Humanitarianism, Human Rights, and Security: The Case of Frontex 2020037809, 2020037810, 9780367195038, 9780429202841

Table of contents :
Cover
Half Title
Series Page
Title Page
Copyright Page
Contents
List of figures
About the author
Acknowledgements
Introduction
1 Humanitarianism, human rights, and security
2 Frontex as a compromise
3 Frontex as protector of Europe, saviour of lives, and promoter of rights
4 Frontex as a fragmented organisation
5 The effects of Frontex’s re-positioning
Conclusion: reconsidering critique
Index

Citation preview

Humanitarianism, Human Rights, and Security

Examining the relationship between humanitarianism, human rights, and security in the governance of borders and migration, this book analyses the case of the European Border and Coast Guard Agency (Frontex), challenging the common assumption that humanitarianism and human rights provide a critical basis for countering securitisation. Arguing that these are not three opposing discourses and modes of governing, the author contributes to a deeper understanding of their connections and combined effects in border governance. Drawing on ethnographic fieldwork, interviews, and document analysis, the book offers three perspectives on Frontex’s changing relationship to humanitarianism and human rights. In doing so, it provides a multifaceted account of Frontex and its gradual appropriation of what are often considered pro-migrant discourses. Combining organisational sociology with a Foucauldian analysis, the book speaks to ongoing debates on continuity and change in the security field and provides insights into studying security organisations more generally. Drawing on insights from Critical Migration and Border Studies, Critical Security Studies, Critical Humanitarianism and Human Rights Studies, and Organisational Sociology, the book will generate interest to multiple disciplines, including Sociology, International Relations, Politics, Anthropology, European Studies, and Geography. Nina Perkowski is working as a Researcher at the Institute for Peace Research and Security Policy at the University of Hamburg, Germany.

Interventions Edited by Jenny Edkins Aberystwyth University Nick Vaughan-Williams University of Warwick

The Series provides a forum for innovative and interdisciplinary work that engages with alternative critical, post-structural, feminist, postcolonial, psychoanalytic and cultural approaches to international relations and global politics. In our first 5 years we have published 60 volumes. We aim to advance understanding of the key areas in which scholars working within broad critical post-structural traditions have chosen to make their interventions, and to present innovative analyses of important topics. Titles in the series engage with critical thinkers in philosophy, sociology, politics and other disciplines and provide situated historical, empirical and textual studies in international politics. We are very happy to discuss your ideas at any stage of the project: just contact us for advice or proposal guidelines. Proposals should be submitted directly to the Series Editors: • •

Jenny Edkins ([email protected]) and Nick Vaughan-Williams ([email protected]). ‘As Michel Foucault has famously stated, “knowledge is not made for understanding; it is made for cutting” In this spirit The Edkins – Vaughan-Williams Interventions series solicits cutting edge, critical works that challenge mainstream understandings in international relations. It is the best place to contribute post disciplinary works that think rather than merely recognize and affirm the world recycled in IR’s traditional geopolitical imaginary.’ Michael J. Shapiro, University of Hawai’i at Manoa, USA

A New Political Imagination Making the Case Tony Fry and Madina Tlostanova Humanitarianism, Human Rights, and Security The Case of Frontex Nina Perkowski For more information about this series, please visit: www.routledge.com/series/INT

Humanitarianism, Human Rights, and Security The Case of Frontex

Nina Perkowski

First published 2021 by Routledge 2 Park Square, Milton Park, Abingdon, Oxon OX14 4RN and by Routledge 52 Vanderbilt Avenue, New York, NY 10017 Routledge is an imprint of the Taylor & Francis Group, an informa business © 2021 Nina Perkowski The right of Nina Perkowski to be identified as author of this work has been asserted by her in accordance with sections 77 and 78 of the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988. All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reprinted or reproduced or utilised in any form or by any electronic, mechanical, or other means, now known or hereafter invented, including photocopying and recording, or in any information storage or retrieval system, without permission in writing from the publishers. Trademark notice: Product or corporate names may be trademarks or registered trademarks, and are used only for identification and explanation without intent to infringe. British Library Cataloguing-in-Publication Data A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Names: Perkowski, Nina, author. Title: Humanitarianism, human rights and security : the case of Frontex / Nina Perkowski. Description: Abingdon, Oxon ; New York, NY : Routledge, 2021. | Series: Interventions | Includes bibliographical references and index. Identifiers: LCCN 2020037809 (print) | LCCN 2020037810 (ebook) | ISBN 9780367195038 (hardback) | ISBN 9780429202841 (ebook) Subjects: LCSH: Humanitarianism—Europe. | Human rights—Europe. | Border security—Europe. | European Border and Coast Guard Agency. | Europe—Emigrants and Immigration. Classification: LCC BJ1475.3 .P42 2021 (print) | LCC BJ1475.3 (ebook) | DDC 201/.76—dc23 LC record available at https://lccn.loc.gov/2020037809 LC ebook record available at https://lccn.loc.gov/2020037810 ISBN: 978-0-367-19503-8 (hbk) ISBN: 978-0-429-20284-1 (ebk) Typeset in Times New Roman by Apex CoVantage, LLC

Contents

List of figures About the author Acknowledgements Introduction

vi vii viii 1

1

Humanitarianism, human rights, and security

17

2

Frontex as a compromise

41

3

Frontex as protector of Europe, saviour of lives, and promoter of rights

63

4

Frontex as a fragmented organisation

106

5

The effects of Frontex’s re-positioning

135

Conclusion: reconsidering critique

152

Index

163

Figures

0.1 Word counts of rights-related terms in Frontex’s annual reports over time 0.2 Word counts of rescue-related terms in Frontex’s annual reports over time 0.3 Word counts of security-related terms in Frontex’s annual reports over time 0.4 Word counts per page in Frontex’s annual reports over time 1.1 Mapping differentiation in practices of humanitarianism

4 4 5 5 28

About the author

Nina Perkowski is working as a Researcher at the Institute for Peace Research and Security Policy at the University of Hamburg, Germany. Prior to this, from 2017 to 2019, she was a Lecturer at the Chair of Criminology at the University of Hamburg. From 2015 to 2017, she was a Research Fellow in the project Crossing the Mediterranean Sea by Boat as well as the Research Coordinator of the Economic and Social Research Council’s Mediterranean Migration Research Programme at the University of Warwick. Nina studied at the Universiteit Maastricht, University of California in Berkeley, and the University of Oxford. She holds a PhD from the University of Edinburgh. In her research, she focuses on how borders are drawn, contested, and navigated within and around European societies, critically examining the interplay of border security and border violence in different contexts. Her research has been published in international peer-reviewed journals such as Security Dialogue, Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies, and Journal of Common Market Studies.

Acknowledgements

This book would not have been possible without the support of my colleagues, friends, and family along the way. First of all, I would like to thank Christina Boswell and Andrew Neal, who accompanied me as supervisors throughout writing the thesis this book is based on, and whose critical comments and questions helped me sharpen my arguments and my thinking. I would also like to thank the School of Social and Political Science at the University of Edinburgh for awarding me the very first Chrystal Macmillan Studentship that made the research for this book possible. My heartfelt thanks go to the friends, colleagues, and office mates who made life in Edinburgh what it was: Joanna Wiseman, Alessio Bertolini, Anna Pultar, Roberto Grasso, Lisa Schweiger, Henrike Hirnstein, Supurna Banerjee, and so many others. As my PhD funding ended, I was fortunate in being offered a job at Warwick University, which allowed me not only to continue paying my bills, but also to become part of a vibrant team of academics who share my interest in EUropean border governance and migration. Vicki Squire, Nick Vaughan-Williams, and Dallal Stevens offered their guidance and understanding for my ongoing battle to finish the PhD, as well as nudging me to think about life beyond submission. When returning to Germany and updating the research underpinning this book, I found wonderful people and two great institutions to connect with: sincere thanks go to Christine Hentschel, Susanne Krasmann, and Vojta Drapal at the University of Hamburg, and to Ursula Schröder, Martin Kahl, and my colleagues at the Institute for Peace Research and Security Studies at the University of Hamburg. Transcending specific places in which I lived and worked, I found a stimulating academic community in both critical security studies and migration and border studies. Speaking about my work to Veit Schwab, Maurice Stierl, Stephan Scheel, Damien Simmoneau, Lorenzo Pezzani, Martina Tazzioli, Celine Cantat, Didier Bigo, Julien Jeandesboz, Polly Pallister-Wilkins, Francesco Ragazzi, Thierry Balzacq, and Emmanuel-Pierre Guittet, among so many others, has enriched my understandings and analysis. The many conversations I have had with colleagues in the kritnet network who share not only my research interests but also my anger about EUropean border governance and my desire to contest the division between “activism” and “academia” to work towards political change have been incredibly rewarding and inspiring.

Acknowledgements ix There have been many people who have been by my side for much longer than this research project, and who have kept me grounded, loved, and supported throughout it. Thanks for our conversations, laughter and tears, marathon Skype sessions, emails, packages and postcards, your many visits, and your determination to remain connected to me despite the physical distance. You have been a never-ending source of support, love, comfort, joy, and self-reflection. Linda Avena, Mo Zündorf, and Geraldine Lamfalussy and her wonderful family, Marianne Kraußlach, Maren Kurschat, Charlotte Jacobi, Sophie Hinger, Franzi Förster, Henni Freckmann: I thank you with all my heart. My family has been my rock throughout. The knowledge to have a place to return to at any time, under any circumstances, has been invaluable. I am incredibly privileged to be able to count on my parents’ and brothers’ unwavering support, laughter and silliness, encouragement, and open arms. Finally, my thanks go to Jacopo, who has been on my side for much of this project and has had to endure most as I was writing up the thesis and revising this manuscript. I don’t know how I would have kept going without your boundless patience, love, and support. And to our little Leo, who has brought so much joy into our lives and has made sure I remember that life is more than this book: I cannot thank both of you enough. Parts of chapters 1 and 5 were previously published in: Perkowski, Nina. Frontex and the Convergence of Humanitarianism, Human Rights and Security. Security Dialogue 49(6): 457–75. Copyright © 2018 Nina Perkowski. Sage Journals. DOI: 10.1177/0967010618796670 Parts of chapter 4 were previously published in: Perkowski, Nina. “There Are Voices in Every Direction”: Organizational Decoupling in Frontex. JCMS: Journal of Common Market Studies 57(5): 1182–99. Copyright © 2019 University Association for Contemporary European Studies and John Wiley & Sons Ltd. John Wiley & Sons Ltd. DOI: 10.1111/jcms.12897

Introduction

It is late May 2013. In Warsaw’s Pepsi Arena football stadium, around 700 people have gathered for the annual European Day for Border Guards. Many have met each other before and are chatting in small groups. Those who mix and mingle are border guards from various member states, representatives of the security industry, Frontex staff members, or guests from third states, specifically invited for this special day. Among them are also chosen delegates from NGOs, international organisations, and EU agencies, as well as a few researchers, including myself. When entering the event area, a large exhibition hall opens up and invites participants to learn about recent developments at EUropean external borders. Security companies showcase their latest inventions. On large banners, they feature military-style images, inviting onlookers to See through the confusion. Minimize the threat. From scanners able to detect false passports to radio wave barriers alerting against intruders, what they advertise is clear: protection from a “migrant threat” by means of newer, better, more sophisticated technology. A brief stroll further, a different scenario unfolds. Amnesty International, ECRE, PICUM, and various other rights-based organisations present their perspective on EUropean border management. Videos and leaflets cite the numbers of deaths in the Mediterranean: attempts to show the “human side” of border controls. Right next to them, yet separated by a movable, orange wall, various national police and military forces each have their own stall, presenting their work as border guards. In the middle, in between border guards and NGOs on the one hand, and security companies on the other, Frontex has set up its exhibition space. At the centre of the exhibition, Frontex is also the organiser of this event: its diverse participants have come by invitation of the agency. In panel discussions during the day, representatives of Frontex, academia, national border guard and police forces, NGOs, EU institutions, and think tanks speak about EUropean border controls with one another, highlighting challenges, best practices, and future developments. Sitting in the audience, I cannot help but wonder how this has happened, how Frontex – an agency that is barely 7 years old at this moment in time and that has been subject to intense criticism by NGOs and activists since its very beginnings – has seemingly become a connection point for national border guards, security companies, NGOs, international organisations, and EU institutions. This particular day in May marked the beginning of the fieldwork for this

2 Introduction book and illustrated what had intrigued me already from my desk in Edinburgh, and during political work with friends and allies in Berlin and Sicily: Frontex, the EUropean border management agency, seemed to be changing its organisational narrative, beginning to present itself as an active promoter of fundamental rights, and as a saviour of people in distress at sea. As Frontex’s mandate was the coordination of external border controls, and its focus continued to remain on border security, this development puzzled me. More than that, it inspired the research this book is based on. Over the following years, I analysed documents and press releases issued by Frontex and interviewed Frontex staff and management as well as guest officers in Frontex operations. In addition, I observed Frontex events and operations in Bulgaria and Italy and spoke informally to a range of people working for or with Frontex about their understanding of the agency and its work. In doing so, I sought answers to the following questions: How do humanitarianism, human rights, and security relate to each other in governing EUropean borders? How has Frontex negotiated humanitarianism, human rights, and security in its organisational narrative over time? And what are the effects of this for the agency and its position in EUropean border governance? This book collates the results of my research. What makes Frontex’s turn to humanitarianism and human rights particularly intriguing is not its exceptionality, but the fact that it is illustrative of wider developments in the border regime. Staggering numbers of deaths at sea in recent years have contributed to growing concerns about search and rescue: “irregular” boat crossings have come to be framed not only as a security concern for EU and Schengen member states but increasingly also as a great risk for those attempting to reach EUropean shores without authorisation. At the same time, humanitarian, human rights, and security actors have entered mutually supportive, if tense relationships with one another in EUropean border governance. The ensemble of actors described in the opening paragraphs portrays far more than what happened on this particular day in a Warsaw football stadium: in recent years, we have been seeing the increasing convergence of humanitarian, human rights, and security discourses and actors in EUropean border governance more widely. In seeking to understand this wider development, Frontex is an insightful example to study. Founded in 2004, the agency quickly became a symbol for tighter controls at – and beyond – EUrope’s borders, the advance of security technology, partnerships with private security and arms companies, and the failure to rescue those in distress at sea. As such, it has attracted an enormous amount of criticism by NGOs, activists, and scholars, much of which is centred around issues of human rights (inter alia, Baldaccini, 2010; Cholewinksi, 2004; Human Rights Watch, 2011; Klepp, 2011; Pollack and Slominski, 2009; Papastavridis, 2010). While a large part of this criticism focuses on Frontex’s practical missions, the agency plays a crucial role in the EUropean border regime also in another respect: “Frontex is a ‘think tank’, which conceptualises future blueprints of the border, as well as a laboratory, which generates experimental knowledge about the consequences of conceptual changes for the practice of ‘border management’” (Kasparek, 2010: 113, my translation). Frontex does not only shape border

Introduction 3 practices but also border thinking. It promotes a common “border guard culture” through its training, academies, and events; invests in research and development of “new solutions” in border governance; and engages on its own terms with member states and EU institutions. It brings together border forces, the industry, and policymakers, and pro-actively constructs understandings of border governance through its website, media interviews, and other forms of interventions. Meanwhile, it sets standards regarding data collection, analysis, and reporting on migration. Since the scene described in the opening paragraphs of this chapter, Frontex’s positioning vis-à-vis human rights and humanitarianism has changed and evolved further. This book will trace this evolution through time, reflecting on how humanitarianism and human rights were gradually incorporated in the agency’s organisational narrative and subsequently scaled back again, in particular in the wake of the so-called migration crisis in 2015 and 2016. In doing so, the book pursues two objectives. First, it contributes to academic debates on the connections between humanitarianism and security, on continuity and change in the security field, and on methodology in security research. Second, it seeks to offer and stimulate reflections on what the convergence of humanitarianism, human rights, and security might mean for activism and critique, that is for those who work to oppose a highly exclusionary, discriminatory, violent, and often deadly border regime.

Changes in Frontex’s organisational narrative through time A word count in Frontex’s annual reports illustrates the developments that will be explored in greater depth in the remainder of this book. Albeit a rather crude method, it reveals a broad pattern of how the agency has employed humanitarian, human rights, and security language over time. In 2013, as I considered whether to embark on the research that led to this book, this simple word count confirmed my sense that a change was underway in Frontex’s organisational narrative that was worth examining more closely. The graphs plotting the word counts of humanitarian, human rights, and security-related terms render changes in how Frontex has mobilised these different discourses visible: they provide a rough, yet insightful mapping of how Frontex has engaged with humanitarianism, human rights, and security quantitatively over time. Indeed, human rights-related language, that is the terms “human right/s” and “fundamental right/s,” was not mentioned at all in Frontex’s first three annual reports. The 2008 annual report referenced fundamental rights for the first time, and from then on references increased rapidly until the 2014 annual report, when “fundamental right/s” was referred to 137 times and “human right/s” 10 times.1 From the following year onward, such references decreased again. Nevertheless, they have remained an integral part of Frontex’s reporting. A broadly similar pattern emerges when searching for terms related to humanitarianism, in particular the terms “saved,” “saving,” and “save,” as well as “rescue,” “rescuing,” and “rescued.” Contrary to human rights, Frontex already referenced

4

Introduction

Rights-related terms in Frontex reports over time 160 140 120 100 80 60 40 20 0 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 Human right/s

Fundamental right/s

Figure 0.1 Word counts of rights-related terms in Frontex’s annual reports over time

Humanitarian terms in Frontex reports over time 25 20 15 10 5 0 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 save/saved/saving

rescue/rescued/rescuing

Figure 0.2 Word counts of rescue-related terms in Frontex’s annual reports over time

these terms once or twice in the annual reports of 2006 and 2007. Beginning in 2009, there was, however, a clear increase in references to saving and rescuing lives, peaking in the annual report for the year 2015 with 23 mentions of the counted terms and decreasing once again thereafter. When comparing these graphs to a word count of security-related terms – in particular “threat” and “risk” – it is clear that a growing emphasis on humanitarianism and human rights has not been accompanied by a decreasing emphasis on security. Instead, the use of security-related terms – most importantly “risk” – has been comparatively stable, with a notable increase in recent years, in particular in the 2016 annual report.

Introduction 5

Word count of security-related terms in Frontex’s annual reports over ame 300 250 200 150 100 50 0

2005

2006

2007

2008

2009

2010

2011

2012

threat

2013

2014

2015

2016

2017

2018

risk

Figure 0.3 Word counts of security-related terms in Frontex’s annual reports over time

When interpreting these graphs, it is important to note that Frontex’s annual reports vary in length. To account for this variation, Figure 0.4 plots the occurrence of humanitarian, human rights, and security-related terms per page number. This shows that the increase in humanitarian and human rights-related terms in Frontex’s annual reports between 2008 and 2015 and their subsequent drop in 2016 cannot be attributed to an increase in page numbers alone. Something else is going on: Frontex has changed the emphasis placed on humanitarianism and human rights in its reporting over time and began mobilising these two discourses to varying extents alongside a continued emphasis on security.

Frontex Annual Reports Over Time 2.5 2 1.5 1 0.5 0 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 rights

humanitarianism

threat

risk

Figure 0.4 Word counts per page in Frontex’s annual reports over time

6 Introduction As noted, word counts of this sort are a crude method of analysis to identify all three of the discursive formations named earlier, and the words included in (and excluded from) this initial search are open for debate. Other terms might be relevant too, and in addition to specific words in and of themselves, the associations, connections, and images created by the agency matter in terms of understanding whether and how Frontex frames migration and border controls as a matter of security, as well as how its presentations regarding humanitarianism and human rights have changed over time. Despite these clear shortcomings, the word counts illustrate that there has been a change in Frontex’s self-representation through its annual reports over time that merits closer examination. This insight marked the very beginning of this research project in 2013. It motivated much of the more detailed analysis that was to follow, which will be presented in the remainder of this book.

Theorising change and continuity in the security field In analysing Frontex’s evolving relationship with humanitarianism and human rights, the book speaks to ongoing debates on continuity and change in the security field. While sociological and political theory approaches in critical security studies have made important contributions to understanding the constructions of particular issues as matters of security and to analysing how security functions as a mode of government, there has been a tendency within some of these works to assume the existence of overarching rationalities in security organisations or entire security fields as explanatory forces (Bröckling, Krasmann, and Lemke, 2011; Petersen, 2012; Walters, 2015). Rather than viewing changes in Frontex’s self-representations a priori as functions of and subordinated to the discursive formation of security, the book remains open to the coexistence of multiple and potentially conflicting rationalities. Combining organisational sociology with a Foucauldian analysis, the book provides a diversified account of the agency’s organisational narrative and its officers’ understandings that elude the imposition of any single rationality of government. In so doing, the book shows that organisational dynamics matter in security fields, as security agencies do not constitute monolithic “black boxes” that follow one central rationality (see Chapter 4). It argues that critical security studies could benefit from new institutionalist perspectives and analyses in making sense of the behaviour of security agencies. So far, there has been a strong emphasis on the competition between different security actors in theorising change and continuity in the security field, at the root of which is the involved actors’ interest to maximise their power and ensure their survival: “all the institutions dealing with coercion, both internally and externally, have the same interest: to perpetuate the existence of their profession” (Bigo, 2006b: 393). How security agencies understand the requirements they need to meet to ensure this key interest, however, is not straightforward. Indeed, new institutionalist scholarship shows that organisations respond in different ways to what they perceive as challenges to their legitimacy and might pursue a variety of goals in doing so. In examining Frontex’s responses to humanitarian and human rights pressures from its environment, the

Introduction 7 book shows that organisational dynamics matter when analysing change and continuity in the security field. At the same time, the book provides insights into studying security and other relatively inaccessible organisations. While researching organisations will almost always require a fair amount of trust-building and negotiation, security agencies are often particularly concerned about outsiders gaining information about them and their work, and defend their secrecy by pointing to the security threats they seek to address. Given the specific field they research, scholars within critical security studies have been acutely aware of such access limitations (de Goede, Bosma, and Pallister-Wilkins, 2020). New institutionalist analyses on the other hand are mostly premised on extensive if not full access to organisations, including internal deliberations, documents, meetings, and discussions. While gaining full access to security organisations for research purposes might often prove extremely challenging if not impossible, the book seeks to show how an openended, experimental, and multi-faceted research approach can elicit valuable insights where access limitations persist, by combining formalised interviews, participant observation, document analysis, and informal conversations. As such, it demonstrates that organisational analysis can provide important contributions to understanding change and continuity in security organisations also where full access cannot be negotiated.

Extending debates on humanitarianism and human rights With its specific focus on the relationship between humanitarianism, human rights, and security, the book moreover speaks to critical enquiries into the connections between militarisation, war, violence, and security on the one hand, and human rights and humanitarianism on the other hand. While these discursive formations tend to be seen as opposed to one another in public debates and some academic writings, critical scholarship has exposed the often-intricate linkages between them (e.g. Fassin, 2012; Ticktin, 2011; Brown, 2004; Douzinas, 2007). Most authors, however, have either focused on the relationship between humanitarianism and security, treated humanitarianism and human rights as one-and-thesame, or critically engaged with human rights (see Chapter 1). This book seeks to bring these debates together and further build on them by analysing the relationships and interplay of humanitarianism, human rights, and security in EUropean border governance. It argues that there are important differences between humanitarianism and human rights and shows how analysing them as distinct yet closely related discursive formations adds to existing scholarship. It not only allows for appreciating the differences between the formations and their relationships on a discursive level but also enables a more nuanced analysis of how security actors such as Frontex mobilise humanitarianism and human rights differently, distinguishing carefully in their positioning vis-à-vis each of them. Reflections on how humanitarianism, human rights, and security work together in contemporary border governance speak not only to academic debates, however. Indeed, the insights presented in this book are of high relevance also to those who seek

8 Introduction to oppose exclusionary and violent border controls in other ways. As will be shown in later chapters, activists, NGOs, scholars, and commentators relying on humanitarianism and human rights in order to critique a security-focused border regime might inadvertently contribute to the further securitisation of migration. In offering a problematisation of the close relationships between humanitarianism, human rights, and security in contemporary border governance, I therefore also seek to open up space for a renewed reflection on what effective opposition to highly violent and exclusionary policies and practices might look like under these circumstances.

Reflections on research and writing Finally, this book speaks to methodological debates in security studies, in particular regarding the world-making effects of methodological choices. These choices and their implications are reflected on throughout the book, and discussions of methods and methodology as well as their implications are interwoven with the empirical results, rather than artificially separated from them in a methods chapter. This setup is deliberate and seeks to render the world-making effects of methodological choices visible throughout the writing, embedding them in the presentation of the research findings. As such, the way the book is laid out in an attempt to productively use and integrate the “mess” (Law, 2004) of social scientific research in the writing process. Rather than seeking to fit data collected in the spirit of “methodological bricolage” (Aradau et al., 2015: 8) and “nonlocal ethnography” (Feldman, 2012) into one coherent account, I draw on cinematography to argue that arranging the insights gathered into distinct “takes” allows us to see and understand the “scene” studied from different angles (see Chapter 2). My research on Frontex illustrates how every “take” renders different actors visible, foregrounds a different storyline, and excludes other aspects from view or relegates them to the background. While each “take” shows the same scene, they nevertheless do not constitute a coherent whole; they are not pieces of a puzzle but rather different ways of seeing, interpreting, and simultaneously constructing a social phenomenon. In continuously reflecting on methodological choices and implications, this book builds on feminist scholarship recognising the importance of reflexivity (Tickner, 2006: 28). This also includes critical scrutiny of the researcher’s positionality and how it shapes and affects their research and scholarship (Ackerly, Stern, and True, 2006). In addition to the reflections on methods that take place throughout the book, the following sections therefore offer some insights into my own role in the research process, in particular by providing reflections on my positionality vis-à-vis the research and on negotiations around research access that shaped the research process. These reflections serve as a frame for the remainder of the book, positioning me in relation to the story I will be telling in later chapters (cf. Doty, 2010). Political positioning “Developing a new kind of curiosity is not just academic. It takes energy. It is political. It is cultural. It is personal” (Enloe, 2016: 15). For me, doing research

Introduction 9 on Frontex has been all of this. It has been a quest to understand better how, why, and with what effects humanitarian and human rights discourses – which are the backbone of much of the political work challenging and opposing an exclusionary and violent border regime – have been appropriated seemingly at ease by Frontex and other state actors. My hope was that understanding the relationships of these discourses with security better might encourage reflections on some of the inherent shortcomings and problems of humanitarianism and human rights as bases for political change among those who most frequently rely on them: academics, activists, and NGOs. Critical scholars and NGOs have shown extensively that EUrope’s borders kill; more than 40,000 individuals are documented to have lost their lives as a result of EUropean border policies since 1992 (UNITED, 2020) – and many more are very likely unaccounted for. Against this background, I regard border controls and the discrimination they entail as deeply problematic. Accordingly, I disagree with the work that Frontex does and many of the assumptions Frontex staff and management make. These beliefs, as well as my position within a university and a network of activists, my class background, age, nationality, race, and gender influenced not only how I conceptualised and implemented my research but also how my respondents interacted with me. During my fieldwork, however, I attempted as much as possible to put my own opinions aside. My reasons for doing so are summed up in an excellent chapter by Cohn (2006), in which she reflects on her research with nuclear defence intellectuals and explains the reasons for putting political critique – the driving force behind her research – aside during the research process. Cohn explains that despite her political convictions, the main goal of her research was to learn about “what’s out there, without imposing preconceptions,” and emphasises the importance of listening in this regard (Cohn, 2006: 104). She notes that there are also important personal factors behind her decision to set aside her analysis and opinions during the field research: First, temperamentally, I am a listener. . . . Second, I find it excruciatingly painful to have direct confrontations with very powerful people who are doing (or have done, or will do) what I consider to be terrible things, or things with terrible effects. . . . Finally, and maybe most significantly, I find it both personally and professionally untenable to talk with people without being able to be honest about what I want to know, and why I am talking with them. To do that, I have to let my genuine interest in how the world looks to them, and why it does so, be what I and my research are about. (Cohn, 2006: 105) Like Cohn, both my personal predisposition and my desire to learn and understand led me to listen openly and curiously, rather than expressing my own views during the research. Mostly, research participants were content to hear about my general interest in Frontex and border guarding and did not pressure me to position myself politically. Where they did ask me to do so, I tried to remain as elusive as possible. The

10 Introduction fragmented nature of my fieldwork meant that I moved back and forth between the identity of a researcher and that of a critic, which brought about feelings of guilt and discomfort. Indeed, I felt the dilemmas resulting from my positioning as a border critic doing research in the security field throughout the research process. At times, I felt deeply uncomfortable about the views my interviewees shared with me, some of whom showed crude, biased, and racist attitudes towards border crossers (see Jacoby, 2006: 168). At other times, I felt guilt and discomfort about holding back my own views, especially when I found that I actually liked some of my interviewees and interlocutors, and when some made a conscious effort to help me in my research. Despite this discomfort, I believe that putting my political beliefs aside while doing research was important. Not only did it allow interviewees to express themselves in the way they saw fit, without necessarily having to legitimise, defend, or justify their work but it also allowed myself to remain open for surprises, for shared understandings and unexpected views. When speaking informally to a group of EUropean border guards over some wine, for example, one of them leaned over and told me quietly that he did not believe in borders. He asked me what would happen when all borders disappeared, and I responded that so-called illegal migration would cease to exist. In response, he exclaimed “exactly!”, and proceeded to explain that everyone should be allowed to freely move where they wanted to. Exchanges such as this, occurring in confidence in the context of a very informal encounter would have been difficult had I clearly positioned myself politically, rather than expressing an openness and a curiosity to converse with and learn from guest officers. Research access and the question of gender In a context in which research access was a constant challenge, my positionality had an important impact on how I could negotiate this access. While I tried to set my politics aside during the research process, my identity as a young woman had a palpable effect on research access. I first became aware of this during the evening of the EUropean Day for Border Guards in May 2013, when I joined the dinner and party hosted by Frontex for the EUropean border guard community. Throughout the evening, I found myself approached by young men, who sought to establish contact in ways familiar to me from student parties, bars, or clubs. While not particularly surprising in hindsight, the realisation that in that particular context I was seen primarily as a young woman alone at a party rather than a researcher or even a critic took me by surprise and ultimately led to me leaving the event earlier than planned. Indeed, being a young woman fostered situations in which personal and professional boundaries were blurred, despite conscious efforts to be clear and transparent about my role and my interests as a researcher. This was less relevant in Frontex’s headquarters, where interview contexts were formal and encounters had a clear beginning and end point. Research in Frontex operations, however, was more challenging: To interview guest officers in an ongoing operation, I was told

Introduction 11 that I required the authorisation of Frontex, the host member state, and the guest officer’s member state, in addition to the consent of the individual in question. The challenges I faced while doing research in Bulgaria illustrate this: the Bulgarian national authorities officially allowed me to visit “the border” for a maximum of 1 hour, after I had requested permission to observe the Frontex operation there for 4–6 weeks. Rather than observing officers going about their normal work, as I had requested, it appeared that the officers in question had been deployed on a deserted road – presumably out of the way of their colleagues – specifically to speak to me and a film crew who was visiting at the same time. At all times, a Bulgarian press officer was present, who was occasionally asked for permission regarding particular requests. Unsurprisingly, the guest officers I interviewed had received phone calls from Frontex before my arrival, and I was told that they had been instructed that they could speak to me and answer (most of) my questions but that they should not allow me to use a recording device. After about an hour and a half at this staged “border,” I was interrupted while doing an interview and told that I had to leave. An officer kindly drove me to the hotel in the nearest city where many of the guest officers were staying, and encouraged me to hang out in the lobby and speak to his colleagues. Spending time in the hotel lobby and speaking informally to various officers became my main activity over the next few days. While I obtained a few formal interviews, I also spoke to officers informally whose national authorities had not granted them permission to give me an interview. The informal situation and the underlying gender dynamics – all the guest officers I encountered there were men, and most of them were in their late twenties or early thirties – initially helped me to establish contact. They, however, also meant that I soon got requests for my Facebook contact or was asked whether I had a partner and that it was non-negotiable that my drinks at the hotel bar were paid by guest officers. While I communicated clearly that I was interested in speaking to officers in my capacity as a researcher, the fact that I was “hanging out” at the hotel bar rather than being able to rely on a more formal interview context seemed to undermine this messaging, and professional and personal boundaries were increasingly blurred by those I spoke with. As my unease about this situation grew, I eventually decided to leave the fieldwork site and returned to Sofia. As this anecdote illustrates, my identity as a young woman both opened and closed particular research sites and routes, and at times centrally affected who I could speak to and how they would relate to me. Sometimes, interviewees explicitly reflected on my identity as a young woman and its impact on obtaining access. Over dinner after a Frontex management board meeting, one attendee noted that the Fundamental Rights Officer was a charming woman and was liked and well respected for this reason. My interlocutor then referred to me, saying that I knew well myself how “these things” worked, and pointed out that most attendees were older men. The comment was meant as an encouragement to pursue further ideas for fieldwork I had been uncertain over, but it also reveals how my gender and age influenced how I was perceived (and at times welcomed) by staff and management members. Being a young woman

12 Introduction meant that I was not viewed as particularly threatening, and might have encouraged some people to speak with me more freely, or even agree to speak to me at all (see Cohn, 2006: 97). On the flipside, it also led to not being taken as seriously as a more senior male colleague might have been and to having to navigate the blurring of boundaries by research participants that I described earlier.

The research context and terminology Before introducing each chapter in turn, some brief notes on the time frame of the research underpinning this book and the terminology used are warranted. Regarding the former, it is important to note that the document analysis underpinning this book covers a period from the 1990s to 2020 for the discussions around Frontex’s establishment and subsequent amendments (see Chapter 2), and from Frontex’s foundation in 2005 to December 2019 for Frontex’s own publications (see Chapter 3), whereas the fieldwork for this book took place between May 2013 and September 2014, with interviews conducted between December 2013 and September 2014. The interview data presented in Chapter 4 thus stems from a particular moment in time, while the discursive and institutionalist analyses in Chapters 2 and 3 are able to take a broader view of developments through time. Nevertheless, the organisational dynamics that I explore in Chapter 4 have not lost their pertinence in recent years. Indeed, the arguments I make about Frontex’s repositioning in light of external pressures and the convergence of humanitarianism, human rights, and security in Frontex’s organisational narrative have been clearly reflected in the events unfolding over the last 5 years. The analyses of developments since 2014 illustrate this: Chapter 2 shows how contradictory demands continue to shape Frontex’s environment, and how various stakeholders seek to impose their interests on the agency. Chapter 3 shows how Frontex has continued to respond to changing political climates, with the agency scaling down its emphasis on saving lives and promoting rights while ensuring that both remained an integral part of its reporting in the wake of the so-called “refugee crisis”. Regarding the question of terminology, it is important to acknowledge that writing about mobility and borders constitutes a challenge at a time when the word “migrant” itself has become intricately bound up with a whole range of negative associations. While xenophobia and racism have been prominent factors in the responses to migration and boat arrivals by EUropean publics for decades, debates on migration have become increasingly toxic, and nationalisms across EUrope have been flaring up violently as boat arrivals increased again. Already in 2002, Didier Bigo wrote that “[m]igrant, as a term, is the way to designate someone as a threat to the core values of a country, a state, and has nothing to do with the legal terminology of foreigners” (Bigo, 2002: 71). Today, this statement remains as accurate as ever. At the height of the so-called refugee crisis, several media outlets joined in a discussion and problematisation of the negative connotations of the term “migrant,” highlighting how it dehumanised the deaths and suffering of millions of people (see, e.g. Malone, 2015; Marsh, 2015; Pritchard, 2015; Taylor, 2015). Against this backdrop, the book seeks to avoid the term “migrant,” instead

Introduction 13 using terms such as “individuals,” “people,” or “persons” wherever possible to emphasise a simple fact: those who drown in the Mediterranean, who are pushed back by border guards, left in dire conditions in camps within or outside EUrope, or who successfully manage to traverse the many borders of the European Union, are above and before all else, human beings.

Outline of chapters Chapter 1 presents a close engagement with humanitarianism, human rights, and security. Introducing each discursive formation in turn, the chapter takes particular note of (post)colonial continuities and modes of governance bound up with humanitarianism, human rights, and security, respectively. Proceeding to analyse connections and convergences across the three formations, the chapter conceptualises them as discourses of protection that render their subjects vulnerable in particular ways. Drawing on Bigo’s (2006a) etymological analysis of protection, the chapter differentiates between three dimensions of protection: tegere, praesidere, and tutore. It argues that humanitarianism, human rights, and security become combinable in EUropean border governance because they rely on different registers and technologies of protection. Understanding humanitarianism, human rights, and security in this way allows for analysing their co-articulation in Frontex’s organisational narrative, while situating the agency’s positioning in a wider struggle over the meaning of protection within EUropean border governance. Chapter 2 highlights the methodological challenges of researching security organisations. Drawing on cinematography, it suggests that combining different methods produces different “takes” on the agency and its relation to humanitarianism and human rights, foregrounding different storylines. The chapter proceeds by presenting the first such “take”: a historical-institutional analysis examining Frontex through the history of its foundation and subsequent changes to its mandate. In this perspective, Frontex emerges as a compromise between various actors’ interests, with different rationalities inscribed in the agency as a result of its diverse stakeholders. The chapter shows that examining Frontex through its founding history renders the agency’s contested nature visible, exposing the multiplicity of interests it was intended to serve and the range of actors it remains accountable to. It notes that Frontex began to incorporate humanitarianism and human rights language in its organisational narrative as the European Parliament’s powers increased, identifying the increasing influence of the European Parliament as co-legislative body as one possible explanation for this shift. Presenting the second “take” on Frontex, Chapter 3 provides insights into how Frontex has articulated humanitarianism, human rights, and security in its organisational narrative. Complementing the quantitative analysis presented in the Introduction with an in-depth, qualitative reading of general reports and press releases published by Frontex, this chapter shows how Frontex progressively incorporated humanitarianism and human rights alongside a continued emphasis on migration as a risk and a threat. In addition to analysing how Frontex has been constructed as a saviour of lives, promoter of rights, manager of risks, and

14 Introduction defender of EUrope in times of crisis, the chapter examines how humanitarian, human rights, and security discourses converge in particular agency narratives. The chapter concludes with a reflection on the added value of a discourse-analytical approach to Frontex, arguing that this perspective produces important knowledge on how Frontex has actively positioned itself in relation to humanitarianism, human rights, and security through time. Moving from documents to interviews, informal conversations, and observations, Chapter 4 presents a third “take” on Frontex, examining it from an organisational perspective. While interview data suggest that humanitarian and human rights language was partially incorporated in agency narratives in response to outside pressures, the chapter challenges a purely instrumentalist understanding of these developments and reveals a more fragmented and potentially contradictory picture of underlying motivations, behaviours, and understandings. Indeed, research findings expose important divergences between Frontex’s headquarters, guest officers working in its operations, and different members of its management board. Drawing on insights from organisational sociology, the chapter argues that examining Frontex from an organisational perspective produces important insights into its organisational dynamics. In particular, it allows for understanding Frontex as a fragmented organisation in a contested environment, highlighting the role of decoupling mechanisms in response to contradictory pressures from this environment. Chapter 5 examines the effects of Frontex’s positioning as a saviour of lives, promoter of rights, and protector of EUrope, arguing that it has strengthened Frontex in three ways. First, it has enabled Frontex to be framed as the go-to solution to diverse “crises” in the EUropean border regime. Second, it has been key in enabling Frontex to forge new coalitions with diverse actors focused on migration management and the identification of new arrivals. Third, it has allowed agency staff and management to shift the blame for rights abuses to member states, constructing the agency as a solution to potential rights violations rather than as part of the problem. The chapter concludes with a consideration of the potential implications of seeking to ensure Frontex’s conformity with human rights and humanitarian principles without questioning its task to keep out racialised “others.” In particular, it argues that attempts to “sanitise” EUropean borderlands from violence and death while seeking to keep its territory clear of migrant “others” risk feeding into longer-standing efforts to externalise border controls and the racialised violence they entail. The Conclusion offers a final reflection on the limitations of humanitarianism and human rights as critical grounds for opposing securitisation, considering in particular the implications for activism and critical scholarship. Rather than giving up on the ambivalent discursive formations of humanitarianism and human rights altogether, the chapter argues that it is important to critically and creatively re-engage with them. If taken seriously, such a re-engagement cannot end with calls for the proper implementation of rights or for the alleviation of some forms of human suffering. Opening up space for reflection on and challenges to the meaning and significance of “the human,” the chapter considers potential ways

Introduction 15 forward from the impasse presented in previous chapters. In particular, it queries whether “the human” at the heart of humanitarianism and human rights can be productively challenged and resignified, or whether suggestions to move towards the “posthuman” offer a more fruitful basis for challenging the exclusionary effects of the three discursive formations at the heart of this monograph.

Note 1 As this shows, Frontex refers primarily to “fundamental rights” rather than human rights, which is in line with wider EU discourse and the legal obligations the agency has under the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union. The Charter was first proclaimed and ratified in 2000 and became legally binding with the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty in 2009 (European Union, 2012).

References Ackerly, BA, M Stern, and J True. 2006. Feminist Methodologies for International Relations. In Feminist Methodologies for International Relations, edited by Brooke A. Ackerly, Maria Stern, and Jacqui True, 1–15. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Aradau, C, J Huysmans, AW Neal, and N Voelkner. 2015. Introducing Critical Security Methods. In Critical Security Methods: New Frameworks of Analysis, edited by Claudia Aradau, Jef Huysmans, Andrew W. Neal, and Nadine Voelkner, 1–22. Abingdon and New York: Routledge. Baldaccini, A. 2010. Extraterritorial Border Controls in the EU: The Role of Frontex in Operations at Sea. In Extraterritorial Immigration Control: Legal Challenges, edited by Bernard Ryan and Valsamis Mitsilegas, 229–257. Leiden, The Netherlands: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers. Bigo, D. 2002. Security and Immigration: Toward a Critique of the Governmentality of Unease. Alternatives 27: 63–92. ——— . 2006a. Protection: Security, Territory and Population. In The Politics of Protection: Sites of Insecurity and Political Agency, edited by Jef Huysmans, Andrew Dobson, and Raia Prokhovnik, 84–100. Abingdon and New York: Routledge. ——— . 2006b. Internal and External Aspects of Security. European Security 15(4): 385–404. Bröckling, U, S Krasmann, and T Lemke. 2011. An Introduction. In Governmentality: Current Issues and Future Challenges, edited by Ulrich Bröckling, Susanne Krasmann, and Thomas Lemke, 1–33. New York and Oxford: Routledge. Brown, W. 2004. “The Most We Can Hope For . . .”: Human Rights and the Politics of Fatalism. South Atlantic Quarterly 103(2/3): 451–463. Cholewinksi, R. 2004. European Union Policy on Irregular Migration: Human Rights Lost? In Irregular Migration and Human Rights: Theoretical, European and International Perspectives, edited by Barbara Bogusz, Ryszard Cholewinksi, Adam Cygan, and Erika Szyszczak, 159–192. Leiden, The Netherlands: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers. Cohn, C. 2006. Motives and Methods: Using Multi-Sited Ethnography to Study US National Security Discourses. In Feminist Methodologies for International Relations, edited by Brooke A. Ackerly, Maria Stern, and Jacqui True, 91–107. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. de Goede, M, E Bosma, P Pallister-Wilkins, eds. 2020. Secrecy and Methods in Security Research: A Guide to Qualitative Fieldwork. London and New York: Routledge.

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Introduction

Doty, RL. 2010. Autoethnography – Making Human Connections. Review of International Studies 36(4): 1047–1050. Douzinas, C. 2007. Human Rights and Empire: The Political Philosophy of Cosmopolitanism. Abingdon: Routledge-Cavendish. Enloe, C. 2016. Globalization and Militarism: Feminists Make the Link, 2nd ed. Lanham and London: Rowman & Littlefield. European Union. 2012. Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, 2012/C 326/02. Available at https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/treaty/char_2012/oj. Fassin, D. 2012. Humanitarian Reason: A Moral History of the Present. Berkeley: University of California Press. Feldman, G. 2012. The Migration Apparatus: Security, Labor, and Policymaking in the European Union. Stanford: Stanford University Press. Human Rights Watch. 2011. The EU’s Dirty Hands: Frontex Involvement in Ill-Treatment of Migrant Detainees in Greece. Brussels. 2011. Jacoby, T. 2006. From the Trenches: Dilemmas of Feminist IR Fieldwork. In Feminist Methodologies for International Relations, edited by Brooke A. Ackerly, Maria Stern, and Jacqui True, 153–173. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Kasparek, B. 2010. Laboratorium, Think Tank, Doing Border: Die Grenzschutzagentur Frontex. In Grenzregime: Diskurse, Praktiken, Institutionen in Europa, 2nd ed., edited by Sabine Hess and Bernd Kasparek, 111–126. Assoziation A. Klepp, S. 2011. Europa Zwischen Grenzkontrolle Und Flüchtlingsschutz. Bielefeld: transcript Verlag. Law, J. 2004. After Method: Mess in Social Science Research. London and New York: Routledge. Malone, B. 2015. Why Al Jazeera Will Not Say Mediterranean “Migrants.” Al Jazeera, August 20, 2015. Marsh, D. 2015. We Deride Them as “Migrants”. Why Not Call Them People? Guardian, August 28, 2015. Papastavridis, E. 2010. “Fortress Europe” and FRONTEX: Within or Without International Law? Nordic Journal of International Law 79(1): 75–111. Petersen, KL. 2012. Risk Analysis – A Field within Security Studies? European Journal of International Relations 18(4): 693–717. Pollack, J, and P Slominski. 2009. Experimentalist but Not Accountable Governance? The Role of Frontex in Managing the EU’s External Borders. West European Politics 32(5): 904–924. Pritchard, S. 2015. The Readers’ Editor On . . . the Semantics of Migration. Guardian, August 16, 2015. Taylor, A. 2015. Is It Time to Ditch the Word “Migrant”? Washington Post, August 24, 2015. Tickner, JA. 2006. Feminism Meets International Relations: Some Methodological Issues. In Feminist Methodologies for International Relations, edited by Brooke A. Ackerly, Maria Stern, and Jacqui True, 19–41. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Ticktin, M. 2011. Casualties of Care. Immigration and the Politics of Humanitarianism in France. Berkeley and Los Angeles, CA: University of California Press. UNITED. 2020. List of 40 555 Documented Deaths of Refugees and Migrants Due to the Restrictive Policies of “Fortress Europe.” 2020. Walters, W. 2015. Reflections on Migration and Mobility. Movements. Journal Für Kritische Migrations- Und Grenzregimeforschung 1(1): 2015. Available at: http://movementsjournal.org/issues/01.grenzregime/04.walters--migration.governmentality.html.

1

Humanitarianism, human rights, and security

Introduction In public debates and academic writings critical of contemporary bordering practices, security-centred approaches to migration are often opposed to “better” alternatives, particularly human rights or humanitarian approaches. Where humanitarian or human rights language is used by security actors or in securityoriented policymaking, this tends to be dismissed as a strategic act, viewed as being insincere and divorced from “real” practices on the ground. This dismissal, however, fails to appreciate the intricate connections between humanitarianism, human rights, and security. In assuming that human rights and humanitarianism are opposed to security, it risks resulting in calls for a better implementation of humanitarian and human rights principles rather than fundamentally challenging existing border practices. Moving beyond the idea of a gap between humanitarian and human rights rhetoric and security practices, this chapter offers an analysis of humanitarianism, human rights, and security as three independent yet closely related discursive formations. The chapter begins with a cursory overview of the connections drawn between humanitarianism, human rights, and security in EUropean border governance over the last 15 years. Exploring how this development has been understood within academic literature, the chapter proceeds by showing that existing analyses tend to focus on the connections between humanitarianism and security, neglecting human rights. Seeking to address this gap, the chapter proceeds by introducing each of the three discursive formations in turn. It briefly reflects on their respective histories and their contemporary manifestations in migration governance, taking into account their “colonial arcs” (Lemberg-Pedersen, 2019, p. 250). This historical grounding seeks to provide a context for the analysis presented in the remainder of the book, contesting policy framings that tend to portray migratory developments and policy responses as novel and unprecedented. Given the diversity of colonial powers, strategies, and contexts, this chapter cannot provide a comprehensive engagement with each discursive formation’s historical links to colonial regimes, as doing so would go beyond the scope of this book and “run the risk of a too-hasty homogenization of colonialism as a whole” (Scott, 2005). It will instead indicate some of the postcolonial continuities that are important to consider in relation to contemporary invocations of humanitarianism, human

18 Humanitarianism, human rights, and security rights, and security. After introducing each discursive formation individually, the chapter examines their similarities and connections. In particular, it argues that understanding humanitarianism, human rights, and security as discourses of protection allows for making sense of their interconnections in border governance, as their shared characteristics have created the conditions of possibility for the appropriation of human rights and humanitarianism alongside security by state and security actors. This theoretical understanding provides the basis for the remainder of this book.

Humanitarian, human rights, and security in EUropean border governance Humanitarian and security logics have been connected in EUropean border discourse and practice for at least 15 years. Ongoing discussions around extraterritorial processing illustrate this. In the wake of the Cap Anamur case1 in 2004, the German and Italian Ministers of the Interior Schily and Pisanu first mobilised humanitarian arguments to promote the creation of extraterritorial camps for asylum seekers, claiming that these would put an end to deaths at sea (Hess and Tsianos, 2007; Klepp, 2011). While the UK government had presented similar proposals for extraterritorial processing already in 2003, these focused on improving migration management and enhancing security and were met with sceptical responses by other EU governments, in particular Germany and Sweden (Léonard and Kaunert, 2016). Reconsidering the idea a year later, Schily justified it in both humanitarian and security terms. He explicitly addressed his intervention in favour of extraterritorial processing centres to “those who justifiably worry about the people who become victims of smugglers or try to reach Europe from North Africa via the Mediterranean on their own with unseaworthy boats,” noting that “[t]his attempt has cost many people their lives. That can and must not leave anyone indifferent” (Schily, 2004, my translation). A decade later, in response to heightened arrivals in 2014, German Minister of the Interior De Maizière once again proposed to open what he referred to as “welcome centres” in order to facilitate the extraterritorial processing of asylum claims, arguing that this would speed up deportations, save lives, and protect individuals from smugglers (Braun, 2014). Indeed, humanitarian arguments have become one of the main justifications for externalising border controls over the last decade (Casas-Cortes et al., 2015, p. 74). On an EU policy level, the 2011 Global Approach to Migration and Mobility (GAMM) introduced a “migrant-centred” approach, outlining a range of concerns about the well-being and rights of irregular migrants (European Commission, 2011). Declaring that “migration governance is not about ‘flows’, ‘stocks’ and ‘routes’, it is about people,” the GAMM states that “policies must be designed to respond to the aspirations and problems of the people concerned,” and that special consideration must be paid to “protecting and empowering vulnerable migrants” (European Commission, 2011, p. 6). This humanitarian language is combined with an emphasis on human rights, and the GAMM makes clear that “[r]espect

Humanitarianism, human rights, and security

19

for the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the EU is a key component of EU policies on migration” (European Commission, 2011, p. 6). At the same time, the document retains a strong focus on security, declaring for instance that “irregular migration also needs to be considered in connection with organised crime and lack of rule of law and justice, feeding on corruption and inadequate regulation” (European Commission, 2011, p. 15). As such, the GAMM combines humanitarian, human rights, and security concerns in a single document. Written shortly after the death of more than 1200 people in a single week in April 2015, the 2015 European Agenda on Migration (the Agenda) has an even stronger emphasis on humanitarian values and human rights. The Agenda sets out “to protect those in need,” “to avert further loss of life,” “[t]o try to halt the human misery,” and declares a commitment “to be a safe haven for those fleeing persecution” and “the need for swift and determined action in response to the human tragedy in the whole of the Mediterranean” (European Commission, 2015, p. 2). An emphasis on human rights complements this, with migrants’ rights invoked in particular in relation to deportations, reception conditions, fingerprinting, and the social rights of those legally resident in the EU. In “[u]pholding our international commitments and values while securing our borders” (European Commission, 2015, p. 2), the Agenda brings together this emphasis on “EU values” and legal obligations with a security logic. Invoking fears of uncontrolled mass migration, it notes that “there are serious doubts about whether our migration policy is equal to the pressure of thousands of migrants” (European Commission, 2015, p. 2) and outlines a range of measures aimed at deterring migrants and externalising migration controls. Presenting the EU’s response to the so-called migration crisis, the Agenda weaves together human rights, humanitarian, and security language seamlessly and further consolidates this triple focus in EU migration policy. As these examples show, connections between security and humanitarianism within the context of EUropean migration governance are not new. Indeed, their connection in policy and practice has attracted increasing scholarly attention in recent years. Notably, Lemberg-Pedersen argues that “the observable ambivalence in the twin appeals to security and rights, which have characterized humanitarian action since its inception in eighteenth century anti-slavery politics” were already “[p]art and parcel of colonial matrices of power” (Lemberg-Pedersen, 2019, p. 253). Identifying “blurred boundaries between capture, rescue and predation” during colonialism as well as in contemporary externalisation practices, he shows that there exist contingent parallels between both (Lemberg-Pedersen, 2019, p. 265). Others focus their analyses on contemporary EUrope. Fassin (2012) has been influential in exploring the prevalence of “humanitarian reason” in the contemporary world, analysing among others how humanitarianism and security worked together in the governing of Sangatte camp. Ticktin (2011) shows how humanitarianism works as a strategy of government in France, where an opening of “humanitarian” residence permits was accompanied by a closing down of rights-based routes. Agier (2010, p. 30) refers to humanitarianism as “a form of policing,” problematising its use as a strategy of control in refugee camps. Within critical security studies, Aradau (2008) provides the most in-depth analysis of the

20 Humanitarianism, human rights, and security convergence of security and humanitarianism/human rights to date. Using a Foucauldian approach, she shows how a politics of pity mobilised by NGOs on behalf of victims of trafficking is compatible with and gradually morphed into a rationality of risk management. She argues that being at risk (of trafficking, or abuse) is often coterminous with being a risk to society (of becoming a perpetrator of abuse, or an irregular migrant) and that the inscription of riskiness into women’s biographies subverts the pity mobilised by NGOs. In analysing the governance of human trafficking,2 Aradau raises pertinent points regarding the cooperation between NGOs and police, the incorporation of a “victimisation” approach in the security dispositif, and the merging of humanitarianism/human rights and security in the governance of trafficked women. Importantly, however, Aradau does not distinguish between humanitarianism and human rights and uses them interchangeably. Other analyses of humanitarianism in border governance have continued in this vein. Vaughan-Williams (2015) for instance contrasts humanitarian policy discourses with the “animalisation” and deaths of irregularised individuals at sea, in camps and detention centres. Attesting a “conceptual crisis” (2015, p. 6) in contemporary scholarship, he argues that analyses pointing to a gap between humanitarian “rhetoric” and violent “reality” fail to grasp that border practices are inherently ambiguous, simultaneously understanding people on the move as at risk and as risks. Reworking existing scholarship on biopolitics and combining this with insights from Agamben, Derrida, and Esposito, Vaughan-Williams provides important insights into the thanatopolitical and zoopolitical potentialities of EUrope’s biopolitical borders and argues that EUrope’s border crisis can be understood as an auto-immune crisis, an excess of EUropean border security practices. Similar to Aradau, however, he conflates humanitarianism and human rights in his analysis, treating references to saving lives and protecting rights as one and the same. Other scholars have focused their analyses exclusively on the articulation of humanitarian and security practices. Like Aradau and Vaughan-Williams, Pallister-Wilkins (2015, 2018) draws on a Foucauldian understanding of government in analysing the intersection of humanitarianism and policing in EUropean border governance. Examining the representation of Frontex’s activities, and drawing on work in what she calls critical humanitarianism studies – most prominently Fassin (2012), Ticktin (2011), and Agier (2011a) – PallisterWilkins notes that historically, both humanitarianism and policing have been bound up with notions of care and control. Reaffirming that humanitarianism and policing should not be thought of as opposites, Pallister-Wilkins contends that “there is nothing contradictory in the use of humanitarian ideas and practices in European border policing” (2015, p. 55). Examining EU hotspots, she points to the double function of humanitarianism as a liberal diagnostic (ReidHenry, 2013) that enables the maintenance of liberal order at times of growing hostility towards refugees across EUrope on the one hand, and the efficient management of the “refugee crisis” in the Greek islands on the other (PallisterWilkins, 2018).

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As noted, Pallister-Wilkins limits her analysis to humanitarianism and security, despite the prominent roles that human rights have had within Frontex and in setting up the hotspots. Indeed, she argues that Frontex can talk in humanitarian terms, ask for humanitarian action, and manage risk in the name of human beings but, importantly . . . Frontex cannot uphold human rights, neither can they ensure territorial security as both human rights and border policing remain the sovereign responsibility of the member states. (Pallister-Wilkins, 2015, p. 66) Regardless of any legal argument made here, this analysis stops short of engaging with the centrality of human rights claims in Frontex’s organisational discourse. Beyond issues of legal competence – and accountability – there are important questions around the ability of institutional actors like Frontex to combine human rights, humanitarian, and security talk, which will be explored in the remainder of this book. Unlike other scholars, Aas and Gundhus (2015) differentiate between humanitarianism and human rights in their analysis of border policing in EUrope. Meanwhile, they focus primarily on what they discuss as the challenges of policing humanitarian borderlands, where incoherencies between the rhetorical importance given to humanitarianism and human rights on the one hand and a practical focus on minimising risks for state security on the other prevail, thereby reifying the “rhetoric” vs. “practice” gap criticised by Vaughan-Williams (2015). Drawing on Fassin (2012), they understand Frontex as an example of how humanitarianism has come to shape contemporary policing, even if primarily in rhetoric. Challenging Fassin’s suggestion that a proliferation of humanitarian reason and governance occurs at the expense of human rights, they find that “the language of humanitarian assistance has grown alongside an intensified organizational focus on human rights” (Aas and Gundhus, 2015, p. 14). Also, Cuttitta (2017) differentiates between humanitarianism and human rights and conceptualises the latter as a constitutive part of the EU’s humanitarian border. In analysing the inclusionary and exclusionary effects of this border, Cuttitta critically examines the selective incorporation of human rights in affirmations of the humanitarian border by EU institutions. In particular, he notes that EU and Italian border practices in the Mediterranean affirm the right to life, the right to physical integrity, the right to be treated humanely, and the right not to be tortured, while leaving aside the right to leave any country. Cuttitta argues that the relationship between the humanitarian border and human rights is “controversial”: humanitarian arguments can at times be more encompassing than human rights obligations, while they entail a paternalistic act of grace rather than the fulfilment of a legal obligation (Cuttitta, 2017, p. 4). Importantly, both humanitarianism and human rights can be used to legitimate restrictive policies. Delocalisation is key to this, as “processes of humanitarianization and delocalization are in a relationship of mutual support

22 Humanitarianism, human rights, and security and influence” (Cuttitta, 2017, p. 3). In sum, both Cuttitta and Aas and Gundhus make a number of important observations regarding the ambivalent relationships between humanitarianism and human rights in EU border practices that inform the remainder of this book. They, however, stop short of providing a comprehensive analysis of the discursive relations of humanitarianism, human rights, and security that underpin their convergence in particular governmental practices and render it possible. It is to this task that this chapter now turns.

Three discursive formations Drawing on Foucault’s Archaeology of Knowledge, this book uses the concept of discursive formation to think through the connections between humanitarianism, human rights, and security. While a full archaeology of these discursive formations is not possible within the constraints of this chapter, it will draw on routes of inquiry outlined by Foucault. Importantly, the exploration that follows “is not intended to reduce the diversity of discursive formations, and to outline the unity that must totalize them, but is intended to divide up their diversity into different figures” (Foucault, 1972, pp. 159–160). As outlined already, it does so by dividing the highly diverse terrain of EUropean border governance into three discursive formations: humanitarianism, human rights, and security. Following Foucault, the concept of discursive formation describes instances where between objects, types of statement, concepts, or thematic choices, one can define a regularity (an order, correlations, positions and functionings, transformations). . . . The conditions to which the elements of this division (objects, mode of statement, concepts, thematic choices) are subjected we shall call the rules of formation. The rules of formation are conditions of existence (but also of coexistence, maintenance, modification, and disappearance) in a given discursive division. (Foucault, 1972, p. 38) While being characterised by particular rules, discursive formations are dynamic and in constant historical flux, they are “forming formedness”: their principles of order are continuously overridden and ever changing (Angermuller, 2014, p. 15). They have neither a definite origin nor a clearly defined end point they are striving towards. Moreover, discursive formations are composed of multiplicities of diverse elements that may be contradictory to one another (Foucault, 1972, p. 200). This means, as Angermuller notes, that “an arbitrary moment inheres in every representation of discursive formation. No part can represent the whole since it cannot be clear where discursive formation starts and where it comes to an end” (Angermuller, 2014, p. 16). When exploring the characteristics of and connections between humanitarianism, human rights, and security, it is thus important to emphasise that these discursive formations are highly diverse and dispersed rather than unified. Those drawing on the same discursive formation do not necessarily share the same reasoning or viewpoints and might rely on different

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elements within the same discursive formation. In analysing the interrelationships of discursive formations, the aim of this chapter is not to understand individual actors’ intentions in making utterances or drawing new connections. Instead, the focus is on what makes such connections and transitions between discursive formations possible, on mapping the proximities, analogies, and symmetries that allow for their interplay (Foucault, 1972). Security In his lectures on Security, Territory and Populations, Michel Foucault made a number of propositions about security, without, however, developing any of them in depth (Bigo, 2008; Foucault, 2009). Nevertheless, his initial thoughts stimulated a range of scholarly work. Building on this body of work, this book understands security as a discursive formation and a technique of government that orders social relations, administering trust and fear between individuals and groups of people. Security in this approach is understood as “ordering the social” (Aradau, 2008, p. 6), as displacing an epistemological fear – “the fear of not knowing who is dangerous” – with an “objectified fear” of particular groups of people (Huysmans, 2006b, p. 53). In doing so, it produces an in-group, deemed in need of protection, and a threatening “other” that is excluded and sought to be kept at a distance. Security policy tends to be focused on creating or maintaining a distance between this in-group and the threatening “other,” and/or eliminating the identified threat. Moreover, security constructs and reasserts a unified, protectionworthy “us,” a political identity of the referent object to be protected, and an equally unified, abject, excluded “other” (Huysmans, 2006b; Aradau, 2008). Foucault identified the emergence of a particular, liberal governmentality in 18th-century Europe, which he saw as closely linked with security apparatuses (Foucault, 2009). Importantly, Foucault’s understanding of security is different from “traditional” notions of security as related to exceptionalism and war and is instead closely bound up with freedom of circulation, calculations of probability, and risk. Following Foucault, the emerging security apparatus was “not so much establishing limits and frontiers, or fixing locations, as, above all and essentially, making possible, guaranteeing, and ensuring circulations: the circulation of people, merchandise, and air, etcetera” (Foucault, 2009, p. 51). In this, security differs from discipline: it is not isolating, closing off, or centralising, but instead aimed at “constituting an ‘environment of life’ for populations, by opening, integrating and enlarging” (Bigo, 2008, p. 97). Relying on the principle of freedom of circulation and of the protection of population life, security simultaneously implies the management of risk, based on calculations of probability and statistical distributions. Security is thus also the outcome of surveying statistical regularities and deriving abnormalities. It produces categories and profiles and is profoundly normalising. Those deemed “abnormal” or “threatening” are excluded, kept at a distance, or disposed of. As such, security seeks to create conditions favourable to population life – to make live – while it also has the power to “let die.” Explaining the biopolitical state’s ability to “let die” in particular, Foucault conceptualises racism as “a

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way of introducing a break into the domain of life that is under power’s control: the break between what must live and what must die” (Foucault, 2003, p. 254). Indeed, he argues, “[i]n a normalizing society, race or racism is the precondition that makes killing acceptable” (Foucault, 2003, p. 256). Killing, importantly, does not only include targeted murder but practices exposing individuals to death or increasing their risk of dying as well as “political death,” for instance through expulsion (Foucault, 2003, p. 256). Importantly, Foucault limits his analysis of the historical emergence of liberal governmentality and the security apparatus to the European context, examining it as largely unaffected by the colonial projects and encounters of European powers at the time (Young, 1995; Legg, 2007; Willaert, 2012). Where Discipline and Punish mentions the colonies, it does so to provide examples of disciplinary technologies, “not as sites that played a foundational role in the genealogy of disciplinary power” (Willaert, 2012, p. 97). In his “Society Must Be Defended” lectures, Foucault refers to a “boomerang effect” of techniques of power developed in the colonies: “while colonization . . . obviously transported European models to other continents, it also had a considerable boomerang effect on the mechanisms of power in the West, and on the apparatuses, institutions, and techniques of power” (Foucault, 2003, p. 103). He stops short of elaborating on these connections, however. As a consequence, “the work of figuring out how coloniality and governmentality implicate one another has been left to others to take up” (Walters, 2015, pp. 12–13). Arguing that developments in EUrope cannot be understood as divorced from forms of governing and securing the colonies abroad, a range of scholars have shown how techniques of power travelled between the colonies and their colonisers, and at times emerged in the colonial periphery rather than the imperial core (Willaert, 2012; Brown, 2014; Walters, 2015). Countering Foucault’s focus on Northern Europe, Inda (2005, p. 12) argues that “Europe’s colonial outposts were key sites in the development of modern governmental practices.” Similarly, Berda (2013, p. 628) finds that “[t]he shift from securing territory to monitoring population begins in the colonies.” Research has also shown how the emergence of governmentality shaped colonial practices (Scott, 2005), and how colonial instruments such as the penal colony can be useful to illustrate the at-times imperfect realisation or failure of governmental norms and phantasies in the colonies (Redfield, 2005, p. 65). Importantly, the apparatus of security emerging in the 18th century has not replaced previously existing mechanisms of sovereignty or discipline. Instead, “security is a way of making the old armatures of law and discipline function in addition to the specific mechanisms of security” (Foucault, 2009, p. 25). Indeed, Foucault notes, in addition to the growing importance of biopolitics, systems of security rely on sovereign and disciplinary power in order to work (Foucault, 2009, p. 22). In order to analyse the different forms of power at play in contemporary security formations, Huysmans’ (2014) analysis of “exceptionalist securitizing” and “diffuse securitizing” as the two main techniques of enacting security is useful. Exceptionalist securitising intensifies challenges to the nation or political community by framing them as existential threats and invoking a conception of

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war, including the need to fight against an enemy. Importantly, in doing so, it “also defines what counts as normal or democratic in the very act of identifying what is considered abnormal or non-democratic” (Huysmans, 2014, p. 69). While concerned with “exceptional” situations, this mode of securitising is not only concerned with inter-state matters of war and peace. Instead, it “often works the boundary between the normal democratic and the exceptional into intimate and everyday relations,” such as crossing international borders and thus has profound consequences on how individuals can live their daily lives (Huysmans, 2014, p. 72). Diffuse securitising, on the other hand, de-intensifies and scatters insecurities, including through the expansion of security technologies to areas not traditionally associated with security. Rather than invoking an existential threat or deadly enemy, diffuse securitisation is often related to analysing, preparing for, and managing uncertainties and risks: “[d]efining uncertainty as the ‘new’ security question and instituting practices of risk management have played a central role in this process of breaking down the instituted hierarchies and divisions of insecurity” (Huysmans, 2014, p. 77). Diffuse securitising often works by making associations and drawing connections between different types of insecurities or risks, reconnecting diverse elements into a “patchwork of insecurities.” In doing so, it does not simply describe realities but brings a world of risks into being. Importantly, the two modes of securitising do not mutually exclude one another but can be combined. While practices of border control for instance can mostly be described as diffuse securitising, they are often framed as part of an exceptionalist security politics (Huysmans, 2014, p. 181). The notion of “humanity” Whereas security focuses on a particular population, humanitarianism and human rights are based on the notion of “humanity.” Despite the seemingly universal appeal of this term, different groups of people have been deemed to belong outside the notion of a shared humanity throughout history. At the time of the French revolution, women were excluded from the “universal” rights outlined in the “Declaration of the Rights of Man and of the Citizen” (Rancière, 2004). During colonialism, the colonised were violently excluded from humanity and actively dehumanised (Cornell, 2014). Even today, we are seeing “varying degrees of humanity,” for instance in relation to the duty to rescue individuals at sea (Basaran, 2015, p. 213). Historically, the concept of “humanity” has thus been deeply exclusionary, and it fails to provide a stable normative foundation for policies and practices. Given their shared focus on a common humanity and on limiting human suffering, humanitarianism and human rights at times blur in practice. There exist, however, also important differences between them: “human rights institutions are largely grounded in law, constructed to further legal claims, responsibility, and accountability, whereas humanitarianism is more about the ethical and moral imperative to bring relief to those suffering and to save lives” (Ticktin, 2006,

26 Humanitarianism, human rights, and security p. 35; see also Barnett, 2011, p. 16). Human rights focus on the entitlements and rights of victims and might thus be viewed as potentially more emancipatory than humanitarianism: “[d]uties are owed to the other person, whereas charity can be weighed against other considerations” (Basaran, 2015, p. 213; see also Barry, 1982). On the other hand, human rights are generally understood as principles that need to be balanced against one another due to their specific codification in law and can be limited or restricted to maintain, for example, national security or the human rights of others (Douzinas, 2007, p. 60), whereas humanitarianism does not have these in-built limitations. Despite their partial blurring, humanitarianism and human rights have separate histories and different contemporary characteristics. In the following paragraphs, each will be introduced in turn, before considering the interrelationships between humanitarianism, human rights, and security. Humanitarianism Humanitarian ideas have a long history in EUrope and have come to fundamentally structure common ways of thinking. From individuals to NGOs to states and militaries, humanitarian narratives are central to many justifications of actions or interventions on behalf of others. Fundamental to humanitarianism is the aim to relieve unnecessary suffering (Barnett, 2011, p. 221). This book understands humanitarianism as a discursive formation and a technique of government that orders social relations. Humanitarianism administers compassion and indifference, producing differential relations of compassion. While some are rendered pitiable, others are constructed as responsible for their own suffering or otherwise undeserving of humanitarian aid. As such, humanitarianism has the power to let live and to let die (Fassin, 2010, p. 244; Agier, 2011a). Humanitarianism creates a victimised “other” and a heroised “saviour.” “Victims” tend to be imagined as strangers: “not just people one happens not to know, but people paradigmatically distant” (Calhoun, 2010, p. 33). “Saviours,” on the other hand, are constructed as in-group. As a technique of government, humanitarianism is engaged with the management of those constructed as victims: the “undesirables of the world” (Agier, 2011b). Humanitarianism is closely connected to biopolitics, administering vulnerable populations in order to allow their survival. At the same time, those receiving humanitarian aid are often subject to intense disciplinary power, as examples of refugee camps or reception centres powerfully illustrate. Fassin (2010) notes that there are hierarchies of lives inherent in humanitarianism, which value the lives of those who intervene and those whom they assist differently. These inequalities are grounded in the asymmetric risks for different groups of people and in differential relations of compassion vis-à-vis these groups (Fassin, 2010, p. 255). Both deserving and undeserving “victims” tend to be understood as devoid of political agency: “Humanitarianism occupies the whole space of life, including the political space: situations in which the victim and the guilty, the true refugee and the false refugee, the vulnerable and the undesirable occupy the whole representation of the person, and sound the end of the citizen who may say what he or she wants without condition” (Agier, 2011a, p. 202). In

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Agamben’s (1995) analysis, sovereignty has its origin in the production of bare life, which it simultaneously includes and excludes. Humanitarianism focuses on those who are deemed to constitute bare life and appeals for pity and assistance on their behalf, while not fundamentally questioning their exclusion. Instead, it perpetuates the “othering” that is necessary for sovereign statehood to function, rendering migrants as helpless victims and abject others, thereby increasing their vulnerability. As this indicates, humanitarianism is deeply ambivalent. While it invokes a universalising ethics, compelling us to feel sympathy and connection with strangers, humanitarianism can also engender inequality: moral sentiments are focused mainly on the poorest, most unfortunate, most vulnerable individuals: the politics of compassion is a politics of inequality. On the other hand, the condition of possibility of moral sentiments is generally the recognition of others as fellows: the politics of compassion is a politics of solidarity. This tension between inequality and solidarity, between a relation of domination and a relation of assistance, is constitutive of all humanitarian government. (Fassin, 2012, p. 3) Importantly, actors resolve the tensions and ambivalences inherent in humanitarianism differently, with at times widely different implications. In seeking to understand particular humanitarian practices, it is useful to differentiate between emancipatory and paternalistic as well as between restrictive and expansive invocations of humanitarianism, which work as two axes on which such practices can be located. More emancipatory forms of humanitarianism take the agency of “victims” seriously, intervening on their behalf where this is requested and understanding them as active political subjects. More paternalistic forms of humanitarianism construct “victims” as passive and unable to take rational decisions, and intervene irrespective of and possibly against their will while claiming that this is for their own good. More restrictive forms of humanitarianism highlight the humanitarian potential of otherwise-oriented practices (e.g. security practices) and conceptualise humanitarianism as a by-product of other activities, while more expansive forms of humanitarianism subsume other objectives under practices that prioritise the mitigation of suffering or the saving of lives. This differentiation is key to understanding processes of adaptation and resistance regarding humanitarianism in EU border governance (see Figure 1.1 for an illustration of how particular practices conducted by or related to Frontex can be mapped in this way). While different actors use humanitarianism in more or less expansive or emancipatory ways, this book argues that the underlying tensions and ambivalences of humanitarianism mean that even emancipatory and expansive invocations of humanitarianism permanently risk a “slippage” of their humanitarian arguments into more paternalistic and restrictive forms. Whereas not all humanitarianism is thus necessarily paternalistic, paternalism has featured prominently throughout its varied history. Often, the emergence of humanitarianism is dated back to abolitionist movements in the UK, France, and

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emancipatory

anti-humanitarian humanitarianism

rule-of-law humanitarianism

Mare Nostrum / calls for Frontex Plus

paternalistic restrictive

expansive

Figure 1.1 Mapping differentiation in practices of humanitarianism

the US, while the foundation of the Red Cross movement by Henry Dunant in 1864 is seen as a pivotal moment in its institutionalisation (Barnett, 2011; Ticktin, 2011; Fassin, 2012). Where exactly humanitarianism had its beginnings, however, is not self-evident, partially because it is not easily defined (Ticktin, 2011, p. 69). Barnett (2011, p. 10) characterises the emergence of humanitarianism as bearing three marks of distinction from generalised sentiments of compassion that had existed for centuries: “assistance beyond borders, a belief that such transnational action was related in some way to the transcendent, and the growing organization and governance of activities designed to protect and improve humanity.” Notably, humanitarianism has been closely bound up with colonialism and racism, and the work of missionaries attempting to “civilise” or “humanise” the “savage peoples” (Barnett, 2011, p. 82). This legacy has continued to shape humanitarian engagement also after the end of the Second World War, as decolonisation took place: [w]ith the missionaries losing ground to the development experts, humanitarians were . . . more sensitive to infantilizing language and discarded any hint that these people were “backward” or “child-like”, even though distinctions between “undeveloped” and “developed” retained evolutionary images in which the West would show the rest of the world its future. And, they used expert knowledge and utilized quasi-technocratic language to justify their interventions. Although these changes could suggest a more respectful approach, humanitarianism was still something done for and to others, not with them. (Barnett, 2011, p. 105)

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While the vocabulary regarding beneficiaries changed, paternalism continued to loom large in humanitarian thought and action. Meanwhile, the charged political climate of the Cold War led humanitarians to actively attempt to appear depolitical and to separate their work from a more politically charged human rights language. The foundation of Médecins Sans Frontières in 1971 was a key development for the “moralist antipolitics” of this era (Ticktin, 2011, p. 73). As the Cold War ended, the reach of humanitarian thought and practice expanded, as “[h]umanitarianism was the only feasible direction for ‘the ethically serious European’ following the discrediting of both communism and developmentalism after 1989” (Edkins, 2003, p. 254). Simultaneously, the proliferation of liberalism, and with it the belief that markets, democracy, and the rule of law were the universally applicable solution for all of humankind led to an intensification of previously existing trends: the cooperation between state actors and humanitarian organisations grew closer, the role of expertise in humanitarian work increased, new connections between development, human rights, and relief efforts were forged in response to “new wars” and “complex emergencies” (Barnett, 2011; Ticktin, 2011). In the 1990s, the relationship between humanitarianism and the military began to change, too: “whereas at the beginning of the decade aid agencies tried to recruit states for their cause, by the beginning of the next decade they discovered that states had already co-opted humanitarianism for their interests” (Barnett, 2011, p. 172). Around the turn of the millennium, military forces came to view humanitarian and human rights actors not as opponents, but as constructive critics helping to make military violence more efficient (Weizman, 2011, p. 117). The last few decades have thus firmly engrained humanitarian ideals in contemporary societies. In Douzinas’ words, “[h]umanitarianism started its career as a limited regulation of war but has now expanded and affects all aspects of culture and politics” (Douzinas, 2007, p. 57). Humanitarian arguments have become unquestionable, and the need to save lives and mitigate human suffering are commonly accepted “truths”: “[h]umanitarian reason is morally untouchable” (Fassin, 2012, p. 244). As such, Michel Agier (Agier, 2010, 2011a, 2011b) refers to the present as the “age of humanitarianism,” in which dissensus to the idea of a shared, global humanity is stifled or dismissed. Humanitarianism circulates widely, and the media as well as politicians, NGOs, international organisations and activists refer to and build on it. In Fassin’s words, “the distinctive feature of contemporary societies is without doubt the way that moral sentiments have become generalized as a frame of reference in political life” (Fassin, 2012, p. 247). Human rights Like humanitarianism, human rights enjoy almost universal approval and are deeply ingrained in the political culture of modern states. They pervasively configure a political culture and organise political space, frequently aiming to monopolise it (Brown, 1995, p. 120, 2004, p. 461). Like security and humanitarianism, human rights function as a discursive formation and a technique of government. They are never a-historical or a-cultural but are always embedded

30 Humanitarianism, human rights, and security in power relations (Douzinas and Gearty, 2014, p. 8). By administering rights to groups and individuals, human rights simultaneously define which rights render us human, and who counts as human enough to be entitled to particular rights. As such, human rights “produce and regulate the subjects to whom they are assigned” (Brown, 2004, p. 459). They create different degrees of “humanness”: despite their universal framing, human rights have a long history of selectively defending the rights of some and not others. In addition, they create a particular vision of what it means to be human, producing the fiction of a sovereign individual (Brown, 2002). Human rights are inseparably connected with discipline. Subordinated subjects seeking to assert their rights need to do so on the terms set by the human rights corpus, which limits the identities that can be fought for. In addition, struggling for legal recognition may reify oppressive power relations: “disciplinary productions of identity may become the site of rights struggles that naturalize and thus entrench the powers of which those identities are the effects” (Brown, 1995, p. 120). While the international human rights system limits the authority of states over their citizens, it also reinforces state power – up until today, a large part of human rights activism and legal work is primarily addressed to states (Merry, 2006, p. 5; Salter, 2012, p. 750). As Mutua (2001, p. 203) notes, “[t]he state is the guarantor of human rights; it is also the target and raison d’etre of human rights law.” Indeed, human rights are intimately tied up with statehood and sovereignty. Nevertheless, human rights also constitute an important means to struggle against disenfranchisement and exclusion. They serve as a tool to fight on behalf of the subordinated, while masking and at times reifying relations of power and domination. Brown explores this tension specifically in relation to feminist struggles, while illuminating the paradoxes of human rights for the subordinated more generally: rights secure our standing as individuals even as they obscure the treacherous ways that standing is achieved and regulated; they must be specific and concrete to reveal and redress women’s subordination, yet potentially entrench our subordination through that specificity; they promise increased individual sovereignty at the price of intensifying the fiction of sovereign subjects; they emancipate us to pursue other political ends while subordinating those political ends to liberal discourse; they move in a transhistorical register while emerging from historically specific conditions; they promise to redress our suffering as women but only by fracturing that suffering – and us – into discrete components, a fracturing that further violates lives already violated by the imbrication of racial, class, sexual, and gendered power. (Brown, 2002, p. 430) With their almost universal appeal, human rights are at times the only tool available to the disadvantaged to challenge their domination. As Brown’s characterisation shows, however, they constitute a double-edged sword. As human rights are presented primarily in moral rather than political terms, they tend to focus on the relief of pain and suffering rather than on ideals of comprehensive justice (Brown,

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2004). At the same time, they have marginalised other forms of critique in recent decades, in particular visions of social justice that are less individualistic (Kennedy, 2002, p. 108; Merry, 2006). By framing struggles in terms of individual rights instead of political structures, human rights conceal deeper issues around the roots of conflict and injustices and focus on small improvements for particular individuals or groups rather than the more fundamental and large-scale questioning of exploitative structures or political systems (Douzinas, 2007, pp. 109–110). As such, “[h]uman rights remedies, even when successful, treat the symptoms rather than the illness, and this allows the illness not only to fester, but to seem like health itself. . . . [T]his may, in some contexts, place the human rights movement in the uncomfortable position of legitimating more injustice than it eliminates” (Kennedy, 2002, pp. 118–119). As a moral narrative, human rights divide humanity into distinct parts. Similar to humanitarianism, human rights produce victims and rescuers. Importantly, however, human rights also produce perpetrators: “[t]he grand narrative of human rights contains a subtext that depicts an epochal contest pitting savages, on the one hand, against victims and saviors, on the other” (Mutua, 2001, p. 201). This narrative carries racial connotations: “savages and victims are generally nonwhite and non-Western, while the saviors are white” (Mutua, 2002, p. 14). While cultural norms and practices emerging from liberal thought and philosophy are conceived as virtuous, those from the Global South are often seen as degenerate. Dominant narratives of the history of human rights further consolidate this differential valuation of “the West” as the birthplace and defender of human rights and “the rest” as in need of Western intervention and ideas. Indeed, the history of human rights is often traced back to Stoic thinkers in ancient Greece and Rome, through natural law in the Middle Ages and early modern natural rights. The French and American revolutions and the “Declaration of the Rights of Man and Citizen” are seen as key events institutionalising human rights, which is further narrated as closely connected with the abolition of slavery and eventually enshrined in international law through the Universal Declaration on Human Rights in 1948 (Moyn, 2010). Narrating the history of human rights in this way fails to engage with non-Western invocations of rights, first and foremost the Haitian revolution occurring around the same time as the French revolution. While Haiti has come to be understood as “the most radical (and therefore one of the most important) assertions of the right to have rights in human history” (Dubois, 2016), recounting the history of human rights with reference to a largely white-led abolition movement instead of a slave-led revolution centrally contributes to a framing of human rights in terms of racialised victims and oppressors and white saviours (Mutua, 2001; Wall, 2012). Narrating human rights history in these terms, then, constructs a particular understanding of this discourse with significant (post)colonial ramifications. Critically examining the inception of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, Mayblin (2017) notes that European powers sought to limit the access colonised peoples had to human rights, further undermining claims to universality. While rights were thus initially intended to be limited primarily to Western citizens, they soon transformed into an instrument of Western states to spread

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“universal values” across the world (Mutua, 2001, p. 223; Brown, 2004, p. 460). Examining how the horrors of the Holocaust and the Second World War gave an important impetus for writing the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, Mutua notes that “[a]lthough the human rights movement arose in Europe, with the express purpose of containing European savagery, it is today a civilizing crusade aimed primarily at the Third World” (Mutua, 2002, p. 19). Contemporary human rights are frequently bound up with notions of democracy, good governance, and liberalism (Moyn, 2010). They go hand in hand with and may even intensify the biopolitical management of populations: “calculations of population control, the measurement of human development, public health policy and the production of human capital are all capable of reformulation as human rights problems” (Orford, 2005, p. 211). This has furthered critiques of an imperialist stroke of contemporary human rights, in which visions of a “better” society and political system are sought to be actively spread around the world (see, e.g. Asad, 2000; Mutua, 2001). As such, human rights “are part of the cultural package of the West, complete with an idiom of expression, a system of government, and certain basic assumptions about the individual and his relationship to society” (Mutua, 2001, p. 237). Where states fail to adhere to particular standards, they are deemed less “civilised” at best and at worst perceived as a case for liberal intervention (Anghie, 2006, p. 745).

Interconnections between humanitarianism, human rights, and security While humanitarianism and human rights have been among the main discursive tools of those seeking to oppose violent border practices, they have proven combinable with a concern to protect EUrope from potential threats. As the following chapters will unpack in greater detail, humanitarian and human rights concerns could be reconciled with long-standing practices by security actors such as Frontex, including patrolling activity and surveillance (which can save lives), and the return of “unwanted” arrivals to countries of origin and transit (while respecting fundamental rights safeguards) (Perkowski, 2018). This section will argue that the simultaneous mobilisation of humanitarianism, human rights, and security in Frontex’s organisational narrative has been enabled through their similarities: they are all discourses of protection that render their subjects vulnerable, including by “othering” migrants and reinforcing state power. These similarities and connections have created the conditions of possibility for their concomitant articulation in contemporary EUropean border governance, and in Frontex’s documents and statements more specifically. Importantly, understanding humanitarianism, human rights, and security in this way allows for analysing their co-articulation by Frontex in the following chapters, while situating the agency’s positioning in a wider struggle over the meaning of protection within EUropean border governance: an attempt to secure agency survival in a contradictory environment that is constantly in flux (Huysmans, 2006a). As noted, humanitarianism, human rights, and security function as discourses of protection: each aims at protecting someone from something. Whereas security

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focuses on protecting an in-group against external threats, humanitarianism seeks to protect victims from suffering or death, and human rights aims to protect individuals against specific rights abuses. When examining this common focus more closely, Bigo’s (2006) etymological analysis of protection is useful. Following Bigo, there are three dimensions of protection: tegere, praesidere, and tutore. Protection as tegere invokes a sacred place, and a protector shielding the protected from an enemy. It is related to sovereign decision-making and the vulnerability of the body of the protected – for instance the body of the nation – who remains an active subject while being protected. Protection as praesidere involves the physical containment of the protected, for instance in a camp. Here, the protected is separated from potential enemies, but simultaneously monitored and disciplined: “The protector supervises and monitors the protected which (or who) is dependent on the protector for the assumption of its sovereign autonomy” (Bigo, 2006, p. 91). Lastly, protection as tutore involves the notion of a protectorate, of profiling the present and future, of deciding for the protected what is best for them and enacting their complete dependency on the protector, while the notion of the enemy disappears. Whereas tegere is connected to sovereign power and praesidere to discipline, tutore is closely associated with biopolitics. Each form of protection can be associated with security, humanitarianism, and human rights. As this book will go on to show, however, in EUropean border governance tegere is most often related to security, which also invokes protection as tutore and praesidere. Humanitarianism and human rights on the other hand – in particular in the ways in which they are used by security actors – are invoked primarily in the sense of tutore and praesidere. Indeed, in mobilising humanitarianism and human rights as tutore and praesidere, Frontex – like other state and security actors – draws on and reinforces paternalistic and restrictive understandings of protection that are easily combinable with security measures. It thereby intervenes in a wider struggle over the meaning of protection, defining what EUrope and its citizens ‘owe’ to others or how and whom they should show ‘care’ towards them. In other words, security is concerned with governing populations through sovereign, disciplinary, and biopolitical techniques of power. This includes for instance the use of databases to establish “risk profiles” of entrants, the filtering of “good” versus “bad” border-crossers, the use of detention and deportation against “undesirables,” who are confined to or removed from particular spaces, and the exposure to death of precarious lives through a refusal to open safe routes and/or provide adequate search and rescue mechanisms at sea. Humanitarianism on the other hand governs through disciplinary and biopolitical techniques of power, often through spatial confinement in camps. Makaremi (2009) coined the term “humanitarian confinement” in relation to France’s government of asylum seekers and irregular arrivals, referring to the spatial practice of confining victims/threats in so-called international zones at airports. As Walters notes, “[t]his paradoxical term effectively captures the ambivalence of a policy that engages its target population as simultaneously vulnerable and criminalized” (Walters, 2015, p. 7). Lastly, human rights are intimately bound up with biopolitical and disciplinary techniques of power and are connected to

34 Humanitarianism, human rights, and security liberal ideas about self-expression, individualism, and the rule of law. In relation to migration governance, they often entail an element of spatial confinement in camps or the government of people in space. This occurs at the very least while the determination of categories of protection and rights takes place, but also in relation to categories of people – such as unaccompanied minors – who are assigned to particular spaces over longer periods of time. A further example for this type of spatial governance is the Dublin Regulation, which facilitates the confinement and at times deportation of people on the move to the first EU country they enter for the purposes of initially determining and subsequently accessing their rights. All three discursive formations thus rely on disciplinary and biopolitical techniques to govern populations, centrally including the government of people in space. The different modes of protection that security, humanitarianism, and human rights invoke in border governance have implications for the subject positions that they produce. As the remainder of the book will show, the active subject of tegere is primarily related to security, whereas humanitarianism and human rights are invoked in the sense of tutore and praesidere, conceptualising those to be protected as mostly or entirely passive. This means that in all three discourses, white, EUropean citizens tend to be presented as active subjects, whereas unauthorised border crossers are seen as threatening “illegals” or passive “victims.” Importantly, the latter figures are “incompatible with those of the subject and the citizen” (Agier, 2011a, p. 215). “Illegals” and “victims” are racialised categories, imagined as non-white and non-Western, and the transition between them is frequent and random (Mutua, 2001; Douzinas, 2007). It is the white, Western citizen who figures in all three discursive formations as implicit “us”. In humanitarianism and human rights, the citizen becomes the saviour, affirming their own humanity by “helping” others. Importantly, the relationship between saviours and victims is a hierarchical one: “[w]e do not like these others, but we love pitying them. They, the savages/victims, make us civilised” (Douzinas, 2007, p. 70). As such, each discursive formation produces an unequal power relationship between protector, protected and/or enemy (Bigo, 2006). As a result of the subjectivities and governmental techniques they produce and employ, humanitarianism, human rights, and security produce different vulnerabilities. Security produces vulnerability in two ways: it emphasises the vulnerability of states vis-à-vis what are regarded as migrant threats and exposes these “threats” to greater risks through security technologies, rendering them more vulnerable. Frontex explicitly engages in the construction of the first sense of vulnerability in its risk analyses, where the vulnerability of the border and specific member states to deal with migratory pressures is at the centre of analysis. The second sense of vulnerability is produced indirectly, as a result of restrictions on human mobility in a world where life chances and possibilities of survival vastly depend on one’s place of residence. While legal travel has become faster, cheaper, and safer than ever before, those who are deemed “unwanted” are left with no option but unsafe boats or trucks to attempt perilous journeys to EUrope. Importantly, however, EUropean states and those exposed to their bordering practices are not

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equally vulnerable: vulnerability is laced with power structures (Butler, Gambetti and Sabsay, 2016). Rather than addressing this unequal distribution of vulnerability, however, humanitarianism and human rights risk shoring up the power differentials producing these vulnerabilities in the first place. Indeed, Frontex’s references to humanitarianism are framed as addressing the vulnerabilities that emerge through restrictive policies, in particular deaths at sea. In conceptualising migrants as bodies to be saved, stripped of agency, however, it reproduces their vulnerability by exposing saved bodies to the very control practices that rendered them vulnerable in the first place. Having saved lives at sea, these lives are then processed according to rules that foresee their detention and identification, at times culminating in deportation. Similarly, Frontex’s claims to human rights are framed as addressing migrants’ vulnerabilities to exploitation and rights abuses. In focusing on rendering specific bordering practices rights-conform, they simultaneously legitimise EUrope’s right to control its borders and to exclude those who are deemed unwanted. Stabilising an inherently violent system, they reproduce the vulnerability of those who are locked out: even rights-conform detention and deportation practices increase individuals’ vulnerability to mental health issues, poverty, and violence. In part, this is because humanitarianism and human rights are closely connected to statehood, reinforcing sovereign power. While humanitarianism aims to soften the most drastic effects of a politics of deterrence, it does not question the state’s right to protect its borders. Moreover, it perpetuates the othering of migrants by administering them as helpless victims devoid of political agency. As such, it legitimises the state’s power to exclude. Rendering migrants as helpless victims and abject others, humanitarianism does not address their vulnerability, but further solidifies it. Human rights are also closely connected to the sovereign power of states. By appealing to the state as the principal guarantor for such rights, state responsibility and power are strengthened and legitimised. Meanwhile, individuals seeking to claim rights are subject to intense disciplinary power, and relations of domination risk being masked and reinforced rather than addressed by invoking particularised rights instead of further-reaching notions of social justice. Of course, also security reinforces state power: it tends to take the state or the nation as its referent object, focusing on the threat people on the move allegedly pose to them: “Threats and insecurities . . . constitute the state: the state only knows who and what it is through its juxtaposition against the radical, threatening Other” (Hansen, 2006, p. 30). All efforts are focused on protecting the state against unwanted intrusion, rendering those seeking access vulnerable to the adverse effects of deterrent measures. In sum, security, humanitarianism, and human rights produce and depend on those who are ruled, those who rule, and those who are excluded (Edkins, 2003, p. 256). Rather than challenging sovereignty, humanitarianism and human rights tend to reinforce it. Finally, humanitarianism, human rights, and security all include neo-imperialist ambitions. Striving for “pre-emptive” security, “buffer zones” are being created outside of the EUropean borders, extraterritorialising security, border controls, and sometimes deaths to third states (Zaiotti, 2009). Human rights and humanitarian

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arguments on the other hand have been used to justify military interventions by Western states over the last two decades. Donnelly refers to “imperial humanitarianism” to capture the problematique of military interventions justified in humanitarian terms (Donnelly, 2007, p. 298), and Balibar notes that “‘humanitarian right’ turns out to be intimately combined with imperialist strategies for policing the world” (Balibar, 2013, p. 19). Human rights similarly have emerged as a powerful discursive formation that transports ideas about “civility,” “good governance,” and liberalism across national boundaries: “the globalization of human rights fits a historical pattern in which all high morality comes from the West as a civilizing agent against lower forms of civilization in the rest of the world” (Mutua, 2001, p. 210; see also Kennedy, 2002; Merry, 2006). The common orientation towards non-Western states as needing intervention that humanitarianism, human rights, and security share underpins a growing focus on externalising EU migration governance, which will be further explored in Chapter 5.

Conclusion Despite apparent differences, the discursive formations of security, humanitarianism, and human rights share a number of important commonalities. The similarities and connections across the three discursive formations have created the prerequisites for their contemporaneous articulation in a wider interdiscourse3 of migration control in contemporary EUropean border governance in which they have, at times, become almost exchangeable. Similarities across the discursive formations have allowed for the appropriation of humanitarianism and human rights by state and security actors, as this appropriation does not fundamentally challenge the security-based assumptions under which they exist and operate. As Chapters 3 and 4 will show, the similarities between the discursive formations have enabled Frontex to increasingly portray itself as a saviour of “migrant victims” and promoter of fundamental rights, while simultaneously upholding its identity as a protector of EUropean citizens from “migrant threats.” Drawing on different registers and technologies of protection, humanitarianism, human rights and security have become combinable in Frontex’s organisational narrative.

Notes 1 The Cap Anamur was a ship owned by a German NGO with the same name. In 2004, the ship’s crew rescued 37 individuals in distress at sea close to Italian waters. The Italian government refused the boat entry into Italian territorial waters, and a nearly two-week standoff between the Italian coastguard and the Cap Anamur ensued. Eventually, the boat disembarked in Sicily, where most of those who had been rescued were deported immediately. The ship’s captain and two crew members were charged with assistance to illegal immigration. They were acquitted in 2009 (Hans, 2009; Baldaccini, 2010). 2 Notably, Aradau discusses trafficking as a “special case”: “Compared to the more straightforward examples of securitization such as migration, trafficking is a peculiar case, as it has witnessed a move from state security to a humanitarian approach” (Aradau, 2008, p. 98). Developments in border governance since her analysis have shown that this “move” has not remained exceptional.

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3 The concept interdiscourse is taken from Michel Pêcheux’s (1982) work and refers to a complex of related discursive formations, the meanings of which are partially determined by their relationships with each other (see also Fairclough, 1992).

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Pallister-Wilkins, P. (2018) ‘Hotspots and the Geographies of Humanitarianism’, Environment and Planning D: Society and Space. doi: 10.1177/0263775818754884. Pêcheux, M. (1982) Language, Semantics and Ideology. New York: St. Martin’s Press. Perkowski, N. (2018) ‘Frontex and the Convergence of Humanitarianism, Human Rights and Security’, Security Dialogue, 49(6), pp. 457–475. Rancière, J. (2004) ‘Who Is the Subject of the Rights of Man?’, The South Atlantic Quarterly, 103(2/3), pp. 297–310. Redfield, P. (2005) ‘Foucault in the Tropics: Displacing the Panopticon’, in Inda, J. X. (ed.) Anthropologies of Modernity: Foucault, Governmentality, and Life Politics. Malden, MA: Blackwell Publishing Ltd, pp. 50–79. Reid-Henry, S. M. (2013) ‘Humanitarianism as Liberal Diagnostic: Humanitarian Reason and the Political Rationalities of the Liberal Will-to-Care’, Transactions of the Institute of British Geographers, 39, pp. 418–431. doi: 10.1111/tran.12029. Salter, M. B. (2012) ‘Theory of the / : The Suture and Critical Border Studies’, Geopolitics, 17(4), pp. 734–755. doi: 10.1080/14650045.2012.660580. Schily, O. (2004) ‘F.A.Z. Gastbeitrag: Afrikas Probleme in Afrika lösen’, F.A.Z., 23 July. Available at: www.faz.net/aktuell/politik/f-a-z-gastbeitrag-afrikas-probleme-in-afrikaloesen-1174809.html?printPagedArticle=true#pageIndex_2. Scott, D. (2005) ‘Colonial Governmentality’, in Inda, J. X. (ed.) Anthropologies of Modernity: Foucault, Governmentality, and Life Politics. Malden, MA: Blackwell Publishing Ltd, pp. 23–49. Ticktin, M. (2006) ‘Where Ethics and Politics Meet: The Violence of Humanitarianism in France’, American Ethnologist, 33(1), pp. 33–49. Ticktin, M. (2011) Casualties of Care. Immigration and the Politics of Humanitarianism in France. Berkeley and Los Angeles, CA: University of California Press. Vaughan-Williams, N. (2015) Europe’s Border Crisis: Biopolitical Security and Beyond. Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press. doi: 10.1093/acprof. Wall, I. rua (2012) Human Rights and Constituent Power: Without Model Or Warranty. Abingdon and New York: Routledge. Walters, W. (2015) ‘Reflections on Migration and Mobility’, Movements. Journal für kritische Migrations- und Grenzregimeforschung. Available at: http://movements-journal. org/issues/01.grenzregime/04.walters – migration.governmentality.html (Accessed: 7 August 2016). Weizman, E. (2011) The Least of All Possible Evils: Humanitarian Violence from Arendt to Gaza. London and New York: Verso. Willaert, T. (2012) ‘Postcolonial Studies after Foucault: Discourse, Discipline, Biopower, and Governmentality as Travelling Concepts’, Universität Gießen, PhD thesis. Available at: http://geb.uni-giessen.de/geb/volltexte/2013/9180/pdf/WillaertThijs_2013_01_21.pdf. Young, R. (1995) ‘Foucault on Race and Colonialism’, New Formations, 25, pp. 57–65. Available at: www.robertjcyoung.com/Foucault.pdf. Zaiotti, R. (2009) ‘The ENP and Security: Creating New Dividing Lines in Europe?’, in Balzacq, T. (ed.) The External Dimension of EU Justice and Home Affairs: Governance, Neighbours, Security. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, pp. 187–204.

2

Frontex as a compromise

Since its establishment in 2005, Frontex has become a key player in EUropean border governance. For some, it has been a focal point for criticism and discontent, and a symbol for EUropean efforts to reinforce control of the Schengen borders. For others, Frontex has emerged as a one-size-fits-all solution to a range of “problems” and “crises” in border governance. The agency has grown at great speed in terms of resources, staff members, and responsibilities, having seen repeated increases to its budget as well as more fundamental changes to the regulations governing it in recent years. Seeing its powers and competences regularly expanded, Frontex has remained a highly controversial and symbolically charged actor in EUropean border governance. At the same time, the agency has been relatively elusive. As a security organisation, Frontex is not always cooperative in facilitating research access, and not all parts of the agency are open to academic or public scrutiny. As a result, research relying extensively on direct contact with Frontex staff or guest officers is still scarce, despite some notable exceptions (e.g. Aas and Gundhus, 2015). In light of an overall restrictive research context, this book pursues a multidimensional approach to studying Frontex. It argues that taking this approach mitigates the difficulties arising from limited research access in the security field, while also provoking an open reflection on the implications of relying on specific methods and perspectives when studying security organisations. Understanding methods as “inscription devices” that not merely describe but also enact social and political worlds (Aradau and Huysmans, 2014, p. 604), Chapters 2–4 engage with three different ways of knowing Frontex. Informed by different methods and held together by an experimentalist and open-ended methodology, they thus offer distinct views of the agency. In doing so, they enable reflections on how Frontex can be known and which knowledge about the agency is produced by different kinds of scholarly analyses. Rather than presenting three separate pieces that together form one coherent whole, the following chapters present stand-alone analyses from different vantage points, each of which provides a partial answer to the question of how we can understand Frontex and its shift towards humanitarianism and human rights. Connecting to ongoing debates about methods in critical security studies, this chapter begins by setting up the approach taken and the empirical findings to

42 Frontex as a compromise be presented in Chapters 2–4. It then proceeds by introducing the first of three “takes” of Frontex. Analysing the agency through its founding history, this chapter engages with the dominant interpretation of Frontex in academic literature. It examines the political processes leading to the agency’s establishment as well as changes and amendments to the regulations governing it since then. Understanding Frontex as a compromise between the diverse interests of different EU institutions and member states, it explores what interpretations of the agency’s development this perspective opens up, and what it reveals about the coexistence of diverse rationalities – including humanitarianism, human rights, and security – within the agency today. The chapter concludes with a reflection on how examining Frontex through the institutions founding and controlling it renders the agency knowable, and what questions it leaves unaddressed.

A bricolage of Frontex Conducting research in the security field often constitutes a particular challenge in terms of securing access, as security actors are keen to stay in control of the information given to outsiders and point to the importance of secrecy in facilitating their work: “access is particularly sensitive in the security field” (Salter, 2013, p. 22). This is true also for Frontex: research access is selective and overall rather restrictive, despite a willingness by the agency’s Press Office to accommodate some requests for interviews or field visits. How to conduct research in the security field has been the subject of lively debates in recent years (Hansen, 2006; Salter and Mutlu, 2013; Aradau and Huysmans, 2014; Aradau et al., 2015a; de Goede, Bosma and Pallister-Wilkins, 2020). In these debates, the focus has been not only on navigating difficulties in terms of research access but more fundamentally on understandings of methods and methodologies in the field of critical security studies. The most recent engagements with methods have distanced themselves from the disciplining and constraining canon of research methods as it is frequently taught to students in the social sciences. Instead, the authors contend that “method and methodological reflections can be a key site of revisiting critique and politics in IR research” (Aradau and Huysmans, 2014, p. 598). In doing so, they make a number of moves that challenge “traditional” conceptions of methods. Importantly, they position themselves against dividing and hierarchically arranging methodology and methods, with theory coming first, followed by methodology and finally methods (Aradau and Huysmans, 2014; Aradau et al., 2015a). Instead, they propose conceptualising – and problematising – methods as a practice: “[m]ethods are a practice of and within power relations; they exercise power and are inscribed by power relations” (Aradau et al., 2015b, p. 11). As practices, methods are “inscription devices”: Social realities, identities, categories, and objects are made and remade through methods, which act within and upon social and security worlds (Aradau and Huysmans, 2014, p. 604). As such, researchers need to make choices pertaining to the kinds of worlds they want to enact when selecting and employing methods. Given that methods interfere with and have effects on the world, they are inevitably political: “[t]here is no innocence” (Law

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and Urry, 2004, p. 404). Understanding methods as practices rather than neutral, fact-finding devices allows for adopting an experimental approach to methods and methodology, combining different methods, theories, concepts, or data in potentially new or unorthodox ways (Aradau et al., 2015b, p. 7). The open-ended, experimental research design underpinning this book reflects a theoretical commitment to understanding methods as practices on the one hand, and a response to conducting research in situations of secrecy and constrained research access on the other. Engaging in methodological bricolage (Aradau et al., 2015b), I pursued various routes of data collection simultaneously, following up with opportunities for research access where they arose while also relying on publicly available information. The latter strategy proved particularly helpful to effectively use periods of prolonged waiting for responses to fieldwork requests and outcomes of inner-organisational negotiations regarding research access, which at times lasted several months. Combining interviews, informal conversations and participant observation at Frontex events as well as in Frontex operations without imposing a previously established grid of analysis on them moreover allowed me to prioritise understanding the worldviews of Frontex’s staff, management, and guest officers and to be surprised by some of the more unexpected narratives I heard (see Law, 2004, p. 102; Bueger and Mireanu, 2015, p. 129). In pursuing this approach, I was inspired by Feldman’s (2012) conceptualisation of nonlocal ethnography. Feldman describes this approach as follows: [n]onlocal ethnography shifts the accent of analysis from location-specific practices to rationales that enable, organize, and effectively integrate many disparate practices, in order to identify unmappable ethnographic terrain, as it were. “Nonlocal” describes rationales and practices that are present in multiple locations but not of any particular location. (Feldman, 2012, p. 192, emphasis in the original) Feldman notes that processes of migration policymaking in the European Union emerge within networks of policymakers and practitioners. As specific rationales, discourses, and narratives become dominant in these networks, they as well as existing forms of bureaucratic and technical organising make particular policy choices appear logical or even inevitable. The goal of nonlocal ethnography is to uncover and question such rationales, narratives, and discourses and to understand “how policy actors create and reiterate a self-referential circle of policy phrases that become ever more resilient as they are repeated” (Feldman, 2012, p. 20). While I studied a specific organisation rather than a policy network, Frontex itself is partially characterised by such indirect relations and network-like characteristics. As will be further explored in Chapter 4, the agency’s management, its headquarter staff, and the officers implementing joint operations are only loosely connected to one another. Rather than taking a localised approach, I therefore sought to gain insights into how those working for and with Frontex in a variety of contexts and locations made sense of their work, of Frontex, and of the wider field of border and migration governance.

44 Frontex as a compromise An eclectic approach, nonlocal ethnography combines the analysis of policy documents, newspapers, press releases, public statements, and email correspondence with personal interactions, participant observation, and informal as well as formalised interviews. It breaks with the traditional privileging of participant observation but strives to maintain the epistemological basis of ethnography. On the one hand, it seeks to displace the researcher, to overcome pre-existing biases and engage openly with previously unfamiliar ideas, values, and practices. It, however, understands displacement not as the crossing of geographical boundaries but instead as “any research (or personal) practice that dislodges the assumptions, discourses, and rationales the researcher would otherwise take for granted” (Feldman, 2012, p. 195). On the other hand, nonlocal ethnography seeks to illustrate the historical contingency of present phenomena. This is achieved through genealogical approaches and analyses of context, rather than the traditional longterm embedding of the researcher in a specific community. In this way, nonlocal ethnography “critiques the hegemony of ‘common knowledge’ and traces the role of contingency in human affairs” (Feldman, 2012, p. 196). This approach to research enables researchers to maintain what Walters (2015) and Mezzadra and Neilson (2013) refer to as an “ethnographic sensibility.” Importantly, “[s]uch an outlook is able to capture the way in which technologies of control are cobbled together somewhat adventitiously: one can say they are emergent and never perfectly follow a plan” (Walters, 2015, pp. 6–7). Following this understanding, I conducted semi-structured interviews with seven Frontex staff members based in the agency’s headquarters, with a member of its management board, with an NGO representative of Frontex’s Consultative Forum on Fundamental Rights, with a national policeman of a EUropean country who had trained Frontex guest officers, with four EUropean guest officers who were deployed in Frontex operation Poseidon Land in Bulgaria in March 2014 and three EUropean guest officers who were deployed in Frontex operation Hermes in Sicily in August 2014. The Frontex staff members I interviewed were senior officers in leading positions, who worked in different units within the agency (including the press office, risk analysis, operations, training, and fundamental rights). The variety of interviewees reflects my attempt to speak to individuals working for and with Frontex in different capacities and contexts. Throughout the research, I remained open and flexible in my selection of research participants in order to respond to new avenues for research access as they emerged. All interviews took place between December 2013 and September 2014. Rather than introducing security, human rights, or humanitarian discourses myself, I asked open questions pertaining to the work of Frontex; the importance of border control; the agency’s role in EUropean border governance; and its challenges and future ambitions. Interviews were semi-structured, with an average of 65 minutes per interview. Before conducting these interviews, I spoke informally with EUropean border guards, Frontex staff, and industry representatives and conducted participant observation during the EUropean Day for Border Guards in May 2013. When the opportunity presented itself to observe the agency’s 47th management board meeting in February 2014, I seized it. On this day, I also had the chance to have

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informal conversations with members of the management board during coffee and lunch breaks, and at a dinner and subsequent drinks that I was invited to that same evening. Passing through Berlin, I attended a Frontex event on search and rescue and maritime border controls a week later, at which I again had the possibility to talk to some of the agency staff and management members I had previously met. Finally, I had informal conversations with various guest officers deployed in the Frontex operations I visited, who were not always permitted to give formalised interviews. Particularly in Bulgaria, I encountered a sizable group of guest officers who had been asked to decline my requests for interviews by their national authorities but who were happy to meet with me in groups and pairs and talk informally about what moved them at the time, including their reasons to participate in the operations, and their thoughts on border controls and migration. While in Bulgaria and Italy, I also spoke informally with a range of local activists about their knowledge of the situation at the borders and of Frontex’s activities in the region. In addition, I analysed the discussions around the regulations governing Frontex and the multiple changes to its mandate (see discussion below) and conducted a discourse analysis of all press releases and annual reports issued by the agency until the end of 2019 (see Chapter 4). This multidimensional approach produced a diverse range of research data. Rather than seeking to fit this data into one coherent account, I arranged it into three “takes.” Borrowing this term from cinematography, I suggest that this approach allows us to see the “scene” of Frontex’s turn towards humanitarianism and human rights from three distinct angles. Each of these “takes” renders different actors visible, foregrounds a different storyline, and excludes other aspects from view or relegates them to the background. While each “take” shows the same scene, the three “takes” nevertheless do not constitute a coherent whole; they are not pieces of a puzzle but rather different ways of seeing, interpreting, and simultaneously constructing a social phenomenon. Each “take” is, of course, closely related to the others, but they cannot be pieced together to produce a “true picture” of Frontex’s relationship with humanitarianism and human rights. Indeed, none of the three “takes” can claim to be getting any closer to the “truth” than the others, with each offering insights and interpretations that the others do not. It is here that the notion of methodological bricolage is key once again, as it “takes complexity not as a challenge to knowledge that needs to be overcome by multiplying methods but as the recognition that the world consists of things that relate but don’t add up (Mol and Law 2002, p. 1)” (Aradau et al., 2015b, p. 8, my emphasis). Nevertheless, considering the three “takes” together produces insights none of them would individually. In particular, such insights relate to the complex relationships between the institutions shaping Frontex from the outside, and the various entities and individuals influencing and/or implementing its work from within. Thinking the three “takes” together also allows for reflections on the role of specific events in Frontex’s wider environment acting as catalysts for processes that are, at times, long in the making. Most importantly, perhaps, it exposes the effects methodological choices have on the knowledge produced through social scientific enquiry, prompting a critical

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reflection on how an understanding of methods a practices can inform not only data collection but also the writing and sharing of research findings. Before the knowledge produced by considering Frontex through three distinct “takes” can be considered, however, each “take” needs to be introduced individually: it is to this task that this chapter now turns.

Take 1: Frontex as a compromise One way in which Frontex has been understood in the academic literature is through the history of its foundation, in particular an examination of the interests of various actors in negotiations on EUropean border controls that were taking place in the early 2000s. The wider political context at the time was one in which interior ministries were seeking to find ways to avoid constraints on a securitycentred, restrictive governance of migration, without necessarily sharing the same vision on how this might best be achieved. Guiraudon and Lahav showed how efforts to move matters of immigration and border controls to the EU level in the late 1990s and early 2000s more generally were motivated by the desire of home affairs ministries to avoid domestic constraints, such as national courts and NGO mobilisation (Guiraudon, 2000, 2003; Guiraudon and Lahav, 2000). Building on this work, Lavenex (2006, 2007) argued that similar concerns also led to an increased emphasis on externalising migration controls, as officials working within home affairs were seeking new ways to avoid political, normative, and institutional constraints emerging on a EUropean level. Together, the authors demonstrated that EU policy processes in this area have been closely bound up with institutional interests and competitions. The same observation can be made regarding the establishment of Frontex. What gave rise to the negotiations and could be regarded as Frontex’s “founding myth” was the persistent belief that the lifting of border controls among Schengen member states necessitated stricter controls at these states’ external borders.1 Accordingly, cooperation on immigration and external border controls in EUrope began in the 1980s with the Schengen treaty, which contained initial provisions on inter-state cooperation regarding matters of immigration and asylum (Schengen Agreement, 1985). While these agreements were made between individual states, the 1992 Treaty of Maastricht incorporated cooperation on matters of migration in the EU framework as a whole (Léonard, 2010, p. 233). Five years later, the Treaty of Amsterdam further consolidated an EU approach to migration that was characterised by a continued focus on security. It introduced the notion of EUrope as an “Area of Freedom, Security and Justice” (AFSJ), which was framed as being in need of protection from outside threats (Lavenex, 2005; Pellerin, 2005; Kostakopoulou, 2009). This security-focused approach was continued also at the 1999 Council meeting in Tampere, which officially incorporated a commitment to externalise border controls in order to prevent migration towards EUrope (Samers, 2004; Lavenex, 2007). The perception that external border controls needed to be improved remained strong in the following years and led Belgium, France, Germany, Italy, and Spain to commission a feasibility study exploring the idea of a

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common EU border police in 2001. While agreeing that better cooperation in this field was needed, the UK and several Scandinavian countries expressed reservations regarding such far-reaching ambitions (Monar, 2005; Jorry, 2007; Neal, 2009). The years between 2001 and 2003 were marked by a series of negotiations, accommodation, and compromises between the Commission and the Council on the one hand, and between various member states within the Council on the other (Neal, 2009, p. 340). While the Commission initially took up the results of the feasibility study, the December 2001 Justice and Home Affairs Council in Laeken did not make reference to a common border guard, reflecting the reluctance of some of the participating member states. The presidency conclusions did however request the Council and the Commission to look into “mechanisms or common services to control the external borders” (European Council, 2001, para. 42). Nevertheless, the Commission held onto the idea of a common border guard and published a communication that outlined the path towards an EU Corps of Border Guards in May 2002 (European Commission, 2002). In June, the Council reiterated its concern to improve cooperation and coordination among member states but postponed any decision on a common border guard that could support (rather than replace) national forces to an undetermined later stage (European Council, 2002, p. 27). Instead, a so-called Action Plan created the “External Borders Practitioners Common Unit,” consisting of the previously existing “Strategic Committee on Immigration, Frontiers and Asylum” working group (SCIFA) as well as representatives of the national border guards, and became known as SCIFA+ (Neal, 2009, p. 341). The unit was set up in autumn 2002 and promptly implemented a number of pilot projects in different member states (Jorry, 2007). The work of SCIFA+, however, was viewed as ineffective by the Commission and several member states (Léonard, 2009; Neal, 2009). As the 2004 enlargement of the European Union moved closer, concerns regarding the perceived challenges in governing the external borders of the 10 new member states grew, and the interest to progress with improving and harmonising external border controls across the EU remained great (Ekelund, 2014). Given the dissatisfaction with SCIFA+, the Thessaloniki Council Conclusions in June 2003 invited the Commission “to examine . . . the necessity of creating new institutional mechanisms, including the possible creation of a Community operational structure, in order to enhance operational cooperation for the management of external borders” (European Council, 2003, para. 14). Seizing this opening, the Commission proposed that the Council establish a “European Agency for the Management of Operational Co-operation at the External Borders” in November 2003 (European Commission, 2003). The Commission proposal took the differing stances among member states into account and suggested establishing an agency that was to be tasked primarily with coordinating the cooperation between member states, as well as providing a number of other services to them. Less than a year later, in October 2004, Council Regulation 2004/2007 created the agency, commonly known as Frontex (European Council,

48 Frontex as a compromise 2004).2 Importantly, taking a decision on Frontex this swiftly allowed for the marginalisation of the European Parliament in the process. The 1999 Treaty of Amsterdam was followed by a five-year transition period in which the Parliament was only consulted, and decisions in the Council needed to be taken unanimously. As of January 1, 2005, the European Parliament would have been actively involved in Frontex’s foundation through the co-decision procedure, which gave it equal standing with the Council in terms of passing regulations in some issue areas, including those pertaining to migration and asylum (Léonard, 2009). While the Parliament was consulted prior to the Council’s decision on Frontex’s foundation, its proposed amendments to the regulation – including attempts to strengthen the community character of the agency by empowering the Commission and the Parliament as overseers and to reinforce the agency’s fundamental rights obligations in the document (European Parliament, 2004) – were ignored (Léonard, 2009). As a result, fundamental rights were only referenced in the preamble of Frontex’s founding regulation, not in the substantive text itself. Mostly, the Council followed the Commission’s proposal in establishing Frontex but decided to strengthen member states’ powers over the agency: the management board was to consist of a representative of each Schengen member state, in addition to two representatives of the Commission (European Council, 2004). As Sarah Léonard summarised, “Member States were able to agree relatively swiftly on the creation of an agency that they would be able to control . . . and which would be limited to the coordination of operational cooperation at the external borders” (Léonard, 2009, p. 381). When examining the processes and negotiations leading up to Frontex’s establishment, the agency can thus be understood as a compromise between those who were striving for a EUropean approach to border guarding – including the Commission, Germany, and Italy – and those who were reluctant to give up parts of their sovereign powers, such as the United Kingdom and Scandinavian countries (Neal, 2009; Campesi, 2014). A variety of perspectives and rationalities have informed the foundation of Frontex, and the agency is the response to diverse concerns. Frontex was conceived as an agency intending to serve member states who felt that practical support was needed at their (or others’) external borders, while at the same time ensuring that it would not be perceived as a threat to those member states concerned about safeguarding their sovereign right to control their borders. Disagreements also included different visions of what border guarding should look like, with some espousing more risk-based approaches and others a stronger focus on emergency response (see the next section). Looking at Frontex through a history of its foundation explains the control diverse stakeholders exert over the agency. As noted, the signatories of the Schengen acquis oversee the agency’s activities by serving on its management board. In Frontex’s founding regulation, the management board is set out to consist of 30 heads of border guards of Schengen treaty signatories, two Commission delegates, and two representatives of non-Schengen states’ border forces who are invited to attend meetings but not allowed to vote on decisions (the UK and Ireland). With the UK having left the European Union, Ireland

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at present remains the only non-voting representative. The management board supervises the executive director, the agency’s annual reports and programmes of work, budget, organisational structure, and staffing policy, among other duties (European Council, 2004, Articles 20 and 21). Due to its composition, [management] board discussions are still tilted towards political issues. National interests have remained key at the cost of the effectiveness of the agency (Cowi, 2009, p. 65). Similarly, although the executive director (appointed by the board on proposal of the European Commission) is formally independent (Art. 25 Regulation 2007/2004), his appointment is strongly influenced by intergovernmental compromises. (Wolff and Schout, 2013, p. 316) Member state interests have thus been of vital importance not only to how the agency was conceived and set up but also to its activities and functioning once it had been established. Indeed, the institutions shaping its foundation – the Commission and the member states – configured themselves as overseers of the everyday running of the agency. In contrast, the Parliament had only a limited influence on Frontex in its early years, given its inability to influence the legislative process in 2004. Most importantly, it was given partial control over Frontex’s budget. After having been marginalised in the founding process of the agency, the Parliament sought to exert pressure on Frontex in informal ways, in particular in relation to fundamental rights and search and rescue (see Chapter 4). It for instance repeatedly summoned Frontex’s executive director for questioning. Given its limited powers over the agency, these requests were at times ignored by the agency, especially in its early years (Baldaccini, 2010; Martin, 2013; LIBE Committee, 2014). As the following sections will explore, this changed over time, as the Parliament used its growing powers to exert an independent influence on Frontex and the regulations governing it.

The growing influence of the European Parliament In part due to the different stakeholders involved, “Frontex was . . . born in the context of an ambiguous dialectic between the technocratic ideology of risk management and the recurrent call for emergency measures” (Campesi, 2014, p. 128). It was founded partly as a technocratic agency tasked with “risk management,” analyses and research, advancing the normalisation of governing migration as a security issue (Neal, 2009). At the same time, the agency faced repeated demands by member states for “urgent and rapid action” at their external borders (Carrera, 2007, p. 12). Responding to these demands, the Council and the European Parliament reinforced Frontex’s ability to intervene on short notice in 2007, establishing the mechanism of “Rapid Border Intervention Teams” (RABIT) for situations “of urgent and exceptional pressure, especially the arrival at points of the external borders of large numbers of third-country nationals trying to enter the territory of the Member State illegally” (European Parliament and Council, 2007, Article

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1(1)). The mechanism obliged member states to provide personnel in these situations, making “solidarity” compulsory. It also made clear that an emergencyfocused outlook – or exceptionalist securitising, following Huysmans (2014) – would continue to coexist with a technocratic risk-management approach – or diffuse securitising – within Frontex. The establishment of a rapid border intervention mechanism was the first chance the European Parliament had to impact on the regulations governing Frontex under the co-decision procedure, after having been excluded from the legislative process in 2004. As the regulation was passed through a 1st reading “deal”3 with the Council, it is unclear if the Parliament used this opportunity to exert a meaningful influence on the regulation. The procedure took place behind closed doors, precluding public scrutiny. Judging from a comparison of the original Commission proposal from July 2006 and the regulation passed by the European Parliament and Council, it seems likely that the Parliament added an emphasis on fundamental rights and search and rescue. Points 17 and 18 of the (nonbinding) preamble note member states’ obligations in this regard more clearly than the original proposal. More importantly, the final regulation has an additional article on the rights of refugees and non-refoulement in the substantive and thus legally binding part of the text (European Commission, 2006; European Parliament and Council, 2007, Article 2). The regulation was passed by the European Parliament at first reading in April 2007 and adopted by the Justice and Home Affairs Council in June 2007. It entered into force just over a year after the original Commission proposal, in August 2007. In February 2010, the Commission tabled a new proposal to amend the Frontex regulation, expanding the competences and resources of the agency. In the process leading up to the new regulation, the European Parliament insisted on strengthening the role of fundamental rights in the proposed text (European Parliament, 2011; statewatch, 2012). With the amendments, Frontex thus not only received greater powers – such as the permission to own and lease equipment and to create and use information systems to exchange data with other EU agencies – but was also obliged to create a Consultative Forum on Fundamental Rights consisting of NGOs, EU agencies, and international organisations, as well as to establish the position of a Fundamental Rights Officer inside the agency. The amendment was voted for in the European Parliament in September 2011 and adopted by the Council in October. It entered into force on December 12, 2011. Meanwhile, the European Parliament was fighting for more say on another regulation pertaining to Frontex before the Court of Justice of the European Union. In April 2010, mounting criticism regarding deaths at sea as well as allegations of push-backs by member states and Frontex led to the Council adopting rules governing Frontex operations at sea (Peers, 2014). The European Parliament sued against these being adopted as a Council measure implementing the Schengen Borders Code, arguing that they impacted on fundamental rights and entailed fundamental changes to the Schengen Borders Code. Given their widereaching implications, the Parliament insisted that any such decision had to be taken through the ordinary legislative procedure, that is with the involvement

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of Parliament. In September 2012, the Court of Justice decided in favour of the European Parliament. It declared that as a result of the Council decision, “the fundamental rights of the persons concerned may be interfered with to such an extent that the involvement of the European Union legislature is required” (Court of Justice of the European Union, 2012, paragraph 77). Consequently, the Commission put forward a new proposal for guidelines for sea operations in April 2013, which were deliberated and passed under the co-decision procedure. In the process, the European Parliament succeeded in adding a number of amendments strengthening provisions related to search and rescue as well as to fundamental rights and refugee protection, in particular non-refoulement.4

The European Border and Coast Guard Less than four years after the amendment of Frontex’s founding regulation, the political atmosphere had changed considerably, prompting renewed scrutiny of the agency’s mandate. In his opening speech in front of the European Parliament in October 2014, the new Commission President Jean-Claude Juncker set out his vision and priorities for the European Commission 2014–2019, centrally including the improved governance of migration. Highlighting the importance of border security, Juncker announced his intention “to reinforce the work of FRONTEX and put European Border Guard Teams into action for quick deployment in FRONTEX joint operations and rapid border interventions” (Juncker, 2014). In March 2015, the Commission announced that it had commenced work on a “European Agenda on Migration” (European Commission, 2015b). The deaths of around 1200 people in April 2015 added to the growing attention to the realities of precarious migration across the Mediterranean Sea. In response to these deaths, the European Commission published a “Ten-point action plan on migration” on April 20, followed by the launch of “A European Agenda on Migration” on May 13, 2015 (European Commission, 2015a, 2015c). Outlining a range of measures relating to border control, reception, relocation, and deportation, the Agenda also announced that a new proposal on Frontex was being developed that would enable Frontex to “fulfil its dual role of coordinating operational border support to member states under pressure, and helping to save the lives of migrants at sea” (European Commission, 2015a, p. 3).5 The new proposal was published in December 2015. In it, the Commission re-awakened the idea of a common EU border guard corps that it had already put forward in 2002. While observers expected this to be highly controversial and unlikely to find support among member states, the proposal was deliberated and passed in less than a year (Niemann and Speyer, 2018, p. 24). The political context at the time was crucial in facilitating this. As Niemann and Speyer (2018) show, the Commission used a window of opportunity that had opened in response to the so-called refugee crisis: member states were eager to make progress on EUropean border governance, which was widely perceived as unfit to respond to increasing numbers of arrivals in 2015 and 2016. In their analysis of the legislative process, Niemann and Speyer also note the importance of

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cooperation between the Commission, the Parliament and the Dutch Presidency, and the latter’s role in pushing deliberations in the Council along. The European Parliament was in favour of the Commission proposal from the beginning. In the negotiation, it succeeded in reinforcing fundamental rights provisions in the regulation, as well as increasing its influence on the appointment process of the executive director. It also strengthened the mandate of liaison officers to be deployed to all member states and the provisions on equipment for operations (Niemann and Speyer, 2018). Meanwhile, there was considerable resistance among member states regarding a suggested right by the new agency to intervene without the affected member state’s consent, as many had concerns about the implications this had for national sovereignty. Focusing on the dysfunctionality of the existing agency in light of heightened arrival numbers at the time, the Commission, however, succeeded in reframing the debate, focusing discussions on how apparent problems could be solved. Meanwhile, the Dutch Presidency worked out a compromise stipulating that the decision to intervene in a member state is taken by a qualified majority vote in the Council rather than by a Commission implementing act, as originally proposed. This eased member states concerns, and they eventually agreed to this modified version of the right to intervene (Niemann and Speyer, 2018). The European Parliament and Council published their agreement on the Commission proposal on June 27, and the European Parliament endorsed it at the first reading on July 6. In October 2016, the new regulation entered into force. It granted the European Border and Coast Guard – which continues to also be referred to as Frontex – a range of new competences as well as unprecedented independence from member states. Importantly, it defines border management as a “shared responsibility” of the agency and national authorities (European Parliament and Council, 2016, Article 5), a significant shift away from the previous regulation, in which this responsibility rested solely with member states (European Council, 2004, Article 1). The regulation renders Frontex explicitly accountable to the European Parliament and Council (Article 7). It gives Frontex the new task to conduct mandatory “vulnerability assessments” of member states’ border management capacities (Article 13), equips it with a “standing corps” of at least 1500 border guards and other relevant staff (Article 20), and enables the agency to cooperate more closely with third countries, including by conducting joint operations on the territory of states neighbouring the EU and by sending liaison officers to third countries (Articles 53–55). It defines search and rescue as an integral part of European integrated border management (Article 4) and notes Frontex’s responsibility to assist member states in SAR operations, however only if these arise in the context of border control activities. Fundamental rights are further strengthened in the regulation, with Frontex being tasked to “monitor and ensure the protection of fundamental rights” in its work and to staff the Fundamental Rights Officer appropriately (preamble, point 48), as well as to develop a code of conduct applicable to all Frontex operations (Article 35) and to set up a new complaints mechanism regarding fundamental rights violations (Article 72). Further increasing the agency’s powers, the regulation also empowers Frontex to intervene in

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situations that “risk jeopardising the functioning of the Schengen area” – as noted earlier, this is possible even against the explicit wish of the concerned member state. Where proposed measures resulting from a “vulnerability assessment” are not implemented, the agency can notify the Commission, which then identifies and proposes the measures the agency ought to take to the Council. The Council decides on the Commission proposal by a qualified majority vote, whereas the affected member state is “required” to cooperate (Article 19). Despite these far-reaching changes, the European Border and Coast Guard constitutes a further development rather than a radical break from Frontex. In spite of the name “European Border and Coast Guard,” the regulation does not in fact set up a European border guard, but rather stipulates a range of measures to reinforce cooperation among member states, as well as setting up a pool of equipment and border experts that the agency can draw on (Carrera et al., 2017, p. 48). Importantly, the European Border and Coast Guard remains dependent on member states in a number of ways: it continues to rely on guest officers to conduct its operations – even if 1500 border guards are now mandated to be readily available for deployment – and it does not have executive powers, meaning that member states remain in command. Its management board remains composed of two representatives of the Commission and one representative of each Schengen member state (Article 62). Where a “vulnerability assessment” finds that a member state’s border management capacities show weaknesses, it is the management board that in the first instance decides on the measures to be taken in order to address identified shortcomings. Frontex’s ability to intervene is thus curtailed in two key ways by member states: first, the management board has to approve the measures mandated by Frontex by a two-thirds majority, and second, the Council has the final say on whether or not a Frontex intervention ought to be conducted in case these measures are not taken by the state in question (Carrera et al., 2017). These in-built limitations of Frontex’s right to intervene put member states back in the driver’s seat, while retaining the possibility for intervention where individual states are uncooperative. As such, the solution brokered by the Dutch Presidency on this constitutes a compromise between those favouring a more robust European Border and Coast Guard able to take over EU border control in times of “crisis,” and those keen to safeguard member states’ competences in this area. In June 2018, less than two years after the transformation of Frontex into the European Border and Coast Guard, Jean-Claude Juncker announced that the Commission was preparing a proposal to create a “standing corps” of 10,000 border guards for the agency by 2027 (Herszenhorn and Eder, 2018). Confirming the Commission’s plan to strengthen Frontex yet again, Juncker formally launched the new proposal in his State of the European Union speech in September 2018, announcing the Commission’s intention to establish the 10,000-strong “standing corps” by 2020 (European Commission, 2018; Juncker, 2018). This ambitious timeframe as well as the proposal to equip the standing corps with executive power caused significant concern among member states. As a result, the Austrian Presidency suggested a compromise, spreading out the establishment of the “standing corps” over seven years (from 2021 until 2027) and coupling the ability

54 Frontex as a compromise of officers to have executive power to an authorisation by the respective host member state (Presidency, 2019). By March 2019, the European Parliament and Council had found an agreement, and the Parliament approved the regulation in the first reading in April (European Parliament, 2019a, 2019b). The new regulation entered into force in December 2019 (European Parliament and Council, 2019). The regulation details that the “standing corps” will eventually consist of 3000 staff directly employed by the agency (“statutory staff”), 1500 member state staff seconded on a long-term basis to the agency, and 5500 member state staff deployed on a short-term basis by 2027. The regulation also entails a greater role for the agency in relation to returns, more possibilities to cooperate with non-EU countries, and confers executive powers for Frontex “statutory staff” in operations (subject to the authorisation of the host member state). It constitutes the fourth change to Frontex’s mandate since it was established in 2005.

Knowing Frontex through its founding history Understanding Frontex’s foundation as a compromise between diverse interests allows for tracing and identifying these interests and influences both in its initial setup and in its contemporary functioning. It makes clear that the agency is not an entirely autonomous and independent actor but that it was created in a way that sought to satisfy diverse concerns and continues to be held accountable by different actors through its institutional design. The agency’s external stakeholders continue to leverage different degrees of control over the agency: Frontex’s management board is composed of a representative of each Schengen member state, in addition to two representatives of the Commission. The European Parliament and Council constitute its budgetary authority. With diverse actors continuing to exert partial control over the agency also after its most recent transformations, conflicts of interest are built into Frontex’s organisational setup. This suggests that tensions between diverse rationalities, goals, and interests have been present and productive within Frontex since its very beginning. It also opens up the possibility that the coexistence of different discursive formations in the agency’s organisational narrative is reflective of the different stakeholders shaping its institutional design and partially controlling its everyday functioning. Importantly then, the agency’s growing emphasis on human rights and humanitarianism in its public rhetoric from 2008 onwards must be understood in light of the wider context described in this chapter. With its mandate up for discussion every few years, the agency has been almost constantly in the spotlight of EUropean policymaking and under pressure to maintain its legitimacy visà-vis the institutions negotiating its organisational future. Meanwhile, member states, the Council, the Commission, and the Parliament have each sought to shape and reshape Frontex in light of their own preferences. Most importantly, perhaps, the European Parliament has used its growing competences in various ways to influence legislation related to Frontex, after being sidelined during its establishment. From secret “deals” with the Council in 2007 to more longwinded processes of negotiation in 2010/2011, 2015/2016, and 2018/2019,

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as well as a legal battle in front of the Court of Justice of the European Union from 2010 to 2012, the Parliament has pursued various avenues to exert its power, and put an emphasis on strengthening the role of fundamental rights and search and rescue in the regulations governing Frontex. Whereas the agency was initially established as a compromise between the Commission and the member states, the European Parliament thus gradually asserted itself as another key player shaping Frontex’s institutional setup, while simultaneously using less formal ways to reach out to the agency and hold it to account (see Chapter 4). Indeed, the agency’s turn towards proactively referring to human rights and humanitarianism in its public documents likely constitutes not only a response to the increasing inclusion of fundamental rights obligations and provisions related to search and rescue in the regulations governing it, that is its changing legal context. It can also be interpreted as an attempt to respond to an evolving political context, in which defusing concerns on these matters by the Parliament became increasingly important in order to ensure the continued legitimacy of the agency vis-à-vis its multiple stakeholders. Frontex’s growing emphasis on human rights and humanitarianism in its public documents slowed down, however, as the political climate began to change in response to unprecedented arrival numbers in 2014–2016. As European institutions and member states scrambled to demonstrate to the public that they were “doing something” to limit new arrivals, security concerns grew more dominant whereas human rights faded into the background, and humanitarian actors came to be publicly attacked for their efforts to save lives at sea (Heller and Pezzani, 2017). The “European Agenda on Migration,” while invoking search and rescue and fundamental rights, had a clearly security-focused outlook, and the measures taken to respond to the so-called migration crisis were almost exclusively security-focused. While Frontex’s institutional environment remained the same, it is thus not surprising that this broader change in atmosphere is reflected also in the agency’s public documents, where references to saving lives and protecting rights were scaled down from 2018 onwards (see Introduction and Chapter 3). Understanding Frontex through the institutions shaping its establishment and subsequent revisions not only provides a number of interesting insights but also relies on problematic assumptions. In particular, the institutions involved in the setting up of Frontex in this narrative are conceptualised to some extent as unitary, pursuing their objectives in a process of rational negotiation and reasonable compromise. While disagreements between member states in the European Council form part of the explanation for Frontex’s foundation, tensions and discrepancies within the Commission, Parliament, and member states are left out of the picture or only marginally considered.6 This is, at least in part, an effect of the methods underpinning this particular “take” on Frontex, most importantly the analysis of policy documents. Crucially, documents tend to be discussed as if they were the united voice of a particular organisation: authorship is often invisible to outsiders and thus attributed to the institution as a whole rather than individuals or fractions within it (Freeman and Maybin, 2011, see Chapter 3). Clearly, the account presented in this chapter thus entails a simplification of the

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internal dynamics of each of the actors involved. In this way, it is a perspective that “zooms out” of each of the institutions and reduces their complexity, focusing instead on their interrelations. While necessarily partial, this “take” offers valuable insights into Frontex as an agency that is shaped and partially controlled by diverse actors and seeks to respond to pressures emanating from its key stakeholders. What it fails to account for, however, is how Frontex has negotiated the different interests and pressures in its environment once it became an actor in its own right, and how it has manoeuvred its position vis-à-vis its stakeholders and the outside world more generally. While not being entirely separate and independent from its environment, Frontex is also not fully steered or controlled by it. As Frontex issues public documents and press releases on its own accord, examining the ways in which it has presented itself publicly provides a different perspective on the agency, complementing the historical and institutions-focused one outlined thus far. Indeed, analysing its public communications provides insights into how the complex institutional environment the agency finds itself in has been negotiated vis-à-vis the general public, and how Frontex has communicated its work and rationale over the years.

Conclusion Arguing that pursuing methodological bricolage reflects a theoretical commitment to methods as practices while simultaneously enabling researchers to mitigate research access limitations in the security field, this chapter has set up the empirical part of the book. In particular, it has suggested that the use of different research methods in studying Frontex’s changing use of humanitarianism and human rights allows for exploring this phenomenon through three distinct “takes.” Each of these “takes” foregrounds a different storyline, centring some actors while moving others to the background or excluding them from view. The three “takes” presented in Chapters 2–4 engage with the same social phenomenon or “scene” but do so from different perspectives. While closely connected to one another, they are not pieces of a puzzle but constitute distinct ways of seeing, interpreting, and constructing a social phenomenon. As the first “take,” this chapter has approached Frontex and its relation with security, humanitarianism, and human rights through the history of its foundation and subsequent legislative changes. This perspective allows for understanding the agency as a compromise between diverse actors: Frontex has been configured and changed in response to at times widely varying concerns and continues to be partially controlled by actors pursuing different interests. Understanding the agency through these actors’ agendas and involvement helps to make sense of the coexistence of different rationalities within Frontex and of its ongoing need to negotiate multiple discursive formations in order to maintain legitimacy among diverse stakeholders. It allows for a less unitary and deterministic view of Frontex’s work and suggests that its organisational narrative has changed and evolved partially in response to developments in the wider border regime. In particular, shifts of power relations both among and within EU institutions have likely had an influence on the organisational language

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used: As more “migration-friendly” actors – most importantly the European Parliament – gained greater influence, Frontex began incorporating references to humanitarianism and human rights more frequently, whereas these references decreased again when the political climate grew more hostile in the wake of the so-called migration crisis.

Notes 1 Accompanying the myth that lifting internal border controls necessitates stricter external border controls is the image of the Schengen zone as a chain depending on the strength of each individual link. A promotional video by Frontex posited: “[a]s internal border controls were removed, the need to strengthen external borders became paramount. The Schengen chain is only as strong as its weakest link” (Frontex, 2013). This image was also taken up by the European Commission when putting forward a new proposal for replacing Frontex with a more powerful European Border and Coast Guard Agency: “A single travel area without internal borders is only sustainable if the external borders are effectively protected. A chain is always only as strong as its weakest link. A decisive step towards an integrated management system for external borders therefore is needed” (European Commission, 2015d, p. 2). 2 According to Art. 2(1) of its founding regulation, Frontex initially had six tasks, namely to: “(a) coordinate operational cooperation between Member States in the field of management of external borders; (b) assist Member States on training of national border guards, including the establishment of common training standards; (c) carry out risk analyses; (d) follow up on the development of research relevant for the control and surveillance of external borders; (e) assist Member States in circumstances requiring increased technical and operational assistance at external borders; (f) provide Member States with the necessary support in organising joint return operations” (European Council, 2004). 3 As a statewatch analysis of this process explains, “1st reading trilogue ‘deals’ are held in secret where there is no record (Minutes) and no documents publicly available. The process removes meaningful debate, disagreements, options, votes from both the Committee meetings and the plenary session – both of which are open and the documents discussed are publicly accessible. The practice pre-empts a wider debate in parliament, the media and society at large” (Bunyan, 2009, p. 6). 4 For a detailed analysis of these provisions and the European Parliament’s role in the legislative process, see (Peers, 2014). 5 For an analysis of the “European Agenda on Migration” and its implications, see Squire et al. (forthcoming). 6 See also Ripoll Servent’s (2018) critique on literature on EU agencies.

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Lavenex, S. (2006) ‘Shifting Up and Out: The Foreign Policy of European Immigration Control’, West European Politics, 29(2), pp. 329–350. doi: 10.1080/01402380500512684. Lavenex, S. (2007) ‘Shifting Up and Out: The Foreign Policy of European Immigration Control’, in Guiraudon, V. and Lahav, G. (eds) Immigration Policy in Europe: The Politics of Control. London: Routledge, pp. 129–150. Law, J. (2004) After Method: Mess in Social Science Research. London and New York: Routledge. doi: 10.4324/9780203481141. Law, J. and Urry, J. (2004) ‘Enacting the Social’, Economy and Society, 33(3), pp. 390– 410. doi: 10.1080/0308514042000225716. Léonard, S. (2009) ‘The Creation of FRONTEX and the Politics of Institutionalisation in the EU External Borders Policy’, Journal of Contemporary European Research, 5(3), pp. 371–388. Léonard, S. (2010) ‘EU Border Security and Migration into the European Union: FRONTEX and Securitisation through Practices’, European Security, 19(2), pp. 231–254. LIBE Committee (2014) 12.0 (LIBE/8/01027) Frontex Activities in the Mediterranean. Available at: www.europarl.europa.eu/ep-live/en/committees/video?event=201409040930-COMMITTEE-LIBE (Accessed: 7 August 2016). Martin, M. (2013) ‘Trust in Frontex’: The 2013 Work Programme. Available at: www. statewatch.org/analyses/no-212-frontex-work-programmes.pdf (Accessed: 7 August 2016). Mezzadra, S. and Neilson, B. (2013) Border as Method, or, the Multiplication of Labour. Durham and London: Duke University Press. Mol, A. and Law, J. (2002) ‘Complexities: An Introduction’, in Law, J. and Mol, A. (eds.) Complexities: Social Studies of Knowledge Practices. Durham, NC: Duke Press, pp. 1–22. Monar, J. (2005) ‘The European Union’s “Integrated Management” of External Borders’, in DeBardeleben, J. (ed.) Soft or Hard Borders? Managing the Divide in an Enlarged Europe. Aldershot: Ashgate, pp. 145–163. Neal, A. W. (2009) ‘Securitization and Risk at the EU Border: The Origins of FRONTEX’, JCMS: Journal of Common Market Studies, 47(2), pp. 333–356. Niemann, A. and Speyer, J. (2018) ‘A Neofunctionalist Perspective on the “European Refugee Crisis”: The Case of the European Border and Coast Guard’, Journal of Common Market Studies, 56(1), pp. 23–43. doi: 10.1111/jcms.12653. Peers, S. (2014) ‘New EU Rules on Maritime Surveillance: Will They Stop the Deaths and Push-Backs in the Mediterranean?’, EU Law Analysis. Available at: http://eulawanalysis. blogspot.com/2014/06/new-eu-rules-on-maritime-surveillance.html (Accessed: 11 October 2019). Pellerin, H. (2005) ‘Migration and Border Control in the EU: Economic and Security Factors’, in DeBardeleben, J. (ed.) Soft or Hard Borders? Managing the Divide in an Enlarged Europe. Ashgate: Aldershot, pp. 105–122. Presidency (2019) ‘Interinstitutional File: 018/0330(COD)’. Brussels. Ripoll Servent, A. (2018) ‘A New Form of Delegation in EU Asylum: Agencies as Proxies of Strong Regulators’, Journal of Common Market Studies, 56(1), pp. 83–100. doi: 10.1111/jcms.12652. Salter, M. B. (2013) ‘Research Design: Introduction’, in Salter, M. B. and Mutlu, C. E. (eds) Research Methods in Critical Security Studies: An Introduction. New York: Routledge, pp. 15–23. Salter, M. B. and Mutlu, C. E. (eds) (2013) Research Methods in Critical Security Studies: An Introduction. New York: Routledge. Samers, M. (2004) ‘An Emerging Geopolitics of “Illegal” Immigration in the European Union’, European Journal of Migration and Law, 6(1), pp. 27–45. doi: 10.1163/ 1571816041518750.

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Schengen Agreement (1985) Agreement between the Governments of the States of the Benelux Economic Union, the Federal Republic of German and the French Republic on the Gradual Abolition of Checks at their Common Borders. Available at: http://eur-lex.europa. eu/legal-content/EN/ALL/?uri=CELEX:42000A0922(01) (Accessed: 7 August 2016). Squire, V., Perkowski, N., Stevens, D., and Vaughan-Williams, N. (forthcoming) Reclaiming Migration: Voices from Europe’s ‘Migrant Crisis’. Manchester: Manchester University Press. statewatch (2012) A Drop of Fundamental Rights in an Ocean of Unaccountability: Frontex in the Process of Implementing Article 26(a). Available at: www.statewatch.org/ news/2012/may/02-eu-frontex-article26a.html (Accessed: 7 August 2016). Walters, W. (2015) ‘Reflections on Migration and Mobility’, Movements. Journal für kritische Migrations- und Grenzregimeforschung. Available at: http://movements-journal. org/issues/01.grenzregime/04.walters – migration.governmentality.html (Accessed: 7 August 2016). Wolff, S. and Schout, A. (2013) ‘Frontex as Agency: More of the Same?’, Perspectives on European Politics and Society, 14(3), pp. 305–324. doi: 10.1080/15705854.2013.817809.

3

Frontex as protector of EUrope, saviour of lives, and promoter of rights

While studying Frontex through the political and legislative processes shaping its institutional setup provides important insights, it also leaves key questions unaddressed. Rather than being fully determined by the institutions establishing and partially controlling it, Frontex actively constructs narratives about itself, EUropean borders, and migration governance in EUrope. It publishes annual reports and work programmes reporting on its activities and priorities, press releases commenting on topical developments in migratory developments or news from within the agency, and risk analyses assessing the situation at the external borders. In addition, reports on specific themes or topics are also released, as well as training materials and research reports. Through such documents, as well as through appearances at EU and governmental hearings and occasional interviews in media outlets, Frontex actively constructs an organisational identity that it projects outwards. Examining this identity constitutes the second “take” this book puts forward. It focuses on the image the agency has constructed of itself vis-à-vis the public, analysing how humanitarianism and human rights have been woven into Frontex’s organisational narrative and how they have been mobilised alongside security over time. As there are a plethora of written outputs the agency has produced over the course of its existence, not all could be analysed in depth. Instead, the following analysis is focused on Frontex’s annual reports and its press releases. By analysing the agency’s annual reports, it is possible to see how Frontex explains and justifies its actions retrospectively, both vis-à-vis its stakeholders and the public. The elaborate reports allow for a contextualisation of the agency’s actions, which are described in relation to particular understandings of the migratory and policy developments mobilised in these reports. Complementing this analysis with an examination of all press releases published by Frontex between 2005 and 2019 allows for an analysis of how the agency comments on events as they are unfolding and describes its work while it is ongoing. These much shorter texts do not offer the same richness in terms of justification and contextualisation, but they constitute the primary means of Frontex to comment on topical events and communicate speedily to external actors, including the general public. In a less systematic way, the following discussion also draws on several presentations by the agency to the European Parliament, on newspaper interviews with Frontex staff, and on “feature stories” published on Frontex’s website.

64 Frontex as protector of EUrope, saviour of lives, and promoter of rights The chapter begins with an analysis of all press releases and annual reports published since Frontex’s foundation until the end of 2019. Tracing Frontex’s organisational narrative through four temporal stages, the chapter shows how Frontex progressively incorporated human rights and humanitarianism alongside a continued focus on migration as a risk and a threat. It examines how the agency has positioned itself as a saviour of lives, promoter of rights, manager of risks, and defender of EUrope in times of crisis simultaneously, and how it has first increased and subsequently scaled back its emphasis on human rights and humanitarianism. After a close reading of Frontex’s public documents through four temporal stages, the chapter will offer some methodological reflections, examining in particular the implications of understanding Frontex’s turn to humanitarianism and human rights through a discourse-analytical approach. THE EARLY YEARS: 2005–2008 When examining annual reports and press releases issued in the first few years after Frontex began its activities, its public interventions appear clearly securityfocused: the agency describes the need to “combat,” “fight,” and “tackl[e] illegal immigration” (Frontex, 2006b, 2007b, 2007c, 2007d, 2007h, 2008b), and “to avert the illegal immigration threat” (Frontex, 2007j, 2007g). In its early years, the agency writes primarily about “illegal” (im)migrants and (im)migration. As Neal notes, Frontex uses security discourses despite the rather neutral wording of its founding regulation: “[c]rime, illegal immigration, human trafficking and international terrorism are all uttered in the same breath” (Neal, 2009, p. 350). At the same time, however, Frontex’s mandate inscribed a risk management logic in the agency: it was tasked with providing integrated risk analyses, trainings, and follow-up on relevant research. Frontex described its activities as “intelligence driven” already in its first reports, and established the “Frontex Risk Analysis Network (FRAN)” in 2006. It also invoked a managerial approach to border governance by referring repeatedly to “Integrated Border Management (IBM)” and “best practice” in these early years (Frontex, 2006a, 2007h, 2008b). The risk-based approach inscribed in its mandate and the urgency and exceptionalism invoked at times constitute two distinct modes of operation within the discursive formation of security (see Chapter 1), which coexist in Frontex’s selfrepresentations. In a 2007 statement on “facts and myths” about Frontex, Laitinen spoke to the tension between both and made clear that in his view, Frontex ought to focus on risk management rather than emergency response: [t]he raison d’etre of Frontex are not emergency operations but the consistent introduction of well planned regular patrols by Member States, in order to limit urgent missions and to integrate the management of borders in all its dimensions defined by the Member States. Doctors say that the best intensive care unit cannot replace prophylaxis; I would say that it applies also to borders. (Frontex, 2007f) While expressing a clear preference for a risk management based approach, the medical metaphor used by Laitinen shows that ultimately, both approaches were

Frontex as protector of EUrope, saviour of lives, and promoter of rights 65 perceived as necessary and complementary by him: while prevention was key and was likely to decrease “emergency operations,” urgent interventions would be needed in cases where prevention had failed, or where unforeseen incidents occurred. In the first years of its existence, Frontex declared that one of its objectives was “reducing illegal immigration” (Frontex, 2007b, 2010f, pp. 5, 42–44), which resonated with member states’ interests at the time, particularly those which were experiencing boat migration (Rijpma, 2010). Initially, the agency omitted any reference to potential asylum seekers among the “illegal migrants” it reported on. In response to a request by the Immigration Law Practitioners Association (ILPA) regarding asylum claims in its HERA and NAUTILUS operations, Frontex replied that “FRONTEX is not aware of any claims of asylum which have been submitted to the national authorities during the referred joint operations. Nevertheless, it could be the case, that hosting Member State[s] could receive asylum claims later on, just after the interrogation” (cited in Guild and Bigo, 2010, p. 270). As Guild and Bigo problematised, the lists of nationalities identified through interviews conducted by Frontex guest officers included Somalis, Eritreans, Iraqis, and Pakistanis, who were among the largest groups of asylum seekers at the time. Regardless of this, Frontex initially sought to avoid any responsibility for or association with asylum claims in its operations and categorically described the individuals it sought to stop as “illegal migrants.” While presenting migration as a risk and a threat, Frontex referred to saving lives early on, too. Some of the first news items released on the agency’s website in late 2006 and early 2007 describe the purpose of its HERA operation as not only controlling “illegal immigration,” but also as “reducing the numbers of lives lost at sea” (Frontex, 2006c, 2007b). What was portrayed as rescue at sea entailed the physical diversion of “saved” individuals back to the countries of departure, in this case Senegal and Mauritania. The aim of joint patrols was presented in February and April 2007 as being “to stop migrants from leaving the shores on the long sea journey and thus reducing the danger of losses of human lives” (Frontex, 2007a, see also 2007i). In the annual report for 2006, the agency reported that “[d]uring HERA I and II operations, close to 5000 illegal immigrants could be stopped from setting off for a dangerous journey that might have cost their lives” (Frontex, 2007h, p. 12). In the 2007 report, it was stated that out of 401 “migrants,” 166 were rescued – without however specifying whether this meant that they were in distress and needed assistance, or whether they were “saved” by being stopped to take the risk of travelling further towards EUrope (Frontex, 2008b, p. 24). These references to saving lives by preventing migration were part of a wider discursive narrative common in EUropean member states at the time. In 2003, then Prime Minister Tony Blair had proposed the establishment of extraterritorial camps for refugees, justified by a reference to saving lives. In 2004, German and Italian interior ministers Schily and Pisanu advocated similar plans, again arguing that such camps would stop deaths at sea (see Chapter 1). And also in response to the arrival of boats in the Canary Islands in 2006, similar arguments were made (Klepp, 2010; Tsianos and Hess, 2010). Frontex’s use of this wider narrative did thus not occur in isolation. While emphasising that joint operations contributed

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to saving lives by stopping individuals from departing, Frontex made clear that it did not intend to be a search and rescue agency. In a press release in 2007, executive director Laitinen was moved to publicly emphasise the security mandate the agency had been given: [l]ast weeks [sic] I learned reading the press that Member States don’t want Frontex to fulfil its tasks; Member States want Frontex to become a search and rescue body. Legal advisors could have some problems in explaining why a Community agency should take action in an area that is out of the mandate not only of the agency but also the European Union. (Frontex, 2007f) It seems that Laitinen attempted to resist a public call by one or several member states for Frontex to be more involved in search and rescue activities. His response marked Frontex’s refusal to become a “search and rescue body,” which the agency invoked also in recent years, as will be further discussed later. In firmly rejecting calls to actively conduct search and rescue operations, Frontex self-identified as a security actor, albeit one that emphasised the humanitarian by-product (of saving lives at sea) its security-focused joint operations allegedly resulted in. While references to saving people in distress at sea were made early on in Frontex’s publications, its annual reports and press releases did not address human rights at all within the first years of its existence. Neither did the agency refer to human rights when reporting to the Commission on a technical mission to Libya in 2007 (Frontex, 2007e; Buckel and Wissel, 2010), in spite of NGOs warning about the dire situation in the country for those on the move at the time (Amnesty International, 2005, 2007; Human Rights Watch, 2005). When evaluating its Nautilus operation – in which Human Rights Watch alleged illegal pushbacks to Libya took place – and related operations, Frontex deputy director Arias-Fernandez was quoted as saying: [b]ased on our statistics, we are able to say that the agreements [between Libya and Italy] have had a positive impact. On the humanitarian level, fewer lives have been put at risk, due to fewer departures. But our agency does not have the ability to confirm if the right to request asylum as well as other human rights are being respected in Libya. (cited in Human Rights Watch, 2009, p. 37) While pointing to the allegedly humanitarian effect of its operations, Frontex thus eschewed any responsibility for making sure that human rights were respected in Libya, despite highly critical public reports at the time. In fact, it took almost three years for Frontex to refer to human rights in its press releases or annual reports: in June 2008, the first reference to human rights appeared in a news piece on the occasion of a cooperation agreement with UNHCR (Frontex, 2008a). As the following section will show, references to human rights became more regular from then on.

Frontex as protector of EUrope, saviour of lives, and promoter of rights 67 In sum, the first years of Frontex’s establishment were characterised by a selfrepresentation that portrayed “illegal migration” as both a threat and a risk to EUropean states and constructed Frontex as “fighting” this threat primarily by improving preparedness through its risk analyses and trainings and by actively working to decrease unauthorised arrivals in EUropean states. As such, the narrative presented in the agency’s annual reports and press releases connected diffuse securitising practices and technologies to a wider framing of migration as an existential threat – that is exceptionalist securitising (Huysmans, 2014, see discussion in Chapter 1). In this framing, Frontex was first and foremost presented as a protector of EUrope. In an early form of humanitarian reasoning, this self-representation co-existed with claims that Frontex’s explicitly security-oriented operations had the positive side effect of saving the lives of those who were diverted back to their countries of departure. Simultaneously, however, press releases actively distanced the agency from demands to conduct search and rescue operations and emphasised Frontex’s security mandate. Importantly, neither asylum nor non-refoulement nor human rights featured in these early self-representations, which focused very strongly on Frontex’s role in keeping individuals away from EUropean territory. INCORPORATING HUMAN RIGHTS AND HUMANITARIANISM: 2008–2011 While Frontex’s early publications were characterised by its framing of migration as a threat to be fought, the agency slowly began to change its language in the years to come. In its 2009 General Report, Frontex began using the term “irregular” instead of “illegal” in conjunction with “migrant” and subsequently used “illegal” primarily to describe actions – such as “illegal border crossings,” “illegal stay” or “entry” – rather than individuals. Instead, “irregular” was used more often in conjunction with “migration” and particularly “migrants” (Frontex, 2010f). This change might be seen as a move away from what has often been criticised as incriminating and securitising language and corresponds to a wider shift within the European Union more generally (see Morehouse and Blomfield, 2011). At the same time, however, Frontex continued to construct human mobility as a security problem. The agency listed irregular migration in the same sentence as “serious organised crime” and terrorism (Frontex, 2011d, 2013b, p. 7) and reiterated its objectives “to curb illegal migration,” “to tackle irregular migration,” and “to better fight trafficking in human beings” in its 2010 annual report (Frontex, 2011e, pp. 4, 14, 24). In 2010, the agency moreover started to publish public versions of its risk analyses, in which asylum applications are counted as one “indicator” of the “threat of irregular migration” to which member states’ borders might be “vulnerable” (Frontex, 2010h, 2010a, 2010b, 2010c, 2011b). Despite the subtle shift from “illegal migrants” towards “irregular” ones, Frontex thus continued the risk-focused language of its early years. In addition, the agency engaged in the occasional, time-specific declaration of situations as exceptional, urgent, or part of a crisis and also in this way fostered an interpretation of mobility as a security issue. Frontex engaged in exceptionalist securitising particularly extensively in 2011, the year of political upheavals in

68 Frontex as protector of EUrope, saviour of lives, and promoter of rights North Africa and increased boat departures towards EUrope; but also before and after that point in time, crisis-invoking statements can be found. In relation to the RABIT deployment in Greece in 2010, Frontex stated that the situation there had to be brought “under control” (Frontex, 2010g), implying that it had been out of control beforehand. Reflecting back on the year, the annual report of 2010 stated that “Frontex demonstrated capability and flexibility in tackling the significant challenge related to irregular migration in 2010 – the drastic increase in migratory pressure towards the EU via the Greek-Turkish land border” (Frontex, 2011e, p. 15). When reporting on 2010 statistics in May 2011, Frontex wrote that “detections of illegal border crossing soared on previous years as the dominant routes used by migrant smugglers continued to shift. The Greek-Turkish land border in particular saw massive increases in migratory pressure” (Frontex, 2011a). Meanwhile, the fact that the overall number of detections in 2010 had actually slightly decreased in comparison with 2009 was mentioned briefly, leaving the reader with the impression of an increasing and threatening trend, rather than a state of overall stability. As noted already, 2011 was the first year in which Frontex extensively furthered images of crisis and emergency in relation to EUrope’s southern borders. Even before being prompted by member states, Frontex reacted publicly to rising numbers of arrivals in Italy. On February 14, the agency released a news item addressing the “sudden migratory situation in Lampedusa,” stating that a factfinding team had been dispatched and operational responses were being prepared in Warsaw, despite the absence of a request for assistance by Italy at that point (Frontex, 2011k). A day later, the agency first published some statistics on the numbers of individuals arriving at Italy’s shores and compared those to previous years and then issued another news item reporting that Italy had requested the assistance of Frontex for “targeted risk analysis on the possible future scenarios of increased migratory pressure in the region . . . and the possibility of the opening up of a further migratory front” (Frontex, 2011n). The high pace of reporting on the unfolding “crisis” continued, with another news item four days later announcing the imminent deployment of guest officers to Italy (Frontex, 2011g), and further ones published on February 22 and 25 reporting on the beginning of the Hermes operation and the deployment of guest officers (Frontex, 2011f, 2011c). Two press releases on March 11 and 25 reported on the development of different scenarios and responses by Frontex, and the latter referred to “the notable increase in migratory pressure on Italy and the island of Lampedusa in particular,” announcing the widening and extension of JO Hermes (Frontex, 2011h, 2011o). Executive director Laitinen assured readers that “Frontex is closely monitoring the development in North Africa and stands ready to assist the member states operationally if requested. We are also continuously developing additional operational responses for potential rapid deployment throughout the Mediterranean if needed” (Frontex, 2011h). Through the frequency of the reporting, the emphasis on “the highly volatile situation in North Africa” (Frontex, 2011p) and Frontex’s readiness to act, as well as the use of war-like terms such as “migratory front,” the agency’s press releases contributed to the perception of the situation as one of crisis and exception.

Frontex as protector of EUrope, saviour of lives, and promoter of rights 69 Also when Frontex reported back on activities in 2011 in its general reports of 2011 and 2012, this framing prevailed. The agency stated that there had been the need to “to tackle the exceptional and urgent emergency situation caused by massive migration flows at the Greek-Turkish land border” (Frontex, 2012d, p. 15) and designated occurrences in Italy as “mass influx of migrants” (Frontex, 2013b, p. 51), “migratory crisis situation” (Frontex, 2012d, p. 21), “massive and disproportionate migration flows” (Frontex, 2012d, p. 49), and a “migration crisis,” which “demanded a reinforced operational response package” (Frontex, 2013b, p. 51). Frontex’s reporting on the “migration crisis” of 2011 resonated with a wider narrative within the border regime that labelled the arrivals of people from Tunisia and Libya as “exceptional” or even an “exodus” (see, e.g. European Commission, 2011a; Times of Malta, 2011). Importantly though, Frontex took a proactive role in the framing of and continuous reporting on this “crisis.” In response, the agency received a boost to its resources: it obtained €30 million from the Commission and €1.8 million by Schengen Associated Countries in addition to its 2011 budget of €86 million, representing an increase of 27.3% (European Commission, 2011b; Frontex, 2011l, 2012d). More importantly, perhaps, it positioned itself as the “solution” to the “problem” at hand and as capable of supporting member states proactively. As Jef Huysmans noted, the activities Frontex undertook in response to the proclaimed “crisis” nevertheless had a strong risk component, consisting of information gathering, identification of new arrivals, early detection and prevention of crime, and updating risk analyses (Huysmans, 2014, p. 95). Once again, techniques of diffuse securitising took place in a context that was framed within a language of exception and crisis both within Frontex’s public documents and in the wider political narratives at the time. As noted in the previous section, there were nearly no references to asylum seekers in the first documents and statements published by Frontex, which classified all those “intercepted” categorically as “illegal immigrants.” This changed from 2009 onwards, when asylum seekers were mentioned and portrayed as a risk both to EU member states and to the asylum system: “[a] large volume of [asylum] applications will put a strain on border control authorities and will inevitably prevent the rapid provision of protection for those third-country nationals with legitimate claims” (Frontex, 2010f, p. 6). Implying and at times explicitly stating that many asylum applications were “unfounded,” Frontex thus claimed to safeguard the interests of “legitimate” asylum seekers through its work. In addition, Frontex press releases started reporting on “unscrupulous smugglers” which “lured these desperate people” into dangerous situations, sometimes resulting in their deaths (Frontex, 2010d). By introducing the commonly used narrative of the “unscrupulous smuggler,” Frontex drew on the discursive formations of humanitarianism and security simultaneously. In this narrative, smugglers are blamed for the deaths and suffering of innocent and defenceless people on the move on overcrowded and unseaworthy boats or in otherwise unacceptable conditions caused by the smugglers’ greed for profit and disrespect for human lives. As Pallister-Wilkins (2015, p. 64) argues, the narrative “references Frontex’s core mandate of border law enforcement and humanitarianism

70 Frontex as protector of EUrope, saviour of lives, and promoter of rights premised on a victim and savior dichotomy that has (as we have seen) come to dominate multiple forms of governance over the previous two decades.” It presents Frontex as a protector of EUrope and of smuggling victims simultaneously, while shifting blame for deaths and suffering away from the agency (see Perkowski and Squire, 2019). Further drawing on the discursive formation of humanitarianism, annual reports and press releases also featured increased references to saving lives at sea again, after a period of relative quiet on this since 2007. It was pointed out that “the rescue of people in distress at sea were among the key elements highlighted during maritime joint operations in 2010” and that “maritime joint operations resulted in significant decrease of illegal migration flows, also avoiding high numbers of boatpeople in distress; this contribution to saving lives is considered the most appreciated effectiveness” (Frontex, 2011e, p. 42). While still formulated somewhat clumsily in terms of the “effectiveness” of operations aimed to primarily decrease unauthorised arrivals in EUrope, these increasing references to saving lives indicate a renewed emphasis on humanitarianism alongside a continuous focus on security in the agency’s publications. In March 2011, also the exploration of the use of unmanned aerial vehicles was justified with their potential to reduce the death toll by saving more lives at sea (Frontex, 2011d). These renewed references to humanitarianism also coincided with the appearance of fundamental rights in Frontex documents. In the annual report for 2008, it reads: “[f]ull respect and promotion of fundamental rights, belongs to the value “Humanity.” It is the most important corner stone of modern European border management” (Frontex, 2009, p. 10). Over time, the emphasis put on fundamental rights in Frontex’s publications gradually increased. The 2009 annual report stated that “full and sincere respect of Fundamental Rights is a firm and strategic choice of Frontex. It will be demonstrated through the values of the agency in all its operational and administrative activities and when developing the capacity of the Member States” (Frontex, 2010f, p. 4). In the 2010 document, this statement was reiterated, and already in the foreword of the report, the chair of the management board listed a number of specific activities relating to fundamental rights that Frontex had conducted over the course of the previous year (Frontex, 2011e, pp. 4, 7). In addition, the report for the first time featured a page-long section on fundamental rights, demonstrating the agency’s commitment to them. While not as frequently and extensively as humanitarianism, also fundamental rights were occasionally linked to security issues. In 2010, Laitinen was quoted in a news release as saying: “[f]ighting crime at the border is a key objective of the Lisbon Treaty, one of the cornerstones of which is full respect for fundamental rights. There is no need to compromise between these two goals – they are complementary and can be achieved in tandem” (Frontex, 2010e). Similar to the intertwining of security and humanitarianism discussed above, fundamental rights were thus incorporated into a primarily security-centred outlook in Frontex’s public documents in this period. The clear increase in fundamental rights references in Frontex’s reports and press releases between 2008 and 2011 coincided with increasing pressure by the European Parliament on the agency (see Chapter 2). In 2010, negotiations for the 2011 amendments of Frontex’s founding regulation commenced. In March

Frontex as protector of EUrope, saviour of lives, and promoter of rights 71 2011, Frontex’s management board passed the agency’s Fundamental Rights Strategy and a Code of Conduct, explicitly incorporating fundamental rights in the agency’s working routines for the first time (Frontex, 2011i, 2012b). In the announcement accompanying the decision, Laitinen was cited as saying “[f]undamental rights and human dignity have always been at the heart of Frontex’s values” (Frontex, 2011i). Frontex’s press releases thus began to present the agency as pro-actively and sincerely committed to fundamental rights only months before these principles were more firmly inscribed in its legal basis, while references to saving and protecting those in need increased as well. In sum, between 2008 and 2011, Frontex’s organisational narrative began to shift considerably in comparison to earlier documents. While an understanding of migration as a risk to be managed remained central in the agency’s public narratives, the active construction of “crises” in 2010 and 2011 reinforced an exceptionalist reading of events in EUrope at the time, framing them as “crises” in need of urgent responses. In addition, the common narrative on “unscrupulous smugglers” began to feature in the agency’s public documents, in which the discursive formations of humanitarianism and security were tied up simultaneously. This coincided with a renewed emphasis on Frontex’s contributions to saving lives at sea. Importantly, references to fundamental rights also increased significantly during this period, and fundamental rights were presented as having always been central to Frontex’s work. In this period, then, the discursive formations of humanitarianism, human rights, and security came to be increasingly intertwined in Frontex’s public documents, and the agency began to be presented as a promoter of human rights, a saviour of people from unscrupulous smugglers, and a protector of EUrope at the same time. MAINSTREAMING AND CONNECTING HUMAN RIGHTS, HUMANITARIANISM, AND SECURITY: 2011–2015 While the invocation of a crisis and emergency in Frontex’s public documents had reached a preliminary peak in 2011, the threat scenario connected to this year of “exception” continued to be invoked in the following years. Despite relatively low numbers of arrivals in 2012, the agency reported that “the risk of a resurgence of illegal border crossings on the Eastern Mediterranean route remains” (Frontex, 2013b, p. 9). In late 2013, the agency highlighted “migratory pressure [that] was comparable to the same period in 2011” (Frontex, 2013c). And with arrival numbers increasing further, Frontex stated that 2013 “saw a massive upswing in irregular migrants [sic] arrivals in the Central Mediterranean. This . . . meant there were more detections of illegal border-crossing at the EU maritime borders than during the height of the 2011 ‘Arab Spring’” (Frontex, 2014e). Also the 2013 annual report spoke about “a huge increase in Syrian nationals,” “intense migrant flows” and reported that “the volumes of migration flows almost returned to the level of the exceptional pressure stemming from the ‘Arab Spring’ of 2011” (Frontex, 2014d, pp. 54, 63). As migratory movements increased even further, a 2014 news release compared arrivals to “the exceptionally high [arrival] levels of summer 2013” (Frontex, 2014c), replacing 2011 as a key reference point.

72 Frontex as protector of EUrope, saviour of lives, and promoter of rights Continuing this focus on “exceptional” arrival numbers, Frontex reported a “surge” and a “wave of migrants” in May 2015 (Frontex, 2015x). Over the summer, the agency’s tone became more urgent: in July, Frontex invoked an “exceptional migratory and refugee situation facing the European Union” (Frontex, 2015h). On August 7, the agency noted a “record number” and a “massive number of arriving migrants” (Frontex, 2015am, see also 2015l). Invoking a “crisis,” deputy director Arias Fernandez deplored that the agency hadn’t received sufficient support from member states (Frontex, 2015am). A few days later, executive director Leggeri invoked an “emergency situation for Europe” (Frontex, 2015al). The agency continued to refer to a “massive” (Frontex, 2015d) or “unprecedented inflow of people” (Frontex, 2015c, see also 2015ab, 2015n), “unprecedented number[s] of migrants” (Frontex, 2015p, 2015m) and a “surge in detections” (Frontex, 2015d), “intense” or “massive migratory pressure” (Frontex, 2015ak, 2015c, 2015ae), and a “critical migratory situation” (Frontex, 2015v). In October, Leggeri stated: “We are facing a migratory and refugee crisis” (Frontex, 2015ah). Similar to 2011, Frontex’s framing of 2015/2016 as a “crisis” did not occur in isolation but resonated with wider media and political narratives at the time. As the potentially most influential expert voice in analysing and responding to migratory trends in EUrope, however, Frontex’s active use of crisis narratives carries particular weight and merits scrutiny. Despite the crisis rhetoric, much of the agency’s practical work remained based on risk management. Different versions of its risk analysis reports continued to be published throughout the year, outlining and forecasting changes in migratory patterns. Related to the focus on minimising and preparing for risks, executive director Leggeri expressed a commitment to “the need for ensuring a smooth flow of legitimate travellers while making sure that any illegal activity is detected in a timely manner” (Frontex, 2015r). This included for instance a reinforced focus on document fraud from 2012 onwards, with the agency declaring that [f]irstly, document fraud allows migrants in irregular or unlawful situations to enter the territory of a Member State, and potentially also to move freely within the Schengen area. Secondly, individuals assuming a bogus identity and operating within black markets seriously affect internal security, and undermine international criminal investigations as well as national social systems and the ability of any state to effectively manage and protect its legitimate communities. Finally, document fraud profits and progressively demands closer and stronger links to organised crime groups as modern documents require more skilled and expensive techniques to produce quality forgeries. (Frontex, 2013b, p. 35) The presence of individuals relying on false passports – which for many constitutes the only way to enter EUrope that does not involve life-threatening boat journeys or equally dangerous, hidden land border crossings – here is constructed as a threat to the economy, the welfare state, internal security, and the

Frontex as protector of EUrope, saviour of lives, and promoter of rights 73 “legitimate communities” EUropean states are seeking to protect. In a 2015 press release, those using fraudulent documents were even referred to as “fraudsters,” evoking images of criminality and suspiciousness (Frontex, 2015e). The associative connections made between diverse issue areas in the statement cited above create what Huysmans refers to as a “patchwork of insecurities,” and contribute to a generalised sense of unease in relation to unauthorised migration (Huysmans, 2014, p. 84). In particular, associations between migration and (organised) crime were made repeatedly in Frontex’s publications in this time period. In Frontex’s 2013 annual report, smuggling was framed as a “serious crossborder crime” (Frontex, 2014d, p. 15). It was moreover warned that Frontex’s “analysis of the different waves of migrant boats that have targeted Italy’s sea border since November 2013 suggests development of the logistical & organisational capacities of the criminal groups which facilitate the gathering and embarkation of migrants along Libya’s coast” (Frontex, 2014c). Describing boat arrivals as “waves” that are “targeted” specifically at Italy’s coast feeds into a wider trend of describing migration in terms of fluidity – such as “flood,” “tide,” or “flow,” which further contributes to the dehumanisation and securitisation of people on the move (see Pugh, 2004). From 2013 onwards, Frontex increasingly highlighted terrorism as a further source of insecurity related to migration. The agency introduced a new mission statement (repeated in similar ways in its annual reports until 2018) that emphasised its goal “to tackle the challenges of migration flows and serious organised crime and terrorism at the external borders” (Frontex, 2013b, p. 7). Connections between terrorism and migration were made more often and assertively in the following years. The 2015 General Report noted that the “foreign fighter phenomena and difficulties for border management authorities to detect them . . . has increased the complexity of the situation by adding a major internal security threat” (Frontex, 2016v, p. 6). Referring to the terrorist attacks taking place in Paris at the end of 2015, the report argued that these clearly demonstrated that irregular flows can be used by terrorists to enter the EU. Two of the terrorists involved had previously irregularly entered via Leros and had been registered by the Greek authorities, presenting fraudulent Syrian documents in order to speed up their registration process. . . . With large numbers of arrivals remaining essentially doubtful for a variety of reasons, . . . there is a risk that some persons representing a security threat for the EU will take advantage of this situation. (Frontex, 2016v, p. 12) Responding to heightened public and political unease in the wake of the Paris attacks, Frontex framed those arriving as inherently suspect. It thereby stoked fears in relation to those arriving, rather than for instance emphasising that the huge majority of those crossing the sea on unseaworthy boats were refugees rather than terrorists and that many of those committing attacks at the time had been born and raised in EUrope. By reinforcing the association between unauthorised

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migration and terrorism, and further linking migration with organised crime, black markets, drug trafficking, cybercrime, trafficking of human beings, smuggling of goods, drug trafficking, fraud, violence, and internal state security, the agency continued to construct migration as a diffuse risk affecting diverse areas of EUropean societies (e.g. Frontex, 2015aq). This focus on migration as a threat to EUropean societies coexisted with a strong emphasis on fundamental rights throughout the time period under consideration. As noted in Chapter 2, 2011 was a turning point for Frontex in terms of its fundamental rights obligations, as the agency was mandated to create the position of a Fundamental Rights Officer and to establish a Consultative Forum on Fundamental Rights. Accordingly, its 2011 annual report put a particular emphasis on fundamental rights. Not only did executive director Laitinen report on the structural changes the regulation amendments required, he also claimed that this was in line with Frontex’s previously existing commitments to fundamental rights in a foreword to the report: [d]espite all these changes, some things remain the same: the need to maintain Frontex’s vision, goals and values by ensuring quality in everything we do; the commitment and professionalism required to deliver constant and reliable support to the Member States; and an unfaltering recognition of the importance of fundamental rights at every stage of operations will all stand us in good stead for whatever challenges the future may hold. (Frontex, 2012d, p. 5) This emphasis on fundamental rights continued in news items issued between 2012 and 2015, with Laitinen being cited in May 2012 as saying “Frontex, from the very beginning of its work, took the respect of fundamental rights as a sine qua non in the performance of all its tasks [. . .]” (Frontex, 2012c). In September 2012, Laitinen stated that “Not only respect for Fundamental Rights, but their active promotion, is a firm cornerstone of the agency’s strategy” (Frontex, 2012a). Upon being appointed new executive director, Fabrice Leggeri reiterated that “Fundamental Rights must always be anchored in Frontex missions, the training of European border guards and any cooperation with non-EU states” (Frontex, 2015k). Also in Frontex’s annual reports, fundamental rights were reported about in increasing breadth. In the 2012 and 2013 reports, 5–6-page annexes reported about activities related to fundamental rights, as did numerous sections within the reports (Frontex, 2013b, 2014d). In the annual reports on the years 2012–2017, the values and mission of Frontex were described as strongly connected to fundamental rights: “[h]umanity links Frontex’s activities with the promotion and respect of Fundamental Rights as an unconditional and integral component of effective integrated border management resulting in trust in Frontex” (e.g. Frontex, 2014d, p. 11). Adherence to fundamental rights was framed not only as a value in and of itself but also as a means to gain trust and legitimacy. When examining the time period between 2011 and 2015, it appears that fundamental rights language effectively became mainstreamed in Frontex’s

Frontex as protector of EUrope, saviour of lives, and promoter of rights 75 publications, with references to their centrality and importance incorporated into many of its press releases, public statements, and all of its annual reports. In 2015, the agency reported on a rights violation related to one of its operations, with a 17-year-old being shot dead during an arrest of suspected smugglers. The agency emphasised that the officers deployed directly by Frontex did not use weapons, leaving open whether Greek border guards cooperating with them had done so (Frontex, 2015g, 2015z). The issued press releases noted that the agency requested further information, potential consequences in relation to the shooting were not mentioned either at the time or in the following years. As further discussions in Chapters 4 and 5 will show, the blame-shifting in the two press releases is illustrative of the agency’s response to reports of rights abuses at EU external borders. Importantly, fundamental rights language was combined with other aspects of Frontex’s self-representation, constructing a narrative of an agency that was promoting best practices, professionalism, the rule of law, and fundamental rights through its training and joint operations. The 2015 General Report highlighted: “Fundamental rights and ethics are integral to every aspect of border guarding learning and practice” (Frontex, 2016v, p. 59) At times, rights-related concerns were connected to security mechanisms, for instance when reporting on registration procedures and fingerprinting for new arrivals in terms of their ability to access international protection or the EU relocation mechanism (see, e.g. Frontex, 2015ab, 2015o, 2015n). At the same time, there was a shift away from focusing on the reduction of irregular migration within Frontex’s publications. While the annual reports and press releases published during Frontex’s early years described a decrease in irregular migration as one of the agency’s primary goals, its 2012 annual report instead cites the importance of “reduc[ing] the loss of lives at sea and the number of irregular migrants who enter the EU undetected” (Frontex, 2013b, p. 20, my emphasis). Relatedly, a 2014 quarterly risk analysis acknowledged the displacement effects of Frontex operations, pointing out that migratory routes were shifting rather than stopped in response to the agency’s activities (Frontex, 2014c). In addition to an increase in references to fundamental rights, Frontex’s public documents saw a growing emphasis on the efforts the agency was undertaking to save people in distress at sea: its 2011 annual report stated that 23,192 “migrants in distress” had been saved, the following year’s report spoke of 5,575 “migrants” and that of 2013 reported repeatedly that more than 37,000 “persons,” “people,” and “migrants in distress” had been saved (Frontex, 2012d, p. 50, 2013b, pp. 17, 52, 2014d, pp. 3, 16, 64). At least between late 2012 and March 2018 – when Frontex launched a new website – the agency described itself as “Europe’s biggest Search and Rescue (SAR) operation” on its website (Wayback Machine, 2020). At times, security and humanitarian language seemed to merge in the self-representations mobilised in press releases and annual reports, such as when Frontex declared that “53 758 migrants (approximately 147 migrants per day on average) were apprehended/rescued during joint sea operations in 2013” (Frontex, 2014d, p. 63). The use of “apprehended/rescued” seems to indicate that in

76 Frontex as protector of EUrope, saviour of lives, and promoter of rights some instances, humanitarian and security languages became exchangeable in the agency’s public documents. Similarly, it was reported in April 2015 that individuals “were intercepted in Search and Rescue (SAR) operations” (Frontex, 2015a, my emphasis). Technologies such as EUROSUR Fusion Services or air surveillance more generally were moreover framed as enabling Frontex “to locate vessels requiring search and rescue operations or those that are suspected of being engaged in criminal activities, such as drug or weapon smuggling”, once again highlighting the close connections drawn between humanitarian and security objectives (Frontex, 2015aa, see also 2015y, 2015s). Also during the European Day for Border Guards 2013, an annual event organised by Frontex to strengthen the EUropean border guard community, border surveillance was associated with search and rescue. The director of Frontex’s Operations Division, Klaus Roesler, noted in a panel discussion that “it’s worth to reiterate that two out of three detected migrants are rescued, are subject to a search and rescue operation. It means that border surveillance regularly turns into a search and rescue operation coordinated by the responsible search and rescue centres, following international law” (Roesler, in Frontex, 2013a). Roesler’s statement illustrates Frontex’s commitment to a restrictive rule of law humanitarianism, that is to assisting member states’ Maritime Rescue Coordination Centres (MRCCs) in search and rescue operations when asked to do so. As in 2007, the agency simultaneously insisted that its mandate remained limited to border security. When Italian pressures on Frontex to take on more responsibility for search and rescue mounted in 2014 (see Chapter 5), the agency resisted such pressures publicly while spending considerable energy in presenting itself as saving lives. In press releases and annual reports, it made regular references to how many lives the agency had saved (see, e.g. Frontex, 2015af, 2015i, 2015f, 2015ag, 2015a, 2015an). At times, also deaths at sea were explicitly mentioned, such as in February 2015: “Frontex Executive Director Fabrice Leggeri expressed sadness over the tragic deaths of migrants in the Mediterranean this week and said that while the mandate of Frontex is border control, the agency would continue to do its utmost to assist the Italian authorities in the search and rescue operations to save migrants stranded at sea” (Frontex, 2015q, see also 2015an). The careful navigation of a restrictive rule-of-law humanitarianism that is visible in this statement allowed the agency to present itself as a saviour at sea, while simultaneously rejecting a fundamental reorientation of its work towards saving lives. A news release issued in February 2015 expanded on this restrictive form of humanitarianism: “Frontex coordinates border surveillance operations at the external borders of the European Union. . . . When called upon by the relevant authorities, they take active part in search and rescue operations, as required by maritime law” (Frontex, 2015ai). Resisting calls to take on further-reaching responsibility for search and rescue, Frontex executive director Leggeri nevertheless emphasised that “[w]e will continue to do our part to save lives in the Mediterranean” (Frontex, 2015a). Throughout 2015, there was a particularly strong emphasis on what Frontex understood as “its part” to save lives at sea, with news releases headlined among

Frontex as protector of EUrope, saviour of lives, and promoter of rights 77 others “Enlarged Triton helping rescue migrants” (Frontex, 2015j), “Frontex helps save 3 400 migrants off Libyan coast last week” (Frontex, 2015u), “Frontex helps rescue dozens in the Aegean” (Frontex, 2015t), “Frontex vessel rescues 487 migrants in Italy over the weekend” (Frontex, 2015ad), or “Frontex vessel plays key role in rescue of hundreds of people off Lesbos” (Frontex, 2015ac). This was also reflected in the General Report 2015, in which Frontex declared: “The first priority was to increase our search and rescue capacity following the tragic events during spring 2015, where hundreds of people lost their lives in the Central Mediterranean Sea” (Frontex, 2016v, p. 6). Against this background, the agency highlighted that “[a]ssets taking part in Frontex-coordinated operations rescued 254 693 migrants, which was almost 700 persons per day, on average. Compared with 2014, that was 47% more lives saved” (Frontex, 2016v, p. 53). Between 2011 and 2015, Frontex’s role in saving lives was not only emphasised more frequently, it also became framed as an achievement in and of itself, rather than a factor making particular operations “effective” (see the discussion on 2008–2011). Meanwhile, Frontex continued to shift the blame for deaths at sea away from itself. Not only did it emphasise the responsibility of member states for coordinating search and rescue operations, it also pointed to the challenges of “thousands of migrants putting their lives in peril” (Frontex, 2016v, p. 13), shifting blame for deaths at sea at least partially on those seeking to reach EUrope by boat. In addition, Frontex engaged in blame-shifting in a third way, blaming ruthless smugglers for showing disregard for human lives. In relation to the death of 45 individuals, deputy executive director Gil Arias Fernandez was cited as follows: “[t]hese people were put on rubber boats or told to swim or cross the freezing cold river by the facilitators. . . . In fact, an important target of our operation are the criminal facilitation networks who are behind these arrivals” (Frontex, 2011m, see also 2011j, 2012f, 2012e). In particular in 2015, Frontex reported on its fight against smugglers extensively. Smugglers were described as “willing to put the lives of hundreds of people at the mercy of the rough seas” (Frontex, 2015q), “putting migrants in greater danger” (Frontex, 2015w), “preying on desperate people” (Frontex, 2015s), and as “ruthless” (Frontex, 2015b), “aggressive and cruel” (Frontex, 2015ak). Highlighting the violence of smugglers vis-à-vis migrants on the one hand (e.g. Frontex, 2015ai, 2015ak, 2016v, p. 12) and visà-vis border guards on the other (Frontex, 2015f, 2015an, 2015ao, 2016v, p. 12), the agency presented smugglers as degenerate evil while positively emphasising its own work against smuggling networks. Mobilising the narrative of “unscrupulous smugglers” enabled Frontex not only to remain silent vis-à-vis the more fundamental reasons for irregular migration but also made it possible to frame unauthorised border crossers as threats and victims at the same time. It allowed Frontex to put forward a restrictive and paternalistic form of humanitarianism, emphasising its efforts to save “helpless” migrants while maintaining that its mandate remained security-focused. Alongside the “unscrupulous smugglers” narrative, also the narrative on “asylum fraudsters” was drawn on prominently between 2011 and 2015. As one

78 Frontex as protector of EUrope, saviour of lives, and promoter of rights example of this, the chair of the management board noted in his foreword to Frontex’s 2013 annual report: [t]hose in need of protection can only be identified and granted an orderly admission procedure if the EU’s external borders are under intensive surveillance. The same applies when it comes to combating human smuggling as a complex, international, unscrupulous and organised business. In order to improve the situation of refugees sustainably and to fight all aspects of cross-border crime we need to step up and coordinate our cooperation with the relevant countries of origin, the transit of irregular migration and crossborder crime. (Frontex, 2014d, p. 3) While reaffirming the need to protect “legitimate” asylum seekers and refugees, other asylum seekers were repeatedly portrayed as cunning, strategic, and illegitimate. In July 2014, a news item on Frontex’s website reported trends of the previous year, including “a sharp increase of nationals of the Russian Federation of Chechen origin refused entry and then using asylum applications in Poland as a way to enter the EU and then move on to Germany” (Frontex, 2014a, my emphasis, see also 2014d, p. 19). Similar claims were made in another news item on the “Western Balkans Annual Risk Analysis” in 2014: “[w]hen detected, almost all migrants claimed asylum. The abuse of visa-free travel through mostly unfounded asylum application in the EU remained at the same level as in 2012” (Frontex, 2014b, my emphasis, see also 2014c). In the 2015 General Report, the agency problematised that “many other [non-Syrian] migrants also claim to be from Syria in order to speed up their journey” (Frontex, 2016v, p. 11). Drawing on the widespread narrative of the “fraudulent asylum seeker,” applying for asylum is thus portrayed as a strategy to gain access to the EU or speed up procedures by “irregular migrants” (rather than by bona fide refugees). By associating and partially equating asylum with irregular migration as well as with deception and abuse, these publications draw on and further consolidate a generalised sense of unease vis-à-vis migration and asylum in EUrope (see e.g. Bigo, 2002; Huysmans and Buonfino, 2008; Huysmans, 2014). As such, the narrative positions Frontex simultaneously as a protector of EUropean citizens from outside threats and as a compassionate rescuer of those seeking to reach EUrope without authorisation. Importantly, the narratives of the “asylum fraudster” and of the “unscrupulous smuggler” are commonly known among publics in EUrope, and alluding to them allows Frontex’s messages to be instantly understood. They combine concern for the welfare and rights of “genuine” refugees on the one hand with the assertion that “fraudsters” as well as “smugglers” need to be combatted decisively to protect “genuine” asylum seekers and potential “smuggling victims,” and to shield EUropean citizens from risks and threats. Overall, press releases and annual reports released by Frontex between 2011 and 2014 saw the mainstreaming of the portrayal of Frontex as a saviour of lives and human rights promoter, which was

Frontex as protector of EUrope, saviour of lives, and promoter of rights 79 at the same time closely bound up with ideas more traditionally associated with security and law enforcement: staying in and exercising control. AFTER “THE CRISIS”: 2016–2019 With the peak of the so-called migratory and refugee crisis having taken place in 2015, Frontex built on and further reified this crisis narrative over the following years, using it as a central trope in explaining its work (e.g. Frontex, 2017b, p. 26). In 2016, this primarily entailed an emphasis on the scale of arrivals registered over the previous year (Frontex, 2016v, p. 10, 2016t). Frontex’s 2015 General Report argued that “[t]he EU had to work last year in crisis mode at political and operational level” (Frontex, 2016v, p. 6) and featured a separate section on “Emergency Response.” It claimed that “throughout the summer-months scenes of chaos from the border areas spoke of a situation that seemed to be out of control” (Frontex, 2016v, p. 10, my emphasis) and pointed to related “violence requiring public order policing” (Frontex, 2016v, p. 12). Invoking an image of a EUrope overwhelmed with unprecedented “migratory flows” (see, e.g. Frontex, 2015ap, 2016y, 2017x, 2018p, 2018c, p. 20) “migrants that . . . flowed into” other countries (Frontex, 2017b, p. 9), or “migratory pressure” (Frontex, 2015aj, 2015ap, 2017b, p. 15, 2018p) that was at times described as “extraordinary” (Frontex, 2016f) or “enormous” (Frontex, 2017b, p. 71), Frontex not only contributed to the ongoing dehumanisation of those seeking safety in the EU by describing them in terms of fluidity but also fostered a sense of grave concern regarding the 2015 “crisis” and the looming threat of new emergencies. Importantly, the so-called crisis remained a crucial anchoring point of Frontex’s reporting not only in the immediate aftermath of the events unfolding in 2015 but also long after arrival numbers had dropped significantly. Indeed, drops in arrival numbers were relativised consistently by highlighting that they were still higher than numbers counted before the “crisis” (Frontex, 2016g, 2016d, 2016x, 2016y, 2017v, 2017b, p. 15) or by noting that they were high or increasing at a particular section of the border, despite an overall decrease (e.g. Frontex, 2017y, 2017z, 2018n, 2018o). In Frontex’s Annual Activity Report1 2017, for instance, the agency announced a sharp decrease in arrival numbers in 2017 compared to the previous two years, before highlighting that the number of detections “still exceeds any total recorded in recent history before the year 2014” and that “[t]he number of migrants detected on the western Mediterranean route hit a new high in 2017, more than doubling the record of last year” (Frontex, 2018c, p. 12, see also 2018l). As the pre-2014 threshold was eventually reached in 2018, the agency reported that while the “[n]umber of irregular crossings at Europe’s borders [was] at [its] lowest level in 5 years . . . the number of arrivals in Spain via the Western Mediterranean route doubled last year for the second year in a row to 57 000” (Frontex, 2019v). In continuously emphasising the “migratory pressure” EU borders were facing despite an overall decrease in arrival numbers, the agency created an atmosphere of heightened alertness even as arrival numbers had plummeted long after the so-called crisis ended.

80 Frontex as protector of EUrope, saviour of lives, and promoter of rights This framing only changed in 2019, when further decreases in arrival numbers began to be presented without qualifiers (see, e.g. Frontex, 2019b, p. 9, 2019p). Interestingly, when slight rises in arrival numbers over the summer months in 2019 were announced, Frontex noted that overall detections remained lower than in previous years (Frontex, 2019s, see also 2019r, 2019q, 2019t). Indeed, in 2019 the agency seemed to somewhat shift its emphasis in reporting. Not only did its commentary on migratory developments begin to be characterised less by a sense of urgency and exception, but also the political context was invoked in its Annual Activity Report 2018 in unusual clarity: In 2018, Member States reported an increase in the detection of clandestine entries. Nevertheless, the number of detected attempts of clandestine entry continued to be arguably below the level to be expected in times of tightened border surveillance at the land and sea borders. (Frontex, 2019b, p. 9) Here, Frontex acknowledges the contribution of restrictive border controls to attempts to cross these borders undetected, highlighting the wider context in which migratory movements take place. This understanding is more in line with Frontex’s continued emphasis on risk analysis, which takes political and structural factors like tightened border controls and their displacement effects routinely into account. Further developments in the period between 2016 and 2019 illustrate that an understanding of migration as a risk to be managed and prepared for remained central to the agency’s work. First, Frontex launched a service offering information on developments at and beyond the external borders to its stakeholders 24/7, providing them “with [an] accurate and close-to-real-time situational picture of the EU’s border and pre-frontier areas, improving situational awareness and increasing reaction capability” (Frontex, 2019b, p. 48). Risk analysis was also further rolled out to Africa, with “Risk Analysis Cells” run by Frontex-trained personnel set up in Niger (Frontex, 2019k) and Senegal (Frontex, 2019l). Second, cooperation and information exchange with other EU agencies – in particular Europol – and the EU naval operation EUNAVFOR MED intensified, partially in response to Frontex’s revised mandate (e.g. Frontex, 2019b, p. 34). Third, Frontex began conducting so-called Vulnerability Assessments in line with a change in its mandate (see Chapter 2), analysing member states’ “capacity and readiness . . . to face anticipated challenges” (Frontex, 2019b, p. 36, see also 2017g, 2018i). The terminology used here is noteworthy: “vulnerability” refers to member states’ ability to control their borders effectively, whereas the number of applications for asylum – connected to questions of human vulnerability – are regarded as a risk factor for these states. Interestingly, Frontex introduced a footnote on this latter issue in its Annual Activity Report 2018, explaining that An application for political asylum does not in itself represent an irregular process. However, in order for a migrant to lodge an application for asylum at a MS/SAC airport they may in some instances have had to obtain forged, counterfeit or otherwise improperly obtained documentation from a criminal

Frontex as protector of EUrope, saviour of lives, and promoter of rights 81 network, or to have obtained a Schengen visa by making a false declaration as to their intentions, or to have abused the direct airside visa transit waiver on arrival at an MS/SAC airports. Therefore asylum is one of the indicators that help assessing a number of activities concerning the abuse of legal travel or migratory processes for irregular migration at air borders. (Frontex, 2019b, p. 10) While the agency somewhat distances itself from its own description of asylum seeking as a risk factor here, it continues to associate it with a range of other purported risks, including irregular migration, document fraud, or the “abuse” of transit waivers. Asylum seekers also continued to be represented as fraudulent, with nationalities being prefaced with terms such as “declared” or “claimed” (Frontex, 2016ab, 2016h, 2017aa). Finally, there was a greater emphasis on security as circulation, including concerns to ensure the smooth functioning of the external borders and to allow “legitimate” travellers to move without delays, while monitoring risks and filtering out those deemed risky or suspect being articulated regularly (e.g. Frontex, 2017d, 2018e, 2018f, 2018c, pp. 15 and 35, 2019b, p. 34). In this context, Frontex announced their “mission to make crossing the border easier and more secure at the same time” (Frontex, 2019n), with the use of new technologies – such as biometrics – being presented as key to this ambition (for this latter aspect, see also Frontex, 2019w, 2019j). Frontex also began making connections between internal and external security more extensively, in line with changes in its mandate that emphasised the importance of internal security for integrated border management (European Parliament and Council, 2016, Articles 1 and 4). As the agency highlighted, “[w]ith its new mandate, the role of Frontex in safeguarding the EU’s internal security is taking centre stage” (Frontex, 2017r, see also 2017b, p. 17). Since 2016, there has been a growing emphasis on the interconnections between internal and external security, with executive director Leggeri for instance noting that “[w]e need external borders that help to preserve the EU internal security in an area without internal border control” Leggeri, (Frontex, 2016p), a focus on “border security as part of maintaining internal security within the EU” (Frontex, 2017s) at the 2017 European Day for Border Guards, and the launch of a “Crime Information Cell” pilot project in cooperation with EUNAVFOR MED and Europol to bridge internal and external security (Frontex, 2018m). Also beyond these specific instances, references to linkages between internal and external security increased (see, e.g. Frontex, 2016m, 2017f, 2018f), and both deputy director Koerner (Frontex, 2018f) and executive director Leggeri (Frontex, 2018k) were cited as saying “Europe is only as secure as its external borders.” Frontex’s increased focus on internal security went hand in hand with a stronger emphasis on filtering out potential risks, in particular “risks emanating from cross-border crime and international terrorism” (Frontex, 2019w, see also 2019i). The importance of intelligence sharing and practical cooperation in joint actions with other security agencies such as Europol and Interpol was highlighted (see, e.g. Frontex, 2016l, 2016q, 2018b, 2019b, p. 28). Again, this increased cooperation and greater focus on cross-border crime is connected to Frontex’s mandate

82 Frontex as protector of EUrope, saviour of lives, and promoter of rights change in 2016, which enabled the agency to process personal data and transfer it to Europol and Eurojust (European Parliament and Council, 2016, see, e.g. Articles 46 and 47; see also Frontex, 2017i). Highlighting the importance of cooperation, Leggeri was quoted in 2018 as saying that “[w]e can only win the fight against crime and for security together” (Frontex, 2018i). Frontex’s emphasis on fighting terrorism continued throughout 2016–2019. In its Annual Activity Report 2016, Frontex noted that “there is an underlying threat of terrorism-related travel movements” (Frontex, 2017b, p. 15). Terrorism was often mentioned in connection with cross-border crime (Frontex, 2017l, 2017r, 2018b) and a range of related threats, with Frontex for instance listing “various types of cross-border crime, including drug trafficking, people smuggling, human trafficking and terrorism” (Frontex, 2017l, see also 2017p), or “serious crime with a cross-border dimension, such as migrant smuggling, trafficking in human beings, trafficking of drugs and weapons, and terrorism” (Frontex, 2018c, p. 15, see also 2018a). Document fraud continued to be presented as a key issue connecting terrorism and other threats, with Frontex arguing that fake documents “can be in fact [be] used or re-used for many other criminal or terrorist activities” and therefore “represent a substantial threat to the security of the EU in 2017” (Frontex, 2017b, p. 15, see also 2017f, 2017t). In autumn 2019, the agency announced that it had “team[ed] up with INTERPOL to track down foreign terrorist fighters, [resulting] in the detection of more than a dozen suspected foreign terrorist fighters travelling across the Mediterranean . . . during the busy summer tourist season” (Frontex, 2019m). While the agency did not clarify how these “suspected foreign terrorist fighters” travelled to the EU, this announcement associatively connects precarious maritime journeys with “terrorist fighters,” contributing to a sense of grave danger emanating from among those who risk their lives seeking safety in the EU. As noted in the previous section, the associative connections made between diverse threats ranging from terrorism to unauthorised border crossings to public health and drugs and weapons smuggling create a “patchwork of insecurities,” contributing to feelings of unease and fear in relation to unauthorised migration (Huysmans, 2014, 84). In recent years, Frontex thus continued to present unauthorised migration as a risk and a threat. At the same time, the agency emphasised the importance of fundamental rights. Press releases noted not only the publication of annual reports by the Consultative Forum on Fundamental Rights (Frontex, 2016ad, 2017c, 2018g, 2019g) but also used occasions such as World Refugee Day to positively emphasise the importance of border guards in enabling refugees to access international protection (Frontex, 2016s). Fundamental rights were also invoked in relation to the monitoring of joint return operations (Frontex, 2016r, 2017m), trainings for screening experts interviewing newly arrived individuals (Frontex, 2016u), a programme seeking to install a “protection-sensitive response to mixed migration flows” in the Western Balkans and Turkey (Frontex, 2017k, 2017u, 2019o, 2019b, pp. 20 and 41), and the establishment of a Serious Incident Report mechanism (Frontex, 2017b, p. 36) as well as a complaint mechanism the agency was obliged to set up under the new 2016 regulation (e.g. Frontex, 2017b, p. 10).

Frontex as protector of EUrope, saviour of lives, and promoter of rights 83 While fundamental rights continued to be invoked in the agency’s reporting, it is noteworthy that news releases referring to them decreased significantly after 2016. In 2016, fundamental rights aspects were still regularly mentioned when security measures were outlined, for instance in relation to assessing individuals’ need for international protection in Greece (Frontex, 2016ab), the cooperation with NATO in the Aegean Sea to address smuggling (Frontex, 2016n), deportations from Greece to Turkey (where responsibility for upholding EU and international law was placed squarely on Greece (Frontex, 2016j, 2016k)), capacity-building on integrated border management in Eastern Partnership countries (Frontex, 2016ae), and trainings of the Libyan Coast Guard (Frontex, 2016o). This changed in 2017, when news releases referring to human rights topics became rarer (for recent examples see, e.g. Frontex, 2019u, 2019c). Frontex’s annual reports continued to report on fundamental rights, but similar to its news releases did so less extensively from 2016 onwards. Whereas the 2015 General Report featured a six-page “Fundamental Rights Progress Report” annex in addition to sections dedicated to the work of the Fundamental Rights Officer and the Consultative Forum, and mentioned the term “fundamental rights” 127 times, the 2016 iteration had a one-page section on fundamental rights, making only 52 references to fundamental rights. In the 2017 Annual Activity Report, fundamental rights were reported on even less, in a joint section on “Fundamental Rights and Data Protection” and with only 25 references throughout the report. The following year, the annual report began including details on the complaint mechanism as required per the agency’s new regulation, meaning that a separate, four-page section was featured once again. This most recent report refers to fundamental rights 46 times and acknowledges that “the new regulation has clearly stepped up the fundamental rights obligations of the European Border and Coast Guard staff” (Frontex, 2019b, p. 55). Whereas fundamental rights were mentioned as an integral part of Frontex’s mission from its annual report 2008 until the annual activity report 2016, the 2016 change in Frontex’s mandate also led to a reworking of its mission and vision statements that saw this focus being removed. Instead of the previous mission statement referring to the Charter on Fundamental Rights and general treaty obligations (see previous section), it now reads: “Together with the Member States, we ensure safe and well-functioning external borders that provide security” (Frontex, 2018c, p. 10). And whereas previously, the reports invoked values referring to humanity, it now states “we are respectful” and “[w]e care. As European public agents we serve the interests of citizens because we care about people and believe in European values” (Frontex, 2018c, p. 11). Overall, then, the period from 2017 to 2019 was marked by a decreased emphasis on fundamental rights reporting. There are a number of possible explanations for this change, including a change in the political climate in the wake of the so-called refugee crisis as well as sustained criticism in relation to fundamental rights leveraged at Frontex in recent years. Indeed, when examining Frontex’s responses to reports by the Consultative Forum on Fundamental Rights, it becomes clear that the agency’s relationship with fundamental rights is not always straightforward. Whereas the Forum’s first

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annual report covering the year of 2013 was reworked after criticism from Frontex’s leadership, the 2014 report revealed open conflict between the Forum and Frontex, as a foreword by the management board and executive director in the report indicates: the Management Board requested the Consultative Forum, to re-draft and clarify certain misunderstandings contained in the report. As the annual report was not subject to amendments, the Management Board and Executive Director of Frontex deem it necessary to make the following written statement and express diverging opinions concerning certain contents of the report. (Frontex Consultative Forum on Fundamental Rights, 2015, p. 4) The Forum’s annual reports in subsequent years did no longer contain such “diverging opinions.” From 2017 onwards, however, the press office issued a yearly news release which presented the agency’s stance on the critique leveraged by the Forum. In response to criticism related to the agency’s work at the SerbianHungarian border in a context in which Hungary sought to summarily return new arrivals, it was noted that “the agency believes that the presence of members of the European Border and Coast Guard Teams and Frontex staff on the HungarianSerbian border can actively contribute to minimise any possible risks highlighted by the Forum. It can also provide an objective and reliable source of information on the circumstances on the ground” (Frontex, 2017o). In both 2018 and 2019, the agency responded to critique regarding the lack of adequate staffing for the Fundamental Rights Officer, with the executive director highlighting resources that had already been invested (Frontex, 2018h, 2019h). While the agency publicly embraced fundamental rights, particularly between 2011 and 2015, it thus continued to face pressures from the Consultative Forum to live up to its stated commitments. Similar pressure also came from the outside, from the European Parliament, NGOs and activists, and journalists. As one example, a team of investigative journalists and information activists published a TV feature on German television in collaboration with correctiv.org concerning human rights abuses that were flagged up in Frontex’s “Serious Incident Reports” and questioning the agency’s responses to such abuses (Correctiv, 2019). In response, the agency issued a lengthy news release titled “Frontex condemns any form of inhumane treatment and violence,” highlighting the centrality of fundamental rights to the agency’s work, clarifying its processes around Serious Incident Reports, and noting its limited authority in terms of investigating abuses or suspending national border guards (Frontex, 2019f). As this episode illustrates, Frontex continues to be confronted with allegations of human rights abuses and remains at pains to frame itself as committed to fundamental rights despite frequent criticism. By emphasising the limitations of its mandate and the inability to sanction national border guards, it shifts responsibility for human rights abuses to national border authorities, while highlighting the allegedly positive role of Frontex officials in “minimising risks” of and providing information on abuses (see Frontex, 2017o, 2019f and Chapter 5).

Frontex as protector of EUrope, saviour of lives, and promoter of rights 85 Similar to Frontex’s references to fundamental rights, also its references to saving lives decreased in 2016. Occasional press releases continued to highlight the amount of people saved in particular throughout 2016 and 2017, and the annual reports for 2016 and 2017 stated that the agency had been involved in 2,669 and 2,233 SAR cases, respectively (Frontex, 2016a, 2016ac, 2016b, 2017b, p. 70, 2017ad, 2018c, p. 20). Where it was mentioned, search and rescue were often connected to security-related activities. Key themes in this context included the cooperation with other agencies as enhancing SAR and the fight against illegal activities at sea (Frontex, 2016i, 2017h, 2018l), the improvement of surveillance as contributing to search and rescue activities (Frontex, 2016e, 2017q, 2018c, p. 37, 2019b, p. 23, 2019e), reports on operations that were said to fulfil both security and humanitarian purposes (Frontex, 2016f, 2016c, 2017b, p. 21, 2017g, 2017n, 2019b, p. 17), and accounts of exercises that led to the saving of lives as well as a range of security-related objectives (Frontex, 2017ac, 2019a). Also the reduction of arrivals due to the EU-Turkey Statement was positively referenced as having “helped to significantly reduce the number of lives lost at sea” (Frontex, 2017b, p. 16), disregarding the very real risk of chain refoulement or otherwise precarious lives those who remained excluded from the EU faced in Turkey and beyond. In 2018, there was a further decrease in the amount of references press releases made to search and rescue, with only two press releases invoking search and rescue directly. One announced the beginning of joint operation Themis, noting that it included “search and rescue as a crucial component” and highlighting the numbers of lives saved by Frontex operations in 2017, while mostly focusing on the “security component” of the new operation (Frontex, 2018j). The other announced the testing of unmanned aircraft for border surveillance for search and rescue as well as a range of security-related activities, such as detection of drugs and weapons smuggling or other criminal activities (Frontex, 2018d). The 2018 Annual Activity Report illustrated once more the blurring of humanitarian and security discourses. Not only did it report the “rescue/interception of 4 924 migrants at sea” (Frontex, 2019b, p. 23, my emphasis), but it also positively emphasised that “Frontex maritime surveillance operations have significantly increased the search and rescue (SAR) capacities of Member States [having] helped rescue more than 37 000 migrants during their patrolling activities” (Frontex, 2019b, p. 17). This latter statement illustrates how rescue continues being understood as a by-product of surveillance and patrolling activities (see also Frontex, 2019d). In a significant change from previous years, however, the transformation of the agency into the European Border and Coast Guard meant that its mandate explicitly included search and rescue from October 2016 onwards. Frontex noted this in a press release at the time (Frontex, 2016ac), while highlighting at other times that the responsibility for such operations remained with national authorities: “All search and rescue operations in the Central Mediterranean are coordinated by the Italian Guardia Costiera from the Maritime Rescue Coordination Center (MRCC) in Rome, which directs maritime assets in the area to the vessels in distress. All Frontex assets are at the disposal of MRCC to assist with search and rescue” (Frontex, 2017w, my emphasis).

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Apart from shifting responsibility for SAR by pointing to the responsibility of member states, Frontex also continued to blame smugglers for bringing people into life-threatening situations in the first place. Fabrice Leggeri was, for example, quoted as saying: “The dramatic rescue operations last week showed how the ruthless smugglers cram as many people as possible onto unseaworthy boats with little regard for human life” (Frontex, 2016a, see also 2016t, 2016c, 2016aa, 2017ad, 2017a). In addition to “cramming” people onto unseaworthy boats, smugglers were said to be “making billions” from smuggling “desperate people” (Frontex, 2016n, 2016l). Frontex also noted that people smugglers were forcing people onto unseaworthy boats against their will (Frontex, 2016z, 2016w) and emphasised that the agency was “doing all we can to combat the criminals” (Frontex, 2016n) and that “dismantling people-smuggling networks operating in Libya is part of our mission” (Frontex, 2017a), continuing to weave together humanitarian and security rationales in a narrative on “unscrupulous smugglers.” In the time period under consideration, Frontex moreover began shifting blame for deaths in the Mediterranean Sea in a third way: not only did it insist on the responsibility of member states and blamed ruthless smugglers facilitating dangerous journeys, but it also accused search and rescue NGOs of being responsible for a situation of record deaths. In December 2016, the Financial Times reported that Frontex “accused charities of exacerbating the situation [in the Mediterranean] and – in some cases – even colluding with people smugglers in a series of confidential reports seen by the Financial Times” (Robinson, 2016a). Frontex denied the existence of such reports, leading to a revised version of the article that spoke of the agency’s concern that those travelling by boat had been given “clear indications before departure on the precise direction to be followed in order to reach the NGOs’ boats” and highlighting that there had been a “[f]irst reported case where the criminal networks were smuggling migrants directly on an NGO vessel” (quoted in Robinson, 2016b). Frontex’s suggestion that NGOs were – intentionally or not – assisting smuggling networks in their activities was reiterated in its Risk Analysis 2017. The document, published in February 2017, implicitly suggested a collaboration between NGOs and smuggling networks by highlighting a sharp decrease in distress calls to national authorities and a concomitant increase in NGO involvement in search and rescue operations that had taken place in the second half of 2016. It moreover argued that border control and SAR activities close to Libyan territorial waters had “unintended consequences. Namely, they influence smugglers’ planning and act as a pull factor that compounds the difficulties inherent in border control and saving lives at sea” (Frontex, 2017ab, p. 32). Going further, the agency argued that “all parties involved in SAR operations in the Central Mediterranean unintentionally help criminals achieve their objectives at minimum cost, strengthen their business model by increasing the chances of success” and linked this to a record number of deaths that had been recorded in 2016 (Frontex, 2017ab, p. 32).2 As this shows, Frontex’s public positioning vis-à-vis search and rescue evolved during this time: the agency no longer toed the line between embracing search and rescue while insisting that this was not in its mandate and remained the

Frontex as protector of EUrope, saviour of lives, and promoter of rights 87 responsibility of member states. Instead, it actively worked to discredit efforts at saving lives at sea, arguing that those patrolling close to the Libyan shore – where most distress cases occur – were in fact contributing to higher numbers of deaths by acting as a “pull factor.”3 Rather than disavowing humanitarianism altogether, however, the agency used humanitarian arguments to discredit humanitarian efforts, engaging in a form of anti-humanitarian humanitarianism:4 it associated the record numbers of deaths in 2016 with the increased presence of NGOs close to the Libyan coast (Frontex, 2017ab, p. 32). Continuing its efforts to reign in the activities of NGOs in the Central Mediterranean, Frontex also expressed explicit support for Italy’s Code of Conduct (Frontex, 2017e, 2017j). The Code was submitted by Italy to NGOs to sign on August 1, 2017, and can be understood as a further attempt to discredit and actively undermine the efforts of nongovernmental organisations in the Mediterranean Sea. While being officially framed as seeking to achieve “greater rescuing effectiveness,” the code was widely seen as weakening NGOs’ rescuing capabilities and violating humanitarian principles (Cusumano, 2019). As such, it constitutes a further example of anti-humanitarian humanitarianism, that is the deployment of humanitarian reasoning for objectives that are hostile to humanitarian activities. As this overview shows, several key features persisted in Frontex’s organisational narrative over the last 15 years. In particular, the agency conceptualised migration both as a risk to manage and be prepared for and as related to “crises” and “emergencies” that had to be responded to with urgent interventions. While humanitarianism and human rights have been invoked prominently in Frontex’s organisational narrative since 2011, they have had less relative weight in Frontex’s reporting since 2016. The narrative on “fraudulent asylum seekers,” for instance, was related only to security concerns in this period, with the agency no longer making the point that this (alleged) behaviour was damaging the rights of “genuine” refugees. In contrast, the “unscrupulous smuggler” narrative remained a central element of Frontex’s reporting since it emerged in 2010, allowing for the continued representation of Frontex as a saviour of people in distress at sea and a protector of EUrope simultaneously. The most remarkable change over recent years is perhaps Frontex’s evolving positioning vis-à-vis search and rescue activities. While publicly discrediting search and rescue NGOs in particular, Frontex used humanitarian arguments in doing so, thereby introducing a form of antihumanitarian humanitarianism. Indeed, the agency presented itself as genuinely concerned with saving lives at sea, while simultaneously undermining the activities of those conducting search and rescue operations where most deaths occur. KNOWING FRONTEX THROUGH ITS PUBLICATIONS As the previous analysis has shown, a number of important continuities and key shifts begin to emerge when examining Frontex’s press releases and annual reports over the last 15 years. Understanding Frontex through its public documents, however, also has particular methodological implications. Most importantly, perhaps, documents tend to create the impression of a unitary, coherent organisation:

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authorship, disagreements, negotiations, conflicts, and compromises during the writing process are invisible when examining the final text (Freeman, 2006; Freeman and Maybin, 2011). Who is involved in drafting documents or in supervising the drafting process, in ordering and presenting the necessarily selective “truth” the organisation chooses to tell, however, matters (Freeman and Maybin, 2011, p. 163). Similarly, it matters who is able to read particular documents. In relation to Frontex, a great part of its documents and texts are never published. Restricted for security reasons, its operational plans, evaluations, up-to-date analyses, and a wealth of other information are not available to those outside the organisation.5 As I could only access a small part of the documents written by those working for Frontex over the last 15 years, namely texts that publicly present the agency towards the outside world, the impression of a united voice emerging from Frontex is even more pronounced. Through documents, organisations talk about themselves as well as to themselves (Harper, 1998). In Frontex’s case, public documents such as annual reports and press releases create an image of Frontex vis-à-vis the outside world and position the agency within its wider environment, while also cultivating a particular organisational identity within the agency. As such, documents are “a nexus of social practice. . . . They create groups, providing them with a common language and vocabulary and helping them express to others what they are trying to do” (Freeman, 2006, p. 53). Through its documents, Frontex projects a unified, coherent organisational identity. As such, analysing Frontex’s public documents is important not only in terms of understanding how Frontex presents and positions itself vis-à-vis its environment but also to examine the organisational identity fostered inside the agency. Indeed, discursive practices are productive, rather than merely reflective of an already existing reality (Freeman, 2006). Examining changes in Frontex’s public documents does not only provide insights into how the language in them has changed over time; the language that is used to describe Frontex’s work, borders, and migration simultaneously creates the world the agency is situated in (see Hajer, 1993). How mobility is responded to is intimately bound up with how it is perceived and understood, which linguistic practices are central to (Fischer and Forester, 1993, p. 6). As noted already, Frontex’s public documents draw on discursive formations that circulate widely in contemporary EUrope. They continuously reiterate already-existing subjectivities and narratives and are thereby performative. Not only do they (re-)produce particular conceptualisations of migration and mobility, they also produce Frontex as a humanitarian, human rights, and security actor. Indeed, the preceding analysis allows for following Frontex’s trajectory in becoming more “humanitarian” and “human rights-focused” through time. In the agency’s early publications, migration was presented primarily as a threat and a risk, and Frontex was portrayed as analysing, anticipating, and managing this risk as well as being ready to quickly respond to unexpected emergencies as they arose. More recently, Frontex has constructed its identity as a protector of EUrope in times of crisis, a manager of risks, a saviour of lives at sea, and a promoter of fundamental rights. While Frontex’s evolving position was likely a response to

Frontex as protector of EUrope, saviour of lives, and promoter of rights 89 external pressures and legislative processes (see Chapters 2 and 4), this analysis suggests that it also followed interdiscursive dynamics. Importantly, Frontex’s ability to combine security with fundamental rights on the one hand and humanitarianism on the other can only be understood when looking at the similarities of these discursive formations. I have reflected on these similarities in Chapter 1, arguing that they create the conditions of possibility for the convergence of humanitarianism and human rights with security in Frontex’s organisational narrative. In particular, I argue that humanitarianism, human rights, and security are all discourses of protection that share a number of key commonalities in relation to the subject positions they produce, the forms of power they rely on, and the vulnerabilities they create. Their similarities make it possible to incorporate references to saving lives and protecting rights in Frontex’s publications, while maintaining a conceptualisation of migration as a risk and a threat at the same time. While Frontex’s organisational narrative invokes protection as tegere, praesidere, and tutore (Bigo, 2006), the preceding analysis shows that the protection of an active subject is invoked only in terms of security, whereas forms of protection that conceptualise the protected as more or less passive are invoked also in relation to humanitarianism and human rights. Indeed, the sovereign decision-making of tegere is articulated only in relation to security, where the protected is the community of EUropean states that decided to share a common border and is threatened from the outside, with the protector – Frontex – enacting protection in the name of this sovereign. On the contrary, praesidere, closely associated with disciplinary power, is connected to humanitarianism, human rights, and security simultaneously. Surveillance, patrolling, detection, and identification are framed as protecting EUrope from migrant threats, saving migrant lives, and facilitating the protection of migrants’ rights at the same time. While the agency-annihilating dimension of tutore emerges in Frontex’s organisational discourse most clearly in relation to humanitarianism, the focus on profiling the present and the future appears also in relation to security. The fact that Frontex is able to engage in anti-humanitarian humanitarianism, that is to make a humanitarian case in its critique of humanitarian NGOs relies on its use of humanitarianism in its paternalistic and restrictive form or as tutore, that is as protecting migrant victims who are framed as passive, incapable, and irresponsible. In combining humanitarian, human rights, and security rationales in relation to protection as tutore and praesidere, Frontex thus constructs an organisational identity as a saviour of lives and a promoter of rights without jeopardising its identity as a defender of EUrope against migrant threats. Because the protection of migrants is understood only in the sense of tutore and praesidere, it poses no challenge to Frontex’s core security mandate – Frontex commonly emphasises how its security activities contribute to humanitarianism and human rights. Joint operations, cooperation with other security agencies and surveillance technology are framed as securing EUrope and saving lives; identification procedures and trainings of third state actors are described as crucial tools to enable individuals to access their rights and to filter out potential frauds and threats; the

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fight against smugglers is presented as serving both EUropean security and the protection of vulnerable and exploited people. Building on racialised notions of migrants as passive and helpless victims of degenerate smugglers and/or as a threat to security and peace in EUrope (see Stachowitsch and Sachseder, 2019), Frontex presents itself as quintessentially EUropean actor protecting EUrope and its migrant ‘others’ at the same time. In this process, the use of widely known tropes such as the “asylum fraudster” and the “unscrupulous smuggler” further contributes to the consolidation of connections between humanitarianism, human rights, and security, enabling Frontex to stabilise its identity in these terms.

Conclusion This chapter has analysed Frontex’s organisational discourse through its public communication, in particular its press releases and annual reports. It has followed this organisational narrative through four temporal stages, showing how Frontex gradually built an identity as a saviour of lives, promoter of rights, manager of risks, and defender of EUrope in times of crisis. In its early years, Frontex focused entirely on its security mandate, sporadically invoking the saving of lives as a side effect of security-focused joint operations and not referring to human rights at all. This changed in 2008, when human rights began to be invoked and both human rights and references to saving lives became mainstreamed in Frontex’s publications between 2011 and 2015. From 2016, there was a notable decrease in the emphasis placed on fundamental rights and the saving of lives. Despite this apparent scale-back, human rights as well as restrictive and paternalistic forms of humanitarianism have remained integral parts of Frontex’s reporting. In its more recent communications, however, Frontex emphasises the importance of human rights and humanitarianism in their own right less often, linking them instead to the agency’s core mandate, that is security-related activities and objectives. In doing so, it invokes different notions of protection in relation to each discursive formation, referring to protection in the sense of protecting an active subject (tegere) in relation to security, and protection in the sense of protecting more or less passive victims (praesidere and tutore) also in relation to humanitarianism and human rights. This framing has important implications for the agency’s legitimacy and its standing in EUropean border politics (see Chapter 5). It also, however, relies on an understanding of public documents as largely reflective of Frontex as an organisation and reifies notions of Frontex as a coherent actor speaking with one unified voice. These assumptions will be queried in Chapter 4, which seeks to further complement the preceding analyses with a closer look at Frontex’s organisational dynamics.

Notes 1 Frontex changed the name of its annual reports from “General Report” to “Annual Activity Report” with the 2016 report, in line with a change in the regulation governing the agency and its stipulations on the agency’s reporting that year (see Chapter 2). 2 For a compelling critique of these claims, please see Heller and Pezzani (2017).

Frontex as protector of EUrope, saviour of lives, and promoter of rights 91 3 Notably, this critique included also border patrol activities. Frontex’s critical stance visà-vis the Italian military operation Mare Nostrum that operated close to the Libyan coast had already been made clear informally in 2013 and 2014 (see Chapter 5). 4 Thanks to Charles Heller for bringing up this term in a discussion on Frontex’s stance vis-à-vis search and rescue activities during this time period. 5 In recent years, activists have challenged the secrecy maintained by Frontex by demanding access to classified documents through freedom of information requests, publishing the agency’s responses on portals such as https://fragdenstaat.de. When Frontex refused to disclose the positions of ships involved in its operations, activists brought the case before the European Court of Justice (Correctiv, 2019).

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Frontex as protector of EUrope, saviour of lives, and promoter of rights 93 Frontex (2010b) FRAN Quarterly Issue 2, April–June 2010. Warsaw. Available at: frontex. europa.eu/assets/Publications/Risk_Analysis/FRAN_Q2_2010.pdf (Accessed: 7 August 2016). Frontex (2010c) FRAN Quarterly Update Issue 1, January–March, 2010. Available at: frontex.europa.eu/assets/Publications/Risk_Analysis/FRAN_Q1_2010.pdf (Accessed: 7 August 2016). Frontex (2010d) Frontex Estimates Illegal Border Crossings on the Greek Turkish Border Have Diminished by 44% by the End of November. Available at: http://frontex.europa. eu/news/frontex-estimates-illegal-border-crossings-on-the-greek-turkish-border-havediminished-by-44-by-the-end-of-november-zM59Oo (Accessed: 7 August 2016). Frontex (2010e) Frontex Operational Office Opens in Piraeus, News. Available at: http:// frontex.europa.eu/news/frontex-operational-office-opens-in-piraeus-hk4q3Z (Accessed: 7 August 2016). Frontex (2010f) General Report 2009. Warsaw. Available at: http://frontex.europa.eu/assets/ About_Frontex/Governance_documents/Annual_report/2009/gen_rep_2009_en.pdf (Accessed: 7 August 2016). Frontex (2010g) Papoutsis, Besson, Malmström and Laitinen Visit RABIT Operational Area, News. Available at: http://frontex.europa.eu/news/papoutsis-besson-malmstromand-laitinen-visit-rabit-operational-area-jkKZi9 (Accessed: 7 August 2016). Frontex (2010h) Western Balkans Annual Risk Analysis (Public Version). Available at: frontex.europa.eu/assets/Attachments_News/wb_ara_.pdf (Accessed: 7 August 2016). Frontex (2011a) Annual Risk Analysis 2011, News. Available at: http://frontex.europa.eu/ news/annual-risk-analysis-2011-uGgHEQ (Accessed: 7 August 2016). Frontex (2011b) FRAN Quarterly Issue 3, July–September 2011. Warsaw. Available at: http://frontex.europa.eu/assets/Publications/Risk_Analysis/FRAN_Q3_2010.pdf (Accessed: 7 August 2016). Frontex (2011c) Frontex Guest Officers Sent to Work in Italy, News. Available at: http:// frontex.europa.eu/news/frontex-guest-officers-sent-to-work-in-italy-URXwE0 (Accessed: 7 August 2016). Frontex (2011d) Frontex R&D UAV Workshop and Demo 2011 – Call for Expressions of Interest. Available at: http://frontex.europa.eu/news/frontex-r-d-uav-workshop-and-demo2011-call-for-expressions-of-interest-EDouHq (Accessed: 7 August 2016). Frontex (2011e) General Report 2010. Warsaw. Available at: http://frontex.europa.eu/ assets/About_Frontex/Governance_documents/Annual_report/2010/frontex_general_ report_2010.pdf (Accessed: 7 August 2016). Frontex (2011f) Hermes 2011 Running. Warsaw: Frontex. Available at: http://frontex. europa.eu/news/hermes-2011-running-T7bJgL (Accessed: 7 August 2016). Frontex (2011g) Hermes 2011 Starts Tomorrow in Lampedusa, News. Available at: http:// frontex.europa.eu/news/hermes-2011-starts-tomorrow-in-lampedusa-X4XZcr (Accessed: 7 August 2016). Frontex (2011h) Hermes Operation Extended, News. Available at: http://frontex.europa.eu/ news/hermes-operation-extended-OWmwti (Accessed: 7 August 2016). Frontex (2011i) Management Board Endorses Frontex Fundamental Rights Strategy, News. Available at: http://frontex.europa.eu/news/management-board-endorses-frontexfundamental-rights-strategy-KxtacI (Accessed: 7 August 2016). Frontex (2011j) Poseidon 2011: Migrants Smugglers Open Fire on Border Guards. Available at: http://frontex.europa.eu/news/poseidon-2011-migrants-smugglers-open-fire-onborder-guards-ZpmqYU (Accessed: 7 August 2016).

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Frontex (2011k) Press Statement on Sudden Increased Migratory Situation in Lampedusa, News. Available at: http://frontex.europa.eu/news/press-statement-on-sudden-increasedmigratory-situation-in-lampedusa-YkbG1a (Accessed: 7 August 2016). Frontex (2011l) Programme of Work 2011. Warsaw. Available at: www.frontex.europa.eu/ assets/About_Frontex/Governance_documents/Work_programme/2011/fx_pow_2011. pdf (Accessed: 7 August 2016). Frontex (2011m) RABIT Operation – Situational Update. Available at: http://frontex. europa.eu/news/rabit-operation-situational-update-pwIcR8 (Accessed: 7 August 2016). Frontex (2011n) Request for Help over Migratory Pressure in Lampedusa, News. Available at: http://frontex.europa.eu/news/request-for-help-over-migratory-pressure-in-lampedusa0H2ukS (Accessed: 7 August 2016). Frontex (2011o) Update to Joint Operation Hermes 2011, News. Available at: http:// frontex.europa.eu/news/update-to-joint-operation-hermes-2011-7DIILz (Accessed: 7 August 2016). Frontex (2011p) Update to Joint Operation Poseidon 2011, News. Available at: http:// frontex.europa.eu/news/update-to-joint-operation-poseidon-2011-jzZfWV (Accessed: 7 August 2016). Frontex (2012a) Consultative Forum on Fundamental Rights Elects Chairpersons at Inaugural Meeting, News. Available at: http://frontex.europa.eu/news/consultative-forumon-fundamental-rights-elects-chairpersons-at-inaugural-meeting-LEmmP6 (Accessed: 7 August 2016). Frontex (2012b) Frontex’s Response to Ombudsman Own-initiative Inquiry. Available at: www. ombudsman.europa.eu/showResource?resourceId=1342511806022_OI-5-2012-BEH-MHZS2012-158110_p3-61.pdf&type=pdf&download=true&lang=en (Accessed: 7 August 2016). Frontex (2012c) Frontex Responds to the European Ombudsman, News. Available at: http:// frontex.europa.eu/news/frontex-responds-to-the-european-ombudsman-8oCMDO (Accessed: 7 August 2016). Frontex (2012d) General Report 2011. Warsaw. Available at: http://frontex.europa.eu/ assets/About_Frontex/Governance_documents/Annual_report/2011/General_Report_ 2011.pdf (Accessed: 7 August 2016). Frontex (2012e) Greek-Turkish Land Border JO Poseidon Land: Situational Update, January 2012. Available at: http://frontex.europa.eu/news/greek-turkish-land-borderjo-poseidon-land-situational-update-january-2012-tXUqGg (Accessed: 7 August 2016). Frontex (2012f) JO Hermes – Situational Update, News. Available at: http://frontex. europa.eu/news/jo-hermes-situational-update-SKGo7W (Accessed: 7 August 2016). Frontex (2013a) EUROSUR Panel Discussion at ED4BG 2013. Poland. Available at: www. youtube.com/watch?v=Ns9gHa3l5zg&list=PL_d1T8plJFX7ImBzsjAnjTk5v9P1Z4gTs& index=2 (Accessed: 7 August 2016). Frontex (2013b) General Report 2012. Warsaw. Available at: http://frontex.europa.eu/ assets/About_Frontex/Governance_documents/Annual_report/2012/EN_General_ Report_2012.pdf (Accessed: 7 August 2016). Frontex (2013c) Update on Central Mediterranean Route, News. Available at: http:// frontex.europa.eu/news/update-on-central-mediterranean-route-5wQPyW (Accessed: 7 August 2016). Frontex (2014a) Frontex Publishes Eastern European Borders Annual Risk Analysis 2014, News. Available at: http://frontex.europa.eu/news/frontex-publishes-eastern-europeanborders-annual-risk-analysis-2014-8pfjcb (Accessed: 7 August 2016). Frontex (2014b) Frontex Publishes Western Balkans Annual Risk Analysis 2014, News.Available at: http://frontex.europa.eu/news/frontex-publishes-western-balkansannual-risk-analysis-2014-fnd3Eh (Accessed: 7 August 2016).

Frontex as protector of EUrope, saviour of lives, and promoter of rights 95 Frontex (2014c) Frontex Risk Analysis Report for Q1 2014 Published, News. Available at: http://frontex.europa.eu/news/frontex-risk-analysis-report-for-q1-2014-publishedLyEPZo (Accessed: 7 August 2016). Frontex (2014d) General Report 2013. Warsaw. Available at: http://frontex.europa.eu/ assets/About_Frontex/Governance_documents/Annual_report/2013/General_Report_ EN.pdf (Accessed: 7 August 2016). Frontex (2014e) Irregular Arrivals Were at Record High in the Third Quarter of 2013, News. Available at: http://frontex.europa.eu/news/irregular-arrivals-were-at-record-highin-the-third-quarter-of-2013-qZCQJR (Accessed: 7 August 2016). Frontex (2015a) 2 400 Migrants Rescued off Libyan Coast before Easter, News Release. Available at: https://frontex.europa.eu/media-centre/news-release/2-400-migrants-rescuedoff-libyan-coast-before-easter-8k1Cj9 (Accessed: 6 June 2020). Frontex (2015b) 23 000 Migrants Arrived in Greece Last Week, News Release. Available at: https://frontex.europa.eu/media-centre/news-release/23-000-migrants-arrived-ingreece-last-week-vQZzyE (Accessed: 6 June 2020). Frontex (2015c) 710 000 Migrants Entered EU in First Nine Months of 2015, News Release. Available at: https://frontex.europa.eu/media-centre/news-release/710-000migrants-entered-eu-in-first-nine-months-of-2015-NUiBkk (Accessed: 5 June 2020). Frontex (2015d) Analysis of W. Balkans: Number of Syrians Quadrupled in Q2, News Release. Available at: https://frontex.europa.eu/media-centre/news-release/analysis-ofw-balkans-number-of-syrians-quadrupled-in-q2-M5wDHk (Accessed: 5 June 2020). Frontex (2015e) Analytical Report for the First Quarter of 2015 Published, News Release. Available at: https://frontex.europa.eu/media-centre/news-release/analytical-report-forthe-first-quarter-of-2015-published-jejDJn (Accessed: 6 June 2020). Frontex (2015f) Assets Deployed in Operation Triton Involved in Saving 3,000 Migrants since Friday, News Release. Available at: https://frontex.europa.eu/media-centre/newsrelease/assets-deployed-in-operation-triton-involved-in-saving-3-000-migrants-sincefriday-xmtkwU (Accessed: 6 June 2020). Frontex (2015g) Body Found Following Shooting Incident Aboard Smuggling Vessel in Greece, News Release. Available at: https://frontex.europa.eu/media-centre/news-release/ body-found-following-shooting-incident-aboard-smuggling-vessel-in-greece-KTWyC0 (Accessed: 6 June 2020). Frontex (2015h) Danish Minister Meets Frontex Executive Director, News Release. Available at: https://frontex.europa.eu/media-centre/news-release/danish-minister-meetsfrontex-executive-director-QV2dpm (Accessed: 6 June 2020). Frontex (2015i) Dramatic Rescue Operation off the Coast of Libya – 29 Dead, News Release. Available at: https://frontex.europa.eu/media-centre/news-release/dramatic-rescueoperation-off-the-coast-of-libya-29-dead-EDomPH. Frontex (2015j) Enlarged Triton Helping Rescue Migrants, News Release. Available at: https://frontex.europa.eu/media-centre/news-release/enlarged-triton-helping-rescuemigrants-jumO29 (Accessed: 6 June 2020). Frontex (2015k) Fabrice Leggeri Takes the Helm at Frontex, News Release. Available at: https://frontex.europa.eu/media-centre/news-release/fabrice-leggeri-takes-the-helm-atfrontex-Z30Vu6 (Accessed: 6 June 2020). Frontex (2015l) Frontex Accepts Greece’s Request for Rapid Border Intervention Teams, News Release. Available at: https://frontex.europa.eu/media-centre/news-release/frontexaccepts-greece-s-request-for-rapid-border-intervention-teams-amcPjC (Accessed: 5 June 2020). Frontex (2015m) Frontex and Greece Agree on Operational Plan for Poseidon Rapid Intervention, News Release. Available at: https://frontex.europa.eu/media-centre/news-release/

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frontex-and-greece-agree-on-operational-plan-for-poseidon-rapid-intervention-yiSxga (Accessed: 6 June 2020). Frontex (2015n) Frontex Asks for Additional 269 Officers for Registering Migrants, News Release. Available at: https://frontex.europa.eu/media-centre/news-release/frontex-asksfor-additional-269-officers-for-registering-migrants-TEddm5 (Accessed: 6 June 2020). Frontex (2015o) Frontex Begins Testing Accelerated Registration Process in Lesbos, News Release. Available at: https://frontex.europa.eu/media-centre/news-release/frontexbegins-testing-accelerated-registration-process-in-lesbos-VLktjw (Accessed: 6 June 2020). Frontex (2015p) Frontex Deeply Engaged in Assisting Greece Handle Incoming Migrants, News Release.Available at: https://frontex.europa.eu/media-centre/news-release/frontexdeeply-engaged-in-assisting-greece-handle-incoming-migrants-dpkw5d (Accessed: 6 June 2020). Frontex (2015q) Frontex Executive Director Saddened by Tragic Deaths of Migrants off Libyan Coast, News Release. Available at: https://frontex.europa.eu/media-centre/newsrelease/frontex-executive-director-saddened-by-tragic-deaths-of-migrants-off-libyancoast-OqEAuf (Accessed: 6 June 2020). Frontex (2015r) Frontex Executive Director Visiting Polish – Russian Border, News Release. Available at: https://frontex.europa.eu/media-centre/news-release/frontexexecutive-director-visiting-polish-russian-border-5O7b90 (Accessed: 6 June 2020). Frontex (2015s) Frontex Expands Its Joint Operation Triton, News Release. Available at: https://frontex.europa.eu/media-centre/news-release/frontex-expands-its-joint-operationtriton-udpbHP (Accessed: 6 June 2020). Frontex (2015t) Frontex Helps Rescue Dozens in the Aegean, News Release. Available at: https://frontex.europa.eu/media-centre/news-release/frontex-helps-rescue-dozens-inthe-aegean-nM85Vj (Accessed: 6 June 2020). Frontex (2015u) Frontex Helps Save 3 400 Migrants off Libyan Coast Last Week, News Release. Available at: https://frontex.europa.eu/media-centre/news-release/frontex-helpssave-3-400-migrants-off-libyan-coast-last-week-QEmmR0 (Accessed: 6 June 2020). Frontex (2015v) Frontex Offers Additional Help to Greece, News Release. Available at: https://frontex.europa.eu/media-centre/news-release/frontex-offers-additional-help-togreece-qeFedV (Accessed: 6 June 2020). Frontex (2015w) Frontex Publishes Annual Risk Analysis 2015, News Release. Available at: https://frontex.europa.eu/media-centre/news-release/frontex-publishes-annual-riskanalysis-2015-lA1x1g (Accessed: 6 June 2020). Frontex (2015x) Frontex Publishes Western Balkans Annual Risk Analysis 2015, News Release. Available at: https://frontex.europa.eu/media-centre/news-release/frontexpublishes-western-balkans-annual-risk-analysis-2015-dCUqfL (Accessed: 5 June 2020). Frontex (2015y) Frontex Ready to Implement European Council Conclusions – Executive Director, News Release. Available at: https://frontex.europa.eu/media-centre/newsrelease/frontex-ready-to-implement-european-council-conclusions-executive-directorfh9MEr (Accessed: 6 June 2020). Frontex (2015z) Frontex Requests More Information on Symi Incident, News Release. Available at: https://frontex.europa.eu/media-centre/news-release/frontex-requestsmore-information-on-symi-incident-YmXP7D (Accessed: 6 June 2020). Frontex (2015aa) Frontex to Implement Border Surveillance Services as Part of Copernicus, News Release. Available at: https://frontex.europa.eu/media-centre/news-release/ frontex-to-implement-border-surveillance-services-as-part-of-copernicus-Z1r4A0 (Accessed: 6 June 2020).

Frontex as protector of EUrope, saviour of lives, and promoter of rights 97 Frontex (2015ab) Frontex to Strengthen Operations in Greece and Launch Additional Activities on Land Borders, News Release. Available at: https://frontex.europa.eu/mediacentre/news-release/frontex-to-strengthen-operations-in-greece-and-launch-additionalactivities-on-land-borders-a21yH2 (Accessed: 6 June 2020). Frontex (2015ac) Frontex Vessel Plays Key Role in Rescue of Hundreds of People off Lesbos, News Release. Available at: https://frontex.europa.eu/media-centre/news-release/ frontex-vessel-plays-key-role-in-rescue-of-hundreds-of-people-off-lesbos-q1cQJ3 (Accessed: 6 June 2020). Frontex (2015ad) Frontex Vessel Rescues 487 Migrants in Italy Over the Weekend, News Release. Available at: https://frontex.europa.eu/media-centre/news-release/frontex-vesselrescues-487-migrants-in-italy-over-the-weekend-haWei2 (Accessed: 6 June 2020). Frontex (2015ae) Greece Asks Frontex for Rapid Intervention Teams in the Aegean Islands, News Release. Available at: https://frontex.europa.eu/media-centre/news-release/greeceasks-frontex-for-rapid-intervention-teams-in-the-aegean-islands-0swm9L. Frontex (2015af) ICGV Týr Conducts Search and Rescue of 450 Migrants, News Release. Available at: https://frontex.europa.eu/media-centre/news-release/icgv-tyr-conductssearch-and-rescue-of-450-migrants-GYoKNV (Accessed: 6 June 2020). Frontex (2015ag) Joint Operation Triton Extended to the End of 2015, News Release. Available at: https://frontex.europa.eu/media-centre/news-release/joint-operation-tritonextended-to-the-end-of-2015-NXCwpk (Accessed: 4 September 2018). Frontex (2015ah) Member States Provide 291 Border Guards to Frontex to Be Deployed in Greece, Italy, News Release. Available at: https://frontex.europa.eu/media-centre/ news-release/member-states-provide-291-border-guards-to-frontex-to-be-deployed-ingreece-italy-2tVnYY (Accessed: 6 June 2020). Frontex (2015ai) Migrants Forced to Board Inflatable Rafts at Gunpoint, News Release. Available at: https://frontex.europa.eu/media-centre/news-release/migrants-forced-toboard-inflatable-rafts-at-gunpoint-bvmRKT (Accessed: 6 June 2020). Frontex (2015aj) Monthly Analysis of Migratory Trends – May 2015, News Release. Available at: https://frontex.europa.eu/media-centre/news-release/monthly-analysis-ofmigratory-trends-may-2015-f02aLN (Accessed: 6 June 2020). Frontex (2015ak) More than 500 000 Migrants Detected at EU External Borders So Far This Year, News Release. Available at: https://frontex.europa.eu/media-centre/newsrelease/more-than-500-000-migrants-detected-at-eu-external-borders-so-far-this-yearfGa82v (Accessed: 6 June 2020). Frontex (2015al) Number of Migrants in One Month Above 100 000 for First Time, News Release. Available at: https://frontex.europa.eu/media-centre/news-release/number-ofmigrants-in-one-month-above-100-000-for-first-time-I9MlIo (Accessed: 6 June 2020). Frontex (2015am) Record Number of Migrants Enter Greece in July, News Release. Available at: https://frontex.europa.eu/media-centre/news-release/record-number-ofmigrants-enter-greece-in-july-dMt39y (Accessed: 6 June 2020). Frontex (2015an) Smugglers Fire Shots in Migrant Rescue Operation, News Release. Available at: https://frontex.europa.eu/media-centre/news-release/smugglers-fire-shotsin-migrant-rescue-operation-yrzoyZ (Accessed: 6 June 2020). Frontex (2015ao) Swedish Vessel Rammed by Suspected Smugglers, News Release. Available at: https://frontex.europa.eu/media-centre/news-release/swedish-vessel-rammed-bysuspected-smugglers-45qPNK (Accessed: 6 June 2020). Frontex (2015ap) The Netherlands Foreign Affairs Minister Visits Frontex, News Release. Available at: https://frontex.europa.eu/media-centre/news-release/the-netherlands-foreignaffairs-minister-visits-frontex-GF49xb (Accessed: 6 June 2020).

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Frontex (2015aq) VEGA Children 2015 Helps Crack Down on Child Trafficking, News Release. Available at: https://frontex.europa.eu/media-centre/news-release/vega-children2015-helps-crack-down-on-child-trafficking-YJPBAR (Accessed: 6 June 2020). Frontex (2016a) 13 800 Migrants Rescued in Central Med Last Week, News Release. Available at: https://frontex.europa.eu/media-centre/news-release/13-800-migrants-rescuedin-central-med-last-week-ACfEBV (Accessed: 6 June 2020). Frontex (2016b) 5 900 People Saved in Dramatic Rescue Operations off Libyan Coast, News Release. Available at: https://frontex.europa.eu/media-centre/news-release/5-900people-saved-in-dramatic-rescue-operations-off-libyan-coast-hSgsmj (Accessed: 6 June 2020). Frontex (2016c) Central Med Remained under Migratory Pressure in May. Available at: https://frontex.europa.eu/media-centre/news-release/central-med-remained-undermigratory-pressure-in-may-9Wtxug (Accessed: 6 June 2020). Frontex (2016d) European Border and Coast Guard Agency Publishes Analysis for Western Balkans for Q2, News Release. Available at: https://frontex.europa.eu/media-centre/ news-release/european-border-and-coast-guard-agency-publishes-analysis-for-westernbalkans-for-q2-PQNvaH (Accessed: 6 June 2020). Frontex (2016e) European Fisheries Control Agency (EFCA) and Frontex Agree on Closer Cooperation, News Release. Available at: https://frontex.europa.eu/media-centre/newsrelease/european-fisheries-control-agency-efca-and-frontex-agree-on-closer-cooperation6LRXrc (Accessed: 6 June 2020). Frontex (2016f) EURTF Office in Catania Inaugurated, News Release. Available at: https:// frontex.europa.eu/media-centre/news-release/eurtf-office-in-catania-inaugurated-fcQoSr (Accessed: 6 June 2020). Frontex (2016g) FRAN Quarterly: Illegal Crossings Down in the First Quarter of 2016, News Release. Available at: https://frontex.europa.eu/media-centre/news-release/franquarterly-illegal-crossings-down-in-the-first-quarter-of-2016-Cc5040 (Accessed: 6 June 2020). Frontex (2016h) FRAN Quarterly – Number of Illegal Border-Crossings at Record High in Q4, News Release. Available at: https://frontex.europa.eu/media-centre/news-release/ fran-quarterly-number-of-illegal-border-crossings-at-record-high-in-q4-tRfbnB (Accessed: 6 June 2020). Frontex (2016i) Frontex, EMSA and EFCA Extend Cooperation, News Release. Available at: https://frontex.europa.eu/media-centre/news-release/frontex-emsa-and-efca-extendcooperation-eIXD0P (Accessed: 6 June 2020). Frontex (2016j) Frontex Assists Greece in Transporting 202 Migrants to Turkey, News Release. Available at: https://frontex.europa.eu/media-centre/news-release/frontex-assists-greecein-transporting-202-migrants-to-turkey-ysX0nX (Accessed: 6 June 2020). Frontex (2016k) Frontex Assists Greece in Transporting Migrants to Turkey, News Release. Available at: https://frontex.europa.eu/media-centre/news-release/frontex-assists-greecein-transporting-migrants-to-turkey-QqtvpJ (Accessed: 6 June 2020). Frontex (2016l) Frontex Boosts Efforts to Help Combat Cross-border Crime, News Release. Available at: https://frontex.europa.eu/media-centre/news-release/frontex-boosts-effortsto-help-combat-cross-border-crime-sdIwK8 (Accessed: 6 June 2020). Frontex (2016m) Frontex Director Addresses Europol Management Board, News Release. Available at: https://frontex.europa.eu/media-centre/news-release/frontex-directoraddresses-europol-management-board-GlGjco (Accessed: 6 June 2020). Frontex (2016n) Frontex Executive Director to Meet NATO Secretary General and EU Commissioner Avramopoulos. Available at: https://frontex.europa.eu/media-centre/news-

Frontex as protector of EUrope, saviour of lives, and promoter of rights 99 release/frontex-executive-director-to-meet-nato-secretary-general-and-eu-commissioneravramopoulos-XBP2KN (Accessed: 5 June 2020). Frontex (2016o) Frontex Helps Train Libyan Coast Guard, News Release. Available at: https://frontex.europa.eu/media-centre/news-release/frontex-helps-train-libyan-coastguard-zxRCnE (Accessed: 6 June 2020). Frontex (2016p) Frontex Hosts Ambassadors in Warsaw, News Release. Available at: https://frontex.europa.eu/media-centre/news-release/frontex-hosts-ambassadors-inwarsaw-kBvUZo (Accessed: 6 June 2020). Frontex (2016q) Frontex Hosts Meeting of Africa-Frontex Intelligence Community (AFIC), News Release. Available at: https://frontex.europa.eu/media-centre/news-release/frontexhosts-meeting-of-africa-frontex-intelligence-community-afic – PnHfGe (Accessed: 6 June 2020). Frontex (2016r) Frontex Organises Workshop for Monitors of Joint Return Operations, News Release. Available at: https://frontex.europa.eu/media-centre/news-release/frontexorganises-workshop-for-monitors-of-joint-return-operations-2s0swb (Accessed: 6 June 2020). Frontex (2016s) Frontex Presents Guide on Access to the Asylum Procedure on World Refugee Day, News Release. Available at: https://frontex.europa.eu/media-centre/newsrelease/frontex-presents-guide-on-access-to-the-asylum-procedure-on-world-refugeeday-bePNdo (Accessed: 6 June 2020). Frontex (2016t) Frontex Publishes Risk Analysis for 2016, News Release. Available at: https://frontex.europa.eu/media-centre/news-release/frontex-publishes-risk-analysisfor-2016-NQuBFv (Accessed: 6 June 2020). Frontex (2016u) Frontex Trains Screening Officers in Riga, News Release. Available at: https://frontex.europa.eu/media-centre/news-release/frontex-trains-screening-officersin-riga-QSurjP (Accessed: 6 June 2020). Frontex (2016v) General Report 2015. doi: 10.2823/56587. Frontex (2016w) Italy Remained under Migratory Pressure in November, News Release. Available at: https://frontex.europa.eu/media-centre/news-release/italy-remained-undermigratory-pressure-in-november-WeeHRo (Accessed: 6 June 2020). Frontex (2016x) Number of Migrants Arriving in Greece Down 40% in January, News Release. Available at: https://frontex.europa.eu/media-centre/news-release/number-ofmigrants-arriving-in-greece-down-40-in-january-x3gZWu (Accessed: 6 June 2020). Frontex (2016y) Number of Migrants Arriving in Greece Dropped in March, News Release. Available at: https://frontex.europa.eu/media-centre/news-release/number-of-migrantsarriving-in-greece-dropped-in-march-aInDt3 (Accessed: 6 June 2020). Frontex (2016z) Number of Migrants Arriving in Italy Up 12% in July, News Release. Available at: https://frontex.europa.eu/media-centre/news-release/number-of-migrantsarriving-in-italy-up-12-in-july-Nkrpt5 (Accessed: 6 June 2020). Frontex (2016aa) Record Number of Migrants Reached Italy in October, News Release. Available at: https://frontex.europa.eu/media-centre/news-release/record-number-ofmigrants-reached-italy-in-october-sc99xk (Accessed: 6 June 2020). Frontex (2016ab) Share of Syrians Arriving on Greek Islands Has Fallen in Recent Months, News Release. Available at: https://frontex.europa.eu/media-centre/news-release/shareof-syrians-arriving-on-greek-islands-has-fallen-in-recent-months-POQt0V (Accessed: 6 June 2020). Frontex (2016ac) Split Hosts First European Coast Guard Exercise, News Release. Available at: https://frontex.europa.eu/media-centre/news-release/split-hosts-first-europeancoast-guard-exercise-bVl0ZR (Accessed: 6 June 2020).

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Frontex (2016ad) Third Annual Report of Frontex Consultative Forum on Fundamental Rights Published, News Release. Available at: https://frontex.europa.eu/media-centre/ news-release/third-annual-report-of-frontex-consultative-forum-on-fundamental-rightspublished-RpreBJ (Accessed: 6 June 2020). Frontex (2016ae) Two Years of Capacity Building in Eastern Partnership Countries, News Release. Available at: https://frontex.europa.eu/media-centre/news-release/two-yearsof-capacity-building-in-eastern-partnership-countries-BsR4zF (Accessed: 6 June 2020). Frontex (2017a) 5 Vessels Deployed by Frontex Engaged in Rescue Operations in Central Mediterranean, News Release. Available at: https://frontex.europa.eu/media-centre/ news-release/5-vessels-deployed-by-frontex-engaged-in-rescue-operations-in-centralmediterranean-sJnCVI (Accessed: 6 June 2020). Frontex (2017b) Annual Activity Report 2016. Warsaw: Frontex. Available at: https:// rm.coe.int/168070ad23. Frontex (2017c) Annual Report of the Frontex Consultative Forum on Fundamental Rights Published, News Release. Available at: https://frontex.europa.eu/media-centre/ news-release/annual-report-of-the-frontex-consultative-forum-on-fundamental-rightspublished-V2Fmoa (Accessed: 6 June 2020). Frontex (2017d) Call for Extended Abstracts for Conference and Exhibition on Biometrics, News Release. Available at: https://frontex.europa.eu/media-centre/news-release/callfor-extended-abstracts-for-conference-and-exhibition-on-biometrics-htB7uc (Accessed: 6 June 2020). Frontex (2017e) EU Member States and Frontex Show Support for Italy at Meeting to Discuss Operation Triton, News Release. Available at: https://frontex.europa.eu/mediacentre/news-release/eu-member-states-and-frontex-show-support-for-italy-at-meetingto-discuss-operation-triton-BQUaRu (Accessed: 6 June 2020). Frontex (2017f) Experts Meet to Tackle Document Fraud, News Release. Available at: https://frontex.europa.eu/media-centre/news-release/experts-meet-to-tackle-documentfraud-kYuGEl (Accessed: 6 June 2020). Frontex (2017g) First Ship with Multinational Crew Joins Frontex Operation, News Release. Available at: https://frontex.europa.eu/media-centre/news-release/first-shipwith-multinational-crew-joins-frontex-operation-wz2nlo (Accessed: 6 June 2020). Frontex (2017h) Frontex, EFCA and EMSA Present Results of Pilot Project ‘Creation of a European Coastguard Function’, News Release. Available at: https://frontex.europa. eu/media-centre/news-release/frontex-efca-and-emsa-present-results-of-pilot-projectcreation-of-a-european-coastguard-function – xvNGeM (Accessed: 6 June 2020). Frontex (2017i) Frontex, the European Border and Coast Guard Agency, After One Year, News Release. Available at: https://frontex.europa.eu/media-centre/news-release/frontexthe-european-border-and-coast-guard-agency-after-one-year-BJMHvS (Accessed: 6 June 2020). Frontex (2017j) Frontex and Italy Hold First Meeting of Working Group on Operation Triton, News Release. Available at: https://frontex.europa.eu/media-centre/news-release/ frontex-and-italy-hold-first-meeting-of-working-group-on-operation-triton-0qdvsf (Accessed: 6 June 2020). Frontex (2017k) Frontex and Partners Evaluate IPAII Project and Plan Way Ahead, News Release. Available at: https://frontex.europa.eu/media-centre/news-release/frontex-andpartners-evaluate-ipaii-project-and-plan-way-ahead-vvQcFr (Accessed: 6 June 2020). Frontex (2017l) Frontex Celebrates Europe Day, News Release. Available at: https:// frontex.europa.eu/media-centre/news-release/frontex-celebrates-europe-day-ygeRDA (Accessed: 6 June 2020).

Frontex as protector of EUrope, saviour of lives, and promoter of rights 101 Frontex (2017m) Frontex Creates a New Pool of Return Experts, News Release. Available at: https://frontex.europa.eu/media-centre/news-release/frontex-creates-a-new-pool-ofreturn-experts-yWWYG1 (Accessed: 6 June 2020). Frontex (2017n) Frontex Director Leggeri Visits Spain to Discuss Operational Coordination, News Release. Available at: https://frontex.europa.eu/media-centre/news-release/ frontex-director-leggeri-visits-spain-to-discuss-operational-coordination-FKklpT (Accessed: 6 June 2020). Frontex (2017o) Frontex Executive Director Acknowledges Frontex Consultative Forum Report, News Release.Available at: https://frontex.europa.eu/media-centre/news-release/ frontex-executive-director-acknowledges-frontex-consultative-forum-report-KZg6Dl (Accessed: 15 May 2020). Frontex (2017p) Frontex Executive Director on Official Visit to Niger, News Release. Available at: https://frontex.europa.eu/media-centre/news-release/frontex-executivedirector-on-official-visit-to-niger-6LTRB6 (Accessed: 6 June 2020). Frontex (2017q) Frontex Helps Italy Track Down People Smugglers, News Release. Available at: https://frontex.europa.eu/media-centre/news-release/frontex-helps-italy-trackdown-people-smugglers-3wtAmW (Accessed: 6 June 2020). Frontex (2017r) Frontex Holds 23rd International Border Police Conference, News Release. Available at: https://frontex.europa.eu/media-centre/news-release/frontex-holds23rd-international-border-police-conference-SaIsg2 (Accessed: 6 June 2020). Frontex (2017s) Frontex Hosts 8th European Day for Border Guards, News Release. Available at: https://frontex.europa.eu/media-centre/news-release/frontex-hosts-8theuropean-day-for-border-guards-lhjRAI (Accessed: 6 June 2020). Frontex (2017t) Frontex Hosts Expert Group on Document Fraud, News Release. Available at: https://frontex.europa.eu/media-centre/news-release/frontex-hosts-expert-group-ondocument-fraud-RdATdJ (Accessed: 6 June 2020). Frontex (2017u) Frontex Hosts Workshop on Return Operations as Part of IPAII Project, News Release. Available at: https://frontex.europa.eu/media-centre/news-release/ frontex-hosts-workshop-on-return-operations-as-part-of-ipaii-project-0a30sZ (Accessed: 6 June 2020). Frontex (2017v) Frontex Publishes Risk Analysis for 2017, News Release. Available at: https://frontex.europa.eu/media-centre/news-release/frontex-publishes-risk-analysisfor-2017-CpJiC8 (Accessed: 6 June 2020). Frontex (2017w) Frontex Rescues More than 1400 Migrants Over Easter Weekend, News Release. Available at: https://frontex.europa.eu/media-centre/news-release/frontex-rescuesmore-than-1400-migrants-over-easter-weekend-l88LOD (Accessed: 6 June 2020). Frontex (2017x) Joint EASO-Frontex Management Board Session Held in Malta, News Release. Available at: https://frontex.europa.eu/media-centre/news-release/joint-easofrontex-management-board-session-held-in-malta-V9jX1q (Accessed: 6 June 2020). Frontex (2017y) Migratory Flows in July: Numbers Fall in Italy, Remain High in Spain, News Release. Available at: https://frontex.europa.eu/media-centre/news-release/ migratory-flows-in-july-numbers-fall-in-italy-remain-high-in-spain-XBhJTt (Accessed: 6 June 2020). Frontex (2017z) Migratory Flows in October: Overall Levels Remain Low; Spain Arrivals Soar, News Release. Available at: https://frontex.europa.eu/media-centre/news-release/ migratory-flows-in-october-overall-levels-remain-low-spain-arrivals-soar-tGrQTZ (Accessed: 6 June 2020). Frontex (2017aa) Migratory Flows in September: Arrivals in Italy Lower than a Year Ago, More Departures from Tunisia and Algeria, News Release. Available at: https://frontex.europa.eu/

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media-centre/news-release/migratory-flows-in-september-arrivals-in-italy-lower-than-ayear-ago-more-departures-from-tunisia-and-algeria-i4mfbI (Accessed: 6 June 2020). Frontex (2017ab) Risk Analysis for 2017. Varšava: Frontex. Available at: http://poznam. mnz.sigov.si/skmp/images/abook_file/annual_risk_analysis_2017.pdf (Accessed: 4 September 2018). Frontex (2017ac) Three-day Long Coast Guard Exercise Takes Place in Troia, Portugal, News Release. Available at: https://frontex.europa.eu/media-centre/news-release/three-day-longcoast-guard-exercise-takes-place-in-troia-portugal-zydgfw (Accessed: 6 June 2020). Frontex (2017ad) Vessels Deployed by Frontex Help Rescue 2 800 People in Central Mediterranean, News Release. Available at: https://frontex.europa.eu/media-centre/newsrelease/vessels-deployed-by-frontex-help-rescue-2-800-people-in-central-mediterraneanIzHwua (Accessed: 6 June 2020). Frontex (2018a) Border Management Cooperation in the Mediterranean Region Takes Centre Stage at Frontex Conference, News Release. Available at: https://frontex.europa. eu/media-centre/news-release/border-management-cooperation-in-the-mediterraneanregion-takes-centre-stage-at-frontex-conference-TqTTCo (Accessed: 6 June 2020). Frontex (2018b) Europol and Frontex Strengthen Cooperation to Tackle Cross Border Crime, News Release. Available at: https://frontex.europa.eu/media-centre/news-release/ europol-and-frontex-strengthen-cooperation-to-tackle-cross-border-crime-kamkNJ (Accessed: 6 June 2020). Frontex (2018c) ‘Frontex Annual Activity Report 2017’. Frontex (2018d) Frontex Begins Testing Unmanned Aircraft for Border Surveillance, News Release. Available at: https://frontex.europa.eu/media-centre/news-release/frontex-beginstesting-unmanned-aircraft-for-border-surveillance-zSQ26A (Accessed: 7 July 2020). Frontex (2018e) Frontex Concludes Four-Year Eastern Partnership Project, News Release. Available at: https://frontex.europa.eu/media-centre/news-release/frontex-concludesfour-year-eastern-partnership-project-YRfU0z (Accessed: 6 June 2020). Frontex (2018f) Frontex Conference to Boost Cooperation at Europe’s Air Borders, News Release. Available at: https://frontex.europa.eu/media-centre/news-release/frontexconference-to-boost-cooperation-at-europe-s-air-borders-gf9f4j (Accessed: 6 June 2020). Frontex (2018g) Frontex Consultative Forum Publishes Annual Report, News Release. Available at: https://frontex.europa.eu/media-centre/news-release/frontex-consultativeforum-publishes-annual-report-F7lVzY (Accessed: 6 June 2020). Frontex (2018h) Frontex Executive Director Acknowledges Frontex Consultative Forum Report, News Release.Available at: https://frontex.europa.eu/media-centre/news-release/ frontex-executive-director-acknowledges-frontex-consultative-forum-report-yXx5jQ. Frontex (2018i) Frontex Hosts European Border and Coast Guard Day to Discuss Security at Sea, News Release. Available at: https://frontex.europa.eu/media-centre/news-release/ frontex-hosts-european-border-and-coast-guard-day-to-discuss-security-at-sea-vb539m (Accessed: 6 June 2020). Frontex (2018j) Frontex Launching New Operation in Central Med, News Release. Available at: https://frontex.europa.eu/media-centre/news-release/frontex-launching-newoperation-in-central-med-yKqSc7 (Accessed: 6 June 2020). Frontex (2018k) Frontex Marks Two Years as the European Border and Coast Guard Agency, News Release. Available at: https://frontex.europa.eu/media-centre/newsrelease/frontex-marks-two-years-as-the-european-border-and-coast-guard-agencyECWley (Accessed: 6 June 2020). Frontex (2018l) Frontex Publishes Risk Analysis for 2018, News Release. Available at: https://frontex.europa.eu/media-centre/news-release/frontex-publishes-risk-analysisfor-2018-9UxpCV (Accessed: 6 June 2020).

Frontex as protector of EUrope, saviour of lives, and promoter of rights 103 Frontex (2018m) Frontex Teams Up with EUNAVFOR Med and Europol to Track Down Cross-border Crime, News Release. Available at: https://frontex.europa.eu/mediacentre/news-release/frontex-teams-up-with-eunavfor-med-and-europol-to-track-downcross-border-crime-v8oqKs (Accessed: 6 June 2020). Frontex (2018n) Migratory Flows in 2017 – Pressure Eased on Italy and Greece; Spain Saw Record Numbers, News Release. Available at: https://frontex.europa.eu/mediacentre/news-release/migratory-flows-in-2017-pressure-eased-on-italy-and-greece-spainsaw-record-numbers-QK2Wcw (Accessed: 6 June 2020). Frontex (2018o) Migratory Flows in April: Overall Drop, but More Detections in Greece and Spain, News Release. Available at: https://frontex.europa.eu/media-centre/newsrelease/migratory-flows-in-april-overall-drop-but-more-detections-in-greece-andspain-OGO6LA (Accessed: 6 June 2020). Frontex (2018p) Migratory Flows in November: Total Lower, Western Mediterranean the Most Active Route, News Release. Frontex (2019a) COASTEX 2019 Exercise, News Release. Available at: https://frontex.europa. eu/media-centre/news-release/coastex-2019-exercise-r6JjjB (Accessed: 30 June 2020). Frontex (2019b) ‘Consolidated Annual Activity Report’. Available at: https://frontex.europa. eu/assets/Key_Documents/Annual_report/2018/Annual_Activity_Report_2018.pdf. Frontex (2019c) EU Agencies Join 10-Year Anniversary of EU’s Fundamental Rights Charter, News Release. Available at: https://frontex.europa.eu/media-centre/newsrelease/eu-agencies-join-10-year-anniversary-of-eu-s-fundamental-rights-charter-oSO1Jx (Accessed: 30 June 2020). Frontex (2019d) European Border and Coast Guard Agency (Frontex) Involved in Search and Rescue Operation off Lesvos, News Release. Available at: https://frontex.europa.eu/ media-centre/news-release/european-border-and-coast-guard-agency-frontex-involvedin-search-and-rescue-operation-off-lesvos-Q3sC4e (Accessed: 7 July 2020). Frontex (2019e) Frontex Begins Testing Use of Aerostat for Border Surveillance, News Release. Available at: https://frontex.europa.eu/media-centre/news-release/frontexbegins-testing-use-of-aerostat-for-border-surveillance-ur33N8 (Accessed: 30 June 2020). Frontex (2019f) Frontex Condemns Any Form of Inhumane Treatment and Violence, News Release. Available at: https://frontex.europa.eu/media-centre/news-release/frontexcondemns-any-form-of-inhumane-treatment-and-violence-KDNxb6 (Accessed: 30 June 2020). Frontex (2019g) Frontex Consultative Forum Publishes Annual Report, News Release. Frontex (2019h) Frontex Executive Director Acknowledges Frontex Consultative Forum Report, News Release. Available at: https://frontex.europa.eu/media-centre/newsrelease/frontex-executive-director-acknowledges-frontex-consultative-forum-reportHyMHML (Accessed: 30 June 2020). Frontex (2019i) Frontex Holds Workshop on Traveller Risk Assessment at Amsterdam’s Schiphol Airport, News Release. Available at: https://frontex.europa.eu/media-centre/ news-release/frontex-holds-workshop-on-traveller-risk-assessment-at-amsterdam-sschiphol-airport-b2tL09 (Accessed: 6 June 2020). Frontex (2019j) Frontex Hosts Conference on Biometrics in Warsaw, News Release. Available at: https://frontex.europa.eu/media-centre/news-release/frontex-hosts-conferenceon-biometrics-in-warsaw-889K4E (Accessed: 6 June 2020). Frontex (2019k) Frontex Opens First Risk Analysis Cell in Niger, News Release. Available at: https://frontex.europa.eu/media-centre/news-release/frontex-opens-first-risk-analysiscell-in-niger-HQIoKi (Accessed: 6 June 2020). Frontex (2019l) Frontex Opens Risk Analysis Cell in Senegal, News Release. Available at: https://frontex.europa.eu/media-centre/news-release/frontex-opens-risk-analysis-cellin-senegal-6nkN3B (Accessed: 6 June 2020).

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Frontex (2019m) Frontex Teams Up with INTERPOL to Track Down Foreign Terrorist Fighters, News Release. Available at: https://frontex.europa.eu/media-centre/news-release/ frontex-teams-up-with-interpol-to-track-down-foreign-terrorist-fighters-9SedgZ (Accessed: 6 June 2020). Frontex (2019n) Frontex Testing the Future of Border Checks at Lisbon Airport, News Release. Available at: https://frontex.europa.eu/media-centre/news-release/frontex-testingthe-future-of-border-checks-at-lisbon-airport-DI84r4 (Accessed: 6 June 2020). Frontex (2019o) Frontex Trained 250 Experts from Western Balkans and Turkey, News Release. Frontex (2019p) Migratory Situation in April – Fewer Migrants Reach Europe, News Release. Available at: https://frontex.europa.eu/media-centre/news-release/migratorysituation-in-april-fewer-migrants-reach-europe-l3XvUn (Accessed: 6 June 2020). Frontex (2019q) Migratory Situation in August – Slight Increase on Main Migratory Routes, News Release. Available at: https://frontex.europa.eu/media-centre/news-release/migratorysituation-in-august-slight-increase-on-main-migratory-routes-2Xmzlk (Accessed: 6 June 2020). Frontex (2019r) Migratory Situation in July – Arrivals in Europe Up Slightly from Previous Month, News Release. Frontex (2019s) Migratory Situation in June – Arrivals in Europe Rise Slightly, News Release. https://frontex.europa.eu/media-centre/news-release/migratory-situation-in-junearrivals-in-europe-rise-slightly-wk1wkx. Frontex (2019t) Migratory Situation in September – Eastern Mediterranean Accounts for Most Arrivals, News Release. Available at: https://frontex.europa.eu/media-centre/ news-release/migratory-situation-in-september-eastern-mediterranean-accounts-formost-arrivals-jB1gtA (Accessed: 6 June 2020). Frontex (2019u) New Frontex Regulation Comes into Force, News Release. Available at: https://frontex.europa.eu/media-centre/news-release/new-frontex-regulationcomes-into-force-S0luwe (Accessed: 30 June 2020). Frontex (2019v) Number of Irregular Crossings at Europe’s Borders at Lowest Level in 5 Years, News Release. Available at: https://frontex.europa.eu/media-centre/news-release/ number-of-irregular-crossings-at-europe-s-borders-at-lowest-level-in-5-years-ZfkoRu (Accessed: 6 June 2020). Frontex (2019w) Smart Borders: Bringing Frontex and Customs Closer Together, News Release. Available at: https://frontex.europa.eu/media-centre/news-release/smart-bordersbringing-frontex-and-customs-closer-together-AzessI (Accessed: 6 June 2020). Frontex Consultative Forum on Fundamental Rights (2015) Second Annual Report. Warsaw. Available at: http://frontex.europa.eu/assets/Partners/Consultative_Forum_files/ Frontex_Consultative_Forum_annual_report_2014.pdf (Accessed: 7 August 2016). Guild, E. and Bigo, D. (2010) ‘The Transformation of European Border Controls’, in Ryan, B. and Mitsilegas, V. (eds) Extraterritorial Immigration Control: Legal Challenges. Leiden, The Netherlands: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, pp. 257–278. Hajer, M. A. (1993) ‘Discourse Coalitions and the Institutionalization of Practice: The Case of Acid Rain in Great Britain’, in Fischer, F. and Forester, J. (eds) The Argumentative Turn in Policy Analysis and Planning. London: UCL Press, pp. 43–76. Harper, R. H. R. (1998) Inside the IMF: An Ethnography of Documents, Technology and Organisational Action. Available at: http://books.google.com/books?hl=en&lr=&id= 6fc9VgWiQB4C&pgis=1. Heller, C. and Pezzani, L. (2017) Blaming the Rescuers. Available at: https://blamingtherescuers. org/report/ (Accessed: 13 February 2020).

Frontex as protector of EUrope, saviour of lives, and promoter of rights 105 Human Rights Watch (2005) World Report 2005. New York. Available at: www.hrw.org/ legacy/wr2k5/wr2005.pdf (Accessed: 7 August 2016). Human Rights Watch (2009) Pushed Back, Pushed Around: Italy’s Forced Return of Boat Migrants and Asylum Seekers, Libya’s Mistreatment of Migrants and Asylum Seeker. New York. Available at: www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/reports/italy0909web_0.pdf (Accessed: 7 August 2016). Huysmans, J. (2014) Security Unbound: Enacting Democratic Limits. London and New York: Routledge. Huysmans, J. and Buonfino, A. (2008) ‘Politics of Exception and Unease: Immigration, Asylum and Terrorism in Parliamentary Debates in the UK’, Political Studies, 56(4), pp. 766–788. doi: 10.1111/j.1467-9248.2008.00721.x. Klepp, S. (2010) ‘A Contested Asylum System: The European Union between Refugee Protection and Border Control in the Mediterranean Sea’, European Journal of Migration and Law, 12(1), pp. 1–21. Morehouse, C. and Blomfield, M. (2011) Irregular Migration in Europe. Washington, DC: Migration Policy Institute. Available at: www.migrationpolicy.org/pubs/TCMirregularmigration.pdf (Accessed: 7 August 2016). Neal, A. W. (2009) ‘Securitization and Risk at the EU Border: The Origins of FRONTEX’, JCMS: Journal of Common Market Studies, 47(2), pp. 333–356. Pallister-Wilkins, P. (2015) ‘The Humanitarian Politics of European Border Policing: Frontex and Border Police in Evros’, International Political Sociology, 9(1), pp. 53–69. doi: 10.1111/ips.12076. Perkowski, N. and Squire, V. (2019) ‘The Anti-Policy of European Anti-Smuggling as a Site of Contestation in the Mediterranean Migration “Crisis”’, Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies, 45(12), pp. 2167–2184. Pugh, M. (2004) ‘Drowning Not Waving: Boat People and Humanitarianism at Sea’, Journal of Refugee Studies, 17(1), pp. 50–69. Rijpma, J. J. (2010) Frontex: Successful Blame Shifting of the Member States, Análisis del Real Instituto Elcano (ARI). Available at: www.realinstitutoelcano.org/wps/portal/rielcano_eng/Content?WCM_GLOBAL_CONTEXT=/elcano/elcano_in/zonas_in/ari692010 (Accessed: 7 August 2016). Robinson, D. (2016a) ‘Death in the Mediterranean: The Role of NGOs’, Financial Times, 15 December. Available at: www.ft.com/content/e294e3d1-e754-3a9d-ab53-b87359a330ca (Accessed: 13 February 2020). Robinson, D. (2016b) ‘EU Border Force Flags Concerns over Charities’ Interaction with Migrant Smugglers’, Financial Times, 15 December. Available at: www.ft.com/ content/3e6b6450-c1f7-11e6-9bca-2b93a6856354 (Accessed: 10 September 2018). Stachowitch, S. and Sachseder, J. (2019) ‘The gendered and racialized politics of risk analysis. The case of Frontex’, Critical Studies on Security 7(2), pp. 107–23. Times of Malta (2011) ‘Italy Fears “Biblical” Immigrant Exodus’, Times of Malta, 24 February. Available at: www.timesofmalta.com/articles/view/20110224/world/italy-fearsbiblical-immigrant-exodus-february-24-2011.351723 (Accessed: 7 August 2016). Tsianos, V. and Hess, S. (2010) ‘Ethnographische Grenzregimeanalyse’, in Hess, S. and Kasparek, B. (eds) Grenzregime: Diskurse, Praktiken, Institutionen in Europa, 2nd edn. Berlin and Hamburg: Assoziation A, pp. 243–264. Wayback Machine (2020) Internet Archive: Wayback Machine. Available at: https:// archive.org/web/ (Accessed: 6 June 2020).

4

Frontex as a fragmented organisation

The previous chapters provided two different “takes” on Frontex, looking at the agency through the history of its foundation on the one hand, and through its published documents on the other. This chapter will complement the preceding perspectives with a third way of knowing Frontex. Drawing on findings from interviews, participant observation, and informal conversations, it moves beyond Frontex’s organisational narrative vis-à-vis the public and complicates its portrayal as a unitary, rational actor. Instead, it suggests that Frontex can be understood as a fragmented (or decoupled) organisation situated in a highly contested field, which is subject to diverse and at times contradictory pressures from the outside. This relates, of course, to the history of the agency’s foundation as it was presented in Chapter 2. Rather than seeing Frontex as the product of its stakeholders’ interests, however, it allows for a more nuanced conceptualisation of how those working for and with the agency portray and actively negotiate the agency’s positioning in the EUropean border regime. As discussed in the Introduction, my access to Frontex remained limited throughout my research, and insights presented in this Chapter offer glimpses into the agency rather than a fully-fledged organisational analysis. While I was only able to spend short periods of time in Frontex’s headquarters, at Frontex events, and in joint operations in Bulgaria and Italy, the data gathered in these dispersed locations and with diverse people meaningfully complements and complicates the data presented in the previous chapters, providing an additional perspective of the agency through the accounts of those working for and with Frontex. The chapter begins with a brief note on the specific temporal context in which the research took place. This is followed by an examination of the organisational narrative emerging in Frontex’s headquarters, and positions taken by guest officers in Bulgaria and Italy. After outlining the research findings across these different locations, I will draw on new institutionalism to discuss discrepancies and continuities across the research sites. Most importantly, I will argue that Frontex is a highly fragmented organisation and that inconsistencies between different parts of the organisation reflect inconsistencies and contradictions in its wider environment.

The research context As outlined in the Introduction, the research this chapter is based on was conducted between December 2013 and September 2014. Before delving into the discussion

Frontex as a fragmented organisation 107 of how those working for and with Frontex understood the agency’s role, it is useful to recap the wider political context in which the following interviews and observations took place. Frontex’s mandate had been extended in 2011, and as a result, the Fundamental Rights Officer was appointed in December 2012 and the Consultative Forum on Fundamental Rights established in September 2012. In April 2013, the European Commission put forward new guidelines for sea operations conducted by Frontex, specifying in particular search and rescue procedures. Greece, Spain, France, Italy, Cyprus and Malta initially opposed the proposal, which eventually entered into force on July 17, 2014.1 The attention to the issue of search and rescue further intensified with the deaths of 365 people off the coast of Lampedusa on October 3, 2013, followed by the deaths of more than 200 people in a second shipwreck eight days later. In response to the 3rd of October shipwreck, Commissioner Malmström called for the deployment of “an extensive Frontex search and rescue operation that [would] cover the Mediterranean from Cyprus to Spain” (Malmström, 2013). According to her, such an operation would prevent further losses of lives at sea by improving the possibilities to identify, track and rescue small boats. The Commission-led “Task Force Mediterranean” set up in response to the deaths emphasised humanitarian concerns, while proposing largely security-focused measures, including closer cooperation with third states in border and migration control (European Commission, 2013, 2014). Meanwhile, Italy commenced the “military-humanitarian” operation Mare Nostrum on October 18, 2013, which according to Italian Minister of the Interior Alfano saved 100.250 lives over its roughly one year of activity (Italian Interior Ministry, 2014). Mare Nostrum officially ended in November 2014 and was replaced by Frontex Joint Operation Triton (see Chapter 5). As the research informing this chapter was conducted, both fundamental rights and search and rescue in relation to Frontex’s activities were thus high on the political agenda. This was reflected in particular in the organisational narrative that circulated in Frontex’s headquarters at the time, as the following section will show.

Frontex’s organisational narrative Despite some nuances and different emphases between the accounts of different interviewees, a relatively uniform organisational discourse emerged among the members of Frontex staff and management I interviewed. They framed migration as a threat to be ready to respond to at short notice, invoking a continuum of threats ranging from the overburdening of the asylum system to terrorism, drug dealing, rape, the shadow economy, bank robbery, murder, counterfeiting, human trafficking, and weapon smuggling. At the same time, they also emphasised the novelty Frontex had to offer to “traditional” conceptions of border security through its intelligence-based approach. In terms of humanitarianism, interviewees cautioned against excessive expectations from the outside and emphasised the limited mandate of the agency. They embraced a restrictive and paternalistic reading of humanitarianism, rejecting wider interpretations of humanitarian duties vis-à-vis those in need. This emphasis on a rule-of-law humanitarianism rather than wider, moral concerns fits with the portrayal of the agency as a law enforcement organisation, aiming to make sure that legal

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rules are applied: in EU and international law, search, and rescue obligations are firmly enshrined. Also, fundamental rights are an integral part of the legal framework Frontex is bound by. While some staff members acknowledged that Frontex’s commitment to rights in practice was still “work in progress” and of relatively recent origin, the growing emphasis on fundamental rights fits together with a wider narrative of Frontex as an agency that promotes the rule of law, best practices, uniform standards, and a common culture of border guarding across EUrope. In this section, I will explore how staff and management mobilised security, humanitarianism, and human rights in this wider narrative, before then contrasting it with the accounts by guest officers in Frontex operations. Frontex as a protector of EUrope Among Frontex staff and management, migration was frequently linked with (organised) crime and terrorism and portrayed as presenting a variety of threats. Particularly when I asked about the importance of border management for the European Union, but also in comments about the role of Frontex more generally, these associations appeared. One staff member for instance explained: if you are a UK citizen living in Edinburgh, you don’t want someone coming from Lithuania to come by flight, without control, bringing arms, making a bank robbery, killing two people and going back to Lithuania safe. You don’t want someone coming from, from a specific country, being trained in a camp, come back and then, having the training, put a bomb in the metro station and make it explode. You don’t want people to earn money in the UK working illegally in, in a restaurant and then sending the money somewhere to finance some illegal activities, drug trafficking, or, or for buying, purchasing drugs or for trafficking human beings. You don’t want people who come with the contagious diseases to pass the border without any . . . There are various dimensions of border control. (FR4) As this statement illustrates, migration was associated with a continuum of threats to EU citizens, EU member states, and the EU itself (see Bigo, 2002). Reflecting the breadth of this continuum, threats were at times framed in highly individualised terms –“how would you feel if your daughter got raped and you only have this open border and the criminal can leave Europe and you’ll never find him again?” (FR1) – and at other times related to the functioning of the state or society as a whole –“everybody will come here. And it will be a total disorder so to say. And disorder in the bad sense, of like, not having sufficient jobs or food or anything” (FR3). They were also bound up with the functioning of Schengen, which was portrayed as embodying as well as necessitating the solidarity the EU was relying on. Frontex and its coordination of border controls was portrayed as a key “solidarity instrument” (FR1) that supported member states in keeping the threat of irregular migration at bay. In addition, the agency was presented as law enforcement actor,

Frontex as a fragmented organisation 109 implementing the rules that Schengen member states had agreed on, in particular the Schengen Borders Code. Both law and order as well as security and threat discourses emerged across all interviews with Frontex staff and management. At times, the presentation of migration as a threat was bound up with notions of urgency. As one staff member explained, “Frontex can also deploy, let’s say, urgent, urgently a set of people, assets, in an area which is experiencing sudden problems. And an unexpected level of threat” (FR4). The capacity of Frontex to speedily respond to an unforeseen “threat” was emphasised, which is in line with interpretations of security as requiring a readiness to urgently respond to essentially unpredictable threats. On the other hand, staff members also invoked understandings of security as risk management, presenting their work as routine and cyclical: we get intelligence and so on, and we try to provide knowledge about how the operation is going, what are the findings, if we have to readjust the deployment, if we have to readjust the way of the, the operational response to specific new trends. And then, in the end of these operations, we support also the, let’s say the final evaluation of the operation, each operation. Lesson learned, best practices, problems, improvements, and so on. In a circle that, let’s say, looks to learn from, from the operations for the future. (FR4) This understanding of risk analyses and operations as building on each other was framed by FR2 as running “almost in automated mode: member states already know that in this period of the year we are going to discuss with them what they will be able to provide next year, . . . so everything is already in a cycle mode.” In this framing, the focus was thus not on urgent responses to unpredictable threats, but on routine monitoring and planning ahead. Frontex was presented as a service provider, offering “additional support” to member states and EUropean institutions, in particular “intelligence-driven” planning and preparation. Throughout the interviews, the importance of risk analyses, best practices, capacity building, trainings, evaluations and learning was highlighted. In line with this emphasis on managing risks, several interviewees remarked that Frontex’s focus was not on stopping irregular migration, but on detection and identification: well, the importance of border control is, let’s put it this way: I believe that no one would allow to enter in his own home somebody that you should not know. And this is the key point. We believe that all the people that will cross the EU borders legally or illegally should be identified. (FR7) There’s also the main idea to make sure that people who travel legally should be able to cross the border as smoothly as possible. And those that are not legal travellers should be found among the travellers as easy as possible. (FR5)

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Concerns around detection and identification are closely bound up with a conceptualisation of security as risk management and of migration overall as a risk to be calculated and managed (Aradau and van Munster, 2008; Huysmans, 2014). This focus on identifying individuals rather than necessarily stopping them stands in contrast to common portrayals of Frontex as seeking to stop and return people, or even waging “war” against them. Rationalities and technologies of risk, however, render the population of border crossers in its entirety suspect, positing them as requiring profiling, identification, and filtering (see Bigo et al., 2011). FR5 referred to the importance of filtering rather clearly, emphasising the need to let “legitimate” travellers pass smoothly while detecting “illegitimate” travellers among border crossers as efficiently as possible. Frontex staff and management thus framed migration both as a continuum of threats that might require urgent responses, and as a risk to be managed and prepared for (see also Neal, 2009, p. 349). Two staff members reflected on this coexistence of an urgency-based and a more long-term, risk-based approach within Frontex. FR2 emphasised the novelty of risk-based approaches in EU border governance, arguing that this was something “the agency introduced in the traditional methods of border control,” and that it constituted “a way of better managing not only the resources, but also the real needs at the border.” FR1 emphasised developments in Frontex over time, arguing that we’re becoming more, I think, less of an emergency help to more of a part of a system. What the system in the end will be we shall see, it’s difficult to say today. But you know, EUROSUR is an existing system. There is a new information exchange platform and we’re part of it. And we provide the member states with very specific products. So it’s, we still, you know, rush to the border to help when there is a crisis, when there is a large flow of migrants, but I think there is more, there is the, we develop things that are more long-term, less emergency. (FR1) Clearly, staff members were aware of the coexistence of both modes of operation, urgency-based responses which were bound up with a perception of migration as a continuum of threats (or exceptionalist securitising) on the one hand, and risk-based approaches focusing on long-term planning, risk minimisation, detection, and identification (or diffuse securitising) on the other (see Huysmans, 2014). Their coexistence indicates the existence of various rationalities within the agency, which might complement and contradict one another at different moments in time. With one of the major concerns among staff members at the time of the research being the limited financial budget for the agency despite its increasing responsibilities, it is not difficult to imagine that tensions around the prioritisation of these means for urgent responses vs. long-term preparedness might arise. At other times, both approaches feed into one another and coexist harmoniously: as staff members explained, urgent interventions produce intelligence that is fed back into Frontex’s risk analyses, which in turn contribute to improving

Frontex as a fragmented organisation 111 operational responses, including “rapid interventions.” The coexistence of these modes of securitising within Frontex will be further reflected on in the third part of this chapter. Frontex as a saviour of lives Apart from security formations, Frontex staff and management also drew on humanitarianism and human rights. In most of the interviews conducted, research participants introduced the topic of search and rescue at sea without prompting. While they emphasised that the agency was doing its best to rescue people in distress at sea, they at the same time stressed that Frontex remained a security organisation. Repeatedly, interviewees asserted that “Frontex is not there to solve the problem” (FR4), “I don’t think we want to become an SAR agency” (FR6), “we are not a search and rescue organisation” (FR1), “Frontex has no mandate or competence to coordinate search and rescue cooperation” (FR2), and “Frontex is not a search and rescue agency. It’s a border agency” (FR3). While they emphasised that those participating in Frontex operations would aid a boat in distress if they received requests by a member state to do so, interviewees insisted that this did not mean that Frontex could be said to coordinate search and rescue operations. In addition, they spent considerable time explaining how difficult it was to see small boats in the vast area of the Mediterranean Sea, especially in bad weather conditions: [w]hen you have a boat in the middle of the sea and the, you have seven wind force and the boat is overcrowded and there are waves between 4 and 7 meters, you cannot even approach the boat. Because if you get close to a boat, you can create the conditions for capsizing or you cannot transport people because they can die. You know, putting a person, a pregnant woman or an old person or a child on a rope on the sea which is moving like this between boat A and boat B, one being ten meters high, it’s really, really bad. . . . Sometimes, you know, the migrants put themselves really in bad conditions. (FR4) As this quote illustrates, some interviewees were at least partially blaming the travellers themselves for the dangerous situations they found themselves in, engaging in a restrictive and paternalistic form of humanitarianism. Others were more sympathetic and pointed to the strict visa regime as barring whole categories of people from travelling to EUrope legally. Regardless of whether they apportioned blame to the travellers or not, staff members seemed to feel a need to explain and justify Frontex’s actions at sea. They pointed not only to the practical difficulties of saving lives at sea but also insisted that it was the responsibility of member states to coordinate search and rescue operations. In the interviews, a fine line between emphasising that Frontex was doing everything it could and had saved tens of thousands of people, and pointing out that search and rescue was not something the agency was responsible for emerged.

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Frontex staff members endorsed a rule-of-law humanitarianism, positively emphasising Frontex’s adherence to international legal frameworks, while at the same time guarding themselves against criticism based on a more expansive reading of humanitarian duties. Frontex’s negotiations with Italy over the replacement of Mare Nostrum in 2014 are an interesting example of this balancing act (see Chapter 5). Speaking to one of the Frontex staff members involved in these discussions in September 2014, it became clear that there was an ongoing struggle between Italy and Frontex over the agency’s activities in the Mediterranean: they want one thing which we cannot deliver, so this is the basic line. . . . But they are constantly trying to push for that, as much as possible. But we cannot. It’s not a question of negotiating. On that thing we cannot negotiate, because we cannot. We cannot do what is Mare Nostrum doing right now. It’s not our role and it’s not our activities and we’re not supposed to be doing that, so this is the end. We will not do that. (FR7) In addition to concerns about overstretching Frontex’s mandate by engaging in search and rescue more proactively, some staff and management members also suggested that Mare Nostrum might be a “pull factor,” or embolden facilitators to send people on the sea journey without adequate resources. When asked whether there might be tensions between search and rescue and border security objectives, interviewees, however, denied this to be the case. Instead, they framed search and rescue activities as temporarily suspending border controls, which would resume as soon as the rescued individuals were disembarked somewhere. As FR2 elaborated, for instance: “when you are at sea, the first priority is to save lives. Then you process immigration as you should afterwards. I mean first you save the lives, then you take a look.” FR1 emphasised that better surveillance could lead to earlier detection and thus a higher chance of successful search and rescue operations, emphasising how both objectives could work together. Again, this points to interviewees’ commitment to a rule-of-law interpretation of humanitarianism and search and rescue obligations, fulfilling but not exceeding international legal requirements. While a more proactive approach to saving lives – that is conducting operations according to search and rescue rather than border security objectives – was explicitly rejected, Frontex’s participation in nationally coordinated search and rescue operations was positively emphasised and not viewed as problematic by those interviewed. Also beyond search and rescue activities, references to saving and protecting people on the move were made. When asked whether Frontex’s risk analyses took the risk that travellers faced into account, FR4 explained that this was indeed the case and pointed to a potential need to “prevent” departures in case of particularly bad weather for the individuals’ own good, once again indicating a paternalistic form of humanitarian concern. FR7 noted that illegalised people could more easily be exploited once they arrived in EUrope and that identifying them would therefore help authorities to “protect” them. Relatedly, also the narrative

Frontex as a fragmented organisation 113 of “unscrupulous smugglers” who exploit vulnerable people was mobilised in the headquarters: similar to Frontex’s public documents, staff members portrayed the agency as protecting people from exploitation and violence. They linked migratory movements with organised crime, and the risks people faced on their journeys to EUrope with the unscrupulous behaviour of facilitators: I don’t know if you saw, there was a boat last week that sank, they were forced by the, this facilitators that are, on purpose they sank the boat with the migrants. And this is something, you know – this is really the issue at this point, you know? . . . Because it’s not like we are against, we as Frontex are against migrants. Here, no one is against migrants. They are not criminals, they are people they are trying to look for their lives and some of them escaping and this is not our target . . . one of our main focus is facilitators. These are the people that we are very, very much interested in. We are putting a huge effort trying to detect, identify the facilitators and try as much as possible to bring them to justice. (FR7) Again, emphasising the exploitation of individuals by facilitators allows for the construction of an image of Frontex as protecting individuals from harm both by rescuing them when in distress and by fighting people smuggling. Understanding those seeking to cross into EUrope without authorisation simultaneously as victims and threats enabled Frontex staff to present the agency’s work as protecting EUropean citizens and people on the move, while upholding law and order at the same time. Frontex as a promoter of fundamental rights Contrary to the cautious negotiation of Frontex’s stance towards search and rescue, the importance of fundamental rights was emphasised and endorsed unambiguously throughout the interviews and was frequently juxtaposed to what staff members framed as unjustified or misguided criticism from the outside. FR5 for instance asserted: “as you might know, Frontex has for long been pinpointed by different nongovernmental organisations for not respecting fundamental rights and things like that. Which is far from true and actually, the full respect of fundamental rights has a very special position within Frontex.” Interviewees emphasised that Frontex took human rights very seriously and that the criticism the agency received was largely misdirected: in Frontex operations, fundamental rights had not been violated. After stating this, however, FR3 also pointed out that Frontex was in a transition phase, gradually ensuring that fundamental rights were being respected in all its activities and at all times. Most interviewees emphasised that already before the introduction of the Consultative Forum on Fundamental Rights (Forum) and the Fundamental Rights Officer (FRO), fundamental rights had been very important to Frontex. At the same time, they acknowledged that awareness of fundamental rights had increased

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since then, as they had “been highlighted in a clearer way” (FR5). Many remarked that initially, attitudes towards the Forum and the Fundamental Rights Officer had been cautious. I was told that there had been fears by Frontex staff that they would be told that what they were doing was wrong, but that a year after both institutions had taken up their work, a constructive and cooperative approach prevailed. Particularly FR2 praised the day-to-to cooperation with the Fundamental Rights Officer, and also other interviewees commented favourably on her and the Forum’s work. The staff members directly involved with the Consultative Forum also assessed its work positively. At the same time, they emphasised that trust needed to be built within the agency regarding the work of the Forum and the Fundamental Rights Officer: “you also need to consider that we are in an agency, you need to kind of build mutual trust. So . . . and this is a process that cannot happen you know overnight. So you need to allow some time to everybody. But what, certainly I mean, I’m confident, because I could see really an extremely constructive approach” (FR6). Overall, Frontex staff members were well aware of the necessity of embracing fundamental rights publicly, while also acknowledging that mainstreaming them throughout the organisation was still work in progress. As noted, Frontex staff asserted that human rights were not violated during the agency’s own operations and emphasised Frontex’s promotion of best practices and the setting of standards: “wherever Frontex is it should be the highest standard, I think that’s pretty much understood by everybody, in terms of fundamental rights especially” (FR3). Importantly, interviewees were quick to distance Frontex from allegations of abuse by border guards. There seemed to be some frustration with the negative press that abuses in some member states entailed for Frontex. Countering this, a member of Frontex’s management board and the NGO representative of the Consultative Forum I spoke with emphasised the possibility of Frontex operations leading to the reporting of human rights violations and thus human rights improvements. Indeed, according to interviewees, Frontex had played a key role in improving the human rights situation in “problematic” member states such as Greece over time.

Guest officers’ understandings of Frontex As Frontex’s work is not only planned and carried out at the headquarters but also implemented through its operations, I visited operation Poseidon Land at the Bulgarian-Turkish border in spring 2014, and operation Hermes in southern Italy in summer 2014. When interviewing guest officers within Frontex operations at the Bulgarian-Turkish border and in Sicily, the relatively uniform organisational discourse from the headquarters broke down. Instead, guest officers and seconded officers articulated highly diverse interpretations of their work and of Frontex. Before examining their accounts more closely, it is important to note that the guest officers I spoke with normally worked in their own countries, and were deployed to Frontex operations for only one to three months at a time. They were under the command of the “host member state,” that is the country they were deployed to, during that time. Seconded guest officers served with Frontex for up to six

Frontex as a fragmented organisation 115 months, and contrarily to guest officers could be sent to several joint operations in a row. Both types of officers in both research locations explained their decision to participate in a Frontex operation similarly, noting that it allowed them to understand another country’s border policing better, learn new practices, get to know new people, places, and languages, and meet colleagues which then would be valuable contacts during their daily work back in their home countries. Some also pointed to financial incentives and to benefits for their career prospects at home when spending some time in police missions abroad. Unequivocally, however, all officers expressed that they felt rather distanced from Frontex and were at times hesitant to respond to my questions about the agency at all. When asked about changes in Frontex over time, one guest officer said: I think that’s very difficult to answer, because, me my little role, a small place there, I don’t know if I can see the big picture in that, that sense. I have not really felt very big change in my contact with Frontex and how I see Frontex from my starting till the end (laughs). But my contact is not very strong, you know? They2 also articulated doubts about the usefulness of their role in the operation: “I think, why this mission, what can we gain from it. That’s what I think. And sometimes I have difficulties to really . . . understand myself.” Throughout, officers expressed that Frontex was “far away” from them in their everyday work, that they had not been in touch with the agency a lot before or after their deployment in the operation, that they had not paid much attention to it, or that Frontex simply did not play a role in their everyday work at home. Overall, the officers expressed that they felt rather disconnected from Frontex and did not always know much about the agency. This distance and disconnect will be further explored in the last part of this chapter. Bulgaria: migration as a security threat When speaking to guest officers close to the Bulgarian-Turkish land border, both human rights and humanitarianism seemed to be virtually absent. Officers focused on the need to “catch the bad guys,” and migration was framed as a threat which needed to be controlled as close to the border as possible. Otherwise, “migrants” would travel on and would be increasingly difficult to “catch.” According to one guest officer, one of the biggest problems in the EU were “migrants”: “they’re here, they are making problems, they are involved in all kinds of criminal activities and so on.” They then said “we want as few [migrants] as possible.” Their colleague interjected, saying that “generally, I’m sure we don’t consider them as potential criminals. I’m sure it must be hard in someone’s life that he decides to leave one’s land.” They added though that the globe was huge and not everyone could live in Europe. This is why borders existed. They appeared older and more senior than their colleague (judging from the amount of stars on their uniform)

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and redirected the conversation several times during the interview, relativising rather crude statements regarding migration by their younger colleague and asking me to not “misunderstand,” as both of them had nothing against migration. People only had to enter the EU legally, and this was what Frontex was there to ensure. The dynamics between both officers suggested that the more senior border guard was aware of certain limits as to what was acceptable to say about people on the move towards an outsider like myself. They did not express disagreement with their colleague but intervened and qualified the other’s statements repeatedly to reassure me that neither of them had a problem with those who sought to cross EUropean borders as such. Throughout the interviews and informal conversations I had when at the Bulgarian-Turkish border, the focus remained entirely on security and control concerns. Only when specifically asked about criticisms of Frontex did one officer informally comment briefly that Frontex was “taking care” of people on the move and that for the agency, human rights were central. When enquiring about potential changes in Frontex’s guidelines for the joint operations, a guest officer said they had not noticed any such changes in the “six to seven” operations they had participated in. Most of the officers I spoke with were so-called surveillance experts, using thermovision cameras and other equipment to detect individuals crossing into Bulgaria, and then alerting the Bulgarian authorities who would “take the necessary steps.” In my reflective notes at the time, I noted that I perceived a reluctance to speak openly among guest officers, whose answers to my questions were often rather short. I expressed an uncertainty whether this was due to them being cautious and holding back particular views or thoughts, or due to them feeling that they did not have much to respond to my questions on Frontex. I also wondered whether the relative absence of humanitarian concerns among the officers I met might have been connected to the fact that I was visiting a land operation, where numbers of deaths are relatively low. In order to speak to officers involved in a sea border operation, I decided to visit operation Hermes in southern Italy. Italy: a diversity of views In Sicily, a somewhat different and very diverse picture emerged. The three officers I interviewed expressed starkly differing perceptions about their work and the context they were working in. In contrast to the surveillance experts I had interviewed in Bulgaria, I primarily spoke to guest officers working as debriefers in Italy, that is those responsible for interviewing individuals after their arrival in EUrope to gather intelligence about their motivations, routes, and the facilitators of unauthorised journeys. Contrary to the officers in Bulgaria, they had direct and often quite intense contact with those arriving. While the officers’ different narratives cannot be said to be representative of Frontex guest officers overall, they provide insights into the breadth of positions and interpretations among those implementing Frontex operations. For this reason, I will briefly outline each of their positioning in turn.

Frontex as a fragmented organisation 117 One officer invoked an image of migration as a stark threat and a danger, of travellers who lie, cheat, and carry diseases such as Ebola and Scabies into the EU. They did not express any kind of sympathy or compassion towards those arriving via boat to Italy. Instead, they advocated their summary returns to the countries they had travelled from as the only “real solution” to growing numbers of arrivals and suggested that it was people’s own fault if they found themselves in situations of distress, after deciding to enter unsafe boats without appropriate equipment. In their view, Italy’s Mare Nostrum operation was not saving people, but instead “aiding and abetting illegal immigration,” which was a crime. The scenario they described was thus entirely centred on a security perspective, portraying migration as a continuum of threats, without any mentioning of humanitarian or human rights concerns. The second officer expressed more understanding for those fleeing poverty and violence. They mobilised both risk management and threat-focused discourses. Regarding the former, they for instance pointed to the need to harmonise procedures, learn from best practices, make cooperation more efficient, and find the right level of migration to benefit EU member states: “it must be regulated in a way so we can have a certain level of system for people staying, living in our society.” Regarding the latter, they maintained that “illegal” migration was a “huge problem,” that “Europe” wanted “to stop this flow,” and that the fact that migration was not regulated strictly enough was a threat to member states’ welfare systems. During the interview, the officer repeatedly linked migration and crime and stated that in their country, international crime had increased to new record levels since the creation of the Schengen zone. At the same time, they also drew on humanitarianism, speaking in particular about the protection needs of Syrians and the dangers of irregular sea crossings. After explaining the need to limit irregular migration, they said: and it’s a little bit heart-breaking as well. Because we are talking about people here. That’s what I think is a little bit difficult. Here we talk about people who are not really doing something wrong. Normally in my job back home I, people do bad things and I arrest them or . . . And here the, these type of immigrants, they haven’t done much wrong. Okay, they broke the border, they illegally entered Schengen, okay, but that’s it . . . and they have a difficult situation, many of them. You realise how unfair the world is. And I, me and maybe you too are one of the lucky ones. In the big picture. Speaking about their understanding of those on the move, the officer reflected also on their own privilege. Similar to the headquarter narrative, they combined security and humanitarian discourse positions in their accounts of Frontex and EUropean border controls, but – contrary to there – did not mention human rights at all. When I specifically asked about the changing role of human rights, they said that since they began to be involved with Frontex in 2010, human rights had been an integral part of the trainings and briefings provided. They went on to reflect on their own experiences in Frontex operations and explained that while they

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were aware of human rights complaints that had been made, they did not actually know what Frontex did when receiving reports about “serious incidents.” Similarly to what I had heard from an NGO staff member and Frontex management, the officer nevertheless suggested that Frontex might have a beneficial effect on the human rights situation in EUrope: “but in a way I think Frontex maybe can be a good thing, that these things [human rights abuses] would never have been reported. Maybe in any channel.” In their account, the officer thus carefully negotiated humanitarianism, human rights, and security, while also expressing uncertainty and distance vis-à-vis Frontex and its responses to abuses. They seemed to occupy a somewhat ambivalent position towards the agency and EUropean cooperation more widely, emphasising its potential and necessity on the one hand, and expressing cautious doubt as to its practices and efficiency on the other hand. The account of the third officer in Italy differed starkly from this and all other guest officers’ accounts. Throughout the interview, this officer made clear that their primary desire was to help people and that they trusted those they interviewed on behalf of Frontex. They explained how they would do small favours for recent arrivals, by for instance sending WhatsApp messages to their families to tell them that they were alive: “sometimes I write ‘please don’t call back, because this is not me, this is a friend from Europe.’Anyway, they call, you know (laughs). And I have half of Syria calling on my phone.” The officer shared several individuals’ stories with me, highlighting the violence and horror their interviewees had lived through before reaching EUrope. Explaining how he interacted with the people he met in his role as debriefer, he noted: “one of my goal is to, that they could see, they were able to see that we are equals. You know? Just only this situation that in his country makes them to be hidden in a boat and running away and trying to jump over Italy to get to another country in the North of Europe and my point is that they don’t feel like they are an inferior, inferiority, you know? That we are equals.” This notion of dignity and equality was crucial to this officer, and they emphasised throughout the interview that they understood and respected people’s decisions to leave and come to EUrope, given the difficult circumstances they faced. One recent story seemed to have moved them in particular, and it was the first they told me: [W]ith this guy I spent almost 5 hours talking to him. I offered, he was very busy with his child and I offered him help. You know, I, what you need, I will give you, I will try to obtain for you. . . . And he told me that when he came to the shore, the facilitators told them that they were able to carry on all their belongings, and when they came to the shore, in the last moment, before they’re going in to the boat, the facilitators [said]: “no, you cannot go through. You need to leave all, all in the shore.” And I saw him that he was carrying, carrying two old [inaudible] like a laptop suitcase, but full, you know, and I asked him “but yes I saw you with, with . . .” “No Alex,3 this is milk. I left all and I try, I get just only the important things. It’s milk for my sons and that’s all.” And two Quran books, because they are Sunnis. And for me it’s very, very, you know, we live in this, in this society consumism and capitalist, and we take care about some things. But they teach you a lot of

Frontex as a fragmented organisation 119 things. So that’s the point. Maybe for those things, sometimes I think I really help them. . . . Sometimes, two years ago, one guy has told me, you are talking like two hours or three hours. . . . And he told me, “Alex, I will remember you for the rest of my life.” At this point, the officer took a long break and seemed to struggle with tears. Overall, it seemed that they were genuinely moved by the stories of those they were working with.4 When explaining their role as a debriefer, they made clear that it allowed them to reassure new arrivals and to offer them a “smile and a welcome.” Initially, I was puzzled as to how this declared desire to help travellers fit together with working in a position that meant gathering information used to further impede these same people from arriving in EUrope. When I asked if the information they collected was not used to reinforce border controls the officer agreed, without seemingly seeing a contradiction between this and their desire to “help” those who tried to cross borders without authorisation. Later on, they said that they understood the role of Frontex not as stopping people from coming to EUrope, but as being prepared for and identifying them. In their explanation of their work, they drew on humanitarianism to justify the need for operations in the Mediterranean, arguing that a lack of surveillance meant high risks for those crossing, whose deaths would never be known about: and that’s what is I think, that, in my opinion, what is the main task of Frontex. To try and go one step in advance. To avoid those kind of tragedies. Because most of people that works in this has a very good feeling about this, you know. They believe in the work they are doing, even the migrants told me they are very professional. They [say] “you can see on his face, that from the heart, they want to save us. It’s not like in other places, ‘they are paying me to do this.’ They want,” the migrants say this. And I think it’s, it’s one of the properties of Frontex. Notably, the officer suggested that also their colleagues’ genuine motivation was to save people. In doing so, they portrayed the agency as a truly humanitarian organisation, bringing together individuals prepared to save and assist people in distress, and conducting surveillance for this reason. As in all interviews I conducted in Italy, the officer spoke about Italy’s Mare Nostrum operation as well, describing it like their colleagues as a “pull factor.” This officer portrayed the existence of Mare Nostrum as a dilemma – if the operation was stopped now, many more people would die, as they relied on the presence of the Italian navy and coastguard in the Mediterranean. If it was continued, more and more people would arrive in EUrope, which the officer portrayed as problematic as well. It was at this point, towards the very end of the interview, that the officer brought up security concerns in relation to irregular arrivals for the first time: sometimes things happens. And maybe in five years somebody will explode a bomb maybe in Copenhagen and all people will say who was this guy, from

120 Frontex as a fragmented organisation where he came, why the authorities didn’t check who was this guy? Because there are hundred of thousand of people coming. And we need to control this, we need to know who is coming and where is he going. They thus portrayed those arriving as potentially including terrorists, who would need to be identified by the state – thereby drawing on the risk management discourse present also among Frontex’s staff and management. Despite this reference to the importance of identification and risk management, the officer’s framing clearly foregrounded humanitarian concerns. In doing so, they presented one end of a spectrum of highly diverse narratives of guest officers in Frontex operations provided in informal conversations and formalised interviews. As this section has illustrated, Frontex’s organisational discourse was only ever partially reflected in the accounts of officers I spoke with in Frontex operations. Moreover, there seemed to be no overarching unity among the narratives officers shared with me, and I remained deeply puzzled as to the heterogeneity of their positioning vis-àvis humanitarianism, human rights, and security discursive formations after my visits of operations Poseidon and Hermes.5

Making sense of contradictions: organisational sociology The divergences and inconsistencies identified between the headquarters and Frontex operations and among officers deployed in Frontex operations show that it is important to take a closer look at the agency’s internal dynamics. New institutionalist approaches in organisational sociology have engaged with organisational dynamics in-depth and provide valuable insights in this regard. First, organisational sociology holds that organisational success depends in part on how well organisations do at internalising the beliefs and understandings that circulate in their environment (Meyer and Rowan, 1991; Deephouse, 1996). Importantly though, “there is no such thing as the environment” in “objective” terms: what matters is how organisations perceive and make sense of their environments (Dery, 1986, p. 19). Organisational culture and identity influence how organisations interpret expectations within their environment (Greenwood et al., 2008). Constantly reproduced in the day-to-day functioning of the organisation, beliefs and norms attached to organisational identity help avoid cognitive overload and reduce the complexity of decision-making by portraying only some of a range of options as rational or thinkable (DiMaggio and Powell, 1991; Boswell, 2009). Rather than ascribing a universal set of behaviour to agencies, analysing the specific understandings articulated by an agency’s staff and management is thus of key importance. Second, sociological institutionalists argue that “the organization must enjoy a certain degree of legitimacy in the eyes of its environment” (Brunsson, 1989, pp. 13–14). In addition to securing support and resources, and ultimately organisational survival, legitimacy is important for organisations to maintain the confidence of their staff internally (Dowling and Pfeffer, 1975; Suchman, 1995; Boswell, 2007, 2009). There has been a wealth of research on organisational

Frontex as a fragmented organisation 121 legitimacy, defined as “the perceived appropriateness of an organization to a social system in terms of rules, values, norms, and definitions” (Deephouse et al., 2017, p. 32). When seeking to gain or maintain legitimacy, organisations often espouse particular values, ideologies, or goals vis-à-vis their environment. If they fail to embrace environmentally legitimated accounts of their structures and activities, organisations render themselves vulnerable to claims that they are “negligent, irrational, or unnecessary” (Meyer and Rowan, 1991, p. 50; see also Brunsson, 1989). Third, in order to secure legitimacy, organisations tend to appropriate structures and belief systems they view as successful within other organisations. This process – referred to as isomorphism – means that organisations within a given field eventually share a number of commonalities (DiMaggio and Powell, 1991). DiMaggio and Powell suggest that there are coercive, mimetic, and normative mechanisms of isomorphic change. The first refers to political or legislative pressures by actors upon which the organisation depends, or the expectations of its funders. In case of noncompliance with particular demands, the organisation might be threatened with sanctions. Mimetic pressures, on the other hand, are primarily the result of uncertainty, which leads organisations to imitate other actors who appear to be successful in its environment. Lastly, normative pressures relate to widespread ideas of “proper” conduct or moral obligations and a logic of appropriateness (Boxenbaum and Jonsson, 2008). Fourth, responding to coercive or normative pressures does not necessarily require a radical readjustment of organisational practices and structures. External demands might not appear useful to the pressured organisation or they might compete with internal organisational culture and beliefs (Boxenbaum and Jonsson, 2008). Boswell (2008) suggests that four organisational responses are possible: full adaptation to external pressures; evasion and thus the failure to adapt to the demands at all; reinterpretation of outside demands through the lens of existing organisational culture; or decoupling. The latter entails disconnecting different organisational structures from each other and/ or from an organisation’s activities: “decoupling enables organizations to maintain standardized, legitimating, formal structures while their activities vary in response to practical considerations” (Meyer and Rowan, 1991, p. 58). In addition, and this is key to research on EU agencies with multiple collective stakeholders such as Frontex, decoupling also becomes relevant for organisations when they are faced with contradictory pressures. A range of rationalities might coexist in an organisation’s environment, in which different actors, legal structures or normative ideas coexist (Brunsson, 1989; Scott and Meyer, 1994). Decoupling formal and informal structures, the different units within the same organisation, or language and action can allow organisations to reconcile incompatible demands. Rather than this being an exception, most organisations tend to be only loosely coupled (Meyer, Boli and Thomas, 1994). Indeed, Brunsson describes this phenomenon as “a fundamental type of behaviour in the political organization: to talk in a way that satisfies one demand, to decide in a way that satisfies another, and to supply products in a way that satisfies a third” (Brunsson,

122 Frontex as a fragmented organisation 1989, p. 27). In sum, institutionalist analyses conceptualise incoherence and contradictions within organisations not necessarily as organisational failure, but as a potentially “reasonable strategy for coping with conflict” (Boswell, 2008; see also Meyer and Rowan, 1991). What this means in relation to Frontex will be explored in the following two sections.

Knowing Frontex: an organisation in a contested field Examining Frontex through the perspective of new institutionalism offers valuable insights and allows for moving beyond a one-dimensional conceptualisation of Frontex as a unitary, power-maximising security agency (Perkowski, 2019). Importantly, Frontex staff and management are acutely aware of the complex environment the agency is situated in, and throughout the interviews referred to other organisational actors that had an influence on the running of the agency. Frontex finds itself among a multiplicity of actors concerned with the governance of EU external borders and migration. Diverse stakeholders continue to leverage different degrees of control over the agency: Frontex’s management board is composed of a representative of each Schengen member state, in addition to two representatives of the Commission. The European Parliament and Council constitute its budgetary authority. With diverse actors continuing to exert partial control over the agency, conflicts of interest are built into its organisational setup. Apart from the direct influence member states and the Commission have on the agency via its management board, and the Council and the European Parliament via its budget, Frontex works in close cooperation with EASO, EUROPOL, and FRA, has connections to the security industry, and has been closely watched by NGOs, the European Ombudsman, and international organisations. When asking about Frontex’s work, changes through time, or future prospects, staff and management members in the headquarters frequently invoked the agency’s multiple stakeholders as decisive, stating that “we don’t exist in a vacuum” (FR7) and “everything we do is not done in isolation” (FR4). They consistently noted that the agency was acting within a wider migration policy framework that it had no influence on. In the interviews I conducted with Frontex staff and management, the agency was portrayed as an actor with diverse stakeholders in a contested field. One staff member likened Frontex’s history to running and building up the motor of a car at the same time, emphasising the perceived need to deliver results as well as building up structures and capacity at the same time: “the agency didn’t choose to consolidate, build up everything and then start running. This was not an option which was made available by our management and by our stakeholders” (FR4). FR4 invoked pressures to deliver quickly, making clear that this had been a major challenge for an organisation that was at the same time building up its structures. Frontex staff repeatedly referred to high expectations the agency was facing from its stakeholders, in particular the European Parliament, the Commission, and the member states. Indeed, several staff members expressed worries that the agency was being burdened with increasing tasks and responsibilities, without the necessary time to consolidate existing structures. More specifically, interviewees emphasised that

Frontex as a fragmented organisation 123 there were great expectations regarding search and rescue at sea, which as they stated rested on misunderstandings of Frontex’s role, or mistaken appraisals of the difficulties of search and rescue operations in practice. Relatedly, staff and management articulated concerns that they might be blamed for travellers’ deaths. For example, a management member expressed unease about raising false expectations when talking about the new surveillance system EUROSUR: what I really dislike at the moment with this whole discussion in the public is that the impression is created that with this system, that the sinking of refugee boats, or the, the rescue at sea could be organised better. And I think also the, the people in Warsaw, in the Situation Centre in Warsaw are very concerned that one day, it is said “you in Warsaw, you are watching idly as those in the Mediterranean are drowning.” (FR9) Staff and management portrayed search and rescue operations as not only extraordinarily costly but also difficult in practice, given the vast space of the Mediterranean, small boats, and often harsh weather conditions. It appeared that they felt the need to justify the organisation’s approach to rescue at sea. Interviewees expressed worries that Frontex was bound to fail fulfilling exaggerated expectations, and FR1 urged that “we also need to be realistic about it.” While there was an attempt to cultivate Frontex’s humanitarian image in its public relations at the time the research was conducted, staff members responded with unease to pressures acting on the agency and referred back to Frontex’s limited mandate and resources possibly to dispel some of that pressure in the interviews. When speaking about the role of Frontex, staff and management often noted that the agency was rendered highly visible in the border regime and was frequently criticised. Several interviewees deplored that Frontex was used as a “scapegoat” or seen as “the incarnation of evil.” In particular, critiques of “Fortress Europe” were associated with parts of the European Parliament, whereas calls for “more Frontex” were linked to the member states and Council. Interviewees did not specifically reference public or activist protests, although they occasionally referred to NGOs as being critical. Overall, their tendency to focus on the actors with an immediate influence on the agency confirms previous studies of administrative agencies (see Boswell 2009, pp. 50–51). The focus of Frontex staff and management on the agency’s immediate stakeholders might partially explain its delayed but increasing emphasis on human rights and humanitarianism. While harsh criticism of the agency existed from its very beginnings, the European Parliament only gained increasing powers and competencies when the Lisbon Treaty entered into force at the end of 2009, making it a more influential actor in Frontex’s environment (see Chapter 2). This might have rendered critical voices from within the European Parliament more relevant and visible to Frontex staff and contributed to decisions to respond to them by altering the agency’s organisational narrative vis-à-vis the public. When Frontex staff and management referred to outside criticism, they were quick to point out that this was misguided or inappropriate. They emphasised that

124 Frontex as a fragmented organisation Frontex was part of a wider field of migration and border governance and that the agency was only implementing policies and decisions taken elsewhere. As one interviewee explained, the policy is huge, and the borders are like the culprit of it. The borders are like the gate. And then you stop or enter, it’s there. But actually the decision is made somewhere else. That’s my perception of the big bubble so to say. That’s why you say, you say management of border, but I say, management of the border comes as a consequence of the management of migration. And that’s a bigger issue. . . . And then how people are treated and then it’s easier to blame the people that treat you bad than to blame the people that you don’t see. (FR3) Throughout the interviews, Frontex staff members engaged in blame shifting, arguing that national and EU policymakers were politically responsible for border controls: “if you don’t want Fortress Europe, tell the politicians not to create those, those rules” (FR4). In their portrayals, Frontex was intricately bound up with the highly controversial policy area of migration governance, which was, however, controlled by member states and EU institutions. This meant that both critique aimed at “Fortress Europe” and critical voices regarding the agency’s inability to properly “close” the borders were deemed to be misguided if directed at Frontex. As FR2 insisted, “if you don’t develop the other structures, you cannot expect border surveillance and control to solve anything. . . . You cannot expect border control to be the ultimate solution for migration.” Similarly, a management member insisted that “[b]order control is the last link of the chain, so when beforehand everything has failed then we will not be the ones stopping it” (FR9). As this indicates, some staff and management members expressed considerable frustration regarding the policy processes in Brussels that were affecting them, criticising the lack of understanding of policymakers of the processes and requirements of Frontex. During an interview I had with FR1, another staff member was present in the same room, and towards the end of the interview became involved in the conversation. The exchange between the two staff members illustrates their frustration and is worth quoting at length: FR8:

Whatever the Commission proposes, it’s always watered down by the Council and the Parliament on the way. So then, a compromise that we have to live with. So we read the regulation and then we look at each other: “so what does it mean?” FR1: Because so many, so many interests have to be satisfied (laughs) in the end. The wording is such that . . . okay . . . (laughs). FR8: As long as criminal law that’s fine, ok, the court will do it. But if you need to do something you should better have clear instructions, and the sea guidelines for Frontex operations, we read them, they are nice. Nothing new. FR1: We just don’t know what it means.

Frontex as a fragmented organisation 125 FR8:

But it doesn’t change anything. There are there, okay, so we attach them to the operational plan (FR1 laughs). Great. Thank you European Parliament, European Council, great. [. . .] FR8: We had something that we were calling best practices manual, that was developed . . . five years ago. And then with the new regulation we just have to re-do exactly the same thing, but it’s called differently. And of course, invite people again, and it’s like, I would say, it’s like amendments to best practices manual we had. But we would have it anyway, and it changes with time and you collect new practices and so on. But because it was in the regulation, member states were less keen to agree on certain things. Because, it is not binding still for them, but they feel this legal pressure somehow. . . . So it’s like, some, some actions are counterproductive I would say. And there is a big fuss, we hear a lot of voices from left to right in the European Parliament, and in the end of the day, we get prostheses. FR1: Because we’re an operational, you know, we’re an operational agency. We’re actually the guys who have to go out there and do it. I mean it’s easy to, you know talk about it. But how do you, so what do I do? [. . .] FR8: Well I mean, this is like, our, when we talk in the corridors after such meetings, we always saying, there is this magic expression that we would like someone in Brussels to hear: evidence-based policy-making. It’s that simple. Not that I have a feeling that . . . and then you draft a regulation. Because then you will have nice, legal documents that are completely useless. In this conversation, the two staff members discuss discrepancies between processes of political decision-making on the one hand and the more practical concerns of an operational agency on the other. They critique the lack of clarity provided by policy documents as a result of political compromises and suggest that these therefore fail to provide meaningful guidance for operational practices. While not criticised as explicitly by other staff members, there was an overall emphasis on the fact that policies were decided upon elsewhere, while Frontex was (unjustly) confronted with the consequences and the criticism of these decisions. In particular, the European Parliament was portrayed as lacking an understanding of Frontex’s role and work, and as posing demands that were not in line with the mandate the agency had been given. Presenting itself as the implementing agency of other institutions’ decisions, Frontex’s staff and management thus engaged in double blame-shifting: responsibility was diverted both regarding the difficulties individuals faced in terms of in reaching EUrope, and regarding the agency’s inability to work as efficiently as possible due to interference from the outside. “There are voices in every direction”: organisational hypocrisy in Frontex As outlined, Frontex faces diverse pressures from its different stakeholders, including the management board and the Parliament: inevitably, some of these

126 Frontex as a fragmented organisation pressures are in tension or outright contradiction with one another. While embracing a security-focused discourse quickly gained Frontex “a considerable amount of confidence and goodwill among national authorities” in its early years (Hobbing, 2010, p. 71), for instance, it simultaneously led to criticism by the European Parliament for its disregard of fundamental rights. In interviews, staff members pointed to the difficulty of being faced with such diverse and partly incompatible demands from their environment. FR1 elaborated: I mean if you read some of the articles you’ll see that there is that sort of, Frontex was there and you know, there is not enough Frontex. There is too much Frontex. Frontex is ineffective. Frontex is too small. Frontex should be shut down. You know, there are voices in every direction. (FR1) FR4 explained that Frontex staff were working in a sensitive area, which meant that “you cannot be satisfying the wishes of everyone. Everyone has different perspectives on problems and you must be aware that there is criticism and you have to take it into account” (FR4). As an EU agency, Frontex has since its foundation been confronted with conflicting and at times incompatible demands from different external actors controlling parts of the agency (see Chapter 2). Given that the agency is dependent on these diverse EU institutions for its existence and budget, negotiating these demands in its own work has been of great importance to its legitimacy and survival. As the previous chapter has shown, Frontex’s public language has transformed strongly over the years, increasingly invoking an image of the organisation as a fundamental rights promoter and a saviour of people in distress at sea. Indeed, Frontex staff have responded to outside pressures and demands by changing the agency’s organisational narrative. When I asked a management member about a statement on the agency website declaring that Frontex was Europe’s biggest search and rescue operation, their explanation revealed that there had been a conscious attempt by some in the agency to respond to outside criticism through Frontex’s public organisational narrative: [t]hat’s a reaction to accusations by members of the European Parliament regarding Frontex. And myself and [then Frontex executive director] Laitinen, we had a, we then said now it’s enough of us being portrayed as those who are letting people drown in the Mediterranean. We will write down the numbers. Those are only the people who have been rescued in the framework of Frontex-coordinated operations. Whom the Greek coastguard fished out of the sea apart from that, or the Italians, I don’t actually know. But through Frontex operations alone, coordinated by Frontex, by now, I think by now almost 40,000 people have been fished out of the sea. Who otherwise simply would have drowned, okay? And then we said, well, these border control operations do not only have the goal of organising border protection, but on this occasion so many are saved. So that one should ask oneself the question,

Frontex as a fragmented organisation 127 there was this talk about abolishing Frontex and all these stories. And then of course there are also these kinds of numbers. (FR9) Rather than outlining any particular change in structures or actions, the interviewee explained how pressures and criticism by the European Parliament spurred Frontex staff and management to portray the agency’s work differently, making changes to its website and emphasising the amount of people Frontex operations had saved as a “by-product” of border protection operations. When examining the European Parliament’s interactions with Frontex over time, it is clear that the Parliament has exerted sustained normative and coercive pressure on the agency in relation to human rights and search and rescue operations, after having been marginalised in the founding process of the agency (see Chapter 2). In 2009, the Parliament’s Civil Liberties, Justice, and Home Affairs (LIBE) Committee warned that Frontex operations risked creating “a zone of indistinction and arbitrariness, contrary to the EU values,” as regards the applicability of human rights (LIBE Committee, 2009, p. 18; Williams, 2010, p. 149). In 2010, the Parliament issued a resolution in response to allegations of human rights abuses against individuals returned to Libya by Frontex operations, calling on “member states that deport migrants to Libya, in cooperation with Frontex . . . to stop doing so immediately” where the principle of non-refoulement might be violated (European Parliament, 2010). The Parliament also repeatedly invited Frontex’s executive director for presentations and questioning over the years (Baldaccini, 2010; statewatch, 2012b; Martin, 2013; LIBE Committee, 2014). In 2011, the European Parliament and the Council expanded Frontex’s mandate. As noted in Chapter 2, in particular the European Parliament insisted on strengthening the role of fundamental rights in Frontex’s founding regulation (European Parliament, 2011; statewatch, 2012a). With the amendments, Frontex had to create the Consultative Forum and to establish the position of the Fundamental Rights Officer. Following the amendments, the European Ombudsman conducted an own-initiative inquiry into the agency’s implementation of its fundamental rights obligations (European Ombudsman, 2012, 2013; Neumann, 2013). The procedure prompted lengthy replies from Frontex, which made its Fundamental Rights Strategy and Action Plan public (Frontex, 2012) and invited NGOs to comment on these plans and explanations, with many taking a critical approach (Amnesty International, 2012; Caritas, 2012; Human Rights Watch, 2012; Jesuit Refugee Service, 2012; Meijers Committee, 2012; Red Cross/EU Office, 2012; statewatch and migreurop, 2012). Frontex has thus faced sustained normative and coercive pressures to improve its safeguards for fundamental rights not only by the European Parliament but also by the European Ombudsman, NGOs, legal scholars, and activists. Given the growing importance of the European Parliament in particular, it is likely that those working for the agency felt a need to respond to these external pressures. By the time I conducted my interviews in 2013 and 2014, all staff and management members I spoke with invoked fundamental rights consistently and without prompting. Indeed, references to fundamental rights seemed to have become routine-like,

128 Frontex as a fragmented organisation like a well-rehearsed and necessary part of every explanation of Frontex’s activities. Illustrating this most clearly, one staff member said: of course I don’t want to be boring and talk about fundamental rights, you know, how it’s always in our operational plans, there are codes of conducts, there are trainings about it . . . just to make sure that, you know, when Frontex has an operation, it’s carried out up to the highest standards. We get criticised anyway, but we can do what we can do, you know. (FR1) Referring to human rights in this context as ‘boring’ is insightful, and might reflect a sustained effort placed on regularly mentioning human rights in the organisation over previous years. Another interviewee, however, noted in passing that Frontex’s increase in rights-related language did not always lead to structural changes: the [fundamental rights] strategy was made before the regulation was amended. Like 6, 9 months before or something like that. Several months. So [Frontex was] really aware that, that critics were there. So to say. And so [Frontex is] now trying to see whether, structurally, they need structures I mean inside in order to do everything that’s needed. (FR3) While Frontex might thus have adopted its fundamental rights strategy in response to outside pressures in April 2011, this did not immediately lead to structural changes within the organisation. When conducting my first interviews 2.5 years after the strategy was passed, I was told that internal structures to ensure the mainstreaming of fundamental rights throughout the agency were still lacking. It thus seems that references to human rights are at least partially ritualistic portrayals of the agency’s acceptance of these principles to its environment, which are not necessarily linked to meaningful structural changes. Indeed, the most visible structural changes pertaining to fundamental rights within Frontex are the creation of the Consultative Forum on Fundamental Rights and the position of the Fundamental Rights Officer. Both, however, were not initiated by the agency itself but imposed on it by the European Parliament and the Council. In fact, there was fierce resistance from member states in the management board and Council working groups regarding the Fundamental Rights Officer and the Consultative Forum on Fundamental Rights, a member of Frontex’s management told me. Staff members added that resistance regarding these proposals prevailed also among Frontex staff at the time. While Frontex’s management board passed the agency’s Fundamental Rights Strategy before the legislative changes and references to fundamental rights had become more frequent in Frontex’s PR at the time, the change in organisational language did not lead to an openness to structural adjustments. Ultimately, both the FRO and the Forum were imposed on the agency from the outside. Overall, disparities regarding the organisational narrative of Frontex and its work by staff and management, guest officers, and public documents suggest that

Frontex as a fragmented organisation 129 Frontex is a loosely coupled organisation, in which a number of conflicting rationalities coexist. First, its operations are largely decoupled from its core organisation. Not only do guest officers feel distanced from Frontex, agency staff also noted at the time of the initial interviews in December 2013 that only around 30% of their officers in operations had undergone Frontex training. Guest officers were thus likely to be primarily influenced by their national border guard culture and training (as well as their personal predispositions) and failed to be familiarised with Frontex’s organisational culture and identity.6 The loose coupling between the organisational culture and identity promoted in Frontex’s headquarters on the one hand and that of guest officers on the other hand allows for the coexistence of diverse interpretations of border guarding among those who implement Frontex joint operations at the EU’s external borders. By not imposing a coherent or unitary understanding among those working for Frontex at the external borders, potential conflicts with member states over ways of thinking and doing border controls are avoided. Instead, space for diversity, contradiction, and incoherence among guest and seconded officers’ understandings seems to exist. Second, different units within Frontex’s headquarters are only loosely coupled to each other. FR3 noted that some staff members were trained and aware of fundamental rights, while there was a large effort needed to train other staff and guest officers in order to increase their awareness and understanding. The NGO member of the Consultative Forum I interviewed similarly emphasised that there were discrepancies between different parts of the organisation regarding their openness to the Consultative Forum when I asked about its working relationship with Frontex: with the Fundamental Rights Officer, excellent. . . . Other parts of the headquarters also good. Good, pleasant working atmosphere. Sometimes, but well that is then conditioned by the respective roles and origins, there are difficulties because some colleagues first have to learn what we are talking about. So especially the risk analysis unit understands its task and its work as rather technical and has not had a lot to do with the topic of human rights and individual fates so far. And needed to understand first of all what our problem is. That still remains a bit of work. Other parts of the secretariat still have a little bit a very bureaucratic approach, also a very police-like approach, but overall the cooperation with Frontex isn’t bad. . . . Cooperation with the management board – I would not talk about cooperation. The management board clearly did not want us. (NGO) Different parts of Frontex were thus perceived as demonstrating different attitudes vis-à-vis the Forum by this interviewee. Especially the management board was described as non-cooperative, contrary to other parts of Frontex’s headquarters that were viewed as relatively easy to work with. Third, the interviews I conducted as well as my observations during the Frontex management board meeting showed that also Frontex’s management is far from

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united: it is fragmented within itself and only loosely coupled to the agency. During the management board meeting, two member states were asked to provide an explanation of recent incidents at their external borders, which had left several people attempting to cross their borders dead. In informal conversations, various management board members expressed their frustration either with each other (for violating fundamental rights) or with Frontex (for blaming such violations on member states). Frontex staff members on the other hand articulated frustration with member states violating human rights and distanced themselves from such rights infringements. In sum, Frontex can better be understood as a fragmented and partially decoupled organisation than a coherent, unitary agency controlled by a uniform management board. The agency’s fragmentation and loose coupling allows for the separation of its organisational narrative towards the outside from its internal procedures and rules on the one hand, and its everyday practices on the other. It enables Frontex to respond to diverse external pressures, while maintaining flexibility in its practices and procedures at the same time.

Conclusion Complementing the perspectives on Frontex presented in Chapters 2 and 3, this chapter has engaged with the agency as an organisation, looking at its position in a contested policy field and its responses to external demands and pressures. Challenging conventional depictions of Frontex as a unitary, rational actor, the chapter has argued that the agency can better be understood as a fragmented, contradictory and only loosely coupled organisation. Drawing on interviews and informal conversations in Frontex operations and in its headquarters, it has shown that divergences exist between different Frontex units; their outward-facing language and their internal structures and priorities; and between those implementing Frontex operations on the ground, those planning them in the headquarters, and the management board members, who are also divided among themselves. Using insights from organisational sociology, the chapter has argued that this form of fragmentation is in part a response to diverse external pressures on the agency. The decoupling of different aspects of its works enables Frontex to respond to contradictory demands posed on it by its various stakeholders and to maintain its legitimacy in a contested environment. This has important effects on its standing in EUropean border governance, which will be explored in Chapter 5.

Notes 1 For a more detailed account and analysis, see (Peers, 2014). 2 As some interviewees might be identifiable through their gender, I use the genderneutral pronoun “they” instead of “he” or “she.” 3 The interviewee’s name has been changed. 4 Similar emotional reactions were also found by Aas and Gundhus (2015) when speaking to Norwegian police officers involved in Frontex operations. 5 Given that I only visited two joint operations, and could conduct formal interviews with only 7 individuals, I am not able to identify patterns in the differences between officers’

Frontex as a fragmented organisation 131 accounts. Further research is needed to determine how various factors such as guest officers’ role within the joint operation, their nationality, gender, and a range of other factors might influence understandings of their work in Frontex missions and migration and border governance more generally. 6 This may have changed in recent years, as the 2011 amendment to Frontex’s founding regulation mandates the agency to train all officers working in its operations prior to deployment. At the time of the interviews, this goal was being worked towards.

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Dery, D. (1986) ‘Knowledge and Organizations’, Policy Studies Review, 6(1), pp. 14–25. DiMaggio, P. J. and Powell, W. W. (1991) ‘The Iron Cage Revisited: Institutional Isomorphism and Collective Rationality in Organizational Fields’, in Powell, W. W. and DiMaggio, P. J. (eds) The New Institutionalism in Organizational Analysis. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, pp. 63–82. Dowling, J. and Pfeffer, J. (1975) ‘Organizational Legitimacy: Social Values and Organizational Behavior’, The Pacific Sociological Review, 18(1), pp. 122–136. European Commission (2013) Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council on the Work of the Task Force Mediterranean, COM(213) 869 final. Brussels. Available at: http://eur-lex.europa.eu/procedure/EN/1041481 (Accessed: 7 August 2016). European Commission (2014) Implementation of the Communication on the Work of the Task Force Mediterranean, SWD(2014) 173 final, Part 1/2. Brussels. Available at: http:// ec.europa.eu/dgs/home-affairs/e-library/documents/policies/legal-migration/general/ docs/sdw_implementation_of_the_communication_on_the_work_of_the_task_force_ mediterranean_part_1_en.pdf. European Ombudsman (2012) European Ombudsman Invites Observations from Interested Parties Concerning His Own-initiative Inquiry into the Implementation by Frontex of Its Fundamental Rights Obligations. Available at: www.ombudsman.europa.eu/en/cases/ correspondence.faces/en/11757/html.bookmark (Accessed: 7 August 2016). European Ombudsman (2013) Decision of the European Ombudsman Closing Owninitiative Inquiry OI/5/2012/BEH-MHZ Concerning the European Agency for the Management of Operational Cooperation at the External Borders of the Member States of the European Union (Frontex). Available at: www.ombudsman.europa.eu/en/cases/ decision.faces/en/52477/html.bookmark (Accessed: 7 August 2016). European Parliament (2010) European Parliament Resolution of 17 June 2010 on Executions in Libya – P7_TA(2010)0246. Available at: www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc. do?type=TA&reference=P7-TA-2010-0246&language=EN (Accessed: 7 August 2016). European Parliament (2011) Frontex Border Guard Teams and Fundamental Rights. Available at: www.europarl.europa.eu/news/de/news-room/content/20110622IPR22352/html/ Frontex-border-guard-teams-and-fundamental-rights (Accessed: 7 August 2016). Frontex (2012) Frontex’s Response to Ombudsman Own-initiative Inquiry. Available at: www. ombudsman.europa.eu/showResource?resourceId=1342511806022_OI-5-2012-BEHMHZ-S2012-158110_p3-61.pdf&type=pdf&download=true&lang=en (Accessed: 7 August 2016). Greenwood, R. et al. (2008) ‘Introduction’, in Greenwood, R. et al. (eds) The SAGE Handbook of Organizational Institutionalism. London: Sage Publications, Inc, pp. 1–46. Hobbing, P. (2010) ‘The Management of the EU’s External Borders: From the Customs Union to Frontex and E-borders’, in Guild, E., Carrera, S., and Eggenschwiler, A. (eds) The Area of Freedom, Security and Justice Ten Years On: Successes and Future Challenges under the Stockholm Programme. Brussels: CEPS, pp. 63–72. Human Rights Watch (2012) European Ombudsman’s Own-initiative Inquiry into the Implementation by Frontex of its Fundamental Rights Obligations. Available at: www. ombudsman.europa.eu/en/cases/correspondence.faces/en/11949/html.bookmark (Accessed: 7 August 2016). Huysmans, J. (2014) Security Unbound: Enacting Democratic Limits. London and New York: Routledge. Italian Interior Ministry (2014) Si conclude ‘Mare Nostrum’, al via ‘Triton’. Available at: www.interno.gov.it/it/notizie/conclude-mare-nostrum-triton (Accessed: 11 October 2019).

Frontex as a fragmented organisation 133 Jesuit Refugee Service (2012) Your Own-initiative Inquiry OI/5/2012/BEH-MHZ Concerning Implementation by Frontex of Its Fundamental Rights Obligations. Available at: www.ombudsman.europa.eu/en/cases/correspondence.faces/en/11948/html.bookmark (Accessed: 7 August 2016). LIBE Committee (2009) External Dimension of the Area of Freedom, Security and Justice. Available at: www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/etudes/join/2009/410688/IPOLLIBE_ET(2009)410688_EN.pdf (Accessed: 7 August 2016). LIBE Committee (2014) 12.0 (LIBE/8/01027) Frontex Activities in the Mediterranean. Available at: www.europarl.europa.eu/ep-live/en/committees/video?event=201409040930-COMMITTEE-LIBE (Accessed: 7 August 2016). Malmström, C. (2013) Press Release – Commissioner Malmström’s Intervention on Lampedusa During the Home Affairs Council Press Conference. European Commission – MEMO/13/864. Available at: http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_MEMO-13-864_en.htm (Accessed: 7 August 2016). Martin, M. (2013) ‘Trust in Frontex’: The 2013 Work Programme. Available at: www.state watch.org/analyses/no-212-frontex-work-programmes.pdf (Accessed: 7 August 2016). Meijers Committee (2012) Public Consultation on Frontex and Fundamental Rights. Available at: www.ombudsman.europa.eu/en/cases/correspondence.faces/en/11996/html.book mark (Accessed: 7 August 2016). Meyer, J. W., Boli, J. and Thomas, G. M. (1994) ‘Ontology and Rationalization in the Western Cultural Account’, in Scott, W. R. and Meyer, J. W. (eds) Institutional Environments and Organizations: Structural Complexity and Individualism. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publications, Inc., pp. 9–27. Meyer, J. W. and Rowan, B. (1991) ‘Institutional Organizations: Formal Structure as Myth and Ceremony’, in Powell, W. W. and DiMaggio, P. J. (eds) The New Institutionalism in Organizational Analysis. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, pp. 41–62. Neal, A. W. (2009) ‘Securitization and Risk at the EU Border: The Origins of FRONTEX’, JCMS: Journal of Common Market Studies, 47(2), pp. 333–356. Neumann, S. (2013) ‘Ein neues Mind-set der Europäischen Grenzschutzagentur? Zur Internalisierung menschenrechtlicher Vorgaben durch Frontex’, MRM – Menschen RechtsMagazin, 1, pp. 19–32. Peers, S. (2014) ‘New EU Rules on Maritime Surveillance: Will They Stop the Deaths and Push-backs in the Mediterranean?’, EU Law Analysis. Available at: http://eulaw analysis.blogspot.com/2014/06/new-eu-rules-on-maritime-surveillance.html (Accessed: 11 October 2019). Perkowski, N. (2019) ‘“There Are Voices in Every Direction”: Organizational Decoupling in Frontex’, JCMS: Journal of Common Market Studies, 57(5), pp. 1182–99. Red Cross/EU Office (2012) Comments of the National Red Cross Societies of the Member States of the European Union and of the International Federation of the Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies in the Enquiry Concerning Frontex. Available at: www. ombudsman.europa.eu/en/cases/correspondence.faces/en/12058/html.bookmark (Accessed: 7 August 2016). Scott, W. R. and Meyer, J. W. (1994) ‘Developments in Institutional Theory’, in Scott, W. R. and Meyer, J. W. (eds) Institutional Environments and Organizations: Structural Complexity and Individualism. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publications Ltd., pp. 1–8. statewatch (2012a) A Drop of Fundamental Rights in an Ocean of Unaccountability: Frontex in the Process of Implementing Article 26(a). Available at: www.statewatch.org/ news/2012/may/02-eu-frontex-article26a.html (Accessed: 7 August 2016). statewatch (2012b) Criticism Mounts of Frontex’s Operations at Sea. Available at: www. statewatch.org/analyses/200-frontex-search-rescue.pdf (Accessed: 7 August 2016).

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statewatch and migreurop (2012) Reply to the Ombudsman’s Request for Submission – Frontex’s Fundamental Rights Strategy. Available at: www.ombudsman.europa.eu/en/ cases/correspondence.faces/en/12022/html.bookmark (Accessed: 11 October 2015). Suchman, M. C. (1995) ‘Managing Legitimacy: Strategic and Institutional Approaches’, Academy of Management Review. Academy of Management Briarcliff Manor, NY 10510, 20(3), pp. 571–610. doi: 10.5465/amr.1995.9508080331. Williams, A. T. (2010) The Ethos of Europe. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. doi: 10.1017/CBO9780511750335.

5

The effects of Frontex’s re-positioning

The previous three chapters have offered three distinct perspectives on Frontex’s turn towards humanitarianism and human rights. Putting different actors and dynamics in focus, they approached this issue from distinct angles. Together, the preceding chapters show that while humanitarianism and human rights have been among the main discursive tools of those seeking to oppose violent border practices, they ultimately proved combinable with a concern to “manage” migration and to “secure” EUrope from potential threats. Humanitarianism and human rights could be reconciled with long-standing practices by the security actor Frontex, including patrolling activity and surveillance (which has been declared to save lives), and the return of “unwanted” arrivals to countries of origin and transit (while respecting fundamental rights safeguards), among others. Taking this development seriously, this chapter examines more closely which effects the intertwinement of humanitarianism, human rights, and security in Frontex’s organisational narrative has had on the agency itself, as well as on EUropean border governance more widely. Importantly, I am not suggesting here that Frontex staff and management intended to present the agency in a particular way with these effects in mind. Rather, I view Frontex’s discursive positioning as performative, regardless of the intentions of those working for and with the agency. Indeed, this chapter understands borders as processes that are constantly being (re-)produced by a variety of actors. When “borderworkers” (Rumford, 2006) such as Frontex change how they present their work internally and externally and construct a new identity for themselves, this has effects on how they construct or maintain bordering processes. In examining these effects, this chapter follows three key themes emerging through Frontex’s organisational narrative (see Chapter 3). In particular, it analyses the effects of Frontex’s positioning as a crisis response mechanism, as a manager of risks, and as a promoter of human rights, showing how these three moves have considerably strengthened the agency. Further problematising the effects of a strengthening of humanitarianism and human rights alongside a continued focus on border security, the chapter proceeds by exploring the potential implications of seeking to ensure EUropean border guards’ conformity with human rights and humanitarian principles without questioning their task to keep out racialised “others.” In particular, it argues that attempts to “sanitise” EUropean borderlands from

136 The effects of Frontex’s re-positioning violence and death while seeking to keep its territory clear of migrant “others” risk feeding into longer-standing efforts to externalise border controls.

Frontex as a crisis response mechanism Through its press releases and annual reports, Frontex constructs an organisational identity that positions it simultaneously as a manager of risks and a crisis response mechanism. While some argue that Frontex adheres to a risk management discourse, which is “regularly at odds” with more spectacular crisis politics (Jeandesboz and Pallister-Wilkins, 2014: 121), this book has shown how Frontex actively draws on both crisis and risk management narratives. Indeed, the apparent tensions between both approaches within Frontex’s organisational narrative are productive and have been beneficial for the agency. As outlined in Chapter 4, Frontex is positioned in a contested environment with multiple stakeholders and seeks to respond to at times contradictory external pressures to secure its legitimacy. Incorporating both an emphasis on routine risk analysis and declaring a readiness to respond to “crises” opens up the possibility of satisfying diverse demands. Moreover, a focus on risk management is not necessarily at odds with crisis narratives. Huysmans’ (2014) conceptualisation of diffuse and exceptionalist securitising as two techniques of enacting insecurity is helpful here (see Chapter 1). While they have different modes of operation, a focus on risk management can become embedded in an exceptionalist framing. Finally, both modes of enacting insecurity can and do feed into each other in practice. This was emphasised by some of the interviewees, who explained that urgent interventions produced information that was fed back into Frontex’s “risk analyses,” which then enhanced the “operational response” to perceived risks and threats, including “urgent” interventions. Rather than understanding Frontex purely as a risk management agency, the agency can thus be seen as enacting both diffuse and exceptionalist securitising. Each of these modes of operation produces particular effects. While this section reflects on the performativity of crises narratives, the effects of risk management narratives will be discussed in the following section. As Chapter 3 has shown, Frontex’s positioning as a protector of EUrope in times of crisis is a central element of its organisational narrative. This focus on recurring “crises” resonates with a proliferation of crisis narratives in EU border governance more generally. Indeed, crisis narratives have become pervasive: references to a humanitarian crisis, a crisis of border control, a crisis of the asylum system, a Schengen crisis, a human rights crisis, a refugee crisis, a migrant crisis, a crisis of EUrope, and of course a financial crisis and a demographic crisis have become frequent and, to an extent, normalised. In EUropean border governance, crisis narratives have increasingly been bound up with notions of humanitarianism and human rights, focusing on tragic deaths, large-scale suffering, or the lack of basic provisions for those newly arrived, including medical care, food, water, or shelter. Human Rights Watch (2012), for instance, spoke out forcefully against a “hidden emergency” in the Mediterranean, calling for urgent action to put an end to deaths at sea. The UNHCR warned of a “colossal humanitarian

The effects of Frontex’s re-positioning 137 catastrophe” threatening to materialise at EUrope’s southern borders (Sherwood et al., 2014). And the events of 2015 and 2016 seemed to confirm this warning, as media, policymakers, NGOs, and international organisations alike invoked an unprecedented refugee or migrant “crisis” in EUrope, drawing on the discursive formations of humanitarianism, human rights, and security alike. In this section, I will explore what such invocations of crisis do in contemporary EUropean border governance, examining how the concept of a “crisis” enables some questions while foreclosing others (Roitman, 2014: 10). Rather than conceptualising crisis as the occurrence of specific events, I understand it as a discursive narrative which produces particular meanings. Roitman proposes conceptualising crisis narratives through the metaphor of a “blind spot”: invoking a crisis is based on assumptions about how certain processes or categories should work, without accounting for the ways in which such categories are produced in the first place (Roitman, 2014: 13). As such, the wider context of events framed in terms of “crisis” tends to be obscured: In declaring a “migration crisis” in EUrope, the focus is on the number of deaths at sea, the squalid living conditions of new arrivals, or the number of unauthorised border crossings. (Post-)colonial legacies, racialised visa policies, and related wealth and power disparities between the Global North and the Global South are sidelined while the focus is on urgent responses to pressing problems. This allows diverse actors – including state and security actors, NGOs, international organisations, activists, and volunteers – to cooperate in their responses to proclaimed “crises,” without having to agree on a common interpretation of the wider social, economic, and political conditions producing these “problems” in the first place. When EUropean governments, agencies, volunteers, and NGOs cooperate to react to “crises” declared in the Mediterranean, their interventions work to affirm their agency and humanity. Indeed, crises narratives produce particular, “response-able” actors (van Reekum, 2016). Their interventions simultaneously project the Mediterranean Sea as a EUropean space of care and control. In addition, they portray problematic events as originating outside of EUrope: imaginings and representations of contemporary illegalised migration suggest not only that “Europe” is confronted with a “crisis” that originates “elsewhere,” therefore, but also that “Europe” is a kind of “victim” of unfathomable conflicts erupting elsewhere, derived from the incapacity or incompetence of (postcolonial) “others” to adequately govern themselves. (New Keywords Collective, 2016: 13) Those “others” who are on the move, on the other hand, are presented as passive subjects to be governed: to be saved from distress, processed in centres, provided with aid, screened for potential risks; to be pitied and/or feared. Meanwhile, the term “crisis” no longer invokes just a singular moment of decision and judgement but has come to be understood as a condition, a protracted state of being (Roitman, 2014: 16). Indeed, “we must recognize that – regarding illegalized migration into and across Europe – the very distinction between (and separation of) what

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is ostensibly ‘stable’ and ‘in crisis’ is altogether tenuous, indeed, dubious” (New Keywords Collective, 2016: 10). In this protracted state of “crisis” in EUropean border governance, Frontex has come to profit from constantly (re-)produced crisis narratives. Indeed, the agency’s planned budget was increased repeatedly in response to events that were framed as “crises” in the Mediterranean, including in 2011, 2014, and 2015. In 2011, the declared “crisis” was connected to a perceived loss of control over EUropean borders, as increased numbers of individuals left from Tunisia and Libya at the height of the so-called Arab Spring (Carrera, Den Hertog, and Parkin, 2012). In 2014, Frontex’s budget was increased post hoc to allow it to step in for (though not replace) Italy’s military-humanitarian Mare Nostrum operation, justified by the need for continued search and rescue activities at sea (European Commission, 2014a; Frontex, 2015). The 2015 budget increase came as the almost immediate response to the deaths of more than 800 individuals in a single incident in April of that year (European Council, 2015). In addition to a significant increase of its budget, the so-called migration crisis of 2015 and 2016 also spurred the expansion of Frontex’s mandate and personnel through its transformation into the European Border and Coast Guard (see Chapter 2). Frontex has thus emerged as a “go-to” solution to a variety of “crises” in EUrope, crucially enhancing its legitimacy as the key response mechanism to various crises in EU border governance. The agency’s status as the almost automatic solution proposed by EU and national policymakers in response to diverse “crises” in recent years relies on its broad positioning as a security, humanitarian, and human rights actor. Not only does the agency present itself as key to improving and harmonising EUropean border controls, surveillance, and patrolling but also it emphasises its contributions to search and rescue at sea and portrays itself as actively promoting human rights among Schengen member states and national border guards. Its projected organisational identity as rescuer at sea, promoter of fundamental rights, and protector of EUrope in times of crisis has enabled Frontex to become positioned as a key solution to diverse migration “crises.” Importantly, declarations of crises and emergencies – also when coming from outside the agency – have strengthened Frontex, enhancing its legitimacy as well as leading to repeated increases in its power and resources.

Frontex as a manager of risks As noted, crisis narratives facilitate the working together of diverse actors, including NGOs and activists, international organisations, police and border forces, and Frontex. Importantly, this holds not only for crisis narratives but also for risk management. Contrary to the exceptionalist focus of crisis narratives, a focus on risk management entails a routinisation of security (Aradau, Lobo-Guerrero, and van Munster, 2008). It constitutes what Huysmans (2014) terms “diffuse securitisation” and relies on an understanding of migration as a risk to be calculated, predicted, and prepared for. In addition to compiling Risk Analyses, Frontex engages in risk management through a variety of other practices, including the gathering

The effects of Frontex’s re-positioning 139 of intelligence, the identification and registration of unauthorised arrivals, and the implementation of routine border checks aimed at filtering out those considered to constitute a risk to EUropean societies, among others. A focus on managing risks entails a generalised suspicion of actual and potential border-crossers, who are regarded as needing profiling, identification, and filtering. Risk management thus entails an emphasis on categorising and identifying individuals. It shares this in common with humanitarianism and human rights: categorisation is the basis for responding to new arrivals according to the risk they pose, the needs they have, or the rights they hold. This common emphasis has allowed humanitarian, human rights, and security actors to cooperate in processing new arrivals. While humanitarian and human rights actors might argue for exceptions to a risk-based understanding for particular categories of people (according to their presumed humanitarian need or legal entitlement), in doing so they “confirm the security norm against which these outliers are to be measured. Claiming that exceptions need to be made, they (unwillingly) contribute to targeted risk management that depends on these very categorizations” (van Munster, 2009: 143). Furthermore, an emphasis on identification and categorisation reinforces the “othering” of those on the move: by presenting them as victims to be assisted, and/or threats to be carefully screened, they are juxtaposed to the figure of the EUropean citizen, and produced as racialised and faceless, variably helpless, abused, or potentially threatening “other” (see Chapter 1). While the overall focus is on the management and classification of individuals, the subject positions produced in this way are inherently unstable, and purported “victims” and “threats” can swiftly transform from one into the other. Frontex’s Consultative Forum on Fundamental Rights is an insightful example of the cooperation of humanitarian and human rights actors in what ultimately remains a risk management approach. The Consultative Forum consists of nine NGOs, two EU agencies, and six international organisations that regularly advise Frontex on matters pertaining to human rights. Its members work without remuneration by the agency and provide advice on all aspects of Frontex’s work, ranging from offering feedback on written codes of conduct to observing trainings to visiting operations. As noted in Chapter 3, Frontex’s relationship with the Consultative Forum has not always been straightforward, with the agency at times exerting pressure on the Forum to change its reports or issuing diverging opinions to reject criticism of its operations contained in the Forum’s annual reports. Initially, there was strong opposition within the agency to the proposal of a Consultative Forum: [t]o be completely open, initially the member states fought massively against that, both in Brussels . . . and in the management board, against the Consultative Forum. . . . Then it was pushed through somehow and once you have it, you have to see that you make the best of it. (FR9) While many explained that they had been sceptical at first, all staff members I spoke with – between one and one and a half years after the Consultative Forum’s

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establishment – viewed the Forum positively and found cooperation with it to be constructive. As the interviewee cited above went on to outline, “many member states have lost the fear that we would get an additional watchdog, which would maybe also organise shaming and blaming. That – thank god – doesn’t happen, so that we can say that the Consultative Forum, the way we configured it, works well at this moment.” Far from being perceived as a threat to Frontex’s work, the Consultative Forum was thus seen as a constructive force, assisting Frontex in improving its work. Indeed, FR6 stated, “we couldn’t count on a better advice body, I would say.” Through its work, the Forum legitimates Frontex, cooperating with the agency in order to improve border controls. In the Forum, fundamental questions such as the right of states to control their borders or the wider global and historical conditions in which contemporary border controls take place do not form part of the discussions; the focus is instead on improving existing procedures, particularly those pertaining to refugee protection. Tellingly, a key term in Frontex’s organisational discourse is “best practices”: these are represented as enabling efficient and effective border control, while simultaneously adhering to human rights standards and humanitarian principles. The common goal of Frontex, NGOs, and international organisations in the Consultative Forum is the advancement of such “best practices,” which entail the “humanisation” of border controls rather than their fundamental questioning. A further example of the convergence of risk management, humanitarianism, and human rights is the European Day for Border Guards 2013, during which panellists from Frontex, the Italian government, Médecins Sans Frontières, and the European External Action Service discussed the need to “manage” migration effectively and to identify those with protection needs from amid “mixed flows.” The discursive formations of human rights and humanitarianism were drawn on both by an NGO representative and in the statements of state and security agency representatives. Regardless of who uttered them, they contributed to a managerial discourse in which humanitarian, human rights, and risk management concerns converged. The focus on dividing individuals into “victims in need” and “others” further strengthened a dominant risk management narrative, while contributing to the “othering” inherent in this discourse. Also beyond the Consultative Forum and the European Day for Border Guards, Frontex staff recounted that the agency was “opening up” to NGOs, for instance by reaching out to organisations with specific expertise when developing new guidance for border guards. Speaking about a new handbook on “vulnerable children” in airports, a staff member explained how Frontex had invited NGOs to discuss a draft document. They asserted that there was an open approach from Frontex, also to receive critics, and also to find a common ground for cooperation. And at the end of the workshop of course we ended up with a document which was endorsed by everybody, so by the member states, Frontex itself, and the NGOs and international organisations. (FR6)

The effects of Frontex’s re-positioning 141 While the agency’s first steps of “opening up” to NGOs and international organisations might have been legally mandated, it goes beyond these legal requirements by now and succeeds in creating agreements with diverse organisations regarding its work. In these emerging coalitions, a common focus on categorising new arrivals according to threat level, rights entitlement, and humanitarian needs, and on routinising security and identifying and spreading “best practices” is crucial. While reaching out to humanitarian and human rights actors, Frontex maintains close links with national border guards and the security industry and is thus positioned as a contact point between these diverse social worlds. As such, Frontex finds itself strategically positioned at the heart of newly emerging coalitions of human rights, humanitarian, and security actors, who work together in their pursuit to optimise and “humanise” EUropean border controls.

Frontex as a promoter of rights Beyond positioning Frontex as the “one-size-fits-all” solution to various “crises” in border governance and a connection point between diverse actors in a wider “migration management” approach, the emphasis on human rights within the agency also has effects on its relations with member states and its standing in EUropean border governance. In highlighting its role as promoter of human rights, Frontex casts itself as spreading EUropean values to member states and improving the standards of border guarding throughout EUrope. In so doing, the agency shifts blame for potential rights abuses to member states, presenting its work as a solution to rights violations rather than as part of the problem. Indeed, interviewees distanced Frontex operations from the work national border guards carried out, highlighting Frontex’s limited mandate and its inability to control member state behaviour. Several staff and management members acknowledged that abuses might be committed by particular member states outside of Frontex operations but emphasised that Frontex’s own work was human rights conform. As one of them stated when asked about human rights, “I can say that the Frontex operations . . . are properly done. Then, the member state issue is a bit more tricky” (FR3). While acknowledging that some member states may have committed human rights violations, Frontex was presented as respecting human rights at all times. Rather than denying the criticism brought against border guards in EUrope more widely, including reports on beatings, inhumane detention conditions, and illegal push-backs (Amnesty International, 2014b, 2014a; Human Rights Watch, 2011), Frontex staff and management distanced the agency from such reports by pointing to the responsibility of member states. In juxtaposing an allegedly rights-conform Frontex with member states who at times violate rights, interviewees from among Frontex staff, its management, and its guest officers engaged in a particular discourse on “EUropeanness.” They claimed that particularly Greece and Bulgaria, and sometimes former communist states more generally, were lacking a tradition and a history of human rights. Scandinavia (particularly Finland) and Germany on the other

142 The effects of Frontex’s re-positioning hand were praised for their rule of law and respect for fundamental rights.1 FR1 stated for instance: you know, it’s cultural. I mean there is, without criticising anybody, but there is a difference in . . . Probably the Finns started training their border guards in the issues relating, you know, fundamental rights in border control, human rights, respect of human rights in border control, probably earlier than Bulgarians. (FR1) Often, it was implied that EU member states in the south eastern periphery had some catching up to do and that Frontex was helping them in this regard. While some member states were portrayed as not understanding the importance of respecting human rights, Frontex operations were presented as a way to expose problematic practices. Several interviewees for instance emphasised that the human rights situation in Greece had improved thanks to Frontex, which had put pressure on the country. They argued that it was better to have a Frontex presence in “problematic” member states (particularly Greece) than to leave national forces up to their own devices. Similar positions also surfaced in publications by the agency (see Chapter 3). Framing EUropean member states in the South (and) East as not fully understanding the importance of human rights feeds into a wider discourse that questions the “EUropeanness” of these member states. Human rights are not only inseparably connected with liberal democracy and ideas about modern statehood, they are also presented as a core value of the European Union. Indeed, the central Treaty on European Union (TEU) proclaims that “The Union is founded on the values of respect for human dignity, freedom, democracy, equality, the rule of law and respect for human rights, including the rights of persons belonging to minorities” (TEU, Article 2). While scholars have questioned the historical accuracy of such statements (Hansen and Jonsson, 2014; Williams, 2009, 2010), the European Union has claimed human rights as one of its core values in recent decades, closely tied to the political identity it projects. Questioning the ability or willingness of particular member states to respect human rights therefore questions their status as “true EUropeans” and puts their belonging to the EUropean project in doubt. The differentiation between North European states that were regarded as human rights conform and those in the South and East that were seen as more problematic in this regard speaks to and further reinforces unequal power relations within EUrope. Indeed, several scholars have noted that the different valuation of “core” EUrope and its peripheries has long-standing historical roots: modern EUropean identity has been constructed not only in opposition to an orientalised “Other” but also as contrary to the European South as the “indispensable internal Other” (Dainotto, 2007 cited in Ervedosa, 2017). As noted, interviewees focused in particular on the problematic track record of Greece and Bulgaria in terms of human rights, feeding into a wider narrative questioning the belonging of the Balkan peninsula to EUrope. As Douzinas notes, “the Balkans are approached as peripheral parts of the civilised world, placed in Europe by

The effects of Frontex’s re-positioning 143 accident of geography rather than achievement of history or culture” (Douzinas, 2007: 74; see also Todorova, 1997). By presenting itself as teaching peripheral member states about human rights, Frontex positions itself as a “truly EUropean” actor and a “civilising force” that brings best practices and standards of human rights from the EUropean “core” to its “problematic” peripheries in the South (and) East. This move deflects blame for potential abuses away from the agency, while further enhancing its legitimacy. Indeed, shifting the blame for rights violations to member states positions the agency as the “solution” to human rights violations at EUrope’s borders, rather than as a part of the problem. A greater presence of Frontex, when following this framing, should decrease abuse and make EUropean borders more “humane.” Unsurprisingly, this framing has led to discontent among some member state representatives affected by rights-related criticism, who for instance approached me during a break at the management board meeting to complain about Frontex’s manoeuvring in this regard. They sought to express their frustration about the fact that Frontex staff had distanced the agency from allegations of fundamental rights abuses by emphasising that no Frontex officers or assets were involved, which the country representatives complaining to me perceived as finger-pointing and manifestation of a lack of solidarity with national border guard services. This episode makes clear that Frontex’s interests and organisational narrative do not always match those of the member states and highlights existing divisions between the agency staff and representatives on its management board (see Chapter 4). While Frontex strengthens its position by presenting itself as spreading EUropean values and addressing rights violations by “problematic” member states, the member states in question find themselves at the receiving end of Frontex’s blame-shifting and are simultaneously positioned as “less EUropean” and in need of training or oversight from Frontex.

“Sanitising” the border regime, externalising violence? As noted in Chapter 1, the strengthening of humanitarian and human rights discourses alongside a continued focus on border security is not limited to Frontex but constitutes a wider trend in the governance of EUropean borders. Broadening the analytical perspective, this section moves beyond a narrow focus on Frontex and examines some of the effects of the convergence of humanitarianism, human rights, and security in EUropean border governance more widely. While the similarities between humanitarianism, human rights, and security create the conditions of possibility for their convergence, tensions and conflicts between the three discursive formations persist and are productive in and of themselves. Whereas viewing migration as a question of security – as is commonly the case – tends to lead to demands to keep unauthorised migration low or “under control,” the ability to do so is limited if human rights and humanitarian principles are strictly adhered to: Legally, individuals can only be denied entry to EU territory at an external border crossing once it has been ascertained that they are not at risk of refoulement, necessitating individual processing. As such, strictly adhering to human rights and refugee law curtails Frontex’s (and other security actors’)

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ability to prevent people from entering EUrope, despite this being precisely what is expected of the agency by some of its stakeholders. Similarly, an insistence on humanitarian principles in border practices might make it “easier” for people to arrive in EUrope, simply because sincere and determined search and rescue measures could reduce the extent to which the Mediterranean Sea acts as a space of biopolitical abandonment – people who might have otherwise drowned might be enabled to reach EUropean territory. These tensions emerge because borders as they currently function are “inherently violent, engendering systematic violence to people and the environment,” (Jones, 2017). Keeping people from crossing borders that demarcate huge differences in wealth and privilege between the Global North and the Global South is a form of violence in and of itself. In order to work as they are intended, borders rely on further forms of violence: to deter people from making unauthorised crossings, border policies render such crossings extraordinarily risky, exposing those who attempt them nevertheless to the risk of death or serious injury. In addition, individuals seeking to cross borders without authorisation are regularly exposed to direct violence by border guards or vigilantes. Borders in their current form necessitate direct and indirect forms of violence and cannot function otherwise (Jones, 2017). As such, seeking to promote respect for human rights and humanitarian principles in border governance without fundamentally rethinking border security at the same time appears oxymoronic. The debates that took place around the humanitarian-military operation Mare Nostrum illustrate these tensions in practice. Saving thousands of individuals from distress at sea, Mare Nostrum also coincided with heightened numbers of arrivals in Italy in 2014 (Frontex, 2014d). Accordingly, Italy’s right-wing parties described it as a “pull factor” that encouraged more people to attempt the crossing (ANSA, 2014b). The attempt to save those in distress at sea clashed with a widespread desire to keep EUrope’s doors closed to unauthorised travellers and led to fierce opposition to Mare Nostrum. Behind the scenes, Frontex management board members and guest officers expressed similar views, which were also reflected in a leaked concept paper by Frontex (Frontex, 2014a). As a result, Italy faced substantial pressures to end the purportedly humanitarian operation. It did not succeed in obtaining EUropean support for the continuation of the mission, nor was the operation replaced by EUropean means, as was requested repeatedly. Indeed, a public exchange between Italian officials and Frontex representatives revealed considerable tensions between both sides. As boat arrivals increased in summer 2014, Alfano mobilised humanitarian appeals to call for greater EUropean responsibility in the region. In June, he argued that it was Europe that needed to take over the Italian humanitarian-military operation Mare Nostrum, given that those saved wanted to go to Europe rather than specifically to Italy (La Reppublica, 2014a). Shortly thereafter, he announced that Mare Nostrum would be substituted by a Frontex-coordinated operation (La Reppublica, 2014b). At this point, a struggle over Frontex’s responsibilities and character became visible: soon after Alfano’s claim that Mare Nostrum would be replaced by Frontex, the agency was quoted as denying this in media reports, saying that it had

The effects of Frontex’s re-positioning 145 neither the resources nor the mandate to do so (La Reppublica, 2014c; Meier, 2014). Unperturbed, Alfano began speaking about “Frontex plus” as the replacement for Mare Nostrum (La Reppublica, 2014d; La Stampa, 2014). After meeting Commissioner Malmström in Brussels, Alfano and the Commissioner reiterated that “Frontex plus” would substitute Mare Nostrum (ANSA, 2014a; European Commission, 2014b). Frontex interim executive director Arias Fernandez, however, insisted that the agency’s mandate remained limited to border security during a hearing at the European Parliament. Announcing that Frontex would launch a new operation in the Mediterranean, he reiterated that “Joint Operation Triton will not replace Mare Nostrum. Neither the mandate nor the available resources allow for that replacement” (LIBE Committee, 2014). When answering questions by Parliamentarians, Arias Fernandez further clarified that Frontex has never given its name to any operation. So “Frontex plus” is totally misleading for the public and also for you. . . . In any case, the difference between Mare Nostrum and Triton is fundamentally the nature of the two operations. While Mare Nostrum is clearly a search and rescue operation, Triton will be with the main focus on border control, border management. Although as it is obvious, saving lives is an absolute priority. (Arias Fernandez in the LIBE Committee, 2014) Similar declarations were also made in Frontex press releases at the time, which simultaneously emphasised the importance of saving lives and Frontex’s border control mandate (Frontex, 2014b, 2014c). A concept paper Frontex sent to the Italian government that was leaked to the press made clear that the operational aim of Triton would be “to control irregular migration flows towards the territory of the European Union and to tackle cross border crime” – a clearly security-oriented goal (Frontex, 2014a). While search and rescue activities are mentioned in the document, they appear only marginally and are described as Italy’s responsibility. The discussions around “Frontex plus” and the mandate of Joint Operation Triton illustrate an attempt of the agency to present itself as committed to fulfilling its duties under international maritime law, that is responding to distress calls in the vicinity of its operations, and following instructions by national MRCCs to conduct search and rescue activities on an ad hoc basis. More expansive interpretations of humanitarianism, particularly suggestions that Frontex should conduct operations with the objective of searching and rescuing individuals at sea, were firmly rejected. In the public documents released by Frontex, it was implied that the agency’s life-saving activities occurred as a side effect of its security-focused joint operations and that they remained ultimately the responsibility of member states. Despite humanitarian appeals to continue search and rescue activities, Mare Nostrum was thus replaced by an unambiguously security-focused operation, which merely expanded Frontex’s previous work in the region. The emphasis on saving lives that existed within Mare Nostrum was perceived to be at odds with border security rationales, and the ensuing controversy exposed EUrope’s reliance on the Mediterranean Sea as a space of biopolitical abandonment and

146 The effects of Frontex’s re-positioning death as an integral part of its border security strategy. A few years later, the same conflict erupted in relation to the alleged pull effects by search and rescue operations conducted by NGOs (see Chapter 3). An increased focus on humanitarianism and human rights, when coexisting with a continued understanding of migration as a security problem, thus leads to demands that seem difficult to reconcile: respecting fundamental rights and saving lives at sea, while simultaneously keeping arrival numbers low and allowing states to remain in control of who arrives, which renders border violence necessary. There is, however, a way in which this tension can be resolved: by limiting the focus of humanitarian and human rights concerns to EUrope on the one hand, and moving border controls and the violence accompanying them beyond EUropean territory on the other. Indeed, the externalisation of border controls is a longstanding trend in EUropean border governance. More than 10 years ago, Lavenex (2006, 2007) described the inclusion of EUropean immigration control in foreign policy as a continuation of attempts by immigration ministers to increase their autonomy vis-à-vis normative, institutional, and political constraints. She built on previous work showing how increasing constraints on immigration policymaking posed by national constitutions, humanitarian discourses, courts, and ministries led to immigration ministers seeking to EUropeanise these matters (Guiraudon, 2000; Lavenex, 2001). As constraints grew stronger on a EUropean level, this created an interest in externalising migration policies and incorporating them in relations with third states. Already then, the constraints on policymaking that were sought to be avoided included human rights obligations. It is not difficult to imagine that a strengthening of humanitarianism and human rights in the EUropean border regime in recent years might have provided new impetus to already existing externalisation processes. Indeed, externalisation was often referenced by interviewees when I asked about the future of border guarding in Europe, who pointed to the importance of improving relationships with third countries. In doing so, they explained that the focus was on “preventing” irregular migration through agreements with third states, so that “the countries of origins’ authorities, let’s say, or actors, make sure that the people migrating choose regular paths” (FR6). Interviewees noted that the externalisation of border controls was not necessarily Frontex’s own initiative, but had to be understood in the context of a wider and longer-standing trend among EU policymakers and institutions: I think now the trend is to externalise more and more border control. I mean, to put it more and more far away from the physical border. This is the trend now and it’s, it has a very strong political content behind. I mean it’s not this agency or the border guards that are going to develop such system. It has a very strong political component that you can put the control of your borders more and more far away of the physical borders. (FR2) While Frontex is thus not the only actor driving the externalisation of border controls politically, it does play an active role in shaping this process through

The effects of Frontex’s re-positioning 147 practices. As interviewees had predicted, the process of externalising border controls was expanded and indeed further accelerated in response to the so-called migration crisis over recent years (McMahon and Sigona, 2018). Framed in security, human rights, and humanitarian language (see Chapter 1), the 2015 European Agenda on Migration emphasised among other policy measures the need to “support third countries developing their own solutions to better manage their borders” and “to strengthen the capacity for countries in North Africa to intervene and save the lives of migrants in distress” (European Commission, 2015: 11–12). The Valletta Summit on Migration in November 2015 sought to further expand cooperation between African countries and the EU, and the EU-Turkey Statement that entered into force in March 2016 was followed by a significant reduction in crossings across the Eastern Mediterranean. Finally, the transformation of Frontex into the European Border and Coast Guard gave the agency additional powers in cooperating with third states. As a result, Frontex initiated the project EU4BorderSecurity with countries in the southern Mediterranean, North Africa and the Levant in order to enhance “their capacity to conduct risk analysis, situation monitoring and operational border and coast guard operations [aiming] to contribute to the fight against security threats, particularly organised crime and terrorism in the region” (Frontex, 2019a: 50–51). The agency also worked together with civilian common security and defence policy (CSDP) missions in Libya, Mali and Niger and launched its first joint operation in a third country in May 2019 in Albania (Frontex, 2019a: 50, 2019b). These activities clearly show that the agency is heavily invested in externalisation processes in practice. When externalising border controls, the apparent tension between humanitarianism and human rights demands on the one hand and security concerns on the other can be resolved, as the violence inherent in EUropean borders is shifted away from its territory. Indeed, externalising border controls could make it possible to respect humanitarian principles and human rights on EUropean territory, while the violence necessary to maintain current borders is outsourced to third states. A member of the management board revealed that some within the agency are aware of the cost this might inflict on would-be-travellers: FR9:

We can of course send liaison officers to third states, who attempt to prevent migration from there. Although as said before, we only prevent the running away then. We don’t work on the causes. INTERVIEWER: If you say it like that, it seems pretty apparent that . . . the costs for hindering migration effectively will be extremely high, if the causes of migration are not addressed at the same time. Both financial costs and human costs . . . FR9: That will be the case; that will be the case. Externalising controls is thus not envisioned to reduce violence but to move it beyond EUropean external borders. As past cooperation agreements have shown, violence might intensify in third countries, while being removed from the EUropean public’s view at the same time. Cooperation agreements with countries in North Africa, particularly Libya, have been described as the creation of

148 The effects of Frontex’s re-positioning “‘off-shore’ black holes where European norms, standards and regulations simply do not apply” (Bialasiewicz, 2012: 861; see also Buckel and Wissel, 2010: 40). This exposes a fundamental limitation of many efforts to improve EUropean border controls: appeals to respect human rights and to save lives at sea are primarily directed at EUropean governments and policymakers. Human rights especially are territorial despite their almost universal appeal, relying on authorities within a particular jurisdiction to respect and enforce them. When border controls and the accompanying violence and exclusion are outsourced to third countries, EUropean states cease to be responsible for rights infringements in legal terms. While externalisation stands in tension with a comprehensive conception of travellers as rights holders, including the right to leave any country and the right to seek asylum, it shifts the responsibility for rights infringements to third states. In so doing, the process of externalisation re-enacts previously existing power inequalities and dependencies between EUrope and its southern neighbours, “reproduc[ing] recent colonial relations of dependency” in two ways (Balibar, 2009: 203). First, externalisation projects EUropean power outwards and extends EUropean influence to a “buffer zone” around member states in which EUropean interests are defended by third state authorities. While third states are certainly not powerless victims in these cooperation agreements, there are important power differentials between the cooperating “partners”: EUrope leverages considerable political and economic pressure to ensure compliance (Kunz and Maisenbacher, 2013). Second, externalisation might also contribute to a continuation of (post)colonial narratives about a “civilised” EUrope and a “barbaric” North Africa (see Rejeb, 2012). Indeed, outsourcing the violence necessary to maintain EUropean borders to third states while progressively cleansing EUropean borderlands of this violence would allow EUrope to continue presenting itself as a “normative power,” a humane actor respecting humanitarian principles and human rights norms. Those carrying out the violence necessary to uphold EUropean borders, on the other hand, might be presented as degenerate, rights-violating “Others.” While this is a hypothetical scenario given that there is still plenty of direct and indirect violence taking place in EUrope itself, this very dynamic can be seen already in relation to Libya. The country is regularly highlighted as particularly problematic in relation to human rights and violence and presented as a hell-hole of lawlessness and extreme violence. The role of the EU and its member states in fostering these conditions through long-standing cooperation agreements aimed at reducing departures from Libya at all costs as well as the 2011 NATO intervention on the other hand is rarely problematised. This then exposes a crucial limit of humanitarianism and human rights, particularly if they remain focused on EUrope. Importantly, I do not suggest here that externalisation is the conscious response of those working for Frontex or EUropean institutions more widely to the tensions that exist between humanitarianism, human rights, and security. Rather than describing causality or intentionality, my remarks here are intended to offer a reflection on the potentialities of contemporary articulations of humanitarianism, human rights, and security in the EUropean border regime. When conceptualising discursive formations as performative, it

The effects of Frontex’s re-positioning 149 is important to recognise that they might have effects that exceed the intentions of those mobilising them. Indeed, humanitarian and human rights appeals that remain focused on EUropean actors and stop short of challenging the assumption that migration is a security issue can coexist with a simultaneous push to “sanitise” EUropean borderlands from violence and deaths. In doing so, humanitarian and human rights appeals that remain focused on EUrope are not only unlikely to be able to counter already-existing processes towards externalisation, but might even provide further impetus for them.

Conclusion This chapter argued that in combining humanitarianism, human rights, risk management and crisis discourses, Frontex has strengthened its position and enhanced its legitimacy. By presenting itself as protecting EUrope in times of crisis as well as saving lives at sea, Frontex has positioned itself as a crisis response mechanism that is able to address diverse “emergencies,” whether these are framed in terms of deaths at sea or heightened arrival numbers. As such, it has come to profit from the proliferation of crisis narratives in EUropean border governance, including by increases to its budget, powers, and personnel. The agency’s simultaneous positioning as a manager of risks has enabled Frontex to work together with a range of different actors, placing it at the heart of emerging coalitions that unite humanitarian, human rights, and security actors in their concerns to ensure “best practices” of border guarding and to process, identify, and categorise new arrivals. Moreover, its identity as a promoter of rights has allowed the agency to shift blame for human rights violations to member states, further enhancing its legitimacy by emphasising its role in spreading ‘EUropean values’ and ‘best practices’ across the EU. Finally, I cautioned that the entanglement of humanitarianism, human rights, and security in EUropean border governance more widely might provide new impetus for an externalisation of border controls. Where human rights and humanitarian appeals focus on “sanitising” EUropean borderlands without challenging the fundamental assumptions contemporary border security is based on, this could contribute to the outsourcing of the violence that a highly exclusionary border regime aiming to keep arrival numbers low necessarily relies on.

Note 1 Similar findings were also made by Aas and Gundhus when interviewing Norwegian officers who worked with Frontex: “Our interviewees frequently invoked differences between East and West, North and South of Europe, and described themselves in terms of their national policing culture which they saw as distinct from, and superior to, other nations” (Aas and Gundhus, 2015: 7).

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Conclusion Reconsidering critique

This book has shown that humanitarianism, human rights, and security are entangled in contemporary EUropean border governance. Frontex’s appropriation of humanitarianism and human rights alongside a continued emphasis on security is an important example of the convergence of the three discursive formations, while simultaneously contributing to blurring them further. The book has argued that this blurring has been enabled by the commonalities shared by the three discursive formations. It has offered three different “takes” on Frontex’s changing relationship with humanitarianism, human rights, and security and examined the effects of Frontex’s simultaneous positioning as a saviour of lives, promoter of rights, defender in times of crisis and manager of risks. The Conclusion will offer reflections on the findings presented in the preceding chapters, revisiting some of the main themes running through the book as a whole. It will begin by considering the three takes offered in Chapters 2, 3, and 4 alongside each other, asking what insights they produce collectively. It will then revisit the notion of discourses of protection explored in Chapter 1 and discuss how Frontex draws on different dimensions of protection in its mobilisation of humanitarianism, human rights, and security. Finally, the Conclusion will consider the limitations of humanitarianism and human rights as critical grounds for opposing securitisation. In so doing, it queries whether “the human” at the heart of humanitarianism and human rights can be productively challenged and re-signified, or whether suggestions to move towards the “posthuman” offer a more fruitful basis for challenging the exclusionary effects of the three discursive formations at the heart of this book.

Three “takes” of one scene Rather than providing one coherent story of how and why Frontex has shifted its organisational narrative towards humanitarianism and human rights, the three “takes” presented in this book approach Frontex’s changing relationship to humanitarianism and human rights from different angles and with different methods, putting different actors and dynamics in focus. Chapter 2 highlighted the debates among the institutional actors determining Frontex’s legal setup and its various regulatory changes through time, showing the importance of power shifts among the institutions controlling Frontex and their effects on the agency.

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Chapter 3 foregrounded changes in Frontex’s public communication, examining the organisational identity Frontex has constructed and how this has changed and evolved over time. Chapter 4 exposed institutional rifts inside the agency and engaged more closely with Frontex’s attempts to navigate a contradictory and highly contested environment shaped by diverse stakeholders. While these three “takes” do not form one coherent whole, they are closely related and speak to one another. Examining them together produces insights that none of them would individually. Indeed, they expose complex relationships between the institutions exerting pressure on Frontex from the outside and the various units and individuals implementing or shaping its work from within. Changing power relations between external stakeholders are observed and interpreted by Frontex staff and management, who seek to navigate and respond to external demands in order to maintain organisational legitimacy. As actors such as the European Parliament became more powerful, their demands carried greater weight. However, interpretations of external influences and demands might vary between different parts of the agency. Further complexifying things, some parts of Frontex fulfil double functions: national border guard representatives in its management board act first and foremost as representatives of member states, rather than necessarily with the best interest of Frontex in mind. Guest officers carrying out Frontex operations remain influenced by their national contexts and trainings, while being expected to carry out EUropean border missions. There are thus different logics inscribed in the agency aside from its triple focus on humanitarianism, human rights, and security, and nation-state thinking coexists alongside a distinct EUropean outlook. Considering the three “takes” together furthermore allows for reflections on how particular events in Frontex’s environment shape the agency in different ways. The devastating deaths off the coast of Lampedusa in October 2013 for instance led to increasing pressures on Frontex to take on more responsibility for search and rescue operations, in particular by Italy. This forced Frontex to publicly clarify its position on search and rescue, carefully navigating a restrictive rule-of-law humanitarianism by emphasising the amount of lives saved by Frontex on the one hand while rejecting demands to take on responsibility for search and rescue on the other. As Chapter 5 has shown, publicised events pertaining to EUropean border governance – notably large-scale shipwrecks in 2013 and 2015 and increases in arrival numbers in 2011 and 2015/2016 – have invariably led to a strengthening of Frontex, leading to augmentations of the agency’s budget or expansions of its mandate. While political solutions regarding other aspects of migration governance tend to be more challenging for EUropean institutions to agree on, Frontex has emerged as a key compromise that member states, the European Parliament, and the European Commission can rally around and swiftly agree on when political responses to specific events are sought. As a result, external events have had dramatic effects on the agency, with the speed of its growth in terms of mandate and budget at times overwhelming existing staff members (see Chapter 4). Most importantly, perhaps, thinking the three “takes” presented in the book together exposes the effects that methodological choices have on the knowledge

154 Conclusion produced through social scientific enquiry. In seeking to address the research questions through three sets of methods and perspectives, the book not only shows that different methods produce different kinds of knowledge but also offers an explicit reflection on the world-making effects of these methods. It suggests that each “take” produces valuable insights that remain nevertheless only ever a partial appreciation of a more complex reality. Examining Frontex through the negotiations leading to its foundation and subsequent amendments of its regulations produces an understanding of the agency as a compromise between diverse actors’ interests, explaining how these interests remain inscribed in the agency as it operates today. Frontex’s turn to humanitarianism and human rights from this perspective can be attributed to an increase in power of the European Parliament, which has used its strengthened position to exert pressure, forcing Frontex to pay greater attention to human rights and humanitarian concerns by changing its legal basis. Approaching Frontex through its published documents on the other hand allows for appreciating it as an actor in its own right rather than the outcome of others’ compromises and pressures. It shows how the agency has actively changed its positioning through press releases, annual reports, and other forms of interventions. Frontex’s turn to humanitarianism and human rights from this perspective can be understood in light of the conditions of possibility offered by the three formations from a discursive perspective, that is the commonalities between them that allow for their convergence in narratives such as that of the “unscrupulous smuggler” or the “fraudulent asylum seeker.” Finally, studying Frontex’s work across different sites through interviews, informal conversations, and participant observation generates insights regarding its organisational dynamics, producing an understanding of the agency as a partially fragmented organisation. Here, Frontex’s turn to humanitarianism and human rights can be understood as a response to contradictory pressures by its diverse stakeholders, and an attempt to maintain organisational legitimacy in a highly politicised environment. In proposing to understand Frontex through these three related and nevertheless distinct “takes,” the book also provides a practical example of how research findings can be written and communicated based on an understanding of methods as practices.

Discourses of protection Through all three “takes,” the book has shown that Frontex has been able to present itself as a saviour of lives at sea, a promoter of fundamental rights, a defender of EUrope in times of crisis and a manager of risks simultaneously. In seeking to explain this, I have argued that the commonalities across humanitarianism, human rights, and security have enabled their connections and convergence in Frontex’s organisational narrative and EUropean border governance more widely. Indeed, all three are discourses of protection: security promises protecting an “us” from a threatening “them,” human rights seek to protect individuals from abuses of their rights, and humanitarianism aims at protecting victims from what is considered unnecessary harm or suffering. In examining how Frontex mobilises

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humanitarianism, human rights, and security, however, the book has shown that the agency draws on different dimensions of protection in relation to each of these formations. The protection of an active subject in the sense of sovereign decision-making (tegere) is invoked only in relation to security concerns, where the protector – Frontex – presents itself as protecting the sovereign community of EUropean states against threatening outsiders. Here, the metaphor that the “Schengen chain is only as strong as its weakest link” is telling (see Chapter 2). It reveals internal power differentials between what are perceived to be “strong” and “weak” states inside EUrope, while illustrating the imagined need to provide additional defences to a community of states that has decided to give up internal border controls among them, making its member states depend on one another for protection. While the EUropean community as a whole remains an active subject in this narrative, providing the mandate for Frontex to provide protection, different parts of EUrope are understood as having more or less capacity to protect themselves and the community as a whole. This feeds into existing narratives of EUropeanness (see Chapter 5), where in particular states in EUrope’s periphery are regarded as somehow less EUropean or capable than those at its core. As this observation indicates, security is at times also connected to protection in the sense of praesidere and tutore. In particular peripheral states are considered as requiring continuous monitoring and disciplining through instruments such as risk analyses and vulnerability assessments, with recent changes to Frontex’s regulation enabling interventions in the name of protecting and securing EUropean borders even against the will of the concerned member state (see Chapter 2). Internal power differentials within EUrope thus persist and are maintained in a framework in which the targets of capacity building and interventions tend to be those states that have historically been regarded as somehow less EUropean. While security invokes protection in the sense of tegere, praesidere, and tutore, attributing different degrees of agency to the protected, Frontex uses humanitarianism only in the sense of praesidere and tutore. Patrolling, surveillance, and detection are considered key practices in order to save lives. At times, Frontex uses “apprehended/rescued” (Frontex, 2014: 63) or “rescue/interception” to describe its life-saving activities (Frontex, 2019: 23), indicating the equivalence of surveillance and search and rescue measures from the point of view of the agency. In this phrasing, those rescued/apprehended appear as threats and victims at the same time (see Chapter 1). While Frontex’s use of humanitarianism as praesidere is most pronounced in relation to sea rescue, also the registration and identification of new arrivals is framed at times in these terms, with a focus on protecting the concerned individuals from exploitation and abuse. Finally, protection as tutore is invoked where Frontex aims to prevent boat departures (either itself or through cooperation with third states). This entails the profiling of the present and the future: the aim is to predict and prevent mobility, while the decision-making power and agency of those seeking to reach safety in EUrope is disregarded. Regarding human rights, Frontex primarily invokes praesidere, with the processing and identification of new arrivals presented as central measure to enable

156 Conclusion individuals to access their rights, including the right to seek asylum. Meanwhile, Frontex also presents itself as a watchdog over peripheral EUropean states in relation to human rights, monitoring their adherence to fundamental rights and exerting different forms of pressure in response to rights abuses. While palpable consequences such as the ending of a joint operation in case of questionable human rights records are eschewed (see Chapter 3), Frontex does apply more subtle forms of disciplinary power by for instance requesting member state representatives to explain reports of extreme violence or deaths at external border crossings during management board meetings (see Chapter 4). Frontex’s use of fundamental rights is closely connected to ideas around best practices and EUropean values, and it mobilises both disciplinary and biopolitical techniques of power in its spreading of fundamental rights to peripheral EUropean states as well as third states. In its use of humanitarianism, human rights, and security, Frontex is engaged in a wider struggle over the meaning of protection in EUropean border governance: who is to be protected by border policies and practices and in which ways? Who is understood as active subject and capable of taking decisions, who needs to be protected even against their will? In Frontex’s framing of migration and border practices, these questions are answered unambiguously: while EUropeans from the “core” of EUrope are regarded as capable and response-able actors, EUrope’s South-Eastern periphery is seen as in need of oversight and support, whereas people on the move themselves are regarded as utterly incapable of taking rational decisions. Other actors mobilising humanitarianism and human rights in relation to border governance might take different positions on these matters, and use humanitarianism and human rights in more emancipatory ways. Even where this is the case, however, appeals to humanitarianism and human rights permanently risk slippage. Where critical scholars or NGOs might call for greater respect to fundamental rights and humanitarian principles, this opens up a space for intervention, and actors such as Frontex enter and fill this space with their own interpretations of what addressing these concerns means in practice. Indeed, I have shown that Frontex has been able to benefit from its positioning in humanitarian, human rights, and security terms. By presenting itself as saviour of people in distress at sea, promoter of fundamental rights, and defender of EUrope in times of unexpected threats, Frontex has become positioned as the solution to diverse “crises.” It has seen budget increases in relation to events framed as humanitarian as well as border control “crises” and has become the almost automatic solution to diverse “problems” emerging in the EUropean border regime. Simultaneously, it has contributed to the blurring of and transitioning between different discursive formations: Frontex has responded to “humanitarian crises” with “security measures,” that is practices aiming to restrict unauthorised mobility and criminalising those facilitating it. In addition, it has been able to bring together humanitarian, human rights, and security concerns also through risk management approaches, focusing centrally on the registration and identification of new arrivals. Indeed, Frontex’s positioning in humanitarian and human rights terms and its decoupling of various aspects of its work from one another has enabled

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the agency to cooperate closely with a wide variety of actors, ranging from the arms and security industry to national border guards to EUropean bureaucrats, politicians, and NGOs and international organisations. Finally, Frontex has been able to position itself as a “civilising force” in EUrope, shifting responsibility for human rights abuses to “problematic” member states in the South (and) East while affirming its identity as promoting and monitoring the adherence to “EUropean” values across EUropean territory. What this means, then, is that relying on humanitarianism and human rights uncritically as a way of challenging and opposing current bordering practices can be counterproductive. Indeed, the convergence of the three discursive formations in EUropean border governance has created new openings for practices that rely on a conceptualisation of migration as a risk or a threat: I have shown that scandalising deaths in the Mediterranean by invoking a humanitarian crisis can lead to more restrictive practices as a form of “crisis response,” likely leading to more deaths. Similarly, emphases on identifying people in need or protecting refugee rights can further a managerial approach that “others” newcomers and affirms an understanding of migration as a phenomenon to be dealt with through risk management. In addition, I have argued that scandalising rights violations in particular member states might lead to calls for “more Frontex” in order to enable the agency to monitor and improve the situation in “problematic” member states. Going beyond these observations, I also cautioned against potential future developments. In particular, I suggested that calls to adhere to humanitarian principles and human rights that remain focused on EUrope and do not challenge the fundamental assumption that racialised “others” need to be kept out of EUrope could end up providing increased momentum for already-existing processes of externalisation.

Reconsidering critique While all of these potentialities remain no more than this, possibilities rather than necessities, they show that even in mobilising humanitarianism and human rights specifically for the purpose of critiquing the status quo, it is possible to feed into and further strengthen security practices. Given the convergence of humanitarianism, human rights, and security in contemporary EUropean border governance, can humanitarianism and/or human rights remain useful vehicles to challenge restrictive practices? As media outlets, activists, journalists, and academics keep producing images of death and despair from EUropean borderlands, the need for change is more than clear. What this book shows is that calls to respect human rights or humanitarian principles might fail to fundamentally challenge existing frameworks and might even inadvertently serve to legitimise and reinforce restrictive practices. Rather than focusing on “sanitising” EUropean borderlands from violence, abuse, and death, it therefore remains important to question what the conception of humanity underlying current and proposed practices is: to whom, when, and where does it (not) apply? If taken seriously, a critical re-engagement with the understanding of the “human” in humanitarianism and human rights cannot end with calls for a proper

158 Conclusion implementation of rights or for the alleviation of some forms of human suffering. Instead, it “must address the question of how to remake and improve Europe’s relationships with its unwanted settler-migrants, refugees, denizens and illegals: all those racial and civilizational inferiors judged infrahuman, whose lives are accorded a diminished value even when they fall inside the elastic bounds of the law” (Gilroy, 2014: 147). Remaking this relationship requires a move beyond appeals seeking to re-humanise current practices and policies, or attempting to encourage a more consistent implementation of existing laws. Indeed, opening up space for reflection on and challenges to the meaning and significance of “the human” is necessary to break the continuum of human rights, humanitarianism, and security. A central resource in this regard is the work of Sylvia Wynter, who has shown how a specific conception of Western “Man” became synonymous with “human.” In doing so, she reveals how “the West, over the last five hundred years, has brought the whole human species into its hegemonic, now purely secular . . . model of being human” (Wynter and McKittrick, 2015: 21). Conceptualising different genres of being human, Wynter argues that those not conforming to the Western liberal monohumanist model of Man, which she refers to as homo oeconomicus, have been excluded and deemed less-than-human for centuries. Rather than dismissing humanism and the notion of the “human” altogether, Wynter suggests a critical rethinking and reworking of the term. In doing so, she centrally draws on the work of Du Bois, Fanon and Césaire, suggesting that the liminal position of Black people historically has forced them to see themselves as both normally and abnormally human at the same time. Drawing on Fanon’s redefinition of being human as consisting of both skins and masks, Wynter argues that to grasp what it means to be human we need to combine both ontogeny and sociogeny, or what she terms bios and mythoi: “as the creators of our societies we must recognize the condition of our being able to live, thereby to be, hybridly human” (Wynter and McKittrick, 2015: 53). Wynter thus redefines what it means to be human as entailing not only the biological organism but also the collective forms of storytelling and rule-making that structure human societies. Indeed, Wynter notes that storytelling and origin stories – mythoi – are interlinked with the biological organism – bios – in that what we believe to be “good” or “rightful” activates neurological reward structures in the brain. Extending Butler’s analysis of gender performativity, she argues that not only gender, but all human genres are realised through performative enactments that have real effects on our identities and views of the world: “Why not, then, the performative enactment of all our roles, of all our role allocations as, in our contemporary Western/Westernized case, in terms of, inter alia, gender, race, class/underclass, and, across them all, sexual orientation? All as praxes, therefore, rather than nouns. So here you have the idea that with being human everything is praxis” (Wynter and McKittrick, 2015: 33–34). In drawing on Butler, Wynter also makes clear that we cannot simply rid ourselves of the stories shaping our identities: “For what I’m saying is that as humans, we cannot/do not preexist our cosmogonies, our representations of our origins – even though it is we ourselves who invent those cosmogonies and then

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retroactively project them onto a past” (Wynter and McKittrick, 2015: 36). Critically analysing the history of Western humanism, Wynter shows how different genres of being human have been constituted through sociogenic principles and that Western understandings of these genres have become hegemonic. She argues that we need to become aware of the sociogenic principles constituting our current world order in order to re-imagine what is means to be human. According to her, doing so at this particular moment in time is pressing, given the complex problems humanity as a whole is faced with: “thinking globally, what ‘we really have is a poverty-hunger-habitat-energy-trade-population-atmosphere-waste-resource problem,’ none of whose separate parts can be solved on their own” (Wynter and McKittrick, 2015: 44). In this equation, unauthorised migration is part of a larger complex of unsolved problems, centrally including climate change. Wynter identifies the Western liberal conception of homo oeconomicus as the root of this complex and our current inability to adequately resolve it, prompting her to call for a much-needed reconsideration of what is means to be human. This diagnosis is shared by Rosi Braidotti: “The climate change emergency and the general condition of the Anthropocene expose not only the limitations, but also the responsibilities of European Humanism and its scientific culture” (Braidotti, 2019). Both Wynter and Braidotti see climate change and the hegemony of a specific Western notion of what it means to be fully human as closely interlinked.1 Rather than calling for a “re-enchantment” of humanism like Wynter (2000) does, Braidotti, however, advocates moving beyond the notion of the “human,” putting forward a posthuman understanding of subjectivity instead. Complex global issues such as undocumented migration, displacement, a growing divide between rich and poor, racism, xenophobia, war, and climate change in Braidotti’s view pose both a conceptual question pertaining to the kind of subjects “we” are, and an ethical question relating to how we can develop a posthuman theoretical framework that strives towards justice. In arguing that we need to understand ourselves as connected to the environment and other living beings, Braidotti notes that a posthuman position requires us to think of ourselves as members of a species, rather than only a culture or a polity. In addition, she notes that such an understanding “demands accountability for the disastrous planetary consequences of our species’ supremacy and the violent rule of sovereign Anthropos” (Braidotti, 2019). In her proposal of posthuman subjectivity, the notion of a multiscalar relationality is central: Posthuman subjects establish relations on at least three levels: to one’s self, to others and to the world. The world can be defined as a complex set of environmental, social and affective ecologies. What does it mean to say that subjects are relational? Firstly, that the agency commonly reserved for subjects is not the exclusive prerogative of Anthropos. Secondly, that it is not linked to classical notions of transcendental reason. Thirdly, that it is de-linked from a dialectical view of consciousness based on the opposition of self and others and their struggle for recognition. (Braidotti, 2019)

160 Conclusion Braidotti thus makes a radical move away from dominant understandings of what it means to be human, asking us to re-imagine ourselves as deeply related to other beings and the planet as a whole. Like Wynter, Braidotti seeks to move beyond merely critiquing the exclusionary and destructive character of Western humanism. Proposing an affirmative ethics, Braidotti (2019) argues that “‘[w]e’ need to compose a new people and a new earth.” Central to her project of envisioning posthumanity is an emphasis on radical immanence and situated perspectives. In bringing together diverse situated perspectives, Braidotti envisages the creation of a new collective subject, “a ‘we-are-(all)-in-this-together-but-we-are-not-oneand-the-same’ kind of subject.” Through this creation, what Braidotti calls “the missing people” – those whose knowledge have been historically excluded and who have been considered less-than-human – will be actualised, that is rendered visible and acknowledged as political subjects. Braidotti centrally draws on feminist and postcolonial thought in developing her posthuman analysis. Indeed, she deliberately seeks to bring together different critical perspectives that are currently not in dialogue, noting that encounters between posthuman knowledge and black, postcolonial, anti-racist and indigenous theories and philosophies are urgently needed. She notes the resonances between these streams of thought, arguing that these resonances may lead to “the composition of sharable discursive spaces, where the critique of Eurocentric imperialism and colonial violence can be written into the new scripts emerging from the posthuman convergence” (Braidotti, 2019: 347). As such, Braidotti begins an important conversation and opens up a collective thought process. Both Wynter’s and Braidotti’s work thus point to an urgent need to fundamentally rethink the notion of the “human” underpinning humanitarianism and human rights. They provide sharp and insightful analyses of the dead-end we are currently in, of which unauthorised migration and its violent government is one part. Their writings constitute invaluable contributions to a conversation that needs to be continued beyond disciplinary boundaries and that most certainly needs to be acknowledged and built on in critical security studies and migration and border studies, in which questions of postcoloniality and race have only recently garnered more wide-spread attention. Throughout this thought process, the voices of the various “missing people” must be central. Not only because after centuries of silencing and invisibilising, it is vital that their voices are heard, but also because it is precisely through their liminal positions that they can imagine “other forms of being and becoming human” (Weheliye, 2014: 29) that have “the potential to disarticulate the human from Man” (Weheliye, 2014: 32). Meanwhile, Wynter and Braidotti also point quite simply to the importance of listening to the experiences, perspectives, and understandings of those whose knowledge tend to be excluded and marginalised. As such, they provide practical guidance to those not versed or interested in academic discussions on the future of the “human,” even if these discussions will ultimately (hopefully) affect changes reaching beyond the academy and academic debate. Most importantly, their work makes clear that those seeking to struggle against deaths and suffering in and beyond EUropean borderlands must move beyond a political mobilisation

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on behalf of voiceless victims, and work through and with the power differentials inherent in the struggle against exclusion, racism, and discrimination. The developments of the last 15 years have shown that it is by no means the European Commission, Frontex, or EUropean political leaders more widely who onesidedly determine developments in the realm of migration and mobility. People on the move themselves have defied the laws and practices seeking to exclude them, claimed the right to access EUrope, and often succeeded in travelling to their destination countries in spite of manifold physical and legal barriers seeking to block them from doing so (Stierl, 2019). They have exposed deep divisions between EUropean policymakers, who scrambled for responses to an often seemingly ungovernable mobility. In doing so, they have demonstrated that moments of “autonomy of migration” persist even in the face of stringent controls and securitisation (Mezzadra and Neilson, 2013; Papadopoulos, Stephenson, and Tsianos, 2008; Scheel, 2019). It is crucial that this agency and defiance is recognised also by those seeking to support border crossers, whether through academic writings or practical solidarity actions. Rather than perpetuating patronising appeals on behalf of suffering others, political opposition to current border policies and practices needs to take politics, power, and positionality seriously, challenging structures of exclusion, marginalisation, and hierarchisation within the border regime and beyond EUropean territory as well as in social movements. When doing so, it can open up space for reflection and (self-)critique and might allow for identifying moments in which the dominant humanity-security continuum proliferating in contemporary EUropean border governance can be disrupted or subverted.

Note 1 Also Mignolo highlights the devastating consequences of the current capitalist world order for the environment and those deemed less-than-human, pointing once more to the exclusionary character of the “human” underpinning the global human rights regime. Advocating a shift from “human rights” to “life rights,” Mignolo notes that “Life rights emerged precisely in places and from people suffering the consequences of the miseries and splendors of western civilization. Those who speak for the “human” in human rights invented the anthrōpos (the lesser human) to be civilized. That cycle is closed. Now the anthrōpos is rising, becoming the savior of his/her self. By so doing s/he delinks, expands and decolonizes the narrow western paradigm of Human Rights” (Mignolo, 2014: 180).

References Braidotti, R. 2019. Posthuman Knowledge. Epub Publi. Cambridge: Polity Press. Frontex. 2014. General Report 2013. Warsaw. 2014. ——— . 2019. Consolidated Annual Activity Report. Gilroy, P. 2014. Race and the Value of the Human. In The Meaning of Rights: The Philosophy and Social Theory of Human Rights, edited by Costas Douzinas and Conor Gearty, 137–158. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press. Mezzadra, S, and B Neilson. 2013. Border as Method, or, the Multiplication of Labour. Durham and London: Duke University Press.

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Mignolo, WD. 2014. From “Human Rights” to “Life Rights.” In The Meaning of Rights: The Philosophy and Social Theory of Human Rights, edited by Costas Douzinas and Conor Gearty, 161–180. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Papadopoulos, D, N Stephenson, and V Tsianos. 2008. Escape Routes: Control and Subversion in the Twenty-First Century. London and Ann Arbor: Pluto Press. Scheel, S. 2019. Autonomy of Migration? Appropriating Mobility within Biometric Border Regimes. Abingdon and New York: Routledge. Stierl, M. 2019. Migrant Resistance in Contemporary Europe. Abingdon and New York: Routledge. Weheliye, AG. 2014. Habeas Viscus: Racializing Assemblages, Biopolitics, and Black Feminist Theories of the Human. Durham and London: Duke University Press. Wynter, S, and K McKittrick. 2015. Unparalleled Catastrophe for Our Species? Or, to Give Humanness a Different Future: Conversations Denise. In Sylvia Wynter: On Being Human as Praxis, edited by Katherine McKittrick, 9–89. Durham and London: Duke University Press. Wynter, S, and D Scott. 2000. Re-Enchantment of Humanism: An Interview with Sylvia Wynter. Small Axe 8: 119–207.

Index

Aas, Katja F. 21, 22 abolitionism 19, 27–28, 31 aerial surveillance 70, 76, 85 Agamben, Giorgio 20, 27 agency 26, 27, 35, 89, 155, 161 Agier, Michel 19, 20, 29 Alfano, Angelino 107, 144–145 American Revolution 31 Amsterdam Treaty 46, 48 Angermuller, Johannes 22 annual reports see document analysis Arab Spring 71, 138 Aradau, Claudia 19–20, 42–43 Arias Fernandez, Gil 66, 72, 77, 145 asylum 18, 33, 48, 65–69, 77–81, 87, 90, 107, 136, 148, 154, 156 “asylum fraudster” narratives 77–78, 80–81, 87, 90, 154 Austria 53–54 Balibar, Étienne 36 Balkan states 78, 82, 142–143 bare life 27 Barnett, Michael N. 28–29 Belgium 46 Berda, Yael 24 Bigo, Didier 12, 33, 65 biometric technologies 81 biopolitics 20, 23–24, 26, 32, 33–34, 156 bios 158 Blair, Tony 65 blame-shifting 14, 69–70, 77, 84, 86–87, 124–125, 141–143, 149 border guards: attitudes toward Frontex 115–120, 128–129, 141–142; attitudes toward migrants 115–120; border guard culture 3, 108, 129; debriefing officers 116–119; EU common border guard 46–47, 51–53; European Day

for Border Guards 1–2, 10, 44, 76, 81, 140; Frontex guest officers 2, 10–11, 14, 43–45, 53, 114–120, 128–129, 141–142, 153; guidance documents for 140–141; humanitarian discourses 117–120; human rights abuses by 114, 130, 141; human rights discourses 117–118; interviews with 10–11, 44–45, 114–122, 128–129, 141–142; national border guards 1, 47–48, 84, 129, 138, 141–143, 153; observation of 11, 44; security discourses 115–118, 119–120; standing corps of Frontex border guards 52, 53–54; training of 3, 74, 117, 129, 142, 153 bordering processes 135 border regimes: cooperation of diverse actors 2, 14, 139–141, 149; critique of 8, 9, 14, 31, 50, 83–84, 113, 152, 157–158, 161; deaths caused by 75, 145–146; EU policies 18–19, 43, 46–48, 51, 55, 124–125, 145–149; externalisation of 14, 18, 19, 35–36, 46–47, 136, 146–149, 157; Frontex’s governance role 2–3, 14, 41, 47–54, 108–109, 123–124; guards see border guards; integrated border management 52, 64, 83; international cooperation 107; removal of EU internal controls 46, 155; role of member states 21, 47–54, 141–143; “sanitising” of 14, 135–136, 143–149, 157; technological innovations 1, 2; violence of 14, 144, 146–149 Boswell, Christina 121 Braidotti, Rosi 159–160 bricolage see methodological bricolage Britain see United Kingdom Brown, Wendy 30 Brunsson, Nils 121

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Index

buffer zones 35, 148 Bulgaria 2, 11, 44–45, 106, 114–116, 141–142 Butler, Judith 158 camps 13, 18, 19, 26, 33, 34, 65 Canary Islands 65 Cap Anamur case 18 categorisation (of arrivals) 34, 139, 141, 149; see also filtering (of arrivals) Césaire, Aimé 158 Charter of Fundamental Rights (EU) 19, 83 Chechen 78 circulation, freedom of 23, 81 civilisation discourses 28, 32, 36, 143, 148, 157 Civil Liberties, Justice and Home Affairs (LIBE) Committee 127 climate change 159 codes of conduct 52, 71, 87, 128 coercive pressures 121, 127 Cohn, Carol 9 Cold War 29 colonialism 13, 17, 19, 24–25, 28, 31–32, 137, 148, 160; see also decolonisation; postcoloniality common security and defence policy (CSDP) missions 147 complaint mechanisms 52, 82, 83 conflicts of interest 54, 122 Consultative Forum on Fundamental Rights 44, 50, 74, 82–84, 107, 113–114, 127–129, 139–140 corrective.org 84 Court of Justice of the European Union 50–51, 55 crisis narratives 3, 12, 19–20, 51, 55, 67–69, 71–72, 79, 87, 136–138, 149, 156 crisis response see emergency response critical humanitarianism studies 20 critical security studies 6–7, 19–20, 41–42, 160 critique: of border regimes 8, 14, 31, 50, 83–84, 113, 152, 157–158, 161; of Frontex 1, 2, 41, 50, 83–84, 113, 123–128; and humanitarianism 8, 14, 152; and human rights 8, 14, 31, 83–84, 113, 143, 152; relationship to research 9 Cuttitta, Paolo 21–22 Cyprus 107 data collection and analysis 3, 33, 69, 82, 138–139 deaths: caused by border guards 75, 130; caused by EUropean border policies

9, 145–146; Frontex expressions of sadness for 76–77; numbers of deaths at sea 1, 2, 19, 41, 51, 86–87, 107, 137, 138, 153; power to let die 23–24, 26; “sanitising” from border regime 14, 135–136, 143–149, 157; shifting of blame for 14, 69–70, 77, 86–87; and smuggling 69–70, 77, 86 debriefing officers 116–119 “Declaration of the Rights of Man and of the Citizen” 25, 31 decolonisation 28; see also colonialism decoupling 14, 106, 121, 129–130, 156–157 dehumanisation 12, 25, 73, 79 delocalisation 21–22 democracy 25, 29, 32, 142 deportations 18, 19, 32–35, 83, 127, 135 Derrida, Jacques 20 detention 33, 34, 35, 141 deterrence 19, 35 developmentalism 28, 29 diffuse securitising 24, 25, 50, 69, 110, 136, 138 DiMaggio, Paul 121 disciplinary power 24, 26, 30, 33–34, 35, 89, 156 discursive formations 22–23 disease 108, 117 document analysis: 2005–2008 documents 64–67; 2008–2011 documents 67–71; 2011–2015 documents 71–79; 2016–2019 documents 79–87; annual report word counts 3–6; knowledge of Frontex gained from 14, 87–90, 154; methodology 2, 7, 12, 44, 45, 55–56, 87–88; overview of empirical data 13–14, 63–64 document fraud 72–73, 80–81, 82 Donnelly, Jack 36 Douzinas, Costas 29, 34, 142–143 drug trafficking 74, 76, 82, 85, 107, 108 Dublin Regulation 34 Du Bois, W. E. B. 158 Dunant, Henry 28 emergency response 48–50, 64–65, 67–69, 79, 87, 109–110, 135–138, 149, 152 Enloe, Cynthia 8 Esposito, Roberto 20 EU4BorderSecurity project 147 EUNAVFOR MED 80, 81 Eurojust 82 European Agenda on Migration 19, 51, 55, 147

Index European Asylum Support Office (EASO) 122 European Border and Coast Guard 51–54, 83, 84, 85, 138, 147 European Commission 47–55, 66, 69, 107, 122, 124–125, 153 European Council 46–55, 122, 123, 124–125, 127, 128 European Day for Border Guards 1–2, 10, 44, 76, 81, 140 European External Action Service 140 European Ombudsman 122, 127 European Parliament 13, 48–55, 57, 70–71, 84, 122–128, 145, 153–154 European Union: Austrian Presidency 53–54; Charter of Fundamental Rights 19, 83; Court of Justice 50–51, 55; Dutch Presidency 52, 53; enlargement of 47; and the foundation of Frontex 46–49, 152; internal power asymmetries 137, 142, 155, 156; internal security 72–73, 81; migration and border policies 18–19, 43, 46–48, 51, 55, 124–125, 145–149; removal of internal border controls 46, 155 European values 83, 141–143, 149, 155, 156, 157 Europol 80, 81–82, 122 EUROSUR surveillance system 76, 110, 123 exceptionalism 23–25, 50, 64, 67–69, 71–72, 110, 136 exceptionalist securitising 24–25, 50, 67–69, 110, 136 External Borders Practitioners Common Unit (SCIFA+) 47 externalisation (of border controls) 14, 18, 19, 35–36, 46–47, 136, 146–149, 157 extraterritorial processing 18, 65 false passports 72–73, 80–81; see also document fraud Fanon, Frantz 158 Fassin, Didier 19, 20, 21, 26, 29 Feldman, Gregory 43–44 feminist theory 8, 30, 160 filtering (of arrivals) 33, 81, 110, 139 fingerprinting 19, 75 Finland 141–142 fluidity metaphors 73, 79 “Fortress Europe” discourses 123, 124 Foucault, Michel 6, 20, 22–24 France 19, 25, 27–28, 31, 33, 46, 73, 107 fraud see “asylum fraudster” narratives; document fraud

165

French Revolution 25, 31 Frontex: border governance role 2–3, 14, 41, 47–54, 108–109, 123–124; budget 41, 48–49, 54, 69, 110, 122, 126, 138, 149, 153, 156; Code of Conduct 52, 71, 128; complaint mechanism 52, 82, 83; as compromise between diverse interests 13, 46–49, 53–57, 153–154; Consultative Forum on Fundamental Rights 44, 50, 74, 82–84, 107, 113–114, 127–129, 139–140; contradictory pressures upon 14, 32, 106, 121–130, 136, 153, 154; critique of 1, 2, 41, 50, 83–84, 113, 123–128; data collection and analysis 3, 33, 69, 82, 138–139; and decoupling 14, 106, 121, 129–130, 156–157; effects of repositioning 14, 135–149, 156–157; emergency response 48–50, 64–65, 67–69, 79, 87, 109–110, 135–138, 149, 152; European Border and Coast Guard 51–54, 83, 84, 85, 138, 147; European Parliament influence 13, 49–51, 54–55, 57, 70–71, 123, 126–128, 153–154; events 1–2, 10, 43, 44, 45, 106, 140; founding of 2, 12–13, 42, 46–49, 54–56, 152, 154; as fragmented organisation 14, 106, 129–130, 154; Fundamental Rights Officer 50, 74, 83, 84, 107, 113–114, 127–129; Fundamental Rights Strategy 71, 127, 128; guest officer interview perspectives 115–120, 128–129, 141–142; guest officers 2, 10–11, 14, 43–45, 53, 114–120, 128–129, 141–142, 153; humanitarian discourses 2, 3–6, 13–14, 32, 36, 54–55, 63–90, 107–108, 111–113, 123, 126–127, 135, 149, 152, 154–157; human rights discourses 2, 3–6, 13–14, 32, 36, 48, 54–55, 63–90, 108, 113–114, 123, 126–128, 135, 138, 141–143, 149, 152, 154–157; interaction with member states and institutions 3, 13, 42, 122–128, 141–143, 152–153; interaction with NGOs 86, 87, 140–141; interaction with third countries 52, 107, 146–147; liaison officers 52, 147; management board 11, 14, 44–45, 48–49, 53–54, 71, 84, 122, 128–130, 143, 147, 153; mandate 13, 45, 51–54, 64–66, 80–82, 107, 123, 125, 127, 138, 141, 145, 153 (see also Frontex, regulations governing); organisational dynamics 6–7, 12, 14, 90, 120–130, 153, 154; organisational legitimacy 6, 54–56, 74, 90, 120–122, 126, 130, 136, 138,

166

Index

149, 153, 154; organisational narratives 2–6, 12–14, 32, 36, 54, 63–90, 107–114, 123, 126–130, 135–149, 152–157; Press Office 42, 84; as promoter of rights 2, 13–14, 36, 64, 71, 78–79, 88–90, 113–114, 126, 135, 138, 141–143, 149, 152, 156; as protector of Europe 14, 36, 64, 67, 70–71, 78, 87–90, 108–111, 136, 138, 149, 152, 156; regulations governing 41–42, 45, 48, 50–55, 64, 70–71, 82–83, 85, 124–125, 127, 154–155 (see also Frontex, mandate); research access limitations 10–11, 41, 42–43, 88, 106; risk management 13–14, 49–50, 64–67, 69, 72, 75, 80, 88, 109–113, 120, 135–141, 149, 152, 156; as saviour of lives 2, 13–14, 36, 64, 71, 78–79, 87–90, 111–113, 126–127, 138, 152, 156; sea operations guidelines 51, 107, 124; search and rescue operations 50–52, 65, 75–77, 85–87, 107, 111–112, 123, 126–127, 138, 144–145, 153; security discourses 2, 3–6, 13–14, 32, 36, 55, 64–90, 107–111, 126, 135, 145–146, 149, 152, 154–157; Serious Incident Reports 82, 84, 118; staff and management interview perspectives 107–114, 120, 122–130, 139–140, 141–142; standing corps of border guards 52, 53–54; think tank role 2–3; training 3, 44, 63–64, 67, 74–75, 82, 89, 117, 128–129 “Frontex plus” 145 Frontex Risk Analysis Network (FRAN) 64 fundamental rights see human rights Fundamental Rights Agency (FRA) 122 Fundamental Rights Officer 50, 74, 83, 84, 107, 113–114, 127–129 Fundamental Rights Strategy 71, 127, 128 gender: and human rights 25, 30; and performativity 158; and research access 10–12 Germany 18, 46, 48, 65, 78, 84, 141–142 Global Approach to Migration and Mobility (GAMM) 18–19 governmentality 23–24 Greece 20, 68, 69, 73, 83, 107, 114, 126, 141–142 guest officers see border guards Guild, Elspeth 65 Guiraudon, Virginie 46 Gundhus, Helene O. I. 21, 22

Haitian Revolution 31 HERA operation 65 Hermes operation 68, 114, 116–120 Holocaust 32 homo oeconomicus 158, 159 humanism 158–160 humanitarianism: anti-humanitarian humanitarianism 87, 89; and biopolitics 26; border guard discourses of 117–120; coalitions of human rights, humanitarian and security actors 139–141, 149; and colonialism 13, 17, 28; and critique of border regimes 8, 14, 152, 157–158; and discipline 26; as discourse of protection 13, 18, 32–35, 89, 90, 152, 154–157; as discursive formation 26–29; emancipatory approaches 27–28, 156; emergence of 27–29; European Parliament emphasis upon 13, 50–51, 55, 126–127, 154; and European Union policy 18–19; and externalisation of border controls 146–149; Frontex discourses of 2, 3–6, 13–14, 32, 36, 54–55, 63–90, 107–108, 111–113, 123, 126–127, 135, 149, 152, 154–157; mainstreaming of 29, 78–79, 90; and the military 29, 36; and neo-imperialism 35–36; paternalistic approaches 27–29, 33, 89, 90, 107, 111, 112; and policing 19, 20–21, 36; and production of inequality 26–27; and production of vulnerability 34–35; relation to human rights 7–8, 17–22, 25–26, 32–36, 89–90, 135, 143–149, 152, 157; relation to security 7–8, 17–22, 32–36, 70, 75–76, 85–86, 89–90, 135, 143–149, 152, 157; and rescue (see search and rescue); and risk management approaches 20, 112–113, 139–141, 149, 156; rule-oflaw humanitarianism 76, 107–108, 112, 153; and the state 29; victim and saviour discourses 26–27, 34, 70, 75–77 humanity: groups excluded from 25, 30, 158, 160–161; meaning and significance of 14–15, 25–26, 30, 152, 157–161; posthumanity 15, 152, 159–160; re-signifying 152, 158–161; Western conception of 158–160 human rights: abuses of 14, 75, 84, 114, 118, 127, 130, 141–143, 148–149, 156–157; and biopolitics 32, 156; border guard discourses of 117–118; coalitions of human rights, humanitarian and security actors 139–141, 149; and

Index colonialism 13, 17, 25, 31–32; and critique of border regimes 8, 14, 31, 83–84, 113, 143, 152, 157–158; and discipline 30, 35, 156; as discourse of protection 13, 18, 32–35, 89, 90, 152, 154–157; as discursive formation 29–32; emergence of 31–32; European Ombudsman inquiry 127; European Parliament emphasis upon 13, 50–51, 55, 70–71, 84, 126–127, 154; and European Union policy 18–19, 55; and European values 141–143, 149, 156; and externalisation of border controls 146–149; Frontex discourses of 2, 3–6, 13–14, 32, 36, 48, 54–55, 63–90, 108, 113–114, 123, 126–128, 135, 138, 141–143, 149, 152, 154–157; in Frontex’s governing regulation 50–51, 52, 55, 127; and gender 25, 30; groups excluded from 25, 30; mainstreaming of 74–75, 78–79, 90, 114, 128; and neo-imperialism 35–36; and production of vulnerability 34–35; relation to humanitarianism 7–8, 17–22, 25–26, 32–36, 89–90, 135, 143–149, 152, 157; relation to security 7–8, 17–22, 32–36, 70, 89–90, 135, 143–149, 152, 157; and risk management approaches 139–141, 149, 156; and the state 14, 29–30; victim and saviour discourses 31, 34 Human Rights Watch 66, 136 human trafficking 18, 20, 64, 67, 82, 108; see also smugglers Hungary 84 Huysmans, Jef 24–25, 42, 50, 69, 73, 136, 138 identification (of arrivals) 14, 35, 69, 89, 109–110, 119–120, 139, 141, 149, 155–156 “illegal” migration 34, 64, 65, 67, 69, 117; imaginations of 137–138 Immigration Law Practitioners Association (ILPA) 65 Inda, Jonathan X. 24 indigenous theory 160 inequalities 26–27, 34–35, 137, 144, 148 in-groups 23, 26, 33 integrated border management (IBM) 52, 64, 83 intelligence-based approaches 81–82, 107, 109 intelligence sharing 81–82 internal security 72–73, 81

167

international law 31, 76, 108, 112 Interpol 81–82 interviews: formal 2, 7, 10–11, 12, 14, 43, 44–45, 106, 154; Frontex guest officer perspectives 114–120, 128–129, 141–142; Frontex staff and management perspectives 107–114, 120, 122–130, 139–140, 141–142; informal 2, 7, 10–11, 14, 43, 44–45, 106, 154; knowledge of Frontex gained from 14, 122–130, 154; methodology 2, 7, 10–11, 12, 43, 44–45; overview of empirical data 14, 106; political context 106–107; theorising contradictions 120–122 Ireland 48–49 isomorphism 121 Italy: Frontex operations 2, 44–46, 106, 114, 116–120; Mare Nostrum operation 107, 112, 117, 119–120, 138, 144–145; NGO Code of Conduct 87; numbers of arrivals 68–69, 73; participation in European Day for Border Guards 140; promotes EU approach to border governance 48; promotes externalisation of border control 18, 65; search and rescue operations 76, 85, 107, 112, 117, 119–120, 126, 138, 144–145; seeks Frontex assistance 68, 76, 85, 112, 144–145, 153 journalism see media Juncker, Jean-Claude 51, 53 Justice and Home Affairs Council 47, 50 Kennedy, David 31 Koerner, Berndt 81 Lahav, Gallya 46 Laitinen, Ilkka 64–65, 66, 68, 70–71, 74, 126 Lampedusa 68, 107, 153; see also Italy Lavenex, Sandra 46, 146 Leggeri, Fabrice 72, 74, 76, 81, 82, 86 legitimacy see organisational legitimacy Lemberg-Pedersen, Martin 19 Léonard, Sarah 48 liaison officers 52, 147 liberalism 23–24, 29, 31, 32, 34, 36, 158, 159 Libya 66, 69, 73, 83, 86–87, 127, 138, 147–148 Lisbon Treaty 70, 123 Lithuania 108 Maastricht Treaty 46 Maizière, Thomas De 18

168

Index

Makaremi, Chowra 33 Mali 147 Malmström, Cecilia 107, 145 Malta 107 Mare Nostrum operation 107, 112, 117, 119–120, 138, 144–145 Maritime Rescue Coordination Centres (MRCCs) 76, 85, 145 Mauritania 65 Mayblin, Lucy 31 Médecins Sans Frontières 29, 140 media 12, 72, 84, 114, 137, 144–145, 157 methodological bricolage 8, 43, 45, 56 Mezzadra, Sandro 44 migrant, problematisation of term 12–13 “migration crisis” (2015 and 2016) 3, 12, 19–20, 51, 55, 72, 79, 137–138, 147 migration prevention 65–66, 112, 147 military forces 1, 29, 36 military interventions 36, 148 mimetic pressures 121 Mutua, Makau W. 30, 32 mythoi 158 national border guards see border guards nationalisms 12 natural law 31 natural rights 31 NAUTILUS operation 65, 66 Neal, Andrew W. 64 Neilson, Brett 44 neo-imperialism 35–36 Netherlands 52, 53 new institutionalism 6–7, 106, 120–122 New Keywords Collective 137–138 Niemann, Arne 51–52 Niger 80, 147 non-governmental organisations (NGOs): as advisors to Frontex 140–141; cooperation with police 20; and crisis narratives 137; critique of border regimes 8; critique of Frontex 1, 2, 113, 123, 127; Frontex’s critique of 86, 87; and humanitarianism 26, 29, 66, 137; representation on Frontex’s Consultative Forum 44, 50, 114, 129, 139; search and rescue operations 86, 87, 146; and victim discourses 20 nonlocal ethnography 8, 43–44 non-refoulement principle 50, 51, 67, 85, 127, 143 normative pressures 121, 127 North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) 83, 148

observation see participant observation organisational culture 120–121, 129 organisational dynamics 6–7, 12, 14, 90, 120–130, 153, 154 organisational legitimacy 6, 54–56, 74, 90, 120–122, 126, 130, 136, 138, 149, 153–154 organisational sociology 6, 14, 120–122 organised crime 19, 67, 72–74, 76, 81–82, 107–108, 113, 117, 147 othering 14, 23, 26–27, 32, 35, 90, 135–137, 139–140, 157 Pallister-Wilkins, Polly 20–21, 69–70 Paris terror attacks 73 participant observation 2, 7, 11, 14, 43–45, 106–107, 129–130, 154 paternalism 21, 27–29, 33, 89, 90, 107, 111, 112 patrols 32, 64, 65, 85, 87, 89, 135, 138, 155 people smugglers see smugglers performativity 158 Pisanu, Giuseppe 18, 65 pity, politics of 20, 26–27 Poland 78 policing 19, 20–21, 36, 79 policy: EU migration and border policies 18–19, 43, 46–48, 51, 55, 124–125, 145–149; policymaking processes 43, 124–125 Poseidon Land 114, 115–116 positionality 8–12 postcoloniality 13, 17–18, 31–32, 137, 148, 160; see also colonialism posthumanity 15, 152, 159 Powell, Walter W. 121 power asymmetries 30, 34–35, 137, 142, 155, 156 praesidere 13, 33, 34, 89, 90, 155–156 pre-emptive security 35–36 press see media protection: discourses of 13, 18, 32–35, 89, 90, 152, 154–157; and production of vulnerability 13, 32, 34–35, 89; three dimensions of 13, 33–34, 89, 90, 155–156 pull factors 86–87, 112, 119–120, 144, 146 push-backs 13, 50, 65–66 racialisation 14, 31, 90, 135, 137, 139, 157 racism 10, 12, 23–24, 28, 159, 161 rape 107, 108 Rapid Border Intervention Teams (RABIT) 49–50, 68

Index reception conditions 19, 137 Red Cross movement 28 refoulement see non-refoulement principle refugee camps see camps rescue see search and rescue research methodologies: access limitations 7, 10–11, 41–43, 56, 88, 106; document analysis 2, 7, 12, 44–45, 55–56, 87–88, 154; formal interviews 2, 7, 10–11, 12, 43–45, 106, 154; and gender 10–12; informal interviews 2, 7, 10–11, 43–45, 106, 154; methodological bricolage 8, 43, 45, 56; methods as practices 42–43, 56, 154; nonlocal ethnography 8, 43–44; participant observation 2, 7, 11, 43–45, 154; positionality 8–12; “takes” approach 8, 13, 45–46, 55–56, 152–154; time-frame of research 12, 44, 106–107; world-making effects 8, 41, 42–43, 153–154 risk: asymmetric risks 26; discourses of 4–5, 13–14, 20, 64–69, 71–74, 80–82, 87–89, 117, 157; migrants at risk 2, 20, 85, 112–113, 144; migrants framed as a risk 2, 13, 20, 64–69, 71–74, 80–82, 87–89, 109–110, 117, 138–139; risk analysis 34, 44, 63–69, 72, 75, 80, 88, 109, 112–113, 136, 147, 155; risk management 13–14, 20, 23, 25, 49–50, 64–67, 72, 87–88, 109–113, 117, 120, 135–141, 149, 152, 156–157; risk profiling 33, 34, 110, 139, 155; see also threat discourses Roesler, Klaus 76 Roitman, Janet 137 rule of law 19, 29, 34, 75, 108, 142 rule-of-law humanitarianism 76, 107–108, 112, 153 Russia 78 “sanitisation” (of border regime) 14, 135–136, 143–149, 157 saviour discourses 2, 13–14, 26–27, 31, 34, 70, 75–77, 88; see also Frontex, as saviour of lives Schengen Borders Code 50, 109 Schengen states 2, 41, 46, 48, 53–54, 69, 108–109, 122, 138 Schengen treaty 46, 48, 108–109 Schily, Otto 18, 65 Schout, Adriaan 49 search and rescue: European Parliament emphasis upon 50–51, 55, 126–127, 154; Frontex operations 50–52, 65,

169

75–77, 85–87, 107, 111–112, 123, 126–127, 138, 144–145, 153; Frontex sea operations guidelines 51, 107, 124; in Frontex’s governing regulation 50–51, 52, 55, 85; linked to security activities 75–76, 85–86, 135, 145, 155; Mare Nostrum operation 107, 112, 117, 119–120, 138, 144–145; NGO operations 86, 87, 146; practical difficulties of 111, 123; as a “pull factor” 86–87, 112, 119–120, 144, 146; rescue discourses 3–4, 55, 65–66, 75–77, 85–87; and surveillance 76, 85, 112, 119, 123, 135, 155 Second World War 28, 32 security: border guard discourses of 115–118, 119–120; at borders (see border regimes); coalitions of human rights, humanitarian and security actors 139–141, 149; and colonialism 13, 17, 24; diffuse securitising 24, 25, 50, 69, 110, 136, 138; and discipline 23, 24; as discourse of protection 13, 18, 32–35, 89, 90, 152, 154–157; as discursive formation 23–25; and European Union policy 18–19, 46, 51, 55, 146–147; exceptionalist securitising 24–25, 50, 67–69, 110, 136; and externalisation of border controls 14, 18, 19, 35–36, 46–47, 136, 146–149, 157; Frontex discourses of 2, 3–6, 13–14, 32, 36, 55, 64–90, 107–111, 126, 135, 145–146, 149, 152, 154–157; intelligence-based approaches 81–82, 107, 109; internal security 72–73, 81; and neo-imperialism 35–36; pre-emptive security 35–36; and production of vulnerability 34–35; relation to humanitarianism 7–8, 17–22, 32–36, 70, 75–76, 85–86, 89–90, 135, 143–149, 152, 157; relation to human rights 7–8, 17–22, 32–36, 70, 89–90, 135, 143–149, 152, 157; research access limitations 7, 10–11, 41–43, 56, 88, 106; risk management approaches 23, 25, 49–50, 64–67, 72, 87–88, 109–111, 120, 135–141, 149, 156–157; and search and rescue operations 75–76, 85–86, 135, 145, 155; and the state 23–24, 35; technologies of 1, 2, 25, 81 Senegal 65, 80 Serbia 84 Serious Incident Reports 82, 84 Sicily 44, 114, 116–120; see also Italy slavery 19, 27–28, 31

170

Index

smugglers 18, 69–71, 73, 77–78, 82, 86–87, 90, 113, 154; see also human trafficking social justice 30–31, 35, 159 solidarity 27, 50, 108–109 sovereignty: of the individual 30; sovereign power 24, 27, 33, 35; of the state 21, 27, 30, 35, 48, 52 Spain 46, 79, 107 Speyer, Johanna 51–52 states: and humanitarianism 29; and human rights 14, 29–30; and security 23–24, 35; sovereignty of 21, 27, 30, 35, 48, 52; vulnerability of 34, 52, 53, 80–81, 155 Strategic Committee on Immigration, Frontiers and Asylum (SCIFA) 47 suffering, alleviation of 25, 26, 30, 33, 154, 158 surveillance 32, 76, 78, 85, 89, 112, 116, 119, 123, 135, 138, 155 Sweden 18 Syria 71, 78, 117, 118 Task Force Mediterranean 107 technology 1, 2, 25, 81 tegere 13, 33, 34, 89, 90, 155 “Ten-point action plan on migration” 51 terrorism 64, 67, 73–74, 81–82, 107, 108, 119–120, 147 Themis operation 85 Thessaloniki Council Conclusions 47 threat discourses 1, 4–5, 34–36, 64–67, 71–74, 88–89, 107–110, 113–117, 139, 155, 157; see also risk Ticktin, Miriam 19, 20, 25 trafficking see drug trafficking; human trafficking training 3, 44, 63–64, 67, 74–75, 82, 89, 117, 128–129, 142, 153

Treaty on European Union (TEU) 142 Triton operation 107, 145 Tunisia 69, 138 Turkey 68, 82, 83, 85, 147 tutore 13, 33, 34, 89, 90, 155 unaccompanied minors 34 “undesirables” 26, 33 United Kingdom 18, 27–28, 47, 48–49, 65, 108 United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) 66, 136–137 United States 28, 31 Universal Declaration on Human Rights 31–32 unmanned aerial vehicles 70, 85 “unscrupulous smuggler” narratives 69–71, 77–78, 86–87, 90, 113, 154 Valletta Summit on Migration 147 Vaughan-Williams, Nick 20, 21 victim discourses 20, 26–27, 31, 34, 36, 70, 77, 90, 113, 137, 139–140, 155 violence, of border regimes 14, 144, 146–149 vulnerability: and discourses of protection 13, 32, 34–35, 89; of migrants 13, 27, 32, 33, 34–35, 90; production of 13, 27, 32, 34–35, 89; of states 34, 52, 53, 80–81, 155; vulnerability assessments 52, 53, 80–81, 155 Walters, William 33, 44 war 23, 25, 159 weapon smuggling 76, 82, 85, 107 welfare system 72, 117 Wolff, Sarah 49 World Refugee Day 82 Wynter, Sylvia 158–159, 160