Human Wisdom of St. Thomas - Breviary of Philosophy from Works of St. Thomas Aquinas
Josef Pieper has attached no commentary to the texts brought together in this breviary of the philosophy of St. Thomas,
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Table of contents :
The order of the parts of the universe to each other exists in virtue of the order of the whole universe to god -- The creature is vanity in so far as it comes from nothingness, but not in so far as it is an image of god -- There can be good without evil, but there cannot be evil without good -- Intellectual nature have a greater affinity to the whole than other beings -- Our intellect in understanding is extended to infinity -- Morality presupposes nature -- Reason is man's nature. Hence whatever is contrary to reason is contrary to human nature -- The desire of the last end is not amoung those things over which we have mastery -- The happienes of the active life lies in the action of prudence by which man rules himself and others -- Moral virtue does not exclude the passion -- Through virtue man is ordered to the utmost limit of his capacity -- Pleasure prfects operation just as beauty perfects youth -- Grace and virtue imitate the order of nature which is instituted by the divine wisdom -- The theologian considers human actions in so far as through them man is ordered to beatitude -- Each being naturally loves god more than itself -- Things are more in god than god is in things -- This is the final human knowledge of god: toknow that we do not know god - - KEY TO THE ABBREVIATIONS IN THE INDEX OF REFERENCES - - INDEX OF REFERENCES
Citation preview
The Human Wisdom of St. Thomas A Breviary of Philosophy from the works of ST. THOMAS AQUINAS
Arranged by
JOSEF PIEPER Translated by DROSTAN MacLAREN, O.P.
SHEED & WARD New York 1948
Copyright 1948 by Sheed & Ward, Inc.
NIHIL OBSTAT: FR, MARCUS BROCKLEHURST, O.P,, S,T,L, FR, ALBERTUS M. BRINCAT, O.P,, PHIL. BACC, IMPRIMI POTEST: FR, ANTONINUS MAGUIRE, O.P. VICARIUS PROVINCIALIS PROVINCIAE ANGLIAE LONDINI, DIE 17A MAIi, 1947,
PRINTED IN THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA BY THE HADDON CRAFTSMEN, INC., SCRANTON, PA.
To
Dr. Franz Schranz
with affection and gratitude
CONTENTS PREFACE .................................. ........
I.
II.
III. IV. V. VI. VII.
VIII.
IX.
lX
The order of the parts of the universe to each other exists in virtue of the order of the whole universe to God ................................ The creature is vanity in so far as it comes from nothingness, but not in so far as it 1s an image of God ........................................ 6 There can be good without evil; but there cannot be evil without good........................... 9 Intellectual natures have a greater affinity to the � than other beings ......................... 19 s>ur .intellect in understanding is extended to 1nfin1ty........................................ 24 Morality presupposes nature ..................... 36 Reason is man's nature. Hence whatever is con trary to reason is contrary to human nature ........ 42 The desire of the last end is not among those things over which we have mastery......... . ............ 46 The happiness of the active life lies in the action of prudence by which man rules himself and others. 49 vii
CONTENTS X. XI.
XII.
XIII.
XIV.
xv. XVI. XVII.
Moral virtue does not exclude the passions........ 55 Through virtue man is ordered to the utmost limit of his capacity ................................. 58 Pleasure perfects operation just as beauty perfects youth ......................... . --:-:-:-':'. ......... 60 Grace and virtue imitate the order of nature which is instituted by the divine wisdom ............... 63 The theologian considers human actions in so far as through them man is ordered to beatitude ...... 75 Each being naturally loves God more than itself .. 78 Things are more jE_ God than God is in things .... . 87 This is the final human knowledge of God: to know that we do not know God ............. ......... . . 99
KEY TO THE ABBREVIATIONS IN THE INDEX OF REFERENCES .............................105 INDEX OF REFERENCES ............................105
VIII
PREFACE These remarks are not intended of the necessity of using his
mind
to relieve the reader
to get at the
meaning
of the texts brought together in this Breviary.
contrary,
it
all
the
seems desirable that the reader should
encounter these passages from the works of
Aquinas
On
on
his
own
Thomas
and, so to speak, left alone
without the aid of an introduction or commentary.
It
be hoped that such an encounter will of itself introduce the reader to the form and design of the is
to
whole work of the “Universal Doctor” of Christendom. The Editor does not wish this book to be read straight through from beginning to end at one sitting, but rather that one or more of these texts, or even a whole section, should be absorbed thoughtfully again and again; in this way the reader will kindle his own thinking, and by gradually making the thought of St. Thomas his own, he will gain some degree of familiarity with the philosophical attitude with which each and every one of these words has been uttered. I therefore deliberately refrain from even the briefest interpretation of my own of the basic thought of St. Thomas Aquinas contained in this synthesis. In spite of this, I must not omit to point out that this book, which is intended to be a Breviary of “Philosophy,” contains nothing which is Theology in the strict sense of the term. (That can be left over for IX
PREFACE a second, similar, self-contained collection of texts.)
must be remembered that this philosophy has sprung from the soil of a great theology in which alone was it able to flourish. Also it can scarcely remain hidden from anyone who follows the thought Nevertheless,
it
attentively that the reflections here gathered together
lead to the gateway of
word
of our Breviary
the eagle; blessed
which
human
like
Theology and
is
The
Faith.
that concerning the
beyond
all
human power
last
owl and
is
a heart
an eagle, flying upwards over the mists of with deeply penetrating eye into
frailty, gazes
the light of unchangeable truth.
“Order and Mystery”: this title needs a word of explanation. It has become almost a commonplace that ordo represents a basic category of mediaeval
thought,
and
especially
of
the system
of
Thomas
Aquinas.
Ordo: represents the clear and
up
intelligible building
of reality, as well as the doctrine
which
reality; it represents the satisfaction
reflects that
enjoyed by our
and penetrating the pattern of life which can be trodden and followed by our thought. And in fact nobody who minds
in surveying
life;
represents ways of
it
has absorbed into himself even a
little
Theologica” will be able completely to
of the
“Summa
resist the cold,
enchantment which the reason in its search for enlightenment encounters in an explanation of the
logical
universe constructed with such architectural power. Nevertheless, anyone
who
does not see this world,
apparently explained with the utmost clarity of reason.
PREFACE surrounded on all its borders by pathless mystery does not do justice to Thomas Aquinas. In the opinion of Thomas, not only does mystery put a limit to the penetrability of reality, but ordo itself is interwoven and crossed by mystery. And it is not only mystery in
theological
the
sense,
likewise
flowing
through every part of the whole world, which opposes itself to the grasp of our ordering thought and our attempts at rational mastery. No, the boundary between order and mystery passes through this world itself;
the effort of
human thought, says Thomas, has down the essence of a single
not been able to track gnat.
One aim
of our Breviary
double aspect of the work of and the mystery.
to demonstrate this
is
St.
Thomas: the order
Anticipating a probable objection by
critics, I
myself
wish to say quite frankly that the choice of the texts has been determined entirely by the personal feelings
remark may also be allowed work I had in mind especially my friends, and I included only such texts
of the chooser; so a personal here.
During
own
circle of
as I
this
should like to bring to their notice. This
order that the real character of
made
visible to
them
objective point of view
St.
did in
Thomas might be
in this way. Yet after
may
I
all,
the
balance the subjective to
a certain extent.
This Thomist Breviary has, I suppose, scarcely been harmed by the fact that the work of selection and translation has been done during my years of service in the XI
PREFACE army, and had to progress in a not very academic atmosphere. In such changing conditions of life, what has already for the tialities
become first
time,
familiar
is
encountered afresh,
as if
and with previously unknown poten-
of understanding. In this
way not
a few tract-
which I thought I knew very well, at this second meeting have entirely surprised me. It is now my hope that the character of Thomas Aquinas as revealed in this Breviary, may dawn on the reader also, whether already acquainted with it or not, with that morning power of radiation which is usual at a first meeting. ates,
JOSEF PIEPER
xii
The least insight that one can obtain into sublime things
is
more
desirable
than the most certain knowledge of
lower things
(I,
i,
5 ad
1).
I The order of the parts of the universe to each other exists in virtue of the order of the whole universe to God. (1) ( 2) Everything eternal 1s necessary. (3) Just as God himself is One, so he also produces unity; not only because each being is one in itself, but also because all things in a certain sense are one perfect unity. (4) The more unity a thing has, the more perfect is its goodness and power. (5) The higher a nature is, the more closely related to it is what emanates from it. (6) Everything imperfect strives after perfection. (7) The source of every imperfect thing lies neces sarily in one perfect being. (8) The beginning of everything is directed towards its perfection. This is clear in those things
THE HUMAN WISDOM OF
ST.
THOMAS
which are done by nature, as well as in those things which are made by art. Thus every beginning of perfection is ordered to the complete perfection, which is realized in the last (9)
end.
The
higher the rank a thing holds in the uni-
verse, the
more
it
ought to participate in that
order in which the goodness of the universe consists.
(10)
(11)
The more
power and the greater degree of goodness it possesses, the more universal is its striving after goodness and the more it seeks out and accomplishes good in that which is distant from it.
The
perfect a thing
is
in
sign of perfection in lower beings
is
that
they are able to produce things like themselves.
(12)
What comes from God
is
well ordered.
the order of things consists in are led to
(13)
God
that they
each one by the others.
The complete mands
this,
Now
perfection of the universe de-
that there should be created natures
which return
to
God, not only according
to the
likeness of their being, but also through their actions.
This can only be through the acts of and the will, because God himself
the reason
s
THE HUMAN WISDOM OF has no other
way
Hence, for the it
ST.
THOMAS
of acting towards himself.
final perfection of the universe,
was necessary that there should be intellectual
beings.
(14)
Although a thing which adheres firmly to God better, yet a thing which can either adhere to God or not is also good. Hence that world in which both these kinds of beings are found is better than one in which there is only one kind. is
(15)
Although a being subject to decay would be if it were incorruptible, yet a world composed of both permanent and transitory beings is better than one in which there of higher degree
are only incorruptible beings.
(16)
Although
spiritual substance
is
better than cor-
poreal substance, nevertheless a world in which there were only spiritual beings
would not be
better but rather less perfect.
(17)
All
movement
is
derived from something un-
moved.
(18)
Everything changeable
moved is
is
reduced to a
first
un-
being; hence each particular knowledge
also derived
from some completely certain
knowledge, which
is
3
not subject to error.
THE HUMAN WISDOM OF (ig)
ST.
THOMAS
The
order of divine providence demands that there should be coincidence and chance in things.
(20)
(21)
The perfection of the whole of corporeal nature depends in a certain sense on the perfection of man. The is
lowest
member
of a higher class of beings
always found in contact with the highest
member
of a lower class.
of animal
life
Thus
the lowest type
scarcely exceeds the life of plants;
which have no movement have only the sense of touch and stick to the earth just like plants. Hence the blessed Denis says, The Divine Wisdom joins the last of the higher kind with the first of the lower kind. In the genus of corporeal things we can therefore take something supreme, namely the human body, which is united in harmonious equilibrium. It touches the lowest member of a higher class, namely the human soul which, from its mode of understanding, can be perceived to hold for example, oysters
the lowest position in the class of intellectual
Hence
comes to pass that the intellectual soul is said to be like the horizon or boundary line between corporeal and incorporeal substance, since it is itself an incorporeal substance and yet is the form of the body. beings.
it
4
THE HUMAN WISDOM OF (ss)
Intellect
universe.
must
is .
.
the .
first
end of the universe good of the intellect. Hence truth must be
last
necessarily be the is
THOMAS
author and mover of the
Hence the
This, however,
ST.
truth.
the last end of the whole universe.
II
The
creature
vanity in
is
comes from nothingness, but not in so far as it is an image of God. (23) so far as
(24)
Even though created beings will never sink
(25)
The
creature
it
pass away, they
back into nothingness. darkness in so far as
is
out of nothing. But inasmuch as origin from God,
and (26)
it
(27)
The
image
the cause of a tendency to notitself,
in
has developed out of nothing.
is distant from that which namely God, the nearer it is to nothingness. But the nearer a being stands to God, the further away it is from nothingness.
is
(28)
it
its
him.
being. Rather the creature has this of so far as
comes has
participates in his
this leads to likeness to
God cannot be
it
it
further a being
Being of
itself,
The movement creature this
is
proper to the nature of a
not a tendency towards nothingness:
movement
has a fixed direction towards 6
THE HUMAN WISDOM OF
ST.
THOMAS
good and the tendency towards nothingness only a defect in
(29)
is
it.
Since free will comes from nothingness,
it is its
peculiar property not to be naturally confirmed in good.
(30)
The
property of being pliant to evil belongs
to the will in virtue of
ness
(31)
and not because
The
it
its
origin from nothing-
comes from God.
intellectual creature cannot naturally
relieved of the possibilities of sinning; since
has arisen out of nothingness,
it
be it
can be capable
of defect.
(32)
not a convincing argument to say
It is clearly
that
what
is
derived from nothing tends of
and thus the potency
to nothingness
being resides in created by
God
itself
to not-
created things. For beings
all
can only be said to tend towards
nothing in the same way
as they
have also taken
from nothing. This, however, happens only through the power of the agent. their origin
Hence
the potency to not-being does not dwell
but God has the power either to them being or to allow the inflow of being them to dry up.
in creatures,
give into
(33)
Even
that
which
is
stable in things 7
would sink
THE HUMAN WISDOM OF
ST.
THOMAS
back into nothingness, since it arises from nothing, were it not held up by the hand of the governor of all things.
(34)
The
potency to not-being of spiritual creatures
dwells
more
in God,
who can withdraw
the
influx of his power, than in the nature of those
creatures themselves.
(35)
God were
reduce a being to nothingness, he would not do it by an action, but because he If
would
to
cease to act.
8
Ill
There can be good without
be
(37)
Every creature participates in goodness in the
same degree
(38)
(39)
but there cannot without good. (36)
evil;
evil
as
it
participates in being.
and
Everything that
is,
good
it exists.
in so far as
Being
itself is like
in whatever
goodness.
way
it is, is
Good and Being
are convertible ideas.
(40)
Good and
true and being are one and the same
thing in reality, but in the
mind they
are dis-
tinguished from each other.
(41)
Good and
the inclination to good follow from
the very nature of a being; hence, so long as the nature remains, the inclination to good cannot be removed, not even from the damned.
(42)
No
(43)
Evil consists entirely in not-being.
essence
is
in itself evil. Evil has
9
no
essence.
THE HUMAN WISDOM OF (44)
Nothing can be
ST.
called evil in so far as
being, but only in so far as
part of
(45)
it is
it
is
it
has
deprived of
being.
Evil actions are good and far as
(46)
its
THOMAS
come from God
in so
a question of the being they possess.
All that belongs to being and action in a sinful
comes from God as first cause. But the deformity in it goes back to free will as its cause, just as the progress made by one who limps is reduced to the power of movement as its first act
cause, while all the obliquity in such a gait arises
(47)
from the crookedness of
There
God
his limbs.
is
nothing unseemly in the thought that
acts
with adulterers in their natural action,
for the nature of adulterers their will.
What
is
not
evil,
only
worked by the power of from their will but from
is
their seed springs not their nature.
Hence
it is
not unfitting that
should co-operate in that action and give
God it its
final perfection.
(48)
In the demons one
aware of both their nature, which is from God, and the deformity of their sin, which is not from God. Thus it is not is
absolutely true to say that
we must add beings.
But
—only
it is
God
is
in the demons:
in so far as they are real
absolutely true to say that 10
God
1
THE HUMAN WISDOM OF is
in things,
if
we mean
ST.
THOMAS
things whose nature
is
not deformed.
(49)
demons are intellectual substances, way have a natural urge to any whatsoever. Hence they cannot naturally
Since the
they can in no evil
be
(50)
evil.
Evil itself
which
is
not a positive thing, but that in is something positive, in so away only a part of the good.
evil adheres
far as evil takes
In the same way, blindness
is not anything but he who happens to be blind is something positive.
positive,
(51)
Just as perfection
word good,
so the
is comprehended under the word evil means nothing but
the loss of perfection.
(52)
some particular thing being but good arises only from a whole and
Evil arises through lacking,
integral cause.
(53)
A single and solitary defect is sufficient to make something bad. But for a thing to be absolutely good a single, particular goodness is not sufficient; for this the entire fulness of goodness
is
demanded. (54)
Every being
is
perfect in so far as 1
it
has real
THE HUMAN WISDOM OF
THOMAS
ST.
existence but imperfect in so far as
and thus deprived
potential,
(55)
Good so
is
of real existence.
what all things desire, well by the Philosopher.
as
is
.
in their
own way
.
.
was
But
things
all
This
desire real, actual being.
evident from the fact that
all
said
first
things by their
very nature fight against corruption.
(56)
only
it is
Hence
real, actual
being makes up the idea of the good.
The good
fulfills
not only the idea of being
perfect but also that of causing perfection.
(57) -
Although everything being, yet being
created thing. creature
(58)
is
is
is
good in so
not
Hence
it
itself
far as
it
has
the essence of a
does not follow that a
good in virtue of
its
own
essence.
Everything naturally desires unity just as
it
also desires goodness.
(59)
There
is
no
desire
which
is
not directed towards
a good.
(60)
(61)
Nobody can
strive after evil for its
own
sake.
Sin does not occur in the will without some
ignorance in the intellect. For unless
it is
we
will nothing
good, either real or apparent. 12
THE HUMAN WISDOM OF (62)
It is
THOMAS
ST.
impossible that any evil should be striven
by the natural
precisely as evil, either
after
appetite, or the sensitive, or the intellectual,
which (63)
We
is
the will.
do not
strive
towards evil by tending
towards anything but by turning away from something. Just as a thing reason of
thing
is
called
is
good by
participation in goodness, so a
its
by reason of
called evil
its
turning away
from good. (64)
Evil in things
lies
outside any purpose:
it
occurs
without the intention of the agent.
(65)
(66)
Even
aimed at in sin is something evil in reality and opposed to the rational nature, nevertheless it is apprehended as a good and according to nature. Evil
that
if
is
is
never loved except under the aspect of
good; that in
which
is
to say, in so far as
some particular
respect,
it is
but
is
truly a
good
conceived as
absolutely good.
(67)
To
will evil
is
neither freedom nor a part of
freedom.
(68)
Pain at the
loss of
something good shows the
goodness of the nature.
THE HUMAN WISDOM OF (69)
Hatred would never overcome the sake of a
(70)
ST.
The
still
THOMAS love, except for
greater love.
rational, intellectual nature
is
related to
good and evil in a way which distinguishes it above all other beings. For every other creature is naturally ordered to some particular, partial
On
good.
the other hand, only the intellectual
nature apprehends the universal idea of good itself
through
moved by is
fault
(71)
and is good in its
intellectual knowledge,
the desire of the will to the
universality. evil
its
Hence, among rational creatures,
divided in a particular way, namely, into
and punishment.
In the sphere of free-will every evil
is
either
punishment or fault. Fault comes nearer than punishment to the idea of evil. (72)
Punishment
who
is
is opposed to the good of the one punished and deprived of some good.
Fault stands in opposition to the good of the
order towards God, and thus
it is
directly op-
posed to the divine goodness.
(73)
Judgment must not be passed on
things accord-
ing to the opinion of the wicked, but according to that of the good, just as in matters of taste,
judgment must not be according
to the opinion
of the sick, but according to that of the healthy. 14
THE HUMAN WISDOM OF Hence punishment
is
ST.
THOMAS
not to be regarded as the
greater evil, because the wicked are of
it;
To
more
afraid
must rather be held as the greater
because the good are more afraid of
evil,
(74)
but
fault
it.
the order of the universe there also belongs
the order of justice,
ment should be
which demands that punishon everyone who sins.
inflicted
God is the author of the evil punishment, but not of the evil which
In this respect,
which is
(75)
is
fault.
It is
thus determined in the order of divine
one is subject in punishment to the power of him by whose suggestion one has con-
justice: that
sented to
(76)
sin.
must be avoided in every way; hence it is in no way permitted to do evil so that from it some good may arise. But good need not be done in every way; hence some good must Evil
sometimes be omitted in order that great may be avoided.
(77)
Just as good
is
naturally prior to evil, which
signifies a lack of
soul,
good, so the affections of the
whose object
to those affections
which therefore
evils
is
good, are naturally prior
whose object is evil, and from the former. Hence
arise 15
THE HUMAN WISDOM OF
ST.
THOMAS
hatred and sadness have their cause in some love, desire or pleasure.
(78)
Good
is
the cause of evil in so far as
a cause at
all.
For
it
must be
Evil
(80)
Every is
is
can have
realised that evil
cannot have a cause, proper to
(79)
it
itself.
not caused except by good. evil
is
based on some good.
based on the good rooted in
.
.
.
Moral
human
evil
nature;
which springs from the nature and is the privation of being, is based on matter which is good, like being which only exists potentially. evil
(81)
Everything everything
(82)
evil
is
false in
Evil produces
no
rooted in some good, and
some
truth.
except in virtue of some
effect
good.
(83)
Evil does not fight against good except in virtue of good. For in itself
and (84)
is
the source of
However much
it is
no
evil
powerless and weak,
activity.
is
multiplied,
able completely to swallow
(85) Stronger than the evil in wickedness
in goodness. 16
it
is
never
up good. is
the good
THE HUMAN WISDOM OF (86)
Good can be
(87)
Though
ST.
THOMAS
form than evil. For there is some good in which no evil is mixed, but there is nothing so very evil that no good is mixed in it. realised in purer
evil always lessens
good, yet
able completely to destroy
it.
it is
never
Just as in this
way some good always remains, so there cannot be anything completely and wholly evil. (88)
There can be no supreme evil in the same way is a supreme good, which is essentially
as there
good.
(89)
In the world nothing
and completely (90)
is
found which
is
wholly
evil.
In every sinful action there remains something good.
(91)
Nothing is so very evil that it cannot have some appearance of good; and by reason of such goodness
(92) It
is
it is
able to
move
the desire.
impossible for the good of our nature to be
destroyed completely by
sin.
is not impossible that an evil should be ordered to good by some good; but it is impossible that anything should be ordered to evil by some good.
(93) It
17
THE HUMAN WISDOM OF (94)
(95)
(97)
THOMAS
were completely excluded from reality, it would mean that much good would also be taken away. Divine providence does not imply the complete removal of evil from reality, but rather the ordering to some good of the evil which arises. If evil
Many good
things
would disappear
not allow some evil to
(96)
ST.
If
God had
if
God
did
exist.
taken away from the world every-
thing which
man
the universe
would remain imperfect.
has
made an
occasion of sin,
were taken away from some parts of the universe, then much of its perfection would disappear, for its beauty arises from the orderly union of good and evil, while evil springs from the waning away of good. Nevertheless, by the foresight of the governor of the universe, good follows from evil just as the song receives its sweetness from the interval of silence. If evil
18
IV Intellectual natures have
a greater affinity to the
whole than other beings. (99)
(98)
In the universe only the intellectual nature is its own account, all others on account
sought on of
( 1
00)
it.
The highest step
in the
tion of creatures
which matter tends
Man (101)
It
is
whole process of genera-
the
is
human
as its
therefore the
soul,
towards
ultimate form.
end of
all
.
.
.
generation.
follows that spiritual things are called great
according to their fullness of being. For Augustine says that,
no (102)
size, to
among
be greater
is
those things
which have
the same as to be better.
Intellectual natures have a greater affinity to
the whole than other beings; for every intellectual being
in so far as
is
by the power of
manner all things, comprehend all being
in a certain
it is
able to its
understanding. Every other
nature possesses only an imperfect participation in being. 19
— THE HUMAN WISDOM OF (1
03)
The and
( 1
04)
The
desire of
man
to
is
ST.
THOMAS
know something whole
perfect.
soul
is
given to
man
in the place of all the
forms, so that in a certain sense
man might
be
all things.
(105)
The
natural perfection of each single being
which
is
in the state of potentiality consists in
can be made actual. But the in the state of potentiality with
the fact that intellect
is
it
regard to things which can be known. Before is
made
perfect that
it
actual
when
imperfect; but
is
it
it is
it
is
it
made
carried over into the act, so
arrives at the
knowledge of
things.
Hence
some philosophers, directing their attention to the natural perfection of man, have said that the final happiness of that in his soul
is
man
consists in this
reflected the order of the
Man’s beatitude consists in whole universe. the knowledge of God but not in the knowledge of created things. Hence one is not more blessed because of the knowledge of creatures, but only because of the knowledge of God. Nevertheless, this very knowledge of created things belongs .
.
.
to the natural perfection of the soul.
(106)
It is said that
the soul
things, because
In this
way
it is
it is
is
in a certain sense all
created to
know
all things.
possible for the perfection of 20
.
THE HUMAN WISDOM OF
ST.
the whole universe to have
its
THOMAS existence in one
Hence, according to philosophers, which the soul can attain is that in it is reflected the whole order of the universe and its causes. This also, they say, is the last end of man, which in our opinion will be attained in the vision of God. What is single being.
the ultimate perfection to
there that they will not see,
who (107)
him
(Gregory the Great)
acts.
man
is not only a soul but a and body. But Plato was able to assert that man is a soul which makes use of the body, because he attributed sense percep-
It is clear that
compound
of soul
tion to the soul as proper to
(109)
will see
Only the intellectual creature is able to comprehend the direction by which it is directed to its
own (108)
sees all things?
who
In so far as the soul
is
it.
the form of the body,
it
has not got an existence apart from the exist-
ence of the body;
through
(110)
it is
rather united to the body
this existence.
Union with
the
body belongs
to the essence of
the soul.
(ill)
Since the soul
is
only a part of
human
nature.
.
THE HUMAN WISDOM OF it
in
(112)
does not possess
its
ST.
THOMAS
natural perfection except
union with the body.
Hence our body itself
is
transitory because
perfectly subject to the soul; for
completely subject to the soul,
would overflow
to
it
not
it is
were
it
immortality
from the immortality of
the soul.
(113)
It is clear that
the better a
body
is
prepared,
the better will be the soul allotted to
Since
among men
.
.
.
some who possess them also will be endowed with a greater power there are
a better-disposed body, allotted a soul
it.
to
of understanding.
(114)
Since the body with which the intellectual soul is
united must be prepared in the best way,
is
necessary for the sensitive nature to possess
it
the finest possible organ of the sense of touch.
Hence
it is
said that
among
all sensitive
beings
we have
the most reliable sense of touch,
also that
it is
and on account of the delicacy of this sense that one man is more fitted than another for the work of the intellect (Aristotle)
(115)
All the other senses are based
on the sense
of
Among all beings which have sense perception, man has the most delicate sense of touch. And among men, those who possess touch.
.
.
.
.
.
.
22
THE HUMAN WISDOM OF more
the
THOMAS
ST.
refined sense of touch have the best
intelligence.
(116)
Since tion
man
possesses intellect
and bodily
and sense percep-
strength, so, according to the
plan of divine providence, these are
(117)
all
har-
monized in him, in the likeness of which is found in the universe.
that order
The human
abundance on the
soul possesses such an
of various powers because
dwells
it
borders of spiritual and material being; in
it
therefore the powers of both kinds of being
meet together. (118)
Natural things learn nothing and forget nothing.
...
We
do not forget nor do we learn
natural things.
(119)
In
man
there
is
not only
memory but
also retro-
spection.
(120)
A
devil
knows the nature
better than
(121)
In us there
man is
of
human
thought
does.
not only the pleasure which
we
share with the beasts, but also the pleasure
which we share with the
23
angels.
V Our
in
intellect
standing
under-
extended to
is
infinity. (122)
(123)
(124)
Desire of the knowledge of truth nature.
In
active nature the intellect
its
naturally capable of
peculiar to
is
human
therefore
is
knowing everything
that
exists.
(125)
Wonder
(126)
Our
is
intellect in
to infinity.
(127)
the desire for knowledge.
knowing anything
This ordering of the
infinity
would be vain and
were no
infinite object of
An
is
extended
intellect to
senseless if there
knowledge.
ever-so-imperfect knowledge of most sub-
still implies high perfection for the Hence, although the human reason is unable perfectly to comprehend what lies be-
lime things soul.
yond
its limits,
perfection for perceives
(128)
it
by
nevertheless
it
acquires
itself if it, at least
in
much
some way.
faith.
The greatest kindness one can render to any man consists in leading him from error to truth. 24
THE HUMAN WISDOM OF (129)
The
distinction
more
restricted,
ST.
THOMAS
between intelligent beings and those which have no knowledge lies in the fact that the latter have nothing but their own form, while intelligent beings have the forms of other things also, since the image of the thing known is in the knower. Hence it is clear that the nature of non-intelligent beings is narrower and while that of intelligent beings
has greater breadth and power of comprehension. is
( 1
30)
in
Hence the Philosopher says a certain manner all things.
The most
perfect types of beings, such as intel-
lectual beings, to their
that the soul
own
make
the most complete return
essences. In
knowing something
outside themselves, they step outside themselves in a certain sense; in so far as they
know
that
they know, they already begin to return to
midway knower and the thing known. But that return is completely achieved when they know their own essences. Hence every being which knows its own essence is said to make themselves, for the act of knowledge
is
between the
the most perfect return to
(131)
To
return to
its
own
its
essence.
essence
is
nothing other
than having independent being resting in
(132)
The
itself.
proper object of the human intellect when united with the body is natures actually existing in corporeal matter. 25
.
THE HUMAN WISDOM OF (133)
(134)
THOMAS
ST.
Our natural knowledge can extend as far as it can be led by the hand through material things. Since the senses are the
knowledge,
we
pass
it
first
source of our
follows that all things
judgment are some way.
upon which
necessarily related to the
senses in
(135)
Although the soul creatures are, yet of
its
own
more
is
it
like
than other
from which and from which
nature, so as to distinguish
other natures, except by
way
it
of creatures
can be known by the senses, our knowledge takes its origin.
(136)
God
cannot arrive at knowledge
Although by Revelation we are elevated to the knowledge of things which would otherwise remain unknown to us, yet we are never raised so far as to know them in any way other than through things which can be known by the senses.
(137)
The
senses are not deceived concerning their
proper object.
(138)
Truth
is
faculties,
in both the reason
and the
but not in the same way.
sense-
It is in
the
reason as the result of the act of knowledge,
and
at the
same time
as
26
known by
the reason.
.
.
THE HUMAN WISDOM OF known by
It is is
reflected
act
on
but also
the reason because the reason
of their act.
own
its
act,
knowing not only its ... In the
relation to reality.
its
sense-faculties,
THOMAS
ST.
however, truth .
.
But
.
it
is
only the result
is
not in the sense-
known by the senses. Though the sense-faculties make true judgments on things, yet they do not know the truth by which they make true judgments. For though the senses know that they perceive things, yet they do not know their own nature, and consequently the faculties as
nature of their truth remain
(139)
No
sense organ
tion.
that
The
To
its
is
aware of
eye neither sees
it sees.
and of (140)
act, its relation to reality
unknown by
But the
act of
judge one’s
and
its
the senses.
itself
intellect
or of
its
opera-
nor does aware of
itself, is
it
see
itself
knowing.
own judgment:
this
can only
reflects on its own and knows the relation between that upon which it judges and that by which it judges. Hence the root of all freedom lies in the reason.
be done by the reason, which
act
(141)
The
object of the natural appetite
case this thing in so far as
it is
object of the sensitive appetite
thing in so far as
it
is
is
in every
this thing. is
The
always this
agreeable and brings
pleasure; for example, water not in so far as 27
it
THE HUMAN WISDOM OF is
THOMAS
ST.
water, but precisely as pleasing to the taste.
But the proper object of the
will
perception
is
the good
is
way
taken as such. In the same
itself,
sense
distinguished from intellectual
knowledge: the apprehension of this coloured thing is proper to the senses, but the intellect
knows the very nature (142)
The
truth of the
of colour
human
itself.
intellect receives
its
and measurement from the essences of things. For the truth or falsity of an opinion depends on whether a thing is or is not. direction
(142a)
The most things;
perfect kind of order
from them
found in derived the order of our
is
is
knowledge.
(143)
The human
measured by things so not true on its own ac-
intellect
is
that man’s thought is count but is called true in virtue of its conformity with things. The divine intellect, on the other hand, is the measure of things, .
.
.
since things are true to the extent in
which they
represent the divine intellect.
(144)
Created things are midway between God’s knowledge and our knowledge, for we receive our knowledge from things which are caused by God’s knowledge. Hence just as things which can be known are prior to our knowledge and •
28
THE HUMAN WISDOM OF
ST.
THOMAS
its measure, so is God’s knowledge the measure of created things and prior to them.
are
(145)
The word
has naturally
the reality
who as in
(146)
it
expresses than with the person
speaks, even its
Nobody
more conformity with
though
it
dwells in the speaker
subject.
perceives himself to
know
except from
the fact that he knows some object, because knowledge of some object is prior to knowledge of oneself as knowing. Hence the soul expressly attains to the perception of itself only through that which it knows or perceives. Our mind is unable to know itself in such a way that it immediately apprehends itself, but it arrives at knowledge of itself by the fact that it perceives .
.
.
other things.
(147)
It is all
necessary to say that the
human
soul
knows
things in the eternal ideas as all our knowl-
from participation in them. The is nothing else than a kind of participated image of the uncreated light in which the eternal ideas are con-
edge
arises
intellectual light dwelling in us
tained.
(148)
Just as in that part of the soul adapted to active operation, the
first
intuitive awareness of prin-
ciples never errs, so insight into the first prin29
THE HUMAN WISDOM OF
ST.
THOMAS
knowledge never errs in that part of the which is disposed to speculative reasoning.
ciples of
soul
(149)
A
twofold relationship
One
is
found between the
when the real thing is manner of the soul and not in its own mode: the other is when the soul is related to the real thing existing in its own mode of being. Thus a thing is the object of the soul in a double way. One way is in so far as soul
and
itself in
reality.
the thing soul,
is
the soul in the
disposed or adapted to be in the
is
not according to
its
own mode
of being,
but in the manner of the soul; that is to say, in a spiritual way. This is the idea of intelligibility in so far as it is knowable. In the other way, a real thing is the object of the soul inasmuch as the soul is inclined to it and ordered to it according to the mode of real being existing in itself. This is the idea of desirability in so far as it is desirable.
(150)
Knowledge the thing
takes place in the degree in
known
is
place inasmuch as the lover real object of his love.
a nobler
but,
way
which
in the knower, but love takes is
united with the
Higher things
exist in
in themselves than in lower things
on the other hand, lower things
exist in a
nobler way in higher things than in themselves.
Hence knowledge
of lower things
is
more
valu-
able than love of them, but love of higher 30
THE HUMAN WISDOM OF and above
things,
all
THOMAS
ST.
love of God,
is
more
valuable than knowledge.
(151)
Love of God is better than knowledge of him; on the other hand, knowledge of corporeal things
better than love of them. Nevertheless,
is
considered in
the intellect
itself,
is
nobler than
the will.
(152)
Knowledge is perfected by the thing known becoming one with the knower in its image. Love, however, causes the very thing
which
itself
loved to become one with the lover
is
in a certain sense.
Hence
love has
more
unitive
power than knowledge. (153)
Union belongs desire
is
as to itself
(1
54)
to love in so far as the loving
related in affection to the thing loved
or something belonging to
Intellectual activity
made perfect in
is
ligible things are in the intellect its
own proper mode
lect
is
of being.
not injured but
is
The
action of the will,
sists
in
thing loved.
blemish when
Hence it
is
that intel-
according to
Hence
the intel-
made perfect by things. on the other hand, con-
movement towards
that in love the soul
itself.
the thing
itself,
so
fused together with the
the
soul
receives
some
clings to things in an inordi-
nate way. 31
THE HUMAN WISDOM OF (155)
There
the following distinction between the
is
intellect
THOMAS
ST.
and the
Knowledge
will.
known The will,
the fact that the thing
way
in the knower.
is
is
caused by
in a certain
however, does
not act in the same way, but contrariwise, according as the will
is
related to the actual
thing desired, in so far as the one who wills seeks something in which he finds satisfaction. For this reason good and evil, which are concerned with the will, are in things; but truth and error, which are concerned with the intellect, are in the mind which knows.
(156)
Love
is
said to transform the lover into the
loved because by love the lover the thing loved.
is
But knowledge
moved towards creates likeness
in so far as an image of the thing
known
arises
in the knower.
(157)
Truth and goodness include one another. The is something good; otherwise it would not worth desiring; and the good is true; otherbe wise it would not be intelligible. truth
(158)
Since goodness and truth are convertible in reality, it follows that the
mind
as true just as truth
good is
is
known by
the
desired by the will
as good.
(159)
Truth
is
the good of the intellect; for this 32
THE HUMAN WISDOM OF reason every intellect
knows
(160)
(161)
The
is
ST.
called
THOMAS good because
it
truth.
will
would never
knowledge unless comprehended knowl-
desire
the intellect
first
edge
itself as
something good.
The
good, considered as true,
reason before
of all
is
related to the
related to the will as some-
it is
thing worth desiring.
(162)
The
intellect
is
in itself prior to the will, be-
cause the object of the will
known, yet the movement.
(163)
will
Every act of the will the will lect, for
is
will
receiving it
is
a good which
is
arises
from an
act of the
prior to a particular act of the intel-
the will tends towards the final act of
the intellect, which
The
is
prior in action and in
Nevertheless, one particular act of
intellect.
(164)
is
is
its
is
beatitude.
not a supreme rule but
is
a rule
direction from elsewhere, because
directed by the reason and intellect, not
only in us but also in God. In us intellect and will are really distinct,
and hence the
will
and
the rectitude of the will are also not the same,
but in
God
intellect
33
and
will are the
same in
THE HUMAN WISDOM OF reality,
with his will
that
man
it
when one
itself.
to will perfectly
perfection of goodness
the good, but not
would seem
directly in this
itself;
namely,
imperfectly and ineffectively
wills
than that of truth.
It
itself;
in
does not always obey
what he wished
The
is
some way always wills which he wishes to will. In one sense,
however,
(167)
of his will
In a certain sense the will always obeys namely, so that
(166)
THOMAS
and hence the rectitude
also identical
(165)
ST.
.
all
.
effectively.
more widespread
is
All beings strive after
know
that
life,
.
and
the truth.
God cannot be
loved
one cannot love what Augustine says. But we
for
one does not know, as do not know God directly in
we
this life:
see
him through a glass darkly (i Cor. 13.12). Hence we do not love him directly. To this we must reply: Although one cannot love what one
—
does not know, yet the order of knowledge need
not necessarily be the same as that of love.
Love
is
the term or end of knowledge; hence
can begin at once where knowledge namely, in the thing itself which is it
ceases,
known
through another thing. (168)
The
intellect
for all the
knows not only
powers of the 34
soul.
for itself,
The
but also
will wills not
•
THE HUMAN WISDOM OF only for
itself,
ST.
but also for
THOMAS the powers of
all
the soul.
(169)
Man
wills
(170)
The
proper object of love
good (171)
is
good by natural
necessity.
is
the good.
.
.
The
.
the proper cause of love.
Everything that
whatever
acts,
it
may
be, per-
forms every action from some kind of love.
(172)
Just as natural
movement and
rest spring
from
the form of a thing, so every affection of the soul
has
(173)
its
Love
origin in love.
is
the
first
movement
of the will
and every
faculty of desire.
(174)
In us love receives
(175)
The
first
of the '*
its
order from virtue.
act of the will does not exist in virtue
command
of the reason, but in virtue of
some higher
a natural instinct or
35
cause.
VI Morality presupposes nature. (176)
(177)
Natural love resides not only in the powers of the vegetative soul but also in all the powers of
the soul and in every part of the body, and universally in all things.
(178)
The
first
source to which every act of the will
is reduced man.
(179)
is
that
which
is
Just as natural knowledge
willed naturally by
is
always true, so
natural love always good, since
it
is
is
nothing
other than a natural urge implanted by the
author of nature. Hence, to say that a natural inclination
is
wrong
to offer
is
an insult to the
creator of nature.
(180)
In the same
way
as
the will
nature, everything that
and foundation
in
is
is
founded on
desired has
something which
is
its
origin
naturally
desired.
(181)
The
right order of things
the order of nature,
for
is
in
harmony with
natural things are
ordered to their end without any error. 36
THE HUMAN WISDOM OF (182)
(183)
The
to nature.
what the reason
It is certain that
much
so that
can be
is
naturally
is
true in the highest degree; so
it is
not even possible to think
it
false.
Since the will is
which are
principles of reason are those
endowed with
(185)
THOMAS
Reason imitates nature.
conformed
(184)
ST.
is
naturally good,
always good. As
man
wills his
its
natural act
own
happiness
naturally, the natural act of the will
stood to be
life
and beatitude.
If
we
is
under-
are refer-
ring to moral good, then the will considered in
itself
is
neither good nor bad, but
potency to good and
(186)
is
in
evil.
In the sphere of intellectual knowledge and voluntary action, what
and from
it all
else
edge of naturally
is
is
natural comes
derived.
known
first
From
first,
the knowl-
principles
is
de-
rived the knowledge of that which follows from
them, and from the fact that one wills the end naturally perceived is derived the choice of the
means leading
(187)
to the end.
Action conformable to art and reason must be uniform with that which is according to nature
and
instituted
by the divine reason. 37
THE HUMAN WISDOM OF (188)
A
ST.
THOMAS
natural desire cannot possibly be vain and
senseless.
(189)
(190)
Nature is presupposed by all the virtues, those bestowed gratuitously by God as well as those which are acquired.
To become reason
is
like nature
by consenting
to the
the property of those virtues dwelling
in the appetite.
(191)
Just as the order of right reason takes
from man,
so the order of nature
is
its
origin
from God
himself.
(192)
Natural inclinations dwell in things by the action of God,
who moves all
things.
Hence
it is
impossible that the natural tendency of any kind of being should be directed to something which is evil in itself. But the natural urge to carnal intercourse resides in It is therefore
perfect animals.
impossible that carnal intercourse
should be evil in
(193)
all
itself.
Even in the state of innocence there would have been generation of offspring for the multiplication of the
human
race; otherwise
would have been necessary in order a good should arise from it. 38
man’s sin
that so great
THE HUMAN WISDOM OF (194)
ST.
THOMAS
may say: If the Word has assumed body, why then did the Evangelist make
Perhaps you a living
no mention the flesh,
of the spiritual soul but only of
when he
says.
The Word was made
flesh}
To
firstly
in order to manifest the reality of the In-
this I
answer: the Evangelist did this
who
carnation against the Manichees,
Word
did not take on real flesh
.
.
not fitting that the word of the good
on
take
flesh,
.
said the
since
it is
God should
which they themselves called
a
creature of the devil. (195)
Since that which
is
according to nature
is
or-
dered by the divine reason, which ought to be
whatever
trary to
human
reason, hence sin and evil done by human judgment conthe order which is commonly found
imitated by is
is
in natural things.
(196)
Everything that opposes a natural inclination is
sinful because
it
is
contrary to the law of
nature.
opposed
(197)
Sin
(198)
Since sin
is
is
to the natural inclination.
contrary to nature ... to seek the
satisfaction of a natural desire
nothing inordinate (199)
The
is
added
to
virtues perfect us so that
is
not sinful
we
follow our
natural inclinations in a fitting manner. .89
if
it.
THE HUMAN WISDOM OF (200)
The
natural inclination
THOMAS
ST. is
the beginning of
virtue.
(201)
Although the virtues in
their perfect state
do
not have their origin in nature, yet they cause
an inclination to that which nature, that
is
to say, that
according to
is
which
is
according
to the order of reason.
(202)
The
submission of the lower powers of the soul
comes from nature, but they are not actually and continually subject by their nature. to reason
(203)
The
natural inclination to the good of virtue
indeed a beginning of virtue, but fect virtue. tion, the
The more
horse
blind, the
is
forward, the
some object
is
not per-
perfect such an inclina-
more dangerous can
united to right reason
it is
.
.
.
it
be,
just as
if it is
when
more impetuously
not
a racing it
dashes
more violently does it collide with and the more grievously is it in-
jured.
(204)
There can be a natural a single virtue
inclination to the acts of
but not
to the acts of all the
by which the same time
virtues, because the natural readiness
a
man
is
inclined to one virtue at
causes an inclination to the contrary of another virtue.
He who happens
disposition to fortitude, 40
to
have a natural pre-
which
is
manifested in
THE HUMAN WISDOM OF
ST.
THOMAS
the prosecution of a difficult end, to meekness,
which
is less
disposed
consists in mastering the
passions of the irascible powers.
(205)
Every sin
man
is
based on a natural desire. Since
naturally desires likeness to God, in so far
an image of the divine goodness, hence Augustine says, when speaking to God: The soul commits adultery when it turns aside from Thee and in sinning seeks outside Thee those things which it can find pure and clear only when it returns to Thee. as all naturally desired
goodness
is
—
—
41
VII
Reason
is
man’s nature.
Hence whatever
is
con-
trary to reason is contrary to
(207)
(208)
What
is
ing to
human
ordered according to reason
The good this:
human nature.
is
accord-
nature.
man, precisely
of
(206)
as
man,
consists in
that the reason should be perfect in the
knowledge of
truth,
and
that the subordinate
be regulated in accordance with the rule of reason. For man’s human nature belongs to him from the fact that he has affections should
the
(209)
power
The
rule
of reason.
-of
the
human
will
is
twofold.
One
is
immediate and homogeneous, namely, the human reason. The other is the supreme rule, namely, the eternal law, which is, so to speak, God’s reason.
(210)
The human will can only be protected from when the reason is preserved from ignorance
sin
and
error.
42
THE HUMAN WISDOM OF (211)
ST.
THOMAS
Moral virtue perfects the appetitive faculty of directing it towards the good of the
man by reason.
(212)
Human
nature in the
strict sense consists in
being according to the reason. Hence a man is when he acts in accord-
said to contain himself
ance with reason.
(213)
The more
necessary something
is,
the
more
it
needs the preservation of the order of reason in
(214)
it.
Moral virtue
is
nothing other than a participa-
tion of the appetite in right reason.
(215)
The
perfection of virtue
is
achieved not by
nature but by the reason.
(2
1
6)
(217)
(218)
(219)
The reason which knows evil is not opposed good but rather shares in the idea of good. The
root cause of
human good
is
to
the reason.
Human good is the end of the moral virtues; but the good of the human soul is to be in accordance with reason. The
reason
activity.
is
the primary source of
Those sources 43
of
human
all
human
action which
THE HUMAN WISDOM OF
THOMAS
ST.
are also found elsewhere, in
some way obey the
reason.
(220)
Every movement of the appetite conformed to true knowledge is good in itself; but every movement conformed to false knowledge is in itself
(221)
The
bad and
sinful.
spiritual beauty of the soul consists in the
fact that the
man
conduct and action of
accordance with and
fitted
to
the
is
in
spiritual
clearness of the reason.
(222)
Considered in
from the reason it is
(223)
itself is
the will which departs
always bad, no matter whether
right or wrong.
Although a man is not superior to himself, yet by whose command he has knowledge, is superior to him; thus man is bound by his the one,
own conscience. (224)
When
the reason proposes something to us as
God’s command, despise the
as despising
(225)
Conscience because
then, even
command
it is
if it is
of the reason
in error, to is
the same
God’s command.
be the law of our minds the verdict of the reason, deduced
is
said to
from the law of nature. 44
(226)
THE HUMAN WISDOM OF ST. THOMAS Man himself does not create the law;
but
through his knowledge, by which he perceives the law created by someone else, he is bound to obey the law.
(227)
To compare
the obligation of conscience with
the obligation is
due
to the
command of a superior
the same as comparing the obligation of a
divine
command with
perior’s
the obligation of a su-
command. Since
a divine
command
binds even against the order of a superior and in a higher way, the obligation of conscience
is
thus higher than the obligation of a superior’s
command, and if it
conflicts
the conscience will bind even
with the
45
command
of a superior.
VIII
The
desire of the last
end
is not among those things over which we have mas-
tery. (228)
(229)
Wherever there is
(230)
intellectual knowledge, there
also free will.
He who action,
(231)
is
The
acts against his will has
nature of free will
choose
evil;
quence of
We
is
of
will.
not the ability to
but the choice of
evil
is
a conse-
free will, in so far as the latter resides
in a created nature
(232)
no freedom
but he can truly have free
which
is
capable of defect.
are masters of our actions inasmuch as
we
are able to choose this or that. Choice, however, is
not concerned with the end, but only with
means leading to the end. Hence desire of end is not among those things over which we have mastery. the
the last
(233)
The
will necessarily desires
its last
end
so that
unable not to desire it; but it does not necessarily desire any of the means leading to it
is
the end. 46
THE HUMAN WISDOM OF (234)
Anything towards which we not subject to free
(235)
THOMAS
strive naturally
is
will.
Every appetitive nature must necessarily desire peace, since
it
always strives to arrive peacefully
and without hindrance its
(236)
ST.
at that towards
which
desire goes out.
Whoever
strives
towards good, by
fact also desires beauty. ... It
that
is
is
this
very
the same desire
directed towards goodness, beauty and
peace.
(237)
The end
is
last in
execution but
first
in the in-
tention of the reason.
(238)
Man
necessarily desires everything
on account
of the last end.
(239)
Man in
is
when he is good when he is good in his
not called simply good
some part
entirety;
only, but
but the
latter
comes about through
the goodness of the will.
(240)
A good man is not one who has a good but one who has a good will.
(241)
A
(242)
good will makes a
The man who
man
absolutely good.
has a good will
a good man. 47
intellect
is
called simply
THE HUMAN WISDOM OF (243)
ST.
THOMAS
Rightness of intention alone does not
make
the
will completely good.
(244)
From
the fact that one wills the end, the reason
determines on the means leading to the end.
(245)
Whenever at the
a colour
is
seen, light
same time; but one can
is
perceived
see light
without
perceiving colour.* In the same way, whenever the
means to an end are willed, the end is willed same time; but the converse does not
at the
hold good. The theory of light which St. Thomas inherited from now known to be quite erroneous. What he means by the
Aristotle
is
words, “one can see light without perceiving colour,** is that though the “diaphanous** is not visible in itself as colours are, i.e., air, ether, or atmosphere yet it may be said to be seen in the same sense as we say we see darkness.
—
—
48
IX
The
happiness of the ac-
tive life lies in the action
by which man rules himself and others.
of prudence
(246)
(247)
Three things are necessary for the salvation of man: to know what he ought to believe, to know what he ought to desire, and to know what he ought
(248)
The that
(249)
to do.
will
directed to the end, but choice to
is
which leads
to the end.
A man
does not take counsel with himself over the end, but only over the means leading to the end.
(250) (25 0
To
order
is
The name
the task of the wise man.
of wise
served only for
man
simply in
itself is re-
him whose
consideration directed to the end of the universe, which
is is
also the source of all things.
(252)
Even though knowledge 49
of universals
is
first
THE HUMAN WISDOM OF in certainty, yet
it
ST.
THOMAS
does not have
first
place in
the sphere of operation; that belongs rather to
knowledge of
particulars, since action
is
con-
cerned with particular things.
(253)
It is not the task of prudence to concern itself with the most sublime things, which are con-
sidered by wisdom. Prudence rules the things
which are ordered to wisdom, namely the means by which men ought to arrive at wisdom. In this way prudence is the servant of wisdom. (254)
Prudence considers the ways by which we rive at beatitude: but
wisdom considers
ar-
the very
object of beatitude.
(255)
Man
already possesses some share in true beati-
tude according to the measure in which he studies wisdom.
(256)
By wisdom itself one is kingdom (Wisd. 6.21).
(257)
Moral virtue presupposes knowledge.
(258)
led to the everlasting
Since practical knowledge belongs to prudence, it is
more natural
to
man
than pure speculative
knowledge.
(259)
Human
virtue
is
perfection in a 50
human
way.
THE HUMAN WISDOM OF ST. THOMAS Man is not able to comprehend the truth
of
things with certainty in a simple intuition, especially
those
things
which are related
to
action and contingent.
(260)
The
happiness of the contemplative
life
lies
but the perfect consideration of the highest truth; but the happiness of the active life lies in the act of prudence, through in nothing else
which man rules himself and
(261)
The more
others.
contemplation excels the active
life,
the more service seems to be done for God by one who has to put up with a loss of his beloved contemplation in order to serve the salvation of his neighbour for God’s sake.
(262)
A precious pearl is more valuable than bread; but in the case of hunger bread would be preferred to
(263)
it.
He who is dying of hunger must be fed rather than taught, since for one in need it is better to
inherit
wealth than to be a philosopher
although the latter in tainly of higher value. (Aristotle),
(264)
To
itself is cer-
be called from the contemplative to the active life is not a loss but a gain. 51
THE HUMAN WISDOM OF (265)
ST.
THOMAS
All the virtues of the appetitive part of man,
which are called the moral
virtues, in so far as
they are virtues are caused by prudence.
(266)
When
things are lower than the one
them, then to
what
is
know them
is
who knows
superior to willing
directed towards them, because then
things are in a higher in themselves
—
thing else
in
is
way
in the intellect than
since everything that it
in the
manner
is
in some-
of that thing
which it is. But when things are higher than the one who knows them, then the will ascends in
higher than the
mind
is
Thus
able to reach.
it
comes about that in the sphere of moral action, which is lower than man himself, an intellectual virtue gives their form to the moral virtues as prudence to the other moral virtues. In the sphere of the theological virtues, however, which are directed towards God, charity, which is a virtue of the will, gives its form to faith, which
—
is
(267)
an intellectual virtue.
To
prudence belongs the execution of
all pre-
cepts about the acts of justice contained in the law.
(268)
The
act of the
unless reason
(sensitive) is
desire
is
imperfect
perfected by prudence,
matter what disposition to good the appetitive faculty. 52
may
no
dwell in
Without prudence,
there-
THE HUMAN WISDOM OF
THOMAS
ST.
cannot be discipline, or moderation,
fore, there
or any moral virtue.
(269)
Prudence is wisdom wisdom absolutely in to
human
good, but
in
human
itself.
man
is
affairs,
Prudence
is
but not directed
not the highest good
in the sphere of existing beings.
(270)
(271)
(272)
All moral virtue must be prudent. All sins are opposed to prudence, just as virtues are ruled
by prudence.
Prudence helps
all
in
(273)
them
all
the other virtues and acts
all.
In general,
man
can receive counsel from an-
other regarding that which in the very act
judgment
itself,
is
to
be done; but,
the preservation of his
in undisturbed rectitude against the
influence of the passions arises only from the
unerring rule of prudence, without which there can be no virtue.
(274)
In matters of prudence nobody
is
self-sufficient
in all things.
(275)
Those who need another,
if
know how
to
be guided by the advice of
they are in a state of grace, at least to advise themselves 53
by the
fact that
THE HUMAN WISDOM OF
ST.
THOMAS
they seek the advice o£ someone else and are able to distinguish good and bad counsel.
(276)
human
In
activity a special
£ound wherever there domination and ordering. is
(277)
is
kind o£ prudence a special kind o£
A man
cannot be
domain
o£ a single virtue unless
sufficiently
prudent in the he is prudent
in all things.
(278)
When man
acts
against
against prudence, without
any virtue he acts which there cannot
be any moral virtue.
(279)
Prudence
by intemperance. Hence the vices opposed to prudence arise mostly from impurity. .
.
is
£rustrated chiefly
.
54
X Moral virtue does not
ex-
clude the passions. (280)
(281)
The
passions are in themselves neither
good
nor bad, since in man good and evil are determined according to the reason. Hence the passions, considered in themselves, can as well as evil,
with the reason or be contrary to (282)
What
is
be good
according as they can correspond
good
is
it.
determined for every being
according to the condition of
its
nature.
Hence
good human action is accompanied by passion and the service of the body. (283)
human
Since
soul, of
human
is made up of body and an intellectual and a sensitive part, good demands that man should sur-
nature
render himself in his totality to virtue; that is to say, both in his intellectual and sensitive
and with
part,
virtue
it
is
his body.
Hence, for
human
necessary that the desire for just
vengeance should reside not only in the rational part of the soul but also in the sensitive part
and
in the body,
moved
and that the body should be
to serve virtue. 55
— THE HUMAN WISDOM OF (284)
Hence
it is
ST.
THOMAS
true that to act from passion lessens
both praise and blame, but
to act
with passion
can increase both.
(285)
It is
not contrary to the idea of virtue that the
deliberation of the reason should be suspended in the carrying out of that
which has already
been considered by the reason. (286)
He who
is
angry or afraid
is
not praised or
blamed, but only he who, while in
this state,
behaves either properly or not.
(287)
There
are four basic passions of the soul-
Sadness, Joy,
(288)
Fear.
Like nature, passion also drives to
(289)
Hope and
itself
violently
one determined thing.
Of
all
the passions, sadness causes the most
injury to the soul.
(290)
Every virtue by which a passion
is
ordered
also gives order to the body.
(291)
Anger,
even
it is
if it
true, in
some way upsets the reason,
follows a rational judgment, but
it
helps the promptitude of action.
(292)
Anger, like
all
other movements of the sensitive 56
THE HUMAN WISDOM OF appetite, a'
man
is
ST.
THOMAS
useful from the fact that
does more
readily
when angry
what reason com-
mands.* Otherwise the sensitive appetite in man would be in vain, whereas it remains true that nature makes nothing in vain.
(293)
Since hatred wills evil to another precisely as evil, it is not satisfied with any degree of evil, since
what
is
desired for
its
own
sake
is
desired without any limit, as the Philosopher says.
.
.
.
Anger, however, wills
evil
only under
the aspect of just vengeance; hence evil inflicted exceeds the
the opinion of the one
measure of
who
is
when
the
justice in
angry, then he
becomes merciful. (294)
Despair, like hope, presupposes desire. Neither
hope nor despair is directed towards anything which does not move our desire. (295)
Fear
is
never without hope in a happy result,
which cannot in
whom
exist in
any way in the damned,
there can therefore be no fear.
(296)
All fear arises from the love of something.
(297)
Fear makes
Though anger coming nevertheless
it is
men more after a
useful because
it
deliberative than hope.
rational
judgment upsets the reason,
gives greater
promptitude in carrying
out the commands of the reason. Coming before a judgment, however, anger is bad, as it makes a true judgment almost impossible.
57
XI Through
virtue
ordered
man
utmost
the
to
is
limit of his capacity. (298)
(299)
Sin consists in the loss of order in the soul, just as sickness consists in disorder of the
(300)
Inordinate love of
(301)
All sin arises from some ignorance.
(302)
Inordinate fear
miser fears the
man (303)
is
self is
body.
the cause of all sin.
included in every
loss of
sin;
the
money, the intemperate
the loss of pleasure.
Spiritual sins contain a greater malice than
those of the flesh.
(304)
He who
from that in which
sins turns aside
the idea of the last end
is
truly found; but, as
a matter of fact, he does not cease to intend the last
end, which, however, he seeks wrongly in
other things.
(305)
The good
for everything
according to
its
is
form; evil
what is
is
that
not correspond to the order of
its
fitting to
it
which does form.
THE HUMAN WISDOM OF (306)
Sin
is
Virtue cause
THOMAS
nothing other than falling away from the
good which (307)
ST.
is
it
is
fitting to one’s nature.
called the limit of potentiality
.
.
.
be-
causes an inclination to the highest act
which a faculty can perform. (308)
The
nature of virtue demands that
look
up
to the last end.
59
it
should
XII Pleasure
opera-
perfects
tion just as beauty perfects youth. (309)
(310)
way
All things desire pleasure in the same
as
they desire goodness; but they strive towards pleasure on account of good and not e converso. It
does not thereby follow that pleasure
good or that
is
the
good in itself; but every pleasure does spring from some good, and some pleasure springs from that which is the highest good and good in itself. greatest
(311)
it
is
The fact that children and animals seek pleasure does not show that they are altogether wicked:
them the natural impulse acts from God, who moves them to act according to that imin
pulse.
(312)
Pleasure as the
is
a kind of perfection of operation,
Philosopher has
made
clear;
it
perfects
operation just as beauty perfects youth.
(313)
The way
good in the same towards the enjoyment of good,
desire strives towards as
which
it
strives
is
pleasure.
Thus 60
as the desire
is
moved
THE HUMAN WISDOM OF
THOMAS
ST.
through striving towards good, so through striving towards pleasure. to action
(314)
The more
perfect action causes
more
also
perfect
pleasure.
(315)
In so far as
it is
loved, everything
becomes a
source of pleasure.
(316)
uniform in that it means the resting in some good, and in this respect it can be a rule and measure of action. He whose will comes to rest in an actual good is himself good, while he whose will comes to rest in evil is All pleasure
himself
(317)
Good
is
evil.
is
aspired to and pleasure
the same reason: this reason
is
is
desired for
nothing other
than the satisfaction of the appetite in good.
(318)
The
idea of joy
is
distinguished from that of
pleasure. Pleasure arises
from a
real
union with
some good
thing. Joy, however, does not re-
quire
the
this;
mere
satisfaction of the will
is
sufficient for the idea of joy.
(319)
Pleasure
is
not good in the highest degree from
the fact that
it
is
pleasure, but because
perfect rest in a sublime good. 61
it
is
THE HUMAN WISDOM OF (380)
ST.
THOMAS
Pleasure which springs from contemplation is opposed by no sadness; nor is sadness joined except in an accidental way. to it
—
(321)
There is a double goodness common to pleasure and sadness; true judgment on good and evil as well as the due order of the will which accepts good and rejects evil. Thus it is clear that in pain and sadness there is some good the lessening of which can make them less good themselves. But in every pleasure there is not something evil through whose removal the pleasure itself can become better. Hence it is in fact possible that some pleasure can be the highest good of man but sadness cannot be .
the greatest
human
.
.
evil.
62
XIII
Grace and virtue imitate the order of nature which is instituted by the divine wisdom. (322) (323)
The thing
act of the intellect
known being
accomplished by the
is
in the knower; thus the
determined
excellence of the intellectual act
is
according to the degree of the
intellect.
act of the will, is
and
The
of every appetitive faculty,
perfected in the inclination of the one
desires to the actual thing desired, as to
its
who end;
hence the dignity of the act of the appetite is determined in accordance with the actual thing which is the object of this act. A thing inferior to the soul
in
itself,
manner
is
in the soul in a nobler
for every thing of that in
which
than the soul, however, itself,
what
way than
is
in another in the
it
is.
is
A
thing higher
in a nobler
way
in
than in the soul. Hence, with regard to is
inferior to us,
love, for
knowledge
is
nobler than
which reason the Philosopher places
the intellectual virtues higher than the moral
But with regard to what is above us, especially God, love is higher than knowledge. Hence charity excels faith. virtues.
63
THE HUMAN WISDOM OF (324)
The
discipline
which
(325)
.
.
and moderation of the miser,
restrain the desire for intemperance beit
may
cost
Although charity
is
not necessary to
know
rather
(326)
THOMAS
money, are not true virtue. There can be no true virtue without charity.
cause .
ST.
As
it is
it is
necessary for salvation,
more
generally
good
it is
that one has charity;
useful not to know.
to love a friend in so far as
he
is
a
bad to love an enemy in so far as he is an enemy; but it is good to love an enemy m so far as he is a creature of God. To love a friend as a friend, and an enemy as an enemy, would be a contradiction; but it is no contradiction to love both friend and enemy in so far as both are creatures of God. friend, so
(327)
To
it is
love an
enemy
friend, since if
we
it
is
higher than to love only a
shows greater love of God. But
consider both acts in themselves,
better to love a friend than an enemy, better to love
God
than a friend.
involved in loving an
The
and
it
is
it is
difficulty
enemy does not determine
the nature of merit,
except inasmuch as
it
which overHence, if love were so perfect that it would completely overcome the difficulty, it would be still more meritorious. manifests the perfection of love
comes
this difficulty.
64
THE HUMAN WISDOM OF (328)
THOMAS
In the idea of merit and virtue the good
more valuable than that
(329)
ST.
also meritorious:
is difficult is
is
the effort. Hence, not all
must the same
but
it
be difficult in such a way that time good in a higher way.
it is
The
good more than
nature of virtue
lies
in
at
in difficulty.
(330)
The
divine law so orders
men
to each other
one preserves his order. This means have peace with each other, for peace between men, as Augustine says, is nothing that each
men
that
other than the (331)
The
harmony
of order.
idea of peace includes the idea of concord
and adds something further. Wherever there is peace, there is also concord; but wherever concord rules, there
understood
is
at all in its
cord implies one
many
not always peace,
proper sense.
common
peace
if .
intention
.
.
is
Con-
among
people; but peace, in addition to this
common
purpose, also implies a unity of desire
opposed by a twomen with themselves and the dissension between one another. Only the second kind of dissension
in each individual. Peace fold
dissension;
is
the dissension of
opposes concord. (331a)
To is
be
the
at
peace befits love; but to
work
of ordering wisdom. 65
make peace
THE HUMAN WISDOM OF (332)
A
ST.
THOMAS
father naturally loves his son
more than
brothers love each other, although the son does
not love his father as
much
as
he
is
loved by
him.
(333)
The
love with
which one loves oneself includes and child more than the love
the love of wife of father.
(334)
The common good is
the noblest
among human human
goods; but the divine goodness surpasses
good.
(335)
Man
cannot possibly be good unless he stands
in the right relation to the
(336)
(337)
(338)
The
common
good.
higher virtues are in a closer relation to
the
common
are
more
the
common
The good
good. But justice and fortitude
closely related than
temperance to
good.
whole is higher than the particular good of an individual, if both are understood as springing from the same source. But the good of a single grace is higher than the natural good of the whole universe. of the
Just as the right use of power in ruling over
many people
is
a
good 66
in the highest degree,
THE HUMAN WISDOM OF SO
is its
THOMAS
ST.
misuse in the highest degree
power can be turned into good or (339)
God’s power
is
use his power in the case of
hence he can only good way. But this is not so
man. Hence
man
(340)
it is
not sufficient for
should become like to
in power, unless he
goodness
Thus
his goodness;
in a
beatitude that
evil.
evil.
becomes
like to
God
him
in
also.
Every law is ordered to the common salvation of mankind, and it is in virtue of this quality that it possesses the nature and binding force of law. In so far as it fails in this, it has no power of obligation.
(341)
Among
the virtues only justice includes the
idea of duty; hence moral virtue
by law in the degree in which
is
determinable
it is
related to
justice.
(342)
The
task of the
human lawgiver is to rule To God alone, who is the
external actions only.
divine lawgiver,
(343)
belongs
interior
movements
Human
law
justice; if it
it
sets
the
ruling
of
the
of the will.
up no
precepts except about
prescribes the acts of other virtues,
does so only in so far as these assume the
nature of justice. 67
THE HUMAN WISDOM OF (344)
(345)
Justice without
(346)
is
THOMAS
mercy cannot be perfect
Justice without
out justice
ST.
mercy
cruelty;
is
virtue.
mercy with-
the mother of laxity.
Mercy does not cancel out justice; it is rather, in a manner of speaking, the plenitude of justice.
(347)
The
old and the wise,
who
think that evil can
happen to themselves, likewise the feeble and the fearful are more merciful. Those, on also
the contrary,
and
who
think themselves to be happy,
so strong that
no
evil
can happen to them,
Thus weakness
are not so easily merciful.
is
always a foundation of mercy.*
(348)
Among
all
the moral virtues the activity of
right reason appears tice.
The wrong
most apparent in
(349)
more
use of the reason
The good of the reason
The
is
therefore
sins against justice.
lies
object and in justice as
(350)
particularly in jus-
in truth as
its
proper
its
proper
effect.
praise of fortitude in a certain sense de-
pends on justice. Hence Ambrose says. Fortitude without justice is the matter from which evil arises. * This applies only to man. God’s mercy always
68
arises
from
his love.
(351)
THE HUMAN WISDOM OF ST. THOMAS To suffer death is not to be praised for its own sake but only because of
(352)
its
order to some good.
Those who do brave deeds
for
the sake of
worldly glory are not truly brave. (353)
It
can happen that a
man may
fear death less
than he ought. (354)
Fortitude appears to excel
Virtue
among
the virtues.
concerned with things difficult and is concerned with difficulty;
is
good. But fortitude
hence
it is
we must
the greatest of the virtues.
is
The
difficulty.
The
greatness of a
therefore to be measured according to
the idea of
(355)
this
reply: the idea of virtue consists in
good rather than virtue
To
good rather than that of
difficulty.
who
are rightly
acts of fortitude in battle are
ordered to
boldest people are those
related to divine things.
(356)
The
and peace; for it would be wage war only for its own sake. victory
(357)
Fortitude has two acts
—
to attack
foolish to
and
to hold
one’s ground.
(358)
The most to
it
special act of fortitude,
than attacking,
to stand
immovable
is
more peculiar
to sustain, that
is
to say
69
in the face of danger.
THE HUMAN WISDOM OF (359)
ST.
THOMAS
Endurance truly implies a suffering attitude of the body, but it also implies an act of the soul which with all its strength perseveres in good; it follows from this that the soul does not yield to bodily passion already attacking
(360)
Endurance
is
more
difficult
than attacking, and
this for three reasons. Firstly,
to
mean
that
one stands
while one
assailant,
endurance seems
fast against a
who
it.
stronger
attacks goes forward
with superior strength; but
it is
more
difficult
weaker opponent. Secondly, endurance perceives danger already present, while for the one who attacks it is still in the future; but it is more difficult to be unmoved by the present than by the future. Thirdly, endurance implies duration in time, while one can attack with a sudden impulse; but it is more difficult to remain unmoved for a long time than to fly at some difficult object with a sudden movement. to fight against a stronger than a
(361)
A brave man
(362)
Patience tial
is
is
also patient.
included in fortitude, for the essen-
is also possessed by the namely not being upset by threatening Fortitude, however, adds something furnamely to attack the threatening evil when
quality of patience
brave, evil.
ther,
necessary.
70
THE HUMAN WISDOM OF (363)
ST.
THOMAS
A man
is called patient not because he shuns but because he endures a present evil in an honourable fashion; that is to say, he is not made unduly sad by it.
evil
(364)
Among lays
the virtues temperance in particular
claim to a special beauty, and ugliness
most apparent in
(365)
There
is
especially
(366)
sins of
is
intemperance.
something shameful about all sin, but about the sin of intemperance.
Intemperance
is
most opposed to the purity and
beauty of man.
(367)
Right reason makes one exercise abstinence in a fitting way, namely, with cheerfulness of mind, and for a fitting end, namely, for the glory of God and not for the glorification of oneself.
(368)
All worldly things can be reduced to three:
honour, wealth and happiness.
(369)
Abstinence from things which bring pleasure fitting for those
who have undertaken
of contemplation and the passing
on of
the
is
life
spiritual
good to others in a kind of spiritual generation, but it is not fitting to those whose task it is to do bodily work and serve physical generation. 71
THE HUMAN WISDOM OF (370)
If a
man
ST.
THOMAS from wine
deliberately abstains
to
such an extent that he does serious harm to his nature, he will not be free from blame.
(371)
(372)
Recreation
The
is
necessary to lead a
result of impurity
is
a
human
life.
harmful duplicity
of mind.
(373)
The
virtue of chastity prepares
man
best for
contemplation.
(374)
He who
gives
way
blame than he who is
(375)
less
to anger
is less
worthy of
yields to desire, for the latter
deprived of reason.
Sons imitate their fathers more in sins of anger than in sins of desire.
(376)
Meekness above
all
makes men masters of them-
selves.
(377)
(378)
Pride extinguishes
all
the virtues and destroys
all
the powers of the soul, since
to
them
The
its
rule extends
all.
skilful doctor puts
up with
his patient
by a lesser illness in order that he may recover from a serious disorder; in the same way the gravity of sins of pride is shown being
afflicted
72
THE HUMAN WISDOM OF by the
fact that
God
allows
other sins in order to heal
(379)
Many
ST.
THOMAS
man
to fall into
him from
pride.
people take pride even in their humility.
(380)
In a certain sense humility is man’s readiness to approach spiritual and divine things.
(381)
Humility makes
(382)
Humility prepares the way for wisdom.
(383)
Two
man
capable of knowing God.
things can be considered in
man; what
is
God and what is of man. ... In view of this every man must submit what is of man in himBut self to what is of God in his neighbour. humility does not demand that a man should submit what is of God in himself to that which seems to be of God in another. ... In the same way humility does not demand that a man of
.
should submit what is
(384)
(385)
of
man
of himself to that
.
which
in another.
Pusillanimity can also spring from pride.
To
act deceitfully
but a proud
(386)
is
.
The
man
is
is
a sign of pusillanimity:
open and frank in
ambitious are easily 73
made
all things.
jealous. In like
THE HUMAN WISDOM OF manner
ST.
THOMAS
the faint-hearted are jealous, as they
consider everything to be important, and whatever good
falls to
someone
be an unfair advantage.
74
else,
they believe to
XIV The theologian considers human actions in so far as through them man is ordered to beatitude. (387) (388)
The
(389)
A man is called a wayfarer because he is striving
last
end of human
life is
towards beatitude; but he
hensor”
(390)
when he
is
beatitude.
called a “compre-
has already reached beatitude.
Striving towards beatitude
is
the same as striv-
ing towards the satisfaction of the will.
(391)
Happiness is a good proper to human beings. Animals can only be called happy by a misuse of language.
(392)
Even though money
merely useful, yet it has a certain resemblance to happiness because it is
possesses the character of universality, since all
things obey
(393)
money
(Eccles. 10.19).*
In perfect beatitude the whole
man
is
made
For the miser, one who makes money the last end of human life, all things may be said to obey money. St. Thomas is here referring to the *
sin of avarice.
75
THE HUMAN WISDOM OF
ST.
THOMAS
which means that perfection overflows from the higher to the lower part of his nature.
perfect,
In the imperfect beatitude of the present
life,
on the other hand, we proceed contrariwise from the perfection of the lower part to that of the higher part.
(394)
What
most desired and willed by the inis the supreme perfection of that nature; which perfection is its own beatiis
tellectual nature
tude.
(395)
(396)
The
rational creature naturally desires beati-
tude.
Hence
Perfect
cannot wish not to be happy.
beatitude belongs naturally to
alone, as in tical.
it
him being and
For the creature, however, beatitude
not a natural possession but
(397)
God
God
beatitude are iden-
is
is its last
beatitude by his essence.
.
.
.
is
end.
Men, how-
ever, only participate in beatitude; as Boethuis says,
they are called “gods” by reason of some
participation.
(398)
Virtuous action
is
to
be praised because
it
is
by which he
is
directed towards beatitude.
(399)
Virtues perfect
man
led to beatitude. 76
in actions
THE HUMAN WISDOM OF (400)
Whatever
is
willed
is
ST.
THOMAS
in every case directed
towards beatitude, which
itself is
not desired on
account of something else and in which the
movement (401)
The
last
of the desire comes to rest.
end and beatitude
perfect operation.
77
of
man
is
his
most
XV Each being naturally loves
God more than itself. (402) (403)
(404)
Each single being is perfect in the measure in which it reaches up to its own origin. In tending towards
its
own
perfection, every-
thing tends towards God, for the perfections of all things are images of the divine being.
(405)
The
highest perfection of
in the
(406)
mind
of
Since the soul
is
man
human
life consists
being open to God.
created directly by God,
not be completely happy unless
it
it
sees
will
God
directly.
(407)
Every rational being knows God implicitly in every act of knowledge. For, just as nothing has the nature of desirability except through likeness
to
the
first
goodness, so nothing
knowable except through first
(408)
The
its
its is
likeness to the
truth.
natural desire for knowledge cannot be
satisfied in
us until
we know 78
the
first
cause,
and
THE HUMAN WISDOM OF
ST.
THOMAS
any kind of way but in its essence. God, however, is the first cause. Hence the last end of the creature endowed with a spiritual that not in
intellect
(409)
The
God
to see
in his essence.
happiness and beatitude of any in-
final
tellectual
(410)
is
being
is
Purity makes the eye the vision of
God
know God.
to
fit
for clear vision; so also
promised
is
to the
pure of
heart.
(411)
The
creature
is
darkness compared with the
Hence created derived from the power of
excellence of the divine light.
knowledge, which created being,
(412)
is
is
called evening knowledge.
Created things in themselves do not lead away from God but towards him; for the invisible things of
God
are clearly seen, being understood
made (Rom.
1.20)
the fact that they lead us away from
God
by the things that are
from the
Hence
fault of those
it is
who
use
said: creatures are
to the feet of the
them
made
.
But
arises
foolishly.
into a snare
unwise (Wisd. 14.11). But
even in the fact that creatures lead us away from God in this way, there is evidence that they have their being from God, for they would not be able to lead the unwise away from God 79
THE HUMAN WISDOM OF
ST.
THOMAS
except by enticing them by the good which they possess
(413)
It is
from God.
quite clearly a false opinion to say that,
with regard to the truth of
faith, it
is
completely
what one thinks about created things, provided one has the right opinion about God; an error about creatures reacts in a false knowledge of God. indifferent
(414)
The end and soul
is
ultimate perfection of the
to transcend the
human
whole order of created
things through knowledge and love, and to ad-
vance to the
(415)
first
cause,
which
is
God.
The end which the intellectual creature reaches by its own activity is the complete actualisation of the intellect in relation to all intelligible
things lying within tellect
(415a) Although the a
little
edge
it
its
becomes most
capacity; in this the in-
like to
human
God.
intellect
can
know only
about divine things, yet in that knowlfinds
its
desire, love
and happiness more
completely than in the most perfect knowledge it
(416)
can have of lower things.
All beings naturally strive towards explicitly
but implicitly. 80
God
—not
THE HUMAN WISDOM OF (417)
Although the soul intellect
yet the
is
THOMAS
ST.
God through
led to
the
more than through the love of the will, movement of love reaches him more
perfectly than the intellect does.
(418)
Man
God through
love
than through his reason, because in love
man
approaches nearer to
does not act himself, but
(419)
in a
is
God
speaking drawn nearer by
manner
of
himself.
Nothing lies midway between our intellect and God, either by way of efficient causality since our minds are directly created and sanctified by God or by way of some object causing beatitude since the soul is beatified by enjoying God
—
— —
himself.
(420)
Love, which
even in
is
an
act of the appetitive faculty,
this life tends
from him passes on
God and
primarily to
to other things; according
to this, charity loves
God
directly but other
things through the mediation of God. In knowledge, however, the converse
know God through through
effects
is
true, since
we
other things, either as cause
or
by way of eminence or
negation.
(421)
It
can well happen that one
charity loves one created thing
another equally with 81
God and
who
is
not in
more than God,
another
less
than
THE HUMAN WISDOM OF God. But
it
is
ST.
THOMAS
impossible for one to love a
creature equally with
God and
at
the same
time love nothing more than God, because the last
end of the human
will
must
necessarily be
one single thing. (442)
(423)
worth loving in so far as it worth loving since his goodness is infinite. But no creature can love infinitely, since no finite power can be infinitely in act. Hence God alone can love himself in the most perfect way, since his power of loving Since everything
God
is
is
good,
is
as great as his goodness,
The
we
infinitely
why we
reason
cause
is
are called wayfarers
are striving towards God,
is
be-
who is our we advance
end and beatitude. In this life by coming nearer to God, not with bodily steps but through the affection of the heart. This approach, however, is made by charity because by it the mind is united with God. last
(424)
Man
is
(425)
The
love of
things:
united with
it
God through
his will.
God has the power of uniting reduces human affections from many Love
on the other hand, divides up human affections and diversifies to one.
.
.
.
of
self,
them.
(426)
Since every creature according to 82
its
nature
THE HUMAN WISDOM OF naturally belongs to God,
man
angel and
themselves, in
its
THOMAS
ST. it
follows that both
naturally love
God more
than
and before themselves. Everything naturally loves God more than
own way
itself.
(427)
Hope
leads to love in so far as the
getting of
(428)
God
some good from God for his
of
sake.
All things, in so far as they have being, are like to God, who manner.
(429)
own
hope
leads to the love
It
is
being in the
evident that
is
God, who
is
which they become
being
itself,
while
things only participate in being. last
and highest
things naturally strive
all
after being, according to like to
first
end towards which God.
all
all
other
Hence
things
strive
the is
likeness to
(430)
All things, in so far as they have being, aim at likeness to
(431)
God, who
is
being
itself.
Being is itself a likeness of the divine goodness. Hence, in so far as a thing longs for being, it desires likeness to God, and longs for God himself implicitly.
(432)
The
last
which
all
end
is
the
first
perfection 83
is
principle of being, in
preserved,
and towards
THE HUMAN WISDOM OF whose likeness their perfection,
all
THOMAS
ST.
things strive according to
some
in relation to being only,
others in relation to living being,
and others in and beati-
relation to living being, intelligence tude.
(433)
Everything which strives after tion tends towards likeness to
He who
its
own
perfec-
God.
{434)
something under some aspect of good, has a will conformed to the divine will.
(435)
All creatures participate in the divine goodness,
wills
with the result that they pour forth to others the goodness which they themselves possess. For
it
belongs to the nature of goodness to communicate itself to others.
(436)
An
good through action is implanted in every creature which comes from the hand of God. But the creature becomes more like to God by the realisation of each single inclination to
good.
(437)
Since God’s essence and operation are identical, the highest assimilation of man to in
some
action.
Hence
is
made
like to
God
beatitude,
in the
God is realised by which man
most complete way
and which is the end of human in an action. 84
life,
consists
(438)
THE HUMAN WISDOM OF ST. THOMAS When man omits to do what is in his power and only waits for God’s help, he appears to tempt
God.
(439)
Since the creature endeavours to be like to
God through many maining
who (440)
is
to
it
is
things, the last thing re-
to seek the likeness to
God,
the cause of other things.
Although there
is
some
likeness to
God
in all
creatures, only in the intellectual creature this likeness
creatures
(440a)
Our
it is
by way of image ... in other by way of vestige or footprint.
likeness to
God
is
our neighbour, which
(441)
is
prior to our likeness to is
based on the former.
Creatures do not reflect their exemplar in a perfect manner.
many there
and
Hence they can
reflect it in
many
images. But
ways, and there are is
only one perfect way of representation,
so there can only be
one Son, who
is
the
perfect image of the Father.
(442)
There
is
only one perfect uncreated image.
The
first exemplar, the divine essence, cannot be represented perfectly by a single creature but must be represented by many created
things.
85
.
THE HUMAN WISDOM OF (443)
One
result of the vision of
fixed,
all else
when known
because
can be
the spirit
comes
the is
God
is
the
first
immutintellect
cause in which
reached, the quest of
an end.
to
THOMAS
and the will. The
ability of the intellect is
ST.
The
mutability of
the will also ceases, because nothing further
remains to be desired contains in is
(444)
(445)
itself
when
the last end,
which
the plenitude of goodness,
reached.
The
nearer a thing
to
is
God, who
is
completely
changeable and more en-
immovable, the during it is.
less
The emanation
of creatures
from God would
be imperfect unless they returned to him in equal measure.
(446)
Wood
burning in a
nature of also
(447)
made
fire;
fire
participates in the
thus in a certain sense
man
is
a participator in the divine nature.
Since the enjoyment of God, deservedly, due to his excellence, surpasses the
creatures,
it
follows
that
this
enters into
Lord (Matt.
it.
all
man but rather Enter into the joy of thy
perfect joy does not enter into
man
power of
complete and
25.21)
86
XVI Things are more in
God
than
is
in
God
things.
(448)
(449)
God
himself
said of
(450)
is
own
his
which can be
being,
no other being.
Since the proper
name
of
God
nature identical with his being
is is
He who
is,
a
proper to him
alone.
(451)
Since God’s being cannot be as
if
contained
pure being, it is not limited in any determined mode of perfection of being but contains in itself the whole of being. in a receptacle, but
(452)
is
All things in the whole world are
moved
to
by something else, except the first agent, whose action is such that he is in no way moved to act by anything else. In him nature and will act
are identical.
(453)
Time
has a before and after, aeon in
no before and
itself
has
though they can be joined
after,
87
THE HUMAN WISDOM OF to
(454)
ST.
THOMAS
but eternity has no before and tolerate such things.*
it,
does
it
The
higher a being
is,
the simpler
after,
nor
Hence
it is.
which possess the highest degree of must also possess the highest degree of
the beings nobility
simplicity.
(455)
God
(456)
Even though
is
the
first
exemplar of
all things.
all things, in so far as
they exist,
they do not all do one and the same way, but in different ways and in different degrees. Thus the divine essence is the proper exemplar and idea of a particular creature in so far as it can be reflected by this determined creature in this determined
reflect the divine essence, yet
so in
way.
(457)
From
the one
first
truth there result
human mind, just produces many images
as
human
in a
face
many
the one
truths in the
broken
mirror.
(458)
God, and what is in God, are not directed to any end but are the end.
aeviternity, or aeon is used by St. Thomas and the Scholastics the measure of the duration of spiritual substances such as angels. It comes midway between time and eternity, and may be conceived as the measure of the duration of a thing which is unchangeable in itself, but whose operations involve change.
*
Aevum,
to
mean
88
THE HUMAN WISDOM OF (459)
God, who
ST.
THOMAS
acts first of all beings,
does not gain
anything for himself by his action, but com-
municates and gives out something to others. Hence things are not ordered to God as end in order to
add something
to
him, but so that
may reach the end, each in through him who is himself the they
(460)
God
loves those
their love
rather
(461)
The in
who
its
own
end.
love him, but not as
if
were the reason why he loves them;
it is
the contrary.
divine love causes the good which
some
way,
thing; but
it is
it
loves
not always so with human
love.
(462)
Since
God
is
outside the whole created order
and every creature contrary
is
is
ordered to him, but the
not true, so
it is
clear that there
a real relation of creatures to God.
There
is is,
however, no real relation of God to creatures, but only a rational one, in so far as creatures are referred to him.
(463)
(464)
We
can in truth open our hearts to God, but not without God’s help.
The word perfection, if taken in its literal sense, cannot be applied to God, for nothing is made 89
THE HUMAN WISDOM OF perfect
(factum)
(465)
except what
(per-fectum)
created
is
.
We know and judge all things in the light of the first is
truth, for the light of
our
intellect,
either natural or a gift of grace,
other than an imprint of the
(466)
THOMAS
ST.
Just as a doctor
is
first
is
which
nothing
truth.
said to cause health
though
he only acts exteriorly, while nature alone is active from within, so man is said to teach truth though he only announces it exteriorly while
God (467)
teaches interiorly.
When man
teaches he only exercises an external
activity like a doctor
when he
the interior nature
is
heals;
but just
as
the principal cause of
healing, so also the interior light of the
mind
is
the principal cause of knowledge. These, however,
(468)
We
both come from God.
acquire our interior knowledge by the fact
that things impress their likeness
on our
souls.
But in God’s knowledge the contrary is true; from his mind forms flow out to all creatures. Hence, just as knowledge in us is a sealing of our souls through things, so, on the other hand, forms are nothing other than a sealing of things through God’s knowledge.
(469)
Human rational
knowledge 90
is
in a certain sense
THE HUMAN WISDOM OF caused by things; telligible
hence
things are
THOMAS
ST. it
follows
that
the measure of
knowledge. That reality
is
in-
human
of this nature
is
a
judgment of the reason, but the contrary is not true. God’s mind is by its knowledge the cause of things. Hence his knowledge must necessarily be the measure of things, just as the rules of art measure the works of art, each of which is perfect in the degree in which it true
obeys these rules.
(470)
Even if the human intellect did not exist, things would still be called true by reason of their If, however, both were thought to be no more, which is
order to the divine intellect. intellects
impossible, the idea of truth could not exist in
(471)
any way.
The knowledge
of
God
is
compared
to created
things as art to works of art. Hence, just as art
not only knows but also creates what
is
artis-
while it only knows but does not what deviates from the rules of art, so God’s knowledge both knows and creates all good things, while it only knows sin and evil, which are deviations from his eternal law, but tically correct,
create
does not cause them.
(472)
God’s purpose or in those
is
who
not frustrated in those
attain salvation. 91
who
sin
THE HUMAN WISDOM OF (473)
ST.
THOMAS
There remains one reason for the angels’ joy, men repent and when they sin, namely that the order of divine providence is both when
fulfilled.
(474)
J’^st as
a pottery vase could expect to be put to
good use by the
potter, so
man must hope
to
expect right guidance from God.
(475)
mercy that it what is more,
It is a feature of
to others and,
is
poured forth it
should
this
belongs
that
comfort the poverty of others. But
in the highest degree to the superior. Hence,
mercy belongs properly to God, and it is said that his omnipotence is here most clearly shown. (476)
God’s omnipotence
most manifest in clemency and mercy, for the supreme power of God is most clearly evident in the fact that he forgives sins freely. He who is bound by the law is
of a higher authority
is
not free to leave sins
unpunished.
(477)
Divine justice always presupposes divine mercy
upon which
it is
based.
Nothing
is
due
to the
creature except with regard to something real
already existing in latter
is
due
it
beforehand; and
to the creature, again
regard to something prior. Since
ceed to
infinity,
we must 92
it
if is
we cannot
this
with pro-
necessarily arrive at
THE HUMAN WISDOM OF
ST.
THOMAS
something which depends only on the goodness of the divine will, which is man’s last aim and end.
(478)
(479)
(480)
(481)
Nothing is due to anyone except in virtue of something which has been given to him gratuitously by God. Things are
been created in the beginning of time, not as if the beginning of time were the measure of creation, but because heaven and earth have been created together with time.
God
said to have
has created
all
men
for beatitude.
human law is between men, so the purpose of the divine law is to establish friendship between men and God. Just as the primary purpose of
to cause friendship
(482)
(483)
The eternal law is compared to the order human reason as art to a work of art. God by
his
of the
power does touch created things in
moving them, but he himself is not touched, for the natural power of no creature is able to penetrate to God.
(484)
Irrational
creatures 93
neither
participate
in
THE HUMAN WISDOM OF human
THOMAS
ST.
reason nor do they obey
it,
yet they
participate in the divine reason by obeying
(485)
Wherever God his
is,
there he
undivided power he
is is
totally.
in
it.
Through
contact with
everything.
(486)
Even natural love, which dwells in all things, arises from some knowledge; this knowledge, however, does not belong to things themselves
but to the founder of creation.
(487)
It is
true that God,
who
is
the
first
cause, does
not enter into the essences of created things; yet created being can only be understood as
having arisen from the divine being.
(488)
though they do not give being to other things except in so far as the power of God acts in It is clear that all inferior beings,
are active,
them.
(489)
God must be in all The fact
way.
.
things
(490)
.
is
.
things in the most intimate that he acts directly in all
a sign of the almighty
power of God.
Everything which acts must be said to act through the power of God. It is God himself
who
is
the cause of the activity of all things. 94
THE HUMAN WISDOM OF (491)
Though proper
created
things
effects, yet it is
ST.
THOMAS
produce
their
not superfluous that
should also produce the same
own God
because
effects,
the creature produces nothing except through
power of God. Nor is it superfluous that the effects which God can produce by himself should also be produced by other causes. This comes not from any insufficiency in the divine power, but from the immensity of God’s goodness, through which he has wished to communicate his likeness to things not only by giving them existence but also in making them the
—
the causes of other things. In this double the image of
Here
also
is
God
is
common
way
to all creatures.
manifested the beauty of the order
in creation.
(492)
All creatures are nothing other than an objective expression is
(493)
and representation of what
contained in the concept of the divine Word.
Knowledge and will mean that the thing known in the knower and the thing willed is in the wilier. Thus, according to knowledge and will, things are more in God than God is in is
things.
(494)
We
know that everything done by God dwells in him as known, so it follows that all created things are in him as in the divine life. Also .
95
.
.
THE HUMAN WISDOM OF
ST.
THOMAS
the natures of inanimate things are alive in God’s mind, in which they have divine existence.
(495)
Since is
is
the universal cause of
God
is
is
being,
all
thus necessary that wherever being
God (496)
God
is
found,
also there present.
the cause of all action in so far as he
grants the
power
which he preserves
of acting,
and brings into act, and in so far as it power that every other power
his
When we realise
that
God
is
his
is
through
is
active.
own power and
that he dwells in every being, not as part of
essence but as holding that
it
God
it
in being,
it
its
follows
himself must act directly in every
agent; this, however, does not exclude the action of the will
(497)
The
and of nature.
natural
necessity
which are determined action of
God
directing
indwelling in to a single
them
end
things is
the
to their end, just
by which an arrow is determined is an action of the archer and not of the arrow. But there is a difference; what creatures receive from God is their nature, but what man impresses on as the necessity
to fly to a certain target
natural things, in addition to their nature,
is
the compulsion of force. Hence, just as the
necessary compulsion in the flight of the arrow
shows the aim of the archer, so the natural 96
THE tIUMAN WISDOM OF
ST.
THOMAS
necessity in creatures manifests the direction of
divine providence.
(498)
(499)
God moves all things in their own manner. Hence some things participate in the divine movement in a necessary way, but the rational creature is moved freely. It
is
not contrary to the idea of nature that
moved by God
natural things should be first
mover, since nature
is
as
a kind of instrument
used by God. In the same way there is nothing contradictory in the idea of voluntary action arising from God, in by God.
(500)
so far as the will
is
moved
God’s providence cares for all things in their Voluntary action, and mastery
own manner
.
.
.
man and to compulsion is opdoes not compel man to act
over that action, are peculiar to spiritual creatures.
Hence God
posed.
To
this
rightly.
(501)
God’s action
as first cause
action
needed
is
also
as
is
but natural
perfect,
second cause.
God
could
do what nature does without the help of nature, but it is his will to act through the medium of nature so that order may be preserved in things. 97
THE HUMAN WISDOM OF (502)
God our
(503)
THOMAS
does not justify us without any action on
part.
Divine providence does not destroy the nature of things but preserves
(504)
ST.
The
gifts of
it.
grace are joined to nature in such
way that they do not destroy but perfect Hence the light of faith, which flows into
a
it.
us
through grace, does not extinguish the light of natural knowledge which is our natural inheritance.
(505)
Grace does not destroy nature but presupposes and perfects it.
XVII This is the final human knowledge of God: to know that we do not know God. (506)
(507)
Although uncreated truth exceeds truth, yet there
is
which are less known better by us.
(509)
God
created
nothing to prevent created
known
truth from being better
(508)
all
to us.
in themselves are
Things
known
one in reality but multiple according our minds; we know him in as many ways created things represent him.
The
is
necessity of calling
evident. Since
to as
God by many names is know God naturally
we cannot
except from his
effects,
so
it
is
necessary to
designate his perfection by different names, just as different perfections are
things.
hend
If,
found in created
however, we were able to compre-
his essence in itself
and give him a name
proper to his essence, then we would express him in a single name. This is promised to those
who
will see
God
in his essence. In that day 99
THE HUMAN WISDOM OF there shall be one Lord,
THOMAS
ST.
and
his
name
shall be
one. (Zach.14.9).
(510)
Created things are not sufficient to represent the creator.
Hence we cannot
possibly arrive at
perfect knowledge of the creator
from creatures;
in addition, because of the weakness of our intellect
we cannot even know
all
that created
things manifest of God.
(511)
God
can in no way be said to be like creatures;
but creatures can truly be called
like to
God
in a certain sense.
(512)
No human
affections in the strict sense
actually be in
God
also,
can
with the exception of
joy and love.
(513)
Even though yet
never arrives
it
due God.
is
(514)
to
it
may be very like God, the stage when something
a creature
in the
at
way
we know
God
due
to
From
his effects
he
the cause of other things, and that he
is
excels everything else
him; that
is
edge in this
(515)
that things are
Th^
that
which he
exists, that
leaves far
below
the final perfection of our knowllife.
truths of faith,
which can only be known
100
THE HUMAN WISDOM OF completely by those
can be
known by
who see the human
the
which are not
similitudes,
THOMAS
ST.
essence of God,
reason only in
sufficiently clear to
give comprehensive knowledge of that truth as if
by a demonstration or
as
understood in
if
human
useful for the
itself.
Nevertheless,
mind
to exercise itself in such enquiries, inade-
quate
as
it is
they are, provided there
is
no presump-
tuous claim to complete understanding and demonstration.
A
little
knowledge of the most it is poor and in-
sublime things, even though sufficient, is a
(5 1 6)
source of the highest joy.
The human mind proceeds to the knowledge of God in three ways, although it does not arrive at
knowledge of what he
is
but only that he
Firstly: in so far as his creative action is
more
perfectly. Secondly: in so far as
cause of higher excellence
he above as
(517)
is
all
more
is
the
show forth
intellect,
his
Thirdly: in so far
known more and more as being those things we see in his effects.
The human its
distinctly.
known
he
these bear his
effects, for since
likeness in a higher way, they
is.
far
which naturally acquires
knowledge from material
things,
is
not able
of itself to arrive at the point of seeing the
divine substance in
itself,
since
elevated incomparably above
and even above
all
all
other beings. 101
the latter
is
material things
THE HUMAN WISDOM OF (518)
Our
cannot
mode
own mode
know them
of existence
To know God know
(520)
THOMAS
intellect speaks of divine things,
cording to their
(519)
ST.
of existence
—
not
—
ac-
for
it
but according to the so found in created things.
in a created likeness
is
not to
the essence of God.
Whatever
is
comprehended by
a finite being
is
itself finite.
(521)
The
way
investigation of divine things in such a
one were able to comprehend them completely is presumptuous and is forbidden.
as if
(522)
(523)
It is
impossible to predicate anything of
and of other beings in the same
sense.
The
the will of
reason cannot track
down
God
God
except with regard to what he must will with absolute necessity; but his will in relation to creatures
(524)
God
is
there
is
is
not of such a kind.
not called incomprehensible because something in him which cannot be seen,
but because he
is
not seen as perfectly as he
can be seen.
(525)
God may
is
honoured by
say or
because
we
know nothing about him, but
be-
102
silence, not
THE HUMAN WISDOM OF cause
we know
that
we
ST.
THOMAS
are unable to compre-
hend him.
(526)
(527)
Neither Christian nor pagan knows the nature of
God
In
we cannot know perfectly what God but we can know what he is not, and in this
is,
as
he
is
in himself.
this life
consists the perfection of
our knowledge
as
way-
farers in this world. Likewise, in this life
we
cannot love God perfectly so that we are permanently turned towards him in act, but only imperfectly so that our minds are never turned towards what
(528)
(529)
The
contrary to him.
its immensity exceeds form every which can be grasped by our minds. Hence we cannot comprehend it by knowing what it is, but only have a slight knowledge of it in knowing what it is not.
We he
(530)
is
divine substance in
only
is
know God
above
all
that
truly
men
when we
believe that
can think about God.
end of our knowledge God is ultimately known as unknown, because then the mind knows God most perfectly when it knows that his essence is above all that can be It is said that at the
known
in this life of wayfaring. 103
THE HUMAN WISDOM OF (531)
Even though
ST.
THOMAS
the eye of the owl does not see
the sun, nevertheless the eye of the eagle gazes at
it.
104
Key
to the Abbreviations in the
Index of References
In the following index of references, the references to the Summa Theologica are represented only by num-
For example,
bers.
II-II, 123, 2
II part, question 123, article 2
for the
means the II Part of the .The same holds good
commentary on the Books
Peter Lombard. For example,
of the Sentences of
3, d. 33, 2, 5,
3rd. Book, dist. 33, question 2, article 5. works are abbreviated as follows: C.G.
=
Comp,
Summa theol.
—
means the
The
other
contra Gentiles.
Compendium
theologiae.
=
Questiones disputatae de veritate. Pot. :z= Questiones disputatae de potentia Dei. Mal. rr Questiones disputatae de malo. Car. zr Questiones disputatae de caritate. Corr. frat. Questiones disputatae de corr. fraterna. De spe = Questiones disputatae de spe. Virt. comm. Questiones disputatae de virtutibus in communi. Virt. card, zi: Questiones disputatae de virtutibus cardinalibus. Spir. creat. Questiones disputatae de spiritualibus creaturis. An. zz Questiones disputatae de anima. Quol. zz: Questiones quodlibetales. Ver.
—
—
De perfectione vitae spiritualis. De natura verbi intellectus. Un. int. zz De unitate intellectus contra Averoistas. Comm. in An. zz Commentary on Aristotle’s De anima. In Met. — Commentary on the Metaphysics of Aristotle. In Job. zz Commentary on the Gospel of St. John. In Matth. zz Commentary on the Gospel of St. Matthew. In Trin. = Commentary on Boethius on the Trinity. In div. nom. zz Commentary on Pseudo-Dionysius on the Divine Names. Praec. car. zz De duobus praeceptis caritatis. Perf. vit. spir. zz
Nat. verb, zz
Index of References (1)
Pot. 7. 9.
(3)
Pot. 3, 16
(2)
C.G.
(4)
C.G.
1,
83.
105
1,
ad
102.
1.
THE HUMAN WISDOM OF
THOMAS
ST.
(5)
C.G.
(51)
Comp,
(6)
I-II, i6, 4.
(52)
(7)
C.G.
1,
(53)
MI, MI,
(8)
MI.
1, 6.
(54)
3, go.
(55)
C.G. C.G.
3, 24.
(56)
Ver. 21, 3 ad
2, 6.
(57)
11.
4,
C.G. (10) C.G. (11) C.G. (9)
28.
theol.
I,
ad
3.
19, 7
20, 2.
I, 6,
1,
28.
G
37-
ad
3
(12)
I-II,
111,
(58)
I-II, 36, 3-
(13)
C.G.
2, 46.
(59)
I-II, 8, 1.
(14)
(60)
MI,
78,
(15)
Ver. 24, 1 ad 16. Ver. 5, 3 ad 3.
(61)
C.G.
4, 92.
(16)
C.G.
(62)
I,
(17)
I,
(63)
Pot. 3, 6
(18)
Ver. 16,
(64)
C.G.
(65) (66)
MI, MI,
(67)
Ver. 22,
6.
(68)
I-II, 35»
1
(69)
I-II, 29, 3
1.
3, 136.
84,
ad
1
(19)
C.G.
(20)
Comp,
3.
2.
3, 74.
C.G. (22) C.G. (23) Car.
theol. I, 148.
2, 68.
(21)
1.
1, 1
ad ad
11.
(24)
I, 65,
(25)
Ver. 18, 2 ad
(26)
I,
1
1.
(27)
104, 3 ad C.G. 2, 30.
(28)
Pot. 5,
(29)
1
5.
1.
ad 16. 8 ad 14. 6 ad 3.
(30)
Ver. 24, Ver. 22,
(31)
2, d. 23,
(32)
C.G.
(33)
I.
103.
»
(34)
I,
104,
1
(35)
I,
(36)
I,
104, 3 109, 1
(37)
Ver. 20, 4.
(38)
C.G.
(39)
Ver. 21,
(40)
MI,
(41)
Ver. 16, 3 ad
(42)
C.G.
(43)
Pot- 3- >6
(44)
I. 5.
2, 30.
27,
(72)
MI,
(73)
Mai.
(74)
1.
(75)
1,
49 63
Corr Mai. Mai.
1.
3.
(81)
1.
Mai. (83) C.G. (84) C.G. (85) C.G.
79, 1, ,
,
.
3.
29, 5. 5.
3, 7.
48, 6.
ad 4. 5 ad 10.
2.
8.
frat. 1
ad
1
ad
10.
3» 11*
ad
12,
2.
ad
1
3, 12; cf. I, 48, 4. 3» 71-
(86)
Ver. 16, 2
(87)
1.
(88)
Comp,
(89)
»
(sed contra)
3-
theol.
(9«)
Ver. 22, 6 ad
(46)
(92)
Mai.
(47)
C.G.
(93)
Ver. 5, 4 ad
(94)
Comp,
(95)
1,
48 2 ad
3.
(96)
1,
92
ad
3.
(48)
I, 8, 1
(49)
I.
(50)
Mai.
ad
4.
63, 41, 1.
106
10.
3» 9-
(90)
2, 89.
4.
5.
1, 3-
3,
3 ad 2. Ver. 8, 4 ad 5. Pot. 3, 6 ad 20.
(45)
3.
3. 2.
1
103, 7 ad Ver. 24, 10
ad
1.
ad ad
I»
17 , 4
49
3.
ad
1
10,
^82)
3, 7.
14.
1, 4*
(79)
I»
ad
4 ad
6,
Mai.
C.G. (80) C.G.
2.
2.
3» 4*
I, 48;, 5»
(78)
ad ad ad ad
ad
1
t
(70)
(77)
2.
2.
19^ 9-
(7»)
(76)
1.
114.
I,
2,
1
117.
ad
11.
6.
12. 6.
theol.
,
,
I,
1.
I,
142.
THE HUMAN WISDOM OF
THOMAS
ST.
(142a) II-II, 26,
ad 2. ad 3.
1
(102)
C.G. C.G. C.G. C.G. C.G. C.G.
(147)
I,
(103)
I-II, 32, 2.
(148) (149)
(106)
Comm, in An. 3, 8, lect. 13. Ver. 20, 3; Ver. 20, 3 ad 5. Ver. 2, 2.
Ver. 16, 1 (sed contra). Ver. 22, 10.
(107)
C.G.
(108)
I,
75, 4.
(109)
I,
76, 7
(110)
Un.
(111)
Spir. creat. 2
ad
(112)
Ver. 13, 3 ad
2.
(113)
I,
(97) (98) (99) (100)
(101)
(104) (105)
(114)
3, 71. 3,
112.
(143)
I-II, 93,
3,
112.
(144)
I, 14,
3,
22.
(145)
1,
43. 112.
(146)
Nat. verb. Ver. 10, 8.
3,
3, 113.
ad
3.
int.
An. C.G.
(117)
(118)
1, 77, 2. Virt. comm.
(1 19)
An.
(120)
Mai.
13.
I-II, 31,
(124)
C.G. Mai. C.G.
(125)
MI,
(123)
9.
ad 4 ad
16, 8
59.
32, 8.
(128)
C.G. 1, 43. C.G. 1, 5. In div. nom.
(129)
I,
(126) (127)
(130)
Ver.
1, 9.
Ver.
2, 2
(132)
I,
84, 7.
(133)
I,
12,
(135) (136)
ad
2.
12.
Ver. 12, 3 ad Ver. 18, 2 ad
In Trin.
2.
7.
6, 3.
85, 6.
(137)
I,
(138)
Ver.
O39) C.G.
9.
1,
2, 66.
(141)
Ver. 24, Ver. 25,
(142)
De
(140)
4, 4.
14, 1.
(131)
(134)
spe
I-II, 28,
I-II, 26, 2
(154)
I-II, 86,
(155)
C.G.
1
ad ad ad
1
1
3. 2. 2.
cf.
16,
I,
1;
C.G. C.G.
107
71.
1,
3, 26.
(161)
I-II, 19, 3
ad
(162)
Car.
ad
12.
(163)
(166)
I-II, 4, 4 ad 2. Ver. 23, 6. Ver. 24, 10 ad 15. Ver. 21, 3.
(167)
II-II, 27, 4, obj.
(168)
I-II,
(169)
Ver. 25,
(170)
I-II, 27, 1.
3,
5 ad
I-II, 28, 6.
De
(173)
I,
(174)
I-II, 55,
(175) (176)
I-II, 17, 5 Corr. frat.
(177)
I-II, 26,
(178)
Car.
(179)
I,
(180)
Ver. 22,
spe
60,
(181)
C.G.
(182)
I,
(183)
II-II,
3.
1. 1
1
ad 4. ad 3. 1, ad ad 3.
1. 1
ad
3.
5.
3, 26.
60, 5.
I-II,
1
1.
(171)
20,
1,
2.
(172)
(186)
7.
ad 13. ad 2. ad 3. 1
59, 2
I,
(159)
(184)
1.
6,
79* 11
C.G. (185) Mai.
2.
ad
3.
77;
1,
Mai.
(158)
(165)
3.
9, 1. 3,
(152)
(164)
7.
43.
1,
ad
(153)
(160)
3, 81.
(121)
108, 6 82, 3.
(156)
8.
(122)
I,
I,
26, 3.
76, 5.
(116)
3.
84, 5.
(151)
^57)
1.
8 ad
(150)
5.
85, 7.
(115)
1
154, 12. 1, 7.
2, 3
17,
ad
9 ad
2.
2.
5.
ad
1.
Ver.
.
THE HUMAN WISDOM OF
THOMAS
ST.
(187)
II-II, 50, 4.
(231)
Ver. 24, 3 ad
(188)
C.G.
(232)
I,
(189)
Ver. 16, 2 ad
(233)
Ver. 22,
(190)
I-II, 58,
(234)
1,
(191)
II-II, 154, 12,
(192)
C.G.
(193)
I,
(194)
In Joh.
(195)
II-II,
(196)
II-II, 133, 1; II-II, 142, 1.
(>97)
I,
(>98)
Quol.
3, 22.
(»99) (200)
II-II,
108, 2.
2, 79.
5.
ad
1
3.
ad
1,
3, 126. 1-
982
1, 7.
130,
1.
63, 9.
4 ad
I-II, 58,
(201)
I-II, 71, 2
(202)
Virt.
(203)
I-II, 58,
(204)
Virt.
3.
ad
comm.
4 ad
comm.
Mai. (206) Mai.
ad
17.
3.
ad
8
10.
2.
8,
(205)
1.
8,
ad
14, 2
8.
82,
ad
1
2.
3.
6.
83, 2.
(235)
II-II, 2g, 2.
(236)
Ver. 22,
1
(237)
I-II,
18,
7
(238)
MI,
1,
(239)
Virt.
(240)
I, 5,
(241)
Virt.
comm.
(242)
Mai.
1,
(243)
I-II,
(244)
I-II, 90,
(245)
I-II,
(246)
Virt.
(247)
Praec. car.
ad ad
12. 2.
6.
comm. 4 ad
ad
7
9 ad 16.
5.
ad 2. ad 3. 8, 3 ad 2. comm. 5 ad 19, 8 1
(248)
C.G.
(249)
I-II, 14, 2.
(250)
(251)
C.G. C.G.
(252)
I-II, 77, 2
1,
88.
1.
1,
II-II,
145, 3.
(208)
Virt.
comm.
(209)
I-II, 71, 6.
(253)
I-II, 66,
5 ad
1.
(210)
C.G.
(254)
I-II, 66,
5 ad
2.
(211)
I-II, 59, 4.
(255)
(212)
II-II, 155,
(256)
C.G. C.G.
(213)
II-II, 153, 3.
(257)
I-II, 56, 2
ad
2.
(214)
Virt.
(258)
Ver. 18, 7 ad
7.
(259)
II-II, 51,
(215)
157» 2Virt. comm. 8.
(260)
Virt.
(216)
C.G.
1,
(261)
Perf.
I-II,
66,
70.
4,
ad
1
comm.
2.
12
ad
16;
IMI,
71*
comm. 4
8.
(princ)
(207)
9.
2.
3.
1.
1,
1,
2.
1,
2.
ad
1.
ad
1
comm.
2.
5 ad
spir.
vit.
8.
23.
(262)
Quol.
3.
(263)
II-II, 32, 3.
(218)
IMI,
(264)
IMI,
(219)
MI,
(265)
Virt.
(220)
II-II,
(266)
Car. 3 ad 13.
(221)
II-II, 145, 2.
(267)
II-II, 56, 2
(222)
(268)
Ver. 14,
(223)
i-n, 19, 5. Ver. 17, 3 ad
3.
(269)
II-II, 47, 2
(224)
I-II,
5 ad
2.
(270)
Virt.
comm.
12
ad
(225)
1.
(271)
II-II,
119, 3
ad
3;
(227)
Ver. 17, 1 ad Ver. 17, 3 ad Ver. 17, 5.
(228)
I,
82,
(229)
I»
59» 3-
(230)
Mai.
(217)
ad
(226)
1;
Virt.
47> 6. 58, 2. 20,
19,
1
6,
1.
ad 1
2
1.
3.
ad
22.
108
ad
1,
14.
182,
ad
1
comm.
3.
6.
ad
3.
ad
1.
6.
3.
(272)
II-II, 47, 5
(273)
Virt.
(274)
II-II, 49, 3
(275)
n-ii, 47,
ad
2.
comm. 6 ad ad 3. 14 ad 2.
2.
23. II-II, 55,
..
THE HUMAN WISDOM OF (276)
IMI,
(277)
Virt. card. 2
(278)
I-II, 73,
1.
50,
II -II, 153,
(280)
I-II, 59, 2
(281)
I-II,
(282)
I-II, 59, 5
(sed contra)
1.
59,
Mai.
(284)
Ver. 26, 7
(285)
II-II, 158,
(286)
II-II, 125,
(287)
Ver. 26, 5. C.G. I, 89.
ad 1. 1 ad 2. I ad 1.
I-II, 37, 4.
(290)
Virt.
comm. 12,
Mai. II-II,
I-II, 35, 5.
(321)
I-II, 39,
(322)
II-II, 31, 3.
(323)
II-II, 23,
(324)
II-II, 23, 7.
4 ad
6 ad
9.
Ver. 10, 10 ad 7. Car. 8 ad 11, ad 12.
(327)
Car. 8 ad 17.
(328)
II-II, 27, 8
(329)
II-II, 123, 12
(330)
C.G.
ad
ad 4. ad 2. 6 ad 1. 4 ad 3. 4 ad 2.
(293)
I-II, 46, I-II, 40,
(295)
I-II, 67,
(296)
I-II, 43,
(297)
I-II, 44, 2
(298)
Virt.
comm.
(299)
Mai.
7, 1.
(300) (301) (302)
II-II,
(303)
I-II, 73, 5.
(304)
I-II, 1, 7
(305)
MI,
(306)
I-II, 109, 2
(307)
Virt.
ad
ad
ad
2.
(336)
II-II, 141, 8.
(337)
I-II.
ad
113. 9
4 ad (339) I-II. 2. 4 ad (340) 1-11,96,6. (338)
3.
11
96, 3
(335)
(334)
(sed contra)
1
I,
I-II, 2,
I-II,
100, 9.
I-II, 77, 4.
I-II.
100, 2.
C.G.
(344)
I-II. 65, 4-
(345)
In Matth.
(346)
I,
(347)
II-II. 30. 2.
(348)
II-II, 55, 8.
15.
4, 70.
125, 2.
ad
1.
18, 5.
ad
2.
comm. 9 ad
15;
Virt.
card. 3.
21, 3
(349)
II-II.
124,
(350)
II-II,
123, 12
(35O
II-II,
II-II, 123, 4.
(352)
C.G.
(353)
II-II, 126,
(312) (313)
C.G. Mai.
1
3.
ad
2.
90.
1,
10, 3.
8 ad
(314)
I-II, 32,
(315)
I-II, 31, 6.
(316)
I-II, 34,
(317)
I-II, 2,
3.
4 ad
6 ad
2.
1; I-II,
34, 2
ad
3-
(318)
C.G.
(319)
I-II, 34,
t,
90.
3 ad
(354)
II-II,
(355)
I-II, 45. 3 -
109
ad ad
3.
3.
1.
123, 12
ad
(356)
C.G.
(357)
II-II, 128, 1.
(358)
II-II, 123, 6.
(359)
II-II, 123,
6 ad
(360)
II-II, 123,
6 ad
(361)
I-II, 66,
(362)
Virt. card,
(363)
II-II, 136, II-II,
3.
1.
1.
(309)
6 ad
1.
2.
(308)
I-II, 34,
2.
5, 1.
ad
124. 3 II-II, 131, 1
90.
3.
2.
5 ad
I-II. 99.
(342)
(440a) II-II, 26, 2
I,
1.
4 ad
(399) (400)
1,
ad
C.G. 3 21. (440) I2 93 6.
62, 4.
C.G. (401) C.G.
3.
4.
(437)
1
3. 2.
106, 4.
ad 2. 3 ad 3-
13, 3
1,
ad
(430) (431)
2.
ad
1
3.
,
(384)
36,
20.
60 5; I, 60, 5 ad (427) De spe 3. (428) C.G. 1, 80. (429) C.G. 32 19(426)
ad
10.
,
(383)
1
4.
(421)
(425)
In Matth. 11. (382) Mai. 8. 3 ad 8.
(381)
8 ad
103.
I,
62,
8
.
,
10,
2
1
3 ad
1
5*
ad
ad
1.
3. 1.
I,
2.
13,
11.
1.
.
THE HUMAN WISDOM OF ( (
454 ) 455 )
(456) (
457 )
(458) (
C.G. I.
18.
1,
(494)
44. 3 -
Quol. Quol. Pot.
18, 4; I, 18,
C.G.
(496)
Pot. 3, 7.
(497)
I,
(498)
Quol.
(499)
I-II, 6,
1
(500)
C.G. 3
14^*
(501) (502)
Pot. 3, 7 ad 16. I-II, 111, 2 ad 2.
ad
2
1.
3»
Ver. 27, 2 ad
(461)
C.G.
(462)
I. 13.
1.
150.
3,
(464)
7 Ver. 24, 15 ad 2. Ver. 2, 3 ad 13.
(465)
I,
(466)
Ver. 11,
(467)
I,
(468)
Ver.
-
ad
88, 3
117,
ad 7. ad 1. ad 6.
1
1
1,
»
I-II,
In Trin.
(505)
Ver. 14, 10 ad 9;
10, 4. 2, 3.
ad
2
I, 2,
Pot. 7, 5 ad 14. Ver. 10, 12 ad 6.
4 ad
C.G.
1,
61.
(508)
I,
(470)
Ver.
1,
2.
(509)
C.G.
Ver. 5, 2 ad 11. Ver. 2, 11 ad 1.
Quol.
5, 2.
(510)
(472)
I,
63, 7
(511)
(473)
I.
113,
ad 2. 7 ad 3.
474 ) Comp, theol.
(475)
II-II, 30, 4.
(476)
I,
25, 3
477 )
I,
21, 4.
(478)
I,
25, 3
I,
46, 3
(
(
479 )
(480)
(481)
ad ad ad
Ver. 23, i-n, 99,
2, 4.
13,
1,
(512)
C.G.
1,
91.
(513)
Ver.
2,
11.
3.
3.
(518)
h
39» 2.
2.
(519)
I,
12,
2.
(520)
I-II, 4, 3
(521)
In Trin. 2, C.G. 1, 32.
1.
4 ad
(484)
(523)
I,
46, 2.
C.G.
(524)
I,
12, 7
(486)
I-II, 27, 2
(525)
In Trin.
(487)
Pot.
(526)
I,
(488)
C.G.
3, 66.
(489)
I, 8,
1; I, 8, 1
C.G. (491) C.G. C.G. ( 498 ) (490)
(
493 )
I, 8,
(
3, 68.
ad 3. 5 ad 1.
ad
3.
528 )
Car. 10,
(528)
C.G.
1,
1.
ad
ad
1. 1
ad
2.
2.
ad 6. ad 5. ad 2 (contra) 2, 1
14;
I,
3
(prooem-
C.G. 1, 5; Ver. 8, 1 ad In Trin. 1, 2 ad 1. (531) In Joh. prologus. (529)
4 ^*
ad
2;
2.
ium)
3, 70.
3
13, 10
(527)
3, 67.
4»
ad
3.
C.G. 3, 49. (5 « 5 ) C.G. 1, 8. (516) In Trin. 1, (517) C.G. 4»
I-II, 71, 2
3,
8
(514)
(485)
(483)
1,
31.
ad 4. I, 105, 2 ad 1. I-II, 93, 5 ad 2.
(482)
I,
1.
(507)
(471)
2.
ad 3. ad 2. ad 3.
(503)
(506)
i
7
(504)
1
1
2,
1.
103,
(469)
(
4 ad
3, 68.
10, 7.
(460)
(463)
I,
THOMAS
ST.
4, 1.
1,
459 ) C.G.
(495)
.
(530)
3.
111
8.