How to Achieve Defence Cooperation in Europe?: The Subregional Approach 9781529209440

Table of contents :
Front Cover
How to Achieve Defence Cooperation in Europe?: The Subregional Approach
Copyright information
Table of contents
List of figures
List of abbreviations
Preface
1 Introduction
Scholarship on defence cooperation in Europe
The argument
Key concepts
Multinational defence cooperation (MDC) in Europe
Defence Policy Communities (DPC)
Theoretical framework
Factors that are needed to establish MDCs in Europe successfully
1. The existence of the European security community
2. The perception that individual European armed forces do not have appropriate funds for defence
3. Previous defence collaborations between the participating states
1. Strong leadership by a group of enthusiastic high-level officials and good interpersonal chemistry between them
2. A supportive political milieu for the defence cooperation
Interactions among factors
Outline of the book
2 Multinational Defence Cooperation in Europe
Multinational defence cooperation in Europe and the subregional dimension
The evolution of defence cooperation in Europe between 1990 and 2010
Conclusion
3 Conceptualizing Defence Cooperation
The case studies: Lancaster House Treaties, NORDEFCO, CEDC
Developing the theoretical framework
Rival Explanation 1: lack of progress on pan-European/transatlantic defence cooperation
Rival Explanation 2: effects of the financial crisis
Rival Explanation 3: convergent threat perceptions
Why were the subregional MDCs created? The empirically based patterns
Factors necessary for the establishment of subregional MDCs: a generic framework
Structural factors
The existence of the European security community
The perception that individual European armed forces do not have appropriate funds for defence
Previous long-standing defence collaborations between the participating countries
Situational factors
Strong leadership by a group of enthusiastic high-level officials and good interpersonal chemistry between them
Supportive political milieu for subregional multinational defence cooperation
Conclusion
4 The European Security Community
Dissatisfaction with the shared meanings created and uploaded: the Lancaster House Treaties
Different institutional memberships as the impetus for cooperation: NORDEFCO
Social learning by superficial downloading: CEDC
Conclusion
5 Defence Budgets
Doing it nationally: the Lancaster House Treaties
The problem of critical mass of capabilities: NORDEFCO
Drastic defence budget cuts result in drastic capability cuts: CEDC
Conclusion
6 Previous Defence Collaborations
Recurring adaptive expectations: the Lancaster House Treaties
Cooperation on peacekeeping during the Cold War: NORDEFCO
Learning effects facilitate investing set-up costs: CEDC
Conclusion
7 Strong Leadership and Chemistry
Positive North Atlantic attitudes: the Lancaster House Treaties
Military leaders with an academic affinity: NORDEFCO
Military officers in policy jobs: CEDC
Conclusion
8 Supportive Political Milieu
The role of domestic politics: the Lancaster House Treaties
Wider subregional support: NORDEFCO
Borrowing policy frames from other defence collaborations: CEDC
Conclusion
9 How to Achieve Defence Cooperation in Europe
Dynamics between the structural and situational factors: the theoretical model
The Lancaster House Treaties
The Nordic Defence Cooperation
The Central European Defence Cooperation
10 Conclusion
Notes
References
Index
Back Cover

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HOW TO ACHIEVE DEFENCE COOPERATION IN EUROPE?

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HOW TO ACHIEVE DEFENCE COOPERATION IN EUROPE? The Subregional Approach Bence Nemeth

First published in Great Britain in 2022 by Bristol University Press University of Bristol 1–​9 Old Park Hill Bristol BS2 8BB UK t: +​44 (0)117 954 5940 e: bup-​[email protected] Details of international sales and distribution partners are available at bristoluniversitypress.co.uk © Bristol University Press 2022 British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library ISBN 978-​1-​5292-​0943-​3 hardcover ISBN 978-​1-​5292-​0945-​7 ePub ISBN 978-​1-​5292-​0944-​0 ePdf The right of Bence Nemeth to be identified as author of this work has been asserted by ​them in accordance with the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988. All rights reserved: no part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording, or otherwise without the prior permission of Bristol University Press. Every reasonable effort has been made to obtain permission to reproduce copyrighted material. If, however, anyone knows of an oversight, please contact the publisher. The statements and opinions contained within this publication are solely those of author and not of the University of Bristol or Bristol University Press. The University of Bristol and Bristol University Press disclaim responsibility for any injury to persons or property resulting from any material published in this publication. Bristol University Press works to counter discrimination on grounds of gender, race, disability, age and sexuality. Cover design: blu inc Front cover image: imageBROKER / Alamy Stock Photo Bristol University Press uses environmentally responsible print partners. Printed in Great Britain by CPI Group (UK) Ltd, Croydon, CR0 4YY

Contents List of Figures List of Abbreviations Preface

iv v vii

1 Introduction 2 Multinational Defence Cooperation in Europe 3 Conceptualizing Defence Cooperation 4 The European Security Community 5 Defence Budgets 6 Previous Defence Collaborations 7 Strong Leadership and Chemistry 8 Supportive Political Milieu 9 How to Achieve Defence Cooperation in Europe 10 Conclusion

1 24 35 61 80 96 116 133 150 163

Notes References Index

168 170 192

iii

List of Figures 1.1 1.2 3.1 3.2 3.3 3.4 3.5 3.6 3.7 3.8 3.9 3.10 9.1 9.2

Uploading and downloading policies between the different 20 levels of MDCs in Europe Interaction between the factors in defence cooperation in Europe 21 Generic pattern of Rival Explanation 1 46 Actual case patterns of Rival Explanation 1 47 Generic pattern of Rival Explanation 2 49 Actual case patterns of Rival Explanation 2 49 Generic pattern of Rival Explanation 3 50 Actual case patterns of Rival Explanation 3 51 Shared threats of the subregional MDCs’ participating nations 52 Empirically based pattern of CEDC 52 Empirically based pattern of Lancaster House Treaties 53 Empirically based pattern of NORDEFCO 54 Uploading and downloading policies between the different 152 levels of MDCs in Europe Interaction of the factors in defence cooperation in Europe 153

iv

List of Abbreviations AAF ASEAN BENELUX C2 CBRN CEDC CENCOOP

Austrian Armed Forces Association of Southeast Asian Nations Belgium, Netherlands, Luxembourg Command and Control Chemical, Biological, Radiological and Nuclear Central European Defence Cooperation Central European Nations’ Cooperation in Peace Support ChoD Chief of Defence CJTF Combined Joint Task Force COG Cooperation Groups CPG Comprehensive Political Guidance CSDP Common Security and Defence Policy CSTO Collective Security Treaty Organization DCI Defence Capabilities Initiative DPC Defence Policy Community DPD Defence Policy Director EDA European Defence Agency EI2 European Intervention Initiative ESDP European Security and Defence Policy EU European Union GDP Gross Domestic Product G7 Group of Seven (Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, UK, US) HM Government Her Majesty’s Government ISAF International Security Assistance Force JEF Joint Expeditionary Force KFOR Kosovo Force LoI Letter of Intent MDC Multinational Defence Cooperation MLF Multinational Land Forces MoU Memorandum of Understanding MoD Ministry of Defence v

HOW TO ACHIEVE DEFENCE COOPERATION IN EUROPE?

NATO NBG NORDAC NORDCAPS

North Atlantic Treaty Organization Nordic Battlegroup Nordic Armaments Cooperation Nordic Coordinated Arrangement for Military Peace Support NORDEFCO Nordic Defence Cooperation NORDSAMFN Nordic Cooperation Group for Military UN Matters NORDSUP Nordic Supportive Defence Structures NRF NATO Response Force OSCE Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe P&S Pooling and Sharing PARP Planning and Review Process PCC Prague Capabilities Commitment PESCO Permanent Structured Cooperation PfP Partnership for Peace PSO Peace Support Operations R&T Research and Technology SAC Strategic Airlift Capability SAF Slovak Armed Forces SDSR Strategic Defence and Security Review SHIRBRIG Multinational Stand-​by High Readiness Brigade for UN Operations SNHP Standard Nordic Helicopter Programme SOF Special Operations Forces UAV Unmanned Aerial Vehicle UN United Nations V4 Visegrad Four /​Visegrad Group WEU Western European Union WMD Weapons of Mass Destruction

vi

Preface The core idea of this book emerged about a decade ago when I was working at the Hungarian Ministry of Defence (MoD). I worked extensively with the European Union (EU) and North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and was also involved in policy development regarding smaller multinational defence collaborations. At that time my impression was that the academic scholarship did not reflect my experiences and the everyday practices of European MoDs. While the academic debate primarily focused on the EU’s Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP), the relevance of NATO was much bigger in defence, but most importantly, bi-​and minilateral collaborations seemed to be even more relevant. I call them subregional collaborations in this book, while in this framework NATO and the EU are the regional, European-​level multinational cooperative frameworks. European militaries have established a plethora of subregional multinational defence collaborations, and although NATO-​and EU-​level processes have an impact on them, these smaller collaborations also influence European-​ level dynamics. My observation was that these smaller defence collaborations below the NATO and EU level provided the substance, the backbone, of military cooperation in Europe. Often the participating members of these subregional defence collaborations channelled their already existing practical cooperation into NATO and EU frameworks or rebranded them according to the newest vocabulary of these two organizations. The participating states of these subregional collaborations also coordinated their policies and intended to shape the debate in NATO and the EU. However, the dynamics behind starting a new defence cooperation in Europe was more complex than that, and I wanted to understand them in detail. Thus I started a PhD programme at King’s College London, and this book is a heavily revised and upgraded version of my PhD thesis. As the reader will see throughout the book, my experience as a former defence official influenced my approach. Thus it will perhaps not be surprising that I propose that Defence Policy Communities (DPCs) should be the unit of analysis of multinational defence cooperation instead of governments or international organizations. The rationale behind this is that members of DPCs have the will and the opportunity to shape these vii

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collaborations. Of course, the DPC of every country is slightly different, but there are commonalities, and the staff of the MoDs and defence staffs, politicians and other government officials are usually the most influential members of them. I found that recognizing the motivations and dynamics inside a DPC and between DPCs are crucial for understanding cooperative defence processes, and this book intends to highlight this. It took a long time to arrive at this point where this book could be published and I am deeply grateful to many people who supported me and impacted on my way of thinking during this journey. First and foremost, I owe gratitude to Dr Xymena Kurowska at the Central European University. Her courses and insights have immensely shaped how I think about international affairs and she was very generous with her time and support when I prepared my research proposal about this topic. Professor Andrew Dorman at King’s College London as my PhD supervisor was extremely understanding and helpful at every stage of my doctoral research and gave me all the support I needed, especially during the difficult moments. Dr Tamás Csiki Varga at the Center for Strategic and Defence Studies (Budapest) has provided fantastic insights and served an excellent sounding board to test my ideas for the last decade. Dr Thomas-​Durell Young of the Naval Postgraduate School (Monterey, CA) gave excellent advice and helped me a lot, especially regarding the Central European case. My conversations with Professor Nicholas Dew, also from the Naval Postgraduate School, for the last years have had a remarkably influence on how I approach research and see the organizational aspects of defence cooperation. I have been blessed with wonderful colleagues both at the Hungarian Ministry of Defence and at the Defence Studies Department of King’s College London. Dr Gergely Németh and Col József Bali helped me to understand the dynamics of a defence ministry and of international cooperation as they shared their unique perspectives and experiences with me. My practical and theoretical discussions with them have influenced me greatly. I am also thankful for my former colleagues Viktória Nyulász, Kristóf Popgeorgijev and Dóra Nagy, from whom I have learned a huge amount. I am highly indebted to my colleagues at the Defence Studies Department of King’s College London, and I feel that I am extremely lucky that I just need to knock on the door of a neighbouring office to discuss ideas and receive extremely friendly feedback from world-​leading scholars. I was also very fortunate that my department is multidisciplinary, and my interactions with colleagues from different fields have influenced this book as I use concepts of international security studies, economics, social psychology, public policy studies and political science. Professor Matthew Uttley’s office door has always been open, and our conversations have helped me immensely in many ways to finish this book. Professor Tracey German has supported me with practical advice and urged me to test my concepts at different academic viii

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Preface

conferences. Dr David Roberts has been extremely generous with his time, discussing various aspects of my book, commenting on sections and helping me overcome difficulties during the writing process. I am highly grateful to him. Dr Stefan Schilling’s comments about certain sections were very beneficial, and his contribution to finalizing the book’s theoretical framework was invaluable. I am very thankful to many other colleagues for their advice. Furthermore, as my department at King’s teaches British and international military officers at the Joint Services Command and Staff College, I had the opportunity to test the concepts of my book with military officers during my seminars. My students probably did not even recognize this, but their comments and insights really helped me sharpen my argument and make the discussion of the book more accessible. I want to thank the fantastic team of Bristol University Press who made the publication of this book possible. I am incredibly grateful for Stephen Wenham, who had to endure quite a few headaches because of me, and I am immensely thankful for his understanding and support. I also want to thank Yumeng Zhu (朱竽梦), who helped me visualize my theoretical framework, which provided me with immeasurable inspiration and helped to reach the final version of the theoretical approach of the book. Finally, I want to thank my parents, Erika Lénárt and Csaba Németh, who were not involved directly in writing this book but who enabled it in many ways.

ix

1

Introduction Subregional defence collaborations provide the backbone of military cooperation in Europe and have become an integral part of the life of Europe’s armed forces. Subregional defence collaborations are the smaller bilateral and minilateral military projects that can function independently or as part of larger regional frameworks in Europe like the European Union (EU) and NATO. The relevance of subregional defence collaborations might be surprising at the first sight, as European regional level (NATO and EU) defence collaborations get much more media and academic attention than defence cooperation on the subregional level. For instance, when the French President, Emmanuel Macron called for a ‘true, European army’ at the centenary of the World War I Armistice in November 2018, or more recently when he emphasized that the EU needs to develop ‘strategic autonomy’, the news covered these topics extensively. However, when subregional level (bilateral, minilateral) defence collaborations are established, they receive less attention despite the fact that, currently, a web of hundreds of subregional military collaborations exist in Europe, many of them having been evolving for years or even decades. If we look at some of the military initiatives of the last several years, we can see that many of them are smaller collaborations that are not necessarily part of European regional, NATO/​EU level cooperation. For instance, with the leadership of France, nine European countries –​including the UK and Germany –​created the European Intervention Initiative (EI2) in June 2018. In 2017 Sweden and Finland joined the British-​led Joint Expeditionary Force (JEF) that now includes nine European countries. Furthermore, the armed forces of six Central European states started to cooperate against mass irregular migration in 2016. Bilaterally, while thousands of British and French troops exercise together regularly, in 2019 Germany and France signed agreements to collaborate on the development of several future defence systems. The UK Carrier Strike Group 2021, led by the HMS Queen Elizabeth aircraft carrier sailed to the Indo-​Pacific region with the support of Dutch and US ships in 2021. In the same year, Greece and France agreed on a major package of 1

HOW TO ACHIEVE DEFENCE COOPERATION IN EUROPE?

bilateral military cooperation. Even many of NATO’s and the EU’s military projects are based on smaller subregional (bilateral, minilateral) groupings. For instance, in the framework of NATO’s Enhanced Forward Presence Initiative, European militaries, together with US and Canadian troops, have deployed four multinational battalion-​size battlegroups to the three Baltic states and Poland to strengthen the eastern flank of the Alliance. These battlegroups are established by between three and ten contributing nations. In 2017 the EU created the so-​called Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO) ‘to deepen defence cooperation amongst EU Member States who are capable and willing to do so’ (European Commission, 2017), and most of its projects include between two and six countries. These examples demonstrate the breadth and depth of subregional defence cooperation in Europe, but they are just the tip of the iceberg. The UK Ministry of Defence defines a Multinational Defence Cooperation (MDC) as ‘any arrangement where two or more nations work together to enhance military capability. This can include exchanges and liaisons, training and exercising, common doctrine, collaborative equipment procurement, or multinational formations’ (UK Ministry of Defence, 2001: 2). MDCs in Europe are at the subregional (bilateral, minilateral) and European (EU and NATO) levels. They are interlinked and overlap with each other and react dynamically to the changes of the national domestic and international political environments. The density and interconnectedness of subregional and regional military cooperation in Europe are unprecedented both historically and geographically, and they are even more striking if we take into consideration that this phenomenon has arisen mainly in peacetime during the 30 years that have passed since the end of the Cold War. The traditional view is that countries begin defence collaborations when they create military alliances, either aligning against the most powerful or the most threatening power or, by contrast, allying with the most threatening state (Walt, 1987). European countries often formed military alliances over the last millennium, and in the last century they fought two world wars against each other and prepared for a third one during the Cold War while the allied countries cooperated on defence issues. However, since the collapse of the Soviet Union there has not been a single state that would have seriously threatened EU and NATO member states militarily, and both subregional and regional MDCs have flourished over the last three decades in Europe. Arguably the security landscape has been changed by the Russian occupation of Crimea and the war in Ukraine, and these certainly affect MDCs. At the same time, many European states that are not threatened by Russia have also used already existing subregional and regional MDCs excessively or have created new ones since the start of the conflict in Ukraine. The proliferation of MDCs is remarkable not only because it has happened during a period when, most of the time, European countries did not have to prepare for a 2

Introduction

major war but also because the level of military cooperation in Europe has reached an unprecedented level. While for instance during the Cold War NATO countries coordinated their forces with individual nation corps committed to a NATO army group headquarters, nowadays even battalion-​ sized European multinational formations often contain elements from several countries. Of course, defence cooperation in Europe does not end with creating multinational units, as European states co-​develop and co-​procure military weapon systems, collaborate around common equipment, pool and share military capabilities, develop and apply common standards and doctrines and establish multinational military infrastructure. There is no region other than Europe where so many countries would collaborate in smaller and larger groups that are closely interlinked with each other on such wide-​ranging areas and at such a deep level regarding defence. Of course, multinational military exercises are organized among different countries in different parts of the globe, and certain countries establish relevant military cooperation too. Among others, in Asia the eight members of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization –​which includes China, Russia, India and Pakistan –​ occasionally organize military exercises, and six former Soviet states collaborate on defence-​ related issues in the framework of the intergovernmental military alliance known as the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO), while for example bilaterally China and Russia have been increasing their military cooperation too. However, compared to the extensive and deep military cooperation of European states these defence initiatives are still premature. The situation closest to Europe is in the Indo-​Asia-​Pacific region, where Australia, India, Japan, South Korea and the US have established several defence collaborations on different levels, but they are still far from the dense and interconnected set of subregional and regional MDCs in Europe, despite the fact that they have created significant bilateral and trilateral military collaborations (Burgess and Beilstein, 2018) and many South Asian countries cooperate on specific security issues in the framework of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) too. This book examines why the current situation regarding defence cooperation in Europe is so different from other historical periods and from other geographical regions. The book argues that the driving force behind defence cooperation in Europe comes from the subregional dimension, where bilateral and minilateral collaborations provide the backbone of defence cooperation in Europe. This book highlights the fact that subregional MDCs are often established and function without NATO and the EU and shape defence cooperation in Europe quite autonomously, and more often than not they interact with European regional-​level organizations (EU/​NATO) by uploading their preferences to or downloading policies from them. 3

HOW TO ACHIEVE DEFENCE COOPERATION IN EUROPE?

More specifically, the book studies the dynamics of defence cooperation in Europe focusing on why European countries are creating new subregional multinational military collaborations. For this purpose, the book studies three subregional MDCs. These are the Nordic Defence Cooperation (NORDEFCO) established by Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway and Sweden in 2009, the British–​French Lancaster House Treaties of 2010 and the Central European Defence Cooperation (CEDC) created by Austria, Croatia, the Czech Republic, Hungary, Slovakia and Slovenia in 2011. Using these examples, the book offers a theoretical framework that explains the circumstances necessary for the successful establishment of new subregional MDCs in Europe. It argues that the theoretical framework of this subregional approach has three ‘structural’ and two ‘situational’ factors. These are the most important elements when subregional MDCs are created in Europe and they interact in a particular way. The structural factors are: 1) the existence of the European security community; 2) the perception that individual European armed forces do not have appropriate funds for defence; and 3) previous defence collaborations between the participating states. The situational factors are: 1) strong leadership by a group of enthusiastic high-​level officials and good interpersonal chemistry between them; and 2) a supportive political milieu for the defence cooperation.

Scholarship on defence cooperation in Europe Defence cooperation in Europe since the end of the Cold War has been researched extensively, and most of the scholarship has either concentrated on certain areas of cooperation, such as procurement, training, political issues, tactical-​level cooperation, or has analysed individual cases at different levels of cooperation (EU/​NATO, minilateral, bilateral). However, the conceptualization of subregional level defence cooperation has been largely ignored even though most of the time subregional MDCs have been the basis of the EU and NATO multinational projects too. Although tens of thousands of European troops participate in military cooperation every year and billions of Euros are spent on the common development of military platforms in subregional multinational projects, little attempt has been made to understand systematically why and how subregional MDCs are created, when they are launched successfully and how this affects NATO and EU processes. This is remarkable, because both practitioners and scholars have been aware of the significance of the multinationalization of militaries in Europe for decades. At the end of the 1990s Charles Moskos, John Williams and David Segal pointed out that one of the defining characteristics of ‘post-​ modern armed forces’ after the Cold War is that they have become more and more international by the establishment of subregional multinational forces 4

Introduction

(Moskos et al, 2000: 2). According to Anthony King, this process primarily began with the decrease in financial resources allocated to defence in Europe, which made the concentration and transnationalization of Europe’s armed forces necessary (King, 2005: 328). However, financial pressure on defence budgets could not have triggered this process alone, and Fréderic Mérand argues that the internationalization of armed forces in Europe was made possible by spreading the ‘model of the culturally interoperable professional soldier’, which took root through the socialization of thousands of officers in the multinational organizations of NATO during the Cold War (Mérand, 2008: 68). Even though multinational defence cooperation has been going on for decades and scholars deem it one of the most relevant aspects of modern European armed forces, only a few works exist that attempt to conceptualize this topic, understand the dynamics behind it and generalize the circumstances that make these collaborations possible on either the regional or the subregional level. Instead, the majority of the literature has focused on three issues: multinational forces, multinational capability development and collaborative equipment procurement. In these works the reasons for the creation of MDCs have rarely been problematized and the relevance of subregional dynamics have rarely been highlighted. It was rather taken as given that military cooperation happened, because of decreasing defence budgets after the Cold War. Another strand of the scholarly works has focused on explaining the establishment of the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) in 1998–​99 and the processes that have happened after that in this regard, but has not sought to deal with the fact that MDCs have been established in NATO and in subregional formats as well. The third group of explanations perceive MDCs in a more complex way and highlight the relevance of subregional military cooperation, but these policy-​focused papers contain only a list of factors that might be necessary to establish a successful multinational military cooperation. Unfortunately, they are rarely underpinned by appropriate research and do not attempt to provide a theoretical basis that would help to understand the dynamics behind European MDCs. This section discusses these three strands of responses to the question of how and why MDCs are created in Europe. As has been mentioned, most of the scholarly literature regarding MDCs is devoted to multinational forces, multinational capability development and collaborative equipment procurement. Scholars who studied ‘multinational forces’ have carried out research mostly on the so-​called NATO multinational corps and the concept of the Combined Joint Task Force (CJTF) in the 1990s (Barry, 1996; Whitford and Young, 1997; Young, 1997; Cooke, 1998; Bensahel, 1999; Lansford, 1999; Bailes, 1999a; Deni, 2004), and their interest moved in the 2000s to the EU battlegroups and the NATO Response Force (NRF) (Garnett, 2003; Bialos and Koehl, 2005; Rynning, 2005; Lindstrom, 5

HOW TO ACHIEVE DEFENCE COOPERATION IN EUROPE?

2007; Jacoby and Jones, 2008; Ringsmose, 2009; Chappel, 2009; Ringsmose and Rynning, 2017; Reykers, 2017).1 A common thread in the literature is that the military usefulness of multinational forces is at least questionable, either because they are much less effective than national units or because they have not been deployed as a result of the differing political interests of the participating states. Accordingly, their creation is mostly explained by financial and political reasons rather than by their military necessity (Young, 1997; Balossi-​Restelli, 2011; Reykers, 2016). For instance, Martin A. Smith highlighted that at the beginning of the 1990s NATO member states were primarily interested in saving money by restructuring their forces. As a result NATO planners feared that unilateral cuts and withdrawal of NATO commitments could result in the collapse of NATO’s force structure. However, emphasizing the necessity of multinational forces and the need for greater military integration helped to save NATO’s force structures from disintegration by making it politically acceptable for member states (Smith, 2000: 66–​8). However, these scholarly pieces concentrated mostly on the NATO and EU level and did not recognize that these initiatives were always dependent on subregional military collaborations that established the multinational forces requested at the EU and NATO levels. The literature on ‘multinational capability development‘ has focused on two main issues. One group of scholars has concentrated almost exclusively on policy analysis regarding different EU and NATO capability development initiatives (Wouters, 2008; Witney, 2008; Biscop, 2008, 2008; Biscop and Coelmont, 2010a; Biscop and Coelmont, 2010b). The other group has developed the conceptual background of ‘multinational capability development’ and, based on these concepts, they examined certain areas of defence cooperation. The conceptual bases for this were laid down by Michael Alexander and Timothy Garden in 2001 (Alexander and Garden, 2001), when they argued that not only the decreasing European defence budgets but also their shrinking purchasing power had resulted in the sharp decline of military capabilities in Europe. The reason for this is that defence inflation is significantly higher than ‘normal’ inflation, because personnel costs and equipment costs rise faster than general inflation (Alexander and Garden, 2001: 515–​17). The authors identified only two options to counter this trend: increasing the defence budget significantly or establishing ‘real cooperation’ at European level. They concluded that the first option was very unlikely, so they argued that despite the many difficulties of the second one it still remained a much more viable possibility. However, they also highlighted that ‘real cooperation’ would not solve the problem, although ‘it could put off the crisis for a generation or more’. Alexander and Garden identified two types of cooperation: pooling and integration. Based on their work, scholars developed coherent concepts and sets of definitions to understand ‘multinational capability development’, which became known 6

Introduction

as pooling and sharing of military capabilities. The relevance of subregional aspects of multinational capability development were occasionally recognized by scholars, but the vast majority of this literature focused on regional-​ level (EU and NATO) dynamics (Heise, 2005; Maulny and Liberti, 2008; Giegerich, 2010; Csiki and Németh, 2012). ‘Collaborative equipment procurement’ is different from ‘multinational forces’ and ‘multinational capability development’ in the sense that these projects had already proliferated in Europe during the Cold War and they were always initiated at the subregional level. Since the early 1990s most scholarly works have been dominated by different aspects of the emerging European armament cooperation and transatlantic defence industrial relations (Scherpenberg, 1997; Crollen, 2003; James, 2003; Kapstein, 2004; Guay, 2005; James, 2005; Barrinha, 2010; Thiem, 2011; Hoeffler, 2012; Fiott, 2017). Andrew Moravcsik, among others, studied the characteristics of the internationalization of European defence industry in the late 1980s and early 1990s (Moravcsik, 1990). He notes that as modern weapon systems became more and more sophisticated and their unit cost increased exponentially, the European defence industry found itself in a crisis that pushed it into a greater level of international collaboration. According to him, co-​development based on the juste retour principle should be used only for the most expensive weapon systems (aircrafts, helicopters, large missiles and so on), and the free-​market principle should be applied to cheaper items (small arms, small transport planes, minor aerospace items and so on).2 For intermediate-​cost items (such as battle tanks, electronics, radar and avionics systems and so on) multinational consortia should compete with each other, with every consortium comprising companies from the countries participating in the programme, so in these cases the juste retour and free-​market principles would be combined (Moravcsik, 1990: 76–​7). Moravcsik’s article is still relevant not only because it was written just after the fall of the Berlin Wall and thus provides an insight into topics that concerned scholars at that time, but also because it touches on almost every relevant issue concerning collaborative equipment procurement that was to characterize the literature for the next three decades (the free market and juste retour, transatlantic relations, European procurement agency and so on). The long-​standing structural issues and financial problems regarding collaborative equipment procurement are described well in an article by Bastian Giegerich and Alexander Nicoll from 2012 when they surveyed European capabilities and cooperation including armament collaborations (Giegerich and Nicoll, 2012). They pointed out that only the 20 per cent of the biggest European weapon acquisition projects were collaborative equipment procurement, and an ‘unhealthy proportion’ of multinational programmes began in the Cold War, including the Eurofighter Typhoon and the A400M military transport aircraft. In addition, European governments have spent much less on the development of new high-​tech 7

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projects and have tended to buy equipment off the shelf (Giegerich and Nicoll, 2012: 68–​9). More recently, a more extensive analysis of defence industrial cooperation in Europe has been provided by Daniel Fiott, which has become a seminal work in the field (Fiott, 2019). Although it is not a separate category from the previous ones, it is important to note that most recently an increasing number of scholars have started to focus explicitly on the dynamics behind subregional MDCs, which rarely happened before the 2010s (Cottey, 2000). However, it has become more evident for scholars that these are the MDCs where often the most meaningful collaborations are going on. A study conducted by the European Parliament (Mölling and Brune, 2011a) using a sample of 70 MDCs concluded that 60 per cent of them had only five or fewer members, and they were mostly based on already existing cooperative –​often subregional –​structures outside the EU and NATO. Among them, the most frequent type of collaboration was bilateral. Moreover, the study highlighted the fact that the majority of the MDCs analysed were not integrated into the EU institutions, but some of the largest ones were established within NATO frameworks, suggesting that for large collaborations strong US leadership may have been needed (Mölling and Brune, 2011a: 43). Thus it is not surprising that there is a growing interest in subregional MDCs among scholars as well. Even though, among others, British-​and German-​led MDCs (Saxi, 2017) and the military cooperation of the Nordic (Forsberg, 2013; Saxi, 2019, Wilson and Kárason, 2020) and Central European (Nemeth, 2018; Nemeth, 2019) states have been studied for the last few years, bilateral collaborations among the major European powers (Pannier and Schmitt, 2014) and especially British–​French military cooperation have received the most scholarly attention (Pannier, 2013; Pannier, 2016; Sus and Martill, 2018; Pannier, 2020). This research has contributed to the better understanding of certain aspects of MDCs greatly, but it has not focused on why and how these subregional military collaborations have been established or on how they affect NATO and EU policies and vice versa. As we were able to see in the previous section, the most common explanation for the establishment of MDCs was financial, as the perception was that because of the falling defence budgets after the Cold War Europeans had to create MDCs to maintain critical military capabilities and industrial capacities. However, this is not a natural response by states to decreasing defence budgets. For instance, the military expenditure of European nations declined significantly after World War I too, and they did not create a web of interlinked MDCs then. Besides, although countries in other regions also cut their defence budgets sharply after the Cold War, they did not establish a dense network of military collaborations either. Therefore, while decreasing military expenditures may be a relevant factor to explain the emergence of

8

Introduction

MDCs in general and especially subregional MDCs in particular in Europe, it is not a sufficient explanation in itself. An answer to this question is provided by Seth G. Jones, who uses realist international relations theory to explain the rise of European security cooperation (Jones, 2006; Jones, 2007). According to him, during the Cold War Europeans created large multinational forces and a centralized command structure together with the US in NATO to answer the Soviet threat. However, since the fall of the Iron Curtain, European Union member states have created their own independent capacities within the framework of the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP), which was a response to the new challenges posed by the changed international and European regional system. Concerning the international system, Jones points out that with the collapse of the Soviet Union the bipolar system became unipolar. Thus, European states began to collaborate on an unprecedented scale regarding security to aggregate their power in order to reduce their reliance on the US and increase their ability to project power. Jones points out that the second reason for strengthening European security cooperation relates to regional dynamics. European states wanted to hinder Germany from becoming a regional hegemon again and wanted to guarantee peace in Europe. One of the problems with this explanation is that since the publication of Jones’s book (2007) we have not seen any real appetite on the part of the Europeans for the development of credible military capabilities, something that generated criticism from successive US administrations. Another problem is that Jones focuses almost exclusively on the EU-​and NATO-​level processes, and does not take into consideration the subregional dynamics, and thus his argument was able to offer only a partial explanation of this phenomenon. However, most of the other systemic explanations focus entirely on the EU context and the establishment of ESDP too. Among others, Frédéric Mérand argues that the reason why the ESDP was created is based on ‘two distinct processes of institutional integration’, which were ‘the internationalisation of European armed forces since the end of World War II’ and ‘the Europeanization of foreign policy since the beginnings of the EU’ (Mérand, 2008: 14). However, neither Mérand nor the works of  those who have focused entirely on ESDP can explain the complexity of the interconnected bilateral, minilateral and multilateral (EU and NATO) MDCs. As Hugo Meijer and Marco Wyss pointed out, despite ‘the overwhelming focus on the literature on the CSDP [the EU’s Common Security and Defence Policy], it has in reality only played a relatively limited role within the complex patchwork of national defence policies and of bilateral and mini-​/m ​ ultilateral arrangements that compose Europe’s security architecture’ (Meijer and Wyss, 2019: 380). Accordingly, ESDP-​/C ​ SDP-​focused explanations (Posen, 2006; Menon, 2010; Meyer, 2011; Hyde-​Price, 2012; Kurowska and Kratochwill, 2012; Weiss, 2014; Tardy, 2018; Sweeney and Winn, 2020) are not adequate 9

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to provide a better understanding of the creation of subregional MDCs in Europe. The third strand of systemic explanations emerged after the financial crisis of 2008, when the perception was widely shared that the negative effects of the decreasing defence budgets could be tackled if European states began to cooperate more closely in smaller groups, basically in subregional settings. Therefore, some of the explanations that emerged since then have focused explicitly on the conditions that make MDCs successful. Among others, Tomas Valasek argued for the creation ‘of multiple, discreet, regional “islands of cooperation”, whose members would partly integrate their militaries’ (Valasek, 2011: 29). According to him, significant subregional differences existed among European states regarding their defence needs, which had to be taken into consideration when establishing successful initiatives regarding the pooling and sharing of military capabilities. Using anecdotal evidence Valasek suggested that to create a successful MDC the participating states had to share most of the following characteristics: similarity of strategic cultures, trust and solidarity towards each other, a level playing field for defence companies, forces of similar size and quality, clarity of intentions regarding cooperation, seriousness of intent and low corruption (Valasek, 2011: 21–​7). Partly building on Valasek’s work, Dick Zandee, Margriet Drent and Rob Hendriks also studied the characteristics of successful MDCs (Zandee et al, 2016), and they presented a list of criteria very similar to Valasek’s findings.3 Although these studies take into consideration different subregional dynamics in Europe and their results are similar, they lack a coherent framework and are not based on rigorous and systematic research. As this section has highlighted, although hundreds of multinational military projects, frameworks and initiatives exist in Europe that are based on subregional cooperation –​perhaps even most NATO and EU projects –​ the conceptualization of how these multinational defence collaborations are created has been mostly neglected by scholars. Most of the research regarding MDCs in Europe has concentrated on multinational forces, multinational capability development and collaborative equipment procurement, but this strand of research has not sought to conceptualize the reasons behind the creation of MDCs. Instead, this scholarship assumes that MDCs are established because the decreasing defence budgets have forced European states to cooperate more to maintain military capabilities and defence industrial capacities together. However, historical lessons and dynamics in other regions show that this explanation cannot sufficiently explain the topic. The other main strand of research has focused on the creation and evolution of ESDP/​CSDP. Although these works can provide insight into how defence collaboration happens in the EU institutions, they are not appropriate to explain the processes at the subregional context and in NATO. The few existing works that have tried to conceptualize this topic 10

Introduction

are mostly policy-​focused research and provide only a list of criteria regarding successful MDCs in general and subregional ones in particular. Thus, the entire subject is lacking in a wider understanding of the dynamics behind European MDCs, supported by appropriate research and analysis.

The argument My aim is to provide a theoretical framework that explains why and how multinational defence collaborations in Europe are created, and by doing this the book intends to fill the conceptual gap highlighted in the previous section as well. This gap was also revealed by a three-​year-​long research project that brought together more than 60 scholars and resulted in a major publication (Wyss and Meijer, 2018). The editors of that book identified two main areas of future research regarding European defence, and one of them was the study of MDCs in Europe at the subregional (bilateral, minilateral) level. They pointed out that Europe’s security architecture today consists of a complex patchwork of interwoven bilateral partnerships, minilateral cooperation initiatives and multilateral institutions. The variety and overlapping of defence cooperation configurations in Europe arguably deserve greater theoretical and empirical attention in the scholarly research. Examining the evolution, the key drivers and the main challenges in the post-​ Cold War development of these multifaceted international cooperation pathways would help answer the question of the complementary or competing logics of these different types of defence and security arrangements. (Meijer and Wyss, 2019: 395) Accordingly, in contrast to the existing literature, subregional (bilateral and minilateral) MDCs play a much more significant role in European defence than the research into them suggests. The book intends to contribute to this research agenda and have three main points in this regard. First, MDCs in Europe often overlap and are interlinked, and they react to national policies, international events and each other dynamically. This book offers a theoretical framework to explain these processes through the subregional approach. The core argument of the book is that three ‘structural’ and two ‘situational’ factors are the most relevant ones concerning the creation of subregional multinational defence collaborations in Europe, and they interact with each other in a particular way. The structural factors are: 1) the existence of the European security community; 2) the perception that individual European armed forces do not have appropriate funds for defence; and 3) previous defence collaborations between the participating states. The situational factors are: 1) strong leadership by a group of enthusiastic 11

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high-​level officials and good interpersonal chemistry between them; and 2) a supportive political milieu for the defence cooperation. Second, the book proposes that instead of focusing on international organizations or states, the unit of analysis regarding the study of MDCs has to be the defence policy communities of the participating countries of an MDC. Defence policy communities consist of groups and people who have the expertise, will and opportunity to influence the defence policy of a particular state. Finally, the book argues that a multidisciplinary approach is needed to understand the creation of MDCs, as these are complex processes that cannot be explained by the insights of one discipline. Thus the book uses concepts drawn from economics, international security studies, social psychology, public policy studies and political science.

Key concepts Multinational defence cooperation (MDC) in Europe This book studies European subregional multinational defence cooperation (MDC). As has been mentioned before, the book uses the definition provided by the UK Ministry of Defence to inform its research, which says that an MDC can be ‘any arrangement where two or more nations work together to enhance military capabilities. This can include [among others] exchanges and liaison, training and exercising, common doctrine, collaborative equipment procurement, or multinational formations’ (UK Ministry of Defence, 2001: 2). In the context of this book ‘Europe’ is a region that refers to that area covered by NATO and EU members, and subregional cooperation is any MDC that is not established in a NATO or EU framework in this area. Accordingly, the book does not deal with subregional collaborations established between NATO/​EU members and countries outside these two organizations. This means that the book does not examine initiatives like the bilateral military cooperation between Greece and Israel or the so-​called 5 +​ 5 Defence Initiative that provides a forum for military cooperation between five EU and/​or NATO members (Spain, Portugal, France, Italy, Malta) and five North African countries (Algeria, Libya, Morocco, Mauritania, Tunisia) (Meijer and Wyss, 2019: 393). However, although the US is not a European country, because of its NATO role it often takes part in European MDCs and has a significant impact on shaping multinational defence cooperative dynamics in Europe. Thus, the role of the US in the establishment of MDCs will be taken into consideration. A ‘European-​level MDC’ refers to a collaboration within either a NATO or an EU framework. The umbrella of one of these multilateral organizations means that this MDC is accepted and supported by most of the countries in Europe. Such MDCs include, for instance, the NATO Response Force, which is a multinational force that comprises 40,000 troops and to which 12

Introduction

most NATO members contribute. Another example is the EU’s Permanent Structured Cooperation, which currently facilitates the collaboration of 25 EU member states on 17 defence capability projects. Subregional MDCs are military collaborations that are established outside the EU and NATO. They can involve either bilateral or minilateral cooperation. A bilateral MDC is when two countries cooperate on different defence-​related issues. This is the most common military collaboration format, probably because coordination between two countries is much easier than between several ones. A good example for this is the defence cooperation between Belgium and the Netherlands, in which the two states integrated many aspects of their navies and also established the so-​called Deployable Air Task Force to exercise and participate in air operations jointly. However, if we look at only the UK we can see that London has bilateral relationships on strategically crucial aspects of defence with France, it also has extensive cooperation on many military areas with Denmark and Norway, that the Royal Marines cooperate on amphibious capabilities with the Netherlands and that recently London signed an agreement with Germany about deepening their military relationships. This list of the UK’s bilateral MDCs is far from comprehensive, and most European countries also have widespread bilateral defence collaborations with other European states. Minilateral MDCs are those subregional defence collaborations that include more than two countries but are not NATO or EU initiatives. Among others, the Baltic states –​Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania –​established four major defence cooperative structures in the framework of the Baltic Defence Cooperation (the Baltic Battalion, Baltic Naval Squadron, Baltic Air Surveillance Network and Baltic Defence College). Based on the South-​ Eastern Europe Defence Ministers Process that began in 1996, Albania, Bulgaria, Greece, Italy, Macedonia, Romania and Turkey established the South Eastern Europe Brigade as early as 1999. Outside NATO and EU frameworks the UK also leads a multinational force, the so-​called Joint Expeditionary Force (JEF), which includes Denmark, Estonia, Finland, Latvia, Lithuania, the Netherlands, Norway and Sweden.

Defence Policy Communities (DPC) The members of a ‘typical’ DPC of a current European country are groups and people who have the expertise, will and opportunity to influence the defence policy of the state. Thus, this book argues that DPCs of European countries have the most significant influence on the establishment of multinational defence collaborations, and using them as the unit of analysis regarding MDCs is more useful than an analytical lens that focuses either on the state as a whole or on international organizations. Therefore one of the most relevant tasks in studying MDCs is to find the ‘centre of gravity’, 13

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the most significant actors inside the DPCs who shape decision-​making in this regard. The original approach to ‘policy community’ (omitting defence) set by Richardson and Jordan in the late 1970s attempted to show that it was not party politics but community-​like dynamics between policymakers and interest groups that are the most relevant factors influencing policy outcomes in the UK (Richardson and Jordan, 1979). Since then many theories regarding policy communities have emerged. For instance, R.A.W. Rhodes perceives policy communities as networks that are interdependent, integrated, have a restrictive membership and are closed to other networks and the general public (Rhodes, 1991). More recently the concept of policy community has been defined by Grant Jordan as ‘the population of organizations with a stake in an area of public policy. In its more technical sense, it refers to interorganizational structures exhibiting a close, stable, cooperative relationship between a limited number of, mainly self-​selected interest groups and “partnering” elements of the governmental machinery’ (Jordan, 2011: 1902). According to the policy community literature, the dominant type of policymaking takes the form of routine decision-​ making and bargaining processes between the interest groups of the policy community, because politicians usually focus on a few high-​level issues relevant to them and do not have the time and energy to engage deeply in every area (Jordan, 2011). The term ‘defence policy community’ (DPC) was introduced by Kimberly Martin Zisk in her book published in 1993 to explain Soviet military doctrinal development from 1955 to 1991 (Zisk, 1993: 21–​6). According to her, the Soviet DPC comprised three main characteristics. First, it consisted of people who had expertise in the area of defence policy and were highly interested in policy outcomes; second, the members of the community communicated and exchanged ideas. Finally, access to decision-​makers was deemed highly important, because this could provide the opportunity for groups or people to enter the policy community. This last characteristic was relevant, because the Soviet DPC was not as open to expert groups from outside the military as, for instance, the American one, but during the Gorbachev era policymakers were also recruited from latent segments of the Soviet DPC, who traditionally did not have access to decision makers. Leonard C. Sebastian and Iis Gindarsah also apply the concept of DPC in their work about post-​Suharto military reforms in Indonesia (Sebastian and Gindarsah, 2013). They identify ‘the birth of a “defense policy community,” where scholars and civil-​society actors engage in discussions with policymakers and parliament members on wide-​ranging defense and security issues’ in Indonesia during the 2000s (Sebastian and Gindarsah, 2013: 36). They also highlight the fact that a mature DPC with relevant knowledge and expertise is crucial for the transformation of the Indonesian 14

Introduction

National Armed Forces (Sebastian and Gindarsah, 2013: 53). Anand Menon points out that in France, although the president is at the top of the decision-​ making structure, ‘defence policy is made up of a series of discrete decisions, many of which, made under conditions of routine, day-​to-​day politics, are often finalized well below the President in the policy hierarchy’ (Menon, 1995: 296). Menon describes in detail that making defence policy choices regarding financial issues is often a result of bitter negotiations between the Ministry of Defence (MoD) and the Finance Ministry, and the MoD competes over influence with the Foreign Ministry on doctrinal issues. At the same time the MoD is not a monolithic organization either, as different lobby groups exist within it, while the policy process is also influenced by defence industrial actors and NATO too. Despite these numerous actors, a core consensus regarding defence policy exists in France, and Menon highlights that the ‘consensus provided a ready mechanism for delegitimizing certain groups or individuals who questioned prevailing policy options. The ability of the defence policy community to structure its own membership to a large degree made of it a highly collusive group’ (Menon, 1995: 297). These works highlight the fact that a DPC might consist of different groups and organizations in different countries. Zisk points out that the US DPC was open to experts outside the circles of the armed forces during the Cold War, but this was not the case in the Soviet Union until the 1980s. Sebastian and Gindarsah in turn show a mixture of different types of groups –​military personnel, politicians, civilian experts and so on –​in the newly emerging DPC after Suharto in Indonesia. Menon explains the complexity of formal and informal decision-​making processes between different actors in the French defence policy community and points out that, despite the president’s seemingly very strong formal role, his or her influence in shaping defence policy is often limited. As was mentioned at the beginning of this section, this book defines a ‘typical’ DPC of a current European country as the network of groups and people who have the expertise, will and opportunity to influence the defence policy of the state. Accordingly, DPCs primarily consist of civil servants and military personnel from the Ministry of Defence –​including the Defence Staff –​and its closely related institutions, which provide the most relevant members and groups of the DPC in every country, because they possess the most up-​to-​date and relevant information about defence policy issues, they have direct access to high-​level decision-​makers and basically they are the ones who execute the decisions. These are highly important, because the vast majority of policy issues are usually not sufficiently high-​profile for politicians –​even for the Minister of Defence –​or for the public, thus in these cases the members of the aforementioned groups of the defence establishment (personnel of MoD and its closely linked institutions) have the greatest influence on policy outcomes. The relevance of other members and 15

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groups of a certain state’s DPC may vary widely from country to country, and depend on their access to policymakers. Thus, typically the DPC of a state can include experts from the Prime Minister’s Office, influential members of parliament, experts from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Ministry of Finance, major defence industrial actors and scholars of defence academies, defence-​related research institutes and think tanks. In addition, solid DPCs are recognizable not only within European states but both within NATO and EU, as they have permanent and long-​ serving staff members and personnel in their core institutions and also in their agencies, educational institutions and think tanks. We can see that the DPCs of NATO and EU have a similar set of institutions to their national counterparts, and the employees of these institutions –​especially the permanent ones –​constitute a different but not entirely independent DPC both within NATO and EU. Although most of the civil servants and military personnel working in these institutions are sent and seconded by member states, NATO and EU as institutions have their own organizational goals and interests which do not necessarily converge with every member state’s interests. These goals and interests are set partly by the defence policy communities of member states and partly by the DPCs of NATO and EU.

Theoretical framework This section describes the core argument of the book and proposes that three ‘structural’ and two ‘situational’ factors are the most relevant ones concerning the creation of European multinational defence collaborations. The structural factors are: 1) the existence of the European security community; 2) the perception that individual European armed forces do not have appropriate funds for defence; and 3) previous defence collaborations between the participating states. The situational factors are: 1) strong leadership by a group of enthusiastic high-​level officials and good interpersonal chemistry between them; and 2) a supportive political milieu for the defence cooperation. The book proposes that these factors interact with each other in a particular way. First, the structural factor related to the existence of the European security community is the most relevant one, as the dynamics in this community always have an impact on the subregional processes, and often the subregional processes also shape events at the European level. Second, the other four factors interact together at the subregional level, and when they align together, new MDCs can be established.

Factors that are needed to establish MDCs in Europe successfully In the context of the book ‘structural factors’ are institutions, solid and long-​standing relationships, trends and perceptions that have developed over 16

Introduction

a relatively long period. They do not trigger the establishment of defence collaborations, but they enable them and provide the conditions for their creation. The structural factors are:

1. The existence of the European security community The emergence of the European security community created the most important precondition for the proliferation of MDCs, and in this process NATO and EU played a critical role by facilitating institutional security cooperation. As a result, it is not surprising that NATO-​and/​or EU-​related processes almost always have an impact on the creation of MDCs. As Andrew Cottey points out, ‘security community is a group of states among whom conflicts are resolved by peaceful means, so there is a high expectation that this norm will be maintained and that war would be extremely unlikely, if not inconceivable’ (Cottey, 2013a: 13). The European security community emerged in Western Europe during the Cold War, but it later admitted most of the Central and Eastern European states as well by subsequent NATO and EU enlargements. Through institutionalized security cooperation today EU and/​or NATO member countries understand the concept of security the same way, they perceive that their interests are similar and that they share the same identity. Previously, European countries did not trust each other and were always preparing for the next war (Cottey, 2013a: 12–​19). However, the emergence of the European security community made it possible for the dominant feature of the relations between most European countries to become cooperation instead of competition, and thus MDCs could start to proliferate.

2. The perception that individual European armed forces do not have appropriate funds for defence DPCs often perceive that the defence budgets they receive are inappropriate to fund all the capabilities they deem necessary to have in order to maintain their social roles and answer the perceived challenges of the international environment. After the Cold War, the priorities of governments changed and they scaled down defence spending so that other policy areas could be prioritized (for example healthcare and education). This resulted in massive reductions in their armed forces, and most European NATO countries cut their military personnel by between 25 and 50 per cent over the 1990s (NATO, 2012: 9), and, albeit at a slower rate, these reductions have continued in the 2000s and 2010s. This was necessary not only because of the defence budget cuts, but also in order to channel resources for modernization, transformation and transition from conscripts to professional armed forces. When DPCs realized that the situation would soon become critical and that the capabilities 17

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needed to maintain the bare minimum of their social roles would disappear, they started to look for solutions. One of the logical choices was the search for relevant partner DPCs with resources in the European security community who could help them to mitigate their problems via cooperation.

3. Previous defence collaborations between the participating states Early choices regarding defence cooperative frameworks influence later collaborative processes because the opportunity costs of replacing an already existing collaboration are high, and even the components of less successful collaborations are usually preserved in successor MDCs (DeVore, 2012). Accordingly, defence collaborations are often path-​dependent. Besides, MDCs establish more dense relationships and networks among the participating DPCs which may help to create new cooperative initiatives too, as it is easier to start a new collaboration with a partner whom you know well and with whom you have a collaborative history. Thus, already existing cooperative frameworks and institutions have an advantage over new ones. ‘Situational factors’ regarding the establishment of new subregional MDCs reflect the political and economic environment, personal relationships that may change relatively quickly. The situational factors help to explain why a particular MDC was established at a particular time, and thus they are always case-​specific. The situational factors are:

1. Strong leadership by a group of enthusiastic high-​level officials and good interpersonal chemistry between them Agency matters regarding establishing MDCs, as structures per se are not enough to create them. People are always needed to make things work. In this regard, it is highly important to identify the actors who are shaping policies regarding defence cooperation the most. Regardless of the level (subregional, European) of the MDC, it is often the case that two enthusiastic leaders work together as the engine of collaboration to make the MDC happen. In most of the cases they have very good interpersonal chemistry between them as well, which seems to be logical, because people are less likely to begin a new cooperation with people they do not like. Interpersonal chemistry and good relationships are important, because these people have to support each other to overcome the resistance of other groups in their own DPCs and potentially win over the DPCs of other countries too. This means that these people have to invest significant time and resources in creating these collaborative frameworks. This high-​level collaboration and cooperation usually happens if both leaders believe in the importance of the MDC and like working together. 18

Introduction

2. A supportive political milieu for the defence cooperation A supportive political environment for the launching of new subregional MDCs is relevant, because even if enthusiastic high-​level officials with interpersonal chemistry were to work on the launch of an MDC, without supportive political environment they would be working in a vacuum. They would probably still be convinced that it was necessary to set up the MDC, but outside the enthusiastic group, other members of their own DPC, DPCs of other countries and other relevant communities would not support or would not necessarily participate in a new defence cooperative framework. The supportive political environment is always time-​and DPC-​ specific: it can exist either at the domestic or the international level, and it is not necessarily the same for every participating DPC of the same MDC.

Interactions among factors The five factors described above interact with each other in a particular way. The first factor –​the existence of the European security community –​ has a wider impact on subregional dynamics, while the other four factors interact at the subregional level. This section first explains how the dynamics in the European security community work and then highlights how the interactions between the remaining factors lead to the establishment of new subregional MDCs. The European security community provides the overarching umbrella for defence cooperation in Europe. Without the reasonable assumption that NATO and EU countries will not wage war against each other and without the trust and common identity they have, the current level of in-​depth, wide-​ ranging defence cooperative initiatives could not work. However, this does not explain the dynamics of the European security community. This book argues that the best way to understand how the dynamics of the European security community work regarding MDCs is by borrowing and adapting the concept of ‘Europeanization’. The scholarship on ‘Europeanization’ points out that EU members ‘upload’ national policies to the EU level and as a result these policies become EU-​wide policies, while they also ‘download’ EU level policies to their national level. Using this logic, the book argues that MDCs ‘upload’ and ‘download’ policies between the subregional and European levels frequently. Europeanization has a very rich literature, and different interpretations of it have emerged (Olsen, 2002: 923–​4), but one of the dominant views is that three different Europeanization processes exist, and they are especially relevant when we analyse the foreign policies of the European Union and its member states (Major, 2005). First, ‘uploading’ happens when a state intends to shape EU-​level policies or institutions based on its own national 19

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Figure 1.1: Uploading and downloading policies between the different levels of MDCs in Europe

European level (NATO/EU) Downloading

Uploading

Subregional level

preferences. During this ‘bottom-​up’ process the country attempts to project its domestic policies and make them EU-​wide policies by convincing EU institutions and other member states about them. The process of ‘downloading’ is the exact opposite. It is a ‘top-​down’ process, which is ‘understood as the penetration of the European dimension into the national’ (Major, 2005: 176–​81). In this case, the policy of a state is Europeanized from the EU level, and the country plays only a passive recipient role. Cross-​loading is the socialization of interests and identities; in other words, identity reconstruction happens, where the identities of the participating actors will become more similiar as the result of the previous two (up-​and downloading) processes (Wong, 2007: 322), which bring closer the point of views, ideas and identities of EU member states. I apply the logic of Europeanization regarding MDCs but in a more generic sense, as this book focuses not only on the EU but is interested in the dynamics between MDCs at the European regional (NATO/​EU) and subregional (bilateral, minilateral) levels (see Figure 1.1). For instance, subregional MDCs have downloaded the EU Battlegroup initiative from the European level. EU Battlegroups are multinational units consisting of at least 1,500 personnel, and two of them are always on standby for six months on a rotational basis. At the minilateral level Italy, Hungary and Slovenia –​ based on a multinational brigade-​level unit they created in the early 2000s without any connection to the EU –​created an EU battlegroup that was on standby in 2007 and 2012. Furthermore, using the excellent Czech and Slovakian bilateral military collaborations, Bratislava and Prague provided an EU battlegroup in 2009 (Nemeth, 2018: 18–​19). Another example that demonstrates the uploading/​downloading dynamics between the different levels of MDCs is the way British–​French bilateral defence cooperation has shaped European-​level military collaborations several times. In 1998 the British prime minister Tony Blair and French president Jacques Chirac 20

Introduction

signed the St Malo declaration, and by this, they uploaded their policies to the European level by triggering the establishment of the ESDP. Additionally, based on the bilateral military cooperation France and the UK enjoyed thanks to the Lancaster House Treaties of 2010, these two countries uploaded their bilaterally agreed policy to the NATO level in 2011 to wage war against Libya and topple Muammar Gaddafi. As a result, they could use NATO’s command structure and the military support of many NATO allies to achieve their national and bilateral policies. Although the adapted version of Europeanization helps to explain how the European and subregional levels interact, it cannot per se explain in detail how and why MDCs are created. It is true that the European security community is the wider environment where defence cooperation happens, which provides an indispensable element of mutual trust among European DPCs. However, the actual options for cooperation evolve at the subregional level of Figure 1.1 and the interactions of the other four factors on the subregional level lead to the creation of subregional MDCs. These dynamics at the subregional level are explained by Figure 1.2, which resembles an hourglass. The ‘sand’ that is created by the other two structural factors, which are related to the perception of the defence budgets and previous defence collaborations, trickles down and creates options for defence collaboration in the bottom half of the hourglass. The DPC being studied sits in the middle of the hourglass, and in principle it has many ‘available Figure 1.2: Interaction between the factors in defence cooperation in Europe

Previous defence collaborations Perception about defence budget

Defence policy community

Personal relationships Political milieu

Potential options Available options

21

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options’ (the white circles) for cooperation based on the aforementioned two structural factors. However, only the so-​called ‘potential options’ (the black circles) have a reasonable chance of being realized, as they are supported by stronger previous defence collaborations and very similar perceptions of the defence budget on the part of the potential partner DPCs. At the same time, these ‘potential options’ become MDCs only if the situational factors related to ‘personal relationships’ and the positive ‘political milieu’ are present. They function as filters which can stop a ‘potential option’ for cooperation from trickling down to the bottom of the hourglass and thus leave it an unrealized option. These filters created by the situational factors can stop only ‘potential options’ as they are more robust. However, if the situational factors are not in line, the ‘potential options’ will not become MDCs either. In the top half of the hourglass, the structural factors related to previous path-​dependent defence collaborations are relevant, because what happened in the past provides options and constraints regarding future decisions for DPCs. The structural factor related to the perception of the defence budget is also crucial. Typically, when a DPC’s perception of the defence budget is more or less positive and it is satisfied with the amount it receives, it becomes less willing to cooperate as it may perceive that it can achieve its goals individually. However, excessive defence budget cuts, for instance, might mean that the DPC does not think it has enough funds to cooperate. Accordingly, establishing an MDC requires the perception of financial scarcity but the collaborating DPCs also need to have enough resources to allow them to think and invest in long-​term collaborations. In the bottom half of the hourglass, the political milieu represents those relationship patterns that are relevant to getting support for the MDC from outside the collaborating DPCs. The issue of how supportive, neutral or antagonistic other relevant communities are outside the DPC can be decisive for the creation of a new subregional MDC. In addition, personal relationships between key stakeholders of DPCs are often critical. Without actual people, nothing is done, so key stakeholders from at least two DPCs have to work together and take a leadership role to initiate cooperation. The most important precondition for this is that they have to like each other, because those people who do not like each other to some degree will not be happy to cooperate and will prefer instead to avoid one another.

Outline of the book Chapter 1 discussed the scholarship on defence cooperation in Europe, then introduced the argument and the key concepts of the book. Finally, it explained the theoretical framework of the book, defining the structural and situational factors needed for the establishment of subregional MDCs in Europe and highlighted how they interact with each other. 22

Introduction

Chapter 2 addresses conceptual issues of MDCs and subregions, and in addition it outlines the wider history of defence collaboration in Europe. Chapter 3 introduces the case studies and the development of the theoretical framework of the book. The three case studies are: 1) the creation of Nordic Defence Cooperation (NORDEFCO) in 2009; 2) the creation of the British–​French Lancaster House Treaties in 2010; and 3) the creation of the Central European Defence Cooperation (CEDC) in 2011. Chapters 4, 5 and 6 study the structural factors individually using the insights of the three case studies (NORDERFCO, Lancaster House Treaties, CEDC) introduced in Chapter 3. Accordingly, Chapter 4 examines how the existence of the European security community played a role in the creation of the three MDCs, while Chapter 5 focuses on ‘the perception that individual European armed forces do not have appropriate funds’ in this regard. Chapter 6 investigates the previous defence collaborations between the participating states of these three studied MDCs and how they shaped the creation of these new ones. Chapter 7 and 8 examine the situational factors. Chapter 7 concentrates on the leadership in the creation of the three MDCs and highlights the critical dynamics behind this factor. Chapter 8 studies the political milieu of the case studies and suggests lessons that can be drawn from it. Chapter 9 utilizes the insights and lessons of the previous five chapters and explains how each subregional MDC studied in them was established. Finally, Chapter 10 provides the book’s conclusion.

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Multinational Defence Cooperation in Europe Multinational Defence Cooperation (MDC) is part of the everyday life of European armed forces. It has become such a natural and self-​evident phenomenon for European military personnel and policymakers that they do not even think about its causes any more although it shapes almost every aspect of defence. MDCs have a massive effect on the defence policies, force structures, capability development plans and defence industrial considerations of individual European states. This is reflected in the strategic documents of European countries and the fact that they do not go to war without the support of other European states. Furthermore, most of the sophisticated weapon systems developed by European countries have been multinational projects for decades, and they cost billions or tens of billions of Euros. Every year tens of thousands of European troops participate in multinational military exercises, dozens of multinational units have been created for the last thirty years and Europeans also procure and maintain military capabilities together. However, this level of cooperation did not happen overnight; rather, it has been the result of a decades-​long evolution of collaborations. This chapter defines what an MDC is in the context of the book and also defines what the concepts of region and subregion are, pointing out the relevance of the subregional dimension of MDCs. The second half of the chapter outlines the broader history of defence collaborations in Europe between 1990 and 2010, as the studied three case studies were established in the late 2000s and early 2010s.

Multinational defence cooperation in Europe and the subregional dimension The UK Ministry of Defence defines ‘Multinational Defence Cooperation (MDC) as any arrangement where two or more nations work together to enhance military capability. This can include exchanges and liaison, training 24

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and exercising, common doctrine, collaborative equipment procurement, or multinational formations’ (UK Ministry of Defence, 2001: 2). The book uses this definition as a basis to inform its research, but it will amend it slightly as it acknowledges that this definition might seem too broad for analytical purposes. For instance, one might question the usefulness of a definition that covers everything from the exchange of liaison officers between two countries to collaborative equipment procurement including several countries. One could also argue that there is a big difference between defence cooperation in NATO/​EU in institutional frameworks and defence cooperation in minilateral and bilateral settings. Accordingly, the book adds two further elements to the definition to sharpen its focus and provide a more rigorous basis for the analysis. The book focuses on MDCs that are planned to be permanently structured and intended to enhance military capabilities between defence policy communities (DPC). Thus, the organizing concept of an MDC is not the activities or structures it includes, but the capability the participating DPCs intend to develop together in a permanent way. This means that, although MDCs may include many forms of military cooperation, not every type of military cooperation is an MDC. This definition does not include, for example, cooperation in operations (as they do not focus on capability development) or one-​off multinational military exercises (as they are not permanently structured). In addition, exchange liaison officers can serve diplomatic purposes or can increase operational cooperation as well, but as the focus of their work is not capability development, they are not MDCs. However, for example, an exchange liaison officer who supports cooperation on developing a multinational unit is part of a wider package of the development of that multinational unit. Thus, this liaison officer is part of this MDC, but not necessarily an MDC per se. Accordingly, the working definition of an MDC in the book is a slightly modified version of the original UK MoD version: an MDC is any arrangement where two or more Defence Policy Communities work together to enhance military capability in a permanently structured way. This definition emphasizes that the core function of an MDC is to enhance military capabilities in a permanently structured way among DPCs in Europe. Therefore, this capability is an organizing concept of MDCs, and the related activities (for example, exercises, liaison officers, common procurements, common doctrines) ‘only’ support the enhancement of this multinational capability. The research conducted for this book also points out that, by using DPCs as the unit of analysis and applying the proposed framework, it becomes clear that the dynamics of creating an MDC are very similar at the subregional and European levels. Although EU/​NATO cooperation is understandably slightly 25

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different, at the very basic level both the EU and NATO have their own DPCs similarly to states, and they interact with other DPCs to enhance military capabilities like other national DPCs at the bilateral and minilateral levels. Of course, the DPCs of EU and NATO are even more interested in the success of defence cooperation as it is part of their raison d’être, and they are different from national DPCs in the sense that they have different resources to facilitate cooperation. Furthermore, the focus of the definition on DPCs has another important consequence, namely, the research is not based on the normative assumption that MDCs are beneficial to European security, but it suggests that MDCs are pragmatically useful for the DPCs that participate in the studied MDCs. However, DPCs can see an MDC in very different ways. Some of them want to create new capabilities (as the definition of the MDC suggest), but other DPCs might participate for political (either domestic of foreign policy) purposes, while some DPCs are not necessarily enthusiastic about an MDC but they participate to wait and see and other DPCs participate to sabotage a cooperation. Thus, the success of an MDC needs to be analysed from the individual DPC point of view. Therefore, counterintuitively, falling short of most of the stated objectives of an MDC is not necessarily a failure for some DPCs. Many concepts and approaches try to define those MDCs that are not European regional-​level (NATO/​EU) defence collaborations. For instance, Christian Mölling and Sophie-​Charlotte Brune call them ‘clusters of cooperation’ (Mölling and Brune, 2011a: 48–​52), and although Tomas Valasek also uses this term, he calls them ‘islands of cooperation’ and ‘regional clusters’ too (Valasek, 2011). At the same time an EU Institute for Security Studies report uses the term ‘regionalisation of military capabilities’ (Missiroli et al, 2013: 47). Pieter-​Jan Parrein points out that ‘Europe is regarded as a region with regional cooperation organizations such as the EU or the Council of Europe, therefore regional cooperation within Europe is in fact subregional’ (Parrein, 2012), thus he refers to them as subregional defence cooperation. The different terms and definitions probably stem from the fact that while many MDCs in Europe are based on membership of relatively well-​defined and institutionalized regions/​subregions (for example, Baltic, Benelux [Belgium, Netherlands, Luxembourg], Nordic), other mostly bilateral collaborations are not necessarily significant in dimensions outside defence cooperation. Furthermore, in the case of bilateral defence collaborations it is not clear why some are deemed regional/​subregional (British–​French, British–​Dutch) while others are perceived as exclusively bilateral cooperations (Dutch–​German, German–​French). In this book, the concept of subregion is used in a simplified way, and MDCs that are not created at the European regional level are called subregional. Of course, the concept of region and subregion in the academic literature is more complex than this approach. According to John Agnew, to ask what a region is, is a 26

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worthy question, without doubt –​or at least it used to be. Increasingly often, answering this question proves if not an impossible task, then at least one that is bound to produce multiple answers, once again, both politically and conceptually. Labelling regions has ceased to be –​ assuming that it ever was –​a descriptive exercise in which observers held their mirrors –​geographical, cultural and so on –​to the(ir) world: what a region is always reflects ‘the biases, intellectual and political, of their originators. (Agnew, 1999: 95) We face similar problems when defining the concept of subregion. Andrew Cottey points out that ‘the term is not exact, since it is clear that the definition of any subregion (like that of a region) reflects not only geography, but also history and politics –​often making the issue contentious.’ In his research, Cottey perceives Europe as a region, and according to his definition ‘ “subregional” refers to a geographically and/​or historically reasonably coherent area within the OSCE space as a whole’ (Cottey, 1999b: 7). The book partially accepts this definition, but at the same time it has to be emphasized again that the subregional cooperations on which the book focuses are situated in the territory of EU and NATO Europe, and do not include collaborations from other parts of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) area. Furthermore, any bi-​or minilateral collaborations can be understood as subregional cooperation that are not directly initiated by European-​level (EU/​NATO) processes or which are not under explicitly under the umbrella of EU/​NATO institutions. Based on the abovementioned definitions and the literature, the following defence collaborations in Europe are illustrative examples of relevant subregional MDCs in Europe: • Baltic Defence Cooperation: In order to prepare for NATO accession and create military capabilities they lacked, the three Baltic states –​Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania –​ established four major defence cooperative structures (the Baltic Battalion, Baltic Naval Squadron, Baltic Air Surveillance Network and Baltic Defence College) during the 1990s, which are still operational. • Benelux Defence Cooperation: Belgium and the Netherlands integrated many aspects of their navies via the Admiral Benelux agreement (1995) and also established the Deployable Air Task Force (1996) to exercise and participate in air operations jointly. In 2012 the Ministers of Defence of the Benelux states signed a declaration on defence cooperation to reinvigorate their military collaboration (BENELUX, 2012). • Central European Defence Cooperation: In 2011, the Defence Policy Directors of six Central European countries –​Austria, Croatia, the Czech Republic, Hungary, Slovakia and Slovenia –​agreed to begin to map out the possible 27

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•

•

•

•

•

areas of cooperation where their countries could pool and share military capabilities, and also agreed to coordinate their standpoints on defence policy and planning issues. British–​Dutch Amphibious Force: Cooperation between the UK and the Netherlands regarding amphibious forces started in 1973. Currently the navies of the two nations use the same training and tactics, and conduct operations in a fully integrated manner. British–​French Defence Cooperation: In 2010 France and the UK signed two treaties on cooperation in strategically crucial fields such as: nuclear weapons testing; the operation of two aircraft carriers; the sharing of training, resources and maintenance; the establishment of a division-​size joint expeditionary force; and common research and development. Nordic Defence Cooperation: In 2009 the five Nordic countries –​Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway and Sweden –​ established the Nordic Defence Cooperation, which covers almost the whole spectrum of their defence sectors in order to achieve cost-​effectiveness and enhanced operational capability. South-​Eastern Europe Defence Cooperation: The South-​Eastern Europe Defence Ministers Process began in 1996 and resulted in the creation in 1999 of the South-​Eastern Europe Brigade by Albania, Bulgaria, Greece, Italy, Macedonia, Romania and Turkey. Both the process and the brigade have provided fruitful forums for cooperation and confidence-​building in the region. Visegrad Group: The Visegrad Group consists of the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland and Slovakia. The cooperation was founded in 1991 with the aim of supporting the Euro-​Atlantic integration of the four Central European countries in general. Although regular meetings between the Chiefs of Defence and Ministers of Defence of the participating countries were held, the collaboration of the Visegrad Group in the area of defence was not strong until 2011, when they decided to establish an EU Battlegroup be operational and stand by in 2016 and 2019.

The evolution of defence cooperation in Europe between 1990 and 2010 The roots of many current defence cooperative efforts in Europe can be partly traced back to the Cold War. At that time many institutions and frameworks (or their predecessors) were established that even today facilitate and contribute to defence collaborations in Europe. However, defence cooperation happened in very different ways in Western and Eastern Europe and have different implications for current dynamics. Following the fall of the Iron Curtain, circumstances supported military cooperation in Europe. Thanks to the end of the Cold War, governments could redefine their priorities and have been spending proportionately less on defence than 28

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before and more on social needs and to sustain economic growth (Davoodi, 1999). In the meantime, European countries needed to adapt their armed forces to the emerging post-​Cold War security environment. Previously, on the European continent everyone prepared for a large-​ scale conventional war with mass conscript armies trained to stop and repel territorial aggression. However, these times have passed, and the conflicts of the 1990s –​especially the NATO intervention in Kosovo –​highlighted the fact that European armed forces were not prepared for expeditionary warfare (Dorman, 2002). Accordingly, while there was a need to restructure the European armed forces to meet the requirements of the new era, governments did not provide extra funds for this but instead decreased defence expenditure considerably. This resulted in massive reductions in the sizes of armed forces and at the same time European countries started to professionalize their militaries. This was necessary not only because of defence budget cuts but also in order to channel resources for modernization and for a transition from conscripts to professional armed forces. The latter was crucial, because professional troops are more prepared and equipped for expeditionary operations, and they are understandably much more expensive as well. These processes and circumstances provided a solid basis for multinational defence cooperation. For most of the 1990s the emphasis was mostly on the creation of multinational land forces. The Alliance laid down the guidelines of its new force posture and the characteristics of its future forces in the 1991 Strategic Concept. In this manner it also determined the main directions of defence cooperation in Europe for the next decade. According to the document, even though the size and readiness of allied forces was to be reduced and the concept of forward defence to be abandoned, the Alliance would possess ‘a limited but militarily significant proportion’ of immediate-​and rapid-​reaction elements able to respond quickly and flexibly to the ‘multi-​directional’ risks of the new era (NATO, 1991). Besides these rapid-​reaction troops, NATO’s conventional forces would be made up of the main defence forces and the augmentation forces; in addition the document supported strongly the creation of multinational forces. Thus, many bi-​and multinational corps were created to ensure the ability of the Alliance to conduct collective defence operations after the Cold War. Parallel with this, NATO also added crisis management to its security agenda, and developed the Combined Joint Task Force (CJTF) concept to have a tool for such operations outside NATO territory. According to the concept, CJTF was a ‘deployable multinational, multiservice task force generated for and tailored [...] to military operations not involving the defence of Alliance territory’ (NATOa, 1999). Thus, CJTF was intended to be flexible and modular; it could be augmented and composed of staff and force elements according to the requirements of the particular mission. This provided the possibility to create ‘coalitions of 29

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the willing’ which could have been led either by NATO or the Western European Union (WEU), and Partnership for Peace (PfP) members could also have participated in CJTFs. The experience of post-​Cold War military conflicts in the 1990s revealed that as a consequence of the revolution in military affairs (Futter and Collins, 2015), the assessment of military power based on quantitative measurements became inadequate, and the focus on capabilities has become more important than that on forces (Maulny and Liberti, 2008: 4–​5). Indeed, the force approach has been changed by the capability approach, which concentrates not exclusively on the number of troops and assets but mostly on the military effects that can be achieved by a means of action. The Gulf War and the interventions in the Balkans underlined the fact that Europe lacked crucial capabilities necessary to deploy and sustain forces in operations abroad using precision weapons and the most advanced command, control, communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance technologies. Thus, at the end of the 1990s both NATO and EU initiated their own defence capability development programmes to overcome these shortfalls, mostly building on the capability approach instead of the force approach. NATO’s heads of state and government accepted the Defence Capabilities Initiative (DCI) at the Washington summit in 1999 to improve the ability of member states to take part effectively in crisis management operations outside the Atlantic Alliance’s area (NATO, 1999b). DCI identified 59 shortfall areas and categorized them into five groups: deployability and mobility; sustainability and logistics; survivability; consultation, command and control; and effective engagement. In the same year the European Union established the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP), and member states agreed at the Helsinki summit in 1999 to establish a 50–​60,000 strong military force by 2003 capable of the full range of Petersburg tasks1 and capable to sustain itself for at least a year (Council of the European Union, 1999). This was called the Helsinki Headline Goal. After the assessment of the commitments made by member states to meet this goal, the European Union Military Staff found shortfalls almost in the same capability areas as NATO’s DCI did. The EU launched the European Capability Action Plan to obtain the missing capabilities from its member states by voluntary contributions on national and also multinational basis. However, the two initiatives faced the same problem: European states were not spending enough on defence capability development (Quille, 2006: 126–​7). Based on the lessons learned from the earlier initiatives, NATO launched the NATO Response Force (NRF) and the Prague Capabilities Commitment (PCC) at the 2002 summit in Prague. With the creation of the NRF, NATO intended to establish ‘a technologically advanced, flexible, deployable, interoperable and sustainable force, including land, 30

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sea and air elements ready to react quickly whenever needed’ (NATO, 2002). Two main considerations were behind the NRF concept. First, NATO needed a tool to be able to provide rapid and substantial military response to emerging crises, so the initial concept was that the NRF would comprise 20–​25,000 troops to be deployed at five days’ notice and to be engaged in combat operations after deployment. Second, the NRF was deemed a crucial facilitator of capability transformation especially for European allies by common training, introducing new doctrines and new technologies (Rynning, 2005). The PCC covered the same shortfall areas as the DCI but was more focused and also provided the possibility to assess and measure more easily the progress of member states on the agreed capability development goals. Furthermore, the PCC was intended to foster multinational defence cooperation by facilitating the pooling of resources and role specialization among allies. Even though the PCC became more successful than the DCI, it could not realize every capability target, and the Alliance decided to concentrate on specific ‘high priority capability development areas’ of the Comprehensive Political Guidance (CPG). The CPG was accepted at the Riga summit in 2006, and gave further relevance and almost absolute priority to expeditionary capabilities in NATO. The Lisbon Capabilities Package –​accepted at the 2010 summit in Lisbon –​ determined the direction of the Alliance’s capability development focusing on the need of NATO’s Afghan mission and other long-​standing critical shortfall areas. At the same time, the European Union developed the EU Battlegroup concept and established the European Defence Agency (EDA). Although the European Council declared the Helsinki Headline Goal fulfilled in 2004, it was achieved only on paper. Officially it was not admitted, but the EU’s military ambition was lowered significantly by the EU battlegroup concept, which was launched in the framework of a new process called Headline Goal 2010. EU battlegroups were defined as battalion-​sized forces (1,500 troops) able to be deployed at 15 days’ notice and be sustained for 30 days or 120 days by rotation in crisis management operations. According to the concept, two battlegroups were to be available at any particular point in time, with individual battlegroups following a six-​month rotation. Battlegroups –​like the NRF in the Atlantic Alliance –​were deemed the driving force of multinational military cooperation especially on training and interoperability, because most of the member states could not establish one battlegroup alone, and so many of them had to collaborate on it. The EDA was intended to be the catalyst for European defence cooperation on crisis management capabilities by developing capabilities, promoting cooperation on research and technology (R&T) and armaments and also fostering a competitive European defence equipment market (Council of the European Union, 2004). The EDA, together with the EU Military 31

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Committee, played a key role in elaborating the Capability Development Plan in 2008, which defined short-​and long-​term capability needs. More recently the Lisbon Treaty provided the opportunity for the creation of permanent structured cooperation in defence for those EU ‘member states whose military capabilities fulfil higher criteria and which have made more binding commitments to one another in this area with a view to the most demanding missions’ (European Union, 2009: Article 42.6). The launching of PESCO would require a qualified majority in the EU; thereafter the participating states could set criteria regarding participation in the mechanism, where the EDA would play a significant role. Over the years the idea of PESCO’s exclusiveness has eroded and disagreements have emerged concerning its implementation as well, and PESCO was finally established in 2017. However, because of disagreements among European states regarding PESCO’s realization, the EU began to focus on more practical approaches of ‘pooling’ of capabilities to mitigate the effects of the financial crisis in the end of the 2000s. Thus EU defence ministers put the concept of Pooling & Sharing (P&S) to the top of the agenda of EU defence policy at their meeting in Ghent in September 2010 (Germany and Sweden, 2010). To facilitate the conceptual framework of P&S, Germany and Sweden suggested that EU member states should categorize their military capabilities based on the level of sovereignty they wanted to keep regarding their individual capabilities. For this process the following three categories were offered: 1) capabilities ‘maintained on a strictly national level’; 2) capabilities to be pooled that do not ‘create too strong dependencies’ in the case of cooperation; and 3) ‘capabilities and support structures where mutual dependency and reliance upon European partners is acceptable in an international role-​and task-​sharing framework’ (Germany and Sweden, 2010). During 2011, EU member states finished this categorization and indicated which capabilities they would be willing to cooperate on. At the Munich Security Conference in February 2011, NATO Secretary General Anders Fogh Rasmussen launched a very similar initiative to the Ghent Process in NATO, called ‘Smart Defence’. According to Rasmussen, ‘Smart defense is about building security for less money by working together and being more flexible’ (Rasmussen, 2011: 5). The concept had three main elements: prioritization means aligning ‘national capability priorities’ more with NATO’s capability goals; specialization aims at coordinating defence budget cuts in an organized manner in order to achieve ‘specialization by design’ and avoid the usual process of ‘specialization by default’; and finally cooperation is basically P&S. Both P&S and Smart Defence initiatives had an important impact on the case studies under scrutiny in this book. We can see that the most robust MDCs emerged in the framework of NATO and EU from the end of the Cold War until the early 2010s. 32

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This is understandable, because these organizations provide the forum for Europe-​wide defence collaboration. Interestingly, most of the subregional cooperative structures that were established after the Cold War in the 1990s focused primarily on practical, non-​or soft-​security issues.2 Nevertheless, they contributed to European security by playing a crucial role in eroding the East–​West divide created by the Cold War. In addition, many of them served as important spaces for the former communist countries during their preparation to NATO and EU accession (Cottey, 2000). Thus, unsurprisingly subregional collaborations were never perceived as alternatives to pan-​European organizations, but they were intended to complement them (Cottey, 1999a). Researchers in the 1990s pointed out that, although subregional structures were more flexible and adaptable to the problems of the particular subregion than big multilateral organizations, they had their own limits as well. For instance, they were not big enough to tackle ‘major global issues’ or transmit normative principles. Furthermore, they were deemed inappropriate for cooperation in the field of ‘strategic military security’ (Bjurner, 1999: 13–​15). Alyson J.K. Bailes highlighted at the time the fact that subregional structures did not initiate regular defence ministerial or defence staff-​level meetings, and were not interested in ‘cooperation on defence modernization’ either. Moreover, they did not elaborate ‘ “hard” arms control measures’ like the OSCE, and did not get involved in nuclear issues or in discussing security guarantees (Bailes, 1999b). Scholars in the 1990s were partially right, as most subregional structures were not intended to manage defence matters at that time. However, as we saw previously, many subregional military-​focused collaborations were established in the 1990s (such as the Benelux, Baltic and South-​Eastern Europe defence cooperations) while others date back to the Cold War era (British–​French, Nordic, British–​Dutch collaborations). Thus, dense defence collaborations already existed at the subregional level much earlier, but it seems that scholars after the Cold War paid less attention to them. These scholars were right in the sense that the relevance of these subregional MDCs seemed to be much less than that of other non-​military focused subregional collaborations and processes in regional-​level organizations in NATO and the EU. However, since then, subregional MDCs have also evolved and became even more relevant at the subregional level than before. Nowadays, subregional collaborations focusing on military cooperation have a higher political profile, and they regularly organize defence ministerial and senior military-​level meetings as well. In the 1990s many Western and former communist countries established subregional cooperations to facilitate the evolution of their relationship with each other after the Cold War. However, since the mid-​2000s this intention has disappeared, because most post-​communist states became members of NATO and the EU. The relations between most European countries are so 33

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extensive in every field –​including defence issues –​that it is not necessarily immediately evident why they would establish new subregional military structures or revitalize old ones instead of making use of existing frameworks inside NATO and the EU. Thus, the following chapters of the book study the dynamics behind the creation of subregional MDCs.

Conclusion This chapter clarified definitions that are key for the book and introduced the processes of defence cooperation in Europe between 1990 and 2010. It highlighted the fact that the concepts of Multinational Defence Cooperation (MDC) and subregion/​region could both be understood differently. For this book, an MDC is defined as any arrangement where two or more defence policy communities work together to enhance military capability in a permanently structured way. Furthermore, the concept of the subregion is used in a simplified way regarding European MDCs. Any MDCs that are not established on the European regional level in NATO and EU frameworks are identified as subregional, while regional MDCs are those created by NATO and the EU. Of course, this distinction is not always clear-​cut, as the regional-​and subregional-​level collaborations influence each other and sometimes overlap. However, this definition provides a solid basis for the aims of the book. This chapter also showed that, while most of the focus was on European regional-​level collaborations, subregional MDCs have existed for a long time and provided many practical benefits for their DPCs. For European-​level initiatives, the EU’s P&S and NATO’s Smart Defence are especially relevant as they have had a significant influence on some of the cases discussed in this book.

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Conceptualizing Defence Cooperation Defence cooperation does not exist in a vacuum, and several structural and situational factors are needed to establish a multinational defence cooperation (MDC) successfully. This book uses three cases to demonstrate the dynamics behind the creation of three defence collaborations in Europe: 1) the Nordic Defence Cooperation (NORDEFCO) in 2009; 2) the British–​French Lancaster House Treaties in 2010; and 3) the Central European Defence Cooperation (CEDC) in 2011. The first half of this chapter introduces the case studies and explains how they were selected, while the second half explains how the theoretical framework of the subregional approach was developed. In this regard, three rival explanations were tested using the method of pattern-​matching, which means that the author generated predicted patterns regarding the studied phenomena and compared them to empirically based patterns. The three rival explanations regarding the creation of the studied MDCs were: 1) the lack of progress on pan-​European/​transatlantic defence cooperation; 2) the impact of the financial crisis of 2008; and 3) different emerging perceptions by European states of shared threats. This research framework provided the opportunity to close certain explanations out, and helped to develop the empirically based patterns concerning every case that could convincingly explain the individual case studies. These empirically based patterns helped to develop the theoretical framework of the subregional approach. This theoretical framework is the structural and situational factors, and their unique interactions, which were introduced in Chapter 1. The details of them will be discussed in the following chapters.

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The case studies:​Lancaster House Treaties, NORDEFCO, CEDC The book studies three subregional MDCs. The Lancaster House Treaties that were established between the UK and France comprise a bilateral MDC, while NORDEFCO and the CEDC are minilateral MDCs. These cases were selected because the academic literature focuses mostly on EU and NATO initiatives; the aim is for these bilateral and minilateral cases to provide a relevant contribution to our understanding of defence cooperation in Europe. Second, the cases represent different regions in Europe (the east, north and west); thus they make it possible to make generalizations about military cooperation in Europe. This adds much-​needed breadth to the scope of analysis and allows this book to make a firmer and wider case than many other studies that tend to have a narrower case selection. Third, the studied MDCs were created immediately after the financial crisis. Thus, by examining the emergence of these MDCs in a stringent financial environment this monograph can directly test the widely mooted hypothesis that fiscal considerations play a key role in fostering defence cooperation in Europe. Finally, from a methodological perspective, the chosen cases are appropriate for using the literal replication logic of the case study research method, because it requires the selection of similar cases where the predicted results are similar. These MDCs are similar, because they were established during the same period, are multidimensional collaborations and are intended to be permanently structured. The first case study is the Lancaster House Treaties which established a framework for deepening the security and defence cooperation between France and the UK and were signed by French President Nicholas Sarkozy and British Prime Minister David Cameron at 10 Downing Street on 2 November 2010.1 One of the two treaties determines the objectives and different aspects of the mechanism regarding Anglo-​French defence cooperation (France, 2010a). The two countries agreed on five main objectives: 1) coordination on capability development, maintenance, procurement, facilities and equipment; 2) reinforcement of the defence industry, and cooperation in research and development; 3) collaboration on common deployments; 4) cooperation on national (nuclear) deterrents; 5) mutual support regarding actions in the UN and NATO and within CSDP. Accordingly, it lays down several principles with regard to the common deployment of troops, about how the two states can access each other’s facilities or equipment, and it also sets out some baselines for market access, and the costs and benefits of the joint projects as well as for cooperation on defence industrial issues. The treaty touches on the issue of exchanging information on various aspects, such as consulting on future operations or sharing classified information. In 36

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addition, the agreement states that the ‘Parties undertake to consult before taking any decision on significant capability programmes or procurement’ (France, 2010a: 7). Thus, the document requires very high-​level collaboration in pooling and sharing of military capabilities between France and Britain. The second treaty focuses on cooperation on technologies related to the stewardship of nuclear stockpiles (France, 2010b). In this regard, France and Britain agreed on exchanging classified information concerning the safety and security of nuclear weapons, stockpile certification and countering nuclear or radiological terrorism. They also agreed to build and operate jointly a radiographic/​hydrodynamic facility in France and a facility for radiography and diagnostics technology programmes in the UK. The facility in Britain was set to be operational by 2014; the first phase of the facility in France was due to be finished in 2014, with its second phase planned to be completed in 2016. The construction and operational costs of the facility in Britain are to be paid for by the UK, while France is responsible for costs regarding the first phase of the facility on its soil. A joint team from the two countries is responsible for the construction and operation of the facilities. A joint Letter of Intent (LoI) and a package of joint measures were also signed about a number of concrete projects in the framework of the first treaty described above. These included, among others: the development of a 10,000-​strong bilateral unit named the Combined Joint Expeditionary Force; cooperation on aircraft carriers; common support of A400 transport aircrafts; collaboration on the development of submarine technologies and systems; maritime mine countermeasures; cooperation on future military satellite communication; air-​to-​air refuelling and military air transport; collaboration on unmanned air systems; defence industrial cooperation; research and technology cooperation; collaboration on cyber security and counter-​terrorism. In the short term the most tangible impact of the treaties was the cooperation between the two countries regarding military operations especially in Libya but also to some extent in Mali and the Central African Republic. Although the Libyan war in 2011 became a NATO operation, it was initially led by France and the UK with the support of the US. As a result, many commentators and analysts perceived the conflict as a ‘French and British War’ (Coughlin, 2011; Elliott, 2011). Perceptions of the results of the Libyan intervention are mixed (Clark, 2011; Daalder and Stavridis, 2012; Campbell, 2013; Zunes, 2013), but it clearly had a very positive effect on British–​French defence relations. The Libyan conflict proved for many people in the British and French foreign and security establishment that the two countries could work and fight together (Former French MoD Official, 2014). The situation was different in Mali and the Central African Republic, where France intervened on its own in 2013, and British contributions to these operations in the first half of the 2010s were limited to providing 37

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C-​17 transport aircraft. Although the French probably expected a larger contribution from the British, Britain was still the fastest and one of the most generous contributors to French operations in Africa. Moreover, it provided capabilities that the French lacked. Besides operations, another very visible manifestation of the Lancaster House Treaties has been the surge in Franco-​British military exercises, mostly related to development of the 10,000-​strong Combined Joint Expeditionary Force. Even though nuclear cooperation between the two countries is not so visible and is not discussed in the press, it is proceeding in accordance with the plans and generates savings for both London and Paris. Progress in this regard was relevant, especially if we take into consideration that nuclear cooperation is one of the most sensitive projects in the Lancaster House Treaties (Ricketts, 2020). However, as relations between France and the UK became more tense after Brexit, collaboration even on these more successful collaborations of the Lancaster House Treaties began to slow down. However, there has not been significant progress at all in terms of joint capability development. According to Edgar Buckley, who was senior vice-​ president of Thales, a French multinational defence industrial company, and also took part in the work of the UK–​French High-​Level Working Group, ‘joint procurement has not yet become a reality, with a strong tendency on both sides to judge each cooperative opportunity separately on its merits rather than within the overall context of the treaty’ (Buckley, 2014). Although certain major joint projects have been discussed between London and Paris, implementation has not begun properly, and even the targeted €100 million annual budget for common R&T projects has not been spent. Buckley points out that only cooperation in the area of complex weapons met with success, but this cooperation, especially on missiles, had been quite effective well before the Treaties were signed (Buckley, 2014). The Nordic Defence Cooperation (NORDEFCO) was established by the defence ministers of Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway and Sweden when they signed a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) on 4 November 2009 in order to ‘strengthen the participating nations’ national defence, explore common synergies and facilitate efficient common solutions’ (NORDEFCO, 2009: 3). The five Nordic countries decided to enhance their defence-​ related cooperation in every possible field, including but not limited to capability development, defence policy, multinational operations, defence technology and defence industry. In 2007 Norway and Sweden published reports independently and together about how cost-​effectiveness could be achieved via defence cooperation among Nordic armed forces to help each other maintain the full range of defence capabilities (Saxi, 2011: 17–​18). In June 2008 another report was written together by Norway, Sweden and Finland that identified 140 possible areas for defence collaboration, and suggested 40 of them as an initial first step by the beginning of 2010. In 38

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November the same year Iceland and Denmark joined this initiative, which culminated in the establishing of the so-​called Nordic Supportive Defence Structures (NORDSUP), which ‘was something prelude to NORDEFCO’ (Dahl, 2014: 5). These activities remained at defence ministry level, but other processes also supported the creation of NORDEFCO. In June 2008 the foreign ministers of the five Nordic countries charged Thorvald Stoltenberg (former minister of foreign affairs of Norway) to draw up a plan for how the Nordic countries could cooperate on foreign and security issues over the next decade or so. The Stoltenberg report (Stoltenberg, 2009b) was presented to the Nordic foreign ministers at an extraordinary meeting in February 2009 and generated discussions about several wide-​ranging issues (Archer, 2010). Thanks to these efforts the Nordic Defence Cooperation was established at the end of 2009 by signing an MoU. With this step the participating countries put many separate Nordic defence collaborations under the framework of one structure. The MoU of NORDEFCO emphasized that this MDC is ‘a comprehensive, enhanced and long-​term approach to defence related issues’. Accordingly, it listed several general cooperation areas, including ‘defence related strategic and policy issues of common interests’, enhancing operational effectiveness, improving interoperability, collaboration on multinational operations, gaining technological benefits, and improving the competitiveness of the Nordic countries’ defence industries. In addition, the document kept open the possibility of collaboration in other areas and stressed that the participants would ‘identify new possible initiatives for cooperation in the areas of policy, capabilities and operations’ (NORDEFCO, 2009). NORDEFCO is not an organization but a ‘lean structure for a comprehensive cooperation’ (Andersen, 2013: 5). Decision-​making is based on consensus at every level, it has an annually rotating chairmanship and both the defence ministers and the chiefs of defence meet twice a year, while state secretaries meet once a year. The work of these bodies was supported by several committees and practical working groups, with titles such as: Capabilities, Human Resources & Education, Training & Exercises, Operations and Armaments. Dozens of projects dealt with topics such as: the Platform for Security Policy Dialogue; cooperation on operations; defence sector capacity-​building; air surveillance; counter-​improvised explosive devices; and joint deployable exploitation and analysis capacity. Projects in NORDEFCO do not need the participation of every Nordic country as they can choose to opt out of any activities, but they also have the opportunity to join to an on-​going project later. Of course, the above listed projects not the only ones pursued in the framework of NORDEFCO. Among others, cooperation on exercises, trainings, educational activities have been extremely successful throughout the years, but armament programmes 39

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and common procurements have usually generated disappointments (Dahl, 2014). On the one hand, Nordic defence collaboration has been expanding and deepening, and the political support exists for further progress. In the mid-​2010s it was perceived that NORDEFCO reached its structural and political limits which seemed to be difficult to overcome, but Russia’s revisionist approach in Ukraine and the military challenge it posed to the Nordic-​Baltic area reenergized NORDEFCO (Saxi, 2019). The third case is the so-​called Central European Defence Cooperation (CEDC). The first official CEDC meeting was held at the defence policy director (DPD) level at the margin of an EU meeting in January 2011 (Csiki and Nemeth, 2012). The defence policy directors of Austria, Croatia, the Czech Republic, Hungary and Slovakia discussed the possibility of practical defence collaboration. They decided to focus on areas where quick, practical wins could be achieved regarding capability development. For this, the participating MoDs agreed to complete a survey of the areas on which they were interested in cooperating. This resulted in an extended matrix, which was first discussed by the DPDs and where common interests were identified a lead nation started to coordinate the cooperation by organizing expert-​level seminars and writing food-​for-​thought papers. The groundwork of the actual defence cooperation was laid down at these events, which resulted in the launch of bi-​or trilateral practical military collaborations under the CEDC umbrella. The first collaborative initiatives in this regard included cooperation on: special operations forces (SOF); counter-​improvised explosive devices; logistics; disaster relief operations; chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear (CBRN) capabilities; and a joint training programme involving Czech, Croatian and Hungarian air mentor teams for NATO’s International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) mission (Csiki and Nemeth, 2013: 18–​19). The defence policy directors did not want to create new organizations or bureaucracies for coordinating CEDC and wanted to keep the cooperation as simple and flexible as possible. This flexibility ensured that the participating countries could join or opt out of any of the proposed projects and ‘could choose à la carte among defence cooperation initiatives without formal obligations’ (Csiki and Nemeth, 2012: 1). Furthermore, the lead nation of a project continued to coordinate the actual collaborations, while DPDs discussed higher-​level policy issues mostly on the margins of EU and NATO meetings. This approach brought down the ‘costs’ of the cooperation both in terms of time and financially. When CEDC projects became more solid, the collaboration was elevated to the level of defence ministers, who started to meet yearly in CEDC format. The first defence ministerial meeting was held in Austria in 2012, and from this point on the presidency system was also introduced. It meant that one of the CEDC countries took the presidency of the cooperation for one year and coordinated the efforts of CEDC in general and also organized the yearly defence ministerial meeting. 40

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Originally, CEDC was intended to focus on collaborations regarding defence capability development, but it has evolved and has also become a forum for coordination of defence policy standpoints and cooperation against mass illegal migration. Of course, capability development issues were still on the CEDC agenda later on. For instance, a Central European air-​policing framework was discussed after Hungary took over the policing of the Slovenian airspace, but a broader initiative that would have included more countries was not realized (Kurowska and Nemeth, 2013). At the same time, the defence policy directors started to use CEDC to coordinate their policy standpoints before EU and NATO plenary meetings, as they met on the margins of these sessions in CEDC format anyway. For instance, thanks to these CEDC meetings, Hungary and Austria strengthened their cooperation and aligned their policy standpoints regarding the EUFOR Althea operation in Bosnia and Herzegovina (Nemeth, 2018). After the European migration crisis in 2015, CEDC had a new impetus. Many CEDC countries were directly affected by the waves of migrants arriving in Europe, and their defence ministers discussed this issue and signed a joint declaration in April 2016. They agreed that CEDC ‘countries will support all initiatives aimed at reducing the migration pressure on Europe’ and ‘are committed to enhancing coordination in taking action to solve the crisis’ (Hungarian Ministry of Defence, 2016). Subsequently Austrian police and troops arrived at the Hungarian border to assist with handling the situation. The Czech and Slovakian police and militaries sent their personnel to Hungary as well, and renewed their contributions after the CEDC meeting. The first CEDC military exercise was held in 2017, and during this exercise the participating countries also prepared for a new migration crisis (Nemeth, 2018).

Developing the theoretical framework As Chapter 1 explained, this book introduces a new theoretical framework regarding defence cooperation and argues that the subregional approach is the most effective lens through which to understand defence collaborative dynamics in Europe. The theoretical framework introduces three structural and two situational factors that are necessary for the establishment of new subregional MDCs in Europe. The ‘structural factors’ are institutions, solid and long-​standing relationships, trends, perceptions that had been developed for a relatively long period, while ‘situational factors’ reflect the political and economic environment and personal relationships, which might change relatively quickly. The structural factors enable while the situational factors trigger the creation of defence collaboration. The structural factors are: 1) the existence of the European security community; 2) the perception that individual European armed forces do not have appropriate funds for defence; 41

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and 3) previous defence collaborations between the participating states. The situational factors are: 1) strong leadership by a group of enthusiastic high-​level officials and good interpersonal chemistry between them; and 2) a supportive political milieu for the defence cooperation. This section explains the research behind how these factors were identified. The core aim of the research was to investigate why European countries establish new subregional MDCs in Europe, when many cooperative frameworks have been in existence at different levels (for example, NATO and EU), and to identify those factors which encourage European states to prefer subregional cooperation on military capabilities. In order to answer these questions the case-​study research method was chosen, because the research focused on relatively current events, the relevant behaviours of the actors could not be manipulated and the research was mostly explanatory in nature. In political science the traditional view is that the method of single-​case and multiple-​case study researches differ. This difference is reflected in the names of these types of methods as well, because only the single-​case study research is called ‘case study’, and the multiple-​case study is mostly referred to as ‘comparative research’ (Lijphart, 1971). In addition, political scientists apply different methods on the basis of the number of the studied cases regarding multiple-​case studies; thus they differentiate small-​N comparison (two to twelve cases) and large-​N studies (of large numbers) (Halperin and Heath, 2012: 202–​29). Contrarily, Robert K. Yin argues that ‘case study research includes both single-​and multiple case studies’ (Yin, 2009: 19), and has developed a set of rigorous procedures which provides a comprehensive but still flexible framework for case-​study research thus mitigating the deficiencies suggested by critics of the case study method. Yin elaborated a twofold, technical definition for case studies. While the first part of the definition introduces the scope, the second part focuses on the technical characteristics of case study research. ‘In essence, the twofold definition shows how case study research comprises an all-​encompassing method covering the logic of design, data collection techniques, and specific approach to data analysis’ (Yin, 2009: 18). According to Yin’s definition (Yin, 2009: 18): 1. A case study is an empirical enquiry that investigates a contemporary phenomenon in depth in within its real life context, especially when the boundaries between phenomenon and context are not clearly evident. 2. The case study inquiry copes with the technically distinctive situation in which there will be many more variables of interest than data points, and as one result relies on multiple sources of evidence, with data needing to converge in a triangulating fashion, and as another result benefits from prior development of theoretical propositions to guide data collection and analysis. 42

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Based on the approach introduced in this definition, Yin not only proposes the components of a case study’s research design but also establishes a set of procedures to improve its quality and discusses the types of case studies as well. According to Yin, the research design of a case study has to contain at least five components (Yin, 2009: 27): a study’s question; propositions; unit(s) of analysis; the logic linking the data to the propositions; and the criteria for interpreting the findings. This means that the research design should include not only the type of information and data that the researcher needs to collect –​these can be inferred from the study’s question, the propositions and the units of analysis –​ but it has to tackle the situation after data collection by providing the logic which links data to the propositions and the criteria for interpreting the findings (Yin, 2009: 35). At the same time, Yin provides detailed procedures to the four tests –​ construct validity, internal validity, external validity and reliability –​common to every social science method in order to improve the quality of the case study research (Yin, 2009: 40–​5). For instance, with regard to construct validity –​‘identifying correct operational measures for the concepts being studied’ –​he suggests to ‘use multiple sources of evidence, establish chain of evidence’ and ‘have key informants review draft case study report’. In the case of reliability –​‘demonstrating that the operations of study can be repeated with the same result’ –​he proposes to ‘use case study protocol’ and ‘develop case study data base’ (Yin, 2009: 40–​1). Of course, Yin does not list only these procedures but elaborates them in detail. As has already been mentioned, Yin does not consider the distinction between single and multiple case studies as the ‘classic’ approach in political science does. According to Yin, we have to think case studies as analogous to experiments. Thus, the rationales which underpin the execution of a single experiment can justify conducting a single-​case study, and multiple-​ case studies must be ‘seen’ as multiple experiments, where it is not the sampling logic of the ‘classic’ case study approach that should be used but the replication logic of multiple experiments. Yin highlights the fact that, based on the logic of experiments, at least five major rationales exist for developing single-​case design, which emerge either when the case represents the critical case in testing a theory or when it is an extreme case, or is a typical case, or is a revelatory case or is a longitudinal case which covers a longer period. Although, multiple case designs are deemed to provide more ‘compelling’ results, not all research can be done in this manner, and usually research concerning the extreme case, the critical case and the revelatory case is conducted in a single-​case study. However, we have to bear in mind that in general multiple-​case studies are more ‘robust’ than single-​case studies, so if we have the opportunity to conduct a multiple-​case study instead of a single-​case study, it has to be 43

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the preferred type. Yin argues that the multiple experiments’ replication logic and not the survey-​based sampling logic is relevant to multiple-​case studies. Thus, he proposes two replication logics and suggests that ‘each case must be carefully selected so that it either (a) predicts similar results (a literal replication) or (b) predicts contrasting results but for anticipatable reasons (a theoretical replication)’. According to Yin, ‘an important step in all of these replication procedures is the development of a rich, theoretical framework’, because it provides the relevant factors –​which will be found (literal replications) or will be not found (theoretical replication) –​in the selected replication procedure (Yin, 2009: 54). Yin also distinguishes between case studies on the basis of whether they have more than one unit or sub-​units of analysis. If it contains more than one sub-​unit of analysis, he calls them ‘embedded’ case studies; if not, and the case study investigates the case from a ‘global’ perspective, it is a holistic case study. Both types have their own advantages, but the researcher has to pay considerable attention to their weaknesses as well. For instance, with regard to a holistic case design, common pitfalls are that researchers can conduct the study ‘at an unduly abstract level, lacking sufficiently clear measures or data’, or the case study may take a new orientation ‘and the evidence begins to address a different research question’ (Yin, 2009: 51–​2). A typical problem of embedded case design, on the other hand, can easily occur if the case study focuses too much on the sub-​unit level and ‘fails to return to the larger unit of analysis’ (Yin, 2009: 51). As was mentioned earlier, the research intended to explore why new subregional MDCs in Europe are established, when many defence collaborations exist, and to identify those factors which encourage European states to create subregional MDCs. The assumption behind the research was that those European countries that establish or renew subregional MDCs were not fully satisfied with the already existing cooperative frameworks; they deemed them inadequate and inefficient for defence cooperation on certain issues. At the same time these countries perceived cooperation in subregional MDCs to be more beneficial. As the most relevant defence collaborations in the 2000s happened in NATO and EU institutional frameworks, the question arises of why certain countries think that a new or a renewed subregional cooperation, which is less institutionalized, would be more advantageous or more effective than cooperative frameworks in organizations –​such as the EU or NATO –​which have well-​institutionalized solutions for collaborations and negotiations? Different explanations existed. One of the understandings of this phenomenon in the policy sphere was best described by Pieter-​Jan Parrein. He argued that new subregional MDCs were established and old ones were re-​energized for two main reasons (Parrein, 2012). First, the evolution of pan-​European structures regarding defence cooperation did not progress 44

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appropriately, as they had not significantly mitigated European fragmentation in the field of defence. Secondly, European states also needed quick solutions to maintain national capabilities after the austerity measures generated by the financial crisis. This explanation seems logical, as the studied cases were established after the beginning of the financial crisis. Another possible answer can be inferred from the emerging different threat perceptions of NATO/​ EU member states, which have generated concerns for many policymakers and scholars in NATO. This problem was noted by, among others, British Defence Secretary of that time, Philip Hammond (Baron, 2013) and experts from many NATO member states, who deemed this issue highly significant regarding future alliance operations at a NATO workshop as well (NATO, 2013). Marko Papic –​analyst at Stratfor –​even argued that the main reason of the evolution of ‘a set of regionalized groupings’ regarding security was the different threat perceptions countries possess on the continent. He explicitly stated that ‘in Europe, there is no such clarity of what constitutes a threat’ and because of ‘the regionalization of European security organizations’ basically ‘NATO has ceased to effectively respond to the national security interests of European states’ (Papic, 2011). To establish which concept explains the phenomenon of the development of subregional MDCs, the abovementioned three concepts were used as possible explanations and were tested through different cases. The analytic technique used was pattern-​matching, which ‘compares an empirically based pattern with a predicted one (or with several alternative predictions)’ (Yin, 2009: 136). Furthermore, using rival explanations as patterns provided an opportunity for pattern-​matching for independent variables. According to Yin: This analysis requires the development of rival theoretical propositions, articulated in operational terms. The desired characteristic of these rival explanations is that each involves a pattern of independent variables that is mutually exclusive: If one explanation is to be valid, the others cannot be. This means that the presence of certain independent variables (predicted by one explanation) precludes the presence of other independent variables (predicted by a rival explanation). The independent variables may involve several or many different types of characteristics or events, each assessed with different measures and instruments. The concern of the case study analysis, however, is with the overall pattern of results and the degree to which the observed pattern matches the predicted one. This type of pattern matching of independent variables also can be done either with a single case or with multiple cases. With a single case, the successful matching of the pattern to one of the rival explanations would be evidence for concluding that this explanation was the correct 45

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one (and that the other explanations were incorrect). Again, even with a single case, threats to validity –​basically constituting another group of rival explanations –​should be identified and ruled out. Moreover, if this identical result were additionally obtained over multiple cases, literal replication of the single cases would have been accomplished, and the cross-​case results might be stated even more assertively. (Yin, 2009: 140) This analytic method was applied in a multiple-​case design, because a multiple-​case study is more ‘robust’ and can provide more compelling results. This meant that one of the replication logics suggested by Yin could be used. This multiple-​case design was an embedded one and not a holistic one, where the cases were certain subregional MDCs and the ‘embedded unit of analysis’ was different for the three possible explanations: 1) dissatisfaction with European-​level defence integration; 2) defence budget cuts after the financial crisis; or 3) threat perceptions by the states in the studied subregional MDCs.

Rival Explanation 1: lack of progress on pan-​European/​transatlantic defence cooperation This rival explanation suggests that European states were dissatisfied with the lack of progress on NATO/​EU level defence cooperative efforts, and they thus created subregional MDCs in order to make better progress in a different format. In this case the independent variable is ‘lack of progress on pan-​European and Transatlantic defence cooperation’, which links via the intervening variable of ‘European nations are dissatisfied with NATO and EU’ to the dependent variable of ‘creation of subregional MDC’ (see Figure 3.1). Figure 3.1: Generic pattern of Rival Explanation 1 Lack of progress on panEuropean and Transatlantic defence cooperation

European nations are dissatisfied with NATO and EU

Creation of subregional MDC

Based on this pattern’s variables, several assumptions were developed as prerequisites to verify this rival explanation. Basically, each variable has its own prerequisite, thus Prerequisite 1 is a prerequisite for the independent variable, Prerequisite 2 is for the intervening variable and Prerequisite 3 is for the dependent variable. The prerequisites are the following: 1. The lack of progress regarding defence cooperation in EU and NATO had to be identified. 46

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2. The dissatisfaction of countries participating in the studied subregional MDC concerning the lack of progress of defence cooperative efforts in the EU and NATO had to be detected. 3. The creation of the subregional MDC must be linked to the dissatisfaction of the participating countries with the NATO/​EU. Figure 3.2: Actual case patterns of Rival Explanation 1 Lack of progress on panEuropean and Transatlantic defence cooperation

CEDC countries are dissatified with NATO and EU

Creation of CEDC

Lack of progress on panEuropean and Transatlantic defence cooperation

UK and France are dissatified with NATO and EU

Creation of Lancaster House Treaties

Lack of progress on panEuropean and Transatlantic defence cooperation

Nordic countries are dissatisfied with NATO and EU

Creation of NORDEFCO

If we compare the actual patterns of the three cases (see Figure 3.2) with the generic pattern of Rival Explanation 1, we can see that Rival Explanation 1 has explanatory power over the case of the Lancaster House Treaties only. Every prerequisite of the Lancaster House Treaties could be verified, which means that the pattern of Rival Explanation 1 met the empirical based pattern concerning this case. Both the UK and France were dissatisfied with the progress of defence cooperative efforts in NATO and the EU, as they felt that most European countries did not take defence seriously enough, and that closer cooperation between Europe’s premier military powers would thus be beneficial. This phenomenon played an important role in establishing the Lancaster House Treaties between the two countries. As far as the CEDC and NORDEFCO are concerned, Rival Explanation 1 does not have explanatory power, because Prerequisite 2 could not be verified concerning these two cases. As the intervening variable was not valid, it could not link the independent variable to the dependent variable either. This means that, although lack of progress on pan-​European and transatlantic defence cooperation (independent variable) could be verified based on the literature, the dissatisfaction of the Nordic and CEDC countries with NATO and EU defence cooperation (intervening variable) could not. CEDC countries that were members of NATO were not critical of NATO; rather, bigger allies were critical of them on defence issues (Bartkowski, 2004; Adams, 2007; Richter 2011). They were not dissatisfied with the lack of progress on EU defence collaborations either, because they focused almost exclusively on NATO issues, and were less concerned with ESDP/​CSDP. Austria has been an EU member only, and Vienna was not dissatisfied with ESDP, as a less deep cooperation and less focus on war fighting capabilities fit Austria’s identity and the capabilities of its armed forces (Nemeth, 2018). 47

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Although the Nordic NATO members used to be sceptical towards NATO, like Denmark in the 1980s (Rieker, 2006a: 126–​8; Doeser, 2011), or ambivalent, like Norway in the 1990s (Rottem, 2007), in the period when NORDEFCO was created they became important proponents and supporters of NATO policies, cooperative initiatives and operations (Ringsmose and Rynning, 2008; Petersson and Saxi, 2013). Sweden and Finland were not dissatisfied with NATO either, because, despite the fact that they were not NATO members, they were able to join many NATO initiatives and operations (Cottey, 2013b; Pyykönen, 2016) and could choose the level and depth of this cooperation. The Nordic EU members were not dissatisfied with the EU as it was flexible enough both to support Sweden’s ambitious military transformation goals (Jacoby and Jones, 2008: 324–​7) and to satisfy Finland with its territorial defence focus. Denmark could not participate in ESDP/​CSDP, because it opted-​out from this policy area in the EU, but, interestingly, the non-​EU member Norway was more integrated into ESDP/​ CSDP projects, initiatives and operations. Lack of progress in ESDP/​CSDP was not a problem for them, but Danish and especially Norwegian officials and bureaucrats were concerned that they could not influence decisions in ESDP/​CSDP (Rieker, 2006b: 292–​4; Olsen, 2011: 23). Based on the comparison of the predicted generic version of Rival Explanation 1 and the three actual case patterns, we can conclude that Rival Explanation 1 cannot explain per se why the three subregional MDCs were established, because it had explanatory power over the case of Lancaster House Treaties only.

Rival Explanation 2:​effects of the financial crisis Rival Explanation 2 assumes that as a consequence of the financial crisis of 2008 the defence budgets of the studied European states were decreased, forcing them to turn to multinational solutions in order to get help to maintain their national military capabilities. At the end of this process, the studied countries created subregional MDCs to mitigate the effects of the defence budget cuts. Accordingly, the independent variable of Rival Explanation 2 is ‘defence budget cuts as a consequence of the financial crisis’, the intervening variable is ‘need for alternative solutions to maintain national military capabilities’ and the dependent variable is ‘creation of subregional MDC’ (see Figure 3.3). This rival explanation was meant to test the widely shared assumption among experts that financial scarcity is a relevant factor regarding defence cooperation in Europe. By examining the three cases after the financial crisis, when state budgets were under pressure, this book attempts to establish whether this view is supported by empirical evidence. The prerequisites for the variables of the pattern of this rival explanation are the following: 48

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Figure 3.3: Generic pattern of Rival Explanation 2 Defence budget cuts as a consequence of the financial crisis

Need for alternative solutions to maintain national military capabilities

Creation of subregional MDC

1. Defence budget cuts had to happen as a consequence of the financial crisis in the participating countries of the studied subregional MDC. 2. The defence budget cuts had to foster the search for a range of alternative multinational solutions to maintain national military capabilities in the participating countries of the studied subregional MDC. 3. The creation of the studied subregional MDC needed to be linked to the participating countries’ search for alternative multinational solutions to maintain national military capabilities as a consequence of the financial crisis. Figure 3.4: Actual case patterns of Rival Explanation 2 CEDC defence budget cuts as a consequence of the financial crisis

Need for alternative solutions to maintain national military capabilities

Creation of CEDC

UK and FR defence budget cuts as a consequence of the financial crisis

Need for alternative solutions to maintain national military capabilities

Creation of Lancaster House Treaties

Nordic defence budget cuts as a consequence of the financial crisis

Need for alternative solutions to maintain national military capabilities

Creation of NORDEFCO

If we compare the actual case patterns (see Figure 3.4) and the generic pattern of Rival Explanation 2, we can conclude that none of the actual case patterns met the generic one. In the cases of CEDC and the Lancaster House Treaties, we can see that the participating countries cut their defence budgets as a consequence of the financial crisis, so the prerequisite of the independent variable was verified. However, except for Hungary (Hungarian Ministry of Defence, 2012), they did not search for alternative multinational solutions to mitigate the effects of their decreased defence budgets on national military capabilities; instead, they chose to absorb the losses individually. In the case of the Lancaster House Treaties, the UK accepted that some of its military capabilities would be lost temporarily or permanently (HM Government, 2010), while France rather opted for ‘muddling through’ and slowed down its military modernization (Carnegy, 2013). The CEDC countries chose different strategies to deal with the defence budget cuts as well, but basically all of them attempted to solve their financial problems on their own. Accordingly, the prerequisite of the intervening variable was not verified concerning these two cases; thus the intervening variable (‘need for alternative solutions to maintain national military capabilities’) could not link the independent variable to the dependent variable (‘creation of subregional MDC’). 49

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The NORDEFCO case was different, because already the dependent variable was not verified, since the Nordic countries did not cut their defence budgets. Denmark decreased its defence budget slightly, but the other three Nordic countries with armed forces (Finland, Norway and Sweden) increased their defence budgets significantly in the years following the financial crisis. As even the independent variable was not verified, it could not be the source of the intervening and dependent variables either. Based on the fact that Rival Explanation 2 could not provide evidence for establishing the studied MDCs, we can conclude that it does not have explanatory power in their regard.

Rival Explanation 3: convergent threat perceptions Rival Explanation 3 supposes that the countries perceived the same threat(s) in their subregion, and accordingly they began to form an alliance by starting conversations and cooperation against this threat(s). As a final step, they institutionalized this alliance in the form of the studied subregional MDCs. Based on the abovementioned logic, the independent variable of Rival Explanation 3 is ‘perception of the same threat’ by the countries of the studied subregions, the intervening variable is starting establishing ‘alliances against the biggest threat’ by these countries and the dependent variable is ‘creation of subregional MDC’ (see Figure 3.5). Figure 3.5: Generic pattern of Rival Explanation 3 Perception of the same threat

Alliances against the biggest threat

Creation of subregional MDC

The prerequisites for verifying the variables of this pattern are the following: 1. The states participating in the studied subregional MDC had to share the perception of the same threat or threats as the largest threat. 2. The states participating in the studied subregional MDC had to initiate discussions and cooperation regarding the shared threat and had to begin to cooperate on them before the creation of the subregional MDC. 3. The links between the shared biggest threat(s) discussed and cooperated on by the states participating in the studied subregional MDC and the initiation and creation of subregional MDC have to be established. The analysis of the actual case patterns (see Figure 3.6) suggests that none of them met the generic pattern of Rival Explanation 3. The dependent variable 50

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Figure 3.6: Actual case patterns of Rival Explanation 3 Perception of the same threat

Alliances against the biggest threat

Creation of CEDC

Perception of the same threat

Alliances against the biggest threat

Creation of Lancaster House Treaties

Perception of the same threat

Alliances against the biggest threat

Creation of NORDEFCO

in all three cases was verified: the countries participating in the individual subregional MDCs shared the same threats as their most important national security issues. In case of CEDC, the intervening variable could not be verified. Although CEDC countries shared the same threats, they did not start discussions or cooperation on them in CEDC format, because they had already been collaborating on these issues in different Central European, European and other multilateral formats. In regard to the Lancaster House Treaties and NORDEFCO, the participating countries started conversations and cooperation in Nordic and British–​French bilateral frameworks on the shared threats, thus the intervening variable was verified in these cases. However, there was no link between the intervening and dependent variables. The analysis of the Lancaster House Treaties and the package of joint measures, the interviews with officials and the discourse between French and British experts highlighted the fact that shared threats were not a factor in establishing of this MDC. The Nordic countries discussed many security related issues at a high level and they began collaborating on them, but cooperation on issues that could be connected to the shared threats was not initiated in the framework of NORDEFCO but in other Nordic formats and institutions. The comparison of the shared threats of the participating nations of the three subregional MDCs (see Figure 3.7) shows that these countries not only shared threats with their subregional partners, but also that they shared them with countries in other subregions. Accordingly, regarding most of the threats it would not have been logical to start a subregional cooperation, because these were not problems specific to the subregion. The only exception here is the Arctic region, where Nordic countries have a special interest as a consequence of their geopolitical location.2

Why were the subregional MDCs created? The empirically based patterns Although the studied rival explanations did not explain why European countries established the three studied subregional MDCs, when similar pan-​European structures existed in the framework of NATO and the EU 51

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Figure 3.7: Shared threats of the subregional MDCs’ participating nations CEDC Lancaster House Treaties • Proliferation of Weapons • Terrorism of Mass Destruction • Cyber security (WMD) • Natural and man-made • Terrorism disasters • Regional conflicts • Organized crime • Cyber security • Natural and man-made disasters

NORDEFCO • Terrorism • Proliferation of WMD • Environmental issues (natural disasters and/or climate change) • Arctic region • Cyber attacks

Figure 3.8: Empirically based pattern of CEDC EU and NATO generated milieu that supported creation of subregional MDCs

CEDC countries wanted to cooperate on NATO and EU multinational projects Creation of CEDC Individual motivations of CEDC countries to cooperate in CEDC

the research has helped to rule out several possible answers, and has also assisted in the development of the empirically based patterns concerning every case. The empirically based CEDC pattern (see Figure 3.8) highlights the fact that one of the main reasons why CEDC was created is that NATO’s and EU’s initiatives (Smart Defence, P&S) created a milieu that supported the creation of MDCs in general. This milieu had an impact on Central European countries, and accordingly they intended to create CEDC to support NATO’s and EU’s new initiatives. This means that CEDC countries did not want to establish an alternative to NATO and EU frameworks for defence cooperation; rather, they wanted to support them with the CEDC (Nemeth, 2018). The other identified main reason of the launching of CEDC was that every CEDC country had its own individual motivations to cooperate in a CEDC format. The largest stakes were held by Hungary and Austria (Csiki and Molnar, 2010; Kurowska and Nemeth, 2013; Hungarian MoD Official, 2013; Austrian MoD Official 2014), the two countries that initiated CEDC, but every participating state had some interest in it, if only because they just did not want to be left out (Nemeth, 2018). Based on these, two independent variables were identified concerning the creation of CEDC. One of them is ‘EU and NATO generated milieu that supported creation of subregional MDCs’. This independent variable is linked to the dependent variable of the creation of CEDC via the 52

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intervening variable of ‘CEDC countries wanted to cooperate on NATO and EU multinational projects’. The other independent variable is the ‘individual motivations of CEDC countries’, with an emphasis of Austrian and Hungarian motivations. As we saw, the rival explanation of ‘Lack of progress in pan-​European/​ Transatlantic defence cooperation’ had explanatory power over the Lancaster House Treaties case, and this contributed significantly to the creation of this MDC. Another important factor was the fact that defence cooperation between Britain and France had already been going on for decades. As the Lancaster House Treaties basically put the already existing cooperative initiatives into one framework (Mid-​career UK MoD Official, 2014), this process was crucial. A third reason was that the personalities and motivations of the French President Nicolas Sarkozy and Prime Minister David Cameron matched and the chemistry between them worked well (Former French MoD Official, 2014; Senior UK MoD Official, 2014). Although the first two factors were long-​standing trends, the constellation of compatible political personalities, who took advantage of these trends and pushed for a more intensive cooperation, was needed to trigger the Lancaster House Treaties. Thus, the empirically based pattern of the establishing of the Lancaster House Treaties (see Figure 3.9) has three independent variables. The first is the ‘Lack of progress on pan-​European/​transatlantic defence cooperation’, which according to Rival Explanation 1 is linked to the creation of the Lancaster House Treaties (dependent variable) via the intervening variable of the ‘UK and France are dissatisfied with EU and NATO’. The second and third independent variables were the ‘decades-​long defence cooperation between France and UK’ and ‘personalities, motivations and relationship of leaders’, which were directly connected to the dependent variable of the ‘creation of the Lancaster House treaties’. The actual empirically based pattern of NORDEFCO (see Figure 3.10) shows that the creation of this MDC happened thanks to three main reasons. First, the Swedish and Norwegian Chiefs of Defence shared a Figure 3.9: Empirically based pattern of Lancaster House Treaties Lack of progress on panEuropean and Transatlantic defence cooperation

UK and France are dissatisfied with NATO and EU

Decades-long defence cooperation between FR and UK

Creation of Lancaster House Treaties

Personalities, motivations and relationships of leaders

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Figure 3.10: Empirically based pattern of NORDEFCO Shared vision and leadership of the Swedish and Norwegian Chief of Defences Institutional considerations of SWE, FIN and, to a lesser extent, NOR

Creation of NORDEFCO

Supportive political milieu to Nordic collaborations

vision that they could solve their ‘critical mass’ problem via multinational defence cooperation (Saxi, 2011: 73), and took a leadership role in this regard. Second, several countries had institutional considerations that supported the creation of NORDEFCO. Sweden and Finland did not perceive the EU as the most appropriate forum for defence cooperation on capability development, and as they were not members of NATO they believed that a subregional organization would suit their interests better. Although Norway was not an EU member and did not have serious concerns with cooperation in NATO, Oslo saw NORDEFCO as an opportunity to get more access to ESDP/​CSDP via more robust defence cooperation with EU members Finland and Sweden (Saxi, 2011: 28–​9). The third main factor was the political milieu, which supported the Nordic cooperation in general. Without this milieu, military cooperation between Nordic states could have stalled with the creation of NORDSUP with the participation of Finland, Norway and Sweden only. Accordingly, the empirically based pattern of the creation of NORDEFCO had three independent variables: ‘shared vision and leadership by the Swedish and Norwegian defence chiefs’, ‘institutional considerations of Sweden, Finland and, to a lesser extent, Norway’ and the ‘supportive political environment for Nordic collaborations’.

Factors necessary for the establishment of subregional MDCs:​a generic framework This section attempts to generalize the results of the research based on the empirically based patterns and the empirical material used for studying the three rival explanations. According to the results of the research, it was concluded that the three cases provided three main structural and two main situational factors that played the most significant roles in the creation of these subregional MDCs. The factors are: 54

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Structural factors: 1) the existence of the European security community; 2) the perception that individual European armed forces do not have appropriate funds for defence; 3) previous defence collaborations between the participating states. Situational factors: 1) strong leadership by a group of enthusiastic high-​level officials and good interpersonal chemistry between them; 2) a supportive political milieu for the defence cooperation.

Structural factors Structural factors are solid long-​standing relationships, trends and perceptions that have developed over a relatively long period and do not change overnight. Usually they are bounded by and linked to certain structures: for example, organizations, institutions and frameworks. Three structural factors concerning the circumstances that encourage the creation of subregional MDCs were identified: the existence of the European security community; the perception that individual European armed forces do not have appropriate funds for defence; and previous defence collaborations between the participating states. Based on the research into the three case studies, we can conclude that these structural factors did not trigger the establishment of subregional MDCs but did enable their creation. This means that the existence of these structural factors would not have been enough per se to launch subregional MDCs, but without their presence the MDCs being studied would not have been established either.

The existence of the European security community In the European security community it is very unlikely that European states will wage war against each other, because of their shared views about the concept of security, their similar identity and their broad and deep institutional security cooperation (Cottey, 2013a: 13). NATO and the EU as security organizations have an extremely important role in this regard, and this is supported by this research too, as the perceptions of the countries participating in the MDCs about certain EU and NATO processes and initiatives affected the creation of the studied subregional MDCs significantly. However, the nature of its impact was different in each case. In regard to the Lancaster House Treaties, British and French dissatisfaction regarding progress on EU-​and NATO-​level defence capability cooperation 55

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facilitated the creation of the British–​French MDC. Both countries perceived progress on capability development in these two institutions negatively, and they believed that as the only two major military powers in Europe they could progress faster bilaterally than was possible within the EU and NATO. CEDC was established to support NATO and EU initiatives, because the smaller Central European countries perceived that they did not have sufficient resources to provide appropriate capabilities to the new Smart Defence and P&S initiatives. Thus Central European countries investigated how could they work together to support NATO and the EU in their efforts, and searched for partners in already existing projects within the framework for CEDC. In the case of NORDEFCO, EU members Sweden and Finland did not deem the EU as an appropriate forum for multinational defence cooperation on capability development, because it was deemed too slow and complicated for that (Saxi, 2011: 28–​9). These phenomena supported the setting up of NORDEFCO. The European countries studied here were deeply integrated into the EU and/​or NATO, and their perceptions concerning these organizations had evolved over a long period and are thus probably deeply ingrained in their decision-​makers’ way of thinking. Accordingly, perceptions about NATO and EU processes and initiatives that could evolve thanks to the European security community had a relevant impact on the creation of the MDCs being studied here.

The perception that individual European armed forces do not have appropriate funds for defence As was shown in Chapter 1, there is a widely shared view among scholars that the main reason for the creation of MDCs in Europe is a lack of financial resources for defence. However, this research showed that, although this is part of the answer, it is not the only relevant factor in this regard and not always the most relevant one either. The research focused on MDCs that were created after the financial crisis of 2008 to see whether rapidly declining defence budgets facilitate defence cooperation. The answer was no. The CEDC countries and UK and France sought to mitigate the effects of their shrinking defence budgets by national solutions rather than multinational ones. The defence budget cuts were so severe and so quick that the defence policy communities (DPCs) did not even have time to consider the establishment of sophisticated multinational solutions for this problem, and some of them even worried that already existing multinational collaborations could fall prey to financial constraints too (see the details in Chapter 5). At the same time, the Nordic countries did not cut their defence budgets considerably after the financial crisis, and so their defence collaborations were not affected either. 56

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Although the financial crisis did not trigger the establishment of the MDCs being studied, economic issues were always taken into consideration. For instance, the Norwegian and Swedish bilateral cooperation that became the core of NORDEFCO began from the conviction that the capabilities of the armed forces of the two countries would lose a critical mass that was necessary for militaries. In terms of CEDC, the Hungarian DPC pushed the creation of this MDC to pool and share fighter jet capabilities in the region, as this was a huge problem for most of the countries in Central and Eastern Europe. Although the Lancaster House Treaties did not include many new initiatives, they did provide a framework for previously established French and British defence collaborations that were intended to generate synergies and savings. Even when the stakeholders did not articulate the lack of resources explicitly, this issue was implicit in their narratives. The perception that individual European armed forces do not have appropriate funds for defence became so ingrained in the mindset of European DPCs that often they did not recognize this issue as something new, because it became part of their everyday life, influencing their decisions.

Previous long-​standing defence collaborations between the participating countries If we look at the three subregional MDCs in question, we can see that they barely included new initiatives or new institutions. Basically all of them created new frameworks that merged with already existing defence collaborations, some of which had been evolving for decades. In regard to the Lancaster House Treaties, a UK MoD official pointed out, that the vast majority of the Franco-​British bilateral projects had already existed before Lancaster House, and the treaties ‘only canonized’ them and put them into one overarching framework (Mid-​career UK MoD Official, 2014). These defence collaborations between France and Britain had been evolving for 30–40 years. For instance, the agreement that made sure that British and French defence ministers would meet twice a year was signed in 1982, and the two MoDs agreed that they would not start new armaments programmes without discussing it with their counterpart in 1984 (Chabaud, 1989: 155–​ 66). The Anglo-​French Joint Nuclear Commission was established in 1992, the LoI between the French and British armies was signed in 1997, and the Memorandum for Understanding concerning cooperation on defence related research and development was signed in 2000 (Taylor, 2010: 4–​7). These just created the framework that enabled the two countries to collaborate on a range of activities, including aircraft carriers, unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs), A400 transport aircraft, missile systems, helicopters, training, exercises and so on. The situation with NORDEFCO was the same. As analysts have pointed out, NORDEFCO ‘was in reality nothing more than a merger of earlier 57

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cooperation initiatives […] in different areas within a common framework’ (Rieker and Terlikowski, 2015: 3). The origins of the Nordic defence collaboration go back much earlier, to when cooperative structures started to be established (see a more detailed discussion in Chapter 6). For instance, in the 1960s NORDSAMFN (Nordic cooperation group for military UN matters) was created to improve Nordic cooperation on UN peacekeeping operations. NORDSAMFN was abolished in 1997, and a larger and more developed structure was created the same year in the form of the Nordic Coordinated Arrangement for Military Peace Support (NORDCAPS) (Jakobsen, 2007: 459). NORDAC established Nordic collaboration in the field of armament development and procurement in 1994 (Hagelin, 2006: 170), and the Nordic Supportive Defence Structures (NORDSUP) were launched to focus on force production and supportive functions in 2008 (Forsberg, 2013: 1169). Basically, these three structures were merged into the framework of NORDEFCO in 2009. Although CEDC did not have as long a history as the British–​French bilateral defence cooperation and the Nordic military collaborations, defence cooperation among Central European states has evolved rapidly since the end of the Cold War. They collaborated in subregional (for example, the Visegrad Group or Central European Nations’ Cooperation in Peace Support [CENCOOP]) and regional (OSCE, EU, NATO) frameworks, and accordingly they developed dense cooperative relations with each other. If we look at CEDC projects (Csiki and Nemeth, 2013: 18), we can see that almost all of them were based on ongoing projects, such as the Austrian–​Croatian bilateral SOF cooperation, the Czech–​Croatian bilateral training for Air Mentor Teams, the Czech-​led Multinational Logistic Co-​ordination Centre and so on. Thus, similarly to the Lancaster House Treaties and NORDEFCO, CEDC was an initiative that put already existing collaborations into one overarching framework. Previous long-​standing defence collaborations between the participating states of the studied subregional MDCs were therefore crucial, as they enabled the creation of CEDC, Lancaster House Treaties and NORDEFCO. Without these previously existing multinational projects and institutions, the MDCs being studied could not have been created in their current format.

Situational factors Situational factors comprise, for the purposes of this book, personal relationships and the political and economic environment, which can change relatively fast. These elements create a situation that may not be long-​lasting, but which still provides a window of opportunity to launch initiatives. Two situational factors concerning the circumstances that encouraged the creation of subregional MDCs are identified: strong leadership by a group of enthusiastic high-​level officials and good interpersonal chemistry 58

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between them; and a supportive political milieu for subregional multinational defence cooperation. Based on the study of the three cases, we can conclude that situational factors help to explain why the subregional MDCs being studied were established at a particular time. The presence of these factors triggered the launch of these MDCs, which otherwise would not have been set up.

Strong leadership by a group of enthusiastic high-​level officials and good interpersonal chemistry between them In all three cases a core group of enthusiastic high-​level officials initiated the subregional MDC. They were the key figures concerning the launch of these MDCs, which means that for various reasons they invested time and resources in order to create these collaborative frameworks. With regard to NORDEFCO, the Norwegian Chief of Defence (ChoD) Sverre Diesen and the Swedish Chief of Defence Håkan Syrén were the key figures, the ‘architects’ of the cooperation. They shared the same vision that their ‘critical mass’ problem could be overcome by deeper, multinational, Nordic defence cooperation. They took a leadership role to launch several analyses and organize different multinational (bilateral and trilateral [with Finland] Nordic) discussions about this issue. They pressed forward for the institutionalization of the cooperation they envisioned. In the case of the Lancaster House Treaties, David Cameron was the person who pushed for an ambitious defence agreement with France, and even sent a handwritten letter to President Sarkozy about his propositions. Sarkozy became enthusiastic about the idea and provided his full support (Senior UK MoD Official, 2014). In the launch of CEDC the Austrian defence policy director Johann Pucher and his Hungarian counterpart József Bali were the key figures. They organized seminars to set out the foundations of CEDC and thereafter they also took the CEDC presidency roles to help continue and deepen this cooperation (Csiki and Molnár, 2010: 4). In all three cases the key figures (Diesen and Syrén, Cameron and Sarkozy, Pucher and Bali) had a very good interpersonal chemistry as well. This seems to be logical, because people are less likely to start a new cooperative enterprise with people they do not like. Accordingly, we cannot ignore the role of personalities in the creation of subregional MDCs.

Supportive political milieu for subregional multinational defence cooperation A supportive political milieu was crucial for the launch of each of the MDCs in question. Without a milieu that was supportive of Nordic collaborations in general, NORDEFCO might have not been created. New Nordic military cooperation would probably have ended with the creation of 59

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NORDSUP, with the participation of Finland, Norway and Sweden, as these three states were the ones most interested in deeper Nordic defence cooperation. However, the positive milieu that existed at that time helped Denmark and Iceland to become involved into a re-​energized Nordic defence collaborative framework. In the case of CEDC, NATO and the EU created a positive environment by launching, respectively, the Smart Defence and P&S initiatives. These initiatives emphasized and encouraged the necessity of multinational defence collaborations that facilitated the setting up of CEDC. As far as the Lancaster House Treaties are concerned, the political context was different and was strongly linked to the British Prime Minister and the French President. For Cameron, the domestic political milieu was the most important one, because he wanted to demonstrate to British Eurosceptics that Britain could cooperate with Europeans outside the EU. For Sarkozy, the European-​level political context was more relevant: he wanted to show that France could lead Europe and even could draw the UK into European projects. To sum up, a supportive political milieu for launching new subregional MDCs was important, because without it the enthusiastic officials would have been working in vacuum. They would probably still have been convinced that launching the MDC was necessary, but outside the enthusiastic group other officials of the DPC or DPCs of other countries would not necessarily have participated in a new defence cooperative framework.

Conclusion The original patterns of rival explanations that were developed for conducting research into why certain European countries established new subregional MDCs instead of cooperating within NATO and the EU and establishing the circumstances that encourage European states to prefer subregional cooperation over NATO and EU were not able to answer the research questions. However, this research provided an opportunity to exclude the rival explanations as possible explanations and helped to develop the empirically based patterns that could convincingly explain each of the three individual case studies. These empirically based patterns helped to develop the theoretical framework of the subregional approach that describes the factors and their interactions, which encouraged the creation of the studied subregional MDCs. The next five Chapters (4–​8) examine these factors one by one in detail, while Chapter 9 highlights how they interact with each other.

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4

The European Security Community More than sixty years ago Karl Deutsch argued in his seminal work that a ‘security community’ emerges when states agree to resolve their conflicts peacefully, not applying military force against each other but using mostly institutional procedures to overcome their differences (Deutsch, 1957). He pointed out that such states not only exist next to each other, but they also develop trust, shared values, shared identities and a sense of community. Building on Deutsch’s idea, Emanuel Adler and Michael Barnett have highlighted the fact that it is a reasonable assumption in a security community ‘that states do not undertake –​indeed, do not consider –​security actions that can be interpreted by others within the community as militarily threatening’ (Adler and Barnett, 1998: 34–​5). Adler and Barnett also distinguish between loosely and tightly coupled pluralistic security communities. The most significant difference is that while a loosely coupled security community is only a transnational region where states practise self-​restraint based on shared values and identities to ensure ‘dependable expectations of peaceful change’, a tightly coupled security community has become a mutual ‘aid society’ through common institutions and collective security arrangements (Adler and Barnett, 1998: 30–​7). Europe has a tightly coupled security community, which is based on the military, economic and political integration that has happened mostly through NATO and the EU. This is the most relevant precondition that allows the proliferation of multinational defence cooperations (MDCs) in Europe, and the first structural factor discussed in this book. Before the emergence of the European security community, the danger of war had always loomed over Europe. In the twentieth century, two world wars broke out on the continent, and the Cold War created more than four decades of political, ideological and military divide between Eastern and Western European countries. In previous centuries European states often waged smaller, larger and even Europe-​wide wars against each other. 61

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However, now in the twenty-​first century it is unimaginable that a war would break out between European countries that are members of the EU and/​or NATO. Accordingly, these states do not perceive any military threats from inside the security community, as they have reasonable assumptions that they will solve their conflicts in a peaceful way mostly through institutionalized processes in the EU and NATO. This security community emerged during the Cold War in Western Europe, but after the fall of the Iron Curtain it expanded to many former communist countries thanks to NATO and EU enlargements. Certain scholars focus on only one of the organizations in their research (Williams and Neumann, 2000; Adler, 2008; Mitzen, 2018), and it could be argued that the EU and NATO have two distinct security communities. However, this book accepts Andrew Cottey’s view that because the member states –​and as a consequence the defence policy communities (DPCs) –​of these two organizations mostly overlap, there is a single European security community (Cottey, 2013a). To understand the process by which peaceful change in security communities is brought about, Adler and Barnett developed a theoretical framework which has three tiers. Tier One focuses on the precipitating exogenous and endogenous conditions –​such as external threats, changes in technology, demography, migration and so on –​that incentivise states to cooperate on security issues. If, based on Tier One activities, the cooperating states start to interact more frequently and establish new social bonds, the elements of Tier Two might come into play, which are structures and processes ‘conducive to the development of mutual trust and collective identity’ (Adler and Barnett, 1998: 38). The first two tiers establish the conditions for collective identity formation and mutual trust (Tier Three), which lead to dependable expectations of peaceful change in the security community. This book is less interested in how the European security community has evolved, and it takes the presence of European security community as a given and as an enabling factor that facilitates the establishment of MDCs on the continent. The book is rather interested in how the presence of the European security community affects defence cooperative dynamics, and in this regard Tier Two elements are the most relevant ones, where international organizations (EU and NATO) play the most significant roles. Adler and Barnett distinguish between two main elements in Tier Two: structure and process. Structure is about power and knowledge, where power is relevant to pull weaker states to the stronger ones and also in terms of deciding shared meanings of the security community, while knowledge is about these shared meanings that among others represent ‘categories of practical action and legitimate activity’ (Adler and Barnett, 1998: 40). Process, on the other hand, is about (symbolic, economic, political and so on) transactions, (international) organizations and social learning. At first sight it might seem surprising that international organizations are part of 62

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the process and not the structure. However, Adler and Barnett follow the approach of Alexander Wendt, who argued that based on process theories, structures –​and thus international organizations –​can be understood as processes that ‘explain how practices and interactions reproduce and/​or transform structures’ (Adler and Barnett, 1998: 42). This is why the EU and NATO are the most relevant elements in our case, because these are the bodies where the shared meanings of the structure are developed by DPCs, and these shared meanings are often distributed through these two organizations as part of social learning. In terms of the MDCs, uploading and downloading (see Chapter 1) happens in this context. Uploading is basically when new shared meanings are created by DPCs at the subregional level by uploading their approaches to the European level. And downloading is when these shared meanings are learned socially via communication and different transactions at the subregional level. The following sections introduce how the European security community in general, and NATO-​and EU-​related processes in particular, can affect the establishment of MDCs. The British–​French Lancaster House Treaties will demonstrate how powerful DPCs can create shared social meanings in the European security community by uploading policies and how they can ignore them when they do not suit their goals any more. CEDC shows how social learning happens via downloading, and the case of the Nordic countries point out how different memberships of NATO and EU might affect defence cooperation.

Dissatisfaction with the shared meanings created and uploaded: the Lancaster House Treaties The British and French DPCs have had different multilateral institutional preferences regarding defence cooperation. While Britain’s priority has been defence collaboration mostly via NATO, France attempted to facilitate an autonomous European defence via EU’s ESDP/​CSDP, and as the most significant military powers in Europe they often uploaded their policies to these organizations. However, both countries became dissatisfied and frustrated by the lack of progress in NATO and the EU, mostly because of the lack of contribution by many of the other European countries. Although this dissatisfaction was present in both countries, the British DPC was more unhappy with the evolution of defence cooperation in the two multilateral organizations than the French one –​or at least, London was more willing to express its opinion openly in this regard. This dissatisfaction played a relevant role in the creation of the Lancaster House Treaties, because at the end of the 2000s the two DPCs concluded that they could cooperate militarily more effectively together than with other European states in multilateral organizations. 63

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The British DPC has long been dissatisfied with its European ally DPCs and their contribution to defence. In the late 1990s one of the main reasons why Britain supported the launch of ESDP was that European nations were not willing to invest more in military capabilities via NATO, and the US sent very clear messages that Washington would lose its interest in the Atlantic Alliance if Europeans did not want to provide more in terms of military capabilities. Accordingly, the Tony Blair government initiated negotiations with the French leadership which culminated in the St Malo Agreement in 1998 (Howorth, 2014). Based on this, the British and French DPCs uploaded their concept of defence cooperation to the EU level together, and as a consequence serious EU level defence cooperation was able to begin in the framework of ESDP (later CSDP). During the 2000s the UK was at the centre of uploading many of the NATO and EU defence cooperative initiatives and tried to convince and pressure its partners to take defence issues more seriously. At that time the UK focused on defence cooperation in terms of a contribution to NATO operations, especially in Afghanistan (House of Commons, 2008). Accordingly, the UK measured the collaborative efforts of its allies by their operational contributions and their level of defence budgets. The view of the British DPC was that while only a few countries bore the brunt of the dangerous tasks and the fighting in the ISAF operation in Afghanistan, the troops from most European NATO members were deployed to stable parts of the country, and their caveats prevented them being sent on combat missions. The DPC of the UK was also highly dissatisfied not only because Europeans sent proportionately much fewer soldiers to Afghanistan than Britain but also because they were not willing to deploy vital equipment such as helicopters either. Accordingly, the British attempts to create shared meanings about what appropriate contribution to the Afghan mission meant were only partly successful. Although, the British DPC together with the American one could upload many policies to NATO level as NATO member DPCs accepted them in principle, at the downloading phase most NATO member DPCs implemented them only partially. Several British Secretaries of Defence openly expressed their frustration at the lack of contribution from European nations to operations and their low-​level defence budgets. Among others, Defence Secretaries Des Browne (Labour) in 2007 (Browne, 2007) and also John Hutton (Labour) in 2009 expressed their dissatisfaction about the unwillingness of Europeans to provide an appropriate level of contribution to NATO’s operations in Afghanistan (DeYoung, 2009). Liam Fox, both as Conservative shadow and then as Coalition Defence Secretary, criticized European NATO members for their ‘insufficient’ level of contribution to the Afghan mission and their low defence budgets (Fox, 2010; Kirkup, 2011). Although this message was delivered after the signing of the Lancaster House Treaties, it was telling 64

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that Fox’s successors, Philip Hammond, reiterated this argument in 2012 too (Hammond, 2012). Such open and sustained criticism from successive British Defence Secretaries reflected the British DPC’s disappointment with the defence collaborative efforts of many of their European allies in the second half of the 2000s and early 2010s. This view has also been underpinned by other officials and official documents. For instance, Quentin Davies, the UK Minister for Defence Procurement in the late 2000s, expressed his frustration at the slow progress in both NATO and EU, as ‘collaboration within the NATO planning process has failed to produce joint kit requirements’ and ‘the European Defence Agency has not met early expectations’ (Franco-​British Council, 2009). Thus, not surprisingly the 2010 British Strategic Defence and Security Review (SDSR) clearly prioritized bilateral defence cooperation over multilateral collaborations. Although the document said that the UK would look for partners and possibilities to ‘share capabilities, technologies and programmes, ensuring that collective resources can go further’ (HM Government, 2010: 59), it also emphasized the UK’s preference for bilateral collaborations in this regard. It stated that the UK ‘will focus particularly on building new models of practical bilateral cooperation’ and ‘will generally favour bilateral equipment collaboration or off-​the-​shelf purchase, because such arrangements are potentially more straightforward and more fruitful than complex multilateral agreements, which have delivered mixed results for us in the past’ (HM Government, 2010: 59–​60). This basically means that the British DPC decided that it would not take part actively in Europe-​ wide (ie NATO and EU) P&S projects, because earlier multilateral projects did not provide satisfactory results. The French DPC’s commitment to NATO had not been and could not be as strong as the British one, especially since Paris’s reintegration into NATO was accomplished only in 2009 and omitted French nuclear forces. The French priority had been developing an autonomous European defence with the leadership of the French DPC possibly via ESDP/​CSDP. Thus, it is understandable that France was more interested in the success of ESDP/​CSDP and accordingly had a bigger stake in it. With regard to the French DPC, French officials did not criticize NATO and EU members openly as the British did, but during the second half of the 2000s French disillusionment with ESDP became clear. This can be identified as French ‘attitude’, and policies have significantly changed regarding ESDP/​CSDP in this period. Among others, Bastien Irondelle and Frédéric Mérand refer to several French experts who point out that at the end of the 2000s ‘a certain degree of disenchantment’ with ESDP’s operational accomplishments and a disappointment concerning ESDP’s ‘institutional stagnation’ were perceivable on the part of the French DPC (Irondelle and Mérand, 2010: 33). In addition, even the 2008 French White Paper on Defence and National 65

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Security mentioned ‘hopes and disappointments’ regarding ESDP (Office of the President, 2008: 20), highlighting French dissatisfaction with the evolution of ESDP. Accordingly, it is not surprising that President Sarkozy and his team seemed ‘convinced that ESDP has reached a plateau in the pre-​2007 configuration’ (Irondelle and Mérand, 2010: 33). Therefore, President Sarkozy attempted to reinvigorate ESDP during the French EU Presidency in 2008 and had great ambitions for it: he intended to establish the core of a European military HQ and also wanted to revise the European Security Strategy. Furthermore, Sarkozy also intended to upload the French concept of PESCO and thus improve European capabilities, which France thus supported from the outset. However, for various reasons none of these initiatives was realized during the French Presidency (Liberti, 2008). This experience may have been an eye-​opener for President Sarkozy, as he did not subsequently attempt to achieve any major goal regarding ESDP/​CSDP. The French disillusionment with ESDP/​CSDP was also clearly shown by later developments: in early 2010, when the Spanish EU Presidency put PESCO on the agenda again, France did not champion the issue any more, but ‘took a much nuanced position’ on it and even ‘seemed no longer [to] support the idea’ (Biscop and Coelmont, 2011: 253). Accordingly, the French DPC became more and more frustrated. Antoine Rayroux, who conducted a comprehensive discourse analysis of French parliamentary debates about ESDP pointed out that while in the period 2000–​7 the dominant discourse of members of parliament regarding ESDP was ‘enthusiastic and ambitious’ in 2008–​9 the debates showed disappointment (Rayroux, 2014: 235). As he points out, ‘in 2008–​2009, the discourse progressively turns more critical […] Several debates even suggest that the existence of a European defence should be called into question’ (Rayroux, 2014: 235–​6). Many scholars agree that one of the many reasons why Sarkozy completed the reintegration of France into NATO was the lack of progress in ESDP (Ghez and Larrabee, 2009: 81–​4; Bickerton, 2010: 119–​20; Irondelle and Mérand, 2010: 33; O’Donnell, 2011: 428). French officials highlighted the fact that French reintegration into NATO can be understood as St Malo II (Bickerton, 2010: 120), because the logic behind it was very similar to Tony Blair’s move in the second half of the 1990s, when he supported the launch of ESDP, as he wanted to facilitate European defence efforts this way. Now the situation was the other way around and the French DPC intended to do the same through reintegration into NATO, especially because the French defence establishment became convinced that via NATO Europeans might be more willing to develop their military capabilities (O’Donnell, 2011: 428). In addition, with this step France would be able to remove the obstacles caused by its lack of involvement in NATO’s integrated military structure 66

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(Ghez and Larrabee, 2009: 78–​81). Although the UK was keen to launch ESDP in the late 1990s and early 2000s and then to develop its institutions and capabilities, the British view changed significantly in the mid-​2000s, especially once the British DPC became frustrated with the lack of contribution by many European nations via ESDP (O’Donnell, 2011: 423). Consequently, the UK ‘played an active blocking role’ regarding the development of many EU capabilities and institutions, because British officials saw them as possible duplications of NATO assets (Biscop, 2012: 2304). The French DPC therefore had a very strong incentive to minimize conflict with the UK, the biggest European military power, and accordingly Sarkozy chose to reintegrate almost fully into NATO. The SDSR for 2010 was developed in parallel with the Lancaster House Treaties and states that the UK is looking for ‘practical bilateral cooperation’ with countries possessing a similar military posture as Britain or collaborating with the UK on operations. In addition, as it was earlier mentioned, the SDSR also emphasizes that the UK favours bilateral or off-​the-​shelf solutions on equipment procurement, because ‘complex multilateral agreements […] have delivered mixed results for us in the past’ (HM Government, 2010: 59–​ 60). Basically this means that, in general, the UK supported practical bilateral cooperation, and because of the dissatisfaction of the British DPC with multilateral solutions, the UK opted for bilateral agreements over multilateral ones in the field of equipment cooperation. As one senior UK MoD official remarked, ‘the curse of consensus’ in EU and NATO frameworks had been perceived as a serious problem in the British DPC regarding defence cooperation (Senior UK MoD Official, 2014). Thus, on behalf of the British the lack of progress in these two organizations was seen as an important factor when the Lancaster House Treaties were drafted, because British officials thought that with France, who had ‘broadly similar capabilities and strategy’ to the UK, it would be easier to create collaborative projects and make progress on a bilateral basis than multilaterally within NATO or EU (Senior UK MoD Official, 2014). Not only officials but also British analysts expressed the view that ‘neither NATO nor the EU can offer the solution to the strategic dilemma both London and Paris face’ (Lindley-​French, 2010) and argued for stronger British–​French bilateral defence cooperation because of this reason. In the case of France, officials were not only dissatisfied with the developments in EU structures regarding defence collaboration, but Vincent Thomassier, the defence procurement attaché at the French Embassy in London, also expressed his frustration concerning the lack of progress in other pan-​European structures as well. He said at the Franco-​British Council Seminar in October 2009 that, ‘what we are doing is not enough. Three years ago we defined a common industrial strategy but I sense a frustration from the minister […] We are not doing enough. Perhaps we are still too rich 67

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and the crisis isn’t pinching enough’ (Franco-​British Council, 2009: 2–​3). This type of frustration regarding multinational defence cooperation was repeated by other French officials as well, and they also recognized that the capability development projects initiated by the 1998 St Malo agreement had basically failed. As a senior French MoD official stated in an interview about the Lancaster House Treaties in December 2010, ‘France fought hard for EU defence structures for ten years. We are now in a new era of developing capabilities. If we cannot do that collectively as Europe then we need to look at other ways’ (Jones, 2011: 19). In early 2011 a similar view was expressed by a former French MoD employee and research analyst at Chatham House, who highlighted that the ‘EU and other multilateral frameworks are clearly secondary to the 2010 UK–​French agreements’ (Gomis, 2011: 8). We can conclude that, although the existence of the European security community provided the opportunity for the French and British DPCs to create shared meanings (for example, ESDP/​CSDP, PESCO, proper contribution to Afghanistan, taking defence seriously) by uploading them to NATO and EU level, not every European DPC followed them and downloaded them fully. Thus, not surprisingly, several analysts perceived that the frustration and dissatisfaction regarding developments in NATO and especially in the EU had a major role in the creation of the bilateral Franco-​British agreements in the form of the Lancaster House Treaties (O’Donnell, 2011: 422–​7; Biscop, 2012: 1297–​313; French Scholar, 2014). As Sven Biscop pointed out, ‘the Lancaster House meeting looked more like St-​Malo in reverse, aimed at bilateral rather than European cooperation’ (Biscop, 2012: 1306). However, it is important to note how relevant a role the converging memberships of France and Britain in international organizations of the European security community played in establishing the Lancaster House Treaties. As British officials highlighted, the agreement could not have been reached without the French reintegration into NATO. Thus, paradoxically the deeper French integration to one of the organizations of European security (NATO) provided the opportunity to create a deeper, more comprehensive, bilateral MDC, despite the fact that both the French and British DPCs were dissatisfied with multilateral organizations in general.

Different institutional memberships as the impetus for cooperation:​ NORDEFCO The four Nordic countries that have armed forces (Denmark, Finland, Norway and Sweden) have tended to be reliable and constructive members of the European security community in general, and of the organizations they have been members of in particular. The Nordic case is relevant, because the Nordic countries have different memberships in NATO and the EU. Norway is a NATO member only, Finland and Sweden are EU members 68

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and Denmark is both an EU and a NATO member, although it opted out of the EU’s CSDP and does not take part in its projects and operations. The differences between the EU and NATO memberships of the Nordic countries was not a relevant problem in practice, as Nordic countries could cooperate with the organizations they were not part of through different arrangements too. At the same time, certain Nordic DPCs perceived Nordic cooperation as an opportunity to get access and ‘penetrate’ even further into the projects of the organization that they were not members of, but which other Nordic states had membership in (Saxi, 2011: 25). For Norway this was the EU, as Sweden and Finland were active members of ESDP/​CSDP. In addition, the Norwegian DPC hoped that it could cooperate with Nordic countries on security issues relating to the North Sea, as prospects of collaboration with NATO members did not seem fruitful in this regard (Saxi, 2011: 28). Although Norway is not an EU member, Oslo is much more integrated into ESDP/​CSDP than the EU member Denmark, which opted out of ESDP/​CSDP. Among others, Norway participated in the EU Battlegroup initiative by providing troops for the Nordic Battlegroup, and Oslo also takes part in EDA projects and provides troops for EU operations. Although some segments of Norway’s DPC were ambivalent towards ESDP/​ CSDP in the early 2000s (Udgaard, 2006), governments since then have supported Norway’s participation in it. Thanks to these activities, Norway achieved some level of access to and even influence in ESDP/​CSDP, but not as much as it expected. At the same time, Norwegian diplomats felt that they were often sidelined in the decision-​making processes of ESDP/​ CSDP (Rieker, 2006b: 292–​4). Thus, the Norwegian DPC was concerned that it did not have enough influence in it. On the other hand, Norway’s influence in NATO is much more significant. This is shown by the fact that Jens Stoltenberg, a former prime minister of Norway who is a member of the Norwegian DPC, held the position of NATO Secretary General between 2014 and 2022. Norway was deemed a reliable ally in the 2000s before NORDEFCO was established, but this was not the case in the 1990s. Norway was viewed one of the most cooperative and reliable NATO members in the Cold War, but it quickly lost this status in the 1990s, as the Norwegian DPC adapted to the new international situation very slowly and it was ambivalent to the direction NATO took. After the Cold War the focus shifted to the number of troops capable of being deployed to international operations and the willingness to use them in combat missions (Petersson and Saxi, 2013: 775). At the same time Norway was reluctant to send combat troops to NATO operations, especially in the 1990s. The major deficiencies in Norway’s military capabilities were clear to all. Partly this was because Oslo was not only reluctant and sceptical about out-​of-​area operations but it was also not an enthusiastic supporter of NATO enlargement either (Rottem, 2007: 630), preferring to concentrate 69

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on NATO–​Russia relations (Petersson and Saxi, 2013: 770). However, in the 2000s Norway not only transformed its military in the 2000s but also became more ambitious in international operations as well. In the first period of NATO’s Afghan mission, Norway deployed special operation forces and F-​16 fighter aircrafts capable of conducting air-​to-​ground tasks (Saxi, 2010: 417). Although, it sent only non-​combat units to the ‘coalition of the willing’ operations in Iraq, the Norwegian contribution to the ISAF mission increased gradually and Oslo was praised by US representatives for ‘punching above its weight’ in Afghanistan in 2008. At the same time, US and NATO officials expressed their disappointment as Norway ‘answered negatively to the alliance request to contribute combat forces for the south’ of Afghanistan (Petersson and Saxi, 2013: 773). The Danish DPC was not especially interested in NORDEFCO on capability development, because Copenhagen was ahead of other Nordic countries concerning military transformation and its main partners were top-​tier NATO members such as the UK and the US. Furthermore, Denmark had already cut its capabilities and specialized its armed forces to provide effective expeditionary forces to NATO and ‘coalition of the willing’ operations (Saxi, 2011: 29–​30), so Nordic cooperation would not have provided tangible benefits for the Danish DPC. At the time of the creation of NORDEFCO, Denmark was considered as a top-​tier member of NATO. As Copenhagen shut itself out of ESDP/​CSDP, Denmark concentrated on NATO as it remained its only option. Denmark adapted faster to the new international environment and took military transformation much more seriously than most of its allies. Although NATO already recognized and valued Danish soldiers and their contribution to international operations during the 1990s and early 2000s, the 2004 Defence Agreement, by focusing exclusively on deployability, sustainability and professionalization and by the abolition of the remaining territorial defence forces, pushed Denmark to the top tier of NATO members. The process that began with the 2004 Agreement was called a ‘role model within NATO’ by the US Ambassador to NATO and was praised by the Secretary General of NATO as well (Ringsmose and Rynning, 2008). The Danish DPC faced difficulties around the time of the creation of NORDEFCO though. It did not finish the transformation process as originally planned because Danish participation in demanding international operations cost much more than anticipated. As a result, the costs of operations were subsidized from financial resources previously allocated for capability development. Another serious problem was that many soldiers resigned because of the frequent overseas deployments. In addition, the debate about burden-​sharing in the Alliance began to shift to the level of defence budgets, and as Denmark’s defence budget in terms of Gross Domestic Product (GDP) was not close to the agreed NATO level, 70

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Copenhagen had concerns about the sustainability of its top-​tier NATO member status (Ringsmose and Rynning, 2008). Denmark is not part of the ESDP/​CSDP. Although the Danish parliament supported the Treaty of the European Union, the majority of Danish voters voted against it on a referendum in 1992. Thus, the Danish political leadership made a special arrangement in the European Council and opted-​ out of cooperation on EU level in four areas including defence. This was acceptable for Danish voters on another referendum in 1993, but it meant that Denmark did not have a word in ESDP/​CSDP (Olsen and Pilegaard, 2005: 346–​8). Although the opt-​out on defence matters had no significant impact on Denmark’s prestige, coalition power and reputation in the EU in general, the fact that Danish officials were not taken seriously concerning defence issues in the EU created deep frustration in the Danish Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Ministry of Defence. As a Danish MoD official put it: ‘We are obliged to be attentive towards every change and development in the ESDP. We have to participate in meetings and in committees but we are not taken seriously. Our market value vis-​à-​vis the other EU countries is very limited […] As a bureaucracy, we are paralysed’ (Olsen, 2011: 23). Accordingly, a kind of dissatisfaction on the part of Danish officials towards ESDP existed, but this was not because of ESDP’s lack of progress per se, but because Denmark could not participate in it. The Norwegian and Danish DPCs thus became influential in NATO, but they could not influence ESDP/​CSDP processes. Although Norway and Denmark were able to download policies from the EU level through different mechanisms, they could not upload their own approaches. The Norwegian DPC, in particular, hoped that, using its influential NATO role, it could upload its own preferences camouflaged as Nordic policies to the EU level through NORDEFCO. In the case of Sweden and Finland institutional considerations for participating in NORDEFCO were quite different. The Swedish and Finnish DPCs were not disappointed with the EU in general, as Britain and France were. However, officials from both countries deemed this organization ‘too slow, large, heterogeneous and cumbersome’ especially for very practical collaboration on capability development intended to save costs (Saxi, 2011: 28). During the Cold War, neutral European countries like Sweden and Finland ‘had to demonstrate the ability to defend themselves autonomously against violation of their neutrality and to maintain their territorial integrity. Moreover, their neutral status required that they achieved this by conducting a nonaggressive policy’ (Rickli, 2008: 311). However, after the Cold War these two DPCs adopted a more cooperative strategy towards NATO and the EU and developed their military capabilities to be able to participate in a range of expeditionary operations. The Swedish and Finnish DPCs also 71

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invested huge energy in making sure that ESDP would take a direction that was acceptable for them, and made sure that for a while ESDP would focus not on collective defence but on ‘humanitarian and rescue operations, peacekeeping and crisis management, [so] their non-​alignment policy could be maintained’ (Forsberg and Vaahtoranta, 2001: 72). They also supported the British–​French initiative in St Malo, although Sweden had concerns that ESDP progressed too fast by setting capability goals –​the so-​called headline goals –​for EU members at the end of the 1990s. However, during the Helsinki summit in 2000 both DPCs made sure that the headline goals would not be too demanding and that new institutions and processes would be developed according to their interests. Furthermore, they insisted on and successfully ‘uploaded’ to ESDP the idea that EU should not only focus on the military side of crisis management but must include the civilian aspects of it as well (Forsberg and Vaahtoranta, 2001: 72–​4). Accordingly, we can see that both the Swedish and Finnish DPCs played a major and leading role by shaping shared understandings of the European security community in the 1990s and early 2000s. They have also participated actively in many EU-​led crisis management operations and made significant changes to prepare their armed forces for expeditionary tasks. The Finnish and Swedish DPCs were active contributors to defence cooperation in NATO too, despite the fact that they were not members. Among others, both countries deployed approximately 500 troops to the IFOR (Implementation Force) mission in Bosnia and 800 troops to Kosovo Force (KFOR) in Kosovo during the 1990s. The Swedish DPC even provided one of the three non-​NATO member-​led Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRT) in Afghanistan. Stockholm deployed 500 troops to the ISAF mission, while Finland contributed 150 Finnish soldiers to the Swedish PRT. The collaboration between the two Nordic countries and NATO was not confined to operations. Thanks to the different structures established for facilitating partnerships between NATO and non-​NATO members, Sweden and Finland participated in the development of all the collaborative frameworks related to NATO partnerships, and also participated in NATO exercises and training (Pyykönen, 2016: 32–​43). With regard to cooperation on capability development with NATO, Sweden and Finland took part both in individual NATO projects and systematic defence cooperation as well. For the former, the best example is the Strategic Airlift Capability (SAC). In this project, the two Nordic countries together with ten NATO member states procured and have been maintaining three C-​17 transport aircraft under the auspices of a NATO agency. The cooperation on systemic capability development between NATO and its Nordic partners is going on in the framework of the Partnership for Peace Planning and Review Process (PARP).1 Through these experiences the two DPCs have downloaded shared meanings, including doctrines, standards and conceptual approaches, from NATO. 72

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The social learning through downloading from and interactions with NATO had a fundamental effect on the shared understandings of the Finnish and Swedish DPCs. For instance, Finnish officials perceived the EU to be ‘too heterogeneous, slow moving, and based in any case on NATO standards’, and so they would have preferred capability development-​related defence cooperation in NATO rather than the EU (Saxi, 2011: 29). However, as Finland was not a NATO member, it would have been too difficult to fulfil the potential of this cooperation, and they therefore opted instead for the Nordic option and supported the creation of NORDEFCO. The Swedish DPC was convinced that smaller groupings of countries was better suited for cooperation on capability development than the EU’s ‘slow, large, heterogeneous and cumbersome’ (Saxi, 2011: 28) approach. An interview from 2010 with General Håkan Syrén, who was Chairman of the European Union Military Committee at the time and Chief of Defence of the Swedish Defence Force during the creation of NORDEFCO, represents well the way of thinking of the Swedish DPC in this regard: We are trying to bring clusters of countries that can cooperate around the table, and we are trying to find different areas where it’s possible to cooperate. This can be training and exercise, education, maintenance, procurement, or surveillance and, if we can identify these areas pragmatically and put the member states around the table, then the bottom-​up approach will meet the top-​down approach, and then we have an instrument that really can activate, stimulate and give inspiration for deeper cooperation. (Jehin, 2010) In conclusion, the creation of NORDEFCO was highly influenced by the different memberships of the Nordic countries and their interactions with those institutions they were not part of. For the Norwegian and Danish DPCs, who had a significant influence in NATO, it was very difficult to accept that they could only download policies from the EU and did not have the opportunity to upload their own approaches, as they were not part of ESDP. Thus, they –​especially the Norwegian DPC –​intended to use NORDEFCO to improve their influence in ESDP processes. At the same time, although Sweden and Finland are not members of NATO, the Swedish and Finnish DPCs downloaded NATO’s shared meanings (policies, standards, doctrines, approaches and so on) through complex social learning and consequential experiences they gained in NATO operations. Based on this social learning, they found the EU to be a less effective organization on cooperation regarding capability development than the Alliance. However, because they were not NATO members, this option was not available for them, and they instead opted for cooperation in a smaller subregional framework. 73

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Social learning by superficial downloading:​CEDC The post-​communist CEDC countries wanted to be members of the EU and NATO not only because of legal issues or economic gains but for symbolic reasons too. When they successfully joined these organizations, they were inexperienced and first attempted to find their place in and understand the dynamics of these organizations. They went through a difficult social learning process while they attempted to download the categories of practical action and legitimate activity. Accordingly, these Central European DPCs were not dissatisfied with the lack of progress of defence cooperation in the EU and NATO, as the French and British ones were. Instead they were criticized by others, because they often lagged behind on military modernization and did not keep their defence budgets at the ‘appropriate’ level suggested by the shared meanings of the European security community. One of the main reasons why they established CEDC was that Central European DPCs wanted to contribute to EU and NATO capability development initiatives together, to demonstrate that they intended to meet the goals set by the two organizations by downloading the shared meanings of the European Security community. The CEDC countries, which joined NATO after the Cold War, have been criticized regularly both openly and behind closed doors by the DPC of NATO (as an organization) and the DPCs of older NATO members. For example, the Czech Republic and Hungary joined NATO in 1999 (along with Poland) and faced harsh criticism from NATO officials in the early 2000s. Ferenc Juhász, the Hungarian defence minister at that time, was the subject of several critical remarks because of the severe Hungarian defence budget cuts and the lack of progress on the transformation of the Hungarian Defence Force (Bartkowski, 2004: 5–​6). In 2002 he acknowledged ‘after meeting with NATO Secretary-​General Lord Robertson that Hungary has failed to meet its NATO commitments over the past four years to such an extent that the alliance has unofficially told him that Hungary would already have been expelled if an expulsion were possible’ (Wallander, 2002: 5). General Joseph Ralston, the Alliance’s Supreme Allied Commander in Europe that time, told Juhász that ‘Hungary had not met any of the commitments it had freely undertaken earlier’ (Bartkowski, 2004: 6). At the same time, DPCs of Western European NATO members were concerned about the corruption and lack of transparency concerning defence contracts in the Czech Republic (Wallander, 2002: 6). In this regard one of the major issues was the Czech aircraft tender. The Czech armed forces intended to buy more than twenty new aircraft, which according to the NATO Secretary General was ‘unnecessary from the NATO point of view’, and these costs could have been spent on the procurement of more demanding capabilities (Bartkowski, 2004: 6). Like Hungary, the Czech Republic was 74

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also criticized for implementing defence reforms too slowly and narrowly (Bartkowski, 2004: 6). The DPCs of Western NATO states were disappointed with the contribution of new NATO members to the ISAF mission in Afghanistan in early 2000s too. One of the senior defence diplomats of a Western NATO member argued that many NATO countries believed that Hungary ‘could have done more in Afghanistan’ (Bartkowski, 2004: 3). Like Hungary, the Czech Republic was also reluctant to provide military assistance to the ISAF mission in the first years of the operations in Afghanistan. As was mentioned in the previous section, in 2007, referring to the new Eastern European member states, Liam Fox argued that ‘they have come into NATO, pocketed the security guarantee and have cut defence spending.’ He also stressed that NATO should ‘be able to suspend NATO members who do not spend the levels of funding that we agreed’ (Adams, 2007). In 2011 NATO Secretary General Anders Fogh Rasmussen criticized both the Czech Republic and Slovakia for reducing their defence budgets, thus moving farther from reaching the goal of spending 2 per cent of their GDP on defence, on which all NATO members had agreed. In this regard, Rasmussen sent a letter to the Czech prime minister ‘warning that his government might not be able to fulfil its commitments to the alliance should these cuts continue in the coming years’ (Richter, 2011). In addition, according to the Czech media, a draft NATO report was leaked which concluded that the ‘Czech Republic would not be useful for NATO if a real war broke out unless it adds money to the armed forces’ (Atlantic Council, 2014). Rasmussen met the prime minister, the president, the ministers for defence, foreign affairs and interior affairs of Slovakia in May 2011, when he expressed his dissatisfaction regarding Slovakia ‘for providing too few financial resources for its military’ (Trend, 2011). The other post-​communist CEDC countries are special cases. Croatia joined NATO in 2009 and became an EU member in 2013. Thus between the date of Croatian admission to NATO and the creation of CEDC only two years passed, which may be too short a period to determine how the Croatian DPC fitted into NATO. Slovenia’s case is also a special one. Before Slovenia’s 2004 admission to NATO, Slovenia’s critics had ‘legitimate issues to raise especially concerning its limited force projection capabilities’ (Hendrickson, 2002: 74). However, the possibilities of the relatively small Slovenia were clear for NATO members, whose expectations about Slovenia’s future contributions had to remain realistic. If we look at the defence budgets of the CEDC NATO members, we can see that they were consistent underperformers in providing sufficient financial resources to their defence capabilities, as none of them has ever reached the abovementioned 2 per cent of GDP threshold on defence spending. Not surprisingly, the question whether these new NATO members 75

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were free riders in the Alliance has been raised from time to time (Szayna, 1999; Hillison, 2009; Bell and Hendrickson, 2012;). Wade Jacoby argued that new NATO members attempted to compensate for their slow military transformation and low defence budgets by ‘policy loyalty’ in the 2000s (Jacoby, 2005: 254–​5). He pointed out that, when older NATO members realized that they could expect only limited military contributions from the Central and Eastern European (CEE) NATO members, they asked instead for policy loyalty, diplomatic support, niche capabilities and troop contributions to NATO missions instead of significant defence capabilities. ‘Thus, NATO’s recognition of the factors blocking real defence reform led it to refashion its key demands to stress the policy loyalty of CEE states’ (Jacoby and Jones, 2008: 321). Accordingly, the DPCs of CEDC NATO members could avoid costly structural defence reforms by providing ‘policy loyalty’, and could still benefit from NATO and EU memberships. The creation of CEDC follows this pattern, and it seems that it was more an act of policy loyalty than a genuine attempt to reform defence institutions. Thus it is not surprising that Central European DPCs wanted to use CEDC to demonstrate that they were attempting to contribute to NATO and EU projects. One Slovakian MoD official framed the general feeling about CEDC best: CEDC was established to support initiatives of EU and NATO. EU and NATO offer many projects and initiatives where CEDC countries don’t have enough resources (financial, personal, technical and so on). Together we have a potential to support EU and NATO projects and operations effectively. I wouldn’t see CEDC cooperation as a competitor to the EU and NATO initiatives. During the first CEDC meetings there was a matrix of projects identified, in which are participating countries willing to cooperate. All of them are in line with EU Pooling&Sharing and NATO Smart Defence [initiatives]. We are searching for partners to join already existing projects. (Slovakian MoD Official, 2014) This means that, although post-​Communist CEDC DPCs downloaded the EU’s P&S and NATO’s Smart Defence concepts to the CEDC level, they did not intend to create new projects or capabilities as they were ‘searching for partners to join already existing projects’. Jack Levy distinguishes between simple and complex social learning. Simple learning happens when a new input generates changes in the ‘means’ but not in the ‘ends’, while complex learning transforms both ‘end’s (goals) and ‘means’ (resources) too. He also points out that learning is not a necessary precondition of policy change, as actors can change course because of the external environment, individual beliefs or organizational or high politics (Levy, 1994: 286–​91). We can see 76

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that CEDC was created as a consequence of downloading EU-​and NATO-​ level policies, and this resulted in policy changes for the DPCs of Central European countries that facilitated the creation of CEDC. However, this was simple learning at best, or possibly not learning at all. Although some ‘means’ were changed as the CEDC DPCs attempted to collaborate more to satisfy the European security community, they did not internalize these concepts fully and did not change their goals either. Complex social learning could therefore not happen. Austria’s situation was different, because it has been an EU member since 1995 but has never joined NATO. The Austrian DPC regarded CEDC as the Central European realization of EU’s Ghent process about P&S of defence capabilities too (Austrian MoD Official, 2014). It also perceived it as a framework where Vienna could work together with its NATO member neighbouring states (Austrian Bundesminister, 2013: 34). The Austrian DPC built a very close relationship with NATO, as Vienna has been contributing to NATO operations on the Balkans, and at some point in the 1990s it seemed that the political will might exist in Austria to join the Alliance (Schmiedl, 2013: 112–​14). In addition, the public would have supported Austrian NATO accession as well, but especially the controversies of NATO’s Kosovo intervention in 1999 and Operation Iraqi Freedom (which was not a NATO operation) in 2002 made Austrians more cautious about NATO membership and strengthened the status of permanent neutrality –​taken by Austria in 1955 –​as an important element of Austrian identity (Neuhold, 2003). However, the EU initiative of creating an ESDP questioned the sustainability of Austria’s permanent neutrality status. Furthermore, the Austrian DPC was aware of the changing international security dynamics, and wanted to make sure that Vienna remained a constructive and solid member of the EU concerning security and defence issues as well (Homan and Doel, 2007: 5–​12). Accordingly, it changed the slogan of neutrality to solidarity, and decided to reduce the concept of neutrality to its core, which meant that they would not join a military alliance and would not permit the stationing of foreign military troops on Austrian territory (Krüger, 2003). However, despite the fact that Austria supported ESDP, the Austrian DPC was always ambivalent about abandoning or reducing Austria’s neutrality further. Deeper EU defence cooperation could have created situations when new debates might have arisen about Austria’s stance on neutrality. Second, during the Cold War the Austrian DPC never believed that the Austrian Armed Forces (AAF) would fight (Schmiedl, 2013: 108–​9), and accordingly the AAF’s warfighting capabilities were limited. Austrian troops have instead focused on participating in international peace operations since the 1960s; thus for Vienna the EU’s less developed defence cooperation and lesser focus on actual warfighting fitted its identity and its operational military experience. Based on the abovementioned ambivalent Austrian attitude to 77

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its neutrality and its limited combat capabilities, Austrians were probably less interested in a quickly progressing EU defence collaboration. In conclusion we can say that CEDC was created mostly because the new EU and NATO member DPCs have gone through social learning, but not in the way Western DPCs expected. What post-​communist DPCs have learned is that they can download policies in principle and can pretend to act on them by changing some ‘means’, but not transforming themselves fundamentally. This observation corresponds with Thomas-​Durell Young’s argument. He highlighted the fact that the transformation of post-​communist defence institutions in Europe has happened only at a superficial level. He pointed out, among other things, that despite the fact that many post-​communist countries have been members of NATO and EU for years or decades, many communist legacy values, beliefs and concepts remained inherent part of the collective cognitive structures of the members of post-​communist DPCs (Young, 2018). A similar thing happened with the creation of CEDC too, as Central European DPCs accepted the new shared meanings of the European security community (P&S, Smart Defence), but they did not change their ‘ends’ to substantially fulfil them. The Austrian DPC downloaded the EU’s P&S initiative too, but it was not eager to put significant resources behind this either.

Conclusion The most relevant precondition for the proliferation of MDCs in Europe is for the evolution of the European security community to have made it possible for the dominant feature of the military relations of most European countries to become cooperative instead of confrontational. This has happened mostly through political, military and economic integration in the EU and NATO, which has enabled the establishment and dissemination of shared meanings between the member states through uploading and downloading processes. Thanks to these processes, it became unimaginable that EU and NATO members would wage war against each other to solve their conflicts. Besides the reasonable assumption that they will address their disagreements through institutional approaches –​mostly in the EU and NATO –​they have also developed a sense of community, shared values and mutual trust. Accordingly, it is not surprising that EU and NATO always have an impact on creating subregional defence cooperation even if these MDCs are not linked directly to NATO and EU. In the case of the Lancaster House Treaties, France and the UK attempted to upload their own approaches to the NATO and EU level, but it was only partially successful. Thus, they decided that NATO and EU did not fit their goals any more, despite the fact that they shaped the two organizations significantly by deciding their shared meanings. However, the reintegration 78

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of France into NATO was a crucial step in the development of mutual trust between the French and British DPCs, because it demonstrated that Paris accepted those shared meanings that were relevant for London. So, although the two DPCs were dissatisfied with the development in the two multilateral organizations, a higher-​level integration of the two states facilitated bilateral cooperation. The post-​communist Central European countries tended to download EU-​and NATO-​level policies and approaches in principle, and by doing so they demonstrated policy loyalty, but they did not internalize and implement these policies and approaches fully. This happened to some extent in relation to the creation of the CEDC too. Central European DPCs started to cooperate to support downloaded EU (P&S) and NATO (Smart Defence) initiatives in the framework of CEDC, but they did not deliver meaningful capabilities and did not align their ‘means’ and ‘ends’ to these initiatives. One of the factors that drove Nordic cooperation was that the Nordic countries did not share the same institutional organizational memberships. Norway and Denmark were NATO members but were not members of ESDP/​CSDP, while Finland and Sweden were EU members but not members of the Alliance. While the Norwegian and Danish DPCs hoped that they would gain more influence in ESDP/​CSDP through NORDEFCO thanks to their influential NATO roles, the Finnish and Swedish DPCs found collaboration on capability development in EU slow and cumbersome and sought another option. Originally they would have preferred cooperation in NATO, but this was not possible and they decided to cooperate with their Nordic partners instead.

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Defence Budgets After the Cold War, the defence budgets of European armed forces were under pressure. First, governments in Europe decided to spend on defence significantly less, as a large-​scale conventional war on the continent became improbable. Understandably, they started to channel these extra funds into their economies and welfare systems (Davoodi, 1999). Second, as the international environment changed, the tasks of the armed forces had to change with them. Thus, European armed forces started to focus on power projection abroad both in terms of a war-​fighting role and peace support operations (Edmunds, 2006). However, this needed massive restructuring and new investments, as European militaries had to transform themselves into smaller but flexible and highly skilled organizations compared to the mass conscript armies they had previously maintained. This double pressure –​ decreased funding and the need for transformation –​resulted in significant force reductions in Europe, as militaries tried to free up funds for investment in new capabilities and structures. The conceptual bases of the abovementioned thinking were laid down by Michael Alexander and Timothy Garden in their paper ‘The arithmetic of defence policy’, published in International Affairs in 2001 (Alexander and Garden, 2001). They pointed out that not only decreased defence budgets but also their shrinking purchasing power had resulted in the sharp decline of military capabilities in Europe. The reason for this is that defence inflation is significantly higher than ‘normal’ inflation, because although maintenance costs in the field of defence rise at the same ratio as inflation, personnel costs and equipment costs rise much higher than inflation (Alexander and Garden, 2001: 515–​17). Consequently, the higher rate of defence inflation would normally cause a decline in the purchasing power of defence budgets even if they remained unchanged in real terms and did not decline, as has been the case in Europe for the last few decades. This has led to continuous decreases in force levels and military capabilities to compensate for diminishing defence budgets and the effects of defence inflation. According to Alexander and Garden, this ‘arithmetic’ suggested 80

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that by 2020 the UK’s front-​line forces might be only half of the 2001 level. Their prediction was fairly accurate, as the number of active military personnel in the UK in 2019 was 66 per cent of the 2000 level (NATO, 2012; NATO, 2020). Alexander and Garden (2001: 520) identified two options to reverse this trend. Accordingly, European countries should either raise their defence budgets or develop a genuine collaboration at the European level. They believed that the second option, despite its numerous challenges, was a far more realistic alternative. They also pointed out that even with the help of a comprehensive European-level defence cooperation, the crisis generated by the arithmetic of defence policy cannot be stopped, but it can be put off ‘for a generation or more’. Alexander and Garden identified two types of cooperation, pooling and integration, but they did not elaborate on the theoretical framework of these. They argued for EU-​wide supranational pooling of forces, and they proposed operational integration for sensitive capabilities. They pointed out that, although duplication and multiplication basically existed in every field of European defence (for example, headquarters, bases, logistics support, planning, training, procurement and so on), some particular areas of cooperation could get results more quickly. According to them, aircraft capabilities were the most obvious choices for initial pooling, because in this field the procedures were harmonized. In addition, the unit costs and the costs of infrastructure were very high, which might necessitate more cooperation. Thus, pooling air transport capabilities or creating a European air-​to-​air refuelling fleet would be ideal for collaboration. With regard to navies, the pooling of transport ships, supply support and integration of naval training could also produce significant savings. However, according to Alexander and Garden, the land domain offered less potential, because land capabilities were usually very sensitive, and cooperation of land forces would save much less in the way of resources than the other two fields. Still, logistical support, medical services, communication and IT systems could be areas where successful cooperation could begin. Alexander and Garden acknowledged that this type of supranational cooperation could not be established regarding combat capabilities, and so they proposed their operational integration, which later could lead to common procurement, training and maintenance. To develop new common European capabilities further, they suggested the creation of a European planning and budgetary system supported by a common European defence budget (Alexander and Garden, 2001: 520–​8). According to Garden, the allocation of around 5 per cent of the defence budget of every EU member state to this European defence budget would be a good start (Garden, 2003). Alexander and Garden recognized the sensitivity of pooling and rationalization processes, which could cause the closing of some headquarters and bases and could raise problems regarding national sovereignty. However, they argued that 81

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‘the arithmetic of defence policy is implacable and will not tolerate delay for very much longer’ (Alexander and Garden, 2001: 529). This seminal work has had an enormous impact on thinking about defence inflation, conceptualizing ‘pooling and sharing’ of military capabilities and also on practical collaborations. Although the vision set out by Alexander and Garden has not come true in its entirety, they were right about trends in defence cooperation, and their work served as an inspiration. For instance, the European Air Transport Command pools and shares the air transport capabilities of seven European militaries. Also, significant progress has been made regarding the cooperation on logistical support and training in the land and sea domains between European countries, and the establishment of the so-​called European Defence Fund –​the EU’s multibillion Euro contribution to military research and development projects –​provides the core of the European defence budget. However, these achievements are still far from the level of pooling and integration that Alexander and Garden envisioned in 2001. In regard to our analysis, these issues are less relevant, and the chapter focuses on Alexander and Garden’s insight that, because of their decreasing defence budgets –​either in nominal or in real terms –​European militaries have two choices. Either they cut their capabilities further or they deepen their defence cooperation with P&S. The three studied multinational defence cooperations (MDCs) were established right after the financial crisis of 2008–​2009, when financial scarcity was a crucial issue for every Western government. Thus, the Lancaster House Treaties, NORDEFCO and CEDC provide excellent case studies of how DPCs react in an environment where financial resources are scarce and they have to decide between cutting military capabilities and cooperating with other DPCs. Accordingly, this chapter looks at whether the financial crisis had a significant impact on creating the three studied MDCs.

Doing it nationally:​the Lancaster House Treaties The 2008 financial and economic crisis hit the UK and France significantly, and both London and Paris intervened massively to avoid the collapse of their banking and financial sectors. As a consequence of the huge stimulus packages that the two governments provided, the budget deficits of these two countries reached historical heights, and accordingly they were compelled to introduce austerity measures. Both the UK and France introduced reductions in their defence budgets after the financial crisis. While the British armed forces suffered an 8 per cent reduction in real terms from 2010 and later had to make additional cuts, the French defence budget was decreased immediately after the crisis by 3 per cent, while in the period of 2009–​2020 it has suffered a reduction of more than 9 per cent. 82

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In general, we can say that neither France nor the UK has searched for alternative multinational solutions to maintain its national military capabilities; rather both countries were committed to handle their hardships in the traditional national way. As Paul Cornish and Andrew Dorman pointed out, the UK was the first Western country to undertake a complete defence and security review taking into account the negative effects of the financial crisis (Dorman and Cornish, 2012: 219). Thus the 2010 SDSR gives a good indication of how Britain intended to handle the ‘age of austerity’ concerning defence around the time the UK and France signed the Lancaster House Treaties. Preparation for the SDSR began as early as the summer of 2009, when Secretary of State for Defence Bob Ainsworth (Labour) announced that the Ministry of Defence would develop a Green Paper for the SDSR until early 2010 (Cornish, 2010: 4). Based on the results of this document, the newly elected Conservative–​Liberal Democrat coalition government eventually adopted the SDSR and published it on 19 October 2010. As the discussion on the Lancaster House Treaties between France and the UK began at the end of 2009 and they were signed on 2 November 2010, the treaties and the SDSR were developed and drafted in parallel and each had an impact on the other (Senior UK MoD Official, 2014). The SDSR on the one hand revealed the future vision of what kind of capabilities and structures the British armed forces would need by 2020; on the other it focused its provisions mostly on the period 2010–​2015 and identified the necessary strategic decisions for that time frame (HM Government, 2010). Thus it left certain questions to be answered after 2014, when the Afghanistan mission was set to end. According to Andrew Dorman, ‘this allowed the government to justify significant cuts to the armed forces with plans to reconstitute some capabilities by 2020’ (Dorman, 2012: 10). These cuts meant reductions in personnel, decommissioning of equipment, slowing the procurement of new equipment and even cancelling projects. Among other things the SDSR envisaged a nearly 10 per cent reduction in service personnel (reducing the 175,000 personnel by 17,000) until 2015, reducing the deployable number of brigades from six to five, the number of Challenger 2 main battle tanks by 40 per cent and the artillery by 35 per cent; it decommissioned the Harrier fleet, reduced the size of the Tornado fleet, delayed orders for the Joint Strike Fighters, cancelled the Nimrod MRA4 maritime aircraft programme, retired the C130 Hercules transport aircraft fleet in 2022, a decade earlier than planned, and decommissioned HMS Ark Royal and thus temporarily eliminated the British carrier strike capability, reducing the size of the surface fleet and so on. In accordance with these measures the SDSR decided to close bases and rationalize the command structure and the resource management systems (HM Government; 2010: 15–​34). Although the SDSR increased the reserve forces to compensate some of the reductions and also introduced future 83

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procurement projects, the planned cuts show that the British armed forces faced very serious short-​term reductions in capabilities. Thus, ‘inevitably, the UK’s level of ambition has been scaled back’ (O’Donnell, 2010) by the SDSR, as became absolutely clear from the military tasks and defence planning assumptions set (HM Government, 2010: 18–​19). The UK did not search for multinational solutions to help maintain its national military capabilities. The document did not mention any cooperation in the framework of NATO and EU or any other organization which could fit the definition of an MDC.1 This means that the British government –​as the SDSR stated –​was not interested in ‘complex multilateral agreements, which have delivered mixed results’ earlier regarding capability development (HM Government, 2010: 60). Instead, the British government intended to strengthen collaboration between nations on military operations and political issues in NATO and the EU. Thus the SDSR emphasized the importance of ‘ensuring that NATO has the political will and ability to respond to current and future threats’, ‘successfully complet[ing] the mission of the NATO-​led International Security Assistance Force in Afghanistan’, ‘recognis[ing] the importance of NATO’s wider security role’, ‘continu[ing] to reform NATO’, ‘foster[ing] better EU-​NATO cooperation’, ‘support[ing] continued EU enlargement’ and ‘support[ing] EU missions’ and so on (HM Government, 2010: 62–​3). Second, although the SDSR stressed the importance of ‘building new models of practical bilateral cooperation with those countries whose defence and security posture is closest to our own or with whom we cooperate in multinational operations’, the document did not mention directly which countries the authors were thinking of in this regard (HM Government, 2010: 59). Of course, the SDSR names the UK’s two most important partners in terms of defence, and not surprisingly these were the US and France. However, it was referring to continuation of the existing collaboration with the US and the practical British–​French defence cooperation that had flourished since the end of the Cold War. However, since the signing of the Lancaster House Treaties happened so close in time to the publication of the SDSR, the authors of the document probably had the British–​French cooperation in their mind in this regard. However, if we investigate the document, we can see that it lists six initiatives to strengthen British–​ French defence collaboration, four of which (cooperation on training and doctrine, complex weapons, UAVs, logistics of A400) were already under way in different formats before the negotiations on the Lancaster House Treaties began. In contrast, the situation in France was quite different from that in Britain, as the French defence budget did not immediately decrease as much as the British one. According to the original plans, during the period 2008–​14 the French armed forces had to realize only a 3 per cent reduction in their 84

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planned budget, so in France no big cuts in terms of personnel had been carried out (Office of the President of the French Republic, 2013: 109) or in terms of capabilities other than those planned in the 2008 White Paper. The 2013 White Paper was the first strategic document to be drafted in France after the financial crisis, but the cuts and reductions foreseen there were not as serious as those in the British SDSR either. Although the 2013 French White Paper decided that the 288,000-​strong Armed Forces –​222,000 active military and 66,000 other personnel (Ministère De La Défense, 2013: 15) –​ would be decreased by 34,000 between 2014 and 2019, the French Armed Forces reduced its personnel by 40,000 in the period of 2008–​12 as well (Office of the President of the French Republic, 2013: 93, 107). So the elimination of jobs in the armed forces cannot be attributed exclusively to the negative effects of the financial crisis, because this process began much earlier, and in addition the financial crisis did not hit the French defence budget as severely as expected. Although that is true that the French Armed Forces did not receive the same amount of resources in the period of 2014–​19 as was proposed in the 2008 White Paper, this did not result in a radical strategic rebalancing. Of course, freezing the defence budget in France had consequences. The French MoD decided to slow down the purchase of the Rafale jets, buying only 26 instead of 66 between 2014 and 2019 (Vignal and Sage, 2013). It also decided to delay plans for further attack submarines and frigates. However, Paris did not eliminate entire capabilities or cancel projects as London did regarding the aircraft carriers or the Nimrod MRA4 maritime aircraft programme. As François Heisbourg highlighted, the ‘French have pointedly decided they are not going to make such crunchy choices’ (Carnegy, 2013). If we analyse the discourse of British and French officials on the forums of the Franco-​British Council, we can see that the effects of the financial crisis did not play a major role during their discussions before the creation of the Lancaster House Treaties either. It is true that they recognized that defence budget cuts could be expected, and ‘the heavy constraints on defence budgets […] will be a push towards speeding up Franco-​British cooperation’ (Chick, 2010a: 5–​6). Some of the participants even perceived this situation as a positive thing, which might provide a needed window of opportunity to push for deeper defence cooperation between the two countries (Franco-​British Council, 2009: 4). However, others pointed out the possible dangers the financial crisis could pose to the decades-​long British-​French defence collaboration. Christophe Burg, the director of industrial affairs at the Directorate General of Armaments, noted that ‘in times of crisis like the one we are facing today it would be really dangerous if nationalism should reappear’, and in this regard he highlighted the fact that Paris had already channelled large sums into the defence sector with the aim of ‘propping up the domestic economy’ (Franco-​British Council, 85

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2009: 4). Others argued that focusing on the mitigation of the effects of the financial crisis via defence cooperation would be problematic, because this would generate short-​term projects. Sir Menzies Campbell ‘expressed the fear that concentrating on the short term is the wrong aim: nothing will come of identifying military capabilities based on the available finances’ (Chick, 2010a: 6). James de Waal emphasized that ‘the financial crisis must not emerge as the leitmotiv of a revival of the Franco-​British dimension; it is not a synonym for more intense cooperation’ (Chick, 2010a: 6). Accordingly, both the British and French DPCs were aware of both the opportunities and the dangers the financial crisis could provide for defence cooperation, but they did not perceive it as a game-​changer concerning British–​French defence collaboration, especially not in the short term. This is underpinned by the views of members of the respected DPCs (Former French MoD Official, 2014; Senior UK MoD Official, 2014; Mid-​career UK MoD Official, 2014; French Scholar, 2014), many of whom deemed that the financial crisis might have had an impact on supporting the creation of the Lancaster House Treaties but did not see it as the most important factor. Certain officials did not even perceive the effects of the financial crisis as an important issue concerning the establishment of the treaties (Senior UK MoD Official, 2014). However, all of them were aware of the phenomenon, that the agreement had a financial aspect, but it had not been necessarily linked to the financial crisis, but to a longer trend that pressured defence budgets in Europe.

The problem of critical mass of capabilities: NORDEFCO The Nordic countries have small, open, export-​oriented economies, which were all affected by the global economic crisis of 2008. However, the four Nordic countries possessing armed forces (Denmark, Finland, Norway, Sweden) managed the situation successfully, and the impact of the economic crisis for the four Nordic economies ‘was not as serious as expected and their recovery was obvious’ (Lin et al, 2014: 11). In 2011 an EU report on the impact of the financial crisis on European defence highlighted the fact that ‘with the exception of Sweden, Poland, France, Finland and Denmark, all states are implementing more or less drastic consolidations measures strongly affecting defence spending’ (Mölling and Brune, 2011a: 34). We can see that three of the five EU countries that did not cut their defence budgets after the financial crisis were states participating in NORDEFCO, while Norway was not included in the report –​as it is not EU member –​although its situation was similar to the other three Nordic countries. Denmark was the only Nordic country that slightly decreased its defence budget after the financial crisis. Copenhagen initially considered only a 86

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US$500 million saving over a five-​year period from an approximately US$4 billion annual defence budget (The Nation, 2010), which is a mere 2.5 per cent decrease. The Danish MoD intended to achieve this saving by cutting operating costs and decommissioning older equipment (Mölling and Brune, 2011b: 45). However these budget cuts did not happen immediately. While Danish defence spending more or less stagnated until 2012, since 2013 it has decreased sharply, which has generated a series of problems regarding manning and maintaining different platforms (Schaub, 2015). This can be partially explained by the Danish political system, where the defence budget is agreed for four to five years, and the new multi-​year budget was accepted in 2012. At the same time, these defence budget cuts cannot be attributed directly to the effects of the economic crisis: the real reason was the decrease in Danish military commitments in international operations. Finland increased its defence budget by 13 per cent to €2.78 billion in 2009 (Finnish Ministry of Defence, 2016), but the following year the Finnish MoD announced that its defence spending would increase further by 2 per cent every year from 2011 to 2015. The financial crisis thus did not have any serious impact on Finnish defence budgets and military capabilities. Although the 2 per cent increase was not executed in 2014 and 2015, as had originally been planned, the Finnish defence budget never went below €2.66 billion (Finnish Ministry of Defence, 2016). Like Finland, Sweden and Norway also increased their defence budgets after the financial crisis. In 2013 the Norwegian defence budget was US$7.4 billion, which was a 20 per cent increase on the 2009 defence budget (US$6.2 billion) (NATO, 2012). Sweden also increased its defence budget every year after the financial crisis, and provided 16 per cent more funding for defence in 2014 (44.98 billion Swedish krone) than in 2009 (38.75 billion Swedish krone) (Worldbank, 2020). At the same time Stockholm intended to rationalize and reorganize certain elements of its armed forces to save costs (Mölling and Brune, 2011b: 28). We can see that the Nordic states did not decrease their defence budgets significantly as a consequence of the financial crisis. Only Denmark executed small cuts in defence spending while the other three countries increased their defence budgets by more than 15 per cent after 2008. Although NORDEFCO was not established because of the financial crisis, its creation had a very important economic rationale. As Tuomas Forsberg highlighted, ‘cost-​effectiveness, the financial aspect, is the most commonly cited argument for increased Nordic cooperation in security and defence policy’ (Forsberg, 2013: 1174). During the 2000s, several Swedish and Norwegian official reports and academic studies were published which pointed out that the state of affairs did not allow smaller countries to maintain a full spectrum of defence capabilities. Many reasons were cited, including the decrease in defence budgets after the Cold War, the increased demand for participation in costly international operations, increasing labour costs 87

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and the problem of defence inflation –​the phenomenon whereby every generation of defence equipment costs significantly more than the previous generation, resulting in static defence budgets losing their purchasing power (Saxi, 2011: 9–​13). The former Norwegian Chiefs of Defence Sverre Diesen and the former Swedish Chief of Defence Håkan Syrén are deemed to be the ‘architects’ of NORDEFCO, and they had very good interpersonal chemistry (Swedish Scholar, 2014). Both of them used the concept of a special version of a ‘critical mass’ to describe the abovementioned problem. Sverre Diesen used this term to mean the ‘smallest practical number of any given weapon system’, and he argued that we […] need to remind ourselves that there is a lower limit as to the number of systems or units of each capability –​tanks, frigates, fighters –​which can be sustained before it becomes either unpractical, prohibitively expensive or both. An air force of 10 modern jet fighters is absurd, both because of sky-​rocketing unit costs and the fact that operating 10 planes will not generate a sufficiently large pool of people with pilot experience required to fill all the positions in the command structure, the support organisation and other functions necessary to operate and support a fighter force. (Diesen, 2012b) However, the armed forces of smaller European nations –​including the Nordic countries –​became so small that many capabilities were below the threshold of ‘critical mass’ (Saxi, 2011: 11). The vision of Diesen and Syrén was that this problem should be solved with the help of multinational defence cooperation. As Diesen put it: This means that each participating nation [of the defence cooperation] will retain its full spectrum of weapon systems and capabilities, achieving instead the necessary economy of scale by integrating their force production or force generation processes. In other words, all the support functions underpinning and enabling the operational capabilities such as military schools, maintenance workshops, specialist training centres, storage facilities, bombing ranges and other infrastructure etc etc, will be joint, each country looking after its designated slice of these support functions for all the participating nations. (Diesen, 2012b) It is not so surprising therefore that the Norwegian and Swedish DPCs published reports independently and also together in 2007, in which they emphasized the necessity of cooperation with other Nordic countries to achieve cost-​effectiveness in order to be able to maintain a full range of defence capabilities (Saxi, 2011: 17). As we can see, the debate about this 88

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issue had been going on in Norway and Sweden for years, and the Chiefs of Defence of the two countries supported the idea of closer multinational defence cooperation among the Nordic countries. The fact that both DPCs were in the middle of the transformation of their armed forces in the 2000s probably fostered a better mutual understanding too, as they faced very similar problems during this process. The Finnish DPC joined in the analytical work of mapping possible cooperative areas among the Nordic countries, which resulted in the Finnish, Norwegian and Swedish joint report which identified 140 areas for collaboration. Based on the results of this analysis, the three countries established NORDSUP to create joint logistical and support capabilities, coordinate training activities and harmonize their equipment. NORDSUP’s progress report reiterated the argument of Diesen and Syrén: Given the loss of purchasing power, small and medium sized countries will not be able in the close future to sustain complete and balanced armed forces. To put it somewhat simplified we face two options: either to share capabilities with strategic partners on a bilateral or multilateral basis or to face a future with fewer capabilities. (Saxi, 2011: 17) As we know, NORDSUP was incorporated into NORDEFCO together with NORDCAPS and NORDAC, but the question of ‘critical mass’ and cost-​effectiveness dominated the discourse concerning Nordic cooperation on defence. So we can conclude that the financial crisis did not play a significant role in the creation of the NORDEFCO; instead, the main motive behind NORDEFCO was the recognition that small states were not able to maintain the full spectrum of military capabilities because of different structural financial constraints. Thus, the Swedish and Norwegian Chiefs of Defence set in motion a process to solve this problem through multinational defence cooperation in the Nordic region.

Drastic defence budget cuts result in drastic capability cuts:​ CEDC The financial and economic crisis of 2008 had a severe impact on the CEDC countries, and they implemented austerity measures to balance their budgets similarly to most of the European countries. On average they reduced their defence spending by 25 per cent in the period between 2009 and 2014. The smallest decrease happened in Austria, where the defence budget was cut by 6 per cent, and the largest was in Slovenia, where defence spending was reduced by 38 per cent. As a consequence of the Austrian defence budget cuts, the Austrian DPC decided to decrease its personnel, decommission military equipment, reduce training and sell some of its properties. One of the most significant 89

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measures was that the Austrian Armed Forces (AAF) personnel were cut by 1,000 from 27,300 (Austrian Parliament, 2010). Approximately half of them were pensioned off, while others were transferred to the Finance and Interior Ministries and the unfilled positions were eliminated. The MoD also decommissioned 500 tanks, closed several barracks and reduced training hours significantly (Austrian Parliament, 2010). In other words, Austria’s immediate response to the defence budget cuts was traditional, and Vienna intended to solve its problems at a national level. The Croatian DPC was in the middle of the execution of its 2006–​15 long-​term development plan (Croatian Ministry of Defence, 2006) when the financial crisis hit the country and its defence budget. The defence budget cuts had a serious impact on most parts of the Croatian armed forces. The most notorious problems emerged with the ageing Croatian MiG-​21 fighter jet fleet, as two fighter jets crashed in 2010 on the same exercise and an additional one crashed in 2014 (Croatian Ministry of Defence, 2010, 2014). With regard to the first two crashes, in 2010, the Croatian prime minister dismissed the idea that the defence budget cuts were in any way involved; in 2014, referring to the subsequent case, the defence minister admitted that ‘defence cuts were in some degree responsible for the crash’ (Milekic, 2014). The Czech DPC dealt with the problems stemming from its decreasing defence budget in the traditional national way too. The Czech armed forces intended to absorb the impact of the cuts by reducing resources itself; at the same time the Czech MoD was open to multinational solutions on capability development but did not focus on them. The Czech armed forces cut personnel numbers significantly, from 24,000 to 18,000 in 2010 (Mölling and Brune, 2011b: 42). Of these, altogether 4,500 positions were eliminated at the MoD and among the troops, while the General Staff and the Joint Support Command were restructured into three agencies, resulting in a further reduction of 1,600 personnel (Kufcák, 2014: 43). Besides this, along with some of its counterparts, the Czech armed forces reduced their level of ambition, withdrew most of their forces from NATO’s Kosovo mission (KFOR), sold military properties and postponed the procurement of several major weapon systems and equipment (Kufcák, 2014). The Czech DPC was open to multinational solutions in principle but did not actively look for MDCs on capability development in practice, and according to the Czech White Paper of 2011 the Czech DPC concentrated on the existing cooperative frameworks of NATO and the EU (Czech Ministry of Defence, 2011). Unlike the Czech Republic, Hungary maintained its level of ambition and the number of its troops in international operations, but it stopped most of its major procurement programmes and postponed them until after 2016. Besides the freeze on procurement, the Hungarian MoD renegotiated its lease contract with SAAB for Hungary’s Gripen fleet, extending the contract 90

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another ten years in order to free financial resources for the period 2012–​ 2016 (Kufcák, 2014: 45). In 2011 the Hungarian DPC cut the administrative and command positions of the Hungarian Defence Force and MoD by 1,000, and decided to sell some of its properties as well (Szenes, 2011). At the same time Hungary seriously considered that projects in MDCs might be alternatives for national capability development on certain areas. As the Hungarian National Military Strategy of 2012 states: in capability development we must increasingly rely upon NATO, EU, regional and bilateral programmes. […] Keeping cost efficiency in mind, the opportunities lying in the development and sharing of defence capabilities in international cooperation must be exploited. In this regard, it is advisable to rely upon regional defence and military cooperation, among others the cooperation of the Visegrad Four and other Central European partners. (Hungarian Ministry of Defence, 2012: 23) Like the Czechs, the Hungarian DPC perceived NATO and the EU as frameworks that were appropriate for the development of costly capabilities ‘that the country could not procure or maintain on its own and that are also absent in the international domain’ (Hungarian Ministry of Defence, 2012: 23). However, the difference between the Hungarian and the Czech stance on MDCs was that, while the Hungarian DPC openly advocated the usage of subregional (which the official documents called ‘regional’) MDCs, the clear priority for the Czech DPC remained cooperation in NATO and the EU. Hungary’s openness to MDCs was evident in the implicit remarks of consecutive defence policy directors about the possibility that MDCs could mitigate the effects of the financial crisis on defence capabilities (Csiki and Molnár, 2010: 9–​11). Not surprisingly Hungary played a significant part in the creation of CEDC, and in the first half of the 2010s it was very active in deepening defence collaborations in the context of the Visegard Four group (V4) as well (Hungarian MoD Official, 2013). Based on the aforementioned processes and phenomena, we can conclude that Hungary took seriously the idea that MDCs could help maintain its national military capabilities and could thus mitigate the negative effects caused by the financial crisis on national defence capabilities. After the financial crisis the Slovak Armed Forces (SAF) were reorganized significantly in 2009 (Kufcák, 2014: 47); in addition the newly elected government initiated a Strategic Defence Review in 2010, which was outlined in a new White Paper. The Slovak DPC, similarly to its Hungarian counterpart, prioritized its contributions to international operations and its troop readiness over capability development, and it thus postponed its major procurement programmes and reduced some of the staff personnel as well 91

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(Kufcák, 2014: 47). Replacement of the MiG-​29 fighter jets was perceived as one of the most pressing and expensive issues, but the SAF would not have funds for that in the foreseeable future. According to Slovakia’s 2011 White Paper, Bratislava was ready to cooperate on many defence capability areas on a multinational basis, but its emphasis was on collaborations in NATO and the EU (Slovakian Ministry of Defence, 2013: 94). Although the White Paper does not explicitly emphasize the prevalence of NATO in this regard, the list of potential areas of multinational capability development suggests that it was the most important multinational framework for Slovakia on capability development. While in terms of subregional defence cooperation only one remark can be found in the document, about the Visegrad Group, it states that bilateral military cooperation has to be pragmatic, economically feasible and long-​term (Slovakian Ministry of Defence, 2013: 94–​5). We can see that the measures taken by Slovakia to handle the decreasing financial resources after the economic crisis were also national ones. Although the Slovak MoD supported MDCs, according to its White Paper it prioritized defence cooperation in NATO above any other forms. Accordingly, in the case of Slovakia the financial crisis did not foster the search for new multinational solutions to maintain national military capabilities. Slovenia’s situation is similar to the cases of Hungary and Slovakia in the sense that the Slovenian DPC decided to postpone or cancel its procurement programmes, but did not cut its personnel as much as the Czech Republic. Straight after the financial crisis, resources for modernization were decreased by 50 per cent, and the Slovenian MoD did not have the funds to recruit more soldiers as had been planned earlier (Mölling and Brune, 2011b: 69). Slovenia published a new National Security Strategy in 2010, and although it mentions the effects of the economic crisis several times (Slovenian Ministry of Defence, 2010: 12, 24, 32), it does not discuss how the Slovenian MoD should handle the defence budget cuts resulting from the financial crisis. The document does not mention multinational defence cooperation at all, and does not state how it should be used to help meet policy objectives. In addition, even the General Long-​Term Development Plan of the Slovenian Armed Forces published in 2011 barely touches MDCs. It only says that ‘the legal basis allowing the implementation […] of multinational modernization and equipping projects of the Slovenian Armed Forces should also be provided’ (Slovenian Ministry of Defence, 2011: 56). Based on the national approach to the defence budget cuts, and the total lack of interest in MDCs in Slovenia’s strategic documents, it is safe to assume that Slovenia did not take into consideration the fact that it should look to multinational solutions to manage its shrinking national capabilities. This makes sense if we take into account the fact that defence budget cuts for CEDC countries were imminent, and CEDC DPCs had to manage their worsening budgetary situation immediately. Developing multinational 92

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projects takes time, which CEDC countries did not have. Accordingly, it is not surprising that they reacted at a national level to the defence budget cuts, and if they had to choose, they preferred already existing multinational frameworks. Austria focused on the EU, and the Czech Republic and Slovakia prioritized NATO over any other options concerning capability development. It means that these three countries were open to multinational capability development programmes in principle, but none of them considered MDCs as a cure for the decreasing defence budgets. The Slovenian DPC did not concentrate on multinational capability development at all, while the Croatian DPC focused on integration into NATO and preparation to join the EU. Although the Croatian DPC had previously intended to procure fighter jets in a multinational programme, it abandoned this idea to the second half of the 2000s. Hungary was the only CEDC country that really believed that MDCs could be the solution to the problem caused by the economic crisis. Accordingly, we can conclude that, with the exception of Hungary, the defence budget cuts resulting from the financial crisis did not foster the search for multinational solutions to maintain national military capabilities in the CEDC countries. Referring to the effects of the financial crisis, Peter Slovak, the Head of Defence Policy Division at the Slovak MoD at that time, pointed out that ‘capability planning with pooling and sharing […] is one of the ways how to get more capabilities for less money, but it will be quite difficult to reach this goal due to an uncertain resource [financial] perspective’ (Csiki and Molnár, 2010: 14). Accordingly, some perceived the financial crisis as an obstacle rather than an opportunity for multinational defence cooperation. Austrians perceived that CEDC was more a political project than a financial one. Johann Pucher, the Austrian defence policy director, emphasized that ‘enhancing cooperation in capability development would enable cost saving as well as preservation of existing capabilities that otherwise could not be maintained; cooperation should not be focused on economic goals only but has to take into account the political dimension of pooling and sharing incentives’ (Csiki and Molnár, 2010: 6). Accordingly, Austrian officials believed that CEDC might bring cost savings in the long term, but this would take time and huge amount of work, and the political side of the cooperation was initially more important (Austrian MoD Official, 2014). Czech officials perceived the financial crisis as a factor in creating CEDC (Junior Czech MoD Official, 2014) and believed that the impact of the financial crisis on defence budgets was one of the causes and part of the ‘official’ narrative for establishing CEDC. However, the ‘unofficial’ reason for the Czechs was not related to economic issues; in fact, the main added value of CEDC was that it brought Austria and Croatia into a Central European framework, where the Czech MoD could work with them together with other countries from the region (Senior Czech MoD Official, 2014). Thus 93

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the possible economic benefits of the cooperation for the Czech Republic were much less significant than other considerations. The Croatian DPC supported CEDC initiatives, which provided opportunities to work together with NATO and EU members. Croatia joined NATO in 2009 and was preparing for its accession to the EU (2013) at the time of establishing CEDC. Accordingly, the Croatian DPC was less concerned with the economic issues concerning defence cooperation, and focused more on how they could integrate into different multinational defence cooperative frameworks. CEDC just fitted this aim. The Hungarian DPC perceived CEDC as a possible tool for alleviating defence budgetary constraints, but other considerations were taken into account as well. Hungary held the EU Presidency in the first half of 2011, and the Hungarian DPC wanted to gain political capital and support from its Central European partners for its presidency tasks as well. This probably also partly explains why, at the end of 2010, the Hungarian defence policy director initiated formal talks with his CEDC counterparts for the time of the Hungarian EU Presidency in 2011. We can conclude that most of the CEDC countries did not search for multinational solutions to alleviate the negative effects of the financial crisis on defence budgets. Although economic and financial issues were always implicit in considerations regarding defence collaboration, tactical and short-​ term considerations were more important for Central European DPCs than alleviating the immediate effects of the financial crisis.

Conclusion Twenty years ago, Alexander and Garden argued that the effects of dwindling European defence budgets could be handled in three ways. Either the governments should increase them in real terms again, or the militaries would have to cut their capabilities further, or they could cooperate by pooling and sharing certain capabilities. The Lancaster House Treaties, NORDEFCO and CEDC were established in an environment where governments experienced financial scarcity as a result of the financial crisis of 2008–​2009, and according to the logic of Alexander and Garden they either could cut their capabilities or begin to cooperate. As we have seen, the case studies showed that the financial crisis did not have any significant impact on creating the three studied MDCs. For instance, the seeds of the Nordic cooperation were sown a few years before the financial crisis hit the world economy, as the Swedish and Norwegian DPCs started the conceptual work on their collaboration in 2006–​7. In any case, the defence budgets of most of the Nordic countries were not decreased as a consequence of the financial crisis, so this could not have been a reason for setting up NORDEFCO. Although all of the DPCs 94

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of the Lancaster House Treaties and CEDC experienced significant defence budget cuts, they did not intend to mitigate their effects by cooperation and instead cut their capabilities. In most cases the defence budget cuts were so significant and quick that these DPCs did not have the time to think about multinational cooperation or coordinate their approaches with other DPCs. They therefore acted swiftly by decreasing military capabilities at national level. Many DPCs saw the effects of the financial crisis as a significant threat to defence cooperation as the decreasing defence budgets might lead to the cancellation of already existing cooperative projects or hinder the setting up of new ones. However, in general, financial aspects played a significant role in the creation of the MDCs being studied here. The Nordic –​especially the Swedish and Norwegian –​DPCs perceived that their financial resources were not enough to maintain the ‘critical mass’ of military capabilities nationally, and would reach a level where certain capabilities would be useless soon. They intended to prevent this by deeper cooperation, and they saw NORDEFCO as a tool to mitigate this problem. The French and British DPCs also perceived a financial rationale behind the Lancaster House Treaties, but this was linked rather to the decades-​long pressure on European defence budgets than to the financial crisis. Most of the Central European DPCs supported the creation of CEDC for very different reasons, and many of them also saw it as an economic opportunity in the long term. Accordingly, abrupt severe financial scarcity does not facilitate defence cooperation as in these situations DPCs work on survival mode and do not have the capacity to think long-​term. This hinders multinational defence collaborations because launching an MDC needs extra effort and coordination, and when significant defence budget cuts happen, there is no time for that. However, as we have seen, long-​term structural financial problems facilitate defence collaborations. Thus, if the DPCs expect that their funding will be limited in the long term, they start to turn to each other and attempt to mitigate their problems through cooperation with other DPCs.

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Previous Defence Collaborations Multinational defence cooperations (MDCs) are rarely created from scratch; rather, they are based on previous collaborations lasting years or even decades. These existing collaborations generate personal networks and institutional relationships between the participating defence policy communities (DPCs), and these accumulate over time, and can help to launch new collaborations. The reason for this is that it is easier to cooperate with someone we know and have established relationships with than with an entirely new partner. Thus, already existing institutions, solutions and cooperative frameworks have an advantage over new ones (Uttley et al, 2019). Path-​dependence is a concept originally used in economics, but currently it is widely used in different academic fields. As William Sewell points out, this approach ‘assumes that events are normally “path dependent”, that is, what has happened at an earlier point in time will affect the possible outcomes of sequence of events occurring at a later point in time’ (Sewell, 1996: 262–​3). This concept is very broad, and scholars understand it in different ways. For some, path-​dependence might mean simply that history matters. However, others focus on more specific issues such as the importance of initial conditions, while others again study the effect of historical lock-​in or the mechanisms of self-​reproducing and reactive sequences and their role in determining final outcomes (Mahoney and Schensul, 2006). The large variety of approaches to the concept of path-​dependence has been criticized and also labelled as ‘concept stretching’ (Pierson, 2000: 252). Not surprisingly many scholars have attempted to provide more conceptual clarity for this term from different perspectives (Greener, 2005; Page, 2006). Marc R. DeVore applied the concept of path-​dependence in relation to defence cooperation (DeVore, 2012). In his research he investigated 16 different European and transatlantic armaments organizations that have been created since the end of World War II. DeVore shows that in the first half of the Cold War functional transatlantic organizations developed fastest and deepest thanks to the US’s political, technical and financial support for transatlantic armament cooperation. However, from the mid-​1960s politically 96

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driven European organizations began to flourish because of the drying up of American subsidies and because some conflicts emerged between the US and European nations. The majority of pre-​existing transatlantic organizations survived and were not replaced by other European ones. After the Cold War, the evolution of the EU provided inspiration for armaments collaboration as well and supranational bodies attempted to control this field. But the existing transatlantic organizations have become even stronger and, although new pan-​European institutions have been established, they have often taken over the responsibilities of earlier organizations. DeVore points out that early organizational choices influenced later processes, because the opportunity costs of replacing efficient armament organizations are too high for them to be replaced by new ones; in addition, even some components of less successful organizations are usually preserved in their successors. Although it is clear that the current ‘polycentric’ dynamics of armament cooperation is inefficient, DeVore concludes that ‘due to their path-​dependent development, it would be prohibitively costly to replace today’s organizations with a single new entity’ and thus ‘the EU’s role will likely remain limited to its current responsibilities and domains outside the mandates of existing organizations’ (DeVore, 2012: 454). This book argues that DeVore’s results are applicable not only to armament cooperation but also to MDCs in Europe in general. The line of thought concerning path-​dependence applied by DeVore argues that path-​dependence can best be illustrated by the ‘increasing returns’ concept that comes from economics. Paul Pierson highlights that ‘in an increasing returns process, the probability of further steps along the same path increases with each move down the path. This is because the relative benefits of the current activity compared with other possible options increase over time. To put it a different way, the costs of exit –​of switching to some previously plausible alternative –​rise’ (Pierson, 2000: 252). Four self-​reinforcing mechanisms are relevant in this regard (Arthur, 1994: 112; Pierson, 2000: 254). First, when a collaboration or an institution is created, it often includes investments of large set-​up or fixed costs that incentivize the parties to stay in the initiative. While in economics these are usually means investments in new technologies, in our case these investments instead take the form of establishing collaborative frameworks (for example, regular high-​level meetings, working groups), international agreements and ongoing practical cooperation (for example, exercises, common procurement). Second, when the actors involved start to cooperate, they learn how to do this in practice in a more and more efficient way, and personal networks among them also start to evolve, which makes the collaboration even more straightforward. Accordingly, these learning effects make alternative solutions less desirable, as they would underperform compared to the existing one. Third, when actors perceive the benefits of ‘going along’ with other actors, 97

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they tend to take similar actions. These coordination effects also ‘encourage states to reinforce, rather than replace existing’ (DeVore, 2012: 438) frameworks. Fourth, when actors perceive that a solution has worked in the past, they often expect that it will work in the future too. They thus adapt their actions with these expectations and are willing to put even more effort into these solutions to make them work. These adaptive expectations work similar as a self-​fulfilling prophecy as they strengthen coordination effects further. This chapter shows how defence cooperation has evolved among the DPCs of the case studies (Lancaster House Treaties, NORDEFCO, CEDC) and why it was important for the setting up of these MDCs. To do this, the chapter applies the approach of path-​dependence, explained above, which focuses on the four self-​reinforcing mechanisms of increasing returns (large set-​up or fixed costs, learning effects, coordination effects, adaptive expectations).

Recurring adaptive expectations:​the Lancaster House Treaties British–​French relations have always been complicated, and over the last few centuries France and the UK competed with each other more than they cooperated, so the mutual suspicion between these two countries is not surprising. Nevertheless, the two countries share very similar values and cultural attitudes; in addition, they were allies during the two world wars and during the 1956 Suez crisis. However, as Philippe Chassaigne and Michael Dockrill very diplomatically stated, ‘in spite of all these encouraging elements, the history of the last 100 years [1898–​1998] of Franco-​British relations is marked by difficulties, such they appeared on more than one occasion to be hardly possible to overcome’. Still they also point out that ‘with the benefit of hindsight, we can see now that most of these crises, however acute they seemed to be at the time, were in fact nothing more than gut reaction’ (Chassaigne and Michael, 2002: 3–​4). Franco-​British defence relations during the Cold War were described by Jean Chabaud as a ‘succession of misunderstandings and missed opportunities’. He points out that ‘there were many occasions on which the French and British positions could have been identical. However, prejudices and misunderstandings prevented this’ (Chabaud, 1989: 155–​6). For example, the foreign and defence policies of the two countries diverged significantly during the Cold War despite the two countries signing a Treaty of Alliance and Mutual Assistance in Dunkirk in 1947, and despite the fact that both of them were founding members of the Western European Union (WEU) in 1948 and of NATO in 1949. The roots of the divergence can be traced back to the time before and during World War II, and stem from different world views, experiences and different relations with the US. For instance, 98

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while, after World War II, the UK remained a great power and forged a very strong relationship at every level with the US, France felt humiliated and wanted to restore itself to greatness, which it believed had been lost during the war. The situation became more complicated as the French believed that after World War II they would be degraded to a servile status in relation to the US. In addition, Washington distrusted Charles de Gaulle –​the leader of the Free French during the war and President of France later –​from the beginning, which in turn also had a negative impact on de Gaulle’s views about Americans. These dynamics had an impact on relations between the UK and France, and de Gaulle, among others, had the impression ‘that the British […] would never stand up to the Americans’ (Chuter, 1996: 207, 211–​12). After World War II the UK and France were in similar positions in the sense that they had to handle their relative declining power and both knew that they needed the US for that. The UK decided to become a kind of ‘loyal courtier’ of the US in order to be able to persuade Americans to make the British policy their own. Although France was convinced too that the US had to be involved in European affairs via some transatlantic structure, Paris wanted to create a European organization where France was in a dominant position, from where it could be able to speak with Washington on an equal basis and put an end to its inferior status. However, the evolution of NATO did not favour France, which led to repeated French disillusionments with the Alliance –​NATO did not provide help in France’s colonial wars, NATO rearmed Germany, Anglo-​Saxons dominated the organization and the US, who did not provide ‘sufficient’ military aid to Paris, humiliated France during the Suez Crisis in 1956 (Chuter, 1996: 247–​62). These processes led to France’s withdrawal from NATO’s integrated military command in 1966, and put France and Britain on different paths in many aspects of defence policy. France decided to become an independent great power to restore its greatness, and thus followed a different foreign policy from that of the US and took the lead in the integration process of the EEC/​EU. Parallel with these, Paris developed its indigenous doctrines and weapon systems in every area independently from NATO and the US. At the same time the UK put NATO at the forefront of its defence policy and cooperated more intensively with the US on foreign and defence policy, and when London could not allocate the appropriate resources for the development of certain military technologies, it procured them from Washington. In addition, in the framework of NATO the UK followed and adjusted to US military doctrines as well. Despite the aforementioned processes, Franco-​British defence relations did not come to an end during the Cold War. The closest military cooperation between them was Operation Musketeer in 1956, when Franco-​British troops invaded Egypt to take over the Suez Canal. From 99

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the 1960s the two countries cooperated on several armament programmes like the Martel missile, the Jaguar aircraft, the Lynx, Puma and Gazelle helicopters (Hussain, 1989: 129). However, later both countries embarked on multilateral armament programmes instead of bilateral ones and, besides the previously mentioned collaborations of the 1960s, they did not initiate other British–​French major armaments programmes during the Cold War. In 1962 the two countries discussed the possibility of an ‘entente nucléaire’, a framework where they could combine their nuclear forces and could cooperate on developing technologies necessary for new nuclear weapon systems. However, at the same time the US offered Polaris missiles to both countries, and while the UK accepted the American offer, France declined it. In the subsequent years the idea of nuclear cooperation emerged between London and Paris on several occasions, but it did not take root (Roper, 1989). These processes and initiatives cannot be called the set-​up costs for the Lancaster House Treaties. However, they were essential to make the relationship between France and the UK stronger in the field of defence and were thus able to provide the foundation for future deeper cooperation. The large set-​u p costs for making British–​F rench relations more institutionalized began to be invested in the 1970s, when the annual Franco-​British summit was established; it became a regular event after 1976. That year London and Paris also signed a ‘Memorandum of Understanding on the Placing of Services and Facilities of the Government of the French Republic at the Disposal of British Forces in times of crisis’, which represented a very important shift in terms of trust between the two countries (Roper, 1989). In the long term these Franco-​British summits significantly helped to improve defence cooperation between the two states, as they started to learn to work with each other and coordinate their standpoints better. These learning and coordination effects culminated in the agreement of 1982, when Paris and London decided that their defence ministers would meet twice a year. Thanks to the increasing number of learning and coordination effects, the two MDCs started to have adaptive expectations about the benefits of their cooperation. Accordingly, two years later, at the 1984 Franco-​British summit the parties also agreed on that neither of them would begin any new armaments programme without discussing it with the other (Chabaud, 1989). However, they could not agree on the development of a new fighter aircraft, with the result that the French developed the Rafale while the British participated in the development of the multinational Eurofighter. This shows that, although the French and British DPC started a path for bilateral cooperation, it was not strong enough to overwrite everything. The end of the Cold War transformed the strategic environment significantly and opened up new windows of opportunity for many new defence collaborations in Europe. Cooperation this time was driven 100

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mostly by decreasing European defence budgets, newly emerging military technologies, new tasks –​expeditionary warfare –​and the joint allied operations of the 1990s (the Gulf War in 1991, peace support operations in the Balkans in the 1990s and the Kosovo War in 1999). These processes affected British–​French relations as well and created the momentum for an improvement in defence cooperation between the British and French DPCs that had never been seen during the Cold War. This was able to happen so quickly because the two DPCs had already invested large set-​up costs (for example, regular high-​and lower-​level meetings, several agreements) and the cooperation created learning and coordination effects and adaptive expectations. Thus, it is less surprising that a series of British-​French bilateral agreements and initiatives regarding defence was established during the 1990s and the 2000s (Taylor, 2010): • In 1992 the Anglo-​French Joint Nuclear Commission was established, which became the main forum for discussion on nuclear issues between the two countries. • In 1995 the Franco-​British European Air Group was created. (Membership of this initiative was later extended, and it is currently called the ‘European Air Group’, in which seven European nations cooperate on air defence training and reciprocal air support.) • In 1996 the Franco-​British Joint Commission on Peacekeeping was established to harmonize the doctrines and procedures of the two armed forces regarding peace support operations. In the same year an LoI was signed on maritime cooperation. In the LoI France and the UK established 20 working groups to study among others amphibious operations, operational doctrine and personnel exchanges and also aircraft carrier development. • In 1997 an LoI between the British and French armies was signed. • In 1998 a Franco-​British Joint Declaration was adopted at St Malo which created the basis for the Common Security and Defence Policy of the EU. • In 2000 a Memorandum of Understanding on Cooperative Defence Research and Technology was updated by the two countries which covered several cooperative initiatives between the UK and France (for example, jet engines and airborne radar, armoured fighting vehicles, ship propulsion systems). In the same year France and Britain together with Germany, Italy, Spain and Sweden signed an LoI on the Framework Agreement on Defence Industrial Restructuring. • At the Franco-​British summit of 2003 the two countries reached an agreement on further defence cooperation both bilaterally and in an EU framework. On this occasion they agreed to improve their cooperation on aircraft carriers, proposed the creation of the EDA and suggested that the EU should take over the NATO operation in Bosnia and Herzegovina. 101

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• In 2006 the UK and France agreed to cooperate on future aircraft carrier design and established a High-​Level Bilateral Working Group to study the possibilities to improve collaboration on current and future armament programmes between the two states. • At the 2008 summit London and Paris decided to cooperate on the A400 transport aircrafts, initiated a joint helicopter trust fund and proposed the creation of European carrier group interoperability and a joint industrial strategy for complex weapons. • In 2009 the UK and France proposed initiatives on UAVs and next-​ generation military communication satellites. In addition, the French and British MDCs have also cooperated together with other countries on several armament programmes. Good examples of this are the British–​French–​Italian PAAM surface-​to-​air missile system for destroyers and the Meteor air-​to-​air missiles for the Eurofighter Typhoons and A400s. However, not every collaborative effort was beneficial for both countries, and in some cases there were misperceptions about the intentions of the other. For instance, the UK withdrew from the British–​French–​Italian Horizon destroyer programme in 1999 and Britain developed the Type 45 destroyer instead (Taylor, 2010: 6). The UK also withdrew from the British–​French–​German Trigat MR third-​generation anti-​tank missile programme in 2003 and instead procured American and Israeli weapon systems off the shelf. Furthermore, the UK and France occasionally saw the raison d’être of their common initiatives differently, which later caused misunderstandings between them and at times slowed their collaborations. The most obvious example is the St Malo agreement, because while the initiative was seen by the British mostly as a capability development issue where CSDP might develop into the ‘European wing of NATO’, the French perceived the agreement as a political issue that would lead to a ‘European alternative to NATO’ (Bickerton, 2010: 120). As we can see, cooperation between the French and British DPCs was not always without conflicts, and the two countries did not agree on everything. However, the learning and coordination effects that were generated by decades-​long practical military collaboration were able to initiate new adaptive expectations from time to time. For instance, a big positive shift can be perceived around 2008, as the joint declaration of the Franco-​British summit on defence and security issues began to focus much more on bilateral defence and security issues than on cooperation within multilateral frameworks as had been typical of earlier declarations. On this occasion much more emphasis was put on several security-​and defence-​related topics than previously, and the declaration clearly stated that the UK and France would cooperate on countering the proliferation of CBRN weapons, terrorism and cyber attacks. One year later the French President and the British Prime Minister decided to deepen their cooperation on counter-​terrorism, among other things, by 102

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‘high level operational coordination’ and by establishing ‘high level, strategic working groups’ (France–​UK Summit, 2009). In addition to the declarations of the summits and the actions that stemmed from them, very close defence and security policy cooperation was established between the British and French DPCs on the basis of decades-​ long earlier collaborations. For instance, British officials were closely involved in the preparation of the 2008 French White Paper (Gomis, 2011: 4), and French officials participated in the work of the British SDSR published in 2010 (Lindley-​French, 2010). In this process, the question of risks and vulnerabilities was touched on and discussed between the parties. The convergence of views is also well represented by the declaration on defence and security of the 2009 Franco-​British summit, which stated that ‘it is difficult to envisage a situation in which the vital interest of either of our two nations could be threatened without the vital interest of the other also being threatened’ (France–​UK Summit, 2009). Furthermore, if we look at the discussions of experts and officials who participated in the two events of the Franco-​British Defence Cooperation Roundtable in 2010, we can see that they agreed that their countries shared the same threat perception (Franco-​British Council, 2009; Chick, 2010a, 2010b). Accordingly, a UK MoD official pointed out that the vast majority of the Franco-​British bilateral projects had already existed before the Lancaster House Treaties, and the treaties ‘only canonized’ them and put them into one overarching framework (Mid-​career UK MoD Official, 2014). Actually, only the collaboration on cyber defence and the creation of a Joint Readiness Force were really new initiatives. Even the other major projects stemming from the Lancaster House Treaties, such as nuclear cooperation and collaboration on aircraft carriers, had been discussed for years. Thus the Lancaster House Treaties can be seen more as the result of a long path-​ dependent process than as an immediate answer to political and financial needs. This could happen thanks to the large set-​up costs invested into institutionalized cooperation during the Cold War and to the fact that the British–​French defence cooperation became more and more efficient thanks to the increasing learning and coordination effects and the recurring adaptive expectations. This means that, while political support may have been behind deeper cooperation among French and British DPCs, that support could not have been so overarching and deep without the decades-​long cooperation that created a dense layer of smaller and larger practical collaborations.

Cooperation on peacekeeping during the Cold War: NORDEFCO Defence cooperation among Nordic countries had already begun in certain areas during the Cold War, but the roots of defence collaboration date back 103

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to the interwar period. The possibility of establishing a Nordic Defence Union among the Nordic countries had been discussed several times in the 1930s, but the idea had been turned down, and the only defence cooperative efforts among Nordic countries were established bilaterally between Finland and Sweden and between Sweden and Norway on a limited scale before World War II (Blidberg, 1987: 6–​11). In that period all the Nordic countries deemed themselves neutral, and did not join either the Axis Powers or the Allies. However, this did not mean that they were not involved in World War II. Denmark and Norway were occupied by Nazi Germany in 1940, and Britain invaded Iceland in the same year. Finland successfully fought for its independence against the Soviet Union during the war, and in the final years it also expelled German troops from its territory (Lunde, 2013). Sweden was the only Nordic country during World War II not to be directly involved in major military confrontations. However, it is worth noting that Sweden provided a volunteer corps of more than 8,000 troops to support Finland against the Soviet Union during the Winter War in 1939–​40 (Sprague, 2010). The idea of establishing the Nordic Defence Union was raised again after the war and was seriously considered by the governments of Sweden and Norway in 1948. Finland and Denmark joined in the negotiations soon afterwards, and these four Nordic countries established the Scandinavian defence committee in October 1948 to investigate different aspects of the creation of the Nordic Defence Union (Blidberg, 1987: 41–​63). However, the idea of a Nordic defence bloc was not realized, as Denmark, Iceland and Norway became founding members of NATO in 1949, while Sweden chose to keep its neutral status and established itself as an armed neutral country. Finland signed a special agreement with the Soviet Union in which Helsinki agreed to maintain a neutral status in return for Soviet troops leaving its territory. As a result, Finland was not allowed to develop closer relationships with the West and remained more or less within the Soviet orbit during the Cold War (Allison, 1985). As a consequence of the Nordic states division between the orbits of East and West, defence cooperation during the Cold War could only be limited. Nevertheless, Denmark, Iceland and Norway collaborated extensively in the framework of NATO, and they were able to cooperate militarily with Finland and Sweden in UN peacekeeping operations. Thus, Nordic defence cooperation in this area did not create tensions between Nordic countries and ‘their’ respective superpowers. Nordic cooperation on peacekeeping operations was extremely successful during the Cold War. Denmark, Finland, Norway and Sweden worked together closely and often deployed peacekeepers to the same conflict zones at the same time. As Iceland does not have armed forces, Reykjavik did not take part actively in this cooperation. The four Nordic countries altogether provided the 25 per cent of all peacekeeping forces to UN operations 104

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during the Cold War (approximately 125,000 troops), and acquired a huge reputation as a result. They also developed a distinct Nordic model for peacekeeping, which, according to Peter Viggo Jakobsen, comprised the following elements: • creating institutional frameworks for defence ministerial negotiations and working groups for practical cooperation; • cooperation on military education by establishing joint UN peacekeeping courses; • developing national standby forces of volunteers able to be deployed at short notice; • willingness to deploy troops for UN operations. (Jakobsen, 2006a) The framework for the abovementioned cooperation was called NORDSAMFN in it, decision-​making among Nordic states was based on consensus, and troop contributions to UN operations were made on a case-​by-​case basis (Jakobsen, 2006a: 213). The Nordic standby force, which was the most important element of NORDSAMFN, was established by Norway, Sweden and Denmark in 1964, and later Finland also joined this collaboration. In the second half of the Cold War the Nordic standby force consisted of a 6,000-​strong troop pool (Denmark 950 troops, Finland 2,000 troops, Norway 1,330 troops, Sweden 2,000 troops), but it was never used as a joint Nordic force, despite the fact that this possibility was considered several times. However, as a result of the continuous Nordic contribution to UN missions and because of difficulties in recruitment, the Nordic standby force became a system that ensured the rotation of Nordic troops in UN operations rather than a real standby force, which could have been deployed in a short notice, and this was useful for the Nordic MDCs. The training, deployment and equipment provision of the national elements of the standby unit were responsibilities of the individual Nordic countries. The soldiers of the standby-​force were volunteers, approximately 90 per cent of whom were civilians who completed their basic military training as conscripts and only 10 per cent professional soldiers. Every volunteer had the obligation to finish a three-​to four-​week national peacekeeper training, and non-​commissioned officers and officers took part in joint Nordic UN training programmes as well (Jakobsen, 2006a: 29–​32). These show that all the self-​reinforcing mechanisms for a path-​dependent Nordic cooperation had been in place during the Cold War. Among other things, large set-​up costs were invested in extensive institutional frameworks including high-​ and lower-​level bodies and education and training programmes to support the Nordic peacekeeping cooperation. Common training and deployments generated learning and coordination effects that made the cooperation more effective. Finally, the success of the Nordic 105

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peacekeeping cooperation created adaptive expectations that made sure that the Nordic DPCs were convinced that their collaboration would be successful in the future as well and invested more into it. After the end of the Cold War the geopolitical situation changed significantly in Europe, which created an environment that supported cooperation among Nordic states on military affairs. The Soviet Union collapsed, meaning Finland could distance itself from Moscow, and also Sweden’s position on armed neutrality could be eased. Accordingly, both countries changed their neutral status and became non-​aligned, although they still have not joined NATO. However, the evolution of their approach in this regard allowed them to join the EU in 1995 and participate in the EU’s security and defence policy (Devine, 2011). In addition, they also participate in NATO partnership structures, as was mentioned earlier, and EU membership and NATO partnership status gave Stockholm and Helsinki new platforms to participate in defence collaboration outside the framework of the UN. This would have been impossible during the Cold War, when the East–​West divide was stark, and the Kremlin probably would not have tolerated Finland’s and Sweden’s abandonment of neutrality for non-​alignment. Furthermore, the security situation was much safer in Europe in the 1990s and 2000s, and although the defence budgets and troop levels of the Nordic countries were significantly decreased (Forss and Holopainen, 2015), these developments (Euro-​Atlantic integration, peaceful security environment in Europe) created an environment where defence cooperation become much less sensitive among Nordic states than earlier. Positive adaptive expectations also prevailed regarding the success of future Nordic cooperation, and several Nordic cooperative frameworks were established after the Cold War. For instance, Denmark, Finland, Norway and Sweden established the Nordic Armament Cooperation (NORDAC) ‘with the goal of coordinating armaments development, maintenance and procurement’ in 1994 (Forsberg, 2013: 1168). NORDAC provided some tangible benefits and generated savings by information sharing on technology and test results (Hagelin, 2006), which were discussed in the so-​called Cooperation Groups (COG). COGs were dedicated to broad cooperation areas such as logistics, military clothing, NATO codification, the Nordic Public Private Partnership, investigation (of new areas of cooperations) and so on, and helped to facilitate some smaller procurements between the Nordic countries. At the same time, the few major joint Nordic armament collaborations failed. The Standard Nordic Helicopter Programme (SNHP) did not result in an all-​Nordic procurement as had been intended, because Denmark decided to buy the AgustaWestland EH101 helicopter, while the other Nordic countries opted for the NH90 helicopter. Similarly, the Viking submarine project started with only three Nordic nations (Finland 106

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did not participate), but Norway decided to quit the programme in 2003 and Denmark did the same one year later. As analysts pointed out, one of NORDAC’s significant problems was that it had a great imbalance favouring Sweden concerning armament deals in the Nordic region, as Stockholm had the strongest defence industry among the participating countries (Hagelin, 2006). The Nordic peacekeeping model, which was the success story of Nordic military cooperation in the Cold War, faded after the fall of the Iron Curtain. Jakobsen highlights that two changes led to this situation. First, many states that earlier were not interested in participating in peacekeeping missions began to send troops in big numbers to peacekeeping operations. This meant that the Nordic countries lost their status as major troop contributors. Second, the peace operations after the Cold War needed a different approach concerning the use of force. While peacekeepers had previously used force mostly for self-​defence, the international operations of the 1990s and 2000s needed combat-​capable forces for offensive operations as well (Jakobsen, 2006b: 387). Realizing this situation, Nordic countries created several new Nordic frameworks for reforming their participation in international missions. These were NORDCAPS, the Nordic Battlegroup (NBG) and the multinational Stand-​by High Readiness Brigade for UN Operations (SHIRBRIG). The Nordic countries established NORDCAPS in 1997, and at the same time they abolished NORDSAMFN, the cooperative structure that was created in the Cold War (Jakobsen, 2007: 459). The size of NORDCAPS’s force pool (12,000) was twice that of NORDSAMFN (6,000), but the force was never used for joint deployments, and as the EU Battlegroup concept was introduced in 2004 analysts deemed NORDCAPS ‘obsolete’, and NORDCAPS’s force pool was wound up in 2006. Under NORDCAPS the Nordic countries instead created a joint support package for improving UN capacities, and started security sector reform projects in the Balkans, in Africa and in Ukraine. In addition, NORDCAPS’s framework was used to create NBG, which was established under the aegis of the EU’s battlegroup initiative, and was on standby for the first time in 2008. Sweden took the responsibility of being NBG’s framework nation and provided 2,000 troops to the unit, while Finland and Norway contributed to it at company level. Because of Denmark’s opt-​out from ESDP/​CSDP it could not take part in this project, but Ireland and the Baltic countries did. The third cooperative framework on operations was the Danish-​led SHIRBRIG. It was not purely a Nordic initiative as Canada and the Netherlands also contributed to this unit, but there was major involvement from the four Nordic countries. The multinational brigade was established in 2000, and made forces available at short notice for UN operations for a maximum of six months. Elements of SHIRBRIG were deployed, among others, to the UN mission in Ethiopia 107

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and Eritrea, UN headquarters in Liberia and the UN mission in Sudan, and also supported African multinational organizations in creating their own standby forces. However, unlike the NBG, SHIRBRIG could not be deployed for conducting offensive enforcement operations (Jakobsen, 2007: 460–​1). Finally, SHIRBRIG was deactivated in 2008 (Saxi, 2011: 16). NORDSUP was established with a ‘focus on force production and supportive functions’ in 2008 after a trilateral study by Finland, Norway and Sweden identified 140 possible military cooperation areas among the three Nordic countries, and they began collaborating on 40 of them (Forsberg, 2013: 1169). Iceland and Denmark joined this initiative shortly afterwards. NORDEFCO was created in 2009 and took over the responsibilities and institutional structures of NORDSUP, NORDCAPS and NORDAC, merging all of them into one overarching framework (Forsberg, 2013: 1171–​2). Rieker and Terlikowski pointed out that the establishment of NORDEFCO in 2009 ‘was in reality nothing more than a merger of earlier cooperation initiatives (NORDAC, NORDCAPS and NORDSUP) in different areas within a common framework. This means that it has not led to the establishment of any new institutions’ (Rieker and Terlikowski, 2015: 3). Accordingly, NORDEFCO merged, streamlined and upgraded all of the already established Nordic defence collaborations while it did not include any major new initiatives, much like the Lancaster House Treaties did with previous British–​French defence cooperation. Another similarity is that the Nordic countries also established self-​reinforcing mechanisms regarding their military collaborations during the Cold War that led to a path-​dependent process. The large set-​up costs concerning establishing institutions and frameworks that facilitated cooperation were invested during the Cold War, and these frameworks were subsequently changed in light of new demands. Thanks to the extensive collaboration on peacekeeping in the areas of training and deployment, the learning and coordination effects reinforced the Nordic military cooperation by making them more effective. Thus, positive adaptive expectations regarding Nordic military cooperation were able to prevail after the Cold War, and even after certain Nordic collaborative efforts were not necessarily successful these adaptive expectations remained solid.

Learning effects facilitate investing set-​up costs: CEDC The CEDC countries had never previously cooperated in this form on defence. The closest thing to CEDC was the Austro-​Hungarian Empire more than one hundred years ago, when the territories of the current CEDC countries were part of the Habsburg-​led Austro-​Hungarian Empire and their population was recruited to the Austrian-​Hungarian armed forces. However, 108

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at that time the CEDC states did not exist in their current format, so this comparison is not really quite appropriate. After World War I the Paris Peace Conference divided Austria-​Hungary into pieces, and several new countries emerged on the map of Europe: Czechoslovakia was established from the northern part of the empire, the territories of current Slovenia and Croatia were attached to the Kingdom of Yugoslavia in the south (the Yugoslav Kingdom also included current Serbia, Montenegro and Macedonia), while Austria and Kingdom of Hungary –​the two ruling pillars of the empire –​ became also separate and independent states, though their territories became significantly smaller. Some other parts of Austria-​Hungary were also given to Romania and Italy. Taking into consideration that several countries were winners and others were losers in respect of the peace treaties of World War I, it is not surprising that some of the countries of the former Austrian-​Hungarian Empire failed to cooperate with each other on defence over the next decades. In the interwar period Czechoslovakia, Romania and Yugoslavia established a military coalition called the ‘Little Entente’ against Hungary and Austria to prevent the restoration of the Habsburg monarchy in any form and to prevent any Hungarian attempt at irredentism vis-​à-​vis newly established borders militarily (Craig and Gilbert, 1953: 111–​22). Although Austria and Hungary did not join forces for revenge, Hungary sided with the Axis Powers to gain back some of its former territories (Montgomery, 1993). Immediately before and during World War II Austria became part of the Third Reich via the Anschluss, and the western part of Czechoslovakia (the current Czech Republic) was occupied by Nazi Germany; and although Slovakia earned its independence, its southern territories were taken by Hungary.1 After World War II the borders established by the peace treaties of World War I were restored, but as a consequence of the new geopolitical situation of the Cold War defence cooperation between the countries of the region was not possible. Czechoslovakia and Hungary became the part of the Soviet sphere of influence, and thus had no choice but to join to the Warsaw Pact in 1955. Although Yugoslavia was a communist country like the Soviet Union, the relationship between Moscow and Belgrade broke down after World War II and Yugoslavia declared itself a non-​aligned country. Yugoslavia thus developed its own distinct doctrines and weapon systems and prepared to defend itself from NATO, as well as the Warsaw Pact (Horncastle, 2011). Austria became a neutral country in 1955, which ensured that it did not have to join either NATO or the Warsaw Pact. However, the Soviet military operational plans intended to attack NATO through Austria. There was thus no opportunity for the countries of the region to cooperate on defence issues during the Cold War, because they were mostly preparing for war against each other. Despite the fact that Hungary and Czechoslovakia belonged to the same military bloc and thus used the same weapons and doctrines, 109

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their defence cooperation was limited too. The reason for this was that the Warsaw Pact countries were ‘strategically subordinated to the Soviet High Command’ (Dunay, 2005: 21), and there was not much space for regional or bilateral initiatives. After the end of the Cold War the situation changed fundamentally in Central Europe. The Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact collapsed, and both Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia had been dissolved in the early 1990s. While the Czech Republic and Slovakia managed their break-​up peacefully in 1993, both Croatia and Slovenia had to fight for their independence in the Yugoslav Wars of the early 1990s. In the subsequent decades the CEDC countries joined the EU (Austria in 1995, the Czech Republic, Hungary, Slovakia and Slovenia in 2004 and Croatia in 2013), and all of them except Austria have become NATO members too (Hungary and the Czech Republic in 1999, Slovakia and Slovenia in 2004, Croatia in 2009). Thus, a new political environment has allowed these countries to begin to cooperate on defence issues with each other in different formats. For instance, four of the six CEDC countries (Austria, Croatia, Hungary and Slovakia) participated in the so-​called Central European Nations’ Cooperation in Peace Support (CENCOOP). This defence collaboration aimed to bring together Central European countries to cooperate and participate together in peace support operations (PSOs). CENCOOP was an initiative by the Austrian DPC in 1996 as a reaction to the challenges of the peace support operations in the Balkans in the 1990s. The rationale behind this MDC was the realization that Central European armed forces needed to adapt to the new tasks related to PSOs, a fundamentally different situation from the Cold War, when territorial defence was the priority. Austria’s leadership of CENCOOP was obvious, as Austria had earned an outstanding reputation in peacekeeping thanks to its substantial and successful contributions to UN operations in the Cold War. As a result, Vienna was able to provide guidance and assistance to former post-​communist countries through the framework of CENCOOP. CENCOOP was finally launched by Austria, Hungary, Romania and Slovakia in 1998, while Switzerland joined one year later, and Croatia was admitted to the organization in 2001 (Nemeth, 2014: 99–​100). However, frictions emerged almost immediately. The international environment changed as a consequence of the NATO enlargement and the terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001, which had different impacts on each of the CENCOOP countries’ DPCs. While the neutral Austrian and Swiss DPCs still preferred to focus on peace support operations, the other CENCOOP DPCs became less interested in them. They were aspiring NATO-​member, post-​communist countries who were more focused on NATO initiatives such as the Partnership for Peace programme, as their main goal was to join NATO. Accordingly, subregional frameworks became 110

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less important for them. Their interests began to diverge fundamentally from the neutral CENCOOP DPCs when they started to deploy troops in Afghanistan and Iraq to contribute to the US war against terrorism. These missions needed capabilities and skills of counterinsurgency operations and warfighting that were not matters of interest to Austria and Switzerland, and so they could not offer expertise in this area. Therefore, CENCOOP lost its significance by the end of the 2000s (Nemeth, 2014: 99–​100). Another Central European military collaboration, in which several CEDC countries worked together, was the Visegrad Four (V4) cooperation. The V4 consisted of three countries that later joined CEDC –​the Czech Republic, Hungary and Slovakia –​plus Poland. The Visegrad Cooperation began started in 1991 and founded by three members (Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Poland), initially with no relevant military dimension. However, after the peaceful separation of the Czech Republic and Slovakia and the dissolution of Czechoslovakia both new independent countries kept their V4 memberships. The Visegrad cooperation was highly successful in the 1990s as the four Central European countries often represented themselves as a bloc during their negotiations with Western countries and international institutions (Latawski, 1993). For instance, thanks to the V4 group, the negotiating potential of the participating countries increased significantly when they were negotiating their admission to NATO and the EU. The V4 countries have established a sophisticated collaborative framework in which meetings have been held for the last three decades, at every level from high politics to specialist areas of expertise, on issues such as foreign, environmental, economic, cultural policies and so on. Thus, in the 1990s they also shared their experience with each other about establishing the rule of law, building democracy and maintaining state sovereignty (Rusnák, 2013). Although, the V4 countries still maintained their cooperation on many policy areas, their collaboration slowed down after they joined the EU and NATO in the 2000s and was revived again only in the 2010s. The possibility of military cooperation appeared on the agenda of the V4 early on, but although defence ministers and high-​ranking military officers met regularly, actual defence cooperation lacked substance until the early 2010s. This does not mean that the V4 DPCs did not intend to cooperate, just that their initiatives did not work out. For instance, the V4 defence ministers officially agreed to collaborate on a common V4 modernization programme regarding Mi-​24 attack helicopters in 2002, but their competing defence industrial interests eliminated the initiative (Nemeth, 2014). Thus, it is surprising that defence cooperation reenergized the whole V4 group in the first half of the 2010s. In 2011 the four Central European countries decided to establish a V4 EU Battlegroup and make it ready by 2016. The training, exercises and preparations of the 950 Polish, 750 Czech, 510 Hungarian and 450 Slovakian troops made the V4 defence cooperation much 111

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more meaningful (Csiki and Németh, 2013: 16). The V4 Battlegroup was on standby not only in 2016 but also in 2019, and according to the plans it will be on standby again for EU operations in 2023. Hungary and Slovenia, two CEDC countries, cooperate with Italy in the framework of the brigade-​level unit called Multinational Land Forces (MLF). MLF-​based 1,500-​strong Battlegroups were provided to the EU in 2007, 2012 and 2017, while certain parts of this multinational unit were deployed both in Afghanistan and Kosovo. Both Hungary and Slovenia provide one battalion to the MLF, while Italy as the framework nation of this cooperation contributes by providing a regiment and most of the logistical support and command and control (C2) capabilities (Nemeth, 2014: 103–​4). Hungary and Slovakia have also collaborated with Romania and Ukraine on disaster relief operations in the Multinational Engineer Battalion Tisa since 1999. The river Tisa often causes severe floods in these countries, and this battalion is designed to provide support when it is needed most, but so far it has not been deployed. The four countries contribute with one company each to the 700-​strong unit, and the command structure is multinational. The battalion organizes multinational exercises regularly, but as with the MLF, the different elements of this unit are not located in one base but are stationed in their own countries (Somlai-​Kiss, 2011). CEDC DPCs not only cooperated in other subregional formats but also had dense bilateral military relationships, especially in the fields of training, education and sharing operational lessons. However, there are several examples of more substantial bilateral defence cooperation among them too. For instance, Hungary has been providing air policing over neighbouring Slovenia since 2014, and there was a long negotiation and coordination process before this could happen. Slovenia does not have fighter jets, and a NATO ally always offers help to provide air policing in Slovenian airspace. However, the most extensive bilateral military cooperation is between the Czech and Slovakian DPCs. The armed forces of the two countries have a similar cultural background and the language barrier between them is small too, as they were part of the same military until the dissolution of Czechoslovakia. The Czech and Slovak armed forces together deployed a CBRN battalion in Iraq and a battalion in Kosovo and provided a battlegroup to the EU in 2009, as well as organizing large bilateral military exercises (Nemeth, 2018). We can see that before CEDC the participating states had not cooperated on defence in this format, but the collaborations between the six DPCs had been deep-​rooted not only at the subregional and bilateral levels, but also in the EU and NATO too. Not surprisingly the participating DPCs intended to channel their already existing bilateral or trilateral collaborations into the CEDC: for example, joint training of Czech and Croatian air mentor teams for NATO’s ISAF mission (Hungary joined to 112

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this initiative thanks to CEDC); Austrian-​Croatian cooperation of SOF; Hungary’s intention to extend air-​policing cooperation to the region based on the preparation of Slovenian-​Hungarian air-​policing tasks; and CBRN cooperation through a Czech initiative that already involved several members of CEDC. Accordingly, the dynamics of CEDC were similar to NORDEFCO and the Lancaster House Treaties, and CEDC provided an umbrella over earlier collaborations. However, most of the self-​reinforcing mechanisms regarding path-​ dependence were not in place when CEDC was established. The large set-​up costs were just invested by creating the cooperative framework of CEDC, but these set-​up costs were mobilized thanks to many previous bilateral and minilateral defence collaborations among CEDC DPCs. They had learned to work with each other in different formats, and these learning outcomes created a favourable environment for investing set-​up costs in a new framework. Coordination effects were also in place as the participant DPCs were convinced to ‘go along’ with other Central European DPCs, and beginning a new cooperation was more beneficial than being left out. Therefore, the Central European case is different from NORDEFCO and the Lancaster House Treaties, where there had been decades-​long institutionalized defence cooperation before they were established. However, the CEDC case highlights an important point, namely that when strong path-​dependence regarding cooperation is not established among the cooperating DPCs, they probably need to establish some learning effects –​and possibly coordination effects –​before they are willing to invest large-​set up costs. They need some reassurance that their ‘investments’ will give them potential returns in terms of future fruitful cooperation. This can be established by successful smaller projects that do not need large set-​up costs, but whose relative success can indicate that more costly cooperation might work too. This is a version of adaptive expectation in the sense that, based on involvement in smaller collaborations, the actors can expect that larger collaborations will work in the future as well.

Conclusion Previous defence collaborations are highly relevant when DPCs want to create new MDC, as they establish institutional relationships and personal networks that might generate trust and familiarity between DPCs, which serve as a basis for new initiatives. The reason for this is that it is much easier to begin a new collaboration with a partner whom you know well and with whom you have a collaborative history than with a stranger. If we have known someone for a while, we will know how to work with them, and what their strength and weaknesses are. Also, when DPCs have a continuous cooperation with each other they communicate more often, 113

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and this per se can generate new collaborative ideas, or they can explore their own initiatives with a close partner easier. As we have seen, previous defence collaborations are often rebranded as new MDCs or part of wider defence cooperation, which is beneficial for politicians and also for PR purposes. These rebrandings offer an immediate result and success for the cause of cooperation and can help elevate this MDC to a higher place on the political agenda. The British–​French and Nordic defence collaborations are similar in the sense that the self-​reinforcing mechanisms of increasing returns were already in place during the Cold War that created a path-​dependent process for both MDCs. They invested large set-​up costs to create institutions and forums for coordination during the Cold War, and in the case of the Nordic countries common training and education programmes on peacekeeping were established too. The ongoing cooperation between these DPCs created learning and coordination effects that made the cooperation more effective and desirable. The successes supported the perception that the collaborations were working and would work in the future too, and these adaptive expectations convinced the participating DPCs to invest even more effort into these collaborations. We could see that neither the British–​French nor the Nordic cooperation was always perfect and successful in every area. However, the invested set-​up costs, the learning and coordination effects helped to overcome these difficulties and were able to create positive adaptive expectations from time to time. These processes created path-​dependence that played a significant role in creating the Lancaster House Treaties and NORDEFCO. The case of CEDC is different as the participating Central European DPCs had not had decades of institutionalized previous collaborations before this MDC was created. The large set-​up costs were just invested by creating CEDC. However, the Central European countries also incorporated already existing smaller collaborations to CEDC, and similarly to the other two cases they barely started new ones. This suggests that although these Central European DPCs did not have an institutionalized framework for defence cooperation, they were convinced that creating a new forum and ‘going along’ with the others in this regard would create benefits for them. These coordination effects were underpinned by two decades of experience of working together in different forums where they learned that they can cooperate with each other. The learning effects and the coordination effects created adaptive expectations that suggested that, as previous defence collaborations in different formats had worked among them in the past, this new one probably would work too. This process led to the willingness to invest large set-​up costs by creating CEDC. The CEDC case is significant because it shows how relatively new MDCs can become path-​dependent. Although, investing large set-​up costs are relevant, they are probably not the first step for path-​dependence regarding MDCs. 114

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To be willing to invest a large amount of effort in an MDC, the participating DPCs have to have adaptive expectations that this MDC will probably work. This can happen only if the participating DPCs have already established learning and/​or coordination effects based on smaller previous collaborations. Although the investment of large set-​up costs in the Franco-​British cooperation happened in the 1970s and 1980s by institutionalizing collaboration at different levels, they were preceded by, among other things, the common British–​French operation in Suez in 1956, joint armament projects and the negotiations about nuclear projects in the 1960s. These events and processes generated learning effects that made potential later cooperation more effective and provided a basis for investing large set-​up costs in this cooperation in the subsequent decades. The Nordic countries began cooperation in the Cold War too. Still, for them the coordination effects were more relevant, as they realized that ‘going along’ with other Nordic countries regarding collaboration in peacekeeping would be beneficial for them. Learning effects stemming from common peacekeeping operations also started to make the cooperation easier, and these mechanisms facilitated adaptive expectations and made the investment into large-​set up costs (for example, institutions, training and education programmes) worthwhile. Accordingly, establishing path-​dependence regarding MDCs starts with generating learning effects and/​ or coordination effects that create adaptive expectations about the future success of the MDC. When these mechanisms are in place, participating DPCs are more willing to invest large-​set up costs in defence collaborations.

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Strong Leadership and Chemistry Although structures are highly important because they provide the context for what is possible and what is not, without actual people nothing is done. Thus, in business or diplomatic negotiations, personal relationships between key stakeholders are often crucial. This chapter demonstrates that when new subregional multinational defence cooperations (MDC) have been established, key stakeholders from at least two defence policy communities (DPCs) worked closely together and took leadership to initiate new cooperation. The most important precondition for this was that these stakeholders had to like each other. This insight corresponds with the practical experiences of diplomats, who observe that when people in critical positions from different countries like each other and establish a good working relationship, significant progress can be made in a very short period of time on issues that had been stalled for years (Witness Seminar, 2019). They also notice that progress can still be made without interpersonal chemistry between leaders, and especially when frameworks or institutions are already in place, gradual improvements can be made too. These institutions can even serve to maintain healthy relations between countries at the technical level when the relationship between the leaders deteriorates significantly. However, good chemistry between leaders almost always boosts cooperation. This chapter thus describes a situational factor that can be described as ‘Strong leadership by a group of enthusiastic high-​ level officials and good interpersonal chemistry between them’. It points out that structural factors are not enough to launch new MDCs and explains how interpersonal chemistry among the key leaders plays a crucial role in establishing new defence collaborations. This chapter applies the insights of social psychology, focusing on the research regarding interpersonal attraction. Interpersonal attraction has an extensive literature in psychology that studies why certain people like and are attracted to each other and why others not (Huston, 1974; Hogg and Turner, 1985; Klohnen and Luo, 2003; Montoya et al, 2008; Finkel et al, 2015). People can find others attractive for different reasons, and attraction can lead, for instance, to friendships, romantic 116

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relationships or good business partnerships. The underlying dynamics of attraction in each of these social settings are very similar, and empirical research shows that the most relevant variables for developing interpersonal attraction are propinquity, similarity and physical attraction. This chapter focuses on the first two variables, because physical attraction plays a less relevant role in the context of creating MDCs. Propinquity regarding liking someone is critical because without a chance of coming into contact with that person, it is almost impossible to develop interpersonal attraction. This insight ‘suggests that most people have the capacity for friendships if only given the opportunity’ (Larsen et al, 2015: 94). Moreover, propinquity increases the chance of repeated interaction, which makes someone familiar to us, and this can lead us liking them. Thus, not surprisingly, those who share apartments on the same floor of a block of flats or sit next to each other in an office space have a bigger chance of developing a mutual attraction. This is thanks to the so-​called mere exposure effect, which is a widely studied phenomenon in social psychology and demonstrates that if we are exposed to someone or something, most of the time this will lead to us liking that person or object more (Montoya, 2017). They become familiar to us, and they seem to be less threatening as their behaviour and feature become predictable. Accordingly, the mere exposure effect can be understood ‘as a form of classical conditioning if we assume that the absence of aversive events constitutes the unconditioned stimulus’ (Zajonc, 2001: 224). However, the mere exposure effect has a few important caveats. First, too much exposure to something can lead to the boredom effect. That is to say, we can get bored of the thing or person we are exposed to too much, and after a while the boredom effect can lead to less liking (Bornstein et al, 1990). Second, if we have a negative impression about someone or something early on, repeated exposure to this person or object will most likely exacerbate our adverse feelings towards them (Brickman et al, 1972). Thus, we have to have neutral or positive attitudes regarding someone from the beginning for interpersonal attraction to develop through the mere exposure effect. Similarity is another crucial factor regarding interpersonal attraction (Singh et al, 2007), and partially helps to explain why not everyone who meets regularly likes each other. Similarity in relevant areas such as religious belief, social class, education level, age, gender, academic achievement, social behaviour and so on can provide a ‘common platform’ for people concerning interpreting events and phenomena the same way. This allows the development of trust and a certain degree of intimacy between similar individuals. For instance, early psychological studies pointed out that undergraduate students who began living in the same building in college and shared similar attitudes on relevant issues in the first week, had a much higher chance to become friends than those ones who had different attitudes 117

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(Newcomb, 1961). The reason behind this is that ‘we find pleasure in our relationships with similar others because they confirm our beliefs and the value of our person. When we meet with likeminded people, they validate our inner most values and expressed attitudes’ (Larsen et al, 2015: 98). This makes communication more straightforward as similar individuals have to be less guarded among each other. Thus, similarity decreases the ‘costs’ of interaction and facilitates more effective communication in functional relationships. Based on social identity (Tajfel and Turner, 1979) and self-​categorization theories (Willer et al, 1987), several research projects have shown that both the impact of the mere exposure effect and the perception of similarity are influenced by our identities and social group memberships. For instance, what we perceive as similar is often based on group prototypicality, which has a significant effect on who we are attracted to. This means that if someone is very similar to a given group’s prototype and embodies by and large the identity of the group, group members will like her/​him more than those others who are less representative of their group (Hogg and Hardie, 1991). Furthermore, our social group membership and social identity also have a significant influence on whether we react to repeated exposure to someone positively or negatively (Crisp et al, 2009). This chapter shows that those key stakeholders that were the engines of the studied MDCs had strong interpersonal chemistry and liked each other. In all cases they shared a high level of similarity and became familiar with each other through repeated interactions, and thus they experienced the mere exposure effect. However, propinquity was not relevant in the traditional way, as they lived and worked in different countries. Nevertheless they met, interacted and were exposed to each other regularly at official bilateral and multinational meetings. Propinquity played a role in the sense that these key stakeholders were always from neighbouring countries. Neighbouring states usually have more interactions than those ones that are geographically farther apart. Thus, thanks to more frequent interactions the leaders studied here had more chance to meet and to be exposed to each other. However, this was only a precondition for any chemistry to develop between them. Without it they could not become familiar to each other. Other people in their positions met also regularly before and after them and they did not necessarily like each other as much and did not start a new multinational cooperation. This is where similarity comes into effect. The studied leaders were similar to each other in relevant aspects that made their communication straightforward; they were able to build trust faster and to agree on several issues more easily. In the case of the Lancaster House Treaties, the good relationship between French President Nicolas Sarkozy and the British Prime Minister David Cameron was crucial, while with regard to NORDEFCO, the Norwegian 118

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Chief of Defence Sverre Diesen and the Swedish Chief of Defence Håkan Syrén were the key figures and the ‘architects’ of the cooperation. At the launch of CEDC the Austrian defence policy director Johann Pucher and his Hungarian counterparts József Bali and subsequently Péter Siklósi were the most relevant personalities. This chapter highlights how propinquity and especially similarity played a significant role in establishing good relationships between these actors through interpersonal attraction.

Positive North Atlantic attitudes: the Lancaster House Treaties Several observers have pointed out that the Lancaster House Treaties were able to happen partly because the British Prime Minister David Cameron and the French President Nicolas Sarkozy actually liked each other and there was chemistry between them (Former French MoD Official, 2014). They emphasized that the treaties would not have been signed, for instance, during the term of the next French President, François Hollande, as his personality was so different from Cameron’s and they had a difficult professional relationship (French Scholar, 2014). This does not mean that Sarkozy and Cameron agreed on everything, but they were able to find common ground on security and defence policy issues even when they had serious disagreements on other matters. As Alice Pannier pointed out, the launch of the Lancaster House Treaties ‘was facilitated by the good relationship and close political vision of Nicolas Sarkozy and David Cameron’ (Pannier, 2020: 39). The key factors were that even before Cameron came to power he had interacted with Sarkozy regularly, and as a result the two men were able to experience the mere exposure effect by establishing propinquity. Besides, they were similar in some relevant aspects. Most importantly, they came from the same political family, and Sarkozy pursued a more Atlanticist foreign policy than his predecessors, which from Sarkozy’s part showed a higher level of prototypicality to other Western –​especially British –​leaders. Cameron and Sarkozy met in 2008 for the first time, two years before Cameron became British Prime Minister; at this time Sarkozy had been the French President for almost a year. Sarkozy knew that David Cameron would probably be his next British counterpart and met him discreetly at the French ambassador’s residence in London during the British–​French summit in March 2008. Their meeting focused on EU-​related issues, where certain disagreements already emerged between them, and although their interaction was amicable and convivial, Sarkozy was convinced that he would have problems with dealing with Cameron in the future. However, Sarkozy’s fears were not justified, and they were eventually able to work together much better than he had expected (Ashcroft, 2016). 119

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After this meeting the two leaders had plenty of opportunities to interact with each other that provided a sound basis for creating propinquity. As a result, Cameron and Sarkozy were able to experience the mere exposure effect that helped establish a good relationship between them. Before Cameron came to power in 2010, Sarkozy had already engaged seriously with him and his Shadow Cabinet, where Shadow Defence Secretary Liam Fox also played a crucial role in negotiating about defence matters with French officials (Pannier, 2020). After Cameron took office in April 2010, the two leaders were exposed to each other even more. For instance, the preparations for the yearly Franco-​British summits always need a huge amount of coordination and negotiation between 10 Downing Street and the Elysée Palace before the actual meetings, which created the possibility for Cameron and Sarkozy to interact intensively with each other. This did not necessarily involve verbal communication all the time. For example Cameron even sent a handwritten letter to Sarkozy about his proposal to create a treaty on defence collaboration between France and Britain during the 2010 British–​French summit, which later became the Lancaster House Treaties (Senior UK MoD official, 2014). Furthermore, as France and the UK were major European powers and members of several international organizations and forums, Sarkozy and Cameron were able to meet regularly at EU, NATO, UN and G7 summits. Accordingly, thanks to the propinquity of their official relationship, they experienced the mere exposure effect at different events. The timing and the level of the mere exposure effect were also ideal. Cameron became prime minister in April 2010, and the Lancaster House Treaties were signed by him and Sarkozy in November that year. Thus, the caveat of the mere exposure effect, which was mentioned earlier –​the idea that too much exposure can result in less liking –​did not play a role. That is to say, there was probably not enough time for the boredom effect to be developed between them. In addition, certain issues where they had disagreements did not come up either, so they did not have many confrontations in this period. For instance, one year later, in October 2011, their relationship became very intense when David Cameron intervened in solving the Euro crisis, even though the UK was not part of the eurozone. After the EU summit at that time, Sarkozy, not very diplomatically, told Cameron that ‘you have lost a good opportunity to shut up [...] We are sick of you criticising us and telling us what to do. You say you hate the euro, and now you want to interfere in our meetings’ (Stratton and Gow, 2011). Thus, before signing the Lancaster House Treaties, Cameron and Sarkozy were exposed just enough to like each other but did not have time to develop too many negative feelings. This created a window for them to establish an interpersonal attraction, which made their cooperation easier, enabling them to push for closer cooperation between France and Britain on defence. 120

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Of course, propinquity and the mere exposure effect cannot on their own explain why the two politicians had such chemistry, as other French presidents and British prime ministers have often interacted in Franco-​British summits and different international forums. But, although these occasions served Sarkozy and Cameron as a prerequisite to meeting and allowed them to start liking each other, the concept of similarity helps us understand why they developed a deeper interpersonal attraction. As mentioned before, similarities in relevant areas can provide a common ground for people as, based on these similarities, they will probably view certain aspects of life the same way that decreases the ‘costs’ of communication and creates deeper functional relationships (Larsen et al, 2015). Comparing Sarkozy’s and Cameron’s life trajectories (Sarkozy, 2008; Ashcroft, 2016; Cameron, 2020), it becomes clear that they had similar experiences and characteristics. Both came from upper-​middle-​class families, attended high-​ranking universities and began their political career in their twenties. However, these experiences are not unique to these two politicians, and anyway such similarities do not always lead to significant interpersonal attraction. Furthermore, Sarkozy and Cameron were different in many relevant aspects. Among other things, Sarkozy was more than ten years older than Cameron, which meant that they had had different experiences when their personalities were formed. For instance, being a law student in the early 1970s at the Université Paris X Nanterre, where the May ’68 student movement started, must have been a very different experience for Sarkozy than studying PPE at Oxford in the 1980s during the Thatcher years for Cameron. In addition, Cameron’s family was much wealthier and politically more connected than Sarkozy’s. But Sarkozy had significantly more political experience, as he started in local government and served as a mayor of a town of 50,000 inhabitants for almost two decades; later, he was interior minister twice and was finance minister once in the French government ahead of his presidency. At the same time, Cameron did not hold any public office apart from being an MP before becoming prime minister. An important characteristic that had a great impact on Sarkozy’s personality was that he came from a multicultural family, as his father was Hungarian and his mother was half Greek and half French and of Jewish ancestry. And although David Cameron was always very proud of having Welsh and Scottish ancestors (Lowerth, 2014; Cornock, 2015), he grew up in an English family that provided a very different perspective about how society works from Sarkozy’s upbringing. So while there were several relevant areas (education, socio-​economic background, involvement in politics early on) where they were very similar, in other aspects of their lives (age, experience, family background) there were significant differences too. However, while people do not have to be similar in every way to develop an interpersonal attraction, they do have to be similar in the aspects that are 121

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relevant to their relationship. In the case of Cameron and Sarkozy, one crucial element was the fact that they were both right-​wing politicians (French Scholar, 2014; Former French MoD Official, 2014; Senior UK MoD Official 2014). Moreover, Sarkozy showed a high level of prototypicality (similarity to a group’s prototype) to other Western –​especially Anglo-​Saxon –​leaders by being more Atlanticist and pragmatic when dealing with the US and the UK than his predecessors. Being right-​wing politicians was a relevant factor in the relationship of Cameron and Sarkozy, as it has been very rare for the incumbent British prime minister and French President to belong to the same political family. In the first two decades of the twentieth century there were only two years (2010–​12) when this was the situation, and they came during Cameron’s and Sarkozy’s tenure. Although, before Sarkozy, Jacques Chirac was the French president who belonged to the same right wing party as Sarkozy, his British counterpart was Tony Blair of the left-​wing Labour Party. Sarkozy’s first British counterpart was Gordon Brown, also from Labour. After Sarkozy’s term ended in 2012, a left-​wing (François Hollande) and after that a liberal-​ centrist (Emmanuel Macron) politician were elected to be French president, while subsequent right-​wing Tory governments remained in power in the UK in the 2010s. So, the situation that Sarkozy and Cameron, two right-​ wing politicians, occupied the highest political positions in the UK and France at the same time was unique. The fact that two people come from the same political family does not guarantee that they will like each other though. And if two statesmen come from the opposite sides of the political spectrum, it does not mean that they cannot work together. For instance, Tony Blair a left-​wing British prime minister, and Jacques Chirac, a right-​wing French president, initiated together the European Security and Defence Policy by signing the St Malo declaration in 1998, which was another historical British–​French agreement (Franco-​British, 1998). However, same set of values and attitudes definitely help to establish a common platform faster. Thus, when two like-​minded people interact, communication is more straightforward and can allow them to cooperate easier and quickly. Both Sarkozy and Cameron had strong right-​ wing values that can be traced back to their youths and family backgrounds, and these were absolutely relevant for them (Former French MoD Official, 2014; Senior UK MoD Official, 2014). The other significant factor in terms of ‘similarity’ was Sarkozy’s Atlanticist attitude, which was certainly refreshing for the British. As was mentioned in the previous chapter, France left the military wing of NATO in 1966 and pursued a more independent defence and security policy that was supported by subsequent French presidents. This resulted in several disagreements between Paris and Washington, but after the Cold War, France started to align its policies to NATO in many areas. Jacques Chirac even attempted, 122

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unsuccessfully, to reintegrate France to NATO in the late 1990s (Ostermann, 2020). Later Chirac’s stark opposition to the Iraq intervention in 2003 put him and Washington and London on a collision course that led to a deterioration in French and Anglo-​Saxon relations. However, Sarkozy showed a much higher prototypicality that was similar to other Western leaders in the sense that he was more Atlanticist and more pro-​US and pro-​UK than his predecessors. Under his presidency, France finally reintegrated into NATO in 2009, and especially at the beginning of his term he was perceived as someone who favoured and wanted to copy Anglo-​Saxon economic and domestic policies. When he came to power in 2007, one of the commentators pointed out that ‘Mr. Sarkozy is certainly an outspoken Anglophile, regularly coming to London to visit relations. A friend and admirer of Tony Blair, he holds up Britain as a shining example of a dynamic economy with a flexible work force. It is no coincidence that the landmark foreign visit of his campaign was to London’ (Dempsey and Bilefsky, 2007). Because of these attitudes, his policy agenda and his diplomatic gestures to London and Washington he was labelled as among other things, ‘The New Margaret Thatcher’ and ‘Sarko the American’ (Ramdani, 2018), demonstrating that he was seen much closer to the prototype of the politicians of Western leading nations (US and UK) than previous French presidents. Of course, Sarkozy’s policies and agenda were more complex than this (Marlière, 2009), but for developing interpersonal attraction, perceived similarities are more relevant than actual ones (Montoya, 2008). In this sense, Sarkozy was seen as much more similar to the prototype of Western leaders and embodied the relevant identities of this group (pro-​ NATO, pro-​UK, pro-​US) to a great extent. As a result, Anglo-​Saxon leaders, including Cameron, liked him more from the outset than other French politicians who were less representative of this group prototypicality. It is therefore not surprising that Cameron was the person who, after becoming prime minister, pushed for a more ambitious deal and wanted to create a treaty on defence cooperation instead of a more loose agreement, as had originally been planned. Although Cameron was the more enthusiastic of the two on this issue at first, Sarkozy took over the idea immediately and provided full support (Senior UK MoD Official, 2014). This was able to happen partly because the two leaders had good interpersonal chemistry. Of course, they did not just support this deal because they liked each other; each man also had his own agenda, which will be discussed in the next chapter. However, the interpersonal attraction was vital, because it meant they could collaborate faster and could reach a more ambitious defence cooperation. This was able to happen because both propinquity and similarity were present in their case. Propinquity was established between them through repeated interactions even before Cameron became prime minister. They could then experience the mere exposure effect more on official bilateral and 123

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international meetings. In addition, they were able to develop interpersonal attraction quickly as they were similar in two relevant respects. First, they belonged to the same political family. And second, thanks to Sarkozy’s high level of prototypicality regarding Atlanticism, he was seen as someone who embodied the groups of Western leaders’ relevant identities, which made it easier for Cameron to accept and trust him.

Military leaders with an academic affinity:​ NORDEFCO Observers highlighted the fact that the main architects of the NORDEFCO, like those of the Lancaster House Treaties, had very good interpersonal chemistry and that this played a significant part in the evolution of this cooperation. The key figures in this regard were the Norwegian Chief of Defence, General Sverre Diesen and his Swedish counterpart, the Supreme Commander of the Swedish Armed Forces, General Håkan Syrén. They often discussed their views, and thanks to their genuinely good relationship, they co-​authored articles and gave joint interviews to publicize military cooperation between Sweden and Norway and in wider Nordic settings. This high level of interpersonal attraction was achieved partially thanks to the deep-​rooted Nordic military collaborations and the fact that Sweden and Norway are neighbouring countries with the largest defence budgets in the region. These factors provided many opportunities for the two military leaders to meet officially, and these repeated interactions established a sound basis for the mere exposure effect which led to a mutual liking. More importantly, they were similar in relevant aspects, as their academic affinity provided a good basis for a better mutual understanding and easier communication between them, which helped create interpersonal attraction. It was pointed out that Diesen and Syrén had interpersonal chemistry and a strong professional friendship that contributed greatly to establishing NORDEFCO (Swedish Scholar, 2014). They perceived the problems of their respective militaries similarly and saw the solution in military cooperation. As mentioned in Chapter 5, Diesen and Syrén shared the view that for a military to be able to operate, a ‘critical mass’ of its military capabilities must be maintained in order for that capability to remain sustainable. Therefore, the ‘critical mass’ of a type of military capability was defined as ‘the volume which allows a structural element to be developed, maintained, trained and operationally employed’ (Saxi, 2011: 17). Thus, not only the ‘critical mass’ of the military equipment but also the related logistical support, personnel and expertise had to be maintained. They pointed out that the Norwegian and Swedish armed forces were losing this ‘critical mass’ because of declining defence budgets and the rising costs of military capabilities. Together, they came to the conclusion that with deeper military collaboration Sweden and 124

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Norway could mitigate this problem (Saxi, 2019: 663), and later they also involved other Nordic countries in attempting to achieve greater efficiencies. Diesen and Syrén closely worked together on this, and it was clear that they had an excellent relationship. As one diplomatic cable highlighted, they met regularly, and in the second half of 2006 they gave speeches together to convince different audiences about the necessity of deeper defence cooperation (Wikileaks, 2007). In 2007 they also published joint articles in the Swedish newspaper Dagens Nyheter and in the Norwegian newspaper Dagbladet, and they also gave interviews about their idea. Among their ‘proposals were joint military exercises, military education, joint development of new military doctrines, and cooperation in buying military equipment such as warships and vehicles’ (Nohrstedt and Ottosen, 2011: 225). Later they involved the Finnish Chief of Defence in publicizing the concept of Nordic defence cooperation, and the three military leaders published another article in the leading newspapers of their countries (Kaskela et al, 2008). The interpersonal chemistry that allowed this unusually close cooperation between Diesen and Syrén was enabled by the propinquity that official meetings provided and the similarity of the two generals regarding their academic affinity. Although Sweden and Norway were not members of the same military alliances, they were neighbouring countries with similar values and political systems, and thanks to the decades-​long military cooperation of the Nordic countries the leaders of the two militaries had plenty of opportunities to meet officially. Although Norway was a NATO member and not part of the EU and Sweden was an EU member only and not a member of the Alliance, their Chiefs of Defence met many times to interact and were able to experience the mere exposure effect. As mentioned previously, the Nordic countries had cooperated on peacekeeping and peace support operations since the Cold War. They established force pools, common training and education programmes, logistical support and complex coordinating mechanisms (Saxi, 2011: 15–​21). This needed lots of cooperation on the part of the military leaders of the participating nations; thus, any Swedish and Norwegian Chiefs of Defence had to interact regularly about these issues. In addition, during the tenure of Diesen and Syrén, the Nordic countries under Sweden’s leadership were preparing to make the Nordic Battlegroup ready for the beginning of 2008 (Jepsson, 2009). Although Norway was not an EU member, it nevertheless decided to contribute to this initiative, which provided further opportunities for Diesen and Syrén to interact. Accordingly, the official meetings that were based on Nordic and EU collaborations could provide the basis of propinquity regarding interpersonal attraction between Diesen and Syrén. However, this propinquity was present for other Nordic military leaders as well. Therefore, propinquity does not in itself explain why this excellent interpersonal relationship was able to arise 125

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between Diesen and Syrén and not, for instance, between the Danish and Finnish or the Danish and Swedish Chiefs of Defence. All Nordic countries have faced the same set of issues regarding decreasing defence budgets since the end of the Cold War and increasing costs of military capabilities. So the question is why Diesen and Syrén were able to agree on the concept of the ‘critical mass’ and why they pushed for cooperation first. The answer probably lies in the fact that they shared a high level of similarity in relevant aspects, especially an academic affinity. At first glance, the military backgrounds of Diesen and Syrén seem to be different in the sense that while Diesen was an infantry officer in the Norwegian Army, Syrén served in the Swedish Navy (NATO, 2008; Forsvarsmakten, 2014). Although they belonged to different services, which often fundamentally shapes how military officers think, they were similar in age (Diesen was born in 1949, Syrén in 1952) and both had a long and successful military career. However, many military leaders share these characteristics, and they do not develop the same level of interpersonal chemistry as Diesen and Syrén. The most relevant similarity in their case was their academic leanings. Both of them were highly educated and interested in academic research, which probably enabled them to engage in critical thinking more than many of their peers, as military officers are usually prone to thinking in practical terms rather than conceptually. Thanks to this similarity, their communication was more straightforward, and the ‘costs’ of interaction for them were lower as they were thinking along similar lines. As a result, as like-​minded people, they were able to be less guarded with each other. Both of them had diverse educational and academic backgrounds. They graduated from the military officer schools of their respective countries, as any military officer does, before becoming military officers. However, during their careers, they also both pursued further education and attended several academic courses. Diesen holds an MSc in Civil Engineering from the Norwegian University of Technology and Science, studied at the Norwegian Military Academy and attended staff courses in Norway and the UK (NATO, 2008). Syrén meanwhile completed staff courses in Sweden but also studied in the US. He studied at the US Naval War College in the late 1980s and finished a management course at the US Naval Postgraduate School (Monterey, CA) in the late 1990s (Forsvarsmakten, 2014). On top of that, Diesen and Syrén not only studied and applied the knowledge that they acquired, but they actively contributed to academic scholarship. Diesen wrote (Diesen, 2000) and also edited (Diesen, 2012a) books about military strategy before and after becoming the Chief of Defence of Norway. This shows that he had an affinity for academic work and thought deeply about conceptual aspects of war and security. Syrén was not as active as Diesen in writing books, but he also published longer pamphlets (Syrén, 2007) 126

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and taught military strategy at the Swedish Military Academy. He was also a member of the Royal Swedish Academy of War Sciences and the Royal Swedish Society of Naval Sciences (Forsvarsmakten, 2014), two highly selective organizations with limited membership that foster academic research and debate on their disciplines. These activities show that both Syrén and Diesen had an affinity for scholarly work that provided a sound basis for similarity in their case. This is relevant because ‘scholar officers’ are rare, and Syrén and Diesen showed a high level of prototypicality in this regard. As a result, they were able to understand each other easier and could discuss military issues more conceptually. It is not surprising therefore that they wrote articles together as both were used to communicating complex ideas this way. So the excellent relationship between Syrén and Diesen that helped lay the foundations of NORDEFCO was based on propinquity and similarity. Their interactions during official meetings where they met in Nordic settings helped them experience the mere exposure effect that led to actual affection. However, as we have seen, propinquity alone would not have been enough to develop such a good professional relationship and such good interpersonal chemistry, which led to such a deep cooperation that Syrén and Diesen wrote articles together, gave joint interviews and initiated new collaborations between their armed forces. Their similarity in terms of their academic-​mindedness was highly important in this regard, as it enabled them to understand each other more easily and to discuss their ideas at a higher conceptual level.

Military officers in policy jobs: CEDC At the launch of CEDC, the Austrian defence policy director Johann Pucher and his Hungarian counterparts József Bali and subsequently Péter Siklósi were the key figures. They organized seminars to lay down the foundations of CEDC, and subsequently they also took the CEDC presidency roles to continue and deepen this cooperation. One significant factor in the setting up of this MDC was that the three all had very good, convivial relationships with each other (Hungarian MoD Official, 2013; Austrian MoD Official, 2014). Pucher and Bali were high-​ranking military officers with surprisingly similar careers in their respective militaries and civil services that provided a high degree of similarity and a solid foundation for an interpersonal attraction. In addition, they shared the view that international cooperation is the foundation of security in Central Europe and were proponents of such initiatives. Propinquity was present in their case as they met regularly at official subregional and EU meetings. Siklósi took over Bali’s position in the Hungarian Ministry of Defence in the middle of the launch of CEDC, but Bali supported this transition, and Siklósi also immediately developed an excellent relationship with Pucher. Although Pucher and Siklósi shared 127

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fewer similarities in their careers, as Siklósi was a career civil servant rather than a military officer, he ‘inherited’ a good relationship, and Bali and Pucher also helped to ensure that the transition went smoothly. Propinquity for any Hungarian and Austrian defence policy directors is almost guaranteed, as the Hungarian and Austrian bilateral military relations are robust and the two armed forces see each other as strategic partners (Snoj, 2020). Hungary and Austria are neighbouring nations with a rich shared history, and although during the Cold War Austria was a neutral country while Hungary belonged to the Warsaw Pact, since the fall of the Iron Curtain their bilateral military cooperation has blossomed. For example they cooperated on training, military operations and, more recently, on migration management too. Both nations are EU members, and they often coordinate their positions on defence-​related issues before EU meetings (Nemeth, 2018). Although Austria is not a NATO member while Hungary is part of the Alliance, the basis of their collaboration is more related to their geopolitical situation, and both of them take the stability of the Western Balkans seriously as it is on their doorstep. Thus it is not surprising that they are the largest troop contributors to the EU’s military mission in Bosnia Herzegovina (EUFOR, 2021), and only the US and Italy deploy larger contingents to NATO’s mission in Kosovo than Austria and Hungary (KFOR, 2021). The DPD position is an extremely influential one in both the Austrian and Hungarian DPCs. They are the highest-​level bureaucrats in their respective Ministries of Defence who coordinate the development of defence policy, and thus the highest non-​political position at which policy is formed. They are also responsible for leading defence diplomatic efforts and international cooperation bilaterally, minilaterally and at the EU/​NATO levels. DPDs can meet on their own right at any of these levels and they almost always accompany the defence ministers to most international events. Accordingly, DPDs often interact at ministerial-​level meetings as well. Thus, thanks to the aforementioned strategic partnership between the Austrian and Hungarian MoDs, the DPDs of these countries have plenty of opportunities to meet and experience the mere exposure effect. Besides, the DPCs of these two countries are relatively small, so the chance that they had encountered each other at subregional international workshops and seminars before they became DPDs is high. Therefore, usually, they were already exposed to each other to a certain extent and knew quite a lot about each other before they took the DPD position. Geographical proximity also facilitates ‘propinquity’ as Vienna and Budapest are only two and a half hours from each other by car, which means that the DPDs can meet easily. Consequently, a high level of ‘propinquity’ is almost a given for the Austrian and Hungarian DPDs as they regularly interact, which helps them become familiar with each other, providing a good basis for liking. 128

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Another factor that helped establish interpersonal attraction between Johann Pucher and József Bali was that they shared a high level of similarity. They were similar in many relevant areas, and their formative experiences regarding their careers were almost the same (Bundesheer, 2021; Sarvarikisterseg, 2021). For instance, they were the same age, belonged to the same military branch of their respective militaries, had served in UN missions and worked as military advisers in other ministries, were commanders of international formations and also became two-​star army generals. Both of them were born in 1948 and finished their studies at their military colleges in the early 1970s (Bali in 1970, Pucher in 1971), and both began their careers as air defence artillery officers. They also served in international peacekeeping and military observer missions several times. In 1974–​5 Pucher served in the UN peacekeeping mission in Cyprus, while Bali was a military observer in South Vietnam in the same years. Pucher was also deployed to the UN peacekeeping mission to the Golan Heights in the second half of the 1980s, and Bali worked as a military observer in Iraq in 1990–​91. In addition, they both commanded military units at home and international formations abroad. Bali commanded the UN Military Observer Group in India and Pakistan in 1999–​2000, and Pucher was the head of Regional Arms Control Verification and Implementation Assistance Centre (RACVIAC) in Croatia in 2002–​05, which has 23 member and associate member countries. On top of that, they worked in ministries other than their MoDs. Bali was the military adviser of the Hungarian minister of foreign affairs in the late 1990s, while Pucher was responsible for military affairs in the cabinet of the Bundeskanzler of Austria (the equivalent of the Prime Minister’s office) at the same time. Of course, there were differences regarding their careers that mainly stemmed from the fact that they served in different countries. For instance, Bali finished his military staff training at the US Army War College in the 1990s, while Pucher did his in Austria in the 1980s. Bali contributed significantly to Hungary’s successful NATO membership application in the late 1990s, while Pucher led the team in the Austrian MoD that coordinated the Austrian EU presidency on defence issues in 2007. Bali had to retire from the military service when he became the Hungarian DPD in 2001, because it is a civil service position in Hungary that cannot be fulfilled by military personnel. However, Pucher was able to keep his military rank in Austria and served as the DPD from 2007. At the same time, we can see that in the most relevant aspects they had similar careers and experiences, which may have made them less guarded with each other and may have created an atmosphere in which they could communicate more straightforwardly. As was mentioned earlier, similarity decreases the ‘costs’ of interaction and facilitates more effective communication in functional relationships. So it is not surprising that, 129

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based on their similar careers, they liked each other and had interpersonal chemistry, as observers pointed out (Hungarian MoD Official, 2013; Austrian MoD Official, 2014). Furthermore, thanks to their experience of working extensively in international settings, both were proponents of international cooperation at the European level (Pucher, 2011; Bali, 2013) and backed subregional initiatives too. While, for instance, both Bali and Pucher supported the idea of closer Central European subregional military collaboration (Csiki and Molnár, 2010), Pucher was an advocate of more extensive subregional cooperation in south-​east Europe too (Pucher, 2011). Thus, together with propinquity, similarity in relevant aspects (age, career, formative experiences, a highly positive view of international cooperation) has helped create an interpersonal attraction between Bali and Pucher which made their interactions easier. Their good relationship is also demonstrated by the fact that the original idea of starting a Central European subregional cooperation on P&S of military capabilities was raised in a bilateral meeting between Pucher and Bali in November 2009, and they agreed that they would organize subregional seminars about it (Csiki and Molnár, 2010). Without their interpersonal chemistry, they would probably not have started this initiative with each other. However, they liked and trusted each other enough and they knew that they were on the same page on military cooperation. As a result, the first seminar on Central European P&S where the representatives of the CEDC countries were present was organized in Austria in May 2010, and the next seminar was held by the Hungarian MoD in Budapest in November of the same year (Csiki and Molnár, 2010). At the time of the second seminar, József Bali was already retired and Péter Siklósi, who was much younger than Bali and Pucher, had become the new Hungarian DPD. He was not a military officer but a career civil servant with extensive experience working in leading positions in the Hungarian MoD, the Hungarian representation to NATO in Brussels and the Prime Minister’s Office. Despite his different background, he quickly established a good relationship with Pucher during the seminar in Budapest in November 2010. They already knew each other and József Bali was one of the keynote speakers at that event and helped make sure that his successor and Johann Pucher would get along with each other (Hungarian MoD Official, 2013). This is a good example of how someone can ‘inherit’ a good relationship when there is not as much similarity between them and their counterpart and still be able to create a good functional relationship quickly. As we can see, the rich military relationship between Austria and Hungary and their similar geopolitical interests create many official and informal opportunities for the DPDs of the two countries to experience the mere exposure effect that helped establish familiarity between them. Besides, the careers and experiences of Johann Pucher and József Bali were very similar, 130

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and they had similar views on relevant aspects of their relationship (such as military cooperation). Based on these dynamics, which helped to establish propinquity and similarity, they developed an interpersonal attraction that created the trust that allowed them to start a Central European subregional military cooperation.

Conclusion This chapter highlights the fact that every subregional defence collaboration needs at least two leaders in relevant positions who like each other and start working together to push an initiative forward. These leaders have an interpersonal chemistry that helps them to work easier and faster on the collaboration. If there is interpersonal attraction between these leaders, their communication and cooperation become more effortless, and they enjoy the interactions that underpin the cooperation. This chapter shows that, depending on the collaboration, the engine –​ the two leaders –​ which kickstarts the MDC can be at different levels: head of state/​head of government (the Lancaster House Treaties), Chiefs of Defence (NORDEFCO) or Defence Policy Director (CEDC). However, the dynamics of why they develop interpersonal chemistry are very similar and can be explained by the concepts of propinquity and similarity. Propinquity is relevant because, without any interactions, it is not possible to develop an interpersonal attraction. In all cases, the official and semi-​official events and meetings where the studied leaders met created propinquity for them. Thus, they could interact with each other regularly, and as a result they could experience the mere exposure effect that could lead to liking. However, propinquity is not enough to create deep interpersonal chemistry. Otherwise, every European DPD, every head of state/​head of government and every Chief of Defence would like each other very much. While propinquity establishes the conditions for regular interactions and leaders to become familiar with each other, similarity is the deciding factor for whether two leaders will have significant interpersonal chemistry or not. As the case studies pointed out, the stakeholders do not have to be similar in every respect, but they do have to be similar in certain critical aspects that are highly important for them and they must also support the initiation of the MDC. This similarity helps them to be less guarded with each other and makes communication easier. In the Lancaster House Treaties case, Nicolas Sarkozy and David Cameron belonged to the same political family, which was a unique situation regarding the French head of state and British head of government. Furthermore, Sarkozy demonstrated a higher level of prototypicality of Western leaders than previous French presidents as he was clearly an Atlanticist, which helped him to be accepted and to be liked by Cameron more easily. With NORDEFCO, General Sverre Diesen and 131

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General Håkan Syrén, the Chiefs of Defence of Norway and Sweden at that time, shared a high level of ‘similarity’ in terms of academic affinity. Both were military officers who enjoyed academic work and thought more conceptually than their peers. Finally, Johann Pucher and József Bali, the Austrian and Hungarian Defence Policy Directors, shared a remarkably similar military career that fostered a good chemistry between them and enabled them to push for the establishment of CEDC.

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8

Supportive Political Milieu Defence matters do not exist in a vacuum: they are always influenced by the actual political environment, the current political milieu. This is the case with defence collaborations in Europe as well. Without a supportive political milieu, those defence policy communities (DPCs) that want to cooperate with each other would be working in a void with no outside support, which would make their efforts to launch a multinational defence cooperation (MDC) very difficult or even impossible. A supportive political milieu helps to galvanize wider support for the MDC and can help to mobilize proponents from outside the enthusiastic members of the cooperating DPCs too. This may provide ‘firepower’ for the advocates of a new MDC to convince and change the attitudes of those who are sceptical or even hostile to the idea inside and outside the DPC. Thus a supportive political milieu for the creation of a new subregional MDC is a situational factor that is often necessary for a new defence collaboration to be initiated. In general, the attitudes of actors regarding political issues ‘are powerfully conditioned by the social and political milieu in which they take place’ (Weatherford, 1982). For instance examining how political attitudes changed during the 1980 presidential campaign in the US, Michael MacKuen and Courtney Brown found that ‘the impact of an individual’s milieu on attitude change is greater than the effect of a respondent’s sex, age, or education […] the respondent’s race, information level, income, and ideology’ (MacKuen and Brown, 1987: 477). They also demonstrate that, although the political milieu of the macroenvironment is relevant in this regard, the content of the discussion in the microenvironment of the studied individuals has an even bigger impact on their political attitude. This affects communities differently, creating an unstable and dynamic nature for the contemporary political context (MacKuen and Brown, 1987: 485). Building on the insights of MacKuen and Brown, this book understands the political milieu on two levels: the microenvironment and the macroenvironment. The microenvironment is where the discussions and the policy formulation happen inside a DPC (Roberts, 2020) and 133

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between relevant DPCs. However, this conversation is influenced by the events and processes of the macroenvironment. In this book, even the macroenvironment of the political milieu is not understood as the wider social and political context of the time, which is relatively stable, but refers to the developments that are directly relevant regarding the studied MDCs and may change quickly. More specifically, the actual political milieu in the macroenvironment represents those events and relationship patterns that are relevant to getting support for the MDC from outside the DPCs. How supportive, neutral or antagonistic the broader political milieu and other relevant actors are towards an MDC will have a significant impact on the chances of creating a defence cooperative initiative. Conceptually, the microenvironment of the political milieu is the same for every MDC. As has been mentioned, these are the dynamics inside and between the DPCs regarding the defence cooperation in question. However, the relevant macroenvironment is always MDC-​specific. Depending on the MDC, the relevant macroenvironment of the political milieu can come from either the domestic or the international level, and is not necessarily the same for every participating DPC of the same MDC. Therefore, it is possible, for instance, that for each DPC of one MDC the relevant macroenvironment is the events and processes in NATO and/​or EU, while for another MDC it comprises purely subregional dynamics or exclusively domestic political developments. On top of that, the relevant macroenvironment for the DPCs of the same MDC can be different. For example, regarding the launching of a new MDC, the macroenvironment for one of the participating DPCs might be the events in NATO/​EU, but domestic political pressures can be the relevant macroenvironment for another DPC of the same MDC. Accordingly, while it is not difficult to recognize the microenvironment of the political milieu of an MDC, it is crucial to identify its macroenvironment(s) accurately to understand those forces that influence the creation of a defence cooperation. It might seem that the macroenvironment of the political milieu has a much more significant impact on the creation of an MDC, because the DPCs in the microenvironment receive passively the effects coming from the macroenvironment. However, this is not the case. The microenvironment is not just where the DPCs ‘make sense’ of the developments of their macroenvironment(s) and act based on that, but the DPCs in their microenvironment might want to shape the broader macroenvironment to gain support for establishing an MDC too. By analysing the evolution of the early stages of ESDP, Xymena Kurowska demonstrates that dynamics in the microenvironment can change the political milieu in the macroenvironment too. She used the term ‘Solana milieu’ to refer to ‘a constellation of organizational entities, including administrative bodies and […] special representatives’ that provided ‘the ideational and 134

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institutional entrepreneurship’ necessary to strengthen ESDP in the late 1990s and early 2000s (Kurowska, 2009: 524). Javier Solana was the Secretary General of the Council of the EU and the High Representative of the EU for Common Foreign and Security Policy at the time. The ‘Solana milieu’ describes the efforts of the EU entities allied with Solana that strove to create a stronger EU defence policy. In the framework of this book the function of the ‘Solana milieu’ can be understood as the way that a significant portion of the EU’s DPC worked in its microenvironment to convince other actors in order to create a favourable attitude to the ESDP in the macroenvironment too. To study this process, Kurowska applied frame analysis, introduced by Martin Rein and Donald Schön (Rein and Schön, 1977, 1994) and developed further by Dvora Yanow (2008). Kurowska summarizes the concept thus: conventionally defined, framing is understood as a process of selective control over the perception of the meanings attributed to certain phenomena with the aim to permit certain interpretations and rule out others. Framing, when it is successful, thus ensures that specific issues come to be considered as crucial and, just as importantly, come to be viewed in certain ways rather than others. As such, framing should be seen as an adjunct to the political process of agenda setting. […] The approach to framing and frame analysis adopted here is embedded in the social ontology where social beings cannot be separated from the context that continually shapes them and, by extension, what they perceive as their interest. (Kurowska, 2009: 525–​6) Merlijn van Hulst and Dvora Yanow developed a dynamic concept of framing and argued that the work of framing happens via three different acts (Hulst and Yanow, 2014): sense-​making, naming and storytelling. First, when actors face uncertain situations, they have to work out what is happening, and they have to make sense of the events. This often happens unconsciously, and actors make sense of things based on their previous experiences, cultural attitudes and identities and by interacting with others. When they think that they have an initial understanding of what is happening, they start to imagine what should be done. Sense-​making is an iterative and interactive process that is shaped by the changing environment. Second, during naming, actors construct meanings regarding circumstances, developments and events that they face by naming, selecting and categorizing some issues and ignoring others. This way, one can emphasize and also close out certain elements of the policy discourse to lay down the bases of future courses of action. Third, storytelling is an attempt to convince others about an interpretation of reality. Actors often do not agree about what is going on, and they compete for interpreting events by persuasive framing moves, countermoves 135

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or negotiations over defining the relevant issues or deliberately constructing ambiguous stories that can be interpreted differently. However, a successful story that is able to mobilize relevant actors to take action has to be able to describe reality in a way that ‘rings true’ (Kurowska, 2009: 517). For the purposes of this chapter, van Hulst’s and Yanow’s concept and Kurowska’s insights are taken into consideration to understand those dynamics in the microenvironment of the political milieus of the MDCs being studied (the Lancaster House Treaties, CEDC, NORDEFCO) where the relevant DPCs framed the cooperation to create a positive attitude towards the studied MDCs in both their micro-​and macroenvironments. It is important to make clear the distinctions between the micro-​and macroenvironments of the political milieu and the uploading/​downloading framework that was introduced in Chapter 1 and applied in several chapters. Uploading happens when new shared meanings are created by DPCs at a subregional level and they upload their approaches to a higher-​level defence cooperation (EU/​NATO). Downloading is when shared meanings regarding defence cooperation are created at the European level (EU/​NATO) and learned socially by DPCs via communication and different transactions at the subregional level. The political milieu is not about the relationships between the different levels of defence cooperative frameworks but about the wider support, or lack of it, for the creation of the studied MDCs. The macroenvironment of the political milieu is the developments that are directly relevant regarding the studied MDC, and which may change quickly, while the microenvironment of the political milieu is where DPCs frame the events of the macroenvironment by sense-​making, naming and storytelling; they may also want to shape the macroenvironment by using these framing tools in their own favour. The following sections introduce how the actual political milieu supported the establishment of the three studied cases. We will see that in relation to the Lancaster House treaties mostly domestic British and French considerations played the most relevant roles, while the creation of NORDEFCO could rely on the rejuvenation of broader Nordic subregional processes. Finally, in the Central European case, European-​level developments had a significant impact on the way the launch of CEDC was framed.

The role of domestic politics: the Lancaster House Treaties DPCs first and foremost are interacting with actors in the domestic political environment of their countries, as they have to coordinate their actions with other policy communities, politicians and civil society. Thus, not surprisingly, regarding the creation of the Lancaster House Treaties, the most relevant macroenvironment for the British and French DPCs were their own domestic 136

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political environments, and partially the French DPC was also influenced by European-​level processes. The two DPCs made meaning of the launch of the Lancaster House Treaties by emphasizing the similarities of the two countries and leaving out their disagreements, stating that the two countries were ‘natural partners in security and defence’ (UK–​France, 2010a). The leading politicians told the story that the treaties were unprecedented and historical in Anglo-​French relations and used policy frames of maintaining their countries’ sovereignty and providing a strategic vision to Europe to convince relevant actors and audiences about the usefulness of this MDC in the macroenvironment of the political milieu. As it was mentioned, the relevant macroenvironments of the political milieu for the British and French DPCs were their domestic political landscapes. Although a lower-​level defence arrangement probably would have been signed between France and the UK in 2010 anyway, David Cameron pushed for a more ambitious agreement than originally planned. One of his main motivations was that he wanted to demonstrate to the increasingly influential Eurosceptic wing of the Tory party that he could achieve significant cooperation with European major powers outside EU frameworks (Senior UK MoD official, 2014). This way, Cameron could strengthen his position inside the party. Liam Fox, who served as Shadow Secretary and Secretary of State for Defence when the Lancaster House Treaties were negotiated, explained that the conservative party was interested in a ‘defence cooperation with a country inside continental Europe that had nothing to do with the EU’ and wanted to ‘tie France to a transatlantic view’ with the help of the treaties (Pannier, 2016: 482). For Nicolas Sarkozy and his administration, it also became crucial to show success in the field of defence cooperation in Europe after he could not reinvigorate ESDP during the French EU presidency in 2008. As the wider political establishment in France became disillusioned with ESDP (Rayroux, 2014), Sarkozy needed to choose a new approach to show leadership in defence matters in Europe. Thus, for instance, his move to reintegrate France fully into the NATO military structures in 2009 was not opposed significantly by domestic actors. The reintegration opened up the opportunity to make a more ambitious bilateral deal with London as the French full membership in NATO eliminated many previously existing security and trust issues between the two countries. Similarly to Cameron, Sarkozy also needed a significant international success and the Lancaster House Treaties were an excellent tool to show to its domestic audience and to show Germany that France could be the leader in Europe and could pull the UK to European projects too (Former French MoD Official, 2014). In the British microenvironment of the political milieu, the situation was mostly straightforward. The most relevant elements of the British DPC –​ including No 10, the MoD, the relevant politicians, defence industrial 137

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actors, think tanks –​were aligned with or at least did not oppose a deeper Anglo-​French defence cooperation. Most of the French DPC backed the idea too, but it had a deep divide between the Atlanticist and European camps. The Atlanticists, who supported NATO reintegration and practical military cooperation with the UK, were led by the French MoD while the European camp, represented mostly by the Quai d’Orsay (the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs), promoted collaboration primarily in the EU and with Germany (Pannier, 2017: 488–​90). However, the Élysée Palace wanted the treaties, which were supported by the defence industry, and, as we could see, the French politicians were disillusioned with ESDP and did not oppose a deeper cooperation between France and Britain. Therefore, the French microenvironment of the political milieu was largely favourable for the Lancaster House Treaties too. During the naming, selecting and categorizing phase of policy framing, officials selected and emphasized the elements of British–​French relations that were supportive of the treaties and highlighted the commonality of the two countries. It was claimed that Britain and France were ‘natural partners in security and defence’ (UK–​France, 2010a). According to the official argument, this natural partnership was based on four main common characteristics of the two countries. First, the UK and France were members of the same formal and informal groups: they were permanent members of the United Nations Security Council, NATO and EU members and members of the group of nations, which possess nuclear weapons. Second, they spent the most on defence in Europe and they were the European countries that were willing to use military force in international politics. This is underpinned by the fact that they had the third and fourth biggest defence budgets in the world at that time, which altogether provided 50 per cent of all European defence expenditure. Furthermore, the UK and France invested two thirds of the budgets for defence research and technology in Europe. Moreover, they were contributing the most to international military operations and were ‘able and ready to fulfil the most demanding military missions’. Third, they faced the same ‘new challenges such as the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and ballistic missiles, terrorism, cyber attack, maritime and space security’. Fourth, the UK and France could not imagine a serious security threat that would not impact on them both (UK–​France, 2010a). At the same time, both analysts and politicians highlighted certain aspects of British–​French relations that the two DPCs ignored when they framed the cooperation in a positive way (White, 2010). For instance, the New York Times pointed out that a deeply rooted historic rivalry existed between the two nations and ‘the shadows of Nelson and Napoleon, of Henry V and Joan of Arc, seemed to hang over the occasion’ when Sarkozy and Cameron signed the treaties (Burns, 2010). Furthermore, Bernard Jenkins, British 138

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Conservative MP, said that there ‘is a long term record of duplicity on the French part when it comes to dealing with their allies … France has never and is never likely to share strategic interests with the UK’ (Gomis, 2011: 7). The theme ‘can we really trust the French?’ emerged during the debate about the cooperation in the UK (Gomis, 2011: 7) but it was pointed out that the French also thought that the British are duplicitous (Wintour, 2010). Although there were voices that were sceptical about the cooperation and pointed out elements that the official narrative ignored, the British and French DPCs were largely supportive of the Lancaster House Treaties. However, framing is more than just highlighting some elements of the policy discourse and ignoring others by selecting, naming and categorizing. It also includes storytelling where patterns, plots and narrative frames are bonded together into a coherent and believable story. The official story of the Lancaster House Treaties highlighted that the two most relevant military powers in Western Europe reached a historical agreement that provided practical solutions to maintain their sovereignty and offer a strategic vision to Europe. Van Hulst and Yanow point out that during the process of story-​ telling ‘policy-​relevant actors typically reach back in time to a moment when all was well’ (Hulst and Yanow, 2014: 101). David Cameron did exactly the same when he emphasized the longstanding nature of British–​French defence cooperation. Among others, he said that ‘Britain and France have a shared history through two world wars. Our brave troops are fighting together every day in Afghanistan.’ However, the British and French DPCs went further and claimed that British–​French relations had never been better. Cameron stated that London and Paris opened ‘a new chapter in a long history of cooperation on defence and security between Britain and France’, while Sarkozy argued that the treaties showed ‘a level of trust and confidence between our two nations which is unequalled in history’ (UK–​ France, 2010b). Furthermore, influential members of the two DPCs called the agreement ‘unprecedented’ (Cody, 2010). As we could see, the two DPCs highlighted many shared policy frames, but there were some divergences as well. Although both the French and British leaders agreed that maintaining sovereignty was necessary, this topic seemed to be much more crucial for the British Prime Minister than for the French President, who argued that the Lancaster House Treaties were beneficial for Europe too. David Cameron emphasized that two countries that spent the most on defence recognized ‘that if we come together and work together we can increase not just our joint capacity but crucially we can increase our own individual sovereign capacity to make sure that we are able to do more things alone as well as together’ (UK–​France, 2010b). While Nicolas Sarkozy acknowledged that sovereignty was a ‘touchy issue’ in France too, he rather highlighted that France and the UK gave a ‘strategic vision’ to Europe with the treaties. He also stated that, thanks to the agreements, ‘the 139

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two major military powers in Europe have pooled their efforts –​some of their efforts, as it were –​and this is to the greater benefit of Europe’ (UK–​ France, 2010b). These different stories were meant to target the relevant actors in the different macroenvironments of the French and British DPCs. By emphasizing the relevance of sovereignty, David Cameron intended to convince Eurosceptics in the Tory party about the usefulness of the treaties, while Sarkozy’s argument about the benefits for Europe concerning the British–​French defence collaboration aimed to persuade the relevant actors in French domestic politics and possibly other European countries. In conclusion, the relevant political milieu influenced the French and British DPCs and helped to trigger the establishment of the Lancaster House Treaties. The macroenvironments of the two DPCs were their domestic political environments where leading politicians intended to use the Lancaster House Treaties for domestic political purposes. As shown, a comprehensive defence agreement between France and the UK would have probably been created anyway, but it was David Cameron’s initiative to elevate it to treaty level. Thus, sense-​making happened in the macroenvironments in regards to policy framing. In the British case, David Cameron and his team sensed that they had to demonstrate to the Eurosceptic wing of the Tory party that it was possible to work together with another European power outside the EU. In the French case, Nicolas Sarkozy wanted to lead European efforts on defence and was open for alternatives when it was not successful in improving ESDP/​CSDP. The Lancaster House Treaties served both of these intentions and the majority of the British and French DPCs were supportive of a deeper defence collaboration between Paris and London. Thus, the naming, selecting and categorizing the DPCs highlighted the commonalities of British–​French interests and positions in the world while ignoring their differences in the policy discourse to gain more support in their respective macroenvironments. This provided a solid foundation for the main plots of the stories the DPCs told about the agreements, which argued that the two most relevant military powers in Western Europe reached a historical agreement that provided practical solutions to maintain their sovereignty and offer a strategic vision to Europe.

Wider subregional support:​NORDEFCO In the case of the NORDEFCO, primarily the Swedish and Norwegian DPCs and partially the Finnish DPC played the most critical roles and the dynamics between them were the most relevant aspects of the microenvironment of the political milieu. The Swedish, Norwegian and Finnish DPCs had already created new defence cooperative frameworks when the attitudes of the public and the political leadership of the five Nordic countries shifted and became supportive towards deeper Nordic 140

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foreign and security cooperation in general. These Nordic subregional processes made it possible to extend the defence cooperation to every Nordic country including Iceland and Denmark, and this change in the macroenvironment of the political milieu triggered the creation of the Nordic Defence Cooperation in 2009. In the microenvironment of the political milieu, many Nordic DPCs started to have a strong uneasy feeling about the future of their armed forces in the early 2000s. This was the period when the act of sense-​making started to accelerate in the policy framing process and led to the creation of NORDEFCO later. Among others, General Håkan Syren, the Swedish Chief of Defence, stated that the Swedish military ‘has come to the end of the road … in its effort to maintain a balanced and modern defence force on a national basis’, while General Sverre Diesen, the Norwegian head of the military, pointed out that ‘ “modern defence we have now established” would come to “disappear in the course of two to three decades” ’ (Saxi, 2019: 663). In the sense-​making phase of policy framing, actors often face a situation that ‘worries’ them and certain issues seem to be ambiguous or uncertain. Thus, explicitly or implicitly, they ask the question ‘What is it that is going here?’ (Hulst and Yanow, 2014: 97). The main worry of the Nordic DPCs was that they started to realize they would not be able to maintain the structures and capabilities of their militaries –​the Norwegian and Swedish DPCs especially attempted to make sense of this situation. Unsurprisingly, in the 2000s, many policy and academic researchers have tried to answer the question ‘what was going on?’. This discourse provided the foundation for naming, selecting and categorizing issues for framing certain policies. In this regard, the decreasing purchasing power of defence budgets, maintaining of balanced force structure and the critical mass of military capabilities became significant topics. The most relevant documents concerning establishing the policies for defence cooperation were the official reports that the Swedish and Norwegian militaries published about their situations in 2007 (Saxi, 2011: 17). Several issues were highlighted about why they were losing their military capabilities and why the military structure was unsustainable, but the decreasing purchasing power of the defence budgets was named as the most relevant one. For instance, the Norwegian defence budget lost 40 per cent of its purchasing power between 1990 and 2006 as a result of defence budget cuts, the increasing costs of modern weapon systems and new tasks (Saxi, 2019: 663). In many ways, the Finnish military was in even bigger trouble as it implemented less reform and decreased its personnel on a much smaller scale than the Swedish and Norwegian armed forces, while its defence budget was also reduced. The concept of ‘critical mass’ was also named as a significant issue and its relevance was emphasized in the policy discourse. As it was mentioned in the previous chapters, in this context critical mass was 141

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understood as the ‘smallest practical number of any given weapon system’ and the fear was that the Nordic militaries would lose the critical mass of several military capabilities (Diesen, 2012b). By emphasizing the relevance of the decreasing purchasing power of the defence budgets and the problem of ‘critical mass’, the DPCs laid down the basis of future courses of action in the microenvironment of the political milieu. They created a binary policy choice by naming, selecting and highlighting these issues and ignoring other possible categories. On top of that, only one of the options could be realistically accepted. In the context of this policy discourse, one of the solutions could have been to increase the defence budgets significantly to compensate for their decreasing purchasing power. This way the DPCs could maintain a balanced force structure by having the critical mass of military capabilities nationally. However, the DPCs understood that it was implausible because the international environment was benign in the late 2000s and the public would not support it. Accordingly, the Norwegian and Swedish DPCs came to the conclusion that the other option had to be accepted and they had to start to cooperate bilaterally on procurement, maintenance, logistics, training and education to be able to maintain their forces (Saxi, 2019: 663). They started to collaborate on these issues in 2007 and Finland joined them the next year. The official story they told about the policy of defence cooperation was based on their discourse and they argued that their countries would ‘not be able in the close future to sustain complete and balanced armed forces’ and that is the reason why they needed to ‘share capabilities with strategic partners’ (Saxi, 2019: 664). Although the Finnish, Swedish and Norwegian DPCs accepted this story in the process of policy framing, this interpretation of the reality did not persuade the Danish and Icelandic DPCs. Iceland did not have armed forces, and so the question of military capabilities was not relevant for Reykjavik. At the same time, the Danish DPC made different policy decisions than the Finnish, Swedish and Norwegian DPCs and did not intend to maintain the critical mass of every capability to keep a balanced force structure. Among others, the Danish armed forces scrapped its ground-​based air defence, submarine and long-​range fire support capabilities in the second half of the 2000s to free resources to develop high-​quality expeditionary capabilities that could be deployed in Afghanistan (Saxi, 2010: 425–​6). Therefore, the Icelandic and Danish DPCs did not agree on relevant issues about defence with the other Nordic countries and thus they were not interested in creating a pan-​Nordic military collaboration to maintain a balanced force structure. Not surprisingly, the stance of the Icelandic and Danish DPCs on the question of military capabilities did not change significantly after the creation of NORDEFCO. However, certain processes in the macroenvironment of the political milieu changed the dynamics in the microenvironment. The macroenvironment 142

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of the NORDEFCO was the subregional dynamics between the Nordic countries. In this regard, the Nordic public, the wider Nordic foreign and security policy community and the Nordic politicians all supported a deeper Nordic cooperation, including defence collaboration, in the late 2000s. As a consequence, the five Nordic DPCs started to create new structures for collaboration in late 2008 and finally established NORDEFCO in November 2009 to coordinate their defence cooperative efforts in one framework (Saxi, 2019). The most relevant process that represented the supportive political milieu in the macroenvironment was the development of the so-​called Stoltenberg Report. In June 2008, the five Nordic foreign ministers asked Thorvald Stoltenberg, a former Norwegian minister of foreign affairs, to produce proposals about the strengthening of foreign and security policy cooperation among the Nordic states for the next 10–​15 years (Icelandic Ministry for Foreign Affairs, 2009). Stoltenberg engaged with the most relevant actors in every Nordic state, making sure that the Nordic cooperation was high on the agenda in the macroenvironment of the political milieu. Thus, the development of the report was based mainly on interviews and conversations with different officials and experts from the five Nordic countries. For this, Stoltenberg had a small secretariat from Norway and two contact persons from each Nordic capital to help facilitate and organize the meetings and research. Accordingly, no committee was established, and, except the contact persons, no other officials took part in the development of the report. Thus, the report ‘was less likely to be a list of lowest common denominators, but also it was not “owned” by the governments that commissioned it. They could take or leave its contents piecemeal, which is precisely what they did’ (Archer, 2010: 49). The Stoltenberg Report was published half a year later and Stoltenberg presented the results of it to the Nordic foreign ministers in an extraordinary meeting in February 2009 (Archer, 2010: 49). The report contained 13 concrete proposals that were partly defence related and also covered issues concerning foreign policy and non-​military aspects of security, including the creation of a Nordic Stabilisation Task Force, cooperation on Arctic issues, establishing a Nordic maritime monitoring system and cooperation on cyber and disaster relief operations (Stoltenberg, 2009b). The different actors in the macroenvironment of the political milieu received the report positively. However, the public and the politicians of the different Nordic states paid various levels of attention to the release of the document. While Norway, Sweden and Iceland were very enthusiastic about the Stoltenberg Report in general, only the foreign and security policy community engaged with the issue in Finland and the relevant Danish actors were the least interested ones (Haugevik and Sverdrup, 2019). Cooperation started on most of the issues Stoltenberg suggested, but the intensity of the work has differed regarding the proposals (Archer, 2010: 58–​63). The 143

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Nordic foreign ministers also accepted a version of the Nordic solidarity clause –​the Stoltenberg Report’s most far-​reaching proposal –​in April 2011 (Government of Norway, 2011), but it was a significantly watered-​down version of the original proposition. Stoltenberg’s idea was to establish a mutual defence agreement between the Nordic states. Still, the actual version of the Nordic solidarity clause applied only to natural and human-​made disasters and cyber and terrorist attacks. Although not every proposal of the Stoltenberg Report has been fully implemented, we could see that the public, politicians and officials in the Nordic macroenvironment were largely supportive towards Nordic foreign and security policy cooperation, including defence matters in 2008–​9 when NORDEFCO was created. This was the main reason why the Norwegian–​ Swedish–​Finnish trilateral military cooperation become a pan-​Nordic defence collaboration and also become more ambitious (Saxi, 2019: 665). However, the micro and macroenvironments of the political milieu do not work in isolation. Hence, it does not mean that the above-​mentioned dynamics of the political milieu in the macroenvironment happened independently from the processes of the microenvironment, instead, they both affected each other. Thorvald Stoltenberg highlighted that the deepening defence cooperation between Sweden, Norway and Finland had a wider impact on the macroenvironment of the political milieu too. He wrote that the defence chiefs’ decision [about military cooperation] was also an important motivating factor when the foreign ministers decided to study the potential for Nordic cooperation on foreign and security policy. The defence chiefs were an important source of inspiration for me personally, too. I realised that wide-​ranging cooperation on defence would push security-​policy cooperation up the Nordic agenda. Similarly, cooperation on security policy would stimulate Nordic defence cooperation. (Stoltenberg, 2009a: 10) We can conclude that defence cooperative efforts had been underway between Sweden, Norway and Finland in the microenvironment, but a supportive macroenvironment of the political milieu was necessary to extend this cooperation to every Nordic state and cement collaborative efforts. These bilateral and trilateral defence collaborations also had an impact on the macroenvironment and shaped the dynamics that helped to establish a supportive environment towards wider Nordic cooperation. Nevertheless, starting defence cooperation with more DPCs does not mean that every DPC will have the same enthusiasm to collaborate. In practice, NORDEFCO largely remained a Swedish–​Norwegian–​Finnish trilateral collaboration as the Icelandic and Danish armed forces could not or did not intend to cooperate with their Nordic counterparts (Saxi, 2019: 665). The 144

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Icelandic and Danish DPCs never accepted those policy frames and stories –​ cooperation is necessary to keep the critical mass of military capabilities in order the maintain a balanced force structure –​that provided the foundation for military cooperation among the other three Nordic countries. This shows the limitations of defence cooperation. If certain DPCs join the collaboration because of the pressures coming from the macroenvironment, and not because they share and accept the policy frames that underpin the cooperation in the microenvironment, they might avoid real collaboration and will cooperate in name only.

Borrowing policy frames from other defence collaborations:​ CEDC The policy discourse and events in the macroenvironment of the political milieu of CEDC had a huge impact on the microenvironment of this MDC. First, the concept of pooling and sharing of military capabilities had been discussed in the EU extensively in the late 2000s and that shaped the way of thinking of Central European –​especially the Austrian and Hungarian –​ DPCs significantly. Second, several newly established MDCs also played a crucial role because they created a perception for the Central European DPCs that a new trend was emerging in Europe where smaller groups of states would cooperate more closely together militarily. The example of NORDEFCO was critical in this regard, as Central European DPCs intended to mimic NORDEFCO at great extent. Thus, European-​level processes and collaborations in other subregional MDCs created a political milieu in the macroenvironment for Central European DPCs that pushed them to establish CEDC in their microenvironment. The concept of pooling and sharing of military capabilities had been discussed throughout the 2000s in the EU and many experts and officials argued that, by pooling and specialization, EU countries could eliminate duplications and be much more effective in developing defence capabilities (Alexander and Garden, 2001; Flournoy and Smith, 2005; Heise, 2005). For instance, the European Security Strategy published in 2003 explicitly stated that ‘systematic use of pooled and shared assets would reduce duplications, overheads and, in the medium-​term, increase capabilities’ (Council of the European Union, 2003). However, only the financial crisis of 2008 provided an impetus to establish an EU-​wide policy in this regard, which materialized in the so-​called Ghent process, also known as the P&S initiative, in November 2010. This macroenvironment of the political milieu on the EU level, where more and more intensive discussions were happening about military cooperation in general and pooling and sharing in particular, had a significant impact on the discourse about defence cooperation among Central European DPCs 145

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between 2008 and 2011. The study written by Jean-​Pierre Maulny and Fabio Liberti for the European Parliament’s subcommittee on Security and Defence in 2008 became very influential in shaping the views of defence officials in this subregion. Maulny and Liberti highlighted that among European Union member states too many duplications existed in defence and this represented ‘a huge and irrational cost for European taxpayers’ (Maulny and Liberti, 2008: 3). They did not believe that a full military integration was possible in Europe, but according to them ‘pooling’ provided the possibility for significant savings. Their concept of pooling and sharing became the starting point for the categorization of different defence cooperation initiatives in Central Europe. Maulny and Liberti identified four pooling categories: 1) sharing of capabilities, whereby member states create common capabilities through the provision of national capabilities and there is no structure to organize their use; 2) pooling of capabilities, which involves an integrated structure to organize the use of national capabilities; 3) pooling through acquisition, where national capabilities do not exist and are substituted in favour of multilateral capabilities, and the multilateral organization owns the assets; 4) role sharing, whereby certain capabilities are relinquished on the assumption that another country will make it available when necessary. Besides of the EU-​wide discourse on P&S, the examples of newly established MDCs also influenced the microenvironment of the political milieu. One of them was the Strategic Airlift Capability (SAC) that was established by 12 nations (Bulgaria, Estonia, Finland, Hungary, Lithuania, the Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Romania, Slovenia, Sweden and the United States) in 2008 to procure and maintain three C-​17 military transport aircrafts together. Based on Maulny and Liberti’s categorization, this MDC is a high-​level pooling as pooling works through acquisition and the C-​ 17s are not national capabilities but are managed through a NATO agency (although not only NATO members are part of the consortium). Thus, all life-​cycle costs are shared by the members of SAC to make the capabilities affordable to smaller nations as well. This MDC has been perceived as a very successful project and was highly visible for Central Europeans at the time when CEDC was created, as the main base of SAC is in Pápa Airbase, Hungary, where the aircrafts started their operations in 2009 (Hungarian MoD Official, 2013). The other subregional MDC that had a significant impact on the way of thinking of Central Europeans was NORDEFCO, and it was deemed an example that should be followed as there were many similarities between the Nordic countries and the participating states of CEDC. Among others, they were all smaller European nations, both subregions had EU and NATO member and non-​member states, they transformed their militaries to be able to contribute to peace support operations while their defence budgets were cut significantly and all shared similar security concerns. Central European 146

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states were aware of the negotiations around the Lancaster House Treaties too but it was deemed less relevant as the British–​French agreement was a bilateral cooperation between two European military powers, offering fewer lessons for Central Europeans than NORDEFCO. The Austrian and Hungarian defence policy directors discussed the idea of a Central European P&S seminar for the first time in November 2009 (Csiki and Molnár, 2010: 4). This was the same month NORDEFCO was launched and the last C-​17 aircraft of the SAC fleet arrived to Hungary a few weeks earlier. Besides, Hungary had just started to prepare for its EU presidency that would begin in early 2011 and was very perceptive to the EU policy discourse regarding defence. Thanks to these dynamics, the first step was made by the Austrian DPC to create CEDC and it organized a conference titled ‘Security Cooperation in Central Europe’ in Vienna in May 2010 to start discussions about future military collaborations between the DPCs of the subregion. In October of the same year, a seminar that exclusively focused on Central European P&S opportunities was organized in Budapest, where the Hungarian defence policy director suggested to the representatives of other Central European DPCs (Austria, Croatia, Czech Republic, Hungary, Slovenia, Slovakia) to start discussions on defence cooperation in January 2011 on the margin of the informal meeting of EU defence policy directors (Csiki and Molnár, 2010). The Budapest seminar was crucial in the creation of CEDC because this was the single most important event where the naming and storytelling acts happened in the policy-​framing process in the microenvironment of the political milieu. However, compared to the NORDEFCO and Lancaster House Treaties, the naming, selecting and categorizing of the most relevant issues and the story that was told were not based on indigenous processes of the microenvironment, but the categories and stories were borrowed from the macroenvironment of the political milieu. For instance, Peter Siklósi, the Hungarian defence policy director, pointed out in the seminar that no country in the subregion had ‘the financial capacity to build the full range of defence capabilities’ (Csiki and Molnár, 2010: 5). Similarly, his Austrian counterpart Johann Pucher argued that ‘cooperation should be the normality, purely national planning the exception’ and ‘enhancing cooperation in capability development would enable cost saving as well as preservation of existing capabilities that otherwise could not be maintained’ (Csiki and Molnár, 2010: 5–​6). These policy frames echoed the arguments of the earlier-​mentioned study prepared by Maulny and Liberti to the European Parliament (Maulny and Liberti, 2008) and the rationale behind the creation of NORDEFCO that was discussed in the previous section. Thus it is perhaps not surprising that the speakers of the seminar explicitly referred to the Maulny and Liberti paper several times. Furthermore, another speaker, deputy manager of SAC, explained why SAC was a successful P&S project while the Swedish 147

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Ambassador to Hungary talked about the rationale and positive lessons of NORDEFCO and argued ‘that in the era of globalization, subregional and regional cooperation is a must for small states to exert influence in complex operations’ (Csiki and Molnár, 2010: 5–​6). At the end of the event, the Hungarian defence policy director also announced that, during the Hungarian EU presidency, which would start in a few months, he would organize an EU-​level seminar on P&S in Budapest and would work closely with the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy on the EU’s P&S initiative. Accordingly, although the policy frames that supported the establishment of a Central European MDC were borrowed from the EU-​level policy discourse and the official narrative of NORDEFCO, the story that was told was supplemented by the inevitability of closer subregional cooperation. This was important because the arguments behind the necessity of cooperation were not convincing to every Central European DPC (Nemeth, 2018). However, by echoing the narratives of the EU level discussion on P&S –​ presenting the NORDEFCO and the SAC as successful, recently established subregional MDCs and pointing out that P&S would be on the top of the agenda of EU during the Hungarian presidency –​the story that was told implicitly and explicitly suggested that subregional defence collaboration in Central Europe is a must because P&S is going on in the macroenvironment and will go on in the future too. This indicates that the political milieu of the macroenvironment –​the P&S related EU-​level discourse and the recent launch of other subregional MDCs –​had a significant impact on the microenvironment of CEDC and played an important role in the launch of this Central European MDC.

Conclusion We could see that positive political milieu always played a significant role in the launch of the studied subregional MDCs. Even when structural elements and processes that were supportive of military collaboration were in place, the positive political milieu was needed to provide an impetus to trigger the establishment of these MDCs. The interactions between the macro and microenvironmental actors of the political milieu are crucial in this regard and they often determine where and how the most relevant policy framing acts are done. Identifying the relevant macroenvironment of the political milieu of an MDC is crucial because it helps us to understand the broader constraints and opportunities the DPCs have to operate in. Understanding the dynamics inside the microenvironment of the political milieu is similarly important because DPCs try to make sense of the macroenvironmental processes on this level. However, DPCs do not necessarily play a passive role in the microenvironment. It is true that, in some cases, they just accept the 148

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policy frames originating from the macroenvironment but other times they actively shape the policy discourse in the macroenvironment too. As the three subregional MDCs demonstrated, the macroenvironment of the political milieu can be different in every MDC and it can also be different for DPCs in the same MDC. The latter was the situation concerning the Lancaster House Treaties. Here, domestic party politics provided the macroenvironment for the British DPC and domestic French politics and partly European processes was the macroenvironment for the French DPC. In both cases, the relevant domestic political actors were favourable towards a more extensive British–​French defence cooperation but their rationales were different. For the Nordic countries a wider Nordic foreign and security policy cooperation generated a supportive milieu in the macroenvironment, while EU-​level policy discourse and recently established new MDCs created a favourable environment for Central European DPCs to launch CEDC. The most relevant acts of policy framing happened in the macroenvironment regarding the British–​French agreement –​the DPCs in the microenvironment accepted it and supported the main policy frames that were presented by high-​level politicians. In the Nordic case, policy framing happened in the microenvironment by the Norwegian and Swedish DPCs. Their narrative was accepted by the Finnish DPC and these three DPCs started to cooperate accordingly. This cooperation helped the revival of wider Nordic foreign policy cooperation in the macroenvironment and also strengthened the case of deeper defence cooperation, making the creation of a truly Nordic cooperation possible. The DPCs in Central Europe borrowed most of the policy frames from their macroenvironment (EU and NORDEFCO) and deduced that subregional cooperation was vital in helping the launch of CEDC.

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How to Achieve Defence Cooperation in Europe The previous chapters introduced how the individual structural and situational factors worked and how they contributed to establishing the three studied subregional multinational defence cooperations (MDCs): the Lancaster House Treaties, the NORDEFCO and CEDC. However, they do not explain how these factors interacted with each other and what the dynamics were between them. Accordingly, the current chapter brings the structural and situational factors together by applying the theoretical model that was briefly introduced in Chapter 1. For this purpose, this chapter first summarizes the conceptual elements of the studied structural and situational factors and expands on the model which the book offers to understand how and why new subregional MDCs are created in Europe. Second, based on this discussion and the insights of the previous chapters, this chapter explains how each studied subregional MDC was established. The purpose of this section is to pull all threads together with the help of the aforementioned theoretical model to provide a comprehensive picture about how these defence collaborations were created and how defence cooperation can be achieved in Europe. As mentioned in Chapter 1, this book argues that, for understanding the processes behind creating subregional MDCs, we have to know the factors that affect and drive the participating defence policy communities (DPCs) to establish defence collaborations. Therefore, the unit of analysis is the individual DPCs of subregional defence cooperation. This book defines DPC of a current European country as the groups and persons who have the expertise, will and opportunity to influence the defence policy of the state. DPCs usually consist of military personnel and civil servants of the Ministry of Defence –​including the Defence Staff –​experts from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Ministry of Finance and the Prime Minister’s Office or its equivalent, major defence industrial actors, scholars of defence academies and think tanks and influential members of the parliament. In regard to the 150

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Lancaster House Treaties, the British and French DPCs, and in the case of the NORDEFCO the Norwegian and Swedish DPCs, while concerning the CEDC the Hungarian and Austrian DPCs, will be discussed in this chapter in detail. The choice of the British and French DPCs are obvious in the Lancaster House Treaties because this was a bilateral cooperation. However, both the NORDEFCO and CEDC had more participating DPCs, but the Norwegian and Swedish and the Hungarian and Austrian DPCs were the most active in initiating these two defence collaborations. Thus, this chapter focuses on them.

Dynamics between the structural and situational factors:​the theoretical model This book argues that certain structural and situational factors are necessary to establish a new defence cooperation in Europe. Structural factors are understood as institutions, solid and long-​standing relationships, trends and perceptions that had been developed for a relatively long period. Normally, they create the wider conditions for collaborations but they cannot trigger the launch of new MDCs per se. Situational factors relate to the political and economic environment, personal relationships that might change relatively quickly. These elements create a situation that provide favourable circumstances and a window of opportunity to establish a new defence collaboration. The structural factors are: 1) the existence of the European security community; 2) the perception that individual European armed forces do not have appropriate funds for defence; 3) previous defence collaborations between the participating states. The situational factors are: 1) strong leadership by a group of enthusiastic high-​level officials and good interpersonal chemistry between them; 2) a supportive political milieu for the defence cooperation. The dynamics between these factors can be explained by two figures. Figure 9.1 shows how the subregional level processes interact with the first structural factor: the existence of the European security community. Figure 9.2 highlights what happens on the subregional level regarding the other two structural and two situational factors. Figure 9.1 points out that the existence of the European security community has an impact on the subregional level and that developments 151

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Figure 9.1: Uploading and downloading policies between the different levels of MDCs in Europe

European level (NATO/EU) Downloading

Uploading

Subregional level

on the subregional level can have an impact on the European-​level security processes. This structural factor is the most relevant precondition for creating MDCs in Europe because the members of the European security community do not intend to solve their problems militarily with each other, as they share similar identities, perceive their interests similarly and understand the concept of security in the same way. This created an environment in Europe where cooperation instead of confrontation has become the dominant trait in military affairs in the European security community. Furthermore, through institutionalized security cooperation in NATO and the EU, different DPCs create new shared meanings (for example, concepts, approaches, policies) in this community by uploading their approaches from the subregional to the European level. And DPCs also download shared meanings from the European level to the subregional level when they learn them socially through different transactions and communications. This can be seen in Figure 9.1 which shows that NATO and EU processes influence the subregional level and vice versa. This also means that only NATO and/​or EU members are part of this security community and it does not include every European country. Figure 9.2 explains the dynamics on the subregional level, which is at the bottom of Figure 9.1. Accordingly, Figure 9.2 highlights how the remaining four factors interact with each other on the subregional level regarding the DPC of one country. When we analyse the creation of a defence collaboration, we have to analyse the most relevant DPCs in the studied defence collaboration. Figure 9.2 looks like an hourglass where the ‘sand’ of the two structural factors related to previous defence collaborations and perception about the defence budgets slowly trickles down, creating ‘options’ for defence cooperation on the bottom part of the hourglass. Based on this, the studied DPC, which sits in the middle of the hourglass, has several available options (circles) for defence collaborations with other DPCs of the European 152

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security community. However, the ‘potential options’ (black circles), which are based on stronger previous partnerships and similar perceptions about their defence budgets of two or more DPCs, will be likely realized if the situational factors are in place. These situational factors work as filters that retain certain potential options from ‘falling down’ to the bottom of the hourglass and this way they can become defence collaborations. The filters created by the situational factors can stop only ‘potential options’ as they are more robust. However, when the situational factors related to ‘personal relationships’ and the ‘political milieu’ are not properly in line, they cannot work as filters and even the ‘potential options’ fall down and none of the options will become an MDC. On the top half of the hourglass, the structural factor of ‘the perception that individual European armed forces do not have appropriate funds for defence’ reflects the widely shared view among DPCs that, in general, European militaries do not have enough funds to have every military capability they need. These perceived scarce budgetary resources can be mitigated by cooperation. However, as we saw in Chapter 5, DPCs do not necessarily create new collaborations because of a budgetary famine as happened after the 2008 financial crisis. In such crisis situations, they focus on themselves instead of looking for new collaborations and do not have the resources to cooperate. Rather, the long-​term perception of the lack of resources is the key element for them in cooperation. The other Figure 9.2: Interaction of the factors in defence cooperation in Europe

Previous defence collaborations Perception about defence budget

Defence policy community

Personal relationships Political milieu

Potential options Available options

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structural factor points out that previous defence collaborations create path-​ dependencies and thus there is a bigger chance that a new MDC will be established among existing partners. The four self-​reinforcing mechanisms incentivize the already collaborating DPCs to stay or expand their defence cooperation further. First, the already invested set-​up costs in the form of collaborative frameworks, agreements and practical cooperation urge the DPCs to continue working together. Second, during the collaboration process, they also learn to cooperate with each other more effectively, which is called learning effects. When they start to benefit from coordinating their activities with other DPCs in the form of coordination effects, it also reinforces existing collaborations instead of replacing them with totally new ones. Finally, adaptive expectations come into play when DPCs believe that the cooperation that has worked in the past will work in the future too, so they are willing to invest more into them. These two structural factors related to previous defence collaborations and perceptions about the defence budget have been evolving slowly and creating options for collaborations for DPCs. These options can be seen on the bottom half of the hourglass in Figure 9.2. In principle, a DPC can establish a new MDC with any other DPC in the European security community with which it had a certain level of defence cooperation in the past and perceive the inadequacy of its defence budget similarly to the other DPC.1 These are the available options. However, some options have a better chance to be materialized because of deeper partnerships between DPCs in the past and more similar views about their defence budgets. These are the potential options. If the situational factors are in place, they work as filters and stop these potential options falling down in the ‘hourglass’ and trigger the creation of an MDC. One of these situational factors is the ‘strong leadership of a group of enthusiastic high-​level officials and good interpersonal chemistry between them’. Without actual people, structures per se will not establish new collaborations, meaning that at least two leaders have to work actively on launching the MDC. These stakeholders usually like each other and this interpersonal attraction helps them to work together more effortlessly. Scholarship in psychology highlights that propinquity and similarity are key in developing interpersonal attraction. Propinquity is crucial because it is almost impossible to develop interpersonal attraction without a chance of coming in contact with a person. If people regularly interact, in most cases, they start to like each other more. This happens thanks to the mere exposure effect which explains that, as a result of increased engagement with someone or something, they become familiar to us and become more predictable and less threatening. In the case of creating MDCs, the propinquity is often established through several official meetings in different settings. Although propinquity can help to develop a relationship to a certain extent, similarity 154

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between individuals in relevant areas also plays a crucial role. If two people are similar to each other in terms of their attitudes, experience, social class and so on, they can better understand each other, build trust faster and their communication becomes more effortless and straightforward. The other situational factor is the ‘supportive political milieu towards subregional multinational defence cooperation’. This is relevant because, although the structural factors and the situational factor of strong leadership and interpersonal chemistry between the leaders might be present, without the supportive political milieu, the leaders would work in a political vacuum and could not launch a new MDC successfully. The political milieu works on two levels: on the microenvironment and the macroenvironment. The microenvironment is where the discourse and the  policy formulation about possible military cooperation happens inside a DPC and between relevant DPCs. The macroenvironment can be understood as the events and relationship patterns that are significant to get support for creating the MDC from outside the DPCs. The relationships between the events of the microenvironment and macroenvironment are dynamic. Occasionally, the macroenvironment is supportive towards certain MDCs, but sometimes  the DPCs in the microenvironment intend to shape their macroenvironment to get support for launching a new defence collaboration. In this context, the DPCs are making sense, telling stories and naming certain issues to frame policies based on the interactions between the micro and macroenvironments of the political milieu. Based on these structural and situational factors and the model that is describing the dynamics between them in Figure 9.1 and Figure 9.2, we can analyse how and why certain MDCs are created. The next sections of this chapter will briefly explain the launch of the Lancaster House Treaties, the NORDEFCO and CEDC, applying this model and using the insights of the previous chapters.

The Lancaster House Treaties The Lancaster House Treaties between France and the UK were signed by the French President, Nicolas Sarkozy, and the British Prime Minister, David Cameron, on 2 November 2010. In the treaties, the two DPCs agreed on cooperating on several areas such as capability development and procurement, defence industry, research and development, common deployments, nuclear deterrents and so on. One of the reasons why the French and British DPCs pushed for this defence cooperation was that they were dissatisfied with the developments at the European level. They were highly influential in shaping the shared meanings of the European security community as they often uploaded their approaches, concepts and policies to the EU and NATO (Figure 9.1). For 155

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instance, together they launched the ESDP in the late 1990s and regularly pushed for new initiatives either alone with others. However, towards the end of the first decade of the 2000s, both DPCs were disillusioned with NATO and EU processes. The British DPC had been mostly dissatisfied with the contribution of European DPCs to military missions in Iraq and Afghanistan and the low level of defence budgets of European armed forces. The members of the British DPC were very vocal about these issues and concluded that practical bilateral cooperation with partners who possess similar military capabilities was a better option than large multinational solutions. France was an obvious option for this and the French reintegration to the NATO’s military wing in 2009 made the collaboration even easier. The French DPC had a similarly negative view about EU level processes, but as Paris invested more into EU-​level military cooperation than in NATO partnerships its dissatisfaction was mostly about the lack of progress in EU defence. Partially, this disillusionment about the EU was the reason why France reintegrated into NATO’s military wing in 2009 and also looked for practical cooperation with credible partners such as the UK. Thus, these European-​level processes (reluctant allies to contribute to defence efforts in NATO and EU and French reintegration to NATO) had a significant impact on the thinking of the British and French DPCs on the subregional level. In terms of the second structural factor, the British DPC had ‘the perception that it had not appropriate funds’ for achieving all of its goals and the reluctance of European allies to share the burden made Britain frustrated. At the same time, the large defence budget cuts that the British MoD suffered after the 2008 financial crisis did not incentivize the British DPC to look for alternative multinational solutions to maintain some of its capabilities. The MoD rather focused on national solutions by cutting back capabilities and commitments. The French Armed Forces did not immediately suffer from big defence budget cuts as its British counterpart did, but several military equipment programmes were slowed down and delayed significantly. However, the financial crisis did not trigger the French DPC to look for multinational solutions either. In the cases of the French and British DPCs, rather, the long-​standing trend of the eroding of the value of the defence budget contributed to the idea that strengthening the cooperation with already existing pragmatic partners was desirable. The British and French DPCs had worked together for decades on defence before the Lancaster House Treaties, highlighting the third structural factor (previous collaborations) which is often necessary for creating a new MDC. They invested the large set-​up costs by establishing cooperative frameworks and agreements already in place from the 1970s and 1980s. As they started to cooperate more, they experienced the learning and coordinating effects by learning to work together more effectively and also experienced the benefits from their cooperation. As in the 1990s, these processes led to adaptive 156

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expectations, namely the British and French DPCs holding the belief that their cooperation could work in the future too. Thanks to these developments, the French and British DPCs established plenty of defence collaborations on different levels after the end of the Cold War that created even more path-​dependencies for them. Thus, the structural factors about the perception to the lack of funds for defence and the previous defence cooperation between the French and British DPCs created a ‘potential option’ for collaboration (Figure 9.2). Although this ‘potential option’ existed previously, the presence of the two situational factors was needed for the launch of the Lancaster House Treaties. The first situational factor was that the French President, Nicolas Sarkozy, and the British Prime Minister, David Cameron, showed strong leadership and had interpersonal chemistry. This relationship was built through experiencing the mere exposure effect through repeated interactions in official and semi-​official meetings bilaterally and in multinational settings. In addition, they were similar in relevant aspects, which helped them to develop interpersonal attraction quickly. First, they belonged to the same political family, which was very unique for an incumbent British Prime Minister and French President, as it was the case for only two years in the 21st century so far. Second, Sarkozy was much more pro-​UK and pro-​US than his predecessors. Thus, he was seen as someone who was more similar to Western political leaders, which made it easier for Cameron to accept and trust Sarkozy. The second situational factor was the positive political milieu towards this MDC. In the microenvironment (the level of the DPCs), the French and British DPCs were supportive for deeper pragmatic collaborations with each other. Thanks to their aforementioned dissatisfactions in the NATO and EU-​level processes, France’s reintegration to NATO, the perception of lack of funding and decades-​long British–​French defence cooperation, they saw the potential for a new, deeper collaboration between them in a positive light. The macroenvironments of the two DPCs were their domestic political environments where leading politicians intended to use the Lancaster House Treaties for mostly domestic, political purposes and framed-​related policy decisions. The British Prime Minister intended to demonstrate to the Eurosceptic wing of the Tory party that he could cooperate with other European countries outside the EU successfully. At the same time, Sarkozy needed to show France’s domestic audience and its European partners that France was proactive and a leading nation in defence after the ESDP stalled. Although certain differences emerged in the French and British policy discourse regarding the Lancaster House Treaties, essentially, the French and British DPCs had similar approaches. They emphasized the commonalities between their countries while ignoring their differences to gain support. As shown, the dynamics concerning the five factors fostered the creation of the Lancaster House Treaties. Namely, the British and French DPCs 157

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were frustrated with the developments on the European-​level defence collaborations in the EU and NATO, perceiving that, in general, they did not receive enough resources to fund themselves properly. This led to the conclusion for both DPCs that they needed to strengthen existing pragmatic partnerships instead of focusing on large multinational solutions in the EU and NATO. As the French and British DPCs cooperated for decades before the Lancaster House Treaties, existing path-​dependencies pushed them to work even more closely together, creating a potential option for a new MDC. This potential option was materialized in the Lancaster House Treaties. The fact that Nicolas Sarkozy and David Cameron liked each other helped them to easily work together and, for different reasons, the political milieu in both countries were supportive towards this new MDC.

The Nordic Defence Cooperation The Nordic Defence Cooperation (NORDEFCO) was launched by the defence ministers of Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway and Sweden in 2009 to find synergies and foster collaborations on defence policy, multinational operations, capability development, research and development and defence industry. This cooperation started as a Swedish and Norwegian bilateral initiative and later was extended to the other Nordic countries. In terms of the structural factor of the ‘existence of the European security community’, NORDEFCO countries had different institutional memberships. For instance, Norway was a NATO member while Sweden was an EU member only, and both countries DPCs’ were frustrated because they did not have full access to and relevant influence in the organization they did not have memberships with. They tried to mitigate this issue by participating in different projects and operations. Among others, the Norwegian military contributed to the EU battlegroup developed by the Nordic countries despite the fact that Norway was not an EU member. At the same time, the Swedish DPC deployed troops to NATO operations when Sweden was not part of the Alliance and participated in other NATO projects too. Thus, the Swedish DPC downloaded most of NATO’s shared meanings in terms of concepts (Figure 9.1), doctrines and policies and found that NATO was more efficient in capability development than the EU. These processes had significant influences on the subregional level. Namely, the Norwegian DPC attempted to use NORDEFCO to gain influence in the ESDP indirectly, while, as the Swedish DPC perceived the EU unsuitable for many aspects of military cooperation and NATO was not an option, it found that collaboration in smaller groups such as NORDEFCO would be more efficient. The second structural factor is about the perception of the inadequacy of defence budgets, which had a significant impact on the creation of the 158

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NORDEFCO. Both the Swedish and Norwegian DPCs perceived that, since the end of the Cold War, their defence budget decreased significantly; they participated in more operations while the costs of modern military capabilities increased drastically. This led to the realization that the Nordic DPCs were losing the ‘critical mass’ of certain military capabilities, where critical mass was understood as the ‘smallest practical number of any given weapon system’ and the related personal, logistical support and training. The fear of the Swedish and Norwegian DPCs were that, by going below this ‘critical mass’, entire crucial military capabilities could be lost. To mitigate this problem, they found that by cooperation and sharing capacities with each other the problem of critical mass could be solved partially. The third structural factor that is related to previous defence collaborations was particularly strong in the Nordic case. Peacekeeping-​related, structured military cooperation between the Nordic countries dates back at least to the 1960s, and in the subsequent decades they have developed several frameworks for common training, exercises, logistical support and so on. Accordingly, large set-​up costs for establishing frameworks that fostered military cooperation were invested in early on by the Nordic countries and these collaborations provided a good basis for deepening military cooperation after the end of the Cold War. As a result of these wide-​ranging defence collaborations between the Nordic countries, the Swedish and Norwegian DPCs worked together regularly, creating learning and coordination effects that made cooperation between them and other Nordic DPCs easier and more efficient. Not surprisingly, these processes led to positive adaptive expectations. Thus, the Nordic countries were convinced that their cooperation could work in the future as they worked well together in the past, and this belief survived despite several unsuccessful Nordic initiatives. These processes and previous military collaborations provided a good basis for the Swedish and Nordic DPCs to start a deeper defence cooperation and involve other Nordic countries later on. As Figure 9.2 highlights, the structural factors can create options but the presence of two situational factors are necessary in establishing a new MDC. The first situational factor focuses on the relationship of key officials who are the engine of the cooperation. In the case of the NORDEFCO, the Supreme Commander of the Swedish Armed Forces, General Håkan Syrén, and the Norwegian Chief of Defence, General Sverre Diesen, were the key figures. They had an excellent relationship. They genuinely liked each other and worked closely together to establish deeper defence cooperation between the Swedish and Norwegian DPCs and, later on, among all Nordic DPCs. They had interpersonal chemistry based on propinquity and similarity. Thanks to the aforementioned dense military relationships between Nordic countries, Diesen and Syrén met regularly in official settings which provided the basis for propinquity. This helped them to experience the mere exposure effect that 159

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leads to interpersonal liking. However, their similarity regarding academic affinity could help them to establish a very close professional relationship. Both of them were academically active in their military communities and as a result their way of thinking was highly conceptual and critical. This similarity helped them to easily communicate and allowed them to establish good interpersonal chemistry. The other situational factor is the positive political milieu towards the MDC which worked out a bit differently than in the case of the Lancaster House Treaties. On the DPCs level (microenvironment), the Swedish and Norwegian DPCs were fully convinced about the benefits of a new MDC and the Finnish MDC joined to this initiative later. However, a wider Nordic macroenvironmental supportive milieu was needed to make it a Nordic-​ wide military cooperation. At the end of the 2000s, the Nordic public, politicians and the wider Nordic foreign and security policy community perceived a deep Nordic cooperation positively. As a result, the five Nordic ministers of foreign affairs asked Thorvald Stoltenberg, a former Norwegian minister of foreign affairs, to research how the Nordic states could strengthen their foreign and security policy cooperation in the coming decade. The Stoltenberg report was crucial in providing visibility of a wider supportive Nordic macroenvironmental milieu that also fostered military cooperation among the five Nordic DPCs. The three structural factors reinforced each other in the Nordic case. On the European level, the different NATO and EU institutional memberships of Sweden and Norway, and the frustration of their DPCs regarding the limited opportunities to influence the organizations they were not members of, pushed them into closer cooperation. At the same time, the two DPCs were convinced that they did not have enough financial resources to maintain the critical mass of capabilities and they saw opportunities in working together to mitigate this problem. They were also natural partners to each other as they had decades-​long military cooperation on peace support operations, thus the ‘costs’ of a new collaboration were relatively low. As the situational factors were present, the potential option of a new MDC which was created by the structural factors could be materialized. Thanks to the especially good personal relationships of the Swedish and Norwegian chiefs of defence that was based on their academic affinity and the wider supportive Nordic political milieu, the creation of a new Nordic-​wide defence collaboration was triggered.

The Central European Defence Cooperation The Central European Defence Cooperation (CEDC) was created by the defence policy directors (DPD) of six Central European states –​Austria, Croatia, Czech Republic, Hungary, Slovakia and Slovenia –​in 2011. Their main goal was to find synergies in developing and maintaining military 160

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capabilities in cooperation with each other and to explore where they could cooperate most efficiently. The first structural factor, the existence of the European security community, had a significant impact on the creation of the CEDC. As the CEDC countries were smaller European states that invested limited resources into defence, they had been criticized by other NATO countries for not fulfilling their obligations in terms of military transformation and capability development for a long period of time. Thus, Central European countries often offered policy loyalty instead of tangible results. Although they downloaded shared meanings from the European level and followed EU-​and NATO-​level policies and approaches in principle (Figure 9.1), they did not internalize them fully. Similar things happened with the creation of the CEDC. Namely, one of the main goals of the CEDC was to support EU (pooling and sharing) and NATO (smart defence) initiatives by establishing cooperation with each other. Thus, CEDC countries downloaded these policies from the European level but they were reluctant to align their means and ends to these initiatives. The second structural factor, the significance of the perception of the DPCs that the defence budgets are inadequate, played a relevant role in the establishing of the CEDC. For instance, the Hungarian DPC considered MDCs as a possible tool to share the financial burden of military capability development with other like-​minded countries. The Austrian DPC also agreed with this, but it saw the financial benefits of defence cooperation in the long term and perceived the CEDC as a political project, while other participating DPCs had other reasons to join this MDC. Thus, although Central European DPCs saw an economic opportunity behind the creation of the CEDC, it was a less critical aspect than in, for instance, in the case of NORDEFCO. In terms of the third structural factor –​previous defence collaborations between the participating states –​the CEDC DPCs had not worked together in this format before. In this sense, they just invested large set-​up costs by establishing the CEDC. However, they could do this only because a plethora of past bilateral and minilateral defence collaborations existed among them and many of them learned to work together, creating learning outcomes. This also helped creating coordination effects. These DPCs went along with other Central European DPCs to establish a new framework and believed participating in it was more beneficial than being left out. This highlights an important lesson that new frameworks can be established without previous collaboration in the proposed format, but some amount of learning and coordination effects have to be in place already among participating DPCs. This is a version of adaptive expectation. Namely, based on their experience of cooperating in smaller groups with each other, the participating DPCs can expect that collaboration in a larger framework will work too. 161

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These structural factors regarding previous defence collaborations and the perception that there is a lack of funding in defence created a ‘potential option’ for cooperation (Figure 9.2). Although this potential option has evolved slowly, it needed the presence of the two situational factors. First, the strong leadership and interpersonal chemistry existed between the Austrian and Hungarian defence policy directors Johann Pucher and József Bali. They had a high degree of similarity thanks to their almost identical military careers and they also shared the view that international collaborations are the foundation of security in Central Europe. Propinquity among them was provided by the EU, subregional and bilateral official meetings where they met regularly and could experience the mere exposure effect. Accordingly, propinquity and similarity generated interpersonal chemistry between them that helped to establish trust, which was necessary to approach each other with the idea of creating a new Central European military cooperation. The other situational factor –​ supportive political milieu towards subregional multinational defence cooperation –​has also contributed to the establishment of the CEDC. An EU-​level discourse was going on about pooling and sharing of military capabilities that influenced the microenvironment of this cooperation; the Austrian and Hungarian DPCs especially internalized this concept. Furthermore, at the beginning of the 2010s, new European-​level initiatives were started in the EU and NATO. Other projects such as NORDEFCO and SAC have generated a positive political milieu in the macroenvironment of this cooperation too. These initiatives and projects in the macroenvironment depicted by certain Central European DPCs suggested that these types of collaborations were inevitable, thus the CEDC had to be established too. In the CEDC case, we could see that the first structural factor, the existence and dynamics in the European security community, was very powerful. At the same time, the two other structural factors –​the perception of lack of appropriate funds for defence and previous defence collaborations –​were present but they were not as significant as in the cases of NORDEFCO and the Lancaster House Treaties. Accordingly, the CEDC countries downloaded policies and initiatives from the European level regularly. Although they did not cooperate in this format earlier, they all worked together previously in different constellations and the CEDC enabled them to cooperate in a new platform. The financial aspects were fundamental to the Hungarian DPC and to a certain extent to the Austrian DPC too, but it was not the most crucial element for other participating DPCs. However, these structural factors created a potential option that could be materialized thanks to the presence of situational factors. These were the interpersonal chemistry of the Austrian and Hungarian defence policy directors, which was based on their almost identical military careers and the wider processes in Europe that supported military cooperation on capability development in general. 162

10

Conclusion This book intended to understand why and how new defence collaborations in Europe are created and argued that the driving force for this is the subregional dimension. However, these subregional dynamics are less visible for the public and are studied less by scholars compared to NATO and EU-​level dynamics. Thus, the subregional level regarding military cooperation –​the processes going on below the large European organizations of EU and NATO –​is often neglected even though most of the practical work is happening there. On the subregional level, European armed forces organize multinational exercises, cooperate on weapons development and procurement, establish multinational formations, train together, pool and share their capabilities and so on. Furthermore, the negotiations about these projects also take place on the subregional level. Thus, not surprisingly, the extensive cooperation of European militaries on the subregional level provides the foundation of European-​level (NATO/​EU) defence collaborations. These subregional processes shape European-​level dynamics but European-​level processes also have an impact on subregional defence matters. To understand the complexities of this issue, the book offered three major innovations. First, the book proposed a theoretical framework of the subregional approach and applied it to three cases: the Lancaster House Treaties, the Nordic Defence Cooperation and the Central European Defence Cooperation. The theoretical framework of the subregional approach suggests that both ‘structural’ and ‘situational’ factors are needed to create a new defence cooperation, and these factors interact with each other in a particular way. Second, the book argued that, instead of focusing on states, governments or international organizations, the best way to grasp the essence of defence cooperation is using defence policy communities (DPCs) as the unit of analysis. Finally, throughout the book, it was demonstrated that a multidisciplinary approach was needed for studying defence collaborations in order to be able to analyse the different aspects of this phenomenon. The proposed theoretical framework of the subregional approach suggests that both long-​term processes and rapidly changing events play a role when 163

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a multinational defence cooperation (MDC) is established. Thus, the book distinguishes between ‘structural’ and ‘situational’ factors. The ‘structural’ factors are those elements that have been evolving for a long time and change slowly. They do not trigger a new defence cooperation, but they enable the launch of it. The ‘situational’ factors are those conditions that trigger the establishment of a new MDC and they can usually change quickly. The structural factors are 1) the existence of the European security community; 2) the perception that individual European armed forces do not have appropriate funds for defence; 3) previous defence collaborations between the participating states. The situational factors are 1) strong leadership by a group of enthusiastic high-​level officials and good interpersonal chemistry between them; 2) supportive political milieu towards subregional multinational defence cooperation. Through the case studies, the book demonstrated that the first structural factor is the most relevant one as, without the existence of the European security community, there would not be a high level of trust among European countries to start defence collaborations with ease. As they often upload preferences and policies from the subregional level to the European (EU/​NATO) level and download initiatives from the European level to the subregional level, European countries got to cooperate with each other. The book has also shown that any changes in the dynamics in the European security community can impact the subregional level. For instance, France’s reintegration into NATO created an opportunity to deepen its defence ties with the UK and changes in the relevant discourse on the EU level about pooling and sharing of capabilities strengthened the conviction of Central European militaries to cooperate with each other more. On the subregional level, the other four factors interact with each other in a particular way. The two remaining structural factors are creating potential options for defence cooperation, and if the two situational factors are present, they can trigger the launch of a new MDC. However, if the situational factors are not aligned, the potential option does not materialize into a new MDC. Through the three case studies, the book showed that the relevance of these structural and situational factors can vary but they are present in every case. One of the main lessons in this regard was that previous collaborations matter. A new defence cooperation is rarely created from scratch, usually, they build on pre-​existing collaborations. Furthermore, the perception about defence budgets is also important. If certain armed forces perceive that they do not have enough funds, they are more prone to find partners to mitigate the effects of their ‘inadequate’ defence budgets. However, if they experience a budgetary famine, they do not have the resources for creating a new cooperation. So, although a lack of resources is needed for cooperation, the budgetary pressure cannot be so immense that it does not leave capacities for collaboration. These two structural factors are usually present for a long time and a window of opportunity arises when 164

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situational factors emerge. In this regard, the lessons are that both agency and political environment matter. Typically, two influential stakeholders initiate the cooperation and they become the engine of making the project work. These two leaders can come from different levels of the government and often have interpersonal chemistry that helps them work together. Finally, a supportive political milieu is needed, otherwise the leaders cannot get wider support for their cooperative project. The book also highlighted that, when we want to understand the dynamics behind defence collaborations, the unit of analysis should be DPCs instead of states, governments or international organizations. The members of a ‘typical’ DPC of a current European country are groups and persons who have the expertize, will and opportunity to influence the defence policy of the state. A DPC is always country-​specific and usually it involves the staff of Ministries of Defence and the defence staff, certain politicians and government officials, the defence industrial complex and scholars. Without understanding the motivations and the internal dynamics of the participating DPCs, it is very difficult to analyse what has led to the creation of an MDC. Finally, one of the main lessons of this research is that a multidisciplinary approach is needed for studying defence collaborations, as the ‘structural’ and ‘situational’ factors are so different that one discipline cannot provide the appropriate insight for all of them. Thus, this book applied concepts of international security studies (security communities), defence economics (arithmetic of defence policy), economics (path-​dependence), social psychology (interpersonal liking), public policy studies (policy framing) and political science (political milieu). Accordingly, this book proposes that, although an overarching theoretical framework is needed to understand multinational defence cooperation, if we want to dig deeper into each factor, we need to be flexible in our approach. Though a bit of a generalization, we can say that scholars are usually more interested in the bigger picture and want to understand why certain outcomes happened, while defence practitioners intend to meet deadlines, finish their tasks and survive the day. Thus, more often than not, scholars focus on structures and processes while defence practitioners concentrate more on the people they work with and the situation they find themselves in. This book intended to bring these two lenses together by arguing that we need to understand both the structures that create constraints and opportunities for practitioners and the situation and people that allow the establishment of new multinational defence cooperations. However, the book does not argue that the suggested five factors and their interactions can explain every aspect of defence collaborations. For instance, this framework does not say anything about how successful an MDC will be and what kind of capability outputs they will be able to generate. It does not focus on the practical implementation of an MDC either, which can have an enormous impact on 165

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the success of a military cooperation. It only suggests that, when these factors are aligned, a new subregional defence collaboration can be established. However, when these factors come together, significant progress can be made. At the same time, as time passes, one or more factors will not be as favourable anymore. For instance, new people are arriving to the relevant jobs in the DPC and they are often not as motivated or do not have such a good interpersonal chemistry as their predecessors. For example, many observers noted that the Lancaster House Treaties could not have happened between David Cameron and François Hollande (Sarkozy’s successor as French president) as they did not like each other from the beginning. The political milieu can also change and can become adverse or less supportive to the MDC. We could see this in CENCOOP, a Central European military collaboration. In the 1990s, cooperation on PSOs had a wider supportive political milieu and Central European DPCs started to collaborate in this regard in the framework of CENCOOP. However, the political objectives of the NATO member aspirant countries changed and they started to focus on NATO goals. Thus, the political milieu around PSOs that underpinned CENCOOP became less supportive of the collaboration in the early 2000s. Also, when significant changes happen in the dynamics of the European security community, it has an impact on subregional defence collaborations. As shown, the French reintegration to the military wing of NATO opened up the opportunity for a deeper cooperation between France and the UK. However, in the same way, Britain’s exit from the EU have a negative effect on British–​French military collaborations. Similarly, if the perception of the DPCs change in regards to their defence budgets and, for instance, they experience a significant increase in their fundings, they can focus less on subregional MDCs as they might perceive that they have enough financial resources to go alone. In any of these cases, a subregional MDC might lose momentum. However, when a subregional MDC is established, it very rarely ceases to exist as the DPCs institutionalize these collaborations and keep them going until their benefits outweigh their costs, and actually might keep them alive much longer. Based on the logic of the book, significant quick progress can be made in forming an MDC next time the five factors become aligned again. If that happens, a new or ‘upgraded’ version of the existing subregional MDC will likely be established based on the ongoing collaborations. It will most likely incorporate some or all elements of the previous collaborative projects and initiatives and will build on them. However, it is also possible that the five factors of defence cooperation will not be present at the same time in order to rebuild an MDC in the future. In this case, the MDC will stagnate first and slowly die out. These observations might be relevant for scholars but policymakers still might ask, what does all of this mean in practice? My short answer for 166

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practitioners is to focus on the subregional level instead of the European level and know the defence policy community of your potential partners. Understand the dynamics of the European security community and build consciously on existing defence collaborations if you and your potential partner have enough resources for cooperation and establish cooperation on the areas where you and your partner cannot do everything alone. Finally, develop good personal relationships with potential partners while maintaining an excellent situational awareness of your political milieu and try to shape it in your favour. This is how you achieve defence cooperation in Europe.

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Notes Chapter 1 1 2

3

See a more detailed explanation about these issues in Chapter 2. The juste retour principle guarantees that every participating nation of the given armament co​operation develops and produces their share of the programme equal to their share of weapons being procured as part of the project. The list of criteria is the following: Trust, confidence and solidarity; Sovereignty and autonomy; Similarity of strategic cultures; Geography and history; Number of partners; Countries and forces of similar size and quality; Top-​down and bottom-​up; Mind-​set, defence culture and organization; Defence planning alignment; Standardization and interoperability; Realism, clarity and seriousness of intentions; Involvement of parliaments.

Chapter 2 1

2

Petersberg tasks: humanitarian and rescue tasks; peacekeeping tasks; tasks of combat forces in crisis management, including peacemaking. For example, Barents Euro-​Arctic Council, Council of Baltic States, Visegrad Group, Central European Free Trade Agreement, Central European Initiative, Black Sea Economics Cooperation, Southeast European Cooperative Initiative.

Chapter 3 1

2

Besides the Lancaster House Treaties, a very similarly named Lancaster House Agreement also exists. The latter was the end product of conferences which resulted in the recognition of the independence of Rhodesia (currently Zimbabwe) in 1979. Nordic countries intensified their co​operation on Arctic issues, but mostly in the Arctic Council and not in NORDEFCO.

Chapter 4 1

PARP was designed for NATO partners, and this process ‘serves as a planning tool to guide and measure progress in defence and military transformation and modernization efforts’. This means that the Alliance and PARP members agree on so-​called partnership goals to make sure that capability development of partners are in line with NATO’s plans. Thus, the armed forces of partners can become interoperable with the militaries of NATO to be able to participate effectively in NATO’s international operations.

Chapter 5 1

As mentioned, the definition of MDC is: ‘Any arrangement where two or more nations work together to enhance military capabilities. This can include exchanges and liaison, 168

Notes

training and exercising, common doctrine, collaborative equipment procurement, or multinational formations’ (UK Ministry of Defence, 2001: 2).

Chapter 6 1

In the region, Hungary also occupied or got territories via treaties from Romania and Yugoslavia during World War II.

Chapter 9 1

Here we have to stop for a moment –​it might seem that MDCs cannot be created without previous defence collaborations between DPCs. Of course, in principle, it is possible. For instance, we could see in the 1990s that former Warsaw Pact state DPCs started to cooperate with NATO DPCs while they did not have much experience to collaborate with each other previously. At the time, the situational factors (especially the positive political milieu) were so strong that they could trigger entirely new partnerships, but this is rather the exception than the rule. Most of the time, the chance for starting an entirely new MDC from scratch is low and already existing partnerships are usually preferred over new ones. Of course, nowadays, thanks to the EU and NATO frameworks, basically every European DPCs worked together on a certain extent earlier, but it does not mean that these previous collaborations would be equally as strong.

169

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191

Index References to figures appear in italic type. References to endnotes show both the page number and the note number (168n3). 5+​5 Defence Initiative  12 A Adler, E.  61, 62–​3 Afghanistan  111, 112, 139, 156 NATO and  64, 70, 84 Agnew, J.  26–​7 Ainsworth, B.  83 Alexander, M.  6, 80–​1, 82, 94 Arctic Council  168n2 Arctic region  51, 52, 143, 168n2 arithmetic of defence policy  80–​2, 94, 165 armed forces  Austria  77, 90 budget cuts and reduction of  80–​1, 85, 90–​1, 106 Croatia  90 Czech Republic  90 defence cooperation in Europe  3 European army  1 expeditionary operations  29, 31, 71, 72, 101, 142 France  85 Hungary  90–​1 internationalization of armed forces in Europe  4–​5, 9 interoperability of  5, 30–​1, 39, 168n1 MDC and  24 Nordic countries  106 Slovakia  91–​2 Slovenia  92 training  28, 31, 58, 81, 105, 111, 112, 142, 159 transition from conscripts to professional  17, 29, 80 UK  81, 82, 84 see also defence budget and MDCs creation; military exercises; multinational forces ASEAN (Association of Southeast Asian Nations)  3

Austria  47 AAF  77, 90 CENCOOP  110 defence budget  89–​90 ESDP  77, 93 NATO  77, 110 neutrality  77–​8, 109, 111, 128 World War II  109 see also CEDC Austro-​Hungarian Empire  108–​9 B Bailes, A.J.K.  33 Bali, J.  129 Pucher/​Bali/​Siklósi relationship  59, 119, 127–​31, 132, 162 the Balkans  30, 77, 101, 110, 128 Baltic Defence Cooperation  13, 27, 33 Barnett, M.  61, 62–​3 BENELUX (Belgium, Netherlands, Luxembourg)  27, 33 bilateral cooperation/​MDCs  26, 27 Austrian/​Croatian cooperation  113 CEDC  112 Czech/​Croatian cooperation  58, 112–​13 Czech/​Slovak cooperation  112 definition  13 Hungarian/​Austrian cooperation  128 Hungarian/​Slovenian cooperation  112, 113 Lancaster House Treaties  36, 68, 79, 147, 151, 156, 156 Norwegian/​Swedish cooperation  57, 142, 158 subregional MDCs  1, 2, 3, 11, 13 UK  13, 65, 67 see also British–​French defence cooperation Biscop, S.  68 Blair, Tony  20–​1, 64, 66, 121, 123 Bosnia and Herzegovina  41, 101, 128 British–​Dutch Amphibious Force  28, 33

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British–​French defence cooperation  8, 13, 20–​1, 28, 33, 36, 38, 84, 98–​103 1990s–​2000s  101 annual summits  100, 101, 102, 103, 120 bilateral projects  103 Brexit  166 Cold War  98, 99–​100, 103, 114, 115 cooperation with other countries  102 nuclear cooperation  28, 100, 101, 115 see also Lancaster House Treaties Brown, B. 133  Brown, G.  122 Browne, D.  64 Brune, S.-​C.  26 Buckley, E.  38 Burg, C.  85 C Cameron, D.  121, 157 Cameron/​Sarkozy relationship  53, 59, 118, 119–​24, 131, 157, 158 Lancaster House Treaties  36, 60, 120, 137, 139, 140, 155 Campbell, M.  86 capabilities (military capability development)  30 CEDC  40, 41, 91–​3, 160–​1 DCI  30, 31 decline of  80 defence budget cuts and  80–​1, 83–​4, 85, 90–​1, 95 EU  30, 31–​2 European Capability Action Plan  30, 32 Lancaster House Treaties  38 multinational capability development  5, 6–​7, 10 NATO  30–​1, 32–​3 NORDEFCO, critical mass capabilities problem  57, 59, 86–​9, 95, 124–​5, 126, 141–​2, 145, 159, 160 PCC  30, 31 UK  83–​4 see also CBRN capabilities; P&S; SAC case studies  23, 32, 35, 36–​41, 163 case study research method  36, 42–​4, 46 reasons for the selection of  36 see also CEDC; Lancaster House Treaties; NORDEFCO CBRN capabilities (chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear)  40, 102, 112, 113 CEDC (Central European Defence Cooperation)  4, 23, 27–​8, 35, 40–​1 bilateral cooperation  112 capability development  40, 41, 91–​3, 160–​1 CEDC presidency  40, 59, 127 cooperation areas  40–​1 establishment of  40, 160

flexibility  40 migration  41, 128 military exercises  41 as minilateral MDC  36, 112–​13 MoDs  40 organizational structure  40–​1 projects  58 shared threats of participating nations  51, 52 CEDC creation  2008 financial crisis  89–​94 defence budget  56–​7, 89–​94, 95, 161, 162 DPCs  74–​8, 79, 91–​4, 95, 112, 113, 114, 145–​6, 147–​8, 149, 151, 161, 162 DPDs  40, 41, 128, 129, 130, 160–​1 empirically based pattern  52, 52 ESDP and  77 EU, P&S  52, 56, 60, 76, 77, 78, 79, 145–​6, 147–​8, 149, 161, 162 European security community  56, 63, 74–​8, 79, 161, 162 interaction among situational and structural factors  160–​2 macro/​microenvironments  145–​8, 149, 162 NATO  74–​7, 78, 79, 94 NATO, Smart Defence  52, 56, 60, 76, 78, 79, 161 NORDEFCO and  146–​8, 149, 162 policy loyalty  76, 79, 161 previous defence collaborations  58, 108–​13, 114, 161, 162 Pucher, J.  147 Pucher/​Bali/​Siklósi relationship  59, 119, 127–​31, 132, 162 reasons for the creation  52–​3, 56, 78, 93, 161 Rival Explanation 1: lack of progress on European/​transatlantic cooperation  47, 47 Rival Explanation 2: effects of 2008 financial crisis  49, 49 Rival Explanation 3: convergent threat perceptions  50–​1, 51, 52 SAC and  146, 147–​8, 162 social learning by superficial downloading  74–​8 strong leadership and chemistry  59, 119, 127–​31, 132, 162 supportive political milieu  52, 60, 136, 145–​8, 149, 162 CENCOOP (Central European Nations’ Cooperation in Peace Support)  58, 110–​11, 166 Central African Republic  37–​8 Chabaud, J.  98 Chassaigne, P.  98 China/​Russia military cooperation  3 Chirac, Jacques  20–​1, 122–​3 CJTF (Combined Joint Task Force)  5, 29–​30 COG (Cooperation Groups)  106

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Cold War  2, 61 British–​French defence cooperation  98, 99–​100, 103, 114, 115 CEDC countries  109–​10 collaborative equipment procurement  7 defence cooperation in Europe  28, 33 European security community  62 multinational forces  9 NATO  3, 5, 9 neutral European countries  71, 109 NORDEFCO: cooperation on peacekeeping  103–​8, 114, 115, 125, 159 subregional collaboration  7 collaborative equipment procurement  5, 7–​8, 10, 12 juste retour and free-​market principles  7, 168n2 subregional collaboration  7 see also weapons/​weapon systems Cornish, P.  83 Cottey, A.  17, 27, 62 CPG (Comprehensive Political Guidance)  31 Croatia  110 defence budget  90 NATO  75, 93, 94, 110 see also CEDC CSDP (Common Security and Defence Policy)  9 1998 St Malo Agreement  21, 64, 68, 72, 101, 102 Denmark  69, 70, 71, 107 reasons for the establishment of  10 see also ESDP CSTO (Collective Security Treaty Organization)  3 Czech Republic  111, 112 defence budget  75, 90, 93 NATO  74–​5, 93, 110 see also CEDC Czechoslovakia  109–​10, 111, 112 D Davies, Q.  65 DCI (Defence Capabilities Initiative)  30, 31 De Gaulle, C.  99 De Waal, J.  86 defence budget  arithmetic of defence policy  80–​2, 94 Austria  89–​90 budget cuts after Cold War  5, 8, 17, 29, 75–​6, 80, 87, 101, 106, 141, 158–​9 capabilities and budget cuts  80–​1, 83–​4, 85, 90–​1, 95 CEDC NATO members  74, 75–​6 Croatia  90 Czech Republic  75, 90, 93 defence inflation  6, 80–​2, 88 Denmark  86–​7 financial pressure on  5, 80

Finland  87, 141 France  82, 84–​5, 138, 156 Hungary  74, 75, 90–​1, 93, 94 NATO  17, 74, 75–​6 Norway  87, 124, 141, 158–​9 reduction of armed forces and budget cuts  80–​1, 85, 90–​1, 106 Slovakia  75, 91–​2 Slovenia  89, 92 Sweden  87, 124, 158–​9 UK  82–​4, 138, 156 defence budget and MDCs creation  2008 financial crisis  48–​50, 50, 82–​7, 89–​95, 153, 156 CEDC  56–​7, 89–​94, 95, 161, 162 DPCs  22, 56–​7, 95, 166 lack of budget as structural factor in MDCs creation  4, 11, 16, 17–​18, 21, 21, 22, 56–​7, 153, 153, 154, 164 Lancaster House Treaties  56, 82–​6, 95, 156 NORDEFCO  56–​7, 86–​9, 94, 95, 141–​2, 158–​9, 160 defence cooperation in Europe  1, 3, 11 1990–​2010 evolution  28–​34 achieving defence cooperation  166–​7 armed forces  3 Cold War  28, 33 density and interconnectedness of  2, 3, 9, 18 European security community and  19, 21 forms of  3, 12, 24–​5 key concepts  12–​16 military alliances  2, 3 post-​Cold War  9 as regional, multinational cooperative framework  vii scholarship on  4–​11 subregional collaboration and  vii, 1, 3 weapons  3, 163 see also MDC; subregional collaboration; subregional MDCs creation: theoretical framework defence industry (Europe)  7, 8 Denmark  CSDP  69, 70, 71, 107 defence budget  86–​7 NATO  70–​1, 104 see also NORDEFCO Deutsch, K.  61 DeVore, M.R.  96–​7 Diesen, S.  126, 127 Diesen/​Syrén relationship  59, 88, 119, 124–​7, 131–​2, 159, 160 NORDEFCO  88, 159 Dockrill, M.  98 doctrines and standards  3, 12, 31, 72, 73, 101, 109–​10, 125 France  99 shared concept of security  17, 55 US military doctrines  99

194

Index

Dorman, A.  83 DPC (Defence Policy Community)  13–​16 decision-​making  15 definition  12, 15, 150, 165 EU DPCs  16, 25–​6 members of  15–​16, 150, 165 MoDs and  viii, 15, 150, 165 NATO DPCs  16, 25–​6, 169n1 DPCs and MDCs creation  CEDC  74–​8, 79, 91–​4, 95, 112, 113, 114, 145–​6, 147–​8, 149, 151, 161, 162 defence budget and MDCs creation  22, 56–​7, 95, 166 DPC as unit of analysis  vii–​viii, 12, 13, 25–​6, 150, 163, 165 DPCs, influence on the creation of MDCs  13–​14, 17–​18, 21–​2, 21, 63, 150, 152–​3, 154 Lancaster House Treaties  63–​8, 79, 86, 136–​9, 140, 149, 150–​1, 155–​8 NORDEFCO  69–​73, 79, 88–​9, 95, 141–​2, 144–​5, 151, 158–​60 previous defence collaborations  96, 98, 113–​15 strong leadership and chemistry  116 supportive political milieu  134, 136, 148–​9, 155 Drent, M.  10 E EDA (European Defence Agency)  31–​2, 101 EI2 (European Intervention Initiative)  1 ESDP (European Security and Defence Policy)  5, 9 Austria  77, 93 CEDC creation and  77 establishment of  9, 10, 21, 30, 156 Finland  71–​2 France  65–​6, 137, 138, 140 Helsinki Headline Goal  30, 31, 72 Lancaster House Treaties creation and 63–​7, 78, 137, 138, 140 NORDEFCO creation and  69–​73, 79 Norway  69 ‘Solana milieu’  134–​5 Sweden  71–​2 UK  64, 67 see also CSDP EU (European Union)  capabilities  30, 31–​2 CEDC countries  110 DPCs  16, 25–​6 enlargement  17, 33, 62, 111 European security community and  17, 19, 61, 62–​3, 78, 152, 169n1 Lisbon Treaty  32 subregional collaboration and EU-​level processes  vii, 2, 4, 6, 152

subregional MDCs creation and EU-​level processes  17, 55–​6, 63, 134, 164 see also defence cooperation in Europe EU Battlegroup  20, 28, 31, 111–​12 see also NBG Euro crisis  120 Europe: definition as key term  12 European Air Transport Command  82 European Defence Fund  82 European Parliament  8, 146, 147 European security community  Cold War  62 defence cooperation and  19, 21 DPCs, uploading and downloading policies  63, 152 emergence of  17, 62 EU/​NATO and  17, 19, 61, 62–​3, 78, 152, 169n1 war and  17, 29, 55, 61–​2, 78 European security community and MDCs creation  CEDC  56, 63, 74–​8, 79, 161, 162 cross-​loading  20 European security community as structural factor in MDCs creation  4, 11, 16, 17, 32–​3, 55–​6, 61, 78–​9, 63, 151–​2, 164 European security community and subregional dynamics  19, 164 Lancaster House Treaties  55–​6, 63–​8, 78–​9, 155–​6, 157–​8, 166 as most relevant structural factor  164 NORDEFCO  54, 56, 63, 68–​73, 158, 160 Rival Explanation 1: lack of progress on European/​transatlantic cooperation  35, 44–​5, 46–​8, 46, 47 uploading and downloading policies between different levels of MDCs  19–​20, 20, 63, 136, 151–​2, 152, 164, 166 Europeanization  9, 19–​21 F financial crisis (2008)  10, 32, 36 CEDC creation and  49, 49, 89–​94 defence budget and MDCs creation  48–​50, 50, 82–​7, 89–​95, 153, 156 France  82, 85, 156 Lancaster House Treaties creation and  49, 49, 82–​6 NORDEFCO creation and  49, 50 P&S  145 Rival Explanation 2: effects of 2008 financial crisis  35, 45, 48–​50, 49, 56 UK  82, 156 Finland  Cold War  71 defence budget  87, 141 ESDP  71–​2 NATO  72, 73 see also NORDEFCO

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HOW TO ACHIEVE DEFENCE COOPERATION IN EUROPE?

Fiott, D.  8 Forsberg, T.  87 Fox, L.  64, 75, 120, 121, 137 France  2008 financial crisis  82, 85, 156 2008 White Paper  85, 103 2013 White Paper  85 armed forces  85 Atlanticism  122–​3, 124, 138 defence budget  82, 84–​5, 138, 156 ESDP  65–​6, 137, 138, 140 MoD  15 NATO  65, 66–​7, 68, 78–​9, 98, 99, 122–​3, 137, 138, 156, 164, 166 PESCO  66 see also British–​French defence cooperation; Lancaster House Treaties G Gaddafi, M.  21 Garden, T.  6, 80–​1, 82, 94 Germany  P&S  32 as regional hegemon  9 Giegerich, B.  7–​8 Gindarsah, I.  14–​15 Gulf War  30, 101 H Hammond, P.  45, 65 Hendriks, R.J.  10 Hollande, F.  119, 122, 166 Hulst, M.V.  135, 136, 139 Hungary  2011 EU Presidency  94, 147, 148 2012 National Military Strategy  91 Cold War  109, 128 defence budget  74, 75, 90–​1, 93, 94 MLF  112 NATO  74–​5, 91, 110, 129 V4  111 World War II  109, 169n1 see also CEDC Hutton, J.  64 I Iceland  see NORDEFCO Indo-​Asia-​Pacific region  3 Indonesia  14–​15 infrastructure  3, 81, 88 interaction among situational and structural factors  19–​22, 21, 35, 41, 150, 151–​5, 153, 163, 164–​5 CEDC  160–​2 Lancaster House Treaties  155–​8 NORDEFCO  158–​60 see also subregional MDCs creation: theoretical framework Iraq  111, 112, 123, 156 Irondelle, B.  65

ISAF (International Security Assistance Force, NATO)  40, 70, 75, 112 Italy  112 J Jacoby, W.  76 Jakobsen, P.V.  105, 107 JEF (Joint Expeditionary Force)  1, 13 Jenkins, B.  138–​9 Jones, S. G.  9 Jordan, A.G.  14 Juhász, F.  74 K KFOR (Kosovo Force, NATO)  90 King, A.  5 Kosovo  29, 77, 90, 101, 112, 128 MLF  112 Kurowska, X.  134–​5, 136 L Lancaster House Agreement (1979)  168n1 Lancaster House Treaties (2010)  4, 21, 23, 35, 36–​8 Anglo-​French defence cooperation  36, 53 bilateral cooperation  36, 68, 79, 147, 151, 156, 156 Brexit  38 capability development  38 Central African Republic  37–​8 cooperation areas  36–​7, 57, 155 exchanging information  36, 37 impact of  37–​8 Libya  37 LoI  37, 57 Mali  37–​8 military exercises  38, 57 MoU  57 nuclear cooperation  36, 37, 38, 57, 103 P&S  37 shared threats of participating nations  51, 52 Lancaster House Treaties creation  2008 financial crisis  82–​6 Cameron, D.  36, 60, 120, 137, 139, 140, 155 Cameron/​Sarkozy relationship  53, 59, 118, 119–​24, 131, 157, 158 defence budget and  56, 82–​6, 95, 156 DPCs  63–​8, 79, 86, 136–​9, 140, 149, 150–​1, 155–​8 dissatisfaction with shared meanings created and uploaded  63–​8, 78–​9, 155–​6, 157–​8 domestic politics  136–​40, 149, 157 empirically based pattern  53, 53 ESDP/​CSDP and  63–​7, 78, 137, 138, 140 European security community  55–​6, 63–​8, 78–​9, 155–​6, 157–​8, 166 interaction among situational and structural factors  155–​8

196

Index

macro/​microenvironments  137–​8, 140, 149, 157 NATO  63–​8, 78, 164 previous defence collaborations  53, 57, 98–​103, 114, 115, 156–​7, 158 reasons for the creation  53, 55–​6, 63, 68, 155 Rival Explanation 1: lack of progress on European/​transatlantic cooperation  47, 47, 53, 55–​6, 63–​8, 78–​9 Rival Explanation 2: effects of 2008 financial crisis  49, 49 Rival Explanation 3: convergent threat perceptions  50–​1, 51, 52 Sarkozy, N.  36, 60, 120, 137, 139–​40, 155 strong leadership and chemistry  53, 59, 118, 119–​24, 131, 157, 158 supportive political milieu  60, 136–​40, 149, 157, 158 see also British–​French defence cooperation; France; UK leadership  see strong leadership and chemistry left-​wing politics  122 Levy, J.  76 Liberti, F.  146, 147 Libya  21, 37 Little Entente (coalition)  109 M MacKuen, M.  133 Macron, E.  1, 122 Mali  37–​8 Maulny, J.-​P.  146, 147 MDC (Multinational Defence Cooperation)  12–​13 armed forces and  24 core function of  25 creation and evolution of  4, 5, 8–​10, 24, 32–​3 definition  2, 12, 24–​6, 34, 168–​9n1 European-​level MDC  2, 12–​13, 34 NATO level MDC  2, 5 overlapping  11 proliferation of  2–​3, 4–​5, 17 regional MDCs  2, 34 relevance of  24 scholarship on  4–​11 see also defence cooperation in Europe; subregional MDCs; subregional MDCs creation: theoretical framework media  1, 75 Meijer, H.  9, 11 Menon, A.  15 Mérand, F.  5, 9, 65 methodology  aim and research questions  42, 44, 163 case study research method  36, 42–​4, 46 multidisciplinary approach  12, 163, 165 pattern-​matching  35, 45–​6

subregional approach  11, 35, 41, 60 variables  46–​54 see also case studies; subregional MDCs creation: theoretical framework migration  62 2015 European migration crisis  41 CEDC and  41, 128 military alliances  2, 3 military exercises  1–​2, 12, 24 CEDC  41 Lancaster House Treaties, military exercises  38, 57 multinational military exercises  3, 163 minilateral cooperation/​MDCs  1, 2, 3, 11, 13, 27 CEDC  36, 112–​13 definition  13 NORDEFCO  36, 59, 108, 144 MLF (Multinational Land Forces)  112 MoD (Ministry of Defence)  CEDC  40 DPCs and  viii, 15, 150, 165 UK  2, 12, 24 Mölling, C.  26 Moravcsik, A.  7 Moskos, C.  4–​5 Multinational Engineer BattalionTisa  112 multinational forces  9, 10, 29, 163 NATO  5–​6, 29 see also EU Battlegroup; JEF; MLF; NRF N nationalism  85 NATO (North Atlantic Treaty Organization)  1 1991 Strategic Concept  29 capabilities  30–​1, 32–​3 CEDC countries  110 CJTF  5, 29 crisis management  29, 30, 31 defence budget  17, 74, 75–​6 DPCs  16, 25–​6, 169n1 Enhanced Forward Presence Initiative  2 enlargement  17, 33, 62, 74, 110, 111 European security community and  17, 19, 61, 62–​3, 78, 152, 169n1 interoperability of armed forces  5, 30–​1, 168n1 lack of effective response to European security interests  45 multinational forces  5–​6, 29 Nordic NATO members  48 post-​Cold War era  29 as regional, European-​level multinational cooperative framework  vii Smart Defence  32, 34, 52, 56, 60, 76, 78, 79, 161 subregional collaboration and  vii, 2, 4, 6, 152

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NATO, specific conflicts  Afghanistan  64, 70, 84 Cold War  3, 5, 9 Kosovo  29, 77, 90, 101, 112, 128 Libya  21 NATO, specific countries  Austria  77, 110 Croatia  75, 93, 94, 110 Czech Republic  74–​5, 93, 110 Denmark  70–​1, 104 Finland  72, 73 France  65, 66–​7, 68, 78–​9, 98, 99, 122–​3, 137, 138, 156, 164, 166 Hungary  74–​5, 91, 110, 129 Iceland  104 Norway  69–​70, 71, 104, 125, 158 Slovakia  92, 93, 110 Slovenia  110 Sweden  72, 73, 104, 125, 158 UK  64, 98, 99 NATO and MDCs creation  8, 17, 55–​6, 63, 134, 164 CEDC  74–​7, 78, 79, 94 CEDC and Smart Defence  52, 56, 60, 76, 78, 79, 161 Lancaster House Treaties  63–​8, 78, 164 NORDEFCO  68–​73, 79 NBG (Nordic Battlegroup)  69, 107, 108, 125, 158 see also EU Battlegroup Nicoll, A.  7–​8 NORDAC (Nordic Armaments Cooperation)  58, 89, 106–​8 NORDCAPS (Nordic Coordinated Arrangement for Military Peace Support)  58, 89, 107–​8 NORDEFCO (Nordic Defence Cooperation)  4, 23, 28, 33, 35, 38–​40 bilateral cooperation  57, 142, 158 CEDC creation and  146–​8, 149, 162 committees, projects, working groups  39–​40 cooperation areas  39 establishment of  38–​9, 108, 143, 158 minilateral cooperation  36, 59, 108, 144 MoU  38, 39 Russia as military challenge  40 shared threats of participating nations  51, 52 NORDEFCO creation  Cold War collaboration  103–​8, 114, 115, 125, 159 critical mass capabilities problem  57, 59, 86–​9, 95, 124–​5, 126, 141–​2, 145, 159, 160 defence budget  56–​7, 86–​9, 94, 95, 141–​2, 158–​9, 160 Diesen, S.  88, 159 Diesen/​Syrén relationship  59, 88, 119, 124–​7, 131–​2, 159, 160

different institutional memberships  68–​73, 79, 158 DPCs  69–​73, 79, 88–​9, 95, 141–​2, 144–​5, 151, 158–​60 empirically based pattern  53–​4, 54 ESDP/​CSDP  69–​73, 79 European security community  54, 56, 63, 68–​73, 158, 160 interaction among situational and structural factors  158–​60 macro/​microenvironments  141, 142–​5, 149, 160 NATO  68–​73, 79 previous defence collaborations  57–​8, 103–​8, 114, 115, 159, 160 reasons for the creation  53–​4, 73, 126 Rival Explanation 1: lack of progress on European/​transatlantic cooperation  47–​8, 47 Rival Explanation 2: effects of 2008 financial crisis  49, 50 Rival Explanation 3: convergent threat perceptions  50–​1, 51, 52 Stoltenberg Report  39, 143–​4, 160 strong leadership and chemistry  53–​4, 59, 118–​19, 124–​7, 131–​2, 159–​60 supportive political milieu  54, 59–​60, 136, 140–​5, 149, 160 Syrén, H.  88, 141, 159 Nordic Defence Union  104 NORDSAMFN (Nordic Cooperation Group for Military UN Matters)  58, 104–​5, 107 NORDSUP (Nordic Supportive Defence Structures)  39, 58, 60, 89, 108 Norway  68–​9 defence budget  87, 124, 141, 158–​9 NATO  69–​70, 71, 104, 125, 158 see also NORDEFCO NRF (NATO Response Force)  5, 12–​13, 30–​1 nuclear-​related issues  British–​French defence cooperation  28, 100, 101, 115 Lancaster House Treaties  36, 37, 38, 57, 103 see also CBRN capabilities O OSCE (Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe)  27, 33 P P&S (pooling and sharing)  3, 6–​7, 32, 34, 82, 93 2003 European Security Strategy  145 2008 financial crisis  145 CEDC creation  52, 56, 60, 76, 77, 78, 79, 145–​6, 147–​8, 149, 161, 162 Central European P&S  130, 147–​8

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EU  32, 52, 146, 163 Ghent process  32, 77, 145 Lancaster House Treaties  37 see also pooling Pannier, A.  119 Papic, M.  45 PARP (Planning and Review Process)  72, 168n1 Parrein, J.-​P.  26, 44–​5 path-​dependence  18, 96–​8, 103, 105, 108–​9, 113–​15, 154, 157, 158, 165 adaptive expectations  100, 101, 103, 106, 108, 113–​15, 154, 156–​7, 159, 161 large set-​up or fixed costs  97, 100, 101, 103, 105, 108, 113–​15, 154, 156, 159, 161 learning and coordination effects  97–​8, 100, 101, 102, 103, 105, 108, 113–​15, 154, 156, 159, 161 see also previous defence collaborations PCC (Prague Capabilities Commitment)  30, 31 peacekeeping  72, 101 Austria  110 CENCOOP  110 NORDEFCO  103–​8, 114, 115, 125, 159 Nordic model for peacekeeping  105, 107 NORDSAMFN  58, 104–​5 post-​Cold War  107 PESCO (Permanent Structured Cooperation)  2, 13, 32, 66 Petersburg tasks  30, 168n1 PfP (Partnership for Peace)  30 Pierson, P.  97 Poland  111 policy community  14 pooling  air/​land/​sea domain  81 arithmetic of defence policy and  81–​2 subregional MDCs  10 see also P&S previous defence collaborations  96–​8 CEDC  58, 108–​13, 114, 161, 162 DPCs  96, 98, 113–​15 importance of  113–​14, 164 Lancaster House Treaties  53, 57, 98–​103, 114, 115, 156–​7, 158 NORDEFCO  57–​8, 103–​8, 114, 115, 159, 160 as structural factor in MDCs creation  4, 11, 16, 18, 21, 21, 57–​8, 113–​15, 153, 154, 169n1 see also path-​dependence PSO (Peace Support Operations)  110, 166 Pucher, J.  93, 129 CEDC  147 Pucher/​Bali/​Siklósi relationship  59, 119, 127–​31, 132, 162

R Ralston, J.  74 Rasmussen, A.F.  32, 75 Rayroux, A.  66 Rein, M.  135 Rhodes, R.A.W.  14 Richardson, J.J.  14 Rieker, P.  108 right-​wing politics  122 Russia  China/​Russia military cooperation  3 Crimea, occupation of  2 military challenge posed by  40 Ukraine, war in  2 S SAC (Strategic Airlift Capability)  72, 146, 147–​8, 162 Sarkozy, Nicholas  66, 67, 121 Atlanticism, pro-​US/​-​UK attitude  122–​3, 124, 131, 157 Cameron/​Sarkozy relationship  53, 59, 118, 119–​24, 131, 157, 158 Lancaster House Treaties  36, 60, 120, 137, 139–​40, 155 Sebastian, L.C.  14–​15 Schön, D.  135 security community  17, 61, 165 loosely/​tightly coupled pluralistic security communities  61 peaceful change in: Tier One–​Three 62–​3 see also European security community Segal, D.  4–​5 Sewell, W.  96 Shanghai Cooperation Organization  3 SHIRBRIG (Multinational Stand-​by High Readiness Brigade for UN Operations)  107–​8 Siklósi, P.  119, 127–​8, 130, 147 situational factors  4, 11–​12, 16, 18–​19, 22, 23, 35, 41, 42, 55, 58–​60, 151, 152–​5, 163, 164, 165 see also interaction among situational and structural factors; strong leadership and chemistry; subregional MDCs creation: theoretical framework; supportive political milieu Slovak, P.  93 Slovakia  109, 111 2011 White Paper  92 defence budget  75, 91–​2 NATO  75, 92, 93, 110 SAF  91–​2 see also CEDC Slovenia  110, 112 defence budget  89, 92 see also CEDC Smith, M.A.  6

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SNHP (Standard Nordic Helicopter Programme)  106 social psychology  12, 116, 117, 165 SOF (Special Operations Forces)  40, 58, 113 Solana, J.  135 South Eastern Europe Brigade  13, 28 South-​Eastern Europe Defence Cooperation  28, 33 Soviet Union  collapse of  2, 9, 28, 62, 106, 110 Soviet DPC  14 see also Cold War; Warsaw Pact St Malo Agreement (1998)  21, 64, 68, 72, 101, 102, 122 St Malo II  66 Stoltenberg, J.  69 Stoltenberg, T.  39, 143, 144, 160 Stoltenberg Report  39, 143–​4, 160 strong leadership and chemistry  116, 131–​2 CEDC  59, 119, 127–​31, 132, 162 DPCs  116 interpersonal attraction  116–​17, 119, 131, 154 Lancaster House Treaties  53, 59, 118, 119–​24, 131, 157, 158 mere exposure effect  117, 118, 119–​21, 123–​4, 125, 128, 130, 131, 154, 157, 159–​60 NORDEFCO  53–​4, 59, 118–​19, 124–​7, 131–​2, 159–​60 propinquity  117, 118, 119–​21, 123, 125–​6, 127–​8, 130–​1, 154, 159, 162 similarity  117–​18, 119, 121–​2, 123, 125, 127, 129–​32, 154–​5, 159–​60, 162 as situational factor in MDCs creation  4, 11–​12, 16, 18, 21, 22, 59, 116, 153, 153, 154–​5, 165, 166 structural factors  4, 11, 16–​18, 21, 23, 35, 41–​2, 55–​8, 151–​4, 163, 164 see also defence budget and MDCs creation; European security community and MDCs creation; interaction among situational and structural factors; previous defence collaborations; subregional MDCs creation: theoretical framework subregional collaboration  vii Cold War  7 collaborative equipment procurement  7 defence cooperation in Europe  vii, 1, 3 definition  12 EU-​level processes and  vii, 2, 4, 6, 152 NATO and  vii, 2, 4, 6, 152 relevance of  1–​2, 3, 4–​5, 6, 11 scholarship on  4, 10 see also MDC; subregional MDCs subregional MDCs  2, 3, 26–​8 bilateral cooperation  1, 2, 3, 11, 13 definition  13, 34 limitations  33 minilateral cooperation  1, 2, 3, 11, 13

non-​/​soft-​security issues  33 relevance of  33 scholarship on  8, 10, 11, 33, 163 see also subregional collaboration subregional MDCs creation  4 EU-​level processes and  17, 55–​6, 63, 134, 164 lack of scholarship on  4, 5 NATO and  8, 17, 55–​6, 63, 134, 164 reasons for  5, 8–​10 successful MDCs  4, 10, 16–​17, 168n3 US and  8, 12 subregional MDCs creation: theoretical framework  11–​12, 16–​22, 35, 60, 163–​7 achieving defence cooperation in Europe  166–​7 case studies  23, 32, 35, 36–​41, 163 developing the theoretical framework 41–​54, 60 DPC as unit of analysis  vii–​viii, 12, 13, 25–​6, 150, 163, 165 DPCs, influence on the creation of MDCs  13–​14, 17–​18, 21–​2, 21, 63, 150, 152–​3, 154 empirically based patterns  35, 51–​4, 52, 53, 54, 60 generic framework  54–​60, 151–​5 interaction among factors  19–​22, 21, 35, 41, 151–​62, 163, 164–​5 limitations  165–​6 multidisciplinary approach  12, 163, 165 Rival Explanation 1: lack of progress on European/​transatlantic cooperation  35, 44–​5, 46–​8, 46, 47 Rival Explanation 2: effects of 2008 financial crisis  35, 45, 48–​50, 49, 56 Rival Explanation 3: convergent threat perceptions  35, 45, 50–​1, 50, 51 Rival Explanations patterns  46–​7, 46, 47, 48–​9, 49, 50, 51, 60 situational factors  4, 11–​12, 16, 18–​19, 22, 23, 35, 41, 42, 55, 58–​60, 151, 152–​5, 163, 164, 165 structural factors  4, 11, 16–​18, 21, 23, 35, 41–​2, 55–​8, 151–​4, 163, 164 subregional approach  11, 35, 41, 60 see also CEDC creation; DPCs and MDCs creation; Lancaster House Treaties creation; methodology; NORDEFCO creation Suez Crisis (1956)  98, 99, 115 supportive political milieu  133, 148–​9 CEDC  52, 60, 136, 145–​8, 149, 162 DPCs  134, 136, 148–​9, 155 framing  135–​6, 137–​8, 141–​2, 149 Lancaster House Treaties  60, 136–​40, 149, 157, 158 macroenvironment  133–​4, 148–​9, 155 macro/​microenvironment distinction  136

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making sense  135, 136, 141, 148, 155 microenvironment  133–​4, 136, 148, 155 naming  135, 136, 138–​9, 140, 141–​2, 147, 155 NORDEFCO  54, 59–​60, 136, 140–​5, 149, 160 as situational factor in MDCs creation  4, 12, 16, 19, 21, 22, 59–​60, 133, 148–​9, 153, 153, 155, 165, 166 storytelling  135–​6, 137, 139–​40, 147–​8, 155 Sweden  Cold War  71 defence budget  87, 124, 158–​9 ESDP  71–​2 NATO  72, 73, 104, 125, 158 P&S  32 see also NORDEFCO Switzerland  110, 111 Syrén, H.  73, 126–​7 Diesen/​Syrén relationship  59, 88, 119, 124–​7, 131–​2, 159, 160 NORDEFCO  88, 141, 159 T Terlikowski, M.  108 terrorism/​counter-​terrorism  37, 52, 102, 144 2001 September 11 terrorist attacks  110 war against terrorism  111 Thomassier, V.  67–​8 U UK (United Kingdom)  2008 financial crisis  82, 156 2010 SDSR  65, 67, 83–​5, 103 armed forces  81, 82, 84 Atlanticism  122–​3 bilateral collaboration/​MDCs  13, 65, 67 Brexit  38, 166 British–​American defence cooperation  84, 99 capabilities  83–​4 Carrier Strike Group 2021  1 defence budget  82–​4, 138, 156 ESDP  64, 67 Euroscepticism  137, 140, 157 important defence partners  84 MoD  2, 12, 24 NATO  64, 98, 99 see also British–​French defence cooperation; Lancaster House Treaties

US (United States)  15 British–​American defence cooperation  84, 99 subregional MDCs and  8, 12 V V4 (Visegrad Four/​Visegrad Group)  28, 58, 91, 92, 111–​12 Valasek, T.  10, 26 W war  European security community and  17, 29, 55, 61–​2, 78 Gulf War  30, 101 Kosovo  29, 77, 90, 101, 112, 128 Yugoslav Wars  110 see also Cold War; World War I; World War II Warsaw Pact  109–​10, 128, 169n1 weapons/​weapon systems  3, 24, 88, 109–​10, 141 defence cooperation in Europe and  3, 163 free-​market principle  7 internationalization of European defence industry  7 juste retour principle  7, 168n2 see also collaborative equipment procurement Wendt, A.  63 WEU (Western European Union)  30, 98 Williams, J.  4–​5 WMD (weapons of mass destruction)  52 World War I  2, 8, 61 CEDC countries  109 World War II  2, 61 CEDC countries  109 Franco-​British defence relations  98–​9 Hungary  109, 169n1 internationalization of armed forces in Europe  9 Nordic countries  104 Wyss, M.  9, 11 Y Yanow, D.  135, 136, 139 Yin, R.K.  42–​4, 45–​6 Young, T.-​D.  78 Yugoslav Wars  110 Yugoslavia  109, 110, 169n1 Z Zandee, D.  10 Zisk, K.M.  14, 15

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Xymena Kurowska, Central European University

Bence Nemeth is Lecturer at the Defence Studies Department, King’s College London, where he primarily teaches military officers at the UK Defence Academy.

This timely analysis of security in Europe identifies the factors that enable and hinder the creation of networks of defence cooperation across the continent.

BENCE NEMETH

Going beyond regional arrangements established by NATO and the European Union, this book considers the subregional level by focusing on bilateral and minilateral defence collaborations. It provides a new conceptual framework to assess the rationales, leadership and the complex dynamics within these alliances, and highlights how they shape and interact with NATO and EU initiatives.

HOW TO ACHIEVE DEFENCE COOPERATION IN EUROPE?

“A historically relevant monograph that reappraises subregional defence cooperation in Europe with contextual nuance and theoretical sophistication. In helping to make sense of new defence realities, it will be invaluable for both scholars and practitioners.”

HOW TO AC HI E V E D E FE N C E CO O P E RAT I O N I N E URO P E ? T HE S U B REG I ON AL AP P ROAC H B E N C E N E M E TH

ISBN 978-1-5292-0943-3

9 781529 209433

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