Human Rights in China [1 ed.] 9781614700593, 9781607411161

Citation preview

Copyright © 2009. Nova Science Publishers, Incorporated. All rights reserved. Human Rights in China, Nova Science Publishers, Incorporated, 2009. ProQuest Ebook Central,

Copyright © 2009. Nova Science Publishers, Incorporated. All rights reserved. Human Rights in China, Nova Science Publishers, Incorporated, 2009. ProQuest Ebook Central,

In: China in the 21st Century Series

Copyright © 2009. Nova Science Publishers, Incorporated. All rights reserved.

HUMAN RIGHTS IN CHINA

No part of this digital document may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system or transmitted in any form or by any means. The publisher has taken reasonable care in the preparation of this digital document, but makes no expressed or implied warranty of any kind and assumes no responsibility for any errors or omissions. No liability is assumed for incidental or consequential damages in connection with or arising out of information Human Rights in China, Nova Science Publishers, Incorporated, Ebook Central, contained herein. This digital document is sold2009. withProQuest the clear understanding that the publisher is not engaged in

CHINA IN THE 21ST CENTURY SERIES FDI in China: Contributions to Growth, Restructuring and Competitiveness Jiang Xiaojuan 2003. ISBN 1-59033-894-4 Government and Market in China: A Local Perspective Jian Zhang (Editor) 2004. ISBN 1-59033-883-9

Copyright © 2009. Nova Science Publishers, Incorporated. All rights reserved.

Human Rights in China Lee R. Massingdale (Editor) 2009. ISBN 978-1-60741-116-1

Human Rights in China, Nova Science Publishers, Incorporated, 2009. ProQuest Ebook Central,

In: China in the 21st Century Series

HUMAN RIGHTS IN CHINA

Copyright © 2009. Nova Science Publishers, Incorporated. All rights reserved.

LEE R. MASSINGDALE EDITOR

Nova Science Publishers, Inc. New York

Human Rights in China, Nova Science Publishers, Incorporated, 2009. ProQuest Ebook Central,

Copyright © 2009 by Nova Science Publishers, Inc. All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system or transmitted in any form or by any means: electronic, electrostatic, magnetic, tape, mechanical photocopying, recording or otherwise without the written permission of the Publisher. For permission to use material from this book please contact us: Telephone 631-231-7269; Fax 631-231-8175 Web Site: http://www.novapublishers.com

Copyright © 2009. Nova Science Publishers, Incorporated. All rights reserved.

NOTICE TO THE READER The Publisher has taken reasonable care in the preparation of this book, but makes no expressed or implied warranty of any kind and assumes no responsibility for any errors or omissions. No liability is assumed for incidental or consequential damages in connection with or arising out of information contained in this book. The Publisher shall not be liable for any special, consequential, or exemplary damages resulting, in whole or in part, from the readers’ use of, or reliance upon, this material. Independent verification should be sought for any data, advice or recommendations contained in this book. In addition, no responsibility is assumed by the publisher for any injury and/or damage to persons or property arising from any methods, products, instructions, ideas or otherwise contained in this publication. This publication is designed to provide accurate and authoritative information with regard to the subject matter covered herein. It is sold with the clear understanding that the Publisher is not engaged in rendering legal or any other professional services. If legal or any other expert assistance is required, the services of a competent person should be sought. FROM A DECLARATION OF PARTICIPANTS JOINTLY ADOPTED BY A COMMITTEE OF THE AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION AND A COMMITTEE OF PUBLISHERS. LIBRARY OF CONGRESS CATALOGING-IN-PUBLICATION DATA Available upon request ISBN: H%RRN

Published by Nova Science Publishers, Inc.  New York

Human Rights in China, Nova Science Publishers, Incorporated, 2009. ProQuest Ebook Central,

CONTENTS Preface Chapter 1

Copyright © 2009. Nova Science Publishers, Incorporated. All rights reserved.

Chapter 2

vii Human Rights in China: Trends and Policy Implications Thomas Lum and Hannah Fischer Internet Development and Information Control in the People’s Republic of China Thomas Lum

Chapter 3

China and Falun Gong Thomas Lum

Chapter 4

Human Rights and the Rule of Law in China. Hearing before the Congressional-Executive Commission on China, One Hundred Ninth Congress, Second Session, September 20, 2006 U.S. Government Printing Office

Index

Human Rights in China, Nova Science Publishers, Incorporated, 2009. ProQuest Ebook Central,

1

45 63

79 151

Copyright © 2009. Nova Science Publishers, Incorporated. All rights reserved. Human Rights in China, Nova Science Publishers, Incorporated, 2009. ProQuest Ebook Central,

Copyright © 2009. Nova Science Publishers, Incorporated. All rights reserved.

PREFACE In the past two decades, human rights has been a principal area of U.S. concern regarding the People’s Republic of China (PRC), along with security and bilateral trade. Some U.S. leaders argue that U.S. policies of engagement with China, particularly since granting the PRC normal trade relations status in 2000, have helped to accelerate economic and social change and build social and legal foundations for human rights progress in the PRC. Others contend that U.S. engagement has failed not only to produce meaningful political reform but also to set any real change in motion. This book analyzes China’s mixed human rights record of the past several years — major human rights problems, new human rights legislation, and the development of civil society, legal awareness, and social activism. Chapter 1 - In the past decade, PRC government has attempted to respond to public grievances and popular calls for redress while subduing activists who attempt to organize mass protests. This approach has produced both incremental improvements in human rights and allowed for continued, serious abuses. Major, ongoing problems include unlawful killings by security forces, torture, unlawful detention, the excessive use of state security laws to imprison political dissidents, coercive family planning policies, state control of information, and religious and ethnic persecution. Tibetans, ethnic Uighur Muslims, and Falun Gong adherents have been singled out for especially harsh treatment. This report discusses major areas of concern but does not provide an exhaustive account of all human rights abuses in the PRC. China’s leadership has addressed rising public expectations through a combination of economic growth policies and carrot-and-stick political tactics. In so doing, however, it also has planted seeds of potential change. China’s developing legal system, while still plagued by corruption and political interference, has

Human Rights in China, Nova Science Publishers, Incorporated, 2009. ProQuest Ebook Central,

Copyright © 2009. Nova Science Publishers, Incorporated. All rights reserved.

viii

Lee R. Massingdale

provided activists in China with a tool with which to promote human rights. Although generally supportive of the status quo, the urban middle class has begun to engage in narrowly-targeted protests against local government policies, following over a decade of social unrest among wage laborers and rural residents. Despite a massive censorship effort, the Internet and other communications technologies have made it impossible for the government to clamp down on information as fully as before. The United States government has attempted to promote human rights in China through a multi-faceted approach. U.S. efforts include formal criticism of the PRC government, official bilateral dialogue, public diplomacy, and congressionallysponsored legislation, hearings, visits, and research. The U.S. government also provides funding for rule of law, civil society development, participatory government, labor rights, preserving Tibetan culture, Internet access, and other related programs in China. Chapter 2 - Since its founding in 1949, the People’s Republic of China (PRC) has exerted great effort in manipulating the flow of information and prohibiting the dissemination of viewpoints that criticize the government or stray from the official Communist party view. The introduction of Internet technology in the mid-1990’s presented a challenge to government control over news sources, and by extension, over public opinion. While the Internet has developed rapidly, broadened access to news, and facilitated mass communications in China, many forms of expression online, as in other mass media, are still significantly stifled. Empirical studies have found that China has one of the most sophisticated content-filtering Internet regimes in the world. The Chinese government employs increasingly sophisticated methods to limit content online, including a combination of legal regulation, surveillance, and punishment to promote self-censorship, as well as technical controls. U.S. government efforts to defeat Internet “jamming” include funding through the Broadcasting Board of Governors to provide counter-censorship software to Chinese Internet users to access Voice of America (VOA) and Radio Free Asia (RFA) in China. As U.S. investments in China and bilateral trade have surged in the past several years and China has developed its communications infrastructure, Chinese society has undergone rapid changes while the PRC government has continued to repress political dissent. Many U.S. observers, including government officials, have argued that economic openness and the growth of the Internet in China would help bring about political liberalization in China. However, contrary to facilitating freedom, some private U.S. companies have been charged with aiding or complying with Chinese Internet censorship. Private U.S. companies that

Human Rights in China, Nova Science Publishers, Incorporated, 2009. ProQuest Ebook Central,

Copyright © 2009. Nova Science Publishers, Incorporated. All rights reserved.

Preface

ix

provide Internet hardware, such as routers, as well as those that provide Internet services such as Web-log (blog) hosting or search portals, have been accused of ignoring international standards for freedom of expression when pursuing business opportunities in the PRC market. In the 1 08th Congress, the provisions of the “Global Internet Freedom Act” (H.R. 48) were subsumed into the Foreign Relations Authorization Act of 2004-05 (H.R. 1950) and passed by the House on July 16, 2003. Christopher Cox reintroduced the bill (H.R. 2216) to the 109th Congress in May 2005. If passed, the act would authorize $50 million for FY2006 and FY2007 to develop and implement a global Internet freedom policy. The act would also establish an office within the International Broadcasting Bureau with the sole mission of countering Internet jamming by repressive governments. On February 1, 2006, the Congressional Human Rights Caucus held a hearing entitled, “Human Rights and the Internet — The People’s Republic of China.” On February 15, 2006, the Subcommittee on Africa, Global Human Rights and International Operations of the House International Relations Committee will hold a joint hearing with the Subcommittee on Asia and the Pacific regarding the Internet and censorship in China. Chapter 3 - In 1999, the “Falun Gong” movement gave rise to the largest and most protracted public demonstrations in China since the democracy movement of a decade earlier. The People’s Republic of China (PRC) government, fearful of a political challenge and the spread of social unrest, outlawed Falun Gong and carried out an intensive, comprehensive, and unforgiving campaign against the movement. Since 2003, Falun Gong has been largely suppressed or pushed deep underground in China while it has thrived in overseas Chinese communities and Hong Kong. The spiritual exercise group has become highly visible in the United States since 1999, staging demonstrations, distributing flyers, and sponsoring cultural events. In addition, Falun Gong followers are affiliated with several mass media outlets. Despite the group’s tenacity and political activities overseas, it has not formed the basis of a dissident movement encompassing other social and political groups from China. The State Department, in its annual International Religious Freedom Report (November 2005), designated China as a “country of particular concern” (CPC) for the sixth consecutive year, noting: “The arrest, detention, and imprisonment of Falun Gong practitioners continued; those who refused to recant their beliefs were sometimes subjected to harsh treatment in prisons and reeducation-through-labor camps, and there were credible reports of deaths due to torture and abuse.” In March 2006, U.S. Falun Gong representatives claimed that thousands of practitioners had been sent to 36 concentration camps throughout the PRC. According to their

Human Rights in China, Nova Science Publishers, Incorporated, 2009. ProQuest Ebook Central,

Copyright © 2009. Nova Science Publishers, Incorporated. All rights reserved.

x

Lee R. Massingdale

allegations, at one such site in Sujiatun, near the city of Shenyang, a hospital has been used as a detention center for 6,000 Falun Gong prisoners, three-fourths of whom are said to have been killed and had their organs harvested for profit. American officials from the U.S. Embassy in Beijing and the U.S. consulate in Shenyang visited the area as well as inspected the hospital on two occasions and “found no evidence that the site is being used for any function other than as a normal public hospital.” Since 1999, some Members of the United States Congress have made many public pronouncements and introduced several resolutions in support of Falun Gong and criticizing China’s human rights record. In the 109th Congress, H.Res. 608, agreed to in the House on June 12, 2006, condemns the “escalating levels of religious persecution” in China, including the “brutal campaign to eradicate Falun Gong.” H.Res. 794, passed by the House on June 12, 2006, calls upon the PRC to end its most egregious human rights abuses, including the persecution of Falun Gong. In January 2006, U.S. citizen Charles Li was released from a PRC prison after serving a three-year term for “intending to sabotage” broadcasting equipment in China on behalf of Falun Gong. Chapter 4 - In connection with today’s release of the 2006 Annual Report, the Commission has asked a distinguished group of witnesses to assess the current state of civil rights and criminal defense; freedom of expression; and efforts to adopt democratic institutions of governance, implement legislative reform, and improve the environment for domestic and international civil society groups in China. The Commission will also hear the perspective of the witnesses on how the United States might best engage with the Chinese Government through dialogue on human rights and rule of law issues. In its 2006 Annual Report, the Commission expresses deep concern that some Chinese Government policies designed to address growing social unrest and bolster Communist Party authority are resulting in a period of declining human rights for China’s citizens. The Commission identified limited improvements in the Chinese Government’s human rights practices in 2004, but backward-stepping government decisions in 2005 and 2006 are leading the Commission to reevaluate the Chinese leadership’s commitment to additional human rights improvements in the near term. In its 2005 Annual Report, the Commission highlighted increased government restrictions on Chinese citizens who worship in state-controlled venues or write for state-controlled publications. These restrictions remain in place, and in some cases, the government has strengthened their enforcement.

Human Rights in China, Nova Science Publishers, Incorporated, 2009. ProQuest Ebook Central,

In: Human Rights in China Editor: Lee R. Massingdale, pp. 1-43

ISBN: 978-1-60741-116-1 © 2009 Nova Science Publishers, Inc.

Chapter 1

HUMAN RIGHTS IN CHINA: TRENDS AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS* Thomas Lum and Hannah Fischer ABSTRACT Copyright © 2009. Nova Science Publishers, Incorporated. All rights reserved.

In the past two decades, human rights has been a principal area of U.S. concern regarding the People’s Republic of China (PRC), along with security and bilateral trade. Some U.S. leaders argue that U.S. policies of engagement with China, particularly since granting the PRC normal trade relations status in 2000, have helped to accelerate economic and social change and build social and legal foundations for human rights progress in the PRC. Others contend that U.S. engagement has failed not only to produce meaningful political reform but also to set any real change in motion. This report analyzes China’s mixed human rights record of the past several years — major human rights problems, new human rights legislation, and the development of civil society, legal awareness, and social activism. It also discusses factors that may help shape trends during the next several years. In the past decade, PRC government has attempted to respond to public grievances and popular calls for redress while subduing activists who attempt to organize mass protests. This approach has produced both incremental improvements in human rights and allowed for continued, serious abuses. Major, ongoing problems include unlawful killings by security forces, torture, unlawful detention, the excessive use of state security laws to imprison political dissidents, coercive family planning policies, state control of information, *

Excerpted from CRS Report RL34729, dated October 31, 2008.

Human Rights in China, Nova Science Publishers, Incorporated, 2009. ProQuest Ebook Central,

2

Thomas Lum and Hannah Fischer

Copyright © 2009. Nova Science Publishers, Incorporated. All rights reserved.

and religious and ethnic persecution. Tibetans, ethnic Uighur Muslims, and Falun Gong adherents have been singled out for especially harsh treatment. This report discusses major areas of concern but does not provide an exhaustive account of all human rights abuses in the PRC. China’s leadership has addressed rising public expectations through a combination of economic growth policies and carrot-and-stick political tactics. In so doing, however, it also has planted seeds of potential change. China’s developing legal system, while still plagued by corruption and political interference, has provided activists in China with a tool with which to promote human rights. Although generally supportive of the status quo, the urban middle class has begun to engage in narrowly-targeted protests against local government policies, following over a decade of social unrest among wage laborers and rural residents. Despite a massive censorship effort, the Internet and other communications technologies have made it impossible for the government to clamp down on information as fully as before. The United States government has attempted to promote human rights in China through a multi-faceted approach. U.S. efforts include formal criticism of the PRC government, official bilateral dialogue, public diplomacy, and congressionally- sponsored legislation, hearings, visits, and research. The U.S. government also provides funding for rule of law, civil society development, participatory government, labor rights, preserving Tibetan culture, Internet access, and other related programs in China.

OVERVIEW Many observers disagree over whether human rights conditions in the People’s Republic of China (PRC) have improved or gotten worse over the past several years. For many U.S. policy-makers, China’s progress in this area represents a test of the success of U.S. engagement with the PRC, particularly since permanent normal relations status (PNTR) was granted in 2000. Some observers, including some Members of Congress, have noted the growth of PRC legal restrictions on freedoms and cases of political and religious persecution. Some have pointed to the U.S. Department of State’s annual report on human rights practices, which has not noted major improvements in human rights conditions since the democracy movement of 1989.[1] Other analysts, including many Chinese citizens, have contended that economic and social freedoms have expanded rapidly in the past two decades while the government’s controls over most aspects of people’s lives have diminished considerably. This trend has even allowed for the emergence of occasional, fragile outbursts of “people power.” Under the leadership of President Hu Jintao and Premier Wen Jiabao, both in office since 2003, the PRC government has developed along the lines of what

Human Rights in China, Nova Science Publishers, Incorporated, 2009. ProQuest Ebook Central,

Copyright © 2009. Nova Science Publishers, Incorporated. All rights reserved.

Human Rights in China: Trends and Policy Implications

3

some analysts call “responsive authoritarianism.” Beijing has striven to become more populist, accountable, and law-based. However, the government has rejected far- reaching or immediate political reforms.[2] It has sympathized with segments of the population who have been left out of the economic boom. The central leadership also has formally acknowledged human rights as a concern of the state, continued to develop legal institutions, and implemented limited institutional restraints on the exercise of state power. However, in practice, government and Communist Party officials have retained a large degree of arbitrary authority. The PRC government faces a quandary — how to improve governance and reduce sources of social and political instability through anti-corruption campaigns and the implementation of incremental political reforms without unleashing mass pressures for greater change. PRC leaders have expressed the fear that China’s fledgling civil society, combined with foreign “democracy assistance” and the involvement of international non-governmental organizations, could bring about a “color revolution.” “Color revolutions” refer to peaceful democratic movements involving mass demonstrations that have toppled several post-communist authoritarian governments in former Soviet States such as Georgia, Ukraine, and Kyrgyzstan. The Chinese government has enacted legislation aimed at preventing human rights abuses, but without protecting the activities of human rights activists or “defenders.” It has tolerated protests against official policies, particularly at the local level, but has arrested protest leaders. Public and semi-public discourse on a wide variety of topics has become routine, but politically sensitive issues remain offlimits. Meanwhile, economic and social tensions have combined with growing rights consciousness and social activism. Many efforts by citizens to express grievances and demand redress, having been met by government inaction, have erupted into large-scale public protests.

A MIXED PICTURE The past few years have witnessed a mixed picture on progress in human rights conditions in China. On the one hand, the U.S. State Department’s annual human rights reports have stated that China’s record has “remained poor.” None of the groups suffering the greatest persecution have experienced notable improvement in overall treatment, according to the reports. These include Tibetan Buddhist monks and ethnic Uighur Muslims, leaders of unsanctioned Christian churches, Falun Gong practitioners, political dissidents, and “human rights defenders.” On the other hand, the PRC government has enacted laws aimed at reducing some of the most egregious human rights abuses, protecting property rights, and promoting government

Human Rights in China, Nova Science Publishers, Incorporated, 2009. ProQuest Ebook Central,

4

Thomas Lum and Hannah Fischer

transparency, and continued to develop mechanisms for consulting with non-state policy experts. The Chinese Communist Party (CCP) reportedly also has debated abolishing the re-education through labor system or laojiao, reducing restrictions on migrants, and expanding direct elections. Two recent events, the Beijing Olympics and the Sichuan earthquake, helped to demonstrate both the overwhelming power of the state and the potential of China’s young civil society. In 2007, many Chinese political activists took advantage of the Olympics’ promise of increased openness to make public appeals for political and policy reforms.[3] However, the leadership, rather than act upon President Hu’s repeated references to “democracy” at the 17th Party Congress in October 2007, stifled most dissenting voices during the several months leading up to the games. In the immediate aftermath of the May 2008 earthquake, China experienced an unprecedented outburst of unfiltered press coverage and volunteer activity and organization. But in June 2008, the PRC government began suppressing protests regarding shoddy construction of school buildings that collapsed during the disaster and killed an estimated 10,000 children.[4]

Copyright © 2009. Nova Science Publishers, Incorporated. All rights reserved.

Selected Highlights from the State Department’s Human Rights Report for 2007 The State Department’s annual Country Reports on Human Rights Practices stated that China’s human rights record remained poor in 2007.[5] According to the report, the PRC remains an authoritarian state in which the permanent leadership role of the Chinese Communist Party is etched in the Constitution, while the legislative and judicial branches lack the power to check the CCP and the state. Many political rights remain severely curtailed. In 2007, further restrictions on rights were imposed in Tibet and Xinjiang, upon the mass media, and toward petitioners seeking redress in Beijing. According to the State Department, major human rights abuses committed by the state in 2007 included the following: •

•

Unlawful or Politically-Motivated Killings: Several persons died in detention as a result of torture, and 18 Uighur Muslims were killed in a “counter-terrorist” police raid. Torture: The use of torture appeared to be common method used against Falun Gong adherents, Tibetans, Uighur Muslims, and other prisoners of conscience and criminal suspects. The United Nations’ Special Rapporteur on Torture, Manfred Nowak, reported that Falun Gong practitioners accounted

Human Rights in China, Nova Science Publishers, Incorporated, 2009. ProQuest Ebook Central,

Human Rights in China: Trends and Policy Implications

•

•

•

•

Copyright © 2009. Nova Science Publishers, Incorporated. All rights reserved.

•

•

5

for about two-thirds of victims of alleged torture while in government custody. Re-education through Labor (RETL): The RETL system, in which individuals are held in administrative detention for anti-social activity, without formal charges or trial, for a period of up to four years, remained a central feature of social and political control in China. Unlawful Detention: Unlawful detention and house arrest remained widespread, particularly against scores of human rights activists, lawyers, journalists, and leaders of unofficial Christian churches. According to an official Chinese survey, between 2003 and 2007, 33,643 persons were detained for periods longer than that allowed by law. Political Prisoners: Several thousand persons were serving jail time for “endangering state security” or the former political crime of “counterrevolution.” Coercive Family Planning: China’s “one child policy” continued with sporadic reports of coercive abortions, forced sterilizations, and other unlawful government actions against individuals, some of which triggered anti-government protests.[6] Censorship: Critical public discussion, speech, or reporting of sensitive or controversial topics were forbidden. Such topics included the Tiananmen events of 1989, Taiwan, Tibet, Falun Gong, and the CCP leadership. The government continued to control political content of print media, jam some foreign radio broadcasts, and censor Internet sites, Web logs (blogs), and e-mail. Many journalists, editors, and freelance writers, including Internet authors, who broached dissenting views on sensitive political issues, faced harassment, physical assaults, detention, or imprisonment. Religious Persecution: The extent of religious freedom continued to vary widely within the country. Crackdowns against unregistered Protestants and Catholics, as well as Tibetans and Uighur Muslims in Xinjiang, were reported in some areas, and repression of Falun Gong continued. Freedom to participate in officially sanctioned religious activity continued to increase in most areas, however.

The Birth of Civil Society Although the PRC leadership remains the final, undisputed authority, non-state actors play a tiny but growing role in policy-making, political discourse, and social

Human Rights in China, Nova Science Publishers, Incorporated, 2009. ProQuest Ebook Central,

6

Thomas Lum and Hannah Fischer

Copyright © 2009. Nova Science Publishers, Incorporated. All rights reserved.

activity.[7] In some cases, the state has encouraged social participation, either as a way to improve governance or to allow people to “let off steam.” In other cases, social actors have pushed the boundaries of permissible activity at great personal risk. Some academics and intellectuals have reported greater involvement in policymaking through the government’s consultation of expert opinion and think tanks. They also collaborate with other non-state elites and actors, such as nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) and private entrepreneurs, who often sponsor research projects. Although nearly all of China’s think tanks are governmentsponsored institutions, their funding sources and clientele, academic backgrounds, and areas of expertise have become increasingly diverse. They also have become more autonomous, although many budgetary and political constraints remain.[8] In other areas, the range of sensitive topics, such as social unrest, government corruption, and the abuse of power, that can be reported or discussed publicly has grown. Religious activity overall, in both sanctioned and unsanctioned places of worship, has increased. Freedom of movement, both within the country and abroad, has also expanded. Lawyers, journalists, and activists have been at the forefront in helping to protect and promote human rights and the public interest. They may form the beginnings of a small, loosely organized, and still largely latent human rights movement, in which “civil elites” work with grass roots groups to safeguard human rights.[9]

Non-Governmental Organizations Beijing has expressed both an appreciation for the social contributions of NGOs and suspicion of their potential autonomy and intentions. According to various estimates, there are over 300,000 registered NGOs in China, and over one million in total, including over 200 international organizations.[10] Environmental groups have been at the forefront of NGO development in China. Other areas of NGO activity include poverty alleviation, rural development, public health, education, and legal aid. According to many experts, most of the registered NGOs are government-sponsored, while those that truly advocate social causes or policy changes account for a very small percentage of all nonprofit groups. After nearly a decade of steady proliferation, in 2005, Beijing began to tighten restrictions on non-governmental organizations while airing voices critical of foreign involvement. The government was especially fearful of the potential of foreign NGOs in China to help foment a “color revolution,” and established an office to monitor foreign NGOs and their domestic partners or grantees. Although the investigations did not result in a broad crackdown on non-governmental

Human Rights in China, Nova Science Publishers, Incorporated, 2009. ProQuest Ebook Central,

Human Rights in China: Trends and Policy Implications

7

organizations, they reportedly have discouraged NGOs from taking on more politically daring projects.[11]

Human Rights Legislation While the Hu-Wen government has proven to be politically conservative — placing more emphasis upon reducing social tensions and maintaining social stability than either major economic or political reform — it has enacted several important laws that may reduce some of the most egregious patterns of human rights abuse. In 2004, the phrase, “the State respects and protects human rights” was added to the PRC Constitution. Laws and regulations designed to protect human rights include those related to the use of torture, the death penalty, labor conditions, private property, and government transparency.

Copyright © 2009. Nova Science Publishers, Incorporated. All rights reserved.

•

•

•

Rights of the Accused: In July 2006, the state enacted prohibitions on specific acts of torture and requirements that interrogations of suspects of major crimes be video-recorded. These regulations followed a 2004 law forbidding the use of torture to obtain confessions. The United Nations’ Special Rapporteur on Torture, Manfred Nowak, after a visit to China in November 2005, stated that torture was “on the decline but still widespread” and that the heavy reliance on obtaining confessions to indict suspects encouraged the use of torture.[12] In March 2007, the Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress (NPC) debated a law that would grant suspects the right to remain silent.[13] The Death Penalty: In March 2007, the Supreme People’s Court was granted sole power to review and ratify all death sentences, following four years of discussion among the CCP leadership. Xiao Yang, president of the Supreme People’s Court, stated that the death penalty would be exercised “more cautiously for only a small number of extremely serious offenders with hard evidence.”[14] An effort to reduce the death penalty may have been responsible for a reduction in the use of capital punishment (from 15,000 annually a decade ago to 6,000, according to some estimates).[15] Labor Rights: In 2006, the NPC issued a report that highlighted China’s labor rights abuses. In March 2007, China’s legislature passed a Labor Contract Law. The law, which went into effect in January 2008, reportedly has spurred a dramatic rise in labor dispute arbitration cases and lawsuits as well as strikes for higher wages and benefits. However, workers still do not have the right to strike or form their own unions.[16]

Human Rights in China, Nova Science Publishers, Incorporated, 2009. ProQuest Ebook Central,

8

Thomas Lum and Hannah Fischer •

•

Copyright © 2009. Nova Science Publishers, Incorporated. All rights reserved.

•

Property Rights: In March 2007, the NPC passed a constitutional amendment designed to protect property rights that had been debated since 2002. Although the Property Law would preserve the state’s ownership of all land, it nonetheless was opposed by some who believed that it had gone too far. Backers of the law argued that it would help to protect not only private entrepreneurs but also urban families who own apartments and farmers whose crop lands risk seizure by government-backed real-estate developers.[17] In October 2008, the government issued new measures allowing farmers to lease and transfer or sell rights to the property allocated to them by the state, in order to help strengthen their control over their land.[18] Government Transparency: In April 2007, the PRC government announced new rules, to take effect in 2008, requiring greater disclosure of official information.[19] In addition, institutional and legal mechanisms have been set up to provide for greater government responsiveness and accountability. In part, these measures represent attempts to compel local governments to reveal financial accounts related to land takings in rural areas, and to avoid negative stories in the press and other media channels.[20] Organ Transplants: On May 1, 2007, regulations banning trade in human organs went into effect. They also stipulated that the donation of organs for transplant be free and voluntary. These restrictions followed claims that organs of executed prisoners, including many Falun Gong members, had been removed without their prior consent and sold in a booming domestic and foreign market for organ transplants.[21] In 2006, U.S. officials visited a site alleged to be a concentration camp and organ harvesting center for Falun Gong prisoners, the Sujiatun Thrombosis Hospital in Shenyang city. While expressing ongoing concern about human rights abuses against Falun Gong, they “found no evidence that the site is being used for any function other than as a normal public hospital.”[22]

Other Policy Developments Re-Education through Labor In March 2007, the Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress resumed deliberation on legislation, which had been tabled for two years, that would restrict the use of re-education through labor (laojiao) sentencing, shorten

Human Rights in China, Nova Science Publishers, Incorporated, 2009. ProQuest Ebook Central,

Human Rights in China: Trends and Policy Implications

9

Copyright © 2009. Nova Science Publishers, Incorporated. All rights reserved.

terms, improve conditions at such centers, and provide better protections of the legal rights of “minor offenders.”[23] Re-education through labor (RETL), an administrative measure, empowers the police to sentence persons guilty of minor and non-criminal offenses such as petty theft, prostitution, unlawful religious activity, and “disrupting social order” to a maximum of three or four years in detention. Approximately 300 RETL centers in China, which can hold roughly 300,000 persons in total, have absorbed large numbers of individuals deemed by the state to undermine social or political stability, such as thousands of Falun Gong adherents earlier this decade.[24] According to some estimates, between 2% and 10% of those in the laojiao system were detained for political reasons.[25]

In the Provinces: Renewed Talk of Reform In June 2008, Communist Party leaders in Shenzhen, the pioneering Special Economic Zone bordering Hong Kong, drafted a reform plan that would expand the powers of the municipal people’s congress and make legislative elections more competitive. The two-year plan also would provide for greater judicial independence and intra-party democracy. However, some local government officials and political commentators expressed concern that there was insufficient support from the central government, and too much resistence from local power holders, to carry out such a proposal.[26] Such reforms have been broached on and off since the late 1980s. On August 31, 2008, Communist Party Secretary of Hunan province, Zhang Chunxian, stated in a televised conference that the focus of China’s reforms should turn from economic to political empowerment. Some observers interpreted his remarks as referring to political rights (quan). While the CCP is not contemplating relinquishing power, such discussion may refer to greater public “supervision” of government.[27]

Recent Hopes and Disappointments 17th Party Congress President Hu Jintao’s calls for more “people’s democracy” and intra-party democracy at the 17th Party Congress in October 2007 caused a hopeful stir among some reform-minded officials and intellectuals. However, the government’s open tone took a hardline turn following the March 2008 protests in Lhasa, Tibet. During the Olympic torch relay and the aftermath of the Sichuan earthquake, nationalistic fervor filled the mass media while talk of reform was pushed to the sidelines.[28]

Human Rights in China, Nova Science Publishers, Incorporated, 2009. ProQuest Ebook Central,

10

Thomas Lum and Hannah Fischer

Pre-Olympics Crackdown Many Chinese activists used the spirit of the Beijing Olympics to attempt to pressure the government to adopt reforms more quickly. Some Chinese journalists expressed optimism that the Olympics would, at least temporarily, provide them with greater freedom to report, which may in turn help to further “chip away” at the government’s ability to censor news. In August 2007, a group of prominent Chinese dissidents sent an open letter to Party leaders, calling upon the government to honor its human rights commitments as the Olympics host.[29] In 2007, land rights activist Yang Chunlin penned a letter, signed by over 10,000 citizens, mostly farmers, entitled “We Want Human Rights, Not the Olympics.” However, during the year leading up to the games, many activists spoke of a crackdown and sweep of potential “trouble makers,” including Falun Gong, Tibetan and Uighur “separatists,” and democratic forces with foreign connections. In March 2008, Yang Chunlin, who reportedly had been tortured in detention, was sentenced to five years in prison for “inciting subversion of state power.”[30] Other examples of the toughening government attitude toward its critics included the following:

Copyright © 2009. Nova Science Publishers, Incorporated. All rights reserved.

•

•

•

•

From August to October 2007, when the CCP held its 17th Party Congress, PRC authorities reportedly carried out dozens of arrests, beatings, and abductions of lawyers, human rights activists, petitioners, and Christian leaders in what some observers called the “worst crackdown in five years.”[31] According to some sources, the government detained 44 dissident writers.[32] The government reported that, in 2007, 742 people were arrested for “endangering state security,” a catch-all offense for political crimes, the highest number since 1999.[33] In 2008, reports of detentions or harassment of dissidents included the following: Human rights activist Hu Jia was sentenced to 3 1/2 years in prison for “inciting subversion of state power;” Zheng Enchong, a human rights activist, and Gao Zhisheng, a lawyer who became famous for defending Falun Gong practitioners, remain under heavy police surveillance or house arrest; Guo Feixiong remains in jail (since 2006) for helping to lead farmers in protests against local officials. Prior to the Beijing Olympics, the PRC government tightened controls over NGOs, especially those with foreign funding or those promoting grassroots democracy and human rights. During the lead up to the games, the government launched what one Chinese NGO leader referred to as a “systematic crackdown on the voices of civil society,” while harassing and

Human Rights in China, Nova Science Publishers, Incorporated, 2009. ProQuest Ebook Central,

Human Rights in China: Trends and Policy Implications

•

•

Copyright © 2009. Nova Science Publishers, Incorporated. All rights reserved.

•

11

shutting down some large NGOs, including the most prominent NGO magazine and clearinghouse, “China Development Brief.”[34] In September 2007, Beijing authorities demolished several buildings that had provided housing for petitioners who had come to the capital to submit formal complaints about official misconduct. According to Human Rights Watch, the “petitioner village” held roughly 4,000 persons.[35] The construction of Olympic venues forced tens of thousands of Beijing residents from their homes, often without adequate notice, due process, or fair compensation, according to human rights activists. Some housing rights activists, such as attorney Ni Yulan, were harassed or detained. Ni was disbarred and served a jail term in 2002 for her involvement in helping Beijing residents petition the government over evictions. In 2008, she was arrested for allegedly obstructing the demolition of her own home. Ni reportedly was beaten while under detention in both 2002 and 2008.[36] In August 2008, international journalists arriving at the state-of-the art Olympic press facilities in Beijing found some sensitive Internet sites blocked, including those related to the Dalai Lama and the 1989 Tiananmen military crackdown. The PRC government unblocked some websites, such as those of Amnesty International, Voice of America, and the BBC, after foreign reporters protested.[37]

The Sichuan Earthquake and Civil Society In the weeks following the 7.9 magnitude earthquake that occurred on May 12, 2008, in Sichuan province, China witnessed an unprecedented burst of volunteer organization and activity and a level of unfettered press coverage that was rare for a natural disaster. One Chinese expert on NGO development stated that the government was “more open and more friendly to NGOs than before.”[38] Although PRC authorities reportedly first tried to control news from the epicenter, they could not stop the flow of information, aided by cell phone communications and the Internet. For a few weeks, authorities did not interfere with the coverage of the disaster. Some observers surmised that improved access to information reflected the recent enactment of new “Open Government Information” regulations. This relatively open atmosphere was soon replaced by government surveillance of NGOs, censorship, travel restrictions, and prohibitions on demonstrations and petitioning by parents of children killed in school buildings. Huang Qi, founder of a human rights website, was detained while investigating allegations of shoddy construction that had contributed to the collapse of schools. He was formally

Human Rights in China, Nova Science Publishers, Incorporated, 2009. ProQuest Ebook Central,

12

Thomas Lum and Hannah Fischer

charged with “possessing state secrets” on July 18, 2008, and is under detention awaiting trial.[39]

SELECTED HUMAN RIGHTS ISSUE AREAS Persecution of Political Dissent China’s state security law is used liberally and often arbitrarily against political dissidents. In 2007, the number of convictions under this law reportedly was 20% greater than 2006, which was double that of 2005.[40] According to the CongressionalExecutive Commission on China, more than 900 persons are serving prison terms for activities related to expression, assembly, spiritual practice, and religious worship.[41] Once charged with crimes such as subversion, the accused are rarely acquitted, while conditions in prison continue to be described as harsh and inhumane. During the past year, there were numerous reports of torture of human rights activists and other dissidents while in prison. Other activists claim to have been harassed by police or assaulted by unidentified assailants also described as “hired thugs.”

Copyright © 2009. Nova Science Publishers, Incorporated. All rights reserved.

State Control of Information The state still directly controls the largest mass media outlets, pressures other media regarding major or sensitive stories, and imposes severe measures against its critics. However, overall, it exercises less control over news and information than it did a decade ago. One scholar characterizes state control of the media as evolving from “omnipresence to selective enforcement.”[42] The greater volume of news reporting has not translated into significant advances in freedom of expression, but nor has an increase in regulations affecting journalists and other critical voices significantly curbed the flow of information, thanks in large part to the Internet. In some cases, the government has supported journalistic efforts to expose official corruption and incompetence, particularly at the local level. According to some observers, a recent tactic of the central government appears to have been to allow relatively open reporting on social crises, such as the scandal over tainted baby formula and milk, as long as it assigns blame to economic enterprises or lower level officials.[43] Beijing has remained vigilant toward media activities that challenge CCP authority.[44] At the end of 2007, 29 journalists and 51 cyber-dissidents reportedly remained in detention for political reasons.[45] Reporters Without Borders, an

Human Rights in China, Nova Science Publishers, Incorporated, 2009. ProQuest Ebook Central,

Copyright © 2009. Nova Science Publishers, Incorporated. All rights reserved.

Human Rights in China: Trends and Policy Implications

13

advocacy group for press freedom, stated that 24 journalists, cyber dissidents, and other “free expression activists” were arrested or sentenced to jail terms during the first half of 2008.[46] However, in October 2008, the central government permanently adopted the Olympics-related temporary regulations that had expanded press freedoms for foreign journalists. These include the ability of foreign journalists to travel within the country and to interview Chinese subjects without official permission.[47] Increasingly commercialized media outlets negotiate a delicate balance of responding to growing public demand for information while remaining within the bounds of what authorities will allow. Under the economic reform policies of the past two decades, a vibrant private media industry has developed, and market considerations have compelled many newspapers and television stations as well as Internet outlets to push the envelope of cultural, social, and, to a lesser extent, political content. Nearly all media organizations in China rely upon sales to sustain themselves. State media also have had to provide more probing social and political fare in order to attract readers, stay competitive, and to respond to news and public opinion appearing on the Internet. One study suggests that, on the one hand, media commercialization has opened up an unprecedented amount of space for free information flow and helped to bolster the media’s role as government watchdog. On the other hand, many domestic and foreign media outlets in China have been able to make profits without broaching political issues.[48] The tug-of-war between society’s demand for news and information and the state’s attempts to maintain social and political control is likely to continue. The central government has employed a two-pronged approach, relying on traditional coercive tactics such as intimidation and incarceration of critics as well as adapting to both society’s growing expectations and innovations in communications technologies. Meanwhile, China’s media and online political community have pushed back with increasingly frequency, though such movements remain fleeting. Growing numbers of young Internet users reportedly are chafing against information controls and expressing such frustrations online.[49] The government closure in January 2006 of the politically provocative supplement “Freezing Point” in the relatively progressive China Youth Daily provoked an angry response by Chinese writers, academics, lawyers, and other citizens, particularly via the Internet.[50] In April 2004, the senior editor and other executives of Guangzhou-based Southern Weekend, a weekly known for investigative journalism, were sentenced to prison terms on charges of embezzlement, reportedly provoking an anti-government petition by dozens of prominent journalists and academics. The real reason for the crackdown, many believed, was the newspaper’s reporting of a suspected re-emergence of the SARS virus. However, the weekly

Human Rights in China, Nova Science Publishers, Incorporated, 2009. ProQuest Ebook Central,

14

Thomas Lum and Hannah Fischer

eventually resumed its muckraking efforts. In June 2008, it published an extensive article on the Sichuan earthquake and one school’s substandard construction. In September 2008, an editor reportedly wrote in his blog that prior to the Beijing Olympics, the newspaper had received information about tainted milk supplies, and implied that the state had forbade Southern Weekend from investigating the story further.[51]

Copyright © 2009. Nova Science Publishers, Incorporated. All rights reserved.

Religious and Ethnic Issues According to many sources, the extent of religious freedom varies widely within the country. Participation in officially sanctioned religious activity has increased in most areas. The PRC Constitution protects “normal” religious activities and those that do not “disrupt public order, impair the health of citizens or interfere with the educational system of the state.” New PRC regulations, enacted in March 2005, protect the rights of registered religious groups to publish literature, collect donations, possess property, and train and approve clergy. In the past year, the State Administration for Religious Affairs (SARA) set up a new unit to supervise folk religions as well as religions outside the five officially-recognized major religions (Buddhism, Protestantism, Roman Catholicism, Daoism, and Islam), including the Eastern Orthodox Church and the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints. Many experts assert that these laws grant the government continued broad latitude to determine what religious groups are lawful and to deny protections to others. The religious and religious-ethnic groups that have clashed the most with the state in the past decade have been unregistered Protestant and Catholic congregations, Tibetan Buddhists, and Uighur-minority Muslims in the Xinjiang Uighur Autonomous Region (XUAR). The International Religious Freedom Act of 1998 (P.L. 105-292) established the United States Commission on International Religious Freedom (USCIRF) to monitor religious freedom around the world and make policy recommendations to the President and Congress. Based largely upon the Commission’s reports, the Department of State has identified China as a “country of particular concern” (CPC) for “particularly severe violations of religious freedom” for nine consecutive years (1999-2007). This designation has subjected the PRC to U.S. sanctions pursuant to P.L. 105-292 (a ban on the U.S. export of crime control and detection instruments and equipment to China). In August 2005, the USCIRF traveled to China for the first time. The Commission made what may be described as informative but superficial or controlled visits to significant religious places, and lamented the lack of access allowed in their investigation.[52]

Human Rights in China, Nova Science Publishers, Incorporated, 2009. ProQuest Ebook Central,

Copyright © 2009. Nova Science Publishers, Incorporated. All rights reserved.

Human Rights in China: Trends and Policy Implications

15

Christians in China Overall, Christians in China find increasing acceptance in society and, within limits, from the government. The PRC leadership has begun to acknowledge the enduring, positive role that Christianity can play in promoting social development, yet remains deeply suspicious and fearful of its potential power as a source of autonomous organization. A meeting on religion convened by top Party leaders in December 2007 that seemed to welcome the role of religion in China’s development was seen by some observers as grounds for hope regarding a more tolerant religious policy.[53] By some estimates, the number of Christians in China ranges from 40 million to over 60 million, with nearly two-thirds gathering in unofficial churches.[54] Membership in official Christian churches alone has grown by 50% in the past decade, according to the government. The religion with the largest number of followers in the PRC, at roughly 100 million, is Buddhism. Some studies have suggested that Christianity’s rise in China, as well as the growth of other religions, reflects greater freedom and affluence among some Chinese, and the need to cope with dramatic social and economic changes among others.[55] However, many unofficial Protestant churches, also known as “house churches” or “home gatherings” by the government, lack legal protections, and remain highly vulnerable to the often unchecked authority of local officials. According to reports, in some regions and large cities, particularly in the south, unregistered congregations meet with little or no state interference, while in other areas, particularly in Henan and Shandong provinces and in many rural areas, such independent gatherings experience regular harassment by local authorities and their leaders have been beaten, detained, and imprisoned. Many Chinese Protestants reject the official church, also known as the Three- Self Patriotic Movement, for political or theological reasons.[56] The government claims that it has encouraged such churches to register with the state, but that many of them have been discouraged from doing so by foreign Christian groups.[57] The China Aid Association, a U.S.-based non-profit organization that monitors religious freedom in China, reported 788 incidents in which house churches were persecuted by the government in 2007, up 18.5% from 2006; 693 cases of Chinese Christians detained or arrested, up 6.6%; and 16 cases of the faithful sentenced to prison terms, down 5.9% from the previous year.[58] Most detainees reportedly were released after sessions involving interrogation, intimidation, and sometimes torture by police. In the year leading up to the Olympics, according to some reports, the government tightened restrictions, arresting leaders of house churches, harassing members of congregations, shutting down places of worship, and denying visas to foreign missionaries.[59]

Human Rights in China, Nova Science Publishers, Incorporated, 2009. ProQuest Ebook Central,

16

Thomas Lum and Hannah Fischer

Copyright © 2009. Nova Science Publishers, Incorporated. All rights reserved.

Beijing and the Vatican, which broke ties in 1951, have engaged in dialogue in the past few years toward improving relations. One of the key obstacles to normalizing ties is China’s rejection of the Holy See’s authority to appoint bishops. In a May 2007 “Letter to Chinese Catholics,” Pope Benedict conveyed greater flexibility toward Catholic churches that are registered with the government, while the PRC leadership was relatively muted in its response to the letter. In September 2007, the state-sanctioned Catholic Patriotic Association appointed two bishops with the Vatican’s blessing. Although government harassment of unregistered Catholic bishops, priests, and lay persons continues, the diminishing dichotomy between the unofficial and official Catholic churches in China has helped to reduce conflicts with the state.[60]

Tibetan Protests During the past year, policies restricting Tibetan religious practices continued, while local resentment simmered regarding the influx of Han Chinese, the majority ethnic group in China, to Lhasa, capital of the Tibet Autonomous Region (TAR). According to official Chinese statistics, Tibet’s resident population is 2.84 million (2007). Han Chinese form small minority in the TAR (4%), but constitute half of Lhasa’ s population. Many Han Chinese believe that the PRC government has brought positive economic and social development to the region. By contrast, many Tibetans claim that such development has not benefitted them economically and has accelerated the erosion of their traditional culture. In September 2007, the State Administration for Religious Affairs issued a set of regulations that required all Tibetan lamas wishing to reincarnate to obtain prior government approval through the submission of a “reincarnation application.” The Dalai Lama’s Special Envoy to the United States, Lodi Gyaltsen Gyari, described the new regulations as a blow against “the heart of Tibetan religious identity.”[61] On March 11, 2008, the anniversary of the Tibetan uprising of 1959, 300 Buddhist monks reportedly demonstrated peacefully to demand the release of Tibetan prisoners of conscience. These demonstrations sparked others by monks and ordinary Tibetans demanding independence from China or greater autonomy, one of the most sensitive political issues for Beijing. On March 15, demonstrations in Lhasa turned violent as Tibetan protesters confronted PRC police and burned shops and property owned by Han Chinese. From exile in India, the Dalai Lama, the Tibetan spiritual leader, denied involvement and appealed to both the Chinese government and his followers to refrain from violence. The PRC government blamed the Dalai Lama for instigating the riots and labeled his followers “separatists.”[62]

Human Rights in China, Nova Science Publishers, Incorporated, 2009. ProQuest Ebook Central,

Human Rights in China: Trends and Policy Implications

17

Copyright © 2009. Nova Science Publishers, Incorporated. All rights reserved.

Official PRC news sources reported that 19 persons died in the riots and emphasized Chinese casualties, while Tibetan groups suggested that roughly 200 persons were killed by paramilitary troops in several Tibetan areas in western China, where approximately 100 protests broke out during the following weeks. A Chinese court sentenced 30 Tibetans, including six Buddhist monks, to jail terms ranging from three years to life in prison for their alleged roles in the Lhasa riots, according to state media. Estimates of the number of monks and nuns detained during the aftermath of the unrest range from hundreds to over one thousand. The government also has expanded and intensified the already widespread “patriotic education” campaigns in monasteries and nunneries. PRC leaders and representatives of the Dalai Lama met in May 2008 to help defuse the crisis while the PRC government continued to publicly demonize the exiled Tibetan leader.[63] At least two lawyers were disbarred for offering to defend Tibetans arrested for taking part in the demonstrations.[64] The eighth round of talks since 2002 between Beijing and envoys of the Dalai Lama was scheduled to commence in late October 2008 to discuss issues related to Tibetan autonomy.

Uighur Muslims Estimates of China’s Muslim population range from 20 million to 30 million persons. Most Muslim communities in the western provinces of Ningxia, Gansu, Qinhai, and Yunnan reportedly coexist peacefully with non- Muslims and local authorities under relatively flexible religious policies.[65] However, social and political tensions and harsh religious policies have long plagued China’s far northwestern Xinjiang Uighur Autonomous Region. The XUAR is home to 8.5 million Uighur Muslims (45% of the region’s population), one of several Turkic ethnic groups in the region. The PRC government fears not only Uighur demands for greater religious and cultural freedom but also their linkages to Central Asian countries and independent Islamic organizations, including terrorist groups. The East Turkestan Islamic Movement, a Uighur organization with alleged ties to Al Qaeda that advocates the creation of an independent Uighur Islamic state, is on the United States’ and United Nations’ lists of terrorist organizations. Because of perceived national security-related concerns, the PRC government monitors and imposes restrictions upon Uighur society more stringently than it does most other religious and ethnic groups, focusing on Uighur religious leaders and practices. Such restrictions include those related to the training and duties of imams, Uighur and Arabic language, literature, and education, public access to mosques, the celebration of Ramadan, contacts with foreigners, travel abroad, and the hajj. Uighur children and youth (under 18) are forbidden from entering mosques and government workers are not allowed to practice Islam. According to Amnesty International, in

Human Rights in China, Nova Science Publishers, Incorporated, 2009. ProQuest Ebook Central,

18

Thomas Lum and Hannah Fischer

Copyright © 2009. Nova Science Publishers, Incorporated. All rights reserved.

2007, Uighurs were the only known group in China to be sentenced to death for political crimes such as “separatist activities.”[66] In March 2008 in northwestern Xinjiang, PRC authorities suppressed demonstrations involving an estimated 600 ethnic Uighurs who were calling upon the government to scrap a proposed ban on head scarves, grant greater autonomy to Uighur-populated regions, and release political prisoners. The protests reportedly were triggered by the death in custody of a prominent Uighur businessman. In April 2008, PRC authorities claimed to have broken up two terrorist cells that allegedly had plotted to bomb hotels during the Beijing Olympics.[67]

Falun Gong Falun Gong combines an exercise and meditation regimen derived from qigong with spiritual beliefs. It reportedly gained millions of adherents across China in the late 1990s. On April 25, 1999, thousands of practitioners gathered in Beijing to protest the government’s growing restrictions on their activities. Following a crackdown that began in the summer of 1999 and deepened in intensity over a period of about two years, the group, which the government labeled a dangerous cult, has largely diminished as a social or political issue in China. Nonetheless, the continuation of government vigilance against Falun Gong indicates that some followers continue to practice or refuse to recant. Since the crackdown, estimates and claims of the number of Falun Gong adherents who have died in state custody have ranged from several hundred to a few thousand.[68] U.S.based Falun Gong organizations have reported many cases of torture and abuse of adherents under detention or serving jail sentences. The PRC government has acknowledged that deaths while in custody have occurred but denied that they were caused by mistreatment.[69]

VARIABLES OF CHANGE The PRC government has been adept at employing a seemingly ad hoc combination of coercive and non-coercive approaches toward human rights issues. In addition, two decades of rapid economic growth have helped to legitimate CCP authority. Some potential, incremental improvements in human rights conditions in China are likely to stem from government policy. Chinese leaders have displayed a willingness and eagerness to improve government performance and accountability and to solicit some non-state input on policy issues, while economic reforms, new communications technologies, and related social changes have created new spaces for free expression and social activism. However, the state also has used other means

Human Rights in China, Nova Science Publishers, Incorporated, 2009. ProQuest Ebook Central,

Human Rights in China: Trends and Policy Implications

19

to reduce or squelch public discourse and activity that have political relevance. Such methods range from manipulating the mass media and coopting members of the intellectual, professional, and entrepreneurial classes to selectively harassing, physically intimidating, arresting, and punishing dissidents and activists. The reeducation through labor system remains a key component of the state’s capacity for removing large numbers of disaffected people from society. Whether the PRC government can continue on its present course may depend upon the outcomes of several ongoing developments in Chinese politics and society.

Copyright © 2009. Nova Science Publishers, Incorporated. All rights reserved.

Central vs. Local Governments Many analysts assign partial blame for human rights abuses in China to local officials. One the one hand, local and provincial level misconduct often has complicated or undermined central government efforts at reducing human rights abuses. On the other hand, much of the problem has arisen from the Chinese leadership’s unwillingness to institute more far-reaching reforms and its emphasis on maintaining social harmony. Although the central government has made some progress in enacting laws aimed at curbing the most egregious human rights abuses, it has not created institutions that would help enforce these laws, such as checks and balances or direct elections for executive office beyond the lowest administrative levels. Nor has it allowed for independent watchdog or advocacy entities or groups, such as the press, human rights lawyers, and activists. Meanwhile, many local governments have experienced revenue shortfalls under the economic reforms of the past two decades, thereby reducing their ability to provide public services and driving them into collusive relationships with private developers. These conditions have been the source of many human rights abuses and mass protests of the past several years. The PRC leadership thus far has been able to avoid much of the blame in many conflicts related to land seizures, public health threats, environmental pollution, and other sources of public anger and protest. Rather than focusing their attention on larger, systemic problems, aggrieved citizens generally have blamed corrupt local officials for not acting in accordance with the law, while viewing central leaders as well-intentioned. Beijing often has openly criticized or punished local officials and expressed sympathy for aggrieved residents while allowing police to detain or arrest protest leaders.[70] The central government has applied a flexible approach toward mass demonstrations especially in cases in which the press, Internet, or local television stations have generated widespread publicity in favor of the protesters.[71] Some analysts argue that mass pressures for greater human rights protections by way

Human Rights in China, Nova Science Publishers, Incorporated, 2009. ProQuest Ebook Central,

20

Thomas Lum and Hannah Fischer

of fundamental political reform may gather strength only as the public begins to perceive local problems and activism in national political terms.

Copyright © 2009. Nova Science Publishers, Incorporated. All rights reserved.

Rights Awareness and Legal Activism China’s legal system has made significant strides since the Cultural Revolution (1966-1976), when the court system was severely weakened and heavily politicized. According to some analysts, PRC legal and institutional reforms could ultimately provide foundations for far reaching social and political changes, by nurturing public consciousness of rights and the rule of law and providing a framework for the exercise of political rights and government accountability.[72] The state still wields disproportionate power against citizens and legal activists and continues to interpret the law arbitrarily in many cases. However, unlike overt and large scale political movements of the past, such as the democracy movement of 1989, which the PRC leadership ultimately viewed as hostile, many of today’s legal activists have managed to survive in a gray area in which narrow aims receive grudging or partial legitimacy from the state.[73] Although some experts suggest that most Chinese still do not place much faith in the nation’s courts, other analysts contend that PRC citizens have rising expectations that the state will honor basic legal rights. According to many reports, rising legal awareness and the development of laws have resulted in the growth of legal activity, especially since 2004, when the PRC government enshrined the protection of human rights in the constitution. Chinese citizens are increasingly turning to the courts to assert claims and even to sue public officials.[74] More than 150,000 cases are filed annually against the government, although the rate of success remains low. Some reports point to a continuing trend of modest growth in cases and a more dramatic growth in the number of appeals. PRC lawyers also have begun to file “public interest” cases in growing numbers. Though rarely successful, these cases often draw temporary publicity through the mass media and help to further spread legal consciousness, according to some experts.[75] China’s legal profession has grown quickly, albeit from a small base. The country reportedly has 122,000-130,000 full-time lawyers, a third of them practicing in Beijing. This number translates to one attorney for every 10,000 citizens, compared to about one for every 300 in the United States.[76] In 2008, the PRC Law on Lawyers was amended to provide limited protections for lawyers and their clients, although potential state interference in the legal process remains a serious problem. These reforms include allowing defense lawyers to meet with clients without first seeking permission from judicial authorities, although only after

Human Rights in China, Nova Science Publishers, Incorporated, 2009. ProQuest Ebook Central,

Copyright © 2009. Nova Science Publishers, Incorporated. All rights reserved.

Human Rights in China: Trends and Policy Implications

21

defendants have been interrogated alone; banning police from observing conversations between lawyers and clients; and exempting statements made by lawyers in the courtroom from prosecution, except those that “harm national security, intentionally slander others, or seriously disrupt courtroom order.” The PRC court system also has implemented programs to strengthen the competence and professionalism of judges and the effectiveness of the judicial system.[77] Despite reforms around the edges, the legal and judicial systems in China remain flawed in basic ways. The government places a heavy emphasis on establishing the guilt of defendants: there is no adversary system, no presumption of innocence, no protection against double jeopardy, and no law governing the type of evidence that may be introduced. In many cases, police, prosecutors and judges disregard the protections that Chinese law does offer.[78] In criminal and political cases, sentences are decided not by judges but by a court committee named by the Party. In March 2006, the state-sanctioned All China Lawyers Association (ACLA) issued guidelines on the handling of “mass cases” (10 or more plaintiffs), in part strengthening the supervisory roles of local lawyers associations and judicial offices. The ACLA argued that these guidelines protect lawyers’ rights and enhance their abilities in such cases, while human rights activists charged that they “sharply curtail the ability of plaintiffs to be meaningfully assisted or represented by lawyers when they seek justice.”[79] China’s changing legal environment has provided an opening for human rights attorneys, but one that is fraught with risks for citizens and lawyers. Some analysts argue that China’s fledgling human rights and defense lawyers are key agents of change. During the past several years, several dozen lawyers in China have made names for themselves by taking on sensitive cases against government entities or economic enterprises with government connections.[80] In January 2006, a group of prominent Chinese attorneys and legal scholars announced the establishment of an Association of Human Rights Attorneys for Chinese Christians, whose purpose is to educate and defend house church leaders regarding their rights. Chinese lawyers who have pursued politically sensitive cases have faced a range of troubles, including intimidation, disbarment, kidnaping, house arrest, and prison sentences. Many human rights and defense lawyers have been harassed by officials or beaten by plain-clothes agents of local state agencies or economic interests. Others have been falsely accused of committing slander, perjury, fabrication of evidence, or the graver crimes of subversion or revealing state secrets. Shanghai attorney Zheng Enchong, for example, who represented families claiming that they had been forcibly evicted from their homes or had received inadequate compensation by the state, was convicted in 2003 of “supplying state secrets to foreigners” and sentenced to three years in prison.[81] Gao Zhisheng, an attorney who publicly

Human Rights in China, Nova Science Publishers, Incorporated, 2009. ProQuest Ebook Central,

22

Thomas Lum and Hannah Fischer

criticized the government’s treatment of Falun Gong practitioners, was convicted of subversion in December 2006 but granted a suspended sentence. Lawyers who had publicly offered to defend Tibetan protesters in 2008 were warned not to get involved or they would face disciplinary action.[82]

Copyright © 2009. Nova Science Publishers, Incorporated. All rights reserved.

Social Unrest Economic and social changes have created economic classes and widening disparities of income and power. Because legal, judicial, and enforcement mechanisms have largely failed to protect the economic and political rights of many disadvantaged Chinese, social protest has become a common form of expression and means of resolving grievances. In the past several years, major types of social unrest have included state-owned enterprise workers demonstrating against layoffs; migrant industrial laborers protesting lack of pay; farmers objecting to unfair taxation and usurious fees, confiscation of land for development projects, and loss of agricultural land due to environmental degradation; and urban homeowners opposing forcible evictions related to urban renewal. In cases of land confiscation and home evictions, much popular anger has been directed at collusive, lucrative deals between local officials and private investors and the lack of fair compensation. Since 2005, official government data have pointed to a decline in “mass incidents” or protests involving “mass participation,” while other studies have reported an increase in “public order disturbances” — from 87,000 in 2005 to 95,000 in 2006 and 100,000 in 2007.[83] Central government policies designed to decrease tax burdens on farmers and labor abuses in factories have reduced some forms of largescale protest. In recent years, new sources of social unrest have included budding farmers’ movements to claim ownership of land; the closing of thousands of factories due to climbing labor and energy costs and the rising value of the Chinese currency; unemployment among college graduates; consumer price inflation; and coercive enforcement of the one-child policy.[84] Social unrest has stemmed from not only economic hardship and anger over abuses of power by and collusion among officials and private developers, but also the growing popular awareness and understanding of legal rights. The PRC government has applied a carrot-and-stick approach toward disgruntled social groups, often sympathizing with them and pressuring local authorities to give in to some demands while arresting protest leaders and intimidating social activists. The developing legal consciousness of many Chinese citizens, combined with small but vital networks of lawyers, journalists, and activists attracted to human rights causes, has assured that social pressures for human rights are likely to continue.

Human Rights in China, Nova Science Publishers, Incorporated, 2009. ProQuest Ebook Central,

Human Rights in China: Trends and Policy Implications

23

Mainstream Protests While the PRC has experienced over a decade of social unrest among relatively marginalized groups such as wage laborers and farmers, in the past two years, protest activities have begun to appear among more affluent, urban Chinese. These incidences may signal new trends in protest activity: They have been less isolated and displayed greater organizational capacity; the government’s responses have been relatively restrained; grievances have been less about participants’ livelihoods and more about quality of life issues and the lack of government consultation.[85] Many analysts suggest that the government most fears disparate groups — wage laborers, farmers, urban homeowners, and intellectuals — linking up to form a broad-based movement. The following are examples of recent protest activities: •

Copyright © 2009. Nova Science Publishers, Incorporated. All rights reserved.

•

•

In May 2007, students and professors at Xiamen University in Fujian Province reportedly sent out a million text messages calling on city residents to assemble to protest the planned construction of a Taiwan-financed petro-chemical plant. Estimates of the number protesters, whose march was video-recorded, range from 7,000 to 20,000 persons. Construction of the plant was temporarily halted. In January 2008, thousands of suburban homeowners in Shanghai gathered at People’s Square and embarked on a raucous protest walk through some of the city’s main thoroughfares to protest plans to construct a maglev (magnetic levitation) high-speed train line through their neighborhoods. The protests can be viewed on YouTube.[86] The Mayor’s office reportedly announced that the project would be delayed by at least a year in which to review concerns about health effects and noise. In June 2008, tens of thousands of people — estimates range from 10,000 to 30,000 — rioted and torched government buildings in Weng’an County in Guizhou province. The protest was sparked by the drowning of a 17year old girl, which local police declared was a suicide. Her parents and many residents suspected that she had been raped and killed, and that local officials were protecting the true perpetrators. The protest was remarkable because it was reported in the official media, citizen commentary online was widespread, and central and local officials acknowledged “legitimate” grievances that may have contributed to the people’s distrust of government, including the demolition of homes and forced relocations to make way for development. Local police officials were replaced following the riots.

Human Rights in China, Nova Science Publishers, Incorporated, 2009. ProQuest Ebook Central,

24

Thomas Lum and Hannah Fischer •

At the end of August 2008, one week after the closing ceremonies of the Olympic games, hundreds of Beijing residents living near a newly built waste-fueled thermal power plant protested against the fumes emanating from the facility. No arrests were reported.[87]

Copyright © 2009. Nova Science Publishers, Incorporated. All rights reserved.

New Agents of Democracy? Some Western political theorists and policy makers have argued that the growth of the middle and entrepreneurial classes in developing market economies creates pressures for democracy. According to these hypotheses, demands for rights protections and democracy stem from emerging class desires to protect economic interests and political influence, a growing sense of entitlement, and confidence in their capacity to affect or participate in government decisionmaking. However, many studies of China’s changing society show how some social groups who have benefitted greatly from economic reforms value incremental over dramatic political change. One study concludes that the Chinese middle class, which constitutes about 15% of the total population, “do think and act in accordance with democratic principles.”[88] Other observations, however, suggest that many members of the rising middle class, a product of economic reforms, have displayed either a lack of interest in politics or a preference for political stability rather than rapid democratization. They have been careful not to jeopardize their hard-won economic gains, and have expressed some fear of grassroots democracy.[89] Rather than asserting its independence from the state, China’s business sector has remained heavily dependent upon it, and often seeks close relations with, relevant government agencies. The CCP, in turn, has welcomed business persons into the Party. The PRC government wields influence over the private sector not only through its jurisdiction over business transactions, but also through its control over many other areas of the economy, such as finance and property. Furthermore, the weakness of China’s legal system means that many business persons must seek relations with government officials in order to protect their assets or enforce contracts. According to several studies, private entrepreneurs favor strengthening the rule of law and support long-term political reform, but also value social stability and are satisfied with the current, slow pace of political reforms, which have largely served their interests.[90] China’s public intellectuals, another potential agent of change, have been relatively quiescent during the past decade. The formation and crackdown upon the China Democracy Party in 1998-99 crushed nearly all hope for fundamental change,

Human Rights in China, Nova Science Publishers, Incorporated, 2009. ProQuest Ebook Central,

Human Rights in China: Trends and Policy Implications

25

while growing opportunities for making money, travel, academic career development, and even policy input have helped to dampen the urgency of political reform. Some analysts state that the PRC government has coopted most intellectuals.[91] Furthermore, many Chinese intellectuals reportedly are not as enamored of democracy as they once were, for various reasons, including the view that Western efforts to promote democracy in China may be part of an effort to weaken the PRC and pessimistic perspectives on political and economic developments in other postcommunist countries, such as Russia. According to one analyst, since 1989, only a tiny group of mostly middle-aged and older intellectuals has actively pursued major democratic reform.[92]

Copyright © 2009. Nova Science Publishers, Incorporated. All rights reserved.

New Communications Technologies The PRC government’s efforts at censoring the Internet have been strenuous and effective, but not fully successful. In 2008, China overtook the United States in terms of the number of Internet users, with over 220 million people online. Despite its revolutionary qualities as a communications medium, the Internet has not opened the floodgates of political discourse in China as some had hoped or envisioned. Nonetheless, the Internet has made it impossible for the government to clamp down on information as fully as before, despite a rise in arrests for political crimes since 2006. These arrests reflect the rise of “a new generation of dissenters who are increasingly well informed about their scant legal rights and more inclined to spread their views using the Internet.”[93] Beijing has employed a variety of “hard” and “soft” techniques and approaches to control online content and behavior, including electronic filtering, regulation of Internet Service Providers, monitoring of Internet cafes, and intimidation through the arrests of high profile “cyber dissidents.”[94] According to some analysts, the government cannot control all Internet content and use, but its selective targeting creates an undercurrent of fear and promotes self censorship. The government also has attempted to sway online debates by entering the chat room fray. An estimated 280,000 “Web commentators” — many of them university students — reportedly are employed by state entities to “guide public opinion” or steer discussion online.[95] To some extent, the Internet has proven to be less of a political tool than many observers had expected or hoped, although vast areas for cultural and social expression have opened up online. Those who mine the Internet for political information reportedly make up a small minority of all users. Greater political information is available for Chinese who use “proxy servers,” which help circumvent

Human Rights in China, Nova Science Publishers, Incorporated, 2009. ProQuest Ebook Central,

Copyright © 2009. Nova Science Publishers, Incorporated. All rights reserved.

26

Thomas Lum and Hannah Fischer

government electronic filtering, or those who frequent English language sites. However, according to one study, less than 8% of Internet users in China access proxy servers “sometimes” to “frequently.”[96] Chinese online chat rooms and blogs also have been hotbeds of ultra-nationalist sentiment. Many major U.S. online news sites, such as the Washington Post, New York Times, and CNN.com, are frequently available. Since the end of the Beijing Olympics, Voice of America’s website generally has been allowed, although it is still subject to selective blocking. However, for many of China’s educated elites who are proficient in English as well as government officials concerned about political control, it is not the availability of foreign news to a minority of Chinese citizens that is important, but rather the ability to foment political change on the basis of such information. Such ability remains substantially curtailed. Finally, many Chinese Internet users support the idea of censorship, particularly the government’s efforts to ban online pornography, gambling, illegal commerce, phishing, and spam.[97] In the middle of the decade, bulletin board systems (BBS) and blogs burst onto the online scene, providing forums for Chinese to express opinions publicly and often anonymously. BBS and blogs became the principal medium for political discourse in China. One study found that 61% of blogs carried “critical” opinions, including those related to society, government, corporations, and public figures, while 36% of blogs demonstrated “pluralism” or two or more opposing perspectives.[98] After the government required BBS participants to register their real names with forum hosts, BBS activity fell dramatically, while blogs surged in popularity.[99] In the Xiamen University protests of 2007, local residents sent text messages about the demonstrations to bloggers in other cities, who posted reports on the Web, thus keeping “one step ahead of the censors.”[100] Some experts on the Internet in China have acknowledged government repression while remaining optimistic about the medium’s power. One political blogger stated that although media controls had multiplied under President Hu Jintao, they had not translated into less freedom overall, thanks to the Internet.[101] A university professor described the constant struggle with government censors this way: I have noted the life span of new forms on the Internet here has been about one or two years. Bulletin boards were very free, and after one or two years, they were restricted. Then we saw the emergence of personal Web sites, and after one or two years they were restricted. Then we had blogs. After a year or two, they moved to restrict them, too. I think the Internet in China will always find a way forward, because of technology and other factors. I am actually very optimistic.[102]

Human Rights in China, Nova Science Publishers, Incorporated, 2009. ProQuest Ebook Central,

Human Rights in China: Trends and Policy Implications

27

Copyright © 2009. Nova Science Publishers, Incorporated. All rights reserved.

U.S. EFFORTS TO ADVANCE HUMAN RIGHTS IN CHINA The United States government has employed a comprehensive approach toward promoting democracy, human rights, and the rule of law in China, but its effects likely have been felt primarily along the margins of the PRC political system. Some experts argue that U.S. policies of political and economic engagement with China have created necessary conditions in which progress in democracy and human rights can be, and to a limited but significant extent has been, made. Others suggest that U.S. engagement policies have failed not only to produce a political transformation but also to set any real change in motion.[103] In this context, some contend, U.S. efforts to promote democracy and human rights, especially through quiet diplomacy, have been largely ineffectual. The Bush Administration and Congress have pressured China from without through openly criticizing the country’s human rights record and calling upon the PRC leadership to honor the rights guaranteed in its own constitution, bring its policies in line with international standards, release prisoners of conscience, and undertake major political reforms. President George W. Bush has appealed personally to President Hu Jintao to allow more religious freedom and has met with Chinese independent Christian leaders at the White House. Members of the 110th Congress have sponsored nearly 20 resolutions aimed at promoting human rights in China. The U.S. government also has provided funding for programs within China that help strengthen the rule of law, civil society, government accountability, and labor rights. It has supported U.S.-based non-profit organizations and Internet companies that monitor human rights conditions in China and help enable Chinese Web users to access Voice of America (VOA), Radio Free Asia, and other websites that are frequently blocked by the PRC government (see below).

Openly Criticizing China Some analysts argue that the U.S. government should take principled stands against China’s human rights policies more frequently and openly, while others believe that such methods can undermine human rights efforts in some situations. The PRC government generally has reacted angrily when the U.S. government has publicly denounced its policies or defied its wishes for reasons related to human rights. In some cases, China has made small or token concessions in order to help reduce or avoid open U.S. criticism.[104] Some analysts suggest that China’s decision

Human Rights in China, Nova Science Publishers, Incorporated, 2009. ProQuest Ebook Central,

28

Thomas Lum and Hannah Fischer

Copyright © 2009. Nova Science Publishers, Incorporated. All rights reserved.

to restart the U.S.-PRC human rights dialogue in 2008 was related to the U.S. State Department’s excluding China from its annual list of “worst human rights violators,” while continuing to harshly criticize its record. In other cases, Beijing has responded to perceived U.S. insults in a “tit for tat” manner. Some observers surmise, for example, that the PRC’s sudden denial of a port of call to the USS Kitty Hawk in November 2007 represented, at least in part, a response to the U.S. legislature awarding the Congressional Gold Medal to the Dalai Lama the previous month. The U.S. government has sponsored resolutions criticizing China’s human rights record at the annual United Nations Commission on Human Rights (UNCHR) meeting four times in the past decade.[105] Members of Congress also have sponsored numerous non-binding resolutions condemning or calling upon the PRC government to cease or make improvements to various human rights policies. These include the imprisonment and detention of prominent political, religious, and ethnic figures; persecution of Tibetans and Uighurs; lack of progress in the dialogue between Beijing and the Dalai Lama; the crackdown on political voices prior to the Beijing Olympic games; control over the Internet and other mass media; the one-child policy; and treatment of North Korean refugees. Related House bills include those that would restrict U.S.-China trade on the basis of PRC human rights abuses or prohibit U.S. funding to American officials attending the opening ceremonies of the Beijing Olympic.

Human Rights Dialogue The human rights dialogue between the United States and China was set into motion by President Clinton and President Jiang Zemin in 1998 but has been held only in 2001 and 2002. Beijing formally suspended the dialogue in 2004 after the Bush administration sponsored an unsuccessful U.N. resolution criticizing China’s human rights record. In February 2008, while Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice was in Beijing and prior to the release of the State Department’s annual human rights report, the PRC government announced that it would resume the human rights dialogue with the United States. In May 2008, the two sides held “constructive and productive” discussions on a wide range of issues. Assistant Secretary of State for Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor David Kramer told reporters that the talks included the following topics: prisoners of conscience, freedom of religion, the situation in Tibet, the Muslim majority in Xinjiang, and media and Internet freedom.[106] Some observers argue that while such talks help to produce a positive atmosphere, they result in few if any real changes on the ground. For example, as the bilateral discussions commenced in Beijing, a group of Chinese human rights

Human Rights in China, Nova Science Publishers, Incorporated, 2009. ProQuest Ebook Central,

Human Rights in China: Trends and Policy Implications

29

attorneys were detained as they attempted to meet with two visiting Members of Congress.[107] Others suggest that while the dialogue may produce limited short-term results, the absence of such dialogue reduces the overall effectiveness of U.S. human rights policies in China.[108]

Copyright © 2009. Nova Science Publishers, Incorporated. All rights reserved.

Rule of Law and Civil Society Programs United States foreign operations appropriations for China chiefly have supported democracy-related programs, particularly rule of law development. They also have assisted Tibetan communities. The U.S. Congress has played a leading role in funding these and related programs, which has grown from $10 million in FY2002 to an estimated $23 million in FY2008. Major program areas include legal training, legal aid, criminal defense, labor rights, civil society development, media reform, participatory government, and preserving Tibetan culture. Congress also has provided financial support to U.S. educational institutions for exchange programs with Chinese universities. Several American law schools now offer law degree programs in China or exchange programs. Temple University’s Beasley School of Law, which has received USAID assistance, offers a Masters of Laws program in conjunction with Tsinghua University in Beijing. The program reportedly has graduated 650 legal professionals, including Chinese officials and prosecutors, law professors, and legal staff.[109] According to some experts, U.S. law programs in China have provided relatively secure settings for the discussion of sensitive legal and related political topics.[110] The National Endowment for Democracy (NED) is a private, non-profit organization created in 1983 and funded by the United States government to promote democracy around the world. According to one study, NED programs constituted over one-third of all U.S. democracy funding in China in the 1999-2003 period.[111] The Endowment’s programs in China, administered through its “core institutes,” have included legal aid, labor rights, investigative reporting, HIV/AIDS awareness, and “activist training.”[112] NED also funds several U.S.-based organizations that monitor human rights conditions in China, including Tibet and Xinjiang, research and publish newsletters and journals on democracy-related topics, and disseminate political works from China.

Human Rights in China, Nova Science Publishers, Incorporated, 2009. ProQuest Ebook Central,

30

Thomas Lum and Hannah Fischer

Public Diplomacy

Copyright © 2009. Nova Science Publishers, Incorporated. All rights reserved.

The U.S. government aims to influence the hearts and minds of progressiveminded Chinese educated elites through its public diplomacy programs. According to the Department of State, nearly half of all PRC citizens participating in educational and cultural exchanges in the United States are engaged in activities related to democracy, human rights, and religious freedom. Both the Fulbright Scholarship and Humphrey Fellowship exchange programs devote significant resources for rule of law studies. The U.S. International Visitor Leadership Program sponsors U.S. speakers to travel to China to discuss rule of law issues and brings PRC counterparts to the United States. In 2007, 398 U.S. citizens and 552 PRC citizens participated in U.S. government educational and cultural and exchange programs with China.[113] In the two decades since the Tiananmen military crackdown in 1989, many Chinese have come to equate democracy with political instability or view it as harmful to economic growth. One analyst suggests that, rather than touting the virtues of freedom and democracy as abstract ideas, the U.S. government should bolster public diplomacy efforts as a means toward addressing Chinese doubts about democracy. In particular, U.S. public diplomacy efforts should help to persuade the emerging PRC middle class that democracy, stability, social development, and economic growth are mutually reinforcing.[114]

Internet Freedom The U.S. government has funded programs to help circumvent PRC Internet censorship and called upon U.S. Internet providers that have entered the Chinese market to promote human rights. The International Broadcasting Bureau funds antijamming technologies (approximately $1 million per year) to help enable Internet users in China, Iran, and other countries to access Voice of America and other censored U.S. government and non-government websites, and to receive VOA e-mail newsletters. The Consolidated Appropriations Act for FY2008 (P.L. 110-161) appropriated $15 million for an Internet freedom initiative to “expand access and information in closed societies.” The funds are to be used to develop software to broaden access in countries where the Web is heavily censored, particularly China and Iran. The $15 million is part of the “Human Rights and Democracy Fund” (HRDF), for which Congress allocated $164 million in 2008.[115] In May 2008, the Senate Committee on the Judiciary, Subcommittee on Human Rights and the Law held a hearing entitled “Global Internet Freedom: Corporate

Human Rights in China, Nova Science Publishers, Incorporated, 2009. ProQuest Ebook Central,

Copyright © 2009. Nova Science Publishers, Incorporated. All rights reserved.

Human Rights in China: Trends and Policy Implications

31

Responsibility and the Rule of Law.” Representatives from Google, Yahoo, and Cicso Systems testified before the subcommittee regarding their operations in China. Many U.S. observers have accused U.S. information technology corporations of either cooperating with PRC censorship systems or supplying China with censorship technology. Yahoo’s China operations have been especially singled out for criticism by human rights groups. In 2004, Yahoo’s Hong Kong office provided information to PRC authorities about the identity of a Chinese Yahoo e-mail account holder, Shi Tao. Shi, a journalist, reportedly had forwarded information about a state directive regarding the 15th anniversary of the Tiananmen demonstrations to an overseas democracy organization. In March 2005, a PRC court sentenced Shi to 10 years in prison for “leaking state secrets.” In August 2008, Google, Yahoo, and Microsoft reached an agreement in principle on a voluntary code of conduct for their activities in China as well as other countries that restrict Internet use. The code, to be completed in 2008, is to regulate the behavior of U.S. Internet companies operating in these countries in order to help protect human rights and resist censorship. The Global Online Freedom Act of 2007, introduced on January 5, 2007, would establish an Office of Global Internet Freedom; prohibit U.S. Internet companies from locating their servers in “Internet-restricting” countries such as China; forbid U.S. companies from censoring content or providing personal user information to the government in such countries; and establish civil and criminal penalties for companies and individuals who violate provisions of the act. Some Chinese “cyber dissidents,” however, have argued that on balance, U.S. Internet companies in China have helped to accelerate information flow and provide more opportunities for free expression, despite their operating within the country’s censorship regime.[116]

Labor Rights The U.S. government has promoted PRC adherence to international labor standards. U.S. officials monitor compliance with the 1992 U.S.-China Memorandum of Understanding and 1994 Statement of Cooperation on Prison Labor and investigate allegations of forced child labor. The United States and China conduct exchanges on coal mine safety, dispute resolution, occupational safety and health, wage and hour (payroll) administration, and pension programs. The U.S. government also funds programs that help develop the capacity of local Chinese organizations involved in rights protection and legal aid for workers.[117]

Human Rights in China, Nova Science Publishers, Incorporated, 2009. ProQuest Ebook Central,

32

Thomas Lum and Hannah Fischer

Congressional-Executive Commission on China On October 10, 2000, President Bush signed into law P.L. 106-286, which authorized the President to grant Permanent Normal Trade Relations (PNTR) to China. The law established the Congressional-Executive Commission on China (CECC) to monitor human rights and the rule of law in China and to submit an annual report with recommendations to the President and Congress.[118] The body consists of nine Senators, nine Members of the House of Representatives, five senior Administration officials appointed by the President, and a staff of ten. On its website, the Commission provides human rights-related news, keeps track of pertinent PRC laws and regulations, and maintains a database of political prisoners.[119] Since its inception, the CECC has held nearly 80 public hearings and roundtables on rights-related topics, including the following: the Beijing Olympics, rule of law development, religious freedom, ethnic minorities, criminal justice, political reform, village elections, labor conditions, mass media, international trade issues, public health (SARS, avian influenza, and HIV/AIDS), property rights, and the Internet in China. It has an annual operating budget of approximately $2 million.

Copyright © 2009. Nova Science Publishers, Incorporated. All rights reserved.

FURTHER READING U.S. Department of State, 2007 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices — China (March 11, 2008). U.S. Department of State, International Religious Freedom Report, 2008 — China (September 2008). Congressional-Executive Commission on China, Annual Report 2007 (October 10, 2007). Annual Report of the United States Commission on International Religious Freedom (May 2007). China Aid Association, Annual Report of Persecution by the Government on Christian House Churches within Mainland China (February 2008). Reporters without Borders, China — Annual Report 2008 (February 2008). Human Rights in China Monthly Brief [http://www.hrichina.org/publ ic/contents/history?cid=1 055] Dui Hua Foundation [http://www.duihua.org] Laogai Research Foundation [http://www.laogai.org] Ying Ma, “China’s Stubborn Anti-Democracy,” Policy Review, February/March 2007.

Human Rights in China, Nova Science Publishers, Incorporated, 2009. ProQuest Ebook Central,

Human Rights in China: Trends and Policy Implications

33

APPENDIX

Copyright © 2009. Nova Science Publishers, Incorporated. All rights reserved.

A number of jailed or detained rights defenders have gained national and international attention for their efforts on behalf of causes involving aggrieved citizens. Some of them have been harassed or denied civil liberties by Chinese authorities off and on over a period of several years. Many of these activists are experts on PRC law and have targeted specific violations by local officials, rather than challenging the PRC leadership or broad policy. The government has charged these individuals with various crimes, including “subversion of state power,” “supplying state secrets to foreigners,” and illegal business practices. In most cases, their punishments have been less severe that those of past dissidents who had attempted to organize or represent political or religious groups on a national scale and those of many Tibetan and Uighur activists. The following selected list provides examples of prominent rights defenders, government critics, journalists, and religious figures who are reported to have been imprisoned or detained by the government or denied civil rights. The names are drawn from the Congressional-Executive Commission on China’s Political Prisoner Database and other sources. It is not exhaustive and is intended to illustrate or provide a sampling of the plight of many political activists and dissidents in China.

PROFILES OF SELECTED IMPRISONED DISSIDENTS AND ACTIVISTS[120] Chen Guangcheng

Gao Zhisheng

Chen Guangcheng, a legal rights advocate, is best known for his efforts in 2005 challenging illegal family planning practices in Linyi county, Shandong province. PRC authorities arrested Chen in June 2006. A local court sentenced him to four years and three months in prison for “intentional destruction of property” and “gathering people to disturb traffic order.” Gao Zhisheng, a human rights attorney, has represented numerous individuals, activists, writers, and religious leaders. On October 18, 2005, Gao wrote an open letter to President Hu Jintao and Premier Wen Jiabao, urging an end to persecution of Falun Gong practitioners. He was convicted on December 22, 2007, of “inciting subversion of state power” and was handed a three-year jail sentence, which has been suspended for five years.

Human Rights in China, Nova Science Publishers, Incorporated, 2009. ProQuest Ebook Central,

34

Thomas Lum and Hannah Fischer Guo Feixiong

Hu Jia

Copyright © 2009. Nova Science Publishers, Incorporated. All rights reserved.

Huang Qi

Shi Tao

Su Zhimin

Guo Feixiong, a rights activist, assisted residents of Taishi village, Guangdong province, who had been involved in an effort to recall their village chief because of his alleged graft. On November 14, 2007, PRC authorities sentenced Guo to five years in prison for “illegal operation of a business.” Hu Jia has advocated on behalf of HIV/AIDS patients, other rights defenders, and environmental issues. Hu was placed under surveillance in 2006 for his support of legal advocate Chen Guangcheng. On April 3, 2008, Hu was sentenced to three years, six months’ imprisonment for “inciting subversion of state power.” In October 2008, the European Parliament awarded Hu the Sakharov Prize for Freedom of Thought. Huang Qi, an Internet activist, maintained a website, [http://www.64tianwang.com], devoted to finding missing persons, including trafficked girls. In 2008, Huang visited the Sichuan earthquake zone and published articles online criticizing the government’s response to the disaster. Huang was imprisoned from 2003 to 2005 for “inciting subversion of state power.” In 2008, he was arrested and charged with “possessing state secrets.” Shi Tao, an editor, was sentenced to 10 years’ imprisonment on April 27, 2005, for “disclosing state secrets to foreigners.” Shi reportedly had e-mailed information about a government order regarding the 15th anniversary of the Tiananmen student demonstrations to an overseas democracy organization. Su Zhimin, the underground bishop of Baoding city, Hebei province (whose position is not recognized by the PRC government), was detained briefly in 1996. He was again arrested in October 1997, after he reportedly wrote an open letter to the National People’s Congress urging religious freedom. Since then, with the exception of a reported sighting in 2003 at a hospital in Baoding, his whereabouts have remained unknown.

Human Rights in China, Nova Science Publishers, Incorporated, 2009. ProQuest Ebook Central,

Copyright © 2009. Nova Science Publishers, Incorporated. All rights reserved.

Human Rights in China: Trends and Policy Implications Tenzin Delek

Tenzin Delek, a Tibetan Buddhist leader and monk, was sentenced to death with a two-year reprieve in 2003 on charges of separatism and on alleged involvement in a bombing. Due to international pressure, Tenzin’ s sentence was commuted to a life sentence in 2005.

Wang Bingzhang

Wang Bingzhang, a Chinese dissident and permanent U.S. resident, established the pro-democracy China Spring magazine in 1982 in Canada. In 1998, while in China, Wang helped found the China Democracy Party, for which he was deported by PRC authorities. In 2002, Wang reportedly was apprehended in while meeting with Chinese labor leaders in Hanoi. He was repatriated to China where he faced charges of espionage and “organizing and leading a terrorist group.” In February 2003, a Shenzhen court sentenced Wang to life in prison.

Yang Chunlin

Yang Chunlin, a land rights activist, was arrested in August 2007 and sentenced to five years in prison for “inciting subversion of state power.” Yang was accused of writing essays critical of the Communist Party and accepting money from a “hostile” foreign group. In 2007, he wrote an open letter to the government entitled “We Want Human Rights, Not the Olympics.” It was signed by over 10,000 citizens, mostly farmers.

35

REFERENCES [1] [2]

[3]

[4]

Hon. Thaddeus McCotter and John J. Tkacik, Jr. “The China Delusion,” The Heritage Foundation, August 28, 2008. Ting Shi, “Finding a Balance for Left and Right: China’s Latest Property Reforms Seek to Secure the Middle Ground, Say Analysts,” South China Morning Post, March 19, 2007. Edward Cody, “Chinese Dissidents to Appeal to Government on Human Rights,” Washington Post, August 7, 2007; Maureen Fan, “In China, Rights Activists Use Olympics to Push for Reforms,” Washington Post, March 24, 2008. Edward Wong, “Grieving Chinese Parents Protest School Collapse,” International Herald Tribune, July 16, 2008.

Human Rights in China, Nova Science Publishers, Incorporated, 2009. ProQuest Ebook Central,

36 [5] [6]

[7]

[8] [9]

[10] [11] [12]

Copyright © 2009. Nova Science Publishers, Incorporated. All rights reserved.

[13] [14] [15] [16] [17] [18]

[19] [20]

Thomas Lum and Hannah Fischer U.S. Department of State, 2007 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices — China (March 11, 2008). Exceptions to the one-child rule are made for ethnic minorities, couples whose first child was a girl (in rural areas) or one with a disability, and couples who agreed to pay a “social compensation fee” or fine. “Non-state” actors in China, such as academics, NGOs, and private entrepreneurs, while they do not perform political or bureaucratic functions, are tied to the state in myriad significant ways, unlike their American counterparts. He Li, “The Role of Think Tanks in Chinese Foreign Policy,” Problems of Post- Communism, Vol. 49, no. 2 (March/April 2002). Paul Mooney, “Beijing Silences ‘One-Man Rights Organization’,” South China Morning Post, January 27, 2008; Edward Cody, “In Chinese Uprisings, Peasants Find New Allies,” Washington Post, November 26, 2005. Ying Ma, “China’s Stubborn Anti-Democracy,” Policy Review, February/March 2007; [http://www.chinadevelopmentbrief.com]. Paul Mooney, “How to Deal with NGOs — Part 1, China, YaleGlobal Online, August 1, 2006. “Torture Behind Nearly Every Wrong Conviction in China: Official,” South China Morning Post, November 20, 2006. Zhu He, “‘Right to be Silent’ May Be Granted,” China Daily, May 18, 2007. Zhao Yuanxin and Xie Chuanjiao, “No Turning Back on Death Rule,” China Daily, March 15, 2007. Peter Ford, “Amid Human Rights Protests, A Look at China’s Record,” Christian Science Monitor, April 10, 2008. “China Rocked by Labor Disputes Due to Legal Reforms, Inflation Fears,” Nikkei Weekly, July 14, 2008. Edward Cody, “Lawmakers Approve Measure to Protect Private Property,” Washington Post, March 16, 2007. While the state owns all land in China, farmers are granted rights of use via long term (30- year) contracts with the state. Maureen Fan, “China to Allow Land Leasing, Transfer,” Washington Post, October 20, 2008. Edward Cody, “China Announces Rules to Require Government Disclosures,” Washington Post, April 24, 2007. Suisheng Zhao, “Political Reform in China: Toward Democracy or a Rule of Law Regime,” Asia Program Special Report No. 131, Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, June 2006; Richard Baum, “The Limits of

Human Rights in China, Nova Science Publishers, Incorporated, 2009. ProQuest Ebook Central,

Human Rights in China: Trends and Policy Implications

[21]

[22] [23]

[24]

[25]

Copyright © 2009. Nova Science Publishers, Incorporated. All rights reserved.

[26] [27] [28] [29] [30] [31] [32] [33] [34] [35] [36]

37

Consultative Leninism,” Asia Program Special Report No. 131, Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, June 2006. David Matas and David Kilgour, “Bloody Harvest: Revised Report into Allegations of Organ Harvesting of Falun Gong Practitioners in China,” January 2007; Gregory M. Lamb, “China Faces Suspicions about Organ Harvesting,” Christian Science Monitor, August 3, 2006; Glen McGregor, “China Buffs Image with Transplant Rules,” Ottawa Citizen, November 27, 2007. U.S. Department of State Daily Press Briefing, April 14, 2006. Debate on reform of the laojiao system was suspended from 1999-2003 during the crackdown on the Falun Gong group, then suspended again in 2005. Wu Jiao, “New Law to Abolish Laojiao System,” China Daily, March 1, 2007. The State Department’s 2007 Report on Human Rights Practices states that, according to some observers, more than half of re-education through labor detainees were first time or returning Falun Gong practitioners. Minnie Chan, “Kinder Face for Notorious Re-education Camps,” South China Morning Post, February 21, 2007; Jim Yardley, “Issue in China: Many Jails Without Trial,” New York Times, May 9, 2005. Edward Cody, “Pioneering City Offers Peek at Political Ferment,” Washington Post, June 30, 2008. Wu Zhong, “Party Time for China,” Asia Times, [http://www.atimes.com], September 10, 2008. Willy Lam, “China’s Reforms Buried under Rubble,” Far Eastern Economic Review, vol. 171, no. 5 (June 2008). Edward Cody, “Chinese Dissidents to Appeal to Government on Human Rights,” op. cit. Anita Chang, “China Rights Activist Sentenced to Jail,” USA Today, March 24, 2008. “Chinese Activists Arrested, Beaten in ‘Worst Crackdown in Five Years,’” BBC Monitoring Asia Pacific, October 12, 2007. Jill Drew, “China’s Silencing Season,” Washington Post, July 10, 2008. Ford, “Amid Human Rights Protests, A Look at China’s Record,”op. cit. Peter Ford, “China Cracks Down on NGOs,” The Christian Science Monitor,” December 6, 2007. Human Rights Watch, “China: Petitioners’ Village Faces Demolition,” September 6, 2007. “China: Beaten Activist to Be Tried on Eve of Olympics,” Human Rights Watch Asia [http://hrw.org/english/docs/2008/07/29/china19494.htm].

Human Rights in China, Nova Science Publishers, Incorporated, 2009. ProQuest Ebook Central,

Copyright © 2009. Nova Science Publishers, Incorporated. All rights reserved.

38

Thomas Lum and Hannah Fischer

[37] Maureen Fan, “Journalists Say China Is Not Living up to Openness Pledge,” Washington Post, August 3, 2008. [38] Peter Ford, “China Quake: Controls Cautiously Lifted on Flood of Volunteers,” The Christian Science Monitor, May 29, 2008. [39] Klaudia Lee, “Lawyers Finally Allowed to See Arrested Dissident Campaigner Denied Access to Legal Counsel for Two Months,” South China Morning Post, September 24, 2008. [40] Derrick Z. Jackson, “Prisoners of Sentencing Politics,” Boston Globe, March 15, 2008. [41] [http://www.cecc.gov] [42] Hongying Wang and Xueyi Chen, “Globalization and the Changing StateMedia Relations in China,” Paper Prepared for Presentation at the 2008 Annual Conference of the American Political Science Association, August 38-31, 2008. [43] Ariana Eunjung Cha, “Public Anger over Milk Scandal Forces China’s Hand,” Washington Post, September 19, 2008. [44] Fan, “Journalists Say China Is Not Living up to Openness Pledge,” op. cit. [45] U.S. Department of State, 2007 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices, op. cit. [46] “Increase in Pre-Olympic Repression, with at Least 24 Journalists and CyberDissidents Arrested or Sentenced since January,” Canada Newswire, June 27, 2008. [47] Human Rights Watch, “China: Extend New Media Rules to Chinese Reporters,” October 21, 2008. [48] Hongying Wang and Xueyi Chen, “Globalization and the Changing StateMedia Relations in China,” op. cit. [49] Howard W. French, “Great Firewall of China Faces Online Rebels,” New York Times, February 4, 2008. [50] Edward Cody, “Chinese Media Lash Out at Government’s Censure,” Washington Post, January 8, 2008; Chris Buckley, “Chinese Outcry Against Censorship Will Grow,” Reuters News, January 26,2006. [51] Howard W. French, “China Tries Again to Curb Independent Press in South,” New York Times, April 15, 2004; Iain Marlow, “The Disaster that Finally Shook Up China’s Media,” The Independent, June 16, 2008; Frank Ching, “China Must Open Up to Restore its Reputation,” New Straits Times, October 9, 2008. [52] United States Commission on International Religious Freedom, Annual Report 2006, May 2006.

Human Rights in China, Nova Science Publishers, Incorporated, 2009. ProQuest Ebook Central,

Copyright © 2009. Nova Science Publishers, Incorporated. All rights reserved.

Human Rights in China: Trends and Policy Implications

39

[53] China Aid Association, “Annual Report of Persecution by the Government on Christian House Churches within Mainland China: January 2007-December 2007,” February 2007. [54] Because many Chinese worship in unsanctioned churches, it is difficult to determine the number. “Survey Finds 300M China Believers,” BBC News, February 7, 2007; Central Intelligence Agency, The World Factbook — China, August 2008. [55] Associated Press, “Poll Shows 300M in China ‘Religious’,” South China Morning Post, February 7, 2007. [56] “Three Self” refers to independence from foreign missionary or other religious influence — self-governance, self-support (i.e., financial independence from foreigners) and self- propagation. [57] Brookings Institution, “Religion in China: Perspectives from Chinese Religious Leaders,” September 11, 2008. [58] China Aid Association USA, Annual Report of Persecution by the Government on Christian House Churches within Mainland China, January 2007-December 2007, February 2008. [59] Maureen Fan, “Beijing Curbs Rights it Says Citizens Have to Worship,” Washington Post, August 10, 2008. [60] U.S. Department of State, International Religious Freedom Report, 2008 — China (September 2008). [61] “The Question of Tibet,” International Debates (Congressional Digest), May 2008. [62] For further information, see CRS Report RL34445, Tibet: Problems, Prospects, and U.S. Policy, by Kerry Dumbaugh. [63] John Ruwitch, “China Condemns Dalai Lama Ahead of Planned Talks, Reuters, May 3, 2008. [64] Edward Cody, “China Sanctions Lawyers Offering to Help Tibetans,” Washington Post, June 3, 2008. [65] Ben Blanchard, “Religion, Politics Mix Awkwardly for China’s Muslims,” Washington Post, May 26, 2006. [66] Amnesty International Report 2008, May 5, 2008. [67] Edward Cody, “During Crackdown in Tibet, Uighurs Pursued Own Protest,” Washington Post, April 3, 2008; Michael Bristow, “China Confirms Xinjiang Protests,” BBC News, April 2, 2008; Martin I. Wayne, “Al Qaeda’ s China Problem,” PacNet Newsletter [pacnet@ hawaiibiz.rr. com], February 3, 2007; Annual Report of the United States Commission on International Religious Freedom (May 2007); Edward Wong, “Wary of Islam, China Tightens Vice,” New York Times, October 19, 2008.

Human Rights in China, Nova Science Publishers, Incorporated, 2009. ProQuest Ebook Central,

Copyright © 2009. Nova Science Publishers, Incorporated. All rights reserved.

40

Thomas Lum and Hannah Fischer

[68] [http://faluninfo.net/]; U.S. Department of State, 2007 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices, op. cit.. For further information, see CRS Report RL33437, China and Falun Gong, by Thomas Lum. [69] M2 Presswire, “Amnesty International: China — Falun Gong Deaths in Custody Continue to Rise as Crackdown Worsens,” December 20, 2000. [70] Edward Cody, “China Announces Rules to Require Government Disclosures,” op. cit. [71] Edward Cody, “China’s Local Leaders Hold Absolute Power,” Washington Post, June 10, 2008. [72] Jamie P. Horsley, “The Rule of Law in China: Incremental Progress,” The China Balance Sheet in 2007 and Beyond (Phase II Papers), Center for Strategic and International Studies, May 2007. [73] Paul Mooney, “Beijing Silences ‘One-Man Rights Organization’,” South China Morning Post, January 27, 2008. [74] Tim Johnson, “A Legal Revolution,” Knight Ridder Foreign Service,” November 9, 2003; “Constitutional Change Giving New Momentum to China Protests,” Kyodo News, April 24, 2004. [75] Joseph Kahn, “When Chinese Sue the State, Cases Are Often Smothered,” New York Times, December 28, 2005; John L. Thornton, “Long Time Coming,” Foreign Affairs, Vol. 87, no. 1 (January/February 2008). [76] Geoffrey A. Fowler, Sky Canaves, and Juliet Ye, “Chinese Seek A Day in Court — With New Faith in Rule of Law, More Citizens File Suits,” Wall Street Journal, July 1, 2008. [77] Benjamin L. Liebman, “China’s Courts: Restricted Reform,” The China Quarterly, no. 191 (September 2007). [78] Jim Yardley, “Desperate Search for Justice: One Man vs. China,” New York Times, November 12, 2005. [79] Human Rights Watch, “China: ‘A Great Danger to Lawyers’ — New Regulatory Curbs on Lawyers Representing Protesters,” December 2006. [80] Edward Cody, “China Uses Heavy Hand Even with Gadflies,” Washington Post, April 9, 2008. [81] Amnesty International UK Press Release, January 23, 2006. [82] For more information on the plight of legal practitioners in China, see “Walking on Thin Ice: Control, Intimidation and Harassment of Lawyers in China,” Human Rights Watch, 2008. [83] Richard S. Williamson, “Growing Social Unrest Will Force China to Reform,” Chicago Sun Times, January 30, 2007; Jamil Anderlini, “A Restive Peasantry Calls on Beijing for Land Rights,” FT.com, February 19, 2008.

Human Rights in China, Nova Science Publishers, Incorporated, 2009. ProQuest Ebook Central,

Copyright © 2009. Nova Science Publishers, Incorporated. All rights reserved.

Human Rights in China: Trends and Policy Implications

41

[84] Bill Powell, “China’s At-Risk Factories,” Time, April 28, 2008; Edward Cody, “Farmers Rise in Challenge to Chinese Land Policy,” Washington Post, January 14, 2008. [85] Edward Wong, “In China March, Hints of a Movement: Protest of Pollution Is Latest in a Series,” International Herald Tribune, May 6, 2008. [86] [http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=-7iikjHOOsA]. [87] “Post-Olympic Stress Disorder,” Economist.Com, September 11, 2008. [88] Jie Chen and ChunLong Lu, “Does China’s Middle Class Think and Act Democratically?” Journal of Chinese Political Science, Vol. 11, no. 2 (Fall 1996). [89] See Willy Wo-Lap Lam, Chinese Politics in the Hu Jintao Era, M.E. Sharpe: Armonk, NY, 2006. [90] Bruce J. Dickson, “Integrating Wealth and Power in China: The Communist Party’s Embrace of the Private Sector,” The China Quarterly, no. 192, December 2007; Kellee S. Tsai, “China’s Complicit Capitalists,” Far Eastern Economic Review, January/February 2008; Bruce J. Dickson and Jie Chen, “Engaging the State: Political Activities of Private Entrepreneurs in China,” Paper Prepared for Presentation at the 2008 Annual Conference of the American Political Science Association, August 38-31, 2008. [91] Lam, op. cit. [92] Teresa Wright, “Disincentives for Democratic Change in China,” East-West Center Asia Pacific Issues, No. 82, February 2007. [93] Maureen Fan, “‘State Security’ Arrests in China Doubled in ‘06, Group Reports,” Washington Post, November 29, 2007. [94] Some experts estimate that the PRC government has employed 30,000 “Internet police.” “On the Wrong Side of Great Firewall of China,” New Zealand Herald, November 27, 2007. [95] David Bandurski, “China’s Guerrilla War for the Web,” Far Eastern Economic Review, Vol 171, no. 5 (July/August 2008). [96] Rebecca MacKinnon, “Bloggers and Censors: Chinese Media in the Internet Age,” China Studies Center, May 18, 2007. [97] Rebecca MacKinnon, “Is Web 2.0 a Wash for Free Speech in China,” RConversation [http://rconversation.blogs.com]. [98] “Chinese Bloggers Are Really Edgy,” Wall Street Journal, June 14, 2008. [99] See also Rebecca MacKinnon, “Flatter World and Thicker Walls? Blogs, Censorship and Civic Discourse in China,” Public Choice, Vol 134 (January 2008).

Human Rights in China, Nova Science Publishers, Incorporated, 2009. ProQuest Ebook Central,

Copyright © 2009. Nova Science Publishers, Incorporated. All rights reserved.

42

Thomas Lum and Hannah Fischer

[100] Edward Cody, “Text Messages Giving Voice to Chinese,” Washington Post, June 28, 2007. [101] Isaac Mao and Michael Anti at Hong Kong U.,” April 17, 2007. [http://rconversation.blogs.com/rconversation/2007/04/isaac_mao_and_m.ht ml]. [102] Howard W. French, “Chinese Discuss Plan to Tighten Restrictions on Cyberspace,” New York Times, July 4, 2006. [103] For recent debate on the topic, see David M. Lampton, “‘The China Fantasy,’ Fantasy,” The China Quarterly, No. 191 (September 2007); James Mann, “Rejoinder to David M. Lampton,” The China Quarterly, No. 191 (September 2007). [104] Melinda Lu, “Saying No to Bush,” Newsweek, November 22, 2005. [105] The UNCHR, which had been criticized for including some of the world’s worst human rights abusers, was terminated in 2006 and replaced by the United Nations Human Rights Council. The U.S. government, citing a continuation of problems similar to those of the UNCHR, has refrained from seeking a seat on the Human Rights Council. Since the U.S. government began sponsoring such resolutions in 1991, they have been blocked by “no action” motions nearly every time. Only one, in 1995, was considered by the Commission, but lost by one vote. [106] “U.S. Says Human Rights Talks with China ‘Constructive’” AFP, May 27, 2008. [107] Jill Drew and Edward Cody, “Chinese Lawyers Arrested before Meeting with Congressmen,” Washington Post, July 1, 2008. [108] Kristine Kwok, “Resume Rights Talk, China and U.S. Urged,” South China Morning Post, April 17, 2008. [109] Temple University School of Law, Rule of Law Projects in China (Executive Summary), March 2007. [110] Jen Lin-Liu, “The Paper Chase Comes to China,” The Chronicle of Higher Education, May 14, 2004. For further information, see CRS Report RS22663, U.S.-Funded Assistance Programs in China, January 28, 2008. [111] General Accounting Office, “Foreign Assistance: U.S. Funding for DemocracyRelated Programs,” February 2004. [112] National Endowment for Democracy Asia Program Grants (China):[http://www.ned.org/grants/07programs/grants-asia07.html# china]. NED’s core institutes or grantees are the International Republican Institute (IRI); the American Center for International Labor Solidarity (ACILS); the Center for International Private Enterprise (CIPE); and the National Democratic Institute for International Affairs (NDI).

Human Rights in China, Nova Science Publishers, Incorporated, 2009. ProQuest Ebook Central,

Copyright © 2009. Nova Science Publishers, Incorporated. All rights reserved.

Human Rights in China: Trends and Policy Implications

43

[113] U.S. Department of State, Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor, Advancing Freedom and Democracy Reports — 2008: China (includes Tibet), May 23, 2008; U.S. Department of State, Office of Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs. [114] Ying Ma, op. cit. [115] “State Department Gets Funds to Fight Internet Censorship,” Federal Times, January 14, 2008. [116] Human Rights Watch, “‘Race to the Bottom:’ Corporate Complicity in Chinese Internet Censorship,” August 2006. [117] Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor, Advancing Freedom and Democracy Reports — 2008, op. cit. [118] On October 30, 2000, the Floyd D. Spence National Defense Authorization Act for 2001 (P.L. 106-398) established the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission to monitor, investigate, and submit to congress an annual report on the national security implications of the bilateral trade and economic relationship between the United States and the People’s Republic of China. [119] [http://www.cecc.gov] [120] Compiled by Hannah Fischer, Information Research Specialist. All profiles were developed using the Political Prisoner Database of the Congressional-Executive Commission on China [http://www.cecc.gov], along with other media sources.

Human Rights in China, Nova Science Publishers, Incorporated, 2009. ProQuest Ebook Central,

Copyright © 2009. Nova Science Publishers, Incorporated. All rights reserved. Human Rights in China, Nova Science Publishers, Incorporated, 2009. ProQuest Ebook Central,

In: Human Rights in China Editor: Lee R. Massingdale, pp. 45-62

ISBN: 978-1-60741-116-1 © 2009 Nova Science Publishers, Inc.

Chapter 2

INTERNET DEVELOPMENT AND INFORMATION CONTROL IN THE PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF CHINA *

Thomas Lum

Copyright © 2009. Nova Science Publishers, Incorporated. All rights reserved.

ABSTRACT Since its founding in 1949, the People’s Republic of China (PRC) has exerted great effort in manipulating the flow of information and prohibiting the dissemination of viewpoints that criticize the government or stray from the official Communist party view. The introduction of Internet technology in the mid-1990’s presented a challenge to government control over news sources, and by extension, over public opinion. While the Internet has developed rapidly, broadened access to news, and facilitated mass communications in China, many forms of expression online, as in other mass media, are still significantly stifled. Empirical studies have found that China has one of the most sophisticated content-filtering Internet regimes in the world. The Chinese government employs increasingly sophisticated methods to limit content online, including a combination of legal regulation, surveillance, and punishment to promote self-censorship, as well as technical controls. U.S. government efforts to defeat Internet “jamming” include funding through the Broadcasting Board of Governors to provide counter-censorship software to Chinese

*

Excerpted from CRS Report RL33167, dated February 10, 2006.

Human Rights in China, Nova Science Publishers, Incorporated, 2009. ProQuest Ebook Central,

Copyright © 2009. Nova Science Publishers, Incorporated. All rights reserved.

46

Thomas Lum Internet users to access Voice of America (VOA) and Radio Free Asia (RFA) in China. As U.S. investments in China and bilateral trade have surged in the past several years and China has developed its communications infrastructure, Chinese society has undergone rapid changes while the PRC government has continued to repress political dissent. Many U.S. observers, including government officials, have argued that economic openness and the growth of the Internet in China would help bring about political liberalization in China. However, contrary to facilitating freedom, some private U.S. companies have been charged with aiding or complying with Chinese Internet censorship. Private U.S. companies that provide Internet hardware, such as routers, as well as those that provide Internet services such as Web-log (blog) hosting or search portals, have been accused of ignoring international standards for freedom of expression when pursuing business opportunities in the PRC market. In the 1 08th Congress, the provisions of the “Global Internet Freedom Act” (H.R. 48) were subsumed into the Foreign Relations Authorization Act of 2004-05 (H.R. 1950) and passed by the House on July 16, 2003. Christopher Cox reintroduced the bill (H.R. 2216) to the 109th Congress in May 2005. If passed, the act would authorize $50 million for FY2006 and FY2007 to develop and implement a global Internet freedom policy. The act would also establish an office within the International Broadcasting Bureau with the sole mission of countering Internet jamming by repressive governments. On February 1, 2006, the Congressional Human Rights Caucus held a hearing entitled, “Human Rights and the Internet — The People’s Republic of China.” On February 15, 2006, the Subcommittee on Africa, Global Human Rights and International Operations of the House International Relations Committee will hold a joint hearing with the Subcommittee on Asia and the Pacific regarding the Internet and censorship in China.

The government of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) places strict limitations on its domestic and foreign news media. Information that is considered “politically sensitive” or that conveys organized dissent and criticism of the Communist Party is not tolerated.[1] As a result, objective reporting on subjects such as China’s human rights record, Tibetan independence, Falun Gong, Taiwan, or the 1989 Tiananmen crackdown, among other politically sensitive topics, are largely absent in China. Journalists have allegedly been harassed, sometimes with violence, and jailed for reporting content that is undesirable or that implicate government officials in corruption. In addition to reporting that is critical of the government, PRC leadership actively suppresses coverage of events that it considers a threat to social stability. State coverups of the early spread of HIV/AIDS, the Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome (SARS) outbreak in April 2003, and fatal

Human Rights in China, Nova Science Publishers, Incorporated, 2009. ProQuest Ebook Central,

Internet Development and Information Control…

47

industrial disasters are notable examples of issues that have been censored in the Chinese media.[2]

Copyright © 2009. Nova Science Publishers, Incorporated. All rights reserved.

INTERNET DEVELOPMENT AND USE IN CHINA[3] In the early stages of its development, the Internet presented a challenge to Chinese government control over information flows and public opinion. In pursuit of economic growth and modernization, however, the government actively promoted Internet development. Because it is subject to PRC censorship, yet continues to spread news across national borders, the Internet has played a role in bringing international attention to issues forbidden in China, including PRC censorship itself. Since the country’s first connection in 1993, the Internet has experienced exponential growth in China.[4] According to PRC data, the number of Internet users in China (not including Hong Kong, Macau, and Taiwan), which has the second largest Internet population in the world, reached 111 million in 2005.[5] An official report also finds that over half of the users have broadband access (5 1%), 55% have a college degree, 60% are male, and 71% are young (under age 30).[6] Another study estimates that there are currently up to 134 million Chinese Internet users, approximately a fivefold increase from 23 million in 2001.[7] Although 103 million or 134 million would account for only 8% or 10% of China’s population, respectively, Internet usage is expected to rise as China continues to promote Internet development and enjoy rapid economic growth. As in the United States, the Internet has already transformed the daily lives of many people in China. Chinese citizens are able to use the Internet to communicate with others, find entertainment, engage in commercial activities, obtain government services, access a wide variety of cultural, social, and academic information, and, for some users, learn about or discuss sensitive political news, if only fleetingly.[8] Despite censorship of news, the Internet in China often disseminates forbidden information and opinions through e-mail, instant messaging, blogs, and bulletin board forums or through political expressions disguised as non-political comments. However, nearly all such communications are eventually censored and offending texts are deleted by PRC authorities.[9] Chinese studies have found that the majority of Internet users in China use the Internet for entertainment purposes.[10] Notwithstanding, the PRC government strictly controls news and political content online, which has drawn the attention and criticism of many analysts and U.S. policymakers.

Human Rights in China, Nova Science Publishers, Incorporated, 2009. ProQuest Ebook Central,

48

Thomas Lum

Copyright © 2009. Nova Science Publishers, Incorporated. All rights reserved.

Censorship and Content Control of the Internet During the early days of the Internet in China, some observers hoped that greater access to information brought about by this new technology would also encourage political expression and democracy in China. Although there has been a documented expansion in the scope of permissible private speech in recent years, the Chinese government has also intensified efforts to monitor and control use of the Internet and wireless technologies (e.g. cellular phones).[11] An often cited empirical study by the OpenNet Initiative (a collaboration between Harvard Law School, University of Toronto Citizen Lab, and Cambridge Security Program) found that China has the most sophisticated content-filtering Internet regime in the world.[12] Compared to similar efforts in other countries, the Chinese government effectively filters content by employing multiple methods of regulation and technical controls. The PRC- sponsored news agency, Xinhua, stated that censorship targets “superstitious, pornographic, violence-related, gambling and other harmful information.”[13] However, many observers are concerned about the pervasive filtering of any content that the Communist Party of China views as politically objectionable. Informational websites, including that of the BBC, Voice of America, Radio Free Asia, and the public encyclopedia, Wikipedia, have been regularly blocked in China, while other news sources, such as the New York Times, the Washington Post, the South China Morning Post (Hong Kong), and CNN have been intermittently blocked.[14] Sites that carry news in Chinese language generally face greater censorship obstacles than English-only sites. In addition to censorship of news reports that may present the government in a negative light, the Internet is used to channel and influence public opinion, especially in support of nationalistic sentiments. The People’s Daily, a state-sponsored newspaper, has an online bulletin board called the “Strong Nation Forum,” intended for discussion on how to make China a stronger nation. The forum hosted angry antiJapanese postings in April 2005, during a political fallout between China and Japan concerning Japan’s alleged re-writing of wartime atrocities in its history textbooks.[15] Earlier that year, however, when users visited the forum to mourn the death of former Communist Party General Secretary Zhao Ziyang, moderators promptly removed messages of condolence. Zhao had been stripped of his government position in 1989 largely for sympathizing with Tiananmen student protesters, and was placed under house arrest. His death in 2005 received only muted attention in the national media, reflecting the government’s fear of renewing public calls for a

Human Rights in China, Nova Science Publishers, Incorporated, 2009. ProQuest Ebook Central,

Internet Development and Information Control…

49

reversal of the official verdict on the Tiananmen demonstrations and the rehabilitation of those condemned during the crackdown.[16]

METHODS OF PRC INTERNET CENSORSHIP AND CONTENT CONTROL In order to suppress politically sensitive or undesirable content online, the PRC has adopted two main strategies. First, the Chinese government employs a complex system of regulations, surveillance, and punitive action to promote self-censorship among the public. Second, the government uses technology and human monitors to physically filter unwanted content.

Copyright © 2009. Nova Science Publishers, Incorporated. All rights reserved.

Legal Regulations Since the commercialization of the Internet in 1995, the PRC government has issued extensive regulations regarding Internet usage. Because these regulations often overlap, are regularly updated, and are created and carried out by multiple government agencies, the legal infrastructure regarding Internet usage in China is extraordinarily complex. At least 12 different government agencies are involved in Internet regulation, which are directed at Internet service and content providers, cyber-café operators, and Internet users themselves.[17] Internet service providers (ISPs) must obtain an operating license from the Ministry of Information Industry (MII) and record each customer’s account number, phone number, IP address, sites visited, and time spent online. Internet content providers (ICPs) that publish information, operate electronic bulletin boards, or engage in journalism must record all content made available and the date it was issued. For both service and content providers, these records must be maintained for 60 days and surrendered to relevant government agencies upon request.[18] After obtaining permission to open an Internet café, café operators are required to install software that blocks pornographic and “subversive” content, keep detailed logs linking users to the pages they visited and record visits to any blocked pages, and report these to the Public Security Bureau.[19] As with ISPs and ICPs, cafes must retain this information for 60 days. PRC authorities reportedly closed 47,000 unlicensed Internet cafes in 2004 while installing monitoring software in others.[20]

Human Rights in China, Nova Science Publishers, Incorporated, 2009. ProQuest Ebook Central,

50

Thomas Lum

In addition to regulations directed at Internet service and content providers, this complex legal infrastructure is also extended to Internet users themselves. The Ministry of Public Security took initial steps to control Internet use in 1997 when it issued comprehensive regulations governing internet use. Selected portions of three key sections, Articles 4-6, are presented here:

Copyright © 2009. Nova Science Publishers, Incorporated. All rights reserved.

Individuals are prohibited from using the Internet to: harm national security; disclose state secrets; or injure the interests of the state or society [4]. Users are prohibited from using the Internet to create, replicate, retrieve, or transmit information that incites resistance to the PRC Constitution, laws, or administrative regulations; promotes the overthrow of the government or socialist system; undermines national unification; distorts the truth, spreads rumors, or destroys social order; or provides sexually suggestive material or encourages gambling, violence, or murder [ 5]. Users are prohibited from engaging in activities that harm the security of computer information networks and from using networks or changing network resources without prior approval [6].[21]

September 25, 2005 Regulations On July 1, 2005, Chinese authorities shut down thousands of websites that had not registered with the government. Following this stringent measure, in September 2005, the PRC State Council and the MII announced new rules regarding the administration of the Internet. These new rules formalized interim provisions enacted in 2000, which established general Internet content regulations and a mandatory system of licensing and registration for those engaged in “Internet information services.”[22] In addition to combining and clarifying earlier provisions, the new rules both tighten control over online news services and define them more broadly. They stipulate that private individuals or groups must register as “news organizations” before they can operate websites or e-mail distribution lists that spread news or commentary. Because a news organization is required to employ experienced staff, have registered premises, capital, and a transparent system of operation whereby writings can be attributed, approval will likely be difficult for many individuals and private groups.[23] Websites and popular Internet portals such as Sina.com or Sohu.com must publish only news items, without commentary, even though commentary is often a staple of Web-logs, or “blogs.”[24] According to the PRC news agency, Xinhua, electronic bulletin board systems (BBS) and cell-phone text messages that contain news content are also subject to these regulations.[25] In addition, two new stipulations indicate increased Communist government concerns about civil unrest. The first bans Internet news services from inciting illegal

Human Rights in China, Nova Science Publishers, Incorporated, 2009. ProQuest Ebook Central,

Internet Development and Information Control…

51

assemblies, marches and demonstrations; the other prohibits activity on behalf of illegal civil groups.[26] The complex legal infrastructure governing Internet usage in China also includes punitive measures for those who violate the regulations. Under the September 2005 rules, websites that distribute news without government authorization are under the threat of closure and fines of up to 30,000 yuan (US$3,700).[27] Similar penalties and fees exist for website operators who fail to register with the government, and, in serious cases, their network access would be terminated. However, some Internet portals or websites reportedly often drag their feet when complying with official censorship directives in order to attract or maintain market share.[28]

Copyright © 2009. Nova Science Publishers, Incorporated. All rights reserved.

Technical Methods of Content Filtering China censors the Internet through website blocking and key word filtering, primarily at the router level. Routers are devices through which packets of data are directed until they reach their final destination. In China, routers are programmed to channel Uniform Resource Locators (URLs) through proxy servers, which look for politically sensitive words such as “falun” (as in “www.faluninfo.net” of the banned Falun Gong spiritual movement), and send back an error message (e.g., “file not found”) to the Internet user who requested the page. Internet search results are similarly blocked. For example, although the phrase “Taiwan independence,” may not be part of a website URL, entering this phrase into a search engine would result in a URL followed by those words (i.e., http://www.google.com/search?Taiwan+ Independence), which would trigger the router to filter and block the search results.[29] The OpenNet Initiative found that China tolerates occasional over-blocking as the price of preventing access to prohibited sites.[30]

Cyber-Police, Punitive Action, and Self-Censorship For those websites that bypass automated filtering, China’s Ministry of Public Security (MPS) reportedly employs 30,000 human monitors, or “cyberpolice,” to monitor Internet content.[31] This cyber-police force, established in 2000, operates as a division within the police departments of 700 cities and provinces in China. Along with investigating online crimes, such as spreading viruses, pornography, or attempting financial fraud, the cyber-police monitor websites and email content and remove objectionable or subversive material.[32]

Human Rights in China, Nova Science Publishers, Incorporated, 2009. ProQuest Ebook Central,

Copyright © 2009. Nova Science Publishers, Incorporated. All rights reserved.

52

Thomas Lum

In addition to an established Internet police force, the Chinese government solicits help from citizens themselves to monitor Internet content. In July 2004, the MPS established a network of online reporting centers accompanied by a rewards component that encourages citizens to report “illegal” or “harmful” information.[33] Xinhua News Agency disclosed that by October 2004, 50 citizens were rewarded 5 00-2,000 yuan ($62-$247) for reporting pornography and 18 citizens were rewarded 3,000 to 10,000 yuan ($370-$ 1,235) for reporting illegal online gambling. Although Xinhua did not disclose statistics for citizens who reported “subversive” political content, the guidelines on the cyber-police website state that citizen vigilance should not be limited to reporting pornography, but should extend to online political activities as well.[34] China reportedly holds between 15 and 54 “cyber dissidents” in prison for posting messages or articles on the Internet that were considered subversive.[35] Amnesty International stated that some cyber dissidents were charged with revealing state secrets or endangering state security and received prison sentences of two to twelve years.[36] Although the government generally does not prosecute citizens who receive dissident e-mail publications, forwarding such messages sometimes results in detention. The detainment of Internet political writers reflects Chinese repression of free media in general; according to the Committee to Protect Journalists, in 2005, 32 journalists were imprisoned in the PRC.[37] Since prohibited topics such as “state secrets” have not been clearly defined by PRC authorities, many reporters, writers, and Internet users exercise self-censorship to avoid the risk of losing their jobs or facing criminal liability.[38]

U.S. PRIVATE SECTOR INVOLVEMENT IN PRC INTERNET CENSORSHIP Within the United States, there has been considerable discussion surrounding the alleged complicity of private U.S. companies in the development and maintenance of PRC Internet filtering. Some contend that when presented with large profit potential, U.S. corporations are willing to overlook violations of freedom of expression in China. Others argue that, despite problems with censorship regarding a limited number of topics, U.S. investment in China’s Internet industry has led to the greater flow of global information in the country. Some analysts suggest that China’s sophisticated Internet infrastructure would not be possible without technology and equipment imported from U.S. and other foreign companies. For China’s latest network upgrade, “CN2,” which began in mid-

Human Rights in China, Nova Science Publishers, Incorporated, 2009. ProQuest Ebook Central,

Copyright © 2009. Nova Science Publishers, Incorporated. All rights reserved.

Internet Development and Information Control…

53

2004, two U.S. companies, Cisco Systems and Juniper Networks, were granted four out of six contracts. Cisco Systems, a U.S. telecommunications equipment company, has previously faced allegations that it assisted China in developing censorship capabilities.[39] In its recent router contract for CN2, Cisco will provide China with its 12000 Series routers, which are equipped with filtering capability typically used to prevent Internet attacks (i.e., worms and viruses). This technology can also be used by PRC authorities to block politically sensitive content.[40] Derek Bambauer, a researcher at the OpenNet Initiative, believes that without this upgrade, routers in China are not searching deeply within packets of data for banned keywords, because it would put an enormous load on the routers. Some contend that Cisco routers and the CN2 network upgrade may enable Chinese authorities to employ more sophisticated keyword filtering.[41] Cisco denies allegations that it has altered its products to suit the objectives of PRC cyber-policing. Cisco has declared that it does not tailor its products to the China market, and the products it sells in China are the same as those in other countries.[42] In addition to U.S. companies, such as Cisco, that provide hardware, a number of U.S. software and Internet service providers, such as Yahoo and Microsoft, have been accused of complying with censorship in China.[43] In 2002, Yahoo was condemned by human rights groups for voluntarily signing a pledge of “selfdiscipline,” promising to follow China’s censorship laws. In June 2005, Microsoft’s blog-hosting service, MSN Spaces, began removing words like “democracy” and “human rights” from use in Chinese blog titles and postings.[44] In December 2005, human rights activists criticized Microsoft after the company, at the PRC government’s behest, removed the MSN Spaces Web log of a well-known Chinese journalist, Zhao Jing. Zhao, who worked for the Beijing Bureau of the New York Times, occasionally broached sensitive political topics on his blog, such as a recent strike at a city newspaper. In January 2006, Microsoft announced a new policy for foreign countries whereby the company would close personal Web logs only if presented with a legally-binding order, inform its users of the reason for the removal, and continue to make such blogs accessible in other countries.[45] In January 2006, Google announced that it would launch a search engine in China. Google’ s U.S.-based site currently is the second-most popular search engine in China, despite the PRC government’s occasional blocking of it, with an estimated 23% share of the market, after the Chinese Internet content provider Baidu (37%) and followed closely by Yahoo (21%). Google will not offer e-mail or blog services in China in order to avoid the possibility of having to divulge private Internet user information to the PRC government. Google reportedly will comply with PRC laws regarding censorship of information deemed inappropriate or illegal, but plans to disclose when such information was removed for censorship purposes.[46] Paris-based

Human Rights in China, Nova Science Publishers, Incorporated, 2009. ProQuest Ebook Central,

54

Thomas Lum

Reporters without Borders reacted to the Google announcement by stating that “it was a black day for freedom of expression in China.”[47] Other U.S. companies, such as Secure Computing, Fortinet, and Websense, have also been accused of aiding China’s Internet filtering capabilities, but the evidence currently available does not appear to indicate their direct involvement in the PRC government’s national censorship system. In 2004, Secure Computing, which makes Internet filtering software, sold authentication systems, or user identification systems, to China’s major telecommunications companies. Fortinet sells anti-virus firewall technology to Internet, governmental, educational, retail, and foreign business institutions and establishments in China. Websense reportedly provides Web filtering and monitoring software to Chinese companies. Websense spokespersons have stated that the company has not licensed the PRC government to use its technology to censor personal Internet access and that it would decline to sell its products to the PRC government if they would be used for nationwide censorship purposes.[48]

Copyright © 2009. Nova Science Publishers, Incorporated. All rights reserved.

Yahoo and Shi Tao Case Yahoo has come under fire for giving the personal e-mail address of a Chinese journalist, Shi Tao, to PRC government authorities, which led to his criminal conviction and sentence of 10 years in prison. In April 2004, Shi, who was an editor at Contemporary Business News based in Hunan province, attended an editorial meeting in which government officials read an internal document outlining media restrictions before the 15th anniversary of the 1989 Tiananmen Square crackdown in June 2004. Shi sent copies of his notes via his personal Yahoo e-mail account to a pro-democracy organization in the United States. PRC state security authorities later requested information from Yahoo that enabled them to identify Shi and use it in his conviction. Jerry Yang, co-founder and senior executive of Yahoo, confirmed that his company gave Chinese authorities information and described the company’s compliance as part of the legal burden of doing business in China.[49]

Human Rights in China, Nova Science Publishers, Incorporated, 2009. ProQuest Ebook Central,

Internet Development and Information Control…

55

U.S. GOVERNMENT EFFORTS TO PROMOTE UNRESTRICTED INTERNET ACCESS IN CHINA Some U.S. officials have expressed their belief that the growth of the Internet and other information technologies will help bring about wide-scale democratization abroad. Former U.S. Secretaries of State James A. Baker and Madeleine Albright are quoted as supporting information technologies in foreign countries as a way to promote their eventual democratization.[50] U.S. Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld has also made statements on the importance of political freedoms in China: “Every society has to be vigilant against another type of Great Wall ... a wall that limits speech, information, and choices.”[51] The State Department has censured the Chinese government by including an explanation of the PRC’s media and Internet controls and related persecution of political dissidents in its annual human rights report.[52] However, aside from diplomatic rebukes of China’s restrictions on freedom expression, U.S. actions to combat Internet censorship in China have primarily been in the form of funding for anti-censorship software.

Copyright © 2009. Nova Science Publishers, Incorporated. All rights reserved.

Congressional Action In the 108th Congress, Representatives Christopher Cox and Tom Lantos and other Members introduced The Global Internet Freedom Act (H.R. 48), a bill to establish an Office of Global Internet Freedom and to develop and implement strategies to combat state-sponsored Internet jamming and persecution of those who use the Internet. In the 109th Congress, Representative Cox reintroduced the Global Internet Freedom Act as H.R. 2216. The bill was referred to the House Committee on International Relations. On February 1, 2006, the Congressional Human Rights Caucus held a hearing entitled, “Human Rights and the Internet — The People’s Republic of China.” On February 15, 2006, the Subcommittee on Africa, Global Human Rights and International Operations of the House International Relations Committee will hold a joint hearing with the Subcommittee on Asia and the Pacific regarding the Internet and censorship in China.

International Broadcasting Bureau The U.S. Broadcasting Board of Governors (BBG), which oversees the International Broadcasting Bureau (IBB), has promoted Internet freedom in China by focusing on its Voice of America (VOA) and Radio Free Asia (RFA) websites, which are regularly blocked by Chinese authorities. In 2001, the BBG provided

Human Rights in China, Nova Science Publishers, Incorporated, 2009. ProQuest Ebook Central,

56

Thomas Lum

Copyright © 2009. Nova Science Publishers, Incorporated. All rights reserved.

$100,000 to Safeweb Inc., a government contracted company that also had been briefly funded by the CIA, to set up proxy servers to help Chinese Internet users access prohibited information.[53] However, within a year, Safeweb’ s technology was reportedly unsuccessful in protecting user identities.[54] Since 2003, the BBG has funded Dynamic Internet Technology (DynaWeb) and UltraReach, which have each developed software to enable Chinese Internet users to access VOA and RFA websites (see table 1). Funding for these Chinese programs constitutes about three-fourths of the BBG’s global anti-jamming expenditures, which are expected to grow by about 28% in 2006 from the previous year. DynaWeb’ s website is difficult to block because of “anonymizing” technology that regularly changes its numerical Internet Protocol (IP) address. Dynaweb president, Bill Xia, disclosed that earlier efforts to provide Chinese Internet users with unblocked IP addresses through an e-mail subscription service had failed because censors had also subscribed to the service, and quickly blocked those sites as well.[55] According to Xia, DynaWeb must evolve according to how China censors the Internet, and that “both parties can always implement new technologies to stay ahead and sustain the advantage.” However, in testimony before the Congressional- Executive Commission on China, Xia stated that censors have a “brighter future,” because China purchases the most advanced censorship technology from Western companies and has more resources than counter-censorship efforts in the United States.[56] Table 1. Broadcasting Board of Governors Funding for Counter-Censorship Technology in China FY2003

FY2004

FY2005

Dynaweb

$497,700

$806,326

$685,000

UltraReach

$3,000

$21,000

$42,003

Total

$500,700

$827,326

$727,003

Source: Broadcasting Board of Governors.

As of April 2005, Dynamic’s homepage was viewed about 90,000 times per day, while UltraReach allows approximately 4,000 visits and 30,000 page views for VOA and 2,600 visits and 28,000 page views for RFA daily.[57] Visits to these sites reportedly rise when PRC censorship tightens, such as during the SARS outbreak of 2003. The BBG disseminates Chinese-language news summaries, some of which contain critical opinions or stories about China, to recipients in China via e-mail. These e-mails employ techniques that circumvent censorship and

Human Rights in China, Nova Science Publishers, Incorporated, 2009. ProQuest Ebook Central,

Internet Development and Information Control…

57

include IP addresses of proxy servers through which users may view VOA and RFA reports.[58] Some U.S. companies are developing software for Chinese Internet users to circumvent the PRC government censorship firewall entirely. In February 2006, Anonymizer Inc., a company that specializes in identity protection technology, announced that it was developing anti-censorship software for Internet users in the PRC. Anonymizer’ s China program would provide a regularly changing URL which Chinese Internet users could access for unfettered links to the World Wide Web. According to the company, users’ identities would also be protected from online tracking and monitoring by the PRC government. Peacefire, a free speech advocacy organization and website, has developed protocols for circumventing Internet blocking programs that can be used by Chinese Web users.[59]

Copyright © 2009. Nova Science Publishers, Incorporated. All rights reserved.

ISSUES FOR U.S. POLICY Human rights organizations, U.S. government officials, U.S. Internet companies, and experts on the development of the Internet and censorship in China have made wide-ranging recommendations for expanding Internet freedom in China. These policy suggestions include enacting legal prohibitions on U.S. companies that would aid PRC government censorship efforts; creating U.S. governmental institutions for promoting global Internet freedom; funding the development of counter-censorship technologies; applying greater pressure at the government-to-government level; and establishing codes of conduct for U.S. Internet companies in China that promote free expression within the confines of PRC political and business realities. Some analysts recommend making laws that would prohibit U.S. companies from locating their servers, offering e-mail services, or selling surveillance and filtering technology in countries with repressive regimes such as China. The U.S.China Economic and Security Review Commission advocates the creation of an executive branch office that would monitor global Internet censorship and promote the development of anti-censorship technology.[60] In its annual report for 2005, the Congressional-Executive Commission on China recommended that Congress should appropriate funds to support technologies that would help Chinese citizens access Internet-based information that is officially censored. Some U.S. Internet companies in China argue that their own efforts to resist PRC government demands to comply with censorship norms would be enhanced by higher profile U.S. government pressure on the Chinese government. U.S. Internet companies in China reportedly are also considering how to develop common responses that would attempt to strike a balance between promoting free expression or protesting

Human Rights in China, Nova Science Publishers, Incorporated, 2009. ProQuest Ebook Central,

58

Thomas Lum

censorship and operating within an authoritarian political system. For example, some U.S. Internet companies have announced policies of informing users when content is unavailable due to government censorship restrictions and demanding that PRC authorities provide clear legal bases for complying with Chinese government demands regarding censorship and the investigation of Internet users.[61] Some observers hold that there needs to be more demand from Chinese people themselves to obtain uncensored information. They posit that if demand for free information is great enough from within China, the government will be more inclined to loosen its grip on Internet information controls.[62] When the popular search engine, Google, was blocked in 2002, some observers believe that the Chinese government gave into pressure and lifted the block after only 10 days because of the flood of complaints received from Chinese researchers and Internet users.[63]

REFERENCES [1] [2]

Copyright © 2009. Nova Science Publishers, Incorporated. All rights reserved.

[3] [4]

[5] [6]

[7]

[8]

OpenNet Initiative, “Internet Filtering in China in 2004-2005: A Country Study,” April 2005, [http://www.opennetinitiative.net/studies/china/]. He Qinglian, “Media Control in China,” November 4, 2004, China Rights Forum, [http://www.hrichina.org/public/contents/899 1]. This report is a revised version of the original report by Michelle W. Lau. Shanthi Kalathil and Taylor C. Boas, “Wired for Modernization in China” in Open Networks Closed Regimes, 13 (Washington DC: Carnegie Endowment, 2003). For an overview of the earlier development of China’s Internet industry, see CRS Report RL30636, China’s Internet Industry, by Thomas Lum. “More than 11 1M Chinese Log on,” Australian Broadcasting Corporation News, January 19, 2006. China Internet Network Information Center (CNNIC), 16th Statistical Survey Report on the Internet Development in China, July 2005. Latest data can be found at [http://www.cnnic.net.cn]. “Net User Tally in China Nears 134 million,” South China Morning Post, February 4, 2005, at [http://www.asiamedia.ucla.edu/ article.asp?parentid=20477]. Kalathil and Boas, op. cit., 23. “China: News agency reports on role of internet in people’s lives,” Xinhua News Agency, October 7, 2005, accessed via BBC Monitoring Media.

Human Rights in China, Nova Science Publishers, Incorporated, 2009. ProQuest Ebook Central,

Internet Development and Information Control… [9]

[10]

[11]

[12] [13]

[14] [15] [16] [17]

Copyright © 2009. Nova Science Publishers, Incorporated. All rights reserved.

[18]

[19] [20] [21]

[22]

[23] [24] [25]

59

“In China, Information Slips Through the Net,” Washington Post, January 15, 2006;Bruce Einhorn, “How China Controls the Internet,” Business Week Online. Guo Liang, Surveying Internet Usage and Impact in Twelve Chinese Cities (Beijing: Research Center for on Social Development, Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, 2005). U.S. Department of State, Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor, Country Reports on Human Rights Practices, 2004 — China (February 2005). OpenNet Initiative, op. cit., 3. Chen Siwu and Yu Hong, “China Holds Forum on ‘Cleaning’ Internet,” Xinhua News Agency, October 17, 2005 ( BBC Monitoring Asia Pacific). “China Blocks Access to Internet Encyclopedia,” Kyodo News, October 26, 2005, Open Net Initiative, op. cit. “China, Japan Eye Textbook Tension,” BBC World Monitoring. April 11, 2005. “Muted Goodbye to Chinese Reformer,” BBC News, January 29, 2005. OpenNet Intiative, op. cit., 8. For complete list of these agencies, see Appendix 2. Measure for the Administration of Internet Information Services, September 25, 2000, translation available at [http://www.cecc.gov/pages/ virtualAcad/exp/explaws.php]. OpenNet Intiative, op. cit., 11. “China Closes 47,000 Internet Cafes in 2004,” Xinhua News Agency, March 1, 2005 (BBC Monitoring Asia Pacific). Computer Information Network and Internet Security, Protection and Management Regulations, translation and summary in OpenNet Initiative, op. cit. Rules on the Administration of Internet News Information Services, translation available at [http://www.cecc.gov/pages/virtualAcad/ index.phpd?showsingle= 24396]. “China Internet: Government Tightens Controls Again,” Economist Intelligence Unit, October 12, 2005. Joseph Kahn, “China Tightens its Restrictions for News Media on the Internet,” New York Times, September 26, 2005. “China Tightens Supervision over Online News Services,” China Daily, September 26, 2005.

Human Rights in China, Nova Science Publishers, Incorporated, 2009. ProQuest Ebook Central,

Copyright © 2009. Nova Science Publishers, Incorporated. All rights reserved.

60

Thomas Lum

[26] Anick Jesdanun, “China Targets Tech-savvy Protesters,” Contra Costa Times, October 2, 2005. [27] “China Internet: Cracking down as China Opens up” Economist Intelligence Unit, October 4, 2005. [28] “In China, Information Slips Through the Net,” op. cit. [29] Testimony of Kenneth Berman, Director of Information Technology, International Broadcasting Bureau, before the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, April 14, 2005. [30] OpenNet Intiative, op. cit., 51. [31] U.S. Department of State, Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor, op. cit.; Traci E. Carpenter, “Great Firewall,” MSNBC.com, July 21, 2005. [32] Testimony of Xiao Qiang, Director of China Internet Project, UC Berkeley, before the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, April 14, 2004; and Steven Cherry, “The Net Effect,” Spectrum, June 2005. [33] Foreign Broadcasting Information Service (FBIS), “Analysis: PRC Solicits Citizen Help in Controlling Internet Content,” August 19, 2005. [34] [http://cyberpolice.cn]. [35] Jonathan Watts, “Internet Censorship,” The Guardian, January 25, 2006; “USA: Watchdog Claims China and Cuba are Top Jailers of Journalists,” BBC, December 14, 2005; “Internet Under Surveillance 2004,” Reporters Sans Frontieres, at [http://www.rsf.org]. [36] “Controls Tighten as Internet Activism Grows,” Amnesty International, January 28, 2004. [37] Testimony of Frank Smyth, Representative from the Committee to Protect Journalists, before the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, on April 14, 2005. [38] He Qinglian, op. cit. [39] Ethan Gutman, Losing the New China: A Story of American Commerce, Desire, and Betrayal, Encounter Books, 2004. [40] The OpenNet Intiative, op cit. [41] Steven Cherry, “The Net Effect,” Spectrum, Electrical and Electronics Engineers, Inc. (EEEI), June 2005. [42] Kevin Poulsen, “Critics Squeeze Cisco Over China,” Wired News, July 29, 2005, at [http://www.wired.com]. [43] Tina Rosenberg, “Building the Great Firewall of China, with Foreign Help,” The New York Times, September 18, 2005; Fang Yuan, “Microsoft Filters ‘Democracy’ in China” Radio Free Asia, June 20, 2005.

Human Rights in China, Nova Science Publishers, Incorporated, 2009. ProQuest Ebook Central,

Copyright © 2009. Nova Science Publishers, Incorporated. All rights reserved.

Internet Development and Information Control…

61

[44] “Microsoft Censors Chinese Blogs,” BBC News, June 14, 2005. [45] “Microsoft Amends Policies Regarding Blog Shutdowns,” San Jose Mercury News, January 31, 2006. [46] Most search engines in China will simply post a message, “This page cannot be displayed” when requested information is censored. [47] [http://www.rsf.org] [48] Amnesty International, “State Control of the Internet in China,” November 26, 2002; Amnesty International, “Controls Tighten as Internet Activism Grows,” January 28, 2004; “Secure Computing Extends Strong Authentication Leadership in China Telecommunications Market with China Telecom Win” [http://www.securecomputing.com/news], February 10, 2004; “Fortinet Adds to Growing Customer Base in China,” Market Wire News [http://www.marketwire.com], March 25, 2003; “Companies Defend Against Chinese Censorship,” Network World [http://www.networkworld.com], December 2, 2002; Statement from Websense representative, February 10, 2006. [49] Peter S. Goodman, “Yahoo Says it gave China Internet Data,” Washington Post, September 11, 2005. [50] Randolph Kluver, “US and China Policy Expectations of the Internet” China Information, vol. 29, no. 2 (2005). [51] Thom Shanker, “Rumsfeld Urges Openness in China.” Houston Chronicle, October 19, 2005. [52] Department of State, Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor, Country Reports on Human Rights Practices - 2004 (China), February 28, 2005. [53] Murray Hiebert, “Counters to Chinese Checkers,” Far Eastern Economic Review, November 7, 2002. [54] Oxblood Ruffin, “Great Firewall of China,” New Scientist (London), November 9, 2002. [55] Bill Xia, president of DynaWeb, “China’s Cyber-Wall: Can technology Break Through?” Testimony before the Congressional-Executive Commission on China, November 4, 2002. [56] Ibid. [57] James C. Mulvenon, DGI Center for Intelligence Research and Analysis, “Breaching the Great Firewall,” Testimony before the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, April 14, 2005. [58] Kenneth Berman, Director of Information Technology, International Broadcasting Bureau, “China’s State Control Mechanisms and Methods,”

Human Rights in China, Nova Science Publishers, Incorporated, 2009. ProQuest Ebook Central,

62

[59]

[60]

[61]

Testimony before the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, April 14, 2005. “Anonymizer to Provide Censor-Free Internet to China” [http://www.anonymizer.com/consumer/media/press_releases/020 12006], February 1, 2006. Anonymizer receives funding from the BBG ($72,000 in 2005) primarily for VOA anti- blocking efforts in Iran. Peacefire received $24,600 in 2005 from the BBG for counter- censorship objectives globally, including China. See Statement of Carolyn Bartholomew before the Congressional Human Rights Caucus Hearing on Human Rights and the Internet — the People’s Republic of China, February 1, 2006. David Barboza, “Version of Google Won’t Offer E-Mail or Blogs,” New York Times, January 25, 2006; “Microsoft Amends Policies Regarding Blog Shutdowns,” op. cit. Xia, op. cit. November 2005, Interview by author with prominent Chinese researcher, who prefers to be unidentified.

Copyright © 2009. Nova Science Publishers, Incorporated. All rights reserved.

[62] [63]

Thomas Lum

Human Rights in China, Nova Science Publishers, Incorporated, 2009. ProQuest Ebook Central,

In: Human Rights in China Editor: Lee R. Massingdale, pp. 63-78

ISBN: 978-1-60741-116-1 © 2009 Nova Science Publishers, Inc.

Chapter 3

CHINA AND FALUN GONG

*

Thomas Lum ABSTRACT

Copyright © 2009. Nova Science Publishers, Incorporated. All rights reserved.

In 1999, the “Falun Gong” movement gave rise to the largest and most protracted public demonstrations in China since the democracy movement of a decade earlier. The People’s Republic of China (PRC) government, fearful of a political challenge and the spread of social unrest, outlawed Falun Gong and carried out an intensive, comprehensive, and unforgiving campaign against the movement. Since 2003, Falun Gong has been largely suppressed or pushed deep underground in China while it has thrived in overseas Chinese communities and Hong Kong. The spiritual exercise group has become highly visible in the United States since 1999, staging demonstrations, distributing flyers, and sponsoring cultural events. In addition, Falun Gong followers are affiliated with several mass media outlets. Despite the group’s tenacity and political activities overseas, it has not formed the basis of a dissident movement encompassing other social and political groups from China. The State Department, in its annual International Religious Freedom Report (November 2005), designated China as a “country of particular concern” (CPC) for the sixth consecutive year, noting: “The arrest, detention, and imprisonment of Falun Gong practitioners continued; those who refused to recant their beliefs were sometimes subjected to harsh treatment in prisons and reeducation-through-labor camps, and there were credible reports of deaths due to torture and abuse.” In March 2006, U.S. Falun Gong representatives claimed that thousands of practitioners had been sent to 36 concentration *

Excerpted from CRS Report RL33437, dated August 11, 2006.

Human Rights in China, Nova Science Publishers, Incorporated, 2009. ProQuest Ebook Central,

64

Thomas Lum camps throughout the PRC. According to their allegations, at one such site in Sujiatun, near the city of Shenyang, a hospital has been used as a detention center for 6,000 Falun Gong prisoners, three-fourths of whom are said to have been killed and had their organs harvested for profit. American officials from the U.S. Embassy in Beijing and the U.S. consulate in Shenyang visited the area as well as inspected the hospital on two occasions and “found no evidence that the site is being used for any function other than as a normal public hospital.” Since 1999, some Members of the United States Congress have made many public pronouncements and introduced several resolutions in support of Falun Gong and criticizing China’s human rights record. In the 109th Congress, H.Res. 608, agreed to in the House on June 12, 2006, condemns the “escalating levels of religious persecution” in China, including the “brutal campaign to eradicate Falun Gong.” H.Res. 794, passed by the House on June 12, 2006, calls upon the PRC to end its most egregious human rights abuses, including the persecution of Falun Gong. In January 2006, U.S. citizen Charles Li was released from a PRC prison after serving a three-year term for “intending to sabotage” broadcasting equipment in China on behalf of Falun Gong.

Copyright © 2009. Nova Science Publishers, Incorporated. All rights reserved.

OVERVIEW Since July 1999, when the Chinese government began detaining thousands of Falun Gong (FLG) adherents, the spiritual exercise movement has gained the attention of many U.S. policy makers, primarily as an international human rights concern. Many FLG practitioners reportedly have died or remain in PRC prisons or other forms of detention. In 2005, the United States Commission on International Religious Freedom recommended that China remain as a “country of particular concern” (CPC) and stated that crackdowns on the group have been “widespread and violent.”[1] On the basis of this recommendation, the State Department, in its annual International Religious Freedom Report (November 2005), designated China as a CPC for the sixth consecutive year, noting: “The arrest, detention, and imprisonment of Falun Gong practitioners continued; those who refused to recant their beliefs were sometimes subjected to harsh treatment in prisons and reeducation-through-labor camps, and there were credible reports of deaths due to torture and abuse.”[2] The PRC government appears to have been largely successful in not only suppressing FLG activity in China but also discrediting Falun Gong in the eyes of PRC citizens and preventing linkages between Falun Gong and other social protest movements. Nonetheless, FLG followers have displayed a remarkable tenacity and dedication both domestically and abroad. They have become a recurring irritant in China’s efforts to project an image of a peaceful world power that abides by

Human Rights in China, Nova Science Publishers, Incorporated, 2009. ProQuest Ebook Central,

China and Falun Gong

65

international norms, and have raised suspicions among some PRC leaders that the U.S. government is colluding with them. On April 20, 2006, at the official welcoming ceremony of PRC President Hu Jintao’ s visit to Washington, D.C., Ms. Wang Wenyi, a reporter for the Epoch Times, interrupted Hu’ s speech by shouting in support of Falun Gong for more than two minutes before being hustled away by U.S. security agents. Although ostensibly not a political movement, Falun Gong practitioners in the United States have become visible and vocal, particularly in major U.S. cities and in Washington, D.C., in criticizing the PRC government and publicizing human rights abuses against their fellow members in China. The PRC government reportedly also has been aggressive abroad, attempting to refute FLG claims and counteract their activities.

BASIC DESCRIPTIONS AND MAJOR EVENTS

Copyright © 2009. Nova Science Publishers, Incorporated. All rights reserved.

What is Falun Gong? “Falun Gong,”also known as “Falun Dafa,”[3] combines an exercise regimen with meditation, moral values, spiritual beliefs, and faith. The practice and beliefs are derived from qigong, a set of movements said to stimulate the flow of qi — vital energies or “life forces” — throughout the body, and Buddhist and Daoist concepts. Falun Gong upholds three main virtues — truthfulness, compassion, and forbearance (zhen-shan-ren) — which may deliver practitioners from modern society’s “materialism” and “moral degeneration.”[4] FLG adherents claim that by controlling the “wheel of dharma,” which is said to revolve in the body, one can cure a wide range of medical ailments and diseases. They believe that by practicing Falun Gong, or “cultivation,” they may achieve physical well-being, emotional tranquility, moral virtue, an understanding of the cosmos, and a higher level of existence or salvation.[5] Some observers maintain that Falun Gong resembles a cult and refer to the unquestioning support given to its founder, Master Li Hongzhi, departure from orthodox Buddhism and Daoism, and emphasis on supernatural powers. Others criticize the spiritual practice for being intolerant or exclusive. The PRC government charges that Falun Dafa has disrupted social order and contributed to the deaths of hundreds of Chinese practitioners and non-practitioners by discouraging medical treatment and causing or exacerbating mental disorders leading to violent acts. FLG followers counter that the practice is voluntary and that levels of faith and involvement vary with the individual practitioner. They also emphasize that Falun

Human Rights in China, Nova Science Publishers, Incorporated, 2009. ProQuest Ebook Central,

66

Thomas Lum

Gong is not a religion — there is no worship of a deity, all-inclusive system of beliefs, church or temple, or formal hierarchy.

Copyright © 2009. Nova Science Publishers, Incorporated. All rights reserved.

Formation and Organization During the mid-1990s, Falun Gong acquired a large and diverse following, with estimates ranging from 3 to 70 million members, including several thousand practitioners in the United States.[6] Falun Gong attracted many retired persons as well as factory workers, farmers, state enterprise managers, entrepreneurs, intellectuals, and students in China. The practice’s claimed healing powers became especially attractive as economic reforms caused many citizens to lose medical benefits and services. In addition, Falun Gong reportedly was embraced by many retired and active Chinese Communist Party (CCP) and government cadres and military officials and personnel. In 1999, then Vice-President Hu Jintao stated that of 2.1 million known members of the Falun Gong group, one-third belonged to the CCP.[7] Falun Gong’s apparently loose but effective organization has remained somewhat mysterious. During the early phase of the crackdown, adherents of Falun Gong generally characterized their objectives as personal and limited in scope. They described their movement as being loosely organized and without any political agenda beyond protecting the constitutional rights of practitioners in China. According to some analysts, however, the movement was well organized before the crackdown in 1999. After the government banned Falun Gong, a more fluid, underground network, aided by the Internet, pagers, and cell phones, carried on for over two years.[8]

Master Li Hongzhi Li Hongzhi (“Master Li”), a former Grain Bureau clerk, developed Falun Gong in the late 1980s, when qigong began to gain popularity in China. In 1992, Li explained his ideas in a book, Zhuan Falun. Falun Gong was incorporated into an official organization, the Chinese Qigong Association, in 1993 but separated from it by 1996.[9] Around this time, Li reportedly left China.[10] Since 1999, Li, who lives with his family outside New York City, has remained in seclusion, but has made occasional appearances at Falun Gong gatherings. In 2005 and 2006, Li gave lectures to followers in Chicago, New York, San Francisco, and Los Angeles. Some reports suggest that Li Hongzhi has directed his adherents from behind the scenes

Human Rights in China, Nova Science Publishers, Incorporated, 2009. ProQuest Ebook Central,

China and Falun Gong

67

and that his public statements are interpreted by many Falun Gong practitioners as instructions.

Copyright © 2009. Nova Science Publishers, Incorporated. All rights reserved.

The 1999 FLG Demonstrations and PRC Government Crackdown On April 25, 1999, an estimated 10,000 to 30,000 Falun Gong practitioners from around China gathered in Beijing to protest the PRC government’s growing restrictions on their activities. Some adherents presented an open letter to the Party leadership at its residential compound, Zhongnanhai, demanding official recognition and their constitutional rights to free speech, press, and assembly. Party leaders reportedly were split on whether to ban Falun Gong and conveyed contradictory messages.[11] Premier Zhu Rongji reportedly met with a delegation of practitioners and told them that they would not be punished. By contrast, President Jiang Zemin was said to be shocked by the affront to Party authority and ordered the crackdown. Jiang was also angered by the apparent ease with which U.S. officials had granted Li Hongzhi a visa and feared U.S. involvement in the movement. The government produced circulars forbidding Party members from practicing Falun Gong. Security forces collected the names of instructors, infiltrated exercise classes, and closed book stalls selling Falun Dafa literature. Tensions escalated as followers engaged in 18 major demonstrations, including occupying a government building in the city of Nanchang and demonstrating in front of China Central Television Station in Beijing. The official crackdown began on July 21, 1999, when Falun Gong was outlawed and an arrest warrant was issued for Li Hongzhi. On October 30, 1999, China’s National People’s Congress promulgated an “anti-cult” law (article 300 of the Criminal Law), effective retroactively, to suppress not only the Falun Gong movement but also thousands of religious sects across the country. However, Ye Xiaowen, director of the State Bureau of Religious Affairs, stated that police would not interfere with people who practiced alone in their own homes.[12] In Beijing alone, public security officers closed 67 teaching stations and 1,627 practice sites.[13] In the immediate aftermath, the state reportedly detained and questioned over 30,000 followers nationwide, releasing the vast majority of them after they promised to quit or identified group organizers. Under article 300, cult leaders and recruiters may be sentenced to 7 or more years in prison, while cult members who disrupt public order or distribute publications may be sentenced to three to seven years in prison.[14] During the first two years of the crackdown, between 150 and 450 group leaders and other members were tried for various crimes and sentenced to prison terms of up to 18-20 years.

Human Rights in China, Nova Science Publishers, Incorporated, 2009. ProQuest Ebook Central,

Copyright © 2009. Nova Science Publishers, Incorporated. All rights reserved.

68

Thomas Lum

Estimates of those who have spent time in detention or “labor reeducation” range from 10,000 to100,000 persons.[15] According to estimates by the State Department and human rights organizations, since 1999, from several hundred to a few thousand FLG adherents have died in custody from torture, abuse, and neglect. Many other followers have been suspended or expelled from school or demoted or dismissed from their jobs. It took the PRC government, employing methods of social control that have deep roots in both Chinese Communist Party practice and Chinese history, over two years to subdue the Falun Gong organization. Incremental improvements in the rule of law in China in the past decade have had little if any effect in protecting the constitutional rights of FLG followers. In 1999, the central government reportedly combined an intensive propaganda campaign with stern internal party directives and reliance upon a system of informal control at the local level. At first, the local enforcement of government decrees, such as those requiring universities, employers, and neighborhood committees to obtain individual repudiations of Falun Gong, was often lax.[16] Some reports suggested that local officials had hoped that they could persuade Falun Gong members to give up the practice or at least refrain from engaging in public protests in the capital. However, between July 1999 and October 2000, many Falun Gong adherents continued to journey to Beijing and staged several large demonstrations (involving several hundred to over a thousand persons) — many participants were sent home repeatedly or evaded the police. As Falun Gong demonstrations continued, the government crackdown took on a greater sense of urgency. The PRC leadership employed a traditional method of threats and incentives toward lower authorities to prevent public displays of Falun Gong, particularly demonstrations in Beijing. Central leaders turned a blind eye to local methods of suppression against unrepentant practitioners, including the reported use of torture. The largest memberships and severest human rights abuses have been reported in China’s northeastern provinces.[17]

FALUN GONG ACTIVITIES UNDERGROUND AND OVERSEAS AND CONTINUED GOVERNMENT REPRESSION There has been little, if any, FLG activity reported in the past year, although the State Department reported that in 2005, there were still hundreds of thousands of practitioners in the country.[18] Many FLG followers are believed to be still practicing in their homes or meeting secretly. One source estimates that there are 60,000

Human Rights in China, Nova Science Publishers, Incorporated, 2009. ProQuest Ebook Central,

China and Falun Gong

69

FLG practitioners left in China: half of them are still in detention while the other half remain under surveillance.[19] According to another expert, there are between 15,000 and 25,000 political or religious prisoners in China, half of whom are linked to the Falun Gong movement.[20] FLG members in the United States claim that adherents in China continue to disseminate written information about the practice.

Interruption of Television Broadcasts

Copyright © 2009. Nova Science Publishers, Incorporated. All rights reserved.

Between 2002 and 2005, in about a dozen reported cases, Falun Gong members interrupted programming in several large Chinese cities and broadcast their own images, possibly with the aid of sources outside the country.[21] In 2002, PRC courts sentenced 27 practitioners to prison terms of 4 to 20 years for carrying out these activities. In July 2005, satellite broadcasts reportedly were interrupted by a 15minute FLG video.[22] On May 19, 2003, U.S. citizen Charles Li was sentenced to three years in prison for “intending to sabotage” Chinese television broadcasts. Li returned to California after he was released in January 2006. U.S. consular officials had maintained regular contact with Li through his detainment. In a letter that he sent while under incarceration, Li reportedly wrote of physical and mental abuse in prison.

Alleged Concentration Camps and Organ Harvesting In March 2006, U.S. Falun Gong representatives claimed that thousands of practitioners had been sent to 36 concentration camps throughout the PRC, particularly in the northeast, and that many of them were killed for profit through the harvesting and sale of their organs. Many of these claims were based upon allegations about one such camp in Sujiatun, a district of Shenyang city in Liaoning province. The Epoch Times, a U.S.-based newspaper affiliated with Falun Gong, first reported the story as told by a Chinese journalist based in Japan and a former employee of a Sujiatun hospital that allegedly operated the camp and served as an organ harvesting center.[23] According to Epoch Times reports, of an estimated 6,000 Falun Gong adherents detained there, three-fourths allegedly had their organs removed and then were cremated or never seen again.[24] American officials from the U.S. Embassy in Beijing and the U.S. consulate in Shenyang visited the area as well as the hospital site on two occasions — the first time unannounced and the second with the cooperation of PRC officials — and after investigating the facility “found no evidence that the site is being used for any function other than as a normal public hospital.”[25] Amnesty International spokespersons have stated that

Human Rights in China, Nova Science Publishers, Incorporated, 2009. ProQuest Ebook Central,

70

Thomas Lum

Copyright © 2009. Nova Science Publishers, Incorporated. All rights reserved.

the claims of systematic organ harvesting of Falun Gong practitioners cannot be confirmed or denied. The PRC government has rejected claims about live organ harvesting of Falun Gong practitioners. In December 2005, Chinese officials reportedly confirmed that executed prisoners had been “among the sources of organs for transplant” and admitted that a market for such organs had existed, but denied that they had been removed without consent.[26] In March 2006, the Chinese Ministry of Health announced stricter regulations that would require written consent from organ donors, ban the sale of human organs, and limit the number of hospitals allowed to perform transplants.[27]

The Kilgour-Matas Report On July 6, 2006, two Canadian investigators, former Liberal Member of Parliament David Kilgour and David Matas, an international human rights attorney, published Report into Allegations of Organ Harvesting of Falun Gong Practitioners in China. The report concludes that the allegations that “large numbers” of Falun Gong practitioners in the People’s Republic of China (PRC) have been victims of live organ harvesting are true.[28] For the most part, however, the report does not bring forth new or independently-obtained testimony and relies largely upon the making of logical inferences. The authors had conducted their investigation in response to a request by the Coalition to Investigate the Persecution of the Falun Gong in China (CIPFG), a U.S.-based, non-profit organization founded by the Falun Dafa Association in April 2006. In addition to interviewing the same former Sujiatun hospital worker as featured in the Epoch Times, Kilgour and Matas refer to recordings of telephone conversations provided by CIPFG. In these recorded calls that CIPFG members allegedly made from locations outside China to PRC hospitals, police bureaus, and detention centers, telephone respondents reportedly indicated that organ harvesting of live Falun Gong detainees was common. Although many claims and arguments in the Kilgour-Matas report are widely accepted by international human rights experts, some of the reports’s key allegations appear to be inconsistent with the findings of other investigations.[29] The report’s conclusions rely heavily upon transcripts of telephone calls in which PRC respondents reportedly stated that organs removed from live Falun Gong detainees were used for transplants. Some argue that such apparent candor would seem unlikely given Chinese government controls over sensitive information, which may raise questions about the credibility of the telephone recordings.

Human Rights in China, Nova Science Publishers, Incorporated, 2009. ProQuest Ebook Central,

China and Falun Gong

71

Falun Gong Activities Overseas

Copyright © 2009. Nova Science Publishers, Incorporated. All rights reserved.

Hong Kong Practicing Falun Gong is permitted in the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region (HKSAR) and local members, which number an estimated 500, frequently stage protests against PRC policies toward Falun Gong on the mainland. In November 2004, a Hong Kong appeals court reversed convictions for “obstructing a public place” against sixteen Falun Gong members who had participated in a demonstration in March 2002. The judges ruled that the defendants had been exercising their right to demonstrate. In May 2005, the Court of Final Appeal overturned the convictions of eight other protesters for assaulting and obstructing police, stating that “the freedom to demonstrate peacefully is protected by law.”[30] The HKSAR government reportedly has occasionally barred entry to foreign Falun Gong adherents. In February 2006, 83 overseas Falun Gong practitioners, mostly from Taiwan, were refused entry prior to a conference organized by the Hong Kong Association of Falun Dafa, leading some to speculate that PRC authorities keep tabs on overseas and Taiwan FLG members.[31] The United States There are an estimated several thousand Falun Gong practitioners in the United States and similarly large numbers of adherents in other countries with large ethnic Chinese populations. The movement has become highly public in the United States. Members regularly stage demonstrations, distribute flyers, and sponsor cultural events. In addition, FLG followers are affiliated with several mass media outlets, including Internet sites. These include The Epoch Times, a newspaper distributed for free in eight languages and 30 countries (with a distribution of 1.5 million); New Tang Dynasty Television (NTDTV), a non-profit Chinese language station based in New York with correspondents in 50 cities worldwide; and Sound of Hope, a northern California radio station founded by FLG members.[32] These media outlets report on a variety of topics but emphasize human rights abuses in China, particularly against Falun Gong members, and publish mostly negative or critical reports on PRC domestic and foreign policies. Two U.S. Internet companies founded by Chinese Falun Gong practitioners, Dynaweb Internet Technology Inc. and UltraReach Internet Corporation, have been at the forefront of overseas Chinese and U.S. efforts to breach the PRC “Internet firewall.” They have each developed software to help Chinese Web users — estimated at 111 million in 2005 — to circumvent government censorship and access websites which the PRC government has attempted to block. The United States Broadcasting Board of Governors has provided funding to these companies in order

Human Rights in China, Nova Science Publishers, Incorporated, 2009. ProQuest Ebook Central,

Copyright © 2009. Nova Science Publishers, Incorporated. All rights reserved.

72

Thomas Lum

to help sustain their efforts in enabling Web users in China to freely access the Internet, including Voice of America and Radio Free Asia websites.[33] On behalf of plaintiffs in China, Falun Gong adherents in the United States have filed several civil complaints in U.S. federal courts against PRC leaders for violations of the Torture Victim Protection Act, the Alien Tort Claims Act, and other “crimes against humanity.”[34] In September 2003, a U.S. District Court judge in Chicago dismissed a lawsuit filed against former PRC President Jiang Zemin, on the basis of lack of jurisdiction and sovereign immunity. In December 2004, a U.S. District Court in San Francisco ruled that Beijing Party Secretary and former Beijing mayor Liu Qi had broken U.S., international, and PRC law for his role in violating the human rights of Falun Gong practitioners.[35] PRC officials in the United States have engaged in a public relations blitz to counter FLG efforts. In 2001, over one dozen U.S. mayors reported pressure from PRC officials urging them not to give public recognition to Falun Gong.[36] In 2002, according to Falun Gong practitioners, PRC consulates sent approximately 300 letters to local U.S. officials, including mayors and the governor of Washington state, asking them not to support Falun Gong.[37] The Wall Street Journal wrote: “Chinese diplomats spend a lot of time writing letters and making visits to governments, local newspapers and television outlets, politicians and others. ..warning them about the movement.”[38] Since 2001, Falun Gong plaintiffs have filed several lawsuits in federal courts claiming that the PRC officials in the United States have been responsible for dozens of isolated incidents of physical and verbal harassment, eavesdropping, and destruction of property of Falun Gong adherents and supporters in the United States. However, plaintiffs often have possessed little evidence of direct involvement by the Chinese government in the alleged incidents. PRC consular officials deny participation in such criminal activity in the United States and claim that they are entitled to diplomatic immunity. In November 2002, the Circuit Court of Cook County charged a PRC immigrant with battery for having physically assaulted a Falun Gong hunger striker in front of the Chinese Consulate in Chicago in September 2001.[39] In February 2005, Falun Gong members in the United States reported that a coordinated, world-wide campaign (in over 20 countries) of telephone harassment against them had taken place.[40] This telephone harassment allegedly consisted of pre-recorded anti-Falun Gong messages in both English and Chinese, some purportedly originating in China. In May 2005, Mr. Chen Yongli, a political officer at the PRC Consulate General in Sydney, Australia, defected and requested political asylum on the grounds that he would be persecuted if sent back to China.[41] On June 4, 2005, Chen made a public appearance at a rally in Sydney to commemorate the 16th anniversary of the 1989

Human Rights in China, Nova Science Publishers, Incorporated, 2009. ProQuest Ebook Central,

China and Falun Gong

73

Tiananmen Square military action. In his speech, Chen declared that Beijing had directed the PRC consulate to identify and harass members of the Australian Chinese community who belonged to groups that the PRC deems subversive, such as democracy activists and Falun Gong practitioners. As a consular official, Chen reportedly resisted orders to provide extensive details about FLG adherents in Australia[42]2 Chen alleged that the PRC government had deployed a network of 1,000 agents and spies in Australia to discredit Falun Gong and to spy on its members, and that the number of such agents in the United States was likely higher. In July 2005, the Australian Immigration Department granted permanent protection visas to Chen, his wife and daughter.

Copyright © 2009. Nova Science Publishers, Incorporated. All rights reserved.

IMPLICATIONS FOR PRC POLITICS The Chinese government reportedly referred to Falun Gong as “the most serious threat to stability in 50 years of [Chinese] communist history.” The practice’s popularity in China’s northeast and other economically depressed areas was especially worrisome to the Party because of the fear that “religious fever” combined with economic unrest could spark widespread political protests. Some observers noted that the crackdown on Falun Gong deepened anti-government sentiment among not only adherents but also non-adherents, including many reform-minded intellectuals. However, there has been little indication that Falun Gong has become a rallying cry for other disaffected social groups or China’s small number of political activists. Many Chinese, either because of government propaganda or their indifference toward Falun Gong, have become critical toward the movement or apathetic about the crackdown. Some have charged that Li Hongzhi has exploited vulnerable people and caused their suffering by exaggerating the healing powers of Falun Gong or by encouraging followers in prison to attain full enlightenment by exercising “forbearance” or refusing to recant.[43] The January 2001 selfimmolations of six purported Falun Gong members on Tiananmen Square was exploited by the official media, further alienating many PRC citizens.

U.S. GOVERNMENT ACTIONS Since 1999, some Members of the United States Congress have made many public pronouncements and introduced several resolutions in support of Falun Gong. In the 109th Congress, H.Res. 608, agreed to in the House on June 12, 2006,

Human Rights in China, Nova Science Publishers, Incorporated, 2009. ProQuest Ebook Central,

.

74

Thomas Lum

condemns the “escalating levels of religious persecution” in China, including the “brutal campaign to eradicate Falun Gong.” H.Res. 794, passed by the House on June 12, 2006, calls upon the PRC to end its most egregious human rights abuses, including the persecution of Falun Gong. H.Con.Res. 365, introduced on March 28, 2006, would urge the PRC government to allow civil rights attorney Gao Zhisheng to continue practicing law. PRC authorities reportedly revoked Gao’s license after he provided legal assistance for peasant demonstrators, Christian house church worshipers, Falun Gong practitioners, and others. For six consecutive years (19992004), the U.S. Department of State has designated China a “country of particular concern” for “particularly severe violations of religious freedom,” including its persecution of Falun Gong. An ongoing ban on the export of crime control and detection instruments and equipment to China satisfies the requirements of P.L. 105292, the Freedom from Religious Persecution Act of 1998, which authorizes the President to impose sanctions upon countries that violate religious freedom. In April 2006, prior to PRC President Hu Jintao’s visit to the United States, 81 Members of Congress reportedly co-signed a letter written by Representative Dana Rohrabacher to President Bush in support of an investigation into the allegations of organ harvesting of Falun Gong adherents in China.[44]

Copyright © 2009. Nova Science Publishers, Incorporated. All rights reserved.

REFERENCES [1] [2] [3] [4] [5]

[6]

[7]

Annual Report of the United States Commission on International Religious Freedom, May 2, 2005. Department of State, Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor, International Religious Freedom Report 2005 — China (November 2005). The literal meanings of “Falun Gong” and “Falun Dafa,” respectively, are “law wheel exercise” and “great way of the law wheel.” According to Falun Dafa, examples of moral degeneration include rock music, drug addiction, and homosexuality. See [http://www.falundafa.org] and [http://www.faluninfo.net] See also Li Hongzhi, Falun Gong (rev. ed.) (Gloucester, MA: Fair Winds Press, 2001). One estimate put the number of adherents in China at “several million” members. See Craig S. Smith, “Sect Clings to the Web in the Face of Beijing’s Ban,” New York Times, July 5, 2001. The practice reportedly enjoyed a strong following among soldiers and officers in some northeastern cities, while the PRC Navy published copies

Human Rights in China, Nova Science Publishers, Incorporated, 2009. ProQuest Ebook Central,

China and Falun Gong

[8] [9] [10]

[11]

Copyright © 2009. Nova Science Publishers, Incorporated. All rights reserved.

[12]

[13]

[14]

[15]

75

of Zhuan Falun. According to one source, there were 4,000-5,000 Falun Gong “sympathizers” in the PLA air force. See David Murphy, “Losing Battle,” Far Eastern Economic Review, Feb. 15, 2001. See also John Pomfret, “China Takes Measured Steps Against Sect,” Washington Post, Aug. 6, 1999. Ian Johnson, “Brother Li Love: In China, the Survival of Falun Dafa Rests on Beepers and Faith,” Wall Street Journal, Aug. 25, 2000. Reports differ on which group, Falun Gong or the Qigong Association, initiated the split. FLG founder Li Hongzhi was reportedly en route from Hong Kong to Australia when the April 1999 demonstrations broke out and denies that he instigated them. Vivien Pik-Kwan Chan, “Sect Ban Rumour Not True — Beijing,” South China Morning Post, June 15, 1999; John Pomfret, “Jiang Caught in Middle on Standoff,” Washington Post, Apr. 8, 2001. The PRC government has not carried out a consistent policy regarding practicing in private. According to the State Department, the mere belief in the discipline (without any public manifestation or practice) has been sufficient grounds for punishment ranging from loss of employment to imprisonment. Department of State, Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor, Country Reports on Human Rights Practices — 2005 (China), March 8, 2006. See also Matt Forney, “Beijing Says Changes in Economy Helped Spur Falun Dafa’ s Growth,” Wall Street Journal, Nov. 5, 1999. Before the crackdown, there were approximately 39 “teaching centers,” 1,900 “instruction centers” and 28,000 practice sites nationwide. See John Pomfret and Michael Laris, “China Expands Sect Crackdown,” Washington Post, July 25, 1999; and John Wong and William T. Liu, The Mystery of Falun Gong (Singapore: World Scientific Publishing Co. and Singapore University Press, 1999). Statement of Gretchen Birkle, Acting Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary, Bureau for Democracy, Human Rights and Labor, U.S. Department of State, Joint Hearing before the Subcommittee on Africa, Global Human Rights and International Operations, Falun Gong and China’s Continuing War on Human Rights, July 21, 2005. “Labor re-education” is a form of “administrative punishment” for noncriminal acts (such as “disrupting public order”) that lasts between one and three years and does not require a trial. See Craig S. Smith, “Sect Clings to the Web in the Face of Beijing’s Ban,” New York Times, July 5, 2001; Mary Beth Sheridan, “Falun Gong Protests on the Mall,” Washington Post,

Human Rights in China, Nova Science Publishers, Incorporated, 2009. ProQuest Ebook Central,

76

[16] [17]

[18] [19]

[20] [21]

Copyright © 2009. Nova Science Publishers, Incorporated. All rights reserved.

[22] [23]

[24] [25]

[26] [27]

Thomas Lum July 20, 2001; Paul Vallely and Clifford Coonan, “China’s Enemy Within: The Story of Falun Gong,” The Independent, April 22, 2006. See John Pomfret, “China’s Steadfast Sect,” Washington Post, Aug. 23, 2000. Ian Johnson, “Death Trap: How One Chinese City Resorted to Atrocities to Control Falun Dafa,”Wall Street Journal, Dec. 26, 2000; Charles Hutzler, “Falun Gong Feels Effect of China’s Tighter Grip,” Asian Wall Street Journal, Apr. 26, 2001; John Pomfret and Philip Pan, “Torture Is Breaking Falun Gong,” Washington Post, August 5, 2001; “China’s Heilongjiang Records Highest Falun Gong Death Toll,” BBC, Dec. 6, 2003. Department of State, Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor, International Religious Freedom Report 2005 — China, op. cit. Statement of Yonglin Chen, Joint Hearing before the Subcommittee on Africa, Global Human Rights and International Operations, Falun Gong and China’s Continuing War on Human Rights, July 21, 2005. Terence Chea, “Former American Businessman Lobbies for China’s Political Prisoners, San Diego Union-Tribune, August 28, 2005. The satellite interference may have originated overseas. The Taiwanese government has denied any involvement. “China Condemns Alleged Falun Gong Satellite ‘Attack,’” Dow Jones International News, July 6, 2005. Brian Marple, “Secret Chinese Concentration Camp Revealed,” The Epoch Times, March 10, 2006; Ji Da, “New Witness Confirms Existence of Chinese Concentration Camp,” The Epoch Times, March 17, 2006. The hospital worker’s ex-husband, a former surgeon at the same hospital in Sujiatun, reportedly confided to her in 2003 that he had performed cornea removal operations on approximately 2,000 Falun Gong prisoners. “U.S. Presses China for Probe on Falun Gong Organ Harvesting Claim,” Agence France Presse, March 31, 2006. “U.S. Finds No Evidence of Alleged Concentration Camp in China — Repression of Falun Gong, Reports of Organ Harvesting Still Worry Officials,” Washington File, April 16, 2006; see also Mike Steketee, “The Price is Rights,” The Australian, April 1, 2006. Department of State, Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor, Country Reports on Human Rights Practices — 2005 (China), op. cit. Christopher Bodeen, “China Bans Sales of Human Organs,” Seattle Times, March 29, 2006; “China Admits Prisoner Organ Sales,” The Times (UK), December 5, 2005.

Human Rights in China, Nova Science Publishers, Incorporated, 2009. ProQuest Ebook Central,

Copyright © 2009. Nova Science Publishers, Incorporated. All rights reserved.

China and Falun Gong

77

[28] The Kilgour-Matas report is available at [http://www.investigation. redirectme.net/]. [29] See also the U.S. State Department’s discussion of Falun Gong, Country Reports on Human Rights Practices — 2005 (China), op. cit. [30] Albert Wong, “Falun Gong Victory on the Right to Protest,” The Standard, May 6, 2006. [31] “Falun Gong Blacklist Theory Raised,” South China Morning Post, February 8, 2006. [32] See [http://www.falundafa.org]; [http://faluninfo.net]; [http://www. clearwisdom.net]; [http://www.epochtimes.com]; [http://www.ntdtv.com]; KTVO AM 1400. Vanessa Hua, “Culture and Religion: Dissident Media Linked to Falun Gong,” SFGate.com, December 18, 2005. [33] For further information, see CRS Report RL33167, Internet Development and Information Control in the People’s Republic of China, by Thomas Lum. [34] Under U.S. law, foreigners accused of crimes against humanity or violations of international law can be sued in federal court by U.S. citizens or aliens in the United States. The accused individual must be served a civil complaint in the United States. [35] Liu was served with legal papers in 2002 in San Francisco while en route to the Salt Lake City Winter Olympics. The Court ruled that Liu appeared to have violated Chinese law and was thus not entitled to sovereign immunity. The plaintiffs did not receive damages but hope to bar Liu from visiting the United States again. Vanessa Hua, “Beijing Official Liable in Falun Gong Case,” San Francisco Chronicle, Dec. 24, 2004. [36] Helen Luk, “China Steps up Efforts Against Sect,” The Patriot-News, July 9, 2001. [37] Steve Park, “Officials Ask U.S. Cities to Snub Sect,” The Washington Times, April 8, 2002. [38] Pui-Wing Tam, Ian Johnson and Li Yuan, “China’s Diplomats in U.S. Act to Foil Falun Gong Protesters,” Wall Street Journal, November 24, 2004. [39] Lydia Polgreen, “On New York Streets, Warning of a Crackdown by China,” New York Times, November 22, 2004. [40] The information source for this is Jeff Chen, spokesman for the Washington D.C. Falun Dafa Association. See also “Attorney General Asked to Investigate Massive Harassment Calls,” U.S. Newswire, March 2, 2005.

Human Rights in China, Nova Science Publishers, Incorporated, 2009. ProQuest Ebook Central,

78

Thomas Lum

Copyright © 2009. Nova Science Publishers, Incorporated. All rights reserved.

[41] Although Chen’ s request for political asylum was rejected, the Australian government granted Chen and his family permanent protection (immigration) visas in July 2005. [42] Simon Kearney, “Falun Gong Paying Defector’s Expenses,” The Australian, July 13, 2005; Janaki Kremmer, “Chinese Defector Details Country’s Espionage Agenda,” Christian Science Monitor, June 20, 2005. [43] See “Master Li Hongzhi’ s Lecture at the Great Lakes Conference in North America, Dec. 9, 2000.” See also John Pomfret, “A Foe Rattles Beijing from Abroad,” Washington Post, Mar. 9, 2001; and Ian Johnson, “As Crackdown Grows, Falun Gong’s Faithful Face a New Pressure,” Wall Street Journal, Mar. 27, 2001. [44] Falun Dafa Information Center, Falun Gong News Bulletin, April 24, 2006.

Human Rights in China, Nova Science Publishers, Incorporated, 2009. ProQuest Ebook Central,

In: Human Rights in China Editor: Lee R. Massingdale, pp. 79-150

ISBN: 978-1-60741-116-1 © 2009 Nova Science Publishers, Inc.

Chapter 4

HUMAN RIGHTS AND THE RULE OF LAW IN CHINA. HEARING BEFORE THE CONGRESSIONAL-EXECUTIVE COMMISSION ON CHINA, ONE HUNDRED NINTH CONGRESS, SECOND SESSION, SEPTEMBER 20, 2006

Copyright © 2009. Nova Science Publishers, Incorporated. All rights reserved.

U.S. Government Printing Office WEDNESDAY, SEPTEMBER 20, 2006 CONGRESSIONAL-EXECUTIVE COMMISSION ON CHINA, Washington, DC. The hearing was convened, pursuant to notice, at 10:09 a.m., in room 138, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. Chuck Hagel (Chairman of the Commission) presiding. Present: Senators Brownback and Martinez; Representatives Leach (CoChairman of the Commission), Pitts, Aderholt, Levin (Ranking Member of the Commission), and Honda; Steven J. Law, Deputy Secretary of Labor, and Franklin L. Lavin, Under Secretary of Commerce.

Human Rights in China, Nova Science Publishers, Incorporated, 2009. ProQuest Ebook Central,

80

U.S. Government Printing Office

Copyright © 2009. Nova Science Publishers, Incorporated. All rights reserved.

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. CHUCK HAGEL, A U.S. SENATOR FROM THE STATE OF NEBRASKA, CHAIRMAN, CONGRESSIONAL-EXECUTIVE COMMISSION ON CHINA Chairman HAGEL. Good morning. The Congressional-Executive Commission on China issues a report each year to the Congress and to the President on human rights conditions and the development of the rule of law in China. In connection with today’s release of the 2006 Annual Report, the Commission has asked a distinguished group of witnesses to assess the current state of civil rights and criminal defense; freedom of expression; and efforts to adopt democratic institutions of governance, implement legislative reform, and improve the environment for domestic and international civil society groups in China. The Commission will also hear the perspective of the witnesses on how the United States might best engage with the Chinese Government through dialogue on human rights and rule of law issues. In its 2006 Annual Report, the Commission expresses deep concern that some Chinese Government policies designed to address growing social unrest and bolster Communist Party authority are resulting in a period of declining human rights for China’s citizens. The Commission identified limited improvements in the Chinese Government’s human rights practices in 2004, but backward-stepping government decisions in 2005 and 2006 are leading the Commission to reevaluate the Chinese leadership’s commitment to additional human rights improvements in the near term. In its 2005 Annual Report, the Commission highlighted increased government restrictions on Chinese citizens who worship in state-controlled venues or write for state-controlled publications. These restrictions remain in place, and in some cases, the government has strengthened their enforcement. The Commission notes the progress that the Chinese Government has made over the past 25 years in beginning to build a political system based on the rule of law and on respect for basic human rights. The twin demands of social stability and continued economic progress have spurred legal reforms that may one day be the leading edge of constraints on the arbitrary exercise of state power. The government’s achievements in the economic realm are impressive, none more so than its success in lifting more than 400 million Chinese citizens out of extreme poverty since the early 1980s. While all of these changes are important, the gap between forward-looking economic freedoms and a backward-looking political system remains significant.

Human Rights in China, Nova Science Publishers, Incorporated, 2009. ProQuest Ebook Central,

Copyright © 2009. Nova Science Publishers, Incorporated. All rights reserved.

Human Rights and the Rule of Law in China…

81

There are leaders now within China who comprehend the need for change and who understand that inflexibility, secretiveness, and a lack of democratic oversight pose the greatest challenges to continued development. These leaders will need to gather considerable reformist courage to overcome obstacles and push for continued change. Such changes will not occur overnight, but rather in ways that Chinese society, culture, infrastructure, and institutions must be prepared for and willing to accept. To help us better understand human rights conditions and the development of the rule of law in China, we turn to our witnesses this morning. Professor Jerome A. Cohen is a Professor of Law at the New York University School of Law; an Adjunct Senior Fellow on Asia at the Council of Foreign Relations; and Of Counsel at the law firm of Paul, Weiss, Rifkind, Wharton & Garrison. Professor Cohen is a leading expert on the Chinese legal system and the legal aspects of the international relations of East Asia. As Director of East Asia Legal Studies at Harvard Law School from 1964 to 1979, Professor Cohen pioneered the study of East Asian legal systems in American legal curricula. He has published numerous books and articles on Chinese law, including “Contract Laws of the People’s Republic of China,” “The Criminal Process in the PRC: 1949 to 1968,” and “The Plight of China’s Criminal Defense Lawyers.” After Professor Cohen, we will hear from Mr. John Kamm. Mr. Kamm is Executive Director of The Dui Hua Foundation; a member of the Board of Directors for the National Committee on U.S.- China Relations; and Director of Stanford University’s Project on Human Rights Diplomacy. Since 1990, Mr. Kamm has been an advocate on behalf of prisoners of conscience in China and has made more than 70 trips to Beijing in an effort to engage the Chinese Government in a dialogue on human rights. He was granted the Eleanor Roosevelt Human Rights Award by President George W. Bush in December 2001, and a MacArthur Fellowship in September 2004. Mr. Kamm was the Hong Kong representative of the National Council for U.S.-China Trade from 1976 to 1981, and was President of the American Chamber of Commerce in Hong Kong in 1990. Dr. Minxin Pei will provide perspectives on democratic governance and development of civil society. Dr. Pei is Senior Associate and Director of the China Program at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. He is an expert on China, U.S.-China relations, Taiwan, East Asia, and the development of democratic political systems. Dr. Pei is the author of numerous books and articles on China, including “China’s Governance Crisis;” “Rebalancing United StatesChina Relations;” and “Future Shock: The WTO and Political Change in China.” In his most recent book, “China’s Trapped Transition: The Limits of

Human Rights in China, Nova Science Publishers, Incorporated, 2009. ProQuest Ebook Central,

82

U.S. Government Printing Office

Copyright © 2009. Nova Science Publishers, Incorporated. All rights reserved.

Developmental Autocracy,” Dr. Pei examines the sustainability of the Chinese Communist Party’s reform strategy—pursuing pro-market policies under oneparty rule. Mr. Xiao Qiang will share his expertise on freedom of expression in China. Mr. Xiao is Director of the China Internet Project at the University of California at Berkeley. He is a recipient of the MacArthur Fellowship and is currently teaching classes on “new media and human rights in China” at the University of California at Berkeley. Mr. Xiao was the Executive Director of Human Rights in China from 1991 to 2002. He spoke at each meeting of the U.N. Commission on Human Rights from 1993 to 2001, and has lectured on the promotion of human rights and democracy in China in over 40 countries. Mr. Xiao currently runs the China Digital Times Internet news portal, and is a weekly commentator for Radio Free Asia. We welcome our distinguished panel of witnesses this morning. At this point I would ask my distinguished colleague, the Co- Chairman of this Commission, Representative Jim Leach, for his comments. Then I would ask for comments from other colleagues on the Commission before we hear from the witnesses. Representative Leach. [The prepared statement of Senator Hagel appears in the Appendix.]

O PENING S TATEMENT OF H ON . J IM L EACH , A U.S. R EPRESENTATIVE FROM THE STATE OF IOWA, CO-CHAIRMAN, CONGRESSIONAL-EXECUTIVE COMMISSION ON CHINA Representative LEACH. Well, thank you, Chairman Hagel. I have a long statement. I would simply ask unanimous consent to put it in the record, and make two very quick observations. Perspective is awfully difficult to bring to events of this nature and assessments of the nature that the Commission is obligated to make. From any historical viewpoint, China is obviously economically better off than it has ever been. From a freedom point of view, it is probably as well off as it has ever been. On the other hand, quite clearly there have been some steps back in the last several years that are of serious dimensions and they have to be noted, and we are obligated to note that.

Human Rights in China, Nova Science Publishers, Incorporated, 2009. ProQuest Ebook Central,

Copyright © 2009. Nova Science Publishers, Incorporated. All rights reserved.

Human Rights and the Rule of Law in China…

83

In this regard, I personally want to tip my hat to the staff that has been so responsible for putting together this report. We have a first-class professional staff, non-ideological, Chinese language- trained, and we are very proud of the work product that they have produced and the efforts that they have undertaken. With that, I would yield back the balance of my time. [The prepared statement of Representative Leach appears in the Appendix.] Chairman HAGEL. Co-Chairman Leach, thank you. One of our distinguished members of the Commission is the Under Secretary of Commerce and the former U.S. Ambassador to Singapore. Mr. Lavin, do you have any comments? Mr. LAVIN. No opening statements, Mr. Chairman, but to associate myself with your opening statement and with that of Congressman Leach as well. [The prepared statement of Mr. Lavin appears in the Appendix.] Chairman HAGEL. Mr. Lavin, thank you. Also, another distinguished member of our Commission, Representative Joseph Pitts of Pennsylvania, has joined us. Mr. Pitts has been actively engaged in this Commission. Congressman Pitts, do you have a statement? Representative PITTS. Mr. Chairman, I would just like to say this is an excellent report and I would like to commend the staff for the good work they have done here. I want to thank the witnesses for their expertise and for coming today. I yield back. Chairman HAGEL. Representative Pitts, thank you. The recognition of the efforts of the staff of this Commission is appropriate. The staff has been under the leadership of Dr. David Dorman and Mr. John Foarde, who deserve a considerable amount of attention and appreciation, as well as all of the members of the Commission staff. I think our Commission is unanimous in its praise of the good work of our staff on the report that was released today. We have just been joined by another distinguished member of our Commission, Mr. Aderholt. Would you care to make a statement? Welcome. Representative ADERHOLT. Thank you. It is good to be here this morning. I do not have anything right now. I may submit something for the record. But I look forward to the testimony this morning. Thank you. Chairman HAGEL. Representative Aderholt, thank you. With that, let me now ask our distinguished witnesses if they would proceed. I would ask them to proceed in the order in which I introduced each of you. We will begin with you, Professor Cohen. Welcome. Thank you.

Human Rights in China, Nova Science Publishers, Incorporated, 2009. ProQuest Ebook Central,

84

U.S. Government Printing Office

Copyright © 2009. Nova Science Publishers, Incorporated. All rights reserved.

STATEMENT OF JEROME A. COHEN, PROFESSOR OF LAW, NEW YORK UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW, NEW YORK, NY Mr. COHEN. Thank you, Senator Hagel. I am very glad to see good attendance today, to see your colleague, Congressman Leach, again, Secretary Lavin, and Congressmen Pitts and Aderholt. We are very happy, those of us in the China field, with what this Commission has done. I think hearings such as this, and reports— I have already read this report and it is a very able, comprehensive, balanced view that will be of inestimable help to people in the news media, as well as scholars of China. My hope is that some day this report, which I know is translated into Chinese at least in part, could be made available in China. Now, setting the tone for today’s hearing is a challenge. It has been over a year since I last appeared here, and the last year has not been a good one for the subjects of our concern, the rule of law and human rights—human rights, in the sense of political and religious freedoms, protection against arbitrary criminal punishment, the development of fair and independent courts, and the growth of a free and vigorous legal profession. I will speak briefly about some recent developments. Many of us have hoped that there would be a new Criminal Procedure Law out in China before the Olympics in 2008. There are so many issues, which I list in my formal presentation, that cry out for amendment, revision, clarification, and improvement. It now looks like prospects for the new criminal procedure laws coming out in the near future are receding. That is too bad. The idea was to lay the groundwork for China’s ratification of the U.N. Convention on Civil and Political Rights. China, as you know, signed onto the ICCPR in 1998. It has been eight years. The hope was, and many Chinese experts as recently June were still confident, that China would ratify that Convention by the time of the Olympics. I think there is a desire on the part of the Chinese leadership in principle, although they have a hard time living up to it in practice, that China be seen as a fully civilized member of the world community by 2008. A new Criminal Procedure Law consistent with the ICCPR would be part of that, but that prospect, too, seems to be fading. Now, I had at least hoped that the Chinese National People’s Congress would abolish the notorious sanction called “Reeducation Through Labor” that allows the police to put anyone away for three or four years with no review by the prosecutor’s office, no review by the courts, and no review by anybody else. That

Human Rights in China, Nova Science Publishers, Incorporated, 2009. ProQuest Ebook Central,

Copyright © 2009. Nova Science Publishers, Incorporated. All rights reserved.

Human Rights and the Rule of Law in China…

85

has been one of the most effective and feared police sanctions for almost the entire history of the People’s Republic of China. There has been a bill before the National People’s Congress for over two years that would abolish, or at least substantially reform, that sanction. That, too, seems dead in the water, at least for now. So the National People’s Congress cannot be looked to, for the next year at least, for much action on the questions at issue. Fortunately, the Supreme People’s Court of China is trying to fill the gap. There has always been a kind of contest between the National People’s Congress and the Supreme People’s Court, how much terrain the Supreme Court can cover. They are not allowed to make constitutional decisions, but they do interpret their power of interpretation broadly. Right now, they are focusing on trying to improve procedures for death penalty cases in China. As you know, China is infamous, even more than the United States, for the numbers of people it puts to death. We do not know the figures—it is a closely guarded secret—but between 8,000 to 10,000 people a year are executed. Now, people know the procedures have been abysmal for trying these people and reviewing their cases. The Supreme Court of China is trying on its own now to make important improvements. For that, they have to hire 300 or 400 new judges—that gives you some idea of how many cases there are to review—who have got to take part in the review process, and they have got to improve the trial processes. They are making some progress. It is slow. It is difficult. We do not know how well they will do. Many of us are cooperating, to the extent that they welcome it, in this effort. But it is the only game in town right now in terms of law reform of the administration of criminal justice in China. Now, there have been some disgraceful criminal cases that many of you know about. The Washington Post, New York Times, or other news media have been full of various cases. I have been involved in two of them in the last year. One is the famous blind man, who is what we would call a “barefoot lawyer.” He is not a lawyer, but he is self-taught, and has been a social/legal activist. He has been locked up now and sentenced to four years and three months in prison. I brought along a T-shirt that shows this man. He was a State Department visitor— that is how I met him—in 2002. When you meet him, you are very much moved. He is like a Chinese version of, a legalistic Gandhi. This is a very sincere, very brilliant, very courageous, determined person, and he is paying the price for it today. Other T-shirts were confiscated by the Chinese police the day I got mine last June.

Human Rights in China, Nova Science Publishers, Incorporated, 2009. ProQuest Ebook Central,

Copyright © 2009. Nova Science Publishers, Incorporated. All rights reserved.

86

U.S. Government Printing Office

I also have taken part in the famous case of Zhao Yan, a New York Times staff person in the Times’ Beijing Bureau, who has now been sentenced to three years in prison after another trial that can only be regarded as a farce, and after highly illegal—according to Chinese law—pre-trial detention, interrogation, et cetera. These cases, it is sad to say, the Supreme Court does not do anything about in its supervisory powers. Wholesale, they are doing pretty well. Retail, they have a lot to cover and, I think, to make up for. One of the interesting phenomena is that, despite these actions, the Communist Party itself is showing itself increasingly sensitive to legal considerations. The Party plays a very important, but little-noticed, role in criminal justice. If important people in the Party are going to be interrogated, investigated for corruption, for example, the Party usually locks these people up long before they get to the police or formal criminal process. The Party can hold somebody for as long as they want, sometimes years. The Party, in principle, recognizes a few protections, but in practice these people are held incommunicado. The result is that the elite of China, China’s 70 million Party members, often have fewer rights in protecting themselves against arbitrary prosecution than ordinary members of the public. But it is good that the Party is showing some interest in ideas of judicial due process and other protections. I think this tells you something about a new generation that is coming along. The Party has to look more legitimate to its members and they want to seem less arbitrary. Another problem I want to talk about is restraints on lawyers. I am not going to repeat what I have said here before about the many obstacles and sanctions imposed against vigorous defense lawyers in China. This year has been even worse. Lawyers have been physically beaten and abused on many occasions. They have been deprived of their license to practice law. Some have been prosecuted. Mr. Gao Zhisheng, one of the most outspoken, is currently under investigation and detained for unspecified criminal activities. A lot of these people and their families, lawyers as well as their political dissident clients, are subject to blockades of their home. There is no legal authority for this. In June, I wanted to pay my respects in Shanghai to a former lawyer who had been disbarred and sentenced to jail for three years and who had just come out of jail. I went to his home. He invited me for dinner. Police prevented me from going. When I said, “What authority have you got for interfering with my right to see him and his right to see me?”the only answer I got after repeated questions, was “Women shi jingcha.” “We are the police. We do not need any authority.” More than that, they showed me their

Human Rights in China, Nova Science Publishers, Incorporated, 2009. ProQuest Ebook Central,

Copyright © 2009. Nova Science Publishers, Incorporated. All rights reserved.

Human Rights and the Rule of Law in China…

87

badge. This is what is happening. People are being subjected to a range of illicit measures that simply are not justified according to Chinese law. Now, what we find is that there are also other restraints on lawyers. Lawyers in the news media are getting too close for comfort from the leadership’s point of view. My blind man friend’s real offense was not using the law in court to give the government difficulty, but it was contacting the Washington Post through me. It was really going on the Internet through the help of Chinese lawyers in Beijing. They do not want people letting the foreign press know what is really going on. They are also sensitive because many public interest lawyers in China now are going out of their way to help groups that are subject to various forms of suppression and have collective grievances. In order to stop this, on March 20, the All China Lawyer’s Association, under pressure from the Ministry of Justice, put out a new, so-called “Guiding Opinion” that really wants to turn lawyers, in cases involving 10 or more people as their client, into instruments of the public security forces and the government. The idea that has been gradually taking root in China since the 1980s that a lawyer is the representative of his client, he is not a state legal worker, has now been gone back on. They are trying to convert these lawyers into state legal workers again who do not have full loyalty to their client, but really have to have absolute loyalty to the state. This is a very sinister development. Well, what can we say about the future? Are there any grounds for optimism? Beneath the top leadership in China you have a marvelous group of able, determined, scholarly, law-reforming people, hundreds of thousands of these people if you count all the members of the different professions, from staff of the legislature, to people working in the Ministry of Justice, even the Ministry of Public Security has some, and certainly in the law schools, among the defense bar, you have a lot of idealistic people trying for law reform. We hope that in the future these people can be heard from. The immediate future depends on the 17th Communist Party Congress that will be held a year from now. There will be personnel changes then. We do not know who will be added to the Politburo, who will be subtracted. There are rumors that one member recently added to the Politburo, the Minister of Public Security, who is the only representative of the legal community in the Politburo, will be promoted to the Standing Committee of the Politburo and placed in charge of the Party Political-Legal Committee that leads all legal agencies in China in a coordinated way. He may also become the Chairman of the Party’s Central Discipline and Inspection Commission. If this happens, Minister Zhou Yongkang will have unprecedented power in the administration of justice.

Human Rights in China, Nova Science Publishers, Incorporated, 2009. ProQuest Ebook Central,

Copyright © 2009. Nova Science Publishers, Incorporated. All rights reserved.

88

U.S. Government Printing Office

My hope is that the president of the Supreme Court, Xiao Yang, will be promoted to the Politburo. He should have been put in at the 16th Party Congress. The fact is that there is no representative who represents the importance of law among all these engineers who run the Politburo, and therefore the development of China. But we do not know. A lot depends on future personnel changes. Chairman HAGEL. Professor Cohen, may I interrupt just for a moment? If it is acceptable to you, we can include your full statement in the record. I want to make sure we have adequate time for questions. We have a large panel today and I would ask, again, if it is acceptable, if I could move to the next witness. We will place your complete statement in the record. Mr. COHEN. Could I make one long sentence, and then I will quit? Chairman HAGEL. Yes. Mr. COHEN. Because this concerns you people. What can we do? I think the Congress should expand its current funding for support for the rule of law in China. The critical thing is that you must make it clear to the Department of State that you support fundamental research on problems such as, “how did other countries around China develop genuine judicial independence? Why did it fail in previous efforts in China?” Right now, they say they cannot support research, only training and exchanges. My argument is that this is all very vital, but it helps to know what you really should be training people about in order to get maximum bang for the buck. So I think research is fundamental. We do not know enough. And just as we used to have arguments whether the U.S. Government should support basic research in the sciences that was solved long ago. I think we should now solve the question whether you should support basic research on how to promote the administration of justice in China. Thank you. [The prepared statement of Mr. Cohen appears in the Appendix.] Chairman HAGEL. Professor Cohen, thank you very much. Mr. KAMM.

STATEMENT OF JOHN KAMM, EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR, THE DUI HUA FOUNDATION, SAN FRANCISCO, CA Mr. KAMM. Chairman Hagel, distinguished Members of the CongressionalExecutive Commission on China. It is always a special occasion for me to address the Congress of the United States. I began my work in the field of human rights in China in May 1990, the month that I made my first intervention on behalf of a political prisoner and the

Human Rights in China, Nova Science Publishers, Incorporated, 2009. ProQuest Ebook Central,

Copyright © 2009. Nova Science Publishers, Incorporated. All rights reserved.

Human Rights and the Rule of Law in China…

89

month in which I gave my first testimony to Congress on China’s human rights record and U.S.-China relations. I am especially pleased to be here for today’s important hearing. I was one of the first advocates of establishing this Commission, and Dui Hua enjoys a close relationship with it. The Chairman and other Commissioners have been of great help to our work. Thank you. For several years, Dui Hua has been conducting a worldwide search for the names of individuals detained in political cases in China since 1980. Our database has information on more than 11,500 such individuals, of whom about 3,100 are currently in prisons, labor camps, or other places of detention. Many whose names are in the database are not imprisoned, though they are hardly free. We know of but a small percentage of the population of those persecuted in China for political and religious reasons. We use the database to raise the names of detainees with Chinese officials and make lists that are submitted to departments of the Chinese Government. A key recipient of our lists has been the Ministry of Justice, which runs China’s prisons and reeducation through labor camps. Through a unique relationship spanning a period of 15 years, requests for information on about 1,000 individuals detained in political cases have been submitted. Information on hundreds of prisoners, many of whose names we discovered, has been obtained. Lives have been saved. The Chinese Government has now decided to close this channel. The Ministry of Justice has said it will not meet me any more unless I agree to stop raising names and submitting lists. This, I cannot agree to do. The Justice Ministry’s position overturns years of cooperation in prisoner accounting, cooperation that has enjoyed the support of leaders, officials, and legislators in both countries, and especially in the Congress of the United States. It violates China’s own policy of conducting human rights dialogues on the basis of mutual respect, and represents a setback to the principles of transparency and open governance. It directly contradicts President Hu Jintao’s recent statement that China is prepared to enhance dialogue and exchanges with the United States on human rights. Eliminating a unique program of cooperation is not enhancement, it is a big step backward. Dui Hua will always find ways to put cases we uncover in front of the Chinese Government. We will work more closely with the United Nations, with the governments of countries that have human rights dialogues with China, with cities and states that have sister relationships in China, and, most importantly, with members of this Commission. We will find ways to contact Chinese NGOs working to build a civil society.

Human Rights in China, Nova Science Publishers, Incorporated, 2009. ProQuest Ebook Central,

Copyright © 2009. Nova Science Publishers, Incorporated. All rights reserved.

90

U.S. Government Printing Office

Dui Hua looks forward to the day when Chinese NGOs will themselves be able to work effectively to secure information and better treatment for political and religious prisoners and deal with other human rights issues. Dui Hua also looks forward to the resumption of the U.S.-China official dialogue on human rights. When and if the two governments resume the dialogue, we will be ready with a list. Various reasons have been put forward for why the Chinese government has clamped down on information relating to political dissent and public protest, both of which are growing at least as fast as the much-vaunted economy. I think the most plausible explanation has to do with the senior leadership’s fear of a “Color Revolution” that would topple the rule of the Chinese Communist Party, just as other revolutions have done to regimes in the Middle East, Central Asia, and the former states of the Soviet Union. Dui Hua is an NGO monitoring political crime and public protest. That it should be targeted in the campaign to oppose the “Color Revolution” when so many other smokeless guns are being silenced is not surprising. But what makes Dui Hua’s work seem especially threatening is that it has worked for, and then publicized, the release of dissidents and activists, not a mere handful, but hundreds. Our work has had the cumulative effect of helping to reduce the fears and inhibitions of those standing up for their rights. The Chinese Communist Party has a problem: the Party is more and more afraid of the people, but the people are less and less afraid of it. Here is how the New York Times’ Nicholas Kristoff puts it: The basic problem for Mr. Hu is that incentives have changed over the last half- dozen years, encouraging more challenges to the system. As one dissident told me, “In the past, getting in trouble would mean a 10-year term in prison, alone and forgotten. Now if I go to prison,” he said, “I will get out after a year and I will be a hero. True, some people are sent to prison longer, like my colleague Zhao Yan, but few people seem much intimidated.”Mr. Chairman, I would like to sum up. In Britain’s darkest hour, Winston Churchill addressed a group of officers aboard a warship. He asked what you would get if you put the most gallant sailor, the most intrepid airman, and the most audacious soldier together at the same table. Today we might ask what you’d get if you put the most gallant rights defender, the most intrepid underground priest, and the most audacious journalist together at the same table in China. The answer would be the same: “the sum of their fears.”Those inside and outside China who labor to bring rule of law and respect for human rights to that great country have achieved something of special

Human Rights in China, Nova Science Publishers, Incorporated, 2009. ProQuest Ebook Central,

Human Rights and the Rule of Law in China…

91

value. By doggedly seeking justice for those imprisoned for what they believe in, we have helped reduce the fears of those working for change. This is our legacy, and it is one that your Commission can be proud of. Now is the time to redouble your efforts. Thank you. [The prepared statement of Mr. Kamm appears in the Appendix.] Chairman HAGEL. Mr. Kamm, thank you. I would remind each of the witnesses again that your full statements will be placed in the record. I have been asked by one of our members, Senator Brownback, if he could interrupt the proceedings for a couple of minutes to make a statement. He is supposed to be in a Judiciary Committee hearing now, and I have agreed with that request. So at this point we will go to Senator Brownback, and then come back to the witnesses. Thank you.

Copyright © 2009. Nova Science Publishers, Incorporated. All rights reserved.

S TATEMENT OF H ON . S AM B ROWNBACK , A U.S. S ENATOR FROM THE STATE OF KANSAS, MEMBER, CONGRESSIONAL- EXECUTIVE COMMISSION ON CHINA Senator BROWNBACK. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Senator Hagel, thank you very much. I am sorry to do this. For other causes and calls that I have, I will not take too long. I do ask that my full statement be submitted into the record. Chairman HAGEL. It will be. Senator BROWNBACK. Mr. Chairman, I think we are at a very important juncture here. I think there has been a lot of progress that has taken place in China, and I outline that in my statement. But I think what you are seeing now is the summation of the fears of the Chinese Government. Instead of there being the rule of law, they are using the rule by law. Professor Cohen was saying that he asked why could he not go see his friend? Well, because “I am the policeman.” That is the rule by law, not the rule of law. I think we are seeing a fearful government resort to the use of rule by law to sustain their own power. We are seeing more and more of this suppression and oppression taking place. To me, this is the time for us to push more aggressively and more specifically and directly at the Communist government. That is the group that is doing this. That is the group that is using the law to sustain their own power and ignoring the law when it does not sustain their own power. I think we need to have a discussion of the regression by the Chinese Communist government. Mr. Kamm,

Human Rights in China, Nova Science Publishers, Incorporated, 2009. ProQuest Ebook Central,

Copyright © 2009. Nova Science Publishers, Incorporated. All rights reserved.

92

U.S. Government Printing Office

who I have met with over the years—and I admire greatly your work, and more, even the people on the ground in China that you work with, and people that have gone to prison—who have done a great deal to try to connect the United States and China, and working that back and forth, are now being shut out by this country. I think it is important for us to go directly at the regime. One final point on this. This is a bit of a sidebar, but I think it is also an indicator of the problems you get when a regime operates the way this one does. I have worked with North Korean refugees for some period of time. We have had the first group come out from North Korea, being accepted into the United States as refugees. The women in this group say, 100 percent of the women that walk out of North Korea into China are trafficked. They are caught by somebody local in China, they are told by their Chinese captors, their hunters, that “you do what I say or we are turning you in to the Chinese authorities, who will send you back to North Korea and you will end up in the gulag, and you know what happens there.” One hundred percent of the women are caught, then sold to some Chinese man who tells them the exact same thing: “do what I say or else I am turning you in to the authorities. You will be sent back to North Korea to the gulag, and you know what happens there.”This is because China is refouling and breaking an international human rights obligation that they have, and then you get this trafficking that takes place because of that. It is the regime that is doing this. I only point it out as one of a number of cases of what you are seeing of when a country violates its own laws, the human rights of its own citizens or people that are there, that you continue to see the deterioration taking place. That is why I applaud this hearing. I applaud the Report for its footnoting, but I think we are weak on our conclusions. I think we need to press the Chinese Government, the Communist government, much more. That is why my vote will be against the report, although I do appreciate the effort of pulling together, I think, a very strong narrative in this report. I think it is very good in that result, in that part. But I think the recommendations need to go right at what the government itself is doing and really press that government for more change. Mr. Chairman, I want to thank you as well, again, for allowing me to break in at this point to say that. I appreciate that, and appreciate the hearing. [The prepared statement of Senator Brownback appears in the Appendix.] Chairman HAGEL. Senator Brownback, thank you. We will resume hearing from our witnesses. Dr. Pei.

Human Rights in China, Nova Science Publishers, Incorporated, 2009. ProQuest Ebook Central,

Human Rights and the Rule of Law in China…

93

Copyright © 2009. Nova Science Publishers, Incorporated. All rights reserved.

STATEMENT OF MINXIN PEI, DIRECTOR, CHINA PROGRAM, CARNEGIE ENDOWMENT FOR INTERNATIONAL PEACE, WASHINGTON, DC Mr. PEI. Thank you, Mr. Chairman and members of the Commission. I feel very honored to be here today as a witness to this Commission. This Commission’s work is very important for those who want to see a China that is not only economically prosperous, but politically democratic. Like many observers of developments in China, I have watched with increasing concern recent trends that indicate deterioration in human rights conditions and stagnant progress toward strengthening the rule of law. While today’s China is a much kinder and gentler nation than it was before the reform period began, and we should give the Chinese people and pro-reform forces in the Chinese Government all the credit for achieving such amazing progress in poverty reduction and expansion of personal freedoms, we must also recognize that the pace of improving political rights for Chinese citizens and strengthening the institutions of the rule of law has lagged significantly behind the speed of economic progress. In recent years, the process of political liberalization has stalled, even as the Chinese economy continues its rapid rise. In today’s testimony I will briefly focus on the underlying causes for the deterioration of political rights and stalled progress in China. In my judgment, recent symptoms of rising social unrest may be only a partial explanation for the government’s intensified efforts of social and political control. The more important causes for China’s backslide on human rights and the rule of law originate from a combination of factors that, together, reduce the ruling elite’s incentive to pursue political reform, while increasing their capacity for political control. China has fallen into a classic transition trap at the moment. The current stage of transition, with half-finished economic reform and minimal political reform, provides an ideal situation for the ruling elites who can maintain power with a mixture of economic performance, political cooptation of new social elites, and the increasingly effective application of political control. Economically, the strong growth record since Tiananmen has reduced the pressure on the Chinese Government to pursue democratic reforms. Indeed, it has even provided justifications for a hardline position on human rights. More importantly, because under one-party rule China’s political elites can easily convert their political power into economic wealth, they have even less

Human Rights in China, Nova Science Publishers, Incorporated, 2009. ProQuest Ebook Central,

Copyright © 2009. Nova Science Publishers, Incorporated. All rights reserved.

94

U.S. Government Printing Office

incentive to permit greater political competition. It is obvious that democratic reforms will threaten not only their political monopoly, but also their newly acquired economic wealth. At the same time, the Chinese Government has been adapting itself very skillfully to new socioeconomic changes. It has done so, first, by including social elites such as professionals and intellectuals into the ruling circle. In addition, it has also managed to co-opt new social elites, especially private entrepreneurs. This strategy has eliminated challenges to the Party’s authority from the most well-endowed and capable elements in Chinese society. Over the last decade, the Chinese Government has also greatly improved its capacity for suppressing both political dissent and social unrest. It has done so by heavy investment in law enforcement and technology. These strong capabilities, unfortunately, seem to have convinced the Chinese leadership that a tough approach to dealing with political dissent and social frustrations is a more effective way than political negotiation, compromise, and democratic reforms. As long as this combination of factors persists, it is very unlikely that human rights will improve in China, nor is it likely that the rule of law will be strengthened. But the picture is not all that gloomy. Despite the Chinese Government’s unrelenting efforts to control the mass media and limit the growth of democratic forces, Chinese society continues its amazing change. At the moment, it is not possible to form a broad- based democratic opposition to challenge the authority of the party, but the spread of personal freedom, the information revolution, and market forces is creating a more conducive environment for social pluralism in the long run. So, finally, I would like to strongly applaud the professionalism and outstanding work of the staff of the Commission that has produced this document. The situation in China is unsatisfactory at the moment. I think the only means available to us to pressure the Chinese Government is through combined efforts from Congress and the Administration, and this report is a great example of that kind of effort. Thank you very much. [The prepared statement of Mr. Pei appears in the Appendix.] Chairman HAGEL. Dr. Pei, thank you. Mr. Xiao.

Human Rights in China, Nova Science Publishers, Incorporated, 2009. ProQuest Ebook Central,

Human Rights and the Rule of Law in China…

95

Copyright © 2009. Nova Science Publishers, Incorporated. All rights reserved.

STATEMENT OF XIAO QIANG, DIRECTOR, CHINA INTERNET PROJECT, THE GRADUATE SCHOOL OF JOURNALISM, UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA AT BERKELEY, BERKELEY, CA Mr. XIAO. Thank you, Mr. Chairman and distinguished Commission members. It is a privilege for me to speak in front of this important Commission, and alongside of my distinguished fellow panelists. I particularly want to echo what my colleague Pei Minxin just said of his analysis of China’s political situation. I fully support that. Today, my talk will focus on two things, the growing information flow on the Chinese Internet, and the Chinese Government’s intensified control in this regard. In China, every number is huge. On the Internet, over 130 million Chinese are online, 440 million cell phones are in use. Now I am talking about the blogosphere. In January 2005, China estimated to have around 500,000 bloggers. By the latest survey, it is 28 million blogs. This significant growth is mainly due to the fact that the main China Internet portals, such as Sina.com and Sohu.com, are actively promoting blog applications among the 130 million Chinese Internet users. But it is worth noting that all these Internet companies are funded through venture capital from the United States and are listed, or aiming to be listed, on the NASDAQ stock market. The unintended effect is that Chinese citizens now have a platform to create a public space to discuss political and public affairs, as well as creatively expressing themselves and form social networks online or offline. Mr. Chairman, online discussions are currently becoming a real phenomena that is starting to have real agenda-setting power. The Chinese Government has devoted enormous financial resources to set out government-sponsored Web sites at all levels of government. Before the blogs, about 10 percent of Web sites were directly set up by the government. However, the problem is that the Chinese netizens do not believe those propaganda efforts, and the blogs and BDS are far more popular than government Web sites. This leads to my second point. The Chinese Government has intensified control of the Internet. This effort is well-documented. I particularly want to praise the Commission’s report this year, which has excellent documentation of the control measures.

Human Rights in China, Nova Science Publishers, Incorporated, 2009. ProQuest Ebook Central,

Copyright © 2009. Nova Science Publishers, Incorporated. All rights reserved.

96

U.S. Government Printing Office

But I want to just focus on two telling examples of this important component of this Internet control, as has been said by my co-panelist, John Kamm, and that is about fear. In January 2006, the Shenzhen Public Security Bureau created animated images of a pair of police officers name “Jingjing” and “Chacha.” They sound like panda names, but they are two virtual police images, floating online on the Web sites. Anybody can click through to the police Web site and can report anybody else. According to the Chinese official e-Governance Net Web site, it said, “The main function of Jingjing and Chacha is to intimidate. . . . The Internet has always been monitored by the police. The significance of Jingjing and Chacha’s appearance is to publicly remind all netizens to be conscious of the safe and healthy use of the Internet, to self-regulate their online behavior, and maintain harmonious Internet order together.”Another important method to monitor Internet activities is to use real-name registration. In June 2006, the Ministry of Information Industry ordered all weblogs and Web sites to register with government or face closure. This registration will impose a true-name system on Web site owners. After registration, one must display an electronic verification mark in a specific location on the Web site, and it must also link to the Ministry’s supervision system for making inquiries. By doing so, the identity of a Web site owner will be immediately clear. These examples reveal that the Chinese Government has learned to turn the digital and transparent properties of Internet technology into a surveillance and intimidation tool to control citizens’ behavior. The underlying mechanism works to instill fear among netizens that they are being watched. Of course, these new technology-empowered control mechanisms are only effective when they are used together with intimidation in the physical space. In the past two weeks, three cyber-dissidents have been arrested. Mr. Chairman, distinguished Commission members, let me put it this way. For China’s one-party state, controlling the nature of the information available to its citizens has never been more difficult. Tens of millions of netizens are now empowered by the new publication platform, and what is happening in the Chinese blogosphere is a power shift, not directly at the level of political institutions or law, but around the change of communication systems and ability to shape information and symbolic environment. But the long-term survival of the Chinese Communist Party’s power monopoly regime also critically relies on its ideological work and the control of this environment. In the near future, we will see more and more efforts by the Chinese Government to control the information flow, online or offline, under this control, using the mechanisms listed in the Commission’s report and the examples I

Human Rights in China, Nova Science Publishers, Incorporated, 2009. ProQuest Ebook Central,

Copyright © 2009. Nova Science Publishers, Incorporated. All rights reserved.

Human Rights and the Rule of Law in China…

97

mentioned above. But a deeper problem is that the Chinese Communist Party itself is morally bankrupt and intellectually exhausted. As Professor Cohen said, there is a younger generation with higher ideals. What are the ideals? The ideals are democracy, human rights, rule of law, those that we all believe in together. When they gradually rise into positions, and these ideals and ideas are being facilitated by the new emerging communication platforms, we can see, in long-term, the Chinese censors cannot stop the rise to a freer Chinese society. Finally, I just want to say that the U.S. Government should be a more active player in the development and employment of anticensorship technologies, which will not only help the Chinese people to gain direct access of information to the U.S. Government-sponsored Web sites, but also contribute to the greater information flow in Chinese cyberspace. The Great Firewall, no matter how advanced its technology and how much fear the government is trying to instill, will crumble, and much sooner than the Great Wall. Thank you. [The prepared statement of Mr. Xiao appears in the Appendix.] Chairman HAGEL. Mr. Xiao, thank you. Thank you again to each of our witnesses for your helpful and enlightening testimony. We have good representation on the Commission this morning, so I would suggest that we take, each of us, five minutes for our first round of questioning. We will stay as long as the witnesses will stay with us to answer questions, if that is acceptable. Thank you. I will begin, Mr. Xiao, with your ending comments. I want to focus on the Chinese Government’s blocking, in particular, of the Web sites of foreign news organizations and human rights organizations. As you probably know, in May of last year the Chinese Government began blocking this Commission’s Web site from being viewed in China. I have a two-part question. How does the Chinese Government determine which foreign Web sites are to be blocked? Mr. XIAO. Essentially, they pay attention to the politically sensitive materials far more than any other Web sites, such as pornography, which they are only halfheartedly trying to block. For a particular Web site, the criteria is usually coming from Chinese language content, first. The Hong Kong news media, Taiwan news media, the BBC Chinese site, the Voice of America, Radio Free Asia, and the Chinese dissidents human rights organizations and other overseas publications. Then, the second priority is English-language news media, but with content that they feel is “politically undesirable.” I think the Commission Web site falls in

Human Rights in China, Nova Science Publishers, Incorporated, 2009. ProQuest Ebook Central,

Copyright © 2009. Nova Science Publishers, Incorporated. All rights reserved.

98

U.S. Government Printing Office

that category. Particularly if you have your materials translated into Chinese, then it falls into the blacklist right away. The problem with that also is that there is no clear procedure. They never say which ones are blocked, and also once a Web site has been blocked, there is no way to get it off the blacklist either. Chairman HAGEL. The second part of the question is this, what actions can the U.S. Government or the international community take to circumvent this government censorship? Mr. XIAO. Fortunately, the Internet, by nature, is a decentralized technology. Those information packets can travel in every direction. The later applications of pure technologies and proxies are relatively easy and inexpensive to get around the firewall, as long as those applications are being more and more adopted by the Chinese netizens. We need a certain amount of financial resources to develop those technologies to support a number of those kinds of activities and projects, but the impact with this investment is totally worth it. On the number, you will probably only see a small portion of Chinese Internet users actually using this technology to get around the firewall, only the tech-savvy ones, only the ones who use the Internet a lot. But these are the people who have a much larger audience in China, so you do not need 130 million Chinese people using this, all you need is 100,000 people actively using it. But these are the 100,000 people who are journalists, teachers, and freelance writers who have a greater impact on their opinion leaders in China’s cyberspace. Chairman HAGEL. Thank you. Dr. Pei, given the current state of freedom of expression in China, and each of you have discussed this issue in some detail in your testimony this morning, how much freedom of expression and freedom of the press do you expect for the 2008 Beijing Olympics? Mr. PEI. I think there will most likely be a period of intensified control around the Olympics that is for the purpose of maintaining stability, because it is crucial for the Chinese Government to maintain social and political order. Their mind-set is such that they believe control equals stability, so that is going to be expected. However, if you look at the Chinese press as a whole, you will find that in a cultural sphere, and now increasingly in the business sphere, there is a lot more freedom. The sphere of control that the government continues to monitor and control very tightly is just strictly the political sphere. Chairman HAGEL. Thank you. Mr. Kamm, the same question, if you would care to add anything to what you heard regarding the 2008 Beijing Olympics. Mr. KAMM. I would agree with Dr. Pei. I think there will be an attempt to increase controls in the name of stability. I am not very confident that the Chinese

Human Rights in China, Nova Science Publishers, Incorporated, 2009. ProQuest Ebook Central,

Copyright © 2009. Nova Science Publishers, Incorporated. All rights reserved.

Human Rights and the Rule of Law in China…

99

Government is going to be very successful. I have heard various figures that 20,000 foreign journalists will be in the country. There will be a lot of reporting that those journalists do that have very little to do with the Olympics, per se. As recently as a few weeks ago, the Chinese Government has once again stated that it will allow journalists freedom to move around the country and write about whatever they want. But I do anticipate that, in line with the current campaign against the “Color Revolutions,” that they will, in fact, impose new strictures on the press and on foreign journalists. Chairman HAGEL. Thank you. Professor Cohen. Mr. COHEN. It can be noted, however, that recently foreign journalists— regulations—some of them are being subjected to requests for strip searches and things of that nature. The Foreign Correspondents Club of China is very concerned about it and has recently put out a special bulletin because so many foreign journalists have actually run into new restrictions in practice. Chairman HAGEL. Thank you. Congressman Leach. Representative LEACH. Well, thank you, Mr. Chairman. I want to raise kind of a bedeviling issue for us on tactics. I think we are obligated to record, to the greatest extent possible, every abuse of the human rights circumstance that we can discern. But then we have the problem of advocating for the individual. One has the sense that in the human rights arena, in many countries, over many years, advocacy from this country has been helpful. But one also has the sense, in the last two or three years in China, that if one takes a specific individual and advocates for that individual, it is counterproductive for that individual. This raises a very interesting question of where we should come down on individual cases. I mean, that is, describing the big picture, with the reference to every individual’s circumstance in a report is one thing. Going to an official and saying, “Individual XYZ should be taken out of jail,” it seems that that causes a spine- strengthening on their side. Do you have that sense, Mr. Kamm, Dr. Pei? Mr. KAMM. I would say, until very recently, I do not have that sense. But I do think very recently—in fact, in the last few weeks and months—the Chinese Government might be attempting to disabuse us of the notion that by raising cases, the fate of those people is improved. In my written testimony, you will see that I have done an analysis of a prisoner list that former Assistant Secretary of State Lorne Craner handed over

Human Rights in China, Nova Science Publishers, Incorporated, 2009. ProQuest Ebook Central,

Copyright © 2009. Nova Science Publishers, Incorporated. All rights reserved.

100

U.S. Government Printing Office

five years ago exactly. If you look at what happened to the people on that list who were in prison at the time the list was handed over, you will find that they enjoyed a rate of early release from prison three times greater than other political prisoners who were not on the list. I could give you many other examples where people who are on lists, who are repeatedly raised with the Chinese Government, are better treated, and get early release. In addition to what I pointed out in my testimony, that this has had the cumulative effect of making people less fearful, I would point out that some of the people who, through advocacy, have been released, such as Rebiya Kadeer, have become extremely effective spokespeople for their causes in China. But I am concerned that recently it has come to my attention that some prisoners who are the focus of international attention may, in fact, not be getting better treatment. Representative LEACH. Dr. Pei. Mr. PEI. I want to add two points. First, I think we really do not know. If there were not that kind of international attention, their plight might have been even worse. The second point I want to make is that in the last two years the United States has lost a great deal of leverage vis-a-vis China about human rights issues. The United States, in fact, needs China more than before on Korea, Iran, and a bunch of other issues, on economic issues, and the symbiotic economic relationship has grown much tighter. The Europeans are also in a similarly weak position vis-a-vis China. So as a result, that kind of attention is not producing the desired outcome. Representative LEACH. Mr. Cohen. Mr. COHEN. In criminal cases, the hardest judgment for every Chinese family of someone who has been detained is whether or not to go public. Chinese do not like to wash their laundry in public. Normally they want to try to handle things quietly, informally in the Chinese way. But for serious cases, at some stage, usually after a formal arrest has been announced and it is clear prosecution is going to go ahead, Chinese families then decide the time has come to go public. Now, just as the two previous speakers have made clear, a lot depends on the timing. In 2000 and 2001, when the Congress had to decide whether or not to grant China permanent Most-favoredNation [MFN] treatment, we had maximum leverage. I looked pretty good getting people out of jail. But now the Chinese Government does not have that kind of situation. They feel more confident. They do not want us to see that we can be successful by naming different people.

Human Rights in China, Nova Science Publishers, Incorporated, 2009. ProQuest Ebook Central,

Copyright © 2009. Nova Science Publishers, Incorporated. All rights reserved.

Human Rights and the Rule of Law in China…

101

A good example is Yang Jianli, the democratic organizer from Boston who made the mistake of going back into China after having been excluded for 12 years and using a friend’s passport. He should have been sentenced to not more than one year, but they used the phony ID to give him five years. He is serving out that full five years. A lot depends also on the person’s behavior. How compliant is the person while detained? How stubborn? So, there are a number of factors. But, generally speaking, we have less leverage. Of course, the origin of this Commission lies in the fact we recognize that in granting MFN permanently to China we would need new forms of leverage. Representative LEACH. Fair enough. I apologize, on behalf of the House side. We have votes on the House floor at the moment, so Mr. Levin and I will have to leave. But thank you all very much. Representative LEVIN. Could I just add quickly, this has been an important hearing. I think it emphasizes, within our ranks, if I might put it that way, there is less question about the facts and more concern about what we do about them. Senator Brownback has said he thought the suggestions or the recommendations were not strong enough. We did some work preliminarily to try to work on that very issue, all of us. So, I do think it would be helpful as we proceed, and we must, that all of us work on the issue of how we approach the dynamics. I think that, while China is a huge country and it is not always clear what the facts are, the basic dynamics are pretty clear, the information revolution, the economic growth, but disparities. There are deep divisions within China now economically, so there is more turbulence. The question becomes, how do we most effectively affect that? The more help we can get, the better. Suggestions of research, development of new technologies to counter repression are good. But should we be spending more funds, for example, working with groups in Hong Kong or elsewhere who can affect China if we do not do it directly? All these suggestions, that is really what I think we need, practically, is to focus on how do we proceed from here, because, clearly, the whole purpose of this Commission was, as we engage China, as we must, we also have to confront, if I might use that word, China in terms of its development of political/religious freedoms. Thank you. Chairman HAGEL. Gentlemen, thank you each for your active participation and contributions. Secretary Lavin. Mr. LAVIN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Let me begin by complimenting all of the participants who provided testimony today. I found it a very useful overview of the issues we are looking at.

Human Rights in China, Nova Science Publishers, Incorporated, 2009. ProQuest Ebook Central,

Copyright © 2009. Nova Science Publishers, Incorporated. All rights reserved.

102

U.S. Government Printing Office

I would like to begin by posing a question to Professor Cohen on the commercial dimension. It is an issue that we frequently grapple with at the Commerce Department. To what extent are the commercial elements of human rights part of the broader civil rights challenge? Do you subscribe to the view that improvement in commercial rights, property rights, and so forth can lead to broader improvement? Could you comment on that? Mr. COHEN. The growing recognition in China of rights consciousness, of the awareness that is growing, reaches property law. But you will notice the effort to enact a property law recently failed. I think it will succeed, but there is a big ideological debate going back to the remnants of the impact of earlier decades of Communist philosophy, as well as there are questions of people protecting their own economic interests, in some respects. But there is no doubt that property law, putting respect for property rights in the Constitution, having people trying to enforce commercial rights, not only foreigners but people in China themselves, this is important. We just had a new bankruptcy law after a long period of gestation. There will be an antitrust law soon. But the real problem is enforcement. You can enact all the laws you want and raise all of people’s consciousness, but if you have not got credible legal institutions to enforce those rights, you only enhance people’s sense of disappointment, frustration, and cynicism. So here is the common factor between commercial interests and those who are interested in political freedom being protected, et cetera. You have to have a credible court system, and you have to have a credible arbitration system. For 20 years, I represented foreign investors in China. We did not have anything to do with the courts because nobody wanted to have anything to do with them. They were not credible. So we used arbitration. But experience has shown that most—not all—of China’s arbitration suffers from the same problems that the courts suffer from: incompetence, corruption, networks of relationships, influence, local protectionism. China has a crisis of legal institutions and those affect commercial aspects of life, as well as political freedom aspects of life. That is why I think it is critical to focus on ways of improving the functioning of the courts in China. Efforts to do that, whether for commercial reasons or others, I think, have a common benefit in all these respects. Mr. LAVIN. Part of the discussion of human rights in China involves—— Mr. KAMM. Well, in the particular work I do, I have not found much support from the business community over the years, not to say outright opposition, but certainly almost no support at all. Mr. COHEN. You used to be a leader in the business community.

Human Rights in China, Nova Science Publishers, Incorporated, 2009. ProQuest Ebook Central,

Copyright © 2009. Nova Science Publishers, Incorporated. All rights reserved.

Human Rights and the Rule of Law in China…

103

Mr. KAMM. Well, that is right, but those days are long gone, I am afraid. Recently I have seen that in the American Chambers of Commerce in China, they have started corporate social responsibility committees. I was invited to speak to a small group of committee members recently in Shanghai. They are, in fact, more and more interested in the human rights situation, and I think that is something we can work on. Mr. LAVIN. But I was thinking more indirectly, Mr. Kamm, if I may, just in the sense of—I am not sure how realistic it is for the companies to formally promulgate human rights points of view, but is the existence of multinational corporations [MNCs] in China, the way they treat people, the way they train people, the way they conduct business, does that process lend itself toward a general improvement in human rights in China or is it not relevant? Mr. KAMM. I look at the human rights environment in terms of two spheres. One is the overall picture, the overall environment which you document so well in the Commission’s report. There, I do not see much impact in the overall general environment by multinational corporations. However, in the workplace, no question about it, workers who are in American-owned factories and American offices certainly are exposed to values of openness and transparency, good governance. This is a very good thing. I am particularly interested to see how Sarbanes-Oxley is going to be used in China in Chinese companies. I think it is going to pose a tremendous challenge as time goes on. But the very fact that when you go into a Chinese bookstore now, you will find the Sarbanes-Oxley legislation translated into Chinese and available for people to read. That is a good thing. So, that is how I would address that question. Mr. LAVIN. Thank you, sir. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Chairman HAGEL. Secretary Lavin, thank you. Since we have a vote called, I am going to recognize Senator Martinez, with your permission, so he can ask his questions and then go vote, then we will come back to you, Mr. Secretary. Thank you. Senator Martinez. Senator MARTINEZ. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, very much. I want to thank all of the witnesses, and also praise this important report. I know it will make a great contribution to our future analysis. I tend to associate myself with the remarks of Senator Brownback in terms of “where do we go from here?” being the real important question. There are a number of things I would love to delve into, but I will try to organize my thoughts and zero in on a couple that are particularly of interest to me.

Human Rights in China, Nova Science Publishers, Incorporated, 2009. ProQuest Ebook Central,

Copyright © 2009. Nova Science Publishers, Incorporated. All rights reserved.

104

U.S. Government Printing Office

I am concerned about this condition of prisoners. I know, Mr. Kamm, your foundation works in this arena, so I wonder if you can tell us whether there are any signs of progress or improvement beyond whatever the report may show, but just to highlight here today for me, not having read the whole report, as to what those conditions may be and what the prospects are. Are there international visitors permitted, such as the International Red Cross, particularly with the prisoners of conscience, those that are really in prison only for their beliefs? Mr. KAMM. A really ground-breaking visit took place in China, Senator Martinez, at the end of last year. The U.N. Rapporteur on Torture was allowed into the country and he produced quite a good report. The report basically says that torture in China remains widespread, but it appears to be declining in urban areas. He goes directly to your question about whether conditions are improving. I would summarize the report to say that, as far as the detention centers are concerned, and that is where people are held in detention for long periods before being brought to trial, we do not see improvement. In fact, it is probably getting worse. As far as the prison system is concerned, since 1994, since there has been a prison law, I have seen some improvements. There are certainly many problems. By the way, the 1994 prison law, I do think, was in some respects occasioned by the whole debate about MFN in this country. Now, with respect to the international community, the Red Cross is still not allowed into China’s prisons. There have been discussions held on that issue for more than 12 years and they have so far not resulted in an agreement. That is how I would summarize. Senator MARTINEZ. It is encouraging that one group has been allowed in. Mr. KAMM. Well, the Working Group on Arbitrary Detection has been in twice, and the Rapporteur on Torture has been in once. That is what we have so far. And the Rapporteur on Torture was able to interview political prisoners, and some of those interviews made it into the final report. So, that is a step in the right direction, but it really has been just one visit like that. Mr. COHEN. But he made clear that he interviewed under constraints and his report was so strong and so critical, I think it is going to be a long time before they let him back in again. Mr. KAMM. Probably right. Senator MARTINEZ. The issue of organ harvesting among executed prisoners. I wonder if either you, Professor Cohen, or Mr. Kamm can comment on where we are on that and how prevalent is the practice? Are there any human rights standards that are being followed or observed as it relates to that?

Human Rights in China, Nova Science Publishers, Incorporated, 2009. ProQuest Ebook Central,

Copyright © 2009. Nova Science Publishers, Incorporated. All rights reserved.

Human Rights and the Rule of Law in China…

105

Mr. COHEN. This is, of course, one of the most controversial questions. The Falun Gong has made the most serious accusations against the government. Thus far, we have not found that substantiated. The lack of transparency in China makes it very difficult to know what is going on. They have passed regulations that, on the face of the regulations, forbid illegal harvesting. But my impression is that it is going on. I do not know whether you could say there is an economic incentive to go on executing so many people, in part, because obviously clear benefits are coming to certain agencies and people from organ harvesting. Of course, benefits also incur to the people who are the recipients of the organs, which are in scarce supply outside of China. But this is a very difficult problem. The Chinese Government has not allowed sufficient transparency. We do not know how to answer accurately some of the very controversial charges that are being made. Mr. KAMM. I would simply add here and repeat something that Professor Cohen said in his opening remarks. We do not know how many people are executed every year in China. It is a very closely held state secret. I tried, on my most recent trip, to get some idea of the number. There have been reports. One member of the National People’s Congress said, I think two and a half years ago, that the number is about 10,000 per year. More recently, an individual said that he had been given the number—this is a Chinese scholar—by the president of the Supreme Court and the number is appalling. We simply do not know. I recently found the first-ever county-level report with statistics on the number of individuals executed in that county between 1950 and 1999. If you extrapolate from that number—and I am told it is not a representative county—the number would be closer to 20,000 executions. Senator MARTINEZ. Per year? Mr. KAMM. Yes. If you extrapolate from that number. Now, I think it is not a representative county. It is in a border region and there is a lot of drug smuggling going on. The execution rate in that county is probably higher there than elsewhere. But I am convinced that the number for the country as a whole is well in excess of 10,000. Finally, I want to say that we are facing a particularly serious situation over the next few months. This is the execution season in China. People are typically executed toward the end of the year in China. Right now, the Supreme Court has had the power of review returned to it, but it is not exercising that power of review. In my opinion, if and when they do exercise that power of review, many people will not be executed. So it is extremely urgent that the Commission and members of the Commission press hard that this important reform be instituted

Human Rights in China, Nova Science Publishers, Incorporated, 2009. ProQuest Ebook Central,

Copyright © 2009. Nova Science Publishers, Incorporated. All rights reserved.

106

U.S. Government Printing Office

quickly, otherwise I fear hundreds of people will lose their lives; innocent people who have been convicted without due process rights will be executed. This is a very urgent situation. Mr. COHEN. For that reason, some lawyers have suggested an Illinois-type moratorium until the Supreme People’s Court’s new review procedures can be set in place. It does not look like the Supreme People’s Court is likely to accept that. I mentioned this issue in my written statement. Senator MARTINEZ. I have to go vote. But let me just say, there are a number of other questions I would like to touch on, but am limited by having to run to the floor to vote. I think it is really important that we talk about these issues. I would love to know more about the development of civil society and the opportunities that there are for that. I think it is also terribly important that information and the free flow of information be maintained and continued. Internet access, I think, is a vital way in which, in our current times, people can, frankly, find forums of discussion and support, so I think it is vitally important to continue that work. I also would love to discuss this further with you, Mr. Xiao, in terms of how it might be utilized in a place very close to my own heart, which is Cuba, which has great similarity to all of the issues that we have been discussing here with respect to China today. One big difference is that we do not trade with Cuba. I am often asked why we do not trade with Cuba when, in fact, we trade with China. That question I usually answer by saying “Well, I wonder whether that is improving the conditions of the people of China by our continued business with our conscience.” I think it is a real problem. So I think as we continue to flourish in our bilateral relationships in trade and commerce, and as we go to the store and find the “Made in China” label on just about every other thing that we purchase, we should not wonder what the obligation is of those of us who engage in commerce with China to end these heinous practices, or at least raise our conscience to a level to cause us to wonder if it is all right and everything is fine, and China is the prosperous country that we all know it is. The Olympics are going there, but yet something is very “rotten in Denmark,” to quote from William Shakespeare. Thank you very much. Mr. LAVIN [presiding]. Thank you, Senator. With your permission, Representative Honda, we will ask Deputy Secretary Law to proceed with his questions. Mr. LAW. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I am pleased to see that we have rules for the peaceful transition of authority on this Commission.

Human Rights in China, Nova Science Publishers, Incorporated, 2009. ProQuest Ebook Central,

Copyright © 2009. Nova Science Publishers, Incorporated. All rights reserved.

Human Rights and the Rule of Law in China…

107

I first want to commend all of the panelists for truly cogent and penetrating testimonies. It has been a wonderful learning experience. I also want to thank each of you for your commitment, your personal commitment of time, treasure, and talent to this tremendous cause. I was particularly taken by a theme that was part of Dr. Pei’s testimony, and my question will be directed at him. The reason I was taken by it is because it dovetails perfectly with the opening statement that I was going to give at the outset, which I would like to submit for the record. I would like to briefly summarize a few of the points I would make, which would then lead to the question. One of the questions we often ask ourselves is whether the glass is half full or half empty. Someone once wisely responded to that by saying that it depends entirely on how thirsty you are. When we try to assess progress on human rights in China, there are often two views. To some in the West who are eager to do business in China, the glass appears half full. But to those in China who are thirsting for freedom of speech, religion, and assembly, who are thirsting for the protection of an impartial rule of law, the glass remains half empty and appears at times, especially more recently, to be slowly evaporating. I want to extend my thanks to the Commission staff for assembling a report that gives due credence to both perspectives, noting the progress that China is making undeniably on certain human rights issues, as well as highlighting the disconcerting slippage that has occurred in recent months with respect to basic political freedoms. What is important to discern in all this is not individual anecdotes, but meaningful trends. One of the most significant trends, in my view is the growing intersection and overlap of fundamental human rights issues and larger economic interests. We see this vividly in the area where the Department of Labor is most directly engaged, and that is in labor rights. Increasingly, China’s ability to institute basic wage protections, health and safety standards, and pension rights will be a key determinant in achieving both economic and civic stability. The Chinese Government knows this and has been fairly forward-leaning in seeking technical assistance from our department and in pursuing labor law reforms that can help quell mounting unrest over labor conditions in China. My written statement does list and enumerate some of the results of the progress we have made in that area. Another example of this trend is the growing nexus of freedom of speech, regulation of the Internet, transparency of economic information, which some of you have discussed, as well as respect for intellectual property.

Human Rights in China, Nova Science Publishers, Incorporated, 2009. ProQuest Ebook Central,

Copyright © 2009. Nova Science Publishers, Incorporated. All rights reserved.

108

U.S. Government Printing Office

As freedom begets freedom, repression also begets repression. China’s curbs on political dissent have slowly but surely metastasized to constrict the free flow of information on the Internet, access to the Internet, and unfettered economic reporting. Such restrictions not only impinge upon individual liberties, they also impede the effective functioning of China’s own economy by discouraging the creativity, collaboration, and transparency that are the lifeblood of sustained economic growth. We raise these concerns and issues in this Report not to scold China or to claim moral superiority, and nor to disparage China’s commitment to achieving continued progress on all these fronts. But as these issues of human rights and economic growth converge, China will increasingly discover that freedom is not divisible and the rule of law, not repression, is the best guarantor of prosperity and stability. Finally, those who currently see the glass as half full will begin to share the same perspective with those who see it today as half empty. Now my question for Dr. Pei, and anyone else who would like to respond. In your recent book, “China’s Trapped Transition: The Limits of Developmental Autocracy,” you point out the strains between China’s dualistic policy of promarket economic growth on the one hand, and continued autocratic one-party rule on the other. In your view, is the Communist Party’s dualistic strategy sustainable in the long term? How can we as policymakers best challenge that policy to promote greater, broader human rights and freedom in China? Mr. PEI. I believe this strategy is not sustainable for the long term, mostly because Chinese society itself is growing far more complex, plural, and it will require increasing investments in law enforcement and political control that simply are going to be unaffordable. The second part is that what has underwritten this strategy is continued economic growth. We cannot take for granted that China’s economic growth will continue for the next two to three decades. That is because the current growth model itself is not only inefficient, but is producing imbalances that contribute to rising social and political strengths. Certainly, I think what is most important to know about China is the lack of values that will give both the people in China confidence, and also the members of the ruling elite the confidence that this system will work. From my own research, it is abundantly clear that there is not only a crisis of confidence on the part of ordinary citizens, but there is also a crisis of confidence on the part of the ruling elite. Mr. LAW. Interesting. Yes?

Human Rights in China, Nova Science Publishers, Incorporated, 2009. ProQuest Ebook Central,

Copyright © 2009. Nova Science Publishers, Incorporated. All rights reserved.

Human Rights and the Rule of Law in China…

109

Mr. XIAO. If I could just add a little bit to what Dr. Pei just said regarding your question of whether the current ruling model is sustainable. I agree that in the long term it is not sustainable, and would add two factors. One is simple, but is important: the environment. China’s economic growth has enormous environmental cost, environmental degradation, and that factor will get back to China’s economy, and also its sociopolitical stability. The second, we have discussed a little bit less here, is the Chinese Communist Party, by nature, is the controlling force of the nation. Yes, it is ruled by law, but most importantly it is the rule by the gun and the rule by the pen. That is Mao Zedong’s quote and it still works today. It is ruled by the violence, intimidation, and backing by a propaganda, ideological machine that the Party governs. That machine is really in crisis because of the Internet and other commercialization of official media. That is where the Chinese people cannot be fooled any more and that is where the Party is fighting a losing battle. Mr. LAW. Thank you both. That is a very important point. That is the only question I wanted to raise. It does go, though, to a point that Mr. Kamm made earlier about the fact that, in recent years in particular, the business community has not been actively engaged on these issues, but slowly but surely as that business model becomes unsustainable, the business community will have to start to look more intentionally and be more engaged on these issues. Thanks. Mr. COHEN. Could I just supplement this with a reference to a question Secretary Lavin asked earlier that I did not chime in on about the impact of American cooperation with China in the business sphere? Although our hopes that this would produce more rapid political and legal reform have not yet been vindicated, I think the broader impact continues. The opportunities that foreign business provides through massive investment in China and technology transfer are a very important influence. The joint venture, the foreign-invested enterprise, is a mini university in a country that has not yet allocated sufficient resources to higher education. On the other hand, the business community in the United States and elsewhere seems blissfully unaware of the full weakness of Chinese legal institutions. I think it should be applying far more cooperation and pressure for improvement. Hundreds of thousands of contracts, literally, are made every year, most of which provide for arbitration of disputes in China. People who sign these documents often are crossing their fingers and closing their eyes, or are simply unaware of the risks involved. It is only when they do get involved that they see the weakness and the inadequacy. I think foreign business should be working harder with the Chinese to strengthen these institutions.

Human Rights in China, Nova Science Publishers, Incorporated, 2009. ProQuest Ebook Central,

Copyright © 2009. Nova Science Publishers, Incorporated. All rights reserved.

110

U.S. Government Printing Office

[The prepared statement of Mr. Law appears in the Appendix.] Mr. LAVIN. Thank you, Professor. Let me ask Representative Honda for his comments. Representative HONDA. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Let me, first, apologize for being tardy. I know that the expertise here is very global and it is very deep and profound, and I know that the witnesses have spent a lot of personal time getting here, so I just wanted to let you know that I apologize for being late. Having read the report that our Commission has put out, I am struck by its even-handedness and its objectivity. That is why I wanted to hear your testimony. Having heard some of the comments, some of the suggestions that Mr. Cohen had made, I guess my general question to all of you would be, given the kinds of directions that Congress has taken up today with respect to China, and Asia in general, and given our report, what are some of the other suggestions you would make for legislators to develop policies toward China in the different arenas, everything from the rule of law to business and the protection of intellectual property? You made one statement, that we should be engaging ourselves more, it sounds like, at the ground level in terms of us understanding what and how China does business in terms of contracts, contract proposals, and that sort of thing. Second, looking at a possibility which is highly improbable, by the sense that I got, to looking at the courts in China to suspend all death penalties until such time that they are all reviewed, which will have a better outcome, historically. Are there other kinds of comments and suggestions you could make to Members of Congress and the Senate as to what direction and what kinds of postures we should be taking in order to improve, and also to learn more? Mr. COHEN. There is one over-arching factor no one has mentioned, but we are all aware of. Robert Burns once said, “Oh, would the Lord, this gift He give us, to see ourselves as others see us.”We are worried about human rights and law reform in China. The United States has generally stood for good things in the Chinese mind. But current events, especially the struggle that the Congress and the Executive Branch are in with respect to our government’s treatment of people inside and outside this country—whether we will adhere to due process, the rule of law, the rights of suspects, the role of the court in independently reviewing arbitrary acts by the Executive Branch—people in China are very much aware of this if they have access to the Internet, the Voice of America, or Radio Free Asia. We cannot be hypocritical. We cannot say, “Do as we say, not as we do.” What Americans stand for in this world has been eroded, as many people realize. The most important thing Congress can do is really strengthen, once again, our soft power. Make the right decisions about the rule of law in this country.

Human Rights in China, Nova Science Publishers, Incorporated, 2009. ProQuest Ebook Central,

Copyright © 2009. Nova Science Publishers, Incorporated. All rights reserved.

Human Rights and the Rule of Law in China…

111

Representative HONDA. Thank you. That sort of reminds me of the Scripture that says, “How is it that you are worried about the splinter in my eye when you have a log in yours.”Any other comments? Yes? Mr. XIAO. I, first, want to absolutely support what Professor Cohen said. The U.S. Government’s human rights record and actions themselves speak much louder than words, and that will only strengthen or weaken the power of the negotiations and dialogue with China’s government. So the one thing the U.S. Congress must do is hold the highest standard of its domestic and foreign policy practices on the human rights standard. Second, regarding what I also suggest, I want to bring the Commission’s attention to another important document, “Race to the Bottom: Corporate Complicity in Chinese Internet Censorship,”published by Human Rights Watch last month, which addressed issues of U.S. companies—actually, global Internet companies, but mainly U.S. companies—Google, Yahoo, Microsoft, and their role in reinforcing the censorship mechanism within China. The previous question was, “These U.S. companies, are they problems or solutions for human rights?” For those Internet information companies, they are both. They are a solution in terms of their being part of the information revolution in China. They provide technology applications and commercial incentive. But they are also part of the problem because, in order to get access to the Chinese market, they have to cooperate to some degree and be complicit with the Chinese censors. This has serious implications not only to the Chinese netizens, but to the world’s information freedom and privacy. Earlier this year I was here at a different hearing, proposing the Code of Conduct approach for industry. I have been involved with multiple universities to draft the guiding principles for those industries and had the dialogues and working group with the companies, trying to push that collective action approach. However, if you read the Human Rights Watch report, it is important to stress the role of Congress, that legislation seems a necessary tool in order to move these things forward, because companies have incentives, but also disincentives to stand up against the Chinese Government. They need the protection and support from the U.S. Government. That is where I think the Congress can do something. Let me say very specifically what is going to help. We talk about the rule of law here. We talk about freedom of information. In China, the main control of information is not by rule of law, it is by self-censorship, by intimidation, I stress. So those companies, they censor something on the Internet not because the Chinese legal agencies gave them a list specifically explaining what needed to be censored. It is because they hired staff. They come up with a list of politically sensitive materials themselves under the guidance of the Chinese authorities. They

Human Rights in China, Nova Science Publishers, Incorporated, 2009. ProQuest Ebook Central,

Copyright © 2009. Nova Science Publishers, Incorporated. All rights reserved.

112

U.S. Government Printing Office

over-censor as well, and they do not have a legally accountable document for this process. That is where the transparency and the rule of law works. The Yahoo buyer often says, “Oh, we just follow Chinese law.”Actually, a lot of their censorship is not following any real docu- mented Chinese law. If you force them to make that transparent, it will protect these companies’ operating environment, but it would also significantly actually change the censorship mechanism within China, which to me will be of great benefit to the Chinese netizens. Representative HONDA. I appreciate your comment, Mr. Xiao. If what you are saying is that if the U.S. companies did not follow or interpret strictly what they thought might be law and they moved forward as you suggest, what is the impact on the end users if they exercise that level of flexibility from the central government in increasing prisoners of conscience? Mr. XIAO. The impact will be big. I cannot completely predict, because the censorship mechanisms are huge. It is not only about censorship of certain words or search results. But let us focus on the future words list. I am teaching in the school. In the U.S. mainstream media, there are certain words, seven or so, that you cannot really use. In the Chinese Internet, the list is as long as more than 1,000 Chinese words that cannot be used that are sensitive materials. But where does that list come from? That list is not necessarily directly transparently coming from any legal enforcement agencies in China. Do they ever make it public? No. Even when they order media or Internet companies to censor those words and contents, do they give a written record? Most times, no. So they themselves are afraid. Also, that is the mechanism of censorship, how that works. They want to also leave deniability for themselves. If we can push, just simply by the rule of law, corporate transparency, and social responsibility approach to force that as a transparent and legal process, I do not know if they can dare to show all the things they censor. That is like reading the psychological mind of what they are really afraid of. Representative HONDA. So, if I may, what you are really saying is, through the pipeline, it should be agnostic and allow the end users to determine for themselves the shade and the content of their words and their terminology. Mr. XIAO. Right. The end users have much more creative ways to express themselves. But from the censor’s point of view, it will cause incredible changes for them in how to control people’s minds, which again, you are empowering the users and protecting the users, which, in the long term, is significant. Mr. KAMM. Congressman Honda, just two quick recommendations addressing your question.

Human Rights in China, Nova Science Publishers, Incorporated, 2009. ProQuest Ebook Central,

Copyright © 2009. Nova Science Publishers, Incorporated. All rights reserved.

Human Rights and the Rule of Law in China…

113

First of all, I have been coming here for many years, meeting with members, testifying. My impression is that in the past, members of the House, Senators, whenever they went to China they would raise cases, they would hand over lists, or when Chinese officials came here that would happen. My impression is that that is much less common now. Just reading from press reports of recent visits by important congressional delegations, I see a lot of interest in intellectual property rights and the situation in Korea, all of which is as it should be. But I would strongly recommend that Members of Congress return to the previous practice of raising cases and handing over lists. You have got an excellent database. You can generate lists very quickly and very professionally, and of course we can help in that respect, too. A second recommendation. My foundation has put together a list of more than 120 cities and States that have sister city and State relationships in China. That is a very good channel to raise human rights concerns with those places in China. When those cities host or send delegations to China, again, they should raise cases and concerns in those specific cities and provinces. In a couple of weeks I will meet with a city that has a relationship with a city in China, and they are willing, in fact, to do just that. So this is a specific recommendation that I hope the Commission might follow up on. Mr. COHEN. Could I just supplement that? Before you got here today, Congressman Honda, I discussed, among other things, the most pathetic case I know of, that of a blind, so called “barefoot lawyer,” a legal activist who has been badly abused for over a year in China in Linyi City, a city, if you can believe it, of 10 million people. I had never heard of it before I met this man. Linyi City authorities have not only committed horrible abuses against him, but the reason he got involved was because of their illegal compulsory sterilization and abortion program, violating China’s central laws for birth control, et cetera. Thousands of people were abused. He was protesting this. Now, a Linyi City delegation is coming here to D.C. next month to take part in a beautiful program at the National Arboretum. Are we going to let these people come here and manifest no recognition of the abuses they are committing? I hope not. Representative HONDA. Thank you. Chairman HAGEL [presiding]. Representative Honda, thank you. Any further questions? [No response.] Chairman HAGEL. Gentlemen of the panel, we are most grateful for your helpful and insightful thoughts and analysis. You all have been very helpful to

Human Rights in China, Nova Science Publishers, Incorporated, 2009. ProQuest Ebook Central,

114

U.S. Government Printing Office

this Commission, and in particular, to our staff, over many years. We are grateful for that. As I noted earlier, your testimony and other comments, as well as the dialogue we have just had over the last hour and a half, will all be included in the record. We may have follow-up questions. I know we will continue our association with each of you, and we are grateful for that also. I also want to thank our staff for the good work they have done in producing a rather significant report, as well as all of my colleagues, for their personal involvement. Thank you very much. This hearing is adjourned. [Whereupon, at 11:15 a.m. the hearing was adjourned.]

APPENDIX. PREPARED STATEMENTS

Copyright © 2009. Nova Science Publishers, Incorporated. All rights reserved.

Prepared Statement of Jerome A. Cohen, September 20, 2006 Senator Hagel and Other Distinguished Members of this Commission, All of us who focus on China’s progress, problems and prospects with respect to human rights and the rule of law are grateful for this Commission’s continuing interest and cooperation. Hearings such as today’s and publications such as your just- released 2006 Annual Report, which offers a comprehensive, balanced and accurate account of recent developments, stimulate interest and spread knowledge about a vast, complex and important subject that receives too little public attention in both China and the United States. It would be wonderful if the 2006 Annual Report could be published in China as well as this country. Striking the right tone for today’s Hearing is a challenge. It has been over a year since my last appearance here, and this has not been a good time in China for either the rule of law or for human rights in the sense of political and religious freedoms, protection against arbitrary criminal punishment, the development of fair and independent courts and the growth of a free and vigorous legal profession. The picture is somewhat brighter if we focus on the role of law and legal institutions in promoting China’s remarkable economic progress. The new and long-awaited Bankruptcy Law and the forthcoming Antitrust Law are recent examples of ongoing legislative progress, although the temporary failure of the draft Property Law reminds us of the ideological as well as practical and technical challenges confronting the National People’s Congress in seeking to regulate bitter rural and urban land use disputes.

Human Rights in China, Nova Science Publishers, Incorporated, 2009. ProQuest Ebook Central,

Human Rights and the Rule of Law in China…

115

Yet even commercial laws need credible enforcement. China’s rapidly expanding institutions for legal education and scholarly publication are gradually improving the craft skills of the various branches of the legal profession. But the courts, the China International Economic and Trade Arbitration Commission and most, but not all, of the many municipal arbitration organizations continue to suffer from political interference, corruption, “local protectionism” and the corroding effects of personal ties compendiously described as “guanxi.” The impact of these serious institutional shortcomings will become more apparent as China’s economy reaches a higher stage of development. Moreover, not all recent economic rulemaking has been positive in facilitating either foreign business cooperation with China or even unfettered distribution of purely commercial news. I am sure that my colleagues at this Hearing will analyze the continuing and extensive denials in practice of the freedoms to receive information, speak, publish, organize, assemble, demonstrate and worship that are enshrined, in principle, in China’s Constitution. Here I will comment only on prospects for further legislative reform of the administration of criminal justice and relevant activities of Chinese courts and lawyers.

Copyright © 2009. Nova Science Publishers, Incorporated. All rights reserved.

Prospects for Legislative Reform of the Criminal Process Chinese experts have long recognized that the 1996 Criminal Procedure Law (CPL) is in need of revision, clarification and elaboration. Several impressive academic drafts of a new law have been circulating in official circles for some time. Yet hopes that a new law might be enacted by the time of the Beijing Olympics in 2008 now appear to be receding. This new law was to accompany and implement China’s long-awaited ratification of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), which the People’s Republic of China (PRC) signed in 1998. Ratification of the ICCPR—and implementation in accordance with its terms—would have a more profound effect on the PRC’s political, legal and social systems than the PRC’s entry into the World Trade Organization has had upon its economy. Undoubtedly for this reason, in what is plainly a very conservative climate for law reform, ICCPR ratification also seems to be retreating to the back burner of a leadership that has shown itself to be increasingly impervious to popular demands for due process in law enforcement. At least in the short term, the Politburo has decided to meet the spectre of social instability with harsh repression rather than legislative innovation.

Human Rights in China, Nova Science Publishers, Incorporated, 2009. ProQuest Ebook Central,

Copyright © 2009. Nova Science Publishers, Incorporated. All rights reserved.

116

U.S. Government Printing Office

This is unfortunate since a large number of Chinese criminal justice experts from the judiciary, the procuracy, the defense bar, the Ministry of Justice, the Ministry of Public Security, the NPC staff and academic life have been making impressive efforts to develop a national consensus on a broad range of understandably contentious issues. Should suspects generally be granted bail during the investigation period instead of languishing in detention as at present? Should they have a right to keep silent and not incriminate themselves? Should a presumption of innocence be confirmed and its implications spelled out? Should defense lawyers be allowed to monitor police interrogations, conduct their own investigation prior to indictment and freely meet detained clients? What steps should be adopted to make defense lawyers available to accused who more often than not go unrepresented? What protections should be enacted to reduce the likelihood that suspects will be tortured and to curb widespread overtime detentions? What measures should be prescribed to strengthen the current insignificant legislative barriers to arbitrary search and seizure? Should all illegally-obtained evidence be excluded from trials? Should plea bargaining be fostered? Should prosecution witnesses be required to appear at trial in order to make meaningful the existing right to cross-examine one’s accusers? What kind of appellate review should replace the current perfunctory procedure? None of these issues, which have long cried out for legislative resolution, is likely to be dealt with by the NPC in the near future. Nor does the NPC seem ready to abolish the notorious, supposedly “noncriminal,”administrative punishment of “reeducation through labor” (RETL), which allows the police unilaterally to ship people off to three or even four years of confinement in circumstances that are similar to those of the conventional criminal punishment of “reform through labor.” Two or three years ago, many Chinese reformers, even within the Ministry of Public Security (MPS), seemed confident that the NPC was about to abolish or at least substantially revise RETL. There was widespread agreement among the experts that its continuing existence undermines the significance of the Criminal Procedure Law (CPL), since it allows the police to circumvent the protections of the CPL, including review by the procuracy and the courts, and nevertheless to send people to long periods of what is, for all intents and purposes, criminal punishment. But the apparent opposition of the Central Party Political-Legal Committee and the leadership of the MPS, which believes that it continues to need this weapon to help quell social unrest, has been sufficient to block adoption of the draft legislation that now lies dormant in the NPC.

Human Rights in China, Nova Science Publishers, Incorporated, 2009. ProQuest Ebook Central,

Human Rights and the Rule of Law in China…

117

Copyright © 2009. Nova Science Publishers, Incorporated. All rights reserved.

Supreme Court Efforts to Restrict Application of the Death Penalty Although one cannot be optimistic about immediate prospects for further NPC reforms of the criminal process, this does not rule out the efforts that can be made by other institutions, especially the Supreme People’s Court (SPC). Within its limited political power, the SPC has been trying to sustain the momentum for law reform. Early this year, it made public its Second Five-Year Reform Program for the People’s Courts, which sets forth an ambitious 50-goal agenda for court improvements of various kinds. It has more recently announced thirteen new research projects for implementation. Experience suggests caution before equating breathless pronouncements with actual accomplishments. Nevertheless, the most active law reform currently under way in the criminal justice field is the SPC’s energetic effort to dramatically improve the present inadequate procedures for trying and reviewing death penalty cases. The SPC recently announced its determination to retrieve from the provincial high courts the responsibility the SPC had granted them for final review of all death penalty cases except for those involving crimes of corruption and of endangering state security, which the SPC has always retained. For practical rather than political reasons, implementation of this determination has proved to be a slow and painstaking task, largely because of the difficulty of recruiting the 300 to 400 new SPC judges who are deemed to be necessary to do the job. This estimate offers some clue to the huge, but unconfirmed, number of capital prosecutions brought by the procuracy each year. The SPC has reportedly recruited over 100 of the newly needed contingent from the lower courts. In order to speed completion of the task, it has also begun to recruit Chinese law professors and lawyers to serve on its staff. Although this had occasionally been done in the past, the current attempt to recruit broadly outside the career judiciary bodes well for the future, if it proves successful. Because the SPC is not expected to grant final review to the retrieved categories of capital cases until 2007, that responsibility will continue to rest with the high courts until then. Although some lawyers have urged the SPC to declare a moratorium on final reviews until it is ready to conduct them, the SPC has not responded to this proposal and is unlikely to do so. Even the SPC, which to its credit frequently adopts a dynamic view of its authority, would be hard-pressed to take such a bold step in the absence of new legislation or a Politburo instruction, neither of which is anticipated. This is especially the case since the enactment, just weeks ago, of a Supervision Law that strengthens the controls of the standing

Human Rights in China, Nova Science Publishers, Incorporated, 2009. ProQuest Ebook Central,

Copyright © 2009. Nova Science Publishers, Incorporated. All rights reserved.

118

U.S. Government Printing Office

committees of the people’s congresses at all levels over government, court and procuracy activities. When this law goes into effect on January 1, 2007, the SPC will be required to file with the NPC’s Standing Committee each new interpretation it issues, knowing that the Standing Committee has the power to amend its interpretation. What the SPC has done is to move ahead to improve procedures at the high court level. Since July 1, all appeals of death penalty cases require a formal court hearing—though not necessarily a public hearing-rather than merely what was often only a cursory review of the case file and the briefs submitted by the procuracy and defense lawyers. Moreover, some SPC experts have recognized that not only are the appellate and final review processes in need of improvement, but also the trial itself. Capital trials inevitably suffer from the same deficiencies as other criminal trials in China, only the stakes are higher. In the absence of specific authorizing legislation, it is unclear how far the SPC can go in mandating more accurate and fairer procedures in capital trials. Yet if it does carry out far-reaching improvements, this would not be the first time it has tread upon the NPC’s turf. Thus far, in order to guide trial courts, the SPC has reportedly drafted “standards for the application of the death penalty in certain cases,“ namely, for crimes of murder, injury causing death, drug trafficking and robbery, which account for the bulk of PRC death sentences. These standards, which have not been made public, apparently call for the imposition of capital punishment only in cases in which the new and detailed conditions that they set forth have been met. Of course, law reformers will be quick to advocate that any new trial and appellate procedural guaranties in capital cases be extended to the processing of other serious crimes.

Disgraceful Handling of Some Recent Criminal Cases Unfortunately, the SPC’s encouraging activism with respect to death penalty reform has not been matched by equal vigilance in supervising the conduct of lower courts in individual criminal cases. This past year has witnessed a series of outrageous criminal convictions in cases that have been widely publicized outside China despite being shrouded in secrecy within the country. I have served as an informal consultant in two of these cases. In one, the blind legal activist Chen Guangcheng was sentenced to four years and three months in prison by the Yinan County Basic Court in Linyi City, Shandong Province, allegedly for instigating a mob to block a road and for inflicting damage on public property. The detention procedures and trial in this case were a travesty of justice by any standards. In the

Human Rights in China, Nova Science Publishers, Incorporated, 2009. ProQuest Ebook Central,

Copyright © 2009. Nova Science Publishers, Incorporated. All rights reserved.

Human Rights and the Rule of Law in China…

119

other case, Zhao Yan, a Chinese staff member of the Beijing bureau of the New York Times, was sentenced to three years in prison allegedly for committing criminal fraud against a friend, again after detention and trial procedures that shamed a great nation, but this time not in a poor, rural Shandong county but in Beijing, the prosperous and impressive political and educational heart of the country. These cases are merely the tip of a criminal process iceberg that is largely concealed from the scrutiny of both Chinese and foreigners and that functions with cynical disdain for the country’s criminal justice laws and international human rights standards. Court procedures are sometimes a farce, but pre-trial police misconduct is frequently worse. The Ministry of Public Security in practice often condones the misbehavior of its police, who increasingly retain thugs to carry out some of their most lawless acts. And the Ministry of State Security, China’s version of the former Soviet KGB, is even more a law unto itself because of the even greater secrecy of its operations. At the national level, the Supreme People’s Procuracy, the supposed “watchdog of legality’’ in Communist systems, continues to issue rules designed to curb actions such as illegal extended detentions of suspects by investigating officials. Yet in practice, local procuracies are often politically helpless or uninterested in implementing such rules. Further, in pursuing their own responsibilities for the investigation of corruption cases, local procuracies themselves frequently disregard prescribed procedures. Thus far, efforts by the NPC and local people’s congresses to ferret out law enforcement abuses have not proved effective and in some cases, have actually served as cover for illicit interference with law enforcement. Whether the recently promulgated Supervision Law, which strengthens the powers of the standing committees of people’s congresses to review the operation of various government agencies including the courts, will yield better results remains to be seen.

The Communist Party’s Participation in Criminal Investigation One of the most prominent and interesting features of recent PRC criminal justice is the increasing visibility of the Party’s own investigative and coercive apparatus. To be sure, the Party, through its political-legal committees and through organizations within every law enforcement agency and court, controls the operations of official law enforcement at every level of government. But it also plays a major role itself in investigating and confining suspect Party members

Human Rights in China, Nova Science Publishers, Incorporated, 2009. ProQuest Ebook Central,

Copyright © 2009. Nova Science Publishers, Incorporated. All rights reserved.

120

U.S. Government Printing Office

in important and complex cases before their processing by the official law enforcement agencies even begins. The Party’s 70 million members, and sometimes others as well, are subject to informal, but effective and often longterm compulsory detention by one of the Party’s ubiquitous discipline and inspection commissions. This process is generally referred to as “shuanggui,” which means “double regulation” or “the two stipulations,”because investigative targets are ordered to report at a stipulated time and place. Especially in major cases of corruption, shuanggui investigation/detention often precedes both the formal imposition of Party disciplinary sanctions against members who appear to have violated Party rules and the transfer of suspects to the law enforcement agencies if they appear to have violated the Criminal Law. Because shuanggui suspects are often relatively important Party figures, they are usually confined in more comfortable quarters than a regular police detention cell. Nevertheless, although recent Party documents purport to assure shuanggui detainees of humane treatment, guaranteeing them against abuses against their person and property and even authorizing contacts with their family, if their captors believe this would not adversely affect the investigation, they are generally held incommunicado and denied some of the protections to which criminal suspects are entitled at least in principle. Thus they may be detained for as long as the Party discipline and inspection commission thinks appropriate, have no right to the advice of counsel, and have no opportunity for the procuracy to review the basis for their detention. If the suspect is turned over for criminal investigation, these criminal procedure rights should come into play, but by then it is usually too late for them significantly to benefit the suspect even if they are observed in practice. Consequently, as suspects, Party members—the nation’s elite—have even fewer due process rights than the masses!

New Restraints upon Lawyers My last year’s testimony to the Commission emphasized the many restrictions imposed on China’s criminal defense lawyers during both the investigation and trial stages and the threat of criminal prosecution that hangs over any lawyer who presents too vigorous a challenge to the facts alleged by the procuracy. The situation is no better this year. Indeed, in several respects it has deteriorated. During the past year police or their hired thugs have often beaten lawyers for controversial defendants in order to prevent the lawyers’ access to their clients or to the courts. The courageous human rights lawyer Gao Zhisheng was deprived of his license to practice law and is now being detained for unspecified “criminal

Human Rights in China, Nova Science Publishers, Incorporated, 2009. ProQuest Ebook Central,

Copyright © 2009. Nova Science Publishers, Incorporated. All rights reserved.

Human Rights and the Rule of Law in China…

121

activities.” His law firm has been suspended from practice for one year. Police illegally prohibit his family from leaving their home or receiving visitors. Lawless police blockades, long a feature of PRC repression of political dissidents, seem more numerous at present than at any time I can recall and are now frequently imposed on lawyers and other legal activists as well as their clients. A large group of government officials and thugs have blockaded the farm house of blind “barefoot lawyer’’ Chen Guangcheng since August 11 of last year and have maintained the blockade against his wife even after Chen was illegally taken into custody in March of this year. In June, I was invited to dinner at the apartment of former Shanghai lawyer Zheng Enchong, who had lost his license because of his dogged defense of the real estate rights of Shanghai residents and who had just completed a three-year prison sentence for allegedly revealing “state secrets” about a public protest to an American-based human rights organization. However, a group of policemen, who could cite no legal authority and would give no reasons, barred my visit. When repeatedly asked to justify their interference, they merely said: “We are police.”Plainly, contacts between lawyers and the media, especially the foreign media, have become increasingly sensitive. Defense lawyers in “state secrets” cases have been warned not to inform the press, or even the defendant’s family or legal consultants, of developments in the case, even though this may inhibit an effective defense. What triggered the persecution of “barefoot lawyer” Chen Guangcheng was his role in the Internet report on Linyi’s illegal birth control measures posted by several Beijing legal scholars and the long dispatches filed by foreign journalists about the situation, including a front-page story in the Washington Post. Two of the scholars who filed the Internet report were subsequently threatened with being sacked by their law schools and have also suffered other sanctions. The prosecution of former lawyer Zheng Enchong demonstrated how easy it is for someone who has contacts with foreign reporters to be convicted of illegally transmitting “state secrets” or mere “intelligence” to a foreign entity. What constitutes a “state secret” or “intelligence” remains a fluid concept in the PRC and is subject to arbitrary, even retroactive, interpretation by the authorities. Equally sensitive to the regime are the contacts that public-interest lawyers have been cultivating with aggrieved groups of citizens. Perhaps the most recent adverse development involving lawyers was the issuance on March 20, by the Executive Council of the All China Lawyers Association, of a ‘‘Guiding Opinion on Lawyers’ Handling of Mass Cases.” This document, evidently the product of pressure from the Ministry of Justice, which controls the legal profession, is applicable not only to criminal cases but also to all other instances in which a lawyer is asked to represent ten or more people in the same case. It has created an

Human Rights in China, Nova Science Publishers, Incorporated, 2009. ProQuest Ebook Central,

Copyright © 2009. Nova Science Publishers, Incorporated. All rights reserved.

122

U.S. Government Printing Office

uproar among activist lawyers and law professors since it substantially restricts the conduct of lawyers in such cases and vitiates the loyalty to their clients that has been developing into one of the hallmarks of the legal profession in China. The Guiding Opinion’s most sinister provisions require lawyers, after accepting a mass case, promptly to ‘‘discuss the case fully” with ‘‘the relevant judicial departments,” ‘‘honestly report the situation” to them and ‘‘actively assist the judicial organs to clarify the facts.” In this context the terms ‘‘judicial departments” and ‘‘judicial organs” plainly refer to the law enforcement agencies, not only to the procuracy and the courts but also to the police! Lawyers are also required to report on the situation to other government agencies concerned, including the ‘‘judicial administrative organ in charge,” i.e., the local justice bureau under the Ministry of Justice. The Guiding Opinion emphasizes that the lawyer has a duty to assist the government as well as his client in such cases and to mediate and promote solutions that are acceptable to all. The Guiding Opinion also prohibits lawyers from encouraging or participating in large group efforts peacefully to use letters and visits to petition government agencies to resolve problems. Yet it authorizes lawyers to take part in such efforts if invited to do so by relevant government agencies. The Guiding Opinion deserves detailed analysis, but it obviously seeks to convert lawyers into instruments of law enforcement and other government institutions to the prejudice of the interests of their clients in mass cases. This represents a giant step backward to the 1980s, when China’s newly revived lawyers were deemed to be merely ‘‘state legal workers” rather than the independent representatives of their clients.

The Immediate Future This is a gloomy time in China for the administration of criminal justice and related legislative and judicial reform. The NPC seems to be frozen in this area, and the only significant systemic reform—the SPC’s effort to improve procedures in death penalty cases—is moving slowly and toward an uncertain outcome. In too many cases, the police operate with reckless disregard for existing criminal procedures, and in making their decisions courts are the helpless tool of Party and government leaders and the objects of other distorting influences. Although the nation’s leaders continue to use the abstract rhetoric of the ‘‘rule of law,” they increasingly emphasize that the Western-style laws, institutions and procedures that the Party has introduced since 1978 are not to be applied in a Western manner. They want the legal system to repress the rising tide of social unrest

Human Rights in China, Nova Science Publishers, Incorporated, 2009. ProQuest Ebook Central,

Copyright © 2009. Nova Science Publishers, Incorporated. All rights reserved.

Human Rights and the Rule of Law in China…

123

generated by China’s rapid success rather than effectively process the new disputes and grievances that are being brought to it for solution. This in itself has added to social instability. The failure of the highly touted ‘‘socialist rule of law” to meet popular needs and its frequent use as an instrument of repression have fueled feelings of frustration that are being transformed into what has accurately been called ‘‘rightful resistance.”Are there any grounds for optimism? Although the engineerdominated Politburo Standing Committee appears to have little appreciation of a legal system’s potential contribution to social engineering and to the resolution of social tensions, below the top leadership level a younger and more sophisticated generation of officials, legislative staff, scholars, judges, prosecutors and lawyers is actively engaged in field research and practical experiments relating to reform of the justice system. Moreover, ideas of due process and fair adjudication appear to be making inroads into the Party itself, as demonstrated by the continuing quiet efforts to improve the conditions of shuanggui detainees and to ‘‘judicialize” Party disciplinary tribunals. A year from now, after the 17th Party Congress, at which the Hu Jintao-Wen Jiabao leadership is expected to be firmly entrenched for the next five years, we will be able to form a clearer picture of the prospects for reform. Optimists already claim to see signs, or at least hear talk, of bringing officials educated in law into many higher posts within the Party and government, including the influential provincial Party discipline and inspection commissions. It would also be desirable to place law-trained officials in charge of all the country’s law enforcement agencies at every level. The most obvious indication of the new leadership’s intentions regarding the legal system will be personnel changes within the Politburo and its Standing Committee. The admission to the Politburo of Minister of Public Security Zhou Yongkang at the 16th Party Congress, making him the sole government representative of the entire legal system at the pinnacle of power, has not substantially benefited criminal justice reform. It is rumored that next year Minister Zhou will be promoted to membership in the Politburo Standing Committee, perhaps replacing Luo Gan as the head of the Central Party PoliticalLegal Committee that leads the operations of the courts, the procuracy, the Ministry of Justice, and the law enforcement ministries. Some even believe that he will also become head of the Central Party Discipline Inspection Committee. How he would exercise such vast power is unclear, but it would be comforting if someone with greater knowledge and experience in legal affairs, and with greater zest for strengthening the rule of law, were appointed to the Politburo. It was

Human Rights in China, Nova Science Publishers, Incorporated, 2009. ProQuest Ebook Central,

124

U.S. Government Printing Office

disappointing that, at the previous Party Congress, SPC President Xiao Yang was not elevated. A seat in the Politburo would give him some of the political clout required to implement his ambitious plans. An earlier SPC President, Ren Jianxin, who had decades of legal experience, not only sat in the Politburo but also served as head of the Central Party Political-Legal Committee. But perhaps a leadership that wants to keep “politics in command” does not regard that as a desirable precedent. Such personnel appointments will have a crucial impact upon whether the PRC decides to ratify the ICCPR prior to the 2008 Olympics, adopt a new Criminal Procedure Law, curb police lawlessness and remove the restrictions that hamstring defense lawyers and other legal activists.

Copyright © 2009. Nova Science Publishers, Incorporated. All rights reserved.

What Should We Do? Understandably, China has always gone its own way, and outsiders who have sought to influence its course have had much to be modest about. Yet China has never been more open to international cooperation in all fields than today, and the PRC’s legal experts, in and out of government, genuinely welcome virtually all opportunities to work with counterparts from abroad. International organizations, foreign governments and charitable foundations, non-governmental organizations, universities and lawyers’ groups from many countries have already helped to launch numerous joint law reform projects in China. Nevertheless, this impressive effort has merely scratched the surface of the need and revealed the depth, breadth and long-term dimensions of the opportunity. My hope is that Congress and the executive branch will substantially increase existing U.S. Government funding for cooperation with the PRC in rule of law and human rights projects. Moreover, the scope of this funding should be expanded to support research into important problems of criminal justice and the development of legal institutions in China. Continuing government sponsorship of training, conferences and exchanges is vital. Yet, unless such activities rest upon an adequate research foundation, their impact will be limited. For example, everyone recognizes that, if China is ever to enjoy a genuine rule of law, the most fundamental reform required is the development of a fair and independent court system. China’s neighbors—Japan, Taiwan and South Korea—have made great strides in this respect despite the fact that they share China’s Confucian-Buddhist political-legal culture. How did they do it? And why did previous efforts to establish a fair and independent judiciary fail in China? This type of research

Human Rights in China, Nova Science Publishers, Incorporated, 2009. ProQuest Ebook Central,

Copyright © 2009. Nova Science Publishers, Incorporated. All rights reserved.

Human Rights and the Rule of Law in China…

125

deserves the highest priority. Yet it has thus far found no U.S. Government support. Finally, no assessment of prospects for law reform in China should overlook the work on Chinese justice published by relevant United Nations agencies, the reports of international human rights NGOs, the studies published by various governments including our own and the scholarship of the academic community. This vast literature not only enhances our knowledge of a complex and relatively non-transparent subject but also stimulates further progress by the PRC. The report on torture in China issued last spring by Professor Manfred Nowak of Austria, Special Rapporteur of the U.N. High Commissioner for Human Rights, goes far beyond a narrow focus on torture and should be required reading for China’s leaders as well as all others concerned. The largely unnoticed but important decisions of the U.N. Working Group on Arbitrary Detention, which has repeatedly condemned PRC practices in a long series of sad cases, is another example of U.N. action that deserves greater circulation. The 2006 Annual Report released today by this Commission is a splendid example of how helpful a foreign government’s report can be to China’s progress. I strongly urge that the U.S. Government devote greater financial support to the dissemination of all such material in China, where, largely because of wellknown obstacles to communication, even judges, prosecutors, legal officials, lawyers and scholars often do not know about events, incidents and developments involving the administration of justice in their own country. It is shocking, for example, that many Chinese legal experts who would be appalled at their government’s persecution of blind “barefoot” lawyer Chen Guangcheng have never heard of this case. This suggests that agencies such as Voice of America and Radio Free Asia still have a long way to go. Yet it is possible, even in today’s controlled media environment in China, for Chinese language versions of such helpful material to circulate.

PREPARED STATEMENT OF JOHN KAMM, S EPTEMBER 20, 2006 Recent Developments in Dui Hua’s Dialogue on Human Rights with the Chinese Government Chairman Hagel, Distinguished Members of the Congressional-Executive Commission on China:

Human Rights in China, Nova Science Publishers, Incorporated, 2009. ProQuest Ebook Central,

126

U.S. Government Printing Office

In May 1990, I intervened, for the first time, on behalf of a political prisoner in China, raising the name of a student leader jailed during the spring 1989 political disturbances, at a banquet in Hong Kong with a Chinese minister. Later that month, I gave my first testimony to Congress, addressing the question of human rights and China’s Most Favored Nation status (MFN). I have come back to Congress several times over the last 16 years to report on the progress of the dialogue with the Chinese government being conducted by me and my foundation, a dialogue that has seen me make approximately 100 trips to Chinese cities—75 to Beijing— to discuss cases, exchange information, visit prisons, and attend trials. Today I welcome the opportunity of briefing the Commission on recent developments.

Copyright © 2009. Nova Science Publishers, Incorporated. All rights reserved.

Ministry of Justice Stops Accepting Prisoner Lists The framework for Dui Hua’s dialogue with the Chinese government was established in November 1991 at a meeting in Beijing’s Great Hall of the People between me and a member of the Standing Committee of the Political Bureau of the Chinese Communist Party, one of China’s most senior leaders. From the outset, it was clear that an important focus of this dialogue would be prisoners. The senior leader stated that if a foreigner came to China, pounded the table, and demanded the release of a prisoner, the Chinese government would not respond. But if a foreigner came as a friend and showed respect, providing information on prisoners, indeed releasing them early, “was no big deal.”After this meeting, I began to visit prisons. The Ministry of Justice, which runs China’s 700 prisons and 300 re-education through labor camps, began accepting my requests for information on prisoners in the form of lists of 20–25 names. In April 1992 I was given an audience with a vice minister of the Ministry of Justice. I was advised that a decision had been made to accept any inquiries about prisoners that I might have, and to answer the inquiries to the best of the ministry’s ability. I was invited to ask about any prisoner, and I asked about Wei Jingsheng. Then and thereafter I asked about many others. During the first half of the 1990s, my dialogue with the Chinese government went smoothly. Getting information on prisoners was commonplace, and there were many releases of high-profile prisoners. At the time, Beijing was worried about losing its MFN trade status. In 1994, President Clinton de-linked China’s MFN from its human rights record. Chinese officials had said that if the United States reduced its pressure, China would respond with human rights moves. I decided to take the Chinese government up on its offer. In December 1994, the

Human Rights in China, Nova Science Publishers, Incorporated, 2009. ProQuest Ebook Central,

Copyright © 2009. Nova Science Publishers, Incorporated. All rights reserved.

Human Rights and the Rule of Law in China…

127

Ministry of Justice for the first time sent a written reply to a prisoner list by fax, standard practice for the next 10 years. In January 1995, the State Council and the Ministry of Justice agreed to receive from me four lists of 25 names, one each quarter, in calendar year 1995. In May 1995, the Chinese government suspended the prisoner information project because the State Department had granted a visa to Taiwan President Lee Tenghui. The Ministry of Justice continued to receive my lists, but contrary to what it had promised it was not willing to provide information. I turned to the U.S. Congress for help, and beginning in 1996 more than three dozen members of the House and the Senate, several of whom are distinguished members of this Commission, wrote letters to the Chinese government asking it to honor the commitment that had been made. In 1997, Beijing badly wanted a state visit to the United States for Jiang Zemin. In October 1997, President Jiang made the visit, and in talks with President Clinton agreed to resume providing me with information about prisoners. The agreement was listed as an achievement of the summit in the statement issued by the White House, and was singled out in a Senate Resolution on the Jiang visit introduced by Senator Feinstein, a distinguished member of this Commission, and Chairman Hagel. By early 1999, the Ministry of Justice had, for the most part, finished responding to 1995’s list of 100 names, many of whom had been obscure prisoners hardly known to the outside world. Based on information provided on 70 percent of the names, more than half of the prisoners on the list had been granted early release or sentence reductions after the list’s submission. Based on interviews with released prisoners and members of their families, I have no doubt that “the list of 100” played a significant role in securing early release and better treatment for dozens of people who would otherwise have been forgotten. In April 1999, the State Department introduced a resolution criticizing China at the annual meeting of the U.N. Commission on Human Rights in Geneva. The Ministry of Justice again suspended providing information about prisoners to me. The next month, NATO warplanes bombed the Chinese embassy in Belgrade, and Beijing suspended the official dialogue on human rights with the United States. The following year (2000), the Chinese government badly wanted to secure Permanent Normal Trade Relations (PNTR). It silently acquiesced in the establishment of this Commission as part of the effort to get PNTR. The Ministry of Justice began allowing me back into prisons and once more provided information on prisoners. By now, Dui Hua had been established, and we were engaged in a worldwide, open source search for the names of individuals detained in political cases. Our data base had been set up and our lists were becoming longer and more detailed. (A recent breakdown of our data base is appended to

Human Rights in China, Nova Science Publishers, Incorporated, 2009. ProQuest Ebook Central,

Copyright © 2009. Nova Science Publishers, Incorporated. All rights reserved.

128

U.S. Government Printing Office

this testimony.) The information we received from the Ministry of Justice, which we shared with this Commission and with NGOs and governments engaged in rights dialogues, was increasingly valuable to an understanding of how China’s penal system treated prisoners convicted in political cases. In late July 2001, Secretary of State Colin Powell visited Beijing to help repair relations badly frayed by the EP3 incident. Agreement was reached to resume the official rights dialogue that had been suspended in May 1999 in the wake of the NATO bombing of the Chinese embassy in Belgrade. Secretary Powell tasked the newly confirmed Assistant Secretary of State for Democracy, Human Rights and Labor Lorne Craner with preparing for a round of the dialogue to be held in Beijing. Mr. Craner turned to Dui Hua and other NGOs to assemble a list of names of individuals detained in political cases (Dui Hua contributed the names of 50 “counterrevolutionaries”), and this list of 75 names was handed to China’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs in the late summer of 2001. After the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, the Chinese government made a strategic decision to side with the United States and to seek ways to exploit the new international environment to improve relations with the United States and achieve other foreign policy goals. As part of this decision, detailed information would be given on prisoners, and those identified by the United States as important cases would be granted early release. In October 2001, a session of the official human rights dialogue was held in Washington. Detailed information was provided on 68 of the 75 names on the list. Early releases of important prisoners began in January 2002. The first to benefit was the Tibetan ethnomusicologist Ngawang Choephel. In the ensuing months, nearly all of the well-known prisoners on Mr. Craner’s list—including Jigme Sangpo, Xu Wenli, Wang Youcai, Ngawang Sangdrol, and finally Rebiya Kadeer—were released from prison. Several were allowed to leave China for medical treatment. (I made two trips to Lhasa, accompanied by officials of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, to verify that Tibetan prisoners wanted to leave for the United States.) Not only were well-known prisoners released. I recently looked at what had happened to the 60 people who were actually serving prison sentences in September 2001 when the Chinese response was being prepared. I am attaching a brief analysis to this testimony. Of the sixty, 27 have been granted early release, and four have been given sentence reductions. In other words, if you were on the list, you had a better than 50 percent chance of being released or given a sentence reduction in the ensuing five years. That’s three times better than the rate of early release recorded for political prisoners that we know of who were serving sentences as of September 2001 but who weren’t on Craner’s list.

Human Rights in China, Nova Science Publishers, Incorporated, 2009. ProQuest Ebook Central,

Copyright © 2009. Nova Science Publishers, Incorporated. All rights reserved.

Human Rights and the Rule of Law in China…

129

(Unfortunately, the rate of parole and sentence reduction for political prisoners, even those on important lists, remains well below the rate for ordinary prisoners.) How was this result achieved? Good cooperation with our Chinese counterparts, coordination with allied governments, steady follow-up (the names appeared on several subsequent lists handed over by Dui Hua, the United States and other governments), linking better treatment of prisoners to “rule of law” issues, and always emphasizing the need for human rights improvements, as measured in concrete terms, if US-China relations are to improve. A little known example of how the Craner list was used to address a systemic issue is the two rounds of talks on sentence reduction and parole for prisoners serving sentences for counterrevolution and endangering state security that were organized by the State Department and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in February 2004 and August 2005. In these talks, ably led by the State Department’s Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights and Labor and China’s Supreme People’s Court, Beijing affirmed that individuals serving sentences for counterrevolution and endangering state security enjoy the same opportunities for sentence reduction and parole as other prisoners. National reviews of sentence reduction and parole cases had begun on a trial basis in 2003 and they were expanded in 2004 and 2005. In 2005 Dui Hua heard reports that at the local level a policy of non-discrimination toward those convicted of counterrevolution and endangering state security was being followed. In January 2005, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs took the extraordinary step of e- mailing Dui Hua information on a large group of such prisoners, most of whose names were unknown, who had in fact been granted sentence reduction or parole in recent months. My last meeting with the Ministry of Justice took place in April 2005. Senior officials of the Prison Administration Bureau and the Department of Judicial Assistance and International Affairs received me in the Minister’s Conference Room. It was an unusually friendly meeting. We discussed the possibility of Dui Hua hosting a delegation from the Prison Administration Bureau. I was asked to prepare a detailed proposal for the Ministry’s consideration. I handed over a short prisoner list. The senior representative of the Prison Administration Bureau promised that he would personally look into the cases. I was told that I would receive the desired information through the usual channel, that is, by fax or e-mail to my San Francisco office. Weeks and then months went by without Dui Hua receiving the information. I visited Beijing in October 2005 and brought with me a detailed proposal on the delegation and a new prisoner list. I called the International Affairs Department of the Justice Ministry to schedule a meeting and was told that I was welcome “as an old friend” to visit the ministry but only if I agreed to three

Human Rights in China, Nova Science Publishers, Incorporated, 2009. ProQuest Ebook Central,

Copyright © 2009. Nova Science Publishers, Incorporated. All rights reserved.

130

U.S. Government Printing Office

conditions: There would be no discussion of “human rights dialogues,” the names of “criminals” (i.e. prisoners) could not be raised during the meeting, and a prisoner list could not be handed over. I refused to agree to these conditions, and protested that the ministry’s new position was contrary to longstanding practice reaffirmed as recently as April. It ran counter to China’s policies of encouraging transparency and conducting dialogues based on equality and mutual respect. I sought the assistance of China’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs. I discussed the situation with officials of the Departments of North American and Oceanian Affairs and International Organizations and Conferences, the U.N. missions in New York and Geneva, and the Chinese embassy in Washington. I am grateful for the work of several Chinese diplomats on this matter. I have recently been told that there is nothing personal in the decision to stop providing information on prisoners and that I am welcome to continue visiting China. In February 2006, a senior Ministry of Foreign Affairs official advised me that I would get “good news” from the Ministry of Justice soon. I received information on a few prisoners channeled through the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. I was further heartened when President Hu Jintao visited Washington on April 20 and announced that China was prepared to “enhance” its dialogues and exchanges with the U.S. side in the area of human rights. On August 24, 2006, I met with Ministry of Foreign Affairs officials in Beijing. I was informed that the Ministry of Justice had not changed its position. I was told that “people are fed up” with receiving prisoner lists from foreigners. Such lists represented attempts to interfere in China’s internal affairs and were disrespectful of China’s independent judiciary. Foreign countries have no right to submit them, and China is under no obligation to reply to them. When I sought an explanation for the Ministry of Justice’s decision to stop accepting lists and discussing cases, I was told that the Ministry of Justice is “unhappy and disappointed over how the information has been used.” Specifically, I was told that the impression had been given that prisoners were released early as a result of foreign pressure instead of as a result of “the normal workings of the Chinese legal system.”At the meeting I asked the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to try one more time to convince the Ministry of Justice to change its position. I requested an update on a set of nine prisoners, all of whom the Ministry of Justice had provided written information on, all longer than three years ago. On September 14, 2006, I received the Ministry of Foreign Affairs’ formal response: As the bilateral dialogue between the United States and China has not been resumed, discussion or exchange of information on individual cases is not appropriate. I was also reminded that the basic principle for the rule of law is

Human Rights in China, Nova Science Publishers, Incorporated, 2009. ProQuest Ebook Central,

Human Rights and the Rule of Law in China…

131

independence of judicial organs, a principle the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and, it hopes, “our American friends” will observe.

Copyright © 2009. Nova Science Publishers, Incorporated. All rights reserved.

Dui Hua Responds Since Dui Hua cannot accept the Ministry of Justice’s new policy of “three no’s”— no mention of human rights dialogues, no raising the cases of prisoners, and no prisoner lists—the foundation will no longer seek meetings with the Ministry of Justice in Beijing. The question will be revisited if and when the official human rights dialogue between the United States and China resumes. Dui Hua holds that the Ministry of Justice’s “three no’s” policy overturns many years of cooperation that have enjoyed the support of leaders and senior officials of both the United States and China. The Ministry’s behavior toward Dui Hua does not square with the policy of conducting dialogues based on equality and mutual respect. It is a setback for the principles of transparency and open governance, and calls into question President Hu Jintao’s April 20 promise to enhance dialogue and exchanges on human rights between the two sides. Dui Hua points out that the foundation is an international human rights organization that enjoys non-governmental consultative status with the Human Rights Council of the United Nations, a status that we would not enjoy had China chosen to oppose it. Although it actively supports dialogue on human rights between the Chinese and American governments (as it does the eight other official dialogues), Dui Hua’s own dialogue is not dependent on the US-China dialogue and has never been viewed in such terms. On many occasions during long periods when the official dialogue was suspended (e.g. calendar year 2000), Dui Hua’s own programs with the Ministry of Justice were plentiful and productive. If such things as prison visits and exchange of information on cases were appropriate then, why are they inappropriate now? Dui Hua agrees that the basic principle of rule of law is independence of the judicial organs, but we fail to see how asking questions about cases represents interference. Underpinning the principle of independence is transparency and openness of the legal system. “In speaking about laws, proceed from an examination of cases “yi an shuo fa,” is a favorite saying of members of China’s judiciary, and in its attempt to understand China’s security, legal, and prison policies and systems Dui Hua is doing just that. As for the question of how the information has been used, Dui Hua has reviewed all written communications from the Ministry of Justice since 1994, as well as the notes of meetings since 1991. It cannot find language asking that

Human Rights in China, Nova Science Publishers, Incorporated, 2009. ProQuest Ebook Central,

132

U.S. Government Printing Office

information be kept confidential, nor setting any other limits on how the information was to be used. On the contrary, there are several expressions of mutual esteem and desire for further cooperation. Prior to August 24, 2006, Dui Hua had never received a complaint from a Chinese official over how the information on prisoners had been used. It is true that the impression has been given that prisoners who are the focus of international concern are more likely to receive better treatment than those who are not the focus of concern (a situation hardly unique to China), but the experience of the last 16 years tells me that interventions like my 1995 list and Mr. Craner’s 2001 list have in fact prompted better treatment for many prisoners. That has been the case-until now, at least. Dui Hua is concerned that prisoners who manage to get information on their situations to the outside world-and their families- may be suffering consequences, including delays or cancellations of sentence reductions, denial of family visits and the like.

Copyright © 2009. Nova Science Publishers, Incorporated. All rights reserved.

A Window Closes, a Window Opens? During the period of difficulties with the Ministry of Justice, Dui Hua has enjoyed good relations with Chinese courts, including the Supreme People’s Court. The court has arranged for wide-ranging discussions with senior judges and staff of the court on such topics as sentencing and application of the death penalty. (Interestingly, individual cases were discussed and sometimes raised by the Chinese side. No judge has ever accused Dui Hua of “interference” for asking details of a case.) It made arrangements for Dui Hua to begin attending Chinese trials. We have been encouraged by the willingness of the courts to be more open and receptive to foreigners and are looking forward to finding more ways to cooperate with both the court system and with China’s procurators. Of special interest to Dui Hua is the question of the availability of verdicts. Obviously, if verdicts become more widely available, the work of promoting transparency (and finding out about cases) would be greatly enhanced. At present, verdicts in many cases-including “sensitive ones” like those involving capital punishment, state secrets and juveniles-are not made available by courts and are even being denied to the families of those sentenced. The determination of what is “sensitive,” especially with regard to state security cases, is often in the hands of the police who make the arrest. The present system of withholding verdicts from the public is the subject of much debate in China, and there have been a few local experiments at making the publication and dissemination of verdicts less restrictive.

Human Rights in China, Nova Science Publishers, Incorporated, 2009. ProQuest Ebook Central,

Human Rights and the Rule of Law in China…

133

I was especially disappointed to read, therefore, that the Chinese government has promulgated new rules forbidding the release by courts of news related to “state secrets, business secrets and personal information, including in cases related to juveniles and those that are not tried publicly.” The rules, which have yet to be published, set up a new system of court spokesmen and stipulate punishment for court officials who leak information, which covers “any document passing through upper level and lower level courts.” This presumably includes verdicts, but Dui Hua is seeking clarification. These rules come on the heels of other measures to restrict the operations of foreign news media and punish domestic media for unauthorized reporting on natural disasters and mass incidents. They are of a piece with the decision to shut down the prisoner information project with Dui Hua, and other actions the Chinese government has taken like harassing and jailing journalists, and closing down publications, web sites and blogs. I will briefly discuss the reasons for the ongoing clampdown in my oral remarks and will be happy to explore it further during the discussion period following our testimonies.

Recommendations

Copyright © 2009. Nova Science Publishers, Incorporated. All rights reserved.

1. I would like to conclude this testimony with a few recommendations: 1

2

When and if the official dialogue between the United States and China resumes, consideration of a list of individuals detained for the non-violent expression of their political and religious beliefs must form a key element of it, as it has in all previous sessions. The State Department should have on hand a continuously updated list of prisoners that can be readily handed over to Chinese officials at short notice, and it should rely on the CECC’s data base and Dui Hua’s data base to prepare it. In its dealings with the governments of countries that have human rights dialogues with China, the State Department should encourage the practice of asking about cases of concern in the form of prisoner lists, and push for greater sharing of information and other forms of cooperation. The Berne Process, a five-year-old grouping of countries that have dialogues and exchanges with China on human rights, has shown some modest results in these areas but has recently come under attack by the Chinese government. The State Department should make clear its support for the Berne Process, and raise the level of its participation in the group’s meetings.

Human Rights in China, Nova Science Publishers, Incorporated, 2009. ProQuest Ebook Central,

134

U.S. Government Printing Office 3

4

Copyright © 2009. Nova Science Publishers, Incorporated. All rights reserved.

5

The State Department should examine ways to better utilize the United Nations system to bring cases of concern to the attention of working groups and thematic mechanisms, the International Labor Organization, and UNESCO. The United States should join the Human Rights Council at the earliest opportunity. The Chinese government appears to have come to the conclusion that interest in human rights among people in Washington has waned and that issues like North Korea, Iran, and currency exchange rates are what occupy policy- makers and legislators. Reading press accounts of recent visits by Congressmen and Senators to China, I have been struck by how human rights is rarely if ever mentioned. I wonder if members are willing to bring prisoner lists to China, as they did in the past. I am confident that Senator Hagel and commissioners will take steps to disabuse the Chinese government of the notion that Members of Congress and the people they represent no longer care about the fate of prisoners of conscience in China. It is vital that funding of open-source research and the data bases it feeds be maintained at least at present levels. I am troubled by reports that State Department funding for Dui Hua’s data base might be reduced. I have brought with me two representative “finds” made recently in libraries in China, one giving the first-ever detailed statistics for executions carried out in a Chinese county, the other giving details of a hitherto-unknown political party with more than 2,000 members operating in Henan Province. Its leaders are almost certainly still in prison. They are alone, but they are no longer unknown, and we will not forget them.

Thank you again for inviting me to testify today, and for the important work of the Congressional-Executive Commission on China. Dui Hua looks forward to even more cooperation with the commission in the future.

PREPARED STATEMENT OF MINXIN PEI, SEPTEMBER 20, 2006 Mr. Chairman and Members of the Commission: Like many observers of developments in China, I have watched with increasing concern recent trends that indicate deterioration in human rights conditions and stagnant progress in strengthening the rule of law in China. To list

Human Rights in China, Nova Science Publishers, Incorporated, 2009. ProQuest Ebook Central,

Copyright © 2009. Nova Science Publishers, Incorporated. All rights reserved.

Human Rights and the Rule of Law in China…

135

a few examples, several eminent lawyers have been intimidated and prevented from representing their clients. A blind peasant activist has been falsely charged of crimes he did not commit and sentenced to lengthy prison terms. The media has come under increasing government control as well. Many urgently needed legal reforms, such as changing the way judges are appointed and courts are financed and supervised, have been put on shelf even though these measures will increase judicial independence and contribute to social stability. While today’s China is a much more kinder and gentler Nation than it was before reform, and we should give the Chinese people and the pro-reform forces in the government the credit for achieving such amazing progress in poverty reduction and expansion of personal freedom, we must recognize that the pace of improving political rights for Chinese citizens and strengthening the institutions of the rule law has lagged significantly behind the speed of economic progress. In recent years, the process of political liberalization has stalled even though the Chinese economy continues its rise. In today’s testimony, I will briefly focus on the underlying political causes for the deterioration of human rights and stalled progress in building a system based on the rule of law in China. In my judgment, recent symptoms of rising social unrest and instability may be only a partial explanation for the government’s intensified efforts of social and political control. The more important underlying cause for China’s backslide on human rights and rule of law originates from a combination of factors that together reduce the ruling elites’ incentive to pursue political reform while increasing their capacity for political control. China has fallen into a classical transition trap at the moment. The current stage of transition, with half-finished economic reforms and partial political reforms, provides an ideal situation for the ruling elites who can maintain power with a mixture of political legitimacy derived from economic performance, political co-optation of new social elites, and increasingly effective methods of political control. Economically, strong growth record since Tiananmen has reduced the pressure on the Chinese government to pursue democratic reforms; indeed, it has even provided justifications for a hardline position on human rights. More important, because under one-party rule, China’s political elites can easily convert their political power into economic wealth, they have even less incentive to permit greater political competition. It is obvious that democratic reforms will not only threaten their political monopoly, but newly acquired economic wealth. At the same time, the Chinese government has been adapting itself skillfully to new social and economic changes. It has done so first by including social elites, such as professionals and intellectuals, into the ruling elites. In addition, it has

Human Rights in China, Nova Science Publishers, Incorporated, 2009. ProQuest Ebook Central,

136

U.S. Government Printing Office

Copyright © 2009. Nova Science Publishers, Incorporated. All rights reserved.

also managed to co-opt new elites, especially private entrepreneurs. This strategy has eliminated challenge to the Party’s authority from the most well-endowed and capable elements in Chinese society. Over the last decade, the Chinese government has also greatly improved its capacity of suppressing both political dissident activities and social unrest. It has done so by heavy investment in law enforcement and technology. The strong capabilities, unfortunately, seem to have convinced the Chinese leadership that a tough approach to dealing with political dissent and social frustrations is a more effective way than political negotiation, compromise, and democratic reforms. As long as this combination of factors persists, it is unlikely that human rights will improve significantly in China. Nor it is likely that the rule of law will be strengthened. But the picture is not all that gloomy. Despite the Chinese government’s unrelenting efforts to control the media and limit the growth of democratic forces, Chinese society is changing. Although it is not possible to form broad-based democratic opposition to challenge the authority of the Party openly today, the spread of personal freedom, the information revolution, and market forces is creating a more conducive environment for social pluralism. Therefore, I continue to urge a policy of critical engagement that can both advance American values and promote its national interests.

PREPARED STATEMENT OF XIAO QIANG, SEPTEMBER 20, 2006 The Rise of Chinese Blogosphere and Intensified Control Efforts on the Chinese Internet Chairman Senator Chuck Hagel and Distinguished Commission members, My name is Xiao Qiang. I am the Director of the China Internet Project, at the Graduate School of Journalism of UC Berkeley. It is a privilege for me to be speaking in front of this important commission, and alongside my distinguished fellow panelists. My talk today will focus on the growing information flow on the Chinese Internet, and the Chinese government’s intensified control in this regard. Over 130 million Chinese are now online, and 440 million cell phones are in use in the country. Over the last 18 months, two significant trends related to China’s Internet development deserve our attention. The first is the explosive growth of the Chinese blogosphere and related new media technologies such as

Human Rights in China, Nova Science Publishers, Incorporated, 2009. ProQuest Ebook Central,

Copyright © 2009. Nova Science Publishers, Incorporated. All rights reserved.

Human Rights and the Rule of Law in China…

137

podcasting and photo/video sharing Web sites; and the second is pervasive and sophisticated government censorship, through legal and administrative regulations, together with surveillance, intimidation, imprisonment and propaganda measures. Today, I will provide some context and analysis for both phenomena, and also make recommendations to the U.S. government on policy implications. The number of bloggers has increased so rapidly in the past two years that there exists no accurate count of their number. In January of 2005, China was estimated to have around 500,000 bloggers. According the latest survey from the official China Internet Network Information Center, there were about 28 million blogs in China by the end of July 2006. This is more than twice the number of bloggers in the United States. This significant growth is mainly due to the fact that all the main China Internet portals, such as Sina.com and Sohu.com, and other portal-like blog hosting services, such as bokee,com and Blogbus, started actively promoting blog applications among the over 130 million Chinese Internet users. It is worth noting that all these Internet companies are funded through venture capital from the United States, and listed or aiming to be listed on the Nasdaq stock market. Development of the blogosphere is the result of both technology diffusion and Chinese government efforts to promote a knowledge-based economy in a global environment. The unintended result, however, is the ability of Chinese citizens to create a public space to discuss public and political affairs, as well as creatively express themselves and buildup social networks online. Unleashed in a personalized, accessible, and inexpensive medium, Chinese netizens, especially urban intellectuals, students and white collar workers have begun to use the Internet as the primary place to voice their opinions on personal or public affairs. Despite government efforts to control the information environment and mass media, in the highly decentralized and diversified blogosphere, bloggers communicate political views in such a manner as to bring many “hidden transcripts,” once suppressed, into the light of public consideration. Mr. Chairman, Distinguished Commission members, online discussions of current events, especially through Internet bulletin board systems (BBS) and Weblogs, or “blogs,” are having real agenda-setting power. The Chinese government has devoted enormous financial resources to set up governmentsponsored Web sites at all levels of government, from national to regional and provincial. About 10 percent of all Web sites are directly set up and run by the government, until bloggers arrives in Chinese cyberspace. But these official sites have signally failed to gain the trust of the young, urban and educated netizens. On the contrary, people simply go to any number of independent BBS and blogs,

Human Rights in China, Nova Science Publishers, Incorporated, 2009. ProQuest Ebook Central,

Copyright © 2009. Nova Science Publishers, Incorporated. All rights reserved.

138

U.S. Government Printing Office

to read what they think is interesting. Popular BBS such as Tianya community and Xicihutong, and individual bloggers, enjoy far more online popularity, and therefore real influence among netizens, than official Web sites such as Xinhua.com. This leads to my second point: the Chinese government’s intensified control of the Internet. The Chinese government’s ongoing efforts to control speech online and in print has been well-documented. But a series of new measures show that official control of expression has reached a new height in recent months. These measures range from the Public Pledge on Self-Discipline for China’s Internet Industry, regulation of news and information, Internet cafe management, domain name management and Web site real name registration. The Commission’s new report did an excellent job in documenting those censorship measures. Let me just focus on two telling examples from an important component of Internet control: fear. In January 2006, the Shenzhen Public Security Bureau created animated images of a pair of police officers named ‘‘Jingjing” and ‘‘Chacha,” (from ‘‘jingcha,” or police.) These images, which appear on Web sites of Shenzhen city offices and private Shenzhen-based companies, provide links to the Internet police section of the Public Security Web site. By June, the Chinese Ministry of Public Security created similar online police mascots that were put into operation in eight major cities in China. According to the official Chinese E-Governance Net Web site: ‘‘The main function of Jingjing and Chacha is to intimidate. . . . The Internet has been always monitored by police, the significance of Jingjing and Chacha’s appearance is to publicly remind all netizens to be conscious of safe and healthy use of the Internet, self-regulate their online behavior, and maintain harmonious Internet order together.”Another important method to monitor Internet activities is the use of real-name registration. In June 2006, the Ministry of Information Industry (MII) ordered all weblogs and Web sites to register with the government or face closure.This registration will impose a true-name system on Web site owners. After registration one must display the electronic verification mark in a specific location on the Web site, and must also link to the MII supervision system for making inquiries. By doing this the identity of the Web site owner will be immediately clear. These examples reveal that the Chinese government has learned to turn the digital and transparent properties of Internet technology into a surveillance and intimidation tool to control its citizens’ behavior. The underlining mechanism works to instill fear among netizens that they are being watched. Of course, these new technologically empowered control mechanisms are only effective when they

Human Rights in China, Nova Science Publishers, Incorporated, 2009. ProQuest Ebook Central,

Copyright © 2009. Nova Science Publishers, Incorporated. All rights reserved.

Human Rights and the Rule of Law in China…

139

are used together with intimidation in the physical space. In just the past two weeks, three cyber-dissidents—Zhang Jianhong,Yang Maodong and Chen Shuqing—have been arrested for their online publishing activities, according to the Paris-based Reporters without Borders. This combination of old-fashioned state control and the most advanced communication technology has a powerful chilling effect to enforce self- censorship in Chinese cyberspace. Mr. Chairman, Distinguished Commission members, despite impressive economic growth over the last two decades, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) faces a fundamental dilemma in that it wants to create an information-based economy, but lacks the political will to promote active political participation by Chinese citizens. The long-term survival of the CCP’s power monopoly regime also critically relies on its ideological work and control of the information and symbolic environment. But for China’s one-party state, controlling the nature of the information available to its citizens has never been more difficult. Tens of millions of netizens are empowered by the new publishing platform. What’s happening in the Chinese blogosphere is a power shift—not directly at the level of political institutions and law, but around the change of communication systems and the ability to shape the information and symbolic environment. In the near future, we will see more and more efforts by the Chinese government to keep the information flow, online or off-line, under its control, using the mechanisms listed in the Commission’s report, and mentioned in my presentation today. In the long term, however, I believe the Chinese censors are fighting a losing battle. The deeper problem here is that the Chinese Communist Party itself is morally bankrupt and intellectually exhausted. More regulations will not make official propaganda any more attractive or credible to Chinese netizens. Technological filtering and surveillance, real name registration, and even harsh police actions against political activists will not help the party gain legitimacy either. In my view, the rise of the blogosphere and other communication technologies such as cell phones and short text messages marks the beginning of the end of the CCP’s ideological and propaganda control over Chinese society. For this reason, in addition to close monitoring, more comprehensive and indepth studies on the social and political implications of the Internet are crucial for the U.S.-China policymaking process. Will this pervasive, many-to-many and emergent communication platform play a critical role in democratizing China?— or will the Chinese Communist Party’s one-party authoritarian regime ultimately domesticate Chinese cyberspace, turning it into an Orwellian monster? We need a better understanding of these questions if we want to understand this complex, rapidly changing and globally significant country.

Human Rights in China, Nova Science Publishers, Incorporated, 2009. ProQuest Ebook Central,

140

U.S. Government Printing Office

Copyright © 2009. Nova Science Publishers, Incorporated. All rights reserved.

I also want to bring the Commission’s attention to another important document: “Race to the Bottom: Corporate Complicity in Chinese Internet Censorship,” published by Human Rights Watch last month. The report documents the different ways in which American companies such as Yahoo!, Microsoft and Google are assisting and reinforcing the Chinese government’s censorship system. The report also makes policy recommendations to both the U.S. government and companies on how to address this serious issue. Finally, I encourage the U.S. government to be a more active player in developing and employing anti-censorship technologies, which will not only help Chinese people to gain direct access to information about U.S. government sponsored Web sites such as Radio Free Asia and VOA, but also can contribute to greater information flow and freedom of expression in Chinese cyberspace. Ultimately, it’s the Chinese people themselves who want a freer Internet and a freer society. The Great Fire- wall, no matter how advanced its technology and how much fear the government tries to instill, will crumble, and much sooner than the Great Wall. Neither repression nor censorship will stop China from becoming a more open and humane society in the 21st century. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. CHUCK HAGEL, A U.S. SENATOR FROM NEBRASKA, C HAIRMAN, CONGRESSIONAL -EXECUTIVE COMMISSION ON C HINA , S EPTEMBER 20, 2006 The Commission issues a report each year to the Congress and to the President on human rights conditions and the development of the rule of law in China. In connection with today’s release of the 2006 Annual Report, the Commission has asked a distinguished group of witnesses to assess the current state of civil rights and criminal defense; freedom of expression; and efforts to adopt democratic institutions of governance, implement legislative reform, and improve the environment for domestic and international civil society groups in China. The Commission will also hear the perspective of the witnesses on how the United States might best engage with the Chinese government through dialogue on human rights and rule of law issues. In its 2006 Annual Report, the Commission expresses deep concern that some Chinese government policies designed to address growing social unrest and

Human Rights in China, Nova Science Publishers, Incorporated, 2009. ProQuest Ebook Central,

Copyright © 2009. Nova Science Publishers, Incorporated. All rights reserved.

Human Rights and the Rule of Law in China…

141

bolster Communist Party authority are resulting in a period of declining human rights for China’s citizens. The Commission identified limited improvements in the Chinese government’s human rights practices in 2004, but backward-stepping government decisions in 2005 and 2006 are leading the Commission to reevaluate the Chinese leadership’s commitment to additional human rights improvements in the near term. In its 2005 Annual Report, the Commission highlighted increased government restrictions on Chinese citizens who worship in state-controlled venues or write for state-controlled publications. These restrictions remain in place, and in some cases, the government has strengthened their enforcement. The Commission notes the progress that the Chinese government has made over the past 25 years in beginning to build a political system based on the rule of law and on respect for basic human rights. The twin demands of social stability and continued economic progress have spurred legal reforms that may one day be the leading edge of constraints on the arbitrary exercise of state power. The government’s achievements in the economic realm are impressive, none more so than its success in lifting more than 400 million Chinese citizens out of extreme poverty since the early 1980s. While all of these changes are important, the gap between forward-looking economic freedoms and a backward-looking political system remains significant. There are leaders now within China who comprehend the need for change, and who understand that inflexibility, secretiveness, and a lack of democratic oversight pose the greatest challenges to continued development. These leaders will need to gather considerable reformist courage to overcome obstacles and push for continued change. Such changes will not occur overnight, but rather in ways that Chinese society, culture, infrastructure, and institutions must be prepared for and willing to accept. To help us better understand human rights conditions and the development of the rule of law in China, we now turn to our witnesses. Professor Jerome A. Cohen is a Professor of Law at the New York University School of Law; an Adjunct Senior Fellow on Asia at the Council of Foreign Relations; and Of Counsel at the law firm of Paul, Weiss, Rifkind, Wharton & Garrison. Professor Cohen is a leading expert on the Chinese legal system and the international relations of East Asia. As an attorney, he has long represented foreign companies in contract negotiations and dispute resolution in China and other countries in East Asia. As Director of East Asian Legal Studies at Harvard Law School from 1964 to 1979, Professor Cohen pioneered the study of East Asian legal systems in American legal curricula. He has published numerous books and articles on Chinese law, including “Contract Laws of the People’s Republic of China;” “The Criminal Process in the PRC: 1949–1968;” and “The

Human Rights in China, Nova Science Publishers, Incorporated, 2009. ProQuest Ebook Central,

Copyright © 2009. Nova Science Publishers, Incorporated. All rights reserved.

142

U.S. Government Printing Office

Plight of China’s Criminal Defense Lawyers.”After Professor Cohen, we will hear from Mr. John Kamm. Mr. Kamm is Executive Director of The Dui Hua Foundation; a Member of the Board of Directors for the National Committee on U.S.-China Relations; and Director of Stanford University’s Project in Human Rights Diplomacy. Since 1990, Mr. Kamm has been an advocate on behalf of prisoners of conscience in China and has made more than 70 trips to Beijing in an effort to engage the Chinese government in a dialogue on human rights. Mr. Kamm was awarded the Best Global Practices Award by former President Bill Clinton in June 1997. He was also granted the Eleanor Roosevelt Human Rights Award by President George W. Bush in December 2001 and a MacArthur Fellowship in September 2004. Mr. Kamm was the Hong Kong representative of the National Council for U.S.-China Trade from 1976 to 1981 and was president of the American Chamber of Commerce in Hong Kong in 1990. Dr. Minxin Pei will provide perspectives on democratic governance and development of civil society. Dr. Pei is Senior Associate and Director of the China Program at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. Dr. Pei is an expert on China, U.S.-China relations, Taiwan, East Asia, and the development of democratic political systems. Dr. Pei is the author of numerous books and articles on China, including “China’s Governance Crisis;” “Rebalancing United StatesChina Relations;” and “Future Shock: The WTO and Political Change in China.” In his most recent book, “China’s Trapped Transition: The Limits of Developmental Autocracy,” Dr. Pei examines the sustainability of the Chinese Communist Party’s reform strategy—pursuing pro-market policies under oneparty rule. Mr. Xiao Qiang will share his expertise on freedom of expression in China. Mr. Xiao is Director of the China Internet Project at the University of California at Berkeley. Mr. Xiao is a recipient of the MacArthur Fellowship and is currently teaching classes on “new media and human rights in China” at the University of California at Berkeley. Mr. Xiao was the Executive Director of Human Rights in China from 1991 to 2002. Mr. Xiao spoke at each meeting of the U.N. Commission on Human Rights from 1993 to 2001, and has lectured on the promotion of human rights and democracy in China in over 40 countries. Mr. Xiao currently runs the China Digital Times Internet news portal and is a weekly commentator for Radio Free Asia. We welcome all of our witnesses today and appreciate their time and presentations.

Human Rights in China, Nova Science Publishers, Incorporated, 2009. ProQuest Ebook Central,

Human Rights and the Rule of Law in China…

143

Copyright © 2009. Nova Science Publishers, Incorporated. All rights reserved.

PREPARED STATEMENT OF HON. JAMES A. LEACH, A U.S. REPRESENTATIVE FROM IOWA, CO-CHAIRMAN, CONGRESSIONAL-EXECUTIVE COMMISSION ON CHINA, SEPTEMBER 20, 2006 Senator Hagel, I am pleased to join you and the Members of the Congressional- Executive Commission on China today for this hearing on the core issues in the Commission’s mandate: human rights and the rule of law in China. Our session this morning is timely, as we have completed another year’s work on these issues, as directed by Public Law No. 106–286. The culmination of our labors is today’s release of the CECC Annual Report for 2006, which is also required by the statute. I hope that our witnesses this morning can assess for us the short and medium- term trends on several key issues of specific concern to the Commission: the current state of freedom of expression and the free flow of information; criminal and civil rights defense; and government transparency in providing information about prisoners of conscience. Each of our witnesses has the background and experience to provide us with insights on efforts to implement legislative reform, and improve the legal and operational environment for domestic and international civil society institutions in China. Mr. Chairman, the United States has pursued a policy of engaging in discussion and dialogue with the Chinese government on human rights and rule of law issues, and the views of our witnesses on how best to achieve success in such a dialogue would be most welcome. I would also like to recognize the dedication and hard work of the CECC staff. These 15 professionals have excellent Chinese language skills, deep understanding of Chinese history and culture, great sympathy for the Chinese people, and a passionate dedication to human rights and the rule of law. From the youngest research associate to the most experienced senior counsels, this group has focused its energies on advancing our knowledge about the issues in our mandate, and have prepared a superb report for us again this year. Mr. Chairman, China’s growing role in regional and international affairs is a result and a recognition of the impressive economic and social development in China since the “reform and opening up to the outside world” period began in the late 1970s. When this period of remarkable change began, the People’s Republic of China had a minuscule national economy, negligible international trade, no system of laws, and by most objective measures was among the least developed countries in the world in economic, political, and social terms. The achievements

Human Rights in China, Nova Science Publishers, Incorporated, 2009. ProQuest Ebook Central,

Copyright © 2009. Nova Science Publishers, Incorporated. All rights reserved.

144

U.S. Government Printing Office

of the Chinese people are such that, to quote a December 2005 report by the Dui Hua Foundation headed by John Kamm, one of our witnesses today, “. . . China is, in most respects, a more well-off, open, and free place than it has been in modern history.”Yet China has far to go to complete its reforms, and has yet to address in a comprehensive way the need for a model of democracy that can ensure that these achievements will continue and take that nation’s development to the next level and beyond. Significant problems loom ahead that may undo some or all of China’s great progress. Chinese citizens who challenge government and Communist Party controls on religion, speech, or assembly continue to face severe official repression, with the government frequently using methods that violate not only China’s own Constitution and laws, but also internationally recognized human rights standards. The Chinese Communist Party continues to dominate political life in China, with Party organizations formulating all major state policies. Most often these policies are designed to protect the Party’s rule. Many of the new laws adopted by the National People’s Congress have proven difficult or impossible to implement in practice at the provincial and local levels. In the area of international trade, the government tolerates very high rates of infringement of intellectual property rights. In commercial and civil law, court judgments are often difficult to enforce. Labor laws related to workplace health and safety, overtime, and payment of overdue wages are most often honored in the breach, resulting in widespread worker protests. Chinese leaders seem deeply worried about growing social unrest, which often is the result of official corruption, development projects that pollute the environment, government eviction of urban and rural residents from their land for new building projects, poor workplace conditions in many Chinese mines and factories, and unpaid wages and pensions. In addition, an underfunded public health system cannot offer ordinary care to most citizens, and is dangerously incapable of coping with the sudden health crises of a globalized world, such as HIV/AIDS, SARS, and avian influenza. As a result, many Chinese citizens have lost confidence in the Communist Party and the government. As the 21st century advances, the impact of these and other problems could precipitate the worst nightmare for China’s leaders: widespread unrest, possibly social and political chaos. For basic democracy to work anywhere, citizens need freedom of expression and a free flow of information, so that, for example, public health crises such as HIV/ AIDS or SARS can come to light without delay; so those injured by state officials or policies can safely speak out and organize to oppose them; and so that those harmed by corrupt or incompetent officials can blow the whistle and begin legal procedures to remove them without fear of retribution. In this connection,

Human Rights in China, Nova Science Publishers, Incorporated, 2009. ProQuest Ebook Central,

Human Rights and the Rule of Law in China…

145

Copyright © 2009. Nova Science Publishers, Incorporated. All rights reserved.

the trend lines are troubling: over the past year or more, the Chinese government has become less tolerant of public discussion of central government policies. Restrictions have tightened on journalists, editors, and Internet Web sites, and officials frequently harass, intimidate, and imprison journalists, editors, and writers. Mr. Chairman, I believe that whether the 21st Century is peaceful and prosperous will depend on whether the world’s most populous country can live with itself and become open to the world in a fair and respectful manner. In a globalized world in which peoples everywhere are seeking a sense of community to serve as a buttress against political and economic forces beyond the control of individuals and their families, mutual respect for differences is the key to peace and prosperity. From an American perspective, the assumption is that China’s economic and social system cannot develop to its fullest unless the rule of law and its associated rights—including freedom of religion, speech, and of the press, due process for disputes over private rights and also contractual obligations, and a judiciary that efficiently and fairly adjudicates disputes—are made central tenets of Chinese life and the normal experience of the Chinese people. I look forward to learning from our witnesses whether or not they believe China is closer to that goal today. Thank you.

PREPARED STATEMENT OF HON. SAM BROWNBACK, A U.S. SENATOR FROM KANSAS, MEMBER, CONGRESSIONAL-EXECUTIVE COMMISSION ON CHINA, SEPTEMBER 20, 2006 Thank you for holding this hearing, Mr. Chairman, and for assembling a distinguished panel of witnesses. Today the Commission is releasing its annual report and yesterday, the members of the Commission, including myself, had the opportunity to cast our votes. I did not approve this year’s report and I would like to take just a few minutes to explain why. Back in 2000, almost exactly six years ago today, the Congress granted permanent normal trade relations with China. PNTR was considered not only the best economic deal for the United States, but also was seen as one of the best ways to support reform in China. One of the key provisions of the PNTR bill was the creation of this Commission to act as the watchdog on China human rights. By

Human Rights in China, Nova Science Publishers, Incorporated, 2009. ProQuest Ebook Central,

Copyright © 2009. Nova Science Publishers, Incorporated. All rights reserved.

146

U.S. Government Printing Office

statute, the Commission is charged with monitoring the broad human right’s situation in China and it does this by holding hearings, conducting research, and management of a critical data base on prisoners. The Commission also is required to publish an annual report that is designed to guide U.S. policy toward China based on its human rights record. In my opinion, this report does not meet that goal. The Commission staff has done an incredible job pulling together a strong and compelling narrative with over a thousand footnotes on what has happened over the past year in the specific areas of concern in China. And the continuing human rights abuses they have reported are very troubling. The report is weak however, in the conclusions it draws and the recommendations to the executive and legislative branches. What troubles me is the scorecard mentality we take toward human rights in China—one activist released but two arrested. One new law passed, three more laws completely ignored. It’s not clear to me if such an approach gives us a broad view of the state of human rights in China today. I believe that any discussion of regression or progress in China has to address the fundamental issue of China’s one-party dictatorship. Without recognition of the centrality of this fact, we are left treating the symptoms but not the disease. We should not hesitate to call a spade a spade. We should not hesitate to say explicitly that the fundamental obstacle to true reform in China is the Chinese Communist Party because the Communist Party continues to control all facets of Chinese political and social life. This type of one-party dictatorship prohibits the functioning of an independent judiciary, freedom of expression and the development of other freedoms enjoyed by citizens in a liberal democracy. Absent reforms in the political and civic spheres in China, incremental legal, social and economic reforms detailed in this report will never lead to true human rights or rule of law in China. And what does this mean for U.S. policy? It means we can’t be fooled into believing that years of rule of law training will in and of themselves lead to the development of rule of law in China. External aid cannot substitute for internal will to reform. What China has now is the Communist Party’s “rule by law” and this will not be supplanted with “rule of law” without fundamental change in the one-party structure of control by the Communist Party. Recently China has started rounding up and jailing lawyers who are simply trying to use China’s own system of laws to fight for the rights of ordinary citizens. These are not protestors throwing Molotov cocktails hoping to overthrow the government. These are principled men and women who simply want to use the tools supposedly given to every Chinese citizen to exercise their rights under the

Human Rights in China, Nova Science Publishers, Incorporated, 2009. ProQuest Ebook Central,

Human Rights and the Rule of Law in China…

147

Copyright © 2009. Nova Science Publishers, Incorporated. All rights reserved.

Chinese legal system. Apparently even that goes too far for the Party and these rights defense lawyers are being harassed, beaten, arrested and sentenced to lengthy prison terms. One of these brave activists, Wang Yi, summed it up succinctly: “If even the rights defense movement cannot succeed, then there is really no hope for China.”The relationship between rule of law and human rights is inviolable. We will not see an improvement in human rights without the rule of law in China. If we truly want to see change in China, we need to engage the Chinese on the most fundamental issue—their one-party dictatorship and the need for true political reform that will bring about a representative democracy. This is what the Commission should be advocating and where recommendations to drive U.S. policy toward this end would be most effective. This is what is missing in this year’s report and what I hope to see in next year’s report. I would like to ask that my full statement be made a part of the record. Again, thank you Mr. Chairman for convening this hearing and I look forward to hearing from the witnesses.

PREPARED STATEMENT OF HON. STEVEN J. LAW, DEPUTY SECRETARY OF LABOR, M EMBER, CONGRESSIONAL EXECUTIVE COMMISSION ON CHINA, S EPTEMBER 20, 2006 Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I would like to commend the staff of the Commission for their diligent work in producing the 2006 Commission Annual Report on human rights conditions in China. It is important to note both the progress China has made over the last year—as a result of both advocacy and engagement by the United States and by members of this Commission—and acknowledge the challenges we still face in the areas of human rights and political freedom in China. In its 2005 Annual Report, the Commission identified several problematic areas relating to labor conditions in China. Among them: • •

Wage and pension arrears are among the most important problems that Chinese workers face, and Workplace health and safety conditions are poor for millions of Chinese workers.

Human Rights in China, Nova Science Publishers, Incorporated, 2009. ProQuest Ebook Central,

148

U.S. Government Printing Office

As the 2006 Annual Report notes, over the course of the past year, the U.S. Department of Labor continued to engage China to implement bilateral cooperative activities to address these challenges. During the year, we provided training to Chinese officials who are responsible for enforcing the Chinese labor code. We educated company managers on worker rights and work safety. We also provided education and legal aid to migrant and women workers who are among the most vulnerable population in the workforce. I would like to highlight a few indicators of the achievements resulted from such bilateral cooperation: •

• •

Copyright © 2009. Nova Science Publishers, Incorporated. All rights reserved.

•

•

As of April 2006, the Rule of Law project trained 8,522 participants (migrant workers, management representatives, and government inspectors) and produced 153,000 worker awareness publications to publicize wage and hour laws and other labor regulations. 1,150 workers received counseling services. Among the migrant workers participating in the project, the percentage of workers able to list three or more workplace rights increased to 96 percent in the first quarter of 2006, up from 23 percent in 2005. The Rule of Law project is assisting in the drafting of China’s first Employment Contract Law, which is expected to improve worker protection and reduce the conflicts and inconsistencies between laws that impede the enforcement of exiting labor regulations. At the coal mines participating in a DOL project, the number of injuries per 1,000 miners decreased from 7.7 in 2003 to 1.86 in the first half of 2005.

While acknowledging these positive developments, we still face several challenges in our engagement with China on worker rights and labor standards. Some of these challenges arc daunting. We call on the government of China to hilly respect international labor standards and the principles embodied in the [LO 1998 Declaration on Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work. These principles include: • • •

The elimination of all forms of forced or compulsory labor; The effective abolition of child labor; and The elimination of discrimination in respect of employment and occupation.

Human Rights in China, Nova Science Publishers, Incorporated, 2009. ProQuest Ebook Central,

Human Rights and the Rule of Law in China…

149

The 2006 Annual Report that we are releasing today finds that there is “an increase in the number of labor disputes” in China. Today, China is at a critical juncture with a significant rise in strikes, marches, demonstrations and mass petitions. The Department of Labor is currently working with China to address the challenges in employee-employer relations: •

•

•

•

Copyright © 2009. Nova Science Publishers, Incorporated. All rights reserved.

•

Through the Rule of Law project and working with Chinese government, researchers and enterprises, China completed the first comprehensive baseline survey on labor dispute resolution in April of this year; The survey report, along with a list of recommendations, serves as a much needed reference in drafting China’s Labor Dispute Resolution Law, which is reportedly to be ready for consideration this year; Over the last year, the project set up labor-management committees at 15 selected enterprises in China and provided training to committee members on ways to handle workplace disputes; and The project is testing training materials for government mediators on labor dispute resolution techniques. Training is expected to begin in November.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for the opportunity to note the positive development in the labor areas in China and the continued work that needs to be done in these areas.

PREPARED STATEMENT OF FRANKLIN L. LAVIN, UNDER SECRETARY OF COMMERCE, M EMBER , CONGRESSIONAL -EXECUTIVE COMMISSION ON CHINA, S EPTEMBER 20, 2006 Thank you, Chairman Hagel, Co-Chairman Leach, Senators, Congressmen and fellow members of the Commission. I commend the staff for its excellent work on the 2006 Annual Report on human rights conditions and the development of the rule of law in China. I also thank the distinguished group of witnesses gathered today to discuss the current state of freedom of expression, criminal and civil rights defense, and government transparency in providing information about prisoners of conscience in China.

Human Rights in China, Nova Science Publishers, Incorporated, 2009. ProQuest Ebook Central,

Copyright © 2009. Nova Science Publishers, Incorporated. All rights reserved.

150

U.S. Government Printing Office

For more than 25 years, the United States has pursued a policy of open commercial exchange with China. We have encouraged Chinese leaders to embrace market principles and welcomed China into the global economy. We supported China’s accession to the World Trade Organization. We have an optimistic goal of a stable and prosperous partnership between America and China that will be better achieved with China fully participating in the international trading system. Economic cooperation between the United States and China has greatly benefited both countries and we believe that the dynamic growth that China has realized through free trade and will work for our mutual benefit in the future. With this in mind, we also believe that there is a relationship between open economies and open societies and expect that economic progress is likely to be accompanied by progress in human rights and the rule of law. Indeed, we approach this Commission with a fundamental belief that progress in human rights and the rule of law are essential for China to maintain its economic progress. We also have a fundamental concern about the relationship between commercial rights of U.S. companies and individual rights. Further, we want U.S. companies to be good corporate citizens in their overseas activities, respectful of the rights of workers and other stakeholders. We must measure how well and how transparently China treats both companies and individuals under the law. We are also concerned about the role of U.S. companies doing business in China as well as how China treats these companies. How these companies perform in their dealings with the Chinese government and in the Chinese commercial environment has a bearing on future progress in human rights for Chinese citizens.

Human Rights in China, Nova Science Publishers, Incorporated, 2009. ProQuest Ebook Central,

INDEX

Copyright © 2009. Nova Science Publishers, Incorporated. All rights reserved.

A abortion, 113 academic, 6, 25, 47, 115, 116, 125 academics, 6, 14, 36 access, viii, 2, 12, 15, 18, 26, 28, 31, 45, 46, 47, 48, 51, 54, 56, 57, 72, 97, 106, 108, 110, 111, 120, 140 accountability, 8, 19, 20, 27 accounting, 89 achievement, 127 activism, vii, 1, 3, 19, 20, 118 ad hoc, 19 adjudication, 123 administration, 32, 50, 85, 87, 88, 115, 122, 125 administrative, 5, 9, 19, 50, 76, 116, 122, 137 advocacy, 13, 19, 57, 99, 100, 147 Africa, ix, 46, 55, 76 age, 32, 47 agenda-setting, 95, 137 agent, 25 agents, 21, 22, 65, 73 agricultural, 22 aid, 5, 6, 29, 30, 32, 57, 69, 146, 148 aiding, viii, 46, 54 AIDS, 144 air, 75 Al Qaeda, 18, 40 aliens, 77

analysts, 2, 3, 19, 20, 21, 23, 25, 26, 28, 47, 52, 57, 66 anger, 20, 22, 23 antitrust, 102 appellate review, 116 application, 16, 93, 118, 132 appropriations, 29 arbitration, 8, 102, 109, 115 argument, 88 arrest, ix, 5, 11, 20, 22, 48, 63, 64, 67, 100, 132 ARS, 144 Asia, viii, ix, 28, 37, 38, 41, 43, 46, 48, 55, 59, 60, 72, 81, 82, 90, 97, 110, 125, 140, 141, 142 Asian, 1, 17, 45, 63, 76, 81, 141 assaults, 5 assessment, 125 assets, 25 asylum, 73, 78 atmosphere, 12, 29 atrocities, 48 attacks, 53, 128 Attorney General, 78 Australia, 73, 75 Austria, 125 authentication, 54 authoritarianism, 3 authority, 3, 6, 13, 15, 16, 19, 67, 80, 86, 94, 106, 117, 121, 136, 141 autonomy, 6, 17, 18

Human Rights in China, Nova Science Publishers, Incorporated, 2009. ProQuest Ebook Central,

152

Index

Copyright © 2009. Nova Science Publishers, Incorporated. All rights reserved.

availability, 26, 132 avian influenza, 32, 144 awareness, vii, 1, 20, 23, 30, 102, 148

business model, 109 buyer, 112 bypass, 51

B

C

bail, 116 bankruptcy, 102 barriers, 116 basic research, 88 battery, 72 BBG, 55, 56, 62 behavior, 25, 31, 96, 101, 131, 138 Beijing, x, 3, 4, 6, 7, 10, 11, 13, 14, 16, 17, 18, 20, 21, 24, 25, 26, 28, 29, 32, 36, 39, 40, 41, 53, 59, 64, 67, 68, 70, 72, 73, 75, 77, 78, 81, 86, 87, 98, 115, 119, 121, 126, 127, 128, 129, 130, 131, 142 beliefs, ix, 18, 63, 64, 65, 66, 104 benefits, 8, 66, 105 bilateral relations, 106 bilateral trade, vii, viii, 1, 43, 46 binding, 28, 53 birth, 113, 121 birth control, 113, 121 blame, 13, 19, 20 blocks, 49 blog, ix, 14, 46, 53, 95, 137 blogger, 27 blogs, 5, 26, 27, 42, 47, 50, 53, 95, 133, 137 Board of Governors, 46 bomb, 18 Boston, 38, 101 bounds, 13 breakdown, 127 broadband, 47 Broadcasting Board of Governors, viii, 46, 55, 56, 72 Broadcasting Board of Governors (BBG), 55 Buddhism, 14, 15, 65 Buddhist, 4, 17, 35, 65, 124 budding, 22 buildings, 4, 11, 12, 24 buses, 3, 8, 19, 22, 65, 68, 72, 74, 119, 146 Bush administration, 27, 29

campaigns, 3, 17 Canada, 35, 38 capacity, 19, 24, 32, 93, 94, 135, 136 capital punishment, 8, 118, 132 career development, 25 cast, 145 Catholic, 14, 16 Catholics, 5, 16 cell, 12, 50, 66, 95, 120, 136, 139 cell phones, 66, 95, 136, 139 cellular phone, 48 cellular phones, 48 censorship, viii, ix, 2, 12, 26, 30, 31, 45, 46, 47, 48, 49, 51, 52, 53, 54, 55, 56, 57, 62, 72, 98, 111, 112, 137, 138, 139, 140 Central Asia, 17, 90 Central Intelligence Agency, 39 channels, 8 chaos, 144 child labor, 32, 148 children, 4, 12, 18 China, i, iii, v, vii, viii, ix, x, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 9, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, 21, 25, 26, 27, 28, 29, 30, 31, 32, 33, 35, 36, 37, 38, 39, 40, 41, 42, 43, 45, 46, 47, 48, 49, 51, 52, 53, 54, 55, 56, 57, 58, 59, 60, 61, 62, 63, 64, 66, 67, 68, 69, 70, 72, 73, 74, 75, 76, 77, 78, 79, 80, 81, 82, 84, 85, 86, 87, 88, 89, 90, 91, 92, 93, 94, 95, 97, 98, 99, 100, 101, 102, 103, 104, 105, 106, 107, 108, 109, 110, 111, 112, 113, 114, 115, 118, 121, 122, 124, 125, 126, 127, 128, 129, 130, 131, 132, 133, 134, 135, 136, 137, 138, 139, 140, 141, 142, 143, 145, 146, 147, 148, 149, 150 China Daily, 36, 37, 59 Christianity, 15 Christians, 15, 16, 22 CIA, 56

Human Rights in China, Nova Science Publishers, Incorporated, 2009. ProQuest Ebook Central,

Copyright © 2009. Nova Science Publishers, Incorporated. All rights reserved.

Index circulation, 125 citizens, 2, 3, 10, 14, 20, 21, 23, 26, 30, 33, 35, 47, 52, 57, 65, 66, 74, 77, 80, 92, 93, 95, 96, 108, 121, 135, 137, 139, 141, 144, 146, 150 civil law, 144 civil liberties, 33 civil rights, 33, 74, 80, 102, 140, 143, 149 civil society, vii, viii, 1, 2, 3, 4, 11, 27, 29, 80, 81, 89, 106, 140, 142, 143 classes, 19, 22, 24, 67, 82, 142 classical, 135 clients, 21, 86, 116, 120, 121, 122, 135 closure, 14, 51, 96, 138 CNN, 26, 48 Co, 32, 40, 75, 79, 82, 83, 102, 143, 149 coal, 32, 148 coal mine, 32, 148 codes, 57 collaboration, 48, 108 collusion, 23 commerce, 26, 106 Commerce Department, 102 commercialization, 13, 49, 109 Committee on the Judiciary, 31 communication, 96, 97, 125, 139 communication systems, 96, 139 communication technologies, 139 Communism, 36 communist countries, 25 Communist Party, 3, 4, 9, 35, 41, 46, 48, 66, 68, 80, 82, 86, 87, 90, 96, 97, 108, 109, 119, 126, 139, 141, 142, 144, 146 Communist Party of China, 48 communities, ix, 17, 29, 63 community, 13, 73, 84, 87, 98, 102, 104, 109, 125, 138, 145 compassion, 65 compensation, 11, 22, 36 competence, 21 competition, 94, 135 compliance, 32, 54 concentration, x, 8, 64, 69 concrete, 129 confessions, 7

153

confidence, 24, 108, 144 confinement, 116 congress, 9, 43 Congress, iv, v, ix, x, 2, 4, 7, 9, 10, 15, 27, 28, 29, 31, 32, 35, 46, 55, 57, 64, 67, 74, 79, 80, 84, 85, 87, 88, 89, 94, 100, 105, 110, 111, 113, 114, 123, 124, 126, 127, 134, 140, 144, 145 consciousness, 3, 20, 21, 23, 102 consensus, 116 consent, 8, 70, 82 Consolidated Appropriations Act, 31 Constitution, 4, 7, 14, 50, 102, 115, 144 constraints, 6, 80, 104, 141 construction, 4, 11, 12, 14, 23 consultants, 121 consulting, 4 contracts, 25, 37, 53, 109, 110 control, viii, 5, 8, 12, 13, 15, 25, 26, 28, 45, 47, 48, 50, 68, 74, 93, 94, 95, 96, 98, 108, 111, 112, 135, 136, 137, 138, 139, 145, 146 conviction, 54 Cook County, 72 cornea, 76 corporate social responsibility, 103 corporations, 26, 31, 52 corruption, vii, 2, 3, 6, 13, 46, 86, 102, 115, 117, 119, 120, 144 costs, 23 counsel, 120 counseling, 148 counter-terror, 5 couples, 36 courts, 20, 69, 72, 84, 102, 110, 114, 115, 116, 117, 118, 119, 120, 122, 123, 132, 133, 135 coverage, 4, 11, 46 CP, 4, 66, 139 CPC, ix, 15, 63, 64 creativity, 108 credibility, 71 credit, 93, 117, 135 crime, 5, 15, 74, 90 crimes, 7, 10, 12, 18, 22, 25, 33, 51, 68, 72, 77, 117, 118, 135

Human Rights in China, Nova Science Publishers, Incorporated, 2009. ProQuest Ebook Central,

154

Index

criminal activity, 72 criminal acts, 76 criminal justice, 32, 85, 86, 115, 116, 117, 119, 122, 123, 124 criminals, 130 criticism, viii, 2, 28, 31, 46, 47 CRS, 1, 39, 40, 43, 45, 58, 63, 77 Cuba, 60, 106 cultivation, 65 Cultural Revolution, 20 culture, viii, 2, 16, 29, 81, 124, 141, 143 currency, 23, 134 cyberspace, 97, 98, 137, 139, 140 cynicism, 102

Copyright © 2009. Nova Science Publishers, Incorporated. All rights reserved.

D database, 32, 89, 113 death, 7, 18, 35, 48, 85, 110, 117, 118, 122, 132 death penalty, 7, 85, 117, 118, 122, 132 death sentence, 7, 118 deaths, ix, 18, 64, 65 decisions, 80, 85, 110, 122, 125, 141 defendants, 21, 71, 120 defense, 21, 22, 29, 80, 86, 87, 116, 118, 120, 121, 124, 140, 143, 147, 149 degradation, 22, 109 demand, 3, 13, 17, 58 democracy, ix, 2, 3, 4, 9, 10, 11, 20, 24, 25, 27, 29, 30, 31, 35, 48, 53, 54, 63, 73, 82, 97, 142, 144, 146, 147 Democracy Fund, 31 democratization, 24, 55 denial, 28, 132 Denmark, 106 Department of State, 2, 15, 30, 32, 36, 37, 38, 39, 40, 43, 59, 60, 61, 74, 75, 76, 77, 88 deported, 35 depressed, 73 desire, 84, 132 destruction, 34, 72 detainees, 16, 37, 70, 71, 89, 120, 123 detection, 15, 74

detention, vii, ix, 2, 5, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 18, 28, 52, 63, 64, 68, 69, 70, 86, 89, 104, 116, 118, 120 developed countries, 143 dichotomy, 16 dictatorship, 146, 147 diffusion, 137 directives, 51, 68 disability, 36 disappointment, 102 disaster, 4, 12, 34 discipline, 53, 75, 120, 123 disclosure, 8 discourse, 3, 6, 19, 25, 26 discrimination, 129, 148 disputes, 109, 114, 123, 145, 149 disseminate, 30, 69 distribution, 50, 71, 115 division, 51 donations, 14 donors, 70 double jeopardy, 21 draft, 111, 114, 116 drowning, 24 drug addict, 75 drug addiction, 75 drug smuggling, 105 drug trafficking, 118 due process, 11, 86, 106, 110, 115, 120, 123, 145 duties, 18

E earthquake, 4, 10, 11, 14, 34 East Asia, 81, 141 eavesdropping, 72 economic boom, 3 economic change, 15, 135 economic development, 25 economic growth, vii, 2, 19, 30, 47, 108, 109, 139 economic performance, 93 economic reform, 13, 19, 24, 66, 93, 135, 146 economic reforms, 19, 24, 66, 135, 146

Human Rights in China, Nova Science Publishers, Incorporated, 2009. ProQuest Ebook Central,

Copyright © 2009. Nova Science Publishers, Incorporated. All rights reserved.

Index Education, 9, 43 educational institutions, 29 educational system, 14 elaboration, 115 embezzlement, 14 emotional, 65 employers, 68 employment, 75, 97, 148 empowered, 96, 138, 139 empowerment, 9 energy, 23 engagement, vii, 1, 2, 27, 136, 147, 148 enterprise, 22, 66, 109 entertainment, 47 entrepreneurs, 6, 8, 25, 36, 66, 94, 136 environment, 21, 80, 94, 96, 103, 109, 112, 125, 128, 136, 137, 139, 140, 143, 144, 150 environmental degradation, 22, 109 environmental issues, 34 equality, 130, 131 equating, 117 erosion, 16 espionage, 35 ethnic groups, 14, 17, 18 European Parliament, 34 Europeans, 100 exchange rate, 134 exchange rates, 134 execution, 105 Executive Branch, 110 exercise, ix, 3, 18, 20, 52, 63, 64, 65, 67, 74, 80, 105, 112, 123, 141, 146 expenditures, 56 expert, iv, 6, 12, 69, 81, 141, 142 expertise, 6, 82, 83, 110, 142 extreme poverty, 80, 141 eyes, 64, 109

F fabrication, 22 failure, 114, 123 faith, 20, 65, 66 family, vii, 2, 34, 67, 78, 100, 120, 121, 132 family planning, vii, 2, 34

155

Far East, 37, 41, 42, 61, 75 farmers, 8, 10, 11, 22, 23, 35, 37, 66 fax, 127, 129 FBIS, 60 fear, 3, 24, 26, 48, 73, 90, 96, 97, 106, 138, 140, 144 fears, 17, 23, 90, 91 February, ix, 29, 33, 35, 36, 37, 39, 40, 41, 43, 45, 46, 55, 57, 58, 59, 61, 62, 71, 73, 77, 129, 130 federal courts, 72 fee, 36 feelings, 123 fees, 22, 51 feet, 51 fever, 73 filters, 48 finance, 25 financial resources, 95, 98, 137 financial support, 29, 125 fines, 51 fire, 54 flexibility, 16, 112 floating, 96 flood, 58 flow, viii, 12, 13, 31, 45, 52, 65, 95, 96, 97, 106, 108, 136, 139, 140, 143, 144 fluid, 66, 121 focusing, 18, 20, 55, 85 Ford, 36, 38 foreign policy, 111, 128 foreigner, 126 foreigners, 18, 22, 33, 35, 39, 77, 102, 119, 130, 132 France, 77 fraud, 51, 119 free trade, 150 freedom, viii, ix, 5, 10, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 27, 29, 30, 31, 32, 35, 46, 52, 54, 55, 57, 71, 74, 80, 82, 94, 98, 99, 102, 107, 108, 111, 135, 136, 140, 142, 143, 144, 145, 146, 147, 149 freedoms, 2, 13, 55, 80, 84, 93, 101, 107, 114, 115, 141, 146 frustration, 102, 123

Human Rights in China, Nova Science Publishers, Incorporated, 2009. ProQuest Ebook Central,

156

Index

funding, viii, 2, 6, 11, 27, 28, 29, 30, 45, 55, 57, 62, 72, 88, 124, 134 funds, 30, 32, 57, 101

Copyright © 2009. Nova Science Publishers, Incorporated. All rights reserved.

G gambling, 26, 48, 50, 52 games, 4, 10, 11, 24, 28 General Accounting Office, 43 generation, 25, 86, 97, 123 Geneva, 127, 130 Georgia, 3 gestation, 102 gift, 110 girls, 34 glass, 107, 108 global economy, 150 Globalization, 38 goals, 128 google, 51 governance, 3, 6, 39, 80, 81, 89, 103, 131, 140, 142 government, vii, viii, ix, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, 20, 21, 22, 23, 24, 25, 26, 27, 28, 29, 30, 31, 32, 33, 35, 42, 45, 46, 47, 48, 49, 50, 51, 52, 53, 54, 55, 56, 57, 58, 63, 64, 65, 66, 67, 68, 70, 71, 72, 73, 74, 75, 76, 78, 80, 87, 89, 90, 91, 92, 95, 96, 97, 98, 105, 111, 112, 118, 119, 121, 122, 123, 124, 125, 126, 127, 128, 129, 131, 133, 134, 135, 136, 137, 138, 139, 140, 141, 142, 143, 144, 145, 146, 148, 149, 150 government policy, 19 government repression, 26 government-to-government, 57 grants, 43 grass, 6 grassroots, 11, 24 Great Lakes, 78 greed, 127 grouping, 133 groups, ix, 4, 6, 14, 16, 17, 18, 19, 23, 24, 31, 33, 50, 53, 63, 73, 80, 87, 101, 121, 124, 134, 140

growth, vii, viii, 2, 15, 19, 20, 24, 30, 46, 47, 55, 84, 93, 94, 95, 101, 108, 109, 114, 135, 136, 137, 139, 150 Guangdong, 34 Guangzhou, 14 guidance, 111 guidelines, 21, 52 guiding principles, 111 guilt, 21 guilty, 9 guns, 90

H hamstring, 124 handedness, 110 handling, 21 hands, 132 harassment, 5, 11, 15, 16, 72 harm, 19, 21, 50 harmony, 19 Harvard, 48, 81, 141 harvesting, 8, 69, 70, 74, 104, 105 healing, 66, 73 health, 14, 23, 32, 107, 144, 147 health effects, 23 hearing, ix, 31, 46, 55, 79, 84, 89, 91, 92, 101, 111, 114, 118, 143, 145, 147 heart, 16, 106, 119 height, 138 higher education, 109 high-speed, 23 hips, 106 HIV, 30, 32, 34, 47, 144 HIV/AIDS, 30, 32, 34, 47, 144 homeowners, 22, 23 homosexuality, 75 Honda, 79, 106, 110, 112, 113 Hong Kong, ix, 9, 31, 42, 47, 48, 63, 71, 75, 81, 97, 101, 126, 142 hospital, x, 8, 35, 64, 70, 76 hospitals, 70 host, 10, 113 hotels, 18

Human Rights in China, Nova Science Publishers, Incorporated, 2009. ProQuest Ebook Central,

Index

Copyright © 2009. Nova Science Publishers, Incorporated. All rights reserved.

House, ix, x, 28, 32, 33, 39, 46, 55, 64, 74, 101, 113, 127 housing, 11 human, vii, viii, x, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 10, 11, 12, 19, 20, 21, 22, 23, 27, 28, 30, 31, 32, 34, 42, 46, 49, 51, 53, 55, 64, 65, 68, 70, 71, 72, 74, 80, 81, 82, 84, 88, 89, 90, 92, 93, 94, 97, 99, 100, 102, 103, 104, 107, 108, 110, 111, 113, 114, 119, 120, 121, 124, 125, 126, 127, 128, 129, 130, 131, 133, 134, 135, 136, 140, 141, 142, 143, 144, 145, 146, 147, 149, 150 human rights, vii, viii, x, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 10, 11, 12, 19, 20, 21, 22, 23, 27, 28, 30, 31, 32, 34, 42, 46, 53, 55, 57, 64, 65, 68, 70, 71, 72, 74, 80, 81, 82, 84, 88, 89, 90, 92, 93, 94, 97, 99, 100, 102, 103, 104, 107, 108, 110, 111, 113, 114, 119, 120, 121, 124, 125, 126, 127, 128, 129, 130, 131, 133, 134, 135, 136, 140, 141, 142, 143, 144, 145, 146, 147, 149, 150 humane, 120, 140 humanity, 72, 77 husband, 76

I id, 16, 33, 39 identification, 54 identity, 16, 31, 57, 96, 138 Illinois, 106 images, 69, 96, 138 imbalances, 108 immigration, 78 immunity, 72, 77 implementation, 3, 115, 117 imprisonment, ix, 5, 28, 34, 35, 63, 64, 75, 137 incarceration, 13, 69 incentive, 93, 94, 105, 111, 135 incentives, 68, 90, 111 income, 22 independence, 9, 17, 24, 39, 46, 51, 88, 131, 135 India, 17

157

indication, 73, 123 indicators, 148 individual rights, 150 industrial, 22, 47 industry, 13, 52, 58, 111 inferences, 70 inflation, 23 influenza, 32, 144 information technology, 31, 60, 61 infrastructure, viii, 46, 49, 50, 51, 52, 81, 141 infringement, 144 injuries, 148 injury, iv, 118 innovation, 115 inspection, 87, 120, 123 inspectors, 148 instability, 115, 123, 135 institutional reforms, 20 institutions, 3, 6, 19, 29, 54, 57, 80, 81, 93, 96, 102, 109, 114, 115, 117, 122, 124, 135, 139, 140, 141, 143 instruction, 75, 117 instructors, 67 instruments, 15, 74, 87, 122 insults, 28 intellectual property, 107, 110, 113, 144 intellectual property rights, 113, 144 intelligence, 121 intensity, 18 intentions, 6, 123 interference, vii, 2, 15, 21, 76, 115, 119, 121, 131, 132 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 115 International Labor Organization, 134 international law, 77 international relations, 81, 141 international standards, ix, 27, 46 international trade, 32, 143, 144 Internet, v, viii, ix, 2, 5, 11, 12, 13, 14, 20, 25, 26, 27, 28, 29, 30, 31, 32, 34, 42, 43, 45, 46, 47, 48, 49, 50, 51, 52, 53, 54, 55, 56, 57, 58, 59, 60, 61, 62, 66, 71, 72, 77, 82, 87, 95, 96, 98, 106, 107, 108, 109, 110,

Human Rights in China, Nova Science Publishers, Incorporated, 2009. ProQuest Ebook Central,

158

Index

111, 112, 121, 136, 137, 138, 139, 140, 142, 145 Internet Protocol, 56 Internet Protocol (IP), 56 interpretation, 85, 118, 121 interrogations, 7, 116 intervention, 88 interview, 13, 104 interviews, 104, 127 intimidating, 19, 23 intimidation, 13, 16, 22, 25, 96, 109, 111, 137, 138 investigative, 14, 30, 119 investment, 52, 94, 98, 109, 136 investors, 22, 102 IP, 49, 56, 57 IP address, 49, 56, 57 Iran, 31, 62, 100, 134 Islam, 14, 18, 40 Islamic, 17 ISPs, 49

Copyright © 2009. Nova Science Publishers, Incorporated. All rights reserved.

J January, x, 8, 14, 21, 23, 31, 36, 37, 38, 39, 40, 41, 42, 43, 53, 58, 59, 60, 61, 62, 64, 69, 74, 95, 96, 118, 127, 128, 129, 137, 138 Japan, 48, 59, 69, 124 Japanese, 48 jobs, 52, 68 journalism, 14, 49 journalists, 5, 6, 10, 11, 13, 14, 23, 33, 52, 98, 99, 121, 133, 145 judge, 72, 132 judges, 21, 71, 85, 117, 123, 125, 132, 135 judgment, 93, 100, 135 judicial branch, 4 judiciary, 91, 116, 117, 124, 130, 131, 145, 146 Judiciary Committee, 91 jurisdiction, 25, 72 justice, 21, 32, 85, 86, 87, 88, 91, 115, 116, 117, 118, 119, 122, 123, 124, 125 juveniles, 132, 133

K knowledge-based economy, 137 Korea, 92, 100, 113 Korean, 28, 92 Kyrgyzstan, 3

L labor, viii, ix, 2, 4, 7, 8, 9, 19, 22, 27, 29, 30, 32, 35, 37, 64, 68, 89, 90, 107, 116, 126, 147, 148, 149 land, 8, 10, 20, 22, 35, 37, 114, 144 land use, 114 language, 18, 26, 48, 56, 71, 83, 97, 125, 131, 143 language skills, 143 large-scale, 3 laundry, 100 law, viii, 2, 3, 5, 7, 8, 12, 20, 21, 25, 27, 29, 30, 32, 33, 67, 68, 71, 72, 74, 77, 80, 81, 84, 85, 86, 87, 88, 90, 91, 93, 94, 96, 97, 102, 104, 107, 108, 109, 110, 111, 112, 114, 115, 117, 118, 119, 120, 121, 122, 123, 124, 125, 129, 130, 131, 134, 135, 136, 139, 140, 141, 143, 144, 145, 146, 147, 149, 150 law enforcement, 94, 108, 115, 119, 120, 122, 123, 136 laws, vii, 2, 4, 7, 14, 19, 20, 32, 50, 53, 57, 84, 92, 102, 113, 115, 119, 122, 131, 143, 144, 146, 148 lawsuits, 8, 72 lawyers, 5, 10, 14, 17, 19, 20, 21, 22, 23, 86, 87, 106, 115, 116, 117, 118, 120, 121, 122, 123, 124, 125, 135, 146 layoffs, 22 lead, 11, 102, 107, 146 leadership, vii, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 15, 16, 20, 27, 33, 46, 67, 68, 83, 84, 87, 94, 115, 116, 123, 124, 136 learning, 107, 145 legal aspects, 81 legal protection, 15

Human Rights in China, Nova Science Publishers, Incorporated, 2009. ProQuest Ebook Central,

Index

Copyright © 2009. Nova Science Publishers, Incorporated. All rights reserved.

legal systems, 81, 141 legislation, vii, viii, 1, 2, 3, 9, 103, 111, 116, 117, 118 legislative, 4, 9, 80, 114, 115, 116, 122, 123, 140, 143, 146 legislative elections, 9 liberal, 146 liberalization, viii, 46, 93, 135 licensing, 50 life span, 27 likelihood, 116 limitations, 46 links, 57, 138 local authorities, 15, 17, 23 local government, viii, 2, 8, 9, 19 local television stations, 20 location, 96, 138 London, 61 long period, 102, 104, 116, 131 long-term, 25, 96, 97, 120, 124, 139 Los Angeles, 67 love, 103, 106 loyalty, 87, 122

M Macau, 47 magnetic, iv, 23 Mainland China, 33, 39 mainstream, 112 maintenance, 52 major cities, 138 management, 138, 146, 148, 149 management committee, 149 Mao Zedong, 109 marches, 51, 149 market, ix, 8, 13, 24, 30, 46, 51, 53, 70, 82, 94, 95, 108, 111, 136, 137, 142, 150 market share, 51 mass communication, viii, 45 mass media, viii, ix, 4, 10, 12, 19, 21, 28, 32, 45, 63, 71, 94, 137 materialism, 65 meanings, 74

159

measures, 8, 12, 51, 87, 95, 116, 121, 133, 135, 137, 138, 143 media, viii, ix, 4, 5, 8, 10, 12, 13, 17, 19, 21, 24, 27, 28, 29, 32, 43, 45, 46, 48, 52, 54, 55, 62, 63, 72, 74, 82, 84, 85, 87, 94, 97, 109, 112, 121, 125, 133, 135, 136, 137, 142 mediators, 149 meditation, 18, 65 membership, 123 men, 146 mental disorder, 66 Mercury, 61 messages, 23, 26, 48, 50, 52, 67, 73, 139 Microsoft, 31, 53, 60, 61, 62, 111, 140 middle class, viii, 2, 24, 30 Middle East, 90 middle-aged, 25 migrant, 22, 148 migrant workers, 148 migrants, 4 military, 11, 30, 66, 73 milk, 13, 14 mines, 144 minorities, 32, 36 minority, 14, 16, 26 missions, 130 moderators, 48 modern society, 65 modernization, 47 momentum, 117 money, 25, 35 monks, 4, 17 monopoly, 94, 96, 135, 139 moratorium, 106, 117 morning, 80, 81, 82, 83, 97, 98, 143 motion, vii, 1, 27, 28 movement, ix, 2, 6, 20, 23, 51, 63, 64, 65, 66, 67, 69, 71, 72, 73, 147 MPS, 51, 52, 116 MSNBC.com, 60 multinational corporations, 103 murder, 50, 118 music, 75 Muslim, 17, 29 Muslims, vii, 2, 4, 5, 14, 17, 40

Human Rights in China, Nova Science Publishers, Incorporated, 2009. ProQuest Ebook Central,

160

Index

mutual respect, 89, 130, 131, 145

Copyright © 2009. Nova Science Publishers, Incorporated. All rights reserved.

N naming, 100 NASDAQ, 95 nation, 48, 93, 109, 119 national, 18, 20, 21, 33, 43, 47, 48, 50, 54, 116, 119, 136, 137, 143 National Defense Authorization Act, 43 national interests, 136 National People’s Congress, 7, 9, 35, 67, 84, 85, 105, 114, 144 national security, 18, 21, 43, 50 NATO, 127, 128 natural, 12, 133 natural disasters, 133 Navy, 75 Nebraska, 80, 140 neglect, 68 negotiation, 94, 136 network, 50, 51, 52, 66, 73 new media, 82, 136, 142 New York, iii, iv, 26, 37, 39, 40, 42, 48, 53, 59, 60, 62, 67, 71, 75, 76, 78, 81, 84, 85, 86, 90, 119, 130, 141 New York Times, 26, 37, 39, 40, 42, 48, 53, 59, 60, 62, 75, 76, 78, 85, 86, 90, 119 New Zealand, 42 newsletters, 30, 31 newspapers, 13, 72 NGO, 6, 11, 12, 90 NGOs, 6, 7, 11, 12, 36, 38, 89, 90, 125, 128 Ni, 11 noise, 23 non-binding, 28 nongovernmental, 6 nongovernmental organization, 6 non-profit, 7, 16, 27, 29, 70, 71 non-violent, 133 normal, vii, x, 1, 2, 8, 14, 64, 70, 130, 145 norms, 57, 65 North America, 78, 130 North Korea, 28, 92, 134

O objectivity, 110 obligation, 92, 106, 130 obligations, 145 observations, 24, 82 occupational, 32 offenders, 7, 9 old-fashioned, 139 online, viii, 13, 24, 25, 26, 34, 45, 47, 48, 49, 50, 51, 52, 57, 95, 96, 136, 137, 138, 139 openness, viii, 4, 46, 103, 131 opposition, 94, 102, 116, 136 oppression, 91 optimism, 10, 87, 123 oral, 133 organ, 8, 70, 74, 104, 105, 122 organization, 4, 11, 15, 16, 18, 29, 31, 35, 50, 54, 57, 66, 68, 70, 121, 131 organizational capacity, 23 organizations, 3, 6, 7, 13, 17, 18, 27, 30, 32, 50, 57, 68, 97, 115, 119, 124, 144 orthodox, 65 oversight, 81, 141 overtime, 116, 144 ownership, 8, 22

P Pacific, ix, 38, 41, 46, 55, 59 packets, 51, 53, 98 Paper, 38, 41, 43 paramilitary, 17 parents, 12, 24 Paris, 53, 139 Parliament, 70 parole, 129 partnership, 150 patients, 34 payroll, 32 penalties, 31, 51, 110 penalty, 7, 85, 117, 118, 122, 132 Pennsylvania, 83 pension, 32, 107, 147

Human Rights in China, Nova Science Publishers, Incorporated, 2009. ProQuest Ebook Central,

Copyright © 2009. Nova Science Publishers, Incorporated. All rights reserved.

Index pensions, 144 performance, 19, 93, 135 perjury, 22 permit, 94, 135 personal, 6, 27, 31, 53, 54, 66, 93, 94, 107, 110, 114, 115, 130, 133, 135, 136, 137 petitioners, 4, 10, 11 philosophy, 102 phone, 12, 49, 50 physical well-being, 65 planning, vii, 2, 34 platforms, 97 play, 6, 15, 120, 139 plea bargain, 116 plea bargaining, 116 pluralism, 26, 94, 136 police, 5, 9, 11, 12, 16, 17, 20, 21, 24, 42, 51, 52, 67, 68, 70, 71, 84, 85, 86, 96, 116, 119, 120, 121, 122, 124, 132, 138, 139 policy makers, 24, 64 policy reform, 4 policymakers, 47, 108 political instability, 3, 30 political legitimacy, 135 political participation, 139 political power, 93, 135 political stability, 9, 24 politicians, 72 politics, 19, 24, 124 pollution, 20 poor, 3, 4, 119, 144, 147 population, 3, 16, 17, 24, 47, 89, 148 pornography, 26, 51, 52, 97 poverty, 6, 80, 93, 135, 141 poverty alleviation, 6 poverty reduction, 93, 135 power, 3, 4, 6, 7, 9, 10, 11, 15, 20, 22, 23, 24, 26, 33, 34, 35, 65, 80, 85, 87, 91, 93, 95, 96, 105, 110, 111, 117, 118, 123, 135, 137, 139, 141 power plant, 24 powers, 9, 65, 66, 73, 86, 119 preference, 24 prejudice, 122 president, 7, 56, 61, 88, 105, 142

161

President Bush, 32, 74 President Clinton, 28, 126, 127 press freedom, 13 pressure, 10, 35, 57, 58, 72, 87, 93, 94, 109, 121, 126, 130, 135 presumption of innocence, 21, 116 prisoners, x, 5, 8, 17, 18, 27, 29, 32, 64, 69, 70, 76, 81, 89, 90, 100, 104, 112, 126, 127, 128, 129, 130, 131, 132, 133, 134, 142, 143, 146, 149 prisons, ix, 63, 64, 89, 104, 126, 127 privacy, 111 private, viii, 6, 7, 8, 13, 19, 22, 23, 25, 29, 36, 46, 48, 50, 52, 53, 75, 94, 136, 138, 145 private property, 7 private sector, 25 professionalism, 21, 94 professions, 87 profit, x, 7, 16, 27, 29, 52, 64, 69, 70, 71 profits, 13 program, 29, 57, 89, 113 programming, 69 proliferation, 7 promote, viii, 2, 6, 25, 27, 30, 45, 47, 49, 55, 57, 88, 108, 122, 136, 137, 139 propaganda, 68, 73, 95, 109, 137, 139 propagation, 39 property, iv, 4, 8, 14, 17, 25, 32, 34, 72, 102, 107, 110, 113, 120, 144 property rights, 4, 8, 32, 102 prosperity, 108, 145 prostitution, 9 protection, 20, 21, 32, 57, 73, 78, 84, 107, 110, 111, 114, 148 protectionism, 102, 115 Protestants, 5, 15 protocols, 57 proxy, 26, 51, 56, 57 public, vii, viii, ix, x, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 8, 9, 13, 14, 18, 19, 20, 22, 25, 26, 30, 32, 45, 47, 48, 49, 58, 63, 64, 67, 68, 70, 71, 72, 73, 74, 75, 76, 86, 87, 90, 95, 100, 112, 114, 117, 118, 121, 132, 137, 144 public affairs, 95, 137 public health, 6, 20, 32, 144

Human Rights in China, Nova Science Publishers, Incorporated, 2009. ProQuest Ebook Central,

162

Index

public interest, 6, 21, 87 public opinion, viii, 13, 26, 45, 47, 48 public relations, 72 public service, 19 punishment, viii, 45, 75, 76, 84, 114, 116, 133 punitive, 49, 51

Q quality of life, 23 questioning, 97

Copyright © 2009. Nova Science Publishers, Incorporated. All rights reserved.

R radio, 5, 71 radio station, 71 Ramadan, 18 range, 6, 17, 19, 22, 23, 24, 29, 65, 68, 87, 116, 138 RC, vii, viii, 1, 2, 10, 45, 46, 54, 115 reading, 112, 113, 125 real estate, 121 recall, 34, 121 recognition, 67, 72, 83, 102, 113, 143, 146 recruiting, 117 Red Cross, 104 reduction, 8, 93, 128, 129, 135 reforms, 3, 9, 10, 19, 21, 25, 27, 80, 93, 94, 107, 117, 135, 136, 141, 144, 146 refugees, 28, 92 regional, 137, 143 regression, 91, 146 regular, 15, 69, 120 regulation, viii, 25, 45, 48, 49, 107, 120, 138 regulations, 7, 8, 12, 13, 14, 16, 32, 49, 50, 51, 70, 99, 105, 137, 139, 148 rehabilitation, 49 reincarnation, 16 rejection, 16 relationship, 43, 89, 100, 113, 147, 150 relationships, 19, 89, 102, 106, 113 relevance, 19 religion, 15, 29, 66, 107, 144, 145 religions, 14, 15

religious belief, 133 religious beliefs, 133 religious groups, 14, 33 repair, 128 reporters, 11, 29, 52, 121 repression, 5, 52, 101, 108, 115, 121, 123, 140, 144 Republican, 43 research, viii, 2, 6, 30, 88, 101, 108, 117, 123, 124, 134, 143, 146 researchers, 58, 149 resentment, 16 residential, 67 resistance, 50, 123 resistence, 9 resolution, 29, 32, 116, 123, 127, 141, 149 resources, 30, 50, 56, 95, 98, 109, 137 responsibilities, 119 responsiveness, 8 retail, 54 retribution, 144 revenue, 19 revolutionary, 25 rewards, 52 RFA, viii, 46, 55, 56 rhetoric, 122 risk, 6, 8, 52 risks, 21, 109 robbery, 118 rule of law, viii, 2, 20, 25, 27, 29, 30, 32, 68, 80, 81, 84, 88, 90, 91, 93, 94, 97, 107, 108, 110, 111, 114, 122, 123, 124, 129, 130, 131, 134, 135, 136, 140, 141, 143, 145, 146, 147, 149, 150 rural, viii, 2, 6, 8, 15, 36, 114, 119, 144 rural areas, 8, 15, 36 rural development, 6 Russia, 25

S sabotage, x, 64, 69 safeguard, 6 safety, 32, 107, 144, 147, 148 sales, 13

Human Rights in China, Nova Science Publishers, Incorporated, 2009. ProQuest Ebook Central,

Copyright © 2009. Nova Science Publishers, Incorporated. All rights reserved.

Index sampling, 33 sanctions, 15, 74, 85, 86, 120, 121 SARA, 14 SARS, 14, 32, 47, 56, 144 satellite, 69, 76 scandal, 13 scholarship, 125 school, 4, 12, 29, 68, 87, 112, 121 scores, 5 search, ix, 46, 51, 53, 58, 61, 89, 112, 116, 127 search engine, 51, 53, 58, 61 searches, 99 searching, 53 Seattle, 77 secret, 85, 105, 121 Secretary of Commerce, 79, 83, 149 Secretary of Defense, 55 Secretary of State, 29, 99, 128 secrets, 12, 22, 31, 33, 34, 35, 50, 52, 121, 132, 133 security, vii, 1, 2, 5, 10, 12, 18, 21, 43, 50, 52, 54, 65, 67, 87, 117, 129, 131, 132 seeds, vii, 2 seizure, 8, 116 seizures, 20 Self, 15, 39, 51, 138 Senate, 31, 79, 110, 127 sentences, 18, 21, 22, 52, 128, 129 sentencing, 9, 132 September 11, 39, 41, 61, 128 series, 118, 125, 138 service provider, 49, 53 services, iv, ix, 19, 46, 47, 50, 53, 57, 66, 137, 148 shade, 112 Shanghai, 22, 23, 86, 103, 121 shape, 1, 96, 139 sharing, 133, 137 short-term, 29 sign, 109 signs, 104, 123 similarity, 106 Singapore, 75, 83

163

sites, 5, 11, 26, 27, 48, 49, 51, 56, 67, 71, 75, 95, 96, 97, 133, 137, 138, 140, 145 skills, 115, 143 smuggling, 105 social change, vii, 1, 19, 22 social control, 68 social development, 15, 16, 30, 143 social group, 23, 24, 73 social life, 146 social network, 95, 137 social order, 9, 50, 65 social participation, 6 social responsibility, 112 social systems, 115 socialist, 50, 123 socioeconomic, 94 software, viii, 31, 46, 49, 53, 54, 55, 56, 57, 72 solutions, 111, 122 sounds, 110 South Korea, 124 Soviet Union, 90 spam, 26 speech, 5, 48, 55, 57, 65, 67, 73, 107, 138, 144, 145 speed, 23, 93, 117, 135 spheres, 103, 146 spine, 99 spiritual, ix, 12, 17, 18, 51, 63, 64, 65 sponsor, 6, 71 sporadic, 5 stability, 7, 9, 24, 25, 30, 47, 73, 80, 98, 107, 108, 109, 135, 141 stages, 47, 120 stakeholders, 150 standards, ix, 27, 32, 46, 104, 107, 118, 119, 144, 148 state control, vii, 2, 12, 139 State Council, 50, 127 State Department, ix, 3, 4, 28, 29, 37, 43, 55, 63, 64, 68, 69, 75, 77, 85, 127, 129, 133, 134 state-owned, 22 statistics, 16, 52, 105, 134 sterilization, 113

Human Rights in China, Nova Science Publishers, Incorporated, 2009. ProQuest Ebook Central,

Copyright © 2009. Nova Science Publishers, Incorporated. All rights reserved.

164

Index

stock, 95, 137 strains, 108 strategic, 128 strategies, 49, 55 strength, 20 stress, 111 strictures, 99 strikes, 8, 149 students, 23, 26, 66, 137 suburban, 23 suffering, 4, 73, 132 suicide, 24 summaries, 56 summer, 18, 128 Sun, 41 superiority, 108 supernatural, 65 superstitious, 48 supervision, 9, 96, 138 supply, 105 suppression, 68, 87, 91 Supreme Court, 85, 86, 88, 105, 117 surveillance, viii, 11, 12, 34, 45, 49, 57, 69, 96, 137, 138, 139 survival, 96, 139 suspects, 5, 7, 110, 116, 119, 120 sustainability, 82, 142 symbiotic, 100 symbolic, 96, 139 sympathy, 20, 143 symptoms, 93, 135, 146 systems, 21, 26, 31, 50, 54, 81, 115, 119, 131, 137, 141, 142

T tactics, vii, 2, 13, 99 Taiwan, 5, 23, 46, 47, 51, 71, 81, 97, 124, 127, 142 talent, 107 tanks, 6 TAR, 16 targets, 48, 120 taxation, 22 teachers, 98

teaching, 67, 75, 82, 112, 142 technical assistance, 107 technology, viii, 27, 31, 45, 48, 49, 52, 54, 56, 57, 61, 94, 96, 97, 98, 109, 111, 136, 137, 138, 140 technology transfer, 109 telecommunications, 53, 54 telephone, 70, 71, 73 television, 13, 20, 69, 72 television stations, 13 terrorist, 17, 18, 35, 128 terrorist attack, 128 terrorist groups, 18 terrorist organization, 18 testimony, 56, 70, 83, 89, 93, 97, 98, 99, 100, 101, 107, 110, 114, 120, 126, 128, 133, 135 textbooks, 48 theft, 9 thinking, 103 threat, 47, 51, 73, 120 threatened, 121 threatening, 90 threats, 20, 68 Tiananmen Square, 54, 73, 74 Tibet, 4, 5, 10, 16, 29, 30, 39, 40, 43 time, 5, 15, 21, 37, 42, 49, 66, 68, 70, 72, 83, 84, 88, 91, 92, 94, 100, 103, 104, 107, 110, 114, 115, 118, 119, 120, 121, 122, 126, 130, 135, 142 timing, 100 torture, vii, ix, 2, 5, 7, 12, 16, 18, 64, 68, 104, 125 tracking, 57 trade, vii, viii, 1, 8, 28, 32, 43, 46, 106, 126, 143, 144, 145, 150 trading, 150 traffic, 34 training, 18, 29, 30, 88, 124, 146, 148, 149 trans, 21 transactions, 25 transcripts, 71, 137 transfer, 8, 109, 120 transformation, 27 transition, 93, 106, 135 translation, 59

Human Rights in China, Nova Science Publishers, Incorporated, 2009. ProQuest Ebook Central,

165

Index transparency, 4, 7, 89, 103, 105, 107, 108, 112, 130, 131, 132, 143, 149 transparent, 50, 96, 112, 125, 138 transplant, 8, 70 travel, 12, 13, 18, 25, 30, 98 trend, 3, 20, 107, 145 trial, 5, 12, 76, 85, 86, 104, 116, 118, 119, 120, 129 tribunals, 123 trust, 137 turbulence, 101

Copyright © 2009. Nova Science Publishers, Incorporated. All rights reserved.

U U.S.-China trade, 28 ubiquitous, 120 UK, 41, 77 Ukraine, 3 unemployment, 23 UNESCO, 134 unification, 50 unions, 8 United Nations, 5, 7, 18, 28, 42, 89, 125, 131, 134 United States, viii, ix, x, 2, 15, 16, 18, 21, 25, 27, 28, 29, 30, 32, 33, 39, 40, 43, 47, 52, 54, 56, 63, 64, 65, 66, 69, 71, 72, 73, 74, 77, 80, 81, 85, 88, 89, 92, 95, 100, 109, 110, 114, 126, 127, 128, 129, 130, 131, 133, 134, 137, 140, 142, 143, 145, 147, 150 universities, 29, 68, 111, 124 university students, 26 urban areas, 104 urban renewal, 22 USAID, 29

V values, 65, 103, 108, 136 venture capital, 95, 137 victims, 5, 70 village, 11, 32, 34 violence, 17, 46, 48, 50, 109 violent, 17, 64, 66

virus, 14, 54 viruses, 51, 53 visa, 67, 127 visas, 16, 73, 78 visible, ix, 63, 65 voice, 137 vulnerable people, 73

W wages, 8, 144 Wall Street Journal, 40, 42, 72, 75, 76, 78 war, 13 Washington Post, 26, 36, 37, 38, 39, 40, 41, 42, 48, 59, 61, 75, 76, 78, 85, 87, 121 water, 85 weakness, 25, 109 wealth, 93, 135 web, 133 Web 2.0, 42 web sites, 133 websites, 11, 28, 31, 48, 50, 51, 55, 56, 72 well-being, 65 Western-style, 122 White House, 27, 127 Wired News, 60 wireless, 48 witnesses, 80, 81, 82, 83, 91, 92, 97, 103, 110, 116, 140, 141, 142, 143, 144, 145, 147, 149 women, 92, 146, 148 worker rights, 148 workers, 8, 18, 22, 32, 66, 87, 103, 122, 137, 147, 148, 150 workforce, 148 working groups, 134 workplace, 103, 144, 148, 149 World Trade Organization, 115, 150 World Wide Web, 57 worms, 53 writing, 35, 48, 72 WTO, 81, 142

Human Rights in China, Nova Science Publishers, Incorporated, 2009. ProQuest Ebook Central,

166

Index

X yield, 83, 119 yuan, 51, 52

Copyright © 2009. Nova Science Publishers, Incorporated. All rights reserved.

Xinhua News Agency, 52, 58, 59

Y

Human Rights in China, Nova Science Publishers, Incorporated, 2009. ProQuest Ebook Central,