Humanity: The political and social philosophy of Thomas G. Masaryk 9783111509723, 9789027979810

Table of contents :
Preface
Contents
Introduction
A Biographical Sketch
1. Norm and Fact. How are Norm and Fact, Morality and Religion Related in Masaryk's Thought?
2. Humanity. An Analysis of the Key Concept of Masaryk's Social and Political Philosophy
3. Humanity, National Identity and Nationalism
4. Humanity and Socialism
5. Humanity and Democracy
6. Humanity and Revolution: The Problem of Violent Revolution as a Means of Creating Political and/or Social Change
Bibliography

Citation preview

Humanity: The Political and Social Philosophy of Thomas G. Masaryk

Issues in Contemporary Politics Historical and Theoretical Perspectives

1

Mouton · The Hague · Paris

Humanity The Political and Social Philosophy of Thomas G. Masaryk

ANTONIE VAN DEN BELD University of Utrecht

Mouton · The Hague · Paris

ISBN: 90 279 7981 2 © 1975, Mouton & Co, Publishers, The Hague, Paris Printed in the Netherlande

To Alena and Thomas

Preface

In this English Edition of my study on the political and social philosophy of Thomas G. Masaryk (first published in Dutch in 1973 in the form of a Doctoral Dissertation in the State University of Utrecht under the title, Humaniteit: De politieke en sociale filosofie van Tomài G. Masaryk, van Gorcum & Co. b.v. Assen, 1973), every possible effort has been made to make all the material understandable for the English reader. All the citations have been translated into English from German, Czech, French and Dutch. Where possible, existing translations have been used, both in the text and in the footnotes; though on occasions we have deviated from them when this seemed to be in the best interests of accuracy and clarity (and, hence, in the best interests of the reader). Commonly accepted English transliterations of Slavonic names have been used; though no attempt has been made to harmonize different conventions (and deviant English and American spellings) which have been used in the various official translations and in the texts cited in full in this work. There is enough information in the footnotes and in the bibliography to enable the reader who is willing and able to verify the original references in the German, Czech, French and Dutch originals which are here superseded either by official translations or by our own. In the interests of simplicity and clarity double and triple references have been avoided wherever possible in the footnotes. But the reader can take a short cut to the sources by consulting the Dutch edition in which citations are always given either in the text or in the notes in the language of the original source. As the enumeration of the footnotes and citations is the same in both the English and the Dutch editions, even non-Dutch readers will be able to use the Dutch edition as a short-cut to the original citations. My warm thanks are due to the Netherlands Organisation for the Advancement of Pure Research (ZWO) for the financial assistance which

vin

Preface

made this English Edition possible. And also to The Rev. Dr. Peter Staples for translating the Dutch edition so accurately in his leisure time. A few small changes have been introduced into the first English Edition. This book is dedicated to my wife, without whom it would never have been written. And also to our son Thomas. One day I hope that he will understand why his father has devoted so much of his time to the writing of this book about the man after whom he has been named. A. van den Beld

Contents

Preface

VII

Introduction

1

A Biographical Sketch

9

1. Norm and Fact. How are Norm and Fact, Morality and Religion Related in Masaryk's Thought? 1. Introduction 2. Norm and Human Nature 3. Norm and Social Reality (History) 4. First Conclusion 5. Morality and Religion 6. Second Conclusion

14 14 14 19 28 29 35

2. Humanity. An Analysis of the Key Concept of Masaryk's Social and Political Philosophy

38

3. Humanity, National Identity and Nationalism 1. Introduction 2. The Political-Historical Framework 3. Humanity and Nationalism 4. Humanity and National Identity 5. The Development of the Idea of National Identity as a Political Idea

48 48 49 52 57 61

χ

Contents

4. Humanity and Socialism 1. Introduction 2. Masaryk and the Social Question; Masaryk and Socialism 3. Masaryk and Marxism 5. Humanity and Democracy 1. Introduction 2. Political and Social Democracy 3. The Justification of Democracy 1. Myth and Science; Theology and Philosophy 2. Aristocracy and Democracy in Relation to Theology and Philosophy 6. Humanity and Revolution: The Problem of Violent Revolution as a Means of Creating Political and/or Social Change 1. Introduction 2. Masaryk''s Normative Theory of Revolution; His Controversy with A. Hajn 3. Masaryk's Criticism of the Marxist Theory of Revolution 4. Masaryk''s Normative Theory of Revolution in its Final Form 5. Masaryk's Theory of Revolution Checked against his Attitude towards Austria in the Years 1914-1918 6. Masaryk's Theory of Revolution Tested against his Attitude towards Revolutionary Bolshevism Bibliography

69 69 69 83 101 101 102 113 114 116

126 126 128 134 137 141 147 155

Introduction

The writing of a study about Thomas Garrigue Masaryk (1850 - 1937) from the point of view of the history of philosophy requires some justification. Was he such an important figure in the world of philosophy that the devotion of a book to him can be justified? A purely historical study would require no further explanation; because Masaryk was too important and remarkable a personality upon the stage of history for that. He was indeed a man of many parts: the son of a worker, a university professor, a Member of Parliament, the leader of a successful revolution, and, last but by no means least, the founding father and first president of the Republic of Czechoslovakia. In modern textbooks of philosophy and ethics, however, one rarely if ever encounters his name. 1 This could well be an indication that Masaryk's philosophy and ethics lacked the necessary proportions to allow him the stature of a great thinker; or, if less then great, then at least the stature of one of the more important ones. But, on the other hand, this could also be caused by the fact that his thought did not receive the attention which it so rightly deserved because of certain adverse historical circumstances. Even if it were conceded that the first of these two assumptions is not entirely without foundation - about which more in due course - the second assumption is the one which should receive the most emphasis. Certainly in his own native land - as well as outside it - Masaryk's philosophy did not pass unnoticed; above all during his own lifetime. Indeed, a considerable number of publications was dedicated to him. 2 1. The Encyclopedia ofPhilosophy, (Ed. Paul Edwards, New York and London, 1967), which has a one and a half column article about Masaryk by R. Wellek, is a good and authoritative exception. 2. An almost complete bibliography of works by Masaryk and about Masaryk

2

Introduction

One of these was a comprehensive Festschrift which was presented to him in 1930 on the occasion of his eightieth birthday. To this, an international selection of scholars including B. Croce, S. Bulgakov, L. Brunschvicg and H. Driesch contributed papers taking up various aspects of his thought. 3 It was the way in which national and international politics developed after Masaryk's death in 1937 which brought to a premature end all critical reflection upon his work. It was also a premature end in the sense that scholars had not yet had the time, generally speaking, to attain a sufficiently critical distance both from his person and from his work. During the German occupation of Czechoslovakia, it was quite out of the question for scholars to pay serious attention to his writings. The post-war discussion to which J.L. Hromádka 4 , among others, contributed had to come to a speedy end after the communist take-over in 1948. And even when there was an official publication about him, he was presented either as an enemy of the working class5 or, in the most favourable light, as a bourgeois ideologist.6 The 'conspiracy of silence' surrounding Massaryk, however, seemed to have been broken at the end of the sixties. One of the indications of this thaw was a book published by M. Machovec which, when all said and done, still gave little more than a biography supplemented by a sympathetic commentary plus several excerpts from his works.7 Another indicaton was a series of articles in the (up to about 1930) is to be found in, Festschrift Th.G. Masaryk zum 80. Geburtstage (Ed. by Β. Jakowenko), II, (Bonn, 1930), pp. 383^10. This is cited below as Festschrift II alongside Festschrift I (same year, same editor). The bibliography to be found in the dissertation of O. Funda, T. G. Masaryk. Sein philosophisches und religiöses Denken, (Basle/Basel, 1971) is of a more recent date. The bibliography published by J. Dolezal in 1938 of works by Masaryk and about Masaryk is very comprehensive (almost 300 pages). He lists works in many languages, including French, German, English and Russian; but excludes those written in Czech. See J. Dolezal, T. G. Masaryk, Soupis tiskû ν cizich jazycich, (Praha/Prague, 1938). (For an English translation of the Czech titles, the reader should consult the appended bibliography in this book.) 3. Festschrift I and II; see above, note 2. 4. J.L.Hromádka,Masarykmezivcerejskemazitrkem,(Praha/Prague, 19472; 19401). The first edition appeared in America in 1940; the second edition has been enlarged by the addition of a comprehensive final chapter entitled 'Masaryk na prahu zitrka* (Masaryk at the threshold of tomorrow). Another article on Masaryk from this period is J. Král, 'Demokratism jako Masarykova filosofie' in, Sociologie a sociálníproblémy, VII (1947), pp. 5-13. 5. As, e.g., in, F. NeCásek et al., Dokumenty o protilidové a protindrodnipolitice T. G. Masaryka, (Praha/Prague, 1953). 6. As in, L. Novi, Filosofie T. G. Masaryka, (Praha/Prague, 1962). 7. M. Machovec, Tomài G. Masaryk, (Praha/Prague, 19682; 19671). In the heat of his enthusiasm for the events of the Prague Spring, Machovec wrote a Foreword for the

Introduction

3

Acta Universitatis Carolinae, including an interesting monograph o n Masaryk's anthropology. 8 This renaissance in Masaryk studies, however, was strangled shortly after its birth, in August 1968, by yet another fateful twist in the history of Czechoslovakia. Outside Czechoslovakia, interest in Masaryk's work began t o c o o l off after his death, 9 a state o f affairs which lasted until a revival began in the late sixties. The third volume of Masaryk's great work o n Russia and Europe 1 0 appeared posthumously in England in 1967, its publication having been facilitated by the Masaryk Publications Trust based in the United States. 1 1 T w o years later, his war memoires were reprinted. 1 2 The first two volumes of his Russian studies, first published in 1913, appeared about the same time in a new German reprint. 13 O. Funda, a Czech student, defended a dissertation on Masaryk's philosophy in the University of Basle (Basel) in 1971 1 4 and an abridged edition of Masaryk's study o n Marxism was published in America for the benefit of English readers

second edition of March 1968 which shows how important Machovec thought Masaryk was for the movement towards democracy (i.e. socialism 'with a human face'), which had just got under way in Czechoslovakia at that moment. I had a conversation with him towards the end of 1972 and he also let me know that he really wanted to devote more attention in his book to Masaryk's political and social thought; but circumstances did not permit this at that particular time. 8. O. Louzilová, 'Masarykova filosofie ôlovëkà in, Acta Universitatis Carolinae. Philosophica et Histórica. Monographia XVII, (Praha/Prague, 1967). O. Louzilová, 'Masarykûv problém sebevrazdy', in, Acta Universitatis Carolinae. Philosophica et Histórica, 1/1968, pp. 83-97. J. Bednár, 'Vyvoj Masarykovy nábozenské filosofie', in, Acta Universitatis Carolinae. Philosophica et Histórica, 1/1969, pp. 17-65. 9. In America there also appeared W. Preston Warren's, Masaryk's Democracy, (Chapel Hill, 1941); and, in 1945, an article by R. Wellek entitled, 'Masaryk's Philosophy', in Ethics, LV (1945), pp. 298-304. After the Second World War, a Dutch scholar, Th.J.G. Locher, wrote an article on, 'Masaryk als humanistisch staatsman', in, Wending, Vol. 2 (1947/8), pp. 261-266. He had already published an article about Masaryk before the war. See, "Thomas Garrigue Masaryk', in De Gids, Vol. 100, part 2, pp. 187-203. 10. T.G. Masaryk, The Spirit of Russia III, (Ed. by George Gibian and trans, by Robert Bass, London, 1967). 11. Founded by Masaryk's daughter in 1959 'for the primary purpose of collecting and arranging for publication any unpublished writings of the Masaryk family'. Ibid. p. vii. 12. T.G. Masaryk, The Making of a State, (London/New York, 19692). 13. T.G. Masaryk, Russland und Europa, Studien über die geistigen Strömungen in Russland. Erste Folge. Zur russischen Geschichts- und Religionsphilosophie. Soziologische Skizzen, 2 Bände, (Jena, 1913; Düsseldorf, 19652). The English edition entitled, The Spirit of Russia, (2 vols., London, 19684) is used here and cited as Spirit of Russia. 14. O. Funda, op. cit. note two, above.

4

Introduction

at the end of 1972.15 After a period of eclipse, Masaryk's thought is once again the focal point of growing international interest.16 The above mentioned assumption that Masaryk's philosophy and ethics lacked sufficient stature to win him a place in modern philosophical textbooks can be justified to this extent: his importance to the philosopher does not lie in the first instance in his contributions in the fields of logic, epistemology or metaphysics, which are traditionally regarded as the central subjects in philosophy. And for all his interest in the philosophy of religion, we should not try to discover his importance for philosophy at this particular point. Nor yet in the interesting things which he has to say about modern man and his religion. Masaryk deserves the attention of the philosopher for reasons other than these. Far more significant is the fact that Masaryk was one of the very first scholars - if not the first - to have taken seriously the philosophy of Karl Marx. When philosophers were still turning a deaf ear to Marx, Masaryk had already devoted lectures to him and had already published a penetrating critique of Marxism. 17 At a time when virtually nobody outside Russia had even heard of Lenin, Masaryk - who was a specialist in the field of Russian literature and philosophy - was already acquainted with his publications. It was indeed Lenin himself who named Masaryk in 1919 as his most serious opponent in the whole of Europe on the ideological plane.18 As in the case of Marx and Lenin, the importance of Masaryk for the philosopher lies more in the sphere of social and political philosophy (ethics). That is, in his ideas about the concept of humanity and its relation to the notions of nationalism, socialism, democracy and revolution. Like Marx, Masaryk had also reflected upon the relation between 15. Masaryk on Marx. An Abridged Edition ofT.G. Masaryk, The Social Question: Philosophical and Sociological Foundations of Marxism, (Ed. and trans, by Erazim V. Kohák, Lewisburg, 1972). The German edition (see note 17) is used here because the English edition is abridged; though the pagination of the English text is given in brackets in the footnotes. English citations (unless stated otherwise) are from Kohák's edition. 16. For Dutch readers, C.J. de Vogel published in 1968 a study on the subject of humanism in which a section is devoted to Masaryk. See C.J. de Vogel, Het humanisme en zijn historische achtergrond, (Assen, 1968), pp. 147-154. 17. T.G. Masaryk, Die philosophischen undsociologischen Grundlagen des Marxismus. Studien zur socialen Frage, (Wien/Vienna, 1899). Cited below as Grundlagen. For the abridged English Edition see note 15, above. 18. O. Odlozilik (Ed.), T. G. Masaryk, His Life and Thought, with an introduction by Harry D. Gideonse for the 100th anniversary of the birth ofThomas Masaryk. Published by the Masaryk Institute, (New York, 1960), p. 4.

Introduction

5

theory and practice; though at least in part independently of him. One of his very first publications, which dates from before the time he knew him, is devoted explicitly to this very subject.19 Unlike Marx, however, Masaryk not only had the opportunity as a philosopher to think out a theory of action (or praxis), but also had the opportunity as a politician to submit his theory to the test of practice. In the second half of the twentieth century the philosophers have given Marx his reputation back. Likewise, Masaryk also deserves to be protected from falling into oblivion; and not just on the strength of the fact that he was one of Marx's most penetrating critics. More positively, the social and political philosophy of Masaryk deserves the attention of all those who for professional or other reasons are engaged in answering two questions. How should the state be governed? And: How should society be organised? The fact that it was precisely in Czechoslovakia during the 'Prague Spring' of 1968 that 'socialism with a human face' became the outspoken ideal of a great many people cannot be separated from the life and work - that is both the theory and the praxis - of the man who served his native land several decades ago as both professor and president. To mention but two of the parts which he played in his lifetime. One should also mention in addition that Masaryk's political and social philosophy has been overlooked in the scholarly literature which has already appeared to date. These are the considerations which together make up the backcloth of the stage which is now to be studied. It begins with a short biographical sketch followed by an analysis of Masaryk's ethics; i.e. his social and political philosophy.20 In Chapter 1, the structure of Masaryk's ethical thought, his social and political philosophy, is examined. This is done by means of answering the question: How are norm and fact related in his thought? An answer to this over-arching question is sought by means of answering two more specific questions: 19. T. Masaryk, 'Theorie a praxis', originally published in, Moravská Orlice, (Brno, 1876); also in J. Dolezal, Masarykova cesta zivotem II, (Brno, 1921). Masaryk adopted the middle name Garrigue after his marriage with Charlotte Garrigue in 1878. 20. The two terms 'ethics' and 'social and political philosophy' are virtually interchangeable here. 'Ethics' is the more comprehensive term of the two. In round terms, social and political philosophy denotes a system of more or less fundamental value judgements (rules, principles, ideals) plus other kinds of 'judgements' (statements) which concern the ordering of a society and the governing of a state. Furthermore, the term 'ethics' can also denote a system of value judgements etc. concerning the relationships of individuals to their fellows.

6

Introduction

a). Is the (moral) norm given in human nature? Or, in other words, is it to be found through psychological or biological investigation? b). Is the norm given in social reality or in history? Or, in other words, is it to be found through historical or sociological investigation? On the one hand, Masaryk opposes ethical positivism (Popper) on principle; especially in his criticism of Marx and the Marxists. He recognises a difference in category between norm and fact. On the other hand, however, he has not been able to avoid a semblance of ethical positivism whenever he explains his own normative ideas. The fundamental norm, namely humanity (humanita), was so self-evident to Masaryk that both human nature and history - after a manner of speaking - could not but confirm it. In principle, however, the norm did not have to be 'verified' by the facts. The question of how religion and morality are related in Masaryk's work is then examined at the end of Chapter 1. As far as religion is concerned, morality takes priority over it; but in its pure form, religion has fundamental as well as practical significance for morality. In Chapter 2, the content of Masaryk's normative thinking is subjected to a closer examination. Particular attention is given to the meaning of the central concept of humanity. After a detailed examination of his literary works relating to a particular period in the development of his social and political philosophy, in particular those works dealing with the cultural history of his own land, it appears that Masaryk understands humanity in terms of its end as national identity (nârodnost), Socialism (social justice) and democracy. And in terms of means he understands humanity to include both work and education (vzdëldnl): love in action, the opposite of violence. In the four chapters which follow, the concept of humanity is unfolded in the form of an analysis of the meaning of these terms. In Chapter 3, Masaryk's ideas on the subject of national identity and nationalism are examined in the light of the concept of humanity; and also against the background of two closely related problems of a political nature which did indeed become pressing problems during his lifetime. First, the relationship between the Czech nation and the Habsburg Empire. Second, the problem of the relationship between the Czechs and Germans within the frontiers of the Bohemian Crown Lands. It is shown that the relationship between humanity and national identity in Masaryk's thought was a critical one. Whenever the idea of national identity degenerates into blind nationalism he criticises it on the basis of the norm of humanity. But the relationship between national identity and humanity

Introduction

1

in Masaryk's thought is also a positive one. Because he regards love for one's own nation - a positive form of nationalism possibly leading to the pursuit of independence - as one form of humanity. Love for one's own nation is above all to be understood as a cultural programme. In Chapter 4, the question of how Masaryk understood humanity as social justice is explored by means of an examination of the manner in which he formulated the social question of his time, of the position which he adopted over against it, and of the solution which he advocated. The question of whether - and to what extent - Masaryk can be called a socialist is answered. Masaryk's criticism of Marx is then expanded. It focusses upon historical materialism and what he calls its amoral positivistic or objectivist character. As far as Masaryk is concerned, Socialism is a moral imperative, a matter of humanity. It is not a historical necessity. In Chapter 5, Masaryk's 'theory' of democracy is sketched along the lines of those criteria which H.B. Mayo regards as the 'distinguishing principles' of a coherent theory of democracy, a) Where there is no possibility in a modern state for direct self government by the people, Masaryk emphasizes a genuine and suitable representation of the people both in Government and in Parliament, b) Masaryk is also a champion of universal and equal suffrage; and of proportional representation: i.e. of political equality for the people, c) By reason of the connexion which he sees between learning - and the pursuit of it - and democracy, democracy means in principle for Masaryk that everything should be open to criticism and public scrutiny. Hence, civil liberties are essential for democracy, d) The principle of majority rule is accepted by him as being a consequence of democracy with its principle of political equality. According to Masaryk, the ideal of democracy is not finally realised unless it takes shape in both its social as well as in its political form. Chapter 5 also demonstrates how Masaryk justified the norm - the ideal - of democracy in the context of his philosophy of history. He interprets history by using the antithesis: aristocracy (theocracy) and democracy. These concepts come thereby to have a more comprehensive connotation. They begin to assume the character of a world view. He relates aristocracy to myth (theology); and democracy to learning (philosophy). The democratic world view is characterized by its positive evaluation of work, which is based on knowledge. In this, it differs from the aristocratic world view. This latter has no respect for the value of work and either lapses into passivity or degenerates into revolutionary

8

Introduction

violence. By emphasizing work based on knowledge, the democratic world view becomes a form of humanity. It is justified thereby. The central question of Chapter 6 is this. Is it possible in practice and in principle to attain the goal of humanity by means of revolutionary violence? Masaryk's answer to this question, which was forged over the years in confrontation with national radicalism and Marxism, appears to be that a revolution can only be admissible if there is no other nonviolent means available for protecting the physical and mental integrity of all concerned (his more specifically moral principle). And also if it can be assumed that the revolution will bring about the desired more human situation (his more political principle). This normative theory of revolution then serves as a test for - and is also tested by - Masaryk's handling of two revolutionary situations with which he had to deal as a practicing politician. After the outbreak of the First World War, Masaryk had to decide whether to side for or against Austria. That is, for or against revolution. In the years 1919-1920, he was also obliged as President to formulate his attitude towards the powerful up-and-coming revolutionary Bolshevism in Czechoslovakia. It is shown that the more political - though not amoral - principle played a greater role than the more specifically moral one in Masaryk's practical considerations.

A Biographical Sketch1

When the seventy year old Masaryk addressed himself to the mineworkers of Brezo vé Hory as President of Czechoslovakia with the words: Ί used to be a member of the working class myself and my sympathies always used to go out to you and still do' 2 he was fully entitled to use these words. Thomas (Czech: Tomás) Masaryk was born on the seventh of March, 1850, in Hodonin in South East Moravia as the son of a coachman on a royal estate. Although serfdom had been officially abolished in 1848, his father had still continued to live in a feudal relationship with his master. His parents were of Slovakian and Czech (Moravian) descent. Masaryk grew up as a country lad with a striking intelligence. Thanks both to this and to the cooperation of several older people who were well-disposed towards him, he did not have to kick his heels all his life making locks or shoeing horses; though he did work for a time both as a locksmith and as a blacksmith. Instead, he was able to proceed via the German speaking Grammar Schools (Gymnasia) at Brno and Vienna - for there were no Grammar Schools where Czech was spoken in those days - to an academic career; beginning in the last-mentioned city of Vienna. In the early part of 1876 he crowned his studies in classical philology and philosophy under the tutorship of Th. Gompertz, F. Brentano and R. Zimmermann (to mention but the most distinguished of them) with a dissertation on the nature of the soul in Plato's philosophy (Das Wesen der Seele bei Plato). In the same year he moved on to Leipzig, where he followed several courses of lectures in different subjects including the lectures of Wundt 1. The following biographies have been used as sources: those by Capek, Herben, Ludwig, Nejedly and Rychnovsky (see bibliography). 2. 'Já sám jsern byl dëlnikem a citil jsem vzdy s vàmi a citim'. See, T.G. Masaryk, Cesta Demokratie. Soubor projevù za republiky I, 1918-1920. (Praha/Prague, 1934), p. 410.

10 A biographical Sketch (both a philosopher and a psychologist) and Luthardt (a theologian). He also struck up a friendship with his fellow countryman E.Husserl in Leipzig. And, much more important, he came to know Charlotte Garrigue: an American woman of Hugenot descent. It was she who used to exercise such an enormous influence both upon his intellectual and also especially upon his religious and spiritual development after their marriage in 1878. Masaryk, who had become progressively more and more alienated from the Roman Catholic Church since his years of adolescence, became more and more inclined towards Protestantism, the doctrine of Papal Infallibility having become unacceptable to him. He joined one of the Protestant churches in 1880 (of the Reformed type); though without ever having finally felt at home in it, for the scope for intellectual reflection was too restricted for a free and liberal thinker such as he. From 1879 on he was a lecturer (Privatdozent) in Vienna on the strength of his thesis (Habilitationsschrift) on the theme of suicide, after which he was named as Professor of Philosophy in 1882 at the new Czech University of Prague. As far as his academic terms of reference allowed, he began to blaze new trails by putting forward the claims of certain philosophers such as Hume and, above all, Comte, who had been almost totally neglected in Prague at that time. At the beginning of his academic career, Masaryk had been strongly influenced in his philosophical work by Comte. When he had been in Prague for only a few years, Masaryk made a reputation for himself far beyond the walls of the university by his dramatic intervention in the so-called 'manuscript controversy'. Together with several other learned colleagues, he had dared to challenge the authenticity of two manuscripts in the pages of the Athenaeum, a journal founded and edited by himself. Previously, these documents had been passed off as fragments of old Czech poetry. In fact, however, they were f orgeries dating from the first (romantic) period of the Czech nationalistic movement deliberately designed to demonstrate that there must have been a separate Czech culture - going back to the tenth century - alongside the old German culture. Masaryk and his colleagues were subsequently branded by the leading Czech newspapers as traitors to the national cause. In 1891 he was elected to a seat in the Vienna Parliament as a nationalliberal candidate (Young Czech). No more than two years later, however, he gave up his seat as the result of disagreements with his party. In this short period in Parliament he had already drawn attention to himself with his speeches in favour of the introduction of social security benefits, educational reforms, and - above all - the revision of the whole of the

A biographical Sketch

11

Austrian Commonwealth: i.e. aform of autonomy for the Bohemian Crown Lands within the Austrian Empire (Reich). He was very active in the business of publishing in the years which followed. He became not only the editor of a new journal for 'science, art and society', which built up a great reputation for itself over the years (not least for his own contributions to it), but also produced in addition a whole list of works which ranged from a comprehensive interpretation of Czech history to a critical appraisal of Marxism. In the last year of the previous century both his fidelity towards and his faith in his motto 'the truth prevails' were put to a test much severer than that of the 'manuscript controversy' which has already been mentioned. Whereas he had enjoyed the support of powerful protagonists in that particular cause célèbre, he stood virtually alone in 1899 when he criticised the course of justice in the case of a Jew who had been found guilty of a ritual murder and subsequently sentenced to death; the so called Polná trial. In this matter, the whole of public opinion, including the majority of his colleagues and his students, turned against him in a most unseemly manner. Not an inch did he budge, however, and in the year which followed he denounced superstitious anti-semitism in a special pamphlet. Masaryk was one of the founder members of a new political party in 1900. This was the so-called 'People's Party' which subsequently became the Czech Progressive Party after a merger in 1905; though it was generally called the 'Realist Party'. Its programme was not all that much different from that of the Social Democratic Party. Both before and after 1900, the influence of Masaryk on Czech social democracy was certainly far from inconsiderable. Indeed, the sympathy accruing to him from this particular quarter can be seen in the support which he obtained from the Social Democrats in the election campaign of 1907, to mention but one example. Despite the spirited opposition of the Roman Catholics, he was again returned to a seat in the Vienna Parliament. The opposition of the Roman Catholics resulted from criticisms which he had expressed in previous years against the clerical, conservative, anti-democratic and even antisemitic side of Austrian Catholicism. In 1907 he had to defend himself again before Parliament against the anti-semitic insinuations of the Roman Catholics: '... it is impossible for anyone whose religion is governed by Jesus to be an anti-semite'.3 3. ' Wer Jesum zu seinem Führer in der Religion hat kann kein Antisemit sein'. See E. Rychnovsky, Masaryk, (Prag/Prague, no details), p. 94.

12 A biographical Sketch During his second term in Parliament Masaryk again came into the lime-light with his critical speeches in which he continued to press hard for the reorganisation both of the Austrian state and of Austrian society; and also for freedom in education and academic work. By his criticism of the Austrian Minister of Foreign Affairs, Mr. Aehrenthal, he attracted attention to himself even in international circles. First, in 1908 in connexion with the annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina; and almost immediately afterwards, because of the role of that particular minister in the staging of an anti-Austrian plot which subsequently led to a treason trial against fifty-three Croats. Masaryk was able to stop the trial; thereby administering Aehrenthal a moral defeat in Parliament. Both in Parliament and in the country Masaryk did all in his power to divert Austria from a belligerent policy. His attitude towards the Austria of pre-war days was extremely critical and he persisted in saying that many profound changes were necessary; but that did not mean that he was disloyal. In the midst of all his political activities, Masaryk still found time to devote to other work of a more academic nature. In 1907 he made yet another lecture tour of the United States, speaking on such subjects as 'The Free Thought Movement and Socialism' and 'Religion and Human Society'. Without listing all his other publications, it should at least be mentioned that in 1913 two important volumes appeared from his hand; weighty both in quality and in quantity. They formed part of his great study project on Russian philosophy of history and religion. The outbreak of the First World War prevented not only the publication of the third volume of this Russian study, but also brought him into open conflict with the Austrian authorities. After long deliberation, he decided to sever his ties of allegiance with Austria and to strive for the independence of the Czechs and Slovaks. He went abroad to plead for the cause of the Czechs and the Slovaks in the lands of the 'Entente Cordiale' and also to prepare for independence. Both in his capacity as Professor of King's College, London, as the commander of several thousand Czech soldiers in Russia, for whom he was able to get a free passage through Siberia to Vladivostok, and above all as an adroit diplomat, he was able to work for the independence of Czechoslovakia. Whilst still in the United States of America, Masaryk was unanimously elected by the National Assembly in Prague on the 14th of November 1918 to the presidency of the new state. As a president of great moral and political authority, Masaryk did not hold himself aloof from the arena of politics. He let it be known, for example, that in their conflict with the left-wing Bolsheviks (in the party)

A biographical Sketch

13

his sympathies lay with the right wing Social Democrats. Even less did he allow any doubts to persist about his support for cooperation between the Germans, the Czechs and the Slovaks in the new republic. He was concerned above all with the maintenance of democracy. This meant more than merely playing party politics. The fact that Czechoslovakia was able to develop itself in Central Europe between the two world wars into an exemplary democracy is largely due to the person and the work of Masaryk over the years; both before as well as after independence. When he was 85 years old, Masaryk resigned from the presidency on grounds of ill health; and two years later, on the 14th of September, 1937, he died. He was mourned as the Father of the Fatherland.

Chapter 1

Norm and Fact. How are Norm and Fact, Morality and Religion Related in Masaryk's Thought?

1. Introduction In this first chapter, Masaryk's ethics are submitted to a structural examination. This is done by asking how norm (or, rather, the moral norm) is related to fact in his thought. This question is answered by splitting the main question into two parts. The first is this. Is the norm (or 'the good') already given in human nature so that it is possible in principle to discover it by means of psychological or biological investigation? Then the following question is asked. Is the good (the norm) already given in history or what we might call social reality? If so, can we know what the good is by means of historical or sociological investigation? As soon as these questions have been answered, the relationship between morality and religion will be discussed.

2. Norm and Human Nature To begin with the first question. Masaryk published in 1883 his German translation of David Hume's Enquiry Concerning the Principles of Morals. Hume, to whom Masaryk had devoted his inaugural lecture,1 and for whom he had a lifelong admiration, is considered by Masaryk in his 1. T.G. Masaryk, David Hume's Skepsis und die Wahrscheinlichkeitsrechnung. Ein Beitrag zur Geschichte der Logik und Philosophie, (Wien/Vienna, 1884). This speech was delivered in Czech and originally published under the title, Pocet pravdêpododobnosti a Humova skepse. Historicky úvod ν theorii indukce, (Praha/Prague, 1883). The influence of his tutor Brentano can be detected in this choice of subject. Cp. J. Tvrdy, 'Vlivy positivistické a Brentanovy na Masarykovy myälenky o dëjinâch filosofie', in, Masarykùv Sborník I, (Praha/Prague, 1925; cited as M.S.), pp. 22f. For the English translation of Czech and Dutch titles see the appended bibliography.

Norm and Fact 15 Foreword to be important because, among other things, Hume gives a classical example of the use of empirical method in ethics. Masaryk also agrees with the results of Hume's empirical enquiry. Including the view that the actual mainsprings of all human actions are to be found not in the powers of reason, but rather in the emotions.2 In the Index compiled by Masaryk himself, he gives the following words under the heading Moral: 'Wohlwollen — Sympathie = Menschlichkeit ist das Grundprincip der Moral; als solches fehlt sie keinem Menschen...'.3 (Benevolence = Sympathy = Humanity is the fundamental principle of morality; as such it is lacked by no man). Masaryk's ethics - if not Hume's - are certainly characterised by this. Because we find this particular notion time and time again in Masaryk's work. For example, in the study on Marxism written in 1899 he refers to the 'evident awareness of a binding sentiment of humanity'. 4 And in his First World War memoires he speaks of 'every man's innate sympathy for his neighbour'. 5 Masaryk based his conviction upon what psychology knows about human nature. That is, upon empirical data. He is convinced of the fact that ethical implications do indeed accrue from the data provided by the empirical sciences. If and when someone is convinced that human society as well as the whole of nature is dominated by a struggle such as Darwin depicted, then according to Masaryk both Nietzsche and his disciples must have been right after all.6 He calls it sophistry to assert that it is wrong to deduce on the basis of the biology (or natural history) of Darwin that the principle 'might is right' is morally acceptable.7 His campaign against Tolstoy's doctrine of pacifism is also characteristic. 'Neither morally nor, I think, psychologically, did Tolstoy recognize the distinction between aggressive violence andself-defence'. 8 Inareview of Kautsky's 2. T.G. Masaryk, Eine Untersuchung über die Principien der Moral von David Hume, (published in German with indexes provided by Prof. Dr. Thomas Garrigue Masaryk, Vienna/Wien, 1883), p. iv. 3. Ibid. p. 165. 4. Masaryk, Grundlagen, p. 437 (Social Question, p. 318). 5. T.G. Masaryk, The Making of a State. Memories and Observations, 1914-1918, (New York, 196Í»), p. 319. 6. T.G. Masaryk, Ideals of Humanity and How to Work, (London, 1938), p. 72. 7. Ibid. pp. 71f. 8. Masaryk, Making of a State, p. 72. The German edition is clearer: 'Tolstoj erkannte psychologisch und daher auch moralisch den Unterschied zwischen der Abwehr und der Gewalt des Angreifers nicht an.' Die Weltrevolution, Erinnerungen und Betrachtungen (Berlin 1925), p. 60; my italics. We come across the same line of argument elsewhere in his work. E.g. 'Tolstoy's judgement on war is incorrect; in fact his teaching of non-resistance is neither correct nor natural, The New Europe, (London, 1918), p. 62.

16 Norm and Fact ethics, he criticizes Marxism because, among other things, there is a deficiency in psychological perception. This could well indicate the fundamental phenomenon of sympathy.9 A faulty psychology means a faulty ethical system; because ethics depend upon psychology. Ethics are subordinate to psychology in Masaryk's classification of the sciences; just as depicted in his Versuch einer concreten Logik,10 The specific role assigned by him to ethics is that of instructing mankind about the feelings and ideas 'which determine man in his relation to the world and his fellow men. Ethics lay down the rules according to which man has to direct his will'. As such, ethics ought to draw upon the total resources of both the theoretical and the practical sciences. Because 'a right and balanced rule of life ought not to be based upon compartmentalized and faulty knowledge, but rather upon knowledge harmoniously unified; thus upon philosophy'. 12 The most essential sciences for ethics are theoretical psychology and sociology, to which ethics are directly connected in his scientific system as a practical science.13 From a formal point of view, ethics may have assumed a subordinate role in Masaryk's classification of the sciences. In practice, however, ethics meant more to him. Masaryk also gave lectures on practical philosophy in Prague; just as his old tutor Brentano used to do in Vienna. For Also in a review of Bertrand Russell's, Principles of Social Reconstruction, he argues that pacifism is at any price both an unnatural and a wrong view to take. See, 'Filosofie pacifismu', in M.S. Ill, (Praha/Prague, 1929), p. 151. 9. T.G. Masaryk, 'Neue Sittenlehre, Α. Mengers und Kautsky's Ethik', in, Zeitschrift für Sozialwissenschaft, IX (Berlin, 1906), p. 390. 10. T.G. Masaryk, Versuch einer concreten Logik. Classification und Organisation der Wissenschaften, (Vienna/Wien, 1887; cited as Versuch), pp. 14ff. Masaryk makes here a distinction between the theoretical and the practical sciences. The theoretical sciences are further divided into the abstract and the concrete. The practical sciences depend upon the theoretical. There are seven major scientific fields. Each of them is subdivided into the abstract, concrete (together forming the theoretical branch) and practical disciplines. The field of psychology and sociology, for example, which is one of the seven, is subdivided into abstract psychology and sociology (concerned with the laws and the nature of (individual) consciousness and society respectively), concrete (anthropology, ethnology, political science, economics and history), and practical (pedagogy, didactics, politics and ethics). 11. Ibid. pp. 232ff. 12. Ibid. p. 233. For Masaryk philosophy is, on the one hand, 'the universal science alongside the (special) sciences... (it is)... human omniscience... universal scientific Bildung... unified world view', ibid. pp. 272f. It is as scientia generalis metaphysics, cp. ibid. p. 14. On the other hand, for him philosophy is 'in every scientific discipline. All sciences are philosophical. The scientific philosopher is an expert in one or several disciplines', preferably, however, in psychology, ibid. pp. 273f. 13. See note 10 and cp. Versuch, p. 120: 'Ethics is mainly based on psychology'.

Norm and Fact

17

Masaryk, this was a kind of ethics based on sociology: the concrete application of philosophy in life and human society. The fact that Masaryk places ethics in such a central position should also be seen in connexion with his emphasis upon the unity of theory and practice. 14 None of this, however, distracts from the fact that for Masaryk ethics as a science does not have its own peculiar object. The good, the norm, is given with human nature. It is a psychological fact: the feeling of sympathy. It is a natural inclination. This inclination should not work wholly in the dark; it ought to be guided by the light of reason. 15 This is the task of science. On the other hand, one can find other passages in Masaryk's work which are not in agreement with this naturalistic approach. In his lectures on practical philosophy he argues that man's egoistic feelings and inclinations dominate his altruistic feelings. According to Masaryk, however, this is not an assertion that morality is to be based upon man's egoism. As far as he is concerned, it is emphatically a matter of ascertaining a psychological fact: that is, what man by nature is. This, however, still tells us nothing about ethics. 16 When he analyses Goethe's Faust, Masaryk notices that his ethical system is thoroughly naturalistic. Because man's natural and innate powers are morally good in Goethe's view.17 It is a critical point in Masaryk's exposé; though he does not elaborate his criticism in detail. Masaryk criticizes Engels'justification of the proletarian demand for equality. Masaryk considered his statement of historical facts 14. Ethics is the heart of philosophy for Masaryk as he says in an article on the place of sociology in the system of the sciences. (In this classification ethics is, by the way, no longer regarded as the practical side of psychology and sociology.) Had not philosophy since time immemorial received a powerful impulse from the necessities of man? See, 'Rukovët sociologie: podstata a methoda sociologie', in, Nase Doha, VIII (1901), p. 12. This is cited below as N.D. In Plato's work Masaryk values especially the fact that for him philosophy is something which is quite different from what one learns in school. He also appreciates that Plato connected theory and practice so closely with each other; if not actually identifying them. See, 'Plato jako vlastenec' in J. Dolezal, Masarykova cesta zivotem II, (Brno, 1921), p. 170. 15. According to Masaryk, however, man's feelings and inclinations are more powerful than his reason, Versuch, p. 7. Because of this, it is not man's reason that makes the decision about the goals of human action in the last resort but his feelings as Hume among others has stated. See op. cit. p. 230 and cp. Ideals of Humanity, pp. 88f. So also 50 years later: 'But the aim, the ideal, is not laid down by reason alone, but by feeling also. The means are dictated by reason.' See, K. Capek, President Masaryk Tells His Story : Recounted by Karel Capek. (London, 1934), p. 224. 16. Z. Nejedly, T.G. Masaryk III, (Praha/Prague, 1935), p. 213. Here, as elsewhere, there are traces of the influence of Comte in Masaryk's use of the terms altruism and altruistic. 17. T.G. Masaryk, Modern Man and Religion, (London, 1938), p. 285.

18 Norm and Fact to be inadequate; reference to the naturalness of the proletarian response to blatant social inequalities and a revolutionary instinct is also unsatisfactory. One argument is that he had but scant respect for instincts. And absolutely none at all for those which perhaps do not even exist. Should the revolutionary instinct justify the demand of the proletariat for equality, he objects, then the power instinct would also justify Napoleon's lust for power; and even that of the capitalists!18 Masaryk also attacks ethical naturalism in several passages in his work on Russian philosophy. He does not agree with Kropotkin who 'declares the moral sense to be a natural endowment, no less natural than the sense of taste or smell'; and according to whom 'the natural inclinations of human beings are sufficient to explain human actions'. 19 In a criticism of a review of a novel written by the Russian writer Ropsin, he defends the independence of ethics over against psychology. It is wrong to suppose that direct sensation, that human psychology rather than the moral norm (ethics) can teach us that we cannot kill our personal enemies.20 One gets the impression that Masaryk here regards ethics as the science concerned with the moral norm, with the categorical imperative, with ought rather than primarily with is.21 To summarize the answer to the first question: as far as the relationship between human nature and morality in Masaryk's thought is concerned, two distinct tendencies which are mutually incompatible need to be distinguished. They should not be reduced to two successive phases in the development of his thought. On the one hand, one can find a reduction of norms to facts in Masaryk's work. A reduction of ought to is. The good is both the object and the result of empirical enquiry. It is not a special object of a separate discipline called ethics. On the other hand, Masaryk defends both the irreducibility of the moral norm and the independence of ethics as an academic discipline from the other sciences.

18. Masaryk, Grundlagen, pp. 420f. (280f). 19. Masaryk, Spirit of Russia II, p. 383. The second quotation differs from the official English translation which mistranslates the German 'genügt zu erklären' (Russland und Europa II p. 359.) with 'serve to explain'. 20. Ibid. p. 461. 21. This reappraisal of ethics did not take place in isolation from the work of Kant. For Masaryk, who came from the school of Brentano, Kant was originally little more than one of the better philosophers and was overshadowed by Comte. In his Russian studies, Kant has become the philosopher par excellence. Cp. E. Ràdi, 'Masaryk und Kant', in, Festschrift II, pp. 153ff.

Norm and Fact 19 3. Norm and Social Reality (History) The second question which has been raised at the beginning of this chapter is the one concerning the relationship between (moral) norm - on the one hand - and social reality and history - on the other hand - in Masaryk's thought. Thus, we come back again to the relationship between fact and norm; though seen now from a different angle. It has already been noted that in his own particular classification of the various sciences, ethics - as one of the practical sciences - depends not only upon psychology but also upon sociology.22 Ethics is just as much a matter of applied psychology as applied sociology. At the level of abstract sociology, Masaryk follows Comte in distinguishing what he calls 'statics' and 'dynamics'. 23 The task of the former is 'to grasp the real nature of the social order (system) within the continuous change and development of all social factors'. 24 The latter 'asks after the universal laws according to which human society is developing'.25 Alongside this, there is also a concrete sociology whose task it is to depict the social systems of the past and the present in their particular nature and development.26 Historical science is also one of the many parts of this immense scientific field. Abstract sociology comes first, however. This means that a scholar who is working in the field of concrete sociology, i.e. historical science, must also be both complete and knowledgeable in the field of abstract sociology.27 As a science, history is future-oriented. It is becoming more and more the science of the future. 28 That is, what is now fashionably called Futureology. What then is the relationship between sociology (understood in this way and including historical science) and ethics? Masaryk states in no uncertain terms that true sociological knowledge results in such moral qualities as altruism and love for one's neighbour. It makes us 'patient 22. See above, p. 16. 23. For Masaryk's classification of the sciences see note 10 above. 24. Masaryk, Versuch, p. 139. 25. Ibid. pp. 153f. 26. Ibid. p. 154. 27. Ibid. p. 158. When Masaryk was occupied in the nineties with Czech history and was drawn into a conflict with the professional historians about the interpretation of it, one of their criticisms was 'that Masaryk's methodology is unsubstantiable because he subordinates it to sociological preconceptions, whereas the proper procedure would be the reverse.' See S. Harrison Thomson, 'T.G. Masaryk and Czech historiography', in, Journal of Central European Affairs, 10 (April, 1950), p. 49. Cp. Kamil Krofta, 'Masaryk und sein wissenschaftliches Werk', in, Festschrift II, p. 262. 28. Masaryk, Versuch, p. 186.

20

Norm and Fact

about the present and modest about our o w n performances; and fills us with respect for the past'. 2 9 History, as a branch of sociology, is life's guide {historia vitae magistra). By revealing the past to us it points us the way to the future. W h e n properly practiced, sociology leads to the reformation of society. When it is not practiced properly, sociology leads to disaffection and revolution. 3 0 Ethics - and also politics - is bound up with sociology. 3 1 G o o d actions accrue from a real knowledge of social and historical reality. Knowledge is virtue. N o r m s are deducible from facts; and right actions are based upon our knowledge o f reality. In Masaryk's description of the function of theoretical sociology, there is a remarkable resemblance not only to the work of Comte, but also to that of J. S. Mill. A n d even to that of Marx. 3 2 This resemblance to the work of Marx is all the more interesting for us because about a decade after the publication of his Versuch, Masaryk was fully occupied with Marxism and criticized it in n o uncertain terms. 3 3 One o f Masaryk's

29. Ibid. p. 186. 30. Ibid. pp. 186f. 31. 'Practical sociology is politics. It elaborates scientifically those norms which are needed for the purposeful, most harmonious and consistent guidance of society.' Masaryk, Versuch, p. 147. For Masaryk, politics is a kind of social ethics. That politics cannot be amoral is a matter of course for him. All human action - inasmuch as it is not irrelevant - should be moral. See, Grundlagen, p. 228 (212) and, Versuch, p. 149. That sociology includes ethics appears in his earlier writings. In them, he states for example, that there can be no sociology without ethics and that sociology should care for the wellbeing of society; but not for any one society in particular. That follows from the character of sociology as a science based on universal laws. See Dolezal, Masarykova cesta II, p. 165 (with reference to a passage in 'Plato jako vlastenec') and also p. 185 (with reference to 'Theorie a praxis'). In an address delivered in 1907 in the USA on the subject of religion and society, Masaryk states that man should observe the (unchangeable) order both in nature and in society and from it formulate rules to guide his behaviour. See, Americképrednásky, (Praha/Prague, 19292), p. 53. 32. K.R. Popper draws attention to the agreement between Marx and Mill in, The Open Society and its Enemies, Vol. II, The High Tide of Prophecy: Hegel, Marx, and the Aftermath, (London, 19695), p. 87. 'Thus when Marx says in the preface to Capital 'It is the ultimate aim of this work to lay bare... the law of modern society' he might be said to carry out Mill's programme: 'The fundamental problem... of the social science, is to find the law according to which any state of society produces the state which succeeds it and takes its place'.' 33. T. G. Masaryk, Die philosophischen undsociologischen Grundlagen des Marxismus. Studien zur socialen Frage, (Vienna/Wien, 1899; previously cited in full and referred to as Grundlagen). The Czech edition appeared in 1898. A second Czech edition based both on the first Czech and the more polished German edition appeared in 1936. It was partly destroyed by the Nazis during the war. A post-war reprint of this edition was subsequently destroyed by the Communists. It was one of the first philosophical studies on Marxism; based not only on the works of Marx which were then accessible -

Norm and Fact

21

criticisms of the teaching of Marx concerns his historicism. Though it is quite typical of Masaryk that he is not an opponent of historicism as such, but rather of an exaggerated form of it. Under this particular category he understood a sociology which neglects the 'statics' and puts all the emphasis upon the 'dynamics' (development). Over against an exaggerated form of historicism, Masaryk put forward what he called 'realism'. Things must first be known in their concrete being and only then in their development. 'First the study of things, then that of their development'.34 Masaryk also argued emphatically that there was no absolute antithesis between historicism and realism. Nothing exists without development. And there is no development without things. Masaryk did not condemn every form of historicism.35 This is shown by his recognition that history is governed by laws.36 And also by the fact that he maintained that it is possible to predict future events scientifically on the basis of the historical determination of their development as the conclusions of the premisses of the past. Historical science is Vitae Magistra precisely because it has predictive possibilities. Marx's attempt to predict the future scientifically earned him Masaryk's praise; and he deplored the fact that his epigones turned their backs more and more from this.37 In addition to the exaggerated form of historicism, Masaryk also attacked it whenever it appeared in a dialectical-materialistic and objectivistic guise. Historical causality is a complicated matter which cannot simply be reduced to the relations of production (Produktionsverhältnisse). In its totality, society develops under the influence of all kinds of forces.38 Masaryk labelled Marx's Masaryk also pleads in his Introduction for a critical edition of the works of the young Marx - and those of Engels, but also containing references to the writings of the first generation of Marxists: e.g. Kautsky, Bernstein, Cunow, Konrad Schmidt, Bebel, Liebknecht, Mehring, Vollmar, Plechanov, Bax, Morris, Lafargue, and Ferri. In all his criticism of Marxism, Masaryk is lavish with his acknowledgement 'that the philosophy of Marx and Engels is far richer in its contents than one was accustomed to admitting', op. cit. p. 87. 34. Ibid. p. 76 (85). The term 'realism' denotes for Masaryk more than a scientific method. It also denotes a political programme. See further below. 35. Ibid. p. 76 (85). In an essay entitled, 'Masaryk als Soziologe', in, Festschrift II, p. 350, Mykyta J. Schapowal shows us (rightly) that although Masaryk considered the 'statica' to be the more important, he was more concerned in his writings with the elaboration of the social 'dynamica'. 36. Masaryk, Grundlagen, pp. 207,218f. (192,203).Cp., Védaacirkev,(Praha/Prague, 1908), pp. 16f. 37. Masaryk, Grundlagen, pp. 220ff. (204ff). Cp. 131 (118). 38. Ibid. p. 150(140). The American sociologist F. Kolegar calls Masaryk's theory of social causality 'very modern'. See his article, 'T.G. Masaryk's contribution to

22 Norm and Fact form of historicism 'objectivistic'. Because this makes out human consciousness to be something secondary, to be merely an illusion. In Marxism, nature and society is primary and not man. Matter is primary and not mind. 39 In spite of the fact that he criticized certain specific aspects of Marx's historicism, Masaryk's own sociological theory is nevertheless still in agreement with K. R. Popper's definition of historicism. Popper understands historicism to be 'an approach to the social sciences which assumes that historical prediction is their principal aim and which assumes that this aim is attainable by discovering the 'rhythms' or the 'patterns', the 'laws' or the 'trends' that underlie the evolution of history.' 40 At a certain point, however, Masaryk turns his back completely upon historicism (Historismus).41 That is when he takes up the problem of ethics. Popper has listed the following characteristics of a historicist ethics: historical relativism and moral positivism. The first he understands to be the notion that moral judgements are historically contingent. The question of whether it is right to act in a certain way would not be enough. An adequate question, for example, would have to be this: 'Is it right, in the sense of fifteenth-century feudal morality, to act in this way? Or perhaps: Is it right in the sense of nineteenth-century proletarian morality to act in this way?' 42 In its Hegelian form, moral positivism teaches that there is no moral standard but the one which exists; that what is, is both reasonable and good; and that 'might is right'. The practical consequences of Hegel's version of ethical positivism is that it is quite impossible to sociology', in (Ed.) M. Rechcigl Jr., Czechoslovakia Past and Present II, (The Hague and Paris, 1968), p. 1532. 39. Masaryk, Grundlagen, p. 509(330). Cp. p. 117(103). See further below, pp. 90ff. 40. K.R. Popper, The Poverty of Historicism, (London, 1957), p. 3. 41. K. Heussi characterizes the term 'historism' (Historismus) as a label with many meanings which changes like a chameleon. It is used seemingly in the most different connotations.' See, Die Krisis des Historismus, (Tübingen, 1932), p. 1. The reason why Popper defines the term 'historicism' as given here is probably for the purpose of clarification whilst he understands 'historism' to be another approach to the social sciences which suggests the possibility 'of analysing and explaining the differences between the various sociological doctrines and schools by referring... to their connection with the predilections and interests prevailing in a particular historical period'. See, The Poverty of Historicism, p. 17. The meaning which Masaryk attributes to the word 'historism', however, is identical with Popper's definition of the word historicism. Furthermore, he also uses the term 'historicism', which he understands literally to be an exaggerated form of historism. 'Rukovët sociologie', p. 825. The term historicism is always used here. 42. Popper, Open Society II, p. 203.

Norm and Fact

23

criticize the existing state of affairs; because it is the status quo itself which determines its own moral standards. In its Marxist form, moral positivism teaches that there is no moral standard other than that which the future holds in store. Whatever will be, will be good. The might which is to come is right. Popper is quite correct when he argues that in their theoretical structure there is no real difference between Hegel's moral conservatism and Marx's ethical futurism. 43 A Marxist ethical positivist treats the question of right conduct as a scientific question, and not as a moral issue. It is simply a matter of scientific-historical prediction. Popper's criticism of Marxist ethics was anticipated by Masaryk who attacks the ethical positivism of Marx and Engels without recognizing any fundamental difference between Hegel and Marx. 'And so Marx and Engels became positivistic dogmatists of the revolution, just as Hegel became a positivistic dogmatist of the reaction - which is also a revolution'. 44 In other words, just as Hegel deduced from the existing state of affairs that reaction is reasonable (and therefore right), so also Marx and Engels deduced that revolution is right. According to Masaryk, however, one cannot deduce either from the way things are or from what they used to be what a moral being ought to do when aspiring to the good. So Masaryk immediately mounts a frontal attack upon ethical positivism in its historicist form with the words: 'And yet it should be clear that entities and concepts are not valid because they once existed any more than because they now exist. All progress and all human dissatisfaction - and precisely this 'holy restlessness' too - is a protest against the so-called logic of facts. Historicism is no more than a species of such 'hard' logic'.45 Neither the way things used to be nor the way things are indicate what is the moral good; or what a right act is. But what about the way things are going to be? What about the future? Masaryk begins to find himself in difficulties at this point. It has already been shown that he thought predicting the future in a scientific way - albeit on a limited scale - to be both possible and desirable on the basis of the fact that development - to a certain extent - is predetermined. But now he adds that science is unable to decide 'how I should act under given circumstances. Prediction is not yet action. Action is rooted in the will as well as in knowledge'.46 It is precisely at this point that Masaryk 43. 44. 45. 46.

Ibid. p. 206. Masaryk, Grundlagen, p. 66 (75). Ibid. p. 138 (125). Ibid. p. 226f. (211). Masaryk makes the distinction - still current in the psychology

24

Norm and Fact

m a k e s a non sequitur.

If the future can be d e d u c e d f r o m the premisses of

the past, then the willing subject m u s t himself be subsumed under the premisses. In w h i c h case it is quite inadmissible to leave out the willing subject at a n arbitrarily c h o s e n m o m e n t . A s Masaryk himself says: Ί t o o , with m y consciousness and conscience, a m history !' 47 A c c o r d i n g t o him, a h u m a n being, qua h u m a n being, is indeed determined. N o t simply because 'he is history', but also because he h a s b o t h c o n s c i o u s n e s s a n d a conscience. T h e science o f consciousness is psychology; and p s y c h o l o g y instructs u s a b o u t the laws w h i c h govern psychological p h e n o m e n a . 4 8 Masaryk says quite explicitly that empirical p s y c h o l o g y demonstrates that h u m a n volition is determined. 4 9 Y e t Masaryk still maintains the difference between a scientific prediction a n d a social ideal. T h a t is, between w h a t shall be a n d w h a t o u g h t t o be; between ethics a n d the other sciences, notably s o c i o l o g y a n d history. A s Masaryk puts it, w e c a n n o t derive a decision as t o h o w w e o u g h t t o act f r o m history; a n d it all c o m e s d o w n to this in the e n d . 5 0 But he never m a n a g e d to find a proper theoretical basis for this distinction. 5 1

of his time - between acts of cognition, affectivity and conation. 'Reason (including the perceptions, ideas, judgements, and other acts), (manifold) feelings, and willing (from various aspirations and so-called blind instincts all the way to entirely conscious willing) are the ultimate, central psychic factors, and so also social factors.' See, Grundlagen, p. 156 (147). For Masaryk's methodological individualism see Chapter 4, note 82, below. 47. Ibid. p. 227(211). 48. Masaryk, Versuch, p. 117. 49. Masaryk, Grundlagen, p. 234(217). 50. Ibid. p. 555. Kohák's English translation is mistaken at this point (p. 354). 51. Masaryk rejects Kant's solution to the problem of determinism and free will. He calls it a 'strange duality' ('merkwürdige Doppelseitigkeit'). He calls his own standpoint 'theistic determinism'. He distinguishes this sharply from every form of fatalism, ibid. p. 234(218). He speaks copiously about this in his conversations with Capek: 'the freedom and predestination of man is given by his relation to God, omnipotent, and omniscient, knowing the past and the future, determining this future. Man is after the divine image... from this follows for man a conscious synergism, collaboration with the divine will. In acquiring knowledge of Nature, and of man, in revealing the natural laws, spiritual and historical, in accepting and fulfilling those laws we participate in the divine creation and direction of the world. God lets us do his work, He wants us to work, and so collaboration. Every co-operation, among men too, includes freedom and subjection, initiative and constraint. Synergism with the divine will gives man his measure of freedom and of determinism; the stronger and the more conscious he is, the more of both.' See, K. Capek, Masaryk on Thought and Life: Conversations with Karel Capek, (London, 1938), pp. 74f. In this formulation of his own position, Masaryk has not resolved the problem, but rather formulated it anew in metaphysical terms. Finally, for Masaryk freedom is more or less insight into necessity :

Norm and Fact

25

Whenever Masaryk is dealing with Marxism, he takes up the cudgels against ethical positivism in its historicist version. In a criticism of Kautsky's ethics, he emphasizes that duty, the categorical imperative, (or the moral norm) cannot be reduced to historically or socially given facts. 52 His great three volume work on Russian philosophy includes a frontal attack upon historicism in his criticism of the concept of 'historical process'. 'What is the "historical process"? Is there any such process, over and above the individual consciousness of particular individuals, who continually, and amid varying conditions, have severally to face the ethical problems of life?' And a few lines further on one can read: 'Characteristic of the superficiality of historicism and its objectivist amoralism is the continued evasion of the question of personal decision, of personal responsibility for action...' 53 As far as Masaryk is concerned, history is amoral·, that is, morally neutral. Socialism can have either a moral or a historical (amoral) basis. (Moral and historical being alternatives here.) The choice for or against Socialism is, for Masaryk, a moral question. 54 In his criticism of Marxist ethical positivism, Masaryk states quite clearly that empirical reality, neither as it was in the past, nor as it is in the present, nor even as it will be in the future, can provide an answer to the question of the right and the good. There are fundamental objections to reducing ethics to history and sociology. There are, nevertheless, still traces of ethical positivism in its historicist form in Masaryk's thought. When Masaryk is not engaged in polemics with the Marxists, and when he is speaking his own mind positively, neither history nor social reality are amoral (morally neutral). We have been able to establish that in his interpretation of sociology ethics are dependent upon sociology. In one of his earlier publications, in which he deals with the notion of progress, he says that it is only possible for Ά man has only as much reasonable freedom, as much determinism as he can understand in himself and in the order of the world.' Capek, op. cit. p. 76. Masaryk also likes to cite (e.g. in, The New Europe, p. 46) the epigram of Cleanthes: 'volentem ducunt fata, nolentem trahunt'. In the matter of determinism and free will, there is an affinity with Brentano. He also argued in favour of a form of determinism and also explicitly differentiated between this and fatalism. See F. Brentano, Grundlegung und Aufbau der Ethik. Nach den Vorlesungen über 'Praktische Philosophie' aus dem Nachlass herausgegeben von Franziska Mayer-Hillebrand, (Bern, 1952), pp. 261ff. 52. Masaryk, 'Neue Sittenlehre', p. 390. 53. Masaryk, Spirit of Russia, II. p. 460. 54. Ibid. p. 323. Masaryk also states with satisfaction that Marx did not succeed in keeping his system amoral. See, Grundlagen, p. 118(104). We return to this problem in Chapter 4, in which Masaryk's criticism of Marx is discussed in detail.

26 Norm and Fact science - and here he is thinking primarily about sociology - to find out the real goal of progress. That is, the good. 55 Elsewhere Masaryk speaks about a providential plan in history which both historians and philosophers should try to lay bare. 56 This plan is bound up with the realization of the ideal of humanity. And in this, in addition, lies the meaning of Czech history. 57 Masaryk also remonstrates with the Russians that it is necessary to formulate their own ideals on the basis of their knowledge of the Russian people and their history.58 He says that his own 'humanitarian' programme, his own principles and aims, have all evolved out of Czech history.59 After setting out Masaryk's criticism of ethical positivism in its Marxist form, thereby demonstrating that Masaryk himself did not entirely escape from this particular form of historicism, it only remains to discuss his arguments against yet another aspect of Marxist ethics, namely historical relativism. This is yet another characteristic feature of historicist ethics. Ethical relativism can be attacked in two different ways. One can try to show that the fundamental conceptions of good and evil do not really differ from place to place and from time to time. The other possibility is to try to show that two mutually contradictory moral judgements on the same subject - e.g. Mr. A says Ά is good' whilst Mr. B. says Ά is not good' - cannot both be equally true or both equally valid. Masaryk employs the first method and appeals to the empirical world. According to him, experience shows that despite the fact that at 55. T. Masaryk, Ό pokroku, vyvoji a osvëtë', in, J. Dolezal, Masarykova cesta II, pp. 214 and 217. Masaryk is quite convinced of historical progress. This is shown not only by this writing, in which he emphasizes progress in science and makes reservations about the ethical, religious, artistic and social field, but throughout the whole of his work. Cp. Grundlagen, pp. 218f. (202f.); Ideals of Humanity, p. 75; and Spirit of Russia III, p. 154. 56. Ί believe with Kollár that the history of nations is not accidental, but that in it a specific plan of Providence reveals itself, and that it is thus the task of historians and philosophers, the task of each nation, to fathom out this plan, to recognize one's place in it, to determine one's place in it, and to act to the best of one's knowledge; also in political activity'. See Masaryk's Preface to the first impression of, Ceskd Otázka, (1895) printed in the sixth edition (1948) in which Ceskd Otázka, together with, Nase Nynëjsi Krise (which appeared in 1896) are printed (title: Ceskd Otdzka-Nase Nynêjsi Krise, Praha/Prague, 1948), p. 3. Cited below as C.O.-N.N.K. 57. This is the thesis of Masaryk's, Ceskd Otdzka, the last chapter of which bears the title 'Humanity, the national and historical meaning of our National Revival' ('Humanita naäeho obrozenl smysl národní a historicky'). We return to this point in subsequent chapters. 58. Masaryk, Spirit of Russia II, p. 562. 59. Masaryk, Making of a State, p. 421.

Norm and Fact

27

different times and a m o n g different people, classes and groups, people have entertained different moral beliefs, there has still been unanimity in respect to the fundamental moral norm. He speaks of 'a positive fact - the evident awareness of a binding sentiment of humanity'. 6 0 Masaryk states that the ideal of humanity develops and is formulated in different ways. But this does not alter the fact that everyone, everywhere, still retains both mankind and humanity as the ethical and social ideal. 6 1 It is quite understandable that in his polemics with Marx and Engels, Masaryk appeals to the evidence of history and psychology. That is, to the empirical world. But this makes him somewhat vulnerable to criticism. There was indeed a period during which cultural and ethical relativism (the latter being closely related to the former) used to have the upper hand in the field of cultural anthropology. But the fact that this particular emphasis is n o w receding still does not say anything about the truth and validity of moral norms. 6 2 The same also goes for Masaryk's norm: humanity. By appealing to the evidence of the empirical world, Masaryk is still not able to demolish the fundamental principles of historical relativism as set out by Marx and Engels. 6 3 60. Masaryk, Grundlagen, p. 487(318). 61. Ibid. p. 492(324); cp. Ideals of Humanity, p. 28. 62. See J. Tennekes, Het cultuurrelativisme in de Amerikaanse culturele anthropologie, (Cultural Relativism in American Cultural Anthropology), Dissertation, Utrecht, 1970, p. 106. 'Particularly on a more fundamental and abstract level we can find universale in human thought and action, even in ethical norms.' P. F. Strawson offers an acceptable explanation for this fact. Ί have remarked already that, because certain human needs and interests are as fundamental and as general as they are, we shall find correspondingly general types of virtue and obligation acknowledged in some form and in some degree in almost any conceivable moral system.' P. F. Strawson, 'Social Morality and Individual Ideal', in, (Eds.) G. Wallace and A.D. M. Walker, The Definition of Morality, (London, 1970), p. 113. 63. In another context, namely in a discussion with the sociologist Funck-Brentano, Masaryk does not refer to empirical data for the absoluteness of moral norms, but puts himself on the side of those moralists who declare that the good is sui generis and who thus strive to find an absolute norm (good and evil). See, 'Zákony osvëty a budoucnost slovanstva (La civilisation et ses lois, Morale sociale p. Th. Funck-Brentano, Paris, 1896)' in, M.S.I, (Praha/Prague, 1925), p. 42. Brentano indicated in 1876 in a lecture on practical philosophy which, according to Nejedly, Masaryk also followed (see Z. Nejedly, T.G. Masaryk 1,1 (Praha/Prague, 1931), p. 312), that the universality of a moral law or moral sentiment by no means makes this particular law or sentiment universally valid. According to Brentano, there is an analogy between a value judgement and a statement of fact, Brentano, Grundlegung und Aufbau der Ethik, p. 70, cp. p. 146: 'We call something good because of the fact that the love which is directed to that something is characterized by its lightness. In the same way as we call an object something which has being if the knowledge of it is directly or indirectly evident.' ('Wir nennen etwas gut mit Rücksicht darauf, dass das darauf gerichtete Lieben als richtig

28

Norm and Fact

The result of our investigation into the relationship between the moral norm and history (or social reality) in Masaryk's ethical system does not differ fundamentally from that which has been discovered about the relationship between the norm and human nature. Here, the conclusion is also two-sided. On the one hand, the moral norm is a historical or social fact. Norms and values are both to be deduced from the historicalsocial reality. What they are can be discovered by means of scientific research. In other words, the right and the good are the products of a precise knowledge of the way things are in the real world. On the other hand, Masaryk also argues that there is a fundamental difference between norm and fact; especially in his anti-marxistic polemic. In this case, the question of how we should act (morally) cannot be answered by an appeal to the facts; at any rate not by an appeal to historical facts.

4. First Conclusion To summarize the answer given to both the questions posed at the beginning of this chapter, we should conclude that Masaryk's ethical system labours under an inner contradiction. On the one hand, he is a positivist (or naturalist) inasmuch as he deduces norms from facts. On the other hand, however, he is an anti-positivist (anti-naturalist) inasmuch as he recognises a categorical difference between norms and facts. 64 But it is not without significance that, especially when he wears his 'critic's hat', Masaryk argues in a non-positivistic - and often even in an anti-positivistic (anti-naturalistic) - vein. Whenever he is confronted with positivistic (naturalistic) arguments which are in conflict with his own personal beliefs, he rejects them. But when he sets out his own position, he reverts more or less inadvertently to the same kind of positivism (naturalism) that he attacks in others; albeit in forms differing from his own. Masaryk's fundamental moral norm humanity was so self-evident to him that both human nature and the ongoing process of history - in a manner of speaking - could not but confirm it. But in principle his basic norm did charakterisiert ist. Analog wie wir einen Gegenstand seiend nennen wenn das darauf gerichtete Anerkennen unmittelbar oder mittelbar evident ist.') Although Masaryk also uses the term evident, the meaning of it differs from its usage in Brentano's work. Masaryk took a different line here from that of Brentano. 64. E.g. in his criticism of Marx and Marxism, in his criticism of Russian philosophy of history, in his criticism of Goethe as set out above.

Norm and Fact 29 not have to be 'verified' (justified) by the facts. 63 For Masaryk, neither the foundation of morality nor its justification is ultimately to be found in the facts of the empirical world; but rather in itself. Or, perhaps, in religion. 5. Morality and Religion We arrive at this point at the relationship between morality and religion. In this connexion it is necessary to take up more fully the question of Masaryk's philosophy of religion. Religion was a matter of supreme importance both in his life and in his thought. Even a cursory glance at Masaryk's academic work shows that as a philosopher he was also very much concerned with religion. His Habilitationsschrift dealing with the problem of suicide has as its basic thesis that the problem of suicide in the modern world is ultimately brought about by man's lack of religion.66 The first lecture in which Masaryk presented himself to the Czech public outside the university was about the life and philosophy of Pascal.67 He chose this particular subject because the indifference to religion which then obtained in the broad strata of the liberal Czech intelligentzia had already come to his attention. 68 For the whole of his life he was preoccupied with the problem of religious indifference.69 According to him, the religious question was vitally important for a nation which had lived through both the Reformation and the Counter-Reformation. 70 In his great work on Russian thought in the nineteenth Century, including the posthumous third volume which appeared in 1967, Masaryk set out to work primarily from an ethical-religious point of view. One could also refer here to his study on Karl Marx and Marxism, to his war memoires 65. In his, Jan Hus, Masaryk also says that going back to the past again, getting back again to the ideas of the Reformation, should not be uncritical. He both accepts and defends the Reformation period because, according to him, it is right and good for us all. Moral, humanitarian effort is needed in order to defeat eclectic, historical empiricism. See, Jan Hus. Nase obrozenía nase reformace, (Praha/Prague, 19233), pp. 47f. 66. T.G. Masaryk, Sebevrazda, hromadnym jevem spolecertskym moderni osvëty, (Praha/Prague, 19304), pp. 92 & 249. German: Der Selbstmord als sociale Massenerscheinung der modernen Civilisation, (Wien/Vienna, 18811). 67. T.G. Masaryk, Blaise Pascal, jeho zivot a filosofie, (Praha/Prague, 1883). 68. See, T.G. Masaryk, Intelligence a nábozenstvi. Nábozenská diskusse ν Krdlovéhradeckém Albertinu, (Praha/Prague, 1907), p. 139. Jan Hus, pp. 12ff. and 81ff. Cp. Jan Herben, T.G. Masaryk, (Praha/Prague, 19465), p . 26. 69. See Masaryk, Spirit of Russia, III, p. 143 and Capek, President Masaryk Tells His Story, p. 211. 70. Masaryk, C.O.-N.N.K., p. 191.

30 Norm and Fact and to the other publications in which he deals directly with religion.71 In particular, what does Masaryk have to say about the way in which religion is related to morality? The distinction which he makes between revealed and non-revealed (or natural) religion is, in the first place, of fundamental importance. And also the parallel distinctions between (blind) faith and justified belief;72 between authority and the free use of one's reason; 73 and between theology and science (or philosophy). Masaryk maintained these distinctions throughout the whole of his life. Though he did qualify the contrast between theology and science somewhat at a later date. When understood as a critical science of religion, theology does have a 'scientific' status. 74 Between dogmatic theology, however, which takes revelation (or myth) as its source of knowledge, and science, which takes experience as its foundation, there still remains a fundamental difference which cannot be reconciled. In 1887 Masaryk wrote: 'Whilst theology takes revelation to be its source of knowledge, science puts its trust in experience and explanation in the light of reason'. 75 Some twenty years later, in one of his speeches in the Vienna Parliament, he said that science is built upon the basis of sense experience, on the natural gifts of reason, feeling and will. In the theology of the church, however, one begins with revelation; either in the realm of theory or in the realm of practice. By the latter he means the miraculous as 'des Glaubens liebstes Kind'.76 Another twenty years or so later, Capek took down these words of his: 'philosophy is the organ of science, of the scientific, critical spirit, theology is the organ of myth and of the mythical 71. E.g. T.G. Masaryk, V boji o nábozenstvi, (Praha/Prague, 19473; 19040; Idem, Intelligence a nábozenstvi; Idem, Modern Man and Religion. 72. See T.G. Masaryk, Vëda a cirkev. Clrkevnë politicky vyznam Wahrmundovy affairy, (Praha/Prague, 1908), p. 17. Americké prednásky, pp. 52 & 86. 73. We can find a characteristic expression in Masaryk's lecture on Pascal, in which he says that he saw Pascal's exalted spirit continually tossed too and fro between the demands of reason and respect for tradition, between scientific criticism and authoritarian faith. T.G. Masaryk, Velici muzové. Vybral V.K. § krach, (Praha/Prague, 1926), p. 36. 74. See, Ceská Mysl II, (1901), pp. Iff., cited by J.B. Kozák, 'Masaryk a metafysika', in, M.S.Y, (Praha/Prague, 1930/1), p. 141. In his arguments he appeals on more than one occasion to theologians of the historical-critical school, such as Jülicher, Wernle, Weiss and also Harnack. See, Vëda a cirkev, pp. llff. and '¿ivot cirkevní a nábozensky roku 1904', in, N.D., XII (1905), p. 518. O. Funda is mistaken when he asserts that, in contrast to what one might have expected, Masaryk did not speak positively about this historical-critical theology. See O. Funda, T.G. Masaryk. Sein religiöses und philosophisches Denken, p. 102. 75. Masaryk, Versuch, p. 276. 76. Rychnovsky, Masaryk, p. 119.

Norm and Fact

31

spirit.' 77 Masaryk presses this distinction so much that it seems to coincide with the difference between truth and falsehood (or self-deception). 7 8 Back again to the distinction between revealed and non-revealed religion. Masaryk rejects the former unconditionally; because he links together revelation and blind faith, authority and theology. In this way, revelation and church, revealed religion and 'organized religion' belong together. Masaryk rejects the latter as firmly as he does the former. 7 9 In the process of historical development from theocracy (or aristocracy) to democracy, both church and revelation, organized religion and revealed religion, all belong to the old dispensation. This is to be rejected. 8 0 The new era demands a new and higher form of religion divorced from the churches. Masaryk was, therefore, the champion of a non-church, nonrevealed, yet still genuinely spiritual and genuinely moral religion. 8 1 His criticism of official 'churchy' religion is not only determined by his theory of knowledge and his philosophy of history, but also (and above all) by his ethics. 8 2 The church in general and the R o m a n Catholic Church in 77. Capek, Masaryk on Thought and Life, p. 127. This tallies almost literally with what Masaryk himself says in, Versuch, p. 286. Here, he deals more extensively with the relation between myth (or theology) and science (or philosophy); and yet again in later publications such as, for example, Americképrednásky, pp. 41ff. and, Spirit of Russia, II, pp. 468. It is scarcely necessary here to indicate Masaryk's indebtedness to Comte. For the relation between Masaryk and Comte cp. V. K. Skrach, 'Masaryk et le positivisme français', in, Festschrift II, pp. 7-36. The relation between myth (or theology) and science (or philosophy) in Masaryk's thought will be dealt with in more detail in Chapter 5. 78. E.g. we can read: 'and nowadays we constantly have the progressive theologians who distinguish, interpret, allegorise, symbolise and so forth. They wish us to cling to the untenable and have us believe that falsehood is actually the truth.' See Masaryk, Spirit of Russia III, p. 84. He makes a similar statement in, Americké prednásky, p. 43, that, when referring to the unity of the truth, either theology or philosophy has the truth. 79. When he takes up the cudgels against the principles of church and revelation, ecclesiastical and revealed religion, Masaryk has the Roman Catholic Church chiefly in his mind. But he is not unmindful also of the Russian Orthodox Church and sometimes even of ecclesiastically organized protestantism. 80. 'Revealed religion is of necessity a religious and priestly aristocracy; and as such it is the foundation and the prototype of socio-political aristocracy.' See Masaryk, Spirit of Russia II, p. 497. Cp. Americké prednásky, p. 51. 81. Masaryk, Americké prednásky, p. 55. In his criticism of organized religion (i.e. the church), Masaryk also gladly adduces that Jesus did not found a church. Ibid. p. 46. He does not deny, however, that the church, in particular the protestant churches, has been important in the past for man's spiritual and moral development. See, for example, Versuch, p. 297 and, V boji o nábozenstvi. pp. 24f. This is a typical notion of the Enlightenment. Cp. J. Sperna Weiland, 'Kant en de strijd der faculteiten' in M. A. Beek and others, Spelregels, (Amsterdam, 1967), p. 130. 82. The ethical element in epistemology and the philosophy of history is' also in

32

Norm and Fact

particular are condemned by him for making such a great distinction between religion and morality. 83 'We regard the moral imperatives so highly that we evaluate every religion precisely from a moral point of view', said Masaryk in the speech before Parliament to which reference has just been made. 84 Here, Masaryk states clearly that it is morality which is primary. He is no less clear on this particular point in his great study on Dostoevsky in which he reproaches the Christian churches - and in particular the Russian Orthodox Church - because they regard morality as subordinate to matters of faith and ritual. 'Morality implies obedience to revealed commandments: it is not to be justified with reference to a natural moral law based upon entirely independent principles.' 85 If we accept morality as an emanation from God, then it follows from this that any doubts about the existence of God must ultimately lead to Ivan Karamazov's principle that everything is permissible. True, Dostoevsky challenges this last assertion. But according to Masaryk he does this with invalid arguments. He preaches that man should submit himself to an external authority without reserve. What he lacked was firm moral principles and a categorical imperative. 86 When Masaryk judged institutionalized forms of religion, he applied moral standards. Our conclusion, therefore, can be that for him this particular, institutionalized form of religion is subordinate to morality. 87 What then is the relationship between morality and that form of religion which Masaryk himself favours? What Masaryk understands by religion should first be examined more closely. When he received his honorary Doctorate in Theology in 1923, Masaryk said in his vote of thanks that, despite much reflection, he was still unable to get the problem of religion straight in his mind. He had failed to consolidate his thoughts into onesystematic whole. 88 In fact, Masaryk's criticism of institutionalized religion is clearer than his exposition of what he himself positively no way lacking. As far as epistemology is concerned, this can be seen very clearly indeed in Masaryk's discussion on Hume, Kant and Comte in, Modem Man and Religion. In the case of philosophy of history, Masaryk's ethical critique of historicism has already been explained. 83. See Masaryk's, Intelligence a nábozenství, p. 102 and, V boji o nábozenství, p. 10. 84. Masaryk, Vëda a cirkev, p. 24. 85. Masaryk, Spirit of Russia III, p. 67. 86. Ibid. pp. 67 & 70. 87. See for example his statement: 'My quarrel with the Church was also a matter of morals.' See, Capek, President Masaryk Tells his Story, p. 210. 88. T.G. Masaryk, 'Ree pri promoci na doktora Husovy bohoslovecké fakulty evangelické', in, M.S. II, (Praha/Prague, 1927), p. 90.

Norm and Fact

33

understands by it. Even his study of modern man and his religion still leaves us groping mostly in the dark. 8 9 The most substantial passage to be found in Masaryk's work is in V boji o náboienství, where he defines religion as living sub specie aetemitatis. It is our awareness that we have a relation t o the world. It is the meaning of life. It is truthfulness itself. Religion is both the central and the guiding spiritual power. It is devotion to a new life, to newer and yet higher values for living. It is the solution to the problem posed by eternity. It is not just a theoretical solution to this question, but also a practical one. Because it is necessary for man to experience the problem of eternity. 9 0 These and similar thoughts can also be found in other parts of Masaryk's writings. 9 1 T w o cardinal points now require attention. First, the predominant role of morality in Masaryk's conception of religion. In Masaryk's thought, religion manifests itself mainly as morality. A b o v e all, religion is the higher morality. 9 2 His appreciation of the historical Jesus and the spiritual leaders of the Czech Reformation such as Hus, Chelcicky and Comenius is based upon this. Masaryk calls Jesus both his teacher and his leader. 9 3 The religion which Masaryk attributed to Jesus bore a striking 89. Masaryk does not say very much more here with a positive bearing upon religion than that religion is the basic content of man's spiritual life; it is as necessary for life as the air he breathes, Modern Man and Religion, p. 56. 90. Masaryk, V boji o nábozenstvi, p. 22. 91. In, Americké prednásky, Masaryk says that religion makes a man conscious of his relation to the world and his fellow men; that in religion man comes face to face with the riddle of eternity, the hub of religion. Religion is a lived out relationship, deeply felt, possessed by each and every man to what is called God or to the whole world. Religion is practice, not theory, op. cit. pp. 40 & 62. In his conversations with Capek he said : 'This natural religion, it'is'just that through our own reason and abilities we become conscious of the world and of our relation to it ...A thinking man simply desires and must make clear for himself: what the world, is, who made it, what is God, what we ourselves are, what we are aiming for, what death is; in the very end all these questions concentrate into one: What, who am I really?' See Capek, Masaryk on Thought and Life, p. 153f. In the last quotation, religion is linked with human thinking; but in, Americké prednásky, it is linked with human feeling. From the point of view of psychology, religion is grounded in human feeling according to Masaryk. In this he agrees with Schleiermacher. See, Versuch, pp. 275ff. Masaryk, however, was more and more convinced that the religious feeling, like the moral sentiment (see below, p. 17), must be guided and developed by reason in order to obviate the danger of irrational mysticism. See, Véda a cirkev, pp. 19f. Hence his later criticism of Schleiermacher, who would have 'reduced' religion to the realm of feeling, V boji o nábozenstvi, p. 23. 92. Ibid. p. 27. One point in Masaryk's criticism of Dostoevsky is that he does not see that for the protestants, with whom Masaryk identifies himself here, the real basis of religion is the ethical. See, Spirit of Russia III, p. 51. 93. T.G. Masaryk, Za svobodusvëdomiauceni, (Praha/Prague, 1908),p. 41 ; cp. p. 44. For Masaryk, however, Jesus is not entirely immune from criticism. 'In science, art and

34 Norm and Fact similarity to his own. 'Jesus' religion reveals itself in morality and humanity; it is humanitarianism sub specie aeternitatis',94 In a debate with an orthodox protestant clergyman who was making difficulties about liberal methods of biblical criticism, Masaryk wonders if it is really so necessary either for the good of religion or for the eternal salvation of the soul to believe that Moses wrote the Pentateuch. According to Masaryk, religion and 'eternity' do not depend upon Moses. Nor yet upon belief in the divinity of Jesus Christ. 95 The second of these two cardinal points is the emphasis which Masaryk lays upon the significance of eternal life, eternity and the immortal soul in connexion with his doctrine of God. Man is a being who lives between birth and death. He is confronted by an eternity which overwhelms him. It seems to relativize everything. Theoretically, religion solves the problem of relativism by an appeal to the doctrine of the immortal soul. And practically by the application of the principle: Love thy neighbour. Because one eternal soul cannot be indifferent to another. God and eternity (immortality) are Masaryk's specifically religious categories. God should not be understood in anthropomorphic or sociomorphic terms. If and when God is understood as 'spirit', he answers to our need for moral improvement and perfecting.96 According to Masaryk, modern man has a higher conception of God than his ancestors. He knows that God has given him powers of perception and therewith both knowledge and foreknowledge. This is why he anticipates no more miracles. But he is firmly resolved to cooperate with God in the development of mankind and of the universe.97 It looks here as if Masaryk's doctrine of God has been subordinated to the notion of man as an ethically living and an ethically striving being. This subordination becomes even clearer when Masaryk states that belief in God is a secondary consideration compared to hope in everlasting life. The most important mainspring driving man's ethical development is his longing for eternity. It is the hope of immortality which fortifies his spiritual existence.98 In a speech dating from 1920, politics Christ cannot be our sole teacher, nor ought even his religious teaching be accepted entirely uncritically'. See, Spirit of Russia, III, p. 181. Cp. Vol. II p. 498. 94. Capek, Masaryk on Thought and Life, p. 142. 95. Masaryk, *2ivot církevní a nábozensky roku 1904', p. 521. 96. Masaryk, V boji o nábozenstvi, p. 32. 97. Ibid. p. 32. Hromádka rightly remarks that Masaryk replaces one particular notion of God (anthropomorphic) for another (synergistic). See J.L. Hromádka, Masaryk, (Praha/Prague, 1930), p. 152. 98. Ibid. p. 32.

Norm and Fact

35

in which religion is directly linked with the eternity sentiment, he says that this particular feeling makes us modest and strengthens our moral responsibility."

6. Second

Conclusion

In answering the question which has just been posed aboutthe relationship between morality and the kind of religion Masaryk advocates, in which the notion of eternity and immortality is more important than the idea of G o d , 1 0 0 we are inclined to answer that inasmuch as religion is not reduced to ethics, the former adds an extra dimension to the latter. Belief in G o d and eternity (or immortality) promote the moral life and add extra power to it. 1 0 1 Religion plays a secondary role to morality in Masaryk's thought.

99. T.G. Masaryk, Programpresidentüv, Usporádal Prokop Maxa, (Praha/Prague, 1930), p. 74. 100. God's existence is no postulate of practical reason for Masaryk as it is in the work of Kant. The existence of God - or better, theism - is theoretically and scientifically a hypothesis. See, Velici muzové, p. 37; Am. prednáíky, p. 64; and Capek, Masaryk on Thought and Life, pp. 66 & 80. It is odd that Masaryk, in his conversations with Capek, adduces the teleological and cosmological proofs for the existence of God only to speak again later of a hypothesis, 'which according to the demand of logic is simpler, and therefore more justifiable than other hypotheses such as materialism...' Op. cit. pp. 62 & 66. In itself, theism is not religion, op. cit. p. 80. Masaryk also quotes James 2.19 ('the devils also believe, and tremble') in a review on Dostoevsky, with whom he is in agreement that mere belief in God still does not constitute true religion. See, Spirit of Russia, III, p. 22. Masaryk's God (Providence) can be replaced as a religious term without difficulty by the feeling for eternity. Of this, it is also said that we can understand the development and perfecting of the world and society through it. See, Program presidentùv, p. 74. As to the immortality of the soul, we do find traces of the idea of a postulate: 'can pure, complete love of one's neighbour exist without the highest appreciation of the human personality, without faith in the immortality of the human soul?' See Capek, op. cit., p. 150f. The connexion between love of one's neighbour and the immortality of the soul was also found by Masaryk in the works of Buckle and Byron; as appears in a letter to his friend Zdenka Semberová dated 22. 5. 1876. See Z. Nejedly, T.G. Masaryk I, 1 (Prague/Praha, 1931), pp. 280f. There is also the influence of Plato. Masaryk's lost dissertation had the title: 'Das Wesen der Seele bei Plato'. In his conversations with Capek, he explicitly appeals to Plato for the belief in immortality. Op. cit. p. 151. One could also refer to the agreement with Brentano as to his ideas about theism and immortality. Like Masaryk, (see Capek, op. cit. pp. 66 and 69) Brentano used to link theism and belief in the immortality of the soul together. See, Grundlegung und Aufbau der Ethik, p. 231. 101. Masaryk had already clear views about this in Sebevrazda, in which he states that man also needs moral support in addition to science in order both to live and die. According to him, only religion can supply this. Op. cit. p. 186.

36 Norm and Fact There are certain passages, however, which seemingly contradict these conclusions. There is the remark in Ideals of Humanity that religion must be the foundation of morality. Masaryk is incapable of conceiving of any final solution to the moral question which does not include religion.102 Furthermore, in The Social Question, Masaryk expresses the conviction that there can be no adequate humanitarian ideal and no adequate form of Socialism without a religious foundation. Man can be an ideal to man only 'sub specie aeternitatis\1^ In his conversations with Capek, a similar thought is to be found. 'Religion without humanity cannot be true; humanity without religiousness cannot be complete.' 104 It is precisely religion which provides the ideal of genuine perfection. 105 But over against this, there is the important passage in his Spirit of Russia, in which Masaryk analyses Dostoevsky's views on the subject of love. He appreciates his justification of loving one's neighbour 'with reference to the notion of immortality'. To this he adds: Ί myself certainly believe that religion can and should bring the notion of immortality to bear upon thought, morality and love, but then the kind of religion and the manner in which you love your neighbour still remain considerations of some consequence.'106 Masaryk then rejects both his notion of love' and his notion of religion. The first because in it there is a tendency towards romanticism, aristocracy and sentimentality. And the second because it is a kind of mysticism and reveals itself as a short-fall in morality. 107 This 102. Masaryk, Ideals of Humanity, p. 87. 103. T.G. Masaryk, Otázka sociálni. Základy marxismu filosofické a sociologické II, (19476), p. 230. This passage has no parallel in, Grundlagen, (18992). In Kohák's English edition it appears on p. 230. 104. Capek, Masaryk on Thought and Life, p. 99. 105. Masaryk, Programpresidentuv, p. 74. 106. Masaryk, Spirit of Russia III, p. 75. 107. Ibid. pp. 75ff. Masaryk's moral-religious evaluation of Dostoevsky - and according to Jan Romein Masaryk was one of the most capable judges of his work, see J. Romein, Dostojewsky in de Westersche kritiek, dissertation, University of Leiden, 1924 - became less positive over the years. In 1892, Masaryk called him a great thinker and artist, a good disciple of Jesus Christ, the best Christian of his time, who, in his love for the weak, the poor, the downcast and the wicked, sees the genuine love of one's neighbour. 'Spisy Fedora Michajlovice Dostojevského', first published in, Cas, 1892, No. 2. Here, quoted from M.S. II, pp. 22f. In the, Spirit of Russia, III, Masaryk's final judgement on Dostoevsky is as follows: 'Dostoevsky's ambivalence was of a quite peculiar order. Here was a sceptic and unbeliever who discovered every plausible and implausible argument in favour of Caesaro-papism and ecclesiastical and state absolutism. He was a curiously broken soul. He had a vision of the new truth, but, being afraid of it, could only summon the courage to try to lie his way toward it. He is the dogmatist of orthodox Jesuitism.' Op. cit., p. 216.

Norm and Fact

37

shows that Masaryk did indeed recognize the value of religion; especially the concept of immortality. But it also shows that in his view religion did not define the actual content of the moral system. This supports our conclusion that for Masaryk morality takes priority over religion. Properly understood, however, religion has both fundamental and practical significance for morality. 1 0 8

108. That religion is also regarded by Masaryk as the foundation of morality is, according to Hromádka (who likewise thinks that morality is primary in Masaryk's thinking) a postulate, a consequence of the obligatory character of moral consciousness. See J.L. Hromádka, 'Masarykova svëtovà revoluce a princip Krest'anstvi', in, M.S. II p. 78. In a short passage in an essay on Masaryk's philosophy which is as outstanding as it is brief, R. Wellek writes as follows: 'The ethical starting-point of his religion is obvious: the difference between right and wrong was something so absolutely clear and selfevident, something so immutable... that he was driven to look for a sheetanchor in religion. The concept of God and immortality is for him a guarantee of the eternal difference between right and wrong.' See R. Wellek, 'Masaryk's Philosophy', in, Essays on Czech Literature, (The Hague, 1963), p. 64.

Chapter 2

Humanity. An Analysis of the Key Concept of Masaryk's Social and Political Philosophy

The conclusion of the preceding chapter was that the moral norm according to Masaryk is justified by morality itself. In principle, it is dependent neither upon biological and psychological nor upon sociological and historical facts. Morality does, however, have a religious dimension. This religious dimension certainly does not determine the actual content of ethics; though it does add an ultimate seriousness, a profundity which would otherwise be lacking without religion. One could also state that Masaryk was not able to avoid the semblance of ethical positivism or naturalism. When he is dealing with the content of the norm (or the ideal) in a more concrete way, it sometimes looks as if he is deducing the norm (humanity) from what we know about human nature and history. In what now follows, a more detailed answer will be given to the question about the content of Masaryk's ethical thought (or his social and political philosophy). The content of his ethical thought can be summarized in one word: humanity. Before setting out systematically what Masaryk understands by the notion of humanity, however, the origin and development of this concept in Masaryk's work is examined from a more historical point of view. The word humanity can be tracked down in Masaryk's philosophy of Czech history. He was hard at work in the second half of the 1880's trying to formulate an alternative programme to replace the romantic 'slavophilism' which had a strong foothold in Prague at that particular time. He published the results of his work in 1889.1 Here, Masaryk offers not only an analysis of slavophilism in the form of a review of the ideas 1. T.G. Masaryk, Slovanské Studie I. Slavjanofilstvi I. V. Kirëjevshéko, (Praha/ Prague, 1889). This study appeared earlier in ajournai entitled Athenaeum, (December 1888-May 1889) and goes back even further to a set of lectures dating from 1885. See Herben, Masaryk, p. 32.

Humanity. An Analysis of the Key Concept

39

of the Russian Slavophile Kirëjevskij, (1806-1859), but also a political and social programme derived by him from Czech history. 2 Every educated Czech wanting to understand both the nature and the development of his nation should ask himself, according to Masaryk, how he stands over against Czech history. That is, over against Hussitism and the Unitas Fratrum (Bohemian Brethren). He should also ask himself how he could reconcile the ideas and aspirations of that particular period with those of his time. Masaryk emphasized that the Czech reformation succeeded amongst the great majority of the Czech people. This reformation had no doubt been the foremost expression of the Czech spirit, its most singular achievement. The subsequent recatholicizing had been but a caesura in the continuity of Czech history. 3 Small wonder Masaryk was desirous of restoring the continuity of the spirit of the Czech reformation ! In 1891, Masaryk was elected to the Parliament in Vienna, in which year he joined the Young Czech Party (National Liberals) along with two fellow members of the 'realist' movement. His political activities as a representative of the Czechs in the forum of the Habsburg Empire, together with certain disagreements and conflicts with other party members, urged Masaryk to delve still deeper into the Czech question. This he took to be the problem of the place and task of the Czech nation among the other nations. For this reason he resigned his seat in 1893.4 In the years which followed, Masaryk built up a tremendous literary output. In the autumn of 1893 a new journal was founded with Masaryk as editor-in-chief.5 Masaryk unfolded the journal's programme in the Foreword to the first number: to try to find an answer to the question: What is the place of the Czech nation amongst the peoples of Europe as a whole? What is its place in the development of mankind, in order that one might learn 'what we have given to others and what we have 2. One should recall here Masaryk's positive evaluation of Plato, in whose work theory and practice are so closely connected according to Masaryk. See Chapter 1, note 14, above. The bulk of Masaryk's publications (certainly those appearing after 1890) are reflections upon a social and political praxis both at home and abroad with which he was concerned. Nejedly's thesis, that Masaryk the Philosopher must be understood in the light of Masaryk the Politician is understandable on this basis. See Nejedly, Masaryk, I, 1, p. 14. 3. Herben, Masaryk, pp. 32f. 4. In his conversations with Capek, Masaryk said: 'The conflicts of the time were for me merely the occasion, the true motive was my political immaturity... I began my political studies afresh and more thoroughly', see Capek, Masaryk on Thought and Life, p. 159. 5. Naie Doba. Revue pro Vëdu, Umëni a ¿ivot Sociální. Earlier cited as N.D.

40

Humanity.

An Analysis of the Key

Concept

received from them; we want to get to know ourselves properly, for we have to know how to proceed with our development, what we should and must do, and in which direction we have to go.' 6 It was Masaryk's own programme. 7 In the very first volume of NaSe Doba, there appeared a series of articles by Masaryk in which he elaborated for the first time the concept of humanity. 8 It is another Slavonic study, a continuation of his 1889 study on Kirëjevskij. This time, however, its subject is the Slovak Kollár. 9 Masaryk reiterates explicitly in his introduction that he is concerned with the Czech question. That is, with the question of the goal of the Czech nation and the way along which this goal could best be reached. 1 0 Our interest here is less in Kollár's theories than in Masaryk's criticism of them inasmuch as what he himself thought about humanity can be derived from it. Kollár used to distinguish between the following three cultural elements or principles: (a) the Classical; (b) the Romantic; and (c) the Humanitarian. 11 Kollár understood the principle of humanity in terms of the meaning given to it by the eighteenth century philosophers. Particularly 6. Masaryk, N.D. 1(1893), p. 1. 7. Masaryk was not primarily concerned with giving an accurate description of a piece of Czech history, but with its interpretation (in order to be able to formulate a national programme). Cp. R. Wellek, 'Masaryk's Philosophy', p. 68. See also Chapter 1, notes 27 and 56, above. 8. Some months earlier, Masaryk had already used the word in the same volume of Nase Doba in an article on the cult of reason and the Supreme Being (Kult rozumu a Nejvyssi Bytosti) in the sentence: 'Kult Nevysäi Bytosti mèi proto také byti Kultem disté humanity.' (The cult of the Supreme Being must therefore also be the cult of pure humanity). V. Skrach has already drawn our attention to this in his essay, 'Masarykova myslenka humanity'. In, M.S. V, p. 168. 9. T.G. Masaryk, Slovanské Studie. Jana Kollára Slovanská vzájemnost', N.D. 1(1893), pp. 481ff„ 588ff„ 655ff„ 721ff„ 822ff„ and 891SF. The article contains 95 paragraphs, of which the last fifty also appear in, Ceská Otázka. Jan Kollár (1793-1852), a Slovakian by birth, who, after a period in the parochial ministry, became Professor of Slavic Antiquities, in Vienna, was one of the leading figures of the Czech national and cultural renaissance. He was a famous poet and a man of letters. 10. Ibid. p. 481. 11. Ibid. p. 592. The translation of the adjective 'humanitni' (which is derived from the noun 'humanita') is a technical problem. Masaryk shows expressly on a number of occasions (for example in 'Humanita a národnost', N.D. IV(1897), p. 257 and also in, Jan Hus, p. 13) that the meaning of the word 'humanita' (humanity) must be distinguished from that of the word 'humanism'. According to him, the origins of humanism are to be found in Classicism; and those of his humanitarian programme (humanitni program) in Christianity. In his opinion, the only possible solution was to use the words 'humanitism' and 'humanitista' (humanitist, sic). See, 'Humanita a národnost', p. 257. However, Masaryk uses these words very seldom. Here, 'humanitni' is rendered by using 'humanitarian'; or by a genitive form of the noun humanity.

Humanity. An Analysis of the Key Concept

41

the Germans. According to Masaryk, however, there is also a French and an English conception of humanity alongside the German one. German philosophy takes humanity to be a cultural ideal which links up with Classical humanism. In France, the ideal of humanity has a much more political and, in part, social content as well: the rights of man, freedom and brotherhood. Finally, in England it is more an ethical ideal: sympathy (feeling for one's fellow men), the basis of all the social virtues.12 Masaryk's criticism of Kollár comes down to this: his understanding of humanity istoo rationalistic, too literary and cultural. It has too little moral/religious and political content. 13 Masaryk does, however, appreciate the fact that Kollár based the rights of nations upon the concept of humanity. Every nation has the (natural) right to develop in its own way towards the ideals of humanity. 14 On the other hand, Masaryk criticizes the leading role among the nations which the Slavs would have allotted to them in the realization of the principle of humanity should Kollár have his way. He also criticizes both Kollár's occasional Panslavist tendencies and his emphasis upon nationality. This emphasis was of such a degree that even humanity itself threatened to disappear. 15 Kollár adopted a different position in this from that of his mentor Herder. 16 One should note here a characteristic way of thinking of Masaryk in connexion with what has just been related. The leaders of the Czech national and intellectual renaissance17 needed a philosophical foundation for their work. They found this in the eighteenth century German philosophy of humanity and enlightenment. It was a philosophy which answered to their needs in the struggle for development, progress and culture {Bildung). By doing this, according to Masaryk, German philosophy was but repaying the loan it had received in the past from the Czech Reformation; and still in the seventeenth century from Czech Protestant emigrées. As Masaryk puts it, in Germany, England and France the Enlightenment was but a 12. Ibid. p. 592. Also in, 'Palackého idea národa deského', (Praha/Prague, 19475), originally published in N.D. V(1898), pp. 769-795, we come across the idea of a differing German, English and French notion of humanity. Op. cit. p. 17. 13. Ibid. p. 593. Cp. p. 722. 14. Ibid. p. 731. There is more about the relationship between natural rights and humanity in Masaryk's work in the following chapter. 15. Ibid. pp. 656ff„ 737 & 892. 16. Masaryk shows that Kollár's work sometimes contains citations from Herder's, 'Ideen zur Philosophie der Menschheit', which are virtually word for word the same, ibid. p. 670. For the influence of Fries, Harms and Luden, cp. pp. 666ff. 17. Dating from the end of the eighteenth and the beginning of the nineteenth century.

42 Humanity. An Analysis of the Key Concept continuation in the spirit of the leading ideas of the Czech Reformation. 1 » In this series of articles in the first volume of NaSe Doha, Masaryk dealt not only with Kollár, but also with other outstanding figures from the Czech national revival; though in less detail. We are only concerned, however, with what is relevant for Masaryk's interpretation of the keyconcept of humanity. In a passage dealing with Palacky,19 Masaryk states that the year of revolution (1848) can be seen as a continuation of the ideas of Liberty and Humanity which date from the time of the French Revolution. Palacky appealed to the slogan 'Liberty, Equality and Fraternity' in order to demand the equality of all the nations on this basis irrespective of their individual political power and greatness.2^ Masaryk is especially appreciative of the fact that in his work Palacky had emphasized the religious aspect of humanity - which he based as a natural right upon the Gospel and had pointed in this connexion to the significance of Czech religious history. That is, to the Hussite movement and the Unitas Fratrum (Bohemian Brethren).21 By understanding humanity more in political terms than Kollár, Palacky also goes further than he did. 22 It was indeed Palacky who formulated the political demand for Czech independence within the Habsburg Empire. Havlicek, a younger contemporary of Palacky, 23 subsequently understood humanity more adequately than Palacky. Masaryk takes the view that Havlicek was much more of a democrat than Palacky. And also more socially committed. Unlike Palacky, he was also mindful of the political rights of the working class. Thus, he was in favour of universal suffrage. He had already seen that the notion of democracy included the participation of the working class in government; for workers still had no share in political rights. Masaryk makes a distinction, however, between 18. Ibid. pp. 727f. 19. Frantisele Palacky (1798-1876), a famous Czech historian and politician, wrote the first Czech history from a national-Czech standpoint. For him, the Hussite movement was the zenith of Czech national history. 20. Ibid. pp. 892ff. 21. Ibid. p. 896. The meaning of the Czech Reformation with respect to the idea of humanity, the religious part of it, is the central theme of Masaryk's, Jan Hits, (Praha/ Prague, 18961). 22. Ibid. p. 899. In 1848 Palacky was a supporter of the idea of a federal Austria. After 1867 (the year of the Austro-Hungarian Ausgleich) he changed his mind. 23. Karel Havliöek Borovsky (1821-1856) was a famous Czech journalist and politician. In both roles he used to fight on the side of democratic liberties against absolutism in church and state. He became the symbol of the battle for Czech freedom.

Humanity. An Analysis of the Key Concept 43 'extensive' and 'intensive' humanity; between humanity understood in political terms and humanity understood in social terms. Both Palacky and Havliöek, according to him, understood humanity extensively; i.e. politically. Masaryk contends that the slogan of the French Revolution 'Liberty, Equality and Fraternity' had had no practical consequences for the working class; i.e. for those who were economically and politically weak. Something of this kind had also happened to the notion of humanity as proposed by Palacky. It was a fate shared to a lesser extent by Havlicek's notion of humanity. 24 At the close of his series of articles on Kollár, Masaryk remarks that both Palacky and HavliSek remained faithful to the concept of humanity in that they both consistently pursued their political and cultural ideals by peaceful means. They were both against the use of violence.25 To summarize the argument up to this point: one can say that Masaryk traces back the concept of humanity via Herder and the German Enlightenment to the heritage of the Czech Reformation. So doing, a connexion can even be established with the Gospel. That is, with love of one's neighbour. To his own earlier question (What have we Czechs received from others and from our own history?) Masaryk gives what follows as his own answer. We have received humanity from both sources; but primarily from our own history. Since the time of Herder and Kollár its content has developed. It has not only a cultural and political, but also a social meaning. For Masaryk, humanity should also be understood in a religious context. That is, in the context of the Czech Reformation. In the second volume of Naie Doha, Masaryk published a series of articles under the title, 'Current Trends and Yearnings'. 26 This series links up directly with the 'Slavonic Studies' on Kollár. These articles are extremely important for this enquiry. Because Masaryk not only looks for the meaning of the concept of humanity in the past, but also links it 24. Ibid. pp. 905ff. In addition to Palacky, Masaryk also openly criticized the even more sympathetic HavliCek a year later in a speech about John Hus. Because they both failed in their social politics. Their understanding of Humanity and Fraternity was too academic. What he found difficult to swallow in the case of Havlííek was that he could see no good in men such as Proudhon. See, Jan Hus, p. 44. 25. Ibid. p. 920. 26. T.G. Masaryk, 'Casové smëry a tuzby', in, N.D. II (1894/5). Without the introduction, these articles form the bulk of, Ceská Otázka, which appeared in 1895 in Prague. In the sixth impression, which has been used here, they cover sections 50 to 90 with the exception of 77. In this edition, Naie Nynëjsi Krise was also included with it; though it appeared separately in 1895. Citations are from, Ceská Otâzka-Nase Nynëjsi Krise, (Praha/Prague, 19486).

44 Humanity. An Analysis of the Key Concept directly with his own social and political programme. In them, the answer to the second part of Masaryk's programatic question is given: What are we to do? How should we go on from here? 27 First, there is again the past. In addition to a number of chords which have already been heard, Masaryk strikes up new ones. Humanity is the national and historical meaning of the Czech intellectual renaissance. To use his own words:... 'with humanity in all its full and true significance, we take up again the threads of the best that the past has bestowed upon us; with humanity we bridge over several centuries of intellectual and moral slumber; with humanity it is our task to lead the progress of mankind. Humanity is our national task, elaborated and handed down to us by our Unitas Fratrum. The ideal of humanity is the full meaning of our national life.' 28 Chelcicky and the Unitas Fratrum were a synthesis of Hussitism and the Taborite movement.29 Chelcicky won over Hussitism with his reason and the Taborite movement with his love. Masaryk has in mind here the doctrinal irresolution of the former and the revolutionary violence of the latter. 30 The nineteenth century Czech philosopher Smetana also obtains an honourable mention from Masaryk. Although lost in German thought, especially in the philosophy of Hegel, this thinker did see that the social question was going to be the most pressing problem of the age. Smetana had come to recognize the humanitarian task of philosophy: how a natural alignment with the past (and not an unnatural break with it) must lead to the solution of the social question. By so doing, he complemented Kollár's theory of humanity and provided the democratic yearnings of Havlicek and others with a philosophical basis.31 27. See above, p. 40. 28. Masaryk, C.O.-N.N.K., p. 208. 29. Petr Chelcicky (circa 1390-1460) was the spiritual father of the Unitas Fratrum which was founded after his death. With likeminded fellows, he formed a group of Christians who wanted to live their lives in accordance with the substance of the Sermon on the Mount. They rejected violence on principle. Chelöicky and his supporters are distinguished in this from the Hussites (Utraquisti) and the Taborites, who fought with each other after the death of Hus for the spiritual estate which he left behind. Religiously and socially, the Taborites formed the most radical group. 30. Ibid. p. 212. 31. Ibid. p. 142. Augustin Smetana (1814-1851) should not be confused with the composer Bedrich. Augustin Smetana was a Czech Hegelian who tried to bring about a synthesis of the thought of Hegel, Feuerbach and Herbart. Masaryk deals with him in detail in, Modern Man and Religion. He calls him the strongest thinker among our (Czech) humanitarians, op. cit. p. 198. He says that for Smetana religion becomes universal brotherhood, creative love. The Czech ideal of brotherhood becomes the ideal of humanity, op. cit. p. 192 (the official English translation is not quite correct here).

Humanity. An Analysis of the Key Concept 45 Here, one of the main points of Masaryk's own social and political programme is reached. According to him, humanity demands social reforms. It should be understood in a way which is less abstract and 'extensive' than was the case in the past. Humanity means working for those people who have been excluded up to now from the culture-making process. It would not suffice merely to grant them a few (political) rights. It is also necessary to think and work on behalf of and alongside them. The social question is preeminently a Czech question. In his opinion, a nation which has given birth to the national Unitas Fratrum and continues to bear witness to the heroes of the past has a great and 'most national' task in solving the social question. 32 Another point from Masaryk's humanitarian programme - the term comes from Masaryk himself 33 - is national independence. Not without his German fellow-citizens, he wants to strive for independence within the Habsburg Empire. Independence in the sense that each nation decides its own internal affairs. 34 Masaryk entertains no misunderstandings at all, however, about the fact that the social aspect of humanity is more immediate and more important than its national aspect. In other words, social justice takes precedence over national independence.35 Masaryk calls his programme 'realism'. This realism, this humanitarian programme, consists not only of a goal, but also offers, above all, a means to that end. It is a method. 36 Two questions can be asked about this kind of realism. First: What kind of a method is realism? With both an appeal and a reference to Czech history, Masaryk answers as follows. The goal of humanity can only be reached by using humanitarian methods. That means primarily not by force but by peaceful means. Not by the sword, but with the plough. Not by blood-letting, but by letting live. Not by killing, but by working. In short, by love in action. Secondly, Masaryk continually points to the significance of formal and further education; to knowledge, science and culture; to the school and the university; to literature and journalism. 37 This short answer to the question about the content of 32. Ibid. p. 163. The expression 'most national' (nejnârodnëjsi) has an aníí-nationalistic thrust. For this, see Chapter 3. 33. 'Humanitni program', see, e.g. ibid. pp. 163,226 and 374 (to limit ourselves only to this one work which has been cited). 34. Ibid. p. 163, cp. p. 374. 35. Ibid. p. 218. 36. Ibid. pp. 161ff. and 166. In addition to referring to a scientific method, the term 'realism' in Masaryk's work also denotes a political method. Cp. note 34, ch. 1 above. 37. Ibid. pp. 143ff„ 156ff„ 169, 178,184 and 255ff. See also T.G. Masaryk, 'Rozhledy

46 Humanity. An Analysis of the Key Concept humanity as a means to an end in Masaryk's work can be condensed still further into two words: love and reason (Chelcicky). As to Masaryk's 'realist' programme, the second question is about its goal. Where is realism leading to? In which direction does it point? The answer is: to humanity. Which forces us to consider yet another question. What is humanity? What is its content? What does it denote? What will the goal of humanity be like? On the basis of those writings which have already been analysed one can say: national independence (or national identity), social justice (or Socialism) and democracy. To which one should add straight away that these three concepts by no means exhaust the full meaning of humanity. Once more, they are ultimately means towards humanity and necessary conditions for it. It has already been possible to show that this is the case with respect to national independence. In Masaryk's thought, however, they have their significance as penultimate goals. As such, they require closer examination in the following chapters; whilst the question of humanity qua method/means will come up in the final chapter in connexion with the problem of violence and revolution. Before we turn to these topics, two further points need to be made. First, it should be stated that Masaryk did not regard humanity as a purely Czech (national) ideal. This possible misunderstanding could well have been already largely removed by the material which Masaryk has presented in his Kollár studies. Humanity is a universal ideal. As he himself expressly stated on more than one occasion. This is what he writes about it in an article in the Workers' Calendar of 1896 in answer to the question of whether democracy and humanity might or might not be the common goal of all mankind in addition to being the goal of the Slavs and particularly the Czechs. 'Humanity - that is the goal of all of us - Liberty, Equality and Fraternity certainly hold not only for us, but also for all people.' 38 The fact that Masaryk so expressly allows humanity qua Czech ideal to occupy the centre of the stage must be seen in the light of his involvement in the social and political life of the Czechs. But whenever Masaryk is playing a role on the stage of world politics, he then lets the emphasis fall elsewhere.39 Second, it is worth while recalling a politické, in, N.D. IV (1897), pp. 256ff., in which the demand for the education of the people is mentioned as a point in the humanitarian programme. 38. The citation is taken from, C.O.-N.N.K. in which it is included on p. 626. There are also passages elsewhere in which Masaryk refers to the universal character of the humanity ideal. See, e.g. Ideals of Humanity, p. 28. Also, Making of a State, p. 407. 39. So, for example, in, The New Europe, p. 20: 'Humanitism... found general acceptance and became the recognised foundation of all modem morals'.

Humanity. Art Analysis of the Key Concept

47

remark once made by V. Skrach, who indicated quite rightly that Masaryk had already become familiar with the notion of humanity before he even used the word. 40 Masaryk's appreciation of Hume's ethics could also be mentioned here. In particular his identification of Hume's 'benevolence' with humanity: the basic principle in morality.41 To which one should also add the significance which Masaryk attached to knowledge and education both at the outset of his career and throughout the whole of his life. As early as 1877 he stated that these are required by the principle of 'humanity'. 42 That Skrach was quite right about this can also be seen in what follows.

40. Skrach, 'Masarykova myälenka humanity', p. 162. 41. See above, p. 15. 42. Masaryk, Ό pokroku, vyvoji a osvëtë', in, J. Dolezal, Masarykova p. 216. Here, Masaryk uses the word 'lidskost' instead of 'humanita'.

cesta II,

Chapter 3

Humanity, National Identity and Nationalism

1. Introduction

Among other things, the object of this chapter is to study the relationship between humanity, on the one hand, and national identity1 and nationalism in Masaryk's thought on the other. It has already been seen that a particular form of national autonomy was a part of Masaryk's humanitarian programme. In his work, as one might have expected, the idea of national identity is a political one. Though not exclusively. At the same time, it is just as much a cultural idea, if not actually more cultural than political. As a cultural idea, humanity includes a love of the language and literature of one's nation, a feeling for its history, and the pursuit of the nation's all-round cultural development. Both the political and the cultural idea are combined in the concept of nationalism in some cases. This concept is, however, only used by Masaryk sparingly in a positive sense. In the name of humanity he fights nationalism in the pejorative sense of that word. In this section we will see how he does this and which arguments he uses. Masaryk's thought on the subject of national identity and nationalism developed in a particular political-historical context. It should be seen against the background of two mutually related political problems which had become pressing ones during his lifetime. First, there was the question of the relation between the Czech nation and the Habsburg Empire. Should it constitute part of the Empire? And, if so, on what terms? Second, there was the question of the relationship between the Czechs and Germans within the historical boundaries of the Bohemian Crown Lands. 2 1. The most adequate translation of the term 'ndrodnost ' seems to me 'national identity'. In some cases, namely in compound words, I have translated it with 'nationality'. 2. These lands comprise: the Kingdom of Bohemia, the Marquisate of Moravia,

Humanity, National Identity and Nationalism

49

Therefore it would be useful to add first a historical sketch of these two problems; taking as the starting point the year 1848.3

2. The Political-Historical Framework The year of revolution (1848) worked as a catalyst in the relationships between Germans 4 and Czechs in the Bohemian Crown Lands. In the early stages of the revolutionary movement, both nations joined hands in the struggle against the absolutism of the government in Vienna. One of their demands was for an administrative union of the Bohemian Crown Lands. Another was for the summoning of a joint Parliament (Landtag) in Prague. The Czech and German-speaking literati in Prague stated in a joint-declaration that Czechs and Germans had equal rights. One of them was Palacky, the political leader of the Czechs at that time. But it soon appeared that the phrase 'equal rights' was understood differently. Havlicek demanded political supremacy for the Czechs. In a second petition, signed only by the Czechs and significantly addressed not to the Emperor of Austria but to the King of Bohemia (both titles held by the same person), it was supposed that the Czech nation was the people of the state {Staatsvolk). The Germans in the Crown Lands protested and demanded in turn the union of Austria, including the Bohemian Crown Lands, with a renewed Germany. At that time, a renewed Germany was also discussed in the Church of St. Paul, Frankfurt, where a German Parliament had already met to discuss the future of the states joined together in the German Federation. Palacky was also invited to Frankfurt. But he refused in a famous letter in which he revealed himself to be an advocate of the preservation of the Danube monarchy. 5 An Austrian federation was the best state {Staat) for the Slavs who lived in this particular area. At the same time, however, voices could be heard in and the Duchy of Silesia (in turn comprising the princedoms of Troppau and Teschen). The Emperor of Austria was also the Sovereign of these lands. 3. The data are mainly taken from the, Handbuch der Geschichte der böhmischen Länder, (Ed. Karl Bosl, Vol. III, Stuttgart, 1968). Cited below as, Handbuch III. 4. The reference here and below is to the German-speaking inhabitants of the Bohemian Crown Lands. 5. Masaryk cites a passage from this letter in which Palacky maintains that even if the Austrian State had not existed for such a long time, it would still be in Europe's best interests, and even in the best interest of mankind, that one should strive to create it. See, C.O.-N.N.K., p. 98.

50 Humanity, National Identity and Nationalism German circles pleading for the separation of the German-speaking parts of Bohemia and their incorporation into Germany. The Panslavic Congress was convened on June 1st. It opposed the idea of an Austrian Federation. This meant a further intensification of national tensions. The end of 1848 saw, however, a rapprochement between the Germans and the Czechs following the return to power of the conservatives in Vienna. At the beginning of 1849, it seemed likely that a parliamentary bill outlining a new constitution bringing into being an Austrian Federation based upon national groups would be accepted in Vienna by a considerable majority. The violent dissolution of Parliament, however, prevented this. Hereby, Austria lost a great chance to solve the 'nationality problem' - in other words, the problem of a multi-national state - at a time 'when nationalism as an ideology was still the concern of a narrow segment of the intelligentzia'.6 National-political demands could not be tabled by the Czechs in the Viennese Parliament once Austria had returned to its former absolutist rule. Though there was still further reflection on the position of the Bohemian Crown Lands within the Habsburg Empire. The theory of historical state's rights, the substance of which had already been defended in 1848, was formulated. It provided a foundation both for the union of the Bohemian Crown Lands and for the right of those lands to a special kind of autonomy. This foundation is history. It also specifies the relationship between these lands and the other countries incorporated into the Habsburg Empire. 7 This theory of historical state's rights played an important role in Czech political life right up to the time of the foundation of the state of Czechoslovakia. Masaryk was also concerned with this theory on more than one occasion. It became the common political creed of the two Czech political parties, the Old Czechs and the Young Czechs. These two parties differed from each other less on matters of programme than in their respective social composition and political 6. Bosl, Handbuch III, p. 53. 7. 'The Bohemian State's Right firstcomprisestherelationshipofthethreeinseparably united lands of the Bohemian Crown: Bohemia, Moravia and Silesia, to the Habsburg Dynasty. Secondly, the relationship of the independent, sovereign lands of the Bohemian Crown in their unity to the other lands of their king and to the other states. Finally, the public, constitutional law of the lands of the Bohemian Crown, the rights of the Parliaments (Landtage) and the Civil Service in the three lands and the rights of the Crown over the Estates in respect of legislation and administration.' So Karl Kramáf in, Das böhmische Staatsrecht, (Wien/Vienna, 1896), pp. 5ff., cited in Bosl, Handbuch III, p. 62. For Masaryk's criticism of the conservative character of the Historic Right see note 45 below.

Humanity, National Identity and Nationalism

51

temperament. The Old Czechs leaned heavily upon the support of the nobility, the clergy and the old bourgeoisie. Whilst the Young Czechs derived their support from the new, up-and-coming bourgeoisie. The latter would eventually completely overshadow the Old Czechs.8 To the extent that the central government met these demands which were based on the historical rights of the Bohemian lands, the Czech politicians adopted a more (or less) cooperative stance towards Vienna. A new bill for a revised constitution which was proposed after Austria's debacle in Italy in 1859 (the so-called Oktober Diplom of 20. 10. 1860) took as its starting-point a federal union of states. It was well received by the Czechs, especially by Palacky. But the bill never reached the statute book. In 1863, most of the Czech representatives in the Viennese Parliament decided to boycott it. In 1865 Palacky wrote the famous words:'We [-i.e. the Czechs-] were before Austria was, and we shall also be after Austria.' 9 What the Czechs were denied, the Hungarians did indeed receive in 1867: a farreaching form of autonomy within the Habsburg Empire. The consequences of the Ausgleich for the nationality problem in the Bohemian Crown Lands were threefold. The Czechs demanded first that the state's right be observed in a more radical way than ever before. And from 1868 they also began to boycott the Parliament (Landtag) in Prague. Secondly, Slavophilism became stronger amongst the Czechs, as can be seen in the Czech participation in a pilgrimage to Moscow (including Palacky). Thirdly, in the west of the Empire, the Germans discovered that their minority position had become more unfavourable. In 1871, it appeared that the Czechs would also get their Ausgleich; albeit under protest from the Germans. The original proposal was amended, however, to such an extent that the Czechs themselves eventually rejected it. Especially amongst the ranks of the Young Czechs, doubts began to arise in the 1870's that the tactics which they had been pursuing might not have been appropriate to the situation. Surely it was time to replace the tactics of boycott and non-cooperation with a more positive form of political activity? Doubt turned into certainty in a majority of cases; and, when the government in Vienna was also prepared to make concessions in the field of national politics, the Czech delegates again took their respective places in the various representative bodies. Masaryk also welcomed this decision.10 8. The influence of the Young Czechs reached its climax in the 1890's and thereafter declined rapidly. 9. See Masaryk, C.O.-N.N.K., p. 100. 10. See Nejedly, T.G. Masaryk I, 2 (Praha/Prague, 1931), pp. 165 & 177. For that

52 Humanity, National Identity and Nationalism 3. Humanity and Nationalism Masaryk's first pronouncements on the nationality problem also date from the 1870's. In a note in his curriculum vitae, compiled in connexion with his promotion in 1875, he remarked: 'Only by study and right understanding of the history and culture of Rome was my opinion about nationality in such a way modified that I now share the view of Cicero and agree in large measure with Mill, who put forward his point of view in his Logic, Book 6, Ch. IO.'11 In this way Masaryk joined forces with two philosophers who came from multi-national states (like Austria) whose thinking is definitely not nationalistic. According to Cicero, nation and state are identical. A nation is 'an assemblage of people in large numbers associated in an agreement with respect to justice and a partnership for the common good.' 12 J. S. Mill also writes about the nation in the context of his discourses on the state. The genuine national sentiment is 'a feeling of common interest among those who live under the same government and are contained within the same natural or historical boundaries'. It is neither 'a senseless antipathy to foreigners' nor 'indifference to the general welfare of the human race'. 13 Nor is Masaryk's tone nationalistic in his early publications. In 1878 he published an essay on Plato as a patriot in which he attacked the verdict of the German historian B. G. Niebuhr that Plato could not have been a good citizen or a good patriot. Masaryk does this by using a persuasive definition of patriotism. He asks himself whether Plato's support for Socrates - even at the risk of his life - might not have testified to his patriotism. Plato accepted the good in his country; it was the bad that he rejected. He cannot be faulted, according to Masaryk, just because there was so much badness. After his appreciative exposition of Plato's philosophy of the state, Masaryk concludes that this opinion of Niebuhr on Plato was neither fully thought out nor well grounded. Because he thought first of all that the older and the newer patriotism were one and the same. And secondly because his concept of patriotism was not clear matter, Masaryk had also already turned in an indirect way against a passive politics in his, Theorie a praxis. 11. Dolezal, Masarykova cesta I, p. 13. The change of opinion which Masaryk mentions probably refers to the understandable nationalism of his Grammar School days in Brno. Cp. Nejedly, Masaryk I, 1, pp. 170ff. 12. M.T. Cicero, De re publica. De legibus. (With an English Translation by Clinton Walker Keyes, London, 1970»), p. 64. 13. J.S. Mill, A System of Logic, (3rd. edn. Vol. II, London, 1851), p. 508.

Humanity, National Identity and Nationalism

53

cut. 14 Masaryk prefers the older, Platonic patriotism instead of the patriotism of his contemporaries. For Masaryk, patriotism is something other than a blind and irrational form of nationalism, against which he had to fight throughout his whole life.15 Masaryk comes closest to the heart of the matter when he points out in his study on Kirêjevskij (dating from 1889) what he does and does not understand by love for one's country. 'Why should a man who knows the weaknesses of his people not love it? The fact that we openly condemn our own shortcomings by no means implies that we regard what is strange or alien as good or even better. It is not necessary to hate another nation in order to love one's own.' 16 Nationalism is both blind and irrational. It is blind both to its own faults and to the virtues of other nations. It is irrational because it is not based on a knowledge of the facts. Such blindness is a consequence of ignorance. The significance which Masaryk attached to knowledge and general education 17 in the field of ethics (and politics) has already been indicated. So his criticism of the Czech nationalists largely boils down to this: they are insufficiently informed and not sufficiently competent in matters of national politics. This is why he wrote his Theorie a Praxis. And it is against this background that one should also read his most important works of the 1890's.18 Masaryk's standpoint can be illustrated by reference to a review dating from 1877. He argues here that one must stop generalizing about whole nations when one is thinking only of particular individuals. He also argues that our knowledge of other peoples has up to now been very inadequate. As long as anthropology does not have a solid scientific basis, one should not complain of other nations or curse them. 19 So Masaryk fights the evils of nationalism by using knowledge as an argument. An impartial observer and a clear thinker cannot be a chauvinist.20 14. Masaryk, 'Plato jako vlastenec', in Dolezal, Masarykova cesta II, pp. 159-175. Cp. Nejedly, Masaryk I, 2, pp. 212-217. 15. One should bear in mind here the battle of the manuscripts, the Polná trial and its aftermath and his opposition to anti-German nationalism before and during the First Czechoslovakian Republic. 16. See Herben, Masaryk, p. 32. Masaryk still adhered to this view many years later: 'No criticism - even if very sharp - can really be damaging to a national cause.' Spirit of Russia III, p. 115. 17. See above p. 45. 18. Especially his, Ceská Otázka and, Nase Nynëjsi Krise·, see e.g. op. cit. pp. 122, 178, 367, 394 & 416. 19. Masaryk, 'Zákony osvëty a budoucnost Slovanstva', p. 49. 20. Masaryk, Spirit of Russia III, p. 115, where the full thrust of the argument is

54

Humanity, National Identity and Nationalism

Masaryk is defending here a meaningful argument. In the historical context from which he speaks, the exaggerations and blunders of the nationalists were often caused by their ignorance. In the battle of the manuscripts, what was at stake was a proper analysis of the texts of Zelená Hora and Králové Dvur. Lack of knowledge also contributed to the mishandling of the Polná trial. In this case, ignorance about the religious life of the Jews. In the political battle with the government in Vienna, a proper evaluation of the political options open to the Czech people was also important. And, both before and during the time of the first Czechoslovakian Republic, it was again a matter of gaining a proper insight into the historical relationships of the various peoples who inhabited the Bohemian Crown Lands. But has everything been said when the argument from knowledge has been used ? Is it possible to rid the world of the problems of nationalism (chauvinism and discrimination) simply by seeing to it that people are well-informed? In this connexion, let us ask what kind of knowledge in particular Masaryk has in mind. He has his own answer to this question. 21 What he has in mind is knowledge of a nation's character, soul and spirit. People make judgements about these; usually unfounded or at best superficial on the basis of what they see. Such as: what and how people eat and drink. What they wear and how they dress themselves. According to Masaryk, one gets to know more about a nation by studying its literature than by an analysis of its institutions of state and its political and military history. A comparative study of Goethe's Faust and Dostoevsky's The Brothers Karamazov could tell us more about the German and Russian national characters than dozens of pronouncements by Slav and German demagogues.22

aimed at the idea of a specially chosen nation. In a publication dated 1905, Masaryk combats the thought that there might be superior and inferior races. One race can lag behind another intellectually and culturally - for example the negroes who lag behind the whites - but that has nothing to do with heredity. It is always possible to catch up later. He points out that the black race in America has only just been liberated from slavery ànd still lacks a tradition. Because of this, the blacks have not reached the same level of development as the white race. But it shows continuously that the black race can develop whenever it gets the opportunity. See, Nàrodnostnifilosofiedoby novëjsl, (Praha/Prague, 19192), p p . I7f. 21. Masaryk, 'Slovanské Studie', pp. 829ff. 22. Ibid. p. 830. Masaryk's, Spirit of Russia is an example of such a study. Whenever Masaryk speaks about the national character of a people, he does this with the necessary safeguards. In his war memoires he speaks about 'the complicated concept of national character' and also about the 'lack of clarity with which it is spoken about'. Weltrevolution, p. 467 (a passage which does not occur in the Making of a State).

Humanity, National Identity and Nationalism

55

It is notable in this connexion that Masaryk, having drawn upon an analysis of both Slavic and non-Slavic literature, came to the same opinion as Herder: that the Slavs distinguished themselves both from the Latin and the Germanic peoples by their innate humanity. This humanity should manifest itself historically in the form of an aversion from violence (nebojovnost). Masaryk describes this Slavic 'nebojovnost' then in such an ambivalent way that it remains undecided whether the Slavs, or the Czechs, are morally better than the non-Slavs, or the Germans. It is still very much an open question for Masaryk whether the ideal of humanity really can be realized through the Slavic Nebojovnost'.23 So one should bear in mind, according to Masaryk, that Herder did not contend that only the Slavs could humanize mankind. That was the Slavophile Kollár's idea. Herder expected a peaceful, non-military federation of states in which the principle of humanity would be consistently realized.24 For Masaryk, it was not a matter of stressing the contrasts between the Germans and the Czechs. Quite the reverse. Because what he wants - again drawing upon literary sources - is to emphasize that the Slavs and the Germans have a close relationship to one another. And also that German influences have not harmed the Czech national character as much as many Slavophiles suspect.25 So, according to Masaryk, ethnology consists of knowledge about the soul, the character and the destiny of a nation; and in knowing the philosophy of the nation's history.26 Apart from the difficulty of obtaining objective (i.e. intersubjective) knowledge on these subjects, note how ambivalent such knowledge is when it comes to the problem of nationalism! An appeal to this kind of material for the purpose of combatting nationalism could go awry. Just like an appeal to other kinds of objective knowledge.27 Thus Masaryk 23. Ibid. pp. 832f. 24. Ibid. p. 839. 25. Ibid. pp. 830f. 26. We are concerned here with philosophy of special history in the context of the general philosophy of history 'which takes as its explicit task the understanding of the meaning of national development'. See Grundlagen, p. 433(288). 27. For example, what if it should be scientifically shown that the I.Q. of the average Czech is higher than that of the Germans? It could have been an argument for Masaryk's nationalistic adversaries. Anyway, Masaryk would not have justified Czech nationalism or discrimination against the Germans on the basis of this knowledge. To illustrate the problem one can refer to an article by Prof. J. H. van den Berg entitled 'Probleemrijk Zuid-Afrika', in, Intermediair, 31 March 1972. Here, he states with reference to the results of various scientific investigations that the negro is probably less intelligent than the whites because of heredity factors. The lower I.Q. should not be attributed to the environment factor. With this in mind, Prof, van den Berg asked for under-

56 Humanity, National Identity and Nationalism comes dangerously close - in spite of himself - to a form of nationalism (the idea of a chosen nation) whenever he acknowledges the special and peculiar national character, as well as the vocation, of the Slavs in general and the Czechs in particular. He would not have taken such a firm stand against Hegel and his German nationalism, and against the later panGermanists,28, had he limited himself purely to the arguments of the philosophy of history school. Why deny to the Germans what is permitted to the Slavs or the Czechs? That is, a special role in the future historical development of the nations. But Masaryk does not limit himself to this. His philosophy of history is subservient to his ethics. It has already been stated that for Masaryk history can only confirm his deepest moral conviction. That is, that humanity is and ought to be the norm and the goal of man's individual and social life. Also with respect to the problem of nationalism, Masaryk continues to maintain this opinion. Nations are to be judged in accordance with moral standards. 29 He entertains no doubt whatsoever as to what the norm is by which he judges nations: humanity must be the goal of every individual and every nation. According to Masaryk, there cannot be any such thing as an ethical system for a single nation. 30 Masaryk also prescribes this norm for his own nation; in particular for its nationalistic leaders. When Masaryk's party, with its humanitarian programme, was accused just like the social democrats of half-heartedness on the national question, he responded by arguing yet again that the principle of humanity demands humanity towards the Germans and the other nations. Humanity in the sphere of politics is a product neither of sentimentality nor of indifference towards one's own people. It is standing for South Africa's apartheid policy. Prof. de Froe, when asked to comment upon this in the same number, was largely able to 'follow and approve' the data upon which van den Berg's argument was based. But in his opinion these facts do not justify the apartheid policy. 'Racial diiferences are not relevant differences with respect to our humanity. One can value them as one will; but government ought to ignore them.' This is the conclusion of his commentary. See, 'Zuid-Afrika, genetisch commentaar', in, Intermedial, 31 March 1972. Van denBerg and de Froe do not differ fundamentally about the facts. But they do evaluate the facts differently. This is all the more a proof that facts cannot replace norms. Or, to put it differently, that facts do not imply norms. In other words, that moral 'knowledge' - awareness of moral norms - does not follow from a knowledge of the facts. Knowledge is not yet virtue. 28. For Masaryk's criticism of the former see, for example, 'Slovanské Studie', p. 840. For his criticism of the latter see esp., The New Europe, pp. 2ff., 12 & 14. 29. Masaryk, 'Slovanské Studie', p. 830. 30. Ibid. p. 830.

Humanity, National Identity and Nationalism

57

derived, rather, from the living conviction that the Czechs can only support themselves on the basis of the principle of humanity. We not only ask, he argues, for humanity, that is for truth and justice, for ourselves, but also for our enemies. 31 Masaryk mentions truth and justice in the same breath as humanity, of which they are both explications. 32 These qualities characterize Masaryk's own position over against his nationalistic opponents at the time of the various conflicts and controversies over the nationality problem. 33 In the light of his moral respect for the truth - his life's motto was 'truth prevails' - one should also see the emphasis which he used to lay upon knowledge and education. Knowledge is the servant of truth; and hence the servant of humanity. Knowledge is virtue. 34 Or at any rate a useful weapon in the fight against vice, which takes here the form of nationalism. The fact that Masaryk could appeal here to his own experience is something which has already been mentioned in addition to the more problematical aspects of Masaryk's position. 4. Humanity and National Identity As has already been seen, Masaryk criticizes nationalism in the pejorative sense of that word by using the concept of humanity as his norm. On the other hand, however, he links the notion of national identity with the idea of humanity; basing the former upon the latter. This point has already been mentioned. 35 Masaryk described John Hus to the Czech 31. Masaryk, 'Rozhledy politické', pp. 256ff. 32. Masaryk repeatedly puts falsehood or lying on a par with violence, the great opposite of humanity. For example, in two of his presidential addresses cited in, Program Presidentuv, pp. 71 & 90. There is more about humanity and justice in the following chapter. 33. A significant citation from a letter of Masaryk is to be found in the journal, Athenaeum, 15 Feb. 1886 referring to the battle of the manuscripts: 'The nation's honour desires defence, or respectively, the recognition of the truth, nothing more; and morality and courage which admits an error is greater than the defence of error, though the whole people share in it'. This citation is taken from Rychnovsky, Masaryk, p. 41. Elsewhere, Masaryk says that the simple old adage 'don't tell a lie' teaches more than a thousand thousand times as much as all the bombastic speeches about Fatherland and Nation put together. See, Ό úkolech òeského studentstva', (Praha/Prague, 1889); reprinted in C.O.-N.N.K., p. 410. 34. Cp. above, p. 20. 35. See above, p. 45. The critical relationship between nationality (nationalism) and humanity and the positive relationship between them are clearly brought to our notice in a passage from, Karel Havlicek in which he takes nationalism to be a one-sided cultivation of language and national identity which overlooks the fact that national identity should be based upon humanity. Karel Havlicek, (Praha/Prague, 19203), p. 110.

58 Humanity, National Identity and Nationalism students in 1899 as the man who founded national identity upon religion. Likewise, the greatest thinkers of the Czech national revival also based national identity upon the idea of humanity. That is, upon a moral and religious idea. 36 And earlier in the same lecture, Masaryk says that the idea of national identity is ultimately love; i.e. the reciprocity resulting from a common language and national origin.37 These passages in Masaryk's writings contain yet again a polemic thrust against the nationalists of those days. As to national identity, it is not a matter of a one-sided political problem; i.e. of (revolutionary) agitation against Austria. On the contrary, it is very much a matter of a moral, religious ideal. Or, as he puts it elsewhere, it is a whole cultural programme. 38 Eight years later, in 1907, he supported the ideals of humanity in the Viennese Parliament and praised Herder for teaching that humanity means not only making man human, but also making man national. 39 In The New Europe, which appeared during the First World War, Masaryk indicates again that the idea of national identity had always attracted him through its social and moral content. So he can state that the suppression of nations is a sin against humanity. 40 In his inaugural lecture as Professor at King's College, London, (1915) he also linked the idea of national identity (equal rights of nations) with the idea of humanity. Just as he had done earlier in Ideals of Humanity.41 In this way he can also maintain that as

36. Masaryk, Jan Hus, p. 133. Masaryk connects the idea of nationality directly with the Reformation. 'The modern conception of nationality first grew strong in the Reformation...' Grundlagen, p. 432(286), and especially with the Czech Reformation. He states that for the first time the principle of national identity was realized consistently in Bohemia; so that the Czechs have been up to now as it were the specialists in matters of nationality. So Masaryk in a lecture on practical philosophy cited in Nejedly, Masaryk III, p. 306. J. Barents and G.P. van Itterzon have also drawn attention to the relationship between the idea of nationality (national identity, nationalism) and Hussitism. See their articles, 'Het nationalisme in de middeleeuwen' and, 'De reformatie en de nationale gedachte', in, J. Barents et al., Christendom en Nationalisme, (The Hague/'s Gravenhage, 1955), pp. 75-78. 37. Ibid. p. 132. 38. Masaryk, Nàrodnostni filosofie doby novëjsi, p. 8. See also, 'Ernest Renan o národnosti. Qu'est-ce qu'une nation?', in, M.S. I, p. 60; The Making of a State, p. 390; The New Europe, p. 17. 39. Rychnovsky, Masaryk, p. 130. 40. Masaryk, The New Europe, p. 145. It is possible here that Masaryk is referring to mankind with the word humanity. However, in the German edition one finds here: '...eine Sünde gegen die Menschheit und Menschlichkeit'. Cited by Rychnovsky, Masaryk, p. 317. 41. T. G. Masaryk, 'The Problem of Small Nations in the European Crisis', Inaugural

Humanity,

National Identity and Nationalism

59

human beings become more human, they also become more national. And vice versa.42 Masaryk also connects nationality and humanity indirectly; namely by deducing the idea of national identity from the notion of natural right. Here, he is following Palacky. But the content of natural right does not differ essentially from the ideal of humanity. 4 3 Masaryk is well aware that the notion of natural right is a controversial matter. 4 4 Yet he still continued to invoke it throughout the whole of his life when dealing with the nationality problem. In this he did not reject the historical rights of the Bohemian Crown Lands; even though his acceptance of the latter is not entirely without criticism. 45 What Masaryk brings to the fore in his debate with Marx and Marxism about the idea of national identity is instructive. Marx is frequently far

Lecture at the University of London, King's College, (London, 1915), p. 23. And earlier in, The Ideals of Humanity, pp. 17f. 42. Masaryk, The Making of a State, p. 390. 43. In a passage in, Ceskd Otdzka, Masaryk states that when Herder is proclaiming humanity and Rousseau nature and natural right, both are actually proclaiming the same thing. C.O.-N.N.K., p. 92. 44. Ibid. 45. According to Masaryk's brochure on Natural Right and Historic Right, historic right is too static. Adherents of this notion do not see that State and Right develop. See, Prdvo prirozené a historické, (Praha/Prague, 1900), p. 7. In 1912, Masaryk's criticism was even more fundamental. He indicated that at the time of the restoration, historic right was used as a weapon by conservatives and reactionaries alike against the revolutionary natural right. Continuity became the norm of right (justice). Not only right (justice) is a matter of continuity; but also injustice. Only an awareness of justice which is not determined by time, that is, by the past, can decide the question of what precisely is and is not just. At the present time, according to Masaryk, the difference between natural right and historic right will disappear; because the gradual development of all social institutions and naturally also of man's (innate) awareness of what is right and just is better understood. The older historic right laboured under the difficulty that it laid too great an emphasis upon the past in its notion of right. According to Masaryk in his political programme of 1912 right is sanctified both yesterday and today, however, by moral consciousness. Cited in Herben, Masaryk, p. 106. A similar train of thought can be observed in, Karel Havlicek. Here, he argues that the law, custom (mos) and regulation are not already just and justified because they once used to exist or still exist. He says that he regards historic right (positive law) as subordinate to natural right (natural law). That is, subordinate to the ethical ideals of social justice. See, Karel Havlicek, p. 142. Masaryk's criticism of historic right sometimes had a purely political motive. On the basis of historic right, the State of Czechoslovakia had no right to exist. See Capek, President Masaryk Tells his Story, p. 191. Conversely, he appeals again to historic right to support the political unity of the Bohemian Crown Lands against the natural right of the Germans there to self-determination. See, The Making of a State, p. 385.

60 Humanity, National Identity and Nationalism from fair in his judgements about the various nations in Masaryk's opinion. 46 On matters of principle Marx lacks clarity and is superficial.47 He incorrectly identifies nationality (nation) and state. His understanding of the concept of nationality is too political. Because for Marx political considerations ultimately become economic interests, his concept of nationality is too economic.48 Masaryk recognises that economic interests and relations also contribute 'to territorial and national differentiation'. Though he points to other additional factors which are not reducible to purely economic relations. For example, climate, ground, blood (which should be the subject of investigation especially among the advocates of historical materialism), language, law, morality, art, literature, philosophy and religion.49 Positively, Masaryk again points to the kinship between national and humanitarian ideas. The idea of nationality developed together with the idea of humanity. Furthermore, the national idea is ethically based upon humanity. 50 He sees in Socialism, however, with its internationalism, a welcome corrective to national egoism and chauvinism : '...a corrective that is particularly welcome because the national idea and national feelings have been misused by many manipulators, small and great, in the same way as religion, science, journalism - everything.'51 On the other hand, Masaryk also states with satisfaction that second generation Marxists think more positively about the idea of national identity than either Marx or Engels.52 For Masaryk, national identity and internationalism were never mutually exclusive. Each was a necessary corrective of the other. 46. According to Masaryk, Marx evaluates the various nations wrongly when he does this on the basis of their revolutionary zeal. He is, therefore, favourable in his judgement of the Poles; but unjust to the other Slavic nations especially to the Russians and the Czechs. See, Grundlagen, pp. 440 & 442. (not in Kohák.) 47. 'At any rate his views are... rather superficial', ibid. p. 431, cp. p. 444. (not in Kohák.) 48. Ibid. pp. 430ff. See also, The New Europe, p. 30. Because of this onesidedness, Masaryk regards Marx' analysis of the Jewish problem to be unsatisfactory. 49. Ibid. pp. 433f. (288). 50. Ibid. pp. 436 (291), cp. p. 440: 'The national idea is indeed also an idea and even an ethical idea', (not in Kohák.) 51. Ibid. p. 439 (294). 52. For this Masaryk refers to Kautsky's programme and to an article by the Austrian social democrat Pernerstorfer in the, Arbeiterzeitung, (9 June 1897), from which he cites the following: 'In this sense of a real internationalism, the view will come into prominence that one can be a good German, an excellent Slav, an enthusiastic Italian and nevertheless a passionate, international social democrat.' Cited in, Grundlagen, p. 427. (not in Kohák.)

Humanity, National Identity and Nationalism

61

Up to now, we have been trying to show on the one hand that the connexion between humanity and national identity in Masaryk's thought was a critical one. The idea of national identity is criticized by him on the basis of the norm ("the ideal) of humanity or truth (knowledge) and justice whenever it turns into a blind and irrational form of nationalism. We wanted to show, on the other hand, that the relationship between national identity and humanity in Masaryk's work was also a positive one. National identity, love of one's own nation, a positive form of nationalism possibly leading to the pursuit of independence, but above all understood as a cultural programmers a form of humanity. 'To a positive nationalism, one that seeks to raise a nation by intensive work, none can demur. Chauvinism, racial or national intolerance, not love of one's own people, is the foe of the nations and of humanity. Love of one's own nation does not entail non-love of other nations.' 53

5. The Development of the Idea of National Identity as a Political Idea It has already been argued that Masaryk's thinking about humanity, national identity and nationalism should be considered against the background of two political problems which were pressing during his lifetime. That is, the problem of the relationship between the Czech nation and the Austrian Empire and the relation between the Czechs and the Germans within the historical frontiers of the Kingdom of Bohemia. This is why the standpoint adopted by Masaryk over against both of these questions should now finally be examined. In other words, the development of the idea of national identity as a political idea in Masaryk's thought. It has already been seen that at the beginning of his career Masaryk invoked Cicero and J.S. Mill for his outlook on the notion of national identity. It may be concluded from this that Masaryk then considered the idea of the nation to be subordinate to that of the state. He was of the opinion that as a nation the Czechs belonged to the Austrian Empire. In the lectures which he gave from 1885 onwards on the subject of practical philosophy, Masaryk speaks first about the state and only thereafter about the nation. States are the social structures within which mankind is organized.54 The idea of national identity is 53. Masaryk, The Making of a State, p. 390. 54. Nejedly, Masaryk III, p. 286.

62 Humanity, National Identity and Nationalism a historical and cultural principle, the modern interpretation of which is that it is a struggle to realize certain ideals. That is, longings inherited from one's forefathers. Political independence can be a powerful instrument. But national feeling can also be strong even if it is unaccompanied by political independence.55 The principle of national identity has only a relative validity. Because the interdependence of the nations in cultural matters and in matters of practical necessity is so great - and is becoming still greater - that it is precisely the principle of national identity which needs the principle of /«^/--nationality to ensure its preservation.56 From what has just gone before, it does indeed appear that for Masaryk the idea of national identity has little national-political significance so far. Political independence for the Czech nation, in any form whatsoever, was an unimportant matter as far as he was concerned up to and including the 1880's. Though he did change his mind in the 1890's. On June 30th 1891, Masaryk criticized centralism in the educational policy of the government in one of his speeches in the Viennese Parliament in a debate on the budget of the Ministry of Education. It was this centralism which was damaging to Czech education. He pleaded for Czech autonomy in educational matters. Though he added expressly that he was not speaking about autonomy in the usual political sense.57 A good six months later, he was less restrained when he raised the question of the idea of the Austrian state in the same political forum. He fought against the belief that in Austria, although it was not a national state, a particular nation was still allowed to claim a special position. There could be no question of one nation being subordinated to another. Instead of the subordination ( Unterordnung) of one nation to another, one should envisage, rather, a coordination. That is, a coordination (Beiordnung) of all national and state powers. In the Austrian Empire, therefoi e, one should not pursue uniformity but community. Not exclusive justice but social justice. One should not conquer other countries but perfect one's own state. One should not cultivate a police state but a free citizenry. One should not cling to the status quo, but renew the state for the benefit of the whole of its citizens.58 Masaryk continues to maintain his allegiance to the 55. Ibid. pp. 304f. 56. Ibid. p. 307. See above, p. 56 f. and cp. what Masaryk brought forward in his discussion with Marx and Marxism about the link between nationality and internationality. 57. Rychnovsky, Masaryk, p. 60. 58. Ibid. pp. 67f.

Humanity, National Identity and Nationalism

63

Austrian state; though he does not spare it from criticism. What he does want is drastic reforms, including political ones. Masaryk formulated these political reforms in rather precise terms in the budget debate of November 1892. He demanded that the rights of the Kingdom of Bohemia should be realized, also because of economic reasons. He did not want the Bohemian Crown Lands to be exploited for the benefit of the rest of the Austrian Empire. There remained but one response to the domineering role played by Hungary: the creation of a Bohemian State. Furthermore, autonomy would be the best way to damp down the struggle between the various nations in Austria; provided that it were given a suitable form. For instance, if the Czechs and the Germans in Bohemia could be separated as far as might be necessary.39 In the following year, Masaryk repeated the demand for autonomy for the Bohemian Crown Lands; this time putting the emphasis upon Moravia and Silesia. The aspirationsof the Czechs in the field of state's rights culminated, as Masaryk said on that occasion, in the natural pursuit of independence. This would not be achieved at the expense of the national, economic and political interests of the German and the other non-German peoples in the Austrian Empire. 60 In an earlier speech in his Parliamentary Constituency, Masaryk had already expressed the hope that his German fellow countrymen would come to see that the programme aimed at obtaining state's rights could also serve their interests. On that occasion, he also considered a compromise between Germans and Czechs in Bohemia on the question of nationalities to have the highest priority. 61 Masaryk spoke no more in the 1890's in such precise terms about the nationality problem as he had done when he was a Member of Parliament (1891-1893).62 Two matters spring to mind out of his speeches which are connected 59. Ibid. pp. 69ff. 60. Ibid. pp. 67 & 77. Masaryk appeals here both to natural right and to historic right. 61. Herben, Masaryk, p. 55. 62. The exception is an article dating from 1896 entitled, 'Zur deutsch-böhmischen Ausgleichsfrage', Die Zeit, (Vienna/Wiçn, 1896), Nr. 82. Here, Masaryk proposes, among other things, the formation of provinces and districts (Kreise and Bezirke). In this way, Bohemia and Moravia could be divided into ten and four provinces respectively each as large as Silesia. 'The territory of the provinces, as also that of the districts, should be separated where possible on the basis of language'. In the larger communities (Gemeinden) with considerable national minorities 'national communities resembling church parishes' could be formed. Masaryk is well aware of the complicated nature of his proposal; but he adds:., 'the complication consists precisely in the fact that we have lands (Länder) and communities which are of mixed nationalities.' Op. cit. pp. 51f.

64

Humanity, National Identity and Nationalism

with this theme. First, his support for the autonomy of the Bohemian Crown Lands within the Habsburg Empire. Second, his continued support for the cohabitation of the Germans and the Czechs within an autonomous Bohemian State; despite his plea for separation where necessary. At a time of strong anti-German feeling, Masaryk abstained from any nationalistic denunciation of the Germans. Neither when he was a Member of Parliament, nor in his capacity as University Professor, did he do this. Both as Member of Parliament and as Professor Masaryk was concerned with the cultural emancipation of the Czechs. He saw this obstructed not only by the structure of the Austrian State, but also by the shortcomings of his own people. As a Member of Parliament he used to refer to the first; and as a Professor preferably to the second. In Vienna, he used to criticize Austrian politics; but in Prague that of the Czechs. As Professor he used to remonstrate with his fellow Czechs that the salvation of the nation did not lay in political independence; though he got little thanks for doing so. 63 Thus Masaryk could also make the ironical remark, whilst serving a second term as Member of Parliament in Vienna, that the Czechs regarded him as too pro-Austrian and the Austrian Government (i.e. Minister Aehrenthal) upbraided him for being a bad Austrian. 64 He was also intensively busy throughout his second parliamentary term (1907-1914) with the nationality problem. In his first speech, he hammered away again at the problem of the national rights of the non-Germans in Austria; including the right of the Czechs to use their own language in the Viennese Parliament. The implementation of universal suffrage for elections to the Parliament (Reichsrat) in Vienna, a step forward in the direction of democracy, demands a further extension of it at national (Landtag) and local government level. It also demands proportional representation, the consequence of which would be the separation of the various nations in Bohemia and self-government for the Germans and the Czechs. 65 Masaryk also established himself as the champion of the rights and interests of the other Slavic nations in Austria. He calls the Slovaks who, according to him, were being treated inhumanely by the Hungarians, people who belong to the same nation 63. Masaryk, 'Slovanské Studie', p. 915. Cp. Palackého idea ndroda ceského, p. 44. 64. Rychnovsky, Masaryk, p. 153. 65. Ibid. pp. 110-112. Masaryk never discussed in detail how one might conceivably separate the Germans and the Czechs in the Bohemian Crown Lands in practice. H e has never said more than in his, 'Zur deutsch-böhmischen Ausgleichsfrage', see note 62. Later, when he was president, it was precisely the problems posed by the separation of these nations to which he pointed. See, The Making of a State, pp. 385ff.

Humanity, National Identity and Nationalism

65

(.Konnationalen). So he urged upon Austria the pursuit of a pro-Slav policy with respect to the State of Hungary. 66 In the great debate of December 1908, which took place after the annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina, Masaryk said quite openly that Austria as it then was could not be allowed to continue; that it should be changed in its very structure. The state should not be allowed to suppress the nations. It must, rather, use the power of the national idea in the interest of the nations and the whole state.67 The direction envisaged by Masaryk for the structural change of the Austrian Empire can be seen in a speech delivered in the 'delegation' of 1910,68 in which he showed himself to be a protagonist of a 'Great Austria'. This, however, could only come into being by accumulating all the powers of all the peoples in it. Ά Great Austria (GrossÖsterreich) should promote its peoples in all its aspects (i.e. cultural, economic etc.). It should also support liberty, progress and democracy.' 69 Until the First World War, in anticipation of which Masaryk had continually issued warnings and against the outbreak of which Masaryk had committed himself, he continually reiterated this standpoint on various occasions. He spared Austria from none of his criticism; though he remained loyal to the idea of the Empire.70 A development in Masaryk's thinking about the relationship between nation and state can now be noted. Even if the idea of national identity as a political principle was originally subordinate to the idea of the state, at a later period Masaryk's thinking came to be dominated by the insight that the state should serve the national identity of the various peoples or nations. Where the state did not serve the nations - as was the case in Austria - it should be reformed. Yet it still cannot be said that the idea of national identity is an idea which leads to the formation of a state in 66. Rychnovsky, Masaryk, pp. 113f. 67. Ibid. pp. 127f. 68. In the delegation, the common problems concerning Austria and Hungary were dealt with. 69. ibid. p. 146. 70. In 1913, Masaryk expressed his conviction in Parliament in a speech very critical of Austria that 'this Austria - whether good or bad - will last'. Ibid. p. 176. In a speech dating from the same year delivered before a meeting of his party, Masaryk says that all the Czechs ('all of us') desire equality and equal rights, all want freedom in Austria. Then there will be no reason to wish to get out of Austria within the foreseeable future. See Herben, Masaryk, p. 137. In 1895, Masaryk rejected out of hand the alternative to a political link with Austria, i.e. a political link with Germany. See, C.O.-N.N.K., p. 283. There are insufficient grounds for doubting Masaryk's loyalty to Austria in the pre-First World War period as Nejedly does. See Z. Nejedly, 'T.G. Masaryk a revoluce', in, M.S. II, pp. 153f.

66 Humanity, National Identity and Nationalism Masaryk's works. The autonomous Bohemian State for which he pleaded was still a multi-national state within an even larger commonwealth of nations. In such a Bohemian State, however, much more could be done for the cultural and national identity of the Czechs (and Germans). It was only during the First World War that the idea of a nation state dawned upon him; even though it was not a coherent idea. In The New Europe, the state is quite explicitly subordinated to the nation. Masaryk believed that the nation and (the idea of) nationality should be regarded as the goal of every social effort. And the state as a means to this end. To this he added that every awakened nation aspires to be an independent state. 71 So history shows, according to Masaryk, that evolution favours the formation of small national states.72 This historical tendency, moreover, runs parallel to yet another trend: the tendency for individuals, classes and nations to come together. There is no conflict between nationality and inter-nationality (one of Masaryk's life-long convictions)73 because nations are the natural instruments of humanity. Humanity does not necessarily imply uniformity; but rather unity. The liberation of the nations will make organic association possible: the federation of nations; the federation of Europe; the federation of the whole of mankind. 74 However, Masaryk thinks that national autonomy within a multi-national state is not sufficient any more for a nation such as the Czech nation. 75 He endorsed President Wilson's Declaration on the right of nations to self-determination.76 On the basis of this principle he thought that the Austro-Hungarian Empire had been both politically and morally condemned. 77 But the self-determination which he claimed for the Czechs 71. Masaryk, The New Europe, p. 18. This book, which was written in Russia in 1917, originally intended for the information of the Czechoslovakian soldiers who were there at the time, bears clear signs of being propaganda. It was published in manuscript form in 1918 simultaneously in French and English. Rychnovsky calls it not unfairly 'an outspoken propaganda document' (Tendenzschrift). See, Masaryk, p. 217. 72. Ibid. p. 23. 73. See above, pp. 60, 62 In, The Ideals of Humanity, Masaryk deduces the idea of nationality (national identity) like that of mfernationality (cosmopolitanism) from the idea of humanity. Op. cit. p. 18. In a speech on the occasion of the first anniversary of the Czechoslovakian Republic, Masaryk pointed out yet again that 'as Dostoevsky neatly demonstrated' man not only cherishes love for his own nation, but also a yearning... for the unification of mankind. See T.G. Masaryk, Cesta demokracie. Soubor projevu za repubìiky I (1918-1920), (Praha/Prague, 1934), p. 201. 74. Masaryk, The New Europe, p. 26. 75. Ibid, p. 28. 76. Ibid. p. 20. 77. Ibid. p. 34.

Humanity, National Identity and Nationalism

67

he had to deny to his German fellow citizens. It was his conviction that it is not possible to plan a new Europe on a strictly national basis.78 Within the framework of his thought in The New Europe, and the right of nations to self-government propagated therein, Masaryk's plea for a Czechoslovakian state is inconsistent. Masaryk's support for the principle of self-determination, however, must be seen in the context of his propaganda. 79 It was intended to be more of an argument against AustriaHungary than an argument in favour of Czechoslovakia.80 So in his war memoires Masaryk himself questions the right to self-determination. It is not accurately defined; and it does not imply an unconditional right to political independence for every nation without reserve. The independence both of the whole and its parts is not only determined by one's own rights; but also by the rights of others. Economic considerations also play an important role here. 81 As president, Masaryk guaranteed the Germans complete equality before the law82 and left no stone unturned in order to bring them out of their isolation and to involve them in the processes of government.83 It gave him great personal satisfaction when representatives of German political parties entered the government in 1926.84 Again, he carried the fight to nationalistic chauvinism.85 He had no more ears for the notion of a nation state. When speaking about the national character of the Czechoslovakian state, he would indicate that this should be based upon 'the quality of a common cultural programme comprehensively and 78. Ibid. p. 53. He himself speaks of a paradox when dealing with this point. 79. See above, note 71. 80. For the Czechoslovakian state, Masaryk adduces other historical and above all geopolitical arguments. Cp. T.G. Masaryk, 'Národ òeskoslovensky', in, M.S. II, pp. 242-247. 81. Masaryk, The Making of a State, p. 386. 82. For example, in his first speech before the national assembly (22 Dec. 1918), Cesta demokracie I, p. 20. And a year later in a speech on the occasion of the first anniversary of the Republic, ibid., p. 201. See also, The Making of a State, p. 387. 83. Cp. Handbuch der Geschichte der böhmischen Länder, Vol. IV, (Ed. by Κ. Bosl, Stuttgart, 1970), p. 37. 84. Ibid. p. 62. 85. For example, in the speech delivered on the occasion of the first anniversary of the Republic which has already been mentioned. Here, he says that a genuine national political policy will never be chauvinistic. See, Cesta demokracie I, p. 201. See further, The Making of a State, pp. 389f. and Rychnovsky, Masaryk, p. 260. Rychnovsky cites a speech of Masaryk which he delivered in 1928 on the tenth anniversary of the Republic: 'whilst I appeal to what I have already said, I repeat and emphasize also after the war that from our politics any chauvinism must be excluded, at any rate on both sides'.

68 Humanity, National Identity and Nationalism consistently carried out.' 86 As president Masaryk used to stress the importance of the state more than that of the nation. Though for him, the state is not an end in itself. It is, rather, the means to a higher end: cultural-social life; the liberation of the human spirit; the Kingdom of God.8? Summarizing this enquiry into the notion of national identity as a political idea in Masaryk's work, it can be stated that there was indeed a development in his thinking. But to the end he still remained faithful to the general tenor of his original position which he had formulated as a student of twenty-five. The ideas which he first maintained in his curriculum vitae about national identity (nationality) do not differ all that much from the standpoint to which he adhered during his presidency. Even when he was a Member of Parliament in Vienna, Masaryk did not follow a course which deviated substantially from this line; despite the fact that in different historical and political situations he let the accent fall elsewhere. It was only during the First World War that Masaryk deviated from his initial position in his defence of the nation state. (At that time, though, he was blazing the propaganda trail.) In his thinking about the relationship between national identity and humanity, Masaryk was primarily concerned with national identity as a cultural idea. National identity as a political idea - i.e. political autonomy - was subservient to this.88

86. Masaryk, The Making of a State, p. 388. 87. Masaryk, Program presidentuv, pp. 45, 78 & 169. 88. Karl Popper, who values Masaryk as a great 'humanitarian and liberal', is nevertheless the author of a mistake (quite understandable) when he repeatedly asserts that Masaryk supported the principle of the national state and national self-determination. See Popper, The Open Society, II, pp. 51, 312 & 318. And, Conjectures and Refutations, (London, 19693), p. 367.

Chapter 4

Humanity and Socialism

1. Introduction In this chapter, we shall go a little deeper into the assertion made in an earlier passage1 that Masaryk also interprets humanity as Socialism. This will be done as follows. First, Masaryk's formulation of, attitude towards and proposed solution for the social question will be examined. After that, by expanding his criticism of Marxism, we shall try to show that one of his main points of criticism is that on the basis of Marxism it is impossible to justify Socialism morally. Socialism is understood by Masaryk to be a social-political programme aimed at the attainment of social justice. By these two means it is hoped that the relationship between humanity and Socialism will become clearer.

2. Masaryk and the Social Question; Masaryk and Socialism The 1890's were not only important in the crystallization process of Masaryk's thinking about national identity and nationalism. Above all, they were the years in which Masaryk became conscious of the central significance of the social question; both for theory (philosophy) and for praxis (politics). What is special in all this is not that Masaryk was all that early in taking note of the social problems and in showing that he understood the miserable position of the working class in Habsburg Austria. Because he was certainly not one of the first on this particular scene. What is especially important is that at a time during which the national question dominated both the thinking and the emotions of the 1. See above, p. 46.

70 Humanity and Socialism citizens of the Bohemian Crown Lands, Masaryk was attempting to convince them that the social question was the more urgent and pressing of the two. As already said, Masaryk was by no means the first to appear on the scene. In the nineties, the situation of the working class in Austria was certainly no worse - and the social question objectively speaking no more pressing - than ten or twenty years before. 2 Yet one can find in Masaryk's works dating from the seventies and eighties only sporadic remarks which point in the direction of the social question. We do indeed find the expression 'sociální otázka' (the social question) in his thesis on the problem of suicide. But the inverted commas which Masaryk puts around these words indicate that his interpretation of the social question was different from the usual one. Although the standard of living was higher than in former days, Masaryk did not believe that the wealth of the nation was being divided in a completely just manner. It was his view that modern nations should strive to give a 'logical' form to the social relationships which had developed as it were spontaneously up to that time. In the field of economics, Socialism in its many forms should be seen in connexion with the pursuit of this form of social relationship. The materialism of those days, however, was more than Masaryk could take without thinking especially of Socialism in this context. The consequence of the economic circumstances of those days was a creeping, universal disenchantment. This turned in many cases into the feeling that life had become a burden (taedium vitae). Masaryk adds to this that in general the misfortunes of the day did not result from material wants or from superabundance; but rather from an immoral overemphasis on material satisfaction. According to Masaryk, the whole social question boils down to this: Do people really want to be moral and reasonable beings? Neither the poor nor the rich bear in isolation the blame for the situation. Everyone is guilty. Everyone has to make amends for his social guilt. And everyone has to suffer for it. 3 Masaryk also touches upon the social question in his lectures on practical philosophy. Though it is at precisely this point that one might have expected more from him. In the course of his expositions on the subject of society, in which he, though acknowledging that continuous changes are taking place, still persists in distinguishing two great classes: 2. See Bosl, Handbuch III, pp. 21 Iff. 3. Masaryk, Sebrevrazda, pp. 67-69. The influence on Masaryk of the ChristianSocialist priest M. Procházka, his competent Grammar School teacher from Brno, is still very noticeable here. Cp. Nejedly, Masaryk I, 1, pp. 182ff.

Humanity and Socialism

71

the ruled (the workers) and the rulers (governors), he also speaks about labour and the role of the machine in the work process. Masaryk does not agree with those who suppose that machines themselves can signify the liberation of the worker from his slavery. It is the other way about: machines make the workers' slavery more unbearable than feudalism ever did. Even if the ultimate in machines should ever be discovered, we would still not be able to expect from them a real emancipation for the workers. Were the relationship between worker and the 'boss' not to be improved in some way, were it not to be made more 'noble', then this would not be safeguarded by the introduction of machines.4 What is interesting for our purposes, namely the first theme of this chapter, is what Masaryk has to say on the subject of property. From a historical standpoint, he does not think that it is possible to regard existing forms of private ownership as final or sacrosanct.5 He denies that man qua man must possess private property, alluding here to real estate and not to goods and chattels. He also refers to history to support this opinion. Our ancestors, hunters, fishermen, herdsmen and farmers had no private property. Though Communism was not the original form of society. Only in the course of time would man become communist. By nature he is in favour of private property.6 So Masaryk was hopeful for 4. Nejedly, Masaryk III, pp. 270f. In the closing part of the passage paraphrased here, Masaryk probably had in mind the relationship of the worker and the owner of the means of production. So there is a great temptation to identify the two classes which he distinguishes as being the workers and the owners of the means of production. Not only the terms which he uses - 'trida vládnouclch' or 'spravujiclch' and 'trida ovládanych' or 'pracujicich' contradict this identification, but also the fact that when referring to the 'class of rulers' Masaryk has in mind especially the military. So Plato's influence is evident here. (Popper also points out that Plato in fact distinguishes between only two social classes; and not between three: 'the military caste - the armed and educated rulers - and the unarmed and uneducated ruled, the human sheep; for the guardians are no separate caste, but merely old and wise warriors who have been promoted from the ranks of the auxiliaries.' Open Society I, p. 46). Masaryk is perhaps also influenced by Plato when he thinks it would be ideal for society if everyone were to mind his own business, see Nejedly, Masaryk III, p. 271. Plato's idea of justice should be borne in mind here, as formulated in the Republic, 441d, cp. 433a and 434a and b. 5. Ibid. p. 297. 6. Ibid. p. 297. In the, Grundlagen, Masaryk is engaged in a controversy with Engels about the so-called primitive communism. According to Masaryk, that was something quite different from what Engels envisaged by it. It was a negative form of communism born out of material and spiritual need. 'On no account should one see an ideal state of affairs in the original agrarian form of communism and in the communistic economy', op. cit., pp. 348f. In the, Grundlagen, his expectation of the future communistic man has disappeared. Just like Aristotle, he thinks that communism is

72 Humanity and Socialism the future. Human nature develops out of an original situation, characterized by strife and slavery, towards greater and greater freedom. Man's altruistic feelings are bound to become stronger and stronger in this process.7 Were men to take into consideration how many people had achieved considerable political rights, Masaryk argues, then they would be bound to see in the end that the immediate future demands a juster distribution of income and property. The optimum and most justifiable economic structures would not come into being all at once. Certainly, not all the evil in the social system is destined to disappear. Socialists and communists alike are exaggerating when they think that everything will be brought about simply by changing social structures. Masaryk, however, is concerned with whether or not a solid foundation has already been laid for the healthy development of society in the future. 8 It is typical of Masaryk - though somewhat premature in the middle of the 1880's - when he argued whilst dealing with the question of Communism that one should not only concentrate upon the acquisition of property, but also upon how it is used. Economics should not be the only consideration. At this point, Masaryk stresses again the importance of morality and reasonableness. The only sensible position possible for him is that the work of men's hands ought to be used for the development of every facet of human life: the intellectual, ethical and the aesthetical.9 As already indicated, Masaryk came to realize the urgency of the social question in the nineties. His active and positive concern for the workers' movement and social democracy also dates from this time.10 During a debate on the budget in Parliament in 1891, Masaryk raised the social problem when the subject of public order was under discussion. This had only possible amongst friends, op. cit. p. 325 (250). Cp. Capek, President Masaryk Tells his Story, p. 181. 7. Both from his use of the word altruism and from his expectations for the future development of this sentiment among men, the influence of Comte can be deduced. See also above, p. 17. 8. Ibid. pp. 299f. 9. Ibid. p. 299. In this opinion of Masaryk's, an echo of J.S. Mill can be heard of what he was arguing in his, Principles of Political Economy, see Bk. IV, Ch. VI, § 2 (in the people's edition, London, 1896, pp. 453-455). 10. In 1889 Masaryk wrote for the first time about social democracy. The article was written in connexion with the International Workers' Congress held in Paris in that same year. Here, he refers to the massive expansion of the workers' movement and especially to the position of the social democrats in Germany. The greater part of the article is a reproduction of a speech in Parliament delivered by Bebel aimed at Bismarck's proposal for the introduction of an insurance against industrial [accidents. See T.G. Masaryk, Ό snahách sociálni demokracie', in, Cas, Vol. III, (1899), pp. 523-527.

Humanity and Socialism

73

become a matter of concern because of massive workers' demonstrations on the occasion of Labour Day (May 1st), because of miners' strikes, and no less because of the police reaction to these events in the spring of 1890. According to him, Austria was too close to being a police state when it came to the preservation of public order. Over against this, he suggests a state which refrains from persecution and arranges for social benefits. He criticizes the treatment of the workers and their newspapers. This reveals an obsolete police mentality. On the other hand, he praises the appointment of work-inspectors whose task it would be to act as middlemen in negotiations between employers and employees without getting involved, however, in political matters. But still he doubts whether the government really did have a coherent social programme. His final verdict is not at all flattering to the government. 'The government is totally alienated from the ordinary working man. All regulations and legislation betrays an ignorance of the real state of affairs. It is not only this intellectual failure which one can feel. Everything exudes a spirit of neglect, disdain and even contempt...'! 1 Masaryk pleads for the introduction of old-age benefits and breakdown pensions. For him, such a measure had nothing to do with stateSocialism. He acknowledged himself to be no friend of this. 'In this case, I do not fear state interference. Those who share my outlook and I will always cleave to the principle of autonomy and self-government both in legal and administrative decisions; even in this field. We do not, however, renounce these principles by our pleading for benefits for the elderly and pensions for invalids.' 12 On this occasion, Masaryk again emphasizes the notion that the social question is not only, and not even primarily, an economic question. Speaking about economics is merely scratching the surface of the social question. For Masaryk, the social question is preeminently a spiritual and moral question. In broad terms, he sees the answer to this problem in turning Christ's command to love one's neighbour into a living reality.13 He is, however, quite well aware that it cannot be enough simply to put norms and ideals in the form of pronouncements. The law would also have to be changed. He demanded this in January 1892 in a debate on the reform of the curriculum for the sciences of jurisprudence and constitutional law. According to him, Law now has a social function to perform. The social question is the funda11. Rychnovsky, Masaryk, p. 56. 12. Ibid. p. 57. 13. Ibid. pp. 57f.

74 Humanity and Socialism mental problem of the day. It is necessary to create what he calls 'living law' ('lebendiges Recht'). For this purpose, it is necessary to educate jurists who are capable of interpreting the law in the light of social development.14 The social question had thus become the central problem for Masaryk by 1892. It would long remain the object of his special attention. Indeed, right up to and including the time of his presidency; though strictly speaking the war years should be excluded. It has already been seen15 that in his Ceská Otázka, Masaryk expressly rated the social question as being more important than the national question. The ideal of humanity demands social reforms. It is not a matter of winning the workers to the national idea; rather of bringing about a sensitivity for justice throughout the whole of society.16 In the nineties, these are themes which recur time and time again in his writings. In Nase NynëjSi Krise, whilst remonstrating with his liberal, nationalistic opponents, Masaryk states that the workers, the proletariat, also form part of the nation. Because it is based upon humanity, the process of renewal implies precisely the moral, cultural and political liberation of the working class.17 In his study on Havliëek, we can read that Czech politics must indeed be humanized. That is, socialized. Also that up to now nationalism has hindered the socialization of politics.18 In his Jan Hus, Masaryk concerns himself with the Czech idea of humanity, which is preeminently social. It means fraternity; though this does not imply sentimentality but rather activity.19 Even in one of his publications which is devoted explicitly to the national question, Masaryk does not refrain from indicating that the solution to this problem can only be found if and when the principles of freedom and social justice are not only recognized but also put into practice.20 Thus, the original tenor of Masaryk's writings in the 1880's was that the social question did indeed have its material, economic side. And also that alterations were needed in the social field; though it was primarily a moral and spiritual problem. In other words, he believed that first of 14. Ibid. p. 66. 15. See above, p. 45. 16. Masaryk, C.O.-N.N.K., p. 220, cp. p. 270. Here, Masaryk states emphatically that he is not blind to the fact that 'our' workers are oppressed; even though he is not in agreement with Marx' theory.

17. Ibid., p. 249, cp. 293. 18. Masaryk, Karel Havlicek, pp. 109f.

19. Masaryk, Jan Hus, p. 73. 20. Masaryk, 'Zur deutsch-böhmischen Ausgleichsfrage', p. 51.

Humanity and Socialism

75

all a spiritual and moral transformation of man was needed in order to solve the social question. Eventually, however, the emphasis in his work comes to lie elsewhere. The demand for social justice comes to occupy a central position. Real changes of a social and political kind will have to take place. Throughout the whole of his criticism of marxist social theory, Masaryk is well enough aware that Socialism, like all other socialreforming creeds, has its living source in the obvious imperfections of the present social order, in its lack of justice and morality; and, in particular, in the material, spiritual and moral need of the great masses of all peoples.21 Material needs come first. The belief that a spiritual change is also necessary - he no longer says above all necessary - which he expresses in his study on Marxism, does not diminish the power with which he insists upon social reforms. 22 This change of emphasis is seen even more clearly in two papers published in the same year (1907). In the first one, Socialism is compared with the teaching of Jesus and the teaching of the church, 23 and in the second with the free-thought movement. 24 Masaryk is prepared to call Jesus a social reformer who fought for the poor and the dispossessed. He also draws attention to a number of Biblical texts which justify this image of Jesus. Jesus proclaimed the Gospel of Love; just as the church did inasmuch as it was true to Jesus. In its earliest days, as well as at later times - here Masaryk refers to the Taborites - a form of Communism had been known in the church. Many a form of Socialism has or has had a Christian character. But however sympathetic Masaryk's stance may be towards Jesus and religious forms of Communism and Socialism, he still thinks that the modern form of Socialism (i.e. Marxism) is a great step forward. The first improvement as he sees it is that Socialism in its marxist form is no longer Utopian. Instead, it strives to be scientific.25 Its second improvement is the desire to exchange 21. T.G. Masaryk, 'Die wissenschaftliche und philosophische Krise innerhalb des gegenwärtigen Marxismus', Die Zeit, Nrs. 177-179, (Wien/Vienna, 1896). This passage is from Nr. 179, p. 152. 22. Masaryk, Grundlagen, pp. 324f. (250f.). 23. T.G. Masaryk, O klerikalismu a socialismu, (ValaJ Meziríáí, 1907). 24. T.G. Masaryk, ('Svobodomyslnost a socialism', in,| Americké prednúSky, pp. 24-36. 25. Masaryk has in mind here Marx' recognition of historical laws, of the regularity of history, which, according to him, appeals to human action. Against this, he sets a belief in miracles which waits for intervention from the beyond. See, O klerikalismu a socialismu, pp. lOf. Cp. what Masaryk writes in, Spirit of Russia II, pp. 360f. 'We cannot esteem the social democracy too highly for the way in which it has made it a point of principle to insist that science must be applied to political practice, to demand

76 Humanity and Socialism philanthropy for social legislation, the begging-bowl for the statute book, and sermons about charity for just deeds.26 In his paper on Socialism and the free-thought movement, Masaryk draws attention to the similarities between them, on the one hand, namely anti-clericalism and being scientific; and, on the other hand, to the difference between them, namely that the free-thought movement theorizes without generally switching over to practice. Someone strives at the most after a so-called ethical culture. Instead of this, socialists want a completely new social order. They regard an ethical culture as insufficient; as they do the church's charge to love one's neighbour. 27 In both publications, Masaryk clearly opts for Socialism and for praxis; for a systematic endeavour on behalf of social justice. This is confirmed by certain points in his treatment of Dostoevsky, Tolstoy and Chekov. In the case of Dostoevsky, Masaryk criticizes his opinion that Socialism in its political form only aims at robbing the rich. He regards Dostoevsky's Christian Socialism as problematical; because it is based on a love which gives and asks to receive nothing, and is more concerned with God than with the workers. Christian teaching about brotherly love falls short of its goal in one way or another. This is why Masaryk thinks that social legislation is necessary.28 He also reproaches Tolstoy for his lack of understanding of the significance of social legislation. And for not seeing the difference between love and justice. 29 He is disappointed to find in Tolstoy's work only an academic interest in Socialism; which, according to Masaryk, has resolutely striven after progress.30 As President, Masaryk saw the implementation of social reforms as the primary task of the government. 31 In 1923, the year of the fascist Putsch that politics shall be based upon strictly scientific and sociological knowledge.' See also below, pp. 121ff. 26. It looks rather as if Masaryk - see also what follows - sees a contrast between love and justice. However, he says in the selfsame work that it is not sufficient merely to preach love for one's neighbour in a moralistic way; society itself must be a really moral one and should really love its neighbour. That can be seen when society accepts specific laws. Real love of one's neighbour means social justice, not philanthropy; and demands legislation. See, O klerikalismu a socialismu, p. 14. 27. Masaryk, Americké prednásky, p. 36. 28. Masaryk, Spirit of Russia III, pp. 147f. Here too Masaryk is not of the opinion that love necessarily fails and cannot result in social legislation. According to him, love usually fails to rise above the level of sentimentality, op. cit. p. 148. 29. Ibid. p. 189. For the contrast between love and justice see note 26. 30. Ibid. p. 303. 31. See, for example, Masaryk, Cesta demokracie I, pp. 260 & 313.

Humanity and Socialism

77

in Munich, he expressed his conviction that despite temporary and local right-wing tendencies, the general trend in every state is leftwards. Czech politics must be truely socially reforming and creative. He thought it fair that the Czech socialists should participate in government. Socialist parties in other countries which were vociferous in their complaints against this understood neither the international situation nor Socialism's peculiar tasks. 32 What are Masaryk's concrete proposals for the solution of the social question? For doing social justice? For socializing politics? What measures has he in mind? What is the content of his social-political programme? First, Masaryk is an advocate of the introduction of social security schemes. In his first period in office in the Viennese Parliament, he pleaded for a compulsory insurance scheme for old age and break-down pensions.33 To which he added in 1908 a universal sickness benefit as well. The costs of this scheme would have to be financed by a complete overhaul of the taxation system. In any case, these social security benefits could not be put into operation at the same time as an increase in the defense budget. Therefore Masaryk proposed the alternative: either soldiers or social security. He did not hide his own preference in this matter. 34 He had already spoken out on earlier occasions in favour of the introduction of a guaranteed minimum wage, the limitation of inheritance, a progressive taxation system, effective measures against unemployment and a conscious population policy (though he does not appear to have worked out the details of it). 35 Other social-democratic yearnings found a resolute champion in him too. He was one of the earliest advocates of equal and universal suffrage and the eight-hour working day. He had revealed himself to be in favour of equal and universal suffrage as early as the Workers'Congress of 1893 ; 36 subsequently, forexample, in Ceská Otázka37 32. Masaryk, Cesta demokracie II, p. 483. Masaryk insisted persistently upon socialist participation in the government. See Herben, Masaryk, pp. 359, 396 & 423. 33. See above, pp. 73. 34. In a speech on the necessity for a progressive politics delivered in Mëlnik on 20 September 1908, 'Potreba pokrokové politiky', in, M.S. I, pp. 175f. 35. See Masaryk, Grundlagen, p. 325 (251). As president he was committed to social legislation. He speaks out in favour of further progress towards the implementation of this programme in, The Making of a State, p. 395. 36. See, Cas, Nr. 16, (22 April, 1893), p. 251. In his lectures on practical philosophy a decade earlier Masaryk had already pleaded for proportional representation; but not yet - or at least not explicitly - for equal and universal suffrage. See Nejedly, Masaryk III, p. 290. 37. Masaryk, C.O.-N.N.K., p. 219.

78

Humanity and Socialism

and also during the workers' demonstrations of 1905 in which he himself had participated.38 Before and after 1907, the year in which voting rights had been partially granted, Masaryk worked zealously both in and outside Parliament for their complete realization. That is, for their implementation not only at state level, but also at regional (Land) and at local (Gemeinde) level; and also for proportional representation.39 He also campaigned by means both of the spoken and the written word on behalf of the eight-hour working day. He addressed striking mineworkers to this end in 1900.40 Indeed, as early as 1893 Masaryk had already made the suggestion in Vienna that the Minister of Foreign Affairs should confer with allied and other governments about the eight-hour working day; thus pleading for a foreign policy which was a social one. 41 It was no historical accident that the first bill which Masaryk signed as President was the one implementing the eight-hour working day. The complete socialization of the means of production lay originally outside his field of vision. At any rate, nothing is heard from him about this before the foundation of the Republic. Though he did have his own point of view about state Socialism. Both as a Member of Parliament and as a citizen with an interest in politics he resolutely rejected it. 42 As 38. Masaryk published an article about these demonstrations in, Der Weg, Vol. I, no. 7, (Wien/Vienna, 11 Nov. 1905), pp. 1-3, 'Der blutige Kampf um das allgemeine Wahlrecht in Böhmen'. He denounced police brutality and emphasized the non-violent, democratic and social character of the demonstrations. He had himself also contributed to the peacefulness of these demonstrations by his own moderating action. See, íeskoslovenská akademie vëd, Prehled (eskoslovenskych dëjin II, 2, (Praha/Prague, 1960), pp. 977, 983 & 985. 39. See Masaryk, 'Potreba pokrokové politiky', p. 174; 'Na prechodu k demokracii', in, N.D. XIV (1907), pp. If.; Rychnovsky, Masaryk, p. 112. 40. This speech, which was delivered in Kladno, appeared in the form of a brochure in Prague and is reprinted in a French translation in T.G. Masaryk, Les problèmes de la démocratie. Essais politiques et sociaux. Préface d'Albert Thomas, (Paris, 1924), pp. 1-23, under the title, 'La journée de huit heures'. Masaryk emphasizes above all - giving both chapter and verse - the practical advantages, both for employers and for employees, of the eight-hour working day. He recognizes, however, that its introduction is still not possible in all branches of industry; for example, it is not possible on the farm. One of the advantages enumerated by him consists in this, that the worker receives the opportunity to develop himself intellectually; and this again works in favour of the reduction of working hours. 41. Rychnovsky, Masaryk, p. 81. 42. See Masaryk, Grundlagen, p. 325 (251); Rychnovsky, Masaryk, p. 57 (see above, p. 73). In a lecture dating from 1899, his argument against state Socialism is that the State itself supports land ownership and industry, but has up to now neglected the workers and the trade's people very much. See, Vyvoj evropské spoleônosti ν devatenáctém století', in, M.S. II, p. 124.

Humanity and Socialism

79

President he did not use the word state Socialism; though he did indeed mention nationalization. He emphatically did not take this to be the same thing as socialization. Although Masaryk generally valued socialization in a positive way, nationalization was not his preference. In his war memoires, he writes: Ί am not opposed to the socialization of a number of undertakings socialization, not merely nationalization or State control - such as railways, canals, coal mines, and means of communication. I can imagine a gradual, evolutionary socialization for which the ground would be prepared by the education of workmen and of leaders in trade and industry. To this end well-ordered State finances will be needed and closer and apter control of the whole financial system, including the banks...' 43 In much the same vein, Masaryk used to make speeches on different occasions; especially in the early years of the Republic. The recurring topics of his speeches are: gradualism (because in the deplorable economic situation of Europe a revolutionary movement could well turn a bad situation into an even worse one), thorough preparation, schooling and the education of the workers,44 international cooperation, and a compromise with capitalism.45 Land reform which, unlike the socialization of industry, was indeed quickly pushed through, also found in Masaryk a convinced advocate. 46 In 1927, he said that the implementation of the 43. Masaryk, The Making of a State, p. 395. 44. See Masaryk, Cesta demokracie I and II, passim. Throughout the whole of his life, Masaryk used to hammer away at the question of schooling and the further education of the workers; and, indeed, not just on behalf of the workers, but also on behalf of the whole nation. He contributed personally to this cause. He was one of the founders of the Workers' Educational College in Prague (1897); he helped to finance the publication of a workers' paper; and he did not find it beneath his dignity to lecture to working class audiences; for example, a course of lectures in PIzeft in 1907 on the history of Socialism. 45. For this last point, Masaryk appeals also to Kautsky who, in an article in, Vorwärts, had pointed out to the German workers that after the devastations caused by the war the fastest possible restoration of production (i.e. restoration of the capitalistic mode of production) was in the interest of the workers. See, Cesta demokracie I, p. 402; cp. ibid. p. 159. 46. In this matter also he again insists on a wise policy. He refers to Marx for his view that expropriation cannot take place without compensation. Cesta demokracie I, p. 416. In, Grundlagen, p. 522 note 3 (431 § 142, note 6), he refers to a passage from Bernstein's, Die Neue Zeit Vol. XVI (1897/8), Part 1, p. 750 for this. Here, Bernstein writes: '...and he (Marx) declared on another occasion with reference to the land question in England, that one could apparently get off most cheaply if one bought out the landlords.' The article from which this passage is taken is entitled, 'Kritisches Zwischenspiel'.

80

Humanity and Socialism

land reforms in Czechoslovakia was the most important thing which the new Republic had done. It was a just and formidable achievement. 47 With this the review of Masaryk's social-political programme is concluded. Is it possible now to call him a socialist? The answer to this question depends upon what one calls Socialism. In his conversations with Capek, Masaryk says that he accepted contemporary Socialism inasmuch as it tallied with his humanitarian programme. For Masaryk Socialism is loving one's neighbour: humanity. He does not, however, take this to include philanthropy. Philanthropy only helps accidentally here and there; whilst humanity strives to improve the present situation by legislation. 48 Masaryk sees Socialism in the light of the humanitarian ideals of Equality and Fraternity. 49 It is an attempt to transform these ideals into reality; to turn slogans into political and social rights. 50 In Masaryk's work, however, the ideals of Equality and Fraternity had not so much the function of blueprints in agreement with which a new situation could be created as that of norms by which he judged the existing state of affairs to be unjust and on the basis of which it should be ameliorated. In this light, one should also see the statements in which he doubts the possibility of the consistent realization of Equality and Fraternity in society. 51 It is against this background that one should look at Masaryk's acceptance of Socialism.52 Masaryk could go along with contemporary Marxists because he shared their social criticism. He also repudiates a capitalism which made it possible for many people to live like parasites off the work of others by having an unearned income. 53 Like the socialists, he rejects the 47. Masaryk, Program presidentuv, p. 116. 48. Capek, President Masaryk Tells his Story, p. 180f. 49. Masaryk also relates democracy to these ideals. For that matter, democracy and Socialism overlap. See Chapter 5, below. 50. See Masaryk, Ideals of Humanity, p. 20f. 51. A passage from the, Grundlagen is typical: on the one hand, Masaryk rejects the ideal of absolute human equality; but, on the other hand, the existing inequality is harmful, unjustified and unjust. He is concerned with reaching a tolerable level of inequality. Op. cit. p. 324 (250). 52. In addition to the already mentioned passages from the work of Capek (see note 48, above), in which Masaryk favours Socialism (though only conditionally), he also declares himself for Socialism in, Spirit of Russia II, p. 362; and in, O klerikalismu a socialismu, p. 16, he reckons himself among the socialists. His most pregnant utterance is to be found in Capek, President Masaryk Tells his Story, p. 182: Ί am always on the side of the workmen and working people of all sorts, often for Socialism and occasionally for Marxism'. 53. See Masaryk, 'Vyvoj evropské spolecnosti ν devatenáctém století', p. 123. Cp. Grundlagen, p. 325 (251) and, The Making of a State, p. 173.

Humanity

and Socialism

81

laissez-faire economy of the liberal capitalists. 5 4 On matters of programme relating to actual social and political wants, there is little if any difference between Masaryk and his social democratic fellow countrymen. A n d certainly not during his presidency. Y e t they still hesitated to regard him as really one of them; despite all the sympathy they had for him and the g o o d will he used to enjoy in their circles. 55 This hesitation, which was not infrequently a negation, was a consequence of the fact that Masaryk had adopted a very critical stance over against the official (up t o the year 1930) ideology or doctrine of the Czech social democrats: i.e. Marxism. So the answer to the question raised earlier is that we can call Masaryk a socialist because of his social-political programme if we begin from the premiss that it is not strictly necessary to embrace Marxism in order to be a socialist. Ideologically speaking - or, in other words, from the point of view of doctrine - he was not, however, a Marxist. On the contrary, he was the most authoritative of Marxism's critics in his o w n country. His criticism had also attracted attention beyond the borders of his o w n country. 5 6 T o anticipate for a moment the analysis of his critique 54. Ibid. p. 124. 55. In the Festschrift offered to Masaryk in 1910 on his 60th birthday, two of the authors who were social democrats did not regard him as a socialist. See K. Dëdic, 'Masaryk a òeské socialistické hnutí', and F. ModráCek, 'Masaryk a deské hnutí dëlnické', in, M.S. IV, pp. 304-308. One of them, F. Modráíek, in a subsequent Festschrift (Th.G. Masaryk zum 80. Geburtstage, II, Bonn, 1930, pp. 291-298), did not hestitate 20 years later to call him a socialist; albeit not a marxist socialist. About the same time, Z. Nejedly is again arguing that Masaryk was not a socialist. See Nejedly, Masaryk I, 1, p. 28. 56. E. g. G. V. Plechanov, A. Labriola and E. Vandervelde noticed his work. Plechanov tries above all to meet Masaryk's criticism of dialectic. See his, 'Kritika nasjich kritikov', in, Sotsjinenija XI, (Moskva/Moscow, 1923), pp. 370-382. This criticism was more or less shared by Labriola. Labriola furthermore characterizes Masaryk - thereby making his own standpoint clear as well - as a 'doctrinaire', 'who believes in the power of ideas, that means as an academic for whom everything centres upon a battle for a world view; so it is not really surprising that he rejects with utter contempt "the instinct of the masses". This kind of criticism, which rests completely upon the arrogance of a disdainfully objective judgement in the name of science upon the practical battles of life and knows nothing about the devotion to thought which is quite content to follow the natural course of history, is and ultimately remains decrepit because it does indeed skirt around the edges of Marxism without, however, reaching the heart of the matter: the understanding of historical development from the point of view of the proletarian revolution.' Masaryk's, Grundlagen, is typified by Labriola thus: 'though well-endowed with scrupulous information and free from the professional contempt for Socialism - in intention and in execution none other than a long positivistic litany of complaint against Marxism!' See Antonio Labriola, 'Zur Krise des Marxismus', in, Die Neue Zeit, Vol. XVIII, Part 1, (1899-1900), pp. 70 & 72. For Vandervelde's criticism see below, p. 99. We come back again to the positivism which Labriola

82 Humanity and Socialism of Marxism, we can place him in the history of the social movement (or, Socialism) along with reformists à la Jaurès and the Fabians, though not with the revisionists à la Bernstein; however many similarities there might have been between the latter and Masaryk. 57 Just as Socialism cannot exist for Masaryk without democracy,58 so it is also impossible for it to exist without personal freedom. Throughout the whole of his life, he would have nothing at all to do with totalitarian or collectivistic forms of Socialism (or Communism). For him, Socialism is a necessary condition for the development of man in his individuality; meaning here of every man, not just of the 'happy few'. This is why he does not think that individualism and Socialism contradict each other. He writes: 'The social whole is made up out of the socialisation of organised individuals, and therefore the problem cannot be formulated "aut individual aut society", but must necessarily be formulated, "individual and society"... The individual must not and cannot be sacrificed to society and society must not and cannot be sacrificed to the individual. It is not individualism and socialism that are mutually exclusive, but solipsism and solomnism, or, in the concrete, Stirner and Marx, for both are wrong.' 59 We can typify his kind of Socialism as 'Socialism with a human face'. With such a characterization one can also typify the Czech socialist experiment during the so-called 'Prague Spring' of 1968. And the fact that it was precisely in Czechoslovakia that this particular experiment took allegedly finds in Masaryk's criticism of Marxism in a later paragraph. See note 124, below. 57. Werner Hofmann distinguishes between reformism and revisionism as follows: 'Within reformism, revisionism is a trend which has adopted a critical stance towards Marx, but first maintains that it is a development of his ideas. Not every reformism is at the same time revisionism; the latter can be understood rather by its relationship to that which it revises. For example, English Fabianism, like a segment of French social thought after Marx, is not based a priori on Marx' theory and is therefore not to be reckoned as revisionism. So 'reformism' is the broader, overarching concept over against 'revisionism'. Revisionism has certainly led to practical reformism too: still, the reasoning underlying both had to be different.' W. Hofmann, Ideengeschichte der sozialen Bewegung des 19. und 20. Jahrhunderts, (Berlin & New York, 1971), pp. 174f. 58. More about this in Chapter 5. See especially p. 106. 59. Masaryk, Spirit of Russia II, p. 403. Cp. Ί need not now fear that I am using empty words when I declare that individualism as an endeavour to secure the utmost possible development and perfectionment of one's own personality within society, is justifiable, and must be made possible and regarded as desirable in every political system, the socialist system not excepted. In this sense we accept individualism and its aspiration for liberty.' Ibid. pp. 403f. See also, Americképrednásky, p. 35; The Making of a State, p. 172; and note 82 below and Chapter 6, note 100.

Humanity

and Socialism

83

place should not be isolated from the consequences o f the filtering through of Masaryk's ideas.

3. Masaryk

and

Marxism

F r o m and especially during the 1890's, the social question had not only captured Masaryk's interest in its practical, social-political aspects; its theoretical side also occupied him intensively. Marxism, that is, the ideas of Marx and Engels,16(> w h o had relocated the social question in a new, theoretical context, was the kernel of Masaryk's predominantly critical exposition. 6 1 W e have already come across his critique of Marx in Chapter 1. There, it was mostly a matter of Masaryk's rejection of historicism. This is the occasion to g o into further details concerning the focal point of Masaryk's critique of Marxism: i.e. historical materialism. A s has already been seen in Chapter 1, one o f the reasons why Masaryk rejected historicism (in its exaggerated form) was that the ethical conse60. 'Both from a scientific and from a philosophical point of view Marxism consists of the ideas of Marx and Engels'. See Masaryk, Die wissenschaftliche und philosophische Krise innerhalb des gegenwärtigen Marxismus', in, Die Zeit, Nr. 177, p. 117. By reviewing Marx and Engels simultaneously rather then consecutively - to say nothing about a critical comparison between them - Masaryk neglects perhaps the differences between them too much; though he does also say that there are differences. On the other hand, they have probably been too much exaggerated in recent years to do justice to the real relation between them. The differences are more often than not the result of a selective reading both of Marx, the young Marx, and also of Engels, the old Engels, whereby Marx is seen too exclusively as the philosopher of alienation with an ethos of humanity and freedom, and Engels as the ideologue and system builder. In their lifetimes, Marx and Engels were not aware of any such fundamental differences; though they were well aware of developments and changes in their thought (certainly in Engels' case). Here, see note 97. As a matter of fact, they jointly edited the Communist Manifesto and The Holy Family, and also the German Ideology, though the lion's share of the work in this case fell to Marx. Furthermore, Marx collaborated with Engels when Engels wrote the Anti-Dühring, a fact which is often overlooked. See G. Lichtheim, Marxism, An Historical and Critical Study, (London, 19714), p. 237. Finally, it should not be overlooked that Marx' Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844, the most philosophical of his works, were not published before 1932, when Masaryk was 82 years old. 61. From 1895 on, Masaryk used to lecture on Marxism. His, Grundlagen, see Chapter 1, note 33, above, consists of material formulated in these lectures and is therefore the main source for his criticism of Marxism. From 1898, he regularly published articles in German and Czech periodicals on the latest developments in Marxism ; e.g. in Die Zeit and Nase Doba. (See the bibliography.) Nearly all the articles which appeared in Die Zeit also appeared in Nase Doba. Furthermore, important passages on Marxism may be found in his studies on Russian philosophy of history and religion.

84 Humanity and Socialism quences of historicism were unacceptable. An attempt will now be made to demonstrate that Masaryk's critique of historical materialism has yet again an ethical thrust as well. His repudiation of historicism cannot be taken in isolation from his criticism of historical materialism. It is connected with the positivistic character of both. A sketch of the intellectual development of Marx and an analysis of marxist epistemology (psychology) and metaphysics precedes the actual discussion of historical materialism in the Grundlagen. In agreement with the now current interpretation of Marx - an interpretation one cannot easily say was current in the time of Masaryk - Masaryk sees Hegel and Feuerbach as the most important of Marx' auctores intelleciuales; without thereby neglecting the influence of French thinkers such as Saint-Simon, Proudhon and even Comte. 62 Hegel's dialectic and Feuerbach's materialism are the basic ingredients of Marx' historical materialism. 'Hegel introduced him (Marx) to philosophy of history and to political philosophy, which Feuerbach's critique of religion made materialistic and social.' 63 If Masaryk was extremely critical of Hegel's dialectic, he was even more critical - if that is possible - of the marxist materialistic dialectic.64 Masaryk sees as the greatest fault both of Hegel's dialectic and of marxist dialectic the fact that they render impotent the principle of contradiction, one of the basic rules of thinking: in dialectic contradiction is an integral part of the truth. 65 That Marx and Engels see the foundation of the dialectic to be in nature changes nothing. Because, according to them, dialectic eventually enters the brain via nature. 66 Masaryk denies that there is an objective dialectic either in nature or in history. What Engels produces as examples of a dialectical process in nature and in history is not dialectic according to Masaryk but development. In Engels' own 62. See Masaryk, Grundlagen, pp. 35f. (47), and 164. He is, however, circumspect in his analysis. 'Lacking a full critical edition of the works of Marx and Engels and a detailed biography we cannot define Marx's philosophical and scientific development precisely in all its details.' See, Grundlagen, p. 21 (38). He used to maintain, however, against e.g. Struve and Cunow, that in the works of Marx one can trace the influence of Hegel 'in every period and right from the very beginning. That Marx scrutinized Hegel critically at an early period does not imply that he was not influenced by him. Quite the contrary.' Op. cit. p. 43 (note). In agreement with Struve, he is well prepared to admit that Lorenz von Stein influenced the course of Marx' development. Op. cit. p. 34 (note). 63. Ibid. p. 21 (37). Cp. p. 164. 64. Ί must admit, Hegel's dialectic even in materialistic garb appears sheer hocuspocus'. Ibid. p. 45 (55). 65. Ibid. pp. 46f. (57f.). 66. Ibid. p. 48 (58).

Humanity

and Socialism

85

words as cited by Masaryk: 'the causal interconnection of the progressive movement from the lower to the higher, which asserts itself through all zigzag movements and temporary retrogressions.' 67 With respect to Masaryk's critique of the materialism of Marx and Engels, it is best to keep several things in mind. First, Masaryk's repudiation of epistemological and metaphysical materialism is quite definite. Here, he also turned more upon Engels than upon Marx. Feuerbach's influence at this point is not important. 6 8 Despite his declarations to the contrary, Masaryk is of the opinion that Engels did not transcend the vulgar materialism of Büchner, Vogt and Moleschott. For Masaryk, materialism is not more acceptable if and when the life of the soul is n o longer explained in mechanical terms but rather in terms of chemistry and biology. H e also regards it as superfluous to have to point out yet again that n o serious researcher still took the view that spirit is the highest product of matter. 6 9 Second, it is striking that Masaryk labels materialism 67. Ibid. p. 47 (58), cp. 50. The quotation is from Engels' study on Feuerbach which Masaryk quotes from a revised reprint from the journal Neue Zeit (1886), p. 44. For a reference to the English text, see Kohák, op. cit. p. 405, § 9, note 4. There is a remarkable similarity between Masaryk's criticism of the dialectic of Hegel and Engels (Marx) and that of Popper. In his essay, 'What is dialectic?' (in, Conjectures and Refutations, London, 19693, pp. 312-335), we can find Masaryk's arguments, albeit elaborated and in more systematic form, alongside other arguments. Masaryk's respect for Marx' and Engels' knowledge of the contemporary natural science is just as scant as is Popper's for Hegel's knowledge of the then contemporary natural science ('the natural sciences are for Marx and Engels nothing but methodological puff-puff.'). Ibid. p. 80 (90). 68. Even before, Grundlagen, Masaryk wrote in, Nase Nynëjsi Krise, that the Feuerbach upon which the socialists of those days based themselves, was not so simply materialistic. See, C.O.-N.N.K., p. 383. Also on the basis of this passage and with the context in mind, we take the view that a sentence in the, Grundlagen referring to Feuerbach ought to read as follows: 'Yet, Feuerbach was still critical enough not to accept all of materialism consistently and with all its consequences', ibid. p. 58 (67). Both in the existing German text and in the revised Czech version of 1936 the negative is missing. 69. Ibid. pp. 59f. (68f.), cp. 56 (65). Tempora mutantur. On the basis of the investigations of the anthropobiologists, the theologian E. Schroten now writes about the spirit as a dimension of matter in his dissertation entitled, Kerker of Tempel. Over de zin van de lichamelijkheid, (diss. Utrecht, 1970), pp. 38ff. From Masaryk's criticism of Engels, one can get the impression that as far as Masaryk is concerned, there is no difference in principle between epistemology and psychology. He seems to confuse the philosophical question (the second order question): How is true knowledge of the world possible, what is knowledge? with the empirical question (the first order question): How does man get to know the world, how does he perceive the world? Nevertheless, for Masaryk the noetic problem seems to have more than just a psychological aspect. He regards Engels' argument against Kant (chemistry would refute Kant) as completely unsatisfactory; just like his pudding argument (the proof of the pudding is in the eating). In Masaryk's estimation, Engels, and Marx as

86

Humanity

and

Socialism

in its marxist form as positivistic and regards Feuerbach here as the significant factor. The denial by Marx and Engels of metaphysics and ideology 7 0 is considered by Masaryk to be positivistic, together with their emphasis upon a scientifically-based world view (Weltanschauung). 7 1 Feuerbach's significance for the positivistic character of marxist materialism is seen by Masaryk to lie in his theory of anthropomorphism. That is, in his critique of religion and theology. Here, Feuerbach continues in the footsteps of Hume, the father of modern positivism. 7 2 According to Masaryk, Marx and Engels followed again in the steps of Feuerbach in their critique of religion and theology; a critique which is not always as clear as it should be. N o r is what they thought about positive science characterized by clarity. 'At n o place in Marx and Engels do w e find the required theory of what actually constitutes science and scientific knowledge, of what constitutes scientific explanation. For a system that calls itself scientific - scientific socialism... this is not a minor failing.' 7 3

well for that matter, never took up thoroughly enough the noetic problem. The reason is that they were not critical enough. They were too much under the influence of Hegel, whose spectacles they used when reading Kant. Ibid. pp. 58 & 60 (66, 69). Masaryk rejects the identity of psychology and epistemology. 'Certainly, all logical processes must also be studied in their psychological aspects; though epistemology and logic are not part of psychology'. Versuch p. 203f., note 2. When Masaryk describes the role of epistemology, however, - epistemology, as a part of theoretical logic, is concerned with the origin and development of knowledge - the philosophical character of epistemology again becomes problematical. Op. cit. p. 204. 70. Masaryk points out the various meanings of this word in Marx' work; and, above all, in that of Engels', ibid. pp. 65 & 71. 71. Here, he cites almost exclusively from Engels, e.g. his definition of materialism:... 'to comprehend the real world - nature and history - just as it presents itself to everyone who approaches it free from preconceived idealist crotchets. It was decided mercilessly to sacrifice every idealist crotchet which could not be brought into harmony with the facts conceived in their own and not in a fantastic interconnection.' Ibid. p. 63(72) (the citation is from L. Feuerbach, p. 43). Further: 'It is no longer a philosophy at all, but simply a world outlook ( Weltanschauung) which has to establish its validity and be applied not in a science of sciences standing apart, but in the positive sciences.' Ibid. p. 64 (72) and 72 (81) (the citation is from, Anti-Diihring, p. 141). For references to the official English translations see Kohák, p. 407 § 13, notes 1 and 4. Masaryk refers here rightly to the influence of positivism (Comte). On the other hand, he could have referred here to a difference between Marx and Engels. Engels was indeed more the builder of a system, of a closed world view, than Marx. 72. Ibid. p. 35 (47), cp. pp. 28 (43) & 66 (75). 73. Ibid. pp. 71f. (80f.). Here, one should ask oneself whether Masaryk had thought about Marx' and Engels' ideas about scientific history. Actually he did think about this: 'Marx does, to be sure, have a concept of scientific law, but he is not clear as to its extent because he failed to clarify the essential nature of scientific explanation.' Ibid. p. 205 (191). Elsewhere he says: 'They (i.e. Marx and Engels) do not distinguish

Humanity and Socialism

87

According to Masaryk, Feuerbach is also of great significance for Marx' and Engels' philosophy of (revolutionary) praxis. We will come back to this point again later. 74 After these introductory remarks, there now follows an analysis of Masaryk's specific critique of marxist historical materialism. Our benchmark is his formal criticism of Marx' Preface to his A Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy. This was already regarded by Kautsky as the classical formulation of historical materialism. The 'classical' character of this text was attacked by Masaryk because he did not find in it the chief distinguishing feature of what is classical: accuracy and clarity: 'Let the reader beware: the analogizing expressions: a superstructure arises - the image does not tally with the following stipulations, according to which ideology is only a symptom, something which indicates the relations of production; the unqualified verb "to determine" - three expressions for the same concept coming hard after each other: relations of production, modes of production, conditions of production. In the main, however, it is the psychology which strikes our attention: What are "forms of consciousness"? What is consciousness generally? Is it true that being determines consciousness? Is it not the case in reality that being and consciousness are identical for man? Feuerbach, who is speaking here, has at least expressed himself more definitely: "Man should explain thought (not consciousness) from being; and not being from thought". Furthermore, the sentence contains an intrusion: In the first part of the statement "consciousness" and "being" are spoken about, and in the latter part "social being" is already spoken about! Further on in the course of his argument consciousness is identified with ideology. Is it true and what could it mean that men bring the social revolution to consciousness in ideological forms? Would not material contradictions in themselves be recognizable? In fact Marx wants man to explain this revolutionary consciousness straight away in the

exactly between real sociohistorical causes and laws... do not specify the degree of generality of particular laws, and do not distinguish empirical laws from basic principles of explanation'. Ibid. p. 208 (193). Masaryk's criticism of dialectic and its connexion with the 'great' law of the class struggle underlies this observation. In his distinction between two types of laws, Masaryk seems to follow J.S. Mill. Mill distinguished empirical laws (with a low degree of generality) from the laws of nature. See Popper, The Poverty of Historicism, p. 120. 74. See below, pp. 95 and 105.

88

Humanity and Socialism

very next sentence on the basis of "the contradictions of material life", which alone is according to the famous objective dialectic.'75 This long quotation is cited here because in it Masaryk is giving an indication of the direction which his critique of historical materialism is going to take. Behind his more formal criticism of it there lurks an underlying critique of its content. But Masaryk did not confine his (more formal) criticism to A Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy He also cites from The Holy Family, the Manifesto of the Communist Party (in which historical materialism is 'already fully stated'), The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte, and copiously from Capital I and III.2. 76 His conclusion is again given in an extended citation: 'Such a word-count and such a confrontation is informative ! We can observe how Marx continually modifies his definitions; at the same time we can see how the original materialistic radicalism is toned down with time. In The Holy Family and still later Marx absolutely repudiates all ideology. Guided by his materialism he takes economic relations to be social senses, ideology to be thought stemming from the senses, thus approximating Hume's position when distinguishing the living sense impressions from the less living ideas, which are none other than pictures, copies of sense impressions. Similarly (similarly - it is here only a matter of similarity!) Marx takes ideology - Religion, Morals, Philosophy, Art, the State - to be a kind of reflex, an indicator of economic relations. According to Marx' verbal explanations, the relationship between ideology and the relations of production (less accurately: economic relations) does not become clear to us. So one should make here two distinctions. First, the evaluation of ideology. Generally speaking, Marx' estimation of this is very low - he only takes the relations of production for "real", somewhat in the sense as one without Marxism very often hears self-styled "practical people" saying that outside the full purse there is "nothing"; one can but take Religion etc. also to be a kind of decoration of this "praxis" - Marx sometimes speaks in this vein. Of more weight than his evaluation of ideology is his explanation of its relationship to the relations of production. Provisionally one should beware that Marx originally denies ideas any effectiveness 75. Ibid. pp. 94f. This passage is missing in Kohák's English edition. Masaryk cites from Kautsky's German edition of 1897, p. XI. Masaryk took the quotation from Feuerbach from the latter's, Sämmtliche Werke 1846-1866, II, p. 263. 76. See ibid. pp. 95ff. Kohák, op cit. p. 101, only indicates where the material quoted by Masaryk can be found in the respective English editions.

Humanity and Socialism

89

whatsoever. Apart from his wonderfully naive sentence, that people with practical power are needed to put ideas into practice (Masaryk has in mind here a passage from The Holy Family) the question which interests us here is precisely whether the relationship between ideology and the relations of production is to be understood causally. What Marx says in this connexion is imprecise. Now ideology is but a reflex, individual consciousness merely an illusion; now ideology is attributed a greater or lesser effectiveness. As early as Volume I of Capital, one can read of the end which as a law determines our will; we learn that we, by changing nature, change ourselves and that technology unveils the direct production process of life (a peculiar way of expressing something); in this context it is then expressly said that the mental images (ideas) spring from the social relations of life, therefore not from the merely economic relations of production. In volume three, Marx eventually admits quite openly that political power, which is determined by the economic form, in turn determines this form; we also learn about modifying social powers, about various natural conditioning factors, e.g. race, yes, even about extra-historical influences and suchlike. Let the reader observe for himself with what multifariousness Marx defines his real economic foundation: relations of production or relations of property; relations of production and relations of property; relations of production and means of transport; technology and mode of work in general (not what is made but how) and suchlike.'77 In the same critical vein, Masaryk deals with those passages in the work of Engels which are concerned with historical materialism. He states that Engels over the years revised his opinion on historical materialism, to which Marx also adhered. He draws attention to the fact that Engels recognized that both Marx and 'he had partly only themselves to blame for the fact that the younger generation sometimes lays more weight on the economic side than it deserves'.78 So Engels went on to speak of an interaction between the economic substructure (Unterbau) and the variable parts of the superstructure (Ueberbau) without, however, crediting ideology with a historical development of its own. 77. Ibid. pp. 98-100. Again missing in the edition of Kohák. 78. Ibid. pp. 103-109 (the quotation is from p. 104). Masaryk refers, e.g., to passages from, Anti-Diihring, The Origin of the Family, Private Property and the State, and from several letters. For English references see Kohák's edition, p. 101.

90

Humanity

and

Socialism

Masaryk's critique of the substance of historical materialism is both ample aïid full of variety. H e criticizes it because history is interpreted dialectically and historicistically (in an exaggerated form) under the influence of Hegel. 7 9 Masaryk regards the statement that the classstruggle should be the power-house of the historical process as primitive. A n d also as a fiction.80 History (society) develops under the influence of various factors which are not reducible to one single factor; a thought which shows Masaryk to have been ahead of his time. 8 1 In the historical process, the individual plays a much more important role than Marx and Engels admit. 8 2 Masaryk, however, is certainly willing t o recognize that Marxism made a significant contribution to scientific historical explanation with its estimation and overestimation of economic forces and conditions. 8 3 Masaryk's predominant objection t o historical materialism, however, is its extreme positivism and objectivism. For the most part, the rest of his critique is reducible to this. Masaryk labels Marx an objectivist, by which he implies that Marx rejects absolutely as a valid object of the philosopher 79. Cp. above, pp. 21ff. 80. 'Engels' two classes... may correspond to Hegel's negation of the negation, but this negation of the negation does not correspond to reality. Marx and Engels repeatedly become victims of exaggerated primitivism. 'Ibid. p. 172 (159). 81. Cp. F. Kolegar, 'T.G. Masaryk's Contribution to Sociology", in, (Ed.) M. Rechcigl Jnr. Czechoslovakia, Past and Present, Vol. II, p. 1532. See also Chapter 1, note 38. Masaryk distinguishes between natural factors (Naturkräfte), cosmic, tellural and biological, and social factors - religion and church, morals and customs, art, science, philosophy, politics and law, nationality and language, economy and social organization and the biological organization of the population, Grundlagen, pp. 150ff. (141f.). 82. As early as 1877 in his criticism of Funk Brentano's, La civilisation et ses lois {M.S. I, p. 40), he turned against a sociology which did not take into consideration the concrete individual; but rather put everything on a purely abstract thing, on society. There is a reciprocal relation between the individual and society. We find the same opinion in his lectures on practical philosophy (Nejedly, Masaryk III, pp. 241 & 258). On op. cit.p. 256, just as in the, Grundlagen (pp. 188ff., Kohák, p. 175ff.), Masaryk also attacks an organismic sociology with strong arguments. He thinks Marx and Engels have also been influenced by it. To put it in modern sociological terms: Masaryk attacks methodological collectivism (holism) and is a proponent of methodological individualism. For this terminology see W.H. Dray, 'Holism and Individualism in History and Social Science', in, The Encyclopedia of Philosophy, (Vol. IV, pp. 53ff.). Cp. his thesis: 'In the last analysis sociological and historical explanation must always be psychologically verified, for the simple reason that society consists of individually conscious and consciously acting individuals.' See, Grundlagen, p. 153 (143). 83. Masaryk, Grundlagen, p. 130 (116). Elsewhere, however, Masaryk contends that in this, Marx and Engels echo a line of thinking which had already largely been accepted. Ibid. p. 168.

Humanity and Socialism

91

man reflecting upon himself. For Marx, man in his subjectivity is not an object of philosophy. Philosophy should be a science, whose object lies outside the individual, subjective man. That is, in the objective world of men, in nature and, above all, in society interpreted historically. This world of men is the object of science and philosophy, of scientific or positivistic philosophy. Masaryk argues that for Marx, philosophy is a 'naturalistic photograph of the world-process' ('naturalistische Copie des Weltprocesses'),94 in which human consciousness plays only a secondary role. The contents of it are ideological and illusory; as they are determined by existing economic conditions. Especially in the light of this, Masaryk labels Marx as a positivist and Marxism as positivism.^ Masaryk is unwilling to allow human consciousness to vanish entirely into thin air as if it were some kind of illusion; i.e. to be sacrificed on the altar of positivism. Because psychological analysis demonstrates, according to him, that religious feelings and ideas, morality, artistic and philosophical creativity etc. do have a positive value of their own which is not dependent upon economic conditions. The value of religion, morality etc. as independent entities is confirmed by history. 'Religion cannot be adequately accounted for in terms of economic development.' 86 So consciousness is a very comprehensive concept in Masaryk's work. It comprehends all the psychological activities of man - thinking, feeling, willing - which 84. Ibid. p. 89(98). 85. 'Positivism... wastes no time on study of man's inwardness. Comte intentionally eliminated it from his psychological method and characteristically subordinated psychology to physiology. Similarly, for Marx a concept is a mere reflection of an external world, a mental photograph.' Ibid. p. 86(95). That Hegel's and Marx' historicism is characterized by Masaryk as positivistic too - see ibid. pp. 66 (74f.), 117 (102f.) and 138 (125f.) - should come as no surprise. For typical of historicism is the idea of an objective, regular development (i.e. following set laws) which takes place independently of the individual. See above, pp. 21 if. 86. Ibid. p. 152(142). Masaryk's reply to Engels' theory: that Calvin's doctrine of grace is an expression of the fact that in the world of business whether an individual is successful or goes bankrupt depends not on individual competence and energy but on conditions beyond man's control; that this doctrine of grace had to be formulated of necessity in the time of Calvin, is: 'We can, after all, trace Calvin's views far beyond Calvin... we can note Calvin's reliance on Augustine - what does all that have to do with the economic relations of Calvin's time?... It is true that the merchant is at the mercy of economic constellations unknown to him and that these can affect him in a way analogous to the way in which the terrifying, equally mysterious natural forces affect the savage. The merchant in his anxiety can take refuge in supernatural powers, as can the savage in the primeval forest... We have long known that in misfortune men seek God more diligently than in good fortune. So far, we can agree. But all that follows from this is that economic conditions can make men afraid. What follows from this for economic materialism?' Ibid. p. 145 (134).

92

Humanity and Socialism

have to do with religion, morality, art, philosophy and science. That psychologists treat consciousness as a self-evident and irreducible fact, however, does not mean for Masaryk that man is not liable to make all sorts of mistakes and to be misled by all kinds of illusions. For instance an illusion about historical development. That is why Masaryk does not find it so surprising that Marx and Engels see the nature of man and history as something quite different from what they are usually taken to be. What is surprising is that they did not make a proper attempt to establish the truth of their doctrine. Furthermore, so he proceeds with his argument, Marx 'failed to note that all consistent thought, all philosophy, is really a dis-illusionism - a constant critique and overcoming of our various illusions.' 87 Masaryk states not only the reality of consciousness (real in the sense of 'not fictitious, not illusory'), but also tries to show that illusionistic historical materialism contains self-contradictions and is thereby rendered impossible. So he wonders whether the fact that positive science, which Marx and Engels accept, grows and structures itself under the old capitalistic economic order, does not prove 'that ideology is not a superstructure and that this superstructure does not "change more or less rapidly" only with the change of the economic infrastructure?'88 Masaryk thinks that even if it were possible to distinguish - which it is not - between 87. Ibid. pp. 154f. (144f.), cp. pp. 86(95), 134(121). The Marxism which pretends to be scientific is not critical enough for Masaryk. That is a recurrent criticism in Masaryk's work. Cp. his earlier criticism of the marxist dialectic and theory of science. More frequently and more pointedly does this reproach ring out against the epigones of Marx and Engels. In 1898, Masaryk speaks of a crisis in Marxism, whereby he focusses upon the contrasts between the opinions of Marx and Engels, on the one hand, and the younger marxist theoreticians on the other. Masaryk's evaluation of this crisis is positive: it means that Socialism is getting more scientifically exact and more critical. It is losing its exclusivity and the darkness of infallibility. 'The party belief which rests on authority retreats before criticism and self-criticism.'See,'Die wissenschaftliche und philosophische Krise innerhalb des gegenwärtigen Marxismus', in, Die Zeit, Nr. 179, p. 151. In later publications, Masaryk's evaluation of the crisis in Marxism is a negative one; because the contradictions are 'disguised in a scholastic way'. See T.G. Masaryk, 'Wissenschaftlicher Sozialismus und Masseninstinkt', in, Die Zeit, Nr. 366, (Wien/Vienna, 1901), p. 5. And also because 'powerful partymen took the edge off the new problems'. See T.G. Masaryk, 'Der Fall Millerand und die Krise innerhalb des Marxismus', in, Die Zeit, Nr. 350, (Wien/Vienna, 1901), p. 163. He speaks of a 'deadly scholasticism, which just like the other parties and churches and by using their methods of distinction, definition, interpretation, allegorization and symbolising, aspires to adapt the untenable doctrines of Marx and Engels to the new views'. See T.G. Masaryk, 'Marx Studien', in, Zeitschrift für Sozialwissenschaft, (Berlin, 1904), p. 697. 88. Ibid. p. 159 (153), cp. Spirit of Russia II, pp. 322f. & 328f.

Humanity and Socialism

93

a nonpositive, unreal ideology ('ideological ideology') and a positive realistic one ('realistic ideology') 'the contradiction remains, for this represents an admission that exact thought and conscious willing creates new, better economic conditions'. 89 Masaryk's conclusion, then, is that Marx' scientiiic Socialism is a fundamental denial of economic (historical) materialism: 'the scientific socialist, to use Marx' terms, already has a communistic economic order in mind - this order is already present ideally in the scientific mind - that means that the economic foundation of Marx is not a substructure but a superstructure. The economic "foundation" clings to the coat-tails of ideology.' 90 The claim of the Marxists that Socialism, or the socialist system is scientific and represents the truth about social reality, that it is neither ideology nor illusion, does not tally with the contention that human consciousness - at least in a capitalist society - is illusory, ideological and determined by the social situation in which men find themselves.91 Masaryk does not limit himself to a negative criticism of the positivist character of historical materialism. He also demonstrates that Marx and Engels themselves have already broken through the framework of this amoral positivism. Amoral because it is a positivistic doctrine that morality is ideology and an illusion. The only thing which can be scientifically done is the explanation and prediction of reality. 92 Thus, Marx and Engels cannot dispense with an aim; that is, a social ideal. Masaryk is conscious of the fact that Marx and Engels distinguish between collective aims and individual social ideals. They accept the former as self-evident, objectively given in the (historical) situation (of the proletariat), whilst rejecting the latter as ideological constructions about the future. 93 Still, 89. Ibid. p. 159 (153). 90. Ibid. pp. 159f. (153f.). Translation slightly altered. Masaryk is thinking here of a passage in the first volume of, Capital in which Marx is comparing an architect to a bee. 'What distinguishes the worst architect from the best of bees is that he raises his structure in his head before he builds it in wax. At the end of the labour process a result comes about which at the beginning was already in the representation of the laborer, which was already present ideally.' Ibid. p. 97. Masaryk cites from the 4th German edition of 1890 (p. 163), cp. K. Marx, Capital, (E.Tr. Samuel Moore and Edward Aveling, New York, 1968), I, p. 178. 91. A marxist could object here that for Marx science, not only natural science but also social science, does not necessarily have to belong to the ideological superstructure. However, the question then poses itself in the form: Where does it belong then? Masaryk offers an interpretation of historical materialism which is an obvious consequence of the Ueberbauf Unterbau theory. It is made possible by the terminological weakness of historical materialism. This was something Masaryk himself put his finger on. 92. Cp. Chapter 1, p. 23.

94 Humanity and Socialism that is all a positivistic rejection of an ethic which wants something different from the prediction of what is going to happen. There is more in the work of Marx and Engels, however, than merely predicting the future scientifically according to Masaryk. The future communistic society has the character of a social ideal, not that of scientific prognostication. In agreement with their positivistic principles, Marx and Engels speak in a relativizing way about the various periods of history which lay behind them. But when it comes to the future, communistic society, their utterances have become absolute and therefore ««positivistic. While the Communism of the future as but a phase in the future historical development must also pass away according to the law of the negation of the negation and be superseded, this is still praised by them as the final, ultimate state. 'The law of the negation of the negation', Masaryk writes, 'having done its function, is suspended.' 94 Elsewhere, Masaryk directly connects Marx' Communism with ethics. 'Marx ultimately demands his Communism on ethical grounds, on the grounds of justice and genuine humanity, in spite of all his amoralism and positivism.'95 Masaryk also regards Marx' powerful critique of contemporary social conditions as something transcending amoral positivism. When Sombart says that there is not even a trace of ethics in Marx' work, he is only right in so far as Marx wanted to keep his system amoral. However, he did not succeed in this. Masaryk does not regard this as something strange; it would be quite impossible. 'We do not merely know the world, we judge it as well. Our world view is always a (value) judgement about the world as well. Marx too begins and ends his work with a (value) judgement.' 96 Masaryk does not make the usual distinction between the young Marx, the philosopher, and the later Marx, the economist.97 He sees not only moral judgements and condemnations in 93. Ibid. pp. 221f. (205f.) Masaryk refers to passages from the, Deutsch-Französische Jahrbücher, The Holy Family, A Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy, and, Capital. 94. Ibid. p. 217 (202). 95. Ibid. p. 332. 96. Ibid. p. 118 (104). 97. Though Masaryk does draw attention to the fact that in the Preface to the second edition of his, The Condition of the Working Class in England, Engels criticises himself for having seen in Communism in the first edition not simply a theory of the workers' party, but also a theory of the liberation of the capitalists. Engels blames himself that the spirit of classical philosophy and not that of scientific Socialism still speaks out of the pages of the first edition. Against this, Masaryk deplores the fact that it is precisely the later positivistic science which forced out this philosophy. Ibid. p. 490 (321).

Humanity and Socialism

95

the Theses on Feuerbach and the Communist Manifesto, but also in his Capital. 'The whole of Capital and all its presuppositions are ethical. The concept of surplus value is already viewed as not only economic but as ethical; the whole explanation of capitalism culminates in the assertion that the capitalists exploit the workers. All of history becomes a struggle of the oppressed against their exploiters. In spite of all positivistic laws, history appears in Capital as a continuous struggle for justice.'98 Masaryk devotes ample attention to Marx' criticism of Hegel's philosophy of right, which he holds up as the best and the soundest of Marx' writings." Masaryk recognizes the ideal of humanity in Marx' aspirations; though he rejects the method which Marx propagated: i.e. revolution. In Marx' plea for revolution, Masaryk sees less the result of an analysis of the economic situation, than the logical consequence of Feuerbach's critical philosophy of religion. Marx' philosophy of revolution is ideological. But it is an ideology which has not, however, the character of a superstructure (Ueberbau) in the sense of historical materialism; but rather of a 'pre-structure' ( Vorbau).100 The critique of historical materialism as being an amoral positivism runs right through Masaryk's study of Marxism. So, for example, in the chapter on Justice and the State.101 He reiterates here yet again that Marx 98. Ibid. pp. 118f. (104). A. Wood emphasizes the amoral character of Marx' criticism of capitalism. According to him, Marx is not critical of the capitalist system in terms of its supposed injustice. In my view, Masaryk is closer to the truth when he maintains that Marx wanted his 'system' to be amoral; though he did not succeed in this. See A. Wood, 'The Marxian Critique of Justice', in, Philosophy and Public Affairs, Vol. 1, 3 (Spring, 1972), pp. 244-282. 99. Ibid. p. 543 (342). 100. Ibid. p. 555 (353f. ). Cp. above, p. 93. 101. As to the state, Masaryk argues yet again that there is a contradiction in marxist theory. On the one hand, Marx and Engels assert that the state is merely the result of, or even the reflection of, economic relations; whilst, on the other hand, they want the proletariat to seize the power of the state in order to change the economic relations, ibid. p. 408 (272). Cp.: 'The state as an epiphenomenon of class rule, and the state as the prime agent of revolutionary change, exist on different planes of the complex Marxian structure. Depending on whether Marxism serves as a theory of bourgeois society, or as a doctrine of social revolution, the emphasis shifts from one aspect to the other, though the tension never quite disappears.' G. Lichtheim, Marxism, p. 375. Masaryk values Marx' emphasis on the economy, or economic conditions, over against the state. 'Economic conditions have acquired a great significance, particularly in recent times... This significance seems to me so great that I believe... that development is leading toward the creation of independent socioeconomic structures alongside political organizations. I understand recent social development in the sense that some important social organs are becoming more independent alongside and within the state. As the Church has become more independent, so, I believe, is economic or-

96

Humanity and Socialism

and Engels could not dispense with a social ideal. The question, then, is why this ideal would have to be accepted and how the means for the realization of this ideal could be justified. When the majority is in favour or when unanimity exists? Masaryk repliesj that in questions of truth and justice the majority cannot decide. Or else, in their own day, Marx and Engels would have had no right to speak at all. 102 Masaryk admits that the existing law is not identical with right and justice. Even for this right, however, there is no place in the positivistic system of Marx and Engels. Because it is ideology. That is, it is 'unreal and unjustified'. 103 On the other hand, they do nevertheless appeal to right and justice in the sense of natural law (right).104 Masaryk thinks that Engels' exposition on the subject of human rights - in Anti-Dühring - fails to prove his case. His exposition consists for the most part of a description of historical developments, i.e. facts which Masaryk for that matter does not entirely agree with in many cases. Economic developments have certainly contributed to the formulation of the demand for equality, to the freeing of the working people; 'but other factors, moral and political, were also present. Christianity proclaimed love of one's neighbour throughout the world for two thousand years; has this had no effect?' 105 However, as to human rights, e.g. equality, facts or historical developments are not decisive when the justification of equality is at stake. Inasmuch as Engels attempts to give such a justification, Masaryk rejects what he has to say. The demand for equality cannot be justified as a natural reaction ganization becoming increasingly autonomous. Various aspects are being singled out from the old state, and economic and intellectual structures in particular are becoming differentiated. This is why today economic and intellectual conditions... represent a considerable autonomous force alongside and within the state.' Ibid. pp. 409f. (273). As Masaryk himself indicates, this passage must be read in the light of his rejection of state Socialism. 102. Ibid. pp. 414f. (277f.). 103. Ibid. 416 (279). 104. Ibid. p. 416 (279). Masaryk refers in a note to Marx', A Contribution to the Critique of Hegel's Philosophy of Right, in which Marx opposes human right = natural right and historical right. Masaryk would have in mind here the passage at the close of the 'Introduction' in which Marx is speaking about the creation of a class, a 'sphere... which can invoke no historical but only its human title'. See Karl Marx, A Contribution to the Critique of Hegel's Philosophy of Right, in Lewis S. Feuer (Ed.), Basic Writings on Politics and Philosophy: Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels, (New York, 1959), pp. 264f. (original italics). 105. Ibid. p. 422 (282). In comparison with Marx and Engels, Masaryk regards the proclamation of human rights as of great significance. 'It is not adequate to say that these rights are only 'apparent', and Marx is even less justified in interpreting human rights as a type of modern slavery.' Ibid. p. 424 (284).

Humanity and Socialism

97

against blatant social inequalities and as the expression of a revolutionary instinct. And, as a more far-reaching consequence of the demand of the bourgeoisie, the proletarian appeal for social equality is also unjustified. Because that in turn depends upon whether the demand of the bourgeoisie is justified or not. It is a question in itself whether the demand of the proletariat is justified. And if the bourgeoisie had not formulated the demand for equality - and it is also a fact that many of them do not do this - what, so Masaryk asked himself, would then happen in the case of Engels' more far-reaching consequence?106 Masaryk summarizes the chapter on Justice and the State with the conclusion that Marx and Engels regarded right (the law) only as a reflection of existing economic relations; and for this reason did not even attempt to specify the legal concepts. 'For positivistic amoralism, it is enough to say what has been and what will be; what ought to be, positive legal concepts, do not concern jt.'107 It should come as no surprise that Masaryk, in that part of his study on Marxism which is explicitly concerned with ethics, again concentrates his criticism upon the positivism of Marx and Engels. Their amoralism is quite impossible. Why do they oppose capitalistic exploitation? Just because the capitalistic system does not function well from an economic point of view? Not because it is unjust, because it interferes with humanitarian feelings? Why should we support Communism? Because of fear? Just because the 'rebels' in the Communist Manifesto are threatened? These are but a few of Masaryk's rhetorical questions.108 According to him, society is not just organized upon technical and economic, but also upon ethical principles. 'Justice and morality are real social factors, justified not only by their usefulness for society and the individual, but rooted in the feeling of humanity given to man.' 109 He speaks of the absoluteness of the idea of humanity in reaction to the relativism of Engels. Positivistic amoralism is wrong because, in conflict with the canons of positivism, it took a positive fact ('the evident awareness of a binding sentiment of humanity') to be an illusion. This sentiment of humanity justifies itself.110 106. Ibid. p. 421 (280f.). 107. Ibid. p. 426 (285). 108. Ibid. p. 486 (316f.). 109. Ibid. p. 486 (317). 110. Ibid. p. 487 (318). Masaryk justifies his highest norm, humanity, both with an appeal to its absolute character and with an appeal to its objective character, its naturalness. Cp. Chapter 1, pp. 28f.

98

Humanity and Socialism

Masaryk had already indicated on earlier occasions both the impossibility and the lack of consistency in the amoralism of Marx and Engels.111 In the context of ethics he again brings the humanism of both of them to the fore. They accepted the humanism of Feuerbach; but changed it from a sentimental humanism (in their opinion) into the real humanism of the class-struggle.112 Engels contradicts his own ethical relativism when he expects a 'genuinely human morality' for the communist future. 113 So humanity remains still their ideal; even when they have sacrificed morality in general, along with love, on the altar of positivism and historicism. They misunderstood the ideal of humanity and criticized it for this very reason; although they had to recognize it time and time again willy-nilly.114 For Masaryk, humanity does not exist without love; but love is not to be confused with sentimentality. 'Love today means having no peace because of all the physical and moral misery. Today, love means working ceaselessly, consciously, against all that misery.' 115 Or, as he writes elsewhere: 'Democratic love of one's neighbour requires the legal establishment of equality, demands justice; this is the essential meaning of socialism...' 116 Masaryk writes of an ethic and a religion of love. Not just for Sundays, high days and holidays, but for every day; for an ethic which would be lived out in the field of economics and politics. 117 Small wonder that he sees the proclamation of the rights of man, his economic rights included, such as the right to work, as a further realization of the ideal of humanity, as a translation of the ideal of humanity from the realm of ideas and aspirations into political and social practice. Marx and Engels just did not understand this. 118 In the numerous publications written after the Grundlagen which are directly or indirectly concerned with Marxism, 119 Masaryk returns regularly to historical materialism and its amoral positivism. One does violence to Marx, according to Masaryk, just as M. Adler did, by interpreting him as a Kantian. 'The amoralism of Marx and the moralism 111. See above, pp. 93ff. 112. Ibid. p. 491 (322). 113. Ibid. p. 487 (318). 114. Ibid. p. 491f. (322f.). 115. Ibid. p. 493f. (325). 116. Masaryk, Spirit of Russia II, p. 515f. Cp. note 26, above. 117. Masaryk, Grundlagen, p. 495 (327). 118. Ibid. p. 492 (323). 119. See the bibliography of Masaryk's works, especially the titles which appeared between 1898 and 1907.

Humanity and Socialism

99

of Kant cannot be sweated together.'12« Masaryk regards Adler's interpretation of Marx as a symptom of the crisis within Marxism.121 Several years later he also rejects E. Vandervelde's interpretation of Marx. According to this Belgian social democrat, Marx would not have failed to appreciate the influence of moral and intellectual factors. Masaryk, however, wants to retain the view that Marx recognizes but one real basis: the economic. The rest - religion, morality, etc. - is ultimately ideology. Therefore, he does not want to know about the historical idealism which Vandervelde ascribes to Marx and Engels. 'The fight for justice, which Vandervelde finds in the work of Marx and Engels, could be an ad hominem argument though; but there is no such struggle, nor could there be according to Marx because it is precisely this idealism, according to Marx, which is nothing but a pre-scientific illusion. Historical materialism must deliberately destroy this illusion in order to expedite the breakthrough of the amoral way of looking at the world.' 122 The fact that Masaryk rejects historical materialism still does not mean that he failed to see the historical function which it used to fulfil. Historical materialism functioned according to him as an inadequate means to an end he could himself support: opposition to the dominant philosophical, religious and political forms of absolutism. This absolutism, however, needs to be fought with weapons other than those of historical materialism. 123 Masaryk also considered himself as belonging to the social and political opposition of his time. But the weapon which he wanted to see wielded was ethics, which is impotent in historical materialism. Thus Masaryk's criticism of marxist historical materialism all flows into the statement already clearly implicit in the Grundlagen: that Socialism as a social-political programme cannot be established objectively or historically (scientifically) - that is amoral-positivistically - but only subjectively or ethically.124 120. Masaryk, 'Marx-Studien', p. 697. 121. See note 87. 122. T.G. Masaryk, Έ . Vandervelde's Sozialistische Essays', in, Zeitschrift für Sozialwissenschaft, (Leipzig, 1907), p. 106. In this article, Masaryk responds to Vandervelde's critique of his Grundlagen in, Essais Socialistes, (Paris, 1906). 123. Masaryk, 'Neue Sittenlehre', p. 391. 124. Masaryk, Spirit of Russia II, p. 324. Cp. 'Syndicalisme et démocratie', in Problèmes, pp. 84f. 'If we renounce the defective historical explanation which Marx proposed for Socialism and if we recognize that Socialism must be based upon morality, the result of it would be that the question of the socialist foundations of morality is a religious and metaphysical problem' (my italics). Cp. Chapter 1, p. 25. This quotation and the whole of this section for that matter ought to be enough to refute the opinions of

100

Humanity

and

Socialism

With this we come back to our bench-mark. We have attempted to show that Socialism as a social-political programme should be justified according to Masaryk from an ethical point of view. It is precisely at this point that Marxism, because it is amoral, fails. Socialism is for Masaryk a moral imperative, a matter of humanity, nonsentimental love in action. 1 2 5 H o w up-to-date Masaryk's understanding is can be seen from a recent book on political philosophy: 'The difference [i.e. between democratic Socialism and marxist Communism] is that modern democratic socialism shares the conviction of pre-Marxist socialists or communists that political policy should be rooted in ethical ideals, and especially in a notion of social justice. Like other democrats, socialists found political aims on ethical aims.' 1 2 6

A. Labriola; see A. Labriola, 'Zur Krise des Marxismus', in, Die Neue Zeit, Vol. XVIII, p. 72 (cp. note 56, above) and also the opinions of Ger Harmsen, which are apparently based on those of Labriola; see G. Harmsen, 'De continuiteit in het denken van Marx; de discontinuiteit in de ontwikkeling van het Marxisme', in, Algemeen Nederlands Tijdschrift voor fVijsbegeerte en Psychologie, Vol. LXI, (July, 1969), p. 173 - that Masaryk attacked Marxism from a positivistic position. 125. In one of the most readable articles (the average standard is not very high) devoted to Masaryk's philosophy from an orthodox marxist perspective, Masaryk is attacked among other places at precisely the point at which he regards the social question as a moral question. He was also attacked for his belief that the world could be changed by philosophical-and-ethical formulae; for his view that the philosophers' vocation would be to change the world; that they can and will change it; and also for his aspiration that his 'moral philosophy' would be objective, universally human (whereas it was in fact class-based). See J. Tábor, 'Socialismus a Masaryk', in, Filosoficky Casopis Vol. IV, (1956), pp. 749fF. (originally published in, Kommunistickd Revue, 1925). 126. D.D. Raphael, Problems of Political Philosophy, (London, 1970), p. 146.

Chapter 5

Humanity and Democracy

1.

Introduction

In Masaryk's work, democracy is a word the connotation of which is not kept within fixed limits. It has both a political and a social meaning; and also a 'philosophical' (weltanschaulich) meaning. 1 In view of the relationship between, on the one hand, a world view and, on the other hand, a political and social theory (philosophy), it is by no means strange that the boundaries between these three aspects of the concept of democracy cannot always be drawn sharply. Henry B. M a y o states - he is speaking here about the nature of a political theory - that even when it is partial (as Masaryk's certainly is), it consists of a combination of description, generalization which merges into causal theory, and justification, which is ultimately moral in its basis. 2 In Masaryk's theory of democracy, in which 1. The meaning of the terms political, social and weltanschaulich is as follows: (i) political: appertaining to the government of the state; (ii) social: appertaining to the organization of society, especially to its economic organization; (iii) weltanschaulich: appertaining to one's world view ( Weltanschauung). A world view is a more or less coherent system of norms (values) and ideals, and the beliefs underlying them, by which one's attitude to life is guided. See also note 94 below; and cp. V. Brümmer, 'Zijn er ware antwoorden op laatste vragen?', in, Rondom het Woord, volume 14, No. 4. p. 370. 2. H.B. Mayo, An Introduction to Democratic Theory, (New York, 1960), p. 14. There are divergent opinions as to what precisely the nature of a political or a social theory is. D.D. Raphael distinguishes between political (and social) theory on the one hand, and political (and social) philosophy on the other in such a way that the former is scientific. Its aim is explanation. Political (and social) philosophy is concerned with the 'critical evaluation of beliefs' and the 'clarification of concepts' appertaining to the social and political reality. As such it is normative. See D.D. Raphael, Problems of Political Philosophy, (London, 1970), pp. 2ff. By contrast, W.G. Runciman distinguishes the theory of political sociology, on the one hand, - 'a proposition of "if - then" form analogous, at least, to the theories of natural science' - and a normative political theory or philosophy on the other. See W. G. Runciman, Social Science and

102 Humanity and Democracy political and social elements can indeed be distinguished from each other but cannot always be separated, it is justification which occupies the foreground; it occurs in the context of his philosophy of history. Here, the word democracy in its more comprehensive, weltanschaulich meaning is a central concept. Political and social democracy are justified by democracy as a world view. Democracy in this last sense is virtually a synonym for humanity. Attention will first be given to democracy as a political-and-social concept in Masaryk's thought, so that one can then turn to his philosophy of history with the question in mind of how Masaryk justifies political and social democracy.

2. Political and Social Democracy In the post-War period, the lack of clarity with respect to the meaning of the term 'democracy' has become greater. If the word democracy was not entirely free from vagueness before the Second World War, its multiplicity of meanings has certainly increased since then. States with the most divergent political and social organization are called democratic. To give some examples, one hears of 'the Western democracies', since 1949 of the German Democratic Republic and until 1971 there was official mention of the Democratic Republic of the Congo ('République Démocratique du Congo'). Because such a complete diversity of states is referred to by the use of the word democracy, it should come as no surprise to find that there exists no unanimity about the descriptive meaning of this term. 3 The fact that the terms democracy and democratic Political Theory, (Cambridge, 19692), p. 2. The word 'theory' in the compound political (or social) theory can thus refer as much to a scientific as to a normative theory. Cp. what is understood here by social and political philosophy; see note 20 of the Introduction (above). 3. A Marxist-Leninist Dictionary even relates democracy to dictatorship. For this see note 4, below. Bearing in mind the confusing vagueness of the term 'democracy* in this day and age which makes it possible for democracy to be able to refer to something smacking of dictatorship, the political commentator M.S. Arnoni has recently pleaded for a new term to denote what used to be understood in an earlier period by democracy. He wrote: 'They (i.e. the Americans) have just as much right to give their system a name as parents have to give one to their children. But, apart from the question of names, an investigation into the dictatorships of the last century... cannot bring one to light in which power is so concentrated or so personal' (as in the U.S.A.). 'This view will not curtail the Americans' privilege to give things names. But it really has become a compelling social and linguistic need to think up a new term for what men used to

Humanity and Democracy

103

are used so universally and so readily in our own time to denote all kinds of political and social systems, is a result of the evaluative function (meaning) of these words. When General Mobutu, Honecker, the first man in the D.D.R., and President Nixon call their respective states 'democracies', then they are all three expressing their 'pro-attitudes' towards their own states and prescribing this particular attitude for those who listen to them; although they are all three referring to states of a rather different kind. In other words, the absence of a universallyaccepted descriptive meaning for the word democracy (or democratic) notwithstanding, it does actually have a fixed evaluative meaning. 4 In Masaryk's time, and certainly before the First World War, the situation with respect to the meaning of the word democracy was quite different. Its descriptive meaning was certainly not rigidly defined; but the word could nevertheless not be used to refer at the same time to states which varied so much politically and socially as the (Third) French Republic and the Russia of the Czar. As to its evaluative meaning, the word democracy could not only be used to express - and to prescribe - a pro-attitude towards the object (state or nation) referred to - as was the case at a later period. The words democracy and democratic could also be used in a pejorative sense; that is, to express a 'con-attitude'. 5 understand by the word "democracy"'. See M.S. Arnoni, 'De deugden van een zwijgzame beul'. In, Trouw, (17 January 1973). 4. This circumstance - no generally accepted descriptive meaning, though there is a fixed evaluative meaning - makes the word eminently suitable for 'persuasive definition*. That is, makes it possible to revise the descriptive meaning of the term without changing the evaluative meaning. The pro- or con-attitude of the person to whom the new definition is presented is in this way fixed upon a new object. In the, Wörterbuch der Marxistisch-Leninistischen Soziologie, (Ed. W. Eichhorn et al., KölnOpladen, 1969), p. 94, there is, for example, the following 'persuasive definition' of democracy: 'the socialist democracy is a qualitatively new and the highest historical type of democracy. It originates with the conquest of the political power by the working class as dictatorship of the proletariat. That is for the first time in the history of mankind real democracy...' Dictatorship is lauded under the heading of democracy! For 'persuasive definition' see C.L. Stevenson, Ethics and Language, (Yale University Press, 1962), pp. 210ff. R. Robinson indicates that a 'persuasive definition* is a special kind of definitio realis, and therefore not a definition in the real sense - i.e. definition of a word - but the pronouncement and recommendation of an ideal. R. Robinson, Definition, (Oxford, 1965»), pp. 165ff. 5. For the negative stance of, for example, Kierkegaard, Nietzsche and Burckhardt over against democracy, see H. Maier, 'Demokratie' (ad loc.) in, (Ed.) J. Ritter, Historisches Wörterbuch der Philosophie, Vol. II, (Darmstadt, 1972), p. 52. Popes Pius IX, Leo XIII and Pius X also rejected democracy fundamentally. See Β. Schwalm, 'Démocratie' (adloc.), in, Dictionnaire de théologie catholique, Vol. IV, I, (Paris, 1920), col. 301 ff.

104 Humanity and Democracy Masaryk used the term, however, without exception in a positive, non-pejorative sense. For him, democracy is primarily a normative term. Originally, he used it especially to oppose the existing non-democratic system; without, however, letting this opposition get bogged down in negation.6 The existing order, in place of which he would have had democracy, embraces more than just politics for him. The social, in particular the economic, is also included. So it is not without significance that in his thinking about democracy Masaryk takes as his bench-mark the French Revolution with its slogan: Liberty, Equality, Fraternity; sometimes also with reference to the declaration of the rights of man. He does not start from the model of Athenian political democracy. 7 As a political-social concept, democracy is turned against authoritarian, aristocratic and freedom-and-equality-restricting relationships. The word democracy has a polemical function in Masaryk's criticism. The repeated demands for democracy and its implementation in his parliamentary speeches have an anti-aristocratic and anti-absolutist character; with a strong emphasis on the anti. Masaryk speaks in favour of a democratized politics instead of Austria's absolutist foreign policy as manifested in the annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina.8 When questions were asked in Parliament about the trial in 1909 of 53 Croats accused of high treason, Masaryk put his finger on what he himself calls Austria's political weakness: its antiquated, short-sighted government. Austria would have to democratize itself from top to bottom. 9 A year later, in an exchange of words with the Austrian Minister of Foreign Affairs, Aehrenthal, he requires as a democrat the democratization of foreign policy and diplomacy. He pleads for a Great Austria which cultivates freedom, progress and democracy.10 6. Masaryk's usage of the term democracy may be used as a confirmation of G. Sartori's observation that in the 19th century the word democracy was used mainly in progressive circles as an oppositional ideal, the function of which was 'to oppose, not to propose'. See G. Sartori, 'Democracy' (adloc.) in, (Ed.) D.L. Sills, International Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences, Vol. IV, p. 116. 7. See Masaryk, 'L'idée démocratique et la politique', in, Problèmes, p. 25; Spirit of Russia II, pp. 415 & 506; The Making of a State, pp. 390f.; Rychnovsky, Masaryk, p. 225. H.B. Mayo begins with the model of Athenian democracy, An Introduction to Democratic Theory, pp. 59fF. 8. Rychnovsky, Masaryk, p. 124. Whenever parliamentary speeches are mentioned, Masaryk's speeches in the 'delegation' are also included (the delegation was a meeting in which matters affecting both parts of the Danube Monarchy were discussed). 9. Ibid. p. 141. 10. Ibid. pp. 144 & 146.

Humanity and Democracy

105

In the light of the critical function of the concept of democracy, both Masaryk's positive and negative evaluation of liberalism is understandable. His positive appraisal follows from the political significance of liberalism: the recognition of human rights, the sovereignty of the people as the basis of state power, constitutionalism and parliamentary democracy together with universal suffrage and majority rule, all at the expense of absolutism and aristocracy.11 His criticism of liberalism bears upon the economic and social aspects of liberalism, the laissez-faire principle in the field of economics and its social consequences. The liberal bourgeoisie certainly did implement important social reforms, e.g. the abolition of serfdom and the guilds; the partial liberation of women and children from a patriarchal husband and father. But it was precisely in the social domain that the limitations of liberalism were made manifest. 'In the days of the great revolution, the first advocates of economic equality and democracy, the first experimenters in communism, were put to death by the democratizing bourgeoisie. Although Rousseau, Meslier, Morelly, Mably, and other writers, had condemned private property and inequality of property, the republic declared property sacrosanct, just as absolutism had declared the monarchy sacrosanct.' 12 However much Masaryk might appreciate Palacky when he refers to the ideals of the French Revolution, and - even more so - Havlicek with his positive stance on universal suffrage, 13 he still thought the liberal idea of democracy in the years which followed 1848 to be no longer sufficient for his time. Bourgeois-democracy degenerated into something which is not democracy: into a bourgeois, plutocratic aristocracy over against which social democracy, Socialism stands. 14 11. Masaryk, Spirit of Russia II, p. 414. 12. Ibid. p. 415f. For Masaryk's progressive views on the subject of the status of women, see note 40, below. 13. See above, pp. 42f. 14. Masaryk, C.O.-N.N.K., p. 274. Masaryk is arguing here with his political opponents of the second half of the 1890's, the socially conservative Young Czechs (liberals). For this party see p. 51. A virtually identical criticism of the self-same Czech liberalism can be found in his, Jan Hus, which was written at this period. See op. cit pp. 12ff. and 42. In the context of this argument, one should understand the contrast which Masaryk sees in the last mentioned work between the ideal of brotherhood of the Czech Reformation and that of the French Revolution; and between both ideals of humanity in general. Op. cit. pp. 13f. & 42. The antithesis stated here by Masaryk is an exception which can be explained by its polemical context. In, Karel Havlííek, which was written about the same time, he links the ideals of the French Revolution directly with those of the Reformation, op. cit., p. 162. So there are insufficient grounds for the statement of F. X. Salda, a competent Czech essayist and critic, that Masaryk's idea of democracy - of

106 Humanity and Democracy In its normative-critical meaning, the concept of democracy (democratic) has a powerful social connotation. It cannot always be distinguished from the concept of Socialism (social, socialistic). In a speech dating from 1899, Masaryk states that an organization of society which is social and democratic stands over against one which is aristocratic.15 When he speaks about a democratic and social movement at the climax of the struggle for universal suffrage,16 he is using words which are more or less tautological. Both have a strong anti- absolutist and anti-aristocratic flavour. The same scarcely differentiated usage is to be found in a formulation of one of the aims of Masaryk's progressive party: democratization and socialization of the state and its administration. 17 Democracy and Socialism are both linked with the ideal of human equality over against aristocratic inequality.18 Democracy is, however, the term with the wider meaning. In 1907, Masaryk wrote that democracy not only knows political equality and universal suffrage (then already realized to a large extent), but also the economic, social, moral, religious and spiritual equality in general.19 When used normatively and critically, the term democracy is still used very vaguely in Masaryk's work. Nevertheless, he also uses the word with a more precise meaning. In these cases, he is referring above all to political democracy. It is even possible to speak here of a first step towards a theory of democracy. That is, we can find a more or less generalizing description of it. Necessary conditions for the existence of a democracy in the real political world are mentioned. This is done, however, from a normative point of view.20 On the other hand, Masaryk certainly never got down to the business of formulating a political theory. A systematic treatment of the subject is, therefore, lacking in his work. His most direct treatment of the theme of democracy, albeit not entirely systematic, Christian origin - does not tally with the Western notion of democracy with its nonChristian origin. F.X. Salda, 'Masaryks Persönlichkeit', in, Beilage der 'Prager Presse', zum 80. Geburtstage des Präsidenten der tschechoslowakischen Republik am 7. März 1930. 15. Masaryk, 'Vyvoj evropské spolecnosti', p. 121. 16. Masaryk, 'Der blutige Kampf um das allgemeine Wahlrecht in Böhmen', p. 2. 17. Masaryk, 'Na prechodu k demokracii', p. 3. 18. See above, p. 80. 19. Masaryk, O klerikalismu a socialismu, p. 18. In his conversations with Capek, Masaryk says: 'My opinion of Socialism is derived from my ideas of democracy.' See K. Capek, President Masaryk Tells his Story, p. 182, cp. 192. 20. Masaryk gives a sort of real definition - to be distinguished from a word definition - of democracy. This comes between what Robinson calls a 'real definition as analysis' and a 'real definition as the adoption and recommendation of ideals'. See R. Robinson, Definition, pp. 165ÍT. and 171ff.

Humanity and Democracy

107

is in two essays dating from the immediate pre-First World War period. 21 His continued interest in and care for the Czechoslovakian Republic in the days of its infancy after the First World War also led him to the formulation of theoretical view-points. We will now outline Masaryk's 'theory' of democracy with the help of criteria which are regarded by H. B. Mayo as the 'distinguishing principles' of a coherent theory of democracy. Starting from the model of the Athenian democracy he enumerates the following principles:22 A. The fundamental characteristic of a democracy in a modern state where direct self-government, as in Athens, is not possible because of its extent and the number of its citizenry, is control by the people by means of regularly held elections of those who determine its political policy. Such control is an indirect one in nearly every case, namely by means of the institution of popular representation. B. The second principle is political equality. This means: (i) universal adult suffrage; (ii) one man one vote; (iii) each vote should count equally; and (iv) proportional representation.23 C. The third principle is that popular control by means of elections of those who determine public policy is effective. That implies: free elections without coercion and intimidation. Anyone can stand for election without legal inhibitions. In short, the effectiveness of popular control demands political freedoms: freedom of speech, freedom of assembly, and freedom to oppose the government. D. Mayo enumerates as his fourth and final principle that of majority rule. That is, when the representatives are divided the decision of the majority prevails. With the proviso that the majority does not encroach 21. T.G. Masaryk, Nesnaze demokracie, (Praha/Prague, 1913); and T.G. Masaryk, Demokratism ν politice, (Praha/Prague, 1912). Both of these essays are included under the respective titles, 'Les difficultés de la démocratie' and, 'L'idée démocratique et la politique', in, Les problèmes de la démocratie'. (Hence cited respectively as, 'L'idée démocratique', and, 'Les difficultés'). 22. See Mayo, An Introduction to Democratic Theory, pp. 59-69. Mayo develops in fact a normative model of democracy, beginning with the positively evaluated Athenian democracy. This model is then discussed from a knowledge of how Western democracies function; in particular, the American one. So the model in its totality is not a pure description and explanation of the functioning of an actual democracy. It is therefore rather misleading when Mayo writes (op. cit. pp. 69f.) that the principles (the model) can also be formulated normatively (or morally). (My italics). For they describe no existing reality. They are already more or less normative in character; certainly in the context in which Mayo presents them. 23. Mayo states (ibid. pp. 64 & 126ff.) that the practice of many democracies diverges from the principle of proportional representation; and often for good reasons.

108

Humanity and Democracy

upon the above-mentioned political liberties and that the minority restricts itself to opposition and protest within the limits of peaceful, political channels. With respect to the first of Mayo's four democratic principles, Masaryk was quite well aware that democracy, understood as direct self-government by the people is not possible in a modern state. The geographical extension and the larger size of the citizenry in a modern state is a great difference when compared to fifth century (B.C.) Athens. 24 He recognises in broad terms R. Michels' iron-law of oligarchy: It makes no difference whether a land (or a party) is ruled democratically or autocratically (aristocratically); in fact an oligarchical group rules.25 Though he did not thereby deny the differences between these two systems. So for him, aristocracy means domination; whilst democracy means government with knowledge and insight.26 He frequently formulates the differences in moral and weltanschauliche terms.27 According to him, even the French Syndicalists did not succeed in bringing about direct democracy; not even in theory. 28 In addition to the oligarchic, Masaryk also accepts the bureaucratic aspect of a democratic government.29 He regards leadership and authority highly - a functional authority, that is, not the sic volo sic iubeo of a single individual30 - but he firmly rejects fascism. 31 So long as the words are 24. Masaryk, 'L'idée démocratique', p. 28; 'Les difficultés', p. 52. 25. Masaryk, 'L'idée démocratique', p. 31. Masaryk devotes a comprehensive review to Michels' book (later to become a classic), 'Zur Soziologie des Parteiwesens in der modernen Demokratie', (Leipzig, 1911), in his article, 'Syndicalisme et démocratie', in, Problèmes, pp. 87ff. Michels' iron law is still regarded by modern political scientists as justified in its essentials. See G. Sartori, Democratic Theory, (Detroit, 1962), p. 122. Cp. Popper, Open Society I, p. 125: 'For although "the people" may influence the actions of their rulers by the threat of dismissal, they never rule themselves in any concrete, practical sense.' 26. Masaryk, 'L'idée démocratique', p. 31f.; The New Europe, p. 68. An echo of Comte and Engels can be heard in this remark. Comte writes in the ninth letter of Saint-Simon's, 'l'Organisateur': 'the people no longer need to be governed, that is to say, to be commanded. It suffices for the maintenance of order that affairs of common interest are administered.' Oeuvres de C.H. de Saint-Simon II, (Paris, 1869), pp. 144f. Cp. Engels, 'People will no longer be governed but affairs administered... 'AntiDiihring, (Berlin, 192811), p. 302. Engels states, moreover, that this opinion had 'already been clearly expressed' by Saint-Simon', op. cit. p. 277. 27. See below, pp. 116. 28. See Masaryk, 'Syndicalisme et démocratie', pp. 73f. 29. See Masaryk, 'L'idée démocratique', pp. 30f.; Program presidentùv, p. 174. In, 'L'idée démocratique', the terms oligarchy and bureaucracy are used virtuously synonymously. 30. E. Ludwig, Defender of Democracy: Masaryk of Czechoslovakia,{London, 1938), p. 227. Cp. Masaryk, Cesta demokracie II, p. 98, 210, 294 & 432. Capek, Masaryk

Humanity and Democracy

109

not misconstrued, it could be said that Masaryk was a supporter of 'guided democracy'. He continually emphasizes how important the competence of the ruling and governing oligarchy, including the Parliament and the bureaucracy (Civil Service), is in a democracy.32 He rejects, however, on principle government by an extra-parliamentary cabinet of experts; because in a democracy elections decide who is to govern.33 This emphasis upon the significance of elections for democracy - 'elected representatives are essential to democracy'34 - already indicates the importance which Masaryk attached to the control of power. Such control is a sine qua non for democracy. Masaryk regards free criticism and public control as the basis of democracy. In this context he has in mind Parliament as the representation of the people. But also the role of the press and freedom of assembly.35 Masaryk was always a staunch defender of the part played by Parliament in a democratic state. In a University lecture delivered in 1885, he states that the most preferable form of state is the one which best realizes popular representation. That is, by means of proportional representation. So doing, minorities also have their representatives.36 Many years later, he fought Lenin's contention that on Thought and Life, pp. 195f. Cp. Sartori: 'The truth is that democracies depend - as the most thoughtful scholars have observed - on the quality of their leadership', Democratic Theory, p. 118. 31. 'Fascism appropriates the externals of Catholicism, its symbolism, its uniform organisation, the infallible authority of its Supreme Head ... I doubt very much if a new Weltanschauung, new world formulas ... can be created by a political attempt to produce politically the Nietzschean superman. The will to power is the chief doctrine of both systems, and in the sense of this voluntaryism instinct, as an infallible guide, is finally placed in an authoritative position above intellect. ... For many who believe in them, Fascism and Pangermanism may also mean religion. But both these systems give rise to religious reaction and retrogression; in short a return to heathenism.' Ludwig, Defender of Democracy pp. 222 & 224f. 32. He also bore in mind the tension which exists between the bureaucracy (administration, executive power) and Parliament. During the period of the monarchy he was aware of the dominating position of the executive power. So he asserted that Parliament did not possess one tenth of the power and the rights which the administration had. T.G. Masaryk, 'How to Work', in, Ideals of Humanity and How to Work', p. 181. As president, he had the good functioning of Parliament at heart. Political and administrative competence he thought, therefore, to be a must for Members of Parliament and ultimately for a politically developed people. See, Program presidenti, pp. 174f. ; Making of a State, p. 392; Cesta Demokracie II, p. 208; Capek, Masaryk on Thought and Life, pp. 196ÍF. He had formulated this last opinion at any rate as early as 1895. See, C.O.-N.N.K., p. 226. 33. Masaryk, Program presidents, p. 172; cp. p. 175. 34. Masaryk, The Making of a State, p. 392. 35. See Capek, Masaryk on Thought and Life, p. 198.

110

Humanity and Democracy

Parliaments are the lackeys of banks in particular and of capitalism in general. He regards this as a simple exaggeration. Furthermore, it is unfair. In this context, he points out the Czechoslovakian Parliament with its massive socialist membership.37 Notwithstanding his strong preference for parliamentary democracy, he was never blind to the imperfections inherent in it. According to him those imperfections were, however, also partly due to the electorate which did not return more qualified representatives. So one should not expect better things from a Republic of Soviets.38 After all that has gone before, the second of Mayo's points about political equality can be dealt with briefly.39 After having originally pleaded for proportional representation, Masaryk revealed himself to be a supporter of universal, equal suffrage as well as of proportional representation from the 1890's. And with even greater emphasis after the turn of the century. By 'universal' (suffrage) he means definitely including women. 40 And by 'equal' (suffrage) he means 'one man one vote'. Each vote has the same weight as any other. So one of his complaints against the Russian communists is that they reject universal suffrage and

36. Nejedly, Masaryk III, p. 290. 37. Masaryk, Cesta demokracie I, p. 393. 38. Ibid, p. 319. See also note 32, above. An echo of Masaryk can be heard in Popper's work when he writes: 'It is quite wrong to blame democracy for the political shortcomings of a democratic state. We should rather blame ourselves, that is to say, the citizens of the democratic state.' See, Open Society, I, p. 127. 39. See pp. 77f. and in this chapter passim. 40. See Masaryk, 'Potreba pokrokové politiky', p. 174. In the annals of the women's movement the name of Masaryk can be mentioned with honour. In his lectures on practical philosophy (circa 1885), he pleads for more education and cultural development for women. By this her subordinate role in marriage (the plaything of the man) could be altered. In those days, he still did not think that every social role would be suitable for a woman because of her physical and psychological make up; for example, the role of politician. On the other hand, the nursing profession and suchlike would be quite possible. Above all, the woman is needed in the family for rearing the children. See Nejedly, Masaryk, III, pp. 236f. Twenty years later (1907), in a speech delivered in America which could still be called progressive nowadays, he expresses his solidarity with the women's emancipation movement. The fact that faults had certainly been made in the movement, so he argues, does not mean that a woman should not change her way of life. A movement aimed not only at the liberation of women, but also at the liberation of men and the family should not be rejected. See, Americké pfednásky, pp. 11 If. In his old age, Masaryk said in his interviews with Ludwig: 'Even up to today I am working for equal rights on their behalf. I do not find that women are any way inferior in intelligence, only that there are many things which they have not yet done, because they were compelled to do other things.' Ludwig, Defender ofDemocracy, p. 242.

Humanity and Democracy

111

exclude the right to vote from those who oppose the régime. Just as used to be done in the days of the Czar. 41 With respect to the third of Mayo's four points, democracy means for Masaryk primarily criticism and openness. He supports this either with an argument based upon the close connexion which he takes to exist between science - bearing in mind that there can be no science without criticism - and democracy. 42 Or, by interpreting criticism and openness as a consequence of the ideals of freedom and equality. 43 Alternatively, he regards openness as a self-evident condition for democracy. 44 So Masaryk comes out forcefully in favour of freedom of speech, the freedom of the press, and freedom of assembly. 45 He is also in favour of human rights in general. 46 He even relates one right in particular to democracy: the right of initiative; though the content of this right is not always the same. In any case, however, it includes the right to put oneself up for election. 47 In the light of what has already been said about the actual significance of openness and criticism for the good functioning of democracy, it is small wonder that Masaryk sets great store by competent, independent and even 'irresistable' journalism. 48 With respect to the fourth and last of Mayo's points, Masaryk accepts majority rule as a consequence of democracy with its principle of political equality. According to him, it is preferable to the oligarchical principle of absolutism and Bolshevism.49 Masaryk was also quite well aware, however, of the problems of the principle of majority rule. For example, when it is defended in terms of goodness and truth. Masaryk says that a 41. Masaryk, Cesta demokracie, I, p. 392. 42. See below, p. 120. 43. Masaryk, Making of a State, p. 400. 44. Masaryk, Cesta demokracie, I, p. 63. 45. Masaryk, 'Les difficultés', p. 57. 46. See his evaluation of political liberalism, p. 105 above; cp. also Chapter 4, note 105, above. 47. In 1899, Masaryk meant by this the right of the people to vote on a proposal of their own choosing and to lay this before Parliament (there was still no universal suffrage in those days). See, 'Vyvoj evropské spoleínosti', p. 127. In, 'Les difficultés', he speaks about the right of initiative which not only belongs to the government and Parliament, but also generally to every citizen, op. cit. p. 61. From the context, it appears that he means what he later in connexion with the subject of freedom calls 'the right of initiative in all spheres of life, especially in the political sphere'. See Ludwig, Defender of Democracy, p. 228. Cp. Making of a State, p. 415. 48. See Masaryk, 'Vyvoj evropské spolednosti', p. 127; Cesta demokracie II, p. 484; Capek, Masaryk on Thought and Life, p. 198. 49. Masaryk, Cesta demokracie I, pp. 393-395.

112

Humanity and Democracy

majority does not per se guarantee justice, truth and Tightness.50 On the other hand, he rejects dictatorial absolutism when it employs arguments such as: conscience and justice, reason and science are absolutes. On the subject of the argument from science, for which Masaryk must indeed show sympathy in view of the close connexion which he makes between science and democracy, and the importance which he gives to scientificallybased politics,51 he remarks that however scientific politics may be, it is not infallible - as science is not infallible. It cannot be used to justify any form of political absolutism. 52 It is precisely because the relationship between science and democracy is one of principle that Masaryk regards the latter as discussion: people are governed by arguments and not by anything arbitrary or violent. 53 He takes it for granted that democracy includes protecting the rights of minorities and a loyal form of exercising opposition. 54 There is a noticeable hesitation and reticence on Masaryk's part, however, when he endorses the principle of majority rule.55 This can be explained with reference to his justification of democracy in which science and ethics play an important role. Neither upon the principles of science nor upon the principles of a rather Kantian formal ethical system is it easy to justify the principle of majority rule.56 50. Masaryk, Cesta demokracie II, p. 294; How to Work, p. 181. 51. See Chapter 1, note 30. 52. Masaryk, Making of a State, p. 417. 53. Masaryk, The New Europe, p. 68. 54. For the first, see Masaryk, Cesta demokracie I, p. 394. Masaryk's preference for proportional representation is also prompted by his consideration for the rights of minorities. See Masaryk, How to Work, p. 181, and, 'Potrëba pokrokové politiky', p. 174. Cp. p. 109, above. 55. See e.g. Masaryk, Spirit of Russia II, p. 517. 56. In my opinion, Popper has succeeded in giving a convincing justification of the majority principle which can also be seen as something which is based upon an extension of Masaryk's own principles; that is, his anti-absolutism. According to Popper, a theory of democracy should be based on the principle that political institutions must be created, developed and protected in order to avoid tyranny. 'This principle does not imply that we can ever develop institutions of this kind which are faultless or foolproof, or which ensure that the policies adopted by a democratic government will be right or good or wise. ... Seen in this light, the theory of democracy is not based upon the principle that the majority should rule; rather the various equalitarian methods of democratic control, such as general elections and representative government, are to be considered as no more than well-tried and, in the presence of a widespread traditional distrust of tyranny, reasonably effective institutional safeguards against tyranny, always open to improvement, and even providing methods for their own improvement. He, who accepts the principle of democracy in this sense is therefore not bound to look upon the result of a democratic vote as an authoritative expression of what is right. Although he will accept a decision of the majority, for the sake of making the

Humanity and Democracy

113

Up to now an attempt has been made to clarify the meaning of the term democracy in a political and social context in Masaryk's work. It has been seen that Masaryk often uses the word democracy in a normative and critical way. The content of the norm must be seen in relation to the ideals of the French Revolution: Freedom and Equality. On the other hand, it has also been possible to uncover the rudiments of a descriptive theory of political democracy in his writings. This is not, however, entirely valuefree. Democracy in its normative-critical sense, as well as in its descriptive sense, is justified by Masaryk in the framework of his philosophy of history. How he does justify democracy is the subject of the following section.

3. The Justification of Democracy As already stated in the subheading, the theme of this section is the question: How does Masaryk justify democracy? He does this in the context of his philosophy of history. So, in the pages which follow, Masaryk's philosophy of history is dealt with in the light of this question. Masaryk's philosophy of history is characterized by the antithesis: aristocracy (theocracy) and democracy. 57 However political-and-social these concepts may appear to be at first sight, in Masaryk's thinking they transcend the political and social level and assume the content of a world view. That their meaning transcends the realm of politics and sociology can be deduced from two more pairs of antitheses: myth and science; theology and philosophy; on the understanding that myth and theology are connected with aristocracy, and science and philosophy with democdemocratic institutions work, he will feel free to combat it by democratic means and to work for its revision. And should he live to see the day when the majority vote destroys the democratic institutions, then this sad experience will tell him only that there does not exist a foolproof method of avoiding tyranny.' Open Society I, p. 125. During the last few years, the problem, or rather the paradox, of the principle of majority rule has been dealt with from various angles; recently in an article by T. Honderich in which he not only summarizes the literature on this topic since the publication of R. Wollheim's, Ά Paradox in the Theory of Democracy', in, Philosophy, Politics and Society, Vol. II, (Eds.) P. Laslett and W.G. Runciman, (Oxford, 1962), but also, equally concisely, offers an acceptable solution to the problem which is in substantial agreement with Popper's. See T. Honderich, Ά Difficulty with Democracy', in, Philosophy & Public Affairs, Vol. Ill, No. 2, (Winter, 1974), pp. 221-226. 57. Aristocracy and theocracy are virtually synonymous concepts in Masaryk's work. For this, see further below.

114 Humanity and Democracy racy. But before going into the question of how Masaryk saw the relationship between aristocracy and theology (myth), on the one hand, and democracy and philosophy (science), on the other, the antitheses mythscience and theology-philosophy will have to be dealt with separately. 3.1 Myth and Science; Theology and Philosophy As Masaryk sees it, man can explain the reality of the world which surrounds him either mythologically or scientifically. The mythical interpretation is a product of man's spontaneous tendency to personify everything and every phenomenon. Man explains everything which happens outside him by analogy with the events which take place in his inner self. Masaryk puts it like this: because man experiences himself above all as a willing and acting being, he transfers these personal characteristics to external objects in order to explain their original coherence by this means.58 Masaryk therefore calls mythical thinking anthropomorphic. 59 But the scientific interpretation of the world is characterized by the study of things and phenomena themselves, by means of observation and the experimental verification of theories. The primeval sense of wonder, the mother of all myth, yields before the power of attentive observation, the mother of all science.60 In the history of human thought, there is a development to be indicated. 61 It moves away from myth in the direction of science.62 During the first phase of his development, man is 'lost entirely in sense observation so that he scarcely perceives the difference between real and imaginary ideas. In this condition of logical emptiness and bashfulness he is continually alarmed by sense impressions; because every appearance of the outer and inner perception is understood as a personal being...'. 63 At a later stage 58. Masaryk, Versuch, pp. 278f. 59. Ibid. pp. 282 & 305. The term anthropomorphic/ism in the context of myth and theology is a stereotype in Masaryk's work. 60. Ibid. p. 280. 61. For the notion of development in Masaryk's thought, see Chapter 1, note 55. 62. In a footnote - Versuch p. 285 - Masaryk refers among others to Vico for his theory of the relationship between myth and science: 'Vico analysed thoroughly for the first time the mythical beginnings of civilization'; to Comte: 'Comte in particular has beautifully demonstrated the gradual development of the scientific spirit out of myth ...'; and to Tylor: to him, above all with the theory of myth in mind. What Masaryk asserts about myth (see below) is remarkably similar to what Tylor relates in connexion with animism, cp. Th.P. van Baaren, Doolhof dergoden, (Amsterdam, 1960), p. 37. 63. Ibid. p. 281.

Humanity and Democracy

115

in this process, namely that characterized by fetishism or animism, phenomena are not personified so directly. Things are regarded as the repository of strange powers; i.e. souls and spirits.64 As man's ability to compare, to abstract and to generalize improves, then the myths are no longer concrete but abstract. When it is no longer individual phenomena but collectivities (phenomena or things) that are linked with a god or spirit, then the polytheistic stage is reached. With the transition from polytheism to monotheism 'by which the primeval mythical idea is concentrated in one single supernatural being', man takes the most decisive step towards a scientific way of looking at things, towards a scientific world view.65 Still, the tendency towards myth-making does not disappear with monotheism. The last, scientific phase in the development of the human mind begins to dawn when man divests things of their personality, learns to observe things as they really are and also learns to explain them on the basis of their own being.66 For Masaryk, this process of development proceeds, however, very slowly, is prone to retrogression and is far from complete. Furthermore, the special disciplines are also at different stages of development. The most progress along the road from myth to science has been made in the field of mathematics. Psychology and sociology are just beginning to become sciences.67 The antithesis myth and science is found reflected in Masaryk's thinking about the relationship between theology and philosophy. Theology is the instrument of myth; and philosophy is the instrument of science.68 Both theology and philosophy are world views.69 Under the heading of theology, Masaryk understands the world view of the supporters of positive religion. That is, those who cling to the Church with its dogmas. Whilst by philosophy he means the scientific world view.70 Whenever they appear in a negative relationship to theology, science and philosophy are frequently interchangeable terms in Masaryk's work. As its first and foremost source of knowledge, theology has revelation. Science (philosophy) relies on experience and reasonable explanation. Theology concerns itself with 64. Ibid. p. 282. 65. Ibid. p. 282 66. Ibid. pp. 282f. 67. Ibid. pp. 284f. The similarity to Comte scarcely needs to be demonstrated. 68. Ibid. p. 286; cp. Spirit of Russia I, p. 208. For the relation between theology and philosophy, see also Chapter 1, pp. 30f. 69. For the meaning of the term world view, see above, note 1. 70. Ibid. p. 276. The scientific world view is, however, still no more than an 'attempt' (Versuch). Cp. Chapter 1, note 12.

116 Humanity and Democracy mysteries; science with puzzles and problems. Theology is 'infallible'; but, in a rather limited way, science recognizes self-evident propositions and rests content with more or less probable theories.71 In Christian Europe, the parting between theology and science took place in the Middle Ages. Though their real antagonism only dates from the time of the Renaissance and the Reformation. 72 Masaryk makes a remark which is very important for the particular theme of this paragraph when he states that medieval society in Europe was organized on the basis of conceptions which had been given universal validity by the medieval Church; and to great effect. 73 Here, Masaryk connects for the first time theology (mythical philosophy) and a specific social political system. That is, theology and aristocracy (theocracy). The thoughts which Masaryk developed in his Versuch einer concreten Logik about the relationship between myth and science, theology and philosophy, and theology (philosophy) and society recur in later publications. But then also principally focussed upon the consequences of theology (myth) and philosophy (science) for the organization of State and Society. 3.2 Aristocracy and Democracy in Relation to Theology and Philosophy It has already been said that according to Masaryk myth is marked by its anthropomorphic character. Theological thinking is also anthropomorphic or sociomorphic with respect to the concept of God: the aristocratic social relationship between the prince and his subjects is projected on to the relationship between God and man. 74 In reverse, the aristocratic, theological view of the relationship between God and man works retroactively upon human social relations; primarily upon the Church but at a secondary level also upon the State. Just as the Church is founded theoretically upon theology, so is the self-same Church with its Pope and its hierarchy the social and political embodiment of sociomorphic monotheism.75 So Catholicism is a model of a theocracy for Masaryk. It is literally government by God; but really government by priests. As such, 71. Ibid. p. 276. 72. Ibid. p. 287; cp. Spirit of Russia II, p. 494; and, V boji o nábozenství, p. 42. The conflict is also related to the philosophy of Hume and Kant. See, Spirit of Russia I, pp. 205f. and II, p. 531. 73. Ibid. p. 286. Masaryk has in mind here the received systems of Plato and Aristotle 'which have been adopted by the church'. These are strongly mythological according to him; especially that of Plato. 74. See Masaryk, V boji o nábozenství, p. 31; and, Americké prednásky, p. 41. 75. Masaryk, V boji o nábozenství, p. 37.

Humanity and Democracy

117

it is an aristocracy and its influence reaches out beyond the boundaries of the Church. 76 In Masaryk's great study of nineteenth century Russian thought, similar trains of thought can be found. His theory of anthropomorphism again recurs here: 'If the essence of myth lies in the premature drawing of conclusions by analogy..., the anthropomorphization characteristic of belief in myth is, ethically considered, egoism; and, politically considered, centralism; and therefore absolutism. ...Just as the mythmaker creates God in his own image, so does he personify and anthropomorphize the state and society at large; mythical monotheism and monarchy arise by parallel development and therefore penetrate one another.' 77 Whilst the idea that the image of God and the shape of social structures develop side by side out of the image that a myth-making man has of himself (I am the master, you are my servant or slave)78 appears here, one again encounters elsewhere in this study the notion of the sociomorphic image of God which reinforces the existing aristocratic model of society. God's might is a projection of the might of the Czar. Conversely, the might of the Czar is seen in the light of the might of God. In this context, Masaryk is speaking about the theocratical position of the Czar and the theological basis of the Russian theocracy.79 In Masaryk's work in general and in his Russian Studies in particular, the concept of theocracy is a fluid one. A theocracy is a régime in which Church and State are not separated from each other either in theory or in practice. Here, he means both Papo-Caesarism and Caesaro-Papism. At one time he has in mind a régime in which a hierarchically organized Church influences the State to a greater or lesser extent. At another he has in mind a régime in which the Church conducts itself more passively and the authoritarian State, justified theologically, meddles in ecclesiastical affairs. 80 The hard core of the theocracy concept is, however, the notion of an aristocracy which is sanctioned and justified by theology. By 76. Masaryk, Americképrednásky, p. 49. Cp. T.G. Masaryk, 'Lev XIII', in, N.D.X (1903), p. 806; Vèda a cirkev, p. 36; and Rychnovsky, Masaryk, p. 121. 77. Masaryk, Spirit of Russia II, p. 512. 78. Capek, Masaryk on Thought and Life, p. 190. 79. Masaryk, Spirit of Russia I, p. 44. 80. Under the former he thinks of states with a dominating Roman Catholic Church including the Danube Monarchy. Or he relates the former directly to Roman Catholicism pure and simple, see Capek, Masaryk on Thought and Life, p. 189. Under the latter, he has especially in mind the situation in Russia. See, Spirit of Russia II, p. 491ff.; and, 'Die Revolution in Russland', in, Oesterreichische Rundschau, February 1905, p. 8.

118 Humanity and Democracy definition, this also means: by the Church. 81 But this particular distinguishing feature, which defines what a theocracy is, says little more than that a theocracy differs little in reality from an aristocracy. Because Masaryk mostly regards the latter as bound up with theology too; and sanctioned and justified by it. 82 Theology is, as it were, the ideology of aristocracy and theocracy. At the political and social level, aristocracy (theocracy) in Masaryk's work says little more than that it is the opposite of democracy and is a form of absolutism. The notions of aristocracy and theocracy become, however, even more problematical when their political and social connotation is reduced to a minimum by the link with theology; or even disappears entirely. So that they are virtually taken as synonyms for the word theology. Theocracy and aristocracy are, then, not so much terms which are used to refer to a form of State (or Society), but rather concepts connoting a particular world view.83 Just as the notion of aristocracy (theocracy) must be seen in close connexion with theology as the world view ( Weltanschauung) of Christendom (the Church), so the notion of democracy must also be seen in relation to philosophy qua scientific world view. First of all, the relation between both pairs of concepts is external, chronological. Just as progress takes place in the ebb and flow of history - and not without periods of slack currents and not at the same time in every place - that is, from myth (theology) to science (philosophy), so is theocracy as a form of State and Society also replaced by democracy.84 In the wake of the conflict between theology and philosophy, there developed an antagonism between aristocracy (theocracy) and democracy. (Actually only since the Renaissance and the Reformation; and with accelerating momentum since the eighteenth century.) The antagonism should be interpreted in such a way that both the Renaissance and the Reformation, and also Philosophy, favoured the development of democracy.85 Whilst Masaryk knows about the 81. See Masaryk, Spirit of Russia II, pp. 506ff; 'Les difficultés*, p. 56; The New Europe, pp. 12f.; and, Capek, Masaryk on Thought and Life, p. 190. In this connexion, Masaryk frequently refers to the idea of rule by the grace of God. 82. See Masaryk, 'Les difficultés\ p. 59; Spirit of Russia II, p. 512; and, The New Europe, p. 68. 83. Thus Masaryk speaks about a mythic aristocracy which is attacked at its roots by Kant's critique. See, Spirit of Russia II, p. 512. We will return to this point later. 84. 'In these studies I set out from the historical conception that society has hitherto been and still is organised theocratically, and that democracy puts an end to theocracy.' Thus Masaryk in, Spirit of Russia II, p. 491. Cp. Ludwig, Defender of Democracy, p. 177. 85. See Masaryk, Spirit of Russia II, pp. 413ff., 494 & 518ff.; Spirit of Russia III, p. 86; and, The Making of a State, p. 423f. For Masaryk, the terms Reformation and

Humanity and Democracy

119

parallel existence of the theological and philosophical world view - the latter is certainly to become dominant in the future, though it has not yet obtained the upper hand 86 - he is also quite well aware that the progress towards democracy is not yet complete. 'Democratic States have hitherto kept up, to a greater or lesser degree, the spirit and the institutions of the old régime out of which they arose. They have been mere essays in democracy; nowhere has it been consistently applied. Only the really new States, the States of the future, will be founded, inwardly and outwardly, on liberty, equality and fraternity.' 87 Aristocracy and theology, democracy and philosophy therefore go together with each other chronologically. There is, however, not only an external, temporal connexion between them, but also an internal one. There is a similarity of content. With respect to aristocracy and theology, this has already been mentioned. As a form of State and Society, aristocracy is sanctioned and justified by theology. It is even possible for the relationship between aristocracy and theology to be so intimate that the former takes over, more or less, the meaning of the latter. It becomes a word for a world view. The meaning of the word democracy in its relation to philosophy as a scientific world view shows an analogous development. First, there is once again the ideological connexion between democracy as a form of the State and Society, and philosophy as a scientific world view. Democracy is a practical extension of philosophy. It is somehow a logical consequence of philosophy or science. 'Democracy relies upon science; the antithesis of science and theology is the very antithesis of democracy and aristocracy.' 88 Masaryk is of the opinion that political (and social) democracy belongs to a new epoch; to a modern world view. That is to say, modern by virtue of the new scientific method which underlies it. 89 In a lecture which he delivered just before the turn of the century, Masaryk had already referred to the social and democratic character of science. Science teaches us to recognize other people's opinions; obliges us to give and to take Protestantism are not synonyms. The Reformation was an emancipation movement dating from the 15th and 16th centuries which culminated in the humanity ideal of the 18 th century. Protestantism certainly came out of this movement too; but it was still not able to free itself entirely from the clericalism which he so abhorred. 86. Masaryk, Versuch, p. 283; and Vbojio nábozenství, p. 42. 87. Masaryk, The Making of a State, pp. 391f.; cp. 'Les difficultés', p. 60; V bojio nábozenství, pp. 42f.; and Ludwig, Defender of Democracy, p. 230. 88. Masaryk, 'Les difficultés', p. 56. 89. Masaryk, The Making of a State, p. 397.

120 Humanity and Democracy criticism; and teaches us to be tolerant. Even more, tolerance in science means that one respects the opinions of others. From a political point of view, to popularize science and bring it to the people means democracy. Because a foundation is laid thereby for the development of political liberties.90 Later, Masaryk also emphasizes the relationship between sicence and philosophy, on the one hand, and democracy: 'By its very nature, democracy counterposes science and philosophy to theology and scholasticism. The democratic character of modern science consists mainly in its use of the scientific method as contrasted with the theocratic method.' 91 A critical attitude is, therefore, not only necessary for the acquisition of knowledge, but also for the acquisition of democratic freedom and equality. Without criticism, neither knowledge nor democracy is possible.92 Again, philosophy, or science, and democracy - just like theology and aristocracy - become so closely related to each other that the dividing line between them becomes more and more obscure. So it is not a completely new development when democracy itself is called a world view; and also an attitude to life.93 In this way, both democracy and aristocracy come to oppose each other; not only as forms of the State and Society, but also as world views and attitudes to life.94 So democracy as an attitude to life has scientific characteristics. This scientific attitude to life is described by Masaryk as the position adopted by those who have given up their belief in revelation and miracles. (Words he regards as tautologous.) Such people observe the changeless order of nature and society and learn to understand it. And from their understanding of it they deduce the rules for their actions. They have confidence in both men and mankind. They have confidence in their own ability. 90. Masaryk, 'Vyvoj evropské spoleönosti', p. 118. 91. Masaryk, Spirit of Russia II, p. 510. 92. Ibid. p. 512. 93. 'Democracy is a new world view and a new attitude to life', Russland und Europa II, p. 467. We prefer our own translation here to the official English version in, Spirit of Russia II, p. 514. Cp. 'Les difficultés', p. 63. 94. For this terminology see note 1 above. A world view is more theoretical in character than an attitude to life. The latter is more directly related to action. For example, someone who regards individual freedom as the highest good (a belief originating in a world view) will have a prima facie negative attitude towards every form of dictatorship (attitude to life). Another example: If I were to say of someone 'he believes in God', then I would be talking about his world view. If I were to say of somebody 'he is forgiving, not resentful, and optimistic', then I would be talking about his attitude to life.

Humanity

and Democracy

121

They are active men. They have come to understand that the anticipation of miracles only serves to sap men's strength. Such people know how to value continuous work and foresight. 95 His belief that nature and society are governed by unchanging laws did not lead Masaryk into a position of social and political passivity. On the contrary, it was precisely this belief which generated his activism. Man also needs foresight in order to prevent, as far as he can, what he finds unacceptable and undesirable. 96 Work and industry are the characteristics of the life of a democrat. Whilst contempt and disdain for work are the characteristics of the life of an aristocrat. This disparaging of labour is a consequence of the 'aristocratic principle', of its indeterminate fatalism. 'According to this viewpoint, nature, the world, society and its history are not governed by laws from which men can learn through careful observation and scientific deduction, but rather by the "Russian God" of w h o m you may ask miracles 95. Masaryk, Americképrednásky, pp. 53f. Here, and in what follows, one can hear an echo of Saint-Simon (the emphasis on the value of work): 'a man who has not contracted certain habits of order, economy and the love of work in his daily life (au temporel), who does not possess a certain level of instruction and foresight in his inner life (au spirituel) is outside the realm of emancipation. ...' Oeuvres de C.H. de Saint-Simon, Vol. II, p. 144. (This quotation is taken from L'Organisateur). Cp. also Saint-Simon's respect (mentioned in 'L'Industrie') for production and producers; and for industry in general. The latter is understood as 'all kinds of useful work'. Oeuvres, Vol. I, pp. 165 & 186. 96. Masaryk is clearly conscious of the conditional character of a law in the field of science when seen from the point of view of praxis. Still, there is in the whole of this passage more than a semblance of historicism. There is a certain non sequitur in Masaryk's historicism - see also above, pp. 23ff. - just as, for that matter, in that of Marx. The eleventh thesis on Feuerbach - 'The philosophers have only interpreted the world, in various ways, the point, however, is to change it.' - does not tally easily with Marx' historicism as it appears in the Preface to the first edition of, Capital·. 'And even when a society has got on the right track for the discovery of the natural laws of its movement and it is the ultimate aim of this work to lay bare the economic law of motion of modern society - it can neither clear by bold leaps nor remove by legal enactments the obstacles offered by successive phases of its normal development. But it can shorten and lessen the birth pangs.' The quotations are from (Ed.) L.S. Feuer, Basic Writings on Politics and Philosophy: Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels, pp. 245 and 136. Even Comte, perhaps the most historicist author of the nineteenth century, is not quite consistent when he writes: Ά sane politics could not have as its aim the impelling of the human species, which is moved by its own impelling power according to a law as necessary as the law of gravitation though more subject to modification. But it has for its end the facilitation of its movement by elucidating it.' A Comte, Système de politique positive, Vol. IV, (Paris, 1854); see general appendix, p. 95. The quotation is from, 'Plan de travaux scientifiques nécessaires pour réorganiser la société', 1822. The non sequitur lies in the fact that Comte speaks about a necessary law which is subject to modification. Moreover, there is a remarkable similarity between this quotation from Comte and the above citation from Marx' Preface.

122 Humanity and Democracy if you find yourself in a tight corner. This belief in miracles, this fatalism and indeterminism is hardly conducive to work.' 9 ' The theme of work and industry as characteristics of the democratic attitude to life recurs consistently in Masaryk's study on Dostoevsky and the other great Russian writers of the nineteenth century. Dostoevsky was an aristocrat in the specifically Masarykian sense: 'Not even his (Dostoevsky's) love of the "poor people" is democratic. To be democratic is rather to recognize work well done and to insist on justice, guaranteed by law; it is in fact a new and fresh approach to life and the world, whereas Dostoevsky's view of both remains aristocratic through and through.'9» Masaryk regards Turgenev's character Solomin in The Virgin Soil as a real democrat: A church warden's son who renounces his theological studies for science, accepts the goals of the revolutionaries, but wants to attain them via a completely different route. Solomin's conversation with Marianna about the significance of man's daily round and common task contains, according to Masaryk, the whole of Turgenev's philosophy of history. 'To counteract the disease of Russia's superfluous people, to combat drowsiness, boredom and indolence no less than the enthusiasm of the advocates of violence, there is only one cure and that is work.' 99 In this speech, 'Turgenev defined the very substance of democracy brilliantly... as Russia's real path to salvation'. 100 In addition to these literary studies, Masaryk also underlines the meaning of work and industry elsewhere; mostly as a characteristic feature of democracy and the democratic attitude towards life. In a lecture on Comenius dating from 1892, he refers not only to his significance for the democratizing of education, but also to his exemplary manner of working: energetic and thoughtful, based upon knowledge and emanating from a firm conviction.101 This is typical of what Masaryk was later to understand by democratic work. He proclaimed before the Parliament in Vienna that Roman Law arose out of a social system which was based on slavery and did not understand what labour signifies today. 102 Here, there is an implicit connexion between aristocracy and slavery; between democ97. Masaryk, Spirit of Russia III, p. 78. 98. Ibid. p. 153, cp. pp. 151f. 99. Ibid. p. 269. Philosophy of history in Masaryk's work has a strong practical character. Cp. above, pp. 25f. and Chapter 3, note 26. 100. Ibid. pp. 270f. 101. Masaryk, Velici muzové, pp. 27 & 30. 102. Rychnovsky, Masaryk, p. 54; cp. Masaryk, 'Vyvoj evropské spoleònosti', p. 127.

Humanity and Democracy

123

racy and labour by all for all. 103 In another of his parliamentary speeches, he says that anyone who thinks progressively and democratically even to a small extent would recommend work to students as well as to anybody else, even on seemingly trivial tasks, in place of heroic stupidities.104 In answer to the rhetorical question posed in a speech dating from 1908, namely: What does it mean to be a democrat in political, social and economic life? Masaryk says: Work! Work hard and honestly. That demands industry; and industrious is he who works constantly. Masaryk also sees a social evil here yet again in the fact that not everyone works and that the majority are compelled to back-breaking jobs. The process of democratization only begins when all men start working from conviction and awareness.105 Elsewhere, Masaryk opposes again work of a simple, humble and honest kind over against the aristocratic pastime of making out of war and violent revolution the central question of life. Such work, however, is not an end in itself. It is sanctified by the dominical command to love one's neighbour and - expressed in a more modern way - by the struggle against social deprivation. 106 So, whenever Masaryk mentions love as another characteristic of the democratic attitude towards life, then he is referring to an industrious, socially-engaged love with justice as its principal feature. 107 That democracy and the democratic attitude to life are typified by tolerance, patience, a critical sense and love for truth 108 follows from the intimate relationship between the scientific world view and democracy which has already been dealt with. The characteristics of the democratic attitude to life are striking. Because of their resemblance to the content of theideal of humanity, which, qua method was summarized as love in action and reason. 109 So, at a certain moment, Masaryk calls the world view or philosophy which 103. This connexion is made explicitly in Masaryk, Spirit of Russia ΙΠ, p. 78; and. The New Europe, p. 68. 104. Rychnovsky, Masaryk, p. 123. 105. Masaryk, 'Potreba pokrokové politiky', p. 172. 106. Masaryk, 'Vyvoj evropské spolednosti', p. 124; cp. Spirito/ Russia III, p. 134. That work is not man's highest goal can also be read in, 'How to Work', p. 130; and in Ludwig, Defender of Democracy, p. 267. 107. 'Love is democratic, faith is aristocratic'... Masaryk, Spirit of Russia II, p. 498. That is, love as social justice belongs to democracy, as faith and philanthropy suit aristocracy. For the relationship between love and justice, see above, Chapter 4, note 26 and p. 98. 108. See Ludwig, Defender of Democracy, p. 228; and Masaryk, The Making of a State, pp. 400ff. 109. See above, p. 46.

124 Humanity and Democracy underlies the democratic attitude to life interchangeably 'Democratism' and 'Humanitism'. 110 To summarize what has just been said and to return to the original question about the way in which Masaryk justifies democracy as a form of State and Society, we conclude that in the context of a philosophy of history he bases democracy upon what he calls modern, scientific philosophy. That is, the modern world view. At this point, he has been no more successful in avoiding the semblance of historicism than he was when justifying the ideal of humanity; inasmuch as he uses the development of history as an argument for the Tightness of democracy. This correspondence to the logic of the justification of his fundamental ideal is by no means accidental. For democracy as a form of State and Society is a characteristic feature of the ideal of humanity. 111 However, as in the case of the justification of humanity, 112 historicism is likewise not a fundamental part of the justification of democracy. The democratic present is not qua present, as progress in time, to be preferred over the aristocratic past, as time which has passed by. Rather, the democratic present is to be preferred to the aristocratic past precisely because it is democratic. Here, the adjectives 'democratic' and 'aristocratic' are no longer purely socialpolitical terms. Such an evaluation takes place on the basis of a 'democratic world view' in which science and ethics are central. Inasmuch as science assumes a central position, Masaryk has especially in mind the humanitarian ethos of science which is projected into the general human sphere beyond the world of science.113 In the framework of the democratic world view, science is understood morally. That is, science has become involved in the realm of the norm of humanity. Our conclusion that Masaryk bases political and social democracy upon what he calls modern, scientific philosophy, upon the modern world view, essentially means no more than that he justifies democracy morally in terms of humanity. 114 There are more than enough explicit references in 110. Masaryk, Russland und Europa II, p. 465. These terms do not occur in the English edition; see Spirit of Russia II, p. 511. 111. See above, p. 46. Cp. Making of a State, pp. 423 & 441; 'Les difficultés', p. 64; and, The New Europe, p. 25. 112. See above, pp. 25f. 113. O.D. Duintjer pleads in an article, 'Moderne wetenschap en waardevrijheid', following others such as, e.g., Popper, for 'the extension of elements from the ethos of science so that they become universal moral values', Algemeen Nederlands Tijdschrift voor Wijsbegeerte, Vol. 62, (Jan. 1970), pp. 38ff. 114. So Masaryk says of the new scientific philosophy that it is essentially ethical. See, Spirit of Russia II, pp. 511 & 515.

Humanity and Democracy

125

Masaryk's work to the moral basis of democracy. 115 This moral foundation should then again be understood in terms of humanity. All the more so because humanity, or love of one's neighbour, is sometimes clearly called the basis of democracy. 116 What has already been stated in connexion with his justification of humanity also goes for Masaryk's justification of democracy: When he justifies democracy with a reference to history as well, then that follows from his belief that history must surely confirm what is regarded as good for reasons which are other than historical, namely for moral reasons.

115. 'If there were no moral difference, what, I beg you, would be the motive which would push the democrat into fighting against the aristocrat? ... It should certainly be understood that it is morality which supplies the decisive motive in favour of the democratic idea'. Masaryk, 'L'idée démocratique', p. 33; cp. Making of a State, p. 214 and Ludwig, Defender of Democracy, pp. 177 & 227. 116. See Masaryk, 'Potïeba pokrokové politiky', p. 172; and, The New Europe, p. 69. In both of these passages to which reference is made here, Masaryk gives a variation of Kant's categorical imperative: in a democracy, one's fellow man is not to be used as a means (to private ends). See also Capok, Masaryk on Thought and Life, p. 190 and the passages referred to in note 111, above.

Chapter 6

Humanity and Revolution: The Problem of Violent Revolution as a Means of Creating Political and/or Social Change

1.

Introduction

In the previous chapters, the concept of humanity in Masaryk's thought has been analysed in terms of national identity (independence), Socialism (social justice) and democracy. This was done with special reference to the goal towards which the term humanity is pointing. In the last chapter which now follows, we are concerned with the content of the idea of humanity as a means to an end, as a way which leads to the goal: humanity. The question about the relationship between humanity and revolution will play a central role in this. Not so much because this subject has become a pressing one in recent years; but because the question of revolution was one of the greatest importance for Masaryk himself. Both as a politician and as an influential philosopher the problem of revolution was one which had a direct bearing upon what he was to do. The period during which Masaryk played a part in public life was characterized by revolutions and rumours of revolutions. The fact that revolution itself - or, more accurately, the question about the (moral) admissibility of revolution - is still a much debated matter can only serve to enhance the relevance of the following exposition. When the problem of revolution is brought to the fore - and hereby revolution is understood as something which men themselves do rather than as something which just happens to them - it should be seen in relation to humanity in a means-end relationship.1 The problem, then, is the 1. Cp. 'So "revolution and evolution" should be regarded as a "strategic distinction"; because it bears upon the choice between two ways to the same "end". ... If one wants to define the term "revolution", it is better, therefore, to define it as a "way to an end" rather than as a "result of certain causes".' G. Kuypers, Grondbegrippen van politiek, (Utrecht-Antwerp, 1972), p. 224.

Humanity and Revolution

127

violent character of revolution. Just as in contemporary studies of, and reflections upon revolution - above all those written by specialists in the field of theological ethics - the problem of revolutionary violence assumes a central if not the central place,2 so also the whole problem of revolution for Masaryk lies first and foremost in its violent character. Humanity cannot be reconciled prima facie with violence as far as Masarykis concerned. In short, this chapter does not deal with the question of revolution in general. Nor is it just a question of revolutionary violence; again understood in general terms. Rather, it is a question of how Masaryk regarded the problem of violent revolution when it is aimed at the attainment of humanity. So the predominant meaning of the word revolution in his work is the violent overthrow of a country's political and/or social structures (or an attempted overthrow) with the intention of achieving humanity. That is, national identity (or independence), Socialism (or social justice) and democracy.3 By violence he understands first of all the violation of the integrity of the human body culminating in its physical destruction. There are, however, other passages in which the meaning of the word violence (and violent) is taken as being wider than this: violence means not only the violation of the integrity of man's body, but also the violation of his spiritual, mental and moral integrity.4 In this chapter, Masaryk's normative theory of revolution is first to be analysed in the form in which it appears in his discussion with the 2. See, e.g., M. Honecker, Konzept einer sozialethischen Theorie, (Tübingen, 1971), pp. 183ff. Honecker gives a whole list of German literature on the problem of revolutionary violence, ibid. pp. 186f. Cp. G.H. ter Schegget, Het beroep op de stad der toekomst, (Haarlem, 1971), pp. 104ff. Also a political scientist such as Peter Calvert sees the problem of violence as fundamental in an evaluation of revolution. See P. Calvert, Revolution, (London, 1970), p. 113. 3. As will be seen, Masaryk also uses the word with other meanings: e.g. in the sense of a spontaneous popular uprising which he regards as ethically much less problematical than an organized, violent revolution; in the sense of a change of mentality; and in the sense of non-violent, fundamental changes in the field of State and Society. He was a whole-hearted protagonist of revolution in the last two senses. 4. See below, note 52. This latter meaning agrees with the definition of J. de Graaf in, 'Die Gewalt: Kritik ihrer Rechtfertigung', in, Zeitschriftfür Evangelische Ethik, Vol. XV, (1971), p. 130. This definition is more adequate than that of Johan Galtung: 'Violence, then, occurs when people are so influenced that their actual bodily and mental realization is less than their potential.' (J. Galtung, 'Gewalt, Frieden und Friedensforschung,' in, (Ed.) Dieter Senghaas, Kritische Friedensforschung, (Frankfurt a. M., 1972). Galtung's definition is too broad; it is no longer possible to distinguish between the use of power and the use of violence. One of the unacceptable consequences of this definition is that the concept of a non-violent society is a contradiction in terms. There is no conceivable society in which everyone's maximal potential can be realized.

128 Humanity and Revolution Czech radicals in the 1890's. There follows then a discussion of Masaryk's criticism of the Marxist theory of revolution. Finally, his theory of revolution, as this crystallized over the years in confrontation with both radicalism and Marxism, will be used as acriterionfortestinghisownstance in two important historical situations. At the same time, his theory will be put to the test. In these situations revolution was not only an academic problem that could be looked at more or less objectively, but also a practical problem which concerned him as a practical politician who had to take decisions.

2. Masaryk's Normative Theory of Revolution; His Controversy with A. Hajn In Naie NynëjSi Krise, a collection of essays connected with the theme dealt with in Ceská Otázka and partly also a continuation of it, 5 Masaryk takes up the criticism which the radical, Antonin Hajn had produced against his interpretation of the concept of humanity as formulated in Ceská Otázka. This he did in a chapter entitled 'Reformace ci Revoluce' (Reform or Revolution).6 Hajn used to be a member of a movement which was nationalistic and also more or less inclined in the direction of Socialism. This movement was held accountable by the central government for the demonstrations in Prague in 1893. They had not only led to the proclamation of a state of emergency in September 1893, but had also precipitated a trial during the course of which Hajn, among others, was sentenced to a period of imprisonment.7 Masaryk's own stance over against this radical movement - or, as the movement styled itself, progressive movement - which drew its members especially from the younger generation,8 could be called one of critical solidarity. His 5. See Chapter 2, note 26. 6. Hajn had expressed his criticism in the journal, Rozhledy, IV, (1894/5), Nrs. 4-7, 7. In the so-called Omladina trial, Hajn was sentenced to 18 months in jail. To him. Masaryk sent straight from the press his Nase Nynëjsi Krise with the following courteous letter: 'Dear Editor, I hope and desire that this letter and this little book of mine, which I hereby announce, reach you in good health. This very day, the sequel to Ceská Otázka, in which a paragraph is dedicated to your analysis of Realism, came off the press. May I presume to send you a copy of it with the request that you acquaint me of its receipt. I assume that publications such as this are delivered to you without difficulty. With best wishes, T.G. Masaryk.' For the Czech original see, C.O.-N.N.K., p. 622, where it is taken up by Skrach in his commentary. 8. Masaryk wrote about this movement in a series of articles under the title, 'Fort-

Humanity and Revolution

129

solidarity appeared first and foremost in his criticism of the repressive measures which the government had taken against these radicals. His criticism applied not so much to the goals formulated by the movement,9 though Masaryk did criticize parts of this formulation, but principally to the tactics of the movement, which did not eschew violence. According to him, only those whose minds were deranged could possibly think of going further than demonstrations. For progressives, however, revolution should be entirely out of the question. He who fights militarism in his programme on principle and desires to turn the State into a democracy and suchlike, should abstain at all hazards from violence. Because violence breeds violence.10 This particular line of criticism is taken up again in the above mentioned article about reform and revolution. The reason why it is so instructive for this study is that Masaryk responds here to Hajn's important remarks on the subject of his concept of humanity. And also rejects a certain interpretation of it. Hajn distinguishes between an absolute ideal of humanity which can in no circumstances be reconciled with the perpetration of violence and a relative form of humanity which can never be treated as an absolute. According to this relative humanity, one should strive to be as human as possible. That is, one should avoid the use of violence as much as possible. Humanity qua absolute ideal and the reality of the human condition are in conflict with one another. Hajn prefers humanity in its relative form. It takes into account the reality of human existence and in certain cases chooses the lesser of two evils in order to avert the greater one. According to Hajn, the tension between ideal and reality is felt especially in the field of politics, in which the relativizing

schrittliche Bewegung, Fortschrittspartei und Omladina in Böhmen', in the Viennese weekly, Die Zeit, (1894), Nrs. 7, 8 & 9. These articles are reprinted in Czech in, Nase Nynëjsi Krise·, in the edition used here, C.O.-N.N.K., on pages 288-309. He asserted here among other things that the movement originated in student circles and amongst young workers (in Prague). This view is confirmed in, Prehled ceskoslovenskych dëjin, Vol. II, 1, p. 653. From the radical movement, there emerged, on the initiative of Hajn and others, the radical-progressive party from which a number of people, including the future chairman of the Senate, F. Soukup, transferred to the social democrats, thereby augmenting significantly the intellectual ranks of this party over which Masaryk's influence was by no means insignificant. See, Prehled ceskoslovenskych dëjin, II, 1, p. 670. 9. Including universal suffrage, self-government (under the Austrian Crown), free medical care and education, 'normal' hours of work and a guaranteed minimum wage. See Masaryk, C.O.-N.N.K., p. 306. 10. Ibid. p. 309.

130 Humanity and Revolution of the absolute ideal is most needed. Humanity does not exclude in advance the use of violence as counter-violence.11 In his commentary on Hajn, Masaryk rejects the notion of a relative form of humanity, of a relative non-violence. He does not deny that there is a tension between norm and reality. But he does question whether one must reconcile oneself with this tension in such a way that one adapts the norm to the world of reality. In other words, Masaryk will have nothing to do with the adaptation of what ought to what is. Quite the reverse. What is should be adapted to what ought. 12 Masaryk certainly does recognize that it can be consistent with the norm of humanity to use force either individually or collectively for the purpose of self-defence. He emphasizes, however, the aspect of self-defence. Meanwhile, according to him, Hajn lays all the emphasis upon the use of violence.13 The norm of humanity permits armed defence against the violence of others; but only as ultima ratio.14 Masaryk does not accept the argument about structural violence which could well justify revolutionary counter-violence. This may be concluded at any rate on the basis of a passage in which he sharply attacks the view that the killing of one man pales into insignificance beside the destruction of human lives condemned to live and to work in miserable circumstances. According to Masaryk, there is all the difference in the world between premeditated murder and what he calls the endemic killing perpetrated by all men both upon themselves and upon others by man's ignorance and his lack of morality. 15 11. This is a paraphrase of Hajn's argument as reconstructed on the basis of a series of extended citations from Hajn's work in Masaryk's rebuttal. See ibid. pp. 330ÍF. The actual phrase' counter-violence' is not used by Hajn, though he does use the sense of it. 12. Ibid. p. 332. 13. Ibid. p. 332, 338 & 344. 14. In a number of earlier publications - the lectures on practical philosophy (1884) and the, Základové konkretné logiky, (1885), cited in T.G. Masaryk, Mravni názory, (Selected by Z. Franta, Praha/Prague, 1923), pp. 43f. - Masaryk sympathizes with a form of pacificm that rejects war and the whole war machine unconditionally. With a reference to Christ, ChelCicky and Tolstoy, he speaks out for a consistent non-violenceoffering no resistance to evil - as an implication of the command to love one's neighbour. As early as his, Versuch, the German version of the Základové (1887), the passage about non-violence is missing and in later publications Masaryk distances himself from the radical standpoint of Tolstoy. He does this explicitly, for example, in, 'In Memoriatrí, which is dedicated to Tolstoy and appeared in, Cas, (22 Nov. 1910); reprinted in, Velici muzové, pp. 175-179. 15. Masaryk, C.O.-N.N.K., p. 365. It should be borne in mind that Masaryk is here attacking revolutionaries who could be held to be responsible for their deeds; not those who are caught up (n.b. the use of the passive voice) in a spontaneous, popular uprising. See note 57. This passage shows, moreover, that the notion of structural violence is

Humanity and Revolution

131

Thus, Masaryk seems to reject violent revolution categorically. He also defends his rejection of violence on grounds of principle with prudential, matter-of-fact arguments; with an appeal to history; and with a reference to his own situation. As far as history is concerned, man learns from it according to him that violent revolution damages rather than furthers man's freedom and humanity. For this belief, he appeals to the events of the French Revolution. It failed to reach its goal because it was not true to its own principles. It arose as a protest against the violence of the absolutist ancien régime in the name of Liberty, Equality and Fraternity. But soon enough it became just as absolutist as the old monarchy of Louis XIV. It bankrupted itself because it used violence. Likewise, violence and revolution rode rough shod over the freedom of the reformation in the Bohemian Lands. 16 It is Masaryk's belief that the real revolution takes place in the realm of the human mind. Only revolution in beliefs and morals is revolution.' Violence, however, corrupts this revolution and restrains it. 17 So freedom is attained by a revolution in man's thinking. It is a revolution prepared throughout the course of countless generations.18 Masaryk is quite well aware of the objection that the development of mankind could not have been possible without the shedding of blood. And also that contemporary society has been built up by fire and sword rather than upon love. He answers this as follows. Although it is a fact that blood has been spilled and is still being spilled, it is still a matter of dispute whether progress has been achieved because blood has been shed rather than because less and less blood has been shed. Another question is whether even more blood will have to be shed.19 In any case, revolution is, according to Masaryk, a nonsensical anachronism in this day and age. Even if one leaves the principle of humanity

older than J. Gattung supposes when he writes, 'Hitherto it was the custom to think of violence as purely personal violence.. .*, 'Gewalt, Frieden und Friedensforschung', p. 66. 16. Ibid. pp. 339f. 17. Ibid. p. 338. 18. Ibid. p. 340. 19. Ibid. p. 343. Some 75 years later, J. de Graaf is thinking along the selfsame lines when he too not only questions the factual connexion between violence and progress in human history, but also at the same time pleads for a revision of factual and moral beliefs relating to the use of violence. 'It (violence) is in a technological world the primitive par excellence, even when it utilizes means which are technically perfect. The method of violence is the opposite of the method of science and technology.' J. de Graaf, 'Die Gewalt: Kritik ihrer Rechtfertigung', p. 138.

132 Humanity and Revolution out of account. 20 He also appeals to Plechanov and Engels for this view. Violence, says Masaryk, here repeating Plechanov, is not identical with revolution. Violence frustrates the social revolution when understood as a fundamental change in an unjust social order. 21 He points to Engels' then newly published Preface to the new impression of Marx' The Class Struggles in France (1895) in which Engels indicates with emphasis the changed circumstances obtaining since 1848. These offered little chance for a successful violent revolution on the part of the working class. Only the enemies of the people would want a revolution.22 So Masaryk's conclusion here is the same as in Ceská Otázka. Both from the point of view of principle, the norm of humanity, as well as on the basis of a prudential estimation of the situation, men should abstain from violent revolution in order to reach their humane, political goals. Masaryk states forcibly that a moral point of view is not unrealistic.23 One should only use the 'tactics of work'. Because one who draws the sword is neither willing nor able to be a democrat. Masaryk is in favour of Equality and Fraternity. This is precisely the reason why he favours work as a means to change the social and political order. 24 On the other hand, Masaryk suggests in his criticism of Hajn that there is a greater disagreement on matters of principle than appears to have been the case. It was the fact that he was engaged in controversy which drove him to widen as much as possible the cleft between him and his antagonist. Masaryk shows a prima facie moral repudiation of violence; though he does not condemn violent revolution unconditionally. It has already been seen that he believed that in certain circumstances the norm of humanity can imply that one should defend oneself by force of arms against the violence of others should no other means be sufficient. In Karel Havlicek, written two years after his altercation with Hajn, Masaryk leaves open the possibility that a violent revolution should be regarded as such a defence against the violence of others. If this is the case, then 20. C.O.-N.N.K., pp. 340f. 21. Ibid. p. 339. 22. Ibid. pp. 339 & 341. In 1895 (the year of his discussion with Hajn), Masaryk wrote in an article on social democracy against revolution that man and society could only be changed in one of two ways: by violence or reasoning. The social democrats strive after their ideals no less than other parties with arguments. According to Masaryk, that is quite natural. Their forefathers were for the most part philosophers and philanthropists too. See, 'Sociální demokracie proti revoluci', in, N.D. II, (1895), p. 891. 23. Ibid. pp. 342ff. 24. Ibid. p. 355; cp. p. 341.

Humanity and Revolution

133

revolution is indeed morally admissible.25 Judgement in this matter depends upon the intention of those who resort to revolution. Every act needs to be judged with respect to the intention motivating it. It is quite clear, therefore, according to Masaryk, that someone defending himself does not come into the same category as someone else who resorts to aggressive violence.26 There is yet another condition which a justifiable revolution must meet in full: the goal of the revolution should be (positive) reform. In this connexion, he underlines the importance of revolutionary success. Revolution must be aimed at positive reform. And also be a successful means of attaining it. 27 The belief that a violent revolution in the existing situation in Austria would not be adequate as a means of realizing political and social reforms thereby bringing the ideal of humanity even closer, strengthened, however, Masaryk's prima facie moral aversion from revolutionary violence. It caused him to plead even more fervently for a revolution of the heart and mind. In other words, for a mental and moral revolution.28 This belief did not impel him into a state of political and social quietism. Rather, it led him to redouble his efforts for a non-violent revolution. In an article written about the same time on the subject of a possible German-Czech settlement, Masaryk writes as follows: 'Without revolution one cannot abolish absolutism. The only thing which matters, therefore, is to make this revolution organically without resorting to force. What was now the greatest and essential result of the revolution of 1848? The abolition of serfdom. And this was abolished once and for all without any violent revolution.' 29 There is no need for sacrifices on the barricades. Rather a need (in his opinion) for more effective offerings upon the factory floor.30

25. Masaryk, Karel HavUâek, p. 158. 26. Ibid. p. 158. Masaryk refers also in this context to the teaching of 'older ethicists and politicians' concerning the moral admissibility of a popular political uprising and tyrannicide. 27. Ibid. p. 159. 28. Ibid. p. 159. According to Masaryk, such a revolution is implied by the demand of the Gospel that we should 'put on the new man'. Ibid. p. 160. 29. Masaryk, 'Zur deutsch-böhmischen Ausgleichsfrage', in, Die Zeit, (Wien/Vienna, 1895), Nr. 82, p. 52. By absolutism, Masaryk understands not only a political, but also a social absolutism. That is evident from the context. 30. Masaryk, Karel Havliiek, p. 160.

134

Humanity

3. Masaryk's

and Criticism

Revolution of the Marxist

Theory of

Revolution

The political implication of this belief is his recommendation o f the legal way. That means the way of parliamentary democracy. If this way is also to be a live option for the Czech workers, w h o lean heavily towards the social-democratic party, then a revision of the marxist idea of revolution is demanded at the theoretical level. A n d at the practical level the introduction of universal suffrage. Masaryk fought for both. His commitment to the latter cause has already been mentioned. 3 1 A s to the former, his approval of Engels' Preface to the new impression of Marx' Class Struggles in France has also been referred to already. In it, Engels recommends the legal way of parliamentary democracy. 3 2 But that was not enough for Masaryk. In the Grundlagen, he devotes no less than fifty pages to the theme of revolution. H e investigates h o w far Marx and Engels had advocated revolutionary methods for the praxis. He concludes that their fundamental insights o n the subject of revolutionary practice were vacillating and had not settled. 3 3 Masaryk regards it, 31. See above, pp. 77f. 32. See above, p. 132. 33. Masaryk, Grundlagen, p. 522 (339), cp. p. 529 (not in Kohák's edition). Masaryk gives a whole row of references to passages in which Marx expresses himself positively on the subject of (violent) revolution. According to Masaryk, the climax is the first Volume of Capital. Ibid. pp. 520-522 (337-339). Though he points to the difference between the first and third volumes of Capital 'in which Marx no longer rejects the existing order absolutely'. Ibid. p. 522 (339). He regards Marx' conduct in 1850 to be typical of his zig-zag course on the subject of revolution. 'In the Address of the Central Committee to the Communist League, written in March, Marx and Engels ask for a permanent revolution and even demand not only that "so-called" excesses, instances of popular revenge on hated individuals or public buildings be tolerated, but "leadership of them should be taken in hand." But five months later Marx and Engels equally vehemently turned against younger comrades who wanted to follow their course even further.' Ibid. p. 522 (339). On the subject of Engels' stance on revolution, Masaryk follows a similar procedure, ibid. pp. 523-529 (abbreviated in Kohák, pp. 339f.). Thus he gives a detailed account of Engels' Preface to the 1895 edition of Marx', Class Struggles in France. Perhaps he interprets this Preface too narrowly in the sense that he depicts Engels here as a too exclusive advocate of the parliamentary and legal way. This is the point at which the Czech communist Tábor is shown to be right; though he, in turn, depicts Engels astoo much of a revolutionary. See J. Tábor, 'Socialismus a Masaryk', in, Filosoficky Casopis, Vol. IV, (1956), pp. 762ff. The theme of Marx' and Engels' 'vacillation' on the subject of revolution returns time and time again in Masaryk's work. For example, as in, Spirit of Russia II, pp. 332ff., from which the following passages are cited: 'In Marx, therefore, and also in Engels, we have to note that a clear distinction is made. For Marx the definitive, terminal,"ultimate and decisive" revolution, the total transformation of the conditions of production and ownership, the negation of negation (in the

Humanity and Revolution

135

however, as unsatisfactory that Marx and Engels try on the one hand to base the necessity of revolution on theory whilst on the other hand expressing the view that revolution is quite unnecessary without ever having reconciled both points of view 'philosophically'.34 The basing of the necessity of revolution on theoretical grounds is rejected by Masaryk. And he thinks that it is not enough merely to express the view that revolution is not necessary. It has already been mentioned that Masaryk, taking as his bench-mark Marx' critique of Hegel's philosophy of right, does not see in Marx' plea on behalf of revolution the result of an analysis of the economic situation but rather the logical consequence of Feuerbach's critical philosophy of religion. Masaryk regards Marx' philosophy of revolution as an ideology; not in the sense of a 'superstructure' (Ueberbau), but rather as a 'prestructure' (Vorbau).35 The move from the theory (ideology) of revolution to its praxis is regarded by Masaryk as too easy a way out. The categorical imperative of the revolution is quite self-evident to Marx; but he ought to ask himself whether a revolution could ever realize the ideal of humanity, and whether it could realize it generally and in 'a twinkling of an eye'. 36 Marx' theory of the revolution is not only interpreted and criticized in relation to Feuerbach's thought, but also in relation to Hegel's thought; especially in connexion with his philosophy of history. Hegelian formula), was entirely different from lesser and indecisive revolutions. He did not clearly explain how far these lesser revolutions would be advantageous to the great revolution, but in accordance with the Communist Manifesto we may assume that such revolutions, too, were to be regarded as valuable. ... To Marx it seemed selfevident that the terminal revolution must be unified, must be a mass-revolution. ... At Amsterdam in 1872 Marx declared that in the United States of America and in England a social revolution could be effected by legal means. For England, in particular, Marx subsequently mooted the buying out of the landlords as a possibility in lieu of forcible expropriation. The catastrophic theory was thus modified in the evolutionary sense...' See, Spirit of Russia II, p. 336. All this is set out again in his polemical article, 'Revoluce a boläevici' (in, Cesta demokracie I, pp. 446-455). Cp. note 102, below.Masaryk's interpretation of Marx' and Engels' theory of revolution - 'vacillating' - is confirmed by that of George Lichtheim when he states: 'Ever since then [Marx' speech in Amsterdam in 1872) it has been possible for Social-Democrats and Communists alike to appeal to his [Marx' ] authority; and for good reason. The contradictions latent in his outlook were fused into a doctrine which Janus-like confronted the beholder whatever his angle of vision. The roots of the dilemma are traceable to the earliest and least understood chapter in the history of Marxism: the role of Marx and Engels in the secret Communist League ...' G. Lichtheim, Marxism, pp. 122f. 34. Ibid. p. 535 (341). 35. See above, p. 95. 36. Ibid. p. 543.

136 Humanity and Revolution 'Here Hegel's negation of the negation is given its full scope. Marx constructs a proletariat, even though he himself has to admit that in Germany industrial development has not yet given rise to one. Similarly he constructs the moral qualities of the "passive" and "material" foundations of the revolution.... It never occurred to Marx that if the proletariat were as he describes it, it would be incapable of what he demands of it. Could such a deprived mass understand Marx' philosophy and would it carry out its philosophical leaders' commands and none other?' 37 Masaryk thus repudiates the marxist notion of a necessary revolution in a double sense. He rejects the idea of history as a process determined by a law in the Hegelian sense, in which the proletarian revolution occurs necessarily and inevitably. In this way, one is confronted by a construction of history; not by real history.38 He does not agree either with the notion that a revolution might be necessary in the sense of a moral demand. That is, in the sense of a categorical imperative. Here, Masaryk takes the view that Marx too easily circumvents the fact that revolution is characterized by violence.39 So that is the main reason why he finds Marx' and Engels' occasional rejoinders that revolution is not necessary quite unsatisfactory. Masaryk admits that he agrees with Engels' argument from utility against revolution as set out in his Preface to Marx' Class Struggles. But he reckons it as a failure that he, no more than Marx, was able to evaluate and, if needs be, to judge revolution from a moral point of view. 'Marx and Engels wanted an amoral philosophy at all costs. For this reason they both defend and condemn revolution only sociologically and historically; the dialectical law of negation demands catastrophes, revolutions. On the other hand, 37. Ibid. pp. 543f. (343) (translation slightly altered). 38. The idea of the proletarian revolution as a historically necessary event is presented by Masaryk in an even sharper formulation than in Marx', A Contribution to the Critique of Hegel's Philosophy of Right by means of a citation from the, Holy Family : "... since the conditions of life of the proletariat sum up all the conditions of life of society today in all their inhuman acuity; since man has lost himself in the proletariat, yet at the same time has not only gained theoretical consciousness of that loss, but through urgent, no longer disguisable, absolutely imperative need - that practical expression of necessity - is driven directly to revolt against that inhumanity; it follows that the proletariat can and must free itself. But it cannot free itself without abolishing the conditions of its own life. It cannot abolish the conditions of its own life without abolishing all the inhuman conditions of life of society today ...' Ibid. pp. 541f. (note). The English translation is from Kohák's edition, p. 432, § 145, note 1 (italics in original text). 39. Ibid. p. 543 (343).

Humanity and Revolution

137

Engels later under the apparent influence of modern evolutionism, speaks out against revolution...' 40 The question of whether a revolution is or is not justified, Masaryk argues, is not just a question for historians and scientists. From the data provided by modern geology one could deduce an anti-revolutionary doctrine. But it is not really necessary. History is not unambiguous either. 'Similarly I cannot derive a decision from history about how I ought to act; and that is the real problem.' 41 Masaryk emphasizes that this does not mean that science cannot help with the business of passing a moral judgement; for example a moral judgement about revolution.42 Ultimately, however, the question boils down to what is right and fitting to do. To the question of what I ought to do. The answer to the question about what has happened in the past, what is happening now and what is going to happen in the future is not decisive.43 And in answering this normative question about revolution the most important point of all is that revolution is accompanied by violence, demands its victims, and implies that there will be loss of life. So Masaryk again falls back to the position which he had already defended earlier: a violent revolution is only admissible in the last resort as a defensive measure. As a means of achieving a better society, hard work is much to be preferred to revolution.44

4. Masaryk's Normative Theory of Revolution in its Final Form At this point in our excursus on Masaryk's criticism of the marxist theory of revolution, we arrive again at our original bench-mark. Humanity as a social ideal requires as its means or method work. It does not require revolutionary violence; except perhaps in the last resort as self-defence. In the political sphere, the work method means the legal way of parliamen40. Ibid. p. 547 (346f.). The translation is slightly altered. The paradoxical character of Marx' amoralism which we have come up against here - revolution as a moral demand, the content of the categorical imperative, and the amoralism which he explicitly affirms - has already been indicated by Masaryk. See above, pp. 93ff. 41. Ibid. p. 555 (our translation). Masaryk's antihistoricism is recognizable, cp. above, pp. 22ff. 42. In this context, he pleads for the study of modern history, in particular the history of the French Revolution, and points to the connexion between revolution and reaction, ibid. pp. 545 & 547 (345f.). 43. Ibid. p. 547 (347). 44. Ibid. p. 547ff. (347ff.).

138 Humanity and Revolution tary democracy. This will begin to show more results as the politicians and the people who choose them are better educated. 45 The problem of revolution, i.e. the (political) use of violence, held Masaryk's attention constantly. After the turn of the century, he returned regularly to this subject too. As far as fundamentals are concerned, there is nothing new to hear from him; though over the years he places the emphasis elsewhere. This last remark does not, however, apply to his review of a work on Lassalle in which he gives credit to this leader of the German workers for spotting the defectiveness of the socialist revolutionary programme at a very early date. And for drawing the conclusions in his political programme from the demand for universal suffrage. In this he had a better judgement than Marx. 46 For Masaryk, the fundamental moral problem is again the admissibility of the violence and the killing which accompanies the revolution.47 The emphases are placed elsewhere in those publications in which Masaryk is concerned with Russia. The revolution of 1905 had scarcely begun before he gave an appreciative, though careful and provisional, commentary upon it. Although in his opinion the nature and the course of a political revolution do not entirely tally with what is happening at that moment in Russia, the movement is distinguished in any case from earlier terrorism by being a mass-movement. 'For the first time in Russia we have to do with an actual mass-movement of a political character. And secondly, almost all active, progressive groups have united in the movement.' 48 Typical of Masaryk is the statement that Russian absolutism is never cut off at its roots as long as the people is not being educated. Meanwhile, however, the axe is already laid at these roots. He is thinking here especially of the marxist movement which has also accomplished much in the field of popular education. He even expresses the conviction that the régime of the Czar will only yield to force. 49 Less explicitly, though certainly implicitly, the same belief can be found in the immediate pre-First World War period in his great Russian 45. Ibid. p. 578ff. (370ff.). Cp. above, Chapter 5, note 32. Note that Masaryk did not deny to the workers their fundamental right to strike. On the contrary, striking workers on various occasions could reckon on his support. Cp. above, p. 78. 46. T.G. Masaryk, 'Lassalle-Studien', in, Zeitschrift für Sozialwissenschaft, Vol. Vili, (Berlin, 1905), p. 95. 47. Ibid. p. 92. 48. Masaryk, 'Die Revolution in Russland', in, Oesterreichische Rundschau, Vol. II, (Febr. 1905), p. 7, cp. p. 1. 49. Ibid. p. 8.

Humanity and Revolution

139

study. In Masaryk's own words, he started this project with the idea 'of elucidating the nature of the Russian revolution, and of discussing the Russian problem as a whole, in a study of Dostoevskii'.50 With the Russian situation in mind, and with a reference to Oxenstierna - 'every government gets the revolutions it deserves' - he states: 'Theocratic absolutism, using violence, is responsible for the use of violence by the revolutionary opposition.' 51 The Russian theocracy is absolutist and as such 'essentially coercive and is prone to the use of violence; hence the resistance offered by the democracy is fully justified'. So revolution can be one of the proper and necessary means of socio-political self-defence, of the defence of one's own and others' lives; and above all of the defence of moral and spiritual interests against the violence of rulers. Whenever this is the case, revolution can then be justified on moral grounds. At such a juncture, it can even become a moral duty. 52 As far as principles are concerned, Masaryk does not deviate fundamentally here from the position he had adopted earlier. Revolution and violence remain as the last line of defence; as the ultimate means of bringing about reforms. Ά desirable revolution springs from the calm conviction that no other means can bring about the requisite progress...' 53 The difference when compared with his earlier standpoint is that Masaryk admits more freely than heretofore the possibility that revolution is an adequate means of bringing about positive changes. But that does not diminish his fundamental aversion from the use of force. Thus he points out in this connexion that people in general still resort too frivolously to violence. The commandment 'Thou shalt not kill' is universally valid. This means that 'the reflective man must do his utmost to husband his own and his neighbours' vital forces.' 54 As conservatism and reaction cannot be justified with an appeal to history, to how things used to be in the past, with an appeal to historical right, neither can revolution by justified with an appeal to the historical process, to what is now and what shall be. That is, to another historical right. 55 The one 50. Masaryk, Spirit of Russia I, p. VII. 51. Ibid. II, p. 537 (translation slightly altered). 52. Ibid. p. 535 (translation slightly altered). When Masaryk speaks here about violence, the meaning is broader than 'the violation of man's bodily integrity'. Cp. above, p. 127. 53. Ibid. p. 536, cp. p. 541. 54. Ibid. p. 537. 55. Ibid. pp. 539ff. The antihistoricism of this passage should be noted. Masaryk rejects here Engels' notionthat the right to make revolution should be the only historical

140 Humanity and Revolution and only possibility of justifying revolution consists in demonstrating 'that the revolution is actually in conformity with the true interests of the people, that it represents a real progress in democratic evolution, and that it is indispensable.'56 Again, what matters is the motivation of the revolutionaries.57 What Masaryk broaches in his Russian studies in connexion with the problem of revolution also differs little fundamentally from what he has to say about it in other contexts. The difference lies really in where he lays the emphasis. What for him was no more than a theoretical possibility in other situations - for example in Austria and in Western Europe - that is, a violent revolution as ultima ratio, became more and more a real possibility in Russia.58 Above all, the difference concerns the contexts; and not so much the norm by which he judges them. The norm by which Masaryk evaluates these different situations is formulated in such a way that in different situations one can arrive at different practical conclusions. Such an interpretation can be substantiated by a quotation from the third volume of the Russian studies in which he is criticizing Tolstoy: 'Tolstoy for his part does not admit that there are moral degrees and shades in all actions, and quite fails to judge individual deeds in the light of their usefulness. That is why he rejects revolution in toto, and remains inattentive to various justifications of and motivations for revolutionary action at different times in different countries.' 59 Although it could have been formulated more clearly, this citation boils right. Though Masaryk has more sympathy for this right than for the conservative version of the historical right. 56. Ibid. p. 539. By 'necessary', Masaryk means ultima ratio, the last means of self-defence against the violence - both physical and mental - of the rulers. This may be deduced from the context. Cp. p. 535f. 57. Ibid. p. 536. In the context of his remarks about the justifiability of revolution, Masaryk has in mind the leaders, those who can be held to be responsible. A spontaneous popular uprising 'brought about by the stress of poverty, hunger, or despair, must not be harshly judged.' Ibid. p. 536, cp. 539. Furthermore, he distinguishes between a revolution 'as a whole and its individual phases, periods and activities'; and he adds: O u r ethical approval may be given to the revolution as a whole even while we condemn the acts of individual participators.' Ibid. p. 536. 58. Masaryk's judgement of the revolution of 1905 is a positive one: 'Judged as a whole, the revolution of 1905-6 was advantageous to the development of Russia, was a notable warning to the government and an impressive lesson to the revolutionaries.' Ibid. p. 347. On the subject of'the definitive social revolution', to which social revolutionaries and social democrats aspired, it is his belief, based on experience since 1905,' that neither in Russia nor in Europe is such a revolution possible forthwith.' Ibid. p. 372 (original italics). 59. Masaryk, Spirit of Russia III, p. 187 (original italics).

Humanity and Revolution

141

down to the following as far as the problem of revolution is concerned. The question of the admissibility of revolution cannot be answered categorically with a yes or no. Rather, it demands a hypothetical answer in which a complex norm is incorporated. Violent revolution is only admissible when there is no other non-violent means available to protect the physical and mental integrity of the people concerned. And if it can further be assumed that revolution will result in the desired (better and more humane) situation. This normative theory of revolution has two focal points (or subnorms). There is the more specific moral principle of revolution as a last resort for the purpose of self-defence. And then there is secondly the more political principle of revolution as an adequate means of attaining a good (humane) end. 60

5. Masaryk's Theory of Revolution Checked Against His Attitude Towards Austria in the Years 1914-1918 Masaryk's decision-making as to the relationship to be adopted with Austria and the policy to be followed after the outbreak of the First World War (i.e. revolution or no revolution) will now be tested against his normative theory of revolution as formulated above. The question here is whether Masaryk dealt with the Austrian connexion in a way which is consistent with his own theory. It has already been seen that Masaryk's stance over against Austria right up to the time immediately preceding the outbreak of the First World War was highly critical but loyal. The goal which he envisaged was autonomy for the Bohemian Crown Lands within a new Austria. We will gloss over the question of the motives which precisely form the source of his loyalty to Austria; though one could well take for granted that Masaryk, even if it were assumed that he did desire a complete break with Vienna in the long run, thought that the time was not yet right for this in any case; and thecircumstances unfavourable. The developmentsin the summer and autumn of 1914, the declarations of war, namely that of England on Germany, 62 the completely new situation which arose thereby both at 60. What is political and what is moral cannot be separated from each other, certainly not in Masaryk's work; yet there is a certain difference between them.Hence the terminology 'more specifically moral' and 'more political'. For the relationship between the political and the moral see note 83, below. 61. See above, Chapter 3, note 70. 62. See Herben, Masaryk, p. 145.

142

Humanity and Revolution

home and abroad, brought Masaryk to a position at which he revised his opinion on the future of the Danube monarchy and the relationship of the Bohemian Crown Lands to it. 63 Masaryk had done everything in his power to avert Austria from the path leading to war. 64 When the war did actually break out, Masaryk's painful concern can be seen in an article which he wrote post-haste for his party newspaper. Its opening sentence reads as follows: 'What everybody feared and thought to be quite impossible, because it is so terrible, has actually happened. The world is being divided into two warring camps. Armies numbering millions are locked together in mortal combat... whilst shortly before a great majority of the combatants did not want war.' 65 Masaryk wonders after that how long the war is going to last, who is going to win, who is going to lose, what the loser is going to lose, and what, perhaps, he might win. He answers: 'Who would dare to answer these questions even if he had complete freedom of speech?' 66 Still, he did try quickly and to the best of his ability to answer these questions himself in order to be able to take practical decisions about the political line to be followed against Austria on the basis of this answer. 67 Masaryk travelled twice to the Netherlands in September and October to consult with influential English and French friends. In the same period, he visited German political experts in Berlin. 68 Kautsky was one of them. 69 In Vienna he put to Körber (a former Prime Minister) the question of whether the Viennese Government would be able to carry out the necessary 63. These are the data which could be adduced for refuting a tentative politicological hypothesis formulated by G. Kuypers: 'Political aims are relatively fixed with respect to changing initial conditions.' See G. Kuypers, Grondbegrippen van politiek, p. 266. 64. Rychnovsky, Masaryk, pp. 170ff. Masaryk tried, for example in December 1912, to mediate between the Serbian Prime Minister, Pasic, and the Austrian Minister of Foreign Affairs, Berchtold; an attempt which was frustrated by the latter, op. cit. pp. 172f. He delivered his last speech in Vienna on 27 Nov. 1913 on the occasion of a peace demonstration by the Austrian Society for Peace. Op. cit. p. 177. 65. The article in, Cas is reprinted in, N.D., XXI (1914), pp. 961-979 with the title, Válka. The citation is from p. 961. 66. Ibid. p. 961. The tenor of the article, in which the economical and the powerpolitical factors underlying the outbreak of war are regarded as the most important, is covertly anti-German. 67. 'When war broke out we had to gauge the European situation, to estimate the strength of the two groups of belligerents, to judge, in the light of history, whither things were tending, to make up our minds and to act - above all, to act.' See, Making of a State, p. 46. 68. See Rychnovsky, Masaryk, pp. 182f. & Herben, Masaryk, pp. 152f. 69. See Karl Kautsky's contribution to a Festschrift on the occasion of Masaryk's 80th birthday in, M.S. V, p. 45.

Humanity and Revolution

143

political reforms after a victory. The answer he received was in the negative. In all probability Germany would not prompt Austria to make reforms. 70 The way in which Masaryk came to make his decisions is copiously and impressively written down in his war memoires. His conclusion was: 'Therefore, after analysing the European situation and estimating the probable course of the war, I decided to oppose Austria actively, in the expectation that the Allies would win and that our espousal of their cause would bring us freedom.' 71 We are not concerned here with an exhaustive historical analysis of Masaryk's revolutionary decision-making processes in the days following the outbreak of the First World War. It should be demonstrated here how important the factual analysis of the situation was for Masaryk, placed as he was before the choice of alternative strategies for or against Austria, with the question of how the stated goal could best be reached in the forefront of his mind. 72 Masaryk's original negative answer to a revolutionary course of action against Austria turned into a positive one because of a new appraisal of the factual situation necessitated by the changed circumstances. Thus he could declare with one eye on his former radical opponents, who were hell-bent on a revolutionary course: 'and when the hour struck, when the situation of the world changed and fate compelled us to decide, it was not my opponents who took the decision and transformed it into action.' 73 It can be concluded that Masaryk's revolutionary stance over against Austria agrees with the more political principle which he favoured: a violent revolution should be regarded as admissible when it can be assumed that it would result in the desired, more humane situation. According to Masaryk, however, another, more specifically moral, principle must be satisfied (as has already been seen) if it is going to be possible to speak of an admissible revolution: it must be possible to 70. Masaryk, Making of a State, pp. 43f. 71. Ibid. pp. 49f. Masaryk's conclusion had more the character of a 'décision-option' than a 'décision-solution'. This terminology, introduced by J. Fourastié, has been used in an article on revolution by A. van den Beld, 'Revolutie en het zedelijk oordeel', in, Wijsgerig Perspectief, IX, (Sept. 1968), p. 66. 72. In the light of his question to Körber, Masaryk had not yet determined the goal. He wanted at least a form of autonomy for the Czechs; possibly still within the framework of the monarchy. By the middle of October, however, he was already thinking in terms of complete independence from Austria and the amalgamation of the historical Bohemia-Moravia-Silesia and the Slovakian parts of Hungary. See Bosl, Handbuch III, p. 307. 73. Masaryk, Making of a State, p. 47.

144 Humanity and Revolution regard revolution as the last resort for the defence of the bodily and mental integrity of those concerned. Was Masaryk's decision to engage in revolution congruent with this second principle as well? It is a difficult question to answer. Masaryk saw himself confronted with a war which he had not wanted. He had even done his best to prevent it from breaking out. 74 He had to look on whilst his fellow countrymen were being called up to fight a war on the side of the Austrians in which they - or at any rate a majority of them - saw no point at all. The war was certainly regarded by them neither as a defence of their own country, nor as a means of preserving their own existence. Desertion occurred on a large scale. The government took strong repressive measures against every expression of an anti-militaristic or an anti-Austrian persuasion. There were also executions.75 Neutrality - holding one's self aloof from the war and pacifism - was a practical impossibility for many of them unless one risked death as a conscientious objector or as a traitor. Violence had broken out on an inconceivably great scale for those days. The actual choice was not for or against violence, but rather one of violence for or against Austria. As a politician called upon to make decisions and get things done, Masaryk saw no other possibility: except to make the best possible decision for his people on the basis of the most delicately judged assessment of the situation. That is, a decision which would promote the desired autonomy of his people. Thus Masaryk decided that the Czechs would organize and arm themselves on the side of the allies against the central powers. That is, he decided for revolution against Austria. Masaryk's decision to take the path of revolution against Austria was in my opinion primarily formed on the basis of political considerations. Doubtless his growing revulsion since the annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina from Austria's militaristic policy also contributed to this decision. As did his belief that the central powers were responsible for the outbreak of the war. This conviction can be read between the lines of an already quoted article in Naie Doba,76 which was written in August of 1914. It is also explicitly stated in The New Europe, which was written during the war, and in his war memoires. In both of these works Masaryk interprets the campaign conducted by the allies - and implicitly the Czech

74. See above, note 64. 75. See, Ceskoslovenská ak. vëd., Prehledll, 2, pp. 1125ff., and Bosl, Handbuch, III, pp. 277 & 292. 76. See Masaryk, 'Válka', pp. 961-990.

Humanity and Revolution

145

revolution as well - as a defensive war against the aggression of the central powers.77 So, was the Czech revolution, and was Masaryk's decision to adopt a revolutionary stance against Austria, in agreement with the principle that revolution is admissible as ultima ratio in order to preserve the bodily and mental integrity of the people concerned? Let us split this question into two parts. First of all then, the question of whether this revolution was the last available means of self-defence. As to the qualification 'last', it is remarkable that Masaryk never actually uses this particular epithet in connexion with the Czech revolution. So there is no reason to speak of a last resort in connexion with this particular revolution.78 Is it, then, possible to think of Masaryk's Czech revolution as a means of self-defence ? As already mentioned, Masaryk implicitly claims that his revolution had a defensive character. But this claim should only be accepted, however, with caution. The revolution, symbolized by Masaryk's part in it, certainly had a defensive character at first. But in the long run this defensive character became, to say the least, problematical.79 When Austria was bent on making a separate peace agreement with the allies on several occasions, Masaryk favoured the continuation of the war to its bitter end. In his plea for the continuation of the war, Masaryk certainly tried to justify it in terms of peace and defence. This justification, however, also smacks definitely of propaganda.80 In his war memoires, Masaryk states 77. Masaryk, The New Europe, pp. 7, 63; cp. Making of a State, pp. 75ff. 78. For that matter, it is very doubtful whether one ever could speak about a violent revolution as a last means of self-defence. At the individual level, one could possibly envisage a situation in which the use of force (violence) can be regarded as the last means of self-defence; but could one ever really assert of a situation at the national or international level that an (organized) revolution is the last means of self-defence? One could think of the situation of the Jews in Hitler's Third Reich; or, more specifically, of the position of the Jews in the Warsaw ghetto. Nevertheless, one should speak here (rightly in my opinion) rather of an uprising than of a revolution. See also note 79. 79. How could it really be otherwise? Is it really possible to speak consistently about a violent revolution as a means of self-defence against personal or structural violence of the ruling power? If a revolution starts out as self-defence and then succeeds, then it must surely have gone on from the defensive to the offensive. Moreover, has a revolution ever really begun as self-defence pure and simple? Is not one of the differences between a spontaneous rising, a food riot for example, and a revolution, which has to be almost by definition organized, precisely that the former is an expression of powerlessness and the second much more a manifestation of might and offensive power? 80. 'In the interest of permanent peace it is therefore necessary to carry on the war till the end. That does not mean to accept Prussian militarism: we merely demand defence, an energetic and thorough defence.' Masaryk, The New Europe, p. 62. For its propagandists character, see Chapter 3, note 71.

146

Humanity and

Revolution

his real reasons against making a separate and premature peace with Austria more clearly: Austria should not be allowed to consolidate its position. It would have to fall apart in order to make possible the foundation of a Czechoslovakian state. 81 Should one still wish, despite the difficulties, to maintain the defensive character of the Czech revolution, then one should think rather more in terms of a defence of the national, political and cultural rights of the Czech people than in terms of a defence of their bodily and mental integrity. 82 T o take up the original question again of how far Masaryk's political dealings after the outbreak of the First World War are consistent with his normative theory of revolution, we conclude that his behaviour is completely consistent with the more political subnorm (revolution is admissible as a means if it can be assumed that the humane goal towards which one strives can be reached by such means). Strictly speaking, however, he did not comply completely with the more specifically moral criterion (revolution is admissible in the last resort for self-defence). It has also been shown that in his practical considerations, the more political issue played a more prominent role than the more specifically moral one. 8 3 81. Masaryk, Making of a State, pp. 126ff., & 244ÏÏ. 82. It speaks for itself that there is a close connexion between a nation's mental and spiritual existence and the recognition of its rights. 83. For the use of the terms 'moral' and 'political' in these passages and elsewhere in this chapter, Masaryk's own terminology has been used as a bench-mark. In, Making of a State, Masaryk writes the following (p. 72): Ί have said that the resolve to fight Austria involved for me a moral as well as a political problem.' (My italics).From the context it appears that Masaryk saw the problem as a political one when he was concerned with the consequences of his Austrian policy with respect to the goal after which he was striving. Revolution as a political problem involved the question of whether revolution was an adequate means of reaching the intended goal. (Masaryk's use of the word 'political' is congruent with that of G. Kuypers who defines political in his, Grondbegrippen van politiek in terms of policy: policy is above all a matter of means and ends - and timing, op. cit. pp. 15fF. & 164fF.). For Masaryk, the moral problem appeared to consist in the violent, prima-facie anti-humanitarian character of revolution, in the fact that this could cost people's lives for which he would be responsible. The same distinction between what is political and what is moral can also be seen in his study on Lassalle: One has only to picture in a lively way what it used to mean before and after 1848 to decide for or against revolution. Politically, it was a matter of weighing up the strengths of the parties, of assessing the consequences, victory or defeat. Fundamentally, however, the politician in his political aspiration has to face the moral question, a question of conscience: would you sacrifice your own life and that of your enemies and of your friends as well, must you and dare you kill? A fearsome responsibility for one who in his democratic passion opposes violence and brutality.' See, 'Lassalle-Studien', p. 192.

Humanity and Revolution 6. Masaryk's Revolutionary

Theory of Revolution Bolshevism

Tested against his Attitude

147 towards

Masaryk's attitude towards revolutionary Bolshevism and the manner in which he dealt with it as President of the Czechoslovakian Republic during the years 1919-20 offer a second possibility of testing his normative theory of revolution against his handling of a revolutionary situation. This particular period has been chosen because it was decisive both for the future of Czech social democracy, in which the revolutionary stream of Bolshevism erupted, and also for the future of the Czechoslovakian state, for which the course to be mapped out by the social democrats (for or against revolution in the style of the Bolsheviks) was of great importance. 8 4 Furthermore, Masaryk did not deviate in later years from the attitude which he had adopted in this period towards Bolshevism. He formulated his fundamental insights during this period. In a speech delivered before the national assembly on the occasion of the first anniversary of the Republic, Masaryk amply articulated for the first

The relation between what is political and what is moral in Masaryk's thinking is, as a matter of fact, rather complicated. On the one hand, politics and (social) ethics - the political good and the moral good - are for him virtually identical. (See Chapter 1, note 31, above). Both are concerned with the just organization of human society; and with the means to this end. Practical politics is the application of social ethics: 'Politics is based upon morality, it is the function of politics to elucidate and to realize ethical principles on behalf of and in the social whole'. Spirit of Russia II, p. 467. On the other hand, politics has a certain autonomy when it is a matter of means to a given (morally good) end. In this sense, we should understand a remark which Masaryk made in his conversations with Ludwig: 'Political principles have more than an ethical foundation. There is a certain amount of logical pleasure in them too - the logic of the State, of the Republic, of democracy, the logic of one's own life. 'Defender of Democracy, p. 310. In turn, morality is also distinguished again from politics in Masaryk's thinking as being a matter of rules of human conduct which are not logically bound up with a certain end specified as good, but which are right in themselves. 'Thou shalt not kill' is one of his examples of such a rule; 'Thou shalt not bear false witness' is another. The well nigh unavoidable tensions and conflicts between morality, the moral good understood as a matter of rules for conduct which are right in themselves, on the one hand, and politics, the political good, instrumentally understood - 'to will the end is to will the means' - Masaryk had experienced for himself. 84. In the first elections - for local councils - in the Republic (June, 1919), the social democrats emerged as by far the largest party with 30.1 % of the votes. In the parliamentary elections of April, 1920, the Czechoslovakian social democrats polled 25.7 % of the votes and the separately organized German social democrats 11.1 %. Together, both parties were more than three times as strong as the strongest nonsocialist party. See V. Olivová and R. KvaCek, Dëjiny Ceskoslovenska IV, od roku 1918 do roku 1945, (Praha/Prague, 1967), pp. 52f. & 548.

148 Humanity and Revolution time in public85 his thoughts about Bolshevism as part of a morally motivated plea for drastic social reforms; including the socialization of the means of production. Here, in addition to calling into question Lenin's marxist orthodoxy and declaring himself an opponent of intervention in Russia, 86 Masaryk statesin no uncertain terms that Bolshevism (revolution) in a Czechoslovakian context would be 'inorganic'. It would not be right were the programmes and methods of the Russians, which had sprung from exceptional and completely abnormal circumstances, to be adopted. Czechoslovakian workers are more developed. Their experiences, as well as the tasks which they perform, are different from those of the Russians. This is why the Russian example cannot be imitated. 87 Regular work as a means of social reform is again stressed over against the false romanticism of war and revolution. Social reforms, as required by a well-thoughtout and theoretically-based programme of socialization, demand industry from everybody, everywhere, in everything.88 In the autumn of 1920, Masaryk occupied himself extensively with Bolshevism. In September of that year, there occurred an open breach within the ranks of the social democrats; between the revolutionary left (the supporters of the Third International) and the right wing reformists. 89 Because of the crisis in the Social Democratic Party, the Tusar Government in which the social democrats held a strong position - six out of the seventeen ministers including the Prime Minister were social democrats was forced to resign. Masaryk greatly deplored this development; but he showed clearly his preference for the right wing of the party. Thus he addressed himself in a speech before an assembly of miners a few days after the fall of the Tusar Government against Bolshevist, revolutionary Socialism. He pleaded with great emphasis and with great concern for a reformist approach to the social problems of his country. He drew attention to the fact that the Tusar Government had a socialist majority. 90 85. Apart from an interview in the Amsterdam Algemeen Handelsbladof 15 Feb. 1919, in which he remarked that Bolshevism was no danger to the Republic. 86. During this period, both are regularly recurring themes. For the latter, see - in addition to, Cesta demokracie I, p. 198 - also ibid. p. 403 and Making of a State, p. 384. For the former, see below, notes 102 and 104. 87. Masaryk, Cesta demokracie I, p. 198. 88. Ibid. p. 198. 89. What gave rise to this was the fact that the right-wing of the party leadership postponed the party congress scheduled to take place at the end of September against the wishes of the left. The left then went through with the party congress. See Olivová, Dêjiny Ceskoslovenska IV, p. 87. 90. Masaryk got his majority by adding another three socialists (National Czech), including BeneS, to the six social democrats.

Humanity and Revolution

149

And he deplored the fact that the socialists were not able to maintain unity within their own ranks. There was no other place in Europe where the socialists had such a strong position. Over against revolutionary enthusiasm, he put well-thought-out planning: 'Agitation is not a plan, comrades; nor is enthusiasm. The best will in the world is not enough in itself without reflection and consideration.' The example of the Russian Revolution was not applicable in Czech circumstances. Those taking the view that what had been done in Russia could be repeated in Czechoslovakia were making a big mistake. 91 Out of his own practical experience, Masaryk said that he knew what a revolution implies.92 Therefore he could say that tinkering about with revolution now, after a successful national revolution, would be most inopportune. It would even be nonsensical where there was a real possibility of having a majority in the (coalition) government. Furthermore, the Czechoslovakian socialists had already produced results that no other socialist party in Europe had been able to achieve thanks to their organisation and parliamentary activity.93 In the same month, Masaryk wrote anonymously a number of articles in the daily newspaper Cas under the title O u r Problems and Soviet Russia'. 94 The sections in them which have a direct bearing upon this study will be mentioned. Masaryk begins by showing that both the protagonists and the antagonists of Russian Bolshevism are not wellinformed about Russian relations at an earlier period as well as today. Information is therefore urgently needed. He admits that Russian Bolshevism is an interesting and ambitious attempt; but he reemphasizes at the same time the tremendous difference that obtains between the situation at home and the situation in Russia. 95 Then he summarizes the following points at which they differ: 96 1. The Russian Bolsheviks form a very small part of the population; yet it has assumed power nevertheless. The Czech socialist parties represent very nearly half of the population. 91. Masaryk, Cesta demokracie I, pp. 410f. 92. Here, he refers to his own experiences as leader of the Czech national revolution as well as to his experiences in revolutionary Russia in the years 1917/18. Ibid. p. 413. 93. Ibid. p. 413. 94. Masaryk, Cesta demokracie I, pp. 356-406. The articles appeared consecutively on 5, 8 , 1 2 , 1 5 , 1 8 , 21, and 23 September. Masaryk states explicitly that he had written the articles long before the crisis in the party had come to light, ibid. p. 405. 95. Ibid. p. 357. Yet Masaryk seriously criticizes this attempt, which is referred to as a formidable one; though this is only mentioned here in passing. 96. Ibid. pp. 357-364.

150 Humanity and Revolution 2. The Bolshevik minority is relatively well organized in Russia; it is therefore in a position to dominate the great unorganized mass of the population with power and violence. In Czechoslovakia there is no unorganized mass. If there were to be a revolution, organized parts of the nation would come face to face with each other. 3. The Bolsheviks stand in a specifically Russian revolutionary tradition; i.e. in an anarchistic and terroristic tradition. The Czechoslovakian socialists have a completely different revolutionary tradition: a non-violent, parliamentary tradition, a tradition of work. 4. The Russian Bolsheviks have their recognized leaders; above all, Lenin. The Czechoslovakian Bolsheviks have no tried and tested leaders; i.e. no Lenin. 5. The Russian Socialists and Bolsheviks form an aristocratic elite. Czechoslovakian Socialism is a popular form of Socialism which is more national and more democratic. 6. The mass of the Russian people can neither read nor write; it is, therefore, a mass of believers. Up to now they believed in the pope; now they believe in socialist propagandists. There is no illiteracy in Czechoslovakia. So the Czechoslovakian socialist is more critical.97 7. Russia is an extremely large country which is thinly populated and has few lines of communication. Its government and its civil service functions poorly. In all these things Czechoslovakia is the opposite of Russia. 8. The geography and historical development are quite different in the two countries. Czechoslovakia lies in the heart of Europe and is surrounded by many other countries. It is much more dependent than Russia upon its neighbours. It is an industrialized country which exports the products of its industries; though it must import raw materials. Therefore, it is much more dependent upon other lands; and much more vulnerable to blockade than predominantly agricultural Russia. Such a blockade would be a much greater catastrophe for the Czechoslovakian workers than for the Russian workers. This is also the reason why the socialization of the means 97. As to the absence of illiteracy, Masaryk is exaggerating somewhat. In the easternmost part of Czechoslovakia, in Ruthenia, ceded to the USSR in 1945, there was indeed illiteracy. Masaryk explains the emergence of a Bolshevist group in the Social Democratic Party largely on the basis of the fact that the experienced social-democratic leaders had left in order to fulfil all kinds of other functions in government at local and national level and could no longer devote themselves to the work of the party, ibid. p. 389.

Humanity and Revolution

151

of production would be a far greater problem for Czechoslovakia than for Russia. It could not take place against the will of the surrounding (western) countries. 9. Russia lost the war, like Germany and Hungary, in which lands there were also Bolshevist disturbances. The Czechs were on the winning side. It is very significant that Bolshevism arose precisely in those lands which had been defeated. 98 Bolshevism, especially in Russia, is something quite different from the definitive and highest form of social development that Marx described as Communism. It is a Communism of famine and hunger which followed in the wake of wartime disintegration. On the basis of these differences, Masaryk thinks it 'doubtful' - in this context clearly an understatement - to recommend without criticism the social methods of the Russian Bolsheviks. Russians and Czechoslovakians, all nations for that matter, may have common goals: Liberty, Equality, Fraternity, a genuine democracy, the end of all forms of exploitation; however they may be formulated. According to him, however, each particular nation has its own history and development. Therefore, it finds itself in specific circumstances in which and out of which it has to rise to a higher level of economic and cultural achievement. So it is the task of each nation - and especially of its leading class and its leading figures to recognize these peculiar circumstances. And then to weigh up the tactics of its reforming efforts and to determine the means which most easily lead to this goal in ways which are consistent with these special circumstances." At the end of his series of articles, Masaryk concludes that the Bolshevist revolutionary method is not the right one. It is unsuitable not only for the Czechoslovakian situation, but also unsuitable for the whole of Western Europe; and even unsuitable for Russia itself. In Czechoslovakia, the obvious means to social reform is the well-

98. When the Bolshevist revolution broke out in Russia, she had not yet lost the war. The Peace of Brest-Litowsk was concluded by the Bolshevists. So, formally speaking, the parallel which Masaryk draws here between Russia, Germany and Hungary is not quite correct; though materially speaking, there is much to say for Masaryk's comparison when one thinks of the disorganization there was in the lands concerned during the time of the Bolshevist agitation. 99. Ibid. p. 364. A similar understanding of the relationship between Czechoslovakia and Russia (USSR) was developed at the time of the Prague Spring (1968). Cp. passages from various articles, in, Literární Listy by L. Vaculik, E. Lobi and V. Kadlec, which are reprinted in German in (Ed.) J. Skvorecky, Nachrichten aus der C.S.S.R., (Frankfurt a.M., 1968), pp. 177, 183 & 202.

152

Humanity

and

Revolution

prepared a n d peaceful way, the w a y o f parliamentary

democracy.100

T h e conflict between left-wing revolutionary socialists a n d right-wing reformist socialists culminated in D e c e m b e r 1920 in the clearing o f a building belonging to the party w h i c h h a d been occupied b y left-wingers. This operation w a s carried o u t at the request o f the right-wing social democrats with Masaryk's approval. A t this, the left-wingers a n n o u n c e d a general strike w h i c h assumed massive, even revolutionary proportions. This turned o u t eventually, however, into a failure for the left. 1 0 1 W i t h these events in mind, Masaryk reached o n c e more for his p e n a n d in the same m o n t h wrote with it an article, w h i c h appeared in a paper in Brno, entitled ' R e v o l u c e a bolsevici' ( R e v o l u t i o n a n d the Bolsheviks). It has t w o m a i n parts. T h e first is a d o c u m e n t e d refutation o f Lenin's criticism o f the revisionists for adulterating the revolutionary fervour o f M a r x with reformism. A c c o r d i n g t o Masaryk, it is h o w e v e r Lenin and the B o l s h e v i k s w h o have themselves deviated f r o m marxist o r t h o d o x y . 1 0 2 T h e s e c o n d is a

100. Ibid. pp. 403f. In an essay on T.G. Masaryk and the revolution, Nejedly attempts to make acceptable the view that Masaryk not only rejected the Russian revolution because he did not believe in its effectiveness as a means, but also because he could not believe in its end. According to Nejedly, Masaryk certainly could not believe that Communism is realizable. Nor that it could serve the best interests of mankind even if it were to become an accomplished fact. Masaryk would lay too much emphasis upon (the freedom of) the individual and would overlook the socialist collectivity; that is, Communism as a practical realization of Marxism which,according to Nejedly, is both sociologically necessary and just. See Nejedly, 'T.G. Masaryk a revoluce', pp. 164 & 167. There is some truth in what Nejedly says here. Masaryk certainly did not believe in the feasibility of a collectivistic Communism - to say nothing about its historical necessity - nor in its desirability. See, Cesta demokracie I, p. 198. Cp. above, p. 82. On the other hand, he saw Bolshevistic revolutionary aspirations in the light of the ideal of humanity and social justice. He stated this explicitly in an interview in the Spanish 'La correspondencia de España'. See, Cesta demokracie I, p. 462. The ideal of humanity, however, is perverted in its comprehensiveness by the revolutionary praxis of the Bolsheviks. As already seen (above, pp. 80 and 106), Socialism could not exist for him at all without democracy; and it was precisely upon the principles of democracy that the Bolsheviks were making serious encroachments. See above all, Cesta demokracie I, pp. 372ÍT. 101. See Olivová, Dëjiny Ceskoslovenska IV, pp. 90ff. 102. Broadly speaking, Masaryk argues in the same vein as in the Grundlagen and in Spirit of Russia II; see above, note 33. He draws the conclusion, then, that the Bolsheviks appeal incorrectly to Marx and Engels for their revolutionism. Both left this behind them in the socialistic and scientific phase of their development. At the most, Marx and Engels regarded violent revolution as a catalyst that would finish off the disintegration of capitalism. In the capitalistic system the new order was already developing through the economic revolution of capitalism. This revolution from within the capitalist system, which had been brought about by economic developments, was regarded by Marx and Engels as the most important and decisive one. Lenin, however,

Humanity and Revolution

153

direct critical attack upon the Bolsheviks' idea of revolution. They regard revolution in a too romantic and a too mystical light. It turns into a revelation; into a fetish; into an end in itself. One should see the uninterrupted fight with the counter-revolutionaries in this light; a fight against counter-revolution which is defined ad libitum. Masaryk emphasizes the problematical character of the revolution; problematical especially when seen from a moral standpoint. The decision for or against revolution is a matter of conscience; because one is deciding whether a great many people shall live or die. Such a decision can be taken with the help of no rule other than the rule that revolution is really the last and absolutely necessary means for defending freedom and for the development of a better future. One must respect the life of another. It is only admissible, therefore, to resort to revolution for self-defence; and human life should be spared as much as possible. The Russian Revolution according to Masaryk does not satisfy this norm. And so a Bolshevist revolution in the rest of Europe (Czechoslovakia included) is to be rejected a fortiori on the basis of this norm. 103 Thus far our analysis of Masaryk's attitude towards the left-wing socialist revolutionary movement in Czechoslovakia in the years 1919-1920 inasmuch as this can be culled from Masaryk's contemporary publications. 104 It can be concluded that Masaryk's position was in agreement with his normative theory of revolution. He could not regard a violent revolution in the Czechoslovakian situation as a last resort for defending the physical and mental well-being of the working class. Furthermore, he had every reason not to believe in the success of a revolution and to expect more results from the gradualist, parliamentary way: the way of

regards violent revolution as the principal one; and as a creative method for bringing the eventual communist régime into being in a half or virtually non-capitalist and undeveloped Russia. See, Cesta demokracie I, pp. 450f. (This article is also reprinted in, Problèmes under the title, 'La révolution et les Bolcheviks', pp. 119-133). Here, compare again Lichtheim's plausible thesis - see note 33 above - that both reformist social democrats as well as revolutionary communists can appeal to Marx. 103. Ibid. pp. 452ff. CProblèmes, pp. 127-132). 104. On 1 Jan. 1921, another article, Ό tak zvané diktature proletariátu' appeared yet again in Cas. See, Cesta demokracie II, pp. 9-21. In this, Marx' idea of the dictatorship of the proletariat as formulated in his critique of the programme of Gotha is compared to the reality of Russian Bolshevism. The dictatorship of a majority of educated revolutionaries is set against the dictatorship of an illiterate, terroristic minority. The article, which tells us, however, nothing new on this subject, also appeared in, Problèmes, pp. 97-119, under the title, 'La dictature du Bolchevisme'.

154 Humanity and Revolution work. 105 Just as in our earlier test, we can state again that in his deliberations it was the political (though not amoral) question which took precedence over the more specifically moral one. He should not be blamed for doing this. On the contrary. From an ethical-political point of view no more can be asked of a politician than that he states as his goals those which can be morally justified. 106 And also that he chooses at the right moments adequate means for their realization. In this, the moral character of the means should also be taken into account; in this sense, that a means which should prima facie be rejected from a moral point of view is not rashly employed.107 Political action without getting one's hands dirty, that is, without coming into conflict with old, universally accepted norms - such as the negative commands 'Thou shalt not kill', 'Thou shalt not bear false witness', 'Thou shalt not steal'; and, positively, the many forms of benevolence - is in many situations just not possible. Therefore, Masaryk can be upheld as an example to many politicians. Because in his successful political activities, which, we reiterate, were aimed at the goal of humanity, he used to take with the utmost seriousness these fundamental rules of right human conduct. 108 More can be asked of no politician. On behalf of humanity, the high goal of politics, and against the debasement of it, 109 one cannot, however, settle for any less.

105. On the first point, Olivová admits that Masaryk is more or less right. See, Dëjiny Ceskoslovenska IV, pp. 92ff. 106. A possible objection could well be that this principle is too vague. N o politician would lightly say that the political goal which he favours is morally unjustified. Alternatively, the principle is not so vague that it can cover a policy which increases human misery and suffering in the world rather than minimizing it. 107. The formulation: 'only if the stated goal cannot be realized by other means' is probably too strong. 108. It would not be difficult to corroborate this with a series of citations. More convincing, however, are his actual political and public actions. One should think once again, for example, of his stance and his course of action in the battle of the manuscripts and in the anti-Semitic Polná trial. 109. One should think, e.g., of the Watergate scandal.

Bibliography1

A. Collections and Journals Frequently Cited in the Text Masaryk, T.G., Mravnl názory, Selected by Zdenëk Franta, Praha 1923. (Moral Opinions) idem, Velicimuzové, Selected by V. Κ. Skrach, Praha 1926. (Great Men) idem, Program president ùv, Arranged by Prokop Maxa, Praha 1930. (The Programme of the President) idem, Cesta demokracie. Soubor projevù za republiky, Vol. I 1918-1920, Vol. II 19211923, Praha 1934. (The Way of Democracy. Collected Speeches during the time of the Republic) idem, Les problèmes de la démocratie. Essais politiques et sociaux. Préface d'Albert Thomas, Paris, 1924 (Problèmes). Naie Doba. Revue pro védu, umênia zivot sociàlni, Vols. I-XXI, Praha 1893-1914 (N.D.). (Our Era. Journal for Science, Art and Society) Masarykùv Sborntk. Casopis pro Studium zivota a dila T. G. Masaryka, Vols. I-VI, Praha 1925-1931 (M.S.). (A Masaryk Collection. Journal for the Study of Masaryk's Life and Work) Festschrift Th.G. Masaryk zum 80. Geburtstage, 2 Vols, edited by B. Jakowenko, Bonn 1930 {Festschrift I, II). B. A List of Masaryk's Works Consulted in the Text 'Theorie a praxis', originally published in: Moravskd Orlice, Brno 1876; also in: J. Dolezal, Masarykova cesta zivotem, Vol. II, Brno 1921. (Theory and Practice) Ό pokroku, vyvoji a osvètë', originally published in: Almanach na oslavu sedmdesdtych narozenin Al. Vojta, Praha 1877; also in: J. Dolezal, Masarykova cesta zivotem, Vol. II, Brno 1921. (On Progress, Development and Culture) 'Zákony osvëty a budoucnost Slovanstva. La civilisation et ses lois. Morale sociale par Th. Funck-Brentano', originally published in: Moravskd Orlice, Brno 1877; also in: M.S. I, pp. 38-53. (Laws of Civilisation and the Future of the Slavs) 1. English titles of Dutch and Czech articles and books are always placed within brackets. Titles of articles and essays incorporated into journals and collections are placed within quotationmarks. Titles of therelevant journals or collections are always italicised; as are book titles. Abbreviated titles used in B. and C. are cited in full in section A. Literature appearing under B. is in chronological order.

156

Bibliography

Plato jako vlastenec', originally published in: Zora, Praha 1878; also in: J. Dolezal, Masarykova cesta zivotem, Vol. II, Brno 1921. (Plato the Patriot) Sebevrazda, hromadnym jevem spolecenskym moderni osvêty, Praha 19304. This book originally appeared in Vienna under the title, Der Selbstmord als sociale Massenerscheinung der modernen Civilisation. 'Ernest Renan o národnosti. Qu'est-ce qu'une nation?', originally published in: Sbornik historicky, Vol. I, Praha 1883; also in: M.S. I, pp. 53-61. (Ernest Renan on Nationality) Blaise Pascal, jeho zivot a filosofie, Praha 1883. (The Life and Philosophy of Blaise Pascal) David Hume's Skepsis und die Wahrscheinlichkeitsrechnung. Ein Beitrag zur Geschichte der Logik und Philosophie, Wien 1884. Also published in Czech under the title, Pocet pravdëpodobnosti a Humova skepse. Historicky úvod ν theorii indukce, Praha 1883. Eine Untersuchung über die Principien der Moral von David Hume. Deutsch herausgegeben und mit einem Namen- und Sachregister versehen von Prof. Dr. Thomas Garrigue Masaryk, Wien 1885. Versuch einer concreten Logik. Classification und Organisation der Wissenschaften. Wien 1887. Also published in Czech under the title: Základové konkretné Logiky, Praha 1885. Ό snahách sociální demokracie', in: Cas, Vol. III, Praha 1889, pp. 523-527. (On the Aspirations of Social Democracy) 'Spisy F . M . Dostojevského', in: Cas, Vol. VI, Praha 1892; also published in M.S. II, pp. 21-33. (The works of Dostoevsky) 'Kult rozumu a NejvysSi Bytosti', in: N.D. I, Praha 1894, pp. 161-173 and 244-268. (The Cult of Reason and the Cult of the Supreme Being) 'Slovanské Studie. Jana Kollára Slovanská vzájemnost', in: N.D. I, Praha 1894, pp. 481-500, 588-598,655-671,721-760,822-844, 891-920. (Slavonic Studies. The Slavonic Reciprocity of Kollár) 'Sociální demokracie proti revoluci', in: N.D. II, Praha 1895, pp. 891-897. (Social Democracy versus Revolution) Ceská Otázka - Nase NynëjSiKrise, Praha 19486. In the sixth edition which is used here, Ceská Otázka, which appeared originally in Prague in 1895, is published in one volume along with a continuation of Ceská Otázka entitled Nase Nynëjsi Krise, which also appeared in Prague in 1896, together with the valuable notes added by V.K. Skrach when he edited the fourth edition of 1936. The fifth edition was destroyed by the Nazis. (The Czech Question - Our Present Crisis) Karel Havlìtek. Snahy a tuzby politického probuzeni, Praha 19203 (18961)· (K. Havlííek, Aspiring and Yearning for a Political Awakening) Jan Hus. Nase obrozenia nase reformace, Praha 19233 (18961)· In the third edition which has been used here, several other smaller works by Masaryk on Hus have been incorporated. The most important are: (i) Hus leskému studentstvu (1899); (ii) M. Jan Hus a ceská reformace (1910). There is also an addition by Masaryk himself to the third edition of the original work. (John Hus. Our Renaissance and our Reformation) 'Zur deutsch-böhmischen Ausgleichsfrage', in: Die Zeit, Wien 1896, Nr. 82, pp. 51-54. Modern Man and Religion, E.Tr. by Ann Bibza and Dr. Václav Beneä. Revised by H.E. Kennedy with a Preface by Dr. Vasil K. Skrach, London 1938. Original: Moderni tlovék a nábozenství, Praha 1934. A number of articles, for the most part under this same title, appeared in the fourth and fifth volume of Nase Doba during the years 1896-1898. These articles appeared for the first time in book form in 1934. 'Humanita a národnost', in: N.D. IV, Praha 1897, pp. 193-205. (Humanity and

Bibliography

157

Nationality) 'Rozhledy politické', in: N.D. IV, Praha 1897, pp. 256-260. (Political Review) 'Die wissenschaftliche und philosophische Krise innerhalb des gegenwärtigen Marxismus', in: Die Zeit, Wien 1898, Nrs. 177-179, pp. 117-119; 133-134; 150-152. Die philosophischen und sociologischen Grundlagen des Marxismus. Studien zur socialen Frage, Wien 1899. English edition: Masaryk on Marx. An Abridged Edition of T. G. Masaryk, The Social Question: Philosophiealand Sociological Foundations of Marxism, Edited and Translated by Erazim V. Kohák. Bucknell University Press, Lewisburg 1972. The original Czech version (which is not as good as the German Edition) appeared in 1898 under the title, Otázka sociálni. On one occasion in the text I have used the improved fourth Czech edition of 1947. How to Work, Lectures delivered in 1898 at the University of Prague, London 1938; English translation of 'Jak pracovat?' Hlas I-II (1898-1899). The Czech original is also published in M.S. I, pp. 233-267. The English translation is published in one volume with The Ideals of Humanity. Palackého idea národa ceskéko, Praha 19475; originally published in: N.D. V (1898) pp. 769-795. (Palacky's Notion of the Czech Nation) 'Die Krise innerhalb des Marxismus. Zum Stuttgarter Parteitag', in, Die Zeit, Wien, Nrs. 239-240, pp. 72-74 and 86-87. 'Vyvoj evropské spolecnosti ν devatenáctém století', in: Moravská revue I, 1899; also published in: M.S. II, pp. 116-131). (The Development of European Society in the Nineteenth Century) 'Kautsky contra Bernstein', in: Die Zeit, Wien 1899, Nr. 263, pp. 19-20. Pravopfirozené a historické, Praha 1900. (Natural Right and Historical Right) 'La journée de huit heures', in: Problèmes, pp. 1-23. This piece was originally a speech delivered by Masaryk in Czech on February 12,1900 in Kladno. The Ideals of Humanity, Translated by W. Preston Warren and How to Work, Lectures delivered in 1898 at the University of Prague, Translated by Marie J. KohnHoloöek, Ph.D. Translation Revised by H.E. Kennedy, B.A., London, 1938. English Translation of: Idedly humanitni. Nëkolik kapitol, Praha 19011. 'Rukovët' sociologie: podstata a methody sociologie', in: N.D. VIII, Praha 1901, pp. 1-12, 98-105, 173-181, 662-667, 735-741, 822-828, and 904-910. (Handbook of Sociology: Its Substance and Method) 'Der Fall Millerand und die Krise innerhalb des Marxismus', in: Die Zeit, Wien, 1901, Nr. 350, pp. 161-163. 'Wissenschaftlicher Sozialismus und Masseninstinkt', in: Die Zeit, Wien, 1901, Nr. 366, pp. 4-6. 'Zur Revision des Hainfelder Programmes der österreichischen Sozialdemokratie', in: Die Zeit, Wien, 1901, Nr. 372 pp. 100-101. 'Zur Krise innerhalb des russischen Marxismus', in: Die Zeit, Wien 1902, Nr. 420. 'Lev XIII', in: N.D. X (1903), pp. 801-808. (Leo XIII) 'Marx Studien', in: Zeitschrift für Sozialwissenschaft, VII (1904), pp. 693-700. Vboji o nábozenstvi, Praha 19473, (19041). (The Religious Conflict) Národnostnifilosofie doby novíjsi, Praha 19192; Jiöin 19051. (More Recent Philosophy of Nationality) 'Lassalle-Studien', in: Zeitschrift für Sozialwissenschaft, VIII (1905), pp. 88-95. '2ivot cirkevni a nábozensky roku 1904', in: N.D. XII, Praha 1905, pp. 274-280, 353-358,446-448,518-524. (Church Life and Religious Life in the Year 1904) 'Der blutige Kampf um das allgemeine Wahlrecht in Böhmen', in: Der Weg, Wien, 11. November 1905, pp. 1-3. 'Die Revolution in Russland', in: Oesterreichische Rundschau, Vol. II, Wien, Februar

158

Bibliography

1905, pp. 1-8. 'Neue Sittenlehre', in: Zeitschrift für Sozialwissenschaft, IX (1906), pp. 382-391. Intelligence a nábozenstvi. Nábozenská diskuse ν Kràlovéhradeckém Albertina 23. fijna 1906, Praha 1907^. (The Intelligenzia and Religion. A Discourse on Religion) 'Na prechodu k demokracii', in: N.D. XIV, Praha 1907, pp. 1-3. (On the Threshold of Democracy) Έ . Vanderveldes Sozialistische Essays', in: Zeitschrift für Sozialwissenschaft Χ (1907), pp. 104-107. O klerikalismu a socialismu, Val. MeziríCí 1907. (On Clericalism and Socialism) Americképrednásky, Praha 19292; Chicago 19071. (American Lectures) Za svobodu svédomi a uceni. SouC. s prof. F. Drtinou, Praha 1908. (On Behalf of Freedom of Conscience and Freedom of Education) Vëda a cirkev. Cirkevnë politick$ vyznam Wahrmundovy affairy. Praha 1908. (Science and Church. The ecclesiastically-political Significance of the Wahrmund affair) 'Potreba pokrokové politiky', in: Obzor, Mëlnik 1908; also published in: M.S. I, pp. 168-179. (The Need for a Progressive Politics) 'In Memoriam'(Tolstoy), in: Cas, 22.11.1910; reprinted in: Velici muzové, pp. 175-179. 'Les difficultés de la démocratie', in: Problèmes, pp. 49-64; appeared originally on December 24,1911, in: Frankfurter Zeitung; and also in Prague in 1913 under the title: Nesnáze denwkracie. 'L'idée démocratique et la politique', in: Problèmes, pp. 25-48; appeared originally in Czech under the title: Demokratism ν politice, Praha, 1912. 'Syndicalisme et démocratie', in: Problèmes, pp. 65-96; appeared in Czech under the title: Nesnáze demokracie, Praha 1913. The Spirit of Russia. Studies in History, Literature and Philosophy; translated from the German original by Eden and Cedar Paul. With additional chapters and bibliographies by Jan Slavik, the former translated and the latter condensed and translated by W. R. and Z. Lee. 2 Volumes, London, New York 19684. German original: Russland und Europa. Studien über die geistigen Strömungen in Russland. Erste Folge. Zur russischen Geschichts- und Religionsphilosophie. Soziologische Skizzen, 2 Bne., Jena 1913. 'Válka', in: N.D. XXI, Praha 1914, pp. 961-990. (War) The Problem of Small Nations in the European Crisis, Inaugural Lecture at the University of London, King's College, London 1915; appeared also in Czech under the title, Problém malych nàrodû ν nynëjâi evropské krizi. Zahajujici prednàâka prof. T. G. Masaryka na Skole Slovanskych studii ν Londynë', in: Ceskoslovenská samostatnost I.V indépendence Tchécoslovaque, dne 23. prosince 1915, pp. 4-6. 'Filosofie pacifismu (Principles of Social Reconstruction: Bertrand Russell, London 1916)', in: M.S. III, pp. 146-152; originally published in: The New Europe Vol. II, London 1917, pp. 342-350. (The Philosophy of Pacifism) The New Europe, London 1918. 'Národ deskoslovensky', in: M.S. II, pp. 242-247; appeared originally in: The Nation, New York, October 5,1918, pp. 386-388. (The Czechoslovakian Nation) Speech to the workers delivered at BFezové Hory, September 24, 1920, in: Cesta demokracie I, pp. 409-413. 'Naie otázky a sovëtské Rusko', in: Cas (5, 8,12,15,18,21,23 September 1920). Also appeared under the title 'Sovëtské Rusko a My' in: Cesta demokracie I, pp.'356-416. (Our Problems and Soviet Russia) 'Revoluce a bolSevici', in: Lidové noviny 24 December 1920; also appeared in: Cesta demokracie I, pp. 446-455; and again in: Problèmes, pp. 119-132, under the title 'La révolution et les bolcheviks'. Ό tak zvané diktature proletariátu', in: Cas, January 1, 1921; also appeared in: Cesta

Bibliography

159

demokracie II, pp. 9-21; and again in: Problèmes, pp. 97-117, under the title 'La dictature du bolchevisme". 'Red pfi promoci na doktora Husovy bohoslovecké fakulty evangelické dne 24. kvètna 1923', in: M.S. II, pp. 90-92. (Speech on the Occasion of the Granting of an Honorary Doctorate in the Evangelical Theological Faculty on May 24,1923) The Making of a State. Memories and Observations. An English Version, Arranged and Prepared, With an Introduction by Henry Wickham Steed, New York 19692. English Translation of: Die Weltrevolution. Erinnerungen und Betrachtungen, 1914-1918, Berlin 1925. The Spirit of Russia Vol. III, edited by George Gibian and translated by Robert Bass, London, 1967. This is the third part of Masaryk's comprehensive work on Russia and Europe. The first two parts appeared in Jena in 1913 in German under the title: Russland und Europa (see above p. 158). The manuscript of the third part was also written in German in 1912; but because of adverse circumstances it could only be published posthumously in England in 1967.

C. Other Works Consulted Anioni, M.S., 'De deugden van een zwijgzame beul', in: Trouw 17.1.1973. (The Virtues of a Silent Executioner) Baaren, Th. P. van, Doolhof dergoden, Amsterdam 1960. (The Labyrinth of the Gods) Barents, J., 'Het nationalisme in de middeleeuwen', in: J. Barents et al. Christendom en nationalisme, 's-Gravenhage 1955. (Nationalism in the Middle Ages) Beld, A van den, 'Revolutie en het zedelijk oordeeP, in: Wijsgerig Perspectief Vol. 9 no. 1 (Sept. 1968), pp. 58-68). (Revolution and the Moral Judgement) Berg, J.H. van den, 'Probleemrijk Zuid-Afrika', in: Intermediair, 31 March 1972. (Problematical South Africa) Bernstein, E., 'Kritisches Zwischenspiel', in: Die Neue Zeit, Vol. XVI (1897-1898) Parti, pp. 740-751. Bednár, J., 'Vyvoj Masarykovy nábozenské filosofie', in: Acta Universitatis Carolinae. Philosophica et Histórica 1/1969, Praha 1969. (The Development of Masaryk's Philosophy of Religion) Bosl, K. (Ed.), Handbuch der Geschichte der böhmischen Länder, Vol. III, Stuttgart 1968, Vol. IV, Stuttgart 1970. Brentano, F., Grundlegung und Aufbau der Ethik. Nach den Vorlesungen über 'Praktische Philosophie' aus dem Nachlass herausgegeben von Franziska Mayer-Hillebrand, Bern 1952. Brümmer, V., 'Zijn er ware antwoorden op laatste vragen?', in: Rondomhet Woord,Yol. 14 no. 4 (1972), pp. 367-381. (Are there True Answers to Ultimate Questions?) Calvert, P., Revolution, London 1970. Capek, K., President Masaryk Tells his Story: Recounted by Karel Capek, London 1934. idem, Masaryk on Thought and Life: Conversations with Karel Capek, London 1938. The above two titles are translated from: Masaryk erzählt sein Leben. Gespräche mit Karel Capek, Berlin, n.d. Cas, ro&iík VII (volume seven) disio 16 (no. 16) 22. dubna (22 Aprii) 1893 'Smës'. (Miscelleny) Ceskoslovenská Akademie Vëd, Prehledieskoslovenskych dëjin, Vol. II, 1 and Vol. II, 2, Praha 1960. (Czecholovakian Academy of Sciences. Review of Czechoslovakian History) Cicero, M.T .,De re publica. De legibus. With an English translation by Clinton Walker Keyes, London 1970».

160

Bibliography

Comte, Α., 'Plan de travaux scientifiques nécessaires pour réorganiser la société'. In: Système de politique positive, Vol. IV, Paris 1854, Appendice général pp. 47-136. Dëdic, K., 'Masaryk a Ceské socialistické hnutï', in: M.S. IV, pp. 304-306. (Masaryk and the Czech Socialist Movement) Dolezal, J., Masarykova cesta zivotem, 2 Volumes, Brno, 19302, (1920/11). (Masaryk's Voyage Through Life) idem, T. G. Masaryk, Soupis tiskù ν cizich jazycích, Praha 1938. (List of works in Foreign Languages) Dray, W.H., 'Holism and Individualism in History and Social Science', in: P. Edwards (Ed.), The Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Vol. IV, London 1967, pp. 53ff. Duintjer, O.D., 'Moderne wetenschap en waardevrijheid', in Alg. Ned. Tijdschrift voor Wijsbegeerte, Vol. 62 (January 1970), pp. 22-44. (Modern Science and Objectivity) Engels, F., Herrn Eugen Diihrings Umwälzung der Wissenschaft (Anti-Dühring), Berlin 192811. Froe, A. de, 'Zuid-Afrika. Genetisch commentaar', in: Intermediair 31 March 1972. (A Geneticist Comments) Funda, O., T.G. Masaryk. Sein philosophisches und religiöses Denken, diss. Basel 1971. Galtung, J., 'Gewalt, Frieden und Friedensforschung', in: Dieter Senghaas (Ed.), Kritische Friedensforschung, Frankfurt a.M. 1972. Graaf, J. de, 'Die Gewalt, Kritik ihrer Rechtfertigung', in: Zeitschrift für Ev. Ethik, Vol. XV (May 1971), pp. 129-141. Harmsen, G., 'De continuiteli in het denken van Marx, de discontinuïteit in de ontwikkeling van het Marxisme. Historische, politieke en filologische kanttekeningen bij de filosofische problematiek rond het jeugdwerk van Marx', in: Algemeen Nederlands Tijdschrift voor Wijsgbeeerte en Psychologie, Vol. 61 (July 1969), pp. 163-195. (Continuity in Marx' Thought and Discontinuity in the Development of Marxism. Some Historical, Political and Philological Glosses upon the Philosophical Problems Relating to Marx' Early Work) Herben, J., T. G. Masaryk, Praha 19465. Heussi, K., Die Krisis des Historismus, Tübingen 1932. Hofmann, W., Ideengeschichte der sozialen Bewegung des 19. und 20. Jahrhunderts, Berlin, New York 1971. Honderich, T., Ά Difficulty with Democracy', in: Philosophy & Public Affairs, Vol. Ill (1974), No. 2, pp. 221-227. Honecker, M., Konzept einer sozialethischen Theorie, Tübingen 1971. Hromádka, J. L., Masaryk, Praha 1930. idem, 'Masarykova svétová revoluce a princip Krest'anstvl', in: M.S. II, pp. 68-84. (Masaryk's World Revolution and the Principle of Christendom) idem, Masaryk mezi vlerejskem a zitrkem, Praha 19472. (Masaryk Between Yesterday and Tomorrow) Itterzon, G.P. van, 'De reformatie en de nationale gedachte', in: J. Barents et al. Christendom en nationalisme, 's-Gravenhage 1955. (The Reformation and the Notion of Nationality) Kolegar, F., 'T.G. Masaryk's Contribution to Sociology', in: M. Rechcigl jr. (Ed.), Czechoslovakia, Past and Present, Vol. II, The Hague-Paris, 1968, pp. 1526-1540. Kohák, E.V., (Ed.), Masaryk on Marx. An Abridged Edition of T.G. Masaryk, The Social Question: Philosophical and Sociological Foundations of Marxism, Edited and Translated by Erazim V. Kohák, Bucknell University Press, Lewisburg 1972. Kozák, J.B., 'Masaryk a metafysika', in: M.S. V, pp. 127-150. (Masaryk and Metaphysics) Král, J., 'Demokratism jako Masarykova filosofie', in: Sociologie a Sociální Problémy,

Bibliography

161

Vol. VII (1947), pp. 5-13. (The Idea of Democracy as the Fundamental Idea of Masaryk's Philosophy) Krofta, K., 'Masaryk und sein wissenschaftliches Werk', in: Festschrift II, pp. 257-273. Kuypers, G., Grondbegrippen van politiek, Utrecht 1973. (Fundamental Political Concepts) Labriola, Α., 'Zur Krise des Marxismus', in: Die Neue Zeit Vol. XVIII (1899-1900) Parti, pp. 68-80. Lichtheim, G., Marxism. An Historical and Critical Study, London 19714. Locher, Th. J.G., 'Masaryk als humanistisch staatsman', in: Wending, Vol. 2, (1947/8), pp. 261-266. (Masaryk as a Humanist Statesman) idem, 'Thomas Garrigue Masaryk', in: De Gids Voi. 100, part 2, pp. 187-203. Louzilová, O., 'Masarykova filosofie clovèka', in: Acta Universitatis Carolinae. Philosophica et Histórica. Monographia XVII, Praha 1967. (Masaryk's Philosophy of Man) idem, 'Masarykûv problém sebevrazdy', in: Acta Universitatis Carolinae. Philosophica et Histórica, 1/1968, Praha 1968. (The Problem of Suicide in T.G. Masaryk's Work) Ludwig, E., Defender of Democracy: Masaryk of Czechoslovakia, London 1938. Machovec, M., Tomài G. Masaryk, Praha 19682. Maier, H., 'Demokratie', in: J. Ritter (Ed.), Historisches Wörterbuch der Philosophie, Vol. 2, Darmstadt 1972. Marx, Κ., 'Excerpts from Capital: A Critique of Political Economy', reprinted in: (Ed.) Lewis S. Feuer, Marx and Engels: Basic Writings on Politics and Philosophy, New York 1959, pp. 133-167. idem, 'Theses on Feuerbach', in: (Ed.) Lewis S. Feuer, ditto, pp. 243-245. idem, 'Excerpt from Toward the Critique of Hegel's Philosophy of Right', in: (Ed.) Lewis S. Feuer, ditto, pp. 262-266. Mayo, H.B., An Introduction to Democratic Theory, New York 1969s. Mill, J.S., A System of Logic, Vol. II, London 18513. idem, Principles of Political Economy, people's edition, London, 1896. Modràòek, F., 'Masaryk a Ceské hnuti dëlnické', in: M.S. IV, pp. 307-308. (Masaryk and the Czech Workers' Movement) Neíásek, F., Pachta, J., Raisová, E., Dokumenty o protilidové aprotinárodnípolitice T.G. Masaryka, Praha 1953. (Documents on T.G. Masaryk's Anti-popular and Anti-national Politics) Nejedly, Z., 'T.G. Masaryk a revoluce', in: M.S. II, pp. 146-168. (Masaryk and Revolution) idem, T. G. Masaryk 1,1 ; 1,2; II; III; IV; Praha 1931-1937. Novy, L., Filosofie T. G. Masaryka, Praha 1962. (The Philosophy of T. G. Masaryk) Odlozilik, O., (Ed.), T.G. Masaryk. His Life and Thought, with an introduction by Harry D. Gideonse for the 110th anniversary of the birth of Thomas G. Masaryk, published by Masaryk Institute, New York 1960. Olivová, V., Kva£ek, R., Dêjiny Ceskoslovenska, Vol. IV, od roku 1918 do roku 1945, Praha 1967. (A History of Czechoslovakia from 1918 to 1945) Plechanov, G.V., 'Kritika nasjich kritikov', in: Sotsjinenija, Vol. XI, Moskva 1923, pp. 370-382. (Criticism of our Critics) Popper, K.R., The Open Society and Its Enemies, Vol. I, The Spell of Plato; Vol. II, The High Tide of Prophecy, Hegel, Marx and the Aftermath, London, 19695. idem, The Poverty of Historicism, London 1957. idem, Conjectures and Refutations. The Growth of Scientific Knowledge, London 19693. Ràdi, E., 'Masaryk und Kant', in: Festschrift II, pp. 153-163. Raphael, D.D., Problems of Political Philosophy, London 1970.

162

Bibliography

Robinson, R., Definition, Oxford, 19658. Romein, J., Dostojewsky in de Westersche critiek, diss. Leiden, 1934. (Dostoevsky in Western Criticism) Runciman, W.G., Social Science and Political Theory, Cambridge 19692. Rychnovsky, E., Masaryk, Prag, n.d. Saint-Simon, C. H. de, Oeuvres, Vol. I and Vol. II, Paris 1869. Salda, F.X., 'Masaryks Persönlichkeit', in: Beilage der 'Prager Presse' zum 80. Geburtstag des Präsidenten der tschechoslowakischen Republik am 7. März 1930. Sartori, G., 'Democracy', in: D.L. Sills (Ed.), International Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences Vol. IV, London 1968. idem, Democratic Theory, Detroit 1962. Schapowal, M. J., 'Masaryk als Soziologe', in: Festschrift II, pp. 337-365. Schwalm, B., 'Démocratie', in: Dictionnaire de théologie catholique, Vol. IV, Part 1, Paris 1920. Schegget, G.H. ter, Het beroep op de stadder toekomst, Haarlem 19712. (Invoking the City of the Future) § krach, V. Κ., 'Masaryk et le positivisme français', in: Festschrift II, pp. 7-37. idem, 'Masarykova mySlenka humanity', in: M.S. V, pp. 161-177. (Masaryk's Idea of Humanity) Skvorecky, J., (Ed.), Nachrichten aus der ÚSSR, Dokumentation der Wochenzeitung 'Literámi Listy' des Tschechoslowakischen Schriftstellerverbandes. Prag, FebruarAugust 1968. Schroten, E., Kerker of Tempel. Over de zin van de lichamelijkheid, diss. Utrecht, 1970. (Prison or Temple, On the Meaning of Corporeal Existence) Sperna Weiland, J., 'Kant en de strijd der faculteiten', in: M.A. Beek et al., Spelregels, Amsterdam, 1967, pp. 121-138. (Kant and the Battle of the Faculties) Stevenson, C. L., Ethics and Language, Yale University Press 1962. Strawson, P.F., 'Social Morality and Individual Ideal', in: G. Wallace and A.D.M. Walker, (Eds.), The Definition of Morality, London 1970. Tábor, J., 'Socialismus a Masaryk', in: Filosoficky Casopis, Vol. IV (1956), pp. 749-771. (Socialism and Masaryk) Tennekes, J., Het cultuurrelativisme in de Amerikaanse antropologie, diss. Utrecht 1970. (Cultural Relativism in American Anthropology) Thomson, S. Harrison, 'T.G. Masaryk and Czech historiography', in: Journal of Central European Affairs, Vol. 10, No. 1, April 1950, pp. 37-52. Tvrdy, J., 'Vlivy positivistické a Brentanovy na Masarykovy mySlenky o dëjinâch filosofie', in: M.S. I, pp. 17-28. (The Influence of Positivism and Brentano on Masaryk's Idea's of the History of Philosophy) Vandervelde, E., Essais socialistes, Paris, 1906. Vogel, C.J. de, Het humanisme en zijn historische achtergrond, Assen 1968. (Humanism and its Historical Background) Warren, W. Preston, Masaryk's Democracy. A Philosophy of Scientific and Moral Culture, London 1941. Wellek, R., 'Masaryk's Philosophy', in: Essays on Czech Literature, introduced by Peter Demetz, The Hague 1963; originally appeared in: Ethics Vol. LV (1945), pp.298-304. idem, 'Masaryk', in: P. Edwards (Ed.), The Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Vol. V, LondonNew York 1967. Wood, A.W., 'The Marxian Critique of Justice', in: Philosophy & Public Affairs, Vol. I (1972), No. 3, pp. 244-283. Wörterbuch der Marxistisch-Leninistischen Soziologie, ed. by W. Eichhorn et ai. Köln-Opladen 1969.