Immigrant Canada: Demographic, Economic, and Social Challenges 9781442676022

Table of contents :
Contents
Preface
Contributors
1. The Immigrant Challenge 2000
Part One: Theories and Policies
2. Immigration Policy: Imagined Futures
3. Toward a Theory of Immigrant Integration
4. Managing Immigrant Social Transformations
Part Two: The Demographic Impact
5. Immigration and Demographic Structures
6. Residential Patterns in Cities
7. Internal Migration of Immigrants
8. Patterns of Acquiring Citizenship
Part Three: The Economic Impact
9. Comparative Immigrant Economic Integration
10. Economic Threat and Attitudes toward Immigrants
11. Visible Minority Income Differences
Part Four: The Social Impact
12. Foreign Born Language Acquisition and Shift
13. Integrating Gender, Language, and Race
14. Intergenerational Language Learning
References

Citation preview

IMMIGRANT CANADA: DEMOGRAPHIC, ECONOMIC,h AND SOCIAL CHALLENGES Edited by Shiva S. Halli and Leo Driedger

Immigration has defined Canada throughout history, and the changes in immigration patterns over the last few decades radically altered the nature of Canadian society. With an increasingly large percentage of the foreign-born population coming from the Third World, multiculturalism in Canada has taken on a new dimension, and this trend is likely to continue in view of the economic and social benefits it brings to our society. Institutions at all levels need to become aware of the changes that are occurring and the appropriate steps to ensure that the integration of new immigrant groups continues to take place. This process requires demographic analysis and a review of public policies. The essays in this book originated as papers given at the 1996 National Symposium on Immigration and the list of contributors constitutes a virtual who's who of Canadian immigration researchers. The authors explore a variety of topics related to immigration, including public policy, economics, and sociodemographic and labour issues. A follow-up to the editors' 1990 book Ethnic Demography, this is the first major work in the field to draw on 1990s data. SHIVA s. HALLI and LEO DRIEDGER are professors in the Department of Sociology at the University of Manitoba.

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SHIVA S. HALLI and LEO DRIEDGER, editors

Immigrant Canada: Demographic, Economic, and Social Challenges

UNIVERSITY OF TORONTO PRESS Toronto Buffalo London

www.utppublishing.com © University of Toronto Press Incorporated 1999 Toronto Buffalo London Printed in Canada ISBN 0-8020-4276-7 (cloth) ISBN 0-8020-8111-8 (paper)

Printed on acid-free paper

Canadian Cataloguing in Publication Data Main entry under title: Immigrant Canada : demographic, economic, and social challenges Includes bibliographical references ISBN 0-8020-4276-7 (bound) ISBN 0-8020-8111-8 (pbk.) 1. Immigrants - Canada. 2. Canada - Emigration and immigration - Government policy. 3. Canada - Emigration and immigration - Economic aspects. 4. Canada Emigration and immigration - Social aspects. I. Halli, Shivalingappa S., 1952- . II. Driedger, Leo, 1928- . JV7225.I4351999

304.871

C99-930790-8

University of Toronto Press acknowledges the financial assistance to its publishing program of the Canada Council for the Arts and the Ontario Arts Council.

To Meyer Burstein

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Contents

PREFACE

ix

CONTRIBUTORS

xi

1 The Immigrant Challenge 2000 SHIVA s. HALLI AND LEO DRIEDGER

3

Part One: Theories and Policies 2 Immigration Policy: Imagined Futures ALAN B. SIMMONS 21 3 Toward a Theory of Immigrant Integration GERTRUD NEUWIRTH 51 4 Managing Immigrant Social Transformations JAMES s. FRIDERES 70 Part Two: The Demographic Impact 5 6 7 8

Immigration and Demographic Structures RODERIC P. BEAUJOT 93 Residential Patterns in Cities T.R. BALAKRISHNAN AND FENG HOU 116 Internal Migration of Immigrants BALI RAM AND Y. EDWARD SHIN 148 Patterns of Acquiring Citizenship FERNANDO MATA 163

Part Three: The Economic Impact 9 Comparative Immigrant Economic Integration VICTOR PICHE, JEAN RENAUD, AND LUCIE GINGRAS

185

viii

Contents

10 Economic Threat and Attitudes toward Immigrants VICTORIA M. ESSES, LYNNE M. JACKSON, JEFFREY M. NOLAN, AND TAMARA L. ARMSTRONG

212

11 Visible Minority Income Differences

K.G. BASAVARAJAPPA AND

FRANK JONES 230

Part Four: The Social Impact 12 Foreign Born Language Acquisition and Shift JOHN DE VRIES 261 13 Integrating Gender, Language, and Race MONICA BOYD 282 14 Intergenerational Language Learning BRIAN R. HARRISON 307 REFERENCES 321

Preface

Ten years ago, Frank Trovato and ourselves invited the top demographers and ethnic scholars in Canada to a conference in Winnipeg. They presented their papers, and many of these appeared in Ethnic Demography, published by Carleton University Press in 1990. As the editors stated in the preface, it was the first volume combining the two fields of demography and ethnicity. The purpose was 'to make available to students and policy-makers the latest data ... from the 1981 and 1986 censuses and recent surveys. This work has been widely used, and it went into a second printing. In October of 1996, we invited many of the same scholars, as well as others who have since entered the field, to present papers at a second conference in Winnipeg. Fourteen of the forty papers have been edited and are made available here in Immigrant Canada, using the latest census data and many additional related studies. Most scholars who attended the conference agreed that the discussions, the intellectual ferment, and the excitement have spurred them onto greater research efforts in the future. The quality of the papers was high, so that fifteen more papers have also been edited and will appear in another book titled Race and Racism, to be published by Carleton University Press in the near future. Many people have made these publications possible, and we wish to acknowledge the help of donors who contributed financially, including Heritage and Multiculturalism Canada; the Metropolis Project; James Gardner and Joanne Kesselman, vice-presidents, Raymond Currie, dean of arts, Emoke Szathmary, president, of the University of Manitoba; and the Prairie Centre of Excellence for Research on Immigration and Integration.

x

Preface

We dedicate this volume to Meyer Burstein, executive head of the Metropolis Project, who has recently spearheaded increased efforts in Canadian immigration research. His efforts encouraged Citizenship and Immigration Canada and the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada to join forces by making $8 million available for immigration research in four metropolitan centres located in Toronto, Montreal, Vancouver, and Edmonton. Burstein has been a leader and a catalyst in promoting research on immigrants who are now in major metropolitan centres. Several scholars working for federal agencies are concerned that we make it clear that the opinions expressed in their papers are not those of the government, but their own. These include Bali Ram and Y. Edward Shin; K.G. Basavarajappa and Frank Jones; Brian R. Harrison, of Statistics Canada; and Fernando Mata of Multiculturalism Canada. Abdolmohammad Kazemipur, PhD candidate in sociology at the University of Manitoba, and Darlene Driedger have both contributed much to the processing of this work, for which we sincerely thank them. SHIVA S. HALLI AND LEO DRIEDGER

Contributors

TAMARA L. ARMSTRONG T.R. BALAKRISHNAN K.G. BASAVARAJAPPA RODERIC P. BEAUJOT MONICA BOYD JOHN DE VRIES LEO DRIEDGER VICTORIA M. ESSES JAMES S. FRIDERES LUCIE GINGRAS SHIVA S. HALLI BRIAN R. HARRISON FENG HOU LYNN M. JACKSON

Department of Psychology, University of Western Ontario, London. Department of Sociology, University of Western Ontario, London. Analytical Studies Branch, Statistics Canada, Ottawa. Department of Sociology, University of Western Ontario, London. Department of Sociology, Florida State University, Tallahassee. Department of Sociology and Anthropology, Carleton University, Ottawa. Department of Sociology, University of Manitoba, Winnipeg. Department of Psychology, University of Western Ontario, London. Department of Sociology, University of Calgary, Calgary. Department of Demography, University of Montreal, Montreal. Department of Sociology, University of Manitoba, Winnipeg. Demography Division, Statistics Canada, Ottawa. Department of Psychiatry, University of Toronto, Toronto. Department of Psychology, University of Western Ontario, London.

xii Contributors FRANK JONES FERNANDO MATA

GERTRUD NEUWIRTH JEFFREY M. NOLAN VICTOR PICHE BALI RAM JEAN RENAUD Y. EDWARD SHIN ALAN B. SIMMONS

Analytical Studies Branch, Statistics Canada, Ottawa. Multiculturalism Directorate, Department of Canadian Heritage, Government of Canada, Ottawa. Centre for Immigration and Ethno-Cultural Studies, Carleton University, Ottawa. Department of Psychology, University of Western Ontario, London. Centre for Ethnic Studies and Department of Demography, University of Montreal, Montreal. Demography Division, Statistics Canada, Ottawa. Centre for Ethnic Studies and Department of Sociology, University of Montreal, Montreal. Demography Division, Statistics Canada, Ottawa. Centre for Research on Latin America and the Caribbean, York University, Toronto.

IMMIGRANT CANADA

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1

The Immigrant Challenge 2000 SHIVA S. HALLI and LEO DRIEDGER

Canada is a land of immigrants. Most of the 28 million people who live here are immigrants or the children of immigrants who arrived less than 500 years ago. Only the aboriginals, who now represent less than 2 per cent of the population, came much earlier, and could be called the 'original' peoples of this land. Immigration has continually played a significant role in Canada. The foreign born have always represented a significant proportion of the population, ranging from as low as 13 per cent in 1901 and as high as 22 per cent in 1931. Northern Europeans, especially the British and the French, have predominated throughout the history of Canada and still remain the most influential inhabitants. The ethnic population of this country, however, is changing from largely white northern European origin to include newcomers of diverse visible minorities. The majority of these visible minorities now come from Asia. In 1971, 5 per cent of Canada's population was non-white; by 1991, this had doubled to 10 per cent. Estimates are that the percentage of visible minorities in the Canadian population will again double in the next generation. Canada is becoming more diverse ethnically, demographically, economically, socially, and religiously. Finding a Conceptual Focus In a previous volume titled Ethnic Demography, we asked demographers to develop the factors that were involved in Canadian population increase (fertility and immigration) and population decrease (mortality and emigration), seeking to sketch the most recent ethnic findings for Canada (Halli, Trovato, and Driedger 1990). Since then much research has clarified the larger ethnic demographic structure of Canadian soci-

4 Immigrant Canada ety. In this volume, we decided to focus on immigration, a very important factor in Canada's population growth, since our policies are relatively open to new immigrants, compared to those of many other western developed countries. Changes to the Immigration Act in 1976 (proclaimed in 1978) changed immigrant patterns based on the country of origin substantially. In 1951 nine of the top ten source countries were European; six of these nine were northern European. Immigrants from the tenth country, the United States, were largely originally of European stock as well. In 1976, six of the top ten countries of origin were non-European, and by 1984, six years after the new Immigration Act had been proclaimed, two Asian countries - Vietnam and Hong Kong - ranked first and second, Britain had dropped to fifth place, and seven of the ten leading countries of origin were in the Third World (Driedger 1996, 59). This trend has continued into the nineties, when Britain dropped to ninth place. By 1993, the seven top donor countries were Asian and they were sending visible minorities to Canada. Many immigrants from all over the world are now able to compete with Europeans in gaining entrance through the point system. Richmond's Structuration Perspective The rapidly changing pattern of immigration poses complex challenges for both immigrants and host societies. In sorting theories of immigration in his Global Apartheid (1994), Anthony Richmond claims that 'there is no single theory of migration nor one sociological explanation of ethnic relations or racial conflict' (Richmond 1994, 3). To frame his thinking he adopted an eclectic approach, trying to find some synthesis of the many theories he reviewed. Richmond found the work of Anthony Giddens (1991) most helpful in this respect. 'His work is grounded in classical theory, "a conceptual scheme that allows one to understand both how actors are at the same time the creators of social systems yet created by them"' (Giddens 1991, 204). 'Among the key concepts necessary to understanding the sociological dimensions of international migration and related questions of "race" and ethnic relations are power, conflict, agency, Structuration, security, identity and communication. In turn these are related to questions of class, ethnicity, racism, domination, migration, and the coaptation of linguistic, religious, and cultural groups in quasi-sovereign states that are part of a world system. That system is currently experiencing radical change as it moves from mo-

The Immigrant Challenge 2000 5 dernity, through late modernity, to an uncertain postmodern phase that promises the possibility of chaos' (Richmond 1994, 4). The seven key concepts identified by Richmond as requiring further research - power, conflict, agency, structuration, security, identity, and communication are reviewed below. Richmond (1994, 4) begins with power, arguing that while a precise definition of power is controversial, it is the capacity to achieve individual or collective goals through cooperation and, if necessary, by overcoming opposition. Political economy scholars reduce power largely to means of economic production, relying on Marxist theories. Some neo-Marxists have followed Cox (1948) in recognizing the reality of a global economic system; others, like Satzewich (1991), examine the incorporation of foreign labour in Canada. Max Weber (1947) also recognized the importance of power but did not agree that it rested primarily in economic property, claiming instead that it was inherent in authority, lodged in traditional, rational, or charismatic empowerment. The British and French charter groups have been and are most influential in Canada, so that according to John Porter (1965), all other immigrants have come as 'entrance' participants. With the two founding European peoples being most influential demographically, economically, and politically, the nonindustrial aboriginal peoples and immigrants who entered the Canadian system later, according to Richmond (1994, 12), are apt to find themselves in situations of asymmetrical distribution of power, status, and resources that have potential for conflict. Conflict arises when there is competition for scarce resources and unequal opportunity for competing successfully. There may also be conflict with respect to family, religious, and cultural values as Canada's population becomes more heterogeneous as the result of the arrival of immigrants from other continents than Europe (Richmond 1994, 12). Factors such as ideology, alliances, degrees of consensus, historical myths, fatigue levels, ability to communicate, and willingness to negotiate all come into play. Such multivariate complexity makes it difficult to broker differences and predict conflicts. Giddens (1985, 376) transcends the split between structural and individualistic theories in his definition of structuration as a process of structuring social relations across time and space where two or more structures may be involved. Social structures that form as a result of human interaction over time restrain behaviour, limiting choices and narrowing options, but they also help to facilitate action (Richmond 1994, 16). Giddens (1985, 31) refers to 'signification' as symbolic orders and modes

6 Immigrant Canada of discourse that are used for 'domination' of political and economic institutions which, in turn, legitimize legal institutions in a society. Class and status are integrally intertwined with this process of structuration, which deeply affects new immigrants of a variety of cultures, ethnicity, and race when they are seen as 'immigrants/ 'refugees,' 'migrants,' or 'visible minorities/ all symbolic signifiers of a lower 'ethclass.' The role of leaders is critical. These are agents who are power holders. Those belonging to the majority have great advantages compared to those who represent minorities. There is much debate over the importance of individuals versus collectivities. Proponents of individualism say that leaders can mould, direct, and influence collectivities and structures, so that leadership of such institutions is crucial. Consider the great religious, political, economic, social, and ethnic leaders who fill our history books, who have moved nations and the world. Both Hechter (1978) and Banton (1983) emphasize the importance of rational choice (Richmond 1994, 13). Questions of human agency and social structures are still debated, and Giddens raises the question of whether collectivities like governments can be considered actors as such, or whether they are dependent on leaders who act within these systems. Both seem to be needed - they need each other. Human identities vary by gender, age, language, nationality, religion, race, ethnicity, occupation, and class. When individuals feel secure in their heritage of identity, they find both inner psychological peace and collective social support in the development of their personalities. New immigrants, having left their homelands for Canada, may never have possessed much in the way of identity status, economic resources, or political power to boost their identity. Most, however, arrive with their language, culture, race, and religion, to replant and transfer their identity. They also assume new identities, which will require adjustments. To become a citizen in a new land takes time; immigrants cannot immediately say, this is 'my land/ 'my language/ or these are 'my people/ and be proud of it. Such identity transferrals are complex and require further study. To be intelligible, communicative actions must take place within the speech community, involving a shared culture and symbolic interaction. When immigrants leave their community of origin and come to Canada, the disjuncture between where they come from and their new home may vary considerably. Earlier immigrants, who came primarily from Europe, shared many climatic (northern), historic (Graeco-Roman), religious (Christian), linguistic (European), economic (capitalist), politi-

The Immigrant Challenge 2000 7 cal (democratic), and social (western) similarities. Thus, the communicative gulf was easier to bridge. As more immigrants arrive from the southern hemisphere of Asia, Africa, and South America, these differences are greater. Such immigrants come from very different life worlds, as Habermas (1990, 135) puts it, the context in which communicative action takes place. They move from a storehouse of unquestioned cultural givens, from which those participating in communication draw agreed-upon patterns of interpretation and understanding, to an alien environment. There are barriers to communication between people who speak different languages, as well as impediments in mutual understanding, habits, and conceptions of reality. It is hard to learn another social context, even in a lifetime. All of the above are of course, closely tied to security and insecurity. Life depends upon routine, involving predictability and trust. Feelings of anxiety are generated when routines are interrupted. Many immigrants who come to Canada find this country more industrial and 'modern/ which holds many opportunities for material advantage, but also considerable potential for anxiety. Too little research has been undertaken on these emotional adjustments and on immigrant experiences of exploitation, degradation, abuse, surveillance, bureaucratization, prejudicial treatment, and economic uncertainty. Some refugees and other immigrants have already experienced such fears before they left home, and coming to a strange country adds to their insecurity. The task for the immigrant is to restore routines, re-establish trust, regain confidence in self and others (Richmond 1994, 20). They may have come to a land of greater political security, but can they take root in the new economic system when their communicative skills are limited, their status is uncertain, and resources are limited? This is especially the problem for refugees, who often face prolonged unemployment, prejudice, and discrimination. The seven factors identified by Anthony Richmond (1994) as crucial to an understanding of the consequences of immigration clearly require further research. Some of the issues raised above have been addressed by contributors to this volume. Sketching Contemporary Immigration Patterns The main purpose of this volume is to bring together scientists of many disciplines to research immigrants' socio-economic and demographic differences. They share their multicultural research and analysis of pat-

8 Immigrant Canada terns of recent immigration and of immigrants' social, cultural, and economic adjustment in Canada. Government policies and approaches that lead to successful integration are part of the adjustment process. Though the volume focuses specifically on immigrants, we hope it will throw light on how their entrance affects the whole structure of Canadian society. An analysis of immigration on a comparative basis will help us to understand immigrant strategies for cultural survival and socio-economic integration and to improve civic and provincial programs so that they encourage adaptations for both. Moreover, it helps us to understand which ethnic strategies and government programs work best under specific economic conditions. Sorting Theories and Policies of Integration

The papers in Part I address immigration policy and provide theoretical frameworks, the context for integration. As Kritz and Nogle (1994, 518) suggest, "immigration policy is the outcome of an interactive process at the national level that incorporates information based on a country's actual experience with immigrants, as well as the perceptions of policy making elites regarding the role of immigration and desirability/ All of the factors of power, conflict, structuration, agency, identities, communication, and security that Richmond describes are part of the mix that every nation must struggle with when formulating immigration policies. Alan Simmons reviews the national immigration policy patterns of Britain, Europe, Australia, the United States, and Japan to show that immigration policies vary significantly. He concludes that Canadian immigration policy is typical of policies of 'New World' countries populated by massive immigration, very similar to that of Australia, for instance. Both countries have high levels of foreign-born population; their earlier policies were highly ethnocentric and often racist, but shifts have taken place since the 1960s. These shifts also parallel major shifts in the United States. Europe has a very different set of policies, involving less major sustained immigration and supporting more restrictive control of migrant inflows, responding mostly to short-term labour shortages. Japan has always been resistant to any immigration, and has instead tried to meet its labour needs for industrial expansion by exporting jobs to Asian nations. These varied national policies have also resulted in policies that favour particular kinds of migrants.

The Immigrant Challenge 2000 9 Simmons presents a model for the historical and comparative interpretation of immigration policies, in which he pays particular attention to power relations between nations and the formation of 'imagined futures' related to immigration policy and state-led nation-building efforts. He summarizes his 'imagined futures and immigration policy' by introducing the demographic (immigration options), economic (trade options), and cultural identity options that must be considered in any policy process. Simmons contends that nations must work at an 'imagined future' that combines immigration, economic, and cultural policies. He traces three historical phases of Canadian immigration policy, illustrating how Canadian policy has juggled these demographic, economic, and social/cultural needs. The subsequent divisions of Immigrant Canada are organized around these three options, with three or four contributors exploring and developing the demographic (Part II), economic (Part III), and social (Part IV) impacts of immigration. First, however, Gertrud Neuwirth picks up on Simmons's discussion of immigrant policy in Europe, focusing especially on the economic and social impacts that other contributors will deal with in Parts III and IV of this volume. Neuwirth presents five principles of immigrant settlement, which represent key elements of what is involved in the process of integration. These principles deal specifically with Richmond's issues of identity, security, and communication, which are closely tied to Simmons's cultural and economic factors. Outlining the five principles for successful immigrant settlement, Neuwirth argues that integration of immigrants is a two-way process that requires commitments by both newcomers and the host population. Newcomers must learn one of the official languages, while individuals of the host society must help immigrants find jobs, see them as partners and not as a threat. It is important for the host society to share with newcomers its values and traditions, including freedom, equality, and participation in a democracy. Both must work to eliminate barriers to integration and toward self-sufficiency, for their mutual benefit. These barriers include language acquisition and issues of gender and race, which are addressed in greater depth in the social impact section (Part IV) of this volume. Neuwirth also discusses economic rights in an unequal labour market. Newcomers can easily become an 'underclass/ and much work is required to help immigrants to succeed in getting jobs quickly so they can support themselves and become contributing members of Canadian

10 Immigrant Canada society. Neuwirth shows that immigrants who are visible minorities from the Caribbean and Asian countries face many racial obstacles. This is especially true for refugees, who endured great hardship before they arrived in Canada and now must try to adjust to a new home while their shattered life in their old country is still a recent troubled memory. Neuwirth presents a theory of immigrant integration which deals with 1) the racial factor and how it influences integration, 2) social class and occupational opportunities, and 3) the social and economic structures into which immigrants must fit. The economic impact of immigration is discussed at greater length in Part III of this volume. In Chapter 4, James Frideres explores the roles of the state, the various ethnic groups, and visible minorities in dealing with conflicting ideologies. This requires rethinking Canada, and it is obvious that the ethnonationalists and multiculturalists, who have very different views of the place of immigrants in our society, will need to engage in some give and take, unless one or the other gains the upper hand. Richmond's seven sociological dimensions - positions of power, how we propose to deal with conflict, who will act as mediary agents, how Canadian structures need to change, what is best for our security, whether we will lose our identity in the process, and whether we can still communicate in an information society - clearly become most relevant when we read Frideres's presentation of the struggles between ethnonationalist and multicultural ideologies. Frideres focuses more specifically on managing some of the macroand global issues Simmons and Neuwirth have outlined, as immigrants are faced with a social transformation process. While Neuwirth concentrated on the economic impact, Frideres's primary concern is with the social impact. His chapter also highlights severe immigrant problems related to the systems of power and the conflicts that result. Frideres sees Canada's multicultural policy as both a visionary and challenging attempt to deal with diversity. As Canada becomes more racially and religiously diverse, the potential for conflict will inevitably increase. Nation states with one official language tried to assimilate everyone into a uniform cultural pattern. In the past, European countries possessed a state religion, a national language, and were often run by monarchs who acted as heads of a symbolic unity. That is no longer possible, nor is it desirable in many modern countries like Canada, which are officially bilingual, multicultural, and, increasingly, multiracial and multireligious. Canada's Charter of Rights, which recognizes rights and freedoms of individuals, also militates against homogeneity.

The Immigrant Challenge 2000 11 Frideres suggests that Canada has become the battleground for ethnonationalists, who vie for a more homogeneous unicultural and unilingual state, and multiculturalists, who wish to work with much more diversity. He also claims that Quebecois and aboriginal peoples contend that they have been hampered in their own quests for identities by multiculturalism, which has diffused their focus and quest. The chapters in Part I clearly demonstrate the many dimensions of change that are involved in the adjustment of new immigrants to Canada. Integrating these variables, dimensions, and changes into theories that can predict outcomes given certain conditions is essentially an extension of Richmond's structuration theory. In his extensive review of past and present immigration policies of the core nations, Simmons (Chapter 2) argues that the core nations dominate world immigration policies to their advantage in spite of economic globalization, resulting in pressures on international migration. He also advances Richmond's theory of structuration by addressing the question of how current policies affect the class, ethnic, and gender composition of Canadian immigration and its impact on the transformation of Canadian society. Theoretical nation-building arguments are also made by Frideres, who argues that more issues will continually be divided by further authorities, thus taking decisions away from minorities. The official policy of integration is constantly changing its focus, moving from the promotion of ethnic identity to forging unity from diversity, building a national identity, and trying to develop the 'economic advantage' of being Canadian. This is done in a dynamic process of providing immigrants a sense of group worth (security), cultural autonomy (identity), and not undermining those institutions that were concerned with guaranteeing equality between individuals and classes. Changing Patterns of Immigrant Demography

In Part II four contributors provide the empirical demographic context for a comprehensive understanding of the larger national ethnic diversity in which new immigrants will find themselves. This section of the volume focuses on one of the three immigration policy processes presented by Simmons. Since changes in immigration policies in Canada promoted immigration from all regions of the world, the annual immigration level has fluctuated. The reasons for these fluctuations are reflected in the economic conditions of Canada and the world in general. Yearly immigra-

12 Immigrant Canada tion targets have usually been based on responses by governments to meet the demands of the economy. Immigration levels are based on the labour market and other economic considerations, family reunion, and the protection of genuine refugees. In setting immigration levels for the future, governments also have to take into account demographic realities. Along with other western countries, Canada has been experiencing a decline in fertility rates and the population is aging. Immigration can play an important role in minimizing population decline. It should also be noted that during the last fifteen years, more than 63 per cent of immigrants to Canada have been from Third World countries. The trend is likely to continue in view of political, economic, social, and demographic conditions in the countries of origin and in Canada. In Chapter 5, Roderic Beaujot addresses the impact of immigration and population growth, the differential demographic behaviour of immigrants, and population distribution, as well as the socio-cultural and socio-economic composition of the population. In addition to providing descriptive demographic context, he argues that the largest impact of immigration is at the time of arrival, with differences declining as length of residence increases. However, in terms of growth, distribution, and composition, more recent immigration is having a larger impact. He also discusses policy implications related to both integration and the appropriate level of immigration. In Chapter 6 Balakrishnan and Hou provide at least a partial answer to the question of the extent of immigration integration that occurs through residential segregation; the greater the self-identity of an immigrant group, the more likely that group is to be segregated. Their main focus is on the concentration of recent immigrant groups, and whether segregation is increasing or decreasing. Do changes in segregation patterns separate newcomers from the majority British and French charter groups, or do newcomers use space to enhance their separation by clustering in enclaves? Do ethnic neighbourhoods differ in their overall socio-economic levels? Balakrishnan and Hou try to explain some of the residential patterns and suggest directions for future research. In Chapter 7 Ram and Shin focus on internal migration related to immigrant integration. They argue that as the duration of residence increases, immigrants find better economic opportunity and become familiar with the dominant culture, so that they can move out to less ethnically segregated areas. Thus, the migration patterns of some immigrants may converge with Canadians of other origins. In the case of

The Immigrant Challenge 2000 13 groups which have shown less ethnic concentration and segregation, geographic mobility facilitates a reduction in economic barriers, which contributes to economic equality. The authors conclude that no single hypothesis can adequately explain the migratory behaviour of all immigrant groups. Fernando Mata (Chapter 8) examines the citizenship status of immigrants in order to understand the many dimensions of the integration process. The question he asks is why do immigrants change their legal status? How is the socio-demographic and economic integration of immigrants related to the acquisition of citizenship? Answers to these questions are dependent on perspective. Some argue that immigrants become citizens because they are better integrated culturally, politically, and economically. Others believe that immigrants decide to become citizens on the basis of 'benefits' and 'costs/ Mata's research shows that the acquisition of citizenship does not change the immigrant's socioeconomic position. The similarities or dissimilarities between groups are related to birthplace rather than citizenship status. The four chapters in this section, although demographic in orientation, also deal with sociological dimensions that relate to the key concepts of Richmond's power relationships between charter groups and their relations with other recent non-European immigrants. For instance, Beaujot argues that unlike white Canadians who arrived earlier, visible minorities are economically in a disadvantaged position. They tend to concentrate in the lower income groups. Similarly, Balakrishnan and Hou show that these groups also maintain social distance based on their residential segregation. According to Ram and Shin, these groups tend to segregate themselves residentially, but also concentrate in a few metropolitan cities. Mata's analysis demonstrates that, unlike the majority groups, minority groups tend to acquire citizenship status, with the hope that it will help them reduce dissimilarities as well as income differences with the majority. But Mata's research reveals that the acquisition of citizenship does not automatically guarantee occupational or economic success. On the other hand, immigrants from the same ethnic groups as the core groups in Canada, irrespective of their naturalization, tend to have greater access to employment, occupational status, and earning power in the Canadian labour force. Even those visible minorities with high human capital endowments are clearly disadvantaged in the labour market. This gives rise to feelings of insecurity and anxiety, as explained in Richmond's structuration theory.

14 Immigrant Canada Integrating Newcomers into the Economy

In Part III we deal with the impact of the economy on immigration, Simmons's second policy option. The three contributors in the economic impact section of this volume focus on comparative immigrant integration, attitudes toward immigrant economic threat, and visible minority income differences. They see the state multiculturalism policy as an attempt at assimilating immigrants and incorporating them into Canadian society. In Chapter 9, Piche, Renaud, and Gingras present a conceptual model involving two factors, place of origin and destination. Using a longitudinal data set, the authors examine the differential process of integration in the labour market. They hypothesize that this process varies by national origin even after human capital and other factors are taken into account. The nature of social networks among immigrant groups, problems related to the acceptance of foreign qualifications, and discrimination are all important. The findings of the study suggest that once immigrants enter the labour force, their nationality as well as human capital variables significantly affect their salary level and occupational mobility. Needless to say, the attitudes of Canadians toward immigrants are important in the process of integrating. However, there are too few studies in Canada that help understand majority attitudes and the implications for immigrants who wish to compete. Esses, Jackson, and Nolan try to fill this gap in Chapter 10 by addressing the links between perceived economic threat and intergroup attitudes. The question is whether Canadians indeed perceive immigrants as a potential threat to their economic welfare. More specifically, the authors examine whether media portrayals of potential economic threat from skilled immigrants can lead to or cause unfavourable attitudes toward these immigrants and their skills. They conclude that the media are an important source of information on immigrants, and that such publicity has the potential for both harm and help. Researchers have argued that countries that manage their immigrants better will be better equipped to successfully face the twenty-first century. In Canada, legislators introduced employment equity legislation to rectify racially based economic disparities. However, it is not clear whether this legislation has made any difference. In Chapter 12, Basavarajappa and Jones, using 1991 census data, examine the influence of human capital and other factors on total income. They hypothesize that visible minorities experience conditions in their life and work that

The Immigrant Challenge 2000 15 weaken their income position. Based on their analysis, they conclude that economic opportunities and education are lower for visible minorities than for their counterparts. The influence of birthplace tends to be weak, but it is greater for nonvisible minorities than for visible minorities. The influence of period of immigration, on the other hand, is strong and supports the hypothesis that recent visible minority arrivals are at a greater income disadvantage than more established visible minority immigrants. They are also at a greater disadvantage when compared with more recent nonvisible minority immigrants. The key concepts of Richmond's theory are also related to questions of class, ethnicity, racism, domination, migration, language, religion, and culture; these relationships form the subjects of the chapters presented in Part III. Recent immigrants to Canada have been selected primarily on the basis of their economic contribution. Hence, the initial attraction of immigrants to their new country is often limited to a single sphere (i.e., the attainment of economic goals). In other words, new immigrants may be more interested in economic integration, keeping their social and cultural identity intact. However, the reality is different. Based on a longitudinal study, Piche et al. show that 'ethnic-connectedness' works against visible minorities. Racism and discrimination tend to act against recent immigrants who are concerned with 'ethnic-connectedness.' Language and nationality tend to affect potential salary levels and occupational mobility. Esses et al. argue that as Canadians perceive new immigrants as potential economic rivals, they become less sympathetic toward immigrants and immigration, and that what people read in the news media can have a genuine influence on whether they see immigrants as rivals. For full integration of new immigrants, acceptance by the host society is required. Otherwise, the main conditions for acquiring a positive status image are not fulfilled and the immigrants continue to be aliens in their new society. It is not enough to pass legislation such as employment equity to rectify racially based economic disparities. Basavarajappa and Jones show that discrimination based on 'ethnic-connectedness' creates a feeling of insecurity among the visible minorities, and, in turn, weakens their economic position. Acquiring Linguistic and Social Skills

In Part IV we examine the impact of social factors on immigrant integration, the third immigration policy dimension. The discussion focuses on internal social networks and immigrant integration into a complex,

16 Immigrant Canada multilayered social environment. Researchers have tried to determine the connection between cultural values and the economic context in which immigrants survive. John de Vries develops a typology of language characteristics and the range of linguistic abilities that new immigrants have acquired, using official language ability, language acquisition, and language shift. He also assesses the factors that influence, or are associated with, language acquisition and shift, and the consequences that result from language for the socio-economic status of immigrants. For virtually every birth category, shift increases monotonically with education. Monica Boyd examines the relation between indicators of economic integration and language skills by gender and people of colour. Boyd's analysis reveals that groups with low levels of language proficiency have the lowest rates of labour force participation, the highest unemployment, and the highest proportions in the lower skilled occupations. They also have the lowest wages among both the foreign born and the Canadian born. Gender, nativity, visible minority status, and language proficiency intersect so that foreign-born visible minority women have the lowest earnings of all groups. Brian Harrison compares language-skill characteristics of children and their parents, to provide insight into the evolution of major nonofficial language proficiency in Canada. The extent to which immigrants are able to pass these languages on to the next generation is the major focus of this chapter. Another side of the integration process is the emphasis on the degree of 'social interaction' or 'social proximity' between new immigrants and majority groups. Personal and institutional integration of immigrants is seen primarily as a process of learning and acquiring the habits of the new society. This process of learning is usually through linguistic abilities that new immigrants acquire. John de Vries's analysis demonstrates the range of linguistic abilities needed and the factors that influence, or are associated with, the extent to which immigrants acquire official language skills. Language acquisition has a direct relevance to economic integration, as Monica Boyd's chapter demonstrates. In addition, Harrison (Chapter 14) shows that the evolution of ethnic language proficiency is important. Retention of the mother tongue by the children of immigrants is clearly an important indicator of genuine identity retention. The contributions to this collection reflect a wide variety of research orientations in immigration research. We hope that the papers in this

The Immigrant Challenge 2000 17 socio-demographic volume will both convey some of the research that has been done, especially using Canadian census data, and that it will inspire others to expand the research.

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PART ONE:

THEORIES AND POLICIES

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2

Immigration Policy: Imagined Futures ALAN B. SIMMONS

There is a relatively large body of previous research and theoretical reflection on Canadian immigration policy, covering how it developed over time, the forces that have shaped its direction, and how it has affected Canadian society. My objective in this chapter is to selectively review, update, and extend this existing theoretical reflection. The task is challenging in a short essay because it involves integrating hypotheses from various sources and developing what is essentially a new framework. To provide a stronger focus, I pay particular attention to the explanation of important shifts in immigration policy at two points in time, the 1960s and the 1990s. The chapter begins with a brief critical review of two well-known macrotheoretical frameworks that have been widely used to interpret Canadian immigration policies. This provides a background for the remaining sections. It is generally accepted that Canadian immigration policies from the latter half of the nineteenth century to the 1990s have been key nationbuilding strategies, implemented by Liberal and Conservative governments alike. Explanations for specific features of Canadian immigration policies, however - such as admission criteria and numbers of immigrants targeted for entry - vary widely. Two theories with very different interpretations have tended to dominate debate in the field. State leaders have justified immigration primarily as a mechanism to ensure that Canada has the kind of workers necessary for economic prosperity, and researchers interested in economic growth have tended to see this as the basic explanation for immigration policies and their modification over time. The theoretical view underlying this interpretation is essentially the neo-classical economic growth model applied to the international system (Kuznets 1959). From this perspective, immi-

22 Part One: Theories and Policies gration policies are to be explained simply as the desire of nation states to take advantage of a mechanism for reallocating labour from nations of lower productivity (and economic stagnation with unemployment and underemployment) to countries with higher productivity (and faster economic growth with lower unemployment). As people move from poorer to wealthier nations, the international system becomes more rational, efficient and wealthy over time (see Thomas (1954) for a classic statement of this view and Massey (1994) for a contemporary version). Such an approach emphasizes the positive outcomes for many of the immigrants (they move to improve their lives and are often successful) and positive outcomes for economic growth in both the migrant sending and receiving countries. When the economic and mobility outcomes do not arise as they should according to the economic growth model, researchers who rely on this approach may argue that policy makers have permitted the entry of the wrong kind of immigrants, such as unskilled workers when the economy has become dependent on high technology (see, for example, DeVoretz (1995)). Studies that assume that economic growth is (or should be) the primary purpose of immigration do not generally ask what other forces shape immigration policy. Researchers who examine Canadian immigration policy from a political economy perspective have been particularly critical of explanations that focus on economic growth alone and ignore social-economic and political inequality (e.g., Stasiulus 1987). They argue that such a viewpoint ignores the role that immigration policies have played in reinforcing social class inequality, racism, and gender inequity in Canada. They propose that Canadian immigration policy can be better understood as the expression of state support for "business interests/ By ensuring a plentiful supply of immigrant workers, the state increases the desire of capitalists to invest in Canada. Under such conditions, wages in Canada stay relatively low and profits for investors remain relatively high (Stafford and McMillan 1988). Explicit racism in Canadian immigrant selection policies up until 1962, and hidden lingering racism in immigrant selection for some years thereafter (Satzewich 1989), created underprivileged racial minorities in Canada that also benefited employers seeking workers for particularly low-paid and hard work (Bolaria and Li 1988). Similarly, the immigration policies that lead to the recruitment of non-white women from poor countries as 'domestic workers' (that is, nannies and maids) tend to reinforce gender and racist stereotyping and lead to exploitation (Bakan and Stasiulis 1994; Calliste 1989; Das Gupta 1994). While immigration policies governing domestic work-

Immigration Policy: Imagined Futures 23 ers may not be intentionally racist, they have been shown to be racist in terms of their outcomes (Simmons 1998). While the political economy approach has an advantage in that it deals both with economic growth and various dimensions (race, class, gender) of inequality, as applied in the research cited above, it is underdeveloped in other respects and does not account for many important changes in Canadian immigration policy over time. The central and only assumption of the political economy approach used in these studies is that immigration policy is designed to reduce labour costs and thereby simultaneously promotes investment, economic growth, and pronounced social-economic inequality. As useful as this argument is for interpreting important aspects of immigration policy in different historical periods, it is not sufficient for addressing many other significant questions. For example, it cannot explain why Canadian immigration policy shifted dramatically away from ethnocentric and racist selection practices in the 1960s. Nor, in my view, can it explain why immigration policies in the 1980s and 1990s gave less attention to the admission of immigrant workers while at the same time gave increased priority to the recruitment of immigrant entrepreneurs, investors, and professionals. The two-sector model is equally deficient in addressing such questions, and further suffers because it ignores questions of political power and social inequality. I believe that many challenging questions regarding immigration policy can be better addressed within a revised and updated political economic framework. First, the approach I have in mind would pay greater attention to specific historical changes in the international political economic system and Canada's position in it. Of particular interest would be the elevation of Canada's position to that of a 'leading middle power' in the 1960s and its struggle to become a 'sophisticated niche player' in the global economy in the 1990s. Second, this revised approach would avoid a narrow focus on labour costs, when in fact nation building from a political economic perspective also involves a much broader range of concerns, such as strengthening trade, cultural, and geo-political links in the international system. Immigration can be conceptualized as playing a role in efforts to achieve policy goals in many of these areas of nation building. Finally, the revised model needs to examine the mechanisms that tend to give coherence to various nation-building policies. I argue later in the chapter that such coherence arises from images of the future nation that are adopted by business and political leaders. I further argue that such visions change

24 Part One: Theories and Policies as the international system evolves and reshapes the options for nation building. The remainder of this chapter is in four parts. The first part reviews selected research and hypotheses that I believe can usefully be integrated into political economic models of immigration policy. A second section integrates and extends these hypotheses in order to elaborate an 'imagined futures' framework. In the third section, the imagined futures approach is applied to try to understand key transitions in Canadian immigration policy and its directions in the 1990s. The chapter concludes by briefly examining some questions for future research that arise from the model. Previous Research and Theory In this review of selected previous research, I will focus on three questions. First, how do Canadian immigration policies and practices compare with those of other nations? Second, what macrolevel political economic, cultural, and other factors might explain variation across nations? Third, what conclusions can be reached from previous microlevel research on the political process leading to Canadian immigration policy? Variation in National Patterns Canadian immigration policy shows many similarities to policies in other New World countries (such as Australia, New Zealand, and the United States) that were first colonized by England and then populated by mass immigration from Europe. However, the similarities are greater in some cases than others. In addition, nations with quite different general policy orientations have nevertheless often adopted parallel immigration measures when they faced common problems in the broader international context. Canadian policy development is mirrored very closely by that in Australia (Hawkins 1989; Richmond 1994; Adelman et al. 1994). Both countries have similarly high levels of foreign born in their population and use a similar points system for evaluating immigration applications. Both were also highly ethnocentric and racist in their immigration policies until the 1960s, when they shifted from a system that strongly favoured European origin immigrants to one admitting immigrants from all parts of the world, particularly Asia. Significantly, both

Immigration Policy: Imagined Futures 25 Canada and Australia have parallel settlement policies that promote multiculruralism along with acculturation to national languages. Canadian policy developments also parallel major shifts in the United States, but the central position of the United States in the international system and its proximity to developing countries in Latin America and the Caribbean led to an earlier rise in immigration from developing countries (Simmons 1990, Table 2; Green 1995). A number of other differences are evident. For example, the U.S. policy does not use a points system for evaluating applications, and family sponsorship appears to have played a larger role in the U.S. case. In recent years, U.S. policy has focused heavily on stopping mass undocumented migration from Mexico, the Caribbean, and Central America (Adelman 1991). Canada, having no borders with less developed countries, has experienced only minor inflows of undocumented migrants. The major policy issue in Canada since the mid-1980s is instead the large number of asylum claimants (Simmons and Keohane 1992; Adelman 1991). Europe is often considered to have had a completely distinctive immigration experience. It was the source region of major flows of emigrants to the New World, has no tradition of significant sustained permanent migration from outside the region, and has recently moved in the direction of virtually cutting off all flows from non-European origins. This said, it is also apparent that over the post-war period Canadian and European immigration policies revealed a number of common influences and directions (Simmons 1995). Both responded to domestic labour shortages in the 1950s and 1960s by bringing in foreign labour, although in the European case the migrants were on work visas and many returned to their home countries (Baldwin-Edwards and Schain 1994), while in the Canadian case nearly all were permanent immigrants. Both have faced the challenge of large volumes of asylum seekers in the 1980s and 1990s and both have sought to restrict the inflow of these 'uninvited' migrants. The response in Europe has generally been far more restrictive and limited permanent resettlement (ibid., chapter 1), while in the Canadian case the flows are met by higher rates of acceptance leading to permanent resettlement and Canadian citizenship (Adelman 1991). Canadian procedures for granting citizenship are currently based on residence (and place of birth) rather than blood or ancestry, and in this regard follow the legal system of some European countries - England and France, for example - rather than that of others - Germany, in particular (Baldwin-Edwards and Schain 1994). The no-

26 Part One: Theories and Policies tion of multicultural citizenship that underlies settlement policy in both Canada and Quebec is similar to that found in the United Kingdom and different from the assimilationist tradition in French policy (ibid.) Among wealthy countries that serve as potential magnets for emigrants from poor regions, Japan provides a marked contrast. Japan has been extremely resistant to all immigration. Instead it has sought to meet its labour needs for industrial expansion by exporting jobs to other Asian nations - that is, by establishing 'offshore' industrial platforms and plants in export free zones in Malaysia, the Philippines, and other countries. Ethnic Japanese - many of whom are second generation and born abroad - in countries like Brazil have also been encouraged by Japanese employers and the Japanese state to return 'home' to help fill labour shortages. Despite the official policies, over recent years a rising number of Filipino and other Asian workers have moved illegally to Japan for employment. A number of countries around the world have policies that favour particular kinds of migrants - such as modern farmers, industrial workers, or professionals - but at times are unable to attract more than a few of the kinds of newcomers they would like. This includes countries such as Mexico and Argentina over recent decades. A mixture of unstable economic and political conditions in these countries has resulted in a situation where available migrants are from even less economically advanced neighbouring countries, such as Central America or Bolivia. In sum, an immigration policy favouring particular kinds of people will only lead to the desired outcome if other circumstances and relationships in the international system are supportive. Clearly, nations vary widely in their immigration policy goals and their success in achieving them. What factors explain such differences? A number of macrolevel historical and comparative models concerning the international system address this question. Macrolevel Historical Approaches

National Wealth and Power In one of the earliest efforts at theorizing international migration, Fairchild (1925) argued that the process is profoundly shaped by the power relations between the countries involved. Historically, international migration has not been based on immigration policies so much as on conquest, flight from invaders, enslavement, and colonization by force. Thus, international migration in the form of the peaceful free

Immigration Policy: Imagined Futures 27 movement of large numbers of peoples from one country to another is a relatively recent phenomon in world history. It emerges, according to Fairchild, under particular circumstances, as when European nations conquered and pacified native peoples abroad then encouraged, with promises of greater opportunity, their citizens and citizens in other 'friendly nations' to move to these new colonies. This is basically the story of the European colonization of New World countries in the Americas and elsewhere (Australia, New Zealand, South Africa). Later, when the New World countries became independent, the process expanded within a regulated international system - that is, a set of understandings between various European countries and former colonies on rules for trade, investment, and immigration. The core of this international system in the nineteenth century was the North Atlantic Economy. Within this system, European nations under British 'leadership' (or hegemony, in the era of Pax Britanica) exported capital and labour to the former colonies in exchange for profits and an increasing supply of low-cost foods and raw materials for industrial transformation (Thomas 1954). As Fairchild observed, the international migration component of such a system is based on an assumption of cultural and economic equality, or at least minimal prejudice with respect to any differences in wealth, power, or culture that may exist between the newcomers and previous colonists. It must also necessarily be based on complementary interests in sending and receiving countries. Fairchild's analysis of the international system up until the early twentieth century provides a useful analytic perspective, but one that needs to be extended to encompass major new developments in the international system over the period up until the present. Staples Theory Staples theory, developed by Harold Innis (1956), provides another promising but incomplete perspective on Canadian immigration. Writing between the mid-1930s and the early 1950s, Innis developed a perspective that has served broadly for interpretation of various aspects of Canadian economic and cultural history. He argued that Canada's political economy was shaped by its early origins as a large, sparsely populated nation dependent on foreign buyers for exports of 'staples' (fur, forest products, grain, etc.) and on foreign capital and immigrants for the exploitation of these resources. According to Innis, these historical political economic conditions led to a national culture with an 'outward' focus (i.e., on developments elsewhere in the world that would affect

28 Part One: Theories and Policies national trade), a preoccupation with communications (with other countries, and across the wider nation) and a favourable attitude toward immigration and permanent settlement of foreign workers and their families. This said, he wrote very little about immigration policy per se, and his observations on 'immigration' and 'settlement' in Canadian are scattered in small pieces throughout his writings in a way that provides a challenge for any effort to capture their full import (see the many index listings for these terms in Innis (1956)). As Stafford and McMillan (1988) have noted, Innis understood Canadian immigration to be deeply structured into the nation's political economy and hence into the relationship between business interests (capital) and workers (labour). Innis commented on the extent to which massive migration from Europe to Canada over the nineteenth century and early twentieth centuries was driven by the diverse interests of capitalists, including employers seeking assured supplies of labour and captains of ships transporting lumber from Canada to Europe who sought to attract settlers as paying passengers for what would otherwise be empty ships on the return passage (Innis 1956, 242-5). He also noted that policies to slow immigration in periods of economic downturn were reinforced both by the rise of organized labour (and its opposition to immigrants in periods of high unemployment) and by the views of employers who saw immigration as unnecessary when many Canadian workers were without jobs (218-19). Empirical analyses of the volume of Canadian immigration over time up to the late 1980s reveals this 'tap-on, tap-off pattern, with state-defined immigration targets being raised in periods of labour demand and lowered in periods of rising unemployment. However, after 1989 the responsiveness of state immigration targets to unemployment trends disappears (Veugelers and Klassen 1994) raising a number of theoretical questions (Simmons 1994). The staples theory approach to the analysis of Canadian immigration is particularly useful in an era of globalization because it draws attention to Canada's evolving place in the international system. Writing decades before contemporary globalization began, Innis perceptively drew attention to the centrality of trade in previous Canadian nation building. He also drew attention to the ways in which immigration policy and national cultural policy are strongly influenced by trade strategies and opportunities. Stated briefly, he argued the following: 1 The international economy has a very powerful role in organizing trade options for a small to intermediate nation such as Canada.

Immigration Policy: Imagined Futures 29 2 Canada was settled and developed initially within a framework of export-led economic growth (national industrial self-sufficiency strategies in the 1950s to the 1980s were a partial departure from this). Hence trade is a central element in efforts to understand Canadian political, economic, and social history. 3 There is a close linkage between economics and nation building. Industrialization generates nationalism, and vice versa. This twoway process may have benefits for economic growth (Innis in Drache (1995), chapter 13), provided that the nationalism does not become extreme, unbalanced, and destructive, as has often been the case in other civilizations (Innis in Drache (1995), 323). 4 Advances in communication technology will tend to transform production, trade, and culture (Innis in Drache (1995), chapter 23). Imagined Communities Nationalism, ethnocentrism, xenophobia, and racism have been powerful forces shaping the development of independent states and their immigration policies. Innis did not really develop this aspect of immigration policy in his approach but, as noted, he did view national culture as central to other aspects of national development. Others have examined in greater detail the cultural and ideological foundations of nation building. Benedict Anderson (1991) has argued that nationalism and related attitudes are deeply rooted in the culture, ideology, and images of a given community. Such images are consolidated and shaped over time by political regimes, the rise of nation states, and linkages between nations in the international system. Any given member of a national community will in his or her lifetime meet personally only a few hundred or at most a few thousand other members. In consequence, '[h]e will have no idea of what they [those he has not met] are up to ... But he has complete confidence in their steady, anonymous, simultaneous activity' (26). This confidence is not extended to 'strangers/ but only to compatriots who are incorporated, socialized, and regulated within the society. Images of who constitutes the nation become prize political property. Despots and imperial leaders will seek to define and promote an 'official nationalism' - that is, one promoted by the state for its own self-interest (159). The success of revolutionary movements, including those that initially seem to offer only modest prospects, often depends crucially on their ability to capture and build an image of an imagined future community - a dream of who constitutes the nation and how the members will live and relate to one another and to nonmembers in other nations (158).

30 Part One: Theories and Policies Anderson does not pursue the above ideas with respect to immigration policy and process. However, a number of recent studies have applied his perspective to specific migration patterns, such the Guatemalan refugee return (Egan and Simmons 1994; Stepputat 1994). Others have pursued research on closely related topics, such as the nature and origin of a sense of 'belonging' among immigrants in their new communities (Chavez 1994). The notion of a nation as an imagined community generated in part from state policies provides a very useful theoretical tool for exploring the origins of various specific state policies that are to contribute to the future nation. International Regimes There is an emerging body of political economic research pointing to the importance of contemporary international economic regimes in shaping immigration trends and policies. The recent reflection turns on efforts to refine the conceptualization of capitalist development beyond the conventional categories: feudal, mercantile, competitive industry, and monopoly capital. In this effort, analysis has centred on the difference between two very recent phases of capitalist development: the Fordist period (beginning in the 1930s, but reaching full development in the United States and other industrial nations between 1945 and 1971, or thereabouts), and a post-Fordist period (from 1971 to the present). Interpretations by Cox (1987) and Harvey (1989) examine these trends broadly in the international system, while Marchak (1991) provides more attention to the Canadian case. The Fordist period was characterized by American hegemony in the west (Pax Americana), a labour-capital accord that gave state protection to unions along with tariff and other protections and supports to industry (within the military-industrial complex, for example) and involved the advanced development of the welfare state. The post-Fordist period is characterized by 'flexible production' (a weakening of labour unions and a shift to part-time work, short-term contracts, multiple jobs, and so on), a shift in manufacturing to low-wage countries, rising trade between nations, the increased power of international corporations and financial institutions - in sum, economic globalization (Harvey 1989; Marchak 1991). Most of the research and reflection on the recent transition in economic regimes concerns shifting production, trade, class structures, and the declining welfare state. However, some analysis of international

Immigration Policy: Imagined Futures 31 migration is also emerging. Zolberg (1992) notes that the shift from a Fordist to a post-Fordist international economic regime had a major impact on immigration policies and immigrant integration practices in a wide range of countries. The Fordist period, one of economic expansion inside the wealthy nations, tended to be accompanied by policies to recruit foreign labour, either as short-term visa workers or as longterm immigrants, depending on the case. In contrast, the post-Fordist period of globalization involves a redeployment of labour, with production and many jobs being shifted to low-wage countries outside the wealthy nations. A rising insecurity of labour in wealthy nations during this process, as noted previously, is an important source of pressure to restrict immigration. International regimes are assumed to arise through transnational institutions specifically designed to carry out regulatory functions. Such institutions are evident historically in imperial regimes concerned with the pacification and settlement of colonies abroad. In this case the international regulatory bodies were colonial governments and military forces. Concern about the absence of such regulatory institutions in a potentially unstable world future led to the various agreements at Bretton Woods in 1944 for establishing the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the World Bank (IBRD), and the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT). The role of these institutions expanded during the Fordist era and they now provide central regulatory functions on economic matters in the new globalization. Various trade agreements, such as the European Economic Community (EEC) and the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), provide a regional regulation of trade to complement the global regulation through GATT. Such trade agreements specifically exclude all but a few selected implications for international migration, despite the fact that they generate movements of investment capital from one country to another, with enormous implications for employment and migration pressures (Simmons 1996, chapter 1). A number of political bodies (such as the Group of 77) and analysts such as Bhagwati (1984) have called for the establishment of international rules to regulate international migration, both globally and regionally. Less developed countries, such as Mexico, have also asked that provisions concerning international migration be included in contemporary trade agreements. Such proposals seek greater economic justice, particularly for the less developed countries that lose skilled work-

32 Part One: Theories and Policies ers and professionals through emigration. The agreements proposed would include both sending and receiving countries and would provide some compensation to sending countries for their loss of skilled workers. Not only have such agreements failed to emerge, but there has been considerable resistance from developed countries to such policy projects (Zolberg 1992; Simmons 1996, chapter 1). This does not mean that there has been no movement toward international migration agreements, but such agreements have taken quite a different thrust, one that excludes the interests of the migrant origin countries. Over the past decade, European nations have signed various agreements moving them toward a common definition of the European border to be used in controlling immigration from other areas and toward a common response to asylum seekers. Canada and the United States have signed an agreement that would also significantly coordinate their response to asylum seekers, although it has not been implemented. In other words, at the present time international regulation of immigration seems limited to arrangements between major receiving countries intended to exclude unwanted migrants. The research reviewed above provides a number of very promising insights for understanding the way in which the international system shapes national immigration policies and their outcomes. How they might be recast to address the Canadian case will be discussed below. Before engaging in developing a model, however, it is useful to examine briefly a separate body of research concerning the process by which immigration policies are developed in Canada and other countries. Is the policy process significantly influenced by competitive nation-building considerations in the international system, as the research reviewed to this point would suggest? Political Process and Immigration Policy Immigration policy at any point in a nation's history may be examined and interpreted from the perspective of the political process leading to the policy. Which political actors were involved? What were their interests and arguments? Does the process suggest how states grapple with and accommodate contradictory pressures and opposing views with respect to immigration? A particularly valuable review of these issues by Hardcastle and others (1994) compares the process in Canada and Australia. The authors identify seven hypotheses relevant to these two countries. Stated in summary form these are:

Immigration Policy: Imagined Futures 33 1 Responsible government: voters decide on policy by informed voting for parties that present attractive platforms across a range of issues, including immigration. 2 Bureaucratic dominance: state bureaucrats develop policy and sell it to political leaders. 3 Nation-building statism: the state acts as an independent, selfinterested promoter of policy. 4 Cosmopolitan elitism: the intelligenstia in civil society shapes policy through dominance of the press, media, and education. 5 Pluralism: policy outcomes are compromises between the views of various interest groups. 6 Business dominance: private capital, both national and international, shapes immigration by using its investment potential to shape policies on immigration, trade unions, and other matters related to the cost of labour. 7 Populism: policies are formed on the basis of ad hoc opinion polls rather than principled objectives. Some research support may be found in both Canada and Australia for each of the preceding hypotheses. Certain hypotheses seem to fit one country better than the other. For example, Australia has a strong legacy of policy development through 'responsible government/ This is documented in cases where the major political parties debate immigration policy during elections. Conversely, in Canada the two major political parties that have dominated national politics since Confederation (the Liberals and the Conservatives) have had almost identical views on immigration and the matter has not been debated much during elections. At the same time, the dominant sources of policy influence seem to be the same in both countries. The authors argue: The evidence appears most convincingly to suggest that the policy-making process in both Australia and Canada is shaped by a tension between the dynamics of nation-building statism (Hypothesis 3) and pluralism (Hypothesis 5). The statist framework encapsulates much of the process in both countries: state actors (ministers, bureaucrats in various agencies, party elites once in government) seem intent on pursuing national goals, such as economic growth, control of border movements, trade opportunities and international respectability, and can often do so with relative insularity from other domestic influences. The state sector does not have complete autonomy - for example, it cannot seriously afford to offend business interests - but in its own self-interest it is unlikely to

34 Part One: Theories and Policies attempt this anyway. [In short, business concerns are internalized by the state, thereby incorporating Hypothesis 6.]

In sum, findings from studies of the political process leading to Canadian immigration policy are broadly consistent with arguments in staples theory. Both bodies of research and theoretical reflection indicate that Canadian immigration policy is strategically formulated to take advantage of opportunities for national building within the international system. The nation-building process is structured around the interests of international capital and domestic business leaders. Immigration policy takes into account these interests, but considers others as well, such as the availability of 'suitable' immigrants abroad and national cultural identity. If one assumes that Canadian immigration policy has been formulated within the strategic nation-building framework, then changes within it over time should reflect changes in the international system and the options that it provides for nation-building efforts. Is this the case? The next section of the chapter turns to this question by outlining some theoretical links between international context and national immigration policy. These links are examined from the perspective of the images of Canada as a nation that underlie the main thrust of Canadian trade, immigration, and cultural policies taken together at different points in history. Imagined Futures and Immigration Policy The model of immigration that is presented in Figure 2.1 incorporates and builds on perspectives outlined in the previous section. Its main objective is to spell out linkages between key variables related to national immigration policy over time. My assumption is that the theoretical framework could be applied to any country and hence is potentially useful for cross-national comparative studies of immigration policy. It can also be applied to the same country at different points in time and thus may be useful for analysing historical changes in immigration policy. The next section applies the model to Canada. To begin with, I examine in greater detail the assumptions of the theoretical framework. The central assumption is that the process leading to national immigration policy is significantly shaped over time by the place of the nation in the international system. The international system shapes the

Immigration Policy: Imagined Futures 35 Figure 2.1 Imagined Futures and Immigration Policy

36 Part One: Theories and Policies nation's options with regard to the international division of labour (trade and international migration) and with regard to cultural values (from ethnocentrism to multiculturalism). Powerful nations will push the international system in directions that suit their economic interests and culture, while less powerful nations will find that they are limited in terms of economic and cultural options, including the immigration dimension that forms part of each of these. The following questions are relevant for analysis. Is the country colonized, a colonizer, or has it been both of these? Is it part of a regional system, such as the North Atlantic community, that offers rewards to its members if they play by international trade, immigration, and cultural norms largely set by the more powerful nations in this community? Is it one of the powerful nations, or a secondary player subject to the rules set by others? As new regional and global accords (e.g., EEC, GATT, NAFTA) arise and reshape the trade and power relations between nations, how is immigration policy affected in each specific nation? The framework in Figure 2.1 also assumes that economic policy includes two components: trade policy and international labour migration policy. Strategies pursued for trade are influenced by options and strategies related to the international migration of workers and vice versa. Classical economic theory tends to assume, for example, that increasing trade between nations will substitute (replace) international migration between them. Neo-classical economic theory also assumes that this will happen, but not quickly or completely (see Simmons 1996). Several questions arise. With respect to trade options, is the nation well placed to export goods? Are there countries that are interested in the products that country produces or could produce? Are goods not currently produced nationally available at attractive prices internationally? Is the country in a position to replace imports with nationally produced goods? Would tariffs be necessary to insure that foreign competition would not eliminate national production? With respect to options concerning international labour migration, is the nation placed to attract capital and labour in the international system, or is capital looking to opportunities provided by labour in other countries? If more labour is desired, are there ready sources of immigrants in other countries? How does the immigration option compare with alternatives, such as exporting capital and production (and even labour) to other countries? Does the nation have the power to export

Immigration Policy: Imagined Futures 37 jobs by using its economic and other incentives to convince other countries to set up 'export free' zones? The answers to such questions over time will determine the extent to which nations remain largely isolated from immigration (e.g., Japan), occasionally involved in immigration (e.g., Europe, with respect to immigrants from elsewhere), or one deeply involved in immigration (e.g., Canada). The model also assumes that national cultural identity is shaped by the trade, immigration, and cultural history of the nation. Nations that were never conquered or colonized (or whose previous experiences in these matters are historically distant and no longer remembered) tend to be monocultural. Nations that have colonized others may be somewhat more multicultural, particularly in cases where the overseas colonial experience led to a return migration from the colonies or other countries under economic domination. Britain may be a good example. Nations that have been colonized will be more multicultural, provided that the original culture also survived or that colonial settlement involved immigration from several sources. The central and most important assumption in the theoretical model is that imagined futures are the conceptual spaces within which potentially competing policy options are compared with one another by national political leaders and policy advisers in an effort to find a simultaneous solution in three interdependent policy areas: trade, immigration, and culture/identity. Political process and discourse leading to an imagined future may be very complex, and will generally differ from one country to another, although the common themes of struggle between economic and cultural criteria will tend to be the underlying concerns. The objective of the state is to find matched or complementary strategies - that is, to reduce the tension between policies in these different but interdependent areas. At certain historical times this may be relatively easy, as when potential immigrants are available in a country or foreign ethnic community with a similar cultural background nation. For example, second generation Japanese in Brazil may wish to return to their 'mother country' during a period of economic crisis in Brazil. At other times finding a harmonious mix of trade, immigration, and cultural policies may be very difficult. For example, available immigrants might not fit with cultural preferences, leading to the search for other options (such as no immigration at all, or migration limited to visa workers), and these latter choices may be viewed as inadequate from the perspective of employers seeking more workers or the majority culture that does not like the temporary workers. The starting as-

38 Part One: Theories and Policies sumption in analysis should be that imagined futures are a central sphere of political and ideological conflict in capitalist societies with some history of immigration. One can conceptualize the search for an imagined future with implications for immigration policy as taking place within a finite number of policy combinations. Table 2.1 shows a simplified set of alternative economic, cultural, and immigration options that countries face. Each combination of hypothetical alternatives suggests a particular immigration policy response. Thus, for example, a nation that does not need additional labour to expand national production and wealth will tend to have policies that favour at most small inflows for family and humanitarian reasons. If the country is also monocultural and ethnocentric and available immigrants are not from the same ethnic stock, then it will presumably prohibit all immigration. If such a monocultural and ethnocentric country does need additional labour but none is available from the preferred ethnic stock, it will tend to seek the required labour either by 'exporting jobs' (industrial investments in other countries, as followed by Japan, for example) or permitting visa workers to enter under very controlled circumstances (Saudi Arabia, for example). The policy options in Table 2.1 are presented in simplified form as distinct alternatives, when in fact they are generally matters of choice involving complex trade-offs. For example, it is hard to imagine a country that could not attract any immigrants at all, given enough effort. The question therefore becomes: what kind of costs would be involved in creating circumstances attractive to immigrants? Are these costs worth paying? The same questions arise for countries that seek immigrants from the same ethnic stock as the majority population and find that they are not readily available. Economic options also involve relative costs. Presumably any country can expand national production without additional labour. The question then becomes whether additional labour (skilled or unskilled, according to need) would provide a faster or less costly route. Because these choices are complex and interdependent, they generate very diverse views in national political debate on policies toward the future nation. The framework outlined in Figure 2.1 and Table 2.1 is also based on another important qualifying assumption. Policies and plans established to achieve an imagined future do not necessarily lead to the expected outcomes. Many unplanned and uncontrolled forces may intervene, or the imagined future may have been poorly planned and understood to

Immigration Policy: Imagined Futures 39 TABLE 2.1 Policy options and immigration policy Economic Options Nation can readily expand pro- Nation needs additional labour in duction without additional labour order to expand production

Cultural Option

Monocultural Multicultural (ethnocentric) (pluralistic)

Monocultural (ethnocentric)

Multicultural (pluralistic)

Immigration Options 1. No immigrants of any kind are available.

No immigration No immigration No immigration No immigration

2. Immigrants are only available from same monocultural source as majority in existing population.

Permit lowlevel immigration for family, etc. reasons

Permit lowlevel immigration for family, etc. reasons

Promote immigration from majority source for labour

Promote immigration from majority source for labour

3. Immigrants are Prohibit all only available immigration from multicultural (minority) sources.

Permit lowlevel immigration for family, etc. reasons

Prohibit all immigration Export jobs & import visa workers

Promote immigration from minority sources

4. Immigrants are available from majority and minority sources.

Permit lowlevel immigration from both sources

Promote immi- Promote immigration from gration from majority source both sources only

Permit lowlevel immigration from majority source only

begin with, as would be the case when perceived options turn out to be incorrect. For example, a nation might base a planned future on the view that culturally similar or compatible immigrants are available, or that national multicultural polices can overcome the rejection of culturally diverse immigrants, then later find out that this was not the case. When the outcomes appear to be achieved and the goals remain as before, then the policies will tend to be repeated. When the outcomes are not achieved or circumstances and goals change, then the policies will tend to be modified.

40 Part One: Theories and Policies The Canadian Case Canadian immigration policy development over the period since Confederation may be understood as a series of historical phases. Each phase is a relatively distinctive period of development in immigration policy. A phase is also understood as an 'historical moment' (covering many years) in which the variables shown in Table 2.2 move toward coherence with one another and, in that sense, provide an interpretation of the immigration policies in that period. That is, in each phase the nation's immigration policy will tend to be consistent with its place in the international system and its related options and preferences with respect to future trade and national culture. A movement toward coherence does not mean the absence of strain or incoherence. In historical cases, one is likely to find varying degrees of strain and a constant jockeying for improved fit between the policy options concerned. As noted previously, because immigration is an area where opposing economic and cultural values intersect, it tends to be a field of conflict in nations around the world. This explains why Canadian immigration policy has been for years a hotly contested subject, characterized by diverse options and a potential for radical change in direction (Simmons and Keohane 1992). The same may be said for immigration policy in the United States and Australia, and in many other countries as well. Given our focus on the latter decades of the twentieth century, it is possible to collapse the history of Canadian immigration policy into three periods. The entire policy history from Confederation to the early 1960s may be considered a single period. This certainly glosses over many changes in national circumstances and immigration policy, but there is also a strong thread of policy continuity in this lengthy phase. The other two phases are shorter, from the early 1960s to the end of the 1980s, and from 1989 to the present. The specific cut-off dates between one period and the next are somewhat arbitrary, since immigration policy often changes in a series of steps spread over several years. In the present case, I have chosen the following key policy events to define the model. In 1962 Canada abandoned the country preference system for immigrant selection. The formal adoption of a new immigration policy based on the points system did not take place until 1987. In 1989 Canadian immigration targets began to be set over periods of several years at a time, rather than annually. Prior to 1989, the direction of unemployment levels in a given year were a good predictor of the

Immigration Policy: Imagined Futures 41 direction of immigration targets in the following year - that is, a rise in unemployment predicted a subsequent fall in immigration levels. Since 1989, this has no longer been the case. Two important Acts (Bills C-55 and C-84) concerning the control and processing of asylum seekers were implemented in 1989 (Simmons and Keohane 1992). Some other features of policy that I have included in the post-1989 period actually began earlier. For example, the special programs to attract business and investor immigrants began in 1984. Other policy changes occurred later. For example, the various measures to reduce the proportion of family class immigrants, increase worker immigrants, and to charge much higher application and landing fees were implemented in 1995. Coherence in Each Phase

Table 2.2 summarizes the broad coherence between variables in the 'imagined futures' model at each historical phase. The historical trends underlying the arguments are taken from various histories of Canadian immigration, including Corbett (1957), Green (1976), and Hawkins (1988), in addition to assessments of recent policy developments in DeVoretz (1995) and Simmons (1995). 1850-1962 Phase 1 was based on an image of Canada as a promising 'European nation' in the New World. This image was hardly surprising. As a former colony, Canada had very strong political, economic, and cultural ties to Great Britain. Canada was a secondary yet important nation in the North Atlantic Economy, hence subject to the power of leading nations (Great Britain and the United States) as they established rules for trade, immigration and culture. As a country in which the native people had been or were about to be 'pacified' Canada offered vast resources and investment opportunities, provided that needed labour, transportation infrastructure, and local governance could be established. The system was ethnocentric (focusing on Europe and its independent 'European' colonies overseas) and racist. Official slavery in the North Atlantic system ended by the mid-1800s, but racism continued to dramatically restrict the opportunities for non-European minorities in the system. It was also a patriarchal system based on an assumption of male workers and female home-makers. Canada's immigration policy was based on an imagined future that incorporated all the underlying assumptions of the system. European workers and their families were 'invited' (with propaganda and land

42 Part One: Theories and Policies TABLE 2.2 Three historical phases of Canadian immigration policy Phase

1850-1962

1962-1989

1989-2000

Imagined Future

Rising 'European Nation' in the New World

Leading Middle Power on World Stage

Emerging Global Niche Player

Immigration Policy Goals Within Imagined Future

Expand labour force through immigration of farmers and factory workers from Europe.

Expanding labour force through immigration of skilled workers from any country.

Enhance economic prospects with very selective professional and entrepreneurial immigration from any country.

Factors Shaping Imagined Future 1. Canada's status in Secondary power in the international the North Atlantic system. Economy.

Middle power on the Wealthy nation world stage. struggling to adjust to new global markets.

2. Economic options favoured by system.

Trade based on exports of agricultural and semimanufactured goods,

As before, with new focus on import substitution industrialization (ISI).

Export-led growth as a niche player in a competitive global system.

3. Cultural options favoured in Canada and permitted in system.

Bilingual European nation.

Bilingual, multicultural nation.

I.Canada: bilingual, multicultural nation. 2. Quebec: unilingual, multicultural nation.

4. Immigration options.

Ready supply of European immigrants.

European immi1. Canada: ready grants drying up but supply of professkilled workers sional immigrants available elsewhere. from non-European countries. 2. Quebec: as above, but supply of those committed to a francophone Quebec nation is limited, creating a policy dilemma.

Immigration Policy: Imagined Futures 43 grants, etc.) to settle in Canada, particularly in decades when Canada faced good export markets and strong national demand for workers. It was a system driven by state policies very sensitive to the interests of capital, hence immigrants judged to be unfit for work in Canada were not admitted while those who sought to organize radical unions were deported. A more detailed examination of the long first phase would necessarily draw attention to the fact that the overall system did not always work well. Canadian levels of economic growth fluctuated and were generally lower than those in the United States. Major recessions, the Great Depression, and the two world wars all disrupted the system and revealed its areas of weakness. Yet Canada's position in the international system seems not to have changed radically or sufficiently to permit any real policy departures, other than shutting down immigration during the periods of system failure and reinitiating them later. 1962-1989 The end of the Second World War is generally considered to be a major marker in Canada's evolving status in the international community. The independent role of Canada in the war, its rising industrial and economic capacity, and its investment opportunities increasingly placed the nation as an emerging force on the world stage. Policy changes that reflected Canada's new role, however, took place gradually in a series of steps largely concentrated in the 1960s. These changes included: 1 A radical shift in immigration policy away from a preference system favouring European workers to one emphasizing the selection of skilled immigrant workers from any country. 2 Taking on new roles internationally, particularly in the areas of peacekeeping, international development, and anti-racism. 3 By the early 1970s, the first in a series of still continuing efforts to expand Canadian trade to a wider range of nations. The new imagined future implicitly underlying these various shifts in international policy was that of a leading middle power on the world stage. The image implied independence in foreign policy and a progressive stance on social and economic problems. Immigration policy was officially non-racist but not anti-racist, so that racism in Canadian society and in the international system continued to affect immigration

44 Part One: Theories and Policies policy and its outcomes to some degree (Richmond 1994, chapter 9; Simmons 1997). The policy was also officially nonsexist (or gender neutral). Women could apply to come as independent immigrants in their own right, and increasingly they did. However, cultural norms with respect to women's roles clearly influenced actual immigration patterns. Many origin cultures do not favour such independence of women and job markets in Canada were not always favourable to independent female immigrants, although there were exceptions. Caribbean and Philippine women came from cultures that granted greater independence to women with respect to international migration and jobs; these women were also sought for domestic and other low-wage jobs in Canada, as well as in fields such a nurses' aids, thereby leading to a situation reinforcing ethnic/gender stereotypes (Silvera 1989). The shift in immigration policy in 1962 may be interpreted as the result of the following changes in context, among others. First, the supply of qualified European immigrants was beginning to decline, as European economic recovery took place and northwestern Europe itself began to experience labour shortages and to promote 'guestworker' programs to bring in labour from the south and from North Africa. Second, unequal development in other parts of the world produced a situation in which skilled workers were unemployed or underemployed (low wages) in their home countries and hence very interested in international migration as a way of solving their problems. Some of these countries had long-standing political and cultural links with Canada. This was the case for the Commonwealth Caribbean, India, Sri Lanka, and Hong Kong, all of which have become major contributors to Canadian immigration. Immigrants from countries without such cultural and political links also increased in this period, usually after a bridge was established via initial refugee flows (see Simmons (1989,1992)). Third, in the 1960s in particular labour demand was high in Canada, related to a still-functioning import substitution industrialization that encouraged the establishment of manufacturing facilities (often American branch plants) in Canada. Fourth, the long history of Canadian immigration from diverse European countries had created an assumption that there existed in Canada considerable tolerance for cultural diversity. When immigration policy was changed in 1962 it is not clear how much this assumption influenced the shift in policy direction. In fact, it seems that the matter had not been thought out very clearly by political leaders and senior bureaucrats. Whatever the case, by the 1970s it became apparent that the

Immigration Policy: Imagined Futures 45 great cultural and ethnic diversity of the new immigration was testing the limits of national tolerance and also challenging the bilingual, binational character of Canada. These circumstances led federal authorities to the establishment of multiculturalism as an official state policy in 1978. 1989 to the Present Immigration polices in Canada are currently 'entrepreneurial' in character, related to assumptions about trade imperatives, multicultural tolerance, and immigration possibilities. They include the following features: 1 Competitive skills. Recent policies stipulate that the proportion of immigrants who have higher level work skills or capital and good knowledge of English and or French is to increase. This is based on the assumption that the more skilled, wealthy immigrants with appropriate language capability will contribute to higher national productivity in the near future, and in the process will require less state support for settlement and integration. 2 Economic immigrants. The proportion of economic migrants workers including professionals, business and entrepreneurial immigrants - is to increase, while the proportion of 'family class' immigrants (spouses and children, namely those not chosen on skills or capital) is to decrease. The assumptions underlying this policy are identical to those in the point above. 3 Reduced welfare burden. Families wishing to sponsor another member as an immigrant must show higher levels of income and an ability and commitment to support those they sponsor should help be required during the settlement process. 4 Cost recovery. Since 1994, immigrants have been required to pay much more for application and for 'landing' fees, if accepted. The current fee schedule implies a total of $3,150 for a family consisting of a couple and two dependent children. Fees for those applying in the business class are much higher. Review of a business proposal (part of the application from business immigrants) alone costs $6,000. These policies presumably tend to reinforce selection favouring individuals from wealthier families and countries who will not need settlement assistance. The preceding immigration policies are part of a new vision of the nation's future, that of a sophisticated niche player in a competitive

46 Part One: Theories and Policies global economy. The image is based on the following logic. First, import substitution industrialization is no longer considered a viable option, such that the nation must shift to a competitive export-led economic strategy. Within the dominant political discourse in the global system and within Canada there is no flexibility on this dimension. Canada needs foreign capital and improved professional capacity to meet the trade challenge. Second, Canada's wealth, established contacts with many immigrant source countries, and economic and political uncertainty in other countries together suggest that a portion of the required skills and capital can be obtained by attracting professional and investor immigrants from other countries. This will have the possible advantage of increasing international trade links as a by-product of immigration policy. Third, the legacy of immigration from culturally and ethnically diverse nations over the past thirty years has created a national tolerance for continuing diversity along these dimensions and hence for an immigration policy oriented to current national economic goals. Integration and Societal Transformation It is important to stress that current immigration policies are part of an imagined future that is based on hopes and, at best, only partially tested assumptions. The assumptions are, moreover, interdependent. For example, if Canada's hopes for future exports are not realized, the logic of a policy favouring the immigration of skilled foreign labour and entrepreneurs will be called into question. The skilled workers will be without jobs and the entrepreneurs will seek greener pastures elsewhere. Conversely, if ways can be found to ensure that the new skilled immigrants fit into the economy and contribute to rising national productivity, then the future trade dimension of the current imagined future will be more probable, and public support for immigration will tend to be higher. Finally, the image of a harmonious multicultural future society clearly depends on national economic success as well, since such success will promote social mobility among immigrants and provide resources for a strong immigrant settlement program. Will the direction of Canadian immigration policy in the 1990s facilitate realization of Canada as an agile niche player in the global economy? Such a question cannot be answered with any certainty. However, some of the key research questions that need to be addressed in an effort to provide an answer can be clarified.

Immigration Policy: Imagined Futures 47 Research on patterns of immigrant integration and their implications for societal transformation can contribute to an understanding of how the assumptions of Canada's official imagined future are working out. Various questions concerning immigrant integration and societal transformation are relevant. A number of these are posed in Figure 2.2. As noted in the Figure, questions on immigrant integration have been the subject of considerable past and ongoing research, with the result that much is known about integration and reviews of the field and new empirical evidence are normally broken down by sub-theme (as is the case in the present volume, where each of the chapters in Parts II, III, and IV examine empirical evidence on a particular aspect of integration). Societal transformations - that is, overall social transformations of the nation in areas such as ethnic, class, and regional structure - arising from immigration constitute a related field of research, but one that has been given less attention. (Fortunately, some useful perspectives may be found in the present volume: see particularly Chapter 4 by Frideres on social transformations.) My objective here is to comment briefly on a number of particular research questions on societal transformation that arise from the model of the immigration process and policy set forth in the present chapter. When the impact of immigration policy on societal transformation is addressed from the perspective of imagined national futures and the international system a number of research questions arise. For example, the recent Canadian policy focus on highly skilled immigrants and those with business experience and capital makes sense today only if other aspects of Canadian economic strategy are also successful. Investor immigrants, for instance, have already threatened to pack their bags and leave if tax laws in Canada shift to give greater attention to offshore earnings. The new globalization encourages offshore production and assembly plants to relocate quickly from one country to another in response to offers of tax shelters and other benefits. We should not be surprised if the same thing occurs with investor immigrants, suggesting that they be viewed as 'offshore capital.' Current immigration and settlement policy also makes sense only if one can assume that it will not contribute to a crisis of national identity or to social and regional conflict that will consume the nation's political energy. In this regard, current trends point to risks on two fronts. The first is ethnic and class conflict. A key assumption of the imagined future behind current Canadian immigration policies is that over time

48 Part One: Theories and Policies Figure 2.2 Research Questions on Immigrant Integration and Societal Transformation A) Questions on immigrant integration • Are recent immigrants as successful as earlier ones in finding jobs? • Do all classes of immigrants own property in the same proportion as the native born? • Is immigrant resident segregation increasing or decreasing? • Do the children of immigrants raised in Canada suffer any disadvantage arising from prejudice or poor integration experienced by their parents? B) Questions of societal transformation • Does immigration assist Canada in efforts to transform itself into a non-racist society? • Will immigration create multiple 'nations' and down-play the historical duality (French/ English) of Canadian society? • Does the asylum component of immigration policy help Canada establish its values and pride as a nation? • Does immigration promote syncretism, that is, the blending of cultures and generation of transcultural interpretation, appropriate for a leading middle power in the new globalization? • Does immigration promote gender equality in Canadian society by bringing in skilled women who do well in the job market, or is the opposite the case?

various ethnic groups in Canada will thoroughly integrate into society. The process would include integration into the class structure, so that no ethnic groups would be particularly advantaged or disadvantaged with respect to social-political participation or economic opportunity. However, a number of studies have shown that such integration is taking place for some non-European minorities in Canada, but not for others. Furthermore, immigration arising in the most recent phase of policy is creating additional challenges. Skilled immigrants with the appropriate language capability are coming from a relatively few countries where such people are numerous and interested in migrating, for reasons of economic and political uncertainty in their homelands. Most are from Asia; fewer are from Latin America and the Caribbean; almost none are from Africa. Meanwhile, the humanitarian dimension of policy is leading to immigration of very poor, often destitute, immigrants with weak skills in English and/or French from other countries. These trends suggest an emerging heterogeneity and polarization of 'ethclasses' (the intersections of class and ethnicity, following the terminology of Gordon (1978, 134-6)). If Canadian economic growth is strong and its multicultural policies effective, the heterogeneity and polarization might

Immigration Policy: Imagined Futures 49 disappear fairly quickly as integration takes place. The immigration of elite non-European immigrants might also help break down ethnic stereotypes that limit social mobility in Canada. However, these are all 'if propositions related to the success of cultural and economic policies. The Quebec questions concerning 'distinct society' and sovereignty are also very much influenced by the direction of Canadian immigration policies, when viewed in the global context in which they operate. Claims for recognition of Quebec as a distinct society based on its historical role in Confederation and its distinct language, culture, and legal tradition increasingly clash with the view in other provinces that they too are distinct in terms of ethnic mix, culture, and economic role. This is clearly the case for British Columbia, where Chinese is now the second language and where trade and economic links are oriented heavily to Asia. Such trends contribute to an impasse in political discourse and to the continuing frustration of the aspirations of promoters of distinct society status for Quebec. The availability of immigrants that fit readily within the cultural dimensions of an imagined future differs considerably between Canada and Quebec. Canada seems to face no shortage of highly skilled, English-speaking applicants for immigration to English-speaking parts of the country (Simmons 1997). This presumably reflects a combination of factors: the world system is biased toward English as the language of international commerce; elites in various countries learn English; and Canada is predominantly an English-speaking country. In contrast, Quebec is having problems in finding immigrants that fit its ideal profile, namely, people with high occupational skills who are French speaking (or willing and able to learn French quickly) and committed to a life in a French culture in Quebec (ibid.). In consequence, Quebec's immigration is low relative to that overall for the rest of Canada (Statistics Canada 1994, 68), in spite of the fact that Quebec has signed an accord with the federal government that would allow it to admit more than its proportional share (based on population size) of total Canadian immigration (ibid.). The current lower level of immigration to Quebec is one of several reasons why that province's share of the nation's population is declining. Will such a decline further promote a sense of insecurity in Quebec and lead to increased support for sovereignty? The preceding questions are illustrative. Other questions on immigration and societal transformation shown in Figure 2.2 raise issues concerning Canada's place in an evolving international system and the

50 Part One: Theories and Policies coherence of various policy elements in the nation's imagined future. Taken together, these questions provide elements of a future research agenda on Canadian immigration policy and societal transformation in an era of accelerated economic globalization.

3

Toward a Theory of Immigrant Integration GERTRUD NEUWIRTH

International migration has led to significant changes in the ethnic composition of most highly industrialized societies. During the last decades, member states of the European Union have incorporated substantial numbers of migrants from countries outside the union. In 1997, for instance, almost 9 per cent or 7.2 million of Germany's 81 million residents were foreigners; immigrants, including about one-third from Muslim countries, constitute slightly more than 7 per cent of France's 58 million residents (Migration News, May 1997); and an estimated 50,000 to 60,000 legal immigrants arrive annually in the UK (Migration News, 1995). In Canada, since 1975 immigrants from Third World countries have outnumbered immigrants from Europe each year such that, according to the 1996 census, more than half of the total population of immigrants who now live in Canada are no longer of European origin (Mitchell 1997). Immigration issues as they affect and are articulated in European countries are being extensively analysed and discussed by social scientists. The interest in immigration issues - ranging from immigrants' integration and marginalization to the meaning of citizenship - is not surprising in view of the fact that European societies still consider themselves to be nation states. In Canada, as opposed to Europe, immigrants' chances for integration as a result of their changing ethnic background have so far not been widely discussed. Because of the successful integration of earlier European immigrants, it seems to be assumed that immigrants from Third World countries will similarly succeed in their adaptation to Canadian society. However, theories of integration must consider that these immigrants face obstacles or hurdles that have not been experienced by Europeans and which are further compounded by the restructuring of the economy due to globalization.

52 Part One: Theories and Policies Immigrants and Citizenship Rights In developing a conceptual framework for a theory of integration that will take into account some of the immigrants' difficulties, I will draw upon T.H. Marshall's conception of citizenship rights. His framework has been employed by other social scientists in analysing immigrant integration. T.H. Marshall draws an analytic distinction between three sets of citizenship rights which, in the United Kingdom, evolved in the following sequence: civil rights were granted first, followed by political and, later, social rights. Civil rights, won in the eighteenth century, concern individual freedom: 'liberty of the person, freedom of speech, thought and faith, the right to own property and to conclude valid contracts, and the right to justice' (Marshall 1973, 71). In the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, civil rights led to political rights, which concern the rights of democratic participation: 'the right to participate in the exercise of political power, as a member of a body invested with political authority or as an elector of the members of such a body.' In turn, twentieth century political rights enabled the working class to obtain social rights covering 'the whole range from the right to a modicum of economic welfare and security to the right to share to the full in the social heritage and to live the life of a civilized being according to the standards prevailing in society' (1973, 72). The framework seems to be particularly appropriate for member states of the European Union, which, by defining themselves ideologically not as immigration countries but as nation states adhering to the jus sanguinis (lineage-based law), place considerable obstacles against the naturalization of immigrants and even of their children born in the host society. Although the applicability of Marshall's concepts beyond the United Kingdom has been questioned (Giddens 1985; Turner 1986), Faist argues that 'Marshall's fundamental suggestion that the extension of citizenship mitigates the inequalities of social class and serves to integrate previously disintegrated segments of the population into the polity remains essentially uncontested and is still valid, hence its usefulness in the field of immigrant integration' (1995,15). In investigating immigrants' incorporation into their host societies, studies employing Marshall's framework have focused on the effects of the denial or lack of political citizenship as far as immigrants' access to civil and, particularly, to economic and social rights are concerned. Access to economic rights enables immigrants to enter and compete in

Toward a Theory of Immigrant Integration 53 the labour market. Access to social rights includes eligibility for government programs, such as education in public schools, health benefits, and welfare and social insurance schemes. However, as a study of non-citizens' access to social services in six nations concluded, 'citizenship ... is not an important determinant of access to social benefits' but rather of physical presence and legality of residence and/or work (Brubaker 1989,159-60).1 Since Canada and the United States were included in the study, these findings also apply to states which, as immigrant or settler societies, make it easier for landed immigrants to become naturalized than do European nation states. In other words, the sequential development of citizenship rights, as formulated by T.H. Marshall, does not apply to post-war immigrants in western welfare states, including both states that adhere to the jus sanguinis and states that adhere to the jus soli (birth in the territory), such as Canada or the United States (Soysal 1994, 26). In all these states civic, economic, and social rights are granted first, with political rights constituting the last layer in the sequence. To capture the unique status of these immigrants, Hammar has coined the term denizens, that is, permanent residents who, with the exception of political citizenship, enjoy the same civic, social, and economic rights as the citizens of the country (Hammar 1990). The decreasing importance of political citizenship as far as landed immigrants are concerned can also be inferred from low naturalization rates. This also seems to apply since 1945 to Canada which, compared to the United States and European countries, still has the highest naturalization rate (Brubaker 1989,117-19). Recently, however, the United States reversed the sequence between social rights and political rights. According to the new welfare reform legislation that went into effect in October 1996, immigrants' entitlement to social rights, with some exceptions, has been made contingent upon their first receiving political citizenship.2 Even though the United States is now the only western welfare state that does not link access to social rights to residence status, the legislation confirms the declining importance of political citizenship as far as immigrants themselves are concerned. In 1996, when more restrictive immigration and welfare measures were widely discussed in the United States, nearly 1.1 million immigrants became citizens, compared to 445,852 naturalizations in 1995! Hence, it has been argued, 'making citizenship the gateway to public benefits creates a motive to naturalize which has far more to do with

54 Part One: Theories and Policies self-interest than with any commitment of allegiance to an adopted country' (Espenshade, Fix, Zimmermann, and Corbett 1996-7).3 Indeed, the number of applications for citizenship continues to increase; as of 31 July 1997, 1.4 million naturalization applications had been received (Migration News, October 1997). Principles of Immigrant Integration: A Canadian Policy Proposal In preparation for the forthcoming devolution of immigrant settlement services from the federal to the provincial levels, Citizenship and Immigration Canada (CIC), in 1996, held consultations with immigrant settlement agencies across Canada at which the discussion document Finding a New Direction for Newcomer Integration was distributed. Intended to provide criteria or guidelines for 'best practices' in the agencies' service delivery, the document outlined four principles considered to be the key elements of immigrant integration and two principles relating to service priority and delivery. The document is significant since the principles of immigrant integration resonate T.H. Marshall's conception of citizenship rights in terms of the dimensions of integration that are being emphasized. Rights entail obligations on the part of those who possess them and it is interesting to note that the principles generally emphasize the immigrants' obligations toward their host society while taking their economic and social rights for granted. The first principle, which defines integration as a two-way process involving both the immigrant and the host society, is relatively unambiguous, as it refers to the social and cultural aspects of integration. Yet, given its emphasis on the commitment required not only of immigrants to adapt to life in Canada but of Canadians to adapt to new people and cultures, the principle can be interpreted to mean that immigrants should be accepted for what they can contribute to Canada. In other words, they should not be confronted with the humiliating experience of discriminatory practices in their attempts to adapt to life in Canada. Principles two and three emphasize the immigrant's attainment of self-sufficiency but are rather vague about how this self-sufficiency is to be achieved. They gloss over some serious problems with respect to what is expected from an immigrant and what an immigrant can expect when settling in Canada. Principle two stresses the importance of communicating in one of the official languages to integration. Indeed, without being able to acquire

Toward a Theory of Immigrant Integration 55 TABLE 3.1 Citizenship and immigration settlement principles Key Elements of Integration Principle 1

Integration is a two-way process, which involves commitment on the part of newcomers to adapt to life in Canada and on the part of Canadians to adapt to new people and cultures.

Principle 2

The ability of newcomers to communicate in one of Canada's official languages is key to integration.

Principle 3

Newcomers' contributions to the economic and social fabric of Canada are valued; it is important for newcomers to become economically and socially self-sufficient, and it is important for members of communities in Canada to help to ensure that newcomers have opportunities to participate in and contribute to economic and social life in Canada.

Principle 4

It is important to share with newcomers the principles, traditions, and values that are inherent in Canadian society, such as freedom, equality, and participatory democracy.

Service Priority Principle 5 Settlement and integration services will be aimed at helping newcomers become self-sufficient as soon as possible. Priority will be given to those facing significant barriers to integration and who are deemed most in need within the community.

such fluency, immigrants will not be able to transfer their occupational skills to the labour market and will experience difficulties in adapting to life in Canada generally. Principle three, which stresses the importance for immigrants to become economically and socially self-sufficient, lends itself to two different interpretations. In a narrower sense, the onus is placed on immigrants to find jobs in order to become economically self-sufficient, regardless of their occupational qualifications and experiences. By becoming economically self-sufficient and thus not dependent on public assistance, immigrants meet the expectations of the host society, even though they may end up in dead-end jobs and their own expectations of being able to continue in their previous or a similar occupation are thwarted. Needless to say, Canadian society would lose by not making use of the immigrants' full potential. Interpreted in the broader sense, immigrants will not only become self-sufficient but be given the opportunity to transfer their occupa-

56 Part One: Theories and Policies tional skills. This would imply that immigrants - particularly those admitted for humanitarian reasons - who do not speak one of the official languages would be given access to appropriate second-language courses and that those without any formal training in their occupations or accredited certifications would be given access to occupational training and upgrading courses. They would obtain an entrance position which, combined with vocational training, would enable them, over time, to enter their previous or a similar occupation, if they so desired. Thus equipped, immigrants will not only make an economic contribution commensurate with their qualifications but their own expectations of being able to use their occupational training and experience will also have been fulfilled. Both Canadian society and the immigrants would benefit from such a scenario.4 However, given principle 5, which deals with service delivery, the inference is warranted that immigrants are expected to become economically self-sufficient in the narrower rather than the broader sense. The principle outlines somewhat vaguely that priority 'will be given to those facing significant barriers to integration, and who are deemed most in need within the community.' However, although funds are currently available, they have not been earmarked by the federal government to finance specific programs, such as second-language courses, which would improve the immigrants' access to the labour market. In other words, whatever help immigrants might receive would come primarily from individual Canadians rather than from the state. Principle four touches upon dimensions of political integration, as adherence to the values of freedom, equality, and participatory democracy would be expected of immigrants applying for citizenship. However, to expect immigrants to believe in equality may turn out to be somewhat problematic, should the value not be translated into practice as far as the economic and social spheres are concerned. Economic Rights but Unequal Access to the Labour Market Although denizens enjoy, in principle, the same civic, economic, and social rights as citizens, research has demonstrated that they do not have the same opportunities in the labour market. Referring to the sixnation survey discussed above, Brubaker notes that '[i]n each of the six countries, noncitizens are overrepresented in jobs that are dirty, dangerous, exhausting, menial, unpleasant, strenuous, monotonous, insecure, badly paid, low-status, or low skill. They have tended to take jobs

Toward a Theory of Immigrant Integration 57 that native workers have shunned ... Moreover, noncitizens have been overrepresented among the unemployed, at least in Europe' (1989,154). Thus it is argued, supported by the voluminous literature on racism in Europe, that in addition to class, ethnicity has become an important cleavage line in western welfare states (Faist 1995, 17; Freeman 1986). Hargreaves and Leaman speak of 'stigmatized ethnic minorities within the labour hierarchies' (1995, 17). Collinson notes that different terms are employed in various European countries to denote those groups for which integration is seen as a problem, such as 'ethnic minorities' in Britain or 'foreigners' or 'aliens' in Germany, but that a common element links the discourse in every country, namely, 'a concern with communities which are both economically disadvantaged and which display a distinct "ethnicity" based on a culture, race, religion, language and/or national identity with roots elsewhere. It is not the immigrant status of these groups which seems to matter so much as their cultural, racial or religious "difference" from the receiving society, reinforced by economic and social marginalization' (1993a, 17). The expression 'underclass' is frequently used to refer to immigrants' marginalization and exclusion from the opportunity structure (Schmitter Heisler 1991), while Faist speaks of underclass formation as a second-class social citizenship (1995). Unlike European states, the Canadian state has not recruited immigrants specifically for 'dirty, dangerous, exhausting, menial, unpleasant, strenuous, monotonous, insecure, badly paid, lowstatus, or low skill jobs.' Canada's post-war immigration policy has relied primarily on independent immigrants in meeting shortages of professional and skilled labour, and, more recently, on entrepreneurs and investors for capital investment. In other words, expected to continue in their occupation or profession, independent immigrants are recruited to make an economic contribution in accordance with the wider interpretation of the CIC principle three outlined above, at no cost to the Canadian state. However, research has demonstrated that, compared to other immigrants, Caribbean or, more generally, blacks and Asian immigrants face greater obstacles in the labour market (Henry 1994; Richmond 1989). Independent immigrants from these countries do face barriers in transferring their occupational skills, such as difficulties in having their credentials recognized and racial discrimination in hiring and promotion (Richmond 1994, 126). For instance, based on the 1986 census, despite their higher proportion with some university education, new immigrants had a lower average total income and a lower average employ-

58 Part One: Theories and Policies ment income than did immigrants from traditional source countries (Beaujot and Rappak 1990). Beginning with the resettlement of some 60,000 Southeast Asian refugees in 1979/80, Canada has also increased the number of refugees from developing countries. Although the number of independent immigrants has risen in recent years, between 1979 and 1996 refugees and their family class members have still constituted the majority of immigrants admitted annually. Refugees resettled from countries of first asylum receive settlement assistance for a limited period of time - either from the federal government or from their private sponsors - but are expected to find employment as soon as possible.5 Thus, they are only expected to make an economic contribution in accordance with the narrower interpretation of CIC principle three. However, many resettled refugees and refugee claimants have postsecondary levels of education and professional and occupational qualifications. They would need some vocational training or upgrading of their skills in order to be able to continue in their previous occupations, yet only a small number has been able to enrol in such programs. By emphasizing early self-sufficiency in the settlement process at the expense of ignoring the refugees' qualifications, the cost to the Canadian state in the short run is kept to a minimum. Lacking the necessary resources or assistance in transferring their skills, it is to be expected that refugees will be even further marginalized in the labour market than independent immigrants who are similarly members of visible minorities. The few available studies have indeed confirmed their marginalization. In their analysis of the evolution of immigrant cohorts, Beaujot and Rappak found that of those who arrived between 1980 and 1985, immigrants from nontraditional source countries, that is, mostly refugees, have higher proportions at low levels of education and lower proportions at high levels of education. In 1986, they were less likely to work full-time and tended to have lower average total and wage incomes than immigrants from traditional source countries (Beaujot and Rappak 1990). Based on the 1991 census, similar findings, with one exception, apply to immigrants who arrived between 1986 and 1990. The exception concerns male immigrants from nontraditional source countries, who have higher proportions at high levels of education and, except for those aged forty-five to fifty-four, lower proportions at low levels of education. However, as in 1986, they were again less likely to work full-time and again had lower average total and employment incomes than im-

Toward a Theory of Immigrant Integration 59 migrants from traditional source countries. Although, of the 1981-5 cohort, the difference between younger immigrants from nontraditional source countries and from traditional source countries had narrowed as far as high levels of education were concerned, the gap in average total and employment income remained (Beaujot 1997). Controlling for level of education, Neuwirth (1993) compared employment characteristics of Southeast Asians who arrived between 1978 and 1986 with those of the Canadian-born population. In 1986, at each level of education, Southeast Asians were overrepresented in machining and service occupations; even a university degree did not improve the employment chances of Southeast Asian men over time. As a result of the refugees' occupational placements, the average wage income of Southeast Asian men was consistently and significantly lower than that of Canadian-born men. In view of women's generally lower wages, wage disparities between Southeast Asian and Canadian-born women were less pronounced. Reflecting the assistance refugees received in finding employment, their unemployment rate was low; for those who arrived between 1978 and 1980, it came to 11.8 per cent for men and 9.5 per cent for women and increased to 19.3 and 12.0 respectively for the 1984-6 arrivals. A 1993 study of a sample of over three hundred successful Somali refugee claimants in Metropolitan Toronto presents a much more disturbing picture. Of mainly urban background, the Somalis have high levels of education; about half had graduated from high school and more than a quarter had postsecondary education. Prior to their arrival in Canada the respondents, with few exceptions, had either been employed or were full-time students. However, in Canada, 48 per cent of the men and 66 per cent of the women were unemployed and the majority of them had been out of work for three or more years. Those who worked were primarily employed in assembly/packaging industries and retailing, mainly at minimum wage rates; most of them found their current jobs through personal efforts and friends and relatives (Opoku-Dapaah 1995). The high unemployment rate of Somali has to be attributed to both their status as refugee claimants and as members of a visible minority. Long delays in becoming landed immigrants prevented them from accessing federally funded assistance and settlement services. Hence, they did not receive whatever guidance or assistance was available in transferring, or making use of, their occupational skills but had to rely on social networks and their own resourcefulness. As members of a visible

60 Part One: Theories and Policies minority, Somalis have also become frequent targets of racial discrimination and harassment in their daily lives and thus face additional barriers in transferring their occupational skills and finding employment. Globalization and Changing Industrial and Occupational Structure The extent to which immigrants are being and will be marginalized or integrated into the labour market will depend on the ongoing structural changes that are brought about by the transformation of the international economy (Simmons 1994; Stafford 1992). Globalization of production has led to the relocation of sectors of labour-intensive industries to Third World countries or countries of the periphery. In the core regions, under the banner of maintaining the competitiveness of the north, social relations of production are being restructured. Fordist mass production is being replaced by post-Fordist structures, such as outsourcing to companies with non-unionized labour, which ensures a more flexible accumulation of capital. While traditional skilled manual occupations are being eroded, the technological advance facilitated by microelectronics "not only has increased both labour productivity and unemployment' (Hargreaves and Leaman 1995, 23) but has also led to the growth of a highly skilled new workforce. As Sassen (1996, 581-2) argues, due to the globalization of economic activity there is a growing demand 'by firms in all industries, from mining to manufacturing to finance and consumer services' for services that enable them to maintain global, national, or regional control. Concentrated in major cities, high-level business services ranging from accounting to decision making have not only generated high-level technical and administrative jobs but also low-wage unskilled jobs needed to maintain their infrastructure. As a result, the 'disproportionate grouping of service industries at either end of the technology spectrum' has contributed to a polarization in the organization of the service sector (584). The 'gentrified' consumption patterns of the high-income workforce have also led to a demand for highly specialized services, such as high-price restaurants, luxury housing, hotels, and gourmet shops, which depend on the availability of low-wage workers. Both the low-paying jobs in the technology and consumer service sector are primarily staffed by immigrants (584). Toronto as a global city (Sassen 1996; Stafford 1992) and Montreal and Vancouver as regional centres (Todd 1995) have witnessed similar structural changes.

Toward a Theory of Immigrant Integration 61 As Hargreaves and Leaman note, the cumulative effect of the changes brought about by globalization was 'a marked redistribution of income - and by implication of wealth - in favour of capital and at the expense of labour.' 'Increasing disparities between North and South were thus accompanied by increasing disparities between rich and poor in the North and by new qualities of insecurity: by severe structural unemployment, increasing individual long-term unemployment, the fundamental insecurity of poverty and by less certain horizons for those in employment' (1995, 23). Since it is the working class that has felt the brunt of these changes, compounded by the erosion of the welfare state as far as social rights are concerned, the 'new racism' has stigmatized non-European ethnic minorities who 'are perceived as illegitimate rivals in the struggle for scarce resources' (Hargreaves and Leaman 1995, 25; Castles 1993, 27). In Canada the working class has similarly born the brunt of 'structural adjustments' or cost-saving measures by transnational and national corporations, while the rapid growth of the high-technology sector has led to a shortage of qualified Canadian workers.6 Thus, immigrants from nontraditional source countries who do not have the required qualifications for the high-technology sector will face mounting difficulties in their search for employment. Should they attempt to obtain a position commensurate with their skills, they may also be increasingly 'perceived as illegitimate rivals in the struggle for scarce resources,' as they are in Europe. Toward a Theory of Integration As the research cited above has amply demonstrated, the possession of economic rights, that is, the right to access the labour market, does not ensure, by itself, that immigrants can compete effectively with the native-born population for jobs. In other words, economic rights are a sufficient condition only as far as the immigrants' incorporation into the host society is concerned. Because of their permanent residence status, immigrants cannot legally be refused employment or deported if and when they are unemployed. However, the possession of economic rights is but a necessary condition as far as immigrants' economic integration is concerned. Being entitled to access the labour market provides no assurance in itself that immigrants will be able to find employment and become economically self-sufficient.

62 Part One: Theories and Policies A theory of integration needs to explore, therefore, to what extent, depending on their ethnic origin, immigrants are able to effect their integration and what obstacles are preventing it. In view of globalization and the restructuring of the economy, the dimensions of economic and social integration will be considered to be the primary factors in the overall integration of immigrants from nontraditional source countries. 'Economic integration' will be defined as 'participation in the economic opportunity structure.' Thus, immigrants who exercise their economic right to enter the labour force but experience long-term or periodic unemployment are considered as wanting in economic integration. For immigrants who are employed, the concept of economic integration will be used in two different senses. Interpreted in the minimal sense, immigrants obtain jobs that enable them to become economically self-sufficient but do not require them to use the skills and experiences they might possess. Interpreted in the optimal sense, immigrants will be able to effect occupational adjustment, that is, to attain jobs in which they can use previously acquired skills or which are commensurate with their qualifications. Since occupational adjustment depends on the ability to be conversant in one of the official languages, linguistic competence is a contingently necessary condition of occupational adaptation. Economic integration has to be analysed both as a process and as an end product. Since immigrants, particularly those admitted for humanitarian reasons, cannot transfer their occupational skills immediately, their first jobs tend to be dead-end, menial positions which, in many cases, are far below their skill level. They will need to become familiar with the requirements of the labour market, acquire job search techniques, and learn about the options, if any, that are available to them in improving their employment opportunities. Immigrants who succeed in their occupational adjustment should be able to enter the same or a similar occupation after a period of three to four years, if they are given the opportunity to improve their second-language competence, enter vocational training courses, acquire accreditation of their credentials, or start in low-level positions in their professional field (Stein 1979). As end product, economic integration refers to the immigrants' final position, from which no further occupational mobility seems likely. Immigrants who, at the end of this period, are still locked into lowpaying, dead-end jobs but are self-sufficient will only be able to make an economic contribution in accordance with the narrower interpretation of CIC principle three. The principle, as discussed earlier, empha-

Toward a Theory of Immigrant Integration 63 sizes the importance for immigrants to become economically and socially self-sufficient. However, immigrants who succeed in their occupational adaptation or in obtaining a job commensurate with their qualifications will be able to make an economic contribution according to the wider interpretation of CIC principle three. Indeed, as Stein has shown in his study of Vietnamese and other refugee groups in the United States, it is occupational adjustment, that is, the ability to obtain employment commensurate with one's skills, that tends to lead to sociocultural adjustment (Stein 1979). Immigrants' chances of participating in the economic opportunity structure may be impeded by discriminatory practices that prevent them from obtaining employment commensurate with their qualifications. In Canada racism has not yet taken the same violent forms or led to the formation of openly racist right-wing parties as it has in Europe. However, it is to be expected that new immigrants from nontraditional source countries will experience rather specific 'racial' barriers intended to prevent their occupational adaptation and even economic self-sufficiency. Although race is not a biological concept, racial definitions, as Max Weber (1968) has already pointed out, are used in everyday life as a pretext for excluding groups with different phenotypical or somatic characteristics from competing for economic and social opportunities. Owing to the recency of the immigrants' arrival, little is known as yet about the exclusionary effects of specific racializations that various 'new' ethnic or national groups from Africa, the Middle East, or Asia are confronted with in their attempt to enter the labour market. It would be premature, therefore, to formulate any specific hypotheses as to the barriers that may constrain immigrants' chances of accessing the economic opportunity structure and, more significantly, of transferring their occupational skills. However, because of structural changes in the labour market and the de-skilling of the labour force, it is important to point out that an individual's life chances of making use of available opportunities, whether that individual is an immigrant or born in Canada, will increasingly depend on his or her educational background. In analyses of census and other public survey data, educational level as proximate indicator of class position would provide some indication as to which class positions, particularly, tend to expose the incumbents to the insecurities of employment, restrictive occupational opportunities, and lowwage incomes. Controlling for level of education, a comparison between immigrants, depending on their language competence, and the

64 Part One: Theories and Policies Canadian-born population would demonstrate the relative effects of class as against the 'racial' factor on the immigrants' participation in the economic opportunity structure. In such analyses, the following questions need to be addressed: 1 whether, regardless of class position, the 'racial' factor is the primary determinant of occupational opportunities or the lack of them for immigrants who belong to specific racialized groups; 2 whether certain class positions are particularly prone to expose immigrants belonging to specific ethnic or national groups to racialization such that, compared to the Canadian born, they tend to be disproportionately excluded from diminishing occupational opportunities; and 3 which class positions, if any, neutralize over time the racialization of immigrants, with the result that immigrants tend to have the same or similar access to the opportunity structure as the Canadian born. However, analysis of census and public survey data can only provide signposts as to the obstacles and hurdles members of racialized immigrant groups face in their economic integration. Research conducted in urban areas in which 'new' immigrant groups are concentrated needs to investigate the practices that lead to their marginalization or even exclusion from the economic opportunity structure and the discourses that rationalize them. Exclusionary practices that block immigrants' transfer of occupational skills need to be studied in some detail. These would include, for instance, the hurdles placed by professional or trade organizations against accepting immigrants' credentials or work experience, and the discourses used by employers and private job referral agencies to rationalize the requirement of 'Canadian experience' as an explicitly racist exclusionary barrier. Studies also need to be conducted in areas of high unemployment in order to ascertain whether immigrants and the Canadian-born population receive the same or similar assistance by employment officers as far as counselling and access to vocational training are concerned.7 The combined findings of census analyses and future studies dealing specifically with exclusionary practices should make it possible to arrive at other necessary conditions which, in combination with class position, facilitate or hinder economic integration in either its minimal or optimal sense. Such research is particularly important since immigrants' economic integration or the exclusion from it will also affect their social integra-

Toward a Theory of Immigrant Integration 65 tion. 'Social integration' will be defined as 'participation in the social institutional sphere of society.' Encompassing the involuntary aspects of cultural adaptation, the social institutional sphere includes 'all institutions that ensure, in principle, that a person's various citizenship rights are protected' (Neuwirth et al. 1987, 6-7). However, in order to participate, immigrants must first acquire the necessary competence to 'follow the social and cultural practices which structure the public aspects of life in an industrialized society.' If they do not acquire this competence, with language proficiency as its prerequisite, they will not be able to effectively use, for instance, educational institutions, the police and courts, and social welfare institutions, including the health-care delivery system. Nor will they be as active in voluntary associations, such as ethnic or multi-ethnic associations representing immigrants' concerns in public life. Within the proposed theoretical framework, the kind of economic integration immigrants are able to achieve will be the primary factor influencing their participation in the social-institutional sphere, although, in conjunction with it, other factors need to be considered. The degree to which immigrants make use of these institutions, if they use them at all, or whether they avoid using them, will differ depending on their prior socialization and, similar to the Canadian-born population, on factors such as a person's social class, gender, and age. However, as far as integration is concerned, immigrants' economic integration combined with their social class position, that is, their educational background, will be particularly significant. Immigrants who are unemployed or marginalized in the labour market - that is, not economically integrated or integrated in the minimal sense for reasons of 'race' and 'class' - will not be able to receive the institutional support they would need in order to enhance and protect their citizenship rights in the social-institutional sphere. It remains to be seen whether ethnic associations formed by the new immigrant groups, such as the Somalis in Toronto, may be able to fill this void by dealing with some of the problems that are inadequately addressed by mainstream agencies (see Opoku-Dapaah (1995), 75). A theory of immigrant integration will need to consider the relationship of economic and social integration to the voluntary components of cultural integration,cultural integration, that is, the sphere of privacy and social life. The sphere that is, the sphere of privacy and social life. The sphere refers to immigrants' domestic and social life which, in principle, is set apart from their work-a-day world and institutions (Neuwirth et al. 1987). Considering the exclusionary barriers that prevent their economic

66 Part One: Theories and Policies and social integration, the new immigrants are not likely to adopt prevailing Canadian practices and norms. They will try to preserve at least some aspects of their cultural traditions and continue to follow their own religious beliefs and practices which, in most cases, also set them apart from Canadians. However, a theory of immigrant integration will need to incorporate the impact of racialization and marginalization on immigrants' family life, such as changes in traditional family roles as well as the influence, if any, parents may exercise over their children's choice of peers, leisuretime activities, and future plans. In other words, a theory of integration has to include the second generation of immigrants from nontraditional source countries. As Cans (1992, 174) has recently argued, older theories of assimilation, according to which 'each native-born generation acculturates further and raises its status vis-a-vis the previous one,' were based on the implicit assumptions of an expanding labour market. However, given the restructuring of the economy, these theories will no longer apply to recent immigrants and their descendants. In other words, the second generation, whose parents are marginalized in the labour market, may similarly be unable to become economically and socially integrated. Thomas Faust's recent comparative study of school-work transition of Turks in Germany and Mexican Americans lends strong support to Gans's arguments. Despite differences in policies governing education, access to apprenticeship programs, and the acquisition of political citizenship, the German and American systems produce similar results. "The two largest immigrant groups in Germany and the United States, Turks and Mexican Americans end up in similarly disadvantaged positions relative to the majority groups - Germans and European Americans. There is even the possibility of long-term socioeconomic marginalization of these immigrant groups in both countries' (1995, xiv). However, a recent study of Vietnamese second-generation youth in New Orleans demonstrated that, despite their parents' disadvantaged economic status, high school students with 'strong adherence to the traditional family values, strong commitment to a work ethic, and a high degree of personal involvement in the ethnic community' tend disproportionately to be high academic achievers (Zhou and Banston III 1994, 821). In his study of Chinese adolescents and youth in Winnipeg, Wong (1997) similarly found that adherence to Chinese culture, respect for legal norms, and the perceived presence of parental supervision

Toward a Theory of Immigrant Integration 67 were important factors of lower involvement in delinquency and health hazard behaviour, whereas acculturation increased the likelihood of such behaviours. As far as recent immigrants from nontraditional sources are concerned, it would appear that adherence to the original culture, if adjusted to fit the demands of an industrialized labour market, is an important resource rather than a disadvantage (Zhou and Banston III 1994, 821^5). To use Driedger's (1996, 39) model, immigrants' assimilation in the labour market may be facilitated when they adhere to a combination of in-voluntary and voluntary cultural pluralism, involuntary because they are not treated as social equals, and voluntary as a form of maintaining a sense of self-respect and pride in the face of adverse conditions. Conclusion In the absence of relevant empirical research, I have only suggested certain key concepts as building blocks for a new approach to a theory of immigrant integration. Taking into account the effect of globalization on Canada's economy and the exclusionary practices that immigrants face, a theoretical model would need to specify further factors in the relationships between the dimensions of economic and social integration and the sphere of privacy and social life as the voluntary aspects of cultural adaptation. In formulating a theoretical model, recent theoretical approaches to the racialization of ethnic groups and to racial discourses of the 'other' will need to be considered as they discuss very similar issues, albeit from a somewhat different perspective. Notes 1 Quoted from David S. North, Catherine Withol de Wenden, and Chris Taylor, 'Non-Citizens' Access to Social Services in Six Nations: Canada, F.R.G., France, Sweden, U.K., and U.S.' Paper presented at the conference on Reaching Citizenship: The Process of Political and Economic Integration, German Marshall Fund of the United States, Berkeley Springs, W.Va., 1987. 2 With some exceptions, such as refugees or asylees, legal immigrants who enter the United States on or after 22 August 1996 are no longer entitled to benefits from most welfare programs for their first five years of residence,

68 Part One: Theories and Policies

3

4

5

6

that is, until they become U.S. citizens. Immigrants who, on 22 August 1996, were supported by any of the three programs lose their eligibility within specified time periods (Primus 1996-7,15). For a fuller discussion of the new welfare legislation and its impact on immigrants, see Focus, 18, No. 2, (Fall/Winter 1996-7), University of Wisconsin-Madison, Institute for Research on Poverty. The issue also includes articles that critically analyse the limitations of available data. The increase in immigrants' welfare dependency during the 1980s can be explained by the large number of refugees increasingly receiving SSI, which is limited to the elderly poor, the blind, and the disabled, and by differences in socio-demographic characteristics between immigrants and native born. The example of a Southeast Asian refugee, a former professor of pharmacology and expert in tropical diseases at the University of Saigon, provides a good illustration. He was only able to find work on a tree farm in Ottawa. With the help of a Canadian doctor, he first worked as a volunteer and then as a paid employee in a hospital pharmacy. His work schedule made it possible for him to complete some courses at the university and to become accredited as a pharmacist in Canada. He now works as a pharmacist in a local hospital in Ottawa. Under the current federal resettlement program, except for hardship cases admitted under the Women-at-Risk program, who are assisted for two years, government-assisted refugees receive settlement cash assistance during their first year of residence. Their assistance is terminated if they find employment before the end of this period. Privately sponsored refugees receive financial assistance from their sponsors for the same period of time. Refugee claimants are not entitled to any federal settlement assistance; however, in the unlikely event that their claim is decided before the end of their first year of residence, they are entitled to such assistance for the remaining months or weeks. No firm decision has been made as to how government-assisted refugees will be aided once settlement services become the responsibility of provincial governments. The document outlining the principles of immigration includes only the following statement: 'CIC may retain responsibility for administering income support for government assisted refugees if a central streamlined system can be developed and is determined to be the most efficient, responsive and cost effective way to meet clients' needs.' The federal government has, therefore, implemented a six-month pilot project, which will sharply reduce the time required for highly skilled workers to enter Canada. Beginning in April 1997, companies will no longer have to prove that qualified Canadians are not available to fill the vacancies.

Toward a Theory of Immigrant Integration 69 Qualified immigrants with work experience who have a firm job offer in one of six high-technology industries, such as telecommunications, multimedia, management information, and imbedded software production, will be admitted within a period of several weeks and issued a temporary work permit for the duration of the pilot project (Ottawa Citizen, 12 March 1997). 7 In view of the devolution of federal job training programs to the provinces, acceptance in vocational training and skill upgrading programs will become a particularly contested issue. While previously immigrants had at least limited access to them, according to the federal minister of human resources, no funds will be given to the provinces which are specifically earmarked for immigrants. Hence, the provinces will have to decide whether immigrants are to be included in the training programs.

4

Managing Immigrant Social Transformations JAMES S. FRIDERES

The creation of a multicultural policy in Canada over a quarter of a century ago was both visionary and challenging in attempting to establish a mechanism for managing ethnic-based diversity. Over the years the policy has become a directional beacon for Canadians, although its ability to provoke and confuse both its supporters and critics still remains as we head into the twenty-first century. Nevertheless, multiculturalism is not only consistent with Canadian values but is the quintessential Canadian value. The concept of multiculturalism is double edged; on the one hand it is seen as contributing to the cultural diversity that enhances the quality of life for Canadians while at the same time it is subject to the criticism that it is the thin end of the wedge that will bring about the disunity of the nation (Schlesinger 1992; Cochran 1995-6). Many scholars have maintained that sustaining a stable political system in a multiethnic society while remaining committed to democratic norms is a problem. As Cochran (1995-6) points out, 'incorporating many ethnic groups into a single political system means incorporating the basic problem of ethnic conflict as well and this causes strain on the political structure' (587). It is a problematic policy, emerging out of two opposing philosophies: the politics of equal recognition, which is constructed out of the principle of universalism, according to which social attributes such as religion, ethnicity, and the race of individuals are irrelevant, and the principle of difference, which recognizes and values distinct dissecting social characteristics such as ethnicity and race (Taylor 1994). The underlying assumption of this policy is that confidence in one's own cultural traditions will foster a healthy self-identity and a positive

Managing Immigrant Social Transformations 71 'outgroup' attitude and will induce mutually enriching experiences and intergroup harmony. Multiculturalism, as used in this chapter, refers to 'An official... set of policies and practices in which ethnoracial differences are formally promoted and incorporated as an integral component of the political, social and symbolic order' (Fleras and Elliott 1992, 22). This definition best reflects both the ideology underlying the policy as well as its applied consequences. First of all, this multidimensional concept recognizes, officially, the positive value of ethnic cultures. Thus, a new moral order has been established in which citizens publicly recognize the value of ethnic minority culture in contributing to the development of both the economics and quality of Canadian society. Second, the policy recognizes the right of the state to become involved in ethnic relations, at a variety of levels. Finally, the concept refers to a philosophy and a set of specific programs that allow ethnic/racial groups to legitimately request state support for maintaining their cultural traditions and incorporating into Canadian society. The policy of multiculturalism does not operate independently but is integrated with and buttressed by other policies and legislative acts. For example, it is entrenched in section 27 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, 1982, which states that the Charter shall be interpreted in a manner consistent with the preservation and enhancement of the multicultural heritage of Canadians. Sallee (1995) argues that the federal government planned to constitutionalize the Charter because it would counter the rising ethnonationalist forces, reinforce the federal presence, create conditions for the emergence of a national identity, and be positively viewed by Canadians. This perspective is further supported by section 36 of the Constitution Act, 1982, which provides that Parliament and the legislatures are committed to promoting equal opportunities for the well-being of Canadians. As such, the multicultural policy has become part of a large and complex legal and policy network. This chapter attempts to track how the aspirations of Quebec ethnonationalists to acquire greater control over their individual and collective identities has been received or dealt with by the remainder of Canada. The chapter builds upon the seminal work of Will Kymlicka (1995a) and W. Connor (1973), showing how immigrants and ethnonationalist groups have been affected by the creation and maintenance of our multicultural policy over the past quarter-century. It con-

72 Part One: Theories and Policies eludes by suggesting that immigrants in Canadian society are crucial to the unification and development of a national identity. Immigrants and Multiculturalism As Burgess (1996) has noted, the issue of minority rights has emerged as a significant feature of post-Cold War international politics. In Canada as elsewhere where governments have experienced high levels of immigration, concerns have been raised (Abu-Laban and Stasiulis 1992). Criticism has come from a variety of sources, including academics, politicians, lobby groups, and ethnics themselves. Multiculturalism is easy to blame for a variety of social problems because there is no single group supporting such a policy. Critics can escape any concerted rebuttal and the repercussions for the accuser are minimal, regardless of the nature of the criticism. Such criticism is based upon perceptions that the policy has conceded too much power to ethnic communities, that immigrants with skills and money are given preference over Canadians, that the national icons and symbols of Canada will soon disappear because immigrants are allowed to challenge the validity of existing symbols, and the fear that multiculturalism will unravel the national fabric, fragment the ethnic mosaic, and bring about the demise of Canadian society. These arguments are not unique to Canada. Other multicultural societies, such as Australia and New Zealand, have also been subject to these concerns (Blainey 1984; Rimmer 1991). One of the most basic and persistent criticisms of multiculturalism is that it will bring about the demise of Canada as a unified, liberal democratic society and allow for the creation of a myriad of ethnic enclaves. The end result will be the destruction of Canada as a nation. Put another way, the argument is that multiculturalism is undermining the ability and/or willingness of immigrants to incorporate into Canadian society (Bibby 1990; Castles 1994). To answer these concerns, we need to determine what evidence is required to support or reject such claims. If we agree that incorporation (a term introduced by Castles (1994)) must have some empirical counterpart, what might we use as an indicator? For example as Kymlicka (1995b) asked, what is the mother tongue retention rate over the past half-century? What is the level of nonofficial language use in the home over the past fifty years? What kind of interest was there in heritage languages before and after the implementation of multiculturalism? Are fewer immigrants learning to speak one of the two official languages? Moving beyond linguistic indicators, we might ask if membership in ethnic voluntary associations has changed over

Managing Immigrant Social Transformations 73 the past thirty years. Finally, we might ask whether or not the number of interethnic marriages has increased or decreased since the introduction of multiculturalism. Data with regard to language use are widely available and show that English is the preferred language by immigrants. This is true for all provinces, including Quebec. It was only when Bill 101 was introduced in 1977 that immigrants were forced to speak French in institutional spheres of Quebec, e.g., work, health, education, even though the highest allophone retention rate in Canada is in Quebec. In the western province of Alberta, English is the mother tongue for over 83 per cent of the population, up from 70 per cent in 1921. In other provinces this figure is much higher. In Alberta languages such as Norwegian, German, and French have decreased (as mother tongues) by over 50 per cent in the past half-century. If we compare the pre- and post-1971 periods, we find that the overall increase in English as a mother tongue and the decreasing use of other languages (either in the home or at work) has not changed with the introduction of the multicultural policy. This does not mean that an interest in heritage languages does not exist. On the contrary, there has been a substantial increase in student demand. For example, nearly one-fourth of all students in Alberta are currently enrolled in some form of heritage language course. If we restrict our analysis to immigrants, a similar pattern emerges. Driedger (1996) calculated a language continuity index from 1981 to 1991 and showed that most of the language shift comes from allophones (70 per cent), while French speakers contributed only 20 per cent. Using a ratio of language spoken at home to mother tongue, he also found that language mobility favours English for all of Canada (113:1) while for French it was 95:8. Allophones had a ratio of 54:9. What was even more surprising is that in Quebec the language continuity ratio for French was only 101:2. This figure means that French speakers recruited 1.2 individuals for every 100 French mother tongue speakers over a decade. In all other provinces, the ratio was less than 1:00. While a definitive study on ethnic organizational membership has not been completed, considerable data has been collected on the number of ethnic voluntary associations and their activities. Again the data show a continual decline in the number of these organizations and their membership. Estimates range from decreases of 30-40 per cent over the past thirty years (Herberg 1989; Jupp 1989; Isajiw 1990). Data with regard to intermarriage show that over the past century, increasing ethnic intermarriage for heads of husband-wife families is evident. While there are variations among ethnic groups, we find that

74 Part One: Theories and Policies for most groups over half of the family heads have spouses of a different ethnic origin than themselves. For example, in 1871, about onequarter of the German marriages were intermarriages; by 1991 this had increased to nearly 60 per cent. While nearly half of the Scandinavian marriages in 1921 were intermarriages, by 1991 the proportion had increased to nearly 85 per cent. In the restricted period 1961 to 1991, we find no specific ethnic group that had lower intermarriage rates in 1991 than thirty years previously (M. Kalbach, personal correspondence, 1996). As Kymlicka (1995c) points out, the evidence suggests that multiculturalism is not producing an unwillingness or inability of immigrants to incorporate into mainstream society. While there are differences among ethnic groups with regard to their level of incorporation, the general pattern holds for most of them. Ethnonationalists and Multiculturalism The concept of 'ethnonationalism' was introduced by Connor (1973), although he never provided a formal definition. For purposes of this chapter, ethnonationalism is defined as an ethnic ideology that involves demands for political autonomy or independence. Thus, there is an explicit linking of nationalism and loyalty to an ethnic group and the relationship between ethnic group and nation is highlighted. (See Norton (1993) for an excellent comparative study on the development of ethnonationalist movements.) Douglass (1988) goes on to note that when an ethnic group aspires to be a 'nation,' the process of ethnonationalism is born. He argues that an increase in the degree of politicization or the emergence of demands for autonomy constitute one of the components of achieving 'nationhood.' Further politicization leads to a struggle for independence and success of independence movements results in the formation of a sovereign state. On the other hand, he recognizes that some of these groups/movements are more obsessed with a vision of freedom from domination by non-members than with a vision of freedom to conduct foreign relations with other states (Douglass 1988). Ethnonationalist groups may be small, local organizations, well within the norms of mainstream society or they may be large, radical, extremist groups spread across the region. They may be located outside the existing political structure, in a 'core' political party, or be found in between, such as the many 'soft' ethnonationalist groups that occupy the middle ground. In the end there is no homogenous form of ethnonationalist group, as such groups may organize and express their vision in many different ways, both within and outside Quebec.

Managing Immigrant Social Transformations 75 We now move to the concerns expressed by ethnonationalist groups in Canada. Ethnonationalism is just one form of social movement, which is conceptualized as an organized collective manifestation of issues for which people have considerable concern. These movements attempt to promote change in the society of which they are a part and they do so through different means (Zurcher and Snow 1981). A social movement is characterized by three features: a program for social change, a plan for satisfying members' needs, and an attempt to gain power for the beneficiaries of the movement (Stephan and Stephan 1985). The ideologies held by ethnonationalist groups help define and explain the grievances held by individuals, define collective goals and strategies for achieving these goals, and provide moral justification for the pursuit of these goals. The ideology serves to translate private troubles into public issues and describes what must, practically and morally, be done. However, not all participants in collective action will accept every aspect of the proffered ideology. The existence of ethnonationalism reflects the tendency among individuals to link political legitimacy with ethnic identity. Two elements set the stage for the emergence of ethnonationalism; the first is selfawareness with respect to ethnicity and the realization that a particular group is different from others (Cook 1986). The second is the success of the notion of popular sovereignty (Macklem 1993). Quebec and aboriginal ethnonationalists argue that multiculturalism has prevented them from acquiring more provincial or self-government powers. But since the establishment of the multicultural policy, the Province of Quebec has established its own immigration policy and language laws and developed social contracts with immigrants, to name just a few powers that had previously been in the sole domain of the federal government. Aboriginals likewise have achieved unprecedented self-government powers over the past twenty-five years (e.g., Sechels and the Nisga'a of British Columbia, the establishment of Nunavut). Indians in the Province of Manitoba are concluding an agreement that will phase out the federal Department of Northern and Indian Affairs and turn over all powers to provincial and local Indian organizations. In summary, existing evidence demonstrates that multicultural policy has not thwarted the efforts for more self-government or provincial powers by ethnonationalist groups. While a number of researchers around the world have focused on the role of ethnonationalist groups there is a paucity of work in Canada (Castles 1994; Halpern et al. 1992; Jamrozik et al. 1995; Levin 1993). Due to space limitations, the current discussion will be restricted to Quebec

76 Part One: Theories and Policies ethnonationalists; nevertheless, many of the processes described are similar for other ethnonational groups, e.g., the Avalogoli in western Kenya; the Biafra and Bette in Nigeria; the Maoris in New Zealand; aboriginals in Canada, the United States, and Sri Lanka. Incorporation into Canadian Society The evidence presented does not support the claim that multiculturalism is hampering the incorporation of immigrants or the goals of ethnonationalist groups. The impact of this policy on immigrant groups and their reaction is easily explained. Immigrants have four options when they arrive in Canada: they can incorporate, remain isolated from mainstream society, try a combination of the two for selected social and cultural institutions, or return to their country of origin (Castles 1995). We will not discuss the fourth option in this chapter, although some immigrants have opted for this alternative. Let us look at each of the remaining possibilities. Most immigrants have left their home because they wanted social change and view Canada as a 'lifeboat' from the environment they fled (Cochran 1995-6). Thus they are predisposed to taking on the social and cultural symbols and behaviours of the host society. There is a willingness to take on new values and mores as they settle into Canada. However, immigrants require a 'cushion' as they incorporate the new Canadian way of life into their lives. By the second generation, immigrants tend to downplay their ethnicity and actively search for ways in which they can become further incorporated into the host society (Encel 1993; Smoliez 1981). In summary, immigrants are generally committed to living in other people's countries and the last thing they want is to remain isolated or secede from them. Some ethnic groups - for example, Hutterites, Mennonites, and Hasidic Jews - may opt to remain outside mainstream society in specific institutional spheres. However, they have done so voluntarily and have served notice that while they are prepared to remain apart from some of the dominant institutions of the larger society, they are nonetheless willing to remain within the overall social and political spheres of Canadian society. If an ethnic group wants to remain isolated and outside mainstream society and yet continue to be a viable cultural community, what would be required of it? As Breton (1964) pointed out, only communities that are institutionally complete and exhibit residential homogeneity and

Managing Immigrant Social Transformations 77 geographical concentration can give any thought to developing a truly alternative system. A full set of parallel institutions such as schools, commercial shops, and religious organizations would have to be established and offer opportunities for members of the ethnic community similar to those offered to mainstream Canadians. In nearly all cases ethnic communities find such a goal unrealistic. However, this does not mean that ethnic communities are not concerned about the retention of their culture. Since the 1980s different ethnic groups have competed in order to acquire legitimacy for their interpretation of social reality (Cairns 1989), and they continue to try and establish small, independent, community-based ethnic institutions. A review of the structure of today's ethnic communities reveals that most are small enclaves within a larger mosaic and lack the geographical concentration and/or organizations necessary to become institutionally complete. Many ethnic groups have established extensive networks in areas such as the economic sphere; nevertheless, even those who reside in large metropolitan areas such as Toronto find the establishment of major social and economic institutions - e.g., universities, banks - an unrealistic aspiration. The fact that immigrants are more vocal and demonstrative of their rights is not evidence that they are less incorporated because of a multicultural policy. To the contrary, it represents the acceptance of multiculturalism and the values it espouses. Immigrants want equality now, not, as in the past, for their children or grandchildren. The idea that immigrants should be quiet and grateful for being allowed into Canada is long out of date. Immigrants are not willing to endure prejudice and discrimination and are prepared to utilize the existing policy and legal system to support their claims. We now turn to an analysis of how ethnonationalist groups have been affected by multiculturalism and, conversely, how it has been used by ethnonationalist groups to achieve their goals and aspirations. While many structural and historical factors have impinged upon the Quebec ethnonationalist movement, the present chapter focuses upon the impact of one particular policy (Helly 1994; Saywell 1977). The basis of our perspective draws upon resource mobilization theory, which examines issues of dependency and obtaining and organizing resources, as well as the tactics used to develop or restrict the movement (Oberschall 1978). We begin our discussion with a brief review of the role of the state in cultural affairs.

78 Part One: Theories and Policies The Role of the State Liberal civic nations tend not to support any particular societal culture or ethnonational identity. Rather, they define national membership in terms of adherence to certain principles of democracy and justice. As such, culture is treated like religion - something you are free to choose in your private life - and is not a concern of the state (Kymlicka 1995c). Nevertheless, the state plays an important role in defining and drawing the boundaries of ethnic groups through a number of strategies (e.g., census data, state funding, official sanctioning). It promotes the idea that all citizens should participate in social culture, which is comprised of a common language(s) and social institutions. Participation in the mainstream social culture will provide access to a variety of social institutions in both the public and private spheres and allow individuals to achieve economic and social success. To facilitate this participation, states have integrated language and social institutions which, it is argued, will allow the individual greater freedom in accepting other cultures and will ensure the individual's success if he/she accepts this linkage. In short, in liberal civic nations there is an unwritten agreement that a common language(s) is necessary if all citizens are to have equal opportunity. At the same time, individuals and communities have the right to reject incorporation, although the consequences of such a decision will probably lead to group marginalization and a reduced likelihood that younger members of the community will be able to incorporate into the dominant institutional structure. Ethnonationalism: National Ethnic Groups Nationalism and the aspirations of marginalized peoples to nationhood have become the hallmark of the modern world in the 1990s (Halpern et al. 1992). The impetus of this revival can be traced to the paradoxical logic of global capitalism, which encourages particularistic loyalties to national cultures and states while at the same time generating transnational markets that link regional economies to global capitalism (Hall 1993). The demand of a state for every people is the extreme political expression of cultural identity (Levin 1993, 3). Second, the politics of ethnonationalism draws its importance from the fact that most countries are culturally pluralistic. Finally, the justifications of ethnonationalism - identity and aspiration - seem to have a naturalness in origin that makes them difficult to reject (Levin 1993).

Managing Immigrant Social Transformations 79 In Canada, ethnonationalist groups have publicly objected to the multicultural policy since its proclamation, arguing that they are outside the scope of the policy since they occupy a special status in the history and institutional structure of Canadian society. To accept the policy would confirm that they are similar to other ethnocultural groups. These ethnonationalists want to achieve greater political powers and have consciously chosen to use the vocabulary of nationalism and language rights as the basis of their rhetoric (Webber 1994). This strategy has been functional for several reasons. First, by claiming that you are a nation, you place yourself in a position that allows you to claim certain legal rights (both domestic and international). Second, it provides an historical basis for your claim, since nations must have an history (Levin 1993). Third, the claims made by nationalist groups are differentiated from claims made by minority ethnic groups. Finally, to claim nation status equalizes power relations between the minority group and the dominant group (Breton 1989; Kymlicka 1995c). While publicly objecting to multiculturalism, ethnonationalists have actively utilized the ideology of the policy and the funds provided for the programs (Handler 1988). However, they have used them not to incorporate into Canadian society but rather as a means to achieve selfgovernment. Using the basic tenets of the multicultural policy within a politically charged atmosphere, ethnonationalists have been able to obtain powers which, under other circumstances, would not have been transferred from the federal government (Langlois 1990). Their first step was to redefine interculturalism. This reconceptualization of pluralism accepts an asymmetry between the dominant group (French) and immigrants, in which immigrants are expected to assimilate into Quebec society (Renaud et al. 1993; Bissonnette 1988; Morissette 1991; Paquet 1994). Over time, they also began to redefine the concept of federalism (Paquet 1994; White 1997). Federalism is normally defined as a system in which there is a central government as well as subgovernments. The limits of authority for each unit are agreed upon. There is an agreement to share power but it is clear that each unit has certain inherent sovereign rights that cannot be unilaterally removed by one or the other parties. Moreover, one level of government cannot intrude on the rights of another without the express consent of both governments. Ethnonationalists define federalism as a federation of people while the rest of Canada continues to define it as a federation of territorial units (Kymlicka 1995a; Cuneo and Curtis 1974; Fournier et al. 1997). As such, ethnonationalists make a distinction between asymmetrical and

80 Part One: Theories and Policies symmetrical federalism. Symmetrical federalism, favoured by a majority of Canadians, is defined as a structure in which all territorial units within a nation have similar and equal powers. Asymmetrical federalism, the ethnonationalist definition, is a system in which political units have different powers (Kymlicka 1995b; Tremblay 1990, 1993). Nevertheless, federalism still continues to be viewed as the preferred government structure by most Canadians, including many ethnonationalists, since it is viewed as a way in which they (ethnonationalists) can achieve their goal of self-government (Fournier et al. 1997). These results have been supported by a number of Angus Reid polls since 1980 (Reid 1992). Thus, for ethnonationalists, federalism is seen as a means to an end and is conditionally supported. However, once the goals of the ethnonationalists have been achieved, federalism as an ideology is redundant. The Role of Visible Minorities Adding to the complexity of ethnic relations and perhaps one of the more problematic aspects of contemporary Canada is the fact that Canadians (both in Quebec and in the rest of Canada) identify themselves as a 'white' society, even though demographic changes have challenged this definition. In the early 1960s, nearly 80 per cent of immigrants were from traditional western Europe countries or from the United States. However, by the end of the 1990s, nearly 80 per cent were from nontraditional countries, most of which represented visible minorities - e.g., Asia, Africa - and issues of colour are consequently taking on a new importance. Reviewing the experiences of immigrant groups, it is safe to say that virtually all of them, at some point in history, have faced prejudice and discrimination. Few immigrant groups entering Canada have been fully accepted by the resident, native-born population. Yet it is equally clear that many groups have prevailed and overcome these barriers. Why have some ethnic groups been able to surmount their disadvantage while others have not? Which groups have not been able to incorporate? Visible minorities argue that unlike 'white' immigrants they have not been allowed to incorporate. The end result is that they constitute an underclass whose members are in a state of isolation from and opposition to mainstream society (Kymlicka 1995d). As pointed out above, nearly all immigrant groups have experienced subordination attempts. However, the subordination has been within

Managing Immigrant Social Transformations 81 the institutional spheres of Canadian society. In the case of visible minorities, their subordination has kept them out of the mainstream institutional structures and in a sense, created an alternative, albeit inferior, set of institutions. Once these separate and parallel institutions are created, they are difficult to phase out. Moreover, it is difficult for members of visible minorities to move from being pariahs to paragons. At the same time, members of the dominant group find there will be a substantial cost to phasing out the parallel structures and incorporating the subordinate group. Moreover, the subordinate group, which is poor and marginally linked to the dominant institutions, finds the process of incorporation a risky and costly venture. Because these minority groupbased institutions are not linked to the dominant society, any attempts to phase them out without guaranteeing new linkages with the dominant society will result in considerable resistance. This complex process can be seen as the federal government attempts to decolonize its relationship with Quebec. As the untying of the Gordian knot continues, its increasing complexity is revealed. Rethinking Canada A recent Angus Reid poll (1992) noted that nearly three-quarters of Canadians felt that a continual reminder of our different origins is less useful than emphasizing the things we have in common in building a united country. This finding has led to an uneasiness about the proliferation of hyphenated Canadians with divided loyalties and the absence of a common Canadian identity. There also is concern that while Canadians are not prepared to accept our own symbols, we have an uncritical acceptance of other cultural symbols. Concern has been expressed over the growing heterogeneity of the population and the need to unify our ideals and solidify a common culture (Jusdanis 1996). People witness nations breaking up because diverse groups have no compelling reason to view themselves as part of the same nation. I have argued above that immigrant groups are not attempting to restructure Canadian society, nor are they trying to create ethnic enclaves that will reproduce their home culture. On the contrary, they are trying to fit into Canadian society, invoking elements of their culture that they think will contribute to the host society. There is, at most, an attempt by immigrants to reform Canadian society, not replace or reject it. Moreover, by the end of the first generation, most immigrant groups have been incorporated into mainstream society. The role of multicult-

82 Part One: Theories and Policies uralism has been to create an ethos as well as specific programs that have been helpful to immigrants. It has provided an 'envelope' that has absorbed much of the initial culture shock experienced by immigrants and has provided official assurance that Canadians accept the legitimacy of immigrant cultures. Governmental activities in multiculturalism are also becoming more instrumental, rather than expressive, as ethnics are increasingly concerned with the removal of discrimination in employment rather than about funding dance classes. Providing immigrant women with language and skills training is more important than providing funds to hold a conference. This does not mean that the expressive (symbolic) component of ethnicity has lost its importance or is no longer a concern for ethnic communities (Spoonley et al. 1991), but the priorities of immigrants have changed over the past-quarter century. What is problematic in developing Canadian unity are ethnonationalist groups. As noted earlier, these groups do not accept the underlying principles or philosophy of federalism or multiculturalism as conceptualized by most Canadians (see Levin (1993), for example). They are adamant that they achieve, at minimum, some sort of distinct status in Canada or preferably, nationhood independent of Canada. Moreover, the quest of ethnonationalists for self-determination deals a shattering blow to the image most Canadians have of themselves. It deconstructs the generous, proud, self-assured, and virtuous picture they have built of themselves (Sallee 1995), thus creating a reaction that might not otherwise be exhibited by English Canadians. Ethnonationalist leaders have cast their group in the role of the oppressed but courageous victims of historical circumstances. However, they do not represent a grassroots development nor is it reflective of collective interests (Linteau et al. 1991). These ethnonationalist groups have emerged from the activities of established, intellectual elites who wish to develop their own definitions of reality and achieve their selfinterests through achievement of nationhood (McRoberts 1988). For example, as Forget points out, in 1975 ethnonationalist groups used several questionable techniques to defeat the Liberals in 1976. Innuendoes and half-truths were used very skilfully and they played well in the media, which created an image problem for the Liberal leader, Mr Bourassa (Bothwell 1996). As Tremblay (1993) argues, the Quebec ethnonationalist movement was started at the top, by political and educational elites who felt they could achieve power and status in spearheading such a movement (Saywell 1977; Brooks and Tanguay 1985).

Managing Immigrant Social Transformations 83 These nationalist groups are not based upon some pre-existing interest but emerged because ethnonationalism has provided a way for ideologists to define their sense of self and to shape a new way of life (Masse 1994). In the Quebec ethnonationalist movement, ethnic entrepreneurs and political leaders articulate beliefs in kinship bonds and common destiny and mobilize and organize groups to press group claims (Fournier 1976; Tremblay 1993). They are power seekers who have mobilized language and ethnic themes for their own individual aggrandizement. As Fleras and Elliott (1995) point out, the recasting of political concerns into linguistic issues can transform the demands of minority groups into something central policy structures can understand. They go on to argue that language possesses the emotive properties to elicit nationalistic passions and galvanize people into protest action, particularly action as seemingly benign as voting. Using the language issue, ethnonationalists can address a number of economic, moral, and political issues in a simple, direct fashion, without having to deal with the complexity of reality. Ethnonationalist leaders attempt to diminish the individual's consciousness of his or her individuality and to superimpose a consciousness of that individual's similarity to 'co-nationals' and differences from members of other groups. Thus the task of ethnonationalist leaders is to engineer an image of the newly proposed nation as the only body capable of realizing the individual's aspirations (Watzlawick 1988; Wihtolde de Wenden 1989). For example, G. Bouthillier (president of the Societe St Jean Baptiste) has argued that it is antidemocratic to let those who have not mastered French vote in a Quebec election. He also called for the creation of a 'media watchdog' in order to ensure equity and equilibrium in political coverage. As Cohen (1996) argues, the task for ethnonationalists is simultaneously to leave the individual with some sense of having interpretive space within which to experience and express differences while also contriving to define or at least limit the space. Halpern et al. (1992) identify a common thread running through all ethnic conflicts: the manipulative role of ethnic group leaders who foster discrimination and mobilize group members against their foes. For example, the process of ethnic outbidding refers to extremist ethnic group leaders who decry moderation with 'enemies' as a sellout of group interests. Ethnonationalists begin by claiming special historical status and previous self-government, which ostensibly makes them different from all

84 Part One: Theories and Policies other ethnic groups, and their incorporation into the larger state is consequently defined as arbitrary, coercive, and illegitimate (McRoberts 1993). Quebec ethnonationalists have followed this process and now claim to hold a different conceptualization of Canada than the rest of Canadians. Most Canadians view Canada as a nation that includes Quebec and Native people (see the recent Angus Reid poll of 1996, as well as the 1996 Environics poll on this issue) and they would argue that as long as you are a citizen of Canada, you have equal rights and responsibilities. It is assumed that the federal government will act as the central stakeholder to ensure that equality is upheld, no matter where you live or what your ethnicity is (McRoberts 1993). To be sure, there are some regional differences, reflected in the economics of Canada, but these are not based upon ethnicity. In short, most people view Canadians as having a common citizenship and reject attempts by any group to claim 'special status/ As Kymlicka (1995c: 8) points out, the majority of the population believe 'that all Canadians form a single nation, and that the federal government should act so as to express and promote this common national identity.' At the same time, English Canada does not exhibit intense forms of nationalism, promote xenophobia or institutional discrimination, or feel that other ethnic groups pose a threat to the purity of the culture. In Quebec, in contrast, after the referendum in 1995 the then premier of the province identified two factors that led to the defeat of the successionist referendum: 'money and ethnics/ The ex-premier more recently identified specific ethnocultural groups such as Jews and Greeks as having defeated the ethnonationalists. Most Canadians (including Quebecers) believe in equality across all provincial boundaries. (See for example the recent polls carried out by Decima and Angus Reid.) Their view of a pan-Canadianism is reflected in the equality assertions with respect to the freedom of labour mobility, common standards across provinces, and portability in pensions (Kymlicka 1995a). Canada has invested considerable time and money during the past century building such a conception, with the creation of national organizations such as the Canadian Broadcasting Corporation and the National Film Board. Many Canadians support federal policy decision making (see the 1995-6 Environics poll results), although they might not support federal administration of those policies. There is a preference for regional administration of the federally applied policies in order to ensure that regional differences are taken into account in the administration of policy.

Managing Immigrant Social Transformations 85 Quebec ethnonationalists, on the other hand, claim to have a different conception of Canada (Foster 1998). First of all, they view Canada as multinational and their provincial government as their national government. They have decided that they are not a nation based only on language, culture, and a shared sense of history; they now include the territorial aspect of nationalism. This means that only Quebec residents can achieve nationhood and self-identity (Bothwell 1996). These defenders of asymmetrical federalism also argue that equality for individual citizens does not require equal powers for political units (Jenson 1996). They go on to argue that unless they obtain special status and special powers they will never achieve equality with the rest of Canadians. For example, they argue that English Canada's reluctance to accept the views of Quebec ethnonationalists or the First Nations has no moral or legal foundation and is in opposition to the basic tenets of multiculturalism (Kmylicka 1995a). This conceptualization is rejected by the rest of Canada, and it would be difficult to instate a brand of federalism acceptable to ethnonationalists. It should also be noted that there is a basic contradiction in the Quebec ethnonationalist position. Sallee (1995) points out that the Quebec ethnonationalists use the same arguments as English Canada when they deal with the First Nations' quest for self-government. Similarly Pelletier et al. (1991) point out that the majority of non-aboriginal Quebec ethnonationalists feel that aboriginals, in so far as they are part of the Quebec institutional framework, should submit to the same legal and administrative constraints applicable to all Quebecers. Quebec ethnonationalists argue that the rest of the country opposes their view of Canada because if this new conceptualization were accepted, the dominance of English Canada would end. Critics of the multinational conception of Canada, on the other hand, claim that if this view of Canada is accepted the principle of equality will be violated, as differential rights would be established. The question as to whether or not asymmetry would give ethnonationalists more or fewer rights than other Canadians (Webber 1994) is considered to be a secondary issue. Critics of symmetrical federalism and multiculturalism (pan-Canadian nationalism) argue that this view ensures English Canada's power base will remain intact and perhaps increase. The underlying logic is that if everyone is to be treated equally, decisions have to be made at the federal level, which will result in a decrease in provincial powers. Decisions will be made where English is the dominant force and they will reflect the 'culture' of English Canada, which is a

86 Part One: Theories and Policies threat to the viability of Quebecois culture (Kymlicka 1995c). Finally, there is a claim to collective rights over individual rights by Quebec ethnonationalists. Thus, the infringement on individual rights in Quebec is justified by appealing to their collective rights. In summary, supporters of a multinational conception of Canada argue that the English view of Canada operates at the expense of minority groups. First, they claim that multiculturalism rejects the view of a multinational state and thus negates the claims put forth by Quebec ethnonationalists. Second, the conception of Canada as a symmetrical federation means that more issues will continually be decided by federal authorities, thus taking decision making away from minorities. Finally, it is argued that core values and cultural components differ among ethnic groups. For example, language use is different between Quebecers and English Canada. Under the existing system, when conflicts over these values emerge, English Canada's views are more likely to prevail. Critics of the ethnonationalist perspective point out that one of the central tenets of multiculturalism is that it must uphold equality among groups and freedom within groups. No one group can be allowed to oppress other groups nor can a group allow its members to oppress others within its own membership by limiting their civil or political rights. Multicultural policy addresses group rights and these group rights involve rights against a larger society, rights that make it easier for members of the group to express their identity within the larger society. It does not allow for a group right to limit the activities of its own members by limiting the freedom of the individual member or trying to construct ethnically or racially closed or 'pure' communities. Conclusion Official multiculturalism has not remained static and has changed its focus over time, moving from the promotion of ethnic identity to forging unity from diversity, building a national identity, and trying to develop the 'economic advantage' of being Canadian. For example, funding from Heritage Canada is now used for developing programs and strategies to integrate immigrants into Canadian society and sensitizing Canadians to the benefits of a multicultural society. These changes are a result of criticism by agents outside government as well as pressures from within, as the context in which the policy operates is continually monitored.

Managing Immigrant Social Transformations 87 Ethnonationalists argue that the pan-Canadian conceptualization of Canada has been a de facto vehicle for the maintenance of power for English Canada (Kymlicka 1995a). Quebec ethnonationalists want national recognition of their distinct and unique status, and they are not prepared to accept it under some 'federation' or 'associational sovereignty' with English Canada (Lachapelle et al. 1993). In the end the conceptualizations of the two solitudes are much too different to be reconciled. This means that English Canadians will either have to abandon their conceptualization of Canada as a uninational state or accede to the wishes of ethnonationalist groups and allow them to secede. The nationalists, for their part, will either have to forgo their desire to achieve self-government or try new strategies to achieve separation. At the present time we are at a stalemate, each of the parties assessing the actions of the other to determine the strengths and weaknesses that can be exploited to promote their cause. The prospect of separation looms large for English Canada within both the economic and expressive context, although the economic consequences remain the primary concern (Fortin et al. 1978). From an historical and economic perspective, English Canada believes that should separation occur, a lowering of the standard of living and quality of life will result. There also is some concern over the possibility of ethnic conflict due to the expected wrangling over ownership and equity of property held by the two parties. English Canada fears that litigation may erupt into overt conflict, which would further plunge the two countries deeper into an economic abyss and bring about either hard or soft mediation by external agents (Safran 1996). The pan-Canadians argue that when secession occurs, the new state invariably contains its own minorities, and this partition does not solve problems of multiethnic coexistence. It only rearranges the configuration of minorities and majorities (Sisk 1996). From the ethnonationalist perspective, expressive issues are paramount and economic issues are secondary, to be dealt with once self-government has been achieved. This means that benefits and 'pay-offs' for hardline Quebec ethnonationalists, which might soften their separatist aspirations, are difficult to identify and provide. Throughout the chapter we have discussed socio-cultural integration, not psychological incorporation. I recognize the difference and conceptualize the two types of incorporations as separate. Psychological incorporation may involve a different process and take longer to achieve.

88 Part One: Theories and Policies Individuals may have to undergo special and positive experiences before personal identification takes place. Moreover, immigrants can incorporate institutionally without necessarily identifying with Canada. This potential gap between structural and psychological identity is not limited or unique to immigrants; ethnonationalist groups may also have this limitation. Our task is to find models of inclusiveness and tolerance that recognize and affirm these diverse norms of group identities and cultural differences. Alternative models suggested by the critics of multicultural policy are exclusionary, too nation specific or unrealistically individualistic in nature. Karmis (1993) and Taylor (1994) suggest a way out of the present dilemma. Taylor argues that Canadians must accept two types of diversity. The first level corresponds to differences in culture, outlook, and background of a population that has a similar national identity. There is also a second, deep diversity level which shows that there is a sense of belonging to Canada, but through membership in a national community. Karmis, on the other hand, argues that Canadians have to recognize the limits of a strictly individualist application of liberal political philosophy and must turn to a communitarian variation of liberal thought. Both Karmis and Taylor conclude that it is possible to integrate within the same institutional and political framework the cosmocentric values of Quebecois and English Canadian political thought and the liberal goals of preservation of individual rights, but only if a politics of what they call 'profound' diversity, which would recognize and accept a plurality of ways of living in and forming bonds to a community, could be established (Sallee 1995). As Karmis (1993: 92-3) argues, "This would require first the recognition of difference and then through a decentralization of power to the political communities of the prime logical relationships, in the case of Quebec, linguistic and cultural organizations.' This position is not workable at the present time. Conciliation is possible when groups have an identity based largely on race and/or religion and a collective consciousness emerging out of discrimination and oppression. Moreover, the aim of the 'reconstruction' is to complete integration into society, access to political power based upon individual rights and social justice. Ethnonationalists are not moving in this direction, their aim is to safeguard a 'particularistic' cultural patrimony (Safran 1996). My position is more in agreement with Hall (1993), who argues that the ability for nations to survive will depend on their ability to live with difference and hybridity. Communities most suited to this are

Managing Immigrant Social Transformations 89 made up of immigrants displaced from their places of origin, living in diasporic situations and carrying multiple cultural markers. Immigrants have experienced living with differences and their contribution to the national mosaic has produced a hybrid society. In this respect, Canada is well-positioned to succeed, with immigrants making up nearly onefifth of its population. This seems to be reflective of the last Quebec referendum where Montreal (an area with most of the province's immigrants) overwhelmingly voted against separation. For example, in the area of Montreal West and Outaouais, approximately three-quarters of the voters voted against separation. On the other hand, in the SaguenayLac Saint-Jean and B. St Laurent-Gaspeste C. Nord areas, nearly twothirds of the voters voted for separation. These results suggest that there is no reason to believe that multiculturalism reduces national unity, because citizens have both ethnic and national identities. All of us have many different identities and we easily shift their priority and nature as we move from one milieu to the next. The question remains as to whether or not the immigrant Canadian experience is strong enough to counter the claims of ethnonationalists and convince them that pluralism is a legitimate and acceptable form of society. What proportion of the population feels this way remains unknown. In the last referendum, although separation was rejected by a small percentage, this rejection probably does not reflect the true strength of ethnonationalism in Quebec. It is estimated that if Quebecers are given a straightforward question about separating from the rest of Canada, about one-third will respond positively. These numbers emerge as the number of recent immigrants, the number of English speakers, the number of older immigrants now living in Quebec, the question posed, and the method of counting ballots are taken into account. The yoke of colonialism and the rule of the English over Quebecers is not part of immigrant history or symbolism. However, at the same time, the implementation of Bill 101 in 1977 (the provincial language bill) and its enforcement has produced a large number of French speakers, which creates a bond of its own. How many immigrants will side with the Quebec ethnonationalists remains uncertain. Perhaps one ingredient missing in dealing with the conflict at this time is the availability and capacity of true negotiators. As Stein (1996) argues, if negotiations between two parties are to come to a successful conclusion, the 'enemy' image must be changed. Such a change will facilitate conflict management, reduction, and resolution. She identifies three contemporary politicians - Anwar Sadat, Mikhail Gorbachev, and

90 Part One: Theories and Policies Yitzhak Rabin - who effected resolution to outstanding differences. Their ability to change the enemy image was due to their political skills, their commitment to a domestic restructuring of society, and their acknowledgment of the failure of alternatives to accommodation. It would seem that Canada has yet to produce such statesmen/women. Immigrant incorporation is of course a two-way process - immigrants must be willing to adapt to certain structures of the host society and the host society must be willing to accept the immigrant on equal terms. This means that all immigrants must have full rights and opportunities and the right to work and live cooperatively with existing residents. Moreover, members of the host society must adapt mainstream institutions and practices when necessary as they deal with minorities. If they do not, or the minority groups do not perceive opportunities, ethnonationalist groups which are prepared to reject incorporation and to develop a parallel society will emerge (Safran 1996). In summary, the goal of multiculturalism is to show that the recognition of cultural diversity is compatible with and will not undermine those institutions that guarantee equality between individuals and classes. The new multicultural policy will have to be a simultaneous recognition of two cultural domains, one a shared political culture (Cochran 1995-6) of the public domain (centred around the idea of equality), the other consisting of a number of separate cultures in the private or communal domain, involving shared language, religion and customs (Rex 1994). Multiculturalism will only be successful if it is able to provide an intermediate linkage between the state and the individual and the basis for a moral relationship between minority ethnic groups and the national society at the political level. Immigrants must be given a sense of group worth, cultural autonomy, and the ability to maintain their ethnic identity. Thus far the evidence suggests that multiculturalism has contributed to this process.

PART TWO: THE DEMOGRAPHIC IMPACT

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5

Immigration and Demographic Structures RODERIC P. BEAUJOT

Demography can be defined as the study of populations, their size, distribution, and composition, along with the immediate factors that make for population change, that is, births, deaths, and movements of people. Immigration clearly has an impact on the changing size of a population. In addition, demographic processes in a country can be affected by the differential fertility, mortality, and migration of immigrants. The population distribution and composition in a country can also be influenced by the various differences between the native born and foreign born. This chapter will explore the thesis that the impact of immigration is especially felt at the time of arrival and, conversely, that it becomes more diffuse over time. A subsidiary thesis is that immigration patterns since the mid-1970s are playing a larger role in the changing demographics of the country. In order to address these theses, it is necessary to assess a number of demographic considerations, including population growth, fertility, mortality, internal migration, distribution, and composition. Immigration and Population Size and Growth Over the period 1901 to 1996, the total immigration of some 12 million persons and the emigration of some 6 million produced a net gain of 6 million people, representing a fifth of Canada's population growth over the period (Table 5.1). The contribution of net international migration to population growth varies considerably over history, reaching a peak in the 1901-11 decade. Since net migration is responsible for more than 25 per cent of population growth since 1971, we can say that

94 Part Two: The Demographic Impact TABLE 5.1 Immigration, emigration, and contribution to population growth, Canada, 1851-1996

Years

Immigration

Emigration

1851-61 1861-71 1871-81 1881-91 1891-1901 1901-11 1911-21 1921-31 1931-41 1941-51 1951-61 1961-71 1971-81 1981-91 1991-96

352,000 260,000 350,000 680,000 250,000 1,550,000 1,400,000 1,200,000 149,000 548,000 1,543,000 1,429,000 1,429,000 1,381,000 1,166,000

170,000 410,000 404,000 826,000 380,000 740,000 1,089,000 970,000 241,000 379,000 463,000 707,000 636,000 490,000 228,000

Contribution to population growth (per cent)

23.0 -32.6 -8.5 -28.7 -24.2 44.1 19.7 14.5 -8.1 7.9 25.5 21.7 28.6 27.7 50.9

Sources: Beaujot and Rappak 1988, 27; Statistics Canada 1996, 238, 241

except for the decade of the turn of the century, recent immigration is having a larger impact. It is also useful to take into account births to immigrants as a further impact of immigration. Using past vital rates to determine the population size without international migration, Duchesne (1993) finds that over the period 1871-1991 there is very little difference in ultimate population size. This is because it took a long time to compensate for the departures to the United States in the period 1871-95. However, over the period 1966-91, the direct plus indirect contribution of international migration amounted to 41 per cent of the total growth. With the persistence of below replacement fertility and current levels of immigration, the impact of migration can only increase. For instance, over the period 1986-2036, Statistics Canada (1990) projections imply that, with a fertility of 1.7 births per woman and an immigration of 200,000 per year, over 90 per cent of the change in Canada's population size would be due to migration (see Table 5.4 below).

Immigration and Demographic Structures 95 TABLE 5.2 Children ever born, by place of birth of mother and immigration cohort, women aged 30-34 and 40-44, Canada, 1991 30-34

Canadian born Immigrant Before 1946 1946-60 1961-70 1971-75 1976-80 1981-85 1986-90

40-44

Total

Europe/ U.S.A.

Other

Total

Europe/ U.S.A. Other

1.46 1.52

1.56

1.48

1.94 2.04

2.00

2.11

1.56 1.45 1.61 1.79 1.67 1.26

1.65 1.49 1.67 1.84 1.63 1.35

1.31 1.57 1.76 1.69 1.23

1.91 2.17 2.04 2.09 1.96 2.07

1.91 2.17 2.00 1.92 1.83 1.92

1.85 2.17 2.07 2.20 2.06 2.13

-

Note: - : fewer than 50 cases Source: Special tabulations based on public use sample for 1991 census

Differential Demographics of Immigrants While the immediate effect of immigration on population size and growth is substantial, by definition this impact is felt at the time of arrival. The longer term impact, through differential demographic behaviour of immigrants, is less pronounced. Fertility of Immigrants In some countries, immigrant fertility is significantly different from that of the receiving population. High immigrant fertility can pose problems if there is a perception that this brings more change to the population than simply that associated with the arrivals themselves. In the Canadian case, we can speak of considerable similarities rather than differences. At the 1961 and 1971 censuses, immigrants in each age group had a lower number of children ever born than the Canadian-born population (Ram and George 1990; Maxim 1996). In 1981, this pattern of lower fertility among immigrants applied to age groups thirty and over. In

96 Part Two: The Demographic Impact 1991, immigrants at age groups thirty to forty-four had higher fertility, but the average differences were not large (Table 5.2). For instance, at age group thirty to thirty-four, the Canadian born had an average of 1.46 children ever born, compared to the average of 1.56 for immigrants of European or American origin and 1.48 for those of other origins. Even subdividing by period of arrival does not reveal much difference, although births are slightly higher for arrival cohorts 1976-90. A specific analysis of the fertility of the visible minorities among the foreign born indicates an average rate that is higher than the national average, but which is converging with the national average (Halli et al. 1995). Using 1991 census data, Ng and Nault (1996) calculate a total fertility rate of 1.65 births per woman for the Canadian born, 1.67 for the foreign born of European and American origin, and 1.93 for the foreign born of other origins. The differences by place of origin are lower among those who have been in Canada for eleven or more years. The convergence that can be observed here applies more broadly to socio-cultural considerations of religion, language, and ethnicity (Beaujot 1995a). The fertility differentials that remain significant in Canada relate to socio-economic considerations, particularly education, labour force status, and income. Other analyses suggest that the uniqueness of family patterns decreases over time and across generations. For instance, Boyd and Norris (1995, 222) conclude that acculturation and assimilation 'diminish the centrality of family roles and relationships in modern industrial societies/ Mortality of Immigrants Given the disadvantages that immigrants often suffer, especially on first arrival, one might expect their life expectancy to be lower. However, a number of studies, using varied methodologies, indicate that the mortality of immigrants is lower than that of the Canadian-born population. Some studies reconstitute the mortality levels based on vital statistics records (Trovato 1990). While the place of birth may not always be properly coded on death certificates, these studies show that immigrants have higher life expectancy. Other studies have been done at the aggregate level, and they find that areas that have more immigrants have higher life expectancies (Choiniere 1993). While it need not be the immigrants from those areas that are producing this effect, controls for other factors, such as socio-economic status, indicate as much effect due to proportions of foreign born as due to proportions with higher socioeconomic status. Finally, health surveys find that immigrants have fewer

Immigration and Demographic Structures 97 TABLE 5.3 Age-adjusted prevalence of any chronic condition, long-term disability, and of persons who never smoked by immigrant status and duration of residence, Canada, 1994-1995 Any chronic condition

Long-term disability

Never smoked

Total Canadian born All immigrants

55.5 56.8 50.3*

21.1 22.0 17.8*

37.9* 34.4

European immigrants Total 0-1 0 years in Canada 1 1 + years in Canada

55.3 46.7 57.7

20.7 19.1 22.1

38.9 55.7* 37.6

Non-European immigrants Total 0-1 0 years in Canada 1 1 + years in Canada

44.7* 37.2* 51.2

13.5* 10.6* 15.5*

67.4* 74.9* 61.7*

51.2*

Notes: * Difference compared with Canadian born significant at 95% confidence level Household population aged 18 and over Source: Chen et al. 1996: Tables 2, 3, and 5 (based on 1994-5 National Population Health Survey)

health problems. Chen et al. (1996) document these results using data from the 1994-5 National Population and Health Survey. The health advantages are found in terms of chronic conditions, long-term disability, and hospitalization. In addition, non-European immigrants have more advantages (Table 5.3). The advantage applies especially to those who have been in Canada ten years or less. Without analysing all possible causes, the authors attribute some of the advantages to lower smoking rates among immigrants. Selectivity also plays a role, since persons with poor health are less likely to immigrate (Trovato 1996). The selection of immigrants is itself based partly on health. It would appear that the positive benefits of selectivity decline over time, but that immigrants retain an advantage with regard to life expectancy. Impact on Age and Sex Structure

Earlier periods have involved a higher proportion of male immigrants, but the masculinity ratio of persons arriving over the period 1981 to

98 Part Two: The Demographic Impact TABLE 5.4 Population projections for Canada, 1986-2036, showing impact of immigration

Population 1986

26,204,000

2036 Zero immigration 140,000 immigration 200,000 immigration

26,819,000 30,787,000 33,994,000

Percentage of growth due to immigration

0.0 86.6 92.1

Median

Percentage

age

65+

31.6

10.6

46.9 45.7 44.7

27.0 25.6 24.5

Note: Projections are based on fertility assumption of 1.7, immigration of zero, 140,000, and 200,000 persons per year, emigration of 0.0, 0.25, and 0.25 persons per 100 population per year. Sources: Statistics Canada 1989 and 1990

1990 was 0:97 (Beaujot and Hou 1993). This is very similar to the ratio for the entire Canadian population, which was also 0:97 in 1991. There are two erroneous conclusions regarding the impact of immigration on aging. One is that immigration would be a solution to population aging. Clearly, aging will continue regardless of the level of immigration. It is equally erroneous to look at the age composition of the foreign born and to conclude that immigration ages the population. The impact of immigration on the age structure can best be appreciated by comparing the median age of immigrants at arrival to that of the Canadian population. The median age of immigrants has been relatively stable, averaging twenty-five years for each year between 1956 and 1976, then increasing to twenty-seven years in the period 1981-6, twenty-eight years in the period 1986-90 and thirty years in 1994 (Beaujot et al. 1989; Beaujot and Hou 1993; Citizenship and Immigration 1997). The median age of the entire Canadian population has changed much more, increasing from 26.3 in 1961 to 35.3 in 1996. In effect, the median age of arriving immigrants has been about a year younger than that of the receiving population over the period 1945-71, changing to two years younger by 1981 and close to five years younger in the period 1991-6. These measures imply that immigration has a rather minor impact on the age structure. The two approaches of simulations and projections enable a more precise estimate of the impact of immigration on the age

Immigration and Demographic Structures 99 structure. For instance, simulating population change as a function of only births and deaths since 1951, Le Bras (1988, 12) finds that the average age of the 1981 population is 0.5 years older than the actual average observed in that year. That is, the international migration of the period 1951-81 reduced the average age in Canada by a half year. Similar results are obtained with projections into the future. The Statistics Canada (1990) population projections based on the 1986 census give median ages in 2036 that are almost two years younger under high immigration than under zero immigration (Table 5.4). The population aged sixty-five and over in 2036 is 24.5 per cent, 25.6 per cent, and 27.0 per cent under high, low, and zero migration assumptions. Clearly, the immigration assumptions have a rather small impact on the age structure. Nonetheless, the impact is to reduce the aging of the population. Between 1981 and 1986 the proportion of the population over sixty-five increased from 9.7 to 10.7. In this context, the higher level of immigration reduces this aging indicator for 2036 by the equivalent of twelve years of aging. These results are nonetheless simplistic because the age distribution of immigrants at arrival is held constant. The aging of the world population would imply that this assumption is unlikely to hold true. That is, the impact of immigration on the age structure is likely to be even less than that implied by these projections. Immigration and Population Distribution Provincial Distribution of Immigrants

Table 5.5 summarizes the regional distribution of immigrants by various arrival cohorts. Compared to the Canadian-born population, immigrants are more concentrated in Ontario and British Columbia and less concentrated in the Atlantic provinces and Quebec. For instance, in 1991, Ontario represented 33.3 per cent of the Canadian-born population and 54.6 per cent of the immigrant population. With fertility and mortality that have become more homogeneous over the provinces, and with declining natural increase, migration becomes the dominant component of differential demographic growth. It is less clear whether internal or international migration constitutes the main factor of changing population distribution by province. At the 1991 census, 12.7 per cent of the population involved Canadian-born persons who were not living in their province of birth and another 17.2 per cent were foreign born, including nonpermanent residents (Statis-

100 Part Two: The Demographic Impact tics Canada 1992a, Tables 2, 3, and 5). This would imply that international migration has a slight edge over internal migration. Yet, for all but two provinces, the proportion born in another province was larger than the proportion foreign born. It was only in Quebec and Ontario that the proportion foreign born was larger than the proportion born in another province. Adding the foreign born and the internal migration of native born shows that only four provinces have made net gains in the 1991 census: Ontario, British Columbia, Alberta, and Quebec. This is a rather striking observation. While Canada is a country of immigration, enumerating 4.4 million persons born outside of the country at the 1991 census, the net impact of both international and internal migration is positive for only four provinces. In all other provinces, population movement has been to their net disadvantage. Among the provinces that gained, it is noteworthy that those born outside of the province represent 51.6 per cent of the population of British Columbia. TABLE 5.5 Regional distribution of Canadian born and immigrants, by arrival cohorts, censuses of

1971-1991, Canada

1971

1981

1991

Canadian born Atlantic provinces Quebec Ontario Prairie provinces British Columbia Total

100.0

Immigrants before 1946 Atlantic provinces Quebec Ontario Prairie provinces British Columbia Total

10.2 39.8 27.4 19.7 100.0

Immigrants 1946-60 Atlantic provinces Quebec Ontario Prairie provinces British Columbia Total

1.9

1.8

1.8

15.0 56.9 12.6 13.6 100.0

12.8 57.4 12.8 15.2 100.0

11.9 60.2 12.4 13.7 100.0

10.3 30.7 33.2 16.5 9.3

2.8

10.9 28.9 32.2 17.8 10.3 100.0

100.0

3.1 9.7

3.1 9.2

41.4 25.7 20.0 100.0

43.6 27.6 16.5 100.0

10.2 28.5 34.4 18.3 8.7

continued

Immigration and Demographic Structures 101 continued Immigrants 1961-70 Atlantic provinces Quebec Ontario Prairie provinces British Columbia Total

2.1 18.0 55.5 11.3 13.0 100.0

2.1

1.9

16.0 55.5 11.3 15.1 100.0

14.8 58.9 10.8 13.6 100.0

Immigrants 1971-80 Atlantic provinces Quebec Ontario Prairie provinces British Columbia Total

— — _ _ — —

2.4

1.8

14.1 51.6 15.1 16.8 100.0

13.8 53.7 14.6 16.0 100.0

Immigrants 1981-91 Atlantic provinces Quebec Ontario Prairie provinces British Columbia Total

— — — — — —

— — — — — —

1.4

15.8 54.7 13.2 14.9 100.0

Sources: Beaujot and Rappak 1990, 113; special tabulations based on 1991 public use sample

Internal Migration of Immigrants

Edmonston (1996) finds that both the foreign born and the native born are more likely to move to provinces that have larger populations, more economic opportunities, and higher proportions of foreign-born population. At the same time, immigrants are more likely to stay in a province that has a higher proportion of foreign born of the same ethnicity, and they are more likely to leave provinces with low relative incomes. Consequently, he finds no evidence of an increased dispersion of immigrants over time. Belanger (1993) finds that, in relation to the 1981 population, the net internal migration ratios tend to be higher for the foreign born. However, it is noteworthy that in the three provinces of Ontario, British Columbia, and Alberta, the probabilities of departure are lower for immigrants than for the Canadian born (Table 5.6, last set of rows). That is, the very provinces that were receiving disproportionate numbers of immigrants were less likely to see their departures for other provinces. Projecting these probabilities to the point of stability, Belanger (1993,

102 Part Two: The Demographic Impact TABLE 5.6 Internal miqration by birthplace and region, Canada, 1981-1986 Atlantic provinces Quebec Net regional migration (1000s) -15.4 Foreign born -2.5 Canadian born -7.6 -47.9

Ontario

Prairie provinces

Alberta

British Columbia

19.8 79.1

-4.3 -0.2

-3.2 -25.9

5.6 2.5

Net regional migration as ratio to 1981 population of same birthplace -0.87 -3.21 0.96 -2.02 Foreign born -2.95 -0.87 -1.47 Canadian born -0.38 1.26 -0.01

0.89 0.13

Probability of departure in relation to the 1981 population of the same birthplace Foreign born 10.83 4.88 1.38 6.54 7.72 3.40 Canadian born 4.23 1.92 2.56 9.93 5.98 5.03 Source: Belanger 1993, Tables 3, 4, and 5

168) concludes that the internal migration of the immigrant population brings a greater concentration of this population. The initial arrival of immigrants has the largest impact on population distribution. To some extent this impact is reduced by the emigration of immigrants, which comprises about half of emigration from Canada (Beaujot and Rappak 1989; Michalowski 1991). The subsequent internal migration of immigrants has less impact, but at the same time it does not bring greater dispersion of the foreign born. Metropolitan Distribution of Immigrants A focus on metropolitan areas provides another important way to capture the geographic impact of immigration. While post-war immigration has largely been a metropolitan phenomenon, the Review of Demography (1989) more correctly concluded that this has involved the metropolitan areas west of the Quebec-Ontario border, plus Montreal. East of this border, the highest proportion of immigrants is in Halifax, but this is still under half of the national average. Even Ottawa-Hull and Thunder Bay have a smaller proportion of immigrants than the national average (Badets and Chui 1994, 10). In these distributions, Toronto and Vancouver stand out in particular, with 41 and 35 per cent foreign born respectively by 1996 (Statistics Canada 1997, 8).

Immigration and Demographic Structures 103 TABLE 5.7 Distribution of Canadian born and immigrants by arrival cohorts and metropolitan areas, Canada, 1991 Canadian Before born 1 960 Toronto Montreal Vancouver Subtotal Other Metropolitan areas Other Total

1961-70

1971-80

1981-91

26.3

25.1 9.5 8.4 43.0

35.4 12.8 9.8 58.0

36.5 11.7 12.6 60.8

39.4 14.0 12.9 66.3

28.0 45.6 100.0

30.3 26.6 100.0

26.0 16.0 100.0

25.8 13.4 100.0

24.5 9.2 100.0

10.2 11.3

4.8

Source: Special tabulations based on 1991 public use sample

In terms of total numbers, the three metropolitan areas of Toronto, Montreal, and Vancouver are particularly noteworthy with more than half of immigrants compared to just over one-quarter of the Canadianborn population (see Hersak and Thomas (1988)). In the Canadianborn population, Montreal maintains its historical position as the largest city of the country, but Toronto's immigrant population is more than three times that of Montreal. Over the immigrant arrival cohorts, Toronto, Vancouver, and Montreal have increased their share of immigrants, while this share has declined slightly for the total of other metropolitan areas and significantly for the nonmetropolitan areas (Table 5.7). Consequently, the nonmetropolitan population comprises 45.6 per cent of the Canadian born population but only 9.2 per cent of immigrant arrivals for the period 1981-91. Immigrants to Quebec are highly concentrated in Montreal. In 1991, 88 per cent of Quebec's foreign born were in Montreal, comprising close to 600,000 people (Gagne 1995). Projecting these trends with 40,000 arrivals to the province per year, Termote (1988) finds that Montreal's population would increase significantly. This would add some 1,150,000 to the population over forty years, compared to a 1986 size of 1,750,000. These types of projections need to be done for other metropolitan areas. It would appear that the metropolitan destination of immigrants is pushing the urbanization trend. There is a need for more analyses of the impact of immigration on the relative growth of the urban popula-

104 Part Two: The Demographic Impact tion, including any impact that it may be having on the movement of the Canadian born toward urban areas. Given that immigrants are likely to settle mostly in metropolitan areas and to follow the pathways established by earlier cohorts, immigration will probably continue to accentuate the inequalities in Canada's regional population distribution. While there are efficiencies associated with more concentration of population, this also means that immigration cannot be seen as a means of demographic redistribution toward areas that have smaller populations. Immigration and Socio-cultural Composition Ethnicity and Visible Minorities Immigration increases the ethnic diversity of the Canadian population. In effect, there is a tradition in Canada to focus on the ethnic characteristics of the foreign-born population (Ramirez 1991). Immigrants can be placed in various categories corresponding to socio-economic characteristics, but they tend to be especially classified into ethnic categories, according to places of origin. All societies have minorities and need to balance assimilation and the respect for differences. The originality of Canada does not come from the presence of minorities and the dynamics of their integration, but from the fact that immigration plays a predominant role in such questions (Lacroix 1991). These dynamics of ethnicity are somewhat different in Quebec, where the French-English tensions have increased the opportunity for other ethnic groups to retain more separateness, and where the policy agenda of integration into a French-speaking majority is more recent (Lacroix 1991). Given the weak position of the French language on the continent, there are difficulties both in integrating immigrants into the French majority and in the French society redefining itself as a receiving and pluralist society. The ease of demographic classifications by place of birth should not discourage research on the extent to which the classification is relevant for given individuals and groups. This problem of the meaning of categories applies especially to the visible minority designation. Since the 1970s, the fastest growing foreign-born population involves persons born outside of Europe and the United States. In view of employment equity programs, the visible minority population is defined as persons who are neither white, Caucasian, nor aboriginal. In effect, it is the

Immigration and Demographic Structures 105 TABLE 5.8 Visible minority population, using various assumptions, 1981, 1991, 2016, Canada

Population 1981 1991

Percentage of total population

1,300,000 2,714,600

4.7 9.7

7,459,500 7,002,300

20.6 19.4

2016 High projection Low projection Visible minority percent in immigration

68%

7,137,000

80% Difference

7,459,500 322,500 (4.5%)

Fertility 2.11 1.87 Difference

7,137,000 7,002,300 134,700 (1.9%)

Sources: Samuel 1987; Dai and George 1996, 29

population that originates directly or indirectly from Asia, Latin America, and Africa. At the 1981 census, the visible minority population was estimated at 1,130,000 persons (4.7 per cent of the total population), of which 85 per cent were of foreign birth (Samuel 1987). In the period 1981-90, 64.8 per cent of immigrants were classified in this category (Beaujot and Hou 1993; Verma and Hou 1992). In 1991, this population numbered 2,715,000, or 9.7 per cent of the total population. Among persons with visible minority status aged fifteen and over in 1991, close to two-thirds had arrived since 1971, and 35 per cent since 1981 (Kelly 1995). Based on slightly lower mortality and slightly higher fertility than the national average, and with a continuation of immigration trends, it is projected that the visible minority population will increase to about seven million in 2016, or close to 20 per cent of the Canadian population (Table 5.8). Among the demographic components, immigration clearly predominates in the relative growth of the visible minority population (Kalbach et al. 1993). For example, a projection based on 80 per cent visible minority among immigrants produces a total that is 4.5 per cent higher than holding the proportion constant at 68 per cent. In comparison, the

106 Part Two: The Demographic Impact difference between a total fertility of 2.11 and 1.87 births per woman produces a difference of only 1.9 per cent in 2016 (Table 5.8). Immigration therefore plays the dominant role in the socio-cultural transformations of Canada associated with the relative growth of the visible minority population. The immigration factor also dominates in the geographic distribution of this population, in favour of metropolitan areas, and the three largest ones in particular. For persons aged fifteen and over, 93 per cent of the visible minority population was in metropolitan areas in 1991, compared to 59 per cent of the rest of the population (Kelly 1995). More than two-thirds live in the three largest metropolitan areas, compared to one-third of the remainder of the population. For example, the visible minority population comprises 24 per cent of the metropolitan area of Toronto, 23 per cent for Vancouver, and 10 per cent for Montreal. While immigration is transforming the Canadian population composition in terms of the relative size of the visible minority component, it is important to appreciate that broad definitions are being used in attempts to capture any element of noncaucasian origin. These definitions are not very sensitive to the appropriateness of the designation, or to the prospects of its reduced relevance over time. The projections used in Table 5.8 may be problematic, since they are based on strong assumptions of ethnic retention, while the very meaning of visible minority status may change considerably over a twenty-year period (Beaujot and Hou 1993). Language Composition

At the time of arrival, 30 per cent of immigrants of the 1969-77 period, and more than 45 per cent of those of the 1978-90 period, did not know either of the official languages (Thomas 1992). For the period 1986-91, Termote (1995, 171) estimates that 25 per cent of the net international migration to Quebec was of French home language, along with 0.1 per cent for the rest of Canada. In the 1986-91 cohort, only a third of immigrants were using an official language at home in 1991, and more than 10 per cent knew neither of these languages (Table 5.9). Over time, the majority of immigrants come to associate with one or the other of the official languages. In order to highlight this tendency, the concept of 'predominant language' combines the responses on language spoken at home and knowledge of official languages. Persons who speak English or French at home were assigned this language as

Immigration and Demographic Structures 107 TABLE 5.9 Knowledge and use of official languages, by sex, for Canadian born and various immigrant cohorts, Canada, 1991 Do not know an official language

Know an official language

Spoken at home

Not spoken at home Male

Female

Male

Female

Male

Female

Canadian born

97.3

97.5

2.3

2.1

0.4

0.4

Immigrants

60.4

59.7

35.1

32.5

4.5

7.7

Before 1946 1946-60 1961-70 1971-75 1976-80 1981-85 1986-91

90.7 73.4 71.0 63.8 56.8 44.9 33.2

88.8 72.6 67.6 63.0 55.5 45.6 34.4

8.5 24.5 25.6 32.9 38.8 49.3 57.1

9.5 23.3 25.9 30.5 36.2 43.6 51.2

0.8 2.1 3.4 3.3 4.5 5.8 9.8

1.7 4.2 6.5 6.4 8.2 10.7 14.4

Source: Special tabulations based on 1991 public use sample

their predominant language. Persons speaking 'other' languages at home were also assigned to English or French predominant language if they could speak 'only' that language among the official languages. In effect, this measures which among the official languages is a given person's predominant language. Outside of Quebec, the results are simple: immigration contributes to the predominance of the English language, and there is less French spoken among immigrants than in the Canadian-born population (Table 5.10). In Quebec, the foreign born are clearly less French (40.1 per cent) than the Canadian-born population (88.8 per cent). In spite of the minority status of English in Quebec, immigrant cohorts before 1971 were more English than French. For more recent cohorts, close to half are French predominant language, and this predominance is stronger for younger immigrants and for those who did not know English at the time of arrival (Veltman 1988). Over time, for a given cohort, French tends to gain (Beaujot and Rappak 1990,116-17). Quebec also receives a greater proportion of immigrants who know neither of the official languages, and persons of third languages retain these longer. This longer retention is probably related to the larger

108 Part Two: The Demographic Impact TABLE 5.10 Predominant language for Canadian born and various immigrant cohorts, Quebec and rest of Canada, 1991 Quebec English Canadian born

Rest of Canada French

Other

English

French

Other

9.3

88.8

2.0

95.4

3.8

0.8

Immigrants

34.7

40.1

25.1

91.7

0.6

7.7

Before 1 946 1946-60 1961-70 1971-75 1 976-80 1981-85 1986-90

68.9 46.7 39.2 32.3 25.1 22.2 25.7

26.8 30.4 36.7 42.6 48.6 49.5 45.4

4.3

22.9 24.2 25.1 26.3 28.2 28.9

98.1 96.0 93.4 93.1 90.0 88.0 85.4

0.3 0.3 0.6 0.6 1.0 0.5 0.8

1.6 3.7 6.0 6.4 9.0

11.4 13.9

Notes: The predominant language is determined on the bases of language spoken at home and knowledge of official languages. Those who speak one national language at home are assigned this predominant language. Those who do not speak English or French at home are assigned that predominant language if they know only English or French among the official languages. The 'other' category comprises those who speak both English and French at home, plus those who speak neither language at home and know both or neither of the official languages. Source: Special tabulations based on 1991 public use sample

potential for ethnic separateness provided by French-English tensions in Quebec. In addition, as we have seen, immigration is concentrated in the one metropolitan area of Montreal, and the City of Montreal in particular (Faille 1991). This concentration presents a difficulty for linguistic integration. For instance, in given localities, French mother tongue children can be in a minority, even in French schools. On the other hand, immigrants of third languages are more oriented to French than are nonimmigrants of either English or third languages (Castonguay 1992). The general linguistic trends in Canada therefore involve decreases in the official language minorities, that is, English in Quebec and French in the rest of Canada. For the rest of Canada, immigration contributes to the trend as there is less French among immigrants than in the nativeborn population. In Quebec, immigration enhances the English minority because there is more English among immigrants than in the native

Immigration and Demographic Structures 109 born, and a sizeable proportion of third-language migrants continue to transfer to the English language. Immigration therefore plays an important role in Canada's changing linguistic distribution. Although the distribution by languages changes only slowly, immigration is the main element producing an increase in the relative dominance of the English language in comparison to the French language (Lachapelle 1988a). While language policy in Quebec has promoted a greater association of immigrants with the French language, this is partly at the expense of departures of English and other linguistic groups. Therefore, it is at the expense of a lower total weight of Quebec in the population of Canada. Lachapelle (1988b) has put it well: it is hard to envisage scenarios that would both sustain the weight of Quebec in the Canadian total and increase the proportion of French in Quebec. The rest of Canada does not have such a problem: more of its international arrivals are English to start with; other immigrants retain their languages to a lesser extent; and almost all transfers favour English. As Lachapelle further observes, only a higher French fertility could both increase the proportion of French and increase the weight of Quebec in Canada. Clearly, immigration has an impact on the changing socio-cultural composition of the Canadian population. However, we would argue that this impact is especially felt at the time of arrival, and that ethnic and linguistic distinctiveness is reduced over time. This is especially the case outside of Quebec, where immigrants associate with the majority language. A significant part of the greater sensitivity toward immigration in Quebec results from the fact that immigrants maintain a greater linguistic distinctiveness from the French majority language. Immigration and Socio-Economic Composition Immigration is largely justified in economic terms (see, e.g., Employment and Immigration (1989)). In view of the geographic size of the country, and the need to control the resources that were present, immigration has often been seen as necessary if not essential (Sullivan 1992). However, it does not necessarily follow that immigrants will enhance the socio-economic composition of the population. Discrimination and racism could operate to provide economic benefits through a supply of cheap labour or a dual labour market (DasGupta 1994). It is therefore important to continuously analyse the economic status of immigrants and to pay attention to disadvantaged groups.

110 Part Two: The Demographic Impact On education, immigrants are more concentrated at the two extremes of the distribution (Beaujot 1997). At higher levels of education, measured in terms of the proportion with some university education, the immigrant advantage applies especially to the last two decades and especially to men. This advantage is also more likely to apply to persons who are of origins other than Europe and the United States, that is, to persons who are largely of visible minority status. For both men and women, immigrants also have higher proportions with less than nine years of education. However, the greater concentration at higher levels of education means that, on average, the foreign born have more education and immigrants of the 1981-91 period have higher average education than the total foreign born (Badets and Chui 1994, 41-4). The foreign born tend to increase not only the average level of education but also labour force participation in Canada. That is, immigrants have higher average levels of labour force participation (Beaujot 1997). In given age groups, a higher proportion of the foreign-born population is working full-time. However, this advantage does not apply to the persons who arrived in the five-year period preceding the census, where labour force participation is significantly lower. Average income provides a summary measure of socio-economic composition. Table 5.11 shows two age-adjusted measures of average income. Total income relates to all persons who indicated a positive income in 1990. Employment income is based on persons aged fifteen to sixty-four who worked full-time for at least forty weeks in 1990. Overall, and in both comparisons, immigrants are very close to the national average. However, this result covers considerable differences by arrival cohort and place of origin. Groups that arrived before 1971 for men and before 1976 for women have average incomes higher than that of the Canadian-born population, while the more recent immigrant cohorts have a disadvantage. Another change is seen to take place over these same cohorts: the average income of immigrants from Europe and the United States moves from being less than to being more than that of immigrants from other continents. In the post-1976 cohorts there is a strong disadvantage for immigrants who are not from Europe and the United States, that is, who are largely visible minorities. For persons admitted in the 1980s, the disadvantage is more than 20 per cent. The comparison of the 1961 and 1971 censuses had shown a very encouraging outcome for post-war immigrants (the 1946-60 cohort). In the majority of age-sex groups, the average income in 1961 was lower than that of the Canadian-born, but by 1971 these groups had largely

Immigration and Demographic Structures

111

TABLE 5.11 Indexes of total income and employment income for persons working full-time at least 40 weeks, by sex, place of birth, and arrival cohorts, adjusted for age, Canada, 1991 Employment income

Total income

Men

Women

Men

Women

Canadian born

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.01

Immigrants Before 1946 1946-60 1961-70 1971-75 1976-80 1981-85 1986-89

1.00 0.99 1.10 1.09 0.99 0.93 0.86 0.75

1.00 1.05 1.06 1.11 1.04 0.93 0.83

0.78

0.99 1.01 1.06 1.06 0.97 0.94 0.91 0.81

0.98 1.07 1.07 1.06 0.99 0.92 0.84 0.79

Europe & U.S. Before 1946 1946-60 1961-70 1971-75 1976-80 1981-85 1986-89

1.06 0.98 1.10 1.07 1.05 1.06 1.03 0.89

1.02 1.05 1.05 1.06 1.02 0.97 0.93 0.80

1.04 0.98 1.07 1.04 1.03 1.06 1.03 0.95

1.01 1.05 1.07 1.03 1.00 0.99 0.95 0.82

Other Before 1946 1946-60 1961-70 1971-75 1976-80 1981-85 1 986-89

0.88 1.16 1.10 1.17 0.94 0.85 0.78 0.70

0.96 1.16 1.19 1.25 1.06 0.91 0.79 0.78

0.90

0.92

1.01 1.10 0.93 0.87 0.82 0.75

1.08 1.13 0.98 0.89 0.78 0.78

-

-

Notes: - fewer than 50 cases Adjustments for age using multiple classification analysis, ten-year age groups, ages 15+ for total income and ages 15-64 for employment income of persons working full-time at least 40 weeks in 1990. Index is based on national average. Source: Special tabulations based on 1991 public use sample

exceeded the averages of Canadian-born counterparts (Richmond and Kalbach 1980). Few similar transitions occurred over the 1971,1981, and 1986 censuses (Beaujot and Rappak 1990, 139). In the vast majority of comparisons, a given immigrant cohort was either above or below the

112 Part Two: The Demographic Impact average of the Canadian-born population at each census. The transitions that occurred were as follows: the 1961-9 cohort had lower average incomes than the Canadian born in 1971 but exceeded this average in 1981, and women of the 1970-4 cohort made a similar transition by the time of the 1986 census. Table 5.11 shows no further transitions in the 1991 census. It would appear that the immigrants of cohorts since 1976 may not reach the average income of persons born in Canada, in spite of their educational advantage. The situation is more positive for immigrants from Europe and the United States, who exceed the Canadian-born average except in the last cohort for men and the three last cohorts for women. For the majority of recent immigrants, that is, those from 'other continents' who would largely be visible minorities, the three most recent cohorts show serious disadvantages. On the other hand, in the cohorts that preceded 1970, these immigrants from the 'other continents' have an average income that is typically superior to the average for immigrants from Europe and the United States. Our objective here is not to pursue an explanation of these differentials. Nonetheless, it is worth noting the importance of region of residence and socio-cultural characteristics. In particular, the disadvantage of recent cohorts, especially those of non-European origin, applies more to residents of metropolitan areas (Beaujot 1997). Except for the most recent arrivals, the minority of immigrants who were living in nonmetropolitan areas had average incomes that compared favourably to the Canadian born in the same areas. Other results show that the advantages of immigrants of European origin apply to the British but not to the Italians. At the same time, the disadvantage suffered by nonEuropean immigrants does not apply to Chinese arrivals of the 1961-80 period. Also, immigrants who speak one of the national languages at home have average levels of income that compare favourably to that of the Canadian born. The overall results by socio-economic status are that immigration enhances the Canadian averages, but that the overall differences are small. For education, the more recent cohorts have more advantages, but there is also a higher proportion with lower levels of education among immigrants. The cohort differences by labour force participation and average income clearly show that the strong negative differential at the time of arrival is reduced over time. However, especially on average income of immigrants who are not from Europe and the United States, the disadvantage of the more recent cohorts is not being reduced as quickly. It is even possible to doubt whether these cohorts will arrive

Immigration and Demographic Structures 113 at the average incomes of the Canadian born, in spite of their educational advantages. Summary and Discussion Our first thesis was that the impact of immigration is especially felt at the time of arrival and conversely that it becomes more diffuse over time. We see that the immigrant population differs from the Canadianborn population more in certain regards than in others. Immigration contributes considerably to demographic growth, to the geographic concentration of this growth, and to ethnic diversity. These aspects of growth, concentration, and diversity are especially felt at the time of arrival. Except on geographic concentration, the impact is reduced over the course of the presence of the foreign-born population. In particular, immigrants do not differ significantly from the receiving population in terms of fertility and mortality. Given in part the advantages in education, the socio-economic differences are reduced with time. The vast majority come to speak the national languages, and even the visibility of ethnic differences lessens, certainly in passing to the second and third generations. Thus, our conclusion is similar to that of Pendakur and Pendakur (1995) when following the occupational distribution of given cohorts of immigrants. Just as the occupation at time of arrival has the largest impact, so too does the demographic impact especially apply to the time of arrival. Since the influence is especially felt at the time of arrival, it is difficult to know whether the impact of immigration has increased. Nonetheless, our second thesis appears to be supported in terms of growth and socio-cultural and socio-economic composition, where a case can be made for an increased impact associated with more recent immigration. With the exception of the period at the turn of the century, immigration of the period since 1971 is having a larger impact on demographic growth. At least if one considers visible minority status to be a significant ethnic category, the mid-1970s are noteworthy as the turning point after which more than half of immigrants were arriving from Asia, Latin America, and Africa. The longer time taken for immigrants from these continents to reach the Canadian-born average in terms of labour force participation and income also represents a larger differential for recent immigration. While much attention is paid to demographic growth, the visible minority population, and socio-economic differentials, the differential geographic distribution is also a significant factor, in part because inter-

114 Part Two: The Demographic Impact nal migration accentuates the strong original differences at time of arrival. Unlike natural increase, which is rather similar across the country, there are very important geographic differentials for both internal and international migration. With a continuation of current trends, one might argue that only some provinces will have a stake in immigration. With the diversification of immigration and its concentration in certain regions, the ethnic profile also varies considerably over the geography of the country. In particular, the visible minority population is concentrated in large cities, while rural areas and the Atlantic region reveal a concentration of European ethnicity (White and Samuel 1991). In Quebec, immigration is concentrated in the one metropolitan area of Montreal, posing specific challenges for integration. In Toronto and Vancouver, the ethnic concentrations in certain areas of the city could also pose problems. There are advantages to concentration in terms of mutual support and the provision of appropriate services. However, large numbers in a given group can introduce institutional separateness and may undermine the identification with a collective destiny as represented by common social programs. The fact that immigrants, particularly the most visible categories of immigrants, are taking longer to arrive at income levels comparable to the national average poses further challenges to integration. A broad-ranging book entitled Age of Migration argues both that migration is an ever-present phenomenon in human history but that it was never as significant as it is today in terms of the diversity that it brings to most countries (Castles and Miller 1993). We have proposed here that immigration is playing a larger role in the period since the mid-1970s in terms of (1) a greater impact on population growth, (2) a greater impact on socio-cultural composition through the importance of the visible minority component, and (3) a greater impact on socio-economic composition through more persistent income differentials compared to the Canadian born. In order to conclude with some policy reflections, these demographic findings need to be supplemented by other significant observations. Ramacharan (1996) argues that Canada has been and continues to be a racist society. Tator and Henry (1996) find that media and other agencies act for the dominant society in undermining the legitimacy of visible minority groups. Taylor (1996) proposes that there are powerful denial mechanisms in the face of individual level of discrimination. Experimental data show that even a few words on the competitive nature of immigrants can encourage students to have a more negative

Immigration and Demographic Structures 115 attitude toward immigration (Esses et al. 1996b). As immigration researchers, we may also have denial mechanisms, especially because we profit from immigration. Other politically correct mechanisms make it difficult to discuss immigration levels; an argument for lower levels can itself be seen as a racist argument. However, if we accept that immigration is having a larger impact on Canadian society, and that racism and discrimination are persistent, two things are possible. We can argue for changing the society to ensure better integration, as many have suggested. But we can also conclude that immigration levels should be lower to permit the society to better accommodate those immigrants allowed in. The argument for increasing the levels of immigration is generally made on economic or demographic grounds: that Canada needs more immigrants (Beaujot 1991, 148-51, 178-201). However, the review by the Economic Council of Canada (1991b) concludes that, in terms of macroeconomic questions, immigration is a fairly neutral phenomenon. In terms of demographics, the projections by Statistics Canada (1994) indicate that even with a fertility rate of 1.7 births per woman and an immigration rate of 150,000 persons per year, the population will still be growing in 2016, that is for the realistically foreseeable future. I am more sympathetic with the socio-cultural argument for immigration. It is on this ground that the Economic Council of Canada suggests maintaining high levels of immigration. Tepper (1987) makes the case that societies that are better able to 'manage ethnicity' will be better equipped to face the twenty-first century. We need to be continuously vigilant with regard to the viability of the 'Canadian experiment' with relatively high immigration. This means that questions of integration are particularly significant. If integration is not working, we must consider both alternatives: improve the mechanisms for effective integration and/or ensure that immigration levels are not beyond an appropriate or optimal level.

6

Residential Patterns in Cities T.R. BALAKRISHNAN and FENG HOU

In Canada at the present time immigration is as important as natural increase, contributing to about half the annual population growth of the country. Not only the number of immigrants but their composition has drastically changed. Removal of discriminatory clauses in the immigration laws in the early 1960s, combined with the changing push factors in the countries of origin, mean that the ethnic composition of Canada is very different from what it was before. While western European origins predominated before 1960, in the '60s and '70s most immigrants were primarily from southern Europe. Since then however, populations from the Third World countries have formed the majority of immigrants. Thus, more than one-half of the immigrants in the 1980s were the so-called visible minority groups of blacks, South Asians, Chinese, and many Latin and Central Americans.1 In 1991, 68 per cent of new arrivals to Canada were visible minority immigrants, about two-thirds of whom were blacks, Chinese, and South Asians (Statistics Canada 1996b). Unlike the earlier immigrants from western Europe, the new immigrants are more selective in their places of destination in Canada. Larger metropolitan areas attract a disproportionately greater share of recent immigrants. For example, during the decade 1981-91, the percentages of black immigrants who went to Montreal, Toronto, and Vancouver were 20.4, 58.1, and 1.8 respectively. The corresponding percentages for South Asians were 6.5, 52.7, and 16.7 and for Chinese immigrants 6.8, 43.3, and 28.8 respectively. Selectivity in the choice of residential space on the part of ethnic groups is noticeable not only at the regional and city levels but within cities as well, in the creation of distinct neigh-

Residential Patterns in Cities 117 bourhoods. The changing inter- and intracity ethnic composition forms the focus of study in this chapter. As the ethnic and racial diversity in Canadian cities change, concerns arise about the socio-economic integration of minority groups in the larger society as well as problems of discrimination they may face in the housing and labour markets. Two types of integration become particularly relevant, namely, in residential choices of minority groups, and in the occupational structure. Lack of spatial integration is manifested in terms of ethnic neighbourhoods and spatial segregation from other groups, especially the major groups. Ethnic neighbourhoods may also promote retention of ethnic identity. This study focuses primarily on the spatial residential patterns of ethnic groups. Is concentration of recent immigrant groups increasing or decreasing? Are there changes in their segregation from the majority Charter groups of British and French? Do ethnic neighbourhoods differ in their overall socio-economic levels? Can we explain some of these patterns? The hypothesis that rapid growth of ethnic and racial minorities through immigration will increase their concentration and segregation from major groups has been posited by others and has found some support (Harwood 1986; Massey 1986; Massey and Denton 1987). The premise is that rapid and substantial increase of such immigrants will stimulate negative attitudes toward them. They may be seen as a threat to employment opportunities and a strain on local services and welfare systems. Different customs and lifestyles may also be difficult to accept if the immigrant population of a different ethnic origin increases substantially within a short time (Reitz 1988a). Discrimination against immigrant groups in housing and labour markets may force them into certain areas of the city and thus increase their spatial concentration and segregation from specific groups, such as the British or other European origin groups (Olson and Kobayashi 1993). In the United States much of the non-white segregation is typical of this involuntary segregation (Taeuber and Taeuber 1965; Taeuber 1970; Massey and Denton 1993). The patterns and changes in involuntary residential segregation have been explained in terms of 'social class' and 'social distance' hypotheses. Residential concentration of social classes may reflect the unequal resources of the classes, which may reduce the choice of residential location for the lower classes. Further, the greater social distance will add to the extent of segregation among certain groups, such as the 'visible minorities' (Duncan and Lieberson

118 Part Two: The Demographic Impact 1959; Darroach and Marston 1971; Richmond 1972; Kantrowitz 1973; Driedger and Peters 1977; Pineo 1977; Balakrishnan 1982,1982; Kalbach 1981; Massey 1979,1981a). On the other hand, concentration can also result from what the minorities perceive as its advantages. Proponents of voluntary segregation, sometimes referred to as the 'cultural proximity model/ argue that persons of the same ethnic ancestry may choose to live in proximity so that social interaction can be maximized and group norms and values can be maintained (Driedger and Church 1974; Balakrishnan 1982). Size and concentration may enable an ethnic group to give its members the comfort of ethnic identity, shared cultural values, language, social institutions such as ethnic clubs, churches, and own language newspapers, and access to economic resources not available elsewhere in the city. One may therefore expect that new arrivals will go to ethnic enclaves first before moving to other areas as their socio-economic conditions and ability to adjust to their new country improve. Most of these studies have been done in the United States with such groups as Mexicans, Puerto Ricans, and blacks. Whether these findings would be duplicated in Canada cannot be taken for granted. Canadian immigrants vary substantially from their American counterparts not only by place of origin but also in their socio-economic characteristics. Moreover, Canada differs from the United States in other respects, for example, the size and history of the black minority. Consequently this hypothesis needs to be tested in the Canadian context. Sources of Data The data used in this study were taken from the summary tapes of the 1981, 1986, and 1991 Canadian censuses. For comparative reasons we restrict ourselves to the largest census metropolitan areas (CMAs) for most of the analysis. Except in two or three cases they also have a population of at least 1,000 in each of the ethnic categories. Because we are interested in the patterns of change in the entire community, it was considered appropriate to keep all the tracts in each census year rather than maintain the same boundaries over the decade. This would mean that the total tracted area of a CMA may have increased during the period 1981-91. The selection and definition of ethnic groups is the most problematic issue for a study of this type. Moreover, the acceptance of multiple responses to ethnicity as of the 1981 census, while making the data rich

Residential Patterns in Cities 119 and more realistic, renders comparative analysis particularly difficult. In the twenty-five CMAs, the percentage of the population giving multiple responses to the ethnic origin question increased from 7.7 per cent in 1981 to 27.4 per cent in 1986 and 27.6 per cent in 1991 (Statistics Canada 1993). Clearly, the 1981 figure underestimates multiple origins, probably as the result of question wording and the fact that only one write-in category beside the mark-ins was allowed. The fact that 1981 was the first time multiple responses were accepted may also be partially responsible. People who had been used to giving a single response in earlier censuses may have been slow in adapting to the change. Statistics Canada has taken greater pains to make the 1986 and 1991 data comparable and more valid. The various ethnic categories used in 1986 and 1991 are directly comparable while those in 1981 are less so and less reliance should therefore be placed on the comparisons made here with the 1981 figures. The lesser emphasis placed on 1981 data in this chapter is due to the lack of direct comparability. Another methodological problem arises from the fact that at the census tract level all the multiple responses were grouped together as one category, and thus we have only single response categories for the various ethnic groups. For the various measures that are central to this study we were forced to use only single responses. This would not have been a serious problem if multiple responses were uniformly distributed by ethnic group or by CMA. Multiple responses vary a great deal by CMA. For example, in Quebec City only 4.6 per cent gave multiple responses in 1991, while in Calgary 41.1 per cent reported more than one ethnic origin. This study, however, was more concerned with recent immigrant groups such as blacks, Chinese, and South Asians, most of whom provided single origin responses. The majority of the multiple responses were among British and French groups. For example, in 1991, of the 27.6 per cent who gave multiple responses, 23.9 per cent were of British origin only, or British, French, and other responses, while only 3.7 per cent gave multiple responses of other than British and French origins (Statistics Canada 1993). Immigration and Ethnicity Ethnic population by period of immigration is not available for the CMAs in the published census data. However, by using the 3 per cent public use sample tape in 1991 we examined the profile of the ethnic population for Canada as a whole by period of immigration. This re-

120 Part Two: The Demographic Impact TABLE 6.1 Percentage distribution of immigrants by period of immigration and ethnicity, Canada, 1991

Total population Single origin British French Dutch German Polish Ukrainian Italian Portuguese Jewish Other European Arab/West Asian South Asian Chinese Other East/ Southeast Asia Latin/Central/ South American Black/Caribbean Aboriginal Other single Multiple origin British only British & French British & other French & other British/French Non-British/French

Percentage distribution of immigrants by period of immigration

Percentage of immigrants in total population

Total

than 1). They accounted for 43 per cent of the total variance in the data. The component loadings and average component scores for each citizenship and birthplace group are presented in Table 8.5.3 The four dimensions found in the data were labelled as: 1 Socio-economic status (SES), the dimension representing the predominance of university degrees, professional and managerial work, and service-sector jobs in the workforce. This dimension was the major one and accounted for 14 per cent of the explained variance in the data. 2 Blue-collar work, reflecting the predominance of a male majority who worked full-time in manual types of jobs. It accounted for 13 per cent of the explained variance. 3 Aging, the dimension associated with older workers with relatively low levels of education. This dimension accounted for 8 per cent of the explained variance. 4 Visible minority presence, the minor dimension, which represented the predominance of visible minority workers who were also more likely to be Metropolitan Toronto residents. It accounted for another 8 per cent of the explained variance in the data.

174 Part Two: The Demographic Impact Figure 8.1 shows the average positions of the groups on the plane of the first two components. Groups 2, 6, and 10 (UK/U.S.-born of different legal status) occupied positions in the lower right-hand corner of the scatterplot, suggesting that members of these groups were generally highly educated individuals who had taken high-status jobs in the labour force. Group 4 (naturalized Asian-born) also ranked high in socio-economic status but, in contrast to the former groups, had a larger number of male and full-time workers. Occupying middle positions in the scatterplot, Canadian citizens by birth and citizenship-ineligible immigrants from Asia appeared to be almost indistinguishable in their sociodemographic and labour attributes. The nonpermanent resident group also occupied an intermediate position in the occupational status hierarchy, but scored relatively low on the blue-collar component. Groups 3 and 7 were composed of a majority of males working in manual jobs. Those workers who were citizenship-eligible born in Europe (Group 7) were the most typical blue-collar segment of the labour force and appeared as a clear 'outlier' in the scatterplot. The naturalized European born were also predominantly composed of manual workers, but they had neither high nor low socio-economic standings compared to other groups. An examination of the groups' positions on the first and third dimensions revealed that the aging component mimicked closely that of the blue-collar worker component, thus the relative distances between the group points was fairly similar to Figure 8.1. Component 4, however, clearly separated citizenship and birthplace groups in terms of the presence of visible minority workers and the likelihood of residing in Metropolitan Toronto versus the rest of the country. Contrary to the other three components, the visible minority component had a negligible loading on total income (-.01), suggesting that among visible minority workers and Metropolitan Toronto residents there are larger proportions of low-income earners compared to other groups. The position of groups in the first and fourth components' space are presented in the scatterplot of Figure 8.2. Among the visible minority groupings, the naturalized Asian-born group scored the highest on the SES dimension while citizenship-ineligible immigrants born elsewhere scored the lowest. The distance range between top and bottom scorers among non-visible groupings was relatively larger than among the visible minority groupings. Two clusters of groups were noticeable among nonvisible minority immigrants: a white-collar 'pole' consisting of those born in Britain or the United States of different citizenship status and a

Patterns of Acquiring Citizenship 175 Figure 8.1 Scatterplot of the positions of groups on first two principal components

1: Socio-economic status * - Average component loadings for each group multiplied by 100 Citizenship/birthplace groups: 1. Canadian citizens by birth 2. Naturalized / U.K. and U.S. born 3. Naturalized European born 4. Naturalized Asian born 5. Naturalized born elswhere 6. Eligible / U.K and U.S. born 7. Eligible / European born

8. 9. 10. 11. 12. 13. 14.

Eligible Asian born Eligible born elswhere Ineligible / U.K and U.S born Ineligible European born Ineligible Asian born Ineligible born elsewhere Nonpermanent residents

blue-collar 'pole' composed of both citizenship-eligible and citizenshipineligible European born. The observed positions of the birthplace and citizenship groups in the components space suggest that, in terms of socio-economic integration in Canadian labour markets, citizenship status is not as important as national origins. Regardless of their citizenship status in Canada (as naturalized Canadians, citizenship eligible or noneligible), immigrants born in the United Kingdom or the United States worked in high SES

176 Part Two: The Demographic Impact Figure 8.2 Scatterplot of the positions of groups on the first and fourth principal components *

* - Average component loadings for each group multiplied by 100 Citizenship/birthplace groups: 1. Canadian citizens by birth 2. Naturalized U.K. and U.S. born 3. Naturalized European born 4. Naturalized Asian born 5. Naturalized born elswhere 6. Eligible U.K and U.S. born 7. Eligible European born

8. Eligible Asian born 9. Eligible born elswhere 10. Ineligible U.K and U.S. born 11. Ineligible European born 12. Ineligible Asian born 13. Ineligible born elsewhere 14. Nonpermanent residents

jobs. They were integrated into the managerial and professional workforce. Their educational attainments and familiarity with Canadian culture may facilitate to a great extent this 'smooth' integration into labour markets. On the other side of the economic spectrum, naturalized and nonnaturalized Europeans (mostly southern Europeans) appeared to have found fixed occupational niches -as manual workers. Some of these workers are likely to perform well in these niches simply because their jobs do not require the special educational credentials or

Patterns of Acquiring Citizenship 177 TABLE 8.5 Principal components analysis results Variables

Component loadings* Component 1 Socioeconomic status (SES)

Age Male Visible minority Living with large family Married status Under Grade 9 education University degree Toronto CMA resident Unemployed Full-time job Number weeks worked in year Self-employed Manager/professional job Manual job Service industry job Total income Eigenvalue % explained variance * - Shaded: component loadings > or = .4

Component 2 Blue-collar work

Component 3 Aging

Component 4 Visible minority presence

+.08 +.07 +.02 +.05 +.05 -.28 +.74 +.03 +.02 +.15

+.02 +.50 -.01 +.11 +.01 +.01 +.03 -.05 +.05 +.56

+.82 .02 +.00 +.09 +.75 +.49 -.02 -.05 -.08 +.19

-.02 -.03 +.78 +.05 +.00 +.01 +.09 +.70 +.01 +.05

+.15 +.05 +.78 -.47 +.46 +.50

+.14 +.13 -.12 +.62 -.57 +.44

+.29 +.21 +.07 +.05 -.01 +.33

+.05 -.13 -.03 -.02 +.00 -.01

1.4 8.1

1.3 7.6

2.4 14.3

2.2 12.9

Average component scores Citizens 1 . Citizens by Birth 2. NT:U.K./U.S. 3. NT:Europe 4. NT:Asian 5. NT:Elsewhere

-.01 +.36 -.12 +.22 +.13

+.00 -.04 +.11 +.04 -.05

-.08 +.31 +.75 +.29 +.19

-.25 +.05 +.13 +2.33 +2.07

Noncitizens 6. EL:U.K./U.S. 7. EL:Europe 8. EL:Asia 9. EL:Elsewhere 10. IN:U.K./US 11. IN:Europe 12. IN:asia 13. IN:Elsewhere 14. NPR All

+.24 -.47 -.16 -.20 +.26 -.28 -.03 -.23 +.01

-.13 +.13 +.04 -.02 -.15 +.00 -.11 -.11 -.12

+.15 +.75 +.31 -.08 -.14 -.07 -.08 -.16 -.30

+.05 +.32 +2.35 +2.15 +.17 +.36 +2.50 +2.58 +1.89

Symbols: NT-Naturalized Immigrants. EL-Citizenship-eligible immigrants. IN-Citizenship-ineligible immigrants. NPR-Nonpermanent Residents

178 Part Two: The Demographic Impact TABLE 8.6 K-means cluster analysis results Citizenship and birthplace groups

Group membership in cluster solutions

2

3

4

5*

6

7

Cluster 1 1. Canadian citizens by birth 2. Naturalized/U.K. and U.S. born 6. Eligible U.K. and U.S. born 10. Ineligible U.S. and U.K. born

1 1 1 1

1 1 1 1

2 2 2 2

1 1 1 1

1 1 1 1

1 2 2 2

Cluster 2 4. Naturalized Asian born 5. Naturalized born elsewhere 9. Eligible born elsewhere 14. Nonpermanent residents

2 2 2 2

2 2 2 2

4 4 4 4

2 2 2 2

4 4 6 6

6 6 4 4

Cluster 3 3. Naturalized European born 7. Eligible European born

1 1

3 3

3 3

3 3

3 3

3 3

Cluster 4 8. Eligible Asian born 12. Ineligible Asian born 13. Ineligible born elsewhere

2 2 2

2 2 2

4 4 4

4 4 4

4 2 2

6 5 5

Cluster 5 11. Ineligible European born

1

1

1

5

5

7

* - Optimal cluster solution

linguistic skills required in other sectors of the economy (e.g., manufacturing, construction, food industries, etc.). A final stage of the multivariate analysis involved classifying the groups to summarize previous findings and detect patterns of similarity or dissimilarity between them. K-means cluster analysis was used for this purpose. Its clustering algorithm permitted measurement of the proximity between groups using estimated Mahalanobis distances between groups located in the component space.4 Beginning with an initial selection of k groups, K-means cluster analysis located each citizenship and birthplace group within clusters according to their distance to the nearest centroid.5 Table 8.6 shows the cluster memberships possible from seven cluster solutions. A k=5 cluster solution satisfied the basic optimality criteria for an adequate classification.6 The five clusters that emerged from the

Patterns of Acquiring Citizenship 179 analysis confirmed that birthplace rather than citizenship is the basic criterion for the patterning of the groups. Canadian citizens by birth and the UK/U.S.-born made up Cluster 1. This is a cluster of 'advantage' in Canadian labour markets. Cluster 2 comprised groups which occupied intermediate positions in the components space. Cluster 3, comprised of naturalized and citizenship-eligible Europeans, was a male and blue-collar conglomerate of older immigrants. Cluster 4 was the cluster of 'disadvantage.' It was comprised mostly of visible minority immigrant workers coming from Third World regions who experienced the most serious obstacles in terms of access, participation, and performance in labour markets. Cluster 5 was made up of recently arrived European-born immigrants. These individuals differed from the more established European-born workers of Cluster 3 because they experienced similar occupational and economic disadvantages as members of Cluster 4. Conclusion The preceding analysis allowed a brief look at the major socio-demographic and economic dimensions underlying citizenship status acquisition by immigrants in Canada. The 1991 census microdata, albeit a rich source of citizenship-related data, imposed several constraints on this analysis and caution is required in reading the results. Data aggregation may have hidden significant inter-and intragroup variations among the citizenship and birthplace groups examined. These groups are by no means homogeneous and require further examination to obtain more conclusive results. The acquisition of Canadian citizenship seems to closely mirror the multidimensionality of the immigrant integration process. The major conclusion of this analysis is that the acquisition of citizenship by immigrant groups does not seem to matter much in explaining positions in an occupational and economic hierarchy such as the Canadian one, which is heavily structured along ethnic and nationality lines. This central finding is relevant in view that it partly contests the public 'myth' that sees the acquisition of citizenship as the golden dream of the immigrant integration process. Although the acquisition of citizenship enables easier access to labour markets, professions, pensions, and other economic entitlements, it does not automatically guarantee occupational or economic success. In this respect, the findings of this study are almost fatalistic: regardless of

180 Part Two: The Demographic Impact their citizenship status in Canada, immigrant groups from particular countries tend to occupy relatively fixed positions in the Canadian labour markets. Immigrants who were born in the United States or Britain, naturalized or not, tend to have a greater access to occupational status and earning power in the Canadian labour force. With the exception of naturalized immigrants born in Asia, no group could come close to their privileged positions. On the other side of the spectrum, naturalized and nonnaturalized immigrants from Third World regions and a few European countries gravitated toward low-income and manual types of occupations. Despite their moderate or even high human capital endowments they were clearly disadvantaged in the labour markets. In light of these findings, suggesting that the chances of social mobility for these groups could be accelerated or enhanced by acquiring Canadian citizenship is an optimistic assumption at best. Some secondary findings also emerged from this analysis. Immigrants who, despite being eligible, have not obtained Canadian citizenship are more likely to be older, well-established and originate from countries that have comparable standards of living to Canada. Another finding concerns those European born who were ineligible for citizenship. As typical recent arrivals in Canada, these workers were more economically disadvantaged compared to the more established European immigrants, who were either already naturalized or non-naturalized. In many ways, they also shared a similar economic fate with those immigrants from Third World regions. Finally, nonpermanent residents did not seem either advantaged or disadvantaged in the labour markets. Their socio-demographic and economic attributes were similar to those of the average population, thus reflecting the typical characteristics of a very heterogeneous human aggregate. Although this analysis has focused on the Canadian labour force as a whole, more research should be undertaken on the spatial specificity of the citizenship acquisition process. For instance, from a social planning perspective, the bulk of present and future citizenship applicants are concentrated in the Metropolitan Toronto area. Most immigrants who are likely to change their legal status in Canada will do so within the social milieu of the Toronto environment. If naturalization decisions are to be systematically studied, the geographical specificity of these decisions has to be taken into account in the future analytical frameworks to be developed. The significance, if any, of citizenship for immigrants may lie not only in labour market outcomes, but in other areas of life as well. It

Patterns of Acquiring Citizenship 181 probably correlates with psycho-social domains of the decision-making process of becoming Canadian (that is, acquiring a new social identity). Measurements of these domains would require specialized surveys of a more meso- or microlevel nature. This chapter is based on census data and as such, it does not contain any information on these types of domains, allowing only for rough socio-demographic and labour force approximations to groups of immigrants differing in their legal status in the country. Also, the lack of longitudinal data in Canada does not allow for testing directions of relevant hypotheses related to labour force and citizenship acquisition: does economic integration lead to the acquisition of Canadian citizenship or does the opposite tend to be the pattern? A final point to be made here concerns the pressing need to study in more detail the linkages between citizenship acquisition and the access to, participation in, and economic performance of immigrants in Canadian labour markets. Data quality and availability are essential prerequisites to movement in this important research direction. Relevant hypotheses can only be tested with sound cross-sectional and /or longitudinal data. Administrative data tracking that would follow a cohort of immigrants over time and collect valuable information on their entry to Canada, immigration histories, socio-economic integration, and subsequent naturalizations are other interesting possibilities. As national boundaries and ethnic loyalties become 'fuzzier' in the international and domestic context of globalization, the dynamics of citizenship acquisition will become a significant research area for Canada, particularly in view of past, present, and future immigration inflows. Notes 1 After being published by the Department of the Secretary of State and Multiculturalism and Citizenship Canada, the Canadian Citizenship Statistics series was discontinued in 1991. It provided basic information about persons granted citizenship by their gender, year of immigration, sections of the Citizenship Act, birthplaces, and countries of former allegiance. 2 Principal components analysis is a type of factor analysis that reduces the data to a number of simple variables (components), which progressively explain the total variation in the data. Although an interval or ordinal level of measurement for the variables is desired, principal components analysis

182 Part Two: The Demographic Impact

3

4

5

6

can handle the analysis of binary variables as well (Rummel 1970). Analogous to multiple regression analysis, a component loading for 0-1 scaled variables can be interpreted as the probability of the presence of the component (if the loading is positive) and absence (if the loading is negative), given that the component exists. A component score is a specific value of a principal component calculated for a particular sampling unit and is formed as weighted sum of the values of standardized variables for that sampling unit. The weighting is determined by the component loadings. Component scores locate cases as a point in a geometrical space defined by the components' axes. An average positive component score for a group indicates that members of this group are, generally, above average with respect to the traits tapped by the component. Negative scores indicate the opposite. The mathematical property of orthogonality (at right angles or zero correlation) that is established between principal components permits treatment of the average component scores for a group as approximate geometrical positions in a multidimensional space spanned by the components' axes. Mahalanobis distances between groups may be readily calculated in this space. These distances (in contrast to Euclidean-type ones) are measures of similarity between observations, which take into account the intercorrelations between variables that describe these observations. A small Mahalanobis distance calculated between one group and another is a net indicator of resemblance in attributes between groups. Cluster analysis methods, which are frequently used for classification purposes, aim at producing groups of highly similar entities. The group 'centroids,' or multivariate means of variables, are frequently used as reference points by the clustering algorithms to assign different cluster memberships. The k-means clustering algorithm allows for the measurement of the proximity between groups using distances between group centroids. Beginning with an initial selection of k groups, this algorithm locates groups according to their distance to the nearest centroid. Searching for the optimality criteria requires the examination of the behaviour of the derived proximity measure in the neighbourhood of k. For the PUMF 1991 data, the largest 'jump' occurred at Step 4, so a five-cluster solution seemed the most appropriate. An 'upper' tail distribution test confirmed this optimal classification (for details on these procedures see Mojena (1977).

PART THREE: THE ECONOMIC IMPACT

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9

Comparative Immigrant Economic Integration VICTOR PICHE, JEAN RENAUD, and LUCIE GINGRAS The economic integration of immigrants in the host society constitutes an essential dimension of the general process of integration. In the literature, the economic profile of immigrants is almost always drawn from cross-sectional data provided by censuses and sometimes, although rarely, by sample surveys. Furthermore, the focus of this line of research is on the comparison of immigrants with native populations, the question being, 'Do immigrants succeed in the labour market as well as nonimmigrants?' The answer has often been 'yes/ and sometimes immigrants do even better than natives. However, results also show significant differences among various immigrant groups. It is this differential labour market experience among immigrants that the present chapter addresses. More specifically, we examine here the differential process of integration in the labour market as a function of the national origin of a sample of immigrants who arrived in Montreal during the year 1989. Although economic integration involves many dimensions, we examine two of them: (1) length of access to first employment and (2) income and socioeconomic status after twenty-six weeks of residence in Quebec. Data used are longitudinal such that we can follow individuals in their work experience after arrival in Quebec and determine the factors that allow for a rapid (or slow) access to first employment, as well as those factors that are associated with high income and socio-economic status after six months of residence. Our central hypothesis is that the process of integration in the labour market will vary according to national origin even after human capital and other important factors are taken into account. We suggest three types of explanations for such differential process: the different nature of networks among immigrant groups, the greater dif-

186 Part Three: The Economic Impact ficulty for certain groups to negotiate their qualifications in the labour market, and discrimination. Conceptual Model Previous studies have identified many important determinants of economic integration. Figure 9.1 presents a general analytical framework specifying key factors in the economic integration of immigrants in the host society (Piche and Belanger 1995). Three categories of factors are identified: 1 Factors related to the global context affecting receiving as well as sending societies. These are essentially macrostructural, economic, and political variables (e.g. international relations, globalization of exchanges, etc.); 2 Factors related to the context in sending societies both at the macro(e.g. situational determinants such as level of economic development, educational levels, etc.) and microlevels (e.g. premigration characteristics); and 3 Factors related to the context in receiving societies, also both at the macro- (e.g. immigration policies, degree of pluralism, etc.) and the microlevels (e.g. postmigration characteristics). Despite the complex nature of the process of integration and its multidimensional aspect, as suggested by Figure 9.1, the microindividual, postmigration characteristics have received most of the attention. In this respect, the distinction between pre- and postmigration characteristics is not always straightforward, particularly when using cross-sectional data, as is usually done. Education provides a good illustration of this shortcoming: when measured in the census or at the time of survey, education could reflect the premigration experience as well as postmigration efforts to acquire further education. It is only with longitudinal surveys that such difficulties could be overcome. Studies on the determinants of economic integration have paid little attention to national origin of immigrant groups. Generally, the major focus is centred on income differentials between immigrants and natives. Using census data, these studies show that immigrants rapidly reach, and sometimes exceed, income levels of native populations (for Canada, see for example, Richmond 1992; Beaujot et al. 1988; Caldwell

188 Part Three: The Economic Impact 1994; for the United States, see Chiswick 1986; Lalonde and Topel 1992). However, this process seems not to apply uniformly to all immigrant groups. Indeed, specific groups, whether in the United States or Canada, experience some difficulties in obtaining incomes comparable to native groups. This appears to be particularly the case for West Indians and East Asians (deSilva 1992; Ledoyen 1992; Manegre 1993; Caldwell 1994; Poston 1994). Recently, such results have been questioned on three methodological grounds: (1) cross-sectional data produce important biases in income differentials; (2) studies vary importantly with respect to independentcontrol variables included; and (3) economic integration involves many dimensions other than income. In the first case, Borjas (1994) has convincingly argued the necessity of taking into account cohort effects. Hence, when immigrant characteristics change over time, which appears to be the case in recent cohorts of immigrants to the United States, income gaps between immigrant and native groups can remain, to the advantage of the latter (for Canada, see Beaujot et al. 1988; Bloom et al. 1994). The second criticism is a reminder that income differentials must be measured net of all other pertinent factors (ceteris paribus). Finally, measures of economic integration should include other dimensions, such as type of employment and socio-economic status (Reitz 1990). In line with these studies, the central hypothesis of this chapter is that national origin constitutes a key determinant of economic integration. It is our contention that, in the absence of specific information on the country of origin, this variable could be used as a proxy for, among other things, levels of social and economic development of sending countries (Borjas 1994). The differential process of economic integration among various immigrant groups could be attributed to at least three factors: 1) the difficulty of negotiating human capital skills acquired in the country of origin or indirect discrimination factors (deSilva 1992; Borjas 1994); 2) the differential access to networks in the host country or networking factors (Poston 1994; Portes and Rumbaut 1990); and 3) direct discrimination in the labour market (Poston 1994; Richmond 1992; deSilva 1992; Borjas 1994; Lalonde and Topel 1991 and 1992). The study presented here attempts to overcome some of the conceptual and methodological shortcomings identified above. First, the analysis is based on a longitudinal survey of a recent cohort of immigrants who arrived in Montreal in 1989. It is therefore possible to follow this cohort as it develops its employment strategies over time. Furthermore, using

Comparative Immigrant Economic Integration 189 a single cohort as the unit of analysis, we 'factor out' date of arrival as well as duration of residence. On the conceptual level, we differentiate immigrant groups along national origin criteria (our central hypothesis). Second, our definition of economic integration is not limited to income but includes access to employment and type of employment in terms of socio-economic status as well. Finally, our causal model specifies many key-control variables that are not always considered simultaneously in other studies. These variables are well documented in the literature and usually refer to pre- and postmigration characteristics (for Quebec, see Piche and Belanger 1995). In this study, premigration characteristics include education acquired before arrival in Canada, language proficiency in both official languages, and social (class) origin. Postmigration characteristics include duration of residence, age at arrival, immigration status, and date of arrival. Sex is a category in itself as it refers to the more general concept of gender: this factor operates as a result of gender experiences in the country of origin as well as the result of gender redefinitions in the host country. Methodology and Data This study draws on data from the 1990-2 Establishment of New Immigrants (ENI) survey.1 This multiround survey (three rounds of interviews), follows the first years of settlement of a cohort of immigrants. All the immigrants surveyed had been admitted to Quebec in 1989 (more precisely, during the summer and autumn) and, at least for the first round of interviews, had settled in the Montreal area. The first series of interviews took place a year after arrival (on average, after forty-three weeks of stay), covering a sample of one thousand respondents.2 Questions touched on household composition as well as events having occurred since arrival in Quebec, such as employment, nonemployment, studies, housing, etc. At the same time, the questionnaire used for the first round also contained a large section on premigratory characteristics. Additional information, including category of admission and knowledge of French and English before arrival to Canada, was drawn from the combined data derived from the survey and the immigrants' entrance administrative files. The second and third rounds of interviews took place at the end of the second and third years of stay respectively, and focused on events that had occurred since the last interview. The systematic collection of dates corresponding to these

190 Part Three: The Economic Impact events was ensured in order to be able to study the dynamics of settlement and a range of biographical trajectories. Hence, all periods of employment have detailed start and end dates, as well as much other information (such as job title, sector, salary, number of hours worked, occupational status, etc.). Longitudinal analysis can be conducted with the use of the factual files produced by the ENI project. Moreover, by regrouping the same information at a precise moment, cross-sectional analysis is also possible. As such, a special simplified file has been constructed for measuring the occurrence of all events under consideration at specific moments of settlement (weeks 4, 26, 52, 78,104, and 130). For the purposes of our study, the concept of national origin has been operationalized by country of birth. Over eighty countries have been enumerated in our sample, which were then categorized into six large geographical regions, using an adapted version of the World Bank classification (World Bank 1993). The sample of respondents was distributed as follows: sub-Saharan Africa (4.5 per cent); the Middle East and North Africa (42 per cent); East Asia, South Asia, and the Pacific (21 per cent); South America and the Caribbean (12.4 per cent); eastern Europe (5.4 per cent); and the rest of Europe and North America (14.5 per cent). In Table 9.1 we present selected characteristics of our sample (age, education, immigration category, etc.), illustrating the diversity in premigratory traits by origin. For example, very few Africans (from subSahara) had migrated after the age of forty-one, whereas this age group accounts for nearly a third of Asian immigrants. The admission category also varies significantly by region of origin. Refugees represent a large proportion of eastern Europeans (46.2 per cent), but there are virtually none from the Middle East/North Africa and the rest of Europe/North America. While some immigrants from the developing world have the lowest levels of educational attainment (those from East Asia, South Asia, and the Pacific region and South America/Caribbean), other Third World immigrants are among the most educated (Middle East/North Africa). Certain groups declare a strong knowledge of French upon arrival (such as those from sub-Saharan Africa, Middle East/North Africa, and the rest of Europe/North America). In general, over three-quarters have work experience prior to their migration to Quebec; few have an attested job upon arrival - except for those from the rest of Europe/North America, who are singled out for their high proportion in this situation (17.8 per cent). And while this is not

Comparative Immigrant Economic Integration

191

the central issue of our study, it should be noted that the overall picture is quite different between the sexes. The First Job: Is Success More Difficult? The first dimension selected for studying an immigrant's economic integration is the key process of access to a first job. This is measured by the time taken to find such a job, which is an indicator of the speed of the integration process. We shall consider all remunerated work, be it salaried or self-employed, full-time or part-time, and regardless of duration. This broad definition of employment should encompass the population that is able to integrate into the Quebec labour force; it is, to some extent, an index of employability. Among first jobs, the median duration is forty-three weeks, and 31 per cent last at least two years. Overall, employment durations are fairly long for our purposes. The figures vary little between the sexes, the median duration being forty-five weeks among men and forty weeks among women (which is not, according to the log-rank test, statistically different). Variations are stronger across the diverse national origins (and statistically different); the shortest median duration is thirty-one weeks among men (Middle East/North Africa) and 26.5 weeks among women (sub-Saharan Africa). Hence, a relatively significant proportion of immigrants had a first job lasting at least six months. The median time lapse before finding a first job is nine weeks for men and thirty-four weeks for women (Table 9.3). An estimated 80 per cent of men and 60 per cent of women find a job in the first year of settlement; only 6.8 per cent of men and 25.6 per cent of women had not found at least one job within the three years of observation. It would thus appear that new immigrants (at least males) integrate relatively quickly into the Quebec labour force. However, certain variations appear when refining the analysis according to national origin (Figures 9.2 and 9.3 and Table 9.3). Among men, those originally from the rest of Europe/North America are the fastest at finding employment (median lapse of three weeks). Immigrants from Third World countries are slowest, in particular those from sub-Saharan Africa and Asia (twenty weeks and eighteen weeks respectively). Among women, it is also those with origins in the rest of Europe/North America who most quickly gain access to the workforce (eighteen weeks). However, contrary to their male counterparts, African women manage relatively well in finding a

192 Part Three: The Economic Impact TABLE 9.1 Socio-demographic characteristics of sample of 1989 immigrant cohort in Quebec

Region of birth Male 1 . Sub-Saharan Africa 2. Middle East/ North Africa 3. South East Asia & Pacific 4. South America/ Caribbean 5. East Europe 6. Rest of Europe/ North America Total Female 1 . Sub-Saharan Africa 2. Middle East/ North Africa 3. South East Asia & Pacific 4. South America/ Caribbean 5. East Europe 6. Rest of Europe/ North America Total Total 1 . Sub-Saharan Africa 2. Middle East/ North Africa 3. South East Asia & Pacific 4. South America/ Caribbean 5. East Europe 6. Rest of Europe/ North America Total

Sample size N %

Age group 18-25 26-40 41 + % % %

Knowledge French English % %

26

4.8

15.4

84.6

-

76.9

42.3

248

45.9

23.8

50.0

26.2

72.4

53.3

99

18.3

19.2

51.5

29.3

10.3

42.3

73 27

13.5 5.0

27.4 14.8

52.1 55.6

20.5 29.6

35.4 28.0

18.5 36.0

67 540"

12.4 100.0

23.9 22.6

56.7 53.2

19.4 24.2

72.3 54.5

52.3 45.3

16

3.7

37.5

56.3

6.3

37.5

50.0

166

38.2

18.1

60.2

21.7

66.0

39.6

100

23.0

17.0

49.0

34.0

7.2

42.3

50 26

11.5 6.0

24.0 7.7

46.0 69.2

30.0 23.1

34.8 39.1

15.2 34.8

76 434"

17.5 100.0

25.0 19.7

48.7 54.4

26.3 25.9

65.7 45.8

52.9 39.7

45

4.5

28.9

68.9

2.2

61.9

45.2

419

42.0

21.2

54.7

24.1

69.9

47.9

210

21.1

19.0

50.0

31.0

8.8

42.3

124 54

12.4 5.4

26.6 11.1

49.2 63.0

24.2 25.9

35.1 33.1

17.1 35.4

145 997*

14.5 100.0

24.1 21.6

53.1 53.8

22.8 24.6

68.9 50.6

52.6 42.9

Notes: * Information on national origin is not available for 3 persons; ** Information on sex is not available for 23 persons. Source: Establishment of New Immigrants survey, 1990-2

Comparative Immigrant Economic Integration 193

Immigration status IndepenFamily dent Refugee % % %

Education 0-6 yrs 1 7 yrs + % %

(SES) (father)

Previous experience %

Guaranteed job %

23.1

61.5

15.4

-

23.1

43.0

73.1

7.7

7.3

92.3

0.4

4.5

34.4

45.2

87.5

12.9

10.1

49.5

40.4

17.5

10.1

43.2

74.7

6.2

58.9

34.2 37.0

6.8

7.4

55.6

5.6 3.7

27.8 25.9

41.8 47.1

82.2 81.5

1.5 8.0

15.2 16.5

84.8 71.4

7.5 7.1

29.9 27.6

44.2

12.1

44.3

89.6 83.7

26.2 11.4

12.5

37.5

50.0

12.5

25.0

44.8

81.3

-

18.4

81.0

0.6

11.6

20.1

45.0

66.9

5.0

25.5

53.1

21.4

11.3

9.3

40.0

63.0

5.2

56.0 25.0

38.0 37.5

6.0

18.0

37.5

-

10.0 19.2

40.1 48.0

76.0 84.6

4.3 4.3

14.7 24.3

85.3 65.9

_

13.3 12.1

25.3 17.4

46.8 43.9

80.3 70.9

10.0

9.8

18.2

50.0

31.8

4.4

22.2

44.5

75.6

4.8

11.8

87.7

0.5

7.2

28.9

45.1

79.5

9.9

18.0

50.5

31.6

13.7

9.8

42.0

69.0

5.7

58.1 15.4

35.5 38.5

6.5

10.5

46.2

1.9

20.2 24.1

41.0 47.3

79.0 83.3

2.7 6.3

14.8 20.0

85.2 68.6

_

10.4 9.1

27.1 23.0

46.0 44.2

84.8 78.0

17.8

11.5

_

5.6

8.8

194 Part Three: The Economic Impact TABLE 9.2

Socio-economic characteristics of immigrants having a job at week 26, 1989 immigrant cohort in Quebec

Knowledge of

Age group Region of birth

Sample size N %

Male 11 1. Sub-Saharan Africa 2. Middle East/North Africa 150 50 3. South East Asia & Pacific 4. South America/Caribbean 38 17 5. East Europe 6. Rest of Europe/ 53 North America Total

Female 1. Sub-Saharan Africa 2. Middle East/North Africa 3. South East Asia & Pacific 4. South America/Caribbean 5. East Europe 6. Rest of Europe/ North America Total

18-26 26-40 41 + French English

42.3 60.5 50.5 52.1 63.0

- 100.0 28.0 54.0 22.0 23.7 17.6

79.0 59.1

7 58 40 19 7

81.8 74.7

58.0 65.8 47.1

18.0 20.0 10.5 35.3

14.3 37.8 20.0

54.5 55.3 51.0 18.9 20.0

24.5 24.4

54.7 57.2

20.8 18.4

65.4 57.1

53.8 48.3

43.8 34.9 40.0 38.0 26.9

42.9 27.6 15.0 21.1 -

42.9 67.2 52.5 63.2 71.4

14.3 5.2 32.5 15.8 28.6

57.1 71.9 5.3 50.0 57.1

85.7 40.4 52.6 16.7 42.9

45

59.2

35.6

51.1

176

40.6

25.4

58.2

13.3 73.8 16.4 53.5

50.0 44.7

42.2 50.4 44.8 46.0 44.4

21.1 27.5 19.1 22.8 12.5

73.7 58.3 56.4 64.9 54.2

5.3 14.2 24.5 12.3 33.3

72.2 73.9 10.3 41.8 31.8

66.7 51.2 51.7 18.2 27.3

69.0 50.7

29.0 24.7

54.0 58.0

17.0 17.4

69.1 55.9

52.1 47.0

319

Total 1. Sub-Saharan Africa 19 2. Middle East/North Africa 211 3. South East Asia & Pacific 94 4. South America/Caribbean 57 5. East Europe 24 6. Rest of Europe/ North America 100 Total 505

Source: Establishment of New Immigrants survey, 1990-2

job, better than those from the other four major regions. The least favoured come from the Middle East/North Africa. These statistics reveal a tendency of unequal access to the labour force by region of origin. At the same time, the integration periods differ tremendously between the sexes. However, it should be noted

Comparative Immigrant Economic Integration 195

Immigration status Independ ReFamily dent fugee % % %

5.9

63.6 92.7 54.0 39.5 41.2

11.5 15.7

88.5 75.9

28.6 12.5 15.8 63.2 14.3

42.9 87.5 71.1 36.8 57.1

13.3 20.2

86.7 74.6

27.8

8.3

55.6 90.9 60.4 38.6 45.8

12.2 17.2

87.8 75.2

27.3 6.7

14.0 60.5

8.6

14.3 61.4

Education

0-6 yrs %

17 years + %

Mean years of education

Previous work Guarexper- anteed SES Salary SES ience job (26th (26th (father) % % week) week)

16.0 14.6 12.5

51.7 45.1 44.5

13.3 14.2

44.7 49.0

81.8 87.3 82.0 86.8 76.5

13.3

44.8 41.7 38.6 36.4 36.6

7.27 8.32 7.76 9.30 8.78

94.3 86.9

30.8 15.6

46.4 41.1

15.7 9.63

46.3 45.2 37.1 35.6 53.5

100.0 74.1 75.0 84.2 100.0

_

10.5 10.5 11.1 -

37.1 37.0 36.7 29.6 40.5

7.23 6.83 7.49 6.17 7.64

13.3 13.6

49.0 43.9

84.4 80.2

14.3 10.6

43.5 37.9

10.60 7.89

36.8 32.4 14.0 26.3 29.2

15.2 14.4 13.0 12.8 14.9

49.2 45.2 41.6 41.5 50.6

89.5 83.9 79.8 86.0 83.3

_

5.5 9.1

41.3 40.5 37.6 34.1 37.8

7.11 7.92 7.52 8.26 8.43

26.0 26.9

13.7 13.9

45.9 44.7

90.0 84.8

23.4 13.8

45.0 40.0

13.47 9.00

9.1 0.7

4.0

32.0

12.0

-

7.9 -

36.4 36.2 14.0 28.9 23.5

9.4 6.3

30.2 30.1

14.1 14.0

41.8 44.9

28.6

_

-

13.2

1.7 5.1

42.9 20.7 12.8 21.1 42.9

14.6 14.0 13.4 11.9 16.6

22.2 21.0

52.9 _ 8.5

-

15.8

28.6

-

_

13.3

5.2

6.8

16.7

_

0.5

25.3

3.3 8.6

-

10.5

45.8

-

_

11.0

7.6

6.3

16.7 10.2 2.7

15.0 10.3

that the methodology so far employed is quite deficient in explaining the employment process, since it ignores numerous factors that may help or hinder access to a job. To further our analysis, we shall now turn to the Cox semi-parametric model, which marries two types of techniques: life table analysis (for a given state) and regression analysis

196 Part Three: The Economic Impact TABLE 9.3 Entry into first job by national origin and sex: median duration (weeks) Region

Male

Female

Total

Sub-Saharan Africa Middle East/North Africa South, East Asia & Pacific South America/Caribbean East Europe Rest of Europe/North America Total

20.0 10.0 18.0 7.5 8.0 3.0 9.0

29.5 40.0 34.0 38.0 37.0 18.0 34.0

23.0 15.0 26.0 15.0 18.0 7.0

15.5

Source: Establishment of New Immigrant survey, 1990-2

(Allison 1984). Survival tables alone are insufficient in measuring the combined influence of several explanatory factors. With the Cox model, the net effect on the risk of exposure to an event may be calculated for every week, each coefficient measures the average influence of the corresponding variable on the risk of obtaining a first job. The coefficients, as presented in Table 9.4, are in fact odds ratios; a ratio greater than 1 signifies that chance of having access to a first job is increased by this variable, while a value of less than 1 indicates that the chance decreases. One of the interesting characteristics of this semi-parametric model is that it allows for the introduction of variables that vary over time as well as other usual fixed independent variables (established before or upon the immigrant's arrival). For instance, a time-dependant variable such as education and training indicates whether or not the respondent is following a course for each time period considered. Six models are tested by national origin, incorporating successive blocks of both fixed control variables (related to demographic and human capital characteristics) and time-dependent variables (related to postmigratory training). The results for the six models are presented in Table 9.4. In the regression procedures, all variables are dummies, that is, each variable category assumes the value of 0 or 1, and one category is always omitted (shown here in parentheses). The first model evaluates the gross effect of national origin. To subsequent models are successively added: sex and age (Model 2); premigratory years of schooling (a metric variable), work experience and knowledge of official languages (French or English) (Model 3); immigration category and guarantee of job or not upon arrival (Model 4); and completion of pursued courses or not (Model 5). The sixth and final model

Comparative Immigrant Economic Integration 197 Figure 9.2 Entry into first job by national origin (male)

n = 558 Source: Establishment of New Immigrants survey, 1990-92

incorporates interaction between educational attainment and national origin. Given their unique feature, namely, that their values change over time, variables related to training necessitate further explanations. The first variable, 'following course/ seizes weekly course attendance and represents the person's non-availability to look for work. With our dy-

198 Part Three: The Economic Impact Figure 9.3 Entry into first job by national origin (female)

n = 439 Source: Establishment of New Immigrants survey, 1990-92

namic coding procedure, it assumes the value 'I' if the respondent had been following a course that given week or '0' if not. The categories ('Cofi, full-time'; 'other course, full-time'; 'other course, part-time') have been selected according to whether the course implies a retreat from the labour force.3 The second variable, 'diploma obtained/ indicates whether, for each week, the person has successfully completed a course. As long as the respondent has not completed a training course, the variable

Comparative Immigrant Economic Integration 199 is attributed the value '0'; once the course is finished, it becomes '!.' The categories have been constructed with criteria of employability in mind: 1) regular, full-time training (not directly associated with a shortterm job); 2) technical and/or professional or other full-time schooling (related to a short-term job); 3) full-time Cofi; 4) French or English courses or part-time Cofi; and 5) technical/professional or other parttime schooling. Overall, the results of the models with fixed variables (Models 2 through 4) follow the expected direction. Men are generally favoured in having access to a first job, as are immigrants aged eighteen to forty years (compared to the forty-one years and over), those admitted under the 'family' or 'independent' category (as opposed to refugees), those with previous work experience (over those with none), and those who already had a guaranteed job upon arrival. Age emerges as an especially significant, even dominating, factor determining access to a first job, the chances of obtaining a first job are 3.7 times greater for the youngest age group than the oldest. The role of education is not significant, at least not in terms of net effect, but rather in interaction with region of origin (a subject to which we will return). Somewhat surprisingly, variables measuring language skills (in French and English) upon arrival are not found to exert a significant net effect. Incorporating time-dependent variables ('following course' and 'diploma obtained,' Model 5) barely alters the effects of the fixed control variables.4 As expected, employment access is somewhat slower when the person is following any full-time course, be it Cofi or regular classes. Among 'graduates,' chances of finding employment increase only among those having completed a full-time Cofi course. More than the simple advantage of Cofi's French course, benefits of socialization in Quebecois society at large may be at play.5 Also, given that other courses (full-time technical or professional) often last longer than Cofi, it may be that their effects did not have time to come into play within the observation period. The introduction of interactive variables (Model 6) modifies only the results concerning the fixed variables pertaining to immigration category and national origin. The former no longer exerts an impact. Turning to national origin, the gross effects (Model 1) are significant for all regions except East Europe; all four other regions exhibit weaker probabilities in job attainment than the reference category (rest of Europe and North America). In Model 5, the introduction of the training variable decreases and/or suppresses the effects observed in Models 2, 3, and 4. Nevertheless two regions remain disadvantaged compared to

200 Part Three: The Economic Impact TABLE 9.4 Odds ratios associated with access to first job, 1989 immigrant cohort in Quebec Model

Variables Region (Rest of Europe/North America) Sub-Saharan Africa Middle East/North Africa South East Asia & Pacific South America/Caribbean East Europe Male (Female) Age group (41 years +) 18-25 years 26-40 years Education Education & region (Educ. & Rest of Europe & North America) Educ.* Sub-Saharan Africa Educ.* Middle East/ North Africa Educ.* South, East Asia & Pacific Educ.* South America/ Caribbean Educ.* East Europe Knowledge of language (Nor French, nor English) French English Previous job (no job) Guaranteed job (no guaranteed job) Immigration status (refugee) Family Independent Taking courses (none) Cofi, full-time Other, full-time Other, part-time Received diploma (Course not completed) Regular courses, full-time

h

.552** .678** .583** .654** .796

.392** .431** .442** .489** .023* .617** .624** .631** .640** .758 .546** .649** .732* .789 .612 .594** .654** .702* .756 .562 .769 .789 .927 .968 .694 1.897** 1.710** 1.698** 1.744** 1.740* 2.172** 2.942** 3.215** 3.667** 3.727* 2.080** 2.017** 2.105** 2.185** 2.192* .999 .993 .990 .983

1.248*

.988 1.019 -

-

1.084 1.054 1.031 1.090 1.100 1.163 1.858** 1.899** 1.796*

1.023 1.022

1.047 1.161 1.794*

-

1.874** 1.938** 1.977*

-

1.419* 1.411*

1.384* 1.438*

1.279 1.317

.321** .313* .397** .380* 1.034 1.028

1.160

1.160

continued

Comparative Immigrant Economic Integration 201 TABLE 9.4 (continued) Odds ratios associated with access to first job, 1989 immigrant cohort in Quebec

Variables Professional/other, full-time Cofi, full-time French/English/Cofi, part-time Professional/other, part-time -2 Log. likelihood Degree of freedom N at risk

Model 1

2

3

-

-

-

-

-

-

6256.69 5 997

4

5

6

1.925* 1.881 2.917** 2.946** -

-

1.390

1.432

1.032

1.012

6112.735629.565551.015469.165453.56 8 1 2 1 5 23 28 997 925 918 918 918

*: 0.05 **: 0.01 Note: Reference categories are in parentheses. Source: Establishment of New Immigrants survey, 1990-2

the others in the race for employment: 'sub-Saharan Africa' and 'Middle East/North Africa/ Last, adding interactive terms between region and education also diminishes the effects of national origin (Model 6). Sub-Saharan Africa is the only region for which nationals still have significantly less chance of finding a job even when controlling for the interaction of region and education. However, for them, the chances improve slightly with increasing educational attainment. For the four other regions, job chances are not significantly different, ceteris paribus, from those of the reference group. Thus when all other factors are considered, it appears as though the 'ethnic' factor comes into play with respect to job opportunities only for immigrants from sub-Saharan Africa. This group literally stands apart, experiencing 98 per cent less chances (or, in other terms, forty-four times less) than nationals from North America or the rest of Europe in finding a first job, unless educated. These results will be further explored later in the chapter. Twenty-six Weeks: Income and Socio-economic Status As seen in the previous section, with respect to national origin, most immigrants (except Africans) have equal chances in finding a first job,

202 Part Three: The Economic Impact once demographic and human capital factors are controlled for. But the question remains as to what extent the jobs obtained are comparable across the diverse immigrant groups. An examination of this question will be conducted with the help of a multivariate model. Occupational status is an important aspect of economic integration. What are the working conditions and professional rankings among immigrants integrating into the Quebec labour force? We have chosen two indicators to measure this dimension: work income and socio-economic status (SES). Renaud and Carpentier (1992a and 1992c), using data from the ENI survey, have already highlighted certain aspects of the position held by immigrants in Quebec's workforce: rupture in professional rank after migration; weak upward mobility in status and income; little correlation between human capital factors and SES level (at the first job). But none of these analyses included factors of ethnicity or national origin. We must first select the jobs to retain for our analysis, given certain constraints. First, in order to control for duration of settlement, a point in time common to all respondents must be chosen. While obtaining a first job is certainly a universally shared event, use of this variable would have created biases, given the highly differential calendar among individuals. Moreover, to adequately employ timing of first job, the occurrence should be sufficiently rapid to avoid compensating mechanisms to come into effect, thus attenuating the influence of national origin. Our choice was to consider the twenty-sixth week of settlement (approximately six months after migration), which probably maximizes the chances of identifying the effects of national origin and furthermore the magnitude of such effects. Logically, it may also capture a point of first contact with Quebecois society and its labour force. One potential problem is the possibility, given the short time frame after settlement, that many immigrants would be still following full-time training programs such as Cofi6 and thus be omitted from analysis. While choice of a later date is possible, it would weaken the sample because of losses in the second and third rounds.7 Of the thousand immigrants who responded to the first questionnaire, 50.7 per cent were employed at the twenty-sixth week. By sex, the figures are 59.1 per cent for men (319 respondents) and 40.6 per cent for women (176). Employment considered in our analysis may be either salaried or self-employed. Selected characteristics of these working immigrants are summarized in Table 9.2. The variable measuring income is represented by the logarithm of hourly wage. For those in our sample employed at the twenty-sixth

Comparative Immigrant Economic Integration 203 week, the average hourly wage is $9.63 among men and $7.89 among women. However, this average hides large discrepancies across national origins: among men, the rate varies from $7.27 per hour (sub-Saharan Africa) to $15.69 (rest of Europe/North America); and among women from $6.17 (South America/Caribbean) to $10.60 (rest of Europe/North America). At first glance, it does not appear that human capital variables could explain the differences. For example, males from sub-Saharan Africa earn the least and yet they are well educated, come from families of high socio-economic status and tend to have strong language skills (knowledge of French and even English) upon arrival (see Table 9.2). Nevertheless, they earn two dollars less per hour than immigrants from Latin America and the Caribbean, while the latter demonstrate lower levels of educational attainment as well as familial and personal socio-economic status, and proportionately know much less French and English. With respect to job status (SES), the measure used is derived from Blishen's 1981 socio-economic scale of professions, which jointly takes into account income levels, education, and prestige associated with each profession (Blishen, Carrol, and Moore 1987). As a basis of comparison, in 1981 the index measured an average of 42.74 for Canada. The value is greater among respondents in our sample: 49.9 for men and 43.9 for women. Still, there remain important differences across the six regions of origin, the SES ranging between 34 and 45. At the scale's lowest end are immigrants from South America and the Caribbean as well as eastern Europeans; at the upper scale, holding the best positions are immigrants from the rest of Europe and North America. Curiously there does not seem to be a direct relationship between SES and income. The most striking counterexample is that of Africans, who, at week twentysix, earn the least but experience the highest SES. This may be compared to the situation of immigrants from South America/Caribbean and eastern Europe, who have the weakest SES yet earn $1.50 to $2 more. Given that the two dependant variables, the log of hourly income and job status, are metric, we shall use ordinary multiple regressions. In the case of income, the coefficients indicate the percentage over (positive sign) or under (negative sign) the reference category. The SES coefficients have the advantage of being directly interpretable in terms of status points. Regressions are presented for both dependent variables in Tables 9.5 and 9.6. In each table, the first model estimates the gross effects of national origin. The effects should eventually disappear upon

204 Part Three: The Economic Impact TABLE 9.5 Regression coefficients associated with income (log of salary/hour) 26th week - region of birth Model 2

Model 3

Model 4

Model 5

-.504** Sub-Saharan Africa -.447** Middle East & North Africa -.524** South, East Asia & Pacific -.482** South America & Caribbean -.372** Eastern Europe (Rest of Europe & North America) Family Independent (Refugee) Male (Female) 1 8-25 years 26-40 years (41 years +) Education SES of father Knowledge of French Knowledge of English (No French, no English) Previous job (No previous job) SES

-.359** -.435** -.421** -.299** -.228 -.049 .285** -

-.400** -.462** -.451** -.362** -.322** -.006 .262** .168** -.306** -.047 -

-.489** -.414** -.468** -.274** -.426** -.100 .047 .131** -.314** -.0999 -.026** .003 -.060 .171** .083 -

-.377** -.331** -.350** -.164* -.314** -.125 -.015 .076 -.208** -.061 .007 .001 -.041 .106* -.073 .017**

Constant

2.421**

2.157**

2.194**

1.805**

1.460**

R2: R2 adj.:

.1299 .1203

.1780 .1649

.2478 .2304

.3366 .3096

.4708 .4473

449

444

384

378

Variables

N

Model 1

456

*: 0.05 **: 0.01 Note: Reference categories are in parentheses. Source: Establishment of New Immigrants survey, 1990-2

successive introduction of other factors: admission category (Model 2); age and sex (Model 3); education, social origin (as indicated by the father's SES),8 and premigratory competence in French and English, as well as previous work experience (Model 4). For income, a fifth model adds job SES to the list of control variables. Should the effects of national origin disappear through the introduction

Comparative Immigrant Economic Integration 205 TABLE 9.6 Regression coefficients associated with socio-economic status (blishen index) 26th week - region of birth Model 1

Model 2

Model 3

Model 4

Sub-Saharan Africa -3.75 -4.54** Middle East/North Africa -7.43** South, East Asia & Pacific -10.91** South America/Caribbean -7.23* Eastern Europe (Rest of Europe & North America) Family Independent (Refugee) Male (Female) 18-25 years 26-40 years (41 years +) Education SES of father Knowledge of French Knowledge of English (No French, no English) Previous job (No previous job)

-.24 -4.80** -4.73* -7.36** -2.63

-1.46 -5.76** -5.50** -9.18** -4.29

-4.88 -5.52** -6.29** -7.42** -6.89*

3.43 10.66*

5.03 10.68*

2.94 5.30*

4.11*

3.55*

-5.76*

-6.27* -1.74

Constant

45.00*

35.24*

34.18*

18.45**

R2: R2 adj.:

.0557 .0460

.1130 .1000

.1682 .1504

.3561 .3317

494

486

479

413

Variables

N

.71

1.25* .08 -1.34 3.19*

1.00

*: 0.05 **: 0.01 Note: Reference categories are in parentheses. Source: Establishment of New Immigrants survey, 1990-2

of this control variable, we could then conclude that differentiation rests on job access rather than access to income per se, and income variations mediated by job status. If, on the other hand, the discrepancies related to national origin persist, we would conclude that access to employment is differential by national origin. Last, we introduced interaction terms in order to test multiplicative effects of sex and region as well as education and region. Should the

206 Part Three: The Economic Impact gross effects of national origin diminish considerably or disappear upon introduction of these diverse controls, then we could conclude that the effects are, in whole or in part, merely an artefact related to the heterogeneous composition of immigrant populations of each origin. If, on the other hand, the gross effects persist despite the controls, we would reject this hypothesis and conclude that national origin does carry net effects. The income and SES regressions (Tables 9.5 and 9.6 respectively) reveal, on the one hand, that control variables exercise the expected impact: the dependent variables are positively correlated with age and education, while men are favoured over women. It should be noted that, with respect to age, the twenty-six to forty years group is not significantly different from the reference category; it is only immigrants in the youngest group, eighteen to twenty-five years, who are disadvantaged. At the same time, premigratory knowledge of English (and not French) offers a net advantage. Admission category tends to influence income and status, although the effects diminish or disappear with the introduction of other control variables. Immigrants arriving as independents tend to experience, ceteris paribus, better chances of obtaining higher status jobs. Finally, neither premigratory work experience nor social origin (as indicated by father's SES) play a significant role (net of all other factors considered). On the other hand, region of origin exercises significant gross influences and the effects are consistently more important (R2) with respect to income than status. The regression models for income show that effects of national origin persist with the successive introduction of control variables: admission category (Model 2), demographic characteristics (age and sex, in Model 3), as well as variables related to education, status of origin, official language skills, and prior work experience (Model 4). We can thus conclude that for all immigrants, income, as measured six months after arrival, is partially determined by their national origin, even when controlled for human capital characteristics. When job status is introduced (Model 5), the influence of national origin continues to operate. Also, the impact of the job status variable does turn out to be significant, which means that part of the income discrepancy among immigrant groups is attributable to the relative concentration in certain types of work. This is particularly true for sex, which becomes insignificant in Model 5: this means that for women income disadvantages are mediated by their concentration in low-prestige occupations.9

Comparative Immigrant Economic Integration 207 TABLE 9.7 Effects among regressions of birth - log of salary/hour, 26th week (Model 5) Category of reference Variable in Model 1 . Sub-Saharan Africa 2. Middle East/North Africa 3. South, East Asia & Pacific 4. South America/Caribbean 5. Eastern Europe 6. Rest of Europe/ North America Constant

1 .046 .027 .213 .063

.377" 1 .083**

2

3

4

5

6

-.046

-.027 .020

-.213 -.167* -.186*

-.063 .017 -.037 .150

-.377** -.331* -.350** -.164* -.314**

-.020 .167* .017

.186* .037

.331** 1.129**

.350** 1.110**

-.150

.164* .314** 1.296** 1.146** 1 .460**

*: 0.05;**: 0.01; n = 378. Source: Establishment of New Immigrants survey, 1990-2 TABLE 9.8 Effects among regions of birth - socio-economic status, 26th week (Model 4) Category of reference Variable in Model 1 . Sub-Saharan Africa 2. Middle East/North Africa 3. South, East Asia & Pacific 4. South America/Caribbean 5. Eastern Europe 6. Rest of Europe/ North America Constant

1

2 .64

-.64 -1.41

4

3 1.41 .77

-2.54 -2.02

-.77 -1.90 -1.37

-1.13 -.60

4.88 13.58**

5.52** 12.93**

6.29** 12.16**

5

2.54 1.90 1.13 .52

2.02 1.37 .60 -.52

6 -4.88 -5.52** -6.29** -7.42** -6.89*

7.42** 6.89* 1 1 .03** 11.56** 18.45**

*: 0.05; **:0.01; n = 413. Source: Establishment of New Immigrants survey, 1990-2

The complete model predicting socio-economic status (Model 4) reveals that immigrants from all regions, except for 'sub-Saharan Africa/ fail to reach the favoured status characterized by the reference category, 'Rest of Europe/North America/ Tables 9.7 and 9.8 present the tests carried out on status (Model 4) and income (Model 5) employing alternatively each of the regions as reference category. Thus a full image of the opposition-difference structure for all national groups is obtained. In the case of income, a system-

208 Part Three: The Economic Impact atic opposition between persons originating from 'Rest of Europe/North America' and those from all other regions is observed. Furthermore, South American and Caribbean immigrants fare better than those from the Middle East and North Africa and from Asia. In the status model (Table 9.8), the contrast is between 'Rest of Europe/North America' and all other regions combined (except Africa). Ceteris paribus, immigrants from the former region tend to obtain better jobs, by five to seven status points, than the latter. Discussion and Conclusion One important conclusion may be drawn from the analyses presented in this chapter: contrary to our initial hypothesis, the impact of national origin in the process of access to a first job is minimal. The same follows for certain human capital variables that normally intervene in access to employment. On the other hand, once in the workforce, national origin of immigrants as well as human capital variables exercise significant influences in terms of earned income and job socio-economic status. Two distinct processes are at work. First, in the case of access to a first job, it can be argued that due to financial obligations most new immigrants are hard pressed to find a job quickly. It must be underlined that our definition of work may be a better index of employ ability than job quality. It involves all remunerated work, be it salaried or self-employed, full-time or part-time, and regardless of duration. Necessity often dictates that these immigrants accept any job, be it below their qualifications. This would explain why, in the multivariate analysis, factors such as national origin, education, and official language skills do not affect the process. The latter result with respect to language skills may seem surprising. It could be argued that language skills open doors to 'good' jobs and upward professional mobility (Manegre 1993, 69-78). Immigrants lacking knowledge of at least one official language may be confined to employment 'ghettos,' unskilled work at low wages. The main determinants are age and sex, followed by prior work experience. Being young and male with previous work experience accelerates access to a first job. It is likely that, ceteris paribus, an immigrant with experience in a given field and ready to accept an income inferior to his 'human capital value' will more easily find a job than one with less (or no) experience. Once integrated in the labour market, a second process emerges. Human capital factors such as age, education, and language operate in the

Comparative Immigrant Economic Integration 209 expected direction,10 although differently according to national origin. In particular, immigrants from industrialized nations, here North America and (non-Eastern) Europe, are clearly distinguished from others by their stronger capacity in obtaining jobs with higher income and socio-economic status. How can this differential process be explained? In our opinion, certain groups are being discriminated against based on, amongst other factors, the difficulty in translating human capital experiences for those coming from less economically developed societies.11 The same hypothesis has been raised elsewhere in studies from the United States (Borjas 1994), Canada (deSilva 1992; Richmond 1992), and Quebec (Ledoyen 1992). From our data, it appears that discriminatory forces cannot be defined solely on the basis of race or colour, given that the experience of immigrants from Eastern Europe is also distinct from that of other Europeans. We suggest that discrimination operates through differential recognition of labour market qualifications in a discriminatory credentialling process. The particular situation of immigrants from sub-Saharan Africa deserves additional comment. This is the only group 'discriminated' against in access to a first job, and these immigrants earn less wages than all others. As mentioned above, skin colour alone cannot be held responsible, given the opposite experiences of other non-white populations in our sample. Apart from the small sample effect (n=45), three other explanations are plausible. First, a phenomenon of self-selection could be operating for Africans: the Kaplan-Meier curves constructed over three years of observation effectively indicate that they have the highest probability of not finding a job (31.7 per cent).12 Second, one (or some) important factor may be absent from our models as, for example, variables related to social networks. African immigration is a relatively recent phenomenon in Quebec,13 and community support and assistance for new members in their job search is probably less extensive. Finally, it is likely that there are distinct discriminatory forces operating specifically against Africans which require further explanation. The analyses presented in this chapter are obviously limited. First of all, they are based on the experiences of immigrants in their first few months of settlement in Quebec. It is possible that influences operating early in the process of economic integration gradually diminish to make room for other factors. We know that duration of residence is a determinant in the integration process: over time immigrants may develop counterstrategies (e.g., following courses) to improve their qualifications. Second, the categorization of immigrants by large regions of ori-

210 Part Three: The Economic Impact gin may hide significant intraregional variations. Net effects of national origin may have been minimized. And finally, our analysis clearly indicates an important difference in the economic integration of women and men. For women, entry into first job, employment durations, income levels, and socio-economic status are all significantly lower than men. To explain more fully this sexual discrimination (over and above national origin), specific factors affecting women (fertility, childcare, sexual harassment, etc.) need to be included in the models. Although the specific Quebec context may not allow us to generalize these results to the rest of Canada, it can be argued that the Montreal experience is to some extent comparable to other North American cities and the results do not seem to contradict the nature of relationships found in other cities; however, direct comparisons cannot be made, since there are no longitudinal studies to compare our results with. The little effect of national origin on access to first job found in this study may arguably be part of a gender process in most large North American cities; new immigrants are hard pressed to find a job quickly due to financial obligations and the specific Quebec context may not be particularly relevant. One final comment. Despite our initial conceptual framework, we have concentrated exclusively on microindividual factors. The inclusion of these factors alone yields in our view fairly satisfactory explanatory models inasmuch as R2's are concerned (0.47 for income and 0.35 for job status). However, the inclusion of structural and network factors would significantly improve our causal models (Poston 1994; Portes and Rumbaut 1990). Notes 1 This survey, conducted by Jean Renaud with the Institut quebecois de recherche sur la culture, is sponsored by the ministere des Communautes culturelles et de I'lmmigration (now known as the ministere des Relations avec les citoyens et de I'lmmigration). 2 Details of the sampling procedure may be found in Renaud, Carpentier, Ouimet, and Montgomery (1992). 3 For example, those attending Cofi full-time classes are not allowed to work. Cofi is a guidance and training centre for immigrants. Financed by the federal and provincial governments, the centre offers French-language courses to newly arrived immigrants.

Comparative Immigrant Economic Integration 211 4 The inclusion of these two variables in the model improves the equation's log-likelihood by 82, with 8 degrees of freedom. 5 The full-time Cofi course lasts thirty weeks. See Renaud (1992) for more on the topic of Cofi's impact on access to a first job. 6 Nearly 20 per cent of the cohort under observation is studying full-time (in all types of courses) at the twenty-sixth week; the rate does not drop below 11 per cent for the first three years. 7 Out of 1,000 immigrants originally interviewed, 729 were surveyed again a year later in the second round (in 1991) and 508 in the third. 8 This factor is measured by the father's job socio-economic status (evaluated using the Blishen index) when the respondent was sixteen years old. 9 We have tested multiplicative interactive terms with sex and education and sex and region. Overall, the terms did not add significantly to the variance explained (R2). Hence, national origin either facilitates or hinders access to higher incomes and superior status, but does not modify the underlying rules or rates at which market transactions are carried out. 10 In this respect, the lack of correlation between prior work experience and the dependent variables, job income, and socio-economic status, could be linked to certain labour force dynamics more closely affecting the immigrant population. For instance, access to upper-level positions is highly competitive and often tightly controlled by professional groups. Functional barriers might be imposed, even if unintentionally, against immigrants for whom previous experience may not conform to the practices and conditions defined within the respective professions (Renaud and Crespo 1992, 6). 11 This assertion has been confirmed in our previous analyses whereby national origin, defined in function of the country of origin's economic level, played a much more prominent role than when categorized by continent (Renaud, Piche, and Gingras 1996). 12 Comparatively, the probabilities are calculated at 13.7 per cent for immigrants from the Middle East/North Africa, 20.4 per cent for Asia, 23.8 per cent for South America/Caribbean, 6 per cent for Eastern Europe, and 10.8 per cent for Rest of Europe/North America. 13 Sub-Saharan Africans having arrived in Quebec in 1989 make up only 3 per cent of all immigrants (MCCI1992).

10

Economic Threat and Attitudes toward Immigrants VICTORIA M. ESSES, LYNNE M. JACKSON, JEFFERY M. NOLAN, and TAMARA L. ARMSTRONG This chapter describes one determinant of attitudes toward immigrants and immigration: perceived economic threat. In particular, it discusses research testing whether perceived competition for jobs from skilled immigrants causes unfavourable attitudes toward these immigrants and toward immigration in general. The suggestion that skilled immigrants may be seen as threatening, and thus undesirable, stands in contrast to the finding that Canadians consistently report that individuals with high levels of education and job skills are most desirable as immigrants to Canada (e.g., Angus Reid Group 1989; Berry, Kalin, and Taylor 1977; Citizenship and Immigration Canada 1994; Kalin and Berry 1994). Presumably, unskilled immigrants are seen as more likely to be a drain on social services, such as job-training programs and social welfare. Yet in times of economic recession and unemployment, it is perhaps not surprising that Canadians also see skilled immigrants who can effectively compete for jobs as a potential source of economic threat and, thus, may question the benefits of their immigration. Of course, the manner in which the media portrays immigrants may play a large role in determining whether immigrants are seen as contributing to or detracting from the economic well-being of the country. We begin by describing a theory that accounts for the relation between perceived economic threat and intergroup attitudes: Realistic group conflict (LeVine and Campbell 1972). We then address the question of whether Canadians indeed perceive immigrants as a potential threat to their economic well-being. This is an important issue in determining the significance and implications of any findings linking perceived economic threat to particular outcomes. Next, we describe re-

Economic Threat and Attitudes toward Immigrants 213 search conducted both in Canada and elsewhere that specifically links perceived economic threat to attitudes toward immigrants and immigration. This research is strictly correlational in nature. Our own research, which follows, has an experimental focus and tests the causal relation between perceived economic threat and attitudes toward immigrants and immigration. In particular, we examine whether media portrayals of potential economic threat from skilled immigrants can lead to, or cause, unfavourable attitudes toward these immigrants and toward their immigration to Canada. We also consider whether perceived economic threat has a negative impact on people's willingness to endorse help for immigrants to adjust to life in Canada. We then describe the implications of our findings for attempts to improve attitudes toward immigrants and immigration and provide suggestions for future research. Realistic Group Conflict Theory The basic premise of realistic group conflict theory is that prejudice and discrimination have their roots in perceived conflicts of interests between groups (LeVine and Campbell 1972). The importance of realistic group conflicts in determining intergroup attitudes and behaviour was noted by Campbell in 1965 in his survey of theories in social psychology, sociology, and anthropology dealing with intergroup relations. A common theme seeming to run through these theories was that intergroup attitudes and behaviour reflect group interests and are based, at least in part, on the nature of and compatibility of group goals. In essence, when group goals are compatible, positive relations are likely to ensue; when they are incompatible, conflict and negative intergroup attitudes and behaviour will result. Campbell (1965) labelled this perspective 'realistic group conflict' to reflect the view that some group conflicts are realistic in that they are based on real competition for scarce resources. The most relevant premises of this theory for our purposes are as follows. First, intergroup threat and conflict increase as the real or perceived competition over resources increases between groups and as the conflicting groups have more to gain from succeeding. Second, the greater the perceived intergroup threat and conflict, the more hostility is expressed toward the source of the threat. Finally, when competition over resources is present, proximity increases intergroup hostility, rather than decreasing it (LeVine and Campbell 1972). A body of literature is

214 Part Three: The Economic Impact available to support these premises (LeVine and Campbell 1972; Sherif 1966; Sherif and Sherif 1953; for reviews, see Brown 1995 and Taylor and Moghaddam 1994). An example of the group conflict perspective is evident in research addressing the nature of contemporary relations between blacks and whites in the United States. As in realistic group conflict theory, current conflicts between blacks and whites are described as involving incompatible group interests and objectives, based on competition over power, wealth, and status (Ashmore and Del Boca 1976; Bobo 1988b; Chesler 1976). It has been suggested that blacks are now seen as a competitive threat to whites, who are attempting to protect their group interests. This competition occurs over such resources as jobs, material resources, and political power (Ashmore and Del Boca 1976; Bobo 1988b; Chesler 1976). Responses to this threat are perhaps most evident in whites' racial policy attitudes (Bobo 1983, 1988a, 1988b). As we will discuss shortly, group conflict may also be applied when explaining attitudes toward immigrants and immigration. Perceived Economic Threat from Immigrants Before examining the potential link between economic threat and attitudes toward immigrants and immigration, it is important to determine whether Canadians indeed perceive that immigrants are a potential threat to their economic well-being. One way to address this issue is to examine the perceived consequences of immigration expressed by Canadians. In a survey of multiculturalism and ethnic attitudes in Canada conducted in the early 1970s, Canadians were asked about their attitudes toward various aspects of immigration (Berry, Kalin, and Taylor 1977). One set of relevant questions requested their opinions about possible further consequences of immigration. Many Canadians agreed that 'there would be more unemployment' (54 per cent agreed, 14 per cent undecided, 32 per cent disagreed). The concern expressed about increased unemployment indicates that Canadians did perceive immigrants as a potential threat to their own employment status and economic well-being. This concern with immigrant competition for jobs has persisted into the 1990s. For example, a recent report by the Economic Council of Canada (1991b) indicates a persisting concern that immigrants will often take jobs away from Canadians. Recent polls taken by Angus Reid likewise indicate that many Canadians still believe that immigration increases unemployment among people already living here. Fifty-four

Economic Threat and Attitudes toward Immigrants 215 per cent of those polled in January 1996 believed that immigration increases unemployment, 29 per cent felt that immigration has no effect on unemployment, and 15 per cent indicated that immigration decreases unemployment. Similarly, 51 per cent of those polled in July of the same year indicated that immigration increases unemployment, 25 per cent indicated that it has no effect, and 21 per cent thought that immigration decreases unemployment (Palmer 1996, personal communication; Toronto Star 1996). Thus, we can conclude that many Canadians do indeed see immigrants as a potential economic threat. Economic Threat and Attitudes toward Immigrants A basic premise of realistic group conflict theory is that intergroup competition over resources and threat lead to negative attitudes toward the source of the threat (LeVine and Campbell 1972). In this context, several correlational studies have been conducted to examine the potential link between economic threat and attitudes toward immigrants. In these studies, perceived economic threat was assessed directly through the use of self-report measures or indirectly through indices of unemployment rates and economic conditions in the relevant regions. Although unemployment rates and economic conditions in a region are not direct measures of economic threat from immigrants, it is likely that immigrant competition for jobs and for other resources is more salient during times of economic hardship (i.e., higher unemployment rates, poorer economic conditions in the region). A series of studies by Stephan and his colleagues (Stephan, Ybarra, and Bachman 1998; Stephan, Ybarra, Martinez, Schwarzwald, and TurKaspa 1998) examined perceived threat as a potential predictor of attitudes toward immigrants in the United States, Spain, and Israel. Two types of intergroup threat were assessed using self-report measures: realistic threat and symbolic threat. Of importance for our purposes, the assessment of perceived realistic threat included items regarding possible job loss to immigrants and economic costs for social services for immigrants. In the United States, this realistic threat was a strong predictor of attitudes toward Cuban immigrants in Florida, Mexican immigrants in New Mexico, and Asian immigrants in Hawaii. In Spain, realistic threat similarly predicted attitudes toward Moroccan immigrants. In all cases, greater realistic threat was related to less favourable attitudes toward the immigrant group. In contrast, however, this realistic threat was not a significant predictor of attitudes toward Ethiopian immigrants or Russian immigrants in Israel. One potential explanation

216 Part Three: The Economic Impact for the lack of an effect in Israel is that the Law of Return grants all Jewish people the right to Israeli citizenship, and has a religious as well as a political basis. Thus, in Israel, realistic threats from new immigrants may be moderated by a sense of religious entitlement for Jewish immigrants. Using a somewhat different paradigm involving analysis of Eurobarometer data from 1988, Quillian (1995) examined perceived economic threat as a predictor of attitudes toward immigrants in the twelve countries constituting the European Economic Community (EEC). It was hypothesized that prejudice toward immigrants is a function of perceived economic threat, which is, in turn, influenced by the current economic situation in a country and the relative size of the immigrant group. As an index of the economic situation in each country, five-year average gross domestic product per capita was utilized (though it was noted that similar results were obtained using average country unemployment rate for the same period). The relative size of the immigrant group in each country was indexed as the percentage of the population that were not citizens of EEC countries. Analyses indicated that the combination of poorer economic conditions in a country and a larger percentage of the population from non-EEC countries predicted antiimmigrant attitudes. The one study that failed to find a relation between perceived economic threat and attitudes toward immigrants examined the relation between the unemployment rate in Canadian cities in 1974 and attitudes toward immigrants expressed by the residents of those cities (Schissel, Wanner, and Frideres 1989). The lack of an effect in this study may be partially attributable to the unit of analysis examined: the city. Realistic group conflict occurs at the group level and the unemployment level within a city may not be the most appropriate index of group competition and threat from immigrants. As Quillian (1995) suggests, the country may be a more appropriate unit of analysis to examine group threat from immigrants because the ingroup, nonimmigrants, and outgroup, immigrants, are defined along national boundaries. Thus, the unemployment rate within a country may provide a more appropriate index of the economic situation of the ingroup, nonimmigrants. Economic Threat and Attitudes toward Immigration Several correlational studies have been conducted to examine the link between economic threat and attitudes toward immigration. In these studies, perceived economic threat was assessed through indices of un-

Economic Threat and Attitudes toward Immigrants 217 employment rates in the relevant regions and perceptions of the state of the economy. The Economic Council of Canada (1991a; 1991b) examined potential predictors of attitudes toward immigration from data collected in sixtyfour surveys conducted in Canada between 1975 and 1989. Of interest, two variables in combination were used as indices of realistic group conflict: the unemployment rate in a region and the proportion of visible minority immigrants in the region. Analyses indicated that, in general, increased unemployment was related to less favourable attitudes toward the current level of immigration (e.g., the perception that there is too much immigration). In addition, the combination of higher unemployment and a higher proportion of visible minority immigrants in the region was especially predictive of unfavourable attitudes toward the current level of immigration. This suggests that in times of high unemployment, the salience, or visibility, of immigrants who may compete for jobs increases the tendency to perceive immigration as increasing unemployment. As a result, attitudes toward the current level of immigration become less favourable. In a similar study examining trends over time in attitudes toward the level of immigration, Palmer (1996) analysed survey data collected in Canada between 1975 and 1995. In this study, the unemployment rate in Canada was taken as an index of perceived economic threat from immigrants to the Canadian population. Analyses revealed a strong correlation between the unemployment rate in a given year and endorsement of the view that immigration to Canada should be decreased. In other words, higher unemployment was highly predictive of greater opposition to immigration. Parallel effects were obtained by Espenshade and Hempstead (1996) in an analysis of attitudes toward immigration in the United States. In particular, they found that between 1946 and 1993 a higher annual unemployment rate predicted greater opposition to immigration. In addition, in an analysis of an American public opinion survey conducted in 1993 they found that respondents who believed that the U.S. economy was getting worse were especially unfavourable toward the level of immigration to the United States. The Causal Relation between Economic Threat and Attitudes Correlational research is extremely useful in illuminating the relations among variables under consideration. Yet correlations do not, in fact,

218 Part Three: The Economic Impact provide any information about the causal direction of effects. Thus, one interpretation of the findings on economic threat and attitudes toward immigrants and immigration is that economic threat causes unfavourable attitudes. An equally viable interpretation, however, is that pre-existing unfavourable attitudes toward immigrants and immigration are rationalized by appealing to economic threat from immigrants (see Kristiansen and Zanna 1994 for a related discussion). This rationalization would be especially likely when economic conditions are poor because it is then most credible. In addition, of course, some third variable, such as political instability, may cause both poor economic conditions in a country and unfavourable attitudes toward immigrants and immigration. In order to clarify this issue and determine whether perceived economic threat causes unfavourable attitudes toward immigrants and immigration, we conducted an experiment in which we manipulated the salience of economic threat from immigrants and examined the effect on attitudes subsequently expressed. To conduct such a manipulation, we focused on media portrayals of immigrants. In particular, we asked sixty-four undergraduates at the University of Western Ontario (thirty-two male, thirty-two female; seventeen to thirty-five years old) to read a magazine editorial that either described immigrants as competing for Canadian jobs or made no mention of this issue. The editorials were developed to be similar to previous reports on immigration in the media, which may present expert opinions on the economic consequences of immigration (e.g., DeVoretz 1996) or results of recent polls of Canadians' attitudes toward immigration (e.g., Globe and Mail 1992); Toronto Star 1996). The study was described to participants as examining 'media coverage of current affairs.' Because participants were randomly assigned to read one of the two editorials, we could be sure that any differences obtained would be due to the content of the editorials read. The specific question we addressed was whether media coverage of immigration that highlights competition for jobs from skilled immigrants serves to promote negative attitudes toward immigrants and immigration. We reasoned that exposure to this sort of information creates negative attitudes toward both immigrants and immigration because of a sense of threat to Canadians' economic well-being. We also examined effects of the information on attitudes toward a specific fictitious immigrant group that we described in the editorial. In this way, we were able to examine the development of attitudes toward a new

Economic Threat and Attitudes toward Immigrants 219 group; for this group, no pre-existing attitudes were present to influence the findings. Media coverage of immigration that highlights competition for jobs might influence both specific and general attitudes. First, attitudes toward a specific immigrant group might be affected by discussion of the group in an economically competitive context, and the related sense of threat evoked by the group's immigration. As a result, attitudes toward the specific group, and toward the group's immigration to Canada, might become less favourable. Additionally, however, when economic threat is salient, people might be less favourable toward immigrants and immigration in general. Moreover, people's views about how immigrant groups should be treated once in Canada might be similarly affected. For example, when feeling economically threatened, people might be less willing to endorse social programs that help immigrants adjust to life in Canada. In sum, we hypothesized that exposure to media coverage of immigration in the context of potential competition for jobs would have a negative effect on attitudes toward a specific immigrant group and toward immigrants in general, attitudes toward the immigration of the specific immigrant group and toward immigration in general, and attitudes toward helping immigrants adjust to life in Canada. Editorials

We created the two editorials about immigration to Canada specifically for this experiment. The editorials were written and formatted in such a way that they appeared identical to real editorials often seen in news magazines. Both editorials contained a discussion of immigration issues in general, followed by coverage of the recent immigration of the specific, fictitious immigrant group. In the editorial designed to make economic threat salient (i.e., the economic threat condition), the general discussion of immigration focused on the participation of skilled immigrants in the Canadian job market. For example, it included statements such as 'Recently, immigrants have been able to successfully compete in our labour market and take part in the many economic opportunities that Canada has to offer' and 'People looking for jobs face fierce competition from a large pool of applicants, including well-qualified immigrants.' The other editorial did not discuss issues of skilled immigrants entering the workforce. Instead, it made general claims such as 'In Canada, immigration patterns

220 Part Three: The Economic Impact during the period 1990-1995 were reflections of changes observed internationally' and 'Neither patterns nor numbers of immigrant movements could be predicted from the information available from the period 1980-1990.' In both editorials, the discussion of general immigration issues was followed by coverage of the immigration of the fictitious immigrant group, who we called 'Sandirians/ The description of Sandirians was identical in both editorials. Sandirians were described in such a way as to convince participants that the group was real, but unfamiliar to most Canadians. For example, Sandir was said to be a very small (hence little-known) country. Sandirians were said to be immigrating to Canada because of a recent natural disaster in Sandir. Indeed, only a few participants expressed any suspicion about the existence of the group (data from these participants are not included in our reported analyses). Sandirian people were described in positive terms; they were portrayed as ambitious, hard-working, smart, family-oriented, spiritual, and religious. In addition, Sandirian people were said to be likely to fit in well and to prosper in Canada. We expected that this positive information would be interpreted less favourably by participants who had just read about economic competition from immigrants, and that more general attitudes toward the group would be similarly affected. Feelings of Economic Threat

Our reasoning about this experiment rested on the assumption that participants who read the editorial describing the participation of skilled immigrants in the Canadian job market (i.e., the economic threat condition) would be more likely to feel that immigrants are an economic threat to Canadians than would participants who read the editorial that made no mention of economic threat. To determine whether this was indeed the case, we asked the participants to rate the extent to which they believed that immigration decreases or increases the number of jobs available to people already living here. Ratings were made on a scale ranging from -2, 'Decreases the number of jobs a lot,' to +2, 'Increases the number of jobs a lot.' In addition, participants were asked to indicate the extent to which they felt anxious versus calm on a scale ranging from -3, 'Anxious/ to +3, 'Calm/ As can be seen in Table 10.1, participants did demonstrate evidence of perceived economic threat in the intended economic threat condi-

Economic Threat and Attitudes toward Immigrants 221 tion. In the economic threat condition only, participants indicated that immigration decreases the number of jobs available to people already living here. In addition, participants in the economic threat condition were significantly less calm than those in the no threat condition. Thus we can conclude that the manipulation of editorial content did evoke perceived economic threat, as it was intended to. Attitudes toward Immigrants How were participants' attitudes toward the fictitious group, Sandirians, affected by perceived economic threat? To answer this question, we first examined participants' willingness to ascribe stereotypes to the group and their interpretation of these stereotypes. We assumed that participants' impressions of Sandirians would be based on the information provided in the editorials. Thus, we asked participants to indicate how descriptive of Sandirians a list of traits were, including the six key traits listed in the editorials (ambitious, hard-working, smart, familyoriented, spiritual and religious). These ratings were made on a scale ranging from 0, 'Not at all descriptive,' to 7, Extremely descriptive.' We expected that participants in both the economic threat condition and the no economic threat condition would indicate that the six key traits described Sandirians. This expectation was supported (see Table 10.1). The traits listed in the editorials were indeed rated as quite descriptive of Sandirians in both conditions. In contrast to the descriptiveness of the traits, however, we expected that the interpretation of the traits, in terms of their favourability, would be affected by the economic threat manipulation. In particular, we expected that the traits used to describe Sandirians would be construed less favourably by participants in the economic threat condition. To assess participants' construal of the traits, they were asked to rate the favourability of each trait on a scale ranging from -3, 'Very negative,' to +3, 'Very positive.' As shown in Table 10.1, participants in the economic threat condition did construe the traits used to describe Sandirians less favourably than did participants in the no economic threat condition. Participants were also asked to rate their overall evaluations of Sandirians on a thermometer scale ranging from 0, 'Extremely unfavourable,' to 100, 'Extremely favourable.' As shown in Table 10.1, the overall evaluations of Sandirians were also less favourable in the economic threat condition, although this difference was not significant.

222 Part Three: The Economic Impact TABLE 10.1 Effect of editorials on perceived threat and on attitudes toward immigrants, immigration, and helping immigrants No economic threat Perceived threat Effect on jobs (-2 to +2) Anxious-calm (-3 to+3) Attitudes toward immigrants Descriptiveness of Sandirian traits (0 to 7) Favourability of Sandirian traits (-3 to +3) Attitudes toward Sandirians (0 to 100) Attitudes toward immigrants in general (-2 to +2) Attitudes toward immigration Sandirian immigration (-4 to +4) Immigration in general (-2 to +2) Attitudes toward helping immigrants Direct assistance (1 to 7) Empowerment (1 to 7) Personal change (1 to 7)

Economic threat

Significance level of comparison

-.03 1.13

-.70 .28

p