities. Chicago migrant leaders claimed Salinas followed the same U.S.-city route conducted by Cardenas as a means to court the growing political allegiance of Chicago’s Mexican diaspora. Salinas’ Chicago visit proved beneficial to his evolving agenda of combining neoliberal reform with emigrant outreach initiatives as he visited Chicago business leaders to galvanize support for NAFTA while also creating consulate programs to bolster migrants’ political, cultural, and economic loyalty (Fox 2005; DeGenova, 2005; M.P. Smith and Bakker 2008; Gzesh 2007). Not coincidentally, around this time the Chicago Mexican consulate’s Program for Mexican Communities Abroad, PCME (el Programa de Comunidades Mexicanos en el Exterior), was established to promote cultural events to enhance Mexican identity, cultivate sporting and business initiatives, stimulate migrant network ties and organizational developments within Chicago, and help coordinate the steady flow of visits by Mexican government officials and state governors (Mexican consular materials 1999; Gomez and Aguilar 2005). The mounting importance of state-migrant collaborations would grow during the 1990s as they were continually supported by the Ernesto Zedillo administration (1994-2000). As a result, the Chicago Mexican Consulate and its diaspora-focused PCME program continued to prosper. This local extension of the Mexican state encouraged various HTAs in Chicago to participate in experimental matching programs (in conjunction with various levels of the Mexican government) geared towards community development in their hometowns. Pilot projects initiated with a one-for-one (uno-por-uno) between Zacatecan HTAs and the Zacatecan state government, 11

In-depth interviews with PRD activist October 19, 2008; Michoacán leader May 15, 2008; IME Coordinator June 8, 2008 and December 7, 2008 all in Chicago, IL.

Vonderlack-Navarro, Rebecca. Immigrant Political Incorporation : The Role of Hometown Associations, LFB

Copyright © 2013. LFB Scholarly Publishing LLC. All rights reserved.

52

Immigrant Political Incorporation

whereby every dollar a club provided for development was matched by a dollar from the Zacatecan state government.12 These initiatives evolved into the 3x1 (tres por uno or three for one) program, according to which every dollar a club provided for development was matched by a dollar from the municipal, state, and national government of Mexico. Chicago’s first 3x1 began in February of 1998 in a partnership between Club Amealco from Texaco, Guerrero, and the various levels of the Mexican government. The 3x1 helped subsidize Guerrero’s social security program, support families that were being deported, and financed other preventative migration programs targeted in areas of the state with high rates of out-migration. The 3x1 soon expanded with other hometown clubs in Chicago with Zacatecan clubs soon to follow in 1999 and Michoacán clubs by 2000 (Gomez and Aguilar 2005; Gomez 2005).13 These early 3x1 infrastructure projects with HTAs throughout the U.S. would eventually grow to be substantial in their economic contributions, providing more than U.S. $30 million to development in Mexico by the early 2000s (Orozco and Lapointe 2004).14 As a result of the extensive Mexican government outreach, the number of HTAs in Chicago and throughout the Midwest (Illinois, Wisconsin, and Northern Indiana) continued to grow. By 2000, more than 170 of the country’s HTAs were concentrated in the Midwest (see Appendix 2 for growth chart). By the early 2000s, the Midwest would emerge with the second largest number of HTAs in the country, the majority of which were Chicago-based (Orozco and Lapointe 2004). 12

Chicago’s early remittance-match programs were modeled after the International Solidarity Program initiated by the Zacatecan state government and the Zacatecano Federation in California (see M.P. Smith and Bakker 2008, 31-33). 13 During the 1990s there were also some reported experimental Mexican government reincorporation projects within New York and Texas, but according to discussions with Chicago consular officials the early efforts did not function as well in these U.S. regions (Interview with IME Officials June 8, 2008 and December 7, 2008, Chicago, IL). 14 Even before the 3x1 programs started, the Chicago consulate began an official recording of clubs’ growing community projects within their hometowns of Mexico, with 30 projects in 1994, 34 in 1995, 63 in 1996 and 77 in 1997 (Mexican consular materials 1999).

Vonderlack-Navarro, Rebecca. Immigrant Political Incorporation : The Role of Hometown Associations, LFB

Copyright © 2013. LFB Scholarly Publishing LLC. All rights reserved.

Mexico Unbound: Chicago's HTA Growth

53

Support for HTA growth would emerge from intensified state-level outreach as well. In particular, State Offices for Attending to Migrants (Oficinas Estatales de Atencion a Migrantes, or OEAM) were established throughout the latter half of the 1990s as a means to facilitate state governments in cultivating links to their diaspora. As a consequence of this substantial political attention, many Chicago HTA and federation cultural festivities incorporated political motives including the formal visits of Mexican government officials. As early as 1997, hometown federations in Chicago began celebrating cultural weeks, which involved tremendous time-consuming planning by HTA and federation volunteers who often solicited sponsors, planned elegant galas, and presented cultural and educational activities such as raffles, bailes (dances), rodeos, soccer tournaments and other sporting events, beauty pageants, and artistic exhibitions. They advertised with local businesses and networked with U.S.-based NGOs. Mexican governmental leaders often served as central guests of honor at these events, championing emigrants for their continued devotion towards developing their hometown communities (Gomez 2005; Gomez and Aguilar 2005).15 Thus, throughout the 1990s even as much of Chicago’s boom of Mexican immigrants remained legally isolated from U.S. political circles (Paral 2004), they were increasingly viewed as attractive interest-groups by politicians back home. Relishing this new attention, Chicago’s HTAs began to see themselves as organizations that might develop their own political agendas beyond the traditional community development initiatives. Over the second half of the 1990s, these organizations came to see themselves less as fortunate recipients of governmental attention and more as political agents negotiating with Mexican elites over development project implementation—even over the terms of their reincorporation into the homeland. This became evident as HTA leaders became increasingly active advocates for dual nationality rights, granted in 1997 (Fitzgerald 2006), and absentee voting rights, which

15

The Zacatecan federation initiated the idea of a cultural week in 1997, and the Guerrero federation began their cultural week in 1998. By the 2000s, various federations celebrated annual festivals as well (Gomez 2005).

Vonderlack-Navarro, Rebecca. Immigrant Political Incorporation : The Role of Hometown Associations, LFB

Copyright © 2013. LFB Scholarly Publishing LLC. All rights reserved.

54

Immigrant Political Incorporation

propelled their participation in organizing Chicago’s symbolic elections in 1994, and again in 2000 (Belluck, 2000).16 Not unexpectedly, the political sway of Chicago’s HTAs developed as a result of the extensive attention. Chicago HTA members, documented or not, were acquiring a new awareness of their political importance within the homeland. A federation leader from Guerrero discussed the impact for migrants when they received direct contact with Mexican officials. “[Before] I never would have gotten face-to-face contact with my governor [of Mexico]…It gives a sense of status and people believe in it.” (Interview, June 8, 2008). He described how members could see the concrete benefit of meetings with the Mexican government and subsidizing development projects because it gave a new sense of political purpose with Mexican politicians along with fulfilling migrants’ dream to return one day to the homeland. Another federation leader from the state of Michoacán described the multi-faceted meaning of hometown club participation. He acknowledged the new political recognition HTA participation provided: “There are a lot of people that see it [their clubs] as an opportunity to have their 15 minutes of fame. There are some that look at it as an opportunity to satisfy their ego…" And yet the Michoacán leader shared that the clubs provided more than quick political notoriety: [Migrants] participate because it is a form, a mechanism of mental hygiene in order to escape the oppression and the lack of participation in this [U.S.] society…. When you go to the real world…everyone tries to ignore you. They try to ignore your rights and you are a second-class citizen. [Yet from] the moment the diputados [Mexican officials] come and they listen to you and respect you, you [begin to] have a certain amount of respect for what you represent as a collective mind. (Interview with former Michoacán Federation President, May 15, 2008, Chicago, IL). 16

Belluck, Pam. 2000. “Mexican Presidential Candidates Campaign in U.S." New York Times, July 1. Also, Chicago Mexican Consular Materials. 1999. “Nuestra Historia en EU Taller Dirigido a Clubes de Oriundos de Illinois,” Instituto Mexicano de Cultura y Educación de Chicago y American Friends Service Committee.

Vonderlack-Navarro, Rebecca. Immigrant Political Incorporation : The Role of Hometown Associations, LFB

Copyright © 2013. LFB Scholarly Publishing LLC. All rights reserved.

Mexico Unbound: Chicago's HTA Growth

55

While largely ignored by the Mexican state when factors of poverty and hardship motivated their often dangerous trek North of the border, migrants now gained new political attention and respect from government notables. It is not difficult to see how being heralded by Mexican authorities as vital contributors to their hometowns’ reconstruction and development might offer these migrants a new sense of political purpose. As migrants came to garner political clout, promoting unity among Chicago’s HTAs became a vital way for Mexican government officials to remain closely informed and linked with the diaspora. By the second half of the 1990s, the associations began to coalesce into federated structures that united the various same-state HTAs. At this time, seven such federations were established in Chicago (Guerrero, Zacatecas, Jalisco, Guanajuato, Michoacán, Durango and San Luis Potosi), and these federations were typified by increasingly formalized leadership structures, as most included a democratically elected board of directors consisting of differentiated positions of president, vice-president, secretary, treasurer, etc. (Mexican consular materials 1999).17 Grouping these organizations by federation made it easier for consular officials to keep informed about community actors’ activities and provided institutional mechanisms that might redirect, if necessary, any unseemly organizational developments. The Mexican government saw federation leaders as intermediaries who could maintain dialogue with emigrant communities and facilitate implementation of its programs. When officials sought to “accomplish social projects,” as the coordinator of the consulate’s Institute of Mexicans Abroad explained, “it is a lot easier to have federations serve as interlocutors.” (Interview with IME Coordinator, June 8, 2008, Chicago, IL). Over time, the Mexican consulate would experiment with new mechanisms through 17

Around this time there were also clubs from 13 mainly rural Mexican states: Durango, Mexico City and the state of Mexico, Guanajuato, Guerrero, Jalisco, Michoacán, Morelos, Oaxaca, Puebla, Sinaloa, San Luis Potosi and Zacatecas. The early clubs and federations were generally representative of Mexican states with high out-migration rates to Chicago, with 16% of the Chicago immigrant population from Michoacán, 14.8% from Guanajuato, 10.7% from Mexico City and the state of Mexico, 7.8% from Durango, 7.7 from Zacatecas, and 18.7% from other states (Chicago Mexican consular materials 1999).

Vonderlack-Navarro, Rebecca. Immigrant Political Incorporation : The Role of Hometown Associations, LFB

56

Immigrant Political Incorporation

which to integrate Chicago’s emigrant community. Migrants, too, had an interest in unifying as a means to increase their leverage within Mexican related projects, such as remittance allocation in community development initiatives, general support for migrant families, improvements in consular services, and so forth.18 In an explicit attempt to stay close to Chicago’s progressively more mobilized emigrants, in 1998 consular officials launched an innovative effort to unify the organizations through the creation of Casa Mexico. The proposed physical space would enable federations to come together to celebrate important events (cultural festivals, visits of state governors) and share infrastructure and resources with local Mexican political party activists. The grand majority of Chicago federations were on board with the plan, including Durango, Michoacán, Guanajuato, Guerrero, Jalisco, and El Estado de Mexico.19 Despite federation leaders’ interest in Casa Mexico, the leaders were skeptical about what, in their view, could have been a Mexican government attempt at possibly co-opting their growing activism and influence: Ahh Casa Mexico, they [the consulate] wanted to organize it but it never, never happened…Casa Mexico is something the Copyright © 2013. LFB Scholarly Publishing LLC. All rights reserved.

18

Despite the desire to remain unified, divisions did occur within the Guanajuato, Guerrero, Michoacán and Durango federations during the early 2000s. Most, if not all, consulate officials and federation leaders consider federations’ divisions the Achilles’ heel of migrant organizational efforts; discussing past divisions was often sensitive and difficult. Multiple factors, both internal and external to all volunteer grassroots clubs and federations, could prove divisive or at least make organizations vulnerable to internal tensions: conflictive Mexican political party interests, leader personality clashes and opportunism, tensions over leadership election outcomes, questioning the allocation of funds for community development projects, and instances when strong leaders and their families carry organizational life and who later may face personal crisis or burnout, causing the organization to fizzle out. (Interview with former Michoacán president, May 15, 2008; former Durango president, May 6, 2008; IME Coordinator, June 8, 2008, Chicago, IL). 19 Zacatecas, which had always been more conservative and hesitant to move outside of the traditional work of Mexican-oriented development projects, decided not to participate in Casa Mexico.

Vonderlack-Navarro, Rebecca. Immigrant Political Incorporation : The Role of Hometown Associations, LFB

Mexico Unbound: Chicago's HTA Growth

57

consulate wanted to do. They had paid a lawyer…they had made the statutes, it was a very ambitious project…[the idea] was ideal, if we could have had it. It would have been perfect, but the trust…we did not have sufficient trust in the consulate so that it would work. So for that it never worked, because the consulate was there metido (meddling). It wasn’t that we felt threatened, the plan was, how do I tell you, it was really good, but the [consulate] wants to control us and we want to liberate ourselves, we don’t want to be controlled, we want independence. (Interview with Durango leader, May 5, 2008, Chicago, IL). As talks for Casa Mexico were underway, network ties between various Chicago federation leaders and other Mexican-focused political party activists in the city began to prosper. In a significant turn of events, the Chicago consular’s plans for Casa Mexico were interrupted as they city’s migrants joined together to oppose a change in Mexico’s border policy.20 In 1999, the Mexican

Copyright © 2013. LFB Scholarly Publishing LLC. All rights reserved.

20

Some PRD immigrant leaders, and not specifically federation leaders, began voicing discontent with the local Chicago Mexican Consulate as early as 1998. Within the PCME program developed under the Salinas administration, the Mexican Institute of Culture and Education was established as a means to promote Mexican identity and culture with the diaspora in the U.S. The Chicago General Consul at this time was highly motivated to raise funds for the institute. As a means to raise money, a U.S. $5 charge was added to documentation service fees run through the consulate. While the added fee was framed as a voluntary contribution, many immigrants felt they were being mandated to pay it and were outraged by the added cost. As the community became angered by the added charges, Chicago’s transnational community leaders, particularly the more confrontational PRD activists, devised numerous press conferences during a four week period to pressure the General Consul to withdraw the charges. Through the media showdown between community leaders and the General Consul, activists were able to prove the consul was acting outside of Mexican government authority and eventually the charges were dropped. While a PRD transnational activist spearheaded the press conferences, new federation leaders at this time saw that working as an oppositional force, particularly through Spanish-speaking media outlets, could bring necessary power gains with Mexican elites. The General Consul at this

Vonderlack-Navarro, Rebecca. Immigrant Political Incorporation : The Role of Hometown Associations, LFB

Copyright © 2013. LFB Scholarly Publishing LLC. All rights reserved.

58

Immigrant Political Incorporation

national government decided to dramatically increase a deposit on cars purchased in the U.S. crossing the Mexican border. The car deposit (which all migrants were convinced would never be returned) would spike from $15 to $400, and even as high as $800 (De la Garza and Hazan 2003, 35; CONFEMEX Estatutos, “Anexo, Historia, Mistica y Metodologia de Trabajo” 2006, 13-14). With regard to the deposit increase, one PRD migrant leader claimed, “You felt assaulted at the border” (Interview, October 19, 2008, Chicago, IL). The tax sent the Chicago migrant community into an uproar of defiant resistance. Federation and other Mexican emigrant community leaders in Chicago interpreted the deposit increase as the Zedillo administration’s attempt to take advantage of the high number of immigrants soon to cross the border to spend the Christmas holiday and millennium New Year in their hometown communities. One leader recalled the anger felt at a Chicago migrant gathering: “I remember someone throwing down their [car] keys on the table, ‘I’m going to burn my car in front of the consulate!’” Numerous federation leaders from Durango, Michoacán, Zacatecas, Guerrero, Jalisco, and San Luis Potosi along with other Mexican immigrant activists gathered at a local Pilsen Catholic Church to meet with consulate representatives and protest their grievances with the tax.21 The Coordinator of the Institute of Mexicans Abroad, who was relatively new to the Chicago consulate and the PCME program at the time, described the mobilization against the tax as “very strong…casi nos golpeo (they almost hit us) [during the meetings]…there was so much indignation” (Interview, June 8, 2008, Chicago, IL). The group of federation and other Chicago migrant community activists conducted protests, and out of their newfound solidarity grew a short-lived coalition whose chosen name, Grupo time was widely known by Chicago transnational activists as “lo que menos ha durado (the one who lasted the least amount of time)” in his leadership post. While rising migrant transnational activists discovered the power of confrontational politics, consular officials learned to take a more diplomatic and accommodating approach when dealing with local immigrant grievances (Interviews with PRD Activists October 19, 2008 and February 2, 2009, Chicago, IL). 21 Chicago Mexican Consular Materials. 1999. “Nuestra Historia en EU Taller Dirigido a Clubes de Oriundos de Illinois,” Instituto Mexicano de Cultura y Educación de Chicago y American Friends Service Committee.

Vonderlack-Navarro, Rebecca. Immigrant Political Incorporation : The Role of Hometown Associations, LFB

Copyright © 2013. LFB Scholarly Publishing LLC. All rights reserved.

Mexico Unbound: Chicago's HTA Growth

59

David (Group David), suggested the new and feisty underdog status that HTAs briefly embraced against the Goliath-like Mexican government. Chicago Mexican consular officials worked to calm the rage felt by the emigrant community. The General Consul was forced to respond to the community uprisings by appealing to the federal government to repeal the tax, and as a result, many of the local consular officials learned the importance of assuming a cautious diplomatic approach when working with the migrant community. The consular Coordinator to the Institute of Mexicans Abroad at the time of this study who witnessed the migrant outrage talked of a larger, long-term lesson he learned within the mobilization. “No todo que dice el gobierno hay tiene que defenderlo. (You do not have to defend all that the government says.)" He strategically listened to community concerns as a way to gradually curb migrant insurgency. The consular official also described the distinct change for federation leaders who participated in the protest: “They woke up because the movement worked” (Interview, June 8, 2008, Chicago, IL). As a result, the car deposit policy was revoked two days after its implementation. Most importantly, the battle against the Mexican government changed the agendas of various Chicago migrant HTAs as they felt more open to work together to challenge the Mexican government (CONFEMEX Estatutos, “Anexo, Historia, Mistica y Metodologia de Trabajo” 2006, 13-14). Moreover, the protests illustrated that HTAs, while generally acting as conventional interest groups to support Mexican state interests, had the capacity to mobilize to contest government policies. Along with HTA leaders’ growing sense of power within Mexican politics, key consulate officials (and eventually the Mexican national government) came to recognize through the car deposit fiasco that when Chicago leaders do not feel heard or respected, they will rebel. A Durango federation leader reflected later on the changing power dynamics between Chicago’s HTAs and the “friendly” consulate that resulted from the protest against the car deposit hike: In this moment I think we were making friendly relations [with consular officials], although not because they were helping us, it was because now they knew that the organizations had more strength…we feel that they want to, how do you say, dominate us. They want to control us, that is

Vonderlack-Navarro, Rebecca. Immigrant Political Incorporation : The Role of Hometown Associations, LFB

60

Immigrant Political Incorporation they are interested in having an organized community, but they want to control it…we showed the consulate that we could change politics and that we didn’t need them as intermediaries (Interview, May 6, 2008, Chicago, IL).

Chicago federation leaders characterized the car-deposit protest as a pivotal moment of HTA political agency (CONFEMEX Estatus 2006, 13-14). A long-standing Durango leader revealed how protest activity created “unity” among the federations:

Copyright © 2013. LFB Scholarly Publishing LLC. All rights reserved.

…there [in the protests] is where the federations found unity and there is where CONFEMEX [the large confederation of Mexican HTA federations that would formally emerge in 2003] formed. After Grupo David that is when the federations worked together and when we started to realize what we were able to do (Durango leader interview, May 6, 2008, Chicago, IL). Even the consulate’s coordinator of the Institute of Mexicans Abroad noted that the car-deposit protests enabled the “clubs to envision their capacity for having effective politics” (Interview with IME Coordinator, June 8, 2008). Chicago’s HTAs had learned to stand up for themselves. The result was an increased consciousness that their unified political action—whether normative or defiant—could make change. By the end of the decade, Chicago had earned a reputation among Mexican political elites as a hotbed of community activism and migrant coalition-building. In response to the car-deposit increase, migrant protests were also held in California and Texas. These migrant leaders eventually joined with Chicago’s community activists by 2000 to form the short-lived International Coalition of Mexicans Abroad (Coalicion International de los Mexicanos en el Exterior, CIME) (Hazan 2006, 139-140; PRD activist interview, October 19, 2008, Chicago, IL). Not long after the demise of CIME,22 right-of-center PAN activists in Chicago (supporters of the Fox campaign, Amigos de Fox) formed the Council of Mexican Migrant Organizations in the Midwest (el Consejo 22

CIME soon experienced a split as many migrant leaders felt it became dominated by left-of-center PRD activists.

Vonderlack-Navarro, Rebecca. Immigrant Political Incorporation : The Role of Hometown Associations, LFB

Mexico Unbound: Chicago's HTA Growth

61

Copyright © 2013. LFB Scholarly Publishing LLC. All rights reserved.

de Organizaciones Migrantes en el Medio Este, COMMO) to also promote migrant absentee voting rights, although it would dissipate by 2003. While COMMO intentionally included many of Chicago’s federations, the federation leaders claimed they could not develop sufficient “confianza (trust)” within the diverse political interests involved in COMMO.23 While the early attempts at coalition-building largely failed, federation leaders began to see the potential political prominence they might gain by working together. As their political sway continued to grow, federation leaders could sense that Mexican government leaders wanted to restrain their growing autonomy. As a Michoacán federation leader reflected: “They [the consulate] want us organized, but not too organized." He felt that the consulate was always careful in preventing organizations from becoming too powerful. He continued to discuss how Mexican state actors began to see Chicago as a testing ground for migrant-related policies: …the consulate [officials] understand that Chicago plays an experimental role for them. If they believe something is doubtful in functioning in other consulates in the American union, Chicago serves as a pilot program. They know that if it functions here than there are many possibilities that it will function in other places (Interview, May 15, 2008, Chicago, IL). The Mexican state’s insistent support for the expansion of HTAs and their broader migrant coalitions in Chicago would, nevertheless, continually be challenged by the rising assertiveness on the part of the organizations themselves. With the onset of the 2000 Mexican presidential campaign, Mexican nationals residing abroad would be treated by political elites as a critical constituency they could not afford to ignore. Even though migrants had not yet gained absentee voting rights, politicians actively campaigned with diaspora communities throughout the U.S. encouraging them to call their families back home and influence their 23

The consulate’s Coordinator to the Institute of Mexicans Abroad claimed that COMMO functioned for only about one year (Interview, June 8, 2008, Chicago, IL).

Vonderlack-Navarro, Rebecca. Immigrant Political Incorporation : The Role of Hometown Associations, LFB

62

Immigrant Political Incorporation

voting choices. Within Chicago’s symbolic elections, 10,000 votes were cast, with Fox as the apparent winner. Upheld as a political outsider and potential reformer from the long-standing corporatist PRI regime, Chicago migrants organized a rally and parade for Fox (Belluck 2000).24 With the rise of the PAN within Mexico’s national politics, neoliberal reforms were further legitimated and state-emigrant relations further prioritized. By and large, by the early 2000s it was evident that the employment conditions, political rights, and re-integration of Mexican nationals residing across the border were of central importance to Mexican governmental and political party players (Fitzgerald 2006; M.P. Smith and Bakker 2008). Consequently, as the next chapter will show, HTA leaders would turn out to take an even more central leadership role in the state’s evolving projects.

Copyright © 2013. LFB Scholarly Publishing LLC. All rights reserved.

Conclusion Mexican immigrants occupied increasingly prominent economic roles in Mexico and the United States from the 1990s into the early 2000s, even as their political status in both countries seemed unstable. Furthermore, as Chicago HTAs received extensive Mexican political support to encourage their growth and continued loyalty to the homeland, migrant leaders began to exert their own autonomy as they came to challenge various Mexican governmental projects, even with contentious activity. At the same time that migrants were making claims within Mexican politics, Mexican immigration—mobile labor— became a main component of neoliberal restructuring in the United States. Migrants’ economic importance in the U.S. created a contradictory political context. Some conservative constituencies aimed to inhibit immigrants as legitimate political actors. At the same time, because of their growing indispensability as economic contributors, strong business groups and other political factions began to sympathize with migrants (Zolberg 2006, 412-18). Beyond Mexican immigrants mounting role within the U.S. economy, their political clout became recognized by the 2000 presidential elections when the Latino vote was deemed crucial. Political candidates (especially U.S. presidential 24

Belluck, Pam. 2000. “Mexican Presidential Candidates Campaign in U.S.” New York Times, July 1.

Vonderlack-Navarro, Rebecca. Immigrant Political Incorporation : The Role of Hometown Associations, LFB

Copyright © 2013. LFB Scholarly Publishing LLC. All rights reserved.

Mexico Unbound: Chicago's HTA Growth

63

hopeful George W. Bush) were keenly aware of the decisive power of Latinos at the polls (430). By early 2001, the recently elected president of Mexico, Vicente Fox, negotiated with the newly elected president of the United States, George W. Bush, over an immigration-reform proposal. (This topic will be explored in the next chapter.) It seemed only a question of time before recent Mexican immigrants would enjoy an expanded set of legal rights in the U.S. to accompany their growing political influence in Mexico. Chicago’s clubs and federations expanded as a result of extensive neoliberal political and economic changes in Mexico and the U.S. This context included the United States' considerable demand for low-end contingent labor increasingly supplied by undocumented immigration as well as Mexico’s dependence on out-migration and return remittance flows for political and economic stability. The outcome included an integrated bi-national economy and unequal political context. Within this environment, migrant HTAs began to partner with the Mexican state to subsidize remittance-based development initiatives. Transnational research thus provides a significant challenge to traditional assimilationist notions of immigrants’ gradual political incorporation into the host society. Indeed, it was through immigrants’ interaction with the extended extraterritorial reach of Mexican governmental-repatriation programming, not with local Chicago machine politics, that budding Chicago HTA leaders developed a norm of political engagement, a nurtured sense of self-confidence, and a certain level of negotiated political efficacy. Nevertheless, Chicago’s HTAs and federations were more than third-sector, voluntary organizations or semi-accommodated extensions of the Mexican state’s neoliberal projects. Through a close examination of the 1990s, we begin to see how Chicago HTAs were developing their own political agency both within and against Mexican state projects. This closer look at the Chicago case also reveals the distinct relationship that began to develop between the local Chicago Mexican consulate and migrant organizations. This relationship encouraged migrants to coalesce, and as a result, unified and strengthened their political clout. As these indigenous organizational networks expanded, federation leaders began to garner trust and familiarity, which served as useful resources to create solidarity to resist the Mexican government’s car deposit increase. It was through their increased access to the Mexican state that immigrant leaders began to nurture a self-assurance

Vonderlack-Navarro, Rebecca. Immigrant Political Incorporation : The Role of Hometown Associations, LFB

64

Immigrant Political Incorporation

Copyright © 2013. LFB Scholarly Publishing LLC. All rights reserved.

to act collectively, even in short-lived defiance of state interests. Migrants’ protest mobilization instigated a significant turn in their sense of political agency and leverage within Mexican politics. Moreover, Mexico’s early projects, viewed with a broader lens that considers neoliberalizing states and migrant agency, can now be seen as vital for conferring promising migrant organizations with a significant sense of political legitimacy that set the stage for their eventual engagement with U.S.-focused immigrant concerns.

Vonderlack-Navarro, Rebecca. Immigrant Political Incorporation : The Role of Hometown Associations, LFB

CHAPTER 3

Copyright © 2013. LFB Scholarly Publishing LLC. All rights reserved.

Conflicting Tendencies: Post-9/11 Politics and HTAs' Nascent U.S. Political Engagement, 2001-2005

Significant changes in the broader political landscape erupted as a result of the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001. The Bush administration’s overhauled national security agenda restructured the country’s inter-state relationship with Mexico along with its own domestic policy priorities. The United States’ new “war on terrorism” ushered in a revamped criminalization and securitization approach to immigrant concerns. Within this threatening political environment, Chicago’s hometown associations welcomed new activities (with much encouragement from the Mexican government) meant to provide enhanced security to their members. At the same time, these new activities fortified HTAs’ participation in U.S.-centered politics and policy advocacy. By late 2005, HTAs were increasingly involved in a dual-focused Mexico-U.S. agenda. While their agenda was still primarily focused on Mexico with emigrant voting rights a main priority, Chicago HTAs began to exhibit increased attention towards domestic political issues in the United States, chiefly at the state level in Illinois. Why were many of Chicago’s HTAs beginning to shift from a Mexican-focused to a bi-national Mexico-U.S. focused agenda, and how would this up-and-coming shift change the political activities of many HTAs? A superficial analysis of Chicago HTAs’ early and gradual embrace of U.S.-focused integration activities might argue that 65

Vonderlack-Navarro, Rebecca. Immigrant Political Incorporation : The Role of Hometown Associations, LFB

Copyright © 2013. LFB Scholarly Publishing LLC. All rights reserved.

66

Immigrant Political Incorporation

their behavior resembles linear assimilationist accounts of the immigrant experience where over time immigrants become more and more integrated into their new host society (Alba and Nee 1997). Yet assimilationist accounts cannot explain how mechanisms that drove HTAs further into the realm of U.S. political activity at this time paradoxically still came largely from the extra-territorial influence of the Mexican state’s reincorporation strategies, especially through greatly overhauled diaspora-inclusionist programs. Even while a Chicago federation leader began to forge important connections with Illinois government leaders by 2005 in ways that would later come to greatly influence multiple federations’ U.S.-focused activities, political opportunities in Mexico were still a topmost concern for Chicago HTAs and federations. Although Mexico was still the uppermost priority for Chicago’s HTAs during this time period, a bi-national consideration for how both Mexico and the U.S. political environments shape the organizations remains necessary. What the Mexican state aimed to accomplish through its partnerships with HTAs and federations was qualitatively different following 9/11. Mexico’s institutionalization of diaspora relations was not just about sustaining migrant loyalty to their patria along with their remittance flows (R.C. Smith 2008; M.P. Smith and Bakker 2008); it was also about securing migrants’ newly precarious legal status within the vastly hardened national security provisions in the United States. Roger Waldinger (2009) provides a compelling analysis of Mexico’s diaspora engagement policies with a refreshing consideration for how both sending and receiving states influence the politics of immigration/emigration, as most of the literature on international migration tends to dichotomize the two.25 While 25

His work explores two specific cases of diaspora engagement: expatriate voting and the provision of the matricula consular documentation. Both cases are similar in that they illustrate a “capacity deficit” within the Mexican state’s reincorporation projects as emigrants reside in a foreign territory where the sending state lacks power. Yet the two cases differ in that millions of undocumented immigrants benefited from the enhanced matricula program, while few emigrants possessed the appropriate credentials to take part in the Vote from Abroad. In general, his analysis is compelling: the divergent outcomes stem from the fact that the matricula provided immigrants with a “source of leverage” in their host society, while expatriate voting involved a

Vonderlack-Navarro, Rebecca. Immigrant Political Incorporation : The Role of Hometown Associations, LFB

Copyright © 2013. LFB Scholarly Publishing LLC. All rights reserved.

Conflicting Tendencies: Post-9/11 Politics

67

persuasive, Waldinger’s work does not consider that the relationship of both the Mexican and U.S. states toward Mexican emigrants/immigrants in the U.S. was also shaped by the broader asymmetrical relationship between Mexico and the United States. This is why, for this study, anchoring the story of Chicago HTAs in the broader, post-1970s neoliberal restructuring of both economies and states (Mexico and the U.S.) becomes important to understanding how the state powers of Mexico vis-à-vis its migrants were historically reconstituted. Indeed, the post-9/11 U.S. war on terrorism had both a geopolitical impact on the U.S.-Mexico relationship, as well as domestic policy impacts on immigration policy and enforcement. The result was a sharpened asymmetry of power between the two countries, with implications for Mexican-state strategies toward U.S.-based migrants. This chapter begins by exploring the impact of a threatening, post9/11 U.S. anti-immigrant politics that influenced Mexican President Vicente Fox in a decision to throw real weight behind building the capacities of HTAs, along with Chicago’s consular programming. These state-migrant efforts were intended to secure undocumented immigrants’ standing in the U.S. as well as sustain remittance flows to Mexico. The chapter continues by examining how HTAs themselves responded to the hardening political environment in the U.S by expanding their services to include migrant-related concerns along with forming a united confederation of Midwest federation and hometown club leaders as a means to fortify their political power. Lastly, and in sharp contrast to the anti-immigrant discourse within U.S. national politics, a quite distinctive and vigorously validating set of Illinois state-government programs was introduced by 2005 as a means to court Mexican HTAs as potential voting constituencies. Chicago HTAs’ emerging focus on U.S.-oriented activities thus can be better understood as an outcome of their interactions with various government entities in Mexico and (especially) in the United States.

more cumbersome effort aimed at trying to reconnect emigrants as members within a homeland they had left behind.

Vonderlack-Navarro, Rebecca. Immigrant Political Incorporation : The Role of Hometown Associations, LFB

68

Immigrant Political Incorporation

Copyright © 2013. LFB Scholarly Publishing LLC. All rights reserved.

U.S. Immigrant Repression and HTAs’ Increased Importance to Mexico U.S. immigrant politics significantly changed following September 2001. In April 2001, just months before the attacks, recently elected presidents Vicente Fox and George W. Bush appeared to form a closer alliance as they began a series of immigration reform talks, including plans for a guestworker program. A comprehensive immigration reform seemed increasingly likely as Fox petitioned the U.S. Congress to loosen immigration laws in early September 2001 (Dlouhy 2004, 95). At this time, Republican Party business interests, along with other government leaders, publicly endorsed continuing the supply of foreign labor as their central immigrant-related concern (Zolberg 2006). While NAFTA encouraged the economic integration of Mexico and the United States, it seemed Fox was willing to become the junior partner in a newly-formed, post-NAFTA state regime. The attacks of September 11, 2001, however, would significantly alter the political course between Mexico and the United States. The resulting dramatic U.S. government shift to a “securitization” and “criminalization” immigrant agenda resulted in a unilateral shift in future immigration policy. By embracing U.S. security as a top political priority, there was new political space created for core constituencies of the Republican Party to link the lack of security to unauthorized immigration. In this context, Bush realized it would be a political liability to work with Fox or create any mutual bilateral agreements on immigration reform. By 2002 when Fox publicly questioned the U.S. invasion in Iraq, it was abundantly clear that Mexico’s ability to bargain directly with the U.S. had been diminished (Zolberg 2006). As a consequence of Mexico’s recent diplomatic strains with the United States, Fox began to develop his own attempts to secure emigrants— and their remittance flows—in an increasingly hostile environment. HTAs would turn out to be focal to Mexico’s overhauled diaspora programming (M.P. Smith and Bakker 2008). From the beginning, Fox aimed to create a loyal emigrant contingent. He espoused a distinct public discourse that elevated migrants to a “hero” status, supported emigrant voting rights, and promoted migrant inclusion into the broader Mexican nation (Fitzgerald 2006, 279). Fox advanced more than rhetoric when he overhauled migrant-focused government programs by restructuring

Vonderlack-Navarro, Rebecca. Immigrant Political Incorporation : The Role of Hometown Associations, LFB

Copyright © 2013. LFB Scholarly Publishing LLC. All rights reserved.

Conflicting Tendencies: Post-9/11 Politics

69

consular services. The new programming was a response to the punitive environment and the increasingly organized migrant constituency in the U.S. who strongly voiced opposition to the car deposit increase, expressed desire for absentee voting rights, and demanded improvements in consular services. Fox began this effort by replacing the PCME (Program for Mexican Communities Abroad) with the Presidential Office for Mexicans Abroad (Oficina Presidencial de Atencion a Migrantes en el Exterior, OPME) headed by Mexican American Juan Hernandez. The program promoted a bi-national agenda and included migrant concerns in the U.S. (e.g., obtaining drivers’ licenses and promoting access to higher education for the undocumented). Due to an antagonistic relationship between Hernandez and Mexico’s Foreign Affairs Minister Jorge Casteneda, Hernandez was dismissed from the job and the OPME was terminated. Eventually, the OPME and the PCME were conjoined to form the current nationally-organized Institute of Mexicans Abroad within the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (el Instituto de los Mexicanos en el Exterior, IME), which came into effect between 2002 and 2003 (M.P. Smith and Bakker 2008, 38-39; local Chicago interviews).26 The Institute included an overhaul and expansion of consular services throughout the U.S. along with specific efforts to fortify HTAs by legislating collective remittance-based development projects (e.g. 3x1 projects) beyond experimental programs in specific U.S. regions to a formalized program for emigrant organizations throughout the United States. A career official within Mexico’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the former Executive Director of the Institute, Carlos Gonzalez Gutierrez, claims the renovated Mexican programming was meant to “empower the Mexican diaspora abroad” (Laglagaron 2010, 10). A strengthened and unified Mexican immigrant community could better advocate for migrant interests on both sides of the border. IME’s services included a broad umbrella of education, health, community organization, consular protection, and business promotion. Fox’s advances also came with the formation of a migrant Advisory Council (CC-IME) to serve as an accessory and consultant to the Institute of Mexicans Abroad. The Advisory Council would be comprised of emigrant leaders, including HTA and federation leaders, 26

Interviews with PRD Activist October 19, 2008 and IME Coordinator June 8, 2008, Chicago, IL.

Vonderlack-Navarro, Rebecca. Immigrant Political Incorporation : The Role of Hometown Associations, LFB

Copyright © 2013. LFB Scholarly Publishing LLC. All rights reserved.

70

Immigrant Political Incorporation

representatives from influential U.S.-based Latino organizations, Mexican leaders from Canada, consultants, and representatives from Mexican state-level governments. Since its inception (Advisory Council meetings officially began in 2003), various Chicago federation leaders would continue to participate in the council and consider it a great honor. Chicago would hold democratic elections for potential advisors beginning in 2002, increasing advisors’ legitimacy and credibility in the community as they were not merely appointed by the consulate. The Chicago consulate also benefitted from the election process as it allowed them to see who the community perceived as their representational leaders.27 Through the creation of an Advisory Council, the Mexican national government created a platform where Chicago advisors to the Institute of Mexicans Abroad could network with other Mexican immigrant and Mexican American leaders throughout the U.S. who were also part of the Advisory Council to discuss escalating migrant concerns on both sides of the border. The restructuring of Mexican consular programming reflected the Mexican state’s growing need to respond and appease migrants’ growing political power. Robert C. Smith (2008) termed the Advisory Council a type of “extra-territorial bureaucracy” that aimed to “constitute a political recognition of a particular group and a commitment to it, thus reifying the relationship with the state, implying permanency and legitimacy” (712-13). After a failed attempt at migrant coalition-building with Casa Mexico in 1998 and the 1999 car deposit protests in Chicago and other areas of the U.S., the new consular programming was also a way for the Mexican government to dissipate escalating dissent within the migrant community. In this post-9/11 era when Fox had lost bargaining power with the United States, the initiatives were a way for the Mexican state to further extend its influence within the diaspora community through the institutionalization of state-migrant partnerships. Yet as Mexican state 27

Requirements to vote in Chicago CC-IME elections include being Mexican or of Mexican descent. For those born in Mexico, one has to be 18 years or older, show the matricula consular (Mexican ID issued through consulates), Mexican passport, military service ID, elector credential, drivers license, Mexican birth certificate or another type of photo ID. For Mexican descendants in the U.S., voters must show their dual nationality through their birth certificate (which indicates their parents’ place of birth) or passport.

Vonderlack-Navarro, Rebecca. Immigrant Political Incorporation : The Role of Hometown Associations, LFB

Copyright © 2013. LFB Scholarly Publishing LLC. All rights reserved.

Conflicting Tendencies: Post-9/11 Politics

71

influence within the emigrant community expanded, it threatened the incorporation of migrant actors as mere agents of Mexico’s state projects. On the one hand, migrant leaders gained a seat at the table with Mexican elites to influence policy; on the other hand, the statesociety divide became further obscured, raising questions as to whether the autonomy of HTA and federation leaders could be co-opted by the Mexican state. Nevertheless, HTAs remained a key priority within Mexico’s revamped diaspora-focused programming. As a result, the number of immigrant clubs proliferated throughout the United States. By the mid2000s, shortly after IME was instituted, Mexican state outreach resulted in more than 1,000 Mexican immigrant organizations and 46 Mexican consulates within 31 states in the U.S. (M.P. Smith and Bakker 2008). In Illinois specifically, the number of HTAs had reached 170 by 2000 and grew to more than 270 by 2005 (see Appendix 3). Many of the budding HTAs began the 3x1 match programs, sponsored Mexicanoriented cultural and social events, and engaged in advocacy for absentee voting rights. HTAs’ financial clout was substantial, and in some instances, HTA donations exceeded what Mexican municipal budgets offered to local communities’ social welfare needs. As Chicago’s HTA and federation scene continued to develop, numerous federations acquired building headquarters in the city, often with the financial aid of Mexican state governments. These served as spaces to foster migrant loyalty and sustain migrants’ “Mexican-ness” through various social and cultural programming events. Among the diaspora-targeted initiatives begun by Chicago’s Mexican consulate, a number of programs were meant to create closer connections between local emigrants and the homeland while safeguarding community members from deportation. Although many consular officials served as important supporters throughout the early emergence of Chicago’s hometown associations the appointment of Carlos Manuel Sada Solano as General Consul in 2001 launched an extended period of innovative diaspora program-building that would greatly enhance the organizational capacities of the city’s HTAs.28 From the beginning, Sada seemed determined to avoid the kind of heavy-handed, top-down directives that had created considerable 28

Carlos Manuel Sada Solano served as general consul of the Mexican consulate of Chicago from 2001 to 2007.

Vonderlack-Navarro, Rebecca. Immigrant Political Incorporation : The Role of Hometown Associations, LFB

72

Immigrant Political Incorporation

tensions during the car-deposit protests in 1999. He recognized that Chicago’s HTAs wished to preserve their newly-won autonomy. As one observer put it, while cultivating closer relations with federation and HTA leaders, Sada was “careful in how his work was administered to avoid paternalism.”29 He initiated bi-monthly meetings between federation leaders and various consular officials and soon built a reputation among local activists as someone who listened to the Chicago migrant community even as he came to enjoy a significant level of influence over its organizations.30 More concretely, Sada’s strategy focused on strengthening the financial ties between the migrant community and the homeland in ways that might also create U.S.-related protections for community members. Central to this strategy was the development of a revamped identity card. As migrants without identity credentials became increasingly vulnerable after 9/11, the consulate created the Matricula Consular de Alta Seguridad (MCAS), an upgraded form of the card traditionally issued to Mexican nationals abroad that could be used by migrants residing in the U.S. without documentation.31 After the success of Chicago’s pioneering pilot program launched in 2000, 32 the

Copyright © 2013. LFB Scholarly Publishing LLC. All rights reserved.

29

Interview with IME Coordinator, June 8, 2008, Chicago, IL. Sada’s favorable reputation among the migrant community was made evident in the interviews and observation data with migrant leaders of various political persuasions, even the more militant activists who wanted nothing to do with the government (Interviews with PRD activists on February 2, 2009 and October 19, 2008, Chicago, IL). 31 As early as 1871, the Mexican government has issued identification documents, namely the matricula consular, to help nationals abroad have an official ID to demonstrate Mexican nationality and therefore have access to consular aid and services. The upgraded card issues by 2002 included enhanced security measures to prevent duplication efforts (Hernandez-Coss 2005,12; Laglagaron 2010). 32 While many banks in the city remained skeptical of the MCAS, Chicago’s Second Federal Savings Bank (with numerous banks scattered throughout Mexican-dominated neighborhoods—like La Villita on 26th Street—and with forty years of experience working with the Mexican community) was keenly aware of the potential financial gains in working with the city’s immigrant community. The President/CEO/Chairman of the Second Federal Savings 30

Vonderlack-Navarro, Rebecca. Immigrant Political Incorporation : The Role of Hometown Associations, LFB

Copyright © 2013. LFB Scholarly Publishing LLC. All rights reserved.

Conflicting Tendencies: Post-9/11 Politics

73

Mexican consulate of Chicago formally launched the MCAS initiative in March of 2002, issuing an average of 450 matriculas on a daily basis. Since the MCAS was established, 118 financial institutions throughout the U.S. have come to recognize the card; 44 of those banks were concentrated within Chicago. By the end of 2003, an estimated 150,000 of these matriculas were in use within Chicago, with another 150,000 in circulation the following year. At the same time, consular officials actively promoted the card to local financial institutions. It was recognized by large numbers of banks, and some went even further. Working with federation leaders and community activists as well as the consulate, several local community banks began to see supermarkets, meatpacking plants, and schools as creative avenues for providing financial services to Chicago’s large population of undocumented residents. By May of 2003, the General Consulate of Chicago and the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation initiated the formation of a New Alliance Task Force to further develop migrant-focused financial services and education. Bringing together banks, federal regulators, secondary market companies, mortgage insurance providers, and Mexican federation leaders and other community organizations, the effort led to an estimated 50,000 new bank accounts worth upwards of $100 million during its first six months alone (Hernandez-Coss 2005, 97-99; also see Gomez and Aguilar 2005). These public-private financial initiatives served multiple purposes for the Mexican government and the immigrant community of Chicago. The immediate economic benefits to both parties (not to mention those to the financial institutions involved) were considerable, particularly in terms of lower fees on remittance transfers.33 Yet the political impact spearheaded the acceptance of the MCAS as early as 2000 and promoted the effort as a way for migrants to avoid high remittance surcharges. 33 Remittances from Illinois to Mexico continued to be substantial; during 2003 an estimated U.S. $13.3 billion in remittances were sent to Mexico, with Illinois sending $1.3 billion. With an estimated 75 percent of undocumented immigrants without bank accounts, they can be compelled to use alternative, and costly, remittance service providers (e.g., Western Union or MoneyGram) or other informal (and possibly insecure) money-carrying channels. Since 2001 when the remittance services were established in as many as 30 Midwestern banks, remittance costs had dropped by 58 percent (HernandezCoss 2005).

Vonderlack-Navarro, Rebecca. Immigrant Political Incorporation : The Role of Hometown Associations, LFB

74

Immigrant Political Incorporation

was also seen as important. By encouraging migrants to establish credit histories, the initiatives were providing mechanisms that might prove time-of-residency requirements in future applications for legal status. More generally, Mexican government officials hoped these sorts of efforts might enlist banks as active political allies in the ongoing struggle for immigration reform. Federation leaders, meanwhile, gained stature from Mexican officials for enhancing the financial integration of their community base. Chicago’s migrant community leaders and consular officials also claimed a share of the political credit when the success of Chicago’s financial pilot programming led President Fox in 2002 to develop a national-level version of the enhanced matricula consular document.34

Copyright © 2013. LFB Scholarly Publishing LLC. All rights reserved.

HTAs’ Growing Autonomy and Interest in U.S. Immigrant Rights It was more than Mexican governmental influences, however, that strengthened Chicago’s HTAs and encouraged migrant leaders’ growing interest in U.S. domestic concerns. One force drawing the associations into the U.S. political realm emerged from ongoing efforts by HTAs themselves to expand their services to include ESL classes, legal counseling, and scholarship programs. While modest in their initial impact, these services nevertheless tended, over time, to connect association members more firmly to U.S. immigrant-related activities (Gomez and Aguilar 2005). More immediately noticeable in its organizational impact was an initiative started in 2002. Chicago federation and HTA leaders began working with a local Chicago nonprofit organization, Enlaces America. Part of the Heartland Alliance for Human Needs and Human Rights, Enlaces helped HTAs develop new leaders for their organizations.35 Intended to build support for a

34

It was argued by migrant activists and consular officials that Fox’s national initiative to promote the card’s acceptance within local financial institutions was influenced by Chicago’s pilot program launched in 2000 (Interviews with IME Coordinator, December 7, 2008, PRD and local union activist, October 19, 2008, Chicago, IL). 35 The Heartland Alliance for Human Needs and Human Rights is a longstanding Chicago NGO that provides comprehensive services to disenfranchised populations. The Heartland Alliance is a large and influential

Vonderlack-Navarro, Rebecca. Immigrant Political Incorporation : The Role of Hometown Associations, LFB

Copyright © 2013. LFB Scholarly Publishing LLC. All rights reserved.

Conflicting Tendencies: Post-9/11 Politics

75

broader, cross-border approach to U.S. immigration reform, this Immigrant Leadership Empowerment Project also created a different kind of forum—one that was not dominated by Mexican governmental officials—where Chicago’s emerging migrant leaders could begin to reformulate their own organizational goals. This involvement not only led to new relationships with immigrant rights groups and other U.S.focused organizations but also gave HTAs themselves a much greater level of political and media visibility in the city of Chicago. The Immigrant Leadership Empowerment Project was a critical point for many emerging federation leaders as it ignited the long-term processes of bringing individuals, many of whom were largely disenfranchised from U.S. society, to recognize their own power for creating change. The Enlaces America program supported migrant leaders in taking on larger roles in the external U.S. political landscape and broader transnational immigrant rights movement. The project was largely invested in creating workshops to target and enhance new grassroots HTA leadership. The workshops focused on individual empowerment, culture and identity, public speaking, planning, fundraising, bi-national integration, and alliance-building. Guided by popular education principles of Paolo Friere, the workshops allowed participants to define for themselves what leadership meant to them and connect their concerns to larger structural phenomena, such as trade, migration policy, and human rights. For many leaders, the workshop project catalyzed an important long-standing process of Chicago migrants’ growing cross-border political consciousness. Moreover, the Immigrant Leadership Empowerment Project expanded the notion of leadership within the immigrant rights movement to include ordinary immigrants and attempted to provide a space for migrant HTA leaders to question the rapid inequality perpetuated by neoliberalism while recognizing their role within such processes. (Interview with former Enlaces America staff, July 14 and August 3, 2006; Durango Federation leader, May 6, 2008; Michoacán federation leader, May 15, 2008, Chicago, IL).

organization within the social services political www.heartlandalliance.org; accessed on February 7, 2011).

world

Vonderlack-Navarro, Rebecca. Immigrant Political Incorporation : The Role of Hometown Associations, LFB

(see

76

Immigrant Political Incorporation

Copyright © 2013. LFB Scholarly Publishing LLC. All rights reserved.

All of the growing HTA and federation activity resulted in the leaders’ desires to unify as a means to increase their political clout on both sides of the border. Their aspirations culminated in February 23, 2003, in the formation of the Confederation of Mexican Federations or CONFEMEX (Confederacion de Federaciones Mexicanos), an umbrella organization initially comprised of eight of the Chicago-based federations and 175 Midwestern HTAs. The federations represented within CONFEMEX at its inception included Durango, Jalisco, Hidalgo, Michoacán, Guanajuato, Guerrero, Oaxaca, and Zacatecas.36 CONFEMEX was created by its leaders to stand apart from the directing hand of the Mexican government and quite deliberately stated in its statutes that the confederation was bi-national (CONFEMEX Estatutos, “Anexo, Historia, Mistica y Metodologia de Trabajo,” 1314). Nevertheless, much of the confederation’s early formation was still centered on enhancing emigrants’ political voice within Mexican government programs. One federation leader from Durango illustrated the Mexican-focus of CONFEMEX at the time as follows: We [federation leaders] saw the necessity…that all of us were working individually for each [Mexican] state and we saw the need to have a common bridge, unity in order to have more impact…I believe that we saw the need to unite as federations because we saw that …we could not change the laws in Mexico if we were not together, because no one is going to pay attention to us as just one state [federation]…if we want El Voto [absentee voting] in Mexico we have to be together…well, this is where we began to see the need to be in CONFEMEX. (Interview with Durango Federation leader, May 6, 2008, Chicago, IL). Yet, as commonly defined by organizational leaders, CONFEMEX had ample bi-national political potential as the confederation represented “the organized voice of Mexicans in the Midwest” (Guerrero Federation leader and CONFEMEX president, May 2, 2008, Chicago, IL). 36

Jalisco was part of CONFEMEX’s formation, but would exit the coalition in 2006. Around the same time, the Aguas Calientes federation joined the CONFEMEX coalition and the Chihuahua federation would join later in 2007.

Vonderlack-Navarro, Rebecca. Immigrant Political Incorporation : The Role of Hometown Associations, LFB

Conflicting Tendencies: Post-9/11 Politics

77

The formation of CONFEMEX illustrated federation leaders’ capacity to critically think and question government authority and its ability to form an integrated front. A Michoacán leader was well aware that the consulate would want to work with CONFEMEX, particularly for their ability to disseminate information to their base: Q: What do you think is the consulate’s opinion of CONFEMEX…? A: I believe that…the consulate, el Consul General, recognizes the importance that CONFEMEX has. I am clear on this. He also recognizes that there is a structure and a mechanism to diffuse information…they [consular officials] try to gain our interlocution. (May 15, 2008, Chicago, IL)

Copyright © 2013. LFB Scholarly Publishing LLC. All rights reserved.

Federation leaders also saw their unity as a way to establish autonomy from Mexican state interests. As a Durango federation leader explained, consular officials would have to contend with CONFEMEX as the federations came to have their own political efficacy in the community: Q: Ok, so what do you think is the consulate’s opinion of CONFEMEX? A: What is their opinion? I believe that their first opinion was that… they believed we were really ignorant. Q: Explain to me more about this. A: …I believe that the opinion of the consulate [now] is very different from what they thought when we began to organize…I believe we have earned their respect…now I believe they even fear us a little bit…because we are no longer [the organization] they were used to before. I mean the people [before] were not organized and well they [consulate officials] could do whatever they wanted and they decided for one and decided for all, but now they [consular officials] are aware that no, that we are here, and we have capabilities. We still have problems…but we know how to move forward and not stay quiet.

Vonderlack-Navarro, Rebecca. Immigrant Political Incorporation : The Role of Hometown Associations, LFB

78

Immigrant Political Incorporation Q: Yes, can you tell me an example when this happened?

Copyright © 2013. LFB Scholarly Publishing LLC. All rights reserved.

A: Look, for example, they always categorized us [like] we’re ignorant, like we are not prepared because the people that come from Mexico, we’re campesino del pueblo (countrymen from small towns), these people have not studied. They are submissive people that aren’t accustomed to fight, but now they [consular officials] know that we won’t stay quiet…we are able to speak and to fight in order to obtain our rights. (Interview with Durango federation leader, May 6, 2008.) As the federation chiefs began to gain more independence, consular officials took steps to ensure they maintained close ties with the newfound migrant confederation. Along with the General Consul’s bi-monthly meetings with CONFEMEX leaders, the IME’s Coordinator of Community Organizing claimed she spent a good 75 percent of her working hours concentrated on developing relations with the federations and clubs represented within CONFEMEX (Interview, February 20, 2009, Chicago, IL). In the midst of the post-9/11 national security climate and the expansion of Mexico’s emigrant-targeted programs, CONFEMEX eventually began to refashion the traditional nature of HTA activities by becoming a more integrated and autonomous organization. One sign of this more independent stance was a decision by CONFEMEX to participate in the interest-group efforts surrounding U.S. immigration policy debates. In January of 2004, President Bush (who faced reelection later in the year) revived proposals for a comprehensive immigration reform with an initiative that would provide millions of undocumented laborers with a path to legal status. The effort was widely seen as an attempt to regain political support from business groups and Latino voters (Dlouhy 2004).37 The move also attracted a 37

Bush’s initiative targeted undocumented immigrants currently working in the U.S. and aimed to encourage access to three-year work visas for jobs in the lower end of the labor market. Bush’s proposal was met with much debate and controversy within his own political party, as many conservatives viewed it as merely an election year ploy that would grant amnesty to lawbreakers who came to the U.S. through illegal entry. In addition, the Bush immigration plan reflected proposals already under consideration in Congress (HR2899,

Vonderlack-Navarro, Rebecca. Immigrant Political Incorporation : The Role of Hometown Associations, LFB

Conflicting Tendencies: Post-9/11 Politics

79

Copyright © 2013. LFB Scholarly Publishing LLC. All rights reserved.

high level of attention from immigrant groups themselves. The following month, building from the local migrant networking that emerged from the Enlaces America Immigrant Leadership Empowerment Project, numerous Chicago federation and other local migrant leaders joined a network of more than 30 Latino and Caribbean leaders from immigrant-led organizations across the United States at an emergency summit (Chacon and Shannon 2006). A CONFEMEX leader from the Michoacán federation present at the meeting later explained the particular outlook that inspired this new kind of direct political participation by migrants in U.S.-centered affairs: There was this conception that well, the question of immigration reform and all that, that we should leave it for the gringos (U.S.-born) to do, no? We should be the ones to talk for ourselves…In Washington there are people speaking who are not migrants, someone else is speaking for us. I believe it is important that the migrants, we are the ones that should speak for us about topics that affect us. The Mexican Americans don’t have problems with [legal] papers, they don’t have problems of documentation and migratory status. We are the Mexicans. We are the ones that should be speaking for our own people, for our own members. And that is what really struck the people [in the meeting]. (May 15, 2008, Chicago, IL). S1461). In 2003, House Republicans from Arizona Jim Kolbe and Jeff Flake along with Arizona Senator John McCain introduced legislation offering new classes of temporary three-year work visas for foreigners (renewable for an additional three years) for jobs posted on an electronic registry that were previously offered to U.S. citizens for a minimum of 14 days. At this time, Bush never backed the congressional measures and neither bill gained approval (Dlouhy 2004, 97; CQ Weekly,2004, .2526). Following Bush’s plan in January 2004 and moving into October of the same year, a number of immigrant policies were introduced to Congress, but they were unable to overcome GOP divisions. Proposed measures included issuing green cards to undocumented children seeking higher education or military positions (S 1545, HR 1684), temporary visas for agricultural workers (S 1645, HR 3142), and allowing local police to arrest unauthorized immigrants and enforce criminal punishment (HR 2671) (CQ Weekly 2004,.2526).

Vonderlack-Navarro, Rebecca. Immigrant Political Incorporation : The Role of Hometown Associations, LFB

80

Immigrant Political Incorporation

By the end of 2004, CONFEMEX had joined with more than 85 migrant-led organizations from many U.S. cities to form the National Alliance of Latino and Caribbean Communities (NALACC) with the goal to “build transnational leadership and immigrant civic participation in order to advocate for policies that will address the root causes of migration, while at the same time reforming U.S. immigration policies to make them more humane and effective” (Chacón and Shannon 2006, 4). The innovative immigrant-led alliance stood out from the well-established U.S. Latino organizations in that it aimed to advocate for sustainable social and economic development strategies in Latin America along with U.S. immigration reform. While the latest Bush reform proposal faded quickly after his reelection in November 2004,38 CONFEMEX would continue to work closely with NALACC around a Washington-focused immigration reform agenda.

Copyright © 2013. LFB Scholarly Publishing LLC. All rights reserved.

The Illinois State-Immigrant Agenda: HTAs as Potential StateSociety Partners Another factor pulling CONFEMEX’s interests towards U.S.-related concerns—and one that in the long term would prove quite powerful— came from state-level politics in Illinois. As early as 2002, state and local politicians (including Democratic candidate for governor Rod Blagojevich) started to take an especially strong electoral interest in Chicago’s Mexican immigrants. Working primarily through Chicago’s Democratic Congressman Luis V. Gutierrez, the Blagojevich campaign made repeated overtures to the Latino community, including a number of Spanish-speaking commercials in which he boasted that he, too, was a son of immigrants.39 In fact, his subsequent victory in November 2002 was attributed in part to strong support by Latino constituency groups, who in turn expected a boost in state-governmental support for citizenship classes, immigrant healthcare, and housing. Yet the expected political benefits failed to materialize, and by 2004 the growing number of Latino lawmakers in Springfield, along with 38

The Bush reform initiative was shot down by conservative Republications in Congress in late November 2004. 39 Many viewed Gutierrez’s support of Blagojevich as a strategic maneuver to heal his poor relationship with powerful Alderman Dick Mell of the 33rd ward, the father-in-law of Blagojevich. Gutierrez actively denied this claim.

Vonderlack-Navarro, Rebecca. Immigrant Political Incorporation : The Role of Hometown Associations, LFB

Copyright © 2013. LFB Scholarly Publishing LLC. All rights reserved.

Conflicting Tendencies: Post-9/11 Politics

81

influential advocacy groups, were becoming increasingly vocal in their criticisms of the governor.40 As Blagojevich looked ahead to his reelection effort in 2006, it was clear that a considerable political gesture would be required to mobilize Latino supporters and the expanding immigrant community.41 The Illinois Governor was savvy in reconfiguring his state-migrant agenda to accommodate grievances within the immigrant community. On November 19, 2005, the Governor issued with much public fanfare the New Americans Executive Order to promote immigrant integration, which included a New Americans Policy Council and the State’s Interagency Task Force to devise recommendations for the state to enhance immigrant and refugee-related services. The Joint Executive Summary refers to the Executive Order as a “unique public-private partnership to create a first-in-the-nation coherent, strategic, and proactive state government approach to immigrant integration” (1). The Governor’s Order intended to build upon state services implemented by the previous administration, which included English classes, citizenship acquisition, and increased accessibility to healthcare and other immigrant services regardless of legal status. Governor Blagojevich ordered the ICIRR to staff the New Americans Policy Council and then tapped Jose Luis Gutierrez, a charismatic CONFEMEX leader from the state of Michoacán, to become the director of the Governor’s Office of New Americans Policy and Advocacy. The board president of the ICIRR revealed why the Michoacán federation leader was backed by ICIRR to take the job in the Governor’s Office: 40

Latino advocates and the increased number of Latino lawmakers (five new seats in the General Assembly, a rise in the Latino Caucus that amounted to 13 members total, and four new Latino Senators) expressed feelings of outrage and betrayal when Blagojevich used potential program funding to help shore up the state’s $5 billion budget deficit. 41 Rogal, Brian J. 2004. “Great Expectations: Latino lawmakers and advocates are gaining influence in Springfield, and warning the governor not to take them for granted,” Chicago Reporter, January; Neal, Steve. 2002, “Gutierrez’s aid boosts Blagojevich; Hispanic voters may have big impact on governor’s contest." Chicago Sun-Times, October 28. Fornek, Scott. 2002, “Blagojevich aims ad at Hispanics; Gutierrez appears in spot for governor hopeful." Chicago Sun-Times, January 8.

Vonderlack-Navarro, Rebecca. Immigrant Political Incorporation : The Role of Hometown Associations, LFB

82

Immigrant Political Incorporation

Copyright © 2013. LFB Scholarly Publishing LLC. All rights reserved.

We had to have a Mexican leader and then the question was which Mexican leader do we believe is prepared? And then…we saw this as our initiative…anytime you’re working in government and you’re supporting someone to go work in government, [it] better be someone you trust. Because…[of] co-optation and all that stuff…and so we push somebody that all of a sudden becomes more part of the government than they are the community. You know, I think that’s our biggest fear when people go into government. So, we’re cognizant of the co-optation part and so, so to me, I mean Jose Luis is absolutely the right person…He had worked his way to get a masters degree and [had] enough leadership credentials because of his involvement with the hometown associations and the Instituto [Institute of Progress (a local NGO)]. And, you know, enough [English]language skills, enough of the exposure to other leaders, beyond the hometown association leaders and, from my perspective, [it] was a great opportunity for this to be a victory for the Coalition [ICIRR]. Gutierrez oversaw the office that summoned the Interagency Task Force, a corresponding panel of representatives from nine state agencies that supervise the provision of health care, education, and human services. While Gutierrez’s extensive experience as an HTA leader made him intimately aware of migrants’ growing ability to gain power within Mexican politics, gaining political leverage within the more powerful U.S. political realm was all the more enticing. In an informal conversation, Gutierrez explained how mounting political recognition in the U.S. could be much more powerful for expanding his political efficacy in both Mexico and the U.S. “They asked me to be a diputado (deputy) in Mexico. That would have been good and I could have had a lot of money… but if I am able to obtain a political position in the United States, I could have much more influence in what happens in Mexico.” (Field observations, February 16, 2006, Durango Unido Offices, Chicago, IL.) Not only was the political capital he garnered over the years within Mexican politics transferrable to the U.S. arena, but his calculated step to become a part of established—and arguably more powerful—U.S. governmental institutions was seen as a mechanism to increase political sway in Mexico even further.

Vonderlack-Navarro, Rebecca. Immigrant Political Incorporation : The Role of Hometown Associations, LFB

Conflicting Tendencies: Post-9/11 Politics

83

Furthermore, Gutierrez’s political appointment signaled a new kind of public recognition for Chicago’s HTAs and CONFEMEX, and this political connection to state-level government and Democratic party politics inspired a growing level of domestic interest-group activity on the part of federation leaders, as well as an emerging focus on U.S. electoral participation. In striking contrast to the raucously antiimmigrant rhetoric that was currently dominating U.S. national politics, Illinois politics seemed to be moving in a very different direction. Growing numbers of Illinois state and local leaders were now holding up the region’s immigrant communities as hard-working, economic contributors and esteemed potential citizens, and organizations such as CONFEMEX seemed to be reaping the political benefits.

Copyright © 2013. LFB Scholarly Publishing LLC. All rights reserved.

Mexico Still the Main Priority: Chicago HTAs Battle for Emigrant Voting Rights It is clear that while post-9/11 national policy trends seemed to be increasingly threatening to Chicago’s Mexican migrants, distinct and contradictory political influences were actually drawing their organizations deeper into U.S. domestic politics. In the meantime, however, a new turn of events made it apparent that CONFEMEX, for all its growing involvement in U.S. political circles, continued to see Mexico as its primary priority. In early 2005, a unanimous vote by the Mexican Chamber of Deputies approved absentee-voting legislation just in time for implementation in the elections the following year. Although contentious restrictions were soon attached to the measure, Chicago’s federation leaders reacted energetically to the seeming advancement, and much of their organizational activity over the remainder of the year focused on voter mobilization related to the homeland. CONFEMEX contributed $5,000 towards a local voter mobilization campaign to educate the Mexican immigrant community about their absentee voting rights for the 2006 elections. CONFEMEX hosted volunteer-led informational workshops concerning voter eligibility, registration locations, and deadlines; they conducted outreach through local Spanish-language media and allocated the federation headquarters of Durango Unido and Casa Michoacán to serve as centers of informational resources. As a result of CONFEMEX’s labors, more than 1,400 eligible voters had their

Vonderlack-Navarro, Rebecca. Immigrant Political Incorporation : The Role of Hometown Associations, LFB

Copyright © 2013. LFB Scholarly Publishing LLC. All rights reserved.

84

Immigrant Political Incorporation

registration forms personally delivered by CONFEMEX leaders to their appropriate location in Mexico City.42 CONFEMEX leaders were soon dismayed, however, by the strict eligibility requirements imposed by the Mexican government. CONFEMEX records indicated that more than 5,000 people arrived to their voter registration drives, but the bulk of interested voters did not satisfy the Mexican government’s eligibility requirements. In response to the “fracaso (failure)” of emigrants to exhibit political weight in the Mexican elections, the CONFEMEX president at the time expressed, “It’s not our fault we [the immigrant community] could not vote, because we didn’t have electorate credentials or because we didn’t have ten dollars to pay to have it sent." She went on to criticize Mexico’s Federal Electoral Institute (IFE for its acronym in Spanish) for not doing enough to help emigrants engage in their newfound voting rights. “In great contrast to the IFE, we [CONFEMEX] offered a training to help people fill out the form and register for the absentee vote. In addition, we sent the vote to Mexico for free, because no one should have to pay to exercise their constitutional right.”43 Even while the restrictions would end up severely inhibiting emigrant voter turnout,44 causing considerable frustration among the city’s homeland-focus political activists, the agenda of CONFEMEX still remained chiefly focused on apparent political opportunities south of the border.

42

CONFEMEX archive materials. “Report Submitted to the Solidago Foundation; Trejo, 2006; CONFEMEX meeting minutes, November 7, 2005 and January 9, 2006. Accessed October 2006, 43 CONFEMEX estimated that their media outreach efforts to inform the public of their voting rights potentially reached 100,000 members of the Mexican immigrant community. Trejo, Karen. 2006. “Fracaso Total.” Especial La Raza, January 20. Accessed January 7, 2007. Especial La Raza, http://www.impre.com/laraza/. 44 Survey estimates indicate that only 3 million of the 10 million potential migrant voters possessed the necessary voter ID cards, suggesting initial limitations to the absentee voting process. (See M.P. Smith and Bakker 2008, 138; see 137-140 for their review on potential blockades to absentee voting. Also R.C. Smith 2008, 721-726, 731 for a review of public debates surrounding migrants’ absentee voting rights in Mexico.)

Vonderlack-Navarro, Rebecca. Immigrant Political Incorporation : The Role of Hometown Associations, LFB

Conflicting Tendencies: Post-9/11 Politics

85

Copyright © 2013. LFB Scholarly Publishing LLC. All rights reserved.

Conclusion The 2001 to 2005 time period sheds important light on the emerging binational activities of Chicago’s confederation of HTAs. CONFEMEX’s growing U.S. engagement was evidenced through Mexican governmental initiatives aimed at fostering the financial integration of the diaspora, nascent engagement with immigrant rights concerns through the Immigrant Leadership Empowerment Project and later with NALACC, and growing involvement in Illinois state politics. Yet the primary focus of the confederation still remained on Mexico, particularly their newly granted absentee voting rights. Even though punitive U.S. immigrant legislation passed during the 1990s and continued to turn repressive moving into 2005,45 much of the immigrant community was fairly confident that eventually another round of immigration reform that included a legalization provision would be achieved through future Fox-Bush talks. At this point in time, the potentially threatening anti-immigrant legislation that existed was seen by many immigrants as only selectively enforced. In addition, within Chicago, migrants were all the time more aware that they served as an indispensible economic resource for the city. But it is important to understand that specific changes in Chicago HTAs and CONFEMEX’s agendas, like co-founding NALACC and widening their activities to include immigrant integration concerns, were critical factors that set the stage for HTAs to eventually embrace an even deeper focus on U.S.related activities moving into 2006.

45

During 2005 specifically a conservative faction of GOP within the House of Representatives pushed for more restrictionist policies: House Judiciary Committee Chairman F. James Sensenbrenner Jr., R-WI, championed an immigration bill (HR 1268) to inhibit undocumented immigrants from accessing drivers’ licenses, create obstacles for those applying for political asylum, and promote the finalized three-mile construction of the border fence along with California-Mexico border; House Rules Chairman David Dreier, R-Calif, pushed HR98 to enhance employer penalties for those who do not fully check their employees’ legal status; and Representative Tom Tancredo, R-Colo, led the anti-illegal immigrant Congressional Immigration Reform Caucus, comprised of 71 conservative GOP members of the House aimed at increasing immigration enforcement (Wayne 2005a; Stern 2005).

Vonderlack-Navarro, Rebecca. Immigrant Political Incorporation : The Role of Hometown Associations, LFB

Copyright © 2013. LFB Scholarly Publishing LLC. All rights reserved. Vonderlack-Navarro, Rebecca. Immigrant Political Incorporation : The Role of Hometown Associations, LFB

CHAPTER 4

Copyright © 2013. LFB Scholarly Publishing LLC. All rights reserved.

"I think we're at the start of a social movement": HTA Mobilization for U.S. Immigrant Rights, December 2005 to March 10 2006

On March 10, 2006, more than 100,000 protestors in Chicago joined together in a historic mass march in defense of immigrant rights (Avila and Olivo 2006a). Although this protest was followed by the much more publicized May 1 rallies, the March 10 demonstration featured the first mass outburst of defiance in response to the threatening provisions of H.R. 4437, the so-called Sensenbrenner bill (Avila and Olivo 2006b). Both participants and observers were astonished by what was then one of the largest protest rallies ever held in Chicago. The leadership of what came to be known as Chicago’s March 10th Committee represented a coalition of local grassroots organizations previously unheard of and distinct from the leadership list for subsequent rallies, which would come to be dominated by large national civil rights organizations and labor unions. The committee included the typical gathering of local immigrant rights organizations, but markedly different was the presence of the Chicago-based confederation of traditionally Mexican-focused hometown associations. By tracing the events in the short period between December 2005 and the passage of the Sensenbrenner bill to the March 10, 2006 mass march, this chapter sheds light on CONFEMEX’s remarkable 87

Vonderlack-Navarro, Rebecca. Immigrant Political Incorporation : The Role of Hometown Associations, LFB

Copyright © 2013. LFB Scholarly Publishing LLC. All rights reserved.

88

Immigrant Political Incorporation

organizational transformation as it came to play a novel central role in Chicago’s demonstration planning. How is it that Chicago’s traditionally Mexican-focused confederation of HTAs came to embrace U.S.-focused contentious action? Traditional assimilationist approaches would expect to find that over time CONFEMEX became engaged in U.S.-focused activity. Yet CONFEMEX’s leadership role in the March 10 rally was not an outgrowth of a slow but sure evolutionary process where immigrants severed ties from their sending society and assumed political allegiance within a tightly bounded new host society. CONFEMEX’s sudden (not evolutionary) prioritization of U.S.-focused activity materialized through state repression and social movement contention.46 By focusing the analysis on migrants’ sustained social and political membership ties with Mexico, transnational conceptions of HTA activities are unable to effectively explain migrants’ rapid recourse to U.S. protest. However, by viewing the process through a social movement lens, we can see how it was CONFEMEX’s process of social mobilization allowed them to become influential in U.S. politics. With the application of the political process model, we can better understand the conditions under which organizations (specifically HTAs) became vehicles for mobilization. As Cloward and Piven (1999) argue, mass disruption is not pushed from the top down by longstanding organizations, unions, or other institutions with access to power. Commonly, the opposite tends to occur. “Mobilization from the bottom swells the ranks of activists” (172). Despite the fact that Chicago has long been a hotbed of immigrant activism, March 10 and the demonstrations that followed in 2006 represented a rare moment when masses of people were ready to take to the streets. Chicago’s HTA leadership was for the first time “caught up in the political tide of the moment” as they encouraged their base and others to join the fight 46

Although the immigrant marches of 2006 were peaceful demonstrations, I argue that the marches still exemplify contentious activity for immigrants. The marches represented a pivotal moment in recent immigrant organizing with large numbers of undocumented immigrants—for the most part marginalized and relegated to the shadows of U.S. society—now highly visible and taking a public stand against national legislation. While peaceful, immigrants’ confrontational response to U.S. national policy in this way can be understood as a contentious act of defiance.

Vonderlack-Navarro, Rebecca. Immigrant Political Incorporation : The Role of Hometown Associations, LFB

Copyright © 2013. LFB Scholarly Publishing LLC. All rights reserved.

HTA Mobilization for U.S. Immigrant Rights

89

against Sensenbrenner (185). Although HTAs had long been known as generally conservative creatures of the Mexican state, a broader focus on their long-standing relationship with various government projects illuminates the factors that induced their embrace of popular mobilization. This chapter begins by focusing on how immigrant politics in the United States changed quickly and vividly with the passage by the House of Representatives of HR 4437 in December 2005. Sponsored by Representative James F. Sensenbrenner (R-WI), the bill proposed making unauthorized immigration or the provision of assistance to undocumented migrants a felony offense. As the leadership circles of the Mexican immigrant community of Chicago learned of the bill, an extraordinary groundswell of concern and anger emboldened leaders to mobilize and fight. The threat of Sensenbrenner ignited within CONFEMEX leaders a “cognitive liberation” to question the political establishment and assert their rights (McAdam 1982, 48). By February 2006, CONFEMEX leaders were hosting a broad array of immigrant rights advocates at the Michoacán federation headquarters to plan a major protest demonstration for the following month. By playing a leadership role in social mobilization, they set the stage for a major shift in focus for the hometown associations and their federation leaders. Due to the massive turnout for the March 10 demonstration, CONFEMEX (along with other loosely grouped grassroots immigrant organizations) found itself at the center of Chicago’s immigrant rights movement. “Thanks to Sensenbrenner”: CONFEMEX Embraces Contentious Activity The Sensenbrenner bill emerged directly from a rightward political resurgence following the Bush reelection in 2004.47 If the effort to 47

At this time, the U.S.’s GOP remained divided over legislative proposals offering temporary work visas to undocumented immigrants. This was a marked contrast to proposals from other party members to secure the border and strengthen deportation policies (Dlouhy 2005, 246). Soon House leaders recognized political unity might be more easily achieved over the proposal to construct a 379-mile electronic border fence between the U.S.-Mexico border (Dlouhy 2005, 442). Talks of border construction began as early as February

Vonderlack-Navarro, Rebecca. Immigrant Political Incorporation : The Role of Hometown Associations, LFB

90

Immigrant Political Incorporation

Copyright © 2013. LFB Scholarly Publishing LLC. All rights reserved.

maintain Republican electoral unity had temporarily muted the party’s internal divisions on immigration, by the following year the more militant conservative faction of the party, particularly within the House of Representatives, was aggressively applying pressure on legislators to refortify the country’s approach to “illegal” immigration. With HR 4437 (the Border Protection, Antiterrorism, and Illegal Immigration Control Act of 2005), House Judiciary Chair James Sensenbrenner introduced a bill that incorporated several highly punitive provisions from a measure proposed by Tom Tancredo (R-CO) earlier in the year, including making illegal entry into the United States a felony, while also redefining any provision of support by people or organizations to undocumented migrants as a criminal offense (Wayne 2005, 2006).48 2005 along with congressional endorsement of a provision providing the Homeland Security Department with unprecedented authority to devise whatever physical obstacles it deemed appropriate to prevent unauthorized immigration (Dlouhy 2005, 442; Stern 2005, 1241). Moving into September of 2005, a guestworker visa program began to appear prominently in the congressional agenda. In May 2005 John McCain (R-AZ) and Edward M. Kennedy (D-MA) proposed a bill (SB 1033) that permitted unauthorized migrants to remain in the U.S. and request a new H-5B visa, with the possibility of eventually attaining legal status. In an effort to prove the bill was not an amnesty provision, supporters of the bill (including business groups and Latino organizations) stressed that undocumented immigrants in the program would pay fines and undergo background checks. In July of 2005, Senators Jon Kyl (R-AZ) and John Cornyn (R-TX) proposed a plan (S 1438) where immigrants would need to return to their countries of origin before being eligible to apply for a new temporary guestworker program. The bills prompted backlash from a group of Republicans spearheaded by Tom Tancredo of Colorado, who was rumored to have his own ambitions for a presidential run. Tancredo, in response, proposed a harsh enforcement bill (HR3333) in July aimed at criminalizing undocumented immigration, making it a felony offence for employers who would face jail time (Stern 2005, 2315). Tancredo was one of numerous state actors using the anti-immigrant platform as a means to further his own career aspirations. 48 During 2005 specifically, a conservative faction of the GOP within the House of Representatives pushed for more restrictionist policies: House Judiciary Committee Chairman F. James Sensenbrenner Jr. (R-WI) championed an immigration bill (HR 1268) to inhibit undocumented

Vonderlack-Navarro, Rebecca. Immigrant Political Incorporation : The Role of Hometown Associations, LFB

Copyright © 2013. LFB Scholarly Publishing LLC. All rights reserved.

HTA Mobilization for U.S. Immigrant Rights

91

The Republican-controlled House of Representatives passed the bill in December 2005 by a vote of 239-182. While its long-term prospects in the Senate were said to be uncertain, the political impact of the measure in immigrant communities were instant and extensive. Chicago’s Spanish-language media gave extensive coverage to the follow-up debates in the Senate, as local immigrant activists quickly framed the House bill as an attack on the Latino community (Shannon 2007). Chicago’s Mexican immigrant federations were caught unaware by the hard-hitting force of the Sensenbrenner bill—at least on the surface. Over the last fifteen years, Chicago’s HTAs had expanded their activities to include infrastructure and voting-rights projects in Mexico and more recently, involvement in a range of U.S.- associated advocacy efforts, including Washington-focused lobbying led by NALACC and working with the Illinois government to expand state services for immigrants. Along with growing political awareness, CONFEMEX had developed a deepened sensitivity to the threatening anti-immigrant politics that had emerged post-9/11. Yet even the most domestically attuned federation leaders were shocked by the punitive emphasis of the Sensenbrenner measure, which quickly created alarm throughout immigrant leadership circles in Chicago. Early reactions by many migrant members on the ground took the form of disbelief, as well as a certain presentiment of doom. “This is a waste of time,” was how one Hidalgo federation leader characterized some of the comments from his members. “We’re not here to change the laws of this country.” After the initial shock had worn off, however, there was anger, along with a new kind of political fortitude to take action. “[We] got mad,” one immigrants from accessing drivers’ licenses, create obstacles for those applying for political asylum, and promote the finalized three-mile construction of the border fence along the California-Mexico border; House Rules Chairman David Dreier (R-Calif.) pushed HR98 to enhance employer penalties for those who do not fully check their employees’ legal status; and Representative Tom Tancredo (R-Colo.) led the anti-illegal immigrant Congressional Immigration Reform Caucus comprised of 71 conservative GOP members of the House. They also aimed to increase immigration enforcement (Wayne 2005a; Stern 2005). See also Wayne, Alex. 2005. “Views of Senate GOP, Bush Threaten Tighter Immigration,” CQ Weekly, January 17, 115; and Stern, Seth. 2005. “Sensenbrenner’s Win on Immigration, “ CQ Weekly, May 9,1241.

Vonderlack-Navarro, Rebecca. Immigrant Political Incorporation : The Role of Hometown Associations, LFB

92

Immigrant Political Incorporation

federation leader noted simply. “Everyone was related to someone undocumented." (Interview with Hidalgo federation president and secretary, June 23, 2008, Chicago, IL.) In the coming months, CONFEMEX took on an unparalleled new level of U.S.-focused protest mobilization. Exactly where CONFEMEX’s new motivation would lead them was not instantaneously apparent. Although Chicago had long been an epicenter for immigrant rights mobilizations, the HTAs and their federations had not been significant participants in these actions. Enduring divisions within the city’s Latino community tended to separate homeland-oriented migrant associations from grassroots organizations that focused on immigrant rights. Thus, it was only the latter who had come together in a series of local efforts to challenge the U.S. government’s growing security-inflected immigration agenda, such as a Human Chain effort in 2001 to stop traffic in Chicago, the 2002 campaign to support the sanctuary bid of undocumented immigrant Elvira Arellano,49 and the local contribution to the national

Copyright © 2013. LFB Scholarly Publishing LLC. All rights reserved.

49

Around this time, a local grassroots organization, Centro Sin Fronteras (Center without Borders) and the, Adlaberto United Methodist Church in the mostly Mexican Humboldt Park neighborhood were looking for media venues to publicly promote the legal case of unauthorized Mexican immigrant and single mother Elvira Arellano—a case that would eventually garner substantial media attention in Chicago and nationwide (Chicago Tribune 2006). Arellano had been arrested in 2002 for using a fraudulent social security number to work in Chicago’s O’Hare International Airport. She was apprehended during a post-9/11 security raid. Due to Arellano’s U.S.-born son’s attention deficit-hyperactivity disorder (ADHD) and other medical issues, Arellano had been granted three deportation extensions since 2003. She would eventually seek refuge in the local Humboldt church in August of 2006, a move that resonated with the experience of Central American migrants who took asylum in U.S. churches during the sanctuary movement of the 1980s. See Editorial. 2006. “Elvira Arellano and the law.” Chicago Tribune, August 17; News Services. 2006. “Activist ready for long haul at church." Chicago Tribune, August 18; Avila, Oscar. 2005. “She refuses to go silently; Caring mother, hard worker, lawbreaker: Advocate for reform of immigration laws has a complex story.” Chicago Tribune, November 19. Also Avila, 2006. “Hunger strikers in Pilsen seek halt to deportations.” Chicago Tribune, May 25; News Services. 2006. “Popular illegal advocate faces

Vonderlack-Navarro, Rebecca. Immigrant Political Incorporation : The Role of Hometown Associations, LFB

HTA Mobilization for U.S. Immigrant Rights

93

Copyright © 2013. LFB Scholarly Publishing LLC. All rights reserved.

Immigrant Freedom Ride in 2004. (Interview with Centro Sin Fronteras Executive Director, October 18, 2008, Chicago, IL.) Even as late as July 2005, CONFEMEX did not officially participate in a proimmigrant rally that drew tens of thousands of demonstrators to Chicago’s Back of the Yards neighborhood (Saldana 2005; NotiMex 2005; Hussain 2005).50 Sponsored by Centro Sin Fronteras, a longstanding immigrant rights organization in Chicago, and publicized by two prominent Spanish-language radio deejays, this demonstration was called explicitly to condemn the formation of the Chicago Minutemen Project, a local offshoot of the militantly anti-immigrant group (Reed 2006; Univision 2004; Avila 2006; Interview with Centro Sin Fronteras Executive Director, October 18, 2008, Chicago, IL).51 CONFEMEX did not participate in this rally, in part because of pressing responsibilities related to what was being called an historic opportunity to Vote from Abroad (El Voto en el Exterior) in Mexico’s upcoming national elections.52 But the confederation was also

deportation.” Chicago Tribune, Red Eye Edition. August 9; Avila, Oscar. 2006. “Act of faith, defiance; Activist for Illinois’ illegal immigrants battles deportation by taking shelter in a city church.” Chicago Tribune, August 16. 50 Saldana, Martha. 2005. “Marcha Historica." El Imparcial. La Guia de la ComunidadMexicanaJuly7;Hussain,Rummana.2005http://circus4youth.org/ph oto_list.p?photosPage=8. “Protestors show support for immigration law reform.” Chicago Sun-Times, July 7; NotiMex. 2005. “Multitudinaria marcha de hispanos, en su mayoria mexicanos, desfila por calles de Chicago para pedir amnistia para migrantes indocumentados.”NoticierosTelevisa,Mexico, www.esmas.com/noticierostelevisa/mexico/457004.html. 51 Reed, Robert. 2006. “Air Power,” Chicago Magazine, January. www.chicagomag.com/Chicago-Magazine/January-2006/Air-Power. Also, Univision Communications. 2004. “Que Buena 105.1FM and ‘El Pistolero’ Make Chicago Radio History.” April 13. Available at: www.univision.net/corp/en/pr/Chicago_23042004-2._ Avila, Oscar. http://circus4youth.org/photo_list.php?photosPage=82006. “Shooting for a big turnout; ‘Pistolero’ steps away from shock jock persona to push immigrants’ march, rally.” Chicago Tribune, March 10. 52 A local Spanish-speaking newspaper illustrated Chicago’s apparent divide in transnational versus U.S.-based immigrant organizing with front page parallel photos. One photo showed transnational activists overjoyed with the newly

Vonderlack-Navarro, Rebecca. Immigrant Political Incorporation : The Role of Hometown Associations, LFB

Copyright © 2013. LFB Scholarly Publishing LLC. All rights reserved.

94

Immigrant Political Incorporation

concerned about involving itself in unruly protest actions. HTA leaders were particularly disdainful toward the deejays, whose low-brow humor was seen as inconsistent with the kind of organizational image the associations were striving to project. Several federation leaders nevertheless urged the confederation to become more involved in immigrant rights. One leader from Guerrero, looking back on the moment later, noted with sarcasm what he saw as the organization’s political blinders: “Oh, how great, you are going to pass the vote in Mexico and you don’t even know what could pass here in Chicago!” (Interview with Guerrero Federation leader, June 8, 2008.) Yet most federation leaders at the time felt that as a "young" organization, CONFEMEX needed to protect its growing reputation, and consequently, the leaders voted against formal approval of the rally. As one CONFEMEX leader later characterized the majority’s attitude: “It [the demonstration] was all about making a show.” (Interview with Michoacán Federation President, June 3, 2008). Following House approval of the Sensenbrenner bill, the political calculus changed. As details of the bill passed down to HTA leaders in December 2005, its alarming consequences also corresponded with the realization that the upcoming Mexican elections in February would not provide the momentous opportunity that had been long hoped. As it became increasingly clear that electoral restrictions would severely limit participation by U.S.-based emigrants, the full measure of Sensenbrenner began to sink in. As one CONFEMEX leader from the state of Michoacán recalls the moment: We were going with the vote of the Mexicans [in Mexico]. But when we became aware of the fiasco, of the lack of people with [Mexican] electoral credentials, there was great disenchantment and all of that hope we had of being able to have major political weight in Mexico [disappeared]. So then it grabbed our attention: Mexico is very far from here, many kilometers. Here is where we are, here is where we are living, and they are at the point of passing a law that is going to make you a criminal – and you continue thinking about voting in Mexico’s next elections? gained absentee voting rights in Mexico, which was juxtaposed by another photo of the July 2005 immigrant rights march (El Imparcial, July 7, 2005).

Vonderlack-Navarro, Rebecca. Immigrant Political Incorporation : The Role of Hometown Associations, LFB

HTA Mobilization for U.S. Immigrant Rights

95

The leader also remembers the deep insult and sense of personal threat that was registered by his immigrant members.

Copyright © 2013. LFB Scholarly Publishing LLC. All rights reserved.

It hit them: This was so bad. The proposal…was so discriminatory that we took it personally. Because before, when you heard about such things on television, yeah, sure, but that is happening there in Washington. It is very far away… But when you begin to see that this is going to affect the doctor who treats your brother who doesn’t have documents, when you see that it is going to be the teacher who gives classes to your nephew who is undocumented, you say,‘Ah chinga, eso esta mal!’ [Screw this, this is bad!]’ We have to change it…. We have to do something, and the people [became] very attentive. I believe there was a certain new level of consciousness. (Interview, May 15, 2008, Chicago, IL.) CONFEMEX leadership wasted no time swinging into motion and responding to the bill during their monthly January meeting with plans for workshops later that month at Casa Michoacán and the Durango Unido headquarters. Michoacán leaders made efforts to invite an immigrant lobbyist to educate the various Chicago federation leaders and their base about the repercussions of the bill. Leaders expressed concern for their base in the January meeting. “We need to make available informational workshops now. The community is confused and they do not know the details of how to get involved [to fight the bill].” (Field notes and CONFEMEX meeting minutes, January 9, 2006.) In the same meeting when CONFEMEX organized a press conference to advertise to the wider community their role in registering the community to vote in Mexico, a clear priority was also given to plan a response to the punitive implications of HR 4437. The anger sparked by Sensenbrenner would make U.S.-focused action a definite priority for CONFEMEX from now and into the future. Federation leaders at the time worried that encouraging their base to protest could prove difficult. Durango leaders in particular were concerned with the lack of panic, and even the outright skepticism, among many of their members. As one noted, “[The law] was bad, but it was worse that people didn’t believe it." Another echoed this concern: “[M]any people ignored the law. A lot of the [member] base

Vonderlack-Navarro, Rebecca. Immigrant Political Incorporation : The Role of Hometown Associations, LFB

Copyright © 2013. LFB Scholarly Publishing LLC. All rights reserved.

96

Immigrant Political Incorporation

ignored it. Many knew it was something dangerous, but not exactly how dangerous it was.” (Interview with former Durango Unido President, May 26, 2008, Chicago, IL.) Other federation leaders encountered a great deal of fear, to the extent that it was unclear whether many HTA members could develop the confidence to participate in what would be a very public event. Leaders from Guanajuato, for example, described how their members expressed concern that the 2006 marches might be a “conspiracy” to get undocumented immigrants out into the streets so as to more easily round them up for deportation. (Interview with Casa Guanajuato cofounder and current president, May 27, 2008.) In any event, it would clearly be up to federation leaders to educate and mobilize the base, as they were quickly coming to the realization that their contentious activity could become important in Chicago. CONFEMEX mobilized by speaking at various federation informational workshops, organizing telephone trees, and mass e-mail distributions. CONFEMEX leaders also worked with the Chicago chapter of NALACC to discuss further the implications of organizing against the bill and planned to host an informational event within Casa Michoacán. (Field notes, Chicago NALACC meeting, December 7, 2005; February 1, 2006; March 1, 2006; Durango Unido headquarters, Chicago, IL.) CONFEMEX leaders also used many consulate-related events, especially during the organizing of the annual Fiestas Patrias (Mexican Independence Day), to make announcements to promote the March 10 efforts. Just days before the demonstration, while organizing an event at the consulate for the Fiestas Patrias celebrations, the Guanajuato President revealed how important he expected the March 10 rally to be for CONFEMEX and the broader immigrant community. “I think we are at the start of a social movement.” (Field notes, Guanajuato President, March 1, 2006, Chicago consulate, Chicago, IL.) Certain federations took an especially energetic role in organizing the rally. When the Hidalgo federation leaders began to realize the extreme implications of the potential law, they quickly immersed themselves in making phone calls to enlist volunteers and to turn out their base. A small federation with a large number of undocumented members, Hidalgo was quickly able to round up 80 volunteers to coordinate security for March 10, and soon found itself dedicating all of its organizational energies to the marches to the extent that the federation even suspended its annual Mexico-oriented banquet and

Vonderlack-Navarro, Rebecca. Immigrant Political Incorporation : The Role of Hometown Associations, LFB

HTA Mobilization for U.S. Immigrant Rights

97

cultural festivities. “We focused 100 percent on immigrant rights,” recalled one leader, who felt personally transformed by the experience. “Sensenbrenner helped me find my purpose to defend people who didn’t have a voice." (Interview with Hidalgo federation president and secretary, June 23, 2008, Chicago, IL.) Other federation leaders chose to mobilize their base by drawing on the list of contacts they had formed through their recent drive to register Mexican absentee voters (Shannon 2007). In the process, the growing level of trust that had developed within the larger confederation of CONFEMEX ensured that the various federation leaders were able to coordinate their efforts effectively.

Copyright © 2013. LFB Scholarly Publishing LLC. All rights reserved.

The Uneasy Merging Organizing Fields

of

Chicago’s

Emigrant/Immigrant

One direct outcome of the political impact of HR 4437 was that it quickly brought together the two parts of the Latino communityorganizational field that had long seen one another as working on separate sides of the migrant/immigrant agenda. If the 2006 marches emerged in part out of a long-developing network of organizational ties, as one study (Cordero-Guzman et al. 2008) convincingly proposes, it took a threat as powerful as Sensenbrenner for Chicago’s grassroots organizations to overcome the deep divide between Mexico- versus U.S.-oriented organizing. On February 15, 2006, sixteen leaders from both sides of the Mexico- and U.S.-focused organizing realms attended an ad hoc meeting at Casa Michoacán, the federation’s Pilsen headquarters, to plan a rally for the following month. They would soon be known as the March 10th Committee, after the date of this first march. (Ad hoc committee minutes, “Resumen de la reunion del comite ad hoc en contra de la HR 4437, 15 de febrero del 2006, Casa Michoacán.”) The choice of venue for the meeting was itself significant, as it was long viewed by transnational-association organizers as terreno neutral (a politically neutral site) because it was not affiliated with any of the Mexican political parties. Casa Michoacán came to be similarly trusted by the various March 10th Committee participants. HTA leaders began to proudly refer to it as Casa de Todo

Vonderlack-Navarro, Rebecca. Immigrant Political Incorporation : The Role of Hometown Associations, LFB

98

Immigrant Political Incorporation

(House of Everyone) in order to highlight its unifying role in the fight against Sensenbrenner.53 The initial ad hoc meeting quickly set the mega-march rally organizing into motion. At the first meeting, organizers set the date of the rally for March 10, 2006. They also promoted Chicago as a “sanctuary city” for immigrants; discussed activists’ anger and a desire to confront Barack Obama for his decision to support border fence construction; established three of the five march committees (press committee, logistics, and security and communication); and scheduled the first press release about the March 10 rally on Thursday, February 16 at Casa Michoacán.54 Organizers wanted to deliberately move the demonstration outside of Latino-dominated areas into the city’s downtown and more directly confront political leaders. As a Michoacán leader within the ad hoc committee reflected: “It [downtown] is where the center of power is." While choosing a day during the weekend might be easier to mobilize their base, the activists strategically pushed for the March 10 work day in order to paralyze downtown activity and call attention to their fight. They strategized about how a mass

Copyright © 2013. LFB Scholarly Publishing LLC. All rights reserved.

53

According to the activists, Casa Michoacán continued to be the headquarters for the mega-march planning for 2006 and even 2007 for several reasons: first, it is located in the heart of Pilsen, a centrally located and predominantly Mexican-immigrant area of the city; second, Casa Michoacán is reportedly trusted by various immigrant groups; third, it provides a large and accommodating space with flexible hours for meetings; fourth, the federation owns the building, which meant that organizers did not have to seek anyone’s permission or approval for holding the meetings; and a fifth reason (and perhaps the most imperative) the Michoacán federation headquarters was perceived by many community leaders as “terreno neutral (neutral terrain)” was because no Mexican or U.S. political party interests are associated with their public space, a logical organizing concern for leaders immersed in the transnational voting campaign. A PRD activist claimed that because Casa Michoacán was perceived by the larger community as politically centrist, no one felt uncomfortable meeting there. (Interview with PRD Activists October 9, 2008 and October 19, 2008, Chicago, IL.) 54 The meeting was organized by a Michoacán federation leader and a PRD activist who were both IME Advisors. They were both interviewed for the study. (Michoacán federation leader, May 25, 2008 and PRD Activist October 9, 2008, Chicago, IL.)

Vonderlack-Navarro, Rebecca. Immigrant Political Incorporation : The Role of Hometown Associations, LFB

Copyright © 2013. LFB Scholarly Publishing LLC. All rights reserved.

HTA Mobilization for U.S. Immigrant Rights

99

demonstration during a Friday rush hour would create “mas dolor (more pain)” for Chicago commuters. (Interview with initial Ad Hoc member and Michoacán federation leader, May 25, 2008, Chicago, IL.) Also critical within the February meeting was a pressing desire for the community turnout for the rally to be extraordinary. And it was here that the role of Chicago’s HTA confederation would become significant. Long established grassroots immigrant leadership in Chicago viewed CONFEMEX’s potential to turn out their base as important for the March 10 demonstration. Just two days following the initial ad hoc meeting, the leadership of the Centro Sin Fronteras organization met with certain CONFEMEX leaders to discuss upcoming March 10 planning efforts. It was obvious the Centro Sin Fronteras director, Emma Lozano, was well connected and streetwise to what it would take to launch a successful mobilization. While not an immigrant herself, she was a long-time mainstay of local immigrant organizing. Lozano had been a central leader within the recent and sizable July 2005 demonstrations where her working relationship with El Pistolero deejay had supplied her with a powerful platform to communicate with the broader immigrant community. (Interview with Emma Lozano, Centro Sin Fronteras Executive Director, October 18, 2008, Chicago, IL.) Many CONFEMEX leaders were wary of Lozano’s often confrontational style. Some federation leaders questioned her intentions in local immigrant organizing. “She acts like she is going to be the savior of us all." Nevertheless, with the dire implications of the Sensenbrenner bill looming, the leaders were willing to push their differences aside and work with Lozano in order to launch collective resistance. (Field observations, February 17, 2006; March 1st, 2006, Durango Unido Offices, Chicago, IL.)55 The early mega-march planning meetings were chaotic, lasting late 55

Reed, Robert. 2006. “Air Power,” Chicago Magazine, January. www.chicagomag.com/Chicago-Magazine/January-2006/Air-Power. Also, Univision Communications. 2004. “Que Buena 105.1FM and ‘El Pistolero’ Make Chicago Radio History.” April 3. Available at: www.univision.net/corp/en/pr/Chicago_23042004-2._Avila, Oscar. 2006. “Shooting for a big turnout; ‘Pistolero’ steps away from shock jock persona to push immigrants’ march, rally.” Chicago Tribune, March 10.

Vonderlack-Navarro, Rebecca. Immigrant Political Incorporation : The Role of Hometown Associations, LFB

Copyright © 2013. LFB Scholarly Publishing LLC. All rights reserved.

100

Immigrant Political Incorporation

into the evening. Tensions between activists became palpable and CONFEMEX leaders were skeptical about whether this unruly group could pull off the demonstration. Growing quickly from fourteen to close to fifty leaders, the planning process also grew unwieldy, and at times CONFEMEX leaders complained. “Everyone wants to be a leader.” (Chicago NALACC field notes and minutes, March 1, 2006, Durango Unido headquarters, Chicago, IL.) Just days before the rally, federation leaders from Durango, Hidalgo, Michoacán, and Guanajuato worried aloud about the planning proceedings. “While we are in agreement with the point of the meetings, much is being lost with its lack of structure.” (Field observations February 23, 2006, Comite Ad Hoc en Contra de la HR 4437.) One source of internal dissension was over what symbols should be used in the protest. CONFEMEX endorsed the idea of protestors carrying U.S. flags as a means of conveying their political membership and sense of belonging in American society. Other organizers pushed hard for the use of Mexican flags, which they argued would uphold their heritage and directly confront racial discrimination against Mexicans. CONFEMEX president Marcia Soto encouraged the various leaders within the ad hoc meetings to think strategically about how to attract the mainstream American public to their cause claiming, “They vote too” and encouraging the group to avoid “grocerias" (rudeness) within their slogans. “…[W]e need to look like part of the community not ‘terrorists’ outside of the community—our own kids are gringos" (U.S.-born). The debate reflected contrasting views about the need for self-expression and racial identity in an increasingly discriminatory environment versus what CONFEMEX leaders believed would be politically effective in winning immigration reform. Representing an HTA base where many members—and some leaders—lacked legal status, CONFEMEX leaders argued, “necessitamos sensitizer a la gente" (we need to sensitize the people) and lure them to their side of the battle. It was critical, in their perspective, that demonstrators be willing to bear the U.S. flag and show allegiance to their new country. (Field observations, February 23, 2006, Comite Ad Hoc en Contra de HR 4437.) The ensuing turnout on March 10 was not only enormous but it was also, surprisingly, the result of local efforts. Rather than national civil rights organizations or labor unions taking leadership, the Chicago March 10th Committee comprised an unparalleled coming together of

Vonderlack-Navarro, Rebecca. Immigrant Political Incorporation : The Role of Hometown Associations, LFB

HTA Mobilization for U.S. Immigrant Rights

101

Copyright © 2013. LFB Scholarly Publishing LLC. All rights reserved.

local grassroots organizations, especially CONFEMEX, which demonstrated its closeness to the ground by showing a strong capacity to mobilize its HTA base. A local Chicago activist, Board President of the ICIRR, talked about the role of HTAs in the mobilizations as follows: Without the HTAs that thing [the marches] does not happen…there’s absolutely no way that thing happens…they have a spirit of volunteerism. They have organized events with actually no resources. So…they don’t have as much of an established political perspective in the U.S. That, you know, groups that have been involved in La Lucha (the struggle) here [in Chicago] for a long time have…I mean, who’s going to do all the work for stuff to happen that made that thing a reality? I mean all the things that people take for granted, that actually happened [in the marches], you know…so it’s their experience, their volunteer base…I believe created the spirit; created the relative sense of neutrality in the midst. Of an environment that was far from neutral, I mean toxically nonneutral…I just don’t see it [the marches] happening if it was based in any other institution other than Casa Michoacán because, you know, it’s [an] open environment. (Interview, January 9, 2009, Chicago, IL.) While CONFEMEX demonstrated its grassroots connections by mobilizing large numbers of its HTA base, CONFEMEX also benefited from its newcomer status within local protest politics—that is, from the perception on the part of other organizations that the HTA federations could operate as a neutral, trustworthy coalition partner. Furthermore, Juan Salgado was quick to notice that HTAs responded more quickly to Sensenbrenner, in contrast to larger, national-level organizations, as the bill would directly impact their membership base of mixed legal status: Q: Why do you think national-level Latino organizations weren’t involved in March 10th? A: Yeah, well, I mean, oh brother, you know, I don’t blame them for not [being involved] because it’s not the kind of organizations they are…they’re tightening up and they’re

Vonderlack-Navarro, Rebecca. Immigrant Political Incorporation : The Role of Hometown Associations, LFB

102

Immigrant Political Incorporation

Copyright © 2013. LFB Scholarly Publishing LLC. All rights reserved.

getting stronger now, but it’s not like they listen to the membership… They do, they consult with us, but they run an organization that we’re part of…it’s very different from ICIRR, which is a membership-driven organization, and even ICIRR is very different from HTAs, you know. It’s a whole different level of grassroots between the Coalition and what the HTAs are…the closer you are to the community, the, the more risk you’re willing to take. Because you have less to lose, more to gain, and the more urgency you feel, because you’re facing the consequences of [government] actions immediately. You face it quicker in real time and you face it without access to a whole lot of resources to do much about it." (Interview, January 9, 2009, Chicago, IL.) A local PRD organizer claimed national organizers were “caught flatfooted because institutions can’t move fast enough.” (Interview, October 9, 2008, Chicago, IL.) In addition, there was also very minimal representation of labor unions in the first March 10 outcry. Because they are relatively more structured and bureaucratic, unions moved more slowly, with the local Service Employee Industrial Union (SEIU) providing last minute funds to help with logistical and stage support. Local migrant activists who work closely with unions explained in our interviews that organized labor did not know how big the March 10 demonstration was going to be, nor did it understand its importance for immigrants.56 Chicago’s immigrant community provided the first mobilization in the country to respond to the Sensenbrenner bill on March 10, 2006 with a massive, yet peaceful march towards the city’s downtown. The rally started in the city’s Near West Side and headed toward the Chicago Loop to the Federal Plaza. Crowd estimates varied, between 100,000 to as many as 150,000 protestors.57 As leaders had strategized, 56

Interviews with PRD activist Jorge Mujica, Oct 9, 2008, and Michoacán federation leader Artemio Arreola, May 25, 2008, Chicago, IL. 57 Olivo, Antonio and Oscar Avila. 2006. “United they march. Hundreds of thousands rally for immigration rights. ‘We have to change the world.’" Chicago Tribune, May 2; Martinez, Michael. 2006. “Rallies draw over 1 million. Economic impact not clear, but businesses note worker shortages." Chicago Tribune, May 2; Associated Press. 2006. “At a Glance: Immigration

Vonderlack-Navarro, Rebecca. Immigrant Political Incorporation : The Role of Hometown Associations, LFB

Copyright © 2013. LFB Scholarly Publishing LLC. All rights reserved.

HTA Mobilization for U.S. Immigrant Rights

103

the demonstration served to freeze downtown Chicago activity and drew broader awareness to their cause. The organizers of the March 10th Committee were shocked and emotionally moved by the massive turnout. And though national legislation was growing more punitive, numerous Illinois local state actors endorsed the marches and spoke at the rally, as they had much to gain from the mounting political consciousness of this potential voting bloc. In direct defiance to Sensenbrenner’s criminalization tactic, Illinois Governor Blagojevich and other local lawmakers spoke at the rally endorsing immigrants as valuable economic contributors to the state. The mega-march instigated a discernable change for CONFEMEX in recognizing its own political power in the United States. CONFEMEX leaders reflected on the emotionally-charged mass turnout claiming, “We woke up." The threat of Sensenbrenner instigated what felt like a turning point with the base, according to a Durango leader who reflected just days after the march: “this was something new for them [the clubs].” In turn, they yearned to maintain their momentum for organizing for future demonstrations. (Field notes, March 18, 2006.) Another Durango leader wryly noted, “We should give thanks to Sensenbrenner,” as the political threat propelled their base into U.S.-focused contentious activism. (Field notes, May 10, 2008, Chicago, IL.) Another leader from Michoacán discussed the growth in their U.S. political awareness: “The marches were a development in the collective consciousness of the importance of immigration reform.” (Field notes, May 15, 2008, Chicago, IL.) Another CONFEMEX leader described the impact in their organizational agenda as follows: … it gave us a lot of strength and energy to continue working…I believe that now we have more responsibility than before…if you are going to rouse the people, if you are going to teach them, if you are going to tell them to talk about their rights, you also have to teach them what are their rights…this is a responsibility that has come upon us…we have changed a Legislation,” Chicago Tribune, May 18; and Associated Press. 2006. “Contra ley antiinmigrante." La Cronica de Hoy. March. Available at: www.cronica.com.mx

Vonderlack-Navarro, Rebecca. Immigrant Political Incorporation : The Role of Hometown Associations, LFB

104

Immigrant Political Incorporation

Copyright © 2013. LFB Scholarly Publishing LLC. All rights reserved.

little our vision that we had in the beginning that was nothing more [than] Mexico…we are showing the people that they should vote [in the U.S.], and I think we have had a lot of impact because there were a lot of people that were [U.S.] residents for many years and nothing more, and we have shown that you are not losing Mexico when you become a [U.S.] citizen. In fact we are winning as federations…I think the marches helped us to understand that we can be American citizens and work in two countries. (Interview with Durango leader, May 6, 2008, Chicago, IL.) The March 10, 2006 rally brought a new energy to CONFEMEX, a sense of political efficacy in U.S. affairs, and a new sense of responsibility to promote the U.S. political incorporation of their base. Tensions materialized, however, as some long-standing local leaders feared Casa Michoacán and CONFEMEX leaders might gain too much credit for their role in the March 10 demonstration. Emma Lozano from Centro Sin Fronteras joined with El Pistolero in his radio show to criticize the federations following the March 10 rally. Federation leaders were highly distressed that the deejay spent more than an hour on his radio show claiming the federation leaders monopolized the microphone at the rally’s central stage and were not helpful in turning out their base to march. He even called the federation leaders outright disrespectful. While the federation leaders were transformed and elated about their new leadership role in the marches, they were greatly distressed by these accusations. Leaders within the movement (like El Pistolero), accustomed to receiving much glory for drawing out the rank-and-file through the radio waves, were not inclined to easily share the spotlight with federation leaders. In an evaluation meeting of the March 10 event, community leaders were distressed by how the “dirty laundry” of the activists had been aired on the radio. The meeting minutes aimed to reconcile the tensions. “Conflicts and disagreements within the group [the committee] should be resolved within the group and not on the radio." The tensions revealed that the immigrant unity necessary to mobilize for March 10 was fragile. (Field notes, March 18, 2006; Ad Hoc minutes, “Reunion de Evaluacion de Comite en Contra de la HR 4437,” March 18, 2006.) Despite the threat felt by other demonstration leaders at the federations' new entrance into U.S.-based protest activity,

Vonderlack-Navarro, Rebecca. Immigrant Political Incorporation : The Role of Hometown Associations, LFB

HTA Mobilization for U.S. Immigrant Rights

105

Copyright © 2013. LFB Scholarly Publishing LLC. All rights reserved.

CONFEMEX’s crucial role in organizing the March 10 rally eventually gave its organizers new standing as emergent leaders in U.S.-focused immigrant organizing. Emma Lozano, director of Centro Sin Fronteras, during a reflective 2008 interview talked of the federations and clubs as follows: “They were finally rolling up their sleeves and getting involved with people on this side of the border…They are going to continue to grow and have power in this history…all of these adults have U.S. children….” (October 18, 2008, Chicago, IL.) The Mexican government Advisor to the Institute of Mexicans Abroad, Omar Lopez (also an NGO director in Chicago who managed all of the March 10 organizing meetings), claimed that the CONFEMEX leadership played an important role in the marches as they passed information onto their members, involved their base in the march, and motivated their people to get out on the day of the march: This was something to be admired because this was an entirely new experience, entirely out of their scope…their scope was Mexico, and in some ways still is. This [the march] wasn’t in their view and they were able to adapt and they did change. And I think the marches changed them. They had to look at the life of the Mexicans who are here …they saw there is a lot of work to be done here for the welfare of their members. (Interview, October 9, 2008, Chicago, IL.) CONFEMEX was gaining new recognition as an organization now responsive to U.S. immigrant concerns. Moving forward, CONFEMEX’s organizational priorities directed towards the U.S., namely U.S. voter mobilization and participation in subsequent marches, would be given equal importance to those focused on Mexico. The March 10 mobilization was a pivotal moment in the recent history of immigrant organizing. Organizers around the country took note of what happened in Chicago. Organizers in Los Angeles, California were quoted in the Chicago Tribune claiming, “We’ve been taught a lesson by Chicago…Thanks to Chicago there will be more people interested in our efforts,” as they too were in the midst of

Vonderlack-Navarro, Rebecca. Immigrant Political Incorporation : The Role of Hometown Associations, LFB

106

Immigrant Political Incorporation

planning their own city-based protest.58 Ultimately, Chicago’s activism further propelled the ignited ripple effect of immigrant uprisings that would continue throughout the country.59 Most notably, Chicago’s March 10 mobilizations sparked immigrants’ collective resistance to Sensenbrenner that would come to the forefront of the nation’s awareness as synchronized national rallies took place on May 1, 2006.

Copyright © 2013. LFB Scholarly Publishing LLC. All rights reserved.

Conclusion In retrospect, it is clear that Chicago’s March 10 mobilizations played an important role in fueling immigrants’ collective resistance to Sensenbrenner, emerging in full flower in the synchronized national rallies that would take place on May 1, 2006. What has been less clear is how traditionally Mexico-oriented HTAs, which had long avoided U.S.-focused protest activity, came to occupy such an important leadership position in the March 10 events. This chapter asked, how is it that Chicago’s traditionally Mexicanfocused confederation of HTAs came to embrace U.S.-focused contentious action? It is only through the examination of longer-term political developments of state-migrant relationships within both Mexico and the U.S. that we can fully understand how these traditionally Mexico-oriented organizations, which had long avoided U.S.-focused protest activity, came to take up such a valuable leadership stance in the March 10 events. Chicago HTAs’ involvement in U.S.-centered protest thus resulted from a long-standing, multi-step organizational response to different state actors at various points in history. First, the beginnings of HTAs’ dramatic growth during the 1990s, when the organizations began to receive significant political recognition from the Mexican state, was a critical time period for garnering political agency within Mexican politics. HTAs during this decade were developing what McAdam (1982) regards as a critical element of popular mobilization: “indigenous organizational strength” (43). Leaders during this time period nurtured an important norm of 58

Ávila, Oscar and Antonio Olivo. 2006. “Rally stirs both sides; Across U.S., immigration supporters, foes view Chicago rally as catalyst." Chicago Tribune, March 12. 59 Espinosa, Leticia. 2006. “Bendicen una delegación que viaja a Washington." Hoy Chicago, March 27.

Vonderlack-Navarro, Rebecca. Immigrant Political Incorporation : The Role of Hometown Associations, LFB

Copyright © 2013. LFB Scholarly Publishing LLC. All rights reserved.

HTA Mobilization for U.S. Immigrant Rights

107

political engagement and efficacy. Second, HTA organizational growth during the post-9/11 period sheds light on how both Mexican and U.S. government action prompted an increasing HTA focus on U.S.-related activities. And, third, following the passage of Sensenbrenner in 2005, an organizational transformation emerged as HTAs embraced U.S.centered popular mobilization. Indeed, within a few short months CONFEMEX leaders did not just go along with the crowd, but took a leadership role in U.S.-focused protest. This study’s broader historical social movement approach provides a larger analytic purchase for understanding HTAs’ evolution than do studies that rely heavily on either assimilationist or transnationalist analyses. Unlike assimilation frameworks, CONFEMEX’s recourse to social mobilization was not due to a steady course of abandoning the old country over time to embrace political allegiance to the new host society. Nor can transnational frameworks, which tend to downplay the host society, adequately explain what triggered CONFEMEX leaders to rush into U.S. protest action. In contrast, a bi-national social movement paradigm allows for a broader exploration of longer-term political processes and their potential relation to the emergence of an immigrant rights movement. The study’s modified political process model in particular offers the analytic linkages between the complex and shifting politics of immigration, the strategic agendas of grassroots organizations like Chicago’s confederation of HTAs, and the unexpected recourse to contentious mobilization. The study’s framework also provides insight as to the political conditions within the immigrant rights movement under which threats can become catalytic. The study’s political process model continues to be useful in the following chapter as it explores the events that led up to and quickly followed the historic May Day rally of 2006. The immigrant movement would quickly enter a path towards U.S. political institutionalization, an effort strongly encouraged by the increasing number of professional organizations, unions, and state actors drawn towards the protest activity and who aimed to accommodate immigrants’ mounting U.S. political consciousness. CONFEMEX’s new leadership role in Chicago’s local protest meant they were now an even more attractive grassroots base for courting emergent Mexican immigrants’ U.S. voting potential. More broadly, the following chapter sheds light on the complex interactions between a range of actors within Mexico, the

Vonderlack-Navarro, Rebecca. Immigrant Political Incorporation : The Role of Hometown Associations, LFB

108

Immigrant Political Incorporation

Copyright © 2013. LFB Scholarly Publishing LLC. All rights reserved.

United States, and CONFEMEX as they attempt to mobilize various activities that traverse the two countries.

Vonderlack-Navarro, Rebecca. Immigrant Political Incorporation : The Role of Hometown Associations, LFB

CHAPTER 5

Copyright © 2013. LFB Scholarly Publishing LLC. All rights reserved.

May Day Opens Doors: Mobilization and Participation, May through November 2006

Invigorated by the massive turnout of the March 10 rally, CONFEMEX leadership submerged themselves in planning an even larger set of nationally-coordinated mass marches scheduled for May 1. In the wake of the March 10 rally and subsequent immigrant mobilizations throughout the country, national civil rights organizations, labor unions, and certain political actors quickly aligned with the burgeoning immigrant rights movement. Along with more institutionalized leadership came a great motivation to keep the marches peaceful and non-confrontational along with strong desire to swiftly channel immigrants’ protest activity into conventional forms of U.S. political participation and interest group consolidation (e.g., citizenship acquisition and voter drives). CONFEMEX, representing a new grassroots base of Mexican immigrants still largely marginalized from U.S. political circles, was now an even more attractive organization for professional organizations and government actors interested in attracting new voting constituencies. Between May and the U.S. congressional elections in November 2006, CONFEMEX made critical choices about how to successfully use their newly-acquired political leverage to advance immigrant interests. What would be the impact of popular mobilization for immigration policy and politics for CONFEMEX and its base of HTAs, and for immigrant leaders themselves? As immigrants throughout the nation 109

Vonderlack-Navarro, Rebecca. Immigrant Political Incorporation : The Role of Hometown Associations, LFB

Copyright © 2013. LFB Scholarly Publishing LLC. All rights reserved.

110

Immigrant Political Incorporation

took to the streets, local organizers (including CONFEMEX) had a new faith and optimism that immigration reform could happen because of people’s growing political consciousness. In addition, politicians who could benefit from a mobilized immigrant electorate worked to reinforce migrants’ political legitimacy. CONFEMEX, as a new leader in the U.S. immigrant rights movement, faced new challenges. How should it respond to the growing attention it was receiving from Illinois politicians and advocacy groups? What would be its position within the new U.S.-based oppositional movement field? Migrant leaders, over the course of a few months, had to make difficult decisions between the pursuit of institutional versus non-institutional tactics. Furthermore, HTAs’ organizational claims were now more than ever influenced by multiple state projects. Until 2006, HTAs had been largely defined by their evolving interactions with the Mexican state, which exalted its expatriates as “heroes” who even if they did integrate politically into the U.S. could function as bi-national citizens and make lasting economic and political contributions to Mexico. With the spring 2006 demonstrations, the power and salience of the United States’ state discourse on immigration became a critical influence on Chicago’s HTA confederation. One important political framework in the U.S. was based on a rhetoric of alarm and repugnance toward new arrivals who posed dangers to the country’s White-Anglo-Saxon-Protestant stock, threatened the nation’s security, and refused to assimilate into the body politic. In contrast, an alternative framing existed. This particular discourse involved a narrative about brave men and women of the past credited for building the foundation of this country, who pulled themselves up by their bootstraps, and who were determined to quickly assimilate by learning English and becoming U.S. citizens (see Foner 2005, 207-212). In critical moments of immigration reform in the U.S., the latter frame has served as a powerfully legitimating influence to facilitate immigrant political incorporation. Indeed, it was the robust sense of political legitimation that contributed in part to the confederation’s response to Sensenbrenner as a confident, contentious vehicle of mobilization. CONFEMEX, nevertheless, was entering into a U.S. political scene that had long provided a conditional path of immigrant inclusion. U.S. political membership required immigrants to adopt our language and play by our rules (i.e., a U.S.-only agenda). CONFEMEX leaders indeed felt energized by the attention of local U.S. state actors and established immigrant advocacy groups who

Vonderlack-Navarro, Rebecca. Immigrant Political Incorporation : The Role of Hometown Associations, LFB

May Day Opens Doors: Mobilization and Participation

111

encouraged migrants to take a stand for their rights. At the same time, immigrant leaders’ broader bi-national agenda and leadership unity could over time become threatened on their path towards U.S. integration. Chicago’s HTAs, however, called into question traditional notions of U.S. political incorporation. The vast majority of Chicago’s HTAs emerged and grew in political strength during an era of intensified global market integration and Mexico’s resulting extraterritorial diasporic inclusion policies. As HTAs began to move further into U.S.focused political activities, they would continue to engage with the Mexican state. The Mexican state, in turn, would further encourage migrants’ assertion of political rights and incorporation into the U.S. This chapter begins by discussing the momentous May Day rallies of 2006 and examines how CONFEMEX made calculated decisions to further prioritize U.S.-focused interest group strategies. The chapter continues by exploring how both local government and the broader U.S. immigrant advocacy field further spurred the Chicago confederation of HTAs on a path towards interest group consolidation.

Copyright © 2013. LFB Scholarly Publishing LLC. All rights reserved.

“A Day Without Immigrants”: The Historic National MegaMarches of May 1, 2006 The May Day rallies, even more than the momentous March 10 protest, propelled immigrant mass mobilization to the forefront of the nation’s awareness. Various Mexican and U.S. state actors, unions, and large civil rights organizations—quick to notice the significance of the March 10 protest and its ripple effect throughout the country—rapidly supported the flourishing immigrant rights movement. As larger, more established U.S. organizations became involved in the movement, CONFEMEX would quickly be drawn into more of the type of U.S.centered political activities that it had traditionally shunned, such as lobbying, coalition-building, and voter mobilization. Just before the May Day demonstrations, Mexican state officials and programs articulated support for HTAs’ emerging immigrant rights campaign. Advisors and leading organizations within the Mexican government’s Advisory Council of the Institute of Mexicans Abroad (CC-IME) quickly illustrated their solidarity with migrants’ mounting contention following the March 10, 2006 rally. With the success of the March 10 protest, this arm of the Mexican government transformed into

Vonderlack-Navarro, Rebecca. Immigrant Political Incorporation : The Role of Hometown Associations, LFB

Copyright © 2013. LFB Scholarly Publishing LLC. All rights reserved.

112

Immigrant Political Incorporation

a space for diffusing information, planning further immigrant demonstrations, and analyzing future steps in the immigration reform debate. The subsequent cohort of 2006-2008 advisors of the Institute of Mexicans Abroad held their first meeting (VII Official CC-IME meeting) on March 29-31 of 2006 in Mexico City with Chicago leaders, including CONFEMEX leaders, honored for their leadership in the March 10, 2006 rally.60 Their Midwest regional working group meeting served as a convenient venue to discuss outcomes and future plans of the immigrant mobilizations.61 Established national-level Latino organizations also used the Mexican-sponsored event as a platform to endorse the U.S.-focused marches. The prominent organizations involved in the Advisory Council included the Mexican American Legal Defense and Educational Fund (MALDEF), Hispanic American Center for Economic Research (HACER), Hispanic National Bar Association (HNBA), League of United Latin American Citizens (LULAC), National Hispanic Media Coalition (NHMC), New American Alliance (NAA), United Farm Workers (UFW), Hispanic Association of Colleges and Universities (HACU), and the Association of Farm Worker Opportunity Programs (AFOP). It was during a Mexican state-supported conference that these national-level U.S. organizations expressed their commitment to migrants’ U.S.-based contentious activity: Our organizations are excited about the result of your strength (and your desire for moderation; crystallized in the past marches.) We want to work together with you all to give the resources that as organizations we are able to offer…In regards to the marches, we want to place at your disposal a

60

Minutes of the Advisory Council of the Institute of Mexicans Abroad (CCIME). http://www.ime.gob.mex/ccime/VIIreunion.htm (Accessed May 6, 2008). 61 Minutes from the Advisory Council of the Institute of Mexicans Abroad (CCIME) http://www.ime.gob.mx/ccime/VIIreunion/Region_Medio_Oeste.htm (Accessed May 6, 2008).

Vonderlack-Navarro, Rebecca. Immigrant Political Incorporation : The Role of Hometown Associations, LFB

May Day Opens Doors: Mobilization and Participation

113

Copyright © 2013. LFB Scholarly Publishing LLC. All rights reserved.

guide of resources to better the success of our common objectives.62 In order to remain relevant to the emerging grassroots base of the immigrant rights movement, established national Latino organizations desired to draw closer ties to the customarily Mexican-focused migrant organizations. Aware that the Chicago-based Casa Michoacán had transformed into a local planning hub for the immigrant rights struggle, the Governor of Michoacán, Mexico, Lazaro Cardenas Batel, wasted no time in writing a letter to demonstrate his strong support of expatriates abroad. “This May 1st we want to bring forth our solidarity with you all and your families…The struggles of the Michoacanos in the United States are also our struggles,” he proclaimed. He went on to elevate migrants’ fight to the struggles of the civil rights movement: “In the spirit of Martin Luther King and of Cesar Chavez…your movement helps us to consolidate the efforts we aim to accomplish on both sides of the border for the strength of our communities [and] our people.” His validating rhetoric not only empowered emigrants to continue their contentious struggle, but simultaneously aimed to further perpetuate their loyalty to the homeland where their “hero” status became even further elevated. (Letter from Michoacán Governor to Michoacán community in the U.S., sent May 1, 2006, obtained on May 3, 2006, Chicago NALACC meeting, Durango Unido Headquarters, Chicago, IL.) U.S. immigrants’ popular mobilization came to full fruition on May 1, 2006 in synchronized rallies held throughout the country. Unlike the March 10 mobilizations where organizers were caught by surprise by the large turnout, organizers, police, and city officials held trainings within Casa Michoacán with peacekeeping volunteers who were well prepared to manage the peaceful flow of marchers streaming into Chicago's Grant Park. As planned throughout the nation, more than one million immigrants in various U.S. cities simultaneously poured into the streets to protest their opposition to HR 4437. Protestor turnouts were estimated at 400,000 in Chicago, 650,000 in two separate rallies held in Los Angeles, 75,000 in Denver, 15,000 in Houston, 62

http://www.ime.gob.mx/ccime/VIIreunion/Organizaciones_Latinas.htm. (Accessed May 6, 2008).

Vonderlack-Navarro, Rebecca. Immigrant Political Incorporation : The Role of Hometown Associations, LFB

Copyright © 2013. LFB Scholarly Publishing LLC. All rights reserved.

114

Immigrant Political Incorporation

30,000 in Florida, tens of thousands in New York City, and thousands in other areas including Las Vegas, San Diego, and San Francisco. In historic solidarity, demonstrators enacted a “Day without Immigrants”63 by taking off work, boycotting U.S. products, initiating school walk-outs, and rallying in the streets. “Hoy marchamos, Manana votamos! (Today we march, tomorrow we vote!)" remained one of the many rally cries demanding that politicians take heed of their growing political clout (Associated Press 2006; Olivo and Avila 2006; Martinez 2006). Latino dominated schools in Chicago estimated that between 30 to 50 percent of students were not in school on May 1 as they were most likely participating in the rally.64 Reflecting the vast demographic growth of immigrants in suburban areas, demonstrations also occurred in the Chicago suburbs of Joliet, Cicero, Elgin, Aurora, and as far away as Dekalb.65 The immigrant rally cry also evoked support from union demonstrators in Mexico involved in yearly May Day rallies.66 Chicago’s May 1 planning was accompanied by a surge of support from unions and an increased turnout of elected officials in favor of immigration reform. Organizers within the March 10th Committee were quickly attracted to the idea of linking their cause with the May Day holiday that signified a “Day of Workers." Millions of immigrants planned to boycott their jobs to send a message of the detrimental affect “A Day Without Immigrants” would have for the U.S. economy along with perceiving the symbolic benefit of associating immigrant struggles with broader labor concerns. Within Chicago, UNITE HERE (recently joined garment workers and hotel and restaurant workers) and the SEIU became central contributors to the movement.67 Recognizing 63

This expression was inspired by a film that hypothesizes how the U.S. would function without the valued labor of immigrants. 64 Banchero, Stephanie and Diane Rado. 2006. “Kids skip class to rally, be part of a life lesson." Chicago Tribune, May2. 65 Dardick, Hal and Mary Ann Fergus. 2006. “Concerns Don’t Stop at city line." Chicago Tribune, May 2. 66 Dellios, Hugh. 2006. “Across border, voices of solidarity rise up." Chicago Tribune, May 2. 67 Olivo, Antonio and Oscar Avila. 2006. “United they march. Hundreds of thousands rally for immigration rights." Chicago Tribune, May 2. Also, supported by interviews with Guerrero federation leader on June 8, 2008, and Michoacán federation leader on May 25, 2008, Chicago, IL.

Vonderlack-Navarro, Rebecca. Immigrant Political Incorporation : The Role of Hometown Associations, LFB

Copyright © 2013. LFB Scholarly Publishing LLC. All rights reserved.

May Day Opens Doors: Mobilization and Participation

115

federation leaders’ critical role in the March 10 protest, SEIU hired Chicago Michoacán federation leader Artemio Arreola, an active member of SEIU and initial organizer of the March 10th Committee, to work full time to organize protestor support for the upcoming May Day rally in both Chicago and California. Sensing the immediacy of the May Day rally events, Arreola resigned from the highly regarded position as CONFEMEX’s central organizer of Chicago’s various homeland-focused Fiestas Patrias (Mexican Independence Day) events to instead promote immigrant rights. CONFEMEX leaders took great pride in coordinating the annual Fiestas Patrias in conjuction with the local consulate and other organizations. In the wake of Sensenbrenner, however, federation leaders supported Arreola’s decision to fight for the more immediate cause of immigrant rights. His decision to focus on U.S. over Mexican-oriented activities would provide him (and eventually CONFEMEX) with increased recognition from larger and more established immigrant rights organizations. Many U.S. political officials were now aware that they needed to recalibrate their political strategies if they wanted to capture the loyalty of this politically conscious voting bloc. Notable rising star in the Democratic Party, Illinois Senator Barack Obama, made a significant speaking appearance in Chicago on May Day to endorse the marches and to support the unification of “Americans” in support of their dreams. “What started out as a march born of fear…has now become a movement of hope…People now recognize that this is not just about stopping bad things from happening but also about lifting up the good things that could happen if we all join together as Americans.”68 Obama’s statement was a calculated outreach to the growing Latino voting bloc, many of whom felt alienated and angered by his decision to back the building of the Mexico-U.S. border wall.69 In contrast to the March 10 mega-march that was predominantly Latino, Chicago’s May 1 protest heard rally cries in both English and Spanish, and organizers made a concerted effort to involve a variety of immigrant groups, including Irish, Korean, Guatemalan, and Ghanian 68

Olivo, Antonio and Oscar Avila. 2006. “United they march. Hundreds of thousands rally for immigration rights." Chicago Tribune, May 2. 69 Key appearances at the march also included religious leaders Cardinal Francis George, imams, and rabbis who joined together in an interfaith service towards the end of the rally.

Vonderlack-Navarro, Rebecca. Immigrant Political Incorporation : The Role of Hometown Associations, LFB

116

Immigrant Political Incorporation

to name a few. The march was also increasingly more professionalized than March 10 in that professional immigrant coalitions and unions distributed glossy printed signs for the protestors to display throughout rallies. With increased organizational involvement, there was constant encouragement to keep the marches peaceful and non-disruptive. Already influenced by the trend towards conventional political participation, CONFEMEX leaders voiced the need for immigrants to participate in the U.S. electoral process in a local newspaper, “Go out in Election Day—it doesn’t matter if it’s raining—to show the politicians in office that if they don’t listen to us, they’re out of there.”70 In a relatively quick time period, CONFEMEX leadership embarked upon nonviolent protest behavior that could serve as an eventual conduit for conventional political practice. CONFEMEX was proud of its grassroots nature and ability to motivate its base to march. Yet the confederation’s all-volunteer grassroots structure left it vulnerable to being used by the more professionalized organizations within the March 10th Committee:

Copyright © 2013. LFB Scholarly Publishing LLC. All rights reserved.

A: Because we are the base and we have a lot of people…there in the marches you could see the difference between paid organizations versus the voluntary… Q: What is the difference? A: The difference is that for many of the paid [organizations], they wanted meetings during working day hours, and it could be that they had more knowledge and everything you would want, but it was like one hour…or two hours and they wanted to leave…it could be they were more worried about money than the work. In contrast, the volunteer meetings could be at 11 at night until whatever hour…they were able to stay at a meeting for three hours and they didn’t care, these were the people that had more conviction for their work…because they believe in the cause…they donate their time, their money, 70

Olivo, Antonio and Oscar Avila. 2006. “United they march. Hundreds of thousands rally for immigration rights." Chicago Tribune, May 2. Also Martinez, Michael. 2006. “Rallies draw over 1 million." Chicago Tribune, May 2.

Vonderlack-Navarro, Rebecca. Immigrant Political Incorporation : The Role of Hometown Associations, LFB

May Day Opens Doors: Mobilization and Participation

117

their strength and they don’t look to be a leader. No, they work for the cause and I believe that for this there were many anonymous people…this is to say there are many leaders that have the knowledge and the work permits and all that, but the labor…the hardest labor, well the people del pueblo [from the base] did it…and they never got recognized for it. (Interview with Durango leader, May 6, 2008, Chicago, IL.) As a result, CONFEMEX leaders began talking more than ever about the need to acquire more resources and to professionalize:

Copyright © 2013. LFB Scholarly Publishing LLC. All rights reserved.

…many organizations, the fact is they have office facilities, they are already paid…for this [reason] much of the paperwork was falling out of the hands of CONFEMEX… CONFEMEX does the hard work and a lot of the work, but it falls out of our hands for the fact that we are purely voluntary. (Interview with Durango leader, May 6, 2008, Chicago, IL.) Another federation leader expressed concern over CONFEMEX’s need for professionalization. “We in theory have the base, but practically at times it costs us a lot of work to mobilize [our base] because our people are people that work and [only] until after their work hours [can they volunteer]. So the traditional community organizations bring their staff and they bring their organizers and we are unable to do it.” (Interview with former CONFEMEX president and Durango federation cofounder, May 10, 2008, Chicago, IL.) The confederation became challenged by other more experienced protest leaders who were skilled at dominating publicity events. The power dynamics between seasoned, paid organizers and the volunteers of CONFEMEX became strikingly apparent within the media and publicity committee where a Guerrero federation leader claimed, “Nos comieron (They ate us up)." CONFEMEX provided the location for crucial headquarters, a vast number of volunteers, leadership, and participation in all committees, but they lacked practice at making their organizational name and cause visible to the broader community. “We were new at this…we learned from this.” (Guerrero federation leader and CONFEMEX president, May 2, 2008, Chicago, IL.) Days following the May 1 rallies, CONFEMEX leaders were both elated and

Vonderlack-Navarro, Rebecca. Immigrant Political Incorporation : The Role of Hometown Associations, LFB

Copyright © 2013. LFB Scholarly Publishing LLC. All rights reserved.

118

Immigrant Political Incorporation

exhausted. During their May monthly meeting, leaders debated whether they should stay involved with the March 10th Committee. “[It] eats up all our time” said a tired Hidalguense leader stretched thin from the organizations’ growing activities. She feared she would not have enough energy to carry on her federation’s traditional homelandoriented activities. The majority of leaders, while “cansados (tired)” and bothered by how they were “used” by other U.S.-focused organizations, pushed for CONFEMEX’s continual leadership within what they perceived to be a momentous “movement” in the U.S. A Guerrero leader declared CONFEMEX needed to be more “aggressive” in gaining recognition. In agreement, the CONFEMEX president and Durango federation leader passionately urged the confederation to continue in the immigrant rights struggle. “We are making history. We cannot be outside of the movement. Many other organizations see us as enemies because we [CONFEMEX] have a clean trajectory and we have a lot of abilities to get funds and they are threatened by that." She recognized the positive side to the confederation’s newcomer status and their ability to make a mark in future U.S. political concerns. (Field notes and minutes, CONFEMEX monthly meeting, May 16, 2006, Durango Unido headquarters, Chicago, IL.) CONFEMEX leaders were torn between professionalizing and maintaining their grassroots structure. While wanting to become more known and established (e.g., pushing for NGO status and getting a paid executive director), other CONFEMEX leaders worried about how professionalizing could steer them away from their current bi-national focus and close-to-the-trenches nature. “It would be really sad if we professionalized so much that we lose the vision,” passionately argued the CONFEMEX president months following the marches. CONFEMEX was in the midst of trying to write a description for an executive director position. They wanted someone with experience in writing grants, eliciting funds, and strategically organizing committee work while at the same time understanding their specifically migrantled bi-national vision. Finding someone who entirely understood their broad agenda would prove to be a challenge. (Field notes, CONFEMEX monthly meeting, August 14, 2006.) The desire for professionalization, nevertheless, was incessant as CONFEMEX struggled to mobilize sufficient manpower for its quickly-expanding Mexican, and especially now, U.S.-focused activities. The 2006 mobilizations coincided with the extensive labor-

Vonderlack-Navarro, Rebecca. Immigrant Political Incorporation : The Role of Hometown Associations, LFB

Copyright © 2013. LFB Scholarly Publishing LLC. All rights reserved.

May Day Opens Doors: Mobilization and Participation

119

intensive planning of Chicago’s annual Fiestas Patrias (Mexico’s Independence Day celebration), where CONFEMEX served as the general coordinator. The Fiestas Patrias was an important celebration for HTAs and federations to promote Mexican culture and identity throughout the city. In conjunction with numerous Mexican community organizations, philanthropic and business groups, the Chicago Mexican Consulate, and various Mexican officials, CONFEMEX struggled in 2006 to coordinate the annual desfile (parade), El Grito (Independence Day Event), in Chicago’s Millennium Park, along with various expositions of local businesses, organizations working with the Mexican community, artistic, cultural, and educational events and banquets. CONFEMEX leaders’ closeness to their base came at the cost of a paid staff and sufficient resources to manage their traditional homeland-oriented events along with their newfound focus on U.S. protest. (CONFEMEX monthly minutes, September 18 and October 9, 2006, Durango Unido headquarters, Chicago, IL.) As early as 2006, protest mobilizing did not appear to be an activity that the confederation of HTAs could easily sustain. Despite struggles to manage their expanding agenda and activities, CONFEMEX’s involvement in the 2006 mobilizations transformed the confederation. Now more than ever, the confederation prioritized the U.S. citizenship and electoral participation of its base. The impact of the marches in driving the federation leaders into the U.S. political realm was especially clear during interviews. Leaders from the Guanajuato Federation described how CONFEMEX’s participation in the marches induced a change in their U.S. political awareness. As the co-founder of Casa Guanajuato noted, “it gave us presence [in the U.S.]…the change came with Sensenbrenner, before we just worried about our ranchito [in Mexico.]" The Guanajuato leader saw a great shift in organizational priorities after Sensenbrenner: “[Before] we didn’t talk of immigrant rights at all. The total purpose was to better the communities of origin." Since the marches, an increasing number of members were looking to become citizens and vote in the U.S. “para que nos hacen mas caso, (so they [politicians] pay attention to us more).” (Interview with Guanajuato co-founder and president, May 27, 2008, Chicago, IL.) Invigorated by their leadership in U.S. popular mobilization, CONFEMEX leaders reached the decision that here in the U.S. they could change the political structures that shaped their daily lives. While discussing the impact of the marches, a leader from

Vonderlack-Navarro, Rebecca. Immigrant Political Incorporation : The Role of Hometown Associations, LFB

120

Immigrant Political Incorporation

Hidalgo discussed her own growing awareness of having political power in the United States. “Even though we’re not from this country, we can change the laws here…we have more awareness of the laws here. We know more about civic participation in the U.S.” (Interview with Hidalgo president and secretary, June 23, 2008, Chicago, IL.) A Durango leader tied her new sense of political efficacy to the conclusion that the U.S. was now her home. “We’ve decided to make this our country. No one in the march would let something bad happen to the U.S. Our kids are here.” (Interview with Durango co-founder and former president of CONFEMEX, May 10, 2008, Chicago, IL.) Although just months before the marches she was immersed in a Mexican government voting drive for emigrants, the importance of U.S. politics and immigrants’ secured integration mattered greatly to her and her family’s future. She also discussed the direct reverberations of the marches within her base:

Copyright © 2013. LFB Scholarly Publishing LLC. All rights reserved.

Q: How did it [the marches] impact your base? A: With the base I believe we have motivated the base and they trust the leaders more. We can move forward and we are able to one day achieve reform or something that helps our people. Our people have a lot of hope, the base has a lot of hope that someday there will be a reform…the march was happy. It was the culmination of the people’s frustration. The march was during a time that we were living in persecution, it was a time that people were losing their jobs, mentally the people were really deteriorated mentally. Since they started the ‘no match’ letters these families have been without tranquility. They are not secure, the people are working with fear and I believe the march…it was like the people said “Basta (Enough)! We are persecuted too much!”…and I think the marches, the marches were that, that the people said “Basta (Enough)!” And they were liberated. Another leader from the Guerrero federation expressed that the marches “gave visibility to the Mexican community. Now [U.S.] political leaders notice us more.” He also remarked that the march left him feeling “surprised…Mexicans are so vulnerable and now they stood up for themselves. It motivates you. It gets you going…the

Vonderlack-Navarro, Rebecca. Immigrant Political Incorporation : The Role of Hometown Associations, LFB

May Day Opens Doors: Mobilization and Participation

121

federation was excited.” (Guerrero federation leader and former president of CONFEMEX, May 2, 2008, Chicago, IL.) The leaders talked of Sensenbrenner and the consequent marches as the “empujo mas grande (the largest push)” for their members, many of whom were now motivated to transition from residency to citizenship status. In just seven weeks between the March 10 rally and the more publicly recognized May Day marches, CONFEMEX received noteworthy acknowledgement by state actors, civil rights organizations, and unions as an important grassroots Mexican immigrant constituency. CONFEMEX leaders themselves were greatly transformed by their critical involvement in the rallies, which had a substantial impact on their expanding bi-national Mexico-U.S. political identities. Most striking was the spurred increase in their activities to include U.S.focused interest group efforts.

Copyright © 2013. LFB Scholarly Publishing LLC. All rights reserved.

Expansions in Illinois Political Opportunities CONFEMEX’s Local U.S. Political Action

Entice

CONFEMEX’s determination to influence U.S. immigrant politics was now unmistakable. The confederation’s quick transition into U.S. political circles was also strongly cultivated by increased attention from established immigrant advocacy coalitions. The confederation was viewed by established organizations as having a promising potential as a critical voting bloc and lobbying arm of the immigrant community. By temporarily marginalizing Mexican political concerns, CONFEMEX embraced U.S.-focused interest group strategies, and as a result, gained local recognition as a potentially significant electoral player. At the same time, the confederation’s new organizational strength ran the risk of restricting its broader Mexico-U.S. bi-national vision into a narrower U.S.-focused agenda. Established immigrant organizations with ties to local Illinois government stood to gain from immigrants’ growing political awareness. The aforementioned Illinois Coalition for Immigrant and Refugee Rights (ICIRR), aimed at fostering immigrants’ political integration through its recently formed state-migrant initiative in partnership with Illinois Governor Blagojevich, was a major organizational leader in Illinois and benefited greatly from the protests. ICIRR, in partnership with grassroots immigrant organizations like CONFEMEX, had the infrastructure to capitalize on immigrants’

Vonderlack-Navarro, Rebecca. Immigrant Political Incorporation : The Role of Hometown Associations, LFB

122

Immigrant Political Incorporation

Copyright © 2013. LFB Scholarly Publishing LLC. All rights reserved.

emerging U.S. political participation and had their own intentions in influencing CONFEMEX’s activism to complement their vision of immigrant civic participation (i.e., citizenship campaigns and voting drives). Quickly following the marches, ICIRR strengthened its relationship with CONFEMEX leaders, inviting them to serve within their New Americans Democracy project’s voter mobilization program. CONFEMEX’s leadership in Chicago’s mobilization illustrated a potential for exciting new and specifically Mexican immigrant voters. Just days following the March 10 outpouring, the executive director of the influential ICIRR, Joshua Hoyt, published an op-ed article in the Chicago Tribune that made the case for this strategy. In this view, the Republican party’s criminalization approach to immigration reform, epitomized by the passing of the Sensenbrenner bill, would only serve to mobilize Latino voters to voice their opposition: A little noted fact about the 2004 presidential election was that socially conservative immigrant Latinos were 40 percent more likely to vote for President Bush than U.S.-born Latinos. Now Bush’s and Karl Rove’s carefully crafted and successful Hispanic outreach strategy is shredded lettuce. What does this mean in Illinois? There are about 348,000 legal immigrants in Illinois currently eligible to become U.S. citizens. If a substantial percentage of these folks now take the steps to become U.S. citizens and the immigrant Latinos are cemented into the ‘Blue’ column of voters, it changes the political balance of power in Illinois for the next generation. Any shortterm political gain to be made from the ‘Kick the Illegals” strategy will likely lead to disastrous long-term pain for the Republican Party. (Commentary, Joshua Hoyt, March 14, 2006). Hoyt’s comments touched upon a deep sense of empowerment within the immigrant community. For the CONFEMEX leadership, it suggested that the immigrant voice in U.S. politics carried significant weight. The framing strategy of “Hoy Marchamos, Manana Votamos" (Today We March, Tomorrow We Vote) would become one of the dominant framing strategies within the movement strongly propelled by ICIRR. According to this strategy, immigrants’ contention could become quickly diffused by a pluralist mode of integration: citizenship,

Vonderlack-Navarro, Rebecca. Immigrant Political Incorporation : The Role of Hometown Associations, LFB

Copyright © 2013. LFB Scholarly Publishing LLC. All rights reserved.

May Day Opens Doors: Mobilization and Participation

123

voting drives, and ties to the “Blue” Democratic Party. On the other hand, many local immigrant leaders were invigorated by the mass protests and continued to see non-institutional tactics as critical for sustaining the immigrant rights movement. As a consequence, CONFEMEX leaders dealt with difficult choices about whether to focus their limited organizational energy into continuing to engage in confrontational protest or intensifying their collaboration with ICIRR and state leaders to make gains within local U.S. institutions. At this point in time, the May Day marches were viewed by CONFEMEX leaders as an extraordinary triumph. The unprecedented nationwide rallies cultivated optimism that a comprehensive immigration reform—or at least a path towards legalization—was possible. The future of the immigrant rights movement appeared open. For CONFEMEX, galvanizing immigrant votes and interest group advocacy seemed like the most optimal plan for achieving reform. As a result, CONFEMEX leadership was emboldened and unified as they began prioritizing conventional U.S. political participation over contentious marching. At their July monthly meeting, they brainstormed tactical ways to register their base to vote in the U.S. They planned informational workshops on immigrant rights “to educate the base about the importance of voting” and discussed strategies, including hiring a professional to train federation leaders on how to register voters, organize electoral drives during hometown club annual bailes (dances) and summer events, and holding a press conference where various federation leaders encouraged U.S. voter turnout. So strong was the focus on conventional political participation that CONFEMEX leaders formally voted to decline the invitation to participate with Centro Sin Fronteras, still heavily connected to the El Pistolero deejay, in another march set for July 19, 2006. (Field notes and CONFEMEX monthly minutes, July 11, 2006.) The July demonstration resulted in a much lower protestor turnout, and as a result, drew concern within the immigrant movement conveyed in a local newspaper: “Activists nationally worried that the city was a cautionary tale for rally fatigue at a time when symbolism matters in the immigration debate.” (Olivo et al., 2006).71 CONFEMEX’s non71

The small turnout also suggests that Centro Sin Fronteras and El Pistolero, working outside of the March 10th Committee, did not have the sufficient base and organizational pull to launch massive rallies. Olivo, Antonio, Oscar

Vonderlack-Navarro, Rebecca. Immigrant Political Incorporation : The Role of Hometown Associations, LFB

Copyright © 2013. LFB Scholarly Publishing LLC. All rights reserved.

124

Immigrant Political Incorporation

involvement in the July protest contributed, in part, to a decreased local momentum for contentious politics. The momentary decline in popular mobilization encouraged CONFEMEX leaders all the more to channel their activism into voting. To be sure, CONFEMEX was not altogether giving up on protest strategies; in fact, they were central planners in an anniversary May Day march in 2007. The confederation for now, however, was making a clear distinction from general social movement organizations. Federation leaders made the strategic choice to favor citizenship and voter drives and actively looked to the Illinois capital of Springfield and Washington D.C. to resolve the immigration struggle. For ICIRR, the immigrant contention of 2006 was useful for stimulating the electoral participation of the state’s immigrants. CONFEMEX’s decision to prioritize voting over marching was further advanced by its intensified ties to the influential ICIRR. A month following the marches, CONFEMEX formed a deliberate partnership with ICIRR by becoming a formal member organization of the coalition. As a result, they influenced much of the confederation’s ambitions to re-focus around local civic engagement initiatives. By the summer of 2006, one Guerrero federation leader had a paid job in the ICIRR as Senior Organizer,72 while another Michoacán leader was in talks to become the Political Director by 2007. Still another Guerrero leader sat on the Board of Directors along with a Michoacán leader who worked directly for Illinois Governor Blagojevich. Energized by the potential new opportunities for gaining political clout within the local state arena, the larger federations within CONFEMEX spearheaded the confederation’s ties to the ICIRR. The federations of Avila, and Ofelia Casillas. 2006. “Immigration Rally draws 10,000." Chicago Tribune, July 20. 72 The Guerrero federation leader who worked as a Senior Organizer within the ICIRR was not heavily involved with his federation or CONFEMEX leadership before the 2006 marches. In fact, in our interview he discussed frustrations with HTA and federation leaders who had been more concerned with Mexico than the needs of immigrants in the U.S. It is rumored that the leadership of ICIRR strongly encouraged this Senior Organizer to become active with his Guerrero federation and CONFEMEX in order to encourage their continued U.S.-focused action. Some federation leaders questioned the authenticity of his involvement and thought it was ICIRR’s attempt to control CONFEMEX’s agenda.

Vonderlack-Navarro, Rebecca. Immigrant Political Incorporation : The Role of Hometown Associations, LFB

May Day Opens Doors: Mobilization and Participation

125

Copyright © 2013. LFB Scholarly Publishing LLC. All rights reserved.

Michoacán and Guerrero were both the largest and most active federations within CONFEMEX and had leaders who were making professional gains within ICIRR. Although at times they competed with each other internally for leadership posts within CONFEMEX, these two stronger federations fervently advocated for an alliance with ICIRR. Board President of ICIRR Juan Salgado saw CONFEMEX as offering the potential for a kind of Latino political machine, much like Chicago’s Hispanic Democratic Organization (HDO). The HDO, however, depended on the availability of public-sector jobs in exchange for votes. Nevertheless, HTAs had the potential to serve as a future pipeline for mobilizing votes within Illinois’ Mexican immigrant community: …I think it’s a mistake for some of the [Illinois] political leadership that doesn’t understand this right now…if you spend any amount of time with them [HTAs] you will understand the depth of the relationship that they have with each other… because, you know, the political organizations sometimes are built on a shallow base. You know, it’s a transactional base, right? And so, when the city doesn’t have a lot of jobs, like they did for the HDO [Hispanic Democratic Organization] organization, it dissolves. But the HTAs aren’t going to dissolve, as much as they fight, they’re not going to dissolve. (Interview January 9, 2009, Chicago, IL.) Unlike the previous Hispanic Democratic Organization, famous for its corrupt relationship with Chicago’s machine politics, HTAs were upheld by ICIRR’s leadership as non-corporatist organizations who were not dependent on votes-for-jobs patronage. Instead, the clubs were viewed as having legitimate political influence because of their tightknit, social support networks and ability to withstand infighting and the struggles brought about by "shady" politics. For other CONFEMEX leaders suspicious of ICIRR and its ties to the state government, however, they questioned whether the coalition was using CONFEMEX for their own monetary and political gains. The questioning of ICIRR was more apparent from the smaller and less powerful federation leaders who were not personally or professionally benefitting from involvements with the coalition. Their expressions of doubt would grow into open conflict in subsequent years. Federation

Vonderlack-Navarro, Rebecca. Immigrant Political Incorporation : The Role of Hometown Associations, LFB

Copyright © 2013. LFB Scholarly Publishing LLC. All rights reserved.

126

Immigrant Political Incorporation

leaders from Durango, Hidalgo, and Guanajuato feared that the stronger and more powerful ICIRR could overwhelm CONFEMEX’s agenda. They also insisted that ICIRR, a coalition that claimed to represent Illinois immigrants actually needed the broad base of Mexican immigrants in CONFEMEX in order to maintain its legitimacy more than CONFEMEX needed ICIRR. On the other hand, despite these reservations, even the smaller federations within CONFEMEX were well aware of the great help ICIRR could provide in mobilizing their base to vote. (CONFEMEX meeting minutes, May 16, 2006, June 11, 2006, July 11, 2006.) Despite some misgivings, CONFEMEX leaders decided to become involved in the ICIRR’s New Americans Democracy Project. The program was intended to reach out to specific geographic areas of Illinois with high immigrant concentrations to promote civic education in specific Chicago neighborhoods and surrounding suburbs (Juliet, Aurora, Waukegan, Elgin, Carpentersville, Des Plaines, and Melrose Park). A CONFEMEX leader proudly explained how CONFEMEX was “the organized voice of Mexicans” within the Coalitions’ New Americans Democracy Project striving to fortify relations with other Illinois-based Chinese, Korean, Hindu, and Muslim immigrant coalition member organizations. (Interview, Michoacán leader, May 25, 2008, Chicago, IL.) ICIRR’s courting of the CONFEMEX leadership planted the seeds to advance U.S. voter mobilization of CONFEMEX’s base. Basking in the political attention from more established immigrant organizations with ties to important government leaders, various federation leaders within CONFEMEX were invigorated to influence U.S. political circles. While CONFEMEX as an organization did not directly endorse political candidates, less than one month following the May Day rally of 2006 federation leaders from Michoacán, Guerrero, Guanajuato, Durango, and Hidalgo along with (and not coincidentally) the President of the board of ICIRR, Juan Salgado, independently formed a political action committee called Mexicans for Political Progress, or MXPP. As a CONFEMEX leader on the MXPP executive committee later reflected, “We are Mexicans representing Mexicans. It gives us [Mexican immigrants] a voice.” (Michoacán leader, May 25, 2008, Chicago, IL.) CONFEMEX leaders recognized that while Mexican immigrants were the largest minority group in Illinois, many

Vonderlack-Navarro, Rebecca. Immigrant Political Incorporation : The Role of Hometown Associations, LFB

May Day Opens Doors: Mobilization and Participation

127

Copyright © 2013. LFB Scholarly Publishing LLC. All rights reserved.

of the newly arrived Mexican immigrants lacked their own formal political representation in U.S. circles. Michoacán leader Jose Luis Gutierrez strongly spearheaded the formation of MXPP as a mechanism to provide clubs and federations with an ability to be heard in local politics: Well MXPP was born as a mechanism of urgent civic participation. On the one hand, to send a political message to all the political actors that we exist, that the federations and clubs are here; that we have a working alliance that is very strategic with some community organizations; that we have many volunteers. I believe that was made clear. And personally, and I am not embarrassed to say it, I capitalized on it to raise funds for the position of my office [Office of New Americans Policy and Advocacy] in the office of the governor. And you know what? I am not alone. I am part of this and they [federation leaders] are with me because [without it] we wouldn’t be able to accomplish anything. Was that intelligent? Maybe yes, maybe no. It depends on how you see it. What I really want to tell you about it is that it was necessary to do it. What is the future of MXPP? We have it there, when it is necessary to use it. [And] we are going to use it because we continue to be active in the community. We continue working with a plan. So, well, it is the political arm [of the federations]…necessary to win political spaces. And maybe tomorrow we’ll decide to launch someone from our group [for public office]. (Interview, May 15, 2008, Chicago, IL.) The new political action committee wasted little time. By late summer 2006, Gutierrez, Salgado, and other leaders had organized themselves sufficiently to provide both financial and volunteer support for a number of local electoral campaigns including those of Illinois Governor Rod Blagojevich, Democratic House of Representative Luis V. Gutierrez, and the congressional campaigns for democratic nominees Tammy Duckworth and Mark Pera. All of these candidates had strong ties with ICIRR, which was the fundamental reason why CONFEMEX leaders within the political action committee decided to support them. MXPP’s support of Blagojevich was partly a form of

Vonderlack-Navarro, Rebecca. Immigrant Political Incorporation : The Role of Hometown Associations, LFB

Copyright © 2013. LFB Scholarly Publishing LLC. All rights reserved.

128

Immigrant Political Incorporation

political payback (as expressed by the Blagojevich appointee) for fundraising, and they perceived that campaign efforts could fortify the newly formed Office of New Americans Policy and Advocacy. Support for Representative Luis V. Gutierrez was also understandable when considering that he (along with leadership of the ICIRR) interviewed and approved the CONFEMEX leader to assume his state appointed position. Federation support for the MXPP was also a vigorous attempt to increase CONFEMEX’s bargaining power with elected officials who could advance immigrant interests. The campaigns of congressional Democratic nominees Mark Pera and Tammy Duckworth were chosen because they were set to oust incumbents who voted in favor of the Sensenbrenner bill.73 CONFEMEX’s new decision to prioritize the development of a powerful Mexican immigrant voting bloc within the U.S. was understandable, as they wanted to defeat the numerous local lawmakers who supported the Sensenbrenner bill.74 CONFEMEX’s newfound work with ICIRR and local politicians could mean they would have a significant impact on U.S. local and national politics, particularly by achieving another round of immigrant legalization reform. Indeed, at this point in time it seemed the U.S. government was responding to immigrant interests. Not only did the mass marches halt the Sensenbrenner bill, but by May 25, 2006—just days after the May Day protests—a Senate bill pushed by an unlikely bi-partisan partnership between John McCain (R-AZ) and Edward M. Kennedy (D-Mass) had passed. The compromise bill included border enforcement, employer enforcement, a guestworker program, and a path to legalization for a 73

Mark Pera would lose to Dan Lipinski and Tammy Duckworth also lost in 2006, by a mere 2 percent of the vote, to Peter Roskam. Duckworth was later appointed to the Illinois Veterans Affairs Department by Illinois Governor Rod Blagojevich. 74 Numerous local lawmakers from both sides of the political aisle in Illinois voted in support of the Sensenbrenner bill: Democrats Dan Lipinski, Melissa Bean, and Jerry Costello along with Republicans Mark Steven Kirk, Jerry Weller, Judy Biggert, Dennis Hastert, Timothy Johnson, Don Manzullo, and John Shimkus. A smaller minority of local Democratic leaders voted against the bill: Bobby L. Rush, Jesse Jackson Jr., Luis Gutierrez, Rahm Emanuel, Danny K. Davis, Jan Schakowsky, and Lane Evans (Associated Press. 2006. Chicago Tribune, May 2.)

Vonderlack-Navarro, Rebecca. Immigrant Political Incorporation : The Role of Hometown Associations, LFB

Copyright © 2013. LFB Scholarly Publishing LLC. All rights reserved.

May Day Opens Doors: Mobilization and Participation

129

large number of the country’s undocumented immigrants (S. 2611).75 For immigrant activists, it appeared that a path to legalization for many of the nation’s undocumented immigrants was close to legislative reality. As political opportunities for the nation’s immigrants seemed close at hand, it is not difficult to understand why CONFEMEX decided on interest group strategies over marching as their preferred course of action. CONFEMEX’s pursuit of normal politics, however, was not an easy choice for the confederation. Questions remained over how much influence CONFEMEX leaders might have in choosing which local candidates to endorse through the MXPP. While there was consensus on the idea that certain lawmakers were anti-immigrant and hence needed to be ousted, that did not mean their electoral opponent was necessarily fully sensitive to the complexities of immigration reform or to the broader bi-national vision of CONFEMEX. While numerous federation leaders were on board with the formation of MXPP following the momentum of the marches, many CONFEMEX leaders in later years (to be discussed) would come to question such close ties with state actors and worried that ICIRR’s powerful local political agenda might cause CONFEMEX to abandon its own broader binational perspective. For the moment, CONFEMEX’s bi-national vision did seem compromised as political opportunities within local Illinois politics trumped the confederation’s priorities on political concerns within Mexico. As it happened, the 2006 U.S. immigrant marches coincided with the intensely contentious presidential run between Felipe Calderon (PAN) and Andrew Manuel Lopez Obrador (PRD) in Mexico. Calderon won, but by a small margin. Consequentially, Obrador refused to recognize Calderon as the legitimate political winner, and a long-lasting post-election period of strikes and blockades consumed the Mexican capital. As Mexico’s national political scene turned explosive over the election outcome, on September 6, 2006, the majority of CONFEMEX leaders were forming the Mexicans for Political Progress' U.S.-focused political action committee. They began soliciting funds to support the reelection of Illinois Governor Rod Blagojevich through a 75

Sandler, Michael. “House Vote 446: Border Security,” CQ Weekly, January 1, 2007, 65.

Vonderlack-Navarro, Rebecca. Immigrant Political Incorporation : The Role of Hometown Associations, LFB

Copyright © 2013. LFB Scholarly Publishing LLC. All rights reserved.

130

Immigrant Political Incorporation

“Mexicanos con Blagojevich (Mexicans with Blagojevich)” campaign finance dinner held at a local Chicago Mexican restaurant. CONFEMEX activists, who just prior to this were largely consumed with advocating for Mexican absentee voting legislation, were now heavily concentrated on gaining power within local Illinois politics. It was at the Blagojevich fundraising dinner where CONFEMEX leaders began chatting about Mexico City and the pro-Obrador strikes. Instead of sparking a discussion about Mexican politics and expatriate voting, a Durango leader curiously wondered, “What are they [in Mexico] saying about us over here?" While HTAs’ organizational activity had been primarily focused on Mexico for more than a decade, the leader did not show interest in Mexico’s political plight. Instead, she wondered what Mexico was thinking about the immigrant “lucha" (struggle) on the U.S. side of the border. (Field notes, September 6, 2006, Restaurante Hacienda Tecalitlan, Chicago, IL.) Some scholars might argue that migrants’ interest in local U.S. politics over Mexico’s 2006 election outcomes was due to their frustration over the significant limitations placed on their absentee voting processes (see R.C. Smith 2008). And in fact, there were some disgruntled migrant PRD activists in Chicago who, in between advocating for U.S. immigrant rights, talked of forming an alternative consulate in Chicago in defiance of PAN candidate Calderon’s narrow win.76 Yet while Mexico’s political context still remained influential for Chicago immigrants’ organizing, CONFEMEX’s activism was, more importantly, heavily impacted by U.S. politics. CONFEMEX leaders were not only concerned about repressive legislation at the national level, but quickly sprung into action to ally with local political candidates in Illinois. Following a traditional Mariachi and folkloric ballet ensemble, various federation leaders proudly gathered in their photo opportunity with the Illinois Governor who boasted at the campaign finance dinner that he, too, was “a son of immigrants." It was obvious that in a very short time the confederation was garnering important clout on the U.S. side of the border that would continue to change the very nature of its bi-national political priorities. (Field notes, September 6, 2006, Restaurante Hacienda Tecalitlan, Chicago, IL.) 76

Olivo, Antonio and Oscar Avila. 2008. “Tense times hit home at Mexican Consulate." Chicago Tribune, February 9.

Vonderlack-Navarro, Rebecca. Immigrant Political Incorporation : The Role of Hometown Associations, LFB

Copyright © 2013. LFB Scholarly Publishing LLC. All rights reserved.

May Day Opens Doors: Mobilization and Participation

131

Even as CONFEMEX prioritized U.S. political integration, the confederation’s ties to Mexico were not abruptly cut off. Various Mexican political elites would work to further support—not dissuade— the Chicago diaspora’s budding interest in U.S. politics and local integration. An early sign of Mexico’s unrelenting attention towards its expatriates and their secured positioning in the U.S. was made evident by late 2006 when Jose Luis Gutierrez, the Michoacán leader working for Blagojevich, took advantage of his long-time connections with the Mexican consulate to help coordinate a press conference hosted by the Mexican consulate. The conference promoted Blagojevich’s expansion in state services to immigrants regardless of legal status. The consulate was quickly on board to aid in the distribution of Illinois governmental brochures to educate the state’s Mexican immigrant population about the many state services available to them. (CONFEMEX listserv, accessed on September 6, 2006.) The Advisory Council of the Institute for Mexicans Abroad also persisted in espousing migrants’ growing U.S. political participation by inviting U.S.-based academics and consultants to evaluate the marches and make plans for future proimmigrant action.77 Over the next few years, CONFEMEX’s emerging voice in U.S. political affairs would continue to be a high priority for various actors of the Mexican government who had much to gain from the diaspora’s secured political standing in the U.S. Throughout 2006, CONFEMEX’s various repertoires of action, both contentious and normative, along with the broader immigrant rights movement can be seen as a vigorous attempt to make U.S. political leaders accountable to immigrant concerns. By abandoning normal interest group approaches and engaging instead in contentious activity, the momentous marches did successfully halt the Sensenbrenner bill. Yet as attention turned from the grassroots trenches to more formalized interest-group lobbying efforts and bargaining with U.S. national political elites in Washington, political fragmentation prevented movement towards immigration reform. Throughout the 77

During the Advisory Council meeting on October 5, 2006 in Mexico City, academics from the Mexico Institute of the Woodrow Wilson Center were invited to provide insight on the U.S.-based pro-immigrant mobilizations. Mexican Ministry of Foreign Affairs website www.ime.gob.mx/ccime/VIIIreunion/relatoria_al_fin_visibles.htm. Accessed May 6, 2008.

Vonderlack-Navarro, Rebecca. Immigrant Political Incorporation : The Role of Hometown Associations, LFB

Copyright © 2013. LFB Scholarly Publishing LLC. All rights reserved.

132

Immigrant Political Incorporation

year, immigration emerged as one of the most divisive issues for Congress. In contrast to a conservative faction of Republicans in the house pushing for increased enforcement and restrictionist provisions (Wayne 2005),78 in the Senate a large group of moderate Republicans along with Democrats backed Bush’s guestworker plans. As mentioned previously, although the McCain-Kennedy bill did pass the senate, the measure was unable to get the support of hard-lined House Republicans during the summer who claimed an “amnesty” would serve to reward undocumented immigrants who had broken the law. In an effort to appear tough on immigration before the November 2006 elections, on September 13, 2006, House Republicans attempted to pass a set of narrower proposals aimed at halting immigration, which would ultimately fail to pass as well. After nine months of heated debate over immigration, on September 28 Congress approved the construction of a 700-mile “virtual fence” consisting of cameras, motion sensors, and other surveillance technology along the Mexico-U.S. border (HR 6061). Conservative lawmakers were hopeful their toughened security measure would resonate with Republican voters (Sandler 2006a,b).79 The Republicans’ harsh security measures, conversely, helped to trigger political backlash. Along with an unsolved immigration debate, the growing unpopularity of the Iraq War and general disenchantment with the Bush administration, the Democratic Party achieved a farreaching triumph within the congressional elections of November 2006. Democrats gained a majority in the House and Senate, as well as governorships and state legislatures within various localities. Immigrant activists were keenly aware that Bush, in collaboration with the new Democratic majority, had a chance to generate sufficient support to pass immigration reform legislation. Thus, it is not difficult to see why CONFEMEX and much of the broader immigrant

78

Wayne, Alex. “Views of Senate GOP, Bush Threaten Tighter Immigration,” CQ Weekly, January 17, 2005, 115. 79 HR 6061 passed the House on September 14 and the Senate on September 29, 2006. President Bush signed the bill on October 26, 2006. Sandler, Michael. “Legislative Summary: Immigration Policy Overhaul." CQ Weekly, December 18, 2006, 3357. See also Sandler, Michael. “Legislative Summary: Mexican Border Fence.” CQ Weekly, December 18, 2006, 3357, and “House Vote 446: Border Security,” CQ Weekly, January 1, 2006, 65.

Vonderlack-Navarro, Rebecca. Immigrant Political Incorporation : The Role of Hometown Associations, LFB

May Day Opens Doors: Mobilization and Participation

133

community saw the November elections—and electoral strategies in general—as an important avenue for realizing immigrant rights.

Copyright © 2013. LFB Scholarly Publishing LLC. All rights reserved.

Conclusion The time period between the considerable May Day demonstrations to the November elections of 2006 was a whirlwind series of moments for CONFEMEX and the immigrant rights movement in general. The May Day demonstrations saw an unprecedented outpouring of immigrant collective resistance. As Doug McAdam (1982) explains about social movements in general, protestors experienced a “cognitive liberation” as they began to recognize their own power for creating change (48). The U.S. national government responded to the public unrest by marginalizing the Sensenbrenner bill and soon appeared close to a compromise immigration reform that included a legalization provision. At the same time, a number of opportunities for immigrant political influence emerged at the Illinois state level. For CONFEMEX, and much of the immigrant rights movement, the May Day demonstrations ignited a hope that a pro-immigrant legislative change could be achieved. As a result, organizational leaders almost from the genesis of the movement did not aim to intensify the momentum of public unrest, but instead focused on institutional political action as a means to cement relations with those who could wield political influence. Through joining and/or strengthening formal, more “professionalized” organizations, immigrant activists could arguably amass financial and political resources, make strategic and informed political decisions as a unified front, and guarantee the perpetuity of the immigrant rights movement. Through this process, grassroots immigrant constituencies that appear to represent the movement such as Chicago’s confederation of HTAs could gain new access to the state to vent their grievances. By pursuing normative political strategies, however, a familiar story of cooptation also begins to unfold. As Piven and Cloward (1977) contend, in their quest to build organizations, organizers turn to elites— both government leaders and larger quasi-corporatist advocacy organizations—for resources and recognition. Organizers, in effect, can deviate away from protest towards pleasing those in power. Consequentially, activists begin to play an elite power game, one that eventually channels protest politics into normal politics. The elite diversion often encourages grassroots organizations to professionalize

Vonderlack-Navarro, Rebecca. Immigrant Political Incorporation : The Role of Hometown Associations, LFB

134

Immigrant Political Incorporation

as a means to gain legitimacy, a move that can also threaten their closeto-the-trenches nature. Sydney Tarrow (1998) explains the institutionalization of social movements as follows:

Copyright © 2013. LFB Scholarly Publishing LLC. All rights reserved.

…a movement organizes massive public demonstrations on behalf of its demands; the government permits and even facilitates its continued expression; numerical growth has its most direct effect in electing candidates to office; thereafter, the movement turns into a party or enters a party in order to influence its policies. (84). The social movement literature sensitizes us to the dialectic that occurs between the state and social movement actors as political elites generally respond to contention with either repression or symbolic endorsement of activists’ cause. By acting as a political ally to the movement, elites can gain important access to influence the claims that legitimate the movement, and in the case of this study, immigrants’ subsequent activism. For Chicago’s HTAs, the amplified government attention and outreach from established, quasi-corporatist immigrant advocacy groups would influence the associations’ course of action from contentious mobilizing vehicles towards interest group consolidation. CONFEMEX, while it faced difficult choices between employing protest or normal politics, undoubtedly prioritized U.S. concerns early in 2006. Assimilation theories could argue that the strong, institutionalizing force of Illinois state politics and ICIRR’s U.S.-only pluralist agenda might cause CONFEMEX to eventually sever ties from the homeland and to focus on local political integration. Indeed, urban scholars have long questioned community groups that become government partners in creating and implementing public programs and policies, as such collaborations can transform activists into milder service-delivery or advocacy organizations. Community groups, in search of funding, professionalization, and state support can potentially lose touch with their broader, cross-border visions and their base (Mayer 2007; Sites 2007; Castells 1983).80 As CONFEMEX became 80

Providing key insights into urban social movements is the seminal theoretical work of Manuel Castells. In Castells (1983) The City and the Grassroots, he acknowledges the complexity of urban movements and the threat of their

Vonderlack-Navarro, Rebecca. Immigrant Political Incorporation : The Role of Hometown Associations, LFB

Copyright © 2013. LFB Scholarly Publishing LLC. All rights reserved.

May Day Opens Doors: Mobilization and Participation

135

enlisted as an agent of ICIRR and its ties to the local state, the confederation’s agenda could evolve to become more concerned with state-focused integration programs, leading to a loss of power on the part of the confederation to question state policies and a minimized ability to create pressure outside of government. As CONFEMEX became the target for establishing state-migrant partnerships to aid in immigrants’ political inclusion, the bi-national identities of CONFEMEX leaders could be accommodated as various leaders are accepted, quite likely as subordinate partners, within local politics. CONFEMEX’s budding U.S. political incorporation, however, was not an inevitable linear process of assimilation. Instead, as the next chapter will show, we begin to see how CONFEMEX’s strategic actions would continue to be influenced by multiple state actors in Mexico and the United States. Moving from December 2006 through 2008, it becomes apparent how various political elites in Mexico and the U.S.—both potential political allies and opponents to the immigrant rights movement—continued to respond to immigrants’ activism, especially the escalating U.S.-focused activism of CONFEMEX. The upcoming years also witnessed a balkanization of repressive immigrant policies with varied forms of heavy-handed enforcement diffused throughout numerous U.S. communities. CONFEMEX leaders would struggle in their response to the various cross-purpose state interests.

captivity within the local scale. In general, organizers fight battles that emerge from their local experience. The challenge, however, is linking local struggles to broader national and transnationally-scaled concerns. His work points to a central obstacle to broadening urban-based movements to a larger more transformative scale: the local state. He argues that the local state’s institutional structures can have a tendency to confine mobilizations within the local arena, despite their broader ambitions at national or transnational scales. While Castells appreciates the necessity for community activists to interact with the political system as a means to secure a political voice, “they must be organizationally and ideologically autonomous of any political party” (Castells 1983, 322). He argues that it is almost inevitable for most radical social movements to be eventually co-opted and repressed by politics.

Vonderlack-Navarro, Rebecca. Immigrant Political Incorporation : The Role of Hometown Associations, LFB

Copyright © 2013. LFB Scholarly Publishing LLC. All rights reserved. Vonderlack-Navarro, Rebecca. Immigrant Political Incorporation : The Role of Hometown Associations, LFB

CHAPTER 6

Copyright © 2013. LFB Scholarly Publishing LLC. All rights reserved.

"Today We March, Tomorrow We Vote": CONFEMEX's Interest Group Consolidation, December 2006 to November 2008

National political opportunities for an immigration reform continued to seem promising in late December 2006 and moving into 2007. Quite distinctly, numerous localities throughout the U.S. began to look more ominous and oppressive for undocumented immigrants. While interest group strategies had taken prominence within CONFEMEX’s agenda following the 2006 protests, migrant leaders continued to see the benefit in mobilizing for what was widely considered an historic May Day march. Consequentially, Casa Michoacán would remain a vital headquarters for protest planning. Tensions had heightened, however, between community organizers in Chicago, throwing into question whether a successful mass rally could be launched for May Day 2007. Community factions were further exacerbated when Illinois Congressman Luis Gutierrez proposed HR1645, the Security Through Regularized Immigration and a Vibrant Economy Act (STRIVE Act) close to two months before the mass rally. While some immigrant activists praised the proposal’s legalization plan, others were appalled by its intense security provisions. Due to divisions among activists, it appeared as though Chicago was going to have two separate marches with much less impact for the May Day 2007 rally. Just days before the demonstration, however, a widely publicized raid in the Mexican 137

Vonderlack-Navarro, Rebecca. Immigrant Political Incorporation : The Role of Hometown Associations, LFB

Copyright © 2013. LFB Scholarly Publishing LLC. All rights reserved.

138

Immigrant Political Incorporation

immigrant neighborhood of La Villita (Little Village) inflamed the community. As a result, feuding activists urgently felt the need to set aside their differences and unite. Chicago’s massive turnout would bring national attention once again to the city’s May Day rally. Despite the demonstration’s success, CONFEMEX was exhausted. Furthermore, the confederation was well aware of the critical influence a mobilized immigrant electorate could create in the upcoming 2008 presidential election. On into the future, CONFEMEX would relinquish its leadership role in protest organizing and instead concentrate its organizational energy into fostering the U.S. citizenship and voting potential of its base. Moreover, CONFEMEX’s decisions seemed to also be influenced by Mexican state leaders who continued to value CONFEMEX and its growing ties with local U.S. state actors. The United States’ decentralized and fragmented political structure provided an apparent avenue for the Mexican state to connect with local and state officials in Illinois. Indeed, state leaders on both sides of the border had interest in expanding migrants’ political and economic integration. These complementary cross-border government influences further encouraged the CONFEMEX leadership to prioritize U.S. citizenship and voting and marginalize protest activity. CONFEMEX’s growing U.S. political incorporation was accompanied, however, by a rise in internal tensions between federation leaders themselves, as well as between the federation leaders and their base. What would be the continued impact of popular mobilization for immigration policy and politics, for CONFEMEX and its base of HTAs, and for immigrant leaders themselves? This chapter explores how relatively emergent migrant groups, like Chicago’s HTA confederation who had long worked with the Mexican state, were experiencing U.S. political incorporation. The bi-national social movement approach, with its consideration for multiple cross-border state influences, remains necessary to fully understand how CONFEMEX navigated their entrance into U.S. political engagement from December 2006 to November 2008. And while assimilation paradigms might explain HTAs’ blossoming participation in U.S. politics as the beginnings of their pluralist accommodation into the United States, CONFEMEX's integration in an era of globalization was not a process solely influenced by typical patterns of local institutionalization. While placing important emphasis on the critical

Vonderlack-Navarro, Rebecca. Immigrant Political Incorporation : The Role of Hometown Associations, LFB

"Today We March, Tomorrow We Vote"

139

influences of the host society in shaping immigrant activities, traditional assimilation frameworks do not explain what a transnational lens effectively illustrates: how contemporary diaspora engagement politics can also function to stimulate (not discourage) immigrants’ integration in the host society. This chapter begins by exploring the various influences that fostered CONFEMEX’s transition from marching in demonstrations into interest group consolidation efforts. Even as immigrant repression in Chicago soared, state influences on both sides of the border would encourage the confederation to prefer incremental political strategies over protest as the most “practical” line of action for achieving political power. Ultimately, due to divergent state pressures that aroused, CONFEMEX’s momentous conversion into a mobilizing structure would be short-lived. In addition, as CONFEMEX came to fully embrace interest group activities, the confederation would appear to weaken in organizational unity. Accusations of co-optation would develop between leaders, and some leaders began feeling distanced from the desires of their HTA base.

Copyright © 2013. LFB Scholarly Publishing LLC. All rights reserved.

Should We Keep Marching? Citizenship and Voting Strategies

CONFEMEX’s Priority for

Following the 2006 Congressional elections and moving into early 2007, CONFEMEX leaders and the immigrant rights movement in general were hopeful as they looked to Washington to achieve a legalization reform. CONFEMEX, now working closely with ICIRR, looked specifically to political ally Illinois Congressman Luis Gutierrez (D-IL) to launch a much-needed legalization plan. Yet when Gutierrez and Jeff Flake (R-AZ) co-sponsored the STRIVE Act of 2007, which included a legalization provision, many immigrant advocates argued the proposal was more harmful than helpful. Many immigrant activists were wary that the bill placed punitive and dubious enforcement provisions at its heart with the intention of luring conservative support, and that the bill contained potential human rights violations. As a result, local community factions that tentatively signed on to the Chicago mobilizations became vehemently divided. CONFEMEX would struggle in the midst of a heated local debate over whether the movement should pursue a pragmatic compromise in the face of mounting local immigrant repression or hold steadfast for a reform that

Vonderlack-Navarro, Rebecca. Immigrant Political Incorporation : The Role of Hometown Associations, LFB

Copyright © 2013. LFB Scholarly Publishing LLC. All rights reserved.

140

Immigrant Political Incorporation

ideologically upheld cross-border concerns of family unity, labor mobility, and human rights. While awaiting for national lawmakers to achieve an immigration compromise, CONFEMEX witnessed many states and localities take on severe immigrant enforcement measures. Numerous callous antiimmigrant policies erupted throughout the U.S. to impose sanctions on employers who hired undocumented laborers, punish landlords for renting to unauthorized immigrants, reduce immigrant access to social services, and increase the number of workplace raids. Estimates indicate that by May 2007, more than 100 municipalities throughout the U.S. were considering sanctions on employers for hiring undocumented immigrants and landlords for renting to them. Even though the threat of Sensenbrenner was no longer front-and-center on national lawmakers’ agendas, immigrant repression had intensified within numerous U.S. localities (Harkness 2007).81 Despite Chicago’s role in launching the mass marches, Illinois was no exception to the rise in local anti-immigrant policy measures. Throughout the state, a nativist backlash targeted primarily Latino immigrant populations. For example, the police of Waukegan, a suburb of Chicago, launched a crackdown on individuals driving without licenses. As undocumented immigrants were restricted by law from attaining a driver’s license, immigrant activists viewed the enforcement as a specific target against the undocumented, igniting a state-wide debate over whether undocumented immigrants should have access to driver’s licenses.82 In a similar vein, the suburban community of 81

Harkness, Peter. 2007. “States and Localities: Trickle-Up Policy." CQ Weekly, July 23, 2176. 82 The Waukegan experience resonated with unauthorized immigrants throughout Illinois who felt threatened everyday while simply driving to work. Debate over undocumented immigrants’ access to driver’s licenses would eventually be considered in a bill before the Illinois Senate in early May, which had already passed the House, that would provide unauthorized immigrants access to a special driver’s certificate. Many CONFEMEX leaders advocated for the licenses. The bill was filled with controversy, however, as opponents of the legislation claimed a special driver’s certificate provided an unmerited bonus to those who had entered the U.S. illegally, while some proponents worried that undocumented immigrants carrying these special certificates would be “outted,” and thus threatened with deportation.

Vonderlack-Navarro, Rebecca. Immigrant Political Incorporation : The Role of Hometown Associations, LFB

"Today We March, Tomorrow We Vote"

141

Copyright © 2013. LFB Scholarly Publishing LLC. All rights reserved.

Carpentersville elected three contentious village trustees who had campaigned on an explicitly anti-immigrant platform and within seven months were able to enforce an English-only ordinance.83 In addition, the recently arrived undocumented population of central Illinois received a flurry of media attention due to a dramatic crackdown in workplace raids.84 As national policy makers failed to take action on immigration reform, CONFEMEX and other immigrant activists were keenly aware of how various localities had transformed into incubators of fear and intolerance for unauthorized immigrants and their families. (MXPP listserv, accessed January 25, 2007; CONFEMEX monthly meeting and field notes July 9, 2007.)

Horan, Deborah. 2007. “Tow policy in cross hairs; Driver Certificate could affect town.” Chicago Tribune, May 2. The driver’s certificate bill would fail to pass the Illinois senate. Receiving national attention, New York was also considering a plan to promote drivers’ licenses for the undocumented. The plan was stopped, however, due to wide public fear that the measure would allow potential terrorists to access driver’s licenses. The Homeland Security Secretary Micheal Chertoff was pleased the measure was suspended. Anonymous. 2007. “Illegal immigrant driver’s license plan dropped.” Chicago Tribune, November 15. 83 Carpentersville’s Latino population had grown over the last decade by 40 percent to 37,000 residents. Feeding off xenophobic fears generated by the white majority, the trustees dispersed 2,000 campaign fliers asking, “Are you tired of sending lunch money with your children while illegal aliens get free breakfast and lunch?" The trustees wanted to renew proposals within the Illegal Alien Immigration Relief Act, specifically to fine landlords who rent to unauthorized immigrants and employers who hire them. After the three village trustees were elected, there were then four trustees out of seven, who formed a majority anti-immigrant alliance. Quintanilla, Ray and Carolyn Starks. 2007, “Suburb’s Hispanics feeling unwelcome after election.” Chicago Tribune, April 21. 84 In early April of 2007, federal officials arrested 85 employers and two managers in a cleaning company and another meatpacking plant that contracted the cleaner. The central Illinois sweep drew vast attention because the managers of the cleaning company themselves had supplied the workers with false social security numbers. Olivo, Antonio. 2007. “U.S. raid at plant nets 62 arrests.” Chicago Tribune, April 5.

Vonderlack-Navarro, Rebecca. Immigrant Political Incorporation : The Role of Hometown Associations, LFB

Copyright © 2013. LFB Scholarly Publishing LLC. All rights reserved.

142

Immigrant Political Incorporation

In contrast to the growing anti-immigrant fervor, other political opportunities encouraged CONFEMEX’s decision to concentrate much of its energy on institutional political action. CONFEMEX, in turn, continued to be favorably seen by Illinois state-level politicians and larger immigrant coalitions as a significant grassroots body of voters. CONFEMEX saw the great benefit its base could attain through their organizational alliance with the ICIRR and Illinois New Americans Initiative. The state-migrant initiative was able to increase the number of state-wide citizenship applications by 31 percent resulting in close to 40,000 immigrants seeking citizenship during 2007. With plans to unleash a campaign aimed at advancing another 400,000 Illinois immigrants from legal status to full citizenship, ICIRR was well positioned in its $450,000 lobby drive to persuade state and federal elected officials of the ways they could benefit from supporting a proimmigrant legalization plan.85 By drawing in CONFEMEX leadership, ICIRR could amass the grassroots, Mexican immigrant representation within their coalition in order to maintain their legitimacy with funders and state leaders. The board president of ICIRR explained how the state-wide immigrant coalition needed to be “representative of the people we’re working with,” particularly in a state where Mexican immigration dominates all immigrant flows. As ICIRR was partnering with 90 community groups to launch their New Americans Initiative, Juan Salgado was frank about the important role of CONFEMEX and its HTA base: [Local Illinois] civic participation needs HTAs…If you’re going to dig deep into citizenship participation in the United States it’s going to take organizations like hometown associations to make that a reality. So when I look at the goals that I believe are important for us to achieve [as] Mexicans and Latinos, you know, overall in the U.S., I think a key part of the strategy for us to achieve those goals includes digging 85

The push for citizenship applications was further fueled by an anticipated increase in application fees for immigrants from $400 to $675. Olivo, Antonio. 2007. “Wave of Citizenship, Marches, Pending fee hike aiding surge in applications, advocates say.” Chicago Tribune, February 23. See also Olivo, Antonio. 2007. “Year later, battle goes on; Immigration rally marks anniversary of massive march.” Chicago Tribune, March 11.

Vonderlack-Navarro, Rebecca. Immigrant Political Incorporation : The Role of Hometown Associations, LFB

"Today We March, Tomorrow We Vote"

143

Copyright © 2013. LFB Scholarly Publishing LLC. All rights reserved.

deep into communities in ways we haven’t done before. And that requires hometown associations, you know, and other such groups, but they are the most organized, I think, [and] are the kinds of groups that can dig deep. (Interview, January 9, 2009, Chicago, IL). The strong outreach of ICIRR towards CONFEMEX encouraged immigrants’ conventional political participation as the primary mechanism for their political engagement. Despite a rise in local immigrant repression, U.S.-focused lobbying, coalition-building, and voter mobilization seemed the most practical line of action for CONFEMEX leadership. Even as CONFEMEX joined with the March 10th Committee to organize a proimmigrant rally on the anniversary of Chicago’s initial reaction to Sensenbrenner on March 10, 2007, the much smaller protestor turnout (as well as the activists' own rhetoric) placed a notable priority on conventional modes of political participation. Michoacán federation leader Artemio Arreola, for example, lamented to the press about the smaller turnout at the rally. “The atmosphere is less charged today than it was last year, when they tried to criminalize immigrants…. At the same time, we want to remark that the system remains broken." In an effort to foster immigrant voting, ICIRR director Joshua Hoyt pointed to Washington politicians as the ones with the real power to make change. He proclaimed to reporters at the rally, “We’re very clear that it comes down to what a relatively small universe of people do this year,” infusing a sense of inevitability that immigrant rights was only likely to be achieved through conventional politics. Even influential Chicago Spanish-speaking disc jockey El Pistolero encouraged his broad listening base to “march by telephone” by calling local lawmakers to press for a legalization provision.86 For a moment in early spring 2007, it seemed that the historic March 10 rally of the previous year, where emergent immigrant groups like CONFEMEX boldly stood in defiance of anti-immigrant legislation, was quickly being diffused into institutional political action. 86

Olivo, Antonio. 2007. “Year later, battle goes on; Immigration rally marks anniversary of massive march.” Chicago Tribune, March 11. See also in the Tribune the same day Antonio Olivo “Activists focusing on raids, rights; Immigrant advocates protesting crackdown during reform debate.”

Vonderlack-Navarro, Rebecca. Immigrant Political Incorporation : The Role of Hometown Associations, LFB

144

Immigrant Political Incorporation

CONFEMEX and other immigrant groups’ choice to largely engage in institutionalized political strategies made sense as Washington lawmakers appeared close to reaching a comprehensive immigration reform. Political leaders on both sides of the party aisle felt an urgency to act, as they were well aware that if immigration reform was not reached soon it would likely fall off the congressional agenda until after the 2008 presidential elections.87 While the national limelight largely focused on the stalled senate battles surrounding the McCain-Kennedy immigration compromise, many Illinois grassroots activists looked to Congressman Luis Gutierrez to accomplish a renewed pro-immigrant legislation. Despite being Puerto Rican, Gutierrez had long been a driving political force within Chicago and Illinois immigrant politics and was a mainstay within the city’s numerous pro-immigrant rallies.88 By 2007, he represented a broad and growing united Latino voting bloc of neighborhoods in the city and

Copyright © 2013. LFB Scholarly Publishing LLC. All rights reserved.

87

Tankersley, Jim. 2007. “Gutierrez’s last immigration stand; Bipartisan proposal puts goal in sight." Chicago Tribune, May 21. 88 Described as a “feisty liberal” in support of immigrant rights, Gutierrez began his long-standing career as a teacher and social worker. In 1985, the Puerto Rican lawmaker began the first seven years of his political career by negotiating on Chicago’s City Council, where he earned the nickname “El Gallito (the little fighting rooster)” for his stubbornness and determination. By 1992, he became the only Latino from Illinois ever sent to Congress, representing the 4th District of Illinois, a strange earmuff-shaped district representing one of the most poorly educated and marginalized predominantly Latino areas of the U.S. His support for immigrants was apparent as he was the first congressional office to host government-approved workshops to help with citizenship acquisition, reaching a considerable 42,000 immigrants with the program, according to a May 2007 report. In addition, as early as 2001 he made numerous attempts to award legal status to millions of undocumented laborers However, some local organizers see Gutierrez as the first to “sell out” to the second Daley machine. While Gutierrez had been part of the antimachine Black-Brown coalition of the Independent Political Organization (IPO) that propelled Harold Washington, Chicago’s first black mayor, into office, some local Latino organizers claim Gutierrez’s eventual alliance to the rising Mayor Daley machine in the 1990s initiated a split in the IPO. In addition to Tankersley's article (note 7) see Teitelbaum, Michael. 2007. “Rep. Gutierrez Announces Retirement” CQ Weekly, March 12, 2007, 760.

Vonderlack-Navarro, Rebecca. Immigrant Political Incorporation : The Role of Hometown Associations, LFB

Copyright © 2013. LFB Scholarly Publishing LLC. All rights reserved.

"Today We March, Tomorrow We Vote"

145

some nearby suburbs.89 Despite his long-standing popularity as an immigrant advocate, thus far he had been unable to achieve immigration reform within the complex wheeling and dealing of the legislative process. With the rise of immigrant unrest along with the new Democratic majority within the House, there was now a chance for Gutierrez to create his own legacy as an effective lawmaker, an even more significant achievement in the wake of his announced retirement plans in early spring.90 Activist groups in Chicago who had cultivated insider access to Gutierrez, namely ICIRR and the New Americans Initiative where CONFEMEX was now a significant member, had much to gain if Gutierrez could pass an immigration bill. The legislative win could help the organizations to appear effective within U.S. politics along with sustaining the enthusiasm of their base. With a goal towards achieving a legalization provision, consensus politics aimed at cultivating Republican support would be Gutierrez’s goal for legislative success. A little over a year since Chicago launched what turned into national-level demonstrations on March 22, 2007, Gutierrez and his co-sponsor Jeff Flake proposed the compromise legislation HR 1645 Security Through Regularized Immigration and a Vibrant Economy Act of 2007 (STRIVE Act). While the STRIVE Act was advantageous towards undocumented immigrants’ legalization, many immigrant activists were wary of its potentially exploitable guestworker initiative and particularly angered by its proposed intensification of raids, detentions, deportations, and militarization of the Mexico-U.S. border. 91 The measure was contingent on the 89

Olivo, Antonio 2007. “Year later, battle goes on; Immigration rally marks anniversary of massive march." Chicago Tribune, March 11. See also: Sanchez, Casey. 2007. “Building power." The Chicago Reporter, October 1; Joravsky, Ben. 1997. “Let’s Get Luis! An unlikely assortment of liberals and conservatives have found common cause in trying to knock Luis Gutierrez from his congressional seat.” Chicago Reader, March 27. 90 See notes 7 and 8. 91 The STRIVE Act included the following measures: a legalization provision for those who entered the U.S. before June 1, 2006; a path to legal residency and eventual citizenship that included up to $2000 in fines and back taxes, along with imposing requirements to gain legal residency; and, eventually, citizenship after passing background checks, proving steady employment, learning English, and having to exit the country and re-enter legally. The

Vonderlack-Navarro, Rebecca. Immigrant Political Incorporation : The Role of Hometown Associations, LFB

146

Immigrant Political Incorporation

Copyright © 2013. LFB Scholarly Publishing LLC. All rights reserved.

implementation of greatly fortified border security measures (increasing the number of personnel and enhancing technological safety gauges) and the issuing of federal IDs through the Electronic Employment Verification System to monitor eligible workers. STRIVE included increased criminal penalties for those caught with fake documents and those who knowingly hire unauthorized immigrants and enhanced penalties for immigrants with criminal convictions. In times when local immigrant repression was on the rise, the bill would also increase the number of Immigrant Customs Enforcement (ICE) officers within U.S. localities and establish an additional twenty detention centers with the space to retain as many as 20,000 immigrants.92 Many activists were wary of how the bill would grant legalization to some of the immigrant community at the expense of others who would likely face an upsurge of exploitation, distress, and potential deaths. Gutierrez’s legislative move aggravated divisions between CONFEMEX leaders and immigrant organizers in general. Activists’ disagreement exploded over favoring strategies of pragmatism versus ideologically addressing factors that fuel immigration and repression. Many national pro-immigrant organizations and interest groups upheld the Gutierrez-Flake proposal, including the League of United Latino American Citizens (LULAC), the American Immigration Lawyers STRIVE Act also included a guestworker initiative (H-2C visas) which mandated that immigrants be paid the prevailing wage, offered labor protections, and allowed a sixty day interim period between the loss of one job and finding a new one. The guestworkers initiative permitted up to 400,000 immigrants to enter the U.S. annually who could eventually apply for residency after five consecutive years of work. The STRIVE Act would also grant eligibility to undocumented minors to receive higher education through the Development, Relief and Education for Alien Minors Act of 2007 or DREAM Act of 2007. Govtrak.us.com. Accessed February 7, 2011 http://www.govtrack.U.S./congress/bill.xpd?bill=h110-1645&tab=summary. 92 The bill provided local police with the authority to enforce immigration laws, something that was generally under the jurisdiction of federal authorities. Tankersley, "Gutierrez’s last immigration stand." Also Demirjian, Karoun. 2007. “Gutierrez pushes immigration bill,” Chicago Tribune, March 23. Also see the STRIVE Act summary, Congressman Jeff Flake's website. Accessed on February 7, 2011. http://flake.house.gov/UploadedFiles/STRIVE%20 Overview.pdf.

Vonderlack-Navarro, Rebecca. Immigrant Political Incorporation : The Role of Hometown Associations, LFB

"Today We March, Tomorrow We Vote"

147

Association (AILA), the National Immigration Forum, and the National Council of La Raza (NCLR).93 Within Illinois, community divisions were clearly marked between organizations with ties to Gutierrez and those without. Some local labor and progressive groups slammed STRIVE’s guestworker plan as “antilabor to the core” (Guard and Mailhot 2007). Mocking the bill’s enforcement measures, long-time immigrant labor activist and leader within the March 10th Committee Jorge Mujica claimed it was comparable to a “Sensenbrenner with a legalization provision” and that Gutierrez “went from hero to villain with his compromise.”94 Similarly, March 10th Committee leader Omar Lopez blasted Gutierrez and the STRIVE Act for its anti-labor stance: People see [Gutierrez] as a champion of immigrants, but the proposals he’s put forth are far from that…I don’t see

Copyright © 2013. LFB Scholarly Publishing LLC. All rights reserved.

93

The executive director of the National Immigration Forum claimed publicly, “If enacted as proposed, it will be the toughest enforcement bill aimed at illegal immigration in American history. It will also be the most practical reform of our legal immigration system in American history. ” (Persaud, Felicia. 2007. “STRIVE immigration reform act stirs excitement and criticism.” New York Amsterdam News). In accordance with the National Immigration Forum, the League of United American Citizens (LULAC) endorsed the bill along with the American Immigration Lawyers Association (AILA) whose president claimed, “It is both tough and fair and strikes the right balance between protecting our security, strengthening our economy, and treating people fairly and humanely." In addition, one of the largest and most influential national pro-immigrant organizations in the U.S., the National Council of La Raza (NCLR), viewed STRIVE as a necessary compromise to move legislation forward and to accomplish immigration reform. See note 12. Conservatives on Capitol Hill expressed disdain for the legalization component of the STRIVE Act, claiming it was rewarding lawbreakers with an amnesty provision. See Persaud, Felicia. “STRIVE immigration reform act stirs excitement and criticism." See also Lulac website, accessed on May 6, 2009, www.lulac.org/advocacy/press/2008/strive.html; AILA's website, accessed on February 7, 2011, www.aila.org/content/default.aspx?docid=21939; and NCLR's website, accessed on May 6, 2009, http://www.nclr.org/content/news/ detail/44866/. 94 See note 7. Also supported by in-depth interview with PRD activist October 19, 2008, Chicago, IL.

Vonderlack-Navarro, Rebecca. Immigrant Political Incorporation : The Role of Hometown Associations, LFB

148

Immigrant Political Incorporation

Copyright © 2013. LFB Scholarly Publishing LLC. All rights reserved.

immigration as a problem of national security where you need to militarize the border. I see it as a labor issue. As long as you criminalize immigrants and ignore their economic contribution, you’re shooting yourself in the foot (as quoted by Lydersen 2008, 4).95 Taking a more nuanced stance, long-time Gutierrez loyalist and Executive Director of Centro Sin Fronteras Emma Lozano admitted her belief that “Luis got played by the Republicans” by pushing for a compromise that turned off many immigrant supporters. Yet in a reflective interview, she critiqued how many activists in the community rejected STRIVE. “[T]hey had an all or nothing attitude, which is ridiculous,” and explained how being pragmatic and making compromises was necessary in order to keep a potential immigration reform on the agenda: “Now all we have is a pathway to deportation.” (Interview, October 18, 2008, Chicago, IL.) With strong institutional ties to Gutierrez through their New Americans Initiative, ICIRR upheld STRIVE as pro-immigrant legislation. The executive director of ICIRR, Joshua Hoyt, went as far as to testify in support of the STRIVE Act before the U.S. House of Representatives Committee on September 6, 2007. He praised the bill for providing undocumented laborers with a path to legalization, the allocation of increased visas to ease the backlog of applications, and the implementation of a temporary worker program that included, in his view, adequate safeguards.96 During the hearing, he argued the bill has “enforcement provisions that are generally reasonable and targeted. There are provisions we don’t like, but we applaud Rep. Gutierrez and Rep. Flake for seeking a solid middle ground.”97 The board president of the ICIRR Juan Salgado reflected how the STRIVE Act strove towards a tactical versus principled approach on immigration reform: 95

Lydersen, Kari. 2008. “The Browning of the Greens. Despite conflict between environmentalists and the immigrants’ rights movement, congressional candidate Omar Lopez thinks the Greens could supplant the Democrats as Latinos’ party of choice,” Chicago Reader, August 14. 96 Judiciary Subcommittee on Immigration, Citizenship, Refugees, Border Security, and International Law. 97 Testimony sent to CONFEMEX listserv on September 6, 2007 by the CONFEMEX leader serving as Political Director within the ICIRR.

Vonderlack-Navarro, Rebecca. Immigrant Political Incorporation : The Role of Hometown Associations, LFB

"Today We March, Tomorrow We Vote"

149

Copyright © 2013. LFB Scholarly Publishing LLC. All rights reserved.

…so the enforcement triggers will apply to anyone who comes in after the date [stipulated in the STRIVE Act]. So what you’re trading is, you know, the good fortunes of the people who got here before the date, the bad fortunes of the people who come here after the date in order to get this thing through. That’s the pragmatic approach. (Interview, January 9, 2009, Chicago, IL.) Activists who favored working within incrementalist politics knew they were able to produce quicker benefits to the immigrant population, especially a legalization provision, by networking with those in power. ICIRR’s insider access to Gutierrez helped to further their organizational agenda to convince the immigrant constituency that advancing incremental politics was a pragmatic alternative for legislative success. Some local activists within the March 10th Committee in turn accused ICIRR of silencing the dialogue between their member organizations about the consequences of the bill. Activists were also disheartened that the legislative proposal failed to address broader economic and social issues that fuel immigration.98 As a consequence of their strong ties with ICIRR, the leaders of CONFEMEX struggled over whether to support the STRIVE Act. The CONFEMEX president participated in a telephone conference with Gutierrez on the day he sponsored the bill, where the legislator drew specific attention to STRIVE’s legalization provision (CONFEMEX listserv, accessed on March 22, 2007). While CONFEMEX made no formal announcement either supporting or opposing the STRIVE Act, frictions played out between CONFEMEX chiefs, leading some to question whether they should continue supporting Gutierrez. For CONFEMEX leaders making inroads within ICIRR, they continued their support for Gutierrez, although sometimes in informal conversations they discussed frustration over the heavy security components of the STRIVE bill. Other federation leaders were turned off by the legislative process altogether. As a vocal Hidalgo federation leader reflected, “I felt like people were taking advantage of us, so they can climb on our backs and just get up to a higher…level.” (Interview, 98

Interviews with PRD activists and leadership within the March 10th Committee on October 9, 2008 and October 19, 2008 and the Durango federation president May 22, 2008, Chicago, IL.

Vonderlack-Navarro, Rebecca. Immigrant Political Incorporation : The Role of Hometown Associations, LFB

Copyright © 2013. LFB Scholarly Publishing LLC. All rights reserved.

150

Immigrant Political Incorporation

June 23, 2008, Chicago, IL.) Other federation leaders expressed doubts over whether a Puerto Rican political leader was able to understand the needs of an emergent immigrant community and their concerns regarding legal status. (CONFEMEX monthly minutes and field notes, April 9, 2007, Chicago, IL; Field Notes, Immigrant Summit, May 12, 2007, Morelia, Michoacán, Mexico.) Another factor making it difficult for CONFEMEX to take a firm stand on the STRIVE Act was that their agenda was momentarily consumed by Governor Blagojevich’s health and education initiatives. Spearheaded by the Michoacán federation leader Jose Luis Gutierrez who worked as a top aide to Governor Blagojevich and just days after the STRIVE Act was introduced, CONFEMEX leaders mobilized to support the Governor’s proposed FY 2008 budget proposal, Invest in Illinois Families. The increased state funding proposed to help the swelling numbers of uninsured Latino immigrants regardless of legal status who lacked access to affordable healthcare and who desired improvements in public education. CONFEMEX organized a formal press conference within Casa Michoacán and sent buses of supporters to the state capitol of Springfield to lobby members of the Illinois General Assembly to encourage their endorsement of the Governor’s proposed budget (CONFEMEX press release, March 28, 2007; CONFEMEX listserv, accessed on March 23, 2007).99 At this point in time, the encompassing influence of the local state encouraged CONFEMEX’s agenda to mobilize around its own locally-focused health and education agenda. At a time when immigrant repression was only escalating throughout Illinois and the nation, CONFEMEX had a great organized turnout for a local concern not directly tied to immigrant rights. Instead of questioning the STRIVE Act and its implications for its vast immigrant base, it looked as though CONFEMEX had temporarily transformed into an agent of the local Illinois state. On the one hand, the confederation’s partnership with the local state could be seen as demobilizing the once contentious organization. While less than a year 99

Federations in support of the Governor’s plan included all nine that were part of CONFEMEX at the time: Zacatecas, Guanajuato, Oaxaca, Hidalgo, Chihuahua, Durango, Guerrero, Aguas Calientes and Michoacán. There were also another 103 individual HTAs that supported the plan. (CONFEMEX listserv, accessed on March 23, 2007.)

Vonderlack-Navarro, Rebecca. Immigrant Political Incorporation : The Role of Hometown Associations, LFB

"Today We March, Tomorrow We Vote"

151

ago CONFEMEX had stood up to punitive national-level legislation, they now gave the impression of a comparably more conservative and mellowed advocacy organization. In this view, CONFEMEX’s interest group support for Blagojevich temporarily hampered their autonomy and limited their ability to challenge the punitive measures in the STRIVE Act. On the other hand, by strengthening their alliance with the Illinois Governor, CONFEMEX was remaining relevant within Illinois politics. A strategic move, one could argue, that would enable federation leaders to maintain their new found bargaining position and advance immigrant interests into the future.

Copyright © 2013. LFB Scholarly Publishing LLC. All rights reserved.

May Day Rally of 2007: CONFEMEX’s Agenda

Marching

Remains

High

on

Despite CONFEMEX’s preference towards Illinois interest group activities, they continued to see the benefit of taking a leadership role in the widely recognized May Day rallies of 2007. Immigrant marching on this historic day was still generally seen by local activists as necessary for winning public support for an immigration reform. While Casa Michoacán remained a key planning site for the rally, demonstration organizers were angrily divided over the STRIVE Act. As May Day drew near, it appeared as though Chicago’s march would be split, and as a result have little political impact. A threatening raid in the heart of one of Chicago’s Mexican immigrant communities just days before May Day, however, would inspire unity once again between local activists. Despite Chicago’s successful rally, local immigrant repression continued to soar. As localities became all the more threatening, activists became all the more hopeful that lawmakers in Washington would realize an immigration reform. Meanwhile, CONFEMEX would come to question the political effectiveness of marching after May Day 2007 and into the future would favor citizenship and voting drives as they looked towards the 2008 presidential elections. CONFEMEX leaders continued to value the importance of marching in such a publicly recognized May Day 2007 rally where immigrants could collectively voice their cause. An especially strong commitment for the demonstration emerged from a cohort of smaller federations, particularly from Hidalgo and Durango, sensitive to their undocumented member base. Fearing that CONFEMEX was losing

Vonderlack-Navarro, Rebecca. Immigrant Political Incorporation : The Role of Hometown Associations, LFB

Copyright © 2013. LFB Scholarly Publishing LLC. All rights reserved.

152

Immigrant Political Incorporation

their leadership within the march planning, they petitioned CONFEMEX to ensure a fortified and structured leadership within the March 10th Committee. At their April monthly meeting, various federation leaders expressed wariness because they had been previously used by other leaders in the March 10th Committee. “[T]hey used us…we loaned not only our house, but our hands.” The idea of being taken advantage of was especially insulting to CONFEMEX leaders committed to turning out their rank-and-file for the movement. “It’s going to be our people marching out there." CONFEMEX leaders were also concerned that the immigrant rights framing was in their view being diluted by a broader leftist agenda, including Green Party interests, gay rights, and anti-war concerns. Regardless of the fear of a watered down message, all of the leaders agreed in the meeting that the confederation should maintain an important leadership role within the May Day march. In addition, due to local activist rivalries that resulted as a response to the STRIVE Act, Chicago’s grassroots organizers for the May Day 2007 rally were fiercely divided. While CONFEMEX continued to work with the March 10th Committee still meeting within Casa Michoacán,100 a separate march was also being planned by leading grassroots organization Centro Sin Fronteras, still strongly allied with El Pistolero deejay. Activists worried that with a divided base of protestors within two demonstrations, the impact of Chicago’s pro-immigrant message was likely to be much weaker than the momentous outpouring of 2006. (Field notes from CONFEMEX April 2007 monthly minutes, Guerrero Federation headquarters; CONFEMEX listserv accessed on April 11, 2007.) Just days before the May Day rally, activists' concern over Chicago’s potentially divided rank-and-file would take a dramatic turn. Just one week before the planned May Day demonstration, a heavyhanded raid in the Mexican-dominated neighborhood of La Villita (Little Village) sent the immigrant community into an uproar. In broad daylight and in front of mothers and children, federal officials with large automatic rifles conducted a high-profile crackdown in a Little 100

Casa Michoacán remained the central headquarters for the March 10th Committee. Unlike 2006, however, the subcommittees for the march were asked to expand their meetings into other arenas (a coffee shop next door became a key spot). Casa Michoacán wanted to avoid having their space completely overwhelmed with meetings, as had happened in 2006.

Vonderlack-Navarro, Rebecca. Immigrant Political Incorporation : The Role of Hometown Associations, LFB

"Today We March, Tomorrow We Vote"

153

Village discount mall where an alleged fake ID ring was in operation.101 Convinced the crackdown was an intimidation tactic aimed at the immigrant community organizing the mobilizations, immigrant activists confronted U.S. Attorney Patrick Fitzgerald who defended the onslaught of police enforcement as a necessary strike against potential terrorism.102 The heavy-handed enforcement caused CONFEMEX and Chicago’s May Day march organizers to rally a renewed energy towards unifying their protest. Through their unity, activists realized they could make a significant show of outrage to the raid. As a strategy to avoid confrontations between immigrant activists still angrily divided over the STRIVE Act, a lead organizer claimed, “We agreed not to talk about it [the STRIVE Act].” (Interview, October 19, 2008, Chicago, IL.) After being inundated with calls about the raid

Copyright © 2013. LFB Scholarly Publishing LLC. All rights reserved.

101

The crackdown occurred in the heart of the community at 26th Street and Albany Avenue. Federal charges were brought against twenty-two people accused of participating in a $2 million underground market for false documentation. It was estimated that on a daily basis the ring was selling up to 100 top-notch, fake social security cards, drivers’ licenses or resident alien cards, with some cards costing upwards of $300. Reports indicate the leaders of the ring were suspects in a murder against a rival who started a competing underground ring. 102 Olivo, Antonio. 2007. “Fake-ID raid a scare tactic, immigrants say; But U.S. defends Little Village sweep." Chicago Tribune, April 26. See also “Crackdown in Little Village.” Chicago Tribune, April 26. A local Chicago alderman was also indirectly tied to the Little Village raid. Newspaper reports implicated the father of Alderman Ricardo Munoz of the 22nd ward in Little Village was the operator of the photo studio, Nuevo Foto Munoz. Alderman Munoz came to the defense of his father after the raid claiming, “Nothing illegal was taking place at [my] father’s shop." See Coen, Jeff. 2007. “Official’s dad nabbed on IDs; Alderman’s father’s photo shop linked to bogus cards." Chicago Tribune, May 30. In July of 2008 the father of Alderman Ricardo Munoz (22nd) pleaded guilty to contributing to the fake ID-ring; he admitted knowing that photos were being used for false documentation. He was accused of making $300 daily from the conspiracy. He was expected to receive both jail time and potential deportation. Coen, Jeff and Antonio Olivo. 2008. “Alderman’s father admits to ID ring; cops say elder Munoz ran Little Village scheme." Chicago Tribune, July 9.

Vonderlack-Navarro, Rebecca. Immigrant Political Incorporation : The Role of Hometown Associations, LFB

Copyright © 2013. LFB Scholarly Publishing LLC. All rights reserved.

154

Immigrant Political Incorporation

from anxious and frustrated listeners, El Pistolero disc jockey changed his tone and sounded support for immigrants’ protest activity. Differing greatly from his previous advice to “march by telephone,” the widely publicized crackdown pushed him to now proclaim defiance, “I think this showed us that this [the raid] is exactly what will happen if we don’t go out there and march.”103 Angered by what they perceived as a scare tactic, Casa Michoacán felt a rush of protestor support, and the confederation of HTAs was further induced to participate wholeheartedly in the 2007 rally. The Little Village raid and resulting unity drew the national spotlight once again on Chicago’s contentious immigrant activism. The once separated marches now functioned as two feeders: one departing from Pilsen (organized by the March 10th Committee where CONFEMEX took central leadership) and another from Humboldt Park (largely led by Centro Sin Fronteras) that planned to come together for a massive rally in Grant Park.104 Volunteer peacekeepers coordinated by CONFEMEX leaders worked extensively with police to conduct street closures, reopening them after marchers had passed. Keeping alive the “Day without Immigrants” theme, an estimated 700 businesses, mostly in the commercial district of 26th Street in Little Village, closed to participate in the rally. Although organizers of the demonstration wanted to continue illustrating the diversity of immigrant communities within the march, much of the thrust of the rally came from the Mexican hometown associations and federations, local Latino community organizations, Spanish-speaking media outlets, outraged high school and college students, unions, and churches. While not as large as the 2006 demonstrations, organizers still enjoyed significant turnout for this rally, estimated at 150,000. Unlike the celebratory and optimistic tone of the 2006 marches, the 2007 crowd was more defiant and enraged by recent punitive action in nearby neighborhoods. Also evident in the march was the feeling of frustration with lawmakers who were unable to achieve immigration reform.105 103

See Olivo, Antonio, “Fake-ID raid a scare tactic.” Originally, the march was to end in Daley Plaza. Because the march was now anticipated to be much larger because of ignited anger in the Latino community, police rerouted the demonstration to Grant Park. 105 Olivo, Antonio. 2007. “Raids stoke immigrant ire; Organizers put harder focus on May Day march.” Chicago Tribune, April 29. Also, Olivo, Antonio. 104

Vonderlack-Navarro, Rebecca. Immigrant Political Incorporation : The Role of Hometown Associations, LFB

Copyright © 2013. LFB Scholarly Publishing LLC. All rights reserved.

"Today We March, Tomorrow We Vote"

155

Notwithstanding the success of Chicago’s May Day rally, CONFEMEX’s leadership role within the various mass marches was taking its toll. Federation leaders discussed both mounting fatigue and fear within their base. For some club members within CONFEMEX, the anxiety of potential police enforcement was overwhelming. A federation leader lamented the detrimental affect of the Little Village raid on their federation. “What happened in La Villita also affected us a lot…there are a lot of people [members] that still don’t want to leave their homes. They don’t want to come to meetings in Chicago because they are afraid…so what we do, is we do telephone conferences.” (Interview, June 23, 2008, Chicago, IL.) Federation chiefs were sharply aware of the raw emotion of panic felt by undocumented families terrorized by the escalation in local police enforcement. Despite immigrants’ successful organizing, immigrant repression throughout the nation continued to swell. Newspaper reports indicate that workplace raids jumped from 845 in 2004 to almost 4,000 by mid-July of 2007, with an estimated rate of 685 raids weekly. CONFEMEX’s base was highly sensitive to growing media attention regarding the estimated 5 million children who were affected by the arrests and consequent deportations of their parents, resulting in harrowing family separations and the children’s growing distrust of police. Immigrants were keenly aware when then Homeland Security Secretary Michael Chertoff made a public warning in Chicago that enforcement against the undocumented was “gonna get ugly…. And, if they have kids at home, even if we make arrangements with social services to take care of the kids, the kids are gonna be scared because Mommy or Daddy is not coming home that day….”106 Heightened local enforcement also persisted within the Chicago suburbs of Carpentersville, Lake County, and Waukegan where local police petitioned for training through the U.S. Immigration Customs Enforcement (ICE) agency whereby local police would be granted the federal authority to detect and arrest unauthorized immigrants. Many immigrants feared the enforcement would hasten deportations and generate police racial profiling in the

2007. “11th hour march switch; Immigration event destination changed to Grant Park site.” Chicago Tribune, May 1. 106 Olivo, Antonio. 2007. “Wave of immigration raids hardens stance on both sides; Increase in Arrests adds to fired debate." Chicago Tribune, July 22.

Vonderlack-Navarro, Rebecca. Immigrant Political Incorporation : The Role of Hometown Associations, LFB

156

Immigrant Political Incorporation

Latino community.107 Despite immigrants’ surge into defiant activism, particularly the booming energy of CONFEMEX and its HTA base, the heightened criminalization and securitization of immigrant policy remained a brutal reality. Activists were frustrated that after significant mass resistance, a path to legalization for the nation’s immigrants had still not been realized. CONFEMEX’s all-volunteer leadership and base also felt exhausted from their extensive efforts to mobilize their volunteers for the marches. An Hidalgo leader explained, “We need to get back to take care of the federation” and refocus organizational priorities on more traditional Mexican-focused activities, like homeland-focused bailes (dances) and development projects. (Interview with Hidalgo federation leaders, June 23, 2008, Chicago, IL.) On top of the cumbersome manpower needed to mobilize insurgency, federation leaders faced a burning question of whether marching remained politically effective. On into the future, CONFEMEX leaders reflected about the changing mood away from immigrant rights marches:

Copyright © 2013. LFB Scholarly Publishing LLC. All rights reserved.

I: Would you ever do another march? R: …I don’t know, I kind of feel the march…served its purpose and it’s overplayed. I think doing our citizenship workshops and going out to vote…I think it will make a difference. (Interview with Michoacán federation president, June 3, 2008, Chicago, IL). Another leader shared a similar prioritizing of conventional politics: “Now we can still march, but it does not get us that far. We 107

See note 26. Also articles by Ray Quintanilla: “Carpentersville OKs English-only resolution; Non-binding language resolution criticized by mayor," Chicago Tribune, June 20, 2007; “Immigration fight spurs exodus; Some Hispanics moving from Carpentersville say the acrimony and anger is forcing them out,” Chicago Tribune, August 3, 2007. Other initiatives took place in the Alabama Department of Public Safety/State Police and the Florida Department of Law Enforcement. Wang, Andrew L. 2007. “Lake County Sheriff seeks training in deportation; Process to target suspected criminals." Chicago Tribune, December 4.

Vonderlack-Navarro, Rebecca. Immigrant Political Incorporation : The Role of Hometown Associations, LFB

"Today We March, Tomorrow We Vote"

157

should march, but in other ways with letters, lobbying and voting.” (Interview, Michoacán leader, May 25, 2008.) In his view, popular mobilization was no longer working. To avoid tactical impotence, the confederation needed to prioritize institutional action. After the 2007 protest, CONFEMEX would limit their future leadership role in immigrant contention. While federation leaders would continue to participate in future marches in upcoming years, they decidedly stepped back from a leadership role. Moving forward, various governmental interests on both sides of the border would encourage Chicago’s HTA confederation to join the coveted Latino immigrant electorate. After decisively stepping back from a leadership role in protest marching, CONFEMEX leaders chose interest group strategies as the most advantageous course of action in order to propel forward much-needed immigration reform. Motivated by both fear of immigrant repression and a surge of political attention, CONFEMEX leaders fortified their efforts towards conventional U.S. political participation as the only practical strategy to achieve a legalization provision and secure migrants’ precarious standing in the United States.

Copyright © 2013. LFB Scholarly Publishing LLC. All rights reserved.

CONFEMEX’s Embrace of U.S. Interest Group Consolidation Over the course of spring 2007 to November 2008, U.S. citizenship and voting would remain high on the confederation’s agenda. At the same time, CONFEMEX strengthened ties with state leaders south of the border. CONFEMEX leaders were not just advancing two separate Mexico- and U.S.-oriented agendas, but would come to be seen by various political actors as conduits for progressing complementary cross-border state motives. As Mexican and U.S. political players encouraged migrant associations’ integration into the United States, internal tensions nevertheless materialized over whether the confederation had succumbed to local co-optation. Luring CONFEMEX more firmly into U.S.-focused integration activities was not just a priority of U.S. politicians. Mexico continued its own interest in supporting its diaspora’s protected standing in a U.S. environment filled with both heavy enforcement and growing opportunities for immigrant inclusion. To illustrate, CONFEMEX drew support from Mexican political elites as they joined with the National Alliance of Latino and Caribbean Communities to launch a multi-

Vonderlack-Navarro, Rebecca. Immigrant Political Incorporation : The Role of Hometown Associations, LFB

158

Immigrant Political Incorporation

national immigrant summit held in Michoacán, Mexico in May 2007. Aimed at discussing cross-border concerns surrounding migration, the summit was greatly supported by then Mayor of Morelia, C. Salvador Lopez Orduna. The mayor declared, “This event demonstrates our commitment to broaden and deepen our collaborative relationship with migrant communities. Only by working in partnership will we construct an appropriate international response to challenges of the global migration phenomenon” (Summit Convention Handbook 2007). Building off the Michoacán state’s first ever momentous granting of migrant absentee voting rights within their gubernatorial elections,108

Copyright © 2013. LFB Scholarly Publishing LLC. All rights reserved.

108

The significance of Michoacán, Mexico for the migrant summit was enhanced by the proactive outreach of the Michoacán state government towards it large and organized diaspora in the U.S. As recently as February 2007, the Michoacán government granted migrants abroad the right to vote within state-level gubernatorial elections. Approved by a unanimous vote, Michoacán became the first state in Mexico to grant voting rights for Governor elections. The legislation was spearheaded by Michoacán Governor Lazaro Cardenas Batel and a migrant diputado Jesus Martinez Saldana. Furthermore, the vote from abroad was lobbied by an extensive national-level network of clubs and federations throughout the U.S. that are part of the Frente Binacional Michoacano (The Binational Front of Michoacanos, FREBIMICH) founded in 2004 to promote the civic and political participation of Michoacán clubs. Migrant advocates within FREBIMICH were quick to point out how demographic shifts caused by massive out-migration along with the importance of migrant-supplied remittances had earned migrants a formalized political voice. There were as many as 2.5 million Michoacano migrants in the U.S. who sent an average of $2,477,000 to Mexico during 2006. Michoacanos are the largest group of Mexican migrants in Illinois (estimated at 250,000) and their federation leadership was crucial in propelling the right to vote. Despite the Illinois Michoacán federation’s active promotion of binational civic participation, expatriate voter turnout for the Governor elections was dismal; an estimated 100 voters registered for the Michoacán vote. In the face of stalled immigration reform and the inability to obtain Illinois drivers licenses for the undocumented, the President of the Michoacán federation was frustrated. “’It appears we can’t win on either side of the border. But we have to keep fighting.’" A binational agenda proved to be a slow and uphill battle for immigrant activists. See Olivo, Antonio. 2007. “Few Decide to Register

Vonderlack-Navarro, Rebecca. Immigrant Political Incorporation : The Role of Hometown Associations, LFB

Copyright © 2013. LFB Scholarly Publishing LLC. All rights reserved.

"Today We March, Tomorrow We Vote"

159

Michoacán Governor Cardenas Batel made key appearances at the summit and generously donated the conference venue. Activities customarily associated with sustaining HTAs and federations’ homeland loyalties were a major part of the event: folkloric music and dance, artistic exhibitions, elegant lighting of Morelia’s Cathedral, classy traditional Morelia dinners sponsored by the municipal government, visits to remittance-based development projects, and events to celebrate Mexican pride. Clearly distinct from a solely Mexican orientation, however, the enveloping weight of local Illinois immigrant politics also served as a vivid component of the summit. U.S. Representative Luis Gutierrez of Illinois flew to Morelia as a keynote speaker to discuss U.S. immigrant politics. Gutierrez perceived the Mexican-based event as an important way to connect with emergent migrant leadership, despite strong criticism from many in the crowd frustrated by the harsh security measures of the STRIVE Act.109 Continuing its effort to pull migrants towards U.S. integration, representatives from Illinois Governor Blagojevich’s Office of New Americans Policy and Advocacy held a workshop at the summit. Local officials promoted the plans of the Illinois state government to enhance immigrant integration initiatives, including the endorsement of the upand-coming Illinois Immigrant Welcoming Center with immigrantfocused services and general social and civic education programs. Seen as allies in establishing local Illinois immigrant integration programming, the workshop panel included CONFEMEX leaders and the recently appointed Chicago General Consul Manuel Rodriguez Arriaga (2007-present). The panel brainstormed ways the New Americans Initiative might link with the Chicago consulate’s services so that new arrivals to the consulate could be immediately connected to Illinois social services. Government leaders on both sides of the border viewed strengthening ties to advancing CONFEMEX leaders as a strategic way to help ensure immigrants’ legal standing in Illinois. The courting of CONFEMEX by both the Mexican and Illinois state-government to promote immigrant integration became even more apparent in early 2008. Mexican President Felipe Calderon (2006present) visited the Chicago Mexican diaspora community in February for Mexican election; Organizers blame low numbers on bureaucratic process." Chicago Tribune, July 4. 109 See note 7.

Vonderlack-Navarro, Rebecca. Immigrant Political Incorporation : The Role of Hometown Associations, LFB

160

Immigrant Political Incorporation

Copyright © 2013. LFB Scholarly Publishing LLC. All rights reserved.

of that year.110 Maintaining federation leaders’ homeland-orientation and continued remittance flows was a major reason for the visit. Calderon proposed to not only continue Fox’s 3x1 development projects in partnership with migrant HTAs and federations, but also to propel an ambitious $499 million state-migrant initiative to match HTA contributions towards infrastructure projects, especially for hometown schools and road construction. In a private meeting with 30 Chicago immigrant leaders (including CONFEMEX leaders), Calderon shared his interest in doubling the program amount in the future. Calderon’s attempt to maintain the attention and loyalty of the diaspora appeared to be working, as a local right-of-center PAN party leader in Chicago111 expressed his enthusiasm about the meeting with Calderon: “We asked him to make it a $1 billion program in the next two years…. He was very receptive.” Another CONFEMEX leader boasted that the private meeting was “very productive and very positive.112 During Calderon’s official address to the migrant community, CONFEMEX leaders symbolically sat at the front of a packed high school auditorium within Chicago’s La Villita neighborhood. The president complemented the strength and value of Chicago’s emigrant community and promised increased funding for Mexican consular services in the Midwest region.113 Even after significant advances within the U.S. political 110

Although the presidential visit ignited some local protest from left-of-center PRD loyalists bitter over the PAN’s narrow election win, federation leaders saw the chance to bolster their remittance-based development plans. 111 The PAN leader is also the chairman of the prominent Little Village Chamber of Commerce in a successful Mexican-immigrant predominant business district in Chicago. 112 Anonymous. 2008. “A Mexican message; Calderon calls attention to immigration, worker programs." Chicago Tribune, February 13. 113 Olivo, Antonio. 2008. “Calderon pledges to boost economy; Mexican president aims to keep jobs, workers there." Chicago Tribune, February 13. See also Anonymous, “A Mexican message.” Chicago Tribune February 13, 2008. Calderon would continue to lose political clout when he was accused of being hypocritical for his stance on immigration. Central American immigrants, particularly from El Salvador, Honduras and Guatemala, accused Mexico of harsh and inhumane treatment of its own undocumented immigrants. Criticism mounted after Calderon finished his U.S. tour in 2008 where he

Vonderlack-Navarro, Rebecca. Immigrant Political Incorporation : The Role of Hometown Associations, LFB

Copyright © 2013. LFB Scholarly Publishing LLC. All rights reserved.

"Today We March, Tomorrow We Vote"

161

arena, CONFEMEX leaders were equally compelled by the direct political attention they received from the Mexican president (Field notes February 12, 2008, Chicago, IL; CONFEMEX monthly minutes and field notes March 10, 2008). Calderon aimed to accomplish more than obtaining CONFEMEX’s Mexican expatriate loyalty. Aware he could not influence U.S. national debates over economic reforms and emigration, Calderon crafted an alternative route for obtaining U.S. political influence by capitalizing on CONFEMEX leaders’ new connections with Illinois state politicians. Calderon complemented Illinois Governor Blagojevich for supporting the migrant community in fighting for healthcare access for the undocumented. Calderon went beyond polite rhetoric when he proposed bi-national programming with local Illinois state and city leaders in the areas of education and labor. CONFEMEX leaders, no less, served as chief players in facilitating a meeting between Calderon and Governor Rod Blagojevich. The meeting resulted in both political leaders signing an agreement to strengthen a cooperative educational and cultural teacher-exchange, where U.S. teachers could work in Mexican schools and Mexican teachers could work in U.S. schools to strengthen Spanish courses and other curriculum areas. Furthermore, in a meeting with Chicago Mayor Richard M. Daley, Calderon and the mayor discussed the potential for creating a “labor competency certificate” for migrant workers in the restaurant industry. The endorsed Mexican immigrants as hard working contributors that merit legal standing in the U.S. Meanwhile, his own country had initiated crackdowns and committed human rights violations towards its own unauthorized immigrants. Avila, Oscar. 2008. “Tables turned in immigration flap; Neighbors say Mexico is guilty of a double standard when it comes to treatment of illegal immigrants.” Chicago Tribune, May 2. See also Anonymous, “A Mexican message,” and Antonio Olivo, “Calderon pledges to boost economy.” February 13; Olivo, Antonio. 2008. “Mexico leader to find anger, hope on visit; Immigrants in city divided on Calderon." Chicago Tribune, February 12. Rosas-Landa, Antonio. 2008. “Calderon mission has dual purpose; President Felipe Calderon has been audacious in achieving compromises with the U.S. and the Mexican Congress." Chicago Tribune, February 12. Boletín Especial Lazos. "Carta del Presidente de la República al Instituto de los Mexicanos en el Exterior (el 6 de Septiembre, 2008). www.ime.gob.mx. Accessed from CONFEMEX listserv September 7, 2008.

Vonderlack-Navarro, Rebecca. Immigrant Political Incorporation : The Role of Hometown Associations, LFB

Copyright © 2013. LFB Scholarly Publishing LLC. All rights reserved.

162

Immigrant Political Incorporation

certification would be managed by a partnership between the Illinois Restaurant Association and the Mexican government, and the association and City Colleges of Chicago would oversee the program. Chicago’s Mayor Daley supported the initiative, claiming, “This new certification program will help ensure that we are providing valuable job training skills to our residents by integrating our education and workforce development systems.”114 Despite the fact that Mexican political elites lacked the ability to directly sway political leadership in the United States at the national level, particularly in regards to U.S. immigration reform talks, Calderon actively worked to foster political alliances within the U.S. local scene. And it was CONFEMEX leaders, in turn, who served as the logical political agents for cultivating these links between leaders on both sides of the border.115 Indeed, the cross-border political capital CONFEMEX leaders had built up with Mexican authorities over the years was perceived by local leadership as a worthwhile resource when it came to enhancing Illinois’ own state-migrant initiatives. Parallel to intensifying connections south of the border, CONFEMEX continued to network with local state actors and ICIRR during the spring of 2007 into 2008. By June of 2007, CONFEMEX leader Artemio Arreola had officially become the Political Director of ICIRR and went to work on their New Americans Democracy Project, an electoral mobilization program to help newcomers with application processes, civic history, and English language skills.116 Having already registered 53,000 new immigrant voters and organized another 1,500 immigrant volunteers to set in motion the “Get Out The Vote” campaigns for the previous 2006 midterm elections, ICIRR’s connection to CONFEMEX secured further commitment in mobilizing the Mexican immigrant community as they looked towards the 2008 elections. In a press release, ICIRR Board President Juan Salgado claimed, “We are very happy that this recognized leader of our community has decided to devote himself to 114

Ibid., “A Mexican message.” See note 33. 116 The Illinois Welcoming Center received an estimated $1.1 million from various state agencies. Diaz, Fernando. 2008. “Mixed Results." Chicago Reporter, http://www.chicagoreporter.com/index.php/c/Inside_stories/d/Mixed_Results. Accessed February 7, 2011. 115

Vonderlack-Navarro, Rebecca. Immigrant Political Incorporation : The Role of Hometown Associations, LFB

"Today We March, Tomorrow We Vote"

163

strengthening the immigrant rights movement with ICIRR…His decision represents a further deepening of ICIRR’s commitment to the political empowerment of the immigrant community and specifically the Mexican immigrant community of Illinois." The ICIRR’s announcement also boasted about the CONFEMEX leader’s crossborder political activism:

Copyright © 2013. LFB Scholarly Publishing LLC. All rights reserved.

Artemio Arreola is one of several Mexican hometown association leaders in Chicago with multiple connections in Mexico and the U.S. From helping organize last year’s massive immigration marches to slating political candidates in his home state, he wields influence on both sides of the border. (Press announcement e-mailed to CONFEMEX listserv on June 12, 2007.) The federation leader’s bi-national activism was viewed as an impressive and transferrable political asset for reaching out to the broader Mexican community of Illinois. ICIRR’s electoral mobilization program had a clear agenda that involved reaching out to emergent Mexican immigrant organizations like CONFEMEX. In response to the strengthened campaigns for voter mobilization in Chicago and other immigrant-heavy areas led by the ICIRR’s New Americans Initiative, Mexican immigrant naturalization within Illinois increased by 46 percent in 2007 to 122,250 new citizens. In Chicago specifically, there was a 30 percent jump in naturalization rates with 37,700 new citizens, with Mexicans serving as the leading group of newly naturalized citizens in the state for 2007. The ICIRR New Americans Initiative also pushed for new citizens to become politically active with the local coordinator proclaiming, “If they’ve naturalized, we want to make sure they’re also registered to vote.”117 Seeing CONFEMEX’s base as potential new voters targeted within the New Americans integration plan, Governor Blagojevich wasted no time recognizing former CONFEMEX president Marcia Soto among a list of community leaders during his inaugural ceremony in Springfield, Illinois. By presenting her with a PATH Award (People Are Today’s Heroes), he honored her work in helping natives from her home state of 117

Olivo, Antonio. 2008. “Citizenship for Mexican immigrants surged in ’07.” Chicago Tribune, July 11.

Vonderlack-Navarro, Rebecca. Immigrant Political Incorporation : The Role of Hometown Associations, LFB

Copyright © 2013. LFB Scholarly Publishing LLC. All rights reserved.

164

Immigrant Political Incorporation

Durango. (CONFEMEX listserv, accessed December 28, 2006, regarding the ceremony on January 8, 2007.) His outreach to immigrant constituencies continued by July 26, 2007, with a ribbon-cutting ceremony for the state of Illinois’ premiere Welcoming Center for New Americans located in Melrose Park, Illinois. Headed by the Department of Human Services with a $1 million annual budget, the center aimed to provide newcomers with access and information to health insurance, job training, civic education, labor and employment services along with networking with nine state agencies and another 40 community-based organizations.118 Blagojevich boasted the center would help new arrivals “make Illinois their new home.” (Press Release, Office of the Governor, Rod R. Blagojevich, July 26, 2007.) 119 Jose Luis Gutierrez, the Michoacán leader serving as the Director of the Governor’s Office of New American Policy and Advocacy, declared the center would “change the way immigrants integrate into our community… As an immigrant myself, I know how crucial this kind of support can be, and I thank the Governor for his leadership in making it happen.” (Press Release, Office of the Governor, Rod R. Blagojevich, July 26, 2007.)120 CONFEMEX, well regarded for their political capital in Mexico, was a plausible target by local leaders who aimed to nurture their mounting political potential within the U.S. Taking pleasure in the political attention, certain federation leaders furthered efforts to directly influence local politics through the Mexicans for Political Progress Political Action Committee (MXPP). Federation leaders from Michoacán, Guanajuato, and Guerrero along with the Board President of ICIRR met during the spring and summer 118

Smith, Gerry. 2007. “New center to help ease immigrants’ transition; The state with help from area agencies and community groups, launches facility to link newcomers with services such as health care." Chicago Tribune, September 30. 119 The Illinois Welcoming Center received an estimated $1.1 million from various state agencies. Diaz, Fernando. “Mixed Results.” 120 In July, it was suggested that new centers were being considered in other Illinois cities including Aurora, Rockford, and Waukegan. There was also an idea for creating mobile services within rural areas of Illinois as a means to extend services to growing immigrant communities. Espinosa, Leticia. 2007. “Inauguran centro de recursos y servicios.” Diario Hoy, Chicago Tribune, July 27.

Vonderlack-Navarro, Rebecca. Immigrant Political Incorporation : The Role of Hometown Associations, LFB

Copyright © 2013. LFB Scholarly Publishing LLC. All rights reserved.

"Today We March, Tomorrow We Vote"

165

of 2007 to forge plans to establish a board of directors, committee members, and donors. They began to define the benefits of member participation, which involved determining criteria for candidates they considered endorsing and discussing the promotion of youth membership for college students under the age of 24. Plans were also in the works to have a marketing and membership solicitation drive for that summer.121 By mid-November 2007, MXPP held campaign finance receptions to support Congressman Luis Gutierrez and Democratic candidate of Illinois' 3rd Congressional district Mark Pera. CONFEMEX leaders were moving in a deliberate direction to advance within U.S.-focused politics.122 As a result of CONFEMEX’s extensive recognition by those in power as a potentially important political player within immigrant politics, marching remained marginal to their agenda. Federation chiefs decidedly did not take a leadership role in the May Day rally of 2008, although they still marched. As the date of the annual May Day rally grew closer, the push for immigrant voting was widely preferred as a more realistic way to achieve reform. Overall, Chicago’s immigrant organizing scene was generally divided into three camps during 2008. The first group aimed to re-energize the movement by encouraging African American involvement in the marches. This new push was spearheaded by the Rainbow/PUSH coalition led by civil rights activist Rev. Jesse Jackson, a familiar name in Illinois politics who many argued was looking to remain politically relevant after being marginalized from the Barack Obama presidential campaign. Organizer attempts at uniting Latino and Black activism, however, largely failed.123 Even while some African Americans were sensitive to the 121

“Proposed MXPP Membership Drive,” Flyer obtained by author at March 2007 monthly CONFEMEX meeting. 122 On November 12, 2007, MXPP held a reception in support of Congressman Luis Gutierrez who was at that point no longer planning to retire. The Board President of ICIRR and leaders of member organizations of the ICIRR were also part of the host committee. MXPP, on December 19, 2007, also backed the candidacy of Illinois 3rd Congressional district Democrat Mark Pera to run against Dan Lipinski, who voted for the Sensenbrenner bill, in the November 2008 elections. Pera would lose to Lipinski for the second time. 123 In turn, some organizers felt that reaching out to African Americans, believed to share many of the same community and class-based concerns of

Vonderlack-Navarro, Rebecca. Immigrant Political Incorporation : The Role of Hometown Associations, LFB

166

Immigrant Political Incorporation

Copyright © 2013. LFB Scholarly Publishing LLC. All rights reserved.

racial injustices and legal plight of immigrants, most African Americans (as was true of many people in Illinois) were busy working to support a different grassroots movement in 2008, the presidential campaign of Barack Obama.124 A second group of immigrant activists in Illinois was the original March 10th Committee, which had now greatly transformed into a heterogeneous group of labor, religious leadership, and other progressive community activists. The March 10th the Latino immigrant population, would result in a successful “Black-Brown Coalition,” as had happened in the 1980s to support the win of Chicago’s first black mayor Harold Washington. The new coalition, “Together We Are the People’s Majority,” aimed to bring together leaders from Rainbow/PUSH and other other community organizations, local churches, and labor unions. Despite organizing efforts, there was a disappointing African American turnout at the rally. While Chicago’s Blacks and Latinos were able to successfully mobilize for political change in the 1980s, tensions resurfaced with the 1986 Immigration Reform and Control Act (IRCA), which provided legalization to the city’s vast population of immigrants. IRCA was not a popular provision among many Black voters who felt immigrants only increased competition for low wage jobs. Many African Americans were also offended that the current immigrant rights movement was tied, in their view, too closely to their own civil rights movement, which they argued had substantially more violence and repression. Blacks’ support for Chicago’s immigrant movement was tense back in 2006 as well, particularly over job competition. In fact, a Pew Hispanic Center poll circulated in 2006 indicated that 41 percent of African-American respondents in Chicago reported at one time losing their employment to an immigrant (versus only 15 percent for white, non-Hispanic respondents). While a general base of African Americans was not strong in the marches, some political elites and civil rights organization were sympathetic to immigrant injustices. U.S. Representative Bobby Rush (D-IL) introduced legislation in 2006 promoting immigrant family reunification, and the NAACP published a report against strict immigrant enforcement. Avila, Oscar. 2006. “Blacks split on support for illegal immigrants." Chicago Tribune. April 23. See also Olivo, Antonio. 2008. “Activists send out invites for rally; Immigration-march organizers aim for Latino-Black coalition.” Chicago Tribune, May 1. 124 Sector, Bob and Michael Martinez. 2008. “Clinton’s Latino edge no accident; Time and effort forged alliance.” Chicago Tribune, February 7.

Vonderlack-Navarro, Rebecca. Immigrant Political Incorporation : The Role of Hometown Associations, LFB

"Today We March, Tomorrow We Vote"

167

Committee by 2008 upheld a much broader left-wing agenda that went beyond immigrant rights (e.g., critique of the Iraq War, promotion of the Free Employee Choice Act pushed by labor, and gay rights). The broadening vision of the March 10th Committee was emblematic of the fact that its leadership was no longer dominated by immigrants, with a new cohort of Anglo activists now on board.125 Local PRD activist and long-time March 10th Committee leader Jorge Mujica was blunt about the changes within the March 10th Committee: “It’s a mess." He lamented that the united front of Chicago’s grassroots immigrant activism that emerged in 2006 and came together again in 2007 became fragmented by 2008.126 CONFEMEX leaders reflected on the change of the March 10th Committee over the past years with great skepticism:

Copyright © 2013. LFB Scholarly Publishing LLC. All rights reserved.

It was an authentic movement [in 2006], it was a very representative movement, very diverse with an important collective vision that has finished being kidnapped by traditional leftist groups that are not very inclusive. And they do not even see the federations of HTAs as authentic representatives [of immigrants]…They don’t respect them [HTAs]. (Interview with Michoacán leader, May 15, 2008, Chicago, IL.) A Guerrero leader critiqued the fragmented planning for 2008. “Ironically we’re pushing for [immigrant] unity and we have different groups planning the march.” (CONFEMEX monthly minutes and field notes, April 14, 2008, Chicago, IL.) The local social movement field had shifted in a way that CONFEMEX leaders no longer identified with the protest leadership. The third group of May 1 march organizers consisted of community leaders with ties to the state and local leaders who wanted to make gains in the November 2008 elections, thus emphasizing voter mobilization over marching. This group included the principal ICIRR 125

Notable unions that participated: electricians union, SEIU, Chicago-area Labor Council for Latin American Advancement, and Unite Here. 126 Franklin, Stephen. 2008. “Labor, immigrants find common ground; May Day rally helps link workers from both groups.” Chicago Tribune, May 2. Also interview with PRD activist and labor organizer, October 19, 2008, Chicago, IL.

Vonderlack-Navarro, Rebecca. Immigrant Political Incorporation : The Role of Hometown Associations, LFB

Copyright © 2013. LFB Scholarly Publishing LLC. All rights reserved.

168

Immigrant Political Incorporation

and its member organizations, like CONFEMEX. While member organizations and ICIRR employees still marched, their voter registration was on overdrive, as a field coordinator explained. “The coalition believes the marches and voter registration are not mutually exclusive. In fact, they reinforce each other…It’s a matter of taking that energy…and converting it to civic participation.”127 CONFEMEX leaders even dismissed leadership within the May 1, 2008 rally that did not equally value citizenship and voting drives claiming. “Those that get their picture taken at the [march] event do not push for citizenship campaigns.” Working with ICIRR on voting was a much larger priority for the confederation who saw electoral participation as the main possibility for realizing immigrant rights. (Monthly minutes and Field notes, April 14, 2008, Chicago, IL.) U.S. electoral mobilization, indeed, was a critical line of action for CONFEMEX during 2008. (CONFEMEX field notes and monthly minutes, March 10, 2008; April 14, 2008; May 12, 2008; July 14, 2008; September, 2008, Chicago, IL.) CONFEMEX specifically expanded its work with ICIRR’s New Americans Democracy Project’s Fellowship program, whereby young volunteers committed twenty weeks to mobilize voters within immigrant-dominated neighborhoods and suburbs. CONFEMEX agreed to host their own fellow, which meant that CONFEMEX members would work with ICIRR to provide volunteers to work with the fellow along with providing the fellow monetary support and office space. The fellow worked for CONFEMEX between June to November of 2008 to solicit votes in the Mexican-dominant suburbs of Berwyn and Cicero.128 CONFEMEX leaders were quick to see the gains in working with ICIRR’s citizenship program. By early October 2008, CONFEMEX and their ICIRR New Americans Project Fellow revealed that they had registered 1,000 new voters and were quick to embark on their next goal of registering 2,000 more by election time. The Guerrero Federation president of CONFEMEX reflected on their political achievement: “CONFEMEX decided to participate in this [New Americas] project because we believe that our community needs to demonstrate its strength through the ballot box. If we want an immigration reform we have to do it this 127

Bauza, Vanessa. 2008. “Interest wanes for immigrant marches; But some leaders say rallies still important." Chicago Tribune, April 27. 128 CONFEMEX listserve, July 25, 2008. Accessed July 26, 2008.

Vonderlack-Navarro, Rebecca. Immigrant Political Incorporation : The Role of Hometown Associations, LFB

Copyright © 2013. LFB Scholarly Publishing LLC. All rights reserved.

"Today We March, Tomorrow We Vote"

169

way, [through] voting and participating.”129 Even in their press release, conventional political strategies were seen as an essential avenue for legislative success. By working with ICIRR, CONFEMEX leaders knew they could identify themselves with political advances for immigrants in Illinois. By 2008, the ICIRR’s New Americans Project boasted that their efforts contributed to 96,680 new U.S. citizens in Illinois, a 56 percent increase. This included 80,759 voter registrations between 2004 and 2008; 25,815 of those registered in 2008 alone. Their initiative received significant financial support and raised a hefty $1,019,000 for their voter mobilization program. It also enjoyed backing from politicians who stood to gain from the new alluring voting bloc. Their Get-OutThe-Vote (GOTV) program continued to gain momentum by the fall of 2008 through extensive mailings, automated phone messages, and enhanced lobbying activities to push for votes, an effort that extended throughout 700 Chicago-area neighborhoods.130 CONFEMEX’s alliance with ICIRR and their GOTV campaign was a robust mechanism for promoting political inclusion as it drew new immigrants into the local arena of specifically Democratic politics. It was not just Blagojevich and Gutierrez who stood to benefit from ICIRR’s voter mobilization programming; at least 24 primarily Democratic elected officials declared themselves “allies” of the immigrant movement.131 129

CONFEMEX Press Release, October 2, 2008, “Mas de 1,000 Nuevos Votantes Registrados En Cicero Por CONFEMEX.” Accessed from CONFEMEX listserv, October 3, 2008. 130 ICIRR bulletin, “Our Vote Is Power, The New Americans Democracy Project 2008.” Also, Anonymous. 2008. “Activists get out the vote." Chicago Tribune, October 8. 131 Right before the elections, ICIRR attracted a vast number of state and city officials into a rally centered on demonstrating immigrants’ voting power: Chicago Mayor Richard Daley, Illinois Attorney General Lisa Madigan, U.S. Representative Luis V. Gutierrez (IL-4), U.S. Representative Danny Davis (IL-7), U.S. Representative Jan Schakowsky (IL-9), Chicago City Clerk Miguel de Valle, Commissioner Joe Berrios, Mayor of Berwyn Michael O’Conner, Alderman Ricardo Munoz, Joe More, Danny Soliz, and state legislators including Iris Martinez, Antonio Munoz, William Delgado, Mattie Hunter, Donne Trotter, Esther Golar, Eddie Acevedo, Deborah Graham, Elizabeth Hernandez, Susana Mendoza, Harry Osterman, Kevin Joyce, Tony

Vonderlack-Navarro, Rebecca. Immigrant Political Incorporation : The Role of Hometown Associations, LFB

Copyright © 2013. LFB Scholarly Publishing LLC. All rights reserved.

170

Immigrant Political Incorporation

Immigrant activists, including those in CONFEMEX, expected that a mobilized electorate could push for an immigration reform. CONFEMEX leaders were also aware that the confederation’s active electorate could offer more advantages than just holding state leaders accountable to immigrant concerns. During the April monthly meeting gearing up for the 2008 elections, a Guerrero leader talked of CONFEMEX’s new recognition by local representative Lisa Hernandez, “She does not care about the money we send back to Mexico,” he claimed.132 CONFEMEX, instead, needed to push its ability to mobilize votes. “We have to talk their [politicians] talk” if they wanted resources and recognition in Illinois. He felt this strategy could be propelled further if they continued “to get help from strong organizations, like La Coalicion [ICIRR].” (Field Notes, April 14, 2008; May 12, 2008, Chicago, IL.) The ICIRR fellow in attendance during the November monthly meeting further encouraged CONFEMEX to continue their U.S. political participation as local politicians were beginning to recognize the federations and their work. Local Senator Martin Sandoval (12th District) even wanted a meeting with CONFEMEX to discuss their future political involvement. He was rumored to have offered CONFEMEX a building headquarters and funding. The CONFEMEX president explained, “We’re speaking the same language: politicians want votes and power and CONFEMEX wants presence and money.” (Field notes taken on November 10, 2008 CONFEMEX meeting, Zacatecas Federation headquarters, Chicago, IL.) CONFEMEX leaders recognized the benefits of working with local U.S. politicians as a means to increase funding and local recognition. Looking towards the 2008 elections, federation leaders were optimistic that their new voting energy would lead to expanded local recognition with those in power and contribute towards a national push for immigration reform. Immigrant leaders’ confidence was seemingly merited as political contenders for the U.S. November election made it increasingly obvious that the Latino voting bloc was crucial.133 Yet Berrios, and Linda Chapa La Via (ICIRR Update, October 24, 2008, "GOTV Rally, Get Out The Vote for Immigration Reform.") 132 Lisa Hernandez was an Illinois State Representative for the 24th district, Cicero, IL. 133 During the long-standing and heated Democratic presidential primaries between Senators Hilary Rodham Clinton (D-NY) and Barack Obama (D-IL),

Vonderlack-Navarro, Rebecca. Immigrant Political Incorporation : The Role of Hometown Associations, LFB

"Today We March, Tomorrow We Vote"

171

Copyright © 2013. LFB Scholarly Publishing LLC. All rights reserved.

although concerted efforts were made to appeal to Latino constituencies, all emergent presidential candidates—Senators Hilary Rodham Clinton (D-NY), Barack Obama (D-IL), and John McCain (RAZ)—did their best to avoid delving into the complexity of immigration reform. Despite their reservations, when pushed on the issue all candidates upheld similar promising (albeit moderate) reform agendas: support for increased militarization of the border, enhanced enforcement and security provisions, and most importantly, a path for legalization for undocumented immigrants. As presidential contenders encouraged immigrants to vote, immigrants in turn hoped their votes would hold lawmakers accountable to their desires for immigration reform.134 CONFEMEX seemed to have effectively channeled its energy into renewed interest group activity from late 2007 to the November elections of 2008. Political leaders in both Mexico and the U.S. in turn further advanced CONFEMEX’s institutional strategies as a way to safeguard Mexican immigrants. CONFEMEX, indeed, had fulfilled its side of a political bargain within U.S. institutional politics. They adapted their organization to respond to new political opportunities Clinton was rumored to be favored by Latino voters. Aware of Clinton’s strong ties with the Latino community nurtured by her husband’s 1996 run, Obama overhauled his outreach efforts to Latinos and relied heavily on the assistance of his home state’s Congressman Luis Gutierrez to make Latino voter gains, a budding partnership that would strengthen over time. Yet during the contentious primaries, Clinton remained the favorite among Latino voters as she made key efforts to connect with Latino activists along with making Latinos part of her close network of advisors. Clinton even held a stronghold with Latino voters in Illinois despite Obama’s overwhelming primary win in his home state. 134 Page, Clarence. 2008. “Clinton’s Hispanic edge over Obama; Any lead has more to do with coattails than race." Chicago Tribune, January 30. Also, Sector, Bob and Michael Martinez. 2008. “Clinton’s Latino edge no accident; time and effort forged alliance." Chicago Tribune, February 7; Torres, Maria De Los Angeles. 2008. “Immigration issue cuts deep; Latino vote a big loss for Obama.” Chicago Tribune, February 10; Tankersley, Jim and Christi Parsons. 2008. “Immigration polarizes small-town America; some communities are angry about immigration, but the candidates aren’t spending much time on the topic.” Chicago Tribune, September 25.

Vonderlack-Navarro, Rebecca. Immigrant Political Incorporation : The Role of Hometown Associations, LFB

172

Immigrant Political Incorporation

with support and votes. Yet all the while that immigrants mobilized votes to push for immigration reform, as the next section will explore, the broader political and economic context began to deteriorate, posing a threat to CONFEMEX’s continued unity.

Copyright © 2013. LFB Scholarly Publishing LLC. All rights reserved.

The Consequences of CONFEMEX’s U.S. Political Engagement: Questions of Co-optation and Dissolution of Base Support Parallel to CONFEMEX’s U.S. interest group consolidation, farreaching changes in the broader political and economic context began to unfold. During 2008, it would become unclear if emerging political and economic conditions would prevent CONFEMEX from continuing its participation in either institutional or non-institutional politics. Along with a continuation of local immigrant repression, a burgeoning and extensive economic crisis would come to threaten political projects that were once friendly towards CONFEMEX. Both Illinois’ statemigrant initiatives and Mexico’s diaspora-focused programs would be greatly weakened by financial troubles. In addition, desires for national-level immigration reform would also become clouded by the economic downturn. Moreover, CONFEMEX’s advances within U.S. politics had intensified internal tensions between federation leaders as well as the leaders and their HTA base. CONFEMEX and other eminent immigrant groups witnessed U.S. localities take a repressive turn toward the undocumented throughout 2008. There were continued hikes in immigrant arrests, deportations, police maltreatment, and hate crimes throughout the country. Within the first two months of 2008, 350 anti-immigrant laws were proposed within U.S. localities (against immigrant access to special drivers’ licenses, punishing employers who hire undocumented workers, limits on social services, English-only ordinances, etc.). By August of 2008, an estimated 60 percent increase in deportations was seen between 2003 and 2008, with some 700 Mexican immigrants deported from the U.S. daily.135 In Illinois specifically, ICE reported the arrests of 72,000 135

Wides-Munoz, Laura. 2008. “Immigration bills many, but laws few; cost and sentiment slow states’ proposals." Chicago Tribune, March 8. See also: Anonymous. 2008. “Anti-immigrant sentiment linked to rise in hate crimes.” Chicago Tribune, March 10. Martinez, Michael. 2008. “More immigrant detentions, more deaths; Arrests have risen dramatically, but critics say

Vonderlack-Navarro, Rebecca. Immigrant Political Incorporation : The Role of Hometown Associations, LFB

Copyright © 2013. LFB Scholarly Publishing LLC. All rights reserved.

"Today We March, Tomorrow We Vote"

173

unauthorized immigrants since 2003. Between October of 2007 and February of 2008, 632 immigrant arrests occurred in Chicago alone. Within the Midwest region, workplace raids and deportations jumped from 6,310 in 2004 to 9,000 in 2007 and this number continued to rise in 2008, averaging 300 deportations on a weekly basis.136 As CONFEMEX united with other budding immigrant groups to push for political power, they were also confronted by nativist backlash as well as the escalation of fear within immigrant communities terrorized by intensified police enforcement. In addition to the escalation of heavy-handed enforcement at the local level, CONFEMEX’s ties to Illinois state leaders and public programming began to suffer. Illinois Governor Rod Blagojevich’s prized state programs of immigrant integration were not entirely playing out as hoped. Blagojevich’s Office of New Americans Policy and Advocacy began with high aspirations. By January of 2008, however, several state agencies were charged with inefficiencies and failing to implement basic procedures to benefit immigrant services (e.g., standardizing the use of interpreters, language and cultural competency tests, and appropriately managing the flow of information to those lacking basic English). To add to that, challenges brought on by the state’s economic crisis created contentious fights within the Springfield legislature over how state funding should be allocated. As a consequence, Blagojevich’s immigration initiative lost $1.7 million, some of which was intended to fund the Illinois immigrant Welcoming Center. The state’s economic problems were so pervasive that Blagojevich vetoed $460 million of funding allocated for school programs, mental health, and other social services, a portion of which

medical care has not kept pace.” Chicago Tribune, June 1. Anonymous. 2008. “Mexicans deported from U.S. face shattered lives." Chicago Tribune, August 25. 136 Bauza, Vanessa. 2008. “Deportation drama plays in Broadview; About 300 immigrants a week from the Midwest pass through the federal facility on this way out of the U.S.” Chicago Tribune, June 27. See also Anonymous. 2008. “Nearly 150 arrests in immigrant sweep.” Chicago Tribune, September 18. Olivo, Antonio. 2008. “Chicago-area sweep leads to arrest of 30.” Chicago Tribune, February 27. Anonymous. 2008. “43 illegal immigrants arrested in 5day sweep.” Chicago Tribune, June 26.

Vonderlack-Navarro, Rebecca. Immigrant Political Incorporation : The Role of Hometown Associations, LFB

Copyright © 2013. LFB Scholarly Publishing LLC. All rights reserved.

174

Immigrant Political Incorporation

benefited immigrants.137 As a result of the lack of funding, the recommendation to provide $25 million to immigrants for English classes received a mere $300,000 from state funding along with a citizenship program that faced such a dearth of resources that it could only service 10 percent of its applicant pool.138 The lack of state funding was compounded by Blagojevich’s bleak approval rating and heightened divisions between the Governor and the state legislature, which only intensified accusations of corruption and the mounting federal investigation of his administration. With the lack of state funding and the Governor’s leadership in doubt, it remained a big question as to how much the state’s immigrant integration initiatives, along with its ties to ICIRR and CONFEMEX, would remain a priority for the state of Illinois in the future.139 Moreover, emergent immigrant groups like CONFEMEX, whose popular mobilization led to eventual voter participation, initially anticipated a reform legislation as a result of their significant voting power. Indeed, many candidates who endorsed anti-immigrant sentiments did suffer at the polls, particularly as anti-immigrant rhetoric meant to fuel Republican turnout failed, and the newly mobilized Latino vote tended to support Democratic contenders. Particularly damaging was when Obama and McCain moved into their heated presidential race. In an attempt to appeal to his conservative constituency, McCain lamented over his past attempts to pass immigration reform legislation, claiming he should have prioritized security measures before launching a legalization provision. McCain’s inconsistency over his immigration stance, along with widespread local hikes in immigrant crackdowns and xenophobic rhetoric within the Republican Party, eventually cost him the Latino vote, which largely favored Barack Obama for U.S. President. Many Latinos, including CONFEMEX, expected payback from Obama with another round of legalization reform or at least a moratorium on raids until a reform was reached. Illinois immigrant advocates, like Gutierrez and ICIRR, boasted of the immigrant voter turnout, especially the Latino vote that 137

See note 36. Sacchetti, Maria. 2008. “Welcomed, wearily. Illinois offered aid to immigrants, Budgets intervened. Wall Street Journal, August 13. 139 Davey, Monica. 2008. “Picking Obama Successor Puts Spotlight on Governor.” The New York Times, November 12. 138

Vonderlack-Navarro, Rebecca. Immigrant Political Incorporation : The Role of Hometown Associations, LFB

Copyright © 2013. LFB Scholarly Publishing LLC. All rights reserved.

"Today We March, Tomorrow We Vote"

175

favored Obama by 67 percent. While Obama could not ignore the Latino vote, passing comprehensive immigration reform, nevertheless, would be complicated by other issues taking precedence, namely healthcare, the Iraq War, and most importantly, the massive global recession taking hold. In the face of economic hardship, public scrutiny at the idea of legalizing the country’s undocumented immigrants, whom could potentially create more competition within a shrinking job market, quickly hardened.140 The significant economic downturn was not a challenge for just CONFEMEX and its desire for an immigrant legalization plan. Mexican state strategies towards its migrants also appeared to be in flux. The onset of a global recession began to threaten the sustainability of Mexico’s dependence on its diaspora and their remittances as a viable economic development strategy. Remittances to Mexico were $24 billion in 2007, yet by August of 2008 the country experienced the largest decrease in remittances in twelve years as they fell by $1.9 billion, a 12.2 percent decrease.141 As a result of the economic depression, many immigrants lost their jobs, and the unemployment rate in the Mexican immigrant community rose from 4.5 to 7.5 percent between 2007 and 2008 (compared to the U.S.’s general unemployment at the time of 6.1 percent).142 Even while Western Union and the remittance industry attempted to maintain the loyalty of migrants by granting scholarships to CONFEMEX youth and through 4x1 projects 140

Witt, Howard. 2008. “Immigration issue routed to state-level; Activists foiled as interest wanes on national stage." Chicago Tribune, March 24. See also: Anonymous. 2008. “The Hispanic vote; McCain, Obama pitch economic plans to crucial demographic.” Chicago Tribune, July 9. Wallsten, Peter and Maeve Reston. 2008. “McCain appeals to Latinos with immigration revamp.” Chicago Tribune, July 9; Pearson, Rick. 2008. “For McCain Hispanic voters now a tough sell; The Republican candidate who received ample Latino support in his Senate races sees the bloc leaning heavily toward his rival.” Chicago Tribune, September 3. 141 Remittances would only continue to fall in 2009. Corresponsales El Universal, October 13, 2009, “Caida de remesas collapse economia regional." Accessed on February 7, 2011. www.eluniversal.com.mx/primera/vi_33765.html. 142 Wilkonsin, Tracey. 2008. “U.S. slump shrinks Mexican money flow." Chicago Tribune, October 2.

Vonderlack-Navarro, Rebecca. Immigrant Political Incorporation : The Role of Hometown Associations, LFB

Copyright © 2013. LFB Scholarly Publishing LLC. All rights reserved.

176

Immigrant Political Incorporation

(in which Western Union provided the fourth match towards collaborative HTA and government subsidized development in Mexico), the economic crisis had the potential to jeopardize the future of remittance-based strategies. Hints of Mexico’s dropping financial support for its diaspora were becoming evident by 2009 when certain government interests proposed a (U.S.) $34.5 million reduction for its 2010 budget in funding for programs that target emigrants abroad. With Mexico’s escalating financial crisis, government officials were hopeful the 3x1 program in conjunction with HTAs would not be negatively affected by the drop in funding.143 As the economic downturn and local repression escalated, immigrant leaders became critical and demanded more support from Chicago’s new Mexican consular leadership. By January 2008, a group of twenty immigrant groups from Illinois and Wisconsin sent a public protest letter to President Calderon criticizing the new General Consul Manuel Rodriguez Arriaga. Activists wanted to see a stronger effort fighting the increase in immigrant enforcement. “We really need a consulate that is going to be more aggressive.”144 In the protest letter, activists also accused the General Consul Rodriguez of being “profoundly incompetent,” “rude,” and even “clumsy” for failing to adequately respond to increased community demands for documentation services (the rising need for documentation that began after the U.S. demanded passports for travel between the U.S. and Mexico). Many community members felt Rodriguez was arrogant and standoffish to their complaints.145 While some CONFEMEX leaders had more to gain from maintaining a diplomatic relationship with the Mexican government, other CONFEMEX leaders, including the CONFEMEX president from Guerrero, thought the complaints against the Consul were merited. CONFEMEX’s relationship with the General Consul would be continue to be rocky and serve to heighten internal tensions between federation leaders within CONFEMEX. In general, 143

Aguilar, Gardenia Mendoza. 2009. “Mexico reduce fondos de ayuda a migrantes. Recorta del presupuesto el 77% de lo asignado el ano pasado en su apoyo." La Opinion, November 19. Obtained from CONFEMEX listserv, November 30, 2009. 144 Olivo, Antonio and Oscar Avila. 2008. “Tense times hit home at Mexican consulate.” Chicago Tribune, February 9. 145 Ibid.

Vonderlack-Navarro, Rebecca. Immigrant Political Incorporation : The Role of Hometown Associations, LFB

Copyright © 2013. LFB Scholarly Publishing LLC. All rights reserved.

"Today We March, Tomorrow We Vote"

177

the new consular strategies towards federation leaders had apparently shifted by 2008. As new officials assumed posts within the Institute for Mexicans Abroad, they tended to see the influence of CONFEMEX as overrated, especially now that the protests were over. While they still wanted HTAs to serve as remittance-generating organizations, consular officials did not seem to have a continued interest in cultivating within federation leaders an independent political perspective. (Interview with IME officials June 8, 2008, December 7, 2008; February 20, 2009, Chicago, IL.) Making matters even more difficult, internal disagreements erupted between federation leaders and between some leaders and their base about CONFEMEX’s bi-national agenda. CONFEMEX’s intensified ties with ICIRR ignited concerns within the confederation for how to advocate for resources and representation with strong and established NGOs. As early as 2007, during their leadership retreat, leaders foresaw a potential challenge in obtaining funds. “As an umbrella organization that is not established within the [U.S.] non-profit community, we have to be creative in order to survive and obtain our own resources.” (CONFEMEX Retiro, January 13 and 22, 2007, minutes.) While Blagojevich’s Office of New Americans Policy and Advocacy was the recipient of state funding, it was ICIRR who was in charge of how resources would be distributed. CONFEMEX was adamant about advocating within ICIRR in order to receive their piece of the financial pie. “No one is going to fight for the Mexicans like we will,” leaders passionately argued in their March monthly meeting in 2008. There was even resentment that the Caucasian native-born Executive Director of ICIRR did not have the same awareness within the migrant community. “At the end of the day the Americans view things differently than Mexicans." CONFEMEX wanted immigrants themselves to have a voice in immigrant politics. CONFEMEX leaders knew that as a broad representative base of Mexican new arrivals they needed more responsibility and clout within ICIRR. “If we don’t get power now and there is an amnesty in a couple of years, others will be making decisions for us [the immigrants]." Federation leaders were sensitive to the dynamic political climate and how power dynamics could quickly change if and when a legalization provision passed. (Field notes and monthly minutes, CONFEMEX monthly meeting, March 10, 2008, Chicago, IL.)

Vonderlack-Navarro, Rebecca. Immigrant Political Incorporation : The Role of Hometown Associations, LFB

Copyright © 2013. LFB Scholarly Publishing LLC. All rights reserved.

178

Immigrant Political Incorporation

Over time, leaders grew increasingly disenchanted by the confederation’s intensified ties to ICIRR and state leaders. And some federation leaders who had made professional gains through ties to local state leadership in turn wondered aloud if they had made the right decision in their new positions of local power. Early on, since the beginning of his work within the Blagojevich administration, Jose Luis himself anticipated problems in taking a government position. He was sensitive to how other leaders and his base questioned his motives. “It pained me that people would tell me ‘Now you are not one of us. You are a politician.’” (CONFEMEX monthly meeting field notes, October 9, 2006, Durango Unido, Chicago, IL.) Similarly, a Guerrero leader anticipated how making ties with government leaders could confine a federation leader’s activism: “Did you notice Jose Luis is now quieter? You cannot go around saying whatever you want when you work for the government." At the same time, many CONFEMEX leaders recognized the potential for federation power gained by moving into government. The Guerrero leader continued, “We pushed Jose Luis to where he is [in government] and now he’ll pull others up with him." While ripe with challenges, leaders saw ties to the local state and ICIRR as a practical route for making inroads in local politics, allowing them to further immigrant interests throughout the state. However, leaders struggled with the reality that such a move into U.S. politics had its drawbacks: “If we gain power here [the U.S.], you start to forget about Mexico." Intensified connections to U.S. politics was seen as potentially limiting to CONFEMEX’s bi-national agenda. (Field notes September 28, 2006, Consulate Foro con los clubes de oriundos, Westside Technical Institute, Chicago, IL.) As CONFEMEX advanced its interest group activities, accusations between federation leaders of “selling out” to local politics became more common. To illustrate, the former president of Zacatecas was quite critical of what he viewed as opportunism within CONFEMEX leaders tied to the Illinois state government: “…the personal missions [of leaders] have become first.” (June 18, 2008, Chicago, IL.) Other leaders, while sensitive to the need for federation leaders to create an authentic voice of immigrants within U.S. politics, were wary that political involvement meant the confederation was becoming absorbed by the government’s own agenda. The founder and president of the Oaxaca federation revealed the potential rewards and losses in working with state leaders:

Vonderlack-Navarro, Rebecca. Immigrant Political Incorporation : The Role of Hometown Associations, LFB

"Today We March, Tomorrow We Vote"

179

I: What is your opinion of federation leaders taking on political positions in the U.S.? A: I think…it’s a good move for them…because we have people that we know taking up those positions, no? But we need them [the leaders] to benefit everyone, not just a certain group…Hopefully these leaders that are gaining [political] positions will continue to work with what is our agenda, that of the organizations [in CONFEMEX], and they don’t forget that.

Copyright © 2013. LFB Scholarly Publishing LLC. All rights reserved.

I: Do you fear that if [federation] leaders begin to assume this path of taking on political positions in the U.S. that they could lose their focus of helping the organizations [of CONFEMEX]? A: Yes, they could lose it because they [politicians] limit you from making opinions. If we are talking about, for example, Jose Luis, you lose. Because there are many times he cannot give his opinion because he works for the state or city…he has to be very careful with this…he has to approach the media as someone from the state government and not as a president of the federation or as a member of the Michoacanos…there is where [federation leaders] lose a little [of their focus]… (Interview, July 17, 2008, Racine, WI). Similar resentment within CONFEMEX leadership also grew over its connection to ICIRR. Many leaders critiqued what they felt was a top-down leadership style within the ICIRR’s New Americans Democracy Project. The president of the Guanajuato federation, for example, described how CONFEMEX was being dictated by ICIRR’s agenda: I am going to tell you something that I don’t like. That I did not like in a big way. So much that I told this to the president of CONFEMEX. In Cicero, who is doing the voter registration? CONFEMEX is doing it. But it was not the decision of CONFEMEX to do it in Cicero. From the moment that Arreola arrived [to work] at ICIRR, he said we have to do

Vonderlack-Navarro, Rebecca. Immigrant Political Incorporation : The Role of Hometown Associations, LFB

180

Immigrant Political Incorporation it [voter registration] in Cicero. And from that moment we are doing it in Cicero. That is manipulation…It’s ok that we do it there, but it should be our own decision. (Interview, August 7, 2008, Chicago, IL).

Some leaders resented that their opinions were not taken into consideration in the voter mobilization program. The leader continued to express his concern that ICIRR was using CONFEMEX to gain funding: I: What is your opinion of the relationship between ICIRR and CONFEMEX? R: …Look, I am very close with ICIRR, and I work closely with ICIRR, but I definitely believe that ICIRR wants to manipulate CONFEMEX and they are achieving that…

Copyright © 2013. LFB Scholarly Publishing LLC. All rights reserved.

I: And why does the ICIRR want [to work with] CONFEMEX? R: …We the Mexicans are the largest group [of immigrants] that exist in Chicago. So the coalition receives more funding if the Illinois Coalition…[represents] we the Mexicans… So, if they group together the majority of Mexicans [within the coalition], obviously, they receive more funds. Although CONFEMEX doesn’t receive anything from ICIRR, compared with the millions of dollars that ICIRR receives.” (Interview August 7, 2008, Chicago, IL). He went on to discuss how CONFEMEX was not yet sufficiently organized with an executive director that could advocate for more funds and resources from ICIRR. With a stronger leadership, CONFEMEX could fight for its needs. As long as CONFEMEX remained weak, he argued, the coalition could use CONFEMEX to meet its own funding needs. “So it’s not convenient for the coalition [ICIRR] to strengthen CONFEMEX." Similarly wary, a Durango leader expressed concern with CONFEMEX’s alliance with ICIRR, an organization that was much stronger than CONFEMEX and with more resources. “We could start working for their agenda and not our own.” (Interview with Durango federation president, May 22, 2008, Chicago,

Vonderlack-Navarro, Rebecca. Immigrant Political Incorporation : The Role of Hometown Associations, LFB

Copyright © 2013. LFB Scholarly Publishing LLC. All rights reserved.

"Today We March, Tomorrow We Vote"

181

IL.) The Durango federation president also expressed her apprehension that CONFEMEX’s unique bi-national agenda as an immigrant-led confederation could be threatened by ICIRR’s agenda. “They [ICIRR] don’t totally understand our bi-national vision…we are not just about [U.S.] votes." She sarcastically described how ICIRR and local politicians were recently attracted to CONFEMEX and its base of HTAs as a prized voting bloc. “Ya somos de moda" (now we’re in style). (Interview, May 22, 2008, Chicago, IL.) Some CONFEMEX leaders argued that CONFEMEX should have more than one federation leader on ICIRR’s board of directors because of the large benefit they were providing for the coalition. Some smaller federation leaders also felt ignored by ICIRR leadership and expressed suspicion that ICIRR’s leadership was only interested in mobilizing the larger federations.146 Ironically, while not long ago HTAs and CONFEMEX were not of great concern to local U.S. electoral organizations and lawmakers, by 2008, some federation leaders were quickly feeling controlled by them. As friction played out between federation leaders, the Mexicans for Political Progress political action committee also suffered. A dismayed CONFEMEX leader from Guanajuato expressed why he chose to no longer participate in MXPP by 2008: “If Blagojevich goes bad, MXPP has problems,” he explained. “It [MXPP] is not inclusive and…I do not see a direct benefit for my community and we will not have much influence in aldermanic elections, because it’s all about the governor." He was also troubled that MXPP “began for a person versus an organization,” as he felt it was all about boosting the jobs of federation leaders who were now tied to the government. (Interview with Guanajuato co-founder, May 27, 2008, Chicago, IL.) The lessening of federation leader involvement in MXPP would greatly limit its influence and ultimately its demise before the 2008 elections. And for the larger Guerrero and Michoacán federations that were strongly advocating for CONFEMEX to connect with ICIRR and state leaders, their rivalry also grew. The celos (jealousy) was especially heightened when a Guerrero leader won the seat of CONFEMEX president in 2007 against a Michoacán contender. (Field notes and CONFEMEX monthly minutes, February 12, 2007; April 9, 2007.) 146

Interviews with federation leaders from Durango, May 22, 2008; Hidalgo, June 23, 2008; and Guanajuato, August 7, 2008 and May 27, 2008, Chicago, IL.

Vonderlack-Navarro, Rebecca. Immigrant Political Incorporation : The Role of Hometown Associations, LFB

182

Immigrant Political Incorporation

Their competition by 2008, however, was not just for gaining leadership posts within CONFEMEX, but also to make gains in ICIRR. (Field notes and CONFEMEX monthly minutes, March 10, 2008; April 14, 2008; May 12, 2008.) The board president of ICIRR even felt caught in the middle of their infighting. He explained how a Guerrero leader had recently called him up wanting more jobs within the coalition: “You’ve got a Michoacano here and a Michoacano is there, so is ICIRR…just about Michoacanos?" The ICIRR board president went on to describe how the infighting between the federations had been detrimental for the continuation of the Mexicans for Political Progress political action committee:

Copyright © 2013. LFB Scholarly Publishing LLC. All rights reserved.

Really the breakdown of communication between [federation leaders] has been fatal. I mean, fatal to the point where…I didn’t even submit the last W-2 [form], I had to pay a $500 fine. I think I was just depressed. (Interview, January 9, 2009, Chicago, IL.) The contention between the Guerrero and Michoacán federation grew so intense that the Michoacán federation would dramatically exit CONFEMEX in 2009 during an upset over how the leadership committee elections were handled. Michoacán’s departure would be a tremendous loss for CONFEMEX as they were at the forefront of CONFEMEX’s formation and proved to be one of the strongest federations in the Midwest pushing for bi-national Mexico-U.S. political advocacy. The infighting for CONFEMEX would eventually prove too strong for reconciliation. Tensions also ensued between some CONFEMEX leaders and their HTA bases. Federation leaders expressed conflicting reactions from their base over involvement in U.S. politics. On the one hand, the base felt deceived by failed struggles to achieve an immigration reform, and as a result, wanted to re-focus on their conventional Mexicanrelated activities. On the other hand, much of the base remained paralyzed and frightened by the escalating police enforcement and looked to their trusted federation leaders to resolve the crisis. As CONFEMEX leaders became increasingly engaged in U.S. politics, some CONFEMEX leaders reported a growing strain relating

Vonderlack-Navarro, Rebecca. Immigrant Political Incorporation : The Role of Hometown Associations, LFB

Copyright © 2013. LFB Scholarly Publishing LLC. All rights reserved.

"Today We March, Tomorrow We Vote"

183

to a base that no longer wanted to focus on immigration reform.147 After the 2006 and 2007 marches, much of the base was confused and disillusioned because no significant policy resolution was attained. Many wanted to return back to the original functions of the clubs and felt their energies were better spent on events that produced tangible results, especially re-focusing on their customary southward-focused activities (e.g. 3x1 development projects and folkloric festivals). The co-founder of the Durango federation explained how the rapid expansion in CONFEMEX activities meant much of their base was losing interest in CONFEMEX and its battle for immigrant rights. While CONFEMEX leaders wanted to push a Mexico-U.S. bi-national vision, “They [the base] still dream of Mexico." As was commonly stated by federation leaders, “Quieren su baile, su 3x1, y no quieren hablar de politicos." (They want their [traditional] dance, their 3x1 [infrastructure projects], and they do not want to talk about politics.) (Interview May 10, 2008, Chicago, IL.) Some club members even complained at a federation meeting that they did not want to hear more about CONFEMEX and its advocacy for immigrant rights, as they wanted to concentrate on the more traditional Mexican-oriented activities. Furthermore, some of the HTA base—frustrated, let down, or even confused by the U.S. stalemate over immigration reform—were feeling disconnected from the movement. It seemed while some federation leaders were making gains within local U.S. politics and prominent advocacy organizations, some of their base felt left out or turned off by the movement. The relationship between the confederation leadership and their base, nevertheless, was more complicated. Many HTA members, at this time, were scared and wanted change. For those in the base who lacked legal status, involvement in U.S. politics was not a choice. “Everyone is related to someone undocumented,” was a common claim by federation chiefs. One CONFEMEX leader revealed at length how the rise in U.S. repression affected their base:

147

Interviews with Durango federation leader, May 6, 2008, Hidalgo federation leaders, June 23, 2008, Oaxaca founder and president July 17, 2008, Michoacán leader May 15, 2008 and Guerrero leader and CONFEMEX president, May 2, 2008.

Vonderlack-Navarro, Rebecca. Immigrant Political Incorporation : The Role of Hometown Associations, LFB

184

Immigrant Political Incorporation

Copyright © 2013. LFB Scholarly Publishing LLC. All rights reserved.

They [new members] have been here since maybe within the last ten years… our new members are basically the ones who have just arrived…and they are 80% to 90% undocumented. So the children are the ones who are the citizens here…[And] because of the uncertainty of being seen [by U.S. authorities]…with the [federation’s] sign-in sheets, they don’t feel secure because, obviously, they know me, but what if the sign-in sheets get lost? They have their name, their address and everything…[and] some of our meetings have gone really low, but yet, they’re still telling us [the federation], ‘keep going.’…So to me that was, like, there’s so much pressure on us [as federation leaders]…because you think, ‘oh my God,’ they look at us like we’re going to…to do the [immigration] reform. To help them. And it’s a lot, because for the one that gets deported, what explanation can I give them? (Interview, June 23, 2008, Chicago, IL.) The rise in U.S. local repression and the inability of U.S. national politics to reach a reform was devastating for many newly arrived HTA members. Overall, the contrasting feelings of their member base— those who favored customary activities and those overwhelmed by antiimmigrant repression—made it more apparent as to why CONFEMEX needed to maintain its bi-national vision. While wanting to stay connected to development concerns in Mexico, the base also had to function in the here and now, which was increasingly threatening. CONFEMEX’s shift into U.S. interest group politics was hardly a smooth transition. A spiraling economy and quick shift in cross-border political strategies meant CONFEMEX would encounter new hardships with both emigrant- and immigrant-targeted programs. On top of external adversity, accusations of leader co-optation and eventual fragmentation ensued. In great contrast to the successful unity they had previously cherished in their battle against immigrant repression, CONFEMEX’s transition into interest group consolidation appeared to have weakened the confederation. Conclusion What can we learn from CONFEMEX’s shift towards US-focused political integration following the marches of 2006? Overall, the

Vonderlack-Navarro, Rebecca. Immigrant Political Incorporation : The Role of Hometown Associations, LFB

Copyright © 2013. LFB Scholarly Publishing LLC. All rights reserved.

"Today We March, Tomorrow We Vote"

185

evolution of CONFEMEX after the marches and the challenges it confronted are a result of the complicated political context it was embedded in rather than an all-too-simple focus on federation leaders. This chapter examined how CONFEMEX, building off the momentum of the mega-marches and the apparent political opportunities for immigration reform, moved into US-focused interest group activity and voting as a natural extension of its bi-national agenda. Yet this new strategy came with certain costs for the confederation: a general weakening of the will to mobilize for marches; a resulting internal fragmentation between leaders as they vied for recognition with stronger organizations and government leaders; and a political context that not only offered few concessions towards immigrants, but intensified national/local repression. As it stood in 2008, there was still no socially sustainable national economic development model for Mexico or the United States. In turn, a cross-border perspective that delved into the consequences of neoliberal restructuring—an agenda united HTA leaders could have potentially brought to the table—remained absent from national immigration debates. In retrospect, then, might CONFEMEX have been more cautious in its embrace of U.S. state and local politics if it had known that this involvement could come at the cost of its ability to push a bi-national agenda? But this decision, too, unfolded within a political context with other powerful actors playing a defining role. First, for reasons of their own, Mexican government officials were encouraging CONFEMEX to become much more deeply involved in Illinois politics; and, second, national politics in the U.S. were already becoming more hostile to pro-immigrant positions, with the result that Sensenbrenner-like threats were no longer galvanizing—they created fear and repression. Perhaps CONFEMEX could have done more to follow a strong marching or mobilizing strategy post-2006. It is not clear, however, that such a strategy would have been any more effective than the voting and lobbying strategies that held the focus of the confederation instead. However, the discouraging outcomes from the 2006 to 2008 efforts seemed to have reignited the interest by federation leaders in the homeland, particularly in the base. All in all, Chicago HTA members did not respond to recent processes of U.S. incorporation by abandoning their Mexico-focused agenda. Instead, these migrants seemed to be reinvesting in traditional HTA activities even as they look

Vonderlack-Navarro, Rebecca. Immigrant Political Incorporation : The Role of Hometown Associations, LFB

186

Immigrant Political Incorporation

Copyright © 2013. LFB Scholarly Publishing LLC. All rights reserved.

to their leaders— state and non-state, in Mexico and in the United States—to address their increasingly difficult political situation in the U.S.

Vonderlack-Navarro, Rebecca. Immigrant Political Incorporation : The Role of Hometown Associations, LFB

CHAPTER 7

Copyright © 2013. LFB Scholarly Publishing LLC. All rights reserved.

Future Considerations for Immigrant Mobilization and Politics

This multi-method case study focused on the evolution of Midwestern HTAs and federations into the Chicago-based confederation CONFEMEX. The case study has argued that recent theories influenced by the “transnationalist” lens that emphasizes sendingsociety political ties do not effectively explain the progression of Chicago HTAs’ activities as they fail to pay adequate attention to the U.S. political environment and how it came to influence HTA activism. Using a modified political process model, I argued that the growing importance of U.S.-focused activities for CONFEMEX as well as its eventual embrace of popular mobilization strategies resulted from its interaction with multiple government entities both in Mexico and (especially) the United States, including both national and state-level actors. By examining how these varied governmental actors worked at different times to suppress, stimulate, or reincorporate CONFEMEX, we can see how the changing form and direction of HTA activism (not only popular mobilization but most recently, interest-group consolidation) represent immigrant leaders’ responses to shifting and cross-cutting state projects in an era of neoliberal globalization. After a careful review of the growing body of research on the transnational politics of Mexican immigrant organizations, the case study developed a broader conceptual framework that drew from social movement paradigms, the political economy of globalization, and 187

Vonderlack-Navarro, Rebecca. Immigrant Political Incorporation : The Role of Hometown Associations, LFB

Copyright © 2013. LFB Scholarly Publishing LLC. All rights reserved.

188

Immigrant Political Incorporation

theories of the state. The study provided a modified political process model to highlight the ongoing dialectic between multiple—and at times contradictory—state projects that interacted with and shaped HTAs' own growing activism. Moreover, the research project suggests the utility of a long-term, bi-national focus on multiple state actors in order to understand the role of HTAs within the complex political evolution of the immigrant rights movement. The project considered HTAs’ organizational developments as occurring within a specific context of a far-reaching restructuring in the political economies of Mexico and the United States. In particular, Mexico’s post-1970s development came to be predicated on mass labor export. The extensive out-migration provided both return remittance flows and internal political stability to the country. As for the United States, its own restructuring increasingly took the form of an hour-glass economy dependent upon highly exploitable immigrant labor, much of which came from Mexico. The result was not only an increasingly integrated bi-national economy but also an evolving, contradictory political context. This was a context where Mexican citizens (who were largely ignored within the homeland) were selectively re-engaged by the Mexican government through their communities in Chicago. It was within this context as well that these migrants found themselves marginalized politically in the United States except when selectively targeted as immigrant voting blocs by partisan strategists. For HTAs during the early years, it was the Mexico side of this context that was most evident and politically beneficial. As such, the many first-generation, Mexican immigrant HTAs and federations in U.S. cities received extensive scholarly attention for their collaborative development projects oriented towards sustaining transnational ties between immigrants and their sending society. While in the beginning these organizations were largely outside of the U.S. scope of action and generally uninvolved with established Latino ethnic organizations, the increase in Mexican emigration to Chicago in the 1990s coupled with proactive Mexican state reincorporation programs resulted in a substantial organizational growth of HTAs in Chicago and the Midwest. Increasingly supported by the Mexican government to retain ties to Mexico throughout the decade, HTAs started to emerge as important social networks in the everyday lives of immigrants and potential conduits for conventional (and eventually contentious) political participation. As the multiple levels of the Mexican

Vonderlack-Navarro, Rebecca. Immigrant Political Incorporation : The Role of Hometown Associations, LFB

Copyright © 2013. LFB Scholarly Publishing LLC. All rights reserved.

Future Considerations

189

government (including a large and important Chicago Mexican consulate) encouraged HTAs’ Mexico-focused activities and emerging political agency, many of the HTAs began to participate in federated structures that linked HTAs into a broader political agenda. During Mexico’s attempt to institutionalize Chicago’s diaspora, Mexican state political opportunities and threats sparked both migrant insurgency and extensive coalition-building efforts between migrant leaders. Migrant leaders, in turn, worked to gain autonomy from Mexican state control. Beyond the Mexican government’s diaspora reincorporation programs and local consular support, a second and possibly more important set of U.S. political actors came to influence Chicago’s HTAs from 2001 to 2005. This period included the combined outcomes of a threatening post-9/11 U.S. anti-immigrant politics and a quite different and powerfully legitimating set of Illinois state government programs that courted Chicago-based Mexican HTAs as attractive voting blocs. In response to the increasingly hostile U.S. political environment post-9/11, both the Mexican state and HTAs themselves embraced strategies to include U.S.-focused activities that aimed to secure migrants’ political standing in the host country. As a result of their expanding cross-border activities, by 2003 numerous federation and HTA leaders joined to form the Chicago-based Confederation of Mexican Federations, or CONFEMEX, with a distinctly bi-national agenda. Continuing the move towards U.S.-focused concerns, CONFEMEX soon joined with the multi-scalar alliance of NALACC, the National Alliance of Latin American and Caribbean Communities, as a means to create a sense of power and a voice for immigrants within the immigration reform debate. The alliance advocated for sustainable social and economic development strategies in Latin America along with U.S. immigration reform. CONFEMEX’s interest in U.S. affairs was further encouraged when the Illinois government extended local political opportunities to some of the confederation’s leaders that allowed them to serve in a state-migrant alliance to foster immigrants’ local U.S. incorporation. By the time the Sensenbrenner bill passed the house in December of 2005, the criminalization tactics clashed profoundly with immigrant leaders’ sense of political legitimacy on both sides of the border. Chicago’s HTA confederation quickly transformed into a mobilizing structure, and for the first time ever, embraced U.S.-focused protest activity. By 2006, CONFEMEX grew to

Vonderlack-Navarro, Rebecca. Immigrant Political Incorporation : The Role of Hometown Associations, LFB

Copyright © 2013. LFB Scholarly Publishing LLC. All rights reserved.

190

Immigrant Political Incorporation

be an important contributor to Chicago’s burgeoning immigrant rights movement. CONFEMEX’s U.S.-focused contention rapidly changed to prioritize conventional U.S. political interest group strategies. Moving from the mega-marches of 2006 to 2008, CONFEMEX more than ever represented attractive, grassroots leadership for professional organizations and state actors who wanted to remain relevant and connected to the ever-growing base of Mexican immigrants in Chicago. As more institutionalized organizations and local political actors became involved in the movement, they pushed to keep the marches peaceful, non-confrontational, and encouraged protestors to eventually engage in conventional U.S. politics (citizenship and voter mobilization). Yet while CONFEMEX leaders felt empowered by the extending reach of local U.S. state actors who encouraged them to take to the streets and eventually integrate into U.S. society, their MexicoU.S. bi-national agenda became threatened, and at times seemingly limited by the profoundly uni-national framing of U.S. immigrant politics. Eventually, the confederation’s path towards U.S. political integration also created internal tensions between CONFEMEX leaders. In addition, conflicts emerged between leaders and their base, as much of the base became disillusioned by the fight for immigrant rights and wanted to re-focus on more customary Mexican-focused activities. Furthermore, others in the member base were disappointed at CONFEMEX’s inability to fight back at the rising number of deportations. Throughout the past twenty years, HTAs (and particularly their federations and CONFEMEX) have functioned as both momentary vehicles for protest and more often than not, as organizers for various cross-border interest group strategies. The study’s historic overview aimed to provide close attention to the crucial moments when HTAs began their mobilization into collective protest (e.g., in 1999 against the Mexican government’s car deposit increase, or on March 10, 2006, against the Sensenbrenner bill). During these episodes of insurgence, HTA leaders were new to political resistance. In 1999, HTAs had yet to form their full identity as united claims-makers making demands on the Mexican government. Even more apparent with the mega-march on March 10, 2006, HTA leaders were new to U.S.-focused protest, and the impact of contentious organizing served to have an exhilarating effect on CONFEMEX leaders. The protests inspired a newfound sense

Vonderlack-Navarro, Rebecca. Immigrant Political Incorporation : The Role of Hometown Associations, LFB

Copyright © 2013. LFB Scholarly Publishing LLC. All rights reserved.

Future Considerations

191

of political efficacy in politics. Further, during both these times of initial protest, HTA leaders lacked substantial power within either the Mexican or U.S. state projects that made decisions about their lives. Indeed, it was outside of state projects where HTA leaders joined in collective protest and began to redefine their own agency within politics. Over time, political elites on both sides of the border and professionalized organizations reacted to HTAs’ contention by encouraging them to mobilize so as to further their own institutional aims. As exemplified by the arguably regulatory intentions of the Mexican state’s Institute for Mexicans Abroad in response to the 1999 Car Deposit protests or the more recent ICIRR and local state’s interests in immigrant voter mobilization, state actors on both sides of the border were able to “manage dissent without stifling it” (Meyer and Tarrow 1998, 21). As state actors garnered influence within HTAs— particularly the more recent local US state actors—they pushed for a uni-national approach to immigration reform and marginalized discussions regarding the multi-national economic and political policies that perpetuate immigration flows. It is not surprising that both conventional and unconventional forms of political engagement often work in combination within grassroots organizing as protestors attempt to maintain influence as they interact with the state. This has arguably been the case for the immigrant rights movement. The challenge, however, is assuring that contentious activity aimed at confronting institutional injustices is not easily transformed into a mere tool of institutional politics. As social movement theorists Meyer and Tarrow (1998) contend, “By accepting and regulating contention…states may have learned to control it and, through this control, begun to domesticate the social movement within the political process” (6). The challenge, thus, would be to ensure that the movement’s vision is not watered down by incrementalist political incorporation, a process that can serve to demobilize healthy debate within the immigrant constituency and consequently fail to maintain the accountability of those in power. Despite the broader political ambitions of cross-border organizations like CONFEMEX, their early local accommodation seemed to have limited their agenda. The predominant approach within the general immigrant rights movement was to pursue a confined incrementalist agenda: a push for immigrant inclusion (legalization and

Vonderlack-Navarro, Rebecca. Immigrant Political Incorporation : The Role of Hometown Associations, LFB

Copyright © 2013. LFB Scholarly Publishing LLC. All rights reserved.

192

Immigrant Political Incorporation

eventual political incorporation) with little, if any, attention to the questioning of neoliberal restructuring. While the immigrant agenda had some pragmatic appeal with political elites in power, the approach marginalized a broader structural agenda that views inclusion alone as insufficient. On the one hand, the inclusionist agenda provided early benefits to the immigrant rights movement by gaining access to elected officials willing to support a compromised immigrant resolution along with financial gains for professionalized NGOs that benefit immigrant interests. More radical groups, in turn, were unable to offer the same quick monetary and political gains. “By definition, we should expect that radicals proceed from a relatively weaker institutional base than those associated with programs that presume the political status quo” (Reed Jr. 1999, 134). Consequentially, a politically independent neoliberal critique of immigrant political reform was almost entirely marginalized from mainstream debate. Currently, there remains a great need for a socially sustainable national economic development model for Mexico or the United States. One could argue, as illustrated by the historical evolution of CONFEMEX, a multi-state solution to immigration was rapidly compromised by immigrants’ systemic inclusion into U.S. politics. Arguably, the mere inclusionary agenda of U.S. political incorporation served to demobilize a broader more meaningful cross-border immigrant rights movement that could address injustices within a political economy that perpetuated such vast immigration flows. As of late, CONFEMEX was recognized as a confederation of important community leaders by both Mexican and U.S. state actors interested in emigrant/immigrant integration. What was lacking as they became increasingly tied to state interests, however, were deliberate steps to cultivate a conscientious immigrant HTA constituency as well as a debate about how various government policies might impact people at the local level. On the other hand, Chicago’s migrant organizational scene continues to be dynamic, and the role of hometown association leaders is likely to endure. At the end of data collection for this study, NALACC represented an important but somewhat forgotten road for federation leaders to continue their bi-national agendas. Federation leaders were so consumed with their many activities that maintaining a strong leadership role within NALACC had been seemingly neglected. Yet by 2009 some federation leaders had renewed ties to NALACC,

Vonderlack-Navarro, Rebecca. Immigrant Political Incorporation : The Role of Hometown Associations, LFB

Copyright © 2013. LFB Scholarly Publishing LLC. All rights reserved.

Future Considerations

193

thus presenting a promise for promoting a multi-scalar agenda. Future research would benefit from exploring this avenue for federation organizing. What characterizes NALACC from other predominant national immigrant advocacy organizations is that it is a uniquely immigrant-led national organization. A fundamental principle of NALACC is to promote multi-national considerations for immigrant policies, proclaiming “…it is imperative to understand migration as a public policy challenge that requires measures in the countries of destination of migration, as well as in the countries of origin.”148 Among its many principles, NALACC advocates for a restructuring of international economic development programs and current trade policies with Latin American countries and promotes a multi-national agenda comprised of three main components: (1) advocacy within the countries of origin; (2) garnering influence within multi-lateral international institutions (e.g., the Organization of American States and the Inter-American Development Bank); and (3) gaining a voice in US foreign policy matters towards Latin America.149 The need for a multi-national approach to immigration reform within mainstream debate remains critical. The vision of NALACC in many ways resonates with federation leaders’ desires to remain engaged with cross-border concerns. The alliance contributes to the multi-scalar promise of CONFEMEX by offering its leadership important links to organizations working at local, national, and transnational scales. While promoting U.S. immigrant rights and integration, the alliance could possibly prevent migrants’ action from being confined within local U.S. politics. At the same time, NALACC could also potentially provide a means for rival federation leaders to 148

Excerpt from “NALACC Position on the Rights of Immigrants and the Need for a Brand New Immigration Policy,” NALAACC, January 6, 2006. 149 Notes taken from a presentation given by the Executive Director of NALACC at the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars Mexican Institute, “Latino Immigrant Civic Engagement Trends,” Friday, June 26, 2009. Available at: http://wilsoncenter.org/index.cfm?topic_id=5949&fuseaction=topics.event&e vent_id=535565.

Vonderlack-Navarro, Rebecca. Immigrant Political Incorporation : The Role of Hometown Associations, LFB

Copyright © 2013. LFB Scholarly Publishing LLC. All rights reserved.

194

Immigrant Political Incorporation

make amends and work together within a broader cross-border initiative. As data collection for this project ended, federation leaders from Michoacán and Durango were playing important leadership roles within NALACC. Their work together within NALACC could create new opportunities for creative coalition building between federation leaders. Future research is also necessary to consider if and how federation leaders embarking on a broader cross-border agenda are able to maintain close ties to their HTA member base. NALACC emphasizes the critical necessity to educate its base and create debate about how government policies impact people at the local level. NALACC actively promotes within its base extensive knowledge-building for how nation-state systems work and how everyday immigrants can create their own political voice on both sides of the border.150 As federation leaders partner with NALACC, the HTA base could increase their own knowledge for advancing an integrated migrant agenda. And while NALACC does not offer the quick political boost or monetary gains available through local machine politics, it could nonetheless cultivate a longer-term vision of true power gains: mobilized immigrants speaking for themselves outside of direct state influences. This is much like what Charles Payne (1995) described in his thoughtful investigation of the civil rights movement as “the central theme of the community-organizing tradition—that people who think they matter, might” (392). On into the future, Mexican HTA organizations—many of whose members lack legal status—will likely continue to represent an important base of the immigrant movement embattled in the struggle for rights, recognition, and influence.

150

Notes taken from a presentation given by the Executive Director of NALACC at the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars Mexican Institute, “Latino Immigrant Civic Engagement Trends,” Friday, June 26, 2009. Available at: http://wilsoncenter.org/index.cfm?topic_id=5949& fuseaction=topics.event&event_id=535565.

Vonderlack-Navarro, Rebecca. Immigrant Political Incorporation : The Role of Hometown Associations, LFB

APPENDIX

Interview Subjects

Copyright © 2013. LFB Scholarly Publishing LLC. All rights reserved.

Federations and Federation Leaders within CONFEMEX Michoacán, Federacion de Clubes Michoacanos en el Medio Este (FEDECMI), which began in 1997 and is based in Chicago, IL. Interviewees claim the first club from the state of Michoacán began in Chicago as early as 1961. By 2008 the federation would represent 35 clubs. The former president of the federation, Advisor to the Mexican government’s IME from 2003-2005, co-founder of CONFEMEX and NALACC, and former director of the Governor’s Office of New Americans Policy and Advocacy under Illinois Governor Rod Blagojevich was interviewed on March 14, 2008 and May 15, 2008 in Chicago, IL.. He began his work with club Morelia in 1998 and at this time became heavily involved with the federation. By 2001 he was president of FEDECMI. The current president of the Michoacán federation during the time of the study was interviewed on June 3, 2008. He also was extensively involved in CONFEMEX and NALACC since their inceptions. He joined the federation in 1997 and feels there was always some type of emphasis on immigrant rights, although it became much stronger after Sensenbrenner. He strongly pushed for voting over marching by 2008. Former treasurer of CONFEMEX, long-time leader in the Michoacán federation, original leader in Chicago’s March 10th Committee, leader in his local Service Employees Industrial Union, migrant advisor to the Mexican government’s IME from 2007-2009 and by 2007 the Political Director of the Illinois Coalitions for 195

Vonderlack-Navarro, Rebecca. Immigrant Political Incorporation : The Role of Hometown Associations, LFB

Copyright © 2013. LFB Scholarly Publishing LLC. All rights reserved.

196

Appendix

Immigrant and Refugee Rights’ New Americans Democracy project was interviewed twice on March 18, 2008 and again on May 25, 2008. As an original leader within the March 10th, 2006 mobilization, he offered extensive knowledge along with flyers and meeting minutes to inform this study’s analysis of the 2006 mobilizations. Durango, the Durango Unido federation began in 1996 with four clubs. By 2008 they had 13 clubs. This is the only federation that was co-founded and whose leadership is dominated by women. The federation has always had more interest in local support and immigrant rights initiatives than in development projects in Mexico. The co-founder of Durango Unido, CONFEMEX president from 2005 to 2007, leader within the original March 10th Committee within Chicago in 2006, and leader within NALACC was interviewed on May 10, 2008 in Chicago. She is one of the oldest federation leaders in Chicago and offered turned to as a spokesperson for the organizations and for offering perspectives on female participation within the clubs. The president of Durango Unido, Midwest Regional Coordinator of NALACC, highly involved in CONFEMEX, and migrant advisor to the Mexican government’s IME for 2007-2009 was interviewed on May 22, 2008. She began her presidency of the federation in 2007. She began her work with the federation after participating in the Enlaces America’s Immigrant Leadership Empowerment Project. Former president of Durango Unido along with her husband, both heavily involved with the March 10th Committee through the peacekeepers commission and co-founders of their hometown club were interviewed on May 26, 2008. While they were both born in Mexico, they grew up migrating back and forth from Mexico and the U.S. She has a real connection to the youth in her club and strongly pushed for the federation’s involvement in both U.S.- and Mexicanfocused concerns. Former president of Durango Unido and heavily involved in CONFEMEX, NALACC, and the March 10th Committee back in 2006. She was interviewed on May 6, 2008. She is the sister of the co-founder of CONFEMEX and has been involved with the federation since its initiation in 1996. Due to her long history with the federation, she offered extensive perspective on the historical developments of Chicago’s clubs and federations, specifically the formation of Casa Mexico, Grupo David, COMMO and later CONFEMEX.

Vonderlack-Navarro, Rebecca. Immigrant Political Incorporation : The Role of Hometown Associations, LFB

Copyright © 2013. LFB Scholarly Publishing LLC. All rights reserved.

Appendix

197

Guanajuato, Casa Guanajuato began in 1995 and has also experienced a contentious division. The other Guanajuato federation of Chicago was claimed to be more aligned with the Mexican government, while Casa Guanajuato wanted to focus more on cultural initiatives and social support here in the U.S. The co-founder of Casa Guanajuato was interviewed on May 27, 2008. He and his wife began the federation informally by inviting leaders from different clubs to come and meet together. They purposefully called themselves Casa Guanajuato, versus the Federation of Guanajuato, because they wanted to avoid sounded too formal or politically tied to their home state. During the federation’s initiation they were much more concerned with development projects and cultural celebrations tied to the homeland than with immigrant rights. They talked of a distinct change for the federation after the antiSensenbrenner marches of 2006. At the time of the study’s interview on August 7, 2008 he had served as the federation president for the past three years. He would later become the president of CONFEMEX in 2009. He also worked for a local community agency, el Instituto del Progreso Latino, a principal member organization of the Illinois Coalition for Immigrant and Refugee Rights. A long-time federation leader within Casa Guanajuato was also interviewed on May 27, 2008. He was a long time member of one of the oldest clubs in Chicago that began in 1983. He had worked extensively with his club to push electrification initiatives and to aid with burial services back in his home state. He would eventually rise to become the president of the federation in 2009. Hidalgo, the Federacion de Hidalgo began in 2002 with a mere four members, but quickly grew to 50 or 60 members. The federation currently has an estimated nine clubs. As early as 2000 then Mexican President Vicente Fox and the former governor of Hidalgo encouraged the federation development during a visit to Chicago. The federation’s initiation was then strongly encouraged by the Chicago consulate’s Coordinator of the Institute for Mexicans Abroad along with the Oficina del Migrante of the state of Hidalgo. The federation co-founder and president was interviewed on June 28, 2008 in Chicago, IL. The president, along with the federation secretary, were highly involved in the immigrant rights mobilization of 2006 and 2007 and members of the March 10th Committee. At the time

Vonderlack-Navarro, Rebecca. Immigrant Political Incorporation : The Role of Hometown Associations, LFB

Copyright © 2013. LFB Scholarly Publishing LLC. All rights reserved.

198

Appendix

of the interview the federation was trying to maintain a balance between their investment projects in Hidalgo along with the immigrant rights movement in the U.S. The secretary of the federation was also interviewed on June 28, 2008. She was born in the U.S. and drawn to the cultural activities of the federation. She also talked extensively of supporting the youth in the federation. Guerrero, the Federacion de Guerrero is the oldest in Chicago and began in 1993 and the first to begin the 3x1 match initiative in 1998. While there are as many as 84 Guerrero clubs in Illinois, the federation experienced a contentious division. Former president of CONFEMEX from 2003 to 2005, migrant advisor to the Mexican government’s IME from 2005 to 2007, cofounder of NALACC and long time leader within his federation was interviewed twice on May 15 and May 19, 2008. He also was an original member of Chicago’s March 10th Committee serving as the coordinator of logistics for both the March 10th and May 1st mobilizations of 2006. He would later serve on the Board of Directors for the Illinois Coalition of Immigrant and Refugee Rights after CONFEMEX became a formal member organization. Initial president of CONFEMEX in 2003, but had to give up the post early on, was interviewed on May 15, 2008. He talked extensively of the positive influence of Chicago’s past General Consul Sada as he worked to understand the vision and objectives of the federations. Member of the Guanajuato federation and the Senior Organizer for the Illinois Coalition for Immigrant and Refugee rights was interviewed on June 8, 2008. Many within CONFEMEX saw his interest in CONFEMEX only occurred after the marches when the confederation drew closer links to the ICIRR. He was highly involved in the March 10th Committee and strongly pushes for immigrant rights issues over diaspora engagement initiatives. The former president of CONFEMEX from 2007-2009 was interviewed on May 2, 2008. He possessed critical leadership within CONFEMEX during its most transitional period of the research project. He pushed for CONFEMEX’s involvement in the immigrant rights marches and eventual conventional participation in voting drives. He was excited about the ties to ICIRR and the idea of having federation leaders someday assume governmental positions in the U.S. His initial

Vonderlack-Navarro, Rebecca. Immigrant Political Incorporation : The Role of Hometown Associations, LFB

Copyright © 2013. LFB Scholarly Publishing LLC. All rights reserved.

Appendix

199

involvement with his federation and with CONFEMEX came from his extensive participation and leadership in the Fiestas Patrias events. Oaxaca, the Federacion de los Oaxaquenos began in 1999. This was the only federation of CONFEMEX not based in Chicago, as it is located in Racine, Wisconsin. As a result, the federation’s involvement with the immigrant rights marches occurred within Wisconsin, although they relied on CONFEMEX for e-mails and other informational distributions. The federation co-founder and president was interviewed on July 17, 2008. He began the federation with merely two clubs and has always been interested in promoting the culture and heritage of Oaxaca. He distinctly distanced his federation from the more radical FIOB of California describing the federation as politically “passivos (passive)” when it comes to governmental affairs of his home state. The federation began when the General Consul Sada of Chicago, also from Oaxaca, presented him with the idea of starting a federation from Oaxaca. Along with the General Consul’s encouragement began the push for the federation to begin a 3x1 initiative. Aguas Calientes, the Federacion de Aguas Calientes was relatively young initiating in 2007. There were three clubs involved in the federation by 2008. The leader within the Aguas Calientes Federation and founder of his own club was interviewed on November 21, 2008. The leader seemed to be still in the process of familiarizing himself of the many developments within his federation, but liked the idea of the clubs working together. He, in fact, felt he was learning more about club and federation participation from the close relationships he had made with the Zacatecas and Michoacán federations. While a young club beginning in October of 2006, he was very proud of their 3x1 program. Chihuahua, the Federacion de Chihuhua began recently in 2007 after the mass mobilizations. The focus of the federation tends to be much more on immigrant rights concerns in the U.S. versus investment projects in Mexico, although a relationship with the Chihuahua government is beginning. The co-founder and president of the federation was interviewed on May 9, 2008 in Chicago, IL. She began the federation by speaking on a local radio station and asking if there were people in the area from her home state that wanted to start a federation. Interested listeners called into the station and there was the initiation of the federation. While

Vonderlack-Navarro, Rebecca. Immigrant Political Incorporation : The Role of Hometown Associations, LFB

Copyright © 2013. LFB Scholarly Publishing LLC. All rights reserved.

200

Appendix

there was another Chihuahua federation that existed in Chicago, the current president is not sure why they fell apart. She sees herself and her executive committee (vice-president, treasury and vocals) as “pioneering” a new federation. The federation remains small with 4060 members coming together on Saturday evenings for federation activities, but plan on having at least 200 guests for their large galas. The federation represents an estimated five clubs. Zacatecas, la Federacion de los Zacatecanos began in the late 1990s in Chicago. The federation is one of the largest in the Midwest with 52 clubs. The former president of the Zacatecas federation was interviewed on June 18, 2008 in Chicago. He became president of the federation in 2004 and served for four consecutive years. He was curious about ways to help his hometown and contacted the Coordinator from the consulate’s Institute for Mexican’s Abroad about how he could help. He is very proud of the extensive club development that occurred under his leadership with 28 clubs in 2004 and 52 by 2008. His own club was even able to raise $150,000 for building a road in his pueblo of Zacatecas. Jalisco, the Federation of Jalisco was one of the founding federations of CONFEMEX, but would exit around 2007. There were claims that their exit was due to internal changes in their leadership, but others claim the federation was upset with the new CONFEMEX president in 2007. The former president of the Jalisco federation from 1985-1987 was interviewed on July 9, 2008. While not currently involved in the federation, as he became disenchanted with their leadership, he was forging a strong relationship with CONFEMEX as the new outreach coordinator for local health clinics located in the Mexican-dominated areas of Little Village. He was very interested in joining with CONFEMEX because of their great volume of members. He and CONFEMEX leadership were in talks by 2007 about how to offer CONFEMEX members subsidized health care visits. Chicago Community Leaders Interviewed The board president of the Illinois Coalition for Immigrant and Refugee Rights was interviewed on January 9, 2009. He is a long-standing Mexican American leader in Chicago with widespread experience with

Vonderlack-Navarro, Rebecca. Immigrant Political Incorporation : The Role of Hometown Associations, LFB

Copyright © 2013. LFB Scholarly Publishing LLC. All rights reserved.

Appendix

201

various community-based organizations. At the time of the interview he served as the executive director for the Instituto del Progreso Latino offering various immigrant-related services. He shares a passion for expanding the civic participation for Mexican immigrants and has worked extensively with various federation leaders, particularly from Michoacán and Guerrero. He also served as a migrant advisor to the Mexican government’s IME from 2005-2007. The executive director of the community-based organization Centro Sin Fronteras was interviewed on October 14, 2008. She is the sister of former well known community organizer and politician Rudy Lozano. She has extensive experience mobilizing the Mexican immigrant community of Chicago and has long-standing ties to U.S. Congressman Luis Gutierrez. She began working with Chicago’s local disc jockeys in 2005 and was a key organizer for the July 2005 rally in response to the initiation of Chicago’s local anti-immigrant Minute Men chapter. She was a important leader in the initial March 10th Committee, although would soon split from the committee. She worked with numerous CONFEMEX leaders in coordinating the marches of 2006 and 2007. The Mexican American Director of the Latino Chapter of Rainbow PUSH was interviewed on October 13, 2008. While involved in all the marches since 2006, she was especially involved in encouraging African American participation in the marches for 2008. During 2007 she also worked extensively with the Hidalgo federation leaders in planning the marches. Long-time Chicago Mexican immigrant community activist, migrant advisor to the Mexican government’s IME, PRD Mexican Political Party Activist, former Green Party Candidate for U.S. Congressman against Luis Gutierrez in 2008, early leader of the March 10th Committee in 2006, and executive director of CALOR, an organization serving those with HIV, was interviewed on October 9, 2008. Due to his initial involvement in the March 10th mobilization, he offered imperative insight on the early developments of the movement. He also worked closely with many CONFEMEX leaders during the marches and through the Migrant Advisory Council to the Mexican government. Long-time PRD Mexican political party activist, union organizer, early March 10th Committee organizer, local journalist, and Mexican immigrant advisor to the Mexican government’s IME was interviewed

Vonderlack-Navarro, Rebecca. Immigrant Political Incorporation : The Role of Hometown Associations, LFB

Copyright © 2013. LFB Scholarly Publishing LLC. All rights reserved.

202

Appendix

on October 19, 2008. He has extensive experience in diaspora engagement initiatives in Chicago and was an early advocate for expatriate voting rights. He offered wide-ranging knowledge of both Cardenas and Salinas’ early visits to Chicago along with broad knowledge of the historical events that led up to the establishment of the Institute of Mexicans Abroad under the Fox administration. In addition, he was an initial leader in the March 10th mobilization and continues to be a vocal advocate for immigrant rights in Chicago. Another long-time PRD Mexican political party activist and early leader within the March 10th committee was interviewed on February 2, 2009. He offered vast knowledge of early interactions between the Mexican immigrant community and various consular leaders throughout the 1990s. He himself was known for being publicly vocal in criticizing various consular leaders. He also has extensive experience working with expatriate voting in Mexico along with the widespread experience in the immigrant mobilizations from 2006-2008. A prominent leader within Chicago’s expatriate voting movement was interviewed on April 18, 2009. He offered extensive knowledge of how Chicago became involved in the absentee voting rights movement. He made his own run losing run for the Mexican congress with the PRD party in 2000. During our interview, he was clear to distance himself from the other PRD activists interviewed for the study. He also was consistently involved in Chicago’s immigrant rights mobilizations having an early relationship formed with the Centro Sin Fronteras executive director and supporting her leadership role in the rally of 2005. Chicago Consular Officials Interviewed The Chicago Consulate’s Coordinator for the Institute for Mexicans Abroad was interviewed twice on June 8th and December 4, 2008. Much of Chicago’s organizational developments can be attributed to this consular official who has worked with the Chicago clubs and federations since 1997, where he began his work with the Programas Para las Comunidades Mexicanas en el Exterior (PCME) later rising to serve as the Coordinator for the Institute of Mexicans Abroad through the Secretariat of Foreign Affairs, referred to as the Coordinator to the Institute of Mexicans Abroad (or IME, el Instituto de los Mexicanos en el Exterior). Due to his crucial role in helping establish a vast network

Vonderlack-Navarro, Rebecca. Immigrant Political Incorporation : The Role of Hometown Associations, LFB

Appendix

203

Copyright © 2013. LFB Scholarly Publishing LLC. All rights reserved.

of clubs and remittance programs in Chicago, he continued to remain in his appointed position for an unusually long period of time. The consular official’s ability to work with Chicago HTA leaders and to motivate their progress in Chicago was widely acknowledged by numerous federation leaders. According to our interview, this longstanding position was very rare for a consular official, particularly for one who works in the dynamic and ever-changing position of community organizing where there can be high turnover. At the time of the study, he had 11 years working at the consulate in the area of community outreach. Many argued his time of serve was longer than any other consular official in the U.S. The Assistant to the IME’s Coordinator, was the Coordinator of Community Organizations also part of the IME, el Instituto de los Mexicanos en el Exterior. She began her work in 2003 and was interviewed for the study on February 20, 2009. She claimed in our interview to spend 75 percent of her working hours concentrated on building relationships and working closely with the clubs and federations represented within CONFEMEX.

Vonderlack-Navarro, Rebecca. Immigrant Political Incorporation : The Role of Hometown Associations, LFB

Copyright © 2013. LFB Scholarly Publishing LLC. All rights reserved. Vonderlack-Navarro, Rebecca. Immigrant Political Incorporation : The Role of Hometown Associations, LFB

Copyright © 2013. LFB Scholarly Publishing LLC. All rights reserved.

References

Alarcon, Rafael. 2001. “The Development of Hometown Associations in the United States and the Use of Social Remittances in Mexico.” Working Paper, Departamento de Estudios Sociales El Colegio de la Frontera Norte. Alba, Richard, and Victor Nee. 1997. “Rethinking Assimilation Theory for a New Era of Immigration.” International Migration Review 31(4): 826-874. ———. 2003. Remaking the American Mainstream: Assimilation and Contemporary Immigration. Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press. Aleinikoff, T. Alexander. 2001. “Policing Boundaries: Migration, Citizenship, and the State." In E Pluribus Unum? Contemporary and Historical Perspectives on Immigrant Political Incorporation, edited by Gary Gerstle and John Mollenkopf. New York: Russell Sage Foundation. Ávila, Oscar. 2006. “Shooting for a Big Turnout; ‘Pistolero’ Steps away from Shock Jock Persona to Push Immigrants’ March, Rally.” Chicago Tribune, March 10. Ávila, Oscar, and Antonio Olivo. 2006a. “A Show of Strength: Thousands March to Loop forImmigrants’ Rights; Workers, Students Unite in Opposition to Toughening Law.” Chicago Tribune, March 11. ———. 2006b. “Rally Stirs Both Sides; Across U.S., Immigration Supporters, Foes View Chicago Rally as Catalyst.” Chicago Tribune, March 12. Associated Press. 2006. “At a Glance: Immigration Legislation,” Chicago Tribune, May 18. Barreto, Matt A., Sylvia Manzano, Ricardo Ramirez, and Kathy Rim. 205

Vonderlack-Navarro, Rebecca. Immigrant Political Incorporation : The Role of Hometown Associations, LFB

Copyright © 2013. LFB Scholarly Publishing LLC. All rights reserved.

206

References

2009. “Mobilization, Participation, and Solidaridad." Urban Affairs Review 44(5): 736-764. Bandy, Joe, and Jackie Smith. 2005. “Factors Affecting Conflict and Cooperation in Transnational Movement Networks.” In Coalitions across Borders: Transnational Protest and the Neoliberal Order, edited by Joe Bandy and Jackie Smith. Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield. Belluck, Pam. 2000. “Mexican Presidential Candidates Campaign in U.S." New York Times, July 1. Benjamin-Alvarado, Jonathan, Louis DeSipio, and Celeste Montoya. 2009. “Latino Mobilization in New Immigrant Destinations: The Anti-H.R. 4437 Protest in Nebraska’s Cities.” Urban Affairs Review 44(5): 718-735. Benford, Robert, and David Snow. 2000. “Framing Processes and Social Movements: An Overview and Assessment.” Annual Review of Sociology 26: 611-639. Bernstein, David. 2008. “Daley vs. Daley.” Chicago Magazine, September. Accessed February 7, 2011. http://www.chicagomag.com/Chicago-Magazine/September2008/Daley-vs-Daley/index.php?cparticle=I&siarticle=0#artanc Blee, Kathleen M., and Verta Taylor. 2002. “Introduction.” In Methods of Social Movement Research, edited by Bert Klandermans and Suzanne Staggenborg. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press. Bloemraad, Irene. 2005. “The Limits of de Tocqueville: How Government Facilitates Organisational Capacity in Newcomer Communities.” Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies 31(5): 865-887. ———. 2006. “Becoming a Citizen in the United States and Canada: Structured Mobilization and Immigrant Political Incorporation.” Social Forces 85(2): 667-695. Bluestone, Berry and Bennett Harrison. 2000. Growing Prosperity: The Battle for Growth with Equity in the Twenty-First Century. Boston: Houghton Mifflin. Boruchoff, Judith. 1999. “Creating Continuity Across Borders: Reconfiguring the Spaces of Community, State, and Culture in Guerrero, Mexico and Chicago.” PhD Diss., University of Chicago.

Vonderlack-Navarro, Rebecca. Immigrant Political Incorporation : The Role of Hometown Associations, LFB

Copyright © 2013. LFB Scholarly Publishing LLC. All rights reserved.

References

207 

Cano, Gustavo, and Alexandra Delano. 2007. “The Mexican Government and Organized Mexican Immigrants in the United States: A Historical Analysis of Political Transnationalism (18482005).” Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies 33(5): 695-725. Castells, Manuel. 1983. The City and the Grassroots: A Cross-Cultural Theory of Urban Social Movements. Berkeley: University of California Press. Cave, Damien. 2008. “States Take New Track on Illegal Immigration." The New York Times, June 9. Chacón, Oscar, and Amy Shannon. 2006. “Challenges and Opportunities for Transnational Community Building: Immigrant Organizations as Change Agents." Unpublished manuscript prepared for the Ford Foundation initiative on Transnational Community Building. Chicago Mexican Consular Materials. 1999. “Nuestra Historia en EU Taller Dirigido a Clubes de Oriundos de Illinois." Instituto Mexicano de Cultura y Educación de Chicago y American Friends Service Committee. Accessed March 6, 2006 at Chicago Mexican Consulate Clemens, Elisabeth S., and Debra C. Minkoff. 2004. “Beyond the Iron Law: Rethinking the Place of Organizations in Social Movement Research.” In The Blackwell Companion to Social Movements, edited by David A. Snow, Sarah A. Soule, and Hanspeter Kriesi. Blackwell Publishers: Malden, MA. Cloward, Richard A., and Frances Fox Piven. 1999. “Disruptive Dissensus: People and Power in the Industrial Age.” In Reflections on Community Organization: Enduring Themes and Critical Issues, edited by Jack Rothman. Los Angeles, CA: F.E. Peacock Publishers. Cordero-Guzman, Hector, Nina Martin, Victoria Quiroz-Becerra, and Nik Theodore. 2008. “Voting With Their Feet: Nonprofit Organizations and Immigrant Mobilizations.” American Behavioral Scientist 52(4): 598-617. Cresswell, John W. 1998. Qualitative Inquiry and Research Design. Choosing Among Five Traditions. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publications. De Genova, Nicholas. 2005. Working the Boundaries. Race, Space, and “Illegality” in Mexican Chicago. Durham and London: Duke University Press.

Vonderlack-Navarro, Rebecca. Immigrant Political Incorporation : The Role of Hometown Associations, LFB

Copyright © 2013. LFB Scholarly Publishing LLC. All rights reserved.

208

References

De la Garza, Rudolfo, and Miryam Hazan. 2003. “Looking Backward, Moving Forward: Mexican Organizations in the U.S. as Agents of Incorporation and Dissociation." The Tomas Rivera Policy Institute, Claremont, CA. Dlouhy, Jennifer A. 2004. “Committed White House Push A Must for Immigration Plan,” CQ Weekly, 95. Durand, Jorge, Douglas S. Massey, and Fernando Charvet. 2000. “The Changing Geography of Mexican Immigration to the United States: 1910-1996.” Social Science Quarterly 81(1): 1-15. Ellis, Mark. 2005. “Unsettling Immigrant Geographies: U.S. Immigration and the Politics of Scale,” Royal Dutch Geography Society 97(1): 49-58. Escala-Rabadan, Luis, Xochitl Bada, and Gaspar Rivera-Salgado. 2006. “Mexican Migrant Civic and Political Participation in the U.S.: The Case of Hometown Associations in Los Angeles and Chicago." NorteAmerica, 2: 127-172 Evans, Peter. 1995. Embeded Autonomy: States and Industrial Transformation. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. Fairbrother, Malcom. 2007. “Making Neoliberalism Possible: The State’s Organization of Business Support for NAFTA in Mexico.” Politics and Society 35(2): 265-300. Fisher, Robert, and Joseph Kling. 1997. “Community Organization, New Social Movement Theory, and the Condition of Postmodernity.” In Integrating Knowledge and Practice: The Case of Social Work and Social Science, edited by David J. Tucker, Charles Garvin and Rosemary Sarri. Westport, CT: Praeger. Fitzgerald, David. 2006. “Inside the Sending State: The Politics of Mexican Emigration Control.” International Migration Review 40(2): 259-293. ———. 2008. “Colonies of the Little Motherland: Membership, Space, and Time in Mexican Migrant Hometown Associations.” Comparative Studies in Society and History 50(1): 145-169. Fornek, Scott. 2002. “Blagojevich Aims at Hispanics; Gutierrez Appears in Spot for Governor Hopeful.” Chicago Sun-Times, January 8. Fox, Jonathon. 2005. “Mapping Mexican Migrant Civil Society.” Background paper for Mexican Migrant Civic and Political Participation, co-sponsored by the Latin American and Latino Studies Department, University

Vonderlack-Navarro, Rebecca. Immigrant Political Incorporation : The Role of Hometown Associations, LFB

Copyright © 2013. LFB Scholarly Publishing LLC. All rights reserved.

References

209 

of California, Santa Cruz and the Mexico Institute and Division of United States Studies Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars. Accessed March 6, 2006. www.wilsoncenter.org/migrantparticipation. Fox, Jonathan, and Xochitl Bada. 2009. “Migrant Civic Engagement.” Research Paper Series on Latino Immigrant Civic and Political Participation, No. 3. Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, Mexico Institute, June. Accessed February 7, 2011. www.wilsoncenter.org/migrantparticipation. Frankenberg, Ronald. 1991. “Participant Observers.” In Field Research: A Sourcebook and Field Manual, edited by Robert G. Burgess. London and New York: Routledge. Freedman, Samuel G. 2008. “Immigrants Find Solace After Storm of Arrests." The New York Times, July 12. Fremon, David K. 1990. “Chicago’s Spanish-American politics in the ‘80s.” Illinois Issues 17. Accessed February 7, 2011. http://www.lib.niu.edu/ipo/1990/Ii900116.html Goldring, Luin. 1998. “The Power of Status in Transnational Social Fields." In Transnationalism From Below, edited by Michael Peter Smith and Luis Eduardo Guarnizo. New Brunswick and London: Transaction Publishers. ———. 2002. “The Mexican State and Transmigrant Organizations: Negotiating the Boundaries of Membership and Participation.” Latin American Research Review 37(3): 55-99. Gomez, Dante. 2005. “Clubes mexicanos de oriundos.” Website of the Consulado de Mexico en Chicago. Accessed March 6, 2006. http://www.consulmexchicago.com/ Gomez, Dante, and Rebeca Aguilar. 2005. “Organizaciones Comunitarios Mexicanas en Chicago,” Publicacion del Instituto de los Mexicanos en el Exterior (IME) 13: 1-5. Gordon, Milton Myron. 1964. Assimilation in American Life: The Role of Race, Religion, and National Origins. New York: Oxford University Press. Guarnizo, Luis Eduardo, and Michael Peter Smith. 1998. “The Location of Transnationalism." In Transnationalism From Below, edited by Michael Peter Smith and Luis Eduardo Guarnizo. New Brunswick and London: Transaction Publishers. ———. 2001. “On the Political Participation of Transnational Migrants: Old Practices and New Trends." In E Pluribus Unum?

Vonderlack-Navarro, Rebecca. Immigrant Political Incorporation : The Role of Hometown Associations, LFB

Copyright © 2013. LFB Scholarly Publishing LLC. All rights reserved.

210

References

Contemporary and Historical Perspectives on Immigrant Political Incorporation, edited by Gary Gerstle and John Mollenkopf. New York: Russell Sage Foundation. ———. 2003. “Assimilation and Transnationalism: Determinants of Transnational Political Action among Contemporary Migrants.” The American Journal of Sociology 108(6): 1211-1249. Gzesh, Susan. 2007. “Paper for the Wilson Center/Enlaces America Roundtable.” Background Paper for Mexican Institute of the Wilson Center for International Scholars and by Enlaces America in collaboration with the National Alliance of Latin American and Caribbean Communities (NALACC). Accessed February 7, 2011. http://www.wilsoncenter.org/news/docs/GzeshrevisedPaper%20for%20the%20Wlison%20Center.pdf Handlin, Oscar. 1959. Immigration as a Factor in American History, 1915 edition. Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall. Harrison, Bennett, and Gary Bluestone. 1988. The Deindustrialization of America: Plant Closings, Community Abandonment, and the Dismantling of Basic Industry. New York: Basic Books. Hazan, Miryam. 2006. “Incorporating in the United States and Mexico: Mexico Immigrant Mobilization and Organization in Four American Cities,” Phd diss., University of Texas, Austin. Hernandez-Coss, Raul. 2005. “The U.S.-Mexico Remittance Corridor. Lessons on Shifting from Informal to Formal Transfer Systems.” Working Paper No. 47. World Bank, Washington, D.C. Hussain, Rummana. 2005. “Protestors show support for immigration law reform.” Chicago Sun-Times, July 2. Illinois Coalition for Immigrant and Refugee Rights and the Office of New Americans Advocacy and Policy. 2006. For the Benefit of All: Strategic Recommendations to Enhance the State’s Role in the Integration of Immigrants in Illinois. Joint Executive Summary, Year One. Jenkins, J. Craig. 1983. “Resource Mobilization Theory and the Study of Social Movements,” Annual Review of Sociology, 9: 527-533. ———. 1995. “Social Movements, Political Representation, and the State: An Agenda and Comparative Framework,” In The Politics of Social Protest. Comparative Perspectives on States and Social Movements, edited by Craig Jenkins and Bert Klandermans. Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota Press.

Vonderlack-Navarro, Rebecca. Immigrant Political Incorporation : The Role of Hometown Associations, LFB

Copyright © 2013. LFB Scholarly Publishing LLC. All rights reserved.

References

211 

Jenkins, Craig, and Bert Klandermans. 1995. “The Politics of Social Protest,” In The Politics of Social Protest. Comparative Perspectives on States and Social Movements, edited by Craig Jenkins and Bert Klandermans. Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota Press. Joppke, Christian. 1998. “Introduction.” In Challenge to the NationState and the United States, edited by Christian Joppke, 1-46. New York: Oxford University Press. Joppke, Christian, and Ewa Morawska. 2003. Toward Assimilation and Citizenship: Immigrants in Liberal Nation-States. New York: Palgrave-Macmillan. Klandermans, Bert. 2001. “Why Social Movements Come Into Being and Why People Join Them,” In The Blackwell Companion to Sociology edited by Judith R. Blau, 268-81. Malden, Mass.: Blackwell Publishers. Klandermans, Bert, and Suzanne Staggenborg. 2002. Introduction to Methods of Social Movement Research, edited by Bert Klandermans and Suzanne Staggenborg. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press. Koopsman, Ruud, and Paul Statham. 2003. “How National Citizenship Shapes Transnationalism: Migrant and Minority Claims-making in Germany, Great Britain and the Netherlands." In Toward Assimilation and Citizenship: Immigrants in Liberal Nation-States, edited by Christian Joppke and Ewa Morawska. New York: Palgrave-Macmillan. Laglagaron, Laureen. 2010. “Protection through Integration: The Mexican Government’s Efforts to Aid Migrants in the United States.” Migration Policy Institute, National Center on Immigrant Integration Policy. Accessed February 7, 2011. www.migrationpolicy.org/pubs/IME-Jan2010.pdf Leitner, Helga, Eric Sheppard, and Kristin M. Sziarto. 2008. “The Spatialities of Contentious Politics.” Transactions for Bristish Geographies 33: 157-172. Levi, Margaret, and Gillian Murphy. 2006. “Coalitions of Contention: The Case of the WTO Protests in Seattle.” Political Studies 54: 651-670. Levitt, Peggy. 2003. “Keeping Feet in Both Worlds: Transnational Practices and Immigrant Incorporation in the United States." In Toward Assimilation and Citizenship: Immigrants in Liberal

Vonderlack-Navarro, Rebecca. Immigrant Political Incorporation : The Role of Hometown Associations, LFB

Copyright © 2013. LFB Scholarly Publishing LLC. All rights reserved.

212

References

Nation-States, edited by Christian Joppke and Ewa Morawska. New York: Palgrave-Macmillan. Lin, N. 2001. “On the Backs of Blacks? Immigrants and the Fortunes of African Americans. In Strangers and the Gates: New Immigrants in Urban America, edited by R. Waldinger, 186-227. Berkeley and Los Angeles, CA: The University of California Press. Lipsky, Michael. 1968. “Protest as a Political Resource.” American Political Science Review 62: 1144-58. Lutton, Linda. 1998. “War on Independents. Was Jesus Garcia Beaten by a New Machine? How Many Other Progressives are Being targeted for Removal?” Chicago Reader, September 3. Martinez, Michael. 2006. “Rallies Draw over 1 million. Economic Impact Not Clear, But Businesses Note Worker Shortages.” Chicago Tribune, May 2. Massey, Douglas S. 1999. “International Migration at the Dawn of the Twenty-First Century: The Role of the State.” Population and Development Review 25(2): 303-322. Massey, Douglas S., Jorge Durand, and Nolan J. Malone. 2002. Beyond Smoke and Mirrors : Mexican Immigration in an Era of Economic Integration. New York: Russell Sage Foundation. Mayer, Margit. 2007. “Contesting the Neoliberalization of Urban Governance.” In Contesting Neoliberalism. Urban Frontiers, edited by Helga Leitner, Jamie Peck, and Eric S. Sheppard. New York: The Guilford Press. McAdam, Doug, Sidney Tarrow, and Charles Tilly. 2001. Dynamics of Contention. New York: Cambridge University Press. McAdam, Doug, 1982. Political Process and the Development of Black Insurgency. Chicago and London: University of Chicago Press. McCarthy, John, and Mayer Zald. 1977. “Resource Mobilization and Social Movements: A Partial Theory.” American Journal of Sociology 82: 1212-1241. Melucci, Alberto. 1994. “A Strange Kind of Newness: What’s ‘New’ in New Social Movements?" In New Social Movements: From Ideology to Identity, edited by Enrique Larana, Hank Johnston, and Joseph R. Gusfield. Philadelphia, PA: Temple University Press. Mihalooulos, Robert Becker, and Darnell Little. 2008. “How Cash, Clout Transform Chicago Neighborhoods.” Chicago Tribune, January 27.

Vonderlack-Navarro, Rebecca. Immigrant Political Incorporation : The Role of Hometown Associations, LFB

Copyright © 2013. LFB Scholarly Publishing LLC. All rights reserved.

References

213 

Mollenkopf, John and Jennifer Hochschild. 2010. “Immigrant political incorporation: comparaing success in the United States and Western Europe. Ethnic and Racial Studies 33: 1, 19-38. Morawska, Ewa. 2001. “Immigrants, Transnationalism, and Ethnicization: A Comparison of This Great Wave and the Last." In E Pluribus Unum? Contemporary and Historical Perspectives on Immigrant Political Incorporation, edited by Gary Gerstle and John Mollenkopf. New York: Russell Sage Foundation. ———. 2003. “Immigrant Transnationalism and Assimilation: A Variety of Combinations and the Analytic Strategy it Suggests." In Toward Assimilation and Citizenship: Immigrants in Liberal Nation-States. Edited by Christian Joppke and Ewa Morawska. New York: Palgrave-Macmillan. Morton, Adam David. 2003. “Structural Change and Neoliberalism in Mexico: ‘Passive Revolution’ in the Global Economy.” Third World Quarterly 24(4): 631-653. Nash, June, and Christine Kovic. 1996. “The Reconstitution of Hegemony: The Free Trade Act and the Transformation of Rural Mexico.” In Globalization: Critical Reflections, edited by James H. Mittelman. Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers. Neal, Steve. 2002. “Gutierrez’s Aid Boosts Blagojevich; Hispanic Voters May Have Big Impact on Governor’s Contest.” Chicago Sun-Times, October 28. Nicholls, Walter J., and Justin R. Beaumont. 2004. “The Urbanisation of Justice Movements? Possibilities and Constraints for the City as a Space of Contentious Struggle.” Space and Polity 8, no. 2: 119135. NotiMex. 2005. “Multitudinaria Marcha de Hispanos, en su Mayoria Mexicanos, Desfila por Calles de Chicago para Pedir Amnistia para Migrantes Indocumentados." Noticieros Televisa, Mexic. Accessed February 7, 2011. www.esmas.com/noticierostelevisa/mexico/457004.html. Olivo, Antonio, and Oscar Avila. 2006. “United They March: Hundreds of Thousands March for Immigration Rights. ‘We have to change the world.’” Chicago Tribune, May 2. Olsen, Mancur. 1965. The Logic of Collective Action. New York: Schocken.

Vonderlack-Navarro, Rebecca. Immigrant Political Incorporation : The Role of Hometown Associations, LFB

Copyright © 2013. LFB Scholarly Publishing LLC. All rights reserved.

214

References

Orozco, Manuel, and Michelle Lapointe. 2004. “Mexican Hometown Associations and Development Opportunities.” Journal of International Affairs 57(2): 31-49. Orozco, Manuel, and Rebecca Rouse. 2007. “Migrant Hometown Associations and Opportunities for Development: A Global Perspective.” Migration Policy Institute. Accessed February 7, 2011. http://www.migrationinformation.org Pallares, Amalia, and Nilda Flores-Gonzalez, eds. 2010. Marcha! Latino Chicago and the Immigrant Rights Movement. Urbana, Chicago, and Springfield: University of Illinois Press. Paral, R. 2006. “Latinos of the New Chicago.” In The New Chicago, edited by Fassil Demissie, Johan Koval, John P. Koval, Larry Bennett, and Michael Bennett. Philadelphia, PA: Temple University Press. Park, R.E., and E. Burgess. 1921. Introduction to the Science of Sociology. Reprint 1969. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. Peck, Jamie. 2004. “Geography and Public Policy: Constructions of Neoliberalism.” Progress in Human Geography 28(3): 392-405. Peck, Jamie, and Nik Theodore. 2001. “Contingent Chicago: Restructuring the Spaces of Temporary Labor.” International Journal of Urban and Regional Research 25(3): 471-496. Pierson, Christopher. 1996. The Modern State. London: Routledge. Piven, Frances Fox, and Richard A. Cloward. 2000. “Power Repertoires and Globalization." Politics and Society 28(3): 413429. ———. 1977. Poor People’s Movements: Why They Succeed, How They Fail. New York: Vintage Press. ———. 1991. “Collective Protest: A Critique of Resource Mobilization Theory.” International Journal of Politics, Culture, and Society 4(4): 435-458. Portes, Alejandro. 2001. “Introduction: The Debates and Significance of Immigrant Transnationalism." Global Networks 1(3):181-193. Portes, Alejandro, Cristina Escobar, and Alexandra Walton Radford. 2007. “Immigrant Transnational Organizations and Development: A Comparative Study.” International Migration Review 41(1): 242-281. Preston, Julia. 2008. “Employers Fight Tough Measures on Immigration." The New York Times, July 6. Reed, Robert. 2006. “Air Power.” Chicago Magazine, January.

Vonderlack-Navarro, Rebecca. Immigrant Political Incorporation : The Role of Hometown Associations, LFB

Copyright © 2013. LFB Scholarly Publishing LLC. All rights reserved.

References

215 

Accessed February 7, 2011. www.chicagomag.com/ChicagoMagazine/January-2006/Air-Power. Reese, Ellen. 2005. “Policy Threats and Social Movement Coalitions: California’s Campaign To Restore Legal Immigrants’ Right to Welfare." In Routing the Opposition: Social Movements, Public Policy, and Democracy, edited by David S. Meyer, Valerie Jenness, and Helen Ingram, 259-287. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press. Rogal, Brian J. 2004. “Great Expectations: Latino Lawmakers and Advocates Are Gaining Influence in Springfield, and Warning the Governor Not to Take Them for Granted.”Chicago Reporter, January. Richter, Kelly Kelleher. 2005. “From the Margins to the Limelight: The Social Construction of a Mexican ‘Illegal Alien Problem’ in Deindustrializing Chicago, 1965 to 1980.” B.A. Thesis, University of Chicago. Rivera-Salgado, Gaspar. 2002. “Cross-Border Grassroots Organizations and the Indigenous Migrant Experience.” In Cross-Border Dialogues: U.S.-Mexico Social Movement Networking, edited by David Brooks and Jonathon Fox. Center for U.S.-Mexico Studies: University of California, San Diego. Rivera-Salgado, Gaspar, Xochitl Bada, and Luis Escala-Rabadan. November, 2005. “Mexican Migrant Civic and Political Participation in the U.S.: The Case of Hometown Associations in Los Angeles and Chicago." Background Paper presented at the seminar, “Mexican Migrant Social and Civic Participation in the United States,” held at the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars. Washington D.C., November 4th and 5th, 2005. Rosenfeld, M.J., and M. Tienda. 1999. “Mexican Immigration, Occupational Niches, and Labor Market Competition: Evidence from Los Angeles, Chicago, and Atlanta." In Immigration and Opportunity: Race, Ethnicity and Employment in the United States, edited by F.D. Bean and S. Bell-Rose, 64-105. New York: Russell Sage Foundation. Rubin, H. J., and I. S. Rubin. 1995. Qualitative Interviewing. The Art of Hearing Data. Thousand Oaks, California: Sage Publications. Saldana, Martha. 2005. “Marcha Historica.” El Imparcial. La Guia de la Comunidad Mexicana. Chicago, IL, July 7.

Vonderlack-Navarro, Rebecca. Immigrant Political Incorporation : The Role of Hometown Associations, LFB

Copyright © 2013. LFB Scholarly Publishing LLC. All rights reserved.

216

References

Sassen, Saskia. 1991. The Global City: New York, London, Tokyo. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. ———. 1998. Globalization and Its Discontents. Essays on the New Mobility of People and Money. New York: New York Press. Schiller, Nina Glick, Linda Basch, and Cristina Szanton Blanc, eds. 1992. Toward a Transnational Perspective on Migration: Race, Class, Ethnicity, and Nationalism Reconsidered. Annals of the New York Academy of Sciences, 645. New York: New York Academy of Sciences. Schneider, Cathy. 1997. “Framing Puerto Rican Identity: Political Opportunity Structures and Neighborhood Organizing in New York City.” Mobilization, An International Journal 2(2): 227-245. Shannon, Amy. 2007. “Mobilizing for Political Power. Immigrant Marches and Their Long-Term Impacts." Voices of Mexico, Issue 78: January-March. Sites, William. 2003. Remaking New York: Primitive Globalization and the Politics of Urban Community. Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota Press. ———. 2007. “Contesting the Neoliberal City? Theories of Neoliberalism and Urban Strategies of Contention.” In Contesting Neoliberalism: Urban Frontiers, edited by H. Leitner, J. Peck, and E. Sheppard, 116-138. New York: Guilford. Smith, Jackie, and Hank Jonston. 2002. Globalization and Resistance: Transnational Dimensions of Social Movements. Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield. Smith, J., and Joe Bandy. 2005. “Introduction: Cooperation and Conflict in Transnational Protest." In Coalitions Across Borders: Transnational Protest and the Neoliberal Order, edited by Joe Bandy and Jackie Smith. Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield. Smith, Michael Peter. 2001. Transnational Urbanism: Locating Globalization. Malden, MA: Blackwell. ———. 2007. “The Two Faces of Transnational Citizenship.” Ethnic and Racial Studies 30(6): 1096-1116. Smith, Micheal Peter, and Matt Bakker. 2008. Citizenship Across Borders: The Political Transnationalism of El Migrante. Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press. Smith, Peter H. 1996. Talons of the Eagle. Dynamics of U.S.-Latin American Relations. New York: Oxford University Press.

Vonderlack-Navarro, Rebecca. Immigrant Political Incorporation : The Role of Hometown Associations, LFB

Copyright © 2013. LFB Scholarly Publishing LLC. All rights reserved.

References

217 

Smith, Robert C. 1998. “Transnational Localities: Community, Technology and the Politics of Membership within the context of Mexico and U.S. Migration." In Transnationalism From Below, edited by Michael Peter Smith and Luis Eduardo Guarnizo. New Brunswick and London: Transaction Publishers. ———. 1995. “Los Ausentes Siempre Presentes: The Imagining, Making and Politics of a Transnational Community between New York and Ticuani, Puebla." Unpublished doctoral dissertation, Department of Political Science, Columbia University. ———. 2003. “Diasporic Memberships in Historical Perspective: Comparative Insights from the Mexican, Italian and Polish Cases.” International Migration Review 37(3): 724-759. ———. 2006. Mexican New York. Transnational Lives of New Immigrants. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press. Snow, David A., and Danny Trom. 2002. “The Case Study and the Study of Social Movements,” In Methods of Social Movement Research, edited by Bert Klandermans and Suzanne Staggenborg. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press. Squires, Gregory, Larry Bennett, Kathleen McCourt, and Philip Nyden. 1987. Chicago: Race, Class, and the Response to Urban Decline. Philadelphia: Temple University Press. Tarrow, Sidney. 1988. “National Politics and Collective Action: Recent Theory and Research in Western Europe and the United States.” Annual Review of Sociology 14: 421-440. ———. 2005. The New Transnational Activism. New York: Cambridge University Press. Tichenor, Daniel J. 1994. “The Politics of Immigration Reform in the United States, 1981-1990.” Polity 26(3): 333-362. Tienda, Marta, and Rebecca Raijman. 2000. “Immigrants’ Income Packaging and Invisible Labor Force Activity.” Social Science Quarterly 81(1): 291-310. Trejo, Karen. 2006. “Fracaso Total." Especial La Raza, January 20. Accessed January 7, 2007 from CONFEMEX leaders. http://www.impre.com/laraza/ Univision Communications. 2004. “Que Buena 105.1FM and ‘El Pistolero’ Make Chicago Radio History." April 3. Accessed February 7, 2011. www.univision.net/corp/en/pr/Chicago_23042004-2_ Valdes Ugalde, Francisco.1996. “The Private Sector and Political

Vonderlack-Navarro, Rebecca. Immigrant Political Incorporation : The Role of Hometown Associations, LFB

Copyright © 2013. LFB Scholarly Publishing LLC. All rights reserved.

218

References

Regime Change in Mexico." In Neoliberalism Revisited: Economic Restructuring and Mexico’s Political Future, edited by Gerardo Otero, 127-148. Boulder, CO: Westview Press. Waldinger, Roger D. 2009. “A Limited Engagement: Mexico and its Diaspora,” Selected Works of Roger D. Waldinger, available at: http://works.bepress.com/roger_waldinger/38 Waldinger, Roger. 2001. “Strangers at the Gates,” In Strangers at the Gates: New Immigrants in Urban America, edited by Roger Waldinger. Berkeley: University of California Press. Waldinger, Roger, and David Fitzgerald. 2004. “Transnationalism in Question.” American Journal of Sociology 109(5): 1177-95. Waldinger, Roger, and Jennifer Lee. 2001. “New Immigrants in Urban America," In Strangers at the Gates: New Immigrants in Urban America, edited by Roger Waldinger. Berkeley: University of California Press. Warner, W. Lloyd, and Leo Srole. 1945. The Social Systems of American Ethnic Groups. New Haven: Yale University Press. Wayne, Alex. 2005a. “Getting Tough on Illegal Immigration." CQ Weekly, December 26. Wayne, Alex. 2005b. “Views of Senate GOP, Bush Threaten Tighter Immigration.” CQ Weekly, January 17. Zabin, Carol, and Luis Escala-Rabadan. 1998. “Mexican Hometown Associations and Mexican Immigrant Political Empowerment in Los Angeles.” California Nonprofit Research Program, Working Paper. Zolberg, Aristide R. 1999. “Matters of State: Theorizing Immigration Policy.” In The Handbook of International Migration: The American Experience, edited by Charles Hirschman, Philip Kasinitz, and Josh DeWind. New York: Russell Sage Foundation. ———. 2006. A Nation by Design: Immigration Policy in the Fashioning of America. Russell Sage Foundation. New York: Harvard University Press.

Vonderlack-Navarro, Rebecca. Immigrant Political Incorporation : The Role of Hometown Associations, LFB

Copyright © 2013. LFB Scholarly Publishing LLC. All rights reserved.

Index

Absentee voting rights, 2, 13, 19, 52, 55, 63, 71, 73, 85-87, 96, 160, 204 Aguas Calientes, 7, 38, 78, 152, 201 Blagojevich, 38, 82-83, 105, 123, 126, 129-131, 133, 152-153, 161, 163, 165, 171, 175, 179180, 183, 197, 210, 215 Calderon, Filipe, 131-132, 161164, 178 Cardenas, Cuauhtémoc presidential campaign of, 52 Centro Sin Fronteras, 94-95, 101, 106-107, 125, 150, 154, 156, 203-204 Chicago Confederation of Mexican Federations. See CONFEMEX Chihuahua, 7, 38, 78, 152, 201202 CONFEMEX, 2-3, 5-6, 8, 34-39, 60, 61-62, 78-80, 82-136, 137205, 219 electoral politics, role in, 8 formation of, 184 interest group strategies, 8, 113, 123, 131, 139, 159, 192 leadership of, 107, 118, 125, 128, 140, 144, 202 March 10 rally, 8 May Day rally, 109

popular mobilization, and, 3, 8, 17, 24, 27, 33, 91, 108-109, 111, 115, 121, 126, 140, 159, 176, 189 Co-optation, political, 4, 26, 28, 84, 141, 159, 186 Diaspora, 5, 8, 13-14, 19-20, 23, 32, 34, 41-42, 50-55, 57, 59, 63, 68, 70-73, 87, 133, 141, 159-161, 174, 177, 191, 200, 204 Dual nationality rights, 55 Durango, 7, 38, 57-62, 77-80, 8485, 97, 101-102, 105-106, 115, 119-122, 128, 132, 151-153, 166, 180, 182-183, 185, 196, 198 Economy global, 4, 14, 17-18, 49 informal, 45 Mexico-U.S., 24, 65, 190 migrant labor, 16, 45, 47 U.S., 17, 44, 64, 116 El Voto en el Exterior. See Vote from Abroad Federation, 2, 7, 13-14, 16, 36-38, 42, 55- 63, 65, 68-69, 71, 7381, 83, 85, 91, 93, 96-106, 116117, 119, 121-122, 125-132, 140, 145, 151-154, 157-160, 162, 165-166, 172, 174, 178-

219 Vonderlack-Navarro, Rebecca. Immigrant Political Incorporation : The Role of Hometown Associations, LFB

Copyright © 2013. LFB Scholarly Publishing LLC. All rights reserved.

220 187, 191, 194-205, See also individual states leaders of, 56, 63, 77-78, 9394, 100, 116-120, 123, 151, 180, 183 Federations organization of, 2, 7, 12, 21, 36, 51 Fox, Vicente, 2, 50, 65, 69-70, 199 Globalization, 3-4, 11, 17-19, 22, 24, 31, 41, 140, 189 Guanajuato, 7, 38, 57-58, 78, 98, 102, 121, 128, 152, 166, 181, 183, 199, 200 Guerrero, 7, 38, 52, 54-60, 78, 96, 116, 119, 122, 126, 128, 152, 154, 166, 169, 170, 172, 178, 180, 183-185, 200, 203, 208 Gutierrez, Luis Congressman, 8285, 129-130, 139, 141, 146151, 161, 167, 171, 173, 176, 203, 210, 215 Hidalgo, 7, 38, 52, 78, 93, 98, 102, 122, 128, 151-153, 158, 183, 185, 199-200, 203 Hometown associations. See HTAs Host country, 12, 191 HTA leaders, 7-8, 43, 51, 55, 61, 6465, 74, 76-77, 96, 99, 187, 191-193, 205 HTAs as vehicles for mobilization, 90 assimilation paradigms of, 12, 140 bi-national activism, 165 Chicago, growth of, 41 consular material, 52, 56, 60, 209 HTAs (hometown associations), 18, 11-24, 29-30, 33-44, 48, 5051, 53-57, 61-78, 82, 85, 87, 90-94, 103-104, 108-113, 121, 127, 132, 135-136, 140, 144,

Index 152, 156, 161-162, 169, 178179, 183, 189-193 ICIRR. See Illinois Coalition for Immigrant and Refugee Rights Illinois Coalition for Immigrant and Refugee Rights, 123, 199, 202, 212 Immigrant Leadership Empowerment Project, 77, 81, 87, 198 immigration policy, 3, 8, 33, 39, 69-70, 80, 111, 140 Immigration Reform and Control Act, 45, 168 IRCA. See Immigration Reform and Control Act Jalisco, 7, 38, 57-58, 60, 78, 202 March 10th Committee, 89, 99, 102, 105, 116, 118, 120, 125, 145, 149, 151, 154, 156, 168, 197-200, 203 Marches 2006, 13, 15-16, 98-99, 126, 156 March 10, 8, 89-91, 95, 98, 100-108, 111, 113-118, 123124, 145, 163, 170, 174, 179, 184, 192, 207 Matricula Consular de Alta Seguridad, 74 May Day rally, 8, 111, 113, 116117, 123, 125-126, 128, 130, 135, 139-140, 153-157, 167, 169 Mexican Consulate, 53, 59, 121, 132, 209 Michoacán, 2, 7, 13, 38, 52-54, 56-58, 60, 63, 77-79, 81, 83, 85, 91, 96-99, 100, 102-106, 115-117, 126, 128-129, 133, 139, 145, 152-154, 156, 158160, 166, 169, 183-185, 196197, 201, 203 Migrants state migrant collaboration, 53

Vonderlack-Navarro, Rebecca. Immigrant Political Incorporation : The Role of Hometown Associations, LFB

Copyright © 2013. LFB Scholarly Publishing LLC. All rights reserved.

Index NAFTA. See North American Free Trade Agreement NALACC. See National Alliance of Latino and Caribbean Communities National Alliance of Latino and Caribbean Communities, 82, 159 Neoliberalism, 21, 48, 77 North American Free Trade Agreement, 19, 45 Oaxaca, 7, 38, 57, 78, 152, 180, 185, 201 Office of New Americans Policy and Advocacy, 38, 83, 129130, 161, 175, 179, 197 PAN. See Partido Accion Nacional Partido Accion Nacional, 50 Partido Revolucionario Democratico, 50 Political incorporation, 1-7, 12, 21-22, 31, 34-35, 42, 65, 106, 112-113, 137, 140, 193-194, 215 PRD. See Partido Revolucionario Democratico

221 Sada Solano, Carlos Manuel, 7374, 200-201 Salinas de Gotari, Carlos, 49 Security Through Regularized Immigration and a Vibrant Economy Act, 139, 141, 147155, 161 Sending country, 14 Sensenbrenner bill, 6, 8, 15, 30, 34, 89, 91, 93, 96, 101, 104, 124, 130, 133, 135, 167, 191, 192 Social movements, 5, 11, 24, 27, 29, 31, 35, 135-136 STRIVE Act. See Security Through Regularized Immigration and a Vibrant Economy Act Transnationalism, 13, 19 Transnationalist, 3, 109, 189 Undocumented immigrants, 13-14, 26, 45-46, 68-69, 75, 80, 87, 90-91, 93, 98, 131, 134, 139, 142, 147, 162, 173, 177 Vote from Abroad, 14, 52, 68, 95 Zacatecas, vii, 7, 38, 57-60, 78, 152, 172, 180, 201-202

Vonderlack-Navarro, Rebecca. Immigrant Political Incorporation : The Role of Hometown Associations, LFB

Table of Contents

Acknowledgments ............................................................................... vii Introduction

........................................................................................ 1

Chapter 1: The Bi-national Path to Immigrant Political Incorporation: Theoretical and Methodological Considerations...................................................................... 9

Copyright © 2013. LFB Scholarly Publishing LLC. All rights reserved.

Chapter 2: Mexico Unbound: Chicago’s HTA Growth through Early 2001 .......................................................................... 39 Chapter 3: Conflicting Tendencies: Post-9/11 Politics and HTAs' Nascent U.S. Political Engagement, 2001-2005 ................ 65 Chapter 4: "I think we're at the start of a social movement": HTA Mobilization for U.S. Immigrant Rights, December 2005 to March 10 2006 ..................................... 87 Chapter 5: May Day Opens Doors: Mobilization and Participation, May through November 2006 .................... 109 Chapter 6: "Today We March, Tomorrow We Vote": CONFEMEX's Interest Group Consolidation, December 2006 to November 2008 ................................. 137 Chapter 7: Future Considerations for Immigrant Mobilization and Politics ....................................................................... 187 Appendix: Interview Subjects ............................................................ 195 References

.................................................................................... 205

Index

.................................................................................... 219 v

Vonderlack-Navarro, Rebecca. Immigrant Political Incorporation : The Role of Hometown Associations, LFB

Copyright © 2013. LFB Scholarly Publishing LLC. All rights reserved. Vonderlack-Navarro, Rebecca. Immigrant Political Incorporation : The Role of Hometown Associations, LFB

Copyright © 2013. LFB Scholarly Publishing LLC. All rights reserved.

Acknowledgments

First and foremost, I would like to thank Dr. William Sites. It is hard for me to put into words what this intellectual journey has meant to me. He helped me take on the topic of immigration, an issue that has long been important to me, and ground it in theory and scholarly rigor. And while the voyage was not easy, his constant support and encouragement were always on hand. El Jefe, I will miss your mentorship dearly. Second, I extend deep gratitude to the Chicago Confederation of Mexican Federations, CONFEMEX, for making this research possible. Community leaders from Aguas Calientes, Michoacán, Durango, Zacatecas, Guerrero, Hidalgo, Guanajuato, Oaxaca, and Jalisco all provided valuable insight into their organizations’ development. In particular, I would like to thank Claudia Lucero who opened her heart and her life to me and who continues to inspire me through her community work. I am also indebted to Chicago consular leaders Dante Gomez and Rebecca Aguilar for sharing their great knowledge with me. I was significantly inspired by the many leaders from the original March 10th Committee who helped mobilize Chicago in the historic mega-marches and who were kind enough to speak with me and help advance this project. I was also greatly informed by leaders within the National Alliance of Latino and Caribbean Communities. May their cross-border efforts continue to bring social justice for migrants. Third, I would like to thank numerous faculty at the University of Chicago for their thoughtful insights: Dr. Virginia Parks, Dr. Robert Chaskin, Dr. Christopher Boyer, and Dr. Jennifer Mosley. I am also thankful to Dr. Michael Peter Smith and Dr. Roger Waldinger who provided thoughtful comments to other papers based on this larger body of work. I have benefited immensely from your vast knowledge and experience in the areas of immigration and organizing. vii

Vonderlack-Navarro, Rebecca. Immigrant Political Incorporation : The Role of Hometown Associations, LFB

Copyright © 2013. LFB Scholarly Publishing LLC. All rights reserved. Vonderlack-Navarro, Rebecca. Immigrant Political Incorporation : The Role of Hometown Associations, LFB

Copyright © 2013. LFB Scholarly Publishing LLC. All rights reserved.

Introduction

Dramatic increases in Mexican immigration to the United States during the past twenty years have sparked growing public and academic debate surrounding the political incorporation of immigrants. Mexican hometown associations (henceforward, HTAs) in U.S. cities have come to be recognized as an important resource to help newcomers sustain transnational ties by participating in cultural events and philanthropic infrastructure projects geared towards the homeland. HTAs also have come to exert influence on local elections in their hometowns in Mexico while fostering important paisano network connections in the U.S. (Goldring 1998, 2002; Rivera-Salgado 2002; R.C. Smith 1995, 1998, 2006; Alarcon 2002; Orozco & Lapointe 2004; Portes, Escobar, and Radford 2007; M.P. Smith and Bakker 2008; Zabin and EscalaRabadan 1998). Yet recent activities in Chicago, including an HTA leadership role in the dramatic 2006 and 2007 marches for immigrant rights, suggest that this kind of organization has the potential to become a significant agent of U.S. political incorporation as well as one that helps maintain transnational ties to Mexican society. In general, however, research on HTAs has not paid sufficient attention to why many of these organizations have shifted to include bi-national Mexico and U.S.-focused activities. Of the research that does explore their emerging US-focused activities, there is still not sufficient analysis as to what encouraged HTAs to unify and eventually emerge as a contentious actor in response to government threats. Throughout U.S. history, newcomers have organized mutual aid societies to maintain important cultural links and provide significant social support in an often unwelcoming new land. Mexican immigrant hometown clubs are no different. They have long served to aid new arrivals, celebrate hometown traditions, fight xenophobia and 1

Vonderlack-Navarro, Rebecca. Immigrant Political Incorporation : The Role of Hometown Associations, LFB

Copyright © 2013. LFB Scholarly Publishing LLC. All rights reserved.

2

Immigrant Political Incorporation

discrimination, organize soccer clubs, and cultivate links with fellow countrymen here in the United States. At times, HTAs pooled resources to support philanthropic projects back in their hometown villages, such as renovating a local church, paving a deteriorating road, or providing an ambulance to a local health clinic (Chicago Mexican Consular materials 1999; Gomez 2000; Gomez and Aguilar 2005). By the late 1980s and 1990s, when Mexican immigrants’ individual and collective remittances provided them with economic clout in their hometowns, many HTAs began to receive recognition from Mexican political elites as potential financial and political resources (Goldring 2002). The significance of Mexican immigrants and their growing organizations to Mexican politics would only escalate moving into the 2000s when Mexican President Vicente Fox overhauled consular programming and nationalized outreach efforts to support the growth of HTA activities (M.P. Smith and Bakker 2008; Fitzgerald 2006; R.C. Smith 2008). Throughout the Midwest, HTAs have considerably increased in number (from a meager 35 in 1995 to over 340 by 2008) and in organizational scale by developing into state-level federations. By 2003, nine of the city-based federations and 175 HTAs joined together to form the Midwest confederation called CONFEMEX, la Confederacion de Federaciones Mexicanos (Chicago Mexican Consular materials 2009). In 2006, CONFEMEX took a leadership role in the marches for immigrant rights, with the Michoacán federation headquarters serving as the city’s crucial planning hub. This and other recent HTA actions in Chicago suggest that this traditionally Mexicanfocused organization may have transformed into a significant agent of U.S. political incorporation even while maintaining its ties to Mexican society. The rise of Chicago HTAs’ political influence offers a unique opportunity to analyze the shift towards bi-national activities—that is, the broadening of agendas to include retaining stake and influence in Mexico (e.g., lobbying for absentee voting rights, allocating remittances for local economic development, and organizing events to maintain their cultural Mexican identity) and U.S. integration activities (e.g., ESL classes, immigrant rights concerns, and more recently, citizenship and voter registration drives). Nonetheless, research to date has failed to pay adequate attention to the broader political and economic circumstances on both sides of the Mexico-U.S. border that caused many HTAs to move beyond their Mexican-focused activities. Further, they fail to examine the critical

Vonderlack-Navarro, Rebecca. Immigrant Political Incorporation : The Role of Hometown Associations, LFB

Copyright © 2013. LFB Scholarly Publishing LLC. All rights reserved.

Introduction

3

and multiple state influences that encouraged HTAs to transform into temporary vehicles for U.S.-focused mobilization. This case study, therefore, poses two related questions. First, why did CONFEMEX eventually shift from a Mexico-focused agenda to a bi-national Mexico-U.S.-focused agenda, and how has this shift affected the political activities of the confederation? Second, why did CONFEMEX and its HTA base embrace contentious activism and how has this step impacted immigration policy and politics for HTAs as organizations, as well as the immigrant leaders themselves? HTAs have been largely conceptualized through “transnationalist” lenses. Such paradigms, which emphasize sending-society political ties, do not successfully elucidate the evolution of Chicago HTAs’ activities because they neglect to give adequate consideration to the U.S. political environment and how it has come to influence HTA activism. Using a social movement approach, this project shows that interaction with multiple government entities in both Mexico and the United States, including national and state-level actors, played a primary role in CONFEMEX’s eventual recourse to social mobilization. By examining how the varied governmental actors worked at different times to repress, endorse, or reincorporate CONFEMEX, we can see how the changing form and direction of HTA activism—not only popular mobilization but more recently, interest-group consolidation—represent immigrant leaders’ responses to changing and contradictory state projects in an era of neoliberal globalization. That is to say, at key moments certain government actors have encouraged CONFEMEX to move in one direction while others have pushed the confederation toward a different path. To fully clarify the argument, the study draws on three theoretical literatures: social movement paradigms, political economy and globalization, and theories of the state. First, social movement paradigms guide the analysis of Chicago HTAs and their strategic decisions and organizational evolution. Political process approaches within the social movement literature highlight the opportunities, threats, and tensions faced by Chicago’s HTA leadership confederation as its political agenda grows to include both Mexico- and U.S.-oriented political activity. Conceptions of political incorporation have largely assumed that the legal vulnerability and social marginality experienced by many immigrant groups render them unlikely to engage in contentious politics. Social movement theorists, by contrast, have developed a number of concepts (e.g.

Vonderlack-Navarro, Rebecca. Immigrant Political Incorporation : The Role of Hometown Associations, LFB

Copyright © 2013. LFB Scholarly Publishing LLC. All rights reserved.

4

Immigrant Political Incorporation

opportunity and mobilizing structures, framing processes, repertoires of contention) that help explain mass mobilization by seemingly marginal social groups (Tarrow 2005, 23; McAdam, Tarrow and Tilly 2001, 4647, 95-98). However, these theoretical concepts have not been extensively applied to immigrant political activity. This in-depth case study finds that many Chicago HTAs and their broader coalitions generally function as interest groups. At significant moments, however, HTAs can transform into vehicles of social mobilization as they relate to both the Mexican and U.S. nation states. As this research will show, various government entities—sending and receiving states, national and local governments—function simultaneously to facilitate, constrain, or co-opt HTAs’ activism. Through a political process approach, the study is able to make sense of both HTA actions and state projects as dynamic and interactive political forces. A deeper understanding as to why Chicago HTA activism has significantly changed also calls for a review of literatures that highlight the contextual influences of the political economy of globalization and the changing realities of state-migrant relations. Viewing HTAs through the lens of political economy illustrates how HTAs and their coalitions formed within an evolving context of neoliberal economic globalization. Theorists of globalization show how capital expansion, market integration, innovations in technology, and travel and information flows have created a new international economy where nation-state powers and their borders seem to hold diminished importance and where immigrants—mobile labor—emerge as crucial social actors (Sassen 1991, 1998; Friedman 1995). Such theorists have used a conception of globalization to explore the economic and macrostructural forces that have created bifurcated economies, with immigrants overrepresented in the lower end of the labor market (Sassen 1991, 1998; Friedman, 1995; Massey, Durand, and Malone 2002). Between Mexico and the U.S. more specifically, the political economy literature sheds light on how processes of economic restructuring within both countries since the late 1970s have repositioned immigrants at the center of national development: the U.S.’s considerable demand for low-end flexible labor increasingly supplied by undocumented immigration; the intensified post-NAFTA integration of the U.S. and Mexican economies, characterized by highly asymmetrical interdependencies and resulting escalation of Mexico-toU.S. immigration; and the role of immigrant remittances as an integral

Vonderlack-Navarro, Rebecca. Immigrant Political Incorporation : The Role of Hometown Associations, LFB

Copyright © 2013. LFB Scholarly Publishing LLC. All rights reserved.

Introduction

5

source of Mexico’s financial livelihood (P. Smith 1996; Wise 2006; Massey et al., 2002; M.P. Smith and Bakker 2008; Waldinger 2001; Peck and Theodore 2001; Bluestone and Harrison 2000; Peck 2004). It is within this context of heightened globalization and Mexico-U.S. economic integration that Mexican immigrant HTAs proliferated in number and their organizational strategies took shape. Third, theories of contemporary states pose a challenge to accounts of political economy that perceive nation-state powers to have lessened in significance. A growing number of scholars of international immigration point to the fundamental role of nation states in shaping immigration and patterns of political incorporation (Bloemraad 2005, 2006; Joppke and Morawska 2003; Waldinger and Fitzgerald 2004; Zolberg 1999; Alba and Nee 2003; Aleinikoff 2001; Hazan 2006). Furthermore, within the current immigrant rights struggle, the relationship between state and movement involves multiple state actors: Mexico and U.S. nation-state agendas, national and local state agendas. This study argues that different sets of governmental officials within both Mexico and the U.S. have engaged in contradictory migrantrelated strategies, perceiving immigrants variably as a source of financial remittances, a supply of undocumented labor, a threat to the nation’s security agenda, or when convenient, as an emerging potential voting bloc. Through the integrated application of the three theoretical literatures we can understand how the complex of forces—HTA strategies, economic restructuring, states’ projects—have led to the quite substantial changes in the agenda and activities of Chicago’s HTA leadership confederation. This study attempts to comprehend Chicago HTAs’ growing Mexico-U.S. bi-national repertoires of action as a result of multi-step, organizational reactions to different state actors at varied historical moments. Using a bi-national approach centered on the multifaceted relationship between neoliberalizing states and social movements, it explores the development of Chicago HTAs’ political agenda, organizational form, and activities as they relate to various levels of governmental officials and political projects within both Mexico and the U.S. The study begins by investigating the intensified political legitimacy conferred upon CONFEMEX by the Mexican government’s diaspora repatriation programs in the 1990s. It continues by examining the contrasting post-9/11, U.S. anti-immigrant politics and various Illinois state-government programs that began courting Mexican HTAs

Vonderlack-Navarro, Rebecca. Immigrant Political Incorporation : The Role of Hometown Associations, LFB

Copyright © 2013. LFB Scholarly Publishing LLC. All rights reserved.

6

Immigrant Political Incorporation

as voting constituencies back in 2005. The final sections of the book center on the activities of CONFEMEX in the wake of a qualitatively new level of anti-immigrant pressures that emerged in U.S. national politics in 2005. Concentrating attentively on the Chicago’s HTA confederation's reaction to the passage of the Sensenbrenner bill (HR4437) by the U.S. House of Representatives in late 2005, the study examines how CONFEMEX became one of Chicago’s leading sponsors of the 2006 immigrant rights marches. Further, it looks at how the organization cultivated closer political relationships with other immigrant groups as well as state and local officials in Illinois. The study then traces post-2006 to 2008 political developments and HTAs’ evolving repertoires of action to explore how CONFEMEX would come to operate as an important interest group and agent of U.S. political incorporation for Chicago’s Mexican immigrant community, a process that also created significant intra-organizational tensions. Overall, by situating Chicago HTA developments in a historical context, the study moves beyond a reification of HTA activism as solely focused on Mexico. Instead, the historical focus enables a deeper comprehension of HTAs’ distinctive transformation in both identity and activism towards bi-national concerns as they interact with multiple government entities in both Mexico and the U.S. The political context includes Mexican emigrant inclusion efforts, U.S. national policy disputes over immigration reform, and Illinois state programs for immigrants. By employing a historical investigation, the study is able to illustrate the complex and evolving relationship between Mexico and U.S. neoliberal restructurings and immigrant organizational responses. The project is a multi-method, case study focused on the political involvements of various Chicago Mexican hometown associations. This study has employed archival research, direct observation, and keyinformant interviews to explore the emergence and development of CONFEMEX, Chicago’s HTA confederation. A multi-method, case study approach has enabled the study to be flexible and open-ended, to triangulate between a plurality of data sources, and to provide a longitudinal view of Chicago HTAs’ development over time (Snow and Trom 2002). Theoretical scholarship, along with secondary historical literatures, were also used to reconstruct the post-1970s economic structures, migration patterns, and state projects that shaped the major political conditions during the evolution of HTA organizational capacities, agendas, and activities. Archival sources included Chicago

Vonderlack-Navarro, Rebecca. Immigrant Political Incorporation : The Role of Hometown Associations, LFB

Introduction

7

Mexican consular publications and records, HTA federation and CONFEMEX meeting minutes, newspaper archives, protest flyers, and pamphlets. Analysis of recent organizational developments draws from direct observation within the leadership circles of CONFEMEX (20052007) as well as interviews with past and present HTA federation leaders, Mexican and U.S. government officials, and local immigrant activists. Interviews with former and current HTA leaders encompassed ten federations (Aguas Calientes, Chihuahua, Durango, Michoacán, Jalisco, Hidalgo, Zacatecas, Guanajuato, Guerrero, and Oaxaca); other interviewees were selected because of their significant involvement with Chicago HTA developments over the past 20 years.

Copyright © 2013. LFB Scholarly Publishing LLC. All rights reserved.

Overview of Chapters Chapter one presents a theoretical overview of the difference between the transnational and assimilation theories commonly used to conceptualize HTAs and their state-level federations. Challenging dominant transnational conceptualizations of immigrant HTAs, the chapter considers the organizations’ increasing tendencies to participate in U.S.-focused politics, particularly in regard to immigrant rights. It also examines how social movement activities may serve as a process for the political incorporation of immigrants into the U.S. Conversely, assimilation theories have traditionally understood political incorporation as resulting from long-term and linear processes of immigrants’ interaction with host states and with local institutions that facilitate inclusion and citizenship (Bloemraad 2005, 2006; Alba and Nee 2003; Gerstle and Mollenkopf 2001; Mollenkopf and Hochschild 2010). While such processes continue to be relevant, recent research suggests that certain changes in the economic and political environment—from new kinds of state policies to new immigrant activities—may significantly accelerate naturalization and electoral participation by immigrants even as these processes do not sever migrant ties to their sending society. Chapter two examines the emergence and early development of Chicago HTAs in response to political and economic restructurings in both Mexico and the U.S. The analysis focuses in particular on the post-1970s dynamics of Mexico-U.S. immigration and the intensifying significance of migrant HTAs for Mexico’s evolving state projects. By considering the importance of Chicago’s long-standing Mexican

Vonderlack-Navarro, Rebecca. Immigrant Political Incorporation : The Role of Hometown Associations, LFB

Copyright © 2013. LFB Scholarly Publishing LLC. All rights reserved.

8

Immigrant Political Incorporation

diaspora for Mexico’s governmental migrant-repatriation projects from the late 1980s through early 2001, we come to see not only how HTAs quickly developed within and around the city, but also how the organizations began over time to acquire a certain amount of political autonomy. Chapter three explores the emerging bi-national focus of Chicago HTAs that developed from 2001 to 2005. Following the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, the political course between Mexico and the U.S. would significantly change as Mexico lost its diplomatic clout with the U.S. The resulting rightward shift in U.S. immigration policy resulting from the “war on terror” would eventually catalyze an expansion in both Mexican state and HTA strategies to include domestically-focused activities aimed at safeguarding their members’ political standing in the U.S. HTAs’ emerging bi-national agendas were further encouraged by growing attention from the Illinois state government, which began to court CONFEMEX as part of a broader Democratic party bid for Latino electoral support. Chapter four examines CONFEMEX’s recourse to popular mobilization. The chapter traces the events that led to CONFEMEX’s central role within the historic immigrant rights march on March 10, 2006. This period represents the most dramatic change in Chicago HTA activity as it reconstructs the strategic developments that ensued following the passage of the Sensenbrenner bill in December 2005 until March 2006. Chapter five examines CONFEMEX’s continued leadership in the historic May Day rally of 2006 and the various state responses to immigrant mobilization up until the November congressional elections of that same year. As a new leader in the U.S. immigrant rights movement, CONFEMEX faced new challenges. HTA leaders faced difficult choices when it came to responding to the growing attention they were receiving from Illinois politicians and advocacy groups. The confederation also had to decide on its position within the new U.S.based oppositional movement field. Chapter six focuses on the time period between December 2006 to early 2008 and explores how and why CONFEMEX came to prioritize interest group strategies over popular mobilization as the most practical avenue for gaining political power. As the confederation aimed to mobilize votes for the upcoming 2008 U.S. presidential election, state actors in both Mexico and the U.S. would further encourage CONFEMEX to channel its political leverage within institutional politics.

Vonderlack-Navarro, Rebecca. Immigrant Political Incorporation : The Role of Hometown Associations, LFB

CHAPTER 1

Copyright © 2013. LFB Scholarly Publishing LLC. All rights reserved.

The Bi-national Path to Immigrant Political Incorporation: Theoretical and Methodological Considerations

Mexican immigrant hometown associations (HTAs) consist largely of first-generation immigrants organized around cultural activities. The goal is to preserve heritage, provide collective remittances and infrastructure development to members’ hometowns in Mexico, and build political capital within sending states. HTAs have been depicted in scholarship as transnational organizations where immigrants’ energies—intensified and facilitated by this era of globalization and Mexican state outreach—concentrate on sustaining social and political membership ties with their country of origin. In other words, while HTAs may be based in U.S. cities, they are often seen as occupying a socio-political sphere distinct from the host society and its state actors. Moving beyond the "assimilation versus transnational" debate that commonly conceptualizes HTA activities, this chapter reviews contributions from literatures on the political economy contemporary states, and social movements. The study’s integrated theoretical framework better illuminates how HTAs (generally understood as interest groups created by the Mexican state) have been influenced by multiple state contingencies in both Mexico and the U.S. over the past two decades. As a consequence, for brief moments HTAs served as “vehicles of mobilization” that reverted quickly back to their interest group functions. 9

Vonderlack-Navarro, Rebecca. Immigrant Political Incorporation : The Role of Hometown Associations, LFB

10

Immigrant Political Incorporation

Copyright © 2013. LFB Scholarly Publishing LLC. All rights reserved.

HTAs and the Assimilation versus Transnational Debate Classic assimilation paradigms believe that over time immigrants to the United States would inevitably sever ties to their homeland and gradually shift political allegiances to the host country (Park and Burgess, reprinted 1969; Handlin 1959; Warner and Srole 1945; Gordon 1964). Even more recent work in this vein tends to see political incorporation as a more or less linear (if often prolonged and uncertain) process shaped largely by host country institutions (Mollenkopf and Hochschild 2010; Bloemraad 2006; Alba and Nee 2003; Gerstle and Mollenkopf 2001). Yet transnational frameworks developed in part to understand a somewhat surprising and fairly recent aspect of the contemporary migration experience: immigrants today often sustain enduring ties to multiple levels of their sending states and society (Schiller et al. 1992; Guarnizo and M.P. Smith 1998; Guarnizo 2001; Portes, 2001; Portes et al. 2007; Guarnizo et al. 2003). Mexican immigrant, self-organized hometown associations (HTAs) and their state-level federations have offered a useful case for empirically supporting the transnational framework and for challenging conventional notions of assimilation (Goldring 1998, 2002; RiveraSalgado 2002, R.C. Smith 1995, 1998, 2006; Alarcon 2002; Orozco & Lapointe 2004; Portes et al. 2007; M.P. Smith and Bakker 2008). More nuanced transnational conceptions of HTAs have considered that as the U.S. government turns increasingly punitive towards immigrants, immigrants face moments when they must prioritize U.S.focused politics as a means to solidify their status in the U.S. and attempt to gain political power. These more multi-faceted understandings also acknowledge that numerous Mexican political actors may have a stake in supporting immigrants’ growing U.S. political activity—their secured political standing in the United States is necessary to ensure continued transnational activity, particularly projects that stimulate continued remittance flows back to Mexico (Guarnizo 2001, 244). The transnational approach, however, does not provide an adequate explanation as to why Chicago’s HTA leadership became one of the city’s central leaders in the 2006 immigrant mobilizations, to the extent that the Michoacán federation headquarters served as Chicago’s central planning hub. Nor is there compelling evidence to suggest that HTAs embraced a leadership role in the marches simply because government

Vonderlack-Navarro, Rebecca. Immigrant Political Incorporation : The Role of Hometown Associations, LFB

Copyright © 2013. LFB Scholarly Publishing LLC. All rights reserved.

The Bi-national Path to Immigrant Political Incorporation

11

actors in Mexico or its consulate in Chicago encouraged them to do so. Instead, both theoretical and empirical work suggest that the most recent developments in Chicago’s HTA leadership activity must be understood within the framework of the U.S. political environment and how these political forces have come to influence immigrant HTA leadership over the past decade, transforming both identity and activism. Only very recently have scholars concerned with immigrant transnational research begun to consider more fully the critical influences of states and politics within both sending and receiving societies on immigrant organizations. A growing number of scholars do make the argument that transnationalism and assimilation are not contradictory processes for immigrants and their organizations (Waldinger and Fitzgerald 2004; M.P. Smith 2007; M.P. Smith and Bakker 2008; Fitzgerald 2008; Guarnizo et al. 2003; Levitt 2003; Morawska 2003; Portes et al., 2007). However, several years ago Roger Waldinger and David Fitzgerald (2004) criticized “the absence of any concerted effort to analyze the relationship between immigrant transnationalism and receiving states and civil society actors” (1181). This gap continues to impede our understanding of HTA evolution and development. For example, heavily guided by the transnational approach, Robert C. Smith (2008) pays little attention to recent migrants’ burgeoning U.S.-focused activity in his analysis of Mexican immigrants’ battle for absentee voting rights and Mexico’s expanding migrant-repatriation programs. In a brief paragraph within a quite extensive study of Mexico’s intensified diaspora engagement initiatives, Smith explains that migrants were more interested in participating in the 2006 marches than in participating in Mexican presidential elections because taking to the streets remained relatively easier than the cumbersome absentee voting opportunities extended by the Mexican government (730). His argument presumes there were no complications in expecting undocumented immigrants to march in public to demand their rights. Research on Mexican immigrants has started to analyze how political environments in both Mexico and the United States can shape migrant associations. In a recent paper, Waldinger (2009) examines two divergent cases of Mexico’s diaspora engagement: the matricula consular, which benefited millions of undocumented immigrants with a valid source of documentation, and the Vote from Abroad, whereby

Vonderlack-Navarro, Rebecca. Immigrant Political Incorporation : The Role of Hometown Associations, LFB

Copyright © 2013. LFB Scholarly Publishing LLC. All rights reserved.

12

Immigrant Political Incorporation

few emigrants possessed the appropriate credentials to participate. In general, his analysis is convincing: the divergent outcomes stem from the fact that the matricula provided immigrants with a “source of leverage” in their host society, while expatriate voting involved a more burdensome effort aimed at trying to reconnect emigrants as members of a homeland they left behind. While often illuminating, Waldinger’s study does not examine how the broader (and highly asymmetrical) relationship between Mexico and the United States might influence the way each state relates to Mexican emigrant/immigrant populations. This possibility suggests the need to resituate the study of migrant political associations within a longer-term framework focused on the changing interests of Mexican and U.S. state actors. In the case of Chicago HTAs, such a framework might usefully begin by examining the post-1970s economic and political restructurings in both societies and the new position of migrants within state strategies and governance projects over subsequent decades. Meanwhile, a somewhat different and quite welcome line of investigation within transnational research comes from the work of Michael Smith and Matt Bakker (2008; also Smith 2007) who challenge the often rigid division of domestic ethnic politics and diaspora politics. Their ethnographic work on various California federation leaders reveal how some customarily transnational migrants are now becoming involved in local Get-Out-The-Vote and immigrantrights focused campaigns while also remaining connected to Mexico. Their focus on this “second face of transnational citizenship” (167) raises several theoretical points to consider: immigrants’ political engagement in both Mexican and U.S. politics can function simultaneously; migrants’ political capital garnered within the sending country can be eventually used as a resource within the host society; and early transnational researchers’ overreliance on translocal connections (R. Smith 1998; Goldring 1998) undermines the potentially influential role of state actors at multiple levels within both Mexico and the U.S. Overall, Smith and Bakker point to the significant need for further examination of federations’ growing engagement within the U.S. political realm and what this might entail for the development of national identities in this new global economy. What is necessary, therefore, is a new theoretical lens that focuses sufficient attention on the complicated influences of the U.S. political environment—anti-immigrant political threats combined with the

Vonderlack-Navarro, Rebecca. Immigrant Political Incorporation : The Role of Hometown Associations, LFB

Copyright © 2013. LFB Scholarly Publishing LLC. All rights reserved.

The Bi-national Path to Immigrant Political Incorporation

13

political legitimacy conferred by local political leaders interested in attracting new voting blocs—in order to view how U.S. state projects have significantly altered many HTA activities. More broadly, this new framework needs to account for how migrants’ continued action is likely to be suppressed or supported by different state actors on both sides of the border. For example, studies on the immigrant mobilizations of 2006 highlight how the central thrust to launch the protests came from innovative organizational networks involving immigrant associations, labor unions, churches, politicians, and media outlets (Codero-Guzman et al. 2008). They do not, however, explain how protests emerged in areas that lacked such organizational connections (Benjamin-Alvarado, DeSipio and Montoya 2009). Furthermore, the inclination within such studies to view HTA activity as a rising form of “civic binationality” (see, for example, Fox and Bada 2009) marginalizes the centrality of government actors in shaping the political landscape that spurred the 2006 marches. At its core, social mobilization involves a dialectic between migrants’ activism and state responses, as states are likely to respond to collective insurgency with either repression or endorsement of activists’ cause. A state’s reaction also contributes to how quickly immigrant activism can become institutionalized and accommodated by the state (Tarrow 1998). Indeed, the 2006 mobilizations were about more than just the criminal provisions of the Sensenbrenner bill (in addition to studies already cited, see Barreto et al. 2009; Pallares and Flores-Gonzalez 2010). A comprehensive analysis of the 2006 mass mobilizations must consider the political and economic factors that preceded the movement’s emergence. In addition, when considering the specific leadership role of Chicago HTAs in the 2006 insurgence, one must consider how HTA action was strongly influenced not only by Mexico’s migrant-reincorporation programs and policies, but by the threat of the United States’ post-9/11 anti-immigrant politics as well. Further, local state actors pursued new immigrants as voting blocs and recognized their organizations as politically-entitled interest groups. It is possible that the weaknesses of the HTA literature also stem from the relative neglect of Chicago-area HTAs. This study’s close examination of Chicago HTA growth and development illustrates a dynamic interplay between migrant activism and various cross-border state projects. The general research on Mexican HTAs focuses primarily on organizational developments in California (Goldring 1998,

Vonderlack-Navarro, Rebecca. Immigrant Political Incorporation : The Role of Hometown Associations, LFB

Copyright © 2013. LFB Scholarly Publishing LLC. All rights reserved.

14

Immigrant Political Incorporation

2002; Rivera-Salgado 2002; M.P. Smith and Bakker 2008; Zabin and Escala-Rabadan 1998; R.C. Smith 2003), New York (R.C. Smith 1995, 1998, 2006), and on the east coast more generally (Portes et al. 2007). Inadequate attention has been paid to Chicago’s particular developments, despite the fact that Chicago and the broader Midwest has an advanced organizational capacity and the second highest number of clubs after California. Research that considers Chicago HTA developments either provides a descriptive overview of their growth, as well as the expansion of development projects within Mexico (Alarcon 2002; Orozco and Lapointe 2004; Orozco and Rouse 2007) or an indepth analysis of early federation development and homeland-oriented activities (Boruchoff 1999). A significant exception is research conducted by Escala-Rabadan, Bada, and Rivera-Salgado (2006) which investigates the growth of both California and Chicago-based HTAs. The work thoughtfully considers how the associations have expanded their agendas to prioritize concerns in both Mexico and the US and sheds important light on their ability to function as political actors interacting with various government entities on both sides of the border. As a consequence, these authors contend, migrant ethnic and social networks learned to adapt to a new social and political environment. Yet involvement in U.S. political networks does not, by itself, explain how Chicago’s HTAs came to occupy a leadership role in the 2006 marches. A more integrated theoretical framework set in a historical context, in turn, might better explore the dynamics of interaction between state actors and immigrant organizations, illuminating more explicitly how political opportunities and threats influence the capacities and strategic orientations of HTAs. Organizational developments grounded in a historical analysis that considers the critical influences of both Mexico and U.S. neoliberalizing state projects illuminates the various contextual processes that have served to influence Chicago HTAs’ ongoing strategies: multi-decade corporate restructuring and deindustrialization, the vast rise of contingent migrant labor, extensive Mexican immigration, local politics and migrant accommodation, and early Mexican state repatriation projects within the city. Over time, many HTAs have responded to varying U.S. and Mexico state projects by increasing in size, federating and eventually confederating, affiliating with other advocacy groups, engaging in demonstrations about

Vonderlack-Navarro, Rebecca. Immigrant Political Incorporation : The Role of Hometown Associations, LFB

Copyright © 2013. LFB Scholarly Publishing LLC. All rights reserved.

The Bi-national Path to Immigrant Political Incorporation

15

immigrant rights, developing relationships at U.S. state and local levels, and sometimes taking positions in local U.S. government. In order to examine the evolution of many Chicago HTAs to include both Mexican and U.S. political activities along with the capacity to mobilize contentiously, research needs to consider the macro-level changes that led to the dramatic shift in HTA activities. This entails a consideration for HTAs’ interaction with both Mexico and U.S. state projects. Although generally downplayed in transnational HTA scholarship, when the relationship between HTAs and U.S. state projects are considered, a complicated and contradictory political context emerges. This context includes Mexican immigrants who have come to play a crucial role in the U.S. economy and are often seen as significant economic contributors as well as policies that criminalize undocumented Mexican immigrants as lawbreakers. At the same time, there are selective instances when immigrants are seen by national and local politicians as potential voting blocs. The following sections provide the broader conceptual framework of this study. Three major scholarly literatures are reviewed: the political economy of globalization, theories of the state, and social movement paradigms. The study’s integrated framework offers the essential theoretical tools to understand how Chicago HTAs’ mounting U.S.-focused activities, as well as their eventual surge into popular mobilization, resulted from the organizations’ long-standing interactions with various cross-border state projects. Post-Industrial Globalization, Internationally Integrated Markets, and Porous Nation-State Boundaries: the Rise of Transnational Immigrant HTAs Examining HTAs through the lens of political economy helps illustrate how HTAs developed within the evolving context of neoliberal economic globalization. Studies of neoliberal globalization can reveal post-1970s patterns of capital mobility, market integration, and free trade within an international economy where nation state authority and territorial boundaries seem to hold decreased importance (Sassen 1991, 1998; Friedman 1986). Studies of immigration from the perspective of globalization have explored the economic and macro-structural forces that have led to the establishment of two-tiered labor markets in the United States, with unauthorized immigrants dominating the lower tier

Vonderlack-Navarro, Rebecca. Immigrant Political Incorporation : The Role of Hometown Associations, LFB

Copyright © 2013. LFB Scholarly Publishing LLC. All rights reserved.

16

Immigrant Political Incorporation

(Sassen 1991, 1998; Friedman 1986; Massey 1999; Massey et al. 2002). These studies tend to highlight the influence of globalization and immigration in large U.S. cities that from the 1970s onward have been transformed into hourglass service-sector economies that also served as key ports-of-entry for immigrants (Sassen 1991, 1998; Freidman 1986; Massey et al. 2002; Harrison and Bluestone 1998).1 In response to changes in the global economy, social movement paradigms have begun to challenge realist assumptions of nation state agency, which tend to analyze social movement activism as inherently constrained by national borders. Transnational social movement paradigms provided unique insights into innovative forms of grassroots agency (including migrant organizing) within the contemporary era of globalization. While early social movement research shed light on organizational strategies to garner resources and take advantage of potential political opportunity structures within domestic politics, transnational scholars explore how factors of globalization created new forms of political opportunities and alignments in the international arena (Smith and Bandy 2005; Jenkins 1995). Transnational social movement scholars consider how activist identities and organizational constituencies are no longer restricted by national identities, as innovative forms of cross-border solidarities form (J. Smith and Bandy 2005; Bandy and J. Smith 2005). Furthermore, the framing processes used by transnational movements can often reflect the reaction to threats posed by various global projects and supra-state governmental organizations such as the World Trade Organization, the growth of multi-national corporations, and alliances against the North American 1

See Durand, Massey, Charvet (2000) for an overview of how the geography of Mexican immigration to the U.S. significantly shifted post-IRCA. While metropolises continue to be a great attraction for Mexican newcomers, particularly Los Angeles, Chicago, Houston and Phoenix, immigration is also growing in rural, agricultural areas. Florida, Georgia, Idaho, Minnesota, Nevada, New York, New Jersey, North Carolina, Oregon and Utah are all new destination states. By the mid-1990s, however, single, male, working-age Mexican migrants who initially worked in U.S. agricultural industries were already heading for better paying urban employment opportunities. In addition, the growing number of urban-bound male migrants were often meeting with a growing number of female migrants heading towards cities as well.

Vonderlack-Navarro, Rebecca. Immigrant Political Incorporation : The Role of Hometown Associations, LFB

Copyright © 2013. LFB Scholarly Publishing LLC. All rights reserved.

The Bi-national Path to Immigrant Political Incorporation

17

Free Trade Agreement (J. Smith 2002; Levi and Murphy 2006; Foster 2002). Globalization factors also point to important changes in scalar and spatial dynamics influencing community activism (particularly migrant activism) that connects local issues with transnational concerns (Tarrow 2002, 2005). Nevertheless, transnational theorists have criticized globalization theories as universally "top-down;" in response they have developed “from below” paradigms that highlight immigrant actors and the importance of locality within the global processes that shape immigration (Guarnizo and M.P. Smith 1998). The work provides important analytic attention to immigrants’ sustained connection to multiple levels of their sending states and society by identifying contemporary immigrants and their organizations’ ability to maintain significant relationships, communal life, and political and economic activities that span between two nation-states (Schiller et al. 1992; Guarnizo and M.P. Smith 1998; Goldring 1998, 2002; R.C. Smith 1995, 1998, 2006). The transnational theoretical orientations are important for understanding HTAs. Arguably, there are aspects of transnationalism and Mexican state outreach towards HTAs and its growing diaspora that are uniquely different and unprecedented. Theorists tend to agree that this current wave of immigrants can experience transnational life with greater intensity and ease due to improvements in technology that have enhanced communication and travel in ways not even imaginable for previous immigrant groups (Guarnizo 2001; Morawska 2001; Portes et al. 2007; for an exception see Fitzgerald 2008). Joppke and Morawska (2003) also argue “New, however, is that transnational identities and involvements, which immigrants have always been enmeshed in, are now considered legitimate and no longer repressed by nationalizing states” (2). Besides increasing acceptance of multicultural identities, advocates for highlighting the recent uniqueness in transnational immigrant activities are quick to point to recent and significant legislative changes of sending governments, especially dualcitizenship laws and absentee voting rights, that serve to incorporate their diaspora and maintain their political and economic loyalty (Guarnizo et al. 2003; M.P. Smith and Bakker 2008; Koopsman and Statham 2003). Such laws enable immigrants to assimilate and gain citizenship status in the U.S. without relinquishing their transnational

Vonderlack-Navarro, Rebecca. Immigrant Political Incorporation : The Role of Hometown Associations, LFB

18

Immigrant Political Incorporation

rights in their country of origin. Guarnizo (2001) describes the implication of such dual citizenship practices:

Copyright © 2013. LFB Scholarly Publishing LLC. All rights reserved.

…a nationalism that does not promote the return to the home country but rather encourages them to become citizens of the receiving society in order to strengthen their position there, remit more money ‘home,’ consume national exports, and advocate their state of origins interests in the United States…they [sending state actors] guarantee migrants’ role as a reliable source of economic and political support of their ‘homeland.’ The increased and increasing reach of the state thus also suggests its growing dependence on its overseas citizens (244). The transnational paradigm highlights how contemporary immigrants and their organizations can maintain ties to the homeland with an intensity and ease not possible for previous waves of newcomers (R.C. Smith 2006; M.P. Smith and Bakker 2008). Furthermore, the transnational paradigm illustrates immigrants’ potential to hold multiple political allegiances and national identities and suggests that the intensity of transnational ties can actually increase over time spent in the host society (Guarnizo et al. 2003). Transnational conceptions of HTAs provide important considerations for understanding migrant agency and state responses. When conceived as transnational organizations, HTAs are migrant clubs whose energies are intensified by this era of global market integration and Mexican state outreach and no longer limited by national boundaries. Their activism concentrates on sustaining social and political membership ties with their country of origin, connecting migrants both “here” and “there." As such, transnationally-led studies of HTAs tend to either minimize the state, failing to make it central to their analysis (Portes, Escobar, and Arana 2008; Orozco and Lapointe 2004; Orozco and Rouse 2007), or more commonly, they analyze HTAs almost entirely in relation to their sending states (Goldring 1998, 2002; R.C. Smith 1995, 1998, 2006; Fitzgerald 2006). The sending state’s diaspora reincorporation initiatives are explained as “deterritorialized nation-building” (M.P. Smith and Bakker 2008, 28, quoting Basch et al. 1994). This is to say that a nation-state’s actions expand beyond its borders as a means to cultivate and maintain the

Vonderlack-Navarro, Rebecca. Immigrant Political Incorporation : The Role of Hometown Associations, LFB

Copyright © 2013. LFB Scholarly Publishing LLC. All rights reserved.

The Bi-national Path to Immigrant Political Incorporation

19

economic and political loyalty of resident citizens residing abroad. Even when HTAs’ emerging U.S.-based activism is given attention (see M.P. Smith and Bakker 2008, 167-183; Rivera-Salgada et al. 2005; Fox 2005), there remains a need for comprehensive analysis of how HTAs and their state-level federations function within the structures of U.S. cities where they are located and how they might be employing local resources, networks, and, most importantly, structures of political power. Thus, in contrast to conventional theories of assimilation built around the notion of sovereign nation-states into which immigrants will inevitably incorporate, transnational theorists point to the role of sending states as they extend beyond their borders to include their emigrants as national members. If nation-states and citizen identities become less defined by national borders, as transnational and global theories suggest, what does this mean for contemporary understandings of immigrant political incorporation into the host society? Recent transnational theorists observe that emigrants who participate in transnational political activity are not deterred from U.S.-focused politics and in fact are often engaged in these politics (see M.P. Smith 2007; M.P. Smith and Bakker 2008). However, this tells us little about how multiple state actors on both sides of the border will shape contemporary immigrants’ political incorporation into the U.S. and what the asymmetrical interdependence between neoliberalizing states implies for immigrant political incorporation. Considerations for Sending and Receiving State Agencies: Implications for Immigrant HTA Organizing and Incorporation into the Host Society While scholars of transnational dynamics and neoliberalism downplay attention on the state, a growing number of scholars of international immigration point to the essential role of host nation-states in shaping immigrant incorporation and activism (Bloemradd 2005, 2006; Joppke and Morawska 2003; Waldinger and Fitzgerald 2004; Zolberg 1999; Alba and Nee 2003; Aleinikoff 2001; Hazan 2006). This work argues that even in a global society, states continue to play a central role in shaping immigrants’ political incorporation. It also points to the critical role played by multiple state projects in influencing HTA developments. For example, Aristide Zolberg (1999) argues the agency

Vonderlack-Navarro, Rebecca. Immigrant Political Incorporation : The Role of Hometown Associations, LFB

Copyright © 2013. LFB Scholarly Publishing LLC. All rights reserved.

20

Immigrant Political Incorporation

of both sending and receiving states is an essential component in theorizing international migration as immigration in and of itself is “the transfer of a person from the jurisdiction of one state to that of another” (81). This includes not only the movement across borders “…but also the rules governing the acquisition, maintenance, loss, or voluntary relinquishment of ‘membership’ in all its aspects, political, social, economic, and cultural” (81). In other words, the movement of populations from one territory to another is innately political. As Joppke (1998) states, “There seems to be no significant migration episode, past or present, in which states have not had an active, rather than reactive, hand” (6). The state, in fact, has always played an active role in shaping immigration through labor-recruitment policies and guest worker initiatives. Further, even the immigration of asylumseekers and refugees is a direct outcome of problems occurring during the maintenance or construction of nation states. Zolberg (1999) emphasizes the principal role of U.S. policy in influencing Mexico-U.S. immigration. In his historical analysis of Mexican immigration he contends that the objective of U.S. policy towards Mexican immigrants has not been to bar their physical entry, but to prevent their social and political incorporation into the U.S. “Mexicans tended to return home when no longer needed, and in any case, their illegal status made it easy for American authorities, whenever they wished, to expel them without complicated legal procedures” (Zolberg 1999, 77). This resonates with the work of DeGenova (2005) who describes this process of U.S. state action as maintaining undocumented Mexican immigrants in a vulnerable state of “deportability—the possibility of deportation” (8). Thus, the question for immigrant HTAs’ evolving activities is no longer if both sending and receiving state agencies influence immigrant activism (Zolberg 1999; Waldinger and Fitzgerald 2004), but how both Mexico and U.S. nation-state projects function to shape and reshape immigrant activism and incorporation. State-based and globalization theories of immigration offer various insights into understanding the evolving agendas and activities of Chicago HTAs that are particularly relevant to this study. Classic conceptions of assimilation and political incorporation view ethnic organizations, like immigrant HTAs, as potential vehicles for integration. While initially they may serve to conserve ethnic identity, eventually they will aid in incorporation processes to the new host society. Transnational theories, in turn, draw

Vonderlack-Navarro, Rebecca. Immigrant Political Incorporation : The Role of Hometown Associations, LFB

Copyright © 2013. LFB Scholarly Publishing LLC. All rights reserved.

The Bi-national Path to Immigrant Political Incorporation

21

on important aspects of globalization, suggesting that research should no longer view sending and receiving states in isolation; rather, interstate connections (heightened through market integration) present implications for the types of organizations immigrants form. Furthermore, the kinds of ties immigrants make and sustain with their sending societies are qualitatively different and of a different scale than previous waves of immigrants (M.P. Smith and Bakker 2008; R.C. Smith 2006). However, transnational research downplays the ways the host nation state might catalyze HTAs to interact with U.S.-based politics and institutions, particularly through political opportunity structures or threats. Transnational theory is not especially helpful in exploring the potential of HTAs to serve as mobilizing structures capable of responding to U.S. government action with both contentious and normative political activity (Alba and Nee 2003; McAdam et al. 2001). By leaving out host nation-state projects, transnational scholarship prevents a full understanding as to why sending states that experience a large emigrant exodus to another country might create, reshape, and strengthen diaspora outreach strategies over time. The intense transnational ties, in turn, can also serve as mechanisms for integration into the host society, as my research will show. What remains necessary in the study of contemporary immigration is a more nuanced conception of nation-state agency within the global era and how it relates to immigrant HTA activism. Peter Evans (1995) theorizes nation states as having their own agency in encouraging their country’s economic transformation. According to his argument, nation states play a fundamental role in stimulating their nation’s capital accumulation and entrance into the international system in a time of economic neoliberalization. In contrast to globalist arguments that downplay state agency, “the nation-state is not so much withdrawing as redirecting its attempts at economic intervention—e.g. using the state to create a more welcoming environment for inward investment” (Pierson 1996, 171). As states enter the global system, they assume a place in the interstate hierarchy, posing important implications for their evolving state-migrant relations. In addition, as states begin to coordinate economic efforts, some states become stronger and others weaker from such arrangements. In the case of this study, the entrance of Mexico and the United States into the global system—particularly through the neoliberal restructurings of their political economies post-

Vonderlack-Navarro, Rebecca. Immigrant Political Incorporation : The Role of Hometown Associations, LFB

22

Immigrant Political Incorporation

1970s—created specific implications for how their state projects relate to immigrant HTAs. For this case study, the organizational developments of HTAs need to be understood in the context of the extensive restructuring of the political economies of Mexico and the United States. Specifically, how Mexico’s post-1970s development came to be predicated on mass out-migration, both for return remittance flows and for internal political stability. As for the United States, its own restructuring increasingly took the form of an hour-glass economy resting upon the backs of highly exploitable immigrant labor, much of which came from Mexico. The result was not only an increasingly integrated bi-national economy but also an evolving, contradictory political context. This was a context where rural Mexican citizens who were relatively disempowered at home were selectively re-engaged by the Mexican government through their communities in Chicago, particularly through migrant HTAs. It was also a context in which these migrants, as workers in Chicago, found themselves marginalized politically except when they were selectively targeted as immigrant voting blocs by partisan strategists.

Copyright © 2013. LFB Scholarly Publishing LLC. All rights reserved.

Mexican Immigrant HTAs as Potential Vehicles for Social Mobilization Social movement paradigms highlight the opportunities, threats, and tensions HTAs face as they grow and interact with government entities on both sides of the Mexico-U.S. border. As those government actors work to support, suppress, or (re)incorporate HTAs’ activism, HTAs respond with selective instances of popular mobilization, or more commonly, through strategies of interest-group consolidation. It is through this study’s modified political process approach that we can understand immigrant leaders’ responses to shifting and cross-cutting state projects in an era of neoliberal globalization. This section briefly reviews various perspectives within the social movement literature that aim to elucidate why social movements emerge. Specific attention is given to grievance theories and resource mobilization models, as well as a central point to this study of contemporary cross-border migrant agency—a modified political process model. Dominant political science and historical research agenda prior to the 1960s understood political processes largely in terms of decisions made by political elites or institutional actors. In response, emerging

Vonderlack-Navarro, Rebecca. Immigrant Political Incorporation : The Role of Hometown Associations, LFB

Copyright © 2013. LFB Scholarly Publishing LLC. All rights reserved.

The Bi-national Path to Immigrant Political Incorporation

23

social movement researchers in the 1960s developed a “research from below” paradigm to recognize non-normative forms of political action and disruption by marginal groups (McAdam et al. 2001, 15). Early social movement researchers rebuffed the notion that oppositional struggles to state rule were merely an emotional, irrational response by uninformed, lower-stratum masses. Rational action theorist Mancur Olson (1965) introduced the “free rider” problem associated with mass mobilization (i.e., individuals recognizing that they can benefit from collective action without themselves having to participate in it), arguing that while individuals might share common concerns, this does not translate into coordinated collective resistance. He contended that rational individuals will not participate in collective resistance except in instances of quite discernable circumstances that convince protestors that mobilization is worth their effort. His work sheds important light on why individuals would choose not to take part in collective protest, but much still remains to be understood within the social movement literature, however, as to why individuals would, in fact, choose to participate in collective resistance. Grievance models, in turn, explained individual’s decisions to participate in mass protest as a response to feelings of anger and a will to change their current circumstances. Relative deprivation is central to this model, as discontent arises as one group feels they are unjustly treated when compared to another group within society. Out of this model derived the concept of collective action frames where a group “specifies a sense of injustice, moral indignation, and outrage about the way authorities are treating a social problem” (Klandermans 2001, 271272). The discourse and symbolism that evolves within framing processes is innovative and changing as state actors, media, and protestors construct and reconstruct their current circumstances. Grievance models provide important insight into understanding how discontent emerges as well as the interactive nature of how issues become framed by protestors and the state. Resource mobilization theories, meanwhile, drew important analytic attention to how groups mobilize, gather resources, garner expertise, unify their bases, and strategize their action tactics (such as exposure to media outlets, interaction with political authorities, and third parties) as well as how these mechanisms are important for movement success (McCarthy and Zald 1977; Jenkins, 1983). Overall, this perspective contends that a group’s ability to amass resources is a

Vonderlack-Navarro, Rebecca. Immigrant Political Incorporation : The Role of Hometown Associations, LFB

Copyright © 2013. LFB Scholarly Publishing LLC. All rights reserved.

24

Immigrant Political Incorporation

key determinant of a group’s ability to mobilize and form a successful opposition. In their attempt to show that protest is more than an irrational disruption, resource mobilization models tend to downplay the emotionally-charged and dynamic forms of contention that can play an important role in protest politics (McAdam et al. 2001, 15). Protest is indeed distinct from interest group politics, as it often occurs by marginal groups outside of conventional politics who lack many resources (Piven and Cloward 1991, 437). According to Piven and Cloward (1991), contentious activity often occurs without planning: “Riots require little more by way of organization than numbers, propinquity and some communication” (446). Contrary to the expectations of resource mobilization models, when groups make efforts to formalize into an organization and focus energy on gathering resources from elites through more conventional means of political participation, they run the risk of pacifying involvement in disruptive action. Instead, community actors may have the tendency to prioritize strategies pleasing to outside funders and undermine potentially more effective forms of claims-making that challenge institutional politics. But what is most problematic about the resource mobilization models, however, is that by placing emphasis on a social movement’s ability to garner resources, resource mobilization theory is driven by an analysis that focuses on the internal dimensions of a social movement. Not given sufficient attention is the broader political environment and how it can be a crucial influence on social mobilization, along with the premise that social mobilization influences the broader political environment (Klandermans 2001). For low-income, disenfranchised groups that lack political resources and power (as is the case for much of Chicago’s HTA base of undocumented immigrants) disrupting institutional rules and procedures may be their only avenue for acquiring real political power. It is through successful opposition that state actors have to pay attention to marginal groups, often responding with repression, concessions, or co-optation (Piven and Cloward 1991, 451-452). Therefore, a more in-depth understanding of collective action, whether contentious or normative, was needed to analyze the role of political institutions and how alignments or de-alignments can stimulate opposition. While Lipsky (1968) began this line of discussion by drawing attention to the dynamic interaction between the political

Vonderlack-Navarro, Rebecca. Immigrant Political Incorporation : The Role of Hometown Associations, LFB

Copyright © 2013. LFB Scholarly Publishing LLC. All rights reserved.

The Bi-national Path to Immigrant Political Incorporation

25

environment and social movement activity, Piven and Cloward’s seminal book, Poor People’s Movements: Why They Succeed, How They Fail (1977), used a structural theory of causation to show how political institutions can condition mobilizing. Their work provided crucial insight into the way political instability can be an optimal time to use disruption as a means to advance a movement’s claims. In addition, they argued that while political institutions influence collective action, collective action can in turn influence political processes and future electoral strategies (Piven and Cloward 1997). The work of Doug McAdam provided important advances within social movement research through the introduction of the political process model in his piece Political Process and the Development of Black Insurgency (1982). The model offered critical insight into factors both external and internal to social movements. In contrast to resource mobilization frameworks, McAdam considered institutionalized political processes as vital to an analysis of a social movement’s emergence and sustainability. He also argued that movements be understood as a multi-stage process, considering within his analysis events that condition insurgency as well as factors that might cause a movement’s decline. McAdam introduced three interrelated elements that contribute to the genesis of insurgency: the structure of political opportunities, the vigor of indigenous organizations, and the extent to which minority groups hold “shared cognitions” about their plight and the potential to change their current circumstances (59). The first element, the structure of political opportunities, involves particular instances of political instability or shifting political conditions where insurgency could threaten the status quo. In some situations, the state can play a critical role in furnishing legitimacy to a movement. The second element for popular mobilization is indigenous organizational strength. Political opportunities alone are not enough to incite protest. Indigenous or minority communities must have sufficient resources to trigger social unrest and take advantage of political prospects. Indigenous resources include strong associational networks in which to integrate, communicate, and recruit movement participants. Organizational leaders are also necessary to direct movement goals. The third element for popular mobilization is a cognitive liberation among insurgents. This entails a change in collective consciousness where people begin to question the political system as unjust, demand that change occur, and recognize their own power for creating change.

Vonderlack-Navarro, Rebecca. Immigrant Political Incorporation : The Role of Hometown Associations, LFB

Copyright © 2013. LFB Scholarly Publishing LLC. All rights reserved.

26

Immigrant Political Incorporation

As the social movement continues to ebb and flow, the sustainability of the movement becomes influenced by a fourth factor: how state leaders and the broader, multi-organizational field respond to the movement. Insurgents generally face a difficult choice of how to sustain insurgency and whether or not they should. On the one hand, insurgents can continue the pursuit of non-institutional tactics, or even “revolutionary” goals. On the other hand, the movement’s survival might depend on reform-oriented, institutionalized tactics. While less likely to face political repression, directing insurgency into more conventional institutionalized channels can threaten a movement’s cooptation or cause a loss of support from the movement’s base. Therefore, by adopting moderate reforms the overall effect of the movement can become compromised. Recognizing the difficulty of a movement’s continued existence, McAdam contends, “insurgents must chart a course that avoids crippling repression on the one hand and tactical impotence on the other. Staking out this optimal middle ground is exceedingly difficult. Yet failure to do so almost surely spells the demise of the movement” (58). By choosing participation within political institutions versus confronting them, insurgents might lessen state opposition but at the same time limit their own power to demand change from authorities. Since McAdam’s seminal work, political-process-oriented, social movement theorists have to date come to a general agreement around the following conceptions of collective protest: 1) Political opportunities or threats: the essential role of the state (political alignments or cleavages, ideological leanings and bargaining styles of political elites, and institutional structures) in configuring oppositional responses. Opposition can develop in reaction to stagnant aspects of the state or changing sociopolitical conditions (Jenkins and Klanderman, 1995; McAdam et al. 2001; Tarrow 2002). 2) Mobilizing structures: daily network connections or formal organizations that can be transformed into resources for collective action (McAdam et al. 2001). 3) Cultural framing processes: the active use of language and symbols by protestors to construct an issue and evoke an

Vonderlack-Navarro, Rebecca. Immigrant Political Incorporation : The Role of Hometown Associations, LFB

The Bi-national Path to Immigrant Political Incorporation

27

emotional response. Framing processes are crucial to the formation of collective identities serving to unite diverse people into a single movement and can also be hampered or encouraged by political opportunity structures or threats (Benford and Snow 2000; Fisher and Kling 1997; Melucci 1994).

Copyright © 2013. LFB Scholarly Publishing LLC. All rights reserved.

4) Repertoires of Contention: the strategies or actions a group employs at any given moment. Strategies usually are innovative and changing (e.g., vigils, marches, violence, etc.) in order to make political claims (McAdam et al. 2001). Instead of viewing each concept as static and separate, more recently Doug McAdam, Sidney Tarrow, and Charles Tilly’s Dynamics of Contention (2001) set the social movement concepts into motion by illustrating their interactive and conditional nature. Guided by their synthesized framework, this study is especially influenced by political process models. Political process models understand the relationship between the political arena (political parties, interest groups, and other political institutions) and collective strategies to be interactive, innovative, and ongoing (Tarrow 1988, 428). Given that the state governs how goods are distributed in society, it is the “simultaneous target, sponsor, and antagonist for social movements as wells as the organizer of the political system and arbiter of victory” (Jenkins and Klandermans 1995, 3). For this study in particular, the relationship between the nation state and collective action—or evolving state-migrant relations—is central to the understanding of immigrant HTAs’ growing activism. This study employs a modified “political process” model that looks at the interaction between HTAs and multiple state actors—in Mexico and the United States—over the course of a decade and a half. Three modifications or extensions to the model are made to better depict the idiosyncratic dynamics at play in this particular case of Chicago HTAs. The first modification is to the concept of “political opportunity structure.” Although social movement scholars have recently revised this longstanding notion of political conditions so as to recognize the importance of threat as well as opportunity (see e.g., McAdam, Tarrow, and Tilly 2001; Reese 2005), the historical circumstances under which

Vonderlack-Navarro, Rebecca. Immigrant Political Incorporation : The Role of Hometown Associations, LFB

Copyright © 2013. LFB Scholarly Publishing LLC. All rights reserved.

28

Immigrant Political Incorporation

threats become catalytic are not well understood in the general literature and have not been sufficiently explored with respect to the U.S. immigrant rights mobilizations. The study aims to unpack how the specific threat of the Sensenbrenner bill came to serve as an impulse, not an impediment, to mass protest for Chicago’s HTAs. A second modification concerns the concept of social movement organization. More generally, the notion that mobilization is centrally driven by social movement organizations (or SMOs) has been subjected to a number of criticisms over the years (Piven and Cloward 1977; Cloward and Piven 1999; Clemens and Minkoff 2004). Yet the idea persists within the field. Too much of this research, however, focuses on the supposedly distinctive characteristics of a particular organizational entity in ways that distract from a core insight of the classic political process model: at certain moments, even highly conservative organizations (churches, civic associations, interest groups, service providers) can engage in mass mobilization. As Cloward and Piven (1999) contend, organizations themselves cannot be relied upon to promote disruption because it calls into question their “legitimacy, resources, and access to centers of power." Participation and even leadership for collective resistance (as is the case for Chicago HTAs) that sprang from “exceptional conditions” over time would not be a sustainable repertoire of action for the organization (172). What this study argues is that it was the Chicago HTAs’ evolving relationships with various state actors over a fifteen-year time period that led these originally conservative and generally non-confrontational organizations to do something that was otherwise challenging to grasp: they embraced and even led a momentous instance of contentious mobilization. As Cloward and Piven observe about a much earlier historical moment that gave rise to the Montgomery bus boycott of 1955: It was one of those infrequent moments when masses of poorer people were ready to mobilize and defy the authorities. What leadership cadres did was suggest a simple way that people could vent their anger and express their hope (172). An important task for analysts, therefore, is to explain the unusual sociopolitical circumstances that lead organizational entities typically wedded to “normal politics” to facilitate surges in mass mobilization.

Vonderlack-Navarro, Rebecca. Immigrant Political Incorporation : The Role of Hometown Associations, LFB

Copyright © 2013. LFB Scholarly Publishing LLC. All rights reserved.

The Bi-national Path to Immigrant Political Incorporation

29

A third modification to this model is the examination of the issue of political conditions in a historical context, where the relationship between the state and a movement involves multiple state actors. The analytic tendency of conventional social movement theory is to study movements as contained within national borders, which stems from a realist understanding of nation-state agency. Realist conceptions of nation states theorize government agency as the maintenance of internal security and order over its territory. In terms of the international arena, realists view nation states as fundamental actors with stronger power than market-driven or supra-state governmental organizations (Pierson 1996; Evans 1995). The model assumes a world where national societies are enclosed entities and political identities are singular, mutually exclusive, and discrete. Realists’ theoretical claims were salient during the 1940s-80s Fordist period when many nation states took a non-interventionist stance in international political affairs and assumed an inward, Keynesian-inspired focus on state regulated economic development. This line of thought conceptualizes social movements as an interaction between state and society that occurs within a sole nation state. Traditional immigrant assimilation and political incorporation models are based on a realist understanding of nation-state agency. They understand immigrant politics as associated with one nation state. The dominant political incorporation models referred to earlier (e.g., Warner and Srole 1945; Handlin 1959) conceive integration processes largely as a linear succession: the more time an immigrant spends in the host society, the higher the likelihood of cutting ties to the homeland and acquiring political loyalty to the new host society. The realist assumption of a bordered nation state applied to HTA social movement activity understands these organizations as similar to mutual aid societies of past generations: a space to maintain culture and traditions and to battle a xenophobic environment, quite possibly with contentious political activity. But, nonetheless, they are organizations that eventually assist in the incorporation processes within the new host society.2 With the onset of post-industrial globalization and mass 2

Mexican immigrant organizations did function much like mutual aid societies during the 1940s up until the early 1980s as they evolved in a political context with relatively little proactive Mexican government outreach to maintain economic and political loyalty to the homeland. Indeed, the democratic rights

Vonderlack-Navarro, Rebecca. Immigrant Political Incorporation : The Role of Hometown Associations, LFB

Copyright © 2013. LFB Scholarly Publishing LLC. All rights reserved.

30

Immigrant Political Incorporation

immigration, however, nation states were no longer viewed as bounded entities. As migrant remittances grew increasingly valuable to various sending states, particularly in the case of Mexico, governments took various actions to cultivate links to their diaspora with an effort to maintain emigrants’ political allegiances. Hence, in contrast to realist assumptions of the state and immigrants’ linear assimilation patterns, the study’s modified political process model challenges the notion that immigrants’ political allegiances are an inevitable linear process easily contained within the host nation. A further complication to the study’s modified political process model, however, is that a country’s state strategies are often far from monolithic. Particularly in the case of Mexico and the U.S., in each society different sets of government officials have pursued divergent migrant-related projects. At certain moments, these divergences become especially striking if we examine the political behavior of national versus state and local officials; at other moments, certain government officials recalibrate their own political interests and take a somewhat different strategic approach, which has implications for migrant organizations on the ground. In order to capture such complex and shifting dynamics, then, it is necessary to develop a framework of analysis that traces the evolving political strategies of multiple government actors over several decades on both sides of the MexicoU.S. border. The modified political process model enables this study to employ a bi-national approach to the complex relationship between of the diaspora and Mexico’s economic dependence on remittances were not of great concern to the Mexican nation state agenda within this time period. Instead, the Mexican government conceived of migrants and their organizations as largely detached from the homeland (Hazan 2006, 85; M.P. Smith and Bakker 2008; Cano and Delano 2007). During the 1900-1930 period, the Mexican diaspora, who left Mexico largely because of political reasons, took interest in Mexico’s revolution and post-war reconstruction efforts. During this period, in contrast, there was interaction between the Mexican government and expatriates within the U.S. By the 1940s, however, migrants tended to be poor rural migrants leaving Mexico for economic reasons. These migrants were not targeted by Mexican state outreach programs with the specific interest of maintaining their economic and political loyalty to the homeland (Hazan 2006).

Vonderlack-Navarro, Rebecca. Immigrant Political Incorporation : The Role of Hometown Associations, LFB

The Bi-national Path to Immigrant Political Incorporation

31

neoliberalizing states and evolving HTA activity. The model brings novel sensitivity to the political conditions that spur migrant mobilization, with particular attention to the influences of political threats. The model highlights how generally conservative organizations (such as Chicago’s confederation of HTAs) can garner political clout “‘outside of normal’ and ‘against normal politics’” (Piven and Cloward 1991, 437). And finally, the modified model not only considers the influence of both Mexico and U.S. state influences on HTA activities, but disaggregates how national versus local government actors can pursue often contradictory migrant-related agendas.

Copyright © 2013. LFB Scholarly Publishing LLC. All rights reserved.

Mexican HTAs’ Bi-national Activism in a Global Era: An Integrated Conceptual Frame The broader conceptual framework for this study employs theoretical insights from three major scholarly literatures—economic restructuring, contemporary state projects, and social mobilization models—as well as from the increasing body of research on the transnational politics of Mexican immigrant organizations. The framework allows the study to give sufficient consideration to the broader historical, political, and economic conditions on both sides of the Mexico-U.S. border that have driven many HTAs to expand beyond their homeland-oriented activities into temporary vehicles of U.S.-focused popular mobilization. The theoretical exploration thus leads us to the study’s main questions: first, why did Chicago’s confederation of HTAs eventually shift from a Mexican-focused to a bi-national, Mexico-U.S.-focused agenda, and how has this shift affected the political activities of the confederation? Second, why did the confederation and its HTA base come to embrace contentious activism, and what have been the impacts of this step for immigration policy and politics for HTAs as organizations, and for immigrant leaders themselves? To answer the study’s focal questions, this project proposes the following claims about the Chicago HTA confederation: First, multiple nation states’ agencies—Mexico and U.S. states, national and local states—would come to influence the activism of the HTA confederation. Nation states, both sending and receiving, are vital to understanding HTAs’ evolving organizational frames and repertoires of action. Not only does each individual nation state “…change the actors, the connections among them, the forms of claims making and

Vonderlack-Navarro, Rebecca. Immigrant Political Incorporation : The Role of Hometown Associations, LFB

Copyright © 2013. LFB Scholarly Publishing LLC. All rights reserved.

32

Immigrant Political Incorporation

the prevailing strategies in contentious politics” (Tarrow 2005, 3), but the long-standing, unequal and shifting interstate dynamic between Mexico and the U.S. also shapes political opportunity structures and immigrant activism. Furthermore, to understand Chicago HTA development, it is necessary to unpack the various state influences. A study of Chicago HTAs’ growing U.S.-based activism must remain sensitive to the separate influences of national versus local politics, especially as the United States’ tendency to download responsibility to the local level can impact how local government actors work to facilitate or constrain immigrant integration (Ellis 2005; Sites 2003). To explore this claim, the study starts by examining the enhanced political legitimacy granted towards Midwestern HTAs by the Mexican government’s diaspora reincorporation programs during the 1990s, and in particular, by Chicago-based consular support. The project continues by investigating the contrasting influences of a threatening post-9/11 U.S. anti-immigrant politics and a quite different—and powerfully legitimating—set of Illinois state-government programs that since 2005 has courted Mexican HTAs as voting blocs. Second, the expanding repertoires of HTA activity would, in turn, transform many of the organizations. As a result of organizational and reportorial changes, many HTAs begin to serve as agents of political incorporation in the U.S. In response to shifting state projects, Chicago HTAs greatly expanded their repertoires of action by growing in size and ambition, coordinating with immigrant rights groups, participating in U.S. immigrant rights protest, and cultivating connections at the U.S. state and local levels. In this process, many reshaped their agendas and priorities to encompass local, national, and transnational concerns. Furthermore, the study concentrates attentively on the reaction of immigrant organizations to the passage of the Sensenbrenner bill by the U.S. House of Representatives in late 2005. The study analyzes how the HTA confederation, CONFEMEX, became one of Chicago’s leading sponsors of the 2006 immigrant rights demonstrations, as well as how the confederation developed closer relations with other immigrant groups and with state and local officials in Illinois. The confederation’s transformation into a vehicle of mobilization would propel its agenda to include both contentious and normative U.S.focused political activities. And third, the study’s focus on the confederated entity, CONFEMEX, remains sensitive to intra-organizational diversity.

Vonderlack-Navarro, Rebecca. Immigrant Political Incorporation : The Role of Hometown Associations, LFB

The Bi-national Path to Immigrant Political Incorporation

33

While HTAs and their confederation over time managed to mobilize within both Mexico and U.S.-focused campaigns, various HTAs and federations would come to serve as arenas of internal contentions between various leaders and between leaders and their base. In particular, by exploring the post-2006 political developments and governmental projects in relation to HTAs’ evolving repertoires of action, I show how CONFEMEX would come to operate as an important interest group and agent of U.S. political incorporation for Chicago’s Mexican immigrant community (though not without also grappling with considerable intra-organizational strains).

Copyright © 2013. LFB Scholarly Publishing LLC. All rights reserved.

Research Strategies and Study Design This multi-method case study focuses on the political involvements of Chicago’s Mexican hometown associations Included within the study are three research strategies to explore the emergence and development of CONFEMEX, Chicago’s HTA confederation (relates to Creswell 1997, 61-64, 87, 109-137; Klandermans and Staggenborg 2002, ixxviii).3 The first strategy provided a reconfiguration of the relationship between political economy Mexico-U.S. immigration, and state restructuring in order to conceptualize the historical conditions that spurred Chicago HTAs’ evolution within the neoliberal transformations of Mexico and the U.S., with special attention on Chicago developments. It seeks to show that from the late 1970s to 2000, two trends emerged: (1) pressures for structural adjustment and economic transformation in Mexico caused economic polarization, out-migration, and the emergence of emigrant remittances as an integral source of the country’s financial livelihood; along with this emigrant outreach initiatives—especially to HTAs—emerged to secure their economic and political loyalty to the homeland (P. Smith 1996; Wise 2006; 3

Klandermans and Staggenborg’s edited volume Methods of Social Movement Research (2002) discusses the usefulness of conducting multiple methods within studies of social movements as a means to include varying perspectives into their emergence and development. They also point to the appropriateness of in-depth interviews “in developing theoretical ideas about complicated processes” (xv). Case studies, in general, are especially useful for the reconstruction of organizational developments and social movement processes over time.

Vonderlack-Navarro, Rebecca. Immigrant Political Incorporation : The Role of Hometown Associations, LFB

Copyright © 2013. LFB Scholarly Publishing LLC. All rights reserved.

34

Immigrant Political Incorporation

Massey et al. 2002; Goldring 2002; M.P. Smith and Bakker 2008); (2) the United State’s vast demand for a flexible labor force was chiefly satisfied by an ever-increasing, undocumented immigrant population under conditions of increasingly restrictive immigrant legislation culminating in an intensified post-NAFTA integration of the U.S. and Mexico economies (Waldinger 2001; Peck and Theodore 2001; Massey et al. 2002; Bluestone and Harrison 2000; Peck 2004; P. Smith 1996). It shows how the neoliberal economic climate gradually altered the political opportunity structures in both Mexico and the U.S. encouraging HTAs to respond with various types of political action— both contentious and normative political activity (McAdam et al. 2001; Nicholls and Beaumont 2004). This historical investigation thus illustrates the interactive nature between political-economic restructuring and immigrant organizational responses. The second research strategy within the case study was to reconstruct a historical account of HTAs, state-level federations, and confederation development(s) specifically in Chicago, with particular emphasis on developments from the 1990s to 2005. Through analysis of historical archives (e.g., protest flyers, federation pamphlets, various meeting minutes, Chicago Mexican consular publications and records, and newspaper archives) the study could identify significant moments of change in HTA agendas and repertoires and thereby highlight conditions under which these moments emerged and how CONFEMEX responded. The third research strategy explored recent organizational developments from 2005 to 2008 through two qualitative methods: two years of direct participant observation within the leadership circles of CONFEMEX and key informant interviews. The two years of direct participant observation within the leadership circles of CONFEMEX (June 2005 to June 2007, with less frequent observations up until the November 2008 elections in the U.S.) provided access to a momentous time period of CONFEMEX organizing. This allowed an analysis of CONFEMEX’s external relations with other Chicago immigrant activists and politicians to launch the mobilizations, along with how they related internally to mobilize their base. Participant observation was also conducted for a shorter time period (September 2005 to December 2006) with the Chicago chapter of the National Alliance for Latin American and Caribbean Communities (NALACC). NALACC, a cross-border immigrant rights organization, represented not only

Vonderlack-Navarro, Rebecca. Immigrant Political Incorporation : The Role of Hometown Associations, LFB

Copyright © 2013. LFB Scholarly Publishing LLC. All rights reserved.

The Bi-national Path to Immigrant Political Incorporation

35

CONFEMEX but more than 85 other Latino immigrant groups based in the U.S. and Latin America concerned with transnational immigration issues. CONFEMEX was one of the co-founding members of NALACC, and certain Chicago federation leaders participated within NALACC’s national leadership. Field activities included note-taking at monthly CONFEMEX and NALACC meetings, volunteering at numerous transnational and immigrant-focused events, observing communications through e-mail listservs of both organizations, and participating in public demonstrations and HTA festivals. The various meetings and activities attended included bimonthly meetings between CONFEMEX leaders and consular officials, planning meetings of various homeland-oriented festivals, protest demonstrations, a diverse array of cultural events (rodeos, beauty contests, dance and music celebrations, artistic exhibitions), development projects in Mexico, community voting in Mexican elections, and CONFEMEX’s internal voting procedures. The direct participant observation made it possible to analyze how CONFEMEX made its decisions. As a volunteer organization with a formal leadership structure, the first form of decision-making established statues, code of processes, and monthly meetings, meaning many decisions were made through normative majority-wins voting. The second form of decision-making emerged through an informal practice of consensus-building whereby certain leaders would lobby other leaders, generally behind-the-scenes, to conform to their agenda. This second form of informal decision-making—often quick and reactive to arising political conditions—made field observations a crucial form of data collection as it provided direct access to informal conversations that illuminated various leader alliances and interpersonal dramas or conflicts. The participant observation facilitated the analysis of evolving leadership dynamics in response to the broader political environment and potential arenas of contention between leaders. Frankenberg (1991) describes the usefulness of participant observation: “It gives you an idea of the interaction and the interrelationships of social relations in a group, and a sense of process in which you cannot get in any other way” (52). The study relied on two types of participant observation as defined by Herbert Gans (1991): research participant and total researcher. The research participant “participates in a social situation but is personally only partially involved, so that he can function as a

Vonderlack-Navarro, Rebecca. Immigrant Political Incorporation : The Role of Hometown Associations, LFB

Copyright © 2013. LFB Scholarly Publishing LLC. All rights reserved.

36

Immigrant Political Incorporation

researcher” (54). This often meant that while at a festival, protest, or indepth interview, I would maintain my researcher role by often guiding conversation in a way that it related to my study’s interest. The second role, that of total researcher, “observes without any personal involvement in the situation under study” (54). This is also referred to as the “passive observer” and reflects my strategy of note-taking during monthly meetings. The study also included 31 key informant interviews conducted from May 2008 to February 2009 with past and present Chicago hometown federation leaders, government officials from Mexico (Chicago-based Mexican Consular Officials), and officials and activists in the U.S. (an Illinois Official of Blagojevich’s Office of New Americans Policy and Advocacy, local immigrant activists, and Illinois NGO leaders) that interact with CONFEMEX (See Appendix 1 for description of interview subjects). The use of semi-structured interviews within social movement research is especially helpful for the “exploration, discovery, and interpretation of complex social events and processes” (Blee and Taylor 2002, 93). All of the federation leaders interviewed had previously or were currently serving on the executive committees of their federation, and the interviews were inclusive of all ten of the federations that were at one point in time part of CONFEMEX: Aguas Calientes, Chihuahua, Durango, Michoacán, Jalisco, Hidalgo, Zacatecas, Guanajuato, Guerrero, and Oaxaca. The other interviewees were selected because of their significant involvement with Chicago HTA developments over the twenty-year time period. A limitation to this case study is that participant observation and interviews were not conducted with the sizable base of HTAs in Chicago and the broader Midwest. Because of the focus on the leadership circles of CONFEMEX, one could argue that the viewpoint of the rank-and-file were not fairly represented within the study and that the analysis was biased towards federation leaders who tend to have a better socioeconomic position and legal status here in the U.S. than their member base. While a valid critique, the federation leadership in Chicago has been much more consistent than their base membership, whose informal structures can cause their base to wax and wane in participation. Many of the leaders studied had been part of their HTAs and federation since they began, providing a longitudinal window into how the organizations grew and changed over time.

Vonderlack-Navarro, Rebecca. Immigrant Political Incorporation : The Role of Hometown Associations, LFB

Copyright © 2013. LFB Scholarly Publishing LLC. All rights reserved.

The Bi-national Path to Immigrant Political Incorporation

37

Moreover, because of the relative stability of federation leadership, they have been the direct targets of various state projects over their organizational evolution due to their ability to disseminate information and to generate volunteers for various events, a fact that was time and again validated by other state and community leaders. By focusing on Chicago’s HTA leadership confederation, the study is still able to talk about the base as understood by CONFEMEX leaders and offers a unique perspective by providing one of the only research accounts of how multiple federations have coalesced within one U.S. locality to fight for change in both Mexico and the U.S. The case study of CONFEMEX provides what Snow and Trom (2002) refer to as a “critical case,” where the focus of the study provides a unique opportunity for analyzing with great detail relevant theoretical and empirical concerns (158). As such, the analysis of CONFEMEX offers what is underrepresented within the immigration literature: how using the lens of a social movement might better inform how we think of hometown federations and various state-migrant projects that have advanced on both sides of the border. This not only deepens our understanding of this unique HTA confederation and its agency in contesting or negotiating broader political circumstances, but also broadens our understanding of how nation states manage their emigrant/immigrant politics. Overall, the three methodological strategies within the case study complement each other, facilitate triangulation, and provide the means for adequately addressing the study’s main questions (Creswell 1997; Klandermans and Staggenborg 2002; Blee and Taylor 2002). First, why did CONFEMEX eventually shift from a Mexican-focused to a binational, Mexico-U.S.-focused agenda, and how has this shift affected the political activities of the confederation? Second, why did CONFEMEX and its HTA base come to embrace contentious activism and what has been the impact of this step for immigration policy and politics, for HTAs as organizations, and for immigrant leaders themselves? The overview of the larger Mexico-U.S. political economy spurring Mexican immigration provides the necessary context for understanding Chicago HTAs’ evolution over the past twenty years. This background allows for the participant observation and in-depth interview portion to provide close analytic attention to particular key moments in the 2005 and 2006 time period and the resulting leadership developments thereafter. This will clarify how the marches and

Vonderlack-Navarro, Rebecca. Immigrant Political Incorporation : The Role of Hometown Associations, LFB

38

Immigrant Political Incorporation

Copyright © 2013. LFB Scholarly Publishing LLC. All rights reserved.

responses by Mexican and U.S. government officials have promoted many HTAs’ dual focus on both U.S. and Mexican-oriented concerns.

Vonderlack-Navarro, Rebecca. Immigrant Political Incorporation : The Role of Hometown Associations, LFB

CHAPTER 2

Copyright © 2013. LFB Scholarly Publishing LLC. All rights reserved.

Mexico Unbound: Chicago’s HTA Growth through Early 2001

Chicago’s hometown associations proliferated throughout the 1990s. As a result of steady migration flows to the city and increased attention from multiple levels of the Mexican government, HTAs significantly expanded in size and purpose. By the end of the decade, HTAs were not simply passive vehicles for Mexico’s state projects; rather, they exerted their own independence from the Mexican government and rose to become important political agents in their own right. Scholars have given considerable attention to the substantial growth of HTAs throughout the U.S. as a primary example of how the Mexican state has aimed to institutionalize the diaspora’s transnational social and political practices (Goldring 2002). Robert Smith (1998) and Luin Goldring (1998), for example, highlight the cross-border political practices conducted through hometown clubs that contributed to the development of translocal communities. Their work draws attention to Mexico’s transforming state-emigrant agenda as various government officials and programs strategically reached out to their diaspora in the U.S. to encourage their organization into HTAs and foster their participation within public works projects, cultural events, and at times, political campaigns. Thus, HTAs have come to be largely conceptualized as new agents within Mexico’s de-territorialized nation state formation (M.P. Smith and Guarnizo 1998). That is to say, within this contemporary era of globalization and Mexico’s democratization, migrant HTAs grew to be more than co-opted state-civil society partners within Mexico’s corporatist machine. Indeed they negotiated a 39

Vonderlack-Navarro, Rebecca. Immigrant Political Incorporation : The Role of Hometown Associations, LFB

Copyright © 2013. LFB Scholarly Publishing LLC. All rights reserved.

40

Immigrant Political Incorporation

certain amount of leverage and claims-making within Mexican politics, particularly at the translocal level, constructing communities, transnational identities, and political agencies that span nation-state borders (R.C. Smith 1998, 2006; Goldring 2002). Michael Peter Smith and Matt Bakker (2008) further the analysis of HTA expansion by drawing noteworthy attention to the specific context of Mexico’s political and economic neoliberal transformation. Their work highlights historical, sociocultural, and institutional factors that encouraged the Mexican state to form unparalleled state-emigrant partnerships with HTAs. In turn, HTAs and their broader organizations have increased their own agency within specific Mexican political spaces beyond translocal levels, transforming into significant interest groups and electoral constituencies advocating for national-level absentee voting legislation. These various studies of how migrants participate in cross-border political spaces and negotiating transnational citizenship practices serve as an important prelude to a Chicago-focused case study of HTA developments. The work helps to understand how Chicago’s HTAs greatly proliferated over the course of the 1990s as a result of broad political and economic changes in Mexico that caused Mexican governmental officials to build diaspora organizations in and around the city to fit their various neoliberalizing state interests. In addition, an analysis of Chicago HTAs’ initial growth offers a useful critique to traditional assimilationist understandings of immigrants’ political incorporation, as Chicago HTAs were not the target of local political integration projects or typical immigrant machine politics. Rather, they grew in number and ambition through their interplay with the Mexican state. There remains a lack of understanding, however, as to how various HTAs and federations developed and came to work together within Chicago. Chicago has long been a principal target for the Mexican state’s migrant-reincorporation projects, yet has received relatively little scholarly attention. HTA research has largely analyzed organizational developments in California and New York with scant attention to how Mexican state-migrant relations have functioned and developed within other U.S. localities. This case study of Chicago HTA and federation growth differs from the dominant HTA literature in two distinct ways. First, in order to understand Chicago HTAs’ extensive evolution during the 1990s, attention is given to Chicago’s Mexican consular

Vonderlack-Navarro, Rebecca. Immigrant Political Incorporation : The Role of Hometown Associations, LFB

Copyright © 2013. LFB Scholarly Publishing LLC. All rights reserved.

Mexico Unbound: Chicago's HTA Growth

41

programming, which served as an important vehicle to channel the emerging political opportunity structure ushered in by Mexico’s neoliberal revolution. Even while migrants actively contested consular control over their organizational activities, this local semi-autonomous apparatus of the Mexican state played an important function in encouraging Chicago HTA growth and unity. Early access to the Mexican state during this time period cultivated a considerable sense of political efficacy within the emerging organizations. HTAs developed a norm of political engagement through negotiating agendas and projects with Mexican authorities. As a consequence, many HTA leaders gained an important level of confidence when it came to participating in political actions. Second, Chicago HTA and federation leaders not only negotiated within Mexico’s growing state projects, but they garnered significant political agency when they pushed back against the Mexican state. By the late 1990s, HTA leaders united together with other local activists to resist the Mexican national government’s imposition of a car deposit increase on vehicles crossing the MexicoU.S. border. Out of their brief defiance, a new and increasing sense of political agency to work together outside of government control was born. Thus we begin to understand how Chicago’s HTAs and federations had the potential to be more than mere third-sector voluntary organizations, as they briefly embraced protest activity against what they perceived as an unjust political threat from the Mexican state. The chapter begins with an overview of the neoliberal restructurings in Mexico, the U.S., and Chicago from the 1970s through 1990s. The account provides a historical context for the changing Mexico and U.S. governance strategies and how they would eventually come to relate to migrant HTAs. Next, the chapter explores early Chicago HTA developments and growing political agency from the late 1980s through early 2001. The analysis investigates the organizations’ emerging political capital within Mexican politics, a resource they would later come to use within U.S. politics. Neoliberal States and New State-Migrant Agendas The emergence and growth of Chicago’s HTAs occurred within a specific context of extensive transformation in the political economies of the United States and Mexico from the 1970s forward. The multi-

Vonderlack-Navarro, Rebecca. Immigrant Political Incorporation : The Role of Hometown Associations, LFB

42

Immigrant Political Incorporation

Copyright © 2013. LFB Scholarly Publishing LLC. All rights reserved.

decade restructuring period resulted in new state projects with various political implications for emigrant/immigrant populations residing in large U.S. cities such as Chicago. By the late 1980s and into the 1990s, organized HTAs grew to become focal components of Mexico’s nationbuilding efforts. Over the course of the decade, as a result of extensive political attention, HTAs would themselves begin to flex their political muscle and define their agendas in new ways. U.S. Neoliberal Restructuring. Following the international economic crisis of the 1970s, service production employing low-wage immigrant labor became one of the fastest-growing sectors of an increasingly hourglass-shaped U.S. economy. The popular use of immigrant contingent workers, especially predominant within newly developing urban service sectors, was accompanied by the outsourcing of manufacturing, attacks on organized labor, and increased economic polarization within the U.S. Along with the political and economic restructuring spearheaded by the Ronald Reagan and George H. Bush presidential eras, migration flows escalated during the 1980s, with the undocumented population from Mexico estimated between two and four million by the end of the decade (Waldinger and Lee 2001). In the lower reaches of the labor market, Mexican immigrant workers in particular came to dominate a range of employment niches—from domestics to bus boys to landscapers—in metropolitan regions such as Los Angeles and Chicago (Lim 2001; Rosenfeld and Tienda 1999; Peck and Theodore 2001; Massey et al. 2002).4

4

Mexican immigration had spread to new destination areas by the late 1980s, and this would continue to be a significant urban trend. See Durand, Massey, Charvet (2000) for an overview of how the geography of Mexican immigration to the U.S. significantly shifted during the late 1980s. While metropolises continued to be a great attraction for Mexican newcomers (particularly Los Angeles, Chicago, Houston and Phoenix), immigration would also grow in rural, agricultural areas. Florida, Georgia, Idaho, Minnesota, Nevada, New York, New Jersey, North Carolina, Oregon and Utah became new destination states. By the mid-1990s, however, single, male, working-age Mexican migrants initially drawn to U.S. agricultural industries quickly headed for better-paying, urban employment opportunities. In

Vonderlack-Navarro, Rebecca. Immigrant Political Incorporation : The Role of Hometown Associations, LFB

Copyright © 2013. LFB Scholarly Publishing LLC. All rights reserved.

Mexico Unbound: Chicago's HTA Growth

43

While migrant labor flowed from Mexico to the U.S., immigrant legislation from 1986 onward was designed to inhibit the flow of undocumented immigrants. In particular, the 1986 Immigration Reform and Control Act (IRCA) became the first U.S. policy primarily directed at preventing undocumented immigration (DeGenova 2005; Zolberg 2006). Part of IRCA included an amnesty provision to an estimated three million undocumented immigrants in the United States; the majority (81 percent) was of Mexican origin (Zolberg 2006).5 While the consequences were unintended, IRCA (and other immigrant-related policies that followed) had several unforeseen outcomes: rapid expansion of undocumented Mexican laborers in the informal economy; an overall drop in wages; increased income polarization and worsened U.S. labor market conditions; and large sums of wasted government funding targeted at security and border control (Massey et al. 2002). Punitive immigrant legislation and undocumented immigrant flow increased throughout the 1990s. The U.S. federal government began the decade by instituting the Immigration Act of 1990, which included a new cap on migrants petitioning for family reunification, a new visa program for countries with low sending rates (i.e., not including Mexico), and increased border patrol measures (DeGenova 2005).6 Despite such legislation, Mexican immigration continued to rise and by the mid-1990s, Mexicans constituted 14 percent of U.S. legal migration and 40 percent of undocumented migration (Zolberg 2006). At the height of the neoliberal revolution, U.S. President Clinton authorized the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) in 1994 with Mexico and Canada. While this extensive trade liberalization measure promoted further international market integration, free flows of capital, addition, the growing numbers of urban-bound, male migrants met with a growing number of female migrants headed towards cities as well. 5 The legislation also fortified border patrol measures, strengthened the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS), created sanctions for employers who hired undocumented immigrants and an H-2 temporary worker program for agricultural production, a measure strongly pushed by farm lobbies. 6 The law enhanced deportation regulations, limited due process rights, and took the granting of citizenship rights outside of the court’s jurisdiction and limited it to the federal office of the attorney general.

Vonderlack-Navarro, Rebecca. Immigrant Political Incorporation : The Role of Hometown Associations, LFB

Copyright © 2013. LFB Scholarly Publishing LLC. All rights reserved.

44

Immigrant Political Incorporation

and increased access for foreign direct investments, it paradoxically did not address the flow of labor that the agreement would further stimulate (Massey et al. 2002). By 1996, Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) estimates indicated that the number of undocumented immigrants in the U.S. was between 4.6 and 5.4 million. Immigration from Mexico comprised half of all undocumented flows (Waldinger and Lee 2001). Soon after the U.S. moved towards economic integration with its southern neighbor, the U.S. government continued to support efforts to militarize the border and limit the rights of newcomers. The Personal Responsibility, Work Opportunity, and Medicaid Restructuring Act (PRWOMRA) of 1996 aimed to hinder undocumented immigrants from means-tested and social security programs, and more extensively, limit accessibility for legal immigrants (Massey et al. 2002). The law was soon followed by the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act (IIRIRA) of 1996, which focused largely on expanding enforcement, toughening sponsorship regulations and civil and criminal consequences for those who entered the country illegally, as well as limiting the rights of the undocumented in their ability to question INS decisions and deportations in federal court (Zolberg 2006). The combination of NAFTA, which intensified the economic integration of the U.S. and Mexico and increased their asymmetrical interdependence, and the restrictive legislation caused undocumented migration streams to escalate. By the early 2000s, there were more undocumented immigrants in the U.S. than documented, and more than half of the undocumented immigrants came from Mexico (Fry 2006). In an evolving, contradictory political context, Mexican immigrants in particular found themselves scapegoats for America’s ongoing economic problems while the legalization of their status was increasingly supported by business elites. Latino communities also found themselves selectively targeted with nativist backlash or as attractive voting blocs by both Democratic and Republican political strategists (Zolberg 2006; Ellis 2005). In line with national trends, Chicago experienced its own multidecade restructuring post-1970s. The political and economic changes resulted in a segmented labor market where Mexican immigrants came to occupy a central position in the city’s low-end labor supply. Corporate restructuring and deindustrialization processes, the emergence of the city’s high-tech service sector economy, and the predominant use of temporary migrant labor within downgraded

Vonderlack-Navarro, Rebecca. Immigrant Political Incorporation : The Role of Hometown Associations, LFB

Copyright © 2013. LFB Scholarly Publishing LLC. All rights reserved.

Mexico Unbound: Chicago's HTA Growth

45

manufacturing, manual labor, and informal labor markets all contributed to the extensive escalation of the city’s Mexican immigrant population, which mushroomed to six times its former size (Squires et al. 1987; DeGenova 2005; Peck and Theodore 2001; Tienda and Raijman 2000). By 2000, Chicago had the second largest urban concentration of Mexican immigrants after Los Angeles: 1.1 million in the greater Chicago area and 625,000 within the city, comprising 18.3 percent of the city’s total population (DeGenova 2005). The great multi-decade surge of Mexican immigrants transformed Chicago. In particular, the immense enlargement in Chicago’s Mexican immigrant population was heavily concentrated in specific Chicago neighborhoods (DeGenova 2005; Squires et al., 1987). Chicago’s lower west side—Pilsen (La Dieciocho or 18th Street) and South Lawndale (La Villita or Little Village)—from 1960 to 1990 experienced great spikes in their Mexican immigrant population growing from 7,000 to 83,000, reaching 101,000 by 1990. Within Pilsen and Little Village, Mexican immigrants comprised 92 percent of the Latino population. Mexican immigration also occurred in Chicago’s historically Puerto Rican neighborhoods (Humboldt Park, West Town, and Logan Square) where between 1970 and 1980 the population quadrupled in size. By 1990, Mexicans equaled the number of Puerto Ricans in these neighborhoods, and by 2000 Mexicans began to demographically dominate. Beyond Chicago, the entire state of Illinois experienced a surge in Mexican newcomers. Following the relocation of various downgraded manufacturing industries, Mexican immigration began to heavily concentrate within various Chicago suburbs (coming from both the city and straight from Mexico). Between 1970 and 1980, the suburban Mexican immigrant population quadrupled in size from 25,555 to 113,000. By 2000, it would quadruple again to 461,000 (DeGenova 2005). As a result of the significant demographic rise of Mexican immigrants, migrants’ social and political integration would eventually become of great concern to both city and state-level officials. Chicago’s growing Mexican immigrant community would also influence local politics. Various Latino immigrant political constituencies—particularly Mexican immigrants—during the 1980s and 1990s would unite into an important army of political loyalists in

Vonderlack-Navarro, Rebecca. Immigrant Political Incorporation : The Role of Hometown Associations, LFB

46

Immigrant Political Incorporation

support of Chicago’s powerful political machine (Lutton 1998).7 Their rise to political power, however, was also accompanied with the 1990s’ surge of new arrivals, a population that was largely undocumented and marginalized from the city’s formal political channels. Parallel to these socio-demographic and political changes, hometown clubs became accessible and alternative organizations of social support for many recently arrived Mexican immigrants. While predominantly focused on Mexico throughout the decade, their early mobilization set the stage for their later recognition by local and state-level politicians in Illinois who came to see HTAs’ potential as state-society partners and voting constituencies now that Mexican immigration had expanded from a city- to a state-wide concern.

Copyright © 2013. LFB Scholarly Publishing LLC. All rights reserved.

Mexico’s Neoliberal Restructuring. In the interim, as the U.S. and its large urban centers dramatically changed, Mexico’s post-1970s neoliberal revolution was also set in motion. The drastic changes led to Mexico’s increased dependence on out-migration and remittance flows as the twin apparatuses of national income generation and the maintenance of political security. Propelled by the international prioritization of “structural adjustment” policies, Mexico began to actively support trade liberalization and export-led 7

Long before the contemporary emergence of HTAs, Chicago was an important destination for Mexican immigrants and a hotbed for their political mobilization. Despite their early arrival (as early as the 1900s), it would not be until the 1980s that Chicago’s Mexican immigrant community would begin to create formal influence within Chicago’s urban political scene. Due to its continued population growth, by the 1990s the Mexican immigrant community became a highly regarded electoral constituency. Propelled by Richard M. Daley (1989-present), “the country’s longest-serving big-city mayor,” concerted efforts were made to appeal to Mexican voters within his campaigns (Bernstein 2008, 10). Under a new era of neoliberalism, state devolution, and urban managerialism, Daley was well aware of the increasing importance of Latino (mainly Mexican and Puerto Rican) community-based leaders and the need to cultivate their ties to the state in order to support his ambitious gentrification agenda. By the early 2000s, as the Mexican immigrant population and contemporary HTAs continued to expand, Daley and other municipal and state leaders were on the lookout for Mexican immigrant political allies and potential voting constituencies.

Vonderlack-Navarro, Rebecca. Immigrant Political Incorporation : The Role of Hometown Associations, LFB

Copyright © 2013. LFB Scholarly Publishing LLC. All rights reserved.

Mexico Unbound: Chicago's HTA Growth

47

production over the course of three decades, which encouraged the privatization of various state projects, an upsurge of maquilladora industrial activity, heightened levels of unemployment, and ultimately, an escalation of out-migration (Massey et al. 2002; P.Smith 1996; Wise 2006; Morton 2003; Fairbrother 2007). Mexico’s response to an altering international economy was accompanied by a remarkable shift in the political establishment. The long-standing Partido Revolucionario Institucional (PRI), which had politically dominated national and local politics since the early twentieth century, continued to govern authoritatively moving into the 1980s. The single-party regime continued to utilize import substitution industrialization strategies as a means to promote and protect domestic manufacturing sectors. The Keynesian-inspired strategy included protectionist trade policies and public sector subsidies that progressively relied on deficit spending (McMicheal 2004; Massey et al. 2002; Morton 2003). Despite rising disapproval from businessman with links to international trade who were unhappy with the vast public sector expansion, the PRI sustained its political rule and social order through corporatist-style governance structures. Under this system, various sectors of Mexican society—working and middle-class, domestic industrialists, peasants and organized labor—were compensated for voter loyalty and politically incorporated by PRI patronage schemes (Morton 2003). Threats to the PRI’s control would become ever more apparent with the debt crisis of the early 1980s. As a result of the economic turmoil, international agencies (such as the International Monetary Fund, the World Bank, and private foreign lenders) began to acquire political authority over their statist-nationalist counterparts, as did elite technocrats within Mexico’s political bureaucracy who mobilized domestically. Throughout the decade, a new national economic development strategy took precedence that focused on cutbacks in public spending, agrarian reforms, measures to deter inflation and monitor the country’s deficit, privatizing state-owned enterprises, dismantling trade tariffs and barriers to foreign investment, and promoting export-led development (Fairbrother 2007; Morton 2003; P. Smith, 1996; Massey et al. 2002). Mired in economic instability and facing both external and internal pressures for reform, PRI Mexican President Carlos Salinas de Gotari (1988-1994), a Harvard-educated technocrat, fully embraced global economic restructuring measures. His

Vonderlack-Navarro, Rebecca. Immigrant Political Incorporation : The Role of Hometown Associations, LFB

Copyright © 2013. LFB Scholarly Publishing LLC. All rights reserved.

48

Immigrant Political Incorporation

modernization agenda included propelling a multi-year struggle to marshal domestic business groups in support of free trade, and he soon began trade liberalization negotiations with the U.S. and Canada, which resulted in NAFTA in 1994 (Fairbrother 2007). Among the many outcomes of the far-reaching neoliberal changes, the economic destabilization and fiscal austerity measures implemented during this time period intensified Mexico’s economic polarization, further spurring out-migration from its poorest sectors and deepening the country’s growing dependence on labor export and return remittance flows (Wise 2006). Meanwhile, by the mid-1990s, in reaction to the growing political competition, the PRI attempted to regain its plummeting authority through a series of measures either strengthening pre-existing state-society alliances or creating them. This involved: 1) fortifying ties between business elites and bureaucratic technocrats who had much to gain through free market development measures; 2) decentralizating state welfare funds (particularly through its National Solidarity Program) within poor urban and rural sectors to pacify potential opposition to the PRI’s modernization agenda (Fairbrother 2007; Nash and Kovic 1996; Morton 2003); and, 3) establishing an unprecedented state-emigrant reincorporation agenda that specifically targeted emigrant HTAs in the U.S. as resources for collective remittances to subsidize government development projects and provide potential political influence. Political party opposition to the PRI also grew from both the left, Partido Revolucionario Democratico (PRD), and the right, Partido Accion Nacional (PAN), which served to disassemble the patronage governance structures of the PRI. By the end of the decade, it was evident the Mexican state had shifted into a multipartisan democracy with the election of PAN presidential candidate Vicente Fox in 2000 (Goldring 2002; M.P. Smith and Bakker 2008).8 8

Mexican state efforts to engage its diaspora began as early as the Mexican Revolution of 1910. Alarmed by the country's underpopulation, the government initiated efforts to foster repatriation and stop labor emigration. Labor out-migration became formalized again under the Bracero Program meant to aid in U.S. labor shortages. The 1970s witnessed some growth in consular protection, the promotion of Mexican cultural centers within the U.S., and attention towards the Chicano movement and migrant rights. These diasporic inclusion precursors, however, would change dramatically with the escalating economic and political importance of Mexican emigrants and their

Vonderlack-Navarro, Rebecca. Immigrant Political Incorporation : The Role of Hometown Associations, LFB

Mexico Unbound: Chicago's HTA Growth

49

Overall, the sweeping economic changes that took place in both Mexico and the U.S. post-1970s onward led to new state projects that would come to have an important impact on emigrant/immigrant organizations. More specifically in Chicago from the late 1980s to early 2001, the Mexican state would revamp its diaspora-reincorporation programs within the city, fueling local HTA organization-building efforts and granting HTA leaders a growing sense of political legitimacy. As a result, emerging migrant leaders would begin to create their own influential voice within various Mexican-related statemigrant projects.

Copyright © 2013. LFB Scholarly Publishing LLC. All rights reserved.

Expansion of Chicago’s HTAs and Their Emerging Political Autonomy Chicago’s HTAs were not always important components of Mexico’s neoliberal projects. The immigrant associations emerged as early as the 1960s as important venues of informal social and cultural support with fellow paisanos (countrymen) who at times fundraised to support development projects in their hometowns. Up until the 1980s, the clubs largely remained outside the purview of either Mexico or U.S. state interests. With the expansion of migration to the U.S., the passage of IRCA (which granted a large number of geographically concentrated immigrants in Chicago legal status), and the increasing importance of remittances to economic life in many Mexican pueblos, immigrant HTAs began to receive attention from Mexican political elites as significant resources of financial and political support. By the late 1980s and through the 1990s, the Mexican government initiated various outreach efforts through its consular offices to immigrant HTAs to facilitate their growth, spur their coalescence into broader state-level federations, and expand their philanthropic community-development projects in hometowns in Mexico (Goldring 2002; Chicago Mexican Consular materials 1999; Gomez and Aguilar 2005).9 By the end of the remittances, which ushered in an overhaul of expatriate programming and policies (Laglagaron 2010). 9 Aware that some clubs were providing numerous benefits to their hometowns, including electrification, school construction, and other infrastructure projects, such clubs began to receive public recognition from the Chicago Mexican consulate as early as 1987 as a means to further cultivate connections to their

Vonderlack-Navarro, Rebecca. Immigrant Political Incorporation : The Role of Hometown Associations, LFB

Copyright © 2013. LFB Scholarly Publishing LLC. All rights reserved.

50

Immigrant Political Incorporation

1990s, organizations that had begun the decade looking very much like mutual aid societies of an earlier era would be recognized as significant players in Mexico’s domestic politics. Mexico’s political party rivalries played a significant role in early steps to link Chicago’s migrants to the homeland. Keenly aware of Chicago’s growing immigrant community and their political potential, the left-of-center PRD presidential candidate of Mexico, Cuauhtémoc Cardenas, campaigned in Chicago in 1988, re-igniting the discussion among immigrants concerned with dual-nationality and absentee voting rights in Mexico (Fox 2005).10 By the early 1990s, Chicago migrant activists began to mobilize and educate themselves on the legalities of absentee voting. Seeing an opportunity to court new voting constituencies with emigrants across the border, both the National Action Party (PAN) and the Revolutionary Democratic Party (PRD) intensified their ties with the diaspora that same year, promoting the protection of emigrants’ rights (Chicago Consular Materials 1999). By 1994, more than 800 local migrants in Chicago held symbolic elections for the Cardenas-Salinas presidential campaign, illustrating their growing organizational savvy and sustained political interest in their homeland (elections were held in Chicago, Texas, and California). A feature propelling Chicago’s eventual influential role in the Vote from Abroad movement was that all main Mexican political party activists— representing PRI, PRD, and PAN—agreed to set aside their ideological differences in order to work together in the coordination of the symbolic elections, forming a collective voice in advocating for voting

homeland, including clubs Almealco and El Postero both from the state of Guerrero (which lead in early club formation in Chicago), along with club Ciudad Hidalgo from the state of Michoacán (Chicago consular materials 1999). Just a year after the passing of the 1986 IRCA and with a large number of geographically concentrated Chicago immigrants granted legal status, Mexican politicians increasingly began to view the U.S.’s Mexican diaspora community in Chicago as a potentially important resource for Mexico. 10 Some local Mexican political party activists claim migrants were discussing absentee voting rights as early as 1982 before the PRD campaign, but the conversation had greatly intensified by 1988 (Interview with Chicago emigrant Vote from Abroad activist, April 18, 2009, Chicago, IL).

Vonderlack-Navarro, Rebecca. Immigrant Political Incorporation : The Role of Hometown Associations, LFB

.

Copyright © 2013. LFB Scholarly Publishing LLC. All rights reserved.

Mexico Unbound: Chicago's HTA Growth

51

rights. Chicago’s unity made it a considerable force within the movement.11 Mexican President Carlos Salinas de Gortari (1988-1994), whose election was very much contested, visited Chicago in the early 1990s to promote Mexican national interests with the growing emigrant community. His visit was arguably driven by the threat of Cardenas’ strategic outreach and political popularity with the ever-growing diaspora, as well as migrants’ enhanced political organizing capacities. Chicago migrant leaders claimed Salinas followed the same U.S.-city route conducted by Cardenas as a means to court the growing political allegiance of Chicago’s Mexican diaspora. Salinas’ Chicago visit proved beneficial to his evolving agenda of combining neoliberal reform with emigrant outreach initiatives as he visited Chicago business leaders to galvanize support for NAFTA while also creating consulate programs to bolster migrants’ political, cultural, and economic loyalty (Fox 2005; DeGenova, 2005; M.P. Smith and Bakker 2008; Gzesh 2007). Not coincidentally, around this time the Chicago Mexican consulate’s Program for Mexican Communities Abroad, PCME (el Programa de Comunidades Mexicanos en el Exterior), was established to promote cultural events to enhance Mexican identity, cultivate sporting and business initiatives, stimulate migrant network ties and organizational developments within Chicago, and help coordinate the steady flow of visits by Mexican government officials and state governors (Mexican consular materials 1999; Gomez and Aguilar 2005). The mounting importance of state-migrant collaborations would grow during the 1990s as they were continually supported by the Ernesto Zedillo administration (1994-2000). As a result, the Chicago Mexican Consulate and its diaspora-focused PCME program continued to prosper. This local extension of the Mexican state encouraged various HTAs in Chicago to participate in experimental matching programs (in conjunction with various levels of the Mexican government) geared towards community development in their hometowns. Pilot projects initiated with a one-for-one (uno-por-uno) between Zacatecan HTAs and the Zacatecan state government, 11

In-depth interviews with PRD activist October 19, 2008; Michoacán leader May 15, 2008; IME Coordinator June 8, 2008 and December 7, 2008 all in Chicago, IL.

Vonderlack-Navarro, Rebecca. Immigrant Political Incorporation : The Role of Hometown Associations, LFB

Copyright © 2013. LFB Scholarly Publishing LLC. All rights reserved.

52

Immigrant Political Incorporation

whereby every dollar a club provided for development was matched by a dollar from the Zacatecan state government.12 These initiatives evolved into the 3x1 (tres por uno or three for one) program, according to which every dollar a club provided for development was matched by a dollar from the municipal, state, and national government of Mexico. Chicago’s first 3x1 began in February of 1998 in a partnership between Club Amealco from Texaco, Guerrero, and the various levels of the Mexican government. The 3x1 helped subsidize Guerrero’s social security program, support families that were being deported, and financed other preventative migration programs targeted in areas of the state with high rates of out-migration. The 3x1 soon expanded with other hometown clubs in Chicago with Zacatecan clubs soon to follow in 1999 and Michoacán clubs by 2000 (Gomez and Aguilar 2005; Gomez 2005).13 These early 3x1 infrastructure projects with HTAs throughout the U.S. would eventually grow to be substantial in their economic contributions, providing more than U.S. $30 million to development in Mexico by the early 2000s (Orozco and Lapointe 2004).14 As a result of the extensive Mexican government outreach, the number of HTAs in Chicago and throughout the Midwest (Illinois, Wisconsin, and Northern Indiana) continued to grow. By 2000, more than 170 of the country’s HTAs were concentrated in the Midwest (see Appendix 2 for growth chart). By the early 2000s, the Midwest would emerge with the second largest number of HTAs in the country, the majority of which were Chicago-based (Orozco and Lapointe 2004). 12

Chicago’s early remittance-match programs were modeled after the International Solidarity Program initiated by the Zacatecan state government and the Zacatecano Federation in California (see M.P. Smith and Bakker 2008, 31-33). 13 During the 1990s there were also some reported experimental Mexican government reincorporation projects within New York and Texas, but according to discussions with Chicago consular officials the early efforts did not function as well in these U.S. regions (Interview with IME Officials June 8, 2008 and December 7, 2008, Chicago, IL). 14 Even before the 3x1 programs started, the Chicago consulate began an official recording of clubs’ growing community projects within their hometowns of Mexico, with 30 projects in 1994, 34 in 1995, 63 in 1996 and 77 in 1997 (Mexican consular materials 1999).

Vonderlack-Navarro, Rebecca. Immigrant Political Incorporation : The Role of Hometown Associations, LFB

Copyright © 2013. LFB Scholarly Publishing LLC. All rights reserved.

Mexico Unbound: Chicago's HTA Growth

53

Support for HTA growth would emerge from intensified state-level outreach as well. In particular, State Offices for Attending to Migrants (Oficinas Estatales de Atencion a Migrantes, or OEAM) were established throughout the latter half of the 1990s as a means to facilitate state governments in cultivating links to their diaspora. As a consequence of this substantial political attention, many Chicago HTA and federation cultural festivities incorporated political motives including the formal visits of Mexican government officials. As early as 1997, hometown federations in Chicago began celebrating cultural weeks, which involved tremendous time-consuming planning by HTA and federation volunteers who often solicited sponsors, planned elegant galas, and presented cultural and educational activities such as raffles, bailes (dances), rodeos, soccer tournaments and other sporting events, beauty pageants, and artistic exhibitions. They advertised with local businesses and networked with U.S.-based NGOs. Mexican governmental leaders often served as central guests of honor at these events, championing emigrants for their continued devotion towards developing their hometown communities (Gomez 2005; Gomez and Aguilar 2005).15 Thus, throughout the 1990s even as much of Chicago’s boom of Mexican immigrants remained legally isolated from U.S. political circles (Paral 2004), they were increasingly viewed as attractive interest-groups by politicians back home. Relishing this new attention, Chicago’s HTAs began to see themselves as organizations that might develop their own political agendas beyond the traditional community development initiatives. Over the second half of the 1990s, these organizations came to see themselves less as fortunate recipients of governmental attention and more as political agents negotiating with Mexican elites over development project implementation—even over the terms of their reincorporation into the homeland. This became evident as HTA leaders became increasingly active advocates for dual nationality rights, granted in 1997 (Fitzgerald 2006), and absentee voting rights, which

15

The Zacatecan federation initiated the idea of a cultural week in 1997, and the Guerrero federation began their cultural week in 1998. By the 2000s, various federations celebrated annual festivals as well (Gomez 2005).

Vonderlack-Navarro, Rebecca. Immigrant Political Incorporation : The Role of Hometown Associations, LFB

Copyright © 2013. LFB Scholarly Publishing LLC. All rights reserved.

54

Immigrant Political Incorporation

propelled their participation in organizing Chicago’s symbolic elections in 1994, and again in 2000 (Belluck, 2000).16 Not unexpectedly, the political sway of Chicago’s HTAs developed as a result of the extensive attention. Chicago HTA members, documented or not, were acquiring a new awareness of their political importance within the homeland. A federation leader from Guerrero discussed the impact for migrants when they received direct contact with Mexican officials. “[Before] I never would have gotten face-to-face contact with my governor [of Mexico]…It gives a sense of status and people believe in it.” (Interview, June 8, 2008). He described how members could see the concrete benefit of meetings with the Mexican government and subsidizing development projects because it gave a new sense of political purpose with Mexican politicians along with fulfilling migrants’ dream to return one day to the homeland. Another federation leader from the state of Michoacán described the multi-faceted meaning of hometown club participation. He acknowledged the new political recognition HTA participation provided: “There are a lot of people that see it [their clubs] as an opportunity to have their 15 minutes of fame. There are some that look at it as an opportunity to satisfy their ego…" And yet the Michoacán leader shared that the clubs provided more than quick political notoriety: [Migrants] participate because it is a form, a mechanism of mental hygiene in order to escape the oppression and the lack of participation in this [U.S.] society…. When you go to the real world…everyone tries to ignore you. They try to ignore your rights and you are a second-class citizen. [Yet from] the moment the diputados [Mexican officials] come and they listen to you and respect you, you [begin to] have a certain amount of respect for what you represent as a collective mind. (Interview with former Michoacán Federation President, May 15, 2008, Chicago, IL). 16

Belluck, Pam. 2000. “Mexican Presidential Candidates Campaign in U.S." New York Times, July 1. Also, Chicago Mexican Consular Materials. 1999. “Nuestra Historia en EU Taller Dirigido a Clubes de Oriundos de Illinois,” Instituto Mexicano de Cultura y Educación de Chicago y American Friends Service Committee.

Vonderlack-Navarro, Rebecca. Immigrant Political Incorporation : The Role of Hometown Associations, LFB

Copyright © 2013. LFB Scholarly Publishing LLC. All rights reserved.

Mexico Unbound: Chicago's HTA Growth

55

While largely ignored by the Mexican state when factors of poverty and hardship motivated their often dangerous trek North of the border, migrants now gained new political attention and respect from government notables. It is not difficult to see how being heralded by Mexican authorities as vital contributors to their hometowns’ reconstruction and development might offer these migrants a new sense of political purpose. As migrants came to garner political clout, promoting unity among Chicago’s HTAs became a vital way for Mexican government officials to remain closely informed and linked with the diaspora. By the second half of the 1990s, the associations began to coalesce into federated structures that united the various same-state HTAs. At this time, seven such federations were established in Chicago (Guerrero, Zacatecas, Jalisco, Guanajuato, Michoacán, Durango and San Luis Potosi), and these federations were typified by increasingly formalized leadership structures, as most included a democratically elected board of directors consisting of differentiated positions of president, vice-president, secretary, treasurer, etc. (Mexican consular materials 1999).17 Grouping these organizations by federation made it easier for consular officials to keep informed about community actors’ activities and provided institutional mechanisms that might redirect, if necessary, any unseemly organizational developments. The Mexican government saw federation leaders as intermediaries who could maintain dialogue with emigrant communities and facilitate implementation of its programs. When officials sought to “accomplish social projects,” as the coordinator of the consulate’s Institute of Mexicans Abroad explained, “it is a lot easier to have federations serve as interlocutors.” (Interview with IME Coordinator, June 8, 2008, Chicago, IL). Over time, the Mexican consulate would experiment with new mechanisms through 17

Around this time there were also clubs from 13 mainly rural Mexican states: Durango, Mexico City and the state of Mexico, Guanajuato, Guerrero, Jalisco, Michoacán, Morelos, Oaxaca, Puebla, Sinaloa, San Luis Potosi and Zacatecas. The early clubs and federations were generally representative of Mexican states with high out-migration rates to Chicago, with 16% of the Chicago immigrant population from Michoacán, 14.8% from Guanajuato, 10.7% from Mexico City and the state of Mexico, 7.8% from Durango, 7.7 from Zacatecas, and 18.7% from other states (Chicago Mexican consular materials 1999).

Vonderlack-Navarro, Rebecca. Immigrant Political Incorporation : The Role of Hometown Associations, LFB

56

Immigrant Political Incorporation

which to integrate Chicago’s emigrant community. Migrants, too, had an interest in unifying as a means to increase their leverage within Mexican related projects, such as remittance allocation in community development initiatives, general support for migrant families, improvements in consular services, and so forth.18 In an explicit attempt to stay close to Chicago’s progressively more mobilized emigrants, in 1998 consular officials launched an innovative effort to unify the organizations through the creation of Casa Mexico. The proposed physical space would enable federations to come together to celebrate important events (cultural festivals, visits of state governors) and share infrastructure and resources with local Mexican political party activists. The grand majority of Chicago federations were on board with the plan, including Durango, Michoacán, Guanajuato, Guerrero, Jalisco, and El Estado de Mexico.19 Despite federation leaders’ interest in Casa Mexico, the leaders were skeptical about what, in their view, could have been a Mexican government attempt at possibly co-opting their growing activism and influence: Ahh Casa Mexico, they [the consulate] wanted to organize it but it never, never happened…Casa Mexico is something the Copyright © 2013. LFB Scholarly Publishing LLC. All rights reserved.

18

Despite the desire to remain unified, divisions did occur within the Guanajuato, Guerrero, Michoacán and Durango federations during the early 2000s. Most, if not all, consulate officials and federation leaders consider federations’ divisions the Achilles’ heel of migrant organizational efforts; discussing past divisions was often sensitive and difficult. Multiple factors, both internal and external to all volunteer grassroots clubs and federations, could prove divisive or at least make organizations vulnerable to internal tensions: conflictive Mexican political party interests, leader personality clashes and opportunism, tensions over leadership election outcomes, questioning the allocation of funds for community development projects, and instances when strong leaders and their families carry organizational life and who later may face personal crisis or burnout, causing the organization to fizzle out. (Interview with former Michoacán president, May 15, 2008; former Durango president, May 6, 2008; IME Coordinator, June 8, 2008, Chicago, IL). 19 Zacatecas, which had always been more conservative and hesitant to move outside of the traditional work of Mexican-oriented development projects, decided not to participate in Casa Mexico.

Vonderlack-Navarro, Rebecca. Immigrant Political Incorporation : The Role of Hometown Associations, LFB

Mexico Unbound: Chicago's HTA Growth

57

consulate wanted to do. They had paid a lawyer…they had made the statutes, it was a very ambitious project…[the idea] was ideal, if we could have had it. It would have been perfect, but the trust…we did not have sufficient trust in the consulate so that it would work. So for that it never worked, because the consulate was there metido (meddling). It wasn’t that we felt threatened, the plan was, how do I tell you, it was really good, but the [consulate] wants to control us and we want to liberate ourselves, we don’t want to be controlled, we want independence. (Interview with Durango leader, May 5, 2008, Chicago, IL). As talks for Casa Mexico were underway, network ties between various Chicago federation leaders and other Mexican-focused political party activists in the city began to prosper. In a significant turn of events, the Chicago consular’s plans for Casa Mexico were interrupted as they city’s migrants joined together to oppose a change in Mexico’s border policy.20 In 1999, the Mexican

Copyright © 2013. LFB Scholarly Publishing LLC. All rights reserved.

20

Some PRD immigrant leaders, and not specifically federation leaders, began voicing discontent with the local Chicago Mexican Consulate as early as 1998. Within the PCME program developed under the Salinas administration, the Mexican Institute of Culture and Education was established as a means to promote Mexican identity and culture with the diaspora in the U.S. The Chicago General Consul at this time was highly motivated to raise funds for the institute. As a means to raise money, a U.S. $5 charge was added to documentation service fees run through the consulate. While the added fee was framed as a voluntary contribution, many immigrants felt they were being mandated to pay it and were outraged by the added cost. As the community became angered by the added charges, Chicago’s transnational community leaders, particularly the more confrontational PRD activists, devised numerous press conferences during a four week period to pressure the General Consul to withdraw the charges. Through the media showdown between community leaders and the General Consul, activists were able to prove the consul was acting outside of Mexican government authority and eventually the charges were dropped. While a PRD transnational activist spearheaded the press conferences, new federation leaders at this time saw that working as an oppositional force, particularly through Spanish-speaking media outlets, could bring necessary power gains with Mexican elites. The General Consul at this

Vonderlack-Navarro, Rebecca. Immigrant Political Incorporation : The Role of Hometown Associations, LFB

Copyright © 2013. LFB Scholarly Publishing LLC. All rights reserved.

58

Immigrant Political Incorporation

national government decided to dramatically increase a deposit on cars purchased in the U.S. crossing the Mexican border. The car deposit (which all migrants were convinced would never be returned) would spike from $15 to $400, and even as high as $800 (De la Garza and Hazan 2003, 35; CONFEMEX Estatutos, “Anexo, Historia, Mistica y Metodologia de Trabajo” 2006, 13-14). With regard to the deposit increase, one PRD migrant leader claimed, “You felt assaulted at the border” (Interview, October 19, 2008, Chicago, IL). The tax sent the Chicago migrant community into an uproar of defiant resistance. Federation and other Mexican emigrant community leaders in Chicago interpreted the deposit increase as the Zedillo administration’s attempt to take advantage of the high number of immigrants soon to cross the border to spend the Christmas holiday and millennium New Year in their hometown communities. One leader recalled the anger felt at a Chicago migrant gathering: “I remember someone throwing down their [car] keys on the table, ‘I’m going to burn my car in front of the consulate!’” Numerous federation leaders from Durango, Michoacán, Zacatecas, Guerrero, Jalisco, and San Luis Potosi along with other Mexican immigrant activists gathered at a local Pilsen Catholic Church to meet with consulate representatives and protest their grievances with the tax.21 The Coordinator of the Institute of Mexicans Abroad, who was relatively new to the Chicago consulate and the PCME program at the time, described the mobilization against the tax as “very strong…casi nos golpeo (they almost hit us) [during the meetings]…there was so much indignation” (Interview, June 8, 2008, Chicago, IL). The group of federation and other Chicago migrant community activists conducted protests, and out of their newfound solidarity grew a short-lived coalition whose chosen name, Grupo time was widely known by Chicago transnational activists as “lo que menos ha durado (the one who lasted the least amount of time)” in his leadership post. While rising migrant transnational activists discovered the power of confrontational politics, consular officials learned to take a more diplomatic and accommodating approach when dealing with local immigrant grievances (Interviews with PRD Activists October 19, 2008 and February 2, 2009, Chicago, IL). 21 Chicago Mexican Consular Materials. 1999. “Nuestra Historia en EU Taller Dirigido a Clubes de Oriundos de Illinois,” Instituto Mexicano de Cultura y Educación de Chicago y American Friends Service Committee.

Vonderlack-Navarro, Rebecca. Immigrant Political Incorporation : The Role of Hometown Associations, LFB

Copyright © 2013. LFB Scholarly Publishing LLC. All rights reserved.

Mexico Unbound: Chicago's HTA Growth

59

David (Group David), suggested the new and feisty underdog status that HTAs briefly embraced against the Goliath-like Mexican government. Chicago Mexican consular officials worked to calm the rage felt by the emigrant community. The General Consul was forced to respond to the community uprisings by appealing to the federal government to repeal the tax, and as a result, many of the local consular officials learned the importance of assuming a cautious diplomatic approach when working with the migrant community. The consular Coordinator to the Institute of Mexicans Abroad at the time of this study who witnessed the migrant outrage talked of a larger, long-term lesson he learned within the mobilization. “No todo que dice el gobierno hay tiene que defenderlo. (You do not have to defend all that the government says.)" He strategically listened to community concerns as a way to gradually curb migrant insurgency. The consular official also described the distinct change for federation leaders who participated in the protest: “They woke up because the movement worked” (Interview, June 8, 2008, Chicago, IL). As a result, the car deposit policy was revoked two days after its implementation. Most importantly, the battle against the Mexican government changed the agendas of various Chicago migrant HTAs as they felt more open to work together to challenge the Mexican government (CONFEMEX Estatutos, “Anexo, Historia, Mistica y Metodologia de Trabajo” 2006, 13-14). Moreover, the protests illustrated that HTAs, while generally acting as conventional interest groups to support Mexican state interests, had the capacity to mobilize to contest government policies. Along with HTA leaders’ growing sense of power within Mexican politics, key consulate officials (and eventually the Mexican national government) came to recognize through the car deposit fiasco that when Chicago leaders do not feel heard or respected, they will rebel. A Durango federation leader reflected later on the changing power dynamics between Chicago’s HTAs and the “friendly” consulate that resulted from the protest against the car deposit hike: In this moment I think we were making friendly relations [with consular officials], although not because they were helping us, it was because now they knew that the organizations had more strength…we feel that they want to, how do you say, dominate us. They want to control us, that is

Vonderlack-Navarro, Rebecca. Immigrant Political Incorporation : The Role of Hometown Associations, LFB

60

Immigrant Political Incorporation they are interested in having an organized community, but they want to control it…we showed the consulate that we could change politics and that we didn’t need them as intermediaries (Interview, May 6, 2008, Chicago, IL).

Chicago federation leaders characterized the car-deposit protest as a pivotal moment of HTA political agency (CONFEMEX Estatus 2006, 13-14). A long-standing Durango leader revealed how protest activity created “unity” among the federations:

Copyright © 2013. LFB Scholarly Publishing LLC. All rights reserved.

…there [in the protests] is where the federations found unity and there is where CONFEMEX [the large confederation of Mexican HTA federations that would formally emerge in 2003] formed. After Grupo David that is when the federations worked together and when we started to realize what we were able to do (Durango leader interview, May 6, 2008, Chicago, IL). Even the consulate’s coordinator of the Institute of Mexicans Abroad noted that the car-deposit protests enabled the “clubs to envision their capacity for having effective politics” (Interview with IME Coordinator, June 8, 2008). Chicago’s HTAs had learned to stand up for themselves. The result was an increased consciousness that their unified political action—whether normative or defiant—could make change. By the end of the decade, Chicago had earned a reputation among Mexican political elites as a hotbed of community activism and migrant coalition-building. In response to the car-deposit increase, migrant protests were also held in California and Texas. These migrant leaders eventually joined with Chicago’s community activists by 2000 to form the short-lived International Coalition of Mexicans Abroad (Coalicion International de los Mexicanos en el Exterior, CIME) (Hazan 2006, 139-140; PRD activist interview, October 19, 2008, Chicago, IL). Not long after the demise of CIME,22 right-of-center PAN activists in Chicago (supporters of the Fox campaign, Amigos de Fox) formed the Council of Mexican Migrant Organizations in the Midwest (el Consejo 22

CIME soon experienced a split as many migrant leaders felt it became dominated by left-of-center PRD activists.

Vonderlack-Navarro, Rebecca. Immigrant Political Incorporation : The Role of Hometown Associations, LFB

Mexico Unbound: Chicago's HTA Growth

61

Copyright © 2013. LFB Scholarly Publishing LLC. All rights reserved.

de Organizaciones Migrantes en el Medio Este, COMMO) to also promote migrant absentee voting rights, although it would dissipate by 2003. While COMMO intentionally included many of Chicago’s federations, the federation leaders claimed they could not develop sufficient “confianza (trust)” within the diverse political interests involved in COMMO.23 While the early attempts at coalition-building largely failed, federation leaders began to see the potential political prominence they might gain by working together. As their political sway continued to grow, federation leaders could sense that Mexican government leaders wanted to restrain their growing autonomy. As a Michoacán federation leader reflected: “They [the consulate] want us organized, but not too organized." He felt that the consulate was always careful in preventing organizations from becoming too powerful. He continued to discuss how Mexican state actors began to see Chicago as a testing ground for migrant-related policies: …the consulate [officials] understand that Chicago plays an experimental role for them. If they believe something is doubtful in functioning in other consulates in the American union, Chicago serves as a pilot program. They know that if it functions here than there are many possibilities that it will function in other places (Interview, May 15, 2008, Chicago, IL). The Mexican state’s insistent support for the expansion of HTAs and their broader migrant coalitions in Chicago would, nevertheless, continually be challenged by the rising assertiveness on the part of the organizations themselves. With the onset of the 2000 Mexican presidential campaign, Mexican nationals residing abroad would be treated by political elites as a critical constituency they could not afford to ignore. Even though migrants had not yet gained absentee voting rights, politicians actively campaigned with diaspora communities throughout the U.S. encouraging them to call their families back home and influence their 23

The consulate’s Coordinator to the Institute of Mexicans Abroad claimed that COMMO functioned for only about one year (Interview, June 8, 2008, Chicago, IL).

Vonderlack-Navarro, Rebecca. Immigrant Political Incorporation : The Role of Hometown Associations, LFB

62

Immigrant Political Incorporation

voting choices. Within Chicago’s symbolic elections, 10,000 votes were cast, with Fox as the apparent winner. Upheld as a political outsider and potential reformer from the long-standing corporatist PRI regime, Chicago migrants organized a rally and parade for Fox (Belluck 2000).24 With the rise of the PAN within Mexico’s national politics, neoliberal reforms were further legitimated and state-emigrant relations further prioritized. By and large, by the early 2000s it was evident that the employment conditions, political rights, and re-integration of Mexican nationals residing across the border were of central importance to Mexican governmental and political party players (Fitzgerald 2006; M.P. Smith and Bakker 2008). Consequently, as the next chapter will show, HTA leaders would turn out to take an even more central leadership role in the state’s evolving projects.

Copyright © 2013. LFB Scholarly Publishing LLC. All rights reserved.

Conclusion Mexican immigrants occupied increasingly prominent economic roles in Mexico and the United States from the 1990s into the early 2000s, even as their political status in both countries seemed unstable. Furthermore, as Chicago HTAs received extensive Mexican political support to encourage their growth and continued loyalty to the homeland, migrant leaders began to exert their own autonomy as they came to challenge various Mexican governmental projects, even with contentious activity. At the same time that migrants were making claims within Mexican politics, Mexican immigration—mobile labor— became a main component of neoliberal restructuring in the United States. Migrants’ economic importance in the U.S. created a contradictory political context. Some conservative constituencies aimed to inhibit immigrants as legitimate political actors. At the same time, because of their growing indispensability as economic contributors, strong business groups and other political factions began to sympathize with migrants (Zolberg 2006, 412-18). Beyond Mexican immigrants mounting role within the U.S. economy, their political clout became recognized by the 2000 presidential elections when the Latino vote was deemed crucial. Political candidates (especially U.S. presidential 24

Belluck, Pam. 2000. “Mexican Presidential Candidates Campaign in U.S.” New York Times, July 1.

Vonderlack-Navarro, Rebecca. Immigrant Political Incorporation : The Role of Hometown Associations, LFB

Copyright © 2013. LFB Scholarly Publishing LLC. All rights reserved.

Mexico Unbound: Chicago's HTA Growth

63

hopeful George W. Bush) were keenly aware of the decisive power of Latinos at the polls (430). By early 2001, the recently elected president of Mexico, Vicente Fox, negotiated with the newly elected president of the United States, George W. Bush, over an immigration-reform proposal. (This topic will be explored in the next chapter.) It seemed only a question of time before recent Mexican immigrants would enjoy an expanded set of legal rights in the U.S. to accompany their growing political influence in Mexico. Chicago’s clubs and federations expanded as a result of extensive neoliberal political and economic changes in Mexico and the U.S. This context included the United States' considerable demand for low-end contingent labor increasingly supplied by undocumented immigration as well as Mexico’s dependence on out-migration and return remittance flows for political and economic stability. The outcome included an integrated bi-national economy and unequal political context. Within this environment, migrant HTAs began to partner with the Mexican state to subsidize remittance-based development initiatives. Transnational research thus provides a significant challenge to traditional assimilationist notions of immigrants’ gradual political incorporation into the host society. Indeed, it was through immigrants’ interaction with the extended extraterritorial reach of Mexican governmental-repatriation programming, not with local Chicago machine politics, that budding Chicago HTA leaders developed a norm of political engagement, a nurtured sense of self-confidence, and a certain level of negotiated political efficacy. Nevertheless, Chicago’s HTAs and federations were more than third-sector, voluntary organizations or semi-accommodated extensions of the Mexican state’s neoliberal projects. Through a close examination of the 1990s, we begin to see how Chicago HTAs were developing their own political agency both within and against Mexican state projects. This closer look at the Chicago case also reveals the distinct relationship that began to develop between the local Chicago Mexican consulate and migrant organizations. This relationship encouraged migrants to coalesce, and as a result, unified and strengthened their political clout. As these indigenous organizational networks expanded, federation leaders began to garner trust and familiarity, which served as useful resources to create solidarity to resist the Mexican government’s car deposit increase. It was through their increased access to the Mexican state that immigrant leaders began to nurture a self-assurance

Vonderlack-Navarro, Rebecca. Immigrant Political Incorporation : The Role of Hometown Associations, LFB

64

Immigrant Political Incorporation

Copyright © 2013. LFB Scholarly Publishing LLC. All rights reserved.

to act collectively, even in short-lived defiance of state interests. Migrants’ protest mobilization instigated a significant turn in their sense of political agency and leverage within Mexican politics. Moreover, Mexico’s early projects, viewed with a broader lens that considers neoliberalizing states and migrant agency, can now be seen as vital for conferring promising migrant organizations with a significant sense of political legitimacy that set the stage for their eventual engagement with U.S.-focused immigrant concerns.

Vonderlack-Navarro, Rebecca. Immigrant Political Incorporation : The Role of Hometown Associations, LFB

CHAPTER 3

Copyright © 2013. LFB Scholarly Publishing LLC. All rights reserved.

Conflicting Tendencies: Post-9/11 Politics and HTAs' Nascent U.S. Political Engagement, 2001-2005

Significant changes in the broader political landscape erupted as a result of the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001. The Bush administration’s overhauled national security agenda restructured the country’s inter-state relationship with Mexico along with its own domestic policy priorities. The United States’ new “war on terrorism” ushered in a revamped criminalization and securitization approach to immigrant concerns. Within this threatening political environment, Chicago’s hometown associations welcomed new activities (with much encouragement from the Mexican government) meant to provide enhanced security to their members. At the same time, these new activities fortified HTAs’ participation in U.S.-centered politics and policy advocacy. By late 2005, HTAs were increasingly involved in a dual-focused Mexico-U.S. agenda. While their agenda was still primarily focused on Mexico with emigrant voting rights a main priority, Chicago HTAs began to exhibit increased attention towards domestic political issues in the United States, chiefly at the state level in Illinois. Why were many of Chicago’s HTAs beginning to shift from a Mexican-focused to a bi-national Mexico-U.S. focused agenda, and how would this up-and-coming shift change the political activities of many HTAs? A superficial analysis of Chicago HTAs’ early and gradual embrace of U.S.-focused integration activities might argue that 65

Vonderlack-Navarro, Rebecca. Immigrant Political Incorporation : The Role of Hometown Associations, LFB

Copyright © 2013. LFB Scholarly Publishing LLC. All rights reserved.

66

Immigrant Political Incorporation

their behavior resembles linear assimilationist accounts of the immigrant experience where over time immigrants become more and more integrated into their new host society (Alba and Nee 1997). Yet assimilationist accounts cannot explain how mechanisms that drove HTAs further into the realm of U.S. political activity at this time paradoxically still came largely from the extra-territorial influence of the Mexican state’s reincorporation strategies, especially through greatly overhauled diaspora-inclusionist programs. Even while a Chicago federation leader began to forge important connections with Illinois government leaders by 2005 in ways that would later come to greatly influence multiple federations’ U.S.-focused activities, political opportunities in Mexico were still a topmost concern for Chicago HTAs and federations. Although Mexico was still the uppermost priority for Chicago’s HTAs during this time period, a bi-national consideration for how both Mexico and the U.S. political environments shape the organizations remains necessary. What the Mexican state aimed to accomplish through its partnerships with HTAs and federations was qualitatively different following 9/11. Mexico’s institutionalization of diaspora relations was not just about sustaining migrant loyalty to their patria along with their remittance flows (R.C. Smith 2008; M.P. Smith and Bakker 2008); it was also about securing migrants’ newly precarious legal status within the vastly hardened national security provisions in the United States. Roger Waldinger (2009) provides a compelling analysis of Mexico’s diaspora engagement policies with a refreshing consideration for how both sending and receiving states influence the politics of immigration/emigration, as most of the literature on international migration tends to dichotomize the two.25 While 25

His work explores two specific cases of diaspora engagement: expatriate voting and the provision of the matricula consular documentation. Both cases are similar in that they illustrate a “capacity deficit” within the Mexican state’s reincorporation projects as emigrants reside in a foreign territory where the sending state lacks power. Yet the two cases differ in that millions of undocumented immigrants benefited from the enhanced matricula program, while few emigrants possessed the appropriate credentials to take part in the Vote from Abroad. In general, his analysis is compelling: the divergent outcomes stem from the fact that the matricula provided immigrants with a “source of leverage” in their host society, while expatriate voting involved a

Vonderlack-Navarro, Rebecca. Immigrant Political Incorporation : The Role of Hometown Associations, LFB

Copyright © 2013. LFB Scholarly Publishing LLC. All rights reserved.

Conflicting Tendencies: Post-9/11 Politics

67

persuasive, Waldinger’s work does not consider that the relationship of both the Mexican and U.S. states toward Mexican emigrants/immigrants in the U.S. was also shaped by the broader asymmetrical relationship between Mexico and the United States. This is why, for this study, anchoring the story of Chicago HTAs in the broader, post-1970s neoliberal restructuring of both economies and states (Mexico and the U.S.) becomes important to understanding how the state powers of Mexico vis-à-vis its migrants were historically reconstituted. Indeed, the post-9/11 U.S. war on terrorism had both a geopolitical impact on the U.S.-Mexico relationship, as well as domestic policy impacts on immigration policy and enforcement. The result was a sharpened asymmetry of power between the two countries, with implications for Mexican-state strategies toward U.S.-based migrants. This chapter begins by exploring the impact of a threatening, post9/11 U.S. anti-immigrant politics that influenced Mexican President Vicente Fox in a decision to throw real weight behind building the capacities of HTAs, along with Chicago’s consular programming. These state-migrant efforts were intended to secure undocumented immigrants’ standing in the U.S. as well as sustain remittance flows to Mexico. The chapter continues by examining how HTAs themselves responded to the hardening political environment in the U.S by expanding their services to include migrant-related concerns along with forming a united confederation of Midwest federation and hometown club leaders as a means to fortify their political power. Lastly, and in sharp contrast to the anti-immigrant discourse within U.S. national politics, a quite distinctive and vigorously validating set of Illinois state-government programs was introduced by 2005 as a means to court Mexican HTAs as potential voting constituencies. Chicago HTAs’ emerging focus on U.S.-oriented activities thus can be better understood as an outcome of their interactions with various government entities in Mexico and (especially) in the United States.

more cumbersome effort aimed at trying to reconnect emigrants as members within a homeland they had left behind.

Vonderlack-Navarro, Rebecca. Immigrant Political Incorporation : The Role of Hometown Associations, LFB

68

Immigrant Political Incorporation

Copyright © 2013. LFB Scholarly Publishing LLC. All rights reserved.

U.S. Immigrant Repression and HTAs’ Increased Importance to Mexico U.S. immigrant politics significantly changed following September 2001. In April 2001, just months before the attacks, recently elected presidents Vicente Fox and George W. Bush appeared to form a closer alliance as they began a series of immigration reform talks, including plans for a guestworker program. A comprehensive immigration reform seemed increasingly likely as Fox petitioned the U.S. Congress to loosen immigration laws in early September 2001 (Dlouhy 2004, 95). At this time, Republican Party business interests, along with other government leaders, publicly endorsed continuing the supply of foreign labor as their central immigrant-related concern (Zolberg 2006). While NAFTA encouraged the economic integration of Mexico and the United States, it seemed Fox was willing to become the junior partner in a newly-formed, post-NAFTA state regime. The attacks of September 11, 2001, however, would significantly alter the political course between Mexico and the United States. The resulting dramatic U.S. government shift to a “securitization” and “criminalization” immigrant agenda resulted in a unilateral shift in future immigration policy. By embracing U.S. security as a top political priority, there was new political space created for core constituencies of the Republican Party to link the lack of security to unauthorized immigration. In this context, Bush realized it would be a political liability to work with Fox or create any mutual bilateral agreements on immigration reform. By 2002 when Fox publicly questioned the U.S. invasion in Iraq, it was abundantly clear that Mexico’s ability to bargain directly with the U.S. had been diminished (Zolberg 2006). As a consequence of Mexico’s recent diplomatic strains with the United States, Fox began to develop his own attempts to secure emigrants— and their remittance flows—in an increasingly hostile environment. HTAs would turn out to be focal to Mexico’s overhauled diaspora programming (M.P. Smith and Bakker 2008). From the beginning, Fox aimed to create a loyal emigrant contingent. He espoused a distinct public discourse that elevated migrants to a “hero” status, supported emigrant voting rights, and promoted migrant inclusion into the broader Mexican nation (Fitzgerald 2006, 279). Fox advanced more than rhetoric when he overhauled migrant-focused government programs by restructuring

Vonderlack-Navarro, Rebecca. Immigrant Political Incorporation : The Role of Hometown Associations, LFB

Copyright © 2013. LFB Scholarly Publishing LLC. All rights reserved.

Conflicting Tendencies: Post-9/11 Politics

69

consular services. The new programming was a response to the punitive environment and the increasingly organized migrant constituency in the U.S. who strongly voiced opposition to the car deposit increase, expressed desire for absentee voting rights, and demanded improvements in consular services. Fox began this effort by replacing the PCME (Program for Mexican Communities Abroad) with the Presidential Office for Mexicans Abroad (Oficina Presidencial de Atencion a Migrantes en el Exterior, OPME) headed by Mexican American Juan Hernandez. The program promoted a bi-national agenda and included migrant concerns in the U.S. (e.g., obtaining drivers’ licenses and promoting access to higher education for the undocumented). Due to an antagonistic relationship between Hernandez and Mexico’s Foreign Affairs Minister Jorge Casteneda, Hernandez was dismissed from the job and the OPME was terminated. Eventually, the OPME and the PCME were conjoined to form the current nationally-organized Institute of Mexicans Abroad within the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (el Instituto de los Mexicanos en el Exterior, IME), which came into effect between 2002 and 2003 (M.P. Smith and Bakker 2008, 38-39; local Chicago interviews).26 The Institute included an overhaul and expansion of consular services throughout the U.S. along with specific efforts to fortify HTAs by legislating collective remittance-based development projects (e.g. 3x1 projects) beyond experimental programs in specific U.S. regions to a formalized program for emigrant organizations throughout the United States. A career official within Mexico’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the former Executive Director of the Institute, Carlos Gonzalez Gutierrez, claims the renovated Mexican programming was meant to “empower the Mexican diaspora abroad” (Laglagaron 2010, 10). A strengthened and unified Mexican immigrant community could better advocate for migrant interests on both sides of the border. IME’s services included a broad umbrella of education, health, community organization, consular protection, and business promotion. Fox’s advances also came with the formation of a migrant Advisory Council (CC-IME) to serve as an accessory and consultant to the Institute of Mexicans Abroad. The Advisory Council would be comprised of emigrant leaders, including HTA and federation leaders, 26

Interviews with PRD Activist October 19, 2008 and IME Coordinator June 8, 2008, Chicago, IL.

Vonderlack-Navarro, Rebecca. Immigrant Political Incorporation : The Role of Hometown Associations, LFB

Copyright © 2013. LFB Scholarly Publishing LLC. All rights reserved.

70

Immigrant Political Incorporation

representatives from influential U.S.-based Latino organizations, Mexican leaders from Canada, consultants, and representatives from Mexican state-level governments. Since its inception (Advisory Council meetings officially began in 2003), various Chicago federation leaders would continue to participate in the council and consider it a great honor. Chicago would hold democratic elections for potential advisors beginning in 2002, increasing advisors’ legitimacy and credibility in the community as they were not merely appointed by the consulate. The Chicago consulate also benefitted from the election process as it allowed them to see who the community perceived as their representational leaders.27 Through the creation of an Advisory Council, the Mexican national government created a platform where Chicago advisors to the Institute of Mexicans Abroad could network with other Mexican immigrant and Mexican American leaders throughout the U.S. who were also part of the Advisory Council to discuss escalating migrant concerns on both sides of the border. The restructuring of Mexican consular programming reflected the Mexican state’s growing need to respond and appease migrants’ growing political power. Robert C. Smith (2008) termed the Advisory Council a type of “extra-territorial bureaucracy” that aimed to “constitute a political recognition of a particular group and a commitment to it, thus reifying the relationship with the state, implying permanency and legitimacy” (712-13). After a failed attempt at migrant coalition-building with Casa Mexico in 1998 and the 1999 car deposit protests in Chicago and other areas of the U.S., the new consular programming was also a way for the Mexican government to dissipate escalating dissent within the migrant community. In this post-9/11 era when Fox had lost bargaining power with the United States, the initiatives were a way for the Mexican state to further extend its influence within the diaspora community through the institutionalization of state-migrant partnerships. Yet as Mexican state 27

Requirements to vote in Chicago CC-IME elections include being Mexican or of Mexican descent. For those born in Mexico, one has to be 18 years or older, show the matricula consular (Mexican ID issued through consulates), Mexican passport, military service ID, elector credential, drivers license, Mexican birth certificate or another type of photo ID. For Mexican descendants in the U.S., voters must show their dual nationality through their birth certificate (which indicates their parents’ place of birth) or passport.

Vonderlack-Navarro, Rebecca. Immigrant Political Incorporation : The Role of Hometown Associations, LFB

Copyright © 2013. LFB Scholarly Publishing LLC. All rights reserved.

Conflicting Tendencies: Post-9/11 Politics

71

influence within the emigrant community expanded, it threatened the incorporation of migrant actors as mere agents of Mexico’s state projects. On the one hand, migrant leaders gained a seat at the table with Mexican elites to influence policy; on the other hand, the statesociety divide became further obscured, raising questions as to whether the autonomy of HTA and federation leaders could be co-opted by the Mexican state. Nevertheless, HTAs remained a key priority within Mexico’s revamped diaspora-focused programming. As a result, the number of immigrant clubs proliferated throughout the United States. By the mid2000s, shortly after IME was instituted, Mexican state outreach resulted in more than 1,000 Mexican immigrant organizations and 46 Mexican consulates within 31 states in the U.S. (M.P. Smith and Bakker 2008). In Illinois specifically, the number of HTAs had reached 170 by 2000 and grew to more than 270 by 2005 (see Appendix 3). Many of the budding HTAs began the 3x1 match programs, sponsored Mexicanoriented cultural and social events, and engaged in advocacy for absentee voting rights. HTAs’ financial clout was substantial, and in some instances, HTA donations exceeded what Mexican municipal budgets offered to local communities’ social welfare needs. As Chicago’s HTA and federation scene continued to develop, numerous federations acquired building headquarters in the city, often with the financial aid of Mexican state governments. These served as spaces to foster migrant loyalty and sustain migrants’ “Mexican-ness” through various social and cultural programming events. Among the diaspora-targeted initiatives begun by Chicago’s Mexican consulate, a number of programs were meant to create closer connections between local emigrants and the homeland while safeguarding community members from deportation. Although many consular officials served as important supporters throughout the early emergence of Chicago’s hometown associations the appointment of Carlos Manuel Sada Solano as General Consul in 2001 launched an extended period of innovative diaspora program-building that would greatly enhance the organizational capacities of the city’s HTAs.28 From the beginning, Sada seemed determined to avoid the kind of heavy-handed, top-down directives that had created considerable 28

Carlos Manuel Sada Solano served as general consul of the Mexican consulate of Chicago from 2001 to 2007.

Vonderlack-Navarro, Rebecca. Immigrant Political Incorporation : The Role of Hometown Associations, LFB

72

Immigrant Political Incorporation

tensions during the car-deposit protests in 1999. He recognized that Chicago’s HTAs wished to preserve their newly-won autonomy. As one observer put it, while cultivating closer relations with federation and HTA leaders, Sada was “careful in how his work was administered to avoid paternalism.”29 He initiated bi-monthly meetings between federation leaders and various consular officials and soon built a reputation among local activists as someone who listened to the Chicago migrant community even as he came to enjoy a significant level of influence over its organizations.30 More concretely, Sada’s strategy focused on strengthening the financial ties between the migrant community and the homeland in ways that might also create U.S.-related protections for community members. Central to this strategy was the development of a revamped identity card. As migrants without identity credentials became increasingly vulnerable after 9/11, the consulate created the Matricula Consular de Alta Seguridad (MCAS), an upgraded form of the card traditionally issued to Mexican nationals abroad that could be used by migrants residing in the U.S. without documentation.31 After the success of Chicago’s pioneering pilot program launched in 2000, 32 the

Copyright © 2013. LFB Scholarly Publishing LLC. All rights reserved.

29

Interview with IME Coordinator, June 8, 2008, Chicago, IL. Sada’s favorable reputation among the migrant community was made evident in the interviews and observation data with migrant leaders of various political persuasions, even the more militant activists who wanted nothing to do with the government (Interviews with PRD activists on February 2, 2009 and October 19, 2008, Chicago, IL). 31 As early as 1871, the Mexican government has issued identification documents, namely the matricula consular, to help nationals abroad have an official ID to demonstrate Mexican nationality and therefore have access to consular aid and services. The upgraded card issues by 2002 included enhanced security measures to prevent duplication efforts (Hernandez-Coss 2005,12; Laglagaron 2010). 32 While many banks in the city remained skeptical of the MCAS, Chicago’s Second Federal Savings Bank (with numerous banks scattered throughout Mexican-dominated neighborhoods—like La Villita on 26th Street—and with forty years of experience working with the Mexican community) was keenly aware of the potential financial gains in working with the city’s immigrant community. The President/CEO/Chairman of the Second Federal Savings 30

Vonderlack-Navarro, Rebecca. Immigrant Political Incorporation : The Role of Hometown Associations, LFB

Copyright © 2013. LFB Scholarly Publishing LLC. All rights reserved.

Conflicting Tendencies: Post-9/11 Politics

73

Mexican consulate of Chicago formally launched the MCAS initiative in March of 2002, issuing an average of 450 matriculas on a daily basis. Since the MCAS was established, 118 financial institutions throughout the U.S. have come to recognize the card; 44 of those banks were concentrated within Chicago. By the end of 2003, an estimated 150,000 of these matriculas were in use within Chicago, with another 150,000 in circulation the following year. At the same time, consular officials actively promoted the card to local financial institutions. It was recognized by large numbers of banks, and some went even further. Working with federation leaders and community activists as well as the consulate, several local community banks began to see supermarkets, meatpacking plants, and schools as creative avenues for providing financial services to Chicago’s large population of undocumented residents. By May of 2003, the General Consulate of Chicago and the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation initiated the formation of a New Alliance Task Force to further develop migrant-focused financial services and education. Bringing together banks, federal regulators, secondary market companies, mortgage insurance providers, and Mexican federation leaders and other community organizations, the effort led to an estimated 50,000 new bank accounts worth upwards of $100 million during its first six months alone (Hernandez-Coss 2005, 97-99; also see Gomez and Aguilar 2005). These public-private financial initiatives served multiple purposes for the Mexican government and the immigrant community of Chicago. The immediate economic benefits to both parties (not to mention those to the financial institutions involved) were considerable, particularly in terms of lower fees on remittance transfers.33 Yet the political impact spearheaded the acceptance of the MCAS as early as 2000 and promoted the effort as a way for migrants to avoid high remittance surcharges. 33 Remittances from Illinois to Mexico continued to be substantial; during 2003 an estimated U.S. $13.3 billion in remittances were sent to Mexico, with Illinois sending $1.3 billion. With an estimated 75 percent of undocumented immigrants without bank accounts, they can be compelled to use alternative, and costly, remittance service providers (e.g., Western Union or MoneyGram) or other informal (and possibly insecure) money-carrying channels. Since 2001 when the remittance services were established in as many as 30 Midwestern banks, remittance costs had dropped by 58 percent (HernandezCoss 2005).

Vonderlack-Navarro, Rebecca. Immigrant Political Incorporation : The Role of Hometown Associations, LFB

74

Immigrant Political Incorporation

was also seen as important. By encouraging migrants to establish credit histories, the initiatives were providing mechanisms that might prove time-of-residency requirements in future applications for legal status. More generally, Mexican government officials hoped these sorts of efforts might enlist banks as active political allies in the ongoing struggle for immigration reform. Federation leaders, meanwhile, gained stature from Mexican officials for enhancing the financial integration of their community base. Chicago’s migrant community leaders and consular officials also claimed a share of the political credit when the success of Chicago’s financial pilot programming led President Fox in 2002 to develop a national-level version of the enhanced matricula consular document.34

Copyright © 2013. LFB Scholarly Publishing LLC. All rights reserved.

HTAs’ Growing Autonomy and Interest in U.S. Immigrant Rights It was more than Mexican governmental influences, however, that strengthened Chicago’s HTAs and encouraged migrant leaders’ growing interest in U.S. domestic concerns. One force drawing the associations into the U.S. political realm emerged from ongoing efforts by HTAs themselves to expand their services to include ESL classes, legal counseling, and scholarship programs. While modest in their initial impact, these services nevertheless tended, over time, to connect association members more firmly to U.S. immigrant-related activities (Gomez and Aguilar 2005). More immediately noticeable in its organizational impact was an initiative started in 2002. Chicago federation and HTA leaders began working with a local Chicago nonprofit organization, Enlaces America. Part of the Heartland Alliance for Human Needs and Human Rights, Enlaces helped HTAs develop new leaders for their organizations.35 Intended to build support for a

34

It was argued by migrant activists and consular officials that Fox’s national initiative to promote the card’s acceptance within local financial institutions was influenced by Chicago’s pilot program launched in 2000 (Interviews with IME Coordinator, December 7, 2008, PRD and local union activist, October 19, 2008, Chicago, IL). 35 The Heartland Alliance for Human Needs and Human Rights is a longstanding Chicago NGO that provides comprehensive services to disenfranchised populations. The Heartland Alliance is a large and influential

Vonderlack-Navarro, Rebecca. Immigrant Political Incorporation : The Role of Hometown Associations, LFB

Copyright © 2013. LFB Scholarly Publishing LLC. All rights reserved.

Conflicting Tendencies: Post-9/11 Politics

75

broader, cross-border approach to U.S. immigration reform, this Immigrant Leadership Empowerment Project also created a different kind of forum—one that was not dominated by Mexican governmental officials—where Chicago’s emerging migrant leaders could begin to reformulate their own organizational goals. This involvement not only led to new relationships with immigrant rights groups and other U.S.focused organizations but also gave HTAs themselves a much greater level of political and media visibility in the city of Chicago. The Immigrant Leadership Empowerment Project was a critical point for many emerging federation leaders as it ignited the long-term processes of bringing individuals, many of whom were largely disenfranchised from U.S. society, to recognize their own power for creating change. The Enlaces America program supported migrant leaders in taking on larger roles in the external U.S. political landscape and broader transnational immigrant rights movement. The project was largely invested in creating workshops to target and enhance new grassroots HTA leadership. The workshops focused on individual empowerment, culture and identity, public speaking, planning, fundraising, bi-national integration, and alliance-building. Guided by popular education principles of Paolo Friere, the workshops allowed participants to define for themselves what leadership meant to them and connect their concerns to larger structural phenomena, such as trade, migration policy, and human rights. For many leaders, the workshop project catalyzed an important long-standing process of Chicago migrants’ growing cross-border political consciousness. Moreover, the Immigrant Leadership Empowerment Project expanded the notion of leadership within the immigrant rights movement to include ordinary immigrants and attempted to provide a space for migrant HTA leaders to question the rapid inequality perpetuated by neoliberalism while recognizing their role within such processes. (Interview with former Enlaces America staff, July 14 and August 3, 2006; Durango Federation leader, May 6, 2008; Michoacán federation leader, May 15, 2008, Chicago, IL).

organization within the social services political www.heartlandalliance.org; accessed on February 7, 2011).

world

Vonderlack-Navarro, Rebecca. Immigrant Political Incorporation : The Role of Hometown Associations, LFB

(see

76

Immigrant Political Incorporation

Copyright © 2013. LFB Scholarly Publishing LLC. All rights reserved.

All of the growing HTA and federation activity resulted in the leaders’ desires to unify as a means to increase their political clout on both sides of the border. Their aspirations culminated in February 23, 2003, in the formation of the Confederation of Mexican Federations or CONFEMEX (Confederacion de Federaciones Mexicanos), an umbrella organization initially comprised of eight of the Chicago-based federations and 175 Midwestern HTAs. The federations represented within CONFEMEX at its inception included Durango, Jalisco, Hidalgo, Michoacán, Guanajuato, Guerrero, Oaxaca, and Zacatecas.36 CONFEMEX was created by its leaders to stand apart from the directing hand of the Mexican government and quite deliberately stated in its statutes that the confederation was bi-national (CONFEMEX Estatutos, “Anexo, Historia, Mistica y Metodologia de Trabajo,” 1314). Nevertheless, much of the confederation’s early formation was still centered on enhancing emigrants’ political voice within Mexican government programs. One federation leader from Durango illustrated the Mexican-focus of CONFEMEX at the time as follows: We [federation leaders] saw the necessity…that all of us were working individually for each [Mexican] state and we saw the need to have a common bridge, unity in order to have more impact…I believe that we saw the need to unite as federations because we saw that …we could not change the laws in Mexico if we were not together, because no one is going to pay attention to us as just one state [federation]…if we want El Voto [absentee voting] in Mexico we have to be together…well, this is where we began to see the need to be in CONFEMEX. (Interview with Durango Federation leader, May 6, 2008, Chicago, IL). Yet, as commonly defined by organizational leaders, CONFEMEX had ample bi-national political potential as the confederation represented “the organized voice of Mexicans in the Midwest” (Guerrero Federation leader and CONFEMEX president, May 2, 2008, Chicago, IL). 36

Jalisco was part of CONFEMEX’s formation, but would exit the coalition in 2006. Around the same time, the Aguas Calientes federation joined the CONFEMEX coalition and the Chihuahua federation would join later in 2007.

Vonderlack-Navarro, Rebecca. Immigrant Political Incorporation : The Role of Hometown Associations, LFB

Conflicting Tendencies: Post-9/11 Politics

77

The formation of CONFEMEX illustrated federation leaders’ capacity to critically think and question government authority and its ability to form an integrated front. A Michoacán leader was well aware that the consulate would want to work with CONFEMEX, particularly for their ability to disseminate information to their base: Q: What do you think is the consulate’s opinion of CONFEMEX…? A: I believe that…the consulate, el Consul General, recognizes the importance that CONFEMEX has. I am clear on this. He also recognizes that there is a structure and a mechanism to diffuse information…they [consular officials] try to gain our interlocution. (May 15, 2008, Chicago, IL)

Copyright © 2013. LFB Scholarly Publishing LLC. All rights reserved.

Federation leaders also saw their unity as a way to establish autonomy from Mexican state interests. As a Durango federation leader explained, consular officials would have to contend with CONFEMEX as the federations came to have their own political efficacy in the community: Q: Ok, so what do you think is the consulate’s opinion of CONFEMEX? A: What is their opinion? I believe that their first opinion was that… they believed we were really ignorant. Q: Explain to me more about this. A: …I believe that the opinion of the consulate [now] is very different from what they thought when we began to organize…I believe we have earned their respect…now I believe they even fear us a little bit…because we are no longer [the organization] they were used to before. I mean the people [before] were not organized and well they [consulate officials] could do whatever they wanted and they decided for one and decided for all, but now they [consular officials] are aware that no, that we are here, and we have capabilities. We still have problems…but we know how to move forward and not stay quiet.

Vonderlack-Navarro, Rebecca. Immigrant Political Incorporation : The Role of Hometown Associations, LFB

78

Immigrant Political Incorporation Q: Yes, can you tell me an example when this happened?

Copyright © 2013. LFB Scholarly Publishing LLC. All rights reserved.

A: Look, for example, they always categorized us [like] we’re ignorant, like we are not prepared because the people that come from Mexico, we’re campesino del pueblo (countrymen from small towns), these people have not studied. They are submissive people that aren’t accustomed to fight, but now they [consular officials] know that we won’t stay quiet…we are able to speak and to fight in order to obtain our rights. (Interview with Durango federation leader, May 6, 2008.) As the federation chiefs began to gain more independence, consular officials took steps to ensure they maintained close ties with the newfound migrant confederation. Along with the General Consul’s bi-monthly meetings with CONFEMEX leaders, the IME’s Coordinator of Community Organizing claimed she spent a good 75 percent of her working hours concentrated on developing relations with the federations and clubs represented within CONFEMEX (Interview, February 20, 2009, Chicago, IL). In the midst of the post-9/11 national security climate and the expansion of Mexico’s emigrant-targeted programs, CONFEMEX eventually began to refashion the traditional nature of HTA activities by becoming a more integrated and autonomous organization. One sign of this more independent stance was a decision by CONFEMEX to participate in the interest-group efforts surrounding U.S. immigration policy debates. In January of 2004, President Bush (who faced reelection later in the year) revived proposals for a comprehensive immigration reform with an initiative that would provide millions of undocumented laborers with a path to legal status. The effort was widely seen as an attempt to regain political support from business groups and Latino voters (Dlouhy 2004).37 The move also attracted a 37

Bush’s initiative targeted undocumented immigrants currently working in the U.S. and aimed to encourage access to three-year work visas for jobs in the lower end of the labor market. Bush’s proposal was met with much debate and controversy within his own political party, as many conservatives viewed it as merely an election year ploy that would grant amnesty to lawbreakers who came to the U.S. through illegal entry. In addition, the Bush immigration plan reflected proposals already under consideration in Congress (HR2899,

Vonderlack-Navarro, Rebecca. Immigrant Political Incorporation : The Role of Hometown Associations, LFB

Conflicting Tendencies: Post-9/11 Politics

79

Copyright © 2013. LFB Scholarly Publishing LLC. All rights reserved.

high level of attention from immigrant groups themselves. The following month, building from the local migrant networking that emerged from the Enlaces America Immigrant Leadership Empowerment Project, numerous Chicago federation and other local migrant leaders joined a network of more than 30 Latino and Caribbean leaders from immigrant-led organizations across the United States at an emergency summit (Chacon and Shannon 2006). A CONFEMEX leader from the Michoacán federation present at the meeting later explained the particular outlook that inspired this new kind of direct political participation by migrants in U.S.-centered affairs: There was this conception that well, the question of immigration reform and all that, that we should leave it for the gringos (U.S.-born) to do, no? We should be the ones to talk for ourselves…In Washington there are people speaking who are not migrants, someone else is speaking for us. I believe it is important that the migrants, we are the ones that should speak for us about topics that affect us. The Mexican Americans don’t have problems with [legal] papers, they don’t have problems of documentation and migratory status. We are the Mexicans. We are the ones that should be speaking for our own people, for our own members. And that is what really struck the people [in the meeting]. (May 15, 2008, Chicago, IL). S1461). In 2003, House Republicans from Arizona Jim Kolbe and Jeff Flake along with Arizona Senator John McCain introduced legislation offering new classes of temporary three-year work visas for foreigners (renewable for an additional three years) for jobs posted on an electronic registry that were previously offered to U.S. citizens for a minimum of 14 days. At this time, Bush never backed the congressional measures and neither bill gained approval (Dlouhy 2004, 97; CQ Weekly,2004, .2526). Following Bush’s plan in January 2004 and moving into October of the same year, a number of immigrant policies were introduced to Congress, but they were unable to overcome GOP divisions. Proposed measures included issuing green cards to undocumented children seeking higher education or military positions (S 1545, HR 1684), temporary visas for agricultural workers (S 1645, HR 3142), and allowing local police to arrest unauthorized immigrants and enforce criminal punishment (HR 2671) (CQ Weekly 2004,.2526).

Vonderlack-Navarro, Rebecca. Immigrant Political Incorporation : The Role of Hometown Associations, LFB

80

Immigrant Political Incorporation

By the end of 2004, CONFEMEX had joined with more than 85 migrant-led organizations from many U.S. cities to form the National Alliance of Latino and Caribbean Communities (NALACC) with the goal to “build transnational leadership and immigrant civic participation in order to advocate for policies that will address the root causes of migration, while at the same time reforming U.S. immigration policies to make them more humane and effective” (Chacón and Shannon 2006, 4). The innovative immigrant-led alliance stood out from the well-established U.S. Latino organizations in that it aimed to advocate for sustainable social and economic development strategies in Latin America along with U.S. immigration reform. While the latest Bush reform proposal faded quickly after his reelection in November 2004,38 CONFEMEX would continue to work closely with NALACC around a Washington-focused immigration reform agenda.

Copyright © 2013. LFB Scholarly Publishing LLC. All rights reserved.

The Illinois State-Immigrant Agenda: HTAs as Potential StateSociety Partners Another factor pulling CONFEMEX’s interests towards U.S.-related concerns—and one that in the long term would prove quite powerful— came from state-level politics in Illinois. As early as 2002, state and local politicians (including Democratic candidate for governor Rod Blagojevich) started to take an especially strong electoral interest in Chicago’s Mexican immigrants. Working primarily through Chicago’s Democratic Congressman Luis V. Gutierrez, the Blagojevich campaign made repeated overtures to the Latino community, including a number of Spanish-speaking commercials in which he boasted that he, too, was a son of immigrants.39 In fact, his subsequent victory in November 2002 was attributed in part to strong support by Latino constituency groups, who in turn expected a boost in state-governmental support for citizenship classes, immigrant healthcare, and housing. Yet the expected political benefits failed to materialize, and by 2004 the growing number of Latino lawmakers in Springfield, along with 38

The Bush reform initiative was shot down by conservative Republications in Congress in late November 2004. 39 Many viewed Gutierrez’s support of Blagojevich as a strategic maneuver to heal his poor relationship with powerful Alderman Dick Mell of the 33rd ward, the father-in-law of Blagojevich. Gutierrez actively denied this claim.

Vonderlack-Navarro, Rebecca. Immigrant Political Incorporation : The Role of Hometown Associations, LFB

Copyright © 2013. LFB Scholarly Publishing LLC. All rights reserved.

Conflicting Tendencies: Post-9/11 Politics

81

influential advocacy groups, were becoming increasingly vocal in their criticisms of the governor.40 As Blagojevich looked ahead to his reelection effort in 2006, it was clear that a considerable political gesture would be required to mobilize Latino supporters and the expanding immigrant community.41 The Illinois Governor was savvy in reconfiguring his state-migrant agenda to accommodate grievances within the immigrant community. On November 19, 2005, the Governor issued with much public fanfare the New Americans Executive Order to promote immigrant integration, which included a New Americans Policy Council and the State’s Interagency Task Force to devise recommendations for the state to enhance immigrant and refugee-related services. The Joint Executive Summary refers to the Executive Order as a “unique public-private partnership to create a first-in-the-nation coherent, strategic, and proactive state government approach to immigrant integration” (1). The Governor’s Order intended to build upon state services implemented by the previous administration, which included English classes, citizenship acquisition, and increased accessibility to healthcare and other immigrant services regardless of legal status. Governor Blagojevich ordered the ICIRR to staff the New Americans Policy Council and then tapped Jose Luis Gutierrez, a charismatic CONFEMEX leader from the state of Michoacán, to become the director of the Governor’s Office of New Americans Policy and Advocacy. The board president of the ICIRR revealed why the Michoacán federation leader was backed by ICIRR to take the job in the Governor’s Office: 40

Latino advocates and the increased number of Latino lawmakers (five new seats in the General Assembly, a rise in the Latino Caucus that amounted to 13 members total, and four new Latino Senators) expressed feelings of outrage and betrayal when Blagojevich used potential program funding to help shore up the state’s $5 billion budget deficit. 41 Rogal, Brian J. 2004. “Great Expectations: Latino lawmakers and advocates are gaining influence in Springfield, and warning the governor not to take them for granted,” Chicago Reporter, January; Neal, Steve. 2002, “Gutierrez’s aid boosts Blagojevich; Hispanic voters may have big impact on governor’s contest." Chicago Sun-Times, October 28. Fornek, Scott. 2002, “Blagojevich aims ad at Hispanics; Gutierrez appears in spot for governor hopeful." Chicago Sun-Times, January 8.

Vonderlack-Navarro, Rebecca. Immigrant Political Incorporation : The Role of Hometown Associations, LFB

82

Immigrant Political Incorporation

Copyright © 2013. LFB Scholarly Publishing LLC. All rights reserved.

We had to have a Mexican leader and then the question was which Mexican leader do we believe is prepared? And then…we saw this as our initiative…anytime you’re working in government and you’re supporting someone to go work in government, [it] better be someone you trust. Because…[of] co-optation and all that stuff…and so we push somebody that all of a sudden becomes more part of the government than they are the community. You know, I think that’s our biggest fear when people go into government. So, we’re cognizant of the co-optation part and so, so to me, I mean Jose Luis is absolutely the right person…He had worked his way to get a masters degree and [had] enough leadership credentials because of his involvement with the hometown associations and the Instituto [Institute of Progress (a local NGO)]. And, you know, enough [English]language skills, enough of the exposure to other leaders, beyond the hometown association leaders and, from my perspective, [it] was a great opportunity for this to be a victory for the Coalition [ICIRR]. Gutierrez oversaw the office that summoned the Interagency Task Force, a corresponding panel of representatives from nine state agencies that supervise the provision of health care, education, and human services. While Gutierrez’s extensive experience as an HTA leader made him intimately aware of migrants’ growing ability to gain power within Mexican politics, gaining political leverage within the more powerful U.S. political realm was all the more enticing. In an informal conversation, Gutierrez explained how mounting political recognition in the U.S. could be much more powerful for expanding his political efficacy in both Mexico and the U.S. “They asked me to be a diputado (deputy) in Mexico. That would have been good and I could have had a lot of money… but if I am able to obtain a political position in the United States, I could have much more influence in what happens in Mexico.” (Field observations, February 16, 2006, Durango Unido Offices, Chicago, IL.) Not only was the political capital he garnered over the years within Mexican politics transferrable to the U.S. arena, but his calculated step to become a part of established—and arguably more powerful—U.S. governmental institutions was seen as a mechanism to increase political sway in Mexico even further.

Vonderlack-Navarro, Rebecca. Immigrant Political Incorporation : The Role of Hometown Associations, LFB

Conflicting Tendencies: Post-9/11 Politics

83

Furthermore, Gutierrez’s political appointment signaled a new kind of public recognition for Chicago’s HTAs and CONFEMEX, and this political connection to state-level government and Democratic party politics inspired a growing level of domestic interest-group activity on the part of federation leaders, as well as an emerging focus on U.S. electoral participation. In striking contrast to the raucously antiimmigrant rhetoric that was currently dominating U.S. national politics, Illinois politics seemed to be moving in a very different direction. Growing numbers of Illinois state and local leaders were now holding up the region’s immigrant communities as hard-working, economic contributors and esteemed potential citizens, and organizations such as CONFEMEX seemed to be reaping the political benefits.

Copyright © 2013. LFB Scholarly Publishing LLC. All rights reserved.

Mexico Still the Main Priority: Chicago HTAs Battle for Emigrant Voting Rights It is clear that while post-9/11 national policy trends seemed to be increasingly threatening to Chicago’s Mexican migrants, distinct and contradictory political influences were actually drawing their organizations deeper into U.S. domestic politics. In the meantime, however, a new turn of events made it apparent that CONFEMEX, for all its growing involvement in U.S. political circles, continued to see Mexico as its primary priority. In early 2005, a unanimous vote by the Mexican Chamber of Deputies approved absentee-voting legislation just in time for implementation in the elections the following year. Although contentious restrictions were soon attached to the measure, Chicago’s federation leaders reacted energetically to the seeming advancement, and much of their organizational activity over the remainder of the year focused on voter mobilization related to the homeland. CONFEMEX contributed $5,000 towards a local voter mobilization campaign to educate the Mexican immigrant community about their absentee voting rights for the 2006 elections. CONFEMEX hosted volunteer-led informational workshops concerning voter eligibility, registration locations, and deadlines; they conducted outreach through local Spanish-language media and allocated the federation headquarters of Durango Unido and Casa Michoacán to serve as centers of informational resources. As a result of CONFEMEX’s labors, more than 1,400 eligible voters had their

Vonderlack-Navarro, Rebecca. Immigrant Political Incorporation : The Role of Hometown Associations, LFB

Copyright © 2013. LFB Scholarly Publishing LLC. All rights reserved.

84

Immigrant Political Incorporation

registration forms personally delivered by CONFEMEX leaders to their appropriate location in Mexico City.42 CONFEMEX leaders were soon dismayed, however, by the strict eligibility requirements imposed by the Mexican government. CONFEMEX records indicated that more than 5,000 people arrived to their voter registration drives, but the bulk of interested voters did not satisfy the Mexican government’s eligibility requirements. In response to the “fracaso (failure)” of emigrants to exhibit political weight in the Mexican elections, the CONFEMEX president at the time expressed, “It’s not our fault we [the immigrant community] could not vote, because we didn’t have electorate credentials or because we didn’t have ten dollars to pay to have it sent." She went on to criticize Mexico’s Federal Electoral Institute (IFE for its acronym in Spanish) for not doing enough to help emigrants engage in their newfound voting rights. “In great contrast to the IFE, we [CONFEMEX] offered a training to help people fill out the form and register for the absentee vote. In addition, we sent the vote to Mexico for free, because no one should have to pay to exercise their constitutional right.”43 Even while the restrictions would end up severely inhibiting emigrant voter turnout,44 causing considerable frustration among the city’s homeland-focus political activists, the agenda of CONFEMEX still remained chiefly focused on apparent political opportunities south of the border.

42

CONFEMEX archive materials. “Report Submitted to the Solidago Foundation; Trejo, 2006; CONFEMEX meeting minutes, November 7, 2005 and January 9, 2006. Accessed October 2006, 43 CONFEMEX estimated that their media outreach efforts to inform the public of their voting rights potentially reached 100,000 members of the Mexican immigrant community. Trejo, Karen. 2006. “Fracaso Total.” Especial La Raza, January 20. Accessed January 7, 2007. Especial La Raza, http://www.impre.com/laraza/. 44 Survey estimates indicate that only 3 million of the 10 million potential migrant voters possessed the necessary voter ID cards, suggesting initial limitations to the absentee voting process. (See M.P. Smith and Bakker 2008, 138; see 137-140 for their review on potential blockades to absentee voting. Also R.C. Smith 2008, 721-726, 731 for a review of public debates surrounding migrants’ absentee voting rights in Mexico.)

Vonderlack-Navarro, Rebecca. Immigrant Political Incorporation : The Role of Hometown Associations, LFB

Conflicting Tendencies: Post-9/11 Politics

85

Copyright © 2013. LFB Scholarly Publishing LLC. All rights reserved.

Conclusion The 2001 to 2005 time period sheds important light on the emerging binational activities of Chicago’s confederation of HTAs. CONFEMEX’s growing U.S. engagement was evidenced through Mexican governmental initiatives aimed at fostering the financial integration of the diaspora, nascent engagement with immigrant rights concerns through the Immigrant Leadership Empowerment Project and later with NALACC, and growing involvement in Illinois state politics. Yet the primary focus of the confederation still remained on Mexico, particularly their newly granted absentee voting rights. Even though punitive U.S. immigrant legislation passed during the 1990s and continued to turn repressive moving into 2005,45 much of the immigrant community was fairly confident that eventually another round of immigration reform that included a legalization provision would be achieved through future Fox-Bush talks. At this point in time, the potentially threatening anti-immigrant legislation that existed was seen by many immigrants as only selectively enforced. In addition, within Chicago, migrants were all the time more aware that they served as an indispensible economic resource for the city. But it is important to understand that specific changes in Chicago HTAs and CONFEMEX’s agendas, like co-founding NALACC and widening their activities to include immigrant integration concerns, were critical factors that set the stage for HTAs to eventually embrace an even deeper focus on U.S.related activities moving into 2006.

45

During 2005 specifically a conservative faction of GOP within the House of Representatives pushed for more restrictionist policies: House Judiciary Committee Chairman F. James Sensenbrenner Jr., R-WI, championed an immigration bill (HR 1268) to inhibit undocumented immigrants from accessing drivers’ licenses, create obstacles for those applying for political asylum, and promote the finalized three-mile construction of the border fence along with California-Mexico border; House Rules Chairman David Dreier, R-Calif, pushed HR98 to enhance employer penalties for those who do not fully check their employees’ legal status; and Representative Tom Tancredo, R-Colo, led the anti-illegal immigrant Congressional Immigration Reform Caucus, comprised of 71 conservative GOP members of the House aimed at increasing immigration enforcement (Wayne 2005a; Stern 2005).

Vonderlack-Navarro, Rebecca. Immigrant Political Incorporation : The Role of Hometown Associations, LFB

Copyright © 2013. LFB Scholarly Publishing LLC. All rights reserved. Vonderlack-Navarro, Rebecca. Immigrant Political Incorporation : The Role of Hometown Associations, LFB

CHAPTER 4

Copyright © 2013. LFB Scholarly Publishing LLC. All rights reserved.

"I think we're at the start of a social movement": HTA Mobilization for U.S. Immigrant Rights, December 2005 to March 10 2006

On March 10, 2006, more than 100,000 protestors in Chicago joined together in a historic mass march in defense of immigrant rights (Avila and Olivo 2006a). Although this protest was followed by the much more publicized May 1 rallies, the March 10 demonstration featured the first mass outburst of defiance in response to the threatening provisions of H.R. 4437, the so-called Sensenbrenner bill (Avila and Olivo 2006b). Both participants and observers were astonished by what was then one of the largest protest rallies ever held in Chicago. The leadership of what came to be known as Chicago’s March 10th Committee represented a coalition of local grassroots organizations previously unheard of and distinct from the leadership list for subsequent rallies, which would come to be dominated by large national civil rights organizations and labor unions. The committee included the typical gathering of local immigrant rights organizations, but markedly different was the presence of the Chicago-based confederation of traditionally Mexican-focused hometown associations. By tracing the events in the short period between December 2005 and the passage of the Sensenbrenner bill to the March 10, 2006 mass march, this chapter sheds light on CONFEMEX’s remarkable 87

Vonderlack-Navarro, Rebecca. Immigrant Political Incorporation : The Role of Hometown Associations, LFB

Copyright © 2013. LFB Scholarly Publishing LLC. All rights reserved.

88

Immigrant Political Incorporation

organizational transformation as it came to play a novel central role in Chicago’s demonstration planning. How is it that Chicago’s traditionally Mexican-focused confederation of HTAs came to embrace U.S.-focused contentious action? Traditional assimilationist approaches would expect to find that over time CONFEMEX became engaged in U.S.-focused activity. Yet CONFEMEX’s leadership role in the March 10 rally was not an outgrowth of a slow but sure evolutionary process where immigrants severed ties from their sending society and assumed political allegiance within a tightly bounded new host society. CONFEMEX’s sudden (not evolutionary) prioritization of U.S.-focused activity materialized through state repression and social movement contention.46 By focusing the analysis on migrants’ sustained social and political membership ties with Mexico, transnational conceptions of HTA activities are unable to effectively explain migrants’ rapid recourse to U.S. protest. However, by viewing the process through a social movement lens, we can see how it was CONFEMEX’s process of social mobilization allowed them to become influential in U.S. politics. With the application of the political process model, we can better understand the conditions under which organizations (specifically HTAs) became vehicles for mobilization. As Cloward and Piven (1999) argue, mass disruption is not pushed from the top down by longstanding organizations, unions, or other institutions with access to power. Commonly, the opposite tends to occur. “Mobilization from the bottom swells the ranks of activists” (172). Despite the fact that Chicago has long been a hotbed of immigrant activism, March 10 and the demonstrations that followed in 2006 represented a rare moment when masses of people were ready to take to the streets. Chicago’s HTA leadership was for the first time “caught up in the political tide of the moment” as they encouraged their base and others to join the fight 46

Although the immigrant marches of 2006 were peaceful demonstrations, I argue that the marches still exemplify contentious activity for immigrants. The marches represented a pivotal moment in recent immigrant organizing with large numbers of undocumented immigrants—for the most part marginalized and relegated to the shadows of U.S. society—now highly visible and taking a public stand against national legislation. While peaceful, immigrants’ confrontational response to U.S. national policy in this way can be understood as a contentious act of defiance.

Vonderlack-Navarro, Rebecca. Immigrant Political Incorporation : The Role of Hometown Associations, LFB

Copyright © 2013. LFB Scholarly Publishing LLC. All rights reserved.

HTA Mobilization for U.S. Immigrant Rights

89

against Sensenbrenner (185). Although HTAs had long been known as generally conservative creatures of the Mexican state, a broader focus on their long-standing relationship with various government projects illuminates the factors that induced their embrace of popular mobilization. This chapter begins by focusing on how immigrant politics in the United States changed quickly and vividly with the passage by the House of Representatives of HR 4437 in December 2005. Sponsored by Representative James F. Sensenbrenner (R-WI), the bill proposed making unauthorized immigration or the provision of assistance to undocumented migrants a felony offense. As the leadership circles of the Mexican immigrant community of Chicago learned of the bill, an extraordinary groundswell of concern and anger emboldened leaders to mobilize and fight. The threat of Sensenbrenner ignited within CONFEMEX leaders a “cognitive liberation” to question the political establishment and assert their rights (McAdam 1982, 48). By February 2006, CONFEMEX leaders were hosting a broad array of immigrant rights advocates at the Michoacán federation headquarters to plan a major protest demonstration for the following month. By playing a leadership role in social mobilization, they set the stage for a major shift in focus for the hometown associations and their federation leaders. Due to the massive turnout for the March 10 demonstration, CONFEMEX (along with other loosely grouped grassroots immigrant organizations) found itself at the center of Chicago’s immigrant rights movement. “Thanks to Sensenbrenner”: CONFEMEX Embraces Contentious Activity The Sensenbrenner bill emerged directly from a rightward political resurgence following the Bush reelection in 2004.47 If the effort to 47

At this time, the U.S.’s GOP remained divided over legislative proposals offering temporary work visas to undocumented immigrants. This was a marked contrast to proposals from other party members to secure the border and strengthen deportation policies (Dlouhy 2005, 246). Soon House leaders recognized political unity might be more easily achieved over the proposal to construct a 379-mile electronic border fence between the U.S.-Mexico border (Dlouhy 2005, 442). Talks of border construction began as early as February

Vonderlack-Navarro, Rebecca. Immigrant Political Incorporation : The Role of Hometown Associations, LFB

90

Immigrant Political Incorporation

Copyright © 2013. LFB Scholarly Publishing LLC. All rights reserved.

maintain Republican electoral unity had temporarily muted the party’s internal divisions on immigration, by the following year the more militant conservative faction of the party, particularly within the House of Representatives, was aggressively applying pressure on legislators to refortify the country’s approach to “illegal” immigration. With HR 4437 (the Border Protection, Antiterrorism, and Illegal Immigration Control Act of 2005), House Judiciary Chair James Sensenbrenner introduced a bill that incorporated several highly punitive provisions from a measure proposed by Tom Tancredo (R-CO) earlier in the year, including making illegal entry into the United States a felony, while also redefining any provision of support by people or organizations to undocumented migrants as a criminal offense (Wayne 2005, 2006).48 2005 along with congressional endorsement of a provision providing the Homeland Security Department with unprecedented authority to devise whatever physical obstacles it deemed appropriate to prevent unauthorized immigration (Dlouhy 2005, 442; Stern 2005, 1241). Moving into September of 2005, a guestworker visa program began to appear prominently in the congressional agenda. In May 2005 John McCain (R-AZ) and Edward M. Kennedy (D-MA) proposed a bill (SB 1033) that permitted unauthorized migrants to remain in the U.S. and request a new H-5B visa, with the possibility of eventually attaining legal status. In an effort to prove the bill was not an amnesty provision, supporters of the bill (including business groups and Latino organizations) stressed that undocumented immigrants in the program would pay fines and undergo background checks. In July of 2005, Senators Jon Kyl (R-AZ) and John Cornyn (R-TX) proposed a plan (S 1438) where immigrants would need to return to their countries of origin before being eligible to apply for a new temporary guestworker program. The bills prompted backlash from a group of Republicans spearheaded by Tom Tancredo of Colorado, who was rumored to have his own ambitions for a presidential run. Tancredo, in response, proposed a harsh enforcement bill (HR3333) in July aimed at criminalizing undocumented immigration, making it a felony offence for employers who would face jail time (Stern 2005, 2315). Tancredo was one of numerous state actors using the anti-immigrant platform as a means to further his own career aspirations. 48 During 2005 specifically, a conservative faction of the GOP within the House of Representatives pushed for more restrictionist policies: House Judiciary Committee Chairman F. James Sensenbrenner Jr. (R-WI) championed an immigration bill (HR 1268) to inhibit undocumented

Vonderlack-Navarro, Rebecca. Immigrant Political Incorporation : The Role of Hometown Associations, LFB

Copyright © 2013. LFB Scholarly Publishing LLC. All rights reserved.

HTA Mobilization for U.S. Immigrant Rights

91

The Republican-controlled House of Representatives passed the bill in December 2005 by a vote of 239-182. While its long-term prospects in the Senate were said to be uncertain, the political impact of the measure in immigrant communities were instant and extensive. Chicago’s Spanish-language media gave extensive coverage to the follow-up debates in the Senate, as local immigrant activists quickly framed the House bill as an attack on the Latino community (Shannon 2007). Chicago’s Mexican immigrant federations were caught unaware by the hard-hitting force of the Sensenbrenner bill—at least on the surface. Over the last fifteen years, Chicago’s HTAs had expanded their activities to include infrastructure and voting-rights projects in Mexico and more recently, involvement in a range of U.S.- associated advocacy efforts, including Washington-focused lobbying led by NALACC and working with the Illinois government to expand state services for immigrants. Along with growing political awareness, CONFEMEX had developed a deepened sensitivity to the threatening anti-immigrant politics that had emerged post-9/11. Yet even the most domestically attuned federation leaders were shocked by the punitive emphasis of the Sensenbrenner measure, which quickly created alarm throughout immigrant leadership circles in Chicago. Early reactions by many migrant members on the ground took the form of disbelief, as well as a certain presentiment of doom. “This is a waste of time,” was how one Hidalgo federation leader characterized some of the comments from his members. “We’re not here to change the laws of this country.” After the initial shock had worn off, however, there was anger, along with a new kind of political fortitude to take action. “[We] got mad,” one immigrants from accessing drivers’ licenses, create obstacles for those applying for political asylum, and promote the finalized three-mile construction of the border fence along the California-Mexico border; House Rules Chairman David Dreier (R-Calif.) pushed HR98 to enhance employer penalties for those who do not fully check their employees’ legal status; and Representative Tom Tancredo (R-Colo.) led the anti-illegal immigrant Congressional Immigration Reform Caucus comprised of 71 conservative GOP members of the House. They also aimed to increase immigration enforcement (Wayne 2005a; Stern 2005). See also Wayne, Alex. 2005. “Views of Senate GOP, Bush Threaten Tighter Immigration,” CQ Weekly, January 17, 115; and Stern, Seth. 2005. “Sensenbrenner’s Win on Immigration, “ CQ Weekly, May 9,1241.

Vonderlack-Navarro, Rebecca. Immigrant Political Incorporation : The Role of Hometown Associations, LFB

92

Immigrant Political Incorporation

federation leader noted simply. “Everyone was related to someone undocumented." (Interview with Hidalgo federation president and secretary, June 23, 2008, Chicago, IL.) In the coming months, CONFEMEX took on an unparalleled new level of U.S.-focused protest mobilization. Exactly where CONFEMEX’s new motivation would lead them was not instantaneously apparent. Although Chicago had long been an epicenter for immigrant rights mobilizations, the HTAs and their federations had not been significant participants in these actions. Enduring divisions within the city’s Latino community tended to separate homeland-oriented migrant associations from grassroots organizations that focused on immigrant rights. Thus, it was only the latter who had come together in a series of local efforts to challenge the U.S. government’s growing security-inflected immigration agenda, such as a Human Chain effort in 2001 to stop traffic in Chicago, the 2002 campaign to support the sanctuary bid of undocumented immigrant Elvira Arellano,49 and the local contribution to the national

Copyright © 2013. LFB Scholarly Publishing LLC. All rights reserved.

49

Around this time, a local grassroots organization, Centro Sin Fronteras (Center without Borders) and the, Adlaberto United Methodist Church in the mostly Mexican Humboldt Park neighborhood were looking for media venues to publicly promote the legal case of unauthorized Mexican immigrant and single mother Elvira Arellano—a case that would eventually garner substantial media attention in Chicago and nationwide (Chicago Tribune 2006). Arellano had been arrested in 2002 for using a fraudulent social security number to work in Chicago’s O’Hare International Airport. She was apprehended during a post-9/11 security raid. Due to Arellano’s U.S.-born son’s attention deficit-hyperactivity disorder (ADHD) and other medical issues, Arellano had been granted three deportation extensions since 2003. She would eventually seek refuge in the local Humboldt church in August of 2006, a move that resonated with the experience of Central American migrants who took asylum in U.S. churches during the sanctuary movement of the 1980s. See Editorial. 2006. “Elvira Arellano and the law.” Chicago Tribune, August 17; News Services. 2006. “Activist ready for long haul at church." Chicago Tribune, August 18; Avila, Oscar. 2005. “She refuses to go silently; Caring mother, hard worker, lawbreaker: Advocate for reform of immigration laws has a complex story.” Chicago Tribune, November 19. Also Avila, 2006. “Hunger strikers in Pilsen seek halt to deportations.” Chicago Tribune, May 25; News Services. 2006. “Popular illegal advocate faces

Vonderlack-Navarro, Rebecca. Immigrant Political Incorporation : The Role of Hometown Associations, LFB

HTA Mobilization for U.S. Immigrant Rights

93

Copyright © 2013. LFB Scholarly Publishing LLC. All rights reserved.

Immigrant Freedom Ride in 2004. (Interview with Centro Sin Fronteras Executive Director, October 18, 2008, Chicago, IL.) Even as late as July 2005, CONFEMEX did not officially participate in a proimmigrant rally that drew tens of thousands of demonstrators to Chicago’s Back of the Yards neighborhood (Saldana 2005; NotiMex 2005; Hussain 2005).50 Sponsored by Centro Sin Fronteras, a longstanding immigrant rights organization in Chicago, and publicized by two prominent Spanish-language radio deejays, this demonstration was called explicitly to condemn the formation of the Chicago Minutemen Project, a local offshoot of the militantly anti-immigrant group (Reed 2006; Univision 2004; Avila 2006; Interview with Centro Sin Fronteras Executive Director, October 18, 2008, Chicago, IL).51 CONFEMEX did not participate in this rally, in part because of pressing responsibilities related to what was being called an historic opportunity to Vote from Abroad (El Voto en el Exterior) in Mexico’s upcoming national elections.52 But the confederation was also

deportation.” Chicago Tribune, Red Eye Edition. August 9; Avila, Oscar. 2006. “Act of faith, defiance; Activist for Illinois’ illegal immigrants battles deportation by taking shelter in a city church.” Chicago Tribune, August 16. 50 Saldana, Martha. 2005. “Marcha Historica." El Imparcial. La Guia de la ComunidadMexicanaJuly7;Hussain,Rummana.2005http://circus4youth.org/ph oto_list.p?photosPage=8. “Protestors show support for immigration law reform.” Chicago Sun-Times, July 7; NotiMex. 2005. “Multitudinaria marcha de hispanos, en su mayoria mexicanos, desfila por calles de Chicago para pedir amnistia para migrantes indocumentados.”NoticierosTelevisa,Mexico, www.esmas.com/noticierostelevisa/mexico/457004.html. 51 Reed, Robert. 2006. “Air Power,” Chicago Magazine, January. www.chicagomag.com/Chicago-Magazine/January-2006/Air-Power. Also, Univision Communications. 2004. “Que Buena 105.1FM and ‘El Pistolero’ Make Chicago Radio History.” April 13. Available at: www.univision.net/corp/en/pr/Chicago_23042004-2._ Avila, Oscar. http://circus4youth.org/photo_list.php?photosPage=82006. “Shooting for a big turnout; ‘Pistolero’ steps away from shock jock persona to push immigrants’ march, rally.” Chicago Tribune, March 10. 52 A local Spanish-speaking newspaper illustrated Chicago’s apparent divide in transnational versus U.S.-based immigrant organizing with front page parallel photos. One photo showed transnational activists overjoyed with the newly

Vonderlack-Navarro, Rebecca. Immigrant Political Incorporation : The Role of Hometown Associations, LFB

Copyright © 2013. LFB Scholarly Publishing LLC. All rights reserved.

94

Immigrant Political Incorporation

concerned about involving itself in unruly protest actions. HTA leaders were particularly disdainful toward the deejays, whose low-brow humor was seen as inconsistent with the kind of organizational image the associations were striving to project. Several federation leaders nevertheless urged the confederation to become more involved in immigrant rights. One leader from Guerrero, looking back on the moment later, noted with sarcasm what he saw as the organization’s political blinders: “Oh, how great, you are going to pass the vote in Mexico and you don’t even know what could pass here in Chicago!” (Interview with Guerrero Federation leader, June 8, 2008.) Yet most federation leaders at the time felt that as a "young" organization, CONFEMEX needed to protect its growing reputation, and consequently, the leaders voted against formal approval of the rally. As one CONFEMEX leader later characterized the majority’s attitude: “It [the demonstration] was all about making a show.” (Interview with Michoacán Federation President, June 3, 2008). Following House approval of the Sensenbrenner bill, the political calculus changed. As details of the bill passed down to HTA leaders in December 2005, its alarming consequences also corresponded with the realization that the upcoming Mexican elections in February would not provide the momentous opportunity that had been long hoped. As it became increasingly clear that electoral restrictions would severely limit participation by U.S.-based emigrants, the full measure of Sensenbrenner began to sink in. As one CONFEMEX leader from the state of Michoacán recalls the moment: We were going with the vote of the Mexicans [in Mexico]. But when we became aware of the fiasco, of the lack of people with [Mexican] electoral credentials, there was great disenchantment and all of that hope we had of being able to have major political weight in Mexico [disappeared]. So then it grabbed our attention: Mexico is very far from here, many kilometers. Here is where we are, here is where we are living, and they are at the point of passing a law that is going to make you a criminal – and you continue thinking about voting in Mexico’s next elections? gained absentee voting rights in Mexico, which was juxtaposed by another photo of the July 2005 immigrant rights march (El Imparcial, July 7, 2005).

Vonderlack-Navarro, Rebecca. Immigrant Political Incorporation : The Role of Hometown Associations, LFB

HTA Mobilization for U.S. Immigrant Rights

95

The leader also remembers the deep insult and sense of personal threat that was registered by his immigrant members.

Copyright © 2013. LFB Scholarly Publishing LLC. All rights reserved.

It hit them: This was so bad. The proposal…was so discriminatory that we took it personally. Because before, when you heard about such things on television, yeah, sure, but that is happening there in Washington. It is very far away… But when you begin to see that this is going to affect the doctor who treats your brother who doesn’t have documents, when you see that it is going to be the teacher who gives classes to your nephew who is undocumented, you say,‘Ah chinga, eso esta mal!’ [Screw this, this is bad!]’ We have to change it…. We have to do something, and the people [became] very attentive. I believe there was a certain new level of consciousness. (Interview, May 15, 2008, Chicago, IL.) CONFEMEX leadership wasted no time swinging into motion and responding to the bill during their monthly January meeting with plans for workshops later that month at Casa Michoacán and the Durango Unido headquarters. Michoacán leaders made efforts to invite an immigrant lobbyist to educate the various Chicago federation leaders and their base about the repercussions of the bill. Leaders expressed concern for their base in the January meeting. “We need to make available informational workshops now. The community is confused and they do not know the details of how to get involved [to fight the bill].” (Field notes and CONFEMEX meeting minutes, January 9, 2006.) In the same meeting when CONFEMEX organized a press conference to advertise to the wider community their role in registering the community to vote in Mexico, a clear priority was also given to plan a response to the punitive implications of HR 4437. The anger sparked by Sensenbrenner would make U.S.-focused action a definite priority for CONFEMEX from now and into the future. Federation leaders at the time worried that encouraging their base to protest could prove difficult. Durango leaders in particular were concerned with the lack of panic, and even the outright skepticism, among many of their members. As one noted, “[The law] was bad, but it was worse that people didn’t believe it." Another echoed this concern: “[M]any people ignored the law. A lot of the [member] base

Vonderlack-Navarro, Rebecca. Immigrant Political Incorporation : The Role of Hometown Associations, LFB

Copyright © 2013. LFB Scholarly Publishing LLC. All rights reserved.

96

Immigrant Political Incorporation

ignored it. Many knew it was something dangerous, but not exactly how dangerous it was.” (Interview with former Durango Unido President, May 26, 2008, Chicago, IL.) Other federation leaders encountered a great deal of fear, to the extent that it was unclear whether many HTA members could develop the confidence to participate in what would be a very public event. Leaders from Guanajuato, for example, described how their members expressed concern that the 2006 marches might be a “conspiracy” to get undocumented immigrants out into the streets so as to more easily round them up for deportation. (Interview with Casa Guanajuato cofounder and current president, May 27, 2008.) In any event, it would clearly be up to federation leaders to educate and mobilize the base, as they were quickly coming to the realization that their contentious activity could become important in Chicago. CONFEMEX mobilized by speaking at various federation informational workshops, organizing telephone trees, and mass e-mail distributions. CONFEMEX leaders also worked with the Chicago chapter of NALACC to discuss further the implications of organizing against the bill and planned to host an informational event within Casa Michoacán. (Field notes, Chicago NALACC meeting, December 7, 2005; February 1, 2006; March 1, 2006; Durango Unido headquarters, Chicago, IL.) CONFEMEX leaders also used many consulate-related events, especially during the organizing of the annual Fiestas Patrias (Mexican Independence Day), to make announcements to promote the March 10 efforts. Just days before the demonstration, while organizing an event at the consulate for the Fiestas Patrias celebrations, the Guanajuato President revealed how important he expected the March 10 rally to be for CONFEMEX and the broader immigrant community. “I think we are at the start of a social movement.” (Field notes, Guanajuato President, March 1, 2006, Chicago consulate, Chicago, IL.) Certain federations took an especially energetic role in organizing the rally. When the Hidalgo federation leaders began to realize the extreme implications of the potential law, they quickly immersed themselves in making phone calls to enlist volunteers and to turn out their base. A small federation with a large number of undocumented members, Hidalgo was quickly able to round up 80 volunteers to coordinate security for March 10, and soon found itself dedicating all of its organizational energies to the marches to the extent that the federation even suspended its annual Mexico-oriented banquet and

Vonderlack-Navarro, Rebecca. Immigrant Political Incorporation : The Role of Hometown Associations, LFB

HTA Mobilization for U.S. Immigrant Rights

97

cultural festivities. “We focused 100 percent on immigrant rights,” recalled one leader, who felt personally transformed by the experience. “Sensenbrenner helped me find my purpose to defend people who didn’t have a voice." (Interview with Hidalgo federation president and secretary, June 23, 2008, Chicago, IL.) Other federation leaders chose to mobilize their base by drawing on the list of contacts they had formed through their recent drive to register Mexican absentee voters (Shannon 2007). In the process, the growing level of trust that had developed within the larger confederation of CONFEMEX ensured that the various federation leaders were able to coordinate their efforts effectively.

Copyright © 2013. LFB Scholarly Publishing LLC. All rights reserved.

The Uneasy Merging Organizing Fields

of

Chicago’s

Emigrant/Immigrant

One direct outcome of the political impact of HR 4437 was that it quickly brought together the two parts of the Latino communityorganizational field that had long seen one another as working on separate sides of the migrant/immigrant agenda. If the 2006 marches emerged in part out of a long-developing network of organizational ties, as one study (Cordero-Guzman et al. 2008) convincingly proposes, it took a threat as powerful as Sensenbrenner for Chicago’s grassroots organizations to overcome the deep divide between Mexico- versus U.S.-oriented organizing. On February 15, 2006, sixteen leaders from both sides of the Mexico- and U.S.-focused organizing realms attended an ad hoc meeting at Casa Michoacán, the federation’s Pilsen headquarters, to plan a rally for the following month. They would soon be known as the March 10th Committee, after the date of this first march. (Ad hoc committee minutes, “Resumen de la reunion del comite ad hoc en contra de la HR 4437, 15 de febrero del 2006, Casa Michoacán.”) The choice of venue for the meeting was itself significant, as it was long viewed by transnational-association organizers as terreno neutral (a politically neutral site) because it was not affiliated with any of the Mexican political parties. Casa Michoacán came to be similarly trusted by the various March 10th Committee participants. HTA leaders began to proudly refer to it as Casa de Todo

Vonderlack-Navarro, Rebecca. Immigrant Political Incorporation : The Role of Hometown Associations, LFB

98

Immigrant Political Incorporation

(House of Everyone) in order to highlight its unifying role in the fight against Sensenbrenner.53 The initial ad hoc meeting quickly set the mega-march rally organizing into motion. At the first meeting, organizers set the date of the rally for March 10, 2006. They also promoted Chicago as a “sanctuary city” for immigrants; discussed activists’ anger and a desire to confront Barack Obama for his decision to support border fence construction; established three of the five march committees (press committee, logistics, and security and communication); and scheduled the first press release about the March 10 rally on Thursday, February 16 at Casa Michoacán.54 Organizers wanted to deliberately move the demonstration outside of Latino-dominated areas into the city’s downtown and more directly confront political leaders. As a Michoacán leader within the ad hoc committee reflected: “It [downtown] is where the center of power is." While choosing a day during the weekend might be easier to mobilize their base, the activists strategically pushed for the March 10 work day in order to paralyze downtown activity and call attention to their fight. They strategized about how a mass

Copyright © 2013. LFB Scholarly Publishing LLC. All rights reserved.

53

According to the activists, Casa Michoacán continued to be the headquarters for the mega-march planning for 2006 and even 2007 for several reasons: first, it is located in the heart of Pilsen, a centrally located and predominantly Mexican-immigrant area of the city; second, Casa Michoacán is reportedly trusted by various immigrant groups; third, it provides a large and accommodating space with flexible hours for meetings; fourth, the federation owns the building, which meant that organizers did not have to seek anyone’s permission or approval for holding the meetings; and a fifth reason (and perhaps the most imperative) the Michoacán federation headquarters was perceived by many community leaders as “terreno neutral (neutral terrain)” was because no Mexican or U.S. political party interests are associated with their public space, a logical organizing concern for leaders immersed in the transnational voting campaign. A PRD activist claimed that because Casa Michoacán was perceived by the larger community as politically centrist, no one felt uncomfortable meeting there. (Interview with PRD Activists October 9, 2008 and October 19, 2008, Chicago, IL.) 54 The meeting was organized by a Michoacán federation leader and a PRD activist who were both IME Advisors. They were both interviewed for the study. (Michoacán federation leader, May 25, 2008 and PRD Activist October 9, 2008, Chicago, IL.)

Vonderlack-Navarro, Rebecca. Immigrant Political Incorporation : The Role of Hometown Associations, LFB

Copyright © 2013. LFB Scholarly Publishing LLC. All rights reserved.

HTA Mobilization for U.S. Immigrant Rights

99

demonstration during a Friday rush hour would create “mas dolor (more pain)” for Chicago commuters. (Interview with initial Ad Hoc member and Michoacán federation leader, May 25, 2008, Chicago, IL.) Also critical within the February meeting was a pressing desire for the community turnout for the rally to be extraordinary. And it was here that the role of Chicago’s HTA confederation would become significant. Long established grassroots immigrant leadership in Chicago viewed CONFEMEX’s potential to turn out their base as important for the March 10 demonstration. Just two days following the initial ad hoc meeting, the leadership of the Centro Sin Fronteras organization met with certain CONFEMEX leaders to discuss upcoming March 10 planning efforts. It was obvious the Centro Sin Fronteras director, Emma Lozano, was well connected and streetwise to what it would take to launch a successful mobilization. While not an immigrant herself, she was a long-time mainstay of local immigrant organizing. Lozano had been a central leader within the recent and sizable July 2005 demonstrations where her working relationship with El Pistolero deejay had supplied her with a powerful platform to communicate with the broader immigrant community. (Interview with Emma Lozano, Centro Sin Fronteras Executive Director, October 18, 2008, Chicago, IL.) Many CONFEMEX leaders were wary of Lozano’s often confrontational style. Some federation leaders questioned her intentions in local immigrant organizing. “She acts like she is going to be the savior of us all." Nevertheless, with the dire implications of the Sensenbrenner bill looming, the leaders were willing to push their differences aside and work with Lozano in order to launch collective resistance. (Field observations, February 17, 2006; March 1st, 2006, Durango Unido Offices, Chicago, IL.)55 The early mega-march planning meetings were chaotic, lasting late 55

Reed, Robert. 2006. “Air Power,” Chicago Magazine, January. www.chicagomag.com/Chicago-Magazine/January-2006/Air-Power. Also, Univision Communications. 2004. “Que Buena 105.1FM and ‘El Pistolero’ Make Chicago Radio History.” April 3. Available at: www.univision.net/corp/en/pr/Chicago_23042004-2._Avila, Oscar. 2006. “Shooting for a big turnout; ‘Pistolero’ steps away from shock jock persona to push immigrants’ march, rally.” Chicago Tribune, March 10.

Vonderlack-Navarro, Rebecca. Immigrant Political Incorporation : The Role of Hometown Associations, LFB

Copyright © 2013. LFB Scholarly Publishing LLC. All rights reserved.

100

Immigrant Political Incorporation

into the evening. Tensions between activists became palpable and CONFEMEX leaders were skeptical about whether this unruly group could pull off the demonstration. Growing quickly from fourteen to close to fifty leaders, the planning process also grew unwieldy, and at times CONFEMEX leaders complained. “Everyone wants to be a leader.” (Chicago NALACC field notes and minutes, March 1, 2006, Durango Unido headquarters, Chicago, IL.) Just days before the rally, federation leaders from Durango, Hidalgo, Michoacán, and Guanajuato worried aloud about the planning proceedings. “While we are in agreement with the point of the meetings, much is being lost with its lack of structure.” (Field observations February 23, 2006, Comite Ad Hoc en Contra de la HR 4437.) One source of internal dissension was over what symbols should be used in the protest. CONFEMEX endorsed the idea of protestors carrying U.S. flags as a means of conveying their political membership and sense of belonging in American society. Other organizers pushed hard for the use of Mexican flags, which they argued would uphold their heritage and directly confront racial discrimination against Mexicans. CONFEMEX president Marcia Soto encouraged the various leaders within the ad hoc meetings to think strategically about how to attract the mainstream American public to their cause claiming, “They vote too” and encouraging the group to avoid “grocerias" (rudeness) within their slogans. “…[W]e need to look like part of the community not ‘terrorists’ outside of the community—our own kids are gringos" (U.S.-born). The debate reflected contrasting views about the need for self-expression and racial identity in an increasingly discriminatory environment versus what CONFEMEX leaders believed would be politically effective in winning immigration reform. Representing an HTA base where many members—and some leaders—lacked legal status, CONFEMEX leaders argued, “necessitamos sensitizer a la gente" (we need to sensitize the people) and lure them to their side of the battle. It was critical, in their perspective, that demonstrators be willing to bear the U.S. flag and show allegiance to their new country. (Field observations, February 23, 2006, Comite Ad Hoc en Contra de HR 4437.) The ensuing turnout on March 10 was not only enormous but it was also, surprisingly, the result of local efforts. Rather than national civil rights organizations or labor unions taking leadership, the Chicago March 10th Committee comprised an unparalleled coming together of

Vonderlack-Navarro, Rebecca. Immigrant Political Incorporation : The Role of Hometown Associations, LFB

HTA Mobilization for U.S. Immigrant Rights

101

Copyright © 2013. LFB Scholarly Publishing LLC. All rights reserved.

local grassroots organizations, especially CONFEMEX, which demonstrated its closeness to the ground by showing a strong capacity to mobilize its HTA base. A local Chicago activist, Board President of the ICIRR, talked about the role of HTAs in the mobilizations as follows: Without the HTAs that thing [the marches] does not happen…there’s absolutely no way that thing happens…they have a spirit of volunteerism. They have organized events with actually no resources. So…they don’t have as much of an established political perspective in the U.S. That, you know, groups that have been involved in La Lucha (the struggle) here [in Chicago] for a long time have…I mean, who’s going to do all the work for stuff to happen that made that thing a reality? I mean all the things that people take for granted, that actually happened [in the marches], you know…so it’s their experience, their volunteer base…I believe created the spirit; created the relative sense of neutrality in the midst. Of an environment that was far from neutral, I mean toxically nonneutral…I just don’t see it [the marches] happening if it was based in any other institution other than Casa Michoacán because, you know, it’s [an] open environment. (Interview, January 9, 2009, Chicago, IL.) While CONFEMEX demonstrated its grassroots connections by mobilizing large numbers of its HTA base, CONFEMEX also benefited from its newcomer status within local protest politics—that is, from the perception on the part of other organizations that the HTA federations could operate as a neutral, trustworthy coalition partner. Furthermore, Juan Salgado was quick to notice that HTAs responded more quickly to Sensenbrenner, in contrast to larger, national-level organizations, as the bill would directly impact their membership base of mixed legal status: Q: Why do you think national-level Latino organizations weren’t involved in March 10th? A: Yeah, well, I mean, oh brother, you know, I don’t blame them for not [being involved] because it’s not the kind of organizations they are…they’re tightening up and they’re

Vonderlack-Navarro, Rebecca. Immigrant Political Incorporation : The Role of Hometown Associations, LFB

102

Immigrant Political Incorporation

Copyright © 2013. LFB Scholarly Publishing LLC. All rights reserved.

getting stronger now, but it’s not like they listen to the membership… They do, they consult with us, but they run an organization that we’re part of…it’s very different from ICIRR, which is a membership-driven organization, and even ICIRR is very different from HTAs, you know. It’s a whole different level of grassroots between the Coalition and what the HTAs are…the closer you are to the community, the, the more risk you’re willing to take. Because you have less to lose, more to gain, and the more urgency you feel, because you’re facing the consequences of [government] actions immediately. You face it quicker in real time and you face it without access to a whole lot of resources to do much about it." (Interview, January 9, 2009, Chicago, IL.) A local PRD organizer claimed national organizers were “caught flatfooted because institutions can’t move fast enough.” (Interview, October 9, 2008, Chicago, IL.) In addition, there was also very minimal representation of labor unions in the first March 10 outcry. Because they are relatively more structured and bureaucratic, unions moved more slowly, with the local Service Employee Industrial Union (SEIU) providing last minute funds to help with logistical and stage support. Local migrant activists who work closely with unions explained in our interviews that organized labor did not know how big the March 10 demonstration was going to be, nor did it understand its importance for immigrants.56 Chicago’s immigrant community provided the first mobilization in the country to respond to the Sensenbrenner bill on March 10, 2006 with a massive, yet peaceful march towards the city’s downtown. The rally started in the city’s Near West Side and headed toward the Chicago Loop to the Federal Plaza. Crowd estimates varied, between 100,000 to as many as 150,000 protestors.57 As leaders had strategized, 56

Interviews with PRD activist Jorge Mujica, Oct 9, 2008, and Michoacán federation leader Artemio Arreola, May 25, 2008, Chicago, IL. 57 Olivo, Antonio and Oscar Avila. 2006. “United they march. Hundreds of thousands rally for immigration rights. ‘We have to change the world.’" Chicago Tribune, May 2; Martinez, Michael. 2006. “Rallies draw over 1 million. Economic impact not clear, but businesses note worker shortages." Chicago Tribune, May 2; Associated Press. 2006. “At a Glance: Immigration

Vonderlack-Navarro, Rebecca. Immigrant Political Incorporation : The Role of Hometown Associations, LFB

Copyright © 2013. LFB Scholarly Publishing LLC. All rights reserved.

HTA Mobilization for U.S. Immigrant Rights

103

the demonstration served to freeze downtown Chicago activity and drew broader awareness to their cause. The organizers of the March 10th Committee were shocked and emotionally moved by the massive turnout. And though national legislation was growing more punitive, numerous Illinois local state actors endorsed the marches and spoke at the rally, as they had much to gain from the mounting political consciousness of this potential voting bloc. In direct defiance to Sensenbrenner’s criminalization tactic, Illinois Governor Blagojevich and other local lawmakers spoke at the rally endorsing immigrants as valuable economic contributors to the state. The mega-march instigated a discernable change for CONFEMEX in recognizing its own political power in the United States. CONFEMEX leaders reflected on the emotionally-charged mass turnout claiming, “We woke up." The threat of Sensenbrenner instigated what felt like a turning point with the base, according to a Durango leader who reflected just days after the march: “this was something new for them [the clubs].” In turn, they yearned to maintain their momentum for organizing for future demonstrations. (Field notes, March 18, 2006.) Another Durango leader wryly noted, “We should give thanks to Sensenbrenner,” as the political threat propelled their base into U.S.-focused contentious activism. (Field notes, May 10, 2008, Chicago, IL.) Another leader from Michoacán discussed the growth in their U.S. political awareness: “The marches were a development in the collective consciousness of the importance of immigration reform.” (Field notes, May 15, 2008, Chicago, IL.) Another CONFEMEX leader described the impact in their organizational agenda as follows: … it gave us a lot of strength and energy to continue working…I believe that now we have more responsibility than before…if you are going to rouse the people, if you are going to teach them, if you are going to tell them to talk about their rights, you also have to teach them what are their rights…this is a responsibility that has come upon us…we have changed a Legislation,” Chicago Tribune, May 18; and Associated Press. 2006. “Contra ley antiinmigrante." La Cronica de Hoy. March. Available at: www.cronica.com.mx

Vonderlack-Navarro, Rebecca. Immigrant Political Incorporation : The Role of Hometown Associations, LFB

104

Immigrant Political Incorporation

Copyright © 2013. LFB Scholarly Publishing LLC. All rights reserved.

little our vision that we had in the beginning that was nothing more [than] Mexico…we are showing the people that they should vote [in the U.S.], and I think we have had a lot of impact because there were a lot of people that were [U.S.] residents for many years and nothing more, and we have shown that you are not losing Mexico when you become a [U.S.] citizen. In fact we are winning as federations…I think the marches helped us to understand that we can be American citizens and work in two countries. (Interview with Durango leader, May 6, 2008, Chicago, IL.) The March 10, 2006 rally brought a new energy to CONFEMEX, a sense of political efficacy in U.S. affairs, and a new sense of responsibility to promote the U.S. political incorporation of their base. Tensions materialized, however, as some long-standing local leaders feared Casa Michoacán and CONFEMEX leaders might gain too much credit for their role in the March 10 demonstration. Emma Lozano from Centro Sin Fronteras joined with El Pistolero in his radio show to criticize the federations following the March 10 rally. Federation leaders were highly distressed that the deejay spent more than an hour on his radio show claiming the federation leaders monopolized the microphone at the rally’s central stage and were not helpful in turning out their base to march. He even called the federation leaders outright disrespectful. While the federation leaders were transformed and elated about their new leadership role in the marches, they were greatly distressed by these accusations. Leaders within the movement (like El Pistolero), accustomed to receiving much glory for drawing out the rank-and-file through the radio waves, were not inclined to easily share the spotlight with federation leaders. In an evaluation meeting of the March 10 event, community leaders were distressed by how the “dirty laundry” of the activists had been aired on the radio. The meeting minutes aimed to reconcile the tensions. “Conflicts and disagreements within the group [the committee] should be resolved within the group and not on the radio." The tensions revealed that the immigrant unity necessary to mobilize for March 10 was fragile. (Field notes, March 18, 2006; Ad Hoc minutes, “Reunion de Evaluacion de Comite en Contra de la HR 4437,” March 18, 2006.) Despite the threat felt by other demonstration leaders at the federations' new entrance into U.S.-based protest activity,

Vonderlack-Navarro, Rebecca. Immigrant Political Incorporation : The Role of Hometown Associations, LFB

HTA Mobilization for U.S. Immigrant Rights

105

Copyright © 2013. LFB Scholarly Publishing LLC. All rights reserved.

CONFEMEX’s crucial role in organizing the March 10 rally eventually gave its organizers new standing as emergent leaders in U.S.-focused immigrant organizing. Emma Lozano, director of Centro Sin Fronteras, during a reflective 2008 interview talked of the federations and clubs as follows: “They were finally rolling up their sleeves and getting involved with people on this side of the border…They are going to continue to grow and have power in this history…all of these adults have U.S. children….” (October 18, 2008, Chicago, IL.) The Mexican government Advisor to the Institute of Mexicans Abroad, Omar Lopez (also an NGO director in Chicago who managed all of the March 10 organizing meetings), claimed that the CONFEMEX leadership played an important role in the marches as they passed information onto their members, involved their base in the march, and motivated their people to get out on the day of the march: This was something to be admired because this was an entirely new experience, entirely out of their scope…their scope was Mexico, and in some ways still is. This [the march] wasn’t in their view and they were able to adapt and they did change. And I think the marches changed them. They had to look at the life of the Mexicans who are here …they saw there is a lot of work to be done here for the welfare of their members. (Interview, October 9, 2008, Chicago, IL.) CONFEMEX was gaining new recognition as an organization now responsive to U.S. immigrant concerns. Moving forward, CONFEMEX’s organizational priorities directed towards the U.S., namely U.S. voter mobilization and participation in subsequent marches, would be given equal importance to those focused on Mexico. The March 10 mobilization was a pivotal moment in the recent history of immigrant organizing. Organizers around the country took note of what happened in Chicago. Organizers in Los Angeles, California were quoted in the Chicago Tribune claiming, “We’ve been taught a lesson by Chicago…Thanks to Chicago there will be more people interested in our efforts,” as they too were in the midst of

Vonderlack-Navarro, Rebecca. Immigrant Political Incorporation : The Role of Hometown Associations, LFB

106

Immigrant Political Incorporation

planning their own city-based protest.58 Ultimately, Chicago’s activism further propelled the ignited ripple effect of immigrant uprisings that would continue throughout the country.59 Most notably, Chicago’s March 10 mobilizations sparked immigrants’ collective resistance to Sensenbrenner that would come to the forefront of the nation’s awareness as synchronized national rallies took place on May 1, 2006.

Copyright © 2013. LFB Scholarly Publishing LLC. All rights reserved.

Conclusion In retrospect, it is clear that Chicago’s March 10 mobilizations played an important role in fueling immigrants’ collective resistance to Sensenbrenner, emerging in full flower in the synchronized national rallies that would take place on May 1, 2006. What has been less clear is how traditionally Mexico-oriented HTAs, which had long avoided U.S.-focused protest activity, came to occupy such an important leadership position in the March 10 events. This chapter asked, how is it that Chicago’s traditionally Mexicanfocused confederation of HTAs came to embrace U.S.-focused contentious action? It is only through the examination of longer-term political developments of state-migrant relationships within both Mexico and the U.S. that we can fully understand how these traditionally Mexico-oriented organizations, which had long avoided U.S.-focused protest activity, came to take up such a valuable leadership stance in the March 10 events. Chicago HTAs’ involvement in U.S.-centered protest thus resulted from a long-standing, multi-step organizational response to different state actors at various points in history. First, the beginnings of HTAs’ dramatic growth during the 1990s, when the organizations began to receive significant political recognition from the Mexican state, was a critical time period for garnering political agency within Mexican politics. HTAs during this decade were developing what McAdam (1982) regards as a critical element of popular mobilization: “indigenous organizational strength” (43). Leaders during this time period nurtured an important norm of 58

Ávila, Oscar and Antonio Olivo. 2006. “Rally stirs both sides; Across U.S., immigration supporters, foes view Chicago rally as catalyst." Chicago Tribune, March 12. 59 Espinosa, Leticia. 2006. “Bendicen una delegación que viaja a Washington." Hoy Chicago, March 27.

Vonderlack-Navarro, Rebecca. Immigrant Political Incorporation : The Role of Hometown Associations, LFB

Copyright © 2013. LFB Scholarly Publishing LLC. All rights reserved.

HTA Mobilization for U.S. Immigrant Rights

107

political engagement and efficacy. Second, HTA organizational growth during the post-9/11 period sheds light on how both Mexican and U.S. government action prompted an increasing HTA focus on U.S.-related activities. And, third, following the passage of Sensenbrenner in 2005, an organizational transformation emerged as HTAs embraced U.S.centered popular mobilization. Indeed, within a few short months CONFEMEX leaders did not just go along with the crowd, but took a leadership role in U.S.-focused protest. This study’s broader historical social movement approach provides a larger analytic purchase for understanding HTAs’ evolution than do studies that rely heavily on either assimilationist or transnationalist analyses. Unlike assimilation frameworks, CONFEMEX’s recourse to social mobilization was not due to a steady course of abandoning the old country over time to embrace political allegiance to the new host society. Nor can transnational frameworks, which tend to downplay the host society, adequately explain what triggered CONFEMEX leaders to rush into U.S. protest action. In contrast, a bi-national social movement paradigm allows for a broader exploration of longer-term political processes and their potential relation to the emergence of an immigrant rights movement. The study’s modified political process model in particular offers the analytic linkages between the complex and shifting politics of immigration, the strategic agendas of grassroots organizations like Chicago’s confederation of HTAs, and the unexpected recourse to contentious mobilization. The study’s framework also provides insight as to the political conditions within the immigrant rights movement under which threats can become catalytic. The study’s political process model continues to be useful in the following chapter as it explores the events that led up to and quickly followed the historic May Day rally of 2006. The immigrant movement would quickly enter a path towards U.S. political institutionalization, an effort strongly encouraged by the increasing number of professional organizations, unions, and state actors drawn towards the protest activity and who aimed to accommodate immigrants’ mounting U.S. political consciousness. CONFEMEX’s new leadership role in Chicago’s local protest meant they were now an even more attractive grassroots base for courting emergent Mexican immigrants’ U.S. voting potential. More broadly, the following chapter sheds light on the complex interactions between a range of actors within Mexico, the

Vonderlack-Navarro, Rebecca. Immigrant Political Incorporation : The Role of Hometown Associations, LFB

108

Immigrant Political Incorporation

Copyright © 2013. LFB Scholarly Publishing LLC. All rights reserved.

United States, and CONFEMEX as they attempt to mobilize various activities that traverse the two countries.

Vonderlack-Navarro, Rebecca. Immigrant Political Incorporation : The Role of Hometown Associations, LFB

CHAPTER 5

Copyright © 2013. LFB Scholarly Publishing LLC. All rights reserved.

May Day Opens Doors: Mobilization and Participation, May through November 2006

Invigorated by the massive turnout of the March 10 rally, CONFEMEX leadership submerged themselves in planning an even larger set of nationally-coordinated mass marches scheduled for May 1. In the wake of the March 10 rally and subsequent immigrant mobilizations throughout the country, national civil rights organizations, labor unions, and certain political actors quickly aligned with the burgeoning immigrant rights movement. Along with more institutionalized leadership came a great motivation to keep the marches peaceful and non-confrontational along with strong desire to swiftly channel immigrants’ protest activity into conventional forms of U.S. political participation and interest group consolidation (e.g., citizenship acquisition and voter drives). CONFEMEX, representing a new grassroots base of Mexican immigrants still largely marginalized from U.S. political circles, was now an even more attractive organization for professional organizations and government actors interested in attracting new voting constituencies. Between May and the U.S. congressional elections in November 2006, CONFEMEX made critical choices about how to successfully use their newly-acquired political leverage to advance immigrant interests. What would be the impact of popular mobilization for immigration policy and politics for CONFEMEX and its base of HTAs, and for immigrant leaders themselves? As immigrants throughout the nation 109

Vonderlack-Navarro, Rebecca. Immigrant Political Incorporation : The Role of Hometown Associations, LFB

Copyright © 2013. LFB Scholarly Publishing LLC. All rights reserved.

110

Immigrant Political Incorporation

took to the streets, local organizers (including CONFEMEX) had a new faith and optimism that immigration reform could happen because of people’s growing political consciousness. In addition, politicians who could benefit from a mobilized immigrant electorate worked to reinforce migrants’ political legitimacy. CONFEMEX, as a new leader in the U.S. immigrant rights movement, faced new challenges. How should it respond to the growing attention it was receiving from Illinois politicians and advocacy groups? What would be its position within the new U.S.-based oppositional movement field? Migrant leaders, over the course of a few months, had to make difficult decisions between the pursuit of institutional versus non-institutional tactics. Furthermore, HTAs’ organizational claims were now more than ever influenced by multiple state projects. Until 2006, HTAs had been largely defined by their evolving interactions with the Mexican state, which exalted its expatriates as “heroes” who even if they did integrate politically into the U.S. could function as bi-national citizens and make lasting economic and political contributions to Mexico. With the spring 2006 demonstrations, the power and salience of the United States’ state discourse on immigration became a critical influence on Chicago’s HTA confederation. One important political framework in the U.S. was based on a rhetoric of alarm and repugnance toward new arrivals who posed dangers to the country’s White-Anglo-Saxon-Protestant stock, threatened the nation’s security, and refused to assimilate into the body politic. In contrast, an alternative framing existed. This particular discourse involved a narrative about brave men and women of the past credited for building the foundation of this country, who pulled themselves up by their bootstraps, and who were determined to quickly assimilate by learning English and becoming U.S. citizens (see Foner 2005, 207-212). In critical moments of immigration reform in the U.S., the latter frame has served as a powerfully legitimating influence to facilitate immigrant political incorporation. Indeed, it was the robust sense of political legitimation that contributed in part to the confederation’s response to Sensenbrenner as a confident, contentious vehicle of mobilization. CONFEMEX, nevertheless, was entering into a U.S. political scene that had long provided a conditional path of immigrant inclusion. U.S. political membership required immigrants to adopt our language and play by our rules (i.e., a U.S.-only agenda). CONFEMEX leaders indeed felt energized by the attention of local U.S. state actors and established immigrant advocacy groups who

Vonderlack-Navarro, Rebecca. Immigrant Political Incorporation : The Role of Hometown Associations, LFB

May Day Opens Doors: Mobilization and Participation

111

encouraged migrants to take a stand for their rights. At the same time, immigrant leaders’ broader bi-national agenda and leadership unity could over time become threatened on their path towards U.S. integration. Chicago’s HTAs, however, called into question traditional notions of U.S. political incorporation. The vast majority of Chicago’s HTAs emerged and grew in political strength during an era of intensified global market integration and Mexico’s resulting extraterritorial diasporic inclusion policies. As HTAs began to move further into U.S.focused political activities, they would continue to engage with the Mexican state. The Mexican state, in turn, would further encourage migrants’ assertion of political rights and incorporation into the U.S. This chapter begins by discussing the momentous May Day rallies of 2006 and examines how CONFEMEX made calculated decisions to further prioritize U.S.-focused interest group strategies. The chapter continues by exploring how both local government and the broader U.S. immigrant advocacy field further spurred the Chicago confederation of HTAs on a path towards interest group consolidation.

Copyright © 2013. LFB Scholarly Publishing LLC. All rights reserved.

“A Day Without Immigrants”: The Historic National MegaMarches of May 1, 2006 The May Day rallies, even more than the momentous March 10 protest, propelled immigrant mass mobilization to the forefront of the nation’s awareness. Various Mexican and U.S. state actors, unions, and large civil rights organizations—quick to notice the significance of the March 10 protest and its ripple effect throughout the country—rapidly supported the flourishing immigrant rights movement. As larger, more established U.S. organizations became involved in the movement, CONFEMEX would quickly be drawn into more of the type of U.S.centered political activities that it had traditionally shunned, such as lobbying, coalition-building, and voter mobilization. Just before the May Day demonstrations, Mexican state officials and programs articulated support for HTAs’ emerging immigrant rights campaign. Advisors and leading organizations within the Mexican government’s Advisory Council of the Institute of Mexicans Abroad (CC-IME) quickly illustrated their solidarity with migrants’ mounting contention following the March 10, 2006 rally. With the success of the March 10 protest, this arm of the Mexican government transformed into

Vonderlack-Navarro, Rebecca. Immigrant Political Incorporation : The Role of Hometown Associations, LFB

Copyright © 2013. LFB Scholarly Publishing LLC. All rights reserved.

112

Immigrant Political Incorporation

a space for diffusing information, planning further immigrant demonstrations, and analyzing future steps in the immigration reform debate. The subsequent cohort of 2006-2008 advisors of the Institute of Mexicans Abroad held their first meeting (VII Official CC-IME meeting) on March 29-31 of 2006 in Mexico City with Chicago leaders, including CONFEMEX leaders, honored for their leadership in the March 10, 2006 rally.60 Their Midwest regional working group meeting served as a convenient venue to discuss outcomes and future plans of the immigrant mobilizations.61 Established national-level Latino organizations also used the Mexican-sponsored event as a platform to endorse the U.S.-focused marches. The prominent organizations involved in the Advisory Council included the Mexican American Legal Defense and Educational Fund (MALDEF), Hispanic American Center for Economic Research (HACER), Hispanic National Bar Association (HNBA), League of United Latin American Citizens (LULAC), National Hispanic Media Coalition (NHMC), New American Alliance (NAA), United Farm Workers (UFW), Hispanic Association of Colleges and Universities (HACU), and the Association of Farm Worker Opportunity Programs (AFOP). It was during a Mexican state-supported conference that these national-level U.S. organizations expressed their commitment to migrants’ U.S.-based contentious activity: Our organizations are excited about the result of your strength (and your desire for moderation; crystallized in the past marches.) We want to work together with you all to give the resources that as organizations we are able to offer…In regards to the marches, we want to place at your disposal a

60

Minutes of the Advisory Council of the Institute of Mexicans Abroad (CCIME). http://www.ime.gob.mex/ccime/VIIreunion.htm (Accessed May 6, 2008). 61 Minutes from the Advisory Council of the Institute of Mexicans Abroad (CCIME) http://www.ime.gob.mx/ccime/VIIreunion/Region_Medio_Oeste.htm (Accessed May 6, 2008).

Vonderlack-Navarro, Rebecca. Immigrant Political Incorporation : The Role of Hometown Associations, LFB

May Day Opens Doors: Mobilization and Participation

113

Copyright © 2013. LFB Scholarly Publishing LLC. All rights reserved.

guide of resources to better the success of our common objectives.62 In order to remain relevant to the emerging grassroots base of the immigrant rights movement, established national Latino organizations desired to draw closer ties to the customarily Mexican-focused migrant organizations. Aware that the Chicago-based Casa Michoacán had transformed into a local planning hub for the immigrant rights struggle, the Governor of Michoacán, Mexico, Lazaro Cardenas Batel, wasted no time in writing a letter to demonstrate his strong support of expatriates abroad. “This May 1st we want to bring forth our solidarity with you all and your families…The struggles of the Michoacanos in the United States are also our struggles,” he proclaimed. He went on to elevate migrants’ fight to the struggles of the civil rights movement: “In the spirit of Martin Luther King and of Cesar Chavez…your movement helps us to consolidate the efforts we aim to accomplish on both sides of the border for the strength of our communities [and] our people.” His validating rhetoric not only empowered emigrants to continue their contentious struggle, but simultaneously aimed to further perpetuate their loyalty to the homeland where their “hero” status became even further elevated. (Letter from Michoacán Governor to Michoacán community in the U.S., sent May 1, 2006, obtained on May 3, 2006, Chicago NALACC meeting, Durango Unido Headquarters, Chicago, IL.) U.S. immigrants’ popular mobilization came to full fruition on May 1, 2006 in synchronized rallies held throughout the country. Unlike the March 10 mobilizations where organizers were caught by surprise by the large turnout, organizers, police, and city officials held trainings within Casa Michoacán with peacekeeping volunteers who were well prepared to manage the peaceful flow of marchers streaming into Chicago's Grant Park. As planned throughout the nation, more than one million immigrants in various U.S. cities simultaneously poured into the streets to protest their opposition to HR 4437. Protestor turnouts were estimated at 400,000 in Chicago, 650,000 in two separate rallies held in Los Angeles, 75,000 in Denver, 15,000 in Houston, 62

http://www.ime.gob.mx/ccime/VIIreunion/Organizaciones_Latinas.htm. (Accessed May 6, 2008).

Vonderlack-Navarro, Rebecca. Immigrant Political Incorporation : The Role of Hometown Associations, LFB

Copyright © 2013. LFB Scholarly Publishing LLC. All rights reserved.

114

Immigrant Political Incorporation

30,000 in Florida, tens of thousands in New York City, and thousands in other areas including Las Vegas, San Diego, and San Francisco. In historic solidarity, demonstrators enacted a “Day without Immigrants”63 by taking off work, boycotting U.S. products, initiating school walk-outs, and rallying in the streets. “Hoy marchamos, Manana votamos! (Today we march, tomorrow we vote!)" remained one of the many rally cries demanding that politicians take heed of their growing political clout (Associated Press 2006; Olivo and Avila 2006; Martinez 2006). Latino dominated schools in Chicago estimated that between 30 to 50 percent of students were not in school on May 1 as they were most likely participating in the rally.64 Reflecting the vast demographic growth of immigrants in suburban areas, demonstrations also occurred in the Chicago suburbs of Joliet, Cicero, Elgin, Aurora, and as far away as Dekalb.65 The immigrant rally cry also evoked support from union demonstrators in Mexico involved in yearly May Day rallies.66 Chicago’s May 1 planning was accompanied by a surge of support from unions and an increased turnout of elected officials in favor of immigration reform. Organizers within the March 10th Committee were quickly attracted to the idea of linking their cause with the May Day holiday that signified a “Day of Workers." Millions of immigrants planned to boycott their jobs to send a message of the detrimental affect “A Day Without Immigrants” would have for the U.S. economy along with perceiving the symbolic benefit of associating immigrant struggles with broader labor concerns. Within Chicago, UNITE HERE (recently joined garment workers and hotel and restaurant workers) and the SEIU became central contributors to the movement.67 Recognizing 63

This expression was inspired by a film that hypothesizes how the U.S. would function without the valued labor of immigrants. 64 Banchero, Stephanie and Diane Rado. 2006. “Kids skip class to rally, be part of a life lesson." Chicago Tribune, May2. 65 Dardick, Hal and Mary Ann Fergus. 2006. “Concerns Don’t Stop at city line." Chicago Tribune, May 2. 66 Dellios, Hugh. 2006. “Across border, voices of solidarity rise up." Chicago Tribune, May 2. 67 Olivo, Antonio and Oscar Avila. 2006. “United they march. Hundreds of thousands rally for immigration rights." Chicago Tribune, May 2. Also, supported by interviews with Guerrero federation leader on June 8, 2008, and Michoacán federation leader on May 25, 2008, Chicago, IL.

Vonderlack-Navarro, Rebecca. Immigrant Political Incorporation : The Role of Hometown Associations, LFB

Copyright © 2013. LFB Scholarly Publishing LLC. All rights reserved.

May Day Opens Doors: Mobilization and Participation

115

federation leaders’ critical role in the March 10 protest, SEIU hired Chicago Michoacán federation leader Artemio Arreola, an active member of SEIU and initial organizer of the March 10th Committee, to work full time to organize protestor support for the upcoming May Day rally in both Chicago and California. Sensing the immediacy of the May Day rally events, Arreola resigned from the highly regarded position as CONFEMEX’s central organizer of Chicago’s various homeland-focused Fiestas Patrias (Mexican Independence Day) events to instead promote immigrant rights. CONFEMEX leaders took great pride in coordinating the annual Fiestas Patrias in conjuction with the local consulate and other organizations. In the wake of Sensenbrenner, however, federation leaders supported Arreola’s decision to fight for the more immediate cause of immigrant rights. His decision to focus on U.S. over Mexican-oriented activities would provide him (and eventually CONFEMEX) with increased recognition from larger and more established immigrant rights organizations. Many U.S. political officials were now aware that they needed to recalibrate their political strategies if they wanted to capture the loyalty of this politically conscious voting bloc. Notable rising star in the Democratic Party, Illinois Senator Barack Obama, made a significant speaking appearance in Chicago on May Day to endorse the marches and to support the unification of “Americans” in support of their dreams. “What started out as a march born of fear…has now become a movement of hope…People now recognize that this is not just about stopping bad things from happening but also about lifting up the good things that could happen if we all join together as Americans.”68 Obama’s statement was a calculated outreach to the growing Latino voting bloc, many of whom felt alienated and angered by his decision to back the building of the Mexico-U.S. border wall.69 In contrast to the March 10 mega-march that was predominantly Latino, Chicago’s May 1 protest heard rally cries in both English and Spanish, and organizers made a concerted effort to involve a variety of immigrant groups, including Irish, Korean, Guatemalan, and Ghanian 68

Olivo, Antonio and Oscar Avila. 2006. “United they march. Hundreds of thousands rally for immigration rights." Chicago Tribune, May 2. 69 Key appearances at the march also included religious leaders Cardinal Francis George, imams, and rabbis who joined together in an interfaith service towards the end of the rally.

Vonderlack-Navarro, Rebecca. Immigrant Political Incorporation : The Role of Hometown Associations, LFB

116

Immigrant Political Incorporation

to name a few. The march was also increasingly more professionalized than March 10 in that professional immigrant coalitions and unions distributed glossy printed signs for the protestors to display throughout rallies. With increased organizational involvement, there was constant encouragement to keep the marches peaceful and non-disruptive. Already influenced by the trend towards conventional political participation, CONFEMEX leaders voiced the need for immigrants to participate in the U.S. electoral process in a local newspaper, “Go out in Election Day—it doesn’t matter if it’s raining—to show the politicians in office that if they don’t listen to us, they’re out of there.”70 In a relatively quick time period, CONFEMEX leadership embarked upon nonviolent protest behavior that could serve as an eventual conduit for conventional political practice. CONFEMEX was proud of its grassroots nature and ability to motivate its base to march. Yet the confederation’s all-volunteer grassroots structure left it vulnerable to being used by the more professionalized organizations within the March 10th Committee:

Copyright © 2013. LFB Scholarly Publishing LLC. All rights reserved.

A: Because we are the base and we have a lot of people…there in the marches you could see the difference between paid organizations versus the voluntary… Q: What is the difference? A: The difference is that for many of the paid [organizations], they wanted meetings during working day hours, and it could be that they had more knowledge and everything you would want, but it was like one hour…or two hours and they wanted to leave…it could be they were more worried about money than the work. In contrast, the volunteer meetings could be at 11 at night until whatever hour…they were able to stay at a meeting for three hours and they didn’t care, these were the people that had more conviction for their work…because they believe in the cause…they donate their time, their money, 70

Olivo, Antonio and Oscar Avila. 2006. “United they march. Hundreds of thousands rally for immigration rights." Chicago Tribune, May 2. Also Martinez, Michael. 2006. “Rallies draw over 1 million." Chicago Tribune, May 2.

Vonderlack-Navarro, Rebecca. Immigrant Political Incorporation : The Role of Hometown Associations, LFB

May Day Opens Doors: Mobilization and Participation

117

their strength and they don’t look to be a leader. No, they work for the cause and I believe that for this there were many anonymous people…this is to say there are many leaders that have the knowledge and the work permits and all that, but the labor…the hardest labor, well the people del pueblo [from the base] did it…and they never got recognized for it. (Interview with Durango leader, May 6, 2008, Chicago, IL.) As a result, CONFEMEX leaders began talking more than ever about the need to acquire more resources and to professionalize:

Copyright © 2013. LFB Scholarly Publishing LLC. All rights reserved.

…many organizations, the fact is they have office facilities, they are already paid…for this [reason] much of the paperwork was falling out of the hands of CONFEMEX… CONFEMEX does the hard work and a lot of the work, but it falls out of our hands for the fact that we are purely voluntary. (Interview with Durango leader, May 6, 2008, Chicago, IL.) Another federation leader expressed concern over CONFEMEX’s need for professionalization. “We in theory have the base, but practically at times it costs us a lot of work to mobilize [our base] because our people are people that work and [only] until after their work hours [can they volunteer]. So the traditional community organizations bring their staff and they bring their organizers and we are unable to do it.” (Interview with former CONFEMEX president and Durango federation cofounder, May 10, 2008, Chicago, IL.) The confederation became challenged by other more experienced protest leaders who were skilled at dominating publicity events. The power dynamics between seasoned, paid organizers and the volunteers of CONFEMEX became strikingly apparent within the media and publicity committee where a Guerrero federation leader claimed, “Nos comieron (They ate us up)." CONFEMEX provided the location for crucial headquarters, a vast number of volunteers, leadership, and participation in all committees, but they lacked practice at making their organizational name and cause visible to the broader community. “We were new at this…we learned from this.” (Guerrero federation leader and CONFEMEX president, May 2, 2008, Chicago, IL.) Days following the May 1 rallies, CONFEMEX leaders were both elated and

Vonderlack-Navarro, Rebecca. Immigrant Political Incorporation : The Role of Hometown Associations, LFB

Copyright © 2013. LFB Scholarly Publishing LLC. All rights reserved.

118

Immigrant Political Incorporation

exhausted. During their May monthly meeting, leaders debated whether they should stay involved with the March 10th Committee. “[It] eats up all our time” said a tired Hidalguense leader stretched thin from the organizations’ growing activities. She feared she would not have enough energy to carry on her federation’s traditional homelandoriented activities. The majority of leaders, while “cansados (tired)” and bothered by how they were “used” by other U.S.-focused organizations, pushed for CONFEMEX’s continual leadership within what they perceived to be a momentous “movement” in the U.S. A Guerrero leader declared CONFEMEX needed to be more “aggressive” in gaining recognition. In agreement, the CONFEMEX president and Durango federation leader passionately urged the confederation to continue in the immigrant rights struggle. “We are making history. We cannot be outside of the movement. Many other organizations see us as enemies because we [CONFEMEX] have a clean trajectory and we have a lot of abilities to get funds and they are threatened by that." She recognized the positive side to the confederation’s newcomer status and their ability to make a mark in future U.S. political concerns. (Field notes and minutes, CONFEMEX monthly meeting, May 16, 2006, Durango Unido headquarters, Chicago, IL.) CONFEMEX leaders were torn between professionalizing and maintaining their grassroots structure. While wanting to become more known and established (e.g., pushing for NGO status and getting a paid executive director), other CONFEMEX leaders worried about how professionalizing could steer them away from their current bi-national focus and close-to-the-trenches nature. “It would be really sad if we professionalized so much that we lose the vision,” passionately argued the CONFEMEX president months following the marches. CONFEMEX was in the midst of trying to write a description for an executive director position. They wanted someone with experience in writing grants, eliciting funds, and strategically organizing committee work while at the same time understanding their specifically migrantled bi-national vision. Finding someone who entirely understood their broad agenda would prove to be a challenge. (Field notes, CONFEMEX monthly meeting, August 14, 2006.) The desire for professionalization, nevertheless, was incessant as CONFEMEX struggled to mobilize sufficient manpower for its quickly-expanding Mexican, and especially now, U.S.-focused activities. The 2006 mobilizations coincided with the extensive labor-

Vonderlack-Navarro, Rebecca. Immigrant Political Incorporation : The Role of Hometown Associations, LFB

Copyright © 2013. LFB Scholarly Publishing LLC. All rights reserved.

May Day Opens Doors: Mobilization and Participation

119

intensive planning of Chicago’s annual Fiestas Patrias (Mexico’s Independence Day celebration), where CONFEMEX served as the general coordinator. The Fiestas Patrias was an important celebration for HTAs and federations to promote Mexican culture and identity throughout the city. In conjunction with numerous Mexican community organizations, philanthropic and business groups, the Chicago Mexican Consulate, and various Mexican officials, CONFEMEX struggled in 2006 to coordinate the annual desfile (parade), El Grito (Independence Day Event), in Chicago’s Millennium Park, along with various expositions of local businesses, organizations working with the Mexican community, artistic, cultural, and educational events and banquets. CONFEMEX leaders’ closeness to their base came at the cost of a paid staff and sufficient resources to manage their traditional homeland-oriented events along with their newfound focus on U.S. protest. (CONFEMEX monthly minutes, September 18 and October 9, 2006, Durango Unido headquarters, Chicago, IL.) As early as 2006, protest mobilizing did not appear to be an activity that the confederation of HTAs could easily sustain. Despite struggles to manage their expanding agenda and activities, CONFEMEX’s involvement in the 2006 mobilizations transformed the confederation. Now more than ever, the confederation prioritized the U.S. citizenship and electoral participation of its base. The impact of the marches in driving the federation leaders into the U.S. political realm was especially clear during interviews. Leaders from the Guanajuato Federation described how CONFEMEX’s participation in the marches induced a change in their U.S. political awareness. As the co-founder of Casa Guanajuato noted, “it gave us presence [in the U.S.]…the change came with Sensenbrenner, before we just worried about our ranchito [in Mexico.]" The Guanajuato leader saw a great shift in organizational priorities after Sensenbrenner: “[Before] we didn’t talk of immigrant rights at all. The total purpose was to better the communities of origin." Since the marches, an increasing number of members were looking to become citizens and vote in the U.S. “para que nos hacen mas caso, (so they [politicians] pay attention to us more).” (Interview with Guanajuato co-founder and president, May 27, 2008, Chicago, IL.) Invigorated by their leadership in U.S. popular mobilization, CONFEMEX leaders reached the decision that here in the U.S. they could change the political structures that shaped their daily lives. While discussing the impact of the marches, a leader from

Vonderlack-Navarro, Rebecca. Immigrant Political Incorporation : The Role of Hometown Associations, LFB

120

Immigrant Political Incorporation

Hidalgo discussed her own growing awareness of having political power in the United States. “Even though we’re not from this country, we can change the laws here…we have more awareness of the laws here. We know more about civic participation in the U.S.” (Interview with Hidalgo president and secretary, June 23, 2008, Chicago, IL.) A Durango leader tied her new sense of political efficacy to the conclusion that the U.S. was now her home. “We’ve decided to make this our country. No one in the march would let something bad happen to the U.S. Our kids are here.” (Interview with Durango co-founder and former president of CONFEMEX, May 10, 2008, Chicago, IL.) Although just months before the marches she was immersed in a Mexican government voting drive for emigrants, the importance of U.S. politics and immigrants’ secured integration mattered greatly to her and her family’s future. She also discussed the direct reverberations of the marches within her base:

Copyright © 2013. LFB Scholarly Publishing LLC. All rights reserved.

Q: How did it [the marches] impact your base? A: With the base I believe we have motivated the base and they trust the leaders more. We can move forward and we are able to one day achieve reform or something that helps our people. Our people have a lot of hope, the base has a lot of hope that someday there will be a reform…the march was happy. It was the culmination of the people’s frustration. The march was during a time that we were living in persecution, it was a time that people were losing their jobs, mentally the people were really deteriorated mentally. Since they started the ‘no match’ letters these families have been without tranquility. They are not secure, the people are working with fear and I believe the march…it was like the people said “Basta (Enough)! We are persecuted too much!”…and I think the marches, the marches were that, that the people said “Basta (Enough)!” And they were liberated. Another leader from the Guerrero federation expressed that the marches “gave visibility to the Mexican community. Now [U.S.] political leaders notice us more.” He also remarked that the march left him feeling “surprised…Mexicans are so vulnerable and now they stood up for themselves. It motivates you. It gets you going…the

Vonderlack-Navarro, Rebecca. Immigrant Political Incorporation : The Role of Hometown Associations, LFB

May Day Opens Doors: Mobilization and Participation

121

federation was excited.” (Guerrero federation leader and former president of CONFEMEX, May 2, 2008, Chicago, IL.) The leaders talked of Sensenbrenner and the consequent marches as the “empujo mas grande (the largest push)” for their members, many of whom were now motivated to transition from residency to citizenship status. In just seven weeks between the March 10 rally and the more publicly recognized May Day marches, CONFEMEX received noteworthy acknowledgement by state actors, civil rights organizations, and unions as an important grassroots Mexican immigrant constituency. CONFEMEX leaders themselves were greatly transformed by their critical involvement in the rallies, which had a substantial impact on their expanding bi-national Mexico-U.S. political identities. Most striking was the spurred increase in their activities to include U.S.focused interest group efforts.

Copyright © 2013. LFB Scholarly Publishing LLC. All rights reserved.

Expansions in Illinois Political Opportunities CONFEMEX’s Local U.S. Political Action

Entice

CONFEMEX’s determination to influence U.S. immigrant politics was now unmistakable. The confederation’s quick transition into U.S. political circles was also strongly cultivated by increased attention from established immigrant advocacy coalitions. The confederation was viewed by established organizations as having a promising potential as a critical voting bloc and lobbying arm of the immigrant community. By temporarily marginalizing Mexican political concerns, CONFEMEX embraced U.S.-focused interest group strategies, and as a result, gained local recognition as a potentially significant electoral player. At the same time, the confederation’s new organizational strength ran the risk of restricting its broader Mexico-U.S. bi-national vision into a narrower U.S.-focused agenda. Established immigrant organizations with ties to local Illinois government stood to gain from immigrants’ growing political awareness. The aforementioned Illinois Coalition for Immigrant and Refugee Rights (ICIRR), aimed at fostering immigrants’ political integration through its recently formed state-migrant initiative in partnership with Illinois Governor Blagojevich, was a major organizational leader in Illinois and benefited greatly from the protests. ICIRR, in partnership with grassroots immigrant organizations like CONFEMEX, had the infrastructure to capitalize on immigrants’

Vonderlack-Navarro, Rebecca. Immigrant Political Incorporation : The Role of Hometown Associations, LFB

122

Immigrant Political Incorporation

Copyright © 2013. LFB Scholarly Publishing LLC. All rights reserved.

emerging U.S. political participation and had their own intentions in influencing CONFEMEX’s activism to complement their vision of immigrant civic participation (i.e., citizenship campaigns and voting drives). Quickly following the marches, ICIRR strengthened its relationship with CONFEMEX leaders, inviting them to serve within their New Americans Democracy project’s voter mobilization program. CONFEMEX’s leadership in Chicago’s mobilization illustrated a potential for exciting new and specifically Mexican immigrant voters. Just days following the March 10 outpouring, the executive director of the influential ICIRR, Joshua Hoyt, published an op-ed article in the Chicago Tribune that made the case for this strategy. In this view, the Republican party’s criminalization approach to immigration reform, epitomized by the passing of the Sensenbrenner bill, would only serve to mobilize Latino voters to voice their opposition: A little noted fact about the 2004 presidential election was that socially conservative immigrant Latinos were 40 percent more likely to vote for President Bush than U.S.-born Latinos. Now Bush’s and Karl Rove’s carefully crafted and successful Hispanic outreach strategy is shredded lettuce. What does this mean in Illinois? There are about 348,000 legal immigrants in Illinois currently eligible to become U.S. citizens. If a substantial percentage of these folks now take the steps to become U.S. citizens and the immigrant Latinos are cemented into the ‘Blue’ column of voters, it changes the political balance of power in Illinois for the next generation. Any shortterm political gain to be made from the ‘Kick the Illegals” strategy will likely lead to disastrous long-term pain for the Republican Party. (Commentary, Joshua Hoyt, March 14, 2006). Hoyt’s comments touched upon a deep sense of empowerment within the immigrant community. For the CONFEMEX leadership, it suggested that the immigrant voice in U.S. politics carried significant weight. The framing strategy of “Hoy Marchamos, Manana Votamos" (Today We March, Tomorrow We Vote) would become one of the dominant framing strategies within the movement strongly propelled by ICIRR. According to this strategy, immigrants’ contention could become quickly diffused by a pluralist mode of integration: citizenship,

Vonderlack-Navarro, Rebecca. Immigrant Political Incorporation : The Role of Hometown Associations, LFB

Copyright © 2013. LFB Scholarly Publishing LLC. All rights reserved.

May Day Opens Doors: Mobilization and Participation

123

voting drives, and ties to the “Blue” Democratic Party. On the other hand, many local immigrant leaders were invigorated by the mass protests and continued to see non-institutional tactics as critical for sustaining the immigrant rights movement. As a consequence, CONFEMEX leaders dealt with difficult choices about whether to focus their limited organizational energy into continuing to engage in confrontational protest or intensifying their collaboration with ICIRR and state leaders to make gains within local U.S. institutions. At this point in time, the May Day marches were viewed by CONFEMEX leaders as an extraordinary triumph. The unprecedented nationwide rallies cultivated optimism that a comprehensive immigration reform—or at least a path towards legalization—was possible. The future of the immigrant rights movement appeared open. For CONFEMEX, galvanizing immigrant votes and interest group advocacy seemed like the most optimal plan for achieving reform. As a result, CONFEMEX leadership was emboldened and unified as they began prioritizing conventional U.S. political participation over contentious marching. At their July monthly meeting, they brainstormed tactical ways to register their base to vote in the U.S. They planned informational workshops on immigrant rights “to educate the base about the importance of voting” and discussed strategies, including hiring a professional to train federation leaders on how to register voters, organize electoral drives during hometown club annual bailes (dances) and summer events, and holding a press conference where various federation leaders encouraged U.S. voter turnout. So strong was the focus on conventional political participation that CONFEMEX leaders formally voted to decline the invitation to participate with Centro Sin Fronteras, still heavily connected to the El Pistolero deejay, in another march set for July 19, 2006. (Field notes and CONFEMEX monthly minutes, July 11, 2006.) The July demonstration resulted in a much lower protestor turnout, and as a result, drew concern within the immigrant movement conveyed in a local newspaper: “Activists nationally worried that the city was a cautionary tale for rally fatigue at a time when symbolism matters in the immigration debate.” (Olivo et al., 2006).71 CONFEMEX’s non71

The small turnout also suggests that Centro Sin Fronteras and El Pistolero, working outside of the March 10th Committee, did not have the sufficient base and organizational pull to launch massive rallies. Olivo, Antonio, Oscar

Vonderlack-Navarro, Rebecca. Immigrant Political Incorporation : The Role of Hometown Associations, LFB

Copyright © 2013. LFB Scholarly Publishing LLC. All rights reserved.

124

Immigrant Political Incorporation

involvement in the July protest contributed, in part, to a decreased local momentum for contentious politics. The momentary decline in popular mobilization encouraged CONFEMEX leaders all the more to channel their activism into voting. To be sure, CONFEMEX was not altogether giving up on protest strategies; in fact, they were central planners in an anniversary May Day march in 2007. The confederation for now, however, was making a clear distinction from general social movement organizations. Federation leaders made the strategic choice to favor citizenship and voter drives and actively looked to the Illinois capital of Springfield and Washington D.C. to resolve the immigration struggle. For ICIRR, the immigrant contention of 2006 was useful for stimulating the electoral participation of the state’s immigrants. CONFEMEX’s decision to prioritize voting over marching was further advanced by its intensified ties to the influential ICIRR. A month following the marches, CONFEMEX formed a deliberate partnership with ICIRR by becoming a formal member organization of the coalition. As a result, they influenced much of the confederation’s ambitions to re-focus around local civic engagement initiatives. By the summer of 2006, one Guerrero federation leader had a paid job in the ICIRR as Senior Organizer,72 while another Michoacán leader was in talks to become the Political Director by 2007. Still another Guerrero leader sat on the Board of Directors along with a Michoacán leader who worked directly for Illinois Governor Blagojevich. Energized by the potential new opportunities for gaining political clout within the local state arena, the larger federations within CONFEMEX spearheaded the confederation’s ties to the ICIRR. The federations of Avila, and Ofelia Casillas. 2006. “Immigration Rally draws 10,000." Chicago Tribune, July 20. 72 The Guerrero federation leader who worked as a Senior Organizer within the ICIRR was not heavily involved with his federation or CONFEMEX leadership before the 2006 marches. In fact, in our interview he discussed frustrations with HTA and federation leaders who had been more concerned with Mexico than the needs of immigrants in the U.S. It is rumored that the leadership of ICIRR strongly encouraged this Senior Organizer to become active with his Guerrero federation and CONFEMEX in order to encourage their continued U.S.-focused action. Some federation leaders questioned the authenticity of his involvement and thought it was ICIRR’s attempt to control CONFEMEX’s agenda.

Vonderlack-Navarro, Rebecca. Immigrant Political Incorporation : The Role of Hometown Associations, LFB

May Day Opens Doors: Mobilization and Participation

125

Copyright © 2013. LFB Scholarly Publishing LLC. All rights reserved.

Michoacán and Guerrero were both the largest and most active federations within CONFEMEX and had leaders who were making professional gains within ICIRR. Although at times they competed with each other internally for leadership posts within CONFEMEX, these two stronger federations fervently advocated for an alliance with ICIRR. Board President of ICIRR Juan Salgado saw CONFEMEX as offering the potential for a kind of Latino political machine, much like Chicago’s Hispanic Democratic Organization (HDO). The HDO, however, depended on the availability of public-sector jobs in exchange for votes. Nevertheless, HTAs had the potential to serve as a future pipeline for mobilizing votes within Illinois’ Mexican immigrant community: …I think it’s a mistake for some of the [Illinois] political leadership that doesn’t understand this right now…if you spend any amount of time with them [HTAs] you will understand the depth of the relationship that they have with each other… because, you know, the political organizations sometimes are built on a shallow base. You know, it’s a transactional base, right? And so, when the city doesn’t have a lot of jobs, like they did for the HDO [Hispanic Democratic Organization] organization, it dissolves. But the HTAs aren’t going to dissolve, as much as they fight, they’re not going to dissolve. (Interview January 9, 2009, Chicago, IL.) Unlike the previous Hispanic Democratic Organization, famous for its corrupt relationship with Chicago’s machine politics, HTAs were upheld by ICIRR’s leadership as non-corporatist organizations who were not dependent on votes-for-jobs patronage. Instead, the clubs were viewed as having legitimate political influence because of their tightknit, social support networks and ability to withstand infighting and the struggles brought about by "shady" politics. For other CONFEMEX leaders suspicious of ICIRR and its ties to the state government, however, they questioned whether the coalition was using CONFEMEX for their own monetary and political gains. The questioning of ICIRR was more apparent from the smaller and less powerful federation leaders who were not personally or professionally benefitting from involvements with the coalition. Their expressions of doubt would grow into open conflict in subsequent years. Federation

Vonderlack-Navarro, Rebecca. Immigrant Political Incorporation : The Role of Hometown Associations, LFB

Copyright © 2013. LFB Scholarly Publishing LLC. All rights reserved.

126

Immigrant Political Incorporation

leaders from Durango, Hidalgo, and Guanajuato feared that the stronger and more powerful ICIRR could overwhelm CONFEMEX’s agenda. They also insisted that ICIRR, a coalition that claimed to represent Illinois immigrants actually needed the broad base of Mexican immigrants in CONFEMEX in order to maintain its legitimacy more than CONFEMEX needed ICIRR. On the other hand, despite these reservations, even the smaller federations within CONFEMEX were well aware of the great help ICIRR could provide in mobilizing their base to vote. (CONFEMEX meeting minutes, May 16, 2006, June 11, 2006, July 11, 2006.) Despite some misgivings, CONFEMEX leaders decided to become involved in the ICIRR’s New Americans Democracy Project. The program was intended to reach out to specific geographic areas of Illinois with high immigrant concentrations to promote civic education in specific Chicago neighborhoods and surrounding suburbs (Juliet, Aurora, Waukegan, Elgin, Carpentersville, Des Plaines, and Melrose Park). A CONFEMEX leader proudly explained how CONFEMEX was “the organized voice of Mexicans” within the Coalitions’ New Americans Democracy Project striving to fortify relations with other Illinois-based Chinese, Korean, Hindu, and Muslim immigrant coalition member organizations. (Interview, Michoacán leader, May 25, 2008, Chicago, IL.) ICIRR’s courting of the CONFEMEX leadership planted the seeds to advance U.S. voter mobilization of CONFEMEX’s base. Basking in the political attention from more established immigrant organizations with ties to important government leaders, various federation leaders within CONFEMEX were invigorated to influence U.S. political circles. While CONFEMEX as an organization did not directly endorse political candidates, less than one month following the May Day rally of 2006 federation leaders from Michoacán, Guerrero, Guanajuato, Durango, and Hidalgo along with (and not coincidentally) the President of the board of ICIRR, Juan Salgado, independently formed a political action committee called Mexicans for Political Progress, or MXPP. As a CONFEMEX leader on the MXPP executive committee later reflected, “We are Mexicans representing Mexicans. It gives us [Mexican immigrants] a voice.” (Michoacán leader, May 25, 2008, Chicago, IL.) CONFEMEX leaders recognized that while Mexican immigrants were the largest minority group in Illinois, many

Vonderlack-Navarro, Rebecca. Immigrant Political Incorporation : The Role of Hometown Associations, LFB

May Day Opens Doors: Mobilization and Participation

127

Copyright © 2013. LFB Scholarly Publishing LLC. All rights reserved.

of the newly arrived Mexican immigrants lacked their own formal political representation in U.S. circles. Michoacán leader Jose Luis Gutierrez strongly spearheaded the formation of MXPP as a mechanism to provide clubs and federations with an ability to be heard in local politics: Well MXPP was born as a mechanism of urgent civic participation. On the one hand, to send a political message to all the political actors that we exist, that the federations and clubs are here; that we have a working alliance that is very strategic with some community organizations; that we have many volunteers. I believe that was made clear. And personally, and I am not embarrassed to say it, I capitalized on it to raise funds for the position of my office [Office of New Americans Policy and Advocacy] in the office of the governor. And you know what? I am not alone. I am part of this and they [federation leaders] are with me because [without it] we wouldn’t be able to accomplish anything. Was that intelligent? Maybe yes, maybe no. It depends on how you see it. What I really want to tell you about it is that it was necessary to do it. What is the future of MXPP? We have it there, when it is necessary to use it. [And] we are going to use it because we continue to be active in the community. We continue working with a plan. So, well, it is the political arm [of the federations]…necessary to win political spaces. And maybe tomorrow we’ll decide to launch someone from our group [for public office]. (Interview, May 15, 2008, Chicago, IL.) The new political action committee wasted little time. By late summer 2006, Gutierrez, Salgado, and other leaders had organized themselves sufficiently to provide both financial and volunteer support for a number of local electoral campaigns including those of Illinois Governor Rod Blagojevich, Democratic House of Representative Luis V. Gutierrez, and the congressional campaigns for democratic nominees Tammy Duckworth and Mark Pera. All of these candidates had strong ties with ICIRR, which was the fundamental reason why CONFEMEX leaders within the political action committee decided to support them. MXPP’s support of Blagojevich was partly a form of

Vonderlack-Navarro, Rebecca. Immigrant Political Incorporation : The Role of Hometown Associations, LFB

Copyright © 2013. LFB Scholarly Publishing LLC. All rights reserved.

128

Immigrant Political Incorporation

political payback (as expressed by the Blagojevich appointee) for fundraising, and they perceived that campaign efforts could fortify the newly formed Office of New Americans Policy and Advocacy. Support for Representative Luis V. Gutierrez was also understandable when considering that he (along with leadership of the ICIRR) interviewed and approved the CONFEMEX leader to assume his state appointed position. Federation support for the MXPP was also a vigorous attempt to increase CONFEMEX’s bargaining power with elected officials who could advance immigrant interests. The campaigns of congressional Democratic nominees Mark Pera and Tammy Duckworth were chosen because they were set to oust incumbents who voted in favor of the Sensenbrenner bill.73 CONFEMEX’s new decision to prioritize the development of a powerful Mexican immigrant voting bloc within the U.S. was understandable, as they wanted to defeat the numerous local lawmakers who supported the Sensenbrenner bill.74 CONFEMEX’s newfound work with ICIRR and local politicians could mean they would have a significant impact on U.S. local and national politics, particularly by achieving another round of immigrant legalization reform. Indeed, at this point in time it seemed the U.S. government was responding to immigrant interests. Not only did the mass marches halt the Sensenbrenner bill, but by May 25, 2006—just days after the May Day protests—a Senate bill pushed by an unlikely bi-partisan partnership between John McCain (R-AZ) and Edward M. Kennedy (D-Mass) had passed. The compromise bill included border enforcement, employer enforcement, a guestworker program, and a path to legalization for a 73

Mark Pera would lose to Dan Lipinski and Tammy Duckworth also lost in 2006, by a mere 2 percent of the vote, to Peter Roskam. Duckworth was later appointed to the Illinois Veterans Affairs Department by Illinois Governor Rod Blagojevich. 74 Numerous local lawmakers from both sides of the political aisle in Illinois voted in support of the Sensenbrenner bill: Democrats Dan Lipinski, Melissa Bean, and Jerry Costello along with Republicans Mark Steven Kirk, Jerry Weller, Judy Biggert, Dennis Hastert, Timothy Johnson, Don Manzullo, and John Shimkus. A smaller minority of local Democratic leaders voted against the bill: Bobby L. Rush, Jesse Jackson Jr., Luis Gutierrez, Rahm Emanuel, Danny K. Davis, Jan Schakowsky, and Lane Evans (Associated Press. 2006. Chicago Tribune, May 2.)

Vonderlack-Navarro, Rebecca. Immigrant Political Incorporation : The Role of Hometown Associations, LFB

Copyright © 2013. LFB Scholarly Publishing LLC. All rights reserved.

May Day Opens Doors: Mobilization and Participation

129

large number of the country’s undocumented immigrants (S. 2611).75 For immigrant activists, it appeared that a path to legalization for many of the nation’s undocumented immigrants was close to legislative reality. As political opportunities for the nation’s immigrants seemed close at hand, it is not difficult to understand why CONFEMEX decided on interest group strategies over marching as their preferred course of action. CONFEMEX’s pursuit of normal politics, however, was not an easy choice for the confederation. Questions remained over how much influence CONFEMEX leaders might have in choosing which local candidates to endorse through the MXPP. While there was consensus on the idea that certain lawmakers were anti-immigrant and hence needed to be ousted, that did not mean their electoral opponent was necessarily fully sensitive to the complexities of immigration reform or to the broader bi-national vision of CONFEMEX. While numerous federation leaders were on board with the formation of MXPP following the momentum of the marches, many CONFEMEX leaders in later years (to be discussed) would come to question such close ties with state actors and worried that ICIRR’s powerful local political agenda might cause CONFEMEX to abandon its own broader binational perspective. For the moment, CONFEMEX’s bi-national vision did seem compromised as political opportunities within local Illinois politics trumped the confederation’s priorities on political concerns within Mexico. As it happened, the 2006 U.S. immigrant marches coincided with the intensely contentious presidential run between Felipe Calderon (PAN) and Andrew Manuel Lopez Obrador (PRD) in Mexico. Calderon won, but by a small margin. Consequentially, Obrador refused to recognize Calderon as the legitimate political winner, and a long-lasting post-election period of strikes and blockades consumed the Mexican capital. As Mexico’s national political scene turned explosive over the election outcome, on September 6, 2006, the majority of CONFEMEX leaders were forming the Mexicans for Political Progress' U.S.-focused political action committee. They began soliciting funds to support the reelection of Illinois Governor Rod Blagojevich through a 75

Sandler, Michael. “House Vote 446: Border Security,” CQ Weekly, January 1, 2007, 65.

Vonderlack-Navarro, Rebecca. Immigrant Political Incorporation : The Role of Hometown Associations, LFB

Copyright © 2013. LFB Scholarly Publishing LLC. All rights reserved.

130

Immigrant Political Incorporation

“Mexicanos con Blagojevich (Mexicans with Blagojevich)” campaign finance dinner held at a local Chicago Mexican restaurant. CONFEMEX activists, who just prior to this were largely consumed with advocating for Mexican absentee voting legislation, were now heavily concentrated on gaining power within local Illinois politics. It was at the Blagojevich fundraising dinner where CONFEMEX leaders began chatting about Mexico City and the pro-Obrador strikes. Instead of sparking a discussion about Mexican politics and expatriate voting, a Durango leader curiously wondered, “What are they [in Mexico] saying about us over here?" While HTAs’ organizational activity had been primarily focused on Mexico for more than a decade, the leader did not show interest in Mexico’s political plight. Instead, she wondered what Mexico was thinking about the immigrant “lucha" (struggle) on the U.S. side of the border. (Field notes, September 6, 2006, Restaurante Hacienda Tecalitlan, Chicago, IL.) Some scholars might argue that migrants’ interest in local U.S. politics over Mexico’s 2006 election outcomes was due to their frustration over the significant limitations placed on their absentee voting processes (see R.C. Smith 2008). And in fact, there were some disgruntled migrant PRD activists in Chicago who, in between advocating for U.S. immigrant rights, talked of forming an alternative consulate in Chicago in defiance of PAN candidate Calderon’s narrow win.76 Yet while Mexico’s political context still remained influential for Chicago immigrants’ organizing, CONFEMEX’s activism was, more importantly, heavily impacted by U.S. politics. CONFEMEX leaders were not only concerned about repressive legislation at the national level, but quickly sprung into action to ally with local political candidates in Illinois. Following a traditional Mariachi and folkloric ballet ensemble, various federation leaders proudly gathered in their photo opportunity with the Illinois Governor who boasted at the campaign finance dinner that he, too, was “a son of immigrants." It was obvious that in a very short time the confederation was garnering important clout on the U.S. side of the border that would continue to change the very nature of its bi-national political priorities. (Field notes, September 6, 2006, Restaurante Hacienda Tecalitlan, Chicago, IL.) 76

Olivo, Antonio and Oscar Avila. 2008. “Tense times hit home at Mexican Consulate." Chicago Tribune, February 9.

Vonderlack-Navarro, Rebecca. Immigrant Political Incorporation : The Role of Hometown Associations, LFB

Copyright © 2013. LFB Scholarly Publishing LLC. All rights reserved.

May Day Opens Doors: Mobilization and Participation

131

Even as CONFEMEX prioritized U.S. political integration, the confederation’s ties to Mexico were not abruptly cut off. Various Mexican political elites would work to further support—not dissuade— the Chicago diaspora’s budding interest in U.S. politics and local integration. An early sign of Mexico’s unrelenting attention towards its expatriates and their secured positioning in the U.S. was made evident by late 2006 when Jose Luis Gutierrez, the Michoacán leader working for Blagojevich, took advantage of his long-time connections with the Mexican consulate to help coordinate a press conference hosted by the Mexican consulate. The conference promoted Blagojevich’s expansion in state services to immigrants regardless of legal status. The consulate was quickly on board to aid in the distribution of Illinois governmental brochures to educate the state’s Mexican immigrant population about the many state services available to them. (CONFEMEX listserv, accessed on September 6, 2006.) The Advisory Council of the Institute for Mexicans Abroad also persisted in espousing migrants’ growing U.S. political participation by inviting U.S.-based academics and consultants to evaluate the marches and make plans for future proimmigrant action.77 Over the next few years, CONFEMEX’s emerging voice in U.S. political affairs would continue to be a high priority for various actors of the Mexican government who had much to gain from the diaspora’s secured political standing in the U.S. Throughout 2006, CONFEMEX’s various repertoires of action, both contentious and normative, along with the broader immigrant rights movement can be seen as a vigorous attempt to make U.S. political leaders accountable to immigrant concerns. By abandoning normal interest group approaches and engaging instead in contentious activity, the momentous marches did successfully halt the Sensenbrenner bill. Yet as attention turned from the grassroots trenches to more formalized interest-group lobbying efforts and bargaining with U.S. national political elites in Washington, political fragmentation prevented movement towards immigration reform. Throughout the 77

During the Advisory Council meeting on October 5, 2006 in Mexico City, academics from the Mexico Institute of the Woodrow Wilson Center were invited to provide insight on the U.S.-based pro-immigrant mobilizations. Mexican Ministry of Foreign Affairs website www.ime.gob.mx/ccime/VIIIreunion/relatoria_al_fin_visibles.htm. Accessed May 6, 2008.

Vonderlack-Navarro, Rebecca. Immigrant Political Incorporation : The Role of Hometown Associations, LFB

Copyright © 2013. LFB Scholarly Publishing LLC. All rights reserved.

132

Immigrant Political Incorporation

year, immigration emerged as one of the most divisive issues for Congress. In contrast to a conservative faction of Republicans in the house pushing for increased enforcement and restrictionist provisions (Wayne 2005),78 in the Senate a large group of moderate Republicans along with Democrats backed Bush’s guestworker plans. As mentioned previously, although the McCain-Kennedy bill did pass the senate, the measure was unable to get the support of hard-lined House Republicans during the summer who claimed an “amnesty” would serve to reward undocumented immigrants who had broken the law. In an effort to appear tough on immigration before the November 2006 elections, on September 13, 2006, House Republicans attempted to pass a set of narrower proposals aimed at halting immigration, which would ultimately fail to pass as well. After nine months of heated debate over immigration, on September 28 Congress approved the construction of a 700-mile “virtual fence” consisting of cameras, motion sensors, and other surveillance technology along the Mexico-U.S. border (HR 6061). Conservative lawmakers were hopeful their toughened security measure would resonate with Republican voters (Sandler 2006a,b).79 The Republicans’ harsh security measures, conversely, helped to trigger political backlash. Along with an unsolved immigration debate, the growing unpopularity of the Iraq War and general disenchantment with the Bush administration, the Democratic Party achieved a farreaching triumph within the congressional elections of November 2006. Democrats gained a majority in the House and Senate, as well as governorships and state legislatures within various localities. Immigrant activists were keenly aware that Bush, in collaboration with the new Democratic majority, had a chance to generate sufficient support to pass immigration reform legislation. Thus, it is not difficult to see why CONFEMEX and much of the broader immigrant

78

Wayne, Alex. “Views of Senate GOP, Bush Threaten Tighter Immigration,” CQ Weekly, January 17, 2005, 115. 79 HR 6061 passed the House on September 14 and the Senate on September 29, 2006. President Bush signed the bill on October 26, 2006. Sandler, Michael. “Legislative Summary: Immigration Policy Overhaul." CQ Weekly, December 18, 2006, 3357. See also Sandler, Michael. “Legislative Summary: Mexican Border Fence.” CQ Weekly, December 18, 2006, 3357, and “House Vote 446: Border Security,” CQ Weekly, January 1, 2006, 65.

Vonderlack-Navarro, Rebecca. Immigrant Political Incorporation : The Role of Hometown Associations, LFB

May Day Opens Doors: Mobilization and Participation

133

community saw the November elections—and electoral strategies in general—as an important avenue for realizing immigrant rights.

Copyright © 2013. LFB Scholarly Publishing LLC. All rights reserved.

Conclusion The time period between the considerable May Day demonstrations to the November elections of 2006 was a whirlwind series of moments for CONFEMEX and the immigrant rights movement in general. The May Day demonstrations saw an unprecedented outpouring of immigrant collective resistance. As Doug McAdam (1982) explains about social movements in general, protestors experienced a “cognitive liberation” as they began to recognize their own power for creating change (48). The U.S. national government responded to the public unrest by marginalizing the Sensenbrenner bill and soon appeared close to a compromise immigration reform that included a legalization provision. At the same time, a number of opportunities for immigrant political influence emerged at the Illinois state level. For CONFEMEX, and much of the immigrant rights movement, the May Day demonstrations ignited a hope that a pro-immigrant legislative change could be achieved. As a result, organizational leaders almost from the genesis of the movement did not aim to intensify the momentum of public unrest, but instead focused on institutional political action as a means to cement relations with those who could wield political influence. Through joining and/or strengthening formal, more “professionalized” organizations, immigrant activists could arguably amass financial and political resources, make strategic and informed political decisions as a unified front, and guarantee the perpetuity of the immigrant rights movement. Through this process, grassroots immigrant constituencies that appear to represent the movement such as Chicago’s confederation of HTAs could gain new access to the state to vent their grievances. By pursuing normative political strategies, however, a familiar story of cooptation also begins to unfold. As Piven and Cloward (1977) contend, in their quest to build organizations, organizers turn to elites— both government leaders and larger quasi-corporatist advocacy organizations—for resources and recognition. Organizers, in effect, can deviate away from protest towards pleasing those in power. Consequentially, activists begin to play an elite power game, one that eventually channels protest politics into normal politics. The elite diversion often encourages grassroots organizations to professionalize

Vonderlack-Navarro, Rebecca. Immigrant Political Incorporation : The Role of Hometown Associations, LFB

134

Immigrant Political Incorporation

as a means to gain legitimacy, a move that can also threaten their closeto-the-trenches nature. Sydney Tarrow (1998) explains the institutionalization of social movements as follows:

Copyright © 2013. LFB Scholarly Publishing LLC. All rights reserved.

…a movement organizes massive public demonstrations on behalf of its demands; the government permits and even facilitates its continued expression; numerical growth has its most direct effect in electing candidates to office; thereafter, the movement turns into a party or enters a party in order to influence its policies. (84). The social movement literature sensitizes us to the dialectic that occurs between the state and social movement actors as political elites generally respond to contention with either repression or symbolic endorsement of activists’ cause. By acting as a political ally to the movement, elites can gain important access to influence the claims that legitimate the movement, and in the case of this study, immigrants’ subsequent activism. For Chicago’s HTAs, the amplified government attention and outreach from established, quasi-corporatist immigrant advocacy groups would influence the associations’ course of action from contentious mobilizing vehicles towards interest group consolidation. CONFEMEX, while it faced difficult choices between employing protest or normal politics, undoubtedly prioritized U.S. concerns early in 2006. Assimilation theories could argue that the strong, institutionalizing force of Illinois state politics and ICIRR’s U.S.-only pluralist agenda might cause CONFEMEX to eventually sever ties from the homeland and to focus on local political integration. Indeed, urban scholars have long questioned community groups that become government partners in creating and implementing public programs and policies, as such collaborations can transform activists into milder service-delivery or advocacy organizations. Community groups, in search of funding, professionalization, and state support can potentially lose touch with their broader, cross-border visions and their base (Mayer 2007; Sites 2007; Castells 1983).80 As CONFEMEX became 80

Providing key insights into urban social movements is the seminal theoretical work of Manuel Castells. In Castells (1983) The City and the Grassroots, he acknowledges the complexity of urban movements and the threat of their

Vonderlack-Navarro, Rebecca. Immigrant Political Incorporation : The Role of Hometown Associations, LFB

Copyright © 2013. LFB Scholarly Publishing LLC. All rights reserved.

May Day Opens Doors: Mobilization and Participation

135

enlisted as an agent of ICIRR and its ties to the local state, the confederation’s agenda could evolve to become more concerned with state-focused integration programs, leading to a loss of power on the part of the confederation to question state policies and a minimized ability to create pressure outside of government. As CONFEMEX became the target for establishing state-migrant partnerships to aid in immigrants’ political inclusion, the bi-national identities of CONFEMEX leaders could be accommodated as various leaders are accepted, quite likely as subordinate partners, within local politics. CONFEMEX’s budding U.S. political incorporation, however, was not an inevitable linear process of assimilation. Instead, as the next chapter will show, we begin to see how CONFEMEX’s strategic actions would continue to be influenced by multiple state actors in Mexico and the United States. Moving from December 2006 through 2008, it becomes apparent how various political elites in Mexico and the U.S.—both potential political allies and opponents to the immigrant rights movement—continued to respond to immigrants’ activism, especially the escalating U.S.-focused activism of CONFEMEX. The upcoming years also witnessed a balkanization of repressive immigrant policies with varied forms of heavy-handed enforcement diffused throughout numerous U.S. communities. CONFEMEX leaders would struggle in their response to the various cross-purpose state interests.

captivity within the local scale. In general, organizers fight battles that emerge from their local experience. The challenge, however, is linking local struggles to broader national and transnationally-scaled concerns. His work points to a central obstacle to broadening urban-based movements to a larger more transformative scale: the local state. He argues that the local state’s institutional structures can have a tendency to confine mobilizations within the local arena, despite their broader ambitions at national or transnational scales. While Castells appreciates the necessity for community activists to interact with the political system as a means to secure a political voice, “they must be organizationally and ideologically autonomous of any political party” (Castells 1983, 322). He argues that it is almost inevitable for most radical social movements to be eventually co-opted and repressed by politics.

Vonderlack-Navarro, Rebecca. Immigrant Political Incorporation : The Role of Hometown Associations, LFB

Copyright © 2013. LFB Scholarly Publishing LLC. All rights reserved. Vonderlack-Navarro, Rebecca. Immigrant Political Incorporation : The Role of Hometown Associations, LFB

CHAPTER 6

Copyright © 2013. LFB Scholarly Publishing LLC. All rights reserved.

"Today We March, Tomorrow We Vote": CONFEMEX's Interest Group Consolidation, December 2006 to November 2008

National political opportunities for an immigration reform continued to seem promising in late December 2006 and moving into 2007. Quite distinctly, numerous localities throughout the U.S. began to look more ominous and oppressive for undocumented immigrants. While interest group strategies had taken prominence within CONFEMEX’s agenda following the 2006 protests, migrant leaders continued to see the benefit in mobilizing for what was widely considered an historic May Day march. Consequentially, Casa Michoacán would remain a vital headquarters for protest planning. Tensions had heightened, however, between community organizers in Chicago, throwing into question whether a successful mass rally could be launched for May Day 2007. Community factions were further exacerbated when Illinois Congressman Luis Gutierrez proposed HR1645, the Security Through Regularized Immigration and a Vibrant Economy Act (STRIVE Act) close to two months before the mass rally. While some immigrant activists praised the proposal’s legalization plan, others were appalled by its intense security provisions. Due to divisions among activists, it appeared as though Chicago was going to have two separate marches with much less impact for the May Day 2007 rally. Just days before the demonstration, however, a widely publicized raid in the Mexican 137

Vonderlack-Navarro, Rebecca. Immigrant Political Incorporation : The Role of Hometown Associations, LFB

Copyright © 2013. LFB Scholarly Publishing LLC. All rights reserved.

138

Immigrant Political Incorporation

immigrant neighborhood of La Villita (Little Village) inflamed the community. As a result, feuding activists urgently felt the need to set aside their differences and unite. Chicago’s massive turnout would bring national attention once again to the city’s May Day rally. Despite the demonstration’s success, CONFEMEX was exhausted. Furthermore, the confederation was well aware of the critical influence a mobilized immigrant electorate could create in the upcoming 2008 presidential election. On into the future, CONFEMEX would relinquish its leadership role in protest organizing and instead concentrate its organizational energy into fostering the U.S. citizenship and voting potential of its base. Moreover, CONFEMEX’s decisions seemed to also be influenced by Mexican state leaders who continued to value CONFEMEX and its growing ties with local U.S. state actors. The United States’ decentralized and fragmented political structure provided an apparent avenue for the Mexican state to connect with local and state officials in Illinois. Indeed, state leaders on both sides of the border had interest in expanding migrants’ political and economic integration. These complementary cross-border government influences further encouraged the CONFEMEX leadership to prioritize U.S. citizenship and voting and marginalize protest activity. CONFEMEX’s growing U.S. political incorporation was accompanied, however, by a rise in internal tensions between federation leaders themselves, as well as between the federation leaders and their base. What would be the continued impact of popular mobilization for immigration policy and politics, for CONFEMEX and its base of HTAs, and for immigrant leaders themselves? This chapter explores how relatively emergent migrant groups, like Chicago’s HTA confederation who had long worked with the Mexican state, were experiencing U.S. political incorporation. The bi-national social movement approach, with its consideration for multiple cross-border state influences, remains necessary to fully understand how CONFEMEX navigated their entrance into U.S. political engagement from December 2006 to November 2008. And while assimilation paradigms might explain HTAs’ blossoming participation in U.S. politics as the beginnings of their pluralist accommodation into the United States, CONFEMEX's integration in an era of globalization was not a process solely influenced by typical patterns of local institutionalization. While placing important emphasis on the critical

Vonderlack-Navarro, Rebecca. Immigrant Political Incorporation : The Role of Hometown Associations, LFB

"Today We March, Tomorrow We Vote"

139

influences of the host society in shaping immigrant activities, traditional assimilation frameworks do not explain what a transnational lens effectively illustrates: how contemporary diaspora engagement politics can also function to stimulate (not discourage) immigrants’ integration in the host society. This chapter begins by exploring the various influences that fostered CONFEMEX’s transition from marching in demonstrations into interest group consolidation efforts. Even as immigrant repression in Chicago soared, state influences on both sides of the border would encourage the confederation to prefer incremental political strategies over protest as the most “practical” line of action for achieving political power. Ultimately, due to divergent state pressures that aroused, CONFEMEX’s momentous conversion into a mobilizing structure would be short-lived. In addition, as CONFEMEX came to fully embrace interest group activities, the confederation would appear to weaken in organizational unity. Accusations of co-optation would develop between leaders, and some leaders began feeling distanced from the desires of their HTA base.

Copyright © 2013. LFB Scholarly Publishing LLC. All rights reserved.

Should We Keep Marching? Citizenship and Voting Strategies

CONFEMEX’s Priority for

Following the 2006 Congressional elections and moving into early 2007, CONFEMEX leaders and the immigrant rights movement in general were hopeful as they looked to Washington to achieve a legalization reform. CONFEMEX, now working closely with ICIRR, looked specifically to political ally Illinois Congressman Luis Gutierrez (D-IL) to launch a much-needed legalization plan. Yet when Gutierrez and Jeff Flake (R-AZ) co-sponsored the STRIVE Act of 2007, which included a legalization provision, many immigrant advocates argued the proposal was more harmful than helpful. Many immigrant activists were wary that the bill placed punitive and dubious enforcement provisions at its heart with the intention of luring conservative support, and that the bill contained potential human rights violations. As a result, local community factions that tentatively signed on to the Chicago mobilizations became vehemently divided. CONFEMEX would struggle in the midst of a heated local debate over whether the movement should pursue a pragmatic compromise in the face of mounting local immigrant repression or hold steadfast for a reform that

Vonderlack-Navarro, Rebecca. Immigrant Political Incorporation : The Role of Hometown Associations, LFB

Copyright © 2013. LFB Scholarly Publishing LLC. All rights reserved.

140

Immigrant Political Incorporation

ideologically upheld cross-border concerns of family unity, labor mobility, and human rights. While awaiting for national lawmakers to achieve an immigration compromise, CONFEMEX witnessed many states and localities take on severe immigrant enforcement measures. Numerous callous antiimmigrant policies erupted throughout the U.S. to impose sanctions on employers who hired undocumented laborers, punish landlords for renting to unauthorized immigrants, reduce immigrant access to social services, and increase the number of workplace raids. Estimates indicate that by May 2007, more than 100 municipalities throughout the U.S. were considering sanctions on employers for hiring undocumented immigrants and landlords for renting to them. Even though the threat of Sensenbrenner was no longer front-and-center on national lawmakers’ agendas, immigrant repression had intensified within numerous U.S. localities (Harkness 2007).81 Despite Chicago’s role in launching the mass marches, Illinois was no exception to the rise in local anti-immigrant policy measures. Throughout the state, a nativist backlash targeted primarily Latino immigrant populations. For example, the police of Waukegan, a suburb of Chicago, launched a crackdown on individuals driving without licenses. As undocumented immigrants were restricted by law from attaining a driver’s license, immigrant activists viewed the enforcement as a specific target against the undocumented, igniting a state-wide debate over whether undocumented immigrants should have access to driver’s licenses.82 In a similar vein, the suburban community of 81

Harkness, Peter. 2007. “States and Localities: Trickle-Up Policy." CQ Weekly, July 23, 2176. 82 The Waukegan experience resonated with unauthorized immigrants throughout Illinois who felt threatened everyday while simply driving to work. Debate over undocumented immigrants’ access to driver’s licenses would eventually be considered in a bill before the Illinois Senate in early May, which had already passed the House, that would provide unauthorized immigrants access to a special driver’s certificate. Many CONFEMEX leaders advocated for the licenses. The bill was filled with controversy, however, as opponents of the legislation claimed a special driver’s certificate provided an unmerited bonus to those who had entered the U.S. illegally, while some proponents worried that undocumented immigrants carrying these special certificates would be “outted,” and thus threatened with deportation.

Vonderlack-Navarro, Rebecca. Immigrant Political Incorporation : The Role of Hometown Associations, LFB

"Today We March, Tomorrow We Vote"

141

Copyright © 2013. LFB Scholarly Publishing LLC. All rights reserved.

Carpentersville elected three contentious village trustees who had campaigned on an explicitly anti-immigrant platform and within seven months were able to enforce an English-only ordinance.83 In addition, the recently arrived undocumented population of central Illinois received a flurry of media attention due to a dramatic crackdown in workplace raids.84 As national policy makers failed to take action on immigration reform, CONFEMEX and other immigrant activists were keenly aware of how various localities had transformed into incubators of fear and intolerance for unauthorized immigrants and their families. (MXPP listserv, accessed January 25, 2007; CONFEMEX monthly meeting and field notes July 9, 2007.)

Horan, Deborah. 2007. “Tow policy in cross hairs; Driver Certificate could affect town.” Chicago Tribune, May 2. The driver’s certificate bill would fail to pass the Illinois senate. Receiving national attention, New York was also considering a plan to promote drivers’ licenses for the undocumented. The plan was stopped, however, due to wide public fear that the measure would allow potential terrorists to access driver’s licenses. The Homeland Security Secretary Micheal Chertoff was pleased the measure was suspended. Anonymous. 2007. “Illegal immigrant driver’s license plan dropped.” Chicago Tribune, November 15. 83 Carpentersville’s Latino population had grown over the last decade by 40 percent to 37,000 residents. Feeding off xenophobic fears generated by the white majority, the trustees dispersed 2,000 campaign fliers asking, “Are you tired of sending lunch money with your children while illegal aliens get free breakfast and lunch?" The trustees wanted to renew proposals within the Illegal Alien Immigration Relief Act, specifically to fine landlords who rent to unauthorized immigrants and employers who hire them. After the three village trustees were elected, there were then four trustees out of seven, who formed a majority anti-immigrant alliance. Quintanilla, Ray and Carolyn Starks. 2007, “Suburb’s Hispanics feeling unwelcome after election.” Chicago Tribune, April 21. 84 In early April of 2007, federal officials arrested 85 employers and two managers in a cleaning company and another meatpacking plant that contracted the cleaner. The central Illinois sweep drew vast attention because the managers of the cleaning company themselves had supplied the workers with false social security numbers. Olivo, Antonio. 2007. “U.S. raid at plant nets 62 arrests.” Chicago Tribune, April 5.

Vonderlack-Navarro, Rebecca. Immigrant Political Incorporation : The Role of Hometown Associations, LFB

Copyright © 2013. LFB Scholarly Publishing LLC. All rights reserved.

142

Immigrant Political Incorporation

In contrast to the growing anti-immigrant fervor, other political opportunities encouraged CONFEMEX’s decision to concentrate much of its energy on institutional political action. CONFEMEX, in turn, continued to be favorably seen by Illinois state-level politicians and larger immigrant coalitions as a significant grassroots body of voters. CONFEMEX saw the great benefit its base could attain through their organizational alliance with the ICIRR and Illinois New Americans Initiative. The state-migrant initiative was able to increase the number of state-wide citizenship applications by 31 percent resulting in close to 40,000 immigrants seeking citizenship during 2007. With plans to unleash a campaign aimed at advancing another 400,000 Illinois immigrants from legal status to full citizenship, ICIRR was well positioned in its $450,000 lobby drive to persuade state and federal elected officials of the ways they could benefit from supporting a proimmigrant legalization plan.85 By drawing in CONFEMEX leadership, ICIRR could amass the grassroots, Mexican immigrant representation within their coalition in order to maintain their legitimacy with funders and state leaders. The board president of ICIRR explained how the state-wide immigrant coalition needed to be “representative of the people we’re working with,” particularly in a state where Mexican immigration dominates all immigrant flows. As ICIRR was partnering with 90 community groups to launch their New Americans Initiative, Juan Salgado was frank about the important role of CONFEMEX and its HTA base: [Local Illinois] civic participation needs HTAs…If you’re going to dig deep into citizenship participation in the United States it’s going to take organizations like hometown associations to make that a reality. So when I look at the goals that I believe are important for us to achieve [as] Mexicans and Latinos, you know, overall in the U.S., I think a key part of the strategy for us to achieve those goals includes digging 85

The push for citizenship applications was further fueled by an anticipated increase in application fees for immigrants from $400 to $675. Olivo, Antonio. 2007. “Wave of Citizenship, Marches, Pending fee hike aiding surge in applications, advocates say.” Chicago Tribune, February 23. See also Olivo, Antonio. 2007. “Year later, battle goes on; Immigration rally marks anniversary of massive march.” Chicago Tribune, March 11.

Vonderlack-Navarro, Rebecca. Immigrant Political Incorporation : The Role of Hometown Associations, LFB

"Today We March, Tomorrow We Vote"

143

Copyright © 2013. LFB Scholarly Publishing LLC. All rights reserved.

deep into communities in ways we haven’t done before. And that requires hometown associations, you know, and other such groups, but they are the most organized, I think, [and] are the kinds of groups that can dig deep. (Interview, January 9, 2009, Chicago, IL). The strong outreach of ICIRR towards CONFEMEX encouraged immigrants’ conventional political participation as the primary mechanism for their political engagement. Despite a rise in local immigrant repression, U.S.-focused lobbying, coalition-building, and voter mobilization seemed the most practical line of action for CONFEMEX leadership. Even as CONFEMEX joined with the March 10th Committee to organize a proimmigrant rally on the anniversary of Chicago’s initial reaction to Sensenbrenner on March 10, 2007, the much smaller protestor turnout (as well as the activists' own rhetoric) placed a notable priority on conventional modes of political participation. Michoacán federation leader Artemio Arreola, for example, lamented to the press about the smaller turnout at the rally. “The atmosphere is less charged today than it was last year, when they tried to criminalize immigrants…. At the same time, we want to remark that the system remains broken." In an effort to foster immigrant voting, ICIRR director Joshua Hoyt pointed to Washington politicians as the ones with the real power to make change. He proclaimed to reporters at the rally, “We’re very clear that it comes down to what a relatively small universe of people do this year,” infusing a sense of inevitability that immigrant rights was only likely to be achieved through conventional politics. Even influential Chicago Spanish-speaking disc jockey El Pistolero encouraged his broad listening base to “march by telephone” by calling local lawmakers to press for a legalization provision.86 For a moment in early spring 2007, it seemed that the historic March 10 rally of the previous year, where emergent immigrant groups like CONFEMEX boldly stood in defiance of anti-immigrant legislation, was quickly being diffused into institutional political action. 86

Olivo, Antonio. 2007. “Year later, battle goes on; Immigration rally marks anniversary of massive march.” Chicago Tribune, March 11. See also in the Tribune the same day Antonio Olivo “Activists focusing on raids, rights; Immigrant advocates protesting crackdown during reform debate.”

Vonderlack-Navarro, Rebecca. Immigrant Political Incorporation : The Role of Hometown Associations, LFB

144

Immigrant Political Incorporation

CONFEMEX and other immigrant groups’ choice to largely engage in institutionalized political strategies made sense as Washington lawmakers appeared close to reaching a comprehensive immigration reform. Political leaders on both sides of the party aisle felt an urgency to act, as they were well aware that if immigration reform was not reached soon it would likely fall off the congressional agenda until after the 2008 presidential elections.87 While the national limelight largely focused on the stalled senate battles surrounding the McCain-Kennedy immigration compromise, many Illinois grassroots activists looked to Congressman Luis Gutierrez to accomplish a renewed pro-immigrant legislation. Despite being Puerto Rican, Gutierrez had long been a driving political force within Chicago and Illinois immigrant politics and was a mainstay within the city’s numerous pro-immigrant rallies.88 By 2007, he represented a broad and growing united Latino voting bloc of neighborhoods in the city and

Copyright © 2013. LFB Scholarly Publishing LLC. All rights reserved.

87

Tankersley, Jim. 2007. “Gutierrez’s last immigration stand; Bipartisan proposal puts goal in sight." Chicago Tribune, May 21. 88 Described as a “feisty liberal” in support of immigrant rights, Gutierrez began his long-standing career as a teacher and social worker. In 1985, the Puerto Rican lawmaker began the first seven years of his political career by negotiating on Chicago’s City Council, where he earned the nickname “El Gallito (the little fighting rooster)” for his stubbornness and determination. By 1992, he became the only Latino from Illinois ever sent to Congress, representing the 4th District of Illinois, a strange earmuff-shaped district representing one of the most poorly educated and marginalized predominantly Latino areas of the U.S. His support for immigrants was apparent as he was the first congressional office to host government-approved workshops to help with citizenship acquisition, reaching a considerable 42,000 immigrants with the program, according to a May 2007 report. In addition, as early as 2001 he made numerous attempts to award legal status to millions of undocumented laborers However, some local organizers see Gutierrez as the first to “sell out” to the second Daley machine. While Gutierrez had been part of the antimachine Black-Brown coalition of the Independent Political Organization (IPO) that propelled Harold Washington, Chicago’s first black mayor, into office, some local Latino organizers claim Gutierrez’s eventual alliance to the rising Mayor Daley machine in the 1990s initiated a split in the IPO. In addition to Tankersley's article (note 7) see Teitelbaum, Michael. 2007. “Rep. Gutierrez Announces Retirement” CQ Weekly, March 12, 2007, 760.

Vonderlack-Navarro, Rebecca. Immigrant Political Incorporation : The Role of Hometown Associations, LFB

Copyright © 2013. LFB Scholarly Publishing LLC. All rights reserved.

"Today We March, Tomorrow We Vote"

145

some nearby suburbs.89 Despite his long-standing popularity as an immigrant advocate, thus far he had been unable to achieve immigration reform within the complex wheeling and dealing of the legislative process. With the rise of immigrant unrest along with the new Democratic majority within the House, there was now a chance for Gutierrez to create his own legacy as an effective lawmaker, an even more significant achievement in the wake of his announced retirement plans in early spring.90 Activist groups in Chicago who had cultivated insider access to Gutierrez, namely ICIRR and the New Americans Initiative where CONFEMEX was now a significant member, had much to gain if Gutierrez could pass an immigration bill. The legislative win could help the organizations to appear effective within U.S. politics along with sustaining the enthusiasm of their base. With a goal towards achieving a legalization provision, consensus politics aimed at cultivating Republican support would be Gutierrez’s goal for legislative success. A little over a year since Chicago launched what turned into national-level demonstrations on March 22, 2007, Gutierrez and his co-sponsor Jeff Flake proposed the compromise legislation HR 1645 Security Through Regularized Immigration and a Vibrant Economy Act of 2007 (STRIVE Act). While the STRIVE Act was advantageous towards undocumented immigrants’ legalization, many immigrant activists were wary of its potentially exploitable guestworker initiative and particularly angered by its proposed intensification of raids, detentions, deportations, and militarization of the Mexico-U.S. border. 91 The measure was contingent on the 89

Olivo, Antonio 2007. “Year later, battle goes on; Immigration rally marks anniversary of massive march." Chicago Tribune, March 11. See also: Sanchez, Casey. 2007. “Building power." The Chicago Reporter, October 1; Joravsky, Ben. 1997. “Let’s Get Luis! An unlikely assortment of liberals and conservatives have found common cause in trying to knock Luis Gutierrez from his congressional seat.” Chicago Reader, March 27. 90 See notes 7 and 8. 91 The STRIVE Act included the following measures: a legalization provision for those who entered the U.S. before June 1, 2006; a path to legal residency and eventual citizenship that included up to $2000 in fines and back taxes, along with imposing requirements to gain legal residency; and, eventually, citizenship after passing background checks, proving steady employment, learning English, and having to exit the country and re-enter legally. The

Vonderlack-Navarro, Rebecca. Immigrant Political Incorporation : The Role of Hometown Associations, LFB

146

Immigrant Political Incorporation

Copyright © 2013. LFB Scholarly Publishing LLC. All rights reserved.

implementation of greatly fortified border security measures (increasing the number of personnel and enhancing technological safety gauges) and the issuing of federal IDs through the Electronic Employment Verification System to monitor eligible workers. STRIVE included increased criminal penalties for those caught with fake documents and those who knowingly hire unauthorized immigrants and enhanced penalties for immigrants with criminal convictions. In times when local immigrant repression was on the rise, the bill would also increase the number of Immigrant Customs Enforcement (ICE) officers within U.S. localities and establish an additional twenty detention centers with the space to retain as many as 20,000 immigrants.92 Many activists were wary of how the bill would grant legalization to some of the immigrant community at the expense of others who would likely face an upsurge of exploitation, distress, and potential deaths. Gutierrez’s legislative move aggravated divisions between CONFEMEX leaders and immigrant organizers in general. Activists’ disagreement exploded over favoring strategies of pragmatism versus ideologically addressing factors that fuel immigration and repression. Many national pro-immigrant organizations and interest groups upheld the Gutierrez-Flake proposal, including the League of United Latino American Citizens (LULAC), the American Immigration Lawyers STRIVE Act also included a guestworker initiative (H-2C visas) which mandated that immigrants be paid the prevailing wage, offered labor protections, and allowed a sixty day interim period between the loss of one job and finding a new one. The guestworkers initiative permitted up to 400,000 immigrants to enter the U.S. annually who could eventually apply for residency after five consecutive years of work. The STRIVE Act would also grant eligibility to undocumented minors to receive higher education through the Development, Relief and Education for Alien Minors Act of 2007 or DREAM Act of 2007. Govtrak.us.com. Accessed February 7, 2011 http://www.govtrack.U.S./congress/bill.xpd?bill=h110-1645&tab=summary. 92 The bill provided local police with the authority to enforce immigration laws, something that was generally under the jurisdiction of federal authorities. Tankersley, "Gutierrez’s last immigration stand." Also Demirjian, Karoun. 2007. “Gutierrez pushes immigration bill,” Chicago Tribune, March 23. Also see the STRIVE Act summary, Congressman Jeff Flake's website. Accessed on February 7, 2011. http://flake.house.gov/UploadedFiles/STRIVE%20 Overview.pdf.

Vonderlack-Navarro, Rebecca. Immigrant Political Incorporation : The Role of Hometown Associations, LFB

"Today We March, Tomorrow We Vote"

147

Association (AILA), the National Immigration Forum, and the National Council of La Raza (NCLR).93 Within Illinois, community divisions were clearly marked between organizations with ties to Gutierrez and those without. Some local labor and progressive groups slammed STRIVE’s guestworker plan as “antilabor to the core” (Guard and Mailhot 2007). Mocking the bill’s enforcement measures, long-time immigrant labor activist and leader within the March 10th Committee Jorge Mujica claimed it was comparable to a “Sensenbrenner with a legalization provision” and that Gutierrez “went from hero to villain with his compromise.”94 Similarly, March 10th Committee leader Omar Lopez blasted Gutierrez and the STRIVE Act for its anti-labor stance: People see [Gutierrez] as a champion of immigrants, but the proposals he’s put forth are far from that…I don’t see

Copyright © 2013. LFB Scholarly Publishing LLC. All rights reserved.

93

The executive director of the National Immigration Forum claimed publicly, “If enacted as proposed, it will be the toughest enforcement bill aimed at illegal immigration in American history. It will also be the most practical reform of our legal immigration system in American history. ” (Persaud, Felicia. 2007. “STRIVE immigration reform act stirs excitement and criticism.” New York Amsterdam News). In accordance with the National Immigration Forum, the League of United American Citizens (LULAC) endorsed the bill along with the American Immigration Lawyers Association (AILA) whose president claimed, “It is both tough and fair and strikes the right balance between protecting our security, strengthening our economy, and treating people fairly and humanely." In addition, one of the largest and most influential national pro-immigrant organizations in the U.S., the National Council of La Raza (NCLR), viewed STRIVE as a necessary compromise to move legislation forward and to accomplish immigration reform. See note 12. Conservatives on Capitol Hill expressed disdain for the legalization component of the STRIVE Act, claiming it was rewarding lawbreakers with an amnesty provision. See Persaud, Felicia. “STRIVE immigration reform act stirs excitement and criticism." See also Lulac website, accessed on May 6, 2009, www.lulac.org/advocacy/press/2008/strive.html; AILA's website, accessed on February 7, 2011, www.aila.org/content/default.aspx?docid=21939; and NCLR's website, accessed on May 6, 2009, http://www.nclr.org/content/news/ detail/44866/. 94 See note 7. Also supported by in-depth interview with PRD activist October 19, 2008, Chicago, IL.

Vonderlack-Navarro, Rebecca. Immigrant Political Incorporation : The Role of Hometown Associations, LFB

148

Immigrant Political Incorporation

Copyright © 2013. LFB Scholarly Publishing LLC. All rights reserved.

immigration as a problem of national security where you need to militarize the border. I see it as a labor issue. As long as you criminalize immigrants and ignore their economic contribution, you’re shooting yourself in the foot (as quoted by Lydersen 2008, 4).95 Taking a more nuanced stance, long-time Gutierrez loyalist and Executive Director of Centro Sin Fronteras Emma Lozano admitted her belief that “Luis got played by the Republicans” by pushing for a compromise that turned off many immigrant supporters. Yet in a reflective interview, she critiqued how many activists in the community rejected STRIVE. “[T]hey had an all or nothing attitude, which is ridiculous,” and explained how being pragmatic and making compromises was necessary in order to keep a potential immigration reform on the agenda: “Now all we have is a pathway to deportation.” (Interview, October 18, 2008, Chicago, IL.) With strong institutional ties to Gutierrez through their New Americans Initiative, ICIRR upheld STRIVE as pro-immigrant legislation. The executive director of ICIRR, Joshua Hoyt, went as far as to testify in support of the STRIVE Act before the U.S. House of Representatives Committee on September 6, 2007. He praised the bill for providing undocumented laborers with a path to legalization, the allocation of increased visas to ease the backlog of applications, and the implementation of a temporary worker program that included, in his view, adequate safeguards.96 During the hearing, he argued the bill has “enforcement provisions that are generally reasonable and targeted. There are provisions we don’t like, but we applaud Rep. Gutierrez and Rep. Flake for seeking a solid middle ground.”97 The board president of the ICIRR Juan Salgado reflected how the STRIVE Act strove towards a tactical versus principled approach on immigration reform: 95

Lydersen, Kari. 2008. “The Browning of the Greens. Despite conflict between environmentalists and the immigrants’ rights movement, congressional candidate Omar Lopez thinks the Greens could supplant the Democrats as Latinos’ party of choice,” Chicago Reader, August 14. 96 Judiciary Subcommittee on Immigration, Citizenship, Refugees, Border Security, and International Law. 97 Testimony sent to CONFEMEX listserv on September 6, 2007 by the CONFEMEX leader serving as Political Director within the ICIRR.

Vonderlack-Navarro, Rebecca. Immigrant Political Incorporation : The Role of Hometown Associations, LFB

"Today We March, Tomorrow We Vote"

149

Copyright © 2013. LFB Scholarly Publishing LLC. All rights reserved.

…so the enforcement triggers will apply to anyone who comes in after the date [stipulated in the STRIVE Act]. So what you’re trading is, you know, the good fortunes of the people who got here before the date, the bad fortunes of the people who come here after the date in order to get this thing through. That’s the pragmatic approach. (Interview, January 9, 2009, Chicago, IL.) Activists who favored working within incrementalist politics knew they were able to produce quicker benefits to the immigrant population, especially a legalization provision, by networking with those in power. ICIRR’s insider access to Gutierrez helped to further their organizational agenda to convince the immigrant constituency that advancing incremental politics was a pragmatic alternative for legislative success. Some local activists within the March 10th Committee in turn accused ICIRR of silencing the dialogue between their member organizations about the consequences of the bill. Activists were also disheartened that the legislative proposal failed to address broader economic and social issues that fuel immigration.98 As a consequence of their strong ties with ICIRR, the leaders of CONFEMEX struggled over whether to support the STRIVE Act. The CONFEMEX president participated in a telephone conference with Gutierrez on the day he sponsored the bill, where the legislator drew specific attention to STRIVE’s legalization provision (CONFEMEX listserv, accessed on March 22, 2007). While CONFEMEX made no formal announcement either supporting or opposing the STRIVE Act, frictions played out between CONFEMEX chiefs, leading some to question whether they should continue supporting Gutierrez. For CONFEMEX leaders making inroads within ICIRR, they continued their support for Gutierrez, although sometimes in informal conversations they discussed frustration over the heavy security components of the STRIVE bill. Other federation leaders were turned off by the legislative process altogether. As a vocal Hidalgo federation leader reflected, “I felt like people were taking advantage of us, so they can climb on our backs and just get up to a higher…level.” (Interview, 98

Interviews with PRD activists and leadership within the March 10th Committee on October 9, 2008 and October 19, 2008 and the Durango federation president May 22, 2008, Chicago, IL.

Vonderlack-Navarro, Rebecca. Immigrant Political Incorporation : The Role of Hometown Associations, LFB

Copyright © 2013. LFB Scholarly Publishing LLC. All rights reserved.

150

Immigrant Political Incorporation

June 23, 2008, Chicago, IL.) Other federation leaders expressed doubts over whether a Puerto Rican political leader was able to understand the needs of an emergent immigrant community and their concerns regarding legal status. (CONFEMEX monthly minutes and field notes, April 9, 2007, Chicago, IL; Field Notes, Immigrant Summit, May 12, 2007, Morelia, Michoacán, Mexico.) Another factor making it difficult for CONFEMEX to take a firm stand on the STRIVE Act was that their agenda was momentarily consumed by Governor Blagojevich’s health and education initiatives. Spearheaded by the Michoacán federation leader Jose Luis Gutierrez who worked as a top aide to Governor Blagojevich and just days after the STRIVE Act was introduced, CONFEMEX leaders mobilized to support the Governor’s proposed FY 2008 budget proposal, Invest in Illinois Families. The increased state funding proposed to help the swelling numbers of uninsured Latino immigrants regardless of legal status who lacked access to affordable healthcare and who desired improvements in public education. CONFEMEX organized a formal press conference within Casa Michoacán and sent buses of supporters to the state capitol of Springfield to lobby members of the Illinois General Assembly to encourage their endorsement of the Governor’s proposed budget (CONFEMEX press release, March 28, 2007; CONFEMEX listserv, accessed on March 23, 2007).99 At this point in time, the encompassing influence of the local state encouraged CONFEMEX’s agenda to mobilize around its own locally-focused health and education agenda. At a time when immigrant repression was only escalating throughout Illinois and the nation, CONFEMEX had a great organized turnout for a local concern not directly tied to immigrant rights. Instead of questioning the STRIVE Act and its implications for its vast immigrant base, it looked as though CONFEMEX had temporarily transformed into an agent of the local Illinois state. On the one hand, the confederation’s partnership with the local state could be seen as demobilizing the once contentious organization. While less than a year 99

Federations in support of the Governor’s plan included all nine that were part of CONFEMEX at the time: Zacatecas, Guanajuato, Oaxaca, Hidalgo, Chihuahua, Durango, Guerrero, Aguas Calientes and Michoacán. There were also another 103 individual HTAs that supported the plan. (CONFEMEX listserv, accessed on March 23, 2007.)

Vonderlack-Navarro, Rebecca. Immigrant Political Incorporation : The Role of Hometown Associations, LFB

"Today We March, Tomorrow We Vote"

151

ago CONFEMEX had stood up to punitive national-level legislation, they now gave the impression of a comparably more conservative and mellowed advocacy organization. In this view, CONFEMEX’s interest group support for Blagojevich temporarily hampered their autonomy and limited their ability to challenge the punitive measures in the STRIVE Act. On the other hand, by strengthening their alliance with the Illinois Governor, CONFEMEX was remaining relevant within Illinois politics. A strategic move, one could argue, that would enable federation leaders to maintain their new found bargaining position and advance immigrant interests into the future.

Copyright © 2013. LFB Scholarly Publishing LLC. All rights reserved.

May Day Rally of 2007: CONFEMEX’s Agenda

Marching

Remains

High

on

Despite CONFEMEX’s preference towards Illinois interest group activities, they continued to see the benefit of taking a leadership role in the widely recognized May Day rallies of 2007. Immigrant marching on this historic day was still generally seen by local activists as necessary for winning public support for an immigration reform. While Casa Michoacán remained a key planning site for the rally, demonstration organizers were angrily divided over the STRIVE Act. As May Day drew near, it appeared as though Chicago’s march would be split, and as a result have little political impact. A threatening raid in the heart of one of Chicago’s Mexican immigrant communities just days before May Day, however, would inspire unity once again between local activists. Despite Chicago’s successful rally, local immigrant repression continued to soar. As localities became all the more threatening, activists became all the more hopeful that lawmakers in Washington would realize an immigration reform. Meanwhile, CONFEMEX would come to question the political effectiveness of marching after May Day 2007 and into the future would favor citizenship and voting drives as they looked towards the 2008 presidential elections. CONFEMEX leaders continued to value the importance of marching in such a publicly recognized May Day 2007 rally where immigrants could collectively voice their cause. An especially strong commitment for the demonstration emerged from a cohort of smaller federations, particularly from Hidalgo and Durango, sensitive to their undocumented member base. Fearing that CONFEMEX was losing

Vonderlack-Navarro, Rebecca. Immigrant Political Incorporation : The Role of Hometown Associations, LFB

Copyright © 2013. LFB Scholarly Publishing LLC. All rights reserved.

152

Immigrant Political Incorporation

their leadership within the march planning, they petitioned CONFEMEX to ensure a fortified and structured leadership within the March 10th Committee. At their April monthly meeting, various federation leaders expressed wariness because they had been previously used by other leaders in the March 10th Committee. “[T]hey used us…we loaned not only our house, but our hands.” The idea of being taken advantage of was especially insulting to CONFEMEX leaders committed to turning out their rank-and-file for the movement. “It’s going to be our people marching out there." CONFEMEX leaders were also concerned that the immigrant rights framing was in their view being diluted by a broader leftist agenda, including Green Party interests, gay rights, and anti-war concerns. Regardless of the fear of a watered down message, all of the leaders agreed in the meeting that the confederation should maintain an important leadership role within the May Day march. In addition, due to local activist rivalries that resulted as a response to the STRIVE Act, Chicago’s grassroots organizers for the May Day 2007 rally were fiercely divided. While CONFEMEX continued to work with the March 10th Committee still meeting within Casa Michoacán,100 a separate march was also being planned by leading grassroots organization Centro Sin Fronteras, still strongly allied with El Pistolero deejay. Activists worried that with a divided base of protestors within two demonstrations, the impact of Chicago’s pro-immigrant message was likely to be much weaker than the momentous outpouring of 2006. (Field notes from CONFEMEX April 2007 monthly minutes, Guerrero Federation headquarters; CONFEMEX listserv accessed on April 11, 2007.) Just days before the May Day rally, activists' concern over Chicago’s potentially divided rank-and-file would take a dramatic turn. Just one week before the planned May Day demonstration, a heavyhanded raid in the Mexican-dominated neighborhood of La Villita (Little Village) sent the immigrant community into an uproar. In broad daylight and in front of mothers and children, federal officials with large automatic rifles conducted a high-profile crackdown in a Little 100

Casa Michoacán remained the central headquarters for the March 10th Committee. Unlike 2006, however, the subcommittees for the march were asked to expand their meetings into other arenas (a coffee shop next door became a key spot). Casa Michoacán wanted to avoid having their space completely overwhelmed with meetings, as had happened in 2006.

Vonderlack-Navarro, Rebecca. Immigrant Political Incorporation : The Role of Hometown Associations, LFB

"Today We March, Tomorrow We Vote"

153

Village discount mall where an alleged fake ID ring was in operation.101 Convinced the crackdown was an intimidation tactic aimed at the immigrant community organizing the mobilizations, immigrant activists confronted U.S. Attorney Patrick Fitzgerald who defended the onslaught of police enforcement as a necessary strike against potential terrorism.102 The heavy-handed enforcement caused CONFEMEX and Chicago’s May Day march organizers to rally a renewed energy towards unifying their protest. Through their unity, activists realized they could make a significant show of outrage to the raid. As a strategy to avoid confrontations between immigrant activists still angrily divided over the STRIVE Act, a lead organizer claimed, “We agreed not to talk about it [the STRIVE Act].” (Interview, October 19, 2008, Chicago, IL.) After being inundated with calls about the raid

Copyright © 2013. LFB Scholarly Publishing LLC. All rights reserved.

101

The crackdown occurred in the heart of the community at 26th Street and Albany Avenue. Federal charges were brought against twenty-two people accused of participating in a $2 million underground market for false documentation. It was estimated that on a daily basis the ring was selling up to 100 top-notch, fake social security cards, drivers’ licenses or resident alien cards, with some cards costing upwards of $300. Reports indicate the leaders of the ring were suspects in a murder against a rival who started a competing underground ring. 102 Olivo, Antonio. 2007. “Fake-ID raid a scare tactic, immigrants say; But U.S. defends Little Village sweep." Chicago Tribune, April 26. See also “Crackdown in Little Village.” Chicago Tribune, April 26. A local Chicago alderman was also indirectly tied to the Little Village raid. Newspaper reports implicated the father of Alderman Ricardo Munoz of the 22nd ward in Little Village was the operator of the photo studio, Nuevo Foto Munoz. Alderman Munoz came to the defense of his father after the raid claiming, “Nothing illegal was taking place at [my] father’s shop." See Coen, Jeff. 2007. “Official’s dad nabbed on IDs; Alderman’s father’s photo shop linked to bogus cards." Chicago Tribune, May 30. In July of 2008 the father of Alderman Ricardo Munoz (22nd) pleaded guilty to contributing to the fake ID-ring; he admitted knowing that photos were being used for false documentation. He was accused of making $300 daily from the conspiracy. He was expected to receive both jail time and potential deportation. Coen, Jeff and Antonio Olivo. 2008. “Alderman’s father admits to ID ring; cops say elder Munoz ran Little Village scheme." Chicago Tribune, July 9.

Vonderlack-Navarro, Rebecca. Immigrant Political Incorporation : The Role of Hometown Associations, LFB

Copyright © 2013. LFB Scholarly Publishing LLC. All rights reserved.

154

Immigrant Political Incorporation

from anxious and frustrated listeners, El Pistolero disc jockey changed his tone and sounded support for immigrants’ protest activity. Differing greatly from his previous advice to “march by telephone,” the widely publicized crackdown pushed him to now proclaim defiance, “I think this showed us that this [the raid] is exactly what will happen if we don’t go out there and march.”103 Angered by what they perceived as a scare tactic, Casa Michoacán felt a rush of protestor support, and the confederation of HTAs was further induced to participate wholeheartedly in the 2007 rally. The Little Village raid and resulting unity drew the national spotlight once again on Chicago’s contentious immigrant activism. The once separated marches now functioned as two feeders: one departing from Pilsen (organized by the March 10th Committee where CONFEMEX took central leadership) and another from Humboldt Park (largely led by Centro Sin Fronteras) that planned to come together for a massive rally in Grant Park.104 Volunteer peacekeepers coordinated by CONFEMEX leaders worked extensively with police to conduct street closures, reopening them after marchers had passed. Keeping alive the “Day without Immigrants” theme, an estimated 700 businesses, mostly in the commercial district of 26th Street in Little Village, closed to participate in the rally. Although organizers of the demonstration wanted to continue illustrating the diversity of immigrant communities within the march, much of the thrust of the rally came from the Mexican hometown associations and federations, local Latino community organizations, Spanish-speaking media outlets, outraged high school and college students, unions, and churches. While not as large as the 2006 demonstrations, organizers still enjoyed significant turnout for this rally, estimated at 150,000. Unlike the celebratory and optimistic tone of the 2006 marches, the 2007 crowd was more defiant and enraged by recent punitive action in nearby neighborhoods. Also evident in the march was the feeling of frustration with lawmakers who were unable to achieve immigration reform.105 103

See Olivo, Antonio, “Fake-ID raid a scare tactic.” Originally, the march was to end in Daley Plaza. Because the march was now anticipated to be much larger because of ignited anger in the Latino community, police rerouted the demonstration to Grant Park. 105 Olivo, Antonio. 2007. “Raids stoke immigrant ire; Organizers put harder focus on May Day march.” Chicago Tribune, April 29. Also, Olivo, Antonio. 104

Vonderlack-Navarro, Rebecca. Immigrant Political Incorporation : The Role of Hometown Associations, LFB

Copyright © 2013. LFB Scholarly Publishing LLC. All rights reserved.

"Today We March, Tomorrow We Vote"

155

Notwithstanding the success of Chicago’s May Day rally, CONFEMEX’s leadership role within the various mass marches was taking its toll. Federation leaders discussed both mounting fatigue and fear within their base. For some club members within CONFEMEX, the anxiety of potential police enforcement was overwhelming. A federation leader lamented the detrimental affect of the Little Village raid on their federation. “What happened in La Villita also affected us a lot…there are a lot of people [members] that still don’t want to leave their homes. They don’t want to come to meetings in Chicago because they are afraid…so what we do, is we do telephone conferences.” (Interview, June 23, 2008, Chicago, IL.) Federation chiefs were sharply aware of the raw emotion of panic felt by undocumented families terrorized by the escalation in local police enforcement. Despite immigrants’ successful organizing, immigrant repression throughout the nation continued to swell. Newspaper reports indicate that workplace raids jumped from 845 in 2004 to almost 4,000 by mid-July of 2007, with an estimated rate of 685 raids weekly. CONFEMEX’s base was highly sensitive to growing media attention regarding the estimated 5 million children who were affected by the arrests and consequent deportations of their parents, resulting in harrowing family separations and the children’s growing distrust of police. Immigrants were keenly aware when then Homeland Security Secretary Michael Chertoff made a public warning in Chicago that enforcement against the undocumented was “gonna get ugly…. And, if they have kids at home, even if we make arrangements with social services to take care of the kids, the kids are gonna be scared because Mommy or Daddy is not coming home that day….”106 Heightened local enforcement also persisted within the Chicago suburbs of Carpentersville, Lake County, and Waukegan where local police petitioned for training through the U.S. Immigration Customs Enforcement (ICE) agency whereby local police would be granted the federal authority to detect and arrest unauthorized immigrants. Many immigrants feared the enforcement would hasten deportations and generate police racial profiling in the

2007. “11th hour march switch; Immigration event destination changed to Grant Park site.” Chicago Tribune, May 1. 106 Olivo, Antonio. 2007. “Wave of immigration raids hardens stance on both sides; Increase in Arrests adds to fired debate." Chicago Tribune, July 22.

Vonderlack-Navarro, Rebecca. Immigrant Political Incorporation : The Role of Hometown Associations, LFB

156

Immigrant Political Incorporation

Latino community.107 Despite immigrants’ surge into defiant activism, particularly the booming energy of CONFEMEX and its HTA base, the heightened criminalization and securitization of immigrant policy remained a brutal reality. Activists were frustrated that after significant mass resistance, a path to legalization for the nation’s immigrants had still not been realized. CONFEMEX’s all-volunteer leadership and base also felt exhausted from their extensive efforts to mobilize their volunteers for the marches. An Hidalgo leader explained, “We need to get back to take care of the federation” and refocus organizational priorities on more traditional Mexican-focused activities, like homeland-focused bailes (dances) and development projects. (Interview with Hidalgo federation leaders, June 23, 2008, Chicago, IL.) On top of the cumbersome manpower needed to mobilize insurgency, federation leaders faced a burning question of whether marching remained politically effective. On into the future, CONFEMEX leaders reflected about the changing mood away from immigrant rights marches:

Copyright © 2013. LFB Scholarly Publishing LLC. All rights reserved.

I: Would you ever do another march? R: …I don’t know, I kind of feel the march…served its purpose and it’s overplayed. I think doing our citizenship workshops and going out to vote…I think it will make a difference. (Interview with Michoacán federation president, June 3, 2008, Chicago, IL). Another leader shared a similar prioritizing of conventional politics: “Now we can still march, but it does not get us that far. We 107

See note 26. Also articles by Ray Quintanilla: “Carpentersville OKs English-only resolution; Non-binding language resolution criticized by mayor," Chicago Tribune, June 20, 2007; “Immigration fight spurs exodus; Some Hispanics moving from Carpentersville say the acrimony and anger is forcing them out,” Chicago Tribune, August 3, 2007. Other initiatives took place in the Alabama Department of Public Safety/State Police and the Florida Department of Law Enforcement. Wang, Andrew L. 2007. “Lake County Sheriff seeks training in deportation; Process to target suspected criminals." Chicago Tribune, December 4.

Vonderlack-Navarro, Rebecca. Immigrant Political Incorporation : The Role of Hometown Associations, LFB

"Today We March, Tomorrow We Vote"

157

should march, but in other ways with letters, lobbying and voting.” (Interview, Michoacán leader, May 25, 2008.) In his view, popular mobilization was no longer working. To avoid tactical impotence, the confederation needed to prioritize institutional action. After the 2007 protest, CONFEMEX would limit their future leadership role in immigrant contention. While federation leaders would continue to participate in future marches in upcoming years, they decidedly stepped back from a leadership role. Moving forward, various governmental interests on both sides of the border would encourage Chicago’s HTA confederation to join the coveted Latino immigrant electorate. After decisively stepping back from a leadership role in protest marching, CONFEMEX leaders chose interest group strategies as the most advantageous course of action in order to propel forward much-needed immigration reform. Motivated by both fear of immigrant repression and a surge of political attention, CONFEMEX leaders fortified their efforts towards conventional U.S. political participation as the only practical strategy to achieve a legalization provision and secure migrants’ precarious standing in the United States.

Copyright © 2013. LFB Scholarly Publishing LLC. All rights reserved.

CONFEMEX’s Embrace of U.S. Interest Group Consolidation Over the course of spring 2007 to November 2008, U.S. citizenship and voting would remain high on the confederation’s agenda. At the same time, CONFEMEX strengthened ties with state leaders south of the border. CONFEMEX leaders were not just advancing two separate Mexico- and U.S.-oriented agendas, but would come to be seen by various political actors as conduits for progressing complementary cross-border state motives. As Mexican and U.S. political players encouraged migrant associations’ integration into the United States, internal tensions nevertheless materialized over whether the confederation had succumbed to local co-optation. Luring CONFEMEX more firmly into U.S.-focused integration activities was not just a priority of U.S. politicians. Mexico continued its own interest in supporting its diaspora’s protected standing in a U.S. environment filled with both heavy enforcement and growing opportunities for immigrant inclusion. To illustrate, CONFEMEX drew support from Mexican political elites as they joined with the National Alliance of Latino and Caribbean Communities to launch a multi-

Vonderlack-Navarro, Rebecca. Immigrant Political Incorporation : The Role of Hometown Associations, LFB

158

Immigrant Political Incorporation

national immigrant summit held in Michoacán, Mexico in May 2007. Aimed at discussing cross-border concerns surrounding migration, the summit was greatly supported by then Mayor of Morelia, C. Salvador Lopez Orduna. The mayor declared, “This event demonstrates our commitment to broaden and deepen our collaborative relationship with migrant communities. Only by working in partnership will we construct an appropriate international response to challenges of the global migration phenomenon” (Summit Convention Handbook 2007). Building off the Michoacán state’s first ever momentous granting of migrant absentee voting rights within their gubernatorial elections,108

Copyright © 2013. LFB Scholarly Publishing LLC. All rights reserved.

108

The significance of Michoacán, Mexico for the migrant summit was enhanced by the proactive outreach of the Michoacán state government towards it large and organized diaspora in the U.S. As recently as February 2007, the Michoacán government granted migrants abroad the right to vote within state-level gubernatorial elections. Approved by a unanimous vote, Michoacán became the first state in Mexico to grant voting rights for Governor elections. The legislation was spearheaded by Michoacán Governor Lazaro Cardenas Batel and a migrant diputado Jesus Martinez Saldana. Furthermore, the vote from abroad was lobbied by an extensive national-level network of clubs and federations throughout the U.S. that are part of the Frente Binacional Michoacano (The Binational Front of Michoacanos, FREBIMICH) founded in 2004 to promote the civic and political participation of Michoacán clubs. Migrant advocates within FREBIMICH were quick to point out how demographic shifts caused by massive out-migration along with the importance of migrant-supplied remittances had earned migrants a formalized political voice. There were as many as 2.5 million Michoacano migrants in the U.S. who sent an average of $2,477,000 to Mexico during 2006. Michoacanos are the largest group of Mexican migrants in Illinois (estimated at 250,000) and their federation leadership was crucial in propelling the right to vote. Despite the Illinois Michoacán federation’s active promotion of binational civic participation, expatriate voter turnout for the Governor elections was dismal; an estimated 100 voters registered for the Michoacán vote. In the face of stalled immigration reform and the inability to obtain Illinois drivers licenses for the undocumented, the President of the Michoacán federation was frustrated. “’It appears we can’t win on either side of the border. But we have to keep fighting.’" A binational agenda proved to be a slow and uphill battle for immigrant activists. See Olivo, Antonio. 2007. “Few Decide to Register

Vonderlack-Navarro, Rebecca. Immigrant Political Incorporation : The Role of Hometown Associations, LFB

Copyright © 2013. LFB Scholarly Publishing LLC. All rights reserved.

"Today We March, Tomorrow We Vote"

159

Michoacán Governor Cardenas Batel made key appearances at the summit and generously donated the conference venue. Activities customarily associated with sustaining HTAs and federations’ homeland loyalties were a major part of the event: folkloric music and dance, artistic exhibitions, elegant lighting of Morelia’s Cathedral, classy traditional Morelia dinners sponsored by the municipal government, visits to remittance-based development projects, and events to celebrate Mexican pride. Clearly distinct from a solely Mexican orientation, however, the enveloping weight of local Illinois immigrant politics also served as a vivid component of the summit. U.S. Representative Luis Gutierrez of Illinois flew to Morelia as a keynote speaker to discuss U.S. immigrant politics. Gutierrez perceived the Mexican-based event as an important way to connect with emergent migrant leadership, despite strong criticism from many in the crowd frustrated by the harsh security measures of the STRIVE Act.109 Continuing its effort to pull migrants towards U.S. integration, representatives from Illinois Governor Blagojevich’s Office of New Americans Policy and Advocacy held a workshop at the summit. Local officials promoted the plans of the Illinois state government to enhance immigrant integration initiatives, including the endorsement of the upand-coming Illinois Immigrant Welcoming Center with immigrantfocused services and general social and civic education programs. Seen as allies in establishing local Illinois immigrant integration programming, the workshop panel included CONFEMEX leaders and the recently appointed Chicago General Consul Manuel Rodriguez Arriaga (2007-present). The panel brainstormed ways the New Americans Initiative might link with the Chicago consulate’s services so that new arrivals to the consulate could be immediately connected to Illinois social services. Government leaders on both sides of the border viewed strengthening ties to advancing CONFEMEX leaders as a strategic way to help ensure immigrants’ legal standing in Illinois. The courting of CONFEMEX by both the Mexican and Illinois state-government to promote immigrant integration became even more apparent in early 2008. Mexican President Felipe Calderon (2006present) visited the Chicago Mexican diaspora community in February for Mexican election; Organizers blame low numbers on bureaucratic process." Chicago Tribune, July 4. 109 See note 7.

Vonderlack-Navarro, Rebecca. Immigrant Political Incorporation : The Role of Hometown Associations, LFB

160

Immigrant Political Incorporation

Copyright © 2013. LFB Scholarly Publishing LLC. All rights reserved.

of that year.110 Maintaining federation leaders’ homeland-orientation and continued remittance flows was a major reason for the visit. Calderon proposed to not only continue Fox’s 3x1 development projects in partnership with migrant HTAs and federations, but also to propel an ambitious $499 million state-migrant initiative to match HTA contributions towards infrastructure projects, especially for hometown schools and road construction. In a private meeting with 30 Chicago immigrant leaders (including CONFEMEX leaders), Calderon shared his interest in doubling the program amount in the future. Calderon’s attempt to maintain the attention and loyalty of the diaspora appeared to be working, as a local right-of-center PAN party leader in Chicago111 expressed his enthusiasm about the meeting with Calderon: “We asked him to make it a $1 billion program in the next two years…. He was very receptive.” Another CONFEMEX leader boasted that the private meeting was “very productive and very positive.112 During Calderon’s official address to the migrant community, CONFEMEX leaders symbolically sat at the front of a packed high school auditorium within Chicago’s La Villita neighborhood. The president complemented the strength and value of Chicago’s emigrant community and promised increased funding for Mexican consular services in the Midwest region.113 Even after significant advances within the U.S. political 110

Although the presidential visit ignited some local protest from left-of-center PRD loyalists bitter over the PAN’s narrow election win, federation leaders saw the chance to bolster their remittance-based development plans. 111 The PAN leader is also the chairman of the prominent Little Village Chamber of Commerce in a successful Mexican-immigrant predominant business district in Chicago. 112 Anonymous. 2008. “A Mexican message; Calderon calls attention to immigration, worker programs." Chicago Tribune, February 13. 113 Olivo, Antonio. 2008. “Calderon pledges to boost economy; Mexican president aims to keep jobs, workers there." Chicago Tribune, February 13. See also Anonymous, “A Mexican message.” Chicago Tribune February 13, 2008. Calderon would continue to lose political clout when he was accused of being hypocritical for his stance on immigration. Central American immigrants, particularly from El Salvador, Honduras and Guatemala, accused Mexico of harsh and inhumane treatment of its own undocumented immigrants. Criticism mounted after Calderon finished his U.S. tour in 2008 where he

Vonderlack-Navarro, Rebecca. Immigrant Political Incorporation : The Role of Hometown Associations, LFB

Copyright © 2013. LFB Scholarly Publishing LLC. All rights reserved.

"Today We March, Tomorrow We Vote"

161

arena, CONFEMEX leaders were equally compelled by the direct political attention they received from the Mexican president (Field notes February 12, 2008, Chicago, IL; CONFEMEX monthly minutes and field notes March 10, 2008). Calderon aimed to accomplish more than obtaining CONFEMEX’s Mexican expatriate loyalty. Aware he could not influence U.S. national debates over economic reforms and emigration, Calderon crafted an alternative route for obtaining U.S. political influence by capitalizing on CONFEMEX leaders’ new connections with Illinois state politicians. Calderon complemented Illinois Governor Blagojevich for supporting the migrant community in fighting for healthcare access for the undocumented. Calderon went beyond polite rhetoric when he proposed bi-national programming with local Illinois state and city leaders in the areas of education and labor. CONFEMEX leaders, no less, served as chief players in facilitating a meeting between Calderon and Governor Rod Blagojevich. The meeting resulted in both political leaders signing an agreement to strengthen a cooperative educational and cultural teacher-exchange, where U.S. teachers could work in Mexican schools and Mexican teachers could work in U.S. schools to strengthen Spanish courses and other curriculum areas. Furthermore, in a meeting with Chicago Mayor Richard M. Daley, Calderon and the mayor discussed the potential for creating a “labor competency certificate” for migrant workers in the restaurant industry. The endorsed Mexican immigrants as hard working contributors that merit legal standing in the U.S. Meanwhile, his own country had initiated crackdowns and committed human rights violations towards its own unauthorized immigrants. Avila, Oscar. 2008. “Tables turned in immigration flap; Neighbors say Mexico is guilty of a double standard when it comes to treatment of illegal immigrants.” Chicago Tribune, May 2. See also Anonymous, “A Mexican message,” and Antonio Olivo, “Calderon pledges to boost economy.” February 13; Olivo, Antonio. 2008. “Mexico leader to find anger, hope on visit; Immigrants in city divided on Calderon." Chicago Tribune, February 12. Rosas-Landa, Antonio. 2008. “Calderon mission has dual purpose; President Felipe Calderon has been audacious in achieving compromises with the U.S. and the Mexican Congress." Chicago Tribune, February 12. Boletín Especial Lazos. "Carta del Presidente de la República al Instituto de los Mexicanos en el Exterior (el 6 de Septiembre, 2008). www.ime.gob.mx. Accessed from CONFEMEX listserv September 7, 2008.

Vonderlack-Navarro, Rebecca. Immigrant Political Incorporation : The Role of Hometown Associations, LFB

Copyright © 2013. LFB Scholarly Publishing LLC. All rights reserved.

162

Immigrant Political Incorporation

certification would be managed by a partnership between the Illinois Restaurant Association and the Mexican government, and the association and City Colleges of Chicago would oversee the program. Chicago’s Mayor Daley supported the initiative, claiming, “This new certification program will help ensure that we are providing valuable job training skills to our residents by integrating our education and workforce development systems.”114 Despite the fact that Mexican political elites lacked the ability to directly sway political leadership in the United States at the national level, particularly in regards to U.S. immigration reform talks, Calderon actively worked to foster political alliances within the U.S. local scene. And it was CONFEMEX leaders, in turn, who served as the logical political agents for cultivating these links between leaders on both sides of the border.115 Indeed, the cross-border political capital CONFEMEX leaders had built up with Mexican authorities over the years was perceived by local leadership as a worthwhile resource when it came to enhancing Illinois’ own state-migrant initiatives. Parallel to intensifying connections south of the border, CONFEMEX continued to network with local state actors and ICIRR during the spring of 2007 into 2008. By June of 2007, CONFEMEX leader Artemio Arreola had officially become the Political Director of ICIRR and went to work on their New Americans Democracy Project, an electoral mobilization program to help newcomers with application processes, civic history, and English language skills.116 Having already registered 53,000 new immigrant voters and organized another 1,500 immigrant volunteers to set in motion the “Get Out The Vote” campaigns for the previous 2006 midterm elections, ICIRR’s connection to CONFEMEX secured further commitment in mobilizing the Mexican immigrant community as they looked towards the 2008 elections. In a press release, ICIRR Board President Juan Salgado claimed, “We are very happy that this recognized leader of our community has decided to devote himself to 114

Ibid., “A Mexican message.” See note 33. 116 The Illinois Welcoming Center received an estimated $1.1 million from various state agencies. Diaz, Fernando. 2008. “Mixed Results." Chicago Reporter, http://www.chicagoreporter.com/index.php/c/Inside_stories/d/Mixed_Results. Accessed February 7, 2011. 115

Vonderlack-Navarro, Rebecca. Immigrant Political Incorporation : The Role of Hometown Associations, LFB

"Today We March, Tomorrow We Vote"

163

strengthening the immigrant rights movement with ICIRR…His decision represents a further deepening of ICIRR’s commitment to the political empowerment of the immigrant community and specifically the Mexican immigrant community of Illinois." The ICIRR’s announcement also boasted about the CONFEMEX leader’s crossborder political activism:

Copyright © 2013. LFB Scholarly Publishing LLC. All rights reserved.

Artemio Arreola is one of several Mexican hometown association leaders in Chicago with multiple connections in Mexico and the U.S. From helping organize last year’s massive immigration marches to slating political candidates in his home state, he wields influence on both sides of the border. (Press announcement e-mailed to CONFEMEX listserv on June 12, 2007.) The federation leader’s bi-national activism was viewed as an impressive and transferrable political asset for reaching out to the broader Mexican community of Illinois. ICIRR’s electoral mobilization program had a clear agenda that involved reaching out to emergent Mexican immigrant organizations like CONFEMEX. In response to the strengthened campaigns for voter mobilization in Chicago and other immigrant-heavy areas led by the ICIRR’s New Americans Initiative, Mexican immigrant naturalization within Illinois increased by 46 percent in 2007 to 122,250 new citizens. In Chicago specifically, there was a 30 percent jump in naturalization rates with 37,700 new citizens, with Mexicans serving as the leading group of newly naturalized citizens in the state for 2007. The ICIRR New Americans Initiative also pushed for new citizens to become politically active with the local coordinator proclaiming, “If they’ve naturalized, we want to make sure they’re also registered to vote.”117 Seeing CONFEMEX’s base as potential new voters targeted within the New Americans integration plan, Governor Blagojevich wasted no time recognizing former CONFEMEX president Marcia Soto among a list of community leaders during his inaugural ceremony in Springfield, Illinois. By presenting her with a PATH Award (People Are Today’s Heroes), he honored her work in helping natives from her home state of 117

Olivo, Antonio. 2008. “Citizenship for Mexican immigrants surged in ’07.” Chicago Tribune, July 11.

Vonderlack-Navarro, Rebecca. Immigrant Political Incorporation : The Role of Hometown Associations, LFB

Copyright © 2013. LFB Scholarly Publishing LLC. All rights reserved.

164

Immigrant Political Incorporation

Durango. (CONFEMEX listserv, accessed December 28, 2006, regarding the ceremony on January 8, 2007.) His outreach to immigrant constituencies continued by July 26, 2007, with a ribbon-cutting ceremony for the state of Illinois’ premiere Welcoming Center for New Americans located in Melrose Park, Illinois. Headed by the Department of Human Services with a $1 million annual budget, the center aimed to provide newcomers with access and information to health insurance, job training, civic education, labor and employment services along with networking with nine state agencies and another 40 community-based organizations.118 Blagojevich boasted the center would help new arrivals “make Illinois their new home.” (Press Release, Office of the Governor, Rod R. Blagojevich, July 26, 2007.) 119 Jose Luis Gutierrez, the Michoacán leader serving as the Director of the Governor’s Office of New American Policy and Advocacy, declared the center would “change the way immigrants integrate into our community… As an immigrant myself, I know how crucial this kind of support can be, and I thank the Governor for his leadership in making it happen.” (Press Release, Office of the Governor, Rod R. Blagojevich, July 26, 2007.)120 CONFEMEX, well regarded for their political capital in Mexico, was a plausible target by local leaders who aimed to nurture their mounting political potential within the U.S. Taking pleasure in the political attention, certain federation leaders furthered efforts to directly influence local politics through the Mexicans for Political Progress Political Action Committee (MXPP). Federation leaders from Michoacán, Guanajuato, and Guerrero along with the Board President of ICIRR met during the spring and summer 118

Smith, Gerry. 2007. “New center to help ease immigrants’ transition; The state with help from area agencies and community groups, launches facility to link newcomers with services such as health care." Chicago Tribune, September 30. 119 The Illinois Welcoming Center received an estimated $1.1 million from various state agencies. Diaz, Fernando. “Mixed Results.” 120 In July, it was suggested that new centers were being considered in other Illinois cities including Aurora, Rockford, and Waukegan. There was also an idea for creating mobile services within rural areas of Illinois as a means to extend services to growing immigrant communities. Espinosa, Leticia. 2007. “Inauguran centro de recursos y servicios.” Diario Hoy, Chicago Tribune, July 27.

Vonderlack-Navarro, Rebecca. Immigrant Political Incorporation : The Role of Hometown Associations, LFB

Copyright © 2013. LFB Scholarly Publishing LLC. All rights reserved.

"Today We March, Tomorrow We Vote"

165

of 2007 to forge plans to establish a board of directors, committee members, and donors. They began to define the benefits of member participation, which involved determining criteria for candidates they considered endorsing and discussing the promotion of youth membership for college students under the age of 24. Plans were also in the works to have a marketing and membership solicitation drive for that summer.121 By mid-November 2007, MXPP held campaign finance receptions to support Congressman Luis Gutierrez and Democratic candidate of Illinois' 3rd Congressional district Mark Pera. CONFEMEX leaders were moving in a deliberate direction to advance within U.S.-focused politics.122 As a result of CONFEMEX’s extensive recognition by those in power as a potentially important political player within immigrant politics, marching remained marginal to their agenda. Federation chiefs decidedly did not take a leadership role in the May Day rally of 2008, although they still marched. As the date of the annual May Day rally grew closer, the push for immigrant voting was widely preferred as a more realistic way to achieve reform. Overall, Chicago’s immigrant organizing scene was generally divided into three camps during 2008. The first group aimed to re-energize the movement by encouraging African American involvement in the marches. This new push was spearheaded by the Rainbow/PUSH coalition led by civil rights activist Rev. Jesse Jackson, a familiar name in Illinois politics who many argued was looking to remain politically relevant after being marginalized from the Barack Obama presidential campaign. Organizer attempts at uniting Latino and Black activism, however, largely failed.123 Even while some African Americans were sensitive to the 121

“Proposed MXPP Membership Drive,” Flyer obtained by author at March 2007 monthly CONFEMEX meeting. 122 On November 12, 2007, MXPP held a reception in support of Congressman Luis Gutierrez who was at that point no longer planning to retire. The Board President of ICIRR and leaders of member organizations of the ICIRR were also part of the host committee. MXPP, on December 19, 2007, also backed the candidacy of Illinois 3rd Congressional district Democrat Mark Pera to run against Dan Lipinski, who voted for the Sensenbrenner bill, in the November 2008 elections. Pera would lose to Lipinski for the second time. 123 In turn, some organizers felt that reaching out to African Americans, believed to share many of the same community and class-based concerns of

Vonderlack-Navarro, Rebecca. Immigrant Political Incorporation : The Role of Hometown Associations, LFB

166

Immigrant Political Incorporation

Copyright © 2013. LFB Scholarly Publishing LLC. All rights reserved.

racial injustices and legal plight of immigrants, most African Americans (as was true of many people in Illinois) were busy working to support a different grassroots movement in 2008, the presidential campaign of Barack Obama.124 A second group of immigrant activists in Illinois was the original March 10th Committee, which had now greatly transformed into a heterogeneous group of labor, religious leadership, and other progressive community activists. The March 10th the Latino immigrant population, would result in a successful “Black-Brown Coalition,” as had happened in the 1980s to support the win of Chicago’s first black mayor Harold Washington. The new coalition, “Together We Are the People’s Majority,” aimed to bring together leaders from Rainbow/PUSH and other other community organizations, local churches, and labor unions. Despite organizing efforts, there was a disappointing African American turnout at the rally. While Chicago’s Blacks and Latinos were able to successfully mobilize for political change in the 1980s, tensions resurfaced with the 1986 Immigration Reform and Control Act (IRCA), which provided legalization to the city’s vast population of immigrants. IRCA was not a popular provision among many Black voters who felt immigrants only increased competition for low wage jobs. Many African Americans were also offended that the current immigrant rights movement was tied, in their view, too closely to their own civil rights movement, which they argued had substantially more violence and repression. Blacks’ support for Chicago’s immigrant movement was tense back in 2006 as well, particularly over job competition. In fact, a Pew Hispanic Center poll circulated in 2006 indicated that 41 percent of African-American respondents in Chicago reported at one time losing their employment to an immigrant (versus only 15 percent for white, non-Hispanic respondents). While a general base of African Americans was not strong in the marches, some political elites and civil rights organization were sympathetic to immigrant injustices. U.S. Representative Bobby Rush (D-IL) introduced legislation in 2006 promoting immigrant family reunification, and the NAACP published a report against strict immigrant enforcement. Avila, Oscar. 2006. “Blacks split on support for illegal immigrants." Chicago Tribune. April 23. See also Olivo, Antonio. 2008. “Activists send out invites for rally; Immigration-march organizers aim for Latino-Black coalition.” Chicago Tribune, May 1. 124 Sector, Bob and Michael Martinez. 2008. “Clinton’s Latino edge no accident; Time and effort forged alliance.” Chicago Tribune, February 7.

Vonderlack-Navarro, Rebecca. Immigrant Political Incorporation : The Role of Hometown Associations, LFB

"Today We March, Tomorrow We Vote"

167

Committee by 2008 upheld a much broader left-wing agenda that went beyond immigrant rights (e.g., critique of the Iraq War, promotion of the Free Employee Choice Act pushed by labor, and gay rights). The broadening vision of the March 10th Committee was emblematic of the fact that its leadership was no longer dominated by immigrants, with a new cohort of Anglo activists now on board.125 Local PRD activist and long-time March 10th Committee leader Jorge Mujica was blunt about the changes within the March 10th Committee: “It’s a mess." He lamented that the united front of Chicago’s grassroots immigrant activism that emerged in 2006 and came together again in 2007 became fragmented by 2008.126 CONFEMEX leaders reflected on the change of the March 10th Committee over the past years with great skepticism:

Copyright © 2013. LFB Scholarly Publishing LLC. All rights reserved.

It was an authentic movement [in 2006], it was a very representative movement, very diverse with an important collective vision that has finished being kidnapped by traditional leftist groups that are not very inclusive. And they do not even see the federations of HTAs as authentic representatives [of immigrants]…They don’t respect them [HTAs]. (Interview with Michoacán leader, May 15, 2008, Chicago, IL.) A Guerrero leader critiqued the fragmented planning for 2008. “Ironically we’re pushing for [immigrant] unity and we have different groups planning the march.” (CONFEMEX monthly minutes and field notes, April 14, 2008, Chicago, IL.) The local social movement field had shifted in a way that CONFEMEX leaders no longer identified with the protest leadership. The third group of May 1 march organizers consisted of community leaders with ties to the state and local leaders who wanted to make gains in the November 2008 elections, thus emphasizing voter mobilization over marching. This group included the principal ICIRR 125

Notable unions that participated: electricians union, SEIU, Chicago-area Labor Council for Latin American Advancement, and Unite Here. 126 Franklin, Stephen. 2008. “Labor, immigrants find common ground; May Day rally helps link workers from both groups.” Chicago Tribune, May 2. Also interview with PRD activist and labor organizer, October 19, 2008, Chicago, IL.

Vonderlack-Navarro, Rebecca. Immigrant Political Incorporation : The Role of Hometown Associations, LFB

Copyright © 2013. LFB Scholarly Publishing LLC. All rights reserved.

168

Immigrant Political Incorporation

and its member organizations, like CONFEMEX. While member organizations and ICIRR employees still marched, their voter registration was on overdrive, as a field coordinator explained. “The coalition believes the marches and voter registration are not mutually exclusive. In fact, they reinforce each other…It’s a matter of taking that energy…and converting it to civic participation.”127 CONFEMEX leaders even dismissed leadership within the May 1, 2008 rally that did not equally value citizenship and voting drives claiming. “Those that get their picture taken at the [march] event do not push for citizenship campaigns.” Working with ICIRR on voting was a much larger priority for the confederation who saw electoral participation as the main possibility for realizing immigrant rights. (Monthly minutes and Field notes, April 14, 2008, Chicago, IL.) U.S. electoral mobilization, indeed, was a critical line of action for CONFEMEX during 2008. (CONFEMEX field notes and monthly minutes, March 10, 2008; April 14, 2008; May 12, 2008; July 14, 2008; September, 2008, Chicago, IL.) CONFEMEX specifically expanded its work with ICIRR’s New Americans Democracy Project’s Fellowship program, whereby young volunteers committed twenty weeks to mobilize voters within immigrant-dominated neighborhoods and suburbs. CONFEMEX agreed to host their own fellow, which meant that CONFEMEX members would work with ICIRR to provide volunteers to work with the fellow along with providing the fellow monetary support and office space. The fellow worked for CONFEMEX between June to November of 2008 to solicit votes in the Mexican-dominant suburbs of Berwyn and Cicero.128 CONFEMEX leaders were quick to see the gains in working with ICIRR’s citizenship program. By early October 2008, CONFEMEX and their ICIRR New Americans Project Fellow revealed that they had registered 1,000 new voters and were quick to embark on their next goal of registering 2,000 more by election time. The Guerrero Federation president of CONFEMEX reflected on their political achievement: “CONFEMEX decided to participate in this [New Americas] project because we believe that our community needs to demonstrate its strength through the ballot box. If we want an immigration reform we have to do it this 127

Bauza, Vanessa. 2008. “Interest wanes for immigrant marches; But some leaders say rallies still important." Chicago Tribune, April 27. 128 CONFEMEX listserve, July 25, 2008. Accessed July 26, 2008.

Vonderlack-Navarro, Rebecca. Immigrant Political Incorporation : The Role of Hometown Associations, LFB

Copyright © 2013. LFB Scholarly Publishing LLC. All rights reserved.

"Today We March, Tomorrow We Vote"

169

way, [through] voting and participating.”129 Even in their press release, conventional political strategies were seen as an essential avenue for legislative success. By working with ICIRR, CONFEMEX leaders knew they could identify themselves with political advances for immigrants in Illinois. By 2008, the ICIRR’s New Americans Project boasted that their efforts contributed to 96,680 new U.S. citizens in Illinois, a 56 percent increase. This included 80,759 voter registrations between 2004 and 2008; 25,815 of those registered in 2008 alone. Their initiative received significant financial support and raised a hefty $1,019,000 for their voter mobilization program. It also enjoyed backing from politicians who stood to gain from the new alluring voting bloc. Their Get-OutThe-Vote (GOTV) program continued to gain momentum by the fall of 2008 through extensive mailings, automated phone messages, and enhanced lobbying activities to push for votes, an effort that extended throughout 700 Chicago-area neighborhoods.130 CONFEMEX’s alliance with ICIRR and their GOTV campaign was a robust mechanism for promoting political inclusion as it drew new immigrants into the local arena of specifically Democratic politics. It was not just Blagojevich and Gutierrez who stood to benefit from ICIRR’s voter mobilization programming; at least 24 primarily Democratic elected officials declared themselves “allies” of the immigrant movement.131 129

CONFEMEX Press Release, October 2, 2008, “Mas de 1,000 Nuevos Votantes Registrados En Cicero Por CONFEMEX.” Accessed from CONFEMEX listserv, October 3, 2008. 130 ICIRR bulletin, “Our Vote Is Power, The New Americans Democracy Project 2008.” Also, Anonymous. 2008. “Activists get out the vote." Chicago Tribune, October 8. 131 Right before the elections, ICIRR attracted a vast number of state and city officials into a rally centered on demonstrating immigrants’ voting power: Chicago Mayor Richard Daley, Illinois Attorney General Lisa Madigan, U.S. Representative Luis V. Gutierrez (IL-4), U.S. Representative Danny Davis (IL-7), U.S. Representative Jan Schakowsky (IL-9), Chicago City Clerk Miguel de Valle, Commissioner Joe Berrios, Mayor of Berwyn Michael O’Conner, Alderman Ricardo Munoz, Joe More, Danny Soliz, and state legislators including Iris Martinez, Antonio Munoz, William Delgado, Mattie Hunter, Donne Trotter, Esther Golar, Eddie Acevedo, Deborah Graham, Elizabeth Hernandez, Susana Mendoza, Harry Osterman, Kevin Joyce, Tony

Vonderlack-Navarro, Rebecca. Immigrant Political Incorporation : The Role of Hometown Associations, LFB

Copyright © 2013. LFB Scholarly Publishing LLC. All rights reserved.

170

Immigrant Political Incorporation

Immigrant activists, including those in CONFEMEX, expected that a mobilized electorate could push for an immigration reform. CONFEMEX leaders were also aware that the confederation’s active electorate could offer more advantages than just holding state leaders accountable to immigrant concerns. During the April monthly meeting gearing up for the 2008 elections, a Guerrero leader talked of CONFEMEX’s new recognition by local representative Lisa Hernandez, “She does not care about the money we send back to Mexico,” he claimed.132 CONFEMEX, instead, needed to push its ability to mobilize votes. “We have to talk their [politicians] talk” if they wanted resources and recognition in Illinois. He felt this strategy could be propelled further if they continued “to get help from strong organizations, like La Coalicion [ICIRR].” (Field Notes, April 14, 2008; May 12, 2008, Chicago, IL.) The ICIRR fellow in attendance during the November monthly meeting further encouraged CONFEMEX to continue their U.S. political participation as local politicians were beginning to recognize the federations and their work. Local Senator Martin Sandoval (12th District) even wanted a meeting with CONFEMEX to discuss their future political involvement. He was rumored to have offered CONFEMEX a building headquarters and funding. The CONFEMEX president explained, “We’re speaking the same language: politicians want votes and power and CONFEMEX wants presence and money.” (Field notes taken on November 10, 2008 CONFEMEX meeting, Zacatecas Federation headquarters, Chicago, IL.) CONFEMEX leaders recognized the benefits of working with local U.S. politicians as a means to increase funding and local recognition. Looking towards the 2008 elections, federation leaders were optimistic that their new voting energy would lead to expanded local recognition with those in power and contribute towards a national push for immigration reform. Immigrant leaders’ confidence was seemingly merited as political contenders for the U.S. November election made it increasingly obvious that the Latino voting bloc was crucial.133 Yet Berrios, and Linda Chapa La Via (ICIRR Update, October 24, 2008, "GOTV Rally, Get Out The Vote for Immigration Reform.") 132 Lisa Hernandez was an Illinois State Representative for the 24th district, Cicero, IL. 133 During the long-standing and heated Democratic presidential primaries between Senators Hilary Rodham Clinton (D-NY) and Barack Obama (D-IL),

Vonderlack-Navarro, Rebecca. Immigrant Political Incorporation : The Role of Hometown Associations, LFB

"Today We March, Tomorrow We Vote"

171

Copyright © 2013. LFB Scholarly Publishing LLC. All rights reserved.

although concerted efforts were made to appeal to Latino constituencies, all emergent presidential candidates—Senators Hilary Rodham Clinton (D-NY), Barack Obama (D-IL), and John McCain (RAZ)—did their best to avoid delving into the complexity of immigration reform. Despite their reservations, when pushed on the issue all candidates upheld similar promising (albeit moderate) reform agendas: support for increased militarization of the border, enhanced enforcement and security provisions, and most importantly, a path for legalization for undocumented immigrants. As presidential contenders encouraged immigrants to vote, immigrants in turn hoped their votes would hold lawmakers accountable to their desires for immigration reform.134 CONFEMEX seemed to have effectively channeled its energy into renewed interest group activity from late 2007 to the November elections of 2008. Political leaders in both Mexico and the U.S. in turn further advanced CONFEMEX’s institutional strategies as a way to safeguard Mexican immigrants. CONFEMEX, indeed, had fulfilled its side of a political bargain within U.S. institutional politics. They adapted their organization to respond to new political opportunities Clinton was rumored to be favored by Latino voters. Aware of Clinton’s strong ties with the Latino community nurtured by her husband’s 1996 run, Obama overhauled his outreach efforts to Latinos and relied heavily on the assistance of his home state’s Congressman Luis Gutierrez to make Latino voter gains, a budding partnership that would strengthen over time. Yet during the contentious primaries, Clinton remained the favorite among Latino voters as she made key efforts to connect with Latino activists along with making Latinos part of her close network of advisors. Clinton even held a stronghold with Latino voters in Illinois despite Obama’s overwhelming primary win in his home state. 134 Page, Clarence. 2008. “Clinton’s Hispanic edge over Obama; Any lead has more to do with coattails than race." Chicago Tribune, January 30. Also, Sector, Bob and Michael Martinez. 2008. “Clinton’s Latino edge no accident; time and effort forged alliance." Chicago Tribune, February 7; Torres, Maria De Los Angeles. 2008. “Immigration issue cuts deep; Latino vote a big loss for Obama.” Chicago Tribune, February 10; Tankersley, Jim and Christi Parsons. 2008. “Immigration polarizes small-town America; some communities are angry about immigration, but the candidates aren’t spending much time on the topic.” Chicago Tribune, September 25.

Vonderlack-Navarro, Rebecca. Immigrant Political Incorporation : The Role of Hometown Associations, LFB

172

Immigrant Political Incorporation

with support and votes. Yet all the while that immigrants mobilized votes to push for immigration reform, as the next section will explore, the broader political and economic context began to deteriorate, posing a threat to CONFEMEX’s continued unity.

Copyright © 2013. LFB Scholarly Publishing LLC. All rights reserved.

The Consequences of CONFEMEX’s U.S. Political Engagement: Questions of Co-optation and Dissolution of Base Support Parallel to CONFEMEX’s U.S. interest group consolidation, farreaching changes in the broader political and economic context began to unfold. During 2008, it would become unclear if emerging political and economic conditions would prevent CONFEMEX from continuing its participation in either institutional or non-institutional politics. Along with a continuation of local immigrant repression, a burgeoning and extensive economic crisis would come to threaten political projects that were once friendly towards CONFEMEX. Both Illinois’ statemigrant initiatives and Mexico’s diaspora-focused programs would be greatly weakened by financial troubles. In addition, desires for national-level immigration reform would also become clouded by the economic downturn. Moreover, CONFEMEX’s advances within U.S. politics had intensified internal tensions between federation leaders as well as the leaders and their HTA base. CONFEMEX and other eminent immigrant groups witnessed U.S. localities take a repressive turn toward the undocumented throughout 2008. There were continued hikes in immigrant arrests, deportations, police maltreatment, and hate crimes throughout the country. Within the first two months of 2008, 350 anti-immigrant laws were proposed within U.S. localities (against immigrant access to special drivers’ licenses, punishing employers who hire undocumented workers, limits on social services, English-only ordinances, etc.). By August of 2008, an estimated 60 percent increase in deportations was seen between 2003 and 2008, with some 700 Mexican immigrants deported from the U.S. daily.135 In Illinois specifically, ICE reported the arrests of 72,000 135

Wides-Munoz, Laura. 2008. “Immigration bills many, but laws few; cost and sentiment slow states’ proposals." Chicago Tribune, March 8. See also: Anonymous. 2008. “Anti-immigrant sentiment linked to rise in hate crimes.” Chicago Tribune, March 10. Martinez, Michael. 2008. “More immigrant detentions, more deaths; Arrests have risen dramatically, but critics say

Vonderlack-Navarro, Rebecca. Immigrant Political Incorporation : The Role of Hometown Associations, LFB

Copyright © 2013. LFB Scholarly Publishing LLC. All rights reserved.

"Today We March, Tomorrow We Vote"

173

unauthorized immigrants since 2003. Between October of 2007 and February of 2008, 632 immigrant arrests occurred in Chicago alone. Within the Midwest region, workplace raids and deportations jumped from 6,310 in 2004 to 9,000 in 2007 and this number continued to rise in 2008, averaging 300 deportations on a weekly basis.136 As CONFEMEX united with other budding immigrant groups to push for political power, they were also confronted by nativist backlash as well as the escalation of fear within immigrant communities terrorized by intensified police enforcement. In addition to the escalation of heavy-handed enforcement at the local level, CONFEMEX’s ties to Illinois state leaders and public programming began to suffer. Illinois Governor Rod Blagojevich’s prized state programs of immigrant integration were not entirely playing out as hoped. Blagojevich’s Office of New Americans Policy and Advocacy began with high aspirations. By January of 2008, however, several state agencies were charged with inefficiencies and failing to implement basic procedures to benefit immigrant services (e.g., standardizing the use of interpreters, language and cultural competency tests, and appropriately managing the flow of information to those lacking basic English). To add to that, challenges brought on by the state’s economic crisis created contentious fights within the Springfield legislature over how state funding should be allocated. As a consequence, Blagojevich’s immigration initiative lost $1.7 million, some of which was intended to fund the Illinois immigrant Welcoming Center. The state’s economic problems were so pervasive that Blagojevich vetoed $460 million of funding allocated for school programs, mental health, and other social services, a portion of which

medical care has not kept pace.” Chicago Tribune, June 1. Anonymous. 2008. “Mexicans deported from U.S. face shattered lives." Chicago Tribune, August 25. 136 Bauza, Vanessa. 2008. “Deportation drama plays in Broadview; About 300 immigrants a week from the Midwest pass through the federal facility on this way out of the U.S.” Chicago Tribune, June 27. See also Anonymous. 2008. “Nearly 150 arrests in immigrant sweep.” Chicago Tribune, September 18. Olivo, Antonio. 2008. “Chicago-area sweep leads to arrest of 30.” Chicago Tribune, February 27. Anonymous. 2008. “43 illegal immigrants arrested in 5day sweep.” Chicago Tribune, June 26.

Vonderlack-Navarro, Rebecca. Immigrant Political Incorporation : The Role of Hometown Associations, LFB

Copyright © 2013. LFB Scholarly Publishing LLC. All rights reserved.

174

Immigrant Political Incorporation

benefited immigrants.137 As a result of the lack of funding, the recommendation to provide $25 million to immigrants for English classes received a mere $300,000 from state funding along with a citizenship program that faced such a dearth of resources that it could only service 10 percent of its applicant pool.138 The lack of state funding was compounded by Blagojevich’s bleak approval rating and heightened divisions between the Governor and the state legislature, which only intensified accusations of corruption and the mounting federal investigation of his administration. With the lack of state funding and the Governor’s leadership in doubt, it remained a big question as to how much the state’s immigrant integration initiatives, along with its ties to ICIRR and CONFEMEX, would remain a priority for the state of Illinois in the future.139 Moreover, emergent immigrant groups like CONFEMEX, whose popular mobilization led to eventual voter participation, initially anticipated a reform legislation as a result of their significant voting power. Indeed, many candidates who endorsed anti-immigrant sentiments did suffer at the polls, particularly as anti-immigrant rhetoric meant to fuel Republican turnout failed, and the newly mobilized Latino vote tended to support Democratic contenders. Particularly damaging was when Obama and McCain moved into their heated presidential race. In an attempt to appeal to his conservative constituency, McCain lamented over his past attempts to pass immigration reform legislation, claiming he should have prioritized security measures before launching a legalization provision. McCain’s inconsistency over his immigration stance, along with widespread local hikes in immigrant crackdowns and xenophobic rhetoric within the Republican Party, eventually cost him the Latino vote, which largely favored Barack Obama for U.S. President. Many Latinos, including CONFEMEX, expected payback from Obama with another round of legalization reform or at least a moratorium on raids until a reform was reached. Illinois immigrant advocates, like Gutierrez and ICIRR, boasted of the immigrant voter turnout, especially the Latino vote that 137

See note 36. Sacchetti, Maria. 2008. “Welcomed, wearily. Illinois offered aid to immigrants, Budgets intervened. Wall Street Journal, August 13. 139 Davey, Monica. 2008. “Picking Obama Successor Puts Spotlight on Governor.” The New York Times, November 12. 138

Vonderlack-Navarro, Rebecca. Immigrant Political Incorporation : The Role of Hometown Associations, LFB

Copyright © 2013. LFB Scholarly Publishing LLC. All rights reserved.

"Today We March, Tomorrow We Vote"

175

favored Obama by 67 percent. While Obama could not ignore the Latino vote, passing comprehensive immigration reform, nevertheless, would be complicated by other issues taking precedence, namely healthcare, the Iraq War, and most importantly, the massive global recession taking hold. In the face of economic hardship, public scrutiny at the idea of legalizing the country’s undocumented immigrants, whom could potentially create more competition within a shrinking job market, quickly hardened.140 The significant economic downturn was not a challenge for just CONFEMEX and its desire for an immigrant legalization plan. Mexican state strategies towards its migrants also appeared to be in flux. The onset of a global recession began to threaten the sustainability of Mexico’s dependence on its diaspora and their remittances as a viable economic development strategy. Remittances to Mexico were $24 billion in 2007, yet by August of 2008 the country experienced the largest decrease in remittances in twelve years as they fell by $1.9 billion, a 12.2 percent decrease.141 As a result of the economic depression, many immigrants lost their jobs, and the unemployment rate in the Mexican immigrant community rose from 4.5 to 7.5 percent between 2007 and 2008 (compared to the U.S.’s general unemployment at the time of 6.1 percent).142 Even while Western Union and the remittance industry attempted to maintain the loyalty of migrants by granting scholarships to CONFEMEX youth and through 4x1 projects 140

Witt, Howard. 2008. “Immigration issue routed to state-level; Activists foiled as interest wanes on national stage." Chicago Tribune, March 24. See also: Anonymous. 2008. “The Hispanic vote; McCain, Obama pitch economic plans to crucial demographic.” Chicago Tribune, July 9. Wallsten, Peter and Maeve Reston. 2008. “McCain appeals to Latinos with immigration revamp.” Chicago Tribune, July 9; Pearson, Rick. 2008. “For McCain Hispanic voters now a tough sell; The Republican candidate who received ample Latino support in his Senate races sees the bloc leaning heavily toward his rival.” Chicago Tribune, September 3. 141 Remittances would only continue to fall in 2009. Corresponsales El Universal, October 13, 2009, “Caida de remesas collapse economia regional." Accessed on February 7, 2011. www.eluniversal.com.mx/primera/vi_33765.html. 142 Wilkonsin, Tracey. 2008. “U.S. slump shrinks Mexican money flow." Chicago Tribune, October 2.

Vonderlack-Navarro, Rebecca. Immigrant Political Incorporation : The Role of Hometown Associations, LFB

Copyright © 2013. LFB Scholarly Publishing LLC. All rights reserved.

176

Immigrant Political Incorporation

(in which Western Union provided the fourth match towards collaborative HTA and government subsidized development in Mexico), the economic crisis had the potential to jeopardize the future of remittance-based strategies. Hints of Mexico’s dropping financial support for its diaspora were becoming evident by 2009 when certain government interests proposed a (U.S.) $34.5 million reduction for its 2010 budget in funding for programs that target emigrants abroad. With Mexico’s escalating financial crisis, government officials were hopeful the 3x1 program in conjunction with HTAs would not be negatively affected by the drop in funding.143 As the economic downturn and local repression escalated, immigrant leaders became critical and demanded more support from Chicago’s new Mexican consular leadership. By January 2008, a group of twenty immigrant groups from Illinois and Wisconsin sent a public protest letter to President Calderon criticizing the new General Consul Manuel Rodriguez Arriaga. Activists wanted to see a stronger effort fighting the increase in immigrant enforcement. “We really need a consulate that is going to be more aggressive.”144 In the protest letter, activists also accused the General Consul Rodriguez of being “profoundly incompetent,” “rude,” and even “clumsy” for failing to adequately respond to increased community demands for documentation services (the rising need for documentation that began after the U.S. demanded passports for travel between the U.S. and Mexico). Many community members felt Rodriguez was arrogant and standoffish to their complaints.145 While some CONFEMEX leaders had more to gain from maintaining a diplomatic relationship with the Mexican government, other CONFEMEX leaders, including the CONFEMEX president from Guerrero, thought the complaints against the Consul were merited. CONFEMEX’s relationship with the General Consul would be continue to be rocky and serve to heighten internal tensions between federation leaders within CONFEMEX. In general, 143

Aguilar, Gardenia Mendoza. 2009. “Mexico reduce fondos de ayuda a migrantes. Recorta del presupuesto el 77% de lo asignado el ano pasado en su apoyo." La Opinion, November 19. Obtained from CONFEMEX listserv, November 30, 2009. 144 Olivo, Antonio and Oscar Avila. 2008. “Tense times hit home at Mexican consulate.” Chicago Tribune, February 9. 145 Ibid.

Vonderlack-Navarro, Rebecca. Immigrant Political Incorporation : The Role of Hometown Associations, LFB

Copyright © 2013. LFB Scholarly Publishing LLC. All rights reserved.

"Today We March, Tomorrow We Vote"

177

the new consular strategies towards federation leaders had apparently shifted by 2008. As new officials assumed posts within the Institute for Mexicans Abroad, they tended to see the influence of CONFEMEX as overrated, especially now that the protests were over. While they still wanted HTAs to serve as remittance-generating organizations, consular officials did not seem to have a continued interest in cultivating within federation leaders an independent political perspective. (Interview with IME officials June 8, 2008, December 7, 2008; February 20, 2009, Chicago, IL.) Making matters even more difficult, internal disagreements erupted between federation leaders and between some leaders and their base about CONFEMEX’s bi-national agenda. CONFEMEX’s intensified ties with ICIRR ignited concerns within the confederation for how to advocate for resources and representation with strong and established NGOs. As early as 2007, during their leadership retreat, leaders foresaw a potential challenge in obtaining funds. “As an umbrella organization that is not established within the [U.S.] non-profit community, we have to be creative in order to survive and obtain our own resources.” (CONFEMEX Retiro, January 13 and 22, 2007, minutes.) While Blagojevich’s Office of New Americans Policy and Advocacy was the recipient of state funding, it was ICIRR who was in charge of how resources would be distributed. CONFEMEX was adamant about advocating within ICIRR in order to receive their piece of the financial pie. “No one is going to fight for the Mexicans like we will,” leaders passionately argued in their March monthly meeting in 2008. There was even resentment that the Caucasian native-born Executive Director of ICIRR did not have the same awareness within the migrant community. “At the end of the day the Americans view things differently than Mexicans." CONFEMEX wanted immigrants themselves to have a voice in immigrant politics. CONFEMEX leaders knew that as a broad representative base of Mexican new arrivals they needed more responsibility and clout within ICIRR. “If we don’t get power now and there is an amnesty in a couple of years, others will be making decisions for us [the immigrants]." Federation leaders were sensitive to the dynamic political climate and how power dynamics could quickly change if and when a legalization provision passed. (Field notes and monthly minutes, CONFEMEX monthly meeting, March 10, 2008, Chicago, IL.)

Vonderlack-Navarro, Rebecca. Immigrant Political Incorporation : The Role of Hometown Associations, LFB

Copyright © 2013. LFB Scholarly Publishing LLC. All rights reserved.

178

Immigrant Political Incorporation

Over time, leaders grew increasingly disenchanted by the confederation’s intensified ties to ICIRR and state leaders. And some federation leaders who had made professional gains through ties to local state leadership in turn wondered aloud if they had made the right decision in their new positions of local power. Early on, since the beginning of his work within the Blagojevich administration, Jose Luis himself anticipated problems in taking a government position. He was sensitive to how other leaders and his base questioned his motives. “It pained me that people would tell me ‘Now you are not one of us. You are a politician.’” (CONFEMEX monthly meeting field notes, October 9, 2006, Durango Unido, Chicago, IL.) Similarly, a Guerrero leader anticipated how making ties with government leaders could confine a federation leader’s activism: “Did you notice Jose Luis is now quieter? You cannot go around saying whatever you want when you work for the government." At the same time, many CONFEMEX leaders recognized the potential for federation power gained by moving into government. The Guerrero leader continued, “We pushed Jose Luis to where he is [in government] and now he’ll pull others up with him." While ripe with challenges, leaders saw ties to the local state and ICIRR as a practical route for making inroads in local politics, allowing them to further immigrant interests throughout the state. However, leaders struggled with the reality that such a move into U.S. politics had its drawbacks: “If we gain power here [the U.S.], you start to forget about Mexico." Intensified connections to U.S. politics was seen as potentially limiting to CONFEMEX’s bi-national agenda. (Field notes September 28, 2006, Consulate Foro con los clubes de oriundos, Westside Technical Institute, Chicago, IL.) As CONFEMEX advanced its interest group activities, accusations between federation leaders of “selling out” to local politics became more common. To illustrate, the former president of Zacatecas was quite critical of what he viewed as opportunism within CONFEMEX leaders tied to the Illinois state government: “…the personal missions [of leaders] have become first.” (June 18, 2008, Chicago, IL.) Other leaders, while sensitive to the need for federation leaders to create an authentic voice of immigrants within U.S. politics, were wary that political involvement meant the confederation was becoming absorbed by the government’s own agenda. The founder and president of the Oaxaca federation revealed the potential rewards and losses in working with state leaders:

Vonderlack-Navarro, Rebecca. Immigrant Political Incorporation : The Role of Hometown Associations, LFB

"Today We March, Tomorrow We Vote"

179

I: What is your opinion of federation leaders taking on political positions in the U.S.? A: I think…it’s a good move for them…because we have people that we know taking up those positions, no? But we need them [the leaders] to benefit everyone, not just a certain group…Hopefully these leaders that are gaining [political] positions will continue to work with what is our agenda, that of the organizations [in CONFEMEX], and they don’t forget that.

Copyright © 2013. LFB Scholarly Publishing LLC. All rights reserved.

I: Do you fear that if [federation] leaders begin to assume this path of taking on political positions in the U.S. that they could lose their focus of helping the organizations [of CONFEMEX]? A: Yes, they could lose it because they [politicians] limit you from making opinions. If we are talking about, for example, Jose Luis, you lose. Because there are many times he cannot give his opinion because he works for the state or city…he has to be very careful with this…he has to approach the media as someone from the state government and not as a president of the federation or as a member of the Michoacanos…there is where [federation leaders] lose a little [of their focus]… (Interview, July 17, 2008, Racine, WI). Similar resentment within CONFEMEX leadership also grew over its connection to ICIRR. Many leaders critiqued what they felt was a top-down leadership style within the ICIRR’s New Americans Democracy Project. The president of the Guanajuato federation, for example, described how CONFEMEX was being dictated by ICIRR’s agenda: I am going to tell you something that I don’t like. That I did not like in a big way. So much that I told this to the president of CONFEMEX. In Cicero, who is doing the voter registration? CONFEMEX is doing it. But it was not the decision of CONFEMEX to do it in Cicero. From the moment that Arreola arrived [to work] at ICIRR, he said we have to do

Vonderlack-Navarro, Rebecca. Immigrant Political Incorporation : The Role of Hometown Associations, LFB

180

Immigrant Political Incorporation it [voter registration] in Cicero. And from that moment we are doing it in Cicero. That is manipulation…It’s ok that we do it there, but it should be our own decision. (Interview, August 7, 2008, Chicago, IL).

Some leaders resented that their opinions were not taken into consideration in the voter mobilization program. The leader continued to express his concern that ICIRR was using CONFEMEX to gain funding: I: What is your opinion of the relationship between ICIRR and CONFEMEX? R: …Look, I am very close with ICIRR, and I work closely with ICIRR, but I definitely believe that ICIRR wants to manipulate CONFEMEX and they are achieving that…

Copyright © 2013. LFB Scholarly Publishing LLC. All rights reserved.

I: And why does the ICIRR want [to work with] CONFEMEX? R: …We the Mexicans are the largest group [of immigrants] that exist in Chicago. So the coalition receives more funding if the Illinois Coalition…[represents] we the Mexicans… So, if they group together the majority of Mexicans [within the coalition], obviously, they receive more funds. Although CONFEMEX doesn’t receive anything from ICIRR, compared with the millions of dollars that ICIRR receives.” (Interview August 7, 2008, Chicago, IL). He went on to discuss how CONFEMEX was not yet sufficiently organized with an executive director that could advocate for more funds and resources from ICIRR. With a stronger leadership, CONFEMEX could fight for its needs. As long as CONFEMEX remained weak, he argued, the coalition could use CONFEMEX to meet its own funding needs. “So it’s not convenient for the coalition [ICIRR] to strengthen CONFEMEX." Similarly wary, a Durango leader expressed concern with CONFEMEX’s alliance with ICIRR, an organization that was much stronger than CONFEMEX and with more resources. “We could start working for their agenda and not our own.” (Interview with Durango federation president, May 22, 2008, Chicago,

Vonderlack-Navarro, Rebecca. Immigrant Political Incorporation : The Role of Hometown Associations, LFB

Copyright © 2013. LFB Scholarly Publishing LLC. All rights reserved.

"Today We March, Tomorrow We Vote"

181

IL.) The Durango federation president also expressed her apprehension that CONFEMEX’s unique bi-national agenda as an immigrant-led confederation could be threatened by ICIRR’s agenda. “They [ICIRR] don’t totally understand our bi-national vision…we are not just about [U.S.] votes." She sarcastically described how ICIRR and local politicians were recently attracted to CONFEMEX and its base of HTAs as a prized voting bloc. “Ya somos de moda" (now we’re in style). (Interview, May 22, 2008, Chicago, IL.) Some CONFEMEX leaders argued that CONFEMEX should have more than one federation leader on ICIRR’s board of directors because of the large benefit they were providing for the coalition. Some smaller federation leaders also felt ignored by ICIRR leadership and expressed suspicion that ICIRR’s leadership was only interested in mobilizing the larger federations.146 Ironically, while not long ago HTAs and CONFEMEX were not of great concern to local U.S. electoral organizations and lawmakers, by 2008, some federation leaders were quickly feeling controlled by them. As friction played out between federation leaders, the Mexicans for Political Progress political action committee also suffered. A dismayed CONFEMEX leader from Guanajuato expressed why he chose to no longer participate in MXPP by 2008: “If Blagojevich goes bad, MXPP has problems,” he explained. “It [MXPP] is not inclusive and…I do not see a direct benefit for my community and we will not have much influence in aldermanic elections, because it’s all about the governor." He was also troubled that MXPP “began for a person versus an organization,” as he felt it was all about boosting the jobs of federation leaders who were now tied to the government. (Interview with Guanajuato co-founder, May 27, 2008, Chicago, IL.) The lessening of federation leader involvement in MXPP would greatly limit its influence and ultimately its demise before the 2008 elections. And for the larger Guerrero and Michoacán federations that were strongly advocating for CONFEMEX to connect with ICIRR and state leaders, their rivalry also grew. The celos (jealousy) was especially heightened when a Guerrero leader won the seat of CONFEMEX president in 2007 against a Michoacán contender. (Field notes and CONFEMEX monthly minutes, February 12, 2007; April 9, 2007.) 146

Interviews with federation leaders from Durango, May 22, 2008; Hidalgo, June 23, 2008; and Guanajuato, August 7, 2008 and May 27, 2008, Chicago, IL.

Vonderlack-Navarro, Rebecca. Immigrant Political Incorporation : The Role of Hometown Associations, LFB

182

Immigrant Political Incorporation

Their competition by 2008, however, was not just for gaining leadership posts within CONFEMEX, but also to make gains in ICIRR. (Field notes and CONFEMEX monthly minutes, March 10, 2008; April 14, 2008; May 12, 2008.) The board president of ICIRR even felt caught in the middle of their infighting. He explained how a Guerrero leader had recently called him up wanting more jobs within the coalition: “You’ve got a Michoacano here and a Michoacano is there, so is ICIRR…just about Michoacanos?" The ICIRR board president went on to describe how the infighting between the federations had been detrimental for the continuation of the Mexicans for Political Progress political action committee:

Copyright © 2013. LFB Scholarly Publishing LLC. All rights reserved.

Really the breakdown of communication between [federation leaders] has been fatal. I mean, fatal to the point where…I didn’t even submit the last W-2 [form], I had to pay a $500 fine. I think I was just depressed. (Interview, January 9, 2009, Chicago, IL.) The contention between the Guerrero and Michoacán federation grew so intense that the Michoacán federation would dramatically exit CONFEMEX in 2009 during an upset over how the leadership committee elections were handled. Michoacán’s departure would be a tremendous loss for CONFEMEX as they were at the forefront of CONFEMEX’s formation and proved to be one of the strongest federations in the Midwest pushing for bi-national Mexico-U.S. political advocacy. The infighting for CONFEMEX would eventually prove too strong for reconciliation. Tensions also ensued between some CONFEMEX leaders and their HTA bases. Federation leaders expressed conflicting reactions from their base over involvement in U.S. politics. On the one hand, the base felt deceived by failed struggles to achieve an immigration reform, and as a result, wanted to re-focus on their conventional Mexicanrelated activities. On the other hand, much of the base remained paralyzed and frightened by the escalating police enforcement and looked to their trusted federation leaders to resolve the crisis. As CONFEMEX leaders became increasingly engaged in U.S. politics, some CONFEMEX leaders reported a growing strain relating

Vonderlack-Navarro, Rebecca. Immigrant Political Incorporation : The Role of Hometown Associations, LFB

Copyright © 2013. LFB Scholarly Publishing LLC. All rights reserved.

"Today We March, Tomorrow We Vote"

183

to a base that no longer wanted to focus on immigration reform.147 After the 2006 and 2007 marches, much of the base was confused and disillusioned because no significant policy resolution was attained. Many wanted to return back to the original functions of the clubs and felt their energies were better spent on events that produced tangible results, especially re-focusing on their customary southward-focused activities (e.g. 3x1 development projects and folkloric festivals). The co-founder of the Durango federation explained how the rapid expansion in CONFEMEX activities meant much of their base was losing interest in CONFEMEX and its battle for immigrant rights. While CONFEMEX leaders wanted to push a Mexico-U.S. bi-national vision, “They [the base] still dream of Mexico." As was commonly stated by federation leaders, “Quieren su baile, su 3x1, y no quieren hablar de politicos." (They want their [traditional] dance, their 3x1 [infrastructure projects], and they do not want to talk about politics.) (Interview May 10, 2008, Chicago, IL.) Some club members even complained at a federation meeting that they did not want to hear more about CONFEMEX and its advocacy for immigrant rights, as they wanted to concentrate on the more traditional Mexican-oriented activities. Furthermore, some of the HTA base—frustrated, let down, or even confused by the U.S. stalemate over immigration reform—were feeling disconnected from the movement. It seemed while some federation leaders were making gains within local U.S. politics and prominent advocacy organizations, some of their base felt left out or turned off by the movement. The relationship between the confederation leadership and their base, nevertheless, was more complicated. Many HTA members, at this time, were scared and wanted change. For those in the base who lacked legal status, involvement in U.S. politics was not a choice. “Everyone is related to someone undocumented,” was a common claim by federation chiefs. One CONFEMEX leader revealed at length how the rise in U.S. repression affected their base:

147

Interviews with Durango federation leader, May 6, 2008, Hidalgo federation leaders, June 23, 2008, Oaxaca founder and president July 17, 2008, Michoacán leader May 15, 2008 and Guerrero leader and CONFEMEX president, May 2, 2008.

Vonderlack-Navarro, Rebecca. Immigrant Political Incorporation : The Role of Hometown Associations, LFB

184

Immigrant Political Incorporation

Copyright © 2013. LFB Scholarly Publishing LLC. All rights reserved.

They [new members] have been here since maybe within the last ten years… our new members are basically the ones who have just arrived…and they are 80% to 90% undocumented. So the children are the ones who are the citizens here…[And] because of the uncertainty of being seen [by U.S. authorities]…with the [federation’s] sign-in sheets, they don’t feel secure because, obviously, they know me, but what if the sign-in sheets get lost? They have their name, their address and everything…[and] some of our meetings have gone really low, but yet, they’re still telling us [the federation], ‘keep going.’…So to me that was, like, there’s so much pressure on us [as federation leaders]…because you think, ‘oh my God,’ they look at us like we’re going to…to do the [immigration] reform. To help them. And it’s a lot, because for the one that gets deported, what explanation can I give them? (Interview, June 23, 2008, Chicago, IL.) The rise in U.S. local repression and the inability of U.S. national politics to reach a reform was devastating for many newly arrived HTA members. Overall, the contrasting feelings of their member base— those who favored customary activities and those overwhelmed by antiimmigrant repression—made it more apparent as to why CONFEMEX needed to maintain its bi-national vision. While wanting to stay connected to development concerns in Mexico, the base also had to function in the here and now, which was increasingly threatening. CONFEMEX’s shift into U.S. interest group politics was hardly a smooth transition. A spiraling economy and quick shift in cross-border political strategies meant CONFEMEX would encounter new hardships with both emigrant- and immigrant-targeted programs. On top of external adversity, accusations of leader co-optation and eventual fragmentation ensued. In great contrast to the successful unity they had previously cherished in their battle against immigrant repression, CONFEMEX’s transition into interest group consolidation appeared to have weakened the confederation. Conclusion What can we learn from CONFEMEX’s shift towards US-focused political integration following the marches of 2006? Overall, the

Vonderlack-Navarro, Rebecca. Immigrant Political Incorporation : The Role of Hometown Associations, LFB

Copyright © 2013. LFB Scholarly Publishing LLC. All rights reserved.

"Today We March, Tomorrow We Vote"

185

evolution of CONFEMEX after the marches and the challenges it confronted are a result of the complicated political context it was embedded in rather than an all-too-simple focus on federation leaders. This chapter examined how CONFEMEX, building off the momentum of the mega-marches and the apparent political opportunities for immigration reform, moved into US-focused interest group activity and voting as a natural extension of its bi-national agenda. Yet this new strategy came with certain costs for the confederation: a general weakening of the will to mobilize for marches; a resulting internal fragmentation between leaders as they vied for recognition with stronger organizations and government leaders; and a political context that not only offered few concessions towards immigrants, but intensified national/local repression. As it stood in 2008, there was still no socially sustainable national economic development model for Mexico or the United States. In turn, a cross-border perspective that delved into the consequences of neoliberal restructuring—an agenda united HTA leaders could have potentially brought to the table—remained absent from national immigration debates. In retrospect, then, might CONFEMEX have been more cautious in its embrace of U.S. state and local politics if it had known that this involvement could come at the cost of its ability to push a bi-national agenda? But this decision, too, unfolded within a political context with other powerful actors playing a defining role. First, for reasons of their own, Mexican government officials were encouraging CONFEMEX to become much more deeply involved in Illinois politics; and, second, national politics in the U.S. were already becoming more hostile to pro-immigrant positions, with the result that Sensenbrenner-like threats were no longer galvanizing—they created fear and repression. Perhaps CONFEMEX could have done more to follow a strong marching or mobilizing strategy post-2006. It is not clear, however, that such a strategy would have been any more effective than the voting and lobbying strategies that held the focus of the confederation instead. However, the discouraging outcomes from the 2006 to 2008 efforts seemed to have reignited the interest by federation leaders in the homeland, particularly in the base. All in all, Chicago HTA members did not respond to recent processes of U.S. incorporation by abandoning their Mexico-focused agenda. Instead, these migrants seemed to be reinvesting in traditional HTA activities even as they look

Vonderlack-Navarro, Rebecca. Immigrant Political Incorporation : The Role of Hometown Associations, LFB

186

Immigrant Political Incorporation

Copyright © 2013. LFB Scholarly Publishing LLC. All rights reserved.

to their leaders— state and non-state, in Mexico and in the United States—to address their increasingly difficult political situation in the U.S.

Vonderlack-Navarro, Rebecca. Immigrant Political Incorporation : The Role of Hometown Associations, LFB

CHAPTER 7

Copyright © 2013. LFB Scholarly Publishing LLC. All rights reserved.

Future Considerations for Immigrant Mobilization and Politics

This multi-method case study focused on the evolution of Midwestern HTAs and federations into the Chicago-based confederation CONFEMEX. The case study has argued that recent theories influenced by the “transnationalist” lens that emphasizes sendingsociety political ties do not effectively explain the progression of Chicago HTAs’ activities as they fail to pay adequate attention to the U.S. political environment and how it came to influence HTA activism. Using a modified political process model, I argued that the growing importance of U.S.-focused activities for CONFEMEX as well as its eventual embrace of popular mobilization strategies resulted from its interaction with multiple government entities both in Mexico and (especially) the United States, including both national and state-level actors. By examining how these varied governmental actors worked at different times to suppress, stimulate, or reincorporate CONFEMEX, we can see how the changing form and direction of HTA activism (not only popular mobilization but most recently, interest-group consolidation) represent immigrant leaders’ responses to shifting and cross-cutting state projects in an era of neoliberal globalization. After a careful review of the growing body of research on the transnational politics of Mexican immigrant organizations, the case study developed a broader conceptual framework that drew from social movement paradigms, the political economy of globalization, and 187

Vonderlack-Navarro, Rebecca. Immigrant Political Incorporation : The Role of Hometown Associations, LFB

Copyright © 2013. LFB Scholarly Publishing LLC. All rights reserved.

188

Immigrant Political Incorporation

theories of the state. The study provided a modified political process model to highlight the ongoing dialectic between multiple—and at times contradictory—state projects that interacted with and shaped HTAs' own growing activism. Moreover, the research project suggests the utility of a long-term, bi-national focus on multiple state actors in order to understand the role of HTAs within the complex political evolution of the immigrant rights movement. The project considered HTAs’ organizational developments as occurring within a specific context of a far-reaching restructuring in the political economies of Mexico and the United States. In particular, Mexico’s post-1970s development came to be predicated on mass labor export. The extensive out-migration provided both return remittance flows and internal political stability to the country. As for the United States, its own restructuring increasingly took the form of an hour-glass economy dependent upon highly exploitable immigrant labor, much of which came from Mexico. The result was not only an increasingly integrated bi-national economy but also an evolving, contradictory political context. This was a context where Mexican citizens (who were largely ignored within the homeland) were selectively re-engaged by the Mexican government through their communities in Chicago. It was within this context as well that these migrants found themselves marginalized politically in the United States except when selectively targeted as immigrant voting blocs by partisan strategists. For HTAs during the early years, it was the Mexico side of this context that was most evident and politically beneficial. As such, the many first-generation, Mexican immigrant HTAs and federations in U.S. cities received extensive scholarly attention for their collaborative development projects oriented towards sustaining transnational ties between immigrants and their sending society. While in the beginning these organizations were largely outside of the U.S. scope of action and generally uninvolved with established Latino ethnic organizations, the increase in Mexican emigration to Chicago in the 1990s coupled with proactive Mexican state reincorporation programs resulted in a substantial organizational growth of HTAs in Chicago and the Midwest. Increasingly supported by the Mexican government to retain ties to Mexico throughout the decade, HTAs started to emerge as important social networks in the everyday lives of immigrants and potential conduits for conventional (and eventually contentious) political participation. As the multiple levels of the Mexican

Vonderlack-Navarro, Rebecca. Immigrant Political Incorporation : The Role of Hometown Associations, LFB

Copyright © 2013. LFB Scholarly Publishing LLC. All rights reserved.

Future Considerations

189

government (including a large and important Chicago Mexican consulate) encouraged HTAs’ Mexico-focused activities and emerging political agency, many of the HTAs began to participate in federated structures that linked HTAs into a broader political agenda. During Mexico’s attempt to institutionalize Chicago’s diaspora, Mexican state political opportunities and threats sparked both migrant insurgency and extensive coalition-building efforts between migrant leaders. Migrant leaders, in turn, worked to gain autonomy from Mexican state control. Beyond the Mexican government’s diaspora reincorporation programs and local consular support, a second and possibly more important set of U.S. political actors came to influence Chicago’s HTAs from 2001 to 2005. This period included the combined outcomes of a threatening post-9/11 U.S. anti-immigrant politics and a quite different and powerfully legitimating set of Illinois state government programs that courted Chicago-based Mexican HTAs as attractive voting blocs. In response to the increasingly hostile U.S. political environment post-9/11, both the Mexican state and HTAs themselves embraced strategies to include U.S.-focused activities that aimed to secure migrants’ political standing in the host country. As a result of their expanding cross-border activities, by 2003 numerous federation and HTA leaders joined to form the Chicago-based Confederation of Mexican Federations, or CONFEMEX, with a distinctly bi-national agenda. Continuing the move towards U.S.-focused concerns, CONFEMEX soon joined with the multi-scalar alliance of NALACC, the National Alliance of Latin American and Caribbean Communities, as a means to create a sense of power and a voice for immigrants within the immigration reform debate. The alliance advocated for sustainable social and economic development strategies in Latin America along with U.S. immigration reform. CONFEMEX’s interest in U.S. affairs was further encouraged when the Illinois government extended local political opportunities to some of the confederation’s leaders that allowed them to serve in a state-migrant alliance to foster immigrants’ local U.S. incorporation. By the time the Sensenbrenner bill passed the house in December of 2005, the criminalization tactics clashed profoundly with immigrant leaders’ sense of political legitimacy on both sides of the border. Chicago’s HTA confederation quickly transformed into a mobilizing structure, and for the first time ever, embraced U.S.-focused protest activity. By 2006, CONFEMEX grew to

Vonderlack-Navarro, Rebecca. Immigrant Political Incorporation : The Role of Hometown Associations, LFB

Copyright © 2013. LFB Scholarly Publishing LLC. All rights reserved.

190

Immigrant Political Incorporation

be an important contributor to Chicago’s burgeoning immigrant rights movement. CONFEMEX’s U.S.-focused contention rapidly changed to prioritize conventional U.S. political interest group strategies. Moving from the mega-marches of 2006 to 2008, CONFEMEX more than ever represented attractive, grassroots leadership for professional organizations and state actors who wanted to remain relevant and connected to the ever-growing base of Mexican immigrants in Chicago. As more institutionalized organizations and local political actors became involved in the movement, they pushed to keep the marches peaceful, non-confrontational, and encouraged protestors to eventually engage in conventional U.S. politics (citizenship and voter mobilization). Yet while CONFEMEX leaders felt empowered by the extending reach of local U.S. state actors who encouraged them to take to the streets and eventually integrate into U.S. society, their MexicoU.S. bi-national agenda became threatened, and at times seemingly limited by the profoundly uni-national framing of U.S. immigrant politics. Eventually, the confederation’s path towards U.S. political integration also created internal tensions between CONFEMEX leaders. In addition, conflicts emerged between leaders and their base, as much of the base became disillusioned by the fight for immigrant rights and wanted to re-focus on more customary Mexican-focused activities. Furthermore, others in the member base were disappointed at CONFEMEX’s inability to fight back at the rising number of deportations. Throughout the past twenty years, HTAs (and particularly their federations and CONFEMEX) have functioned as both momentary vehicles for protest and more often than not, as organizers for various cross-border interest group strategies. The study’s historic overview aimed to provide close attention to the crucial moments when HTAs began their mobilization into collective protest (e.g., in 1999 against the Mexican government’s car deposit increase, or on March 10, 2006, against the Sensenbrenner bill). During these episodes of insurgence, HTA leaders were new to political resistance. In 1999, HTAs had yet to form their full identity as united claims-makers making demands on the Mexican government. Even more apparent with the mega-march on March 10, 2006, HTA leaders were new to U.S.-focused protest, and the impact of contentious organizing served to have an exhilarating effect on CONFEMEX leaders. The protests inspired a newfound sense

Vonderlack-Navarro, Rebecca. Immigrant Political Incorporation : The Role of Hometown Associations, LFB

Copyright © 2013. LFB Scholarly Publishing LLC. All rights reserved.

Future Considerations

191

of political efficacy in politics. Further, during both these times of initial protest, HTA leaders lacked substantial power within either the Mexican or U.S. state projects that made decisions about their lives. Indeed, it was outside of state projects where HTA leaders joined in collective protest and began to redefine their own agency within politics. Over time, political elites on both sides of the border and professionalized organizations reacted to HTAs’ contention by encouraging them to mobilize so as to further their own institutional aims. As exemplified by the arguably regulatory intentions of the Mexican state’s Institute for Mexicans Abroad in response to the 1999 Car Deposit protests or the more recent ICIRR and local state’s interests in immigrant voter mobilization, state actors on both sides of the border were able to “manage dissent without stifling it” (Meyer and Tarrow 1998, 21). As state actors garnered influence within HTAs— particularly the more recent local US state actors—they pushed for a uni-national approach to immigration reform and marginalized discussions regarding the multi-national economic and political policies that perpetuate immigration flows. It is not surprising that both conventional and unconventional forms of political engagement often work in combination within grassroots organizing as protestors attempt to maintain influence as they interact with the state. This has arguably been the case for the immigrant rights movement. The challenge, however, is assuring that contentious activity aimed at confronting institutional injustices is not easily transformed into a mere tool of institutional politics. As social movement theorists Meyer and Tarrow (1998) contend, “By accepting and regulating contention…states may have learned to control it and, through this control, begun to domesticate the social movement within the political process” (6). The challenge, thus, would be to ensure that the movement’s vision is not watered down by incrementalist political incorporation, a process that can serve to demobilize healthy debate within the immigrant constituency and consequently fail to maintain the accountability of those in power. Despite the broader political ambitions of cross-border organizations like CONFEMEX, their early local accommodation seemed to have limited their agenda. The predominant approach within the general immigrant rights movement was to pursue a confined incrementalist agenda: a push for immigrant inclusion (legalization and

Vonderlack-Navarro, Rebecca. Immigrant Political Incorporation : The Role of Hometown Associations, LFB

Copyright © 2013. LFB Scholarly Publishing LLC. All rights reserved.

192

Immigrant Political Incorporation

eventual political incorporation) with little, if any, attention to the questioning of neoliberal restructuring. While the immigrant agenda had some pragmatic appeal with political elites in power, the approach marginalized a broader structural agenda that views inclusion alone as insufficient. On the one hand, the inclusionist agenda provided early benefits to the immigrant rights movement by gaining access to elected officials willing to support a compromised immigrant resolution along with financial gains for professionalized NGOs that benefit immigrant interests. More radical groups, in turn, were unable to offer the same quick monetary and political gains. “By definition, we should expect that radicals proceed from a relatively weaker institutional base than those associated with programs that presume the political status quo” (Reed Jr. 1999, 134). Consequentially, a politically independent neoliberal critique of immigrant political reform was almost entirely marginalized from mainstream debate. Currently, there remains a great need for a socially sustainable national economic development model for Mexico or the United States. One could argue, as illustrated by the historical evolution of CONFEMEX, a multi-state solution to immigration was rapidly compromised by immigrants’ systemic inclusion into U.S. politics. Arguably, the mere inclusionary agenda of U.S. political incorporation served to demobilize a broader more meaningful cross-border immigrant rights movement that could address injustices within a political economy that perpetuated such vast immigration flows. As of late, CONFEMEX was recognized as a confederation of important community leaders by both Mexican and U.S. state actors interested in emigrant/immigrant integration. What was lacking as they became increasingly tied to state interests, however, were deliberate steps to cultivate a conscientious immigrant HTA constituency as well as a debate about how various government policies might impact people at the local level. On the other hand, Chicago’s migrant organizational scene continues to be dynamic, and the role of hometown association leaders is likely to endure. At the end of data collection for this study, NALACC represented an important but somewhat forgotten road for federation leaders to continue their bi-national agendas. Federation leaders were so consumed with their many activities that maintaining a strong leadership role within NALACC had been seemingly neglected. Yet by 2009 some federation leaders had renewed ties to NALACC,

Vonderlack-Navarro, Rebecca. Immigrant Political Incorporation : The Role of Hometown Associations, LFB

Copyright © 2013. LFB Scholarly Publishing LLC. All rights reserved.

Future Considerations

193

thus presenting a promise for promoting a multi-scalar agenda. Future research would benefit from exploring this avenue for federation organizing. What characterizes NALACC from other predominant national immigrant advocacy organizations is that it is a uniquely immigrant-led national organization. A fundamental principle of NALACC is to promote multi-national considerations for immigrant policies, proclaiming “…it is imperative to understand migration as a public policy challenge that requires measures in the countries of destination of migration, as well as in the countries of origin.”148 Among its many principles, NALACC advocates for a restructuring of international economic development programs and current trade policies with Latin American countries and promotes a multi-national agenda comprised of three main components: (1) advocacy within the countries of origin; (2) garnering influence within multi-lateral international institutions (e.g., the Organization of American States and the Inter-American Development Bank); and (3) gaining a voice in US foreign policy matters towards Latin America.149 The need for a multi-national approach to immigration reform within mainstream debate remains critical. The vision of NALACC in many ways resonates with federation leaders’ desires to remain engaged with cross-border concerns. The alliance contributes to the multi-scalar promise of CONFEMEX by offering its leadership important links to organizations working at local, national, and transnational scales. While promoting U.S. immigrant rights and integration, the alliance could possibly prevent migrants’ action from being confined within local U.S. politics. At the same time, NALACC could also potentially provide a means for rival federation leaders to 148

Excerpt from “NALACC Position on the Rights of Immigrants and the Need for a Brand New Immigration Policy,” NALAACC, January 6, 2006. 149 Notes taken from a presentation given by the Executive Director of NALACC at the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars Mexican Institute, “Latino Immigrant Civic Engagement Trends,” Friday, June 26, 2009. Available at: http://wilsoncenter.org/index.cfm?topic_id=5949&fuseaction=topics.event&e vent_id=535565.

Vonderlack-Navarro, Rebecca. Immigrant Political Incorporation : The Role of Hometown Associations, LFB

Copyright © 2013. LFB Scholarly Publishing LLC. All rights reserved.

194

Immigrant Political Incorporation

make amends and work together within a broader cross-border initiative. As data collection for this project ended, federation leaders from Michoacán and Durango were playing important leadership roles within NALACC. Their work together within NALACC could create new opportunities for creative coalition building between federation leaders. Future research is also necessary to consider if and how federation leaders embarking on a broader cross-border agenda are able to maintain close ties to their HTA member base. NALACC emphasizes the critical necessity to educate its base and create debate about how government policies impact people at the local level. NALACC actively promotes within its base extensive knowledge-building for how nation-state systems work and how everyday immigrants can create their own political voice on both sides of the border.150 As federation leaders partner with NALACC, the HTA base could increase their own knowledge for advancing an integrated migrant agenda. And while NALACC does not offer the quick political boost or monetary gains available through local machine politics, it could nonetheless cultivate a longer-term vision of true power gains: mobilized immigrants speaking for themselves outside of direct state influences. This is much like what Charles Payne (1995) described in his thoughtful investigation of the civil rights movement as “the central theme of the community-organizing tradition—that people who think they matter, might” (392). On into the future, Mexican HTA organizations—many of whose members lack legal status—will likely continue to represent an important base of the immigrant movement embattled in the struggle for rights, recognition, and influence.

150

Notes taken from a presentation given by the Executive Director of NALACC at the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars Mexican Institute, “Latino Immigrant Civic Engagement Trends,” Friday, June 26, 2009. Available at: http://wilsoncenter.org/index.cfm?topic_id=5949& fuseaction=topics.event&event_id=535565.

Vonderlack-Navarro, Rebecca. Immigrant Political Incorporation : The Role of Hometown Associations, LFB

APPENDIX

Interview Subjects

Copyright © 2013. LFB Scholarly Publishing LLC. All rights reserved.

Federations and Federation Leaders within CONFEMEX Michoacán, Federacion de Clubes Michoacanos en el Medio Este (FEDECMI), which began in 1997 and is based in Chicago, IL. Interviewees claim the first club from the state of Michoacán began in Chicago as early as 1961. By 2008 the federation would represent 35 clubs. The former president of the federation, Advisor to the Mexican government’s IME from 2003-2005, co-founder of CONFEMEX and NALACC, and former director of the Governor’s Office of New Americans Policy and Advocacy under Illinois Governor Rod Blagojevich was interviewed on March 14, 2008 and May 15, 2008 in Chicago, IL.. He began his work with club Morelia in 1998 and at this time became heavily involved with the federation. By 2001 he was president of FEDECMI. The current president of the Michoacán federation during the time of the study was interviewed on June 3, 2008. He also was extensively involved in CONFEMEX and NALACC since their inceptions. He joined the federation in 1997 and feels there was always some type of emphasis on immigrant rights, although it became much stronger after Sensenbrenner. He strongly pushed for voting over marching by 2008. Former treasurer of CONFEMEX, long-time leader in the Michoacán federation, original leader in Chicago’s March 10th Committee, leader in his local Service Employees Industrial Union, migrant advisor to the Mexican government’s IME from 2007-2009 and by 2007 the Political Director of the Illinois Coalitions for 195

Vonderlack-Navarro, Rebecca. Immigrant Political Incorporation : The Role of Hometown Associations, LFB

Copyright © 2013. LFB Scholarly Publishing LLC. All rights reserved.

196

Appendix

Immigrant and Refugee Rights’ New Americans Democracy project was interviewed twice on March 18, 2008 and again on May 25, 2008. As an original leader within the March 10th, 2006 mobilization, he offered extensive knowledge along with flyers and meeting minutes to inform this study’s analysis of the 2006 mobilizations. Durango, the Durango Unido federation began in 1996 with four clubs. By 2008 they had 13 clubs. This is the only federation that was co-founded and whose leadership is dominated by women. The federation has always had more interest in local support and immigrant rights initiatives than in development projects in Mexico. The co-founder of Durango Unido, CONFEMEX president from 2005 to 2007, leader within the original March 10th Committee within Chicago in 2006, and leader within NALACC was interviewed on May 10, 2008 in Chicago. She is one of the oldest federation leaders in Chicago and offered turned to as a spokesperson for the organizations and for offering perspectives on female participation within the clubs. The president of Durango Unido, Midwest Regional Coordinator of NALACC, highly involved in CONFEMEX, and migrant advisor to the Mexican government’s IME for 2007-2009 was interviewed on May 22, 2008. She began her presidency of the federation in 2007. She began her work with the federation after participating in the Enlaces America’s Immigrant Leadership Empowerment Project. Former president of Durango Unido along with her husband, both heavily involved with the March 10th Committee through the peacekeepers commission and co-founders of their hometown club were interviewed on May 26, 2008. While they were both born in Mexico, they grew up migrating back and forth from Mexico and the U.S. She has a real connection to the youth in her club and strongly pushed for the federation’s involvement in both U.S.- and Mexicanfocused concerns. Former president of Durango Unido and heavily involved in CONFEMEX, NALACC, and the March 10th Committee back in 2006. She was interviewed on May 6, 2008. She is the sister of the co-founder of CONFEMEX and has been involved with the federation since its initiation in 1996. Due to her long history with the federation, she offered extensive perspective on the historical developments of Chicago’s clubs and federations, specifically the formation of Casa Mexico, Grupo David, COMMO and later CONFEMEX.

Vonderlack-Navarro, Rebecca. Immigrant Political Incorporation : The Role of Hometown Associations, LFB

Copyright © 2013. LFB Scholarly Publishing LLC. All rights reserved.

Appendix

197

Guanajuato, Casa Guanajuato began in 1995 and has also experienced a contentious division. The other Guanajuato federation of Chicago was claimed to be more aligned with the Mexican government, while Casa Guanajuato wanted to focus more on cultural initiatives and social support here in the U.S. The co-founder of Casa Guanajuato was interviewed on May 27, 2008. He and his wife began the federation informally by inviting leaders from different clubs to come and meet together. They purposefully called themselves Casa Guanajuato, versus the Federation of Guanajuato, because they wanted to avoid sounded too formal or politically tied to their home state. During the federation’s initiation they were much more concerned with development projects and cultural celebrations tied to the homeland than with immigrant rights. They talked of a distinct change for the federation after the antiSensenbrenner marches of 2006. At the time of the study’s interview on August 7, 2008 he had served as the federation president for the past three years. He would later become the president of CONFEMEX in 2009. He also worked for a local community agency, el Instituto del Progreso Latino, a principal member organization of the Illinois Coalition for Immigrant and Refugee Rights. A long-time federation leader within Casa Guanajuato was also interviewed on May 27, 2008. He was a long time member of one of the oldest clubs in Chicago that began in 1983. He had worked extensively with his club to push electrification initiatives and to aid with burial services back in his home state. He would eventually rise to become the president of the federation in 2009. Hidalgo, the Federacion de Hidalgo began in 2002 with a mere four members, but quickly grew to 50 or 60 members. The federation currently has an estimated nine clubs. As early as 2000 then Mexican President Vicente Fox and the former governor of Hidalgo encouraged the federation development during a visit to Chicago. The federation’s initiation was then strongly encouraged by the Chicago consulate’s Coordinator of the Institute for Mexicans Abroad along with the Oficina del Migrante of the state of Hidalgo. The federation co-founder and president was interviewed on June 28, 2008 in Chicago, IL. The president, along with the federation secretary, were highly involved in the immigrant rights mobilization of 2006 and 2007 and members of the March 10th Committee. At the time

Vonderlack-Navarro, Rebecca. Immigrant Political Incorporation : The Role of Hometown Associations, LFB

Copyright © 2013. LFB Scholarly Publishing LLC. All rights reserved.

198

Appendix

of the interview the federation was trying to maintain a balance between their investment projects in Hidalgo along with the immigrant rights movement in the U.S. The secretary of the federation was also interviewed on June 28, 2008. She was born in the U.S. and drawn to the cultural activities of the federation. She also talked extensively of supporting the youth in the federation. Guerrero, the Federacion de Guerrero is the oldest in Chicago and began in 1993 and the first to begin the 3x1 match initiative in 1998. While there are as many as 84 Guerrero clubs in Illinois, the federation experienced a contentious division. Former president of CONFEMEX from 2003 to 2005, migrant advisor to the Mexican government’s IME from 2005 to 2007, cofounder of NALACC and long time leader within his federation was interviewed twice on May 15 and May 19, 2008. He also was an original member of Chicago’s March 10th Committee serving as the coordinator of logistics for both the March 10th and May 1st mobilizations of 2006. He would later serve on the Board of Directors for the Illinois Coalition of Immigrant and Refugee Rights after CONFEMEX became a formal member organization. Initial president of CONFEMEX in 2003, but had to give up the post early on, was interviewed on May 15, 2008. He talked extensively of the positive influence of Chicago’s past General Consul Sada as he worked to understand the vision and objectives of the federations. Member of the Guanajuato federation and the Senior Organizer for the Illinois Coalition for Immigrant and Refugee rights was interviewed on June 8, 2008. Many within CONFEMEX saw his interest in CONFEMEX only occurred after the marches when the confederation drew closer links to the ICIRR. He was highly involved in the March 10th Committee and strongly pushes for immigrant rights issues over diaspora engagement initiatives. The former president of CONFEMEX from 2007-2009 was interviewed on May 2, 2008. He possessed critical leadership within CONFEMEX during its most transitional period of the research project. He pushed for CONFEMEX’s involvement in the immigrant rights marches and eventual conventional participation in voting drives. He was excited about the ties to ICIRR and the idea of having federation leaders someday assume governmental positions in the U.S. His initial

Vonderlack-Navarro, Rebecca. Immigrant Political Incorporation : The Role of Hometown Associations, LFB

Copyright © 2013. LFB Scholarly Publishing LLC. All rights reserved.

Appendix

199

involvement with his federation and with CONFEMEX came from his extensive participation and leadership in the Fiestas Patrias events. Oaxaca, the Federacion de los Oaxaquenos began in 1999. This was the only federation of CONFEMEX not based in Chicago, as it is located in Racine, Wisconsin. As a result, the federation’s involvement with the immigrant rights marches occurred within Wisconsin, although they relied on CONFEMEX for e-mails and other informational distributions. The federation co-founder and president was interviewed on July 17, 2008. He began the federation with merely two clubs and has always been interested in promoting the culture and heritage of Oaxaca. He distinctly distanced his federation from the more radical FIOB of California describing the federation as politically “passivos (passive)” when it comes to governmental affairs of his home state. The federation began when the General Consul Sada of Chicago, also from Oaxaca, presented him with the idea of starting a federation from Oaxaca. Along with the General Consul’s encouragement began the push for the federation to begin a 3x1 initiative. Aguas Calientes, the Federacion de Aguas Calientes was relatively young initiating in 2007. There were three clubs involved in the federation by 2008. The leader within the Aguas Calientes Federation and founder of his own club was interviewed on November 21, 2008. The leader seemed to be still in the process of familiarizing himself of the many developments within his federation, but liked the idea of the clubs working together. He, in fact, felt he was learning more about club and federation participation from the close relationships he had made with the Zacatecas and Michoacán federations. While a young club beginning in October of 2006, he was very proud of their 3x1 program. Chihuahua, the Federacion de Chihuhua began recently in 2007 after the mass mobilizations. The focus of the federation tends to be much more on immigrant rights concerns in the U.S. versus investment projects in Mexico, although a relationship with the Chihuahua government is beginning. The co-founder and president of the federation was interviewed on May 9, 2008 in Chicago, IL. She began the federation by speaking on a local radio station and asking if there were people in the area from her home state that wanted to start a federation. Interested listeners called into the station and there was the initiation of the federation. While

Vonderlack-Navarro, Rebecca. Immigrant Political Incorporation : The Role of Hometown Associations, LFB

Copyright © 2013. LFB Scholarly Publishing LLC. All rights reserved.

200

Appendix

there was another Chihuahua federation that existed in Chicago, the current president is not sure why they fell apart. She sees herself and her executive committee (vice-president, treasury and vocals) as “pioneering” a new federation. The federation remains small with 4060 members coming together on Saturday evenings for federation activities, but plan on having at least 200 guests for their large galas. The federation represents an estimated five clubs. Zacatecas, la Federacion de los Zacatecanos began in the late 1990s in Chicago. The federation is one of the largest in the Midwest with 52 clubs. The former president of the Zacatecas federation was interviewed on June 18, 2008 in Chicago. He became president of the federation in 2004 and served for four consecutive years. He was curious about ways to help his hometown and contacted the Coordinator from the consulate’s Institute for Mexican’s Abroad about how he could help. He is very proud of the extensive club development that occurred under his leadership with 28 clubs in 2004 and 52 by 2008. His own club was even able to raise $150,000 for building a road in his pueblo of Zacatecas. Jalisco, the Federation of Jalisco was one of the founding federations of CONFEMEX, but would exit around 2007. There were claims that their exit was due to internal changes in their leadership, but others claim the federation was upset with the new CONFEMEX president in 2007. The former president of the Jalisco federation from 1985-1987 was interviewed on July 9, 2008. While not currently involved in the federation, as he became disenchanted with their leadership, he was forging a strong relationship with CONFEMEX as the new outreach coordinator for local health clinics located in the Mexican-dominated areas of Little Village. He was very interested in joining with CONFEMEX because of their great volume of members. He and CONFEMEX leadership were in talks by 2007 about how to offer CONFEMEX members subsidized health care visits. Chicago Community Leaders Interviewed The board president of the Illinois Coalition for Immigrant and Refugee Rights was interviewed on January 9, 2009. He is a long-standing Mexican American leader in Chicago with widespread experience with

Vonderlack-Navarro, Rebecca. Immigrant Political Incorporation : The Role of Hometown Associations, LFB

Copyright © 2013. LFB Scholarly Publishing LLC. All rights reserved.

Appendix

201

various community-based organizations. At the time of the interview he served as the executive director for the Instituto del Progreso Latino offering various immigrant-related services. He shares a passion for expanding the civic participation for Mexican immigrants and has worked extensively with various federation leaders, particularly from Michoacán and Guerrero. He also served as a migrant advisor to the Mexican government’s IME from 2005-2007. The executive director of the community-based organization Centro Sin Fronteras was interviewed on October 14, 2008. She is the sister of former well known community organizer and politician Rudy Lozano. She has extensive experience mobilizing the Mexican immigrant community of Chicago and has long-standing ties to U.S. Congressman Luis Gutierrez. She began working with Chicago’s local disc jockeys in 2005 and was a key organizer for the July 2005 rally in response to the initiation of Chicago’s local anti-immigrant Minute Men chapter. She was a important leader in the initial March 10th Committee, although would soon split from the committee. She worked with numerous CONFEMEX leaders in coordinating the marches of 2006 and 2007. The Mexican American Director of the Latino Chapter of Rainbow PUSH was interviewed on October 13, 2008. While involved in all the marches since 2006, she was especially involved in encouraging African American participation in the marches for 2008. During 2007 she also worked extensively with the Hidalgo federation leaders in planning the marches. Long-time Chicago Mexican immigrant community activist, migrant advisor to the Mexican government’s IME, PRD Mexican Political Party Activist, former Green Party Candidate for U.S. Congressman against Luis Gutierrez in 2008, early leader of the March 10th Committee in 2006, and executive director of CALOR, an organization serving those with HIV, was interviewed on October 9, 2008. Due to his initial involvement in the March 10th mobilization, he offered imperative insight on the early developments of the movement. He also worked closely with many CONFEMEX leaders during the marches and through the Migrant Advisory Council to the Mexican government. Long-time PRD Mexican political party activist, union organizer, early March 10th Committee organizer, local journalist, and Mexican immigrant advisor to the Mexican government’s IME was interviewed

Vonderlack-Navarro, Rebecca. Immigrant Political Incorporation : The Role of Hometown Associations, LFB

Copyright © 2013. LFB Scholarly Publishing LLC. All rights reserved.

202

Appendix

on October 19, 2008. He has extensive experience in diaspora engagement initiatives in Chicago and was an early advocate for expatriate voting rights. He offered wide-ranging knowledge of both Cardenas and Salinas’ early visits to Chicago along with broad knowledge of the historical events that led up to the establishment of the Institute of Mexicans Abroad under the Fox administration. In addition, he was an initial leader in the March 10th mobilization and continues to be a vocal advocate for immigrant rights in Chicago. Another long-time PRD Mexican political party activist and early leader within the March 10th committee was interviewed on February 2, 2009. He offered vast knowledge of early interactions between the Mexican immigrant community and various consular leaders throughout the 1990s. He himself was known for being publicly vocal in criticizing various consular leaders. He also has extensive experience working with expatriate voting in Mexico along with the widespread experience in the immigrant mobilizations from 2006-2008. A prominent leader within Chicago’s expatriate voting movement was interviewed on April 18, 2009. He offered extensive knowledge of how Chicago became involved in the absentee voting rights movement. He made his own run losing run for the Mexican congress with the PRD party in 2000. During our interview, he was clear to distance himself from the other PRD activists interviewed for the study. He also was consistently involved in Chicago’s immigrant rights mobilizations having an early relationship formed with the Centro Sin Fronteras executive director and supporting her leadership role in the rally of 2005. Chicago Consular Officials Interviewed The Chicago Consulate’s Coordinator for the Institute for Mexicans Abroad was interviewed twice on June 8th and December 4, 2008. Much of Chicago’s organizational developments can be attributed to this consular official who has worked with the Chicago clubs and federations since 1997, where he began his work with the Programas Para las Comunidades Mexicanas en el Exterior (PCME) later rising to serve as the Coordinator for the Institute of Mexicans Abroad through the Secretariat of Foreign Affairs, referred to as the Coordinator to the Institute of Mexicans Abroad (or IME, el Instituto de los Mexicanos en el Exterior). Due to his crucial role in helping establish a vast network

Vonderlack-Navarro, Rebecca. Immigrant Political Incorporation : The Role of Hometown Associations, LFB

Appendix

203

Copyright © 2013. LFB Scholarly Publishing LLC. All rights reserved.

of clubs and remittance programs in Chicago, he continued to remain in his appointed position for an unusually long period of time. The consular official’s ability to work with Chicago HTA leaders and to motivate their progress in Chicago was widely acknowledged by numerous federation leaders. According to our interview, this longstanding position was very rare for a consular official, particularly for one who works in the dynamic and ever-changing position of community organizing where there can be high turnover. At the time of the study, he had 11 years working at the consulate in the area of community outreach. Many argued his time of serve was longer than any other consular official in the U.S. The Assistant to the IME’s Coordinator, was the Coordinator of Community Organizations also part of the IME, el Instituto de los Mexicanos en el Exterior. She began her work in 2003 and was interviewed for the study on February 20, 2009. She claimed in our interview to spend 75 percent of her working hours concentrated on building relationships and working closely with the clubs and federations represented within CONFEMEX.

Vonderlack-Navarro, Rebecca. Immigrant Political Incorporation : The Role of Hometown Associations, LFB

Copyright © 2013. LFB Scholarly Publishing LLC. All rights reserved. Vonderlack-Navarro, Rebecca. Immigrant Political Incorporation : The Role of Hometown Associations, LFB

Copyright © 2013. LFB Scholarly Publishing LLC. All rights reserved.

References

Alarcon, Rafael. 2001. “The Development of Hometown Associations in the United States and the Use of Social Remittances in Mexico.” Working Paper, Departamento de Estudios Sociales El Colegio de la Frontera Norte. Alba, Richard, and Victor Nee. 1997. “Rethinking Assimilation Theory for a New Era of Immigration.” International Migration Review 31(4): 826-874. ———. 2003. Remaking the American Mainstream: Assimilation and Contemporary Immigration. Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press. Aleinikoff, T. Alexander. 2001. “Policing Boundaries: Migration, Citizenship, and the State." In E Pluribus Unum? Contemporary and Historical Perspectives on Immigrant Political Incorporation, edited by Gary Gerstle and John Mollenkopf. New York: Russell Sage Foundation. Ávila, Oscar. 2006. “Shooting for a Big Turnout; ‘Pistolero’ Steps away from Shock Jock Persona to Push Immigrants’ March, Rally.” Chicago Tribune, March 10. Ávila, Oscar, and Antonio Olivo. 2006a. “A Show of Strength: Thousands March to Loop forImmigrants’ Rights; Workers, Students Unite in Opposition to Toughening Law.” Chicago Tribune, March 11. ———. 2006b. “Rally Stirs Both Sides; Across U.S., Immigration Supporters, Foes View Chicago Rally as Catalyst.” Chicago Tribune, March 12. Associated Press. 2006. “At a Glance: Immigration Legislation,” Chicago Tribune, May 18. Barreto, Matt A., Sylvia Manzano, Ricardo Ramirez, and Kathy Rim. 205

Vonderlack-Navarro, Rebecca. Immigrant Political Incorporation : The Role of Hometown Associations, LFB

Copyright © 2013. LFB Scholarly Publishing LLC. All rights reserved.

206

References

2009. “Mobilization, Participation, and Solidaridad." Urban Affairs Review 44(5): 736-764. Bandy, Joe, and Jackie Smith. 2005. “Factors Affecting Conflict and Cooperation in Transnational Movement Networks.” In Coalitions across Borders: Transnational Protest and the Neoliberal Order, edited by Joe Bandy and Jackie Smith. Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield. Belluck, Pam. 2000. “Mexican Presidential Candidates Campaign in U.S." New York Times, July 1. Benjamin-Alvarado, Jonathan, Louis DeSipio, and Celeste Montoya. 2009. “Latino Mobilization in New Immigrant Destinations: The Anti-H.R. 4437 Protest in Nebraska’s Cities.” Urban Affairs Review 44(5): 718-735. Benford, Robert, and David Snow. 2000. “Framing Processes and Social Movements: An Overview and Assessment.” Annual Review of Sociology 26: 611-639. Bernstein, David. 2008. “Daley vs. Daley.” Chicago Magazine, September. Accessed February 7, 2011. http://www.chicagomag.com/Chicago-Magazine/September2008/Daley-vs-Daley/index.php?cparticle=I&siarticle=0#artanc Blee, Kathleen M., and Verta Taylor. 2002. “Introduction.” In Methods of Social Movement Research, edited by Bert Klandermans and Suzanne Staggenborg. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press. Bloemraad, Irene. 2005. “The Limits of de Tocqueville: How Government Facilitates Organisational Capacity in Newcomer Communities.” Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies 31(5): 865-887. ———. 2006. “Becoming a Citizen in the United States and Canada: Structured Mobilization and Immigrant Political Incorporation.” Social Forces 85(2): 667-695. Bluestone, Berry and Bennett Harrison. 2000. Growing Prosperity: The Battle for Growth with Equity in the Twenty-First Century. Boston: Houghton Mifflin. Boruchoff, Judith. 1999. “Creating Continuity Across Borders: Reconfiguring the Spaces of Community, State, and Culture in Guerrero, Mexico and Chicago.” PhD Diss., University of Chicago.

Vonderlack-Navarro, Rebecca. Immigrant Political Incorporation : The Role of Hometown Associations, LFB

Copyright © 2013. LFB Scholarly Publishing LLC. All rights reserved.

References

207 

Cano, Gustavo, and Alexandra Delano. 2007. “The Mexican Government and Organized Mexican Immigrants in the United States: A Historical Analysis of Political Transnationalism (18482005).” Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies 33(5): 695-725. Castells, Manuel. 1983. The City and the Grassroots: A Cross-Cultural Theory of Urban Social Movements. Berkeley: University of California Press. Cave, Damien. 2008. “States Take New Track on Illegal Immigration." The New York Times, June 9. Chacón, Oscar, and Amy Shannon. 2006. “Challenges and Opportunities for Transnational Community Building: Immigrant Organizations as Change Agents." Unpublished manuscript prepared for the Ford Foundation initiative on Transnational Community Building. Chicago Mexican Consular Materials. 1999. “Nuestra Historia en EU Taller Dirigido a Clubes de Oriundos de Illinois." Instituto Mexicano de Cultura y Educación de Chicago y American Friends Service Committee. Accessed March 6, 2006 at Chicago Mexican Consulate Clemens, Elisabeth S., and Debra C. Minkoff. 2004. “Beyond the Iron Law: Rethinking the Place of Organizations in Social Movement Research.” In The Blackwell Companion to Social Movements, edited by David A. Snow, Sarah A. Soule, and Hanspeter Kriesi. Blackwell Publishers: Malden, MA. Cloward, Richard A., and Frances Fox Piven. 1999. “Disruptive Dissensus: People and Power in the Industrial Age.” In Reflections on Community Organization: Enduring Themes and Critical Issues, edited by Jack Rothman. Los Angeles, CA: F.E. Peacock Publishers. Cordero-Guzman, Hector, Nina Martin, Victoria Quiroz-Becerra, and Nik Theodore. 2008. “Voting With Their Feet: Nonprofit Organizations and Immigrant Mobilizations.” American Behavioral Scientist 52(4): 598-617. Cresswell, John W. 1998. Qualitative Inquiry and Research Design. Choosing Among Five Traditions. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publications. De Genova, Nicholas. 2005. Working the Boundaries. Race, Space, and “Illegality” in Mexican Chicago. Durham and London: Duke University Press.

Vonderlack-Navarro, Rebecca. Immigrant Political Incorporation : The Role of Hometown Associations, LFB

Copyright © 2013. LFB Scholarly Publishing LLC. All rights reserved.

208

References

De la Garza, Rudolfo, and Miryam Hazan. 2003. “Looking Backward, Moving Forward: Mexican Organizations in the U.S. as Agents of Incorporation and Dissociation." The Tomas Rivera Policy Institute, Claremont, CA. Dlouhy, Jennifer A. 2004. “Committed White House Push A Must for Immigration Plan,” CQ Weekly, 95. Durand, Jorge, Douglas S. Massey, and Fernando Charvet. 2000. “The Changing Geography of Mexican Immigration to the United States: 1910-1996.” Social Science Quarterly 81(1): 1-15. Ellis, Mark. 2005. “Unsettling Immigrant Geographies: U.S. Immigration and the Politics of Scale,” Royal Dutch Geography Society 97(1): 49-58. Escala-Rabadan, Luis, Xochitl Bada, and Gaspar Rivera-Salgado. 2006. “Mexican Migrant Civic and Political Participation in the U.S.: The Case of Hometown Associations in Los Angeles and Chicago." NorteAmerica, 2: 127-172 Evans, Peter. 1995. Embeded Autonomy: States and Industrial Transformation. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. Fairbrother, Malcom. 2007. “Making Neoliberalism Possible: The State’s Organization of Business Support for NAFTA in Mexico.” Politics and Society 35(2): 265-300. Fisher, Robert, and Joseph Kling. 1997. “Community Organization, New Social Movement Theory, and the Condition of Postmodernity.” In Integrating Knowledge and Practice: The Case of Social Work and Social Science, edited by David J. Tucker, Charles Garvin and Rosemary Sarri. Westport, CT: Praeger. Fitzgerald, David. 2006. “Inside the Sending State: The Politics of Mexican Emigration Control.” International Migration Review 40(2): 259-293. ———. 2008. “Colonies of the Little Motherland: Membership, Space, and Time in Mexican Migrant Hometown Associations.” Comparative Studies in Society and History 50(1): 145-169. Fornek, Scott. 2002. “Blagojevich Aims at Hispanics; Gutierrez Appears in Spot for Governor Hopeful.” Chicago Sun-Times, January 8. Fox, Jonathon. 2005. “Mapping Mexican Migrant Civil Society.” Background paper for Mexican Migrant Civic and Political Participation, co-sponsored by the Latin American and Latino Studies Department, University

Vonderlack-Navarro, Rebecca. Immigrant Political Incorporation : The Role of Hometown Associations, LFB

Copyright © 2013. LFB Scholarly Publishing LLC. All rights reserved.

References

209 

of California, Santa Cruz and the Mexico Institute and Division of United States Studies Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars. Accessed March 6, 2006. www.wilsoncenter.org/migrantparticipation. Fox, Jonathan, and Xochitl Bada. 2009. “Migrant Civic Engagement.” Research Paper Series on Latino Immigrant Civic and Political Participation, No. 3. Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, Mexico Institute, June. Accessed February 7, 2011. www.wilsoncenter.org/migrantparticipation. Frankenberg, Ronald. 1991. “Participant Observers.” In Field Research: A Sourcebook and Field Manual, edited by Robert G. Burgess. London and New York: Routledge. Freedman, Samuel G. 2008. “Immigrants Find Solace After Storm of Arrests." The New York Times, July 12. Fremon, David K. 1990. “Chicago’s Spanish-American politics in the ‘80s.” Illinois Issues 17. Accessed February 7, 2011. http://www.lib.niu.edu/ipo/1990/Ii900116.html Goldring, Luin. 1998. “The Power of Status in Transnational Social Fields." In Transnationalism From Below, edited by Michael Peter Smith and Luis Eduardo Guarnizo. New Brunswick and London: Transaction Publishers. ———. 2002. “The Mexican State and Transmigrant Organizations: Negotiating the Boundaries of Membership and Participation.” Latin American Research Review 37(3): 55-99. Gomez, Dante. 2005. “Clubes mexicanos de oriundos.” Website of the Consulado de Mexico en Chicago. Accessed March 6, 2006. http://www.consulmexchicago.com/ Gomez, Dante, and Rebeca Aguilar. 2005. “Organizaciones Comunitarios Mexicanas en Chicago,” Publicacion del Instituto de los Mexicanos en el Exterior (IME) 13: 1-5. Gordon, Milton Myron. 1964. Assimilation in American Life: The Role of Race, Religion, and National Origins. New York: Oxford University Press. Guarnizo, Luis Eduardo, and Michael Peter Smith. 1998. “The Location of Transnationalism." In Transnationalism From Below, edited by Michael Peter Smith and Luis Eduardo Guarnizo. New Brunswick and London: Transaction Publishers. ———. 2001. “On the Political Participation of Transnational Migrants: Old Practices and New Trends." In E Pluribus Unum?

Vonderlack-Navarro, Rebecca. Immigrant Political Incorporation : The Role of Hometown Associations, LFB

Copyright © 2013. LFB Scholarly Publishing LLC. All rights reserved.

210

References

Contemporary and Historical Perspectives on Immigrant Political Incorporation, edited by Gary Gerstle and John Mollenkopf. New York: Russell Sage Foundation. ———. 2003. “Assimilation and Transnationalism: Determinants of Transnational Political Action among Contemporary Migrants.” The American Journal of Sociology 108(6): 1211-1249. Gzesh, Susan. 2007. “Paper for the Wilson Center/Enlaces America Roundtable.” Background Paper for Mexican Institute of the Wilson Center for International Scholars and by Enlaces America in collaboration with the National Alliance of Latin American and Caribbean Communities (NALACC). Accessed February 7, 2011. http://www.wilsoncenter.org/news/docs/GzeshrevisedPaper%20for%20the%20Wlison%20Center.pdf Handlin, Oscar. 1959. Immigration as a Factor in American History, 1915 edition. Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall. Harrison, Bennett, and Gary Bluestone. 1988. The Deindustrialization of America: Plant Closings, Community Abandonment, and the Dismantling of Basic Industry. New York: Basic Books. Hazan, Miryam. 2006. “Incorporating in the United States and Mexico: Mexico Immigrant Mobilization and Organization in Four American Cities,” Phd diss., University of Texas, Austin. Hernandez-Coss, Raul. 2005. “The U.S.-Mexico Remittance Corridor. Lessons on Shifting from Informal to Formal Transfer Systems.” Working Paper No. 47. World Bank, Washington, D.C. Hussain, Rummana. 2005. “Protestors show support for immigration law reform.” Chicago Sun-Times, July 2. Illinois Coalition for Immigrant and Refugee Rights and the Office of New Americans Advocacy and Policy. 2006. For the Benefit of All: Strategic Recommendations to Enhance the State’s Role in the Integration of Immigrants in Illinois. Joint Executive Summary, Year One. Jenkins, J. Craig. 1983. “Resource Mobilization Theory and the Study of Social Movements,” Annual Review of Sociology, 9: 527-533. ———. 1995. “Social Movements, Political Representation, and the State: An Agenda and Comparative Framework,” In The Politics of Social Protest. Comparative Perspectives on States and Social Movements, edited by Craig Jenkins and Bert Klandermans. Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota Press.

Vonderlack-Navarro, Rebecca. Immigrant Political Incorporation : The Role of Hometown Associations, LFB

Copyright © 2013. LFB Scholarly Publishing LLC. All rights reserved.

References

211 

Jenkins, Craig, and Bert Klandermans. 1995. “The Politics of Social Protest,” In The Politics of Social Protest. Comparative Perspectives on States and Social Movements, edited by Craig Jenkins and Bert Klandermans. Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota Press. Joppke, Christian. 1998. “Introduction.” In Challenge to the NationState and the United States, edited by Christian Joppke, 1-46. New York: Oxford University Press. Joppke, Christian, and Ewa Morawska. 2003. Toward Assimilation and Citizenship: Immigrants in Liberal Nation-States. New York: Palgrave-Macmillan. Klandermans, Bert. 2001. “Why Social Movements Come Into Being and Why People Join Them,” In The Blackwell Companion to Sociology edited by Judith R. Blau, 268-81. Malden, Mass.: Blackwell Publishers. Klandermans, Bert, and Suzanne Staggenborg. 2002. Introduction to Methods of Social Movement Research, edited by Bert Klandermans and Suzanne Staggenborg. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press. Koopsman, Ruud, and Paul Statham. 2003. “How National Citizenship Shapes Transnationalism: Migrant and Minority Claims-making in Germany, Great Britain and the Netherlands." In Toward Assimilation and Citizenship: Immigrants in Liberal Nation-States, edited by Christian Joppke and Ewa Morawska. New York: Palgrave-Macmillan. Laglagaron, Laureen. 2010. “Protection through Integration: The Mexican Government’s Efforts to Aid Migrants in the United States.” Migration Policy Institute, National Center on Immigrant Integration Policy. Accessed February 7, 2011. www.migrationpolicy.org/pubs/IME-Jan2010.pdf Leitner, Helga, Eric Sheppard, and Kristin M. Sziarto. 2008. “The Spatialities of Contentious Politics.” Transactions for Bristish Geographies 33: 157-172. Levi, Margaret, and Gillian Murphy. 2006. “Coalitions of Contention: The Case of the WTO Protests in Seattle.” Political Studies 54: 651-670. Levitt, Peggy. 2003. “Keeping Feet in Both Worlds: Transnational Practices and Immigrant Incorporation in the United States." In Toward Assimilation and Citizenship: Immigrants in Liberal

Vonderlack-Navarro, Rebecca. Immigrant Political Incorporation : The Role of Hometown Associations, LFB

Copyright © 2013. LFB Scholarly Publishing LLC. All rights reserved.

212

References

Nation-States, edited by Christian Joppke and Ewa Morawska. New York: Palgrave-Macmillan. Lin, N. 2001. “On the Backs of Blacks? Immigrants and the Fortunes of African Americans. In Strangers and the Gates: New Immigrants in Urban America, edited by R. Waldinger, 186-227. Berkeley and Los Angeles, CA: The University of California Press. Lipsky, Michael. 1968. “Protest as a Political Resource.” American Political Science Review 62: 1144-58. Lutton, Linda. 1998. “War on Independents. Was Jesus Garcia Beaten by a New Machine? How Many Other Progressives are Being targeted for Removal?” Chicago Reader, September 3. Martinez, Michael. 2006. “Rallies Draw over 1 million. Economic Impact Not Clear, But Businesses Note Worker Shortages.” Chicago Tribune, May 2. Massey, Douglas S. 1999. “International Migration at the Dawn of the Twenty-First Century: The Role of the State.” Population and Development Review 25(2): 303-322. Massey, Douglas S., Jorge Durand, and Nolan J. Malone. 2002. Beyond Smoke and Mirrors : Mexican Immigration in an Era of Economic Integration. New York: Russell Sage Foundation. Mayer, Margit. 2007. “Contesting the Neoliberalization of Urban Governance.” In Contesting Neoliberalism. Urban Frontiers, edited by Helga Leitner, Jamie Peck, and Eric S. Sheppard. New York: The Guilford Press. McAdam, Doug, Sidney Tarrow, and Charles Tilly. 2001. Dynamics of Contention. New York: Cambridge University Press. McAdam, Doug, 1982. Political Process and the Development of Black Insurgency. Chicago and London: University of Chicago Press. McCarthy, John, and Mayer Zald. 1977. “Resource Mobilization and Social Movements: A Partial Theory.” American Journal of Sociology 82: 1212-1241. Melucci, Alberto. 1994. “A Strange Kind of Newness: What’s ‘New’ in New Social Movements?" In New Social Movements: From Ideology to Identity, edited by Enrique Larana, Hank Johnston, and Joseph R. Gusfield. Philadelphia, PA: Temple University Press. Mihalooulos, Robert Becker, and Darnell Little. 2008. “How Cash, Clout Transform Chicago Neighborhoods.” Chicago Tribune, January 27.

Vonderlack-Navarro, Rebecca. Immigrant Political Incorporation : The Role of Hometown Associations, LFB

Copyright © 2013. LFB Scholarly Publishing LLC. All rights reserved.

References

213 

Mollenkopf, John and Jennifer Hochschild. 2010. “Immigrant political incorporation: comparaing success in the United States and Western Europe. Ethnic and Racial Studies 33: 1, 19-38. Morawska, Ewa. 2001. “Immigrants, Transnationalism, and Ethnicization: A Comparison of This Great Wave and the Last." In E Pluribus Unum? Contemporary and Historical Perspectives on Immigrant Political Incorporation, edited by Gary Gerstle and John Mollenkopf. New York: Russell Sage Foundation. ———. 2003. “Immigrant Transnationalism and Assimilation: A Variety of Combinations and the Analytic Strategy it Suggests." In Toward Assimilation and Citizenship: Immigrants in Liberal Nation-States. Edited by Christian Joppke and Ewa Morawska. New York: Palgrave-Macmillan. Morton, Adam David. 2003. “Structural Change and Neoliberalism in Mexico: ‘Passive Revolution’ in the Global Economy.” Third World Quarterly 24(4): 631-653. Nash, June, and Christine Kovic. 1996. “The Reconstitution of Hegemony: The Free Trade Act and the Transformation of Rural Mexico.” In Globalization: Critical Reflections, edited by James H. Mittelman. Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers. Neal, Steve. 2002. “Gutierrez’s Aid Boosts Blagojevich; Hispanic Voters May Have Big Impact on Governor’s Contest.” Chicago Sun-Times, October 28. Nicholls, Walter J., and Justin R. Beaumont. 2004. “The Urbanisation of Justice Movements? Possibilities and Constraints for the City as a Space of Contentious Struggle.” Space and Polity 8, no. 2: 119135. NotiMex. 2005. “Multitudinaria Marcha de Hispanos, en su Mayoria Mexicanos, Desfila por Calles de Chicago para Pedir Amnistia para Migrantes Indocumentados." Noticieros Televisa, Mexic. Accessed February 7, 2011. www.esmas.com/noticierostelevisa/mexico/457004.html. Olivo, Antonio, and Oscar Avila. 2006. “United They March: Hundreds of Thousands March for Immigration Rights. ‘We have to change the world.’” Chicago Tribune, May 2. Olsen, Mancur. 1965. The Logic of Collective Action. New York: Schocken.

Vonderlack-Navarro, Rebecca. Immigrant Political Incorporation : The Role of Hometown Associations, LFB

Copyright © 2013. LFB Scholarly Publishing LLC. All rights reserved.

214

References

Orozco, Manuel, and Michelle Lapointe. 2004. “Mexican Hometown Associations and Development Opportunities.” Journal of International Affairs 57(2): 31-49. Orozco, Manuel, and Rebecca Rouse. 2007. “Migrant Hometown Associations and Opportunities for Development: A Global Perspective.” Migration Policy Institute. Accessed February 7, 2011. http://www.migrationinformation.org Pallares, Amalia, and Nilda Flores-Gonzalez, eds. 2010. Marcha! Latino Chicago and the Immigrant Rights Movement. Urbana, Chicago, and Springfield: University of Illinois Press. Paral, R. 2006. “Latinos of the New Chicago.” In The New Chicago, edited by Fassil Demissie, Johan Koval, John P. Koval, Larry Bennett, and Michael Bennett. Philadelphia, PA: Temple University Press. Park, R.E., and E. Burgess. 1921. Introduction to the Science of Sociology. Reprint 1969. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. Peck, Jamie. 2004. “Geography and Public Policy: Constructions of Neoliberalism.” Progress in Human Geography 28(3): 392-405. Peck, Jamie, and Nik Theodore. 2001. “Contingent Chicago: Restructuring the Spaces of Temporary Labor.” International Journal of Urban and Regional Research 25(3): 471-496. Pierson, Christopher. 1996. The Modern State. London: Routledge. Piven, Frances Fox, and Richard A. Cloward. 2000. “Power Repertoires and Globalization." Politics and Society 28(3): 413429. ———. 1977. Poor People’s Movements: Why They Succeed, How They Fail. New York: Vintage Press. ———. 1991. “Collective Protest: A Critique of Resource Mobilization Theory.” International Journal of Politics, Culture, and Society 4(4): 435-458. Portes, Alejandro. 2001. “Introduction: The Debates and Significance of Immigrant Transnationalism." Global Networks 1(3):181-193. Portes, Alejandro, Cristina Escobar, and Alexandra Walton Radford. 2007. “Immigrant Transnational Organizations and Development: A Comparative Study.” International Migration Review 41(1): 242-281. Preston, Julia. 2008. “Employers Fight Tough Measures on Immigration." The New York Times, July 6. Reed, Robert. 2006. “Air Power.” Chicago Magazine, January.

Vonderlack-Navarro, Rebecca. Immigrant Political Incorporation : The Role of Hometown Associations, LFB

Copyright © 2013. LFB Scholarly Publishing LLC. All rights reserved.

References

215 

Accessed February 7, 2011. www.chicagomag.com/ChicagoMagazine/January-2006/Air-Power. Reese, Ellen. 2005. “Policy Threats and Social Movement Coalitions: California’s Campaign To Restore Legal Immigrants’ Right to Welfare." In Routing the Opposition: Social Movements, Public Policy, and Democracy, edited by David S. Meyer, Valerie Jenness, and Helen Ingram, 259-287. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press. Rogal, Brian J. 2004. “Great Expectations: Latino Lawmakers and Advocates Are Gaining Influence in Springfield, and Warning the Governor Not to Take Them for Granted.”Chicago Reporter, January. Richter, Kelly Kelleher. 2005. “From the Margins to the Limelight: The Social Construction of a Mexican ‘Illegal Alien Problem’ in Deindustrializing Chicago, 1965 to 1980.” B.A. Thesis, University of Chicago. Rivera-Salgado, Gaspar. 2002. “Cross-Border Grassroots Organizations and the Indigenous Migrant Experience.” In Cross-Border Dialogues: U.S.-Mexico Social Movement Networking, edited by David Brooks and Jonathon Fox. Center for U.S.-Mexico Studies: University of California, San Diego. Rivera-Salgado, Gaspar, Xochitl Bada, and Luis Escala-Rabadan. November, 2005. “Mexican Migrant Civic and Political Participation in the U.S.: The Case of Hometown Associations in Los Angeles and Chicago." Background Paper presented at the seminar, “Mexican Migrant Social and Civic Participation in the United States,” held at the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars. Washington D.C., November 4th and 5th, 2005. Rosenfeld, M.J., and M. Tienda. 1999. “Mexican Immigration, Occupational Niches, and Labor Market Competition: Evidence from Los Angeles, Chicago, and Atlanta." In Immigration and Opportunity: Race, Ethnicity and Employment in the United States, edited by F.D. Bean and S. Bell-Rose, 64-105. New York: Russell Sage Foundation. Rubin, H. J., and I. S. Rubin. 1995. Qualitative Interviewing. The Art of Hearing Data. Thousand Oaks, California: Sage Publications. Saldana, Martha. 2005. “Marcha Historica.” El Imparcial. La Guia de la Comunidad Mexicana. Chicago, IL, July 7.

Vonderlack-Navarro, Rebecca. Immigrant Political Incorporation : The Role of Hometown Associations, LFB

Copyright © 2013. LFB Scholarly Publishing LLC. All rights reserved.

216

References

Sassen, Saskia. 1991. The Global City: New York, London, Tokyo. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. ———. 1998. Globalization and Its Discontents. Essays on the New Mobility of People and Money. New York: New York Press. Schiller, Nina Glick, Linda Basch, and Cristina Szanton Blanc, eds. 1992. Toward a Transnational Perspective on Migration: Race, Class, Ethnicity, and Nationalism Reconsidered. Annals of the New York Academy of Sciences, 645. New York: New York Academy of Sciences. Schneider, Cathy. 1997. “Framing Puerto Rican Identity: Political Opportunity Structures and Neighborhood Organizing in New York City.” Mobilization, An International Journal 2(2): 227-245. Shannon, Amy. 2007. “Mobilizing for Political Power. Immigrant Marches and Their Long-Term Impacts." Voices of Mexico, Issue 78: January-March. Sites, William. 2003. Remaking New York: Primitive Globalization and the Politics of Urban Community. Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota Press. ———. 2007. “Contesting the Neoliberal City? Theories of Neoliberalism and Urban Strategies of Contention.” In Contesting Neoliberalism: Urban Frontiers, edited by H. Leitner, J. Peck, and E. Sheppard, 116-138. New York: Guilford. Smith, Jackie, and Hank Jonston. 2002. Globalization and Resistance: Transnational Dimensions of Social Movements. Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield. Smith, J., and Joe Bandy. 2005. “Introduction: Cooperation and Conflict in Transnational Protest." In Coalitions Across Borders: Transnational Protest and the Neoliberal Order, edited by Joe Bandy and Jackie Smith. Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield. Smith, Michael Peter. 2001. Transnational Urbanism: Locating Globalization. Malden, MA: Blackwell. ———. 2007. “The Two Faces of Transnational Citizenship.” Ethnic and Racial Studies 30(6): 1096-1116. Smith, Micheal Peter, and Matt Bakker. 2008. Citizenship Across Borders: The Political Transnationalism of El Migrante. Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press. Smith, Peter H. 1996. Talons of the Eagle. Dynamics of U.S.-Latin American Relations. New York: Oxford University Press.

Vonderlack-Navarro, Rebecca. Immigrant Political Incorporation : The Role of Hometown Associations, LFB

Copyright © 2013. LFB Scholarly Publishing LLC. All rights reserved.

References

217 

Smith, Robert C. 1998. “Transnational Localities: Community, Technology and the Politics of Membership within the context of Mexico and U.S. Migration." In Transnationalism From Below, edited by Michael Peter Smith and Luis Eduardo Guarnizo. New Brunswick and London: Transaction Publishers. ———. 1995. “Los Ausentes Siempre Presentes: The Imagining, Making and Politics of a Transnational Community between New York and Ticuani, Puebla." Unpublished doctoral dissertation, Department of Political Science, Columbia University. ———. 2003. “Diasporic Memberships in Historical Perspective: Comparative Insights from the Mexican, Italian and Polish Cases.” International Migration Review 37(3): 724-759. ———. 2006. Mexican New York. Transnational Lives of New Immigrants. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press. Snow, David A., and Danny Trom. 2002. “The Case Study and the Study of Social Movements,” In Methods of Social Movement Research, edited by Bert Klandermans and Suzanne Staggenborg. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press. Squires, Gregory, Larry Bennett, Kathleen McCourt, and Philip Nyden. 1987. Chicago: Race, Class, and the Response to Urban Decline. Philadelphia: Temple University Press. Tarrow, Sidney. 1988. “National Politics and Collective Action: Recent Theory and Research in Western Europe and the United States.” Annual Review of Sociology 14: 421-440. ———. 2005. The New Transnational Activism. New York: Cambridge University Press. Tichenor, Daniel J. 1994. “The Politics of Immigration Reform in the United States, 1981-1990.” Polity 26(3): 333-362. Tienda, Marta, and Rebecca Raijman. 2000. “Immigrants’ Income Packaging and Invisible Labor Force Activity.” Social Science Quarterly 81(1): 291-310. Trejo, Karen. 2006. “Fracaso Total." Especial La Raza, January 20. Accessed January 7, 2007 from CONFEMEX leaders. http://www.impre.com/laraza/ Univision Communications. 2004. “Que Buena 105.1FM and ‘El Pistolero’ Make Chicago Radio History." April 3. Accessed February 7, 2011. www.univision.net/corp/en/pr/Chicago_23042004-2_ Valdes Ugalde, Francisco.1996. “The Private Sector and Political

Vonderlack-Navarro, Rebecca. Immigrant Political Incorporation : The Role of Hometown Associations, LFB

Copyright © 2013. LFB Scholarly Publishing LLC. All rights reserved.

218

References

Regime Change in Mexico." In Neoliberalism Revisited: Economic Restructuring and Mexico’s Political Future, edited by Gerardo Otero, 127-148. Boulder, CO: Westview Press. Waldinger, Roger D. 2009. “A Limited Engagement: Mexico and its Diaspora,” Selected Works of Roger D. Waldinger, available at: http://works.bepress.com/roger_waldinger/38 Waldinger, Roger. 2001. “Strangers at the Gates,” In Strangers at the Gates: New Immigrants in Urban America, edited by Roger Waldinger. Berkeley: University of California Press. Waldinger, Roger, and David Fitzgerald. 2004. “Transnationalism in Question.” American Journal of Sociology 109(5): 1177-95. Waldinger, Roger, and Jennifer Lee. 2001. “New Immigrants in Urban America," In Strangers at the Gates: New Immigrants in Urban America, edited by Roger Waldinger. Berkeley: University of California Press. Warner, W. Lloyd, and Leo Srole. 1945. The Social Systems of American Ethnic Groups. New Haven: Yale University Press. Wayne, Alex. 2005a. “Getting Tough on Illegal Immigration." CQ Weekly, December 26. Wayne, Alex. 2005b. “Views of Senate GOP, Bush Threaten Tighter Immigration.” CQ Weekly, January 17. Zabin, Carol, and Luis Escala-Rabadan. 1998. “Mexican Hometown Associations and Mexican Immigrant Political Empowerment in Los Angeles.” California Nonprofit Research Program, Working Paper. Zolberg, Aristide R. 1999. “Matters of State: Theorizing Immigration Policy.” In The Handbook of International Migration: The American Experience, edited by Charles Hirschman, Philip Kasinitz, and Josh DeWind. New York: Russell Sage Foundation. ———. 2006. A Nation by Design: Immigration Policy in the Fashioning of America. Russell Sage Foundation. New York: Harvard University Press.

Vonderlack-Navarro, Rebecca. Immigrant Political Incorporation : The Role of Hometown Associations, LFB

Copyright © 2013. LFB Scholarly Publishing LLC. All rights reserved.

Index

Absentee voting rights, 2, 13, 19, 52, 55, 63, 71, 73, 85-87, 96, 160, 204 Aguas Calientes, 7, 38, 78, 152, 201 Blagojevich, 38, 82-83, 105, 123, 126, 129-131, 133, 152-153, 161, 163, 165, 171, 175, 179180, 183, 197, 210, 215 Calderon, Filipe, 131-132, 161164, 178 Cardenas, Cuauhtémoc presidential campaign of, 52 Centro Sin Fronteras, 94-95, 101, 106-107, 125, 150, 154, 156, 203-204 Chicago Confederation of Mexican Federations. See CONFEMEX Chihuahua, 7, 38, 78, 152, 201202 CONFEMEX, 2-3, 5-6, 8, 34-39, 60, 61-62, 78-80, 82-136, 137205, 219 electoral politics, role in, 8 formation of, 184 interest group strategies, 8, 113, 123, 131, 139, 159, 192 leadership of, 107, 118, 125, 128, 140, 144, 202 March 10 rally, 8 May Day rally, 109

popular mobilization, and, 3, 8, 17, 24, 27, 33, 91, 108-109, 111, 115, 121, 126, 140, 159, 176, 189 Co-optation, political, 4, 26, 28, 84, 141, 159, 186 Diaspora, 5, 8, 13-14, 19-20, 23, 32, 34, 41-42, 50-55, 57, 59, 63, 68, 70-73, 87, 133, 141, 159-161, 174, 177, 191, 200, 204 Dual nationality rights, 55 Durango, 7, 38, 57-62, 77-80, 8485, 97, 101-102, 105-106, 115, 119-122, 128, 132, 151-153, 166, 180, 182-183, 185, 196, 198 Economy global, 4, 14, 17-18, 49 informal, 45 Mexico-U.S., 24, 65, 190 migrant labor, 16, 45, 47 U.S., 17, 44, 64, 116 El Voto en el Exterior. See Vote from Abroad Federation, 2, 7, 13-14, 16, 36-38, 42, 55- 63, 65, 68-69, 71, 7381, 83, 85, 91, 93, 96-106, 116117, 119, 121-122, 125-132, 140, 145, 151-154, 157-160, 162, 165-166, 172, 174, 178-

219 Vonderlack-Navarro, Rebecca. Immigrant Political Incorporation : The Role of Hometown Associations, LFB

Copyright © 2013. LFB Scholarly Publishing LLC. All rights reserved.

220 187, 191, 194-205, See also individual states leaders of, 56, 63, 77-78, 9394, 100, 116-120, 123, 151, 180, 183 Federations organization of, 2, 7, 12, 21, 36, 51 Fox, Vicente, 2, 50, 65, 69-70, 199 Globalization, 3-4, 11, 17-19, 22, 24, 31, 41, 140, 189 Guanajuato, 7, 38, 57-58, 78, 98, 102, 121, 128, 152, 166, 181, 183, 199, 200 Guerrero, 7, 38, 52, 54-60, 78, 96, 116, 119, 122, 126, 128, 152, 154, 166, 169, 170, 172, 178, 180, 183-185, 200, 203, 208 Gutierrez, Luis Congressman, 8285, 129-130, 139, 141, 146151, 161, 167, 171, 173, 176, 203, 210, 215 Hidalgo, 7, 38, 52, 78, 93, 98, 102, 122, 128, 151-153, 158, 183, 185, 199-200, 203 Hometown associations. See HTAs Host country, 12, 191 HTA leaders, 7-8, 43, 51, 55, 61, 6465, 74, 76-77, 96, 99, 187, 191-193, 205 HTAs as vehicles for mobilization, 90 assimilation paradigms of, 12, 140 bi-national activism, 165 Chicago, growth of, 41 consular material, 52, 56, 60, 209 HTAs (hometown associations), 18, 11-24, 29-30, 33-44, 48, 5051, 53-57, 61-78, 82, 85, 87, 90-94, 103-104, 108-113, 121, 127, 132, 135-136, 140, 144,

Index 152, 156, 161-162, 169, 178179, 183, 189-193 ICIRR. See Illinois Coalition for Immigrant and Refugee Rights Illinois Coalition for Immigrant and Refugee Rights, 123, 199, 202, 212 Immigrant Leadership Empowerment Project, 77, 81, 87, 198 immigration policy, 3, 8, 33, 39, 69-70, 80, 111, 140 Immigration Reform and Control Act, 45, 168 IRCA. See Immigration Reform and Control Act Jalisco, 7, 38, 57-58, 60, 78, 202 March 10th Committee, 89, 99, 102, 105, 116, 118, 120, 125, 145, 149, 151, 154, 156, 168, 197-200, 203 Marches 2006, 13, 15-16, 98-99, 126, 156 March 10, 8, 89-91, 95, 98, 100-108, 111, 113-118, 123124, 145, 163, 170, 174, 179, 184, 192, 207 Matricula Consular de Alta Seguridad, 74 May Day rally, 8, 111, 113, 116117, 123, 125-126, 128, 130, 135, 139-140, 153-157, 167, 169 Mexican Consulate, 53, 59, 121, 132, 209 Michoacán, 2, 7, 13, 38, 52-54, 56-58, 60, 63, 77-79, 81, 83, 85, 91, 96-99, 100, 102-106, 115-117, 126, 128-129, 133, 139, 145, 152-154, 156, 158160, 166, 169, 183-185, 196197, 201, 203 Migrants state migrant collaboration, 53

Vonderlack-Navarro, Rebecca. Immigrant Political Incorporation : The Role of Hometown Associations, LFB

Copyright © 2013. LFB Scholarly Publishing LLC. All rights reserved.

Index NAFTA. See North American Free Trade Agreement NALACC. See National Alliance of Latino and Caribbean Communities National Alliance of Latino and Caribbean Communities, 82, 159 Neoliberalism, 21, 48, 77 North American Free Trade Agreement, 19, 45 Oaxaca, 7, 38, 57, 78, 152, 180, 185, 201 Office of New Americans Policy and Advocacy, 38, 83, 129130, 161, 175, 179, 197 PAN. See Partido Accion Nacional Partido Accion Nacional, 50 Partido Revolucionario Democratico, 50 Political incorporation, 1-7, 12, 21-22, 31, 34-35, 42, 65, 106, 112-113, 137, 140, 193-194, 215 PRD. See Partido Revolucionario Democratico

221 Sada Solano, Carlos Manuel, 7374, 200-201 Salinas de Gotari, Carlos, 49 Security Through Regularized Immigration and a Vibrant Economy Act, 139, 141, 147155, 161 Sending country, 14 Sensenbrenner bill, 6, 8, 15, 30, 34, 89, 91, 93, 96, 101, 104, 124, 130, 133, 135, 167, 191, 192 Social movements, 5, 11, 24, 27, 29, 31, 35, 135-136 STRIVE Act. See Security Through Regularized Immigration and a Vibrant Economy Act Transnationalism, 13, 19 Transnationalist, 3, 109, 189 Undocumented immigrants, 13-14, 26, 45-46, 68-69, 75, 80, 87, 90-91, 93, 98, 131, 134, 139, 142, 147, 162, 173, 177 Vote from Abroad, 14, 52, 68, 95 Zacatecas, vii, 7, 38, 57-60, 78, 152, 172, 180, 201-202

Vonderlack-Navarro, Rebecca. Immigrant Political Incorporation : The Role of Hometown Associations, LFB