Identity and Nation in Iraq 9781626370791

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IDENTITY AND NATION IN IRAQ

IDENTITY AND NATION IN IRAQ Sherko Kirmanj

b o u l d e r l o n d o n

Published in the United States of America in 2013 by Lynne Rienner Publishers, Inc. 1800 30th Street, Boulder, Colorado 80301 www.rienner.com and in the United Kingdom by Lynne Rienner Publishers, Inc. 3 Henrietta Street, Covent Garden, London WC2E 8LU © 2013 by Lynne Rienner Publishers, Inc. All rights reserved Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Kirmanj, Sherko, author. Identity and nation in Iraq / Sherko Kirmanj. Includes bibliographical references and index. ISBN 978-1-58826-885-3 (alk. paper) 1. National characteristics, Iraqi. 2. Nation building—Iraq. I. Title. DS70.7.K49 2012 956.704—dc23 2012034892 British Cataloguing in Publication Data A Cataloguing in Publication record for this book is available from the British Library. Printed and bound in the United States of America The paper used in this publication meets the requirements of the American National Standard for Permanence of Paper for Printed Library Materials Z39.48-1992. 5

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To my beloved wife, Khadija, and my sons, Shako and Shazo

Contents

ix xi xvii

List of Illustrations Foreword, Brendan O’Leary Acknowledgments 1

The Context of Identity in Iraq

2

The Formation of Iraq

21

3

Faisal and the Dream of a Nation

39

4

The Emergence of National Integration

63

5

The Failure of National Integration

95

6

The Process of National Disintegration

131

7

A Disintegrated Nation

169

8

The US Invasion: Opening Pandora’s Box

193

9

The Paradoxes of Nation Formation in Iraq

233

1

Appendixes: 1 The Destruction of Kurdistan, 1963–1987 2 The January 2005 Parliamentary Election Results 3 The August 2005 Constitutional Referendum Results 4 The December 2005 Parliamentary Election Results 5 Civilian Deaths from Violence in Iraq, 2003–2012 6 Average Deaths per Day from Bombs and Gunfire 7 The March 2010 Parliamentary Election Results

260 262 262 263 264 265 266

List of Acronyms Glossary References Index About the Book

267 269 271 297 321

vii

Illustrations

Maps

1.1 1.2 1.3 8.1

Iraq in the Middle East The Provinces of Iraq Iraq’s Major Ethnoreligious Groups Territories Disputed by the Iraqi Government and the KRG

3 4 6 213

Figures

4.1 Urban Population Growth in Baghdad, Mosul, and Basra

70

Tables

4.1 Growth of the Urban Population in Iraq 6.1 The Anfal Stages and the Pattern of Disappearances

ix

70 158

Foreword: In Sami Abdul Rahman Park

Gardening is cheaper than therapy, and it produces flowers and veg-

etables. A love of highly gardened public parks was one of the many dispositions that Sami Abdul Rahman acquired in England, and that he took back to his homeland. Archeologists suggest that his homeland may have been one of the first places on the planet where people started steering water to garden on a large scale. A graduate of the University of Manchester, in that wet city of the north of England, Sami lived much of his life as an exile from his homeland, the Kurdistan Region of Iraq. Sentenced to death in absentia by Saddam Hussein’s regime, Sami and his wife, Fawzia, lived out their exile in Syria, Turkey, Iran, and England. He and his family eventually found an ordinary family home in Chislehurst in Kent, which overlooked green fields where horses grazed. In his younger years Sami had been an officer in the guerrilla army of the legendary Mulla Mustafa Barzani, the Pershmerga—”those who face death.” In that role he had planned and led a daring raid on the Kirkuk oil fields in 1969. “Sami’s Park,” as it is known in Erbil, the capital of the Kurdistan Region, was named after Sami Abdul Rahman. After all, he had initiated it. Its opening was delayed to let the trees within grow taller, and stronger, before Kurdish children clambered all over them. Trees and flowers are now in abundance in the manicured park, and so are fountains and artificial lakes. Kurdistan has always been rich in rivers and water if not in other ways. Aside from the high pollen count, there is now an abundance of children’s climbing frames, playground challenges, and toys. Old couples in Western clothes walk by toward evening. Young couples follow later, sometimes in more traditional clothes, though the women wear the bright colors and make-up frowned upon by puritanical mullahs. Most promenade in their Friday best, but the occasional jogger, skateboarder, and huckster can be seen, though we saw no beggars. Students can be seen looking at their books, in between looking at each other. It is but a short walk to the Parliament, the Kurdistan National Assembly, and to the Council of Ministers behind it, where Sami once had his offices. He was the deputy prime minister of the Kurdistan Regional Government until February 1, 2004. As well as landscape gardening, Sami Abdul Rahman was determined to bring parliamentary democracy to Kurdistan and federalism to Iraq. I recall watching him instruct young Kurdish civil servants on how to take notes: to be unobxi

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Foreword

trusive during meetings with citizens and foreign dignitaries while remaining polite and attentive to the needs of strangers. I can see him presiding over a public seminar in the Parliament after a foreign professor had presented a talk on models of federalism, engaging the audience of Kurdish civil society, and restraining himself from doing their thinking for them. I also remember the twinkle in his eye as he laughed at US and British ambassadors, past and present, who were unable to restrain their arrogant presumptions; or him smiling at the tale of an officious Welsh diplomat telling Kurdish women that they should just be “Iraqis,” when he, as a Londoner, knew that she was both Welsh and British. I was last in the garden in 2009, and I knew he’d be pleased to see what had become of it. The city of Erbil has become not only normally modernized, but elegantly so. It is attracting its own citizens to a public life, as well as attracting curious Arab tourists from the Gulf and also al-Iraq al-Arabi—Arabs from Iraq, as those who are called the Kurds of Iraq typically put it. The Arab tourists have to get through Kurdistan’s security rim, and they have to be willing to leave their weapons behind. Brand new hotels are now present near Sami’s park, both the classy and ultra-classy. The reason is simple. Erbil is the capital of the Kurdistan Region, and the Kurdistan Region is experiencing a gold rush, a black-gold rush. Now it has much more than wealth in water. The Kurdistan Region is now known, for certain, to be fabulously rich in oil and gas. Not just in disputed Kirkuk, where one of the world’s largest set of fields has been exploited since 1927, but throughout undisputed Kurdistan. Direct flights to Erbil are available from Amsterdam, Athens, Munich, Stockholm, and Vienna, as well as from Istanbul, Dubai, Cairo, Abu Dhabi, and Beirut. Just six years earlier on my way to consider Sami’s request that I become one of his advisers, I had flown from Amman through Baghdad on NGO planes, as a nominal member of Archeologists for Human Rights. The alternative route, which I had also taken, involved an eleven-hour car journey from Diyarbakir in Turkey—with no pleasantries exchanged with the Turkish border guards, whose government then still officially denied the existence of Kurds and of a Kurdistan Region. Today Turkish businesses are the largest foreign investors in the non-oil sector and are major partners in many oil and gas exploration companies, and today Erbil has an international airport where 747s can land. I have photographs of it when it was a muddy field with two temporary cabins. I distinctly recall Sami’s worries in January 2004 about the forthcoming negotiation of Iraq’s Transitional Administrative Law, expected to begin within the week. He was recovering from back surgery, which was obvious when he took my friend Khaled Salih and me around the incipient garden. The surgery had gone well, but it would take time for Sami to walk with ease. He feared that any future constitution of Iraq might be dictated by its Arab (and Shiite Arab) majority, and he wanted to be sure that Kurdistan’s leaders made no more mistakes. Jalal Talabani, the leader of the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK), had made a nearly fatal error in November 2003, signing a

Foreword

xiii

letter placed before him by the US-led Coalition Provisional Authority that appeared to countenance an Iraq in which there would be no Kurdistan Region. At least, Talabani claimed that it had been an error, but that was not a view widely held within the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP), of which Sami was secretary-general. He was preparing to lead the KDP negotiating team, and he was determined to avoid bickering among Kurds, especially among Kurdish parties. He had once been the leader of his own party, but had made peace with the KDP’s historic leading family of nationalists, the Barzanis. Sami was now the key councilor of the KDP. He was the judicious and wellread mentor of Nechirvan Barzani, prime minister of the Kurdistan Region and the grandson of Mulla Mustafa. The Parliament and Council of Ministers where Sami worked are not far from the Citadel. Believed to have been settled for at least 6,000 (and perhaps as many as 9,000) years, the Citadel looks over Erbil. In 2004 it was a mess of ruined late-Ottoman buildings and impoverished refugees. The Citadel looks as if it is built on a volcanic outcrop, but it is in fact built up from the debris of the cities that have been built successively on it over the millennia. It contains in its bowels and ancient sewers the leftovers from the time of Sargon, Assyria, Akkadia, Babylonia, and the first great Persian Empire. Many temples, churches, and mosques lie in its layers. In 2009 it was being improved. Today it is beginning to match its history: Umberto Eco might add it to his tours in hyper-reality. The Citadel is not far from where in 331 BCE Alexander defeated Darius III to take over the Persian Empire. The battle was named Arbela because, according to some Greek historians, that was the name of the nearest city. The battle was also called “Gaugamela,” the Camel’s House, which is likely located on the road from the Citadel toward Mosul. Arbela became Arbil in Turkish and Erbil in Arabic and English. Today its mostly Kurdish citizens call the city Hawler (pronounced Haul-eer). The ancestors of the Kurds, a topic worth time, words, and research on another occasion, may have been the Medes, according to today’s Kurds. If so, and it is as good a surmise as many, the ancestors of the Kurds likely fought with Darius III against Alexander, that is, for the Orient and against the Occident.* In 2003, however, the Kurdish Peshmerga fought with the Occident’s greatest power, the United States, to remove the forces of modern-day Oriental despot Saddam Hussein from all of Kurdish territory in Iraq. Sami and his colleagues already administered the parts of Kurdistan from which Saddam had withdrawn in a failed attempt to starve the Kurds into submission in 1991. In 2003 the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan led the assault on Kirkuk, and the KDP liberated Mosul

*The Kurds’ ancestors may also have been the “Carduchians,” who “dwelled throughout the mountains, . . . were warlike, [and] did not obey the King,” and harassed the Greek mercenaries of Xenophon in 401 BCE. Xenophon, The Anabasis of Cyrus, with an Introduction by Eric Buzzetti. Translated by W. Ambler (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1979), p. 120.

xiv

Foreword

from the Baathists. Shortly afterward, Kurdish intelligence helped track down the fugitive dictator to his spider-hole near Tikrit. This book, the product of the fine mind of Sherko Kirmanj, is the best available analysis of Iraq as it came to be just before Saddam was ousted from power, and it also provides an initial and fair-minded appraisal of developments through mid-2012. The book is a powerful and dispassionate analysis of Iraq’s “principal components,” as Iraqis refer to their three major communities—Sunni Arabs, Shiite Arabs, and Kurds—and it does not forget Iraq’s many micro-minorities. The three communities are not presented as monoliths; their internal tensions and contradictions are registered; nuances are respected. The book owes its special timbre to its remarkable angle of vision. Its author, a Kurd from the city of Erbil, was determined to avoid a history of grievances and to provide instead an anatomy of the Iraqi state that Winston Churchill, then the British Empire’s colonial secretary, had put together. That empire was at the time attempting to pacify revolts in Ireland, India, and soon Iraq. Sherko Kirmanj’s work can profitably be compared with Hanna Batatu’s The Old Social Classes and the Revolutionary Movements of Iraq: A Study of Iraq’s Old Landed and Commercial Classes and of Its Communists, Ba’thists and Free Officers (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1978). The latter, widely regarded as the foundational political sociology of modern Iraq, ends just before Saddam’s ascent to the presidency. None of its readers could have predicted the horrors to follow. Strangely, its Palestinian Arab author, though aware of Iraq’s internal ethnic and sectarian differences, still felt able to write an account roughly centered on the theme of nation building (and the failure of communism). Dr. Kirmanj has the advantage of hindsight, but he does not fall into the trap of arguing that catastrophe was necessarily inscribed into Iraq’s formation. He also offers tempered hopes for the future, though no reader of his book will assume the permanency of either Iraq’s federation or of its nascent democratic institutions: breakup and a Shiite Arab rather than a Sunni Arab dictatorship remain genuine possibilities. Kirmanj’s work is the product of reflection in exile, but unlike many exiles’ work it avoids sentimentalizing or romanticizing aspects of the past, or attributing all that has been most foul in Iraq to Saddam or to the Baath Party. I was in Sami’s Park in 2009 because I had work to do, helping to advise on the Kurdistan Region’s own constitution, which is still not issued. I was also having a quiet personal moment with Khaled Salih, paying tribute to Sami by drinking, talking, and walking in the park named after him, where previously there had been one of the gruesome detention centers of Baathist Iraq. A large black-stoned monument graces the park, listing ninety-eight names. It is the Martyrs Memorial. The named persons were killed when suicide bombers exploded themselves at parties being held in Erbil, at the city headquarters of the KDP and the PUK. About two hundred people suffered serious injuries. Sami is on the list. So is one of his sons, Salah, who had come to visit him from London just after we had last seen his father. Salah was a businessman,

Foreword

xv

with a young family. The parties were being held on February 1, 2004, because it was the day of the Eid al-Adha, the Festival of Sacrifice, a day on which Muslims recall Abraham’s willingness to sacrifice his son Ismael as proof of his obedience to Allah, before Allah intervened to stop him and provided a sheep as a substitute. Sami had lived long enough after the blast to learn that his son had been killed. He had certainly not wanted his son, a sports enthusiast, to be sacrificed in the Kurdish struggle. Franso Hariri Stadium is where Sami’s son would have preferred to have been spending his time. It is where Iraq’s international soccer games are now played. The stadium too, however, is named after a martyr; in this case, an Assyrian Christian, a leading light in the KDP, and a governor of Erbil. Franso Hariri was assassinated in 2001 by Kurdish Islamists, members of Ansar al-Islam and confederates of al-Qaeda. Franso, like Sami, was a firm advocate of the beautification of Erbil and Kurdistan. Khaled and I had been invited to the KDP’s 2004 Eid al-Adha party; we also had an invitation to the PUK’s party. One of us, however, had a visit to make to his mother in Suleimaniya. The other had to be at a court in London. We were lucky not to be immolated in Sami’s sacrifice. Life has generally been good to us since. It is easier to sketch what Sami’s country, Kurdistan, has become in the decade since Sami and his son Salah were sacrificed, and since Saddam Hussein’s Baathists ceased to rule any part of Iraq. It is far more difficult to describe the horror that has unfolded in Arab Iraq. As Sami would have wished, Dr. Kirmanj writes the truth about Iraq, both when it was grim and when it was better. It is an honor to write a foreword to this pioneering book in the new scholarship of Iraq that is sorely needed, both to puncture past propaganda and to offer a realistic appraisal of feasible futures. —Brendan O’Leary Lauder Professor of Political Science, University of Pennsylvania

Acknowledgments

My sincere gratitude goes to Shamsul Khan of the School of Commu-

nication, International Studies and Languages, University of South Australia, for his professional and friendly support as I worked on this book. I am wholeheartedly thankful to Muhammad Kamal of the Asia Institute, University of Melbourne, whose encouragement, guidance, and valuable comments have been crucial to the completion of the study. I owe special thanks to my loving wife, Khadija (Hanis) Kirmanj, who sacrificed much for my research. Without her dedication and understanding, it would have been impossible for me to complete this work. Special thanks are also due to Liora Lukitz, formerly of San Diego State University, who offered her valuable time to review my manuscript. I thank others who reviewed the manuscript and contributed helpful comments and constructive criticism: Kami Rostami, Minerva Nasser-Eddine, and Aram Rafaat. Thanks to Sharon Linzey for editing the manuscript. Many thanks go to Ofra Bengio, Brendan O’Leary, Gareth Stansfield, Amatzia Baram, Michael Eppel, Denise Natali, Carole O’Leary, Ronen Zeidel, and Idan Barir. Their comments in the course of face-to-face, phone, and e-mail discussions were very helpful. The efforts of the academic librarians at the University of South Australia, Hayim Gal from the Moshe Dayan Centre, Tel Aviv University, and David Hirsch from the Center for Near Eastern Studies, UCLA, are highly appreciated. The resources they made available to me gave me access to unique information and data. I also thank all the librarians and staff at the Central Library of the University of Salahaddin, Erbil. They helped me to access valuable sources unavailable elsewhere. Rafiq Salih and Sidiq Salih of Binkai Zhin (Zhin Center) in Suleimaniya made many of the center’s valuable collections available on CDs for me. To them I am grateful. I am grateful to all of my family members and friends in Kurdistan: my brother, Muhammad Hamadamin, my sister, Dlveen Hamadamin, Jangi Jabar, Herish Simko, Jamal Mawlood, Abdul Rahman Othman (Banda), Rashid Ali, Nazim Hassan, Choli Muhsin, Sarkawt Muhammad, and Hazhar Sabir. Without their untiring assistance buying, borrowing, and sending numerous books and other valuable resources, completing this book would have been far more xvii

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Acknowledgments

difficult. The assistance from Abdullah Zangana and Azad Ubed from the Kurdistan Journalists’ Union is also highly appreciated. The support of Mumtaz alHaidari, whose home library consists of a rare collection of sources, will last in my memory. Special gratitude goes to my Iraqi friends: the poet Abdul Khaliq Kitan, Abdul Musa, and Riyadh al-Khafaji, who opened the doors of their libraries for my use. It is almost impossible to mention the names of all the people who have helped me in one way or another. Therefore, I thank those who are not mentioned, especially the relatives and friends who made every effort to send and/or carry books and resources from Kurdistan to Australia. Finally I wish to express my sincere gratitude to Lynne Rienner and her great team of editors for their help in bringing the manuscript to publication. I also thank the two anonymous reviewers for their comments that greatly enriched the book. —Sherko Kirmanj

1 The Context of Identity in Iraq

A brief historical, geographical, and cultural review of Mesopotamia

and the territories that constitute Iraq today provides a useful backdrop from which to approach the question of identity in modern Iraq. Iraq gave rise to the world’s earliest civilizations, including Sumer, Akkad, Assyria, and Babylon. After the demise of these civilizations in the sixth century BC, the area became part of the Persian Empire. In 539 BC it was conquered by the Greeks and remained under Greek rule for nearly two centuries. In 224 AD the Persians regained control and dominated the area until Arab Muslims entered the region in the seventh century. After the Muslims defeated the last Persian (Sassanid) Empire, the area was ruled by various Muslim dynasties including the Umayyads and Abbasids. In 762 the Abbasids established Baghdad as the capital of their empire. Under the rule of an Abbasid caliph, Harun al-Rashid (r. 786–809), and his son al-Ma’mun (r. 813–833), Baghdad became a center of rational and philosophical thinking. Although short-lived, the period is remembered as a “golden age” by most Muslims,1 especially by Sunni Arabs. In 1258 Mongol invasions ended the Abbasid rule. Most of these territories eventually came under the control of the Ottoman Empire (r. 1300–1922) and remained under Ottoman administration until the British occupation in the early twentieth century. The modern state of Iraq was created early in the twentieth century by the British colonial administration. British interest in Arabian Mesopotamia dates to the nineteenth century.2 At the outbreak of World War I Britain perceived the Ottoman Empire’s siding with Germany as a threat to its interest in the Far East, especially India. Consequently, it sought to establish some control over Mesopotamia to protect its communication routes and the newly discovered oil fields at the head of the Gulf in Kuwait and the province of Khuzestan in Iran. To keep the Ottomans away from the oil fields and routes to India, Britain invaded Basra, located at the head of the Gulf.3 From there the British launched a campaign to invade the whole of what is now known as Iraq. It accomplished this just before the end of 1

2

Identity and Nation in Iraq

World War I. It is from this point in history that we begin our exploration of the development and character of Iraqi identity.

The Geography of Iraq Iraq, formerly known as Mesopotamia (from the Greek meaning “the land between the two rivers,” the Tigris and the Euphrates), shares borders with Kuwait and Saudi Arabia to the south, Jordan to the west, Syria to the northwest, Turkey to the north, and Iran to the east. It has a narrow section of coastline at Umm Qasr on the Gulf (see Map 1.1). It occupies 434,924 square kilometers, and in 2012 its population was estimated to be 31,129,225.4 The British created Iraq from the former Ottoman provinces of Baghdad, Basra, and Mosul. Under the Ottomans each province was ruled by its own separate administration, and each province had little in common with the other two. Basra enjoyed strong ties to lands throughout the Gulf region.5 The Arabs in the northern province of Mosul were closer to the Arabs in Syria than to those in the middle and southern parts of Iraq. This was the case even during the first years of the monarchy.6 In brief, the people of Baghdad knew little about the people of Basra and Mosul, and the people from the latter provinces knew even less about the Baghdadis.7 The population of the coastal province of Basra was comprised mainly of Shiite Arabs and the central province of Baghdad was dominated by Sunni Arabs, even though it had a large Shiite population. The northern province, centered on Mosul, was predominantly Kurdish, with large pockets of Arabs, Chaldo-Assyrians, and Turkmen.8 For administrative purposes the British divided the three Ottoman provinces into fourteen provinces. For political rather than administrative reasons the Baathist regime reorganized several times from 1968 to 1976. Four new provinces were created in the process. By the time the United States and its allies invaded in 2003, Iraq was administratively divided into eighteen provinces: al-Anbar (Rumadi), Basra, Muthanna (Samawa), alQadisiya (Diwaniya), Najaf, Erbil, Suleimaniya, Kirkuk (al-Ta’mim), Babil (Hilla), Baghdad, Dohuk, Dhiqar (Nasiriya), Diyala (Ba‘quba), Karbala, Maysan (Amara), Ninawa (Mosul), Salah al-Din (Tikrit), and Wasit (Kut) (see Map 1.2). 9 While this division is still in use, the three Kurdish provinces of Dohuk, Erbil, and Suleimaniya and several districts in Mosul, Kirkuk, Diyala, and Salah al-Din provinces are all ruled either directly or indirectly by the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG). Iraq’s economy was almost exclusively based on agriculture until the 1950s. After the 1958 revolution, however, economic development was considerable. Oil revenue nearly quadrupled from 1973 to 1975 due to the nationalization of the oil companies. Until the outbreak of the Iraq-Iran War,

3

The Context of Identity in Iraq

Map 1.1 Iraq in the Middle East Aral Sea

B l a c k

S e a

GEORGIA ARMENIA L. Tuz

s hrate Eup

TURKEY

R.

UZBEK.

Caspian Sea

AZERBAIJAN TURKMENISTAN

L. Van

Tigris R.

Euphr ates

s

R.

SYRIA

CYPRUS LEBANON ranean Sea

IRAN

IRAQ

AFGHAN.

is gr Ti

ISRAEL

Euph rates

R.

Dead Sea

JORDAN

R.

PAK.

KUWAIT Persian Gulf

ve Ri rN

Str. of Hormuz

BAHRAIN

ile

PT

S A U D I

A R A B I A

Red Sea

QATAR

Gulf of Oman

U. A. E.

Lake Nasser

OMAN

Riv

er

e Nil

Arabian Sea

eN Blu

DAN

YEMEN

ERITREA

ile

White Nile

M

DJIBOUTI

Gulf of Aden

Suqutra

ETHIOPIA SOMALIA

5

4

Identity and Nation in Iraq

Map 1.2 The Provinces of Iraq

TURKEY Dohuk

Ninawa

Erbil

SYRIA Kirkuk

Suleimaniya

IRAN Salah al-Din

Diyala Baghdad Al-Anbar Karbala

Babil

Wasit

AlQadisiyah

JORDAN

Maysan

Dhi Qar Najaf

SAUDI ARABIA

Muthanna

Basra

KUWAIT

The Context of Identity in Iraq

5

Iraq’s economy was dominated by oil production. In recent decades oil production has provided about 95 percent of foreign exchange earnings. Iraq’s gross national income (GNP) in 1967 was 745.2 million Iraqi dinars (ID); the gross domestic product (GDP) was 937.7 million ID. By 1982 the GNP and GDP had increased to 12,334.6 and 5,374.5 million ID respectively.10 Both oil production and economic development declined after the start of the Iraq-Iran War and the First and Second Gulf Wars. Consequently, the economy has continued to face serious problems, including a huge foreign debt that has grown since the early 1980s largely due to heavy war expenditures and high military spending. Iraq has some of the world’s largest oil reserves, estimated at 143 billion barrels. This does not include the reserves in the Kurdistan region and the western areas of the country.11 As of March 2012, Iraq was producing about 2.9 million barrels of oil per day (bpd). Iraq’s gross domestic product is expected to rise by 9 percent in 2012, mainly driven by oil production.12

Ethnic and Religious Diversity of Iraq Iraq is shaped by a number of religious, cultural, and ethnic forces. A precise statistical breakdown of the population is extremely difficult due to inaccuracies in census data coupled with official manipulations. Most sources estimate that at least 97 percent of the population adheres to some form of Islam. The remaining 3 percent consists of Christians (Chaldo-Assyrians and Armenians),13 Yazidis (ethnic Kurds), Mandaeans (gnostics), and a small number of Jews.14 Arabs are the largest ethnic group at 77 percent of the overall Iraqi population. Among Iraqi Arabs, Shiite Muslims make up nearly 75 percent of the population, and they are 60 percent of the total Iraqi population. Although predominantly located in the south, the Shiite Arabs are the majority in Baghdad and have communities in most parts of the country. Sunni Muslims account for nearly 25 percent of the Iraqi Arab population and around 20 percent of Iraq’s total population. Geographically the Sunni Arabs are concentrated in the midwest and northwest of the country. There are only two Sunni-dominated provinces: al-Anbar and Salah al-Din. The other provinces in which they are numerically strong are Ninawa (Ninevah), Baghdad, Diyala, and Kirkuk. The Sunni Arabs were the majority in the capital city of Baghdad until the late 1950s when they were overwhelmed by the Shiite Arabs.15 Though predominantly Arab, the Shiites also include Turkmen and Faili-Kurds. The Kurds, the second-largest ethnic group at approximately 20 percent of Iraq’s population, are mostly Sunnis. They reside in the uplands of the northeast of the country. The third-largest ethnic group, the Turkmen, are dispersed throughout the country, especially in the major city centers of Kirkuk, Erbil, and Tala‘far (see Map 1.3).16 Shiism, one of the main sects of Islam, emerged during the early days

6

Identity and Nation in Iraq

Map 1.3 Iraq’s Major Ethnoreligious Groups

TURKEY

Majority Kurd

SYRIA IRAN

Majority Sunni

Baghdad

Northern Desert Majority Shiite

JORDAN

SAUDI ARABIA

Southern Desert

KUWAIT

The Context of Identity in Iraq

7

of Islam following the death of the Prophet Muhammad in 632 AD. The Muslim divide occurred on the issue of the successor to the Prophet, resulting in great disunity and harm to the community. The Sunnis advocate the idea that Muhammad’s successor should be an elected member of the Qurayish tribe, the tribe of the Prophet Muhammad. They argue that the Prophet deliberately refrained from appointing a successor and left it to community leaders to decide on his successor based on the concept of shura (consultation). Accordingly, they approved the succession of Abu Bakr as the first caliph. The other group, the Shiites, believe that Muhammad appointed Ali, his cousin and son-in-law, as successor during his last pilgrimage in 632 just before his death. They also advocate the idea that a successor should be a member of Muhammad’s family (ahl al-Bayt).17 The Shiite-Sunni antagonism climaxed after the establishment of the Safavid dynasty (r. 1502–1722) in Iran and its adoption of Shiism as the state religion. Historically, southern Iraq has been a stronghold of Shiism. The major cities of Basra, Karbala, Najaf, Kufa, and al-Kadhimiya (a suburb in Baghdad today) emerged as Shiite learning and cultural centers. Karbala and Najaf became destinations for Shiite pilgrims because both cities hold major Shiite shrines of Imam Ali and Imam Hussein. Since the disappearance in 764 of the twelfth Shiite Imam, al-Mahdi, the leadership of the Shiite community has been held by religious clerics. This arrangement led to the development of a kind of institution called marja‘iya (senior religious leadership) that tended to provide a strong sense of cohesion.18 Unlike the dominant Shiites, the Sunni religious communal identity is less developed. In Iraq the Sunni Arabs (hereafter the Sunnis), enjoyed supremacy during the Umayyad and Abbasid dynasties. This position lasted until the collapse of the Ottoman Empire and even after the formation of modern Iraq. The other large ethnic group to be reckoned with in Iraq is the Kurd, who speak Kurdish, an Indo-European language. The land on which the Kurds now reside was invaded by Arab Muslims in the mid-seventh century. The first wave of Muslim Arabs arrived in the area during the reign of Umer bin Khatab (r. 634–644), and they continued to arrive throughout the Umayyad and Abbasid dynasties. In 1514 the Kurdish-populated area was officially divided between the Ottomans and the Safavids. During their respective rules, the Kurds initially enjoyed some degree of autonomy and were able to establish several Kurdish dynasties (principalities) such as Ardalan, Badinan, Baban, Soran, Hakkari, and Badlis.19 In 1834, when the centralization policies of the Ottomans ended Kurdish self-rule, several rebellions ensued. The Kurds from Iraq were part of Mosul province during the Ottoman rule. After the British invasion in 1926, the province was formally annexed to Iraq when a border dispute between Britain/Iraq and

8

Identity and Nation in Iraq

Turkey was settled. The Kurds currently constitute a majority in the four provinces of Kirkuk, Suleimaniya, Erbil, and Dohuk, and they form a large minority in the provinces of Ninawa and Diyala.

The Question of Identity in Iraq Compared to the early years of the 2003 occupation by US and allied forces, Iraq has recently experienced an improvement in the security situation and a sharp decline in the levels of violence. In fact, by mid-2007 the fatalities resulting from internal ethnic and sectarian violence had declined by nearly 90 percent.20 The number of civilian deaths also decreased from an average of 2,300 per month in 2006 to an average of 322 per month by 2011.21 The Sunni vs. Shiite violence of 2006–2007, normally considered to be quite extreme, has also abated. Due to the leveling off of violence from all sources, the US military withdrew most of its combat forces at the end of 2011. After two rounds of successful elections in the Iraqi National Assembly in 2005, Iraq staged three more relatively successful elections in 2009 and 2010: the provincial elections in January 2009, the elections for the Kurdistan Regional Parliament in July 2009, and the elections for the Iraqi Parliament in March 2010. Contrary to the 2005 elections, where Sunni citizens boycotted the vote, recent elections had strong participation across all ethnic, sectarian, and political groups. In general, the political and economic progress of the last four years has been significant.22 It should also be acknowledged that al-Qaeda is in retreat, though it retains limited ability to conduct high-profile attacks designed to demonstrate its viability.23 Despite the promising picture of progress and recent security gains, Iraq remains in a delicate condition. The longevity and sustainability of the country’s progress will likely depend upon Iraq’s ability to address a complex set of political issues. Among these are the political reconciliation between different ethnic and religious groups; laws needed to regulate the distribution of revenue gained from the country’s natural resources; management of Iraq’s oil reserves; resolution of the long-standing territorial dispute between the Kurdistan region and the rest of Iraq, including the fate of the oil-rich areas around Kirkuk; the issue of federalism; and the request for amending the Iraqi constitution, especially the articles concerning Iraq’s identity and structure. Although these issues pose the greatest threats to Iraq’s stability, no significant practical measures have yet been taken to resolve them. Iraq remains fragile primarily because the underlying sources of instability have yet to be resolved. Iraq’s major power brokers (the Sunni, Shiites, and Kurds) disagree on the nature of the state, its structure, and

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identity. The current ethnic and sectarian conflict in Iraq cannot be attributed exclusively to insurgency and terrorism. Indeed, the conflicts and disputes between Iraq’s national/ethnic and religious/sectarian groups constitute the most serious part of Iraq’s predicament. Iraq is comprised of people from many different backgrounds. Acknowledgment of this diversity and respecting the cultural and national differences of Iraq’s diverse groups are the most pressing challenge facing the Iraqi people. This is a challenge that needs to be addressed both constitutionally and institutionally.

Contending Debate on Iraq’s Identity Many scholars suggest that the civil unrest, sectarian violence, and ongoing chaos in Iraq are the result of the US invasion and its failure to impose law and order.24 Eric Davis blames the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) and US policymakers for implementing failed policies such as deBaathification and the disbanding of the Iraqi army.25 Others blame the creator of the Iraqi state—that is, Britain—for failing in the process of statebuilding from the very beginning. Toby Dodge, for example, asserts that “troop numbers” and “inadequate resources” were one of the central problems to undermine the stability and state-building processes in Iraq.26 The shortcoming of this argument is that it tends to enlarge the role of the state in constructing identity while marginalizing the will and attachment of people to identity and homeland. Some scholars point out that Iraq remains a fragile political entity due to the fact that it was created in the aftermath of World War I through the involuntary unification of ethnically and religiously diverse groups of the former Ottoman Empire.27 This understanding is shared neither by prominent scholars in the West nor by many Iraqi intellectuals and academics who emphasize the identity factor, oftentimes described as “Iraqiness.” Their notion of Iraqiness rests on the notion that the Iraqi people are the direct descendants of Sumerian, Babylonian, Assyrian, and Arab peoples.28 They argue that Iraqi identity is not an invented phenomenon but has evolved naturally, as any national identity does, in the heart of every Iraqi. All one need do is simply try to revive it. Both Matar and al-Janabi maintain that Saddam Hussein destroyed any semblance of Iraq’s national identity. Similarly, Ghazi Yawar, the first Iraqi president following the collapse of the regime in 2003, blamed the former president, Hussein (hereafter Saddam) for the destruction of Iraqi identity.29 Matar and al-Janabi differ, however, on the issue of the Kurds’ attachment to Iraqi identity. Matar holds the view that the Iraqi Kurds must discover their true historical roots in order to recapture their lost Iraqi identity, while al-Janabi doubts the Iraqiness of the Kurds altogether.30

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Others go further and argue that “Iraq has long been a secular country, where a majority of citizens identify with their national identity rather than their ethnic or religious identity.”31 Marquardt argues that since 1921 Iraqi leaders have been able to preserve Iraq’s territorial integrity and prevent ethnic fissures from forming. He asserts that the seeds of ethnic violence, and even ethnic cleansing, were never experienced in Iraq on a major scale. Marquardt suggests that Iraq’s Sunni and Shiite Arabs share a common identity and that both communities have supported successive Iraqi leaders that have emphasized pan-Arabism. Nevertheless, he believes that the Kurds have never fit into this category. Zakaria asserts that although Iraq’s political system might have failed, Iraq is not a failed nation-state due to the fact that “Iraq is already a nation.”32 Likewise, Yaphe argues that Iraq cannot naturally, historically, ethnically, or religiously be divided or separated into three distinct categories.33 Neither has the cult of personality played a role in Iraq’s historical or political traditions, according to Yaphe. She emphasizes that Iraq is not simply an artificial construct. Davis maintains that the Kurds, Sunnis, and Shiites have consistently indicated a desire to remain an integral part of the Iraqi nation-state.34 These writers use a mixture of modernist and primordial arguments to support their views. One of the aims of this work is to carefully consider and assess these interpretations because on close inspection these arguments appear to be politically motivated. These claims are not based on a careful analysis of Iraq’s modern history. For example, to blame Saddam alone for the destruction of Iraqi identity, to claim that Iraqis are not divided across ethnic and sectarian lines, or to say that the Kurds have never called for independence are all unsubstantiated and dubious claims (see Chapters 2, 6, and 7). Matar and al-Janabi’s claims appear to be based on a belief that Iraq’s ancient past can serve as the mythical foundation for the reemergence of a new identity. This understanding also depends on the view that Iraq is as old as ancient Mesopotamia. However, these views fail to take into account the fact that the complex structure of modern Iraq was not built until the early twentieth century. Similarly, Visser argues that the idea of an invented Iraq is distorted because it does not take into account nineteenth-century sources. Visser notes the term “Iraq” was used by scholars from Baghdad and by Persian pilgrims in the nineteenth century.35 This argument is debatable for the following reasons: first, it is true that the term was used prior to the creation of Iraq. In fact, the term was used even by medieval Muslim scholars (see Chapter 9). But at the time “Iraq” did not connote an identity, describing the land rather than the inhabitants. Second, Iraq, as described before 1921, did not encompass current Iraqi territory. In his seminal work Al-Ahkam al-Sultania (The Ordinances of Government), written in 1045–1058, the medieval Muslim scholar Abu al-Hasan al-Mawardi described the land known as Iraq al-Sawad to be the area within a triangular territory stretching from al-Haditah, a city on the Euphrates near the Syrian

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border, to Halwan, an ancient city located near current Ba‘quba and Abadan, the latter being an Iranian city on the Shatt al-Arab near Basra.36 Al-Mawardi stated that the area was named “Iraq li’stiwaa” due to its levelness and because Iraq’s territory is free of mountains.37 Al-Mawardi’s description of Iraq highlights two important points: (1) the area that was designated in his description does not encompass modern-day Iraq because it excludes large sections of what was historically part of not only Iraq but also Mesopotamia, such as Tikrit and Mosul; and (2) the description also demonstrates that the borders of Iraq cease when the Kurdishpopulated areas, or the mountains, begin. Visser’s reliance on the writings of late-nineteenth-century Baghdadi scholars undermines his argument because, as he and Fattah rightly concede, these scholars excluded large portions of the then Iraqi population from their writings. The Shiites were described by the writers as rafadha (rejectionists).38 In brief, historical descriptions of Iraq either excluded large parts of modern-day Iraqi territory or large portions of its inhabitants. This issue accentuates the crises of identity that this book seeks to clarify. There are scholars who reject the view that Iraq comprises a consolidated community and instead emphasize the inherent divisions among the people that make up Iraq. Although the Iraqis have lived together for nearly a century, the people are not and never have been united. O’Leary and Eland argue that Iraqis neither come from common stock nor are they united by a common immigrant or assimilationist experience.39 The three provinces of the Ottoman Empire were never united politically and culturally by feelings or notions of a collective identity. Iraq is not “one nation,” and it has never transformed itself into one during the modern era. Gelb and Galbraith assert that the assumption that Iraq’s three main communities share a common sense of nationhood is conceptually flawed because each group tends to think primarily in terms of its own ethnic or confessional community and identity.40 This argument, though merited, is not supported by historical evidence. This book illustrates the process of Iraq’s national integration and its process of national disintegration on the basis of a detailed examination of Iraqi history. Some scholars regard time as an important element in the creation of a sense of cohesion and national integration. For example, Cole believes that we cannot ignore the last eighty-four years that Iraqis have lived together; neither can we ignore their desire to remain in a unitary state.41 This view, however, fails to account for the ongoing hostility and conflict that permeates Iraq’s ethnic groups. Take, for example, the unofficial referendum conducted in the Kurdistan region in 2005 in which more than 98 percent of the population voted to secede from Iraq.42 Contrary to Cole, Gelb suggests that the complex and traumatic legacy of eighty years of turbulent history has proven difficult to overcome. Iraq was able to resist total disintegration only by applying the most overwhelming and brutal force. 43 Anderson and

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Stansfield similarly portray Iraq as an “artificial nation” and agree that the Iraqis are divided along ethnic and sectarian lines.44 Concerning ethnic disturbances, scholars differ as to the character and nature of the notorious conflicts and the reasons for the seemingly unceasing internal power struggles. Marr holds that the struggles by both the Shiite and Sunni communities have been for power, not identity.45 Nakash disagrees and argues that the division between these groups is primarily political rather than ethnically or culturally based.46 The competition among both groups appears to be centered on the issue of who has the right to rule and to define the meaning of nationalism for the country. Nakash makes this point when he states that the Sunni leadership has adopted a broader concept of Arab nationalism as its main ideology than the Shiites, who have preferred a narrower version of Iraqi patriotism in which the distinctive values and heritage of Iraqi society are stressed. Bengio argues that the Kurdish struggle is marked by the fight for identity as well as for power.47 Little has been written on the question of Iraqi identity in general and the process of national integration in particular. One notable exception is the work of Simon, who reviewed the reactions of the Shiite majority and the Jewish minority to the imposition of pan-Arabism as the dominant ideology for the country during the 1920s and 1930s.48 Considering the events of 1920–1958, Lukitz concludes that despite the close relationship between communal groups (Sunni, Shiite, and Kurds), the central government failed to create an overarching identity that transcended ethnic and sectarian lines.49 Focusing on Kurdish integration into the Iraqi state, Natali examined Kurdish identity from a constructivist perspective, arguing that the ethnicity of the Kurds as political identity cannot exist prior to some other exclusivist nationalist project.50 She holds that Kurdish nationalism is a function of political space provided by the succeeding Iraqi political authorities. Similarly, Vali argues that “Kurdish nationalism, precipitated by the denial of Kurdish identity, rests . . . on the suppression of civil society and democratic citizenship,” by successive Iraqi regimes.51 This assertion overlooks the emergence of Kurdish nationalism in its many forms that were demonstrated before the formation of the Iraqi state. It also does not take into account the continuing strength of Kurdish nationalism even during periods of greater inclusivity, such as the monarchy of 1921–1958, Abdul Karim Qasim’s era of 1958–1963, and following the removal of Saddam and the emergence of new Iraq. During this period several Kurdish nationalist movements were birthed. There was an outburst of Kurdish rebellion in 1961, and lately the Kurdish secessionist tendency has been gaining strength. This book examines the assumptions, viewpoints, and interpretations that writers have applied to Iraq, while at the same time providing a diachronic review of Iraq’s modern history. The examination starts from the period of the formation of Iraq and covers the ensuing period up to 2012.

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This time period, in particular, aids in our understanding of the process and character of Iraq’s national integration as well as the formation of its national identity. Most studies cited have either focused on one communal group or the other, or they have been limited to a particular historical period. An exception is the work of Marr and Tripp whose seminal works give less attention to the roles of the Shiites and Kurds than they do to the role of the Sunni Arab elite in shaping Iraqi politics. Natali focused on one communal group, the Kurds,52 and Simon studied the period from 1921 to 1941.53 Lukitz covers the 1920–1958 period,54 Baram from 1968 to 1989,55 and Bengio the second Baathist regime, 1968–1995.56 This research is unique in that it offers a balanced examination of the roles of all major communities—the Shiites, the Sunnis, and the Kurds—in relation to the questions of political identity of the modern era in Iraq. This work stresses the political history of Iraq in order to shed light on the internal political dynamics. However, the analysis is not restricted to any particular time period. The other distinguishing feature of this work is that it looks at the processes of the integration and disintegration of Iraq’s national identity from Kurdish and Shiite perspectives, in addition to that of the Sunnis that have historically dominated the country. It examines unique Kurdish sources and Iraqi textbooks that, to date, have not been available to Western scholars due to either restrictions imposed during difficult political times or language barriers. In sum, this work focuses on the main idea that behind the seemingly intractable ethnic and sectarian fragmentation in Iraq lie unresolved issues of national identity. Addressing the question of identity is crucial if one is to understand the stability, or lack thereof, of states. Many postcolonial states experience serious ethnic conflicts as a consequence of the unresolved questions surrounding national identity. Understanding the dynamics of how ethnic conflict can lead to the failure of the nation-state is essential for identifying Iraq’s options as it emerges from its quagmire. It also relates to the global war against terrorism57 because, in addition to weakening states, ethnic and sectarian conflict makes them ungovernable and lawless. Consequently, states with unresolved ethnic conflicts may become havens for terrorist groups. However, the reason national identity is so critical in the case of Iraq is that, instead of consolidating the people that comprise it, it contributes to the propagation of ethnic and sectarian conflict. It is also important because it means that any attempt to forge—or force—a national identity may have political consequences, such as the need to redraw geopolitical boundaries or alter the composition of political regimes and states. National identity is critical because the new world order is basically founded on the formation of nation-states, and identity is the chief definer of individual loyalty and identity.58 To keep order and peace in the world and to develop loyalty to one’s state, it is important for the state to be perceived as legitimate and to be able to develop a sense of belonging among its citizens.

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Conceptualization of Identity and Nation Based on Anthony D. Smith’s seminal contributions, the following characteristics of nation-states may be identified: a distinctive shared culture, a common myth of ancestry (descent) involving a shared history, a strong sense of group sentiment and loyalty, an association with a specific territory, territorial contiguity with free mobility throughout, equal citizenship rights, vertical economic integration, and a common language.59 There are two kinds of nation-states: one with boundaries that are co-extensive with the boundaries of that national population group (e.g., Japan); and what may be termed the “melting pot” state, which is formed initially from migrant settlers and is not identified with a particular ethnic or national group (e.g., the United States). In an evolutionary process people come to identify with the state that eventually becomes tantamount to a nation. However, in the context of postcolonial countries, the nation-state is a “legal transplant” in which states lack the substance of nationhood due to the fact that colonial powers have merged divergent and sometimes hostile groups within artificially drawn boundaries. Some groups residing within the postcolonial or colonial nation-state also call themselves “nations,” but are better known as nations-without-states. Nations-without-states are territorial communities that have their own identities and a desire for self-determination but they are included within the boundaries of one or more states with which they do not identify (e.g., Catalonians, Kurds, and Scots). However, the term “nation” denotes a social group that consciously and willfully forms a community; shares a common memory, culture, and ancestry; has a strong attachment to a clearly demarcated territory; owns a sense of solidarity; has a common project for the future; and claims the right to self-rule. That self-rule may be independent, autonomous, or understood in the context of a federation.60 Here we must distinguish the term “nation” from “nation-state.” In nation-states the citizens of a nation normally coinhabit the same state and expect to enjoy equal citizenship rights and vertical economic integration. But the concept of nation shares most of the characteristics of nation-states except that it normally lacks the last two features: equal citizenship rights and vertical economy. Nevertheless, national identity is a fluid and dynamic concept that generally refers to a community that shares a particular set of characteristics while believing that its members are ancestrally related and possess a shared culture, history, symbols, language, territory, founding moment, and destiny. It is often applied to citizens of a nation-state. At times a sense of national identity may be shared by those who belong to a nation but have no state of their own.61 The definition of nationalism probably has the most scholarly consensus as to meaning: an ideology that serves to liberate, aspire to, or maintain autonomy, and works to solidify the identity of a social group.62

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Based on this definitions and what Hroch defines as the essential conditions for the formation of a nation,63 this work submits for consideration three postulates that must be present for a people to bond as a nation: (1) a memory of a common past; (2) linguistic or cultural ties that enable a higher degree of social communication within the group than that which takes place beyond it; and (3) a conception of equality between members of the group that is organized as a civil society. If a group does not possess these three conditions, it will be extremely difficult, if not impossible, to identify as a people or to bond as a nation. This book investigates the extent to which the Iraqi nation-state possesses or lacks these elements. This work bases its examinations and analysis on a range of indicators for assessing identity and national integration. The first and most important indicator is recognition; this measures the degree to which an ethnic or sectarian group accepts another group and the extent to which the state recognizes other identity-based groups. The second indicator, exclusivity, refers to the degree to which either the state or an identity-based group excludes other groups from its discourses, policies, and practices. The third indicator, primordiality, concerns the ways in which individuals and groups are deprived of rights due to their primordial identity such as race, place of birth, or ethnicity. The fourth indicator, status, may be measured by the availability of facilities provided by the state for identity-based groups to achieve (or restrict) their aims. A fifth set of measures includes favoritism and hostility, which leads to in-group favoritism and out-group hostility. A sixth indicator is claims, which is useful to measure a group’s assertion of its rights on matters of fundamental interest to the group including territorial, cultural, religious, and linguistic claims. Finally, aims are a measure of the goals and purposes of a specific group or state.64 The main actors in identity politics that are considered here for analytical purposes are, first, the state and/or its elite. The state and decisionmakers are the primary forces shaping legislation and implementing policies, whether affirmative or discriminatory in nature, regarding ethnic and religious groups. The second group of actors are ethnic or religious groups (in this case the Kurds and the Shiites before the US invasion, and the Sunnis after the invasion). The third group consists of the influential individuals who represent and speak on behalf of identity-based groups. That is why the roles and views of these three groups of players are scrutinized.

Outline of the Chapters This book addresses the socio-political development of Iraq and has two working themes. The first is that the general and popularly accepted belief that Iraq was a unified and stable nation until the Baath party seized power

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in 1968 is unsubstantiated by historical facts. The second theme is that the inability of Iraq to transform itself into a united and integrated nation between 1921 and the subsequent overthrow of the Baathist regime in 2003 and up to the present time are the direct result of ongoing clashes between the different ethno-national and religious groups. These clashes and conflicts, which took (and take) the form of civil strife, rebellion, and warfare, were/are, for the most part, represented by three competing nationalisms: Iraqi patriotism, Arab or pan-Arab nationalism,65 and Kurdish nationalism. The conflicts also reflect ethnic and sectarian divisions representing the Shiites, Sunnis, and Kurds, respectively. In sum, the main hypothesis of this work is that the failure of national integration in Iraq is a direct result of the clash of identities and competing nationalisms, be they ethnic, secular, or religious. The book identifies the major historical causes of ethnic and sectarian conflict in Iraq as well as the major obstacles facing the process of national integration today. It should be noted that Iraqi society is fraught with other divisions that contribute to the complexity of the situation. Among them are the simmering tensions between the tribal and urban (e.g., intra-Kurdish fight 1966–1998), the religious and secular (e.g., intra-Shiite clash), and the rich and poor (e.g., class struggles). These tensions have evolved across, as well as within, ethnic and sectarian fault lines and they have exacerbated the conflict. While related to the theme of this book, they are not considered in detail because they are outside the main focus of this work. The term “conflict” rather than “war” is adopted in this book because ethnic hostility is not always manifested in the form of war but is frequently expressed in disagreements, tensions, rebellion, and sporadic or continuous violence without necessarily culminating in open warfare. To a large extent the changes in the various political systems define the periods in Iraq’s evolving national integration. Each period is presented as a chapter in this book. Each chapter denotes major changes in the ideological current and/or the way the political system was administered. Some periods under investigation do not represent regime change but mark major turning points in the process of national integration. The death of King Faisal I and the 1991 uprising are two examples. Classifications based on historical time periods are important for comparative purposes. Changes in the social structure of Iraqi society should not be underestimated. For example, the largescale migration from rural areas to urban centers from the 1930s onward led to the emergence of an educated urban class, which would play a vital role in strengthening and/or contributing to the resurgence of such ideological currents as Iraqi patriotism, Kurdish nationalism, socialism, communism, and pan-Arabism. The notion of time is also critical in the way Iraqi communities have “imagined” themselves and others. For example, during the monarchy period the “other” for most Iraqi communities and political

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groups was the colonial power and/or the ruling elite. However, after the monarchy period, ethnic and sectarian groups became the other for each other. This book consists of nine chapters. Chapter 1, “The Context of Identity in Iraq,” introduces the historical and geographical background of Iraq and its people. It also lays out the problem with national identity in the context of Iraq. The modern history of Iraq is then divided into seven periods, each the focus of a chapter. The first period is considered in Chapter 2, “The Formation of Iraq,” where the focus is on the fragmented nature of the Iraqi people and the complexity of Iraqi society in Iraq’s pre-formation years. Chapter 3, “Faisal and the Dream of a Nation,” examines the role that Faisal, the first king of Iraq, played in creating and unifying the country and appraises his successes and failures in this endeavor. The British role in shaping and sustaining Iraq during Faisal’s era is also critically analyzed. The clash between Iraq’s major communities after the creation of Iraq is an important theme in this chapter. Chapter 4, “The Emergence of National Integration,” investigates the impact of modernization and urbanization processes on national integration. The extent to which the Iraqi people have drawn on modern ideologies to form political organizations is also scrutinized. Chapter 5, “The Failure of National Integration,” examines the effects of the removal of the British on the process of national integration. It also traces the effects of these ideologies on different ethnic and sectarian groups. The main reasons for the failure of national integration are also discussed. The role of the Baath party is the subject of Chapter 6, “The Process of National Disintegration.” The focus here is on the way in which the Baath party dealt with four main threats: the communists, the Kurds, the Shiites, and the army. The Baathist policies of Arabization, Sunnification, and Saddamization and their respective impacts on national unity are also explored. Chapter 7, “A Disintegrated Nation,” discusses two strategies that Saddam used in his quest to maintain power: tribalism and the Faith Campaign. Attention is also given to the socioeconomic effects of the United Nations’ sanctions and the subsequent mismanagement by the Iraqi government. Included is an account of the Kurdish movement to build their own state and their corresponding efforts to build their own nation following the establishment of a semi-autonomous Kurdistan region. Chapter 8, “The US Invasion: Opening Pandora’s Box,” is an analysis of the political developments following the United States–led invasion of Iraq and the subsequent collapse of the regime. The aim is to link the rise of sectarian violence with pre-invasion events. Chapter 9, “The Paradoxes of Nation Formation in Iraq,” looks at the systemic deficiencies relating not only to nation-building, but rather to nation formation.

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Notes 1. Hamdi and al-Najar, History of Your Country, p. 82; Republic of Iraq, Ministry of Education, The Arab Islamic History, pp. 76, 84, 93-96. 2. Ireland, Iraq: A Study in Political Development, p. 49. 3. Marr, The Modern History of Iraq, p. 22. 4. See Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), “The World Factbook—Iraq,” 2012. 5. Walker, “The Making of Modern Iraq,” pp. 29-40. 6. Batatu, The Old Social Classes, p. 43. 7. Al-Husri, My Memoir in Iraq, p. 46. 8. Marr, The Modern History of Iraq, pp. 21-6; Tripp, A History of Iraq, pp. 4058. 9. The names in parentheses are the names for the capital city of the province. If only one name is mentioned, the names of the capital and the province are the same. Spellings for Iraqi cities and provinces may differ depending on source. 10. Farouk-Sluglett and Sluglett, Iraq Since 1958, p. 232. 11. Reuters, “Iraq Unveils Oil,” 2010. 12. See Kami, “Iraq Economic Growth.“ 13. While many Christian families fled southern parts of Iraq and headed to the Kurdistan region for safety, recent reports indicate that the overall Christian population may have dropped by as much as 50 percent since the fall of the Saddam regime in 2003. 14. See CIA, “The World Factbook—Iraq,” 2012. Most Jews were forcibly relocated to Israel in the early 1950s. 15. See Batatu, “The Shiite of Iraq.” The Shiites became a majority in Iraq only during the nineteenth century. At that time most of the country’s nomadic Arab tribes settled and began farming around existing major Shiite centers (Nakash, “The Shiites and the Future of Iraq,” pp. 17–26; Fattah, “Identity and Difference,” pp. 205–216). 16. It is difficult to find accurate figures for the ethnic and religious distribution in Iraq. The last census conducted in Iraq was in 1997. Hence, percentages rather than numbers are used. 17. For more information on the early debates between the Shiites and Sunnis, see Black, The History of Islamic Political Thought, pp. 14-16; and Kirmanj, “Islam, Politics, and Government,” pp. 49, 50. 18. Marr, The Modern History of Iraq, p. 14. 19. McDowall, The Modern History of the Kurds, pp. 21–62. 20. U.S. Department of Defense, “Measuring Stability and Security in Iraq,” (2009a), pp. 1–2; “Measuring Stability and Security,” (2009b), p. iv. 21. See Iraq Body Count, “Documented Civilian Deaths.” 22. See Kami, “Iraq Economic Growth,” 2012; COSIT, Drop in Unemployment. 23. U.S. Department of Defense, “Measuring Stability and Security in Iraq,” (2009a) p. 25. 24. See Pei and Kasper, Lessons from the Past; Clark, “Key to Success”; Davis, “Democracy’s Prospects;” Montgomery and Rondinelli, “A Path to Reconstruction”; Ricks, Fiasco; Pollack, “The Seven Deadly Sins.” 25. See Davis, “Democracy’s Prospects.” 26. Dodge, Inventing Iraq, p. xxvii; Dodge, “Iraq: the Contradictions,” p. 187. 27. See Terrill, “Nationalism.” 28. See Matar, The Wounded Self; Argumentation of Identities; al-Janabi, Iraq and Future Convoying; al-Janabi, “The Iraqi Identity.”

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29. See Hoagland, “Restoring Iraqi Identity.” 30. See Matar, The Wounded Self; Matar, Dispute of Identities; al-Janabi, “The Iraqi Identity.” 31. See Marquardt, “Reshaping Iraq”; Marquardt, “Division of Iraq.” 32. Zakaria, “How to Wage the Peace,” pp. 38–49. 33. See Yaphe, “Iraqi Identity”; Yaphe, “The Three-State Solution.” 34. Davis, Memories of State, p. 276. 35. Visser and Stansfield, An Iraq of Its Regions, p. 8–9. 36. Shatt al-Arab was formed by the confluence of the Euphrates and the Tigris rivers in the town of al-Qurnah in the Basra province of Iraq. 37. Al-Mawardi, The Ordinances of Government, p. 224. 38. Fattah, “Identity and Difference,” p. 206, 212; Visser, Basra, the Failed Gulf State, p. 8. 39. O’Leary, “Multi-National Federalism,” pp. 2, 8; Eland, A Way Out, p. 11. 40. See Gelb and Galbraith, “Confederation of Three Entities.” 41. See Cole, “The Three-State Solution?” 42. Berwari and Ambrosio, “Kurdistan Referendum,” p. 891. 43. See Gelb, “The Three-State Solution.” 44. Anderson and Stansfield, The Future of Iraq, pp. 185, 186. 45. Marr, “Iraq’s Many Challenges,” p. 274. 46. See Nakash, “The Shiites and the Future of Iraq.” 47. Bengio, “Nation-Building in Multiethnic Societies,” pp. 149–169. 48. See Simon, “The Imposition of Nationalism.” 49. See Lukitz, Iraq: The Search. 50. See Natali, “Manufacturing Identity.” 51. Vali, “The Kurds and their ‘Others,’” p. 83. 52. See Natali, “Manufacturing Identity.” 53. See Simon, “The Imposition of Nationalism.” 54. See Lukitz, Iraq: The Search. 55. See Baram, Culture, History and Ideology. 56. See Bengio, “Nation-Building in Multiethnic Societies.” 57. Rotberg, “The New Nature,” p. 85. 58. Smith, Theories of Nationalism, p. 2; Smith, National Identity, p. 99. 59. See Smith, The Ethnic Origins of Nations. 60. Guibernau, “Anthony D. Smith on Nations,” p. 132. 61. Seton-Watson, Nations and States, p. 1; Guibernau, “Anthony D. Smith on Nations,” pp. 131–135. 62. Smith, Theories of Nationalism, p. 73. 63. Hroch, “From National Movement,” pp. 78–97. 64. These indicators are predominantly based on indicators suggested by Rawi Abdelal and his colleagues in “Treating Identity as a Variable,” pp. 11, 12. 65. Pan-Arabism is a movement for unifying the peoples and countries of the Arab world from the Atlantic Ocean to the Gulf. It is closely connected to Arab nationalism, which promotes the idea that the Arabs constitute a single nation. “PanArab nationalism,” “pan-Arabism,” and “Arab nationalism” are terms used to refer to the same ideological current.

2 The Formation of Iraq

In November 1914, the British forces occupied Basra. After the battles

at al-Shu‘ayba and the city of Kut in 1917, the British forces entered Baghdad. The following year they moved north and invaded Kirkuk and Mosul.1 Before World War I, the country was predominantly a tribal society whose culture lacked the notion of obedience to any central government. The people living in the Iraqi territory did not constitute a nation, as they were separated by religion, sect, ethnicity, language, geography, and a common sense of belonging to a nation and/or a single homeland. Baghdad contained mixed Sunni and Shiite neighborhoods as well as neighborhoods dominated by the Shiites (e.g., al-Kadhimiya) or the Sunnis (al-Adhamiya). Apart from Baghdad, it is generally agreed that specific Iraqi communities inhabited distinct parts of the country.2 The urban populations were conscious of their ethnic identities, but religious, sectarian, and tribal identities were far stronger for those in the rural areas.3 These conditions were the primary sources of concern for the British as they planned the creation of Iraq. This was evident from the way the British officials perceived Iraq and the Iraqis during its formation years. The acting high commissioner for Iraq, Arnold T. Wilson, explicitly expressed his doubts that the majority Shiite population would want to “acquiesce to the domination of their Sunni brethren.” He also doubted whether the Kurds “would ever accept an Arab ruler.” In sum, “far from making the Arabs on this side our ‘friends,’” Wilson anticipated that the creation of such a state could only be seen as a “betrayal of its interests, and we [the British] shall alienate the best elements here.”4 In the spring of 1921, the British government was persuaded by T. E. Lawrence to disregard these realities and impose a foreign Sunni ruler, Faisal, on a predominantly Shiite population. Faisal, who hailed from Hijaz (Saudi Arabia), was championed by Lawrence.5 At the time the British also incorporated what the British colonial officials called southern Kurdistan.6

21

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Identity and Nation in Iraq

Events Preceding the Formation of Iraq The reaction of the Sunnis, Shiites, and Kurds to the British during the formation years (1914–1921), the Kurdish revolt (1919), and the 1920 Revolution significantly impacted the process of state-building and British policy in Iraq. A review of these issues will enable us to assess the relationship between the three major Iraqi communities and plumb each group’s attitudinal disposition toward their own future and the future of Iraq as a whole. During and after the British invasion, the Shiite mujtahids (religious leaders)7 led a resistance movement by organizing approximately 18,000 tribal warriors to fight British forces under the banner of Islam.8 The resistance was hailed by the Ottomans. Sheikh Mahmud Hafid Barzanji of Suleimaniya, accompanied by more than one thousand cavalry, participated alongside Shiite tribal fighters in the south as part of the resistance movement. They were involved in the battle of al-Shu‘ayba in 1915 near Basra.9 The Shiites and the Kurds participated with the Ottoman army—not as Iraqis, but as Muslims. At around the same time a large number of Sunni officers in the Ottoman army, mostly from Iraq, had left their positions and joined the Arab Revolution that started in 1916 in the Arabian Peninsula. The officers, under the leadership of Sharif of Mecca, fought alongside the British forces against the Ottomans, as they hoped to gain their freedom and statehood.10 Under the overwhelming power of the British army, the resistance movement failed. Consequently, the form, territoriality, and identity of the new state became the key issue of concern to both the British and the people living in the designated areas. Before the formation of Iraq, the Shiite mujtahids of Najaf and Karbala had sent several letters to Hussein bin Ali (the Sharif of Mecca), Prince Faisal, the US president, and the US ambassador in Tehran. The letters made clear that the mujtahids favored an Arab-Islamic state ruled by an Arab prince and bound by a legislative assembly.11 Although the mujtahids called for the inclusion of Mosul province in the proposed state, it is not clear whether they also proposed to incorporate all of the Kurdish areas of the province or only the Arab-dominated areas. An ethnic-oriented ArabIslamic identity for the proposed state was explicitly favored by the mujtahids. In addition to the initial resistance movement and the diplomacy of Sheikh Mahmud and the Shiite mujtahids, two major rebellions were historically significant, especially with regard to identity politics: the 1919 Kurdish rebellion led by Sheikh Mahmud and the Middle Euphrates rebellion known as the 1920 Revolution. The latter revolution was led by tribal and religious leaders in southern Iraq.

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Founding Myth of Kurdish Nationalism in Iraq The British forces arrived at the outskirts of Vilayt (province) of Mosul in the summer of 1918 and invaded the city of Kirkuk the following May. At the time Sheikh Mahmud was the most influential personality in southern Kurdistan (Iraqi Kurdistan). He was appointed the governor of Suleimaniya by the Ottomans before they withdrew from the area. When the news of the British invasion of Kirkuk came, Sheikh Mahmud sent a letter to the British high commissioner indicating that the Kurds were looking forward to prosperity with the support of Britain “just as Iraq prospered.” He ended the letter by urging the high commissioner to form a Kurdish government “under the mandate of the British.”12 It appears from the letter that Sheikh Mahmud neither considered Kurdistan a part of Iraq nor the Kurds as Iraqis. He favored direct rule by the British rather than Arab rule. The British did not respond to this letter because the Ottomans recaptured Kirkuk in May 1918. However, when the British forces reinvaded the city in October 1918, communication between Sheikh Mahmud and the British resumed. 13 By November, the British and Sheikh Mahmud had reached an agreement by which Sheikh Mahmud was appointed as the hukumdar (governor) of Kurdistan.14 However, Sheikh Mahmud’s ambition was far greater than what was offered by the British. He asked the British to form a Kurdish state that would encompass all the Kurdish areas of southern Kurdistan, including some parts of northern Kurdistan (Kurdistan of Turkey), under the British mandate. That state was to be free of any ties to Baghdad, thereby affirming the distinct ethnic nature of the Kurds’ claims. Contrary to Sheikh Mahmud’s demand, the British played the tribal card by providing incentives and bribes to other tribes to stand against Sheikh Mahmud, especially when the British felt that Sheikh Mahmud’s influence was going beyond the Suleimaniya region and spreading over the Kurdish region.15 The British policy of undermining the Kurdish nascent government left Sheikh Mahmud and the nationalists around him no other option but to revolt.16 Consequently, in April 1919 Sheikh Mahmud ordered his forces to expel the British representatives in Suleimaniya and the surrounding areas. When Sheikh Mahmud’s forces took control of the city on April 20, 1919, they brought down the British flag and raised the Kurdistan flag as the flag of the first Kurdish government. Sheikh Mahmud soon formed a government, which adopted its own distinguished flag, designed its own emblem, and issued stamps to represent it.17 By May 1919, the revolt spread to other areas, including Koysinjaq near Erbil.18 British forces reorganized and launched a counterattack, defeating Sheikh Mahmud’s forces at a location known as Darbandi Baziyan. During the battle, forty-eight Kurdish

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Identity and Nation in Iraq

fighters were killed and 128 were wounded, including Sheikh Mahmud himself, who was captured on June 9, 1919, near Barda Qaraman (Hero Rock is named after the event). Since then Barda Qaraman has become a symbol of resistance for the Kurds. After his capture, Sheikh Mahmud was taken to Baghdad for trial.19 The British authority charged Sheikh Mahmud with armed rebellion, bloodshed, bringing down the British flag, and raising the Kurdistan flag. During the trial, Sheikh Mahmud stressed that he had been asked by his people to demand from Britain freedom for the Kurds and that he had been appointed by the British as the governor of Kurdistan. He argued, “[A]s I am accepted by my people, I am obliged to defend these agreements by words or by arms.”20 The court sentenced him to death. After the intervention of a British officer who stressed the good treatment British personnel had received when they were captured by Sheikh Mahmud’s forces, the sentence was commuted to ten years’ imprisonment. He was sent to the Andaman Islands in India to serve out his sentence.21 The failure of Sheikh Mahmud’s revolt made the British authorities in Iraq hasten to carry out their plans regarding the fate of southern Kurdistan and its relation to Iraq. The British authority in London did not have a welldefined plan for southern Kurdistan. Consequently, its fate was left to British civil and military officials on the ground.22 At the time the British officials were divided into two camps. Sir Percy Cox, who replaced Arnold T. Wilson as the high commissioner, along with Gertrude Bell (the British oriental secretary), held the view that southern Kurdistan should be annexed to Iraq under the rule of King Faisal. The second camp consisted of Major E. Noel and Major B. Young, who suggested the establishment of a Kurdish state covering all the areas above a line from Mosul to south of Khanaqin.23 During the Cairo Conference of 1921, the fate of Iraq was decided, though the parties did not reach a conclusion on the future of southern Kurdistan. Turkey claimed Mosul province (southern Kurdistan) as an integral part of Turkey since it was invaded by the British after the Moudros cease-fire between the Ottoman Empire and the allied countries. The issue was tabled in 1923 during the Lausanne Conference between the Allied countries of World War I and Turkey.24 When the British authority and Turkey failed to reach an agreement during the conference, the issue was referred to the League of Nations. Since then the issue has been known as the “Mosul problem.” Before the Cairo and Lausanne conferences, however, the victors of World War I had signed another treaty with the Ottoman Empire, known as the 1920 Treaty of Sèvres. Articles 62, 63, and 64 specifically addressed the Kurdish issue in both Iraq and Turkey. Article 64 indicated that if a majority of the population of the Kurds in Turkey desired independence from Turkey, and if the Council of League considered that these peoples were capable of such independence, it should be granted to them. In addition, Article 64

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specified that if an independent Kurdish state were to materialize, the principal Allied powers should facilitate the voluntary unification of Mosul province with the proposed Kurdish state.25 However, before these articles could be implemented, the tide turned against the Kurds.26 The later Treaty of Lausanne that was agreed upon and signed by Turkey and the victorious allies superseded the Treaty of Sèvres and did not refer to the Kurds at all. It only promised “tolerance for minorities” in general terms. The Kurdish anti-British movement was not restricted to Sheikh Mahmud’s activities and his revolt. During and after Sheikh Mahmud’s rebellion, several small but active organizations were formed by various Kurdish intellectuals. Among them were Barzi Willat (Sublimity of Homeland), Kurdistan Gizing (Glow of Kurdistan), Fidakarani Kurd (Kurdish Fedayee), and Watanparwaran (Patriots).27 When Sheikh Mahmud was captured, the Barzi Willat association published a statement calling for his release and urging the British to leave Kurdistan. It stated that “Kurdistan is the homeland of the Kurds,” and the “English are foreigners here.”28 The Kurds’ mandate for their future relationship with the British and Iraq was obvious: they would either have an independent state or a compromised arrangement involving a mandate under British rule with demarcated boundaries. The Kurdish elite perceived the Kurds as a distinct entity deserving of self-determination in accordance with wartime and postwar British, French, and US promises. The activities of Kurdish intellectual organizations demonstrate that Sheikh Mahmud’s revolt should not be considered merely as a tribal revolt, though the British attempted to portray it as such. As in the Kurdish areas, the center of Iraq also experienced similar turmoil between the Shiite and the British, though not as extensively as in the north.

Differing Versions of Sovereignty The debate on the future of Iraq and the existence of different visions for shaping British-Iraq relations led to the establishment of three parties in Baghdad. The al-Nahdha party was a Shiite-based political party established in al-Kadhimiya, a traditionally Shiite stronghold, and strongly opposed the British mandate. The al-Hur party, established in Baghdad by Mahmud alNaqib—son of the first prime minister of Iraq, Abdul Rahman al-Naqib— was a Sunni-based political party that did not oppose the mandate. The third party, Haras al-Istiqlal, was a more Iraq-centric party led by Sayyid Muhammad al-Sadr, a Baghdad politician, and the famous Baghdadi merchant, Ja‘far Abu Timman. Though both were Shiite, the founding members of the party included several Sunni politicians. Soon after their founding, the al-Haras and al-Nahdha parties organized a large demonstration in

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Identity and Nation in Iraq

Baghdad to denounce the mandate. Consequently, the British authority banned both political parties and sent their leading figures into exile. 29 Another Sunni organization, the al-‘Ahd (Covenant) Association, was established by Sunni Arab military officers in the Ottoman army. After World War I and the creation of Syria and Iraq, the association split into two branches. Prior to the creation of Iraq and Syria, Arabism was the driving force for the establishment of al-‘Ahd Association, whereas afterward the soldiers from Iraq and Syria split with the Arab military officers. Initially, the full independence of Iraq was the primary objective of the Iraqi branch of the association. Al-‘Ahd did not support the British mandate but believed that, for Iraq to stand on its feet, it needed the support of a superpower.30 The Sunni organizations generally supported a kind of arrangement with the British whereby Britain still retained its political control but granted some sort of autonomy. On the other side, the Shiite parties and their religious and tribal leaders for the most part favored full independence. One thing that most Arab Iraqis agreed on was that a son of the Sharif of Mecca ought to be the head of state. The Shiites’ rejection of a mandate and their rejection of direct rule by the British, combined with other factors, led to a clash between the British forces and the Shiite tribal forces in the 1920 Revolution.

The Founding Myth of Iraqi Patriotism On June 30, 1920, the British authorities arrested Sha‘lan Abu al-Jun, head of the al-Dhawalim tribe.31 When the local tribes heard the news of his arrest, they attacked the base where he was held and released him by force. This incident sparked a revolution that involved most of southern Iraq. The success of the tribes led to the downfall of the British and their mighty reputation, encouraging other tribes to join the revolt. Although there were sporadic attacks all over Iraq, especially in Diyala, the main battlefield of the revolution lay in the middle Euphrates. In mid-October, the British forces launched a counterattack on the revolutionaries. The absence of a unified command, the lack of military supplies, and the overwhelming strength of the British forces were among the primary factors that led to the failure of the revolution.32 The principal motivators of the revolution had to do with the perception that the British had pledged during the war to grant Arabs independence. Declaring the mandate over Iraq was an act of direct betrayal by the British of their promise. The refusal of Shiite religious leaders to live in a country controlled and ruled by Western “‘infidels,” combined with the tribal leaders’ refusal to pay taxes, was also a critical factor. The 1920 Revolution helped to shape the Iraqi state. The unprecedented feature of the revolution was the rapprochement between the Sunni

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and Shiite communities, especially in Baghdad. The signs of convergence were magnified during the month of Ramadan when the Shiites attended Sunni ceremonies of the birth of the Prophet Muhammad (mawlud alnabawi), and the Sunnis attended the commemoration of the killing of Imam Hussein (majalis al-ta‘ziya al-Husseiniya).33 Two Baghdadi politicians, al-Sadr, a Shiite, and Ahmed al-Sheikh Dawd, founded the Haras alIstiqlal party, which became the leading Iraq-centric political organization and played a vital role in the rapprochement of the two communities. At the time there was a popular story that Abu Hanifa (a leading Sunni imam, 699–767 AD) was a student of Ja‘far al-Sadiq (a leading Shiite imam, 702–765 AD).34 In fact, the collaboration transcended religious affiliation as it included Jews and Christians as well. Through nationalistic poetry and rhetoric, poets and religious leaders exhorted people to throw off the bonds of imperialism. 35 Some scholars hold that the revolution was an outgrowth of the Iraqi nationalist movement against the British following the collapse of the Ottoman Empire.36 Iraqi intellectuals and historians call the 1920 Revolution Iraq’s “Great Revolution” or the “Founding Revolution.” 37 The well-known Iraqi historian and sociologist Ali alWardi argued against both of these views and suggested that, although the participants in the revolution fought with nationalist slogans and used concepts such as Iraq, Arabism, and patriotism, these words did not mean much to most of them.38 The revolution cannot be understood without taking into consideration the colonial context. The unity of Iraq’s diverse community had more to do with anti-British sentiment than with the desire for a nationalist movement. The struggle against a non-Muslim Christian enemy was the common denominator that united the Shiite and Sunni communities. Further, Iraq was not one territorial entity. The Kurdish area was treated legislatively differently from the rest of Iraq. In Karbala, Hilla, and Najaf, Shiite fighters raised the flag of the Arab revolution and/or their tribal flags on the top of liberated posts and houses while they praised Arab glory. Participants were described as the Arab army rather than the Iraqi army.39 Had the uprising been representative of Iraqi patriotism, it was the Iraqi flag that would have been raised. In Kurdistan the aim of the revolt that ignited a year earlier was an independent Kurdistan. Independence was symbolized by the Kurdish flag that was raised when Suleimaniya was liberated by the rebels under the leadership of Sheikh Mahmud. Therefore, the Kurdish fight for independence cannot be considered as an integral part of the 1920 Revolution. It is true that both revolts were against the British, but there is no evidence of direct collaboration between them, and the objects of both revolts differed extensively. If the 1920 Revolution became the founding myth for Arab Iraqi nationalists, Sheikh Mahmud’s rebellion and his short-lived kingdom

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became a national myth for Kurdish nationalists.40 A fifty-eight-page poem, written by the well-known Kurdish poet Sherko Bekas, entitled the “Epic of Barda Qaraman” (the rock where Sheikh Mahmud was wounded), is an example of the impact of Sheikh Mahmud’s revolt on later generations of Kurds.41 As far as the supposed unity of the Shiites and the Sunnis was concerned, an examination of incidents and historical evidence reveals another picture. Apart from the Sunni involvement in pre-revolutionary activities organized in Baghdad and the role that a few of their leading figures, such as Yousif al-Suwaydi, played, direct or indirect support for and involvement in the revolution by the Sunnis was relatively minimal. More importantly, the largest Sunni political organization at the time, the al-‘Ahd Association, not only did not support the revolution but, according to British secret reports, approached the British and demonstrated a willingness to provide assistance for bringing security and settlement to the rebellious areas.42 The position taken by al-‘Ahd is significant for two reasons. First, it was formed by a large contingent of Iraqi officers in the Ottoman army. It is reported that out of every ten officers from Mesopotamia (Iraq) in the Ottoman army, seven were members of al-‘Ahd. Indeed, before World War I, al-‘Ahd had nearly 400 members.43 Second, the members of al-‘Ahd, including Nuri alSa‘id, Ja‘far al-Askari, Yasin al-Hashimi, Taha al-Hashimi, Jamil alMadfa‘i, Ali Jawdat, Mazahim al-Pachachi, and Hamdi al-Pachachi, all played dominant roles in Iraqi politics until 1958.44 Of the fifty-nine governments formed between 1921 and 1958, the prime ministers of thirty-two of these governments came from al-‘Ahd. Al-‘Ahd’s negative role in the revolution was seen as one of the reasons for the failure of the 1920 Revolution.45 The strong relationship between the two communities at the time is exaggerated because many Sunni figures expressed views behind the scenes that contradicted the supposed close nature of the relationship.46 Sulaiman Faidhi, a leading Sunni figure at the time, told Gertrude Bell that “the most distasteful thing to me is this ‘unity’ between the Shiites and the Sunnis, and I consider the control of the Shiites as so catastrophic that I cannot even envisage it.”47 Abdul Rahman al-Naqib, who was later appointed by the British as the first prime minister of Iraq, said to Bell, “Those [Shiites] that resisted the Englishmen are with no reputation and honor. . . . Who could trust people [Shiites] who had killed Hussein [a Shiite imam], then proceeded to worship him?”48 When the revolution was at its height, Talib al-Naqib, a Sunni leading figure who later became the interior minister in Iraq’s first cabinet, held a farewell party for the acting British high commissioner. Organized on September 19, 1920, the party was attended by the famous Iraqi poet, Jamil Sidqi al-Zahawi, a Sunni who praised the role of Wilson. This happened while British forces were raiding, bombarding, and killing

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the rebels in the south. During the party, al-Naqib disparaged the revolution and the revolutionaries.49 A few days later, during a reception in Basra in honor of the new high commissioner, Cox, Mazahim al-Pachachi, who in 1948 became Iraqi prime minister,50 uttered these words in relation to the 1920 Revolution: I feel sorry that the stupidity of a few Arabs [the revolutionaries] should cause disturbance to the British nation in its mission. . . . The current movement [the 1920 Revolution] is not Arabic but is blended with foreign elements [Shiite mujtahids]. . . . Please do not consider the current revolution as a true wataniya (patriotic) movement which seeks independence because it does not represent the feeling of the ‘majority.’ . . . The powerful Baghdadi families do not sympathize with a movement that has ruined the country.51

When the new high commissioner arrived in Baghdad, more receptions were staged. In one of those receptions, al-Zahawi recited a long poem praising Cox.52 He begged him to “come back to Iraq and redeem what has decayed,” referring to what the revolution caused. After this, he vilified the revolution.53 These examples reveal that the collaboration between the Shiites and Sunnis was not strategic, but tactical, at least from the perspective of the Sunni political elites. The substance of Iraqiness is also questionable. Iraqiness is the feeling of belonging to the state of Iraq. However, Iraq was not even officially formed or recognized as a state during the revolution; therefore, any suggestion as to the existence of Iraqiness at the time is unsubstantiated. The Iraqi Provisional Government was established in October 1920, just after the failure of the revolution. However, even then Iraq did not have its own flag, the primary symbol of any nationalism or nation. The dominant notions involving a sense of identity were those relating to being Arab, Muslim, Shiite, and Sunni rather than Iraqi. This was illustrated in the rhetoric that took place at the receptions planned in Basra on June 23, 1921, and in Baghdad on June 29 for the arrival of Prince Faisal. As it so happened, the streets of Basra and Baghdad were decorated with the Arab revolution flag rather than the Iraqi flag. The first time an Iraqi flag was raised was during the coronation of King Faisal on August 23, 1921. Ironically, during the ceremony, the British national anthem was played, as Iraq did not yet have one.54 It is incongruent to argue for the existence of any sense of nationalism without its fundamental symbolic representation. One might talk of Arabic or Kurdish ethnic identity and Islamic identity, which were the primary motives behind both the 1919 Kurdish and 1920 revolutions, but not Iraqiness and Iraqi patriotism. It is worth noting that in 1934 a few Iraqi intellectuals attempted to celebrate the commemoration of the 1920 Revolution in Baghdad, al-Rumaytha, and al-Diwaniya, but

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they were stopped by the Sunni-dominated authority. In fact, no Iraqi government during the monarchy ever encouraged such activities lest they raise the profile of the Shiite mujtahids and remind people of the great sacrifices made by the Shiites who played a critical role in the revolution.55 During the negotiations that followed the British suppression of the 1920 rebellion, the rebels presented a list of demands. The most significant was that “Iraq should have been an independent Arab state.”56 It is again apparent that the revolution was more concerned with the Arab (ethnic) character of the state rather than a national territorial character. Hence, glossing the 1920 Revolution with Iraq’s nationalistic character is unsubstantiated because religion and ethnicity were the dominant characteristics of the revolution. A field study conducted in 1978 among the surviving participants of the revolution revealed that the people “[knew] nothing about the concept of independence at the time.” They considered “jihad against the English an obligation” because the British were “foreign infidels.”57 Perhaps the best description of the revolution is that it was an “example of the national awakening of Arab and Islamic forces united against the imperialist conqueror.”58 One has to distinguish between Arab nationalism, Islamic nationalism, and Iraqi patriotism. Arab and Islamic nationalisms are supranational movements. That is, they transcend Iraq’s territorial boundaries, while Iraqi patriotism is a territorially based nationalism limited to the Iraqi frontiers. This is not to diminish the importance of the 1920 Revolution, which looms large in the Arab Iraqi myth and imagination. Indeed, it can be seen as the start of Iraq being “imagined,” in Benedict Anderson’s terms. It is important to bear in mind, however, that there were at least four imagined communities at the time: Muslim (Shiite or Sunni), Arab, Arab-Iraqis, and Kurdish.

Kurds and the 1920 Revolution: A Misconception Examining the role and the level of participation of the Kurds in the 1920 Revolution is important for assessing the claim that the revolution was “an outcome of the Iraqi nationalist movement.”59 A look at the mindset of the Kurds during the height of the revolution in the middle Euphrates is instructive. A famous Kurdish historian and scholar, Kamal Mudhir Ahmed, dedicated a book to the role of the Kurds in the 1920 Revolution.60 Ahmed criticizes Iraqi scholars for not mentioning “the Kurdish role” or for doing so in a dismissive or “circumstantial fashion.” He suggests that the Kurdish role, though limited, occupies a significant place in the revolution.61 Ahmed considers the tribal Kurdish rebellions in the Zakho and Tala‘far areas and the 1919 Kurdish revolt of Sheikh Mahmud as events leading to the 1920 Revolution.62 Ironically, when examining Sheikh Mahmud’s 1919 rebellion, Ahmed seems to be either misleading the reader or is unable to present the

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events as they happened. The reason for this might be the Iraq regime’s strict censorship at the time of the book’s publication in Baghdad in 1978. He writes that when Sheikh Mahmud and his forces controlled the base of the British political governor in Suleimaniya, they brought down the British flag. But he does not mention that the Kurdish flag was raised in its place. His version of the incident makes it easier to blend the Kurdish revolt into the 1920 Iraqi Revolution. Ahmed states that Sheikh Mahmud’s revolt was the first sign of the emergence of the Kurdish liberation movement.63 This contradicts his previous suggestion because, if it were part of the Kurdish national liberation movement, then the movement was supposed to seek the establishment of a Kurdish state. Therefore, to consider it as part of the 1920 Revolution that sought Iraqi independence is contradictory. Furthermore, until 1925, even British authorities referred to the Kurdish areas as “southern Kurdistan” rather than northern Iraq. In his analysis of the Kurdish role in the 1920 Revolution, Ahmed relates that when the echo of the revolution reached the city of Khanaqin, the Kurdish revolutionaries liberated the town of Qizilribat and burned the headquarters of the British office in Khanaqin.64 “The revolutionaries,” he adds, “brought down the British flag and raised the Ottoman flag.” 65 However, it has been established that the revolutionaries in the Arab-dominated areas of Diyala province, where Khanaqin is located, raised the Arab revolution flag.66 Generally speaking, in the Arab areas of Iraq, either the Arab revolution flag or the tribal flags were raised in place of the British flag. However, in the Kurdish areas, either the Kurdish flag or the Ottoman flag was raised. These facts indicate that there was no clear bond and/or cooperation between the various groups and communities that participated in the events of 1920. It also illustrates the competing and contradictory visions among the various Iraqi factions before the formation of Iraq. The Kurdish revolt in Kurdistan can be considered as part of the Kurdish ethnonationalist movement that was just emerging with rather tribal characteristics. Meanwhile the 1920 Revolution in the south represented a reaction to the British invasion and had Arabic and Islamic (mainly Shiite) characteristics. As indicated, the aim of this revolution was the independence of Arab Iraq geographically. The 1920 Revolution became the founding myth of Iraqi patriotism, and Sheikh Mahmud’s revolution became the founding myth for Kurdish nationalism. This is an example of the crisis of identity that Iraq faced during its formation. British favoritism of one group over the other deepened the gap between the various Iraqi communities.

British Game of Spoils and Stratagems After the British invaded Iraq from Basra, in response to the Ottoman call for jihad, the Shiite mujtahids, despite their historical suppression by

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Sunni Ottomans, responded positively. With the support of tribal leaders in the south, in 1915 the mujtahids organized thousands of warriors to fight against the “infidel” British forces. 6 7 A reasonable number of Kurdish fighters under the leadership of Sheikh Mahmud also joined the Shiites, and they all fought the invaders under the banner of the Ottomans.68 The resistance, however, was not able to stop the powerful and better organized British forces. Consequently, by 1918, all of Iraq came under British occupation. The attitude of the Sunni community toward the invaders was unclear. Generally speaking, they were militarily inactive. By 1916, the majority of the Sunni officers who left the Ottoman army had joined the Arab revolutionary forces that were fighting the Ottomans in Syria.69 When Baghdad was about to be invaded, a few influential Sunni figures in Baghdad discussed the possibility of an uprising against the Ottoman authority—but not against the invaders.70 Meanwhile, when the Kurdish areas came under direct attack from the British, the Kurds first welcomed them as liberators. In a power-sharing agreement with Sheikh Mahmud, the British appointed him as the governor of southern Kurdistan. However, as mentioned, initial British-Kurd camaraderie did not last long because the Kurds revolted. Thus began a bitter relationship that was to last for the entire mandate.71 By the end of World War I, British power had been consolidated across nearly the whole of Iraq. The Shiites generally were not content with the British. In early 1918, a group of Shiite mujtahids from Najaf established an association, Jam‘iyat al-Nahdha al-Islamiya (Association of Islamic Renaissance). One of its first activities was the assassination of the British political officer in charge of the area, Captain Marshall. This led to an insurgency in Najaf. According to some sources, more than ten thousand rebels participated in the insurgency, which lasted nearly forty days. In response, the British placed an embargo on the city before attacking it. They killed and arrested more than one hundred people, while the British lost around seventy soldiers.72 The continuous Shiite resistance and rebellion against the British and the call of the mujtahids for independence for Iraq during and after the invasion may have been the main cause of distrust and bitterness between the British and the Shiites. This was apparent in Gertrude Bell’s attitude toward the Shiite community, which was expressed in her letters dated March 17 and 22, 1914. Bell, who was one of the most influential colonial officials in the shaping of Iraq policy, described the Shiites as a people “a great deal worse than anyone we have met upon our whole way.” In another letter she says bluntly that she is “not very fond of the Shiites.” “They,” she says, “are very odd people and I am delighted to see them crushed [in the 1920 Revolution] because they are unreliable people.” On March 18, 1918, Bell described the Shiite mujtahids as “a small band of infernal rogues in Najaf with whom we have always had difficul-

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ty.” “The problem is,” she adds, that they “shelter behind the sanctity of their [holy] cities.”73 It appears that the British encounter with both the Shiites and the Kurds was not pleasant but was bitter and full of altercations and animosity. However, there were other reasons that the British officials excluded the Shiites from power and favored the Sunnis. As pointed out by Bengio, these included the perception that the Sunnis would be dependent on the British and submit to them on account of their demographic weakness.74 This view is shared by some Iraqi Shiite intellectuals and ex-politicians, among them Abdul Karim al-Uzri and Hassan al-Alawi.75 Other reasons include the need to satisfy the Sunnis in the new political arena developing in the region as they played a vital role in helping the British army expel the Ottomans from the Arabian Peninsula and Syria. The importance of the fatwa (religious decree) of the Shiite mujtahids to ban cooperation with the newly established government should not be underestimated. Also, the failure of the 1920 Revolution that had been led by the Shiites and the death of three leading Shiite mujtahids in 1920 had an enormous impact on the role the Shiites could play in the formation of the Iraqi state. The British had difficulty finding people within the Shiite community to manage local affairs and assist political rulers. This was because the Shiites were almost totally denied access to government schools and/or to obtaining public positions during the Ottoman reign.76 The marginalization of the Shiites during the Ottoman era allowed the Sunnis to become the best-educated minority group in Iraq. The special favor that the Sunnis received in terms of education is questioned by some Shiite intellectuals, such as al-Alawi,77 who suggests that three Sunni ministers of Iraq’s first cabinet were illiterate. Also, Abdul Rahman al-Naqib,78 a Sunni prime minister, was neither a politician nor civil servant but simply a religious person. Accordingly, the Shiite intellectuals believed that their marginalization was primarily due to their resistance to the British and their call for full independence. At that time the Sunnis were the majority in the capital and made up the bulk of technocrats and civil servants. This significantly increased the British reliance on them. The significance of being a majority in Baghdad had two implications: first, the political stability in the capital in any state is critical to the stability of the country as a whole; second, the most important discussions and decisions regarding the norms and the form of the Iraqi state were made in Baghdad. Since neither the Kurds nor the Shiites had strong influence in Baghdad, the state was formed based on the perspectives and perceptions of the dominant group in the capital, the Sunnis. As for the role of the Kurds in shaping Iraq, the picture is more complex. From the end of the British conquest in 1918 to 1925, British policy fluctuated with regard to the status of the Kurds. The British did not have a clear plan for the future of southern Kurdistan. Promises of autonomy and self-government were replaced by suggestions of British control or even of

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a British mandate in the area. By the mid-1920s, the annexation camp were victorious over the proponents of the mandate and direct rule.79 In general, apart from a few officers who worked directly with the Kurds, the British officials did not favor the Kurds. Winston S. Churchill described the Kurds and the Shiites as “uncivilized” tribes and was strongly in favor of using poison gas on them.80 Consequently, the identity of the Iraqi state was based on policies of favoritism of the British colonial power, which excluded to a large extent the Kurds and the Shiites. This became one of the primary causes of Iraq’s ongoing malady. In sum, before the formation of the Iraqi state, the concepts of Iraq and Iraqiness, though used by some intellectuals, were not familiar. The people mostly identified themselves ethnically, religiously, and tribally. However, despite the obvious resistance to the mandate in 1921, especially by the Shiites, and the Kurds’ reluctance to be incorporated into Iraq, the British, with the support of the Sunnis, formed the Iraqi state and appointed Faisal bin Ali as the first king of Iraq.

Notes 1. Marr, The Modern History of Iraq, p. 22; Ahmed, Kirkuk and Surroundings, p. 100. 2. Batatu, “The Shiites of Iraq,” pp.13–17; Farouk-Sluglett and Sluglett, Iraq Since 1958, p. 1413. 3. Nadhmi, The Political, Ideological and Social Roots, p. 9. 4. Cited in Karsh, “Making Iraq Safe,” pp. 23, 24. 5. T. E. Lawrence was a British Army officer renowned especially for his liaison role during the Arab Revolt against Ottoman Turkish rule of 1916–1918. The breadth and variety of his activities and associations, and his ability to describe them vividly in writing, earned him international fame as Lawrence of Arabia. 6. See Wilson, Mesopotamia; Edmonds, “The Kurds and the Revolution”; Edmonds, “Kurdish Nationalism.” 7. Mujtahid is a person qualified to give independent judgment on legal and theological matters in Islam. The title is used mostly by Shiite clerics. 8. Nakash, The Shi‘is of Iraq, p. 60. 9. Hilmi, Memoir, p. 43; Ahmed, The Role of the Kurdish People, p. 92; alTemimi, Muhammad Ja‘far, p. 82. 10. Safwat, Memoirs: Ja‘far al-Askari, p. 166. 11. Al-Alawi, The Shiite and the Nation-State, pp. 113–117; Nakash, The Shi‘is of Iraq, pp. 64, 65; al-Wardi, Social Glimpses, vol. 5/1, pp. 110–112. The letters dated summer 1919 were sent and signed by Sheikh Muhammad Ridha al-Shbibi and Sheikh Muhammad Taqi al-Shirazi. 12. Hilmi, Memoir, p. 44; Ahmed, The Role of the Kurdish People, p. 101; alBayatti, Sheikh Mahmud al-Hafid, p.104. 13. Al-Bayatti, Sheikh Mahmud al-Hafid, p.109. 14. Hilmi, Memoir, p. 50. 15. Ibid., pp. 73–77; al-Bayatti, Sheikh Mahmud al-Hafid, pp.127–130.

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16. Eskander, “Britain’s Policy,” p. 152. 17. Khwaja, What I Saw, p. 55; Hilmi, Memoir, p. 83; Jwaideh, The Kurdish National Movement, p. 180. 18. Al-Hassani, The History of Iraqi Cabinets, vol. 1, p. 279. 19. Hilmi, Memoir, p. 88; al-Bayatti, Sheikh Mahmud al-Hafid, pp. 148–150. 20. Cited in Baban, Several Famous Trials, pp. 114–115. 21. Al-Bayatti, Sheikh Mahmud al-Hafid, pp.164–166. 22. Eskander, “Britain’s Policy,” p.139. 23. Al-Bayatti, Sheikh Mahmud al-Hafid, p. 172; Korn, The Men Who Put the Kurds in Iraq, pp. 54–70. 24. For the full text of the Treaty of Lausanne, see Treaties of Peace, HR-Net, accessed January 1, 2012 at http://www.hri.org/docs/lausanne. 25. The Peace Treaty of Sèvres was signed between the Allied and Associated Powers and Turkey at Sèvres on August 10, 1920. See Peace Treaty of Sèvres, HRNet, accessed January 1, 2012, at http://www.hri.org/docs/sevres. 26. See Karsh, “Making Iraq Safe for Democracy,” pp. 23–24. 27. Jamal Irfan was the most active intellectual in these organizations. Born in Suleimaniya, he was assassinated in 1923 due to his radical views, which were often interpreted as antireligious (Hassan, “A Book Written in Blood,” p. 14). 28. Cited in al-Bayatti, Sheikh Mahmud al-Hafid, pp. 175, 176. 29. Al-Temimi, Muhammad Ja‘far, p. 57; Alaywi, Political Parties, pp. 47–48; al-Wardi, Social Glimpses, vol. 6/1, pp. 185–187, 193–194. 30. Alaywi, Political Parties, pp. 41–42. 31. For information on the 1920 Revolution, see al-Wardi, Social Glimpses, vol. 5/1–2 and vol. 6/1–2); Ahmed, The Role of the Kurdish People; al-Hassani, The Iraqi Great Revolution; al-Fayadh, The Iraqi Great Revolution of 1920. 32. Al-Wardi, Social Glimpses, vol. 5/1, pp. 236–267, 374–378; Nadhmi et al., Modern Political Development, pp.110–115. 33. Al-Wardi, Social Glimpses, vol. 5/1, p. 185, 186. 34. Al-Wardi states that no historical evidence exists for this, but people believed it, as it was compatible with the spirit of rapprochement. See Al-Wardi, Social Glimpses, p. 205. 35. Nakash, The Shi‘is of Iraq, p. 70; Marr, The Modern History of Iraq, p. 23. 36. For examples, see Davis, “History Matters,” p. 231; and Ahmed, The Role of the Kurdish People, p. 155. 37. See al-Hassani, The Iraqi Great Revolution; al-Fayadh, The Iraqi Great Revolution of 1920; al-Alawi, The Shiite and the Nation-State, p. 134. 38. Al-Wardi, Social Glimpses, vol. 6/1, p. 314. 39. Al-Alawi, The Shiite and the Nation-State, p.136; al-Wardi, Social Glimpses, vol. 5/1, pp. 289, 326, 336; Nadhmi et al., Modern Political Development, p. 112. 40. See Salih, “In Memoriam of Sheikh Mahmud”; Salih, “The Kurdistan Government”; Hafid, “Sheikh Mahmud Hafid’s Memorabilia.” 41. The poem was composed in 1983, sixty years after the battle of Barda Qaraman where Sheikh Mahmud was wounded and captured by the British (see Bekas, Poetical Works of Sherko Bekas, pp. 430–488). 42. Ahmed cites a document from the Public Records Office, London: FO 371/5231. See Ahmed, The Role of the Kurdish People; Nadhmi, The Political, Ideological and Social Roots, p. 159; al-Alawi, The Shiite and the Nation-State, p. 138. 43. In 1914, 1,338 Iraqi Sunnis attended Ottoman military schools to the exclu-

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sion of the Shiites (Nadhmi, The Political, Ideological and Social Roots, p. 61; alGhatta, Sa‘ad Salih and his National Views, p. 24; Alaywi, Political Parties, p. 28; Nadhmi et al., Modern Political Development, p. 42). 44. For the names of other officers, see Alaywi, Political Parties in Iraq, p. 28, n.19; al-Uzri, The Problem of Governance, pp. 125, 126. 45. Ahmed, Several Pages in the History, p. 169. 46. Sulaiman Faidhi (1885–1951) was Basra’s representative to the Ottoman parliament. He was one of the founders of the al-‘Ahd Association, an organization known for its pan-Arab views. He also served as a member of the Iraqi Parliament from 1935 to 1936 (see Faidhi, Memoirs of Sulaiman Faidhi). See also Davis, “History Matters,” p. 231; Ahmed, The Role of the Kurdish People, p. 155. 47. Quoted in al-Wardi, Social Glimpses, vol. 5/1, p. 210. 48. Quoted in Ibid., vol. 5/1, pp. 93, 94. 49. Ibid., vol. 6/1, p. 12. 50. Muzahim al-Pachachi (1890–1982) was an Iraqi politician and diplomat. He was born in a well-to-do family and graduated from the Baghdad School of Law in 1912 (Basri, Political Pioneers, vol. 1, p. 265). 51. Quoted in al-Wardi, Social Glimpses, vol. 6/1, pp. 13–14. 52. Sir Percy Cox had been in Iraq but left for Iran where he became the British ambassador in Tehran. In September 1920, he returned to Iraq to replace Sir Arnold T. Wilson as the British high commissioner. 53. Al-Wardi, Social Glimpses, vol. 6/1, pp. 17–18. 54. Ibid., pp. 87, 91, 120. 55. Al-Uzri, The Problem of Governance, p. 330. 56. Al-Alawi, The Shiite and the Nation-State, p. 140. 57. The field study was conducted by Raja’ Ahmed Bihish al-Zubaidi, a journalism student at the College of Arts at the University of Baghdad in February 1978 (see Ahmed, The Role of the Kurdish People, pp. 11, n. 26, 46). 58. Zubaida, “The Fragments Imagine the Nation,” p. 207. 59. Davis, “History Matters,” p. 231. 60. Ahmed, The Role of the Kurdish People, pp. 115–154; Ahmed, Several Pages in the History of the Kurdish People, pp. 163–171. 61. Ahmed, The Role of the Kurdish People, pp. 8–10, 162. 62. Ibid., pp. 80–96. 63. Ibid., p. 82, n. 170. 64. A few other incidents occurred in the Kurdish areas, but they were sporadic, disconnected, and insignificant (Ahmed, Role of the Kurdish People, pp. 117, 123, 131, 142; al-Wardi, Social Glimpses, vol. 5/2, pp. 73–82). 65. Ironically, in another book Ahmed describes how the revolutionaries brought down the British flag in Kifri, another Kurdish city. But he does not say which flag was raised in its place (Ahmed, Several Pages in the History of the Kurdish Nation, p. 166). 66. Nadhmi et al., Modern Political Development in Iraq, p. 113. 67. Tripp, History of Iraq, pp. 32–33. 68. Hilmi, Memoir, p. 43; al-Bayatti, Sheikh Mahmud al-Hafid, pp. 86–91. 69. Safwat, Memoirs, p. 166. 70. Tripp, History of Iraq, p. 33. 71. Hilmi, Memoir, pp. 75–78; al-Bayatti, Sheikh Mahmud al-Hafid, p. 100. 72. Al-Alawi, The Shiite and the Nation-State, pp. 93–105; al-Wardi, Social Glimpses, vol. 5/2, pp. 235–353. 73. See Bell, Gertrude Bell Archive; al-Nafisi, The Role of the Shiite, p. 199. 74. Bengio, “Iraq: From Failed Nation-State,” p. 62.

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75. Al-Uzri, The Problem of Governance, p. 350; al-Alawi, The Shiite and the Nation-State, p. 148. 76. Al-Chadirchi, From the Papers of Kamil al-Chadirchi, pp. 64, 86; al-Uzri, The Problem of Governance, p. 346. 77. Al-Alawi, The Shiite and the Nation-State, p. 361. 78. Abdul Rahman al-Naqib was the first prime minister and head of Iraq. He was a respected figure in Baghdad because of his lineage from Abdul Qadir alGaylani, a well-known Sufi. 79. See Korn, The Men Who Put the Kurds in Iraq; Bengio, “Iraq: From Failed Nation-State,” p. 62. 80. Simons, Iraq: From Sumer to Saddam, p. 223; Ferguson, The War of the World, p. 412.

3 Faisal and the Dream of a Nation

After the suppression of the Kurdish rebellion in Kurdistan and the

Shiite rebellion in the middle Euphrates, the British appointed Prince Faisal bin Ali, the son of the Sharif of Mecca, to be the first king of Iraq. The important role that Faisal played in the defeat of the Ottomans and later his prominence at the Versailles Peace Conference made him the unrivalled Arab figurehead and the best candidate for the Iraqi throne.1 Faisal was initially supported by both the Sunni and Shiite communities because of his religious lineage and “Arabness.” A large number of Shiites and a few leading Shiite mujtahids believed that to have a member of the family of the Sharif of Mecca (who was a sayyid, a descendent of the Prophet Muhammad) as king would help to protect them from raids by the Ikhwan ibn Sa‘ud (Wahhabi Bedouin). This was important because at the time the family of the Sharif of Mecca was also under severe pressure from the powerful Sa‘ud family of Hijaz.2 Prince Faisal portrayed himself as a leader who could achieve unity. After arriving in Iraq in 1921, on his way to Baghdad he visited the shrine of Imam Ali in Najaf and the shrine of Imam Hussein in Karbala.3 To show that he was one of the people, he wore tribal Arab clothing. Symbolic demonstrations were intended to show that one of the objectives of the 1920 Revolution had been accomplished by having an Arab king as the head of state. In his speeches, Faisal made specific references to the Shiite imams, thereby portraying himself as one of their direct descendants.4 Of course, the British still influenced political events in Iraq by maintaining the mandate. In order to avoid being accused of appointing a king, the British organized a plebiscite to formalize Faisal’s accession to the throne. In mid-August 1921, the result of the plebiscite was officially declared, and arrangements were made for Faisal’s coronation. On August 23, Faisal was installed as king of Iraq. The date Faisal selected for his coronation had symbolic relevance: it coincided with the Eid al-Ghadir, a day that the Shiites believe the Prophet Muhammad appointed Imam Ali as 39

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his successor. This was another move by Faisal to draw the Shiites into the circle of the state.5 Despite these attempts to foster a sense of unity, differing visions of nationhood were revealed by the voting patterns of the Kurds, Shiites, and Sunnis. Ethnic and sectarian divisions were clear. The plebiscite showed that Baghdad, middle Euphrates, and western provinces, where Sunnis and Shiites were dominant, voted in support of the king. But they did so on certain conditions. For example, they wanted him to be a constitutional monarch under a parliamentary democracy that would function under British guidance. However, the Shiite-dominated province of Basra initially rejected Faisal’s nomination altogether, approving it only after assurances were given that their local demands, including self-rule, would be considered. In the province of Kirkuk, the Kurdish majority (supported by Turkmen) rejected Faisal’s nomination altogether. The Kurds preferred waiting until their demands for independence materialized in accordance with the Treaty of Sèvres, while the Turkmen preferred a Turkish ruler. In Mosul, many voters emphasized the rights of minority groups such as the Chaldo-Assyrians; and the Kurds raised the issue of the merger with the Kurdish state that was expected to be formed in the southeastern regions of Turkey, as outlined in the Treaty of Sèvres. The Suleimaniya province did not participate in the plebiscite at all.6 All these factors affirmed the dominance of ethnic and sectarian factors in comparison to other forms of identity available at the time. They also signaled the internal fragmentation of the people living within the territory of Iraq during the time of Faisal’s coronation.

In the Center: Iraqi Moderates vs. Arab Nationalists After Faisal assumed power, the inevitable clash of identities erupted. These clashes stemmed from the inherent aspirations and ideologies of the different groups. The moderate Iraq-centric approach that was engineered by the British and supported by the British-appointed effendis (civil servants)7 was the ideological current that underscored the process of state building. The effendis constituted the elite and consisted of both traditional noble families, the a‘yan, and the families that had risen to prominence after the Ottoman reforms of the nineteenth century. 8 Most Iraqi effendis originated from Baghdad and Mosul, two Sunni-dominated cities with educational systems that were developed during the Ottoman era.9 The British promoted the idea of an Iraqi nation-state. A more influential view of Iraq’s future was presented by King Faisal and those who fought with him against the Ottomans in Syria during the

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1916 Arab Revolution. Initially this group’s plans for Iraq’s future ran contrary to Britain’s agenda. Most in Faisal’s circle were Ottoman-educated Sunni Arab lawyers, officers, and civil servants who possessed administrative skills and whose return from serving in Ottoman had been arranged by the British. This new elite assumed key positions in the new government and became referred to as “the Sharifians,”10 who paved the way for SunniArab dominance in the first Iraqi government.11 In the late 1910s and early 1920s, Faisal and his father were the unrivalled symbols of Arab nationalism. Arab intellectuals and officers flocked to him in Baghdad. Faisal’s inability to establish an Arab state extending from Syria through Iraq to Hijaz, as promised by the British, sharpened his sense of Arab nationalism while at the same time instilling a sense of betrayal.12 With the support of the Sharifians, Faisal’s strategic vision dominated those of rival groups, especially after he replaced British-appointed officers with new officers and intellectuals who came with him to Baghdad. The British faced particular difficulties finding supporters from within the Iraqi bureaucracy. Consequently, they attempted to court the tribal sheikhs in order to counterbalance the influence of the Arab nationalists and the king.13 The tribal leaders were incorporated into the political system, especially when Nuri al-Sa‘id formed the new Constitutional Union Party. The resulting politics of inclusion had a degree of success. By 1933, 21 percent of the seats in parliament had been allocated to tribal leaders, and, by 1954, this figure had risen to 28 percent. The support of tribal leaders was further encouraged by easing their tax burdens and providing government positions to their family members.14 However, these measures did not encourage a common national identity because strengthening tribal loyalties undermined the development of a national consciousness while retarding the process of nation-building. Faisal’s idea of Arab nationalism evolved as he became more involved in the affairs of state. His initial goal of Hashemite15 unity, based on British wartime promises to the Arabs, gave way to a more balanced approach based on Iraqiness. He became more realistic in his pan-Arab aspirations and put Iraq’s independence as his realpolitik priority.16 Faisal found a way to create a coalition consisting of the Sharifian and tribal leaders in his aim to counter the vocal Arab nationalists. 17 While the establishment of a strong and united Iraq was Faisal’s true intention, tribal interests encouraged a weak and disunited country in which their power and influence would remain intact. 18 Although the clash between Iraqcentric and Arab nationalist camps was relatively mild at the time, the country faced numerous challenges related to the struggle over the new state’s identity. This struggle originated from the periphery where the Kurds and the Shiites predominated.

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The Kurds and Their Hope for Independence A more serious challenge to the integrity of the state came from the north. The Kurds’ ambitions for a Kurdish state contrasted with the aims of the British as well as the nationalist sentiments of both Iraq-centric and Arab nationalists. Given the fact that the Kurds differ from Arabs in terms of ethnicity, ancestry, language, traditions, and culture, they opposed British and Iraqi attempts to annex the southern part of the greater Kurdistan region to Iraq. The conflict that emerged could be defined, therefore, as a conflict between two nascent nationalisms: Kurdish and Iraqi. When Faisal assumed power, the issue of the annexation of the southern Kurdistan area arose with the British. Faisal opposed coercing the Kurds into joining Iraq, but he also warned the British authorities of the inherent dangers of allowing Iraq’s Kurdish region to secede. He could easily see that it might set a precedent for the Shiites in Basra.19 In fact, the people of Basra province raised the issue of their own secession in a petition signed by a large number of people in June 1921.20 However, the calls for secession were not an exclusively Shiite bid as Sunni, Christian, and Jewish communities within and outside Basra also played a role in it.21 Even before replacing the Treaty of Sèvres (1920) with the Treaty of Lausanne (1923), a clash emerged between the promoters of Kurdish nationalism and both Arab nationalists and territorial Iraqi patriots. The Kurdish nationalists demanded full independence, while both the Arab nationalists and the territorial Iraqi patriots considered Kurdistan as a natural part of Iraq. By early 1922, disturbances resumed in the Kurdish region. In response, the British returned Sheikh Mahmud to power (see Chapter 2). In September 1922, even before the arrival of Sheikh Mahmud, British officers in Suleimaniya granted a measure of authority to the nobles of the city.22 Sheikh Mahmud met several tribal leaders on his way to Suleimaniya, all of whom signed a memorandum seeking independence for Kurdistan.23 Upon his arrival, Sheikh Mahmud was appointed hukumdar, governor of Kurdistan.24 The visions, ambitions, and aims of the British, however, conflicted with those of Sheikh Mahmud. For him, being appointed hukumdar meant being appointed king of Kurdistan, but for British and Iraqi authorities, hukumdar meant being the governor of Suleimaniya. These contradictory interpretations of the title gave rise to tensions that led to a conflict between the Kurds on one hand and the British and Iraqis on the other. With support from Iraqi forces, the British attacked Suleimaniya and recaptured the city by May 1923. Sheikh Mahmud fled to the mountains where he directed his rebellion until mid-1925. Though isolated, he continued to display the Kurdish flag and regularly published Bangi Kurdistan (the Proclamation of Kurdistan), the mouthpiece of his government-in-exile. The Kurdish leadership rejected an Arab king as head of the Iraqi state. Though Faisal had just been inaugurated, Sheikh Mahmud had appointed

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himself king of Kurdistan. Despite the tribal character of Sheikh Mahmud’s rebellion, he paid particular attention to the media and sought the advice of many Kurdish intellectuals.25 In addition to their respective roles in government, the intellectuals were actively involved in publishing. During the second phase of Mahmud’s rebellion, they published four newspapers, Bangi Kurdistan, Roji Kurdistan (the Sun of Kurdistan), Bangi Haq (the Proclamation of Justice), and Umedi Istiqlal (the Hope of Independence).26 These titles had deep, symbolic meaning for the Kurds, and they have significantly impacted their ideas and attitudes to this day. Once the rebellion was quelled, the Iraqi prime minister, Abdul Muhsin al-Sa‘dun,27 visited the city. Although he stressed that the Iraqi government would not discriminate against the Kurds, most people continued to reject the idea of annexation to Iraq and favored direct rule by the British. The subsequent failure of Sheikh Mahmud’s rule required the Kurds to rethink their position and accept the political reality of the new Iraq.28 The annexation of southern Kurdistan was formalized by the settlement of the Mosul problem, though the status quo was often challenged.

The Mosul Problem: A Conflict of Interests When British and Turkish officials failed to agree on the disputed province of Mosul, the issue was referred to the League of Nations. In early 1923, the league appointed a committee to prepare a report on whether the inhabitants wished to stay with Iraq or become part of Turkey.29 The question of forming a Kurdish state was totally ignored. The population was offered only two alternatives: they could choose to be a part of either Turkey or Iraq. Committee members visited the disputed areas between January and March 1925 and studied both the Turkish and British arguments. The tabled report recommended that if ethnicity were to be considered as a decisive factor to solve the Mosul problem, then “a Kurdish independent state must be formed.”30 The committee conducted a survey rather than offering a plebiscite to determine the will of the people in the disputed areas. Most people, including the Kurds, voted to join Iraq. The primary reasons for the Kurds’ inclination toward Iraq were the promises given them by the British and Iraqis, especially their joint statement affirming a form of self-rule inside Iraq. Another reason was the still-fresh memory of the brutal Turkish suppression of the Kurdish rebellion of 1925 in Turkey. During the debate on the Mosul problem in the British House of Commons, a member of the House suggested that “the problem does not lie in drawing the frontiers, and it is not associated with the question of minority groups, but it resides in the great Kurdish problem.”31 Despite this observation, the committee recommended the annexation of Mosul province to

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Iraq. It was subject to an extension of the British mandate for twenty-five years and the respect of linguistic and administrative rights of the Kurds and other minority groups.32 In July 1926, the League of Nations voted in favor of these recommendations and formalized the incorporation of the southern region of Kurdistan into Iraq. It is not possible here to fully examine the issues related to the British insistence on the annexation of Kurdistan into Iraq, though the discovery of oil might have been a motivation. Nevertheless, there is no evidence that the British were aware of the extent of Kurdistan’s oil resources at that time. Decades later, Wilson, acting British high commissioner, stated that they did not invade Mosul for the sake of oil but rather to stop the Soviets from infiltrating southward.33 Others argue that the British incorporated the Sunni Kurds into Iraq to counterbalance the Shiite Arabs who, in the absence of the Kurds, constituted an overwhelming majority in Iraq.34 The Kurdish mountain range in the north has been noted as a useful natural barrier to any threats from that direction on Iraq.35 The British fixation on Kurdistan has also been viewed as related to United Kingdom financial problems caused by World War I.36 Nevertheless, the Kurdish people considered their inclusion in the new state as a betrayal by the great powers that had promised Kurdish independence in the now defunct Treaty of Sèvres.37

Minority Rights vs. National and Territorial Recognition Following the inauguration of King Faisal, the Iraqi government signed its first treaty with the British. The Treaty of October 1922 urged the Iraqi government to prepare its own constitution. Article 2 of the first constitution drafted in 1925 defined Iraq as “a sovereign state, independent and free. Her territories are indivisible and no portion thereof may be given up” (emphasis added). 38 Contrary to British and Iraqi promises in the British-Iraq Declaration of December 24, 1922, the constitution made no mention of Kurdish rights. According to the declaration, both governments: recognize the right of the Kurds living within the boundaries of Iraq to set up a Kurdish Government within those boundaries and hope that the Kurdish different elements will, as soon as possible, arrive at an agreement between themselves as to the form which they wish that Government should take and the boundaries within which they wish it to extend and will send responsible delegates to Baghdad to discuss their economic and political relations with His Britannic Majesty’s Government and the Government of Iraq.39

For the Kurds, this statement was tantamount to a green light for the establishment of a Kurdish state or at least self-rule with demarcated boundaries within the borders of Iraq. On hindsight, it appears that the declaration

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was a political ploy designed by the British to dissuade moderate Kurds from following Sheikh Mahmud’s ambition for full independence. Even before the publication of this declaration and the 1925 constitution, there had been clashes between the rival groups over their respective nationalist visions. In November 1922 an Iraqi newspaper, al-Iraq, published two articles that urged the government to protect what it called “the natural Iraqi borders” by incorporating the Suleimaniya region into its territory. In response the Kurdish newspaper, Roji Kurdistan, referred to the claim that Kurdistan was part of the “natural Iraqi borders” as “unbelievable.” It argued that historical and geographical facts revealed that the Kurdish nation had existed as an entity quite distinct from the rest of Iraq. It challenged the claim by the al-Iraq newspaper and stated that while most of the population of Mosul province was Kurdish, why then did people from “other nations” (aqwam) demand it? In another article, Roji Kurdistan asserted that “our demand from the Lausanne Conference is not simply the respect for minority rights” but the defense of “an independent great nation with its homeland.”40 When the debate on the Mosul question reached a climax in the Iraqi media, the Kurds reaffirmed their quest for independence, a demand that was questioned by al-Istiqlal, an Iraqi newspaper. It asserted that the “inhabitants of Kurdistan are not a nation” and denied their right to form a state of their own. The article asked, “[I]s there a real Kurdish nation?” and then cynically responded to its own question by stating that “we cannot answer this question!”41 These arguments signaled a turning point in the Kurds’ quest for independence. Iraq’s Arabs, as well as the British, had now become the other—that is, the adversary in the imagination of Iraq’s Kurds. The British were well aware of the Kurds’ disappointment and dissatisfaction at the turn of events. In 1926, British High Commissioner Sir Henry Dobbs compared the relationship of the Kurds and Arabs to the historical animosity between the English and Scots. In a letter to King Faisal, he suggested that the Iraqi administration should follow the steps taken by Queen Victoria with regard to the question of Scottish identity. He recommended that the king acknowledge the binational character of Iraq and declare that the two stars on the Iraqi flag represent “the unity of the two nations, the Kurds and Arabs,” regardless of its historical origin.42 Following the second rebellion of Sheikh Mahmud, a new phase of Kurdish activism commenced. Kurdish intellectuals both inside and outside the government strategized to spread their message, and these included protest letters, petitions, memoranda, and telegrams to the League of Nations, the British high commissioner, and Iraqi government authorities. The activities of Kurdish intellectuals reached their peak in July 1930 when the contents of the British-Iraqi treaty were published. The treaty did not

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mention the Kurdish people or their rights.43 In response to the treaty, a group of Kurdish nobles and activists formed the Jam‘iyat Watanparwaran (Association of Patriots). Izzat Beg Jaff, a member of the association, is reported to have said, “This time our weapon is qalam u muraja‘at” (pen and petitions). This marked a turning point in the Kurdish nationalist movement because, instead of tribal and religious leaders, the urban elite attempted to assume leadership of the movement. The cities were turned into centers of activism, relinquishing the countryside to a temporary secondary role.44 Ongoing Kurdish intellectual activities prompted the king to send Prince Ghazi to reassure the Kurds that their rights would be guaranteed. During a reception in Suleimaniya for Ghazi on July 16, 1930, Ramzi Fatah Effendi, a noble from the city, said, “This century is the century of nations . . . but the [Lausanne] treaty obliterated our hope of independence.” He called on the people to unite and denounce the treaty.45 During the course of the reception, another speaker, Mirza Toufiq Qazzaz, said that the primary demand of the Kurds was the establishment of a “local government” to include “all the provinces of Kirkuk, Suleimaniya, Erbil and Kurdish districts in the Mosul and Diyala provinces.”46 To calm the situation, in August 1930, another British delegation headed by the British high commissioner and accompanied by Acting Iraqi Prime Minister Ja‘far alAskari visited the Kurdish areas. The Kurdish nobles in Erbil raised similar issues and demanded the implementation of previous promises, the most important of which was Article 16 of the British Mandate Law on Iraq. This provision stated, “Nothing in this mandate stops the mandatory [British] from establishing an administratively-independent state in the Kurdish areas.”47 A Kurdish tribal leader, Khidhir Ahmed Pasha, told the delegation that his community endorsed the demands of the people of Suleimaniya, adding that “we live and die with them and reject any separation of Kurdish provinces.”48 To an extent, this underscored the unity of all Kurdish provinces, whatever their fate. In Suleimaniya, the debate on the future of the Kurds in Iraq became more controversial. Both Sheikh Qadir (Sheikh Mahmud’s brother) and Ramzi Effendi suggested that the best solution for Kurdistan was to provide it with a direct mandate, as had been provided to Iraq, because “We are a separate nation. We are Aryans and they [Arabs] are Semites.” However, the acting prime minister insisted on the continuing dependency of the Kurdish areas on the rest of Iraq and acknowledged only linguistic and administrative rights for the Kurdish people. He suggested that the British promise did not extend beyond cultural and linguistic rights. In contrast, the Kurds emphasized their political, national, and territorial rights, a more far-reaching position.49 The central government suspected that Toufiq Wahbi,50 the governor of Suleimaniya, was behind the political disturbances that had incited the peo-

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ple. He was called to Baghdad where he was summarily dismissed. At the time the government was preparing for parliamentary elections. In response to the sacking, the members of the Association of Patriots did not participate in the elections. On September 6, 1930, about 3,000 people gathered in front of Saray, the local, Suleimaniya government house, and demanded their rights and denounced the elections. Police attempts to disperse the protestors led to clashes. When the police opened fire, they killed nearly sixty protesters, wounded even more, and arrested many.51 In Kurdish history this day is marked as Shashy Rashi Aylul (Black September the Sixth) and is remembered in the Kurdish collective memory as a symbol of resistance. Not all resistance had a violent nature. In regard to nonviolent activism, the letters of Toufiq Wahbi—letters sent on behalf of Kurdish intellectuals and political figures52—must not be underestimated. The letters, dated April 19, 1931, were in the form of a petition, and copies were dispatched to the British secretary of state for foreign affairs, the secretary general of the League of Nations, and the high commissioner to Iraq. The letters focused on the treatment of the Kurds since the formation of Iraq. Wahbi described the essence of “the Kurdish problem” in his statements that “the inclusion of Kurdistan in Iraq is neither right nor just but . . . it cannot now be remedied without the disintegration of the sovereign state [i.e., Iraq]. They [the Kurds] claim the right to live free as a separate race [nation] in their own country, loyal to the throne of Iraq.” Wahbi added that Kurdish loyalty to Iraq was conditional on Kurds retaining their rights as a “national entity.” He stressed that it was “no more right to call a Kurd an Arab or an Iraqi than calling an Irishman an Englishman,” and he repeated that “southern Kurdistan has never been an Arab country. . . . The inclusion of Kurdistan is neither right nor just.”53 King Faisal understood the necessity of establishing Kurdish self-rule within Iraq’s borders, as long as it did not lead to political and economic secession. He introduced several measures to ease the tension between the Kurds and Arabs. For example, the government established a Directorate of Education in Kirkuk, and then, in July 1931, it officially approved the Kurdish language to be used in the Kurdish region for legal and educational purposes.54 Moreover, the government accepted that the two stars on the Iraqi flag would be recognized as “symbols of Kurdish and Arab ethnicities, the two major ethnic groups in Iraq.”55 Soon after its formation in 1921, Iraq began to struggle between opposing visions of Kurdish, Iraqi, and Arab nationalisms. The Kurds consistently argued that Kurdistan was not part of Iraq, and if it were, then it is conditioned on full recognition of Kurdish national and territorial rights. In contrast, the Iraqi and Arab nationalists asserted that Iraq is indivisible and a part of the Arab world and Arab nation. This difference of opinion remained a contentious issue throughout modern Iraq history.

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Sectarian Identity and Power Sharing The authorities in Baghdad sent the leading Iraq-centric and Shiite politicians into exile in 1920, leaving a temporary political vacuum within the opposition movement. This was eventually filled by religious/sectarian opposition leaders led by Mahdi al-Khalisi, a leading Shiite mujtahid. King Faisal obtained a conditional pledge from al-Khalisi that he would work to gain full independence for Iraq. However, al-Khalisi reneged on that pledge on November 5, 1922, when he issued a fatwa declaring that whoever took part in the projected elections would be “fighting God, the Prophet and the Imams.” Later, al-Khalisi issued another fatwa that denounced the al-Hur party, the political party led by al-Naqib’s son. In reply, al-Naqib claimed that “this is our country and they [Shiite mujtahids] are mostly foreigners [Iranians].”56 The clash continued until al-Khalisi verbally attacked the king directly and declared his previous pledge void. He alleged that the king had broken his promise to end the British presence in Iraq. He issued another fatwa reminding people not to participate in the elections. Consequently, alKhalisi was considered an “alien Iranian” and was deported to Iran along with other mujtahids.57 Many Shiite mujtahids were Iranian citizens due to the fact that they had previously adopted Iranian citizenship to avoid Ottoman conscription laws. After the deportation of the Shiite mujtahids, the main publication of the al-Hur party, al-‘Asima, stated that boycotting the elections was an ajami (Iranian) idea: “This theme is alien and is not faithful to the Arab nation and the independence of Iraq.”58 Even today similar accusations are leveled at the Shiite mujtahids in Iraq by some Sunni Arab sources inside and outside Iraq.59 The question of the origin and loyalty of the Shiites to Iraq remains one of the current dilemmas of Iraqi identity.

The Iraqi Flag: Symbol of a Nation or Hallmark of English Infidels? The most important day in the Shiite calendar is Ashura, which commemorates the death of Imam Hussein at the battle of Karbala in 680 AD. The word ashura is Arabic for tenth and marks the culmination of the remembrance celebrations. King Faisal partly funded and attended the 1921 Ashura commemoration held in al-Kadhimiya. In addition to chest-beating as a display of devotion to Imam Hussein and in remembrance of his suffering, Ashura is expected to have a theatrical representation of the martyrdom, in the course of which the participants raise banners. On that particular ceremony, the Iraqi flag made its appearance along with other flags. It was carried next to the actor playing the “bad character,” Umer bin Sa‘d bin Abi Waqqas, the leader of the Umayyad forces that killed Imam Hussein.

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Traditionally the attendants of the ceremony cursed and insulted the actor and by implication the flag that was raised next to him. This was the first time that the Iraqi flag was raised on such an occasion.60 Sati‘ al-Husri,61 a Syrian Sunni Arab who would later play a leading role enshrining the pan-Arab ideology into the Iraqi school curriculum, also attended the ceremony. Remembered for his animosity to the Shiites, alHusri asserted in his memoir that the Shiites were disloyal to Iraq and its symbols.62 He reported that during the ceremony he drew Faisal’s attention to the flag being carried next to the bad character. The king then gave instructions for it to be moved next to those acting as Imam Hussein and Abbas, the Shiite martyrs. His account states that when the bearer of the Iraqi flag approached the actors playing Imam Hussein and Abbas, he was violently pushed away. The incident reveals how reluctant the Shiite participants at the ceremony were at that time to recognize the Iraqi flag as their flag. They considered it to be alien and deliberately positioned it next to the villain because it was considered to be the flag of a Sunni-dominated regime. This was the same flag raised by Sharif Hussein (Faisal’s father) during his alliance with the “infidel” English against the Muslim Ottomans. At that time the Shiite mujtahids had raised the Ottoman flag, calling for a jihad against the British infidels.63

Between Independence and Mandate: Encompassing Iraq’s Sovereignty The question of Iraq’s sovereignty and mandate was the subject of heated disagreement between the Shiites and Sunnis during negotiations on the future relationship between Britain and Iraq. Leading Shiite religious figures sought to close the gap between both communities. They invited Shiite and Sunni tribal leaders, city nobles, and the king to a conference to be held in Karbala. Its aim was to address Iraq’s relationship with the British and to find a solution to the continuous attacks by the Wahhabis on Shiite tribes in the south. Under pressure from the British, Faisal declined to attend the April 9, 1922, conference, though many leading Sunni figures did. The participants agreed on a common position to the Wahhabi attacks, a move that accentuated the main principles of a national agreement. The text highlighted the role of the Shiite mujtahids, stating that they and their tribal followers would not relinquish the main directives of their religion. It also recommended fighting the attackers in close cooperation with the king’s army. However, many Sunni participants refused to sign the statement because the wording exalted the status of the Shiite mujtahids and avoided mention of the British role in Iraq.64 On April 23, several Sunni leaders visited the king to express their

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own view, which was contrary to the Shiite position on the mandate. They informed him that they would not support him unless he followed British instructions. They then went to al-Naqib, who advised them to sign a counterstatement that refuted the one signed in Karbala. It claimed that they had been invited to a meeting in Karbala but were presented with a text that included conditions that were not in the best interests of the government or the country. On May 28, a Shiite delegation, supported by a few Sunni leaders from Baghdad, visited the king to reject the idea of a mandate and instead called for full independence.65 Simultaneously, Ja‘far Abu al-Timman, a Shiite who was trade minister in 1922, made a motion in the cabinet condemning the Wahhabi attacks. Prime Minister al-Naqib resisted the motion, suggesting that this would be tantamount to supporting the Karbala meeting.66 The intention of the Shiites was to support the kingdom on condition that it would achieve full independence. The Sunnis were inclined to favor a kind of mandate under British supervision. These competing aims demonstrated that the Sunnis were looking for support from Britain to counterbalance the potentially dominating influence of the Shiite majority. The deportation of the leading mujtahids and King Faisal’s ability to persuade a few leading Shiite tribal leaders to participate in the elections and the government paved the way for the government’s success, while temporarily separating political and religious activities. Despite opposition to the elections by the Shiites and a few Iraqi nationalists in Baghdad, plans for forming the National Assembly proceeded as planned. The decree by the mujtahids that the Shiites should boycott the elections had little impact. On July 27, 1924, the Iraqi Parliament held its first meeting, in the course of which it ratified the 1922 British-Iraqi treaty and the constitution.67 Apart from a few attempts to organize politically, the Shiites were not successful playing a prominent role in shaping Iraq’s politics. Moreover, the clashes sparked by religious ceremonies or by calls for power-sharing by leading political or religious figures widened the gap between the Sunni rulers and the Shiite community.

Ashura: A Continuing Point of Contention The first nine days of the 1927 Ashura ceremonies in al-Kadhimiya, a Shiite quarter in Baghdad, passed without serious incident. But on the tenth day, the last and most important day in the ceremony, the government sent nearly 900 soldiers “to ensure public safety,” as officials claimed. During the course of the processions, participants strike their own heads, backs and chests, causing bleeding. In this instance, a few drops of blood splashed onto the uniform of one of the soldiers patrolling the procession, who reacted angrily to the participants. Two soldiers pushing a small mobile water

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tank were attacked by a mob, prompting other soldiers to fire into the crowd, killing four people in the process. During the skirmishes, one soldier was killed, and fourteen civilians and 166 soldiers were wounded.68 This incident, and the manner in which it was conducted and reported by the authorities, reveals the attitudes of Sunni officials toward the Shiites. It also explains the reasons for most of the past and present grievances of the Shiite community. According to official reports, there were no incidents during the first seven days of the ceremony so it is unclear why such a large contingent was sent to the event unless it was done to intimidate the Shiites during the time of their annual grievance ritual. After the incident, the government issued a statement describing it as a wrangle between “doggeries” (procession participants) and “soldiers,” and in a subsequent letter to the minister of justice, Prime Minister al-Askari described the incident as a hideous attack on “unarmed soldiers . . . the symbol of the nation’s dignity.”69 The incident underscored the government’s suspicion of the Shiite community as well. The prime minister’s description was a gross overreaction to the Shiite ceremonies, revealing the ruling Sunni elites’ fear of them as a threat that required an armed battalion of Iraq’s soldiers to protect the country’s “internal security.” After the al-Kadhimiya incident, the Shiite leaders in Baghdad and Najaf realized the consequences of their miscalculated boycott of the elections and nonparticipation in the government. A meeting was held in Najaf to review the Shiite position. It was decided to remove the ban on accepting government posts. The participants explicitly demanded a fair share of government posts to be allocated to the Shiites—fifty percent at a minimum.70 However, the lack of an organized political party or strong leadership made it almost impossible for the Shiites to achieve their demands for power sharing. One of the difficulties faced by Iraq soon after its creation was the Shiite dissatisfaction of their marginalization by Sunni rulers.

Arab Nationalism and School Curriculum The educational system in Iraq since its founding has been a disciplinary institution modeled after the army curriculum.71 Al-Husri played a vital role in the process of instilling a pan-Arab ideology and discipline into the curriculum. The significance of this is that al-Husri’s attempt along with its consequences clashed with other ideological currents in Iraq at the time, in particular with Iraqi and Kurdish nationalisms. This clash became a major obstacle to the nation-building process. Soon after al-Husri’s arrival in August 1921, as the director general of education, he propounded a sophisticated pan-Arab ideology that was influenced by German philosopher Johann Gottfried von Herder (1744–1803). This ideology, which considered the nation as nothing but a group of people

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speaking the same language, was to be particularly influential throughout the Arab world, especially in the decades after 1940. Based on the Herderian principle, al-Husri suggested that “every Arabic-speaking person is an Arab.”72 However, it is unclear why al-Husri and most Arab nationalists, including Michael Aflaq, the founder of the Baath Arab Socialist Party, adopted the German notion of nationalism. It is likely that Arab dissatisfaction with the unfulfilled promises of the British fueled their determination to establish their own nation-state after World War II. In addition, Arab nationalists needed to justify their quest for an Arab nation, and while doing so they echoed the idealized German image of nationhood that united all people of the same heritage. As a result, Arab nationalists conceived of the Arab nation not as a political community based on free will, as French theorist Ernest Renan had argued, but as an organic entity that the German romantics had stressed. The Arab nationalists’ disenchantment with the Turanic claims of the young Turk nationalists is another factor that influenced their views. Al-Husri’s idea of the utilitarian nature of education was also taken from German nationalist philosophers. In order to maintain the German nation, Johann Fichte had suggested a total change in the prevailing educational system. 73 Fichte introduced his plan for nation-building in his addresses to the German nation. His ideas were not purely political but rather more of a plan for national education.74 In his memoir, al-Husri stated that his sole aim was to create a higher level of Arab national consciousness by means of national education.75 The main reason for the spread of alHusri’s ideas was that he made full use of his position to publish and entrench his theories through school textbooks. Al-Husri’s key objective was the unification of all Arabs under a single state, stressing that a national education system was the only meaningful tool to achieve unification. The importance of teaching the history of the “glorious” Arab past was emphasized in order to provide the basis for a national awakening. In 1922, al-Husri introduced two new items to the school curriculum to propound his ideas: (1) moral and civil information, and (2) a national anthem.76 He believed that although Arab national awareness was weak among Iraqis, it could be heightened by using Arab history to emphasize its glorious past. In history textbooks, he highlighted not only the idea of “the unity of the Arab nation” but also the “Arabness of Iraq.” Al-Husri used his influential position to hire Arab nationalist teachers from Syria and Palestine to play a major role in fostering a sense of Arab nationalism.77 The Arab nationalist vision of education was enshrined in the Public Education Law of 1940. This legislation was the culmination of the Arab nationalist policy movement that had commenced during the 1920s. Any deviation from the curriculum and the textbooks and any teaching that was not in the spirit of the law were absolutely forbidden.78

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The Sunni-dominated administration did not go unchallenged, however, and divisions emerged in the central Ministry of Education. The Sunni camp was headed by al-Husri, and the Shiite camp was led by the Shiite ministers because the education ministry was traditionally held by Shiites.79 Al-Husri proudly reported his effort to convince the king not to open a teachers’ college in Hillah (a Shiite-dominated city) and Mosul (the center of the mixed ethnic and religious province of Ninawa) because, as he said, the main beneficiaries would be students from Shiite and Christian communities.80 His aim was to maintain the dominance of the Sunnis as the sole political and intellectual elite by having teachers colleges only in Baghdad where the Sunnis were dominant at the time. This would ensure that only Sunni students could attend because other communities would not be able to afford to send their children to Baghdad. The Shiite camp favored a decentralized educational system that would enable them to teach aspects of their local identity and values. But al-Husri was not prepared to yield to local demands and asserted the authority of the central office and its prescribed course of instruction. During his time in office, al-Husri vacillated over the issue of teaching in the Kurdish language. Strongly anti-Kurd, his first annual report (1922– 1923) made no mention of the Kurds. Indeed, he categorized the Kurds as Sunnis and so avoided the ethnic/national categorization of Iraqi students.81 Despite the 1922 recognition of the Kurdish language as an official language in the Kurdish region in accordance with the first British-Iraqi treaty, al-Husri consistently rejected suggestions by Kurdish linguists to modify the Arabic alphabet so that it would be more compatible with the Kurdish language.

Al-Sh’ubiya: Questioning Shiite Loyalty After the formation of the state and the allocation of government posts, King Faisal faced several problems, including a shortage of suitable Shiite technocrats and civil servants. To balance the Sunni domination in the administration, the king instructed ministers to facilitate access by Shiite students to tertiary education, including the College of Law.82 The king was aware that the best way to integrate the Shiites into the system was to ensure that they could qualify for government posts.83 His proposal encountered fierce resistance from the Sunni elite, who attempted to stop Shiite graduates of the al-Ja‘fari school, the only Shiite school in Baghdad, from enrolling in the College of Law. Both al-Husri and Tawfiq al-Suwaydi, head of the college, defied Faisal’s orders to accept Shiite students on the grounds that graduates of the al-Ja‘fari school were not adequately qualified.84 After Faisal’s death, a Shiite politician convinced the minister of edu-

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cation to revive the king’s ideas of establishing higher educational institutions in the Shiite-dominated areas so that all sectors of society could have a fair share of government positions. A committee was formed to examine the request but it never convened, and the idea eventually faded.85 The first university established in a Shiite-dominated area was the University of Basra, which commenced in 1964. Al-Husri’s well-known confrontation with the distinguished Iraqi Shiite poet, Muhammad Mahdi al-Jawahiri, demonstrates the clash of visions between the Shiites and Sunnis. Al-Jawahiri was encouraged by his friends in Baghdad to take up a post as a secondary teacher. Al-Husri initially used al-Jawahiri’s Iranian citizenship as a pretext for denying him the appointment.86 This ploy was unsuccessful because al-Jawahiri gained Iraqi citizenship, and al-Husri was forced to grant him the position. After a week of teaching, al-Jawahiri published a poem in which he praised the beauty of Iran, its nature and landscape. This provoked a rebuke from alHusri who claimed that the poem “praises” Iran and “vilifies” Iraq. The main bone of contention was the interpretation of the poem by some Shiite intellectuals, which contradicted the Sunni interpretation. Al-Husri cited only three lines of the poem, selectively chosen to mislead the readers. The three lines read: I have in Iraq folks, if it weren’t for them, Iraq would not have been beloved to me Freshened Tigris, if it weren’t for them, that agonized me, and Euphrates undrinkable It is Faris [Iran], its air is the soul of the levanter, and its sky boughs and leaves.87

Al-Husri showed the poem to leading Sunni writers in Baghdad, including the distinguished Iraqi poet Ma‘ruf al-Rasafi (1875–1945). All considered the poem as part of “al-Sh‘ubiya” leniency.88 Al-Sh‘ubiya is a derogatory term originally applied to non-Arab Muslims—mainly Persians—who resisted Arab claims to be the prime inheritors of the Prophet. As described by Makiya, “crudely put, it means anti-Arab.”89 The result was that al-Husri dismissed al-Jawahiri from his post. The dismissal created pandemonium within the Ministry of Education and became a hotly disputed topic between Minister Sayyid al-Mahdi (a Shiite) and al-Husri. The latter argued that the poem demonstrated al-Jawahiri’s dislike and disrespect for Iraq and its natural icons, the Tigris and Euphrates. More importantly, the poem sprang from strong Farsi (Persian) leanings. Al-Husri labeled such pro-Persian sentiments as al-Sh‘ubiya. However, in a letter to al-Husri, al-Mahdi interpreted the poem as merely describing scenery.90 The differing interpretations illustrate the seriousness of the divergent versions of nationality and Arabism. By accusing al-Jawahiri of being al-

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Sh‘ubiya, the Sunni intellectuals stripped him of his ethnic (Arabic) and national (Iraqi) identities. This was not an isolated event, because many Sunni Arabs (Iraqis or outsiders) had a tradition of questioning the loyalty of the Shiites to Iraq as well as Uruba (Arabness).91 It is worth mentioning that while both al-Khalisi and al-Jawahiri were descendants of Arab Iraqi families and born on Iraqi soil, neither King Faisal nor al-Husri were Iraqis by origin or birth.92

Iraqi Army: Symbol of National Integrity or Division? To lighten the burden on British taxpayers, the Colonial Office in London urged the establishment of an Iraqi army. Using nationals to suppress indigenous citizens was substantially cheaper than using British soldiers. Hence, the first unit of the Iraqi army was established on January 6, 1921, with the prime objective to maintain the internal security of Iraq. The first unit was staffed almost entirely by ex-Ottoman Sunni officers. There were also some Kurdish officers in the Ottoman army, but the Shiites were almost entirely excluded from accessing military schools.93 Based in Istanbul in the late nineteenth century, the Arab officers in the Ottoman army became well-acquainted with Arabism as a nationalist ideology. Later they became the vanguard of Arab nationalism itself.94 After the creation of Iraq, they formed the backbone of both the political and military institutions. From their perspective, the Iraqi army was Arab rather than Iraqi, and their domination of the political scene enabled them to use both the educational and military institutions to promote Arab nationalism. The influence of ex-Ottoman instructors responsible for military training and alHusri’s curriculum were apparent in the thinking and vision of Iraqi officers who graduated from the Iraqi Military College (established in 1924). One officer, Mahmud Durra, recalled that he was “captivated by the dream of wahda (Arab unity). We awakened to see in the Iraqi army the Arab Prussia, the force able to realize our dreams of establishing a great Arab state which would restore the Arab nation to its past glories.”95 It is clear that most of Iraq’s officers envisioned the independence of Iraq as a pathway to the realization of Arab unity. To achieve this dream a few high-ranking politicians, such as Ja‘far al-Askari, Nuri al-Sa‘id and Rashid ‘Ali al-Gaylani (all ex-Ottoman Sunni officers), put forward a National Defense Act that entailed a provision for conscription. Shiite politicians as well as tribal and religious leaders opposed it, fearing that such an army would be used against them by Sunnis. Their fears were heightened by the realization that there would be few, if any, Shiites among the senior officers. Moreover, their sons might be used to fight against their own people.96 The al-Nahdha (a Shiite party)

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used the opportunity to regroup in parliament. In addition to their rejection of conscription, they advanced other demands, including the allocation of half of the cabinet portfolios to the Shiites and equal shares in other government positions.97 The Shiites were not alone in their rejection of conscription. Ismail Rawanduzi, a Kurdish member of parliament, also strongly opposed the act, claiming that in so doing, he represented the views of the Kurdish people. However, the Sunni-dominated government justified conscription on several grounds. They argued that, per Article 4 of the 1924 British-Iraqi military treaty, Iraq was required to spend 25 percent of its revenue on the military. So, conscription would ease the burden on Iraq’s budget and make funds available for other projects. They also argued that Iraq had long and open borders with two major regional powers, Turkey and Iran, making it vulnerable to attack at any time. Consequently, a well-prepared army with sufficient troops was required to defend Iraq.98 Despite opposition from both the Shiites and Kurds, conscription was adopted in February 1934.99 Some scholars argue that the establishment of the army contributed to national integration. Batatu, for example, promotes the idea that the army provided the means to mix Shiites and Sunnis, tribal and urban, and thereby weakened traditional sectarian and tribal affiliation. 100 However, the officer corps was dominated by the Sunnis, while the Shiites and Kurds comprised the rank and file. Tribal leaders and sheikhs were encouraged to send their sons to become army officers, while laypeople were generally refused entry to military colleges. Payments of cash in lieu of service resulted in an army consisting of people from the bottom strata of society. All of these practices created further divisions in the army along sectarian, ethnic, and class lines. As a result, the army did not serve as a mechanism for national integration. Instead of aiding unity, it accentuated inherent divisions. Army rhetoric claimed that the military was to be a school for the nation. However, as events showed, it was not guided by Iraq-centric nationalism but by Arab nationalism. The army became an institution to support an Arab state rather than a means of uniting Iraqis.

Faisal’s Memorandum: A Nation-to-Be In a memorandum written just before his death in 1933, King Faisal summarized the process of national integration during his reign. 101 In this memorandum he pointed out the main challenges facing Iraq’s nationbuilding enterprise. After eleven years in power, Faisal was still wondering whether the creation of an Iraqi nation was really possible. He acknowledged that the government had failed in its nation-building project and lamented:

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There is still no . . . Iraqi people [nation] but unimaginable masses of human beings, devoid of any patriotic idea, imbued with religious traditions and absurdities, connected by no common tie. . . . Out of these masses we want to fashion a people [nation] which we train, educate and refine. . . . The circumstances, being what they are, the efforts needed for this [task] are immense.102

The absence of a common tie was identified by the king as one of the main stumbling blocks in the path to nation-building and nation-formation. In the memorandum the king admitted the depth of the divisions between the various Iraqi communities, pointing out that Iraq lacked the most important elements of social cohesion: “national, religious and ideological unity.” He also identified the challenges facing the government during that time: Iraq is a kingdom ruled by a Sunni-Arab government. . . . This government rules a Kurdish area, where most of them are “ignorant.” Among this group there are those who have personal ambitions, this causes them to abandon the government because, as they claim, it is not their government. This government also rules a majority Shiite segment that belongs to the same ethnic group as the Sunnis. This majority [of Shiites] or greedy persons among them, especially the religious ones, are job seekers but without skills or qualifications. The ones who did not benefit from the new regime are all claiming that they had been persecuted because “they are Shiites.” They encourage the majority people to boycott the government because, as they say, it is vicious.103

In the memorandum the king accused the Sunni ruling class of being “arrogant,” but described them as the “only” progressive group. He did not mention their discriminatory policies, stating only that there had been accusations of discrimination from the Shiites and the Kurds. What is interesting in this context is that the king merely suggested strengthening the army as the main solution to dealing with any insurrections that might emerge in “two far away territories at the same time,” a clear reference to the Kurdish region in the north and the Shiite areas in the south. He added that “the army is the backbone of the creation of any nation” and asserted that he did not ask the army to “protect us from foreign threats, but to crush two revolutions, if sparked, from two far away areas.”104 Although Faisal suggested a few other measures for accommodating the demands of the Shiite community, he regarded Iraq’s primary nationbuilding challenge as security, an issue that he thought could be solved by police and the military rather than through recognition, accommodation, and power-sharing. Iraq’s foundation, laid down by King Faisal, apparently rested on one group imposing its will and identity on other sectors of society, rather than accepting and respecting diversity. Historically, Iraq has had disputes with most of its neighbors, but Faisal’s main concern was the threat from internal disorder. Instead of tackling the challenges through constitutional and institutional means, the king advocated the use of force.

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At the conclusion of his memorandum, Faisal asserted that if these factors were not properly addressed, the country would never achieve stability. He insisted that all sectarian and religious fanaticism be eliminated and replaced with true national notions of wataniya (patriotism). Faisal was aware that both the Kurds and the Shiites were feeling alienated, and that is why he encouraged them to be involved in the political process. He enabled and encouraged them to take government positions in increasing numbers despite stern opposition from the Sunni ruling elite. Acting in their own interests, the Sunnis ignored the diverse nature of Iraqi society. These exclusionary attitudes would lead to many clashes of identities in years to come. Faisal’s recommendation to use military force to quell unrest set the expectation for later generations as how to deal with the grievances of the Kurds and the Shiites. On November 16, 1930, the Iraqi Parliament ratified the treaty that ended the British mandate. This, however, did not diminish British influence. The treaty enabled Iraq to become an independent state and join the League of Nations in October 1932. The pro-British former Ottoman Sunni officers continued to control the government until 1958. While moderate, pro-British groups and individuals, including King Faisal, al-Sa‘id, and alAskari, hailed the treaty as the precursor to independence, other nationalist groups inside and outside the government denounced it as a “honey-trap for pseudo-independence.” It is in this context that one can understand the growth of anti-imperialist sentiments and the dynamics of the 1958 Revolution.105 In sum, neither the founder of the modern state of Iraq, King Faisal, nor the architect of its national school curriculum, al-Husri, were from Iraq. This raised the question of the viability of a state shaped by foreigners, King Faisal and al-Husri, not to mention the creator of Iraq, the British. Because of his moderate stance on most issues, Faisal was to a large extent accepted by most ethnic and religious groups. However, al-Husri’s blatant opposition to the Kurds and the Shiites, and his pan-Arab ideology, led him to be branded as a dakhil (intruder). The policies that King Faisal invoked, and the approaches he used to narrow the gap between social groups, met with fierce opposition from the new Sunni political elite, the Sharifians. Although the king’s intentions may have been worthy when he introduced those measures to strengthen Iraq’s national identity, they clashed with existing ethno-national, sectarian, and tribal loyalties. Neither the political elite nor the laypeople were ready to transcend these loyalties and create an overarching identity. The Sunni political elite should not be blamed entirely for the situation that evolved, because the roots of Iraq’s problems lay in the competing and contradictory visions for Iraqi identity. These visions prevented national integration and thwarted the creation of the nation-state.

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In addition to these contradictory visions, the discriminatory policies that were adopted proved to be another obstacle to national integration. During the 1920s, several cabinets were convened. But at that time only one ministerial post was allocated to the Shiites, that of the minister of education. It was the least powerful of all cabinet posts because al-Husri remained the final decisionmaker on educational matters. At that time the Kurds constituted about 20 percent of the Iraqi population and occupied 22 percent of senior public service posts. They fared better than the Shiites that formed the majority, over 55 percent of the populace, who were granted only 15 percent of the senior positions.106 The main reason for this low level of Shiite representation was the inherent discrimination of the Sunnis that began during the Ottoman era and continued afterward. As mentioned, the Shiites were at first reluctant to accept government positions, and the mujtahids’ fatwa(s) had declared all services under British rule to be unlawful. Besides, the Shiite community lacked secularly educated technocrats, and Shiite parents were reluctant to send their children to secular state schools. When Faisal died in 1933, the Iraqi people were still only “masses of human beings, connected by no common tie.” Indeed, it is not only the nationbuilding effort that faced obstacles in Iraq. As understood by its king, Iraq lacked the essential ingredients of nation-formation, in particular, a common denominator between the Kurds and Arabs, and even among the Arabs themselves as sectarian tensions ran deep.

Notes 1. Dodge, Inventing Iraq, p. 19; Walker, “The Making of Modern Iraq,” pp. 29– 40. 2. Al-Wardi, Social Glimpses, vol. 6/1, p. 133. 3. Imam Ali bin Abi Talib (r. 656–661) was the cousin and son-in-law of Prophet Muhammad. Shiites consider him as the first imam. Imam Hussein (628– 680) was the grandson of Muhammad and the son of Ali bin Abi Talib. He is revered by the Shiites as the third imam. 4. Al-Wardi, Social Glimpses, vol. 1, p. 107. 5. Ibid., vol. 6/1, p. 119. 6. Al-Hassani, The History of Iraqi Cabinets, vol. 1, pp. 58–60; Ahmed, Kirkuk and Surroundings, pp. 137–140; al-Wardi, Social Glimpses, vol. 1, pp. 116–117. 7. Effendi is an Ottoman title of respect similar to Mr., used in the West. It often refers to literate townspeople. 8. Eppel, “The Elite,” p. 227. 9. Al-Wardi, Social Glimpses, vol. 5/1, p. 57. 10. Al-Temimi, Muhammad Ja‘far, p. 132. 11. Before the arrival of Sunni ex-Ottoman officers and civil servants, the positions were filled by British and Indian officials (Al-Wardi, Social Glimpses, vol. 5/2, pp. 232, 233; vol. 6/1, pp. 40, 41. 12. Marr, The Modern History of Iraq, p. 24.

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13. Dodge, Inventing Iraq, pp. 20–23. 14. Nakash, The Shi‘is of Iraq, pp. 89–92; Batatu, The Old Social Classes, pp. 24–25. 15. The Hashemites, or Bani Hashem, are descendants of Muhammad. 16. Shikara, “Faisal’s Ambitions,” p. 43. 17. Nakash, The Shi‘is of Iraq, p. 89; Batatu, The Old Social Classes, p. 25. 18. Batatu, The Old Social Classes, pp. 27, 28. 19. Al-Bayatti, Sheikh Mahmud al-Hafid, pp. 208–210. 20. Faidhi, Memoirs of Sulaiman Faidhi, pp. 308–310. 21. Visser, Basra, the Failed Gulf State, p. vii. 22. Bangi Kurdistan (newspaper), September 18, 1922, pp. 1, 2. 23. Al-Bayatti, Sheikh Mahmud al-Hafid, p. 229. 24. Ahmed, Kirkuk and Surroundings, p. 169; al-Hassani, The History of Iraqi Cabinets, vol. 1, p. 281. 25. Among the intellectuals, Rafiq Hilmi, Sheikh Nuri, Sheikh Salih, Ahmed Khwaja, and Mustafa Pasha Yamolki played vital roles in Mahmud’s government. 26. For information on these newspapers, see Salih and Salih, The Newspapers; Khaznadar, The Sun of Kurdistan. 27. Born in Basra, Abdul Muhsin al-Sa‘dun (1879–1929) was a Sunni politician who served as prime minister of Iraq four separate times between 1922 and 1929. 28. Al-Bayatti, Sheikh Mahmud al-Hafid, pp. 319, 330, 331. 29. For thorough coverage of the Mosul problem, see Hussein, The Mosul Problem. 30. Quoted in Hussein, The Mosul Problem, p. 102; Ahmed, Kirkuk and Surroundings, p. 196. 31. Quoted in Ahmed, Kirkuk and Surroundings, p. 189. 32. Sluglett, Britain in Iraq, pp. 124–125; Hussein, The Mosul Problem, pp. 173–174. 33. Hussein, The Mosul Problem, p. 278. 34. Sabir, “The Sectarian Problem,” p. 53; Lukitz, Iraq: The Search, p. 36. 35. Mina, Iraq’s Security Strategy, p. 83. 36. Stansfield, Iraq: People, History, Politics, p. 44. 37. See Amin, The Age of Pen. 38. Al-Hassani, The History of Iraqi Cabinets, vol. 1, pp. 339–356. For the English version, see Constitution of the Kingdom of Iraq. 39. Cited in al-Hassani, The History of Iraqi Cabinets, vol. 1, p. 282; Ali and Salih, Iraqi Kurdistan, pp. 110–111, 177; Jwaideh, The Kurdish National Movement, p. 196. 40. Roji Kurdistan (newspaper), November 15, 1922, p. 1; December 27, 1922, p. 2. 41. Al-Istiqlal (newspaper), no. 556, February 8, 1925, p. 3, Quoted in Ahmed, Kirkuk and Surroundings, p. 215. 42. Ahmed, Kirkuk and Surroundings, pp. 143–145. Historically the two stars on the Iraqi flag represented the two kingdoms of Jordan and Iraq, both of which claimed to be Hashemite kingdoms (that is, descendants of Prophet Muhammad). 43. Al-Hassani, The History of Iraqi Cabinets, vol. 3, pp. 21–27. 44. Amin, The Age of Pen, pp. 60–61. 45. Zhiyan, July 21, 1930, pp. 2–3. Zhiyan, a Kurdish newspaper, was published in Suleimaniya from 1926 to 1934. 46. Ibid., p. 4.

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47. Al-Hassani, The History of Iraqi Cabinets, vol. 1, p. 303. 48. Zhiyan, August 14, 1930, p. 2. 49. For full coverage, see Zhiyan, August 18, 1930. 50. Toufiq Wahbi (1891–1984) was a Kurdish linguist and army officer who served as a colonel in the Ottoman army. He held a total of eight ministerial posts in the Iraqi government. 51. Amin, The Age of Pen, pp. 66–68. 52. The authorization of Toufiq Wahbi was signed by seventeen Kurdish political activists, including Kurdish members of the Iraqi Parliament (Ali and Salih, Iraqi Kurdistan in the British Ministry of Foreign Affairs, p. 159). 53. Quoted in Ali and Salih, Iraqi Kurdistan, pp. 163, 189, 191. 54. Hassanpour, Nationalism and Language, p. 114. 55. Ahmed, Kirkuk and Surroundings, p. 152. 56. Al-Wardi, Social Glimpses, vol. 6/1, pp. 108, 109, 202, 203, 205. 57. Nakash, The Shi‘is of Iraq, pp. 80, 81. By March 1924, many Shiite mujtahids were allowed to return to Iraq on condition that they refrain from political involvement. The amnesty excluded Mahdi al-Khalisi, who died in Iran (al-Wardi, Social Glimpses, vol. 6/1, pp. 251, 258). 58. Quoted in al-Wardi, Social Glimpses, vol. 6/1, pp. 218, 224. For a similar accusation expressed in Iraqi newspapers, see pp. 234, 235. 59. For instance, Grand Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani holds Iranian citizenship in spite of his deep identification with Iraq and Iraq’s Shiites. 60. Al-Wardi, Social Glimpses, vol. 6/1, pp. 128–130; Zubaida, “The Fragments,” pp. 212, 213. 61. Sati‘ al-Husri (1879–1968) came to Baghdad in early 1921 at the invitation of King Faisal. He served as an adviser but soon took over the most influential position as director general in the Ministry of Education. In 1927, al-Husri became dean of the College of Law through which many second-generation Iraqi politicians passed. 62. Al-Husri, My Memoir, pp. 87–89. 63. Al-Wardi, Social Glimpses, vol. 6/1, p. 129. 64. Ibid., pp. 140–151. 65. Ibid., pp. 164–166. 66. Al-Temimi, Muhammad Ja‘far, pp. 145, 146. 67. Al-Hassani, The History of Iraqi Cabinets, vol. 1, pp. 213–214; Lukitz, Iraq: The Search, pp. 31–33. 68. Al-Hassani, The History of Iraqi Cabinets, vol. 2, p. 109. 69. Ibid., p. 110, n. 1. 70. Nakash, The Shi‘is of Iraq, p. 118. 71. Bashkin, “When Mu‘awiya Entered the Curriculum,” p. 348. 72. Quoted in Tibi, “Religious Fundamentalism,” p. 189. 73. German philosopher Johann Gottlieb Fichte (1762–1814) was well known for his Addresses to the German Nation, delivered in Berlin in 1806 during the French occupation wherein he outlined his vision for the nation. 74. Tibi, “Religious Fundamentalism,” p. 134. 75. Al-Husri, My Memoir, p. 215. 76. Ibid., pp. 57, 213–216. 77. Ibid., p. 256. 78. Simon, “The Imposition of Nationalism,” pp. 87–104. 79. See al-Husri, My Memoir; al-Uzri, The Problem of Governance, p. 200. 80. Al-Husri, My Memoir, p. 80.

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81. Ibid., pp. 336–364. 82. Established in Baghdad in 1908, the College of Law was the only one in Iraq at the time. 83. Al-Uzri, The Problem of Governance, p. 18; al-Wardi, Social Glimpses, vol. 6/1, p. 126. 84. Al-Husri, My Memoir, pp. 405–409. 85. Al-Uzri, The Problem of Governance, pp. 23–24. 86. During the Ottoman era, many Shiites became Iranian citizens in order to avoid military conscription (al-Wardi, Social Glimpses, vol. 6/1, p. 44; al-Uzri, The Problem of Governance, p. 210). 87. Quoted in al-Husri, My Memoir, p. 590. Dr. Hassan Nadhim and the author translated the poem. 88. Ibid. 89. Makiya, Republic of Fear, p. 153. The Al-Sh‘ubiya movement began as a response by Persian Muslims to the growing Arabization of Islam in the ninth and tenth centuries in what is now Iran. It was primarily concerned with preserving Persian culture and protecting Persian identity (see Mottahedeh, The Shu‘ubiyah Controversy). The term Sh‘ubi was historically used by the Sunnis to describe nonArab Muslims, especially Iranians. It also referred to people with anti-Arab sentiments. For the Shiite perspective on al-Sh‘ubiya, see al-Uzri, The Problem of Governance, pp. 262–267; al-Wa’ili, Shi‘a Identity, pp. 207–224. 90. Al-Husri, My Memoir, pp. 595–598. 91. This tradition goes back to Ottoman times; see Chapter 9. 92. Ghareeb and Dougherty, Historical Dictionary, p. 123; al-Wardi, Social Glimpes, vol. 6/1, p. 44. 93. Al-Chadirchi, From the Papers of Kamil al-Chadirchi, p. 86; Hashim, “Military Power,” p. 31. 94. Hemphill, “The Formation of the Iraqi Army,” pp. 91, 98. 95. Quoted in Ibid., p. 101. 96. Nakash, The Shi‘is of Iraq, p. 115. 97. Al-Temimi, Muhammad Ja‘far, pp. 204, 205. 98. Al-Hassani, The History of Iraqi Cabinets, vol. 2, pp. 100–108. 99. Tripp, A History of Iraq, p. 82. 100. See Batatu, “Iraq’s Shiites.” 101. According to al-Hassani, the memorandum was written in March 1932. However, many scholars claim March 1933 to be the more accurate date (Batatu, The Old Social Classes, p. 27). For the full version of the memorandum, see alHassani, The History of Iraqi Cabinets, vol. 3, pp. 315–321. 102. Quoted in al-Hassani, The History of Iraqi Cabinets, vol. 3, p. 317. 103. Ibid., p. 316. 104. Ibid. 105. See Marr, The Modern History of Iraq. 106. Nakash, The Shi‘is of Iraq, pp. 109–111.

4 The Emergence of National Integration

Iraq gained independence on October 3, 1932, but remained subject

to British influence until the overthrow of the monarchy in 1958. Though this direct rule from Britain was one of the shortest in Britain’s colonial history, the British policies during the mandate period (1921–1932) were irresolute and had a lasting impact on Iraq. British rule hastened the drive to modernize through the development of the education system, the establishment of a relatively effective state administration, and the formation of political parties. Nevertheless, British reliance on Sunni elites led to the Arabization and Sunnification of the administration— processes that shaped modern Iraq. The British-initiated modernization process resulted in the beginning of national integration. After the Iraqi state became a reality, the Iraqis began to identify themselves with the state in ways that led to an evolving sense of Iraqiness. The Iraqiness and Arabness (and sometimes a combination of these) were particularly appealing to the newly emerging educated urban middle class. For the Kurds, the impact of modernization, especially migration from rural areas to urban centers, was similar to the rest of the country. However, instead of Arabness, a sense of Kurdishness appealed to the urban, educated middle class, prompting them to form ethno-nationalist organizations. Iraqiness in varying degrees also appealed to many leftistoriented educated people, especially among the Kurds residing in Baghdad. This was also mirrored in some Kurdish regions where left-leaning organizations were politically active. During the period between King Faisal’s death in 1933 and the overthrow of the monarchy in 1958, Iraqiness, Arabness, and Kurdishness impacted the process of national integration. Liberalism, social democracy, and communism were the ideological currents that attracted many followers during these decades. Among them, communism was dominant, which posed particular challenges to Arab and Kurdish nationalisms. While these new ideologies overlapped ethnic and sectarian divisions to an extent, in 63

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reality they became embedded along these lines. This convoluted period of history cannot be understood without mapping out Iraq’s political parties as well as the ideological trends that shaped these parties. A brief account of the background and political platform of each party is necessary to fully grasp the topsy-turvy world of the era between Faisal’s death and the overthrow of the monarchy. When King Faisal was in power, or at least during the last years of his reign, the moderate Iraq-centric, pro-British current, consisting of a coalition of the Sharifians, tribal leaders, and other moderate Iraqi politicians, became the most influential political force in Iraq. Behind the scenes Arab nationalists were also active, especially in the army and the educational system. After his death in 1933, Faisal was succeeded by his twenty-one-yearold son, Ghazi (1912–1939), who was openly anti-British and a fervent believer in the pan-Arab cause.1 Ghazi’s political disposition may be traced to his education and training at the hands of two ardent Arab nationalists,2 Sati‘ al-Husri and Taha al-Hashimi.3 King Ghazi’s pan-Arab orientation shifted the royal family from his father’s main circle, the Sharifians and tribal leaders, toward the sphere of Arab nationalists. King Faisal had used his personal influence to defuse ethnic and sectarian tensions, but Ghazi had little of his father’s clout or authority over tribal, ethnic, or religious factions. To advance the pan-Arab cause, he relied on the Arab nationalists within the army. By the late 1930s, the army had grown from 12,000 to 43,000 personnel.4 It was used primarily to suppress the uprisings by the dispossessed Shiite tribesmen in 1935 in the middle Euphrates region and by the Assyrians in Ninawa province.5 Increasingly, the power center used the army to repress those on the periphery.

Religious Identity and Proportional Representation: The Shiite Grievances In the early 1930s the Shiite mujtahids finally broke the silence that they had maintained following the 1920 Revolution and the deportation of the chief marja‘, Mahdi al-Khalisi. In December 1934, the government manipulated the parliamentary elections by counting only the ballots that supported their candidates.6 As a result, the Shiite tribal leaders were not fairly represented. The situation worsened when the government’s nominees “won” the elections in the tribal areas, which led to internal friction within the tribes. The ramifications of the falsified elections were that the communities were misrepresented in the government to a greater degree than previously. While the Shiites constituted more than 55 percent of the population, their representation after the elections was only 30.7 percent.7 Shiite tribal leaders

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raised their concerns to the new chief marja‘, Kashif al-Ghatta, and urged him to organize a meeting to discuss their grievances.8 About 200 tribal and religious leaders attended a meeting in Najaf where a petition was signed and sent to King Ghazi. The petition accused the authorities of mishandling the elections and argued that the parliament did not represent the people. Opposition to the government led to the resignation of Ali Jawdat’s cabinet in March 1935 and the formation of a new cabinet under Jamil al-Madfa‘i, both Sunnis from Mosul.9 In view of the growing tension in the middle Euphrates, the new cabinet decided to mobilize its troops just days after its formation. The Shiite tribal and religious leaders urged the king to intervene and prevent the clash. This crisis led to the resignation of al-Madfa‘i’s cabinet a fortnight later. A new cabinet, headed by Arab nationalist Yasin alHashimi, had incited the tribal leaders against Jawdat and al-Madfa‘i and their Iraq-centric, pro-British, moderate counterparts.10 After assuming power, the new government issued a statement calling on tribal leaders to disband and lay down their arms. The tribes surrendered, but only after al-Ghatta urged them to press for a peaceful resolution. 11 The resulting peace did not last long because the Shiites in alKadhimiya protested against the government’s plan to demolish a cemetery as part of a new government project. Thirteen people were killed during the confrontation. The Ashura fell just a few days after the al-Kadhimiya tragedy. Being anxious over the repercussions that might turn the Ashura ceremonies into an all-out protest, the government outright banned the ceremonies.12 Eid al-Ghadir also fell in March. A few lawyers and many tribal leaders took advantage of the occasion to visit the chief marja‘ in Najaf. At the end of the visit al-Ghatta drafted a memorandum, historically known as the al-Ghatta Memorandum, which was cosigned by Shiite tribal leaders. Fearful of being accused of sectarianism, a few influential Shiite tribal leaders and political figures refused to sign the memorandum. These include Sheikh Abdul Wahid al-Hajj Sukar, Sheikh Sha‘lan al-Atiya, and Ja‘far Abu al-Timman. They were also concerned with the language of the text. The overwhelming majority of Shiite tribal leaders, however, signed the memorandum.13 This was the most overt expression of Shiite grievances since the 1920 Revolution.14 The first article of the memorandum explicitly accused the government of discriminatory, divisive, and biased policies that had become the fundamental “pillars of governance.” It stated that “the majority [of the Shiites] are represented by one or two ministers only . . . and that discrimination is manifested in the appointment of the officials and members of parliament.” It called for equality between the Iraqi communities and blamed the executive powers of the government— not the constitution—for the injustices. It also called on the government to conduct impartial elections and to legalize the study of Ja‘fari (Shiite) jurisprudence.

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With the backdrop of mutual distrust between the government and the tribes, tensions grew. In May 1935, the police arrested Sheikh Ahmed Asad Allah, a Shiite religious leader, and stripped him of his Iraqi citizenship. This act triggered an attack on government posts by tribesmen.15 Rashid ‘Ali al-Gaylani, the interior minister in al-Hashimi’s cabinet, traveled to the Middle Euphrates to supervise the government’s response that purported, among other things, to declare martial law and the appointment of Bakr Sidqi as chief of staff to bring back order to the region. When rebellion erupted and spread to the surrounding areas, the government proposed a truce to be negotiated with al-Ghatta on behalf of the tribes. While the tribal and religious leaders accepted the truce, the army used the truce period to reorganize and then mercilessly attacked the rebels, many of whom were captured and tried. A court-martial sentenced sixty-three rebels to death.16 This incident demonstrates one more case where the army used its influence to alienate the tribal and religious, or non-Sunni, leaders. During the 1920s and 1930s, Iraq transitioned from a society based on traditional tribal organization and values to one based on centralized authority. At the same time it instituted military conscription, an act that challenged the power and authority of the sheikhs within the tribes. The government’s ban on religious rituals, the arrest of religious leaders, and the lack of proportional representation of the Shiites contributed to the rebellion as it showed the importance of the Ashura rituals for the Shiites and the important role of the Shiite marja’iya in Iraq’s politics. In 1936, the government attempted to impose a unified dress code on Iraqis by suggesting that al-sidara (a hat) should be worn by all Iraqis. It seems that the Sunni effendis in Baghdad wanted to impose a version of the dress code, which it had inherited from the Ottomans, while imitating the shah in Iran and Kemal Ataturk in Turkey. The government reintroduced the Conscription Act, which was ratified by parliament in February 1934. To make matters worse, the government once again attempted to ban the 1936 Ashura ceremonies. These measures prompted a widespread rebellion among the Shiites in the south and the Yazidi Kurds in Sinjar. In October 1935, the army and police suppressed the Yazidis, killing hundreds, and conducted a court-martial to deal with the participants. The response to the second Shiite rebellion of 1936 was even harsher than the previous one in 1935.17 The result of this series of events was that the army emerged as a powerful arm of government, and officers started to believe that direct intervention was the way to best serve politics. By 1936, the number of men in the armed services had doubled to 23,000, and the air force had grown from three aircraft to three squadrons.18 The status of Colonel Bakr Sidqi grew both inside and outside the military, as the government rewarded the army units and especially Bakr Sidqi.19 Instead of becoming a symbol of unity, the Iraqi army had become a tool of repression, ruthlessly crushing the uprisings and those to come.

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The Army: A Battlefield Between Iraqi and Arab Nationalists The events of the 1930s enabled the army to become the most powerful institution in Iraq. This state of affairs paved the way for its intrusion into politics. Bakr Sidqi, known for his Iraq-centric views, emerged as the dominant personality within the army. However, the government was headed by al-Hashimi and al-Gaylani, both devoted Arab nationalists. Conflicting ambitions and ideologies set the scene for yet another clash whereby Sidqi took the unprecedented action of ordering his troops to unseat the government. The military coup was not directed at the monarchy, perhaps to avoid unnecessary or additional complications, but removed only the proponents of Arab nationalism, bringing reformists and Iraqi-orientated politicians to power. A new cabinet was formed by Hikmat Suleiman,20 a member of the al-Ahali group (see below). The new cabinet had a higher proportion of Shiite ministers than any previous administration.21 For the first time in Iraq’s modern history, the Sunnis lost their absolute majority in government. The Suleiman-Sidqi government advocated an Iraq-first policy and promoted the slogan “Iraq for the Iraqis.” Iraqi nationalists and leftists (including al-Ahali and the Iraqi Communist Party) supported the new government. However, the Arab nationalists and other right-wing forces, including the al-Muthanna Club,22 started an opposition movement against the new government. Being an admirer of both Kemal Ataturk of Turkey and Riza Shah of Iran, Sidqi advocated closer relations with both countries. As a result the Sunni Arab nationalists, especially officers within the army, began to accuse the Suleiman-Sidqi government of favoring Iraq’s non-Arab neighbors as well as of downgrading the importance of Iraq’s links with the Arab world.23 In addition, Sidqi was blamed for encouraging the Kurds to join the army. In his memoir, Salah al-Din al-Dabagh, a Sunni Arab-nationalist officer, alleged that Sidqi removed Arab officers from senior positions and replaced them with Kurds. He also claimed that Sidqi encouraged the use of the slogan “Iraq for Iraqis.”24 Regardless of whether these allegations were true, his views indicated the level of tension along ethnic lines. Sidqi was neither pro- nor anti-Kurd; he was an Arabized Kurd who aimed to create an Iraq along the lines of Ataturk’s model. His personal ambition motivated his involvement in politics and served as the basis for his activities. He should be labeled as an Iraqi nationalist rather than a Kurdish nationalist. Stopping in Mosul on his way to Turkey in August 1937, Sidqi was assassinated on orders of the Arab nationalists. His assassination paved the way for the nationalists to strengthen their grip on power and debunk the Iraq-first policies advocated by the Suleiman-Sidqi government. 25 The assassination further weakened the fragile relationships between Iraq’s competing communities. Even more devastating, the army became the central

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actor in a tangled political process that set left against right and Arab nationalists against Iraqi patriots. The Arab nationalist officers forced Suleiman to resign, and a new era commenced, one in which civilian politicians held office only with the approval of a group of officers known as the Circle of Seven or the Golden Square.26 It was clear that the precondition for any civilian to become a member of parliament was his/her attitude toward Arab nationalism. On April 4, 1939, King Ghazi died in a car accident under mysterious circumstances. Abd al-Illah (1913–1958), Ghazi’s cousin, was appointed as regent because Faisal II, Ghazi’s son, was an infant. In contrast to King Ghazi, Abd al-Illah was closer to British rather than Arab nationalists. This strengthened the monarchy’s relationship with a pro-British ruling elite led by Nuri al-Sa‘id. 27 The pro-British approach of the government during World War II conflicted with the Arab nationalists’ anti-British agenda. Consequently the two sides clashed when Arab nationalist officers marched their troops into Baghdad and installed Rashid ‘Ali al-Gaylani,28 an Arab nationalist who was strongly influenced by the mufti of Jerusalem, as Iraq’s prime minister on April 1, 1941. The moderate pro-British Iraq-centric politicians, including al-Sa‘id, Jamil al-Madfa‘i, and Ali Jawdat, fled Baghdad and joined the regent in Basra. Although initially favoring the panArab cause, this group later shifted its position, believing that the stability of Iraq depended on the British. Contrary to Sidqi’s, al-Gaylani’s coup was directed against the monarchy as an institution as well as against the government. The Kurds reacted negatively to al-Gaylani’s coup. Salih al-Haidari reports that “[d]espite their animosity to the British, the Kurdish students in Baghdad did not wish al-Gaylani’s movement to succeed because their leaders were explicitly expressing their anti-Kurdish feelings.”29 Despite the Sunni leadership, Shiite religious leaders supported the coup because alGaylani’s movement was anti-British, as were the Shiites. This was evident from the religious decrees issued by the Shiite mujtahids in which alGaylani’s government was described as an Islamic government. They thought the coup should be supported because it represented a victory of religion.30 In general, the Shiite religious leadership supported any antiBritish movement because the British colonial rulers were seen as the common enemy—the other. Despite that support, when the British reinvaded Iraq to remove al-Gaylani, neither the Shiites nor the Kurds responded to the government’s rallying cry. 31 On the contrary, the al-Muthanna Club (formed mostly of Sunni Arab nationalists), which had been involved in preparing the coup, supported al-Gaylani’s government.32 Al-Gaylani’s coup and his removal by the British strengthened the relationship between al-Sa‘id’s moderate Iraq-centric group and the British. AlSa‘id was the most influential politician until he was forced from office during the 1958 fall of the monarchy. His execution of Arab nationalist

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officers, including three of the Golden Square, and acts forcing others into retirement and/or exile did not leave him much support from the Arab nationalists. Among those exiled was Sati‘ al-Husri, a high ranking Sunni politician who was fired, deprived of citizenship, and exiled from Iraq.33 The removal of so many Sunnis from high office and from the army created a vacuum that would be filled, to an extent, by the Shiites and the Kurds.34 Some Sunnis went into the opposition, especially the Arab nationalists. These developments triggered mounting concern within the army, which still remained a bastion of Sunni dominance. But the removal of Arab nationalists from power in 1941 had the effect of ending the cycle of military coups. The victory of the Allies over the Axis powers in 1945, the removal of Arab nationalist officers from the political scene, the suppression of the Kurdish revolt in 1945, and a reasonable peace in the south of the country all contributed to political openness and the spread of democratic values. As a result, the Iraqis began to participate in politics through newly formed political parties and organizations, and a new chapter in Iraqi politics began. The main feature of this new public engagement was the proliferation of overt and covert political parties and organizations. The resulting political openness was not the only factor in the establishment of political parties, for new concepts such as patriotism, socialism, and social justice helped people to identify more with Iraq. All these factors, along with the modernization process, led to the emergence of the process of national integration and the development of a sense of Iraqi identity.

The Process of National Integration Immigration from the rural areas to the urban centers was one of the most important factors that changed the social fabric of Iraq’s traditional society. The migration was the outcome of modernization and industrialization processes. In the late 1920s and early 1930s, waves of internal migrants moved from rural and semi-rural areas of Iraq toward the major urban centers (see Table 4.1 and Figure 4.1).35 One of the main reasons for the migration was the Land Tenure Law, which had been introduced in 1932. Traditionally, agricultural lands were the property of tribesmen. However, the new system allowed the tribal leaders to register these lands in their own names and this, in turn, reduced the tribesmen’s status to that of tenants. The new status brought economic hardship because peasants received less than their expected one-third of the produce.36 These conditions caused growing discontent that hastened en masse migration to the urban centers. At the same time oil was becoming more important as a national export. Iraq’s urban and industrial sector developed so rapidly that it was able to accommodate some of the migrants. Baghdad

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Table 4.1 Growth of the Urban Population in Iraq Iraq Population in millions 1867 1947 1957 1965 1977 1987

1.25 4.8 6.3 8.0 12.0 16.3

Urban Iraq in millions 0.3 1.7 2.5 4.1 7.6 11.0

Rural Iraq

%

in millions

%

24.0 35.4 39.7 51.2 63.5 67.5

0.95 3.1 3.8 3.9 4.3 5.3

76.0 64.6 60.3 48.2 36.5 32.5

Kurdish Regiona % urban

% rural

— — 33.5 43.2 54.1 71.6

— — 66.5 56.8 45.9 28.4

Source: Derived from Farouk-Sluglett and Sluglett, Iraq Since 1958, p. 246; Batatu, The Old Social Classes, p. 1125; al-Wardi, A Study of the Social Characters, p. 119; Muhammad, The Kurdish Issue, p. 195. Note: a. The Kurdish region in this table is defined as areas where the Kurds are a majority (Salih, “Independence Still a Kurdish Priority,” p. 195).

grew and expanded, becoming the center of power as most developments in the infrastructure took place in the city and its surrounding areas. The population of Baghdad quadrupled from 200,000 in 1922 to nearly 800,000 in 1957.37 This led to an increase in the Shiite population in Baghdad. Earlier in the century, the Shiites constituted only 20 percent of the city’s population, but by 1958 this figure had risen to more than 50 percent.38 Mass education also played a critical role in the process of national integration. Primary school enrollment in Iraq rose from 8,001 in 1920– Figure 4.1 Urban Population Growth in Baghdad, Mosul, and Basra

Source: Derived from data in Batatu, The Old Social Classes and Revolutionary Movements of Iraq, p. 35

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1921 to 89,482 in 1939–1940. During the same time, secondary enrollment rose from 110 to 13,595. The number of state college students increased from 99 in 1921–1922 to 1,218 in 1940–1941, and then to 8,568 in 1958– 1959.39 The rise in the number of college students was correlated to the rise in the number of higher education institutions, a process that accelerated after 1945. These educational advances followed the opening of the colleges of law in 1921, education in 1923, medicine in 1927, and engineering in 1952. Nine more colleges were founded during the 1940s and 1950s. Some of these were later consolidated to form Baghdad University.40 At these colleges, young Shiite, Sunni, and Kurdish students studied side by side. Reforms in the education system also improved integration of the Shiites with other segments of society. In 1927, al-Husri was replaced by Muhammad Fadhil al-Jamali, a Shiite, as head of the director general of education. Though al-Jamali shared many of al-Husri’s pan-Arab views, he advocated for decentralization and ensured that resources were evenly distributed among the provinces. Consequently, beginning in 1933, education facilities expanded in the southern areas of Iraq. The key reform of that period was the decentralization of power by the establishment of provincial directorates of education, which had authority to introduce reforms that catered to local needs. This encouraged more Shiite parents to send their children to school and increased the number of educated young Shiites.41 Modernist theorists of nation and nationalism suggest that industrialization and modernization erode the traditional agrarian ways of living and uproot inhabitants both culturally and geographically.42 They emphasize the importance of mass education and the print media, because both literacy and language aid the unification process. In examining the emergence of Iraqi patriotism, these theoretical approaches are particularly relevant. In the 1940s and 1950s, mass education and other modernization policies gave rise to a newly educated middle class. The ensuing changes weakened the traditional social fabric along with its religious and tribal identities. The growth and expansion of the middle class laid the foundation for the absorption of modern political concepts and ways of thinking.43 As a result, concepts such as nationalism, citizenship, imperialism, sovereignty, equality, freedom, social justice, and class struggle became topics of interest. Although these changes strengthened pan-Arab and Kurdish nationalisms, they also laid the foundation for the emergence of a third movement: Iraqi patriotism. The formation of the Iraqi state led to the establishment of various governments and public institutions that, in turn, reinforced the notion of Iraqiness. The number of public servants increased from 9,740 in 1938 to 20,031 in 1958. Also, the number of people serving in the police force increased from 2,470 in 1920 to 23,383 in 1958. 44 The appointment of

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teachers, engineers, health workers, civil servants, and other professionals served to reinforce bonds of loyalty that formed the basis of a more modern sense of Iraqiness. Until the creation of the new state, there was no institution, apart from tribe and religion, to which the people in the country could have any notion of allegiance. This new nationalism found expression in the slogan “Iraq for the Iraqis,” which had been used during the Sidqi-Suleiman government of 1936–1937. Iraqi patriotism was the outcome of the formation of a state corresponding to the same name. Any claim in regard to the existence of the notion of Iraqiness prior to the establishment of Iraq as a state is unsupported. The main nationalist currents of the 1930s through the 1950s were Iraqi patriotism (wataniya), pan-Arabism, and Kurdish nationalism. In Iraq, patriotism was generally relegated to a local territorial nationalist movement that sought full independence from foreign influence. To a certain extent it embraced diversity and acknowledged the pluralism inherent in Iraqi society. Pan-Arabism or Arab nationalism (qawmiya) was a doctrine that posited the existence of a single Arab nation and demanded the establishment of a single Arab state. It emphasized a common language (Arabic), a shared history (Arab-Islamic), and a culture intermingled with modern elements of German nationalism.45 Kurdish nationalism (kurdayati) entailed the quest for Kurdish national, political, and cultural rights in different forms. It sought an independent state (or a federal or autonomous region) that encompassed the region in which most Kurds lived.46 As these various forms of nationalisms gained momentum, they competed bitterly to define the meaning of Iraqi identity. On July 2, 1922, the first law formalizing the granting of licenses for establishing political associations was promulgated. As a result, a few political parties were formed and officially recognized. Until the mid-1940s, most of these organizations did not have a broad public base. In essence, they were groups comprised of influential individuals and/or parliamentary factions, and the strength of each group depended more on the character of the leader than on any particular ideology. Outside the ruling class two main currents of thought grew in importance in the 1930s. The first was inspired by the rising dictatorships in Europe, and the followers of this current convened the al-Muthanna Club. The second current was inspired by socialist and democratic schools of thought, and this gave rise to the al-Ahali group. The former attracted Arab nationalists, while the latter attracted Iraq-centric activists. After the failure of al-Gaylani’s coup in 1941, the new government banned the al-Muthanna Club and persecuted its members. However, al-Ahali continued to be active until 1946 when the government again permitted political organizations to meet. After the easing of restrictions in 1946, several new parties were licensed. Among them were al-Hizb al-Watani al-Democrati (National Democratic Party, NDP), Istiqlal (Independence Party), Hizb al-Itihad al-

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Watani (Patriotic Union Party), Hizb al-Sha‘b (People Party), and Hizb alAhrar (Liberal Party). Only the first two survived until a ban was reimposed in 1954.47 In the ruling inner circle, a conservative clique dominated the government from 1954 to 1958.48 This clique was a moderate Iraq-centric group that supported the 1930 treaty while favoring continuing ties with Britain. The conservatives relied heavily on the support of tribal leaders and landowners.49

Iraqi Patriotism A form of patriotism emerged in reaction to the political realities after the creation of Iraq. Initially Arabism was the dominant current, both inside and outside government circles. Most ex-Ottoman officers and civil servants who made up the ruling elite were followers and preachers of pan-Arabism. As the creation of Iraq and other Arab countries in the region by colonial powers became a reality, many groups within Iraq accepted the new circumstances and became Iraq-oriented. This sentiment was not limited to the ruling class. In mid-1935, it spread with the formation of the al-Ahali Association and the Iraqi Communist Party, which declared its loyalty to Iraq. Its sense of nationalism was much more inclusive of non-Arab national and ethnic groups than the Arab nationalists. The Kurds were seen as partners in Iraq, and their distinct language and culture were acknowledged. By the 1940s, Iraq’s diverse ethnic and sectarian groups were discovering issues that they had in common, including their anti-imperialist sentiments. This newfound agreement hastened the spread of ideas and shared concepts. The Iraqi Communist Party (ICP) and the NDP were the major advocates of patriotism.

National Democratic Party Of the licensed political organizations, the NDP was probably the most influential. The historical roots of the party go back to the al-Ahali Association. Of the eight founding members of the NDP, only three were not former members of the al-Ahali Association. It inherited the name from the al-Ahali newspaper that the group had launched. Al-Ahali was formed in 1932 by a few young educated men seeking reform and social justice in Iraq.50 They believed that patriotism should not be limited to a call for independence but should also include social reforms within the institutions of society. The NDP’s founding committee consisted of Shiite and Sunni politicians, including Kamil al-Chadirchi,51 a Sunni who led the party for most of its existence, together with two other Sunni members, Muhammad Hadid and Hussein Jamil.

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Like the al-Ahali, the NDP advocated social democracy, which it asserted should be achieved by peaceful means. The party’s program and political activities focused on political freedom, equity, and social reform. Article 1 of the NDP’s constitution stated its aims as “the fulfillment of Iraq’s independence,” which entailed the “replacement of the 1930 British-Iraqi treaty.”52 The unification of all Arab countries was also identified as one of their objectives, which was to be achieved through strengthening the Arab League. 53 Nevertheless, the topic of Iraqi unity occupied much of the NDP’s formal program. Party literature claimed that it did not differentiate or discriminate among Iraqis but considered all Iraqis, regardless of racial, religious, or sectarian background, to be equal in terms of their rights and responsibilities. Iraq was seen as a common platform for free cooperation based on the common interests of Arabs, Kurds, and other groups. Although the NDP’s leadership was based in Baghdad, in the 1947 elections, three of the four seats won by the NDP were in the Shiite-dominated city of Basra. In the 1948 elections, the NDP won one seat in Baghdad and another in Mosul.54 The NDP won six seats from across the country in the 1954 elections. 55 This indicates that the party’s support was widespread, excluding the Kurdish region where the party had few sympathizers. The party’s stance on the Kurdish question led to mutual convergence between the NDP and key Kurdish political figures in Baghdad. 56 A key Sunni member of the party from Mosul, Muhammad Hadid, put forth great effort to establish a power base in the Sunni-dominated al-Anbar and Ninawa provinces but achieved only limited success.57 The NDP’s leadership was a mixture of Sunnis and Shiites, but early in its development four key founding members left the party.58 It was suspected that they left because the Sunni members attempted to exclude the Shiites from key posts.59 However, because it accorded high priority to issues of social justice and due to its Iraq-centric orientation, the NDP was favored more by the Shiites than by the Sunnis. The NDP was an open and public organization until 1954 when it was banned. But even then it continued its activities underground.

Iraqi Communist Party (ICP) In the late 1920s only a few Iraqis were familiar with socialist and communist ideas and concepts. The spread of these ideas led to the formation of a loosely organized committee known as the Association Against Imperialism, which was formed from a few left-oriented cells. Its manifesto called upon Iraqis from all sects and groups to unite against imperialism as well as Iraq’s ruling class. The association never solidified into a formalized body.60 The ICP was formed in mid-1935 following meetings

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between several left-oriented cliques and individuals. It soon established itself as a major player and remained an influential force for decades to come. Of the patriotic groups, the covert ICP was certainly the largest. It adopted a nonethnic, nonsectarian platform, providing membership to all, including marginalized communities such as the Kurds, Shiites, and Christians who sought independence as well as socioeconomic and political reform in Iraq. Its first publication, Kifah al-Sha‘b (The Struggle of the People), defined its aims as “the expulsion of the imperialists,” the redistribution of land, and liberation of the people from subjugation.61 In 1938, Yousif Suleiman Yousif (known as Fahd), a young Iraqi Christian, became the unchallenged leader of the ICP, remaining in office until his execution in 1949. The ICP was the only party that transcended both sectarian and ethnic divisions. In comparison to other parties, the ICP was far less concerned with pan-Arab–related issues but was considered a leading proponent of patriotism. This group coexisted with another strand of Arab nationalism that called for loyalty to Uruba (Arabism) and an Arab homeland.

Arab Nationalism Arab nationalism is the oldest political movement in Iraq. The new thrust of Arab nationalism came mainly from ex-Ottoman officers of the al-‘Ahd Association that fostered pan-Arabism in the ranks of the army. In the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, Arab nationalist leaders aspired to liberate Arabs living only in the eastern parts of the Arab world that was under the control of the Ottoman Empire. However, the new version that emerged after World War I called for the liberation and unification of all Arab countries from the Gulf to the Atlantic Ocean. The theoretical basis of this latter version can be traced to Sati‘ al-Husri and Michel Aflaq.62 The former laid down the foundations, while the latter formulated a brand of fanatical nationalism. The initial success by Germany in the early stages of the war encouraged the spread of pro-fascist ideas among Arab nationalists. 63 Arab nationalist sentiments gained momentum in October 1939 when the mufti of al-Quds, Hajj Amin al-Hussein, arrived in Baghdad to keep the Palestinian cause alive. The partition of Palestine in 1948, the success of Jamal Abdul Nasser’s 1952 coup in Egypt, as well as his Voice of the Arabs (Sawt al-Arab)64 radio station, all played a critical role in strengthening the Arab nationalist cause in Iraq. The radio station had a galvanizing effect on Arabs because it strived to end colonial rule and topple decaying monarchies. The two major players in the Arab nationalist movement were the Istiqlal Party and the Arab Baath Socialist Party.

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Istiqlal Party The second major party within the Arab nationalist camp in the 1940s and 1950s was the Istiqlal Party, an outgrowth of the al-Muthanna Club, 65 which had been formed in reaction to the formation of the al-Ahali Association. Its primary objective was to “revive the spirit of [Arab] nationalism among the people and awaken the feeling of Arabism in their psyche.”66 The founders of the party consisted primarily of Sunni Arab nationalists who had participated in the al-Gaylani coup. 67 Most were young educated lawyers who graduated when al-Husri was the dean of the College of Law. Istiqlal was a traditional reformist party that combined Arabism with Islam. It strongly espoused pan-Arabism and took a stand against the development of a separate Iraqi identity.68 Liwa al-Istiqlal, the organ of Istiqlal, described Iraq as “our small homeland” and the Arab state as “the greater homeland.”69 The party considered the unity of blood, homeland, language, history, and culture as the core components of a nation. It dedicated a large section of its program to the party’s national (pan-Arab) education policy. Locally, the party called for full independence for Iraq and the replacement of the 1930 treaty. The party’s stance with respect to minority groups living within the Arab world was initially exclusionist: minorities were considered obstacles to Arab unity as envisioned by its founder. 70 The Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) accused Istiqlal of aiming to establish an “Arab empire” to subjugate other nationalities in the Middle East. 71 In its 1958 policy statement, Istiqlal modified its stance on Kurdish rights and added, “[W]hile the Party is proud of its qawmiya (nationality), it respects other nationalities and considers the Kurds and the Arabs partners in this homeland.”72 In the 1947 elections, Istiqlal won four seats; in the 1954 elections, it garnered three seats, all in the Sunni-dominated areas of Baghdad, Mosul, and Samarra. 73 The party never appealed to the Kurds and had insignificant appeal for the Shiites. 7 4 It drew its support mainly from the Sunni areas of alAdhamiya,75 Samarra, Mosul, and al-Rumadi.76 In the late 1950s, Istiqlal lost most of its support to a new clandestine organization, the Arab Baath Socialist Party (the Baath). The radical and revolutionary approaches of the Baath attracted a large number of Istiqlal supporters.77 In a sense, the Baath was the heir to the Istiqlal Party.

Arab Baath Socialist Party Baath ideas were transported to Iraq from Syria in 1948 through Syrian students then studying in Iraq.78 The party had been founded in Syria, and its

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first cells in Iraq were formed by Fayaz Isma‘il and Abdul Rahman alDhamin, both Sunnis. Soon after, an Iraqi Shiite, Fuad al-Rikabi, rose to the helm of the party,79 who apparently had been influenced by Arab nationalist ideologies that colored the school curriculum in the mid-1920s and thereafter. The Baath started in al-Adhamiya, its first adherents being mainly university and high school students.80 Many leading Shiite Baathists were also residents of al-Adhamiya, including Hazim Jawad and Hani al-Fkaiki.81 In its early stages it was a nonsectarian party that appealed to both Shiites and Sunnis but not to Kurds. However, as time passed, the Sunni members outnumbered the Shiites, though Shiite leadership and influence remained strong until the early 1960s (see Chapter 5). According to the Baath constitution, Arabs ought to live in one state. Unification was seen as a moral necessity and historically inevitable. This was reflected in the chief slogan of the Baath, “One Arab nation with an eternal mission,” which asserted the primacy of Arab ethnic identity and Islamic message. The Baath constitution stated that “the Arab homeland is for Arabs.” It defined the homeland as the land that extended from “the Torus Mountains and those of Bishtekwih [Bakhtiari Mountain], Basra Gulf, the Arab Sea to Ethiopia Mountains, Greater Sahara, Atlantic Ocean, and Mediterranean.” The flag of the 1916 Arab Revolution was suggested as the flag of the proposed Arab state. The movement asserted that whoever “speaks Arabic and lives on Arab territory” is considered an Arab.82 It is clear that the land regarded by the Kurds as their homeland (Kurdistan) was also claimed by the Baath as part of the Arab homeland. And since the Kurds already inhabited these territories, they were considered to be Arabs! This is the genesis of the clash of identities between the Kurdish and Arab nationalisms in Iraq—a clash of territorial identity. The Baath theory of nationhood is linked to ethnic values such as the oneness of language, shared history, common memory, and the identity of present experience. There is almost nothing in early Baath literature about the Kurds and their rights. Hani al-Fkaiki, an early Baathist leader in Iraq, said that he could not recall reading anything about the Kurds, with the exception of a short speech by Aflaq in 1955, wherein he suggested that imperialism was behind the ethnic demands of Kurds, Assyrians, and Berbers.83 As a warning to other ethnic groups, the Baath constitution declared that minorities “shall be evicted” from the Arab homeland if any of them “called for or joined a racist [ethnic] block against the Arabs.”84 Contrary to the Istiqlal Party, the Baath believed in the army’s right to intervene in politics.85 Though both the Baath and the ICP established clandestine cells within the army, some officers initiated a covert organization known as the Free Officers modeled on the Egyptian group that later played a decisive role in overthrowing the monarchy.

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The Free Officers The Iraqi army was one of the first state institutions established before the creation of the state of Iraq, in January 1921. Since then military officers have played a major role in the affairs of the state. The army’s first direct intervention in governmental affairs was in 1936. Following the assassination of Sidqi, the officers known as the Golden Square began indirectly ruling the country until 1941 when they intervened to remove the civilian administration. After the failure of al-Gaylani’s coup, the regime became associated with the British, and the army officers distanced themselves from it. However, the success of Nasser in Egypt encouraged the officers to become involved in politics again. As a result, a new cell of the movement was formed in 1952.86 The tripartite attack on Egypt by Britain, France, and Israel in October 1956 stirred the movement to action, and in December of the same year the first committee was assembled at an officer’s house in Baghdad. The officers looked to Nasser and Egypt as exemplars of what could be achieved. Their oath of membership stated the aims of the movement as “liberating [Iraq] from the imperialists and their henchmen.”87 Some of the Free Officers were also influenced by the liberal democratic programs of the NDP, others by the leftist agendas of the ICP. However, a large number were attracted to the Arab nationalist cause, most being Sunni. Formed in 1956, the central committee of the Free Officers consisted of fifteen members: thirteen were Sunni, two were Shiite, and no Kurds. 88 Kurdish presence among the senior ranks of the army dwindled after the 1943–1945 Barzan rebellion (see below). The departure of many Kurdish officers to support the Kurdistan Republic in Iranian Kurdistan in 1945 also decreased the number. The domination of Arab nationalists was reflected in the Free Officers’ agenda. Of the eight points in their agenda, four were concerned with pan-Arab issues.89 Many commentators and scholars of Iraqi history focus only on two movements: Iraqi patriotism and Arab nationalism.90 Some marginalize the Kurdish current and only discuss it as part of the Iraqi patriotism movement.91 In fact, Kurdish nationalism is often dismissed as a minor player on Iraq’s political stage altogether, notwithstanding the significant contribution of the Kurdish nationalist movement in shaping Iraq’s identity.

Kurdish Nationalism The Kurdish nationalist movement was active in Kurdistan well before the creation of the Iraqi state. It was manifested in various revolts and rebellions that were led mostly by tribal and religious figures. However, the first Kurdish national organization, the Hiwa (Hope) Party, was established in 1939; its founders and members were mainly urban-educated professionals

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and army officers.92 Long before the formation of the Free Officers by the Arab Iraqis, the Kurdish officers in the Iraqi army formed the Freedom Committee to serve the Kurdish cause.93 The Hiwa played a vital role in what is known as the Barzan revolt of 1943–1945. Mustafa Barzani,94 a legendary Kurdish leader who was in Suleimaniya as a consequence of his failed revolt in the early 1930s,95 was able to escape with the help of the Hiwa. He soon returned to his tribal area where he instigated another revolt. At the time the British, who reoccupied Iraq in 1941, were largely in charge of Iraq’s affairs. In Barzani’s first communiqué to the Kurdish and Iraqi people, he stated that “our struggle is against imperialism and its agents.”96 When the government felt that Barzani was attracting Kurdish nationalists, it commenced negotiations. But because neither would compromise, each resorted to arms. The Kurds initially won battles, but by the end of 1945, the Iraqi army was able to defeat the revolt. Barzani and the Kurdish officers fled across the border into Iran.97 The slogan of the Hiwa was “unity and independence for Kurdistan.” The objective of the Hiwa and Barzani was the creation of an all-Kurdish region comprised of the predominantly Kurdish provinces of Erbil, Kirkuk, and Suleimaniya, and the Kurdish districts of Ninawa and Diyala provinces.98 They also demanded the recognition of Kurdish as the official language of the proposed region.99 The failure of the revolt and the subsequent dissolution of the Hiwa Party paved the way for the emergence of two more urban and radical Kurdish nationalist groups: the Iraqi Kurdistan Communist Party (Shorish) and Rizgari Kurd (Kurdish Liberation). Both organizations combined leftist ideas with Kurdish national ambitions. Unlike the Hiwa, which never produced a formal program, Rizgari Kurd had over 6,000 members and sought a free and unified Kurdistan. Rizgari Kurd linked the attainment of Kurdish self-determination with the destruction of imperialism.100 On the recommendation of Barzani (who was in Iran at the time) and following negotiations between the existing Kurdish organizations in Iraqi Kurdistan, the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) was formed.101 The aims of the new organization were a combination of pan-Kurdish ambitions and Kurdish rights within Iraq.102 The party called for an independent Iraq liberated from imperialism and an Iraq based on voluntary unification between the Kurds and Arabs.103 In 1953, at the KDP’s third conference, it adopted some significant changes in its program and objectives. It worked to establish professional and youth organizations that would be separate from other Iraqi unions and syndicates. Eventually the KDP established its student, youth, and women’s associations, followed by others. The purposes of these associations were to highlight the KDP and the Kurdish people’s separate identity and to differentiate it from other Iraqi civil society organizations. The party adopted some Marxist-Leninist ideas, as leftist ideas dominated the Iraqi political arena, which served to strategically challenge the growth

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of the ICP in Kurdistan. A more moderate slogan was also adopted: “democracy for Iraq and autonomy for Kurdistan.” But anti-imperialism remained high on the agenda and covered the front page of the Rizgari newspaper, the official KDP organ.104 For the first time the KDP considered making the Kurdish national liberation movement part of the Iraqi national liberation movement while acknowledging that the Iraqi Kurds were part of the greater Kurdish nation. The KDP blamed British imperialism for dividing Kurdistan and believed that the best way to achieve its goals was to struggle alongside the Arabs against imperialism and reactionary forces.105 It is worth noting that, at first, the emergence of Kurdish nationalist political organizations did not eliminate the control of tribal leaders from the movement. Despite migration from rural to urban centers, the tribal structure and mentality of Kurdish society remained intact. Moreover, Kurdish intellectuals traditionally relied on tribal leaders to achieve their goals because armed struggle was the customary way of redressing grievances. Second, the Kurdish national movement asserted its distinct ethnic roots and resisted assimilation into the Iraqi national movement. Its affiliation with the Iraqis was based on their recognition of Kurdish identity. Third, the stress on territorial identity was the core value for the movement, regardless of whether the organization pursued secession or sought Kurdish rights within Iraq’s borders.

Embedded Ideologies Along Ethnic and Sectarian Lines In the mid-1940s, Iraq’s political parties and their respective ideologies became more influential in shaping national affairs. However, one notable feature of prevailing ideological currents was that they were embedded along ethnic and sectarian lines. As could be expected, Kurdish nationalism was supported only by the Kurds. This is understandable given the fact that the movement had not much to offer to others. A small number of Christians and Turkmen occasionally joined the Kurdish national movement, but Kurdish nationalism had not yet developed to the point of encompassing all ethnic and religious groups of Kurdistan. Even so, not all Kurds joined the Kurdish national movement. A large number of Kurds joined the ICP, which represented the patriotic movement. Arab nationalism was represented by the Istiqlal and Baath parties as well as by the Free Officers. The Istiqlal was an almost exclusive Sunni organization, though it was headed by a Shiite, Muhammad Mahdi Kuba. The Sunnis dominated its leadership, and its grassroots following were mainly from the Sunni areas of Iraq. The Baath was initially nonsectarian; its leadership consisted of Shiites and Sunnis, but its grassroots consisted mainly of Sunnis. In 1955, the Baath had nearly 289 members, but only eighty-two of them were from the Shiite provinces. Sixty-nine members

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were from Nasiriya, the city of Fuad al-Rikabi. 106 The influence of alRikabi, rather than ideological appeal, seems to have been the reason for the spread of the Baath in Nasiriya. The strongholds of the Baath were the Sunni areas, the same that supported Istiqlal.107 The Baath recruited many officers from the army, because the officer corps was dominated by the Sunnis who traditionally supported Arab nationalism.108 Patriotism (Iraqi nationalism) was represented mainly by the ICP and the NDP. Patriotism was more inclusive, and many of its objectives traversed ethnic and sectarian lines. Although the NDP was part of the patriotic movement, its leadership consisted mostly of Sunnis. It had grassroots support among the Shiites but attracted only a few Kurds. Nevertheless, the ICP was by far the most inclusive political party in Iraq’s history. Although it was founded by an Iraqi Christian, Kurds and Shiites constituted the bulk of both its membership and its leaders.109 Al-Kadhimiya, a Shiite quarter, was known as the “red quarter” because of its strong support for the Communist movement. According to the Communists, people from the Kurdish region and the Shiite areas were enthusiastic to support and join the ICP.110 Communist ideas and patriotism, however, had little attraction for the Sunnis. ICP political views were influenced by the ethnic and sectarian affiliations of its leaders. When the Shiites and Kurds held the leadership, the party’s agenda was more Iraq-centric while exhibiting some understanding for Kurdish national aspirations. From its inception until 1949, the Shiites dominated the leadership of the ICP, and this was reflected in its strongly Iraq-centric programs and activities. In the late 1940s, large numbers of the ICP leadership (mostly Shiites) were arrested, imprisoned, and executed by the authorities. The party was resuscitated by the Kurds when Baha al-Din Nuri (known as Basim), a Kurd, assumed the leadership. In 1953, in a document known as Basim’s Charter, he criticized Fahd’s Charter of 1945, in which Yousif had described the Kurds as “a minority group” 111 on several grounds, including the Kurdish issue. 112 However, Basim’s Charter recognized the right of self-determination for the Kurds as well as the right to secede.113 In fact, the ICP supported the Kurdish right to self-determination for the first time in 1935. Kifah al-Sha‘b, the organ of the ICP, raised the slogan of “self-rule” for Kurds, including the right of secession. However, no practical measures were taken by the ICP until 1945 when the party revoked its original stance.114 This situation was reversed in 1956 when ‘Amer Abdullah,115 an influential Sunni politician from ‘Ana, became the party’s leader. By that time the ICP’s activities and rhetoric began to emphasize pan-Arab issues, including such matters as the unity of Arabs and the Palestine issue. The close association of the Soviet Union, Arab Communists, and nationalists in their opposition to the 1955 Baghdad Pact, an agreement between Turkey, Iraq, Great Britain, Pakistan, and Iran, was also a contributing factor to the Arabization of ICP rhetoric.

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The domination of pan-Arab sentiments on the streets of the Arab world also directed the ICP toward pan-Arabism. The slogan, “For a National Arab Policy,” was adopted by the ICP, which identified itself with “the battle of Arabdom.”116 However, when the Banner of the Workers, a leftist faction led by Kurdish Salih al-Haidari, joined the ICP, the party adopted a more balanced approach. It asserted that only “the territory inhabited by the Arab people in Iraq constituted an indivisible part of the Arab homeland” and that “the Iraqi Kurds were part of the Kurdish nation.”117 The ICP was the only significant party to express serious support (albeit short-lived) for the Kurdish right of self-determination. Perhaps this was the main reason that many Kurds joined the ICP or participated in the patriotic movement. The domination of leftist ideology in the 1940s and 1950s was another factor, for many Kurds saw Communism as a path to freedom from ethnic and class persecution. However, despite agreement on some issues, the Kurdish nationalists and Communists still clashed, especially with the establishment of the KDP in the mid-1940s. At times the Iraqi Communists questioned the existence of the Kurdish nation. Based on Stalin’s definition of nation that emphasized “a common economic life,”118 the Iraqi Communists generally felt that the Kurds did not constitute a nation. In their memoirs, both Iraqi president Jalal Talabani119 and Karim Ahmed,120 the general secretary of the ICP in 1953, recalled similar incidents that captured the nature of the ongoing debate between the Communists and the Kurdish nationalists at the time.121 Ahmed, who was Talabani’s school teacher, says in 1949 that he met with Talabani, who was only twelve years old at the time. Talabani asked him whether the Kurds were a nation. In reply, Ahmed asked, “Why?” Talabani replied, “[T]he communists say that the Kurds have not yet fulfilled all the conditions of a nation, but we (Kurdish nationalists) say the Kurds are a nation.” Ahmed’s response was that the Kurds were not a political entity, and that an entity was the primary requirement for fulfilling the conditions of nationhood. Ahmed’s perspective was rooted in a statist approach that conflates nation with state or nationality with citizenship. Besides, the KDP’s insistence on having its own student, youth, and women’s groups and its own professional associations and unions, as well as its call to abandon the ICP’s Kurdistan branch all led to continuous conflicts. 122 Within the ICP membership, even some Kurds questioned whether Stalin’s definition of nation applied to the Kurds. Al-Haidari, a Kurd and a member of the ICP, recalls debates in ICP circles wherein some Kurdish Communists expropriated Kurdish nationalist poetry and reformulated it to apply to Iraq instead of Kurdistan. An example of this is the famous poem by Kurdish Ahmedi Hardi, where the line, “we are the Kurdish liberators,” was changed to “we are the people’s liberators.”123 In the debate between Communists and Kurdish nationalists, the aim of the Kurdish

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nationalists was to highlight their distinct national identity, while the Communists aimed to create an overarching Iraqi identity. According to a survey by the ICP, the number of copies of al-Qaeda (an ICP organ) that were distributed in 1947–1948 in the Kurdish provinces represented 20.7 percent of the total distribution across Iraq. Thirty-one percent were distributed in the Shiite provinces, while Baghdad had the lion’s share with 46 percent. However, the numbers of distributed copies in alKadhimiya were far larger than the copies distributed in al-Adhamiya. In the other Sunni provinces such as Ninawa, the figure of 4.7 percent seems quite low when one remembers that the Kurdish province of Dohuk was part of Ninawa province at the time.124 The same pattern for the distribution of al-Qaeda occurred in 1952.125 In al-Rumadi, Samarra, and Tikrit (predominantly Sunni cities), the ICP papers were not distributed, and the party had few members. ‘Ana, a Sunni city, produced several leading Communist figures including ‘Amer Abdullah, but the city never had Communist followers.126 The ICP was the only party in which grassroots membership transcended ethnic and religious lines. Even here, however, its main support came from the Kurds and the Shiites. Batatu argued that this was a reflection of the class status of the Kurds and the Shiites. However, it should be kept in mind that it was the Iraq-centric orientation of the ICP that motivated the Shiites to embrace it in the first place. The Shiites were weary of the demands for Arab unification because their numerical majority would have been jeopardized if the proposed Arab unification materialized. The Kurds accepted the concept of Communism in the 1950s and 1960s for several reasons. First, the failure of the Kurdistan Republic in Iranian Kurdistan meant that the Kurds had to work within the framework of Iraq. Second, many Kurdish intellectuals were inspired by Communist and internationalist ideas that portrayed Communism as a way to salvation for both the national and class struggles. Despite the contending nature of the existing movements that reflected Iraq’s ethnic and sectarian groups, anti-imperialism facilitated close cooperation between them. It is in this context that one can understand why some Kurds joined the patriotic movement (the ICP) and why many Shiites were at times involved in Arab nationalist causes. Despite this, the Arabness of the Shiites and consequently their affiliation with certain pan-Arab causes, though limited, could not be totally ruled out. The class status of the Kurds and the Shiites was also a factor in the Kurds’ embrace of Communism. Besides, the fact that the Communists never held power and were always in opposition in Iraq contributed to bringing the Kurds closer to the ICP. Nonetheless, the ICP’s support for the right of self-determination for the Kurds was the most critical factor that ensured the support of the Kurds. Generally speaking, for the Kurds the lines of loyalty blurred as they embraced both Kurdish nationalism and Iraqi patriotism (represented by the

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ICP). They saw both venues as a means to achieve their national ambitions. However, venues for Sunni loyalty were much clearer as they overwhelmingly embraced Arab nationalism. Despite the overwhelming support of the Shiites for the patriotic movement, many of them adopted pan-Arabism as well, a fact that was especially noticeable in the leadership of the Baath Party. In fact, Shiite leaders constituted a reasonable number of the Baath leadership in the 1950s as most of them were residents of Baghdad.127 The urban Shiites in most cases were more politicized than their counterparts from the countryside. This may help to explain why the rural Shiites found it relatively easier to identify with political parties whose platforms didn’t directly correspond to their entrenched group affiliations after they migrated from their original homelands to the urban centers. It was a move that weakened their religious and tribal traditional values. Some Shiites also embraced the ICP and identified with the party’s call for social justice and equality. These were issues to which they could easily relate because traditionally they belonged to the most disadvantaged sector of society. In addition, the Shiite attraction to Communism reflected their search for an opportunity to participate in national politics on equal footing with others and thereby dismantle the instruments of subjugation both at the social and political levels. In doing so they sought to help create for the country an identity that represented their aspirations and interests, an identity that would also take into account their position as the numerical majority of the population. In sum, the 1940s and 1950s were characterized by competing ideologies. Under normal circumstances, political pluralism would lead to development, progress, and national integration. However, when competing ideologies correspond to ethnic and sectarian divisions, they serve to hinder unity and along with it slow the process of national integration.

Anti-Imperialism: Common Thread Between Ideologies The programs of all Iraqi political parties contained provisions for fighting imperialism. The Baath asserted that the Arabs should struggle with all their might to “flatten” the pillars of imperialism.128 Yeketi Tekoshin (the Unity of Struggle), the publication of the Kurdish branch of the ICP, suggested that the rights of both Kurdish and Arabic nations were trampled under the heel of British imperialism that exploited them all. It explained that both groups had to fight together for Iraq’s independence because it would benefit them both. 129 Similarly, Rizgari (Liberation), the mouthpiece of the KDP, employed the slogan “Oh Kurdish and Arab peoples, fight hand in hand against imperialism and its army, its enterprises and pacts.”130 Until 1955, the other two major parties, the NDP and Istiqlal, were less explicit in expressing their hostility to imperialism. However, their respective pro-

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grams included provisions relating to the need to replace the 1930 treaty, the symbol of Iraq’s occupation by the British. Basically, imperialism and Iraq’s client regime were perceived to be the common enemy, and these perspectives provided some degree of concurrence between Iraq’s diverse communities and their representative ideological currents. In a sense, the shared hostility to imperialism facilitated national integration, though it was not sufficiently strong to meld the diverse array of Iraqi communities. Because the relationships among the various ethnic and religious communities and their major political parties remained fragile, it was not possible to overcome the competing and contradictory visions of Iraq’s identity; during the al-Wathba (the Leap) demonstrations and during the 1956 uprising they were as pronounced as ever. Al-Wathba was a reaction to the new treaty between Iraq and Britain, which replaced the 1930 treaty. In January 1948, when the new treaty was announced, people poured into the streets and attacked the British consulates and cultural centers.131 Anti-imperial sentiment was so strong that for a time it united the different ethnic and sectarian communities across Iraq. Baghdad was the main center of demonstrations, but the ICP and KDP worked together to organize demonstrations in several Kurdish cities, also.132 The close cooperation between the Kurds and the Arabs even found expression in Kurdish poetry: Faiq Bekas wrote a poem immediately following al-Wathba in which he stated that “the friendship between the Kurds and the Arabs is age-old, and history is a witness; the arch-enemy [the British] should tear his shirt.”133 The poem celebrated cooperation between the Kurds and the Arabs for fighting the common enemy. It is noticeable that the Kurds and the Arabs were not described by Bekas as co-nationals but as friends. The Kurds’ participation can be linked to anti-imperialist motives and the reflection of their anger toward Salih Jabir, who was the first Shiite to hold the post of prime minister since 1921 and who executed the Kurdish officers involved in the 1945 Barzan rebellion only a few months before al-Wathba. Despite the cooperation between the Shiite and Sunni communities in Baghdad, some Sunnis used public anger for sectarian gains. For example, Sunni students in Baghdad raised slogans such as “down with the rafidhi” (a derogative term for the Shiite).134 Under pressure from angry public and street demonstrations, the prime minister resigned. Jabir’s resignation was welcomed in the Sunni areas, while it was seen as a Sunni plot by the Shiites in Basra and Amara.135 The regent was sensitive to the sectarian emotions of the time and therefore requested that another Shiite, Sayyid Muhammad al-Sadr, form the cabinet. The next major uprising was in reaction to the tripartite attacks on Egypt in 1956. The uprising had ramifications as severe as those of alWathba. Demonstrations started in Najaf and Baghdad and spread to the provinces, including the Kurdish region.136 However, al-Haidari, a leading

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ICP figure of the time, recalled that despite Kurdish support for Nasser and the Egyptian revolution, the Kurds were constrained by the strident nature of pro-Arab slogans such as “al-Iraq al-Arab” and “Urubat al-Iraq” (both mean Arabic Iraq), which were used in the 1956 uprising.137 In September 1954, Nuri al-Sa‘id’s twelfth cabinet banned all political parties. This was a momentous action that alienated the ruling class. The opposition, comprised of moderates (the NDP and Istiqlal) and radicals (the ICP, Baath, and KDP), drew closer in support of Arabism and anti-imperialism. It resulted in the formation of the National Unity Front (NUF) in 1957. The NUF, however, excluded the KDP, the only Kurdish party, when both the Istiqlal and Baath vetoed its inclusion. According to Hani al-Fkaiki, while the “communists were accentuating the Kurdishness of the Kurds in Iraq, we [the Baathists] were looking for books and historical sources that could prove the Arab origin of the Kurds.” He also readily admits “our perspective towards Kurds was the primary factor for the use of the veto but we [the Baathists] declared that the Kurds and Barzani’s separatist inclinations were behind our exclusion of the KDP.”138 This illustrates the point that, at that juncture of Iraqi history, even a common enemy was insufficient to unite the Kurdish and the Arab nationalists. What united the patriotic and Arab nationalist camps was not an overarching sense of Iraqi patriotism but rather the desire to defeat their common enemy. It is therefore not surprising that though the aims of the NUF included reforms within Iraq, its main focus remained pan-Arabism.

Imbalance of Power and the State’s Socio-Political Policies Both the Iraqi and the British governments had endorsed the traditional tribal structure and used it to impose law and order. But the negative impact of endorsing tribalism on the process of national integration and the creation of an Iraqi identity was significant because it created obstacles to developing a sense of belonging to the state. Especially in the rural areas, Iraqis were linked to the state via their tribal leaders, and those leaders and landowners dominated parliament throughout the era of the monarchy. During Faisal’s reign (1921–1933), tribal leaders comprised 15 to 20 percent of parliament, which rose to 37 percent in the 1940s and 1950s. 1 3 9 However, the peasants continued to be persecuted by the landowners and the tribal leaders, thereby alienating a large portion of the rural population. Following the formation of the state of Iraq in 1921, the unrepresentative distribution of power between ethnic and sectarian groups caused discontent. The Sunni ruling class, generally speaking, opposed free and fair

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elections and manipulated the results of the elections in order to sustain its political domination. Iraq held sixteen elections from 1925 to 1958, but none could be termed as free. From, 1921 to 1958, the Sunnis headed fiftythree of the fifty-nine cabinets, ensuring that the overwhelming majority of the ministers were Sunnis. Taken together, during the monarchy era the cabinets formed by the Shiites governed only one year and ten months, whereas Sunni-headed governments ruled Iraq more than thirty-five out of thirtyseven years. The Kurds’ share of power was negligible; only one cabinet was ever led by a Kurd and this, too, survived for only two months.140 In parliament the Kurds were reasonably represented. However, the Shiites’ share of seats ranged from 28 to 43 percent, proportionally less than their population of more than 55 percent. This underrepresentation, combined with other discriminatory policies, further alienated the Shiites and the Kurds. The other chronic impediment to integration was the link between religion and politics. As the Communist movement gained momentum in Iraq in the late 1940s, the British, as power broker, realized that they could not win a war against Communist activities by means of traditional methods such as policing. Therefore they suggested a religious approach. In October 1953, the British ambassador initiated contacts with the chief Shiite marja’, Kashif al-Ghatta, who later revealed that they had discussed the issue of their common enemy: Communism.141 This was a major step toward providing religious leaders a greater role in politics. Moreover, the problem with blending religion and politics in Iraq was that since the Iraqis were already divided along sectarian lines, bringing in the issue of religiosity had the added danger of further dividing and thereby impeding the process of national integration. It is not quite right to say, as suggested by Davis, that during the monarchy Iraqi nationalism transcended ethnic and sectarian lines.142 This is because the period of limited openness lasted for only eight years, from 1946 to 1954. In fact, after 1954, Iraq became a kind of dictatorship, ruled directly or indirectly by Nuri al-Sa‘id, under a democratic facade when the members of parliament won their seats by recommendations based on nepotism.143 With the benefit of hindsight, however, it would now seem that the monarchy operated more efficiently than succeeding regimes. With relative ease and political openness, the monarchy and the regime of al-Sa‘id, as the main pillars of the government, dealt with the perennial ethnic and sectarian differences through the traditional means of cooperation, providing concessions to political figures and tribal leaders. However, as the opposition toward the monarchy and the political system grew, the regime increasingly reversed to the conventional model of coercion to suppress political dissent.

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Notes 1. Tripp, A History of Iraq, p. 81. 2. Al-Husri, My Memoir, p. 399. 3. Taha al-Hashimi (1888–1961) was prime minister of Iraq for two months in 1941 and was twice chief of staff of the Iraqi army. He was an ex-Ottoman officer and a member of the al-‘Ahd Association, known for its Arab nationalist orientation (Basri, Political Pioneers, vol. 1, pp. 229–231). 4. Tripp, A History of Iraq, p. 78; Walker, “The Making of Modern Iraq,” pp. 29–40. 5. For an account of the suppression of the Assyrian community, see Makiya, Republic of Fear, pp. 166–175; Tripp, A History of Iraq, p. 80. 6. Al-Hassani, The History of Iraqi Cabinets, vol. 4, p. 34. 7. Al-Uzri, The Problem of Governance, p. 106. 8. Muhammad Hussein Kashif al-Ghatta (1876–1954) was born and raised in Najaf. He was the chief Shiite marja‘who succeeded Kadhim al-Yazdi. 9. Al-Hassani, The History of Iraqi Cabinets, vol. 4, pp. 49–51. 10. Ibid. 11. Ibid., pp. 78–84. 12. Ibid., p. 89. 13. See al-Hassani, The History of Iraqi Cabinets, vol. 4, pp. 90–93; al-Alawi, The Shiite and the Nation-State, p. 350. 14. For the full text of al-Ghatta’s memorandum, see al-Hassani, The History of Iraqi Cabinets, vol. 4, pp. 90–92. The memorandum is also known as Mithaq alSha‘b (the People’s Pact). 15. Ibid., pp. 102–103. 16. Ibid., pp. 101–127. 17. Al-Hassani, The History of Iraqi Cabinets, pp. 144–148, 163–170,180– 184. 18. Marr, The Modern History of Iraq, pp. 43–44. 19. Bakr Sidqi (1890–1937), a Kurd by origin, was born in Baghdad. He graduated from the military school in Istanbul and joined the Iraqi army as an officer where he achieved the rank of colonel. He led the army units responsible for crushing both the Assyrian revolt in 1933 and the Shiite revolts in 1935–1936 (Basri, Political Pioneers, vol. 1, pp. 215–220). 20. Hikmat Suleiman (1889–1964) was born in Baghdad. He was Georgian by birth and graduated from the College of Law in Istanbul. He served as member of the Iraqi Parliament and held ministerial posts, including the position of prime minister in 1936. 21. Tripp, A History of Iraq, pp. 88, 89; Marr, The Modern History of Iraq, pp. 46–47. 22. The club was named after al-Muthanna ibn Haritha al-Shibani, a seventhcentury Muslim commander who led Muslim armies to conquer Iraq and parts of Persia. 23. Al-Dulaimi, Kamil al-Chadirchi, pp. 76–80; Tripp, A History of Iraq, p. 91. 24. Quoted in al-Adhami, The Nationalist Dimension, p. 7. 25. Lukitz, “Nationalism in Post-Imperial Iraq,” p. 125. 26. The Circle of Seven consisted of senior officers: Hussein Fawzi, Amin alUmari (who assassinated Bakr Sidqi), Salah al-Din al-Sabbagh, Mahmud Salman, Kamil Shabib, Aziz Yamulki, and Fahmi Sa‘id (Tripp, A History of Iraq, p. 94). The four powerful personalities in this group that became known as the Golden Square included Salah al-Din al-Sabbagh, Fahmi Sa‘id, Mahmud Salman, and Kamil Shabib (Marr, The Modern History of Iraq, p. 53).

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27. Nuri al-Sa‘id (1888–1958) was born in Baghdad to a Sunni family of Georgian origin. He served in various key cabinet positions and served fourteen terms as prime minister of Iraq (Basri, Political Pioneers, vol. 1, p. 151). 28. Rashid ‘Ali al-Gaylani (1892–1965) was born to a prominent Baghdadi family and was related to Iraq’s first prime minister, Abdul Rahman al-Naqib. AlGaylani served four times as prime minister and held several ministerial and other high-ranking government and army positions. He was an ardent Arab nationalist who opposed British involvement in Iraq’s internal affairs (Basri, Political Pioneers, vol. 1, pp. 177–186). 29. Salih al-Haidari (1922–2001) was born in Erbil. He graduated from the College of Law in Bagdad in 1944. Al-Haidari formed the first Kurdish Marxistoriented cell in Iraqi Kurdistan and was a founding member of both the Iraqi Kurdistan Communist Party (Shorish) and Rizgari Kurd (Kurdish Liberation) Party. Later he joined the Iraqi Communist Party where he became a pivotal committee member in the mid-1950s (al-Haidari, Selections, pp. 5, 9; Batatu, The Old Social Classes, p. 720). 30. Al-Alawi, The Shiite and the Nation-State, pp. 189–191. 31. Tripp, A History of Iraq, pp. 103–105. 32. Khalil, Overt Opposition Parties, p. 61; Alaywi, Political Parties, p. 89. 33. Tripp, The Modern History, p. 110; Marr, The Modern History of Iraq, pp. 56–57. 34. See Chalabi, “Iraq: The Past as Prologue?” 35. In Table 4.1 the Kurdish Region is defined as areas where the Kurds are a majority. 36. Baali, “Social Factors,” pp. 359–360. 37. Batatu, The Old Social Classes, p. 35. 38. Batatu, “Iraq’s Shiites,” pp. 206–209; Farouk-Sluglett and Sluglett, “The Historiography of Modern Iraq,” p. 1411. 39. Al-Husri, My Memoir, p. 125; Gelvin, “The League of Nations,” p. 41; Batatu, The Old Social Classes, p. 34. 40. Eppel, “The Elite,” p. 233. 41. Nakash, The Shi‘is of Iraq, p. 129. 42. See Gellner, Nationalism; Gellner, “Nationalism and Modernization”; Anderson, Imagined Communities. 43. Eppel, “The Elite,” pp. 232–233. 44. Batatu, The Old Social Classes, p. 33. 45. See Tibi, Arab Nationalism; Makiya, Republic of Fear. 46. For the origin of Kurdish nationalism, see Jwaideh, The Kurdish National Movement; Olson, The Emergence of Kurdish Nationalism. 47. Al-Hassani, The History of Iraqi Cabinets, vol. 7, p. 23; Khalil, Overt Opposition Parties, p. 64; Tripp, A History of Iraq, p. 114. 48. After World War II the ruling elite consisted of Nuri al-Sa‘id, Jamil alMadfa‘i, Ali Jawdat, and Arshad al-Umari (Sunnis); Salih Jabir (Shiite); and Jamal Baban and Sa‘id Qazaz (Kurds), among others. 49. Khalil, Overt Opposition Parties, pp. 58–59; al-‘Akam, History of the Iraqi Istiqlal Party, pp. 16–17. 50. Al-Dulaimi, Kamil al-Chadirchi, pp. 50, 58. 51. Kamil al-Chadirchi (1897–1968) was born in Baghdad. He graduated from the College of Law and held several parliamentary and ministerial posts. As were most activists of al-Ahali and the NDP, he was imprisoned several times in the 1950s (see Basri, Political Pioneers, vol. 1, pp. 273–288). 52. For the full text of the NDP’s program, see al-Hassani, The History of Iraqi Cabinets, vol. 7, pp. 35–39.

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53. The Arab League is a regional organization of Arab states. It was formed in Cairo on March 22, 1945. It currently has 22 members. 54. Hani al-Fkaiki, a prominent Baathist leader, said that his father, a Shiite married to a Sunni, was a well-known Baghdadi figure from the Sunni-dominated quarter of al-Adhamiya. He lost the 1950 parliamentary election to Ismail Ghanim, a Sunni. But when he nominated himself as a candidate in the Shiite-dominated area of al-Shatra where he was not a local, he won the seat (al-Fkaiki, The Den of Defeat, p. 28). 55. Khalil, Overt Opposition Parties, p. 222. 56. Kurdistan Democratic Party, The Stance of Iraq’s Political Parties, pp. 23– 25. 57. Al-Alawi, The Shiite and the Nation-State, p. 236. 58. The Shiite founding members who left the NDP Party in 1946 were Abdul Karim al-Uzri, Abdul Wahhab Marjan, Sadiq Kamuna, and Muhammad Abud alShaliji (Khalil, Overt Opposition Parties, p. 78). 59. Ibid. 60. Batatu, The Old Social Classes, pp. 432–434. 61. Ibid., p. 437; for detailed information on the ICP and the Baath Party, see pp. 367–1073. 62. Michel Aflaq (1910–1989) was the ideological founder of Baathism. He was born in Damascus to a middle-class Greek Orthodox family. Aflaq was educated at the Sorbonne where he first developed Arab nationalist ideals. After returning to Syria, he became a schoolteacher and was active in political circles. Aflaq and Salah al-Din al-Bitar set up the Arab Baath Socialist Party in 1947 (Batatu, The Old Social Classes, pp. 723–724). 63. For information on the pro-fascist current within the Arab nationalist movement, see Simon, Iraq Between the Two World Wars, pp. 7–41; Wien, Iraqi Arab Nationalism, pp. 52–113. 64. Voice of the Arabs (Sawt al-Arab) was a radio station launched by Jamal Abdul Nasser on July 4, 1953. 65. Al-Hassani, The History of Iraqi Cabinets, vol. 7, p. 23. 66. Quoted in al-‘Akam, History of the Iraqi Istiqlal Party, p. 16. 67. The founding members of the Istiqlal Party included Muhammad Mahdi Kuba, Faiq al-Samarra’i, Muhammad Sadiq Shanshal, Khalil Kina, Dawd al-Sa‘di, Ismail Ghanim, Ali al-Qazwini, Abdul Razzaq al-Dhahir, Abdul Muhsin al-Duri, and Ibrahim al-Rawi. Only Kuba was Shiite; the rest were Sunni (al-‘Akam, History of the Iraqi Istiqlal Party, pp. 16–29). 68. For a full text of the Istiqlal Party program, see al-Hassani, The History of Iraqi Cabinets, vol. 7, pp. 24–31; al-‘Akam, History of the Iraqi Istiqlal Party, pp. 357–369. 69. Quoted in al-‘Akam, History of the Iraqi Istiqlal Party, p. 30. 70. Kuba, My Memoir at the Heart of Events, p. 199. 71. Kurdistan Democratic Party, The Stance of Iraq’s Political Parties, p. 28. 72. Al-‘Akam, History of the Iraqi Istiqlal Party, p. 359. 73. See Khalil, Overt Opposition Parties, p. 227, n. 4. 74. At the top of the Istiqlal, Muhammad Mahdi Kuba assisted the party in building reasonable support among the Shiites in Najaf (al-Fkaiki, The Den of Defeat, p. 49). 75. Al-Adhamiya, a relatively upscale area with a predominately Sunni population, is one of the oldest neighborhoods in Baghdad. It is located on the northeast banks of the Tigris River. 76. Al-Fkaiki, The Den of Defeat, p. 49.

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77. Alaywi, The Role of the Arab Baath, p. 134; al-Fkaiki, The Den of Defeat, pp. 49–50, 64. 78. Alaywi, The Role of the Arab Baath, p. 121. 79. Fuad al-Rikabi (1931–1971) was born in Nasiriya. He studied engineering in Baghdad where he was exposed to Baathist ideas. He joined the party in 1950 and soon rose to the top, where he remained until 1959. Under his leadership the Baath grew in numbers mainly in Baghdad and Nasiriya. He was imprisoned and killed in 1971 by later Baathists (Batatu, The Old Social Classes, p. 742). 80. Al-Fkaiki, The Den of Defeat, p. 65; Makiya, Republic of Fear, p. 183; Batatu, The Old Social Classes, p. 742. 81. Al-Fkaiki, The Den of Defeat, pp. 15, 168. 82. Arab Baath Socialist Party, The Constitution of the Arab Baath Socialist Party. 83. Al-Fkaiki, The Den of Defeat, p. 295. 84. Arab Baath Socialist Party, The Constitution of the Arab Baath Socialist Party. 85. Khalil, Overt Opposition Parties, p. 82; al-‘Akam, History of the Iraqi Istiqlal Party, p. 125. 86. The cofounders of the Iraqi Free Officers were Lieutenant Colonel Rif‘at alHajj Sirri (1917–1959), a Sunni born in Baghdad, and Colonel Rajab Abdul Majid (1921–?), a Sunni born in ‘Ana. Lt. Col. Sirri was executed by Abdul Karim Qasim in 1959 (Batatu, The Old Social Classes, p. 771). 87. Ibid., pp. 772–776. 88. Ibid., p. 784. 89. Tripp, A History of Iraq, p. 144; Marr, The Modern History of Iraq, pp. 82–84. 90. For examples, see Batatu, The Old Social Classes; and Marr, The Modern History of Iraq. 91. Haj, The Making of Iraq 1900–1963, p. 112. 92. Abdullah, The History of the Kurdistan Democratic Party—Iraq, p. 18; Sharif, The Kurdish Associations, p. 180. 93. The committee included the well-known four officers: Izzat Abdul Aziz, Mustafa Khoshnaw, Muhammad Mahmud Qudsi, and Khairullah Abdul Karim. They were executed by the Iraqi government in 1947 (Abdullah, The History of the Kurdistan Democratic Party—Iraq, p. 64; al-Haidari, Selections, p. 45). 94. Mustafa Barzani (1903–1979) was chosen to lead the Kurdistan Democratic Party in 1946 when he was in Iran. From 1961 to 1975, Barzani was the most important political and military leader of the Kurdish national movement. 95. For information on the 1931–1932 Barzan rebellion, see Jwaideh, The Kurdish National Movement, pp. 219–229; Barzani, Mustafa Barzani and the Kurdish Liberation Movement, pp. 11–45. 96. Barzani, Mustafa Barzani, pp. 49–50, 63–64. 97. Mustafa Barzani became an influential player in the short-lived Kurdistan Republic in Iran under Qadhi Muhammad. 98. In 1945, Dohuk was part of Ninawa province. 99. Barzani, Mustafa Barzani, p. 65; Jwaideh, The Kurdish National Movement, p. 232. 100. Al-Haidari, Selections, pp. 30, 60; McDowall, The Modern History of the Kurds, p. 294; Jwaideh, The Kurdish National Movement, p. 241; Sharif, The Kurdish Associations, pp. 187, 201. 101. Since its formation the Kurdistan Democratic Party has changed its name several times. It was formed as the Kurdish Democratic Party—Iraq. In its third conference it changed its name to Kurdistan Democratic Party—Iraq (Abdullah, The History of the Kurdistan Democratic Party, pp. 50, 71).

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102. “Pan-Kurdish” refers to the demand of some Kurdish nationalists to seek the unification of all parts of the greater Kurdistan region. 103. Sharif, The Kurdish Associations, p. 228. 104. Amin, Several Pages, pp. 215, 216. 105. Abdullah, The History of the Kurdistan Democratic Party, p. 71; Karim, The History of the Kurdistan Democratic Party, p. 50; Habib, Glimpses of Struggle, pp. 249–251. 106. Batatu, The Old Social Classes, p. 743. 107. Al-Fkaiki, The Den of Defeat, pp. 49, 59. 108. Alaywi, The Shiite and the Nation-State, p. 140. 109. The ICP had many Jewish members in the leadership and at the grassroots level until their departure from Iraq in the early 1950s. 110. See Nuri, Memoirs of Baha al-Din Nuri, pp. 87, 97–98; Himidi et al., The History of Iraqi Cabinets, vol. 6, p. 28. 111. Batatu, The Old Social Classes, pp. 514, 537, 568; Habib, Glimpses of Struggle, p. 265. Although, in late 1945, the ICP’s organ, al-Qaeda, attempted to rectify what was contained in Fahd’s Charter, it did not demand as much as the previous stance of the ICP, such as the right to self-determination. Al-Qaeda’s article acknowledged the Kurdish right to secede but conditioned it on the liberation of Iraq from imperialism (Amin, Several Pages, p. 120; Habib, Glimpses of Struggle, p. 268.) 112. Fahd and Basim were the noms de guerre of both Yusuf Salman Yusuf (1901–1949), the first general secretary of the ICP, and Baha al-Din Nuri (1927–) general secretary of the ICP (1949–1953). 113. Nuri, Memoirs of Baha al-Din Nuri, pp. 146–147; al-Haidari, Selections, p. 163. 114. Amin, Several Pages, p. 110. 115. ‘Amer Abdullah (1924–2000), a Sunni born in ‘Ana, was a lawyer by profession who became a member of the politbureau of the ICP in 1956. Abdullah played a pivotal role in the life of the ICP in subsequent years. 116. Batatu, The Old Social Classes, pp. 749–750. 117. Al-Haidari, Selections, pp. 191–192. 118. Stalin, “The Nation,” p. 20. 119. Quoted in Fayadh, “From Memoir of Uncle.” 120. Karim Ahmed Dawud (1922–), a Kurd, was an influential member of the ICP until 1993 when the Kurds broke away and formed the Kurdistan Communist Party (KCP). Ahmed became its general secretary. 121. See Fayadh, “From Memoir of Uncle” for reference to Talabani’s memoir, and Karim Ahmed, The Journey, pp. 62–63, for his own memoir. 122. Abdullah, The History of the Kurdistan Democratic Party, pp. 57–58; Nuri, Memoirs, p. 59; al-Haidari, Selections, p. 97; Habib, Glimpses of Struggle, pp. 247–249. 123. Al-Haidari, Selections, pp. 97, 98. Emphasis added. 124. See Batatu, The Old Social Classes, p. 608, Table 26–1. 125. Ibid., p. 663, Table 29–2. 126. Ibid., p. 719. 127. Among the leading figures were Fuad al-Rikabi, Shams al-Din Kadhim, Tahsin M‘ala, Hazim Jawad, Hani al-Fkaiki, and Abu Talib al-Hashimi (al-Fkaiki, The Den of Defeat, pp. 65–67; and Alaywi, Political Parties, p. 129). 128. See Arab Baath Socialist Party, Constitution of Arab Baath Socialist Party. 129. Amin, Several Pages, pp. 96–98.

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130. Rizgari, October 3, 1948; May 2, 1952. The slogan or similar versions to it appeared as the headline on the front page of every issue of Rizgari. 131. Ahmed, Several Pages, p. 213; Nuri, Memoirs, pp. 60, 164. 132. Ahmed, The Journey, pp. 71–72. 133. Bekas, Poetical Works, p. 53. 134. The words rafidi, rafadha, or rawafidh are Arabic terms meaning the rejecter(s). 135. Nakash, The Shi‘is of Iraq, p. 128. 136. Al-Hassani, The History of Iraqi Cabinets, vol. 10, pp. 112–118; Marr, The Modern History of Iraq, p. 76. 137. Al-Haidari, Selections, p. 186. 138. Al-Fkaiki, The Den of Defeat, p. 76. 139. Batatu, The Old Social Classes, p. 103. 140. For more information, see al-Hassani, The History of Iraqi Cabinets, vol. 1–10; al-Uzri, The Problem of Governance, pp. 106, 125; Marr, The Modern History of Iraq, p. 310. 141. Batatu, The Old Social Classes, p. 694. 142. Davis, “History Matters,” p. 232. 143. al-Hassani, The History of Iraqi Cabinets, vol. 9, pp. 159–160; al-‘Akam, History of the Iraqi Istiqlal Party, p. 304.

5 The Failure of National Integration

By the late 1950s, public resentment of the oppressive policies of

the state and its close association with the West reached an unprecedented level. It was exacerbated after the imposition of a ban on all political activities in 1954 and the signing of the British-backed Baghdad Pact in 1955.1 In the late 1940s, the Iraqi officer corps became more politicized and radicalized largely in response to the Arab national humiliation after their defeat in the 1948 Arab-Israeli war. By the late 1950s, many officers concluded that the only way to remove the tutelage of Britain and its client government was through military intervention in Iraq’s politics.2 The Free Officers’ activities expanded in the late 1950s,3 especially after they received the green light from Nasser, who promised his support. Before the 1958 coup, the Free Officers had recruited around 200 high-ranking officers. 4 Additionally, the NUF indicated that it would lend its support to the Free Officers’ endeavor.5 On July 14, 1958, two Free Officers, Abdul Karim Qasim and Abdul Salam Arif,6 took advantage of troop movements to seize military control of Baghdad and overthrow the monarchy. Thus began a new era in Iraqi politics: the Republican era. The coup received widespread public support, generally described by scholars and historians as a “revolution.”7 The revolution removed the monarchy and brought to an end the influence of the common enemy: Britain.

Patriots at the Helm: Qasim’s Era On July 14, 1958, Arif declared the revolution on live radio. After the revolution, Qasim, who was of mixed Sunni and Kurdish-Shiite parentage, became the prime minister and the president, while Arif took the post of vice president. The statement stressed wataniya (patriotic) sentiments rather than qawmiya (Arab nationalist) notions.8 A new government was formed, led by a Sovereignty Council consisting of three men designed to represent

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the three major Iraqi communities: Shiites, Sunnis, and Kurds.9 Iraq’s diversity was also reflected in the composition of the first cabinet comprised of six Sunnis, five Shiites, and four Kurds.. A new constitution was hastily drafted to replace the 1925 constitution.10 The provisional constitution identified Iraq as “a part of the Arabic ummah (nation)” and considered “the Kurds and the Arabs as partners in this homeland [Iraq].” This was the first time that Kurdish national rights were enshrined in any Iraqi constitution. Although the 1925 constitution stated that “there shall be no differentiation in the rights of Iraqis before the law, whatever differences may exist in their nationality (qawmiya), religion or language,” it did not specifically mention the Kurds by name as did this later constitution. Qasim’s parentage and origins may have shaped his vision of what integration should mean in the context of Iraq and how it could serve the process of nation-building. He had little interest in religion, at least not to the extent of his successors (e.g., Arif). Qasim understood the multiethnic, multinational, and multisectarian nature of Iraqi society. As a result, both the Kurds and the Shiites were better represented in state institutions, and the first cabinet had a more balanced representation. However, old practices resurfaced thereafter, and the second cabinet, formed in February 1959, allocated only six of fourteen positions to the Shiites and the Kurds together.11 It has been argued that during Qasim’s era “major political dividing lines were reorganized on ideological principles, transcending communal boundaries, and comprising a shared sense of struggle for the nation’s future.”12 However, close scrutiny of the events reveals that the temporary unity among Iraqis was more the result of momentary euphoria following the removal of the common enemy (the British) and the former regime than a shared vision of a common future. It is therefore little wonder that ethnic and sectarian dissension soon reappeared, albeit this time more savagely than in previous years.

Patriotism vs. Arab Nationalism The first crack in the facade of national unity appeared during the debates on unification with the Arab countries. The rift that emerged was not just among political leaders but arose within the general populace. The desire to be united in order to repel imperialism and its client government had been the main factor in the formation of the NUF. But the sense of unanimity soon dissipated with the removal of both the monarchy and the British. Iraqi society, by and large, remained broadly divided into three camps: patriotic and Arab nationalists in the center and Kurdish nationalists on the periphery. As observed during the monarchy, the Arab national-

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ists comprised the Baath, Istiqlal, and Nasserites, who supported Arif. The patriots were made up of the ICP and NDP, both of which supported Qasim. The role of the Communists in the patriotic movement was far more visible after the revolution as NDP influence on the streets began to wane. Qasim was not keen to support unification with the recently established United Arab Republic (UAR).13 Along with the leaders from NDP, ICP, and KDP, he believed in the social reforms in the domestic arena and the development of a separate identity for Iraq. For the leaders of this group (excluding KDP leaders), the merger of Iraq with the UAR was conditional on the retention of Iraq’s sovereignty and its separate identity. Though they did not rule out unification altogether, they made it clear that it would not be on terms proposed by the Arab nationalists, who wanted immediate unification. Qasim and his supporters suggested a federation among “liberated” Arab countries.14 In contrast, Arif (a fervent Nasserite) asserted that Iraq’s identity should be based on a larger Arab identity expressed politically in the form of a united Arab nation. In his public addresses, Arif referred to Nasser as “the hero” and “the great liberator.” His call for unification with the UAR climaxed in a speech on August 17 when he said that the Iraqi republic “is part of the Arab nation,” adding that it had “one aim, one homeland, one republic . . . one nation, one principle and one political party, the party of God that is successful.”15 It has been suggested that there was tension between Qasim and Arif, which probably emanated from their personal ambitions and divergent views. 16 It is because of this tension that both tried to exaggerate their respective roles while undermining the roles of the other, particularly on the point of who initiated the march on Baghdad in July 1958. The tenor of the debate was actually deeper and more divisive than suggested. In fact, the very issue of Iraq’s identity was at the core of the disagreement, not only between Qasim and Arif, but also between the major political parties and among the populace. The issue of whether Iraq should become a territorial nation-state or incorporated into the Arab world was the main bone of contention in the ongoing debate between the patriotic and Arab nationalist camps. Qasim might have had a personal interest in rejecting the unification because, if the unification bid proceeded, he could have been relegated to the position of second-in-command due to Nasser’s cross-border popularity, charisma, and effective rhetoric. Qasim generally believed that the status of Iraq should be equal to that of Egypt, if not above it. This contrasted to Arif’s view, which readily accepted Nasser as his big brother and the leadership of the Arab world as a given. Nevertheless, the struggle was over Iraq’s new identity. The patriots’ focus was on an Iraqi state in which the various communities would have a greater power-sharing role, while the Arab nationalists’ main concern was the merging of Iraq into a larger Arab entity.

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When the Baath and the ICP weighed in on the debate, the contention took another turn. In October, Qasim addressed a large gathering at alKashafa stadium, which the Baathists and the Communists attended after being invited by the NUF. Al-Fkaiki, a Baathist, recalled that “as soon as we set forth unification slogans,” we were “assailed by the communists” who “beat and dispersed” us.17 Al-Fkaiki added that the Communists compared the Baathists to the Nazis and the fascists, branding them remnants of the monarchy. In the absence of a shared vision, the NUF soon disintegrated, the old rivalries and differences between the protagonists of divergent ideologies reemerged, and attacks and counterattacks became daily events in Iraqi streets. On July 24, Michel Aflaq, the founder of the Baath, arrived in Baghdad from Syria to support his Baathist comrades. In a public speech, Aflaq asserted that “Iraq always was the bearer of the Arab unity banner.”18 In response to the Arab nationalist call for unification on July 27, Qasim stated that “unification is not a decision for an individual, but rather for all people.” He added that “Iraq is part of the Arab nation,” but “it [Iraq] is shared by Kurds and Arabs.”19 In addition to the two political movements on the center stage, the secondary force of Kurdish nationalism was equally active in Kurdistan and Baghdad. This created a tripolar phenomenon, a situation that had been noticeable even during the monarchy. The Kurds generally opposed the idea of unification, asserting that “if Iraq [as a federal region] wishes to enter a union with the UAR, recognition of the Kurdish nation is necessary and Kurdistan must be recognized as a federated member in the new configuration.”20 The KDP presented Kurdish concerns to Qasim and Arif in a memorandum on September 11, 1958, when the debate on unification was at its height. In support of the patriotic camp against the Arab nationalists, the KDP signed a Cooperation Alliance agreement with the ICP.21 Scrutiny of the agreement reveals that despite the KDP’s support for the patriotic camp, there were still divergent views on the Iraqi state and what it meant to be Iraqi. The Cooperation Alliance agreement had two ambiguous articles containing contradictory terms. On the one hand, it recognized the right to selfdetermination by the Kurdish people, but on the other, it stated that the Kurds should resist any separatist thoughts and movements. This seems to have been a reflection of the traditionally contradictory nature of the Iraqi and Kurdish nationalisms: one insisting on the right to self-determination and the other insisting on the territorial integrity of Iraq. The main difference in politics during the monarchy and the revolutionary era was that, in the monarchy era, the older groups such as Istiqlal and the NDP favored democratic traditions and elections. The Baath, the ICP, and the KDP of the revolutionary era were clandestine and highly organized groups committed to the monopolization of power by any means, including

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ruthlessness, if necessary. This latter approach was a turning point that laid the foundation for a bloody chapter in Iraq’s modern history. The first round of conflict ended with the expulsion of Arif from the government and the November 1958 ban on the Baath newspaper, alJamhuriya.22 Arif was put on trial and sentenced to death, but his verdict was later commuted to a term of imprisonment. The dismissal of more Arab nationalists from senior positions of the political hierarchy further widened the rift. As a result, the Arab nationalists began to seek other avenues to fight Qasim and his allies, the Communists. These included assassinations, conspiracies, and rebellions. In the Sunni-dominated areas of Baghdad and Mosul, the Baathists (supported by other Arab nationalist groups and Sunni Islamists of the Muslim Brotherhood) formed death squads to kill and expel the Communists from their areas. There are reliable reports that well-known Mosul merchants offered money for dead Communists. By the end of Qasim’s era, more than 400 Communists were killed, and as many as 50,000 had been forced to migrate to other parts of Iraq.23 In response to a revolt in Mosul in March 1959, Qasim cracked down on participating Arab nationalist officers. Meanwhile the Baath unsuccessfully attempted to assassinate Qasim on October 7.24 As a consequence of the government’s move to sideline the Baathists, many of them, including Baath secretary Fuad al-Rikabi, left Iraq or went underground. By late 1959, the Baath considered the elimination of the Communists to be “an Arab nationalist task.”25 The Baathists perceived the Communists as their number one enemy and believed that Qasim’s government was resting on “red shoulders.” They made their views about Qasim quite clear when they asserted that Qasim’s power hold was based on “Sh‘ubi beasts” (Communists) who attempted to rip Iraq from its Arabic identity.26 What is interesting about the contents of this passage is that, first, Iraq was identified in ethno-nationalist Arabic terms based on blood bonds rather than as a territorial nation-state based on citizen loyalty to the country. Second, the Communists were perceived as Sh‘ubi, a term used to describe Iranian anti-Arab movements. In Baath literature, four terms— Sh‘ubi, Shu‘iyun (Communists), Shiites, and Shruqi (easterners)—are generally used to refer to the same thing.27 The mingling of these terms implies disloyalty to Iraq, backwardness, and questionable origins of the Iraqi Shiites. In this context, they tended to be identified with the Iranians with whom they shared the same faith and with the Communists with whom they shared the same egalitarian goals. Playing with the language reaffirms the longstanding debate regarding loyalties to Iraq in which a section of the Iraqi population questions the loyalty of the other (see Chapter 9). By early 1959, the Communists were in total control of the southern cities as well as the streets of Baghdad. Their influence was also evident in certain Kurdish cities. Two bloody events in Mosul and Kirkuk further highlighted the extent of Iraq’s conflict over the question of identity.

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Mosul and Kirkuk Incidents In general, political divisions during Qasim’s era were based on ideological principles. Yet they were also embedded along communal lines. The provinces and the suburbs of Baghdad, which were dominated by the Shiites and the Kurds, became strongholds of the patriotic movement organized by the ICP and the KDP. In contrast to the patriotic movement, which transcended ethnic lines, Arab nationalism during the 1950s and 1960s was almost exclusively confined to the Sunni-populated areas.28 Both the Mosul and Kirkuk incidents are evidence that political struggle along ethnic and sectarian groups in the quest for identity were at the core of these conflicts, although they were usually described as clashes between Arab nationalists and the Communists. Historical examples will help to illustrate some of these observations. The Iraqi officer corps was dominated by Sunnis, mostly from Mosul. In 1963, almost 70 percent of the graduates of the Military College were Sunni. Of these, 45 percent originated from Mosul.29 These officers were dissatisfied with Qasim’s close association with the Communists. In March 1959, the officers decided to launch an attack against the government, using Mosul as their base. Abdul Wahhab al-Shawwaf, commander of the Mosul garrison, and Rif‘at al-Hajj Sirri, chief of military intelligence, directed the troops’ movements, and, on March 10, the Mosul garrison attempted to take control of the city, which sparked the revolt. Their supporters— almost exclusively Sunni—consisted of army officers, Nasserites, Arab nationalists, Baathists, and members of the Muslim Brotherhood. Opposing the rebels were the local police, Communists (mostly Kurds from the eastern side of Mosul), and their supporters consisting of Muslim and Yazidi Kurds, Christians and Armenians, and other minority religious groups.30 There are many theories about the instigation of the rebellion. Some think that the revolt stemmed from a mixture of anti-Communist and pronationalist motives.31 Others think that economic issues, rather than ideology, played a role in the revolt. 32 Yet another explanation is that Qasim’s agrarian reform policies, which redistributed the lands of the large landowners to the peasants, and the revision of the personal statutes code giving women more rights caused the big landowners to revolt.33 But the main divisions between the rival groups were along ethnic and religious lines. Ideological and class divisions were evident in the two combatant groups, but the conflict represented long-standing ethnic and intertribal animosities that existed between the Arabs and Kurds. Ethnic and religious factionalisms tore them apart while other ideological differences were magnified by an overlapping of class divisions and economic interests. For example, while most of the soldiers of the fifth brigade were Kurds from the lower stratum of society, the senior officers of the same brigade were Sunnis from the middle and upper classes.34

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The way that other cities responded to the rebellion sheds even more light on the significance of the ethnic and sectarian dynamics in these otherwise ideologically defined confrontations. The people in the Kurdish and Shiite areas poured into the streets in support of government forces. On March 9 and 10, two days back to back, the people of Basra demonstrated, shouting “execute . . . execute . . . people and the Army will protect you [Qasim] from traitors”! 35 In Kirkuk, the Kurds launched a campaign to capture Arab nationalists who were indirectly involved in the rebellion.36 The KDP also played a vital role in providing support for the Communists.37 Eventually the rebellion was put down, though the event profoundly affected the country as a whole, especially after Qasim executed the leaders of the rebellion.38 Their executions provoked demonstrations against the government in the Sunni neighborhoods of Baghdad, and in al-Anbar people wore black clothes as a sign of grief.39 The Mosul incident bore a similar pattern to other incidents that had occurred in the south and north of the country. The Kurdish revolts led by Sheikh Mahmud (1919–1930) and Barzani (1931–1932 and 1943–1945), and the Shiite revolts of 1920 and 1935–1936 all had similar patterns. The notable feature of all these events was that each uprising stopped at ethnic or religious boundaries. Also, each rebellion faced strong opposition, not only from the government of the day but from other ethnic or sectarian groups. This was the case in Mosul where the revolt was opposed by the Kurds and the Christians. Similarly, the Kurdish and Shiite uprisings of 1991 were crushed by the Republican Guard units, consisting mostly of Sunnis and Sunni tribesmen loyal to the government. The Kirkuk incident of July 14, 1959, is another ideological clash that followed ethnic and religious lines. However, on that occasion the concern was the identity of Kirkuk rather than that of Iraq. During the monarchy, Turkmen had occupied most of the senior posts in the local government. But following the revolution they had been replaced mainly by Kurds who were supporters of the new regime. Tensions escalated when the Kurds urged the government to establish a directorate of education to manage educational issues in the Kurdish region, including Kirkuk. The issue was complicated by the intervention of Nadhim al-Tabaqchali,40 an Arab nationalist officer, who inflamed the situation by writing several letters to the authorities claiming that the Kurds wanted to use the region as a base for establishing their own state. Al-Tabaqchali suggested that “all senior posts in Kirkuk must be given to Arabs.”41 During the first anniversary of the revolution, the supporters of both camps clashed: the Kurds and the Communists on one side, and the Turkmen and the Arab nationalists on the other. The clash led to many deaths, especially among the Turkmen.42 As in Mosul, the conflict had less to do with party politics and more with deep-seated antagonism between the Turkmen and Kurds. Baha al-Din Nuri, in charge of Kirkuk’s ICP organization at the time, stressed that the

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Turkmen neighborhoods of Kirkuk were not sympathetic to ICP activities.43 At the same time the ICP had large support among the Kurds in the city. Basically, while the Kurds attempted to use their control of the province to claim their historic right over the city, the Turkmen feared being wiped away by the tide of change. Turkmen had always been supported by new Arab arrivals in the city mainly because they shared a fear of Kurdish domination. A memorandum sent to Qasim on behalf of the Turkmen called on the government to exclude Kirkuk from the proposed directorate of general education to be established in the Kurdish region.44 Despite the prominence of novel ideologies in the 1950s and 1960s, they were unable to overcome or fully transcend the historic ethnic and religious divisions of the Iraqis. Class divisions were reinforced by ethnic and sectarian divisions in which deep-seated bitterness and conflicting visions were the fundamental factors in further polarizing the ethnic divide.

Iraq: The Republic of the Kurds and the Arabs The Kurds initially supported the new republican government and its leader, Qasim, because the new provisional constitution contained two articles that mentioned Kurdish rights and recognized them as partners with Arabs in Iraq.45 The return from exile of Mustafa Barzani and Qasim’s stance against joining the UAR were also factors that strengthened the Kurds’ support of Qasim, particularly after he stated that “we must not forget that Iraq is not only an Arab state, but an Arab-Kurdish state.” 46 Barzani arrived in Baghdad on October 6, 1958. Although Qasim’s motivation to bring him back is not clear, it has been suggested that it was to counterbalance the rising tide of the Arab nationalists. Arif and other Arab nationalist officers opposed the return of Barzani.47 Qasim also made significant symbolic gestures such as placing a yellow sun on the Iraqi national flag and a dagger in the Iraqi emblem parallel to the Arabic sword to highlight the representation of the Kurds in the state apparatus of Iraq.48 Under Qasim the KDP was officially licensed in February 1960 as a registered political party. This followed the publication of its own newspaper Khabat (Struggle) in April 1959.49 In its first issue, Khabat committed itself to support the revolution under the leadership of Qasim. It also welcomed the withdrawal of Iraq from the Baghdad Pact, as the Kurds believed that the aim of the pact was to suppress the Kurdish national liberation movement.50 The emergence of a new common enemy, the Arab nationalists, was vital to ensure Kurdish support for Qasim and the ICP. The Kurds also believed that the new republic would embrace their Kurdish identity and treat them, not as a minority group, but as a national group, thereby finally recognizing the binational character of the Iraqi people.

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However, the close collaboration between the KDP and the ICP and their support for Qasim did not last long. In its Fourth Congress, held in October 1959, the KDP removed the Marxist-Leninist bent from its program and adopted a more nationalist agenda.51 This indicates that the Kurds’ inclination to the left and their support and association with the ICP were situational. As soon as the British influence in Iraq waned, the Kurdish nationalists turned their focus toward nationalistic programs while distancing themselves from the Communists and Iraqi patriotic camp. When the dust of the revolution settled, it became apparent that Kurdish aspirations and Qasim’s vision for Iraq collided on the questions of nationality, autonomy, and the territorial identity of the Kurdish region. In this context two contentious issues became the focused points of conflict: first, the establishment of a directorate of education for the Kurdish region, and second, Articles 2 and 3 of the provisional constitution, which defined Iraq and determined the Kurds’ and Arabs’ relationship in Iraq. In April 1959, the government announced the establishment of the Kurdistan General Directorate of Education. The Kurdistan Teachers Union (KTU) was the major force behind the directorate. Arab nationalists feared that the establishment of the directorate would spread separatist sentiments in the north.52 The KTU worked hard to implement the government’s new initiative but without much success in the face of what it considered to be the government’s “lagging attitude.” It was also critical of the government for changing the name of the directorate by removing the word “Kurdistan” and replacing it with “Kurdish Studies.”53 This action angered many Kurds, though they eventually accepted it. This episode demonstrated that despite Qasim’s initial inclusive policies, his government and colleagues were still sensitive about using the term “Kurdistan.” The KTU insisted on bringing in all Kurdish areas under the aegis of the General Directorate of Education for Kurdish Studies (GDEKS). It is in this context that Khabat asserted that if the GDEKS did not include all Kurdish areas, it would be an exercise in futility.54 The matter, however, did not end there. When the areas that GDEKS encompassed were announced, the matter took another turn. It ceased being an issue of cultural and linguistic rights but instead became a dispute about territorial identity, which is at the heart of the Kurdish question in Iraq. The Kurds demanded that the GDEKS’s authority cover the provinces of Erbil, Suleimaniya, and Kirkuk, and the Kurdish districts in Diyala and Ninawa provinces. Here again, Kurdish nationalism clashed with Iraqi and Arab nationalisms, both of which were willing to accept some Kurdish rights but stood firm against any territorial claims by the Kurds. Indeed, this became the main obstacle with regard to the GDEKS. There were repeated calls by Khabat to activate the GDEKS, but no effective measures were taken by the government.55 The dispute over territorial identity was not the only point of

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disagreement. The question of Iraq’s new identity soon became another bone of contention between the Kurdish nationalists on the one side and the Iraqi and the Arab nationalists on the other. In mid-1960, Arab nationalist publications began a campaign that questioned the origins of the Kurds and claimed that most Kurdish tribes were originally Arabs.56 Some Kurdish sources compared this campaign to a similar campaign by the Turks that labeled the Kurds as “the mountain Turks.”57 At the same time the Kurds were prevented from affirming their national rights. They were seen by the Iraqis as part of the Iraqi nation and not as a separate national group within the Iraqi state. An example of this attitude took place during a 1960 Baghdad conference when the Iraqis and the Arab nationalists tried to keep the Association of Kurdish Students in Europe from becoming an independent member organization of the International Union of Students. During the conference, the Iraqi delegation, led by a Communist, Mahdi Hafiz, endorsed the UAR and north African delegations’ stand against the Kurdish students’ application.58 They considered the Kurds to be a minority group with no right to join an international organization as an independent entity.59 The debates at the conference were the main themes for two articles published in Khabat in which the Kurdish politicians attempted to clarify their position not only regarding the Arab students’ moves and policies, but also regarding the government’s broader intentions as exposed in the provisional constitution. In the provisional constitution Iraq was defined as part of the Arab nation, implicitly minimizing the Kurds’ position in this broader and more exclusive frame. The first article, “The Kurdish Nation and Article 2 of the Iraqi Provisional Constitution,”60 attempted to deconstruct Article 2, stating that the notion of “Iraq is a part of the Arab nation” is basically a “sentimental statement rather than a scientific and rational assertion.”61 The Khabat article argued that Iraq is “either a land much smaller than contemporary Iraq, if defined historically and geographically; or if defined politically, it was designating a country which was formed after WWI by joining a large portion of historical Iraq to Southern Kurdistan.” The article suggested that “Iraq cannot be considered a part of the Arab nation according to either the political concepts of the word, meaning the state, or the geographical concepts.” It emphasized that “Kurdistan was never considered as a part of the Arab land . . . including the part annexed to the Iraqi state, which is part of Kurdistan.” Khabat recommended rewriting Article 2 as follows: “[Iraq] consists of a Kurdish part [Iraqi Kurdistan] and an Arab part [Mesopotamia]. Only the Arab part of Iraq is part of the greater Arab homeland. Meanwhile, the Kurdish part is part of the Kurd’s homeland [Kurdistan].” It proposed that a permanent constitution (that never came to fruition) should consider the true interests of both Kurdish and Arab nationalities. Khabat asserted that Article 2 of the constitution contradicted Article 3, which stated, “Arabs and Kurds are considered partners in this home-

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land.” “This,” Khabat alleged, “renders Article 2 null and void.” It should be noted here that the notion that Iraq is a part of the Arab nation was proclaimed not only by Arab nationalists but also by Iraqi nationalists (e.g., NDP). In an editorial, al-Ahali, the organ of the NDP, made a similar claim.62 In the second Khabat article, “Partnership of the Kurds and Arabs in Article 3 of the constitution,” the writer acknowledged the significance of Article 3, considering it an “edifice which Arabs and Kurds can build on.” It attempted to define the partnership from a Kurdish perspective by suggesting that any kind of partnership “must acknowledge equal rights and responsibilities for both parties.” It further added that it was “irrational to connect the scope of rights in partnerships between nations to their population numbers.”63 The appearance of these two articles led the government to charge the editor of Khabat with complicity against the Iraqi authorities.64 It seems that the Kurdish perspective of the nation emphasized ethnic origins and rejected the statist view of nation based on the concept of nation-state. The Kurdish nationalist definition of nation entailed territorial contiguity, language, ethnic origin, historical roots, a common homeland, a shared culture, and a common memory.65 It rejected any kind of assimilation, instead asserting a restructuring of Iraq based on the notion of a binational state whereby both nations, the Kurds and the Arabs, would enjoy equal status. Indeed the Iraqi republic was labeled “the republic of Arabs and Kurds,” a phrase that was repeated in almost every one of the 465 issues of Khabat that was published during Qasim’s era (April 1959 to April 1961).66 The Kurds did not present a detailed proposal for a solution to the Kurdish problem. On a few occasions Khabat made reference to autonomy, though it never elaborated on what that term might mean.67 However, the KDP announced several times that its aim was not independence. It insisted that “we did not demand it [independence], rather we fought against it.”68 The Kurdish leadership, at the time, suggested that secession was “detrimental to the Kurdish cause and enfeebles [our] position.”69 Nevertheless, they did insist on national and territorial recognition of the land inhabited by the Kurds. Their persistent insistence on full independence for professional, union, and political representation, though not directly called for, attests to their inclination to a kind of federation or confederation. The publication of the aforementioned articles damaged the relationship between the KDP and the central government. Calls by Arab nationalists to assimilate the Kurds into the Arab nation created still more turmoil. Clovis Maqsud, the official representative of the Arab League in Baghdad, published an article in al-Thawra, a newspaper closely tied to the government, in which he stated that “anybody who is historically a Kurd, Negro or Armenian, and resides in a country that is part of the Arab homeland, is an Arab based on realpolitik. . . . It is necessary for the ethnic minorities to

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show their readiness to become part of the majority nation.”70 Khabat retaliated in a series of articles that led to a media row.71 It asserted that “futile attempts aimed at assimilating or fusing nationalities have failed and will fail.” It urged the government to denounce this campaign, warning that the “loyalty [of the Kurds] to the unity of [Iraq] and Arab-Kurdish brotherhood lies in condemning seditious attempts to wipe out the Kurdish nation.”72 What was more disappointing for the Kurds was that neither Qasim nor the government released any statement condemning the Arab nationalists’ call for Kurdish assimilation.73 On the contrary, Qasim questioned the origins of the Kurds by claiming that “Kurdu” was actually a title bestowed by ancient kings of Persia whose descendants were part of the conquering Muslim army.74 He began to refer to the Iraqis as “one nation” rather than a “bination,” as was stated in the constitution. Qasim suspected that granting autonomy to the Kurds might lead to their secession, as the Arab nationalists asserted. This caused him to delay the implementation of his promises to the Kurds. By late 1960, the tension between the Kurds and the government had reached a boiling point. The authorities in Baghdad arrested two leading stalwarts of the KDP and accused its secretary general, Ibrahim Ahmed, of murdering a Kurdish tribal leader.75 Both parties began to prepare for war. As a final gesture, the Kurdish leadership sent a memorandum to Qasim on July 30, 1961, pointing to the centrality of the question of identity in the ongoing conflict.76 The memorandum urged the government to implement Article 3 of the constitution that recognized the Kurds as “partners” of the Arabs in Iraq, and called for activation of the GDEKS. The linguistic rights of the students and the recognition of Kurdish as the second official language in Iraq occupied large sections of the memorandum. This further angered Qasim and his new Arab nationalist allies within the army. As a result, the Kurdish nationalists mobilized their forces. Circumstances were further aggravated by Kurdish aghas (landlords), who were bitterly opposed to Qasim’s agrarian reforms. Consequently, what had started as a Kurdish agha revolt soon gained support from all sectors of the Kurdish community, including the urban middle class and the intelligentsia.77 The conflict continued to the end of Qasim’s era.

Emergence of Shiite-Oriented Political Activism The 1958 Revolution was a turning point for the Shiites. The Shiites initially had hope that the new regime would be more inclusive by ending Sunni domination or at least enable the Shiites to have their fair share of representation. The Shiite clerics were among the first to congratulate Qasim. However, Qasim’s inclination was toward the left, as were his agrarian

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reforms and amendments to Iraq’s legal system, which were in the process of being changed from a Shari‘a Islamic law basis to a secular system. Qasim’s Personal Status Law introduced radical changes—for example, equating male and female rights of inheritance, raising the minimum age for marriage to eighteen years, setting equal rights of separation for women, and placing conditions on polygamy. 78 All these reforms prompted the Shiite mujtahids to rethink their support for the new regime.79 The secular laws were seen by the mujtahids as unprecedented as well as a threat to their religious authority. Two other factors angered the Shiite clerics: the abolition of the Tribal Dispute Act, which had reduced peasant rights and granted tribal leaders broad power over tribal lands, and the dismantling of parliament, a stronghold of the landowners and the tribal leaders. All these laws and decrees curtailed the rights previously enjoyed by tribal leaders and landowners. During the first year of the revolution, the Communists dominated the streets of most Iraqi cities, especially in the southern provinces. They labeled the religious institutions (Shiite and Sunni) as backward sources of superstition, and on one occasion they assaulted the chief marja‘, Muhsin al-Hakim.80 Feeling that their position, status, and religious authority were threatened, the Shiite clerics responded. In February 1960, al-Hakim issued a fatwa prohibiting the public from joining the ICP. The fatwa read: “Any connection with the Communist Party is unlawful. Such connection is in the nature of disbelief, or it is supportive of disbelief and infidelity.”81 The impact of the fatwa was considerable, especially on the lay Shiites in the countryside. It was heeded by the Shiites, despite Qasim’s housing initiative, which planned to build residential housing for the lower classes, which were overwhelmingly Shiite, and his support for the lower echelons of society that consisted mainly of Shiite peasants and those who migrated to the urban centers. This was possibly due to the fact that, in spite of Qasim’s efforts on the economic level, the Shiites felt that no significant reforms had been made to the political system. The Sunnis still dominated the main state institutions: the army, the police, and the government.82 Consequently, sectarian relations remained unchanged. The new political atmosphere involving the clash between the supporters of the ICP and Qasim on the one side and the clerics on the other created a condition for the emergence of political Islam in Iraq. The first Shiite communal political party, al-Da‘wa al-Islamiya (the Islamic Call, hereafter the Da‘wa), was formed in 1959 83 with the objective of countering the appeal of Communism by reviving Islam. This was a point of departure from traditional Shiite activism led by mujtahids, because the new party sought the establishment of an Islamic polity using modern methods. The establishment of a political party had been debated in Shiite circles since 1952, because Shiites felt that their identity was threatened.84 The debate

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raged among younger clerics and a few businessmen who realized that traditional religious activism had proven fruitless. This revival of religion and the attempt to find an avenue for political expression was aimed at restoring the clout of the Shiite clerics, as well as Shiite traditional institutions. Religious groups saw Communism as a threat to their identities and as an ideology that could affect all Shiites. In other words, the emergence of Shiite Islamism was a reaction to several internal factors: the expansion of an increasingly militant Communist ideology, the emergence of a new generation of Shiite clerics who grew frustrated by the passive approach of the traditional chief marja‘s (such as al-Ghatta and al-Hakim), and their reluctance to participate in Iraq’s politics more actively. Another reason was the establishment of two Sunni political organizations: the Iraqi Islamic party and the al-Tahrir party.85 Muhammad Baqir al-Sadr, Da‘wa’s most important theoretician, produced two major ideological works in 1959 and 1961, respectively: Falsafatuna (Our philosophy) and Iqtisaduna (Our economics).86 The former was a critique of the materialist communist school of thought, and the latter introduced an Islamic theory of political economy in an effort to counter the communist and capitalist systems. Although Da‘wa’s philosophical orientation was a reaction to communism, politically it aimed at ending the domination of the Sunnis. In order to establish a state based on al-Sadr’s theory, wilayat al-ummah (governance of the community), the state was identified as the means for achieving Islamic objectives. Da‘wa activism during Qasim’s era was minimal and mainly restricted to ideological debates among the founding members and a few sympathizers. Until 1964, the Da‘wa was unclear about its political objectives. In its first two decades, it never issued a political statement. As a party, the Da‘wa program was published for the first time in 1980.87 Initially Da‘wa activities were confined to Najaf and Karbala, and when the Sunni-led Islamic Party was established in 1960, al-Hakim endorsed it, indicating that the Da‘wa was still at its formative stage.88 Later, he also endorsed the Da‘wa Party.89 However, as a grand marja‘, he never involved himself directly in politics. Following the formation of the Da‘wa, another organization, Jama‘at al-Ulama (Society of Jurists) was established by some senior clerics.90 Like the Da‘wa, its aim was to revive Shiite values and to counter Communist challenges. Rather than deliberately targeting Qasim, mainly because of his huge popularity, it targeted the Communists. In return, Qasim granted the leaders of the Jama‘at al-Ulama access to government-controlled radio.91 The main difference between the Da‘wa and Jama‘at al-Ulama was that the former was a more political and ideological entity aimed at mobilizing the people, whereas the latter was more theological, focusing mainly on educating the people about various religious and socio-political matters. The establishment of these Shiite organizations and the two new Sunni Islamist parties marked a new trend in the political activities of Iraq that in time

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broke the domination of secular and nationalist forces, which had dominated the political scene. What facilitated the spread of these new movements in later years was the mass migration from rural areas to urban centers. During the monarchy, the migration was evolutionary, continuing at a steady pace, and was fairly organized. Later, the large-scale outflow from the villages to the main urban centers led to a ruralization of the cities. In 1958, nearly 120,000 people from rural areas moved to Baghdad alone.92 Most of them were Shiites who settled in two government-built districts: al-Thawra in al-Rasafa and alShu‘la in al-Karkh.93 One obvious feature of this trend was the prevalence of religious rituals and practices, as the new migrants, feeling separated from their traditional (religious/sectarian) environment and alienated in their new habitat, sought refuge in religion to reconstruct their collective identity. They also sought features in the urban areas that would keep them connected to their former rural practices. Ashura ceremonies became normal practice in Baghdad, whereas previously they had been restricted to the main Shiite holy centers of Najaf, Karbala, and al-Kadhimiya. As a response to the prevalence of Shiite customs and religious rituals in Baghdad’s streets, the Sunnis increased their participation in their own religious ceremonies, such as mawlud (the birth of the Prophet Muhammad).94 Due to the political expediency, the new Islamic parties adopted political programs that fostered alignment along sectarian lines. This is because Shiite political theory rested on the notion of the imamate, and Sunni political theory based its moorings on the concept of the caliphate. Both terms refer to the positions of successive leaders following the death of the Prophet Muhammad. In Shiism, the imams are considered to be divinely guided and infallible spiritual and political leaders of the Muslim community, who are descendants of the Prophet Muhammad. However, for the Sunnis, the caliphate is an elected office. Therefore, the four successors of Muhammad ruled in accordance with Islam. The Shiites, on the other hand, regard the caliphate as a hereditary office, which should have initially been given to the Prophet’s nephew and son-in-law, Ali. Consequently, with the establishment of the previously mentioned Islamist parties, the question of the imamate and the caliphate reopened the long-standing dispute among the Iraqi Muslim communities.95 Despite the establishment of Islamist organizations, the ICP and the Baath were strong and popular and able to overwhelm these nascent religious movements that were insignificant in the early 1960s. Indeed, the secular ideologies—social democrats (NDP), Communism (ICP), and Arab nationalism (Istiqlal and the Baath)—still provided the main political framework for intersectarian and interethnic collaboration. The interaction between modern and traditional ideologies enabled Qasim to become more autocratic. Add to that the clashes between the Arab nationalists and the Communists, and the latter’s unreserved endorsement of Qasim, whom they

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labeled as “the Sole Leader,” and Qasim was able to tighten his grip on the political apparatus as well as the population as a whole.

From Sole Leader to Dictator In early 1961, Qasim began campaigning against all opposition parties. He became more supportive of the Arab nationalists, especially after the Mosul and Kirkuk incidents, and distanced himself further from the ICP by expelling senior Communists from government posts. He dismissed Naziha al-Dulaimi, the only Communist minister in his cabinet, and limited the role of ICP organizations: the Peace Partisans, the Union of the Iraqi Youth, and the League for the Defense of Women’s Rights (al-Rabita). By late 1961, Qasim had lost his closest ally, the NDP. He soon banned al-Ahali, the party’s organ, because it urged the government to remove martial law, prepare a permanent constitution, and make way for parliamentary elections.96 Instead of listening to his former allies—the NDP, ICP, and KDP—Qasim seized the opportunity to enhance his own power. Consequently, the Sole Leader became a dictator, taking advantage of his huge popularity among large sections of the population. The reason for his popular appeal was his personal modesty and his efforts to address the needs of the most disadvantaged, efforts that seemed genuine to many in spite of all his blunders. One of the reasons Qasim changed his direction was the 1961 war in Kurdistan, which prompted him to seek support from the Arab nationalists who dominated the army. To gain their support, he released all prisoners, including the leading Baathists, and his personal rival, Arif. As a result, while Communist influence was waning, the Baathist star was rising. The Baath used the Shiite clerics’ anti-Communist stance to enhance its position. Al-Hakim’s fatwa was described by the Baathists as having “oiled” Qasim’s campaign wheels against the ICP.97 The Baathist ideological defiance of Qasim during al-Mahdawi’s special military court proceedings in late 1959 and 1960 that tried leaders of the monarchical regime, Baath party members accused of attempting to murder Qasim, and army officers who staged a failed coup against Qasim in 1959 garnered great respect for the party’s position and revitalized its image in the eyes of the population. By 1963, the Baath was in a position to launch a coup against Qasim. Under the new leadership of Ali Salih al-Sa‘di,98 and in conjunction with Arif, a platform was organized that included the Baath, the remnants of the Istiqlal Party,99 the Nasserites, and other Arab nationalists. They recruited members and established links with other groups that shared their antipathy for Qasim.100 Together they took decisive action against him. Oddly, by the end of 1962, the Kurds found themselves on the same side as their staunch rivals, the Arab nationalists and the Baathists. At its fifth conference, the Baath leadership contacted their Kurdish counterparts

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and officially adopted decentralization as a main tenet in the party’s platform. They also recognized the need to accord full cultural rights to the Kurds as a solution to the Kurdish question. The Kurds offered the Baathists a cease-fire in return for autonomy if and when Qasim was overthrown.101 Isolated from his previous political partners, Qasim was unable to confront a more active and stronger opposition when the Arab nationalists finally intervened militarily.

Arab Nationalists at the Helm On February 8, 1963, the political takeover by the Arab nationalists began with the assassination of the Communist commander of the air force, Jalal al-Awqati. This was followed by air attacks on the Ministry of Defense. An initial attempt on Qasim’s life failed. Fearing bloodshed and civil war, Qasim rejected the Communists’ request to supply weapons to thousands of supporters from the Shiite and Kurdish suburbs of Baghdad who came out on the streets. After one day of heavy casualties on both sides, Qasim surrendered. Without a trial, he was killed at the scene by a death squad.102 Arab nationalist and Baathist officers led the coup, though the Baath civilian wing also played a critical role during the organizational and implementation stages. Arif was appointed the president, and Ahmed Hassan alBakr,103 a Baathist officer, became the prime minister and vice president. Al-Sa‘di, secretary of the Baath, was appointed deputy prime minister and minister for the interior. The first radio announcement by the coup leaders criticized Qasim for “distancing Iraq” from the “Arab liberation journey.” The aim of the coup was identified as the “fulfillment of Arab unification” and “advancement of the Arabic and Kurdish fraternity.” Qasim was described as ‘adu al-Allah wa ‘aduwakum (the enemy of God and your enemy).104 Arab nationalist sentiments, colored with Islamic themes, were the underlying motifs of the new leaders’ statement. However, the Kurdish issue was not forgotten. A National Council of the Revolutionary Command (NCRC), dominated by the Baathists, was formed, consisting of civilian and military officers. Of the eighteen members, twelve were Sunni, including ten military representatives.105 The Shiites had five members,106 and the Kurds had one Arabized representative, al-Sa‘di.107 In the days following the coup, the Baath paramilitary force, al-Haras al-Qawmi (Arab National Guard), consisting mainly of Baathists, committed acts of unprecedented violence. Before the coup, the Baath used its army officers to train civilian members. During its early days, the paramilitary force’s membership numbered from 3,000 to 5,000, with many of its first groups formed and armed in al-Adhamiya, but this figure grew to nearly 40,000 by August 1963.108 Searching house to house, they arrested and

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killed nearly 5,000 Communists, nine members of the central committee, including the ICP general secretary, Salam Adil.109 The murderous campaign eliminated most high- and mid-level communist officials, while others escaped to Kurdistan or to Eastern bloc countries. However, signs of division soon appeared between the two Arab nationalist groups, the Nasserites and the Baathists. The Nasserites never formed a political party but were a collection of individuals who looked to Nasser for leadership and desired linkages with Egypt. In contrast, the Baath was a political party, whose ideology combined Arab unity with social and economic transformation. Its leadership looked to Syria where the party originated. The main point of disagreement between the Baathists and the Nasserites was the issue of unification. After the coup, Arif and Arab nationalists pushed for Iraq’s unification with Egypt. The less enthusiastic Baathists, however, were well aware of the ramifications, including possibly adverse reaction by the Kurds. The Baathists were also aware of the failure of the Syrian Baathists to unify with Egypt. In addition to their rivalry with the Nasserites, the Baathists were themselves divided into two camps: the leftists and the conservatives. While the former were idealists and consisted mainly of Shiite civilians, the latter were pragmatic and conservative in their approach both to the issues of unification and to social reform. The pragmatic conservatives were all Sunni military officers with whom Arif deeply aligned himself.110 After removing the Baathists from the partnership, the new regime abandoned the 1958 constitution and drafted a new one on April 29, 1964. The new constitution reflected Arif’s ambition for Arab unification. In comparison to the former constitution, it was far more Arab-centric, defining the “Iraqi al-Sha‘b [people] as a part of the Arab ummah [nation].” Its aim was comprehensive Arab unification, and it committed the government to work toward its realization. The constitution contained a few articles concerning the Kurds. It acknowledged that Kurdish national rights would be protected within the framework of Iraq. However, it did not consider the Kurds and Arabs as partners, as had the former constitution. Only Arabic was recognized as the official language.111 In the summer of 1963, a new flag was adopted that comprised the colors of the Arab revolution and a design similar to the Syrian and Egyptian flags. The new flag had three stripes—of red, white, and black—with three green stars in the white stripe that represented the three proposed countries of the UAR: Egypt, Syria, and Iraq. It had no symbols or other motifs to represent the Kurds or Iraq’s diversity.112 Arif’s regime went through several phases before he gained complete control of the country. He sidelined the Baath party on November 18, 1963, and in spring of 1965 a cabinet reshuffle provided him with the pretext for removing most of the Nasserites and other remnants of the Baath. The people who filled the vacuum were mostly members of Arif’s al-Jumaila

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tribe.113 Arif also changed the political landscape of Iraq in unexpected ways. For one, he tribalized and militarized the state. As a result, Arif and his close family members, mainly army officers, dominated all sectors of the government. Arif himself was the chairman and president of the NCRC. His brother, Abdul Rahman, became the chief of staff and commander of the forces in the field and of the fifth division. Arif’s co-tribesman, Sa‘id Slaibi, commanded the Baghdad garrison. 114 Arif also formed the Republican Guard as an elite unit, to be commanded and recruited from his tribe alone. Its supposed mission was to safeguard the republic. By November 1963, when Arif expelled the Baathists, the proposed UAR had already diminished, resulting in reducing his enthusiasm for the scheme. Despite his declining interest, a few practical and symbolic gestures were made. In June 1964, Arif and Nasser established a “unified political Command,” and in December the eagle of the UAR was adopted as the national emblem of Iraq.115 In southern Iraq on April 13, 1966, Arif was killed in a helicopter crash. His brother, Abdul Raham Arif, Arif II, replaced him.116 Abdul Rahman alBazzaz, the prime minister at the time, managed to hang on to his post.117 Like his brother, Arif II was an Arab nationalist and conservative in his religious outlook. Nevertheless, politically he was more open than his brother. He released many opponents of the regime and permitted limited expressions of political opinion.118 In 1966, during al-Bazzaz’s tenure as prime minister, the government reached an agreement with the Kurds. But alBazzaz’s soft policy approach to the Kurds was not appreciated by others. As a result, the military conducted a “white” (bloodless) coup and removed al-Bazzaz from his post. The government of Arif II was then jokingly known as the al-Aftirah government, representing the first letters of the names of the home towns of the senior government officials: ‘Ana, Fallujah, Tikrit, Rawa, and Hit, all of which were country towns of the upper Euphrates and inhabited only by the Sunnis.119 This set the stage for the Sunnification of the state apparatus, a process that continued until the removal of Saddam’s regime in 2003.

Territorial Identity: The Essence of the Kurdish Question Prior to the 1963 coup, Baath and Arab nationalists, joined in opposition to Qasim, had been in contact with the Kurdish leadership. The Baath promised autonomy to the Kurds, even though they had denied the existence of the Kurds until 1962, when they realized that they needed the Kurds to remove Qasim from power. For the Baathists, the term “Kurdistan” was taboo, viewed as a source of incitement, and the Kurds themselves were considered to be immigrants to the Arab homeland.120

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Prior to the coup, the Kurds promised a cease-fire in the ongoing hostilities in the event of Qasim’s removal. Accordingly, when the Baath took office, they initiated negotiations between the new regime and the Kurds. The first statement released by coup leaders was written in a language that was intended to catch the attention of the Kurds. It mentioned the “fraternity” of the Kurds and the Arabs.121 Consequently, a cease-fire was declared, and an agreement was reached on the vague principle of decentralization. Another statement was issued calling for the normalization of the situation in Kurdistan.122 In response, the Kurdish leadership presented a proposal based on their understanding of decentralization.123 The first article of the proposal defined Iraq as a “unified state consisting of two major nationalities, the Kurds and the Arabs, who enjoy equal rights based on the notion of self-determination.” The territorial boundaries for the Kurdish region that the Kurds suggested included the provinces of Erbil, Suleimaniya, Kirkuk, and all Kurdish districts in the provinces of Diyala and Ninawa. The Kurds rejected the central government’s request to disarm their Peshmerga forces.124 These negotiations with the Kurds coincided with the Iraqi negotiations with Egypt and Syria on the subject of unification. The Kurds believed that Arab unification conflicted with their ambitions within Iraq. They feared that any unification would disadvantage them in the negotiation process with the central government, because it would significantly alter the balance of power in favor of the central government. Accordingly, they added an article to the proposal stating that, in the event of unification and the changing of Iraqi citizenship to Arab citizenship, both the identification and the citizenship cards of the Iraqi Kurds should be marked as “Kurdistanis from UAR.” The Kurds’ fears soon materialized when Syria sent 5,000 soldiers to Iraq in 1963 to fight against the Kurds in support of the Iraqi regime. 125 The Kurdish proposal also restricted the movement of the Iraqi army in the Kurdish region. Moreover, the Kurds demanded proportionate (20 percent) representation in government positions and revenues. From the Arab nationalist and Baathist perspectives, these demands were neither reasonable nor acceptable because it would lead to the “creation of a state within a state.”126 The insistence by both parties on their positions, especially on the frontiers of the Kurdistan region, ended any hope for an easy settlement. From the Kurdish perspective, the unity of Iraq should have been voluntary, and the Kurds’ right to self-determination should have been respected. The proposal defined Iraq as consisting of two major nations, the Kurds and Arabs, with equal rights, and the Kurdish region should comprise all the Kurdish areas. However, the government proposed a kind of administrative federation that divided Iraq into six regions. The Kurdish region was not named but was to consist of the provinces of Suleimaniya, Erbil, and Dohuk, and the district of Chamchamal from Kirkuk province.127 Excluding

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the rest of Kirkuk, east Mosul, Sinjar, and Khanaqin added to their suspicion, with the result that the Kurdish team rejected the demands for disarming the Peshmerga forces. These problems and other disagreements caused negotiations to fail. The war resumed in Kurdistan, after which a systematic attempt to assimilate the Kurds into the bawtaqat al-Urubah (the Arab melting pot) commenced. The most obvious manifestation of this was the introduction of policies of ethnic cleansing and scorching the Kurdish land. This was the formal launch of Arabizing Kurdistan, a process that would be continued by successive Iraqi regimes and climaxing during the second Baathist era (see Chapter 6). In June 1963, seventy Kurdish villages were burned to the ground, and thousands of people were arrested and imprisoned.128 During the military raids, all male villagers twelve years old and over were arrested, tortured, and taken to detention centers in al-Musayib, south of Baghdad. The females were left to search for accommodation in nearby cities. The Arabs were then brought in from the western deserts of Iraq to settle in the depopulated villages.129 The campaign pushed Kurdish forces into the mountains of Kurdistan. Along with the military campaign was a propaganda program that fabricated the Arab origins of the Kurds.130 The processes of ethnic cleansing and Arabization set the scene for internal colonization. Nonetheless, in 1964, both sides reached an agreement. But the position of the Kurds was not uniform. A rift within the KDP appeared when Barzani supported the agreement, and the politburo, led by Ibrahim Ahmed and Jalal Talabani, rejected it. The faction led by Ahmed and Talabani rejected the “traditional leadership” of Barzani. The dissension that began in 1964 led to a split within the KDP in 1966. Barzani forces pushed Ahmed and Talabani’s faction out of Kurdistan. They surrendered to Iraqi authorities and cooperated with the regime until 1970 when both factions coalesced once again. Even Barzani saw little point in negotiating with a regime that intended to bury the Kurds in an Arab melting pot. Full-scale military operations resumed with the appointment of a Nasserite prime minister, Arif Abdul Razzaq. In spite of the internal divisions, the Kurdish national liberation movement continued its offensive, gaining momentum after the Hindren Mountain Battle in May 1966, when Iraqi forces suffered severe casualties.131 As the war in Kurdistan intensified, the grand Shiite marja‘, Muhsin al-Hakim, issued a fatwa forbidding fighting against the Kurds. The momentary defeat of the Iraqi army turned the situation around and gave the Kurds a huge moral and tactical boost. As a result, both sides reached an agreement known as the 1966 Accord. Prime Minister al-Bazzaz played a critical role in ensuring the success of the negotiations. As an Arab nationalist theoretician, al-Bazzaz was aware of the power of nationalism. Perhaps that is why he understood quite well that the only way out of the

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conflict was to recognize Kurdish political rights. The twelve-point 1966 Accord provided the Kurds with unprecedented promises. It laid the foundation for the recognition of Kurdish nationality and promised a binational state for the first time in modern Iraq’s history. It anticipated a high degree of decentralization, recognized the Kurdish language as an official language, and agreed to provide for proportional representation of the Kurds in state institutions.132 This attempt to appease the Kurds went further than any previous effort. However, under pressure from the military, Arif II soon cancelled the agreement. The military officers believed that any compromise on Kurdish national rights would lead to secession. They also believed that the concessions had been the result of the army’s defeat, something that needed to be overturned. Consequently, the accord and its articles were not implemented, and fighting resumed on all fronts.133 Contradictory visions for Iraq held by the Iraqi and Arab nationalists on one side and the Kurdish nationalists on the other led to renewed clashes on the issues of Iraq’s nationhood quest and Kurdistan’s territorial identity. These facts demonstrate once again that the crux of the Kurdish problem was related not only to the failure of Iraq’s political leadership to recognize Kurdish ethnic identity but also to Kurdish aspirations for full nationhood and territorial and political autonomy. A satisfactory resolution of these conflicts of ideas is important even today, because Iraqi and Arab nationalists still refer to Iraqis as “one people” who are part and parcel of a “greater Arab nation.” This notion lies in stark contrast to the Kurds’ vision of Iraq as a state in which two major national groups (and other minority groups) cohabit in one state called Iraq. We should note that when the Arab nationalists assumed power in Iraq, the Kurds were not the only group with whom they clashed. A fierce campaign against the Communists also ensued. All these clashes and fights for supremacy hampered the process of national integration.

Sunni Sectarianism and the Shiite Response The removal of Qasim, along with his inclusive policies toward the Shiites, and his close relationship with the Communists, ended the Shiites’ hope of gaining equal status in the political system. In the first six months of Baathist rule, the Communists were subject to unprecedented suppression. This further weakened the Shiite-based patriotic movement and undermined their political roles. By the end of 1963, a few members of the central committee of the ICP who had escaped persecution and left Iraq slipped back into the country and reactivated some ICP cells. However, their stand against Arif’s regime led to a split in the central committee. A group of Maoists, led by Aziz al-Hajj, advocated armed struggle against the regime. Another Communist group that retained the loyalty of the majority adopted

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a more accommodating approach toward the government. Al-Hajj’s group launched guerrilla warfare on a limited scale in the Middle Euphrates and southern marshland areas. Both al-Hajj and Aziz Muhammad, who became the secretary of the ICP’s main faction, were of Kurdish origin. The Kurdish Communists had a better chance of escaping the extermination campaign because they could join the Kurdish revolution in Kurdistan.134 During Arif’s administration the clash between the Sunnis and Shiites became more serious. Arif’s conservative and religious beliefs made him known for his anti-Shiite views, and he labeled the Shiites as rawafidh (rejectionists), an insulting term. He described them as “the frivolous Sh‘ubi(sts).”135 Moreover, during both Arifs’ reigns, several books were published by well-known Iraqi and Arab writers on the origins of the Sh‘ubiya. Perhaps the most authoritative was al-Juzur al-Tarikhiya lil Sh‘ubiya (The historical roots of Sh‘ubiya) by Abdul Aziz al-Duri, a Sunni intellectual who was the president of Baghdad University. He linked Shiism with the Sh‘ubiya and questioned the roots of Shiism and the extent of Shiite loyalty to Iraq. Al-Duri described the historical settlement of various people in Iraq as follows: Iraq . . . is contiguous with the [Arabian] peninsula. [T]herefore the waves of people [Arabs] who came from there imbued it with Arab Semitic characteristics. However, eastern peoples [Iranians, a reference to Shiites and Kurds] came to it [Iraq] only as invaders. Although, they returned to their homelands after short or long periods, they left people here [Iraq]. These groups of people have cultural roots that are foreign.136

Al-Duri viewed the Kurds and the Shiites as foreigners with Iranian roots and not part of the Iraqi nation because they were not “genuine Arabs.” It was not just the Arab nationalists who labeled the Shiites and the Kurds as Sh‘ubi; even some Sunni Islamists did so—even more explicitly. In an editorial on June 15, 1960, Al-Fajir al-Jadid, a newspaper closely associated with Sunni Islamist political parties, described the Sh‘ubis as “the enemies of Arab nationalism who hate the Arabs.” With particularly close ties to the small Iraqi political party Hizb al-Tahrir al-Islami that, in turn, had close ties to Arab nationalists, Al-Fajir al-Jadid further stated that “the Sh‘ubis are mostly sediments of invading waves [Iranians] and foreigners [Kurds].”137 It branded all Communists as Sh‘ubis and twisted the name of the main publication of the ICP from its original name, Itihad al-Sha‘b (the Unity of the People) to Itihad al-Sh‘ubiyun (the Union of Sh‘ubis). It also linked the collapse of Arab-Islamic civilization to the “Sh‘ubist” movement. According to Al-Fajir al-Jadid, these “sediments . . . have returned today to play the same role they played in the past to weaken the Arabs.”138 Basically, Shiism was seen by some Sunnis as the nest of Sh‘ubism. In general, any Shiite demand for freedom and equality during Iraq’s modern history, including the Shiites’ secular and patriotic aims within the Communist

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movement, was closely linked to notions of Sh‘ubism. While the state’s discriminatory policies were presented as nationalistic, the Shiite resistance was branded as sectarian. It is quite ironic that it was the Sunni rule that provided the setting for the Shiite religiously oriented political renaissance. By questioning the origins and loyalty of the Shiites and the Kurds to Iraq, the Sunnis (Islamists and Arab nationalists) ended up excluding nearly 80 percent of Iraq’s population from the process of national integration. The anti-Shiite and anti-Kurdish views expressed in newspapers and books were matched equally by the restrictions imposed on their economic activities. In 1964, the government’s policy on nationalization defined the parameters of these restrictions. Indeed nationalization was partly based on ethnic and sectarian motifs. During the latter part of the Baath era, Fadhil al-Barak, an Iraqi academic and the head of the Iraqi General Intelligence (1983–1989), pointed out that the Shiite and Faili-Kurd merchants dominated the trade and the industrial sectors in the 1950s and 1960s. 139 Their exclusion from state institutions (army, police, and government) forced many of them to resort to trade as a viable career path. The Faili-Kurds and the Shiites dominated Baghdad’s main market, al-Shorja. During the early 1950s, they became more involved in trade when many Jews who traditionally dominated the trade market and the suq al-sarafin (exchange market) were expelled from Iraq. It was reported that before the launch of the nationalization policy in 1964, Prime Minister Tahir Yahya visited al-Shorja and heard the Shiites mourning during their Ashura assemblies. When Yahya heard the sorrowful songs, he pledged to remove the Shiites from the marketplace. 140 The government soon nationalized many industries and sought control of the marketplace by creating establishments to regulate trade. In July 1964, the government nationalized twenty-seven industrial, four commercial, nine insurance, and five banking companies.141 This move appeared to be a deliberate and well-thought-out move intended to deprive the Shiites and the Faili-Kurds of both political power and economic control. As signs of heightened sectarianism became apparent, the Shiite community responded in various ways. In an attempt to persuade the grand marja‘, al-Hakim sent a letter to Yahya in March 1964 warning him of the consequences of sectarianism. In the letter he mentioned that sectarianism was everywhere, and “it is the government’s duty to look at the population fairly and equally, without differentiation or discrimination because of their ethnic and sectarian belonging.”142 A year later a prominent Shiite literary and political personality, Muhammad Ridha al-Shibibi, sent a memorandum to the new prime minister al-Bazzaz in which he summarized Shiite grievances. The memorandum was significant because its content was endorsed by the majority of Shiites. It suggested that sectarianism had never been practiced so openly in Iraq. In this regard Al-Shibibi stated the following:

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Recent developments [including Arif’s takeover] have proved, unfortunately, that the divisive spirit has been revived and is stronger and wilder than ever before. They [Shiites] cannot accept to have their Arab affiliation . . . loyalty to their fatherland . . . slandered by certain public figures and hired newspapers [the books and newspaper who accused the Shiites of being Sh‘ubis]. The government should reverse this improvised policy [of nationalization].143

In 1960, al-Sadr unofficially resigned from the Da‘wa and retreated to hawza (a seminary of traditional Shiite Islamic studies), ostensibly to focus more on his writing and complete his second major book, Iqtisaduna (Our economics).144 The gap in the leadership was filled with noncleric Shiite activists, among them Abdul Sahib Dukheil and Salih al-Adib. This was a point of departure for the Da‘wa, as its focus turned from religious circles to the mainstream Shiite community, especially to middle-class, educated professionals and university students.145 Armed with the ideological vision framed by Baqir al-Sadr, the Da‘wa attempted to fill the ideological gap left by the failure of both the Baath (during the Arifs’ rule) and the Communists (during Qasim’s rule). The new leadership “changed the nature of the Da‘wa from a universalist Islamic group in defense of Islam to a segmented organization fighting in defense of [Shiite] group interests.” 146 The reality is that any religious organization in a multireligious or sectarian society eventually becomes the party of a subnational group. It has been almost impossible for a religious party to represent the interests and ambitions of the Shiites and Sunnis at the same time. The Da‘wa was no exception to this rule, as it focused its religiously oriented activities on the interests of the Shiite identity: the commemoration of Ashura. The Da‘wa initiated mawakib husseiniya (mourning sittings and processions) not only in the religious cities of Karbala and Najaf, but even on the university grounds in Baghdad where celebrating various Shiite religious events became its primary focus. According to Da‘wa sources, around 4,000 university students annually took part in Ashura processions, and more than 1,500 copies of the Da‘wa underground paper, Sawt al-Da‘wa, were distributed to members and supporters at the University of Baghdad alone during the mid-1960s.147 In the early 1960s, the activities of the three Shiite political/religious players—al-Hakim (the grand marja’), Jama‘at al-Ulama (the organization for senior clerics), and the Da‘wa—revolved around building husseiniya mosques and libraries in major Shiite centers. These libraries and venues served as gathering places for recruiting members for the Da‘wa until their closure in the early 1970s by the Baathist regime.148 The primary aim of these centers was to educate young Shiites and turn them away from secular, Communist, and nationalist ideologies. Yet by the late 1960s, the Da‘wa was still an emerging organization with several thou-

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sand members, and its focus was certainly not restricted to religious activities.149 That is why, despite all the repression, the Arifs’ era is considered to be a golden era for modern Shiite politics. The Shiite religious activists still enjoyed relative freedom because the regime focused on the activities of rival groups—the Baathists and the Communists—and also because the Shiite movement was still at its nascent stage. The most significant aspect of the emergence of the Da‘wa was that it provided space for the Shiites to organize themselves around religious ambitions. However, it created an obstacle for national integration by limiting the scope of Shiite political activities to Shiite circles.

Embedded Ideology: Left vs. Right As was the case during the monarchy and Qasim’s era, during the Arifs’ era the Sunni areas were the heartland of Arab nationalists, while the Shiite and the Kurdish areas were the bastions of the patriots and/or Kurdish nationalists. The best illustration of this was the division of the Iraqis along ethnic and sectarian lines with respect to the February 8, 1963, coup. When the news about the coup spread, the ICP called on its supporters to stand against the “conspirators.” The people from the Shiite suburbs of Baghdad poured into the streets to defend the regime. Simultaneously, the residents of the Sunni suburbs of Baghdad came out to support the Arab nationalists and the Baathists.150 This scenario shows that despite Qasim’s nonsectarian policies, the deep-seated divisions between the sects and ethnic groups remained intact for all practical purposes. In 1963, even within the Baath party, ideological differences were embedded along sectarian lines. The left-oriented civilian wing, consisting of Ali Salih al-Sa‘di, Hamdi Abdul Majid, Muhsin al-Sheikh Radhi, Abu Talib Abdul Mutalib al-Hashimi, Hani al-Fkaiki, Hazim Jawad, and Talib Shibib, was dominated by Shiites. They were opposed to reversing Qasim’s statutes and the labor and agrarian laws and were more tolerant of Kurdish rights. In contrast, the right wing, consisting of Ahmad Hassan al-Bakr, Salih Mahdi Ammash, Abdul Satar Abdul Latif, Tahir Yahya al-Tikriti, Muhammad Hussein al-Mahdawi, Rashid Muslih, and Hamid al-Tikriti, were exclusively Sunni military officers and conservative in their political outlook. They called for the reversal of Qasim’s reforms and firmly supported a military solution to “the Kurdish question.” Friction between the two wings emerged when the chief Shiite marja‘, al-Hakim, went through Baghdad to visit Samarra. The military wing refused to send a government representative to welcome al-Hakim, and his march through Baghdad was seen by top-ranking Sunni military officers as a provocative sectarian demonstration. Under pressure from the civilian wing, the military wing agreed to send a representative on condition that the representative would

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be a military officer. However, al-Hakim asked to meet the Shiite members of the Baath. The upshot was a meeting in which al-Hakim raised issues of torture as well as disappearances and killings of the Communists at the hands of the Baathists. Several demands were presented to the government, including provisions for the opportunity to study Shiite jurisprudence and the funding of Shiite religious institutions.151 When the civilian wing rejected the proposal for the reversal of Qasim’s reforms, the military wing, including Arif and al-Bakr, threatened to resign.152 The other contentious issue between civilian and military Baathists related to the treatment of the Communists held in detention centers. While the military wing embarked on a strong campaign and sought to eliminate the Communists, the civilian wing was sympathetic because captured Communists were mostly Shiites. In fact, the civilian wing arranged to help save some of the Communists by having them released from prisons and/or transferring them to detention centers far from the reaches of the military officers.153 After several months in government, the conflict between the left and right of the Baath came to a head. Sunni officers convinced the left wing to strip al-Sa’di of his powers. He was replaced by a moderate Shiite, Hazim Jawad. This action set the scene for a move by the right wing. On November 11, during a regional party conference in Baghdad, the military wing stormed the building.154 The left-wing members were held at gunpoint, handcuffed, and sent by plane to Spain on the same day.155 When Sa‘dun Hamadi, a senior Shiite Baathist, protested the officers’ intervention, he was told to “shut up, Abdul Zahra” (a name used to denounce the Shiites). The left wing was accused by the right wing of sympathizing with the Communists and aiding their escape. A new leadership team for the Baath was appointed by the officers with the support of other senior Sunni military officers in the party. The new team included six military officers (all Sunni), three Shiites, nine Sunni civilians, and one Christian. Two days later the last two moderate Shiite members, Hazim Jawad and Talib Shibib, of the new team were pressured to leave Iraq. That is how the Shiite domination of the Baath leadership ended and a radical, revolutionary-oriented Shiite-civilian political party was transformed into a conservative Sunnimilitary organization. The rise of the Sunnis and the decline of the Shiites at the helm of the Baath has been linked to the discriminatory practices of the Iraqi police after Arif removed the Baath from power.156 Batatu states that the “Baathists belonging to [the Shiite] sect were, after the November 1963 coup by Abdul Salam Arif, more systematically hunted than their Sunni comrades and, when nabbed, treated with severity, whereas the latter [the Sunnis] frequently escaped with light sentences.” Batatu suggests that these policies were not due to sectarian prejudice but to nepotism. However, the Shiites’ significant leading role in Baath leadership ended as a consequence of the military

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wing’s takeover. Senior Shiite members of the Baath were dismissed from their posts and exiled a few days before November 18, when Arif intervened and ousted the Baath totally from power. The Shiite share of Baath leadership roles dropped from 53.8 percent before the Baathist Sunni military officers’ internal plot to only 5.6 percent afterward. While police discrimination certainly played a role, it was primarily the discriminatory policies and internal conflicts of the Baath, which were embedded along sectarian lines, that decreased Shiite leadership roles. One of the devastating consequences of the embedded ideology was the passing on of historical sectarian animosities to ideological currents. In the absence of any form of democracy, and due to the domination of a radical and revolutionary environment, any difference of opinion quickly led to the elimination of opponents. The situation was further exacerbated by the fact that neither Qasim nor the Arifs attempted to create representative institutions or hold parliamentary elections while they were in charge.

Republican Eras: The Fate of National Integration The process of national integration that emerged during the monarchy was strengthened with the appearance of several ideologies that were embraced by Iraqis from different ethnic and sectarian backgrounds. The process gained momentum as rival groups collaborated to oppose the monarchy and British influence in Iraq. One of the reasons for this was that, before the 1958 Revolution, both the Kurds and the Arabs perceived their homeland to have been divided by colonial powers. This apparently helped the process of national integration during the monarchy. However, with the removal of the monarchy and the expulsion of the British, these first attempts at cooperation ceased. This would seem to indicate that the Arab and Kurdish attempts at rapprochement in the 1950s and 1960s were situational. There are some who attribute the failure of national integration to “deep-seated ideological and class differences within the coalition that fostered the [1958] revolution.” 157 While not totally baseless, other factors were more responsible for the failure of the process of national integration. First, Iraqi patriotism could not develop or find the core values and elements necessary to build a nation-state. Indeed, the Iraqi patriotism that emerged in the 1940s, 1950s, and 1960s was mostly firebrand rhetoric against imperialism. Examples of this rhetoric can be seen in the literature produced by the ICP, the Baath, and the KDP (before and after the 1958 Revolution) and also in Qasim’s speeches. Second, while Qasim demonstrated his awareness of the multiethnic and multisectarian nature of Iraqi society when he made constitutional gestures such as the Arab and the Kurd partnership in Iraq, no institutional and practical measures were taken to

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foster closer ties between the Kurds and the Arabs or between the Sunnis and the Shiites, beyond the fight against imperialism. Although Qasim focused more on domestic issues and was more generous than previous regimes in recognizing Kurdish rights, in the absence of any longstanding practical measures, he failed to prevent the erosion of the limited process of national integration developed during the monarchy. More devastating, Qasim’s era opened the door to direct military intervention, which in later years created more instability and led to the rise of authoritarian regimes. Third, in the absence of democratic traditions and institutions, the ideological competition turned nasty. Instead of the demonstrations, protests, and media campaigns that characterized the mode of political expression during the monarchy, elimination of opponents became the norm. Fourth, the rise to power of the Arab nationalists in 1963 contributed greatly to the failure of national integration. Government agendas became less Iraq-centric and more in favor of the Sunni Arab nationalists. The assumption of power by the Arab nationalists also marked the end for any hope of democratic polity that had existed previously. As a result, a system had emerged where military force was legitimized, and conspiracies, assassinations, and the elimination of opponents became daily occurrences. Other factors relating to national integration should not be overlooked or underestimated, among them the weakening of the ICP. During the monarchy and during the early years of the republic, the ICP was the best venue for establishing cordial relations between the Kurds and the Shiites and thereby promoting national integration. The ICP’s cross-ethnic and sectarian ideology permitted close cooperation between the different groups. However, it suffered heavily at the hands of the Baathists and the Arab nationalists in 1963, and, as a result, the process of national integration lost its major platform. After the suppression of the ICP by the Baathists in 1963, the Communist movement was dominated by the Kurds for quite some time. In 1965, the Kurdistan regional section of the ICP became the largest branch of the party.158 This happened because the liberated areas of the Kurdish region that were controlled by the KDP provided a safe haven for the Kurdish Communists. They soon formed an armed wing to conduct guerrilla warfare in conjunction with KDP forces. Although a few Arab and Christian Communists joined the guerrilla movement, it consisted mainly of Kurds. In 1966, the Kurdistan branch of the ICP became semi-independent, holding separate conferences and drafting its own policies. Disarray among ICP members led to factionalism and schisms within both the leadership and the rank and file. In 1967, Aziz al-Hajj abducted and arrested several members of the central committee before it split from the ICP and formed a separate faction called Central Command. All these activities weakened the party and reduced its influence.

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In addition to the ICP, the Baath Party, at least in its early years, was another organization in which both the Sunnis and the Shiite Arab nationalists could fight for their common goal (i.e., the unification of Arabs). However, the ousting of the Shiite civilian wing by the Sunni military wing brought to an end that period of cross-sectarian cooperation. The assaults on the Communists and the ousting of the civilian Shiite wing of the Baath created an ideological and political vacuum in later years, which was to be filled by the Da‘wa. The Shiite community’s retreat from secular ideologies, which had better chances of transcending ethnic and sectarian lines, reinforced religious ideologies that represented only one segment of Iraqi society. More importantly, the Da‘wa took advantage of the sentiments that emerged as a consequence of continued discrimination against the Shiites, especially during the reign of the Arifs. Ultimately, the Da‘wa became the Shiites’ answer to the ICP and to the Sunni-dominated Baath party. A factor that cannot be overlooked, which also led to the failure of national integration, was the phenomenon of embedded ideologies along ethnic and sectarian lines. This phenomenon was a reflection of the nature of Iraqi society in which each ethnic and sectarian group had its own vision for Iraq. For the most part these ideologies and groups not only competed but contradicted each other. By the late 1960s, as the Sunnis increasingly dominated the political scene and sidelined the ICP, various other political processes emerged. Among them was the Sunnification and tribalization of the state’s structure. The loyalty to family, kin, tribe, ethnicity, and sect reinvigorated and challenged the nascent notions of patriotism, shoving the Kurds in the north and the Shiites in the south and center to the periphery and further marginalizing them. With all of these processes and movements happening simultaneously, it is little wonder that national integration failed. Despite the failure of the process, Qasim’s era will certainly be remembered as a period that strengthened patriotic ideas. It was during his time that identification with Iraq and its territory gained momentum, especially as leftist intellectuals produced literature and artworks that praised and embraced Iraqism. In the process, Qasim became the symbol of Iraqi patriotism for later generations.

Notes 1. Established in 1955, the Baghdad Pact was designed to promote political, military, and economic cooperation between Turkey, Iraq, Great Britain, Pakistan, and Iran. The main purpose of the pact was to prevent Communist incursions and foster peace in the Middle East. It committed the states to the policy of nonintervention in each other’s affairs. 2. Taheri, “Iraq: The Failure,” p. 158; Hashim, “Military Power,” p. 31. 3. In 1956, the Free Officers formed a supreme committee consisting of Abdul

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Karim Qasim (Sunni father and Faili [Shiite] Kurd mother); Naji Talib and Muhsin Hussein al-Habib (Shiites); and Muhyadin Abdul Hamid, Rajab Abdul Majid, Abdul Wahhab Amin, Abdul Salam Arif, Abdul Rahman Arif, Tahir Yahya, Rif‘at al-Hajj Sirri, Abdul Karim Farhan, Muhammad Saba‘, Wasfi Tahir, Sabih Ali Ghalib, and Abdul Wahhab al-Shawwaf (Sunnis) (Batatu, The Old Social Classes, pp. 777–783). 4. Ibid., p. 783. 5. Ibid., pp. 104–105. 6. Abdul Karim Qasim (1914–1963) was born in Suwayra, near Baghdad. He graduated from the Military College in 1941 and joined the Free Officers in 1955. Abdul Salam Arif (1921–1966) was born to a poor Sunni family in Baghdad with strong tribal connections in al-Rumadi. He graduated from the Military College in 1941 and joined the Free Officers in 1957. 7. Farouk-Sluglett and Sluglett, Iraq Since 1958, pp. 47, 51. 8. For the full English version of the statement, see Barzani, Mustafa Barzani, pp. 165–166; for the Arabic version, see al-Hassani, The History of Iraqi Cabinets, vol. 10, pp. 316–317. 9. They were Muhammad Mahdi Kuba, a Shiite who headed the Istiqlal Party; Khalid al-Naqishbandi, a Kurd and former officer; and Najib al-Rubai‘i, a Sunni army officer. 10. The constitution was adopted on July 27, 1958. For the full version, see alHassani, The History of Iraqi Cabinets, vol. 10, pp. 325–328. 11. Batatu, The Old Social Classes, pp. 812, 844. 12. Wimmer, “Democracy and Ethno-Religious Conflict,” p. 116. 13. The United Arab Republic was a union between Egypt and Syria. The union began in February 1958 and broke up in September 1961 when Syria withdrew. 14. Haj, The Making of Iraq, p. 113. 15. Quoted in Batatu, The Old Social Classes, p. 817. 16. Farouk-Sluglett and Sluglett, Iraq Since 1958, p. 51; Tripp, A History of Iraq, p. 153. 17. Al-Fkaiki, The Den of Defeat, p. 89. 18. Batatu, The Old Social Classes, pp. 816–818. 19. Al-‘Ani et al., The History of Iraqi Cabinets, vol. 1, p. 130. 20. Barzani, Mustafa Barzani, p. 212. 21. For the full text of the Cooperation Alliance between the KDP and ICP, see Barzani, Mustafa Barzani, p. 203. 22. Haj, The Making of Iraq, p. 118. 23. Batatu, The Old Social Classes, pp. 951–954. 24. One of the assassins who escaped to Syria was a 23-year-old Baathist named Saddam Hussein. 25. Al-Fkaiki, The Den of Defeat, p. 95. 26. Al-Rikabi, The Only Solution, pp. 24–25. 27. Shruqi is a derogative term used to identify people from southern Iraqi Shiite cities who migrated to Baghdad after the 1930s. 28. Al-Fkaiki, The Den of Defeat, p. 118; Batatu, The Old Social Classes, p. 851. 29. Hashim, “Military Power,” p. 32. 30. Batatu, The Old Social Classes, pp. 866–889; Ahmed, The Journey, p. 135. 31. Marr, The Modern History of Iraq, p. 91. 32. Haj, The Making of Iraq, p. 120. 33. Batatu, The Old Social Classes, pp. 866–871. Launched in October 1958, the agrarian reforms redistributed the lands of the large landowners to the peasants.

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The landowners could keep only 618 acres (1,000 dunums) of irrigated areas or 1,236 acres (2,000 dunums) in rainfall areas (Farouk-Sluglett and Sluglett, Iraq Since 1958, p. 76). To defuse Shiite and Sunni religious opposition to his agrarian reforms, Qasim excluded waqf (religiously endowed) lands. This measure greatly reduced the radical impact of the law (Tripp, A History of Iraq, p. 161). 34. Batatu, The Old Social Classes, pp. 866–871. 35. Al-‘Ani et al., The History of Iraqi Cabinets, vol. 2, pp. 103–105. 36. Ibid. 37. Khabat (newspaper), March 9, 1960, p. 1. 38. Among the high-ranking army officers who were executed were Rif‘at alHajj Sirri and Nadhim al-Tabaqchali. Another high-ranking officer, Abdul Wahhab al-Shawwaf, was killed during the rebellion. 39. Itihad al-Sha‘b (organ of ICP), September 24, 1959, p. 5; al-Rikabi, The Only Solution, p. 63; Hussein, Abdul Karim Qasim and the Communists, p. 212. 40. Nadhim al-Tabaqchali (1913–1959) was born in Baghdad, though his family originated from Syria. He was a member of the Free Officers movement and served as commander of the Second Brigade based in Kirkuk (Batatu, The Old Social Classes, pp. 810, 811). 41. Al-‘Ani et al., The History of Iraqi Cabinets, vol. 2, pp. 25–30. 42. Batatu, The Old Social Classes, pp. 912–921. 43. Nuri, Memoirs of Baha al-Din Nuri, p. 105. 44. See Khabat, September 13, 1959, pp. 1, 6. 45. Barzani, Mustafa Barzani, pp. 174–175. 46. Quoted in Natali, “Manufacturing Identity,” p. 266. 47. Al-‘Ani et al., The History of Iraqi Cabinets, vol. 1, p. 209. 48. Al-Waqai‘ al-Iraqiya, June 27, 1959. This newspaper was (is) the official gazette of the government. 49. Replacing Rizgari, Khabat was (and still is) the organ of the KDP. The first issue was published on April 4, 1959. During Qasim’s era it was the mouthpiece of the Kurdish nationalists. 50. Khabat, April 4, 1959, pp. 1, 2, 5; April 8, 1959, p. 1. 51. Karim, The History of the Kurdistan Democratic Party, p. 61. Most highranking left-oriented KDP members were ousted from the party, including Hamza Abdullah, Hamid Othman, and Salih al-Haidari. All had close ties with the ICP. 52. Baghdad, August 2, 1959; al-Botani, Documents on the Kurdish, p. 69. 53. Khabat, August 31, 1959; September 1, 1959; September 9, 1959. 54. Khabat, August 31, 1959; September 14, 1959. 55. Khabat, July 27, 1960; November 20, 1960. 56. Khabat, August 24, 1960; September 2, 1960; al-Itihad al-Sha‘b, September 2, 1960. 57. Khabat, September 2, 1960. 58. Asharq al-Awsat, May 26, 2004. 59. Khabat, October 13, 1960; October 21, 1960; Zangana, “The Trial of Khabat,” p. 147. 60. It is believed that the writer of both articles was general secretary of the KDP Ibrahim Ahmed. 61. Khabat, October 19, 1960, p. 1. Zangana republished Khabat’s article, “The Trial of Khabat.” Barzani translated short selections of the article into English in Mustafa Barzani, pp. 223–224. 62. Al-Ahali, April 29, 1960, p. 1. The NDP played an important role getting Article 3 into the provincial constitution, which stated that the “Kurds and Arabs are partners in Iraq.”

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63. Khabat, October 20, 1960, p. 1. 64. McDowall, The Modern History of the Kurds, p. 304. 65. Khabat, June 16, 1960, p. 5; and July 24, 1960, p. 5. 66. For examples, see Khabat, April 4, 1959, and December 7, 1960. 67. See Khabat, September 7, 1960. 68. See Khabat, September 30, 1959, and November 2, 1960. 69. Barzani, Mustafa Barzani, p. 176. 70. Al-Thawra, February 17, 1961. Khabat republished a version of alThawra’s article on February 19, 1961. 71. The media row was mainly between the al-Thawra and Baghdad newspapers, representing the Arab nationalists and Qasim on one side, and Khabat and Dangi Kurdistan newspapers, representing the Kurdish nationalists, on the other side. 72. See Khabat, February 20, 1961. 73. See Khabat, March 16, 1961; Karim, The History of the Kurdistan Democratic Party, p. 78. 74. Natali, The Kurds and the State, p. 52. 75. Zangana, “The Trial of Khabat,” p. 122. The two leading members of the KDP who were arrested were Saida Salih Yousifi (arrested in December 1960) and Umer Dababa (arrested in January 1961). See Khabat, January 22, 1961; January 27, 1961. 76. For the full text of the memorandum, see Karim, The History of the Kurdistan Democratic Party, pp. 75–83. 77. A Kurdish leader, Fuad Arif, claimed that it was not true that Barzani supported the Kurdish aghas. Barzani himself was not a landowner and had nothing to lose with Qasim’s reforms (al-‘Ani et al., The History of Iraqi Cabinets, vol. 5, p. 145). Indeed, the KDP considered the “eradication of [the] feudal relationship” a necessity (Khabat, September 25, 1960, p. 1). 78. See al-Waqai‘ al-Iraqiya, December 30, 1959. 79. Al-Alawi, The Shiite and the Nation-State, p. 210; Nakash, The Shi‘is of Iraq, p. 135. 80. Al-Alawi, The Shiite and the Nation-state, pp. 214–215. Muhsin al-Hakim (1889–1970) was born in Najaf. He became the grand marja‘ in 1961. He is the father of Abdul Aziz al-Hakim, the former leader of the Supreme Council for the Islamic Revolution in Iraq, and grandfather of Amar al-Hakim, the current leader. 81. Jabar, The Shi‘ite Movement in Iraq, p. 124. 82. Al-Alawi, The Shi‘ite and the Nation-State, pp. 211–213; al-Fkaiki, The Den of Defeat, pp. 117–118. 83. The date for the establishment of the Da‘wa party is disputed but ranges from 1957 to 1964 (Jabar, The Shi‘ite Movement in Iraq, pp. 78, 95–96; see also, alMusawi, The Islamic Da‘wa Party). 84. Jabar, The Shi‘ite Movement in Iraq, p. 107. 85. Ibid., pp. 78–86. The Iraqi Islamic party and al-Tahrir party were established in early 1960 (Alaywi, Political Parties in Iraq, pp. 178–180). 86. See al-Sadr, Our Philosophy; al-Sadr, Iqtisaduna (Our economics). 87. Jabar, The Shi‘ite Movement in Iraq, pp. 93, 98. 88. Ibid., p. 125. 89. See al-Musawi, The Islamic Da‘wa Party. 90. The senior Shiite clerics in Najaf were divided between traditional scholars who advocated aloofness from politics and activists who advocated involvement. Only the latter organized themselves under the banner of Jama‘at al-Ulama (see Aziz, “The Role of Muhammad Baqir al-Sadr”).

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91. Ibid., p. 110; see also Aziz, “The Role of Muhammad Baqir al-Sadr.” 92. Al-‘Ani et al., The History of Iraqi Cabinets, vol. 5, p. 211. A similar phenomenon was noticed in the Kurdish region as waves of people from the villages left for the Kurdish major cities such as Suleimaniya, Kirkuk, and Erbil (see Khabat, February 9, 1960). 93. Al-Rasafa is located on the eastern side of the Tigris in Baghdad, and alKarkh is located on the western side. Al-Thawra was renamed Saddam City in January 1982 and again renamed al-Sadr after the collapse of Saddam’s regime in 2003. 94. Al-Fkaiki, The Den of Defeat, pp. 123–124. 95. See Rizvi, “Imamate”; Black, The History of Islamic Political Thought, pp. 39–48, 81–90. 96. Al-Ahali, October 13, 1961, p. 1. Restrictions placed on political activities led the leadership of the NDP to dissolve the party. 97. Batatu, The Old Social Classes, p. 954. 98. Ali Salih al-Sa‘di (1928–1980) was born in Baghdad to an Arabized Kurdish family. In mid-1960, he replaced Fuad al-Rikabi as secretary of the Baath. 99. After the 1958 Revolution, the popularity and influence of Istiqlal waned, and it lost grassroots support to the Baath. 100. Al-Fkaiki, The Den of Defeat, pp. 178–179. 101. Sa‘id, From the Dialogue, p. 248. 102. Batatu, The Old Social Classes, pp. 974–981; Sa‘id, From the Dialogue, p. 102. 103. Ahmed Hassan al-Bakr (1914–1982) was a primary school teacher before joining the army. He was a member of the Free Officers and joined the Baath Party in 1960, where he played a critical role in the February 8 coup. 104. For the full text of the statement, see Himidi et al., The History of Iraqi Cabinets, vol. 6, pp. 18, 19. 105. The officers included Abdul Salam Arif and Abdul Ghani al-Rawi (Arab nationalists); and Ahmed Hassan al-Bakr, Tahir Yahya, Khalid Makki al-Hashimi, Salih Mahdi Ammash, Abdul Satar Abdul Latif, Hardan al-Tikriti, and Mundhir alWandawi (Sunni Baathists). 106. Civilian members of the NCRC consisted of Ali Salih Sa‘di (Arabized Faili [Shiite] Kurd); Hazim Jawad, Talib Shibib, Muhsin al-Sheikh Radhi, Hamid alKhilkhali, and Hani al-Fkaiki (Shiites); and Hamdi Abdul Majid and Karim Shintaf (Sunnis) (Batatu, The Old Social Classes, pp. 1003–1006). 107. Ibid., pp. 975, 1004–1006. 108. Al-Fkaiki, The Den of Defeat, pp. 219, 237; Tripp, A History of Iraq, p. 171; Farouk-Sluglett and Sluglett, Iraq Since 1958, pp. 85–87. 109. Nuri, Memoirs of Baha al-Din Nuri, p. 314; Batatu, The Old Social Classes, pp. 985, 986. There are reports of the CIA’s involvement in the elimination process as revealed by King Hussein of Jordan. The CIA had strong vested interests in breaking the most popular Communist party in the region (Farouk-Sluglett and Sluglett, Iraq Since 1958, p. 86; Batatu, “The Shiite of Iraq,” p. 985). However, al-Fkaiki states that the Baath leadership itself had prepared a list of seventy Communists to be arrested or killed prior to the coup (al-Fkaiki, The Den of Defeat, p. 255). 110. Sa‘id, From the Dialogue, p. 331. 111. For a copy of the constitution, see Al-Waqai‘ al-Iraqiya, May 10, 1964. 112. Ibid., June 8, 1963. 113. The Al-Jumaila tribe is part of the al-Dulaim tribe, geographically located in the Fallujah area of al-Anbar province. The province constituted the backbone of Arif’s regime (Tripp, A History of Iraq, p. 176).

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114. Batatu, The Old Social Classes, p.1027. 115. Farouk-Sluglett and Sluglett, Iraq Since 1958, p. 95. 116. Abdul Rahman Arif (1916–2007) was a professional soldier who participated in the 1958 and 1963 coups. 117. Abdul Rahman al-Bazzaz (1913–1973) was born in Baghdad. He was dean of the College of Law at Baghdad University and known as an Arab nationalist theoretician. However, just like Sati‘ al-Husri, he never joined a political party. 118. Farouk-Sluglett and Sluglett, Iraq Since 1958, p. 97. 119. Batatu, The Old Social Classes, pp. 1062–1067. 120. Al-Fkaiki, The Den of Defeat, pp. 90, 295–297; Sa‘id, From the Dialogue, p. 247. 121. Himidi et al., The History of Iraqi Cabinets, vol. 6, pp. 18, 19. 122. For the text of the statement, see Himidi et al., The History of Iraqi Cabinets, vol. 6, pp. 132–133; Sa‘id, From the Dialogue, p. 251, n. 2. 123. For the full text of the Kurdish proposal, see Karim, The History of the Kurdistan Democratic Party, pp. 239–246. 124. Peshmerga literally means “those who face death” in the Kurdish language. The term refers to armed Kurdish fighters who fight for freedom and the independence of Kurdistan. 125. Jawad, Iraq and the Kurdish Question, p. 84; McDowall, The Modern History of the Kurds, p. 313. 126. Sa‘id, From the Dialogue, p. 252. 127. For the full text of the Kurdish and government’s second proposed bills, see Himidi et al., The History of Iraqi Cabinets, vol. 6, pp. 137–144. 128. Nadir, Kendenawa, p. 42; Talabany, Kirkuk Area, pp. 54–55. The author’s parental village, Gabalaka, was burned by the Haras al-Qawmi and the Iraqi army on June 13, 1963, along with other villages. 129. Relayed by the author’s parent. 130. Natali, “Manufacturing Identity,” p. 103; McDowall, The Modern History of the Kurds, pp. 314–315. 131. The Hindren Mountain is located northeast of Erbil province. The ICP guerrillas played a vital role in the battle. 132. For the full text of the 1966 Accord, see Karim, The History of the Kurdish Democratic Party, pp. 250–254. 133. Natali, “Manufacturing Identity,” pp. 270–271; Tripp, A History of Iraq, pp. 187–188; Marr, The Modern History of Iraq, pp. 130–132. 134. Batatu, The Old Social Classes, pp. 1038, 1062–1072. 135. Sa‘id, From the Dialogue, p. 307, n.1; al-Fkaiki, The Den of Defeat, p. 273. 136. Quoted in al-Uzri, The Problem of Governance, p. 250. 137. In the 1960s, when Baath members were not allowed to have their own newspaper, they published their opinions in al-Fajir al-Jadid (Abdullah Salum alSamarra’i, al-Fajir al-Jadid, June 4, 1960, p. 1). 138. Al-Fajir al-Jadid, July 31, 1959, p. 1; June 16, 1960, p. 1; May 25, 1960, p. 1. 139. Al-Barak, The Jewish and Iranian Schools, pp. 151–152. 140. Al-Uzri, The Problem of Governance, pp. 275–277. 141. Jabar, The Shi‘ite Movement in Iraq, p. 132. 142. Quoted in al-Khayun, Iraq: An Old Detrimental. 143. Cited in al-Uzri, The Problem of Governance, pp. 180–185; Jabar, The Shi‘ite Movement in Iraq, pp. 134–137. 144. Some suggest that al-Sadr left the Da‘wa because he wanted to become a grand marja‘. Traditionally the hawza did not get involved in day-to-day politics.

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Some suggest that al-Sadr kept in touch with the Da‘wa through one of his pupils (see Aziz, “The Role of Muhammad Baqir al-Sadr”). 145. Jabar, The Shi‘ite Movement in Iraq, pp. 122, 138–139. 146. Ibid., p. 38. 147. See Islamic Da‘wa Party, “Party History.” 148. See al-Musawi, The Islamic Da‘wa Party. 149. Jabar, The Shi‘ite Movement, p. 141. 150. Batatu, The Old Social Classes, pp. 978, 982–985; Sa‘id, From the Dialogue, p. 71. 151. Al-Fkaiki, The Den of Defeat, pp. 273–274. 152. Arif was not a Baathist, but he supported the military wing against the civilian wing. 153. Al-Fkaiki, The Den of Defeat, pp. 275–277. 154. The description of this incident is primarily drawn from al-Fkaiki, The Den of Defeat, pp. 345–357, and Shibib’s memoirs as quoted in Sa‘id, From the Dialogue, pp. 327–332. Both writers were inside the building where the conference was held. 155. The left-wing members who were sent to Spain included Ali Salih alSa‘di, Hamdi Abdul Majid, Muhsin al-Sheikh Radhi, Abu Talib Abdul Mutalib alHashimi, and Hani al-Fkaiki. 156. Batatu, The Old Social Classes, pp. 1078–1079. 157. Haj, The Making of Iraq, p. 136. 158. Nuri, Memoirs of Baha al-Din Nuri, p. 328.

6 The Process of National Disintegration

In July 1968, the Baath Party regained power in a coup led by

Ahmed Hassan al-Bakr and backed by Saddam Hussein. 1 The former became the president and the latter his vice president. In 1970, the regime introduced an interim constitution that defined Iraq as “a part of the Arab Nation,” with Iraq’s primary objective being “the realization of one Arab state.” Nonetheless, Iraq was acknowledged as being comprised of two principal nationalisms: Arab and Kurdish.2 The Kurds were warned that no part of Iraq would be allowed to secede. The interim constitution was kept intact with few changes thereafter until the regime collapsed in 2003. The main feature of the first Baathist cabinet and the Revolutionary Command Council (RCC), the highest legislative power, was the domination by the people from Tikrit, the birthplace of both al-Bakr and Saddam. In the early years of this regime, the Tikritis, led by Saddam, consolidated their power through a series of plots that eliminated potential challengers from both inside and outside the party. Within a fortnight, the first to be eliminated were Abdul Razzaq al-Nayif and Ibrahim al-Daud,3 two Baath co-conspirators. By November 1969, the process of eliminating military control of the RCC commenced by enlarging its membership from five to fifteen. All but one of the new appointees were civilians. Saddam emerged from behind the scene and was elevated to the position of vice chairman of the RCC. 4 Generally speaking, the Baath perceived the ICP, the Kurds, the Shiites, and the army as threats to its power base. An understanding of the approach of the regime to each threat and the implications for the already tattering process of national integration in Iraq are critical to understanding how the Baath were able to reverse the process of national integration.

ICP: Paralysis of a Critical National Platform As noted in the last chapter, action by the Baathists in 1963 severely weakened the ICP. The Kurdistan branch of the party was the only one that 131

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escaped the Baath campaign. In fact, the Kurdish Communist movement had evolved from being merely a branch of the ICP in 1945 to a more expansive organization in 1967: the Kurdistan Regional Organization. These factors reinforced Kurdish supremacy in the ICP. When the Kurdish leadership negotiated and signed the 11 March Manifesto in 1970, which laid the theoretical foundation for autonomy for the Kurdistan region, the ICP was already a part of the Kurdish national movement in the north. Consequently, the ICP also started negotiating unilaterally with the Baath. Despite the ICP’s adoption of a nonviolent approach to the new regime, the Baath carried out several campaigns targeting grassroots supporters, especially in Baghdad. The Baathists were careful not to target senior ICP cadres. As a result, ICP reaction to the Baath action was minimal. By the early 1970s, the ICP had lost its influence in the streets, but it was still a force to be reckoned with. In 1972, Iraq signed a Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation with the Soviet Union. Given the influence of the Soviets on the ICP, the treaty assisted the Baath and the ICP to make a deal that led to the formation in 1973 of the Progressive Patriotic and Nationalist Front (PPNF). A year later when the war broke out between the Kurds and the regime, the ICP sided with the government. Its armed militias joined the Iraqi troops to fight the Kurdish rebels. In 1974, the Kurdish leaders called upon their countrymen to join the resistance, and thousands responded. The Communists admitted that they were “left in true isolation by the Kurdish people.”5 After the success of the campaign against the Kurds, the authorities embarked on a program of Arabization, deportation, and displacement. Despite the ICP’s privately disagreeing with Baathist discriminatory policies and military atrocities, it did not publicly criticize the Baath. This ominous silence along with the ICP’s support for the Iraqi troops against the Kurds during the 1974–1975 war significantly reduced support for the ICP by the Kurdish community. This was a final turning point for the ICP among the Kurds. The Baathist idea of a revolutionary party was linked to the monopolization of power and the control of society—the core elements of any totalitarian regime.6 This idea was fully utilized by the Baath after winning the war in Kurdistan, and it entailed the liquidation of all other internal rivals. In l978, the Communists became the first target to be eliminated. The Baathists claimed that the ICP breached one of the conditions of the PPNF, which gave the Baath the exclusive right to recruit members within the armed forces. Indeed, the ICP reluctantly accepted this condition, and it provided the Baath a justification to have a “distinguished leadership role” in the state.7 The Baath took decisive action to oust the ICP from the PPNF. The regime executed thirty-one Communists on charges of forming secret cells within the army.8 The anti-Communist campaign continued well into 1979 until no visible trace of Communists or Communism remained in the open

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political arena. The ambition of the Baathists to turn Iraq into a one-party state is perhaps the most plausible explanation for their ruthless campaign against the Communists. Another possible reason might be that the regime was afraid of a pro-Communist coup similar to the one that Afghanistan experienced in 1978. By the early 1980s, the remaining Communists moved north to join the resurrected Kurdish national movement where they could be safe. Many ICP surviving leaders fled the country and sought sanctuary in Eastern bloc countries. The party was obviously in disarray and much weaker than during its heyday of the 1950s and 1960s. The surviving elements of the ICP joined the Kurdish factions that were already heavily involved in internal fighting. The KDP and the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK) were the main competing factions, and the ICP often joined one or the other. ICP involvement in this internal conflict cost it a heavy price both in terms of resources and manpower. In May 1983, its headquarters were overrun by PUK troops, and the ICP lost more than sixty of its high-ranking cadres, leaving the group in confusion.9 This fresh blow at the hands of Kurdish nationalists was tantamount to a death sentence for the ICP. Though it did not totally disappear, the party’s impact on Iraq’s political scene practically faded away. For years to come, the ICP was torn by internal ideological and political differences that manifested themselves along ethnic lines. For example, the Arab Communists supported Saddam in the war against Iran, but the Kurdish Communists advocated neutrality.10 This internal conflict caused the defection of a large number of leading Arab members and further consolidated the Kurds’ position in the party leadership. In June 1993, the ICP’s Kurdish branch evolved into the Kurdistan Communist Party (KCP) and became a distinct and separate political entity. Not all Kurdish Communists joined the new party, however. Some preferred to join conventional Kurdish nationalist organizations, especially the KDP. In 2009, the ICP, which once attracted more than 100,000 supporters in Baghdad in the late 1950s, gathered only 1,000 adherents to celebrate Labor Day.11 The decline of the ICP was a serious setback for Iraqi patriotism and/or the patriotic camp. The division of the ICP along ethnic lines left the Kurds with no platform to unite them with their Arab co-citizens. Consequently, Iraq lost its main platform for national integration, at least as far as far as relations between the Kurds and the Arabs were concerned. One might ask why, after years of belief in a shared destiny for Kurdish and Arab (mainly Shiite) Communists, the ICP’s ideology dissolved along ethnic lines. The brutality of the Baath does not adequately answer the question. The Kurds’ sturdy ethno-national identity might provide a more plausible explanation. The idea of Iraqiness that was fostered by the Arab Iraqis and some Kurdish Communists in the 1950s and 1960s could not override the Kurds’ strong national feelings. Put another way, the formation of the Iraqi state and the ensuing process of national integration was not capable

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of transcending Kurdish ethno-national identity, because ideology is less durable than ethnicity or nationality.12 A person may renounce Communism, but one is less able to cease being Kurdish or Arab. Ideological cooperation is one thing, but when it clashes with national sentiments, it readily dissipates. By the same token, economic interests may be negotiated, but the need for identity cannot be readily satisfied because identity cannot be attained by compromising or bargaining. They can only be met by recognition. Integration rooted in strong ethno-national feelings, sentiments, and aspirations, as the Kurdish case demonstrates, are antithetical to the broader notion of integration. The centrality of this argument underpins the essential ingredient for the formation of a nation, and that is ethnicity. This was apparent in the Kurds’ distancing themselves from the ICP and devising their own leftist organizations that combined leftist and nationalist ideals. Among them was the Kurdistan Toiler’s League (Komala), a leading faction within the PUK until 1992 and the backbone of the recently emerging Kurdish political movement, Gorran, in 2009. Historically, the ICP was the only political party that attracted members from all ethnic and sectarian communities. To a large extent, it became a platform for Iraq’s national integration. In 1963, when the Baath dealt a serious blow to the ICP, it still managed to survive. However, in the late 1970s, when the Baathists struck again with the intention to obliterate it, they nearly succeeded. This forced the ICP to revert to armed struggle. These two blows and the survival of the Kurdish branch of the ICP made the ICP almost exclusively a Kurdish political party. Consequently, it became part of the Kurdish national movement rather than an Iraqi movement. Even so, the ICP was sidelined by the Kurds, as several modern left-oriented nationalist organizations emerged within the Kurdish community. The ICP also made the mistake of involving itself in Kurdish internal fighting and as a result warranted another blow that finished it as a viable political party, at least for the time being. The Iraqi nationalist movement therein lost the main representative organization with the potential to foster national integration.

Baathification: Total Control of Society and State Apparatuses The Baath firmly believed in remaking Iraqi society in its own image. Its carefully engineered program, known as Tab‘ith (Baathification), was devised for this purpose. When the Baath regained power in 1968, the domination by Sunni officers from Tikrit added a regional and tribal dimension to the party. Its approach was fueled by the belief that reliance on close tribal and sectarian affiliation was the only way to stay in power. Hence, the

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Baath relied heavily on trusted elements from the Sunni community, especially state security apparatuses.13 The regime had five main security agencies: al-Amn al-Khas (Special Security), al-Amn al-‘Amm (General Security), al-Mukhabarat (General Intelligence), al-Istikhbarat (Military Intelligence), and al-Amn al-‘Askari (Military Security). These were in addition to two special army corps responsible for the security of Baghdad and the president, namely the Republican Guard and the Special Republican Guard. In 1973, Nazim Kazzar, a senior Shiite member of the Baath, expressed resentment at the growing monopoly of power by the Sunnis and Tikritis, particularly in light of the fact that from 1968 to 1977 there were no Shiites on the RCC.14 But Kazzar’s attempt to launch a coup against the al-Bakr-Saddam regime failed, leading to further marginalization of the last remaining Shiites in the Baath party. The Baath relied primarily on Sunni support, particularly on those coming from the tribal groups of the upper Tigris River and Tikrit. 15 This basically meant that the Baathification process in reality was equivalent to the Sunnification process (see Chapter 8 for post-US-invasion implications of Baathification and Sunnification). Official Baath records shed light on the extent and nature of the Baathification program. The report of the Baath’s Eighth Regional Congress states that as soon as they had gained power, the Baathists reinstated the army officers who had been discharged by previous regimes. The Baathification process “started to invite its members, friends and allies to occupy important posts in the government.”16 To ensure that the army was exclusively loyal to the party, the Baathists enacted legislation in 1971 that provided the death penalty for any political activity within the armed forces other than that of the Baath. In a speech in 1977, Saddam reiterated his and the Baathist vision for the army, stating, “We reject the concept of a professional [non-political] army. . . . We reject the slogan of military non-interference in politics.”17 Basically, the army was monopolized, politicized, and then Baathified. Adnan Khairallah Talfah, Saddam’s brother-in-law and cousin, was promoted to the post of minister of defense, a position he held until his death in 1989. It was he who was specifically entrusted to enforce this policy. In 1980, the Baath declared that the army had become an “ideological army” and the “army of the Baath.”18 Baathist officers with the title dhabit tawjih al-siyasi (political guidance officer) were appointed to each army unit. Their task involved intelligence-gathering and the indoctrination of the army to ensure loyalty to the Baath. In the late 1960s, an intelligence service (mukhabarat) was formed within the party called the General Relations Bureau. The bureau, which later became the foundation for the Iraqi Intelligence Services, was directly responsible to Saddam. The party also tightened its control on police and security (amn) by appointing party members to management positions of these two organizations. Their tasks were not only to restructure the two

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organizations to impose a tighter chain of command but also, according to Baathist sources, to “re-educate” the staff “in accordance with the ideas of the Revolution [Baath].” Simultaneously, the armed forces and security organization were purged of what the Baath thought of as “suspect elements” and “conspirators.”19 The Baathification of the state security apparently was only one aspect of the policy that extended to all other sections of government and society. The other sectors that were immediately targeted for Baathification were education and the media. Both received particular attention, because they were recognized by the Baath as crucial sectors. The Baath firmly believed that these institutions should reflect and promote the views and aims of the revolution. In Baath literature, the term, “the Revolution” (al-Thawra), was used conterminously with “Baath” and “state.” To assure that its propaganda reached every corner of the country, the regime freely distributed television sets throughout the countryside of Iraq.20 By early 1980, the entire teaching service was also forced to join the Baath. Any individual employee who refused to join the Baath was denied employment in educational institutions.21 Students who were not Baathist were denied access to the colleges of teaching and education. In other words, only teachers who were “saturated with Baathist ideas,” as the Baath intended, were employed in the education sector. School curricula at all levels, particularly the courses in the humanities and social sciences, were modified in order to conform to “the principles of the Party and the Revolution.”22 The idea of indoctrination through the education of the young received utmost priority by the Baath and was reflected in the slogan: “We recruit the youth to assure the future.”23 This slogan was mounted in the school corridors and posted on the streets. As part of the implementation of this policy, the Baath created three child and youth organizations as recruiting centers. They were named al-Talai‘ (Vanguards), al-Fituwa (Chivalry), and alShabab (Youth). By the 1980s, most children and adolescents were enrolled in one of these organizations. The Vanguards was established in 1974, and the Chivalry and Youth in 1978 and 1980, respectively. By 1980, the number of children recruited in the Vanguards organization reached 1.1 million, the Chivalry 127,000, and Youth 62,000.24 Keep in mind that the Iraqi population was 13 million in the early 1980s. 25 Later these numbers would increase dramatically. As a consequence of these Baathification strategies, the educational system became the most important vehicle for spreading Baathist ideology. Saddam even directed historians to rewrite Iraq’s history in “the spirit of the Baath.” The regime did not need to Baathify the main state legislative body, the RCC, because it had been created entirely anew by the party. The RCC, the highest legislative authority, was formed entirely from the membership of the Baath Regional Command, and the RCC’s decrees had the full force of law. 26 Though the National Assembly (NA) came into existence twelve

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years after the Baath assumed office, it had no real power. The law that regulated the NA and its activities was drafted by the RCC. Furthermore, several provisions were inserted into the law to ensure that in practice only the Baathists or their loyalists could be elected.27 The effects of the Baathification process on Iraqi identity and on the process of national integration were profound. Instead of promoting national integration, it led to national disintegration due to the retention of power by the Sunnis. As a result, Iraq’s identity reflected the visions and ambitions of only one segment of Iraqi society. All other segments were excluded from positions of authority and were subjugated to the service of Arabism. Moreover, the Baathification of the state apparatus had the effect of excluding all other elements of society from being identified with Iraq’s national institutions and symbols. The army became a Baathist symbol and a means of oppression. When Saddam assumed leadership in 1979, the Baathification campaign intensified, and the party itself came under Saddam’s direct control. This process of melding both Iraq and the Baath into Saddam’s image led to a process that can aptly be termed Saddamization.

Saddamization: “If Saddam Said, Then Iraq Said” Saddam’s hold on society did not result merely from use of threats; it was deeply psychological. Saddam was literally everywhere and in people’s minds as well. In 1979, Saddam ousted al-Bakr from his position as president and appointed himself president as well as president of the RCC. His takeover appeared to onlookers to be the first smooth transition of power in over a decade. However, behind the scenes, Saddam promptly eliminated all opponents and commenced a campaign of self-promotion. He established a personality cult whereby the party and the state became no more than tools in his hands. Saddam attempted to interlock his personal destiny with that of the nation by molding every aspect of Iraqi state and society in the image and shadow of his own personality. As a part of this campaign, Saddam ordered giant wall pictures and statues depicting him in different costumes. Posters were displayed in every house, office, and classroom. His image was printed on currency, watches, and in school textbooks. The glorification of Saddam, by both his lieutenants and the state media, knew no boundaries. He was described as “the symbol of Arab revival” and “the greatest Arab hero, who came to save the nation from darkness, backwardness, and disunity.” Throughout his domain, Saddam built one of the most impressive propaganda machines ever seen in the Arab world. Almost daily he was shown on television giving long speeches.28 Thousands of poems, songs, and articles were written in his honor, describing him as leader, struggler, knight, and the sun of the Arabs. Saddam’s personal charisma facilitated his

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endeavors, while the cult of his personality was backed by a system of rewards and punishments. Saddam’s personality cult was best demonstrated in the Ninth Regional Congress of the Arab Baath Socialist Party report, in which Congress basically ratified the Saddamization of the Baath. 29 The party’s history was rewritten to glorify Saddam, elevating him to the rank of “the Baath’s most eminent ideologue.” In the process, the name of the Baath’s previous ideologue, Michel Aflaq, was virtually erased. The report associated the “great achievements” of the Baath with “comrade Saddam’s vision, experience and pragmatism.” According to the report, he was “the planner, the designer, the initiator, the decision-maker and the problem-solver” of the Baath since its first faltering experience in 1963. He was also described as “the exploder (mufajir) of the 17–30 July Revolution.” The report created new labels for him, such as “the national symbol” and “the imperative leader.”30 Large portions of the report were actually citations from Saddam’s previous speeches that had been presented as directives and lessons for Baath members. The authorities also ordered media outlets to repeat the blessing “hafadhahu Allah” (may God preserve him) whenever Saddam’s name was mentioned. In order to Saddamize the sole legislative body of the country, Saddam increased RCC membership by eight. Those who were added were handpicked Baathists loyal to Saddam. To remove any potential intellectual competitors, Saddam expelled, imprisoned, or assassinated most Baath ideologues, including Abdul Khaliq al-Samarra’i, one of the party’s leading ideologues, and Shafiq al-Kamali, the minister of youth and minister of information.31 The removal of al-Samarra’i and al-Kamali paved the way for Saddam to control the media and information bureau of the Baath, an act that reinforced his control on the party’s propaganda apparatus. The motive for this action was to make himself not only the strongman of the state and party but also the only intellectual and ideological thinker. Saddam’s presidential decrees, directives, instructions, and guidelines to state agencies were tantamount to laws. 32 His speeches were later accorded the same authority. To formalize this in 1993, the RCC amended the interim constitution by adding the following provision: “The President of the Republic may, if the need arises, issue resolutions carrying the force of law.”33 The slogan, “if Saddam said, Iraq said,” was repeated widely and with much fanfare on radio and television programs. The implication of this statement was that if Saddam decided anything, then Iraq should follow his order. After the war with Iran, Saddam’s personality cult reached its zenith. He was lionized as al-qa’id al-mansur (the victorious leader), a label with specific meaning. “[I]t evoked memories of Arab-Islamic glory during the reign of the second Abbasid caliph, Abu Ja‘far al-Mansur,” who built Baghdad. In memory of al-Mansur, Saddam erected a large statue in Baghdad. This gesture was ill-conceived because al-Mansur was implicated in the 765 AD poisoning of the fifth Shiite imam, Ja‘far al-Sadiq. That is

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why al-Mansur’s statue was destroyed by the Shiites after Saddam was deposed. This also highlights the contradictory nature of the common memory that the Sunni and the Shiites shared as Arabs. Islamic flavor was added to his long list of names with the curious title of al-mansur bil-lah (victorious by the help of God). In the 1980s, the adulation reached such a pitch that Saddam’s birthday celebration overshadowed the commemorations of Iraq’s national days. Another characteristic of the Saddamization process was the practice of old-fashioned nepotism. The ascendency of his close family members, tribal loyalists, and Tikritis to the top echelons of state power became endemic.34 In late 1986, as part of economic reform, Saddam privatized many stateowned medium- and small-sized companies. This action was designed to extend his family’s control over Iraq’s economy, as most of the companies were sold to close family members and associates. Acts such as these further extended his control over both the private and public sectors. Most companies in the private sector had been nationalized by 1964, though there were ethnic and sectarian dimensions to the decisions to nationalize. The majority of companies had been owned by the Faili-Kurds or the Shiites. By nationalizing them, authorities were able to curtail the former owners’ control of the Iraqi marketplace. Baath sources claimed that due to inadequate nationalization measures of previous regimes, further steps had to be taken to eliminate the influence of Iranian origin merchants (i.e., Faili-Kurds) in the Iraqi marketplace.35 Nationalization processes increased the state’s share of domestic wholesale products from 12.1 percent in 1968 to 51 percent in 1974, and its share of foreign trade rose from 42 to 90 percent during the same period.36 It has been argued that “on the practical level, privatization threatened to undermine the hold of the party apparatus on one of the country’s most important centers of power.”37 While correct, by the late 1980s, the Baath had already been Saddamized; the party had become the Hizb alQa’id (Party of the Leader), and Iraq had become the Iraq al-Qa’id (Iraq of the Leader). The privatization process made the Iraqi ruling elite also the business elite, and the Baath became merely a vehicle for acquiring more power for Saddam. The party was emptied of its original ideological principles. A short poem that was made into a song for schoolchildren quite aptly summarizes what was meant by Saddamization: We are Iraq and its name is Saddam We are love and its name is Saddam We are a people and its name is Saddam We are the Baath and its name is Saddam.38

The most significant outcome of the policy of Saddamization was that it weakened the identity of the Iraqi state as its image was submerged into the personality of a brutal dictator. During the entire period of Baathist rule,

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the process of national integration can only be assessed in light of the double process of Baathification and Saddamization. This processes transformed the identity of Iraq through the Baath monopoly on ideology and Saddam’s personal manipulations.

The Baath and Saddam: Between Iraqiness and Arabness Whether the Baath inclined toward Iraqiness or Arabness during Saddam’s era has been hotly debated in the literature on Iraq. The issue is essential due to its ramifications on the political identity of Iraq. Following the reoccupation of Iraq by the British in 1941, there was a slight shift from Arabism to Iraqism in the educational system. The pro-British regime expelled many Arab-nationalists from the army and the education department, and the study of the history and civilization of Mesopotamia was given special attention.39 This approach was encouraged during Qasim’s term in office. He adopted the Akkadian sun sign as the Iraqi national emblem and the Star of Ishtar as the central motif on the flag. When the Baath returned to power in 1968, they were still pan-Arab oriented but certainly not as explicitly as had been the case in the late 1950s and 1960s. Iraq’s pride in its history and traditions was encouraged, and archaeological and historic sites were rebuilt. The Mesopotamian origins of Iraqi identity were fostered by the Baath and by Saddam.40 The effectiveness of promoting a Mesopotamian-inspired identity should be assessed to determine its contribution to creating an overarching identity for the citizens of Iraq. It is also critical to pinpoint Saddam’s contribution and the implication of his interference in the process. Official Baathist rhetoric seems to have been neutral on the question of Iraqism versus Arabism. Official sources stressed that “the national [regional] tasks are an integral part of Arab nationalism and both are dialectically interconnected. . . . [T]o assert a priori the precedence of one over the other leads to regionalism or to infantile adventurism.”41 This was a major shift in the Baath ideological stance as it always stood against indicators of local nationalism, considering it to be regionalism. The shift was part of the Baath manipulations designed to compete with the Kurdish national movement and the ICP. In light of the 1963 failure to defeat the Kurdish national movement and the ICP, the Baath strategically decided to temporarily display an attitude of leniency toward Iraqism by temporarily displaying a move from pan-Arab ideology. The political manipulation succeeded in achieving some short-term gains, such as the signing of the 11 March Manifesto and a pact with the ICP that resulted in the formation of the PPNF.

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In 1980, Iraq launched a war against its Iranian neighbor that lasted for eight years. During the war, a shift from pan-Arabism was required because the war against Iran, a nation that shared the same religion with the Iraqi Shiites, could not be fought in the name of pan-Arabism. As a strategic mechanism, therefore, Iraqism was encouraged and presented as a form of patriotism that supposedly united Iraq’s diverse communities, including especially the Shiites and Kurds, across the entire Iraqi landscape. Saddam’s personal obsession with Mesopotamian civilization, and his personal ambition to be seen as the heir of the great Mesopotamian kings such as Nebuchadnezzar, was another critical factor in encouraging Iraqism. The regime had two messages: one for domestic use that emphasized Iraqism and the other stressing pan-Arabism with the hope of rallying the Arab people to Iraq’s side. It also attempted to assuage the fears that Arab leaders might have with regard to a possible ideological or military campaign by Iraq against them. An examination of Iraqi textbooks and other Baath sources reveals contradictions in the Baathist dual approach. In 1988, fourteen years after the official declaration of “‘the balanced approach” in relation to Iraqism and pan-Arabism, the Baath’s main indoctrination program, al-Minhaj alThaqafi al-Markazi (Central Education Program) made pan-Arabism the first priority. The book asserted: The doctrine of the Party is nationalism [pan-Arabism], and its achievement requires the elevation of pan-Arabism above all other loyalties. . . . That is why we [the Baathists] cannot consider a person to be a Baathist if he/she believes in sectarianism or regionalism [Iraqism, wataniya] and at the same time claiming that he/she believes in Baathism.42

The textbooks of the time emphasized the Arab character of Iraq and Baath’s Arab ambitions. For example, the grade two intermediate textbook of the National Education Program was entirely dedicated to the notions of Arab nation, Arab nationalism, Arab nations’ goals, and the Palestine issue.43 The question of Iraq and its identity was not overlooked. The grade one intermediate textbook devoted significant space to the topic. However, it looked at Iraq as a “society” and a “people”—not as a nation. It defined Iraqi society as being “composed of Iraqis residing in the Iraqi plains, mountains, marshes and deserts. . . . [They are] united in destiny and a common history, and seek common wataniya and national [pan-Arab] goals. . . . Iraqi society is part of a greater society which is the Arab society.” According to the textbook, Iraqis shared common goals, and its premier goal was the “liberation of the Arab lands and the unification of Arab countries in one state.”44 These highlight the contradictory nature of the Baathist approach and the paradoxes of Iraqi identity, particularly in relation to the torn loyalties between Arabism and Iraqism.

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Saddam’s campaign of the 1970s to rewrite history was part of the process of Arabization and Saddamization of Mesopotamian civilization. His directives to Iraqi historians stated that “the history of the Arab nation does not start with Islam. Rather, it reaches back into the ages of remote antiquity. . . . All basic civilizations that emerged in the Arab homeland were expressions of the personality of the sons of the [Arab] nation, who emerged from one single source.”45 This vision was later enshrined in Iraqi school textbooks. In history textbooks, the languages of all Mesopotamian groups—Akkadians, Babylonians, Assyrians, Canaanites, Arameans, and Arabs who had migrated from the Arabian Peninsula—were considered to have originated from lughat al-Jazira al-Umm (the language of the Mother Peninsula, Saddam’s description), that is, Arabic. More controversially, while history textbooks described the waves of migrants from the Arabian Peninsula to Iraq as “internal migration,” it considered the Koutis’ and the Medes’ (the ancient groups in the Zagros Mountains from which the Kurds trace their ancestry) migration as “external migration.” The book presents the former groups as “authentic” and “liberators,” and the latter groups as “invaders,” “barbarians,” and “uncivilized.”46 As part of the revival of the Mesopotamian civilization, the Baath announced a festival named al-Rabi‘ (Spring) Festival. It was designed to link Iraq historically to the Assyrian and Babylonian civilizations. In this context, two points are worth mentioning. First, although the festival was held in a region where the majority of the population was of Kurdish extraction, nowhere in the celebration were the Kurds or their Median ancestors ever mentioned. Second, the festival was scheduled for March 21 to coincide with the Kurdish national day, Newroz. It obviously was intended to supplant Newroz and thereby diminish the Kurdish history and culture. The attempt to link Iraqi identity with the heritage of Mesopotamia may have been counterproductive. Saddam Hussein rebuilt the historical site of Babylon in his own megalomaniacal image. In the 1980s, he ordered the reconstruction of Nebuchadnezzar’s palace and other buildings using bricks stamped with a tribute to the “Protector of Great Iraq” in the same way that Nebuchadnezzar marked bricks with his own stamp in the cuneiform writing. However, the irony is that by doing so, Saddam imposed his image on the Mesopotamian heritage instead of ta‘riq (Iraqizing it). In fact, he Saddamized it. This approach excluded the Kurds because the Medes had been removed from the Mesopotamian tradition. At the same time, the Arabization of the Mesopotamian heritage alienated the Chaldo-Assyrian community, which traced its ethnic background to the ancient Assyrian and Chaldean peoples, who consider themselves distinct ethnic groups.47 While they accept their Semitic roots, they deny any Arab origins. Some scholars claim that Saddam tried to intertwine ancient Iraqi and Kurdish motifs in the development of a province named Salah al-Din.48

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However, textbooks of the time reveal another picture. The textbooks of Saddam’s era never refer to Salah al-Din as a Kurd. An Iraqi textbook, published in 1990, dedicated a section to Salah al-Din al-Ayubi, describing him as “the leader who expelled the Crusaders from the Arab land.” (emphasis added ).49 While the article repeatedly refers to the Arabs, Arab lands, and the Arab cities, it nowhere mentions the Iraqis or the Kurds (also see Chapter 9). However, the school textbooks from Qasim’s era described Salah al-Din as a Kurd.50 It is not surprising that, after the Baath rose to power, these sections were expunged from all history textbooks. The purpose of establishing Iraq’s historic links to its Mesopotamian heritage was part of Saddam’s strategy to achieve Arab unification. By proving the cultural superiority of Iraq over other Arab countries, Iraq would automatically be at the helm of a pan-Arab coalition of countries. Pan-Arabism was not entirely dropped from Saddam’s agenda, but the means of achieving it changed. Initially, Baathist ideologues expected that unification would result from mass movements. This theory was abandoned, however, in favor of the Bismarckian approach toward unification either by force or through cultural hegemony. Saddam’s spiritual mentor, Aflaq, asserted in 1974 that “the Iraq of the Baath now works for the Arabs and it will be the force to realize Arab unification; its army will be the unification army.”51 In a speech just before the Iraq-Iran War, Saddam described the Iraqi army as: the army of the knights and the men of principles. Every one of them is ready to die in defense of his sword’s honor. . . . We hope that this will continue with even stronger determination so that we will grasp the historical opportunity [for playing] the [same] historical role which our forefathers had played in the service [unification] of the Arab nation and humanity.52

This means that Arabism and Arab unification were not purged from either the Baathist literature or from Saddam’s agenda. Rather, its means were altered. The main reason for this alteration was that Saddam was not an ideologue but rather a man of power. He believed that unification could be achieved—not through ideological rhetoric but through force. Saddam’s quest to be seen as the heir of the great Mesopotamian kings and ArabIslamic rulers, such as al-Mansur, al-Rashid, and Salah al-Din, was also a part of his new strategy for the unification of the Arabs. By putting himself into the shoes of his predecessors, he believed that he might be able to fulfill the same role: restoring the historical greatness of the Arab nation. Saddam’s invasion of Kuwait can be considered as a first step to the realization of his pan-Arab dreams. Despite its rich heritage, a politicized and Arabized Mesopotamian identity, precisely what Saddam was promoting, was not relevant to various ethno-sectarian segments of Iraqi society. In

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fact, Saddam’s manipulation of the Mesopotamian tradition further alienated non-Arab communities in Iraq.

Iraq-Iran War: The Myth of the Surge of Iraqi Nationalism Some scholars hold that the process of banding together to fight common external enemies serves to build a sense of unity among the factions of a nation and foster a common sense of national identity. For instance, Smith suggests that the Anglo-French wars contributed significantly to the development of both the French and English nations.53 Thies asserts that the absence of a threat or common foe decreases the chances of developing national cohesion.54 But, we have to ask whether this model works for the Iraq-Iran War from 1980 to 1988. Did the war foster a sense of national unity? Jabar argues that the war with Iran led to a surge of Iraqi nationalism that enabled Iraq to sustain “an eight-year war with an army in which 80 percent of the soldiers and 20 percent of the officers were Shiites.” 55 Axelgard argues that the war led to the emergence of a “coherent national identity.”56 Marr, however, more cautiously suggests that although the war generated a period of patriotism, which confirmed a sense of Iraqi identity, it is too soon to make such a judgment.57 The ways in which the Kurds, and to a lesser extent the Shiites, reacted to the Iraq-Iran War reveals another story. In the first years of the war, about 45,000 Kurdish soldiers deserted.58 This forced the government to release the majority of Kurdish servicemen from the army and station the rest in the Kurdish region. Saddam made this decision because “the Kurds stationed elsewhere felt as if they had been sent into exile.”59 As a result of the Kurds’ disinterest in serving in his army, Saddam sought to humiliate them when he stated that “it is a shame that the Arabs should defend the land of Kurdistan while the Iraqis of the sons of Kurdistan stand and watch.”60 The Kurds’ behavior was undoubtedly indicative of more than mere apathy. It is telling that, in 1983, the members of the KDP, led by Mas‘ud Barzani, supported the Iranian forces seeking to capture the town of Haj Omran in the Kurdish region of Iraq. The regime’s reaction to this aid “to the enemy” was ruthless. In July 1983, it rounded up around 8,000 civilian members of the Barzani tribe in Qushtapa and took them to undisclosed locations where they forever vanished.61 A few months after their disappearance, Saddam admitted in a televised statement that “they have been severely punished and have gone to hell.”62 When the government realized that its measures to encourage Kurdish participation were futile, it introduced a scheme whereby the Kurds could serve in special Light Battalions (al-Afwaj al-Khafifa) in the Kurdish region. On paper, the regime had nearly 250,000 Kurdish infantry at its disposal, but in reality

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only a fraction of that number ever bore arms in exchange for a signed identity card that would protect them from military service.63 During the war, the Kurdish opposition gained momentum. By 1985, the regime lost control of the countryside to the Peshmerga in Kurdistan, retaining only some influence in the main towns and cities. All these events affirm the reality that disunity, rather than unity, typified the relationship of the Iraqi Kurds and Arabs. As for the Shiites, Iran was the center of Shiite opposition. The Supreme Council for the Islamic Revolution in Iraq (SCIRI), now known as the Islamic Supreme Council of Iraq (ISCI), was formed in Tehran in November 1982, two years after the war commenced. By the end of 1982, Iraq had around 50,000 prisoners of war (POWs).64 Most of them were Shiite rank-and-file soldiers. An arrangement between Iran and the SCIRI allowed a large proportion of POWs to join the SCIRI to become the founding elements of the Badr Brigade. The Badr Brigade was established in 1983 as the military wing of the SCIRI and was trained by the Iranian Revolutionary Guard. It is estimated that it had from 10,000 to 15,000 fighters, many of whom were Iraqi army defectors and former POWs.65 This indicates that the Shiites had minimal commitment to the war—not because they were uncommitted to defend Iraq but rather because they were against the regime. By 1984, desertions in both the Kurdish region and in the south had become a serious problem for the government. It was reported that, during 1985–1986, some 40,000 men deserted. Most were Shiites who sought refuge in the marshlands, in the slums of Baghdad, and in other major cities. At times the number reached 120,000.66 Despite the danger, they organized themselves in the marshes and elsewhere and carried out various antiregime and sabotage activities.67 To combat their activities, the regime resorted to outrageous measures such as poisoning the environment, burning homes, and enforcing an economic blockade. However, this was not enough. The prevalence of desertions obliged the regime to introduce more severe measures. In January 1984, it reinstated the death penalty for desertion, and later desertion was considered to be a crime against morality. 68 Authorities reportedly formed execution squads, stationed right behind the front lines, with the task of executing “backsliders” on the spot. The regime went as far as to give a woman the right to divorce her husband if he deserted from the army or joined opposition groups.69 This also meant the regime perceived army deserters as political activists. A study of political prisoners during the war reveals a confused national front rather than a coherent and united body. At one point in 1986, there were more than 7,000 political prisoners in Abu Ghraib prison. They were divided into two groups: one group of around 3,000 could receive fortnightly visits; the other 4,000 had no visitor access.70 Of the first group, nearly 60 percent were Kurds, 35 percent were Shiites, and the rest were of Sunni or

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other ethnic background. The second group exclusively comprised Shiites.71 These facts illustrate two things: first, the opposition gained momentum during the war, and, second, the strength of the opposition and the number of deserters reflected the extent of the cleavages in Iraqi society. The regime’s success in defending Iraq from the Iranian onslaught was not due to national cohesion. On the contrary, Iraq’s success was in large part due to the financial and military support it received from the Gulf countries and Western powers and by Iraq’s deployment of weapons of mass destruction. The threat from Iran did not contribute to Iraq’s quest for national cohesion. Since its creation, Iraq had been under constant threat from Iran and was involved in three major wars in the last part of the twentieth century. Neither threats nor wars tended to foster a sense of Iraqi unity or identity. The weakening of national cohesion during the First Gulf War, total disintegration of Iraqi society after the Kuwait War (see Chapter 7), and the emergence of civil strife after the Second Gulf War all appear to undermine the argument that wars contribute to national cohesion. It seems that Iraq’s interstate wars further inflamed the intrastate clashes and served to widen the gap between conflicting groups rather than strengthening national cohesion. Unrelated to the Iraq-Iran War, a study conducted in 2004 relating to the US invasion of Iraq examined the linkages between various features of foreign occupation and national pride among different segments of Iraqi society—the Sunnis, Shiites, and Kurds. Its findings indicated “that foreign occupation by itself does not necessarily provoke national pride among all groups within a society.”72 The results of this study can also be applied to the Iraq-Iran War, as the Kurds generally were less enthusiastic to fight against Iraq and the regime that committed horrendous crimes against them. The enthusiasm of the Shiites was also limited, as seen by the large numbers that deserted, joined opposition groups, and/or fought against the regime in the marshes.

The Shiite and the Baath: Disintegration Along Sectarian Lines Shiite religious commitment and orientation strengthened under the Baath for two reasons. First, the weakening of the ICP robbed the Shiites of an effective secular-oriented means for expressing their grievances. Second, Baath discriminatory policies against the Shiites did not facilitate a desire for pan-Arab unity under Baath rule. The restrictions imposed on their religious rituals and publications as well as the closure of many Shiite institutions drove the Shiites from identification with the Baath and strengthened their ties to their native religion.73 In response to the Baathist policy of weeding out what it called the “Iranian nationals” (Faili-Kurds), al-Hakim, the grand

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marja‘, urged the government to halt the deportation campaign and warned that it would “weaken the internal front” (the Sunni-Shiite relation). The Da‘wa went further and urged al-Hakim to demand the “lifting [of] restrictions imposed on hawza, and the inclusion of Shiite jurisprudence in the curriculum of state-run religious academies.” It also urged the Baath to provide “opportunities for Shiite participation in the government” and the lifting of restrictions on political freedom.74 However, instead of listening to the concerns of the Shiite, the regime accused the chief marja‘s son, Mahdi alHakim, of spying for Iran and sentenced him to death.75 In despair, al-Hakim, Mahdi’s father the grand marja’, died on June 2, 1970, and his well-attended funeral turned into a demonstration of Shiite frustration as they chanted antiBaath slogans.76 Al-Hakim’s death left a vacuum, which was soon filled by the energetic and radical Muhammad Baqir al-Sadr. The other popular Shiite leader, Abu Qasim al-Kho’i, was apolitical. With an inspiring new spiritual leader, the Da‘wa party expanded its membership and became better organized and equipped. Government secret police noted their activities and immediately launched a campaign against the Da‘wa in late 1971. Seven leading figures, including al-Sadr and Abdul Sahib Dukheil, were apprehended.77 Apart from al-Sadr, all were soon executed. Another group was rounded up and sentenced to death in 1974–1975.78 In February 1977, the regime banned the Arba‘in (Fortieth), an annual event in which Shiite pilgrims march to Karbala.79 A few notable citizens attempted to convince the local authorities to lift the ban but were instantly arrested. The participants defied the regime and continued their march. Iraqi security forces attempted to challenge the pilgrims but with limited success as they were overwhelmed by an estimated 30,000 marchers. The march continued until the government sent reinforcements, who clashed with the pilgrims. As a result, sixteen participants were killed, many more wounded, and some 500 interrogated. A special court sentenced to death eight participants, while many others were given life imprisonment.80 The demonstrators called for the downfall of the Baathist regime. This unprecedented challenge is known in Shiite literature as the Marad al-Ras, or the Safar uprising, which again demonstrates the significance of the Ashura rituals to the Shiites. To an extent, the expressions of Shiite grievances and antiregime activities historically occurred during those days. The operative slogans highlight the significance of the communal rituals to the Shiites as their defiance to the regime became part of their common memory. One of the slogans read: Defying the foes [Baathists] in the eye Our banners are hoisted aloft Advocates we came to Karbala The Tomb of the Martyr [Imam Hussein] to visit.81

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The primary aim of the Baath suppression of Shiite activism was to forcibly assimilate the Shiite into its imagined vision of Iraq, a vision that, prior to Saddam, was centered on pan-Arabism, and thereafter on both Arabism and Saddam’s persona. The Da‘wa played an active role in organizing the protest. However, the turmoil soon developed into widespread massive unrest. This indicated that the Shiite movement was not confined to the activities of a single political party. It also reaffirmed the power of Shiite religious institutions in the community’s political life. This uprising was an expression of popular resentment, but the harsh measures taken by the regime confined it to clandestine opposition organizations. In response, another Shiite political party took shape: Munazamat al-‘Amal al-Islami (the Islamic Action Organization, MAI). The MAI was headed by a cleric, Muhammad Taqi alMudarisi, from Karbala. It emerged as a militant group that advocated armed struggle and was responsible for many acts of sabotage and assassinations in the early 1980s.82 The Iranian Revolution in 1979 had a profound influence on the Shiite movement in Iraq. But it would overstate the case to claim that it was solely responsible for galvanizing Iraqi Shiite opposition, as argued by some historian and scholars.83 It has been also asserted that the revolution turned Iraq’s Shiite movement from involvement in “clandestine educational activities to open mass political struggle.”84 This, too, is an inadequate depiction of Shiite opposition, which surfaced as a popular movement almost a year before the Iranian upheaval. In fact, the emergence of Shiite activism before the Iranian Revolution was acknowledged by Baath sources.85 This means that Shiite Islamist activism was an authentic Iraqi-based popular movement rather than Iranian inspired. However, it is undeniable that the Iranian Revolution helped to revitalize Islamism in Iraq in 1979 after being crushed in 1977. Emboldened by the events that occurred next door, al-Sadr made repeated statements of support for the Iranian Revolution and issued a fatwa prohibiting the Iraqis from joining the Baath Party.86 The euphoria of the Iranian success as well as the propaganda emanating from Iran soon paved the way for another Shiite event now known as the Rajab uprising. Al-Sadr used his wukala (marja‘iya agents) to show the strength of the Shiites. He was aided by the Da‘wa, which organized its members to travel to Najaf to pledge allegiance to al-Sadr. In May 1979, waves of people journeyed from the Shiite suburbs of Baghdad and the southern provinces, turning Najaf into a demonstration theater. They chanted slogans such as “In the name of Khomeini and al-Sadr, Islam will always be victorious,” and “No custodian, only Ali, we want a Shiite commander.”87 With the events in Iran fresh in mind, the authorities orchestrated a coordinated crackdown on the protesters. Al-Sadr’s arrest in June 1979 led to mass demonstrations. Under pressure from the public, al-Sadr was reluc-

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tantly released. It seems that Saddam was urged by his colleagues to show leniency to al-Sadr and his supporters. But, in July, Saddam ousted President al-Bakr and executed several other leading Baathist figures. Then he turned on the Shiites. Al-Sadr was put under house arrest, and some 4,000 to 5,000 Da‘wa sympathizers were randomly rounded up and subjected to torture, many dying as a result.88 As a consequence, many Da‘wa members and Shiite activists left Iraq, most heading to Iran. In March 1980, a decree from the RCC made membership in the Da‘wa a crime punishable by death.89 As political space narrowed, the Shiites became more militant. This time they actively engaged in sabotage, assassinations, and bombings. On April 1, 1980, an attempt was made on the life of Foreign Minister Tariq Aziz at al-Mustansiriya University. The regime took decisive action and arrested al-Sadr on April 4. He was executed within days, becoming the first grand marja‘ to be executed in the modern history of Iraq. Consequently, he has become a revered figure for the Shiites. These events confirm that the motivation of the Shiite opposition was based on religious values and motives; they also highlight the important roles the Shiite clerics played in the political history of Iraq; and they demonstrate that Saddam’s regime was determined to eliminate any form of opposition by whatever means it could muster. What made it easier for the regime to crush the Shiite opposition was the fact that the protests were confined only to the Shiites. In other words, there was no apparent collaboration between the various communities that opposed the government. This contrasted to previous protests initiated by the ICP in 1948, 1952, and 1956, which attracted support from other groups as well. The opposition had become more aligned with the respective religious sects and thereby further divided the already splintered Iraqi society. In order to minimize Iran’s influence on the Shiite opposition, as well as to resolve by force some boundary disputes, Iraq invaded some Iranian territory inside the Iranian border. By the early 1980s, Iran had become a sanctuary for the Iraqi Shiite opposition. After Iraq’s initial success, the Iraqi military suffered severe losses when thousands of Iraqi soldiers were captured by the Iranians. These factors, along with the Shiite need to reorganize, led several opposition groups to form the SCIRI in 1982.90 The formation of SCIRI was partly linked to Iran’s war effort, and plans were made to invade Iraq and form a government in Iraq in the Iranian style. Although the SCIRI collaborated closely with Iran, the Da‘wa distanced itself from the Iranian clerical establishment because they were led by technocrats rather than by clerics after the death of al-Sadr. The SCIRI was an umbrella organization that had represented only Shiite Islamist organizations. In 1986, the Islamic Movement in KurdistanIraq (IMK) joined the SCIRI. At the time the IMK did not have a strong foothold in Kurdistan. Its inclusion was symbolic. Several attempts were made in the early 1980s to form an Iraqi national front, but this was thwart-

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ed by the refusal of the Shiite Islamists to work with the ICP or with other secular groups. SCIRI’s Badr Brigade and, to a lesser extent, the Kurdish Peshmerga cooperated with the Iranian forces by conducting several offensives against the Iraqi regime. This further hardened Sunni attitudes toward the Kurds and the Shiites. Indeed, Saddam and his Sunni supporters later justified the later genocide in Kurdistan and the suppression of the Shiites on the grounds that they had allied themselves with the enemy. By the early 1980s, the regime’s hostility toward the Shiites had peaked. This was evident in a pamphlet written by Saddam’s uncle, Khairallah Talfah, entitled, “Three Whom God Should Not Have Created: Persians, Jews, and Flies.” It was also reported at the time that when Talfah was asked how to defend Iraq against Iran, he had replied, “nuqatilu al-kilabi bil kilab” (we fight the dogs [Iranians] with the dogs [Shiites]). Whatever the truth of this story, apparently it was circulated and widely believed.91 In a similarly aggressive tone, the Baathists branded the Shiite Islamists as “Persianized” who are filled with “anti-Arab sentiments.”92 Here the Shiite Islamists were equated to the Persians who, according to Saddam’s father-in-law, “God should not have created.” Most leaders of the groups in the Da‘wa and SCIRI were urban, educated, middle- and lower-middle-class Shiites.93 Prior to the emergence of the Islamist groups, these people had formed the bulk of the ICP leadership. By the 1980s, the middle-class Shiites had shifted their allegiance from left-oriented Iraqi ideologies to more sectarian Shiite Islamism. At this point a key question arises: why did the Shiites, the backbone of secular Communism, become conservative and religious? The answer lies in the important fact that the religious sectarian identity was able to provide the Shiites with a new identity at the time they were experiencing cruel treatment at the hands of the Sunni regime. It was Shiite Islamism which, by providing a new identity for the Shiites, also facilitated unity among them. Besides, since the ICP had failed to achieve much for the Shiites, Islamism was the only means left by which the Shiites could express their desire for power and a communal identity.

Arabization and Displacement: Internal Colonization of Kurdistan When the Baathists assumed power in 1968, war was raging in Kurdistan. After two years of fighting, Kurdish and Baath leaders signed the 11 March Manifesto, to be implemented within four years. The 1970 Manifesto guaranteed proportional representation for the Kurds in the central government and equitable distribution of oil revenues. It also recognized Kurdish as the official language in the autonomous region. However, it postponed outlining the boundaries of Kurdistan until a census could be conducted—which

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was to be done before March 1974.94 Any hope of implementing the manifesto soon evaporated, as shortly after the signing, the regime expelled thousands of Faili-Kurds from Iraq and relaunched the policy of Arabization. The policy was a deliberate political strategy designed to change the ethnic identity of targeted areas and cities by expelling the Kurds and replacing them with Arab settlers. The proposal for power-sharing was disregarded, and two attempts were made to assassinate the Kurdish leader, Mustafa Barzani.95 The proposed census was also not carried out, most likely because it might have shown a solid Kurdish majority in the Kirkuk province and in the districts of Khanaqin and Sinjar. Meanwhile, the Baathification of state institutions resumed.96 All of these practices and tactics, especially the assassination attempts, undermined any attempt to build trust between the parties. What further damaged the fragile relationship was the continual supply of weapons to the Kurdish rebels by Iran and the training of the Kurdish rebels by Israel and the Central Intelligence Agency, (CIA).97 Several other factors prompted the Baath to review its agreement with the Kurds, including the nationalization of the oil sector and the subsequent rise of oil prices:98 the signing of an Iraq-Soviet friendship and cooperation treaty, the rise of the ICP to the PPNF, and the success of the Baath in eliminating most of its internal opponents. The Kurds and the regime also disagreed on virtually all details of the provision for autonomy. For example, the Kurds suggested the term iqlim (region) to describe the designated autonomous areas, but the government proposed mantiqa (area). For the Kurds, the term “region” signified that Iraq was comprised of two nationalities and two regions, or homelands. The Kurdish proposal identified Iraq as “composed of the voluntary unification of the two major nationalities, the Arabs and Kurds, and other minority groups.” The government version stressed that “Kurdistan is an integral part of Iraq.”99 Eventually, Baghdad unilaterally decreed an autonomy statute for Kurdistan, which excluded strategic places such as Kirkuk, Khanaqin, Akra, and Sinjar from the autonomous region. It was comprised of only the provinces of Erbil, Suleimaniya, and Dohuk,100 which was less than half of the territory that the Kurds considered rightfully theirs.101 The government proposal was rejected by the Kurds. In March 1974, the conflict resumed, and fighting lasted for a year. According to official state records, more than 60,000 Iraqis were killed during the war in Kurdistan from March 1974 to March 1975 alone, including 16,000 Iraqi soldiers.102 As a result of a signed agreement between the Shah of Iran and Saddam, the Kurdish rebellion crumbled. Despite the failure of the manifesto, it provided the Kurds with a model to which they could aspire in the future. After the collapse of the rebellion, the regime commenced a comprehensive program of Arabization, internal displacement, and deportation. It specifically targeted the districts that bordered Iran, Turkey, and Syria, as

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well as the oil-rich regions in Kirkuk and Mosul and the strategic areas around Sinjar, Tala‘far, Mandali, and Khanaqin. 103 The Arabization process was multidimensional and included registering many Kurdish religious sects (Yazidis, Kakays, Christians, and Sayyids) and tribes (Shabak, Gargar, Salayi, Gezh, and Kikan) as Arabs. Another dimension of the policy was the expulsion of the Faili-Kurds, with two specific objectives in mind: to Arabize the Faili-Kurd areas in Khanaqin and Mandali, and to remove from Baghdad the economic power of the Kurds as well as the Shiites.104 In order to reduce the influence of the Faili-Kurds over the trade and economic sectors, the regime stripped more than 200,000 of them of their rights of citizenship and residency from 1968 to 1982. Their property was confiscated, and they were expelled to Iran. Hundreds of them were also arrested and disappeared during this time.105 Demographic changes brought about by the internal displacement of the Kurds and replacing them with Arabs was the centerpiece of the Arabization policy. The policy can be traced to the monarchy whereby the Arab-Bedouin tribes were resettled in Mosul, Makhmour, Haweeja, and the Garmian plains to the east of the Tigris River.106 Some policymakers during the monarchy, such as Yasin al-Hashimi, provided incentives for the Arab tribes to settle around the Haweeja irrigation system in Kirkuk province. However, these were not systematic endeavors, and many Kurds freely left these areas and willingly sold their lands to the Arab immigrants.107 Prior to the Baath, the settlement of the Arabs in Kurdistan was more of an evolutionary process rather than a systematic government-organized process. Therefore, only the Arabization policies that were implemented between 1963 and 2003 were intentionally enacted for strategic purposes. The area claimed by the Kurds as part of Iraqi Kurdistan was about 86,000 square kilometers (3,3204 square miles); of this, 36,684 square kilometers (14,163 square miles, 42.66 percent) was subject to the policy of Arabization in all its forms.108 Arabization policies were carefully engineered and implemented in several stages. The first stage took place from 1963 to 1968, the second from 1968 to 1975, the third from 1975 to 1987, and the fourth from 1987 to 1991.109 The first and the second stages were not as severe as the third and the fourth. In the first stage, approximately seventy villages on the outskirts of Kirkuk, Dibis district, and Kendenawa region were Arabized. The second stage was less clear as it occurred during negotiations between the Kurdish leadership and the regime (1970–1974). The third stage commenced after the failure of the Kurdish revolt of 1974–1975 when approximately 660 villages were Arabized. Numerous quarters within Kirkuk were built to accommodate the new Arab settlers (see Appendix 1).110 Kirkuk province was subjected to another calculated policy of “cut and fill.” In 1976, the Kurdish districts of Chamchamal and Kalar were excised from the province and attached to Suleimaniya province. The mixed Kurdish

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and Turkmen district of Tuzkhormatu was also reclassified as part of the newly created Salah al-Din province. The predominantly Kurdish district of Kifri was linked to the Diyala province.111 In total, 10,300 square kilometers (3,976 square miles) (50.60 percent) of Kirkuk’s 20,355 square kilometers (7,859 square miles) were reallocated to other provinces. Furthermore, the authorities separated and Arabized the subdistrict of Sargaran (renamed alQuds) from Erbil province in 1975 and put it in Kirkuk province. In 1987, the Arab subdistrict of al-Zab was detached from Ninawa province and added to Kirkuk.112 The aim of all these changes was to Arabize Kirkuk by decreasing its concentration of Kurds. Also, it sought to restrict the migration of rural Kurds to the provincial capital of Kirkuk. This intent was formalized by legislation that banned the Kurds from moving to Kirkuk.113 At the same time, thousands of Kurdish families were forcibly removed. While restrictions were imposed on employment and residence of the Kurds in Kirkuk, incentives were given to the new Arab settlers, which included employment, a house (or a block of land), and housing loans and grants. These were so attractive that thousands of Arabs moved north to settle in and around the city. To accommodate them, the authorities built hundreds of settlements around the province and other targeted areas.114 As a finishing touch to the Arabization process, the regime changed the original Kurdish (or Turkish) names of the villages, towns, schools, and landmarks, and replaced them with Arab-Islamic names. For example, Kirkuk province was changed to alTa’mim; the Kurdistan High School in Kirkuk was renamed Abdul Malik bin Marwan High School; Piramerd Primary School was renamed al-Bakr Primary School; the village of Tirkashkan was changed to al-Qa‘qa‘; and Qarahanjeer was changed to al-Rabi‘. Targeting the northern parts of Iraqi Kurdistan that bordered Iran, Turkey, and Syria, the regime relocated people southward. As many as 872 villages in the border zones were razed to the ground in just two months during the summer of 1978.115 The aim was to concentrate the Kurds in several townships so that it would become easier to control them. This strategy also had the effect of isolating them from the Kurds in the neighboring countries and making it difficult for the Kurdish rebels to receive support from outside sources. What distinguished this policy from Arabization was that the subjected areas were not Arabized. It would have been too difficult for the regime to protect the Arab settlers in the northern mountainous regions, which were often used by the Kurdish fighters as their bases. Approximately 600,000 inhabitants of the demolished villages were rehoused in fifty-nine complexes deliberately located around the major cities and on the main highways.116 The regime used the 1980–1988 IraqIran War and the war in Kurdistan as pretexts to destroy many other villages and displace inhabitants. In sum, by 1987, 1,928 villages, five subdistricts, two districts, and three complexes were destroyed in Kurdistan (see Appendix 1).

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While the Iraqi regime was preoccupied implementing the policy of Arabization, the Kurdish rebels who had escaped and fled abroad after the failed 1974–1975 rebellion reorganized into different groups. One of the new players was the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK), headed by Jalal Talabani and established in Syria in June 1975. He had long been critical of Barzani and now proposed to supplant him with a secular leftist movement with roots among the urban intellectuals. The old KDP also reorganized and established bases in the rugged mountains of Kurdistan. A clear geographical division quickly emerged. The KDP remained the dominant force in Dohuk province, while the PUK held sway in Erbil, Kirkuk, and Suleimaniya provinces. In 1978, open warfare broke out between the two groups, and the fighting lasted until 1986. Despite these internal conflicts, the Kurdish opposition, particularly the PUK, played a vital role in mobilizing the Kurds in both rural and urban areas. In 1984, the PUK unilaterally entered into negotiations with the government. Discussions dragged on inconclusively for more than a year before they finally broke down in January 1985. Several reasons were cited for the failure of the talks, but the key issue was the regime’s rejection of the age-old Kurdish demand that the regions of Kirkuk, Khanaqin, and Sinjar be considered as part of autonomous Kurdistan.117 Unsuccessful attempts to negotiate and the continuing policy of Arabization did not deter the Kurds. Rather, it emboldened them in their quest for national rights. In 1987, the PUK embraced self-determination as its main slogan, and soon it became a motto for the recently established Kurdistan Front. 118 This was a departure from the long-standing goal of autonomy by the Kurds. In light of these events, several observations can be made. First, the Iraqi state’s intention was clear: it was prepared to undertake whatever measures were necessary to bring the Kurdish rebellion under control. Second, the government had no intention of solving the Kurdish problem peacefully. This was evident in the mid-1980s when, embroiled in the war with Iran, the Baathist regime expressed no sympathy or understanding for the position of the Kurdish negotiators. More importantly, the policy of Arabization continued as part of the process of internal colonization. Colonization does not necessarily require establishing direct political control of one country by another; it can also include the economic exploitation of one region by another or exploitation of one group by another. In Kurdistan the signs of colonization appeared in the form of hundreds of forts, which dotted the region, most constructed during the 1970s and 1980s along the main highways and near the major towns for the purpose of controlling and militarizing Kurdistan. Furthermore, while the oil from the Kurdish region was exported, the revenue was used for the development of the Arab parts of Iraq. The only economic development that was allowed in Kurdistan was light industry, because this ensured the dependency of

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Kurdistan on other parts of Iraq. Most major Iraqi oil fields were in Kurdistan (at least until the 1980s when the Basra oil fields were discovered), but the region had only one refinery and no heavy hydrocarbon processing industry, while Iraq had nine refineries before 2003. Other aspects of Iraqi colonization include the removal of the Kurds from their traditional farming and agricultural fields to the southern provinces, a practice that forced them to serve as cheap laborers. But the construction of hundreds of Arab settlements in Kurdistan was by far the most significant aspect of the policy of internal displacement and colonization of Kurdistan. This was a new approach by the Iraqi state to deal with the Kurds and their homeland. Despite internal displacement and the ensuing colonization, the Kurdish national movement survived. With this backdrop, the fourth stage of Arabization began in early 1987, culminating in the infamous Anfal operations of 1988.

Anfal: The Demarcation of Kurdish History in Iraq Anfal means “the spoils” and is derived from the eighth sura of the Quran.119 It was also the name given by the Iraqi government to a series of military actions against the Kurds in 1988. The Anfal operations began soon after the appointment of Ali Hassan al-Majid as secretary general of the Northern Bureau of the Baath Party.120 He was appointed by the RCC “for the purpose of protecting security and order, safeguarding stability, and applying autonomous rule in the region.” According to the RCC decree, alMajid’s “decisions shall be mandatory for all state agencies, be they military, civilian and security.”121 The first phase of Anfal operations, which took place between April 21 and June 20, 1987, razed 703 three villages in government-controlled areas and several towns, though the lives of the people were spared.122 In addition to demolition the villages bordering the Arab areas were also Arabized. In late 1987, the regime designated all other rural areas of Kurdistan as “prohibited areas,” and their inhabitants were given a choice of returning to “the national ranks” or being “regarded without exception, as saboteurs [Peshmerga].”123 The census date of October 1987 was set as the final date for the villagers to return. Four months after the final date to return, the second phase of Anfal began. According to Human Rights Watch (HRW), the Iraqi government massacred between 50,000 and 100,000 noncombatant civilians, including women and children, during a six-month period that ranged from February 22, 1988, to September 6, 1988.124 Together around 1,500,000 Kurds were relocated during phases one and two of Anfal. The regime made widespread use of chemical weapons. HRW recorded forty separate chemical attacks on Kurdish villages between April 1987 and August 1988.125 However, Halabja

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became the symbol of Iraq’s chemical attacks because of large-scale civilian casualties there, nearly 5,000. It is relevant to question why the regime went to such extreme and violent lengths at this time. The Anfal operations were a logical extension of nearly three decades of Arabization policies in the Kurdistan region by successive governments. By the mid-1980s, guerrilla activities had reached unprecedented levels, and the regime’s ability to contain the Kurdish population had deteriorated. Cooperation between Iran and the Kurdish opposition was also a crucial motivation for the Anfals. However, the main reason was to eliminate the Kurdish national movement and then to annihilate the Kurds by demolishing the bases of the Kurdish guerrillas, the villages. The regime intended to destroy the Kurdish infrastructure that relied heavily on rural areas, thus making the Kurds more reliant on other regions of Iraq. Anfal exceeded the previous policy of internal displacement and colonization of Kurdistan. It differed from those policies by targeting the very existence of the Kurds as a people. There are reports that on the day of al-Majid’s appointment as secretary general of the Northern Bureau of the Arab Baath Socialist Party, he told Saddam: “lo albis yashmakh lo alabishum kulhum ‘ugl” ([I will go to the North] either wearing the Kurdish turban or make them all [the Kurds] wear Arabic headbands). These words were on people’s lips. Whether true or not, the people took it as true because al-Majid’s actions confirmed the widely circulated report. Besides, al-Majid’s threat says a lot about the motivations and intentions of the Iraqi regime, which was to blend the Kurds into the Arabic ethnic pot. In fact, a comparison of the regime’s approach to the Kurds in the 1970s and its attitude during the Anfal operations reveals that the government no longer considered the Kurds to be Iraqi citizens. After crushing the Kurdish rebellion in 1975, Saddam claimed that the greatest feature of the conflict was that “no looting had occurred” and “no women were abused.”126 However, during the notorious Anfal operations thousands of women were murdered and countless abused. While the property and honor of civilians were respected during the 1974–1975 war, as Saddam claimed, this was not the case during the Anfal campaigns. Saddam said that even the Kurds who were fighting in “the opposite ditch” were seen as Iraqis. The word anfal usually refers to actions against nonMuslims, but in this context, it implied that Kurds were non-Iraqis and nonMuslims, and so their lives and properties were forfeited. The campaigns were characterized by mass summary executions and the disappearance of more than 100,000 civilians. Kurdish sources generally cite the figure of 182,000. This seems slightly overestimated but alMajid’s dispute with Kurdish negotiators is a good indicator and acknowledgment of the scale in which people disappeared. In a meeting with a Kurdish delegation during negotiations in 1991, al-Majid became enraged as the Kurds raised the matter of the number of missing Kurds. A member of the delegation recalls that al-Majid shouted “what is this exaggerated fig-

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ure of 182,000? It couldn’t have been more than 100,000!” 127 By all accounts the Iraqi regime “committed panoply of war crimes, together with crimes against humanity and genocide.”128 The pattern of civilian disappearances during the second phase of the Anfal operation sheds more light on Saddam’s strategic objectives. The government sought to create a no-Kurd buffer zone around the oil city of Kirkuk as part of the move to fully annex the wealthy areas of Kurdistan. To determine the pattern of disappearances, the areas targeted by Anfal were divided into four catchments (see Table 6.1). Despite its painstaking investigation, HRW’s conclusion regarding the pattern of disappearances was inconclusive and did not represent all the facts. HRW suggested that “the mass disappearance of women and children frequently mirrored the pattern of Peshmerga resistance.”129 In fact, close scrutiny of the operation reveals that the only explanation for the pattern of disappearances was whether the captured civilians resided in the Kirkuk catchment area or outside it.130 For the intensity of resistance, patterns of people movement, and Iraqi measures taken during the stages, this research adopts the HRW description as presented in Iraq’s Crimes of Genocide. As for the number of casualties and people who disappeared, it adopts both HRW’s and Abdul Rahman’s data as presented in Death Crematorium.131 Table 6.1 indicates that the majority of people who disappeared were from the Kirkuk catchment (75 percent).132 It also demonstrates that the pattern of disappearances does not mirror the intensity of the resistance. Conversely, the areas where Iraqi troops faced the most tenacious resistance (Anfal stages 1, 5, 6, and 7) had low numbers of civilians who vanished. Most of the civilians who disappeared were male adults aged fifteen to fifty years. However, only in the Kirkuk catchment did a large number of women and children also vanish. Most of the civilians who disappeared in the Suleimaniya catchment (12.95 percent) were those who had earlier fled their homes to the south only to be rounded up in the Kirkuk catchment area. Taking this fact into consideration, the numbers of the people who vanished in the second Anfal should also be added to the number of people who vanished from the Kirkuk catchment area because they were captured there even though they came from the Suleimaniya catchment. If this is done, then the figure for civilians who were captured and who vanished in the Kirkuk catchments rises to 88 percent. It is relevant to note that the areas of the second Anfal were an extension of the Kirkuk catchment, and this might have been why the civilians in that area encountered the same fate as the people from the Kirkuk catchment. The measures taken by the Iraqi troops shed more light on why the regime singled out the Kirkuk area. Unlike other areas, the Iraqi troops in the Kirkuk catchment encircled the targeted areas before launching their attacks, thus leaving no other option for the civilians but to surrender. Army trucks transported the prisoners to temporary collection centers for process-

Table 6.1 The Anfal Stages and the Pattern of Disappearances Anfal Stage

Resistance Level

Date in 1988 (days)

Sergalour & Bergalou

Strong

Feb. 23– Mar. 19 (27)

240

Qaradagh

Low

Mar. 22– Apr. 1 (11)

—

168

8,835c

12.95

Garmian

Modest

Apr. 7–20 (13)

500 + 4 subdistricts

43

44,035c

64.54

Targeted Areas

1st

No. of Villages Affected

Casualtiesa 460

No. Percentage Disappeared of Each Stage 9b

Percentage of Each Catchment

0.01 12.95

Suleimaniya catchment 2nd

3rd Kirkuk catchment 4th

5th 6th 7th

8th

Total

75.09 Lesser Zab

Erbil Shaqlawa catchment & Rawanduz

Dohuk catchment

Badinan

Low

May 3–8 (5)

200

300

7,201c

10.55

Very Strong

May 15– Aug. 26 (91)

52

55

150b

0.22

0.22

Very Low

Aug. 25– Sept. 6 (13)

310

321

8,000b

11.73

11.73

1,347

68,230

100

100

1,302 + 4 subdistricts

Sources: Derived from Abdul Rahman, Death Crematorium, p. 124; HRW, Iraq’s Crimes of Genocide; Mala Shakhi, Khalkhalan Anfal: The Fourth Anfal, p. 12; The Black Anfal, p. 11; Dzayi, Anfal: The Catastrophe, pp. 84–156.) Notes: a. Includes civilian and Peshmerga casualties. b. Figures from HRW (1995) and Makiya (1993, p. 152). c. Figures from Abdul Rahman (1995, p. 124).

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ing. Such measures were rarely used in other areas, with the exception of the Dohuk catchment where a collection center was also set up. However, the difference was that the Dohuk area was not fully encircled and it was possible for as many as 80,000 civilians to escape by crossing the border into Turkey.133 The thorough and comprehensive nature of all the Anfal campaigns makes it clear that the regime was hell-bent on de-Kurdifying the Kirkuk region, particularly the areas bordering the already Arabized regions.134 It is relevant to inquire as to why these areas were singled out for extermination. The key issue of disagreement between the Kurds and the Iraqi authorities revolved around the fate of Kirkuk and its historical underpinnings. The Kurds have always claimed that Kirkuk and its surrounding areas have been historically part of Kurdistan and must be included in any new autonomous or federal region of Kurdistan. However, successive Iraqi governments have feared that Kirkuk’s inclusion in Kurdistan would lead to its separation from Iraq. In an interview in the late 1990s, Tariq Aziz, former Iraqi foreign minister, asserted that “Kirkuk must not be a part of the autonomous area because if it is incorporated it will be the first stage for [Kurdish] secession.”135 After the Anfal operations, al-Majid confirmed that one of the primary objectives of the Anfals was the de-Kurdification of Kirkuk. In April 15, 1989 he stated: I would like to speak about two points: one, Arabization; and two, the shared zones between the Arab lands and the Autonomous Region. The point that we are talking about is Kirkuk. When I came, the Arabs and Turkmen were not more than 50 percent of the total population of Kirkuk. Despite everything, I spent sixty million dinars until we reached the present situation. Now it is clear. For your information, the Arabs who were brought to Kirkuk didn’t raise the percentage to sixty percent. Then we issued directives. I prohibited the Kurds from working in Kirkuk, the neighborhoods and the villages around it.136

During the Iraq-Iran War, fewer Kurds than Arabs participated in the war effort; that is why their casualties were much lower than their Arab counterparts. Therefore the Anfal operations could also be seen to have been designed to dismantle the Kurd-Arab population imbalance. Mass killings of the Kurds in the Kirkuk region were conducted with this in mind. By specifically targeting Kirkuk, the regime could kill two birds with one stone: (1) to ensure equilibrium in the Kurd/Arab population, and (2) deKurdify the oil-rich Kirkuk area. These operations had profound effects on the Kurds in Iraq. Like the Jewish Holocaust, Anfal became a powerful metaphor that represented their collective experiences. It also provided the Kurds with a common sense of destiny in terms of their homeland, a destiny that will keep resonating throughout the generations of Kurds for many years to come. The Anfals

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came close to removing any possibility of integrating the Kurds into the Iraqi nation-state. Indeed, no event in Kurdish history had aroused such feelings of unity and a sense of shared destiny among the Kurds. It added another layer in the Kurdish shared memory and created a historical dividing line: pre- and post-Anfal. No event in Kurdish history had inspired so many Kurdish poets, writers, and intellectuals to put their thoughts and feelings to paper.137 If it were not for the Kuwait War, the government would certainly have taken even more drastic measures to attain its objective to obliterate the Kurds from Iraq. But the invasion of Kuwait and its ramifications, in particular the 1991 uprising, changed the political scene in Iraq forever.

1991 Uprisings: The Climax of National Disintegration As part of his dream to become the new Nebuchadnezzar of Iraq and a leader of the Arab and Muslim world, Saddam invaded Kuwait on August 2, 1990.138 The occupation lasted only seven months due to his defeat and the expulsion of the Iraqi army from Kuwait by a US-led coalition on February 28, 1991. As the demoralized Iraqi troops retreated from Kuwait, a soldier aimed his gun at one of Saddam’s wall posters in Basra. The incident sparked antigovernment demonstrations that led to a widespread uprising.139 Within days it spread throughout southern Iraq as far as Hilla, only fifty kilometers (thirty-one miles) southwest of Baghdad. In the north, elements of the Kurdistan National Front, especially clandestine cells of the PUK, aided an uprising in the town of Raniya, leading to other uprisings throughout Iraqi Kurdistan. It reached its height with the expulsion of the Iraqi forces from Kirkuk. Hundreds of members of the Iraqi security forces were killed by the Kurds and the Shiites in the north and the south. About 500 security agents were killed in al-Najaf by those avenging the deaths of their relatives. As many as 700 government agents were either killed or executed on the spot in the Suleimaniya Security Directorate alone.140 The uprising was not just the result of the Iraqi troops’ defeat in Kuwait but of years of cumulative injustice and suppression of the Shiites and Kurds. All of these events must be understood in the context of Iraq’s administrative, ethnic, and sectarian divisions. It is no coincidence that all four of the northern Kurdish provinces and all of the nine predominantly Shiite provinces (from Iraq’s eighteen provinces) revolted against the regime. It is also not a coincidence that the predominantly Sunni central provinces strenuously defended the regime. These events changed the political dynamics of Iraq as the protesters increasingly targeted the regime’s security apparatus that was comprised almost entirely of Sunnis.141 It was reported that Shiite protesters in the south carried out more than 2,500 summary executions.142 The resulting brutal reprisals destroyed any remaining sense of cohesion or

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hope of building trust within Iraqi society. The sectarian divisions were fueled by hatred, as evidenced by the popular slogans of the time. The Shiites in the south chanted, “Maku wali ila Ali, nuridu qa’id ja‘fari” (No custodian only Ali, we want a Shiite commander).143 In reply, government troops attacked the Shiite population with the words “La Shiite ba‘d alyawm” (No more Shiites after today!) painted on their tanks. Another slogan was “La Shiite wa la Sharwal” (No Shiites and no trousers [reference to Kurds]).144 The regime circulated the Shiite slogans widely to show that Sunni safety was at stake and to recruit even noncombatant Sunnis to take up arms against the Shiites. Sunni civil servants, tribal members, and even doctors took up arms and joined the Iraqi troops who crushed the uprising.145 The most distinctive features of the uprising were its rapid spread as well as its ethnic and sectarian character. It stopped at the ethnic and sectarian boundaries of the Kurds and the Shiites. Though the majority of the population in Baghdad in 1991 was Shiite, prompt and harsh measures taken by the government curtailed opposition activities just before they got totally out of control. Sporadic riots occurred in the Shiite neighborhoods (e.g., alThawra) of Baghdad but soon dispersed.146 Using its most loyal troops, the Republican Guard and the Special Republican Guard (recruited from tribes mainly from the Tikrit region), the regime managed to dampen the uprising by early April 1991. Terrified of the regime’s retribution, and with fresh memories of Anfal, almost the entire Kurdish population in targeted cities (estimated at two million) fled to the mountains of Kurdistan near the Turkish and Iranian borders. The exodus was a kind of unofficial plebiscite by the Kurds and signified their rejection of Iraq. The suffering of the Kurdish refugees, the killings by the Iraqi troops, and the lack of food, water, and shelter all became part of another tragic memory in the collective mind of the Kurds, as well as another chapter in the collective story of an ethnonational group persecuted by what was supposed to be their government. The Shiites had no memories of mass disappearances; neither did they have escape routes. Consequently, they faced the regime’s troops head on and suffered heavier casualties than the Kurds. Collective punishment was one of the hallmarks of the regime’s response to the people in the southern areas. An estimated 150,000 to 300,000 men, women, and children were killed.147 After suppressing the uprising, the Iraqi troops searched house to house for participants and suspects, while thousands were reportedly executed on the spot. The bodies of thousands of people have subsequently been located in mass graves around Iraq. In two mass graves near Hilla, 2,300 bodies were unearthed. The identity cards discovered with the bodies matched people who disappeared during the uprising.148 As mentioned, the uprising had widespread support among the Shiite and Kurdish populations but was opposed by the Sunnis. Even the Shiite members of the Baath and the pro-government Kurdish militiamen participated in the uprising. Once

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again, one can see that ethnic and sectarian loyalties were the final arbiters of loyalty in Iraqi politics. This climaxed the process of national disintegration that emerged after the Baath took power. In brief, the Baath’s exclusionary policies of the 1970s, 1980s, and 1990s were tantamount to Sunnification and Arabization, which inevitably hastened the process of national disintegration. These policies were shaped by the Baathist vision for Iraq’s identity and the threats they perceived, rightly or wrongly. From the Baathist perspective, the regime faced four threats to its authority: (1) from the army, (2) from the Kurds, (3) from the Shiites, and finally (4) from the ICP. The regime reverted to different strategies to tackle each of these. To counter the Kurdish threats it employed coercion, violence, mass killings, deportation, displacement, depopulation, and Arabization. These policies totally alienated the Kurds and left no room for national integration. Though the Shiites were also brought under control through violence, mass killings, and collective punishment, they were not subjected to Arabization, because it was their sectarian affiliation, rather than their ethnic roots, that was targeted. For countering threats from the army, the regime fully applied the policies of Baathification and Sunnification. The army was also subjected to tight control by Saddam’s inner family circle. The ICP, the main ideological challenger to the Baath in the 1960s and 1970s, was subjected to political manipulation, defamation, and extermination. All these policies were implemented concurrently until 1991 when the Kurds in the north and the Shiites in the south stood up to the regime. The rebellious acts of revenge by the Kurds and the Shiites for past oppressions, and the even more intense reactionary brutal suppression by the regime, largely disintegrated Iraqi society, if not totally. Both the Kurdish and the Shiite opposition allied with Iran, a staunch enemy of the Sunnis. This further distanced these communities from each other and from the central government, especially as the Sunnis perceived the other two communities as traitors rather than conationals or cocitizens. Meanwhile, the Shiite shift toward Islamism distanced them from both the Kurds and the Sunnis. Religion became the main instrument by which to further divide the Iraqis rather than to unite them. The crux of the problem was exacerbated by the fact that while the Sunnis advocated Arab nationalism, the Kurds had their own form of nationalism, and the Shiites supported Islamism. All cut across the various ethnic and geographical boundaries of the Iraqi state. Iraq’s diverse communities were caught in the push and pull of conflicting forces. They tended to retreat rather than coalesce with Iraq as a nation-state. However, neither the Shiites nor the Sunnis questioned the legitimacy of Iraq. The Kurds did question its legitimacy and considered that their involvement should be based on voluntary unification. That is why it may be argued that the Shiite uprisings against the regime sought cosmetic changes in Iraqi identity while also seeking a change in the balance of power. The Kurds, however, demanded radical changes and a

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restructuring of the state itself in order to recognize the binational nature of Iraq. It may be concluded, then, that it was a clash of identities that led to the failure of the process of national integration, a situation that will likely remain until enduring compromises are reached and trust rebuilt. The consequence of the 1991 uprising, and the final years of the Baathist regime, led to complete national disintegration.

Notes 1. Joining the Baath Party in 1957, Saddam became a mid-level operative by the mid-1960s. Soon after the 1968 coup, he reached high levels within the party and Iraq’s security apparatus. This led to the position of vice president. 2. Al-Waqai‘ al-Iraqiya, July 17, 1970, p. 3. 3. Abdul Razzaq al-Nayif, from Anbar province, was the director of military intelligence before the coup. After the coup he became prime minister. Ibrahim alDaud, also from Anbar, was the head of the Republican Guard on the day of the coup and soon after was given the post of minister of defense. 4. Marr, The Modern History of Iraq, pp. 139–140. 5. Nuri, Memoirs of Baha al-Din Nuri, p. 431. 6. For the nature of Baath totalitarianism, see Issa, Baathist Readings, pp. 195– 246; for the concept of totalitarianism, see Arendt, The Origins of Totalitarianism, pp. 305–460. 7. See Arab Baath Socialist Party (ABSP), Political Report, p. 78; ABSP, Central Report, pp. 64, 65. 8. Arab Baath Socialist Party, Central Report, p. 72. 9. As a university student at the time with close relations to supporters of the PUK and ICP, the author monitored events via clandestine radio programs of the PUK and ICP. For the ICP perspective on the events, see Ahmed, The Journey, pp. 235–242 and for the PUK perspective see Amin, Fingers That Crush, pp. 279–299. 10. Bengio, “Iraq 1976–1999,” Middle East Contemporary Survey 1987, p. 438; Ahmed, The Journey, p. 247. 11. See Bangert and Mohammed, “Visual Diary.” 12. Volkan, “Large-Group Identity,” pp. 49–76. 13. See al-Marashi, “Iraq’s Security and Intelligence Network.” 14. Marr, The Modern History of Iraq, p. 144. 15. Baram, Building Towards Crisis, pp. 37–52; Baram, “Saddam Husayn,” pp. 9–21. 16. Arab Baath Socialist Party (ABSP, Political Report, pp. 38, 39. For the English version of the report, see ABSP, The 1968 Revolution in Iraq. 17. Quoted in in Bengio, “Iraq 1976–1999,” Middle East Contemporary Survey 1977–1978, p. 518. 18. Quoted in Ibid., p. 508. 19. Arab Baath Socialist Party, Political Report, pp. 39, 130–133; ABSP, The Central Education Program, p. 168. 20. The author witnessed the distribution of television sets in Iraq. 21. An official document dated March 4, 1989, from the headquarters of the Suleimaniya division of the Arab Baath Socialist Party ordered subsections of the party to provide the names of students who were not members of the Baath so that they could be delisted from studies at Iraqi universities (ABSP, “De-listing Students from University Lists”). Another circulation from the headquarters of the Rawanduz

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branch of the ABSP provides directives to expel non-Baathist teachers from the education sector (see Arab Baath Socialist Party, “Expel Non-Baathist Teachers from Schools”). 22. Arab Baath Socialist Party, Political Report, pp. 112, 113, 215; ABSP, Central Report, pp. 156, 160, 161. 23. The author sighted them in the 1970s and 1980s in Iraq during his school years. See also Arab Baath Socialist Party, Central Report, p. 168. 24. Ibid., p. 169. 25. See Lahmeyer, “Iraq: Historical Demographical Data.” 26. See Al-Waqai‘ al-Iraqiya, July 17, 1970. 27. Bengio, “Iraq 1976–1999,” Middle East Contemporary Survey 1979–1980, p. 506. 28. The author monitored Saddam’s speeches on Iraqi television from the late 1970s until 1991 when he left Iraq. 29. See Arab Baath Socialist Party, Central Report, June 1982. 30. Ibid., pp. 28–35. 31. Abdul Khaliq al-Samarra’i was a member of the Baath National Command (NC). He was considered the third most powerful man in Iraq after al-Bakr and Saddam. Al-Samarra’i was tried in 1973 on the flimsiest of evidence and condemned to death. However, al-Bakr refused to ratify his execution order. Therefore AlSamarra’i was imprisoned, only to be shot in 1979 after al-Bakr himself was purged. Shafiq al-Kamali, a poet, wrote Iraq’s national anthem (1979–2003) and was editor of the famous journal Afaq Arabiya (Arabic Horizons). Becoming a member of the NC in 1969, al-Kamali was one of the earliest Baath members in Iraq to play a critical role in establishing the Baath. In 1984, he was arrested and killed by Saddam (Makiya, “A Model for Post-Saddam Iraq,” p. 12; Ghareeb and Dougherty, Historical Dictionary of Iraq, p. 128). 32. Bengio, “Iraq 1976–1999,” Middle East Contemporary Survey 1979, p. 501. 33. Al-Waqai‘ al-Iraqiya, February 1, 1993, p. 38. 34. See Baram, Building Towards Crisis; Bashir, The Insider. 35. Arab Baath Socialist Party, Political Report, pp. 93–95; ABSP, Central Report, pp. 49–54. 36. Jabar, The Shi‘ite Movement, pp. 204–205. 37. Bengio, “Iraq 1976–1999,” Middle East Contemporary Survey 1986, p. 377. 38. Quoted in Bengio, Saddam’s Word, p. 78. 39. Simon, Iraq Between the Two World Wars, p. 48–49. 40. Baram, Culture, History and Ideology, pp. 30–96; Baram, “A Case of an Imported Identity.” 41. Arab Baath Socialist Party, Political Report, p. 123. 42. Arab Baath Socialist Party, The Central Education Program, pp. 22–23. 43. Republic of Iraq, Ministry of Education, The National Education for Grade Two Intermediate School, pp. 10, 16, 24, 37. 44. Republic of Iraq, Ministry of Education, The National Education for Grade One Intermediate School, pp. 12, 19. 45. Quoted in Baram, Culture, History and Ideology, p. 101. 46. Republic of Iraq, Ministry of Education, The Ancient History of the Arab Homeland for Grade One Intermediate School, pp. 38, 40, 44, 56, 57. 47. Afram, Who Are the Chaldo-Assyrian-Syrians? p. 21. 48. Jabar, The Shi‘ite Movement, p. 266; Baram, Culture, History and Ideology, p. 62. 49. Republic of Iraq, Ministry of Education, The Guiding Readings for Grade Six High School, pp. 19–22.

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50. Salih, A Brief History and Geography for Grade Six Primary School, pp. 64, 65; A Brief History and Geography for Grade Five Primary School, pp. 52, 53. 51. See Aflaq, “For the Sake of Resurrection.” 52. Cited in Bengio, “Baathi Iraq in Search of Identity,” p. 516. 53. Smith, “The Origins of Nations,” p. 148. 54. Thies, “State Building Interstate and Intrastate Rivalry,” pp. 53–58. 55. Jabar, The Shi‘ite Movement, p. 254. 56. Axelgard, New Iraq?, p. 56. 57. Marr, The Modern History of Iraq, p. 178. 58. Saddam Hussein cited this figure during a live speech on Iraqi television in 1982. 59. Bengio, “Iraq 1976–1999,” Middle East Contemporary Survey 1982–1983, p. 575. 60. Bengio, “Iraq 1976–1999,” Middle East Contemporary Survey 1983–84, p. 480. 61. Human Rights Watch, Iraq’s Crime of Genocide, p. 27. 62. A recorded tape of Saddam’s speech is available at Saddam’s Cruelty website. 63. Human Rights Watch, Iraq’s Crime of Genocide, pp. 29, 30. 64. Bengio, “Iraq 1976–1999,” Middle East Contemporary Survey 1982–1983, p. 566. 65. See Abedin, “The Supreme Council for the Islamic Revolution in Iraq.” 66. Human Rights Watch, Human Rights in Iraq, p. 53; in Bengio, “Iraq 1976– 1999,” Middle East Contemporary Survey 1984–1985, p. 465. 67. Ahmed, “The Marshes of Southern Iraq,” p. 1. 68. Al-Waqai‘ al-Iraqiya, January 2,1984; February 1, 1988. 69. Ibid., January 20, 1986. 70. These accounts were recorded by the author when he visited the prisoners at Abu Ghraib prison in July 1987. Muhammed Hamadamin Sadiq, a Kurdish political prisoner from September 12, 1986, to September 14, 1988, later confirmed these accounts. 71. An Iraqi prisoner in the second group from April 4, 1980, to December 23, 1991, Muhammad Baqr Hassan Majid shared this information with the author. 72. Moaddel et al., “Foreign Occupation and National Pride,” p. 696. 73. Bengio, “Shi‘is and Politics in Baathi Iraq,” p. 2; Abedin, “The Islamic Call Party;” Shanahan, “The Islamic Da‘wa Party,” p. 18. 74. Jabar, The Shi‘ite Movement, pp. 204–206. 75. Mahdi al-Hakim was later smuggled out of jail to safety, but in 1988 he was assassinated in Sudan by Iraqi agents. 76. Jabar, The Shi‘ite Movement, p. 206. 77. Abdul Sahib Dukheil was the first leading Da‘wa figure to be executed in 1971 (see al-Musawi, The Islamic Da‘wa Party). 78. Ibid. 79. The Arba‘in March is a Shiite religious observation commemorating the murder of Imam Hussein’s death forty days after the Day of Ashura. It falls on the twentieth day of the month of Safar, the second month in the Islamic calendar. 80. Bengio, “Shi‘is and Politics in Baathi Iraq,” p. 4; Jabar, The Shi‘ite Movement, p. 213; Marr, The Modern History of Iraq, pp. 172,173. 81. Quoted in Jabar, The Shi‘ite Movement, p. 210. 82. Ibid., pp. 216–222. 83. Marr, The Modern History of Iraq, p. 175; Bengio, “The Shi‘is and Politics in Baathi Iraq,” p. 5. 84. Jabar, The Shi‘ite Movement, p. 225.

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85. Arab Baath Socialist Party, Central Report, p. 299. 86. See al-Musawi, “The Islamic Da‘wa Party”; Abedin, “The Islamic Call Party.” 87. Quoted in Jabar, The Shi‘ite Movement, p. 230. Ayatollah Khomeini (1902– 1989) was an Iranian religious leader and politician who saw the overthrow of Mohammad Reza Pahlavi, the Shah of Iran. He became the country’s Supreme Leader, a position created in the constitution as the highest-ranking political and religious authority of the nation. 88. Ibid., pp. 231–233. 89. RCC decree no. 461 was issued on March 31, 1980, and published on January 2, 1984, in al-Waqai‘ al-Iraqiya, no. 2974. 90. Muhammad Baqr al-Hakim and several independent clerics combined the Da‘wa, MAI, and the newly formed organization Mujahidin to form the SCIRI. 91. This report was well circulated among the Shiites in the 1980s and was later confirmed by the author’s contacts. Al-Salihi provides another version of this saying: hadu kilabhum ‘alehum (send their dogs [the Shiites] against them [Iranians]). See al-Salihi, Earthquake, p. 179. 92. Arab Baath Socialist Party, Central Report, p. 293. 93. Jabar, The Shi‘ite Movement, pp. 247–248. 94. For the full text of the 11 March Manifesto, see Karim, The History of the Kurdistan Democratic Party, pp. 255–263; for the English version, see Gunter, The Kurds of Iraq, pp. 15, 16). 95. The first assassination attempt was on September 29, 1971, and the second was on July 16, 1972. 96. See al-Taakhi, August 19, 1973; Sinjari, The Kurdish Issue, pp. 160–199, 206–207. 97. Al-Thawra, “To Maintain Peace,” pp. 72–73, 168–169; al-Barak, Mustafa Barzani, pp. 199–248. 98. Iraq nationalized the Iraqi Petroleum Company (IPC) in June 1972. Iraq’s oil revenues went from £218.6 (US$355.25) million in 1972 to £823.2 (US$1,337.86) million in 1973 (Haj, The Making of Iraq, p. 137). 99. Quoted in Sinjari, The Kurdish Issue, pp. 277–294. 100. The province of Dohuk was created out of the Kurdish districts of Ninawa province in 1969. 101. Mina, Iraq’s Security Strategy, p. 149. 102. Arab Baath Socialist Party, Central Report, p. 62. 103. The areas classified as strategic were Khanaqin and Mandali in Diyala province; Badra district in Wasit province; the Kurdish areas of Shekhan; Telkif, Tala‘far, and Sinjar in Ninawa province; and some areas in the districts of Zakho and Simel in Dohuk province. 104. For a discussion of the economic power of the Faili-Kurds, see al-Barak, The Jewish and Iranian Schools in Iraq, pp. 151–152. 105. Human Rights Watch, World Report 1993; Mina, Iraq’s Security Strategy, p. 129. 106. Mina, Iraq’s Security Strategy, pp. 235–236; Muhammad et al., Arabization Policy, p. 13; Muhammad, The Kurdish Issue, pp. 166–167. 107. Hamadamin Sadiq (the author’s father) recalled how his friend, Sheikh Marf, willingly sold his village of Dirkay Bichuk to the Arabs. 108. Mina, Iraq’s Security Strategy, p. 149. 109. See Mina, Iraq’s Security Strategy; Muhammad et al., Arabization Policy. 110. The quarters built for Arab newcomers in Kirkuk were al-Karama (600), al-Muthana (500), Shuhada Qadisiyat Saddam (200), al-Andalus (200+), Arafa

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(6,000 houses added to previously established quarters), Dur al-‘Amal al-Sha‘bi (1,000), al-Dhubat (500), al-Baath (600), al-Wasiti (200), al-Sikak (450), alIshtrakiya (100), al-Gharnatta (200), al-Hajjaj (1,000), al-Uruba (200), al-Shurta (~100), Musala (400 apartments built in already established quarters), al-Wahda (200), al-Huriya (150), Dur al-Amn (220), Dur Dhubat al-Saff (100) (Mina, Iraq’s Security Strategy, pp. 246–250; Talabany, Kirkuk Area, pp. 58–62; Abdul Rahman, Kurdish Ethnic Cleansing, p. 106). 111. See Al-Waqai‘ al-Iraqiya, December 15, 1975. 112. Haddad et al., Atlas of Kirkuk, pp. 13–19. 113. See Human Rights Watch, Iraq’s Crimes of Genocide; Appendix 1. 114. The settlements were concentrated around Kirkuk and in the district of Dibis. They include Daraman and Galozi in Shwan subdistrict; al-Jamhuriya in Yaychi subdistrict; Maysaloon (100 houses), al-Rafidayin (unknown), Huttayin (500), Haifa (150), Yafa (100), al-Quds (100), Tamuz (30), and quarters of Dur alIza‘a, Dur al-Amn, al-Muthanna, and al-Ta’mim in Dibis district; Yafa al-Asri (300), al-Masawla (500) in Tuzkhurmato district; Mahawish (30), al-Asriya (500), Hussein Agha (400), and Daquq (500) in Daquq district; Klesa (25), Qarahanjeer (400), Laylan (300), Gameshawan Tirkashkan (60), and Tarjil (50) in Qarahassan subdistrict; Yaychi (100) in Haweeja district; al-Ishtrakiya complex (500) in Kifri district; al-Ta’mim (300), Ali Murad (150), Najaf (150), Sab‘a Nisan (100), Karezi Khwaru (100), Fishkhapur (650), Derabin (500) in Zakho district; Sar Shor (400), Kani Spi (300), Faida (500), Bastkey Sari (500), Batel (500), Av Zrik (350), Khrab Dem (450), Kelik (400), Grshin (300), and Bajit Kandala (200) in Smel district; and Ain Sufni (700) and Atrush (150) in Shekhan district (Mina, Iraq’s Security Strategy, pp. 229–260; Talabany, Kirkuk Area, pp. 63-80). 115. Al-Thawra, September 18, 1978; McDowall, The Modern History of the Kurds, p. 339. 116. Mina, Iraq’s Security Strategy, pp. 199–201; McDowall, The Modern History of the Kurds, p. 339. 117. Amin, Going Around in Circles, pp. 74, 75. 118. The Kurdistan National Front included the KDP, the PUK, the Kurdistan Socialist Party, the Kurdistan Popular Democratic Party, the Kurdish Socialist Party (PASOK), the Kurdistan Organization of the ICP, the Assyrian Democratic Party, and the Kurdistan Toilers Party. It was announced in principle in July 1987 (Gunter, The Kurds of Iraq, p. 39). 119. The first verse of the Anfal chapter reads: “They ask you about the spoils. Say: The spoils are for Allah and the Messenger.” The chapter was allegedly revealed to the Prophet Muhammad in the wake of the battle of Badr in 624 AD. 120. Ali Hassan al-Majid (1941–2010) was Saddam’s first cousin. 121. Human Rights Watch, Iraq’s Crimes of Genocide, pp. 276, 277, 296, 297. 122. Ibid., p. 49. 123. Ibid., p. 57. 124. Ibid., p. 5. 125. The first chemical attack occurred on April 16, 1987, in the villages of Balisan and Sheikh Wasan, resulting in the killing of about 320 civilians, including sixty-one children (Ibid., pp. 46–47). 126. Hussein, One Ditch or Two Ditches? p. 26. 127. Makiya, Cruelty and Silence, p. 168. 128. See Human Rights Watch (HRW), Iraq’s Crimes of Genocide. This research was written by a team of HRW investigators who analyzed eighteen tons of captured Iraqi government documents and conducted field interviews with more than 350 witnesses, most of whom were survivors of the Anfal campaigns.

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129. Ibid., pp. 13, 82, 191. 130. The author believes that the number of people who disappeared is actually higher, especially in the Kirkuk catchment area. These figures, however, offer a reasonable indication of the pattern of disappearances. 131. Abdul Rahman’s figures are based on a comprehensive survey conducted by the Committee for the Defense of Anfal Victims’ Rights. It covered only the most severely affected areas of the second, third, and fourth Anfals. While incomplete, these figures approximate the truth. The Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) conducted a survey in 2007, but as the figures do not correspond to the alleged figure of 182,000 (the figure most quoted by the Kurds), the outcome was inconclusive (KRG, Presenting Information Diagrams of the Kurdish Genocide; Abdul Rahman, Death Crematorium, p. 124). 132. A large number of detainees from Kirkuk catchment were freed when the Kurdish townspeople of Chamchamal stoned the trucks and smashed the windows of a convoy carrying detainees through the city (Human Rights Watch, Iraq’s Crimes of Genocide, p. 107). Otherwise, the number would have been much higher. 133. Human Rights Watch, Iraq’s Crimes of Genocide, p. 267; Dzayi, Anfal: The Catastrophe, p. 151. 134. The tribes of Roghzayi and Daoudi that occupy the border areas with the Arabs were the worst hit by the Anfal operations. 135. Quoted in Na‘na‘, Tariq Aziz, p. 163. 136. See Human Rights Watch, Iraq’s Crimes of Genocide, Appendix 1. 137. For example, Khambar, The Exiles Start Here, pp. 11–17; Bekas, Poetical Works of Sherko Bekas; Ali, The City of the White Musicians; Siwayli, Nation and Narration, pp. 183–192. 138. For a thorough discussion of the invasion of Kuwait, see Marr, The Modern History of Iraq, pp. 217–225. 139. Al-Salihi, Earthquake, p. 71. 140. See Human Rights Watch, “Endless Torment.” The author counted twentythree military intelligence corpses at the northern military intelligence compound in Erbil on the day of the uprising in Erbil. 141. Baram documents the domination of the Iraqi security apparatuses by the Sunnis in “Neo-Tribalism in Iraq,” p. 5; see also, Baram, Building Towards Crisis, pp. 37–52; and Baram, “Saddam Husayn,” pp. 9–21. 142. See Human Rights Watch, “Endless Torment.” 143. Al-Salihi, Earthquake, p. 318; Asharq al-Awsat, April 5, 2005. Friends who participated in the uprisings confirmed that this slogan was widely used, but the most popular slogan was “Down with Saddam!” 144. Al-Salihi, Earthquake, p. 321. 145. Several eyewitnesses confirmed these reports to the author. 146. Bengio, “Iraq 1976–1999,” Middle East Contemporary Survey 1991, p. 423. 147. Farouk-Sluglett and Sluglett, Iraq Since 1958, p. 289; Cockburn, Muqtada, p. 72. 148. Cockburn, Muqtada, p. 72.

7 A Disintegrated Nation

The process of national disintegration under the Baathist regime

became even more pronounced with the 1991 uprising. Compared to previous years, there were more divisions in the 1990s among the three main ideological movements: Islamism (mostly the Shiites), Arab nationalism (the Sunnis), and Kurdish nationalism (the Kurds). By the time the United States invaded in 2003, Iraqi society had disintegrated. One of the reasons was that in the 1990s the regime introduced and/or reinvigorated the policies of family rule, the Campaign of Faith, and the re-tribalization of Iraqi society.

Family Rule: Regime’s Narrow Power Base After the 1991 uprising, the Baathist regime’s power base was further narrowed, and the state’s control of the periphery diminished. At the same time Saddam’s close family associates occupied more of the central state and security positions. Saddam’s oldest son, Uday (aged twenty-eight in 1992), was in charge of the Iraqi media. He headed the National Union of Iraqi Students, the Iraqi Journalists’ Union, and the Iraqi Olympic Committee, to name a few of his positions. Uday also founded Saddam’s Fida’iyin (Saddam’s Men of Sacrifice), a paramilitary force. The new paramilitary organization grew rapidly from 30,000 personnel in 1996 to 60,000 in 1998. As revealed by Uday’s former secretary, Abbas al-Janabi, its main task was to gain control of the key areas in Baghdad in the event of an uprising against the regime.1 In 1998, Saddam’s second son, Qusay (aged thirtytwo), was entrusted with the regime’s entire security apparatus. He became head of the Special Security, the Republican and Special Republican Guards, the General Intelligence, the Military Intelligence, and the General Security. In fact, Saddam was preparing to turn the Republic of Iraq into what might be termed an Arab-republican-monarchy. As part of this plan,

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Uday was groomed to inherit Saddam’s position as the leader. However, as a result of an assassination attempt on his life in 1996, Uday was crippled. The crippling of Uday opened the door for Qusay to replace him as heir apparent. With the defection of Hussein Kamil (Saddam’s cousin and sonin-law) to Jordan in 1995 and the assassination attempt on Uday in 1996, the family hold on power weakened slightly for a short time. The primary reason for Saddam’s reliance on family members was that during the Shiite and Kurdish uprisings in 1991, his family appeared to be more trustworthy and committed to the regime’s survival than anyone else. As a consequence of privatization, Saddam’s close family associates controlled large portions of Iraq’s economy. Following the Kuwait War, the effects of their ownership became even more apparent because they had taken control of the profitable food import business and the oil trade, and they asserted rights over vast tracts of farmlands. It was thought that the executions and mysterious killings of several well-known Iraqi merchants in 1992 were orchestrated by family members, especially Uday, in order to monopolize the lucrative import trade. Consequently, Saddam’s close family associates controlled not only the key political positions but dominated the private and public sectors of the Iraqi economy and trade. One of the ramifications of the family’s relentless control of all political and economic sectors of the state was that the Iraqi upper class was further marginalized. While these changes took place in the economic and trade sectors, the Saddamization of Iraq and the development of Saddam’s personal cult continued as before. In the last decade of Saddam’s rule, the flattering literati began describing him as “the nation’s present and past.” State-sponsored festivals were organized under the banner of “Our Saddam is our Iraq.”2

UN Sanction and the Regime’s Manipulations: Erosion of Social Values In tracing the course of the events in the 1990s, it is important to address the socioeconomic conditions of Iraq prior to the US invasion for two primary reasons: first, to determine the extent of the impact of these conditions on the process of national disintegration, and second, to understand the inner dynamics of post-US invasion problems faced by the Iraqis as well as the “invaders.” This will place into context the state of civil strife that emerged postinvasion. Soon after Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait in August 1990, the UN Security Council imposed severe sanctions on Iraq, including restrictions on most forms of trade.3 For Iraq, which historically had depended on the export of oil for 95 percent of its revenue and the import of 80 percent of its food, the sanctions were a severe blow.4 By 1995, there were reports that food prices had inflated by 4,000 percent and inflation had reached 65,000 percent.5 It

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was also reported that 85 percent of Iraqis believed that their income was insufficient to meet even the basic needs. For example, by the mid-1990s, a civil servant earned about 5,000 Iraqi dinars (ID) (approximately US$2.00) per month; but a chicken in the market sold for 4,000 IDs (approximately US$1.50). In 1968, Iraq’s per capita income was US$600 but increased steadily to $5,520 in 1980. By the end of the Iraq-Iran War in 1988, it dropped to $3,590. More devastating for the Iraqis, after five years of sanctions, per capita income plunged to a meager $336 in 1995.6 On the education front, in the late 1980s, the literacy rate in Iraq was as high as 95 percent. However, in 1995, a United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF) survey found that only 87 percent of Iraqi children were enrolled in primary school, and of these only 58 percent completed primary schooling.7 Moreover, the attendance at schools of all levels continued to drop because many parents either could not afford to send their children or they needed them to work to supplement the family income. The picture was no better for the state of health as malnutrition and extreme shortages of medicine caused higher rates of infant mortality. Just before the sanctions in 1990, the mortality rates for infants and children (ages infant to five) were among the region’s lowest: about forty-five deaths per 1,000 children. However, in 1999, in the areas where the government controlled the distribution of food and medicine, the rate had increased by more than 250 percent, reaching a level of 107 deaths per 1,000 children. Contrast this to the Kurdish-controlled region: during the same period mortality rates decreased from sixty-four to fifty-nine per 1,000 children.8 Nevertheless, in 1996, the UN’s oil-for-food program relieved the economic and financial pressure on many segments of Iraqi society because the Iraqi government was permitted to sell US$2.1 billion worth of oil every six months. In 1998, the half-yearly ceiling was raised to $5.2 billion.9 Despite these revenues, a UNICEF report in 2002 indicated that one in five children in the south and center of Iraq remained so malnourished that they needed special therapeutic feeding. The UN Office of the Iraq program repeatedly criticized Iraq for failing to utilize the increased oil revenues, stating that the sums allocated for this in the government’s distribution plan were not commensurate with the problem.10 The rising crime rate was another problem faced by Iraqi communities, with the rate of thievery increasing by 223 percent in 1994 alone.11 The dire economic situation was also reflected in the increasing prevalence of prostitution. To control the crime situation, the regime increased the magnitude of the punishment. State terror was the form of suppression in use, as the regime legalized amputations or executions for desertion or forgery, mutilation or execution for theft, and the death penalty for smuggling.12 Despite these harsh measures, lawlessness intensified as corruption, bribery, extortion, protection rackets, and official thuggery became endemic. These unsavory acts were often perpetrated by the “very people responsible for upholding the law”—the state institutions.13 All these led to the erosion of moral

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and traditional values that for years had held together the fabric of society. Iraq’s power system was on the brink of collapse in January 1998. Baghdad, the most modern capital in the Middle East in the 1970s, was reduced to the level of a big village where the pavement had become shops for rent. In addition to ongoing internal fighting in Kurdistan and the deteriorating socioeconomic and political conditions, the dire situation prompted many Kurds and Iraqis to flee the country. The outflow of people, legally or illegally, was unprecedented and produced two detrimental outcomes: a severe brain drain and the withering of the middle class. The regime denied any responsibility for the catastrophic socioeconomic conditions faced by Iraq. It blamed the people’s suffering on corrupt individuals and on the UN embargo. These factors certainly contributed to the worsening situation, but other contributing factors included smuggling, the population increase, and the reduction of land productively cultivated due to mismanagement and/or government policies. The deterioration of economic conditions could also be linked to the regime’s intent to punish the restive Iraqi population in general and the Shiites in particular for their role in the 1991 uprising and their continued resistance in the marshlands; therefore, draining the Iraqi southern marshlands was one measure to pay back the Shiites for rebelling. The regime also exploited people’s hardships and suffering for propaganda purposes in an attempt to attract sympathy from the international community by blaming the Western powers for people’s misery. In desperation, the regime even reached out to Islam for salvation.

Faith Campaign: Saddam’s Savior In an article published in 1979, Saddam threatened those who attempted to politicize religion.14 However, when faced with the rising tide of Islamism in the 1980s, and in response to Khomeini’s propaganda, Saddam began to loosen the regime’s secular state policies by increasingly drawing on Islamic terminology and symbols to bolster his positions. For example, the word bay‘a (oath of allegiance) was used to portray public support for Saddam because of its Islamic connotation. This choice was, by no means, accidental. The intent was to establish a link between Saddam and the ancient Arab rulers. But this link to religion was only superficial, for the Baath had generally resisted the spread of religiosity, thinking that it would divide membership of the party along sectarian (Sunni-Shiite) lines. During the war with Iran, the Baath was compelled to draw on Islamic sentiments to ward off Khomeini’s appeal to the Iraqi Shiites. As a result, the regime began to make use of symbolic religious gestures. An Iraqi army unit was named Quwwat Allahu Akbar (God Is Great Force) and military communiqués often commenced with Quranic verses. Iraqi offensive operations

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against Iran were given Islamic code names such as Ramadhan Mubarak (Blessed Ramadan) and Tawakalna ‘ala Allah (We Relied on Allah). The 1988 operations against the Kurds were also given religious glosses—for example, Anfal. As the United States and the allied forces deployed troops in the region to force Iraq out of Kuwait, Islamic rhetoric reached unprecedented levels. Just days before the start of the allied offensive in January 1991, Saddam added the slogan “Allahu Akbar” (God Is Great) to the Iraqi national flag. During and after the war, Saddam portrayed himself as the champion of Islam against both Western imperialism and the US infidels. The Islamic tone of the messages seemed to appeal to the Arab and Muslim masses worldwide. In general, the regime’s rhetoric turned from panArabism to a broader form of pan-Islamism as Saddam’s selective and situational slogans always reflected his position. When fighting the Islamic Iran, the focus of Saddam’s rhetoric was pan-Arabism and Iraqism, but when facing the United States, his rhetoric was couched in Islamic terms and idioms. Instead of reflecting merely a shift in ideologies, this switch in tone reflected an overall crisis of identity that Saddam as a leader and Iraq as a state were experiencing. In addition to manipulating religious symbols and terms to win public opinion, a so-called Faith Campaign (Hamlat al-Iman) was launched in June 1993. Its main target was schoolchildren as well as the Baathists, judges, prisoners, and Iraqi women. As part of the campaign, two Islamic universities and several colleges and schools were opened to the public to teach Islamic courses. The graduates of these universities and colleges were later employed in government-sponsored religious positions. In addition to preaching Islam and Islamism in the schools, the state television (the only legitimate media outlet) began broadcasting Friday sermons and daily onehour religious segments aimed at “guiding” citizens to read and understand the Quran. Describing the Faith Campaign as a turning point in Iraqi cultural and educational history, the authorities claimed that, by mid-1998, 4.5 million students “drank from the sources” of faith.15 Official Iraqi statements justified the Faith Campaign as moral guidance to Iraqi youth and thereby protected them from “drifting” toward “suspect,” “radical,” and “destructive” religious movements, namely Shiite organizations.16 There was growing resentment among an increasing number of young people in the 1990s, which the regime attempted to control.17 While this explanation may have had some validity, Saddam needed a more cohesive force, both locally (to unite the Shiites and the Sunnis) and beyond Iraqi borders (in the Arabic and the Muslim worlds) to fight the Western “infidels” and their imposed sanctions on Iraq. The use of Islamic principles instead of secular laws appeared to offer more opportunity for the regime to enforce law and order in the face of ever-increasing lawlessness and corruption. Moreover, the Faith Campaign provided justification for the suffering of the Iraqi people as a result of the UN embargo. The ideological bankrupt-

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cy of the Baath was another reason for the regime to grasp at religion because it was seen to be better equipped to fight the desperation of the people. It is also worth mentioning that Saddam was fifty-six years old in 1993. It is not unusual for older people to turn to religion. It is possible that he might have found more interest in his faith. However, the question remains: did the campaign achieve its intended objectives? Generally speaking, the campaign failed because the gaps between the Shiites and the Sunnis were too wide at this stage to be bridged by the convenient instigation of the Faith Campaign. In fact, it was rather counterproductive as it sowed the seeds of radicalism in Iraq, particularly among the Sunnis, many of whom eventually turned to Wahhabism (an ultra-orthodox Sunni brand of Islam and the inspiration for al-Qaeda). This extreme form of Islamism describes the Shiites as al-rawafidh (the rejecters), and this further widened the rift between the two sectarian groups. The ramifications of the Faith Campaign and the division between the Shiites and the Sunnis grew even more strident during the civil strife that erupted after the removal of the regime in 2003. The Iraqi authorities, either intentionally or unknowingly, tolerated the resurgence of the Iraqi Islamic Party, an offshoot of the Muslim Brotherhood. This party worked to reestablish its base during this time, though in a semi-clandestine way.18 Consequently, Islamism engulfed not only the Shiites but also the Sunnis, who were traditionally less enthusiastic about religiously inspired ideologies. The regime’s media outlets occasionally admitted that Islamism had become “pervasive and active in all theological colleges as well as in the mosques.” 19 The campaign further radicalized Iraqi society, especially as some teachers used the lessons as a pretext or cover for advancing extremist views. While promoting the Faith Campaign, Saddam revived and reinforced traditional tribalism as another means of control because, as the 1991 uprising had shown, the Baath no longer enjoyed total domination of society.

Tribalism: Saddam’s Policy of Public Control Tribal policy in Iraq was not Saddam’s invention. Historically, state authorities had used it in various ways as a utilitarian means of control. During the monarchy, the central government had empowered tribal leaders not only politically (by allocating them almost half of the parliamentary seats) but also economically. The 1924 Tribal Dispute Act and 1932 Land Tenure Law had given the tribal leaders significant powers. At the same time, the laws had the effect of weakening the tribal structures because the laws caused waves of migration from the rural areas to urban centers. Qasim’s agrarian reforms had challenged the power of the tribal leaders and weakened the traditional tribal structures by releasing the peasants from the legal bonds that tied them to their landlords. In its early years, the Baathist regime took

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practical measures to weaken the tribal leaders’ influence. The agrarian reforms that were initiated by Qasim were enforced even more rigorously by the Baath regime. Initially, tribalism was perceived by the Baath as a threat to the party’s rule and as an obstacle to social transformation.20 In its early years, the Baath abandoned the use of tribal names by political leaders, and the very word “tribe” was erased from the Baathist political lexicon.21 However, during the Iraq-Iran War, the Baath reconsidered this strategy. Because Saddam feared betrayal by the Shiites, he highlighted the Iraqis’ Arab tribal identity, believing that this would undermine the Iraqi and Iranian Shiites’ common faith bond and keep them from acting as a united bloc.22 The surge of tribalism was also aimed at fragmenting any potential sources of opposition within the larger ethnic and sectarian communities. For example, during the war with Iran this strategy was tested with the Kurds. Most Kurdish tribal leaders were allowed to establish a paramilitary contingent to discourage young Kurds from joining opposition groups. As part of the regime’s increasing recognition of tribal importance, Saddam began receiving tribal delegations from all parts of the country. He also repeatedly visited various tribal guest houses, downplaying state institutions and raising the stature of tribal leaders, in an attempt to appear to behave in accordance with customary tribal ways. Tribalism became part of the government bureaucracy as Saddam established guest houses in most provincial centers. The importance of the tribe was significant for Saddam’s public image and was further demonstrated by killing Saddam’s sons-in-law after their return to Iraq from Jordan. On the night of the killing, Iraqi television announced that the al-Majid family “had to kill the defectors to cleanse their honor, which had been tarnished by treason.”23 The killings were presented as the redemption of the family’s honor by placing tribal justice above the laws of the state. The influence of the tribal leaders was also reflected in their domination of the National Assembly where 60 percent of the NA members elected in the 1995 elections were either tribal leaders or their representatives.24 By the mid-1990s, tribal conventions had superseded the laws of the state. This happened not just in the peripheral tribal areas but also in Baghdad. Saddam referred to the Baath as “the tribe of all the tribes,”25 in effect tribalizing the Baath Party itself. The main motivation of Saddam’s tribal policy after the 1991 uprising was utilitarian: to control the people and contain the opposition by the strategy of divide and conquer. Tribes and tribal leaders were used by the regime to foster a patron/client relationship with the central government. The failure and apparent weakness of the regime’s security apparatus during the 1991 uprising was another factor that prompted Saddam to turn to the tribes as a means of controlling dissent. This policy authorized the tribes to carry

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out various duties that had formerly been the responsibility of the central government. These duties included the supervision of agricultural activities, the resolution of conflicts among the tribes, recruitment for the army, and oversight of the security affairs in the tribes’ respective local areas. To lift some of the burden on the already weakened state apparatus, the regime armed the tribes on occasion to suppress opposition in the marshlands. The primary aim of arming tribes was to divide and distract internal opposition to the regime by encouraging the Shiites to fight other Shiites. For example, in October 1992, intertribal warfare resulted in the deaths of 266 people and the wounding of 422 tribesmen.26 Another objective of embracing tribalism was that the government wanted the Shiites to deal with their own socioeconomic problems, thereby excusing the state from that responsibility. Also, the ascendancy of tribal values was instrumental to legitimize the Saddam family oligarchy, the Albu Nasr clan, which occupied most central positions in the state after the 1991 uprising. Around 1997, the authorities noticed some of the negative ramifications of embracing tribal policies. The problem was that once tribal groups were imbued with such enormous political and administrative powers, it became extremely difficult to contain them, much less do away with them. The regime belatedly attempted to contain the tribes by asserting the state’s supremacy over tribal authority. State authorities made it clear that any claims or acts contrary to their orders were punishable offenses.27 Eventually the tribal policies backfired on the regime. In fact, the move to both tribalization and Islamization served to undermine the sense of national cohesion and identification with Iraq due to their detrimental consequences. First, they further divided Iraqi society and engulfed it in the contradictions that were inevitable from the attempt to practice tribalism within a modern nation-state. The juxtaposition of tribal practices operating in a modern nation-state presented contrary forces that worked against each other instead of bringing about national integration and a unified identity. Second, the tribal style of life and order undermined existing state institutions and reversed the precarious gains of the preceding decades, which would have fostered nation-building and state-building. In fact, if we accept the theoretical paradigm that nations often emerge from the coalescing of ethnic groups, and ethnic groups emerge from tribal federations, then Iraq was certainly reversing this process in the mid-1990s.

The Regime and the Shiites: The Calculated Policy of Collective Punishment Following the 1991 uprising, the Shiites were almost completely alienated from the state. The regime devised even more discriminatory policies and practices to suppress them, orchestrated a systematic campaign to crush

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Shiite movements, and undermined the organizational and doctrinal foundations of Shiism. While it had limited success, the regime regained control of most of the Shiite south, except the marshlands, which proved impenetrable to infantry and armor. This failure turned the marshlands into an ideal shelter for military deserters and the Shiite opposition. The Iraqi marshlands (al-Ahwar) constitute a low-lying 20,000-squarekilometer (7,722 square miles) landscape in which water from the nearby rivers forms a network of lakes connected by narrow channels.28 It covers a triangular area stretching from Nasiriya to Amara and then to Basra, an area around the confluence of the Tigris and Euphrates rivers. The marshlands, an area inhabited for thousands of years, was drained and depopulated by 1994 due to the regime’s drastic measures to quell Shiite opposition. An estimated 250,000 marsh Arabs were driven from their floating homes and wetland islands.29 Contrary to the authorities’ claims that they drained the area to develop it for agricultural purposes, the politically motivated policy of revenge was an instrumental quest for political control. Indeed, the area was drained because it provided sanctuary to the refugees from the regime, who constituted the bulk of the Shiite opposition after the 1991 uprising. Government actions destroyed a way of life dating back six millennia. It also destroyed a special ecological landscape, making it “one of the world’s greatest environmental disasters.” 30 Just as the rampant demolition of Kurdish villages in 1987 and 1988 was designed to deprive Kurdish guerrillas of sanctuary and to punish the Kurds for their opposition, the draining of the marshlands was intended to deny the Shiites a safe haven, to punish the marsh Arabs for their resistance, and to eliminate the shelter for opposition groups. During the campaign, thousands of unarmed civilian marsh dwellers were subjected to arbitrary prolonged imprisonment, and many of the Shiite fighters and army deserters were murdered or simply vanished. According to HRW, these measures constituted “crimes against humanity.”31 In July 1992, the United States, Britain, and France announced the establishment of Operation Southern Watch, which imposed an indefinite no-fly zone south of the thirty-second parallel similar to that imposed above the thirty-sixth parallel in the north to protect the Kurds. However, HRW reported that the operation provided only partial relief.32 It was less effective than the previous no-fly zone in the north because Iraqi troops were still able to act with impunity while killing, torturing, and summarily executing civilians. As these and other forms of persecution transpired, another sustained form of control was used to diminish the influence of the Shiites. A report by Van der Stoel, United Nations special rapporteur, stated that the Shiites had around 10,000 clerics before the uprising, but barely 800 thereafter.33 After the 1991 uprising, sectarianism and discrimination against the Shiites took other forms. One senior ex-army officer reported that the government ordered secret background checks on all army officers.

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Accordingly, officers were classified into three groups, each containing two categories. The first classification was based on sect, that is, whether the person was Shiite or Sunni. The second classification sorted the army officers on the basis of their approval (or disapproval) of the invasion of Kuwait. The third process listed those who participated in the crushing of the uprising and those who did not participate. 34 These classification processes led many Shiite officers to be sent home or retired, a process that further Sunnified the army. The government branded the predominantly Sunni provinces of al-Anbar, Salah al-Din, and Ninawa as the white provinces, because they did not participate in the 1991 uprising. By inference, the Shiite and Kurdish provinces were designated as black provinces. This reaffirmed the state’s sectarian policies and the division of Iraqi society, not only ethnically and religiously, but also geographically. The control and punishment of the Shiites also entailed the closure of Shiite mosques, schools, and other institutions to dismantle any attachments that would afford the Shiites a measure of identity. For example, entire areas of historical significance to the Shiite culture were destroyed or damaged, including parts of the ancient cemetery of Wadi al-Salam in Najaf, a site revered by Shiites worldwide.35 The regime also attempted to contain the influence of the main Shiite institution, the marja‘iya, by directly intervening in its affairs. So when the Iranian-born Shiite grand marja‘ Abu alQasim al-Kho’i died in August 1992 under suspicious circumstances, in an unprecedented move the government intervened in the appointment of his successor by nominating a cleric of Arab lineage, Muhammad Sadiq al-Sadr (the father of Muqtada al-Sadr), who was known to be apolitical. Initially, Sadiq al-Sadr simply followed the path of al-Kho’i and stayed aloof from politics. But he soon began to challenge the well-known Shiite concept of taqiya (hiding one’s true beliefs) by calling for the revitalization of the institution of the marja‘iya for socio-political engagement. He began to use Friday prayers to mobilize his followers. From these events, it is clear that the regime’s policy toward the Shiites was aimed at cutting the ties between the Shiite community and its political, religious, and tribal leadership. It did this with impunity, first, by crushing the opposition in the marshlands and elsewhere; second, by eliminating and/or disempowering the Shiite clerics; and third, by subjugating tribal leaders through ad hoc alliances with the regime. These practices tore apart the basic fabric of the Shiite community. Notwithstanding the outcome, the main disadvantage for the Shiite opposition remained the same: it rested on a narrow sectarian background and depended too much on Shiite clerics for political guidance. This hampered any hope for broadening the political mobilization process by unifying the Sunnis and the Kurds in opposition. During the events of the 1980s and 1990s, the regime often dealt with the Shiite and the Kurdish movements by collectively punishing entire communities in suspect provinces. This practice was not applied in regions con-

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taining Sunni Arab populations. Some scholars and observers are of the opinion that the Baathist regime was not selective in its persecution policies and practices because it persecuted and suppressed all political opposition irrespective of ethnic and sectarian background. For example, Anderson and Stansfield suggest that the Sunnis suffered as much at the hands of the regime as the Kurds and Shiites.36 Al-Lami argues that it is impossible theoretically or practically to stigmatize the Baathist regime for aggravating ta’ifiya (sectarianism).37 And al-Salihi states that “the regime dispensed favors and terror equally and used this as the basis for the political oppression experienced by all Iraqis.”38 By the mid-1990s, Sadiq al-Sadr was sure that his message of regime persecution in relation to the poor and disfranchised Shiites was being heard. He heightened the level of his rhetorical confrontation with the regime by being more overt in his criticism of government policies. Soon, Sadiq al-Sadr’s messages inspired the establishment of a grassroots domestic opposition force.39 However, outside Iraq his messages were received cautiously by the Da‘wa Party and angrily by the SCIRI, reflected in a war of words between the two groups. It also set the scene for intra-Shiite rivalries that erupted after the removal of the regime in 2003.40 To test Sadiq alSadr’s defiance, the regime urged him in 1998 to cancel the annual Ashura procession to Karbala, a request that was rejected. Moreover, on February 12, 1999, Sadiq al-Sadr demanded the release of the Shiite clerics who had been detained since the 1991 uprising. A week later on February 18, 1999, at the age of fifty-six, Sadiq al-Sadr and two of his sons were killed in unexplained circumstances. This intensified Shiite opposition to the regime, and Sadiq al-Sadr’s followers erupted in rage, calling for the overthrow of the government. The largest clashes occurred in Basra where angry people attacked government buildings and killed at least forty Baathists. The authorities swiftly squelched the demonstrations and arrested 120 of Sadiq al-Sadr’s deputies. They imprisoned over 3,000 supporters and executed around 450 of his followers.41 The disturbances constituted one of the most serious internal challenges to Saddam’s rule since 1991 and later became known as the al-Sadr intifada (uprising). The regime continued unabashedly with its policies of extrajudicial executions, arbitrary arrests, forced disappearances, and torture. Those executed or murdered were buried in unmarked mass graves around Basra, the remains of which were discovered and excavated after the collapse of the regime. In addition to the executions, nearly one thousand civilians, including women and children, were imprisoned for long periods without due process. They were also subjected to daily physical and psychological torture. The authorities demolished the houses of suspects and participants in the uprising and barred family members of the detainees from public sector employment.42 Of course, it is true that it was not just the Shiites and the Kurds who opposed Saddam’s regime. Many Sunnis were equally disaffected by it.

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However, the Sunni opposition came primarily from the military ranks and manifested itself in a series of coup attempts. Although such attempts were not widespread, they were significant because they threatened the regime far more than those rebellions engineered by the Kurds and the Shiites, who were on the fringe of society. The main significance of Sunni opposition was that it came from within the core of the regime’s power base. Nonetheless, the regime’s reaction to such attempts was confined to punishing the perpetrators individually rather than using collective tactics of revenge. During the 1990s, the regime was challenged several times by Sunni opponents. For example, a senior member of the Iraqi air force, Muhammad Mazlum al-Dulaimi, was involved in one such coup attempt. The regime arrested and summarily executed him. The execution of alDulaimi and several other tribal co-conspirators sparked tribal unrest in May–June 1995, as members of al-Dulaimi tribe reportedly mounted demonstrations against the government, set fire to public buildings, and attacked the police stations, the intelligence headquarters, the Baath party offices, and the local governor’s headquarters. The clashes resulted in the death of thirty and the wounding of hundreds of al-Dulaimi tribesmen.43 A few months later, another incident took place when another al-Dulaimi officer, Turki Isma‘il, ordered the release from Abu Ghraib prison of nearly 850 prisoners who had participated in the previous skirmish. The attempt was put down on the spot, and more than 120 were executed. Another example of popular discontent arose when officers of the ‘Ubayd, a Sunni tribe, allegedly plotted a coup attempt in 1993–1994. In 1995, al-Bu Nimr, a clan from Rumadi, also revolted against Saddam.44 Although all these attempts were squelched, no collective reprisals were directed against the Sunnis in general or against the tribes involved in particular. In fact, apart from those directly involved in the plots, who were immediately punished, other tribal members continued to serve in the Republican Guard and in key security and government positions. For thirty-five years of Baath rule, no Sunni village or town was reportedly demolished; no Sunni tribes or groups reportedly were subject to elimination. The August 1995 defection to Jordan of Saddam’s two sons-in-law, Hussein Kamil and Saddam Kamil, together with Saddam’s two daughters, Raghd (Hussein Kamil’s wife) and Rana (Saddam Kamil’s wife), is worth examining because the incident highlights the selective use of collective punishment. After receiving promises of safety from Saddam, the brothers and their families returned to Iraq on February 20, 1996. Three days after their return, the brothers were killed together with only two close family members.45 An Interior Ministry statement said that the brothers had been slain by relatives who declared that “blood should be shed due to their treason to the homeland.”46 Family ties did not save them because Saddam perceived them to be traitors, though the lives of Raghd and Rana were spared despite their likely complicity. The killings were described as “necessary

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acts” to defend “tribal values” and “honor.” But, a year after the incident, the Kamils were named as “martyrs,” and Saddam offered blood money to Kamils’s family to settle the issue once and for all.47 In contrast to selective forms of punishment toward the Sunnis, the Shiites and the Kurds were killed primarily because of their identity and for what they represented symbolically. Many Shiites were executed for reasons as trivial as “failing to cooperate with the authorities in the capture of army deserters.”48 In 1991, when the Iraqi troops attacked Shiite-populated cities, ruthless measures were taken against unarmed civilians. Other acts demonstrating the imposition of collective punishment took place during the 1991 uprising in the south. Shiite children standing on rooftops and even bystanders on the streets were indiscriminately shot at. Some children were even tied to the front of army tanks and used as human shields. Many patients and doctors in hospitals were killed on the spot, and ground-toground Scud missiles were fired indiscriminately at civilians.49 A failed assassination attempt occurred on July 8, 1982, when a group of Shiite militants shot at Saddam and his convoy as they were driving through the streets of Dujail.50 The response was brutal and bloody. The authorities swiftly rounded up 687 Shiite residents of Dujail; 148 (some as young as thirteen years of age) were referred to the revolutionary court and condemned to death after a brief trial; and 399 women, children, and elderly were sent to a desert camp where forty-six eventually died.51 All buildings and homes in Dujail were demolished, and the town was effectively wiped off the map.52 The killing of nearly 300,000 Shiites during and after the 1991 uprising and the disappearance of more than 100,000 Kurdish civilians during the Anfal campaigns are evidence of the use of collective punishment by the regime when it came to dealing with the Kurds and the Shiites. But, as noted earlier, the regime never collectively punished the Sunnis for their opposition to the regime. These discriminatory and double standards of behavior further hastened the disintegration of Iraqi society along ethnic and sectarian lines. Building a nation comprised of people from different ethnic and sectarian backgrounds was virtually impossible, particularly when the state collectively punished and deliberately sidelined large segments of the population by means of discriminatory practices based on ethnicity and religiosity.

Kurds and the Iraqi State: Redrawing Iraq’s Borders The Iraqi attacks on Kurdish cities and fear of a recurrence of Anfal caused the Kurds to flee their homeland en masse. As a result of extensive media coverage of the Kurds’ flight into the mountains and of their privations, the Western media and the ensuing public opinion in Western countries pressured governments to provide aid to the Kurdish refugees. The Western gov-

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ernments’ responses ultimately resulted in the creation of a safe haven above the thirty-sixth parallel.53 Despite its objections to the scheme, the Iraqi government was in no position to resist because by then it was economically and militarily exhausted. The Kuwait War had taken a toll, and Iraq was facing civil unrest in the southern provinces. To avoid permanent displacement of the Kurds from their homeland, the Kurdish political leadership began negotiating with the Iraqi authorities in late April 1991. The negotiation process was also intended to encourage the refugees to return home. Negotiations continued until mid-1991 with discussions focusing on four key points: (1) mutual trust, (2) democratization, (3) Kurdish national rights, and (4) Iraq’s national unity. As in previous negotiation rounds (from 1961 to1984), the fate of Kirkuk and demarcation of the borders of the Kurdish autonomous region became the main points of contention. 54 Despite the hardships faced by the regime (international sanctions and isolation, political and economic adversity, and civil unrest in the southern areas), the Iraqi government still rejected any compromise with the Kurds on these issues. It insisted on maintaining the unilaterally demarcated frontiers for the Kurdistan region that it had proposed in 1974. At the same time the Kurds rejected government demands to disarm their Peshmerga forces and sever their international links. The Kurds also persisted with their ageold proposal that historical, geographical, and ethnographic factors should be the basis for demarcating the Kurdistan autonomous borders. To undermine these claims, the Iraqi negotiators asserted that Andalusia (Spain) was part Arab land historically but no Arabs were claiming it now.55 This argument was supposed to convince the Kurds that historical rights were irrelevant and that they should forget about Kirkuk and other areas just as the Arabs had forgotten about Andalusia. In an interview in May 1991, Saddam stated that the Kurds’ “insistence on Kirkuk’s inclusion in the autonomous region is indicative of the wish for separation.”56 The debate over the borders reaffirms the significance of territorial boundaries in the clash between the Kurdish nationalists and the Iraqi and/or Arab nationalists. The negotiations dragged on until mid-July without much progress. In July 1991, antigovernment demonstrations erupted in Suleimaniya, Erbil, and other towns. This led to armed clashes as Kurdish civilians and the Peshmerga fought the Iraqi security and military forces. The poor performance of the Iraqi forces and the continued Kurdish pressure on the regime forced the government in October 1991 to withdraw its forces, as well as the administrative units from parts of Kurdistan. After the withdrawal of the Iraqi central authority, the Kurds found it necessary to fill the resulting administrative and security vacuum. The Kurdish political parties agreed that elections would be held on May 19, 1992. These elections would be a unique experiment; the first free election in the history of the Kurdish people in Iraq The results were close, with 50.22 percent of the votes for the KDP and 49.78 percent for the PUK. The

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two parties divided the 100 parliamentary seats equally with five remaining seats awarded to the parties representing Christians. This resulted in the formation of the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) on July 4. The KRG and elected parliament seats were thus divided equally between the two major political parties: the KDP and the PUK. As a result of the withdrawal of Iraqi forces and administrative personnel, some 300,000 civil servants lost their jobs and consequently their income. This state of affairs led to dire regional consequences that pushed the Kurdish economy to the “brink of the abyss” as unemployment reached 70 to 90 percent.57 International sanctions and the economic blockade by the Iraqi government seriously impacted the Kurdish community, socially and economically. There were reports of children fainting in school from lack of sustenance and women collapsing under the strain of trying to earn an income.58 Why did the Iraqi central authority abandon Kurdistan? It made no attempt later to recapture Kurdistan, even though it had a large and capable military contingent amassed along the cease-fire zone. Soon after the withdrawal, Saddam claimed that “we told the army to leave for some time. . . . your people [the Kurds] will then cry for the Army’s help and will call on it to rescue them.” Saddam also asserted that “there are not two or three Iraqs,” adding further that the Iraqi “people are one, not two peoples.”59 Almost seven years after the withdrawal, the official Iraqi media claimed that the government wished to end the “abnormal” situation in the north and bring Kurdistan back into the fold.60 However, for twelve years no steps were taken. Even when it was clear in 2003 that the Kurds had given approval for the United States to use Kurdistan as a base from which to topple the regime, still no practical measures were taken by the Iraqi government to bring Kurdistan into the fold. Graham-Brown argues that “the existence of the no-fly zone,” which restricted the activities of the Iraqi air force, as well as the Iraqi desire to “put pressure on the Kurds after the failure of the autonomy talks,” were critical factors that prompted the withdrawal.61 Bengio suggests that the no-fly zone left Iraq’s “ground forces without air support,” making them highly vulnerable should they attempt to recapture Kurdistan.62 She further argues that the central government had no intention of permanently ceding control over the Kurdistan region or of allowing the state to disintegrate. Several other reasons have also been put forward, such as the perception of Iraqi authorities that the normalization of the situation in the center and the south was more pressing following the Kuwait War and the Shiite uprising. Perhaps the Iraqi government hoped that the combination of international sanctions and the blockade it had imposed on Kurdistan would bring the Kurds to their knees and cause them to depend on the central government, economically speaking. Another possible motive was the need to divert much-needed resources from the Kurds to the more loyal segments of society, especially the Sunnis.

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However, a close scrutiny of the new frontiers that the central government demarcated as its northern border with Kurdistan, and the ease with which it recaptured the city of Erbil in 1996, clearly reveal the strategic plans and intentions of the central administration behind its withdrawal from Kurdistan. When the Iraqi government withdrew its forces, it drew a new frontier that incorporated the newly discovered oil areas of Makhmour and Dibaga, namely the Khurmala dome, which, along with Avana and Baba Gur Gur, is a super-giant oil field. Makhmour and Dibaga, where Khurmala dome is located, were part of the Kurdistan autonomous region (unilaterally declared by the government in 1974) until the new demarcation of the borders in late 1991. The 1991 demarcation ceded the Aqra, Kifri, and Kalar areas (not previously in the autonomous region) to the newly created Kurdistan region. The new frontiers were carefully surveyed in order to deprive the Kurds of any meaningful natural resources. The new border was also realigned from a military strategic standpoint. It followed the hilly areas of Kurdistan with the purpose of creating a militarily viable defense line in the event of any future conflict between Iraq and Kurdistan. Clearly, the Iraqi government’s aim was to annex all oil-rich areas from Kurdistan. The arguments highlighting Iraq’s military limitations as a consequence of the no-fly zone are not substantiated by the facts. The no-fly zone encompassed only about half of the Kurdistan region. Despite the fact that a large part of the Erbil province and the whole of the Suleimaniya province were located outside the no-fly-zone, the Iraqi troops still withdrew from them. Baghdad’s lack of power over the Kurds stemmed from its inability to regain political control of the area—not due to military weakness. The areas from which the troops withdrew were, from the point of view of the central government, insignificant, both strategically and economically. In light of Iraq’s past historical events, it is apparent that since its assumption of power in 1968, the Baathist regime used all possible means, including depopulation, forced displacement, Arabization, and genocide, to subjugate and forcibly assimilate the Kurds into Iraq. By early 1991, the regime seemed to realize that the task was simply unachievable. It concluded that the best way to resolve the complex matter was simply to annex the Kurdish areas of strategic and economic importance and leave the rest for the Kurds. In fact, the new frontiers were designed to be the new northern Iraqi borders. The Iraqi government had no real intention of recapturing and ruling the areas it had once withdrawn from. It is intriguing that the new frontiers demarcated by the Baathist regime before its collapse are still the only frontiers recognized by succeeding Iraqi governments. This confirms that Iraqis share a level of consensus, regardless of political or sectarian background, regarding the territorial rights of the Kurds. It seems that if the Kurds really want to secede from Iraq while still conforming to the existing border arrangements and despite the cry for Iraq to maintain its territorial

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integrity, few Iraqis would pay much attention to Kurdish secession. The redrawing of the borders is a strong indication of the failure of Iraq to recognize Kurdish national rights, integrate the Kurds into Iraq, or assimilate them entirely. It also demonstrates the Kurdish refusal to be part of an Iraq as envisaged by the majority of the Iraqi Arabs—whether Shiite or Sunni.

Kurdish Semi-Autonomous Experience: Nation-Building in Turmoil After the establishment of the KRG, it didn’t take long for unity among the Kurds to dissolve. The region that had benefited from self-rule since 1992 was torn apart by severe internal fighting that threatened its autonomy. It was the worst internal Kurdish civil conflict since 1966 when the first KurdKurd conflict erupted. The new wave of fighting between the Kurdish factions started in October 1993 between the PUK and the Islamic Movement of Kurdistan (IMK) and soon engulfed the KDP. After its involvement in the clashes, the KDP became the main opponent of the PUK, and the clash between the two lasted until 1998. Fighting soon split the region into two spheres of influence as the PUK was driven out of both the province of Dohuk and the northern parts of Erbil province. Meantime, the KDP was ousted from the province of Suleimaniya and the eastern parts of Erbil province.63 By the end of 1998, casualties resulting from internal fighting had reached 3,000. In addition to the double embargo imposed externally by the UN and internally by the Iraqi government, the internal fighting further exacerbated the fragile economic, social, and political fabric of the region. This dire situation led to the erosion of the middle class, whose members left Kurdistan in large numbers. A fierce propaganda war accompanied the fighting and reached the Kurdish communities abroad, further damaging the prospects for Kurdish unity. The turmoil had the unintended effect of resurrecting old tribal and local loyalties that were considered more important than loyalty to the nation. With devastating effects, the KDP and the PUK partitioned (tahzib) the entire Kurdish region in Iraq as each party sought to win popular support. The intervention of Turkey (supporting the KDP) and Iran (supporting the PUK) further escalated the conflict. The KDP captured Erbil, under PUK control at the time, with help from the Iraqi army on August 31, 1996. This was a severe blow to the PUK because the loss of Erbil led to the redrawing of the spheres of influence, with the KDP gaining more areas. The intensification of the internecine fighting reduced the capacity of both parties to control their respective areas. This assisted the IMK and its breakaway groups, Jund al-Islam (Soldiers of Islam) and Ansar al-Islam (Partisans of Islam), to seize control of the Halabja area, while the

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Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK) took control of the large areas in the KDP’s sphere of influence near the border with Turkey. Gradually both Erbil (under the KDP) and Suleimaniya (under the PUK) became two competing centers of gravity with two separate governments, two parties, two leaders, two administrations, and two courts of appeal! The entire situation had a galvanizing effect for the Kurdish region in that Kurdish society became divided politically, economically, geographically, and even intellectually into two blocks. In stride with the disintegration of Iraqi society along ethnic and sectarian lines, the war-torn Kurdistan region also disintegrated into factional regions in accordance with tribal, locale, and party affiliation. The KDP and the PUK each claimed that their party represented the Kurdish people.64 During the tumultuous years of the 1990s, another phenomenon emerged within Kurdish society: the rise of Islamism. In fact, the main Islamist organization, the IMK, had only 49,108 votes (about 5 percent) in the 1992 elections and failed to achieve any parliamentary representation. However, in the 2001 local elections, the Islamist groups achieved around 20 percent of the vote in regions controlled by the KDP and the PUK.65 Mediation by various external and internal representatives, popular pressure from within the Kurdish community, and the realization by both factions that neither could win the war militarily finally resulted in a cease-fire. This led to the signing of an agreement in 1998 through the goodwill and assistance of the United States. Despite the internal fighting, the region under the control of the two Kurdish governments fared much better economically and developmentally than the rest of Iraq. The situation gave the Kurds a sense of pride. The infant mortality rates in the central and southern areas of Iraq rose in comparison to the pre-war years, but they declined in Kurdistan.66 Also, the Kurdish region enjoyed continued economic prosperity and a certain amount of political liberalization, especially after 1996.67 Generally speaking, Kurdish self-rule strengthened and deepened the sense of the Kurdish identity. By the late 1990s, the years of separation from Iraq had produced a generation of Kurds that had minimal contact with the Arab Iraqis. The new generation had only limited Arabic language skills, in marked contrast to previous generations that had more contact with the rest of Iraq, especially in university settings, which arguably created some sense of belonging to Iraq. Moreover, the new generation of Kurds was introduced to a school curriculum that emphasized the sense of belonging to Kurdistan rather than to Iraq.68 As part of the curriculum, the geography of Kurdistan was studied, and children were taught that their homeland encompassed the three Kurdish provinces as well as all other areas where the Kurds constituted the majority, including the city of Kirkuk. In the early 1990s, both the PUK and the KDP flew their own flags, the green and yellow, respectively. However, by the late 1990s, they both flew the Kurdish flag and adopted the Kurdish national anthem, which was to be played during official ceremonies and

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daily school assemblies.69 In order to maintain shared memories of Anfal and the chemical attacks, the Kurds built several museums and monuments. As part of the Kurdish nation-building effort, two satellite television networks, namely, Kurdistan TV in 1998 and Kurdsat in 2000, were launched, two police academies were established, and Kurdistan stamps were issued. In order to establish an overseas presence, the KRG opened representative offices in the United States, Australia, and many European countries. While the Kurds in the three provinces of Kurdistan embarked on the process of nation-building, the Iraqi authorities were conducting ethnic cleansing campaigns and implementing forced Arabization policies in the provinces with sizable Kurdish populations still under government control. The Turkmen in those areas encountered similar repressive measures. From 1991 to 1998, 200,000 Kurds and 5,000 Turkmen were evicted from the areas under government control.70 At the same time, the regime intensified the resettlement of Arab families in the areas from which the Kurds and the Turkmen were expelled. As in previous decades, incentives were given to Arab settlers. The RCC issued the “identity correction” decree whereby the Kurds and the Turkmen residing in government-controlled areas were ordered to change their ethnic identities to Arab.71 Those who refused to sign the identity correction forms were expelled from government-controlled territories after the introduction of the decree in 1997. Families were forced to adopt Arab nationality or leave. By the late 1990s, the regime was determined to erase any trace of the Kurds in Kirkuk. The vice president of Iraq, Izzat al-Duri, bluntly declared in a speech that “apart from the Arabs, nobody has the right to stay in Kirkuk.”72 One may recall that a decade earlier, in 1988, the authorities had prohibited Iraqi Arabs from changing their ethnic identity. It was declared to be a criminal offense for which perpetrators were punished by a minimum one-year prison term. 73 People who changed their ethnic identities to Kurdish in areas outside the autonomous region were forcibly deported to the Kurdistan autonomous region.74 While the Kurds attempted to establish a state of their own within the Iraqi state, the Iraqi government attempted to craft a single ethnic Arab-based Iraq. In view of these developments, the formation of a unified Iraqi identity was next to impossible.

Ending of the Baath: A Disintegrated Society In contrast to the monarchy era, when anti-imperial sentiments drew ideological, ethnic, and/or sectarian groups together, antipathy to Saddam’s regime during the 1980s and 1990s was not strong enough to unite the opposition. In the early 1990s, the Iraqi opposition was composed of more than seventy groups, organizations, and parties that were divided along ideological, political, and religious lines.75 The groupings mirrored the ethnic

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and sectarian divisions of society: the Kurds, Shiites, Sunnis, Christians, and Turkmen. In October 1992, at a conference in Salah al-Din, Kurdistan opposition groups formed an umbrella body called the Iraqi National Congress (INC). Even so, the Kurds and Shiites disagreed on most major issues. While the Shiites advocated centralism, the Kurds campaigned for decentralization and federalism. The Shiites aspired to establish an Islamic republic, while the Kurds envisioned a semisecular one. As the KRG gained strength, the dream of self-rule deepened for the Kurds. Until 1991, the declared aim of Kurdish mainstream political parties was autonomy, but after the establishment of the KRG, it evolved to a demand for a federation. This ambitious aim won unanimous support from the Kurdistan parliament in October 1992. Consequently, the KRG defined its legal relationship with the central authority on the basis of the federal structure. Although Shiite and Sunni opposition groups supported the Kurds’ idea of federalism in principle, they argued that this would only “consolidate sectarianism and ethnic division.”76 The 1991 uprising, its brutal suppression by the regime, and the extreme hardship suffered by the Iraqi people due to the sanctions imposed on Iraq disproportionately affected the Shiite areas. Prolonged oppression and ill-treatment pushed the Shiites to mold a new political consciousness and identity.77 Two large Shiite gatherings took place that signaled a clear departure from earlier Shiite political expressions of Communism, Iraqism, and Islamism. The first gathering, held in London in 1993, and the second larger gathering, also held in London, were attended by a range of academics, professionals, religious leaders, intellectuals, military personnel, and tribal leaders, including Adil Abd al-Mahdi (vice president of Iraq 2005– 2011), and Sami al-Askari and Mowaffak al-Rubaie (members of Iraqi Parliament 2005– ). Both gatherings explicitly rejected the continuation of Sunni domination in Iraq, and the second gathering resulted in a statement known as “the Shi’ite Declaration.”78 This was written to confront “the issue of sectarianism and the anti-Shiite biases of the Iraqi state” and “to elucidate a Shiite perspective on the future of Iraq and the necessary changes that must be undertaken to reconstruct the state along the lines of fairness and justice” (emphasis added). 79 For the first time the Shiites began to advocate for community rights based on self-rule. Indeed, the statement called for a type of federalism similar to the one being advocated by the Kurds. However, they differed from the Kurds on details regarding the form and model of federalism. The Shiites opposed the ethnic and the sectarian division and proposed various “administrative and geographic criteria,” which they thought would serve as preventive measures against “partition or separation.” Keen to avoid accusations of promoting separatism, the declaration defined the Shiites as a “social combination” rather than a single ethnic or national group. Unlike the Shiites, the Kurds pushed for a federation along ethno-national lines. By the end of 2002, the KDP proposed a

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draft constitution (soon accepted by the PUK), which proposed a federation comprised of two regions: one Arabic and the other Kurdish. The draft constitution also redrew the frontiers of Kurdistan to include all areas historically claimed by the Kurds—including Kirkuk.80 Why, then, did the territory of Iraq remain intact despite the disintegration of Iraqi society? The answer to this question lies in the differing aspirations of the Shiites and the Kurds. The Kurds had the highest and least ambitions. Their highest aspiration was to break away and establish an independent state; however, the lowest was to remain within Iraq but to function as a parallel nation. After the uprising and the withdrawal of Iraqi forces from parts of Kurdistan, an opportunity presented itself for the Kurds to break away. Loyalty to Iraq and its territorial identity does not seem to have been the main explanation for Kurdish hesitation to declare independence. It appears that the forces that created the Iraqi state and sought to keep it intact (i.e., the British until 1958 and the United States and the regional powers since 2003) were stronger than those (i.e., the Kurds) hoping to deconstruct it. In addition, the Kurdish leadership’s alleged pragmatism and their realization of the geopolitical constraints under which they were operating inhibited the move to full separation. The continued domination by Iraq of the lands historically claimed as Kurdish territory, known as disputed areas, was certainly another major factor that kept the Kurds within Iraq. Although the Shiites traditionally rejected assimilation into the Sunni version of Iraqi identity, they hardly questioned the territorial integrity of the Iraqi state. Nevertheless, the 1991 uprising and the state’s systematic policies of collective punishment and revenge had clearly demarcated the Shiite and the Sunni communities by the end of the century. In addition to the Baathist discriminatory policies, the social, economic, and political conditions experienced by all Iraqis in the 1990s as a result of international sanctions, coupled with the government’s destructive policies, all help to explain the disintegration of Iraqi society. The disunity of the opposition demonstrated that it was no better equipped to aid the process of national cohesion than the state. The way the Iraqi government dealt with communal and ethno-national groups, on the one hand, coupled with the infighting of the opposition, on the other hand, leaves little wonder that Iraq declined as a nation-to-be. In sum, by the early 2000s, Iraqi society became fragmented politically, socially, and ideologically along ethnic and sectarian lines. It is only in light of these realities that one can come to grips with post-US-invasion political developments in Iraq.

Notes 1. See Mylroie, “Interview of Defector.” 2. Bengio, “Iraq 1976–1999,” Middle East Contemporary Survey 1994, p. 347.

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3. See UN Security Council Resolution 661. 4. Bengio, “Iraq 1976–1999,” Middle East Contemporary Survey 1990, p. 413. 5. Bengio, “Iraq 1976–1999,” Middle East Contemporary Survey 1995, p. 332. 6. Bengio, “Iraq 1976–1999,” Middle East Contemporary Survey 1996, p. 336; 1998, p. 303. 7. Sandell, “The Humanitarian Battle,” p. 4. 8. Bengio, “Iraq 1976–1999,” Middle East Contemporary Survey 1999, p. 281. 9. Bengio, “Iraq 1976–1999,” Middle East Contemporary Survey 1998, p. 305; see UN Security Council Resolution 986. 10. See Human Rights Watch, World Report 2002. 11. Bengio, “Iraq 1976–1999,” Middle East Contemporary Survey 1994, p. 338. 12. Al-Waqai‘ al-Iraqiya, June 13, 1994, p. 242; August 1, 1994, p. 242; August 29, 1994, p. 268. 13. Bengio, “Iraq 1976–1999,” Middle East Contemporary Survey 1994, pp. 333–334. 14. Arab Baath Socialist Party, Central Report, p. 4. 15. Bengio, “Iraq 1976–1999,” Middle East Contemporary Survey 1993, p. 392; 1994, p. 336; 1998, p. 297; 1999, p. 164; Baram, “Saddam Husayn,” p. 10; see also Post and Baram, “Saddam Is Iraq.” 16. Bengio, “Iraq 1976–1999,” Middle East Contemporary Survey 1993, p. 392. 17. Marr, The Modern History of Iraq, p. 297. 18. Allawi, The Occupation of Iraq, p. 56. 19. Bengio, “Iraq 1976–1999,” Middle East Contemporary Survey 1994, p. 335. 20. Baram, “Neo-tribalism,” pp. 2–3. 21. Bengio, “Iraq 1976–1999,” Middle East Contemporary Survey 1992, p. 477. 22. Terrill, “Nationalism,” p. 27. 23. See Douglas Jehl, “Iraqi Defectors Killed,” The New York Times, February 24, 1996. 24. Marr, The Modern History of Iraq, pp. 218–263. 25. Bengio, “Iraq 1976–1999,” Middle East Contemporary Survey 1992, p. 477; Baram, “Neo-tribalism,” pp. 11, 14–17. 26. Bengio, “Iraq 1976–1999,” Middle East Contemporary Survey 1992, p. 478; 1994, p. 348. 27. Al-Waqai‘ al-Iraqiya, April 7, 1997, p. 118. 28. Ahmed, “The Marshes,” p. 2. 29. See Human Rights Watch, “The Iraqi Government Assault on the Marsh Arabs.” 30. Ibid., p. 4. 31. Ibid., pp. 1, 15. 32. Ibid. 33. Stoel, “Report on the Situation,” pp. 45–48; Crossette, “UN Investigator.” 34. Al-Salihi, Earthquake, p. 277. 35. See Human Rights Watch, “The Iraqi Government Assault.” 36. Anderson and Stansfield, The Future of Iraq, p. 140. 37. See al-Lami, “Measuring the Positives and Negatives in the Declaration of the Shi’ite of Iraq.” 38. Al-Salihi, Earthquake, p. 281. 39. See Cockburn, Muqtada. 40. Allawi, The Occupation of Iraq, p. 55. 41. Human Rights Watch, “Ali Hassan al-Majid,” pp. 3–9.

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42. Ibid., pp. 1–3, 16, 23, 26, 28. 43. Bengio, “Iraq 1976–1999,” Middle East Contemporary Survey 1995, p. 313; al-Salihi, Earthquake, pp. 284, 285. 44. Post and Baram, “Saddam Is Iraq,” p. 24. 45. See Jehl, “Iraqi Defectors Killed.” 46. Ibid. 47. Bengio, “Iraq 1976–1999,” Middle East Contemporary Survey 1996, pp. 327–328; 1997, p. 376. 48. See Human Rights Watch, World Report 2003. 49. See Human Rights Watch, World Report 2002; al-Salihi, Earthquake, pp. 176, 205. 50. Located around sixty kilometers (37 miles) north of Baghdad, Dujail is a mixed town inhabited by both Sunni and Shiite Arabs. 51. See Iraqi High Tribunal, “The Legal Proceedings of Case Number 1”; Menendez, “What Happened at Dujail?”; Eedle and Hilsum, “The Day They Tried to Kill Saddam.” 52. The author visited Dujail in 1986 and witnessed the destruction. 53. The safe haven was legalized by the UN Security Council in April 1991. See Resolution 688. 54. See, Amin, “The Kurdistani Front.” 55. Ibid. 56. Gunter, The Kurds of Iraq, p. 70. 57. See Meacher, “Kurds Teetering on Brink of Abyss.” 58. Bengio, “Iraq 1976–1999,” Middle East Contemporary Survey 1992, p. 468. 59. Bengio, “Iraq 1976–1999,” Middle East Contemporary Survey 1992, p. 468, 483. 60. Bengio, “Iraq 1976–1999,” Middle East Contemporary Survey 1998, p. 299. 61. Graham-Brown, Sanctioning Saddam, p. 110. 62. Bengio, “Iraq 1976–1999,” Middle East Contemporary Survey 1992, p. 468; 1996, p. 323. 63. Bengio, “Iraq 1976–1999,” Middle East Contemporary Survey 1995, p. 326; Stansfield, “The Kurdish Dilemma,” pp. 132, 133. 64. Bengio, “Iraq 1976–1999,” Middle East Contemporary Survey 1996, p. 338; Stansfield, “The Kurdish Dilemma,” p. 133. 65. International Crisis Group, “Radical Islam,” p. 3. 66. Bengio, “Iraq 1976–1999,” Middle East Contemporary Survey 1999, p. 281. 67. Stansfield, “The Kurdish Dilemma,” p. 134. 68. See Kurdistan Regional Government, Societal Topics for Grade Five Primary School; History of Civilizations for Grade Four High School–Humanities; Aziz, The Kurds of Iraq, pp. 5, 90. 69. The author witnessed the events and developments in 1998 and 2001 when visiting the Department of Education and several schools in the Kurdistan region. 70. See Human Rights Watch, World Report 2000; World Report, 2001; World Report 2003; Talabany, Kirkuk Area, p. 121; Abdul Rahman, Kurdish Ethnic Cleansing, p. 160. 71. See Al-Waqai‘ al-Iraqiya, September 17, 2001. 72. Quoted in Talabany, Kirkuk Area, p. 12, from al-Hayat, September 21, 2000. 73. Al-Waqai‘ al-Iraqiya, December 12, 1988.

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74. A letter dated April 10, 1990, from Tahir Tofiq, the governor of Ninawa, confirms the deportation (Muhammad et al., Arabization Policy in the Iraqi Kurdistan Region, p. 72). 75. Bengio, “Iraq 1976–1999,” Middle East Contemporary Survey 1993, p. 393; 1995, p. 331. 76. Bengio, “Iraq 1976–1999,” Middle East Contemporary Survey 1992, pp. 470, 481, 482. 77. Marr, The Modern History of Iraq, p. 300; Allawi, The Occupation of Iraq, pp. 136, 137. 78. Al-Rubaie et al., “Declaration of the Shia.” 79. Ibid. 80. For the full text of the draft constitution proposed by the KDP, see Salim, Is Federalism, pp. 381–401.

8 The US Invasion: Opening Pandora’s Box

Consistent with the cease-fire agreement for ending the Kuwait

War, a program of ongoing checks by UN inspectors was put in place in 1991 to prevent Iraq from developing and/or possessing chemical, biological, or nuclear weapons. Between 1991 and 2002, Iraq played cat and mouse with the international community to keep everyone in doubt about its true weapons’ capabilities. Despite six years of inspecting Iraqi sites, the UN disarmament commission concluded in 1997 that Iraq continued to conceal information on biological and chemical weapons. In October 29, 1997, Iraq expelled all US members of the UN inspection team, and on January 13, 1998, Iraq temporarily withdrew cooperation with the UN inspection teams. A week later UN inspectors were refused access to the presidential sites, also among suspected weapons’ locations, altogether. The inspectors resumed their tasks only after Kofi Annan, then UN Secretary-General, intervened. This cat-and-mouse game continued until late 2002.1 Despite its claim that it had destroyed its stockpiles of weapons of mass destruction (WMD), Iraq actually wanted other countries to think that it still possessed them. Saddam later claimed that his government intentionally convinced the world that they had WMDs so that Iraq would not appear weak to its enemies, especially to Iran.2 Although Saddam could not be taken at his word, it is apparent that his maneuverings with the UN inspectors led many to believe that Iraq did indeed possess WMDs. After September 11, 2001, the United States became more concerned with Iraq’s possible possession of such weapons. Consequently, disarming Iraq of WMDs, ending Saddam Hussein’s “support for terrorism,” and freeing the Iraqi people from his despotic rule became the justification for the United States, the UK, and their “coalition of the willing” to invade Iraq.3 The US policy of regime change goes back to the enactment of the Iraq Liberation Act in October 1998,4 a US congressional policy statement that called for regime change in Iraq. However, no serious action in this regard had been taken until terrorists attacked the New York Twin Towers of the World 193

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Trade Center, paving the way for the US invasion. On March 19, 2003, Iraq’s presidential palaces were attacked from the air. The following day, US and coalition forces launched an incursion from southern Iraq, and within three weeks the conquest was complete. This brought to an end thirtyfive years of Baathist tyranny. On May 1, US President George W. Bush declared the “end of major combat operations.” Human loss, social dislocation, and the looting of Iraq’s archaeological treasures by Iraqi mobs and professional international thieves were perhaps the worst outcomes of the invasion. Two months after the invasion, the United States and UK established the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) transitional government headed by US Lieutenant General Jay Garner, to be replaced soon by Paul Bremer. The CPA issued two controversial orders: the de-Baathification of the Iraqi state bureaucracy, a process barring all but the party’s junior members from public life, and the disbanding of the Iraqi army and all other state security organizations.5 In July, the CPA established the Iraqi Governing Council (IGC) to allow for representation of Iraq’s various political, sectarian, and ethnic communities and to provide leadership for the country. It consisted of thirteen Shiites, five Sunnis, five Kurds, one Turkmen, and one Chaldo-Assyrian (Christian). In early summer 2003, US forces reported low-intensity guerrilla-style warfare by Sunni insurgents. In August, al-Qaeda staged two deadly bomb attacks targeting the Jordanian embassy and the UN headquarters in Baghdad. However, it was the killing of Shiite leader Muhammad Baqr al-Hakim, the head of Islamic Supreme Council of Iraq (ISCI), that marked the beginning of an all-out war by Sunni insurgents and al-Qaeda against the United States and the newly formed Iraqi government. Saddam escaped initial US attacks but was captured in December 2003 and subsequently charged by an Iraqi court on several counts. He was found guilty on the first charge (the Dujail case) for crimes against humanity and sentenced to death. The punishment was carried out on December 31, 2006. Despite Saddam’s death, the insurgency and al-Qaeda did not give up and, in fact, gained momentum. A number of reasons have been put forth for the rapidly gained strength of the insurgency among the Sunnis. These include the dissolution of the Iraqi army, the dismissal of Baathists from state institutions, high unemployment, and the marginalization of the Sunnis.6 Nevertheless, both the removal of the Baathists from all state positions and the disbanding of the Iraqi army were prerequisites for the engagement of the Shiite and Kurdish political elite in the new administration. If these changes had not been made, the consequences might have been even more catastrophic because it would have marginalized, not the Sunnis who represent 20 percent of the population, but the other 80 percent consisting of the Shiites and the Kurds. Indeed there was strong support for de-Baathification among mainstream Shiites and Kurds, but not the Sunnis, of course, as 50 percent of them

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believed that the de-Baathification process would damage the political condition of the country. Only 18 percent of the Shiites and 22 percent of the Kurds felt this way. Moreover, support for disbanding the Iraqi army was weak among the Iraqi population in general; only 7 percent of the Sunnis and 11 percent of the Shiites supported the measure, compared to 52 percent of the Kurds.7 Apparently Iraqi communities were not united on the measures taken by the CPA in general, although the majority approved the deBaathification process. The problem, as expected, was that the pattern of approval and disapproval was aligned along sectarian and ethnic identification lines. Such patterns of thinking and behaving were, and are, the hallmark of Iraq’s diverse population groups’ reaction to most, if not all, events and incidents of the post-US invasion era. The impact that the dissolution and the de-Baathifiying of the army had on strengthening the insurgency cannot be ruled out, but other factors, in one way or another, empowered the insurgency and contributed to the chaos that the United States and its partners faced in Iraq. The most important factors were misunderstanding the nature of the ethno-national and sectarian conflict that prevailed both before and after the invasion, glossing the campaign with religious terms (e.g., calling it a “war of crusaders”), and the United States’ declared aim to democratize the Middle East. The last two elements evoked sharp reactions from antidemocratic forces, Islamist-oriented regimes in the region, and the majority of the people of Iraq. Nonetheless, the major factor behind the insurgency was the fact that the removal of Saddam’s regime had opened a Pandora’s box that unleashed a vicious cycle of century-old conflicts, animosities, and mistrust among Iraq’s major communities—elements that had been kept in check to a large extent before the invasion. The dismissal of senior Baathist officials was reminiscent of the removal of the Nazis from the government in Germany and the removal of the Fascists in Italy after World War II. However, the problem with the removal of the Baathists was that the Sunnis were abruptly marginalized—something that had never been done before. The de-Baathification process also led to deSunnification of Iraq’s bureaucracy due to the policies that Saddam had put in place decades earlier. Accordingly, the de-Baathification process was synonymous with the de-Sunnification of the country’s institutions.

Crest of Sectarian Violence: Ethno-Sectarian Segregation Following the official transfer of power from the CPA to the Iraqi Interim Government (IIG) headed by Ayad Allawi,8 the IGC and the CPA drafted the Transitional Administrative Law (TAL), which went into effect on June 28, 2004. With ongoing violence in the background, the IIG was created as a

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temporary government with the task of holding an election. On January 30, 2005, about eight million people voted in the elections for a Transitional National Assembly. One of the first tasks undertaken by the assembly was to appoint a committee to draft a permanent constitution. The new constitution was drafted and approved in a referendum on October 15, 2005, thereby replacing the TAL. The constitution defined Iraq as “a single, federal, independent and fully sovereign state in which the system of government is republican, representative, parliamentary and democratic.” Iraq was “a country of multiple nationalities, religions and sects.” For the first time, Iraq was not defined as “a part of the Arab nation” as previous constitutions had stated. Instead, the new permanent constitution stated that Iraq “is a founding and active member in the Arab League and is committed to its charter.” The Arabic and Kurdish languages were designated as “the two official languages of Iraq.”9 These provisions were a shift in Iraq’s official position in that this constitution recognized Iraq’s diversity and mentioned the Kurds. Amid the escalating insurgency, Jalal Talabani,10 president during the transitional period, was reelected, thereby becoming the first Kurd in history to occupy the post. In April 2006, President Talabani asked Nouri alMaliki,11 a compromised candidate from the Shiite-led United Iraqi Alliance (UIA), to form a new government, ending four months of political deadlock. A new cabinet, described as the government of national unity, was formed that included representatives from Iraq’s main ethnic and sectarian communities, including the Sunnis. The Shiites, who now dominated government, took advantage of the new state of affairs and appointed Bayan Jabr, from ISCI, as the minister of interior. He placed leaders of the Badr Brigade, the armed wing of ISCI, in key positions in the ministry and recruited thousands of Shiite militiamen to replace Sunnis in the Special Police Commando units. These Shiite militiamen replaced the Sunnis, who were recruited by a predecessor of Jabr, Falah al-Naqib, a Sunni minister of the interior under the IIG. At the same time, militias loyal to the radical Shiite cleric, Muqtada al-Sadr, also infiltrated the ministry.12 While some of these new recruits used their new positions to settle old scores with Sunnis, Sunni insurgents and extremists used aggressive forms of violence and terror in hope of regaining lost political power. As a result of these clashes immediately following the invasion, Sunni insurgents forced many Shiites out of their neighborhoods in Baghdad and elsewhere.13 In retaliation, the Shiites (who dominated the police force) organized death squads. Initially the death squads operated on a limited scale, but after February 2006, when al-Qaeda bombed an important Shiite shrine in Samarra, the Shiites unleashed waves of sectarian violence against the Sunnis. As a consequence of sectarian violence and in retaliation for previous Sunni actions, the Shiites now threw out the Sunnis, resulting in neighborhoods becoming totally Shiite.14

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In the ensuing violence and counterviolence, thousands of people were killed based on identity, and large numbers were internally or externally displaced. The UN High Commissioner for Refugees estimated the number of Iraqis who fled to Syria to be 1,200,000; to Jordan 750,000; to Egypt 100,000; to Iran 54,000; to Lebanon 40,000; and 10,000 to Turkey. The number of the internally displaced was estimated to be 1,900,000.15 This is equivalent to about 15 percent of the Iraqi population. By the end of 2006, the Shiites had forced the Sunnis out of most of the mixed areas and thereby redrew the sectarian map of Iraq, particularly Baghdad.16 These political developments and postinvasion events underlined the fact that Iraqis were not only voting on the basis of their respective identities, but they were killing each other based on identity. The deep-seated hostility between the Shiites and the Sunnis was reflected in the thousands of civilian deaths that were verified by Iraq Body Count. July 2006 was the worst month, with 3,208 people killed (see Appendix 5). By the middle of 2012, the number of civilian deaths had well exceeded 100,000. Contrary to popular belief, al-Qaeda suicide attacks were responsible for a relatively small proportion of the violence, about 33 percent. Most killings of civilians were carried out by either Sunni insurgents or Shiite death squads. Beginning in 2003, the average number of deaths per day from gunfire, executions, and sectarian violence was 15 compared to the average of 1.5 deaths per day from suicide attacks and vehicle bombs that were mostly claimed by al-Qaeda. At the crest of sectarian violence in 2006, these figures soared to the average of fifty-eight deaths per day compared to the average sixteen per day from suicide bomb attacks. In 2007, the average number of deaths per day from sectarian violence was forty-one, much higher than the average of twenty-two deaths per day at the hands of al-Qaeda bombs. However, by 2008, sectarian violence plunged, and the figures from sectarian violence and al-Qaeda bombings were about the same: an average of five to six deaths per day. This figure continued from 2009 to 2012. In sum, 67 percent of Iraqi casualties that took place since the collapse of the regime until April 2012 were the result of sectarian violence: 70,591 out of 104,792, compared to al-Qaeda bombings, or 34,201 out of 104,792 (see Appendix 6). Considering that even the casualties resulting from al-Qaeda-style bombs were motivated by sectarianism (as they were mostly carried out by Sunni extremists against Shiite civilians), the total human loss of 104,792 could be considered the result of sectarian- or identity-based animosity. The main reason behind the escalating violence was that the insurgency, or the so called resistance, enjoyed widespread support within the Sunni community, at least until 2007.17 At the same time, the Shiites implicitly applauded the activities of the death squads, because their actions were camouflaged by the Shiitedominated police forces.18

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To contain the violence and save Iraq from full-fledged civil war, the United States announced the deployment of an extra 20,000 troops as part of a new military strategy known as the Surge.19 By the end of 2007, security conditions improved, and the number of civilian deaths dropped significantly as did the frequency of suicide attacks and truck bombings. By then it was apparent that the Shiites had largely gained control of Baghdad.20 This corresponded to the results of the 2009 provincial elections in which Shiite political groups won nearly 71 percent of the Baghdad seats. It was generally believed that the Surge and the ability of the Iraqi security forces to suppress the militias were key contributing factors behind the decrease of sectarian violence. However, there is strong evidence that the Surge may not have been as effective as US officials have claimed. By tracking the amount of light emitted by Baghdad neighborhoods at night, a team of geographers demonstrated that night light in neighborhoods populated primarily by Sunni residents declined dramatically just before the February 2007 Surge and never returned. Accordingly, the team of geographers suggested that ethnic cleansing by rival Shiites may have been largely responsible for the decrease in violence.21 Another reason was that, by the end of 2007, sectarian communities in many areas, especially in the capital, had been segregated either because of sectarian cleansing or as a result of the construction of high concrete walls around the Sunni neighborhoods.22 As of June 2012, a 4meter wall is still standing around al-Adhamiya, the largest Sunni neighborhood in Baghdad.23 The change in Iran’s policy, from supporting the Shiite insurgents against US and Iraq government forces to siding with the Shiite government, also indirectly contributed to calming the situation as the Iranians realized that the United States would never withdraw if its troops were endlessly embroiled in an insurgency. 2 4 Therefore, the Iranians endorsed the government’s assault on the Mahdi Army, a group once supported by Iran, that had been responsible for much of the violence by the Shiites. Some Sunni insurgents reached the same conclusion that “armed action will not get the United States out of Iraq.”25 Another change in events occurred when Sunni insurgents turned their guns against al-Qaeda. This change was known as al-Sahwa (the Awakening) and was a major factor in improving security, especially in the Sunni triangle, the densely populated region to the northwest of Baghdad that is mostly inhabited by Sunni Arabs. The Awakening came into prominence at the end of 2005 when local tribes formed units to fight al-Qaeda and affiliated groups and to challenge them for control of western and central Iraq. The reasons for this about-face was not their sympathy for Americans or for the Shiite-dominated government but rather al-Qaeda members’ indiscriminate killing, the flouting of tribal laws and customs, and resulting bloodfeuds. 26 In addition to the killings based on identity and the sectarian

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cleansing that segregated Iraqi communities, the introduction of democracy also entrenched the divisions in their disparate positions rather than bringing the communities closer together.

Democratization: Reinforcing Sectarian and Ethnic Affiliation The elections held in Iraq since 2005 reveal the continued fragmented nature of Iraqi society based on ethno-national and sectarian lines. These divisions were evident prior to the invasion, as was clearly shown in the voting pattern of the elections held in January and December 2005, as well as the referendum on the constitution held in August 2005. While the Sunnis boycotted the January elections, the Kurds and the Shiites participated en masse. The Shiite lists won 146 out of 275 seats, or 53 percent of the total number of parliamentary seats. As a result of the Sunni boycott, the Kurdish lists won seventy-seven, or 26.4 percent, much more than their population ratio, which is about 20 percent. The Sunni lists that participated won six seats, or 2 percent of the total votes. Running on a cross-sectarian platform, the Iraqi National List won forty of the assembly seats, or 13.8 percent of the votes (see Appendix 2). The Sunni boycott of the January elections diminished their political leverage when it came to negotiating the constitution. Perhaps that is why they did not boycott the vote on the constitution. Nevertheless, they were overwhelmed by Shiite and Kurdish support of the constitution in the August 2005 referendum. Almost 79 percent of the Iraqi population voted in favor of the referendum, which reflected the combined influence of the Shiites and Kurds. The 21 percent that voted against the constitution was tantamount to the Sunni population rate. This vote pattern demarcated the will of the sectarian and ethnic groups. For the constitution to be rejected, three provinces were required to vote against it. Only two provinces rejected the constitution: Salah al-Din and al-Anbar, where more than 50 percent of the voters opposed it. In the mixed ethnic or sectarian provinces (i.e., Ninawa and Diyala), the vote against the referendum was less than 50 percent (see Appendix 3). The constitution set the legal framework for general elections to be held in December 2005. The Shiite-led UIA won 128 of the 275 parliamentary seats, constitutionally less than the two-thirds majority needed to rule without coalition partners. The Kurdish lists, Kurdistani Alliance (KA) and Kurdistan Islamic Union (KIU), came in second but won fewer seats than in the January elections: fifty-eight compared to seventy-seven. The Sunni lists fared better but still won fewer seats than expected, at fifty-eight (see Appendix 4).

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As anticipated, in both the January elections and the August referendum, each group (the Kurds, the Sunnis, and Shiites) voted for candidates from their own communities. One notable feature of the 2005 elections was the weak performance of cross-ethnic and/or -sectarian political parties that attempted to represent all sectors of the population of Iraq. In the January elections, the Iraqi National List (Iraqiya), headed by Allawi, claimed nonsectarian affiliation and won forty seats, or 13.82 percent of the total vote. But they won even fewer seats in the December elections: twenty-five seats, or 8 percent of the total vote (see Appendices 2 and 4). By early 2009, the violence had subsided, and there was an atmosphere of greater calm than experienced in the 2005 parliamentary elections. Initial reports stated that popular support for religious and/or sectarian parties was diminishing. 27 However, the evidence does not support this conclusion because final election results demonstrated that ethnic and sectarian interests and identification remained strong.28 The only political group that could be described as nonsectarian (though it did not cross ethnic lines) was Allawi’s Iraqiya list that won only 6 percent of all provincial seats. In addition, these elections were not held in the Kurdistan region, where Allawi lacked support. If they had been, that figure would have been even lower. Sunni Islamists won nearly 65 percent of the seats in the Sunni areas, and the Shiite Islamists won more than 71 percent in the Shiite areas.29 Another feature of the 2009 provincial election was that even al-Maliki’s State of Law (SoL) coalition that campaigned on a nonsectarian platform did not win any seats in the Sunni areas. Similarly, no Sunni candidate or party won seats in the Shiite provinces. Clearly, Baghdad was no longer a Sunni stronghold. The Sunni lists won only 16 percent of the seats, whereas the Shiites won over 70 percent. In the mixed Kurdish and Arab province of Ninawa, ethnic allegiances were even more defined. Sunni Arab nationalists, running on a largely anti-Kurdish ticket, won over 55 percent; and the KA, using the Kurdish card, won 32 percent. This left few seats for other parties. Ironically, the ICP, a party known to span the ethnic and sectarian divide, did not win any seats at all. With regard to the form of government, al-Maliki’s opposition to forming federal regions in the south and center of Iraq and his assertion of a powerful central government won him nearly 28 percent of the overall seats. This made it the largest bloc in most provincial councils. Al-Maliki’s call for strengthening the central government by amending the constitution was unpopular in Kurdistan because the Kurds saw the constitution as their bulwark against Baghdad’s all-too-centralizing policies. The KA that won the July 2009 Kurdistan regional election ran a campaign that stressed federalism and the implementation of Article 140, which sought to define the frontiers of the Kurdistan region from the rest of the country. Before the 2009 provincial elections, the Iraqi Arab and Turkmen parliamentarians attempted to draft a bill to address the special situation of Kirkuk. A clause in the draft election bill that was put to the parliament in

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July 2008 divided Kirkuk’s provincial council seats among ethnic and religious groups. Despite the Kurdish parliamentarians’ objecting to this clause and consequently walking out in protest, 30 parliament approved it. But President Talabani, a Kurd, and Vice President Adel Abd al-Mahdi, a Shiite, rejected the bill and sent it back to parliament.31 A special six-member panel was formed to visit the Kirkuk province for the purpose of finding a solution to the issue and report back to parliament. Based on the panel’s report and ensuing discussions, a draft bill was proposed that was accepted by the Kurdish groups but opposed by the Turkmens, the Iraqi Accord Front, and the al-Sadrists movement. It made reference to the Kirkuk status referendum prescribed in the constitution and proposed delaying the elections until a solution was found. The deep-seated and long-term political and ethnic fissures within Kirkuk province led to the postponement of elections to an unspecified time. This crucial province has yet to have an election. As parliament set the rules for parliamentary elections to be held in 2010, the political landscape looked like more of the same except for three major differences: first, al-Maliki and his associates departed the UIA and chose to run on their own. This split the grand Shiite coalition (UIA) of the previous 2005 elections into two: the SoL and the Iraqi National Alliance (INA). The second difference was the emergence of the Gorran (Change) list in Kurdistan. The third was the formation of a grand coalition between Allawi’s Iraqiya and several Sunni political entities. Despite a few attempts, al-Maliki’s new coalition failed to draw Sunni support. Though all coalition groups drew on national and patriotic rhetoric to support their claims to have open representation, most of the coalition groups still represented sectarian or ethno-national groups. Although the election was held on March 7, 2010, it was only after months of political wrangling and legal challenges that Iraq’s Supreme Court ratified the results on June 1, 2010. This paved the way for parliament to meet. Some observers heralded Iraq as the region’s newest fledgling democracy,32 while most ordinary Iraqis wondered if the country could hold together at all. When it convened in March 2006, the Iraqi Parliament consisted of twelve electoral lists that transformed themselves into parliamentary blocs comprised of loose coalitions: the Shiite UIA (128), Musaliha wa Hiwar (3), and Risaliyun (2); Kurds’ KA (53) and KIU (5); Sunni Tawafuq (44) and Hiwar (11); cross-sectarians Iraqiya (25) and Mithal Alusi (1); Turkmen Front (1); Christians’ Rafidayn (1); and Yazidis (1). Just before the parliamentary term expired four years later, on February 2010, the map of blocs had changed considerably with the total number now increased to sixteen parliamentary blocs: UIA (85), al-Sadrists (28), al-Fadila (15), KA (53), KIU (5), Tawafuq (40), Hiwar (9), Arab independent bloc (8), Iraqiya (19), independents (4), Risaliyun (2), ICP (2), Alusi (1), Turkmen Front (1), Yazidis (1), and Rafidayn (1).

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Generally speaking, in the 2010 elections the secular tone (but not the secularly oriented political entities) was more accepted than in the previous elections where the Islamist/sectarian tone and orientation dominated. This was especially evident with the Iraqiya list that had a somewhat secular tone to its campaign. Headed by Allawi, it took 91 of 325 seats. To a lesser extent, the SoL also adopted a secular tone in its attempt to distance itself from more religious/sectarian-oriented parties such as the ISCI led by Amar al-Hakim, and the al-Sadrist movement led by Muqtada al-Sadr. Headed by al-Maliki, SoL won eighty-nine seats. Many political analysts and observers concluded that the secularists fared better in the voting than the sectarian groups. Indeed, it seemed that Iraqis held a kind of resentment toward the Islamists because of their failure to deliver services and security. Some disenchanted Iraqis believed that secular-oriented groups might do a better job delivering much-needed services and security. In relation to ethno-sectarian representation, the Sunnis, who had boycotted the January 2005 elections and did poorly in the December 2005 elections, came out in greater numbers to vote this time and won more seats. The Kurds took fewer seats in comparison to previous elections, because they were split into four separate political entities that caused them to lose a large number of votes. The Kurds could have taken at least ten more seats had Iraq continued as a single constituency, as it did in the January and December 2005 elections. Having eighteen province-based constituencies split the vote and caused them to lose a good deal of influence. The Kurdish blocs also suffered because of the high Sunni Arab turnout in mixed areas. While in the past the Kurds were the sole kingmaker, now they had to share with the Shiite INA (see Appendix 7). Within the Shiite lists, the ISCI was hurt rather badly as it was reduced to a smaller bloc of only 20 of 325 seats. In the previous parliament, it had about 30 of 275 seats. It could be argued that the new election regulations and their miscalculations as to the alSadrists’ performance led to their own poor performance. The al-Sadrists shared the same list (INA) with the ISCI, but the latter won more primary votes, and the former won more seats, forty, in this election, as opposed to thirty seats in the 2005 elections. The al-Islah (Reform) movement headed by Ibrahim Ja‘fari, a disaffected group from the Da‘wa party, took only one seat and was thus marginalized. The al-Fadila party fared slightly better thanks to the female quota of twenty-five percent. As soon as the final results were announced, a dispute emerged as to which political bloc/group had the right to form a government. The disagreement centered on the interpretation of Article 76 of the constitution. Iraq’s constitution stipulates that “the President of the Republic shall charge the nominee of the ‘largest Council of Representatives bloc’ with the formation of the Council of Ministers.” The Iraqiya list argued that what the constitution meant by largest bloc was the winning bloc. However, al-Maliki’s SoL and the other large Shiite bloc, INA, which were working toward a

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merger, asserted that largest bloc meant either the winning bloc or the one formed after the election results, before or after the first sitting of the parliament.33 This point was rigorously disputed for several months and led to attacks and counterattacks that almost paralyzed the government. Eventually the case was taken to the Federal Supreme Court, which interpreted the definition of the largest bloc to mean the largest coalition that would be in place once the country’s parliament convened.34 This distinction is critical. Basically what it meant is that Allawi’s strong showing in terms of seats could not be translated into his bloc having the first opportunity to form the government. This privilege was given to the INA after its merger with SoL. This left the grand, newly formed bloc just four seats shy of a parliamentary majority, but it would have the right to form the government. Once again, the Kurds played the role of kingmaker, but never practically benefited from the position. Because negotiations dragged on until late December, Iraq broke the record for the longest time between holding a parliamentary election and forming a government. The Netherlands had held the record of 207 days in 1977, but Iraq’s delay took 289 days. Mediated (or pressured) by Iran in October 2010, the INA and SoL merged and thus paved the way for incumbent prime minister al-Maliki to form a cabinet. Allawi’s repeated attempts to attract Kurds and ISCI support were unsuccessful. In the last days of December, a partial cabinet formation was put to vote by parliament, putting al-Maliki, a Shiite, on track as prime minister. Talabani, a Kurd, was returned to the presidency, and Usama al-Nujaifi, a Sunni, became president of the parliament.35 Parliament gave unanimous approval to the new government on December 21, just days before a constitutional deadline, thereby formally returning al-Maliki to power for a second term. Al-Maliki promised to appoint the ministers in charge of defense and interior security later, but by December 2012, after twenty-four months, the promise had yet to be fulfilled. 36 Instead, he named himself as acting head of these two most important posts, in addition to his other roles as prime minister and the commander in chief of the armed forces. Though the cabinet was supposed to be a national unity government, al-Maliki simply excluded all other political groups from decision-making responsibilities related to strategic and security issues. By December 2012, al-Maliki has yet to fulfill his promise of appointing the defense and interior ministers. However, he validated US fears by forming a “government that owes its existence to the al-Sadrists and lacks strong support from Allawi.”37 This could mean a government that leans in Tehran’s direction. Factually speaking, Iran is working behind the scenes to have its nominee, Mahmoud Hashemi Shahroudi, a sixty-four-year-old cleric, replace Ali al-Sistani, who belonged to the quietist school of thought in the Shiite community, which argues against direct engagement in political matters.38 If Shahroudi were appointed, it would profoundly impact Iraqi

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politics by aligning the country to be more favorably disposed to Iran. It would also increase pressure on the fragile semisecular Iraqi political system because, unlike al-Sistani, Shahroudi is known to favor religious involvement in politics. If the election and its aftermath proved anything, it proved how difficult it was to form a government from political entities aligned along ethnic and sectarian lines and how fragile and vulnerable Iraq’s political process actually is. Iraq’s political blocs not only suffer from interethnic/sectarian fissures, but each ethnic and sectarian bloc lacks internal cohesion. This was clear during negotiations for the merger of the two major Shiite blocs, which took place only after pressure from Iran and the realization that if they didn’t unite, the Sunni-affiliated bloc might be successful in forming a government. The self-declared nonsectarian and secular Iraqiya list did not last long because many members withdrew and formed separate blocs. The Kurds’ participation in four blocs reveals the inherent division among them. The Iraqiya list’s increased lack of cohesion indicates that ethnic and sectarian interests and identity are stronger than nonsectarian interests. Nevertheless, Allawi’s popularity in the 2010 election round indicated that some Iraqis have begun to distance themselves from sectarian/Islamist-oriented party politics. Indeed the Iraqiya list is the only group in parliament with representation from Basra in the south to Mosul in the north. Soon after the 2010 election results were announced, numerous claims arose about voter support of nonsectarian lists. Some observers claimed that the results of the 2010 elections indicated that the Iraqis have moved away from sectarianism and were inclining more toward ideological and issueoriented politics. The thinking was that the election results revealed a shift from identity-constrained politics to more of an issue-based democracy. For example, Zalmay Khalilzad argued that in 2005 Iraqis voted according to their sects because they felt threatened and sought security through identity politics. But in the 2010 vote they showed their pursuit of a better life and more effective provision of services. 39 Firas al-Atraqchi asserted that “Allawi appealed mostly to Sunni (and some Shiite) voters, not because he is Shiite or a former Baathist, but because his supporters believed in his message for a nonsectarian Iraq.” 40 While publicly all Iraqi politicians denounce sectarianism and claim Iraqi patriotism, a close look at the 2010 election results reveals that the pattern of voting only slightly shifted, as most Iraqis continued to vote according to sectarian or ethnic identity. Indeed, the elections in Iraq reinforce the country’s sectarian tensions, rather than demonstrate an evolvement toward more mature political processes. Political attitudes and the postelection realignment according to sectarian affiliation demonstrate that Iraq has a long way to go to transcend sectarianism, if it can be transcended at all in the foreseeable future. Here is a

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case in point: when Allawi scored a surprising lead with the support of Sunnis in the election, the coalition of the two other Shiite groups (INA and SoL) began to seriously negotiate for a merger. Despite their rivalries and disagreements, they eventually amalgamated in the face of growing speculation that the Sunnis might return to power on Allawi’s shoulders. The alliance cleared the way to form a dominant Shiite government similar to previous ones. The way the Iraqiya bloc reacted to the announcement indicates that sectarianism is as strong as ever. Allawi warned that the country risked descending into a new sectarian war if his alliance was sidelined.41 The election results disappointed nonsectarian, secular, and patriotic movements such as the ICP (which took two seats in the 2005 election), the al-Ahrar movement, and the al-Umma Party (each won one seat in 2005). None of these three groups took seats in the 2010 election (see Appendices 4 and 7). Al-Maliki’s failed attempt to bridge the sectarian divide by broadening his political base basically undermines any claim of sectarian transcendence. Sadiq al-Rikab, a key political adviser to alMaliki, blamed Saudi Arabia for pressuring Sunni groups from joining alMaliki’s SoL list.42 After the election results were announced, al-Maliki bluntly admitted that “We thought we had gone further in eradicating sectarianism than reality has shown,” adding that the election had returned Iraq to “square one.”43 The reality is that political choices before, during, and after the 2010 elections were and still are determined by identity. The election results demonstrated that a fractured Iraqi electorate had split the eighteen provinces among four different political groups that mirrored the existing ethno-sectarian demography of Iraq (see Appendix 7). Al-Maliki’s SoL won Baghdad, the most populous province, as well as six predominantly Shiite provinces south of the capital; Allawi’s Iraqiya list either won or ran virtually in the five northern and western provinces that had large Sunni populations. Iraqiya won seats in the Shiite- and Kurdish-dominated areas where there were also large Sunni subpopulations, such as Kirkuk, Basra, Diyala, and Hilla. The other Shiite list, INA, won a single province outright but, together with the SoL they dominated the Shiite provinces. The KA and other Kurdish groups won three Kurdish provinces in the north and, with Iraqiya, evenly won the twelve seats of the ethnically mixed Kirkuk province. During the elections, al-Maliki presented himself as opposed to the national unity government as Iraq experienced previously. He repeatedly suggested that the next government should be formed based on al-istihqaq al-intikhabi (the electoral achievements) or al-ghalibiya al-siyasiya (the political majority rule).44 However, the pattern of voting displayed during the elections compelled al-Maliki to reconsider his position and advocate the concept of “partnership,” which is synonymous to al-muhasasa, or forming a power-sharing government by distributing positions along ethnosectarian lines.

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Current and Future Scenarios A discussion of the possible scenarios of these elections might shed light on the complexities of Iraqi politics, a consideration that might be useful for future elections because of the possibility that current political figures/blocs may play a major role in the future. The political map may change but not likely to a great extent. The first scenario is to have a coalition between alMaliki’s SoL (eighty-nine seats), the Shiite INA ( seventy seats), and the Kurdish lists (fifty-seven seats).45 The total seats accumulated by this grand alliance would be approximately 216, enough to elect the president and the prime minister according to the constitution. In this scenario, Iraqiya and other remaining parliamentary groups (mostly Sunni) could form a parliamentary opposition bloc and thereby encourage the move toward democracy. In this scenario, Iraqi ethnic and sectarian groups could be aligned according to their ethnic and sectarian loyalties—that is, the Kurds and the Shiites in the government and the Sunnis plus some secular Shiites in the opposition. Such a scenario would not be welcomed by the United States or the Sunni Arab countries in the region. Iran, however, would likely prefer this scenario. In reality, it is unlikely that this scenario would materialize due to the danger that it would fuel Sunni anger and tap their memory of the 2006 and 2007 sectarian conflicts. In the second scenario, the government would be headed by Allawi representing Iraqiya and supported by the Shiite INA plus the Kurds’ KA; alMaliki’s SoL and the rest would form the parliamentary opposition. This formation would probably gain the support of US and regional powers, except Iran. It certainly would return the Sunnis to full-scale participation in the political process. The government would have representation from all major ethnic and sectarian components of Iraqi society. The weak point of this scenario would be that to an extent Allawi would become an outcast in the current political process since he has not been directly involved in Iraqi politics for the last six years. As a member of the previous parliament residing in Jordan, he rarely attended parliamentary sessions. He became a source of concern among the majority of Shiites and Kurds because of his close cooperation with ex- and pro-Baathist factions that knowingly or unknowingly infiltrated his bloc. People fear returning to the past, with Baathists or their collaborators coming to power directly or indirectly. Allawi’s threat that, if he were not allowed to form the government, Iraq would be returned to sectarian violence was worrisome for mainstream Shiites.46 Having Allawi and the Sunnis at the helm would raise fears that all the ex-military Sunni officers could return to power and facilitate a coup. This would conjure up the memory of the 1960s when Sunni officers removed Qasim from power and assumed rule in Iraq, which lasted for decades. On one hand, Allawi would have great difficulty gaining the Kurds’ cooperation if they insisted on the implementation of Article 140,

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but on the other hand, he would have great difficulty appeasing his Sunni colleagues, who stand firmly against the implementation of Article 140. Such a government would face extreme difficulties forming a united front and vision for Iraq since extreme Shiite al-Sadrists, the radical Sunni alHiwar, and separatist-oriented Kurds all belong to one coalition. The third scenario is the formation of a grand coalition between the two major winning lists: Allawi (ninety-one seats) and al-Maliki (eighty-nine seats). The 180-seat parliamentary bloc is sufficient to form the government and may be enough to appoint a president. The president requires a minimum of 216 votes in the first round, but if no candidate can achieve this then, according to the constitution, 163 votes are required in the second round. This coalition’s most obvious policy would be antifederalism since both coalitions want a more centralized state. Both blocs also have a common Arab nationalist outlook. Nevertheless, due to personality issues and other major disagreements, the materialization of this coalition is the least likely option. As a compromise solution, al-Maliki could lead the government for the first two years, then hand the reins of power to Allawi to finish the four-year term or vice versa. The head of the government could form the cabinet and then dissolve it after two years or form a coalition government but change the head of the government at the end of the two-year period. This scenario could affect a reasonable compromise between the Shiites and the Sunnis. It would address the main point of disagreement between the two blocs: their insistence on who leads the government. If these two blocs can negotiate and agree on strategic issues while establishing common ground, it could lead to a reasonably strong and stable government. The other winning groups, including the Shiite list of INA and the Kurdistani lists, could form a strong opposition consisting of 145 seats. The realization of such a government most likely would reduce the role of the Kurds in Baghdad, leaving a government with a clear majority. A united Iraqiya and SoL coalition would work to reinforce centralism and return Iraq to the old way of running the country. Despite some commonalities between the two lists, the government would not be as homogenous as it could be. There is a possibility of disintegration, as both coalitions consist of people who disagree on almost every single detail related to the past, present, and future of Iraq, especially in relation to bringing ex-military officers and ex-Baathists back to power. Perhaps this is the main reason for al-Maliki’s repeated refusal to allow Iraqiya’s candidates to head the Ministry of Defense; he fears this could lead to the reversal of the de-Baathification process. A unity government scenario, as is currently practiced, was and is the most probable scenario, given the current set of political circumstances in which all political parties have aligned themselves based on ethnic or sectarian identities. Al-Maliki could form the government, which could be headed by Allawi as well. The unity government is a scenario in which all ideological, ethnic, and sectarian groups are supposedly represented. The

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prime ministership could be given to a Shiite (Allawi or al-Maliki, as both are Shiite), the presidency to the Kurds, and the speaker of the parliament to the Sunnis. Since the collapse of the previous regime, this or a similar formula has served as the basis for government formation. The main argument for this formula is that at this crucial time in history Iraq needs a national unity government in which everybody participates. This is practically mandatory because the voting pattern is so closely patterned on the ethnic and sectarian divisions of Iraqi society. The government here would include all components of Iraqi society and give each the opportunity to participate in the decision-making process. The fear of marginalization would be minimized and thereby decrease the involvement of members of Iraq’s various groups in activities aimed against the state and its institutions. At least it would minimize popular support among communal groups for terrorist organizations such as al-Qaeda. Indeed, despite all the malfunctions of the previous and current unity governments, this arrangement seems to have prevented the Iraqi state from totally disintegrating, at least for the moment. Perhaps the greatest disadvantage of this formula is that it would work against the development of a strong opposition, a necessary component for healthy democracies to flourish. It slows down the pace for the evolution of mechanisms of accountability, transparency, and power sharing in the government. Moreover, it could work toward entrenching the prevailing corruption in the government since everyone tends to fight for their piece of the pie. It would further entrench nepotism and favoritism within the government institution as each faction works for its own interests or gain. This is happening now. The unity government may prevent strife, but it produces an inefficient government. Despite the threats, the turnout for the 2010 parliamentary election was relatively high at 62 percent. One positive sign of the election was that, unlike most elections in the Middle East, the outcome was far from certain. The conclusion of the 2010 election tells us that there hasn’t been a big change in Iraqi politics. Indeed most political groups in Iraq made tonguein-cheek appeals to the idea of Iraqi nationalism, knowing full well that the actions of the political elite and the voting pattern on the ground by constituents would be along the old ethnic and sectarian lines. No party or single political bloc/list is likely to win a majority in parliament in the near future, given the diverse array of ideological, ethnic, and sectarian groups. The changes in the electoral rules did not significantly change the way candidates won votes. According to the number of votes won by candidates, only 16 out of 325 members of parliament acquired the required number of votes for success.47 The rest were elected by the votes they gained from other candidates within their lists. Not a single woman won the needed votes. The female with the largest vote was Maha Adil Mahdi Muhammad, who had 31,949 of the 37,110 votes that she needed in Baghdad. The female

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contestant with the fewest votes was Thuraya Najim Abdulla Fatah, also from Baghdad. She took only 734 votes but won a seat. Generally speaking, the Kurdish women took far more votes than their Arab counterparts. During the negotiations for the formation of Iraq’s government, leading politicians consisting of government ministers, clerics, and sheikhs attended lunch at the Arabesque Peace Palace at President Talabani’s house. Not a single woman was invited or attended despite a legal requirement that women occupy one in four seats of parliament. The struggle for power in Iraq is similar to that in other Arab-Islamic countries: it is clearly the domain of men. Political involvement in Iraq generally operates according to the common notion that once powerful figures come to power in the Middle East, they will fight to the bitter end to keep it. Al-Maliki’s political games and lip service promises to the Kurds, compromises with his Shiite rivalries, maneuvers with Iraqiya, and his intention to run for a third term all indicate that once in power he, as most politicians in Iraq, is not inclined to hand over power peacefully—even if a competitor defeats him in succeeding elections. The fallout of the 2010 election demonstrates this rule of thumb pretty clearly. Al-Maliki’s intention to share power with others and his insistence on personally controlling the defense and interior ministries indicate the winner-take-all approach to politics. Nevertheless, having elections per se is a step in the right direction, taking into consideration the fact that democratic values and processes are yet to take hold and mature in Iraq.

Kurds Between Accommodation and Independence In contrast to the ongoing Shiite-Sunni hostilities, the Kurds and the Shiites enjoyed a close relationship for quite some time after the collapse of the regime in 2003. They cooperated on many issues, including the drafting of the TAL and the permanent constitution, the vote for ratification of the constitution, and a parliamentary vote in favor of a law that allowed the provinces to unite and form federal regions. However, this good relationship did not last long. The first sign of disunity appeared when Ibrahim alJa‘fari, the prime minister of the transitional government, omitted the phrase “federal and democratic” from the oath of inauguration in May 2005.48 This move enraged Kurdish leaders and raised fear among ordinary Kurds because many Shiites, as the Sunnis before them, rejected the notion of federalism. Another disagreement developed over the use of the Iraqi flag. Mas‘ud Barzani, president of the KRG, banned the display of the Iraqi flag in August 2006 because “mass-killings were committed in its name. Therefore, it is impossible [for us] to hoist this flag in Kurdistan.” 49 However, the old Iraqi flag was retained as the national flag by successive

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post-Saddam governments in Baghdad (see Chapter 9). Both of these incidents reflected the age-old squabble between the Arab Iraqis and the Kurds in relation to the Kurds’ identification with Iraq. The tensions between the Kurds and the Shiites renewed the fissure along ethnic lines. While the Shiites and the Sunnis were working toward some kind of accord by 2008, the gap between the Kurds and the Arabs (Sunni or Shiite) was widening. This was evident in a dispute over the provincial election law that led to clashes between the Kurds and the Turkmen (supported by the Arabs) in the city of Kirkuk. These clashes served as warnings of possible further civil unrest unless the fate of Kirkuk and other disputed areas was resolved. In autumn 2009, the issue of elections in Kirkuk resurfaced as the Iraqi Parliament discussed a new law for parliamentary elections. After months of political stalemate, with divisions along ethnic lines, legislators finally agreed on a formula to include the province of Kirkuk in a countrywide election, to be held in March 2010. But the elections were avoided because it was thought that they would further destabilize the fragile relations of the ethnic groups in Kirkuk. Although the provincial election law was a breakthrough, the agreement did not really resolve the status of Kirkuk and other disputed areas.50 Elections in Kirkuk province were postponed to an undisclosed date. One of the reasons for the postponement was the lack of demographic data, and what was available was disputed. The 2005 Iraq constitution mandated a census to assist in the handling of this issue and to serve as the basis for a referendum, to be held by the end of 2007. The census was also intended to provide a framework for the inhabitants of the disputed areas to decide whether to join the Kurdistan region or Iraq. A population census would seem to be a simple thing, but in Iraq nothing is simple. A census is akin to a de facto referendum on disputed territories, which is why it was delayed again and again. The central government’s fear was that if the demography of Kirkuk or other disputed areas showed the Kurds as a majority, then it would only confirm, once again, the Kurdish identity of these areas. After much political wrangling, the Ministry of Planning decided to conduct a census on October 3, 2010, the first to be held since 1997. Arabs and Turkmen of the disputed areas threatened to boycott it. A representative of the Arab Political Council suggested that “the biggest threat to the future of Kirkuk is this census. . . . We are calling on people not to take part in it.”51 The Kurds, however, asserted that they were going to make it happen and participate in it. Despite that, the authorities postponed it to December 5. Ironically, whether to conduct the census was not the only point of disagreement between the Kurds and Arabs over the census; there were also disputes about the details, such as one question relating to ethnicity/nationality. A month before December 5, the date scheduled for the census, Ali Baban, the Iraqi minister of planning, suggested that the

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reference to ethnicity/nationality be removed from the questionnaire. The Kurdish authority declared that it would not participate in the census if the reference were removed, stressing that this is a “clear violation of the constitution,” which recognizes ethnic diversity of Iraq.52 This dispute went on despite the readiness of the Ministry of Planning (which had prepared for this for a year) to hold the census. Initially the authorities dismissed calls from representatives of Kirkuk and Ninawa provinces to delay the census, as they thought them to be politically motivated. However, as the pressure grew, the minister of planning issued a statement that “because of certain reservations and concerns from political groups in Kirkuk and Ninawa, the commission responsible for conducting the census is considering the possibility of postponing the census in order to give time to political groups to resolve outstanding issues.”53 The KRG rejected any more delays to the census and stressed that the census must be held by the end of 2010. The Kurds argued that “these people [Arabs and Turkmen] are afraid to face hard facts, including public acknowledgement of the true size of their constituency in Iraq. Attempting to distort facts about the social and ethnic makeup of Iraq is a red line to us [the Kurds].”54 The dispute on the census drew international attention as a group of ex-Baathists, scholars, and journalists around the world, referring to itself as the Brussell’s Tribunal, called the census “criminal social engineering, ethnic cleansing and demographic changes that have been implemented under occupation. This could unleash a full blown civil war across Iraq, and potentially lead to its partition and a consequent regional war.”55 It is not surprising that Iraqi citizens react differently, depending on ethnic lines, to almost every event and social affair, but it is shocking to see a group of international scholars and journalists perceive a constitutionally mandated census, aimed at collecting data on residency and ethnic and religious demography, as a possible source of civil war. In contrast, in Australia, there are around 40,000 Kurds out of nearly 23 million people, or less than 0.002 percent. Despite this small proportion of ethnic Kurds, in the 2006 Australian census, the Kurds were not only allowed to declare their ethnicity but in the field indicating choice of nationality, “Kurdish” was given as an example, and in the 2011 census in the field of ancestry, “Kurdish” was again given as an example. However, in Iraq, the Kurds, who constitute around 20 percent of the population, are denied the right of identifying themselves as Kurds in the proposed census. This is another dilemma in Iraqi politics. After ninety years, the lesson has not yet been learned that the first step toward integration begins with the recognition that the policies of assimilation not only do not lead to integration but instead result in disintegration. Central to the conflict between the Kurds and Arab Iraqis is not only the issue of recognizing the Kurds as an ethnic/national group but the recognition of Kurdistan as a homeland regardless whether it is inside or outside

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Iraq’s borders. In 2005, Iraq constitutionally recognized parts of Kurdistan as a federal region within Iraq.56 However, the fate of a strip of territory stretching from Sinjar to Mandali, known as the “disputed areas,” is yet to be decided (see Map 8.1). The Kurdish-Iraqi negotiations of 1963–1966, 1970–1974, 1984–1985, 1991, and 2003–2012 have broken down over the Kurds’ quest to incorporate this strip of land into their proposed autonomous or federal region. Redrawing the frontier is key to settling this century-old dispute. Article 140 of the Iraqi constitution provides an opportunity for resolving this issue. The article aims to reverse the Baathist regime’s practice of ethnic cleansing and its policy of Arabization through a process called “normalization”; it seeks to determine the future of the disputed areas through a referendum that was to be held no later than December 31, 2007, a date already past. The implementation of this article may seem straightforward, but from the outset it has been the most contentious issue of the postinvasion era. On the one hand, the Iraqi government has taken no serious measures to implement it, primarily because of local antagonism from Arabs and Turkmen. Opponents believe that its implementation would give the Kurds control over the disputed areas well known for their large oil reserves. The Kirkuk fields contain about 14 percent of Iraq’s proven reserves, which are estimated at 143 billion barrels. This figure includes over 45 billion barrels in the areas currently under the control of the KRG and about 20 billion barrels in Kirkuk and other disputed areas.57 Arabs and Turkmen also fear that, with the wealth of Kirkuk to provide a strong economic base, Kurdistan may declare independence. It is generally understood that the conflict is not over the land itself but rather over the oil that lies beneath. The Kurds maintain that the area has a particular moral and symbolic value because Kirkuk has become the symbol of their suffering.58 Mas‘ud Barzani claims that the dispute is not about oil but rather about the land. He adds that it is also about righting the wrongs of the past and stresses that the Kurds “will not relinquish Kirkuk whatever the circumstances.”59 Barham Salih, the prime minister of the KRG from 2009 to 2012, stressed the moral significance of Kirkuk to Kurds by stating that “Kurds view Kirkuk as an integral part of Kurdistan. It is in an embodiment of the plight of the Kurds.”60 The Kurds fought for Kirkuk long before the discovery of oil in large quantities in 1927. Seven years before the discovery of oil, Sheikh Mahmud’s conflict with the British partly stemmed from the British annexation of Kirkuk and other Kurdish territories. This move robbed the Kurds of land that was expected to become part of the Kurdish autonomous areas to be established under British rule.61 In February 1919, the districts of Kirkuk and Kifri were removed from the Suleimaniya division and no longer included within the proposed Kurdish autonomous entity.62 At the Paris Peace Conference of 1919, prior to the establishment of

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Map 8.1 Territories Disputed by the Iraqi Government and the KRG

TURKEY Dohuk

Ninawa N Nin Ni in naw n wa

Erbil

SYRIA Kirkuk Kirkuk Kirk k

Su SSuleimaniya u eima m

IRAN Salah al-Din

Diyala ya alla a Baghdad Al-Anbar Karbala

Babil

Wasit

AlQadisiyah

JORDAN

Maysan

Dhi Qar Najaf

SAUDI ARABIA

Disputed and part of the Kurdish Regional Government Disputed and under the control of the Iraqi government

Muthanna

Basra

KUWAIT

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Iraq as a state, the Kurdish representative, Sharif Pasha, claimed Kirkuk as part of the anticipated Kurdistan state.63 As mentioned, Article 140 of the 2005 constitution laid out the process to determine the fate of the province of Kirkuk and other disputed areas. However, successive Iraqi governments avoided implementing the article, saying that it would lead to civil strife. On a visit to the city in May 2012, Iraqi prime minister al-Maliki suggested that “a solution to the problem of Kirkuk will not be reached by the use of force, it will only be reached by the strong will of its people, and when its people adhere to Kirkuk’s Iraqi identity that should not be overwhelmed by any other minor identities.”64 The Kurds were disappointed and argued that the prime minister ignored the constitution since he failed to mention Article 140 as the basis for settling the question of disputed areas.65 The Kurds complain that al-Maliki was attempting to appease the Sunnis. He had agitated the Sunnis with his policies of marginalization and his crackdown on Sunni leaders by banning Deputy Prime Minister Salih al-Mutlaq from the Council of Ministers and charging Vice President Tariq al-Hashimi with running death squads, for examples.66 A Kurdish spokesman suggested that if al-Maliki “wants to resolve the status of the disputed areas, he needs to implement Article 140 and allow the people of Kirkuk to determine their fate.”67 Historically, Iraqi government policies have been designed in light of Kirkuk’s oil wealth. For many Arab settlers, Kirkuk and other disputed areas have no significant emotional attachment. For example, the secretarygeneral of the Arab bloc in Kirkuk, Ahmed Hameed al-Obaidi, referred to the incorporation of Kirkuk into Iraq only in terms of its economic value. He said, “I would never let the Kurds steal this money by making the city part of their region [because keeping Kirkuk will make me] one of the wealthiest men in the world.”68 It is interesting to note that the Arabs, who were brought to the Kurdish areas as part of Saddam’s Arabization policies, did not bury the bodies of their departed relatives in Kurdish areas but sent them to their homeland (see Chapter 9). The question of emotional attachment to homeland is dismissed by observers who view the issue of the disputed areas as a mere administrative disagreement between Iraqi provinces rather than a question of territorial identity between two competing nationalisms, Kurdish and Iraqi. This view has been expressed by al-Maliki and the UN Special Envoy to Iraq, Stephan De Mistura.69 Based on this understanding, some politicians and observers call for Kirkuk province to become a separate region within Iraq.70 Others, such as Sam Parker from the Washington-based US Institute of Peace and a few Iraqi political groups (such as blocs of Arabs and Turkmen), suggest that the best solution for Kirkuk is to continue to postpone any decision.71 A resolution of this matter must be just and fair to untangle other pending issues between the KRG and the central government, such as the proposed hydrocarbons law, which would regulate management and distribution of

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natural resources; the status, role, and size of the Peshmerga; centralism versus federalism; and the issue of power sharing. Any solution that regards the issue of the disputed areas merely as an administrative issue or fight for oil would overlook and cut short its symbolic and emotional value as part of a homeland (Kurdistan or Iraq). Moreover, it would not help to resolve the age-old point of contention between the Kurds and the Iraqis. Because the issue is really about territorial identity, it must be resolved on this basis. With the emergence since late 2010 of the new states of East Timor, Kosovo, South Sudan, and the accompanying uprisings against autocracies across the Arab world, the Kurds are now addressing the issue of possible independence in louder voices than before. Kurdish intellectuals have been consistently staying on track with regard to statehood. In May 2011, a few Kurdish intellectuals invited selected academics, columnists, journalists, and politicians to participate in a series run by Hawlati newspaper aimed at gathering and organizing different voices to address the question of statehood for Iraqi Kurdistan. Numerous articles that addressed the challenges and obstacles facing Kurdish statehood were published, and possible solutions were suggested in hope of coming up with a road map that would lead to statehood. 72 From these published articles one can see differences between the Kurdish intellectuals’ approach to statehood and that of the Kurdish political elite, known for its pragmatic approach. The latter group has traditionally been pro-independence. Their call for independence reached its peak when South Sudan gained independence in 2011. It provided great motivation because it broke the illusionary sanctity of Arab land unity. 73 Kurdish intellectuals, in contrast, view the establishment of a Kurdish state as a matter of principle that should not be compromised. The long overdue project, they argue, is consistent with the UN Charter, which mandates “the self-determination of all peoples.” Kurdish intellectuals view the essence of the Kurdish national question as establishing the Kurdish state.74 However, several factors have caused the Kurdish political and intellectual elites in early 2012 to consider the possibility of declaring Kurdistan’s independence: the central government’s intentional avoidance of resolving the issue of the disputed areas; its banning of oil companies that invest in Kurdistan from bidding in Iraq, thus preventing the KRG from developing the oil sector; and the central government’s reluctance to share power. On the anniversary of Newroz, Nawshirwan Mustafa Amin, the leader of the opposition movement Gorran, declared that the ultimate objective of Gorran was “the establishment of an independent Kurdistan.”75 During the first few months of 2012, Kurdistan president Mas‘ud Barzani remarked several times that the Kurds would consider breaking away from Baghdad if the central government did not share power with its political opponents by September 2012.76 It was claimed that the PUK, the KDP partner in the KRG, did not share President Talabani’s view that it would be unrealistic

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for the Kurds to push for independence, despite calls by the younger generation to seek it.77 However, Saadi Pira, PUK’s politico bureau member, suggested that Talabani must distance himself from the debate on independence because of his post as Iraqi president. Otherwise, any suggestion that “the KDP and PUK have different stances in regard to the Kurdish citizens’ demands is mistaken.”78 Nonetheless, there was some difference of opinion not only on the question of independence but also as to the relation of the PUK with other Iraqi political blocs. The KDP presents itself as pro-independence, while the PUK is more inclined to accommodation. Also KDP is closer to Allawi’s Iraqiya party, while the PUK is more inclined toward the Shiites’ INA and SoL Opposition from regional powers to the idea of Kurdish independence has begun to dwindle. Turkey seems to be accepting the reality of an everincreasing autonomous Kurdistan region. Turkey’s threat of invasion to prevent the emergence of an oil-rich independent Kurdistan, and the fear that Kurdish nationalism might spill over into Turkey, have often been cited by observers as potential eventualities.79 These appear to be more misconception rather than fact. First, Kurdish nationalism in Turkey predates the emergence of the Kurdish nationalism prevalent in Iraqi Kurdistan. Second, Turkey has tolerated a de facto Kurdistan state since 1992, knowing full well that a Turkish assault on Kurdistan would jeopardize its chance to join the European Union. Third, current developments indicate that the Kurds in Turkey do not favor separatism, and both the Kurds and the Turks are willing to tackle the Kurdish question peacefully. Improvements in TurkishKRG relations since 2009, and the Turkish and US acceptance of the flags of Kurdistan, Iraq, Turkey, and the United States to be hoisted side-by-side in diplomatic meetings are landmarks on the road to the full acceptance of Kurdistan as a separate entity, so far within Iraq.80 Trade between Turkey and Kurdistan topped US$10 billion in 2009 and US$20 billion in 2010. Turkey is the main investor in Kurdistan; of 1,200 foreign companies in the Kurdistan region, about half are Turkish; and 90 percent of the goods sold in Iraqi Kurdistan are made in Turkey.81 Article 140 of the Iraqi constitution opens the way to demarcate the frontiers between the Kurdistan region and the rest of Iraq. By default, it acknowledges the creation of two regions, which most probably will lead either to a confederation or independence, rather than the federal region of Kurdistan. Since early 2012, Baghdad’s relations with Ankara have soured over accusations of Turkish interference in Iraqi affairs, yet Kurdistan’s ties with Turkey have improved dramatically. Another reason for a shift in Turkey’s position toward Iraqi Kurdistan relates to the challenges Turkey faces with the growing and irreversible influence of Iran on Iraq’s politics. Turkish sources suggest that Iran is dispensing “lots of cash, providing arms, perpetrating killings and bombings

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and sending fighters and mullahs in order to create a Shiite Iraq.”82 Turkey also suggested that Iran pushed hard to reinstall al-Maliki to power in 2010 and to keep him there.83 Because of these actions and the new political dynamics emerging as a result of Sunni versus Shiite polarization, Turkey has awakened to the reality that the priority of maintaining Iraqi territorial integrity may no longer be a sustainable policy. Officials in Ankara have indicated that Turkey will be left with no choice but to support partition on its own terms. 84 By default, this means recognition of an independent Kurdistan. Turkey’s role in helping to establish some kind of alliance between the Kurds and Turkmen in the province of Kirkuk was a sea change in Turkish Kurdish policy. The naming of Hassan Toran, a member of the pro-Turkey Turkmen Justice Party, as chair of the Kirkuk Provincial Council just hours before Turkish prime minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan’s landmark visit to the KRG capital of Erbil in March 2011 sent a significant message. 85 The fact that Sunni-majority provinces of Iraq have already shown an interest in forming federal regions, or even separation, reinforces the partition scenario possibility as well. What further distanced Turkey from Iraq’s central government was al-Maliki’s autocratic tendencies and Iraq’s unreserved support for Bashar al-Assad’s regime in Syria, a regime moving in the opposite direction of Turkey by forming an alliance with Iran and Iraq against Turkey’s aspirations in the Middle East. All of these served to catalyze unprecedented developments in the region. The unilateral signing of the KRG and Turkey over plans to build crude oil and natural gas pipelines by 2014, to carry fuel directly from the Kurdistan region to the neighboring country, signals a gigantic shift in geo-economics and associated geopolitics of the Middle East.86 If the Kurdistan region obtains the backing of Turkey, as it seems it would, it will be extremely difficult for the Iraqi government to prevent the Kurds from breaking away. Since 2004, Arab Iraqis have had to apply for special permission from KRG authorities to enter the Kurdistan region from other parts of Iraq. Kurdistan has developed not only trade but diplomatic connections with many countries in the region and around the world. It has signed oil deals and independently held meetings with foreign heads of state.87 The Kurdistan region has all the trappings of a state, with all its practical and symbolical characteristics, including its own constitution, parliament, government, president, opposition, army, security and intelligence forces, flag, and anthem.88 Its sole remaining link with Baghdad is the annual budget it receives from oil revenue. If things go as planned, by 2014, the Kurdistan region could survive on its own budget. Independence is not only the aspiration of the Kurdish political elite but is the dream of every Kurd.89 According to the Iraqi constitution, the unity of Iraq is warranted by the implementation of the constitution. For the Kurds this basically means the implementation of Article 140, which has been already effectively

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bypassed.90 Therefore a Kurdish breakaway is not out of the question. In fact, it seems to be more the question of when than anything else.

Sunnis and a New Iraqi Political Paradigm Some Shiites claim that they have been victimized since “Abu Bakr’s reign [r. 632–634] until Ahmed Hassan al-Bakr’s Party [the Baath] reign,”91 while the Sunnis have felt marginalized and disenfranchised since 2003. One can pinpoint the political behaviors and attitudes that have shaped Sunni politics since the US invasion. The predominant ones include the immediate resistance of the Sunnis to the US invasion, the Sunni boycott of the first parliamentary elections in 2005, the Sunni resurgence against the newly formed Shiite-Kurd dominant government, and the policies of de-Baathification and the disbanding of the Iraqi army. The US invasion hit the Sunni power machine like a tsunami because it nearly demolished the entire Sunni power base. The de-Baathification process perhaps had the most devastating impact because, as explained, it was tantamount to the de-Sunnification of the state’s bureaucratic and security apparatus. After more than two years of insistence by Sunni lawmakers to reinstate the Baathists, parliament finally passed the Justice and Accountability Law in 2008 that replaced the de-Baathification law and allowed many Baathists to resume their government positions. The government’s crackdown on the Shiite Mahdi Army (a group affiliated with the faction of Muqtada al-Sadr) in 2008 convinced some Sunni political factions to join the Shiite-led government. As a result, after a boycott of almost a year, the largest Sunni bloc in the government, the Iraqi Accord Front, returned to the cabinet in June. However, the country was brought to the verge of a political crisis in January 2010 when, on recommendation of the Accountability and Justice Commission, the electoral commission barred more than 400 candidates for alleged Baathist loyalties. The move was seen by Sunnis and Shiites as a heavy-handed attempt by al-Maliki to block rivals. It was overturned by an appeals court, which said the question of disqualifications should be taken up after the election—potentially setting up an even more bitter conflict over removing elected legislators. Consequently, many of them joined political blocs. Even so, just before the elections, more than fifty additional replacement candidates were disqualified. With little time left, the electoral commission at last decided to allow them to run and to deal with the issue later.92 After the March election, the commission threatened to bar “as many as nine candidates, six of them from the Iraqiya coalition, and disqualify dozens of candidates, potentially [resulting in] retabulating the [vote].”93 In May 2010, the Iraqi political factions agreed to end a four-month campaign to bar candidates accused of

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having previous ties to the Baath Party. Iraq’s communities were polarized once again as Sunnis perceived the temporary barring of the candidates to have been designed to quiet Sunni voices and an attempt by Shiites and others to rob the Sunni-associated Allawi coalition of its narrow lead. However, the Shiites blamed Iraq’s electoral commission for caving in to pressure from the UN and the United States to allow the candidates to run in the first place.94 Later developments demonstrated that if big fish can escape the deBaathification process, as happened in the case of the candidates, small fish could not. In 2011, the Ministry of Higher Education in Baghdad sacked 300 Sunni university lecturers and more than 1,200 Sunni teachers for their previous membership in the Baath party. De-Baathification was revived as soon as Ali al-Adeeb, second man in the Da‘wa party, took charge of the Ministry of Higher Education in late 2010.95 Sectarian motives have been cited as the reason for the firing. A university lecturer, Ali Abu-Zeid, himself a Shiite, claimed “even enrollment for postgraduate studies is subtly decided on a sectarian basis.”96 Similar to the introduction of Mu‘awiya, the founder of the Umayyad dynasty, into the curriculum by al-Husri and his associates in 1920s, al-Adeeb is attempting to introduce sirat ahl al-Bayt, the literary history of the twelve Shiite Imams (the narration of Prophet Muhammad’s family history) into the curriculum. An official letter dated April 23, 2012, from the Ministry of Higher Education to universities around Iraq ordered the faculties of humanities to incorporate teaching the history of the twelve Shiite Imams.97 The dismissal of this important part of Islamic history by previous Sunni-ruled governments up until 2003 could be interpreted as having sectarian intentions. By the same token, in the absence of an independent body to draft and develop university curricula, such a move by the Shiite-led government was seen to have a sectarian twist also. Alaa Makki, a Sunni member of parliament and head of a parliamentary committee on education, said, “[I]f this is implemented, it will have a negative reaction from the Sunnis.” A Kurdish parliamentarian suggested that these inclusions in the curriculum will deepen the Shiite-Sunni divide.98 The ramification of this move is yet to be seen. After the US invasion the Sunnis initially boycotted the government and elections just like the Shiites did when the British invaded Iraq, resulting in Shiites’ marginalization. Just as the Sunnis had taken action that led to the marginalization of the Shiites, now the Shiite-led government was systematically excluding the Sunnis from political power in Iraq. The Sunnis claimed that they “only form a majority in the prisons.”99 However, during the years of Sunni domination, the Shiites constituted the majority in the prisons (see Chapter 6). While official data on incarceration rates by sect/ethnicity is lacking, many say that over 80 percent of the detainees in Baghdad’s prisons are now Sunni.100

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In the days before the March 7 election results were announced, it was widely assumed that Iraqiya, which won the most seats, would be given the first attempt at forming the new government. Iraqiya gained the support of the Sunnis, thereby winning not only the most seats in parliament but also the most popular votes: 2,851,823. This was slightly more than al-Maliki’s SoL, which took 2,797,624 votes.101 Despite that, Allawi was outmaneuvered by al-Maliki, who formed a coalition bloc, and the Sunnis were left in despair. Al-Maliki was given a chance to form the government in the way that he generally wanted. However, eyebrows were raised when he prolonged the appointments of the heads of the ministries of defense (the Sunnis’ right to lead based on the political agreement reached in Erbil), and interior. Al-Maliki’s lack of action was related more to his desire to shape Iraq in his own image than it was to his dissatisfaction with the nominees put forth by the Iraqiya bloc for the ministry of defense position. Taking the authority of these ministries for himself further angered the Sunnis. AlMaliki’s intention was to continue carrying on the de-Baathification process of the state institutions responsible for security, to personalize the state bureaucracy in general and tighten his grip on the state, and to reinforce the process of tashi‘ (Shiification), a by-product of the de-Baathification process that started with the collapse of Saddam’s regime and the rise of Shiites to power. Al-Maliki’s actions led to changes in the character of the Iraqi army, whether intended or not. As a result of de-Baathification and distrust, it has led to more Sunni officers being retired or ousted from the army. According to sources from the Ministry of Interior, in July 2010, while al-Maliki was a caretaker/interim prime minister, he discharged fortyfive high-ranking officers and replaced thousands of Sunni officers as well as independent Shiites with his own loyalists.102 This issue led Jawad alBolani, the interior minister from 2006 from 2010, to try to take the case to the high court—in the process, sealing al-Bolani’s fate since his service was not renewed in December 2010. At the same time, more and more Shiite officers replaced the discharged or retired Sunni officers. These actions could only be achieved by having al-Maliki as head of the Ministry of Defense and as commander of the armed forces. Consequently, since 2006 the number of Sunnis serving in the army and the public sector has been decreasing. An Iraqi Sunni working in the security sector claimed that “since I started working four years ago, the number of Sunnis in my section has only decreased. Of the 153 in my department, fifteen were Sunnis; today we are only four.”103 However, a senior official from al-Maliki’s ruling party disputed these claims, suggesting that “if there are so few Sunnis in the administration, that’s because of a fatwa (decree), which the Sunni imams handed down just after the invasion on all those who cooperate with the government.”104 Perhaps there is some truth in both claims and counterclaims. However, this story brings up the memory of

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Mahdi al-Khalisi, a leading Shiite mujtahid who issued a decree just after the occupation of Iraq by the British. He called on the Shiites to boycott the government and the elections (see Chapter 3). As anecdotes, these incidents, reactions, and attitudes demonstrate how Iraq’s history tends to repeat itself as the players change roles. First the Shiites were in opposition to the occupation in the early part of the last century; they boycotted the government and the elections, marginalizing themselves in the process. Early this century the Sunnis resisted the US occupation and called for boycotting the elections, resulting in their own marginalization. The Iraqi constitution, which defines Iraq as a federal state, also stipulates that “one or more provinces shall have the right to organize into a [federal] region based on [its] request to be voted on in a referendum.” However with the exception of the Kurdish political groups and to an extent the Shiite ISCI, major Iraqi Arab political parties explicitly or implicitly opposed creating federal regions in the southern and central parts of Iraq. These would include the Da‘wa party, Muqtada al-Sadr’s group (the two largest Shiite organizations), the Iraqi Accord Front, and the Reconciliation and Liberation Bloc (the two largest Sunni bodies). Also, the Iraqi National Accord (the largest secular group) and the grand Shiite marja‘ al-Sistani also opposed such a move.105 Federalism, generally speaking, was seen as an imposition from external powers. The Sunnis began discussing the issue of federalism in late 2010. The move toward federalism may be considered a first step on the road to establishing other regions in the southern and central parts of Iraq. Since early 2011, profederal movements have begun to appear in al-Anbar, Ninawa, Salah al-Din, and Diyala provinces: indeed, in 2011 a formal proposal was made by the Salah al-Din provincial council to be recognized as a federal region. 106 In December 2011, the Sunni provincial council members of Diyala voted to establish a single federal region. Supported by the Kurdish members, eighteen council members voted in favor and five against.107 The Sunni move toward federalism more likely stems from the marginalization experienced under the Shiite-led government than to an ideological shift in their position. In this context, federalism is seen as the “least bad of the options” by the Sunnis.108 Hamid al-Mutlaq, a Sunni lawmaker, said many of his constituents have been unenthusiastic about creating a federal Sunni region, but the injustices they are experiencing and the double standards that are applied make them call for the creation of these regions.109 The notion of federalism polarized the Iraqi communities along ethnic and sectarian lines. The Kurds have been champion supporters of federalism in Iraq since 1992, while the Shiites’ call for federalism goes back to 2000 when the famous Shiite Declaration for the first time made clear such a desire.110 After the collapse of Saddam’s regime, the Shiites, generally speaking, were not very keen on federalism, but their strong relationship with the

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Kurds early on made them incorporate it into the Iraqi constitution. AlMaliki, a stern opponent of federalism, was a member of the committee that drafted the constitution.111 The dispute over federalism has been an ongoing debate between the supporters and opponents of the idea. When Diyala’s provincial council called for the creation of a self-ruled region, protesters widely suspected to be Shiite militiamen loyal to al-Maliki attacked the offices of the provincial government as well as the home of Sunni governor Abdul-Naser al-Mahdawi as police and army troops stood by and watched. Several council members fled the provincial capital, Ba‘quba, and found sanctuary in the predominantly Kurdish town of Khanaqin. 112 Diyala’s attempt to become a federal region was blocked by al-Maliki because “forming federal regions would break up Iraq,” he argued. 113 Despite suggestions that federations based on ethno-national-territorial differences are doomed, the cases of Canada and Switzerland would seem to indicate otherwise. They are among the world’s oldest stable democratic states, established in 1867 and 1848, respectively. Many other multinational federations or confederations have failed, but most were undemocratic to begin with (e.g., Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union).114 Blaming federalism for the failure of Iraq is an interesting question considering that Iraq, even without fully embracing federalism, ranked 9 out of 177 on the Fund for Peace Failed State Index in 2011,115 a decrease from the previous year. Iraq scored better than only eight countries, including Somalia, Afghanistan, and Sudan. If Iraq is going to collapse, it is doubtful that federalism will be the reason. Rather, the actions of its political elite in addition to its inherent societal problems related to nation-formation and nation-building will be the cause. The polarizing reaction to events and ideas is known by all societies. For example, the introduction of health care reforms polarized US citizens, mostly along ideological lines. While conservatives mostly rejected it, liberals supported the idea. In the context of Iraq, most people react to new and old events and concepts in line with their ethnic and sectarian identities. The pattern of Iraqi communities’ reaction to postinvasion events (such as the hanging of Saddam in 2006) further highlighted the similarities in the way the Iraqis reacted to previous incidents, such as the removal of Qasim from power in 1963. When Saddam was executed in December 2006, spontaneous expressions of exhilaration broke out across the Shiite and Kurdish areas as people flooded the streets, celebrating by whooping and dancing. However, a darker mood settled over the Sunni areas. In al-Adhamiya and Samarra, hundreds of demonstrators marched through the streets carrying photographs of Saddam and denounced the executioners.116 The response of Iraqi communities toward foreign invasions also differed. When the British forces invaded Iraq in 1914, the Kurds and the Shiites resisted the occupation, while the Sunnis either supported the takeover or took a neutral position. Conversely, the US invasion in 2003 was welcomed by the Kurds and

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endorsed by the Shiites. Kurdish cities were decorated with welcoming signs to the Americans who were perceived as liberators.117 However, in Mosul, a Sunni-populated city, graffiti artists painted signs such as “We will remain a thorn in the chest of the Americans” on city walls.118 The Sunnis strongly opposed the invasion and were subsequently marginalized by the Shiites, the Kurds, and the occupiers. This pattern of events was similar to the Shiite boycott of the government in the 1920s, when they ostracized themselves and ended up on the fringe of the country’s affairs. However, in the current context of the upheaval of the US invasion, the Shiites and the Kurds seem to have learned from history by avoiding some of the mistakes made in the last century when their own resistance and boycott enabled the Sunni minority to wield power over them, which lasted nearly a century. In May 2012, when al-Maliki visited the disputed area of Kirkuk, the Sunni Arabs who were well known for their anti al-Maliki dispositions suddenly shifted their stances and quickly praised him.119 Al-Maliki’s visit— which was perceived as politically motivated to express support for the Kirkuk Arabs—not only angered the Kurds, but the Kurdish members of his cabinet boycotted the cabinet meeting held in Kirkuk.120 An Iraqi journalist and writer, Hussein al-Qutbi, neatly summed up the case of the polarization of Iraqi ethno-sectarian groups when he stated the following: You can recognize the sectarian identity of an Iraqi simply from his position on the issue of Mr. al-Hashimi. There are those (Shiites) that demand immediate punishment under the pretext that Mr. al-Hashimi committed terrorist offenses. Then there are those that defend him, the Sunnis, on the pretext of lack of evidence. Al-Hashimi’s flight to Kurdistan was the last straw. The privileged position of the Kurds stems from their specificity. They call for the public and authorities to be “temperate” on pretext of not rushing to conclusions. Iraqi intellectuals in these circumstances face sectarianism like an ostrich and make policies accordingly. They hide their faces behind slogans, fearing of being accused of sectarianism. This is at a time when ostrich-style policies have failed to curb the worsening rift between Iraq’s sectarian communities.121

The governments’ foreign policies also polarize Iraqis. Al-Maliki’s Shiite-led government threw its support behind al-Assad’s Syrian regime, arguing that “the fall of the Syrian regime would imperil an already unstable Iraq.” Ali Hatem Suleiman, the leader of al-Anbar’s biggest tribe, alDulaim, asserts that al-Maliki’s stance is “a result of the will of another neighbor, Iran to the east, and of the hardline sectarian takeover of Iraq.” In opposition to al-Maliki’s stance, he is hoping for al-Assad to leave because “this will secure our back, especially in al-Anbar.” The Sunni tribal leader added that “[with Iran] there is no endeavor we could get into where they would be looking at us as a neighbor. It is a religious prism. It is Arab versus Persian.”122

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Tackling the problem of ethno-sectarian polarization in Iraq is difficult because Iraq’s media outlets, which are partly to blame for this polarization, are deeply partisan. A study of Iraqi media in 2010 suggested that there is a strong possibility of widening “the gap between communities and [thereby] weaken the national identity.”123 The main source of news and information in Iraq is television. In 2010, about 16 million Iraqis were exposed to TV media, daily.124 The study indicated that the media choice of the viewers was often an indicator of his/her sectarian identity.125 Another study came to same conclusion when it argued that Iraq’s media is controlled by powerful sectarian empires that “coalesce around ethno political groups. . . . [They] have print, radio and TV communications at their disposal.”126 The Iraqi state, especially during the Baathist era, controlled and manipulated every single media outlet in Iraq for decades. If the state, with all these mechanisms at its disposal, failed to construct an overarching national identity, one wonders how the current Iraqi regime—or any other governmental regime in the foreseeable future—can possibly achieve it. It is not so much that Iraqi minds are polarized due to the invasion, but Iraqi communities are to a large extent segregated on the ground. According to residents, local officials, and US and Iraqi military commanders, in 2006, at least ten mixed Baghdadi neighborhoods became almost entirely Shiite. As mentioned earlier, the first two years after the collapse of Saddam’s regime was a time of civil unrest and insurgency. The Sunnis forced Shiites out of Baghdad neighborhoods and systematically killed professionals, as well as bakers, barbers, and trash collectors. In reprisal, the Shiite militias started pushing Sunnis out of Baghdad neighborhoods in 2006, forcing them to flee to an increasingly embattled territory in the western part of the city. It was a fight for control of Baghdad that Shiites won. The fault line now in western Baghdad is near al-Mansur, “at the west of the west,” as one Sunni said.127 However, since 2009, as sectarian violence subsided, hundreds of thousands of Iraqis poured back to the areas they fled. Just as leaving their homes was difficult, going home is not as simple as it seems. According to reports, returnees “find themselves perched along the next front in Iraq’s seemingly unending turmoil, the battle of return.” It has been reported that “instead of kindling a much-needed reconciliation [process], they are in some cases reviving the resentments and suspicions created by the bloody purges that carved Iraq into archipelagos of Sunnis, Shiites and Kurds.”128 On the positive side, it is a return “layered with friendship and forgiveness,” but the downside is that it is “stained with blood and psychic wounds.”129 In addition to fear of retaliation from both sides, the Sunnis are angered at what they see as the conversion of Iraq in the Shiite image: flying black, green, and red flags of Shiite mourning and martyrdom, and decorating street walls with posters and paintings of Shiite

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imams, living and dead.130 The flags are even visible on the antennas of police and army vehicles.131 The proliferation of flags seems more like a show of force than of piety or honor.132 In the 1970s, when Baghdad was recreated in the image of Sunni-Arab semisecular Baathists, the city was decorated with the statues of Abu Ja‘far al-Mansur, a Sunni Abbasid caliph, and Saddam. The streets, hotels, and mosques were named after Umayyad and Abbasid caliphates. However, since the Shiites came to the helm, the billboards on the streets carry posters of the Shiite imams. If the Shiites annually commemorate the killing of Imam Hussein and his companion, an event that happened nearly 1,400 years ago, one wonders how long it will take for recent wounds to be healed and killings to be forgotten. It is true that the sectarian dispute has to an extent abated, but it seems that the outright violence has moved from a hard fight to a conflict more subdued, fought in state institutions, government ministries, and on the street. Political analyst Hadi Jalo accurately put it this way: “[W]hat was once an armed conflict has turned into territorial, institutionalized and psychological segregation.”133 As security conditions improved in late 2008, Prime Minister al-Maliki raised the prospect of setting a timetable for the withdrawal of US troops. The Iraqi government started negotiating with the United States in relation to security arrangements. In November 2008, both sides agreed that all US troops would leave Iraq by the end of 2011. Soon thereafter the agreement was ratified by the Iraqi Parliament. Despite the political uncertainties, US military forces ended their presence in Iraq as scheduled, in late December 2011. The Americans were gone, the Middle East was polarized along sectarian lines as a result of the removal of a century-old Sunni rule, and “Arab springs”’ began to pop up all over the place. In Bahrain, the Shiite uprising was crushed by Sunni rulers with the help of Saudi Arabia and Qatar. In Syria, a Sunni-Islamist armed opposition emerged out of peaceful protests against the Alawites/Shiite regime that was fighting for its survival. As a result of these developments, a new political dynamic emerged that polarized Middle Eastern countries along sectarian lines. The Sunni versus Shiite battle revived the old Safavid-Ottoman antipathy, rivalries, and conflict. Iraq aligned itself with Iran and Syria against all other Sunni-ruled countries in the region, led by Turkey and Saudi Arabia. It’s a development that could lead to a totally different geopolitical reality with a new map of the region or some countries. If the civil war in Syria continues to escalate, it could possibly reignite sectarian strife in Iraq or even turn Iraq into a real—or proxy—battlefield between Shiite (Iranian-led) and Sunni (Turkish-led) factions. Soon after US forces left Iraq, the government began to crack down on the Sunnis with a force harsher than ever before, with drastic consequences.

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In late 2011, al-Maliki tried to remove his Sunni deputy prime minister Saleh al-Mutlaq by calling on lawmakers to dismiss him. Concurrently, an Iraqi court made charges against Vice President Tariq al-Hashimi.134 AlHashimi’s defense to the charges he and several bodyguards murdered six judges and committed a series of other killings was that the charges were politically motivated.135 Soon after the charges were made al-Hashimi left Baghdad and headed to Kurdistan, further straining the fragile relations of the Kurds to the central government. Al-Hashimi eventually ended up in Turkey and has yet to return to face the charges. Al-Hashimi’s reaching out to Kurdistan for sanctuary led to a rapprochement between the Kurds and Sunnis. The tense relations between the Kurds and Sunnis for the last few years and the sudden rapprochement brought back memories of a time when the Kurds and Shiites were aligned against a common enemy, a time that became noted in the history of Iraq as a period of cooperation as Kurds and Shiites stood against successive Sunni rulers. How long the Kurds’ and Sunnis’ relationship will last is a question yet unanswered. But it doesn’t seem like it will be long, as the Kurds and Sunnis have few common interests. In fact, their aspirations and visions clash on almost every significant point related to Iraqi politics. The disputed areas and Iraq’s identity are two of the more important. These developments along with the al-Sadrists’ dissatisfaction with alMaliki have led to the formation of a loose alliance between the Iraqiya bloc (excluding Jamal al-Karboli’s group), the Kurdistan Alliance (excluding Talabani’s group), and the al-Sadrists. This conglomerate held its first meeting in late April 2012 when it issued a fifteen-day ultimatum to al-Maliki to adhere to what is called the Erbil agreement that led to the formation of the Iraqi government in late 2010. When the time period granted by the ultimatum expired, another meeting was held in Najaf, with a second ultimatum.136 More than 160 lawmakers had originally supported the motion to unseat Maliki and, by extension, his government.137 Initially the no-confidence bloc was able to gather the just over 163 parliamentary votes required to sack the prime minister. However, because the Kurdistan Alliance, the INA, and the Iraqiya bloc were incoherent even as single blocs, the coalition they devised died before it was born. The pressure from Iran could easily be felt as it made gestures to Talabani and al-Sadr. The most decisive role was played by Grand Ayatollah Kazim al-Haeri, sitting in Iran, who interrupted the process by issuing a decree that urged al-Sadr to avoid dividing the Iraqi Shiites of the INA over political disputes.138 This demonstrates the leverage that Iran has on Iraqi politics and the fragile incoherency of Iraq’s political blocs and coalitions. Political developments in Iraq following the US invasion and departure highlight several salient points. Most notably, Iraq’s history repeats itself,

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with the sectarian/ethnic groups merely changing positions. The old patterns of ethno-national and sectarian loyalty, though fragile, remain the same, and the communities are as polarized as ever. The sources of disunity and polarization come not only from the historical discriminatory actions of the Sunni-led regimes since the creation of Iraq, or the Shiite-led autocratic tendencies once they gained power, or the Kurdish aspirations for self-rule or independence. These policies, attitudes, and ambitions can only partly explain what or why Iraq has been suffering for the last ninety years of its existence. For nation-formation and nation-building to happen, other elements such as a common memory, shared ancestry, culture and destiny, and attachment to a single homeland are essential. Iraq simply lacks these elements.

Notes 1. Congressional Research Service, Iraq: UN Inspections, pp. 5–7. 2. See Federal Bureau of Investigation, “Saddam Hussein Talks to the FBI.” 3. See White House, “President Discusses Beginning of Operation Iraqi Freedom.” 4. For the full text, see the Iraq Liberation Act of 1988. 5. See Coalition Provisional Authority, “Coalition Provisional Authority Order Number 2.” 6. Davis, “History Matters,” p. 238. 7. Moaddel et al., “Foreign Occupation and National Pride,” p. 691. 8. Ayad Allawi (1934–) was born into a middle-class Shiite family in Baghdad. He joined the Baath party in 1961 and became active in the Iraqi National Students’ Union while studying at the College of Medicine in Baghdad. In 1972, he was exiled and barely escaped an assassination attempt. Allawi was a founding member of the Iraqi National Accord. 9. See Al-Waqai‘ al-Iraqiya, December 28, 2005. 10. Jalal Talabani (1933–) is a Kurd who joined the KDP at the age of thirteen and split from the party in 1964 at age thirty-one. In 1975, he founded the PUK and has been its leader since. 11. Nouri al-Maliki (1950–) was born in Hindiya near Hilla. He joined the Da‘wa party in 1970 and escaped to Syria in 1979 where he continued to lead the underground opposition until the overthrow of Saddam’s regime. 12. Perito, “The Iraq Federal Police,” p. 5. 13. See Healy and Ghazi, “As Displaced Return to Iraq”; Tavernise, “Shiites Remake Baghdad.” 14. See Flintoff, “Shiite Militants Try to Drive Sunnis from Baghdad”; Tavernise, “Shiites Remake Baghdad.” 15. See Rosen, “The Flight from Iraq.” 16. See Tavernise, “Shiites Remake Baghdad; Cave, “For Iraqis.” 17. Iraq Study Group, Iraq Study Group Report, p. 4. 18. See Johnson, “Gunmen Target Baghdad Firm.” 19. See White House, “Fact Sheet: The New Way Forward in Iraq.”

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20. See Cockburn, “Sunni vs. Shia: The Real Bloody Battle for Baghdad”; Cockburn, “Who Is Whose Enemy?” 21. See Agnew et al., “Baghdad Nights.” 22. See Brulliard, “Gated Communities”; Wong and Cloud, “U.S. Erects Baghdad Wall”; Tavernise, “Shiites Remake Baghdad”; Cave, “For Iraqis.” 23. See Associated Press, “Signs of Hope in a Former Baghdad Killing Field.” 24. See BBC, June 15, 2009. 25. See Raghavan and Londoño, “In Iraq Regional Politics Heats Up.” 26. See Sherman, “Iraq’s Sunni Time Bomb”; Rasheed and Susman, “Iraq, U.S.-Funded Militia at Loggerheads.” 27. See Myers, “Unity Is Rallying Cry”; Rubin, “Secular Parties.” 28. See Appendix 6 in Kirmanj, “The Question of National Identity,” p. 273; Associated Press, “Iraqi Provincial Election Results.” 29. See Associated Press, “Iraqi Provincial Election Results.” 30. See Robertson, “Kurds Protest Iraqi Election Law.” 31. See Parker and Hameed, “Iraq Local Elections Measure Is Vetoed.” 32. See Dehghanpisheh, “Rebirth of a Nation.” 33. See Ahmed, “Al-Hashimi Interview with Elaph”; Sharbil, “Interview with al-Maliki.” 34. See Daily Star, “Supreme Court’s Opinion.” 35. See Reuters, “Infighting Delays Iraqi Government Formation.” 36. See Leland and Healy, “After Months.” 37. See Myers, “Coalition Picks Maliki.” 38. See McGeough, “The Struggle to Succeed.” 39. See Khalilzad, “Iraq Needs Help to Avoid a Sectarian Resurgence.” 40. See al-Atraqchi, “Iraq’s Political Turmoil.” 41. See Fadel, “Allawi Warns of Sectarian War”; Chulov, “Iraq Risks Sectarian War.” 42. See Rubin, “Iraq’s Politics Still Unsettled.” 43. See Shadid, “Maliki Says Iraq Needs Him as Leader.” 44. See Al-Salim, “Maliki’s Coalition.” 45. The Kurdish lists consisted of Kurdistani Alliance (forty-three seats), the Gorran (eight seats), Kurdistan Islamic Union (four seats), and the Kurdistan Islamic Group (two seats). 46. See Parker, “Iyad Allawi: If Maliki Tries to Form a Government in Iraq.” 47. See Independent High Electoral Commission, “Results of Iraqi Parliamentary Election, 2010.” 48. See Agence France-Presse “Iraqi Oath Changed.” 49. See Zebari, “Kurdish Leader Bans Iraqi Flag.” 50. See Chulov, “Deal on Kirkuk”; Williams and Izzi, “Iraq Passes Crucial Election Law.” 51. See McDermid, “In Northern Iraq, a Census Raises Tensions.” 52. See Agence France-Presse, “KRG Will Boycott Census that Does Not Include Ethnicity.” 53. Ibid. 54. See Kurdistan Region Presidency, “Kurdistan Region Rejects Any Further Delay on National Census.” 55. See Brussell’s Tribunal, “Partition by Census.” 56. See Constitution of the Republic of Iraq, Article 117. 57. See Cocks, “Iraq’s Kurds and Arabs Face Choice to Settle or Fight.” 58. See Rafaat, “Kirkuk: The Central Issue.”

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59. See Asharq al-Awsat, September 1, 2008. 60. See McDermid, “In Northern Iraq, a Census Raises Tensions.” 61. McDowall, The Modern History of the Kurds, pp. 155–158. 62. Eskander, “Britain’s Policy,” p. 149. 63. For the full text of Sharif Pasha’s memorandum submitted to the Paris Peace Conference see Sherko, Kurdish Question, pp. 138-150; O’Leary, How to Get Out of Iraq with Integrity, p. 15; see also Arıkanlı, “British Legacy and Evolution of Kurdish Nationalism in Iraq (1918–1926).” 64. See Prime Minister’s Office, “Kirkuk’s Identity Must Be Iraqi.” 65. See Kurdistan Region Presidency, “On the Visit of Prime Minister Maliki to Kirkuk.” 66. See Associated Press, “Now that US Forces Are Gone.” 67. Ibid. 68. Quoted in Paley, “Strip of Iraq on the Verge of Exploding.” 69. See UN Assistance Mission for Iraq (UNAMI), “Report on Disputed Internal Boundaries”; Prime Minister’s Office, “Muqabala Suhufiya.” 70. For examples, see Beeston and Haynes, “Interview with Nouri alMaliki”; Hussein, “Solving the Kirkuk Problem”; Sinjari, “Kirkuk as an Independent Region.” 71. See Levinson, “Kirkuk Reflects Challenges.” 72. The observations presented here are drawn from articles published in Hawlati from May 2011 until June 2012. 73. See Tofiq, “From the South Sudan Statehood to the Kurdish State.” 74. See Hawlati, “Interview with Dr. Kanaan.” 75. See Sbeiy, “Congratulatory Message of Nawshirwan Mustafa.” 76. Jakes, “Iraqi Kurd leader Hints at Secession,” interview with Associated Press, April 25, 2012. 77. See Arraf, “Iraq’s Unity Tested.” 78. See Hassan, “PUK Official Reiterates Full Agreement with KDP.” 79. For examples, see Cole, “The Three-State Solution?”; and Marquardt, “Division of Iraq.” 80. See Kurdistan Regional Government, “President Barzani”; Phillips, “A New Era.” 81. See Phillips, “A New Era.” 82. See Bozkurt, “Turkey Prepares for Partition of Iraq.” 83. See Agence France-Presse, “Iraq PM’s Rivals Lack Votes to Oust Him,” June 10, 2012. 84. See Bozkurt, “Turkey Prepares for Partition of Iraq.” 85. Ibid. 86. See Cutler, “Iraqi Kurdistan Plans Oil Pipeline to Turkey”; Arraf, “Iraq’s Unity Tested.” 87. Weitz, “New Dawn 2012: Iraq Without the U.S. Military.” 88. See Bengio, “The Kurdish Quiet Spring.” 89. See Raghavan and Londoño, “In Iraq Regional Politics Heats Up”; McDermid, “Iraq’s Next Government.” 90. See Al-Arabiya, “Iraq’s President Pushes for Kirkuk Referendum.” 91. See Aswat al-Iraq, “Al-Samaraa’i Considers al-Araji’s Statement Breach of the Constitution.” 92. See Fadel, “In Iraq, Candidates Seek an Edge with Post-Election Maneuvers.” 93. See Shadid, “Iraqi Deal to End De-Baathification.”

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94. See Fadel, “In Iraq, Candidates Seek an Edge with Post-election Maneuvers.” 95. See Zurutuza, “Iraqi Sunnis Want Autonomy amid Discrimination.” 96. See Associated Press, “Now that US Forces Are Gone.” 97. See Hawlati, “The History of the Twelve Shi’ite Imams Is Introduced into the Curriculum.” 98. Ibid. 99. See Zurutuza, “Iraqi Sunnis Want Autonomy.” 100. Ibid. 101. See Khuzaie, “Iraqi Elections.” 102. See al-‘Ali, “Al-Bolani Charges al-Maliki over Firing Officers.” 103. See Zurutuza, “Iraqi Sunnis Want Autonomy.” 104. Ibid. 105. Senor, “Iraqi Leaders Opposed to Biden’s Partition Plan.” 106. See Visser, “Iraq’s Federalist Project Reflects a Resurgent Sectarian Conflict.” 107. See Associated Press, “Now that US Forces Are Gone.” 108. See Zurutuza, “Iraqi Sunnis Want Autonomy.” 109. Ibid. 110. See al-Rubaie et al., “Declaration of the Shia.” 111. See Niqash, “Members of the Constitution Drafting Committee.” 112. See Associated Press, “Now that US Forces Are Gone.” 113. Ibid. 114. See McGarry and O’Leary, “Federalism, Conflict-Regulation and National and Ethnic Power-Sharing.” 115. The 2011 edition of the index draws on 130,000 publicly available sources to analyze 177 countries and rate them on twelve indicators of pressure on the state for the year 2010. Factors analyzed include items from refugee flows to poverty and public services to security threats. Taken together, a country’s performance on this battery of indicators reveals how stable or unstable it is. See Foreign Policy, “The Failed State Index 2011.” 116. See Semple, “Saddam Hussein Is Sentenced to Death.” 117. See Soriano, “Poll: Iraqis Out of Patience.” 118. See Fadel, “Mosul Struggles with Ethnic Divides.” 119. See Alsabawi, “Al-Maliki’s Visit Welcomed by Arab Politicians in Kirkuk.” 120. Ibid. 121. Al-Qutbi, “Al-Hashim’s Issue Reveals the Communal Fissure in Iraq.” 122. See Chulov, “Iraq’s Sectarian Divide Threatens to Split Country.” 123. Amos, “Confusion, Contradiction and Irony,” p. 2. 124. Ibid., p. 3. 125. Ibid. 126. Al Marashi, “The Dynamics of Iraq’s Media,” p. 14. 127. See Tavernise, “Shiites Remake Baghdad.” 128. See Healy and Ghazi, “As the Displaced Return to Iraq.” 129. Ibid. 130. Ibid. 131. Zurutuza, “Iraqi Sunnis Want Autonomy”; Associated Press, “Now that US Forces Are Gone.” 132. See Chulov, “Iraq’s Sectarian Divide Threatens to Split Country.” 133. See Associated Press, “Now that US Forces Are Gone.”

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134. See Reuters, “Iraq Fugitive VP Charged with Murdering Six Judges.” 135. Ibid. 136. See Visser, “Maliki Consolidates Power.” 137. See Agence France-Presse, “Iraq PM’s Rivals Lack Votes to Oust Him,” June 10, 2012. 138. See Murphy, “Iran Rallies to Aid of Iraq’s Embattled Leader.

9 The Paradoxes of Nation Formation in Iraq

In light of the essential ingredients required for nation formation and nation-building presented in Chapter 1, two sets of problems appear to

be at the forefront of the process of national integration in Iraq. The first difficulty is systemically related to nation formation and has to do with the character of Iraqi society itself. The second issue is a sporadic one and is related to successive Iraqi regimes’ attempts at nation-building, in particular, policies of discrimination, exclusion, and the monopoly of power by one ethnic (Arab) and/or sectarian (Sunni) group. The latter complex has been discussed throughout this book in Chapters 2 through 8. The former set relates to notions such as common memory and ancestry; shared history, culture, and language; core national values and shared symbols; attachment to a single historic homeland; and belief in a unified national destiny. This chapter focuses on both sets of difficulties with an emphasis on the first set—namely the paradoxes facing Iraq’s nation formation.

Paradox of Common Memory Having a common memory is considered to be one of the essential elements for the formation of nation.1 An examination of Iraqi and KRG textbooks, as well as other books written by Sunni, Shiite, and Kurdish authors, demonstrates the contradictions in Iraq with the common memory requirement for nation-building.2 Iraqi textbooks during the monarchy (1921–1958), the Republican era (1958–2007), and the postinvasion period (2007–present) portray the first caliph, Abu Bakr (r. 632–634), as “righteous” and the second caliph, Umer bin al-Khatab (r. 634–644), as “brave,” “just,” and “the greatest reformer in Islamic history.” The textbooks also describe the third caliph, Othman ibn Affan (r. 644–656), as “softhearted,” “tolerant,” and a “stern believer.”3 The Umayyad and Abbasid dynasties are portrayed in the textbooks of 1921–

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2011 as Arab states and their reigns as periods when Arabs—not Muslims— reached the “ultimate level in civilization and governance.” The Abbasid era is described as “the first Arab renaissance” where Arabs became “the utmost nation in the world.”4 The textbooks published from the Republican era up until the present portray the Abbasid period as the “golden era,” especially the reign of Harun al-Rashid (r. 786–809). The Abbasid ruler, Abu Ja‘far alMansur, is honored as “the founder of Baghdad and the Abbasid dynasty.” Qualities such as “resolute,” “bright,” “honest,” and “believer” are ascribed to al-Mansur; and “brave,” “smart,” and “just” were attributed to al-Rashid and his sons al-Amin, al-Ma’mun, and al-Mutawakil.5 The changes made to history textbooks published during Saddam’s era are minimal and generally superficial. In history textbooks currently, the term Furs al-majus (Persian magis) has been replaced with “Persian Sassanids” or “Persian Safavids.”6 A few insertions here and there highlight the role or fate of the Shiite imams, such as the imprisonment of Imam Musa al-Kazim by al-Rashid,7 as is generally accepted by the Shiite community. Iraqi textbooks of 1921–2007 rarely mention the events that led to the killing of the most revered Shiite imam, Hussein bin Ali, at the hands of the Umayyads; and the transition of power from the fourth caliph, Imam Ali, to Mu‘awiya bin Abu Sufyan, the founder of the Umayyad dynasty, is described as if it had occurred smoothly. One of the textbooks states that “[after] the martyrdom of Imam Ali, [the Muslims] pledged allegiance to Mu‘awiya bin Abu Sufyan to be their caliph.” According to the textbook, Mu‘awiya was one of the “writers of the revelations.”8 Current history textbooks, however, avoid mentioning the events that led to the killing of bin Ali and scrapped the statement that after the death of Imam Ali the Muslims pledged allegiance to Mu‘awiya to be their caliph. Instead, it states that “after the istishad (killing) of Imam Ali, the people pledged their general and special allegiance to Imam Hassan ibn Ali [the second Shiite imam, 625–669] as the . . . fifth righteous caliph”9 (emphasis added). There is a consensus among the Sunnis that Muslims had only four “righteous caliphs.” Iraqi textbooks of 1921–2011 that were written from the Sunni and/or Shiite Iraqi perspectives exclude the Kurds altogether because the Islamic dynasties are referred to as Arab states—not Islamic ones. In fact, the terms “Kurd,” “Turkmen,” and “Chaldo-Assyrian” are nowhere mentioned in Iraqi history textbooks. Generally speaking, reading Iraqi history textbooks does not provide the reader with any indication as to the ethnic, religious, or sectarian character of Iraq. Nevertheless, the Arab Islamic character is claimed, not only as the present character of Iraq, but also as the pre- and post-Islamic character of Mesopotamia and Iraq. The only Kurdish figure who is referred to during the Baath era and mentioned in current Iraqi history textbooks is Salah al-Din al-Ayubi, the Kurdish Muslim founder of the Ayubid dynasty who became the first sultan of Egypt and Syria, and whose

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forces defeated the Crusaders at the Battle of Hattin in 1187. However, he is not identified as a Kurd but rather as a Muslim leader who led “the Arab Islamic resistance,” “returned al-Quds to Arab Muslims,” and “liberated the Arab land.”10 In the entire historical account presented in current Iraqi history textbooks, only two lines are dedicated to the Kurds. Those refer to the “[c]hemical bombardment of the city of Halabja in Iraqi Kurdistan when thousands of Iraqi people became victims.”11 It is appalling that these two lines, which are misplaced in an unrelated section of a textbook(s), have no connection whatsoever to the Kurdish situation in Iraq, Halabja, or even to Saddam. They are included in a section entitled “[T]he 1956 Uprising and the Revolution of 1958,” in which the two events are discussed along with political developments in Egypt. After the two lines referring to Halabja end, the paragraph continues its narrative relating to the 1956 uprising and the revolution of 1958. Textbooks published during Saddam’s era demonstrate little, if any, regard for Shiite sensitivities and grievances, as the writers laud the Umayyad and Abbasid dynasties and their rulers. Generally speaking, it may be said that from the Shiite perspective, the Umayyad and Abbasid eras are considered to be dark ages, and their corresponding rulers are perceived as deviants and usurpers. Shiite literature in general avoids direct vilification of the first three “rightly guided caliphs”: Abu Bakr, Umer bin alKhatab, and Othman bin Affan, the successors of the Prophet Muhammad. Nevertheless, it accuses Abu Bakr and Umer bin al-Khatab of attempting to “revive the spirit of jahiliya (ignorance)” by favoring someone from the Qurayish tribe as successor. Umer is often described as being insolent. The story of the succession of Mu‘awiya, which is covered in one line in Iraqi textbooks of 1921–2007 and refuted in current history textbooks, is viewed by the majority of Shiites as the greatest conspiracy in history, engineered by Mu‘awiya.12 The Umayyad reign is perceived as the most terrible period of Islamic history because Imam Hussein and his companions were killed at the hands of Yazid, Mu‘awiya’s son, in a battle that took place on the plains of Karbala in 680. In fact, the stand of Imam Hussein is a most important event in the minds of the Shiites. Thousands of books have been written that describe the events of this ten-day battle, an event that is commemorated each year during the Ashura ceremonies. To retain their shared memory, millions of Shiites walk hundreds of kilometers each year to visit the battle site and Imam Hussein’s shrine in Karbala. The portrayal of these historical events in Iraqi textbooks in the late 1920s led to an uproar in the Shiite cities. A book, titled al-Dawla alUmawiya fi al-Sham (The Umayyad state in Syria), 1 3 glorified the Umayyads, thereby reviving the historical dispute over the battle of Karbala.14 The book also questioned the authenticity of Ali bin Abi Talib, the first Shiite imam, to the caliphate. This is a controversial issue for others, but it is one of the pillars of Shiism. The book also described revered

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Shiite Imam Hussein’s resistance as jarthumat al-ta’amur (the germ of conspiracy) that had to be handled with an iron fist at the time. The author, Anis al-Nusuli, wrote that “unfortunately during the battle [of Karbala, during which Imam Hussein and most of his followers were killed, the Umayyads did not destroy the ill will rooted among the Shiites.” In addition, al-Nusuli described Hajjaj bin Yousif al-Thaqafi, the governor of Kufa, whom the Shiites consider to be a “blood shedder,” as a person who secured both the pillars of the Umayyad dynasty and Islam itself.15 Contrary to this position, the Shiites have traditionally perceived Imam Hussein’s resistance against the Umayyads as a revolution against tyranny and injustice.16 Since the book was written specifically for Iraqi students, not for academics or historians, it caused resentment among the Shiites. After the expression of outrage, it was removed from the school curriculum. However, during the Republican period, as a result of brutal suppression, a similar curriculum that glorified the Umayyads and Abbasids again found its way into Iraqi school textbooks. Due to the sensitivity of the issue, the current Shiite government has not yet revised the textbooks to correct such glorification. Instead of cleansing, they have only offered short-term inoculations to date. The same characters who are portrayed in Iraqi textbooks as heroes and founders of the Arab-Islamic civilization are seen as the killers of nearly all twelve Shiite imams. By and large, the Shiites believe that it was Mu‘awiya who arranged for the murder of Imam Hassan (the second Shiite imam) by poisoning him. Yazid bin Mu‘awiya is cited as the killer of Imam Hussein. Abdul Malik bin Marwan (the fifth Umayyad caliph) is accused of killing the Shiite remnants who survived the Battle of Karbala in Iraq because it was he who appointed Hajjaj bin Yousif al-Thaqafi as the governor of Kufa, and who is blamed for the deaths of thousands of Shiites. Hisham bin Abdul Malik (the tenth Umayyad caliph) is seen as the perpetrator of the death of Imam Ali Zaynul Abidin (the fourth Shiite imam).17 Umer bin Abdul Aziz is the only Umayyad caliph who is praised by Shiite sources for his work on behalf of the descendants of the Prophet Muhammad. He returned the garden of Fadak to Imam Muhammad al-Baqir (the fifth imam). This garden was, according to Shiite sources, usurped by Abu Bakr after the death of the Prophet.18 Several Abbasid caliphs are considered responsible by the Shiites for killing the remaining Shiite imams until the last one vanished. 1 9 Nonetheless, the Shiites initially were left in relative peace because they supported the Abbasids against the Umayyads. This good relationship did not last long, however, because Abu Ja‘far al-Mansur, the founder of Baghdad (from the Sunni perspective), or “the wickedly stubborn” (as Shiite sources described him), poisoned Imam Ja‘far al-Sadiq (the sixth Shiite imam, 702–765). Soon after, Harun al-Rashid, the hero of the golden age of Iraqi history (from the Sunni perspective) and the butcher (as the

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Shiites describe him), imprisoned and poisoned Imam Musa al-Kazim. From the Shiite perspective, al-Ma’mun (the seventh Abbasid caliph) was no less evil than his father, Harun al-Rashid, because it was he who poisoned Imam Ali al-Ridha (the eighth Shiite imam, 765–818). Al-Rashid’s other son, al-Mu‘tasim (the eighth Abbasid caliph), the founder of Samarra, arranged for the poisoning of Imam Muhammad al-Jawad (the ninth Shiite imam, 811–835). Another caliph, al-Mu‘tamid (the fifteenth Abbasid caliph), murdered Imam Ali al-Hadi (the tenth Shiite imam, 828–868) and Hassan al-Hadi (the eleventh Shiite imam, 846–874).20 The birth of the twelfth imam, Muhammad al-Mahdi, was kept a secret. According to Shiite belief, he was hidden by God to return at a future time. What is the relevance of these historical narratives to nation formation and nation-building in Iraq? The ramifications of these events still resonate today and continue to play an important role in the common, but separate, memories of the groups that make up today’s Iraq. For about a century, Iraqi schoolchildren—Kurds, Shiites, and Sunnis—have been taught about the heroic ventures and achievements of the Umayyad and Abbasid dynasties and their rulers. But the Shiites commemorate the killings of their imams and teach the same students their version of the brutalities and injustices of the same rulers. They portray them not as heroes but as tyrants. Shiite storytellers say “la‘natul Allahi ‘alayhi” (may God’s curse be upon him), or mal‘un (God damn him) every time they recall an Umayyad or Abbasid ruler, particularly the ones who had a direct role in the killing of their imams, such as Mu‘awiya, Yazid, al-Mansur, al-Rashid, and al-Ma’mun.21 The destruction of al-Mansur’s statue (erected by Saddam in 2005 in Baghdad) can only be understood in the context of these historical narrations. According to Iraqi sources, in 2009, nearly seven million Shiites visited the shrine of Imam Musa al-Kazim in Baghdad.22 These pilgrimages commemorate the tragic stories of how al-Rashid poisoned Imam al-Kazim. The past persecutions of the Shiite imams has been kept very much alive in the common memory of the Shiites by associating past sufferings to recent sufferings and injustices of the Shiite community and their leaders. For example, the treatment and deportation of Mahdi al-Khalisi, the grand Shiite marja‘, by the Iraqi government in early 1923 was presented as though Yazid bin Mu‘awiya (King George V of Britain), Ubaidullah bin Ziyad (King Faisal of Iraq), and Umer bin Sa‘d (Iraqi prime minister Abdul Muhsin al-Sa‘dun) plotted and killed Imam Hussein.23 Iraqi Shiites to this day tell tales of Hajjaj’s violent rule and compare it to Saddam’s ruthlessness. The memories of the Sunnis, Shiites, and Kurds differ, not only of the Umayyad and Abbasid eras, but also of later years when Iraq was under the mercy of the Sunni Ottomans or the Shiite Safavids. The Iranian Safavids adopted Shiism as the official state religion in 1501. Consequently, they sought to control Iraq because of the presence of the

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Shiite holy places at Najaf, Karbala, and Baghdad. 24 In 1508, Shah Isma‘il, the founder of the Safavid dynasty, invaded Baghdad. In addition to large-scale killings and slaughter, he destroyed the graves of major Sunni imams, including Imam Hanafi. 25 In retaliation, Sultan Salim (r. 1512–1520), an Ottoman ruler, launched a campaign and ordered death squads to eliminate all Shiites in every corner of his empire.26 The rivalry was over territory, power, and the ownership of religious shrines. The struggle centered on Iraq because the Ottomans were followers of the Sunni Hanafi school of Islam, and the tomb of Imam Hanafi was located in Baghdad. Meanwhile, the Safavids had their most sacred shrines controlled by the Sunni Ottomans in Baghdad, Samarra, Najaf, and Karbala. The fighting that ensued over these religious sites served to turn Iraq into a battlefield between the two empires for more than four hundred years. It often led to destruction, not to mention the constant fueling of the ongoing animosity between the Shiites and the Sunnis. The point is that while the occupation by the Shiite Safavids of Baghdad and other parts of Iraq invokes sad memories for the Iraqi Sunnis, the removal of the Safavids by the Sunni Ottomans and the consequences that followed contribute to the unpleasant collective memory of the Iraqi Shiites of that era. Happy stories praising the bravery of Ottoman soldiers as they fought against the Safavids have been recalled until recently among the Sunnis.27 Highlights of atrocities committed by the Ottomans and Safavids have also been recounted.28 There are reports that the “No Shiites after today” slogan, which was painted on Iraqi tanks when Iraqi troops crushed the 1991 uprising in the southern areas of Iraq, was exhibited in reverse almost four centuries ago (1623) when the Safavid troops marched on Baghdad shouting “No Sunnis after today!”29 The battle of Chaldiran in 1514 that took place during the OttomanSafavid conflict resulted in the establishment of a boundary between the two empires that split the area now known as Kurdistan into two. This major event continues to occupy a dominant place in the memory of the Kurds. However, the battle of Chaldiran, which marks the first division of Kurdistan, is hardly of any consequence in the common memories of the Sunni and Shiite Arabs. When writing about Kurdish history, most Kurdish intellectuals and historians set Chaldiran as the starting point of Kurdish contemporary history due to its strong resonance in the collective memory of the Kurds.30 One would think that Islam would be a unifying force for both the Shiites and the Sunnis. But the two groups interpret Islamic history in different and contradictory ways. This makes it difficult to develop the common elements necessary for nation formation: a sense of a unified past, common memory, and/or a shared culture. The Sunnis’ and the Shiites’ respective historical narratives differ considerably, and this prevents the use

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of history to aid the process of nation formation and nation-building. The same difficulty pertains to common ancestry and shared history between the Kurds and the Iraqi Arabs. Like shared memories, the myth of common ancestry (real or imagined) offers a sentiment that provides psychological focus for the unity of a nation. The Iraqi Sunnis and Shiites, generally speaking, claim the same ancestry from Semitic Arabs who migrated from the Arabian Peninsula to Iraq. However, the Kurds trace their ancestry from different stock altogether. The Kurds mostly believe (fact or fiction) that they are the descendants of the Medes of the Aryan race.31 Indeed, the pre-Islamic Median Empire (612–549 BC) shapes the formative memories for Kurdish nationalism, which is echoed in the Kurdish national anthem: We [Kurds] are the children of Medes and Kai Khosrow [Cyaxares],32 Both our faith and religion are our homeland.33

By the same token, the establishment of the Median Empire on the day it defeated the Assyrian Empire in 612 BC is marked in KRG textbooks and by Kurdish poets of today as the start of the Kurdish calendar.34 Sherko Bekas’s theatrical work Kaway Asingar (Kawa the blacksmith) has been performed repeatedly in many Kurdish cities in the last decades. Bekas links Kawa’s legendary story, which supposedly occurred in 600 BC against the tyrannical rule of a mythical Zohhak, to today’s Kurdish fight for freedom and independence in Iraq. The Kurdish national day, Newroz (March 21), is the commemoration of Kawa’s victory over Zohhak. Textbooks published by the KRG assign separate chapters to the Kurdistani and Mesopotamian civilizations in order to show the Kurds’ distinct historical roots—to present the Mitani and the Mede civilizations as Kurdistani, while the Sumerian, Assyrian, and Babylonian civilizations are treated as Iraqi.35 In contrast, Iraqi textbooks portray the Medes as the “destroyers” of the Mesopotamian civilization.36 In addition to the Medes’ achievements, the semi-independent principalities from the sixteenth to the middle of the nineteenth centuries provide another formative memory for the Kurds. Their period of self-rule sets a precedent for the Kurds to admire today. This is reflected in the narration of history by the Kurds in general and by nationalists in particular.37 The period of 1918–1925, when the Kurdish dream to establish a state of their own, per the Sèvres Treaty of 1920, was buried by the Lausanne Treaty of 1923, added another brick to the formative memory of the Kurdish people. The latter period includes Sheikh Mahmud’s revolts in 1919, 1922, and 1926, as well as the first and second Barzani revolts of 1931–1932 and 1943–1945. Evidence of these can be seen in the textbooks currently in use in the KRGcontrolled schools.38

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Nevertheless, the Iraqis in general share some memories, especially since the monarchy era, in relation to two settings: first, their participation in the proto-democratic life of the monarchy era (1941–1958). At this time the government and parliament were more broadly representative in comparison to previous years when it was dominated by the Sunnis. Many Iraqis feel that this era is a model to aspire to and should be reinstituted. Second, the educated middle class, the lower class, and Iraqi intellectuals all share memories generally experienced within the framework of resistance to the monarchy. The monarchy was perceived by most Iraqis, especially after 1954, as the agent of British colonial power. Therefore, the close cooperation of various Iraqi communities can only be understood in the context of fighting against the common enemy, the colonial power. This cooperation works since all communities viewed their salvation as the removal of the monarchy and, with it, British influence. This is evident in the way Iraqi communities highlight the 1948, 1952, and 1956 uprisings and the 1958 Revolution. The textbooks published by the Iraqi government and the KRG underscore the importance of these events as part of their respective shared memories and images of Iraq’s history.39 Yet, while Iraqi textbooks present these events as part of overall Arab history beyond Iraqi borders, the KRG textbooks present them as part of Kurdistan’s history beyond IraqiKurdistan borders. The difference in perception of national borders beyond that of the nation-state contributes to the current crisis of national identity. Iraqi history textbooks, reflecting a pan-Arab vision, pay significant attention to the April 1941 coup that was led by Arab nationalist officers. In fact, the last Baathist coup of 1968, the “July Revolution,” is presented in the textbooks as the legitimate heir of the “April 1941 Revolution.”40 The current history textbook, adjusted after 2010 by the Iraqi Shiite-dominated government, describes the April 1941 coup with the same pan-Arab view that dominated the previous versions except that it removed the part that stated that the Baathist 1968 Revolution was the heir of the April 1941 coup.41 Meanwhile, KRG textbooks emphasize several other events, such as the Black September day of 1930 when the Kurds protested against the British-Iraqi Treaty that ignored Kurdish rights. 42 Both the April 1941 Revolution and Black September are significant events in contemporary Iraqi history. Disregarding the April Revolution in KRG textbooks and ignoring Black September in Iraqi textbooks can only be understood in the light of the different interpretations, images, and symbols that each group contains in its common memory. There are several important days in the recent memory of the Iraqi Kurds—the collapse of the 1974–1975 Kurdish revolt, the 1988 genocidal Anfal operations, the chemical attacks, the 1991 uprising, and the subsequent mass Kurd exodus—that appear to have little effect on the common memory of the Iraqi Arabs, apart from the portion of the 1991 uprising in which the Shiite Arabs also participated. As the Shiites generally use the

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Islamic Hijri calendar to date history, their commemoration of the day does not coincide with that of the Kurds who use the Gregorian calendar. So while the Kurds celebrated the 1991 uprising in 2012 as March 5–21, the Shiites celebrated it in August of the same year. (Some secular Shiites also commemorate the days according to the Gregorian calendar.) Contrary to the positive image that the Shiites and the Kurds give to the 1991 uprising, many Sunnis view it as one of the darkest episodes of Iraqi history. Official Iraqi and Sunni-inclined sources to this day call those days Safhat al-Ghadr wa al-Khiyana (the chapter of treachery and treason), and the participants— heroes to the Kurds and the Shiites—are labeled al-ghawgha’iyun (demagogic mobs).43

Iraq: Historic Nation or Newly Created? Not only is Iraq’s history interpreted in contradictory ways, but its very name and territory are not agreed upon. Although Iraq as a state is modern, many Iraqi Arabs and scholars trace the name “Iraq” to the Sumerian city of Uruk. Al-Istrabadi argues that what medieval Islamic geographers referred to as Iraq is roughly the same territory that we refer to as Iraq today.44 This contradicts medieval Islamic scholar al-Mawardi, whose description of Iraq encompasses only portions of current middle and south Iraq (for more details see Chapter 1).45 Al-Muqaddasi, a medieval Islamic geographer, ascribes the following regions as Iraq: Kufa, Basra, Wasit, Baghdad, Halwan, and Samarra. Yet, another medieval scholar, Ibn Hawkal, considers Iraq “to extend in length from Abadan to Tikrit and in breadth from Baghdad to Kufa and Qadisiya to Halwan.”46 Al-Istrabadi’s claim also flies in the face of historical facts because the current territory of Iraq was referred to historically by three different and distinctive terms, each having different territorial configurations. First, Iraq al-Arabi (a Persian term meaning Arabic Iraq) referred to what is now a southeastern Shiite-populated area of Iraq. Iraq al-Arabi is close to the triangular region from al-Hadith to Hulwan to Basra, which is agreed upon by most medieval scholars. The second is al-Jazira, which attributes to Iraq much of the current Sunniinhabited provinces of Anbar and Ninawa (and beyond into Syria). Third, Kurdistan is used to describe the areas north of Iraq al-Arabi and east of alJazira (the northeastern parts of current Iraq).47 In 1925, a committee of experts presenting to the League of Nations on the Mosul Problem indicated that Iraq’s territory historically extended as far north as the Hamrin Mountains, the natural borders of Kurdistan.48 Therefore, the name Iraq may be old, but its current borders owe much to the British. The old descriptions of Iraq, be they Iraq al-Arabi or Iraq al-Ajami, do not encompass the modern-day territory of Iraq, as discussed in Chapter 1. Despite that, Iraqi Arabs stress their own meaning of its historical roots.49

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As for the term “Kurdistan,” from the ninth to the fourteenth centuries, many Muslim historians and geographers mentioned the word “Kurd.” However, until the eleventh century, Kurdistan was not an administrativepolitical term. In 1150, the Seljuk sultan, Sanjar, gave control of some Kurdish-inhabited areas to the Kurds and used the term “Kurd Ustani.”50 Gradually, the term “Kurd Ustani” turned into Kurdistan.51 Similar to the term “Iraq,” the old use of “Kurdistan” did not cover what is included in the modern-day conception of Kurdistan. Nevertheless, while supporting the deep-rootedness of the terms “Kurd” and “Kurdistan,” many Kurdish intellectuals stress the manufactured nature of the Iraqi state. In fact, its creation is seen by the Kurds as a great mistake.52 The Kurds and Iraqis also do not share the symbolic values that one would expect of a given nation. The social bond between members of a nation may be enhanced through repertoires of shared values, symbols, and traditions. Flags, anthems, costumes, monuments, and ceremonies can remind members of their shared heritage and cultural values, while reinforcing their sense of common identity.53 Despite living in the same country for more than ninety years, it is difficult to find a Kurdish household that raises the Iraqi flag, though the majority raise the Kurdish flag and use the Kurdistan map. In a survey conducted in May 2008 by the Kurdistan Institute for Political Issues, only 9.07 percent of the respondents in the Kurdistan region considered the current Iraqi flag as their flag. 5 4 Meanwhile, 84.13 percent regarded the Kurdish flag as their national flag.55 Indeed, until the removal of the three stars (Baath symbols) from the Iraqi flag, it was banned from state institutions in Kurdistan with overwhelming public support.56 Despite this modal change, the Iraqi flag is still not an allencompassing symbol for Iraqis. Many former Baathist organizations and Sunni groups still use the old version of the Iraqi flag.57 Last but not least, while Iraqis generally regard the palm tree, falcon, and sword as their national symbols, the Kurds consider the oak, partridge, and dagger as theirs. In addition, the Kurds have used “Ey Raqib” as a national anthem since 1946. But from 1979 to 2003, the Iraqis have had several national anthems, including the current “Mawtini” (my homeland) and “Ard alFuratayn” (the land of two rivers). The Iraqi national anthems emphasize Arab and Islamic glory, but the Kurdish one doesn’t draw on the religious motif at all. In the Islamic world, perhaps the only national anthem that states overtly that “our faith and religion are our homeland” is the Kurdish one. Some scholars believe that states are largely responsible for the invention of public ceremonies and the production of public monuments. 58 However, states cannot create national symbols and ceremonies from nothing. While the Baathist regime utilized all state apparatuses to maintain its power, it was not able to impose July 17 (the day the Baathists assumed power in 1968) as Iraq’s national day, nor was it able to abolish Ashura

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(commemoration of the killing of Imam Hussein by the Shiites) or Newroz (the Kurdish national day). To take hold, a public invention must be based on a significant myth or fact of a national or religious group related to common memory or ancestry. The problem inherent in the attempt to create an overarching national day(s) points to the root of the Iraqi identity crisis. In short, the Iraqi identity crisis should not be attributed to the failure of successive Iraqi governments to accomplish the feat of nation-building. It should, however, be linked to the lack of the essential elements required by the nation formation process, also.

Extension of Ethno-National and Sectarian Borders Beyond the Nation-State One of the systemic difficulties Iraq has faced in developing as a nation relates to the major Iraqi ethno-national and religious communities’ links beyond the designated territorial borders of the Iraqi state. Arabs (Sunnis and Shiites) live in four countries: Syria, Jordan, Saudi Arabia, and Kuwait. All these countries border Iraq and share more—culturally, linguistically, and politically—with the Sunnis and Shiites of Iraq than they do with their supposed co-nationals, the Kurds. At the same time, Iraqi Kurds have conationals (ethnically based) living outside the Iraqi borders in the three neighboring countries of Iran, Turkey, and Syria. Though the Shiites may share a common ethnicity with the Sunnis, they have the same religious denomination or orientation as the Iranians, as well as other Shiite-Arabs residing in the neighboring Gulf states. All these factors lead to a disjuncture between loyalty to the state, Iraq, on the one hand, and loyalty to conational/sectarian groups across the Iraqi border, on the other hand. The coexistence of at least two current nationalisms: pan-Arabism and pan-Kurdism, reflects this reality. Both nationalisms respectively call for Arab or Kurdish unification as an irredentist or unification movement.59 Despite the fact that the allure of pan-Arabism and pan-Kurdism is waning, the problems that spring from the multinational character of the Iraqi state remain pretty much intact. This is due to the fact that in bi- or multinational/ethnic states, the state tends to be identified with one predominant ethnic or national group. In the context of Iraq, the state is perceived to be Arabic, despite its multicultural and multiethnic diversity. The notion of Iraq being an Arab state was enshrined in successive Iraqi constitutions until 2005, when for the first time Iraq was not identified as being part of the Arab nation. Nonetheless, all three of Iraq’s recent prime ministers— Ayad Allawi, Ibrahim al-Ja‘fari, and Nouri al-Maliki—have stressed the uncompromised vision of the Arab identity of Iraq again and again.60 In the absence of harmony and a common destiny as a mechanism to unite Iraqis, it is natural for Iraqi communities to identify with their co-

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national or religious groups beyond Iraqi borders. This is especially evident when groups from Iraq in diaspora, such as the Iraqi Kurds for example, form associations with the Kurds from Iran or Turkey. It is also evident when the Iraqi Shiites are seen to identify with Saudi Arabian, Kuwaiti, and Bahraini Shiites rather than with their co-citizens from Rumadi and Mosul. The sectarian and ethno-national affiliations and ties, as well as the Arab and Kurdish nationalisms and religious affiliation, are strong compared to the weakness of Iraqi patriotism. The reason for this lies in another contradiction facing nation formation in Iraq—the paradox of “imagined communities.”

Paradox of the Imagined Community The term “imagined community” was coined by Benedict Anderson, who asserted that in the minds of each member of a community lives the image of their communion.61 The significance of imagination is that “nations are built in the imagination before they are built on the ground.”62 Relating the imagined community to Iraq, when it was created as a state, there were already two ethno-nationalisms, each with its own ideals and imagined community. A look at the emergence of Arab and Kurdish nationalisms and their corresponding imagined communities helps to better understand the weakness of Iraqi patriotism. The idea of nation had been understood and adopted by educated Arabs and Kurds prior to the disintegration of the Ottoman Empire in 1918. The strengthening of ethnic national identification may be traced to a series of reorganizations (Tanzimat) promulgated in the Ottoman Empire from 1839 to 1876. The reforms were partly intended to reorient the relation between the center and the peripheries of the empire, whereby ethnic-based principalities would lose their autonomy and Ottoman institutions would be modernized. As part of the reform process, many Ottoman officers were sent to Europe for training, and European trainers were brought in to train the Ottoman army. Upon their return from Europe, officers from diverse ethnic groups established the Young Ottoman movement in 1865, hoping to reinvigorate “the sick man of Europe,” the Ottoman Empire. In 1880, the movement was replaced by the Young Turks. However, in 1909, when the Young Turks assumed and consolidated power, they revealed their own nationalist ideology—that of Turanism or Turkism. 63 This movement further strengthened non-Turkish (Arabic, Kurdish, and Armenian) national sentiments and identification.64 As a result, the Arabs and Kurds established separate associations, clubs, and leagues, which became involved in publishing books and newspapers, thereby increasing communication among the intelligentsia of their respective ethnic communities. These activities served to heighten interest in Arabic and

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Kurdish history and the realization of their political and cultural aspirations. The Young Turks cracked down on many newly established non-Turkish associations, with the result that clubs and societies that previously operated openly went underground and turned clandestine. Within the Arab community, the most active of these associations were Jam‘iyat al-Arabiya al-Fatat (the Young Arab Society), founded in Paris in 1911, and Jam‘iyat al-‘Ahd (the Society of the Covenant), founded in Istanbul 1913. 65 They demanded autonomy or independence from the Ottomans—demands that resulted in the 1916 Arab Revolt during World War I. In such a semifeudal society, the Arab intellectuals and former Ottoman army officers were unable to lead the revolt, so they joined with tribo-religious chieftains under the leadership of Sharif Hussein of Mecca. By the end of the war, all Arab lands had been liberated from the Turks. As a result, Arab nationalists believed that they were on the verge of establishing the dream of a national state.66 However, these hopes soon vanished as the colonial powers divided the Arab lands among themselves. After World War I, a more sophisticated current of Arab nationalism was imagined by Sati‘ al-Husri and Michel Aflaq. Both pre- and postwar models of Arab nationalism made common language and history the primary bases of nation formation and nation-building.67 However, the distinguishing characteristic of both models was their imagined communities. While the imagined territory of prewar Arab nationalists was the Arab part of Asia (Arabian Peninsula, greater Syria, and Arab Iraq), postwar Arab nationalists’ imagined territory included all of what is now known as the Arab world, from the Persian Gulf to the Atlantic Ocean. Kurdish nationalism was emerging at the same time, years before the creation of Iraq as a state, and Kurdish nationalism also emphasized territorial and linguistic unity. It first took form in terms of language and literature in the sixteenth century when the Kurdish poets broke the Arab and Persian monopoly of literary production. The most important literary manifestation of Kurdish political awareness was Ahmadi Khani’s popular epic, Mem u Zin, written in 1694. Khani was explicitly modern in his conceptualization of the Kurds as a nation. He referred to the Kurds, Arabs, Persians, and Turks not in the then-prevailing meaning of religious community but in an ethno-national sense.68 He laid the foundations of Kurdish nationalism and urged the Kurds to liberate Kurdistan and establish a state of their own. But even before Khani, in 1596, Sharaf Khan al-Bitlisi defined the boundaries of a Kurdish imagined community when he demarcated the Kurdish homeland ethnographically.69 Remarkably, both al-Bitlisi and Khani lived before the rise of modern nationalism. Their idea of a state based on ethnic or national identification predated the French Revolution of 1789, which is often thought of as the authentic birth of the nation-state concept. The second godfather of Kurdish nationalism, poet Haji Qadiri Koyi (1817–1897), also urged the Kurds to unite and form an independent state. Both Khani

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and Koyi emphasized the importance of language, literature, and newspapers as a modern means for mass communication.70 In 1898, a year after Koyi’s death, the first Kurdish newspaper, Kurdistan, was published. The name shows the significance of what the Kurds perceived as their homeland. Similar to Sharif Hussein of Mecca, Sheikh Sa‘id, a Kurdish religious and nationalist leader, led a string of revolts from 1880 to 1925 in hope of achieving statehood.71 Several Kurdish organizations were established by Kurdish urban intellectuals and officers residing in Istanbul. The first organization, Komeley Taraqi u Ta‘ali Kurdistan (Society for the Rise and Progress of Kurdistan), was established in 1908. In 1912, a second organization, Komeley Hevi Kurd (Kurdish Hope Society), was founded, which comprised members from all over Kurdistan. The aims of these organizations ranged from Kurdish autonomy to full independence.72 By the end of World War I, the idea of forming separate Arabic and Kurdish states occupied the minds of a good number of Arab and Kurdish intellectuals. Kurdish and Arab imagined communities were well illustrated on the front covers of Iraqi and KRG textbooks, the former displaying the map of the Arab world, and the latter portraying a map of greater Kurdistan.73 The Arab world map has been removed from the front cover of current Iraqi history textbooks, but titles such as The Modern and Contemporary History of the Arab Homeland remain, and the content of the books, which focus on Arab rather than Iraqi history, is generally intact.74 These two evolving nationalisms served to weaken Iraqi patriotism and identification with Iraq. This is due to the fact that their imagined communities did not coincide with the communities living within current Iraqi borders. Of course, the Arab and Kurdish hoped-for states overlapped each other and would cut across Iraq’s territory and its imagined community once Iraq was formed. An interesting contradiction is that both the Kurdish and Arab nationalists aimed at assimilating Iraq, partially or fully, into another body, specifically the Arab homeland/nation in the case of Arab nationalism, and greater Kurdistan or Iraqi Kurdistan in the case of the Kurds. Two other external factors reinforced the ethnic-based aspirations of the Kurds and the Arabs. The first was US president Woodrow Wilson’s famous Fourteen Points speech put forward in 1918 at the close of World War I, and the second was the colonial powers’ (Britain and France) promises of statehood to ethno-national groups of the Ottoman Empire during the war. In the Anglo-French Declaration, signed by France and Great Britain on November 7, 1918, they agreed to complete the “final liberation of the peoples who have for so long been oppressed by the Turks, and the setting up of national governments and administrations that shall derive their authority from the free exercise of the initiative and choice of the indigenous populations.”75

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Arguably, Wilson’s points and the Allied promises envisioned ethnically and linguistically based states. Indeed, point fourteen of Wilson’s declaration was particularly tempting, as it emphasized that non-Turkish nationalities of the Ottoman Empire “should be assured . . . [of] an absolutely unmolested opportunity of autonomous development.”76 This point was interpreted and understood by Arab and Kurdish leaders to mean that every ethnic group (e.g., Kurds and Arabs or Iraqi Arabs) within the Ottoman Empire should enjoy the right to establish their own states. This was apparent from the way Sheikh Mahmud, the leader of the Kurdish revolts of 1919–1930, confronted British authorities during his trial in 1919. He presented Wilson’s Points and the French and British declaration of 1918 that recognized the right of people to self-determination, saying that one had full rights to fight for the freedom of one’s people based on these points and the British promises.77 Sheikh Mahmud had the text of Wilson’s twelfth point and the Anglo-French declaration strapped like a talisman to his arm.78 Iraqi Arab intellectuals, among them Sa‘ad Salih and Muhammad Ridha alShibibi, who later played a critical role in Iraqi politics, debated among themselves whether they should use Wilson’s points as a basis to demand independence for Iraq.79 British promises to the Arabs were documented in a letter dated July 1915 from Henry McMahon, a British official, to the Sharif of Mecca. McMahon promised to free the Arabs from the yoke of the Turks and to assist them in establishing their own state.80 In a memorandum submitted to the Conference of Allied Powers at the House of Commons, Prince Faisal, who later became the King of Iraq, reminded the Allied Powers of the promises they had made to his father. Faisal argued that his father “considered that in view of the pledges given to him, the essential unity and independence of the Arab-speaking provinces of the Turkish Empire were secure in the event of the success of the Allies”81 (emphasis added). The British had also made several promises to the Kurds. They recognized the Kurds as a distinct ethno-national group and separated them from the Arabs both ethnically and territorially.82 Indeed, soon after their occupation of Iraq, the British published a newspaper in Kurdish, Tegayishtini Rasti (Understanding the Truth), as part of its strategy to win their hearts and minds and to encourage them to rebel against the Ottomans. The logo of the newspaper overtly stated that its aim was “to serve the Kurds’ unity and freedom”83 (emphasis added). Later these promises were inscribed in the Treaty of Sèvres, which recommended the establishment of a Kurdish independent state. These provisions and promises had a significant impact on the mind-set of Arabs and Kurds and served to strengthen the respective senses of ethnonationalism in the region. After its formation, however, Iraq developed an Arab identity, and it came to embody more or less the Iraqi Arabs’ minimal

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aspirations. As a result, Iraqi Arabs were more willing to accept the identity of the newly created state. By the time the Kurdish populated areas were annexed to Iraq in 1926, the idea of an Arab state had already taken hold. This created the mind-set for subsequent generations that Iraq was part of the Arab world and was an Arab state rather than a binational one. Nonetheless, the Kurds challenged the Arab identity of Iraq because, first, they were convinced that each nation had its own genius and ought to have its own state. Second, statehood was seen by the Kurds as a prerequisite for the maintenance of their political and territorial identity. Third, as states are generally referred to by one national identity, for the Kurds to accept Iraqiness meant being subsumed into a larger, and in this case, foreign national group: the Arabs. It seems that not only the Kurds found it difficult to identify with Iraq, as there is evidence of the lack of emotional attachment by the Arabs to the Kurdish-populated areas of Iraq, Kurdistan. During a visit to several Arabized villages in the district of Dibs, in Kirkuk province, in 2005, 2007, and 2011—several years after most of the Arab settlers had left the area— local people verified to the author that although the villages had been occupied by Arab settlers between 1975 and 2003 (that is, for twenty-eight years), none of them buried their family members in the local cemeteries or anywhere else in the area. Instead, they always had their dead taken back to their places of origin in the southern and central parts of Iraq.84 When Arab settlers asked about this, they replied that “the land belongs to its people.”85 While this example might seem anecdotal, it nevertheless signifies the importance of people’s attachment to their homeland. It demonstrates that the Arab settlers did not regard the Kurdish areas as their homeland but considered only their ancestral territory as their motherland. This also shows that the current territory of Iraq consists of two homelands—Kurdistan and Iraq. The appearance of Arab and Kurdish nationalisms before Iraq was formed and the Kurdish and Arab mind-sets arising from the promises made by colonial powers and Wilson’s points meant that the balance turned in favor of Arab and the Kurdish nationalisms vis-à-vis Iraqi patriotism. Nevertheless, as mentioned, Arab nationalism was more appealing to the Sunnis than to the Shiites. One of the reasons for this is what can be best described as the minority-majority contradiction.

Majority-Minority Contradiction According to the first Iraqi official census of 1947, the Sunni Arabs constituted nearly 19.7 percent of the population, the Shiites 51.4 percent, and the Kurds just under 19 percent. 86 Some scholars suggest that the Sunni embrace of Arab nationalism stemmed from their physical proximity to

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Syria.87 An additional dimension was the Sunni predicament of being in the numerical minority status in Iraq but part of a regional Sunni majority in the Arabic-speaking world. The contradiction of this minority-majority status is one aspect of their support for pan-Arabism. This is due to the absence of democratic and constitutional mechanisms that could safeguard power-sharing and political and cultural recognition. In this case, each Iraqi ethnic and sectarian group feared the domination of the other, a circumstance that continues to this day. As a way to address the problem of having a minority status in Iraq, the Sunnis, using pan-Arabism rhetoric, attempted to tie the Iraqi state to a greater Arab homeland where they would constitute the majority. Indeed, for the Sunnis, pan-Arabism was the means to restore the wholesale majority status that they had enjoyed throughout Arab-Islamic history.88 The other reason for the Sunni attempt was the belief that a greater Arab majority would reduce the Kurdish problem to manageable proportions.89 Taha alHashimi, a prominent Sunni politician and prime minister during the monarchy, asserted that the Shiites opposed Arab unity because they feared that unity would decrease their relative majority.90 King Faisal I, in his wellknown memorandum of 1932, also spoke of the Sunni fear of being trapped between the Shiites and the Kurds.91 In brief, the Sunnis sought to achieve strategic depth in their Sunni Arab hinterland. In contrast to the Sunni position, the Shiites feared that if Iraq were to be assimilated into the Arab homeland, they would cease to be the majority. As a result, it can generally be said that the Iraqi Shiites formed the backbone of Iraqi patriotism. This becomes clear when one considers their support for and affiliation with two primary political organizations known for their Iraq-centric orientation: the NDP and the ICP (see Chapters 4 and 5). The Shiites were consciously or unconsciously afraid of losing their numerical majority status in Iraq. The Kurds were even more afraid than the Shiites of the prospect of Arab unification. During the height of panArabism in the late 1950s, they voiced fears in a 1958 memorandum that the KDP sent to Qasim and Arif, the president and the vice president of Iraq. The memorandum stated: The numerical percentage of the Kurds living in the country [reference to the UAR] would plummet because of the vast Arab majority. This would make the Kurds adhere to their national rights more than ever, and cause them to become more sensitive and emotional about anything pertaining to these rights, no matter how remote the connection.92

As Arab unification projects failed one after the other during the 1950s and 1960s, the Sunnis sought other practical means to change their minority status. In an interview in 1977, Saddam (who was Iraqi vice president at the time) revealed the Iraqi state’s plans to invite one million Egyptian farmers to settle in Iraq.93 Though these plans never materialized, the regime took

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advantage of the presence of the Egyptians and other Sunni Arab workers by introducing new measures to encourage them to take on Iraqi nationality. The RCC announced incentives such as awarding a block of land and a housing loan to those Arabs who would adopt Iraqi citizenship.94 While the way was paved for foreign Sunni Arabs to take on Iraqi nationality, the Faili-Kurds and Shiite Arabs were being stripped of their Iraqi nationality and deported to Iran by the thousands. The Sunnis turned a blind eye and invited al-Qaeda into Iraq after the US invasion and the formation of the Shiite-dominated government. The Sunnis were desperate for another force to counter the Shiite resurgence and the Kurd-Shiite alliance. The power struggle between ethnic and sectarian groups led these communities to question one another ’s roots. Consequently, the issue of whether to be loyal to Iraq or to the Arab world posed a dilemma that has not been resolved to this day.

The Dilemma of Loyalties Throughout Iraqi history one of the mechanisms the Sunnis used to undermine the legitimacy of any opposition was to question the origin of the opposition and its leadership. Iraqi opposition traditionally came from either the Shiites or the Kurds. From the Sunni perspective, the best way to diminish the legitimacy of the opposition was to link the Shiites, Shiism, and Shiite opposition to Iran. In fact, as early as 1922, King Faisal accused the Shiite mujtahids, such as Mahdi al-Khalisi, of being loyal to Iran because he was acting as a rival head of state. Pointing to the Shiite mujtahids’ Iranian nationality, the government decided to crack down on the Shiite opposition by deporting their leading mujtahids, including al-Khalisi. In a letter to Sir Percy Cox, the British high commissioner, Faisal suggested that “they [Shiite mujtahids] betrayed the country under the protection of which they have led a life of ease and comfort so as to serve a foreign people [the Iranians] who were one of the major causes of the termination of the Arab Empire.”95 As the Iraqi state took hold in the late 1920s, a more systematic approach was adopted to undermine the roots of the Shiites. Several books were published with pregovernment approval, including the well-known alUruba fi al-Mizan (Arabism on the scale) in 1933 by Abdul Razzaq alHassan. There are reports that the author may have been encouraged by Yasin al-Hashimi, a former prime minister and one of the most prominent Sunni ruling politicians, to write it. The book overtly stated that “the Shiites are completely Sh‘ubis,96 wholly Persians. They are the remnants of the Safavids in Iraq. They have no right in government or to be represented.”97 Other examples of similar accusations can be found in later literature or in expressions by high-ranking Sunni state officials and intellectuals. An Iraqi

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Shiite recalled that, in 1963, Mizban Khidir Hadi, an RCC member, described the people of Kut, a Shiite-dominated city, as “completely communist, Qasimists, Sh‘ubis and Faili-Kurds.” 98 Because the ICP had a stronghold in the Shiite community and because it supported Qasim, who stood up for the poor of Iraq who were mostly Shiite, the Shiites were equated with the Iranians. The Shiite community in Iraq was discredited by drawing a parallel between the existing Shiite community and a movement that emerged during the Umayyad and Abbasid dynasties in the early years of Islam that fought Arab domination. After the 1991 uprising, al-Thawra, the official Baathist newspaper, published a series of articles in which it questioned Shiite (particularly Marsh Arabs) racial ancestry, religion (Shiism), and way of life. In one of these articles al-Thawra stated that: The [areas] of this breed of people [reference to the Shiite Marsh Arabs] was always an immoral center of harboring elements of treason and turbulence that engulfed the Southern Iraq and Middle Euphrates cities during the last events [the 1991 uprising]. . . . If we acknowledge that the ancestors of this kind of people in the Marshlands of Iraq came with water buffalos who were brought by the Arab leader Muhammad al-Qasim from India, and if we acknowledge that stealing goods from their opponents during disputes and burning the houses of those who dispute them is one of the most distinguished characteristics of this people, then these will make it easier to understand much of the looting, destruction, burning, killing and raping that those criminal agents committed [during the uprising].99

In 2006, during Saddam’s trial, a Sunni woman who was a witness in Saddam’s defense denounced the current Iraqi government for being comprised of and headed by Shiites. She asked the judge if she could address a few words to Saddam, and the judge agreed. Pointing to Saddam, she said “Sayidi [my master], Iraq will be ruled neither by those who come from Iran [reference to Shiites] nor the ones breastfed in Iran [reference to Shiites and Kurds].”100 Ironically, some Shiite political leaders have been either Iraqis with no Iraqi citizenship or Iranian by origin and citizenship. A few founding members of the Da‘wa and the SCIRI/ISCI were of Persian origin (e.g., Murtadha al-Askari, Muhammad al-Hashimi, Kazim al-Ha’iri, and Muhammad Asifi).101 The current grand Shiite marja‘, Ayatollah Ali alSistani, is also Iranian by origin. All of this aided the effectiveness of the Sunni attack. Since 1991, the Shiites counterattacked, albeit not as collectively or as strongly as the Sunnis. Some Shiites question the origins of Sunni politicians who had a hand in establishing the Iraqi state. Especially the roots of those who played a role in the Sunnification of Iraq during the monarchy have been traced to non-Arab or non-Iraqi origins. Several famous Sunni politicians have come from Arabized Turkish or Mamluk families who

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Identity and Nation in Iraq

moved to Iraq during the late Abbasid or Ottoman eras.102 The Shiites target those whose family names do not sound Arabic, such as those of Sunni politicians al-Qaraghuli (Nuri al-Sa‘id’s family), al-Pachachi (Hamdi alPachachi), or al-Chadirchi (Kamil al-Chadirchi). Both al-Uzri and al-Alawi, two well-known Shiite politicians and intellectuals, describe Hikmat Suleiman, Naji Shawkat, and Kamil al-Chadirchi, all Sunni politicians, as having Mamluk (Georgian) or Turkish backgrounds.103 The loyalty of Sunni politicians was also questioned by Sayyid Muhammad al-Sadr, a Shiite former Iraqi prime minister. He claimed that Sunni politicians are not “sons of the soil at all” but rather “descendants of foreigners [Turkish] with no real love for Iraq in their veins.”104 Because traditionally the Sunnis enjoyed the upper hand in terms of ruling the country and controlling the mass media, one could occasionally hear accusations of Shiite disloyalty echoed in the West and on Arab streets. For example, Kalpakian claimed that the Shiite community has traditionally looked to Iran for spiritual, if not ethnic, belonging.105 Hosni Mubarak, the former Egyptian president, asserted that “the majority of Shiites are loyal to Iran, not their countries [e.g., Iraq].”106 The lack of common memory and of a shared destiny have contributed significantly to Iraqi communities’ questioning or undermining one another’s roots and origins. The formation of a single united nation is difficult when essential communities of the country (i.e., the Sunnis) question the loyalty of the others (i.e., Shiites) and their essential communities. Unless such hostility ceases, it will be almost impossible to create a unified nation in Iraq. In sum, a major obstacle facing nation formation in Iraq relates to the manifold identities that not only compete for power and dominance but are often contradictory. The people living within the territory of Iraq have no deep, historical common memory, ancestry, or collective destiny. To date, academics and political analysts have missed or bypassed these complex issues by limiting their consideration of the Iraqi problem to the absence of democracy and the discriminatory policies that Iraqis have experienced in the last forty years of the Baathist era.107 While it is true that the lack of democratic values has indeed complicated Iraq’s quest for nation-building, it does not completely explain the failure. Abstract concepts of democracy and democratization are insufficient by themselves to address the complex questions pertaining to nation building in Iraq.

What of the Future? Iraq is a land where language unites and religion/sect divides the Shiites and the Sunnis. It is also a land where religion/sect unites and culture and language divide the Kurds and the Sunni Arabs. Apart from short periods of

The Paradoxes of Nation Formation in Iraq

253

time when the Sunnis and Shiites joined the Baath Party and/or the Kurds and Shiites cooperated in the context of the Iraqi Communist Party, the greatest problem to face modern Iraq since its creation is the extreme difficulty of forming political parties or coalitions that span the interests of ethnic (Kurd-Arab) or sectarian (Shiite-Sunni) group interests. Until the day comes when middle-class Iraqis are able to join together around ideologically oriented political parties, any hope of a united Iraq or overarching Iraqi identity is mere wishful thinking. Whether that day will ever come is an open question. One thing has become clear, and that is that the possibility of transcending sectarian lines is certainly greater than the possibility of transcending ethnic lines. Since the overthrow of Saddam, a good deal of fear has accompanied the task of shaping the political processes necessary to build a new Iraq. There has been far too little hope in the process, and this primarily has to do with the Shiite fear of a return to the past, the Sunni fear of the present, and the Kurds fear of both. What is missing in this process is trust. Building trust in a society that lives in the past more than for the future is extremely difficult, if not impossible. Iraqis tend to live more in the past than in the present, and the future is almost absent. For Iraq and the Iraqi people to have any chance of passing through the quagmire of dilemmas they are facing, they will have to find a way to make a break from their recent and historic past. A process of reconciliation may help to assuage ancient grievances. To make this possible, the Sunnis who ruled the country for the last eighty-five years need to acknowledge past injustices and express regret for their treatment of other segments of the Iraqi population. The other extremely important element that is necessary if Iraq it to be built is the recognition of the right to self-determination for the Kurds. The Shiites need to understand that Iraq cannot be ruled by one segment of the population. The principle of consensus is by far the most crucial factor in the process of decisionmaking, though it has not yet been fully appreciated in Iraq. Consensus is the only safeguard against Iraq’s returning to minority or dictatorial rule. It is said that Iraq needs to be rebuilt. But this is probably not the best choice of words to apply to the needs of this complex land with its multifaceted array of internal situations and contexts and dilemmas. Instead, it is more accurate to say that Iraq needs to be built. The country’s development has always been hampered by the denial of the nature of the country that contains multiple characteristics and identities in its binational, bisectarian, bihomeland, multiethnic, multicultural, and multireligious populace. Based on these realities, the concept of recognition should be given more weight and attention than the concepts of integration or assimilation. Iraq’s future path must be built on the recognition and acceptance of these realities. In light of Iraq’s history and the current state of development, there is not a good deal of hope for Iraq to remain united—or unite—without mutual recognition and acceptance of the other.

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Identity and Nation in Iraq

On the map, the country looks united; however, on the ground, it is divided. Whether the map unites the people of the country or the people tear the map apart is yet to be seen.

Notes 1. Guibernau, “Anthony D. Smith on Nations,” p. 132; Hutchinson, “Ethnicity and Modern Nations,” pp. 651–669; Hroch, “From National Movement,” pp. 78–97; Smith, National Identity, p. 73; Smith, Theories of Nationalism, p. 171. 2. Most textbooks referred to in this work are history textbooks. Teaching history in Iraqi schools normally begins in grade four of primary school and continues up to grade six in high school. The first review of Iraqi history textbooks occurred in 2007. Up to that time, Baath-era textbooks were used. 3. See al-Dujaili et al., The History of Your Country and Nation from the Beginning: for Grade Four Primary School, pp. 132, 138–39, 142, 145; Republic of Iraq, Ministry of Education, The Arab Islamic History for Grade Two Intermediate School, pp. 43, 45–47; General Directorate of Curriculum, The Arab Islamic History for Grade Two Intermediate School, pp. 41–45. 4. General Directorate of Curriculum, The Arab Islamic History for Grade Two Intermediate School, pp. 65, 85, 87; Hamdi and al-Najar, History of Your Country, p. 82. 5. Republic of Iraq, Ministry of Education, Synopsis in Geography and History in Accordance with Grade Six Primary Curriculum, pp. 36–38; The Arab Islamic History for Grade Two Intermediate School, pp. 76, 84, 93–96. 6. General Directorate of Curriculum, The Arab Islamic History for Grade Two Intermediate School, p. 54; The Modern and Contemporary History of the Arab Homeland for Grade Six High School, p. 17. 7. The Modern and Contemporary History of the Arab Homeland for Grade Six High School, p. 87. 8. Republic of Iraq, Ministry of Education, The Arab Islamic History for Grade Two Intermediate School, p. 75. According to Islamic sources, the writers of the revelation are those who compiled the Quran under the authority of Muhammad. This means that Muhammad put extreme trust in Mu‘awiya since he was illiterate. 9. General Directorate of Curriculum, The Arab Islamic History for Grade Two Intermediate School, p. 47. 10. Ibid., p. 96; Republic of Iraq, Ministry of Education, The Guiding Readings for Grade Six High School, p. 19–22. 11. General Directorate of Curriculum, The Modern and Contemporary History of the Arab Homeland for Grade Three Intermediate School, p. 92. 12. Al-Hassani, The Life of Twelve Imams, vol. 1, pp. 259–261, 456. 13. The book was written by Anis al-Nusuli, a history teacher in Baghdad of Syrian origin. 14. The original copy of al-Nusuli’s book, al-Dawla al-Umawiya fi al-Sham (The Umayyad state in Syria), published by Dar al-Salam, Baghdad, is difficult to locate. The quotations here are based on al-Uzri’s quotations in The Problem of Governance in Iraq, pp. 215–230. 15. Quoted in Ibid., pp. 215–230. 16. Al-‘Amd, The Martyred Imam, pp. 140–143. 17. Majmu‘a min Ulama Bahrain, The Death of Imams, pp. 124, 170. 18. Al-Hassani, The Life of Twelve Imams, vol. 1, pp. 117–122. 19. The “occultation” of Imam Muhammad al-Mahdi (the twelfth imam) is a

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central Shiite doctrine. It is believed that in 874 God hid al-Mahdi from the eyes of men in order to preserve his life and will eventually reveal al-Mahdi to the world to guide humanity. 20. Al-Hassani, The Life of Twelve Imams; Majmu‘a min Ulama Bahrain, The Death of Imams. 21. See al-Hassani, The Life of Twelve Imams; Majmu‘a min Ulama Bahrain, The Death of Imams; Maqtal Abi Mukhnaf, The Killing of Hussein. 22. See Aswat al-Iraq, “Plan to Protect Pilgrims.” 23. Al-Wardi, Social Glimpses, vol. 6, pp. 251, 252. Ali al-Wardi was twelve years old when al-Khalisi was deported to Iran. He recalls that the alternative interpretation was shared in most Shiite homes in Baghdad at the time. 24. Al-Khayat, Chapters of Iraq History, p. 131. 25. Al-Alawi, The Shiite and the Nation-State, pp. 50, 51. 26. Al-Wardi, Social Glimpses, vol. 1, p. 46. 27. See al-Khayat, Chapters of Iraq History, pp. 71–77. Al-Alawi, The Shiite and the Nation-State, pp. 50–56. 28. See Al-Alawi, The Shiite and the Nation-State, pp. 50–56. 29. See al-Khayun, “The Unity of Iraq.” 30. Izady, The Kurds, p. 51, 208; Nebez, The Kurds, pp. 46, 50; Masifi, “They Say There Is No Country.” 31. Zaki Beg, A Brief History of Kurds, pp. 76–79, 81–91; Nuri Pasha, The History of Kurdish Origin, pp. 11, 20, 61; Mella, Kurdistan and the Kurds, p. 54. 32. Cyaxares (625–585 BC) was the first Median king. 33. The Kurdish national anthem was written by Kurdish poet Dildar in 1938. 34. Kurdistan Regional Government, Ministry of Education, Societal Topics for Grade Five Primary School, p. 68; Bekas, Poetical Works, pp. 31–217. 35. Kurdistan Regional Government, Ministry of Education, Societal Topics for Grade Five Primary School, pp. 66–69, 71–78; History of Civilizations for Grade Four High School—Humanities, pp. 3, 21, 28; New and Modern History for Grade Twelve High School—Humanities, pp. 53–89. 36. Republic of Iraq, Ministry of Education, The Ancient History of the Arab Homeland for Grade One Intermediate School, pp. 38–57. 37. Amin, The Emirate of Baban, pp. 261–295; Siwayli, The Book of Nali, pp. 39–45; Bekas, Poetical Works, pp. 332–356. 38. Kurdistan Regional Government, Ministry of Education, New and Modern History for Grade Twelve High School—Humanities, pp. 118–126, 141–168. 39. Republic of Iraq, Ministry of Education, The Modern and Contemporary History of the Arab Homeland for Grade Six High School—Humanities, pp. 188– 193; Kurdistan Regional Government, Ministry of Education, New and Modern History for Grade Twelve High School—Humanities, pp. 176–184. 40. Republic of Iraq, Ministry of Education, The Modern History of the Arab Homeland for Grade Six Primary School, pp. 59–65; The Modern and Contemporary History of the Arab Homeland for Grade Six High School— Humanities, pp. 183–188. 41. General Directorate of Curriculum, The Modern and Contemporary History of the Arab Homeland for Grade Six High School—Humanities, pp. 178–182. 42. Kurdistan Regional Government, Ministry of Education, New and Modern History for Grade Twelve High School—Humanities, pp. 156–157. 43. Republic of Iraq, Ministry of Education, The Modern and Contemporary History of the Arab Homeland for Grade Six High School—Humanities, pp. 302– 303; al-Kash, “The Iranian Destructive Role in Iraq”; Al-Rashead Encyclopaedia, “Al-Sha‘baniya Uprising.” 44. Al-Istrabadi, “Rebuilding a Nation,” p. 14.

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45. Al-Mawardi, The Ordinances of Government, p. 224. 46. Cited in Bernhardsson, Reclaiming a Plundered Past, pp. 97, 98. 47. Northedge, “Al-Iraq al-Arabi,” pp. 155–166; Lukitz, “Nationalism in PostImperial Iraq,” p. 9; O’Leary, How to Get Out of Iraq with Integrity, pp. 237–238. 48. Hussein, The Mosul Problem, p. 78. 49. See Matar, The Wounded Self; Matar, Dispute of Identities. 50. Ustan means land, place, or state. The Seljuks used this word to delineate the autonomous regions that they administered. 51. Pirbal, “When Did the Word ‘Kurdistan’ Appear?” p. 14. 52. Mina, Iraq’s Security Strategy, p. 135; Sabir, Iraq: Democratization or Dissolution, p. 7. 53. Smith, National Identity, p. 16. 54. This figure reflects a reasonable account of the numbers of minorities and refugees from elsewhere residing in Kurdistan. 55. Kurdistan Institute for Political Issues, A Survey on the Question of Language and Identity in Kurdistan. 56. Kurdistan Institute for Political Issues, From Citizens to the Authorities, p. 49. 57. See Fadel and Kadhim, “Some Sunni Muslims Won’t Salute Iraq’s New Flag.” 58. Hobsbawm, “The Nation as Invented Tradition,” p. 77. 59. Irredentist nationalism attempts to extend the existing boundaries of a state by incorporating territories of an adjacent state occupied principally by co-nationals. Unification nationalism involves the merger of a politically divided but culturally homogeneous territory into one state. Pan-Arabism and pan-Kurdism carry aspects of both irredentist and unification nationalisms. 60. See al-Jaafari, “A New Marshall Plan for Iraq”; TREND, “Al-Maliki’s Description of Iraq as Arab Country Rankles Kurds”; Wifaq, “What Is Happening in Iraq.” 61. See Anderson, Imagined Communities. 62. McDowall, The Modern History of the Kurds, p. 3. 63. Tibi, Arab Nationalism, pp. 106–109. Turanism was a movement that involved the attempt to unite all Turkic, Tatar, and Uralic peoples living in Turkey and across Eurasia, from Hungary to the Pacific, politically and culturally into one force. 64. Olson, The Emergence of Kurdish Nationalism, p. 4. 65. Tibi, Arab Nationalism, p. 109. 66. Ibid., pp. 112–115. 67. Ibid., p. 148. 68. Khani, Mem and Zin, pp. 33–38; Hassanpour, Nationalism and Language, p. 42. 69. Al-Bitlisi, Sharafnama, pp. 50–51. 70. Khani, Mem and Zin, pp. 17–20; Mukiryani, Collected Works of Haji Qadiri Koyi, p. 54; Bruinessen, Agha, Sheikh and State, p. 34; Hassanpour, Nationalism and Language, p. 42. 71. Olson, The Emergence of Kurdish Nationalism, pp. 2, 153; Bruinessen, Agha, Sheikh and State, p. 405. 72. Olson, The Emergence of Kurdish Nationalism, p. 15; Zangana, The Sun of Kurd, pp. 67–76. 73. Republic of Iraq, Ministry of Education, The Modern and Contemporary History of the Arab Homeland for Grade Six High School—Humanities; Kurdistan Regional Government, Ministry of Education, New and Modern History for Grade Twelve High School—Humanities.

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74. See General Directorate of Curriculum, The Modern and Contemporary History of the Arab Homeland for Grade Six High School—Humanities. 75. See Antonius, “Documents of Western Betrayal and Arab Opposition 1915– 1919.” 76. President Woodrow Wilson delivered his famous Fourteen Points on January 8, 1918. See World War I Document Archive. 77. Baban, Several Famous Trials, pp. 113–114; al-Bayatti, Sheikh Mahmud, pp. 160–163. 78. Hilmi, Memoir, pp. 114–117; McDowall, The Modern History of the Kurds, p. 158. 79. Al-Ghatta, Sa‘ad Salih, p. 78. 80. See Gettleman and Schaar, The Middle East and Islamic World Reader. 81. For the text of the letter, see Saudi Arabia Conference of Allied Powers, “Memorandum Submitted to the Conference of Allied Powers at the House of Commons.” 82. Natali, “Manufacturing Identity,” p. 66. 83. Quoted in Ahmed, Kirkuk and Surroundings, p. 98; quoted from Tegayishtini Rasti, number 17, February 23, 1918, and number 19, March 5, 1918. 84. The Shiites normally take the bodies of their dead family members to Wadi al-Salam in Najaf for burial, but most Arab settlers in the areas visited by the author were Sunnis from central parts of Iraq. 85. The author visited the villages of Palkana, Sarbashakh, Shanagha, Gabalaka, Dirka, and others in the district of Dibs, province of Kirkuk, in March 2005, April 2007, and throughout 2011. He visited the cemeteries of many villages and talked to Arab settlers still living in the region. The same pattern of behavior was confirmed to the author by local people from the Khanaqin area. Dr. Nawzad Rasheed and Ahmed Jaf reported that the Arab settlers from the villages of Kanasur, Alwash, Suleiman, and Baplawi had not buried their dead in these villages but took them back to their original homelands. 86. Batatu, The Old Social Classes, p. 40. 87. Farouk-Sluglett and Sluglett, Iraq Since 1958, p. 54. 88. Tripp, A History of Iraq, pp. 139, 182; Bengio, “Iraq: From Failed Nation,” p. 65. 89. Shikara, “Faisal’s Ambitions,” p. 37. 90. Al-Alawi, The Turkish Impact, p. 156. 91. Al-Hassani, The History of Iraqi Cabinets, vol. 3, p. 321. 92. Barzani, Mustafa Barzani, p. 212. 93. Hussein, Our Struggle, pp. 51–52. 94. See Al-Waqai‘ al-Iraqiya, August 19, 1985. 95. Al-Wardi, Social Glimpses, vol. 6/1, pp. 201–211, 215–235; Nakash, The Shi‘is of Iraq, p. 91. 96. For an expanded interpretation of the meaning of Sh‘ubi and Sh‘ubism, please refer to Chapters 3, 4, and 5. 97. Quoted in al-Alawi, The Shiite and the Nation-state, p. 144; al-Hassani, The History of Iraqi Cabinets, vol. 2, pp. 88, 89; al-Temimi; Muhammad Ja‘far, p. 321; Nakash, The Shi‘is of Iraq, p. 114. 98. See Al-Muhajir, Some Recollections. 99. Quoted in al-Salihi, Earthquake, pp. 275–276. 100. The author heard a woman make these comments during the al-Dujail trial on al-Iraqiya television; the date is uncertain. 101. Jabar, The Shi‘ite Movement, pp. 236, 239–240. 102. The Mamluks were slave soldiers mainly of Turkish origin who converted

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to Islam and served the Muslim Arab caliphs from the ninth to the sixteenth centuries. 103. Al-Uzri, The Problem of Governance, pp. 98, 145; al-Alawi, The Turkish Impact, pp. 102–103; al-Fkaiki, The Den of Defeat, pp. 61, 63. 104. Quoted in Kedourie, “The Shiite Issue,” pp. 496, 498. 105. Kalpakian, “Identity, Conflict and Cooperation,” p. 226. 106. Al-Arabiya.net, April 9, 2006. 107. For a debate on this issue, see Byman and Pollack, “Democracy in Iraq?;” and Sluglett, “Is Democracy the Problem?”

Appendixes

1 2 3 4 5 6 7

The Destruction of Kurdistan,1963–1987 The January 2005 Parliamentary Election Results The August 2005 Constitutional Referendum Results The December 2005 Parliamentary Election Results Civilian Deaths from Violence in Iraq, 2003–2012 Average Deaths per Day from Bombs and Gunfire/Executions The March 2010 Parliamentary Election Results

259

260 262 262 263 264 265 266

Appendix 1 The Destruction of Kurdistan, 1963–1987 (Number of villages, districts[d], subdistricts[sd], and complexes[c] destroyed)

Province

District

Diyala

Khanaqin Kifri

Dohuk

Strategic Regions

Oil areas

no data

Zakho

11

Simel

71

Kirkuk

Tala’far

1 51

Salah al-Din

39 156

Shekhan

106

Telkif

15

Aqra

35

Kirkuk center Tuzkhurmatu

Kurdistan War

156

Sinjar

Dibis

Iran-Iraq War

Military Facilities

227

Amadiya Ninawa

Border Zone

56

3

5

22 17

1

Uprisings

Erbil

Koysinjaq

10

Choman

Suleimaniya

32 77

32 + 1 d

Rawanduz

9

2

Mergasur

62

1

8 + 1 sd 33

Erbil center

4

Shaqlawa

8

Suleimaniya center

16

Halabja

124

Penjwen

143

Pishdar

145 88

3 + 1 sd

2

10

5

10 + 1 d, 2 c 4 44 + 1 sd

Kalar

14 10

Dokan

17

22

Chamchamal

Grand Total

1

Makhmour

Sharbajer

Total

1 + 1 sd

8 + 1 sd, 1 c

9 660

71

872

92 + 2 sd, 2 d, 2 c

211 + 2 sd

14

8 + 1 sd, 1 c

1928 villages, 5 subdistricts, 2 districts, and 3 complexes

Sources: Derived from Mina 1999, pp. 279–345; Muhammad, et al. 2004, p. 19. Notes: Destroyed districts: Penjwen, Choman; destroyed subdistricts: Glala, Siwayil, Khormal, Biyara, Nalparaz; destroyed complexes: Penjwen, Nalparez, Bingird. For list of destroyed villages, see Mina 1999, pp. 279–345.

262

Appendixes

Appendix 2 The January 2005 Parliamentary Election Results Parties and Coalitions United Iraqi Alliance (UIA) Kurdistani Alliance Iraqi National List (Iraqiya) The Iraqis List Iraqi Turkmen Front National Independent Cadres and Elites People’s Union (ICP) Islamic Group of Kurdistan Islamic Action Organization National Democratic Alliance National Rafidain List

Votes

Percentage

Seats

Ethnic or Sectarian

4,075,292 2,175,551 1,168,943 150,680 93,480

48.19% 25.73% 13.82% 1.78% 1.11%

140 75 40 5 3

Shiite Islamist Kurdish secular Iraqi secular Sunni secular Turkmen secular

69,938 69,920 60,592 43,205 36,795 36,255

0.83% 0.83% 0.72% 0.51% 0.44% 0.43%

3 2 2 2 1 1

30,796

0.36%

1

Shiite secular Iraqi secular Kurdish Islamist Shiite Islamist Shiite secular Chaldo-Assyrian secular Sunni secular

8,456,266

100%

275

Reconciliation and Liberation Bloc Total

Shiites (146, 53%) Kurds (77, 28%) Sunnis (6, 2.2%) Cross-sectarian (42, 15.3%) Others (4, 1.5%)

Source: Derived from The Economist, “Shiite Delight and Sunni Gloom,” pp. 44, 45.

Appendix 3 The August 2005 Constitutional Referendum Results Province Baghdad Wasit Maysan Basra Dhiqar Al-Muthanna Al-Qadisiya Babil Karbala Najaf Anbar Salah al-Din Ninawa Diyala Dohuk Suleimaniya Erbil Kirkuk Total

Demographics

No. of Votes

Percentage Yes

Percentage No

Shiite majority Shiite majority Shiite majority Shiite majority Shiite majority Shiite majority Shiite majority Shiite majority Shiite majority Shiite majority Sunni majority Sunni majority Sunni majority Sunni majority Kurdish majority Kurdish majority Kurdish majority Kurdish majority

2,120,615 280,128 254,067 691,024 462,710 185,710 297,176 543,779 264,674 299,420 259,919 510,152 718,758 476,980 389,198 723,723 830,570 542,688

77.70 95.70 97.79 96.02 97.15 98.65 96.74 94.56 96.58 95.82 3.04 18.25 44.92 51.27 99.13 98.96 99.36 62.91

22.30 4.30 2.21 3.98 2.85 1.35 3.32 5.44 3.42 4.18 96.90 81.75 55.08 48.73 0.87 1.04 0.64 37.09

9,852,291

78.59

21.41

Source: Derived from O’Leary, How to Get out of Iraq with Integrity, p. 145.

262

Appendixes

Appendix 2 The January 2005 Parliamentary Election Results Parties and Coalitions United Iraqi Alliance (UIA) Kurdistani Alliance Iraqi National List (Iraqiya) The Iraqis List Iraqi Turkmen Front National Independent Cadres and Elites People’s Union (ICP) Islamic Group of Kurdistan Islamic Action Organization National Democratic Alliance National Rafidain List

Votes

Percentage

Seats

Ethnic or Sectarian

4,075,292 2,175,551 1,168,943 150,680 93,480

48.19% 25.73% 13.82% 1.78% 1.11%

140 75 40 5 3

Shiite Islamist Kurdish secular Iraqi secular Sunni secular Turkmen secular

69,938 69,920 60,592 43,205 36,795 36,255

0.83% 0.83% 0.72% 0.51% 0.44% 0.43%

3 2 2 2 1 1

30,796

0.36%

1

Shiite secular Iraqi secular Kurdish Islamist Shiite Islamist Shiite secular Chaldo-Assyrian secular Sunni secular

8,456,266

100%

275

Reconciliation and Liberation Bloc Total

Shiites (146, 53%) Kurds (77, 28%) Sunnis (6, 2.2%) Cross-sectarian (42, 15.3%) Others (4, 1.5%)

Source: Derived from The Economist, “Shiite Delight and Sunni Gloom,” pp. 44, 45.

Appendix 3 The August 2005 Constitutional Referendum Results Province Baghdad Wasit Maysan Basra Dhiqar Al-Muthanna Al-Qadisiya Babil Karbala Najaf Anbar Salah al-Din Ninawa Diyala Dohuk Suleimaniya Erbil Kirkuk Total

Demographics

No. of Votes

Percentage Yes

Percentage No

Shiite majority Shiite majority Shiite majority Shiite majority Shiite majority Shiite majority Shiite majority Shiite majority Shiite majority Shiite majority Sunni majority Sunni majority Sunni majority Sunni majority Kurdish majority Kurdish majority Kurdish majority Kurdish majority

2,120,615 280,128 254,067 691,024 462,710 185,710 297,176 543,779 264,674 299,420 259,919 510,152 718,758 476,980 389,198 723,723 830,570 542,688

77.70 95.70 97.79 96.02 97.15 98.65 96.74 94.56 96.58 95.82 3.04 18.25 44.92 51.27 99.13 98.96 99.36 62.91

22.30 4.30 2.21 3.98 2.85 1.35 3.32 5.44 3.42 4.18 96.90 81.75 55.08 48.73 0.87 1.04 0.64 37.09

9,852,291

78.59

21.41

Source: Derived from O’Leary, How to Get out of Iraq with Integrity, p. 145.

Appendix 4 The December 2005 Parliamentary Election Results

Alliance/Party

Number of Votes

United Iraqi Alliance (UIA) 5,021,137 Kurdistani Alliance (KA) 2,642,172 Iraqi Accord Front (Tawafuq) 1,840,216

Percentage Number of Votes of Seats

Plus/minus to Jan. Elections

Ethnic or Sectarian

41.2 21.7 15.1

128 53 44

–12 –22 44

Shiite Islamist Kurdish secular Sunni Islamist Iraqi secular Sunni secular

Iraqi National List (Iraqiya) National Dialogue Front

977,325 499,963

8.0 4.1

25 11

–15 11

Kurdistan Islamic Union

157,688

1.3

5

5

Kurdish Islamist

Al-Risaliyun Reconciliation and Liberation Turkmen Front Rafidain List Iraqi Nation Yazidi Movement

145,028 129,847 87,993 47,263 32,245 21,908

1.2 1.1 0.7 0.4 0.3 0.2

2 3 1 1 1 1

2 2 –2 ±0 1 1

Shiite Islamist Sunni secular Turkmen secular Chaldo-Assyrian Iraqi secular Yazidi Kurd

Total (turnout 79.6 %)

12,396,631

275

Remarks

Did not participate in Jan 2005 elections Did not participate in Jan 2005 elections Contested the Jan elections as part of the KA

Shiites (130, 47.3%) Kurds (58, 21.1%) Sunnis (58, 21.1%) Cross-sectarian (26, 9.45%) Minority groups (3, 1.05%)

Source: Derived from Independent High Electroal Commission 2006.

263

264

Appendix 5 Civilian Deaths from Violence in Iraq, 2003–2012 2003

2004

2005

2006

2007

2008

2009

2010

2011

2012

Jan. Feb. Mar. Apr. May. Jun. Jul. Aug. Sep. Oct. Nov. Dec.

3 2 3,977 3,437 547 594 651 796 561 520 488 528

592 645 986 1,302 657 870 812 860 1,018 998 1,603 1,019

1,100 1,258 842 1,075 1,303 1,267 1,503 2,239 1,383 1,253 1,418 1,114

1,530 1,536 1,932 1,714 2,167 2,522 3,208 2,791 2,465 2,947 3,019 2,758

2,888 2,587 2,674 2,483 2,798 2,158 2,618 2,390 1,287 1,226 1,083 938

767 1,021 1,573 1,254 786 693 604 607 552 533 489 532

284 354 416 498 330 494 400 590 303 405 210 457

260 301 335 381 377 377 424 516 252 311 302 217

387 250 307 285 378 385 305 398 394 355 272 371

464 293 320 300

Total

12,104

11,362

15,755

28,589

25,130

9,411

4,741

4,053

4,087

1,377

Grand Total

116,609

Source: Iraq Body Count 2012

Appendix 6 Average Deaths per Day from Bombs and Gunfire/Executions Bomb/al-Qaeda/Terrorism Year 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012a Total

Average/day 1.5 5.3 10.0 16.0 22.0 10.0 8.3 7.3 6.6 6.7

Number Percentage 548 1,935 3,650 5,840 8,030 3,650 3,030 2,665 2,409 2,446

9% 22% 26% 22% 35% 42% 66% 65% 59% 59%

34,201

33%

Gunfire/Execution/Sectarian violence Percentage

Total Deaths from Bombs & Gunfire per Year

5,475 6,935 10,585 21,170 14,965 5,110 1,570 1,424 1,679 1,679

91% 78% 74% 78% 65% 58% 34% 35% 41% 41%

6,023 8,870 14,235 27,010 22,995 8,760 4,599 4,088 4,088 4,125

70,591

67%

Average/day Number 15.0 19.0 29.0 58.0 41.0 14.0 4.3 3.9 4.6 4.6

Source: Iraq Body Count 2012. Notes: Total deaths 104,792. This figure is less than the total deaths (116,609) up to April 2012 as the table’s figures are based on the average per day, which is in fractions. a. The figure for 2012 is based on Iraq Body Count’s data to the end of April

265

266

Appendix 7 The March 2010 Paliamentary Election Results Governorate

SoL

INA

Basra Maysan Al-Muthanna Dhiqar Al-Qadisiya Wasit Najaf Karbala Babil Baghdad Al-Anbar Salah al-Din Ninawa Diyala Kirkuk Suleimaniya Erbil Dohuk Compensatory Minorities

14 4 4 8 4 5 7 6 8 26

7 6 3 9 5 4 5 3 5 17

2

2

2

Total

89

70

91

1

1 3

Iraqiya

Tawafuq

UoI

KI

Gorran

KIU

KIG

3

1 2 2 1 3 24 11 8 20 8 6

1 2 2 1

6

1 2 1

4

8 1 6 8 10 9 1

43

6 2

2 1 1

1 1

8

4

2

Total Seats 24 10 7 18 11 11 12 10 16 68 14 12 31 13 12 17 14 10 7 8 325

Notes: SoL - State of Law, al-Maliki; INA - Iraq National Alliance; UoI - Unity of Iraq; KA - Kurdistani Alliance; KIU - Kurdistan Islamic Union; KIG - Kurdistan Islamic Group

Acronyms

ABSP ABSP/NC CIA CPA CRS FBI GDEKS HRW ICG ICP ID IDP IGC IHEC IIG IMK INA INC ISCI KA KCP KDP KIG KIPI KIU KRG KRG-ME KTU MAI MECS NA NC NCRC

Arab Baath Socialist Party Arab Baath Socialist Party/National Command Central Intelligence Agency Coalition Provisional Authority Congressional Research Service Federal Bureau of Investigation General Directorate of Education for Kurdish Studies Human Rights Watch International Crisis Group Iraqi Communist Party Iraqi Dinar Islamic Da‘wa Party Iraqi Governing Council Independent High Electoral Commission Iraqi Interim Government Islamic Movement of Kurdistan Iraqi National Alliance Iraqi National Congress Islamic Supreme Council of Iraq Kurdistani Alliance Kurdistan Communist Party Kurdistan Democratic Party Kurdistan Islamic Group Kurdistan Institute for Political Issues Kurdistan Islamic Union Kurdistan Regional Government Kurdistan Regional Government, Ministry of Education Kurdistan Teachers Union Islamic Action Organization Middle East Contemporary Survey National Assembly National Command National Council of the Revolutionary Command 267

268

Acronyms

NDP NUF OCAC POW PPNF PUK RCC RI-ME SCIRI/ISCI SoL TAL UAR UIA UN UNAMI UNHCR UNICEF USA/US USSR WMD

National Democratic Party National Unity Front Organizing Committee of the Anfal Conference Prisoners of War Progressive Patriotic and Nationalist Front Patriotic Union of Kurdistan Revolutionary Command Council Republic of Iraq, Ministry of Education Supreme Council of the Islamic Revolution in Iraq/ Islamic Supreme Council of Iraq State of Law Transitional Administrative Law United Arab Republic United Iraqi Alliance United Nations United Nations Assistance Mission for Iraq United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees United Nations Children’s Fund United States of America/United States Union of Soviet Socialist Republics Weapons of Mass Destruction

Glossary

Al-Ahrar Al-Haras al-Qawmi Al-Islah Al-Sahwa Al-Umma Al-Wathba Anfal

Arba‘in

Ashura

a‘yan bay‘a effendi Eid al-Ghadir Fadila fatwa Gorran Hamlat al-Iman Hashemites hawza Hiwa Hiwar hukumdar Iraqiya Istiqlal

Liberal Movement Arab National Guard, the Baath paramilitary force in 1963 The Reform List The Awakening The Nation Party The Leap, the 1956 uprising Name given by the Iraqi Government to a series of military actions against the Kurds in 1988 (taken from the Quran) Arabic term for “fortieth”: a Shiite religious observation that occurs forty days after the Day of Ashura Arabic word for “tenth” and marks the culmination of the remembrance of the death of the Imam Hussein at the battle of Karbala in 680 AD Traditional notable families Oath of allegiance Civil servant A day that the Shiites believe the Prophet Muhammad appointed Imam Ali as his successor The Virtue Party Religious decree The Change Movement Faith Campaign Bani Hashem are descendants of the Prophet Muhammad A seminary of traditional Shiite Islamic studies Hope Party The Dialogue Front Governor Iraqi National List Independence Party 269

270

Glossary

Komeley Hevi Kurd Kurdayati marja‘ marja‘iya mujtahid Musaliha wa Hiwar Newroz Peshmarga qawmiya Rafidayn Rafidi/rafadha Risaliyun Rizgari Kurd Saddam’s Fida'iyin Sayyid Sh‘ubi or al-Sh‘ubiya

Sharifians

Shorish ta'ifiya Tawafuq ummah uruba wataniya

Kurdish Hope Society Kurdish nationalism Senior Shiite religious leadership The source of Shiite religious authority A person qualified to give independent judgment on legal and theological matters in Islam Reconciliation and Dialogue Front Kurdish national day “Those who face death,” used by Kurds to refer to those fighting for the freedom of Kurdistan Pan-Arabism or Arab nationalism Mesopotamia Rejecter/rejecters, derogative term for the Shiites Upholders of the Message Kurdish Liberation Party Saddam’s Men of Sacrifice A descendent of Prophet Muhammad Derogatory terms used for the Shiites; originally applied to non-Arab Muslims who resisted Arab claims of being the prime inheritors of Muhammad Arab officers serving in the Ottoman military; they were the main supporters of the Arab Revolt and played a major role in Iraqi politics until 1958 Iraqi Kurdistan Communist Party Sectarianism The Accord Nation Arabism Iraqi nationalism or patriotism

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Index

Abbasid(s), 1, 138, 225, 237, 252 Abbasid dynasty, 7, 233–237, 251 Abd al-Illah, 68 Abd al-Mahdi, Adil, 188, 201 Abdul Latif, Abdul Satar, 120, 128n105 Abdul Aziz, Umer bin, 237 Abdul Majid, Hamdi, 120, 128n106, 130n155 Abdul Malik, Hisham bin, 236 Abdul Nasser, Jamal, 75, 90n64 Abdul Razzaq, Arif, 115 Abdullah, ‘Amer, 81, 83, 92n115 Ali bin Abi Talib, Imam, 7, 39, 59n3, 234–235 Abi Waqqas, Umer bin Sa‘d bin, 48 Abu al-Timman, Ja‘far, 50, 65 Abu Bakr, 7, 218, 233, 235–236 Abu Ghraib prison, 145, 165n70, 180 Abu Hanifa, 27 Abu al-Jun, Sha‘lan, 26 Accord, 1966: 115–116 Accountability and Justice Commission, 218 al-Adeeb, Ali, 219 al-Adib, Salih, 119 Adil, Salam, 112 Aflaq, Michael, 52, 75, 77, 90n62, 98, 138, 143, 165n51, 245 Agha(s), 106, 127n77 Agrarian reforms, 106, 126n33, 174– 175 al-Ahali Group, 67, 72–74, 76, 90n51, 105, 110, 126n62, 128 al-‘Ahd (Covenant) Association, 26, 36, 75, 88, 245 negative role in revolution, 28

Ahmed, Ibrahim, 106, 115, 126n60, 128n105 Ahmed, Kamal Mudhir, 30, 31 Ahmed, Karim, 82, 92n120 al-Ahrar party (movement), 73, 205 Akra, 151 al-Alawi, Hassan, 33, 252 Allawi, Ayad, 195, 200–208, 216, 219– 220, 227n8, 243 Allies, 2, 25, 69, 248 Amara, 2, 85, 177 Americans, 198, 223, 225 Amin, Nawshirwan Mustafa, 215; 125n3 Ammash, Salih Mahdi, 120, 128n105 al-Amn al-‘Amm (General Security), 135, 169 al-Amn al-‘Askari (Military Security), 135, 169 al-Amn al-Khas (Special Security), 135, 169 Anan, Kofi, 193 al-Anbar (Rumadi), 2, 5, 74, 101, 128n113, 178, 199, 213, 221, 223 Andalusia, 182 Anderson, Benedict, 11, 30, 179, 244 Anfal, 155–161, 167n119, 168n131, 168n134, 173 Anglo-French Declaration, 246 Ansar al-Islam (Partisans of Islam), 185 April Revolution, 240 Arab: Kurdish and Arab rapprochement were situational, 122; antagonism with Turkmen, 212; Arab cleric to replace al-Kho’i, 178; Arab-Muslims, 1, 7; Arabs in Mosul closer to Arabs in

297

298

Index

Syria, 2; Arabs more willing to accept Iraqi identity, 248; Arif’s ambition for Arab unification, 112; attempt to create single ethnic identity, 187; Baath attempt to prove origins of Kurds, 86, 104, 115; British pledge of independence, 26; Chaldeans deny origins, 142; communists rip Iraq from Arab identity, 99; coup against Qasim to promote unification, 111; creation of countries, 73; settlements, 155, 168n134; descendants of, 9; disunity with Kurds, 144–145, 182; Faisal as figurehead, 39; glory, 27, 242; highlight tribal identity, 175; identity, 29; imagined communities, 246; in Kirkuk, 159, 210, 211, 223; independence of, 247; Iraq part of Arab nation, 98, 116, 141, 142; Iraq superior, 143; Islamic messages appeal to, 173; KDP calls for voluntary unification with, 79; Kurdish women take more votes than counterparts, 209; Kurdistan independence, 212, 215; Kurdistan not part of state, 82, 104, 106, 115, 133, 248; “Kurdistani in event of Arab unification, 114; Kurds accept, 21; Kurds and Arabs as partners, 84–85, 96, 98, 102, 104–106, 114, 122; Kurds and Arabs establish separate associations, 244–245; Kurds reject, 41, 45– 47, 77, 100, 133, 185–186, 210; lack of common ancestry or history with Kurds, 239–241; lack of common denominator, 59, 196; language as nation, 52; largest ethnic group in Iraq 5; liberation of, 75; link between Saddam and ancient rulers, 172; luring Arabs to citizenship, 250; marsh Arabs driven from homes, 177; mujtahids prefer, 22; Nasser as leader, 97; need permission to enter Kurdistan, 217; fear of Kurdish domination, 102; no emotional attachment for settlers, 214; nomadic tribes, 18n15; nonArabs as al-Sh‘ubiya, 54, 76, 117; officers in Ottoman army, 55; oil revenue from Kurdistan applied to, 154; one state according to Baath, 77; settlers in Kirkuk, 166n110; policies of discrimination, exclusion, and monopoly of power, 233; political parties

oppose federation, 221; question of Kurdistan as homeland, 211; register sects as, 152; replace officers with Kurds, 67; replacement of British flag, 31; resettle Kurdish villages, 115, 151–153, 187; revolution concerned with anti-imperialism, 30; Saddam as symbol, 137, 160; Saddam’s hope to rally Arabs, 141; senior positions in Kirkuk given to Arabs, 101; settlers with no attachment to Kurdish areas, 248, 257n85; Sheikh Mahmud prefer British, 23; Shiites and Kurds oppose unity, 249; Shiites and Sunnis common goal of unification, 124; Shiite disloyalty, 252; Shiites not genuine, 117; single nation, 19n65, 97,131; struggle with against imperialism, 80, 84, 85, 122; territory of, 243; ultimate level in civilization and governance, 234; unification of countries, 74, 81, 96, 97, 143; unification, 141–143 Arab Baath Socialist Party, 75–77, 90n62, 138, 156, 163n21 Arab-Bedouin tribes, 152 Arab bloc in Kirkuk, 214 Arab centric, 112 Arab citizenship, 114 Arab communists, 81, 123, 133 Arab community, 102, 245; non-Arab communities, 144 Arab civilization, 234 Arab countries, 143 Arab Empire, 250 Arab ethnic identity, 77, 97, 243, 247, 248 Arab homeland, 75, 77, 82, 104–105, 113, 142, 246, 249 Arab imagined communities, 246 Arab Independent bloc, 201 Arab intellectuals, 41, 245, 247 Arab Iraq/Iraqis: 5, 26–27, 30–31, 52, 55, 79, 133, 185–187, 210–211, 217, 239–241, 245, 247–248 Arab-Islamic, 22, 72, 117, 138, 143, 153, 209, 236, 249 Arab-Israeli war, 95 Arab lands and areas, 22, 47, 104, 141, 143, 154, 155, 159, 168n134, 182, 215, 235, 245 Arab leaders, 21, 22, 39, 75, 141, 247

Index Arab League, 74, 90n53, 105, 106, 196 Arab lineage, 178 Arab/Arabic melting pot (see bawtaqat al-Urubah), 14, 115 Arab mindsets, 248 Arab Muslims, 1, 7, 62n89, 235 Arab nationalism (qawmiya), 16, 19n65, 30, 41, 47, 52, 55–56, 63, 67–72, 75– 78, 80–81, 84, 96, 100, 103, 109, 117, 140–141, 162, 169, 243–248 Arab nationalists, 40–42, 47, 52, 64–65, 67–69, 72–73, 75–77, 83, 86, 88n3, 89n28, 90n62, 90n63, 95–105, 109– 118, 120, 123–124, 127n71, 124n117, 140, 182, 200, 267, 240, 245–246 Arab revolution flag, 29, 77, 112, 140 Arab state/nation (ummah), 19n65, 22, 30–31, 41, 47–48, 52, 55–56, 72–77, 81–83, 90n53, 96–98, 102, 104–105, 112–113, 116, 131, 141–143, 169, 187, 196, 207, 215, 234, 243, 246– 249 Arab unity (wahda), 56, Arabesque Peace Palace, 209 Arabian Mesopotamia, 1 Arabian Peninsula, 22, 33, 117, 142, 239, 245 Arabic, 29, 31, 47–48, 52–53, 55, 72, 77, 82, 84, 99, 105, 112, 113, 142, 156, 173, 186, 189, 196, 243–244, 249, 252 Arabism, 26–27, 55, 73, 76, 86, 137, 140–141, 143, 148 Arabic Iraq (Iraq al-Arabi, al-Iraq alArab, Urubat al-Iraq, Iraq al-Ajami), 86, 241 Arabic terms, 93n134, 99 Arabize: 115, 153, 155, 214; Arabized Faili-Kurd, 128n106, 152; Arabized Kurd, 67, 111, 138n98; Arabized Mesopotamian identity, 143; Arabization, 17, 63, 71, 132, 142, 144, 149–154, 159, 162, 166n110, 184, 212; Arabization of ICP rhetoric, 81; policies, 152, 156, 187, 214; Arabization of Islam, 62n89; Turkish or Mamluk families, 251; villages, regions and areas, 31, 152, 153, 159, 162, 248 Arabness (see Uruba) Aramaeans, 142 Arba‘in (Fortieth), 147, 165n79

299

Ardalan, 7 Arif, Abdul Rahman (Arif II): 116, 117, 119, 125n3, 129n16 Arif, Abdul Salam, 95–99, 102, 110– 113, 121, 125n3, 125n6, 128n105, 128n113, 130n152, 249 Arifs’ era, 120, 122, 124 Arif, Fuad, 127n77 Armenian(s), 5, 100, 105, 244 Article 140: 200, 206–207, 212, 214, 216–217 Ashura, (Day of Ashura), 48, 50, 65, 66, 109, 118, 119, 147; 165n79, 179, 235, 242 Asad Allah, Sheikh Ahmed, 66 Asifi, Muhammad, 251 al-‘Asima (newspaper), 48 al-Askari, Ja‘far, 28, 46, 51, 55, 58 al-Askari, Murtadha, 251 al-Askari, Sami, 188 al-Assad, Bashar: Iraq’s support for, 217, 223 Association against Imperialism, 74 Association of Kurdish Students, 104 Assyria, 1; Assyrian(s), 5, 9, 77, 88n5, 142, 194; Assyrian civilization, 142; Assyrian Democratic Party, 167n118; Assyrian Empire, 239; Assyrian revolt, 88n19; Chaldo-Assyrian, 2, 40, 142, 234 Ataturk, Kemal, 66, 67 al-Atiya, Sheikh Sha‘lan, 65 Avana, 184 al-Awqati, Jalal, 110 Axis powers, 69 a‘yan, 40 al-Ayubi, Salah al-Din, 143, 234 Ayubid dynasty, 234 Aziz, Foreign Minister Tariq, 149; Kirkuk issue, 159 Baath Party: one-party state, 133; agrarian reforms, 175; aim to obliterate ICP, 132, 134; unprecedented acts of violence, 80–81, 84, 86, 90n54, 90n62, 91n79, 97–100, 109–114, 116, 118– 124, 143; 147, 155–156, 161; al-Rabi‘ (Spring) Festival, 142; Ali Salih alSa‘di, 128n98; Ahmed Hassan alBakr, 128n103; al-Kamali executed, 164n31; turning Iraq into one-party state, 133; Arif expelled, 113; Arif

300

Index

preferred military wing, 130n152; Baath constitution, 77; Basra killings, 179; clandestine publishing, 129n137; clashes with al-Dulaimi tribesmen, 180; communist rivals, 120; contention between civilian and military wings, 121; destabilized Iraq, 15; discriminatory policies, 189; domination by Tikritis, 131, 134; elimination of al-Nayif and al-Daud, 131; ideas from Syria, 76; right to recruit in armed forces, 132; execution of al-Samarra’i 164n31; failure, 119; Faith Campaign, 173; forcible assimilation of Kurds, 184; ideological army, 135; internal conflicts, 121–122; Islamic sentiments, 172; Istiqlal loses support to, 128n99; list of communists to be eliminated, 128n109; March 11 Manifesto, 150; mukhabarat 135; National Council of the Revolutionary Command (NCRC), 111; national disintegration, 163, 189; no sympathy with Kurds, 154; oust ICP from the PPNF, 132; purges, 136; removal of al-Samarra’i and al-Kamali, 138; reorganization, 2; purges, 136; Saddam, 125n24, 138, 163n1; Sunni Baathists, 128n105; suppression of ICP, 123; Syrian Baathists, 112; threats include ICP, Kurds, Shiites, and army, 162; 1991 uprising, 169; US invasion ended Party, 194; weakening of, 174 Baathification (Tab‘ith), 9, 134–135, 137, 151, 162, 163n21 Baathism, 90n62 Baathist policies, 17, 136, 141, 163n21, 164n21 Baba Gur Gur, 184 Baban, Ali, 7, 211 Babil (see Hilla) Babylon, 142 Babylonians, 9, 142, 240 Badinan, 7 Badlis, 7 Badr Brigade, 145, 150, 196 Baghdad: Abdul Rahman al-Naqib, 37n78; about to be invaded, 32; alAdhamiya neighborhood, 90n75; Aflaq arrival, 98; al-Mansur founded, 138, 234, 236; al-Rikabi, 91n75; alQaeda newspaper, 83; Arab national-

ists troops install al-Gaylani, 68; alHashemi flees, 226; al-Husri, 61n61; al-Jawahiri’s poem, 54; al-Qaeda bomb attacks, 194; ancient part of Iraq, 241; al-Rasafa, 128n93; Arab League, 105; arrival of Prince Faisal, 29, 39; Association of Kurdish Students in Europe kept out of conference, 104; autonomy statute for Kurdistan, 151; Baath dissension, 121; Baath Shiite leadership based in, 84; Baath target ICP, 132; Baghdad Conference, 104; Baghdad garrison, 113; Barzani arrival, 102; base of patriotic movement, 100; British enter, 21; capital of Abbasid Empire, 1; censorship, 31; College of Law, 62n82; convergence of Shiite and Sunnis, 27; Da‘wa processions, 119; death squads, 99; decline of ICP, 133; demonstrations, 85; detention centers, 115; effendis, 40, 66; elections, 76, 208, 209; Faili Kurds and Shiites dominated market,118; fighting in marshlands, 145; former Ottoman city, 2; Free Officers, 78; implication of Sunni majority, 33; Iraq-centric and Shiite politicians in exile in 1920, 48; ‘Iraqiness’ appeals to Kurds in, 63; KDP stalwarts arrested, 106; Kurdish nationalism, 98; Kurdish political leaders, 74; Kurdish students, 68; lack of power over Kurds, 185; lecturers at university sacked, 219; march on Baghdad, 97; migration to, 109; NDP leadership in, 74; neighborhoods became Shiite, 224–225; old Iraqi flag, 210; opposition activities, 161; Palestinian cause, 75; pre-revolutionary activities, 28; political parties, 25; population, 70; power-sharing needed, 215; prisoners now Sunni, 219; Qasim’s executions, 101; Qasim killed, 111; Rajab uprising, 148; rapprochement between Sunnis and Shiite, 27; reduced, 172; reject British mandate, 50; relations with Ankara souring, 216; removing Shiites and Kurds’ economic base, 152; Republican era, 95; 1920 Revolution, 29; Sa‘id Slaibi commanded Baghdad garrison, 113; security of, 135; schol-

Index ars, 11, 13, 54; Sheikh Mahmud’s trial, 24; Shiite leaders realize error in boycotting elections, 51; Shiite population and provinces, 70, 78, 84, 88; Shiite refuge, 145; Shiites, 152, 161; Shiite Arabs dominate, 5; Shiites forced out of neighborhoods, 196; Shiites defend regime from coup attempt, 120; Shiites redraw map and gain control, 197–198, 200; Shruqi, 125n27; SoL win, 205; statues, tombs and shrines, 238; Sunni-Arabs dominated until the 1950s, 5; Sunni neighborhoods and areas, 76, 85, 99, 100; Sunni students, 85; Sunnis forced out of mixed areas, 197; support for Faisal, 40–41; teachers colleges, 53; Toufiq Wahbi dismissed, 47; tribal conventions supersede laws, 175; Uday to gain control of, 169; University, 71, 117, 119; urban and industrial sector growth, 69–70 Baghdad Pact, 81, 95, 102, 124n1 al-Bakr, Ahmed Hassan, 111, 128n103, 131, 218 Bangi Haq (the Proclamation of Justice) newspaper, 43 Bangi Kurdistan (the Proclamation of Kurdistan) newspaper, 42–43 Banner of the Workers, 82 al-Baqir, Imam Muhammad, 236 Ba‘quba (Diyala), 2, 11, 222, 166n103 al-Barak, Fadhil, 118 Barda Qaraman (Epic of Barda Qaraman), 24, 28, 35n41, 35n41 Barzani, Mas‘ud, 144, 154, 209, 212, 215 Barzani, Mustafa, 79, 86, 91n94, 91n97, 101–102, 115, 126n61, 127n77, 239, 151 Barzan Rebellions and Revolts, 78–79 85, 95, 91n95; 239 Barzanji, Sheikh Mahmud Hafid, 22 Barzi Willat, 25 Basim’s Charter, 81 Basra, 1–2, 7, 11, 19n36, 21–22, 29, 31, 40, 42, 54, 85, 101, 155, 160, 177, 179, 204–205, 241 Battle of Chaldiran (see Chaldiran, battle of) al-Bazzaz, Abdul Rahman, 113, 115, 118, 129n117

301

Bekas, Faiq, 85 Bekas, Sherko, 28, 35n41, 239 Bell, Gertrude, 24, 28, 32 Berbers, 77 al-Bitar, Salah al-Din, 90n62 al-Bitlisi, Sharaf Khan, 245 Black September, 47, 240 al-Bolani, Jawad, 220 Bremer, Paul, 194 Britain: al-Wathba, 85; Arabization of ICP rhetoric, 81; Baghdad Pact purpose, 124; blame for failure to build Iraqi state, 8; border dispute with Turkey, 7; Anglo-French Declaration, 246; competing aims of Shiites and Sunnis, 50; conservative 1954-1958 clique favor ties, 73; Faisal plan contrary to agenda, 41; Iraqi autonomy with British control, 26; Iraq independence, 63; freedom for the Kurds, 24; King George V, 237; Ottoman Empire’s siding with Germany, 1; promote Iraqi nation-state, 40; Operation Southern Watch, 177; remove tutelage of, 95; Shiite and Sunni debate on Iraq’s sovereignty, 49; support for Kurds in 1918, 23; tripartite attack on Egypt, 78 British Army, 22, 33, 222 British flag, 31, 36n65 British House of Commons, 43 British-Iraq Declaration, 44 British-Iraqi Military Treaty, 56 British Mandate Law on Iraq, 2, 46 Brussell’s Tribunal, 211 al-Bu Nimr (tribe), 180 Bush, President George W., 194 Cairo Conference, 24 Campaign of Faith, 169 Canaanites, 142 Captain Marshall, 32 census, 248 Central Command: separate faction of ICP, 123 Central Intelligence Agency (CIA): interest in breaking the Communist party, 128n109; training of Kurdish rebels, 151 al-Chadirchi, Kamil, 73, 90n51, 252, Chaldean (see Chaldo-Assyrians) Chaldiran, battle of, 238

302

Index

Chaldo-Assyrians: 2, 5, 40, 64, 77, 142, 194; Chaldean: 42 Chamchamal, 114, 152, 168n32 chemical weapons: 155–156, 167n125, 187, 193, 240 Christians: 5, 18n13, 27, 42, 53, 75, 80– 81, 100–101, 121, 123, 152, 183, 188, 194, 201 Churchill, Winston S., 34 Circle of Seven (Golden Square), 68, 88n26 civil society, 12, 15, 79 Coalition of the Willing, 193 Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA): blamed for de-Baathification policy and disbanding Iraqi army, 9; established by US and UK, 194; draft Transitional Administrative Law with Iraqi Interim Government, 195 common memory: 14, 77, 105, 139, 147, 227, 233, 237–238, 240, 243, 252 Communism (see also ICP): accentuate Kurdishness of Kurds, 86; aim to create Iraqi identity, 83; aligned with Kurds, 101; Baghdad Pact, 81, 124n1; Arab nationalists fight, 99; assassination of Jalal al-Awqati, 111; British use religion to fight, 87; CIA interests in breaking up, 128n109; clashes with Arab nationalists, 100, 116, 98; Da‘wa fill ideological gap, 119, 124; disappearances and killings of, 112, 121, 133; dominated by Kurds, 123; dominated Iraqi cities, 107; fatwa against, 107; Karim Ahmed Dawud, 92n120; KDP support of, 101; ideas, 74; Kurdish communist movement evolve, 132; Kurdish Communists had better chance to escape, 117; Kurdish nationalists distance from, 103; Kurds and Shiites cooperate, 253; Kurds see as path to freedom, 82; Kut Shiite dominated city; 251; loyalty to Iraq, 73; Mahdi Hafiz, 104; path to equality for Shiites, 84, 99; Qasim’s allies, 99; Qasim distance from, 110; ‘red quarter’, 81; regime focus on, 120; role in patriotic movement, 97; Salih alHaidari, 89n29; secular ideology, 109, 163; Shiites as backbone of secular, 150; Shiite departure from, 188; Shorish, 79; support for new govern-

ment, 67; threat to Baath, 17; threat to religious groups, 108; urban class strengthen, 16 Conference of Allied Powers at the House of Commons, 247 Conscription Act, 6 Constitution: (see also Iraqi constitution), 202, 210, 243 Constitutional Union Party, 41 Cooperation Alliance, 98, 125n21 Council of Ministers (Iraq): 202, 214 Cox, Sir Percy (British High Commissioner), 24, 29, 36n52, 250 CPA: (see Coalition Provisional Authority) al-Dabagh, Salah al-Din, 67 Da‘wa Party (al-Da‘wa al-Islamiya, The Islamic Call): al-Islah (Reform) group disaffected from Da‘wa, 202; alMaliki, 227n8; al-Sadr and the Da‘wa, 129n44, 130n144; Sadiq al-Sadr and the Da‘wa, 179; al-Sadr as most important theoretician, 108; answer to ICP, 124; closure by Baath regime, 119; date for establishing, 127n83; expanded membership, 147; first Shiite communal political party, 107; form SCIRI with other groups, 166; leader executed, 165n77; lifting restrictions on hawza 147; member heads Ministry of Higher Education, 219; membership characteristics, 150; opposed creating federal regions, 221; Saddam’s messages received cautiously, 177; federalism, 221; organizing protest, 148; Persian founding members, 251; political space for Shiites, 120; sympathizers tortured, 149 de-Baathification, 9, 194–195, 207, 218–220, non-Baathist teachers expelled, 163n21; re-educate staff, 136 al-Dhamin, Abdul Rahman, 77 al-Dhawalim (tribe), 26 de-Kurdification, 159 De Mistura, Stephan, 214 democracy, 40, 63, 69, 72, 74, 80, 108, 199, 201, 204 206, 252; democratic: 12, 78, 87, 196, 222, 240, 249; values: 209; democratize: 195; democratization, 182

Index Dhabit Tawjih al-Siyasi (Political Guidance Officer), 136 Dhiqar (Nasiriya), 2, 81 Dibaga, 184 Directorate of General Education (see General Directorate of Education for Kurdish Studies) Displacement of Kurds, 132, 150–152, 155–156, 162, 182, 184 Diwaniya, 2, 29 Diyala (see Ba‘quba) Dobbs, Sir Henry, 45 Dohuk, 2, 8, 83, 91n98, 114, 151, 154, 159, 166n100, 166n103, 185 Dujail: comments at trial, 257n100; assassination attempt of Saddam, 181, 194; population, Sunni and Shiite population, 189, 191n50 Dukheil, Abdul Sahib, 119; executed, 147, 166n77 al-Dulaim (tribe), 128n113, 180 al-Dulaimi, Muhammad Mazlum, 180 al-Dulaimi, Naziha, 110 al-Duri, Abdul Aziz, 90n67, 117 al-Duri, Izzat, 90n67, 187 al-Duri, Abdul Muhsin, 90n67, 117 Durra, Mahmud, 55 economy: Kirkuk in terms of value, 214; annex strategic areas of Kurdistan, 184; based on agriculture in 1950s, 2; better after partition, 185; dominated by oil production, 5; effects of withdrawal of Iraqi forces from Kurdistan, 183; Islamic theory of political economy, 108; nationalizing, 139; Turkey and Iraqi Kurdistan, 216; Saddam’s close family associates’ domination of, 170; shift in geo-economics, 217; vertical, 14 education: Arabism to Iraqism, 140; Barzani revolts included in KRG texts, 239; different views of history in textbooks, 236, 240; geography of Kurdistan, 186; literacy rate, 171; teaching of the twelve Shiite Imams, 219; Kurds in Iraqi textbooks, 143; textbooks, 141–142, 233–236, 254n2; UN embargo, 172 Effendi, Ramzi Fatah, 46 effendis, 40; 59n7, 66 Egypt: Egyptians to take on Iraqi identi-

303

ty, 150; Free Officers, 77; Iraqis fleeing to, 197; first Sultan to, 234; Iraqi negotiations with, 114; Kurdish support for Nasser, 86; Halabja incident misplaced in Iraqi text referring to Egypt, 235; Mubarak and Shiites’ loyalty, 252; Nasser’s 1952 coup, 75; Qasim’s and Nasser, 97; Saddam’s invitation to Egyptians, 249; tripartite attack on, 78, 85; UAE, 125n13; unification with, 112; unified political Command with Nasser, 113 Eid al-Ghadir, 65, Faisal’s coronation coincided, 39 Eighth Regional Congress, 135 elections: absence of democracy, 122; al-Khalisi’s fatwa, 48, 221; mishandling of, 65; al-Maliki not inclined to turn over power peacefully, 209; dismissal of Toufiq Wahbi, 47–48; broke record, 203; Kirkuk and elections, 201, 210; determined by identity, 205; monarchy and revolutionary era, 98; 1954 elections, 74, 76; 1992 elections in Kurdistan, 182, 186; 2010 election, 202, 204–209; Faisal persuades Shiites to participate, 50; fraud, 64, 87; government manipulated, 64, 65; high turnout in 2010, 208; current political figures and blocs, 206; Iraq since 2005, 199; Iraqi National Assembly 2005, 8; Istiqlal won 1947, 76; Kurdish and Arab candidates, 207; 8 million participate in 2005 vote, 196; miscalculation of boycott, 51; NA electees, 175; NDP wins, 74; NDP favored democratic, 98; parliamentary elections, 47, 110, 122, 218; 2009 provincial elections, 198; Qasim, NDP and al-Ahali, 110; reveal fragmentation, 199; rise of Islamism, 186; sectarianism and voting in 2010, 204; secular tone in 2010, 202; since 2005, 199; split of grand Shiite coalition, 201; Sunni boycott, 199, 218–219; Sunni manipulated, 87; Transitional National Assembly, 196; tribal leader influence, 175; voting on ethnonational and sectarian lines, 199–200 embargo, 32, 172, 173, 175 Epic of Barda Qaraman (see Barda Qaraman)

304

Index

Erbil: political agreement led to formation of al-Maliki’s government 220, 226; anti-government demonstrations, 182; competing center of gravity, 186; GDEKS’ authority, 103; autonomy statute, 151; demonstrations in, 182; Hindreen Mountain, 129n132; migration to, 128n92; Hiwa and Barzani, 79; implementation of Article 16 of the British Mandate Law on Iraq, 46; one of 18 provinces of Iraq, 2; one of 4 provinces of Kurdistan Region, 8; outside no-fly zone, 184; PUK driven out, 185; PUK in, 154; territorial boundaries, 114; Turkmen in, 5; Erdo an’s landmark visit, 217; uprising in, 168n140; revolt spread to Koysinjaq, 23; Kurdish demand for local government to include, 46, 49, 114; autonomy statute include, 151; Sargaran annexed from Erbil and put in Kirkuk province, 153; recaptured, 184; center of gravity, 186; political agreement, 220 Erdo an, Recep Tayyip: landmark visit to the KRG, 217 ethnic pot (see melting pot) ethnic cleansing, 10, 115, 187, 198, 211–212 ethnicity: Arabs largest ethnic group in Iraq 5; approval along the line of, 195; aspirations based on, 246; character of Iraq not given in Iraqi textbooks, 234; constitution recognizes diversity, 211; ethnic and religious distribution, 18n16; ethnic and sectarian conflict, 9, 12, 16; ethnic and sectarian identities, 222, 226; ethnic groups, 176; differences, 195, 207; fear of domination, 249; incarceration rates, 219; Iraqi textbooks avoidance of, 234; Kurds’ co-nationals, 243; monopoly of power by one group, 233; polarized Iraqi communities, 221; political blocs suffer from fissures, 204; policies of assimilation, 211; possibility of transcending sectarian lines greater, 253; power struggle, 250, prohibited from changing, 187; representatives in new government, 196; Shiites and Iran, 252; state based on, 245, 247; vote according to, 204

Ethno-national(ism), 244, fragmentation, 198; government dealing with groups, 189; groups control media, 224; groups fear domination by the other, 249; lack of common memory, 252; links outside of Iraq, 243; polarization of Iraqi ethno-sectarian groups, 223 Euphrates; meaning of Mesopotamia, 2; location of al-Haditah, 10, Shatt alArab 19n36, rebellion, 22; battlefield of 1920 Revolution, 26; mindset of Kurds, 30; Shiite rebellion, 39; area supported the King, 40; al-Jawahiri’s dislike for, 54; uprisings by Shiite tribesmen, 64; growing tension, 65; al-Hashimi’s cabinet travelled to, 66; country towns inhabited by Sunnis, 113; al-Hajj launched guerilla warfare in, 117; location of Iraqi marshlands, 177, 251 ex-Baathists, 211 al-Fadila Party, 201–202 Fahd’s Charter, 81, 92n111 Faidhi, Sulaiman, 36n46, discussion with Gertrude Bell, 28 Faili-Kurd(s): Arabization policy, 151– 152; 166n104; Baathist policy of ‘weeding out’, 146; merchants dominated the trade in 1950s and 1960s, 118, 139; people of Kut, 251; Shiites include, 5; stripped of Iraqi nationality, 250 Al-Fajir al-Jadid (newspaper), 117, 129 Faisal bin Ali (King Faisal/Prince Faisal): Abd al-Illah appointed as regent, 68; accusing mujtahids of being loyal to Iran, 250; annexing southern Kurdistan to Iraq, 24, 42; arrival to Baghdad, 29; Ashura celebration and Iraqi flag, 49; blaming past Shiite sufferings on current leaders; 237; championed by T.E. Lawrence, 21; conditional pledge from al-Khalisi, 48; death of, 16; establishment of high education institutions in Shiite areas, 54; fear of internal disorder, 57; first king of Iraq, 34, 39; first treaty with Britain, 44; impacts on national integration, 63; invitation to al-Husri, 61n62; lack of

Index essential ingredients of nation-formation, 59, 64; letter from Dobbs, 45; majority of Kurds rejected, 40; memorandum of 1932, 56-58, 62n102, 249; necessity of establishing Kurdish selfrule, 47; not Iraqi by birth, 55, 58; persuade Shiite tribal leaders to participate in elections, 50; reminding Allies of promises to his father, 247; role uniting the country, 17; rural population alienated, 86; Shiite mujtahids of Najaf and Karbala sent memo to, 22; shortage of suitable Shiite technocrats and civil servants, 53; unrivalled symbols of Arab nationalism, 41 Faisal II, 68 Faith Campaign (Hamlat al-Iman), 17, 173–174 Fatah, Thuraya Najim Abdulla, 209 Federal Supreme Court: interpretation of ‘largest bloc’, 203 federalism: imposition from external powers, 221; Iraq must address to achieve progress, 8; Kurds campaigned for, 188, 200; pending issue between KRG and central government, 215; anti-federalism, 207; Shiites rejection of, 209 Federation: al-Maliki opposed, 222; Article 140 of constitution lead to confederation, 216; 97; ethnic groups emerge from, 176; administrative federation, 114; KDP proposes ethnonational, 188–189; Kurds’ inclination to, 105; Qasim suggests federation of “liberated” Arab countries, 97; selfrule a criterion for nation, 14 Fichte, Johann, 52, 62n73 Fida’iyin (Saddam’s Men of Sacrifice), 169 Fidakarani Kurd (Kurdish Fedayee), 25 al-Fituwa (Chivalry), 136 al-Fkaiki, Hani, 77, 86, 90n54, 98, 120, 128, 130n155 Founding Revolution (see 1920 Revolution) Fourteen Points speech, 246 Fourth Congress, the KDP, 103 Free Officers, 77, 79, 90, 125n6, 126n40, 128n103; expansion of activities, 95; formed a Supreme

305

Committee, 124n3; influenced by liberal democratic programs of NDP, 78; represented Arab nationalism, 80 Freedom Committee, 79 Fund for Peace Failed State Index, 222 Gargar, 152 Garner, Lieutenant General Jay, 194 al-Gaylani, Rashid ‘Ali, 55, 65–67, 72, 89n28 al-Gaylani’s coup, 68, 76 General Directorate of Education for Kurdish Studies (GDEKS), 102, 103, 106 General Relations Bureau (mukhabarat), 135 genocide: crimes against humanity, 150, 157, 184; HRW research, 167n128; Chamchamal stoning to free detainees,168n132; justified by Saddam and Sunni supporters, 150 Gezh, 152 al-Ghatta, Muhammad Hussein Kashif, 65–66, 87, 88n8, 108 Ghazi (Prince/King): died under mysterious circumstances, 68; mishandling of elections, 65; pan-Arab orientation, 64; reassure Kurds of rights, 46 GNI (see gross national income) GNP (see gross national product) Golden Square, 68 Gorran (Change), 134, 201, 215; 228n43 Grand Shiite Coalition (see UIA), 201 Great Revolution (see revolution: 1920 Revolution) Greeks, 1 Gregorian Calendar, 241 Gross national income (GNI), 5 Gross national product (GNP), 5 Gulf Countries, 146 Gulf War(s), 5, 146 al-Hadi, Imam Ali, 237 al-Hadi, Imam Hassan, 237 Hadi, Mizban Khidir, 251 Hadid, Muhammad, 73, 74 al-Haeri, Grand Ayatollah Kazim, 226 Hafiz, Mahdi, 104 al-Haidari, Salih, 68, 82, 85, 89n29, 126n51 al-Ha’iri, Kazim, 251 al-Hajj, Aziz, 116–117, 123

306

Index

al-Hajj Sukar, Sheikh Abdul Wahid, 65 Haj Omran, 144 al-Hakim, Amar, 127n80, 202 al-Hakim, Mahdi, 147, 165n75 al-Hakim, Muhammad Baqr, 194, 166n90 al-Hakim, Grand Marja‘ Muhsin, 107– 108, 110, 118–121, 127n80, 146–147 Hakkari, 8 Halabja, 155, 185, 235 Hamadi, Sa‘dun, 121 Hamlat al-Iman (see Faith Campaign) Hanafi School of Islam, 138 Haras al-Istiqlal, 25, 27 al-Haras al-Qawmi (Arab National Guard), 111 Hardi, Ahmedi, 82 Hashemite, 41, 60n15, 60n42 al-Hashimi, Abu Talib Abdul Mutalib, 120, 130n55 al-Hashimi, Taha, 28, 64, 88n3, 249 al-Hashimi, Tariq, 214, 223, 226 al-Hashimi, Yasin, 28, 65, 152, 250 al-Hassan, Abdul Razzaq, 250 Haweeja, 152, 167n14 Herder, Johann Gottfried von, 51, 52 Hilla (Babil), 160, 161 Hijaz, 21, 39, 41 Hindren Mountain Battle, 115, 129n131 Hiwa (Hope) Party, 78–79 Hiwar, 201, 206, 207 Hizb al-Ahrar (see Liberal Party) Hizb al-Itihad al-Watani (see Patriotic Union Party) Hizb al-Qa’id (Party of the Leader), 139 Hizb al-Sha‘b (see People Party) Hizb al-Tahrir al-Islami, 117 al-Hizb al-Watani al-Democrati (National Democratic Party), 72–74, 78, 81, 84, 86, 89n51, 89n52, 90n58, 97–98, 105, 109-110, 126n62, 128n96 honor-killing, 175 hukumdar, 23, 42, Human Rights Watch (HRW), 155, 167n128, 168n132, 168n140 al-Hur Party, 25, 48 al-Husri, Sati‘, 49, 51–54, 55, 58–59, 61n61 al-Hussein, Hajj Amin, 75 Hussein, Saddam: slogan “Allahu Akbar” to the Iraqi flag, 173; background of, 163; charged in Iraqi court, 194; description of army, 143; friends

and family control, 170; hanging, 222; killing sons-in-law, 175, 180; personality cult, 170; turning Iraq into republican-monarchy, 169; overthrow, 253; rewriting history, 136, 142; the Islamic tone, 173; trial, 251; WMD, 193 Hydrocarbons Law, 214 ICP (see Iraqi Communist Party) Identity: Iraqi, 1–2, 8–15, 17, 22, 29, 31, 34, 40–41, 48, 57–58, 69, 72, 76, 85, 86, 97, 99, 104, 137, 139–146, 173, 189, 224, 226, 240, 253; Sunni communal, 7; Kurdish, 12, 79–80, 83, 102–103, 106, 133–134, 145, 181, 186, 189, 210; binational, 45; Shiite, 53, 84, 107, 119, 150, 178, 181, 188; Persian, 62n89; Arab ethnic, 77–78; territorial, 77, 80, 103, 113-116, 189, 214-215, 248; sectarian, 64, 100, 109, 150, 204, 223; Kirkuk, 101; FailiKurds, 151; Baathist vision for, 162; Iraq’s Arab tribal, 175; Islamization and tribalization undermined, 176; RCC’s “identity correction” decree, 187; killings based on identity, 197– 198; elections determined by, 204– 205; al-Maliki’s claim of Kirkuk’s Iraqi identity, 214; crisis, 242–243, 247–248; uncompromised vision of Arab, 243, 248 Imagined community, 47, 59, 98, 116, 244; imagined territory, 245; overlapping hoped-for states, 246 Imam Hussein bin Ali, 7, 27, 39, 48–49, 59n3, 147, 165n79, 225, 234–237, 243 IMK (see Islamic Movement in Kurdistan) INA (see Iraqi National Alliance): division, 226 Independence Party (see Istiqlal), 201 Indo-European: Kurdish as language, 7 internally displaced: 197 international community, 193 International Union of Students, 104 Iran: Arab communists support Saddam in war against, 133; Abadan, 11; alJawahiri’s citizenship, 54; al-Khalisi deported to, 48; al-Khalisi died in Iran, 61n57; al-Sh‘ubiya movement, 62n89; Badr Brigade and Peshmerga,

Index 150; Barzani flees to, 79, 91n94, 91n97; Barzani supports Iranian forces, 144; Baath draw on Islamic sentiments, 172; Battle of Chaldiran, 238; borders with, 56; capture thousands of Iraqi soldiers, 149; center of Shiite opposition, 145; change in policy to side with Shiite government, 198; concern by Turkey of involvement, 217; constant threat to Iraq, 146; Shiite activists go to Iran, 149; departure of Kurdish Free Officers to, 78; east of Mesopotamia, 3; effect of Iranian Revolution on Shiite, 148; Faili-Kurds expelled, 152, 250; failure of the Kurdistan Republic in, 83; fewer Kurds than Arabs participated in war, 159; gestures toward Talabani and al-Sadr by, 226; government appointment of Arab successor to grand marja‘, al-Kho’i, 178; government options for organizing, 206; haven for Iraqi Shiite opposition, 149; imitating the Shah, 66; intervention in PUK-KDP conflict, 185; Saddam’s trial, 117; Iraq aligns with Iran and Syria, 225; Iraq image of WMD, 183; Iraqis flee to, 197; Khomeini, 166n87; Kurdish and Shiite opposition line up with Iran, 162; Kurdish cooperation a motive for Anfal, 156; Kurds living, 243, 244; Kurds flee to mountains, 161; leverage over Iraqi politics, 226; participant in Baghdad Pact, 81, 124n1; pressure for INA and SoL to merge, 203–204; regime accuses chief marja’s son of spying for, 147; regime targets Kurds by border, 153; Saddam draws on pan-Arabism and Iraqism against Iran, 141, 143, 173, 175; Safavids adopted Shiism, 7, 237; sending Shiites against Iranians, 166n91; Sh‘ubi used to describe Iranian, 99; Sidqi advocated closer relations, 67; supplies to Kurdish rebels, 151; support for PUK against KDP, 185; support Shiite government of Iraq, 198; threat to Iraq not conducive to cohesiveness, 146; Turkey worries about growing influence of, 216, 217 Iranian anti-Arab movements (see Sh‘ubi)

307

Iranian Kurdistan, 78, 83 Iranian Revolution, 145, 148 Iranian Revolutionary Guard, 145 Iraq: absence of a common tie, 57; ageold contention with Kurds, 182, 185, 212, 214; Arab Islamic character is claimed, 234; banning oil companies that invest in Kurdistan, 215; binational nature of, 163; British created, 2, 189; categorization of Kurds as Sunnis, 53; Christian population drop, 18n13; collective punishment, 176181; common enemy insufficient to unite, 85–86, 252; communities demarcated by ethnicity, 21, 120, 188, 219; conceal information on WMD, 193; consensus needed, 253; contradictory visions of, 116; as nation-tobe, 189; disarming, 193; disintegration of, 185, 186, 189; economy, 5, 171; flag as a symbol, 242; geographical and cultural character, 1; effects of mass education, 70, 71; polarization, 240; immigration, 172; incoherency of Iraq’s political blocs, 226; infant mortality rise, 186; invade, 193; invaded territory inside Iran, 150; Iraq alQa’id (Iraq of the Leader), 139; Iraq’s two major nationalities, 114, 151, 248; link Shiism to Iran, 250; looting of archeological treasures, 194; national anthems, 242; merger with UAE, 98; mutual recognition needed, 253; name and regions of, 241; oil fields, 155; part of Arab nation, 131; Kirkuk’s oil wealth, 214; opposition, 187; political parties fight imperialism, 84; political parties help to integrate, 69; presidential palaces attacked, 194; reaction to British, 22; rebels demand independent Arab state, 30; removal of British and monarchy, 96, 122; sectarian policy, 177; shared memories, 240; sociopolitical development, 15, 86, 170– 172; southern stronghold of Shiism, 7; sustainability depends on, 8; tribal identity, 175; withdrawal from Kurdistan region, 182, 184 Iraq al-Ajami, 241 Iraq al-Arabi, 241 Iraq Body Count, 197, 227n14 Iraq-Iran war: Baath reconsiders strategy, 175; fewer Kurds than Arabs par-

308

Index

ticipated, 159; question of fostering unity and identity, 144-146; income after, 171; launched by Iraq, 141; oil production declined, 5; per-capita income drop, 171; pretext to destroy villages, 153; Saddam highlights Arab Iraqi tribal identity, 175; Iraq Liberation Act, 193 Iraq-Soviet friendship and cooperation treaty, 151 Iraqi Accord Front: 201; largest Sunni bloc, 218; opposed federalism, 221 Iraqi Air Force, 183 Iraqi Arab(s), 5, 26, 45, 52, 55, 82, 144, 182, 185, 187, 198, 200, 240–242, 247–248 Iraqi army: 1966 Accord, 115–116; alGaylani, 89n28; al-Hashimi, 88n3; alMaliki’s, 220; Kurdish memo regarding GDEKS 106; “Arab army,” 27; Baath and army, 77, 81, 111, 135; Barzani fled, 79; children as human shields, 181; classifying based on support for war, 178; communists’ secret cells, 132; CPA disbanded, 194; crush uprising, 161; death penalty for nonBaathists, 135; defeat in Kuwait, 160; deserters murdered, 177; disbanding of, 9; educational system, 51; establishment of army, 55, 78; ex-Ottoman officers, 75; Faisal relies on Arab nationalists in, 64; Gabalaka burned, 129n128; genocide, 157; killings based on identity, 197; humiliation of Kurds, 144; KDP capture Erbil, 185; most powerful institution in, 67; officers executed, 126n38; pro-British regime expelled Arab-nationalists, 140; protection of Qasim, 101; recruitment, 176; removal of Sunnis from, 69; required to defend Iraq, 57; restricted in Kurdistan, 114; Shiites and Iran-Iraq war, 145; Sidqi, 88n19; Sunnis in army, 107, 110, 220; Sunni politics since US invasion, 218; Sunnis and king’s army, 49; support for disbanding, 195; Mosul problem, 100; threat to Baath, 17, 131, 162; unification mechanism, 143; used truce to attack, 66; withdrawal from Kurdistan, 183, 189 Iraqi Communist Party (ICP):;‘Amer Abdullah, 92n115; anti-imperial senti-

ment, 85; Baath and formation of PPNF, 140; Baath see as threat, 131, 162; branded as Sh‘ubis, 117; clandestine cells within the army, 77; collaboration with NDP, 103; death blow by Kurds, 133; defend regime against coup, 120; development of, 75; disappointed in election results, 205; escaped members return and reactivate cells, 116; Fahd and Basim, 92n112; fatwa against public joining, 107; firebrand rhetoric and national integration, 122; formed in mid-1935, 74; high-ranking leaders ousted, 126n51; Iraqi-centrism/patriotism, 73, 97, 100, 249; joined Iraqi troops to fight the Kurds, 132; no seats won in election, 200; in Kurdistan, 80; in war with Kurds; in Kirkuk, 101; Jewish members, 92n109; Karim Ahmed Dawud, 92n120; Kurdish arm of ICP, 167n118; Kurds and Shiites embrace, 83; Kurdish affairs, 134; Kurds did not constitute a nation, 82; leftist agenda impact Free Officers, 78; little done for Shiites, 150; monopolization of power, 98; most inclusive political party, 75, 81, 84, 134, 249, 253; murderous campaign, 112; parliamentary blocs, 201; senior leaders from government posts, 110; rectify Fahd’s Charter, 92n111; religious movements, 109; rise of PPNF and Kurdish question, 151; role in Hindreen mountain battle, 129n31; stronghold in Shiite community, 251; support Kurdish right to self-determination, 82; suffering at hands of Arab nationalists, 123; Shiites sideline ICP, 124; support for Qasim, 251; support of Arabism, 86; suppression of, 123; Turkmen against, 102; weakened ICP loses Shiites of vehicle to air grievances, 146 Iraqi constitution, 8, 44–45, 50, 65, 96, 102–106, 110, 112, 122, 125n10, 126n62, 131, 138, 189, 196, 199–202, 206, 207, 209–212, 214, 216–217, 221–222, 243, 249 Iraqi flag, 29, 45, 47–49, 102, 173, 211, 216, 224, 225, 242 Iraqi Governing Council (IGC), 194 Iraqi Intelligence Services (formerly General Relations Bureau), 135

Index Iraqi Interim Government (IIG), 195 Iraqi Islamic Party: offshoot of Muslim Brotherhood, 174 Iraqi Journalists’ Union, 169 Iraqi Kurdistan Communist Party (Shorish), 79, 89n29 Iraqi Military College, 55 Iraqi National Accord, 221, 227n8 Iraqi National Alliance (INA): 201–207, 216 Iraqi National List (Iraqiya), 199–202, 204–207, 209, 216, 218, 220 Iraqi National Assembly, 8 Iraqi National Congress (INC), 188 Iraqi nationalism (wataniya), 30, 42, 56, 72, 73, 81, 83, 87, 96, 144, 208, 214 Iraqi Olympic Committee, 169 Iraqi Parliament, 8, 36n46, 50, 58, 61n53, 88n20, 188, 201, 210, 225 Iraqi patriotism (see also Iraqi nationalism/wataniya), 12, 16, 26–27, 29–31, 58, 71–73, 78, 83, 86, 95, 122, 124, 133, 141, 204, 244, 246, 248, 249 Iraqi Provisional Government, 29 Iraqi security forces, 147, 160, 182, 198 Iraqiness: 9, 29, 34, 41, 63, 71, 72, 133, 140, 248 Iraqiya Party, 201 Iraqiya White Bloc, 204 Iraqism, 124, 140, 141, 173, 188 Iraq’s Supreme Court, 201 ISCI (see also Islamic Supreme Council of Iraq), 145, 194, 196, 201–203, 221, 251 al-Islah (Reform) movement, 202 Islam: 76, 109, 119, 142, 148, 172, 173, 174, 236, 238, 251 Islamic Movement in Kurdistan (IMK), 149, 185, 186 Islamic nationalism, 30 Islamic Supreme Council of Iraq (ISCI) formerly the Supreme Council for the Islamic Revolution in Iraq (SCIRI): 145, 150, 194, 196, 202–203, 221, 251 Islamism, (see also Shiite Islamism, pan-Islamism), 148, 150, 162, 169, 172–174, 186, 188 Islamists: 201, 202; Shiite Islamists, 150, 200; Sunni Islamists, 99, 117– 118, 200 Islamization, 176 Isma‘il, Fayaz, 77

309

Isma‘il, Shah, 238 Isma‘il, Turki, 180 Israel, 78, 151 al-Istikhbarat (Military Intelligence), 135 Istiqlal (Independence) Party, 72, 75–77, 80–81, 84, 86, 90n67, 90n78, 97, 98, 109–110, 125n9, 128n99 al-Istiqlal (newspaper), 45 Itihad al-Sha‘b (the Unity of the People) newspaper, 117, 126n39 Itihad al-Sh‘ubiyun (the Union of Sh‘ubis), 117 Jabir, Salih, 85 Jabr, Bayan, 196 al-Ja‘fari, Ibrahim, 202, 209, 243 Ja‘fari jurisprudence, 65 al-Ja‘fari school, 53 Jaff, Izzat Beg, 46 Jalo, Hadi, 225 Jama‘at al-Ulama (Society of Jurists), 108, 119, 127n90 Jamil, Hussein, 73 al-Jamali, Muhammad Fadhil, 71 al-Jamhuriya (newspaper), 99 Jam‘iyat al-‘Ahd (Society of the Covenant, see also al-‘Ahd), 245 Jam‘iyat al-Arabiya al-Fatat (Young Arab Society), 62n89, 245 Jam‘iyat al-Nahdha al-Islamiya (Assoc iation of Islamic Renaissance), 32 Jam‘iyat Watanparwaran (Association of Patriots), 46 al-Janabi, Abbas, 169 Jawdat, Ali, 28, 65, 68, 89n48 Jawad, Hazim: 77, 92n127, 120–121, 128n106 al-Jawad, Imam Muhammad, 237 al-Jawahiri, Muhammad Mahdi, 54, 55 Jews: 5, 18n14, 27, 118, 150 Jewish Holocaust, 159 Jordan, 2, 128n109, 170, 175,180, 197, 206, 243 Jordanian Embassy, 194 al-Jumaila (tribe), 112, 128n113 Jund al-Islam (Soldiers of Islam), 170, 185 Justice and Accountability Law, 218 KA (see Kurdistan Alliance) al-Kadhimiya, 7, 21, 25, 48, 50–51, 65, 81, 83, 109

310

Index

Kakays, 152 Kalar, 152, 184 Kamil, Hussein, 170, 180–181 Kamil, Saddam, 170 180–181 Kamil, Shabib, 88n26 al-Kamali, Shafiq, 138, 164n31 Kamuna, Sadiq, 90n58 Karbala: 2, 7, 22, 27, 39, 48–50, 108– 109, 119, 147–148, 179, 235–238 al-Karboli, Jamal, 226 Kaway Asingar, 239 al-Kazim, Imam Musa, 234, 237 Kazzar, Nazim, 135 KDP (Kurdistan Democratic Party), 76, 79–80, 82, 84–85, 97, 98, 100–106, 110, 115, 122–123, 125n21, 126n49, 126n51, 128n75, 128n77, 133, 144, 154, 167n118, 182–186, 189, 215, 216, 227n10, 246, 249 Khabat (Struggle) KDP newspaper, 102–106, 126n49, 127n71n 127n75 Karbala, 2, 7, 22, 27, 39, 48–50, 108– 109, 119, 147–148, 179, 235–236, 238 al-Khalisi, Mahdi, 48, 55, 61n58, 64, 221, 237, 250, 255; 255n23 Khanaqin, 24, 31, 115, 151–152, 154, 166n103, 222, 257n85 Khani, Ahmadi, 245 al-Kho’i, Abu al-Qasim, 147, 178 Khomeini, Ayatollah, 148, 166n87, 172 Khurmala dome, 184 Khuzestan, 1 Kifah al-Sha‘b (The Struggle of the People) newspaper, 75, 81 Kifri, 36n65, 153, 167n114, 184, 212 Kikan, 152 King Faisal I, 16, 58, 64, 249 King Faisal II, 46, 64, 65, 68 King George V, 237 Kirkuk (al-Ta’mim), 2, 5, 8, 21, 23, 40, 46–47, 79, 99–103, 110, 114–115, 126n40, 128n92 , 151–154, 157, 159– 160, 166n110, 167n114, 168n130, 168n132, 182, 186–187, 189, 200– 201, 205, 210–212, 214, 217, 223, 248, 257n85 KIU (see Kurdistan Islamic Union) Komeley Hevi Kurd (Kurdish Hope Society), 246 Komeley Taraqi u Ta‘ali Kurdistan (Society for the Rise and Progress of Kurdistan), 246

Koutis, 142 Koyi, Haji Qadiri, 245, 246 Koysinjaq, 23 KRG (Kurdistan Regional Government), 2, 168n132, 183, 185, 187–188, 209, 211–212, 214–217, 233, 239–240, 246 Kuba, Muhammad Mahdi, 80, 90n67, 90n76, 125n9 Kufa, 7, 236, 241 Kurd(s): 1966 Accord and al-Bazzaz’s, 113, 116; accusations of discrimination, 57, 58; al-Hashimi reaches out to, 226; al-Husri as anti-Kurds, 53; alMaliki and, 200, 214, 222; al-Rabi‘ Festival, 142; Article 140, 206; Arabization, 152; Arabs and British as ‘Other,’ 45; Article 3 of 1958 constitution, 105; aspirations for self-rule, 72, 227; autonomous region, 182; Baath and, 77–78, 111, 141; Barda Qaraman as symbol of, 24; Black September Day of 1930, 240; boundaries redrawn, 184; British and, 33–34; communism as path to freedom, 82, 123; army and, 56; comprise of population, 5; constitute bulk of ICP, 81; 1958 constitution, 112; constitution recognizes, 196; contingent paramilitary groups, 175; Cooperation with ICP, 98; cooperation with Arabs, 85, 96; de-Baathification, 194; deKurdifying Kirkuk, 159; differences with Shiites, 188; different ancestry, 239; different nationalisms, 248; disagreement on nature of Iraq, 8; displacement and disappearances, 153, 156; distancing from ICP, 134; divided homeland, 122; effects of Anfal, 160; Faili-Kurds and Shiites dominate market, 118; failure to assimilate, 185; Faisal encourages political participation, 58; Faisal opposed coercion, 42; favor direct rule by British, 43; fear of Shiites, 249; federalism, 189, 221; fewer seats taken in 2010 election, 202; fill vacuum left by removal of Arabs in army, 69; fleeing Iraq, 172; formation of ethno-national organizations, 63; foundations for liberation, 245; Freedom Committee, 79; Ghazi reassures Kurds, 46; importance of Battle of Chaldiran, 238; inclusion as

Index betrayal, 44; inherent divisions among, 204; Iraqi textbooks exclude, 234; issue of accepting Arab ruler, 21; issue of independence, 215–216; issue of ‘Iraqiness,’ 9; issue of large oil reserve in Kirkuk, 212; issue of political identity, 12, 13; Istiqlal never appealed to, 76; KDP role in Article 3, 126n62; killing determined by identity, 181; kingmaker role, 203; KRG formation, 183; Kurdish Communist Party, 133; Kurdish lists, 228n43; Kurds constrained by strident Arab slogans, 86; Kurdistan Teachers Union, 103; Kurds revolt under mandate, 32; lack of common memory, 237; lack of enthusiasm to fight for Iraq, 146; language divides, 74, 252; Light Battalions, 144; longstanding ethnic and intertribal animosities, 100; 11 March Manifesto, 151; marginalized, 75, 124; merger of Kurdish state, 40; museums and monuments, 187; nationalizing companies, 139; nationhood understood, 244; negative reaction to al-Gaylani’s coup, 68; no common denominator, 59; no-fly zone, 177; on periphery, 41; opposition to revolt, 101; opposition to Saddam, 179; origin of ‘Kurdistan’, 242; origin of Kurds, 104, 106, 115; Ottomans ended self-rule, 7; part of Greater Kurdish nation, 80, 82; rebellion of Yazidis in Sinjar, 66; pan-Kurdism, 243; participating with Ottoman army as Muslims, 22; participation in 2005 elections, 199; perception of homeland, 246; Peshmarga cooperate with Iran, 150; Peshmarga in control of countryside, 145; possibility of Kurdish break, 218; postponement of census, 211; PUK, 155; region prospered under two governments, 185; reject disarmament, 114, 182; rejection of Iraq, 161; relation with Shiites, 209; relations with Turkey, 217; right to self-determination, 253; Salah alDin not recognized as a Kurd, 143, 235; school curriculum, 186; share of power negligible 87; Sheikh Mahmud and the 1920 Revolution, 27–31; Sheikh Mahmud’s letter to Britain, 23;

311

Sh‘ubis, 117; Sidqi and army, 67; squabble over Iraqi flag, 210; stripped of nationality and deported, 250; Sunni opposition more threatening than Kurdish, 180; support for ICP, 83, 102, 132; support to disband army, 195; suppression of Kurdish rebellion, 39; threat to Baath, 17, 162; Toufiq Wahbi letters, 47; Treaty of Sèvres and Lausanne, 25; two nationalisms, 131; use of Gregorian calendar, 241; villages razed, 154; welcomed US invasion, 223; Wilson’s points and, 247 Kurd-Arab, 159, 253 Kurdayati (see Kurdish nationalism), 72 Kurdish Hope Society (see Komeley Hevi Kurd) Kurdish independence, 44, 216 Kurdish Liberation Party (Rizgari Kurd), 79, 89n29 Kurdish nationalism(s), 12, 16, 23, 31, 42, 51, 63, 71–72, 78–80, 83, 89n46, 98, 103, 169, 214, 216, 239, 243, 244, 245, 247, 248 Kurdish nationalists: 28, 42, 79, 82, 92n102, 96, 103–104, 106, 116, 120, 126n49, 127n71, 133, 182 Kurdish problem, the, 43, 47, 105, 116, 154, 249 Kurdish rebellion, 12, 22, 30, 39, 43, 151, 154, 156 Kurdistan (southern Kurdistan, Iraqi Kurdistan), 5, 8, 11, 17, 18n13, 21, 23, 43– 47, 77, 79–80, 82, 89n29, 92n102, 98, 103–104, 110, 112–117, 123, 131–133, 144–145, 150–159, 172, 182, 183–189, 191n69, 200–201, 209, 210–212, 214– 217, 223, 226, 235, 238, 240–242, 245–246, 248; mandate, 25 Kurdistan (newspaper), 246 Kurdistan Alliance (KA), 199, 200–201, 205–206 Kurdistan Communist Party (Shorish, Iraqi Kurdistan Communist Party, KCP), 79, 89n29, 92n120, 133 Kurdistan Democratic Party (see KDP) Kurdistan flag, 23–24, 27, 31, 42, 186, 216, 217, 242 Kurdistan Front (see Kurdistan National Front), 154, 160, 167n118

312

Index

Kurdistan General Directorate of Education, 103 Kurdistan Gizing (Glow of Kurdistan), 25 Kurdistan Institute for Political Issues (KIPI), 242 Kurdistan Islamic Union (KIU), 199, 201, 228n43 Kurdistan National Front, 160, 167n118 Kurdistan Parliament (see Kurdistan Regional Parliament) Kurdistan Regional Organization, the ICP’s, 132 Kurdistan Region: conflict with Iraq, 184; KDP and PUK partitioned (tahzib), 185; nation-building, 186; parallel nation, 189 Kurdistan Regional Government (see KRG) Kurdistan Regional Parliament, 8 Kurdistan Republic in Iranian Kurdistan, 78, 83 Kurdistan Teachers Union (KTU), 103 Kurdistan Toiler’s League (Komala), 134 Kurdistan TV, 187 Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK), 186 Kurdistani Alliance (KA), 199, 228n43 Kurd’s KA, 201 Kurdsat, 187 Kut (see Wasit) Kuwait War: 143, 146, 160, 168n138, 170, 173, 178 182, 183, 193 Land Tenure Law, 69, 174 Lausanne Treaty, 24, 25, 42, 45, 46, 239 Lawrence, T. E., 21, 34n5 League for the Defense of Women’s Rights (al-Rabita), 110 League of Nations: precursor to independence of Iraq, 58; incorporate Kurdistan into Iraq, 44; Liberal Party (Hizb al-Ahrar), 73 Liberalism, 63 Light Battalions (al-Afwaj al-Khafifa), 144 Liwa al-Istiqlal, 76 al-Madfa‘i, Jamil, 28, 65, 68, 89n48 al-Mahdawi, Abdul-Naser, 222 al-Mahdawi, Muhammad Hussein, 120 al-Mahdi, Imam Muhammad, 7, 237, 254n19

Mahdi Army, 188, 198, 218 al-Majid, Ali Hassan, 155–156, 159, 167n120, 175 Majid, Muhammad Baqr Hassan 165n71 Makhmour, 152, 184 Makki, Alaa, 219 al-Maliki, Nouri, 196, 200–209, 214, 217–218, 220, 222–226, 227n8, 228n31, 229n68, 230n100, 230n117, 243, 256n60, 266 Mandaeans, 5 Mandali, 152, 166n103, 212 al-Mansur, Abu Ja‘far, 138–139, 143, 224–225, 234, 236–237 Maoists, 116 Maqsud, Clovis, 105 Marad al-Ras (Safar Uprising), 147 marja‘iya (Shiite religious authority), 7, 148, 178 Marjan, Abdul Wahhab, 90n58 marsh Arabs, 177, 251 marshlands (al-Ahwar), 145, 172, 176– 178, 251 Marwan, Abdul Malik bin, 153, 236 Marxist-Leninist, 79, 103 Maysan (Amara), 2 mawlud, 27, 109 McMahon, Henry, 247 Medes, 142, 239 Median, 142, 255n32; Median Empire, 239 Media: outlets are partisan, 224 melting pot, 14, 115; Arab(ic) ethnic pot, 156 Mesopotamia: Arabized identity, 143; links in educational system: 140-142; manipulation of Mesopotamian history, 144 Middle East, 3, 76, 124n1, 172, 195, 208–209, 217, 225 Middle Euphrates Rebellion (see 1920 Revolution) Mitani civilization, 239 monarchy, 2, 12, 16–17, 30, 40, 63, 64, 67–68, 75, 77, 86, 87, 95–96, 98, 101, 109–110, 120, 122–123, 152, 169, 174, 187, 233, 240, 249, 251 Mongol, 1 Mosul (Ninawa), 2, 5, 7–8, 11, 21–25, 40, 43–46, 53, 64, 65, 67, 70, 74, 76, 79, 83, 91n98, 99–101, 103, 110, 114– 115, 152–153, 166n100, 166n103,

Index 178, 192n74, 199–200, 204, 211, 221, 223, 241, 244 Mosul problem, 24, 43, 241 Moudros, 24 Mu‘awiya bin Abu Sufyan, 219, 234– 237, 254n8 Mubarak, Hosni, 252 al-Mudarisi, Muhammad Taqi, 148 Muhammad (see Prophet Muhammad) Muhammad, Aziz, 117 Muhammad, Maha Adil Mahdi, 208 Muhammad, Qadhi, 91n97 mujtahids, 22, 29–33, 39, 48–50, 59, 61n57, 64, 68, 107, 250 mukhabarat (see General Relations Bureau) al-Mukhabarat (General Intelligence), 135 Munazamat al-‘Amal al-Islami (the Islamic Action Organization, MAI), 148, 166n90 Musaliha wa Hiwar (Reconciliation and Dialogue Front), 99, 201 al-Musayib, 115 Muslih, Rashid, 120 Muslim(s): 1, 7, 22, 29, 30, 156, 234, 235; Arab, 1, 7, 54, 62n89, 88n22, 235; Arab caliphs, 102, 258n102; army, 106; community, 109; dynasties, 1; Kurds, 100, 234; Non-Muslim, 27, 156, 234; scholars/historians, 7, 242; Ottomans, 50; Persian, 62n86, 106; world, 160, 173 Muslim Brotherhood, 99, 100, 174 Muthanna Club (al-Muthanna Club), 67–68, 72, 76, 88n22 al-Mutlaq, Hamid, 221 al-Mutlaq, Salih, 214, 225 myth of common ancestry, 239 al-Nahdha Party, 25, 55 Najaf, 2, 7, 22, 27, 32, 39, 51, 65, 85, 88n8, 90n74, 108–109, 119, 127n80, 127n90, 148, 160, 167n114, 178, 226, 238, 257n84 al-Naqib, Abdul Rahman, 25, 28, 29, 33, 37n78, 48, 50, 89 al-Naqib, Falah, 196 al-Naqib, Mahmud, 25 al-Naqib, Talib, 28 Nasiriya (see Dhiqar) Nasserites, 97, 100, 110, 112

313

National Arab Policy, 82 nation building (state building), 9, 17, 22, 40, 41, 51–52, 56–57, 176, 185, 187, 222, 227, 233, 237, 239, 243, 245, 252 National Assembly (NA), 8, 50, 136, 175, 196 National Council of the Revolutionary Command (NCRC), 111, 113, 128n106 National Defense Act, 55 National Democratic Party (see al-Hizb al-Watani al-Democrati) national disintegration, 11, 17, 131, 137, 160, 162–163, 169, 170 national integration, 11–13, 15–17, 56, 58–59, 63, 69, 70, 84–87, 116, 118, 120, 122–124, 131, 133–134, 137, 140, 161, 163, 176, 233 National Union of Iraqi Students, 169 National Unity Front (NUF), 86 Nationalism, 14, 16, 29–31, 41, 71, 131, 214, 244, 248 nationalizing companies, 139, 166n98 al-Nayif, Abdul Razzaq, 131, 163 Nazis, 195 NDP (see National Democratic Party) Nebuchadnezzar, 142, 160 Newroz, 142, 215, 239, 243 Ninawa (see Mosul) Ninth Regional Congress, Baath Party, 138 No-fly zone, 177, 183 Noel, Major E., 24 Northern Kurdistan (Kurdistan of Turkey), 23 al-Nujaifi, Usama, 203 Nuri, Baha al-Din (Basim), 81, 92n112, 101 al-Nusuli, Anis, 236, 254n13, 254n14 al-Obaidi, Ahmed Hameed, 214 oil: annex all oil-rich areas from Kurdistan, 184; Iraq ban on oil companies that invest in Kurdistan, 215; Kirkuk and oil, 212, 217; oil production declined, 5 Operation Southern Watch, 177 Othman ibn Affan, 233, 235 Ottoman army, 22, 26, 28, 32, 55, 61n50, 62n86, 244, 245 Ottomans, 62n86, 238, 246, 252

314

Index

Ottoman flag, 31, 49 Ottoman-Safavid conflict, 238 al-Pachachi, Hamdi, 28, 252 al-Pachachi, Mazahim, 28–29, 36n50 Palestine, 52, 75, 81, 141 pan-Arab, 16, 36n46, 41, 49, 51, 71, 81, 83, 146; fighting Islamic Iran, 173, ideology or cause, 58, 63–64, 68, 76, 78, 140, 143, 240; pan-Arabism, 10, 12, 16, 19n65; 72–73, 75–76, 82, 84, 86, 141, 148, 243, 249, 256n59; Saddam and pan-Arabism, 143 pan-Kurdish (pan-Kurdism), 79, 92n102, 243, 256n59 Paris Peace Conference, 212, 229n61 Pasha, Sharif, 214, 229n61 Pasha, Khidhir Ahmed, 46 patriotic movement, 29, 80–84, 97, 100, 116, 205 Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK), 133–134, 154, 160, 163n9, 167n118, 182, 183, 185, 186, 189, 215, 216, 227n10 Patriotic Union Party (Hizb al-Itihad alWatani), 73 Patriotism, 72, 73, 122, 141; weakness of Iraqi, 244 People Party (Hizb al-Sha‘b), 73 Persians: Shiite Islamists branded “Persianized”, 150, 250; Persian (Sassanid) Empire, 1; Persian Sassanids, 234 Peshmerga, 114–115, 129n24, 145, 150, 155, 157, 182, 215 Peace Partisans, 110 Persian Gulf, 245 PKK (see Kurdistan Workers Party) police, 47, 57, 66, 71, 100, 107, 118, 121–122, 135, 147, 180, 187, 189, 196, 197, 222, 225 Prince Faisal bin Ali (see Faisal bin Ali) Prisoners of War (POWs), 145 privatization, 139, 170 Progressive Patriotic and Nationalist Front (PPNF), 132, 140, 151 Prophet Muhammad, 7, 27, 39, 59n3, 60n15, 109, 167n119, 219, 235, 236, 254n8 PUK (see Patriotic Union of Kurdistan) al-Qadisiya (see Diwaniya)

al-Qaeda: 8, 83, 111n92, 174, 194, 196– 198, 208, 250 al-Qa‘qa‘ (Tirkashkan), 153 Qarahanjeer (al-Rabi‘), 153, 167n114 Qasim, Abdul Karim, 12, 91n86, 95– 116, 119–124, 124n3, 125n6, 126n33, 126n49, 127n71, 127n77, 140, 143, 174–175, 206, 222, 249, 251 qawmiya (see Arab Nationalism) Qazzaz, Mirza Toufiq, 46 Qizilribat, 31 al-Quds, 75, 153, 167, 235 al-Qutbi, Hussein, 223 Quran, 155, 172–173, 254n8 Qurayish, 7, 235 Qushtapa, 144 al-Rabi‘ (Spring) Festival, 142, 153 Radhi, Muhsin al-Sheikh, 120, 128n106, 130n155 Rafidayn (Mesopotamia), 201 Rajab Uprising, 148 Ramadan, 27, 173 Raniya, 160 al-Rasafi, Ma‘ruf, 54, 143, 233, 236– 237 al-Rashid, Harun, 1, 133, 234, 236–237 Rawanduzi, Ismail, 56 RCC (see Revolutionary Command Council) Reconciliation and Liberation Bloc, 221 refugees, 161, 177, 181–182, 197, 256n54 religion, 7, 21, 30, 49, 68, 72, 87, 96, 108, 109, 141, 146, 162s, 172, 174, 196, 237, 239, 242, 251–252 Renan, Ernest, 52 Republican Guard, 101, 113, 135, 161, 163n3, 169, 180 revolution, 27, 57, 76, 95, 97–98, 101– 103, 107, 236; Al-‘Ahd’s negative role, 28; April 1941 Revolution, 240; 1916 Arab Revolution, 22, 32, 41, 77, 112; Barzan Rebellions and Revolts, 78–79, 85, 95, 91n95, 239; 17-30 July Revolution (Baathist coup of 1968), 138, 240; 1919 Kurdish revolt, 22–23, 29–30, 239, 247; Kurdish uprisings of 1991, 170; 1958 Revolution, 2, 58, 106, 122, 128n99, 235, 240; 1920 Revolution, 22, 26–33, 35n31, 39, 64, 65; revolutionary court, 181; French

Index Revolution of 1789, 245; revolutionaries, 36n65; Egyptian revolution, 86; Baath revolutionary party, 132; Baath revolution, 136; Iranian Revolution in 1979, 148; Sheikh Mahmud’s revolts 1922, and 1926, 101; Shiite uprising 1935-1936, 64; Shiite uprising of 1991, 101; 1948, 1952, and 1956 uprisings, 215, 240 Revolutionary Command Council (RCC), 131, 135–138, 149, 155, 187, 250 al-Ridha, Imam Ali, 237 al-Rikabi, Fuad, 77, 81, 91n79, 93n127, 99, 128n98 al-Rikabi, Sadiq, 205 Risaliyun, 201 Rizgari Kurd (see Kurdish Liberation Party) Roji Kurdistan (Sun of Kurdistan) newspaper, 43, 45 al-Rubaie, Mowaffak, 188 al-Rubai‘i, Najib,124n9 Rumadi (see al-Anbar) al-Rumaytha, 29 Saddam Hussein (see Hussein, Saddam) Saddamization, 17, 137–142, 170 Saddam’s Men of Sacrifice (Saddam’s Fida’iyin), 169 al-Sa‘di, Ali Salih (Baath Secretary), 110–111, 120, 128n98, 130n155 al-Sadiq, Imam Ja‘far, 27, 138, 236 al-Sadr, city of al-Thawra renamed, 128 al-Sadr, Muhammad Baqir, 108, 119, 127n90, 129n144, 147–149, 178–179 al-Sadr, Muhammad Sadiq, 178–179 al-Sadr, Muqtada, 178, 196, 202, 218, 221 al-Sadr, Sayyid Muhammad, 25, 27, 85, 252 al-Sadrists, 201–203, 206–207, 221, 226 al-Sa‘dun, Abdul Muhsin, 43, 60n28, 237 Safavids: 7; Iranian Safavids, 237; Persian Safavids, 234; Safavid dynasty, 7, 238; Safavids in Iraq, 250; Safavid-Ottoman conflict, 225; Shiite Safavid, 237–238 Safe haven, 182 al-Sahwa (the Awakening), 198 al-Sa‘id, Nuri, 28, 41, 55, 58, 60n14, 68,

315

86, 87, 89n27, 89n48, 252 Salayi, 152 Salih, Sa‘ad, 247 al-Samarra’i, Abdul Khaliq, 138, 164n31 al-Samarra’i, Faiq, 90n67 al-Samarra’i, Abdullah Salum. 129n137 Samawa (see Muthanna) Sanctions, 17, 170–173, 182–183, 188– 189 Sargaran, 153 Saudi Arabia, 2, 21, 205, 225, 143, 244 Sawt al-Arab (see Voice of the Arabs) Sawt al-Da‘wa, 119 Sayyids, 152 SCIRI (see Islamic Supreme Council of Iraq) sectarian: approval along the line of, 195; cause decline, 189; character of Iraq in textbooks, 234; differences and fragmentation, 195, 189, 204, 207; groups change position, 226; groups control media, 224; groups fear domination by the other, 249; lack of common memory, 252; links outside of Iraq, 243; non-sectarian Iraqiya, 200; policy, 177; transcending sectarian and ethnic lines, 253; violence redraws map, 197; worsening rift between Iraq’s communities, 223 al-Shabab (Youth), 136 Shabak, 152 Shah of Iran, Riza, 67, 151, 166n87 Shahroudi, Mahmoud Hashemi, 203– 204 Shari‘a Islamic Law, 107 Sharif Hussein, 49, 245–246 Sharif of Mecca, 22, 26, 39, 247 Sharifians, 41, 58, 64 Shashy Rashi Aylul (Black September the Sixth), 47, 240 Shawkat, Naji, 252 al-Shawwaf, Abdul Wahhab, 100, 125n3, 126n38 Sheikh Mahmud, 22, 23–28, 30–32, 42– 46, 101, 212, 239–240, 247 Sheikh Qadir, 46 Shibib, Talib, 120–121, 128n106 al-Shibibi, Sheikh Muhammad Ridha, 34n11, 118, 247 Shiification (tashi‘), 220 Shiism; Baath suppression of, 148;

316

Index

Shiite school, 53; loyalty to Iraq, 48, 117; withdrawal from secular ideologies, 124; strengthens under the Baath, 147; Iran influence on Shiite, 217 Shiites: autocratic tendencies, 227; boycott election, 221; embargo and hardship disproportionately effect, 188; fear minority status if joined to Arabs, 249; backbone of patriotism, 249; loyal to Iran, 252; identified with foreigners, 244; victimized since Abu Bakr’s reign, 217 Shiite Arabs, 2, 10, largest ethnic group, 5; 18n15, 42, 238, 240, 243; antagonism climaxed with Sunnis after the Safavid dynasty in Iran, 144; avoid military conscription, 62n86; customs and religious rituals, 109; distrust of British, 32; dominate market, 118; double standard treatment, 181; equated with the Iranians, 251–252; nationalists, 124; disagreement with Sunnis, 49–51; leaving Iraq, 149; remain within Iraq, 189; stripped of citizenship, 250 Shiite Baathists, 77, 121; leaders turn on Shiites, 149, 150; religious commitment strengthened, 146; resentment of Tikriti and Sunni monopoly, 134; suppression of activism, 148 Shiite Declaration, the, 221 Shiite Islamists/Islamism, 108, 148– 150, 200 Shiite muhtahids, 22, 29–33, 39, 48–49; 61n58, 64, 107, 250; restoring clout of clerics, 108 Shiite UIA, 201 Shiite uprising, 183 al-Shirazi, Sheikh Muhammad Taqi, 34n11 Shorish (see Iraqi Kurdistan Communist Party) Shruqi (easterners) 99, 125n27 al-Shu‘ayba, 21, 22 Sh‘ubi, 53–55, 62n90, 99, 117–119, 250–251, 257n96, Sh‘ubism, 117–118 al-Sh‘ubiya movement, 62n89 Shu‘iyun (communists), 99 shura (consultation), 7 Sidqi, Colonel Bakr, 66– 68, 72, 78, 88n19, 88n26

Sinjar, 66, 115, 151–152, 154, 166n103, 212 Sirri, Rif‘at al-Hajj, 100, 124n3 al-Sistani, Ayatollah Ali, 61n59, 203, 204, 221, 251 Slaibi, Sa‘id, 113 slogans, 27, 85–86, 98, 147–148, 161 Social Democracy, 63, 74 Social Democrats (NDP), 109 Society for the Rise and Progress of Kurdistan (see Komeley Taraqi u Ta‘ali Kurdistan) Society of the Covenant (see Jam‘iyat al-‘Ahd) Society of Jurists (see Jama‘at alUlama) SoL (State of Law), 200–203, 205–207, 216, 220 Soran, 7 Southern Kurdistan (Kurdistan of Iraq), 21, 23–24, 31–33, 42–43, 47, 79, 89n29, 104, 152–153, 160, 215–216, 235, 240, 246 Soviet Union, 151 Special Police Commando, 196 Special Republican Guard, 135, 161, 169 Stalin, 82 Star of Ishtar, 140 Suleiman, Ali Hatem, 223 Suleiman, Hikmat, 67–68, 72, 88n20, 252 Suleimaniya, 2, 8, 22–23, 27, 31, 40, 42, 45–47, 61n46, 79, 88n20, 103, 114, 128n92, 151–152, 154, 157, 160, 163, 182, 184, 185, 186, 212 Suleimaniya Security Directorate, 160 Sumer, 1; Sumerian, 9, 239, 241 Sunni Arab(s): after the invasion, 15; Ali Jawdat’s cabinet, 65; Allawi appeal, 204–205; al-Mansur as founder of Baghdad, 236; angered at conversion of Iraq in the Shiite image, 224; animosity at Shiites, 54, 117, 238; antial-Maliki dispositions, 223; Arif aligned with, 112; attend Ottoman military schools, 35n43; Baath, 80– 81, 225, 128n105, 121, 124, 134–135; Muhammad’s successor should be from Qurayish tribe, 7; British incorporated, 44, 63; boycott elections, 199, 219; British favored, 33; cities,

Index 83; calls for secession, 42; common identity, 10, 13, 239, 243; deBaathification, 194–197; voting patterns, 40; discriminatory practices of, 59, 85, 150, 189, 224, 227, 233; divert resources to, 183; dominance rejected, 188; dominated central province of Baghdad, 2; domination by, 27, 53, 68, 106–108, 111, 124, 137, 188, 240; education, 71; 2005 elections, 202; exclusion of 80 percent of Iraq from national integration, 118; Faith Campaign, 174; favor mandate, 50; fear of Shiites, 51; forced out of mixed areas of Baghdad, 197; four righteous caliphs, 234; insurgents warfare, 194; fear of present, 253; graves of imams desecrated, 238; ignore diverse nature of society, 58; invited al-Qaeda in, 250; Islamism engulfed, 174; imagined community, 30; in Ottoman army, 22, 32; Iran as enemy, 161; Iraqiya, 220; Istiqlal party, 80; justify conscription, 56; lack of common memory with Shiites, 27, 139, 237; identity less developed than Shiite, 7; lose majority in government, 67; marginalization since 2003, 218; minority in Iraq, 249; nationalists, 84, 120, 123–124, 198, 248; NDP founding committee, 73; neighborhoods, 21, 76, 99–101, 113, 198, 222–224, 241; no support for alMaliki’s coalition, 200; northwest Baghdad areas, 198; old version of flag, 242; opposition to regime, 180– 181; parliamentary opposition bloc, 206; percentage of population, 5, 248, perspectives of, 33; plot by officers, 122; polarization with Shiites, 217, 219, 224–225; political prisoners, 145; political theory based on caliphate, 109; politicians, 74, 77–78; population, 179; pro-army, 66; provinces, 160, 178, 217; Qasim, 95; question Shiite loyalty, 55; rapprochement with Shiites, 26–27, 123–124, 210; rapprochement with Kurds, 226; reject federalism, 209; relationship with Shiites, 28–29, 147, 169, 209; religious opposition, 126n33; remembering “golden age”, 1; removal from

317

office, 69; al-Maliki’s government, 196, 214; ruling class oppose fair elections, 86–87; Saddam’s regime, 179; Sati‘ al-Husri incident, 49; sectarian divisions, 188, 200; sectarian gains, 85; Shiites target, 161, 252; Sh‘ubi, 62n89; Sunni-based political party, 25; struggle for power, 12; Sunni-Arab countries, 206; Sunniaffiliated bloc, 204; support for British, 34; support for Faisal, 39, 41; suppression of mujtahids, 31; take on Iraqi nationality, 250; treatment of alJawahiri, 55; 1991 uprising, 241; version of Iraqi identity, 189; 2005 referendum, 202; war against US, 194, 221, 223; 238 Sunni Islamists, 99, 117, 200 Sunni triangle, 198 Sunnification, 17, 63, 113, 124, 135, 162, 251; de-Sunnification, 195, 218 Supreme Council for the Islamic Revolution in Iraq (SCIRI), 127n80, 145, 149, 150, 162, 166n90, 179, 251 al-Suwaydi, Tawfiq, 53 al-Suwaydi, Yousif, 28 Syrian Baathists, 112 al-Tabaqchali, Nadhim, 101, 126n38, 126n40 Tab‘ith (see Baathification) al-Tahrir Party, 108, 127n85 TAL (see Transitional Administrative Law) Talabani, Jalal: 82, 92n121, 115, 154, 196, 201, 203, 209, 215–216, 226, 227n10 Tala‘far, 5, 30, 152, 166n103 Talfah, Adnan Khairallah, 135 Talfah, Khairallah, 155 al-Talai‘ (Vanguards), 136 al-Ta’mim (see Kirkuk) tashi‘ (see Shiification) Tawafuq (The Accord), 116, 201 Tegayishtini Rasti (Understanding the Truth) newspaper, 247 terrorism, 9, 13, 193 al-Thaqafi, Hajjaj bin Yousif, 141, 236 al-Thawra (newspaper): 105, 127n71, 251 al-Thawra district, 109, 128n93, 161 al-Thawra revolution, 136

318

Index

Tigris, 2, 19n36, 54, 90n75, 128n93, 135, 152, 177 Tikrit (Salah al-Din), 2, 11, 83, 113, 131, 134–135, 139, 161, 241 al-Tikriti, Hamid, 120, 128n105 al-Tikriti, Tahir Yahya (see also Yahya, Tahir), 120 al-Tikriti, Hardan, 105 Tirkashkan (al-Qa‘qa‘), 154, 156n114 Tofiq, Tahir, 192n74 Toran, Hassan, 217 Transitional Administrative Law (TAL): 195, 196 Transitional National Assembly, 196 Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation with the Soviet Union, 132 Tribal Dispute Act, 174, Treaty of Lausanne, 25, 42 Treaty of Sèvres, 24–25, 35n25, 40, 42, 44, 239, 247 Turanism (or Turkism), 244, 256n63 Turkey: 2, 8, 23–25, 35n25, 40, 43, 56, 66–67, 81, 124n1, 151, 153, 159, 185–186, 197, 216–217, 225–226, 243–244, 256n63 Turkism (see Turanism) Turkmen, 200–201, 234 Turkmen Front, 201 Turkmen Justice Party, 217 Tuzkhormatu, 153 Twin Towers, 193 Ubaidullah bin Ziyad (see Faisal I), 237 ‘Ubayd (tribe), 180 Uday, 169 UIA (see United Iraqi Alliance) UK (see United Kingdom) Umayyad: 1, 7, 48, 219, 225, 233–237, 251 Umedi Istiqlal (The Hope of Independence), 43 Umer bin al-Khatab, 7, 233, 235 Umm Qasr, 2 al-Umma Party, 205 UN disarmament commission, 193 UN Embargo, 185 UNHCR (see United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees) UN inspectors, 193 UN Oil-for-Food program, 171 UN Secretary General, 193 UN Security Council, 170

UN Special Envoy to Iraq, Stephan De Mistura, 214 Understanding the Truth (see Tegayishtini Rasti), 247 UNICEF, 171 Union of the Iraqi Youth, 110 United Arab Republic (UAR), 97–98, 102, 104, 112–114, 125n13, 249 United Iraqi Alliance (UIA), 196, 199, 201 United Kingdom (UK), 44, 193, 194 United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), 197 United States: acceptance of the flags of Kurdistan, 216; aim to democratize Middle East, 195; coalition in Kuwait, 160; regime change, 193; create Iraq, 189; desire to keep Iraq intact, 189; expulsion of UN inspection, 193; fears, 203; invasion, 146, 169, 194; negotiate over security arrangements, 225; out of Iraq, 198; post-invasion, 170; Surge, 198; US Institute for Peace, 214 Uruba (Arabness, Arabism), 55, 63, 75, 82–83, 115, 140 Uruba fi al-Mizan (Arabism on the scale), 250 al-Uzri, Abdul Karim, 33, 90n58, 252 Van der Stoel, United Nations special rapporteur, 177 Versailles Peace Conference, 39 Voice of the Arabs (Sawt al-Arab), 75, 90n64 vote: according to ethno-national and sectarian lines, 40, 197, 199, 200, 204; change in electoral rules, 208; compelled al-Maliki to form powersharing government, 205; Diyala vote for federal region, 221; 2005 elections, 202; 2010 elections, 204; first for Kurdish people, 182; for Faisal, 40; Iraqi National List, 199; Iraqiya gained, 220; Islamist groups, 186; Kurds and Shiite cooperation, 209; League of Nations, 44; national unity government, 208; no-confidence, 226; no woman won, 208; on joining Iraq, 43; partial cabinet formation, 203; provincial right to request federal region, 221; referendum 199; retabu-

Index lating, 218; secularists fared better, 202; sufficient to form a government, 207; Sunni lists, 199; Sunnis boycott, 8; to secede, 11; Transitional National Assembly, 196 Wadi al-Salam, 178, 257n84 al-Wardi, Ali, 27, 35n34, 255n23 Watanparwaran (Association of Patriots), 25, 46, 47 Wasit (Kut), 2, 21, 166n103, 166n110, 241, 251 Wahbi, Toufiq, 46–47, 61n53 Wahhabis, 39, 49, 50, Wahhabism, 174 Al-Wathba (the Leap), 85 weapons of mass destruction (WMD): 146, cat and mouse, 193 Wilayat al-Ummah (governance of the community), 108 Wilson, Arnold T., 21, 24, 28, 36n52, 44 Wilson, Woodrow: Fourteen Points Speech, 246–248, 257n76 WMD (see Weapons of mass destruction) World Trade Center, 193 World War I, 1–2, 10, 21, 24, 26, 28, 32, 44, 75, 245, 246

319

World War II, 52, 68, 89n48, 195 Yahya, Tahir, 118, 120, 125n3, 128n105 Yawar, Ghazi, 9 Yazid bin Mu‘awiya, 219, 234–237, 254n8 Yazidis, 5, 66, 152, 201 Yeketi Tekoshin (the Unity of Struggle) newspaper, 84 Young Arab Society (Jam‘iyat alArabiya al-Fatat), 245 Young Ottoman movement, 244 Young, Major B., 24 Young Turk(s), 52, 244–245 Yousif, Yousif Suleiman (Fahd), 75, 81, 92n111, 92n112 al-Zab, 153 Zagros Mountains, 142 al-Zahawi, Jamil Sidqi, 28–29 Zakho, 30, 166n103, 167n114 Zaynul Abidin, Imam Ali, 236 Zohhak, 239

About the Book

Sherko Kirmanj offers a balanced, critical analysis of the evolution of Iraqi national identity and the process of national integration, tracing a

history of antagonisms and violence from the creation of the state in 1921 to mid-2012. Challenging approaches that variously blame the legacy of the Baathist regime or the US invasion for the sectarian violence that plagues Iraq, Kirmanj delves into the political and social dynamics involved across the decades. His focus is on the enduring conflicts between Iraq’s Sunnis, Shiites, and Kurds—and on the challenges of forging a nation when the groups involved share no collective identity or attachment to a single homeland. His work, comprehensive in scope and rich with new insights, is a vital contribution to ongoing debates about the future of the Iraqi state. Sherko Kirmanj is visiting academic at the University of South Australia. He previously served as director of the Human Capacity Development Program for the Kurdistan Regional Government's Ministry of Higher Education in Erbil, Iraq.

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