Identity and marginality in India : settlement experience of Afghan migrants 9781138607965, 1138607967

Table of contents :
1. Introduction: Why study the experiences of Afghan 'Refugees' in India?2. Considerations Concerning the Concepts of Identity and Acculturation with respect to Afghan 'refugees' in India3. Stages of 'Refugee' Lives: A Community Perspective 4. The Settlement Experiences of the Afghan 'Refugees' in India- Expectation and Reality5. Conclusion: 'Lost Between Worlds': Afghans in India Longing to Belong

Citation preview

Identity and Marginality in India

Decades of conflict and war have forced millions of men, women and children to flee from their homes and seek refuge in other parts of the country or in foreign lands – Afghanistan is one such country. This book is a study of the displaced Afghan migrant population in India, in particular the persecuted Sikhs and Hindus who are religious minorities in Afghanistan and make up a majority of Afghan migrants in India. It explores the relationship between acculturation and identity development. By focusing on the interactions between the Afghan immigrant population and the Indian society, the author analyses how the community negotiates identity and marginality in a country that does not recognize them as refugees. The author explains how the Afghan migrant population manages and negotiates various identities, bestowed upon them by the societies in their home and host countries in their day-to-day existence in India. An important study of acculturation and adaptation issues of migrant groups in the setting of a developing country, this book will be of interest to academics in the field of refugee and migration studies, ethnography of (ethnic) identity and Middle East and South Asian Studies. Anwesha Ghosh received her doctoral degree from the Willy Brandt School of Public Policy, University of Erfurt, Germany, under the DAAD Conflict Studies and Management Programme in 2017. She has published extensively in the field of aid diplomacy, India’s foreign policy, regional cooperation, gender, migration and refugees – all with respect to Afghanistan. Her publications include books titled Afghanistan from Enduring Freedom to Enduring Chaos: Implications for India (2012), A Leap Forward: Education, Capacity Building and Indo-Afghanistan Co-operation (2014) and Afghan Women in Transition: Yesterday, Today and Tomorrow (2017).

Routledge Contemporary South Asia Series

124 Employment, Poverty and Rights in India Dayabati Roy 125 Bangladesh’s Maritime Policy Entwining Challenges Abdul Kalam 126 Health Communication and Sexual Health in India Interpreting HIV and AIDS messages Ravindra Kumar Vemula 127 Contemporary Literature from Northeast India Deathworlds, Terror and Survival Amit R. Baishya 128 Land-Water Management and Sustainability in Bangladesh Indigenous practices in the Chittagong Hill Tracts Ranjan Datta 129 Dalits, Subalternity and Social Change in India Edited by Ashok K. Pankaj and Ajit K. Pandey 130 Identity and Marginality in India Settlement Experience of Afghan Migrants Anwesha Ghosh

For the full list of titles in the series, please visit: https://www.routledge. com/Routledge-Contemporary-South-Asia-Series/book-series/RCSA

Identity and Marginality in India Settlement Experience of Afghan Migrants Anwesha Ghosh

First published 2019 by Routledge 2 Park Square, Milton Park, Abingdon, Oxon OX14 4RN and by Routledge 52 Vanderbilt Avenue, New York, NY 10017 Routledge is an imprint of the Taylor & Francis Group, an informa business © 2019 Anwesha Ghosh The right of Anwesha Ghosh to be identified as author of this work has been asserted by her in accordance with sections 77 and 78 of the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988. All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reprinted or reproduced or utilised in any form or by any electronic, mechanical, or other means, now known or hereafter invented, including photocopying and recording, or in any information storage or retrieval system, without permission in writing from the publishers. Trademark notice: Product or corporate names may be trademarks or registered trademarks, and are used only for identification and explanation without intent to infringe. British Library Cataloguing-in-Publication Data A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Names: Ghosh, Anwesha, author. Title: Identity and marginality in India : settlement experience of Afghan migrants / Anwesha Ghosh. Description: Abingdon, Oxon ; New York, NY : Routledge, 2019. | Series: Routledge contemporary South Asia series | Includes bibliographical references and index. Identifiers: LCCN 2018041122| ISBN 9781138607965 (hardback) | ISBN 9780429466854 (ebook) Subjects: LCSH: Refugees—Afghanistan—Social conditions. | Afghans—Cultural assimilation—India. | Afghans—India—Social conditions. | Immigrants—India—Social conditions. | Group identity—India. | India—Emigration and immigration—Social aspects. Classification: LCC HV640.5.A28 G43 2019 | DDC 305.891/593054—dc23 LC record available at https://lccn.loc.gov/2018041122 ISBN: 978-1-138-60796-5 (hbk) ISBN: 978-0-429-46685-4 (ebk) Typeset in Times New Roman by codeMantra

Dedicated to Dadubhai My maternal grandfather, Late Mrinal Kanti Bose for his love, encouragement and inspiration.

Contents

List of figures List of tables Foreword Acknowledgements

ix xi xiii xv

1 Why study the experiences of Afghan ‘refugees’ in India? 1 2 Considerations concerning the concepts of identity and acculturation with respect to Afghan ‘refugees’ in India 29 3 Stages of ‘refugee’ lives: a community perspective 68 4 The settlement experiences of the Afghan ‘refugees’ in India – expectation and reality 115 5 Conclusion: ‘lost between worlds’: Afghans in India longing to belong 199 Index

221

List of figures

2.1 Ecosystem Model of ‘Refugee’ Acculturation and Identity (Re)-Constitution. 57 5.1 Religious Affiliation by Acculturation Profile. 205 5.2 Legal Status and Identity Profile of the Respondents. 207

List of tables

4.1 Sample Distribution in Delhi and Faridabad 124

Foreword

This monograph, which is the product of several years of highly engaged research by the author, is a timely and significant contribution both to our general understanding of the predicament of refugee populations in their new societies and to the mapping of a particular, very much understudied group, namely the Lala Hindu/Afghani Log, aka Afghan Sikh and Hindu refugees in India. The latter represent a quadruple minority condition, notably as a religious minority in their country of origin (Afghanistan), as a sociocultural minority in their host country (India) and, within the latter, as a conflict-displaced refugee population that is, additionally and in contrast to other Afghan refugees, not officially recognized by their host state. Even by the standards of refugee populations across the globe, this makes for a rare combination, and it is largely due to Dr. Ghosh’s pioneering research that the complex ways in which this community has adapted to these intersecting conditions in its new environment have become more transparent. What emerges is a fascinating picture that sheds new light both on the minute aspects of refugee adaptation and on the broader factors that co-determine the predicament of refugee populations in their interaction with host state and international institutions. Dr. Ghosh, thus, manages to combine ethnographic deep description with evidence-based policy analysis, a rare feat that, however, shows the methodological imprint of the Willy Brandt School of Public Policy at the University of Erfurt (Germany), where this project was formally situated. The latter’s transdisciplinary research approach and highly internationalized research environment, in combination with funding from the German Academic Exchange Service (DAAD), provided the backdrop to a highly innovative study in the course of which the author had to overcome a significant number of challenges in the field and had to grapple with a daunting amount of material. It is due to her tenacity and resilience that this work has been completed and now provides a solid basis and a warm invitation for further research. It is to be hoped that this invitation will be taken up, not least by scholars from the global South. Florian F. Hoffmann (PUC-Rio) Rio de Janeiro, August 2018

Acknowledgements

I would like to begin by thanking the German Academic Exchange Service (DAAD) for the incredible opportunity it provided me to conduct my research in Germany. DAAD’s generous funding made this project a reality. I have been fortunate to have Prof. Dr. Florian Hoffmann and Prof. Dr. Frank Ettrich as my Supervisors, without whose critical attention and guidance, albeit the intellectual freedom, this research would have remained impoverished in more ways than one. I am absolutely indebted to Prof. Hoffmann for writing the Foreword of this book. I would like to acknowledge the support provided by my host institute, the Willy Brandt School of Public Policy, University of Erfurt, Germany. I am grateful to Prof. Dr. Heike Grimm and Prof. Dr. Solveig Richter for their encouragement and backing towards me and my work. I thank all my amazing colleagues at Brandt School, Dr. Raghav Sharma, Dr. Pablo Ramos, Dr. Edward Kaweesi, Dr. Asef Hossaini, Dr.  ­Olivia Ugokwe, Dr. Ulugbek Azizov, Dr. Imdad Ullah, Ms.  Miriam  Aced, Ms. Aline Mugisho and Mr. Malek Habra; without the intensive discussion that was the hallmark of our meetings, lunch get-together, seminars, colloquiums and so on, my ideas would never have taken any kind of intelligible shape. I need to strongly and especially acknowledge the contribution of my friend Dr. Raghav Sharma for the stimulation he provided for this research. I also owe a special thanks to Ms. Nripdeep Kaur and Mr. Edris Arib for helping me with the translations from Gurumukhi and Farsi, respectively, and Mr. Riju Ghosh for helping me manage the graphs. I am grateful to my friend Ms. Anneysha Chowdhury for her invaluable assistance in compilation of the index for this book. I am thankful to all the administrative staffs at Brandt School for their generous support and assistance. A special mention must be made about Ms. Carolin Eichholz, one of the most wonderful and generous persons I have known and whose friendship I will cherish all my life. My friends outside office, Flo, Satya, Amit, Saurabh, Bilquees, Samjhana, Nrip, Ritu, Shubhangi, Ana, Masooda, Khaled, Faiza and Hussain, were of immense assistance and made the weekends all play and no work.

xvi Acknowledgements I want to express my deep sense of gratitude to all my respondents from Pakistan, Iran, Afghanistan, United Kingdom and India, whom I have interviewed for my study. I owe so much to so many wonderful warm people I met, spoke, listened to and, most importantly, who let me into their lives, that it is simply not possible to fully spell out my appreciation and indebtedness towards them in words. Yet, two names deserve special mention: ­Sardar Khajinder Singh Khurrana and Mr. Pritpal Singh for their generous support and assistance that enabled me to capture a lot many Afghan voices in India. My fieldwork in India would have certainly not been possible without the generous support extended by UNHCR, India, and its partner NGOs, the Khalsa Diwan Welfare Society, New Delhi, the Afghan Hindu Sikh Welfare Association, sections of the Indian Government and members of Indian academia and civil society. I can never adequately express my gratitude towards my parents, Mr. ­A mbar and Mrs. Panchali Ghosh. I wish to particularly thank my mother for bearing with my mood swings and for being my greatest inspiration. During the course of my research, I met my husband Dr. ­Chinmoy Hazra, whose encouragement and predilection to my work have been extremely reassuring. Our beautiful daughter Pragya Birajini came into our lives while I was working on this book, which makes it the most cherished of all my publications. Last but not least, I would like to thank Ms. Dorothea Schaefter and her brilliant team at Routledge, United Kingdom, with whom I have had the good fortune to confer over this book project. Anwesha Ghosh Daejeon, South Korea August 2018

1 Why study the experiences of Afghan ‘refugees’ in India?

Introduction Whenever we go to Afghanistan they tell us ‘Oh you have come back from your country?’ and when we are in India, we are asked ‘when are you going back to your country?’ We are neither recognized as Afghans nor Indians – what can be more pathetic than this? (Shri Narendra Singh, Afghan ‘refugee’ in India)

Decades of conflict, war and serious human rights abuse have forced millions of men, women and children to flee from their homes and seek refuge in other parts of country or in foreign lands – Afghanistan is one such country. Years of violence have profoundly shaken the whole Afghan society and pushed a third of its population to exile. Although figures fluctuated over the years and various waves have been identified, according to the United Nations Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), refugees from Afghanistan still constitute the second largest refugee group and the world’s largest protracted refugee situation under the UNHCR mandate, with some 2.6 million persons.1 A complete generation of Afghans has witnessed only conflict by virtue of the more than 30-year-old situation, watching it metamorphose into various forms of violence, from actual war to the ferocity of minefields and the destruction of livelihoods. Since the mass exodus began in 1979, in the aftermath of Saur Revolution in Afghanistan, either of its two immediate neighbours, Pakistan or Iran, has been ranked as the world’s top refugee-hosting country for 33 out of the past 36 years. Yet, some Afghans also sought refuge in India, another regional country with long-standing relations with Afghanistan. So far, academic discourses have focused primarily on Afghan refugees in Pakistan and Iran – two neighbouring countries that have repeatedly tried to influence the course of Afghanistan’s history. This study is one of the foremost attempts to capture the experiences of ­conflict-displaced Afghan population in India. Recurrent displacements created constant disruptions in the uniform understanding of ‘home’, and different complexities of the foreign environment impacted upon the manner they defined and redefined their roots.

2  Why study the experiences of Afghan ‘refugees’ in India? The cardinal concern of this study would be to understand the temporal experiences of Afghans in India, which required that they adapt to changing environments as they moved from a pre-conflict, to conflict, displacement and finally to a settlement phase in India. It is important to recognize what such relentless escapes from home as a consequence of conflict have meant for the studied population. What happens when certain social groups no longer have access to spaces that are ordinarily perceived as ‘naturally given’, and when they construct their social identities from a plethora of other factors, social constructions and hierarchies?2 According to Richard Jenkins, the local, the communal and the national are to be understood as historically and contextually specific social constructs on the basis of ethnic themes, allotropes of ethnic identification and thus perceived as naturally given. This research thus attempts to explain how constructs of ethnic and national identities are imagined in the context of alienation and integration within host cultures and communities. The aforementioned statement by one of the respondents interviewed for this study resonates the voice of a large number of displaced Afghans living in India, who feel stranded between two worlds, without belonging to either. The current study holds that ethnic and national identities and their role in adaptation can best be understood in a situation of interaction between the attitudes and characteristics of immigrants and the responses of the receiving society, moderated by the specific circumstances of the immigrant group within the host society. Any immigrant groups or individuals (refugee or others) arrive in a new country with differing attitudes about retaining their culture of origin and becoming part of the new society. In the new society, these attitudes interact with the actual and ostensible levels of acceptance of the immigrants and with the official policies of the host nation towards immigration. Ethnic identity is likely to be stronger in circumstances where immigrants have a strong desire to retain their identities and when pluralism is encouraged or accepted. When there is a pressure towards assimilation and groups feel accepted, the national identity is likely to be strong. In a situation of real or perceived hostility towards the immigrants or their particular group, some may feel encouraged to downplay or reject their own ethnic identity, while others may assert their pride in their cultural group and emphasize solidarity as a strategy of dealing with negative attitudes. Thus, the relationship of these identities to adaptation will likewise be influenced by the interaction of characteristics of specific immigrant groups with those of particular settings. Where there is pressure to assimilate and immigrants are willing to adapt to the new culture, national identity should be predictive of positive outcomes, while in a situation where there is a strong supportive ethnic community, ethnic identity should predict positive outcomes. Additionally, outcomes will also be influenced by the ways in which particular groups and individuals recognize and decipher their circumstances. Consequently, the processes of adaptation are highly variable.

Why study the experiences of Afghan ‘refugees’ in India?  3 Post-2001, Afghanistan provided India an opportunity to underscore its role as a regional power. Being aware of the security challenge an unstable Afghanistan can pose, India invested more than USD two billion3 in the development initiative there. India’s proactive Afghanistan policy, aid diplomacy and role in the country’s reconstruction programmes not only made it one of the largest donors in the country but also helped earn substantial goodwill from the people of Afghanistan. Over the past decade, New Delhi has repeatedly emphasized the importance of ‘people to people contact’ and about its aim to touch the lives of common Afghans through its people-­ centric policies. Unfortunately, such considerations were not observed towards the Afghans living in India. It is extremely challenging to identify the exact number of Afghan ‘refugees’ living in India, as the number would differ based on the definition utilized. According to the data gathered from UNHCR New Delhi, there are approximately 10,334 refugees and 1,949 asylum seekers from Afghanistan as of July 2015.4 The concentration in the national capital is common for refugees and asylum seekers in general.5 Reports suggest that UNHCR India assists over 24,000 urban refugees in total, rendering Afghans one of the most represented communities receiving UNHCR support and protection.6 Those under UNHCR protection have access to ID cards recognizing them as refugees.7 UNHCR statistics and other reports have continually confirmed that the religious make-up of Afghan refugees in India constitutes predominantly Sikhs and Hindus.8 Religious non-Muslim minorities – like Sikhs and Hindus – were systematically targeted especially after the Soviets left Afghanistan in 1989 due to the rise of Islamic fundamentalist ideology, forcing a bulk of them to flee Afghanistan. Ethnic and religious similarities with a segment of the Indian population provided Hindus and Sikhs with incentives to seek asylum in India. Like most refugees, they fled their homeland because of persecution and for most returning to Afghanistan is not an option. A national model refugee law for granting statutory protection to refugees has long been considered in India but is yet to be implemented. Some kind of protection is extended to the Afghans recognized as refugees by the UNHCR. For example, the Refugee ID card issued by UNHCR enables them to receive temporary residence permits, which helps them in renting places for residence and makes them eligible for certain basic facilities. In certain cases, refugees get assistance related to the naturalization procedure. The only possibilities for a long-term stay are, unsurprisingly, for education (student visa) and health (medical visa), but the UNHCR-certified refugee status is also accepted as a valid reason for long-term stays. This puts recognized refugees in a better situation than unrecognized refugees. However, residence is only the beginning of the story. Even registered refugees do not have access to certain basic rights, like right to employment and social security; as a result, like those who have no legal status in India, a large section of recognized refugees also work in the country’s parallel

4  Why study the experiences of Afghan ‘refugees’ in India? economy. It comes as no surprise that Afghan ‘refugees’ (both recognized and non-recognized by UNHCR) look forward to a change of situation. Indeed, beyond issues such as entry, status and treatment, which require ‘emergency responses’ and more tangible effects of not having a developed official policy, there are other issues, which need durable solutions. This brings us to certain intangible issues like the issue of acculturation and adaptation with reference to a bulk of conflict-displaced Afghans in India for whom going back to Afghanistan is not a possibility. Over the years, Afghans in India negotiated different strategies of adaptation, the optimal strategy for individuals and receiving societies being one of integration.9 By exploring the relationship between acculturation and identity development, this research aspires to focus on the interactions between the Afghan immigrant population and the Indian society in order to understand how the community negotiates identity and marginality in a country that does not have a structured legislation for asylum seekers and fails to officially recognize the conflict-displaced Afghans within its territory as ‘refugees’. Understanding how that has impacted the Afghan immigrant population living in India in terms of their access to certain basic rights would be important. The cardinal concern of this study is to understand whether the absence of the ‘refugee’ tag, as a result of non-­recognition of the host government, has influenced their strategy choices during acculturation process and eventually the identities they espoused in the host society. Whether the prevalent policy environment in the host society aided or hindered the overall integration of Afghan ‘refugees’ in India is crucial. Conducted from a socio-psychological perspective, this research also attempts to recognize how ethnic identity and identification with a new society are related to each other and how these identities are related to the adaptation of conflict-displaced Afghan population in India. As mentioned earlier, the escalation of conflict in Afghanistan in the early 1990s forced thousand upon thousand Afghans to flee home and seek refuge in India as an alternative to Pakistan and Iran. The non-Muslim religious minorities, particularly Sikhs and Hindus, who constitute a bulk of Afghan ‘refugees’ in India fled Afghanistan in the early 1990s, while a large number of ethnic Afghans especially Muslims and Christians took refuge in India after 2005, as a result of the escalation of insurgency in Afghanistan. This study chose to focus on the 20-year period, 1992 to 2012, because during that period, Afghans of different ethno-religious backgrounds started coexisting in India, making the period particularly interesting for this study. It must be mentioned here that although the representation of respondents has been titled towards the Sikhs and Hindus of Afghanistan, because of significant presence in India, yet this study does not intend to focus only on these two Afghan communities. Any Afghan, irrespective of his or her ethnicity, religious belief and UNHCR’s recognition, who has been forced to leave his country and has taken refuge in India between 1992 and 2012 and is unwilling or unable to return to his country, has been considered for this study.

Why study the experiences of Afghan ‘refugees’ in India?  5

Perspectives on displacement and usage of the term ‘refugee’ in this study With more than 65 million people forcibly displaced globally and the images of over-crowded rickety boats crossing the Mediterranean capturing the headlines over the past year or so, the perspectives on displacement have become more topical than they were a few years back. In the recent past, the terms such as ‘refugees’ and ‘migrant’ have been frequently used in media and public discourses, almost interchangeably, accompanying complications. The terms are not synonymous and confusing but lead to problems for both the categories. Since this study is about a refugee population, it is important to look at the definition of refugee as given in two foremost international legal instruments, signed by 110 states, that were adapted in Geneva in 1951 and 1967 within the framework of the United Nations.10 The 1951 convention defines ‘refugee’ as follows: As a result of events occurring before 1 January 1951 and owing to a well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion, is outside the country of his nationality and is unable, or owing to such fear, is unwilling to avail himself of the protection of that country; or who, not having a nationality and being outside the country of his former habitual residence as a result of such events, is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to return to it.11 The protections of refugees have many aspects. These include safety from being returned to the dangers they have fled, access to asylum procedures that are fair and efficient, and measures to ensure that their basic human rights are respected to allow them to live in dignity and safety while helping them to find a longer-term solution. States bear the primary responsibility for these protections. The United Nations High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR), therefore, works closely with host governments, advising and supporting them as needed to implement their responsibilities. Migrants, on the other hand, choose to move not because of a direct threat of persecution or death, but mainly to improve their lives by finding work, or in some cases for education, family reunion or other reasons. Unlike refugees who cannot safely return home, migrants face no such impediment to return. If they choose to return home, they will continue to receive the protection of their government.12 For individual governments, this distinction is important. Countries deal with migrants under their own immigration laws and refugees through norms of refugee protection and asylum that are defined in both national legislation and international law. They have specific responsibilities towards anyone seeking asylum on their territories or at their borders. UNHCR helps these countries deal with their asylum and refugee protection responsibilities.13

6  Why study the experiences of Afghan ‘refugees’ in India? In academic research, there are two broad approaches to the discourse on displaced people: the realist perspective, characterized by distinct refugee and immigrant categories, and the world system perspective. The former encompasses the push–pull theory of international migration popularized by Kunz14 and distinguishes refugees from immigrants as distinct categories. The propagator of the later approach, Hein, by contrast emphasizes the shared experiences of refugees and immigrants and the close relationship that exists between deteriorating economic conditions and political conflict and notes that the two perspectives ‘lead an uneasy coexistence within the field’.15 The realist perspective highlights the differences in the motives and circumstances that guide the decision of migration by a refugee and a voluntary migrant. Migration is depicted as a dichotomy in which refugees are pushed, forcibly displaced from their country of origin, while immigrants are voluntarily impelled by a pull from another country to take flight. Kunz described it as ‘the reluctance to uproot one self, and the absence of positive original motivations to set elsewhere, which categorizes all refugee decisions and distinguishes the refugee from the voluntary migrant’.16 Kunz acknowledged the distinction between refugee and non-refugee immigrants that might be less clear in the settlement phase but advocated that the compulsory displacement of refugees creates unique factors in outcomes; as a result, it is important to appreciate the distinctiveness of the categories. Refugee movement from the home country may be anticipatory or acute. The anticipatory refugees leave in a more prepared fashion pushed by impending changes, while the acute movements are pushed by massive political changes in wither mass flight, or individual or group escapes. Kunz had pointed out that some anticipatory refugee movements might superficially resemble voluntary migration; yet, that should not be a deterrence to classify them as refugee movements and in such cases the understanding of the historic–­ political background of the displacement becomes indispensible. If one feels pushed, the choice of a resettlement country is based on ‘Who will have me?’, rather than a pull to migrate voluntarily to a country one desires.17 The world system perspective takes the view that migration of refugees and immigrants over the last decades has included a mix of economic and political motives. Economic conditions around the globe may cause political unrest and political conditions may spur migration due to deteriorating economy, making the typology a ‘problematic distinction’.18 However, Hein acknowledged the difference between refugee and immigrant networks and in a way proposed a modified realist perspective. Although the Afghan population’s study of this research easily qualifies to be termed as ‘refugees’ based on the prevailing definitions, yet from the particular context of the host government in India, they are not recognized as the same. India was not among those 110 states, which acceded to the 1951 Refugee Convention or the 1967 Protocol. India even lacks overarching legislation to deal with matters pertaining to refugees and asylum seekers in general, which leaves the government to deal with refugees on an ad hoc basis.

Why study the experiences of Afghan ‘refugees’ in India?  7 So far, certain displaced communities (like Sri Lankans and Tibetans) have been recognized as ‘refugees’ by the government, while certain others (like Afghans, Burmese and Somalis) have not been recognized. The Indian government officially views these communities as foreigners but allows U ­ NHCR Mission in India to protect them under its mandate. UNHCR follows an indepth Refugee Status Determination process where their primary focus remains on whether the applicant falls into the UNHCR definition of a refugee and based on that, refugee status is granted or rejected. Given the specificities of the circumstances within which the subjects of this study operate, this study has avoided the term ‘Afghan refugee in India’ and has opted for expressions such as ‘conflict-displaced Afghans in India’ and ‘Afghan migrants in India’ to denote the same group. Since not all respondents interviewed in this study have formally been recognized as refugees by UNHCR India, this study sometimes also refers to them as ‘recognized’ or ‘unrecognized’ refugees. Finally, since this study could not identify another all-­encompassing substitute of the word ‘refugee’, that carried the same impact, depth and range, it deliberately chose to use the word refugee within quotes.

Research questions This research is an in-depth study of the representatives of Afghan migrant population living in India between 1992 and 2012. The state of ‘refugees’ in India, and more specifically the community under consideration, has been little studied thus far. This study attempts to trace the experiences of the said population as they moved from pre-conflict and conflict phases in their home country followed by displacement, transition and finally the settlement phase in a new country. It has become increasingly interesting to understand, what the Afghan communities brought to India by way of their history and life stories and also how the interaction with their new environment altered the interpretive experience and life narrative. The initial research and discussion with various relevant stakeholders during the course of field exposures led to the following questions: •

•

How does the lack of ‘refugee’ tag effect the acculturation process of conflict-displaced Afghans in India? Did it play a crucial factor in enabling or constraining overall integration of the studied communities in the host society? How ethnic identity and identification with new society are related to each other? How these identities are related to the adaptation of immigrants? How not having access to certain basic rights (like right to employment and social security) as a result of absence of structured refugee legislation have impacted their adaptation experiences in the host society? How does that impact in identity formation, which then contributes to integration or alienation in the host society?

8  Why study the experiences of Afghan ‘refugees’ in India? Borden had written about normative and non-normative events in the life history. The refugee experience is a non-normative event or a series of events. It creates displacement, unexpected turns in the road and the demand for adapting to new circumstances. This study is interested in determining salient demographic factors among the displaced Afghan population that interact with experiences both before and after migration to shape the adaptation strategies and their prospect of success. It was very important to learn about the perception of the said population of the different phases and experiences of their lives.

Literature review This research was taken up to discover what happens to Afghan refugees at the other end of the journey, and how they adapt to the new socio-cultural environment of the host country. For the Afghans leaving behind the incessant violence, fleeing meant leaving behind everything that had defined their lives up to that point and accepting a new identity – ‘refugee identity’.19 Scholars like Bilder et al. have shown a great deal of interest in the effect of flight on the identity issues of immigrants and refugees: The experience of flight highlights the dynamic character of identity. By transcending borders and embarking on a life in a new cultural environment, refugees normally question old and self-evident collective identities and change them. Either new identities emerge, or sometimes old ones even get strengthened.20 Thus, they have portrayed flight and crossing border as a momentous event entailing great deal of and internal transformations and external ramification for refugees and asylum seekers. Scholars have approached these issues from a variety of angles based on their interests and motivations. Thus, before focusing on the settlement experiences of refugees, it is important to take a note of the academic reflections on the conceptualization of refugees. The issue of the impact of refugee and migrant flows on international relations has been addressed by a number of scholars writing from the perspective of differing intellectual traditions. It is striking how often the abundant literature claiming refugees as its object of study locates ‘the problem’ not first in the political oppression or violence that produces massive territorial displacement of people but within the bodies and minds of people classified as refugees. Emma Haddad21 observed the figure of refugee in an integral part of the international system, symbolizing the failure of state– citizen–territory relationship assumed by the state system to seamlessly ensure international order and justice. The cause and consequence of refugee are intimately linked with world politics. The causes of refugee movements are underpinned by conflict, state failure and the inequalities of international political economy, while the consequences have been associated with

Why study the experiences of Afghan ‘refugees’ in India?  9 security, terrorism, spread of conflict and transnationalism. Therefore, responding to refugees represents a challenge to the world order and justice and to the facilitation of international cooperation.22 The universalization of the figure of ‘the refugee’ is evident in common usage of expressions such as ‘the refugee’, ‘the refugee experience’, ‘refugee mentality’ and ‘refugee Psychology’ by scholars like Benard,23 Norwood24 and Benthall.25 Stain26 opined, ‘despite the diversity among refugees, they should be seen as a social-psychological type’. Malkki’s27 work talked about the trend of a whole internationally standardized way of discussing people who have been displaced across national frontiers. While understanding how the refugee is located at the intersection between the international and the domestic paradigms, Dowty and Loescher28 observed that refugees illustrate a thin boundary between national and international: ‘A large scale movement of people across national borders, under duress, internationalizes what might otherwise be purely domestic issue related to the causes of movement’, Stanley Hoffmann, talking about the duties of the international community, observed: There is no way of isolating oneself from the effects of gross violations abroad: they breed refugees, exiles ad dissidents who come knocking at our door- and we must choose between bolting the doors, thus increasing misery and violence outside, and opening them, at some cost to our own well being.29 At virtually every significant juncture of evolution and development of the international system, the refugee has been a central figure. Hannah Ardent saw them as ‘vanguard of their people’, not only witnessing but also being an integral aspect of the changing architecture of world politics.30 Refugees have existed since the beginning of humanity; yet, there have been three main phases in dealing with issues of refugees in the 20th century: the interwar, the Cold War and the post-Cold War. Talking about the refugee flow, Miller31 pointed out that international migration has significantly affected international relations from time immemorial, but its saliency increased in the post-Cold War period. Combining the responses to the 20th-century crises, the current institutional meaning of refugee is a composite of three categories founded on the causes of the refugee departure according to Z ­ olberg, Suhrke and Aguayo: the first two, constituting the U.N. definition, are a formalization of the classic types. They include refugee as an activist, engaging in some politically significant activity that the state seeks to extinguish; and the refugee as a target, by misfortune of belonging – often by accident of birth – to a social or cultural group that has been singled out for the abuse of state power. The major change in the definition since its inception in the 1950s is the emergence of third category, the refugee as a mere victim.32 Although the term refugee has deep historical roots, its significance as a legal and administrative category has been vastly enhanced. Most academic

10  Why study the experiences of Afghan ‘refugees’ in India? discussions of what makes refugees distinctive have focused on the combination of two different characteristics of their movement – it is involuntary, as opposed to voluntary, and is considered equivalent. Jacques Vernant suggested that to qualify as a refugee rather than a migrant, a person must be ‘the victim of events for which, at least as an individual, he cannot be held responsible’.33 Considering the moment a person becomes refugee, philosophers and political scientists like Arendt and Kohn34 and Nyers35 have pondered the meaning of seeking asylum and taking refuge, exploring reaction of the host societies to the arrival of newcomers. The legalistic aspects of refugee right to protection have been fairly explored by scholars like Hathaway 199136 and 2015,37Goodwin-Gill,38 Chakraborty39 and Roy,40 while reports/handbooks of International organizations like Amnesty International,41 UNHCR,42 UNICEF,43 Human Rights Watch44 and others add to the understanding. The political significance of organized responses made by states, state-like institutions and societies to forced displacements has been discussed in the works of Hyndman45 and Malkki.46 Humanistic approaches to the crisis as well as accumulative experiences on organizations involved in bringing relief to refugees have been dealt by Valentine and Knudsen47 and Gurtov.48 Works of Black49 and Hoerz50 identified the environmental and development issues. Economists like Hiebert51 and Siggner52 have presented data on the financial situation, while anthropologists and sociologists Matsuoka and Sorenson,53 and Tastsoglou, in Tastsoglou and Dobrowlosky,54 using a different language from that of the mental health practitioners but talking about fundamentally the same sorts of issues, worry about their identity and cultural issues. Benedict Anderson’s55 widely acclaimed work has dealt with the personal and cultural feeling of belonging to a nation and also examines the creation and global spread of the ‘imagined communities’ of nationality. Works of Zolberg, Suhrke and Aguyayo56 and Weiner57 have made significant contributions on refugee study of developing countries. This interaction amongst various disciplines in studies on flight and refugee issues reflects what one scholar, an anthropologist, has called ‘the necessity of a multidisciplinary approach due to a complex interplay of the social, cultural, psychological and political aspects of flight’.58 Moving out of the realm of political science and the political significance of refuge and considering the actual settlement experiences of refugees, a significant body of scholarly work on refugees and their adaptation into new societies is devoted to psychosocial issues. Psychology, in addition to other social science disciplines, has been a significant big part towards the understanding of the factors which make adaptation process positive or negative. Issues such as refugee and host society interaction, acculturation, identity and adaptation constitute an important part of the theoretical approach utilized in this study and thus have been extensively dealt in Chapter 2 of this study. For better understanding of the psychosocial issues of the immigrant population, this study looked into other studies conducted in Western

Why study the experiences of Afghan ‘refugees’ in India?  11 settings from similar perspectives. Nann59 provided a detailed argument about how the ‘culture shock’ resulting from resettlement exacerbates the stressful and precarious situation of refugees resettled from various countries to North America. He concluded that the problems were as much to do with the mentality of refugees as the situation of the host country. ­Lipson and Mileis60 accepted that ‘migration is a stressful experience requiring accommodation, adaptation or coping’, consequently classifying migrants and refugees amongst vulnerable populations. They dealt with two dominant paradigms in the literature on refugees and health: the first views refugees as ‘a poverty-stricken and political class of excess people’, and the second objectifies refugees as medical phenomena. Caoughlan and ­Manley’s61 study on the Bosnian Refugees in America also provided interesting insights about the trauma and stress that refugees might encounter as a result of their life experiences. Studies by Dyck and McLaren62 and Dossa63 have concentrated on the actual narratives surrounding the settlement experiences and integration processes of immigrants and refugees in Western countries, while scholars such as Ager and Strang64 have approached the issue differently, positioning ‘integration’ as an objective entity and then researching how immigrants have succeeded, or not, in attaining it. Scholars like Berry65 and Valtonen66 have identified ‘integration’ to be the preferred goal of refugee settlement and defined it ‘as the ability to participate fully in economic, social, political and cultural activities, without having to relinquish one’s own distinct ethnocultural identity and culture’. The ability to participate fully in a host society may be impeded by prejudice, discrimination or stereotyped view of the host society towards the refugee group. Constraints on full participation in a new society can also be greatly influenced by refugee policies and services. The current study provided an opportunity to deal with these issues in the context of a developing country, which does not have structured nation legislation for refugees. Much of the work has traditionally focused on the political economy of international migrations, which highlight the rational economic push and pull factors that guide the movement of people across international ­border.67 But Weiner challenged that notion and argued: ‘Much of the international population flows, especially within Africa and South Asia, are determined only marginally, if at all, by changes in the global or regional political ­economy’.68 Refugee movements in particular, by the definitions, precipitate a further cycle of such events depending on the social and political contexts. Authors have emphasized that the burden of refugees falls disproportionately on the poorest of states in the world.69 Yet, much of the literature in the politics of control focuses on Western refugee receiving states rather than the developing countries of the world.70 Among the scholarly works focusing on South Asia (particularly India), Ranabir Samaddar’s ‘Refugee and the State’ examined the varied encounters between the state and the refugees and provided a record of protection and hospitality to refugees, while pointing out the contradictions in the relation between these positive aspects and

12  Why study the experiences of Afghan ‘refugees’ in India? the manner in which state power has been exercised in postcolonial India.71 More recent works by Ghosh72 and Oberoi73 have dealt with refugee and state policies in South Asia. While Ghosh offered a holistic view of the political and security imperatives, relief practices, legal dynamics and the psychological dimensions pertaining to South Asian migration by focusing on three categories of people, namely migrants, refugees and stateless people, in the subcontinent, Oberoi traced the history of refugee policymaking and motivations since 1947. Works of Mishra and M ­ ajumdar,74 ­Banerjee,75 76 77 Muni and Baral and Nair have made significant contributions towards the understanding of the refugee scene in South Asia; however, in most of the mentioned works, the plight of Afghan refugees in India has been largely neglected. The waves of displacement of Afghan population since the 1970s had attracted researchers like Centlivre,78 Ruiz,79 Rizvi,80 Benjamin81 and Nafziger et al.82 towards population (refugees, IDPs and Migration) movement in Afghanistan. Notable academic intervention on the political developments and particularly the conflict phase of Afghanistan from the 1990s came from Rasul Baksh Rais,83 Amalendu Misra84 and Hafizullah Emadi85 among others. Ahmed Rashid’s86 work although written from a journalistic perspective offers rich details on key players in Afghan politics. Experiences with the Afghan refugee community in Pakistan and Iran have been fairly well explored by Louis Dupree,87 Nancy Dupree,88 Ahmed,89 Edward,90 Bonner,91 Anwar,92; Connor,93 Emiry and Ruiz,94 Koepke,95 Monsutti,96 Hugo et al.97 Suhrke et al.98 Olszewska99 and others. Despite significant attention on Afghan refugees in Pakistan and Iran at large, not many academic works attempted to capture the acculturation experiences of the refugees by tapping the interaction between the immigrant group and the host population. Majority of the existing work focused on the macro-level considerations as a result of the policy shifts of the respective host governments. Gender dimensions of Afghan refugees in Iran, Pakistan and some Western countries have been dealt by Dupree,100 Lindisfarne and Tapper,101 Povey102 and Gaur Singh.103 Apart from Iran and Pakistan, Afghans took refuge in other regional countries, including India; however, the plight of Afghan refugees in India remains a grossly unexplored domain. Although works of Anne Sophie-Bents,104 Bose,105 Dutta and Sharma,106 SAHRDC Report107 and Ghosh108 have touched upon this subject, yet significant areas remain to be untouched. Furthermore, while dealing with Afghan refugees, hardly any attempt has been made to study the experiences of religious minorities (like Sikhs and Hindus) from Afghanistan, their plight, the particular circumstances of their flight and the settlement experiences in culturally complex societies. A bulk of the Afghan ‘refugees’ in India belong to these communities and except for insight by Ballard,109 Emadi110 and Ghosh,111 hardly any attention has been devoted to these communities in academic research. This study aspires to be a remedy for some of the aforementioned

Why study the experiences of Afghan ‘refugees’ in India?  13 gaps in the process of providing a deeper understanding of the ways in which conflict-displaced Afghans adapt to new circumstances of the host society in their settlement phases in India.

Methodology This study evolved in stages. It was not a smooth evolution, but the one that advanced through errors of judgement, scuffles with unanticipated difficulties, coupled with resource and time constraints. In other words, it progressed as research projects normally do. The extensive use of secondary sources provided a good entry point into the debates concerning the issues of identity and acculturation of refugee population in their settlement phases. The theoretical framework drew upon a variety of source materials ranging from published academic works: books, articles, reports, policy papers, etc. However, the relatively meagre academic resources available on the subject area at the host university’s library impeded the pace and scope of access to resources. To cope with this problem, the library research trip to the United Kingdom, more specifically to the University of Oxford and London School of Economics in 2014, was conducted. Additionally, materials were also obtained from libraries in India during the course of field visits. The secondary data sources for the case study part mainly comprised newspaper and journal articles, folklore, reports of human rights organizations, policy papers, reports by audiovisual media and documentary films. Resource centres, think tanks and libraries of Kabul (particularly Afghanistan Centre at Kabul University and Afghanistan Research and Evaluation Unit) and India (the Parliament Library, Jawaharlal Nehru University Library, Jamia Millia Islamia University Library, Institute of Defence Studies and Analysis Library and Gurudwara Singh Sabha GKII, libraries in Delhi and Maulana Abul Kalam Azad Institute of Asian Studies Library, Kolkata) were extensively consulted. This study has also drawn upon the author’s experience of field trips to New Delhi and Kabul between 2012 and 2016, as a part of MPhil research pertaining to Indo-Afghan Bilateral Relations. Due to the dearth of academic research on the communities under consideration, this study has largely depended on primary data generated during field trips by the author. The principal research methodology that anchors this research has been the one that combines both qualitative and quantitative approaches. A mixed method approach was found to be appropriate, given the nature of the research questions, which were concerned with attempting to understand how the concerned community saw their pre- and most migration experiences and how their experiences impacted their acculturation outcomes. Both structured questionnaires and semi-structured research schedules (both open-ended and closed-ended questions) were used as tools for collecting data from the study Universe. The formal questionnaire in

14  Why study the experiences of Afghan ‘refugees’ in India? certain cases gave more structure to an interview in which elaboration of stories was sometimes limited. This study largely depended on summaries of written notes for the analysis; however in certain cases, interviews have been recorded, which allowed more extensive narratives. The participants in this research were from three countries, namely India, the United Kingdom and Germany. The author alone collected the data. All the participants were informed that the participation was voluntary and were given the freedom to decide, if they would like to disclose their identity at the end of the interview. Whenever requested by the interviewee, care has been taken to ensure that their original identities remain confidential. In addition to making use of available primary and secondary source materials, field research was also conducted for progression of research in the direction of answering the research questions posed by the author. The field research to India was conducted in two phases: the first phase covered a period of three months from October 2014 to December 2014 and the second phase commenced from November 2015 up till February 2016. In one instance, care was taken to ensure that the field research overlaps with the festival of Diwali in India – which made greater access to interviewees and field sites possible; prior appointments with governmental organizations, UNHCR, area experts and bureaucrats were scheduled before the trip, in order to utilize the limited time in an effective manner. For the particular aspect of tracing the acculturation process of Afghans in India, around 57 interviews with displaced Afghans in India were conducted of which 54 interviews were selected for the final analysis. Sampling took place mostly in Delhi and its nearby areas (Faridabad, Haryana) because of the high concentration of the studied population in those areas. A sample of 14 respondents from the host population was collected. They were mostly from the same neighbourhoods where the immigrant groups lived. The sample included primarily first generation of respondents (89%), those who have spent considerable time span in Afghanistan as well as India. However, 6 out of 54 respondents from the immigrant group belonged to the second generation that is, born in India or arrived in India before the age of seven (11%). To understand the settlement experiences of the Afghan ‘refugees’ in India, this study identified the different immediate stakeholders that play key roles. Apart from the host population of the immediate surroundings, UNHCR and its partner NGOs and the Government of India were also identified as crucial influencing factors and thereby this research has attempted to tap each and every stakeholder. Greater details about the sample have been provided in the case study chapter (Chapter 4). The ‘snowball technique’ was employed to access interviewees, whereby interviewees referred the author to people through their networks.112 Particular attention was given to ensure that the author did not end up being trapped inside what Gusterson refers to as ‘…the networks echo chamber’113

Why study the experiences of Afghan ‘refugees’ in India?  15 by reaching out to a large and diverse pool of people identified through the author’s diverse personal and professional networks. Prior to commencing interviewing, ‘informed consent’ was obtained from the interviewees, in keeping with the spirit embodied in the ethics code of the American Anthropological Association. Vital consideration concerning informed consent is spelled out as: …the informed consent process is dynamic and continuous…informed consent for the purpose of this code, does not necessarily imply or require a particular written or signed form. It is the quality of the consent not the format that is relevant.114

Measures The interviews conducted were based on the use of questionnaires that had two parts. The first part had a semi-structured format, which allowed for adapting the interview questions to suit the personal demeanour and background of the interviewee. The second part was in a structured format with closed-ended questions meant to elicit specific, usually single-word answers in response to the researchers’ coding scheme,115 particularly for mapping the acculturation outcomes. The author personally administered the questionnaires during interviews. Questionnaires were completed by the author during interview and provided quantitative data in addition to qualitative material that emerged from more open-ended questions. In addition to demographic information, open-ended sections were included to understand the experiences during different stages of migration. The adoption of this approach allowed the interviewee to fill in the boundaries of the conversation, set in their own words thereby equipping us better to understand how they made sense of their lives and experiences. The use of interviews also allowed the author to gain insights into issues not covered by written material, thereby enriching the analysis. The interviews have been woven into the text as opposed to being used in a question and answer format. The overall purpose of using interviews has been to draw reader’s attention to certain issues under consideration and not so much to individual people. The second part of the questionnaire assessed a wide range of variables related to acculturation and adaptation. Measures were either developed for the project, or taken directly with some modification from existing scales. For most scales, responses ranged between three options: ‘Yes’, ‘No’ and ‘Don’t know’ or ‘Never’, ‘Sometimes’ and ‘Very often’. For certain responses, options ranged from ‘Strongly disagree’ (1) to ‘strongly agree’ (5). The psychometric property of most scales established in the present study has been reported in the following table. In addition, the Harvard Trauma Questionnaire was consulted to find responses about specific trauma experiences.

16  Why study the experiences of Afghan ‘refugees’ in India? No.

Scale

Source

1

Acculturation attitude Integration Assimilation Separation marginalization Cultural identity Ethnic identity Acculturation behaviour Ethnic language prof National language prof Language us Ethnic peer contacts National peer contacts Family relationship values Family obligation Perceived discrimination Structured ‘refugee’ legislation Access to basic rights Civil and political participation Psychological adaptation Life satisfaction Self esteem Psychological problems Socio-cultural adaptation Adjustment issues Behaviour problems

ICSEY; Berry et al. (1989)

2 3

4 5 6

7

8

Phinney (1992), Phinney/DevichNavarro (1997) Kwak (1991) ICSEY

Nguyen/Williams (1989), Georgas (1989), Georgas et al. (1996) ICSEY Incorporated for this study

Diener et al. (1985), Rosenberg (1965), Beiset/Flemming (1986), Kinzie et al. (1982), Mollica et al. (1987), Robinson et al. (1991) Anderson (1982), Moos (1989), Sam (1994), Samdal (1998), Wold (1995)

Adapted from J. W. Berry, J. S. Phinney, D. L. Sam and P. Vedder, ‘Immigrant youth, Acculturation, Identity and Adaptation’. BELTZ, no. 55 (2010), 17–43.

Acculturation Attitudes: This scale assessed four acculturation attitudes: assimilation, integration, separation and marginalization. The items concerned five domains of life, namely: cultural tradition, language, marriage, social activities and friends. For example, the items in the social activities domain included four questions: (1) ‘I prefer social activities which involve both nationals (Indians) and my ethnic group (Afghans)’ {Integration}. (2)  I prefer social activities which involve nationals only {Assimilation}. (3) I prefer social activities which involve members of my own ethnic group only {Separation}. (4) I do not want to attend social activities which involve either members of my own ethnic group or nationals {Marginalization}. Cultural Identity: Ethnic Identity was measured with items assessing ethnic affirmation (e.g. Sense of belonging, positive feelings about being group member). A sample item is ‘I feel that I am part of (ethnic ) culture’. National Identity was assessed with measures of national affirmation and the importance of one’s national identity. A sample item is: ‘I am happy that I am (national)’.

Why study the experiences of Afghan ‘refugees’ in India?  17 Language Proficiency and Language Use: The scale for ethnic language proficiency inquired about a person’s ability to understand, speak, read and write the ethnic language. For example, to the question about the knowledge of Afghan languages (Dari and Pashto), the respondents were asked to choose from the five-point scale (not at all = 1 to very well = 5). Proficiency in the national language was assessed with the same self-report questions, but with respect to national language. The interviewer also has a personal evaluation of the respondents’ ability based on the way he/she spoke during the interview. Language use refers to the extent to which the respondents use either their ethnic language or the national language when talking to their family or community members. Ethnic and Peer Group Contact: Two scales assess the frequency of interaction with peers from one’s own ethnic group, or from the national group. An example is: ‘How often do you spend free time with your peers from your own ethnic group?’ Participants responded on a scale ranging from never (1) to very often (5). Couples of open-ended questions about the number of friends and their backgrounds, etc., were also asked. Participants are encouraged to indicate their friends and the amount of time they spend with them in order to form an idea about his level of contact. Family Relationship Values: This scale consisted of one subscale whereby an assessment towards the paternal authority was evaluated. Closed-ended responses were seeked, where the respondents had to choose from options – yes, no and don’t know to questions such as – ‘Should children do what their parents ask them to do?’ Often, follow-up questions were asked to understand the rationale behind a particular response. Perceived Discrimination: This was assessed with the immigrant group only. The scale assessed perceived frequently of being treated unfairly or negatively or being teased, threatened, of feeling unaccepted because of one’s ethnicity (e.g. ‘I have been teased because of my ethnic background’). Participants responded on a scale ranging between yes, no and don’t know. They were further probed about the organizations, groups or people they felt discriminated by. These were open-ended questions; yet, in this study, the responses that were forwarded can be categorized into four groups, namely Government Institutions (FRRO), UNHCR, Employer and people of the neighbourhood. Structured ‘Refugee’ Legislation: With the particular research concern in mind, a new dimension was added to the scale whereby questions were posed on the importance of structured legislation for the refugee group. The two subscales dealt with the importance of access to basic rights and the civil and political participation of the immigrant communities in the host society. Respondents had to choose from three options – yes, no and don’t know to questions such as: ‘Many problems that were faced were due to the lack of a structured refugee legislation in the host country’. In most cases, these closed-ended questions were followed by a set of follow-up questions to understand the depth of their responses. Some of the respondents even changed their responses as a result of this interrogation.

18  Why study the experiences of Afghan ‘refugees’ in India? Socio-cultural Adaptation: Socio-cultural adaptation was assessed by asking the respondents closed-ended questions about various issues like cultural tradition, marriage, importance of national and ethnic language fluency, social activities, food habit, attire, etc. A three-point response category was provided to them. Psychological Adaptation: Psychological adaptation was measured with three scales: life satisfaction, self-esteem and psychological problem. Life satisfaction was measured with a three-item scale – yes, no and don’t know (for example, I feel that I am a person of worth, at least on an equal plane with others). Additionally, they were asked to give an overall assessment of their lives and the options given were between ‘poor’, ‘fair’, ‘good’ and ‘excellent’. Self-esteem was measured using Rosenberg’s (1965) tenitem self-esteem inventory. A sample item is ‘on the whole I am satisfied with myself’. The scale for psychological problems measured depression, anxiety and psychosomatic symptoms. A sample item is: ‘My thoughts are confused’. The host country respondents were not asked questions with respect to language proficiency and language use, ethnic identity and perceived discrimination. Majority of the scales that have been referred in this study were unidimensional and found very strong support for the structural equivalence of the measures.116 Some of the interviews with the ‘refugee’ population lasted up to three and a half hours and typically explored, in more depth, experiences both during and after conflict. Most interviews were arranged in the interviewee’s house, different Gurudwaras in Delhi, office or a public space they felt comfortable in. Out of 82 interviews conducted in India, Hindi was the linguistic medium of conducting with almost 40 ‘refugee’ respondents and 14 host respondents from the immediate surroundings. One interview with the Governmental official (Ministry of Home Affairs), 4 UNHCR and its partner NGO officials and 9 experts and 14 Afghans in India were conducted in English. Interviews conducted in Germany and United Kingdom (South Hall) were in English. Sometimes, some of the Sikh respondents used Punjabi language to respond to certain questions. The author’s interview experiences confirmed the validity of Rathbun’s observation, ‘Interviewing […] is often the best tool for establishing how subjective factors influence decision-making, the motivation of those involved and the role of agency in events of interest’, additionally ‘interviewing in unique in that it allows the interviewer to ask the questions the he or she wants answered’.117 Transcriptions have been made on the basis of the author’s basic proficiency in Hindi, Urdu and Punjabi (spoken) languages; however wherever required, the author took assistance of friends who are native speakers of their languages. The author has taken particular care to ensure that meaning was not lost or transformed over the course of translation and transcription of interviews. In addition to qualitative interviews, a small number of focus group discussions (FGDs) were also conducted both in Germany and India.

Why study the experiences of Afghan ‘refugees’ in India?  19 Before commencing with the interview (for the first time), the author generally briefed about herself and her research enquiry to the interviewee. Interviews generally began with informal queries concerning the interviewee’s background and after that the conversation would edge towards the main contours of the research enquiry. This way with interviewer established a degree of comfort and trust with the person being interviewed. It also allowed for the interviewee to sketch out in their own words the themes which in his/her worldview were important, in turn providing a useful basis for follow-up questions. The author’s gender also played a crucial role in her access to the women of the household. Although there was hesitancy initially, but once they noticed that the author shared good trust, respect and rapport with the male members of their families, they were ready to open up. Author also managed to speak to more than 20 women informally on four occasions – firstly, during a wedding ceremony of two of the members of the Afghan-Sikh community where the author was invited; secondly, during the Gurudwara Langer (community dining) after prayers; thirdly, during author’s visit to the Khalsa Diwan Welfare Society in Delhi were many women in the community came for various trainings; and finally when the author was felicitated by the Afghan-Sikh members of Gurudwara Singh Sabha GKII, New Delhi, on 7th December 2015. Since these were informal interactions, these were not counted as interviews; nonetheless, they provided many interesting inputs to this research. The felicitation by the community and the television interview of the author in one of the popular programmes at a leading national channel (ZEE TV Punjabi)118 played an important role in terms of access to the communities. Many of the members of the communities were aware of the author and her research before they were contacted for interviews and thus they did not turn down the request. The author was welcomed with true Afghan hospitality – green tea, dry fruits, sweets and willing conversations. Many families invited back to share a meal. They were largely generous in their conversation, anxious to explain, sometimes frustrated with language barrier, grasping for just the right word of phrase. Conversation mostly took place in Hindi and Punjabi as respondents switched back and forth for ease of expression. At large, the members of the displaced Afghan communities in India were extremely appreciative of the author’s interest in their lives. Transcriptions of large number interviews were done on the date of the interview, which is in the field itself, but the process of analysis and interpretation was undertaken in Erfurt. This allowed time for reflection on data gathered as also physical and emotional distancing from the field and subjects interviewed. The author also made a note of the general sense that she got from the interviews about the respondents and their current situations. These field notes came particularly handy while understanding and analysing the responses given by the respondents. Apart from use of data generated from interviews, another technique of qualitative research employed included participant observation. The application of this approach

20  Why study the experiences of Afghan ‘refugees’ in India? allowed the author to join the flow of daily life, providing sustained contact with the research subjects and the possibility of building up relationships of trust and intimacy.119 The author’s physical appearance, gender, familiarity with culture and the place where the respondents resided, because of the sustained and intimate contact through her earlier works, allowed her to blend in with the local populace with relative ease. This, on the one hand, provided the author familiarity and an ability to be a part of the world of the people being studied yet on the other hand her not being from amongst their universe shielded her from being ‘home blind’.120 The approach to data analysis was informed by the grounded theory method. This method of data analysis recommends establishing codes as categories or tools to deal with large amounts of raw data; conceptualizing and classifying pieces of data and making comparisons of both identifying patters and determining variations of the patterns in the data.121 This study also relied on the technique named ‘focusing and bounding the data’ as recommended by Miles and Huberman.122 They suggested drawing of an intentional map that combines author’s thinking about the general areas that are perceived to be important with what seemed to be produced from the initial reading of the data. This method was particularly helpful for the questionnaire which eventually contained an intersection of biography, history as a time map that led from pre-conflict life to conflict as a life-changing experience and on to the experiences of life in a new country, leading to various adaptation outcomes. In consistent with Strauss and Corbin’s suggestion that ‘the design, like the concepts, must be allowed to emerge during the research’,123 the analysis of data began with the very first interview, as the author tried to make sense of what she was hearing. The initial research experiences did help to inform the subsequent data gathering efforts. This study largely followed two interview coding schemes as propounded by Aberbach and Rockman:124 firstly, Manifest coding items which include direct responses to specific questions, for the structured part of the questionnaire. Secondly, Global coding items which include items where interviewers formed general impressions from the interview about the respondents’ general traits and style, for the open-ended questions. Comparative statistical data analysis and quantitative content analysis were carried out to map various acculturation outcomes of the respondents. In employing content analysis as a tool, particular attention was given to words, themes, characters and concepts employed.125 Content analysis is generally regarded as an unobtrusive tool of research and it can help reflect on trends in a society over long periods of time.126 This research followed an inductive approach, i.e. as opposed to working with a predetermined theoretical framework,127 this research uses the data generated from the first field research to put forth certain theoretical postulations, particularly concerning settlement experiences of refugees. Furthermore, it also allowed the author to work towards an analytical framework. This study is acutely aware of the postmodern critiques of the life history approach and of ethnographic methodology. As Tierney opined, ‘The

Why study the experiences of Afghan ‘refugees’ in India?  21 purpose of the text, the truth of the text, and the author of the text come into question at the end of the twentieth century in ways that did not concern the life historian a century ago’.128 However, this research proposes that it is possible to erect a healthy sense of scepticism as it listened to the voices of the respondents reflecting on their own experiences of conflict, war, insurgency, violence, deprivation, persecution and flight, realizing that theirs is an imperfect account of their own subjective experience to an imperfect audience! As recommended by Denzin129 and others, attempt has been made to be aware of how class, race, gender, religion and ethnicity shaped the research inquiry. Yet, the imperatives of inquiry dictated that this study overrides the postmodern tendencies to nihilism and proceeds with the work regardless of its limitations.

Limitations of this study At this point, I would like to earnestly acknowledge the limitations of my research. Some of the terms that this research dealt with, for example, identity, culture, acculturation, integration, ethnicity, minority, etc., are not neatly defined, universally accepted scientific concepts. Far from being a conclusive word on these, this study chose to work with simplistic and sometimes narrow interpretations of certain concepts (relevant for the particular case study which could lead to certain deductions), which was seen to be a better position that not reaching any specific conclusion. Secondly, due to the dearth of available material on the subject of this research, the only option was to generate date during field trips to India. Due to the limited time frame of those trips and the inability to hire another person to assist in the process of field data collection due to financial constraints, this research could tap limited number of people. If these constraints were absent, and the research could reach out to many more people, the sample could have been more representative. Having said that, I must also point out, although the sample size might technically not be representative of the population this research attempts to study, it has been successful in catering to members of all the major groups of Afghans living in India and tapping all the relevant stakeholders that influence their settlement experience. The complete non-cooperation from the Indian Government (particularly the Foreigners Regional Registration Office, one of the key players in the given context) has been a huge setback; however, the interview with a senior official at the Ministry of Home Affairs, Government of India can be viewed as a significant success towards addressing that gap. Finally, I wish to mark the fact that the research findings have been published in English, which in a way will limit the ability of this research to share its findings with some of the people who are the subject of this research. This sharing of knowledge, I believe, is important both in terms of contributing to the academic debate on the topic as also in terms of certain ethical considerations that merit address.

22  Why study the experiences of Afghan ‘refugees’ in India?

Notes 1 ‘Solution Strategy for Afghan Refugees: Regional Overview, 2015–2016’, United Nations Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR). Available at: www.unhcr.org/ protection/operations/542522922/afghanistan-regional-portfolio-solutionsstrategy-afghan-refugees-20152016.html?query=Afghanistan (accessed on 22.7.2016). 2 Richard Jenkins, Rethinking Ethnicity-Arguments and Explorations. (London: Sage Publications Ltd, 1997), p. 43. 3 ‘India-Afghanistan Relations’, Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India, June 2015. Available at: www.mea.gov.in/Portal/ForeignRelation/ Afghanistan_2015_07_20.pdf (accessed on 27.6.2016). 4 Shuchita Mehta (Senior Communication/Public Information Assistant, ­U NHCR India) in discussion with Anwesha Ghosh, December 2015. 5 There are no data available on the exact number of people applying for asylum from all across the country over the years. UNHCR has a field office in Chennai, which provides programmes for Sri Lankan refugees. For rest of the country, UNHCR New Delhi remains the only liaison point. This is believed to be one of the reasons why most of the people seeking UNHCR assistance have preferred to settle in and around Delhi. There is no information available about how many people residing in India as a whole seek UNHCR protection. Therefore, it should be kept in mind that UNHCR statistics only reflect those who physically came to UNHCR and those who satisfied the refugee definition. 6 Joint IDP Profiling Service (JIPS), Urban Profiling of Refugee Situation in Delhi: Refugees from Afghanistan, Myanmar and Somalia and their Indian Neighbours: A Comparative Study, September 2013. Available at: http://fic.tufts.edu/assets/ original_Urban_Profiling_of_Refugees_Situations_in_Delhi.pdf (accessed on 6.2.2015). 7 UNHCR certificates enable refugees to acquire temporary residence permits from the Indian authorities and therefore, a right to stay in the country. They also entitle certificate holders to a subsistence allowance and certain other basic services, such as healthcare, education and assistance in the naturalization process. This clearly puts refugees recognized by UNHCR in a much better situation than refugees who are not recognized. 8 According to UNHCR, in 2005, there were more than 8,000 Afghan refugees in India. Close to 88% of the Afghan refugee population in the country were ­Hindus or Sikhs. In 2007, there were 9,200 Afghan refugees in India, of whom 8,500 were Hindus and Sikhs. Nayana Bose, Afghan Refugees in Search of Indian Identity, 19 May 2005. Available at: www.unhcr.org/428c967e4.html (accessed on 6.2.2015). Vivian Tan, Afghan Minorities Seek Home in India, 13 December 2007. Available at: www.unhcr.org/cgi-bin/texis/vtx/search?page=search&docid= 4761579f4&query=new%20delhi. 9 ‘Integration’ is not a neatly defined scientific concept and can be defined in various ways. Broadly, it is defined as a process by which refugees become accepted into the host society. Both the roles of the refugees and the host society are equally important and it is the interaction between the two that ultimately determines the direction of the process. UNHCR views (Fielden, 2008), Refugee Integration in host society is a durable solution, which combines three dimensions: Firstly, it is a legal process, whereby refugees attain a wider range of rights in the host state. Secondly, it is an economic process of establishing sustainable livelihoods and a standard of living comparable to the host community. Thirdly, it is a social and cultural process of adaptation and acceptance that enables the refugees to contribute to the social life of the host country and

Why study the experiences of Afghan ‘refugees’ in India?  23 live without fear of discrimination. This study considered all the mentioned dimensions but focused on the maintenance of a commitment to old values while simultaneously accepting the values of the new society. 10 The Convention and protocol relating to the status of Refugees, 1951. Available at: www.unhcr.org/3b66c2aa10.html (accessed on 24.7.2016). 11 ‘Handbook on Procedures and Criteria for Determining Refugee Status’, Office of UNHCR, Geneva (1992), 14. Available at: www.unhcr.org/4d93528a9.pdf (accessed on 24.7.2016). 12 Adrian Edwards, ‘Refugee or Migrant? Word choice matters’, UNHCR Viewpoint, July 11 (2016). Available at: www.unhcr.org/news/latest/2016/7/55df0e556/ unhcr-viewpoint-refugee-migrant-right.html (accessed on 24.7.2016). 13 Ibid. 14 E. F. Kunz, ‘The refugee in flight: kinetic models and forms of displacement’. International Migration Review, Vol. 7 (1973), 125–146. 15 J. Hein, ‘Refugees, immigrants and the state’. Annual Review of Sociology, Vol. 19 (1993), 43–59. 16 E. F. Kunz, Op.cit (1973). 17 E. F. Kunz, ‘Exile and resettlement: refugee theory’. International Migration Review, Vol. 15 (1981), 42–51. 18 J. Hein, ‘Refugees, immigrants and the state’. Annual Review of Sociology, Vol. 19 (1993), 43–59. 19 Linda A. Camino and Ruth M. Krulfeld. Reconstructing Lives, Recapturing Meaning: Refugee Identity, Gender, and Culture Change. (New York: Routledge, 1999). 20 Susanne Binder and Jelena Tosic. ‘Refugees as a particular form of transnational migrations and social transformations: socioanthropological and gender aspects’. Current Sociology, Vol. 53, no. 4 (2005), 607–624. 21 Emma Haddad, The Refugee in International Society. (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2008). 22 Alexander Betts and Gil Loescher (eds.), Refugee in International Relations. (New York: Oxford University Press, 2011). 23 Cheryl Benard, ‘Politics and the refugee experience’. Political Science Quarterly, Vol. 101 (1986), 617–636. 24 Frederick Norwood, Strangers and Exiles: A History of Religious Refugees. (New York: Abigdon Press, 1969) cited in Liisa H. Malkki, Purity and Exile. (Chicago, London: The University of Chicago Press, 1995). 25 Jonathan Benhall, ‘The refugee experience’. RAIN, Royal Anthropological Institute News, Vol. 37 (1980), 1–3. 26 Berry Stain, ‘Understanding the refugee experience: foundations of better resettlement system’. Journal of Refugee Resettlement, Vol. 1 (1981), 62–71. 27 Liisa H. Malkki, Purity and Exile. (Chicago, London: The University of Chicago Press, 1995). 28 Alan Dowty and Gil Loescher, ‘Refugee flows as grounds for international action’. International Security, Vol. 21 (1996), 42–46. 29 Stanley Hoffmann, Duties beyond Borders: On the Limits and Possibilities of Ethical International Politics. (New York: Syracuse University, Press, 1981), p. 111. 30 Hannah Ardent, ‘We Refugees’. Menorah Journal, Vol. 31, no. 1 (1943), 69–77. 31 Mark J. Miller, ‘International Migration in Post-Cold War International Relations,’ in Bimal Ghosh (ed.), Managing Migration, Time for a New International Regime (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000), pp. 27–36. 32 Arustide R. Zolberg, Astri Suhrke, and Sergio Aguayo, Escape from Violence: Conflict and Refugee Crisis in the Developing World. (New York: Oxford University Press, 1989).

24  Why study the experiences of Afghan ‘refugees’ in India? 33 Jacques Vernant, The Refugee in the Post War World. (London: Allen & Unwin, 1953), p. 5. 34 Hannah Arendt and Jerome Kohn (eds.), Essays in Understanding, 1930–1954. 1st ed. (New York: Harcourt, Brace & Co., 1994). 35 Peter Nyers, Rethinking Refugees: Beyond States of Emergency. (New York: Routledge, 2006). 36 James C. Hathaway. The Law of Refugee Status. (Toronto: Butterworths Publication, 1991). Available at: www.baag.org.uk/. 37 James C. Hathaway, The Rights of Refugees under International Law. 5th ed. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2015). 38 Guy S. Goodwin-Gill, The Refugee in International Law (two editions). (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1996). 39 Manik Chakraborty, Human Rights and Refugees: Problems, Laws and Practices. (New Delhi: Deep and Deep Publications, 1998). 40 Sanjay K. Roy (ed.), Refugee and Human Rights. (New Delhi: Rawat Publication, 2001). 41 ‘The Global Refugee Crisis: A conspiracy of Neglect’, Amnesty International Report, 2015. Available at: www.amnestyusa.org/sites/default/files/p4575_ global_refugee_crisis_syria.pdf (accessed on 22.6.2016). 42 ‘Global Trends: Forced Displacement in 2015’, United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR Report), 2015. Available at: www.unhcr.org/ ­ NHCR statistics/unhcrstats/576408cd7/unhcr-global-trends-2015.html; See also U Annual Reports by year. Available at: http://www.unhcr.org/search?comid= 3b4f07fd4&cid=49aea93a20&scid=49aea93a16&tags=UNHCR%20Annual%20 Reports%20General%20Assembly (accessed on 22.6.2016). 43 ‘Refugee and Migrant Crisis in Europe’, UNICEF, September 2015. Available at: www.unicef.org/publicpartnerships/files/Refugee_and_migrant_children_ in_Europe_-_Sept_2015.pdf (accessed on 22.6.2016). 44 ‘The Mediterranean Migration Crisis’, Human Rights Watch, 2015. Available at: www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/reports/eu0615_web.pdf. 45 Jennifer Hyndman, and Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees. Managing Displacement: Refugees and the Politics of Humanitarianism. (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2000). 46 Liisa Malkki, ‘National geographic: the rooting of peoples and the territorialization of national identity among scholars and refugees’. Cultural Anthropology, Vol. 7, no. 1 (1992), 24–44. 47 E. Velentine Daniel and John Chr. Knusden, Mistrusting Refugees. (Berkley, Los Angeles, London: University of California Press). 48 Mel Gurtov, ‘Open borders: a global-humanist approach to refugee crisis’. World Development, Vol. 19 (1991), 485–496. 49 Richand Black, Refugees, Environment and Development. (Longman Press, 1998. 50 Thomas Hoerz, ‘Refugees and Host Environments’ for GTZ, August 1995. Available at: file:///Users/anweshaghosh/Downloads/Refugees_and_host_ environments_pdf. 51 Daniel Hiebert, ‘Winning, losing, and still playing the game: the political economy of immigration in Canada’. Tijdschrift voor Economische en Sociale Geografie (Journal of Economic & Social Geography), Vol. 97 (2006), 38–48. 52 Rebecca Siggner, Jill Atkey and Michael Goldberg. Study of Income Support Benefits Offered to Government Assisted Refugees Under the Resettlement Assistance Program Written. (Vancouver: SPARC BC, 2007). 53 Atsuko Karin Matsuoka and John Sorenson. Ghosts and Shadows: Construction of Identity and Community in an African Diaspora. (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2001).

Why study the experiences of Afghan ‘refugees’ in India?  25 54 Evangelia Tastsoglou, ‘Gender, Migration and Citizenship: Immigrant Women and the Politics of Belonging in the Canadian Maritimes,’ in Alexandra Dobrowolsky and Evangelia Tastsoglou (eds.), Women, Migration and Citizenship: Making Local, National and Transnational Connections. (Farnham: Ashgate Publishers, 2006), pp. 201–230. 55 Anderson Benedict, Imagined Communities. (Verso, London, 1991). 56 Arustide R. Zolberg, Astri Suhrke, and Sergio Aguayo, Escape from Violence: Conflict and Refugee Crisis in the Developing World. (New York: Oxford University Press, 1989). 57 Myron Weiner, ‘Rejected people and unwanted migrants in South Asia’. Economic and Political Weekly, Vol. 28 (August 1993), 1737–1746. 58 Susanne Binder and Jelena Tosic. ‘Refugees as a particular form of transnational migrations and social transformations: socioanthropological and gender aspects’. Current Sociology, Vol. 53, no. 4 (2005), 607–624. 59 Richard C. Nann (ed.), Uprooting and Surviving: Adaptation and Resettlement of Migrant Families and Children. (Dordrecht, Holland; Boston, MA: Reidel; Hingham, MA: Sold and distributed in the U.S. and Canada by Kluwer Boston, 1982). 60 Lipson and Mileis in Hinshawe et al. 1999, cited in Shiva Nourpanah, ‘The Study of the Cultural Imaginary of Afghan Refugees Settled in Nova Scotia’, (Master Thesis, Dalhousie University, 2010). 61 Reed Coughlan and Judith Owens-Manley, Bosnian Refugees in America, New Communities, New Cultures. (New York: Springer, 2010). 62 Isabel Dyck, Arlene Tigar McLaren, and Isabel Dyck, ‘Telling it like it is? Constructing accounts of settlement with immigrant and refugee women in Canada’. Gender, Place & Culture: A Journal of Feminist Geography, Vol. 11, no. 4 (2004), 513–534. 63 Parin Dossa, ‘Creating politicized spaces: Afghan immigrant women’s stories of migration and displacement’. Affilia: Journal of Women & Social Work, Vol. 23, no. 1 (2008), 10–21. 64 Alastair Ager, Alison Strang and Alastair Ager, ‘Understanding integration: a conceptual framework’. Journal of Refugee Studies, Vol. 21, no. 2 (2008), 166–191. 65 J. W. Berry, ‘A psychology of immigration’. Journal of Social Issues, Vol. 57, no. 3 (2001), 615–631. 66 Kathleen Valtonen, ‘From the margin to the mainstream: conceptualizing refugee settlement processes’. Journal of Refugee Studies, Vol. 17, no. 1 (2004), 70–96. 67 Stephen Adler, International Migration and Dependence. (Westmead: Saxon House, 1977). 68 Myron Weiner, ‘Security, stability and international migration’. International Security, Vol. 3 (1992/1993), 96–97. 69 US Committee of Refugees, World Refugee Survey 1994. (Washington, DC: USCR, 1994), p. 43. 70 James F. Hollifield, ‘Immigration policy in France and Germany: outputs versus outcomes’. The Annuls, Vol. 485 (1986), 113–128. 71 Ranabir Samaddar, Refugees and the State: Practices of Asylum and Care in India, 1947–2000. (India, SAGE Publications India 2003). 72 Partha Sarathy Ghosh, Migrants, Refugees and the Stateless in South Asia. (New Delhi: SAGE Publications India, 2016). 73 Pia A. Oberoi, Exile and Belonging: Refugees and State Policy in South Asia. (New Delhi, Oxford University Press, 2006). 74 Omprakash Mishra and Anindyo J. Majumdar (eds.), The Elsewhere People: Cross-Border Migration, Refugee Protection, and State Response. (New Delhi: Lancers Books, 2003).

26  Why study the experiences of Afghan ‘refugees’ in India? 75 Paula Banerjee, Borders, Histories, Existences: Gender and Beyond. (New Delhi: SAGE Publications, 2010). 76 S. D. Muni and L. R. Baral (eds.), Refugee and Regional Security in South Asia. (New Delhi: Konarak Publishers, 1996). 77 Ravi Nair, ‘Refugee Protection in South Asia,’ Journal of International Affairs, Vol. 51 (Summer 1997), 201–220. 78 Pierre Centlivre, Afghanistan on the Threshold of the 21st Century: Three Essays on Culture and Society. (Princeton: Murkus Wiener Publishing Inc, 2010). 79 Hiram A. Ruiz, ‘Afghanistan: conflict and displacement 1978 to 2001’. Forced Migration Review, Vol. 13, no. 8 (2004), 12–13. 80 Sumbul Rizvi, ‘Internal displacement in Afghanistan’. Middle East ­Institute-Fondation pour la Recherche Stratégique, Vol. 25 (2010), 1–5. 81 Judy A. Benjamin, ‘Internal displacement in Afghanistan: coping strategies and gender differences applying international human rights standards.’ Refugee Survey Quarterly, Vol. 19, no. 2 (2000), 132–136. 82 E. Wayne Nafziger, Frances Stewart, and Raimo Väyrynen (eds.), War, Hunger, and Displacement. Vol. 2. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000). 83 Rasul Bakhsh Rais, ‘Conflict in Afghanistan: ethnicity, religion and neighbours’. Ethnic Studies Report, Vol. 17, no. 1 (1999) 1–19. 84 Amalendu Misra, Politics of Civil Wars: Conflict, Intervention & Resolution. (New York: Routledge, 2008). 85 Hafizullah Emadi, Dynamics of Political Development in Afghanistan: The British, Russian, and American Invasions. (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010). 86 Ahmed Rashid, Taliban: The Story of The Afghan Warlords. (New Delhi: Pan Macmillan, 2001). 87 Louis Dupree, Afghanistan. (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1980). 88 Nancy Hatch Dupree, ‘Demographic reporting on Afghan refugees in Pakistan’. Modern Asian Studies, Vol. 22, no. 4 (1988), 845–865. 89 Akbar S. Ahmed, ‘How to aid Afghan refugees’. RAIN, Vol. 39 (August 1980). Available at: www.jstor.org/stable/3032340. 90 David Busby Edward, ‘Marginality and migration: cultural dimensions of the Afghan refugee problem’. International Migration Review, Vol. 20, no. 2, (Spring 1986), 313–325. 91 Arthur Bonner, Among the Afghans. (Durham: Duke University Press, 1987). 92 Raja Anwar, The Tragedy of Afghanistan: A First Hand Account. (New York: Verso Publishers, 1988). 93 Kerry M. Connor, ‘Residential choices of self-settled Afghan Refugees in Peshawar, Pakistan’. International Migration Review, Vol. 4 (1989), 904–932. 94 Margaret Emiry and Hiram Ruiz, ‘Descent into disaster? Afghan refugees’. Middle East Report, Vol. 221 (2001), 16–17. 95 Bruce Koepke, ‘The situation of Afghans in the Islamic Republic of Iran nine years after the over throw of Taliban regime’. Middle East Institute, Vol. 4 (2011). Available at: http://www.refugeecooperation.org/publications/ afghanistan/pdf/03_koepke.pdf. (Accessed on 14.11.2015) 96 Alessandro Monsutti, War and Migration: Social Networks and Economic Strategies of the Hazaras of Afghanistan. (New York & London: Routledge, 2005). 97 Graeme Hugo, Mohammad Jalal Abbasi-Shavazi, and Rasoul Sadeghi, ‘Refugee movement and development–Afghan refugees in Iran’. Migration and Development, Vol. 1, no. 2 (2012), 261–279. 98 Astri Suhrke, Arne Strand and Kristian Berg Harpviken, ‘Afghan refugees in Iran’. Internaltional Peace Research Institute, (2004). Available at: https://www. cmi.no/pdf/?file=/afghanistan/peacebuilding/docs/cmi-prio-afghanrefugeesin iran.pdf (Accessed on 11.10.2018)

Why study the experiences of Afghan ‘refugees’ in India?  27 99 Zuzanna Olszewska, ‘‘A desolate voice’: poetry and identity among young Afghan refugees in Iran, 1’. Iranian Studies, Vol. 40, no. 2 (2007), 203–224. 100 Nancy Hatch Dupree, ‘Seclusion or service: will women have a role in the future of Afghanistan?’ Occasional Paper 29 ( New York: December 1989), pp. 3-4. 101 Nancy Lindisfarne and Nancy Tapper, Bartered Brides: Politics, Gender and Marriage in an Afghan Tribal Society. Vol. 74. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991). 102 Elaheh Rostami-Povey, Afghan Women: Identity and Invasion. (London and New York: Zed Books, 2007). 103 Deepali Gaur Singh, ‘Afghan woman in the diaspora: surviving identity and alienation’. Center for Non-Traditional Security Studies Research Paper, Vol. 4 (2010), 1–41. 104 Anne-Sophie Bentz, ‘Afghan refugees in indo-Afghan relation’. Cambridge Review of International Affairs, Vol. 26 (2013), 374–391. 105 Ashish Bose, ‘Afghan refugees in India’. Economic and Political Weekly, Vol. 39, no. 43 (2004), 4698–4701. 106 Pramod K. Sharma and Mondira Dutta, ‘Displaced Population from Afghanistan: Case Study of Delhi,’ in Mondira Dutta (ed.), Emerging Afghanistan in the Third Millennium (New Delhi: Pentagon Press, 2009), pp. 1–17. 107 ‘Abandoned and Betrayed: Afghan refugees under UNHCR protection in New Delhi’, South Asia Human Rights Documentation Centre (SAHRDC), November 1999, New Delhi. 108 Anwesha Ghosh, ‘Afghan Migration 2014 and Beyond: A Regional Perspective,’ in Arpita Badu Roy (ed.), Afghanistan Beyond 2014: Domestic and Regional Dynamics. (New Delhi: Pentagon Press, 2016), p. 52. 109 Roger Ballard, ‘The history and current position of Afghanistan’s Hindu and Sikh population’. CASAS, (2011), 1–31. 110 Hafizullah Emadi, ‘Minorities and marginality: pertinacity of Hindus and Sikhs in a repressive environment in Afghanistan’. The Journal of Nationalism and Ethnicity, Vol. 42 (2013), 307–320. 111 Anwesha Ghosh, ‘Marginality and migration: the plight of persecuted religious minorities of Afghanistan’. Refugee Watch Journal, Vol. 45. (June 2015), 34–48. 112 H. Gusterson, ‘Ethnographic Research,’ in Audie Klotz and Deepa Prakash (eds.), Qualitative Methods in International Relations: A Pluralist Guide. (Great Britain: Palgrave, Mac Millan, 2008), pp. 98–99. 113 Ibid. 114 American Anthropological Association, Code of Ethics. American Anthropological Association, February 2009. Available at: www.aaanet.org/issues/ policy-advocacy/upload/AAA-Ethics-Code-2009.pdf (accessed on 27.7.2016). 115 R. K. Yin, Qualitative Research from Start to Finish. (New York: The Guilford Press, 2011), pp. 32–34, 134–136. 116 P. Vedder and F. J. R. Van de Vijver, ‘Methodological Aspects: Studying Adolescents in Thirteen Countries,’ in J. W. Berry, J. S. Phinney, D. L. Sam, and P. Vedder (eds.), Immigrant Youth in Cultural Transition: Acculturation, Identity and Adaptatiom Across National Context (Mahwah, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Associstes, 2006), pp. 7–69. 117 Brian C. Rathbun, ‘Interviewing and Qualitative Methods: Pragmatism and Practicalities,’ in Janet M. Box-Steffensmeier, Henry E. Brady, and David Collier (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Political Methodology (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008), pp. 685–701. 118 Anwesha Ghosh was interviewed by one of India’s foremost Television Networks (ZEE TV) on the situation of Afghan refugees in India with a particular focus on the Afghan Sikhs and Hindus. The programme was telecasted in

28  Why study the experiences of Afghan ‘refugees’ in India?

119 120 121 122 123 124 125 126 127 128 129

Zee Television Punjabi’s popular talk show: Ek Onkar on 17th December 2015. Available at: www.youtube.com/watch?v=oqzQkpiqMGg. H. Gusterson, ‘Ethnographic Research,’ in Audie Klotz and Deepa Prakash (eds.), Qualitative Methods in International Relations: A Pluralist Guide (Great Britain: Palgrave, Mac Millan, 2008), pp. 99–100. I. B. Neumann, ‘Discourse Analysis,’ in Audie Klotz and Deepa Prakash (eds.), Qualitative Methods in International Relations: A Pluralist Guide (Great Britain: Palgrave, MacMillan, 2008), p. 64. A. Strauss and J. Corbin, Basics of Qualitative Research. (Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publication, 1998). M. B. Miles and A. M. Hubermann, Qualitative Data Analysis. (Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publication, 1994). A. Strauss and J. Corbin, Basics of Qualitative Research. (Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publication, 1998). Joel D. Aberbach and Bert A. Rockman, ‘Conducting and coding elite interviews’. Political Science & Politics, Vol. 35 (2002), 673–676. B. L. Berg, Qualitative Methods for the Social Sciences. 4th ed. (Boston, MA: Allyn and Bacon, 2001), pp. 246–247. Ibid., pp. 258–259. Jan Blommaert, Jie Dong and Dong Jie, Ethnographic Fieldwork. (Bristol: Multilingual Matters, 2010), p. 12. W. Tierney, ‘Undaunted Courage: Life History and Post Modern Challenges,’ in N. Denzin and Y. Linclon (eds.), Handbook of Qualitative Research (Thousand Oaks: Sage Publication, 2000), pp. 537–545. N. Denzin, ‘The Practice and Politics of Interpretation,’ in N. Denzin and Y. Linclon (eds.), Handbook of Qualitative Research. (Thousand Oaks: Sage Publication, 2000), pp. 1–28.

2 Considerations concerning the concepts of identity and acculturation with respect to Afghan ‘refugees’ in India

Introduction There can be little disagreement that during the last century, the world has become more connected than ever before. Greater connectivity as a result of globalization, technological improvements and modifications in immigration laws in many countries have resulted in an increase in the diverse populations from many countries to a degree that perhaps would not have been feasible a century earlier. Zolberg analyses the phenomenon at two planes: firstly, because of the widening demographic, economic rift between the First and the Third World and secondly, due to the simultaneous eclipse of distance between the two through the mutually reinforcing links of transportation, communication and migration, the demand for entry into the more prosperous and peaceful territories of the earth is greater than ever before.1 Today, people displaced from their countries of origin by war and civil strife constitute much of the foreign-born population in countries around the world.2 Displacement and mass migration of refugees and immigrants have been results of various political and social changes whose effects have gone far beyond the developments within individual countries and have affected the entire international state system. The refugees, in a way, highlight the imagined power of geographical space via territorial boundaries of sovereign states and of moral space constituted by the ethical border of identity.3 Thereby, the domains of refugees and immigration have continued to be one of the most highly politicized and internationalized areas especially since the second half of the 20th century. Since 1970s, the number of immigrants and refugees originating in developing world generated urgent concerns across the world. When the concern began to mount, the only analytical framework dealing with such movements was Egon F. Kunz’s ‘Kinetic Model’,4 which was formalistic and abstract. Different types of social conflict gave rise to different types of refugee flow and settlements and this ‘internalist’ conceptualization dominated both scholarly and public discourses about refugees. Patterns of conflicts were themselves intimately related to more general socio-economic and political conditions, not only in the countries from which the immigrants and

30  Considerations concerning concepts of identity and acculturation refugees originate but also in the countries they eventually settled. West, because of its experience of handling such population in the past, was better equipped to deal with them. However imperfect, the research works of scholars like Rogers Brubaker5 indicated that there was already a discussion in the academia about the right approach to accommodate post-war immigrants in the western societies so that their civil and socio-economic rights are protected in the best way. However, that was not the case for host countries in the developing world. Many of the refugee-recipient countries of Third World like India were non-signatory to the International Refugee Conventions and thus did not have (and still do not have) a structured refugee legislation that would provide protection to the immigrants who were forced to leave their country under unnatural circumstances. The politicization centring this population has been rampant; however, that has not resulted in concrete policies that would positively impact resettlement experiences of the ethnocultural minorities in the host country. Nonetheless, the politicization has resulted in heightened interest in different aspects pertaining to the settlement experiences of immigrant population. The settlement experiences of the immigrant population in most cases have been accompanied by acculturation. Acculturation has been defined as the process of cultural and psychological changes that follows intercultural contact.6 Cultural changes include alterations in a group’s customs, and in their economic and political lives. Psychological changes include alterations in individuals’ attitudes towards the acculturation process, their cultural identities7 and their social behaviours in relation to the groups in contact. Much has been written in policy and academic fields about the importance of integration into the host society, especially in relation to the settlements of refugees. However, little attention has been given to varied settlement experiences of refugees or how personal, cultural and experiential factors combine to influence settlement experiences. Despite the attention given to integration and cohesion in recent times, and the development of policy aimed at promoting refugee integration, little empirical work has been undertaken to explore the circumstances in which refugee integration takes place. Most academic attention has focused upon the meaning of integration,8 the conditions or relationships necessary for integration to occur9 or the dynamic and fluidity of the settlement process.10 Refugees often choose adaption strategies along the defined parameters of maintaining the old culture and investing in the new. While it is acknowledged that groups and individuals become integrated in different ways, not much attention has been given to the experiences that influence refugee arrival and settlement in new countries. Neither has there been much consideration on how those experiences cause psychosocial stress and how they, or associated stresses, impact upon refugees’ pathway to, or away from, integration. The focus of the present study is on the experiences of one such group of forcefully displaced persons in an exile society. Scholars working on refugee issues come from various academic and professional backgrounds, disciplines and school of thought such as Sociology,

Considerations concerning concepts of identity and acculturation  31 Anthropology, Psychology, Law, International Relations, etc. The lives of refugees, like others, are constructed in broad and multiple contexts. For refugees, these contexts include the family, neighbourhood and community in the part of the world from which they immigrated and those same broad groupings in the new host society. The experiences and perceptions of refugees are shaped by the opportunities, limitations, possibilities and constraints that are naturally available in all of these milieus. In Black’s11 review of the current state of refugee research, he concluded that there is no theory developed solely in refugee studies, only the application of theories from other disciplines to refugee issues. Because of this, Black suggested that: The search for theoretical grounding of refugee studies may be better achieved by situating studies of particular refugee groups… in the theories of cognate areas (and major disciplines). (p. 66) To follow Black’s suggestion, counselling researchers should look for theories of cognitive adjustment that are relevant to the work of helping refugees. In recent decades, labour mobility and population migration have become prominent (and presumably permanent) in many parts of the world.12 Which means, either by choice or out of necessity or coercion, many people in the world had to move from the country they were born. Even when voluntary, immigration is often a difficult process for individuals and families. The decision to leave one’s own country and move to another often brings connection from familiar social institutions and cultural practices, separation from family members and isolation from sources of support in one’s new homeland.13 Their identities are (re)-constituted in the new milieu, based on the opportunities and constraints at their disposal. In cases of refugees and forced migrants, the psychosocial dimensions are often more complex as in most cases because of the circumstances in which they are forced to migrate. The conditions under which they are forced to take refuge in a foreign land are often beyond their control. Therefore, the lives of refugees need to be constructed in different contexts which includes the family, neighbourhood and community in the part of the world from which they immigrated or the heritage society, as well as those same contexts in their new host society. They are faced with acculturation challenges not because they have chosen to enter new society, but because they involuntarily have been subjected to the dominance of majority group; however, that is beyond the scope of the current research. Much of the psychological research on the development of immigrant identity has been studied under the topic of ‘acculturation’ in cross-cultural psychology. But the concept of acculturation is not restricted only to the immigrant group. It has been used to refer to both the immigrant people and non-immigrant ethnic groups.14 There is no denying of the fact that immigrant people bring about cultural change and adaptation in the receiving

32  Considerations concerning concepts of identity and acculturation culture – an area which has primarily been studied by sociological and anthropological scholars. As suggested by scholars like Bhatia and Ram15 and Phinney,16 in addition to acculturation, identity is also often an important issue for immigrant people. This research attempts to explore the relationship between acculturation and identity, especially in context of refugees and forcefully displaced people. This study agrees with the argument that social and cultural identity underlies acculturation and personal identity can help to ‘anchor’ the immigrant person during cultural transition.17 In order to explicate the acculturation–identity relationship, this study employs theories of identity advanced by Erikson (1950,18 1968,19 1975,20 198021), Tajfel and Turner (1986)22 and Pinney (e.g. 1989,23 1990,24 1993,25 200326), among others. This theoretical position makes it possible to define acculturation and identity in specific theoretical propositions and provides room for empirical research and rationales for interventions to promote identity in acculturating individuals. Acknowledging the importance of theoretical efforts forwarded by Brubaker and Cooper,27 this study also views theory as a tool to be used for the betterment of individuals and of society. Practically speaking, theory supports the formulations of research questions and hypotheses for empirical studies;28 in turn, both theory and empirical evidence suggest important targets and mechanisms for fostering positive change.29 When specifically applied in the context of international migration, acculturation refers to the process of adaption along two dimensions. Firstly, adoption of ideals, values and behaviours of the receiving culture and secondly, retention of ideals, values and beliefs from the immigrant person’s culture of origin.30 The theoretical argument put forwarded in this chapter attests that the acculturation dimensions are closely related to the identity formation of an individual. Different strategies adopted during the acculturation process lead to different acculturation profiles and often these dimensions influence the identity (re)-constitution of the immigrant population in the host society. There is no denying the fact that the advent of immigrants also brings cultural changes in the receiving societies and they also need to adapt according to the requirement of situations; however in our current study, the focus will be on the adaption and changes that the migrant population undergoes. The emphasis in this study will be on the occurrences in people’s lives who see their new country as their primary residence and perhaps as the place where their descendants will live. Scholars have argued that the concept of acculturation has been used to refer to both immigrant and non-immigrant ethnic groups.31 Acculturation challenges are faced by non-immigrant ethnic groups who have chosen to enter a new society; under such circumstances, these groups are often seen to have been subjected to the dominance of majority groups, most often in their own land. Examples of such non-immigrant ethnic groups will be African Americans and native Americans in the United States. In an even more general way, it can be said that any change of geographical and cultural space by an individual

Considerations concerning concepts of identity and acculturation  33 voluntarily for the purpose of settlement requires adjustments, behavioural or otherwise. However, acculturation among groups such as these is quite different from acculturation among refugees because of their status as ‘minorities’ or ‘ethnic groups’ within receiving cultures are involuntary. As mentioned earlier, another issue that is of utmost importance and which goes hand in hand with acculturation is the issue of identity. The evolution of the study of identity development will be traced from Sigmund Freud’s early writings32 to Erikson’s extrapolations and theoretical expositions, Marcia’s33 empirical operationalization followed by a brief look at Neo-Eriksonian Identity theories. That will be followed by a detailed discussion on the concept of acculturation, how it has evolved and some of the models that have been used to explain the role acculturation outcomes play in reshaping the identities of immigrant population in the receiving society. In the course of the discussions, the goal of this current research will be to explicate the relationship between acculturation and identity, in terms precise enough to support specific theoretical propositions and provide rationales for using the same for an empirical research. Phinney focuses on identity issues in pluralistic cultures and most importantly, she traces the changes in cultural and ethnic identity as a result of acculturation process and thus becomes extremely relevant for this study. Theoretical efforts undoubtedly are important in their own right;34 however in this research, theories have been used as a tool for better understanding of the empirical study. From a pragmatic perspective, theory supports the formulation of the research questions and hypothesis for empirical studies;35 in turn, both theory and empirical evidence suggest important targets and mechanisms for fostering positive change.36 This chapter will deliberate on the considerations concerning the relations between acculturation and identity and in the process of doing so, relevant selected literature will be utilized to discuss the theoretical framework premised on selected discourses on these concepts. The theories and literature reviews have been intertwined in the following sections.

Identity and acculturation: the key concepts The terms identity and acculturation, which happen to be central to the argument that this research tries to establish, have been the subject of much debate. Since cultural and ethnic identity plays a crucial role in acculturation, the following discussion would also reflect on the term culture and understand the relationship between all three. These terms are, by definition, abstractions and attempts to derive generalized and broad understandings of nuanced processes. Gibson, on the other hand, defined acculturation as the ‘process of cultural change and adaption that occurs when individuals with different cultures come in to contact’.37 Understanding the cultural context of identity development has been declared a high-priority research agenda in the 21st century by practitioners like Fisher.38 The steadily

34  Considerations concerning concepts of identity and acculturation increasing influx of immigrants around the world has prompted scientists and practitioners such as Batencourt and Lopez,39 Broughton,40 Sampson,41 Szapocznik and Kurtines,42 to attend to the important role that acculturation plays in shaping the process of human identity development. Scholars have forwarded several viewpoints, while the ‘modernist’ viewpoints stated that these constructs are fixed entities that similarly describe the effects of all individual, groups and nations; the ‘postmodernists’, on the other hand, have contested those ideas and the operational definitions and causal explanations that are drawn from the conceptualization of acculturation, identity and culture. For example, regarding identity, Brubaker and Cooper argued that it does not exist per se; rather, it is a ‘catch all term used to represent almost anything related to self’.43 While acknowledging the existence of identity, Gergen claimed that it is constantly in flux and cannot be isolated as a permanent construction.44 Hunt et al. contested the notion of acculturation which signalled that it is an individual’s movement ‘from’ traditional values and beliefs and ‘towards’ Western values and beliefs.45 Regarding culture, Bhatia and Ram suggested that it is a phenomenon which cannot be defined easily as it is not clear (a) what constitutes a ‘culture’ and (b) where one culture ends and another begins.46 The notion of culture being a fixed entity that characterizes groups of people was highly problematic as it encourages stereotyping (that is, believing that people from a given ‘culture’ are largely same), according to Gjerde.47 Sorell and Montogomery have argued that cultural context includes the culture of gender as well, as roles and expectations of genders tend to differ within and between cultures.48 The above-mentioned criticisms imply that pursuing conceptual clarity and operational definitions of these terms could be misleading. It can hardly be disputed that a fixed and simplistic view of terms such as acculturation, identity and culture underestimates and under-represents to constructs to which they refer. Thepostmodernist approach rightly highlights the flip side of dealing with watertight definitions and fixed constructs. However, scholars like Chandler have aptly pointed out that although the postmodernist theorists talk about the problems, they fail to offer viable solutions to those problems. As Brubaker and Cooper note, a view of identity as constantly in flux and impossible to locate does not offer pragmatic theoretical, empirical or applied utilities.49 They further explain that if one’s intention is to ‘do useful theoretical work’, then Postmodern conceptions of acculturation and identity might be sufficient but if one attempts to define these concepts for empirical work and application, these postmodern conceptions do not suffice. Thereby, this research self-consciously adopts ‘modernist’ conceptions of acculturation, identity and culture for practical purposes. The decision has been taken after being aware of the fact that the definitions that will be used might not capture the full essence of the constructs to which they refer. However, the decision has been dictated by the principle that even though limited in scope, this approach will lead to certain deductions, which is better than the option of not reaching to any deduction. Schwartz et al. have

Considerations concerning concepts of identity and acculturation  35 put it in the form of a statistical analogy stating that it is better to develop a model that explains a small amount of variability than not to develop a model at all.50 In deriving operational definitions for empirical research and subsequent applied efforts, the specified models appear more ‘fixed’ or ‘normative’ than one might prefer. However, as Schachter has argued, an operationally defined and clearly specified conception of identity that is also flexible enough to be applied across different social and cultural contexts may represent a middle ground between modernist and postmodernist perspectives.51 In the course of this research, therefore attempts have been to use integrative definitions of terms as much as possible. The terms such as ‘identity’, ‘acculturation’ and ‘culture’ have been defined in many ways and have a number of meanings. Even within a particular approach, there are several ways a concept has been dealt with. If we take the example of identity, there are a number of approaches to identity (e.g. personal and social), and with a given approach, multiple aspects of identity may be identified such as gender, vocational personal identities, ethnic and class-based social identities, etc. The definition of identity that this research considers encompasses social and ethnic complements. With regard to acculturation, focus would be on the two independent dimensions underlying the process of acculturation as suggested by Berry,52 Phinney53 and others: individual’s links to their cultures of origin and to their societies of settlement. These links have been manifested in a number of ways, including preferences for involvement in the two cultures (termed acculturation attitudes) and in behaviours that they engage in. These bi-dimensional conceptions have been extensively used and criticized in acculturation literatures and this study would attempt to reflect on those. Attempts to explore the cultural context of development have called into question the historical views of development structures, processes and outcomes as universal (that is, transcultural, transgender, etc.) in all development domains, including the formation of a sense of identity. The definition of culture used for the analysis in this study has been borrowed from Triandis: what ‘has worked’ in the experience of a society that was worth transmitting to future generations…idea(s) [that are] adopted by more and more people…shared standard operating procedures, unstated assumptions, tools, norms, values…[and] conventions about what to pay attention to and how much to weigh the elements that are sampled.54 Such a conception of culture is consistent with Bronfenbrenner’s notion of the ‘macro systemic’ context as the values and ideals that characterize a particular group, notion or region at a particular point in history.55

Conceptions of identity In the introduction of their book titled, Identity and Development. An interdisciplinary Approach, Bosma, Graafsma, Grotevant and de Levita noted

36  Considerations concerning concepts of identity and acculturation that there is no consensus about the phenomenon that identity refers to and that the concept is made operational in many different ways.56 The concept has been studied in different disciplines, alternately concentrating on the biological, the social or the psychological. Before advancing the argument about the relationship between acculturation and identity, this section seeks to articulate the views about how the concept of Identity has evolved in academic literature. What exactly is identity? To what extent is identity formed as an individual project, to what extent it is a function of interacting in social and cultural contexts and to what extent it is a combination of two – by drawing on and extending current literature. Sigmund Freud was one of the first psychologist theorists to address the fundamental question of self-definition. Freud argued that one’s sense of self was derived from parental interjects during the genesis of the superego, at the end of the Oedipal conflict.57 Not only did he believe that these interjects formed the platform of one’s self-definition during childhood, but he also held that these parental identifications were not significantly revised or updated during adolescence or adulthood. Therefore, one’s self-concept was believed to be a function of the basic indemnificatory process that occurred during the preschool years. Although Freud wrote on identification and other identity-like processes, it was E. H. Erikson in his seminal work, Childhood and Society,58 who, for the first time, moved to identity formation beyond childhood identifications. In his original formulation, identity formation was conceptualized as one stage within a universal epigenetic sequence that unfolds over the lifespan. Erikson believed that it is the presence of self-selected identity elements that separates children from adolescents and adults. Conceptualization of identity ranges from (a) development arguments that identity is a normative process and a necessary prerequisite to being able to make one’s way in the world as forwarded by Erikson to (b) postmodern arguments that the concept of identity means almost nothing at all, because the essence of who one is remains constantly influx and cannot be defined as anything in particular, as propagated by scholars like Gergen.59 Erikson spelled out eight stages of ego growth, each marked by a chronological phase-specific psychological crisis. Ideally, in each phase, there is reciprocity and linkage between the developing individual and his or her social milieu, resulting in the predominantly positive resolutions of psychosocial crisis. Erikson’s epigenetic approach and its conceptual and empirical extensions become the most widely used framework in the psychosocial development literature and have been used by scholars like Berzonsky and Adams,60 Schwartz,61 among others. Because of Erikson’s attention at multidimensionality of identity and to its embeddedness with social and cultural contexts, the work of Erikson has been found useful for the present theoretical analysis. For Erikson, identity is best represented by a single bipolar dimension, ranging from the egosynchronic pole of identity synthesis to the egodystonic pole of identity confusion.62 Identity Synthesis represents a

Considerations concerning concepts of identity and acculturation  37 reworking of childhood and contemporaneous identifications into a larger, self-­determined set of self-identified ideals. On the other hand, Identity confusion represents an ability to develop a workable set of ideals on which to base an adult identity. Then, the coherent image that an individual portrays to himself and the world represents his Ego Identity. He argued that ego identity is largely unconscious and therefore may not be measurable. It has been argued that all individuals, at any time during their lives, can be placed at some point on Erikson’s dimension between identity synthesis and identity confusion. Erikson’s conceptualization of identity becomes particularly relevant for this study as it results from a dynamic interplay between individual and context. However, this study would seek to go beyond Erikson’s thinking in order to contextualize and organize theoretical notions. Following Erikson’s theoretical perspective, James Marcia63 developed an empirical model to assess identity development especially for adolescents. Based on Erikson’s ideas, two criteria for the presence of identity formation were proposed: exploration (originally called ‘crisis‘)64 and commitment. Exploration refers to the extent to which individual has experimented with alternative directions and beliefs. Whereas commitment refers to the choice the individual makes among several alternative paths in the different domains.65 Marcia suggested that adolescents can be categorized into four different identity statuses, according to the extent of exploration with the interview domain and strength of the formulated commitment: (1) foreclosure (no exploration, strong commitment), (2) diffusion (exploration or no exploration, no commitment), (3) moratorium (exploration, no commitment) and (4) achievement (exploration, strong commitment). The identity statuses are assumed to describe individuals both at the overall personality level and within any number of content areas known as domains.66 Scholars like Côté and Levine,67 Grotevant68 and others have questioned the validity of identity statuses model; to them, these identity statuses appeared to be better characterized as character types than as developmental stages. In the later stages of his research, Marcia himself admitted that his Identity Status Model deviated from Eriksonian construct of identity and that the model focused primarily on personal identity.69 At least, six such models have been created since 1987, and all of them have at some point critiqued Marcia’s paradigm. Like identity status, each alternative model highlighted Erikson’s concept of personal identity and draws on one or the other levels of identity proposed by Erikson. For the purposes of explication, the alternative identity models have been divided into two groups: Extensions and Expansions. Extensions are defined as models that largely complement identity status theory rather than diverging from it or reconceptualizing it. Extension models have been offered by Berzonsky,70 Grotevant,71 Waterman,72 among others. Expansions are models that may include identity status theory as a component but go far beyond Marcia’s formulation in their scope or coverage. Expansion models utilize the identity statuses but are generally more faithful to Erikson in conceptualizing identity as far more multidimensional and then simply the

38  Considerations concerning concepts of identity and acculturation intersection for exploration and commitment.73 While extension models are fairly divergent from one another, the expansion models overlap considerably and it is difficult to describe any one without referring to others. All of the expansion models focus on both social and personal identities (and on the interactions between the two), although each model differs from the others in terms of the extent to which it highlights each level of identity.74 Kurtines75 focused primarily on personal identity and framed it within a social and cultural context. Adam and Marshall76 gave equal weightage to personal and social identities, postulating that the elements of each type of identity are incorporated by different means. Côté’s works published in 199677 and 199778 emphases were more on social identity and viewed personal identity as a means of negotiating for social resources. Works of all these scholars have been extensively used in the theoretical formulation of the present study. They offer similar and complementary reasons for the marginalization of certain groups from the mainstream society to which they belong; therefore, the attempt has been to offer an integrative viewpoint to establish conceptual linkages among the mentioned expansion models to establish the functions of identity in the later part of the chapter. As mentioned earlier, Erikson’s concept of identity is multidimensional and extensive in its scope and coverage, which includes cognitive, moral, social, cultural aspects, among others. Côté felt that Erikson’s mission was to establish a developmental–social approach encompassing all levels of self, from the most trapsychic ego conflicts to individual’s embeddedness in a cultural and historical context.79 Consistent with Erikson80 and Schwartz et al.,81 the current study regards identity as the organization of self-­understanding that defines one’s ‘place in the world’. Erikson spoke of adolescence as a psychosocial moratorium, a period during which adolescent ‘through free role experimentation may find a niche in some section of his society, a niche which is firmly defined and yet seems to be uniquely made for him’.82 He distinguished between personal and social aspects of identity, but this research sees itself more aligned with the ideas on the lines of scholars like Jensen83 and Phinney et al.,84 who argue that it is important to attend to the cultural aspect of identity, which, as Tajfel and Turner85 and Brown86 have suggested, can be derived from one’s social identity. Social identity theory is a social–psychological theory which was first proposed by Tajfel87 and later by Tajfel and Turner.88 They focus on ‘the group in the individual’89 and assume that one part of the self-concept is defined by our belonging to one or more social groups. Tajfel’s writing in 1979 proposed the ‘minimal group paradigm’ and showed that mere categorization to one group or another makes people discriminate against the designated out-group in favour of the in-group.90 Social identity theories therefore do not begin with assumptions considering the individual, but rather with assumptions referring to a social group. According to Tajfel and Turner, persons categorize themselves and others as belonging to different social groups and evaluate these categorizations and memberships, alongside the value placed on it; it is defined as

Considerations concerning concepts of identity and acculturation  39 social identity.91 Based on his understanding of social groups, ­Tajfel suggested four underlying principles of social identity theory, which were social categorization, social comparison, social identity and self-esteem. Personal identity refers to the goals, values and beliefs that an individual adopts and holds.92 Social identity would ideally be a combination of ideas of Erikson and Tajfel and Turner. According to Tajfel and Turner, it implies to the extent to which that identification leads one to favour the ‘in-group’ (the group to which one feels he belongs) and to distance oneself from ‘outgroups’ (groups other than in-group).93 Scholars such as Padilla and Perez94 and Phinney et al.95 argue that cultural identity is a special case of social identity. Bhatia and Ram96 defined it as the interface between person and cultural context. Phinney’s model of ethnic identity development J. S. Phinney argued that ethnic identity commitment derives from the concept for ego identity commitment, but carries a more specific meaning. It refers to the strength of one’s ties with a particular ethnic group, the evaluation and importance of, and attachment to, one’s ethnic group, and the clarity of beliefs, standards and goals that one holds regarding one’s ethnicity. Commitment can be of two types: with and without exploration. There are certain commitments that are natural and unexamined; for example, a daughter adopts her parent’s views of the meaning of their ethnicity – this type of commitment is referred to as foreclosure. Another possibility is the commitment based on explorations that are generally initiated by ‘identity crisis’. Under those circumstances, an identity is constructed, as individuals examine the meaning and implications of their ethnic group membership and take decisions about how to lead their life as a group member. According to Phinney,97 there are two types of ethnic identity commitment. Ethnic identity foreclosure refers to commitment without exploration. The individual affirms and is committed to his or her own ethnicity and culture but has not questioned parental and societal values and attitudes. Ethnic identity achievement refers to commitment with exploration. The individual has examined the attitudes of parents and society at large, and has developed his or her own understanding about their ethnicity. Scholars such as Phinney, Cantu and Kurtz,98 and Roberts et al.99 have found a positive association between ethnic identity commitment and psychological well-­being (e.g. high self-esteem), lower substance abuse and absence of depression. In studies conducted by scholars on adolescents, some evidence of a positive relationship to academic achievement could also be found.100 Although ­cultural identity may be conceptually similar to the idea of ethnic identity, cultural identity is broader and more encompassing.101 Cultural identity refers to a sense of solidarity with the ideals of a given cultural group and to the attitudes, beliefs and behaviours manifested towards one’s own (and other) cultural groups as a result of this solidarity.102

40  Considerations concerning concepts of identity and acculturation In her seminal work, Phinney developed a three-stage model of ethnic identity development based on research with minority adolescents, combining the ego identity and ethnic identity models proposed by the works of Marcia and Erikson.103 Her research was conducted with both junior and high school adolescents who were found to be at one of the three levels of ethnic identity development.104 The first stage, unexamined Ethnic Identity, is characterized by a lack of exploration. In this stage, individuals may experience diffusion or foreclosure, a lack of interest in ethnicity or a general acceptance of others’ opinion. The second stage of the model, Ethnic Identity Search/Moratorium, combines the notions of encounter and exploration. The individuals start to develop their ethnic identity during this stage which is often triggered by harsh or indirect events. The third stage of Phinney’s Model is Ethnic Identity Achievement. Individuals at this stage have a clear sense of their ethnic identity and are able to successfully navigate their bicultural identity. At this stage, individuals resolve their ethnic identity conflicts, accept membership in minority culture and are open to other cultures. The best outcome, thus, would be for an individual to have a secure ethnic identity and a positive orientation towards the mainstream culture. Phinney developed a survey instrument to assess ethnic identity titled, Multi-group Ethnic Identity Measure (MEIM).105 It was designed to meet the need for a general measure that could assess ethnic identity across diverse groups. Phinney’s model had certain limitations. Foremost, little research has been conducted to explore how ethnic identity changes during adolescence and early adulthood. Most of the studies that have been carried out were latitudinal; more studies with longitudinal data are required. Larger samples are needed to account for variables such as family, gender, etc. There is also a need for research across a wider range of ages and groups as the issues of ethnic identity are not exclusive to the adolescents. Despite the limitations, her work is a significant contribution on the study of identity in general and ethnic identity issues and in pluralistic cultures, in particular. To Phinney, ethnic identity is fluid and changes over time, content and generations; in a new culture, such changes are a result of acculturation processes. The changes attributed to acculturation, such as linguistic changes, changes in attire and food habit and in core beliefs about the relative importance of the individual versus that of the group, may refer in actuality to changes in one’s cultural and ethnic identity. It is quite possible that when an individual acculturates, his definition of ‘in-group’ and ‘out-group’ will undergo changes. For example, it might be realized that his definition of the categories has expended and they now tend to include even members on the receiving society, which initially was considered an ‘out-group’. Therefore, it can be said that orientation towards individualism and collectivism, which one also considers under the rubric of cultural and ethnic identity, may change as immigrant people begin to acculturate. Certain values, goals and beliefs drawn from the receiving culture can then be integrated into one’s personal identity.

Considerations concerning concepts of identity and acculturation  41

Conceptions of acculturation Acculturation has become a well-recognized and an extremely important area of study since the 1980s after significant contributions were made by scholars like John Berry,106 Tadmor, Tetlock, and Peng,107 Gibson,108 Schwatrz et al.,109 among several others. In most of these literatures, acculturation has tended to be defined as those psychological and social changes that groups and individuals experience when they enter a new and different cultural context. ­Although these changes can take place as a result of almost any cultural contact (for example, as a result of globalization), acculturation is most often studied in individuals living in countries or regions other than where they were born – that is , among immigrants, refugees, asylum seekers and sojourners (like international students, seasonal farm workers, etc.).110 Acculturation research since the mentioned period tended to focus mostly on immigrants, refugees and asylum seekers, who were assumed to be permanently settled in their new homeland, although these mentioned groups could be very different from each other. As a result, terms such as migrants or international migrants have often been used in the acculturative literature to refer to the three groups. The flow of migrants around the world has reached unprecedented volume over the past few decades. Not surprisingly, this unprecedented increase has prompted increased scholarly interest in acculturation. Significant contributions have been made by edited volumes published on the subject since the turn of new millennium. Berry, Phinney, Sam and Vedder’s111 book focused on the cultural transition of the immigrant youth; Chun, Organista and Martin’s112 edited volume pushed the boundaries of acculturation as it forwarded new dimensions in the study of the subject. Sam and Berry edited the Cambridge Handbook of Acculturation Psychology and is another major contribution in the field.113 A cursory search of the PsycInfo literature database seeking journal articles with the word acculturation in the title returns 107 records from the 1980s, 337 from the 1990s and 727 from the 2000s. However, as ­Rudmin114 points out, there remain a number of important challenges regarding operational definitions, contextual forces and relationships to psychological and health outcomes that need to be addressed. Research works on multi-­ethnic societies have reached a new height since the past few decades. Works of Berry,115 Helman,116 Hertz,117 Knipscheer,118 Nevid, Rathus and Greene119 reveal that due to the migration experiences itself and often-disadvantaged socio-economic position associated with the status of new arrival, increased risk may exist for the development of mental health-related issues. Acculturation, the adaption of new behaviours, attitudes and values in meeting a new cultural environment while preserving culturally own aspects, has been reported as an important moderator in the explanation of health outcomes.

The process of acculturation In the light of the tremendous amount of migration that has occurred in the past few decades and the concomitant emergence of multicultural

42  Considerations concerning concepts of identity and acculturation societies, it has become increasingly important to understand the psychology of multicultural individuals, or people who have been influenced by different cultural traditions. Within the field of psychology in general and cross-­cultural psychology in particular, there have been several models that explain ­acculturation-related issues. Cross-cultural researchers have studied topics such as acculturation and acculturative stress,120 socialization and enculturation,121 intergroup relations across culture,122 cross-cultural differences in work values,123 individualism and collectivism across cultures and bicultural identity.124 Prominent in acculturation research is the model of acculturation strategies proposed by Berry and his colleagues; their research and findings have been cited most extensively in this field and the models used by them are believed to be the most influential on the subject of acculturation as developed in cross-cultural psychology. Berry’s125 writings suggest that the concept of acculturation generally refers to the continuities and changes in behaviour that are related to the experience of two cultures. It concerns a process that takes place over time and changes both the culture and the individual.126 During this process, various levels of functioning are presumably affected: behavioural functioning (e.g. customs, preference of food, use and preference of media, etc.), affective functioning (emotions) and cognitive functioning (norms and values). In majority of the literature, attention was devoted to the way in which minority groups adapt to the new society; the way in which the host society reacts to the new group has been given relatively less attention. Acculturation has often been presumed to be a linear process; with more involvement, one culture implies low involvement of the other culture. However, more advanced works of scholars like LaFromboise, Coleman and Gerton127 and Berry128 look at acculturation from a bi-dimensional point of view. Acculturation reflects the degree in which native cultural norms are retained, as well as the degree in which new customs are adopted. There are certain contextual factors that affect the phenomenon of acculturation. Although these contextual factors are usually overlooked in the measurement of acculturation, they have a direct impact on how individuals adopt to a new culture. Thereby, one of the key factors in the study of acculturation is how acculturating individuals came into the process. Berry129 identified voluntariness, mobility and permanence as three key factors that influence how groups enter this cultural process. Going by the notion forwarded by Berry, some people came into the acculturation process either on a voluntary basis (e.g. immigrants, sojourners, etc.), while some were forced to acculturate (e.g. refugees). The entry into this process may be because of physical movement into a new environment (e.g. immigrants) or through the colonization of territories (e.g. indigenous). Moreover, some tend to settle permanently in the new environment (e.g. ethnocultural), whereas others tend to move from one cultural environment to another (sojourners). Berry and his colleagues argued that despite the environmental, cultural and economic changes inherent in these modes of entry

Considerations concerning concepts of identity and acculturation  43 and settlement, the general processes of adaptation to a new society appear to be common for all the acculturating groups. The universal perspective of acculturation contends that what varies from individual to individual in these groups is the course of adaptation, the level of difficulty (e.g. Stress) experienced through the process and the actual outcome of the acculturation experience.130 Rogler stated that the disruption of social networks and the creation of new links, as well as the incorporation into a new economic system, influence the process of adaption into a new environment.131 Based on the research works and studies of Berry (1997), Berry and Kim (1988), Berry and Sam (1996), Drachman (1992), Hardwood (1994) and Hovey and King (1997), a broad list of contextual factors for acculturation process among different groups has been derived by Leopoldo J Cabassa in his study titled, ‘Measuring Acculturation: Where we Are and Where We Need to Go’132 and they are as follows: Prior immigration context Society of origin factors: Political Environment, Economic Environment and Social environment. Individual factors: Demographics before immigration, reasons for immigration, role in the immigration decision, prior knowledge or contact with the host society separation from social support networks, loss of significant others. Settlement context Society of settlement factors: Political Environment, Economic Environment and Social environment, immigration policies, societal attitude towards immigrants. Individual factors: Demographics during and after settlement, age at the time of settlement, Legal and residency status, Cultural distance between culture of origin and culture of settlement, time in the new culture, expectation for life in the new culture. Scholars argue that prior immigration context must be considered when studying how individuals adapt to a new culture. Berry argued that the political, social and economic contexts of the country from which individuals migrated are important determinants that influence how individuals left and how they are going to adapt in a new society. The individual factors related to the disposition to move and involvement in the crucial decision as well as prior acquaintance, contact and knowledge about the receiving society often determine the trajectory that individuals take in acculturating to a new society. The way in which the immigration took place, the arrival process, etc., do hold a vast amount of information about the intensity of movement. Similarly in terms of the settlement in the host society, the immigration policies or the lack of it and the attitude of the settlement society hold keys to

44  Considerations concerning concepts of identity and acculturation the acculturation process. Immigrants change in demographic factors such as occupation, educational attainment and socio-economic status, among others, as well as successes and failures in the host society, can have a tremendous impact on how individuals adapt to the new environment. Overall, the basic assumption is that to understand the acculturation experience of individuals, one must be aware of the context in which the acculturation process takes place. They provide the foundation on which acculturation theories and models are built.

The model used in this study: Berry’s model of acculturation For over three decades, the Canadian psychologist John Berry has advocated a comprehensive framework for understanding the process and changes implied in the acculturation process as they affect the individual. Berry developed a model of acculturation in which receiving culture acquisition and heritage culture retention are cast as independent dimensions. Since the conceptual framework used in this research utilizes Berry’s model, the following section of this chapter looks at Berry’s model of acculturation in relative detail. Within Berry’s model, these two dimensions intersect to create four acculturation categories: 1 Assimilation – When an individual wishes to diminish or decrease the significance of the culture of origin and desires to identify and interact primarily with the other culture, typically with the dominant culture if one comes from an ethnic minority group. 2 Separation – Whenever the individual wishes to hold on to the original culture and avoids interacting or learning about the other culture(s). 3 Marginalization – Individuals show little involvement in maintaining the culture of origin or in learning about the other culture(s). 4 Integration – When a person shows an interest in maintaining the original culture and in learning and participating in the other culture(s). Within Berry’s model, the condition of integration represents biculturalism, and this term has been used interchangeably in this study. The broader context of Berry’s concept is the existence of culturally plural societies across the world. Culturally plural societies are those in which a number of different culture or ethnic groups reside together.133 Many of these settings are products of international phenomena such as colonization, slavery, refugee and immigration movements. In many cases, they form cultural groups that are not equal in power (numerical, economic and political). These differences have given rise to the conceptualization of notions and terms to reflect those notions such as ‘mainstream’, ‘minority’, ‘ethnic groups’, etc. While recognizing the unequal influences and changes that exist during acculturation, Berry employed the term ‘cultural group’ to refer to all groups and the terms dominant and non-dominant to refer to their relative power where

Considerations concerning concepts of identity and acculturation  45 such a difference exists and is relevant to discussion. It is imperative that work on acculturation should be based in examining its cultural contexts. Different kinds of cultural groups may exist in plural societies and according to Berry their variety is primarily due to three factors: voluntariness, mobility and permanence.134 Beginning in the years 1974135 and 1980,136 Berry proposed that there are two independent dimensions underlying the process of acculturation: individuals’ link to their cultures of origin and to their societies of settlement. These links can be manifested in a number of ways, including preferences for involvement in the two cultures (termed acculturation attitude), and in behaviours that they engage in (for example, their language knowledge and use, and their social relationship). Phinney forwarded a similar bi-dimensional proposal where it was argued that there were two independent dimensions underlying people’s cultural identity; individuals may have independent identities with respect to their cultures of origin and to their societies of settlement. This bi-dimensional concept has been represented frequently in the acculturation literature. His framework raised two issues: (a) the degree to which people wish to maintain their heritage culture and identity; (b) the degree to which individuals seek involvement with the larger society. When the two issues cross paths, an acculturation space is created with four sectors within which individuals may express how they are seeking to acculturate.137 Berry has argued that the importance attached to the maintenance of one’s culture and the degree and amount of contact with members of the host society will be reflected in the kind of acculturation strategy an individual adopts – assimilation, separation, marginalization or integration.138 Berry’s work demonstrated that refugees experience the least stress when there is cultural similarity between the old and new societies, when they have extensive interaction with members of the host society and when individuals are in favour of integrating the various features of the two cultures.139 Refinements to the acculturation model proposed by Berry came from researchers who argue that the choice of adaptation strategy is the outcome of the interaction of refugee characteristics and characteristics of the host society.140 There is no denying the fact that the immigrant group also brings certain characteristics into the host society. These characteristics include both human and social capitals. The visibility of refugees and cultural similarity or dissimilarity to the dominant group in the host society will also have a bearing on their acculturation experience. At the same time, it is very important to note the relevant features of the host society including its asylum policies and services and receptivity of the newcomers. According to Berry, the receptivity of the host society is reflected in the degree to which the society welcomes cultural diversity and the extent to which refugees can choose to engage with natives, without constraints from the dominant group in a process of mutual accommodation.141 Berry forwarded three sets of views on the basis of two important underlying issues of immigrant and host society dynamics:142 (i) the degree to which

46  Considerations concerning concepts of identity and acculturation there is a desire to maintain the group’s culture and identity and (ii)  the degree to which there is a desire to engage in daily interactions with other ethnocultural groups in larger society. Intercultural strategies represents the core idea that groups and individuals (both dominant and non-dominant) living in plural societies engage with each other in a number of different ways.143 When the phenomenon was examined among non-dominant ethnocultural group that is in contact with the dominant group, these preferences have been termed as ‘acculturation strategies’. When examined among the dominant groups and when the views held are about how non-dominant groups should acculturate, they have been called ‘acculturation expectations’.144 Finally when examined among the dominant groups and when the views held are about how they themselves should change to accommodate the other groups in their society, the strategy is assessed with a concept called ‘multicultural ideology’.145 Not every group or individual seeks to engage in intercultural relations in the same way and adopts various ways to tackle their situations. Berry calls them strategies as opposed to attitudes because they consist of both attitudes and behaviour (that is, they include both the preferences and the actual outcomes) that are exhibited in day-to-day intercultural encounters. Berry’s four strategies have been derived from the two basic issues faced by all acculturating individuals, i.e. a relative preference for maintaining one’s heritage culture and identity and relative preference for having contact with and participating in the larger society along with other ethnocultural groups.146 According to Berry, these two issues can be responded to an attitudinal dimension, represented by bipolar arrows. For the purpose of presentation, generally positive or negative orientations to these issues intersect to define four strategies. These strategies carry different names, depending on which ethnocultural groups (the dominant or non-dominant) are being considered. From the point of view of non-dominant groups when individuals do not wish to maintain their cultural identity and seek daily interaction with other cultures, the Assimilation strategy is defined. In contrast, when individuals place a value on holding on to their original culture, and at the same time wish to avoid interaction with others, then the Separation alternative is defined. When there is an interest in maintaining one’s original culture, while in daily interactions with other groups, Integration is the option. In this case, there is some degree of cultural integrity maintained, while at the same time seeking, as a member of an ethnocultural group, to participate as an integral part of the larger society. Finally, when there is little possibility or interest in cultural maintenance (often for reasons of enforced cultural loss), and little interest in having relations with others (often for reasons of exclusion or discrimination), then marginalization is defined. Berry’s presentation was based on the assumption that non-dominant groups and their individual members have the freedom to choose how they want to acculturate. This might not always be the case. There can be conditions where the dominant group can enforce certain form of acculturation

Considerations concerning concepts of identity and acculturation  47 or the choices of non-dominant groups will be limited. Berry introduced this concept of the dominant group to influence the acculturation strategies available to, and used by, the non-dominant groups.147 As a result, there is a mutual, reciprocal process through which both groups arrive at strategies that will work in a particular society, and in a particular setting. For instance, the non-dominant groups can successfully pursue Integration when the dominant society is open and inclusive in its orientation towards cultural diversity. Therefore, willingness efforts of just one group are not sufficient, as the process has to take place from two ends. Initially, the basic issues were approached from the point of view of the non-dominant ethnocultural groups; however, the original anthropological definition of acculturation clearly established that ‘both’ groups in contact become acculturated.148 Because of this concern, Berry came up with a conceptualization of a plural society. Assimilation, when sought by the non-dominant acculturating group, is termed as Melting Pot. When Separation is forced by the dominant group, it is Segregation. Marginalization, when imposed by the dominant group, is Exclusion. Finally, for Integration, when cultural diversity is a feature of the society as a whole, including all the various ethnocultural groups, it is called Multiculturalism.149 With the use of this framework, comparisons can be made between individuals and their ethnocultural groups, and between non-dominant people and the larger society within which they are acculturating. Although preferences of non-dominant people are core features in acculturation research, ideologies and policies of dominant group constitute an important element of ethnic relations’ research.150 Inconsistencies and conflicts between these various acculturation preferences are sources of difficulty, usually for acculturating individuals, but can also for members of the dominant group. Berry and Ataca observed that when acculturation experiences cause problems for acculturating individuals, or conflict between acculturating groups, we observe the phenomenon of acculturative stress.151 Critique of Berry’s model Berry’s model has been criticized on at least two fronts. Firstly, creating the 2 × 2 matrix of acculturation categories requires classifying individuals as high or low on receiving culture acquisition and on heritage–culture retention. As pointed out by Schwatz, Unger, Zamboanga and Szapocznik, the primary methods of classifying individuals as high or low in categories have involved using a priori values, such as the sample median or the midpoint on the range of possible scores, as cut points. The use of a priori classification rules assumes that all four of Berry’s categories will be well represented in the sample. However, the cut point between high and low is arbitrary and will differ across samples, making the comparison across studies difficult. The use of a priori classification rules assumes that all four categories exist and are equally valid.152 Research works conducted by Schwatrz and Zamboanga suggest that more empirically rigorous ways of

48  Considerations concerning concepts of identity and acculturation classifying individuals (e.g. cluster analysis, latent class analysis) may not extract all of the categories or may extract multiple variants of one or more categories. This seems to suggest that not all of Berry’s categories may exist in a given sample or population and that some categories may have multiple subtypes.153 Secondly, the validity of marginalization as an approach to acculturation has been questioned by Del Pilar and Udasco. The likelihood that a person will develop a cultural sense of self without drawing on either the heritage or receiving cultural contexts is likely to be low according to some scholars. Studies using empirically based clustering methods have found small non-existent marginalization groups and scales that attempt to measure marginalization and typically have poor reliability and validity compared to scales for other categories. Research works have been conducted to address these criticisms, and Schwatrz and Zamboanga have reported some degree of validity for the acculturation categories model in their work.154 Using latent class analysis and a sample of Hispanic young adults in Miami, the authors found that classes resembling three of Berry’s four categories – namely integration, separation and assimilation – emerged from the analysis, along with two additional variants of biculturalism and extremely small class resembling the marginalization category. According to the scholars, the finding was consistent with Rudmin’s criticism of Berry’s model, that is, the categories were not as well differentiated as would be expected, given Berry’s model and multiple types of biculturalism were extracted, but three of four categories proposed by Berry were well represented in the sample. Rudmin has also criticized the acculturation literature in general for its ‘one-size-fits-all’ approach. Scholars like Rudmin think that Berry’s model and other similar approaches entail the same two acculturation processes and the four resultant acculturation categories, for any migrant population irrespective of any factor to be somewhat problematic. Many psychological approaches to acculturation have attempted to examine migrants in isolation and have used terms such as acculturation strategies, implying that individual differences in acculturation outcomes are the result of specific choices made by migrants. Migrants might have some choices regarding some aspect of acculturation; however, demographic and contextual factors can be equally important. Chirkav argued that a more nuanced approach based on Berry’s model may have more explanatory power and broader applicability than a ‘one-size-fits-all perspective’.155

Acculturation and identity: an interactional perspective Identity development can be seen as a collaborative project between an individual’s social and cultural context. So, if one tries to understand how identity develops and changes, it often becomes easier to understand how acculturation affects identity and vice versa. As Bosma and Kunnen have

Considerations concerning concepts of identity and acculturation  49 pointed out, changes in identity occur when one and/or one’s context change in ways that do not mesh with one’s current configuration of goals, values and beliefs.156 Schwartz et al.157 have identified three broad trends of responses that individuals come up with when they are faced with ‘identity challenge’: Firstly, by confronting the challenge and purposefully revising one’s identity in response to it; secondly, by relying on external norms and support sources and responding in the ways that are perceived as socially appropriate and thirdly, by avoiding or ignoring the challenge and making decisions and changes only in response to specific situational demands. Changes that take place or that do not take place in one’s identity are a result to interpersonal or contextual challenges and are often manifested in the quality and stability to the commitments one maintains. It is important to acknowledge that the process of acculturation does not take the same form for all immigrant groups and receiving societies.158 For example, in Western societies, acculturation may be a more difficult and distress-inducing process for non-white and non-Western immigrant population because of the greater cultural and phenotypic differences between immigrant people and members of the receiving society’s dominant cultural group. Mummendey et al. suggested that because of these differences, it is more likely that the immigrant people will be branded as ‘foreigners’ and will be discriminated upon.159 Scholars like Mac Kay and Wong point out that it is particularly crucial to consider the experiences of non-white immigrant people in the light of recent changes in immigration laws in developed nations such as the United States, Canada, Western Europe and Australia that have increased the number and representation of non-white immigrant people coming from developing countries.160 Broadly speaking, this development has resulted in the advent of two new trends, while majority of receiving countries are predominantly individualistic and developed, and majority of sending countries are predominantly individualistic and underdeveloped. As a result, many immigrant people and their descendants continue to ‘stand out’ as minorities – both visually and culturally even after mastering the language of their new homeland and adopting aspects of their culture.161 Different surveys conducted in immigrant-receiving countries reveal that non-white people are often viewed as inferior or less desirable than white immigrant people.162 Many native-born Americans and Europeans oppose immigration by individuals whom they perceive as racially, culturally or religiously different. Therefore, issues of prejudice and institutional barriers are therefore more likely to affect the lives of generations of nonwhite immigrant population in Western countries. According to Rudmin, a purely psychological approach to acculturation, where individual’s acculturation is studied outside of its context, may ‘penalize’ certain individuals and groups for acculturating differently than others.163 Scholars like Berry have argued that biculturalism, in which the immigrant person both adopts the ideals, values and practices of the heritage culture and retails the ideals, values and practices of the heritage

50  Considerations concerning concepts of identity and acculturation culture, is the most adoptive acculturation strategy. This strategy has been particularly successful where there are similarities between the two cultures but in situations where the two are very different, a bicultural approach not only becomes overly difficult but also distressing. S. J. Schwartz et al.’s seminal paper forwarded certain testable theoretical propositions about the acculturation–identity relationship.164 They argued that exposure to the receiving cultural context is what initially prompts changes in the immigrant person’s cultural identity. Such a perspective focuses on the process by which identity is developed or modified rather than the specific content of identity. The second principle deals with the importance of the specific content of the identity being developed or modified and varies between personal and social/cultural identities. In case of acculturation, the aspect dealing with cultural identity with which one enters the receiving society and subsequently how that cultural identity gets modified becomes very important since it becomes a determining factor in how the immigrant persons are regarded both by receiving and heritage culture individuals. Thirdly, it is suggested that identity is a particularly important issue in the clash between growing Western influences and strict adherence to traditional religious and moral principles in regions such as Middle East. The fourth principle deals with the aspect of biculturalism and holds that the viability and benefits of biculturalism vary according to the heritage and receiving cultures in question. In this context, Bhatia and Ram have mentioned that any consideration of acculturation in immigrant people must acknowledge the differential presence of barriers of identity development, adjustment and ‘getting ahead’ faced by immigrant people from different sending countries and ethnic backgrounds.165 Moreover, bicultural immigrant people, especially those from visible minority groups and from ­collectivist-oriented heritage cultures, may be ostracized both in host societies (as foreigners) and in home societies (i.e. as having ‘sold out’). At the same time, it is important to note that bicultural individuals are able to access and display cultural orientations of either their receiving or heritage culture, based on the requirement of the situation. Even though the bicultural approach is seemed by many scholars as the most workable alternative, it is clearly not the panacea that has been portraying it to be. The current research relates to this principle in the sense that an overwhelming majority of the immigrant population studies here belongs to the religious minority community in the country of origin and their experiences of adaptation in the host county, in most cases, echo this principle. Several studies have forwarded various models of immigrant or refugee adaption which deals with different strategies that the migrant population may adopt to cope with a new community and new culture and in most cases both the characteristics of the individual and the host society dictate the choice of strategies. The following section discusses some of the models that have been used in similar research works and then opts a particular model that provides a conceptual framework that attempts to do justice to the objectives of this research.

Considerations concerning concepts of identity and acculturation  51 Ethnic assimilation and acculturation Over the centuries, belonging to a particular ethnic group has remained an important part of how individuals saw and described themselves.166 With the identification of an ethnic group, an individual maintains his or her connection to an existing community and also a historical context. During the course of individual’s life, ethnic identity may also link past and future stages of his life. Most of the available literature often suggests that development of ethnic identity is a phenomenon that is most prominent among adolescence; however, scholars like Simic167 and Myerhoff168 have argued that ethnic identity may also assume a central role in old age, when older adults are perceived by younger adults as cultural carriers and transmitters. Ethnic identity (the degree to which one views oneself as a member of a particular ethnic group), acculturation (the process of adjusting to a different culture) and cultural orientation (one’s feeling towards and level of engagement in different cultures) are similar in a number of ways.169 All the three concepts describe individual’s relationship with the environment to which he or she belongs and spans multiple domains of life experience. Two factors that studies on the three mentioned concepts highlight at are as follows: firstly, they indicate that the differences among groups are due to cultural variables rather than due to variables confounded with culture. Secondly, because measures of ethnic identity, acculturation and cultural orientation include multiple aspects of culture (e.g. language, attitude, social affiliation, etc.), they can illuminate the specific means by which cultural values, customs and norms are transmitted to and influence the individual. Over the past few years, several research works have been conducted on the relationship between ethnic identity and acculturation; however, the focus of these studies mostly has been on the stages of ethnic identity, type of acculturation strategy or type of cultural orientation which have resulted into positive psychological outcomes. Although different outcomes can be seen in these studies, for the most part, they tend to support Phinney’s model of ethnic identity development,170 Berry’s model of acculturation171 and the assumption that high levels of orientation to different cultures are optimal. Works of Berry and Kim,172 Szapocznik and Kurtines,173 and Ward and ­Kennedy174 have shown that consistent with Berry’s model, integrated acculturation appears to be associated with higher levels of psychological adjustment than other acculturation strategies. On the other hand, certain other studies tell a different story. Phinney, Madden and Santos175 found no relationship between cultural orientation and levels of depression, anxiety and self-esteem in a sample of Armenian, Mexican American and Vietnamese immigrant adolescents in Los Angeles. Similarly, Verkuyten and Lay176 also found that ethnic identity was unrelated to personal self-esteem and life satisfaction among Chinese adolescents living in Netherlands. Although many studies support popular models of ethnic identity development, acculturation and cultural orientation, some studies do not. This research holds that acculturation is

52  Considerations concerning concepts of identity and acculturation inextricably intertwined with identity; the changes that occur as a result of acculturation may be viewed as changes in cultural and ethnic identity. As highlighted in the aforementioned discussions, Phinney’s works suggest that ethnic identity becomes salient as part of acculturation process that takes place when immigrants come to a new society. At that time, the distinction between the constructs of ethnic identity and acculturation becomes blurred and these two concepts are often used interchangeably.177 Phinney argued that ethnic identity is that aspect of acculturation that focuses on the subjective sense of belonging to a group or culture. As an aspect of acculturation, ethnic identity can be thought of in terms of the theoretical framework that has been used to understand acculturation. This study finds it useful to employ Berry’s model of acculturation in its conceptual framework, as a useful starting point to understand the variations in identity of the conflict-displaced Afghan immigrant population in India. By analogy with a two-dimensional model of acculturation, ethnic identity and identity as a member of one’s new society (‘national’ identity) can be thought of as two dimensions of group identity that vary independently; that is, each identity can be either secure and strong or underdeveloped and weak. An individual who retails a strong ethnic identity while also identifies with the new society is considered to have an integrated (bicultural) identity. One who has a strong ethnic identity but does not identify with the new cultures has separate identity, whereas who gives up an ethnic identity and identifies only with the new culture has an assimilated identity. The individual who identifies with neither has a marginalized identity.178 This research also acknowledges that to understand acculturation, one must understand the interactional context in which it occurs. These contexts include the characteristics of migrants themselves, the group of countries from which they originate, the socio-economic background and resources, their experiences of displacement, the country and local community in which they settle, the fluency in the language of the country of their settlement, among several other factors. In other words, the interaction of these two sets of considerations – immigrant characteristics along with their pre-­ resettlement experiences and characteristics of the host society and their perception of the immigrant’s experiences – are likely to influence both the adaptation strategies and the identity formation of the non-­dominant population. To understand that, a conceptual framework has been developed by drawing from different frameworks. They are presented in an Ecosystem model of ‘Refugee’ Acculturation and Identity (Re)-Constitution that integrates the theoretical perspectives with which this research framed its final understandings of what the respondents shared with the interviewer.

The conceptual framework The lives of ‘refugees’, like others, are constructed in broad and multiple contexts. These contexts include the family, neighbourhood and community

Considerations concerning concepts of identity and acculturation  53 in the part of the world from which they immigrated and those same broad groupings in the new host society. Their perceptions and experiences are shaped by opportunities, limitations, possibilities and constraints that are naturally present in these milieus. The conceptual framework used for this study has been drawn from the Ecosystem Model of Refugee Resettlement proposed by R. Coughlan and J Owens-Manley in their study on Bosnian refugees in the United States.179 It includes a framework that lays out the stages of refugee experience, an ecosystem perspective for refugee population and an acculturation model for refugee adaptation and identity formation. The framework that this research proposes is titled, the Ecosystem Model of ‘Refugee’ Acculturation and Identity (Re)-Constitution. This framework further highlights the interrelationship between the psychosocial adaptation and identity formation of immigrants in a host society. Lives of people of Afghanistan changed dramatically as a result of war and conflict and the changes in most cases were beyond the control of common Afghans. While millions were injured and killed, some still managed to escape death and injury by chance, as a result of escape over the border to another country. According to Hein, factors that impact the outcome such as the network of family and other social relationships, roles held and status achieved, first in the heritage and then in the receiving society, and the experience of exodus, transit and resettlement all make up the refugee’s life story.180 The holistic view of the refugee experience of Afghans includes the pattern of life prior to the conflict phase, events during the conflict phases and the situation during the course of displacement and settlement. The model used for this research attempts to provide context for understanding the ways in which the refugee experiences of Afghans in India unfolded. The Ecosystem Perspective illustrates the different critical layers of refugee lives in the context of the environment they are in. Urie Brofenbrenner’s work forwarded that in order to understand human development, one must consider the entire ecological system in which growth occurs.181 Morales and Sheafor182 forwarded an ecosystem perspective that illustrated critical layers of refugee lives and their environment based on the work of Brofenbrenner. This model combines the principle of ecology (the study of relationship between organisms and environment) and general system theory (all organisms are entities with boundaries and subsystems) in working with people. Sociological and social work practices have long focused on the dynamic interactions suggested by system theory between individuals, families, groups, organizations and environments. Such a focus is effective in mitigating harmful social conditions and in bringing about a change for improved psychosocial functioning.183 At an individual level, there are biopsychosocial factors that affect a refugee’s interactions within the rest of the system. Biopsychosocial factors acknowledge the contributions of an individual’s natural environment (human biology), together with psychosocial factors (the person in situation). According to Morales and Sheafor, Biopsychosocial factors comprise a cluster

54  Considerations concerning concepts of identity and acculturation of individual characteristics, such as personality and temperament, lifestyle, skills and abilities, a personal world view and a customary response to stress and problems arising from interaction with the other levels of the system.184 People are affected by stress within themselves and also from aspects of the environment which press upon them.185 At the level of family, individuals tend to get influenced by the lifestyle of other family members. The organization of family roles and the terms of negotiation with the authority, gender and emotions reflect values and beliefs held within the family. Family can interact internally, within the system and deal with the different dynamics between individual members. It can also react to external factors at other levels of the system. Cultural values and belief systems are extremely important part of the ecosystem perspective because of the way they are implanted in individual- and family-level characteristics. It has been argued that culture has a unique value and belief system that often shapes people’s response to stressors and to social problems.186 The Environmental factors include political, economic and social structures. Scholars have suggested that many problems affecting people under special circumstances such as refugees are caused by these structural arrangements. In this study, the focus is particularly on the aspects of the refugee population’s access to employment and social security. Within those broad areas, this research wishes to touch upon the structures of education, welfare, health and mental health and public safety, in terms of challenges that present in the process of adaptation of the said population. Finally, the historical factor, that is, the importance of landmark events that led to war, ethnic cleansing and displacement is extremely important to situate their situation and position within a context. It is critical to assess the duration of experiences, and the age when they are experienced, and to be aware of both the contributions of historical influences and their interactions with each of the other levels of the system. Different stages of migration To understand the experiences of settlement and the adaptation of refugee population in a host society, it is critical to examine all aspects of refugee’s migration path. Drachman and Ryan’s framework highlighted three phases, namely:187 (1) Pre-migration and departure, (2) transit and (3) settlement, based on the assumption that ‘All immigrants have an experiential past; some experience abrupt departure, while others experience a decision-­ making process and a period of preparation for a move; a physical move is always involved and finally resettlement and some type of adjustment to a new environment occur’. For the purpose of this particular study of ­conflict-displaced Afghans in India, this research finds it more convenient to divide the refugee life in four phases, namely: (1) Pre-conflict phase, (2) Conflict phase, (3) Displacement phase and (4) Settlement phase. Barring selective works such as the one by Weine188 and colleagues189 or Miller and colleagues,190 most of the literatures available on refugee settlement show that so far, not too much attention has been given to the first

Considerations concerning concepts of identity and acculturation  55 three phases. Understanding the pre-conflict life is extremely important as it serves as an ongoing frame of reference for evaluating and comparing their current experiences in the receiving society. Owen-Manley and Coughlan, thus, have expressed that a consideration of refugees’ lives before the war is important.191 Refugee experiences during war and conflict and during the subsequent displacement are crucial because they do not finally began to relax and attempt to regain a sense of normalcy until they arrived in the host country. Finally, models of refugee adaptation suggest different strategies that they might adapt to cope up with new communities and new culture. Model of acculturation Berry’s model of acculturation has been extensively discussed in the previous segments of this chapter. According to it, a refugee who chooses integration prefers to maintain the original cultural identity while also seeking contact with the host culture. Assimilation means the refugee has not sought to maintain original cultural practices and primarily seeks out contact with the host. Separation means they have maintained their cultural identity without seeking outside cultural contact, and marginalization means they have become alienated from their own culture as well as the host culture. Berry’s model is one of the first to systematically explain how people deal with cultural contact. Berry192 did acknowledge that the acculturating newcomer did not necessarily have free will in choosing the strategy, but the attitudes and strategies of those in the host society would influence the newcomer’s choices and behaviour. Berry (1989, 2003) proposed that acculturation strategies are related to what he called the consequences of acculturation, which are the outcomes of the process of acculturation. In particular, Berry was interested in how a person’s acculturation strategy was related to acculturative stress, or the emotional outcomes of acculturation. Berry believed that there are two cognitive constructs that mediate acculturative stresses. These variables also have emerged in the refugee studies’ literature as important. The first is a sense of control in the acculturation process, or the feeling that one has the power to achieve whatever the acculturation goals are. Berry proposed that a continued sense of control during the acculturation process would lead to positive emotional outcomes. The second cognitive construct that Berry proposed as a mediator between acculturation strategy and outcomes represents acculturation expectations, or how the person hopes to engage with the host culture. Berry’s theory of acculturation strategies is one piece of a greater model that could incorporate all the variables affecting the acculturation process of refugees. Berry’s theory is based on the premise that there are relationships among experiences, individual characteristics and outcomes.193 Current refugee research (Keyes and Kane, 2004;194 Whittaker, Hardy, Lewis, and Buchan, 2005;195 Coughlan and Owens-Manley, 2006196) seems to support the connection Berry has proposed between the experiences, individual

56  Considerations concerning concepts of identity and acculturation attitudes of the acculturating person and their emotional adjustment. Involving Afghan ‘refugees’ in India in research similar to the aforementioned authors would be a good way to continue to flesh out the relationships among acculturation attitudes and consequences. Like Berry’s model, a similar bi-dimensional proposal was made by Phinney (1990), who argued that there were two independent dimensions underlying peoples’ cultural identity; individuals may have independent identities with respect to their cultures of origin and to their societies of settlement. An individual who retails a strong ethnic identity while also identifies with the new society is considered to have an integrated (bicultural) identity. One who has a strong ethnic identity but does not identify with the new cultures has separate identity, whereas who gives up an ethnic identity and identifies only with the new culture has an assimilated identity. The individual who identifies with neither has a marginalized identity.197 The following framework raises the issues of the degree to which people wish to maintain their heritage culture and identity and degree to which people seek involvement in the host society and how that experience (re)-constitutes their identity in the new environment.

Framework used for this study It would seem that the term refugee has analytical usefulness not as a label for a special generalizable ‘kind’ or ‘type’ of person or situation, but only as a broad legal or descriptive rubric that includes with it a world of different socioeconomic statuses, personal histories, and psychological or spiritual situations. - L. Malki198 This research agrees with Malki’s view that there is no single refugee experience; however, it is believed that it is possible and helpful to identify the social and psychological processes and structures that entail the experiences of their flights and settlement experiences. The above-mentioned version of the Ecosystem Model of Immigrant Acculturation and Identity Re-­constitution (Figure 2.1) illustrates the changes that occur as refugees proceed through the stages of refugee experience, moving from pre-conflict life to experiences of the conflict phases and to the arrival and adaptation phases in a new country, as a place to start over. The model proposed in this study highlights the interrelationship between the psychosocial adaptation and identity formation of immigrants in a host society. It is important to understand the situation of the group under consideration during the pre-conflict phase, especially in terms of issues that will be analysed in a settlement phase. For example, since their scope of participation in the Indian labour market will be reviewed in the settlement phase, this research feels that it is important to deal with the same factor in the pre-conflict phase to understand the differences and its possible impact on the acculturation process and the subsequent identity formation. It would

Considerations concerning concepts of identity and acculturation  57 Pre Conflict Phase

Conflict Phase

Displacement Phase

Host society policies, services & acceptance of cultural diversity

Labor market participation Civil/Political participation

Macro-level Factors Political, Economic, Social Structure of the heritage societies

Culture & Ethnicity Intergroup and intra-group social interaction

Meso-level Factors The network of family, friends, cultural, religious and ethnic association

Access to Basic Rights (e.g. Right to Employment and Social Security)

Micro-level Factors Human capital Social capital

Settlement Phase

Access to Basic Rights Role of International Actors Labor market participation Inter/Intra group social interaction Cultural encounter Civil & political participation

Acculturation Strategies Integration Assimilation Separation Marginalization

Identity profile Integration or Bi-cultural National Ethnic Diffuse

Figure 2.1  E  cosystem Model of ‘Refugee’ Acculturation and Identity (Re)Constitution.

be equally important to understand the dynamics of intergroup and intragroup social interactions in the heritage society. The structures of the prewar culture often demonstrate discrimination and barrier to employment, education and other forms of participation for a minority group. As the case study deals with such group, looking as these facets becomes extremely pertinent. For the conflict and displacement phases, only those factors and experiences, that have relevance and impact on the acculturation process and identity formation of the conflict-displaced Afghans in the resettlement phase, will be considered. This study finds the three-layer approach of the environments where the ‘refugee’ is situated in the Ecosystem model relevant and therefore has been included in the framework. However, the nomenclatures of environments in the original model such as ‘nurturing’ and ‘sustaining’ to explain situations that failed to nurture or sustain the population and led to the eventual migration are rather misleading. In terms of the particular case study, the environment that an Afghan ‘refugee’ individual encountered in the conflict and displacement phases failed to ‘nurture’ and ‘sustain’ him, therefore the flight to India. For the purpose of this particular study, it was felt that more generic terms such as Macro-, Meso- and Micro-level factors would be more suitable. The macro-level factors include the economic, social and political structures of society. In the course of the adaptation phase in a new environment of the host society, all these factors play a crucial role. A refugee’s sustaining

58  Considerations concerning concepts of identity and acculturation environment provides access to participation in the labour market, the educational system, social welfare institutions and the health and public safety systems.199 In the course of the different stages of migration, this macro environment undergoes many changes. There could be other factors influencing it, for example, the extended neighbourhood, religious institutions, and social and recreational groups that can cast an impact in the process. The sustaining community may vary in the range, depth and policies of resettlement and in the attitudes and behaviours of the host community towards newcomers. Berry’s model of acculturation provides a useful starting point for understanding variations in identity. By analogy with two-dimensional model of acculturation, ethnic identity and national identity can be thought of as two dimensions of group identity that vary independently; that is; each identity can be either secure and strong or underdeveloped and weak. The meso-level factors influencing an individual prior to emigration typically include family, friends and close neighbours in a familiar setting.200 This implies the factors that have collectively impacted the pre-emigration way of life. Ways of communicating, buying goods, visiting and all aspects of one’s culture and customs are well known and well integrated as a part of self. During the time of major crisis like conflict, war and displacement, in most cases these familiar ways of doing things are lost, family and friends may be separated or killed and transnational living and final settlement in host countries present demand for adaptation. At the micro level are factors such as the individual’s human and social capitals, which play a crucial role on the way he sees and reacts to the developments of his life. The experiences of arriving in a host community are influenced by a variety of factors and circumstances at different levels. While there are discussions about the three levels of environment, this study does not intend to talk about the overall scenario of Afghanistan during pre-conflict and conflict phases, nor does it aspire to offer a comment on displacement and transition phases in the lives of forcefully displaced persons in general. The most essential reason for this section of the research is to fathom how the studied community saw and interpreted those events of their lives and how far those experiences were relevant in their adaptation process during their settlement phase in India. The factors, which were essential for the explanations of the questions posed in this research, have been discussed. In other words, only those aspects (of the refugee experience) that might have had relevance and have contributed towards the identity formation of the said population have been analysed.

Notes 1 A. R. Zolberg, ‘Contemporary Transnational Migrations in Historical Perspective,’ in M. Kirtz (ed.), U.S. Immigration and Refugee Policy (Lexington, MA: Lexington Books, 1983), pp. 15–51. 2 Reed Coughlan and Judith Owens-Manley, Bosnian Refugees in America, New Communities, New Cultures. (Las Cruces, NM: Springer, 2010), p. 1.

Considerations concerning concepts of identity and acculturation  59 3 Emma Haddad, The Refugee in International Society: Between Sovereigns. (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2008), p. 202. 4 E. F. Kunz, ‘The refugee in flight: kinetic models and forms of displacement’. International Migration Review, Vol. 7 (1973), 125–146. 5 William Rogers Brubaker, ‘Immigration, citizenship, and the nation-state in France and Germany: a comparative historical analysis’. International Sociology, Vol. 5 (1990), 379–407. 6 J. W. Berry, ‘Conceptual Approaches to Acculturation,’ in K. Chun, P. Balls-­ Organista, and G. Marin (eds.), Acculturation: Advances in Theory, Measurement and Applied Research (Washington, DC: APA Press, 2003), pp. 17–37. 7 J. S. Phinney, ‘Ethnic Identity and Acculturation,’ in K. Chun, P. B. Organista, and G. Marin (eds.), Acculturation: Advances in Theory, Measurement, and Applied Research (Washington, DC: American Psychological Association, 2003), pp. 63–81. 8 Stephen Castles and A. Davidson, Citizenship and Migration: Globalization and the Politics of Belonging (New York: Routledge 2001). 9 Roger Zetter, David Griffiths, Nando Sigona, and Margaret Hausser, ‘Survey on policy and practice related to refugee integration’. European Refugee Fund Community Actions, (2001/2002), pp. 1–148. A. Anger and A. Strang, ‘Understanding integration: a conceptual framework’. Journal of Refugee Studies (2008), pp. 166–191. 10 Stuart Hall, ‘Cultural identity and diaspora,’ in J. Rutherford (ed.), Identity and Difference (London: Sage Publication, 1990), pp. 221–237. 11 R. Black, ‘Fifty years of refugee studies: from theory to policy’. International Migration Review, Vol. 35 (2001), 57–78. 12 J. R. Fons van de Vijver and K. Phalet, ‘Assessment in multicultural groups: the role of acculturation’. Applied Psychology, Vol. 53 (2004), 215–236. 13 C. Suárez-Orozco, I. L. G. Todorova, and J. Louie, ‘Making up for lost: the experience of separation and reunification among immigrant families’. Family Process, Vol. 41 (2002), 625–641. 14 D. B. Pope-Davis, W. M. Liu, S. Ledesma-Jones, and J. Nevitt, ‘African American acculturation and black racial identity: a preliminary investigation’. Journal of Multicultural Counseling and Development, Vol. 28 (2000), 98–112. 15 S. Bhatia and A. Ram, ‘Rethinking ‘acculturation’ in relation to diasporic cultures and postcolonial identities’. Human Development, Vol. 44, (2001), 1–18. 16 J. S. Phinney, ‘Ethnic identity and acculturation,’ in K. Chun, P. Organista, and G. Marin (eds.), Acculturation: Advances in Theory, Measurement, and Applied Research (Washington, DC: American Psychological Association, 2003), pp. 63–81. 17 S. J. Schwartz, M. J. Montgomery, and E. Briones, ‘The role of identity among immigrant people: theoretical propositions, empirical questions, and applied recommendations’. Human Development, Vol. 49 (2006), 1–30. 18 E. H. Erikson, Childhood and Society. (New York: Norton, 1950). 19 E. H. Erikson, Identity: Youth and Crisis. (New York: Norton, 1968). 20 E. H. Erikson, Life History and the Historical Moment. (New York: Norton, 1975). 21 E. H. Erikson, Identity and the Life Cycle: A Reissue. (New York: Norton, 1980). 22 H. Tajfel and J. C. Turner, ‘The Social Identity Theory of Intergroup Behavior,’ in S. Worchel and W. G. Austin (eds.), The Psychology of Intergroup Behavior (Chicago: Nelson Hall, 1986), pp. 7–24. 23 J. S. Phinney, ‘Stages of ethnic identity development in minority group adolescents’. Journal of Early Adolescence, Vol. 9 (1989), 34–49. 24 J. S. Phinney, ‘Ethnic identity in adolescence and adults: review of research’. Psychological Bulletin, Vol. 108 (1990), 499–514.

60  Considerations concerning concepts of identity and acculturation 25 J. S. Phinney, ‘A Three Staged Model of Ethnic Identity Development,’ in M. Bernal and G. Knight (eds.), Ethnic Identity: Formation and Transformation among Hispanics and Other Minorities (Albany: New York University Press, 1993), pp. 61–79. 26 J. S. Phinney, ‘Ethnic Identity and Acculturation,’ in K. M. Chun, P. B. Organista, and G. Marin (eds.), Acculturation: Advances in Theory, Measurement and Applied Research (Washington, DC: American Psychological Association, 2003), 166–184. 27 R. Brubaker and F. Cooper, ‘Beyond ‘Identity’’. Theory and Society, Vol. 29 (2000), 1–47. 28 W. M. Kurtines and W. K. Silverman, ‘Emerging views of the role of theory’. Journal of Clinical Child Psychology, Vol. 28 (1999), 558–562. 29 S. J. Schwartz, M. J. Montgomery and E. Briones, Op.cit, 2006. 30 J. S. Phinney, G. Horenczyk, K. Liebkind, and P. Vedder, ‘Ethnic identity, immigration and well being: a interactional perspective’. Journal of Social Issues, Vol. 57 (2001), 493–510. 31 D. B. Pope-Davis, W. M. Liu, S. Ledesma-Jones, and J. Nevitt, ‘African American acculturation and black racial identity: a preliminary investigation’. Journal of Multicultural Counselling and Development, Vol. 28 (2001), 98–112; J. D. Saxton, ‘An introduction to cultural issues relevant to assessment with native American youth’. California School Psychologist, Vol. 6 (2001), 31–38; R. Sulaiman, ‘Perceptions of minority’s collective identity and voting behavior: the case of Palentenians in Israel’. Vol. 142 (2002), 753–766. 32 Sigmund Freud, Group Psychology and the Analysis of the Ego. (Vienna: International Psychoanalytic Publishing House, 1921). 33 J. E. Marcia, ‘Development and validation of ego identity status’. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, Vol. 3 (1966), 551–558. 34 R. Brubaker and F. Cooper, ‘Beyond identity’. Theory and Society, Vol. 29 (2000), 1–47. 35 W. M. Kurtines and W. K. Silverman, ‘Emerging views of the role of theory’. Journal of Clinical Child Psychology, Vol. 28 (1999), 558–562. 36 S. J. Schwatz, W. M. Kutines, and M. J. Montgomery, ‘A comparison of two approaches for facilitating identity exploration processes in emerging adults: a exploratory study’. Journal of Adolescence Research, Vol. 20 (2005), 309–345. 37 M. A. Gibson, ‘Immigrant adaptation and patterns of acculturation’. Human Development, Vol. 44 (2001), 19–23. 38 C. B. Fishers, J. F. Jackson, and F. A. Vilarruel, ‘The Study of African-­ American and Latin American children,’ in W. Damon and R. M. Lerner (eds.), Handbook of Child Psychology. 5th ed. (New York: Wiley Publishers, 1998), pp. 1145–1207. 39 H. Batencourt and S. R. Lopez, ‘The study of cultural ethnicity and race in American psychology’. American Psychology, Vol. 48 (1993), 537–629. 40 J. M. Broughton, ‘An Introduction to Critical Developmental Psychology,’ in J. M. Broughton (ed.), Critical Theories of Psychological Development (New York: Planum Publishers, 1987), pp. 1–30. 41 E. E. Sampson, ‘Identity politics: challenges to psychology’s understanding’. American Psychology, Vol. 48 (1997), 1219–1230. 42 J. Szapocznik and W. M. Kurtnes, ‘Family psychology and cultural diversity: opportunities for theory, research and intervention’. American Psychology, Vol. 48 (1993), 400–407. 43 R. Brubaker and F. Cooper, ‘Beyond ‘identity’’. Theory and Society, Vol. 29 (2000), 1–47. 44 K. J. Gergen, The Saturated Self: Dilemmas of Identity in Contemporary Life. (New York: Basic Publishers, 1991).

Considerations concerning concepts of identity and acculturation  61 45 L. M. Hunt, S. Schneider, and B. Comer, ‘Should ‘acculturation’ be a variable in the health research? A critical review of research on US Hispanics’. Social Science and Medicine, Vol. 59 (2004), 973–986. 46 S. Bhatia and A. Ram, Op.cit, (2001). 47 P. F. Gjerde, ‘Culture, power and experience: towards a person centered cultural psychology’. Human Development, Vol. 47 (2004), 138–157. 48 G. T. Sorell and M. J. Montogomery, ‘Feminist perspectives on the relevance of Erickson’s theory of contemporary identity development research’. Identity: An International Journal of Theory and Research, Vol. 2 (2001), 97–128. 49 R. Brubaker and F. Cooper, Op.cit, (2000), p. 11. 50 S. J. Schwartz, M. Montgomery, and E. Briones, ‘The role of identity in acculturation among immigrant people: theoretical propositions, empirical questions, and applied recommendations’. Human Development, Vol. 49 (2006), 1–30. 51 E. P. Schachter, ‘Erikson meets the post modern: can classic identity theory rise to the challenge?’ Identity, Vol. 5 (2005), 137–160. 52 J. W. Berry, ‘Acculturation as Varieties of Adaption,’ in A. Padilla (ed.), Acculturation: Theory, Models and Some New Findings (Boulder, CO: Westview, 1980), pp. 9–25. 53 J. Phinney, ‘Ethnic identity in adolescents and adults: a review of research’. Psychological Bulletin, Vol. 108 (1990), 499–514. 54 H. C. Triandis, ‘Individualism- collectivism and personality’. Journal of Personality, Vol. 69 (2001), 907–924. 55 U. Bronfenbrenner, The Ecology of Human Development. (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1979). 56 H. A. Bosma, T. L. G. Graafsma, H. D. Grotevant, and D. J. de Levita (eds.), Identity and Development. An Interdisciplinary Approach. (Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage, 1994), pp. 1–20. 57 Sigmund Freud, Group Psychology and the Analysis of the Ego. (Vienna: International Psychoanalytic Publishing House, 1921). 58 E. H. Erikson, Childhood and Society. (New York: Norton Publishers, 1950). 59 K. J. Gergen, Op.cit, (1991). 60 M. D. Berzonsky and G. R. Adams, ‘Reevaluating the identity status paradigm: still useful after 35 years’. Development Review, Vol. 19 (1999), 557–590. 61 S. J. Schwartz, ‘The evolution of Eriksonian and neo-Eriksonian identity theory and research: a review and integration’. Identity: An International Journal of Theory and Research, Vol. 1 (2001), 7–58. 62 S. J. Schwartz, Ibid, (2001), p. 9. 63 J. E. Marcia, ‘Development and validation of ego identity status’. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, Vol. 3 (1966), 551–558. 64 J. E. Marcia, ‘The Relational Roots of Identity,’ in J. Kroger (ed.), Discussions on Ego Identity (Hillsdale, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, 1993), pp. 101–120. 65 S. L. Ketner, W. B. Marjo, and A. Harke, ‘Identity strategies among adolescent girls of Moroccan descent in the Netherlands’. Identity: An International Journal of Theory and Research, Vol. 4 (2009), 145–169. 66 H. D. Grotevant, ‘The Integrative Nature of Identity: Bringing the Soloist to Sing in a Choir,’ in J. Kroger (ed.), Discussions on Ego Identity (Hillsdate, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, 1993), pp. 70–93. 67 J. E. Côté and C. Levine, ‘A critical examination of ego identity status paradigm’. Development Review, Vol. 8 (1988), 147–184. 68 H. D. Grotevant, ‘Assessment of identity development: current issues and future directions’. Journal of Adolescent Research, Vol. 1 (1986), 175–182. 69 J. E. Marcia, ‘The Relational Roots of Identity,’ in J. Kroger (ed.), Discussions on Ego Identity (Hillsdale, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, 1993), pp. 101–120.

62  Considerations concerning concepts of identity and acculturation 70 M. D. Berzonsky, ‘Identity style: conceptualization and measurement’. Journal of Adolescent Research, Vol. 4 (1989), 267–281. 71 H. D. Grotevant, ‘Towards a process model of identity formation’. Journal of Adolescent Research, Vol. 2 (1987), 203–222. 72 A. S. Waterman, ‘Personal expressiveness: philosophical and psychological foundations’. Journal of Mind and Behaviour, Vol. 11 (1990), 47–74. 73 J. E. Côté and C. Levine, ‘Acritical examination of ego identity status paradigm’. Development Review, Vol. 8 (1988), 147–184. 74 S. J. Schwartz, ‘The evolution of Eriksonian and neo-Eriksonian identity theory and research: a review and integration’. Identity: An International Journal of Theory and Research, Vol. 1 (2001), 7–58. 75 W. M. Kurtines, ‘A co-constructive perspective on human behaviour and development’. (1999) cited in S. J Schwartz, ‘The evolution of Eriksonian and neo-Eriksonian identity theory and research: a review and integration’. Identity: An International Journal of Theory and Research, Vol. 1 (2001), 33. 76 G. R. Adam and S. K. Marshall, ‘A developmental social psychology of identity: understanding the person in context’. Journal of Adolescent, Vol. 19 (1996), 429–442. 77 J. E. Côté, ‘Sociological perspectives on identity formation: the culture-identity link and identity capital’. Journal of Adolescence, Vol. 19 (1996), 419–430. 78 J. E. Côté, ‘An empirical test of the identity capital model’. Journal of Adolescence, Vol. 20 (1997), 421–437. 79 J. E. Côté, ‘Foundations of psychoanalytic social psychology: neo- Eriksonian propositions regarding the relationship between psychic structures and cultural institutions’. Developmental Review, Vol. 13 (1993), 31–51. 80 E. H. Erikson, Childhood and Society. (New York: Norton Publishers, 1950). 81 S. J. Schwartz, M. Montgomery, and E. Briones, ‘The role of identity in acculturation among immigrant people: theoretical propositions, empirical questions, and applied recommendations’. Human Development, Vol. 49 (2006), 1–30. 82 E. H. Erikson, Identity: Youth and Crisis. (New York: Norton Publishers, 1968), p. 156. 83 L. A. Jensen, ‘Coming of age in a multicultural world: globalization and adolescent cultural identity formation’. Applied Developmental Science, Vol. 7 (2003), 189–196. 84 J. S. Phinney, G. Horenczyk, K. Kiebkind, and P. Vedder, ‘Ethnic identity, immigration and wellbeing: an interactional perspective’. Journal of Social Issues, Vol. 57 (2001), 493–510. 85 H. Tajfel and J. C. Turner, ‘The social identity theory of intergroup behavior,’ in S. Worchel and W. G. Austin (eds.), The Psychology of Intergroup Behaviour (Chicago: Nelson Hall Publishers, 1986), pp. 7–24. 86 R. Brown, ‘Social identity theory: past achievements, current problems and future challenges’. European Journal of Social Psychology, Vol. 30 (2000), 745–778. 87 H. Tajfel, Differentiations between Social Groups. (London: Academic Press, 1978). 88 H. Tajfel and J. C. Turner, ‘An Integrative Theory of Inter-Group Conflict,’ in J. A. Williams and S. Worchel (eds.) The Social Psychology of Inter Group Relations, (Belmons, CA: Wadsworth, 1979), pp. 33–47. 89 M. A. Hogg and D. Abrams, Social Identifications. A Social Psychology of Intergroup Relations and Group Processes. (London: Routledge, 1988), p. 3. 90 H. Tajfel, ‘Individuals and groups in social psychology’. British Journal of Social and Clinical Psychology, Vol. 18 (1979), 183–190. 91 S. Trepte, ‘Social Identity Theory,’ in Bryant Jennings and Peter Vorderer (eds.), Psychology of Entertainment (New Jersey: Lawrence Erlbaum associates Publishers, 2006), pp. 255–271.

Considerations concerning concepts of identity and acculturation  63 92 S. J. Schwartz, M. Montgomery, and E. Briones, ‘The role of identity in acculturation among immigrant people: theoretical propositions, empirical questions, and applied recommendations’. Human Development, Vol. 49 (2006), 1–30. 93 H. Tajfel and J. C. Turner, ‘The Social Identity Theory of Intergroup Behaviour,’ in S. Worchel and W. G. Austin (eds.), The Psychology of Intergroup Behaviour (Chicago: Nelson Hall Publishers, 1986), pp. 7–24. 94 A. M. Padilla and W. Perez, ‘Acculturation, social identity and social cognition: a new perspective’. Hispanic Journal of Behavioral Sciences, Vol. 25 (2003), 35–55. 95 J. S. Phinney, G. Horenczyk, K. Kiebkind, and P. Vedder, ‘Ethnic identity, immigration and wellbeing: an interactional perspective’. Journal of Social Issues, Vol. 57 (2001), 493–510. 96 S. Bhatia and A. Ram, ‘Rethinking ‘acculturation’ in relation to diasporic cultures and post colonial identities’. Human Development, Vol. 44 (2001), 1–18. 97 J. S. Phinney, ‘Ethnic Identity and Acculturation,’ in K. M. Chun, P. B. Organista, and G. Marin (eds.), Acculturation: Advances in Theory, Measurement and Applied Research (Washington, DC: American Psychological Association, 2003) pp. 254–259. 98 J. S. Phinney, C. Cantu, and D. Kurtz, ‘Ethnic and American identity as predictors of selfesteem among African American, Latino, and White adolescents’. Journal of Youth and Adolescence, Vol. 26 (1997), 165–185. 99 R. Roberts, J. Phinne, L. Masse, Y. Chen, C. Roberts, and A. Romero. ‘The structure of ethnic identity in young adolescents from diverse ethnocultural groups’. Journal of Early Adolescence, Vol. 19 (1999), 301–322. 100 J. S. Phinney and M. Devich-Navarro, ‘Variations in bicultural identification among African American and Mexican American adolescents’. Journal of Research on Adolescence, Vol. 7 (1997), 3–32. 101 J. S. Phinney, G. Horenczyk, K. Kiebkind, and P. Vedder, ‘Ethnic identity, immigration and wellbeing: an interactional perspective’. Journal of Social Issues, Vol. 57 (2001), 493–510. 102 L. A. Jensen, ‘Coming of age in a multicultural world: globalization and adolescent cultural identity formation’. Applied Developmental Science, Vol. 7 (2003), 189–196. 103 J. S. Phinney, ‘A Three Staged Model of Ethnic Identity Development,’ in M. Bernal and G. Knight (eds.), Ethnic Identity: Formation and Transformation among Hispanics and Other Minorities (Albany: New York University Press, 1993), pp. 61–78. 104 J. S. Phinney and V. Chavira, ‘Ethnic identity and self esteem: an exploratory longitudinal study’. Journal of Adolescence, Vol. 15 (1992), 271–281. 105 J. S. Phinney, ‘The multi group ethnic identity measure: a new scale for use with diverse groups’. Journal of Adolescence Research, Vol. 7 (1992), 156–176. 106 J. W. Berry, ‘Acculturation as Varieties of Adaption,’ in A. M. Padilla (ed.), Theory, Models and Some New Findings (Boulder, CO: Westview, 1980), pp. 9–25. 107 C. T. Tamdor, P. E. Tetlock, and K. Peng, ‘Acculturation strategies and integrative complexity: the cognitive implications of biculturalism’. International Journal of Cross-cultural Psychology, Vol. 40 (2009), 353–365. 108 M. A. Gibson, ‘Immigrant adaption and patterns of acculturation’. Human Development, Vol. 44 (2001), 19–23. 109 S. J. Schwartz, M. Montgomery, and E. Briones, ‘The role of identity in acculturation among immigrant people: theoretical propositions, empirical questions, and applied recommendations’. Human Development, Vol. 49 (2006), 1–30. 110 J. W. Berry, ‘Acculturative Stress,’ in P. T. P. Wong and L. C. J. Wong (eds.), Handbook of Multicultural Perspective on Stress and Coping (Dallas, TX: Spring, 2006), pp. 287–298.

64  Considerations concerning concepts of identity and acculturation 111 J. W. Berry, J. S. Phinney, D. L. Sam, and P. Vedder, Immigrant Youth in Cultural Transition. (Mahwah, NJ: Erlbaum, 2006). 112 K. M. Chun, P. B. Organista, and G. Marin, Acculturation: Advances in Theory, Measurement and Applied Research. (Washington, DC: American Psychological Association, 2003). 113 D. L. Sam and J. W. Berry, The Cambridge Handbook of Acculturation Psychology. (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2006). 114 F. W. Rudmin, ‘Constructs, Measurements and Models of Acculturation and Acculturative Stress’. International Journal of Intercultural Relations, Vol. 33 (2009), 106–123. 115 J. W. Berry, ‘Psychology of Acculturation,’ in N. R. Goldberger and J. B. Veroff (eds.), The Culture and Psychology Reader (New York: New York University, 1995), pp. 457–488. 116 C. G. Helman, Culture, Health and Illness. (London: Wright, 1990). 117 D. G. Hertz, ‘Bio-psycho-social consequences of migration stress: a multidimensional approach’. Israel Journal of Psychiatry Relations and Science, Vol. 30 (1993), 204–212. 118 J. W. Knipscheer, ‘Cultural convergence and divergence in mental health care. Empirical studies on mental distress and help-seeking behaviour of Surinamese, Ghanaian, Turkish and Moroccan migrants in the Netherlands.’ (Dissertation, Veenendaal: Universal Press, 2000). 119 J. S. Nevid, S. A. Rathus, and B. Greene, Abnormal Psychology in a Changing World. (New Jersey: Prentice Hall, 1997). 120 J. W. Berry, ‘Acculturative Stress,’ in P. B. Organista, K. M. Cren, and G. Marin (eds.), Reading in Ethnic Psychology (New York: Routledge, 1998), pp. 117–122. 121 C. Camilleri and H. Maleswska-Payre, ‘Socialization and Identity Strategies,’ in J. W. Berry, P. R. Dasen, and T. S. Saraswathi (eds.), Handbook of Cross-­ Cultural Psychology: Vol 2, Basic Processes and Human Development (Needham Heights, MA: Allyn and Bacon, 1997), pp. 43–65. 122 W. Gudykunst and M. H. Bond, Communicating with Strangers: A Approach to Intercultural Communication. (New York: Mc Graw Hill, 1997). 123 G. Hofstede, Cultural Consequences. International Differences in Work Related Values. (Beverly Hills: Sage Publishers, 1980). 124 T. Lafromboise, L. K. Coleman, and J. Gerton, ‘Psychological Impact of Biculturalism: Evidence and Theory,’ in P. B. Organista, K. M. Cren, and G. Marin (eds.), Reading in Ethnic Psychology (New York: Routledge, 1998). 125 J. W. Berry and D. L. Sam, ‘Acculturation and Adaptation,’ in J. W. Berry, M. H. Segall, and C. Kagitcibasi (eds.), Handbook of Cross-Cultural Psychology (Needham Heights: Allyn & Bacon, 1997), pp. 291–326. 126 J. W Berry, ‘The Acculturation Process and Refugee Behavior,’ in C. L. Williams and J. Westermeyer (eds.), Refugee Mental Health in Resettlement Countries (Washington: Hemisphere Publishing Corporation, 1986), pp. 25–38. 127 T. LaFromboise, H. L. K. Coleman, and J. Gerton, ‘Psychological impact of biculturalism: evidence and theory’. Psychological Bulletin, Vol. 114 (1993), 395–412. 128 J. W. Berry, U. Kim, Th. Minde, and D. Mok, ‘Comparative studies of acculturative stress’. International Migration Review, Vol. 21 (2000), 491–511. 129 J. W. Berry and D. L. Sam, ‘Acculturation and Adaptation,’ in J. W. Berry, M. H. Segall, and C. Kagitcibasi (eds.), Handbook of Cross-Cultural Psychology (Needham Heights: Allyn & Bacon, 1997), pp. 291–326. 130 J. W. Berry, ‘Acculturative Stress,’ in P. B. Organista, K. M. Cren, and G. Marin (eds.), Reading in Ethnic Psychology. (New York: Routledge, 1998), pp. 117–122. 131 L. H. Rogler, ‘International migration: framework for directing research’. American Psychologist, Vol. 49 (1994), 701–708.

Considerations concerning concepts of identity and acculturation  65 132 L. J. Cabassa, ‘Measuring acculturation: where we are and where we need to go’. Hispanic Journal of Behavioural Sciences, Vol. 25 (2003), 127–146. 133 S. Brooks (ed.), The Challenges of Cultural Pluralism. (Westport: Praeger, 2002). 134 W. Berry, ‘Immigration, acculturation and adaptation’. Applied Psychology: An International Review, Vol. 46 (1997), 5–33. 135 J. W. Berry, ‘Psychological aspects of cultural pluralism’. Culture Learning, Vol. 2 (1974), 17–22. 136 J. W. Berry, ‘Acculturation as varieties of adaptation,’ in A. M. Padilla (ed.), Acculturation: Theory, Models and Some New Findings (Boulders, CO: Westview, 1980), pp. 9–25. 137 J. W. Berry, J. S. Phinney, D. L. Sam, and Paul Vedder, ‘Immigrant youth: acculturation, identity and adaptation’. Applied Psychology: An International Review, Vol. 55 (2006), 303–332. 138 J. W. Berry, ‘Acculturation and adaption in a new society’. Internal Migration, Vol. 30 (1992), 69–85. 139 J. W. Berry, ‘A psychology of immigration’. Journal of Social Issues, Vol. 53 (2001), 615–631. 140 J. W. Berry, ‘A Psychology of Immigration’. Journal of Social Science, Vol. 57. (2001), 615–631. 141 Ibid. 142 J. W. Berry, ‘Integration and multiculturalism: ways towards social solidarity’. Papers on Social Representation, Vol. 20 (2011), 2.1–2.21. 143 J. W. Berry, ‘Acculturation as Varieties of Adaptation,’ in A. M. Padilla (ed.), Acculturation: Theory, Models and Some New Findings (Boulders, CO: Westview, 1980), pp. 9–25. 144 J. W. Berry, ‘Conceptual Approaches to Acculturation,’ in K. Chun, P. B. ­Organista, and G. Marin (eds.), Acculturation: Advances in Theory, Measurement and Application (Washington: APA Books, 2003), pp. 17–37. 145 J. W. Berry, R. Kalin, and D. M. Taylor, Multuculturalism and Ethnic Attitudes in Canada. (Ottawa: Ministry of Supply and Services, 1977). 146 J. W. Berry, ‘Integration and multiculturalism: ways towards social solidarity’. Papers on Social Representation, Vol. 20 (2011), 2.1–2.21. 147 J. W. Berry, ‘Psychological aspects of cultural pluralism’. Culture Learning, Vol. 2 (1974), 17–22. 148 R. Redfield, R. Linton, and M. J. Herskovits, ‘Memorandum for the study of acculturation’. American Anthropologist, Vol. 38 (1936), 149–152. 149 J. W. Berry, ‘Integration and multiculturalism: ways towards social solidarity’. Papers on Social Representation, Vol. 20 (2011), 2.1–2.21. 150 J. W. Berry, R. Kalin, and D. M. Taylor, Multuculturalism and Ethnic Attitudes in Canada. (Ottawa: Ministry of Supply and Services, 1977). 151 J. W. Berry and B. Ataca, ‘Cultural Factors in Stress,’ in George Fink Encyclopedia of Stress (Oxford: Elsevier, 2007), pp. 672–678. 152 Rudmin (2009). 153 S. Schwartz and B. L. Zamboanga, ‘Testing Berry’s model of acculturation: a confirmatory latent class approach’. Cultural Diversity and Ethnic Minority Psychology, Vol. 14 (2008), 275–285. 154 Ibid. 155 V. Chirkov, ‘Summery of the criticism and the potential ways to improve acculturation psychology’. International Journal of Intercultural Relations, Vol. 33 (2009), 177–180. 156 H. A. Bosma and E. S. Kunnen, ‘Determinants and mechanism in ego identity development: a review and synthesis’. Developmental Review, Vol. 21 (2001), 39–66. 157 S. J. Schwartz, M. Montgomery, and E. Briones, Op.cit, (2006), 1–30.

66  Considerations concerning concepts of identity and acculturation 1 58 S. Bhatia and A. Ram, Op.cit, (2001). 159 A. Mummendey, A. Klink, and R Brown, ‘Nationalism and patriotism: national identification and our group rejection’. British Journal of Social Psychology, Vol. 40 (2001), 159–172. 160 S. L. Mackay and S. L. C. Wong, ‘Introduction,’ in S. L. Mackay and S. L. C. Wong (eds.), New Immigrants in United States (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000). 161 C. Suarez-Orozco and M. M. Suarez-Orozco, Children of Immigration. (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2001). 162 R. J. Simon and J. P. Lynch, ‘A comparative assessment of public opinion towards immigrants and immigration policies’. International Migration Review, Vol. 33 (1991), 455–467. 163 F. W. Rudmin, ’Constructs, measurements and models of acculturation and acculturative stress’. International Journal of Intercultural Relations, Vol. 33 (2003), 3–37. 164 S. J. Schwartz, M. Montgomery and E. Briones, Op.cit, (2006), 1–30. 165 S. Bhatia and A. Ram, ‘Rethinking ‘acculturation’ in relation to diasporic cultures and post colonial identities’. Human Development, Vol. 44 (2001), 1–18. 166 A. D. Smith, The Ethnic Origins of Nations. (New York: Basil Blackwell, 1986). 167 A. Simic, ‘Ethnicity as a career for the elderly: the Serbian American Case’. Journal of Applied Gerontology, Vol. 6 (1987), 113–126. 168 B. Myerhoff, ‘A symbol perfected in death: continuity and ritual in the life and ­ ging: death of an elderly Jew,’ in B. Myerhoss and A. Simic (eds.), Life’s Career- A Cultural Variations on Growing Old (Beverly Hills, CA: Sage, 1978), pp. 503–516. 169 Jeanne L. Tsai, Yulia Chentsova-Dutton, and Ying Wong. ‘Why and how researchers should study ethnic identity, acculturation, and cultural orientation.’ Asian American psychology: The Science of Lives in Context, (2002), 41–65. 170 J. Phinney, ‘Ethnic identity in adolescents and adults: a review of research’. Psychological Bulletin, Vol. 10 (1990), 499–514. 171 J. W. Berry, ‘Acculturation as Varieties of Adaption,’ in A. Padilla (ed.), Acculturation: Theory, Models and Some New Findings. (Boulder, CO: Westview, 1980), pp. 9–25. 172 J. W. Berry and U. Kim, ‘Acculturation and Health: Theory and Research,’ in S. S. Kazarian and D. R. Evans (eds.), Cultural Clinical Psychology: Theory Research and practice (New York: Oxford University Press, 1998), pp. 39–59. 173 J. Szapocznik and W. M. Kurtines, ‘Bilculturalism and Adjustment among Cuban Americans,’ in A. Padilla (ed.), Recent Advances in Acculturation Research: Theory Models and some new Findings (Boulder, CO: Westview, 1980), pp. 139–159. 174 C. Ward and A. Kennedy, ‘Acculturation strategies, psychological adjustment, and socio-cultural competence during cross-cultural Transition’. International Journal of International Relations, Vol. 18 (1994), 329–343. 175 J. S. Phinney, T. Madden, and L. J. Santos, ‘Psychological variables as predicators of perceived ethnic discrimination among minority and immigrant adolescents’. Journal of Applied Social Psychology, Vol. 79, (1998), 937–953. 176 M. Verkuyten and C. Lay, ‘Ethnic minority identity and psychological wellbeing: the mediating role of collective self esteem’. Journal of Applied Social Psychology, Vol. 28 (1998), 1969–1984. 177 J. S. Phinney, ‘Ethnic Identity and Acculturation,’ in K. M. Chun, P. B. Organista, and G. Marin (eds.), Acculturation: Advances in Theory, Measurement and Applied Research (Washington, DC: American Psychological Association, 2003), pp. 63–83.

Considerations concerning concepts of identity and acculturation  67 178 J. S. Phinney, G. Horenczyk, K. Liebkind, and P. Vedder, ‘Ethnic identity, immigration and well being: an interactional perspective’. Journal of Social Issues, Vol. 57, no. 3 (2001), 493–510. 179 R. Coughlan and J. Owens-Manley, Bosnian Refugees in America, New Communities, New Cultures. (Berlin: Springer, 2006). 180 J. Hein, ‘Refugee, immigrants and the state’. Annual Review of Sociology, Vol. 19 (1993), 43–59. 181 Urie Brofenbrenner, ‘Ecological models of human development’. International Encyclopedia of Education, Vol. 3 (1994), 37–43. 182 A. T. Molares and B. W. Sheafor, The Many Faces of Social Work Clients. ­(Boston, MA: Allyn & Bacon, 2002). 183 A. T. Molares and B. W. Sheafor, Op.cit. 184 Ibid., 9. 185 M. Payne, Modern Social Work Theory: DiA Critical Introduction. (Chicago: Lyceum Books Inc, 1991), p. 83. 186 A. T. Molares and B. W. Sheafor, 2002. Op.cit. 187 D. Drachman, ‘A stage of migration framework for service to immigrant population’. Social Science Journal, Vol. 37, (1992), 68. 188 S. Weine, When History Is a Nightmare. (New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press, 1999). 189 S. Weine and D. Laub, ‘Narrative constructions of historical realities in testimony with Bosnian survivors of ‘ethnic cleansing’’. Psychiatry, Vol. 58 (1995), 246–260. 190 K. Miller, J. Muzurovic, G. Worthington, S. Tipping, and A. Goldman (2002), ‘Bosnian refugees and the stressors in exile: a narrative study’. American Journal of Orthopsychiatry, Vol. 72 (2002), 341–354. 191 R. Coughlan and J. Owens-Manley, Op.cit, (2006). 192 J. W. Berry, ‘Conceptual Approaches to Acculturation,’ in K. M. Chun, P. B. Organista, and G. Marin (eds.), Acculturation: Advances in Theory, Measurement, and Applied Research (Washington, DC: American Psychological Association, 2003), pp. 17–37. 193 Ibid. 194 E. F. Keyes and C. F. Kane, ‘Belonging and adapting: mental health of Bosnian refugees living in the United States’. Issues in Mental Health Nursing, Vol. 25 (2004), 809–831. 195 S. Whittaker, G. Hardy, K. Lewis, and L. Buchan, ‘An exploration of psychological well-being with young Somali refugee and asylum-seeker women’. Clinical Child Psychology and Psychiatry, Vol. 10 (2005), 177–196. 196 R. Coughlan and J. Owens-Manley, Op.cit, (2006). 197 J. S. Phinney, G. Horenczyk, K. Liebkind, and P. Vedder, ‘Ethnic identity, immigration and well being: an interactional perspective’. Journal of Social Issues, Vol. 57, no.3 (2001), 493–510. 198 L. Malki, ‘Refugees and exile: from ‘refugee studies’ to the national order of things’. Annual Review of Anthropology, Vol. 24 (1995), 495–523. 199 K. Valtonen, ‘From the margin to the mainstream: conceptualizing refugee resettlement’. Journal of Refugee Studies, Vol.17 (2004), 70–97. 200 B. Sheafor, C. Horejsi, and G. Horejsi, Techniques and Guidelines of Social Work Practice. 5th ed. (Boston: Allyn and Bacon, 2000).

3 Stages of ‘refugee’ lives A community perspective

‘The peaceful life’/‘The happy times’ and the run-up to the conflict Life in pre-conflict Afghanistan was shaped by the pulse and character of everyday experience at the local level as well as by larger historical forces that formed group identities in the country. Because of the substantial ­r ural–urban divide that existed in the Afghan society, the daily experiences of people residing in rural areas were starkly different from those who lived in urban setups. The aim would be to explore the nature of everyday life before the conflicts started primarily because one’s past provides a framework for evaluating and comparing current experiences. Scholars have pointed out that this approach is especially relevant for refugees who have been forcibly removed from their former lives.1 Subsequently, this chapter will reflect upon the transition of Afghans through the conflict and displacement phases. During the course of this research, it was realized that the overwhelming majority of the conflict-displaced Afghan population living in India today hailed from the capital city; therefore, a major part of the shared experiences reflects the urban scenario in the pre-conflict phase. This chapter begins by touching upon some traditional cultural and societal patterns very briefly before introducing the contours of everyday lives as revealed through the voices of Afghans themselves.

Afghanistan – the land and its people Located at a very significant geostrategic position, Afghanistan is at the crossroads of a region, which has always invited contest between ­neighbours – the Central Asian Republics to the north, China and India to the east, Iran to the West and Pakistan to the south and southeast. ­A fghanistan’s landscape has steep mountain ranges and deep and narrow valleys that separate and sometimes isolate regions inhabited by people of various cultural backgrounds and lifestyles. Geography has largely contributed to the perpetuation of tribalism, regionalism and ethnocentrism.2 Among the South Asian countries, Afghanistan had a unique experience in state formation because

Stages of ‘refugee’ lives  69 its geostrategic position left its part of a buffer zone between two rival imperial powers in the 19th century. Several important studies by scholars like Gregorian,3 Dupree,4 Adamec,5 Ghani,6 Kakar,7 Rubin,8 among others have attempted to explain the development of state in Afghanistan. Although in the 19th Century it was pressured by both Great Britain and Russia, it became a colony of neither. Afghanistan achieved independence after the Third Anglo-Afghan War in 1919, although nation-building had been occurring there since the rise of the Durrani Pushtun tribe in 1747. Scholars over the years have highlighted numerous constraints in the formation of a nation, foremost being the wide gulf between state and society, which was further exacerbated by four significant factors: firstly, Afghanistan had sharp social cleavages, as the country then (and now) was divided into distinctive communal, ethno-linguistic and religious groups (with the Pushtun tribes being dominant).9 Secondly, these different groups possessed a social system that emphasized loyalty to the local social group (qawm), rather than a higher-order abstraction like the state.10 Thirdly, with the rugged Hindu Kush Mountains bisecting the country, Afghanistan’s isolating geography served to create both a gulf between Kabul and the rural areas and to close the nation to the outside world.11 All the mentioned factors combined to retard the development of centralized political institutions, which could only expand in power at the expense of local loyalties.12 Oliver Roy13 and Ashraf Ghani14 explained how Afghanistan emerged as a state built around a Pashtun tribal structure as opposed to a common sense of shared destiny of its people. The Saddozai Popolzai clans of the Durrani tribes formed a great Pashtun confederation and carved out an empire between India and Persia in the mid-18th century. They were followed by the Mohammadzai Barakzai clans (also Durrani) in 1818, but no internal unity developed. The Pashtuns happen to be the largest ethnic group in Afghanistan and the largest remaining tribal society in the world. They comprised 45%–50% of Afghanistan’s estimated pre-war population of 16 million and were the dominant ethnic group.15 Despite the dominance of the Pashtun tribes, there are numerous significant minorities16 in Afghanistan. Other major ethno-linguistic communities include Tajik, Hazara, Uzbek, T ­ urkmen, Baluchis, Tatar, Aimaq, Qizilbash and Arab, as well as Sikhs and Hindus – each having its own unique culture and traditions.17 Over the millennia, a rich diversity of people have come to this land because it occupies a pivotal position at the hub where four civilizations meet. The centrality of the place as a zone of intercommunication has attracted conquering armies, men of intellect, missionaries, pilgrims, traders, artisans, nomads and political ­exiles. While some passed through, some decided to settle down. Whatever be the manner of their coming, according to Nancy Dupree, all contributed to Afghanistan’s heritage and that it is in this reciprocal interaction of diverse influences that the medley of Afghan culture germinated.18 There are an estimated 40 languages spoken throughout the country, with Dari or Persian as the dominant language, being widely spoken and

70  Stages of ‘refugee’ lives understood by most of the ethnic communities throughout the country.19 Afghanistan’s constitution recognizes all spoken languages, but Persian and Pashtu are the officially recognized languages of the state. Afghanistan has been an overwhelmingly Islamic country, with almost 80% of the population Hanafi Sunni and most of the remainder Jafari Shia; additionally, there are small numbers of Isma’ili Shia, Hindus, Sikhs and Jews, mostly in the towns.20 The country has also been a home to important Central Asian Sufi orders, especially the Naqshbandiya, Qadiriya and Chestiya.21 Since the non-Muslim population were restricted to the urban space, Islam in a way governed the village life and provided an all-encompassing social, normative and ethical framework for daily life. Mosque formed the central gathering place in a village society and the mullahs (village priests) and ­Ulama (religious scholars) rivalled the traditional landowning elite for local leadership. With the rise of the Pashtuns to prominence, their tribal code (known as the Pashtunwali) took the place of a legal system in the settling of disputes. As the Pashtunwali22 provided a code of behaviour for the Afghan tribes, the jirga (tribal assembly) provided a form of government.23 The core of the social system in Afghanistan has been the qawm, which some have interpreted as a tribe, but can more properly be understood in its broader context as being any communal group, including village, extended family or ethnic group.24 Intermarriage between ethnic groups and religious groups has been relatively uncommon, and even the notion of being an ‘Afghan’ has always been severely limited, with most individuals identifying themselves in relation to their qawm. Many scholars have even found it inappropriate to refer to one Afghan culture, as Afghanistan has been in many ways a society with differing ethnic cultures, both overlapping and clashing. It is obvious that defining an ‘Afghan culture’ and ‘Afghan tradition’ in the context of this complex mosaic is a challenging exercise. The term ‘culture’ is in itself a loaded and contested one; for the purpose of this discussion, culture embraces those shared ideas, beliefs, emotions and customs that mould behaviour and place value on creative artistic expressions in fields such as art, music, literature and architecture.25 It defines the way people live, and the way they utilize both material and non-material resources. The measure of being cultured in Afghanistan, where close to 90% are non-literate, need not be equated with being well-read, according to Dupree.26 The following discussion will touch briefly on some traditional cultural attributes that characterize Afghan society.

The Afghan society – certain traditional cultural attributes Afghanistan is a patriarchal society where kinship plays a prominent role in mobilizing public support and developing alliances.27 Honour is the rock upon which social status rests and the family is the single most important institution in Afghan society. Individual honour, a positive pride in independence that comes from self-reliance, fulfilment of family obligations,

Stages of ‘refugee’ lives  71 respect for the elderly, respect for women, loyalty to colleagues and friends, tolerance for others, forthrightness, an abhorrence of fanaticism and a dislike for ostentation, is a cultural quality most Afghans share.28 The position of women is central to these values. Women are the yardsticks by which morality is judged, and they carry the responsibility of passing values of the society to younger generation. Hafuzullah Emadi writes that women are regarded as private property and men are duty-bound to defend and protect their women from strangers, even as they feel entitled to abuse and mistreat their women.29 The criteria for appropriate behaviour may vary from group to group and often within each group, or even within extended families, but central to the rules of etiquette are those designed to uphold honour. Many of the rules for proper behaviour concern male–female relationships, which require separate protected living, working and entertaining spaces. Modesty in dress has been observed by the majority. The distinctive embroidery that adorns many types of clothing is an exuberant art that individual groups proudly display as symbols expressing individual and group identities, social and economic statuses, stages in the lifecycle of individuals and changing sociopolitical trends. Men often wore the traditional salwar and kameez. Headgear is probably the most diagnostic item of clothing. ­Afghan women traditionally have been required to cover their heads in public, with an exception of certain phases of modernization drives in the urban centres. Love for poetry and music have been significant features of Afghan society. For the literate, the Persian-language literary tradition stretches back many centuries and holds in reverence the great poets of Iran and India as well as those from Central Asia. In poetry and literature, distinctions exist between non-literate, mostly rural, and literate, largely urban, populations.30 Nancy Dupree further wrote, while treasuring the poets of the past, a great many gifted Afghans tried their hand at writing poetry and poetry readings or mushaira were a popular form of entertainment. Folk tales and folk songs have been enjoyed by rural and urban populations alike, among both literate and non-literate population. Happy occasions like engagements, weddings, etc., were incomplete without music. It constituted another deeply embedded feature in the Afghan culture having many regional variations. The rich genre of classical music, closely tied to Indian music and instruments, had devoted patrons at court. Cities such as Herat are noted for their musical traditions.31 However, one has to remember that professional musicians often were subjected to condemnation of the orthodox religious establishment who contended that music and dance have corrupting influence on society. In the 1940s and 1950s, Radio Kabul (which was later renamed Radio Afghanistan) played an important role in breaking down reservations towards music in general. The cassette tape recorder revolutionized communication and made way for popular music. Nancy Dupree wrote that it was not unusual in the 1970s to hear the voices of popular singers blending with

72  Stages of ‘refugee’ lives the tinkle of camel bells as caravans passed across the countryside. It is estimated that there were some 500,000 radios in Afghanistan by 1976, or one radio for every 36 persons.32 It became fashionable to hold engagement and wedding parties in hotels and many such occasions featured jazz bands, most of which imitated American and European groups, although some did begin to develop improvised compositions taken from Afghan folk music.33 Afghan films and the Kabul Nandary (theatre) leaned towards translations of Russian and American works, with Western music setting the mood. During the same time, Indian, Pakistani and Iranian films also made their way in Afghanistan. Amrullah Saleh, politician and the former head of National Directorate of security till 2010, while speaking on the social transformation of Afghanistan at a public platform, mentioned how much the Afghans used to enjoy Indian music and that people eagerly waited for the Thursday nights because that was one day of the week when an Indian movie was telecasted on their televisions.34 Afghans are known to be great socializers. Any excuse to get together, whether it be for births, engagements, weddings or sombre mourning rituals, to mark the changing seasons, to welcome or bid farewell to travellers or to honour guests, was seized. Each of these occasions was associated with the preparation of special regional and seasonal dishes; Afghans are justly famed for their hospitality.35 Hospitality or Mehman Nawazi is one of the important principles of Pashtunwali and has been taken seriously by Pashtuns and non-Pashtuns alike. Being a good guest is considered as important as being a good host. The tradition of hospitality has both cultural and religious origins and the cuisine and dining practices have adapted to the generous quantities and elaborate care in preparation and cooking that the guest demands. The guest of honour is always accorded special treatment in terms of sitting area and others are seated according to age and position.36 Traditionally, a typical sitting area in an Afghan household would have Afghani carpets coving the entire floor of the room. There would be big cushions matching the carpet around the wall, so that when one sits, the back can rest on the cushion placed around the wall. This sitting arrangement is made on the floor where people sit down cross-legged. The centre of the room is generally kept empty and the space is used for serving the food and tea on a dastarkhan. Afghanistan’s social activities centre largely around food. Afghan cuisine can be seen as a unique blend of influence and resourcefulness. Fruits, grains, nuts and dry fruits, vegetables and meats are available in abundance or not at all, depending on where the family resides. The food traditionally is served without a table setting, generally on dartarkhan, which is a cloth spread on the ground and the entire meal is served on it. Islam has influenced the country’s food habits and it forbids consumption of pork and alcohol. Common source of meet is beef, sheep, goat and poultry and they tend to strictly adhere to the dietary standards of halaal (slaughtering according to ‘Islamic Tradition’). The huge Afghani bread (naan) made in Tandoor (traditional clay

Stages of ‘refugee’ lives  73 oven) is an integral part of their meal. Preparations made of rice with dried fruits and meat have also been common. The meal is generally followed with cups of green tea with cardamom accompanied by sweets, fruits and dry fruits. Tea has been an integral part of Afghanistan’s social culture. People often socialize at chai khana (Tea houses), which are also known by the name ‘samawar’ which has its links with the Russian word ‘samovar’. Public traditional festivities, such as those that take place on Nawroz, 21  March, the Afghan New Year, are held in association with religious shrines at Mazar-i-Sharif and Kabul sacred to Hazrat Ali, cousin and sonin-law of the Prophet Mohammed, fourth Caliph of Sunni Islam and first legitimate imam in the Shia tradition.37 Both Sunni and Shia from all walks of life, men, women and children, flock to these shrines to enjoy the wide range of festivities, from storytelling to carrousels, and, of course, the Nawroz specialty of fried fish and jalebis (crisp pastry soaked in sugar syrup.) In Afghanistan, the Nawroz celebration was not restricted to the Muslim population alone; this being the most important festival for Afghans, people irrespective of their religious belief used to celebrate the same. For the religious minorities like Hindus and Sikhs, this occasion merged with their traditional festival of Baisakhi (harvest festival of Punjab region), which was their traditional way of welcoming the New Year. Food is an important part of the celebrations. People often visit each other’s house and family members tend to sit together and eat the meal. Hafizullah Emadi in his books writes that the host never knows how many people may actually sit down to a meal. Invited guests may bring extra friends, so in a typical party with a dozen of invited guests, the host will usually prepare enough food to feed three times that many.38 Even the poorest of the families will extend great generosity to their guests even sometimes going beyond their means. In Afghanistan, people greet each other, acquaintances and strangers, with handshakes saying Salaam (Peace be upon you). Close friends and relatives often embrace each other and kiss each other on the cheeks when they greet; however, men are not allowed to touch or shake hands with women who are not related to them. There are unwritten rules and codes of conduct that govern the interpersonal relationships. These codes deal with issues such as pride, honour, hospitality, respect, virtue and morality. These traits demonstrate the value of the society. Emadi points out that the reference to such ideals is found in literature and folklores and the themes such as sadaqat wa Imandari (honesty and integrity), Mehman Nawazi (hospitality to friend as well as strangers), Dosti (nurturing the relationship of friendship), Ghyarat wa namus (defending personal and family honour and property) and wafadari (loyalty to friends and family members) have been essential values of Afghanistan’s cultural life and these have been taken seriously.39 It is important to remember that the basic cultural patterns of ­A fghanistan that have been described in this segment took root over millennia; however when Afghanistan emerged as a nation state in 1880,

74  Stages of ‘refugee’ lives ­ uthoritarian-centralized control became the ideal of the ruling elite who a often looked beyond borders to draw inspiration. New architectural styles were borrowed from Central Asia and the West;40 educated men and women adopted Western dress; nascent secular schools were opened and Kabul acquired a decidedly urban mien.41 The rest was the country which remained largely untouched by the happenings of Kabul; they could never approve of what was happening there, thus widening the rural–­u rban divide. Kabul largely lost touch with the countryside where the traditional lifestyle continued with only superficial changes. In their fervour for modernization, policymakers lost sight of the fact that the vibrancy of a society is maintained by keeping a balance between welcoming the new and treasuring the old, that innovation and continuity imbue a society with that sense of identity essential to keep a nation strong.42 Thousands of Afghans, men and women, who returned from studies abroad carried with them expectations that broadened the already widening gap between Kabul and the rest of the country. As the disgruntlement among various sections of the population became stronger, the stage therefore was set for the bid for change of the existing order. While conflict over values started unfolding around Afghans in the 1970s and the political transitions were taking place in the 1980s, they were still watching and waiting, while still enjoying their lives in the urban centres of the country, hoping these phases to be temporary, until the beginning of 1990s, as was captured in the following segment.

Pre-conflict Afghanistan Clashes with conservatives developed, a coup d’etat ended the reign of the Mohammadzai and made possible the Soviet intervention from which millions fled into exile. Respondents interviewed for this study remembered their ‘pre-conflict’ lives nostalgically, as ‘the peaceful life’, ‘the relaxed life’ or ‘the happy times’ – one filled with family, close friends, financial stability, prosperity and security. Afghanistan for most meant a country of their forefathers, a country where they were born and a ‘beautiful country’ with rich culture and proud people. I grew up in a beautiful country! Spent my childhood in Jalalabad and came to Kabul in the late sixties. My father had built a haweli (big house) with a huge bagh (orchard). More than thirty people lived there including two of my uncles and their respective families. While growing up I remember playing Tashlabazi and Gudiparanbazi with the boys of the neighbourhood. We swam in the rivers during summer. People used to go to each other’s house without even locking the door- Yes, my country was that safe! Went to the local school like most other kids, enjoyed the festivities together, found happiness in little things, there was no pressure or stress of any form – it was a simple yet good life.43

Stages of ‘refugee’ lives  75 Mr. Sham Lal Bhatija, who became Afghanistan’s first Hindu Ambassador, while giving his inaugural speech at an event in New Delhi, remembered a story narrated by his father: My father used to tell stories of how comfortably he would fall asleep under the shades of a road side trees on his way to another place. He knew nobody will steal anything from him, Afghanistan was such a safe and secure place. He used to say, ‘I was confident that nothing can go wrong with me’ and even if something happened, he would say, ‘I knew I can go to my king and ask him, how is it possible that something wrong can happen to your subject under your rule’. That was the amount of trust and confidence that people had on their ruler – it truly was a peaceful life.44 I can remember, while was growing up in the 1950s, King Zahir Shah was fondly called Fakir Shah by many because of his simple and approachable nature. He mixed with common people and never made us conscious about the difference that existed between the Royalty and common man. He allowed children to visit the garden of the King during celebrations. Many a times, he himself was present there.45 Respondents described rich social networks and close family ties, in contrast to the family separation they have experienced since the conflict and war in Afghanistan. Majority of the conflict-displaced population from Afghanistan living in India belong to the minority communities, namely Sikh and Hindu, who have lived mostly in Kabul or other urban centres. Therefore, the respondents tend to reflect upon their experiences there. Commenting on the situation of the minorities in the pre-conflict Afghanistan, some of the respondents interviewed said: Hindus (in Kabul) mostly lived in Shor Bazar and Hindu Guzar (areas of the city). Hindu Guzar was full of life, shopping street, vendors, lots to eat; people could easily spend two or more hours there. In our homes servants did the cleaning, washing and so on…so we can say Hindus has a good life.46 Hindus in Kandahar lived in enclaves known as Kabli Bazaar and Shikharpuri Bazaar. Living in a community or Qawm meant living in close physical proximity. Most temples were situated there. Some of the senior members of the communities mentioned that in old days, there used to be huge gates that would shut at night so that no outsiders could enter. Hindus and Sikhs were spread across the country. Kabul, Logar, Parwan, Qunduz, Paktika, Kandahar, Ghazni, Khost, Nangarhar, Jalalabad, Charikar provinces were among the most important centers. We not only had full citizenship rights but also complete freedom of faith.

76  Stages of ‘refugee’ lives According to Afghanistan’s constitution every Afghan is eligible to serve the country therefore, one could see Sikhs and Hindus serving in the military, working with the government, becoming doctor, engineers, bankers and of course running successful businesses. From the position of the Afghan government, we never felt discriminated.47 It is believed that Guru Nanak, the founder of Sikh religion, visited Jalalabad (Nangarhar province) on his way back to India from Iraq and Saudi Arabia in the 16th century. Later, the Chashma Sahib Gurudwara was erected by his followers in that place and was considered one of the most important shrines by the minorities of Afghanistan. Before the conflict, Sikhs and Hindus from different provinces used to gather there during religious festivals like Baisakhi and Guru Purnima. In the 1970s, the members of the community even decided to buy some more land attached to the shrine, as there was often not enough space to accommodate visitors. As an Afghan we enjoyed all the rights of the land. Be it the right to employment, social security or property. There are instances of many claiming and getting back their properties in Kabul after they went back after 20/25 years in exile post 2002.48 Professor Harjot Oberoi, a noted Sikh scholar at the University of British Columbia, with a long-standing interest in Afghanistan found an account of a traveller who visited Kabul in the 1940s. That account suggested that at that time Afghanistan supported as much as a quarter of a million Sikhs and Hindus spread across the length and breadth of the country, as well as confirming that Sikhs and Hindus controlled a great deal of long-distance trade within Afghanistan as well as across its borders.49 Taking pride in his past, Shri Khajinder Singh Khurrana,50 the secretary Afghan-Sikh and Hindu Welfare Society in India, stated: It was not for no reason that these two communities of Afghanistan were called ‘the backbone of Afghanistan’s economy’. One cannot give a generalized statement for entire community, but it is true that most of our people were into trade, businesses or banking and were quite well to do. The status of Hindus and Sikhs improved substantially in the post-World War II period and the political stability in the country enabled them to expand their businesses; many ventured into commercial and banking sectors to the extent that at one point, Hindus and Sikhs were in charge of banking activities in the country and a number had operated currency exchange centres in major cities that facilitated the operation of informal value transfer systems known as Hawala.51 A typical locality in Kabul as described by the people who were being raised in places such as khair khana or Karta-e Parwan in the 1970s would

Stages of ‘refugee’ lives  77 have a market place, a few butcher shops (without any refrigerators) and a few stationary shops selling basic items like milk powder, biscuits, sugar, salt and a few other basic items. The markets like the houses of the locality were mostly single-storied mud building. The relatively well-off section of the city also lived mostly in mud houses. The most well-off segment lived in primarily three areas of Kabul city, namely the Microroyan housing estate, Wazir Akbar Khan locality and Shar-e-Naw (new city). Life was very simple. The idea of family outing would mean going to a park with family along with home-cooked food. Idea of entertainment was the one movie that would be shown each Thursday night after the news telecast. Since there would be frequent power cuts, one would pray that at least during that time of the week the electricity does not betray us. Even the rich living in the so-called posh localities could not afford a generator in those days to tackle the problem of shortage of electricity supply. The gap between rich and poor was less.52 Some of the persons interviewed also mentioned about Gudiparanbazi or ‘kite fighting’ and ‘pigeon capturing’ as ways of passing free time in those days in addition to music and movies. Young boys used to stand on their rooftops, one controlling the kite and charkha geer – the other letting up the strings covered with crushed glass. With their kites high up in the sky above the city, they used to fight with other boys on other rooftops in an attempt to cut the strings of their kite. If a kite was expensive and attractive, young boys would run behind it to claim it and from that came the term ‘kite runner’. Pigeon capturing was another favourite pastime where people used to capture other people’s pigeons and the person who lost his bird would often go to buy his own pigeon back from the capturer. Sometimes, people used to make money from that sport. Both these forms of entertainment were banned during the Taleban period. Even in the pre-conflict years, Afghanistan was not an industrialized country. Export and import of the goods was the main trade and in most cases, they were big traders. One respondent observed: After coming to India I saw people use the term ‘trader’ for even small shop owners. In Afghanistan that was not the case. The people who were into big businesses, buying and selling goods in several countries were only called traders. They were extremely prosperous. Most had their own property (sometimes multiple properties) in Afghanistan. The moderate businesses comprised of majorly three things: 1. Textile 2. Ration shops and 3. Stationary stores.53 Hindus and Sikhs bear some physical resemblance to Pashtun residents and largely adapted to the local culture. Unlike Hindus, the Sikhs were distinguishable from others in outward appearance; however, there was a

78  Stages of ‘refugee’ lives substantial population of Sahajdhari54 Sikh in the Khost province of Afghanistan that shares borders with Pakistan. Unlike most other Afghans living in India, the members of this community of Afghanistan communicate entirely in Pashtu (as opposed to Dari or Punjabi) language and cling on to the lifestyle and Pashtun traditions that they used to follow in Afghanistan. Although Hindus and Sikhs have been in Afghanistan for decades and played a significant role in the social and cultural lives of the country, local Muslim communities often regarded them as aliens and associated them with the Hindus and Sikhs in Hindustan – India. Emadi writes, Islam recognizes non-Muslims, Jews and Christians as ‘People of the Book’ and treats them favourably; however, it discriminates against Hindus and Sikhs and does not recognize their scriptures, the Vedas and Shri Guru Granth also known as the Adi Granth, to be as divine as Torah and Bible.55 This view of Islam according to the author formed the basis of public perception with regard to Hindu and Sikh residents of the country. Majority of the people in the urban centres, especially the educated and enlightened segments of the Afghan-Muslim population, practised the traditional Islamic beliefs, such as living peacefully with their neighbours and tolerating other religions and practices. Most people also have had a positive image of India because of the friendly history it shares with ­A fghanistan. Moreover, Afghans have been huge admirers of Indian movies, music and stars as they had access to these films even in the pre-­conflict times. Therefore, associating the Sikhs and Hindus with India, ideally, should not have brought a negative connotation to the dynamics and in most cases this association was seen in a positive light in urban centres; however, the experiences of minority communities living in rural Afghanistan were different. While growing up in a village in Kandahar province, I felt discriminated because of my religion quite often. Remember, this is not the Kandahar that people associate with Taleban. This was much before many of these dreaded Talebs were born! The people there were neither educated nor enlightened and at certain occasions one did feel being treated like a second class citizen.56 Wealth commands certain amount of respect, in any society. The experiences of affluent Afghan Sikhs and Hindus should not therefore be seen as a standard experience of all the members of these communities in Afghanistan. As a middle class Sikh boy growing up in Kabul, I have experienced both positive and negative reactions from people- Haath ke Paanch Ungliyan ek jaisi nehi hoti hain, yeh to insaan hain (all five fingers of the hand are not alike, and these are individuals in a society) – this was not surprising.57 Muslim boys often harassed and bullied Hindus and Sikhs and whenever they encountered them on the street, they would insult them sarcastically shouting: ‘Kalima at ra bikhan’ meaning recite the confession of your faith.

Stages of ‘refugee’ lives  79 Confession of faith for Muslims reads: ‘There is no God but God and Muhammad is the messenger of God’.58 Majority of the Afghan ‘refugees’ living in India today have had acquired their education in their home country. Majority of the members of the minority communities used to take education both from Maqtabs and the Khalsa School run by the Gurudwara simultaneously. Mostly, people who have had experiences of living in rural parts of Afghanistan cited experiences of discrimination. Even people who came from Kabul said that they were aware of certain unpleasant incidents about the experiences of their counterparts in rural centres. However, it should be mentioned that nowhere during the course of the interviews did the respondents express that those negative attitudes to be the standard behaviours of the Muslims at large. Even if some people teased us by calling us ‘Hindu infidel’ there was love in that. Here (in India) people may call us Sardarji, but they have hatred in their hearts.59 They did share some incidents where they might have felt discriminated but also specified that those were ‘not the norm’. Mostly, the respondents shared the positive memories and experiences of their times in Afghanistan. Educated and enlightened people in particular treated them with lot of respect and dignity and often addressed them as Lala Hindu or Lala Jan. Lala is a very polite way of addressing somebody, like ‘dear brother’. The Muslims would call us by the name Lala Hindu. They did not understand the difference between Hinduism and Sikhism, for them both Hindus and Sikhs of Afghanistan were Lala Hindu.60 Mohinder Singh felt that the term ‘Sardarji’ became popular ‘after 1984’. By that, he meant the riot that followed after the assassination of Indian Prime Minister Mrs. Indira Gandhi by her Sikh security guard. According to him, Afghan Sikhs were shaken by Operation Blue Star conducted under the order of Mrs. Gandhi, which allowed Indian army to rampage the Golden Temple in Amritsar, the most important pilgrimage place for the Sikhs in the world. ‘Many could never forgive India for that action and chose not to take refuge there and went to the West instead’.61 Some respondents spoke of attending public schools while some from the Afghan-Sikh and -Hindu communities have shared their experiences of attending both Maqtabs and Gurudwara-run schools at the same time. We learnt Gurbani at the Khalsa School run by Gurudwara. At the same time we also went to the Maqtab Baihaki in Shorbazar and learnt other subjects like Mathematics, Geography etc….they had classes for reading Quran, but the teachers at the Maqtabs asked us to wait outside. We were never forced to attend those classes.62

80  Stages of ‘refugee’ lives Another interesting feature about the pre-conflict lives of the people in ­Afghanistan were their experiences of serving the national army. Once an ­Afghan was 18 years of age, he was supposed to serve in the army for three years. The citizens of Afghanistan had Taskara (ID Card) which had their age on it. After those three years, they got the Tarkhis, letter stating the end of contract, which meant after that they had freedom to do whatever they wished. Although the Sikhs and Hindus were drafted in the army as regular soldiers, they were initially not allowed to attend military schools or become army officers. The situation changed in 1955 after Pahan Shikharpuri, a high school graduate, lobbied successfully for the rights of Hindus and Sikhs serving in the army to become officers – a struggle that paved the way for others to attend military schools and become officers. Pawan himself was appointed a commissioned officer in the army.63 Some of the respondents from ­middle-class backgrounds said that even in the late 1980s and 1990s, the recruits to army from minority communities were only used for works such as constructions or even cleaning of areas, as opposed to real training of soldiers. Some of the Afghans belonging to the Christian community, who are currently living in India, shared their experiences of growing up in rural areas of Ghazni province. Though Ghazni was an adjoining province to the capital. We were pretty much cut off from the modernizing trends of the urban centre. The people in my village were primarily farmers, education for us mostly meant going to the madrasas. The Mullah or the priest at the village mosque was very powerful and a respected man. Women were not allowed to go to school, they learnt the usual household chores and were married off very early.64 The condition of women in Kabul, especially belonging to educated families, was significantly different. Women were making important contributions in national development. According to reports, in 1977, women comprised over 15% of Afghanistan’s highest legislative body. It is estimated that by early 1990s, 70% of school teachers, 50% of government workers and university students and 40% of the doctors in Kabul were women.65 As early as the 1960s, the Afghan constitution had provided equal rights to woman but this ‘equality’ was never really achieved. Moreover, the condition of a section of women was never reflective of the situation of women of Afghanistan at large. The female respondents from the minority communities said that they were required to wear chadar, and cover their heads in public space. Women only interacted with the women of their or other communities. Going to the religious worship places like the Gurudwaras and temples in groups especially during festivals was common. There was tremendous amount of cooperation and coordination within the members of our communities. I do not know if this was because we

Stages of ‘refugee’ lives  81 were religious minorities, but I noticed that in case of any problem, the community would be by ones side to give him support and protection. They not only lived near each other but they were really close to each.66 Kishan, who left Afghanistan as a boy of 11, observed that it was perhaps natural that these communities bonded together because they lived in a Muslim country where they were minorities. ‘Staying together may have meant safety’. When there was danger from ‘outside’, because our people were united, one could counter those. One strand of string that bound them together in Afghanistan was the physical space they inhabited that buffered them from the larger society; a second strand was relational closeness.67 Although Afghanistan has long enjoyed the benefits – and not infrequently suffered because of its location – it has rarely been a prosperous country on its own right. Nevertheless, it enjoyed considerable degree of stability during the reign of Zahir Shah (1922–1973) and made substantial economic progress during the 1950s and 1960s, during which the regime was very successful in promoting rivalry between Russian and American efforts to implement development projects throughout the country.68 Given that the Hindus and Sikhs for the most part were thriving economically and had a sizable presence, it was seen that during constitutional monarchy (1964–1973), various political parties like the pro-Soviet Hizb-e-­Damokratike-Khalq-e-Afghanistan, People’s Democratic Party of Afghanistan (PDPA), Sazman-e-Jawanan-e Muttaraqi, Prograssive Youth Organization, among others strove to influence Hindus and Sikhs to support their policies. During 1965 elections, the PDPA candidates – Babrak Karmal, Anahita Ratebzad and Noor Ahmad Noor – visited Hindu and Sikh communities, promising to defend their rights in exchange of votes. At the parliamentary elections in 1969, Hindus and Sikhs nominated candidates from their own communities, Dahoon Chand Kagar and Jai Singh Fani; Fani succeeded in winning the election.69 Jai Singh Fani’s nephew, who is currently based in India, recalled that day nostalgically: ‘Not only was it a great moment for the family but for the community at large. The king had promised to him that he will make him a Minister in the Cabinet but unfortunately my uncle died soon after’.70 Hardit Singh Nagpal, was in his youth during those election said ‘I remember campaigning for him day and night for months. We just knew that we have to make him win and when he ultimately did, our joy and happiness knew no bounds. I still get goose bumps remembering those times in Kabul’.71 When the monarchy was overthrown in a coup by former Prime Minister Mohammad Daoud Khan in July 1973 and Afghanistan was declared a Republic, the status of the minorities remained unchanged. To create legitimacy for the regime, Daoud convened a Loya Jirga and named it Milli

82  Stages of ‘refugee’ lives Jirgah (National Assembly) in 1977, to approve the draft of a new constitution. That Jirgah also had representatives from Hindu and Sikh communities. When the republican regime was overthrown in another coup organized by pro-Soviet army office loyal to PDPA in April 1978, Afghanistan was declared a democratic republic; this ushered an era of Soviet occupation in the country – an era that had far-reaching consequences not only for Afghanistan but the world at large.

The Soviet intervention in Afghanistan and the run-up to the conflict Soviet invasion, Afghanistan ke liye Zakhm-e-Nasoor sabit hua.72 (Soviet invasion proved to be cancerous for Afghanistan) In the 1970s, Afghanistan became a focal point for superpower rivalry. Close to the Persian Gulf’s oil and the Indian Ocean ports and sharing the northern border with the Muslims of Soviet Central Asian Republics to Moscow, a friendly Afghanistan was vital. With the political instability and upheaval that began in the late 1970s, Afghanistan descended into a pattern of conflict, instability and chaos that has continued through the present. By late 1970s, Daoud Khan’s reforms were faltering and the dissatisfaction attached to those developments paved way for the growth of national communist parties, which looked to the Soviet Union for support. The leaders of left-wing regime that succeeded Daoud, both Nur Mohammad Taraki and Hafizullah Amin, employed suppression and violence – including mass arrests, torture and summary executions – to implement socialist reforms.73 Many well-­educated Afghans, landed elites and religious leaders became the targets of the new regime, forcing them to flee their country. These flights out of one’s own country, to gain immunity against the hostile communist regime, paved way for the initial wave of migration out of Afghanistan. The left-wing regime set about reforming Afghanistan by decree. However, decisions like replacement of green flag with the red one and government’s agenda of equal rights and education for women, national language status for Uzbeks, Turkmen, Balochi and Nuristani, credit reforms and land distribution struck at the very root in the socio-economic structure of Afghanistan’s rural society.74 In the countryside, the drastic reforms were not seen positively as they were threatening their traditional customs. Amin realized that the situation at the countryside has gone beyond his control. Besides, the size of Afghan armed forces on which he was so dependent was also cut off into half. He therefore sent his request to Moscow for sending Soviet troops to bring situation under control after mobs massacred Soviet advisors and their families in Herat province.75 Kabul’s request for more Soviet troops moved up the agenda in Moscow. According to the former Deputy Head of KGB (Russian Intelligence Agency), Vladimir Kruichkov, Moscow felt that if they did not go to Afghanistan, some other country

Stages of ‘refugee’ lives  83 would and the interventions of these states could destabilize situation on the Soviet-Afghan border and the region as a whole.76 Although hesitant initially, the politburo took its fateful decision by December 25th 1979, when tens and thousands of men of the Red Army crossed the Afghan border on trucks and tanks. Moscow hoped of accomplishing their mission within weeks. KGB special forces stormed Amin’s residence and shot him dead and replaced him with Babrak Karmal. Since the Cold War started, this was for the first time that Soviet army intervened in a country beyond the borders of the Warsaw Pact. With the decision of intervening in Afghanistan, they were stepping across the line. These developments sparked resistance from Islamic factions, who would later become known as the Mujahideen (the soldiers of God), which ignited the country in a series of violent uprisings in the spring of 1979. From the late 1979 till February 1989, the Soviet military forces remained in Afghanistan, a period that was marked by fierce resistance from the Mujahideen groups. Though many factions were loosely aligned at various points during the conflict, the Mujahideen was never a unified movement. Mujahideen groups were largely fragmented, often determined by ethnic, religious and tribal links and diverse in terms of both size and capability. According to a CNN Documentary, the resistance groups started getting covert American aid in July 1979, initially in the form of communications equipment.77 The Mujahideen groups mostly took shelter in the villages and lunched attacks from there, placing civilians directly under crossfire. These Mujahideen groups were mainly financed and equipped by the United States of America (USA), the various Gulf countries and the Pakistani Intelligence Agency, ISI as well as by China and Iran in their Jihad (religious war) against the Godless Communists. In an attempt to kill or capture Mujahideen fighters and drive civilians out of villages where they took shelter, Soviet and government forces employed brutal tactics that were not only direct violations of international law but, it has been argued, also genocidal in nature.78 For some of the respondents hailing from the rural areas of Afghanistan, the initial migration meant leaving their home and moving to the bigger cities, which till then was relatively peaceful. Most of the young men in our village were by then fighting for Mujahideen groups. I was very small but remember the day, my family fled to Kabul. My father thought we would come back once the situation got little better.79 One day, the Russians started attacks by land and air, with 15 or 20 airplanes that were meant to bomb the Mujahideen hiding in our village. About 40 innocent elders, women and children were killed and the Russians took away 35 people, who are still missing.80 Though initial Soviet troop presence was light, the Soviets were drawn further into the conflict by the growing resistance movement. While Afghan

84  Stages of ‘refugee’ lives government and Soviet forces retained control of most cities, Mujahideen factions waged a guerrilla war in rural areas. This meant that major urban areas, such as Kabul, were relatively unscathed, while contested rural areas bore the brunt of the conflict.81 One of the respondents who lived in Kabul spoke about the overt dependence on Soviet Union for even the things of basic necessities. In Kabul there used to be Coupon Shops and the people used to lineup for food subsidies. Items like wheat, flour, sugar and even luxury items like shaving cream were found in subsidized price. One could feel overt dependence on Soviet Union.82 During the initial years of Communist government women were more visible in Kabul. They were getting educated, becoming professionals. I also remember many youths during those days (especially those whose families were in the good book of the government) were going to Russia for higher education and trainings. At the same time, those who were opposed to the leftwing ideology were imprisoned and tortured.83 For a decade, Soviet troops remained bogged down in Afghanistan. Bombings were often indiscriminate, with between 800 and 1,000 civilians reported to have been killed in a single day in one district of Faryab province.84 Over half of the country’s irrigation systems were destroyed and agricultural production even on cultivatable lands fell sharply due to displacement and other factors.85 During the conflict, over five million – nearly a fifth of the p ­ opulation – fled to Pakistan or Iran and two million were displaced within the country.86 Millions of Afghans were estimated to have been killed and disabled in the process. Though no accurate counts exist of those who have disappeared, many Afghans still do not know what happened to their family members. During the Communist period, the Russians put a check point on our land and we couldn’t cultivate. After years, the land turned into forest and we lost our livelihood. My father and the rest of my family had to leave home and shift to places were there was less fighting and I went to Iran in search of work.87 Some of the members of the Sikh and Hindu communities who were living in Kabul in that period stated that although members of these communities had relatively good relations with the political dispensation in Kabul, yet because of the repressive policies of socio-economic and political reforms many of the wealthy aristocratic families had to leave the country, including a number of prominent Hindus and Sikhs. For the residents of Kabul, military truck and tank on the streets of their cities became quite common in those days. On my way back from school, I would notice a number military trucks carrying soldiers from one place to another. Before this period, I don’t think I saw so many men in uniform in and around my city. Although

Stages of ‘refugee’ lives  85 life in Kabul continued quite ‘normally’ (or may be I was too young to understand what was happening), yet I could feel tension in the atmosphere.88 The road from Kabul to Jalalabad road was damaged extensively specially because of the road side attacks on the Russian tanks and convoys by the Mujahideen. Therefore it often took one entire day for people to cover the distance between these two places which normally could be covered in three hours.89 As their casualties mounted and domestic opinion turned against the war, the Soviets began planning for withdrawal. It was the Geneva Accords of 1988, which finally resulted in the withdrawal of the Soviet forces in 1989. On the whole, the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan demoralized the S ­ oviet people and the army, ridiculed the Soviet armed forces, drained ­Soviet treasury and caused great diplomatic damage and undermined the  ­Soviet ­leader’s confidence in their own Marxist–Leninist ideology. For the A ­ fghans, it meant ‘the defeat of the state of Afghanistan’.90 With Soviet withdrawal, Dr. Najibullah Ahmedzai, the former director of intelligence who took over in 1986, remained in control. Though he managed to retain his grip on power for several more years to the surprise of many observers, Najibullah became increasingly reliant on pro-government militias for support and on continuing Russian aid to purchase their loyalty. William Maley91 identifies certain factors that accounted for President ­Najibullah’s survival, the foremost being continued Soviet assistance. Soviet food and arm supply was necessary and that continued for some more time. Resource supply from USSR, together with the printing of more Afghan money, gave the regime more scope to buy off influential sections of Mujahideen commanders. Additionally, it altered certain policies whereby they decided to go back to more traditional patterns of power and also gave up the revolutionary rhetoric. Although there were occasional missile attacks from areas outside Kabul, but overall Najibullah’s period saw relative security. But what I remember distinctly about that period was the abject amount of poverty. Waiting for hours in a queue for just a loaf of bread or brutal fights among common people for a bottle of milk to feed their children, was as bad as the violent conflict phase according to me.92 In March 1992, Najibullah agreed to step down once an interim government was formed. This drove once loyal militias switched sides and provoked rebellions led primarily by Uzbek and Tajik commanders from the north allied with Mujahideen commander Ahmad Shah Massoud of the Islamic Society, a predominantly Tajik faction headed by Burhannudin Rabbani. The Najibullah government finally collapsed one month later, in April 1992 and paved way for phase that was marked by high-intensity conflict in Afghanistan.93

86  Stages of ‘refugee’ lives

Phases of high-intensity conflict in Afghanistan Life during the Mujahideen and Taleban periods Conflict has been an integral part of Afghanistan’s contemporary history and was of extremely high intensity especially between the years 1992 and 1996, so much so that this phase is often referred to as a period of ‘civil war’ wherein different Mujahideen factions, aided by different regional countries, were engaged in a brutal battle for control of the country. There have been debates and discussions on the appropriateness of usage of the term ‘civil war’, but that is beyond the scope of the current discussion. Since it is a term widely used to denote the conflict in Afghanistan, this chapter uses it. In 1992, with the UN help, a provisional government was formed with the fragile support of major Mujahideen factions and a rotating presidency was agreed upon with Sibghatullah Mojadeddi, leader of the Afghan National Liberation Front, occupying the first rotation to be succeeded by Burhannudin Rabbani (a Tajik and leader of Jamiat-i-Islami). For the first time in its history, Afghanistan was formally declared an Islamic state in April 1992 which paved the way for realization of proclaimed common aim of Mujahideen parties, i.e. establishment of an Islamic system of government. The new Islamic government declared Shari’a law, including severe restrictions on women, but could do little else with its weak power base and limited territorial control, holding few areas of the countryside and only parts of the capital.94 In the meantime, sections of Kabul under the government control were rocketed by Gulbuddin Hekmatyar, the leader of Hezb-e Islami faction, who refused to be part of the new government. With Rabbani refusing to step down in December 1992, the Mujahideen factions previously allied with the government mutinied and whatever ‘unity’ had been established between the commanders quickly tattered and that paved way to an eruption of civil war in the country. It featured fierce fighting over Kabul – occupied by Ahmed Shah Massoud (the Defence Minister of Rabbani government) but desired by Hekmatyar, his arch rival – and in some other major cities, which to that point had escaped most active combat. From April 1992 to April 1993, much of Kabul was destroyed and 30,000 inhabitants were killed, with another 100,000 wounded.95 The country disintegrated into chaos. I vividly remember the day, Mujahideen entered Kabul! It was a normal Thursday evening and we were watching Dil Hai ke Manta Nehi – a Romantic Bollywood movie. Suddenly, in middle of the movie, new bites started appearing. We were so angry and disgusted that we switched of the television without even listening. My father scolded us and asked us to play the news and there we heard for the first time about the Mujahideen takeover of Kabul. There was pin drop silence in that room!96

Stages of ‘refugee’ lives  87 When the Soviets left, Mujahideen lost a common enemy whom they could fight against, so they started to fight among themselves in pursuit of more power. They turned Afghanistan in to a wasteland. Kabul was not destroyed by Soviets, it was Afghans who destroyed it.97 Emphasizing the role played by external actors in this endless conflict, a Dawn editorial wrote: Meddlesome political elements in Pakistan, interest groups in Iran and the authorities in Tashkent and Ashgabat have been blatantly support­ fghanistan. ing and encouraging their own protégés in the war in A What is most worrying is that ethnicity; sectarianism and lust for power rather than national interest have come to determine the loyalties and policies of various factions. That would explain how the hard-line ­Islamist ­Gulbuddin Hekhmatyar and the erstwhile Communist Commander General Rashid Dostum, who would normally be antagonistic towards each other had lined up against President Rabbani and his allies. The first is a Pashtun and latter an Uzbek. Their backers in ­Pakistan and ­Uzbekistan helped them overthrow the Tajik rule of ­Rabbani and his commander Ahmad Shah Massoud. Neighbouring Turkmenistan, which was wary of Uzbek ambitions, was backing yet another guerilla leader, Ismael Khan, who was based in Herat. He had been fighting alongside Rabbani’s men against Dostum to wrest control of the ­A fghan provinces bordering Turkmenistan. Another complicating factor is the impact of the ethnic feuds in Tajikistan, Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan on course of the war in Afghanistan.98 What is shameful about this conflict was that, these people were not fighting for any ideology. They were butchering common people to satisfy their hunger for more power and control.99 As agreements broke down and territory changed hands through violence, local population was subjected to retaliatory punishments by victorious forces.100 The struggle for control of Kabul, which included bloody street battles and random rocketing, left hundreds, if not thousands, dead or wounded.101 Human rights violations, including executions, abduction, imprisonment, sexual violence and other forms of torture, were committed by all factions. The death toll is difficult to determine but by one estimate, 10,000 individuals were killed in 1993 alone.102 The situation in the post-­Soviet withdrawal era was witness to deaths and injuries of Afghans and the destruction in Afghanistan in the first four months of 1994 was considered to be worse than what the country had suffered during the years of Soviet occupation.103 More than 60% of the respondents interviewed during the course of this research had been displaced from Afghanistan after the civil war started in 1992. During this period, the common residents of Kabul were the worst affected. As mentioned by many of them, before the commanders started

88  Stages of ‘refugee’ lives fighting for the control of Kabul, the city had remained relatively peaceful even while fierce battle was going on in the rural areas. Since most of the interviewees hailed from urban areas, till 1992 they did not feel the real heat of what was happening in the country. Most of them identified that from early 1992, things started worsening particularly in Kabul. Like most others, I continued to work in my shop at the Shazada Market while fighting between the Mujahideen was on. Even though things were getting very difficult, I was hoping that all this fighting would stop soon and we will be able to continue with our lives. Fleeing one’s own country/home is by far the toughest decision…but one day a rocket fell inside the market, where I had my shop. Around forty people were killed. I saw dead bodies of my friends scattered everywhere. I was too scared to live in Kabul.104 We were hoping and praying that we do not have to leave Afghanistan. People started leaving in large numbers from 1989/1990. We left in November 1993, we were among the last to leave.105 My father was kidnapped in Jalalabad. The kidnappers asked us to sell our big house and pay ransom for his release. We did that and immediately after his release fled to Pakistan.106 Unable to agree on power-sharing, these groups continued fighting with one another – a war that recognized no role of engagement as combatants took men and women of rival groups and innocent civilian hostages, raping, molesting and mutilating their bodies. As the ideal of ethnic cleansing raged throughout the country, the situation of the non-Muslim minorities became more vulnerable.107 As one of the above-mentioned accounts suggests, people did not think of leaving Afghanistan immediately after the conflict reached Kabul. Religious minorities, especially the Sikhs and Hindus, thought that they would not be attacked as they maintained their neutrality and were not part of any warring factions in particular.108 The period that followed subsequently proved the fatality of that decision. Hindu and Sikh religious centres, Gurudwaras and Mandirs, were either destroyed during the civil strife or were seized by powerful and armed men.109 Since the Sikhs and Hindus mostly belonged trading communities, they were relatively prosperous as a result they in most cases became prey to kidnappings for ransom. Many residents of Karta-e-Parwan (a locality in Kabul, which was mostly inhabited by Sikhs and Hindus) had experienced that.110 During civil war, Ahmad Shah Massoud occupied Gurudwara Guru Har Rai Sahib in the old town and General Dostum of Junbish-i-Milli occupied Bala Hisar on top of the hill. Both these factions fought against each other while the Gurudwara acted as a barricade. Missiles were thrown by targeting our Gurudwara and therefore it sustained huge damages. Even today when I think that our shrine was used as a barricade by those killers, I shake in anger.111

Stages of ‘refugee’ lives  89 Mr. Pritpal Singh, a journalist and television presenter from United Kingdom, was one of the thousands of Afghan Sikhs who fled Afghanistan at the peak of conflict. He later went back to his homeland after two decades in exile to trace the heritage of his community and made a documentary titled, ‘Mission Afghanistan’. While speaking about those times, he mentioned that in Afghanistan, Gurudwaras often used to have guesthouses inside their premises. During civil, there were many people of the minority communities, especially the ones who were poor, lost their homes in the conflict and thus took refuge there. Firstly, they felt that Gurudwaras and Mandirs will be safer; secondly, there will be community members protecting each other and comforting those suffering from the trauma of the war. Most of the time those places were to small to accommodate the huge number of people who took refuge in them, let alone other amenities, there were not enough toilets. Yet they were there – what other option did they have in any case?112 While speaking to the conflict-displaced Afghans currently living in India, it became clear that those who could afford or could arrange some money decided to leave Afghanistan. They often made the point that the problems they were facing at that time were nothing exclusive. Afghans, irrespective of their religion, ethnicity and socio-economic background, were suffering. As one respondent aptly observed: The bombs and missiles did not distinguish between ethnicities, religion and gender. Because of the conflicts in Afghanistan, every Afghan suffered and their future generations continue to suffer even now…as we speak.113 Hafizullah Emadi wrote that warlords associated with Islamic parties brutalized the religious minorities, looted their belongings, molested their wives and daughters and after forcing them to embrace their faith forced them against their will to marry them.114 When probed, most of the people belonging to those communities said that they did not feel they were being treated differently by the Mujahideens, nor were their situation significantly different from any other Afghan; however, they did mention that they themselves thought that if the Mujahideens were not showing any mercy to Muslims, what accountably could they have for others. None of the respondents interviewed for this study mentioned (or knew) anybody within their community, who was forced to convert to Islam during this conflict phase. However, they did mention that such incidents were not implausible. Some of those living in the rural areas have been pressurized to fight for the Mujahideen groups like any other youth of village but I do not remember hearing instances of forced conversion to Islam. But under those conditions, it was not something that was impossible.115

90  Stages of ‘refugee’ lives The vivid description of conditions in Afghanistan during the conflict phase and the indignities people were subjected to, the mental trauma, physical injuries, not only conveyed the extent of their suffering, but also repeatedly made the point that their departure from Afghanistan was a result of conflict and war and not voluntary migration. As the grip of the Islamists tightened, Afghanistan became more and more dangerous for the people of the minority religious groups. The abduction of women, sexual violence and forced marriages increased significantly. Rape of women and girls appears to have been condoned by militia leaders as a weapon of war, to further terrorize civilian populations, as well as a way of ‘rewarding’ fighters.116 As a result, attacking women or dishonouring women of the opponent faction by the Mujahideen groups had become rampant in those days. Because protecting the honour of the women had been at the epicentre of Afghan culture, the attack on the same would have created a tremendous effect. Therefore, the different warring factions attacked the women of the opponent groups, molested and raped them. Many of the interviewees shared knowing or hearing about incidents, where women and even young children were violated by men of opponent camps. Many women killed themselves just to protect their honour. We knew of a family living in Microroyan housing estate. They had three daughters. Within few days of our escape to Pakistan, we got to know that a Mujahideen group attacked our housing. To protect themselves from being raped by those men, two of the girls from that family jumped from their top floor balconies and they died immediately.117 In Mujahideen-controlled areas, girls were often forbidden from attending school and women from working outside the home. In contested areas, the threat of sexual violence or ‘dishonour’ by the Mujahideen caused many families to keep their girls away from school and to marry them at younger ages for the sake of ‘protection’.118 On August 27, 1993, the Government Office of Research and Decrees of the Supreme Court issued an order that all government departments must lay off female employees from their position and close down schools and educational centres for women and girls, declaring such centres as whorehouses, promoting adultery and sexual promiscuity and issuing a rigid code of conduct for women. Situation was such that going out of house had become impossible for them.119 The guidelines for women read as follows: Women need not leave their homes at all, unless absolutely necessary, in which case, they are to cover themselves completely. They are not to wear attractive clothing and decorative accessories; do not wear perfumes, their jewelry must not make noise; they are not to walk gracefully or with pride and in the middle of the side walk, are not to talk to strangers, are not to speak loudly or laugh in public; and they must always ask their husbands’ permission to leave home.120

Stages of ‘refugee’ lives  91 With these guidelines, the women of the religious minorities felt even more vulnerable and started living under tremendous fear. They witnessed that their men were being terrorized by the militants, demanding money as they moved from location to location seeking safety or while visiting relatives, running errand and going to markets to buy groceries. The discussion in the house would revolve around incidents of attacks, death, rapes of women or about instances of people fleeing Afghanistan. We used to feel, if they are not sparing Muslim women what will they do with us?121 The number of Afghans imprisoned during this period is similarly hard to quantify but a 1995 Amnesty International report states that ‘thousands’ of individuals were abducted and few were heard from again.122 In the absence of national government, basic services broke down and infrastructure all but collapsed: by 1994, approximately 60% of schools had no building.123 The absence of regular salaries for most fighting forces meant that they relied on predatory tactics such as ‘taxes’ levied at checkpoints, robbery and varying forms of organized, and often disorganized, crime.124 The Mujahideen who were seen as heroes by Afghans during the Soviet occupation became the most dreaded people during this phase. Poor people suffered the most because they could not escape. Their sons were killed fighting with the Mujahideen and the rest of the family had to live under rocket attacks. Only people with money were able to go to a more secure place.125 The Islamic warriors fought a bitter war that destroyed the country’s infrastructure and claimed lives of thousands of people, pitting Shias against Sunnis and one ethnic group against another. Not a single ethnic group could claim that it did not have a role in the destruction and murder of innocent people, including the murder and torture of members of its own ethnic community. Emadi observed that all ethnic groups – Pashtuns, Tajiks, Hazaras, Uzbeks and others – were equally responsible for the war and the violation of human rights, although many intellectuals tried to exonerate their own ethnic communities and blame others for the brutal war and ethnic cleaning.126 Perhaps the religious minority communities of Afghanistan such as ­Hindus and Sikhs had been the ones who had to pay the price of conflict without being responsible for the creation of the same. Nonetheless, political repression and religious bigotry convinced many to flee the country leaving their ruined properties, businesses and livelihoods in order to escape reprisals by Islamic warriors. The condition of the religious minorities became particularly vulnerable in December 1992, as a response to demolition of Babri Mosque in Ayodhya (India).127 In retaliation of what happened there, the I­ slamic fundamentalists brutalized Hindu and Sikh nationals of

92  Stages of ‘refugee’ lives Afghanistan, destroying their temples and looting their contents. Since then, the community was gradually deprived of their basic rights and liberties. After the Soviet withdrawal, an estimated 1.2 million Afghans returned from Pakistan alone with the hope of being able to live in peace. But millions were soon forced to flee. The Mujahideen leaders demonstrated a disquieting low level of their commitment to peace and the well-being of civilians who lived in a constant state of fear and suffering.128 By 1994, more than a million Afghans were living in Pakistan and just under a million in Iran.129 For the religious minorities however, the mass exodus took them to India. The UN Special Peace Mission headed by Ambassador Mahmoud Mastiri failed to bring the warring factions to the negotiating table in September 1994. Hence, they lost their credibility and further injured a nation that had lost too many and suffered so much for their personal, ideological and ethnic ambitions. Thus, the cycle of violence and the massive mobilization of the nation in an unclear direction with no popular leadership continued.130

Afghanistan under the Taleban regime Till 1993, the Taleban, a relatively unfamiliar Pashtun movement based in Kandahar, began to acquire strength and influence. They vowed to put an end to the violence and establish order, swiftly administering harsh punishments to alleged criminals and eliminating checkpoints. Drawing their fighting forces primarily from a young, uneducated, male refugee population in Pakistan and with financial and technical support from the Government of Pakistan, they seized control of Kandahar in November 1994.131 A team of journalists who had interviewed a cross section of people inside Afghanistan expressed their satisfaction at the taking over of the administration of the Kandahar province by the Talebs who became ‘saviours’ for them.132 After taking over Kandahar in the south, they pushed drug traffickers out of Helmand next door and captured the more noteworthy towns of Zabul and Ghazni. By September 1995, the Taleban gained control over most of eastern, western and southern provinces and eventually seized Kabul the following year. More and more Afghans joined the Taleban movement with the twin slogans of ridding their country of death and destruction and of enforcing the ­Sharia. Initially, they were welcomed by the inhabitants of the conflict-torn rural belts, towns and cities. They soon got support from some local commanders. However, very soon these madrasa students began flying aircrafts and bombing rival forces stronghold. Neamatollah Nojumi133 traced close links of the Taleban movement to Pakistan and rightly argued that the absence of a nationally accepted leadership allowed the Taleban to emerge strongly and aggressively. Although Islamabad kept issuing statements denying its link to Taleban and terming the movement at an indigenous movement of the Taleb, yet it was becoming obvious that without the logistical

Stages of ‘refugee’ lives  93 and military support of the Pakistani intelligence and army, it would not have been possible for the Talebs to gain military victory in almost 90% of Afghan territory.134 The emergence of the Taleban on October 1994 attracted media attention not because of their remarkable success in capturing a large area in a very short time, but because of their strict enforcement of dress codes and denial of access to education and employment to women.135 Commenting on their general aversion to progress and modernity, the French scholar Oliver Roy noted: The men who formed the original core of the Taleban had learned and imparted a version of Islam that differed significantly from other fundamentalists . . .[The] Madrassa education instilled in Pakistan focused on returning Afghan society to an imagined premodern period in which a purer form of Islam was practised by a more righteous Muslim society. This made the Taleban approach to governance somewhat utopian in its attempt to battle the enemies of modernity and non-orthodoxy.136 Since the capture of Kabul on September 26, 1996, the Taleban government issued a series of edicts based on their interpretation of Sharia. Education for girls was abolished. Women were banned from work, aside from female health workers, and were not allowed to leave home without a male escort and a full-length burqa. The wars had created tens of thousands of widows; yet, they were subject to the same draconian laws and many were reliant on assistance from international agencies or reduced to begging on the streets. The impact on women, particularly in urban areas, was severe: 81% of women surveyed in Kabul reported a decline in their mental condition, 42% met the conditions for post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) and 21% said that they ‘quite often’ or ‘very often’ had suicidal thoughts.137 During the Taleban period, our life was bad. As a girl I could not go to a proper school. I, like many other girls attended an underground school and rest of the time me and my sisters wove sacks, which my father would sell in the market. That was our sole source of income. I don’t know how we survived in those days.138 Families which did not have sons, would dress one of their daughters like a boy. We call them bachha posh. They would accompany the women when they went outside, as it was not permitted to leave house without a male member.139 Apart from the restrictions imposed on women, men and boys were also subject to gender-based restrictions and violence. Men were required to have long beards and wear the traditional salwar kameez. Thousands of men were imprisoned and tortured, and many were subject to extortion, physical abuse and sexual violence.140 They imposed ban on most forms of entertainment, from sports to kite flying, hearing music and watching television.

94  Stages of ‘refugee’ lives If somebody was caught doing things that were banned, they had to undergo severe punishment. Edris was a ten-year-old boy when Taleban captured Kabul. He was helping his father at his small medical shop in Karta-e-­Parwan; he remembered an incident: One day an old Taleb came to our shop and somehow managed to see one of those black videocassette which had a Bollywood movie in it. When he interrogated about it I said, it’s a video about Mecca-Medina with recitation of verses from Koran. I was saved that day because he did not ask me to play it! He advised me not to keep these cassettes and said ‘If some other Taleb had seen this, you would have landed up in jail’. I think I was just lucky that day!141 The Taleban’s main organ that was to ensure the strict observance of such kind of Islamization was Amr Bil Maruf Wa Mai An Munkir (the office for the Propagation of Virtue and the Prevention of Vice), religious police established in Kabul which was promoted to the status of Ministry in 1998. Music was prohibited in shops, hotels, vehicles and anyone found with cassettes was to be imprisoned. Bushy beard remained compulsory for men and anyone found guilty for shaving or cutting his beard would be imprisoned. Keeping pigeons and playing birds was prohibited. To prevent idolatry, all pictures and portraits in shops and hotels were abolished. Apart from this, praying at appropriate times was strictly enforced. Praying five times a day was made compulsory and everybody had to stop everything and go to mosque to offer prayers. They would patrol the streets and if they found people loitering during prayer time were arrested immediately. Everybody had to abide by the rules set by the Talebs.142 A central Shura was established in Kandahar, with Mullah Omar designated as Amir-Ul Momineen. Later in October 1997, he renamed the Islamic State of Afghanistan as the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan, with Kandahar as its defacto capital. The regime was recognized by only three countries in the world namely, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia and United Arab Emirates. With the absence of an effective government machinery and devastated state institutions, it was only natural that the Taleban could not make much progress in matters of governance. Lack of ministries, state bureaucracies, an organized army and a state police not only was the drawback or their administration but also severe dearth of employment opportunities. My father used to work for the Taleban administration in Baghlan province. There was hardly any job or any other opportunities for the people who stayed back in Afghanistan. The poor and handicapped people, kids, and widows would beg on the streets – what else could they do?143

Stages of ‘refugee’ lives  95 Access to even the most basic services was extremely limited. In Kabul, one poorly equipped and barely functioning hospital was open to the half million women in the city and 87% of women in Kabul reported that they experienced decreased access to health services.144 As women had comprised the majority of teachers, access to education for boys, who were still permitted to attend school, also declined sharply. The economy came to a standstill. Reportedly, the only functioning factories in Afghanistan were funded by international organizations to manufacture orthopaedic limbs. Afghans became heavily dependent on external support even for basic nutrition, exacerbated by a severe drought in 2000, with approximately half of Kabul’s population reliant on food aid delivered by humanitarian agencies.145 Non-Pashtun ethnic groups, particularly the Hazara, were persecuted, subject to ethnic cleansing and massacred. An estimated 300 Hazara men, women and children were deliberately killed while seeking shelter in a mosque in Yakaolang in January 2001, while an estimated 2,000 Afghans, including many Hazaras, were massacred in an attack on Mazar-e-Sharif in November 1998.146 All the members of Sikh and Hindu communities interviewed in India for research said that they left Afghanistan much before Taleban movement reached Kabul. Given their training in madrasas and wholly committed to Whabi and Deobandi interpretations of Islamic tradition, the Taleban not only enthusiastically imposed bloody punishments on all those whom they considered to have overstepped their narrow and literalistic interpretations of Quranic injunctions, but also took the view that infidels and idolaters had no place in the Islamic paradise which they had constructed.147 Non-Muslim cultural sites, including the Buddha statues in Bamiyan, were destroyed. National landmarks and museums, many of which were also looted and damaged during the civil war period, were defaced and raided. Roger Ballard’s article148 on the situation of Sikhs and Hindus of Afghanistan pointed out that the members of these two communities were required to wear a yellow star on their clothing so that they stand out from the Muslims. These communities soon found themselves being required to financial contributions to the jihad, and if they failed to pay up, to find themselves faced with even larger ransom demands if they wanted to see their kidnapped sons and daughters returned home alive rather than as corpses. However, even under those circumstances, there were many Afghan Muslims who condemned these tactics and felt that they run wholly contrary to their long-standing commitment to plurality and tolerant Sufi interpretation of Islam. In the face of these assaults, Sikh and Hindu families frequently found themselves provided with a modicum of support and shelter by their Muslim neighbours, and most especially those with whom they had sustained relationships or reciprocity over many generations.149 Overall, the refugees continued to flow into Pakistan, Iran and other countries once it became apparent that the violence of the civil war had

96  Stages of ‘refugee’ lives not been eliminated but merely replaced with new forms of repression and abuse. As a consequence of their manifest and widespread abuse of human rights and the deepening poverty and unemployment, the Taleban soon lost the domestic support they had enjoyed initially. What little international support they had received also quickly faded as the scale and severity of their repression, and links to Osama Bin laden and his terrorist organization Al Qaeda, became apparent.150 Meanwhile, conflict in Afghanistan continued. While the Taleban consolidated control, various warlords began to ally with Rabbani, Massoud and Ismail Khan, forming the Northern Alliance. With financial support from India, Iran and Russia, the Northern Alliance attacked both military and civilian targets controlled by the Taleban – but with little military success. By September 2001, the Taleban controlled nearly 80% of Afghanistan.151

Afghanistan post-9/11 – the current conflict Every nation, I every region, now has a decision to make. Either you are with us, or you are with the terrorists. From this day forward, any nation that continues to harbor or support terrorism, will be regarded by the United States as Hostile regime. - US President George W. Bush, September 20, 2001.152 We are going to rain Holy Hell on Them - US President George W. Bush, October 7, 2001153 As the Northern Alliance backed by United States (US) Special Forces and massive airpower swept through Afghanistan on October 7, 2001 indicating the onset of Operation Enduring Freedom, Al Qaeda and its Taleban hosts were not left with many options but to flee to the safe heavens of south and east or over the borders into Pakistan’s tribal areas in disarray. Well-­publicized human rights abuses by the Taleban, particularly their treatment of women, also helped bolster public and political support for the war in the West. Afghanistan has to be rescued from itself,154 was the overall sense. While there remained confusion and questions over the nature of post-9/11 configuration of Afghanistan, the general feeling was that of optimism and victory. While 9/11 came as a shocking news for most of the world, for many Afghans who were stuck in the Taleban controlled Afghanistan- it came as a ray of hope. We knew that the world would now pay attention to us and that would bring an end to our miseries. Within a month after the launch of Operation Enduring Freedom, we were celebrating on the streets of Kabul.155 The people of Afghanistan after a century of misrule were in desperate need of a way to govern themselves that would offer some defence against the

Stages of ‘refugee’ lives  97 abuses of power that have marked Afghan history.156 The US declared that it would establish democracy, rebuild the country’s infrastructure and defend human rights, with particular focus on liberating women from Taleban oppression. The international community, which had backed the American decision to wage war against ‘terrorism’, acknowledged the need to help build a stable government in Afghanistan, while many wondered how Afghanistan should be ruled once the Taleban were defeated. As a result of heavy US bombing on November 13, 2001, Taleban abandoned Kabul157 without a fight, which added to the prevailing euphoria that Taleban was ‘defeated’. In May 2003, the US announced an end to major combat operations. Millions of Afghans who were forced to leave their country because of years of conflict found a reason to return and rebuild their country. The programme of voluntary repatriation to Afghanistan was the largest programme of UNHCR worldwide, with about 5.8 million people returning to Afghanistan since 2002.158 In November 2001, the UN invited major Afghan factions, excluding the Taleban, to a conference in Bonn, Germany. On December 5, 2001, the Bonn Agreement was signed, forming an interim administration headed by Hamid Karzai and authorizing an international peacekeeping force to maintain security in Kabul. Unlike most peace agreements, Bonn did not force the warring factions to lay down their arms, nor did it institute a process for establishing truth or accountability for past crimes. Rather, it marked a clear continuation of a policy of co-option of warlords and commanders to achieve US objectives. Al Qaeda and the Taleban were excluded from this process and many of the participating factions were still being armed by the US to fight against them. Bonn further legitimized these warlords by granting them prominent positions and power within the interim government.159 The following June, an ‘emergency’ Loya Jirga (Grand Assembly) provided representative input into the transitional authority and the Afghan constitution was adopted in January 2004. Forces serving in the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) remained largely confined to Kabul, until expanding into the north, west and south of the country in 2004, 2005 and 2006, respectively. The UN also initially pursued a ‘light footprint’ approach, opening only two provincial-level offices before 2006.160 State-building efforts were sparse in a country that desperately needed law, order and institutions capable of delivering basic services. Karzai Government’s reach remained largely limited to the capital and some other major cities. Until the emergence of the insurgency by 2006, the capacity building and formalization of the Afghan security forces, including Afghan National Army, was largely neglected. Some progress definitely was achieved in sectors such as health and education; however, the path to a reconstruction of democratic institutions has been obstructed by acute dilemmas and crucial challenges of political, economic, social and security dimensions. Obstacles included the widespread destruction of infrastructure; low social indicators;

98  Stages of ‘refugee’ lives acute corruption; prevalence drugs and arms, delicate, uncertain and factionalized politics; a weak state police and army to deal with the rising insurgency and an extremely weak administrative capacity. The unsettled military and political environment along with the competing regional and international interests further influenced the transition process and outcome in Afghanistan. What aid was promised was slow to be delivered and the subsequent invasion of Iraq further diverted political attention and resources away from Afghanistan.161 Together, these factors created power vacuums in some areas or further empowered warlords and their militias in other areas. They also left many Afghans disillusioned, enduring social and economic hardships and vulnerable to emerging anti-­government factions. The disturbing preview of incoherence that was visible after the initiation of Operation Enduring Freedom lacked both clarity and consistency. The initial success of ousting Taleban from power turned out to be short-lived. The turn of events that followed gave the Taleban an ideal situation to regroup and reorganize themselves only to emerge as a groovier nightmare after a few years. Since 2006, the security situation deteriorated rapidly in Afghanistan. Roadside and other bomb attacks nearly doubled from the previous year, suicide attacks increased sixfold and there were more than a thousand civilian casualties.162 The Taleban and other militants extended their control throughout the south and east, and into some western, northern and central provinces. Nearly half of the country is currently considered too dangerous for the UN and other international agencies to access.163 While there is less direct harm caused to civilians in the current conflict than in many previous periods of conflict, civilians bear the brunt of the violence and are often targets of insurgent activity. As a Herati woman, interviewed for a study, reflected: The current conflict has caused lots of tension and concerns among people. People are very concerned about their future. At the beginning, people had hope but the ineffectiveness of the current government and bombardments of civilians by international forces made people hate the government and create more opportunities for the anti-government forces.164 Refugee returns have dwindled during the past five years and owing to insecurity and a difficult socio-economic situation, only around 10,000 refugees returned to Afghanistan during the first seven months of 2014.165 By mid-2014, 683,000 people were internally displaced by the conflict affecting 30 of the 34 Afghan provinces. More than half of Afghanistan’s internally displaced people (IDP) live in urban areas.166 As the insurgency heighted in Afghanistan since 2006, yet again a reverse flow of Afghan population out of their country has been noticed. When the US declared that it would withdraw it from the country by 2014, at a time when most of the set targets remained out of reach and many fundamental questions remained elusive, the people who had returned to Afghanistan with a lot of hope felt disillusioned. Those who had come from the exile societies in the Western countries and

Stages of ‘refugee’ lives  99 were carrying duel citizenships decided to return to those countries, while many of those who had returned from Pakistan and Iran were looking for opportunities to seek refuge in the West. With the withdrawal of several international organizations, the cash flow to Afghanistan started shirking. The amount of opportunities and scope that was available in the first few years of international intervention started evaporating quickly. With security situation deteriorating every day, the Afghans yet again were forced to contemplate leaving their country for a safer and better life. This research chose a time frame of 20 years, 1992 to 2012, because while conducting the interviews with conflict-displaced Afghans living in India, it was observed that some of the forced migration to India took place after 2006. While majority of the Afghans who came and settled in India, since the beginning of the civil war in Afghanistan, were the religious minorities, the recent migration trend shows that the ones who left Afghanistan after 2006 and came to India are largely Muslims and even Christians. Some of the respondents, who came to India in the recent years, explained why they left their country. I have worked with various international organizations in the past few years. But in the second half of the past decade things started changing rapidly. Taleban recaptured power in our area and for them people like me were the easy targets. They equate working with international organization to collaboration with the West against them. To save my life I came to India and sought the protection of UNHCR.167 I was a teaching at a government run school in Ghazni. Before the Taleban took control over the province, everything was fine. But once they identified me because of my profession, I knew I can not stay there anymore and had to flee.168 Some of the respondents interviewed belonged to the Christian communities. They had taken refuge in Iran during the Mujahideen period and had converted to Christianity there. After returning to Afghanistan, they continued practising their religion initially by going to the Karte Sei Church but later when they saw that people around them are behaving in a negative manner, they stopped going to Church and started praying at home. However, they feel that people’s attitude towards them changed immediately after they got to know that they have converted from Islam. In 2007, the local Mullah of my village in Ghanzi province issued a decree that Christians will be stoned to death. We knew no body would come to protect us in Afghanistan. Since India is a secular and progressive country, we decided to take refuge here. All the Afghan-Christian members interviewed belonged to the Hazara ethnic group of Afghanistan. They shared that Taleban has always been hostile towards the Hazara minorities, slitting of throat being the most commonly

100  Stages of ‘refugee’ lives used form of punishment by the Talebs for Hazaras. So for them, in addition to their religion, the fact that they were from that particular ethnic group made their situation particularly vulnerable. Taleban militants have steadily extended their influence and rendered vast tracts of Afghanistan insecure, having established through parallel governance structures in some regions of the country. The general objective of the Taleban is to eliminate U.S. influence in Afghanistan and reinstate Taleban rule – implying a strict form of Islamic law. However, the Taleban is not a monolith; it has several factions and groups, joined for various reasons, ranging from global jihad to local grievances.169 The competition between Taleban fighters – for instance, between insurgent groups associated with Mullah Omar’s Quetta Shura (leadership council), the Haqqani network and Gulbuddin Hekmatyar’s Hizb-e Islami – has continued. Violent rivalries between commanders of these insurgent groups have resulted in the death of many people and created a sense of panic among the common people. To have a better understanding of how Afghans have suffered and sought to cope with the conflict and violence, a research170 was conducted in 14 provinces across Afghanistan in 2009. The core objective was to understand how conflict has impacted the lives of common people over the past three decades. It was found out that approximately one in ten individuals reported being imprisoned at least once and 29% reported having one or more family members imprisoned at some point since 1979. One in five (21%) individuals reported being tortured at least once during the conflict. The majority of these incidents took place either during the Taleban (38%) or the civil war periods (29%). Three in four individuals (76%) interviewed were forced to leave their homes at some point during the past three decades of conflict, consistent with findings published by the International Committee of the Red Cross in 2009.171 The psychological impact of conflict is extremely difficult to measure, particularly during such a prolonged period. Nevertheless, the subject was frequently raised by individuals in the course of interviews or group discussions. Individuals often described memory loss, fear and anxiety or expressed concern about the psychological impact on their children. It would be foolish to imagine that Afghans would think or behave like a normal person from a stable country. My generation has never experienced peace. We have climbed on abandoned tanks for fun, we have played with guns and bullets. Death, violence and torture have been part and parcel of our existence. Generation after generation have been traumatized.172 A dominant theme in the account of the conflict by the people who lived through them was the sense that events were not under control of anyone. Most of the respondents used terms such as ‘before 1979’ and ‘after 1989’ to signify the period of soviet occupation of Afghanistan. People interviewed had mostly forced to leave Afghanistan during the Mujahideen period,

Stages of ‘refugee’ lives  101 therefore have most bitter memories of that phase. People irrespective of ethnicity and religion have suffered, but the sense of victimization was more broadly felt by almost all of the respondents as they described how their lives had been turned upside down by war and its consequences. Before the resettlement phase in India, they had undergone the displacement and transit phase and that remains an important stage of their ‘refugee’ experiences. The following discussion tries to capture that.

Experiences during the displacement phase As the political turmoil and the conflict started unfolding and the ‘home’ turned into a ‘dangerous place’, thousands of families decided to migrate to a safer location, which for many meant a foreign country. Decisions had consequences that could not always be anticipated, because they had to be made at that moment, with little information. People were caught unaware and had little ability to influence the outcome of the unfolding events for themselves and their families. The escape Based on the stories that were shared, escape was often arbitrary, dangerous and expensive. An escape, whether it was from Kabul or a town or village under massive rocket attacks and bombardment in the early 1992 or the death threat from the resurgent Taleban in 2007–2008, was seldom a voluntary one. Based on the experiences and thought process that respondents shared about what went behind the decision of their escapes, one could feel that in the nineties, somewhere they had the hope that their escapes were temporary, for a short period of time and that they would eventually return to their ‘homes’, once things got normalized. The flights that people undertook in the later years, that is in the second half of the international intervention that was with the idea of never returning to Afghanistan again. Yet in both the periods, the decisions have been taken hastily and mostly due to a direct consequence of the immediacy of the threat posed by the enemy to their lives. I call that day, ‘the day of raining bullets’. We were so worried about reaching the van safely amidst the showering of bullets, that I forgot to wear my shoes.173 My husband entered the room and said ‘Isi waqt nikalna hain! (have to leave this very moment!)’. We grabbed and put a few things in a bag and left.174 While he was narrating ‘his escape from death’, one respondent posed a pertinent question: What can you take from your house when you are running for life?175

102  Stages of ‘refugee’ lives Afghans Sikhs and Hindus, who had escaped from Afghanistan during the civil wars in most cases, reached India via Pakistan. When these families were realizing that it might not be feasible for them to continue their lives in Afghanistan and many of them had decided in favour of migrating to India, they knew that they needed to cross Pakistan and therefore along with the visa for India, it was important for them to get permit for Pakistan as well. Some of the respondents mentioned that during that phase Pakistan had relaxed its border control with India and therefore for many of the minority refugees, escape to India was possible. They also mentioned that getting visas from both the Indian and Pakistani Embassies in Kabul was not very difficult in those days. They said that in those particular times, the authorities in both the countries did not create much problem as they were aware of the situation in Afghanistan. Most Afghans, as it would be evident from the statistics published in those years, went to Pakistan and Iran; for the Sikhs and Hindus of Afghanistan, the choice of their preferred destination was India. For the relatively affluent members of the communities, with established businesses or relatives in India, the logistical part of the escape was relatively smoother. They got visas and bought flight tickets to go to India; yet, they did mention about the problems encountered by some of them because of the lack of availability of tickets. The prices of the flight tickets rose a few folds; however, that for most who could afford was not a matter of concern. When you are running to save your life, money is the last thing that you can think about. Yes, it was very difficult to leave everything that had been built through generations of hard work, yet I was thinking, if I am alive these things can be built again.176 For the relatively economically weaker sections of these two communities however, the journey seemed to follow more or less a similar trajectory, which meant reaching India after a long and exhausting journey by road. From the in-depth interviews and group discussions conducted with the members of Afghan-Sikh and -Hindu communities currently living in India, it was gathered that in majority of the cases, two or three families travelled together. Apart from the advantage of sharing the cost of the journey, they also felt more secure and confident when they were travelling together. Under those circumstances, if there are people by ones side (even though they are in the same situation), psychologically one gets more strength.177 For many, the route to India via Pakistan meant leaving Kabul in a truck with a few other families mostly late at night, when the shelling would be relatively less. They collectively hired a truck that would take them up to Hasan Abdal in Pakistan, where Gurudwara Panja Sahib is located. From

Stages of ‘refugee’ lives  103 there, they went to Lahore by hiring another truck or a matador. From Lahore, they hired another vehicle (mostly small trucks), which took them to the India–Pakistan border at Attari. From Attari, they mostly took train to reach Amritsar and after staying there for some time, they shifted to the capital of India. Many of the Afghans who took this route to reach India spoke about the two-week Transit Visa they got from Pakistan. That meant that they had to leave Pakistan within two weeks of entering Hasan Abdal. We stayed at Hasan Abdal for three days at the Gurudwara. It was a great relief to have been able to escape from the conflict however, we knew that the time was ticking and that we have to find our way out of this country before the transit visa expired.178 The journey till their first stop at Panja Sahib was one of the most difficult ones. There were phataks (check posts) of the Mujahideen groups at several points and whenever they encountered one, the amount of tension would escalate. Secondly, there were many people along with their little belongings, all cramped in a truck like cattle. For the ones who left in the winter, the harsh climatic conditions added to the difficulty. It was particularly painful for their children, who mostly were too young to even understand what was happening, just kept on crying in despair. Some of the women expressed that in their culture, they have been raised to feel that the men in their lives would protect them. Throughout their lives, they have looked for security in their men, but this is a situation when they felt that their men were equally nervous, alarmed and susceptible. I never saw my husband cry before that day. For me he was the strongest man who has protected us from everything. The fact that he was succumbing to the pressures made me feel even more scared.179 To conduct the journey within Pakistan, some got in touch with local agents who promised that they will help them reach up to the India–Pakistan border at Attari. They did that in exchange of money. People who were travelling without proper documents or may have lost them in transit felt that it was the best option to take assistance of these ‘agents’ who promised them safe passage. Additionally, respondents shared that: In those days there were not regular trains from the Pakistan border to Amritsar. The train left twice a week and it was very important that we could board the train that left for India.180 One of the respondents who used to live at Chehel Setun area in the suburbs of Kabul described the journey his family conducted along with seven other families from the Qalai Ghaibi settlement, comprising mostly people from

104  Stages of ‘refugee’ lives Kunar province in Afghanistan. He remembered having shifted to Kunar province once for a few days when the conflict had reached Kabul. The area where his family stayed in Kabul had become a frontline for the Mujahideen groups of Pashtun leader Hekmatyar and Tajik commander Massoud. But again returned when they got to know that their fighting had subsided. Around thousand families from different ethnicities lived in Chehel Setun and while growing up we enjoyed a thriving social life. People in the neighborhood shared good relations with each other. However, during the civil war strains between different ethnicities surfaced and the pressure was palpable. Suddenly one day, too many missiles were thrown at our locality and there were dead bodies and corpses everywhere. It was then my family decided to escape.181 The very next morning at about 3 am, these families started their journey. They walked till a check post that was under the control of Massoud’s men. They had warned the group to be particularly careful about one stretch of road in front of them and advised them to cross that one person at a time and not as a group as that would give wrong signals to the opponent group who might mistake them to be Massouds men and attack them. After reaching Kabul by foot, they rented a big car that took them to Char-e-Khar in Parwan province (north of Afghanistan). Mahepur Kabul-Jalalabad road was terribly unsafe at that time especially the stretch from Kabul to Surubi, so we had to take a much longer route just to avoid a small stretch.182 From Char-e-Khar, they hired a truck that had an uncovered trolley to reach Surubi. According to him, more than 50 people were travelling in that trolley as they passed though the Kapisa province and reached their next destination Tagab at night. All the people spent that night in a desert and continued the journey next morning and reached Jalalabad in the afternoon. From Jalalabad, they went to the Torkham (border that separated Afghanistan and Pakistan) and crossed it easily since at that time, there was no border restriction. At Torkham, they rented a Toyota Matador to reach Lowarge in Pakistan and from there they got into a bus that took them to Peshawar. The respondents who migrated to India after 2005, however, came by flight and mostly possessed valid legal documents. Since their routes have been direct and nobody mentioned about encountering any difficulty in conducting the journey, such experiences have not been discussed in detail. During the course of the narration of their experiences, the respondents said that it was difficult for them to revisit those times of their lives. The unintentional tears that rolled down from their eyes, the goose bumps that

Stages of ‘refugee’ lives  105 they experienced while remembering certain incident or the confession of not being able to have a sound sleep because of their past – all pointed to the traumatic stress of a ‘refugee’ life.

Trauma and ‘refugee’ lives Conflict and resulting displacement can be a major source of trauma for refugees, but trauma-induced stress can be created through resettlement activities as well. The works of clinical sociologists like Erikson183 and Herman184 indicate that the impact of negative life events is often felt years after the initial traumatic occurrences. Especially for refugees, experiences in the country of their origin, as well as their migratory transitions and resettlement are known to affect economic, social and psychological adaptations far into the future. Before focusing at the lived experiences of Afghans in India, it is important to consider the phenomenon of trauma. Hermann has defined Trauma as ‘…events involving threats to life or bodily integrity or a close personal encounter with violence of death, which evoke feelings of intense fear, helplessness, loss of control and threat of annihilation’. It has a far-reaching effect on biopsychosocial functioning of an individual. McFarlane and Yehuda’s study185 illustrates the interaction of the person with his or her ecosystem and its mediating effects. Factors such as biological traits, personality, support system and past experiences determine to what extent individuals experience intrusive memories of trauma. The authors opine that some ecosystem factors will increase the probability of illness or disorder and are generally considered ‘vulnerability’ factors, such as shaving a family history of mental illness. Others, such as good use of a social network, are considered ‘resilience’ factors and aid in the path to recovery or protection of wellness. People deal with events that are painful and incorporate them as a part of their life experience over time to make healthy adjustments. Reaction to Trauma may include irritability and rage, lack of intimacy and trust, problems with memory and concentration, and nightmares and insomnia.186 Research conducted by Kahana and Kahana reports187 that after half a century of Holocaust, one study of survivors found that nearly all had severe headaches, over half experienced dizziness on a regular basis and about one-third reported gastrointestinal problems. Van der Kolk, thereby, suggests that: The essence of psychological trauma is the loss of faith that there is order and continuity in life…a state of helplessness; a feeling that one’s actions have no bearing on the outcomes of one’s life.188 Post-traumatic disorder, as well as depression and anxiety disorders are commonly found in refugee populations.189 The conflict in Afghanistan

106  Stages of ‘refugee’ lives meant an extreme disruption of a way of life that had been experienced as predictable and solid. In addition, the conflict-displaced Afghans were exposed to numerous potentially traumatizing vents, such as deaths of family and friends; exposure to shelling, bombardments, deprivation and harsh living circumstances; and imprisonment and acts of ethnic cleansing aimed particularly at the religious minorities of the country. The experiences of displacement and exile are traumatic in themselves. Fullilove has described the experience of displacement as the one in which a sense of belonging is disrupted. Human beings have a personal ‘sense of place’ and a need for belonging that arise from three psychological processes: familiarity, attachment and place of identity, all of which are disrupted in displacement. Home represents ‘…the accumulation of many relationships and much history’, and the loss of that material and relational world can be devastating.190 Dislocation is one of the primary sources of poor mental health; research has suggested that refugee is at risk of depression and anxiety over a long period of adjustment.191 It was seen that most of the Afghans who were interviewed in this study had experienced traumatic events even though the individual experiences of war, conflict and ethnic cleansing varied considerably. The aforementioned discussions attempted to recapture some of the experiences and occurrences, in the context of their both pre-conflict and post-conflict lives, and also a period of some sort of limbo in transition between the home and the host country. The respondents illustrated stories of both individual and group survivorships, but those were much deeper than that. As much as there were commonalities, every individual narrative interpretation about each refugee experience is critical to understand refugee lives and the changes that have taken place. The approach adapted for this study has been similar to the approach adopted by Eastmond192 who said: I listen to the stories people tell me and each other of their lived experiences, of life when it was ‘normal’, of disruption and dramatic changes, and of life in exile and the ways in which they make sense of these changes. A dominant theme in the accounts of the conflict by the people who lived through them was the sense that events were not under anyone’s control. It did not seem that the people were particularly motivated to leave the country had they had the option of not doing so. Both men and women did mention about ethnic cleansing and felt victimized, but all the respondents more broadly felt the sense of victimization as they described how their lives turned upside down by conflict and its consequences. Interestingly, the religious minorities did not say that they felt more vulnerable during civil wars because of their faith. Stories of their displacement and the experiences in the transit (mostly in Pakistan) are often truncated and empty. It was a time of dependence and passivity for many and all of them at that point were

Stages of ‘refugee’ lives  107 looking forward to reach India – a country that they felt would embrace them and help them to reconstruct their sense of belonging, autonomy and independence. The following chapter thus attempts to capture how Afghans in India negotiated with different strategies of adaptation during their settlement phase.

Notes 1 K. Miller, J. Muzurovic, G. Worthington, S. Tipping, and A. Goldman, ‘Bosnian refugees and stressors of exile: a narrative study’. American Journal of Orthopsychiatry, Vol. 72 (2002), 341–354. 2 Hafuzullah Emadi, Dynamics of Political Development in Afghanistan-The British, Russian and American Invasions. (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010), p. 1. 3 Vartan Gregorian, The Emergence of Modern Afghanistan. (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1969). 4 Louis Dupree, Afghanistan. (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1973). 5 Ludwig W. Adamec, Afghanistan’s Foreign Affairs to the Mid-Twentieth Century. (Tucson: The University of Arizona Press, 1974). 6 Ashraf Ghani, ‘Islam and State-Building in Afghanistan’. Modern Asian Studies, Vol. 2 (1978), 269–284. 7 Hasan Kawun Kakar, Government and Society in Afghanistan. (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1979). 8 B. R. Rubin, ‘Political elites in Afghanistan: rentier state building, rentier state wrecking‘.International Journal of Middle East Studies, Vol. 24 (1992), 77–99. 9 W. B. Fisher, ‘Afghanistan: Physical and Social Geography’. The Middle East and North Africa Yearbook 1990. (London: Europa Publication, 1990). 10 Olivier Roy, Afghanistan: From Holy War to Civil War. (Princeton: Darwin Press, 1995). 11 Larry Goodson, ‘The Fragmentation of Culture in Afghanistan’. Journal of Comparative Politics, Vol. 18 (1998), 269–289. 12 Larry Goodson, ‘The Future of Afghanistan in the Changing World Order: Civil War and National Fragmentation as Obstacles to Nation-Building in the 1990s,’ presented at the annual meeting of the Southern Political Science Association, Tampa, FL, November 7–9, 1991, cited in Larry Goodson, ‘The fragmentation of culture in Afghanistan’. Journal of Comparative Politics, Vol. 18 (1998), 269–289. 13 Oliver Roy, Islam and Resistance in Afghanistan. 2nd ed. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990), 13. 14 Ashraf Ghani. Op.cit, 1978, 270. 15 W. B. Fisher, ‘Afghanistan: Physical and Social Geography’. The Middle East and North Africa Yearbook 1990. (London: Europa Publication, 1990). 16 There is no unanimity as to what precisely constitutes a ‘minority’. Perhaps the most widely accepted definition is the one proposed by Francesco Capotorti: ‘A group numerically smaller to the rest of the population of the state in a non-dominant position whose members being nationals of the state-possess ethnic, religious or linguistic characteristics differing from those of the rest of the population and show, if only implicitly a sense of solidarity directed towards preserving their culture, traditions, religion or language’. The problem with such a definition is its sole emphasis on numbers. It overlooks situations where the minority may be in a commanding position and may in fact indulge in abuses against the majority, e.g. Sunni domination of Shiite majority in Iraq, and Bahrain, and the Shiite domination of the Sunni majority

108  Stages of ‘refugee’ lives in Syria. The definition also does not cover groups who may define themselves by other kinds of criteria: political, economic or sexual. For a detailed informed discussion on rights and entitlements of minorities under international law, refer to Wheatley 2005, pp. 1–63 and Hannum 1996, pp. 1–73. The only formal document proposing a definition is the 1993 Additional protocol to the European Convention on Human Rights. It defines a ‘National Minority’ ‘as a group of persons who: reside on the territory of that state and are citizens thereof; maintain long-standing, firm and lasting ties with that state; display distinctive ethnic, cultural, religious or linguistic characteristics; are sufficiently representative, although smaller in number than the rest of the population of that state or of a region of that state; are motivated by a concern to preserve together that which constitutes their common identity, including their culture, their traditions, their religion or their language.’ (Council of Europe 1993). At the national level, several European states such as Switzerland, Estonia and Luxemburg to name a few offer statist definition of the term. Common to all of them is these definitions are criteria of resident in the state territory they claim to be national minorities off, having citizenship and displaying distinct ethnic and/or linguistic criteria. For a more detailed discussion on the discourse on definition of national minority, refer to Marc 2007, pp. 59–66. This particular study intends to focus at two significantly understudied non-Muslim religious minority communities of Afghanistan, namely Sikhs and Hindus. 17 Hafuzullah Emadi, Op.cit, (2010), 3. 18 Nancy Dupree, ‘Cultural heritage and national identity in Afghanistan’. Third World Quarterly, Vol. 5 (2002), 977–989. 19 Hafuzullah Emadi, Op.cit, (2010), 3. 20 Larry Goodson, ‘The fragmentation of culture in Afghanistan’. Journal of Comparative Politics, Vol. 18 (1998), 271. 21 Oliver Roy, Islam and Resistance in Afghanistan. 2nd ed. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990), 38–44. 22 Pushtunwali is a conglomerate of local tribal codes; there are certain primary themes that have emerged, especially honour, hospitality and revenge. 23 Larry Goodson, Op.cit, (1998), 271. 24 Louis Dupree. Afghanistan. (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1973), 183–192. 25 Nancy Dupree, ‘Cultural heritage and national identity in Afghanistan’. Third World Quarterly, Vol. 5 (2002), 977–989. 26 Ibid. 27 Hafuzullah Emadi, Op.cit, (2010), 2. 28 Nancy Dupree, Op.cit, (2002), 977–989. 29 Hafuzullah Emadi, Op.cit, (2010), 2. 30 Nancy Dupree, Op.cit, (2002), 977–989. 31 J. Baily, ‘The role of music in the creation of an Afghan national identity: 1923– 1973’, in M. Stokes (ed.), Music, Ethnicity and Identity: The Musical Construction of Place (Oxford: Berg, 1994), pp. 45–60. 32 Nancy Dupree, Op.cit, (2002), 977–989. 33 L. Dupree, It Wasn’t Woodstock, But: The First International Rock Festival in Kabul. (Hanover, NH: American Universities Field Staff Reports, (South Asia Series), Vol. XX (2), 1976). 34 Amrullah Sahel, talk on the topic ‘Afghanistan in transformation 1989–2013’, TEExKABUL. Available at : www.youtube.com/watch?v=JgtqE5ZIRDs. 35 H. Saberi and Noshe Djan, Afghan Food and Cookery. (Totnes: Prospect Books, 2000). 36 Hafizullah Emadi, Culture and Customs of Afghanistan. (London, Greenwood Press, 2005), p. 138.

Stages of ‘refugee’ lives  109 37 Nancy Dupree, Op.cit, (2002), 977–989. 38 Hafizullah Emadi, Op.cit, (2005), 138. 39 Ibid. 137. 40 Nancy Dupree, ‘Early twentieth century Afghan adaptations of European architecture’, AARP (Art and Archaeology Research Papers), London, 1977, pp. 15–21. 41 F. Rahimi, ‘Women in Afghanistan’, Liestal, Switzerland: Stiftung Bibliotheca Afghanica, 1986, cited in ‘Cultural Heritage and National Identity in Afghanistan’. Third World Quarterly, Vol. 5 (2002), 977–989. 42 Nancy Dupree, Op.cit, (2002), 977–989. 43 Kuldeep Singh (an Afghan-Sikh, currently living in India), in discussion with Anwesha Ghosh, November 2014. 44 Sham Lal Bhatija, Afghanistan’s Ambassador to Canada, spoke while delivering the inaugural address at a conference International Conference on Afghanistan Bonn ’01 to Bonn ’11: Debating Afghanistan’s Political Future’ organized by Maulana Abul Kalam Azad Institute of Asian Studies, Kolkata, Feb 2012. 45 Khajinder Singh Khurrana (Secretary, Afghan-Sikh and Hindu Welfare Society in India) in discussion with Anwesha Ghosh, December 2015. 46 Dr. Pyasa (an Afghan Hindu) quoted in Chitra Venkatesh Akkoor, ‘Ways of Speaking in the diaspora: Afghan Hindus in Germany’ (PhD dis., University of Iowa, 2011), p. 65. 47 An Afghan-Hindu currently living in India, unwilling to disclose his identity in discussion with Anwesha Ghosh, November 2014. 48 Khajinder Singh Khurrana (Secretary, Afghan-Sikh and Hindu Welfare Society in India) in discussion with Anwesha Ghosh, December 2015. 49 Roger Ballard, ‘The history and current position of Afghanistan’s Hindu and Sikhs Population’. Centre for Applied South Asian Studies, (2011), 2. Available at: www.casas.org.uk/papers/pdfpapers/afghansikhs.pdf. 50 Khajinder Singh Khurrana (Secretary, Afghan-Sikh and Hindu Welfare Society in India) in discussion with Anwesha Ghosh, December 2015. 51 Hafizullah Emadi, ‘Minorities and marginality: pertinacity of Hindus and Sikhs in a repressive environment in Afghanistan’. The Journal of Nationalism and Ethnicity, (2013), 1–14. 52 Amrullah Sahel, talk on the topic ‘Afghanistan in transformation 1989–2013’, TEExKABUL. Available at: www.youtube.com/watch?v=JgtqE5ZIRDs. 53 Kartar Singh (an Afghan-Sikh, currently living in India) in discussion with Anwesha Ghosh, November 2014. 54 Sahajdhari (literally ‘slow adopter’) is a person who has chosen the path of Sikhism but not become Amritdhari (a Sikh initiated into Khalsa). Sahajdharis believe in all the tenets of Sikhism and the teachings of Sikh gurus, but may or may not adorn the five symbols (five Ks) of the Sikh faith, namely –Kesh or long hair uncut held with a kangha, comb, and a turban and carry two distinct weapons, karpaan, a small sword and a dagger, karra, steel bracelet on the left wrist, and kachha, long underwear. 55 Hafizullah Emadi, Op.cit, (2013), 1–14. 56 An Afghan-Sikh, currently living in India, unwilling to disclose his identity in discussion with Anwesha Ghosh, November 2014. 57 Mahinder Singh (an Afghan-Sikh, currently living in India), in discussion with Anwesha Ghosh, December 2015. 58 Hafizullah Emadi, Op.cit, (2013), 5. 59 Narinder Singh Nagpal (member, Khalsa Diwal Society, New Delhi), in discussion with Anwesha Ghosh, December 2015. 60 Joginder Singh (name changed) (an Afghan-Sikh, currently living in India), in discussion with Anwesha Ghosh, December 2015.

110  Stages of ‘refugee’ lives 61 Mohinder Singh (an Afghan-Sikh, currently living in India), in discussion with Anwesha Ghosh, December 2015. 62 Mahinder Singh (an Afghan-Sikh, currently living in India), in discussion with Anwesha Ghosh, December 2015. 63 Ishar Dass, We the old Dwellers of this Land. (Stockholm: Afghanistan Cultural Association, 2013). 64 Habibullah (an Afghan-Christian, currently living in India), in discussion with Anwesha Ghosh, December 2015. 65 ‘The Taliban’s War against Women’, Report by the Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights and Labor, U.S. Department of State, November, 2001. Available at: www.state.gov/j/drl/rls/6185.htm 66 Anit Kaur (an Afghan-Sikh, currently living in India), in discussion with Anwesha Ghosh, December 2015. 67 Chitra Venkatesh Akkoor, ‘Ways of Speaking in the Diaspora: Afghan Hindus in Germany’ (PhD dis., University of Iowa, 2011), pp. 70–71. 68 Roger Ballard, ‘The history and current position of Afghanistan’s Hindu and Sikhs Population’. Centre for Applied South Asian Studies, 2011, 4. Available at: www.casas.org.uk/papers/pdfpapers/afghansikhs.pdf 69 Hafizullah Emadi, Op.cit, (2013), 8. 70 Khajinder Singh Khurrana (Secretary, Afghan-Sikh and Hindu Welfare Society in India), in discussion with Anwesha Ghosh, December 2015. 71 Hardit Singh Nagpal (Joint Secretary, Khalsa Diwan Society, India), in discussion with Anwesha Ghosh, December 2015. 72 Khajinder Singh Khurrana (Secretary, Afghan-Sikh and Hindu Welfare Society in India), in discussion with Anwesha Ghosh, December 2015. 73 Ashley Jackson, ‘The Cost of War: Afghan Experiences of conflict, 1978–2009’. Report by Oxfam International, November 2009. 74 Arpita Basu Roy, Contemporary Afghanistan, Conflict and Peace Building. (New Delhi: Har-Ananad Publications, 2010), 32. 75 Joseph J. Collins, Understanding the War in Afghanistan. (Washington: National Defense University Press, 2011), 30–36. 76 ‘CNN Documentary ‘Soldiers of God’. Available at www.youtube.com/ watch?v=Xx4RDzwyOFY (accessed on 10.4. 2016) 77 Ibid. 78 Helen Fein, ‘Discriminating genocide from war crimes: Vietnam and Afghanistan re-examined’. Denver Journal of International Law and Policy, Vol. 22 (1993), 29–62. 79 Habibullah (from Ghazni), in discussion with Anwesha Ghosh, December 2015. 80 Ashley Jackson, ‘The Cost of War: Afghan Experiences of Conflict, 1978–2009’. Report by Oxfam International, November 2009, 9. 81 Ibid. 82 Joginder Singh (an Afghan-Sikh, currently living in India), in discussion with Anwesha Ghosh, December 2015. 83 An Afghan-Sikh, currently living in India, unwilling to disclose his identity in discussion with Anwesha Ghosh, December 2015. 84 UN Special Rapporteur, ‘Report on the Situation on Human Rights in Afghanistan,’ A/41/778 (1986). 85 Swedish Committee for Afghanistan, ‘The Agricultural Survey of Afghanistan: First Report’ (1988). 86 Susanne Schmeidl and William Maley, ‘Searching for a Solution: 25 Years of UNHCR-Pakistan Cooperation’ UNHCR Report, (2005). 87 An ethnic Afghan, currently living in India, unwilling to disclose his identity in discussion with Anwesha Ghosh, December 2015.

Stages of ‘refugee’ lives  111 88 Ibid. 89 Joginder Singh (an Afghan-Sikh, currently living in India), in discussion with Anwesha Ghosh, December 2015. 90 William Volgelsang, The Afghans. (Oxford: Blackwell Publishers, 2002), 322. 91 William Maley, The Afghanistan Wars. (Hampshire and New York: Palgrave Macmillam, 2002), 153. 92 Haroon Yakubi (an ethnic Afghan, currently living in India), in discussion with Anwesha Ghosh, December 2015. 93 ‘Afghanistan: Post-War Governance, Security and US Policy’, Congressional Research Service (2009) cited in Ashley Jackson, ‘The Cost of War: Afghan Experiences of conflict, 1978–2009’. Report by Oxfam International, November 2009. 94 Ashley Jackson, ‘The Cost of War: Afghan Experiences of conflict, 1978–2009’. Report by Oxfam International, November 2009, 9. 95 Ahmed Rashid, Taliban: Militant Islam, Oil, and Fundamentalism in Central Asia. 2nd ed. (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2000), 32. 96 Bilquees Daud, in discussion with Anwesha Ghosh, September 2015. 97 An Afghan-Sikh, currently living in India, unwilling to disclose his identity in discussion with Anwesha Ghosh, December 2015. 98 The Dawn, 2 February 1994. 99 An Afghan-Sikh, currently living in India, unwilling to disclose his identity, in discussion with Anwesha Ghosh, December 2015. 100 ‘Afghanistan: International Responsibility for a Human Rights Disaster’. Amnesty International Report, (1995). 101 Joseph J. Collins, Understanding the War in Afghanistan. (Washington: National Defense University Press, 2011, pp. 34–35. Available at: http://ndupress. ndu.edu/Portals/68/Documents/Books/understanding-war-in-afghan.pdf 102 William Maley, The Afghanistan Wars. (New York: Palgrave, 2002), pp. 204–205. 103 Robert D. Kaplan, Soldiers of God: With Islamic Worriers in Afghanistan and Pakistan. (New York: Vintage Publishers, 2001), p. 39. 104 Mahinder Singh (an Afghan-Sikh, currently living in India), in discussion with Anwesha Ghosh, December 2015. 105 Kartar Singh (an Afghan-Sikh, currently living in India), in discussion with Anwesha Ghosh, December 2015. 106 An ethnic Afghan unwilling to disclose her identity in discussion with Anwesha Ghosh, September 2015. 107 Hafizullah Emadi, Op.cit, (2013), 7. 108 Anwesha Ghosh, ‘Marginality and migration: The plight of persecuted religious minorities of Afghanistan’. Refugee Watch Journal, Vol. 45 (2015), 75–85. 109 Hafizullah Emadi, Op.cit, (2013), 12. 110 Mohinder Singh Khurrana (an Afghan-Sikh, currently living in India), in discussion with Anwesha Ghosh, December 2015. 111 An Afghan-Sikh currently living in India, unwilling to disclose his identity in discussion with Anwesha Ghosh, November 2014. 112 Pritpal Singh (Documentary film maker, journalist and an Afghan-Sikh, currently living in United Kingdom), in discussion with Anwesha Ghosh, September 2014. 113 An Afghan-Sikh currently living in India, unwilling to disclose his identity in discussion with Anwesha Ghosh, November 2014. 114 Hafizullah Emadi, Op.cit, (2013), 9. 115 Jassi (an Afghan-Sikh, currently living in India), in discussion with Anwesha Ghosh, December 2014. 116 ‘Women in Afghanistan: Pawns in Men’s Power Struggles’. Report by Amnesty International, (1999).

112  Stages of ‘refugee’ lives 117 Heili Nur (name changed) (an ethnic Afghan, currently living in India), in discussion with Anwesha Ghosh, September 2015. 118 Ashley Jackson, ‘The Cost of War: Afghan Experiences of Conflict, 1978–2009’. Report by Oxfam International, November 2009, 10. 119 Hafizullah Emadi, Dynamics of Political Development in Afghanistan, The British, Russian and American Invasion. (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010), 177. 120 ‘Fitwa-e-Sharia-e-Satrwa-Hijab’ Kabul (August 27, 1993), cited in Helena Malikyar, ‘Development of family law in Afghanistan: the roles of Hanafi Madhhab, customary practices and power politics’. Central Asian Survey, Vol. 3 (1997), 396. 121 An Afghan-Sikh currently living in India, unwilling to disclose her identity in discussion with Anwesha Ghosh, December 2014. 122 ‘Afghanistan: International Responsibility for a Human Rights Disaster’. Report by Amnesty International, (1995). 123 United Nations, The Status of Education in Afghanistan, Vols. I–II (Peshawar: University of Nebraska at Omaha/ESSP, Research and Planning, 1994). 124 Gilles Dorronsoro, ‘Kabul at War (1992–1996): state, ethnicity and social classes’. South Asia Multidisciplinary Academic Journal, Vol. 1 (2007). 125 An Afghan-Sikh currently living in India, unwilling to disclose his identity in discussion with Anwesha Ghosh, November 2015. 126 Hafizullah Emadi, Op.cit, (2010), 177. 127 On December 6, 1992, a large crowd of right-wing Hindu Volunteers (Kar Sevaksely destroyed the16th-century Babri mosque in Ayodhya, India, in an attempt to reclaim the land known as Ram Janmabhoomi (the mythological birthplace of the Hindu God Ram). The demolition occurred after a rally supporting the movement turned violent and resulted in several months of inter-communal rioting between India’s Hindu and Muslim communities, causing the death of thousands of people. 128 Arpita Basu Roy, Afghanistan-Towards a Viable State. (Haryana, Delhi: Hope India Publications, 2002), 104. 129 UNHCR, ‘Statistical Yearbook Country Datasheet – A ­ fghanistan 1995’. Available at: www.unhcr.org/cgi-bin/texis/vtx/search?page=search&docid= 44e5c7402&query=afghanistan%201995 130 Neamatollah Nojumi, The Rise of Taleban in Afghanistan-Mass mobilization, Civil War and the Future of the Region. (New York: Palgrave, 2002), 116. 131 Ashley Jackson, Op.cit. 2009, 10. 132 Arpita Basu Roy, Contemporary Afghanistan, Conflict and Peace Building. (New Delhi: Har-Ananad Publications, 2010), 40. 133 Neamatollah Nojumi, The Rise of Taleban in Afghanistan-Mass mobilization, Civil War and the Future of the Region. (New York: Palgrave, 2002). 134 Arpita Basu Roy, Afghanistan-Towards a Viable State. (Haryana, Delhi: Hope India Publications, 2002), 106. 135 Peter Marsden. The Taleban: War and Religion in Afghanistan. (London, New York, Zed Books, 2002), 113. 136 Olivier Roy as quoted in Donald Wright et al., A Different Kind of War: The U.S. Army in Operation Enduring Freedom, October 2001–2005. (Fort Leavenworth, KS: Combat Studies Institute Press, May 2010), 19. 137 ‘The Taliban’s war on women: A health and human rights crisis in Afghanistan’. Physicians for Human Rights, 1998. 138 Massouda Jan, in conversation with Anwesha Ghosh, September 2013. 139 Wahida Jan, in conversation with Anwesha Ghosh, May 2013. 140 ‘Afghanistan: Flagrant Abuse of Right to Life and Dignity’. Report by A ­ mnesty International, (1998).

Stages of ‘refugee’ lives  113 1 41 142 143 144 145 146 147 1 48 149 150 151 152 153 154 1 55 156 1 57 158 159 1 60 161

162 163 164 165 166 1 67 168 169

Edris Arib, in discussion with Anwesha Ghosh, May 2014. Ahmad Jawed Nejrabi in discussion with Anwesha Ghosh, February 2014. Kaleid Niazi, in discussion with Anwesha Ghosh, May 2015. ‘The Taliban’s war on women: a health and human rights crisis in Afghanistan’. Physicians for Human Rights, 1998. Ahmed Rashid, Taliban: The Story of Afghan Warlords. (London: Pan Books, 2001). Amnesty International, ‘Afghanistan: Massacres in Yakaolong’ (2001); Human Rights Watch, ‘The Massacre in Mazar-e- Sharif (1998). Roger Ballard, ‘The history and current position of Afghanistan’s Hindu and Sikhs Population’. Centre for Applied South Asian Studies, (2011) 4. Available at: www.casas.org.uk/papers/pdfpapers/afghansikhs.pdf. Roger Ballard, Op.cit, 2011, 4–5. Ibid. Human Rights Watch, Enduring Freedom: Abuses by U.S. Forces in Afghanistan, Vol. 16, No. 3(C), March 2004. Available online at: http://hrw.org/reports/2004/ afghanistan0304/afghanistan0304.pdf. Ashley Jackson, ‘The Cost of War: Afghan Experiences of Conflict, 1978–2009‘. Report by Oxfam International, (2009) 12. George W. Bush, Address to a Joint Session of Congress and American People. (Washington DC: White House Press Release, September 20, 2001). George W. Bush on the eve of launching a military offensive code- named Operation Enduring Freedom (October 7, 2001). Ahmad Rashid, Descent into Chaos, How the War against Islamic Extremism is Being Lost in Pakistan, Afghanistan and Central Asia. (London: Penguin Books, 2008). Edris Arib, in conversation with Anwesha Ghosh, July 2013. Anwesha Ghosh, Afghanistan from ‘Enduring Chaos to Enduring Chaos’: Implications for India. (New Delhi: Knowledge World Publishers, 2012), 1. Hafizullah Emadi, Op.cit, (2010). ‘Voluntary Repatriation’, The UNHCR Report. Available at: www.unhcr. org/449aa7c92.pdf. Ashley Jackson, ‘The Cost of War: Afghan Experiences of Conflict, 1978–2009’. Report by Oxfam International, November (2009). Ibid. For example, in 2004, the US provided $18.5 billion in reconstruction assistance to Iraq but less than $2.5 billion to Afghanistan. For more information, see Congressional Research Service, ‘Iraq: Reconstruction Assistance,’ (2008); Congressional Research Service, ‘Afghanistan: U.S. Foreign Assistance,’ (2009). Human Rights Watch, ‘The Human Cost: Consequences of Insurgent Attacks in Afghanistan,’ 2007, Vol. 19, No. 6(C), April 2007. Available at: www.hrw.org/ reports/2007/afghanistan0407/. ‘Lack of Access Hampering Aid Efforts, UN Official Warns,’ UN News Service, August 7, 2009. Ashley Jackson, ‘The Cost of War: Afghan Experiences of conflict, 1978–2009’. Report by Oxfam International, November 2009, 15. ‘UNHCR country Operation Profile-Afghanistan 2015’. Available at: www. unhcr.org/pages/49e486eb6.html. Ibid. Javed Jan, in conversation with Anwesha Ghosh, December 2015. Latif Haidari, in conversation with Anwesha Ghosh, December 2015. ‘Taliban in Afghanistan’. Report by Council on Foreign Relations. Available at: www.cfr.org/afghanistan/taliban-afghanistan/p10551.

114  Stages of ‘refugee’ lives 170 Ashley Jackson, ‘The Cost of War: Afghan Experiences of conflict, 1978–2009’. Report by Oxfam International, November 2009. 171 International Committee of the Red Cross, ‘Views from Afghanistan: Opinion Survey, 2009,’ (2009), Ipsos/ICRC. 172 Khaled Niazi, in conversation with Anwesha Ghosh, April 2016. 173 An Afghan-Sikh currently living in India, unwilling to disclose her identity in discussion with Anwesha Ghosh, November 2015. 174 An Afghan-Sikh currently living in India, unwilling to disclose her identity in discussion with Anwesha Ghosh, December 2015. 175 Ibid. 176 Ibid. 177 An Afghan-Sikh currently living in India, unwilling to disclose his identity in discussion with Anwesha Ghosh, November 2015. 178 Mahinder Singh (an Afghan-Sikh, currently living in India), in discussion with Anwesha Ghosh, December 2015. 179 Ibid. 180 Raj Kaur (an Afghan-Sikh, currently living in India), in discussion with Anwesha Ghosh, December 2015. 181 An Afghan-Sikh currently living in India, unwilling to disclose his identity in discussion with Anwesha Ghosh, April 2016. 182 A respondent unwilling to disclose his identity, in discussion with Anwesha Ghosh, April 2016. 183 K. Erikson, Everything in Its Path. (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1994). 184 J. Herman, Trauma and Recovery. (New York: Basic Books, 1992). 185 A. C. McFarlane, ‘Resilience, vulnerability and the course of post-traumatic reaction’, in B. A. van der Kolk, A. C Mc Farlane and L. Weisaeth (eds.), Traumatic Stress. (New York: The Guilford Press, 1996), pp. 155–181. 186 M. Basoglu, J. M. Jaranson, R. Mollica, and M. Kastrup, ‘Torture and mental health: An overview,’ in E Gerrity, T. M. Keane, and F. Tuma (eds.), The Mental Health Consequences of Torture (New York: Kluwer Academic/Plenum Publishers, 2001). 187 B. Kahana and E. Kahana, ‘Holocaust Trauma and sequelae’, in E. Gerrity, T. M. Keane and F. Tuma (eds.), The Mental Consequence of Torture (New York: Kluwer Academic/Plenum Publishers, 2001). 188 B. Van der Kolk, Psychological Trauma. (Washington, DC: Ameriacn Psychiatric Press, 1987) cited in Reed Caughlan and Judith Owens-Manley, Bosnian Refugees in America, New Communities, New Cultures. (New York: Springers, 2010). 189 R. Mollica, N. Sarajlic, M. Chernoff, J. Lavelle, I. Vukovic, and M. Massagli, ‘Longitudinal study of psychiatric symptoms, disability, morality and emigration among Bosnian refugees’. JAMA, Vol. 286, no. 5, 546–554. 190 M. T. Fullilove, ‘Psychiatric implications of displacement: contributions from the psychology of place’. American Journal of Psychology, Vol. 12 (1996), 1516–1523. 191 Ibid. 192 M. Eastmond, ‘Refugee and Health: Ethnographic Approaches’, in Frederock L. Ahearn, Jr., (ed.), Psychosocial Wellness of Refugees: Issues in Qualitative and Quantitative Research (New York: Berghahn Books, 2000), 177.

4 The settlement experiences of the Afghan ‘refugees’ in India – expectation and reality

For many of us, our initial experiences in India were through the city of ­A mritsar (Punjab). Of course, it was a satisfactory feeling that we could manage to escape death back home. We were optimistic that India would embrace us knowing our predicament. We were hit by the bitter realities rather quickly.1

This young man was in his 20s when he arrived in Amritsar in 1992 with his wife. Three other Hindu and Sikh families from Kabul travelled to India with them, who left India in the next few years and settled in the West. Although he is not in touch with them, he feels ‘achha kiya, sahi samay pe nikal gaye’ (it was a good decision, they left at the right time). The following discussion reports the experiences of the Afghan migrant population in their years of settlement in India. The phenomenon of immigration has been viewed both as a source of problems and as an opportunity for individuals and societies in different studies.2 Psychology, in addition to social science disciplines, has begun to contribute to an understanding of those factors that contribute to making the process positive, rather than negative, in personal and societal ­development.3 As is evident from the previous discussions, the two consequences of immigration are the experience of acculturation by groups and individuals and the emergence of a culturally plural society. More often, it has been observed that when immigrants enter a society (even if it is plural and diverse in its character), the individuals and groups are required to work out ways of living together, adopting various strategies that will allow them to achieve a reasonably successful adaptation to living interculturally. One of the key aspects of strategizing involves negotiations between their ethnic identity and the identification with the new society. This chapter attempts to focus on the broad questions of how ethnic identity and identification with the new society are related to each other. It then analyses how these identities are related to the adaptation of the conflict-displaced Afghan migrants in India. One of the core objectives of this study has been to understand how the lack of an official ‘refugee’ tag as a result of the absence of a structured

116  Settlement experiences of Afghan ‘refugees’ in India refugee legislation in India has impacted the acculturation process of the said population and the (re) constitution of their identities. It is proposed that ethnic and national identities and their role in adaptation can best be understood in terms of interaction between attitudes and characteristics of the immigrants and the responses of the receiving society, moderated by the particular circumstances of the immigrant group in the new society. Immigrant groups as well as individuals in the group arrive in a new country with differing expectations and attitudes about retaining their culture of origin and adopting new attributes from the new society. Within the new society, these attitudes interact with the actual and perceived levels of acceptance of immigrants and with official policies towards immigration. Their initial impressions depended on their prior expectations as well as their perceptions of how well they were received by their ethnic community and by the larger host society. Ethnic identity is likely to be strong when immigrants have a strong desire to retain their identities. When the groups feel accepted both in terms of the governmental position and from the societal point of view, they feel assimilated and the national identity becomes stronger. In the face of real or perceived hostility towards immigrants or towards particular groups, individuals may downplay or reject their own identity; other may assert their pride in their cultural group and emphasize solidarity as a way of dealing with negative attitudes. It might also be seen that immigrant groups tend to negotiate and sometimes play with various identities just for practical purposes or individual benefits. The relationship of these identities to adaptation will likewise be influenced by the interaction of characteristics of specific immigrant groups with those particular settings. As has been established throughout this study, the aim is to study the experiences of a particular immigrant group in a particular setting. This chapter, therefore, attempts to throw light at the interaction between the Afghan ‘refugee’ population and the Indian society of its immediate surroundings. In-depth interviews and group discussions were carried out in formal and informal settings over a period of three years. The respondents underwent a range of emotional responses when they remembered their experiences during the initial and recent years. During the course of these interviews, certain immediate stakeholders, who have been playing a crucial role in shaping their experiences, were identified. The Afghan ‘refugee’ population in India has been interacting with these stakeholders on a regular basis and these exchanges have impacted their adaptation experiences to a very large extent. This study acknowledges the importance of dealing with each of these stakeholders in the course of this chapter. However before getting into the relationship and the dynamics they share vis-a-vis the concerned population, it is important to understand the magnitude and spread of the Afghan ‘refugees’ in India.

Magnitude and spread of Afghan ‘refugees’ population in India Thousands of Afghans have been living in India for years. It is difficult to estimate and arrive at a meaningful number as far as the magnitude and

Settlement experiences of Afghan ‘refugees’ in India  117 spread of Afghan ‘refugees’ in India. Their number will obviously depend on the definition of ‘refugee’ one utilizes: registered and non-registered refugees, recognized refugees, asylum seekers, etc. Apart from the dilemma pertaining to the definition, there are certain other complications that make counting of the community difficult. First being the lack of availability of data. Secondly, even if there are certain data, the figures vary somewhat disturbingly, from one refugee agency to another. Estimates of Afghan ‘refugees’ and asylum seekers in India range from 30,000 in 2009 to 11,400 in 2011.4 According to a study carried out by South Asia Human Rights Documentation Centre (SAHRDC) in 1999, there were approximately 60,000 Afghans living in India, of which mere 16,000 possessed UNHCR Certificates.5 Indian Government has not recognized them as political refugees. The UNHCR often plays a complementary role to the efforts of the Government, particularly with regard to verification about individual’s background and the general circumstances prevailing the country of origin.6 The number of Afghan refugees that reached India between 1990 and 1999, based on the UNHCR report, is approximately around 166,000, an estimation which is starkly different from several other estimations.7 A report from the Human Rights Law Network titled, ‘Report of Refugee Population In India’ indicated that after the withdrawal of the Soviet Union from Afghanistan and during the subsequent civil war phase, approximately 60,000 Afghans took refuge in India.8 In an article published by Al Jazeera on the situation of Afghan refugees in India at the wake of NATO withdrawal in 2014, 18,000 Afghan refugees were estimated to be living in India.9 A sample survey conducted among 953 displaced persons from Afghanistan in New Delhi, the number of Afghan ‘refugees’ living in India was estimated to be between 30,000 and 40,000.10 These Afghan ‘refugees’ interviewed for the current study also indicated a similar figure when they were asked to provide a tentative estimation of the numbers of conflict-displaced Afghans currently living in India. Government data are difficult to find; as the organization responsible for the registration of foreigners, under the Ministry of Home Affairs (MHA), Government of India, the Foreigners Regional Registration Office (FRRO) was reluctant to impart with any information on the pretext that Right to Information Act does not apply on them. However, one of the earlier Parliamentary proceedings of the Lok Sabha (Lower House of the Indian Parliament) indicated that there are a total of 11,753 Afghan refugees in India of which 10,521 live in Delhi and 1,215 in Haryana in the year 2003.11 This study identified another occasion when the issue of refugees was discussed in the Indian Parliament. In May 2015, in response to a question posed on the issue of Refugee determination System at the Lok Sabha, the Minister of State in the MHA, Shri Kiren Rijiju, identified the number of Afghans, who claim the refugees living in India to be 10,340.12 According to the data gathered from UNHCR New Delhi, the organization assists 10,334 refugees and 1,949 asylum seekers from Afghanistan as of July 2015 of which 7,346 refugees and 79 asylum seekers belong to Sikhs and

118  Settlement experiences of Afghan ‘refugees’ in India Hindu communities of Afghanistan.13 UNHCR India reports suggest that UNHCR assists primarily urban refugees in India, and Afghans are one of the most represented communities receiving UNHCR support and protection.14 UNHCR India is responsible for protecting 26,767 refugees and 5,952 asylum seekers currently living in India. Those under UNHCR protection have access to ID cards recognizing them as ‘refugees’.15 The organization has confirmed that in most cases, these refugees are concentrated in and around the capital city.16 Conflicting data or for that matter availability of reliable data are pertinent issues when it comes to Afghan refugees in India; however, there are several other aspects, information on which is equally difficult to gather. Who are these refugees? What are their ethnicities, religions and places of origin? These things are equally hard to determine definitively because the distinction between the refugees and the migrants often remains blurred and because information on refugees remains scarce and often dubious, as sources are not readily available.17 UNHCR statistics and other reports have also continually confirmed that the religious make-up of Afghan refugees in India is predominantly Sikh and Hindu.18 According to Mr. Manohar Singh, the founder member of the Khalsa Diwan Welfare Society (KDWS),19 Afghan Sikhs and Hindus regard India as their ancestral homeland. Singh argued Our ancestors first went to Afghanistan during the time of King Ranjit Singh in Lahore [during the 19th Century], when it was still part of India. Many others fled from Lahore to Afghanistan during partition in 1947 as it was unsafe to go back to India.20 Shri Kajinder Singh Khurrana, senior member of the Hindu-Sikh Welfare Society (HSWS), indicated that since early 1990s, that is, with the escalation of civil war in Afghanistan, more than 30,000 Sikhs and Hindus took refuge in India. He also emphasized that the Sikh and Hindu communities were primarily into trading in Afghanistan, and they have always had close business relations with India; ‘therefore apart from the culture-religious linkages, it was the pre-established contact as a result of trade relations, that made many Afghans decide in favour of migrating to India’.21 Both KDWS and HSWS, the two most important bodies working for the welfare of the religious minorities of Afghanistan in India, attested that an overwhelming majority of Afghans living in India belong to these communities. However, this has not been the case throughout. According to scholars like Manik Chakraboty22 and Julie Baujard,23 it is essential to make distinction between the earlier Afghan refugees who arrived in India and the ones who came from 1992. The former were not necessarily Hindus and Sikhs; they also included Muslims from the middle and upper classes. They travelled with valid travel documents and in most cases saw India as a temporary halt before they moved to the West to seek asylum. The latter, by contrast, were by a great majority of Hindus and Sikhs. This, therefore, suggests that the

Settlement experiences of Afghan ‘refugees’ in India  119 religious minorities from Afghanistan did not constitute the majority in the first years of exile and that this trend underwent a major shift in the 1990s. This idea has been seconded time and again by the respondents as has been showcased in the course of the previous chapter that attempted to capture the circumstances in Afghanistan that drove people to flee their countries. India-based Afghanistan experts like Mondira Dutta24 and Gulshan Sachdeva25 also stress the importance of distinguishing between the Afghan political elite and the bulk of Afghan refugees in India made up of the religious minorities, namely Hindus and Sikhs. Dutta pointed out that the Afghans who arrived in the 1980s were mainly the Pashtun elite and they were not conflict-displaced. Although conflict had existed throughout this period in some form, yet the people who left Afghanistan before 1990s were not leaving because of conflict. After the Soviets withdrew, many Soviet sympathizers were forced to leave Afghanistan. Because of India’s close ties with the Soviet Union, India did not made much noise about the Afghan migration. But as the situation started deteriorating in Kabul since the beginning of the 1990s, more and more people started entering India. With the beginning of the acute phase of conflict in 1992, thousands of common Afghans were displaced. As is evident from the previous discussions, majority of them migrated to the neighbouring Muslim countries, while the members of Hindu and Sikh started leaving for India via Pakistan. Annie Sophie Bentz26 pointed out that the arrival of the relatively well-off business men did not put an end to the Afghan elite’s flight to India, some of them continued to come to India, especially during the dangerous periods, such as the outbreak of civil war in 1992 and when the Taliban came to power in 1996. She mentions about the family of former Afghan President Najibullah, who was sent to New Delhi in 1992. Perhaps one of the significant changes between the two periods was the fact that from second half of the 1990s, the Afghan elites who came to India were not only composed of the Pashtuns, others, especially elites who were close to the Northern Alliance, also started coming to India. India provided Afghans with an alternative option of refuge in addition to Pakistan and Iran. What makes the phase starting from the year 1992 rather interesting is the fact that from this period, different communities of Afghan ‘refugees’ – Hindus and Sikhs, on one hand and Muslims, on the other – started coexisting in India. Although it has been suggested by various sources that the balance of these categories was quick to tilt towards a majority of Afghans of Hindu and Sikh faiths. A report published by Human Rights Law Network on various refugee groups living in India even observed that almost 90% of the Afghan refugees living in India currently belong to the religious minority communities.27 The interviews conducted with various Afghan communities for the current research indicated that after the rise of Taleban insurgency in the post2005 Afghanistan, many Muslim Afghans have migrated to India. Some of the Afghan ‘refugees’ belonging to the Christian faith also came to India for refuge. An article published estimated a presence of around 200–250 Afghan converts from Islam to Christianity to be living in New Delhi currently.28

120  Settlement experiences of Afghan ‘refugees’ in India For many, India’s secular appeal has been a major attraction point. In most cases like the Hindus and Sikhs, the Christian ‘refugees’ from Afghanistan are also reluctant to return to their homeland. The following section introduces the sample used for this particular study. Because of the paucity of available data on the community, this research largely generated primary data in addition to months of detailed observational study. The group discussions conducted were based on the use of questionnaires based on a semi-structured format, which allowed for adapting the interview questions to suit the personal demeanour and background of the interviewees. Interviews have been carried out with not only the displaced group but also various other relevant stakeholders with whom they interact on a regular basis. A sample of 54 displaced persons from Afghanistan was selected for the study.

Sample Details To begin with, a total of 57 samples were interviewed. After careful scrutiny, a total of 54 questionnaires were selected for this study. The samples were selected on the basis of area of concentration and discussions with eminent members of the Afghan communities in India and UNHCR India office. A major chunk of the refugees were contacted during the occasions such as Diwali, Baisakhi (New Year’s day for Sikhs) and also during a marriage ceremony of members of the Afghan-Sikh community at various Gurudwaras, a large section of Afghan refugees were present. Some of the Christian refugees were protesting in front of the UNHCR Delhi office, so their interviews were carried out at a park close to the protesting venue. The respondents between the age group of 45 and 65 years were more receptive. They were Afghan-born and had spent more time in Afghanistan. Religion The sample survey shows that the majority of the respondents were Sikhs constituting 61% of the sample size. Muslims constituted 22% of the respondents, followed by Hindu and Christian respondents who were 9% and 8%, respectively, of the total respondents from Afghanistan. Afghan Sikhs and Hindus therefore constituted 70% of the total sample size. Since several other sources have continually confirmed that the religious minorities of Afghanistan, namely Sikhs and Hindus constitute an overwhelming majority of the Afghan refugees in India, the overt representation of these two communities within the sample was not seen as problematic. Gender Thirty-eight out of 54 (70%) in the sample surveyed were men, while 16 respondents (30%) were women. The women folk were either reluctant to come

Settlement experiences of Afghan ‘refugees’ in India  121 out or speak without the permission of the male members of the family. Sometimes, they politely turned down the interview offer by citing that she is illiterate and uninformed person and that her responses will not count much. However, because the interviewer happened to be a woman, sometimes getting access to women, striking an informal conversation with them and their household became relatively less cumbersome. Although the sample may portray a gender-based perspective with a mere 30% representation of females, yet those voices are extremely important. Age The sample consists of six second-generation Afghan respondents. These respondents were born and brought up in India and had very less contact with Afghan culture or tradition. Care was taken to avoid too young or too old people. Almost 38% (highest) of the respondents were from the age group of 45–55 years and 19% were between 55 and 65 years of age. Majority of the 45 plus years respondents were from the Hindu and Sikh Afghan communities. 33% of the respondents were between the age group of 25 and 35 years. Most of the Muslim and Christian respondents fell into this group. The older generation, having spent considerable time in Afghanistan as well as in India, was in a much better position to talk about their experiences in both their home and host countries. Language Sometimes, language may pose a big barrier in interacting and intermingling with the host population. Due to ethnolinguistic ties, some of the respondents already were familiar with one of the regional languages, that is, Punjabi. Although the Punjabi-speaking members of the host society identify certain differences in the dialect, the Kabuli-Punjabi can also be understood by certain sections of the host population and vice versa. Majority of Afghan-Sikh respondents (except for the Sahajdhari Sikh group originally from Khost province of Afghanistan) spoke Kabuli-Punjabi at home in Afghanistan. Almost all first-generation Afghan respondents knew Dari (the Darbari version of Persian) irrespective of their religion and some knew Pashto as well. Majority of the respondents knew Hindi reasonably well. The Christian and Muslim refugees, many of who came to India after 2005, spoke Hindi, although with some difficulty. Many of them credited the Hindi films, Indian television series and the environment in which they were living for their proficiency in Hindi. Country of birth Out of 54 respondents interviewed for this study, 48 persons (89%) were born in Afghanistan and had spent considerable time of their lives in Afghanistan. Six respondents (11%) were second-generation Afghans who were

122  Settlement experiences of Afghan ‘refugees’ in India born and raised in India. Parents of each and every member interviewed were born in Afghanistan. It was extremely crucial to talk to Afghans who had lived in both the home and the host country for considerable periods to capture the tension between identities that they have experienced. At the same time, it was interesting to see how the second generation of Afghans living in India saw themselves. Educational background The sample revealed that a total of 50% of the respondents were illiterate. This is by any standard a substantial proportion among the displaced population and this factor has a significant bearing in the quality of life they lead in India. The previous chapter has indicated that many Sikh respondents were educated in the local Gurudwaras in Afghanistan. Around 20% of the respondents attested that they had completed primary education in their home countries. First-generation Afghan women in most cases did not have access to formal education. Out of the literate people, around 15% completed graduation that included second-generation Afghan respondents who were born in India. Period of migration from Afghanistan to India The period of migration has been arranged according to historical events that occurred in Afghanistan. Majority of the respondents migrated in the year 1992 although the process of migration started much earlier. However, among the respondents, majority (61%) were forced to leave Afghanistan during the period 1992–1996 and again after 2005 as a result of increasing insecurity in the country. The decade of 1990s witnessed a major refugee flow from Afghanistan to India and that constituted around 78% of the total sample size including both first-generation respondents and the testimony of the second-generation respondents who identified the same period of migration of their families. Even within that decade, the years between 1992 and 1996 remain the most crucial years which saw very high rate of displacement. Only 8% of the total respondents said that some of their family members are still in Afghanistan. Place of origin Majority of the displaced respondents were from the capital city of Afghanistan, Kabul (68%), followed by Khost province (15%), Ghazni (7%), Jalalabad (6%) and Kunar (4%). Mode of travel Thirty respondents (56%), who came after 1992, crossed Pakistan to reach India via land route. When they described their journey from Afghanistan

Settlement experiences of Afghan ‘refugees’ in India  123 to India, for most, the modes of transport have been trucks and buses till Pakistan. From Pakistan, they took trains to cross the Atari border and reached Amritsar. From Amritsar, they again took trains to reach Delhi. Majority of the Sikhs and Hindus came to India in this manner, in most cases without proper documents. Although very few in number, some Sikhs and Hindus respondents did travel by flight in the early 1990s. Majority of the Muslim and Christian respondents who migrated to India after 2005 said that they took the air route and had valid travel documents. Reasons for displacement As expected, majority of the respondents cited reasons such as life threat, security issues and hostile environment as factors behind their decision to leave Afghanistan. Religious discrimination as a factor was cited by the religious non-Muslim minorities. Fear of Taliban was also mentioned by respondents. Selecting India as a destination The ethnic affiliation and ancestral roots normally played a dominant role in attracting the distressed. Among the respondents, most of Sikhs and Hindu respondents accepted that ancestral roots did convince them to consider India. Each and every respondent (first-generation Afghan in India) identified India’s secular image as a point of major attraction. Most of the respondents accepted that India portrayed a better image in terms of economic prospect, supportive relations and cultural ties. Some of the ‘other factors’ that came up during the interviews were the pre-established business connections that many of the respondents had with India. Those who came to India after 2005 often pointed at their unpleasant experiences in Iran and Pakistan (where they had taken refuge earlier) as reasons for considering India as an alternative option. Some identified the impact of Bollywood, and the image of India they had as a result of watching Hindi movies back home or in Pakistan also influenced their decision to choose India when they started fleeing Afghanistan after 2005. Besides the survey, individual interviews and group discussions with Afghan refugees, this study also gathered information about the said population from different sources; some of the sources include: • • • • • • •

The UNHCR India office at Vasant Vihar, New Delhi SLIC (UNHCR Partner organizations working with Afghans) BOSCO (UNHCR Partner organizations working with Afghans) Khalsa Diwan Welfare Society, Old Mahavir Nagar The Afghan Desk, Ministry of External Affairs, South Block Foreigners Division, Ministry of Home Affairs Foreigners Regional Registration Office (FRRO), R.K. Puram, New Delhi

124  Settlement experiences of Afghan ‘refugees’ in India Table 4.1  Sample Distribution in Delhi and Faridabad Sl.No 1

2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11

• • •

Area Covered

Sample Size

Percentage of Sample

Tilak Nagar, Delhi; Guru Nanak Darbar, Manohar Nagar; Guru Harrai Saheb Kakrola, Palam Mor; Kerala, Angad Devji, Karala, Anjad Devji, Chandra Vihar Greater Kailash (II) Gurudwara Chittaranjan Park (C.R. Park) Munirka, Delhi Malvia Nagar – Khirki Extension Defence Colony Gurudwara Amar Das – Mahavir Nagar (Sahaj dhari Sikhs) Khanpur, Mehrauli Lajpat Nagar Jangpura Faridabad Total

14

26

9 4 2 2 1 8

17 7 4 4 2 15

4 5 3 2 54

7 9 5 4 100%

South Asia Human Rights Documentation Centre (SAHRDC) Parliament Library, Central Secretariat, New Delhi The Embassy of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, Chanakyapuri, New Delhi

It is evident that whatever may be the magnitude of Afghan refugees in India, they mostly concentrated in Delhi and near Delhi (Faridabad, Haryana) and accordingly the sample of this study is concentrated in these regions. As reflected in Table 4.1, the samples were collected from the following areas in Delhi and nearby areas over a period of three years by the author.

Contact, interaction and adaptation in the host society Initial impressions were shaped, in part by the timing of arrival and, in part, by expectations that had been developed prior to departure from Afghanistan. The social origins of recent arrivals also affected their perceptions of India. Relatively affluent city dwellers reported disappointments, especially if they had left early with their memories of pre-war Afghanistan intact. The working-class Afghans, who had endured years of instability and deprivation, as a result of conflict, on the other hand, were relieved just to leave the conflict behind. They arrived in India after 1992 which according to them was ‘relatively late’. Around 78% of the respondents (or their parents in case of second-­ generation respondents) had left Afghanistan in the 1990s, while 22% left

Settlement experiences of Afghan ‘refugees’ in India  125 Afghanistan after 2005. The ethno-religious composition of the respondents who arrived in India in those two phases has been quite different. While the arrivals of the first phase predominantly were Afghan Sikhs and Hindus, the ones who came after 2005 were Muslims and Christians. The experiences of the two groups of migrants from Afghanistan were evidently different as neither the circumstances of their departure from home country nor the arrival in the host country was similar in case of these two groups. The sample distribution is evidently tilted towards the arrivals of the 1990s; yet in this section, attempt has been made to bring forth the experiences of both the groups. For most of the early arrivals, the first stop was Amritsar, a city in the north Indian state of Punjab. One Afghan-Sikh couple in their sixties, who came in the early 1990s, said: Reaching India was like being born again. We were happy that we could escape war and reach Amritsar- the holiest place for any Sikh. But perhaps even more because after years we were feeling ‘safe’ and ‘secure’… we re-discovered ‘peace’ in a foreign land. Unfortunately that feeling was short lived!29 Immediately after reaching Amritsar, many families were accommodated at the guesthouses of different Gurudwaras in the city. They would eat at the langar (food offered by Gurudwaras) and interacted mostly with Indian Sikhs who looked at them with sympathy. But soon we realized that we have to fend for ourselves and we cannot continue to depend on the help of the Gurudwara for ever. Understanding how things work in India was a big challenge. For days and months we were finding it difficult adjust to the new environment, there was hardly anybody to guide me here.30 Something as basic as finding a place to rent can be difficult in an unknown land. To cook food we needed the gas connection, but for us getting a connection was not easy…this is just an example, but it was true for each and every step we took.31 While describing the initial phases in Amritsar, an elderly couple described an incident on the condition of anonymity. After being really frustrated with their situation in the city, some of the Afghan migrants went to the district collector’s office and explained the situation in which they had to leave Afghanistan and what sort of problems they were encountering in India. It was a struggle at every step. I could not take it any more and while explaining things to him I was simply chocked. He was a nice man and very respectfully asked ‘Sardarji, what can I do for you?’. I pleaded to him, please see to that ensure we have a roof over our head and bread to eat. He then Verbally ordered his subordinates to see that we (around

126  Settlement experiences of Afghan ‘refugees’ in India twenty families from Afghanistan, who went to meet him) get places to rent and also issued Ration Cards32 to us, so that we can get wheat at a reasonable price and also can apply for a gas connection without which we cannot cook. According to the respondent, the members of those twenty families got a chit from the collector’s office and they were asked to show that to procure their ration card. It was a great assistance for them at that point of time. They got access to food items, which were not too expensive, they could get gas connection for themselves and also the rent they paid was not unjustified. But after more than 20 years, this particular family had to face tremendous problem because of this one step and they were almost deported back to Afghanistan. Even while explaining what had happened to them, the elderly ­Afghan-Sikh gentleman shook in fear. He explained that they could not stay in Amritsar for too long. For better employment opportunities, they shifted to Delhi. Eventually, they acquired the UNHCR ID card and have been living in India for more than 25 years on visa issued by FRRO. A few years back, he was asked to submit all the documents he had and he submitted everything including his ration card. This time, their visa was cancelled on the ground that they had illegally procured ration card, a document that is only for the citizens of India. We explained everything. Nobody was ready to believe us. They asked us to show the chit issued by the collector’s office. We frantically searched for it but in these twenty years, after so many shifting it must have been misplaced and could not show that. As a result, we were ordered to leave India. Can’t tell you what our situation was, it was hell! Only we know how we stopped them from deporting us back to Afghanistan. His wife informed that they had to pay lots of money in bribe to Indian officials and only after that their visa was issued. They were extremely hesitant to share this experience because they said, ‘We have had enough, do not want to get into more trouble’. They also pointed out that similar or worse things have happened to Afghans in India and they felt that such things could have been avoided if there were people to guide them through the initial phases. Settling in an urban space Many of the respondents who had initially reached Punjab informed that they left that place within a few months of their stay due to limited opportunities and shifted to Delhi and nearby areas. The government figures indicated earlier also confirm that an overwhelming majority of Afghan refugees live in Delhi and nearby areas. Since New Delhi is a very big city, they felt that it would be easier for them to get employment there. Some also

Settlement experiences of Afghan ‘refugees’ in India  127 explained that because Delhi is the national capital, people from all over India migrate there for better opportunities; therefore, they felt Delhi would be more receptive to outsiders. Others thought residing in closer proximity to UNHCR would be beneficial. UNHCR is officially the only body that is ‘responsible’ for us. Logistically it made sense for us to opt for Delhi as opposed to any other city in India.33 Delhi hosts a significant Punjabi population; as a result, a large section of the population there speaks and understands the language. Although the Kabuli-Punjabi that the migrants spoke was a bit different from that of the Punjabi spoken by Indians, yet communication was not very difficult. Some people therefore cited that this language factor also influenced their decision in favour of Delhi to some extent. For the relatively affluent section of Afghans, Delhi was the obvious choice since many of them had established networks because of their prior business relations. Some had even visited Delhi several times before they decided to migrate and were aware of the place. Their friends, people from business network in India, also helped them find accommodation and other necessary things in Delhi. For us UNHCR’s location was not a matter of concern as we never went to seek any assistance from them. Because my family had been conducting business with an Indian company and shared good relations, so my father’s business partner expressed his wish to host us when we reached India. It was not very difficult for us.34 For the Afghans who came in the later phases, New Delhi was their first destination. Since 2002/2003, more and more Afghans had started coming to India for various purposes and thereby slowly they started forming their networks in India. Lajpat Nagar and Amar Colony areas in South Delhi in particular became very popular among the Afghans. They started renting apartments in these areas and slowly as the number of Afghans increased, several restaurants, hotels and travel agency businesses started developing to cater to the needs of Afghans. When Azizullah first reached New Delhi in the end of 2005, the Indian taxi driver took him to that area. I did not have any idea about New Delhi. I did not even speak Hindi since I had lived in Iran. The cab driver understood that I am an Afghan so when I asked him to take me to a hotel, he brought me to Lajpat Nagar.35 Many Afghans who came during the same period said that they had lived in hotels for the initial days and then they established contacts with the local

128  Settlement experiences of Afghan ‘refugees’ in India people who helped them find accommodation in New Delhi. Mostly, people said that Indians had helped them (in exchange of money). In the process, some had good while some had bad experiences. Met an Indian man at the airport. He said he has helped many ‘Afghanis’ to settle down in India and he can help me as well. I did not have a choice but to trust him. He took me to a hotel in South Extension and asked me to give him some advance for his services. It was my first day and till that time I had not even converted my currency. He took $ 200 from me and disappeared.36 According to the respondents, such incidents started happening much later. Initially when Afghans came to India, local people were nice and many helped them find houses in Delhi. Some shared information about agencies which rent apartments, while some introduced to the local broker, although most of them said they provided such services in exchange of money. My first landlord told me about the UNHCR office at Jorbagh.37 Today, Afghan refugees are scattered in pockets throughout Delhi, generally at the outskirts of the city where the rents are lower. The neighbourhood of Lajpat Nagar has the largest refugee population and is also where the more prosperous refugees live, though there are thousands of impoverished refugees in the area as well as surrounding ones, especially east of Kailash and Nehru Nagar. Many other refugees live in outlying areas such as Tilak Nagar, Mukherjee Nagar and Faridabad (in Haryana), where they face prohibitive travel expenses to hospitals and the UNHCR mission. Self-settlement: a choice of compulsion? More than the host society, the Afghans depended upon each other at the initial stage. The case of Afghan refugees in India can be seen as a classic case of ‘self-settlement’ where the refugees made their own choices about where they would reside without any formal or informal assistance from the host government. Those who had shifted earlier and had more experience guided the newcomers and helped to settle down. Many of them therefore started living in the same areas. While conducting this study, it was realized that the Afghan-Sikh families are concentrated mostly in the Western and Southern parts of Delhi. The Hindu respondents informed that although members of their community are spread all across Delhi, a reasonably big concentration of Hindus can be found in Faridabad, in the outskirts of Delhi. The Lajpat Nagar and Malvia Nagar areas in South Delhi host a significant Afghan population especially from the Muslim religious community. The Afghans who were economically prosperous chose to reside in the affluent neighbourhoods of South Delhi.

Settlement experiences of Afghan ‘refugees’ in India  129 Different approaches have been undertaken across the world for the settlement of the refugees. Stereotypical view suggests that they are put up in a secluded camps. Eminent scholars like James Hathaway38 and Oliver Bakewell39 have been critical about the encampment of refugees because of their narrow policy focus and have vouched for a more flexible way of life experienced in self-settlements by the refugees. Encampment primarily refers to a policy which requires refugees to live in a designated area set aside for exclusive use of refugees, unless they have gained specific permission to live elsewhere. The host state is obliged to ensure that the human rights of the refugees are upheld, including rights to shelter, food, water, sanitation and healthcare, and education, but how these are delivered varies enormously.40 The academic debates about camps and settlements have ebbed and flowed over the years but there seems to be a consensus: the encampment of refugees is undesirable. UNHCR data in 2012 suggested that across the world, the number of refugees outside the camp exceeds those within.41 Same data sources also indicate that majority of the refugees in the developing countries stay away from camps, regardless of the host government policy and the law. Because Indian Government does not see Afghans as ‘refugees’, there was no attempt made to encamp them. They live in areas, which are inhabited by Indians. Thereby both the migrant and the host population get ample opportunities of interaction on a day-to-day basis. Sometimes, language can be a big barrier in intermingling with the local people. Due to the ethnolinguistic ties, a significant section of the respondents were already familiar with the local language and did not face much difficulty in expressing themselves freely with the fellow counterpart in Delhi. Twelve out of total fifty-four respondents (22%) had received Indian citizenship, while thirty-five of them (64%) have been protected under the UNHCR mandate and had access to the Refugee ID Card issued by the organization. Five respondents (9%) expressed that their asylum applications have been rejected by the UNHCR and they have been living in the country on Visa, while three respondents (5%) admitted that they have been living in India without any legal document. There seems little doubt that self-settlement can leave refugees in a more precarious formal legal position. Their refugee status may remain unrecognized by the state and even, in practice, by UNHCR, who may be unable to extend their effective protection to the self-settled. If refugees have settled themselves without making themselves known to the authorities, they remain invisible to UNHCR and any protection it may offer. It is true that many refugees may choose the option of self-settlement if they have a choice and put forward various reasons for that. But for the Afghans in India, that has not been the case. For them, it was the only option available to them. Afghan refugees often have trouble finding accommodation. Delhi natives commonly assume that people from the Islamic countries are wealthy, and genuinely needy refugees often encounter rapacious Indian landlords

130  Settlement experiences of Afghan ‘refugees’ in India demanding higher rent rates from them. There is no denying that there are some Afghan refugees who are well-off, but the overwhelming majority do not have substantial income sources and live in cramped dilapidated flats with little furniture. Some of the families interviewed for this study lived in flats with one or two rooms in which anywhere from 4 to 13 people must live. Certain places such as Krishna Park Colony, Khanpur are areas known for antisocial activities. People with better choices would never want to live there. Refugees pointed out that in the evening, even the autorickshaws refuse to go there because of the bad reputation of that area. In certain places such as Nehru Nagar, the local infrastructures are not in place. The residents complained that they had to walk for more than 1 kilometre to get clean drinking water. Even in prosperous areas such as Lajpat Nagar, Mohammad Zaikria Ahmadi lives with his four family members in a less than 3-metre long and 1.25-metre wide room. In the same locality, another seven-member family lives in a room that is only slightly larger: 2-metre wide and 5-metre long.42 Many Afghan refugees in Delhi are at the mercy of landlords who continuously raise the rent and threaten them with eviction. The survey by SAHRDC43 mentioned about Mohammad Usman’s condition, who lived in a single room with two doors, one opening into the street, and the other into the front corridor of the building in which he lives. Due to the heat, he usually kept these doors open in summer time, when cows from the street occasionally wander in and the warlord’s dogs constantly intruded. The dogs often push into our room. They make a mess. They track dirt through the house, and they knocked over our table. We have asked the land lord to keep the dogs out of our space, but he says that he would rather have the dog happy than us, so if we do not like it we can move. Based on the information gathered for this study, it can be said that UNHCR did not assist any refugee in finding housing, nor did it maintain any place where refugees can stay temporarily after arriving in India. Officials at SAHRDC have been told by UNHCR that any effort on its behalf to set up hostels would be discouraged by the Indian Government, as they ‘might be detrimental to India’s interests’.44 While UNHCR is not directly responsible for the precarious living conditions in which most Afghans in India live, it has done little to ameliorate the situation. Regardless, it is clear that a good number of refugees live in conditions that are only marginally above the level of slums. Relationship with UHNCR For many illiterate Afghans who had fled their countries, awareness about international organization such as UNHCR was not there. Therefore, it was not surprising that while conducting the interviews, when people were asked

Settlement experiences of Afghan ‘refugees’ in India  131 about the time they contacted the UNHCR after they reached India, varied responses emerged. A family even informed that they were neither aware of UNHCR nor the FRRO and for years they contacted neither. Many Afghan Sikhs who reached India in the early 1990s expressed that they were not aware of any of the procedures that they were required to follow in India. Slowly, by word of mouth, the information started spreading about UNHCR’s mission in New Delhi and they felt that at least there is one organization which was officially responsible for their well-being in a foreign land, which is why many felt the necessity of moving closer to Delhi. Those who had contacted UNHCR India in the 1990s did not share a cordial relationship with the mission and felt abandoned and betrayed as is evident for a report published in 1999.45 The tensions burst open on 29th July 1999 when a group of more than 100 Afghan refugees staged a sit-in protest outside the UNHCR mission in New Delhi at their Jor Bagh office, effectively hijacking a smaller demonstration by Somali refugees that had been going on for the previous week. Worried by the mass denial of residence permit by the Indian Government and angered by UNHCR’s lack of assistance for refugees seeking settlement abroad, the Afghans were demanding a substantive answer to a letter they had sent to UNHCR expressing their concerns. The protest was one of the most dramatic demonstrations of refugee frustration and despair since July 1994 when Ms. Ajalal, a 27-year-old Afghan woman, burned herself to death at the gate of UNHCR mission. Members of the Afghan community claimed that she was driven to the act by desperation over her living conditions, which has deteriorated considerably after the cancellation of her subsistence allowance by UNHCR. UNHCR, however, maintained that harassment by a group of four Afghan men was the primary cause of her self-immolation. Although the report failed to reach a definite conclusion about the contending claims over the reasons of Ms. Ajalal’s suicide, what was evident from the incidents was the wave of anger and bitterness of the Afghan community towards UNHCR officials in New Delhi and that tensions have been rife between the two sides. Interestingly, the majority of the Muslim and Christian respondents from Afghanistan, who were interviewed and came to India after 2005, had been refugees either in Iran or Pakistan during the 1990s and were quite aware of United Nation’s Refugee Agency. Additionally, by the time they came to India, the Afghans who have been living in New Delhi since 1990s had gained substantial experience to guide their fellow country on the processes they need to follow once they were in India. Afghan nationals who wish to stay in India follow a procedure that is explained by the Indian Bureau of Immigration on a dedicated webpage.46 The only possibilities for a long-term stay are unsurprisingly for education and health-related issues. As part of Assistance Programme, the Indian Government has been providing 1,000 annual long-term University scholarships through Indian Council of Cultural Relations (ICCR) for undergraduate

132  Settlement experiences of Afghan ‘refugees’ in India and postgraduate studies for Afghan students in India – the largest scheme for any country run by ICCR.47 Very recently, India has expanded the programme to invite Afghans to do doctoral research works in India as well.48 Poor healthcare facilities in Afghanistan have encouraged thousands of Afghans to travel to India for medical treatment. According to Mr. Ashraf Haidari, Afghanistan’s deputy ambassador to India, of approximately 1,000 Afghans who come to India everyday, about 70% are health tourists.49 This means that different categories of Afghans have been coexisting in India for quite some time: refugees, who, as already noted, have come at various times in the last 30 years; ‘new’ migrants, who have been coming to India particularly after 2001, thanks notably to scholarship programmes and for medical purposes; and ‘old’ migrants, who came in successive waves and who are settled in India. Because of the close trade relations between the two countries, a category of businesspeople who lived between India and Afghanistan has always existed. Afghan refugees should therefore be seen as part of a larger migration movement from Afghanistan. Their reality however remains different. In effect, India’s non-recognition policy, which, it must be said, is different from the assistance extended to other refugees in India, for example, the Tibetans and the Sri Lankans, has had serious implications for Afghans who have fled there, starting with the fact that help could not and would not come from the Indian state.50 But some kind of protection is extended to the Afghans recognized as refugees by UNHCR. As indicated by the beneficiaries, they have notably been given a refugee certificate (and more recently a refugee identity card) that has enabled them to receive from the Indian authorities the much-desired temporary residence permit, and therefore a right to stay legally in India. While conducting this study, it was realized that although today the awareness about UNHCR and the importance of being under the protection of the organization are considerably high, the respondents did not seem to be happy with the organization. Mostly, people who possess the ‘refugee identity card’ issued by UNHCR indicated that their function pretty much ends there. That document is very important and is recognized by the Indian Government; therefore, the migrants are aware of the difficulties one might face without it. It was realized that majority of the respondents have got in touch with the organization at some point in India irrespective of their current legal status. Each and every member of the Afghan community contacted for this study was aware of the presence of UNHCR’s Mission in India and many of them referred to it as ‘UNHCR Embassy’. As a researcher, the terminology ‘UNHCR Embassy’ caught one’s attention when an appointment was being fixed for an interview with an Afghan refugee over telephone. During the telephonic conversation, the prospective respondent uttered that term ‘UNHCR Embassy’ and suggested it as their preferred venue for the interview. Confusion arose when the researcher reached the Afghanistan Embassy in Delhi at the stipulated time while the

Settlement experiences of Afghan ‘refugees’ in India  133 respondent waited at the UNHCR office. Later on, while conducting the interview of the same person, the question about this terminology was posed. From the response that one got from him and some other people in the course of the subsequent interviews brought forth a few interesting elements about how they saw the organization. When a person is in a foreign land, his country’s embassy is the most important place for him. In case of any problem he goes to his Embassy for help. For us (refugees), going to Afghan Embassy is not an option. That weakens one’s asylum case. For Afghans in India, UNHCR is the most important organization, it is our ‘Embassy’, so we refer to it as ‘UNHCR Embassy’.51 Further enquiry indicated that many people might not put so much thought into a name; they call it ‘UNHCR Embassy’ because they hear others refer to it by that name. Most of the people do not have much education and they might not be aware of the technicalities of these terms. However, Habibullah and his brother Azizullah gave another very interesting explanation. Our Indian neighbors treat us with more respect when we tell them we work at the UNHCR Embassy. They do not know we are refugees. They feel we are educated and rich people when we say we work there, so they treat us with some respect.52 Whatever be the terminology, the fact is that a recognition for the UNHCR puts the displaced population in a better situation than an unrecognized refugee. Evidently, UNHCR is one of the major immediate stakeholders that has been influencing the adaptation process of Afghan refugee community in India and therefore will be discussed in considerable detail later in this chapter. Access to opportunities and services Employment Even the people who are recognized by UNHCR, that is, the legal refugees, are also not allowed to work in India and therefore find it hard to make a living. Occupation for an alien community under the distressing situation, possessing little technology and skills, has hardly any option but to be self-employed. According to a majority of the respondents, 23 out of 54 (43%) were found to be unemployed. Twenty respondents (37%) indicated that they were working under some private owners of factories of shops and 11 respondents (20%) said that they were self-employed. Many of the self-employed respondents were financially well-off, and some even had businesses abroad.

134  Settlement experiences of Afghan ‘refugees’ in India The occupation as per various age groups shows that a large section of displaced people between the age group of 25 and 45 are unemployed. A major chunk of the age group between the age group of 45 and 65 are self-­ employed. Some of the respondents between the age group of 25 and 65 have been working in private jobs which often are low paid. For a very limited period, some refugees who came to India in the 1990s reported that they received subsistence allowance from UNHCR, although the amount was very less, even in respect to that time. Therefore, they, along with the unrecognized refugees, had to look for jobs in the country’s parallel economy. Interviews conducted with the Afghan refugees showed that the jobs held range from waiters, bakers, shopkeepers, street hawkers, small businessmen and impoverished translator. Some refugees informed that they have been employed for a limited period by religious organizations. For example, a Christian couple got a temporary cleaning job at a church, which they were member of. A couple of Sikh refugees said that they are Kirtan singers (prayer singers at Gurudwaras) and get paid from there. Some of the young refugees mentioned that they earn some money by translating for the Afghans who come to India for medical treatments. Especially the Muslim refugees who have learnt Hindi in the years of their stay often said that translation jobs help them earn some money. Age factor does not seem to play a dominant role in the job market, as a considerable number of respondents between the age group of 25 and 45 are unemployed. Majority of the owners of private businesses fall under the age group of 45 and 55. Majority of the self-employed respondents have higher educational qualification. On the other hand, it is amply clear that higher education does not imply jobs in the private sector. Majority of the respondents who work under the private owners are illiterate. One also needs to keep in mind that most of the female respondents were illiterate. The fact the respondents with plus two degree remain unemployed while an illiterate person has more chance of getting a job gives an idea about the skill required for the jobs being offered. Thus, it gives an edge to the employers in the private and unrecognized sector to employ the displaced without having to follow the labour laws. Earning With the kind of occupational structure, income is hardly expected to be sustainable. Majority of the displaced persons (76%) stated that their income was hardly enough to survive. Out of 13 respondents (24%), who said that they had sustainable income, three belonged to the second generation. It was observed that most of the people, who said that they do not face much problems related to income and were financially well-off, are the ones who have got Indian citizenship. All such respondents belonged to the religious minorities of Afghanistan. Most of these people have established businesses in India in sectors such as constructions, trading, export-import,

Settlement experiences of Afghan ‘refugees’ in India  135 etc. Almost all respondents irrespective of their religion did accept that they were much better off and comfortable in Afghanistan as far as their financial situation was concerned. As one of the respondents, on the condition of anonymity, observed: Most of the people of our community (Afghan-Sikh) often say that they were all very well off and had a good life in Afghanistan. I do not say that. Even there, some people were very rich while some were poor. However the fact is, the situation of the poor in Afghanistan was better than the situation of poor here (in India). They realized the hardships of displacement and hoped that they did not have to leave their country. Some respondents did mention that they crave for the situation to become normal so that they could return to their respective places of work and lead a peaceful life but almost in the same breadth, they said that they are quite aware that nothing of that sort will happen within their lifetime. One of the female respondents from the Hindu community, who came to India when she was a few months old and is currently in her twenties, shared something very interesting. She said, she, along with her mother and two sisters, lives with her uncle’s family in Tilak Nagar. My father is based in Kabul. He visits us one in a while. He went back in 2004 after 10 years of relentless struggle in India. He was born and raised in Kandahar, he was comfortable in Pashto and was used to the system of working there. He tried his best to find a job in India, but he could not adjust here. He didn’t have any other choice but to go back, or else we would have starved.53 While describing her father’s struggle in India, she said, her father tried his hands at a few things in India. He worked at a shop of an Indian gentleman who treated him badly, because he was unable to understand the customers (because of his weak Hindi). Then, he tried to sell aloo chat (street food) as a street vendor but police would harass him, as he did not have proper papers. He could not send us to proper schools, there was hardly any money and we had reached almost a dead end. At that point he decided to go back to Afghanistan. We are always stressed and worried because of him. He is into transportation of goods in Kabul but he tells us that he has to close his shop by 4 pm, the security situation is deteriorating each day. A Muslim woman who currently lives with her five children in Mehrauli mentioned that her husband had to go back to Afghanistan almost for similar reasons.

136  Settlement experiences of Afghan ‘refugees’ in India Previously he used to bring dry fruits from Afghanistan and sell in Delhi, In that manner he could earn some money while staying with us. But once he was caught by the Customs. Now he can’t. Whenever he makes some money he comes to India and goes back after a few days. I don’t know how long this will continue.54 While this research was being conducted in Delhi, some Afghan-Christian families were protesting outside the premises of the UNHCR India office at Vasant Kunj in New Delhi. Some of them shared their experiences of getting access to employment in India. Azizullah and his brother Habibullah have been living in India, with their respective families since 2006. The only time the members of these two families found some sort of employment was when Azizullah and his wife were hired by the Church at Mehrauli for cleaning job. It was an employment for six months, where each of them worked from 9 am to 5 pm everyday in return for a payment of Rs. 2,000 per month. They did mention that even that job would not have come their way if they were not recognized by UNHCR. Don Bosco is one of the partner NGOs of UNHCR which primarily is a Christian organization. Since they needed people and knew about this family (who were under UNHCR), they recruited them. Those few months were the only time when we could earn something! Delhi is an expensive place, only God knows in what conditions we are surviving.55 Habibullah further explained the peculiar situation of the Afghan-­Christian, whose situations are even more complex, because of the various types of non-cooperation and alienation they experience for other fellow Afghans. He stated a few points: Firstly, we are not eligible to work with stay visa. Secondly, our fellow country men have made our lives hell, they do not let us work. Thirdly, we are not qualified enough to even think of good jobs. Qualified Indians are struggling to get jobs, so it would be foolish to think of that. Finally, the government do not even acknowledge us, so they are not bothered about the difficulties we face. It is impossible to have respectable life in India.56 According to reports, UNHCR ran a welfare programme which provided subsistence allowance to poor refugees. The allowance was around Rs. 1,400 (19 Euros) per month for an individual or Rs. 4,000 (53 Euros) for a family.57 Some of the respondents did mention about receiving this allowance from UNHCR in the 1990s; however, none of the refugees interviewed testified about receiving any kind of financial assistance from any organization currently. When enquired about this particular programme and the reason for discontinuing it, Ms. Shuchita Mehta of UNHCR India indicated:58 ‘Due

Settlement experiences of Afghan ‘refugees’ in India  137 to cut down of the UNHCR country budget, the subsistence allowance programme underwent major shifts. Today it is only available for “extreme emergency situations”. She further added, ‘UNHCR cannot ensure self sufficiency. We can only help’. Many refugees interviewed mentioned about the ‘need assessment’ visits conducted by Young Men’s Christian Association (YMCA), UNHCR’s implementation partner in Delhi, some years back as its primary tool for monitoring and following up with individual cases. For Refugees at that time, it was a welcome change, because they thought their problems will be highlighted and addressed but later they discovered that rather than an effort to improve the responsiveness, it paved way for the termination of the allowance itself. In a report by SAHRDC titled, The Status of Refugees under UNHCR Protection in New Delhi published in 1995, the exact point was made: the UNHCR has an organized system of need assessment based on file studies and home visits. Need assessments are part of a continuous process and it is incorrect to state that financial assistance to a particular refugee is terminated on the basis of a single home visit.59 The Afghan refugees who had received this allowance from UNHCR up to certain time could not recall any specific reason given by either the YMCA social worker who visited his house or the UNHCR before they got to know that the allowance has been stopped. According to refugees, social workers had cited the presence of furniture or even carpets (of whatever quality) in refugee residences as evidence of prosperity. Such a cursory examination often obliterates cultural nuances and ignores individual predicaments. As a result, tens of thousands of Afghan refugees were ‘re-categorised’ into ineligibility of the financial assistance. By the end of 1994, fewer than 12,000 refugee families in India received subsistence allowance; at the end of 1996, the number was nearly cut down by two-thirds to 4,200 families; by 1998, the number was reduced to 1,500.60 When the issue of subsistence allowance was posed to Ms. Shuchita ­Mehta, Senior Communication/Public Information Assistant, UNHCR India,61 she mentioned that the organization does not have a ‘blanket rule’ regarding that. Currently, less than 5% of the total refugees under UNHCR protection get the allowance; mostly, people with major disabilities are only considered for this. She further added that UNHCR wants the refugees to ‘live with dignity’ and that is why the policy shift took place. Ms. Mehta also mentioned about the Lump Sum Grant Programme that was introduced in November 1993.62 A primary factor in the introduction of the programme was the reduction of UNHCR’s overall financial resources, which were then needed to rehabilitate the new wave of Afghans fleeing-intensified Mujahideen warfare in Afghanistan. For the particular programme, a lump sum grant (between Rs. 10,000 and Rs. 35,000) was provided to refugees, depending on the size of the family to establish him or herself in some sort of livelihood. The lump sum grant was originally awarded to Afghans to ‘break prolonged dependency and motivate refugees to become self sufficient’.63 But it was later observed by UNHCR that they

138  Settlement experiences of Afghan ‘refugees’ in India would often spend that money to fulfil their personal requirements and that would not lead to generation of any livelihood opportunity – a reason that encouraged UNHCR to revoke this programme.64 On the matter of the lump sum grant, several respondents interviewed for the study admitted of receiving it, but many said that they were forced to accept it since it had a clause that those who received it cannot claim subsidiary allowance. Many refugees preferred the monthly flow as opposed to a lump sum grant as they knew that their needs were too overwhelming and somehow the money will evaporate within a few days. Some refugees like Mohammad Usman expressed his preference but he apparently was told that he won’t get the monthly allowance, so either he could take the lump sum or nothing.65 Currently however, this scheme is not functional and the focus has been shifted to vocational trainings through different local NGOs. During the interviews, UNHCR has continually highlighted the works done by its partner NGO, Access Development Services (ACCESS) in generation of livelihood opportunities for Afghan refugees. Ms. Mehta informed that around 750 refugees have been trained for different vocations out of which around 80 individuals got jobs.66 Some of the Afghan refugee women in Delhi have recently started a catering business, under the guidance of ACCESS and named it ‘ILHAM’ (which means ‘positive’ in Dari). According to UNHCR, for Afghan refugee women, who were forced to flee Afghanistan because of conflict, this business not only has worked wonders financially for the partners but more importantly it has been therapeutic.67 Selin Susan Mathew, Project Coordinator with NGO Don Bosco, mentioned about an Afghan refugee named Najeem Khan, who is currently enjoying a celebrity status among the members of his community because he got an opportunity to star in a blockbuster Bollywood film named Bajrangi Bhaijaan, where he played the young age of the Indian superstar Salman Khan.68 While acknowledging that the prohibition of alien employment remains a major problem in India, Ms. Mehta also mentioned: ‘Not every refugee is interested in employment. Especially it has been seen in case of Afghans who have better financial conditions. Many do not want to work, even if they are offered opportunities’.69 One often heard statements like ‘Afghans here are quite rich’, ‘Afghan refugees use the latest model of i-phones which even I cannot afford’ or as a volunteer of the NGO Don Bosco pointed towards a group of Afghan girls in their teens during their Annual Sport Meet event as asked ‘Did you notice their dresses? You think they need financial assistance?’ During informal conversations, one even heard them say, ‘If you go to their houses, you will find everything starting from refrigerator to television’ – although in a very sarcastic manner, point would be raised as to why an Afghan refugee family would exacerbate its precarious financial situation by spending money to purchase television. During the course of the interviews, UNHCR India had repeatedly made it clear that although the majority of Afghans refugees living in India are Sikhs and Hindus, their focus is more on the ‘Ethnic Afghans’, by which they mean the Muslims and Christians because UNHCR believes that ‘the

Settlement experiences of Afghan ‘refugees’ in India  139 Sikhs and Hindus face much less problems because of the ethno-religious and linguistic similarity with the host population and are have more of less integrated in India’.70 When some of the Sikh and Hindu respondents were asked about their responses on the UNHCR India position on them, one of the senior members of the KDWS71 said, We have always felt that their treatment have not been fair and uniform. Yes, there are certain Afghan-Sikhs who are prosperous but to think the same for everybody is silly. So many Hindu and Sikh Afghan men and women are struggling to meet ends…there is no job, no education opportunity for their children, no social security…nothing. He further added, ‘Our tragedy is, UNHCR turns blind eye towards us because they feel we have Indian origin and Indian government turn blind eye and do not give us basic rights because of our Afghan origin. We are just stuck in the middle of these perceptions’. The representative of UNHCR’s partner NGO, Don Bosco’s response on a particular issue confirmed that the feeling of the members of Afghan-Sikhs and -Hindu communities is not baseless. Ms. Selin Mathew said: The focus of our program depends of the focus of UNHCR. At the moment it is on the new arrivals not Sikhs and Hindus of Afghanistan. So far only our Vikaspuri center has a few beneficiaries from the community, otherwise we focus only at ethnic Afghans. For example, the sanitary kit that is provided to Afghan teenage girls are not provided to the girls of the minority groups.72 As far as UNHCR’s official position on them is concerned, in an interview it was expressed that We acknowledge their presence but since part few years the focus of the organization have shifted from the Afghan Sikhs and Hindus to ethnic Afghans.73 For Jassi, an Afghan-Sikh, the struggle to find a source of income has been very hard. After trying really hard, he found a job at a Chemist shop, at Lajpat Nagar Central Market. He lives in a small flat with his wife, two children and ageing parents. His meagre income of Rs. 15,000 is not sufficient but he feels blessed to have at least ‘something’. He compares his current situation with that of Afghanistan’s. We were not particularly well off in Afghanistan. But we ever equal citizens, did not feel inadequate or inferior. After coming here we have been struggling hard just for survival. Yes with my income we probably wont starve to death…but is that everything? What about the future of my daughters? The health problems of my parents?74

140  Settlement experiences of Afghan ‘refugees’ in India Senior members of the Afghan HSWS feel that a section of their community members are still living under trying conditions. Neither UNHCR nor the government feels for our people. We as a community try to be by their side but we cannot be a substitute of either UNHCR or the government. It is true that many of us have prosperous businesses and have tried to employ some of the members from our communities but that is not enough.75 Mahinder Singh Khurrana got his Indian Citizenship a few years back and runs his own construction business in Delhi. Being from an affluent background did make his struggle easier but even then things have not been easy. He knew he could never find a job in India, as the law would not permit him to do many things; therefore, he focused on the business. Even with the background that I come from, the advantage of language and all, doing business in a foreign country was not easy. Firstly, the business environments were very different from what we were used to in Afghanistan. Nobody guided us, warn us of the blocks ahead. We made mistakes, learnt, rectified and moved forward. Sometimes when I look back I fail to understand how did I manage.76 Mahinder Singh, another Afghan Sikh, had a different take on the issue; according to him, it is good that they did not get any support from any quarter. He feels that his community to a large extent is self-reliant; they have worked their way up because they found their own way. He also made an important point about the limitation of Afghans. Because of the situation in Afghanistan, most of us did not have access to proper education there. Majority of the people who came here were illiterates- now what job can they ask for in India? Nobody will offer them white collar jobs and that is justified. Indians themselves have been struggling for a piece of the pie, we came and wanted our share in the same pie, so it is understandable if we are being treated in a particular manner. Things were not as flowery in Afghanistan as many people tend to portray. Even Indians are going through similar struggle as we are going though. I feel it is unfair to make it a community issue.77 Charanjit Kaur,78 a housewife living in one of the most affluent neighbourhoods in Delhi, forwarded a very balanced take on the issue of opportunities enjoyed by members of her community in both host and home countries. She feels that ‘time’ is a very important issue which people tend to ignore. The world 25 years back was different and so were India and Afghanistan.

Settlement experiences of Afghan ‘refugees’ in India  141 In this globalized world, the requirements of people have changed to a large extent, as life has become more complex and competitive. The feeling of not having something is way more stronger that the feeling of having something, at every level. Competition, jalousies have always existed but I feel today they are much more. In India opportunities are there but the competition is hundred times more that what we ever experienced in Afghanistan. In such a competitive space, if a person is already in a back foot because (because of not have access to equal opportunities), he feels frustrated and alienated. Education and vocational training Senior members of Afghan-Sikh and -Hindu communities started KDWS with the aim of educating the future generation of the community. Funding was a major concern, as neither any organization nor the government came forward to assist them in the process. They collected money themselves and with donation from some of the community members living in the West, they started the organization. Since then, the foremost concern of this organization had been the education of the Afghan-Sikh and -Hindu children In India. Currently, they provide assistance for admission in ­Indian schools. India does not have a specific legislation; yet, that provides right to education for refugees in the country. Government of India allows UNHCR mandate refugees to apply for long-time visa work permits. Refugees and asylum seekers have access to basic government services such as healthcare and education.79 Many of the respondents argued that sending children to private schools was beyond their capacities because of the high fees; therefore, some of them got them admitted to the government schools. The respondents mentioned about the importance of assistance they received from UNHCR and KDWS in this regard. Article 28 of the Convention on the Rights of the Child states, ‘Each child has the right to education. The goal is free and compulsory primary education, secondary education (general and vocational) available to all, and higher education on the basis of capacity’.80 The report81 published by SAHRDC on the condition of the Afghan refugees evaluated their condition till the year 1999. According to that, the UNHCR mission in New Delhi, through its partner NGO YMCA, reimbursed some refugee families for the cost of education. Refugees had to pay for the schooling and then bring certificates, grade reports and other evidence of attendance to the NGO to get the reimbursement. The assistance was provided up to 11th standard and not for Higher Education. According to YMCA, 4,672 refugee children were receiving education assistance in 1998 of which only 60 students for 10th grade.

142  Settlement experiences of Afghan ‘refugees’ in India The study observed, among other things, UNHCR’s education policy towards the Afghan refugees to be ‘highly problematic’ for a number of reasons such as: • • •

• • • •

•

The educational stipend was seen to be insufficient to cover tuition fees, let alone cost of uniform and school supplies. UNHCR decisions on other aspects of assistance, such a subsistence allowance, often have serious effects on the ability of the families to send their children to school, even if educational stipend was being given out. The policy of reimbursement, rather than paying of fees directly, may be understandable in light of concerns of fraud. It forced the refugees to come up with the cost of several months worth of schooling before receiving the reimbursement. Some refugee families have simply never received educational assistance funds for their children. Others have been cut off without ever being told why. UNHCR officials have on some occasions pressured refugees to send their children to work rather than to school. An alleged UNHCR policy that encouraged the use of local government schools in every country had caused disagreement between local UNHCR staff and refugees over the value of English-language versus Hindi-language education. Due to time lost, many refugee children are often surrounded by classmates who are much younger. In some cases, refugees have had aid cutoff after reaching a certain age but while still studying in a relatively low class.

Currently, Don Bosco Ashalayam (Don Bosco) is working with UNHCR India to implement its programmes related to education, vocational training and health-related issues of the refugees. In an interview, the Project Co-coordinator of the organization explained the activities undertaken by the organization for the refugees.82 According to Don Bosco, they have been playing an important role to ensure that the refugee children have access to Government Schools. Thereby they help them in the admission process, and provide tuition classes at their centres. They offer bridge classes to enable refugee children to take admission tests and offer language (English, Hindi) and computer training classes. The organization also mentioned about their Creche facilities that they run for young children, distance learning programmes for school dropouts and National Open School for 10th and 12th standard students. They informed that Government sometimes provide books to children and although not on a regular basis they run tuition classes at their centres. Mention was made about the DAFI Scholarship programme that is run jointly by the German Embassy and the UNHCR, whereby every year they announce slots to provide Scholarships to students for their Bachelor studies.

Settlement experiences of Afghan ‘refugees’ in India  143 The scholarship includes payment of admission fee, registration fee, tuition classes and money to buy books. A monthly stipend of Rs. 3,800 is provided to the selected candidates. Regarding Higher Education, it was informed that mostly the refugees have to opt for distance learning at Indira Gandhi National Open University or Delhi University. Don Bosco did mention that the fees paid by foreigners for regular courses are much more higher than what an Indian national pays, which can be challenging for the refugee family. Therefore, both UNHCR and BOSCO have tried to request and have done advocacy with the Government to reduce the fee for the refugees which did not bore any fruit so far. KDWS mentioned that although UNHCR never paid them money but sometimes helped them in other ways like sending trainings, donating equipment, etc.; however, all these have stopped now. One member showed the medals and mementos won by the students at different competitions organized by UNHCR and its partner NGOs for the refugee children. They have kept all the trophies in their office and proudly said ‘Although they do not help for our children or provide assistance to them, yet they always outdo other children in these competitions and make us proud’.83 Khalsa Diwan Society acknowledges that the Afghan-Sikh and -Hindu community needs the support from UNHCR and feels that the children would be greatly benefitted if they got access to the opportunities the children of Muslim refugees are getting. Just to give an example, one of the members pointed out that both KDWS and Don Bosco run English-language training centres. KDWS mentioned that they are running it because the children of their community cannot access the training given by BOSCO. Secondly, they feel that organizations have better human resources in terms of trainers and facilitators in comparison to them because of the limitation of the funds. We have refugee card issued by UNHCR, same as the Muslims from Afghanistan. Yet our children cannot enjoy the benefits of the educational or vocational training programs they run. Since they don’t, we had to come forward.84 While the field research was being conducted, the Annual Sports Meet was taking place where many refugee children currently under the UNHCR protection participated.85 Although not the ideal occasion, yet this event provided some opportunities to interact with the beneficiaries who praised the work done by UNHCR and BOSCO. The responses could have been influenced by the sheer presence of NGO officials. Whenever there have been opportunities to inquire about the assistance they get from UNHCR to get access to education and health services, the response has been standard – ‘Naam ke waaste’, which implied that the programmes they have been running are ‘ just in name’ and lack depth and capacity to bring any significant positive change in their lives.

144  Settlement experiences of Afghan ‘refugees’ in India A Muslim refugee unwilling to share his identity said This school thing is just an eye wash. They said they will help in my daughter’s admission and then they admitted my 14 year old daughter in the fourth standard of a local government school. I had to take her out and put in a private school after that….that sort of assistance they provide!86 An Afghan-Hindu family said, whoever can afford does not send their children to government schools in Delhi. The standard is low, they do not teach properly, they do not teach English…what future will they have after getting educated from there. But private schools charge so much money from the foreigners, how can we pay that, so we let our children go to these local schools only.87 The SAHRDC study interviewed an NGO worker that the policy directives of UNHCR Headquarter had ordered that all programmes worldwide encourage refugee children to attend only local government schools.88 If it is true, then it can be said that such a blanket policy does not take into account the vast differences in the government-run education system worldwide. Mashal, a Muslim Afghan woman, lives with her two children alone at Kasturba Niketan in Lajpat Nagar. Her case has been rejected by UNHCR; therefore, she does not have an official ‘refugee’ status. Things, therefore, are much more complex for her. She said, The system in India is very simple…if you pay bribe everything is possible. My children go to private schools. I pay the high fees therefore no body questions me. What would have happened if I could not pay the fee is a different question altogether. For me the education of my children come first, I will do whatever it takes to give them education.89 Some of the respondents, while discussing the situation of education that their children have access to also pointed out towards the hundreds of scholarships that ICCR offers to Afghans every year to come and study in India. They were appreciative of that policy of the government and felt that it is a good step because the people of Afghanistan need assistance; however, they also expressed their disappointment towards the Government of India for not considering any such thing for the Afghans living within its territory. Over the past 13 years, Don Bosco Ashalayam has been responsible to run programmes of vocational training for the refugees. They took over from YMCA, who had started working with UNHCR since 1996. The purpose of these courses is to help build refugee capacity for self-reliance and assist in assimilation into the local economy. Over the past years, YMCA and

Settlement experiences of Afghan ‘refugees’ in India  145 subsequently Don Bosco have offered a variety of vocational training courses to refugees, including beauty culture, tailoring and embroidery, quilting, air ticketing, computers, motor mechanics, radio and television technology and refrigeration.90 As mentioned earlier, very recently U ­ NHCR’s new partner ACCESS Development Services has trained and facilitated a start-up (catering service) for some Afghan refugee women.91 A study thoroughly reviewed UNHCR’s approach to vocational training and came up with some observations which the current study attempts to summarize:92 Firstly, as with many of UNHCR’s efforts aimed at building self-­ sufficiency, the policy ignores the primary obstacle to self-reliance, which is the illegality of work for most Afghan refugees in India. Although some refugees may find some form of employment, these jobs are very low-paying and precarious. Secondly, the study found much evidence to suggest that many courses were badly designed or managed and that most of the time, these courses are too short to provide adequate training or hands-on training with necessary equipment of tools. Thirdly, to them it seemed that a primary purpose of the vocational training is to provide UNHCR with an excuse to declare refugees ineligible for assistance on grounds that they should be able to support themselves. When UNHCR was questioned about the findings of the study and on the issue of prohibition of alien employment, the response was: Not every refugee is interested to work and this hold true mostly for Afghans. Afghans are financially better off and are unwilling to work.93 Afghan refugees interviewed seriously objected and negated this argument. The Muslim refugees said that it was ‘baseless’ to argue that all Afghan refugees are financially well-off and they do not need employment on the basis a few well-off people. KDWS, on the other hand, said that the members of their communities are barely benefitted by any such policy of UNHCR; as a result, they had to start providing trainings to the Sikhs and Hindus in their limited capacity. Healthcare The right to healthcare services and medical aid is outlined in Article 25 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights,94 which states: Everyone has the right to a standard of living adequate for the health and well-being of himself and of his family, including food, clothing, housing and medical care and necessary social services, and the right to security in the event of unemployment, sickness, disability, widowhood, old age or other lack of livelihood in circumstances beyond his control.

146  Settlement experiences of Afghan ‘refugees’ in India The 1951 Convention, the Convention on the rights of Child, UNHCR’s Refugee Children, Guidelines on Protection and care and Guidelines on Refugee Women and other instruments place emphasis on healthcare and medical aid for vulnerable groups. Moreover, assistance, treatment and rehabilitation form the core of all UNHCR activities. Less than 20% of the total respondents informed that they had ever received any assistance in healthcare-related issues either from UNHCR or any other organization or the government in India. Around 70%, who reported of ever having availed any service, expressed deep disappointment with it. As one of the respondents expressed: Yeh sab duniya ko dikhane k liye. Na hone ki barabar’95 (These services are merely ornamental, to show the world, they are as good as nothing) One of the beneficiaries informed that previously, UNHCR, in partnership with the All India Institute of Medical Sciences (AIIMS) and other government-run hospitals, provided healthcare services for minor ailments to refugees at Primary Health Care (PHC) in Saket, Defence Colony and Vikaspuri neighbourhoods in Delhi. In the initial years (in the 1990s) of his stay in India, he had gone there.96 However, he was not at all happy with the treatment his wife received. He had to go back to the same place because he did not have any other option. The initial days were very tough as he did not have any option but to go there, but as soon as it was possible, he stopped availing that service. Another respondent mentioned about Voluntary Health Association of Delhi (VHAD), which was UNHCR’s health service providing partner. Refugees with medical problems were encouraged to go to VHAD office where they could see the doctor at specific time of the week for minor problems. The prescribed minor medicines could be obtained at local dispensaries but for major cases, refugees were referred to AIIMS. Medical costs incurred for serious illness could be reimbursed by UNHCR, but only if they are incurred at Government hospital. But the respondent said he did not get any reimbursement because his wife’s treatment could not be carried out at a Government hospital. I took my child to government hospital initially, but they refused to admit because there was no vacancy. He was in too much pain and his appendix tumour was about to burst, I had to admit him to private nursing home. This was a good reason for them to avoid my case.97 According to SAHRDC’s report, there was a consensus in the refugee population that UNHCR has neglected refugee healthcare and medical aid and the refugee had not benefitted from UNHCR’s programmes.

Settlement experiences of Afghan ‘refugees’ in India  147 Currently, Don Bosco supervises the healthcare assistance part and it was informed that the doctors come to their centres and the refugees can consult them there at their visiting hours. The representative of the NGO98 mentioned that for medicine, the refugees should go to particular chemist shops, where they need to show their Refugee ID card and prescription to receive the medicine. The NGO has contract with those particular shops and the financial transaction therefore is between them. The refugees do not have to pay for the medicines they get from those shops. Respondents mentioned that in most cases, they do not get the required medicine in those particular shops; as a result, they have to buy them from other shops with their own money. So they said, even if such a facility exists on paper, its real impact remains questionable. Bon Bosco mentioned that for hospitalization cases, refugees have two options, whether to go to government-run hospitals or Vinhams Hospital, New Delhi. Vinhams is a multispecialty private hospital in Delhi which deals with mental health-related ailments. They have a few free beds and the refugees can get access to those. It was informed that because the Afghan refugees come from conflict and war-torn societies, many of them suffer from clinical depressions and need psychosocial help. Many of the female refugees also have experienced sexual and domestic violence and have developed serious mental problems because of such experiences. Apparently, such very serious cases are referred to Vinhams Hospital. However, the NGO did not share any data about the number of people who were benefitted through these programmes. An overwhelming majority of the respondents expressed that it is pointless to expect any sort of assistance from any organization (UNHCR or otherwise) for the refugees in India. The problems individuals encounter are tackled individually by them, without any support from anybody. Those who are financially stable tend to have accepted this fact and have moved on but those who are financially unstable seem to be extremely disappointed with the prevalent scenario. Although not satisfied with the services, yet the refugees under UNHCR felt that they are still in a better position than the ones whose asylum claims have been rejected by UNHCR. Official status India is a signatory to neither the 1951 Refugee Convention nor the 1967 Protocol, and the Indian Government does not officially recognize the Afghan community as refugees. In fact, India lacks overarching legislation to deal with matters pertaining to refugees and asylum seekers in general. This leaves the government to deal with refugees on an ad hoc basis.99 Currently, the government recognizes only Tibetans and Sri Lankan Tamils as ‘refugees’ because recognition of these communities is politically convenient.100 As a result, UNHCR recognizes and offers protection to certain

148  Settlement experiences of Afghan ‘refugees’ in India communities like the Burmese, Afghan and Somali refugees and asylum seekers in India. Therefore, the legal status of the refuges in India can be classified under two heads: a

Refugees who are provided refilled and rehabilitation by the Government of India, like Tibetan, who fled after Chinese annexation of Tibet and Sri Lankans who fled from Sri Lanka after the ethnic civil war. Government of India made some provisions to safeguard their basic rights till their departure. b Refugees recognized by UNHCR but not by the Indian Government, for example, Afghans. Government allows UNHCR to function and operate its welfare programmes within its territory. The refugees protected under UNHCR are provided Stay Visas by the FRRO to attest their legal stay in India and these refugees have access to rights available to any other foreigner in the country.

Given that the UNHCR recognition of refugee status is the only legal protection an Afghan refugee may have against deportation or arbitrary detention, the scope and reach of the UNHCR to effectively protect people have been very limited.101 A holistic focus on the deficiencies of the existing UN structure is beyond the scope of this chapter. However, literature on the subject attributes the UNHCR’s inadequate scope to a lack of sufficient funding for their India office and to the limited awareness and resources of asylum seekers that would allow them to avail themselves of existing facilities.102 Despite India’s acceptance of the principle of non-refoulement, those fleeing persecutions within Indian borders continue to be treated like economic migrants, rather than as a special category of persons in need of international protection. Because no asylum law exists, issues related to refugees and asylum seekers can only be found in Act No. 31 of 1946 – the Foreigners Act. However, even this document fails to recognize asylum seekers and refugees as a special category of non-citizens who should be governed by special circumstances. This has led to court proceedings and subsequent imprisonment of asylum seekers who ‘illegally’ entered the country. In these situations, the only protection imprisoned individuals have against prolonged detention and deportation (in some cases refoulement) is UNHCR, which advocates for the release of individuals who had – prior to detention – lodged an asylum application for asylum. In India, the path to gaining full protection is only possible through citizenship. Foreigners lack access to basic rights (such as the right to an education, the right to public employment, protection against arrest and detention in certain cases), which Indian citizens are entitled to by virtue of the Indian Constitution.103 Anne Sophie-Bentz argued that for a long time, India did not indicate any intention of integrating the bulk of Afghan refugees into Indian society, although things are changing now. Considering majority of the Afghan refugees in India are of the Hindu and Sikh faiths, naturalization has come to be seen by all stakeholders (Afghan refugees themselves, India

Settlement experiences of Afghan ‘refugees’ in India  149 and UNHCR) as the best long-term solution, since many Afghans of Sikh and Hindu faiths are culturally and socially accustomed to the Indian way of life. Desire for Indian citizenship increased in the mid-2000s and the first naturalizations date back to March 2006, but there is still a long way to go.104 The UNHCR supports an NGO called Socio-Legal Information Centre (SLIC) which helps refugees in processing application for acquiring Indian citizenship. The Project Coordinator, Md. Saud Tahir, informed that SLIC is a part of the Human Rights Law Network and has been partnering with UNHCR since 2001 in different programmes run by the organization including facilitating matters related to citizenship.105 In an article published on Afghan refugees in India, it was pointed out that as on August 15, 2004, the number of afghan refugees (mostly Sikhs and Hindus) who had shown ‘expression of interest’ was 2,730 (cumulative figure), out of which 1,499 forms were ‘initiated’. Finally, 538 forms were completed and submitted to SLIC which advertised 430 cases. The next stage was submission of these forms to the sub-district magistrate (SDM) of Delhi NCT, who, in turn, had to submit these cases to FRRO, who was supposed to send the forms back to SDM. Only 376 cases of Afghan refugees were submitted to the SDM out of which 115 were pending with the SDM and another 88 were with FRRO. The cases cleared by FRRO and returned to the SDM for forwarding to deputy secretary passport (DS-PP) were 131, while 35 cases were pending with the DS for forwarding the MHA, Government of India. The FRRO has to take police clearance at various stages. After all these procedures are completed, there are six more steps before the hapless refugee gets citizenship.106 A paper107 that argues in favour of the expansion of the Statelessness regime observed, the Afghan Sikhs and Hindus living in India, lacks effective Afghan or Indian nationality. Coupled with the cultural and ethnic ties that led Afghan Sikhs and Hindus to seek refuge in India may lead one to assume that naturalization would be the best solution. However, due to complicated bureaucratic processes and bottlenecks, the naturalization solution can only be realized in the long term, as is evident for the above-mentioned experience. The Citizenship Act of 2005 stipulates that citizenship can only be acquired by those who have ordinarily (legally) been residents in India for 12 years.108 Establishing lawful residence can prove difficult for persons who entered India irregularly, especially those fleeing persecution. Asylum seekers without proper documentation have only one option for proving their residence – registration and subsequent refugee recognition by the UNHCR. In those recognized, UNHCR helps them to complete bureaucratic procedures at the government level. Children born in India to foreign parents also have to satisfy the residence time frame, as the Indian nationality law largely follows the jus sanguinis (citizenship by right of blood) principle. Thus, one could theoretically be eligible for naturalization on one’s 12th birthday, but birth registration practices in India are generally very low.109 If a family is not aware of the paramount importance of receiving a birth certificate or a certificate is not issued, access to the Indian nationality might be impossible.

150  Settlement experiences of Afghan ‘refugees’ in India Md. Saud Tahir during the course of the interview expressed that the lack of a legal framework in India for matters pertaining to refugees complicates the processes to a large extent. He argued that There is no clarity as far as refugee issues are concerned in India and this lack of clarity proses problems at various steps. The only law that governs is the Article 14, Foreigner’s act, which in principle should not be applied to a refugee.110 In addition to that, he added that the ad hoc and discriminating policies for different refugee groups, followed by the Indian Government, make things even more complicated. To give an example, he cited that Afghan Hindus and Sikhs do not get any fee waiver in the process of gaining citizenship, while there are provisions of waivers for Hindu Pakistanis. But even at a macro level, although Indian Government officially does not pronounce it, it does not offer citizenship to Muslim refugees. Scholars who have studied the refugee scenario in India have raised this very point about the discriminatory approach of Indian Government. Anne Sophie-Bentz wrote, ‘It (Indian Government) is discriminatory against Afghans of Muslim faith, who will not be granted Indian citizenship for the mare reason of religious affiliation’.111 But it also has negative side effects on Afghan Sikhs and Hindus, who are generally not considered for settlement in a third country as a result of existing possibility of acquiring Indian citizenship. For the purpose of this research, Afghan Sikhs and Hindus currently living in Germany and United Kingdom were contacted. All of them said that although they have not disclosed it to their current host governments, but the truth is that they have all lived in India after Afghanistan. They were unwilling to disclose their identities in this particular issue because they have hidden this information while making their case in the West. Some Afghan-Sikh respondents at South Hall England said: India was the first country of asylum for majority of the Sikhs and Hindus from Afghanistan. But we had to face too much problem there. There was no law that could protect us, minimum opportunities and very limited scope to have a prosperous life. Therefore, our families decided to leave and we came to the West. But still there are a lot of our people staying there with whom we are in regular contact. It seems nothing has changed in India. I am glad we left at the right time.112 I reached Holland in 2004 and got my citizenship within two years. My parents who have been living in India since 1990, still did not get Indian citizenship.113 The Government of India has allowed all displaced people from Afghanistan to avail stay visa. They are not allowed to work in the public sector and do not have any political rights. Many of the respondents mentioned about starting

Settlement experiences of Afghan ‘refugees’ in India  151 business in the name of their Indian partners as getting license to start a business is not difficult for Indians. Sometimes, many of the partners are not even involved in the business, but they get paid for providing the name. Sometimes, they got clearances from the authorities just by providing bribe. Several members of the Hindu and Sikh communities expressed that they feel UNHCR would never consider third country settlement for them as they feel that for them, sociocultural integration is not a problem. This idea obviously tends to undermine the fact that without access to basic rights in India and recognition of the government, integration in any society becomes very difficult. Majority of the respondents (especially the Sikhs and Hindus) therefore saw citizenship as their desired status as they feel tired of living in a state of limbo. A report114 published by UNHCR India office noted that more than 3,000 Afghan refugees have expressed an interest in naturalization, but the process is long and complicated. To be eligible, a refugee must have lived in India for 12 years or have been married to an Indian for 7 years. The length of stay must be supported by documentation – a Residence Permit issued by the Indian Government – for it to count towards naturalization. UNHCR’s implementing partner, the SLIC, has helped nearly 1,600 refugees to fill in application forms, while the KDWS also tries to push the process forward by lobbying the Minorities Commission. The Muslim and Christian refugees interviewed seemed to be aware of the fact that naturalization might not be an option they can consider. Many hope for a settlement in one of the Western countries where the Governments will recognize their predicament.

Immediate stakeholders influencing the adaptation process When an outsider comes in contact with an alien society and attempts to adapt to the realities of the ‘new’ environment, that process tends to be influenced by the role played by various immediate stakeholders existing in the society. As is reflected in the previous section, there are a few factors that have direct influence on the adaptation experiences of the conflict-displaced Afghan population in India. This section, thus, identifies and discusses the three major immediate stakeholders that tend to influence the experiences of the Afghans in India, namely: (1) the political system in India, (2) ­UNHCR and (3) the host population of the immediate surroundings. The political system in India An overview of the existing framework This study located a particular parliamentary proceeding in the year 2015, which dealt with the issues of refugees in India. Before getting into further discussion on the correlation between India’s policies for refugees and its impact on their identity, it would be important to take note of the

152  Settlement experiences of Afghan ‘refugees’ in India Governmental position. In the mentioned proceedings in the Lok Sabha, Shri Mahesh Giri raised question whether India has a legal framework and determination system for refugees. In his response, the Minister of State in the MHA, Shri Kiren Rijeju, said: There is no national law on refugees at present. Only Standard Operating Procedure are issued by Ministry of Home Affairs to deal with foreign nationals in India, who claim to be refugees.115 The honourable Minister’s response reiterated that India has no national refugee law specifying the rights and governing the treatment of refugees. In the absence of any specific laws, the presence of refugees in India is regulated on the basis of The Foreigners Act, 1946 and The Foreigners Order, 1948. The Foreigners Act, 1946 deals with the entry of foreigners into India, their presence therein their departure from India. Section 2(a) of the Act states: Foreigner means a person who is not a citizen of India.116 Evidently, it fails to identify any clear distinction between the refugees and the foreigners. There are at least three well-defined groups of foreigners who are different from ‘refugees’ – these are temporary residents, travellers, tourists; Illegal Economic Migrants; Criminals, Spies and Militants.117 Any such distinction between refugees and other class of foreigner is blatantly conflated by the Act.118 Another pertinent feature of the Foreigners Act is that it leaves a wide margin of administrative discretion. The administrative policies under the Act relating to aliens ‘are very skeleton and leave very wide discretion to executive’.119 As per this Act, the entry, stay and exit of the foreigners including refugees are regulated with minimal due process.120 These practices put the refugees in highly susceptible position as the refugees are a creature of vulnerable circumstances whose entry, stay and exit cannot be regulated in consonance with tourists, migrants and other category of foreigners. This study also takes note of the definition propounded by a commission chaired by Justice P. N. Bhagwati in 1997,121 whose task was to construct a uniform national law on refugees. Although the bill was never tabled in Parliament, the term ‘refugee’ was adequately defined in the ‘Model Law’ as: Any person who is outside his/her Country of Origin and is unable or unwilling to return to, and is unable or unwilling to avail himself /herself of the protection of that country because of a well founded fear of persecution on account of race, religion, sex, ethnic identity, membership of a particular social group or political opinion… owing to external aggression, occupation, foreign domination, serious violation of human rights or events seriously disrupting public order in either part or whole of his/her Country.122

Settlement experiences of Afghan ‘refugees’ in India  153 Neither the Government of India nor the UNHCR has ever come up with an official pronouncement on the reasons for India’s decision of not acceding to the 1951 Refugee Convention or 1967 Protocol. However, some aspects of government reasoning have been conveyed publicly by various seminars and talks by government officials relating to the status of refugees in India. Such statements have been further scrutinized and studied by researchers in order to deduce a rationale behind Indian Government’s particular stance. Some of the probable factors are as follows: Foremost, security issues: the line of argument is that borders in South Asia are extremely porous and any conflict can result in a mass movement of people. This can have two results: first, a strain on local infrastructure and resources in countries that are poorly equipped to deal with sudden spikes in population. Secondly, it can upset the demographic balance, a tinderbox in South Asia.123 Secondly, the argument in India is doing its duty anyway, even without signing the agreement – why should signing a paper be seen as important? So far, India has not taken UN money for looking after the population it considers ‘refugees’ and has been dealing with the refugees of its neighbouring country on its own.124 India’s treatment of refugees has been praised by UNHCR. In an interview given to one of the leading newspapers, Antonio Guterres, United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, says that India praised India’s open door policy and argued that ‘India’s refugee policy is an example for the rest of the world to follow’.125 Thirdly, it is necessary to note that India has always hosted refugees quite willingly and has allowed the UNHCR to have an official presence in New Delhi and Chennai; thus, India feels that there is no need to ratify the Convention. Fourthly, adopting a uniform legislation shall increase the friction between the country of origin of refugees and India which may entail further political repercussions for the country. Fifthly, signing the UN Conventions would mean India has to take on a lot of commitments which otherwise India can afford to avoid. India’s refusal to accede to the 1951 Refugee Convention is that the rights that are incorporated within the Convention for refugees are entirely impractical for Third World countries like India, which can barely meet the needs and requirements of its own citizens.126 Sixthly, the legal scholars in India often reference the Eurocentric definition of a refugee as defined in the Convention. They argued that the definition confines itself to the violation of civil and political rights of refugees, but does not extend to economic, social and cultural rights. The definition does not allow for the protection of groups or individuals fleeing situations of generalized violence or internal warfare.127 Finally, these valid critiques lay the groundwork for considering the serious issues of burden sharing, which affect India’s decision of whether to accede.128 B. S. Chimni129 makes the defensible argument that India should

154  Settlement experiences of Afghan ‘refugees’ in India always refrain from acceding to the 1951 Convention, as it is violated by nations in the Global North in both the letter and the spirit of the law. Chimni feels that India, along with other South Asian nations, should argue that accession to the Convention would be conditional to a reversal of the no entry regime created by Western states. This regime is currently evidenced by a wide range of administrative and legal measures, including the safe third country rule, carrier sanctions, interdictions, visa restrictions, the widespread practice of detention, removal of access to social welfare benefits for asylum seekers and, again, the restrictive interpretations of the refugee definition. During the course of an interview, Ms. Praveen Horo Singh, Director Citizenship Division, MHA, Government of India, was asked about the reasons why India does not consider a structured refugee policy; she replied that ‘India already has a lot of problems faced by its tax paying citizens. India currently is struggling to provide facilities to its citizens, so how can we take the burden of non-citizens?’130 She added that the fact that India has allowed them to stay in the country says a lot about the humanitarian side of the government. She pointed towards India’s history of receiving refugees and argued that they are better off than several countries, which is because neither the Government nor the people are hostile towards them. India’s international commitments Whatever be India’s reasons for not signing the UN Refugee Convention (1951) relating to refugee status or the 1967 Protocol, it certainly makes India’s position in terms of treatment of refugees disputable. However, it is equally important to note that India is a signatory to various other international and regional treaties and conventions relating to Universal human rights and refugees such as the UN Declaration on Territorial Asylum (1967), the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and International Convention on Civil and Political Rights.131 India is also a member of Executive Committee (ExCom) of the UNHCR, which approves and supervises the material assistance programme of the organization, all this without actually supporting or acknowledging the role of UNHCR on its own territory.132 India is a signatory to various other international human rights instruments such as the ICCPR,133 ICESCR,134 CRC,135 ICERD,136 CEDAW,137 etc., which contain provision of non-refoulement. The principle of non-­refoulement has been accepted as a principle of customary international law which paves way for an international law and municipal law debate. The question that arises at this point is how does a nation respect international principles and policies without incorporating them in the municipal laws of the nation? India follows a dualist school of law in respect of implementation of international law at the domestic level.138 As a result, international treaties do not fall automatically from part of national law and they need to be incorporated into the legal system by a legislation made by the Parliament.139

Settlement experiences of Afghan ‘refugees’ in India  155 Afghan refugees in the existing legal space Indian Government officially does not recognize the displaced Afghan population in India as ‘refugees’; they are protected under the UNHCR mandate. While conducting the present study, it was realized that a large section of Afghan ‘refugees’ asylum claims have been rejected by UNHCR’s India office, rendering them protection less. This research could reach out to some of the Afghans whose asylum claims have been rejected by UNHCR and who continue to live with stay visa. All the respondents (except the ones who have received Indian citizenship) are living in India on stay visas, irrespective of their legal status. The office under the MHA that issues the stay visa is the FRRO, located in R.K. Puram, New Delhi. It is the primary agency to regulate the registration, movement, stay, departure and also for recommending the extension of stay in India and has branches in different cities. Since the Afghans are primarily based in and around the capital, they are required to deal with FRRO Delhi on a regular basis. Any foreigner on Indian soil is required to register him/ herself within the first 14 days of their arrival in India. The spokesperson at UNHCR India140 said that for the Indian Government, the Afghans (refugee or not) are ‘foreigners’. The government uses the term ‘foreigner’ in all its official correspondences and therefore all the matters pertaining to their stay are determined by FRRO. She added that ‘having a refugee certificate from UNHCR is helpful, not only for the extension of the regular their stay visa but also as an immunity from deportation’. According to the respondents, the documents they need to submit to the FRRO for stay visa are: (1) Passport (2), Landlord’s Voter ID and Pan Card, (3) Rent Agreement and (4) UNHCR Refugee Certificate. UNHCR India informed that they have ‘regular meetings’ with different departments of the Indian Government like the FRRO, MHA and Ministry of External Affairs to address issues pertaining to refugees in India. UNHCR is involved in constant negotiations with the mentioned Governmental departments for various issues. To give an example, Ms. Mehta of UNHCR stated: Constant negotiations took place with various departments of the government regarding the Exit Visa. The Afghans were required to pay hefty fines for over stay. UNHCR negotiated for the waving off of the fee and also convinced FRRO to issue ‘Long Term Visa’ (LTV) to Afghans.141 According to UNHCR, the Long-Term Visa (LTV) has been issued since the year 2011. This visa is valid for one year and apparently it allows an individual to seek employment in a formal sector. Neither FRRO nor other relevant departments of the government confirmed the information. UNHCR also did not provide details about the requirement for the applications of

156  Settlement experiences of Afghan ‘refugees’ in India LTVs or the data about the recipient of that visa. Throughout the course of the current study, FRRO was contacted several times, through all possible channels for their response; however, they refused to respond. For Afghans living in India, the FRRO is the only contact point between them and the government of India. Majority of the Afghans interviewed for the study, irrespective for their religion, ethnicity, and legal and economic statuses, expressed having very bitter experiences with the FRRO Delhi. Many respondents142 expressed their bitter experiences there and that they felt discriminated time and again by the officials there. They never treat Europeans or Americans like that. We are not even treated like humans, let alone ‘foreigner’ or ‘refugee’. I have seen police throwing shoe at an old Afghan man…can you believe it? This has happened in front of my eyes. There is a separate section for Afghans within the FRRO. They say because of the large number of Afghans they come to India they do this, but I feel this separate section has been made, because they want to treat us differently from other foreign nationals who come their for registration. I have been going to FRRO since 1992 for the extension of my visa and the experience in nothing less than a nightmare. This is our only contact point with Indian government who claims to be ‘a friend of Afghanistan and Afghans!’ Is this the way friends are treated in India? The Afghan voices mentioned earlier are just a few among many. The Afghans at large seem very disappointed with the existing situation and practices at FRRO. Not a single person had to say anything good about their experiences with the office. Several respondents hinted about the existing corruption in that department and the nexuses that exist there. Apparently, there are agents (middle men), who have good connection with people with the departments. If one is willing to give bribe, then the process becomes much less cumbersome. Since FRRO refused to cooperate in this research, ‘their version’ on these allegations is not known. Each and every person interviewed from the displaced Afghan community expressed that they have suffered and continue to suffer in India because of the lack of structured legislation for refugees in the country. Many of them expressed that in a country like India, survival is possible even without structured law. People opt for different ways to get their works done and many of them choose the ‘wrong path’ of bribing police, government officials, etc., to do their work. For most, those were their ‘survival strategy’. We had to exploit the system…there was no other way. If we had the option we would have tried to get our work done through proper channel. The money would have gone to the government treasury and not to any individual’s pocket.143

Settlement experiences of Afghan ‘refugees’ in India  157 Several respondents expressed that some of the affluent sections among the refugees manipulated their ways to establish business through personal contacts and bribes. Eventually, they are the ones who received citizenships. However, such things were not at disposal of others; as a result, they had to and continue to suffer. People irrespective of religion, and economic and legal statuses expressed that they felt alienated because of the Government’s refusal to acknowledge them. Respondents were pointed towards the responsibilities and commitments that an official recognition brings with it. They were given examples of their day-to-day lives, where their actions have not been under the government scrutiny; they have been left on their own. They can do many things they like, without the formal permission of the governmental authorities or the fact that they do not have any financial obligation (in terms of tax), that they are required to pay in India, that they are not obligated to learn any new language, etc. Pointing towards their own confessions about the way they have been ‘getting things done through back door channels’ probably might not have been possible if government had a strict refugee legislation. They acknowledged that the flexibility they enjoy could be attributed to the lack of strict vigilance, but they expressed that they were willing to accept all the related responsibilities and commitments if the government was willing to acknowledge and protect them. Majority of the Afghans expressed that the initial days were particularly tough because they were not used to the practices of India. UNHCR’s role (for those who had access to it) has always been very limited and they felt that if the government had a structured policy for refugees, their existential struggles would have been relatively less. Yet, a few of the respondents tried to show the positive sides of not having protection of the Government. They felt that because there was no guidance or handholding from anybody or organization, they learnt the ropes of survival themselves. As a result, they feel much more satisfied and confident about themselves. At the same time the same people also expressed, because they were not helped or assisted by Indian Government, they do not feel much obligation or attachment towards their host country. One senior member of the Afghan HSWS expressed: We appreciate that India has allowed us to stay in its territory and did not send us back. But the Indian government never forwarded any support for our communities. We have been meeting the Home Ministers, Foreign Ministers and even the Prime Ministers for years, they listen to us but nobody does anything.144 The members of Afghan HSWS in India have been trying to lobby with the Indian Government for the members of their communities through their contacts. They seem to have a good relation with the political party of Punjab named Shiromani Akali Dal. They expressed that on their request, the Union Minister for Food Processing Industries, Ms. Harsimrat Kaur Badal, personally visited the Home Minister, Shri Rajnath Singh, to talk

158  Settlement experiences of Afghan ‘refugees’ in India about the issues of the Afghan Sikhs and Hindus in India but they have not heard much after that. Ms. Praveen Horo Singh, Director Citizenship Division, MHA, Government of India, informed that the Indian Government follows a different policy towards ethnic and non-ethnic Afghans. Every two years in the MHA, her division meets members of the Afghan HSWS and tries to address the problems faced by non-ethnic Afghans in India. To give an example, she said: We were told that some of them were facing a lot of problem to renounce their Afghan Passport (It was a requirement for Indian citizenship). Afghan Embassy wanted them to pay a lot of money for the renunciation certificate. On 17th December 2014, MHA came up with a provision for Afghan Sikhs/Hindus and Pakistani Hindus who came to India before 2009, where it was stated that- these communities are the religious minorities of their home country. They entered India with or without legal documents (for different reasons) and their Passport has expired. This step of the MHA allowed them to submit their citizenship application without the passport.145 Commenting on India’s attitude towards refugees, eminent migration expert, Dr. Ranabir Samaddar, observed that ‘it is basically ad hoc but on the whole, kind’.146 India’s generosity in the way it has opened its borders to all people who have come looking for safety and sanctuary at a time most countries are closing its borders has been praised by the UN High Commissioner for Refugees, Mr Antonio Guterres, himself.147 Over the years, India has attempted to regulate the status and protection of refugees by administrative measures, but an iota of doubt remains with regard to the effectiveness of such measures. In the absence of a strict legislative framework, the possibility of bias and discriminatory treatment by the government to refugees cannot be excluded. The external actor – United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) The Indian subcontinent has been witness to some of the largest forced population flows in contemporary history. Since the decolonization of India and Pakistan in 1947, upwards of 30 million persons have sought refuge in and within this region.148 According to the Global Refugee Trend report published in 2014, UNHCR’s India office is among the top ten countries based on the registration of new asylum claims.149 The states of South Asia have experienced migration almost from the very moment of their entry into international community. Coincidentally, as these states were attaining their independence from Britain in the 1940s, the member states of United Nations (UN) were beginning to debate the creation of a formalized

Settlement experiences of Afghan ‘refugees’ in India  159 international refugee regime. However, even after more than 60 years of almost continuous experience of forced migration, not one state in South Asia has acceded to the 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees or its 1967 Protocol. Yet, India has allowed UNHCR to have an official presence in New Delhi and Chennai and has permitted them to protect certain refugee communities to be protected under the UNHCR mandate. The Afghan community is among them. Because the UNHCR has been a foremost foreign agency that has been responsible for the matters pertaining to Afghans in India, this study views it as an important ‘external actor’ and an immediate stakeholder influencing the experiences of the Afghans in India in their settlement phases. UNHCR India mission Despite the presence of a well-developed international legal framework, India has no legislation for refugee status determination (RSD); most of the people from the non-neighbouring countries are assisted by UNHCR, and not by the Indian Government. These include the conflict-displaced Afghan population living in India. UNHCR together with partners and civil society provides a range of services to support refugees and asylum seekers in health, education, legal counselling, vocational skills and livelihoods. In India, UNHCR works with several NGOs, including Bosco, the SLIC, the Gandhi National Memorial Society, the Confederation of Voluntary Agencies and Development and Justice Initiative (DAJI), ACCESS and Save the Children (SCF). India has open borders with countries where undemocratic governments, arbitrary-placed colonial boundaries and ethnic tensions have forced people to flee. Ethnic and religious similarities between some refugee groups and segment of India’s multicultural populations provide incentives for refugees seeking asylum to choose this country as well. The former UN High Commissioner of Refugees in India, Mr. Lennart Kotsalainen, urged the Indian Government to formulate a law even if it is unwilling to sign the Convention.150 He regretted that though UNHCR office in Delhi has been functioning for more than 20 years, it does not have the status of UN Agencies. This does not hinder the UNHCR in liaising with government officials; nonetheless, there are limitations. For example, UNHCR does not have access to the Indian state of Mizoram. Afghan refugees have come to India since the Soviet Union intervened in Afghanistan in 1979. In the 20 years of brutal conflict that followed without an end in sight, UNHCR has apparently discarded voluntary repatriation of these refugees as a viable option. UNHCR has accordingly shifted its goal from providing direct aid to refugees to helping them establish themselves in Delhi for a long term. Under Article 2 (‘General Obligations’) of 1951 Convention,151 the duties of a refugee are to conform to the laws of the host country and to obey measures designed to secure public order.

160  Settlement experiences of Afghan ‘refugees’ in India The main activities152 undertaken by UNHCR India, along with its implementation partners, are the following: Protection

UNHCR registers new asylum seekers, conducts RSD and provides them with documentation which prevents harassment, arbitrary arrests, detention and deportation. The cards also facilitate access to LTV/stay visa. In case of communities protected under UNHCR’s mandate, RSD is largely carried out by the UNHCR and is then subsequently backed by the Indian Government. The steps that a displaced person seeking protection from UNHCR needs to follow, as explained by the office during an interview, have been mentioned below:153 • • • • •

Step One: The displaced person needs to contact the UNHCR Delhi office for an appointment. Step Two: Registration process at UNHCR. Step Three: Filling up of the form provided by UNHCR. Step Four: Called for an interview with a legal team where the applicant is required to present his/her case. Step Five: Refugee status is granted or rejected.

The ones whose cases have been accepted will get the UNHCR ID card and can access all the facilities and programmes of the organization conducted for the refugees. Persons whose claims have been rejected have the option of reopening the case for one more time. Education

According to the UNHCR’s official position, Refugee/asylum seeker children can access government’s free schooling at par with local children. UNHCR’s partners facilitate government school enrolment/retention drives and help refugee and asylum seeker children with enrolment procedures. Language and tuition classes for refugee/asylum seeker children as well as crèches for young children are also operational with UNHCR support in areas of major concentration. Health

Through its partners, UNHCR assists the refugees/asylum seekers in accessing government dispensaries and hospitals. Many, especially the new arrivals, are supported with information about the facilities available, and with interpretation services. Some medical tests/supplies and medicines not readily available are also provided to refugees in New Delhi, where the majority of Persons of Concern live.

Settlement experiences of Afghan ‘refugees’ in India  161 Community empowerment and self‐reliance

UNHCR with the help of its implementing partner supports livelihood activities including vocational training and income-generating activities to help refugees lead a life with dignity. Durable solutions

Voluntary Repatriation: UNHCR facilitates the voluntary return of Sri Lankan and Afghan refugees. Between 2002 and 2015, around 12,290 refugees were repatriated voluntarily to Sri Lanka with the support of UNHCR India. Additionally, about 1,075 Afghan refugees have been voluntarily repatriated to Afghanistan between 2002 and 2015, with UNHCR assistance.154 Naturalization and Local Integration: At the same time, UNHCR is also facilitating the naturalization of Hindu and Sikh Afghan refugees who want to become Indian citizens. Till today, around 830 Afghan refugees of Hindu and Sikh faiths have acquired Indian citizenship. Third Country Resettlement: UNHCR submits the cases of a few refugees with particularly compelling protection needs for resettlement to a third country. Overall assessment of the service provided by UNHCR

Based on the interviews conducted for this study as well as available published literature, the following observations have been made: •

• •

•

•

After years of providing monetary subsistence allowance to Afghan refugees in India, UNHCR, for a variety of reasons, shifted its emphasis in mid-1990s from providing direct aid to an emphasis on assisting refugees in attaining self-sufficiency.155 The ‘need assessment’ home visits carried out by UNHCR arbitrarily and unfairly declared Afghan refugees to be ‘financially self-sufficient’ and thus ineligible to receive the monetary assistance. Most of the respondents (who had received this fund at some point) saw this as a strategy of the organization to stop their funding, carried out in an insensitive fashion and impoverished thousands of Afghan refugee families, adversely affecting their standard of living, driving many of them into debt. UNHCR’s annual compendium, The State of the World’s Refugees: A Humanitarian Agenda, mentions that Afghan refugees have been ‘encouraged to take lump sum payment, to set up small scale businesses, and to gain new skills’, while omitting any clear explanations as to the purpose of the lump sum.156 Due to the lack of work permits for Afghan refugees, using the fund for the required purpose was almost impossible. SAHRDC study concluded that the vocational training courses for refugees sponsored by UNHCR have proven woefully ineffective, mainly

162  Settlement experiences of Afghan ‘refugees’ in India

•

•

•

because of the Indian Government’s refusal to grant work permit to Afghan refugees. According to the recent data given by UNHCR, out of 750 refugees who got the vocational training, only around 80 persons got job.157 (However, details about the kind of job they received are not shared.) UNHCR has, to its credit, continued its policy of reimbursing refugee families for the school fees of their children. Majority of the respondents, however, expressed serious dissatisfaction with the standard of education that their children received in those schools and therefore decided to discontinue it. UNHCR has also continued a policy of reimbursing refugees for their medical expenses if they are incurred at government hospital and for serious medical problems. The ineffectiveness of this policy has been highlighted by the interviewed Afghans. Not only were refugees refused reimbursement for emergency treatment conducted at private hospitals but as studies158 would report, in some cases, refugees were denied reimbursement for major operations conducted at government hospitals, in clear violation of UNHCR’s own stated policies. UNHCR does not consider the religious minorities a priority any more.

During the course of this study, it was realized that asylum claims of a huge number of displaced Afghans in India have been rejected by UNHCR. No official data could be found on the exact number of protection applicants, as neither UNHCR nor FRRO came up with such data. By speaking to the respondents, it was realized that such people exist in all the Afghan communities irrespective of their religion. They are practically without any sort of protection in India; neither UNHCR, nor Indian Government or any relevant organization is responsible for them. It is evident that the only agency that is responsible for protecting refugees in India, UNHCR, also has a limited reach. The host population of the immediate surroundings While studying immigration in America, Portes and Rumbaut observed that receptivity comprises the settlement and resettlement policies and services of the host society and the attitude of its members towards the arrival of these specific refugees.159 The reception of the host society may vary with how culturally and visibly different refugees appear to be and with the degree to which the host society embraces a multicultural ideology.160 In the context of Western societies, scholars like Stepick suggested that the resettlement experience is more difficult for refugees and immigrants of colour.161 The recent incidents of brutal attacks against African immigrants in New Delhi indicate that such experiences are not exclusive to Western societies.162 Over the past few years, Indian media has reported several incidents of attacks on Africans in different cities of India, although the most

Settlement experiences of Afghan ‘refugees’ in India  163 significant of all has been the murder of a 23-year-old Congolese French teacher in New Delhi and many saw the incident in the light of xenophobia on the part of the host society.163 In comparison to Africans in India, Afghan experiences in India have been relatively better. Perception of similarity and competition towards Afghan Sikhs and Hindus in India Afghan refugees, especially the Sikhs and Hindus, are not visibly distinctive from a section of the Indian society. They do not stand out in Delhi in the ways the ethnic Afghans do. Broadly speaking, most of the members of these communities settled in West Delhi and Faridabad in Haryana. The local people denote the Afghan Sikhs with terms such as: ‘Afghani Log’, ‘Kabuli Sikh’, ‘Kabuli Sardar’ or just ‘Kabuli’. Most of the local host population in the West Delhi are Punjabi-speaking; as a result, communication was not a big issue between these people. Some of the local Indians seemed to be aware of the ‘discriminatory treatment’ these communities received in a predominantly Muslim country and the circumstances in which the people were forced to leave Afghanistan. One of the respondents, who runs a departmental store near Bees Block Gurudwara in Tilak Nagar, said: They are good and hardworking people. They had tolerated so such hardship in Afghanistan, people forced them to convert to Islam, still they did not leave their religion! We never had any issues because of them.164 Once enquired about the similarities they (Afghan Sikhs) share with the host population (especially the Sikhs of India), another Indian gentleman who had come to buy sweets from the ‘Sharma Sweets’ opposite to Bees Block Gurudwara said that an Indian Punjabi to identify can very easily identify the ‘Kabulis’, he added, You see their dialect and accent are a little different, we can make out who is Indian Punjabi and who is not.165 The locality where KDWS is located is a predominantly lower-middle-class area. Interaction with three Punjabi women,166 who were at a local tailoring shop to place their order, was kind enough to share their observations: ‘These people are Indians only. Their fore-fathers had migrated from India to Afghanistan. You know very well, how Afghanistan is, they fled to save their lives’, said Saloni Ji who lives in the same building where an Afghan family lives. Parminder Kaur said ‘My husband observed that there’s a lot of bhaichara (unity) among these people. If there is any problem faced by the

164  Settlement experiences of Afghan ‘refugees’ in India members of their community, they all will rally behind that person, which one cannot find among Indians’. ‘Most of the shops that you can see here belong to these people only. When they came they had nothing. Today they are more prosperous than us’ observed Sushma Ji. When it was asked to them if they were aware of their legal status in India, they said that they do not know about the technicalities but they made a couple of very interesting comments when they were asked about their ‘refugee’ status and identity. ‘Refugee to lagte nehi hain’ (They do not appear to be refugees) and as far as their national identity is concerned, ‘who kabhi Afghani ban jate hain aur kabhi Indian’ (sometimes they become ‘Afghan’ and sometimes ‘Indian’). They have been negotiating their identities very smartly.167 They further added, when these people interact with them, they tend to give them an impression that they are like Indian, and they highlight at the commonalities they share with the Indians and share cordial relation with locals. They were not aware of the official position of Indian Government on them but largely feel that they have been accepted. Amit Kumar,168 an autorickshaw driver (originally from Bihar), who has been working in these localities for more than ten years, made some interesting observations both as a local and an outsider, about the dynamics between the Afghans and Indians living together. ‘Lots on Afghans have been settling in Delhi, these areas have become ‘mini-Afghanistan’! Kabuli Sikhs and Hindus have been there even before I came to Delhi in search of livelihood, but in the past few years I have seen a lot of Muslim Afghans settling down in this area’. Based on his encounter with the Afghan customers, he said: ‘I like Afghans, they have big heart, they donate a lot of money. For example if my auto fare in 10 rupees an Afghani will give me 20 or 30 Rupees (whatever will come out of their pocket), they will never bargain, like Indians’. As an outsider (from a different state of India) in Delhi, he has observed the relationship shared by the Sikhs of India and Afghanistan, who have been living together for years in the same locality where he works and feels that the Kabuli Sikhs have done very well for themselves and many of them are prosperous; he feels that Indian Sikhs resent their success. He did not hint at any direct confrontation between the two communities but from what he said, one could deduce that there could be an undercurrent within. According to him, the Kabulis are very good and peace-loving people; they do not bother anybody and ‘mind their own business’ in every sense. Indians, on the other hand, felt that they came and captured the businesses, which

Settlement experiences of Afghan ‘refugees’ in India  165 ideally should have been theirs. He feels that these communities share goods relations but mostly on the surface. A similar view was expressed by Professor Mondira Dutta of Jawaharlal Nehru University, who felt that there is an underlying current between the Indian and Afghan Sikhs.169 Sikhs here do not accept them very well, Afghan Sikhs have their own Gurudwaras run by their communities. One should not make the mistake of imagining that just because these people share religion and language, there is no difference between them. Mahinder Singhji, an Indian Sikh, has been working at the administration of one of the Gurudwaras run by Afghans in Greater Kailash II, South Delhi and therefore has got the chance to observe the members of this community from a very close quarter. He had a very unique way of looking at them: A think they are like water. You can put them in any container and they will take the shape of that. When they lived in Afghanistan, they got assimilated with the Afghans and now that they are in India, they are getting integrated with us. He also pointed towards the unity and brotherhood that the members of this community share. Those who are well established, they tend to help the ones who are in distress and therefore support each other. The Afghans living in India came from different parts of Afghanistan (although mostly Kabul), and there exists a very strong bond between these particular groups. He gave an example of a funeral. If an Afghan Sikh dies, the entire community gathers to pay homage. I have never seen even one fourth of such a gathering if an Indian passes away. It does not matter, if that person was some one important or unimportant, rich or poor. If he was an Afghan, all these people will be there. Mr. Manjit Singh G.K, the President of the Delhi Sikh Gurudwara Management Committee and President, Siromani Akali Dal (Delhi State), had come to inaugurate a kirtan (religious hymn) competition organized by one of the Gurudwaras run by Afghan Sikhs and was kind enough to spare some time for an interview for this study. His observations and perspectives are very important since he holds a very significant position as one of the foremost persons to be responsible for the Gurudwaras in Delhi. As a schoolgoing boy in the 1970s, he remembered the time he came across Sikhs from Afghanistan, who were among the ‘first lots’ to had migrated to India. Since that time, several thousands have come and settled down in India, although he admitted that many have left for Western countries over the past

166  Settlement experiences of Afghan ‘refugees’ in India decade. The most important attribute that he noticed in the community was their adaptability. Afghanistan was never a fertile or prosperous land. Since agriculture was not a fruitful venture, these people were mostly into trading. For trading they had to travel to far away lands and get adjusted in those environments. They picked up that very important trait rather quickly. Personally I feel, their survival instincts are above average…Later when they had to migrate from Afghanistan to India, these ability of quick adaptation along with strong survival instinct, helped them to a great extent to settle down and get integrated with the locals.170 Most of the respondents from the host population observed that although as a community they tend to stick together, yet they felt that overall these people they have integrated in the Indian society, at least from the micro perspective. However, there were some respondents who lived in the affluent South Delhi localities like Greater Kailash and Chittaranjan Park. The situation in those places was quite different. As one of the respondents said: We do not interact with the neighbours much. The communication ends a greeting each other once in a while. They do not know that we are Afghans, they think we are Indian Sikhs.171 On being enquired about the reason behind less interaction, the respondent said: This is the locality of affluent people. These plots ( in C. R Park) were originally allotted to the refugees of Bangladesh by the government, (a reason why it is still called ‘Bengali Colony’) but because these people were given citizenship and support, they eventually prospered. Over the time this became a posh locality. In general nobody cares if the person next door is dead or alive, there is no unity, friendship…nothing! He however expressed that in their particular case, they also hesitate to interact with the neighbours because they do not want them to know that they are not yet citizens of India. We do not know how they will react when they will know that we are Afghans. At the moment they are living with the misconception that we are Indian-Sikhs and they are alright. I am quite sure they would not be too happy to know that their neighbour is an ‘Afghan’. When it was asked what, according to them, would be their reaction if they know that the person next door was a ‘refugee’, a respondent felt that it will not be positive. Even though his neighbours may have been ‘refugees’ at

Settlement experiences of Afghan ‘refugees’ in India  167 some point in their lives, yet today their perspectives have changed, they feel that refugees are burdens and most importantly the rich people here are too status-conscious and they would not live if they know that the family living next door are ‘refugees’ from Afghanistan. In the given context, when it was asked whether they feel that the ‘official’ non-recognition on the part of the Indian Government as ‘refugees’ to Afghans has had some positive results in the sense they do not have to bear that particular tag, one respondent expressed: It is difficult to respond to this answer in ‘yes’ or ‘no’. But one has to acknowledge that in a country like India where people have negative ideas associated with the tag- it is sometimes useful not to carry that. Intermingling with the local population becomes easier. In any case even those who are under UNHCR protection, do not tell the Indians about that and that is because they know the reaction won’t be positive…172 Some of the Hindu respondents interviewed in Faridabad expressed that they have accepted that they have to live in this country with these people. Since by appearance they are not different from locals and they are also followers of the majority religion of the host country, they did not experience any problems in India. Most Indians do not even know that they are from Afghanistan. They expressed that the neighbourhood in which they stay is inhabited by people of similar socio-economic background as theirs. People are worried about day-to-day things; they do not see the struggles of the Afghan Hindus as anything different from theirs. Speaking strictly for the Afghan Sikhs, Mr. Manjit Singh G.K, the President of the Delhi Sikh Gurudwara Management Committee, expressed that after so many years of staying side by side with the Indians, this community is hardly seen as ‘outsider’ or for that matter ‘refugees’ by the host society. As the President, Siromani Akali Dal (Delhi State), which is an important ally of Prime Minister Modi’s Government, he said that his party has been pushing the case of citizenship for the Sikhs and Hindus of Afghanistan quite consistently and assured that: This matter has been principally accepted at the Governmental level and is only stuck at the bureaucratic level. They are more or less integrated at the local level and after these resolutions are accepted the remaining issues will also be salved.173 Perception of similarity and competition towards ethnic Afghans Situation, however, is much different when it comes to the ethnic Afghans174 living in India. According to a report,175 every day, Ariana Afghan Airlines, Safi Airways, Kam Air, Spice Jet and Air India bring as many as 650 Afghans to New Delhi’s Indira Gandhi International Airport from Kabul – students,

168  Settlement experiences of Afghan ‘refugees’ in India traders, asylum seekers, tourists and, most of all, patients looking for treatment that is not available in their country. Once the winter sets in, and the Delhi weather becomes more amenable to the Afghans, this number will rise to 2,000. Apart from the refugees and asylum seekers, there is a large floating population that comes for a few days, weeks or months. If one has to go by the same report, the Indian embassy in Kabul issued 65,000 visas in 2011. By mid-2000, there has been substantial ethnic Afghan population started living in Delhi, so much so that a part of Lajpat Nagar (area behind the Central Market) is being termed as ‘little Kabul’ by some locals.176 Because of the established infrastructure favourable for the Afghans, these areas have continued to attract several Afghans who had come to India over the past decade. Rameen Jan, an Afghan who works at the Kabul-Delhi Restaurant at Lajpat Nagar, observed that ‘Afghans do not realize that they are in a different country when they come to Delhi. They get everything they need and thereby can fulfil their requirements very easily’.177 When one walks through the lanes of Lajpat Nagar, a locality in Delhi which was primarily allotted to the Sikhs and Hindus of Pakistan when they came to India after partition, it barely resembles any other localities of Delhi. Truly, that area had a very distinctive feel mostly, courtesy the presence of a large number of Afghan people (some in their traditional attire, salwar kameez) but also due to the sudden rise in the number of Afghan restaurants, Naan (typical Afghan bread) shops, fruit shops, stationary and chemist shops and Travel Agencies to cater to the needs of these people. The sign boards on these shops are generally written in English and Dari. The host population use the term ‘Afghani log’ to denote the people of Afghanistan. Local people in most cases seemed to be oblivious of the ‘refugee’ status an Afghan might or might not have. Based mostly on an informal interaction, certain preventive ideas about Afghans became apparent. Kasturba Niketan is a lower-middle-class housing complex in Lajpat Nagar, Delhi, where a large number of Afghans have been residing. The owner of a stationary store inside the housing informally said that many of the Indian flat owners have shifted to areas like Dwarka and Noida (suburbs of Delhi) because they find it more profitable to give these apartments on rent to the Afghan people. An Indian woman who had come to buy a few things from the same shop interrupted the shopkeeper and pointed out other aspects about this development. She later mentioned that her father-in-law had a three-room flat in Kasturba Niketan, and they have sublet one of the rooms to an Afghan student. Do you realize how much expensive this place has become because of this people. Today you can ask for any amount of money for something from Afghanis and they will not question you and pay you that. It is not that you are taking less money from Indians…because of these people the prices of things have doubled. We don’t shop from this area any more, we have to travel far to Sarojini Nagar to get our things.178

Settlement experiences of Afghan ‘refugees’ in India  169 They also expressed that her husband is contemplating in shifting to Noida and turning their apartments into a guest house. She said, ‘I think in a few years there won’t be any Indian left in Lajpat Nagar’. When enquired about her perception of the Afghans in general, she expressed: They do not create any problem as such but still, they are Afghans.. Muslim people…plus have you seen their physique? …Darr lagta hain (one gets scared) aur kya pata in mein se koi Osama jaisa ho (and who knows who is like Bin Laden among them). We maintain our distance!179 The point about their physicality (which, in many cases, is strikingly different from the members of the host population) has been raised by quite a few people. They used a colloquial term ‘Pathan type body’ to denote the typicality of the Afghans. While some said that even though they have such huge built and strong appearance, most of them are quite soft at heart and tend not to get into any form of confrontation with anybody. Others pointed towards the same aspects and said that they feel scared and avoid any confrontation with them. Ms Selin Susan Mathew180 from UNHCR’s Partner Agency pointed out that the Afghans face far less problems, especially in comparison to Africans in India. She pointed out towards the general Indian affinity for fair skin. Because most of the Afghans are ‘fair, well built and good looking’, acceptance becomes relatively easier. She confirmed that the host population sees Afghans as an ‘affluent community’ based on the lifestyle they follow in India. According to her, even some of the Afghan refugees are quite welloff and their images tend to clash with the stereotypical image of ‘refugees’ that Indians have. To explain her point, she described a particular incident. It can hardly be denied that unlike the Sikhs and Hindus of Afghanistan, the ethnic Afghans strand out substantially for the Indian population. Because of a certain kind of physical appearance, they have been getting a lot of attention from the opposite gender of the host population. A research carried out with Afghan students studying in different colleges and universities in India showed that a major disgruntlement among the Indian boys in those places for those people was due to the fact that the girls were getting attracted to the Afghans. The sense of competition has even resulted in little skirmishes between Afghans and Indians in places like Cuttack.181 Although that study did not report about any particular incident pertaining to Afghan refugees (as it was not about refugees), but the phenomenon is indicative of the pattern of reactions an Afghan’s presence in an Indian locality can generate. A couple of Indian residents of localities, where a large number of A ­ fghan people live in India, indicated that some of the single Afghan women living in Delhi are earning money in an ‘inappropriate manner’, while saying that they indicated towards the presence of sex racket run by them. Although they were unwilling to share the source of such information, neither were  they willing to disclose their identity, but they made certain

170  Settlement experiences of Afghan ‘refugees’ in India observations regarding this. One respondent mentioned that they are aware that Afghanistan was a conservative Muslim country where women do not enjoy a lot of freedom. So when they see Afghan women coming to India alone (for whatever reason) and staying in Delhi (which is not known to be the safest place for women in case) and maintaining a ‘certain kind of lifestyle’, they tend to make certain deductions. The same gentleman added that these things have not been reported in Indian media yet, but one day it will be and things might not be the same for Afghans then. When asked about this particular issue, Don Bosco also confirmed about the validity of such observations. They have also received information about Afghan girls providing ‘sexual favours’. For most single, un-educated Afghan women is India, this is a very easy way of earning some cash and some ethic Afghan women have been involved in survival sex.182 Afghan refugee women have also complained about the day-to-day harassment by Indian men because they find them attractive. In case of concrete harassment incidents of Afghan refugees, Bosco informed that they help them file police complaints through SLIC. The young Afghan boys often experience abuses from local boys, as many of them associate Afghans with Taliban and Al Qaeda; some of the Afghan respondents claimed that they have been called ‘Osama’ repeatedly in India. SAHRDC report mentioned that the anti-Afghan feeling was heightened in India during the alleged Taliban involvement in the Kargil conflict. Many of the refugees living in India at that time did not go to work or come out of their houses fearing harassment and deportation.183 For most of the Afghan refugees, providing proper legal documents is a big problem; yet, a rent agreement is extremely crucial for the extension of the visa from FRRO. The host population understands the peculiarity of their situation and therefore often overcharges them to provide the contract. Not only the landlord, even for availing the local transport (like rickshaw or auto), they are charged much more than the Indian people in the same area. There is no regulation on what is being paid to an Afghan refugee working in the parallel sector. In most cases, they are exploited and paid much less by the Indian businessmen, who know that this little money is a lot for many Afghans who have to survive in India at any cost. The overall sense that could be gained while speaking to the Indians living in the immediate surroundings is that they are not particularly comfortable with the Afghan’s presence principally and fear that these areas will be entirely ‘captured’ by Afghans if India allows them to come in this manner; at the same time, they are being economically benefitted by their presence. Because of the gains they make as a result of the Afghan’s presence, they do not object to it. The interactions that take place are primarily for business purposes. Both the communities tend not to mix with the other and view each other with suspicion.

Settlement experiences of Afghan ‘refugees’ in India  171

Acculturation and adaptation Acculturation is a complex process of adaptation between two cultures and is further defined as ‘the extent to which ethnic-cultural minorities participate in the cultural traditions, values, and beliefs of their own culture versus those of the dominant…society’.184 After having introduced the sample and undertaken considerable discussion on the actors influencing the adaptation process of conflict-displaced Afghans in India, this section of the chapter considers acculturation outcomes of the respondents from the standpoint of economic, sociocultural and psychological forms of adaptation to the dominant culture of the host society after the initial period of adjustment. According to Aycan and Berry,185 economic adaptation, sociocultural adaptation and psychological adaptation are three equally important measures of acculturation in a new host country. Acculturation occurs at the level of individuals, where thoughts, feelings and behaviours are influenced, whereas structural acculturation takes place at a group level, as ethnic groups occupy various socio-economic and political positions in relation to the dominant group.186 Scholars like Berry and Potocky-Tripodi opine that the newcomers, as the minority group, are likely to adapt to the expectations in a new culture. Yet, Balgopal187 spoke about the responsibilities of the host society to monitor the settlement and resettlement processes for the refugees: Once refugees have entered the resettlement country, adjusting to it is seen solely as their responsibility, without recognizing that the host country also must be willing to accommodate them…what jobs are available? Do they match refugee’s qualifications? How do the wages, salaries and so forth compare with those of similar jobs held by the majority culture and other ethnic groups? What are the policies regarding welfare and medical benefits, housing, family reunification, and immigration of family members? What economic opportunities…should be considered and concurrent interventions required? Balgopal’s expectations might hold relevance for countries who are signatory to the Refugee Conventions and are bound by law to protect the refugees in a certain manner within its geographical boundary and also play an active role to ensure that their transition and settlement phases are less stressful. These surely does not seem to be the consideration of a host country, which does not recognize the group under consideration as ‘refugee’ and treats them like any other foreign national who might have left his/her home country under natural circumstances. Economic adaptation Economic adaptation refers to how all refugees integrate into the labour market of the host community.188 Economic well-being may include, in addition to employment, consideration of the refugee family’s income,

172  Settlement experiences of Afghan ‘refugees’ in India occupation, home ownership and use of welfare programme.189 While introducing the samples in the previous sections of this chapter, it has been stated that approximately 23 out of 54 (43%) respondents were found to be unemployed. Twenty respondents (37%) indicated that they have found employment in the country’s parallel market and 11 respondents (20%) said that they were self-employed. Many of the self-employed respondents were financially well-off, and some even had businesses abroad. While discussing this factor, one has to keep in mind that the human capital supplied by refugees themselves (such as language proficiency, prior work skill and education) and the community context variables such as availability of jobs and conditions in the local labour market are equally important, not just in the initial adjustment period, but for long-term adaptation outcomes as well. The fact that majority of the respondents were illiterate or had attained only basic education in their home countries also determined the options they will be faced with in India. As has been mentioned earlier that majority of the respondents who came in the 1990s belonged to the trading community in Afghanistan, it can be said that their existing skills also encouraged them to start their own businesses in India (or abroad), as opposed to looking for employment in the host country. On top of that, their legal status of being a ‘foreigner’ in the eye of the Indian Government also closed doors for their employment in certain sectors. Out of the total sample size, only less than 10% of the respondents were homeowners in India. In India only, the citizens can hold private properties in their names. Twelve out of 54 respondents (including second generation) interviewed said that they have got the Indian citizenship and among them only five respondents said that they possess house, cars and businesses in their names. Although a few other possessed luxury items like cars, they said that they are yet to buy property in their names. For majority of the respondents, buying a property was not an option both legally and in terms of their financial situation. Around 76% of the total respondents claimed that they did not have access to sustainable income presently. It was observed that those who were financially stable were mostly Afghan Sikhs and Hindus, who also have Indian citizenship. These people and their families mostly belonged to significantly affluent backgrounds in Afghanistan as well, where not only they had flourishing businesses but also in some cases strong political connections. These respondents expressed that the quality of life or the access to opportunities that they enjoyed in Afghanistan was not present during the initial years of their stay in India, but because of their strong financial backgrounds, they managed on their own (or with the support of their peer group) and never approached either UNHCR or any other body in India for assistance. Many of these people had business tie-ups and business partners (Indians) who helped them in the initial years but soon they figured out ways starting businesses and earning money in India. A couple of respondents from the Sahajdhari Afghan-Sikh community said that they have businesses in

Settlement experiences of Afghan ‘refugees’ in India  173 China and Russia. They explained that the legal status did not permit them to do much in India, which is why they looked for opportunities abroad and eventually started businesses there. When they were asked whether they had considered shifting base, they said that was not an option because of the elderly members of their families, who are relatively more comfortable with India as it was relatively culturally similar to Afghanistan than either Russia or China. Out of 16 female respondents, only two mentioned about earning money in India. One Afghan-Christian woman was employed by a Church in Delhi along with her husband for a very short period of time. The second female ethnic Afghan respondent, who is a single mother with two children, said that her major source of earning is through translation and facilitation works for Afghans who visit to India for medical treatment. Because she has been living in India for sometime and speaks Hindi, she could use these skills to earn some money in India. Apart from these two cases, majority of the Afghan women were seen to be homemakers, and some even continue to be in ‘purdah’, like they were in Afghanistan. The male respondents (irrespective to religion) said that Afghan tradition does not permit women to be in public space and they, along with their wives, are not comfortable about the idea of women working outside home. None of the respondents from the second generation of Afghans mentioned to ever have worked in an organized sector in India. Employment and job satisfaction Afghan Sikhs and Hindus did not have much experience of employment neither in public nor in private sectors of Afghanistan. Neither was a significant section of that group involved in agriculture. Most importantly, Afghanistan was never known to be a country with noteworthy industrial or agrarian sectors. Although as citizens of the country, they had the Right to Employment in any sector they wished to work, yet either due to lack of opportunity, specific skill or interests, the Sikhs and Hindus of Afghanistan were primarily involved in businesses and trading activities. A number of respondents from these communities said that they had one (or more) shops where people used to sell things from garments to dress materials, stationaries to medicine and automobiles. Quite naturally, not every member was equally prosperous; however, all the respondents testified that they earned enough to satisfy the requirement of themselves and their families and to lead an honourable life. Many of the respondents, who came after 2005, also mentioned about businesses; yet, there were people who mentioned about working with the government and in the NGO sectors. Not many people said that they were expecting ‘white-collar’ jobs in India, as neither their educational background nor experience justified such expectations. What people largely said was that the environment that they encountered in India was not conducive for doing anything. Technically,

174  Settlement experiences of Afghan ‘refugees’ in India their legal position was not much different from any foreign tourist visiting India. But the situation of Afghans was completely different. They were forced to leave their home country due to war and conflict, for majority of the religious minorities, going back was not a feasible option. Because many of these displaced people had Indian origin and had witnessed India’s soft border policy to allow them to enter India, it encouraged many to hope that the Indian Government will be by their side and their settlement experiences will not be as difficult. The government’s refusal to treat them as ‘refugees’ meant that the only body they could turn to was UNHCR. Overall, majority of the respondents seemed to be extremely disappointed with the role played by UNHCR. The sudden change in their policy of stopping the subsistence allowance (in the early part of 1990s) came as a big blow to many respondents. They gave a funny logic. They told us ‘instead of offering cooked fish on your plate, we prepare you to catch your own fish!’. They offered a lump sum amount to start little ventures with that capital. But how do you do that in an environment that does not permit you to work? It is like expecting people to find fishes in a dry pond. A prominent Indian scholar on refugee issues, Dr. Rnabir Samaddar has spoken in favour of certain basic rights that refugees in India should be allowed to access, like right to move, right to education, right to pursue their vocations, etc.190 The lack of right to pursue their vocations in India made the struggle for existence much more harder. Many were forced to leave India and look for other countries where they had better opportunities. Those who stayed back found jobs in the unorganized sectors; some started businesses in partnership with Indians, and some went to other countries to earn living, while their families stayed back. Many of the Afghans who managed to establish some businesses made sure to employ disadvantaged members of their communities. An Afghan-Sikh respondent interestingly pointed out that the Sikhs who walk the part of righteousness are not permitted to beg, which is a reason one cannot find a Sikh beggar anywhere in this world. Since Afghan Sikhs are among the most religious communities, they knew that they would not beg to anybody, be it UNHCR or the Indian Government. Instead, they stood beside one another, and assisted each other to find employment, so that they could lead a respectable life. The kind of job many of them ended up doing did not demand education. Majority of the respondents, who are either illiterate or have very basic education, have been working under private employers. Many of these employers are aware of the particularities about their situation and accordingly give less money to them than the standard rate. Some of the respondents said that they are street hawkers and are regularly bothered by the local police. They have to bribe them to continue their work. Although none of the 54 respondents interviewed for this study said to have received vocational

Settlement experiences of Afghan ‘refugees’ in India  175 training from UNHCR; yet, UNHCR and its partner NGO Don Bosco did mention about a number of vocational training programmes being run by them primarily for the ethnic Afghans in India. The ethnic Afghans, who manage to speak Hindi, mentioned about earning some money through translation jobs for Afghan medical tourists; some respondents work at the Afghan restaurants in return of minimum pay. During the course of this study, it was repeatedly told that non-ethnic Afghans (Sikhs and Hindus) are no more the focus of UNHCR or its partner organizations as they feel that these communities have successfully settled down in India and are relatively more integrated than the ethnic Afghans. UNHCR feels that the economic situation of Afghans is much better than several other refugee communities in the country. Particularly, the Sikhs and Hindus, after so many years of their stay, are in ‘relatively comfortable’ positions and therefore do not need UNHCR’s assistance. Mr. Trilochan Singh, an Indian politician who was the former Chairman, National Commission for Minority, also agreed with that view and also credited the members of the communities for the status they have achieved based on their perseverance and hard work.191 He acknowledged that the environment that they encountered in India was not conducive for them; yet, many of them have managed to do quite well for themselves. Because majority of the Afghan Sikhs and Hindus settled in India much before the ethnic Afghan respondents, they got more time to understand the job market and find employment for themselves. The knowledge of Indian languages and the similarity in the physical appearance did make things little easier for them. But at large, respondents did express that UNHCR’s policies did not do much to make their lives less stressful. They feel that the recognition from the Indian Government as ‘refugees’ would have had a positive impact in their employment experiences, both in terms of access and job satisfaction. Sociocultural adaptation Sociocultural adaptation reflects the day-to-day ability to function.192 The sociocultural dimensions of adaptation refer to those which make it possible for refugees to become fully participating members of society and to function well in day-to-day social situations. What sort of exchanges and contact do they maintain with the host population in their daily lives in India determines how they have chosen to acculturate in the host society. The inability to function comfortably on a daily basis can be enormously frustrating and is a major source of acculturative stress.193 Living close to one another Teamwork and community cooperation are important strategies for most refugees and immigrants. A notable feature about the Afghan communities in India was their choice of living in close geographical proximity.

176  Settlement experiences of Afghan ‘refugees’ in India Throughout the course of the various interviews that were carried out in different locations of Delhi and nearby areas, it was observed that the Afghan communities in India tend to reside close to one another. Broadly speaking, a large number of non-ethnic Afghans (especially Afghan Sikhs) tend to live in West Delhi, while the ethnic Afghans are based in South Delhi. A significant number of Afghan-Hindu settlements were found in Faridabad. The trend is hardly a surprising one since from the very beginning, people went the ‘self-settlement’ way. However, quite a few factors paved way to this strategy adopted by the refugees. As has been manifested in the discussions of the previous chapter, the members of the religious minorities tended to remain together even while they were in Afghanistan. Because they have been minorities in an overwhelming Muslim country, living in close proximity to one another gave them a sense of security and satisfaction even in the pre-conflict days. During the period of conflict, they came even closer through the support network they created. Majority of the members who came by the land route to India had testified that they had undertaken that journey along with other families. More often, these were families of siblings, family friends or neighbours with whom they share very strong ties. Many male respondents even expressed that they could not accompany their wives and children, so they made it a point to see that their family members were sent with people whom they can trust completely, which in most cases were members of their religious communities. Finally, after reaching India, majority of the respondents had lived in Amritsar for some time, where again they preferred to be near each other. When the respondents realized that moving towards Delhi was a necessity, they consulted the Afghan Sikhs and Hindus who were based there. They categorically mentioned about not being helped by UNHCR or any other organization at any point during that time. When one person found a place to stay in Delhi, he guided his peer groups and they also followed the same path and found another place to stay in the localities where they had ‘their people’. Since they were not faced with any restrictions from any authority, this worked well and after few years, certain localities witnessed influx of a significant Afghan population. The Lajpat Nagar neighbourhood in South Delhi is popularly known as ‘refugee colony’, which has hosted refugees from Pakistan and currently is very popular among the ethnic Afghans. The local people today also see that area as ‘the place where Afghani Log live’. Some of the local shop owners or rickshaw pullers (local transport), who were asked about the direction to the place where Afghans stays, while explaining the direction, made it a point to add a line, ‘the area had become mini Kabul, you simply cannot miss it’.194 After reaching the place, one did realize that the comment made was legitimate because of a large number of ethnic Afghans who have been residing there. Many of the respondents during interviews indicated that the circumstances in which they have been living in India also demanded the communities to be together. Staying in closer proximity was an obvious

Settlement experiences of Afghan ‘refugees’ in India  177 and pragmatic strategy in a country which did not put forward any assistance in their settlement process. They also expressed that they preferred self-­settlement over camp settlement. Contact between cultures and the outcomes While the ethnic Afghans can easily be identified because of their physical appearances, the same might not hold true for the non-ethnic Afghans who share a lot of commonalities with the Indians they live with. These similarities made the interactions and acceptance of these groups of Afghans relatively smoother. The interactions and exchanges between the migrant groups and the host population have been important criteria of acculturation. These interactions have certain very interesting outcomes. Language Majority of the Sikh (and to some extent the Hindu) respondents from Afghanistan informed that they spoke Kabuli-Punjabi in their private spaces even while they were in their home countries. Punjabi (Gurmukhi) is the native language of the Punjabis, the people who historically inhabited in the Punjab region of India and Pakistan. Kabuli-Punjabi is that version of Punjabi language that has been spoken by the non-ethnic Afghans, primarily Sikhs but also the Hindus of Afghanistan. This version of language contains strong influences of Dari and Pashto, the two most important languages of Afghanistan. Therefore, it can be said that there are some differences in the version of the Punjabi language spoken in India and Afghanistan, which might not be easily identifiable to a non-Punjabi speaking audience. The Indian Punjabis who are neighbours of many of these Afghan Sikhs said that although they do not find it difficult to understand each other, yet they can very easily make out who an Afghan is based on their dialect and accent. The Afghans, however, feel that after living in India for several decades, the Kabuli-Punjabi that they used to speak has undergone some changes and they feel that it is more close to the Gurmukhi spoken by the Indians. Additionally, many of them have picked up the Hindi language (spoken by majority of the North Indian population), which was a necessity particularly for the people who were working. Many of the respondents mentioned that they spoke Kabuli-Punjabi or Dari at home. During the course of this research, it was observed that when members of these communities came together, either for some social occasions, religious gatherings and formal meetings in their Gurudwaras, they interacted mostly in Dari or Kabuli-Punjabi. At the tuition classes conducted by KDWS, several children between 3 and 12 years of age were found to be taking lessons. They are all either second or third generation of Afghans in India. Over 60% of these children said that they speak Dari at home; around 10% even said that they know Pashtu

178  Settlement experiences of Afghan ‘refugees’ in India as well. All of these children can speak, read and write Hindi and Punjabi. Some of the local underprivileged Indian children were also part of the group taking lessons; it was noticed that within themselves, they interacted mostly in Hindi or Punjabi. During the course of the interviews with the members of Sahajdhar Sikhs (originally from the Khost province) community in India, whom other ­Afghan Sikhs also identify as ‘Khostis’, it was realized that an overwhelming majority do not speak any language except Pashtu. The older generation and the women of that community in particular do not spoke any other language either in public or private spaces. The younger generation, who have to work, had to pick up some Hindi for survival; even then, their Hindi has very strong Pashtu accent. Although it was not possible to meet the schoolgoing children of the members of these communities, the interviewed members said that their children spoke fluent Hindi like Indians. Some of the ethnic Afghans interviewed informed that they have been introduced to Hindi, through Indian Hindi movies which they used to watch in Afghanistan. However, majority of them picked up the language after living in Delhi for so many years. Since they never learnt the language and merely picked it up from people, most of them can speak but cannot read or write the language. They have a very distinct accent when they speak Hindi; yet, these were respondents (especially female ethnic Afghans) who could not speak any of the Indian languages and expressed that they found it difficult to get by in Delhi because of this limitation. On the whole, majority of the Afghans in India spoke Hindi. Attire Most of the respondents reflected a natural disposition towards the prevalent dress code in the host nation alongside the discourse or modesty and appropriateness congruent with Afghan tradition and culture. The traditional cultural patterns of Indians have certain similarities with the Afghans; therefore, the ‘element of shock’, that is often experienced when two drastically different cultures come in contact with one another, was not there. The traditional attire (salwar kameez) of Indian Punjabis and the Afghan Sikhs, for both men and women, is similar. Although with time, majority of the city dwellers in India have shifted to a more Western form of dressing, yet if one is seen wearing traditional attire, it would not invite attention. With a few exceptions, majority of the Afghan-Sikh respondents, especially from ­m iddle- and lower-income groups, were seen to be wearing the same attire that they used to wear in Afghanistan. Those who were seen wearing Western attire were primarily from the affluent section; however, they did mention of wearing traditional Afghan attires during social occasions involving members of the Afghan community in India. The Afghan Hindus mostly dressed like any other average modern Indian and wore Afghan attire only during special occasions.

Settlement experiences of Afghan ‘refugees’ in India  179 Majority of the female respondents expressed that they were used to wearing burka in the public spaces in Afghanistan, something which they do not ‘have to do’ in India. Afghan women largely continue to cover their heads with their dupattas (a stole, an integral part of the dress they wear) in a way that their faces are visible. However, the practice among the Khostis is relatively different. Interestingly, their women do purdah even after decades of living in India, whereby their faces remain covered when they are in public spaces. The ethnic female respondents wore hijab in most cases. Majority of the female respondents express that they like Saris (traditional Indian attire for women), but a few mentioned about possessing them. Pagri or Pagg (turban) is a very important element of the dress code of the followers of Sikhism in any part of the world. Growing hair is one of five most important articles of faith in Sikhism. All the Afghan-Sikh respondents (except, the Khostis) were seen wearing pagg, although there were certain differences between the turban worn by an Indian and an Afghan Sikh. In most cases, the size of the turban of Afghan Sikhs was smaller, little tilted towards left and they wear them in a manner that a part of the ears is visible. It was also observed that mostly they wore dark-coloured turbans. The Indian Sikhs, on the other hand, wear big turbans, with more colours and their ears are not visible. Some of the Afghan-Sikh respondents explained that their style of wearing turban is closer to the ways Pashtuns of Afghanistan traditionally wore turbans. Interestingly, they have continued to maintain their distinct style of wearing turban in India and have not adapted the Indian style. Afghan Sikhs are known to be extremely religious and therefore majority of them obeyed the traditional requirement of wearing five-ks in their day-to-day lives. Culinary culture and hospitality During the course of the interactions and visit to the homes of Afghans, it became apparent that the ways of dressing and what and how they ate are critical indicators of how they saw ‘self’, any significant shift from that was seen by them as a coercive wearing down of that self. The romanticizing of home they left behind is manifested through the imagery of close family ties, through the sentimentalizing of rituals of folk culture, food and simple household objects. Replication of the way of life as remembered becomes the only connection these groups are able to maintain with their homeland; culinary culture has an important part to play in these diasporic identifications. Food is located within cultural boundaries and beyond, thereby ensuring that diasporic diets, like all aspects of diasporic identity and culture, are constantly remade, even while some key elements endure over time.195 For the Afghans in India, cooking and eating became some of the enduring habits, rituals and everyday practices, which are collectively used to sustain a shared sense of cultural identity. Food is closely linked to the ideas of prestige, social place and identity.

180  Settlement experiences of Afghan ‘refugees’ in India Many of the interviews for this study were conducted at various Gurudwaras in Delhi and in most cases, either these Gurudwaras were built by Afghan Sikhs or were being run by them. Each of these Gurudwaras had Langars196 and an important feature of that was its elaborate spread. Many underprivileged local Indian people were seen coming to these Gurudwaras, who were thankful to the Gurudwara for heavy breakfast which they offer completely free. The langar menu, apart from being elaborate, often had a very interesting mix of Indian and Afghan preparations. Fruit juices and dry fruits are prevalent and in accordance to Afghan food habit the langar food is prepared in pure ghee. Every time the members of these Gurudwaras were asked about this particular aspect they would say that what they offer currently is much less than what they used to offer in langar while they were in Afghanistan. Throughout these conversations, one could make out that they are quite conscious about maintaining this practice to reiterate their Afghan identity. The interviews that were conducted at home were invariably followed by elaborate spread of food. It was not difficult to identify that among the everyday cultural practices routinely used to maintain, enhance or reinvent Afghan identities, food and the rituals associated with eating food assumed central importance. Added to it is the comparative portability of culinary traditions and habits which tend to endure despite multiple migrations and displacements. Ingredients, foodstuffs or method of preparation used in a new habitat, changed or unchanged, help map not just the movement but also the adjustment and adaptation patterns of groups in their new environment. An interesting thing noticed about the ritual of eating food among the Afghans was that the households commonly served the food items on a dastarkhan, which was placed over the carpet at the centre of the room. Because Afghan food is comparatively less spicy than Indian food, there would be occasional disclaimers about their food being ‘non-spicy’ for Indian standards and chillies would be provided separately. However, after tasting their food, it could be realized that several Indian dishes and spices have paved their way into their cuisine. Mobility and adaptability work in tandem to ensure that food habits, even if they undergo transformation, are usually maintained by the Afghan community in India. Over the times, this reshaping of ingredient and cooking methods often leads to reshaping of culinary culture such that the dishes sometimes bear little resemblance to the original. Other times, entire culinary culture is preserved. When a couple of the female respondents were asked if they have consciously adapted to certain food habits, they identified reducing the use of oil and making chapatis (Indian bread) at home, as departures from their practices of making bread in Tandoor in Afghanistan. The weather in India among several other factors also played an important role in these transformations. The special meals at different occasions invariably mean preparations of different kinds of typically Afghan food items but also a few popular Indian dishes. Afghani bread among other food items is a significant feature

Settlement experiences of Afghan ‘refugees’ in India  181 of such spread in the households of the Afghani Sikhs and Hindus in India. Tea is an integral part of the lives of both Afghans and Indians; while Afghans prefer their green or black tea with cardamom (known as kahwa), accompanied mostly by dry fruits and sweets, the Indians prefer their tea with milk (known as dhoodh patti), accompanied by biscuits. One Afghan-Sikh gentleman jokingly said over the years, they have gotten used to Indian whether, Indian people, Indian system and Indian language, but they simply can’t accept tea with milk. In the recent years, Afghan food has gained significant popularity in India as well. The Afghani Market at Lajpat Nagar II, South Delhi, has emerged as one of the hubs of Afghan cuisine. Several articles197 have been published in mainstream print and electronic media that have highlighted the popularity of Afghan food in India. Apart from catering to the increasing Afghan population in Delhi, this market has found local Indian customers as well. Apart from offering traditional Afghan food, these restaurants also keep some very popular Indian preparations. In India, vegetarianism is integral to the food habits of large sections of population; yet, majority of the respondents expressed that they are non-vegetarians unlike several other Sikh and Hindu counterparts in India. In Delhi, a food preparation like Afghani chicken is part of the menu card in all possible non-vegetarian restaurants; yet, people’s perception of Afghans would betray total ignorance. While speaking about the assimilation part of the migrant cuisine into the host country’s culinary culture, it would not be fair to equate the popularity of the migrant dish within a host nation, vice versa, with the assumption of a complete assimilation, acceptance or accommodation of the migrant group. The lighter-coloured chickpeas popularly referred to as Kabulichana, in some parts of India, are called so because they were thought to have come from Afghanistan when they were first seen in the Indian subcontinent in the 18th century; the same is referred to as Indian chickpeas in Afghan cookbooks, another indicator of the migration in the region and their impact on food.198 In Afghan culture, hospitality occupies a very important place. This trait has survived the phases of war, conflict, displacement and migration and even the poorest of the refugees will offer everything they have to a guest. ’Chai?’ (Tea?) was often the first question that came from the Afghan respondents. Depending on the venue of the interviews (Gurudwara, temples, offices or homes), the Afghans always made it a point to invite for a meal together. Sharing a meal, even a tea with guest is an essential part of the values they have been brought up with. Family roles During the settlement experiences of most refugee communities, it has been observed that the cultures that the refugee groups come from are used to situate men in a dominant position, where they hold much of the power, with

182  Settlement experiences of Afghan ‘refugees’ in India clearly defined gender roles. A typical source of conflict in refugee marriage during these phases is the modification or reversal of some of these roles.199 Interestingly, this factor has relatively less relevance because of the similarities in the hierarchy in the family structures in both the home and host countries. Both societies are patriarchal and hierarchy plays an important role within families and kinship groupings also, where men outrank women of similar age, and senior relatives outrank junior relatives. Traditionally, male and female roles are strongly differentiated both in India and Afghanistan. The public sphere is the domain of men, and the domestic one is the realm of women. It is expected that the women would take care of young children, cook for the household and clean the house. However, it is very important to note that any generalization about India could be problematic as along with on established notions comes several others that can challenge that very notion. There is no doubt that upper- and middle-class Indian women, over the past few decades, have been challenging the norms and expectations to their gender roles, especially in the urban spaces. Because there are strong similarities between the family roles in traditional Afghan and Indian cultures, the Afghans in India did not necessarily encounter conflicts in values between the old way and the new, something that was experienced by their counterparts in the Western countries. Respondents expressed that the transition in respect to family roles was least difficult for both men and women after they came to India. Many male respondents expressed that keeping women ‘under control’ is difficult in ‘ultra-modern West’ and they are aware of the problems being faced by Afghans who had migrated to such countries and they felt thankful that they did not have to encounter such situations in India. Some respondents however felt that Delhi being the capital and essentially urban is ‘too modern’ and a section of the society has adopted the ‘Western culture and practices’ (issues such as dressing of women, mixing with the opposite gender, independence, smoking in public disregard for tradition, etc., were discussed), which they do not feel comfortable with. Mentions were repeatedly made of the entertainment industry, namely Indian movie and television, as agents of negative impact for younger generations. Marriage is considered an obligation, and divorce is rare and stigmatized in both India and Afghanistan. All the respondents expressed that choosing one’s own partner is not acceptable and the families perform that responsibility. Even the second-generation respondents expressed that they were unwilling to go against the existing tradition. The Afghan-Sikh and -Hindu respondents expressed that they prefer to stick to matrimonial alliances within their respective communities. The Afghan Sikhs in particular mentioned that ideally they want their children to be married to Afghan Sikhs and marrying an Indian Sikh is also not a preferred option for them. There have a few instances when Afghan Sikhs girls have been married to Indian Sikhs, but that is uncommon. The Sikh and Hindu respondents expressed that they feel that they have shared a certain history and culture which can only be understood by people who have been through similar experiences,

Settlement experiences of Afghan ‘refugees’ in India  183 which makes post-marital adjustment easier which is one of the reasons why they insist on marriages within communities. Among the ethnic Afghan respondents, one of the Afghan widows had married an Indian man of Hindu faith, but has been abandoned by him after one year of their marriage and apparently faced serious threats from his family. The younger generation of ethnic Afghans, those who are single, often have relationships with local Indian girls (without the knowledge of respective families), but many of them do not see marriage as a possibility. Some of the female respondents expressed that Indian men often propose single Afghan women for relationships and marriage knowing very well that it would not get any recognition in either of the societies. This growing trend of Afghan men wooing Indian women is slowly gaining attentions and is likely to have repercussions within the host society in future. Intergenerational conflicts arise between grandparents and grandchildren, and between parents and their adult children as they ‘try to maintain the ways of old culture’. In the new society, elders’ experience and wisdom may be discounted, and they may become very dependent upon other family members because they lack language proficiency and cultural competence. Such situations were experienced with some of the elderly members of the households of the Khosti Sikhs in Delhi. As it has been adequately highlighted that majority of the respondents interviewed for this study were the Sikhs and Hindus from Afghanistan, who shared strong ethnic, religious, linguistic and commercial relations with India, the transition for them was relatively smoother. At the micro level, in the day-to-day interactions with the host population in Delhi, they encountered much less difficult shocks in terms of values, societal roles and attitude. Because majority hailed from Kabul, which was more progressive than rest of Afghanistan of a particular time, the settlement experiences in Delhi, another urban space did not bring additional complexities with in. Therefore, the respondents from these communities expressed that from a micro perspective, they were not required to undergo significant changes to facilitate the adaptation process. Members of the host population sometimes however observed that they felt that the displaced Afghan population did undergo changes, which made their adaptation process easier. To reiterate the point he wanted to establish, Mr. Manjit Singh G.K gave the example of his initial interactions with Afghan-Sikh families in the 1960s and 1970s. He observed that many of the elders of these communities used to throw stones at their children or beat them to an extent that blood would come out for very simple childish mistakes, which he does not see them do any more. Accordingly, he said, ‘They were like the Pathans, jahil (uncivilized ) to some extent but over the years they have mellowed down. India had made them more civilized’.200 From a researcher’s point of view, his statement seemed exceedingly condescending, more so because it was uttered in the presence of senior Afghan-Sikh members (many of whom are citizens of India) and was asked to validate his point. Though not this explicit, similar attitude and perceptions were shared by a few other respondents as well.

184  Settlement experiences of Afghan ‘refugees’ in India Psychological adaptation Psychological adaptation is the final dimension of adaptation outcomes that also include economic and sociocultural adaptation.201 Eminent scholars have described psychological adaptation as a sense of well-being, including health and mental health, and satisfaction with life.202 The respondents were asked to assess their physical health in addition to the closed-ended questions provided in the questionnaires (based on a Likert scale; the Hopkins 25 Symptom Checklist). Evaluation of the mental health status is an arduous task, but their narratives suggested the overall distress levels to be high among the respondents. Very few respondents gave positive responses to the questions about life satisfaction. Responses were dependent on the socio-economic standing of the respondents. Their level of satisfaction also depended on the frame of reference. Some of the respondents compared their present situation with an idealized recollection of life before war; others with experiences during the conflict and some other compared their lives with what life would be like for them if they had remained in Afghanistan. Some respondents also compared their situations with the members of their communities currently living in the West. During the course of this study, it was realized that the narrative responses were extremely effective to determine which of the mentioned frames of reference informed the respondent’s judgement as to their current level of life satisfaction. Conditions in the host society can facilitate or hinder wellness. Depression and anxiety are common among refugees as they cope with various losses and attempt to figure out how to get by in the new circumstances. Scholars like Pernice and Brook,203 Young and Evan204 and Aycan and Berry205 have stated that newcomers may experience psychological distress that is correlated with changes in their environment such as loss of social networks and unemployment. Discrimination is a significant factor predicting high symptoms of anxiety and depression.206 While studying the Bosnian refugee groups in exile, scholars have argued that effects of war trauma are significantly compounded by sources of post-migration distress, such as lack of adequate income, language barrier and social isolation, something which was particularly visible with the Afghan-Christian respondents.

Acculturation stress Acculturation involves a process of communication between two cultures, with implications for group-level changes among refugees and in the host society as a result of their interaction.207 Similarly, acculturation takes place at an individual level as refugees, who are in contact with a new culture experiencing psychological changes. The interface of persons with the unfamiliar cultural environment (and consequently unfamiliar experiences) may produce acculturative stress according to Berry.208 From the standpoint of psychological well-being, acculturative stress can produce positive

Settlement experiences of Afghan ‘refugees’ in India  185 adaptation outcomes such as new opportunities and experiences, or negative adaptation outcomes, such as restrictions on experiences that formerly gave meaning to life. A significant portion of the sample reported somatic symptoms expressed as physical health problems such as headaches, gastrointestinal disorder and sleep problems. Some of the respondents showed some of the injuries that they got during the conflict in Afghanistan. Many of the respondents have undergone surgeries or treatments for which they have been hospitalized in India. Physical health problems were difficult to separate from mental health symptoms, as the same respondents often reported trembling, nervousness and spells of panic in the checklist. Some of the respondents were on medication that had been prescribed for ‘nerves’ and symptoms probably related to post-traumatic stress disorder. Don Bosco supervises the health-related problems of the Afghans in India and they mentioned about dealing with psychological problems of refugees as a result of their experiences of conflict, war, sexual and domestic violation. Many of the refugees under UNHCR’s protection are fighting ailments stemming from depression. The representative of the NGO informed that they themselves had identified a few cases during their regular interactions with the members of the communities, but mostly the families tend to approach them in case they find some of their family member’s behaviours erratic.209 In case of extremely serious cases, there are provisions of patients being referred to the Vimhans Hospital in Delhi as they have a few free beds. None of the respondents (or their family members), however, informed about being treated at Vinhams at any point. Satisfaction with life was measured with one global question asking respondents to rate the quality of their lives as ‘poor’, ‘fair’, ‘good’ or excellent. Nearly 57% of the respondents felt that the life situation in India is extremely negative, while 30% felt the existing conditions to be fair. Less than 10% of the respondents saw their lives as ‘good’ and only 4% of the total number saw their lives as ‘excellent’. Some people used this question as an opportunity to express dissatisfaction with other aspects of their lives, such as job, lack of rights, citizenship, lack of support and assistance, etc. Their words were sometimes at odds with the rating they had given in response to the life satisfaction question. Psychological wellness for Afghans in India Psychological wellness for refugees consists of the ability, independence and freedom to act and the possession of the requisite goods and services to be psychologically content.210 Psychological wellness can be obtained through the ongoing interaction between the person and his or her environment. An assessment of well-being requires an emphasis on the ability of the refugee to function well in his or her environment as well as an understanding of the context in which the current environment is evaluated. For the conflict-­ displaced Afghans in India, experiences during conflict, transition and

186  Settlement experiences of Afghan ‘refugees’ in India settlement shaped dramatic changes in their lives and brought significant changes in their health and well-being. Family separation emerged as one of the universal themes that caused and continued to cause anxiety within the families. Many families had to leave their relatives behind in Afghanistan; some reported that their relatives fled to the West. Many of the respondents (even from the affluent sections) said that their children had to leave India because of the lack of opportunities and are currently settled abroad. Many of the daughters of the Afghan-Sikh and -Hindu respondents have been married to the members of the same communities settled abroad as they were much well settled in comparison to the prospective matches in India. In most cases, the respondents expressed this phenomenon of family separation with the Hindi term ‘Bikharna’, something that they are trying to come to terms with. Sab bikhar gaye. Everybody got scattered. Because of various factors like the lack of employment opportunity for Afghans or the limited literacy rate of the migrant group or the lack of knowledge of the existing order in India, some of the male family members of the respondents had to go back to Afghanistan after a few years of their stay in India to work and earn money. The deteriorating security situation in Afghanistan makes things extremely stressful for the family members who are left behind. They expressed that they are living under immeasurable stress, anxiety and tension; yet, they are continuing this because the other option to this is to starve to death. Undoubtedly, separation from family members inhibits psychological wellness, but for the Afghan Sikhs and Hindus living in India, one of the foremost battles is the one related to the third-party identification of their identity. While in Afghanistan, people saw them as Indians and now that they are in India, the locals see them as Afghans. Narinder Singh Nagpal, a senior member of Khalsa Diwan Society who has been waiting for Indian citizenship for more than 20 years, highlighted the peculiar situation of the religious minorities of Afghanistan: Hamara haalat dhoobi ke kutte jaisa hain…We are neither recognized as Afghan nor Indian. We are neither here nor there…we do not belong anywhere! What can be more pitiable than this?211 The third-party identifications were often found to be the source of disgruntlement among the respondents. One ethic Afghan respondent, who has been living in South Delhi for almost ten years, said: I am tired to Indians calling me ‘Afghani’… I tell them ‘Afghani is the currency of Afghanistan and not a community! After ten years of my stay in this country, I am not human for them…I am an Afghani!212

Settlement experiences of Afghan ‘refugees’ in India  187 The host society often has certain stereotypes in their minds which have negative effects on the migrant communities. For example, the reference of Al Qaeda and Taliban is something that the ethnic Afghans have to endure in India. People have called these names as abuses to a few respondents of the ethnic Afghan community. A heightened tension and an anti-Afghan feeling in India over the alleged Taliban involvement in the Kargil conflict were witnessed by these communities. Mr. Alok Bansal, Director, India Foundation, one of the foremost Think Tanks in the country, sees one of the reasons why India does not officially protect Afghan refugees because of ‘danger of Jihadi terrorism’.213 The correlation between terrorism and the Afghans has been rampant and has caused extreme discomfort to the migrants. For majority of the Sikhs and Hindus of Afghanistan living in India currently, naturalization is the only practical option. The complicated bureaucratic procedures have made that unreachable for majority of the respondents many of whom have been living in India for more than 20 years. Kulwant Singh who runs Chemist shop in the Udipi Complex in Munirka said: ‘My father came to India in 1987 due to apprehensions about conflict escalation. We remained here on ‘stay visa’, since then. It was two years back that we applied for citizenship and finally my family became Indian citizen after a long wait of 18 years’. 1992 to 2015- for the past twenty-three years I have been living in India with a ‘stay visa’. It is nothing more than a stay permit, does not have any other benefits attached. Knowing that Indian citizenship could be the only solution to many of our problems, I tried all possible way to get Indian citizenship. Nothing happened! Last year in frustration I tore my wife’s papers and mine. I told her we will not apply for it any more…I am 73 years old, we have had enough!214 At 21, Jagjit Kaur has spent more than half her life in New Delhi. She looks, sounds and behaves like an Indian. ‘My Indian friends are shocked when I tell them I am an Afghan. They say it’s not possible’, she says. After spending 12 years in the Indian capital, the young refugee and her mother applied for naturalized Indian citizenship 18 months ago. ‘I want an identity’, she says, adding that without an identity card, she feels like she belongs nowhere.215 However, the major reason why the respondents felt that the quality of their life in India was ‘poor’ was due to the lack of basic rights for them. The day-to-day struggles that they have been encountering in India for decades have been primarily because they do not have access to rights, which any refugee group is entitled to. They have recalled their initial days and how they had to struggle to get their footings in a new environment. The lack of guidance then and now, the absence of a ‘real’ assistance from the UNHCR and the total antipathy of the host government all contribute towards making their existence a ‘struggle’ in India. Although certain Sikh and Hindu respondents did express that the absence of the ‘refugee’ tag with them, as

188  Settlement experiences of Afghan ‘refugees’ in India a result of the non-recognition on the part of the government, might have helped them in their interaction with the host population of the immediate surroundings, yet they felt that the overall situation has contributed towards more stress and difficulty. Respondents felt in comparison to conflict-ridden Afghanistan that the situation in India is much better, as they do not have to be worried about being alive the next day. Moreover, they are completely aware of the deplorable condition of the Sikhs and Hindus who are currently stuck there. Ethnic Afghans also felt that in terms of security, the two countries cannot be compared. Many appreciated India’s open border policy and particularly the fact that it has allowed Afghans to stay in its territory in addition to India’s friendly foreign policy towards Afghanistan, but felt disappointed about the way Afghans have been abandoned within its territory. Some of the naturalized respondents expressed their satisfaction over the prevalent situation. Satisfaction was an elusive concept, and perhaps more so because it was responded to generally, rather than out of specific domains of satisfaction. For instance, there were those who were satisfied with their businesses and legal status, but not with their health status, or the separation of their family members. Others have noted the unequal weight of individual life domains in the overall structure of satisfaction and suggested that the relative importance of each domain that is individually determined affects one’s perspective of life satisfaction and overall well-being. The aim of the final chapter would be to lay out certain general impressions about the studied population as well as the immediate stakeholders influencing the settlement experiences of the Afghans. To conclude it would unravel some of the key findings based on the earlier discussions and end by highlighting some of the key contributions of this research.

Notes 1 An Afghan-Sikh currently living in India (unwilling to disclose his identity), in discussion with the author, New Delhi, December 2015. 2 R. Baubock, A. Heller, and A. Zolberg (eds.), The Challenge of Diversity: Integration and Pluralism in Societies of Immigration. (Aldershot: Avebury, 1996). 3 J. W. Berry, ‘A psychology of immigration’. Journal of Social Issues, Vol. 57 (2001), 611–627. 4 Anne-Sophie Bentz, ‘Afghan refugees in Indo-Afghan relation’. Cambridge Review of International Affairs, Vol. 26 (2013), 374–391 cites two different data sources for 2009 (http://refugees.org/resources/refugee-warehousing/ archived-world-refugee-surveys/) and 2011 (www.unhcr.org/cgi-bin/texis/vtx/ page?page=49e4876d6andsubmit=GO). 5 ‘Abandoned and Betrayed: Afghan Refugee under UNHCR Protection in New Delhi’, Report by South Asia Human Rights Documentation Center, New Delhi, 1999. 6 T. Ananthachari, Refugees in India: Legal Framework, Law Enforcement and Security, at www.worldii.org/int/journals/ISILYBIHRL/2001/17.html. Cited in South Asia Human Rights Documentation Centre, Human Rights and Humanitarian Law- Developments in India and International Law (1st ed. 2008) p. 193.

Settlement experiences of Afghan ‘refugees’ in India  189 7 Ibid. 8 ‘Report of Refugee Population In India’, Human Rights Law Network, November 2007. Available at: www.hrln.org/admin/issue/subpdf/Refugee_populations_ in_India.pdf (accessed on 30.5.2016). 9 Baba Umar, ‘Afghan refugees looms options as 2014 looms’. Al Jazeera, 14 November 2013. Available at: www.aljazeera.com/indepth/features/2013/11/ afghan-refugees-weigh-options-as-2014-looms-20131111124715460175.html (accessed on 30.5.2016). 10 Pramod Kumar Sharma, ‘Status of Afghan Refugees in Delhi’ (MPhil. Dissertation, Jawaharlal Nehru University, 2007). 11 Proceedings of the Indian Parliament-Lok Sabha Unstarred Question No.4544, 22.4.2003. 12 Lok Sabha unstarred question no. 6307 for 5.5.2015, Govt. of India, Ministry of Home Affairs. 13 Shuchita Mehta (Senior Communication/Public Information Assistant, ­U NHCR India) in discussion with Anwesha Ghosh, December 2015. 14 Joint IDP Profiling Service (JIPS), Urban Profiling of Refugee Situation in Delhi: Refugees from Afghanistan, Myanmar and Somalia and their Indian Neighbours: A Comparative Study, September 2013, Available at: http://fic.tufts.edu/assets/ original_Urban_Profiling_of_Refugees_Situations_in_Delhi.pdf (accessed on 6.2.2015). 15 Miriam Aced and Anwesha Ghosh, ‘Statelessness Protections as a Remedy for Protection Gaps in Jordan and India’, Refugee Review, Vol. 2, no. 5 (2015), 59–76. 16 Shuchita Mehta (Senior Communication/Public Information Assistant, ­U NHCR India) in discussion with Anwesha Ghosh, October 2014. 17 Anne-Sophie Bentz, ‘Afghan Refugees in Indo-Afghan Relation’. Cambridge Review of International Affairs, Vol. 26 (2013), 374–391. 18 According to UNHCR, in 2005, there were more than 8,000 Afghan refugees in India. Close to 88% of the Afghan refugee population in the country were Hindus or Sikhs. In 2007, there were 9,200 Afghan refugees in India, of whom 8,500 were Hindus and Sikhs. Nayana Bose, Afghan Refugees in search of Indian Identity, 19 May 2005. Available at: www.unhcr.org/428c967e4.html (accessed 6.2.2015). 19 Khalsa Diwan Welfare Society is a welfare organization primarily working with the children of the Sikh and Hindu Afghans living in India. 20 Vivian Tan, ‘Afghan minority seeks home in India’. News Stories, UNHCR, 13 December 2007. Available at www.unhcr.org/4761579f4.html (accessed on 30.5.2016). 21 Shri Khajinder Singh Khurrana (Hindu- Sikh Welfare Society), in discussion with the author in October 2014. 22 Manik Chakraborty, Human Rights and Refugees: Problems, Laws and Practices. (New Delhi: Deep & Deep, 2001). 23 Julie Baujard, ‘Refugee of diaspora? The Indian policies on refugees: the case of Delhi’ in E. Leclerc (ed.), From International to Transitional Political Actors: Case Studies of the Indian diaspora (New Delhi: Manohar, 2011), pp. 65–85. 24 Prof. Dr. Mondira Dutta, (Director, Center for Inner Asian Studies, School of International Studies, Jawaharlal Nehru University) in discussion with the author, October 2014 and December 2015. 25 Prof. Dr. Gulshan Sachdeva (Director, Europe Area Studies Programme Centre for European Studies, School of International Studies, Jawaharlal Nehru University) in an interview with the author, December 2015. 26 Anne-Sophie Bentz, ‘Afghan Refugees in Indo-Afghan Relation’. Cambridge Review of International Affairs, Vol. 26 (2013), 374–391.

190  Settlement experiences of Afghan ‘refugees’ in India 27 ‘Report of Refugee Population In India’, Human Rights Law Network, November 2007. Available at: www.hrln.org/admin/issue/subpdf/Refugee_populations_ in_India.pdf (accessed on 30.5.2016), 20. 28 Neyaz Farooquee, ‘An Afghan Church grows in Delhi’. The New York Times, 22 July 2013. Available at: http://india.blogs.nytimes.com/2013/07/22/an-afghanchurch-grows-in-delhi/ (accessed of 30.5.2016). 29 Kartar Singh and Raj Kaur (Afghan Sikhs in India) in discussion with the author, November 2015. 30 Amarjeet Singh (Afghan Sikh in India), in discussion with the author, December 2015. 31 Kartar Singh (Afghan Sikh in India) in discussion with the author, December 2015. 32 Ration card is an official document, issued by the Government of India to its citizens to have access to basic food and necessary items in a subsidized price. This document is also treated as an ID proof and therefore is very important. 33 Mansa Ram (conflict-displaced Afghan Sikh in India), in discussion with the author, December 2015. 34 Mahinder Singh Khurana (Afghan Sikh in India), in discussion with the author, December 2015. 35 Azizullah (displaced ethnic Afghan in India), in discussion with the author, December 2015. 36 Nabi Sultani (displaced ethnic Afghan in India in discussion with the author, October 2014. 37 Rameen Jan (displaced ethnic Afghan in India) in discussion with the author, October 2014. 38 James C. Hathaway, ‘A Global Solution to a Global Refugee Crisis’. Verfassnugsblog, 1 March 2016. Available at: http://verfassungsblog.de/a-globalsolution-to-a-global-refugee-crisis/ (accessed on 6.3. 2016). 39 Oliver Bakewell, ‘Encampment and Self –settlement’ in Elena Fiddian-­ Qasmiyeh, Gil Loescher, K. Long, and N Sigona (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Refugee and Forced Migration Studies (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014). 40 Ibid. 41 ‘Population of concern to UNHCR by type of accommodation (2000s), end 2011’ (Table -16), UNHCR1012 Global Refugee Trends. 42 The members of the family were unwilling to disclose their identity. For the sake of their privacy, the names have been withheld. 43 Abandoned and Betrayed: Afghan refugees under UNHCR protection in New Delhi’, South Asia Human Rights Documentation Centre (SAHRDC), November 1999, New Delhi, 37. 44 ‘The Status of Refugees under the Protection of the UNHCR in New Delhi‘. South Asia Human Rights Documentation Centre (SAHRDC), 1995, 25. 45 ‘Abandoned and Betrayed: Afghan refugees under UNHCR protection in New Delhi’, South Asia Human Rights Documentation Centre (SAHRDC), November 1999, New Delhi, 6. 46 Indian Bureau of Immigration webpage, Ministry of Home Affairs, Government of India. Available at: www.immigrationindia.nic.in/Instr_Afghans2.htm (accessed on 16.12. 2015). 47 Anwesha Ghosh, A Leap Forward (New Delhi: Knowledge World Publishers, 2013), 6. 48 ‘India for the first time offers 20 PhD scholarships for Afghan students’, Khama Press, 23 September 2015. Available at: www.khaama.com/india-forthe-first-time-offers-20-phd-scholarships-for-afghan-students-1553 (accessed on 6. 6.2016).

Settlement experiences of Afghan ‘refugees’ in India  191 49 ‘Afghans turn to India’s hospitals for treatment’, DW.COM, 29 September 2013. Available at: www.dw.com/en/afghans-turn-to-indias-hospitals-for-treatment/ a-17260216 (accessed on 6. 6.2016). 50 Anne-Sophie Bentz, ‘Afghan Refugees in Indo-Afghan Relation’. Cambridge Review of International Affairs, Vol. 26 (2013), 374–391. 51 Latif Haidari (conflict-displaced ethnic Afghan in India), in conversation with the author in December 2015, New Delhi. 52 Group discussion conducted by the author with Habibullah and Azizillah ­(conflict-displaced ethnic Afghans in India) in December 2015, New Delhi. 53 The respondent (unwilling to disclose their identity) in discussion with the author, in November 2015. 54 The respondent (unwilling to disclose their identity) in discussion with the author, in December 2015. 55 Azizullah and his wife Sakina (Afghan-Christian refugees), in discussion with the author, in November 2015. 56 Habibullah, (Afghan-Christian refugees), in discussion with the author, in November 2015. 57 Ashish Bose, ‘Afghan Refugees in India‘.Economic and Political Weekly, Vol. 39, no. 43 (2004), 6698–4701. 58 Shuchita Mehta (Senior Communication/Public Information Assistant, UNHCR India) in discussion with Anwesha Ghosh, December 2015. 59 ‘The Status of Refugees under UNHCR Protection in New Delhi’, South Asia Human Rights Documentation Centre (SAHRDC), 1995, New Delhi. 60 ‘Abandoned and Betrayed: Afghan refugees under UNHCR protection in New Delhi’, South Asia Human Rights Documentation Centre (SAHRDC), November 1999, New Delhi, 43. 61 Shuchita Mehta (Senior Communication / Public Information Assistant, UNHCR India) in discussion with Anwesha Ghosh, October 2014. 62 Ibid. 63 ‘Abandoned and Betrayed: Afghan refugees under UNHCR protection in New Delhi’, South Asia Human Rights Documentation Centre (SAHRDC), November 1999, New Delhi, 50. 64 Shuchita Mehta (Senior Communication/Public Information Assistant, UNHCR India) in discussion with Anwesha Ghosh, October 2014. 65 ‘Abandoned and Betrayed: Afghan refugees under UNHCR protection in New Delhi’, South Asia Human Rights Documentation Centre (SAHRDC), November 1999, New Delhi, 52. 66 Shuchita Mehta (Senior Communication/Public Information Assistant, UNHCR India) in discussion with Anwesha Ghosh, December 2015. 67 Shuchita Mehta, ‘Catering start-up empowers Afghan refugee women in Delhi’, News Letter- UNHCR, March 8, 2016. Available at: www.unhcr.org/news/ latest/2016/3/56dd8b216/catering-start-up-empowers-afghan-refugee-womendelhi.html. 68 Selin Susan Mathew (Project Coordinator, Don Bosco, UNHCR’s Partner Agency) in discussion with Anwesha Ghosh, December 2015. 69 Shuchita Mehta (Senior Communication/Public Information Assistant, UNHCR India) in discussion with Anwesha Ghosh, December 2015. 70 Ibid. 71 The respondent (unwilling to disclose their identity) in discussion with the author, in November/December 2015. 72 Selin Susan Mathew (Project Coordinator, Don Bosco, UNHCR’s Partner Agency) in discussion with Anwesha Ghosh, December 2015. 73 Shuchita Mehta (Senior Communication/Public Information Assistant, UNHCR India) in discussion with Anwesha Ghosh, December 2015.

192  Settlement experiences of Afghan ‘refugees’ in India 74 Jassi (An Afghan-Sikh who compounder at a Chemist Shop in Lajpat Nagar), in discussion with the author, in October 2014. 75 Harbhajan Singh (Member, Afghan Hindu-Sikh Welfare Society), in discussion with the author, in October 2014. 76 Mohinder Singh Khurrana (Afghan Sikh in India), in discussion with Anwesha Ghosh, December 2015. 77 Mahinder Singh (Afghan Sikh in India), in discussion with Anwesha Ghosh, December 2015. 78 Charanjit Kaur (Afghan Sikh in India) in discussion with the author, in December 2015. 79 Raunaq Bagade, ‘Right of Education for Refugees: The India Scenario‘.Indian Journal of Applied Research, Vol. 5 (2015), 320–322. 80 The Refugee Convention 1951. Available at: www.unhcr.org/4ca34be29.pdf ­(accessed on 10.6.2016). 81 Abandoned and Betrayed: Afghan refugees under UNHCR protection in New Delhi’, South Asia Human Rights Documentation Centre (SAHRDC), November 1999, New Delhi, 74. 82 Selin Susan Mathew (Project Coordinator, Don Bosco, UNHCR’s Partner Agency) in discussion with Anwesha Ghosh, December 2015. 83 Amarjeet Singh (Member, Khalsa Diwan Welfare Society, New Delhi), in discussion with the author, December 2015. 84 Narinder Singh Nagpal (Member, Khalsa Diwan Welfare Society, New Delhi), in discussion with the author, December 2015. 85 Informal discussions carried out with Afghan refugee children at the Annual Sport Event 2015, organized by Don Bosco on 12 December 2015, Okhla, New Delhi. 86 The respondent (unwilling to disclose their identity), in discussion with the author, in November 2015. 87 Aarti (conflict-displaced Afghan Hindu in India), in discussion with Anwesha Ghosh, December 2015. 88 Abandoned and Betrayed: Afghan refugees under UNHCR protection in New Delhi’, South Asia Human Rights Documentation Centre (SAHRDC), November 1999, New Delhi, 78. 89 Mashal (ethnic Afghan in India), in discussion with the author, December 2015. 90 Abandoned and Betrayed: Afghan refugees under UNHCR protection in New Delhi’, Op.cit. 57. 91 Shuchita Mehta, ‘Catering start-up empowers Afghan refugee women in Delhi’, News Letter- UNHCR, March 8, 2016. Available at: www.unhcr.org/news/ latest/2016/3/56dd8b216/catering-start-up-empowers-afghan-refugee-womendelhi.html. 92 Abandoned and Betrayed: Afghan refugees under UNHCR protection in New Delhi’, South Asia Human Rights Documentation Centre (SAHRDC), November 1999, New Delhi, pp. 57–58. 93 Shuchita Mehta (Senior Communication/Public Information Assistant, UNHCR India) in discussion with Anwesha Ghosh, December 2015. 94 ‘Right to an adequate standard of living’ Article 25, The Universal Declaration of Human Rights. Available at: www.un.org/en/universal-declarationhuman-rights/ (accessed on 10.6.2016). 95 The respondent (unwilling to disclose their identity), in discussion with the author, in November 2015. 96 Mahinder Singh (Afghan Sikh in India), in discussion with the author, December 2015. 97 Gurbachan Singh (Afghan Sikh in India), in discussion with the author, December 2015.

Settlement experiences of Afghan ‘refugees’ in India  193 98 Selin Susan Mathew (Project Coordinator, Don Bosco, UNHCR’s Partner Agency) in discussion with Anwesha Ghosh, December 2015. 99 Miriam Aced and Anwesha Ghosh, ‘Statelessness Protections as a Remedy for Protection Gaps in Jordan and India‘.Refugee Review, Vol. 2, no.5 (2015), 59–76. 100 Parts of the Tibetan community fled from Tibet to India in the late 1950s and early 1960s after the Dalai Lama was forced to flee due to increasing Chinese control and oppression over Tibet and the Tibetans. Tibetans were subsequently granted refugee status by the Indian Government. Although the Indian Government has not provided explicit explanations for this, one could attribute the recognition to poor Indian–Chinese relations brought about through the conflict over disputed borders at the time. The Sri Lankan Tamil community began fleeing generalized violence in Sri Lanka in the 1980s due to civil war between the government and the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Elam. Tamils were also granted refugee status by the Indian Government. One could attribute this to the Indian Government’s dependence on public opinion and maintaining public order in southern India (more specifically, the State of Tamil Nadu) where a section of Tamil people were sympathetic towards the secessionist movement in Sri Lanka. 101 Miriam Aced and Anwesha Ghosh, ‘Statelessness protections as a remedy for protection gaps in Jordan and India‘.Refugee Review, Vol. 2, no. 5 (2015), 59–76. 102 UNHCR’s limited capacity is documented by the Ara Legal Initiative, an organization that gives legal assistance to asylum seekers and refugees, ‘Refugee Status Determination (RSD)’, Viewed 9 July 2014, . 103 Constitution (consolidated up to 2007) [India], 26 January 1950. Available at: www.refworld.org/docid/3ae6b5e20.html (accessed 11 July 2014). 104 Nayana Bose, ‘Afghan Refugees in search of Indian Identity’. News Letter, UNHCR, 19 May 2015. Available at: www.unhcr.org/428c967e4.html (accessed on 12.6.2016). 105 Md. Saud Tahir (Project Coordinator, Socio-Legal Information Centre), in discussion with the author, December 2015. 106 Ashish Bose, ‘Afghan Refugee in India’, Economic and Political Weekly, Vol. 39 (2004), 4698–4701. 107 Miriam Aced and Anwesha Ghosh, ‘Statelessness Protections as a Remedy for Protection Gaps in Jordan and India‘.Refugee Review, Vol. 2, no. 5 (2015), 59–76. 108 According to the Foreigners’ Division of the Ministry of Home Affairs. [a] person must be living throughout the period of 12 months immediately preceding the date of application and for 11 years in the aggregate in the 14 years preceding the 12 months. ‘Foreigners Division. Ministry of Home Affairs. Government of India’, Viewed 9 July 2014. Available at http://indiancitizenshiponline.nic.in/citizenshipact1.htm. 109 Aarti Dhar, ‘Births and Deaths Registration still low in India’. The Hindu (2013). 110 Md. Saud Tahir (Project Coordinator, Socio-Legal Information Centre), in discussion with the author, December 2015. 111 Anne-Sophie Bentz, ‘Afghan Refugees in Indo-Afghan Relation’. Cambridge Review of International Affairs, Vol. 26 (2013), 374–391. 112 A respondent (unwilling to disclose their identity), in discussion with the author, in September 2014, South Hall, UK. 113 A respondent (unwilling to disclose their identity), in discussion with the author, in May 2016, South Hall, United Kingdom. 114 Nayana Bose, ‘Afghan Refugees in search of Indian Identity’. News Letter, UNHCR, 19 May 2015. Available at: www.unhcr.org/428c967e4.html (accessed on 12.6.2016).

194  Settlement experiences of Afghan ‘refugees’ in India 115 Lok Sabha unstarred question no. 6307 for 5.5.2015, Govt. of India, Ministry of Home Affairs. 116 The Foreigners Act, 1946, Section2 (a), The Constitution of India. Available at: http://lawmin.nic.in/coi/coiason29july08.pdf (17.6.2016). 117 T. Ananthachari, ‘Refugees in India: Legal Framework, Law Enforcement and Security.’ In ISIL Yearbook of International Humanitarian and Refugee Law, 2001. 118 Sourabh Bhattacharjee, ‘India Needs a Refugee Law’. Economic and Political Weekly, Vol. 43, no. 9 (2008), 71–75. 119 M. P. Singh, ‘Position of Aliens in India’ (legal Position of Aliens in National and International Law, Heidelberg Colloquium, 1985) 12, cited in Shuvro Prasun Sarkar, ‘Protection of Refugees in India: Quest for National Refugee Law’, Refugee Law Initiative, Vol. 11 (2014), 1–12. 120 Sourabh Bhattacharjee, ‘India Needs a Refugee Law’. Economic and Political Weekly, Vol. 43, no. 9 (2008), 71–75. 121 Drafted under the auspices of the Regional Constitutions on Refugee and Migratory Movements in South Asia initiative 1995, with Justice P N Bhagwati as the Chairperson of the Drafting Committee of the India-specific version of the national law on refugee protection. 122 Rajeev Dhavan, Refugee Law and Policy in India. (New Delhi: PILSARC, 2004), p. 156 123 Dipankar De Sarkar, ‘Why India Wont Sign Refugee Treaty’, Live Mint, September 11, 2015. Available at: www.livemint.com/Opinion/bePZQScFIq1wEW v9Tqt4QO/Why-India-wont-sign-Refugee-Treaty.html (accessed on 17.6.2016). 124 India is home to diverse groups of refugees, ranging from Buddhist Chakmas from the Chittagong Hill Tracts of Bangladesh, to Bhutanese from Nepal, Muslim Rohinygas from Myanmar and small populations from Somalia, Sudan and other sub-Saharan African countries. According to the UNHCR, there were 204,600 refugees, asylum seekers and ‘others of concern’ in India in 2011. They were made up of 13,200 people from Afghanistan, 16,300 from Myanmar, 2,100 from various other countries and the two older populations of around 100,000 Tibetans and 73,000 Sri Lankan Tamils. The UNHCR financially assisted 31,600 of them. 125 Smriti Kak Ramachandran, ‘India’s refugee policy is an example for the rest of the world to follow’. The Hindu, January 3, 2013. 126 Sreya Sen, ‘Understanding India’s refusal to accede to the 1951 refugee convention: context and critique’. Refugee Review, Vol. 2, no. 5 (2015). 127 Ibid. 128 A principle of customary international law that requires all states to share the responsibility of asylum provision. 129 B. S. Chimni ‘Status of Refugees in India: Strategic Ambiguity.’ In Samaddar Ranabir Ed. Refugees and the State: Practices of Asylum and Care in India, 1947–2000, 2nd ed. (Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publications, 2008), p. 445. 130 Ms. Praveen Horo Singh (Director Citizenship Division, Ministry of Home Affairs (MHA), Government of India), in discussion with the author, December 2015. 131 T Ananthachari, ‘Towards a National Refugee Law for India’, in P. R. Chari, Mallika Joseph, and Suba Chandran (eds.), Missing Boundaries: Refugees, Migrants, Stateless and Internally Displaced Persons in South Asia (New Delhi: Manohar, 2003), pp. 99–107. 132 Arun Nair, ‘National Refugee Law for India: Benefits and Roadblocks’, Institute of Peace and Conflict Studies (IPCS) Research Paper, December (2007).

Settlement experiences of Afghan ‘refugees’ in India  195 133 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 1966. India acceded to the convention on 10 April 1979. 134 International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, 1966. India acceded to the convention on 10 April 1979. 135 Convention on the Rights of the Child, 1989. India acceded the convention on 11 December 1992. 136 International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, 1965. India ratifies the convention on 03 December, 1968 with reservations. 137 Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women, 1979. India signed the convention on 30 July 1980 and ratified it on 9 July 1993 with reservations. 138 Shuvro Prasun Sarkar, ‘Protection of Refugees in India: Quest for National Refugee Law‘.Refugee Law Initiative, Vol. 11 (2014), 1–12. 139 S. K. Agarwal, ‘Implementation of International Law in India: Role of Judiciary’ (Dean Maxwell & Isle Cohen Doctoral Seminar in International Law Hans & Tamar Oppenheimer Chair in Public International Law Faculty of Law, McGill University). Available at http://oppenheimer.mcgill.ca/IMG/pdf/ SK_Agarwal.pdf, (accessed on 17.6.2016). 140 Shuchita Mehta (Senior Communication/Public Information Assistant, UNHCR India) in discussion with Anwesha Ghosh, October 2015. 141 Ibid. 142 The respondents (unwilling to disclose their identities) in discussion with the author, between October 2014 and December 2015. 143 The respondents (unwilling to disclose their identities) in discussion with the author, in November 2015. 144 Khajinder Singh Khurana (Afghan Hindu-Sikh Welfare Society), in discussion with the author, in November 2015. 145 Ms. Praveen Horo Singh (Director Citizenship Division, Ministry of Home Affairs, Government of India), in discussion with the author, in December 2015. 146 Shriya Mohan, ‘Good refugee policy needs justice and empathy’. CatchNews, June 20, 2016. Available at: www.catchnews.com/india-news/good-refugeepolicy-needs-social-justice-empathy-ranabir-samaddar-1466422213.html? &pg=1 (accessed on 22.6.3016). 147 Smriti Kak Ramachandran, ‘India’s refugee policy is an example for the rest of the world to follow’. The Hindu, January 3, 2013. 148 Pia Oberoi, Exile and Belonging, Refugees and State Policy in South Asia. (New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 2006), p. 1. 149 See UNHCR 2014, Global Refugee Trend- Forced Displacement in 2014. (Geneva: UNHCR Population and Geographical Data Section, 2014). Available at: www.unhcr.org/556725e69.pdf (accessed on 20May, 2016). 150 Ashish Bose, ‘Afghan Refugees in India’, Economic and Political Weekly, Vol. 39, no. 43 (2004), 6698–4701. 151 The Refugee Convention 1951. Available at: www.unhcr.org/4ca34be29.pdf (accessed on 10.6.2016). 152 UNHCR Fact sheet India, February 2016. Available at: www.unhcr.org/ protection/operations/50001ec69/india-fact-sheet.html?query=India (accessed on 10.6.2016). 153 Ibid. 154 UNHCR Fact sheet India, February 2016. Available at: www.unhcr.org/ protection/operations/50001ec69/india-fact-sheet.html?query=India (accessed on 10.6.2016).

196  Settlement experiences of Afghan ‘refugees’ in India 155 UN General Assembly, Executive Committee of the High Commissioner’s Programme, 46th Session, A/AC.96/846/Part II/9, 14 August 1995. 156 ‘The State of World’s Refugees: A Humanitarian Agenda’, UNHCR, 1997. Available at: www.unhcr.org/publications/sowr/4a4c72719/state-worlds-refugees1997-humanitarian-agenda.html (accessed on 14.6.2016). 157 Shuchita Mehta (Senior Communication/Public Information Assistant, ­U NHCR India) in discussion with Anwesha Ghosh, October 2015. 158 Abandoned and Betrayed: Afghan Refugee under UNHCR Protection in New Delhi’, Report by South Asia Human Rights Documentation Center (SAHRDC), New Delhi, 1999, 12. 159 A. Portes and R.G. Rumbaut, ‘Immigrant America: Portrait’ (Berkley: University of California Press, 1996). 160 J. W. Berry, ‘A Psychology of Immigration‘.Journal of Social Sciences, Vol. 57, no. 3 (2001), 615–631. 161 A. Stepick, Pride against Prejudice: Haitians in the United States. (Boston, MA: Allyn & Bacon, 1998). 162 ‘Africans attacked in Delhi: Tracing the fault lines of open racism and distrust‘.The Indian Express, June 14, 2016. Available at: http://indianexpress. com/article/india/india-news-india/african-nationals-attacks-blacks-racismcongolese-national-masonda-ketada-olivier-rajpur-khurd-vasant-kunj2835098/ (accessed on 16.4. 2016). 163 Padmapriya Govindarajan, ‘Attacks against Africans in India: All about Racism’. The Diplomat, 3 June 2016. Available at: http://thediplomat.com/2016/06/ attacks-against-africans-in-india-all-about-racism/ (accessed on 16.4. 2016). 164 B. K. Singh, in discussion with the author in November 2015, New Delhi. 165 Rajat Sharma, in discussion with the author in November 2015, New Delhi. 166 Parminder Kaur, Sushma Sharma, and Saloniji, in discussion with the author in November 2015, New Delhi. 167 Parminder Kaur, Sushma Sharma, and Saloniji, during a group discussion with the author in November 2015, New Delhi. 168 Amit Kumar (autorickshaw driver in Mahavir Nagar area) in discussion with the author in November 2015, New Delhi. 169 Prof. Dr. Mondira Dutta (Centre for Inner Asian Studies, School of International Studies, Jawaharlal Nehru University), in discussion with the author, December 2015, New Delhi. 170 Mr. Manjit Singh G. K. (The President of the Delhi Sikh Gurudwara Management Committee, New Delhi) and President, Siromani Akali Dal (Delhi State), in discussion with the author in December 2015. 171 Kartar Singh (conflict-displaced Afghan Sikh in India), in discussion with the author October 2014. 172 The respondent (unwilling to disclose their identity), in discussion with the author, in November 2015. 173 Mr. Manjit Singh G. K. (The President of the Delhi Sikh Gurudwara Management Committee, New Delhi) and President, Siromani Akali Dal (Delhi State), in discussion with the author in December 2015. 174 UNHCR India office denotes the non-Hindu and Sikh Afghans as ‘Ethnic Afghans’. This research does not take any moral position on who should be called ethnic or non-ethnic. Because the term has been popularly accepted, this research sometimes has used it to denote the Muslims and the recent Christian converts living in India. 175 ‘A Thriving economy of Afghan Business in Delhi‘.Rediff.com, October 11, 2012. Available at: www.rediff.com/business/slide-show/slide-show-1-special-thrivingeconomy-of-afghan-business-in-delhi/20121011.htm#2 accessed on 12.6.2016).

Settlement experiences of Afghan ‘refugees’ in India  197 176 Indra Shekhar Singh, ‘South Delhi Loves its Little Kabul‘.The Hindustan Times, 20 March 2015. Available at: www.hindustantimes.com/delhi/southdelhi-loves-its-little-kabul/story-MRt7ePAIyMRDA2TTUuZllN.html (accessed on 12.6.2016). 177 Rameen Jan (Ethnic Afghan in India), in discussion with the author, in November 2015. 178 Bobby Taneja (resident of Kasturba Niketan, Lajpat Nagar, New Delhi), in discussion with the author, in November 2015. 179 Ibid. 180 Selin Susan Mathew (Project Coordinator, Don Bosco, UNHCR’s Partner Agency) in discussion with Anwesha Ghosh, December 2015. 181 Anwesha Ghosh, A Leap Forward. (New Delhi, Knowledge World Publishers, 2014). 182 Selin Susan Mathew (Project Coordinator, Don Bosco, UNHCR’s Partner Agency) in discussion with Anwesha Ghosh, December 2015. 183 Abandoned and Betrayed: Afghan refugees under UNHCR protection in New Delhi’, South Asia Human Rights Documentation Centre (SAHRDC), November 1999, New Delhi, 11. 184 H. Landrine and E. Klonoff, African-American Acculturation: Deconstructing Race and Reviving Culture. (London: Sage Publishers, 1996). 185 Z. Aycan and J. W. Berry ‘Impact of employment related experiences on immigrants, psychological well being and adaptation to Canada’. Canadian Journal of Behavioral Science, Vol. 28 (1996), 240–251. 186 M. Potocky- Tripodi, Best Practices for Social Work with Immigrants and Refugees. (New York: Columbia University Press, 2002). 187 P. Balagopalan, ‘Social work practice with immigrants and refugees: An overview.’ In P. Balgopal (ed.), Social Work Practice with Immigrants and Refugees. (New York: Columbia University Press, 2000). 188 Z. Aycan and J. W. Berry ‘Impact of employment related experiences on immigrants, psychological well being and adaptation to Canada’. Canadian Journal of Behavioral Science, Vol. 28 (1996), 240–251. 189 M. Potocky- Tripodi, Best Practices for Social Work with Immigrants and Refugees. (New York: Columbia University Press, 2002). 190 Shriya Mohan, ‘Good refugee policy needs justice and empathy’. CatchNews, June 20, 2016. Available at: www.catchnews.com/india-news/good-refugeepolicy-needs-social-justice-empathy-ranabir-samaddar-1466422213.html? &pg=1 (accessed on 22.6.3016). 191 Mr. Trilochan Singh (Former Chairman, National Commission for Minority and Member of Parliament) in discussion with the author in December 2015. 192 Z. Aycan and J. W. Berry ‘Impact of employment related experiences on immigrants, psychological well being and adaptation to Canada’. Canadian Journal of Behavioral Science, Vol. 28 (1996), 240–251. 193 C. L. Williams and J. W. Berry, ‘Primary preventions of acculturation stress among refugees‘.American Psychologist, Vol. 46 (1991) 632–641. 194 One local hawker at the Central Market (Lajpat Nagar), in discussion with the author in October 2014. 195 Deepali Gaur Singh, ‘Afghan woman in the diaspora: surviving identity and alienation‘.Center for Non-Traditional Security Studies Research Paper, Vol. 4 (2010). 196 Langar (is the term used in the Sikh religion for the common kitchen/canteen where food is served in a Gurudwara to all the visitors (without distinction of background) for free. At the langar, only vegetarian food is served, to ensure that all people, regardless of their dietary restrictions, can eat as equals.

198  Settlement experiences of Afghan ‘refugees’ in India 197 Namrata Juneja, ‘Four Places for Meat lovers in Afghani Market’. 25 ­November 2015. Available at: https://lbb.in/delhi/four-places-for-meat-loversto-bookmark-in-afghani-market/. Indra Shekhar Singh, ‘South Delhi Loves its Little Kabul’. The Hindustan Times, March 20, 2015. Available at: www.hindustantimes.com/delhi/southdelhi-loves-its-little-kabul/story-MRt7ePAIyMRDA2TTUuZllN.html. ‘Little Afghanistan in Lajpat Nagar’. Sulekha. Available at: http://creative. sulekha.com/little-afghanistan-in-lajpatnagar_614062_blog. 198 Helen Saberi, Afghan Food and Cookery: Noshe Djan (Hippocrane Books, 2000) cited in Deepali Gaur Singh, ‘Afghan Woman in The Diaspora: Surviving Identity and Alienation’. Center for Non-Traditional Security Studies Research ­Paper, Vol. 4 (2010). 199 Ibid. 200 Mr. Manjit Singh G. (The President of the Delhi Sikh Gurudwara Management Committee, New Delhi) and President, Siromani Akali Dal (Delhi State), in discussion with the author in December 2015. 201 Z. Aycan and J. W. Berry ‘Impact of employment related experiences on immigrants, psychological well being and adaptation to Canada‘.Canadian Journal of Behavioral Science, Vol. 28 (1996), 240–251. 202 Ibid. 203 R. Pernice and J. Brook, ‘Refugee and Immigrant’s Mental Health: Association of demographic and post migration factors. The Journal of `Social Psychology, Vol. 136 (1996), 511–519. 204 M. Young and D Evans, ‘The wellbeing of Salvadoran refugees’. International Journal of Psychology, Vol. 32 (1997), 289–300. 205 Z. Aycan and J. W. Berry (1996), 0p.cit. 206 R. Pernice and J. Brook, ‘Refugee and Immigrant’s Mental Health: Association of demographic and post migration factors. The Journal of `Social Psychology, Vol. 136 (1996), 511–519. 207 J. W. Berry, ‘A Psychology of Immigration‘.Journal of Social Sciences, Vol. 57, no. 3 (2001), 615–631. 208 Ibid. 209 Selin Susan Mathew (Project Coordinator, Don Bosco, UNHCR’s Partner Agency) in discussion with Anwesha Ghosh, December 2015. 210 Frederick L. Ahearn Jr. ‘Psychological Wellness: Methodological Approaches to the study of refugees. In Frederick L. Ahearn Jr, (ed.), Psychological Wellness of Refugees: Issues in Qualitative and Quantitative Research. (New York: Berghahn Books, 2000). 211 Narinder Singh Nagpal (Member, Khalsa Diwan Welfare Society) in discussion with the author in December 2015. 212 Ramin Jan (ethnic Afghan in India) in discussion with the author in December 2015. 213 Mr. Alok Bansal (Director, India Foundation) in an interview with the author, June 2016. 214 The respondents (unwilling to disclose their identities), in discussion with the author, in November 2015. 215 Nayana Bose, ‘Afghan Refugees in search of Indian Identity’. News Letter, ­UNHCR, 19 May 2015. Available at: www.unhcr.org/428c967e4.html (accessed on 12.6.2016).

5 Conclusion ‘lost between worlds’: Afghans in India longing to belong

As ethnocultural groups, refugees encounter host societies in mutual processes of accommodation. This study previously attested to the abrupt changes in refugee lives, the feeling of being unsettled in displacement, to the new worlds and their new demands and finally the complexities of ‘refugeeness’1 for individuals and groups, as they moved from their home country to the country of their settlement. Human beings experience forced migration differently, respond to it differently and hence have different needs and expectations. Thus, the interaction of refugee characteristics and features of the host society continues to be worth of consideration especially since this study attempts to find answer to the broad question, ‘How do Afghans in India acculturate?’ For Afghans, the timing of their migration, the circumstances under which they migrated, the countries through which they made their journey, their position in the social hierarchy in Afghanistan and the rung they occupied in India determined the strategies of acculturation they adapted and the identities they eventually acquired. Therefore, the identities that individuals acquire during the course of their settlement phase in a new country too have to be understood as a multilayered construct, wherein the relationship and positioning of each layer in its specific historical context affect and even construct one’s identity in collectivities in the different layers. It was realized that memory happens to be a very critical element of identity for the Afghan ‘refugees’ in India. Historical memory is seen as a collection of narratives of a shared past which they build and rebuild, block and unblock, forget and remember as they strategically move towards the adaptation of a particular acculturation strategy though a number of issues connected to belonging. The way the respondents narrated their stories indicated that memory somehow was also being used as a coping mechanism. Since most left Afghanistan without preparations, they had very few objects and photographs to substantiate their stories and thus were dependent on individual or collective memories. Sometimes through expression and sometimes through suppression of those memories, they re-rooted in a series of often-meaningful displacements. This study endeavoured to capture these Afghan voices to understand how they defined their identities within the parameters of Afghanistan, and India and how they negotiated with

200 Conclusion the traditional construct of identity given their experience of alienation and integration in the receiving society. This research incorporated both the group and individual perspectives to study patterns of similarity and difference in cultural and individual acculturation phenomena. The task of this concluding segment will be to review what has been learnt about the settlement experiences of the studied population. The framework that has been used for this study raised two issues: (1) the degree to which the Afghans in India wish to maintain their heritage’s culture and identity; and (2) the degree to which they seek involvement with the larger Indian society. When these two issues are crossed, acculturation space is created with four sectors within which the individuals may express how they have been seeking to acculturate. Assimilation is the way when there is little interest in cultural maintenance combined with a preference for interacting with the larger society. Separation is the way when cultural maintenance is sought while avoiding involvement with others. Marginalization exists when neither cultural maintenance nor interaction with others is sought. Integration is present when both cultural maintenance and involvement with the larger society are sought. Acculturation is a process that takes place over time. The four acculturation profiles not only show variety in ways immigrants acculturate, but they also highlight the fact that attitudes, identities and behaviours do not function in isolation but are intimately interrelated. The interrelationship can be seen first in the correspondence between the acculturation attitudes and the cultural identities. For example, attitudes towards integration are positively correlated with both ethnic and national identities, and marginalization attitudes are negatively correlated with both identities. Assimilation and separation attitudes are correlated with the two identities in the expected way, positively with one identity and negatively with the other. The cultural values of family obligation are related in expected ways to acculturation attitudes and identity. Furthermore, acculturation attitudes are lined to the two behavioural variables of language usage and social contact with peers. For example, integration attitudes are associated with the use of both the ethnic and national languages, and with social relationships with peers of both the groups. More broadly, the acculturation profiles suggest that attitudes, identities and behaviours cluster together in different ways to form distinct groups. These groupings are easily interpretable on the basis of the findings on individual variables. The clustering of variables into consistent patterns suggests a broader concept of acculturation strategies that provide a comprehensive picture of how individuals live in contact settings.2

Unravelling the key findings The empirical procedure used in cluster analysis could, in principle, yield any number of profiles, including only one. The fact that this study found four profiles supports the expectation that there are variable ways the studied

Conclusion  201 communities live in their intercultural world. Moreover, the four profiles closely resemble the four sectors of the acculturation framework presented in Chapter 2. To test the model, this study followed a personal approach forwarded by Bergman et al.3 In contrast to a variable approach, the personal approach examines statistical relations among variables across individuals, and it describes characteristics patterns of variables that distinguish among individuals. In this approach, individuals are grouped into categories on the basis of pattern similarity, so that each category has certain distinct pattern similarity and each category has a particular set of properties that differentiates it from other categories. In this study, cluster analysis was used as a tool to identify patterns of acculturation. Based on the dominant theoretical framework and available data, four cluster solutions were replicated. The results showed differences in the way and extent the studied group dealt with their new context. The clusters that emerged have been referred as an acculturation profile. An ethnic profile was seen in an overwhelming 63% of the respondents. National profile was witnessed among 12% of the sample. Integration profile could be seen among 17%, while a diffuse profile among 8% of the total respondents. The ethnic profile was found among an overwhelming 34 out of the total 54 respondents from the studied community. Broadly speaking, they have followed separation strategy during their acculturation process and ended up possessing a separated identity whereby a clear orientation towards their own ethnic group could be noticed. Other trends identified among this cluster were high ethnic identity, ethnic language proficiency and usage, and ethnic peer group contacts. They tended to endorse the separation attitude and scored low on assimilation, national identity and contacts with the national group. Their support for family relationship values was above average. Interestingly, the respondents in this cluster showed extremely negative results in terms of their access to basic rights and the ability to participate in the civil and political activities in the host society. They represent Afghans who are largely embedded within their own culture and show little involvement with the larger Indian society. The national profile included seven respondents who showed a strong orientation towards the host society. The respondents in this cluster were high on national identity and assimilation and very low on ethnic identity. They were proficient in the national language (Hindi and Punjabi) and used it habitually. Their peer contacts were largely with the members of the host society; they showed above average support towards family obligation, like the ethnic profile. The respondents clustered in this category exemplify the idea of assimilation, indicating a lack of retention of their ethnic culture. They have largely adapted the strategy of assimilation vis-à-vis the society they have been living in. All the seven respondents who showed these tendencies were found to be naturalized. They all testified that they have access to all the rights and have no issues as far as civil and political participation is concerned. These seven individuals expressed that they see themselves essentially as Indians.

202 Conclusion The integration profile was the second most frequently occurring profile, although there is evidently a huge gap between the number of people who adapted separation strategy and those who followed an integration approach. Nine out of 54 respondents showed an integration profile, which meant that they indicated relatively high involvement with both ethnic and national cultures. These respondents expressed that they were extremely proud of both their national and ethnic identities and have been trying to maintain close linkages with both. They strongly endorsed integration and gave low endorsement to assimilation, separation or marginalization. They reported high national language and moderate ethnic language proficiency; their language usage suggested a balance between national and ethnic languages. They had peer contacts with both their own group and national groups. They seemed to be comfortable in both ethnic and national contexts, in terms of identity, language, peer contact and values. Majority of the respondents in this cluster expressed that they have acquired the citizenship of India and thereby have access to basic rights and privileges enjoyed by an Indian. The diffuse profile was not easily interpretable. Four respondents have been identified in this profile that reported high proficiency in, and usage of ethnic language, but reported low ethnic identity. They had low proficiency in national language and reported somewhat low national identity and national peer contact. They also reported limited ethnic peer contact. They indicated negative integration and assimilation and above average separation profile. This inconsistent pattern among the respondents was indicative of the fact that these respondents were uncertain about their place in either host or home societies and wanted to be a part of a third society and had failed in that attempt as well. All the respondents who were part of this cluster were from the Afghan-Christian community. This profile appears similar to the people described in the identity formation literature as ‘diffuse’, characterized by a lack of commitment to a direction of purpose in their lives and often socially isolated. The profiles were analysed for difference in relation to some individual characteristics. Because this project did not include longitudinal data that would allow study of changes among immigrant overtime in a new society, it used several other proxy variables, including generation, proportion of life in new society and length of residence that allowed to examine differences among respondents who vary in length of their exposure to the new society. Although any conclusions are tentative in the absence of longitudinal data, the results are sufficiently consistent to indicate patterns of change that are likely to occur over time. The basic element about acculturation research is whether the immigrant undergoes a linear change, from a strong identification and involvement in their culture of origin to a more or less complete identification and involvement in the culture of settlement, that is assimilation, or whether there are alternative pathways of change overtime. The results of this study provide evidence that the process of change is not a linear progression.

Conclusion  203 It has already been mentioned that majority of the conflict-displaced ­ fghans interviewed came in the 1990s, whereby respondents who have A lived in India for more than ten years were significantly more than those who have been in the country for less than ten years. Out of 16 respondents, who arrived in India after the year 2005, four individuals indicated towards a diffuse profile, while 12 participants were seen to have an ethnic profile. The integration and national profiles were missing among the group of people who have been staying in India for less than ten years. In contrast, the diffuse profile was dramatically missing among the respondents who have stayed in India for a longer period of time. In most cases, a longer residence among the respondents meant 20 plus years of stay in India, as majority of them came in the year 1992. Seven respondents showed the national profile having followed the strategy of assimilation with the host country followed by nine members with an integration profile. ­Interestingly, a large number of respondents appeared to have an ethnic profile after they had adapted the strategy of separation during their settlement phases. This is an unexpected result, because all of these 22 respondents are members of Sikh and Hindu communities, who have been perceived as the ‘integrated lot’ by all the other relevant stakeholders in the host society like the host government, UNHCR or even the host population of the immediate surroundings. The reasons behind the dichotomy of the particular result will be discussed in detail in the subsequent sections. Therefore, from the aforementioned figures, it is evident that the longer period of stay did not indicate adaptation of integration strategy; rather, respondents have opted for separation strategies. Perceived discrimination is usually assumed to be an important factor in immigrant adaptation. This study found strong association between perceived discrimination and poorer psychological and sociocultural adaptation. In the current framework, perceived discrimination contributes most to prediction of adaptation outcomes, either directly through its impact on other acculturation variables. But the direction of effect is unclear and one cannot confidently say that discrimination contributes to poorer adaptation; perhaps those who do not adapt well are seen less favourably in the larger society and thus elicit discrimination. Furthermore, self-report of discrimination is subject to personal bias. Nevertheless, the relationship between the perception of discrimination and adaptation was evident. It was expected that perceived discrimination would be negatively related to an individual’s involvement in the larger society, that is, to be less frequent in the national and integration profiles. Those who were with ethnic profile felt a sense of discrimination towards them, mostly from the perspective of the Government of India, UNHCR and the people of the immediate surroundings. The factors that resulted in the feeling of discrimination among respondents varied considerably based on the religious background and economic status of the respondent. For example, the non-ethnic Afghans like the Afghan-Sikh respondents felt discriminated mostly by UNHCR

204 Conclusion and to some extent by FRRO (Indian Government) but not by the host population. On the other hand, the ethnic Afghans (Muslims) felt strong sense of discrimination from the host population of the immediate surroundings, FRRO and in certain cases by UNHCR. The ethnic Afghans might not be satisfied with UNHCR’s programmes but did not feel discriminated by the organization based on their ethno-religious background. Similarly, the non-ethnic Afghans at large might not be too satisfied with the Indian Government’s approach towards them, more specifically the experience at FRRO but overall did not feel discriminated. They, however, reported of a strong sense of discrimination from UNHCR’s mission in India. Finally, the respondents from the Afghan-Christian communities, who indicated a diffuse profile, felt the strongest discrimination from other ethnic Afghans living in India. They even reported about facing life threats from fellow Afghans and as a result decided to move out of neighbourhoods that had significant Afghan population. The Indians of their immediate neighbourhood do not possess a positive attitude towards them because of certain stereotypical image they possess about Afghans. Additionally, they also feel discriminated by the UNHCR, which they feel is unwilling to pay attention to their predicament. Therefore, it is important to note that the respondents, who adapted the separation or marginalization strategies of acculturation and ended up having an ethnic or diffuse profile, did not have any uniform opinion about the source of discrimination. They had different responses about the bodies or groups who might have made them feel discriminated. Nevertheless, the patterns of preferred ways of acculturating cannot be considered universal. The distribution of profiles varied considerably over time and across contexts. Acculturation profiles were found to be related to the ethnic composition of the neighbourhood. Although the ethnic profile was most strongly represented in all neighbourhoods, the number was significantly less in the neighbourhoods consisting of mostly Indian population. Expectedly, the number was extremely high in the localities, which were dominated by members of the same ethnic group. In localities, which had balanced representation of Indian and Afghan population, the number of ethnic profiles was also found to be significantly high. Interestingly, despite regular interaction between the host and immigrant population, ethnic profile was dominant among the members of the studied communities. Attempts were made to analyse difference in profile in relation to the respondents’ self-report of the religion. The members of Sikh religious communities (from Afghanistan) were found to project integration, ethnic and national profiles. One must also remember that the number of respondents interviewed for this study had maximum representation from this particular community. Despite the commonalities that exist between them and a large section of the population of Delhi, a larger number (around 67%) of the Afghan-Sikh respondents showed a strong orientation towards Afghanistan

Conclusion  205 25

20 15 10 5 0

Sikh Hindu Muslim Christian

Integration 7 2 0 0

Ethnic 22 0 12 0

National 4 3 0 0

Diffuse 0 0 0 4

Graph 5.1  R  eligious Affiliation by Acculturation Profile.

and were seen to have ethnic profile. The Hindus from Afghanistan were in both integration and national profiles, as expected. The Muslim respondents were found in the ethnic category, while the Afghan Christians were in the diffuse category. From the aforementioned discussion, it is evident that some contexts support the possibility of integration and make it easier to develop a bicultural identity, whereas others make this resolution difficult. Still, some others may foster separation rather than integration, as is evident from the experiences of the studied groups. When immigrants are not encouraged or allowed their own culture while integrating into the new society, some are likely to choose between the two options of separation and assimilation. Recent reports4 in the Indian media suggest that the African immigrant community in India have been trying to follow the ‘Indian way of life’ since they consider assimilation to be the only strategy to cope with the blatant discrimination and attacks they face in India. The respondents from the Afghan Hindu and Sikhs communities, who chose to adapt the assimilation strategy, however did not indicate any such experience (Graph 5.1).

Policy environment of the country of settlement A nation’s immigration policy and its cultural diversity are examples of distal context variables that are likely to affect acculturation. Bourhis et al.5 suggest that a country’s immigration policy reflects the larger society’s attitude towards immigrants. Both policy and attitudes may influence immigrants’ attitudes and interethnic contact, and thus have an impact on individual immigrant’s well-being. An aspect of the setting that may interact with the identity choices is the existence or non-existence of a structured

206 Conclusion policy for refugees, in the host country. The national policies supporting multiculturalism are expected to allow immigrants the option of being bicultural, and the choice of this option is likely to have an impact on their well-being. Berry has highlighted the Canadian government’s policy for immigrants as the one that highlights cultural maintenance among immigrant groups, whereby it has been seen that the immigrant groups in Canada tend to prefer integration as an acculturation strategy.6 Over the years, several other studies have tried to find correlation between the immigration policy of the host country and the identity profile chosen by the immigrant population.7 However, most of these studies were conducted in countries, which are signatories to the UN Refugee Convention and thereby have structured refugee policies. The current study has been undertaken in a country, which offers a different political environment. There is no national legislation for refugees or asylum seekers at the moment and refugee issues have largely been dealt on an ad hoc basis. While certain refugee communities were recognized by the Indian Government, some other (like the Afghans) were not considered ‘refugees’. Now the question is, what does this non-recognition mean for the displaced Afghans living in India? Former Indian Ambassador to Afghanistan, Shri K. P. Khosla, pointed out that recognizing Afghans as ‘refugees’ would have meant a comment on the political situation on Afghanistan and the Indian Government never wanted that because of its friendly relations with Afghanistan.8 From a macro perspective, the absence of an official recognition meant that these groups were treated as any other foreign national living in India and enjoyed all the freedom allocated to foreigners by the Constitution of India. For example, they were free to choose how and where they wanted to settle down in India. They were neither restricted to any locality nor camps. There were no regulations about the kind of settlement they choose or the standard of living they maintain in India. Like any other foreigner, they also needed to register themselves with the Ministry of Home Affairs within a certain period of their arrival and had to keep on extending their visas for a lawful stay in the country. They were also not subjected to particular activities (e.g. Language courses) and programmes set by the host government. In the absence of a legal status, they did not fall into the taxation bracket. Gaining employment in the country’s parallel sector was also possible because of the lack of strict vigilance. Simultaneously, non-recognition also meant not having access to certain basic rights, protection and assistance from the host government, which any ‘refugee’ is entitled to. Recognition as ‘refugees’ means acknowledgement about that fact that the individual has been forced to flee his/her country and that his circumstances are very different from other forms of voluntary migrants. The legislation9 that governs Afghans in India fails to recognize the special circumstances of these people. Since the Indian Government never acknowledged the Afghans as ‘refugees’, it never provided any assistance or support to the people in their settlement phases. The amount of struggle that many of the conflict-displaced Afghans have been

Conclusion  207 subjected to, just for their day-to-day survival, has played an important role in shaping and reshaping their identities. From a micro perspective, the absence of an official recognition meant not having to carry the tag of being identified as ‘refugee’ – an identity that is often not seen in a positive light by people with limited awareness about the circumstances when one becomes a refugee. A large number of Indian respondents, who live in the immediate soundings of the Afghan population in Delhi and Faridabad, saw refugees as people who are burden on the society. Their responses were particularly interesting because many of them belonged to the families of partition refugees and some of the neighbourhoods where they live are referred as ‘refugee colony’ even today. The awareness about ‘refugees’ or people in refugee-like situation seem to be remarkably less. The older generation often equated the word ‘refugee’ with partition of India and the ordeal attached to that entire event. Based on their current legal status, this study involved three categories of respondents among the displaced Afghan population in India. Firstly, Afghans who have been naturalized – all the respondents who fell into this category were either Sikhs or Hindus. Secondly, Afghans who have been staying in India on stay visas (both short- and long-term), issued by the FRRO (Home Ministry). Many of the respondents from this category also indicated that they also possess UNHCR ID cards, indicating that they are ‘refugees’ protected under UNHCR’s mandate. Those who enjoy UNHCR protection also have the right to access all the assistance programmes run by UNHCR along with its partner NGOs in India. Needless to say, the situation of ‘recognized refugees’ is relatively better that the ‘unrecognized ones’. The third category of respondents comprised Afghans living in India for decades almost without any legal document (Graph 5.2). As stated earlier, almost 70% of the respondents happen to belong to the religious minorities of Afghanistan and have been living in India for more than 20 years. Because of the ethno-religious and linguistic similarities with

Diffuse National Ethnic Integration 0 citizenship Visa without any document

5

10

Integration 7 0 0

15 Ethnic 0 35 3

20

25

30

National 5 0 0

Graph 5.2  L  egal Status and Identity Profile of the Respondents.

35 Diffuse 0 4 0

40

208 Conclusion the host society, it was expected that integration would be the preferred strategy, which would lead to the acquisition of bicultural identity for these respondents. Moreover, UNHCR India has always maintained that the integration of the non-ethnic Afghans in the Indian society has been much easier because of the relatively generous attitude of the government towards them. The fact that citizenship has been offered primarily to members of these communities was cited as an example to substantiate that point. Even the Government is of the opinion and these two communities have managed to integrate into the society. A senior official of the Ministry of Home Affairs stated that the Government has taken concrete steps to facilitate integration and has been in touch with important members of Afghan Hindu and Sikh communities.10 Eminent political personalities in India, like the Honourable Member of Parliament, Mr. Trilochan Singh11 and the President of Shiromani Akali Dal, Mr. Manjit Singh G.K.12 were of the opinion that the non-ethnic Afghans are largely integrated and will be given Indian citizenship very soon. Both of them argued that this issue of citizenship of Afghan Sikhs and Hindus has been agreed upon at the policy level and is merely stuck at the bureaucratic bottlenecks. Members of academia and civil society also felt that similarities between the ‘refugee’ groups (Afghan Sikhs and Hindus) and the host population may have expedited their integration in Indian society. Thus, it can be said that this research found that majority of the relevant stakeholders in this study were of the opinion that the non-ethnic Afghans namely Sikhs and Hindus of Afghanistan have largely been integrated in India. Findings of this study however showed certain unexpected results. Despite the ethnic cultural and linguistic nexuses, around 67% of the Afghan-Sikh respondents have followed a separation strategy of acculturation and have preferred to maintain their own traditional norms and culture and thereby acquired an ethnic profile. At the same time, around 13% members of the same community seemed to have adapted bicultural identity followed by 8%, who adapted national identity. Considering the issues of ethnic linkage, knowledge of local language, religious connection and the time of arrival to India are common between all the members of this particular community; the divergent acculturation outcomes made the findings very interesting. On further analysis of data, a few important areas of difference emerged between the members of the same group. Firstly, it was observed that the members, who showed bicultural and national identity profiles, came from elite backgrounds in Afghanistan. Majority had flourishing businesses and prior commercial linkages with India. Although forced migration had a negative impact on their overall status, but when they reached India, they got assistance from the host population (with whom they had family of business ties) which made the transition process much more easier. Secondly, many of these people managed to start businesses in and outside India with the help of their established networks. As they were affluent and ‘successful’ in the eye of the host population, there was more effort on the part of the host

Conclusion  209 society to integrate them. Thirdly, because of the professional success they achieved in India and the respect they commanded, they emerged as ‘important members’ of the community who were among the first to have got the citizenship. During the course of the interviews, the respondents from these groups categorically spoke about the importance of the legal status in identity formation. One respondent said, Despite the comfortable life I was leading in India, the identity crisis remained….it was like I was stranded between two worlds, and belonging to neither! But once I got the citizenship, things changed completely. The government’s recognition is very important.13 The results of this study revealed that 67% of the Afghan-Sikh respondents who adapted the separation acculturation strategy did not have citizenship. Interestingly, the socioeconomic backgrounds of these Afghans were starkly different from their counterparts who opted for an integration strategy. For most of them, India was the obvious choice of refuge and in a way felt that they would be protected in India. Unfortunately, since the time they set foot in India, they were subjected to endless struggles for survival and have faced uphill battles for a dignified living. They mentioned that the initial days were far more difficult for them as they were not aware of the existing system and practices and there was nobody to guide them and help them in the process of settling down. By not acknowledging them as ‘refugees’, that government shielded itself from the responsibilities and accountability that any host government has towards the ‘refugee’ population. Without access to certain basic rights like right to employment and social security, in the absence of the recognition from the government, their day-to-day existence has been punctuated with severe challenges. In the absence of good education opportunities, access to healthcare in the existent scenario meant that their children’s future would be as dark as their present. The members naturally felt extremely discriminated and deprived. To make things worse, UNHCR stopped the little subsistence allowance that they provide and then subsequently shifted their focus to ethnic Afghans. However, since assistance was not forthcoming, these communities demonstrated an incredible amount of strength, unity and resilience to deal with the challenges of their settlement phase in India and to a large extent succeeded in coping with those. In the absence of structured asylum laws, they see naturalization as the only longterm solution, which can bring an end to their ‘identity crisis’. As a 26-yearold Afghan Hindu girl puts it: ‘Indian citizenship is not just an official status for me, it is an “identity” – which I have been missing all my life’. Many of these members had expressed that they have had regular interactions with the host population of the neighbourhood and that they felt accepted by them. Since they have a common language (Punjabi), interacting has been relatively easy between these communities and the host population. Some respondents even said that their new non-Punjabi neighbours

210 Conclusion consider them to be Indian-Sikhs. When the participants were asked about the perception of the host population about refugees, many of them said that refugees are generally looked from a negative prism, as ‘unwanted guests’, as ‘liabilities’ or as ‘competitors’ depending upon contexts. Many also felt that because of the lack of awareness about these issues, people do not have well-informed ideas but overall most of the respondents expressed that refugees are not viewed through a complementary lens in India. Considering this prevalent negative mindset of the host population, it became even more pertinent to ask them, whether they have been benefitted by the official non-recognition. To which they agreed that strictly in terms of intermingling with the host population and in terms of acceptance from the society, not carrying the ‘tag’ of ‘refugee’ has been beneficial. The absence of that particular ‘label’ and the presence of several factors of similarity have helped them gain more acceptances in the host society. It is thus fair to say that not having a structured legislation for refugees have resulted in different outcomes at different levels. While at the macro governmental level it meant lack of protection, not having access to rights and privileges and endless struggle but at the micro level, not having to carry the ‘refugee’ identity have made their reception amongst the Indians relatively easier. However, it must be mentioned that this particular benefit (if at all it is one) is limited to the non-ethnic Afghans. The lack of a proper definition for asylum seekers has led to such groups being viewed with suspicion by populations in the areas where they are temporarily resettled in India. The ethnic Afghans experienced completely different sentiments from the surrounding host population where the lack of clarity about their legal status has encouraged more suspicion among the host population. Because of their distinct physical appearance, religion and the stereotypical image of the ‘Afghans’, whereby Indians tend to equate to Taleban, Al Qaeda and terrorists, the host population’s attitude has been quite negative. Ethnic Afghans are not the only group who has to face such discrimination. According to Shreya Sen14 who has been conducting researched on environmental refugees in India, the Chakmas living in Arunachal Pradesh were, for example, at the receiving end of the hostilities of locals who were opposed to their presence in the state. The experiences of Africans have been worse. Several African nationals have been attacked in India; some attacks even led to killings in the recent parts. It was informed by the NGO Don Bosco that some of the refugees under UNHCR protection have complained about being treated extremely negatively by their neighbours who accuse them of being drug peddlers and prostitutes polluting the environment.15 The results of the current study indicate that a section of the respondents may have been benefitted at some level because of the absence of the identification as ‘refugee’ as a result of absence of structured refugee policy in India; however, it would be erroneous to see those examples as the broad trend. The same group has been affected negatively due to the absence of the structured legislation in several other important aspects of life, which has made them feel alienated.

Conclusion  211 The findings further suggest that national policies play a decisive factor for identity formation and psychological adaptation in addition to local circumstances. Lack of structured immigration policy and protection from the government has had direct bearing on identity choices of the conflict-­ displaced Afghan population in India. It is not a coincidence that all the respondents, from the Afghan-Sikh and Afghan-Hindu communities, who have demonstrated bicultural or national identities, are citizens of India. Finally, successful acculturation has been largely viewed in terms of mental and physical health, psychological satisfaction, high self-esteem and competent work performance. The previous discussions have dealt with Berry’s proposition that acculturation strategies adopted by acculturating individuals are central factors moderating the adaptation outcomes of acculturation. Several other factors are assumed to influence adaptation outcomes, including moderating factors prior to migration, coping strategies by acculturating individuals, experiences of prejudice and discrimination, social support and contextual factors like demography, official policy of the host country and the ethnic attitudes of the receiving society. Significant research works in the past have supported the positive relation between ethnic identity and self-esteem. Social identity theory suggests strong links between group identification and self-concept. People strive to achieve or maintain a positive social identity, thus boosting their self-esteem. In the event of an ‘unsatisfactory’ identity, people often tend to avoid that or find ways to underplay that with the aim of attaining a positive distinctiveness. This study found that the Afghans largely felt that ‘refugees’ are often viewed in a negative or derogatory way by the Indian society. They therefore have chosen to underplay and sometimes hide this ‘unsatisfactory’ identity and have been assisted by the prevalent legal space in India, which officially do not recognize them as ‘refugees’. The respondents with ethnic profile show good psychological adaptation but not as good sociocultural adaptation. If integration is not an option or is not feasible for Afghans in India, orientation towards the ethnic culture appears to be the next best choice. Overall, the results show that a joint positive orientation towards the ethnic culture and the national society is conducive to better adaptation of both types than an orientation to either the ethnic culture or the host society alone. In contrast, a limited or negative orientation towards either the ethnic culture or the host society independently underlies adaptation problems. The communities have stuck together throughout their struggles in a new country, which helped them foster a stronger sense of ethnic identity. This strong and secure ethnic identity may have made a positive contribution to the psychological well-being of the individuals in the acculturating group. Furthermore, theory and research on acculturation suggest integration that is simultaneous ethnic retention and adaptation to the new society, to be the most adaptive mode of acculturation and the most conducive to immigrant’s well-being, whereas marginalization is the worst. Similarly, in terms of identity, positive psychological outcomes of immigrants are related

212 Conclusion to a strong identification of both their ethnic group and the larger society. In the current study, it was explored whether ethnic identity and national identities, separately and in combination, were related to the adaptation of Afghans in India. The results revealed that only around 17% of the total participants indicated integrated or bicultural identities and they scored significantly higher than all other groups on measures of psychological adjustment. Interestingly, this group along with 9% of respondents who indicated an assimilated identity were the ones to have received the host country citizenship. More than 60% of the respondents have indicated an ethnic identity. Despite ethno-religious and linguistic differences between the members of these clusters, overall it has been observed that these respondents have maintained a separation strategy of acculturation and scored reasonably low on measures of psychological adjustment. However, the worst results of psychological adaptation have been indicated by around 8% of the respondents classified as having marginalized identities. To sum up, the results show that a joint positive orientation towards the ethnic culture and the national society is conducive to a better adaptation of both types than an orientation to either the ethnic culture or the national society alone. This research lends support to the notion that an integrated identity promotes that most healthy psychological adaptation, whereas low scores on these two identities are related in poor adaptation. The interactional model used in the study indicated that these relationships might vary in relation to ethnic group and contextual factors. Additionally, the results of this research also indicate a strong correlation between the immigrant policy (or the lack of it) and the identity choices of the immigrant group in the host country. Furthermore, the results provided considerable evidence that adaptation outcomes are moderated by additional demographic and contextual factors that limit or enhance the options that refugees have. Whenever a social context facilitates an integration approach, it is likely to be the best approach. The degree of acceptance or rejection by the larger society of integration as the way for refugees to acculturate is reflected in their individual attitudes and national policies. When refugees experience discrimination in the host country, be it at the level of government or at the societal level, the most adaptive approach may be for them to seek support in their own culture. Thus, the adaptation is likely to reflect how well the goals and preferences match the opportunities afforded to them in the society of settlement. For the majority of Afghan respondents in India, the feeling of being stranded between worlds has been one of the most difficult things to recon with. For decades, they have been negotiating and renegotiating with different identities as a survival strategy and they look forward to an end to that.

The way forward Based on the broad findings of this study, this research attempts to put forward certain suggestions for the relevant stakeholders particularly UNHCR

Conclusion  213 India Mission and the Government of India to ameliorate the immediate situation of Afghan refugees in India and to further a genuine search for durable solutions. In respect to the UNHCR, it is important that the organization realizes that the Indian Government’s non-recognition of Afghans as ‘refugees’ implies prohibition on employment and access to social security, coupled with the threat of their expulsion, and makes any talk of financial self-reliance sound hollow. UNHCR is mandated to help refugees find ‘durable solutions’ – which means either voluntary repatriation, resettlement to a safe third country or permanent integration into the country of asylum. UNHCR considered the third option to be the most suitable for a large section of Afghan refugees, but its efforts to facilitate the integration process have been slipshod and ineffective. Both UNHCR headquarters in Geneva and its India Mission need to reconsider the agency’s strategy and shift its resources to reflect the reality that Afghan refugees in India are indeed of direct financial assistance during their settlement phases. Until these refugees are not in a position to enjoy certain basic rights in the host country, including the right to reside in India without fear of arbitrary deportation and the right to gainful employment or these refugees can be resettled to safe third countries, UNHCR is obligated to continue direct financial assistance for as long as it takes. Secondly, the organization must reconsider its policy shift whereby they focus primarily on ethnic Afghans and merely acknowledge the presence of Sikh and Hindu Afghan refugees in India and do not provide all the services an ethnic Afghan is entitled to. This swing is based on the assumption that the members of Afghan-Sikh and -Hindu communities have Indian origin whereby acculturation process has been much easier; as a result, they are ‘more or less integrated’. No solid reason or data could be found that could substantiate their assumption. On the contrary, this current study found that only a limited section of the non-ethnic Afghan communities are to be integrated, while a large number of people are struggling and finding it hard to meet ends like any other vulnerable refugee group. Not only they are surprised by UNHCR’s new stance but are exceedingly hurt and disappointed by the selective approach. UNHCR India needs to get rid of its discriminatory policy towards different Afghan communities. UNHCR needs to actively advocate about the refugee crisis faced by the world and bring forth the issues faced by refugees in India before the government, as well as in the Indian media. The immediate goal of such advocacy should be to encourage the Indian Government to adapt a structured national legislation for refugees. India’s membership of executive committee of the agency entails certain responsibilities that the Indian Government should undertake, and it is the duty of UNHCR to point that out. In a day and age of publicity, UNHCR must also be an active and visible force in both Indian mainstream media and social media, educating the public about the plight of refugees in India. This will not only help to dispel the negative stereotypes about certain refugee communities but will also put

214 Conclusion pressure on the Government to change policies and respect human rights of refugees. For example, the issue of discriminating attitude of the Indian Government towards Muslim and non-Muslim refugees needs to be brought in forth and no other organization apart from UNHCR is in a position to do that. The recent European migration crisis generated a lot of interest among common people about refugee and refugee-related issues and it provided a fabulous opportunity to bring forth the issue of refugees in India and raise public awareness on the same. Unfortunately, that has not been done satisfactorily by UNHCR. It was disturbing to know that many of the Afghan refugees interviewed for ­ NHCR’s the current study displayed little knowledge of the exact nature of U policies and the relationships with its implementation partners. Refugees have the right to accurate and relevant information about their rights and responsibilities, as well as the prospects of voluntary repatriation, third country resettlement or local integration. UNHCR must make it a point to inform refugees in advance as to policies that directly impact on them. The process of recommending refugees to resettle abroad should also be made transparent. In case where foreign embassy consults UNHCR regarding a refugee being considered for resettlement, UNHCR should communicate its opinion not only to the embassy, but to the refugee as well. Also UNHCR should make public the names of the refugees whose cases it has forwarded to embassies for resettlement after they have left, along with detailed explanations as to why these individuals were selected. Similarly, UNHCR must also explain the grounds on which an applicant’s asylum claims are being rejected. Some of the Afghan refugees interviewed had specific complaints that involved allegations of UNHCR violating its own stated policies; they even claimed to have approached the organization with their problems, either in writing or in person, and said to have seldom received any helpful response. It is imperative that UNHCR develops a mechanism whereby refugee grievances can be investigated and addressed in a timely manner. Another goal should be improved refugee welfare, especially in relation to the health and education services available to the refugees. Majority of the respondents, who have accessed the services at some point, have been extremely dissatisfied by the quality of assistance and several others stated that those facilities are ‘naam ke waaste’ (basically ornamental) and do not make any real difference to their lives. UNHCR must re-evaluate its policies, assessing not only the relevance, effectiveness and availability of services, but also bearing in mind the freedom of the refugee to take advantage of a particular service. It is imperative that policies designed to ensure the welfare of refugees take a more holistic view of refugees’ needs and problems. Finally, during the course of this study, it was realized that the asylum applications of a large number of Afghans (both ethnic and non-ethnic) living in India have been rejected. Because UNHCR’s protection is the only way Afghan can be protected in India in the absence of any national legislation, a large number of Afghans are extremely vulnerable in India. Neither the

Conclusion  215 host country nor the international community shows any accountability towards these people. The widening of the protection regime will be a great help for people living in various in limbo legal situation. With respect to the Indian Government, while it has not signed the 1951 Refugee Convention or 1967 Refugee Protocol, India has ratified other relevant international instruments and is bound by the international law to comply with them. Despite this, India has no cohesive legal framework for dealing with refugees; the Indian Government classified many internationally recognized refugees (like that of Afghans, who are amongst the largest refugee population in this world) simply as ordinary aliens. The absence of a clear legal framework of refugees obstructs the applicability of other major provisions concerning refugees, which, in turn, frustrates the work of administrative and judicial authorities. In addition, it allows the Indian Government to take an ad hoc approach towards various refugee groups to suit the political exigencies of the moment, even at the expense of the human rights of the refugees. Various international instruments, including the 1951 convention (Articles 35 and 36), the Statute of the office of the UNHCR {Paragraph 2(a)} and the Convention of the Rights of Child (Articles 4 and 22), contain provisions emphasizing the significance of the national legislation on matters pertaining to the protection of refugees but the efficacy of these protection instruments depends on the ability and willingness of states to create domestic legislation and formulate policies to implement their international obligation. The results of this very study have highlighted the benefits of not having a refugee tag (in the absence of a refugee policy) especially in host societies where ‘refugees’ are not viewed through a complementary lens. The findings did suggest that the acculturation process of the non-ethnic Afghans, at the very micro level in the Indian society, has been profited by the prevalent legal space but it would be erroneous to imagine that situation to be true for other Afghan refugee communities or for that matter several other refugee communities living in India. Even the very communities which might have been aided by the Government’s ‘non-recognition’ at one level have dreadfully suffered at another level as a result of lack of access to certain basic rights in a host society. The Indian Government must create a statutory mechanism for dealing with refugees that is accountable both to state organs such as the National Human Rights Commission (NHRC) and to the civil society. A legal regime for refugees must meet basic standards of international law and address at least the following issues: • • • • • •

The Definition of a Refugee A Procedure for the Determination of Refugee Status The Rights and Duties of Refugees Situations of Mass Influxes of Refugees The Cessation of Refugee Status Full cooperation with UNHCR and other International Agencies

216 Conclusion India is a member of the Executive Committee of UNHCR and is party to a number of international instruments that relate to the rights of refugees. This study has pointed out a few occasions when decisions were taken by the Indian judiciary in favour of the refugees while pointing at some of these international instruments that India has been a part of. In addition, the Government of India is constitutionally bound to ‘endeavor’ to foster respect for international law and treaty obligations in dealing of organized people with one another, according to Article 51(c) of the Indian Constitution. The Indian Government must respect the international prohibition on non-­refoulement. This principle enshrined not only in the 1951 Convention, but also in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) and the UN Declaration on Territorial Asylum, to both of which the Indian Government is a signatory. Since Indian Government has allowed Afghans to take refuge in India, it must also allow refugees to take up gainful employment in India and lead a dignified life. At the end, it must be mentioned that the recent policy changes under the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP)-led Government, whereby the Home Ministry sought the cabinet’s approval to initiate the process to grant citizenship to persecuted religious minorities of Afghanistan, Pakistan and Bangladesh, have been welcomed by the Afghan-Hindu and -Sikh communities in India. Apart from the provisions and rights, the news brings hope of finally being able to ‘belong’ to a country. For decades, they have been stuck between two worlds. For years, they had to juggle between various identities just to get acceptance in the societies they have been living. The mentioned development promises to bring the final closure to that and give them a sense of anchor and belonging, which they have been craving for. The bill is, in many ways, a step towards the fulfilment of the ruling BJP’s election promise of making India the ‘natural home of persecuted Hindus around the world’16. In his election rallies, Prime Minister Narendra Modi often asserted, ‘we have a responsibility towards Hindus who are harassed and suffer in other countries. India is the only place for them. We will have to accommodate them here’.17 The tabled bill extends the rights to five other religious communities, but is blatantly discriminatory towards Muslim asylum seekers. One might also view India’s recent policy shift from the context of a cautious step of a nation burdened by historical experiences of partition on religious lines and the security challenges it faces from the Islamic Jihadist organizations on a regular basis. Nevertheless, this policy specifically violates Article 14 of the Indian Constitution, which confers equality before the law to all persons within the Indian territory and thus gives a blow to the ideals of secularism and pluralism. Another issue with the bill is its implicit suggestion that it is only in Muslim majority states that the minority communities are persecuted. Besides ignoring the plight of several other persecuted communities, like the Rohingya Muslims in Myanmar and Ahmadis and Shias of ­Pakistan, the decision invariably feeds into the growing anti-Muslim sentiments in India.

Conclusion  217 India must ensure that it continues and enhances the protection of refugees within its territory. For India, to do less would be to do immense disservice to the Afghan refugees who knocked its doors in search of the protection and hospitality – which India has heralded over the last five decades. In their hearts, the Indian policymakers know that these displaced people make no country safe or dangerous and it is possible to make room for people in need. Yes, there might not be room for everybody, but there is certainly room to do more – there is room to honour more commitments, and room to bridge the divide between what has been promised and what has been accomplished. It is not a time to measure humanity but to act on it. Today, the world has been scared by so much suffering, such that creating room for people is not only doable, but a moral imperative of our times.

Key contributions and direction of future research This research could plausibly claim to have made the following distinctive contributions to the study of the Afghan Refugees. Though Afghan refugees are spread across the globe, studies in academic discourses so far tended to focus primarily on their experiences in Pakistan and Iran – two immediate neighbouring states. For the first time perhaps, an attempt has been made to study the experiences of conflict-displaced Afghan population in India – another significant country in the region where Afghans have taken refuge. What made the Afghan refugee population in India distinctively different from their counterparts in the rest of the world is the fact that majority of the Afghans in India belonged to the non-Muslim religious minorities of ­Afghanistan, namely Sikh and Hindu communities. The experiences of Sikhs and Hindus as persecuted minorities of Afghanistan have been a grossly neglected topic in scholarly literature. This study attempts to remedy this lack of literature and examines the history and the pertinacity of these communities both in pre- and post-migration situations. The 20-year timeline (1992–2012), that this study has chosen to focus at, witnessed common Afghans from non-privileged backgrounds fleeing to ­India as an alternative to Iran and Pakistan. While majority of Sikh and Hindu Afghans arrived in the 1990s, the escalation of insurgency in the post-2005 Afghanistan brought many Muslim and Christian Afghans to India. Thus, Afghans with different ethno-religious backgrounds started coexisting in India during the mentioned period, which made research on these communities even more interesting. Although substantial research works have been conducted on Afghan refugees worldwide, yet hardly any of those scholarly works have been attempted to capture the acculturation experiences of the Afghan immigrant groups as they came in contact with the host society. The cardinal purpose of this research has been to study the temporal experiences of displaced Afghan population as they adapted to the changing environments during their settlement phase in India. This study, thus, is critical to gaining a more

218 Conclusion complete picture of identification and adaptation processes of immigrants in host societies in general. Finally, this research deals with the issue of refugee policy in India, an area that has largely been neglected at the governmental and policy levels. The existing studies on acculturation, identity and adaptation have been largely conducted in Western countries that have structured policies for asylum seekers. This is one of the initial studies to have captured adaptation experiences of refugees in a host country that does not have clear policies for refugees and asylum seekers. The possibility for future research and reflection should entail a pointed thick conversation between oral history, deep anthropological facts, political developments, sociocultural, psychological attributes and raw contemporary probe of responses on areas such as: •

• •

•

•

The experiences of Sikhs and Hindus as persecuted minorities of ­ fghanistan in the context of ethno-sectarian conflict in Afghanistan. A The history of these non-Muslim Afghan communities, their contribution in the country’s development, the perception and treatment of the majority population towards them, and the struggles they have underwent (and undergoing) to preserve their culture and religious tradition in a hostile political environment remains largely undocumented. Meaning and implications of the abiding resonance in the Afghan refugee context of the ideas of ethnic and national identities vis-à-vis the Afghan-Sikh and Afghan-Hindu identities. The differences in the acculturation outcomes and settlement experiences of immigrant groups within India, that is, the groups perceived as ‘refugees’ by the Indian Government and those who are not, need to be studied. A comparative study of refugee settlement experiences in two ­refugeehosting nations, with and without a structured refugee legislation, might be interesting to identify how far the presence or absence of the ‘refugee’ tag (as a result of presence or absence of structured refugee policy in the host society) has impacted their interaction with the host population and their integration in both the host countries. Although significant works have been done on Afghan women in and outside Afghanistan, yet not many have touched upon the predicament of Afghan women in India, their reconciliation with own sense of identity and the stereotyped image of ‘Afghan women’ held by the host society.

This research enquiry could claim to be one of the foremost accounts on the neglected subject of the experiences of Afghan ‘refugees’ in India. Because of the lack of information available on the subject in existing scholarly literature, this study had to overtly depend on primary data, generated through a combination of interviews – both expert interviews and individual

Conclusion  219 interviews with all the relevant stakeholders; field notes and participants’ observation; analysis of governmental documents including parliamentary proceedings. Although limited, secondary data sources comprising newspaper and journal articles, folklore, reports of human rights organizations, policy papers, reports by audiovisual media and documentary films also enabled this research to map the experiences of the studied communities in pre- and post-migration stages. My hope and expectation are that the findings and the recommendations provided in this study would, to some extent, be meaningful beyond the specificities of this research exercise.

Notes 1 Term used by LaCroix to describe the state of being and common experience that transcends country of origin and individual circumstances in M. LaCroix, ‘Canadian refugee policy and the social construction of refugee claimant subjectivity: Understanding refugeeness’. Journal of Refugee Studies, no. 17 (2004), 147–166. 2 J. W. Berry, ‘Immigration, Acculturation and Adaptation’, Applied Psychology: An International Review, Vol. 46 (1997), 5–34. 3 L. Bergman, D. Magnasson, and B. El-Khouri, Studying Individual Development in an Inter-Individual Contect: A Person Oriented Approach. (Mahwah, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum, 2003). 4 Manoj Sharma, ‘Reaching out: Africans in Delhi trying to follow the Indian way of life’. The Hindustam Times, June 4, 2016. Available at: www.hindustantimes. com/delhi/after-attacks-africans-in-delhi-trying-to-follow-the-indian-way-oflife/story-THXwJMqdXW2EMArwJSNTwO.html (accessed on 30.6.2016). Sanjay Srivastava ‘The underlying message to embattle Africans in India: Become like us or perish’. Scroll, June 13, 2016. Available at: http://scroll.in/ article/809521/the-underlying-message-in-debate-over-the-race-attacksbecome-like-us-or-perish (accessed on 30.6.2016). 5 R. Y. Bourhis, L. C. Moise, S. Perreault, and S. Senecal, ‘Towards an interactive acculturation model: A social psychological approach’. International Journal of Psychology, Vol. 32 (1997), 369–386. 6 J. W. Berry, ‘Multicultural policy in Canada: A social-psychological analysis’. Canadian Jounral of Behavioural Science, Vol. 13 (1984), 135–154. 7 J. W. Berry, J. S. Phinney, D. L. Sam, and P. Vedder, ‘Immigrant youth, acculturation, identity and adaptation’. BELTZ, Vol. 55 (2010), 17–43. 8 Shri, I.P Khosla, Former India Ambassador to Afghanistan (1985–1989), in discussion with the author, December 2015. 9 The Foreigner’s Act, 1946. Constitution of India. 10 Ms. Praveen Singh Horo, Director Citizenship, Ministry of Home Affairs, Government of India in discussion with the author, December 2015. 11 Mr. Trilochan Singh (Former Chairman of the Minority Commission of India and Honorable Member of Parliament), in discussion with the author, December 2015. 12 Mr. Manjit Singh G.K, The President of Shiromani Akali Dal, a leading political party in India, in discussion with the author, December 2015. 13 Mohinder Singh Khurrana (conflict-displaced Afghan-Sikh in India), in discussion with the author, December 2015. 14 Shreya Sen (Researcher Calcutta University), in an interview with the author in June 2016.

220 Conclusion 15 Ms. Selin Mathew (Project Coordinator, Don Bosco) in discussion with the author, December 2015. 16 Bhartiya Janta Party (2014), Ek Bharat ShreshtaBhabrat, SabkaSaathSabkaVikas: Election Manifesto 2014. Available at: www.bjp.org/images/pdf_2014/ full_manifesto_english_07.04.2014.pdf (accessed on 5.8.2017). 17 PTI (2016), Government Introduces Bill to Amend Citizenship Act, in: Indian Express. Available at: http://indianexpress.com/article/india/india-news-india/ government-introduces-bill-to-amend-citizenship-act-2924253/ (accessed on 5.8.2017).

Index

access to basic rights 16, 17, 148, 151, 201–2 acculturation 4, 7, 10, 12–16, 20–1, 29, 30–6, 40–9, 50–8, 115, 116, 171, 184, 199, 200–6, 208, 209, 211–13, 215, 217, 218 acculturation and adaptation 4, 15, 171 acculturation attitude 16, 45, 56, 200 acculturation behaviour 16 acculturation outcomes 15, 20, 33, 48, 171, 208, 218 acculturation profile 32, 200, 201, 204, 205 acculturation stress 184 adjustment issues 16 The Afghan Desk, Ministry of External Affairs, South Block 123 Afghan-Hindu 144, 150, 167, 176, 178, 205, 208–9, 211, 216, 218 Afghanistan post-9/11 96 Afghan migrants in India 1, 7, 115, 125 Afghan-Sikh 19, 76, 79, 102, 120–1, 125, 126, 128, 135, 139, 141, 143, 150, 172, 174, 178–9, 181, 183, 186, 203–4, 208–11, 213, 218–19 Afghan society 1, 68, 70–1, 93 alienation 2, 7, 136, 200 Anglo-Afghan War 69 anti-Muslim sentiments 216 assimilation 2, 16, 44–8, 51, 55, 144, 181, 200, 201–3, 205 attire 18, 40, 168, 178, 179 Baisakhi 73, 76 behaviour problems 16 Berry, John 11, 16, 35, 41, 44, 171, 184, 206, 211 Berrys model of acculturation 44, 51, 52, 55, 58 Bharatiya Janata Party 216

Christians 4, 78, 99, 125, 138, 205 civil and political participation 16, 17, 201 Cold War 9, 83 community perspective 68 conceptual framework 44, 50, 52–3 conflict-displaced Afghans 4, 7, 13, 54, 57, 89, 99, 106, 117, 171, 206 contact between cultures and the outcomes 177 culinary culture 179–80 Delhi xvi, 3, 13, 14, 19, 75, 117, 119, 120, 123, 124, 126–30, 132, 136–8, 140, 141, 143–5, 147, 149, 153, 155, 156, 159, 160, 162–70, 173, 176, 178, 180, 181, 183, 185–7, 204, 207 diffuse profile 201–4 direction of future research 217 Don Bosco 136, 138–9, 142, 144, 147, 170, 172, 175, 185 Durrani Pushtun tribe 69 economic adaptation 171 Ecosystem Model of ‘Refugee’ Acculturation and Identity (Re)-Constitution 52, 53, 57 ecosystem perspective 53, 54 education 159, 160, 162, 172–4 emergency responses 4 employment 3, 7 54, 76, 93–4, 96, 126, 133, 136, 138, 145, 148, 155, 171–5, 184, 186, 206, 209, 213, 216 Erikson, E. H. 32, 33, 36–9, 41 ethnic identity 2, 3, 7, 16, 18, 33, 39, 40, 51, 52, 56, 58, 115, 116, 152, 201, 202, 211, 212 ethnic language proficiency 16, 201, 202 ethnic peer contacts 16 ethnic profile 201, 203–5, 208, 211 exile society 30

222 Index family obligation 16, 70, 200, 201 family relationship values 16, 17, 201 family roles 54, 181, 182 Faridabad 124, 128, 163, 167, 176, 207 first generation of respondents 14 Foreigners Division, Ministry of Home Affairs 123 Foreigners Regional Registration Office 21, 117, 123 Germany 14, 18, 97, 150 healthcare 129, 132, 141, 145–7, 209 high-intensity conflict 85, 86 Hindu-Sikh Welfare Society 118 hospitality 11, 19, 72–3, 79, 179, 181, 217 the host population of the immediate surroundings 14, 151, 162, 188, 203, 204 host society 2, 4, 7, 10, 11, 13, 30–2, 42–4, 45, 50, 52–7, 116, 122, 124, 129, 162, 163, 167, 171, 175, 183, 184, 187, 199, 201, 203, 208, 210, 211, 215, 217, 218 identification with new society 4, 7, 56, 115 identity 2, 4, 7, 8, 10, 12–14, 16, 18, 29, 31–40, 42, 45, 46, 48–53, 55–8, 74, 106, 115, 116, 132, 144, 151, 152, 164, 169, 179, 180, 186, 187, 199, 200–2, 205–12, 218 immediate stakeholders 133, 151 Indian Constitution 148, 216 Indian government xvi, 21, 117, 129, 131, 139, 147, 148, 150, 151, 153, 155–9, 162, 164, 167, 172, 174, 175, 204, 206, 213, 215, 216, 218 integration 2, 4, 7, 11, 16, 21, 30, 44–8, 151, 161, 200–9, 211–14, 218 integration profile 201–3 international agencies 93, 98, 215 interview 2, 7, 14, 15, 17–21, 37, 52, 74, 75, 77, 79, 87, 89, 90, 92, 98–100, 102, 106, 116, 117, 119, 120–3, 130–4, 136–9, 142, 144, 145, 150, 151, 153, 154, 156, 157, 160–2, 166, 167, 172, 174, 176, 178, 180, 181, 183, 203, 204, 209, 214, 218, 219 Iran xvi, 1, 4, 12, 68, 71, 72, 83, 84, 87, 92, 95, 96, 99, 102, 119, 123, 127, 131, 217 Islamic fundamentalist 3, 91 Islamic Jihadist organizations 216

job satisfaction 173, 175 jus sanguinis 149 key contributions 188, 217 Khalsa Diwan Welfare Society (KDWS) 19, 118, 123 language 10, 16–19, 45, 49, 51–2, 69–72, 78, 82, 121, 127, 129, 140–3, 157, 160, 165, 172, 175, 177–8, 181, 183, 185, 200, 202, 208, 210 life satisfaction 16, 18, 51, 184 Lok Sabha 117, 152 Marcia, James 33, 37, 39, 40 marginality 4 measures 5, 15, 16, 18, 51, 154, 159, 212 Ministry of Home Affairs, Government of India 21 model of acculturation 42, 44, 51, 52, 55, 58 Modi, Narendra 216 Mujahideen 83–5, 87, 89–92, 99, 100, 103, 104 mullahs 70, 80, 94, 99, 100 Multi-group Ethnic Identity Measure (MEIM) 40 Muslims 4, 78, 79, 82, 99, 118, 119, 120, 125, 138, 143, 204, 216 national identity 2, 16, 58, 116, 164, 201, 202, 209 national language proficiency 16 national peer contacts 16 national profile 201, 203–5 Nawroz 73 official status 147, 209 Pakistan xvi, 1, 4, 12, 26, 68, 72, 78, 83, 84, 87, 88, 90, 92–6, 99, 102–4, 106, 119, 122, 123, 131, 150, 158, 168, 177, 216, 217 partner NGOs 14, 143, 207 Pashtunwali 70, 72 perceived discrimination 16, 17, 203 Phinneys model of ethnic identity development 39 policy environment 4, 205 the political system in India 151 post-2005 119, 217 post-Cold War 9 pre-conflict 2, 7, 20, 54–6, 58, 68, 74–8, 80, 106, 178

Index  223 prior immigration context 43 Protocol (1967) 6, 153, 154, 159 psychological adaptation 16, 18, 105, 171, 184, 211–12 psychological problem 16, 18, 185 psychological wellness 185, 186 qawm 69, 70, 75 questionnaires 13, 15, 120, 184 Radio Kabul 71 Refugee Convention (1951) 147, 153, 154 Refugee ID card 3, 129, 147 refugee identity 8 refugee mentality 9, 11 Refugee Status Determination (RSD) 7 ‘refugee’ tag 4, 7, 115, 187 religious affiliation 150, 205 research methodology 13 right to employment and social security 209 Saddozai Popolzai 69 sample details 120 sample distribution 124–5 Saur Revolution 1 self esteem 16 self-settlement 128, 130, 176, 177 semi-structured research schedules 13 separation marginalization 16 settlement context 43 settlement phases 13, 159, 171, 206, 213 Sikhs and Hindus 3, 4, 12, 69, 76, 78, 80, 88, 95, 102, 118, 120, 123, 125, 138, 139, 145, 149, 150, 158, 163, 164,

167–9, 172, 173, 175, 176, 181, 183, 186–8, 208, 217, 218 snowball technique 14 socio-cultural adaptation 16, 18 Socio-Legal Information Centre (SLIC) 123, 149, 151, 159, 170 sociocultural adaptation 171, 175, 184, 203, 211 South Asia Human Rights Documentation Centre (SAHRDC) 12, 117, 124, 130, 137, 141, 144, 146, 161, 170 soviet intervention 74, 82, 85 stages of migration 15, 54, 58 structured refugee legislation 16, 17, 116, 218 Taleban 77, 78, 86, 89, 92, 96–9, 100–1, 119, 210 theoretical framework 13, 20, 33, 201 Third World 29, 30, 153 trauma 11, 15, 89, 90, 93, 100, 105, 106, 185 Ulama 70 UNHCR xvi, 1, 3–5, 7, 10, 14, 17, 18, 97, 99, 117, 118, 120, 123, 126–34, 136–49, 151, 153–5, 157–62, 167, 172, 174–6, 185, 187, 203, 204, 207–10, 212–16 United Kingdom xvi, 13, 14, 18, 150 vocational training 141–5, 161–2, 175, 138 Young Mens Christian Association (YMCA) 137, 141, 144