How Realist Is India’s National Security Policy? 9780367503673, 9780367554026, 9781003093343

Table of contents :
Cover
Half Title
Title Page
Copyright Page
Dedication
Table of Contents
List of tables
List of contributors
Preface
Introduction: Is India a Realist Power?
Is India Realist
1. Deconstructing Indian Realism
2. Is India Realist?
3. Indian Realisms and Grand Strategic Choices
4. A Journey Without a Destination: The Cultural-Economy of a Great Power
Military Realism
5. India’s Realist Nuclear Posture for the 21st Century
6. Tactical Realism of India’s Conventional Military
7. The Real Tension Between Industrialisation and Indigenisation: How Realistic Is India’s Approach to Self-Reliance in Armaments?
Realism in Diplomacy
8. Indian Foreign Policy Realism and India’s West Asia Policy
9. Look East, Act East: How Realist are Indian Policies Towards the ASEAN States?
10. India’s Moderated Realism vs. China’s Hard Realism
Beyond Realism
11. India and the United States: Clashing Interests and Geopolitics
12. Costs to India, Pakistan of Confrontational Policies: Regional Challenges and Opportunities

Citation preview

HOW REALIST IS INDIA’S NATIONAL SECURITY POLICY?

In managing national security, how realist is India in terms of cultivating and using power and especially military power? A conventional view of India is that it has been uncomfortable with realism or ‘power politics’ as a guide to policy. This volume shows that it has been more realist than is generally recognized and that it has increasingly become comfortable with power in the service of its interests. The essays in this volume




Examine the different aspects and types of realism in India’s national security policy Include a range of perspectives from academics as well as former military officers and diplomats Focus on India’s military and foreign policy in dealing with China, Pakistan, the United States, Southeast Asia, and West Asia.

This key volume will be indispensable to scholars and researchers of politics and international relations, defence and strategic studies, and South Asian studies and to government officials, journalists and general readers interested in the external dimensions of India’s national security. Kanti Bajpai is Wilmar Professor of Asian Studies, Lee Kuan Yew School of Public Policy, National University of Singapore. His research interests are strategic culture studies, India’s foreign policy and national security, and South Asia. His most recent books are India Versus China: Why They Are Not Friends (2021) and the co-edited volume Routledge Handbook of China-India Relations (2020).

HOW REALIST IS INDIA’S NATIONAL SECURITY POLICY?

Edited by Kanti Bajpai

Cover image: Getty Images First published 2023 by Routledge 4 Park Square, Milton Park, Abingdon, Oxon OX14 4RN and by Routledge 605 Third Avenue, New York, NY 10158 Routledge is an imprint of the Taylor & Francis Group, an informa business © 2023 Center for Policy Research The right of Kanti Bajpai to be identified as the author of the editorial material, and of the authors for their individual chapters, has been asserted in accordance with sections 77 and 78 of the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988. All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reprinted or reproduced or utilised in any form or by any electronic, mechanical, or other means, now known or hereafter invented, including photocopying and recording, or in any information storage or retrieval system, without permission in writing from the publishers. Trademark notice: Product or corporate names may be trademarks or registered trademarks, and are used only for identification and explanation without intent to infringe. British Library Cataloguing-in-Publication Data A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data A catalog record has been requested for this book ISBN: 978-0-367-50367-3 (hbk) ISBN: 978-0-367-55402-6 (pbk) ISBN: 978-1-003-09334-3 (ebk) DOI: 10.4324/9781003093343 Typeset in Bembo by Taylor & Francis Books

Essays in Honour of Bharat Karnad

CONTENTS

List of tables List of contributors Preface Introduction: Is India a Realist Power? Kanti Bajpai

Is India Realist

ix x xiii xv

1

1 Deconstructing Indian Realism Pratap Bhanu Mehta

3

2 Is India Realist? Shivshankar Menon

8

3 Indian Realisms and Grand Strategic Choices Kanti Bajpai 4 A Journey Without a Destination: The Cultural-Economy of a Great Power D. Shyam Babu Military Realism 5 India’s Realist Nuclear Posture for the 21st Century Balraj Singh Nagal

21

37

51 53

viii Contents

6 Tactical Realism of India’s Conventional Military Harish Masand 7 The Real Tension Between Industrialisation and Indigenisation: How Realistic Is India’s Approach to Self-Reliance in Armaments? Ajai Shukla Realism in Diplomacy 8 Indian Foreign Policy Realism and India’s West Asia Policy Rajendra M. Abhyankar 9 Look East, Act East: How Realist are Indian Policies Towards the ASEAN States? Gurjit Singh

68

83

103 105

125

10 India’s Moderated Realism vs. China’s Hard Realism Srikanth Kondapalli

143

Beyond Realism

159

11 India and the United States: Clashing Interests and Geopolitics Jon Dorschner

161

12 Costs to India, Pakistan of Confrontational Policies: Regional Challenges and Opportunities Shuja Nawaz

178

TABLES

4.1 Caste-Society vs. Nation-State 12.1 The Size of the Shadow Economy in South Asian Countries (as percentage of official GDP)

42 182

CONTRIBUTORS

Ajai Shukla, a former Indian Army colonel, writes on Asian security and India’s defence economy for Business Standard newspaper and for a range of international publications. He has been a war reporter, covering the post-2001 conflicts in Afghanistan, Iraq, Lebanon, and Syria for New Delhi TV (NDTV). He is an alumnus of the Department of War Studies, King’s College, London. Lt. Gen. Balraj Singh Nagal, PVSM, AVSM, SM (retd.), was Commanderin-Chief of the tri-services Strategic Forces Command. He also served as Chief of the Strategic Programme Staff under the National Security Advisor in the Prime Minister’s Office and is a former Director, Centre for Land Warfare Studies, New Delhi. General Nagal fought in the Indo-Pakistani war of 1971 on the West Pakistan front, was wounded in action during the war, and took part in Operation Vijay (1999) and Operation Parakram (2001–2002). He also commanded the 4th Battalion of the Jat Regiment in Manipur-Nagaland in a counter-insurgency environment. General Nagal writes and lectures on nuclear issues. Gurjit Singh has been the Ambassador of India to Germany, Indonesia, ASEAN, Ethiopia, and the African Union and also served in Japan, Sri Lanka, Kenya, and Italy. He has authored five books. His book on Indonesia, Masala Bumbu: Enhancing the India-Indonesia Partnership was well received as was his comic book Travels Through Time: The Story of India and Indonesia. He focuses on Japan, ASEAN and the Indo-Pacific, and on Africa and Europe, and is an Honorary Professor of Humanities at the Indian Institute of Technology (IIT), Indore. Air Marshal Harish Masand was commissioned as a fighter pilot in December 1967. He saw action in the liberation of Bangladesh in 1971 and won a Vir Chakra for gallantry. He inducted the MiG-29 as a Squadron Commander in 1987 and the

List of contributors xi

Su-30 as the Base Commander in 1997. He is well known for his displays on the MiG-29 and accident-free flying. He is a Flying Instructor, Fighter Combat Leader, a graduate of the Staff College, Wellington, and an alumnus of the Air War College, USA. He has also served as an instructor in many training institutes. Jon P. Dorschner was a career Foreign Service Office from 1982 until 2011. He served in Germany, India, Pakistan, Bangladesh, Nigeria, and the United States Military Academy, and in Washington, D.C. He earned a PhD in South Asian studies from the University of Arizona, teaches South Asian studies at the University level and publishes on South Asian subjects. Kanti Bajpai is Wilmar Professor of Asian Studies, Lee Kuan Yew School of Public Policy, National University of Singapore. His research interests are strategic culture studies, India’s foreign policy and national security, and South Asia. His most recent books are India Versus China: Why They Are Not Friends (2021) and the co-edited volume Routledge Handbook of China-India Relations (2020). Pratap Bhanu Mehta is Laurence S. Rockefeller Professor for Distinguished Teaching at Princeton University. He was previously Vice-Chancellor of Ashoka University and President, Centre for Policy Research, Delhi. He is the author of The Burden of Democracy (Penguin 2003) and has produced several edited volumes. He is most recently co-editor, with Madhav Khosla and Sujit Choudhary, of The Oxford Handbook to the Indian Constitution. He is also a Fellow of the British Academy and SSRC Fellow for 2020. His policy experience includes being Convenor of the Prime Minister of India's Knowledge Commission (2005–2007) and member of India’s National Security Advisory Board. Rajendra Abhyankar teaches at Purdue University, after eight years at the O’Neill School at Indiana University, Bloomington. From 1968–2005, he had an illustrious career in the Indian Foreign Service. He has been India’s Ambassador to the European Union, Belgium, Luxembourg, and major countries in the Eastern Mediterranean. Abhyankar has written several books on international affairs, the latest being Syria: The Tragedy of a Pivotal State (2020). Shivshankar Menon is currently visiting professor at Ashoka University, India, and Chair of the Ashoka Centre for China Studies. He was previously National Security Advisor 2010–2014; Foreign Secretary of India, 2006–2009; and Indian Ambassador or High Commissioner to China, Pakistan, Sri Lanka, and Israel. He has published Choices; Inside the Making of Indian Foreign Policy in 2016 and India and Asian Geopolitics; The Past, Present in April 2021. Shuja Nawaz is a Distinguished Fellow at the South Asia Center of the Atlantic Council, Washington, D.C. He was the Center’s founding director in 2009–14. His previous books include Crossed Swords: Pakistan, its Army, and the Wars Within

xii List of contributors

(OUP 2008 and 2017), and The Battle for Pakistan: The Bitter US Friendship and a Tough Neighbourhood (Penguin Random House, India, Liberty Books, Pakistan, 2019, and Rowman and Littlefield, USA 2020). D. Shyam Babu is Senior Fellow, Centre for Policy Research, New Delhi. A former journalist, Babu obtained an MPhil for his dissertation on the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). He subsequently branched out to focus on India’s domestic politics and policies including how economic change shapes social change. He co-authored (with Devesh Kapur and Chandra Bhan Prasad), Defying the Odds: The Rise of Dalit Entrepreneurs (2014), on the phenomenon of Dalit businesspersons. Srikanth Kondapalli is Dean and Professor in Chinese Studies at the School of International Studies, Jawaharlal Nehru University. He has a PhD in Chinese Studies. He has held visiting positions at Renmin University, Beijing, National Chengchi University, Taipei, and the China Institutes of Contemporary International Relations. He has also been an Honorary Professor at Shandong University, Jinan, Jilin University, Changchun, and at Yunnan University of Finance and Economics, Kunming, and is a Non-Resident Senior Fellow at Renmin University. He has written two books, two monographs and co-edited six volumes, all on China’s security and foreign policies.

PREFACE

Realism and India’s National Security Policy Bharat Karnad is quintessentially CPR. Argumentative, passionate, candid (sometimes too candid!), and always proactive. You don’t have to agree with Bharat, but a debate with him will always provoke you, with an appropriate dose of ‘realism’, to carefully assess the evidence before you, in the process leaving you more enriched. Bharat is as passionately committed to his own intellectual position, as he is to academic freedom and intellectual pluralism. He never shies away from a good argument and is always open to and respectful of differing points of view. During heated debates at our faculty meetings, Bharat would often remind us of our core purpose. We are not a university engaging with ideas in an ivory tower. Our core purpose is to bring the rigour and objectivity of academic research to everyday concerns of policy making. Good ideas must shape policy. Policy research is about assessing and evaluating policy and, through careful, evidence-based critique, contributing to shape its broad direction. It is only fitting, therefore, that a volume of essays celebrating his long and impactful career as one of India’s leading strategic analysts is argumentative, provocative and rich in the diversity of voices it brings to assess the realist foundations of India’s national security policy – realism being the approach that Bharat passionately believes is the right one for India’s security. The range of voices in this volume is also a tribute to the purpose of policy research to which Bharat dedicated his long career. Rarely does a volume bring together voices from academia and the policy community (including practitioners from the military and diplomatic services as well as journalists) to take a hard look at the normative and empirical in India’s national security. The volume asks: is India’s national security policy realist, should it be more realist, and if so, how best to define Indian realism? Beyond the normative concerns, several authors take a hard, pragmatic look at India’s social and cultural relations, institutions (civil and military), and state capacity to assess degrees of realism as these articulate themselves in the real

xiv Preface

world of diplomacy and military action. More proactively, the essays ask whether a realist national security policy is indeed viable given India’s social fissures such as caste and what alternative approaches may serve India better. In true tribute to Bharat and his scholarship, each paper in this volume presents a unique perspective. Even though there is broad agreement that India is moving in the direction of greater realism, each paper questions and critiques this direction while analytically unpacking the characteristics of India’s realism in ways that will enrich the reader. Through much of his career, Bharat has tried to inject a dose of realism into Indian security policy, its practice and its analysis. And yet, by his standards, Indian policy remains mired in ideology and confusion, preventing India from becoming a great power. This volume of essays is an important contribution to understanding the dynamics of Indian national security policy even as the authors grapple with the degrees of realism infused in it. The diversity of perspectives presented here makes this an essential read for students, scholars and practitioners. Bharat is an institution at CPR, both for the rigour of his scholarship and policy engagement and for his steadfast commitment, in an increasingly polarized world, to the importance of vigorous debate. Along with this book, we at CPR hope to keep the legacy of Bharat alive by remaining fiercely and passionately argumentative and provocative. Thank you, Bharat, and we count on you to continue provoking us and holding us to your standards of what it means to be a policy researcher with real public purpose! Yamini Aiyar President and Chief Executive Center for Policy Research (CPR), New Delhi

INTRODUCTION: IS INDIA A REALIST POWER? Kanti Bajpai

This is a book about India’s national security, with essays by former Indian practitioners, both civilian and military, by Indian academics, and by two non-Indians, both with policy backgrounds. If national security policy refers broadly to both the diplomatic and military arts, the volume seeks to answer the question: how realist is India’s diplomatic and military practice? The twelve essays in the volume were written in honour of Bharat Karnad, a former journalist, who has long served the Centre for Policy Research, New Delhi, and has been a leading Indian strategic analyst since the 1980s. Karnad has stood robustly for the view that India has at best been an intermittently realist power whereas realism should have been and, looking forward, should be the cornerstone of its national security policy. Perhaps this view is most clearly signalled in his massive volume on India’s nuclear strategy, Nuclear Weapons & Indian Security, the subtitle of which is ‘The Realist Foundations of Strategy’.1 Realism here refers to the academic theory that in ordinary parlance goes by the name ‘power politics’. Taken together, the essays suggest that India has become more realist and that there are various kinds of realism in Indian thinking and practice. India has apparently moved from something called ‘idealism’ to realism, and most of the essays endorse this change. One essay takes no view on whether realism is good for India’s grand strategy (Bajpai), one essay focuses on whether American policy towards India has been of a realist nature (Dorschner), and one essay steps outside realism to argue that ‘rationalism’ better serves India and other South Asian states in the face of multiple challenges to their well-being (Nawaz). The rest of the essays in varying degrees regard the realist turn as a positive development for India.

Is India Realist? If So, What Kind of Realist? The writings on India’s national security are voluminous. It is not the purpose here to review those writings. However, it is worth pointing out that much of the

xvi Introduction: Is India a Realist Power?

interpretation of India’s national security relies implicitly and sometimes explicitly on realist lines of thinking. A great deal can be said about realism, but at the very least it is typified by (i) the assumption that a state has a national interest and that its interest is fundamentally in conflict with the national interest of (some) other states, (ii) the conviction that the national interest is ultimately about the pursuit of power or is advanced by the use of power, and (iii) the insistence that power is a material resource. Clearly, overall, the dominant view in these essays is that India has not been particularly realist in the past but seems to be moving towards a greater sense of realism. In this view, first, India is becoming more focused on defining its national interest vis-a-vis rivals and less occupied with cosmopolitan goals that serve the larger international interest. Secondly, the national interest is increasingly defined in terms of power – the accretion of power is seen as vital to India’s security. And, third, as these essays mostly demonstrate, power is construed in terms of material capabilities and particularly military capabilities. Having said that India is more realist than before, what kinds of realisms do the essays reveal? Pratap Bhanu Mehta starts the volume off with a cogent unpacking of realism. For Mehta, realism can be distinguished from other international thought by thirteen tenets. From the perspective of policy, the tenets that are vital are: (i) realism’s pragmatism and anti-utopianism, (ii) its insistence on hard power (especially military power) and on a willingness to use any and all means in the service of security, (iii) the view that international institutions are ‘endogenous’ to power (i.e., the functioning of institutions is determined by the preferences of the most powerful members rather than being determinative of those preferences); and (iv) the willingness to tolerate collateral damage in the case of military conflict (collateral damage to the enemy but perhaps also at home). While the essays that follow Mehta’s intervention do not explicitly aver such a clear-headed view of realism and judge India’s policies by such a standard, few of the authors would likely quarrel with his view. Mehta notes that going by his thirteen-stroke depiction of realism, Karnad is probably the only Indian strategic analyst who is truly realist – including in his insistence on a full-fledged maximalist view of India’s nuclear weapons programme. Former Foreign Secretary and National Security Advisor in the Manmohan Singh government Shivshankar Menon provocatively asks whether India is indeed realist. His answer is that if realism in 1947 meant that India would attempt to be a regional hegemon in South Asia and the Indian Ocean area, then this was only viable had India chosen to ally with a great power. Instead, it chose non-alignment because India’s leaders were more interested in ‘making India a prosperous, secure and modern country for all its citizens’ than in cultivating power and seeking great power status. Yet in practice there were realist elements to Indian policy, from the beginning. Non-alignment, for Menon, was a ‘realistic appreciation’ of the strategic space that a middle power could occupy in the balance of terror after 1949 – this was realism as the ‘realistic’. In addition, as Karnad too has argued, Nehruvian policy certainly had a realist component of ‘internal balancing’ – building India’s military and

Introduction: Is India a Realist Power? xvii

economic power, at least up to the point that this did not compromise economic development plans. After Nehru, India resorted to various ‘balancing and hedging steps’ and developed a droit de regard over the Himalayan states through treaties. India’s nuclear weapons programme, however protracted it may have been, Menon suggests, is further evidence of Indian realism. All in all, India was ‘at best…partly realist’ because it did not make a ‘a determined effort to build a strong military and economic basis’. It was not until the Cold War ended that India ‘introduced more realism’ into its policies. If it did become more realist after 1989, Menon suggests that the growth of Indian power on the back of its economic progress made this possible. Why was India not more realist? Menon argues that for the most part it was because it did not have ‘the means’ to be more realist. Also, the realistic trumped the realist in Indian policy: the pragmatic and practical led to ‘hesitations…tactical caution…fear of commitment…and failure to set ambitious [power] targets’. India adapted rather than shaped. Plus, India was preoccupied by the need to provide ‘basic human survival and welfare’. Finally, Indian public discourse does not seem to be comfortable with the kind of selfish pursuit of power that realism entails. Should India, then, be more realist? Menon concludes yes, if that means ‘realism in the conventional, day-to-day sense of understanding the situation around us correctly and responding to it i.e., being realistic’. Kanti Bajpai enters the discussion at this point with his suggestion that three types of realist thought are discernible in Indian thinking: hard realism; liberal realism; and prudential realism. In his view, Menon, along with another former Foreign Secretary, Shyam Saran, is a prudential realist. Prudential realists are averse to the use of force except in extremis and are preoccupied with the question of how to ensure internal political, social and economic resilience. For prudential realists, it makes little sense to talk about the exertion of power when India is so obviously weak and vulnerable at home. Domestic infirmities can be exploited by outsiders and will limit India’s ability to project power. Prudential realists, Bajpai suggests, in their strategic philosophy are close to the view championed by Deng Xiaoping for China – to ‘hide and bide’ in dealing with the US and other rivals. Like China in the Deng years, India should focus on economic development, a non-provocative stance abroad and build cooperative links with a coalition of friendly states including above all the US. In Bajpai’s typology of Indian realists, hard realists reject this view. While Menon and Saran think that the primary strategic responsibility of the Indian government is to give the vast mass of Indians a better life, Bharat Karnad and Pravin Sawhney (and his co-author, Ghazala Wahab), and particularly Karnad, are insistent that external security and not just social security is vital. India confronts primarily China but also Pakistan militarily, and these challenges cannot be ignored in favour of a ‘domestic-first’ strategy. Hard realists want India to build an indigenous defence production capability, import and co-produce arms where necessary and build a diplomatic-military coalition of states against China in particular. Interestingly, though Karnad and Sawhney/Wahab are hard realists, they both urge reconciliation with Pakistan so that India can avert a two-front conflict – perhaps

xviii Introduction: Is India a Realist Power?

the only Indian strategic analysts of any stripe to take such a radical position. Despite these convergences, they also differ. Karnad would use China’s troubles in Tibet against it; Sawhney/Wahab argue that India could eventually be an honest broker between Lhasa and Beijing. Karnad sees China as an implacable foe; Sawhney/Wahab think that once India has settled with Pakistan, built up its defence industry and pacified internal separatist discontent, it could come to terms with China. Between these two realisms, Bajpai suggests, is a third variant: liberal realism. Liberal realism describes a posture that combines realism’s preoccupation with power and interests and liberalism’s concern with norms and institutions. Liberal realists are realist enough to know that norms and institutions in the end are shaped, sustained and deployed by the more powerful for their own ends – against each other and against weaker states. Norms and institutions cannot in themselves check the actions of states; they must be backed by power, even the use of force if necessary. They can, though, be used to shame, slow down and constrain others. According to Bajpai, Subrahmanyam Jaishankar, also a former Foreign Secretary and India’s External Affairs Minister since 2019, judged by his recent writings, is a liberal realist. C. Raja Mohan, the well-known Indian security analyst is also a liberal realist. For liberal realists, India, as a ‘leading power’, must build comprehensive national power, help shape norms and institutions against its rivals, opportunistically partner with those states, especially the US, that can offer diplomatic and military reassurance against China, and be prepared to engage in coercive diplomacy short of outright war against regional threats. If Menon remains somewhat sceptical about India as a realist power and if Bajpai sees at least three streams of realism amongst leading Indian thinkers, D. Shyam Babu, a scholar of Indian domestic politics, asks ‘why is it such a slog for realist policies to find traction in Indian society?’ His question hearkens back to a point made by Menon about a seeming lack of public support for realist lines of policy. Realists there may be in the Indian security community, and moments of realism clearly have marked Indian policy, but Babu raises the question of why India is not more convincingly up to the realism game. The answer may be that ‘the country is a) too idealistic to pursue its national interests or b) too incompetent in that pursuit’. More profoundly, the problem in his view is that ‘India suffers from structural incompetence imposed by caste and culture, rather than its leaders’ infirmities’. Babu points to a seeming paradox. India certainly seems to play the power game. For instance, India’s neighbours feel that they are at the receiving end of New Delhi’s ‘hard-nosed approach…even at the cost of inflicting suffering on its smaller neighbours’. The country has also come to be ‘counted as a major voice in global affairs’, built up its military technological base, become self-sufficient in food production and developed world class IITs and IIMs. On the other hand, it remains a poor country with a ‘dilapidated’ education system, has not projected power outside of its immediate neighbourhood and seems to lack global ambition. Babu attributes this to the lack of a ‘coherent view of its place in its neighbourhood and in the world’.

Introduction: Is India a Realist Power? xix

Why does India lack a coherent view? A popular answer is that India has had ineffectual leaders, especially Jawaharlal Nehru. Babu emphatically argues instead that while India may have invested in the hardware of realism (and even here there are deficiencies), the ‘operating system’ of the software are inadequate. Drawing on G. W. F. Hegel and B. R. Ambedkar, he suggests that India’s attachment to the caste system and related cultural characteristics have stopped the emergence of a true bourgeoisie and democracy, and without social emancipation and egalitarianism on a large scale, India lacks the internal cohesiveness and mobilizational capacity to build and use power externally. States, he notes, go ‘through a journey – from a society to nationhood to state-formation’. If so, India is scarcely a nation in the true sense – it is still in a ‘pre-nationalism phase’ in which society is stronger than the state and caste stunts true nationalism. Caste also stigmatizes businessmen, the wealth creators, and it affects the various organs of state including the military, thus weakening the state: businessmen create the capacity on which national power is based, and a cohesive military is vital for security. Caste, Babu argues, goes so deep that even those measures that seek to overcome it depend on caste-related affirmative action. Caste prevents social mobility which creates economic stagnation, which in turn deepens social immobility. Together these ‘retard’ urbanization – whereas urban life loosens the grip of casteism. The result is that Indians exist in three social phases: some are in the ‘society phase’ in which identity organizes their existence; some are in the ‘nation phase’ where they experience a ‘modicum’ of one-ness with fellow Indians; and some are in the ‘nation-state’ phase where the government provides and enforces constitutional rules over and above societal rules (including caste rules). Without a clear sense of being a nation-state, Babu seems to suggest, it is hard to define a global role: if you cannot quite define and regulate yourself, how do you define and regulate your role in a world made up of competing societies? Babu concludes that IR scholars in India, with their insistence on ‘methodological individualism’ see international affairs as the interplay of unitary states and therefore ignore the internal bases of state power and behaviour. He suggests, in effect, that even those who study and analyze Indian external policy have failed to grapple with the domestic determinants of India’s inability to project power and safeguard its security. Put differently, India’s pretensions to a realist posture in international affairs are just that, given that it has not carried out the thoroughgoing emancipation of its people from caste and understood the importance of the domestic determinants of external policy. Menon, Bajpai and Babu all agree that there is realist thought and practice in India. Menon and Babu also agree that India’s realism is only partial. Both make the strong point that Indian realism in practice is constrained by domestic political and economic limitations. For Babu, the limitations are so fundamental that they go to the very soul of Indian society. Bajpai’s analysis of the various schools of realist thought also suggests that Indian realists are aware of the domestic determinants of realist practice. In short, domestic weaknesses (and strengths) bear on how realist India can be and what kind of realist it can be.

xx Introduction: Is India a Realist Power?

Military Realism: All the Way Down? Balraj Singh Nagal, as a former general in the Indian Army, sees India’s national security strategy as having been based on pretensions as well – realist pretensions. India’s posture has never quite been realist enough. Not surprisingly, it has ‘lurched from one crisis to another’. Nagal argues that it is vital for Indian leaders to go beyond the ethical-normative in international relations and to responsibly focus on the country’s military needs and postures. While China and Pakistan have consistently focused on the military requirements of security, India has just as consistently failed to do so. Having built a nuclear programme and having tested a nuclear device in 1974, it waited another twenty-four years before going overtly nuclear. Even then, it opted for a confused nuclear doctrine built around No First Use (NFU), which Nagal believes reflects once again an inclination towards the moral-normative rather than the realist. A full assessment of the threats to Indian security suggests that India needs to revisit its NFU commitment, its nuclear doctrine more broadly and the nature of its arsenal. These threats include: the possibility of a two-front war; terrorist attacks at the hands of organizations backed by Pakistan; China’s growing influence in South Asia; Chinese advances in military technology including space, cyber and information and drone capabilities; and a nuclear North Korea and possibly a nuclear Iran as well. In addition to the threats arrayed against India, the economics of conventional defence suggest that it must revise its nuclear weapons policies: the cost of conventional weapons and the salary and pension bill of large militaries far exceed the outlays for a robust, usable nuclear force. Finally, according to Nagal, India cannot afford to stick to a second-strike posture; rather, it must be prepared to go to a first use posture if deterrence threatens to fail. India must prepare for escalation dominance – that is upping the level of violence against the opponent at every level, from the conventional to the nuclear, and be prepared to target not just the nuclear and conventional forces of the adversary but also other ‘important industrial and strategic targets’ including the other side’s political leadership. The aim is to threaten to hurt, and to be prepared to actually hurt, the other side. Nagal insists that this posture will be cost effective and militarily effective. At base, it will require investing in a whole range of new military technologies – missiles, space-based assets and energy weapons, among others, At the same time, once these are developed, India must be prepared to withdraw all ‘one-sided concessions’ – on Tibet, in the case of China; and on river waters, in the case of Pakistan. It goes without saying that India will need a clear security strategy and economic capacities to make the ambitious new posture possible. From Nagal’s preoccupations with India’s overall posture and military disposition at the strategic level, Air Marshal Harish Masand gears down to the tactical and operational level. His broad view, consistent with Nagal’s, is that since independence, India has not been realist enough. This is partly the fault of the armed services themselves, but it is also much more the fault of the political and bureaucratic leadership. Having said that, Masand takes realism down to the tactical level above all – a useful reminder to theorists and proponents of realism that if one really

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wants to ‘talk realism’ then you have to talk realism ‘all the way down’: there is little point in posturing as a realist at the strategic level and then failing to be realist at the operational and tactical levels. In fact, as Masand shows, the Indian military displayed tactical realism in the period from 1948 to 1999. It has, he argues, ‘performed reasonably well in almost all situations that confronted the country and managed to defend it against external aggression, albeit sometimes at an unnecessary high cost’. Whatever the political, bureaucratic and upper echelons of the military may have done or not done, [s]ome military leaders have used the vacuum in strategy to perform brilliantly on their own initiative at the tactical and operational levels, at times with strategic effect, while others have dithered without higher direction and orders, an affliction not unknown even in the best militaries around the world. Nagal provides several illustrations of both successful military realism and failures of nerve and imagination in and outside the battlefield. The successes, in Masand’s reckoning, include: the Kashmir airlift of 1947–48; the ‘tactically sound battles’ at Assal Uttar, Haji Pir Pass and Phillora in 1965; Sagat Singh’s ‘operational and tactical brilliance’ at Nathu La and Cho La in 1967; the Indian Air Force’s air dominance in the eastern sector, its ‘pinpoint’ attack on the governor’s house in Dacca, and Sagat Singh on the ground in 1971 in East Pakistan; the 1971 air power battle at Longewala; the navy’s attack at Karachi, also in 1971; the occupation of Saltoro Ridge and Siachen in 1984; the role of the air force and army in Kargil in 1999 (after some initial lapses); and the will displayed by India in the surgical strikes in September 2016 and February 2019 (notwithstanding mistakes and deficiencies in these actions). Masand’s analysis is an important contribution to assessing Indian realism. It is quite true of course that the military is bound to be realist in the sense that its raison d’etre is the deployment of power, and particularly military power, in the service of national interests and security. However, if realism is a spectrum, from more realist to less realist, one way of making a judgment on where India can be placed in that spectrum is the efficiency and efficacy with which it uses military power. Given the various limitations that constrain India, how well do its political and bureaucratic leaders but also its military leaders apply their limited military resources to good effect? Masand’s analysis suggests that India’s military has a mixed record: it has had failures, but it can also notch up heartening successes in the face of political, bureaucratic and even military decision-making that was not-quite-realist. Ajai Shukla, formerly of the Indian Army but also a prominent media commentator on strategic affairs, takes the issue of realism even further by focusing on India’s ability to produce its own arms and, relatedly, its defence effort in terms of its defence budget and spending – without sufficient allocations and the proper distribution of monies, the Indian armed forces cannot be technologically-advanced and self-reliant enough for ‘deterrence and coercion’. Here is where political, economic and organizational vectors combine to give effect to diplomacy and military strategy: Shukla does not quite say it, but if you want to assess the extent to which India is realist, his view is

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‘Look to the money’. The broad conclusion he reaches is that judging by India’s financial commitments to defence, it is not a terribly realist power. Shukla makes the point that India is in a dilemma: it must import key weapon systems because it lacks indigenous systems; and the more it imports these systems, the less likely it will have the finances and the technological confidence to indigenize. What are the prospects of overcoming this dilemma? With respect to indigenization, the first problem is that the Indian private sector does not have the ability to design and develop advanced weaponry. A related problem is the ‘adversarial relationship’ and absence of synergy between the private and public sector who compete rather than cooperate to get defence contracts. Most of the technological expertise is in the public sector. In addition, the private sector does not want to invest in R&D. Compounding the difficulty is the lack of understanding of the difference between ‘Make in India’ and ‘Made in India’. The former describes foreign suppliers manufacturing their systems in India under license without sharing intellectual property; the latter refers to developing the intellectual property within India from the ‘ground up’ and producing native Indian systems. India is still stuck largely in ‘Make in India’. Despite India being one of the largest importers of arms, it has been unable to leverage its buying power to access foreign knowhow. It has become dependent on foreign – largely Russian systems – when it should have emulated the ‘hard-nosed’ Israeli way of becoming a weapons power. The second major problem, in Shukla’s view, is defence spending. Over about the past decade, Indian defence spending has been inadequate and has ‘marginally’ declined when it should have been rising, while defence capital expenditures have been ‘insufficient’ to foster technological development: R&D expenditure has hovered around 0.81 percent of GDP and since 2014–15 has only averaged 0.71 percent of GDP. Whichever way you analyse Indian defence spending, it comes up short. These trends are particularly worrying given the increasing collusion between China and Pakistan. Shukla notes that sloganeering about indigenization to cater to nationalist feeling is one thing; doing the hard work of putting money properly to work in a complex field of public policy is quite another. The third problem in India being realist in terms of defence acquisitions and development of indigenous weapon systems is administrative lack of coordination and accountability. Goals are set that are unrealizable, but more importantly procurement and weapons development is marked by a number of weaknesses: ‘managerial incompetence’; lack of trust between military officials and agencies such as DRDO; badly designed weapons-development policies; poor accountability and oversight; inattention to incrementalism in developing weapon systems; unreasonable performance demands by the military; and the absence of an ambitious weapons-export policy based on the development of high-value platforms. Nagal, Masand and Shukla, in various ways, are dissatisfied with New Delhi’s realist practice. This is not surprising given that they are former military officers. What is interesting is that their dissatisfaction is with every level of Indian policy – nuclear policy, conventional tactics and operational art, and defence expenditure,

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R&D and procurement. Putting their views together, we can say that overall national security strategy in the end rests on the next level of policy which in turn rests on successive levels of policy in a continuous regress. Modern philosophers in the field of epistemology, based apparently on insights from Hindu philosophy, call this the problem of ‘turtles all the way down’: the turtle on top rests on another smaller turtle which in turn rests on another turtle…all the way down. A truly realist national security policy will depend, then, on micro foundations very distant from diplomatic and military capabilities – on basic political, economic, and social policies – which is precisely the kind of argument made by Menon and Babu in their contributions to the volume.

Realism in Diplomacy: From Idealism to Realism? The sense that India has not been consistently or sufficiently realist is also a running theme in the next three papers on Indian diplomacy – on the country’s relations with West Asia, with Southeast Asia and with China. Rajendra Abhyankar, with extensive diplomatic experience in West Asia, argues that New Delhi has oscillated between ‘Nehruvian idealism’ and ‘a more realist stance’. Indian policy towards the region started out with an eye to the historical-cultural links with the societies to its immediate west – from Iran onwards. These links are deeply historical but continued right into the 20th century – Abhyankar cites the Khilafat Movement and India’s nationalists’ support of it as one example of pre-independence affinities to the region. Yet, even during the early post-independence years, when history and culture still informed India’s approach towards the region, realist concerns were not entirely absent: when India opposed the partition of Palestine in 1947, New Delhi was concerned ‘over the security implications of yet another partition in the international system and perhaps even the effects on India’s Muslim population and therefore internal security’. In Abhyankar’s view, the mix of idealism and realism persists to the present day in India’s policies towards West Asia, but the balance is shifting: New Delhi is increasingly cold-eyed and calculative in its actions and behaviours. The end of the Cold War and developments in its wake were probably pivotal. These included the Gulf war of 1990, the Arab-Israeli dialogue in 1992, the US invasion of Iraq in 2003, the UN’s involvement in the Libya bombings leading to the ouster of Muammar Gaddafi, the Syrian crisis of 2012, and the sanctions against Iran. In each case, India increasingly weighed up the costs and benefits of military and hard diplomatic actions led by the US and its allies and walked a fine line. In the end, it tilted towards stances that were tougher than it would have countenanced and endorsed during the heyday of non-alignment. India’s growing realism in recent years, Abhyankar seems to suggest, is also related to the Arab Spring of 2010 and its aftermath. The upsurge of democratic and liberal hopes in the region were quickly replaced by despair and confusion, as popular movements lost their way and West Asian countries descended into nearanarchy. The result often was great violence and repression. In this churn several

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changes occurred, but India’s attention was inevitably drawn to the possibility of another wave of terrorism that might arrive at Indian shores. New Delhi’s security interests in West Asia therefore grew. As Abhyankar shows, Indian policy emphasized an interest in the region’s stability, support for multipolarity in West Asia, opposition to foreign military intervention, the safety and welfare of the Indian diaspora, and the role of the region in India’s maritime ambitions in the Indian Ocean. In the wake of India’s economic reforms from 1991 onwards, New Delhi also saw more clearly the importance of the Gulf for India’s economic prospects – energy, trade, investment, remittances, and medical tourism from the Gulf were vital to the surging Indian economy. Abhyankar concludes by showing that under Narendra Modi, India’s diplomacy in West Asia has been energized as never before – ironically, given that Modi and his party are regarded as hostile to Muslims. Modi’s personal energy and charm seem to have made a difference. India has developed deeper security cooperation with the Gulf countries, drawn close to Israel as never before (while continuing to support the Palestinian cause), blunted Pakistani diplomacy in the Organisation of Islamic Conference (OIC), increased trade and investment, built infrastructure (in Iran), and continued, as before, to import large quantities of hydrocarbons for its energy requirements. Overall, Abhyankar suggests, Modi has focused India even more than his predecessors on security and economic interests, and to this extent has swung the idealism-realism balance more firmly towards realism. As Abhyankar shows India’s West Asia policy moving from an emphasis on socio-cultural and historical engagement to greater economic and then security engagement, so former ambassador Gurjit Singh describes a rather similar arc for India’s Southeast Asia policy. Both diplomats are not satisfied by the degree of realism in Indian policy, but they point to a gradual change in the direction of a more hard-headed, geopolitical approach to the two regions. For Gurjit Singh, driving India’s greater realism in Southeast Asia has been China’s growing power and influence in the region and New Delhi’s desire to provide a balance. He sees the tipping point in Indian policy as being 2014, when Narendra Modi came to power: India switched from a Look East Policy (LEP) to an Act East Policy (AEP). LEP had moved India from a primarily socio-cultural interaction with the region to a more economic interaction; AEP was to move it, in addition, to ‘a greater emphasis on defence and security arrangements’ – this despite the fact that the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), which is the leading point of contact with Southeast Asia as a whole, is primarily a ‘liberalfunctionalist’ organization that depends on norms and institutions to deal with intra-regional as also extra-regional relationships. Perhaps the symbolic high point of India’s greater realist engagement was the 25th Anniversary Summit with ASEAN: the meeting was held on the eve of India’s Republic Day celebrations and was attended by Southeast Asian leaders. Gurjit Singh’s survey of the relationship with Southeast Asia is organized around India’s policies in three domains, around which ASEAN has divided its own endeavours: the political and defence pillar, the economic pillar and the socio-cultural pillar.

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In the political and defence domain, India has gradually increased its engagements – patrols, military exercises, defence and strategic dialogues, disaster relief coordination, diplomatic support for freedom of navigation in the South China Sea, and endorsement of ASEAN ‘centrality’ in East Asia’s security architecture. Having said that, New Delhi’s concern is that ASEAN itself is not sufficiently defence and security oriented and does not stand up to China. As part of the general shift to realism, India has therefore openly linked up with Australia, Japan and the US in the Indo-Pacific grouping and the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (‘the Quad’). Gurjit Singh argues that beyond this, realism requires India to further develop its naval capacities in the Andaman and Nicobar Islands and access US, French and Japanese bases to expand its reach. Yet, New Delhi should not give up on Southeast Asian states in the security domain: if ASEAN as an organization is too conservative, India should collaborate more closely bilaterally with Indonesia, Myanmar, Singapore, and Vietnam. In the economic domain, India has gradually increased its interactions but has found that its partners in Southeast Asia and the larger East Asian region have not accommodated Indian concerns enough, leading to large trade imbalances in their favour. India chose in the end to walk away from the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP) because its economic interests were not fully accommodated. This lack of accommodation has also been the case with ASEAN: Gurjit Singh argues that the time has come for India to renegotiate its trade deal with the organization. Beyond trade and investment, India has engaged the CLMV countries (Cambodia, Laos, Myanmar, and Vietnam) on another plane – development and capacity building. However, this phase of its relations with the CLMV seems to be petering out. India is now keener on working with these and other Southeast Asian countries on infrastructure and connectivity – at least partly in response to China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). Delays in existing projects, though, hamper India’s outreach, as does the region’s deep involvement with Chinese projects. At least one way of overcoming the hurdles and Southeast Asia’s own hesitations is for India to combine with others, such as in the India-Japan-US Trilateral Infrastructure Working Group. Gurjit Singh also emphasizes the importance of engaging Southeast Asia in the socio-cultural domain. India’s links with the region go back to antiquity, but Indian efforts at using these deep historical ties have foundered on the inability to understand that Southeast Asian countries have their own interpretations and versions of cultural imports. So, also, the Nalanda University experiment with Southeast Asian (and Chinese) involvement has more or less failed. India may have better luck in the areas of vocational training, health and medicine and hosting foreign students from the region. Gurjit Singh concludes that if India does not engage ‘the minds of young ASEAN people, the future of India’s relations with the region will not be particularly bright’. The dissatisfaction with India’s realism is conceptually and empirically elucidated in Srikanth Kondapalli’s chapter on relations with China. Kondapalli argues that if one takes a realist lens to India-China interactions since 1949, New Delhi has operated with what he calls ‘moderated realism’ whereas China has operated with

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‘hard realism’. Indian interests have suffered as a result. India has been preoccupied with security and military issues vis-a-vis China, but given the growing asymmetry of power between the two countries, ‘it has avoided, for the most part, a head-on collision on issues of vital importance to its security’. China, on the other hand, has increasingly shown a ‘penchant for the use of military force and coercive diplomacy in pursuing its security interests’. While India has emphasized the need for stability along the border, China has not hesitated in taking aggressive action. New Delhi has continued to support a ‘one China’ policy despite provocations, but Beijing has failed to reciprocate with a ‘one India’ policy (and support, especially, for India’s stand on Kashmir). On the whole, India projects the possibility of actual ‘security, political, and global cooperation’; China by contrast ‘accents procedures towards accommodation’. Kondapalli shows in detail that on the border, on internal conflict (Tibet/Taiwan and Kashmir), on third party relationships (the US and Pakistan), and in the maritime domain (South China Sea and Indian Ocean), India’s moderated realism has translated into postures of accommodation and reassurance which have not been reciprocated by China. In the border dispute, India has been defensive and has urged that the two sides move faster towards a settlement. China on the other hand has felt free to initiate conflict in the borderlands and has insisted that a settlement be left to future generations. India has reassured China on Tibet including curtailing the activities of exiled Tibetans and has limited its interactions with Taiwan, whereas China in recent years has challenged India in the UN (over its abrogation of Article 370) and has pushed through the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) in Pakistan-occupied Kashmir. New Delhi has refused to join the US in an outright containment of China while Beijing continues to cultivate Islamabad and play on India’s fears of a two-front conflict. New Delhi has kept a low profile in the South China Sea, limiting the Indian Navy’s forays. By contrast, Beijing has sailed the PLA Navy into the Indian Ocean region, has acquired a base in Djibouti and has control of Hambantota port in Sri Lanka and runs Gwadar port in Pakistan. Kondapalli concludes interestingly with the thought that India is showing signs of moving away from moderated realism to a harder stance. In a welcome display of greater realism, New Delhi stood up against Chinese coercion in the borderlands in 2013, 2014, 2015, 2017, and 2020. China’s hard realism has failed to deliver strategic gains that are commensurate with its more assertive posture, yet Beijing continues to alienate India and China’s other regional neighbours through Xi Jinping’s ‘Wolf Warrior’ diplomacy. What this means for the relationship is unclear, but India’s moderated realism and China’s hard realism are showing signs of evolving – in the direction of harder stances towards each other. Abhyankar, Gurjit Singh and Kondapalli, like Nagal, Masand and Shukla, are dissatisfied by the extent of Indian realism in practice. If India has not displayed enough military realism, it has also failed to show enough realism in its diplomacy. While it has moved from configuring its relations with other states around historical-cultural ties to economic-commercial ties, it still has a way to go in terms of strategic-diplomatic ties. New Delhi is more hard-headed about what it wants, but

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it remains hesitant to move to what Kondapalli associates with Chinese policy, namely, hard realism. This probably arises because of India’s economic and military deficiencies and no longer from some philosophical aversion to the cultivation and use of power. If so, as its power grows, we can expect India to become increasingly hard realist.

Outside Views: Beyond Realism? The volume ends with two chapters by foreign authors, Jon Dorschner, a former American diplomat, and Shuja Nawaz, a former journalist, Pakistani and international civil servant, and think tank specialist living in the US. Dorschner interprets US policy towards India from the perspective of realism, and Nawaz, stepping outside the realism debate, assesses the rationale for peace and stability in South Asia. Both suggest that realism may not be the best way to understand relations with and within South Asia. Dorschner sets out to assess how realist US policy towards India has been. His broad view is that given that realists regard the state as a black box and a unitary actor, the US and India as realist-minded states should have dealt with each other in terms of clearly defined geopolitical and security interests, without attention to domestic cultural and ideological values and internal developments. However, the paper argues that cultural-ideological factors and internal politics, going back in time and all the way up to Trumpism and Modi-ism, have affected their mutual policies and stances. In the case of the US attitude towards India, Dorschner goes back to Katherine Mayo’s (in)famous 1927 book, Mother India, which argues that Hinduism is the bane of India. It is her kind of interpretation of India, he suggests, which informs the perspective of American Christian evangelicals who voted in huge numbers for Donald Trump. In the case of the Indian attitude to the US, he recalls Arun Shourie’s book, Harvesting Our Souls: Missionaries, Their Design, Their Claims, published in the year 2000, which presents a highly negative analysis of Christian missionaries in India. It typifies a conservative Hindu image of the West including the US. The two interpretations, Dorschner contends, affect US and Indian views of each other but would be ignored by realists who discount cultural-ideological factors. Further, Dorschner suggests that given India’s poverty, economic backwardness and the partition of the subcontinent (which divided the economy and armed forces of British India), the US as a realist power should have concluded that the country was of no great interest to America. It was not a large market for US goods, had no products the US needed (India was largely an agricultural economy), and was preoccupied with internal social change and its conflict with Pakistan and therefore was not a significant geopolitical factor in the emerging Cold War. In fact, however, the US paid India a fair degree of attention. It tried to change Indian economic policy, it regarded India as being a possible ally and it got involved in the India-Pakistan conflict. Dorschner describes several other US stances over the years that did not comport with realism – siding with Pakistan when it

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was the weaker state in South Asia; damaging relations with India in 1971 on the excuse of signalling to China that the US would be a reliable ally against the Soviets; getting involved in ousting the Soviets from Afghanistan with the help of Pakistan and China and in the process alienating India further; and so on. When the US turned to more positive policies towards India, such as the 2005 nuclear deal, relations with India did not greatly improve. The coming of Trump and Modi almost simultaneously to power could have led to a better relationship given the right-wing and populist style of both leaders, but in the end not much changed – the ‘soft alliance’ that was predicted never quite materialized. Matters are not likely to be helped, in his view, by Covid-19. India, having been hit hard by the pandemic and having suffered significant economic losses, coming on the heels of a slowing economy even before Covid-19, could fall out of US geopolitical and security calculations. If the promise of a rapidly rising India fails to eventuate, Washington may well conclude that it needs other quasi-allies or that it needs to deal with China and other international challenges without much Indian help (and the development of certain aspects of the Indo-Pacific initiative with Australia and Japan as well as the launch of AUKUS or the Australia-UK-US partnership would seem to bear out Dorschner’s point). Dorschner concludes with cautions about the India-US relationship. Neither side understands the other’s domestic politics enough, nor factors it in sufficiently. The US is deeply divided between the two main political parties, which will mean incoherence in its diplomacy. The Republicans are likely to be quite racist towards non-white countries, the Democrats are likely to view India’s right-ward, majoritarian politics with a jaundiced eye. The Indian American community, which could become a more influential player, tends to be liberal and favours the Democratic Party, and so this could lead to sharpening differences with India over human rights and religious violence. Realists may not bother about these kinds of variables, and India-US relations would be better if both countries were truly realist in orientation, but Dorschner indicates that it would be foolish to ignore the play of the domestic on foreign policy. If Dorschner is sceptical about the realist nature of US and Indian policies, Shuja Nawaz steps away from realism altogether in his analysis of the future of South Asia and India-Pakistan relations. In essence, for him, it is realism that has led India and Pakistan into ‘confrontation policies’, a rabbit hole from which they have not emerged. The costs to both sides and to the region have been substantial and could be greater still given the many looming challenges at the international and societal level. India and Pakistan need a more ‘rationalist’, not a more realist, approach to their policies: a rationalist approach would see clearly that the benefits of confrontational, realist approaches towards each other are outweighed by the costs of enormous, largely neglected, non-traditional security threats. Most of the threats in the coming years, in Nawaz’s view, are internal, and to deal with them effectively requires ‘a more congenial regional atmosphere that fosters stability and economic growth’. Looking ahead, it is possible to paint a picture of South Asian stability, prosperity and growing influence in the world. In

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this scenario, Afghanistan and Iran might integrate into the region. A stronger India might work out its relations with China. Nuclear India and Pakistan might achieve stable deterrence. Economic growth and an affluent urban population could provide checks against regional conflict. However, Nawaz fears that economic stagnation, ethno-religious differences and narrow economic nationalism will get in the way of a possible rosier future. Further disruption of the region may result from rapid urbanization and the increase in labour-saving technologies – both seem inexorable and impossible to stop. Urbanization raises the spectre of pollution, health crises and very visible economic inequalities. The resulting disaffection could well be compounded by the spread of new communication technologies that allow for unprecedented interconnections and instantaneous knowledge as well as the spread of extremist ideological and religious ideas. Nawaz sees other ‘dark scenarios’ resulting from black swan events. Iran-Saudi quarrels could ‘suck’ India and Pakistan into the politics of the Gulf. China’s growing influence in the Gulf could alarm India. Nuclear weapons might proliferate to the Gulf. South Asian labour may come to be displaced because of local quarrels including Shia-Sunni conflicts. Displaced South Asian labour could add to the disaffection at home by straining domestic labour markets. The loss of remittances for Pakistan could be particularly severe. In South Asia, earthquakes, monsoonal shifts, flooding, deforestation, rising temperatures could produce a perfect storm affecting agriculture, water availability and health. India could resume its growth path and become the third largest economy in the world if the government removes various ills including rent seeking (corruption) in both the public and private sector. Much of the buoyancy in South Asian economies is due to the informal sector and small-scale manufacturing; but both are the cause of low tax collection. Unofficial transfers from workers abroad, other illegal transfers and capital flight in the case of India further affect tax revenues and economic policy making. Nawaz sees little hope that these chronic problems will be overcome given overly intrusive government regulation, bureaucratic inefficiencies and rent seeking. Centrifugal forces are growing in strength in the region. Those forces could link up with communities on the other side of the border to form new centres of crossnational economic activity. But they could also lead to the balkanization of South Asian states. Nawaz is particularly worried about Pakistan, with Balochistan and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa unhappy over central control and the Federally Administered Tribal Area (FATA) being an area of instability adjoining Afghanistan. For India, the problem continues to be Kashmir. The answer, in Nawaz’s view, is that both countries must balance centralized rule against aspirations for greater autonomy. External threats may help maintain the balance: the Indian threat, in Pakistan’s case; and the Chinese threat, in India’s case. For Pakistan, the inflow of funds for the CPEC might help the centre maintain greater control. In the end, though, good governance is the key. The prospects here are not bright. Political parties, which are vital to the political process, are often family enterprises throughout the region. The bureaucracies, in addition, are ‘antique’. The result is ‘whimsical’, rent-seeking governance. Can South Asian governments

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handle the various challenges including climate change and disasters? ‘The future,’ Nawaz sombrely concludes, ‘remains clouded unless rationalism forces behavioural change in the region as a whole.’ Dorschner and Nawaz present two rather different outsider views, but what is common to them is the perception that realism does not quite ‘cut it’. For Dorschner, a narrow realist view in the US and India obscures crucial domestic cultural, economic, and political values, and developments that impact external policy. For Nawaz, realism gets in the way of a more rational assessment of the real existential threats to South Asian states including India: states certainly must be prepared to defend themselves militarily, but they also must acknowledge the fact that there are much more central challenges to their well-being and perhaps even their existence.

Conclusion If Bharat Karnad has dedicated the past several decades to persuading Indian policy makers and the larger attentive public that India should be more realist, then, going by these essays (especially those by the Indians), the country’s national security policy has moved in the direction of greater realism, and he can count on his writings as having been successful. Ideas certainly play a part in moving the policy needle in a society. Karnad and distinguished thinkers and practitioners before him, through their writings, have likely had an impact – ‘likely’ because tracing the causation from ideas to actual policies is no easy task. India’s rising power has also likely contributed to its greater realism – ‘likely’ because, once again, establishing causation is difficult. That ideas and rising material power conjoined to move India from ‘idealism’ to ‘realism’ is at least intuitively appealing for those who have watched and interpreted Indian diplomatic and military practice closely over the past decades. Having said that, our authors are not all in agreement on how realist India has become and what type of realist power it should be. One view, proposed by Menon and his former colleagues in the foreign service (Abhyankar and Gurjit Singh), is that India has always had elements of realism in its external policies and that the realist element has grown over time in response to India’s growing power and the constraints of circumstance. Clearly, most observers would agree that India has used force defensively or more aggressively over time, even before its economic and military rise. A partial list of instances would include the following: the Indian response to the raiders into Kashmir in 1947–48; the threat to use force against Pakistan in 1950; the Forward Policy against China in 1961–62; India’s attacks across the international border with Pakistan in 1965 to ease the pressure of Pakistani attacks in Kashmir; the 1971 intervention in East Pakistan; the 1974 nuclear test; Indian intervention in Sri Lanka, culminating in the sending of the Indian Peacekeeping Force to the island in 1987; India’s rapid and strong response to China’s incursion in Sumdurong Chu in 1986–87; the responses in various crises with Pakistan (1986–87, 1990); the 1998 nuclear tests; the vigorous response to the Kargil incursion in 1999; Operation Parakram in 2001–2; and the military strikes against Pakistan in retaliation for terrorists attacks (e.g., 2016, 2019).

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A second view is that India has not been very realist at all going back to 1947. This view seems to depend on a slightly different judgment. Those who are far more sceptical about Indian realism than Menon, Abhyankar and Gurjit Singh would not deny (probably) that India has been realist in the instances cited above. What they are concerned with is the lack of a consistent, long-term disposition towards the instruments and use of force. The military officers in this volume (Nagal, Masand and Shukla) would probably not deny that we can classify Indian responses as realist when India was pushed to use force; but they would argue that if India had built up its armed forces, adopted the right doctrine for a more aggressive use of force tactically and operationally and chosen an external strategy that from the beginning was singularly focused on Indian rather than internationalist-cosmopolitan interests, then India would not have found itself cornered into situations where it had little option but to threaten to use force or actually fight. Cornered in this way, India did not always achieve optimal outcomes. (e.g., in 1962, 1965 and 1971). This distinction between general and immediate realism is reminiscent of the differentiation that is made in strategic studies between general and immediate deterrence: General deterrence is the ongoing, persistent effort to prevent unwanted actions over the long term and in noncrisis situations. Immediate deterrence represents more short-term, urgent attempts to prevent a specific, imminent attack, most typically during a crisis.2 India’s realist responses when it had little or no option are ‘immediate realism’; its inability over the long-term to cultivate the levers of power and to focus, laser-like, on its interests are a failure of ‘general realism’. The Indian papers in the volume seem to indicate that India has had intermittent moments, marked by some ‘success’, of immediate realism, but, at least until lately (post-Cold War, post-1998, post-2014?), it has failed at general realism. Overall, Menon is the most charitable to India in respect of both immediate and general realism, his foreign service colleagues are somewhere in the middle, and the military authors are the most excoriating in respect of India’s realist record. Karnad, interestingly, probably features somewhere in between the two extremes. His study of Jawaharlal Nehru and nuclear weapons policy would seem to indicate that he sees far more general realism in India’s first prime minister than many today would grant. Nehru may have failed in particular instances to be sufficiently realist, but Karnad holds that the prime minister did lay the foundation for both conventional and nuclear weaponization even if he did not follow through to the logical conclusion of his initiatives – in the end, Nehru’s idealpolitik/moralpolitik, to use Karnad’s term, trumped his realpolitik/machtpolitik.3 One might draw much more from the papers in this volume. For instance, Menon defines realism as ‘the realistic’ or attainable given the constraints operating on India. The military officers are probably less patient with that view, seeing the invocation of ‘the realistic’ as a failure of will and imagination. Nagal presents the

xxxii Introduction: Is India a Realist Power?

most radical view of India’s military posture, with the suggestion of a nuclear policy that goes far beyond anything contemplated by any Indian government (as far as we know). Yet he insists that it is attainable, with the right amount of determination and the right calculation of costs and benefits over the long term. Here Karnad would be closer to Nagal’s view (and Masand’s and Shukla’s views) of what is possible. The two foreign contributors draw attention to the limits of realism in policy making. For Dorschner, one has to understand the domestic politics of one’s interlocutors (both friends and rivals). And for Nawaz, realism’s calculations are too narrow and the challenges in South Asia too great to be stuck with mere realism – far more ‘rationalist’ calculations are vital for the region’s security and well-being. The reader will have to make up his or her own mind on whether India is realist or not, what kind of realist it is and whether realism is enough. The authors in this volume have provided rich fare and a basis on which we can begin to think about questions that have long preoccupied Bharat Karnad in whose honour these essays are written. If the essays provoke lively discussion, then it will have achieved its aim of celebrating Karnad’s contributions over the years and his insistence on open and vigorous debate: for he is ever a gracious but tenacious ‘argumentative Indian’ committed to India’s security and welfare.

Notes 1 Bharat Karnad, Nuclear Weapons & Indian Security: The Realist Foundations of Strategy, New Delhi: Macmillan, 2002. 2 Michael J. Mazarr, ‘Understanding Deterrence’, Perspective, RAND, 2018, https://www.ra nd.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/perspectives/PE200/PE295/RAND_PE295.pdf (accessed on 15 September 2021). 3 Karnad, Nuclear Weapons & Indian Security.

Is India Realist

1 DECONSTRUCTING INDIAN REALISM Pratap Bhanu Mehta

During 2004–2005, as President and CEO of the Centre for Policy Research, I used to constantly get calls from various persons in high places in Manmohan Singh’s government to restrain Bharat Karnad from writing against the civilian nuclear cooperation deal then being negotiated with the United States. Bharat Karnad is a unique figure in the Indian constellation of strategic thinking. If he did not exist, we would have to invent him. Just to emphasize various aspects of his uniqueness: One is, of course, his absolute attachment, passionate defence of a maximalist position on nuclear weapons. He has gone where nobody dares to go even if people think it. In a sense, he sharpened people’s position on nuclear weapons, nuclear deterrence, in a way that very few in the Indian context have done. Bharat Karnad is also unique as a historian of Indian thought. He was, on the one hand, a nuclear maximalist and, on the other hand, he is the last Nehruvian and the last believer in nonalignment. He is the last Nehruvian in that he has maintained throughout his career that, contrary to the way in which Nehru is portrayed, Nehru was actually a realist of sorts and none of this discussion on nuclear military options would have been possible without some devious choices Jawaharlal Nehru made. And he is the last remaining figure of nonalignment in that he has always had the extraordinary belief in atmanirbharta in the best sense of the term – not the fake one – consistently, particularly on Indo-US relations. What he brought to the table is something – and it is what I have learnt from him – that often the way we think of alliances is as furthering the realist cause, that it is pragmatic to do an alliance. Bharat Karnad was prescient in seeing that in India a lot of alliance talk tended to be defeatist talk. It was not consideration of alliances that came out of some deep recognition of the nature of power in the international system. Often the motivations behind it were extremely defeatist: an alliance is an easy way out of a security dilemma, let us outsource security. His skepticism of alliances stemmed from that sensibility. This was a position almost no one else DOI: 10.4324/9781003093343-1

4 Pratap Bhanu Mehta

occupied. When one thinks of International Relations (IR) in India, usually realists tended to push for more alliances. Bharat Karnad was the only one I can think of who steadfastly propagated the view of India standing by itself, doing things on its own. What I thought I would do, not as an IR or strategic studies expert but rather as an anthropologist who has observed realists from afar – my main specimen being Bharat Karnad, so there may be sampling errors! I will quickly run through a portrait of a realist thinker. There used to be a genre of literature – nobody writes this sort of thing anymore – about the liberal personality, the authoritarian personality, the communist personality. What does a realist personality look like? Partly the object is [intellectual] fun; but partly it is serious as well – to set a wide canvas on which we can think of realism, and what it actually means as a political category. The table below encapsulates thirteen different dimensions of realism. It would be interesting to map the different figures that we know in this pantheon. What is the realist core? Which are some of the attributes that define a realist? Bharat Karnad, it turns out, is probably the only one to fit into all of these categories. Definition

Realism (sobre or sombre)

Others

Structural condition Explanatory variable Epistemological outlook

Anarchy External environment The real is rational (practical)

Currency of IR Actor Ethical means Institutional imagination

Hard power/nuclear Unitary state All means possible Institutions endogenous power Tragic/zero-sum Performative machismo Partisan/particularistic Collective self-interest Contextual/pragmatic No individual rights Yes (?)

Hierarchy/interference Identity/inner conflict Make the rational real (utopian) Various Hierarchical (of various kinds) Moralism Institutions exogenous power

Metaphysics of the world Political style Moral imagination Theory of motivation Judgement Salience of individual Collateral damage

Optimistic/non-zero sum Defensive/humanitarian Less partisan/universal Various Priority of norms Salience of individual No (?)

When we think of the various dimensions, when we think of realist doctrine, the first two are very familiar ones to IR scholars. Realism defines the structural condition, broadly speaking, of anarchy. For realists, there is no single authority in the international system, whereas there are some other schools of thought that think the international system is hierarchical. Or there is a view that there are enough bonds of interdependence and that one should not define the system as anarchical. This is IR 101. There is an explanatory variable story where realists

Deconstructing Indian Realism 5

typically look upon the external environment as the primary explanatory variable, whereas others look at a whole range of things, like identity, inner conflicts within societies, mostly inner contradictions of society bleeding into their external behaviour. One of the interesting things about this explanatory variable in the present context is that I have always been puzzled by how any political doctrine which says one should trace our continuities back 2,000 years can ever be a realist doctrine. I thought realists were meant to be forward looking, tradition be damned – there are some core interests, here and now, that are supposed to be met. So, when people say the Chinese are realists and the Chinese do not deviate from anything done 2,000 years ago, and that is what India should also do, I get very frustrated by that conception of realism. On the relationship between the continuity of identity and IR, just to be provocative, I think America is one of the few countries designed to be realist in the sense that it has very shallow historical memories and finds it easy to move on from past conflicts. It is not clear how a power that wants to replay what happened in the 15th century can ever be a realist power. This is the fundamental contradiction at the heart of so-called contemporary Indian realism, or the so-called Hindutva realism, which as far as I am concerned is an oxymoron. Then you come to somewhat subtler aspects of realism – the kind of epistemological outlook to the world where, to put it somewhat telegraphically, for a realist the ‘real’ is rational. There are some binding constraints in reality to take into account pragmatically – so we say, ‘Get real’! Hopefully, there is an intelligent version of what these binding constraints are, whereas others use the ‘Make the rational real’ argument. In this sense, the contrast is often drawn between the practical versus the utopian. The opposite of realism is utopianism. That is the E.H. Carr-kind of doctrine. Then there is the currency of IR. Realists are supposed to think of hard power as the core. In this Bharat Karnad was absolutely clear. Look, he said, you can beat around the bush, you can talk a, b, c, d, economics, identity, culture, but the core is actually hard power. What stands out in Bharat Karnad’s books is his sense that almost all the other aspects of power, including economic power, depend on the capability of deploying hard power. In Bharat Karnad’s case, of course, there is a particular version of it, the power to get to the top of the nuclear ladder in some way. So, there is a kind of basesuperstructure effect, which is sui generic determination by hard power in some way. And that even economic development is actually facilitated by hard power, not the other way around. Then there is the nature of actors in realist thought – the insistence on a unitary state, for instance. There are hierarchies of various kinds that determine action. There is also the question of ethical means. Typically, realists want ‘No binding constraints’ on action, no a priori constraints, all means are possible, whatever it takes, whatever is necessary. And in this dimension realism is the opposite of a certain kind of moralism. Moralists would tie your hands on the available means – no subterfuge, no covert operations to destabilize states, no killing of civilians, those kinds of things. There is also a kind of institutional imagination about the international system. Realists think that institutions are always endogenous to power, they are basically a cloak for power. Others think some forms of

6 Pratap Bhanu Mehta

institutionalism have at least some kind of autonomous explanatory power. Then there is a sort of metaphysics of the world. Realists tend to be tragic. The world is full of irrevocable conflicts – zero-sum conflicts for the most part. You will be lucky if you can catch a snippet of a conflict that is not zero-sum and, therefore, the point has to be made that it has to be big. The point is that the world of states is not about harmony or working towards some non-zero sum. Then again, realism is a matter of political style, particularly in India where realism is performative machismo in many hands. Bharat Karnad wants to have real hard power – his realism comes back to thermonuclear bombs. On the other hand, there are lots of Indian realists for whom it is a performative style, where what you want is to get a masculine kick out of saying, ‘Oh, those liberals are wimps, Nehru did not understand the nature of power’, etc. This realism is a form of performance, a form of cultural performance that is not realistic, that mischaracterizes a predicament. Whereas other political styles are more defensive, more humanitarian, maybe seemingly more indecisive. But there is definitely a performative political aspect to realism, at least in India. There is a form of moral imagination associated with realism, which is always partisan and particularistic in that the point is to win. You are always partisan, the point is to come out top, the point is not to harmonize, not to give-and-take, not to give the other guy some concession. Your loyalty must be absolutely clear, no hesitations about putting your own good and your own priority absolutely first in all circumstances. There has to be a kind of hyper-partisanship that goes with realism, and it follows from the fact that you are winning. The next category in the table is a theory of motivation, which in realism is broadly defined as collective self-interest as defined by the state. Whereas other theories have all kinds of motivation – are you amenable to modern considerations, are you amenable to considerations that go against your own self-interest but are equally destructive such as jealousy, envy, honour? These are a set of predispositions that are not drastically conducive to self-interest. It is a much more pluralistic theory of motivation. As far as a theory of judgement is concerned, realism, by definition, is contextual and pragmatic: tell me where the pieces are on the chessboard, and I will tell you what the next move is. No ex ante commitments, no priority of norms, no binding constraints, no ontological barriers, no saying that I will not do this under any circumstances, because realists believe there is no such thing as ‘never under any circumstances’. Then there is the question that is meant to be controversial – the salience of the individual. It follows from the realist doctrine of collective selfinterest, of particularism, that the individual has no particular autonomous moral salience in the calculus. It is collective self-interest ‘all the way down’. And one of the reasons I mention this – it is my own personal kind of hobby horse – is that Thomas Hobbes is described as a realist, he sets up the anarchical picture of international relations. For Hobbes especially it is the importance of the bare lie, the minute it compromises, that social contract is off. I think that, in a sense, is the tension – the instrumentalization of the individual to a collective goal that has an elective affinity with realism. It leads to a certain kind of attitude to collateral

Deconstructing Indian Realism 7

damage. Yes, realists are much more prepared to take on collateral damage. Other theories say ‘No’, but there is a question mark – ‘No, but’. I am not going to say that realism necessarily makes the world unsafe. In fact, the underlying hypothesis is that if you do not act as a realist actor, and you do not assume the world as is, you will end up making the world more unsafe. So, realism claims to be a theory that more effectively brings about peace. And despite Bharat Karnad’s fascination with thermonuclear weapons and hard power maximalism, it turns out at heart he is a softy. He wants world peace, he does not want conflict, notwithstanding his combative style. And he consistently argues that the only way to bring about world peace is actually to have nuclear weapons proliferate. I hope I have captured something about the different dimensions of Bharat Karnad’s view of the world. It is one in which realists will find a mirror in which to look and in which many others will look at themselves and finally realize they are not as realist as they claim to be.

2 IS INDIA REALIST? Shivshankar Menon

Bharat Karnad is a scholar with a mission. For many years he has tried to inject a dose of realism into Indian foreign and security policy, its practice and its analysis. He, with a few others, have applied realist IR theory to the Indian case. And yet, by his standards Indian policy remains mired in ideology and confusion, preventing India from becoming a great power. His answer to the question posed in the title would probably be an unambiguous No. He has said that India is not realist, and that is why India is not a great power yet, despite having the necessary attributes. This is the source of his strong views and prescriptions for Indian policy, expressed with scholarly objectivity to all governments of India. It is, as we shall see, partly his achievement, along with others of his persuasion, that Indian policy has become more realist over time, at least in its expression. This chapter outlines an argument and presents some preliminary thoughts. It examines from a practitioner’s point of view whether India behaves as a realist power, why this is so, the factors that have contributed, and whether realism explains better the practice of Indian foreign and security policy in this century. Hans Morgenthau once said that a theory of international politics must meet a dual test, an empirical one and a logical one.1 This chapter considers the IR theorist’s view of realism, the practitioner’s way, and whether India has been realist by either definition in her foreign and security policy practice.

The IR Theory Definition of Realism In IR theory realism – no matter whether adherents label themselves classical or neo-realists – is based on three core beliefs. Realists treat states as the principal actors in world politics and focus mainly on great powers because they dominate and shape international politics. Secondly, realists believe that the behaviour of great powers is influenced mainly by their external environment and not by their DOI: 10.4324/9781003093343-2

Is India Realist? 9

internal constitution or characteristics. It is the structure of the international system, which is anarchical and which all states must deal with, that largely shapes their foreign policies. There is no distinction here between good and bad states; only their relative power distinguishes them. Thirdly, power dominates states’ thinking, and states compete for power among themselves, to the point of going to war, when necessary, as an acceptable instrument of statecraft. That competition is largely zero-sum in nature.2 To sum up, realism sees the key to understanding the international system in the egotistic pursuit of national interest under the structural constraints of anarchy. From this premise can be derived other realist axioms such as the utility of force and the indispensability of power.3 As a result, realists are pessimists, and see no easy escape from the harsh world of security competition and war. While classical realists see the cause of contention as being human nature, the Type-A behaviour of leaders, neo-realists see this as structural, as caused by the nature of the international system, the anarchy in international society. Classical realists criticise neo-realists for their tendency to portray the international system in over-theorised and mechanistic ways. Realists also differ among themselves on whether states seek to maximise security or power. Do they seek to dominate the system or merely preserve a modicum of peace, and what about other goals such as status and honour? They also differ on whether multipolar systems are more stable than bipolar ones, as Morgenthau believed and Kenneth Waltz, the neo-realist, disputed. When realists speak of international society as being anarchic, what they mean is not necessarily that it is chaotic or disorderly, but instead that it lacks a centralised authority or arbiter, unlike domestic politics where the organising principle is the opposite of anarchy, namely, hierarchy.4 For the founders of classical realism, the key concept was that of the interest of the state, defined as power (material and ideal), and of the balance of power as the perennial element of international politics. Realism is thus fundamentally amoral, focused as it is on interests rather than on values. Realism aims at the realisation of the lesser evil rather than of the absolute good. The theory is based on fundamental assumptions about the reality of international relations: that the world is anarchic; that states are the fundamental units of international society; that their purpose is to maximise their power vis a vis all other states; and that states and their leaders will behave rationally, in accordance with the rational actor hypothesis. This is a very different set of responses and beliefs from those of liberals who predict greater international cooperation based on domestic and international institutional reasons. For IR liberals, prosperous and economically interdependent states are unlikely to fight one another, democracies do not fight each other, and international institutions enable states to avoid war and are therefore the taproot of stability. For the practitioner it is hard to avoid the conclusion that realism and liberalism have become competing academic ideologies. What IR studies today use is, of course, a very limited definition of realism. Political ideas and discourse can only be understood in the context of the historical era in which they were used, as products of time and place, rather than as vessels of perpetual ‘truths’. What I have described is actually a definition of post-war

10 Shivshankar Menon

American realism, a product of an offshore balancing superpower’s geopolitics in the Cold War and of the crisis of American liberalism.5 There were alternatives to it even in the Western tradition: in the mid-19th century German liberal tradition that coined the term realpolitik; among English realists like Neville Chamberlain who argued for appeasement in the 1930s; and, in the thinking of ‘liberal realists’ like Barack Obama and Joseph Nye.6 Nor does this definition take into account other traditions with different approaches which could be considered realist and could help to broaden and universalise IR theory, making it relevant outside the trans-Atlantic world of the late 19th and early 20th centuries. These would include Kautilya’s Arthashastra and the tradition of ‘cultural realism’ in China which would expand the definition and scope and our understanding of the idea of realism.7

The Practitioner’s Way As a theory of international relations, realism has had considerable success in the last century in the descriptive function of theory, namely, in shedding light on the workings of the international system, perhaps because the most powerful states in the system were and still are believers in a realist approach. It has been less useful to the practitioner in the prescriptive and predictive functions of theory. The practitioner’s life would be much simpler if realism were the theory and realpolitik its practice. In the real world, however, ‘realism’ or ‘realist’ are sticky terms, slippery signifiers. For the most part ‘realism’, ‘realist’, ‘raison d’état’, and ‘realpolitik’ are used interchangeably. They are ‘much used but little understood’. And the differences among realists on what realism means adds to the confusion. All these terms are back in fashion again today, as they always are in times of stress and strife. In the real world, the political uses and meaning of realism have changed over time. Raymond Williams’s 1976 book Keywords examined the etymology and changing meaning of over two hundred words commonly used in political discourse. For realism he indicated that in the 18th century ‘realism’ was taken to mean the general sense of an underlying truth or quality. From the mid-19th century, it increasingly meant facing up to things as they really are. In the second half of the 20th century, the meaning morphed again into implying one’s acceptance of the limits of a situation. In the process, Williams argues, realism became increasingly self-limiting: it offered a version of reality which stressed the limits of human wisdom and action rather than a true assessment of the whole picture.8 For a working diplomat, ‘realism’ normally means the correct perception of the characteristics of events or facts or persons and finding the appropriate response. By this standard, realism is practicality, as opposed to utopianism or the pursuit of an idea to its logical conclusion.9 It starts with the individual, his beliefs and predilections, his understanding of the situation, involving psychology and other behavioural sciences, and is therefore subjective. The matching of actions and responses with reality is a series of pragmatic choices that faces leaders and diplomats every day. The record shows that those choices fall along a spectrum from power politics and realism to the

Is India Realist? 11

most ideologically liberal internationalism. Most countries’ leaders are both, neither predominates, and consistency is rare in political careers. It is therefore not surprising that realism, when defined as pragmatism or being realistic, in the conventional sense, is attractive to the practitioner as justifying his dealings with a complex reality, but not the academic definition of realism. Indeed, for the practitioner ‘there is something amiss in a theory that practice so obstinately declines to fulfil’.10

Indian Attitudes to Realism How have Indians regarded realism? And how does India’s foreign and security practice measure against both these definitions – the IR scholar’s logical and coherent but limited one of power politics, and the practitioner’s pragmatic and looser standard of power as one means to other ends? Does Indian practice suggest that whatever its declared policy positions and justifications and the liberal vocabulary it uses, India operates on a set of realist assumptions about state behaviour? Let us begin by considering what a realist Indian foreign policy, in IR terms, may have looked like at independence in 1947. It would presumably have seen a determined and evident effort to become a regional hegemon in the Indian subcontinent and the Indian Ocean region to begin with, and ultimately in Asia, building security structures centred on India which excluded external powers from India’s sphere, attempting to undo the debilitating effects of partition and concentrating on building the hard power sinews of war. Since evidently India lacked the power in 1947 to achieve such goals alone, realism would have required alliances with external powers, which in the context of the Cold War would have meant joining one of the two blocs. This is precisely what China did immediately after the founding of the People’s Republic of China (PRC), signing a mutual defence treaty with the Soviet Union, entering the Korean War to keep her periphery free from external and inimical powers, an attempt that still continues with growing success. The US too, in her early years, after a brief period of avoiding entanglements, soon declared the Monroe Doctrine in 1823 making the Americas its exclusive sphere of influence. The US worked in tacit alliance, first with France to keep Britain at bay, and then with the Royal Navy to enforce the Doctrine. For all three, India, China, and the US, at early stages of their rise, a realist policy raised the question of which one of two options to choose: the single-minded pursuit of power; or accommodating oneself to existing power balances and structures and working within them. There were Indian voices before independence advocating a ‘realist’ course for India similar to what China chose in 1950. K.M. Panikkar, C. Rajagopalachari (‘Rajaji’), T.T. Krishnamachari (‘TTK’), and others saw India as the fulcrum and prime mover of a security architecture in what they called the near and far east. TTK advocated a regional organisation from Suez to Australia with a Defence Council, centred on India and in association with Britain, while Panikkar sought to ‘knit India to England and England to India in free partnership’.11 In essence, they sought to continue what they saw as India’s regional primacy in their memory of the British Empire. This was a very different view from Jawaharlal Nehru’s sense of

12 Shivshankar Menon

an Asian renaissance based on decolonisation and an equal association of free states in opposition to bloc politics and imperialism that he called the ‘area of peace’. There was also a ‘Hindu’ alternative in this debate, which believed, after Swami Vivekananda, that a reformed Hinduism could liberate India, and that once India mastered science and became a ‘European society with Indian religion’ it would conquer its former conquerors, Muslim and Christian, by spiritual rather than by military power. The idea was that India’s security could be achieved by universal acknowledgement of the truths of Hindu sanatana dharma (roughly, the true, eternal way). Neither Nehru’s nor the ‘Hindu’ approach could be considered realist, in the IR sense of the term. It is not surprising that the first generation of leaders of free India – faced with India’s abject condition at independence, conscious of India’s glorious past and determined to build a great modern future for their country – did not consider themselves realists, as they understood the term. Their purpose or national goal was to transform India, not to make India a great power. Given the condition of the country after two centuries of colonialism, their goal had to be making India a prosperous, secure and modern country for all its citizens. Self-professed realists are still a rarity in Indian politics, as they are in the international arena. Lacking power, the primary determinant of international politics in the realist view, and reacting also against the realist acceptance of the given situation, the leaders of India’s freedom movement were quite outspoken about this – despite a long realist tradition in India, including Kautilya, and the realist practice of Indian politics. Early Indian leaders had an antipathy to considering themselves amoral and were basically optimistic. Hence the faint opprobrium that attaches to the term Chanakya-niti in popular parlance. The antipathy to realism and power politics is expressed most clearly in the separate section on ‘Realism and Geopolitics, World Conquest or World Association, the USA and the USSR’ in Discovery of India that Nehru dedicates to rebutting power politics. Writing in 1946, Nehru saw power politics as the root cause of the two world wars, as the reason for colonialism and the suffering it had imposed on India and as now even more dangerous because of the enormous destructive potential of the atom bomb. Nehru argued that it is difficult to see world peace or cooperation emerging after the Second World War if England, America and Russia reverted ‘to the old game of power politics on a gigantic scale. That is considered realism and practical politics.’ He notes that ‘Realism of course there must be, for no nation can base its domestic or foreign policy on mere good-will and flights of the imagination. But it is a curious realism that sticks to the empty shell of the past and ignores or refuses to understand the hard facts of the present’. Not surprisingly, Nehru warns against ‘the old policy of expansion and empire and the balance of power, which inevitably leads to conflict and war’.12 Nehru saw himself as the champion of an older Indian approach to international relations and politics, an idealist one which looked beyond the system of states to ‘One World’; that, scarred by two world wars, regarded wars and balances of power with dismay as instruments of India’s colonial subjugation; and that invested

Is India Realist? 13

hope in effective international institutions, the law and norms. He harked back to the Indian tradition of Ashoka – choosing that emperor’s symbols for the state insignia of free India. Nehru was concerned not just with the relations of power but also with common concerns, rules and institutions and with the nature of states themselves and their internal ordering. The framers of India’s Constitution mistrusted the state and its role, unlike classical realists, and believed strongly that the internal constitution of the state mattered, a liberal view. Nor were early decision-making processes designed to give hard power practitioners such as the armed forces a seat at the table, and it was only with the formation of the National Security Council on 19 November 1998 that an integrated decision-making structure was put into place. Nehru’s ambivalence, his combination of liberal and realist thought, is clearest in the tension between the realist belief in the state’s claim to sovereignty and the liberal belief that universal rights are vested in people. Nehru was never conclusive on this issue, working for both. He strongly defended India’s sovereign rights and national self-determination, while being equally active in the drafting of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and other international human rights covenants. Decolonisation, for him, was the logical consequence of both impulses.

Indian Realist Practice In practice, Nehru’s foreign policy was founded in large part on realist considerations. Nehru was not blind to what he saw about him in the Cold War – how bipolar Cold War dynamics worked, the rise of a nationalist and strongly power political China on India’s border or the limits of India’s power and its new situation after independence. A liberal by conviction, Nehru was a reluctant realist in practice, particularly in the subcontinent, but not a very good one at that in his dealings with China. His practice of policy was thus a mix. If we are looking in India’s practice for realpolitik – raison d’état or instrumental rationality in the pursuit of exclusively statist goals – the instances were initially rare but increase in frequency over time. In both the Suez and the Hungary crises of 1956, Indian practice left other non-aligned partners unhappy with India’s reasonableness and willingness to accommodate the superpowers. Nehru’s early policy of non-alignment chose a degree of internal balancing against Pakistan and China and avoided Cold War entanglements of alliance or bandwagoning with one or other superpower. Externally, non-alignment only worked because of the bipolar balance of power of the Cold War. It could even be argued that nonalignment was made possible because the balance of terror between the superpowers created by nuclear weapons raised the threshold for great power conflict, creating space for maneuver by middle and smaller powers. Non-alignment represented, but never admitted, a realistic appreciation of that fact – it was possible precisely during the time the two superpowers pursued a fairly stable realist course. It progressively lost its effectiveness after the bipolar Cold War became more complicated and less stable first due to the Sino-Soviet split after 1956 and then when the Cold War in Asia morphed after 1971 into a virtual US-China alliance against the Soviet Union. As the Cold War evolved, Nehru’s successors pragmatically adjusted policy to the new developments,

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moving to a different set of balancing and hedging steps, gradually increasing India’s military power and modifying its non-alignment to accept strategic partnerships and ‘tilts’ in 1962 (briefly with the US) and in 1971 (with the Soviets). Individual Indian leaders’ attitudes to realism varied considerably. Nehru had a very strong aversion to power politics but practiced it in some measure, while his daughter Indira Gandhi is widely believed to have practiced it with much greater positivity. P.V. Narasimha Rao, regarded as the Chanakya of modern Indian politics, and Atal Behari Vajpayee and Manmohan Singh followed the same realistic, not realist, policies as Rao. Narendra Modi’s words are sometimes realist and even more so the words of his external affairs minister S. Jaishankar in his writings and speeches, but this is not so evident in recent practice: Modi’s policies are suggestive of a faith in the efficacy of personal connections (belying the rational actor hypothesis) and in the reliance on soft power and narrative control more than a quest for hard power (regarded as indispensable by realists). The record of Indian practice, as implemented though not stated, is mixed. India’s practice, even in its Nehruvian phase, saw several elements of realism, particularly in the Indian subcontinent. Nehru’s consolidation of the Himalayan foothills in treaties with Nepal, Sikkim and Bhutan drew on a realist understanding, as did the early decisions to help the newly independent government of Burma militarily. U Nu later said, ‘Without the prompt support in arms and ammunition from India, Burma might have suffered the worst fate imaginable’.13 At the very least one can say that Nehru’s liberal practice shaded into realism when it was tied to the question of India’s position and status, particularly in the subcontinent. With time, as India’s power and agency in the international system grew, Indian policy became more realist. Indira Gandhi’s conduct of the 1971 crisis and war with Pakistan, the willingness to enter into the Indo-Soviet Treaty and the birth of Bangladesh were the result of realpolitik – the last was achieved despite the conservatism of international institutions and norms on intervention and the creation of new states through force and the opposition of one superpower. Mrs. Gandhi’s other actions, such as the 1974 nuclear test at Pokhran, merging Sikkim into the Indian Union, resuming ambassadorial relations with China in 1976, the preemptive occupation of the Siachen glacier, and advocacy of an Indian Ocean Zone of Peace free of outside military presence, signaled a higher willingness to use the instruments of state power, including the threat and conduct of war, to achieve Indian interests. Her realist turn brought peace, established the beginnings of nuclear deterrence for India and created what Hedley Bull called a local balance of power in Asia with China as the focus within the central balance between the US and the Soviet Union in the Cold War.14 This realist turn was carried on by the Rajiv Gandhi government when sending Indian troops to Sri Lanka and the Maldives. Both leaders were responding as best they could to changing Cold War dynamics: Mrs. Gandhi to the virtual US-China alliance after 1971 against the Soviet Union, with Pakistan as junior partner; and Rajiv Gandhi to the decline and collapse of the Soviet Union and Deng’s rising China that marked the end of Cold War bipolarity.

Is India Realist? 15

And yet, in a strict sense, these reactions and actions, absent a determined effort to build a strong military and economic basis for the state’s power, can at best be called partly realist. To the extent that the 1974 nuclear test implicitly demonstrated that India was a latent, possibly actual, nuclear weapon state, it fit the realist prescription. Nehru had kept the nuclear weapon option open and foreseen India’s course as early as 1946. But Shastri’s unwillingness to approve India building a bomb after the Chinese test in 1964 suggests the hesitations and limitations on India’s drive to gather power. Defence expenditure remained low as a percentage of GDP and has sunk further in the decades after the eighties as per Figure 2.1 below. It was really with the end of the Cold War and after the economic crisis of 1990–91 that Narasimha Rao’s government and its successors under Vajpayee and Manmohan Singh could be said to have introduced more realism into the conduct of Indian foreign policy, transforming relations with the US, opening diplomatic relations with Israel, declaring India a nuclear weapon state in carrying out the nuclear tests of 1998, promptly using military force to clear Pakistani intrusions at Kargil in 1999, improving infrastructure and military capabilities along the India-China border, among other things. However, even here the record was mixed, and the goal of Indian policy remained the transformation of India rather than the achievement of dominance or great power status: reliance on hard power was limited, with defence budgets declining to less than 2.4 percent of GDP in 2019.15 The Modi government came to power in 2014 promising a radical overhaul of India’s status in the world and of previous government policies that it regarded as having impeded the country finding its rightful place in the world. In practice, however, policy changes have been tactical shifts rather than the radical changes required by two sets of developments: the fundamental upheaval in the international system since the global financial crisis of 2008; and the rise of an assertive China, of

FIGURE 2.1

16 Shivshankar Menon

new authoritarian leaders in all the great powers, of US retrenchment from her role as international hegemon amid domestic preoccupations, and of increasing threats to Indian security on the borders, in the subcontinent, and across the Indian Ocean. The Modi government has built on India-US defence and security ties, tried a policy of diplomatic and military pressures on Pakistan accompanied by a rejection of bilateral talks and is attempting to stabilize a border with China which was destabilized by China’s actions in 2020 when its forces changed the status quo in several places in Ladakh. In addition, the last few years have seen the increasing blurring of the line between domestic party-political needs and relations with subcontinental neighbours like Bangladesh and Nepal – policies towards these two countries seemingly dictated by internal politics and not, as realists would have it, by strict considerations of external exigencies. It is still too early therefore to describe the Modi government’s policies as realist in either a theoretical or practical sense, for they seem to be driven as much by ideology, a quest for status and a conviction that India’s cultural greatness and economic significance will impel the world to accommodate Indian interests. The Modi government has also displayed a faith in personal diplomacy that is not particularly realist. As noted in a different time of transformation in the international system, excessive personalisation of foreign affairs comes at the cost of overall strategic doctrine. Elliot Abrams noted about the US government under President G.W. H. Bush that it had ‘borrowed from “realpolitik” an evasion of principle but has substituted personalized diplomacy for the concrete approach realpolitik demands’.16 The Modi government appears driven to a greater extent than previous Indian governments by identity goals. The transformation of India that this government seeks is to make it into a Bharat, defined ideologically and religiously, rather than into an economic and military power above all. Successive crises, particularly on the border with China, have revealed the gap between India’s interests and power, and the Modi government’s response so far is less a grand strategy than a posture or an attitude. It is still too early to definitively conclude whether the Modi government is realist in its foreign and security policies. If anything, the evidence suggests otherwise. In other words, the degree of realism in Indian policy, in both senses, has varied over time and has depended on the leaders in power. It has also varied from issue to issue. At the risk of gross oversimplification: India’s US policy has been intermittently realist for four decades or so; India has dealt with neighbours in the subcontinent since 1947 in realist ways though largely not so with Pakistan; China policy has swung from one extreme to the other and is now in flux, but was not realist for many of the early years of independent India’s existence; and, India’s actions on nuclear weapons and policy have been realist for the overwhelming part.17 In the case of China, realism would have required India to avoid a potential two-front conflict by not simultaneously treating both China and Pakistan as adversaries, as India has done recently. At the same time, India has consistently displayed a high regard for international norms and stressed interdependence among states and international cooperation, hallmarks of liberal rather than realist policy. Besides, India has not thought or acted as realism predicts – seeking regional

Is India Realist? 17

hegemony, looking for opportunities to expand through conquest and jumping at every opportunity to gain power. Instead, she has displayed very limited offensive proclivities, tactical caution and hesitation in leading subcontinental initiatives. At best, India has been a liberal realist. Public discourse in India on foreign and security policy has largely been in the language of liberalism, while practice, where the relative power balance made it possible, has been realist in the subcontinent and on hard security issues but not always in dealings with great powers. For instance, the debate on whether to acquire nuclear weapons (which was the longest and most public such discussion in any nuclear weapon state in the world) was framed in India in moral terms, as was opposition to signing a Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty (NPT) considered discriminatory and unfair. But the actual practice of keeping the nuclear weapons option open legally, and of creating the necessary capabilities, was realist throughout, whatever the convictions of the leaders, some of whom, like Shastri and Morarji Desai, had strong moral objections to India acquiring nuclear weapons.18 There is an argument to be made for the proposition that the behaviour of the Indian state has become increasingly realist as its capabilities have increased and as the international situation has permitted, but that would require a much more detailed examination of cases than is possible here. Why is India not more realist in her practice? One answer is that it has for most of its independent existence lacked the means to follow a purely realist policy in either a theoretical or practical sense. A second answer is that India has been too realistic in the sense of being too practical/pragmatic – which could explain her hesitations, her tactical caution, her fear of commitment, and failure to set ambitious targets for herself expressed in the language of power. The quixotic quest for a permanent seat on the United Nations Security Council (UNSC), for example, accepts, legitimises and actually buttresses an order that has not included India and that has actively worked against Indian interests in the subcontinent, the Indian Ocean region and in Jammu & Kashmir. As E.H. Carr pointed out, ‘Realism tends to emphasise the irresistible strength of existing forces and the inevitable character of existing tendencies, and to insist that the highest wisdom lies in accepting and adapting oneself to these forces and these tendencies.’19 It is this Carr-ian notion of realism that is probably closest to India’s grand strategic policies over time. A third answer is the liberal answer: India’s lack of realism in international relations is because India had more basic human survival and welfare issues to take care of before attempting to gather power and status in the international system. To Indian realists or purists, including Bharat Karnad, the second answer would appear to be the most apt, namely, that India was too willing to live with reality – with domestic political, social and economic limits and with external constraints. Like former defence and external affairs minister Jaswant Singh, I believe that this willingness is primarily a result of faulty conceptualisation and fractured or ineffective governance – a point that I assume Karnad would probably agree with.20 A counter argument could be that India did better than any other country in the thirty years before 2015, except China. And here is where reality becomes messy.

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For Indian policy has been most successful by its own declared goals when it turned more realist, dealt with the world as it was and not as we wished it to be, and accumulated some elements of hard power – economic and military – and made its diplomacy more transactional. How much better might India have done if Narasimha Rao, Vajpayee and Manmohan Singh’s realism were reflected in the practice of earlier leaders and governments? That is a counter-factual to which we will never have an answer. But there can be no question that we are still dealing with the consequences of that lack of realism of earlier governments in Jammu & Kashmir, with Pakistan, with China, in south-east Asia, and in the other parts of the subcontinent. Besides, public discourse and politics in India has long been expressed in the language of liberalism. Even political parties that rely on religious consolidation to mobilise support find it useful to describe themselves as real or true secularists. Realism’s central message, that it makes good sense for states to selfishly pursue power, does not have popular appeal. But, as we have seen, in India, the language of power is spoken sporadically in hushed tones behind closed doors where national security decisions are made.

Conclusion So, the answer to the question that we began with, ‘Is India realist?’, must be a qualified one, an answer that will be unsatisfying for the purist or theorist. India’s record in practice has been mixed. She has mostly been realistic but not always realist. As her means, power and agency in the international system increased, India became more realist in the expression of her policy stances and, to a lesser extent, in her practice.21 That mixed answer raises a larger question: would it be appropriate for India to adopt realism as the guiding principle in its foreign and security policies? My answer would be yes, if by this we mean realism in the conventional, day-to-day sense of understanding the situation around us correctly and responding to it, i.e., being realistic. But not if we are to determine policy by adopting the IR scholar’s definition, making power and interstate contention the be-all-and-end-all of our actions, the goal and the determinant of our stances. For such a course would distract India from the far greater goal of transforming India into a modern, prosperous and secure country where all its citizens could achieve their full potential. A purely ‘realist’ policy in the IR sense, of a single-minded pursuit of hard power and playing of the power politics game of alliances, could amount to mortgaging India’s future by accepting an unaccommodating status quo and denying it a host of other instruments of policy which might enable it to continue improving its position in the global power hierarchy (as India did for almost seventy years after independence). Besides, India faces issues of political morality and normative practice which realism does not address or answer. Today India is faced with a complex balance in the subcontinent, with external powers entrenched in the sub-region limiting Indian preponderance. The subcontinent itself is embedded in Asian and global balances which are in disequilibrium,

Is India Realist? 19

absent a global order. We are in a much harsher international political environment and a deeply unstable global economic system, in a period when conflict and anarchy are principal ingredients in international relations, as the realists predict. Despite a substantial degree of economic interdependence between states, international institutions and norms are less than effective, and the risks of conflict are rising. Is it any surprise, then, that realism is in fashion again and that practitioners turn to realism for answers? Bharat Karnad’s crusade for a realist Indian policy must needs continue and probably has a long future.

Notes 1 Hans J. Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace, New York: A. Knopf, 1967, p. 3. 2 John J. Mearschimer, The Tragedy of Great Power Politics, New York: Norton, 2001, pp. 17–22. 3 Brian C. Rathbun, Reasoning of State: Realists, Romantics and Rationality in International Relations, New York: Cambridge University Press, 2019, p. 40. 4 Kenneth Waltz, Theory of International Politics, Reading, MA: Addison Wesley, 1979. 5 This is despite Western attempts to create a realist ‘tradition’ going all the way back to St. Augustine and Thucydides via Hobbes and Machiavelli, all of whom had to be reinterpreted. See Nicolas Guilhot, After the Enlightenment: Political Realism and International Relations in the Mid-Twentieth Century, New York: Cambridge University Press, 2017. Aspiring great powers like China and India are in the process of manufacturing their own ‘realist’ traditions today. Yan Xuetong looks to pre-Qin thought to create a Chinese realist tradition in his Ancient Chinese Thought, Modern Chinese Power, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2011, while younger scholars like Manjari Kamal do the same with Kautilya, whom I would call a meta-realist, in Kautilya’s Arthashastra: Strategic Cultural Roots of India’s Contemporary Statecraft , New Delhi: Routledge India, 2022. 6 John Bew, Realpolitik, A History, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016, p. 13. 7 Alastair Iain Johnston, Cultural Realism: Strategic Culture and Grand Strategy in Chinese History, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1995. 8 Raymond Williams, Keywords, A Vocabulary of Culture and Society, London: Fontana/ Croom Helm, 1976, pp. 9–24, 216–221, cited in Bew, Realpolitik, p. 13. 9 See, for instance, E. H. Carr, The Twenty Years’ Crisis, 1919–1939, London: Macmillan, 1939, chapter 2, ‘Utopia and Reality’ pp. 11–21. 10 Isiah Berlin, ‘Realism in Politics’ in Henry Hardy (ed.), The Power of Ideas, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2000, p. 163. 11 K. M. Panikkar, Indian Nationalism: Its Origins, History, and Ideals, London: Faith Press, 1920. 12 Jawaharlal Nehru, The Discovery of India, New Delhi: Penguin Books, 2004, pp. 597–610. 13 S. D. Muni and Rahul Mishra, India’s Eastward Engagement from Antiquity to Act East Policy, New Delhi: Sage Publications, 2019, p. 96. 14 Hedley Bull, The Anarchical Society: A Study of Order in World Politics, London: Macmillan, 1977, p. 98. 15 ‘India, China Among Top Three Military Spenders in 2019: SIPRI Report’, The Hindu, 27 April 2020, https://www.thehindu.com/news/national/india-china-among-top-threemilitary-spenders-in-2019-sipri-report/article31445560.ece (accessed on 20 July 2021). 16 Elliot Abrams, ‘Bush’s Unrealpolitik’, The New York Times, 30 April 1990, https://www. nytimes.com/1990/04/30/opinion/bush-s-unrealpolitik.html (accessed on 22 July 2021), by a former Reagan administration assistant secretary of state about President George Bush’s dealings with Gorbachev and Deng Xiaoping as the Cold War ended and after the Tiananmen killings.

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17 I realise that these are very broad and sweeping generalisations about complex topics which each deserve one or several books, but lack of space here prevents a detailed explanation. For India-US relations, see Rudra Chaudhuri, Forged in Crisis: India and the United States since 1947, New York: Oxford University Press, 2014; for the 1971 crisis, see Srinath Raghavan, 1971: A Global History of the Creation of Bangladesh, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2013; for Indian nuclear policy, see Bharat Karnad, Nuclear Weapons and Indian Security: The Realist Foundations of Strategy, New Delhi: Macmillan India, 2005; and, for India’s China policy, see Ranjit Singh Kalha, IndiaChina Boundary Issues: Quest for Settlement, New Delhi: Pentagon Press, 2014. 18 What prevented Morarji Desai from signing the NPT and accepting full-scope safeguards was his moral outrage at realising that President Jimmy Carter was not willing to practice what he preached to India i.e., reduce the US’ nuclear capabilities in the interest of disarmament. It was not the contribution that nuclear weapons could make to India’s security and power that decided the issue for Desai. 19 E. H. Carr, The Twenty Years’ Crisis, p. 10. 20 Jaswant Singh, India at Risk: Mistakes, Misconceptions and Misadventures of Security Policy, New Delhi: Rupa Publications, 2013. 21 See, for instance, S. Jaishankar, The India Way: Strategies for an Uncertain World, New Delhi:Harper Collins India, 2020.

3 INDIAN REALISMS AND GRAND STRATEGIC CHOICES Kanti Bajpai

The term ‘grand strategy’ is relatively new in the lexicon of Indian foreign policy and security discourse. Grand strategizing is not. All societies must think about their safety from dire external and internal threats and must marshal their resources to deal with those threats. The ranking of threats and the precise mix of military, diplomatic, political, economic, and cultural resources differentiate grand strategies. This chapter asks: what kinds of realism undergird Indian grand strategic thought? In asking this question, the chapter focuses on external threats to security. Realism in the International Relations discipline is a broad church. It is a theoretical position and a foreign policy practice. What are Indian realisms, and how do they differ in grand strategic terms? I argue that current Indian grand strategic thinking encompasses three realisms – hard, liberal and prudential. While there are overlaps between them in terms of the nature of threats and the means of managing those threats, they do differ at base: they are largely agreed on the ranking of threats but differ in terms of preferred responses. Hard realists insist on internal and external balancing; liberal realists favour mobilizing the norms, institutions and practices of international society against India’s rivals; and prudential realists argue that a ‘hide and bide’ posture is best in dealing with more powerful adversaries.

Realism and Indian Grand Strategy There is a view that realism is an Indian tradition of thought about statecraft going back to Kautilya’s Arthashastra. Jawaharlal Nehru famously decried realism and notions of power balancing. Yet even his practice if not his thought has been assimilated to realism.1 In the 2000s, India saw a revival of interest in Kautilya even as Cold War non–alignment waned.2 Various assessments of Indian strategic thought have included a realist school of thought.3 What do Indian realisms look like? How do they rank the threats to India’s security and what responses do they advocate? DOI: 10.4324/9781003093343-3

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It is widely held that the principal external threats to India are China and Pakistan. The challenges from them are territorial, military, diplomatic, economic, and hybrid/grey zone. Unresolved border and territorial disputes, military conflict (including a potential two–front conflict against both powers), diplomatic pressures, the weaponization of economic interactions, and a combination of unconventional threats including cyber–attacks, disinformation campaigns, and support of cross–border terrorism/insurgency, in varying degrees confront Indian decision–makers, with China being a threat across all these domains. How India ranks the threats from China and Pakistan respectively and how it responds to them is the core of Indian grand strategy. Realism is a capacious body of thought in International Relations.4 However, Jeffrey Legro and Andrew Moravscik argue that three key assumptions or lines of thinking distinguish realism from other approaches in International Relations: ‘(1) unitary, rational actors in anarchy; (2) underlying conflict of preferences; and (3) resolution of conflict on the basis of relative control over material resources’. It is assumption 2 and 3 that really mark realism off from other approaches, as the assumption of unitary, rational actors operating in conditions of anarchy is shared with other perspectives.5 Liberals are wont to think that the preferences of actors are in the end compatible or that ‘a harmony of interests’ can be evolved through diplomatic and other forms of communication. However, in the realist view, preferences are not necessarily reconcilable, in which case the stage is set for conflict. Finally, realists insist that ultimately states resolve conflict by threats and inducements based on control over material resources. Non-material resources including international norms, institutions and ideas may independently bear on states and their conflicts. States may also use non-material resources to coerce and convince. Ultimately, though, for realists it is the relative balance in material resources, or hard balancing, that counts.6 The discussion so far suggests that if there is an Indian realism, it would encompass the following key elements. First, China and Pakistan are the key threats to India’s external security, and the differences with those countries are largely irreconcilable, especially on sovereign control of territory. Second, material and non-material resources can be used as threats and inducements to resolve conflict, but the former are decisive. Indian realists like other realists would largely reject the independent influence of international norms, institutions and ideas in resolving conflict, but they would accept that Indian diplomacy can use the norms, institutions and ideas existent in international society to achieve its goals vis a vis China and Pakistan e.g. by public embarrassment and shaming of adversaries, by delay tactics in international institutions to stymie the objectives of rivals and other forms of recalcitrance and resistance in international forums particularly in loose partnership with other states. This is roughly what is referred to in the International Relations literature as ‘soft balancing’.7 In short, a realist grand strategy could entail a mix of hard and soft balancing to threaten and induce Beijing and Islamabad to do India’s will – with hard balancing being, in the end, decisive.

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Third, if all Indian realists find common ground on the centrality of China and Pakistan as threats and the need for hard and soft balancing in dealing with them, they could vary by the priority they attach to various threats and means. Some might place China as the greatest threat, others Pakistan, and yet others might see the two threats as conjoint and co-equal. Indian realists might also differ over the appropriate mix of hard and soft balancing to deal with China and Pakistan over primarily territorial conflicts. In respect of hard balancing, some might favour military methods and some may prefer economic methods. With respect to military methods, some might urge India to be more offensive minded and some more defensive minded. Some might argue for primarily internal balancing – i.e., relying on India’s own military and economic strength – and some might argue for greater attention to external balancing – i.e., reaching out to allies and ‘strategic partners’.8 The chapter focuses largely on the recent writings of six well–known Indian strategists: Bharat Karnad, Pravin Sawhney (with Ghazala Wahab), Subrahmanyam Jaishankar, C. Raja Mohan, Shyam Saran, and Shivshankar Menon. These writings by no means exhaust the writings on grand strategy. However, their authors are well known both internationally and nationally. They have written in the public domain for the media and/or in the blogosphere for many years, so their reach goes beyond the academic or policy community. They have all been affiliated to the Indian government at one time or another – some as government officials (civilian and military), and some as members of Indian government bodies such as the National Security Advisory Board (NSAB) or as formal or informal consultants to the government. Their views therefore are not without importance: they influence or have influenced government thinking, and they in turn have been influenced by their association with the government. The chapter argues that these writings are suggestive of three broad schools of contemporary Indian realism: hard realism; liberal realism; and prudential realism. The term hard realism was probably first used by T. V. Paul and later by Surjit Mansingh.9 Drawing on Paul and Mansingh, hard realism as used here will signify a grand strategy that relies above all on a country’s military strength (internal balancing) but also its alliances/strategic partnerships (external balancing) to deal with adversaries. Liberal realism draws on Srinath Raghavan’s term used to describe Nehru’s strategy of ‘war and peace’ that was attentive to military power but also to the construction of norms and institutions that provide legitimacy for one’s behaviour.10 Liberal realists avow the use of military coercion, when necessary, but also the use of internationally accepted norms, institutions and practices to shape or constrain the actions of one’s adversary. That is, they rely on a mix of hard and soft balancing. Prudential realism is referenced in Paul and gestured at in Pratap Bhanu Mehta’s suggestion that Indian foreign policy is marked by ‘cautious prudence’.11 Prudential realism as used here describes a grand strategy that is averse to the use of military force except in extremis and that above all depends on strengthening internal economic, political and social resilience – it is India’s version of Deng Xiaoping’s ‘hide and bide’ posture in the face of a superior power and an array of threats.12

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Before we get to the writings of Indian analysts, four prefatory points are important. First, this chapter is about strategic thought. It is not an exercise in ‘revealed preferences’ – interpreting elements of Indian thinking from its actual actions. Instead, it is a textual exercise that draws on the current writings of active strategists, as a way of delineating a range of realist thinking. Second, states operate in different theatres and deal with other states on various issues. Indian realists may be other than realist when preferences are not in deep conflict and when international norms and institutions can facilitate cooperation. Third, the chapter does not claim that the analysts it deals with here would apply the label ‘realist’ to their own thinking. My use of the term realist for them is ‘denotative’ and not ‘connotative’. Fourth, in earlier work going back to 2002, I had identified at least two of the thinkers here – Karnad and Raja Mohan – as ‘hyperrealist’ and ‘neo-liberal globalist’, respectively.13 As a description of their thinking at the time, I think those labels are correct. Two decades later, Karnad remains the most prominent hard realist and in that sense ‘hyperrealist’ even if for the purposes of this chapter I have given him a different tag. With the growing challenge of cross-border terrorism from Pakistan, China’s increasing power and assertiveness and the remission of economic globalization, Raja Mohan has shifted to a more realist stance in the sense that he is more likely to support India’s use of force and of economic and other instruments coercively. I therefore see him as a liberal realist now rather than a neo-liberal globalist.

Hard Realism: Bharat Karnad and Pravin Sawhney/Ghazala Wahab Since the early 1990s, Bharat Karnad of the Centre for Policy Research has written voluminously on Indian grand strategy – on the broad approach India should adopt in dealing with China and Pakistan and on various aspects of Indian defence including military strategy and Indian defence production. The key articulation of his broad approach to India’s grand strategic choices was presented in ‘India’s Weak Geopolitics and What to do About It’ in 1995.14 Drawing on the thought of Halford Mackinder and Nicholas Spykman as well as British colonial geopolitical thought, Karnad suggests that beginning with Nehru, independent India failed to comprehend the geographical imperatives and opportunities of grand strategy. In essence, India failed to understand that maintaining a series of buffers on its continental side was vital for security. The failure to appreciate the vital significance of buffers led to the emplacement of Chinese power at India’s borderlands. In addition, India’s enmity with Pakistan meant that joint defence against China, or against Soviet power just over the rim in Central Asia (and later in Afghanistan), was made impossible. Worse, since Pakistan has chosen ‘strength’ rather than ‘accommodation’ with India, India’s western flank has been made vulnerable to Pakistani military power.15 After the Cold War, the instabilities in Central Asia, Afghanistan and thence in Pakistan meant that the western flank became even more unstable. In sum, India was faced with a twofront problem on its land borders and, though Karnad scarcely deals with it in this

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early essay, a potential third front in the Indian Ocean area from the Gulf to the South China Sea. It is the China front, though, that is most worrisome, in Karnad’s analysis: it is the ‘classical danger’.16 Karnad’s proposed response for India is, first, an active policy of internal subversion in China by supporting both Tibetan and Uighur separatists, thereby aiding the domestic unravelling of the communist regime (which he sees as inevitable in the long run if only due to increasing economic disparities), and second, the creation of a coalition with Southeast Asian countries in the east and Israel and the Gulf countries in the west. The first, and particularly the disruption in Tibet, would help alleviate the pressures from China on India’s land borders. The partnership with Southeast Asia would outflank the Chinese navy in the Indian Ocean, and the partnership with Israel and the Gulf would outflank Pakistan, Iran (if it partners Pakistan in an Islamic front), Afghanistan, and various worrisome countries in Central Asia.17 India would be at the heart of the coalition, but it would be aided by at least the tacit support of the US and Russia.18 Finally, Karnad suggests that a strategic understanding with or at least neutralization of Pakistan is possible, which would allow India to concentrate its military forces on China.19 In subsequent writings, Karnad has hewed closely to this overall schema. On India’s Tibet policy, he has continued to urge material support of internal subversion, rethinking India’s commitment to a One China policy (including in respect of Taiwan) and diplomatic embarrassment of Beijing over its human rights record.20 More importantly, he extends the flanking coalition to a middle power grouping that would include not just Southeast Asia (and particularly Vietnam) but also Japan, South Korea and Australia.21 Crucially, as in 1994, he remains sceptical of depending on the US as part of checking coalition against China. The US is untrustworthy, a fading power, more nationalistic and alliance-averse than before, and tempted to accommodate China if not withdraw from Asia.22 With respect to Pakistan, Karnad continues to argue that Islamabad can be at least brought round to neutrality as between India and China. This would require India to restructure its missile and ground forces on the border to reassure Pakistan, open up its markets unilaterally to Pakistani goods and even institute military-to-military social links between two kin forces.23 Most importantly, Karnad argues that in the end India must be a front-rank military power which increasingly produces key military platforms and equipment domestically. He insists on the full-range of nuclear weapons, from tactical to counterforce, and the willingness to use them first, particularly tactical weapons against China.24 On conventional arms production, he recognizes that India is still some way from producing key systems – largely due to civilians and military officials alike being addicted to foreign weaponry – and so sourcing from the US, Israel, and above all, Russia continues to be vital. In the long run, Karnad is convinced that the Indian defence production companies, public and private, can deliver. This is imperative since foreign supplies runs may be uncertain in time of war.25 The second analyst in this school is Pravin Sawhney with his collaborator, Ghazala Wahab. In Dragon on our Doorstep, Sawhney/Wahab sketch out a grand

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strategy directed towards China and Pakistan.26 Like Karnad, they see China as the main threat to India, not Pakistan. Responding to the view that India can fight a two-front war, they dismiss this possibility: ‘Any discerning observer knows that a two-front war with nuclear weapons-armed China and Pakistan will be suicidal [for India]’.27 Indeed, in contrast to Karnad, they go further, suggesting that India would lose outright to China and not even be in a position to defeat Pakistan.28 Fighting a two-front war, therefore, is unthinkable no matter what the Indian military may say. India’s response to this parlous situation must be to settle the Kashmir problem with Pakistan so that the Indian military can focus on one front, namely, China. Kashmir talks with Pakistan, including nuclear confidence building, would ensure stability and avoid an arms race. An agreement on Kashmir would also reduce Pakistan’s worries over the Indus waters.29 Beyond a settlement with Pakistan, India must address the unhappiness of the Kashmiri people (and other disaffected groups outside the mainstream).30 Sawhney and Ghazala seem to suggest that resolving the Kashmir problem would enable Islamabad to declare a victory of sorts in a final give-and-take settlement: ‘The Pakistan Army, with ownership of the Kashmir dispute since the 1947 war, wants to settle it on equal terms.’31 China’s interest in accepting a Kashmir settlement is that it prefers to have a western flank that is peaceful and stable – because these areas are contiguous to Tibet and Xinjiang and because connectivity projects such as the CPEC and in Central Asia become more viable if Indian opposition is diluted after a rapprochement with Pakistan.32 A Kashmir settlement notwithstanding, India will still have to deal with a China ‘which holds most of the cards on the disputed border, [and] would neither settle the issue peacefully nor renege on its claims’.33 To prevent further crises along the existing Line of Actual Control (LAC) with China, India should negotiate stability from a position of greater strength. Building a hedging coalition with the US, Japan, and Southeast Asia is one means of bolstering India’s position.34 Another is to achieve greater internal cohesion: it must make peace internally with various insurgencies so that it is not prone to external blackmail.35 Crucially, Sawhney/Wahab argue, like Karnad, that military power above all is vital. India’s indigenous manufacturing needs revamping but in the meantime crucial technologies must be imported. Rational and faster procurement, technology transfers from the private sector and foreign manufacturers and war purchases from abroad to modernize the armed forces while building R&D and long-term competencies in key areas domestically must be at the heart of a defence overhaul. In terms of imported weapons, Russia is vital, as it has been a more reliable partner in providing arms and transferring technology than India’s other alternative, the US.36 At peace with Pakistan and with a bolstering strategic coalition and a stronger military, India would be well positioned to improve relations with China even as it seeks to stabilize the border and hope for an eventual settlement. Eventually, Delhi could even play honest broker between the Tibetan government-in-exile and the Chinese government and ‘harmonize’ its Act East policy with Beijing’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). In time, India, Russia and China could cooperate on the Asian landmass and farther afield.37

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Hard realists in India put internal balancing at the heart of their grand strategy which is focused on China. Since building an Indian defence industry of size and quality is in the future, they prescribe external balancing – as a means of accessing advanced weapons and as a check against Chinese power while India builds its own hard power. Since China is a formidable rival, a two-front competition is unsustainable, so ‘turning’ Pakistan is vital. This can be done by settling Kashmir and/or by other means of strategic reassurance.

Liberal Realism: Subrahmanyam Jaishankar and C. Raja Mohan A second Indian school of contemporary realism is typified by Subrahmanyam Jaishankar, former Indian Foreign Secretary and later External Affairs Minister in the second Narendra Modi government, and C. Raja Mohan, a long-time Indian think-tank analyst. Jaishankar has made some key speeches during his time as Foreign Secretary (2015–2019) and as External Affairs Minister (2019 onwards). Raja Mohan writes extensively in the press and academic volumes and has published several key books on Indian foreign policy. The two are widely regarded as holding rather similar views, and going back to early days in their careers, they even wrote together.38 As Foreign Secretary and External Affairs Minister, Jaishankar has described India’s changing foreign policy under Narendra Modi, in terms of the broad principles of the new grand strategy and, largely by implication, India’s approach to China and Pakistan. The first principle is that given India’s growing capabilities it is poised to play the role of a ‘leading’ power rather than a mere ‘balancing’ power or swing state. What is a leading power? In essence, it is a power that will go beyond ‘reacting to events’ to actually ‘shaping…even driving’ developments in the international system.39 Secondly, as a leading power India supports the status quo and will not be ‘disruptionist’. It seeks to be a ‘stabilizing power’ in an international system that is ‘law abiding or rule based’.40 As a stabilizing power, India will aim to be ‘a country that brings its capacities to bear on the international system for [the] global good’. It will be a ‘net-security provider…a contributor to connectivity… firm in dealing with challenges like terrorism…’, among other things.41 Thirdly, while the new India will play a role in promoting systemic and cosmopolitan interests, it will also lay greater emphasis on the ‘purposeful pursuit of national interests’ at a time of ‘shifting global dynamics.’ This narrower, more selfish vision entails a greater attention to the new sources of power (technology, infrastructure/connectivity, trade), to ‘outcomes’ over ‘form and process’ and to greater ‘realism in policy’. The new India understands as never before that ‘International relations are very much a test of will’, that ‘the world [is] a gymnasium where nations come to make themselves strong’ and that it cannot ignore ‘the harsher realities of hard security’.42 These three principles are intended to gesture at a more realist orientation to foreign policy. While Jaishankar deploys an internationalist language (i.e. India as a status quo, global good-citizen), as a leading power its primary aim will be to shape

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norms and institutions that promote its own security. Moreover, even in its more cosmopolitan role, it will focus not just on non-traditional security issues such as climate change but also on issues much closer to its everyday security challenges such as terrorism. Above all, India will cultivate strength in a world where power counts. On China and Pakistan, Jaishankar, as a public official, is legitimately guarded: he lists various disputes and differences and repeats various clichés about engagement and problem solving (mostly in respect of China) but says little of real substance about how India will deal with either power. Yet the general principles above are indicative of the new approach. By emphasizing India’s shaping role, he suggests that Delhi will use international norms and institutions against Beijing and Islamabad – for instance, in shaping the global response to cross-border terrorism. The insistence that India will not be a disrupting power implies that there are those who are disruptive – by implication revisionist China and Pakistan. This is classic soft balancing – using international societal values and organizations to shame and constrain adversaries. At the same time, the new India will be a more normal country than it has been in the past in dealing with China and Pakistan: it will build and use its hard power. Internal balancing will be joined by building strategic partnerships with Russia, Australia and the US as a hedging strategy. Relations with Russia are ‘very deeply rooted in a sort of geopolitical understanding…there is a fundamental Eurasian underpinning’ – the ‘Eurasian underpinning’ being no doubt its counterbalancing of China in the Asian landmass. India and Australia are ‘two countries whose interests and approaches are really very convergent’ – that is, above all, convergent on the China threat. As for the US, ‘there is virtually no area of activity where India and the United States don’t work with each other and deal with each other’.43 There is no suggestion here of alliances. Rather, these partnerships are hedges against Chinese aggression, with the implicit threat that India could turn to alliances to counter an overbearing China. Since the end of the Cold War, C. Raja Mohan has been prolific on India’s grand strategy. Broadly speaking, he has argued for a clear-eyed recognition of power dynamics in the international system and India’s policies in light of those dynamics. From this perspective, Raja Mohan sees China as the main threat to India’s power and interests. In 2003, against the backdrop of rapidly rising Chinese power, he wrote ‘Handling the ties with Beijing is likely to be the biggest political challenge for Indian foreign policy in the coming decades’. The challenge at the time was: ‘Can India find a way to deal with China that is not encumbered by selfdoubt or romanticism that marked its past efforts?’44 The response to China must be to build military power and strategic partnerships. India’s nuclear weapons atop ‘longer-range missiles’ could ‘end Beijing’s traditional dismissal of India’s nuclear and great power aspirations’. In addition, its ‘massive [conventional] military modernization’ with the cooperation of Russia, Israel and the US would mean that ‘China will have to deal with a significant military power on its borders in the future’. Beyond military power, India’s incipient ‘natural alliance’ with the US would ‘[force] Beijing to reconsider its own relations with New Delhi’. This would be supplemented by hedging partnerships

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with Southeast Asia, Japan and Taiwan. Finally, India should not ‘wantonly confront China’ during this period of power asymmetry. Engagement in the form of trade, investment and cultural flows would buy India time to build its military and diplomatic strength.45 For Raja Mohan, Pakistan is only a secondary challenge. In 2003, he endorsed a hard power, coercive diplomacy response, as in the 2001–2 full military mobilization after the terrorist attack on India’s parliament.46 The military component of coercive diplomacy must be combined with ‘exploitation of Pakistan’s contradictions with its neighbours’ as well as economic, diplomatic and political pressures ‘to engineer, through external pressures, an internal transformation of Pakistan that puts an end to the sources of compulsive hostility’. However, this could only succeed if India maintained its own ‘internal coherence and unity’ and avoids majoritarianism – otherwise it would lose its advantages to grey zone/hybrid warfare responses from Pakistan.47 In 2015, Raja Mohan endorsed the idea of India as a leading power. India must accept its growing ‘absolute weight in the international system’, move from passive nonalignment and strategic autonomy to ‘shape its external environment’ actively, and make itself attractive to all powers including the US and China. By mid-2020, his position on China had hardened. In a series of columns during the border crisis in Ladakh, he pointed to the growing power gap between the two countries.48 To deal with China, Delhi needs to grow its comprehensive national power by ‘restoring internal political coherence, accelerating economic modernisation and expanding India’s national power’.49 Fundamentally, over the long term, India must build military power, with the help of Russia, France, Israel, and the US. Even then, it must realize that it is largely on its own in resisting Chinese ‘expansionism’, as its putative partners have deep economic ties to China and cannot alienate Beijing.50 On Pakistan, too, Raja Mohan holds to his earlier position – the efficacy of coercive diplomacy. Reflecting on the Balakot air strikes by India in retaliation for the Pulwama terrorist attack in February 2019, he describes it approvingly as a shift in Indian strategy towards ‘offensive defence’. Rather than be hampered by the existence of nuclear weapons in both countries and the fear of escalation, India must exploit escalatory fears to its advantage by conducting operations that impose costs on Pakistan yet do not threaten the country’s survival.51 Here then is the liberal realist grand strategy for India: soft balancing by shaping and using international norms, institutions and practices against rivals; hedging by energetic diplomatic coalition-building; deploying carefully calibrated hard power when necessary (particularly against a weaker opponent); and engaging a more powerful opponent even as India expands its comprehensive national power.

Prudential Realism: Shyam Saran and Shivshankar Menon In contrast to the hard realism of Karnad and Sawhney and the liberal realism of Jaishankar and Raja Mohan, a third realist position is that of former diplomats Shyam Saran and Shivshankar Menon. Both are China specialists, were Foreign Secretary in their time and held post-retirement government responsibilities.52

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Saran’s basic premise is that the pursuit of ‘strategic autonomy’ is the thread that connects India’s external policy from non-alignment days to present-day ‘multi-alignment’. Strategic autonomy is ‘the ability of a state to take relatively independent decisions on matters of vital interest’.53 In Saran’s view, China not only shares a border with India but also ‘is the power that has the most direct impact on India’s strategic space’.54 While China is the main challenge, Pakistan ‘is a subset of this challenge, given the strong alliance between the two countries’.55 How should India deal with a rising China, one that no longer ‘sees any urgency for resolving the boundary issue’ and is increasingly ambitious in South and Southeast Asia?56 Saran argues for the application of ‘Kautilyan principles’. At the core of India’s approach must be to build ‘comprehensive national power’ including ‘political leadership, good governance, a strong economy and a strong military’ to reduce the power gap with China. Since this will be protracted, India must in the meantime ‘align with other powerful states’, principally the US, Japan, Australia, Indonesia, and Vietnam, all of which worry about China. Finally, and most importantly, India must bide its time and ‘act with prudence’ to avoid ‘provoking a conflict with a stronger power while building one’s strength’.57 The basic threat from Pakistan is asymmetric warfare in the form of support for cross–border terrorism. The counter to this is ‘a toolkit of options, short of war…a series of pressure points’. These include resurrecting India’s claims on Gilgit and Baltistan and ‘highlighting’ tribal unhappiness there. Similarly, India should go public on human rights violations in restive Balochistan. In Afghanistan, India could increase its ‘presence’ there and help ‘strengthen Afghan security’.58 Beyond these soft balancing policies, India should use a series of ‘positive levers’ or inducements as well: uninterrupted diplomatic communication; trade and economic ties; and people-to-people relations. Ultimately, if neither soft balancing nor inducements work, India may have to resort to force.59 Menon begins exactly where Saran does, with the assertion that the continuous thread running through India’s foreign policy strategy is strategic autonomy which he defines as ‘keeping decision–making power with itself, avoiding alliances, and building India’s capabilities while working with others when it was in India’s interest to do so’.60 For Menon, ‘China is India’s foremost challenge’.61 Pakistan by contrast ‘is not a strategic threat to India unless India hands it victory by making it possible for Pakistan to exploit religious fissures in India’s society’. Islamabad as Beijing’s close partner is in any case part of India’s larger China problem.62 How should India deal with China and Pakistan? Since the Pakistan problem is essentially a China problem – given Beijing’s increasing support of Islamabad economically, diplomatically and militarily – the grand strategic challenge is how to handle China. India’s response to the China threat is to ‘concentrate its efforts on strengthening itself, consolidating its periphery and external balancing’.63 Internally, it has to push forward its own economic development at a rapid pace. Crucial to this is to keep India’s economy as open as possible and to work with all major powers for its transformation. Internal political stability too is vital. India cannot be secure and to rise as a power if its people are unhappy and if this

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unhappiness can be exploited by outside powers such as Pakistan.64 Beyond building its internal strength, India must ensure that ‘its periphery [its region]… cannot be used against its interests’ by China.65 The bilateral framework with Beijing, evolved after 1988, no longer suffices given China’s rise after the global financial crisis of 2008. India will increasingly therefore have to resort to partnering with others in the extended region, particularly Japan, Vietnam, Singapore, Indonesia, and Australia in both economy and security. On the other hand, Menon is pessimistic about the Indo-Pacific/Quad coalition which, with its focus on the western Pacific and South China Sea, addresses neither India’s continental nor Indian Ocean challenges.66 At the heart of his pessimism on the Indo-Pacific is that this implies an alliance with the US, which ‘is exactly the wrong answer’.67 The complexities facing India in the extended neighbourhood and with China and Pakistan call for ‘creative diplomacy’ and not being ‘entangled in others’ quarrels’. No alliance will help here partly because the US has its own equities in the region, in China and Pakistan.68 In any case, as for Saran, the basic grand strategic posture must be ‘hide and bide’: ‘All rising powers in history have chosen to keep their head down while building their own strength, rather than inviting resistance to their rise to great power status by proclaiming their power and its uses’.69 As fundamental in Menon’s view must be acceptance that ‘Avoiding war and attaining one’s goals is the highest form of strategy by any tradition or book’.70 The prudential realist approach to grand strategy is premised at base on buying time to build up comprehensive national power through good governance and economic openness. With its emphasis on strategic autonomy, its objective in the end is internal balancing. In the meantime, given the power gap with China, India needs hedging partnerships. Avoiding war unless it is thrust upon India must be a bedrock.

Conclusion: Indian Realisms and Grand Strategic Choices Is China or Pakistan the greater threat? How should India deal with China and Pakistan? The three strains of contemporary Indian realism overlap but also differ. All three perspectives see China as the greater strategic worry. While there has long been a ‘Pakistan First’ school and a ‘China First’ school in Indian strategic thinking, the global financial crisis of 2008 was probably a turning point. Beijing’s increasingly assertive signalling and behaviour since then has swung the Indian strategic community towards perceiving China as the main worry. As the US pulled away from Pakistan over Islamabad’s support of terrorism, the China – Pakistan link deepened. A growing view is that the Pakistan problem therefore boils down to removing Beijing’s support of Islamabad. By contrast, hard realists Karnad and Sawhney/Wahab urge India to remove Islamabad’s support of Beijing by a strategy of reassurance to Pakistan. This would convert India’s two-front into a one-front challenge. In terms of managing China and Pakistan, hard realists want India to concentrate on developing a robust military posture (including in Karnad’s case, the willingness

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to use nuclear weapons first in case of war with China), liberal realists rely on shaping international norms, institutions and practices to constrain Beijing and Islamabad until India is more powerful, and prudential realists insist on the primacy of building internal economic, political and social resilience as the basis for long-term balancing. Beyond these broad differences, all three postures are agreed that hard power – military and economic power – is central to grand strategy. In varying degrees all are agreed that India does not have the hard power now or in the foreseeable future to balance China on its own. Pure internal balancing is therefore not feasible. All are agreed that India will need external balancing to bridge the gap. In varying degrees, all Indian realists reject formal alliances and are more comfortable with strategic partnerships – a coalition of states that consult and coordinate militarily and diplomatically with no serious obligation to come to each other’s aid in time of war. While Indian analysts are not explicit on the utility of strategic partnerships, these relationships seem to offer two benefits: first, they lay the groundwork for military inter-operability and grand strategic coordination should it come to war, especially with China; and second, they signal the threat of ‘defection’ to an actual alliance relationship if China becomes too overbearing and are therefore instruments of informal bargaining. Karnad and Sawhney/Wahab are sceptical of the US as a partner – Karnad even more so than Sawhney/Wahab – while the others are more positive. Beyond these strategic partnerships/coalitions, liberal realists envisage a larger soft balancing coalition that would restrain China and Pakistan by India’s shaping of international norms, institutions and practices. Jaishankar and Raja Mohan go so far as to suggest that the old non-aligned group or the ‘global South’ is just such a larger coalition, where India’s traditional clarion calls for international justice can help check Chinese influence in particular.71 All three realisms recognize that beyond military power and external balancing/ partnerships, internal economic, political and social resilience is vital in grand strategy. Hard realists recognize that internal resilience is important in dealing with an adversary (e.g., to stymie hybrid/grey zone attacks), but the most important internal factor is a state’s own arms production. Liberal realists and prudential realists by contrast are much more attentive to the domestic sources of power – economic, political and social. Internal unity and resilience defend against hybrid/grey zone attacks as also create the overall conditions for economic growth and technological progress that are vital for a native arms industry. Hard realists would not disagree that internal economic reform as also other domestic aspects of resilience are important, but these can and should go in tandem with the steady building of an indigenous arms industry. In any case, all realists are agreed that India needs to buy foreign arms until its domestic arms industry becomes capable of building the advanced platforms that Indian requires, even if they differ on the source of imports. Karnad is the most insistent that India can produce all its major defence needs indigenously. He and Sawhney/Wahab regard a combination of Russia, France and Israel as stopgap and supplementary suppliers who could help India indigenize in the long–term since they are more open to technology transfers and in some cases co–production and co–development. The US by contrast is reluctant to part with the latest technology

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and chary of co-production/co-development. While Jaishankar and Raja Mohan do not address the issue explicitly, we can surmise that for them American arms must increasingly be the source of advanced weapons given US high-tech but also because the main alternative, Russia, is increasingly conflicted between China and India. Saran and Menon would probably agree with the Jaishankar and Raja Mohan view. A final thought relates to the nature of power endorsed by the three grand strategic postures. Hard realism depends on military power above all. Liberal realism invokes shaping power. And prudential realism favours stealth power – striving to catch up with a rival in as unprovocative and unnoticeable a way as possible. The grand strategy of India as an actual policy has all three elements, but the three realisms featured here advocate rather different pathways to security.

Notes 1 Bharat Karnad, Nuclear Weapons and Indian Security: The Realist Foundations of Strategy, Delhi: Macmillan India, 2002 and Srinath Raghavan, War and Peace in Modern India, Ranikhet: Permanent Black, 2010. 2 P.K. Gautam, ‘One Hundred Years of Kautilya’s Arthasastra’, IDSA Monograph Series No. 20, July 2013, https://idsa.in/system/files/monograph20.pdf (accessed on 20 May 2021). 3 Stephen P. Cohen, India: Emerging Power, Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution Press, 2001, pp. 36–65, Kanti Bajpai, ‘Indian Strategic Culture’, in Michael R. Chambers, (ed), South Asia in 2020: Future Strategic Balances and Alliances, Carlisle, Pennsylvania: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, 2003, pp. 245– 303, and Rahul Sagar, ‘State of Mind: What Kind of Power will India Become?’ International Affairs, 2009, 85 (4): 801–816. 4 Legro and Moravscik, ‘Is Anybody Still a Realist?’ Working Paper Series 98–14 Weatherhead Center for International Affairs, Harvard University, October 1998, https://www.princeton. edu/~amoravcs/library/98-14.pdf (accessed on 20 May 2021). Also see Jonathan Kirshner, ‘The Tragedy of Offensive Realism: Classical Realism and the Rise of China’, European Journal of International Politics, 2012, 18(1): 53–74 and Jack Donnelly, ‘Realism’, in S. Burchill, A. Linklater, R. Devetak, J. Donnelly, M. Paterson, C. Reus-Smit, and Jacqui True (eds.), Theories of International Relations, 3rd ed., London: Palgrave, 2005, pp. 29–54. 5 Kenneth Oye, ‘Explaining Cooperation under Anarchy: Hypotheses and Strategies’, World Politics, 1985, 38(1): 1–24. 6 Power can be thought about in two ways: outcomes that favour one’s interests; and the (usually material) resources that are deployed to advance one’s interests. See Janice Bially Mattern, ‘The Concept of Power and (Un)Discipline of International Relations’, in Chris Reus-Smit and Duncan Snidal (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of International Relations, Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 693–698. 7 Most recently, see T. V. Paul, Restraining the Great Powers: Soft Balancing from Empires to the Global Era, New Haven: Yale University Press, 2018. 8 On the difference, see Vidya Nadkarni, Strategic Partnerships in Asia: Balancing Without Alliances, 2010, New York: Routledge, pp. 44–51. 9 T. V. Paul, Power Versus Prudence: Why Nations Forgo Nuclear Weapons, London: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 2000, pp. 3–13 and Surjit Mansingh, ‘Indira Gandhi’s Foreign Policy: Hard Realism?’ in David M. Malone, C. Raja Mohan, and Srinath Raghavan, (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Indian Foreign Policy, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015, pp. 104–116. 10 Raghavan, War and Peace in Modern India, pp. 318–321.

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11 Paul, Power Versus Prudence, pp. 14–27 and Pratap Bhanu Mehta, ‘Still in Nehru’s Shadow: The Absence of Foreign Policy Frameworks in India’, India Review, 2009, 8(3): 209–233. 12 Deng’s ‘keep a low profile’ maxim for China’s foreign policy has been explicated as ‘observe calmly, secure our position, cope with affairs calmly, hide our capacities and bide our time, be good at maintaining a low profile, and never claim leadership.’ See Huang Youyi, ‘Context, Not History, Matters for Deng’s Famous Phrase’, Global Times, 15 June 2011, https://www.globaltimes.cn/content/661734.shtml (accessed on 3 August 2021). 13 Bajpai, ‘Indian Strategic Culture’, pp. 245–303. 14 Bharat Karnad, ‘India’s Weak Geopolitics’, in Bharat Karnad (ed), Future Imperilled: India’s Security in the 1990s and Beyond, New Delhi: Penguin Viking, 1995, pp. 17–67. 15 Karnad quotes the US strategic affairs expert William Barnds to this effect. See Karnad, ‘India’s Weak Geopolitics’, p. 48. 16 Karnad, ‘India’s Weak Geopolitics’. 17 Karnad, ‘India’s Weak Geopolitics’, pp. 43–46 and pp. 48–59. 18 Karnad, ‘India’s Weak Geopolitics’, pp. 56–58. 19 Karnad, ‘India’s Weak Geopolitics’, pp. 63–66. See also Bharat Karnad, ‘Key to Peace in South Asia: Fostering “Social Links” Between the Armies of India and Pakistan’, The Round Table, 338, April 1996, pp. 205–229. 20 Bharat Karnad, Why India is Not a Great Power (Yet), New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 2015, pp. 109–112, and pp. 180–182. 21 Karnad, Why India is Not a Great Power (Yet), pp. 115–139 and Bharat Karnad, Staggering Forward: Narendra Modi and India’s Global Ambition, New Delhi: Penguin Viking, 2018, pp. 194–220. 22 Karnad, Why India is Not a Great Power (Yet), pp. 187–219 and Karnad, Staggering Forward, pp. 210–216. The reference to ‘fading power’ and the possibility of the US leaving Asia is on p. 175. 23 Karnad, Why India is Not a Great Power (Yet), pp. 163–166 and Karnad, Staggering Forward, pp. 224–238. 24 Karnad, Nuclear Weapons and Indian Security, pp. 612–645, and pp. 666–682, Karnad, Why India is Not a Great Power (Yet), pp. 388–393, and Karnad, Staggering Forward, pp. 344–349. 25 Why India is Not a Great Power (Yet), pp. 410–454 and Karnad, Staggering Forward, pp. 277–325. 26 Pravin Sawhney and Ghazala Wahab, Dragon on Our Doorstep: Managing China Through Military Power, New Delhi: Aleph, 2017. 27 Sawhney and Wahab, Dragon on Our Doorstep, pp. 159–160. 28 Sawhney and Wahab, Dragon on Our Doorstep, pp. 161–165. 29 Sawhney and Wahab, Dragon on Our Doorstep, pp. 166–170. 30 Sawhney and Wahab, Dragon on Our Doorstep, p. 413. 31 Sawhney and Wahab, Dragon on Our Doorstep, pp. 162–163. 32 Sawhney and Wahab, Dragon on Our Doorstep, pp. 167–168 and p. 412. 33 Sawhney and Wahab, Dragon on Our Doorstep, p. 407. 34 Sawhney and Wahab, Dragon on Our Doorstep, p. 167. 35 Sawhney and Wahab, Dragon on Our Doorstep, pp. 359–376 and p. 413. 36 Sawhney and Wahab, Dragon on Our Doorstep, pp. 295–324. 37 Sawhney and Wahab, Dragon on Our Doorstep, p. 167 and pp. 412–413. 38 C. Raja Mohan and S. Jaishankar, ‘Nuclear Cartelisation: Theory and Practice’, Economic and Political Weekly, 14 May 1977, 12 (20): 798–802. Jaishankar spoke at the launch of Raja Mohan’s latest book, Modi’s World: Expanding India’s Sphere of Influence, New Delhi: HarperCollins, 2015. See ‘Remarks by Foreign Secretary at the Release of Dr. C. Raja Mohan’s Book “Modi’s World-Expanding India’s Sphere of Influence” (July 17, 2015)’, Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India, 18 July 2015, https://mea.gov.in/ Speeches-Statements.htm?dtl/25491/Remarks+by+Foreign+Secretary+at+the+release+ of+Dr+C+Raja+Mohans+book+Modis+WorldExpanding+Indias+Sphere+of+Infuen cequotJuly+17+2015 (accessed on 9 July 2020).

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39 ‘Remarks by Foreign Secretary at the release of Dr. C. Raja Mohan’s Book’. 40 ‘External Affairs Minister in Conversation at Raisina Dialogue 2020: The India Way’, Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India, 16 January 2020, https://mea.gov.in/interviews. htm?dtl/32305/External_Affairs_Minister_in_Conversation_at_Raisina_Dialogue_2020__ The_India_Way (accessed on 15 July 2020). 41 ‘External Affairs Minister’s speech at the 4th Ramnath Goenka Lecture, 2019’, Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India, 14 November 2019, https://www.mea.gov.in/ Speeches-Statements.htm?dtl/32038/External_Affairs_Ministers_speech_at_the_4th_ Ramnath_Goenka_Lecture_2019 (accessed on 15 July 2020). 42 ‘External Affairs Minister’s speech at the 4th Ramnath Goenka Lecture, 2019’. 43 ‘External Affairs Minister in Conversation at Raisina Dialogue 2020: The India Way’. 44 C. Raja Mohan, Crossing the Rubicon: The Shaping of India’s New Foreign Policy, New Delhi: Penguin Viking, 2003, pp. 142–143. 45 Raja Mohan, Crossing the Rubicon, pp. 161–164. 46 Raja Mohan, Crossing the Rubicon, p. 200. 47 Raja Mohan, Crossing the Rubicon, pp. 202–203. 48 C. Raja Mohan, ‘China Now has the Military Power to Alter Territorial Status Quo’, Indian Express, 9 June 2020, https://indianexpress.com/article/opinion/columns/indiachina-ladakh-lac-border-dispute-c-raja-mohan-6449294/ (accessed on 20 May 2021). 49 C. Raja Mohan, ‘Acknowledging Beijing’s Rise, Scale of Challenge it Presents, Are First Steps in Crafting a New China Policy’, The Indian Express, 23 June 2020, https://indianexpress. com/article/opinion/columns/india-china-lac-border-20-armymen-killed-galwan-va lley-6471415/ (accessed on 20 May 2021). 50 C. Raja Mohan, ‘Indian Resistance to China’s Expansionism Would be a Definitive Moment in Asia’s Geopolitical Evolution’, Indian Express, 30 June 2020, https://indianexpress.com/ article/opinion/columns/galwan-encounter-india-china-border-dispute-russia-us-indiaforeign-relations-c-rajamohan-6482305/ (accessed on 20 May 2021). 51 C. Raja Mohan, ‘Explained: How Balakot Changed the Familiar Script of India-Pakistan Military Crises’, Indian Express, 4 March 2019, https://indianexpress.com/article/explained/ pulwama-attack-pakistan-narendra-modi-balakot-air-strike-iaf-5609325/ (accessed on 20 May 2021). 52 Saran was twice a Special Envoy for India, and Menon was National Security Advisor. 53 Shyam Saran, How India Sees the World: Kautilya to the 21st Century, New Delhi: Juggernaut Books, 2017, p. 2. 54 Saran, How India Sees the World, p. 106. 55 Saran, How India Sees the World, p. 58. 56 Saran, How India Sees the World, p. 147. 57 Saran, How India Sees the World, p. 148. 58 Saran, How India Sees the World, pp, 98–99. 59 Saran, How India Sees the World, p. 105. 60 Shivshankar Menon, India’s Foreign Affairs Strategy, Impact Series, May 2020, Brookings Institution India Center, New Delhi, p. 14, https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/ uploads/2020/05/India27s-foreign-affairs-strategy.pdf (accessed on 20 May 2021). 61 Menon, India’s Foreign Affairs Strategy, p. 16. 62 Menon, India’s Foreign Affairs Strategy, p. 16. 63 Menon, India’s Foreign Affairs Strategy, p. 15. 64 Menon, India’s Foreign Affairs Strategy, p. 16. 65 Menon, India’s Foreign Affairs Strategy, p. 15. 66 Menon, India’s Foreign Affairs Strategy, p. 18. 67 Menon, India’s Foreign Affairs Strategy, p. 14. 68 Menon, India’s Foreign Affairs Strategy, p. 14. 69 Menon, India’s Foreign Affairs Strategy, p. 9. 70 Menon, India’s Foreign Affairs Strategy, p. 20. 71 S. Jaishankar, The India Way: Strategies for an Uncertain World, New Delhi: HarperCollins, 2020, p. 182 (Kindle) on India and the global South. See also ‘S Jaishankar in

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Conversation with C. Raja Mohan at RNG Lecture 2019’, Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India, 17 November 2019, https://www.mea.gov.in/interviews.htm?dtl/ 32049/S_Jaishankar_in_Conversation_with_C_Raja_Mohan_at_RNG_Lecture_2019 (accessed on 6 November 2020), and C. Raja Mohan, ‘India Rethinks the Non-Aligned Movement’, ISAS Briefs, 11 May 2020, https://www.isas.nus.edu.sg/papers/india-rethinksthe-non-aligned-movement/ (accessed on 6 November 2020).

4 A JOURNEY WITHOUT A DESTINATION The Cultural-Economy of a Great Power D. Shyam Babu

The present chapter seeks to answer the oft-raised question: why is it such a slog for realist policies to find traction in Indian society? The question appears to assume that the country is a) too idealistic to pursue its national interests or b) too incompetent in that pursuit. It is the contention here that India suffers from structural incompetence imposed by caste and culture, rather than its leaders’ infirmities. Let’s take a reality check. Almost all its neighbours in South Asia resent its hard-nosed approach in minding only its national interests even at the cost of inflicting suffering on its smaller neighbours. India effected a regime-change in Nepal, triggered a civil war in Sri Lanka and broke Pakistan into two parts. However, although almost all its actions vis-à-vis its neighbours were guided by national interests, most of them were reactive moves. For example, India ‘punished’ Nepal and Sri Lanka when it felt they were not sufficiently mindful of its views while dealing with outside great powers like China or the United States. So much so that one Sri Lankan observer rued in the late 1980s: ‘Considering what is happening today and India’s hegemonic ambitions, if a dismembered India is brought into being, then only could her smaller neighbours live without fear’.1 If anything, over the past three decades India’s neighbours have become more critical of their ‘big brother’. While the country was poor and weak militarily during the initial decades after its independence, India managed to be counted as a major voice in global affairs. It acquired civilian and military technologies in addition to dual-use nuclear and space technologies without a commensurate domestic R&D base and without becoming a camp follower of either bloc during the Cold War. Within three decades India had attained self-sufficiency in food-grains production and demonstrated that it could build and run world-class institutions of higher education in the form of the Indian Institutes of Technology (IITs) and Indian Institutes of Management (IIMs). Yet even today it remains poor (the fancy expression is lower-middle income), and the bulk of its education system is in a dilapidated condition. DOI: 10.4324/9781003093343-4

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It is but natural to be baffled at these contradictions and at the yawning gap between India’s promise and its performance. The lack of vision could be but one, if inadequate, explanation. For example, the preoccupation with securing its borders is a virtue for a small country, but a country of India’s size and civilizational pedigree must have goals and ambitions outside its borders. Power projection helps others measure a country’s influence. Except for its brief intervention to thwart a coup attempt in Maldives in the late 1980s, India has never displayed its intention to use its power outside its immediate neighbourhood. Hence the question: does India have a coherent view of its place in its neighbourhood and in the world? One can only answer in the negative. The chapter offers one overarching explanation by expanding on the work of Daniel Markey who reviewed India’s foreign policy ‘software’, focusing on four segments (what I call the apps), viz., India’s foreign service, think-tanks, universities, and media. He warned against ‘significant bottlenecks [that] leave [India’s] ascent less than assured’ and singled out the country’s woeful infrastructure as the chief impediment. ‘So there is no doubt that the ‘hardware’ of the Indian state needs urgent attention’, continued Markey, articulating his main concern: ‘Yet how adequate is India’s “software” – the intellectual and institutional infrastructure needed to exercise power on the international scene?’2 I argue that the efficacy of any software/ app depends on the operating system which is, in our context, the country’s caste system and the culture that caste shaped over millennia, inhibiting the emergence of a bourgeoise which in turn resulted in the lack of democracy as postulated by Barrington Moore in his Social Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy: Lord and Peasant in the Making of the Modern World.3 Five decades after the publication of Moore’s book, the ‘persistence of traditionalism’ vindicates his thesis.4 I am mindful that cultural explanations and studies of national characteristics have gone out of fashion, but I feel that caste, being such a big social, economic, and political force, can bring coherence to other ‘lesser’ factors. For example, caste provides perspective when we regard the Indian economy’s inadequacy in underwriting the ambitions of a great power. Similarly, caste is the invisible thread in the country’s very restrictive self-image of cultural autarky which prevents it from projecting its power and influence outside its borders. ***** How attaining great power status is seen as a symbol and validation of the country’s greatness. How India’s insistence on cultural autonomy and unwillingness to articulate its posture baffles outsiders. India’s strategic community nurses a litany of complaints against the country’s political leadership. The list is long: that Jawaharlal Nehru should have gone all the way to liberate the Pakistan-occupied Kashmir, instead of declaring the ceasefire as he did; that he should have taken back territory that China occupied in 1962; that his successors should have disciplined Pakistan sufficiently to end its mischief in Kashmir; that India should have been spending far more on defence, etc. But the

A Journey Without a Destination 39

crux of the complaint is India’s inability to find a seat at the global high table – i.e., permanent membership in the United Nations Security Council (UNSC). Being a great power, India must be recognised as such, the reasoning goes, with whatever club memberships it feels entitled to. We may profit a bit by delving into the concept of great powers as understood since the Prussian historian Leopold von Ranke defined and popularised it. In his eagerness to extol the accomplishments of Frederick the Great, von Ranke called Prussia a great power because it could ‘maintain itself against all others even when they are united’.5 Thus, he set off the scramble for ‘status’ by postulating ‘a new doctrine of the hierarchy or grading of states’.6 A great power is all about ‘power’ both in economic and military senses. Interestingly, no challenger to the reigning great power(s) ever succeeded. The history of both world wars and the Cold War testifies to the fact that Germany, Italy, Japan, and the Soviet Union failed to replace the Anglo-Americans as global hegemons or to join them as equals, and the first three were subsequently co-opted as allies. Even the rising China story thus far has not been different in this respect. In other words, a great power has to be recognised as such by the existing great powers. Even if one were to accept the five permanent members (P-5) of the UNSC as recognised great powers, none of them has any incentive to let anybody join them. Now, since the outcome of a war is not the determinant of future P-5 plus membership, any expansion must be effected through deliberation, a sure way to stalemate. The new membership criteria would likely include regional representation (who is to represent Africa or South America?) or cultural representation (representation for Islamic and Hindu civilisations, in addition to Western Christian countries that already have more representation than their numbers merit). Germany and Japan, the defeated great/axis powers, feel they must be admitted first. Other countries, like Italy (another axis power), resent being ignored. The aspirant group may therefore be larger than one presumes. A reformed or expanded UNSC must consider the membership claims of India (on its size and distinctiveness as a Hindu civilisation), Nigeria or Egypt or Pakistan or Indonesia (being Muslim countries), Germany and Japan (being former great powers), an African country to represent Black Africa, and middle powers such as South Korea, Canada, and so on. If so, an expanded UNSC will look like a mini-General Assembly and hence will be unwieldy. Because of these complexities, most countries are likely content with the current UNSC as against those who seek its expansion. Much of the global political complexity is not related to India. But how is the country working around these constraints? It insists on its autonomy, but it is both unwilling and incapable of building a bloc to become a pole in world politics. It seeks to acquire first-rate military status but seemingly only to safeguard its borders. Not surprisingly, outside observers are baffled at the opacity of its strategic aims and objectives. Three decades ago, George Tanham offended many Indians by implying that the country had no strategic culture, explaining ‘because India lacked political unity throughout most of its history, Indians have not thought in terms of national defense planning’.7 In 1989, Time magazine questioned why India was

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frenetically building up its military power, and it insinuated that either the country was not telling others or it too didn’t know the reason for the build-up.8 The ambiguity around its military prowess and aims and objectives was justified by some Indian commentators as deliberate. However, most Indian analysts feel that the country a) is always reactive while its adversaries set the agenda, b) is squeamish about asserting its interests, and c) does not seek to maximise its interests. ***** India’s presumed lack of prestige or gravitas as a great power is blamed on politics or national leaders like Nehru. In the tradition of Hegel, Ambedkar, and Acemoglu and Robinson, it is argued that caste stymies nationhood, state-formation, labour mobility, productivity, etc. Caste is against everybody. Many scholars blame India’s lack of standing in world affairs on politics or ideologies like non-alignment or the mixed economy or wrongheaded leaders (Nehru being the all-time favourite whipping boy). But an overarching explanation for the gap in India’s lacklustre performance at home and abroad has been presented in the critique of caste by observers far and near. Most relevant to our discussion are G.W.F. Hegel and B.R. Ambedkar.9 In his lectures on the philosophy of history, Hegel said that caste prevented state formation in India, but he was dismissed as Eurocentric and racist which he undoubtedly is. While recognising his insights on how caste stunted India’s emergence as a great power, one must put on record Hegel’s bigotry: Thus the moral condition of the Hindoos (as already observed) shows itself most abandoned. In this all Englishmen agree…The Brahmins are especially immoral. According to English reports, they do nothing but eat and sleep. In what is not forbidden them by the rules of their order they follow natural impulses entirely. When they take any part in public life they show themselves avaricious, deceitful, voluptuous.10 By revealing his source – the Englishman – Hegel in a way forced his critics to ignore him. Ambedkar insisted that India, even on the eve of its Independence, was not a nation. and he blamed caste for it. He told the Constituent Assembly on 25 November 1949, ‘I am of [the] opinion that in believing that we are a nation, we are cherishing a great delusion. How can people divided into several thousands of castes be a nation?… The castes are anti-national’.11 In fact, Ambedkar’s focus on caste started when he was an undergraduate student at Columbia University. In a paper he read at an anthropology seminar in 1916, he identifies the crux of the problem: There is no country that can rival the Indian Peninsula with respect to the unity of its culture. It has not only a geographic unity, but… the indubitable cultural unity that covers the land from end to end. But it is because of this

A Journey Without a Destination 41

homogeneity that Caste becomes a problem so difficult to be explained. If the Hindu Society were a mere federation of mutually exclusive units, the matter would be simple enough. But Caste is a parcelling of an already homogeneous unit, and the explanation of the genesis of Caste is the explanation of this process of parcelling.12 Daron Acemoglu and James A. Robinson, in their historical-comparative analysis of how the creative tension and contestation between society and state produced or failed to produce liberty around the world, squarely implicate caste in India’s poverty and backwardness.13 The society-state dichotomy – in a sense, is like yin and yang – defines a narrow corridor conducive to liberty. India, however, still largely remains a mass of people in their pre-nationalism phase. Cricket and popular culture may give us a sense of nationhood, but they only produce the optics of nationalism. The ‘state’ and its institutions are expected to be subservient to society i.e. to tradition and culture. But a robust state is a sine qua non for any country to maintain internal stability as well as ward off external aggression. Every nation goes through a journey—from a society to nationhood to state-formation. While society is all about identity, at least in large countries it is pluralistic and requires a modicum of oneness in the form of nationhood which is usually larger than all its parts. Thereafter, the state provides the instruments to serve national goals. British rule did provide an impetus and a rationale for all Indians to feel a certain oneness as a nation. Once the colonial power left its shores, India could not come up with a larger narrative to build nationhood, a challenge Ambedkar recognised. The opposition to foreign rule or an existential threat from a large adversary are not a sound basis for nationhood. This is where Hegel’s insights remain relevant. He calls caste ‘the most degrading spiritual serfdom’14 and regards China ‘as nothing else but a State’ and dismisses India as a collection of ‘people, but no State’.15 The last point has resonance with the Acemoglu-Robinson thesis that too strong a state (China) produces despotism and too strong a society (India) produces disorder, if not anarchy, which is detrimental to liberty and development.16 In his final speech in the Constituent Assembly, Ambedkar lists how Indian kings stood by or collaborated with foreign invaders because they had no sense of oneness, and he attributes this to caste. He confesses that his anxiety is deepened by the realisation of the fact that in addition to our old enemies in the form of castes and creeds we are going to have many political parties with diverse and opposing political creeds… [if] the parties place creed above country, our independence will be put in jeopardy a second time and probably be lost forever’.17 Here is a national leader who, at the cusp of his country gaining independence, is worried about the country losing it once again! An additional point may be made with regard to caste. Caste is not only a problem for the lower castes and Dalits, but rather for the whole country. Acemoglu

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and Robinson conclude that ‘liberty has been absent not just for Dalits but for all Indians, who collectively continue to be dominated by social hierarchy and the cage of caste norms’.18 ***** Caste is no mere social stratification like any other. It cannot stand mobility, be it social or spatial. Immobility results in economic backwardness and tardy urbanisation (no mobility and no growth feed on each other). As caste itself is an elaborate social code of dos and don’ts and punishments for infractions, it is an anathema to the rule of law. There is no country in the world without some form of social stratification, such as caste. What is it about caste that is so unique and deleterious? It is not that caste pushed the country into a Hobbesian state of nature wherein a long war between castes occurs. Many social stratifications and identity markers might have been rigid and brutal in the past but over the centuries lost their virulence. These identities are now more a form of bonding social capital (intra-group solidarity). For example, several social groups in the US, such as Irish Americans or Jewish Americans or Italian Americans, still maintain their distinct identity. The question that follows is: why then cannot India continue with caste? There are two aspects to caste that render it incompatible with modern liberal democracy. One, social identity markers in the US are private matters and cannot be factors in public policy, whereas caste doesn’t make this distinction. Caste appears everywhere, and even the efforts to reduce its impact, by affirmative action or reservations, are based on caste! Two, the main problem with caste is that what it requires to survive and thrive are the things that must disappear for the nation-state to take root. The following Table 4.1 summarizes the opposition of caste-society and nation-state. Caste is no mere four-fold hierarchical system but is finely sliced and diced into thousands of jatis or sub-castes. As a result, a more useful way of referring to the caste system is to always call it a sub-caste system. Consider mobility. Because of sub-caste endogamy, these sub-castes evolved as very local institutions. A Shudra from one region, for example, cannot relate to another Shudra from another region within a state. One can offer several cases of Brahmins from the same region speaking the same language but remaining antagonistic sub-castes. Dalits, as they are outside the caste system as outcastes, may be expected to be weary of TABLE 4.1 Caste-Society vs. Nation-State

Mobility Economic Stagnation Urbanisation The Rule of Law Source: Author

Caste-Society

Nation-State

No Yes No No

Yes No Yes Yes

A Journey Without a Destination 43

endogamy; but no. What does one mean by mobility in the present context? Ambedkar writes in the Annihilation of Caste: An ideal society should be mobile, should be full of channels for conveying a change taking place in one part to other parts. In an ideal society there should be many interests consciously communicated and shared. There should be varied and free points of contact with other modes of association. In other words, there must be social endosmosis. This is fraternity, which is only another name for democracy. Democracy is not merely a form of Government. It is primarily a mode of associated living, of conjoint communicated experience. It is essentially an attitude of respect and reverence towards fellowmen.19 The constraints against mobility severely restrict economic prospects. In fact, economic stagnation and the lack of mobility feed on each other creating a vicious cycle. The phenomenon is well captured by Deepak Lal in the subtitle of his seminal work, The Hindu Equilibrium: Cultural Stability and Economic Stagnation.20 And the logical consequence of this vicious cycle is tardy urbanisation. However, mere urbanisation is no guarantee of escape from caste. Many cities have grown as conglomerates of castes, and even Bangalore, rightly touted as India’s Silicon Valley, is no exception to this. There is also enough evidence that migrant labourers too carry their caste to the cities as they tend to move in clusters from the same area(s). However, caste in a city is a different matter from caste in a village. One may find caste localities in cities, and they remain inward looking groups insistent on endogamy, etc., but they cannot go around imposing caste norms and punishment for violations. The collaborative fieldwork in Uttar Pradesh (UP) that I was a part of established how the cycle of no-mobility and economic stagnation could be broken.21 In the aftermath of the 1991 economic reforms, modest economic growth at eight percent over two decades opened up opportunities for Dalits, and a significant number of them moved to cities as workers, triggering off a chain-reaction of social and economic transformation back home. The state of UP itself did not experience any economic growth, but big cities like Delhi, Mumbai and Pune provided growth avenues. That the Dalits could migrate to cities was facilitated by the rule of law. It is worth noting how mobility worked out for Dalits in post-independence India. The country abolished Untouchability in 1950 and declared the practice a punishable offence. India has also enacted several laws to protect lower castes and provide job quotas for them. However, it may be a surprise to many people that for Dalits in parts of North India (or at least the areas we studied in UP) the liberty to move out of the village in search of employment did not reach them till the late 1980s. During our field visits for more than a decade, we met several elderly Dalit men (who were in their 70s and 80s) who said that when they had tried to escape to cities, the landlords would go to the railway station and force them back to the village.

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The larger point about the rule of law is that it insists on the Constitution and the application of civil and criminal laws which do not recognise caste. The chief objection to the Constitution of India was advanced by conservative Hindus in 1950 on the grounds that the document was not in conformity with the caste code. Historian Ramachandra Guha recalls how The Organiser, the RSS’ official periodical, in its issue dated 30 November 1949 (less than a week after the Draft Constitution of India was adopted) disapproved of it as it had no mention of the unique constitutional developments in ancient Bharat. Manu’s laws were written long before Lycurgus of Sparta or Solon of Persia. To this day, his laws as enunciated in the Manusmriti excite the admiration of the world and elicit spontaneous obedience and conformity [among Hindus in India]. But to our constitutional pundits that means nothing.22 In the subsequent decades, the RSS stopped extolling the virtues of Manusmriti, but has never been known to stand by the Constitution either. Hegel narrates how when the British tried to introduce the system of trial by jury, Indians insisted on punishments that would conform to caste privileges. For example, a Brahmin could not be given a death sentence, etc.23 The three-phase journey from society to nation to state mentioned earlier could be a framework within which we can understand the cultural trappings that pull the country down. What phase is India now in? Is it just a Hegelian mass of people? Or is it still in between society and nation, as Ambedkar said seventy years ago? Or is it a nation-state, as many assume to be the case? I contend that in India all three phases exist side by side – some parts or segments of India are in the society phase, others are in the nation phase, and yet others are in the state phase. When the Europeans showed up on its shores, India was divided in hundreds of kingdoms and principalities. They were also witness for a couple of centuries to how the biggest piece of India, the Mughal Empire, was imploding. The fact was not lost on Hegel that, for example, Indians or the Hindus had never given a name to their land. Hindustan or India are names others coined. Hindustan, like Christendom, was neither a nation nor a state. British rule integrated nearly two-thirds of the country as a single political unit which triggered the national movement. Naturally, the freedom movement fought British rule, and one could not have expected independent India, which is the product of that movement, to swear by the state that still carries a colonial DNA, in Adda Bozeman’s words, ‘of Occidental derivation’.24 The result is that the country has not built its own state apparatus and at the same time is not content with what the British bequeathed to it. This flux has not allowed India to blossom into an economic powerhouse or a great power. Way back in the early 1980s, Bozeman noticed the trend of how ‘each organ of India’s modern administration…is severely challenged today by orthodox Hinduism and the human dispositions it engenders. The resuscitation of the traditional faith has thus brought a revival of caste consciousness and related social norms that conflict sharply with India’s modern systems of constitutional and criminal laws’.25

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***** As an Operating System, caste is both rigid and archaic. It militates against wealth creation by stigmatising businessmen. Because of methodological individualism, those specialising in International Relations and Strategic Studies, scholars and practitioners alike, ignore the study of caste. Scholars have pointed out how caste has been infecting the armed forces, the premier organs of state, for over a century, furthering weakening the state. Caste is no mere inconvenience or constraint on economic progress, but rather it operates as a framework or an operating system (OS). Just like a computer OS enables hardware and software integration, caste is an enabler of social, economic and political ‘apps’ to perform their functions. And it is such an archaic and rigid OS that it doesn’t allow new capabilities to fructify. To stretch the analogy a bit further, imagine a computer in 2021 that can only operate an OS like MS-DOS or the firstgeneration Macintosh System One! All the computer’s inherent capabilities would be wasted, and we would end up with a very expensive word processor. ‘Turn in any direction you like’, Ambedkar wrote, ‘caste is the monster that crosses your path. You cannot have political reform, you cannot have economic reform, unless you kill this monster’.26 Caste is ubiquitous and affects everybody. Its so-called virtues too affect the country. For example, caste teaches frugality and frowns on material wealth. It also forbids lower castes from acquiring wealth. Together with Dalits and Tribals, the lower castes account for more than two-thirds of India’s population. One might argue that these restrictions were never applied. But India as a culture is dominated by priests, teachers and other professionals. This feature is at variance with most great powers. Britain, the US and China are unabashedly commercial-minded. Indian leaders, including business tycoons, preach simple living and praise village life as pure and simple. This cultural reflex against wealth translates into an environment that is unfriendly to business. In literature and cinema, a businessman is often depicted as avaricious, vile, law-breaking, and a tax-evading villain. Commenting on the same situation under the Moghuls, Moore writes: ‘the attitude of the political authorities in India toward the merchant seems to have been closer to that of the spider toward the fly than that of the cowherd toward his cow that was widespread in Europe at the same time’.27 Acemoglu and Robinson go a step further to assert that the caste system as a limiting factor on markets and labour mobility was worse than the feudal order in medieval Europe.28 The metaphor of the spider and the fly, however, has contemporary resonance. Caste as an operating system is ignored because of the tendency to think in terms of methodological individualism whereby the main assumption in the study of social life is individual subjectivity and motivation rather than the dynamic within and between collectives such as caste or class. Most of those who typically specialize in International Relations or Strategic Studies come from Political Science/ International Relations and History where methodological individualism also is rife.29 A social dynamic like caste that touches everything is restricted to the disciplines of Sociology and

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Anthropology. Moreover, since caste is an existential matter for the lower castes and Dalits, researchers in Sociology and Anthropology tend to study both groups within a very restricted and rights-based framework, thus reinforcing academic blindfolding. Other Indian scholars too study caste as a problem for the lower castes, which is a fact, but they tend to miss its wider ramifications. Do IR scholars study the impact of social forces on external policy and international affairs?30 Generally, they do not. This is perhaps understandable as most countries, at least in the West, have transitioned into secular democracies with free markets, and social and religious factors are limited to people’s private lives. In these countries, the contestation between the society and state ended with the latter gaining primacy. India has not entered this decisive phase. The tendency to think about society and state and domestic and foreign policy through the lens of methodological individualism blinds Indians to the fact that the country does not yet really have a state. The armed forces under the British – an institution in which the colonial state carved out its primacy, with hierarchy based on merit, rules that were secular and community (cantonment) life that was stratified by rank – stood against the prevailing system of social life outside the barracks. However, in my obituary of the American scholar of civil-military relations in South Asia, Stephen P. Cohen, I wrote that he had recorded ‘how, by the late nineteenth century, caste and creed were creeping into the cantonment, which was also not alien to racism. He [Cohen] knew it was inevitable that India would get Indianised. But the country would still need… an institutional scaffolding. The only template he was familiar with was the British India [template] and especially how it organized and maintained its army’.31 Scholars who specialize in civil-military relations have been pointing out how social structures like caste affect military effectiveness. If the elements like economy and armed forces that are vital for building India into a great power are rendered below par, we should not be surprised when India’s standing in the world is what it is today. ***** Caste’s overarching negative impact on India should not be dismissed as tenuous. A better appreciation of the subject requires a different kind of education and a different temperament, as symbolised by Ambedkar. There would also be no end to hypotheticals like what else could have been? Indians must ponder why the most comprehensive and scathing attacks on caste as the singular evil against India were mounted by non-Indian scholars. Have I clearly established the causation between several social and cultural infirmities that the chapter discusses and how caste causes them? No. Nor, however, can we dismiss the causation as tenuous. Since the metaphor for caste is a computer OS, we can only see how an app is not functioning and come up with remedies as inferred by Markey. A lesson for India, from his work, is that the US became a great economic/industrial powerhouse much before it entered world

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politics (in fact, this is the way of all other great powers). Set your house in order, seems to be his message to India. And he does not even mention caste. In accounting for national failures, one can be critical of leaders like Nehru who sought to create a post-colonial and genuinely authentic India of their cultural imagination. However, we cannot blame them beyond a point for not seeing the archaic and rigid OS they were operating. This is where the uniqueness of Ambedkar comes in. Among all other leaders of late nineteenth and early twentieth century India, he happened to study subjects as varied as political science, economics, anthropology, and law. His education gave him a unique vantage point on India, and his experience as an Untouchable enriched his understanding. The point even his followers miss is that he understood that caste is detrimental to India, all of India. Period. His followers belabour the view instead that they alone are victims of caste and that they need and deserve props like job quotas. What could have been an alternative trajectory for India? India could have started off as a British Dominion (which it was very briefly during 1947–50) just like Canada and built on that status and blossomed into an independent nation over time. No doubt Canada (or Australia or New Zealand) is a white entity and naturally kept its ties with the mother country. The very spirit of the freedom struggle meant that India instead must start with a clean slate, distinct from the colonial experience. The consequence of this was the country rejected the institutions and the spirit of laws that British rule introduced. ***** In conclusion, I contend that independent India didn’t pay much attention to nation-building or strengthening state institutions or policy capacity. Instead of treating independence as the starting point of a long journey towards nationhood, it assumed that independence was the culmination of its nationhood. It rejected what it inherited, but it didn’t care to replace that inheritance with anything substantial. Cultural sentiments were confused for statecraft. The result? India rejected the British policies of balance of power, buffer state, etc., but clung to the British position on other matters, say, the border with China. In its border dispute with China, ironically India swears by the Simla Convention of 1913–14 wherein the British forced Chinese delegation to accept the McMahon Line as the border in the east. In a way, independent India followed as a successor state to British imperial rule but ignored the latter’s liberal domestic values and practices especially the rule of law, bureaucratic neutrality, and English-language education. Now the emaciated Indian state is held responsible for not helping the country realise its imperial ambitions.

Notes * The author is grateful to Aakash Singh Rathore, Daniel Markey and Sushil Aaron for their comments and suggestions. 1 Sunday Times (Colombo), 23 April 1989, quoted in Bhabani Sen Gupta, ‘South Asia’, in Jayantha Dhanapala (ed.), Regional Approaches to Disarmament: Security and Stability, Aldershot: United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research, 1993, pp. 73–74 (fn.9).

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2 Daniel Markey, ‘Developing India’s Foreign Policy “Software”’, Asia Policy, July 2009, 8 (1): 75. 3 Barrington Moore, Jr., Social Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy: Lord and Peasant in the Making of the Modern World, Harmondsworth, UK: Penguin University Books, 1974. 4 Michael Bernhard, ‘The Moore Thesis: What’s Left after 1989?’, Democratization, 23(1), 2016: 118–140, https://doi.org/10.1080/13510347.2015.1094796 (accessed on 31 May 2018). 5 Hedley Bull, The Anarchical Society: A Study of Order in World Politics, Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2012, p. 316. 6 Bull, The Anarchical Society, p. 36. 7 George K. Tanham, Indian Strategic Thought: An Interpretive Essay, Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 1992, p. 50. 8 Ross H. Munro, ‘Superpower Rising: Propelled by an Arms Buildup, India Asserts Its Place on the World Stage’, Time, 3 April 1989, 133(14), p. 13. 9 Aakash Singh Rathore and Rimina Mohapatra, Hegel’s India: A Reinterpretation, With Texts, New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 2018, and Rajesh Sampath, ‘Appropriating Hegel’s Critique of Hinduism in His Philosophy of World History by Way of His Phenomenology of Spirit to Expand on Ambedkar’s Critique of the Caste System’, International Journal of Religion and Society, 2014, 5(3): 215–227. 10 George W. F. Hegel, The Philosophy of History, Translated by J. Sibree, Kitchener, Ontario: Batoche Books, 2001, pp. 176–177. 11 Constituent Assembly of India Debates (Proceedings), Vol. 11, 25 November 1949, speech by B. R. Ambedkar, https://www.constitutionofindia.net/constitution_assembly_ debates/volume/11/1949-11-25 (accessed on 7 April 2021). 12 B. R. Ambedkar, ‘Castes in India: Their Mechanism, Genesis and Development’, in Dr. Babasaheb Ambedkar: Writings and Speeches, Volume I, New Delhi: Dr. Ambedkar Foundation, 2014, p. 6. 13 Daron Acemoglu and James A. Robinson, The Narrow Corridor: States, Societies, and the Fate of Liberty, New York: Penguin Press, 2019. 14 Hegel, The Philosophy of History, p. 162. 15 ‘This is the first point to be observed: if China may be regarded as nothing else but a State, Hindoo political existence presents us with a people, but no State [emphasis original]’, Hegel, The Philosophy of History, p. 179. 16 Acemoglu and Robinson, The Narrow Corridor. 17 Constituent Assembly of India Debates (Proceedings), speech by B. R. Ambedkar. 18 Acemoglu and Robinson, The Narrow Corridor. 19 B. R. Ambedkar, Annihilation of Caste: With Reply to Mahatma Gandhi, in Dr. Babasaheb Ambedkar: Writings and Speeches, Volume I, New Delhi: Dr. Ambedkar Foundation, 2014, p. 57. 20 Deepak Lal, The Hindu Equilibrium: Cultural Stability and Economic Stagnation: India, c. 1500 BC–AD 1980. Vol. I, New York: Clarendon Press, 1988. 21 Devesh Kapur, Chandra Bhan Prasad, Lant Pritchett, and D. Shyam Babu, ‘Rethinking Inequality: Dalits in Uttar Pradesh in the Market Reform Era’, Economic and Political Weekly, 28 August–3 September 2010, XLV (35): 39–49. 22 Ramachandra Guha, ‘Which Ambedkar?’ The Indian Express, 21 April 2016, http://india nexpress.com/article/opinion/columns/br-ambedkar-2762688/ (accessed on 7 April 2021). 23 Hegel, The Philosophy of History, p. 170. 24 Adda Bozeman, ‘The International Order in a Multicultural World’, in Hedley Bull and Adam Watson (eds), The Expansion of International Society, New York: Oxford University Press, 1984, p. 400. 25 Bozeman, ‘The International Order in a Multicultural World’, pp. 400–401. 26 B. R. Ambedkar, Annihilation of Caste: With Reply to Mahatma Gandhi, p. 47 27 Moore, Social Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy, p. 323. 28 Daron Acemoglu and James A. Robinson, Why Nations Fail: The Origins of Power, Prosperity, and Poverty, London: Profile Books, 2013.

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29 Sushil Aaron, ‘Why Are India’s Strategic Thinkers Silent About the Country’s Decline Under Modi?’ The Wire (blog), 23 January 2018, https://thewire.in/diplomacy/india s-strategic-thinkers-silent-countrys-decline-modi (accessed on 7 April 2021). 30 A good place for an IR student to start focussing on culture is Bull and Watson (eds), The Expansion of International Society, especially Ronald Dore’s chapter therein, ‘Unity and Diversity in World Culture’, pp. 407–424. 31 D. Shyam Babu, ‘The True South Asian Was an American! A Tribute to Professor Stephen Philip Cohen (1936–2019)’, Contemporary Review of the Middle East, 2020, 7(1): 3–5, https://doi.org/10.1177/2347798919890781 (accessed on 7 April 2021).

Military Realism

5 INDIA’S REALIST NUCLEAR POSTURE FOR THE 21ST CENTURY Balraj Singh Nagal

This chapter is about India’s nuclear posture. It argues that India’s national security has not been cast in realist terms, which has led to many security problems and even wars. India did not understand the character of international relations from a realist perspective, but more in idealistic-moral ways with the hope of changing the world to its way of thinking. The result was India found itself lurching from one crisis to another. The present chapter examines India’s challenges in national security, the economics of maintaining a very large conventional military and the nuclear posture India should adopt based on its military challenges, economic circumstances and security requirements in the foreseeable future. The chapter is laid out in four parts: first, realism attributes on which India should base its policies/strategies, and a brief examination of India’s record on realism and some lessons from past decisions; second, India’s future threat evaluation; third, India’s conventional strategy; and finally, India’s nuclear posture based on realism.

A Realist Approach and India’s Record The argument in the current chapter is based on the thought that realism is a view of international relations that focuses on the competitive and conflictual aspects of interactions between countries. From this perspective, India will be buffeted by conflict in the anarchical setting that marks international politics. It will need to focus on addressing the state of instability in the region and will need to act in pursuit of the national interest. It must understand that in international relations there is skepticism about universal justice, the effectiveness of ethical norms, and moralism and moral discourse appear as rationalisations of policy. India’s record on realism and its role in international relations since independence in 1947 has been dismal, whereas China and Pakistan were realists and revisionists. The Chinese Communist government had clear strategic objectives of expansionism, DOI: 10.4324/9781003093343-5

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regional domination and a global role. China began its nuclear weapons programme despite having a weak economy, and in 1964 it became a nuclear weapon state followed by membership of the Non-Proliferation Treaty in 1970.1 Pakistan, despite being much smaller than India, pitched itself strategically in a way that the world began to treat it as an equal of India. After the creation of Bangladesh, Pakistan began its nuclear weapons programme and at last count may have taken a lead over India in terms of the number of nuclear weapons. It has also used nuclear deterrence to conduct a proxy terror war against India. Pakistan is a revisionist state, which has demonstrated the ability to challenge a stronger state successfully. At independence India firmly held to the belief that it would follow a peaceful course, focus on economic development, espouse the cause of newly independent nations, call for equality amongst nations, and use international institutions to further world peace and resolve conflicts. Its efforts largely failed to change international relations and to give India a peaceful environment. India believed in the scientific uses of nuclear technology and in nuclear energy for its development. In retrospect, it is clear it did build a nuclear programme for peaceful purposes with the possibility that the country would have to develop nuclear weapons for its security. However, it hesitated to opt for a full-fledged nuclear weapon programme until much later. It took 27 years to test its first nuclear device in 1974, ten years after China exploded its weapon in 1964.2 It took another 24 years to test several more nuclear weapons and adopt a nuclear weapons doctrine. Overall, a lack of strategic understanding is discernible in the management of the country’s security vis-à-vis its neighbours. The Indian nuclear doctrine was released as a draft in 1999 and the formal doctrine in a cryptic format in 2003. In the draft nuclear doctrine, India outlined several arguments in support of its 1998 tests and determination to develop nuclear weapons. It referred to ‘[a]utonomy of decision making in the developmental process and in strategic matters’,3 indicating that there will be a move towards realism, opposition to the indefinitely extended NPT (in 1995), refusal to cede to the demands of the five nuclear weapons states (the US, Russia, UK, France, and China), and an insistence on charting its own course on nuclear weapons.4 However, having decided on nuclear deterrence for its security, India pulled back by announcing that the main tenet of the nuclear doctrine would be ‘India will not be the first to initiate a nuclear strike’ (1999)5 and that ‘nuclear weapons will only be used in retaliation against a nuclear attack on Indian territory or on Indian forces anywhere’ (2003).6 This No First Use (NFU) commitment rules out Indian nuclear weapons use against an attack by conventional forces, which is problematic in at least two circumstances: first of all, if India’s conventional forces are being overwhelmed by a nuclear-armed adversary (India has ruled out using nuclear weapons against non-nuclear armed states); and secondly, if a nuclear-armed adversary uses conventional forces to threaten the capture or destruction of India’s nuclear forces. India’s NFU also rules out India using nuclear weapons pre-emptively, that is, when the adversary is preparing to launch a nuclear attack against India. India’s NFU seems to draw its essence from a particular kind of ethics and moralism about nuclear weapons and war. However, a nation cannot lay itself open to destruction by an adversary that

India’s Realist Nuclear Posture for the 21st Century 55

has nuclear weapons, once it has its own nuclear force. Given that national interest demands survival above all, NFU is untenable, and no democracy in the world follows such a principle. At the same time, any autocratic state’s public commitment to NFU is open to doubt. For instance, given China’s general disregard for international norms or rulings, its word on NFU must be suspect. India because of its NFU has bound itself to a dysfunctional policy and needs to be more ambiguous about its commitment to the principle in the interest of security. The Indian option of retaliation by nuclear weapons in case of a ‘major attack’ by biological and chemical weapons, articulated in the 2003 version of the doctrine, too was based on realism. The immediate destruction and damage by biological and chemical weapons can be catastrophic to say the least, and the long-term effects coupled with physical and psychological effects can be debilitating. Biological and chemical weapons can also be used by terror organisations sponsored by enemy states or even states signatories to the treaty if taken over by fundamentalists or extremists. India has therefore rightly kept the option of a counterstrike with nuclear weapons – which would then be a first use of nuclear weapons – since biological and chemical weapons are banned by international treaties to which India subscribes. Since it subscribes to those treaties, it cannot then respond to a biological or chemical strike by a biological or chemical weapons retaliation since it would have destroyed its stockpile of those agents under the terms of the relevant treaties.

India’s Threat Picture International relations in the future will witness a greater contest for influence, power, institutions, economic and cultural domination, and resource control, further aggravating the conflictual nature of relationships.7 The present ascent of China and its challenge to the existing world order have exacerbated global tensions. In international relations, nuclear weapons provide prestige and deter powerful adversaries.8 Today, North Korea and Pakistan command respect much beyond their comprehensive national power, economic strength, military capability, and industrial base. Nuclear weapons provide bargaining power and strength in the struggle for power, especially against non-nuclear weapons states and even against powerful nations. Nuclear weapons give nations strategic autonomy and that indirectly allows these nations a greater say and role in international relations.9 How does India figure in the emerging conflicts and struggle for power? For India, the foremost issues to be examined are the conflictual nature of its relations with various powers and the balance-of-power equation. These should be evaluated on two planes: individually with Pakistan and China, and then in combination with both powers lined up against India to pose the threat of a two-front war. From independence, India’s first conflict was with Pakistan over the accession of the princely states to either country. The Kashmir war of 1947–48 was a continuation of this adversarial relationship.10 The war did not solve the problem of Kashmir: the ceasefire laid the foundation for continuous friction and the wars of 1965, 1971 and 1999. The

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creation of Bangladesh reduced Pakistan in size but increased its hostility towards India. The subsequent actions by Pakistan aggravated the distrust and animosity. India’s second conflict arose from the Communist Party coming to power in China. India misread or chose to ignore the signs of Chinese expansionism. The People’s Liberation Army (PLA) began moving to the outer areas of the country in Xinjiang, Tibet and Inner Mongolia.11 China did not accept past treaties or agreements of the British period. Post-1959, the China-India relationship further deteriorated and culminated in the 1962 war. After 1962, relations remain conflictual in spite of various border agreements and confidence building measures. There is no indication that there can be much cooperation. India’s acceptance of Tibet as part of China was an extremely big Indian concession.12 However, there have been no serious reciprocal gestures by China to improve relations or settle the border dispute. In the future, threats and challenges from Pakistan and China will continue to constitute the biggest security problem for Indian security planners. The collusive nexus is likely to increase the predicament of force composition and strategy. The conventional military capabilities of both powers have improved significantly in the recent past, and continuous modernization is in progress including the new domains of cyber, space, and information and drone warfare. These new domains pose threats that will be manifest beyond the battlefield. The development of the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) will deepen the conventional nexus and complicate the security calculus for India.13 Both countries are modernizing and increasing the size of their nuclear arsenals, and new capabilities are being introduced including quicker delivery times. Their strategies or doctrines are deliberately not declared. In the case of China, the professed no first use is clouded in ambiguity. While it has declared that it will not use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against a non-nuclear weapon state or nuclear weapons free zones, there are writings that suggest it could consider nuclear use against conventional forces that threaten its retaliatory capabilities or regime survival.14 Questions also exist on whether its no-first use policy would allow it to use nuclear weapons on its own territory or on territories that it claims (e.g. the borderland areas with India). China’s confusing language and stand is deliberate and has ensured that Beijing retains all options of use while professing otherwise. Pakistan’s development of tactical nuclear weapons (TNW) is aimed at lowering the nuclear threshold, to prevent a decisive conventional war.15 While the efficacy of TNWs has never been proven or tested, Pakistan is using them as a shield to prosecute a terror war against India.16 The joint nuclear arsenals of China and Pakistan will require an appropriate Indian response in terms of force planning and doctrine.17 China, by its economic and military clout and diplomatic influence, will be able to sway and control many states to work against India. The littoral of the Indian Ocean is the focus of China. If and when these states side with China, the threats to India’s security will increase. The military bases that China will acquire, such as the one in Djibouti in the Indian Ocean region, are future threats and will be additional military targets for India.18

India’s Realist Nuclear Posture for the 21st Century 57

The growing threat of state-sponsored terrorism will continue against India since it is religion driven.19 Pakistan and its military have been instrumental and leading the effort. Other nations in the region also provide help to extremist groups in many forms, including sanctuary, finance and weapons. The possibility that terrorist organisations will possess nuclear, chemical or biological weapons needs to be built into India’s threat assessment. These weapons of mass destruction could either be given by inimical states or be procured clandestinely or be developed in safe sanctuaries provided by inimical or weak states. The concept of Islamic jihad is creating terror organisations in many countries.20 While these organisations profess to be welfare or philanthropic in nature, the reality is different. The threat from terror organisations is likely to increase, as Pakistan views terror as a cheap and easy option.21 These organisations require continuous monitoring and threat evaluation. India must adopt a policy of holding accountable states that provide terror organisations with sanctuary, finance, technology, training, and other forms of support. In case a nuclear attack is threatened or carried out by non-state actors, India should reserve the right of nuclear retaliation against the state providing any form of nuclear weapons support (or support for any other weapons of mass destruction) or giving shelter to such entities. Finally, India must consider North Korea and Iran in its threat evaluations. North Korea is aligned with China, indeed is virtually a client state,22 and has been a missile technology supplier to Pakistan.23 Its relationship with China will remain close. Hence, India should consider its relations with North Korea as conflictual. The North Korean nuclear weapons capability, though not directed at India, should be factored into Indian planning given that geo-political realities are susceptible to change. Iran poses a dilemma for India. It is often in tension with the Sunni countries, but it is united in religion with Pakistan and other Muslim countries. It is also inimical to Israel, an ally of India.24 India would do well to further align with Israel and consider the relationship with Iran as conflictual. Iran’s nuclear capability should be a big cause of concern for India. It has the potential to destabilise the West Asian region, in which India has high stakes. Any nuclear exchange there could engulf India. In addition, Turkey and Saudi Arabia should find a place in India’s threat calculus, though at present they do not possess nuclear weapons. Both influence the dynamics of West Asia and could conceivably become nuclear weapon powers at some point in the future. In summary, India faces one of the most complex, complicated and difficult security situations in the world. The chapter now examines India’s existing strategies and force capabilities.

Current Indian Strategy and Constraints This part will analyse India’s current military strategy, budgetary constraints, high import requirements, and impact of new warfare domains of space, cyber and information warfare. In the absence of a national security strategy or Ministry of Defence directive in the open domain, it is left for analysts to infer these directions and strategies/doctrines. These need to be evaluated in the context of the two-and-a-half-front war referred to by the Chief of Defence Staff.25

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As things stand, Indian Army strategy can be divided into two parts: in the mountains, to defend territory as far forward as possible, using attrition warfare with limited offensive capability; and in the plains and desert, to carry out defensive operations along with major offensive operations. This essentially translates into offensive deterrence against Pakistan and defensive deterrence against China. The Air Force seeks to establish air dominance against Pakistan and China (within a limited range) and provide close support to ground forces. It does not possess stand-off capability and is limited in strike roles by operating only fighter bombers or air defence aircraft. The Navy strategy is to establish sea control against Pakistan and sea denial against China. It does not have out-of-area contingency capability for sustained operations/campaign. The nuclear doctrine is not part of these strategies. Since nuclear weapons are intended to be used in retaliation against an adversary (because of no first use), this reduces the degree of uncertainty in the adversary’s calculus. All these Indian strategies suffer from the limitation that they are configured to fight the last war: they do not factor in the ever-changing strategies and capabilities of the adversary and the new security environment. The first new factor is the lowering of the nuclear threshold by Pakistan by its introduction of Tactical Nuclear Weapons (TNW)26 and its articulation of Full Spectrum Deterrence (FSD),27 thereby reducing the efficacy of Indian deep penetration offensives which were envisaged as bargaining factors in negotiations and talks. The strategy to destroy Pakistan’s military capability and capture sizeable territory in a future war may escalate to the nuclear domain in a shorter time frame and at a shallower depth of operations. In addition, the proxy terror war by Pakistan will continue during war and will become the half-front in India’s two-and-a-half-front scenario. Information warfare and cyber-attacks will form an essential part of Pakistani strategy in war as well. The conventional war strategy and capability of Pakistan will be different from the past. Besides absorbing Indian offensives, Pakistan will launch counter offensives to seize territory for future bargaining. It is noteworthy that the Pakistani army force composition is nearly equal to what India can apply against Pakistan. China’s introduction of high technology, long range vectors and weapons with stand-off capability has brought into range strategic targets in the Indian heartland.28 The north Indian plains are vulnerable to conventional Chinese weapons. On the other hand, India today lacks the capability to attack the Chinese heartland by conventional high-technology vectors and weapons. The non-kinetic force multipliers in the information warfare domain will impact operations in ways not anticipated: decision paralysis, grid black-outs, communications failures, weapons deviation, and a host of other mishaps including psychological collapses. Another important feature will be the limited feasibility of synchronized large-scale military Indian operations in conflicts in the mountains and hilly regions. China has a huge buffer, and Indian attacks will be severely limited by terrain and distance. Major offensives will be self-defeating except in terms of material attrition of the enemy. The expansion of the PLA Navy with bases and presence in the Indian Ocean will challenge the Indian Navy’s dominance. Coupled with the Pakistani navy, India’s maritime security problems will increase including the threat to coastal assets.

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Besides conventional offensives, Indian planners must take into consideration cyber-attacks,29 space attacks,30 drone attacks, disinformation campaigns, psychological warfare, large-scale missile attacks on vital areas and critical infrastructure systems, nuclear coercion, and nuclear detonations and radiological attacks by terrorists. Space assets will be vital for communications, reconnaissance, surveillance, and real time imagery and for the success of top-secret missions. All these and unforeseen challenges will place the Indian military in a dilemma. One of the possible responses is increased conventional capability. Today, the Indian military plus central armed police force (CAPF) number close to two million personnel. Despite such a large standing force, at present territorial ‘salami slicing’ by China and border violations/terrorist infiltration by Pakistan continue unabated. There is a possibility that existing and projected threats to India may be countered by a substantial increase in conventional capability including the new domains of space, cyber and information and drone warfare. Any increase in force levels has a direct bearing on the Indian budget, already at 15–16 percent of the central budget.31 This along with the burden of interest payments at 23–27 percent of the central budget will impact the fiscal deficit, economic growth, inflation, and social programmes, which may lead to a slowdown in the economy for the next two decades with resultant effects eventually on defence expenditure.32 India’s defence expenditure has been increasing at an inflation-linked scale and was approximately 16 to 10.5 percent of the central budget in the last ten years and 15.5 percent in 2020–21 It has risen from Rs. 147.3 thousand crores in 2010–11 to Rs. 471.4 thousand crores in 2021–22, an annual increase of nine percent.33 There has been a downward decline in the capital expenditure for modernization and new weapons procurement: as a percentage of the defence budget, it has declined from 35 percent in 2010–11 to 26 percent in 2021–22.34 It is worrisome that the present defence budget funds revenue expenditure and pensions, leaving little for modernization and new weapons/platforms.35 Committed liabilities of weapons and equipment ordered in the past take away most of the capital budget, leaving minuscule sums for emergent or critical purchases, for example as during the Kargil war of 1999 and the Ladakh stand-off in 2020. The high pension bill will not reduce for a few decades based on the current manning pattern of the armed forces. We should note that any increase in manpower is reflected after two decades in the pension bill. The economy and government finances cannot support higher outlays, primarily for two reasons: a middling level of economic growth (compared to other countries) and a poor tax base; and the high value of defence imports for decades. The value of the US dollar to Indian rupee in 1991–92 was approximately 24 rupees to one US dollar; in 2019–20, it is 71 rupees to one US dollar, a three-fold increase in thirty years.36 The cost of modern weapons and platforms have gone up exponentially at the same time. For example, the Rafale fighter bought a few years ago cost Rs. 58000 crores for thirty-six aircraft (Rs. 1611 crores on average) with support systems.37 With

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the declining value of the rupee, it has cost far more than the Mirage 2000s that were bought in 1981–1985 at an average cost of Rs. 110 crores per aircraft.38 The continuous increase in defence expenditure could result in a collapse akin to the Soviet Union’s economy at the end of the Cold War. To be mired in a situation where modernization is delayed and India’s capabilities are well behind China’s is not only dangerous but also irresponsible. India has a massive trade deficit with China, amounting to nearly $48 billion in China’s favour.39 Trade imbalances historically drain vital foreign exchange and put pressure on military capability building. While SIPRI and other research organisations list India as the third highest military spender in the world, in terms of modern technology and weapons capability there nevertheless is a deficit.

India’s Choices Ahead Four factors have emerged which call for review of India’s defence strategy: high-technology long-range warfare; tightening defence budgets; the high cost of imports; and a two-front dilemma. These factors call for review or change of strategy, optimization in force levels, thus increasing dependence on high-technology long-range weapons and systems, space, cyber, and information warfare, weapons of mass destruction and enmeshing the nuclear escalation strategy into the overall strategy. The first change should be in the way India intends to meet future threats and challenges to avoid manpower intensive wars and strategies, the second is the combining of the conventional and nuclear escalation strategy, the third is the induction of high technology and weapons, and the fourth is greater attention to the new domains of space, cyber and information warfare. India must adopt a strategy ensuring that protection of national interests, maintenance of territorial integrity, deterrence by punishment, and escalation dominance are cost effective to the exchequer. India must transition to an appropriate defence, with suitable offensive capabilities for the conduct of conventional operations. These capabilities must rest on technologies which also address noncontact and non-kinetic threats to India’s security. Overall, India must strive to maintain a favourable balance of power to advance its influence and interests. Its strategy therefore should ensure conventional and nuclear deterrence, and if deterrence shows signs of failing, it must be capable of pre-emption and escalation dominance. To be precise, the strategy should be based on escalation dominance, with the initial response being at the border, escalating to attacks against strategic areas, progressing to attacks on the heartland by conventional means, and finally to nuclear escalation across the spectrum. The challenge in a strategy of this nature will be the political decision-making needed to escalate in the military domain in a graduated manner. However, all strategies are fraught with problems, and leadership is about the right decision at the right time. Whilst India has border disputes with China and Pakistan, wars in the modern environment cannot remain limited to the border areas, especially when the Indian heartland is close to the borders and India’s strategic targets are vulnerable to

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China’s strategic rocket force and air force. The Chinese heartland by contrast has the massive buffer of Tibet and other areas. The wars of 1965, 1971 (in the western sector) and 1999 with Pakistan remained confined to the border areas due to the lack of wherewithal to attack strategic targets. The aim of India’s strategy in the future should be to fight a high-technology war with optimised manpower. The war should not be limited to border areas but rather should be fought against the adversary with escalatory strategic targeting. The finer details of such a strategy cannot be further discussed without divulging confidential information, except to say that escalation can be horizontal or vertical or both. The nature of escalation must be determined by the desired end-state. To elaborate in broad terms, precise and powerful long-range vectors must be used to destroy the vital areas, important industrial bases, infrastructure, leadership at higher levels, military bases, and missile bases when feasible. The psychological damage and uncertainty of war must be experienced by the adversary and its population. The strategy should be based on the capability to ensure India’s territorial integrity against an attack by moderate to strong offensive forces. An important feature of the new strategy should be deep strikes by long-range vectors to hold at risk important industrial and strategic targets. Especially against China it is necessary to deter by threatening conventional strikes on vital areas as a quid pro quo against deep border attacks or incursions. China’s border areas with India are on the periphery, well away from the Chinese heartland. Built into India’s new strategy should be a transition to nuclear escalation if vital areas in its border areas are threatened. The Cold War NATO model, that is, forward defence with flexible response involving nuclear forces, suitably modified to Indian conditions and capabilities, will serve India’s security needs. Given its economic constraints and a smaller military compared to NATO, Russia has adopted a strategy of nuclear escalation linked to conventional war.40 The Russian strategy involves the use of nuclear weapons to de-escalate a conventional war which threatens its vital interests. India finds itself in a similar situation, with enhanced threats and limited resources. This new strategy would be fraught with challenges and risks, especially defining danger/escalation lines for escalation control. There will be the need to maintain a certain degree of ambiguity on the danger/escalation lines, but a general sense of the thresholds must be part of declaratory policy. In being willing to escalate the war to depth, strategic and heartland zones, India should be prepared to bear similar attacks, especially in a two-front war. The strategy with respect to China should exploit the psychological aspects of hurting a bigger power’s leadership self-esteem and standing amongst its public. An example of this is North Korea threatening the US-Japan-South Korea alliance system. Bigger powers may threaten smaller countries but when faced with retaliation that could escalate, the costs of conflict, both material and psychological, also escalate because it is hard for a bigger power to accept massive destruction relative to the potential gains from the confrontation against a smaller adversary. As for Pakistan, it is a smaller country which is capable of inflicting damage on India but not at the scale on which India can inflict damage on

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Pakistan. Here, therefore, full-spectrum escalation by India may not be necessary. Conventional escalation backed by a powerful nuclear deterrent may suffice. The cost of building a sizeable nuclear arsenal will be much less than maintaining a large conventional military force. NATO relied on this strategy during the Cold War, which paid dividends and forced the collapse of the Soviet economy. During the height of the Cold War, the US was spending ten percent of the defence budget on nuclear force modernization, which in the Nuclear Posture Review 2018 (NPR) is projected at 6.4 percent for the next two decades of modernization. The cost of the nuclear deterrent as a percentage of the defence budget, as quoted in the US NPR, is 2.7 percent for sustainment and 6.4 percent for recapitalisation. Similarly, India can afford a substantial nuclear force increase to offset conventional force optimization and modernisation. Even if India were to spend ten percent of the current defence budget on nuclear force modernization and increase, it could save on optimized conventional forces manpower i.e. in terms of long-run revenue expenditure and subsequent pension saving. Nuclear weapons provide the capability to neutralize the conventional edge of the combined China-Pakistan nexus, and a very sizeable nuclear force can offset their combined nuclear capabilities. The strategy will face resistance and opposition internally and internationally, but it will cater to India’s need for a more favourable balance of power and enhance its ability to deal with the increasingly conflictual nature of the environment that India is placed in. It is therefore a vital need. In summary, India’s nuclear posture should be based on deterrence against nuclear attacks, and if deterrence fails, first use under conditions of ambiguity. The second tenet should be de-escalation of conventional war by nuclear means if vital interests are threatened. The nuclear umbrella should also allow prosecution of limited wars, especially against Pakistan to counter the proxy terror war. A future challenge is deterrence against non-state actors and state-sponsored terrorist organisations capable of using weapons of mass destruction. Deterrence should also be built against nonnuclear states providing active and basing support to India’s adversaries that have nuclear capabilities. An important tenet of the posture will be to hedge against future uncertainty in the region as other nearby nations may develop nuclear weapons. Lastly, the new nuclear posture will help ensure that the balance of power remains in favour of India. To elaborate further, since the nuclear strategy against India’s adversaries must be able to destroy their political and military leadership, a large part of their nuclear arsenals and major segments of their industrial base and important population centres, it will translate into a sizeable number of targets in each adversary country. The selection and prioritization of targets will depend on the political leadership, strategic environment and end state of war desired. The force structure will remain triadbased as long as space is not weaponized, and the composition of the triad will be determined by strategic needs. The mainstay of the triad will remain land-based and sea-based systems, with airborne systems providing limited capability. The ongoing development and deployment of the Agni series of nuclear vectors, SSBN sea-based vectors and aircraft-delivered nuclear weapons as well as the pace of their induction

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will need to be accelerated to meet the needs of the new strategy. Whereas the increase in the size of the nuclear deterrent is the most important part of the new posture, the second vital area is command and control systems. As these are secret and classified, it is only possible here to underline their importance. Command and control systems require constant investment not only for their survival but also to provide multiple means of ensuring the safety and authorized use of nuclear weapons. Protection and proper use of nuclear forces under nuclear attack demand that new command and control systems are developed and new assets are created regularly. Simultaneously, protection of vital areas and leaderships must remain a priority for the conduct of war and minimum destruction at the end of war. India is working on ballistic missile defence, and it must be deployed selectively. The third important part of the nuclear posture is maintenance and enhancement of the quantity and quality of the deterrent. This requires India to enlarge the nuclear establishment so that it is capable of producing greater numbers of weapons in a compressed time frame. A truly realist posture must ensure a technological lead over and upgradation of capabilities at a faster pace than the adversary, including the induction of hypersonic missiles, manoeuvrable missiles and multiple independent re-entry vehicles to overwhelm the ballistic missile defence (BMD) being developed by China. Earth-penetrating systems are required to attack and destroy underground protected systems. Space has not been weapons-militarized yet, but India should develop systems which are space-deployable at zero notice to counter actions that threaten its assets. Energy weapons should be developed to assist India’s BMD system. Space and counterspace capabilities, cyber and information warfare, command and control systems, and all supporting elements for the functioning of the nuclear deterrent will need careful incorporation and synergisation. The triad against China and North Korea will be based on long-range delivery systems, whereas against Pakistan and Iran short-range to medium-range systems will meet the needs of the nuclear deterrent. To ensure that India can transition to the new strategy against both sets of potential targets there is a need to rapidly increase the production of nuclear weapons and delivery systems. Considering the known threats, and to hedge against unforeseen threats, India will need 1500 to 2000 nuclear weapons in the next 10–20 years. The posture need not divulge the targeting strategy or the number of targets in any country. However, the force size and structure must enable the targeting of all adversary countries from multiple directions. The force composition must be based on the following distribution: fifty percent on sea-based systems, forty percent on land-based systems and ten percent on air-delivered systems. The weapons systems must have yields from twenty kilotons to thermonuclear yields, and the preferred yield for as many weapons as possible should be in the region of 500 kilotons, with the capability to adjust it lower depending on the target. The fourth generation of nuclear weapons, that is, fusion-only weapons, should be developed to eliminate radiation and still cause the desired destruction. Finally, as part of India’s new strategic posture, it needs to revisit some of its past treaties and agreements with China and Pakistan as well as various UN resolutions.

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It should withdraw or exit from those provisions or clauses which have not provided the desired results or have put India at a disadvantage. All one-sided concessions India has granted should be ended, be it with China on Tibet or Pakistan on the Indus waters. Included in the list of issues that should be raised with China are its water policies that affect downstream states. Beijing unilaterally blocks, diverts or dams water from Tibet and has no agreements with the lower riparian states. Crucial for India are also revisiting the border conflict and trade differences with China.

Conclusion India’s quest for big power status through a moral-idealistic foreign policy and strategy is largely a story of failure. India was buffeted by wars and turbulence in the absence of the requisite military power. A realist policy will require India to define its national interests backed by military capabilities including pre-emptive action if necessary. It must have the capabilities to back declaratory policies and display resolve against adversaries. India needs a national security strategy and a detailed national economic policy associated with the security strategy. The economy must be a priority to build national power. India must cope with an expansionist China, a revisionist Pakistan, additional regional threats, and terrorism, besides other destabilizing actions by inimical forces. A two-and-half-front war against India is not a new thought but has gained importance because of the growing Sino-Pakistani partnership. The growth of China’s military and economic power has increased the challenges India now faces on its northern borders. Pakistan has lowered the nuclear threshold by developing theatre nuclear weapons and announced a full-spectrum-deterrence policy. It has unleashed a proxy terror war on India using the threat of nuclear escalation. The political and military leadership must recast India’s national security strategy with a greater reliance on nuclear weapons and simultaneously recast conventional war strategy. The nuclear posture advocated here will need investment in manpower and other resources for the next two decades. Pre-emption and fighting war on the adversary’s soil must gain acceptance in the strategic thought of our decision makers, and India must shed its defensive mindset which is content with waiting for the enemy to attack. Moral principles have no place where survival of the nation is threatened. In an anarchic world, where norms and institutions are weak, might is right, and nuclear weapons provide the greatest might.

Notes 1 James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies, ‘Chinese Nuclear Weapons’, Nuclear Threat Initiative, last updated April 2015, https://www.nti.org/learn/countries/china/ nuclear/ (accessed on 20 November 2020). 2 James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies, ‘Indian Nuclear Weapons’, Nuclear Threat Initiative, last updated November 2019, https://www.nti.org/learn/countries/ india/nuclear/ (accessed on 1 June 2021).

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3 Brajesh Mishra, ‘Draft Report of National Security Advisory Board on Indian Nuclear Doctrine’, Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India, 17 August 1999, https://mea.gov. in/in-focus-article.htm?18916/Draft+Report+of+National+Security+Advisory+Board+on +Indian+Nuclear+Doctrine (accessed on 1 June 2021). 4 ‘Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT)’, Office for Disarmament Affairs, United Nations, https://www.un.org/disarmament/wmd/nuclear/npt/ (accessed on 1 June 2021). 5 Mishra, ‘Draft Report of National Security Advisory Board on Indian Nuclear Doctrine’. 6 ‘The Cabinet Committee on Security Reviews Operationalization of India’s Nuclear Doctrine’, Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India, 4 January 2003, https://www. mea.gov.in/press-releases.htm?dtl/20131/The+Cabinet+Committee+on+Security +Reviews+perationalization+of+Indias+Nuclear+Doctrine (accessed on 1 June 2021). 7 Michael J. Mazarr, Jonathan S. Blake, Abigail Casey, Tim McDonald, Stephanie Pezard, and Michael Spirtas, ‘Understanding the Emerging Era of International Competition: Theoretical and Historical Perspectives’, Rand Research Report, https://www.rand.org/con tent/dam/rand/pubs/research_reports/RR2700/RR2726/RAND_RR2726.pdf (accessed on 20 October 2020). 8 Barry O’Neill, ‘Nuclear Weapons and the Pursuit of Prestige’ [unpublished manuscript], University of California, May 2002, http://www.sscnet.ucla.edu/polisci/faculty/boneill/p restap5.pdf (accessed on 1 June 2021). 9 On India’s strategic autonomy, see Jeff M. Smith, ‘Strategic Autonomy and U.S.-Indian Relations’, War on the Rocks, 6 November 2020, https://warontherocks.com/2020/11/stra tegic-autonomy-and-u-s-indian-relations/ (accessed on 1 June 2021), and ‘India’s Strategic Autonomy Dilemma and the Rapprochement with the United States,’ Mohan Parikkar Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses, New Delhi, 20 March 2009, https://idsa.in/ event/IndiavsUS_gmonsonis_200309 (accessed on 1 June 2021). 10 S. N. Prasad, and Dharam Pal, History of Operations in Jammu & Kashmir, 1947–48, New Delhi: History Division, Ministry of Defence, Government of India, 1987, p. 27, 370, 383. 11 Claude Arpi, Will Tibet Ever Find Her Soul Again? India Tibet Relations 1947–1962—Part 2, New Delhi: Vij Books, 2018, p. 8, 24, 185. 12 ‘Declaration on Principles for Relations and Comprehensive Cooperation Between the Republic of India and the People’s Republic of China’, Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India, 23 June 2003, https://www.mea.gov.in/in-focus-article.htm?7679/Decla ration+on+Principles+for+Relations+and+Comprehensive+Cooperation+Between+the+ Republic+of+India+and+the+Peoples+Republic+of (accessed on 1 June 2021). 13 George Chakko, ‘CPEC and India’s Challenge’, Indian Defence Review, 15 March 2017, http:// www.indiandefencereview.com/news/cpec-indias-challenge/ (accessed on 1 June 2021). 14 Office of the Secretary of Defense, ‘Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China 2018’, US Department of Defense, 16 May 2018, p. 76, https://media.defense.gov/2018/Aug/16/2001955282/-1/ -1/1/2018-CHINA-MILITARY-POWER-REPORT.PDF (accessed on 1 June 2021). 15 Mansoor Ahmed, ‘Pakistan’s Tactical Nuclear Weapons and Their Impact on Stability’, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 30 June 2016, https://carnegieendowment.org/ 2016/06/30/pakistan-s-tactical-nuclear-weapons-and-their-impact-on-stability-pub-63911 (accessed on 1 June 2021). 16 J. Michael Legge, ‘Theater Nuclear Weapons and the NATO Strategy of Flexible Response’, Rand R-2964-FF, April 1983, https://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/p ubs/reports/2007/R2964.pdf (accessed on 25 October 2020). 17 For actual open source information on China’s capabilities, see Office of the Secretary of Defense, ‘Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China’ [2018, 2019, and 2020], US Department of Defense, https://www.andrewerickson.com/2020/09/u-s-department-of-defense-a nnual-reports-to-congress-on-chinas-military-power-2002-20-download-completeset-read-highlights-here/ (accessed on 1 June 2021); the Office of the Secretary of Defense, ‘2018 Nuclear Posture Review’, US Department of Defense, February 2018,

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18

19 20 21 22 23 24 25

26 27 28

29 30 31 32 33 34

https://media.defense.gov/2018/Feb/02/2001872886/-1/-1/1/2018-NUCLEARPOSTURE-REVIEW-FINAL-REPORT.PDF (accessed on 1 June 2021); Donald J. Trump, ‘National Security Strategy of the United States of America’, Trump White House Archives, December 2017, https://trumpwhitehouse.archives.gov/wp-con tent/uploads/2017/12/NSS-Final-12-18-2017-0905.pdf (accessed on 1 June 2021); and many other analyses of China’s military modernisation. For Pakistan, many organisations and think tanks provide open-source information. H. I. Sutton, ‘Satellite Images Show That Chinese Navy Is Expanding Overseas Base’, Forbes, 10 May 2020, https://www.forbes.com/sites/hisutton/2020/05/10/satellite-ima ges-show-chinese-navy-is-expanding-overseas-base/?sh=174234c06869 (accessed on 1 June 2021). John Moore, ‘The Evolution of Islamic Terrorism: An Overview’, PBS, 11 September 2001, https://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/target/etc/modern.html (accessed on 1 June 2021). ‘Jihad in Pakistan’, Bin Laden’s Bookshelf, Office of the Director of National Intelligence, no date (declassified on 1 March 2016), https://www.dni.gov/files/documents/ubl2016/ english/Jihad%20in%20Pakistan.pdf (accessed on 1 June 2021). Amar Cheema, ‘Op TOPAC: Confronting Strategic Asymmetry’, Indian Defence Review, 19 August 2018, http://www.indiandefencereview.com/spotlights/op-topac-confrontingstrategic-asymmetry/ (accessed on 1 June 2021). Eleanor Albert, ‘The China-North Korea Relationship’, Council on Foreign Relations, 25 June 2019, https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/china-north-korea-relationship (accessed on 1 June 2021). ‘Pakistan and North Korea: Dangerous Counter-trades’, Strategic Comments, November 2002, 8(9), https://carnegieendowment.org/pdf/npp/Pakistan-and-North-Korea.pdf (accessed on 20 March 2021). Robert Farley, ‘Iran vs. Israel War: Pray to God It Never Happens’, The National Interest, 1 August 2020, https://nationalinterest.org/blog/reboot/iran-vs-israel-war-pray-god-itnever-happens-166071 (accessed on 1 June 2021). General Bipin Rawat referred to this in a speech at the US-India Strategic Partnership Forum (USISPF) conclave on 3 September 2020. See Krishn Kaushik, ‘Army, IAF Chiefs Visit Forward Areas, CDS Rawat Warns of Two-front Threat’, The Indian Express, 4 September 2020, https://indianexpress.com/article/india/india-china-borderdispute-cds-bipin-rawat-naravane-6582279/ (accessed on 1 June 2021). Ahmed, ‘Pakistan’s Tactical Nuclear Weapons and Their Impact on Stability’. Sannia Abdullah, ‘Pakistan’s Full-Spectrum Deterrence: Trends and Trajectories’, South Asian Voices, 13 December 2018, https://southasianvoices.org/pakistan-full-spectrum -deterrence-trends-trajectories/ (accessed on 1 June 2021). Office of the Secretary of Defense, ‘Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China 2020’, US Department of Defense, September 2020, https://media.defense.gov/2020/Sep/01/2002488689/-1/ -1/1/2020-DOD-CHINA-MILITARY-POWER-REPORT-FINAL.PDF, pp. 55–57 (accessed on 1 June 2021). Office of the Secretary of Defense, ‘Annual Report to Congress 2020’, pp. 61–62. Office of the Secretary of Defense, ‘Annual Report to Congress 2020’, p. 63. Madhunika Iyer, ‘Demand for Grants 2021–22 Analysis: Defence’, PRS Legislative Research, 12 February 2021, https://prsindia.org/budgets/parliament/demand-for-gra nts-2021-22-analysis-defence (accessed on 1 June 2021). ‘Union Budget: Notes on Demand for Grants, 2021–22, No. 37 (Appropriation), Interest Payments’, Ministry of Finance, Government of India, https://www.indiabudget. gov.in/doc/eb/sbe37.pdf (accessed on 1 June 2021). Iyer, ‘Demand for Grants 2021–22 Analysis’. Iyer, ‘Demand for Grants 2021–22 Analysis’; and Armaan Bhatnagar, ‘India’s Defence Spending in 7 Charts’, The Times of India, 30 January 2021, https://timesofindia.indiatim

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35 36

37 38 39

40

es.com/india/indias-defence-spending-in-7-charts/articleshow/80600625.cms (accessed on 2 June 2021). Laxman Kumar Behera, ‘India’s Defence Budget 2020–21’, Manohar Parrikar Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses, 4 February 2020, https://idsa.in/issuebrief/india-def-bud get-2020-21-lkbehera-040220 (accessed on 2 June 2021). ‘Exchange Rate of the Indian Rupee vis-a-vis the SDR, US Dollar, Pound Sterling, D. M. / Euro and Japanese Yen’, Reserve Bank of India, 18 September 2020, p. 215, https:// rbidocs.rbi.org.in/rdocs/Publications/PDFs/ 140TE74E725980E74CB987BB87D52853686D.PDF (accessed on 2 June 2021). Simran Kashyap, ‘Rafale Jet Specifications, Top Speed, Price: Here’s the Lowdown’, OneIndia, 29 July 2020, https://www.oneindia.com/india/rafale-jet-specifications-topspeed-price-here-s-the-lowdown-3126162.html?story=3 (accessed on 2 June 2021). V. K. Bhatia, ‘Cost Factor’, SP’s Aviation, May 2010, http://www.sps-aviation.com/ story/?id=484 mirage (accessed on 2 June 2021). Nikhil Rampal, ‘How India’s Dependence on China as a Trading Partner has Grown Over Years’, India Today, 19 June 2020, https://www.indiatoday.in/diu/story/how-indias-dependence-on-china-as-a-trading-partner-has-grown-over-years-1690731-2020-06-19 (accessed on 2 June 2021). Vladimir Putin, ‘Russian National Security Strategy, December 2015’ (translated), Spanish Institute for Strategic Studies, 31 December 2015, http://www.ieee.es/Galerias/ fichero/OtrasPublicaciones/Internacional/2016/Russian-National-Security-Strategy-31 Dec2015.pdf (accessed on 2 June 2021).

6 TACTICAL REALISM OF INDIA’S CONVENTIONAL MILITARY Harish Masand

The Indian political leadership, the diplomatic community as well as the military have consistently played down the potential threat from China, even after the humiliating experience of 1962, while focusing largely on Pakistan. The emphasis of the military, in 1961, was on the threat from Pakistan.1 Even the Army Chief’s statement on the two-front scenario in early 2020 still indicated a focus on Pakistan while relegating the differences on the border with China as being capable of resolution at the lowest level.2 This is despite the fact that China’s rapid economic rise and the consequent systematic modernization of its military, particularly since the 1990s, have been clearly visible with serious implications for the security of India. China’s claims and aggressive moves in the South China Sea, maritime activity in the Indian Ocean and frequent incursions across the line of actual control (LAC) into India have been on the rise. President Xi Jinping’s emphasis on the military for realization of the ‘Chinese Dream’ also poses a growing security dilemma for India.3 Unfortunately, India had not seen it fit to openly call out or check Chinese moves and continued, till recently at least, to follow an unworkable appeasement policy towards China4 while suffering transgressions on many fronts.5 This chapter argues that this state of affairs has been brought about less by lack of military realism, particularly at the tactical and operational levels, and more because of a lack of strategic vision and direction flowing from India’s political leadership. Coupled with a deficit in bureaucratic expertise, the lack of vision and direction has resulted in a defence structure wherein each Service defines its own doctrines, strategy and force structures with obvious adverse effects on effectiveness. While discussing realism, the chapter confines itself to the practical aspects of the decisions and actions at the tactical levels, based on the prevailing environment. The chapter concludes with some recommendations to overcome the problems. DOI: 10.4324/9781003093343-6

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Independent India’s Strategic Thought and Civil-Military Relations At independence in August 1947, the focus of the political leadership of the country was obviously on economic development and poverty alleviation. With an emphasis on soft power and being a ‘responsible power’, successive political leaderships paid little attention to the extant geopolitics and hard power.6 India overlooked the ancient Indian wisdom on the political realism of Kautilya aka Chanakya wherein he rightly believed that ‘every nation acts to maximize power and self-interest, and therefore moral principles or obligations have little or no force in actions among nations’.7 The first prime minister of India, Jawarharlal Nehru, even felt that a peaceful, non-aligned India would not invite aggression and talked of doing away with the Army, claiming that the police would be adequate to meet its internal and external security needs, while concurrently rejecting a formal defence policy after independence.8 Perhaps Sardar Vallabbhai Patel, Nehru’s competitor for the post of prime minister and the initial home minister, was the only important politician to realise the growing threats to national security with the emergence of communist China in 1949. Patel, also known as the ‘Ironman of India’, even wrote to Nehru on the likely threat from China soon after China’s military take-over of Tibet in 1950.9 Unfortunately, Patel passed away within five weeks of this letter. The Chinese invasion of 1962 shattered Nehru, and military spending increased thereafter. However, no tangible reforms were carried out in the policy or processes of the national security structure to prevent such failures from recurring in the future.10 Such inaction was essentially due to lack of a strategic culture in the Indian leadership, as evidenced by the absence of a formal national security strategy even after over seven decades of independence. The lack of an appropriate higher defence organisation, essential to proactively address and handle security issues in the fastpaced modern world, aggravates the problem. As an example, the Defence Committee of the Cabinet (DCC) has been defunct since the 1950s, leading to little regular dialogue between the political and military leadership except in crises. This led a leading scholar, Jasjit Singh, to remark that, ‘it is ironic that the Cabinet has an Accommodation Committee but not a Defence Committee!’11 Since operational and tactical actions largely flow from the security strategies, it is essential to briefly highlight the reasons for such deficiencies in the Indian security structure to address the issue of tactical realism at the conventional military level. In a 1992 study on Indian strategic thought, carried out by the National Defense Research Institute under RAND, the American scholar George Tanham ascribed the weak and informal strategic culture in India to four key factors; geography, history, culture, and the influence of colonisation under the British Raj.12 Out of these, perhaps the most important is the influence of two centuries of British colonisation. Historically, whenever India existed as a united empire, strategic thought and culture were obviously prevalent as evident from Kautilya’s Arthashastra composed in the fourth century BCE during the reign of Chandragupta Maurya (317–293 BCE), leading to the establishment of the Mauryan Empire.

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While the treatise has been viewed and interpreted differently by various scholars, Heinrich Zimmer rightly characterised it as incorporating ‘timeless laws of politics, economy, diplomacy, and war’.13 There is no denying that Kautilya was a political realist laying emphasis on all forms of power, including hard power, instead of mere passivity and reliance on fate that Tanham identifies as a notable aspect which influenced Indian strategic culture.14 That strategic thinking was later subdued was, perhaps, because of emperor Ashoka turning to Buddhism, non-violence and Dharma as the guiding principle for subsequent rule of the Mauryan Empire.15 This led to the disintegration of the Empire into smaller kingdoms. His concept was evidently well before its time since power continues to be the main instrument for the conduct of inter-state relations even today. While Tanham attributes the lack of strategic thought and planning for the future largely to cultural aspects of Indian civilisation, he later admitted that, amongst the more educated, the need for planning is emerging.16 A subsequent analysis of Tanham’s work also felt that with rapid industrialisation and urbanisation, these aspects of the larger Indian culture are not likely to be fixed or predictive of future Indian strategic thinking.17 Unfortunately, particularly after the Gupta Empire (3rd to mid-6th century CE), the smaller kingdoms were more inward looking and gave little thought to the strategic defence of India as a cultural entity.18 Indian strategic thought almost vanished under British rule since, unlike earlier invaders, the British did not get absorbed into India and kept Indians totally out of policy making and positions dealing with strategy. At independence, India did not have experienced military or civilian officers at the higher levels of government who had earlier been exposed to strategy and policy formulation.19 Indian schools, and even the military, did not include Kautilya or ancient Indian military history in the curriculum till the turn of the millennium.20 While Karnad gives credit to Nehru’s genius for subverting the status quo to advantage the country and the ‘Janus-faced’ nuclear energy programme,21 he also mentions that Nehru took Lord Blackett’s advice on conventional military capabilities ‘too much to heart’, which led to a hard power deficit over the years.22 There has also been a fear of a military take-over in the political class of India considering the developments in Pakistan and other neighbouring countries. Such fears were conveniently fuelled by the bureaucracy for coup-proof domination of the military resulting in dysfunctional civil-military relations.23 Civil-military relations in independent India, instead of evolving to a state where the military was integrated, in appropriate institutions and formalised processes, reached a low with the political drama over General K. S. Thimayya’s resignation and subsequent retraction of resignation in 1959.24 These would, unfortunately, continue to worsen over the years.25 An important aggravating factor is the supplanting of civilian control from the elected representatives, the politicians, to the civilian bureaucracy which has all the authority without however the corresponding accountability.26 The Defence Secretary being made responsible for the defence of India, as per the government’s rules of business, 1961, with the armed forces headquarters (HQ) as attached offices of the Ministry of Defence (MoD), manned entirely

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by generalist bureaucrats with little expertise in military matters, speaks for itself. Such an arrangement must be weighed against the admission of a former Defence Secretary, H. M. Patel, as early as 1953, that ‘the ignorance of civilian officials (to which may properly be added that of the politicians) about military matters is so complete as to be a self-evident and incontrovertible fact’.27 The need for ‘appropriately qualified, highly trained and experienced functionaries’ to man the national security apparatus at all levels was reiterated by another former Defence Secretary even in 2014.28 However, the armed forces cannot totally absolve themselves of the blame for being out of the decision-making loop and the progressive deterioration of civilmilitary relations. Perhaps this deterioration started with the very first war after independence over Jammu and Kashmir (J&K) in 1947–48. Nehru was obviously keen to carry on the war till the whole state of J&K was freed and even talked of striking bases in Pakistan proper, citing self-defence.29 It has also been argued that the Army had the capacity, with the available comparative strength, to liberate the whole of J&K.30 Unfortunately, the views of the British commander-in-chief and Governor General based on Britain’s strategic interests prevailed, and the senior Indian military officers could not seize the opportunity to evict the Pakistani forces from at least a larger part of J&K, an action which may have showcased the importance of the military.31 Soon after, in the 1950s, the Army also rejected the Whitehall-type of Army Council system proposed by Nehru.32 The slide in civil-military relations has been progressive, with the armed forces, without a unified voice and as silent spectators to their own decline, surrendering their rights on even minor administrative matters.33 The lack of a regular dialogue between the political and military leadership, except in crises, as pointed out earlier, is aggravated by a generalist bureaucracy combined with a disinterested political class.34 The natural outcome of such a vacuum has been individual Services working in silos to build their own capabilities to meet perceived threats and pursue resources in a turf war. Such a trend was visible even to international observers in the early days after independence in the 1950–60s due to apathetic political executives.35 This has led to a manpower intensive army and a bean-count approach in acquisitions instead of building suitable capabilities with a long-term perspective in a joint manner. Quite obviously, the threat from Pakistan was easier to project to build a huge, and perhaps unusable, offensive surface capability. Also, while adopting a defensive posture towards China due to lack of resources may be justifiable to some extent, the military cannot escape the responsibility of not pursuing an appropriate capability to effectively deter China even though the Defence Programme post-1962 identified China as the major threat and intended to make the IAF capable of assuming some of the Army’s deterrence capability.36 Perhaps here, India needs to draw suitable lessons from Israel’s focus and dependence on its air force to defend the tiny nation against numerically superior hostile forces on all sides.

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Successes and Failures from 1948 to 1999 However, with that said, through the years, the Indian military has performed reasonably well in almost all situations that confronted the country and managed to defend it against external aggression, albeit sometimes at an unnecessary higher cost. Some military leaders have used the vacuum in strategy to perform brilliantly on their own initiative at the tactical and operational levels, at times with strategic effect, while others have dithered without higher direction and orders, an affliction not unknown even in the best militaries around the world. A few examples for the Indian military on this issue follow. The first example is, obviously, the Kashmir war of 1947–48. Thousands of tribal raiders, led and backed by Pakistani regulars, were knocking on the doors of Srinagar, and particularly its airfield, on 26 October 1947 when Maharaja Hari Singh of J&K signed the instrument of accession to India. The successful airlift of 27 October, despite the risks and advice to the contrary, surprised even Mountbatten.37 While there are differing views on whether the offensive could have been pursued to liberate more of the state from Pakistani occupation, it appears that the nation and the military lost an opportunity, as highlighted earlier.38 The widely recorded humiliation at the hands of the Chinese in 1962, despite individual instances of heroism and tenacity in the face of heavy odds, was largely a fall-out of the political naïveté, intelligence failures and neglect of the military.39 The military leadership also failed and could not stand firm to insist on a tactically sound defensive battle.40 While Brigadier D. K. Palit, then Director Military Operations (DMO), talks of offensive air support (OAS) and all the reasoning behind it, he did not take it up with his counterparts in Air HQ or the Chief of Army Staff (COAS). The Defence Minister also separately overruled the Chief of Air Staff (CAS), Aspy Engineer, on this issue.41 Most scholars agree that the decision was seriously flawed, some terming it a strategic blunder, with a near unanimous view that OAS, particularly in the interdictory role, could have saved India from such a humiliating defeat.42 The IAF was not employed even for a show of force in the build-up phase.43 It is apparent that Air HQ also did not have a professionally correct assessment on this issue since Air Commodore H. C. Dewan, in charge of operations in 1962, later took credit for the negative decision.44 The reactive response of the Indian military was again evident within three years when Pakistan attempted to wrest the state of J&K from India in 1965.45 Admittedly, there was some initial caution from the political leadership on escalating the conflict with use of the IAF and Navy.46 However, with the opening moves by Pakistan in the form of intrusions from 1964 onwards, the build-up in early 1965 and, finally, an attack on the border outposts in the Rann of Kutch in April 1965 through Operation Desert Hawk,47 it is surprising that the military leadership did not fully prepare itself for the impending confrontation even when the outline of Operation Gibraltar emerged with the capture of a large number of infiltrators.48 General J. N. Chaudhuri, the COAS, had realised as early as 5 May 1965 that a Pakistani attack on Kashmir later that year was a distinct possibility.49 However, he did not share his assessment with the

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Air Force and the Navy.50 Thus, there was little improvement in inter-service coordination and joint planning even after the debacle of 1962.51 Apart from some tactically sound battles by individual commanders and tales of valour as at Assal Uttar,52 Haji Pir Pass and Phillora,53 this war was essentially a stalemate in a grinding war of frontal attacks and attrition.54 While, at the strategic level, Pakistan could not achieve its objectives, the question still remains as to why the Navy failed to defer the routine maintenance of its sole aircraft carrier, Vikrant, given the impending war,55 especially after the prime minister’s statement in April 1965 on ‘fighting at a time and place of India’s choosing’.56 As a result, the Navy suffered the loss of a frigate and the ignominy of the attack on Dwarka without being able to counter the Pakistani Navy’s forays.57 Also surprising was the lack of effective dispersal of aircraft, which cost the IAF more than half its aircraft losses on the ground to Pakistan Air Force (PAF) raids, particularly in the eastern sector where the IAF was restrained from any offensive action.58 The IAF had also not devised suitable air combat tactics for the jet age despite many IAF pilots having trained on F-86 Sabres in the US between 1962–6559 and at Day Fighter Leaders School in the UK till 1957.60 Operational squadrons, and individual pilots, were thus left to their own devices to formulate tactics, with many wingmen just sticking to their leader without being of any help during manoeuvres and, sometimes, being shot down. Such a state was to continue even into the 1971 Indo-Pakistani war, till the formation of the Tactics and Combat Development and training Establishment (TACDE) for the development and dissemination of combat tactics to operational squadrons.61 One of the most illuminating examples of individual operational and tactical brilliance, with strategic connotations, is that of Sagat Singh. Sagat was to make a name for himself even in China as the ‘Hero of Nathu La’ as a Major General in 1967 while commanding 17 Mountain Division.62 It was due to his tenacity and far-sightedness that the Division held on to the watershed and the two passes at Nathu La and Cho La, inflicting serious losses on the Chinese for the first time after 1962, while the other pass at Jelep La was surrendered without a fight by 27 Division using the discretion given to the Division Commanders by higher HQ.63 This resolute action by Sagat followed by other actions, like the forward posture in Sumdorong Valley in 1986–87,64 were major factors in maintaining the peace at the LAC with China, without a shot being fired for over five decades including Doklam in 2017. Fate was to soon propel Sagat into a conflict where he would, once again, display his flair for an unconventional approach to battle, even flouting the restraints put on him from higher HQ. In the 1971 Indo-Pakistani war, leading to the birth of Bangladesh, Sagat’s 4 Corps played a crucial role.65 The Indian aim and the Army’s plan, till the start of the war, did not envisage capture of the capital of East Pakistan, Dacca, but only liberation of large tracts of territory where the Bangladesh government could be formed and millions of Bengali refugees, having fled to India, could be resettled.66 It was Sagat’s prompt exploitation of the air superiority achieved in the East by 6 December 197167 with his outflanking heli-borne movements to overcome the

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difficult riverine terrain that put his forces on the outskirts of Dacca in just about ten days.68 Sagat’s 4 Corps was tasked only to secure the eastern banks of the Meghna River and contain Sylhet, with Chittagong as an objective, if time and resources permitted. Sagat’s answer to his Army Commander sums up the essence of operational acumen, which distinguishes military leaders. He said, ‘Jaggi, I am a Corps Commander. I am expected to exploit an opportunity. If an opportunity presents itself to cross the Meghna and give you an aim plus, I will take it. I am giving you the West Bank and beyond; you should be happy’.69 The reason for narrating, in brief, the brilliant and unconventional approach of this one individual, while leaving out many other notable contributors to the above victory, is to contrast it with the conservative approach of most peacetime militaries. Unfortunately, such outspokenness, which generally comes only from bold and confident commanders, is hardly ever rewarded. Sagat was to be passed over as an Army Commander soon after the war, apparently due to some political reservations, without the Army standing up for him.70 Such disincentives do tend to discourage officers from adopting unconventional approaches as they rise through senior ranks. Another notable success for air power was the Battle of Longewala wherein the air base at Jaisalmer, commanded by then Wing Commander ‘Minhi’ Bawa with just six Hunter aircraft, routed a complete Pakistani brigade, with a regiment of tanks, on 5 and 6 December 1971 with his grit and determination.71 Overall, on the western front, it was largely a war of attrition due to the defensive strategy adopted.72 It is to the credit of the Navy that in 1971, it chose to play an active role, even without specific directions from the political leadership, and put the aircraft carrier, Vikrant, out to blockade East Pakistan despite serious boiler problems that restricted its speed to just 14 knots.73 Another notable naval tactical action was the daring strike by missile boats on Pakistani warships and shore installations at Karachi harbour on the nights of 4 and 8 December 1971.74 The IAF achieved complete air supremacy over East Pakistan in two days, which Sagat and others exploited for their rapid advance, leading to the surrender in the east in barely two weeks.75 The innovative pinpoint attack on the Governor’s House in Dacca on 14 December, by MiG-21s from Gauhati and Hunters from Hasimara, was the coup de grace that hastened the surrender.76 However, even with overwhelming numerical superiority in the east, the initial attacks on airfields at Dacca were planned at low levels at extreme ranges, without combat fuel reserves and effective munitions, when attacks from higher levels, with bombs against the operating surfaces of the airfields, would have been more effective with fewer losses to anti-aircraft fire.77 Unfortunately, all the military gains of this war, including a large amount of West Pakistani territory and 93,000 prisoners-of-war, almost a quarter of the Pakistani military, were frittered away by the Indian political leadership in the Simla Agreement of July 1972 without converting the victory into a durable peace.78 The military had no real say in this agreement,79 though mention of the cease-fire line in J&K as of 17 December 1971 in Para 4 of the Agreement80 and pushing back the line of control (LoC) in the Shyok Valley into Pakistani-occupied-Kashmir81 would tend to indicate that the military was consulted, at least to some extent. The whole process of

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negotiations by the politico-bureaucratic leadership, without representation of the military, reconfirms the weaknesses in the national security structure. More than a decade later, the Indian military showed its initiative and acumen in pre-empting the occupation of the Saltoro Ridge and Siachen by heli-lifting a platoon of troops to Bilafond La on 17 April 1984 when Pakistan’s designs in this area became obvious.82 India’s actions were based on the Karachi Agreement of 27 July 1949 that clearly marked the cease-fire line till Point NJ 9842 on the southern edge of Saltoro Ridge and ‘thence North to the glaciers’.83 This brilliant tactical move had significant strategic consequences for the overall defence of Ladakh and the Karakoram Pass by denying the northern axis to Pakistan and/or China even though Siachen, as the highest battlefield in the world, mostly above 20,000 ft AMSL, does entail some costs for India. The Kargil War of 1999 found the Indian military on the back-foot again. The focus on strike forces with large mechanized formations and years of preoccupation with counter-insurgency in J&K seemed to have lulled the Army into thinking that a bolder intrusion to change the LoC and internationalize the Kashmir issue was unlikely.84 Furthermore, the Army did not have a standing requirement for regular photo-reconnaissance of sensitive areas or did not do so whenever the commanding heights in that area were vacated because of difficulties in maintaining such posts or in patrolling during winter, despite earlier Pakistani attempts to occupy posts in and around Siachen.85 All accounts of this war agree on the failure of the intelligence system and lack of coordination between agencies; silos existed even within institutions, as between operations and intelligence in Army HQ.86 Since there was some confusion about the exact extent, nature and number of intruders after the first reports came in on 3 May 1999,87 it is surprising that a request for photo-reconnaissance was not made to first gather essential intelligence on what the Army was facing, before launching foot patrols, which were mostly ambushed and resulted in unnecessary casualties. Instead, the Army asked for armed helicopters, despite the IAF pointing out their unsuitability and vulnerability in that environment.88 The controversy over delayed use of combat air power further confirmed the lack of inter-service communications and joint planning before the conflict.89 Considering the terrain, and the difficulty of acquiring and targeting small camouflaged targets from the air on hilltops and ridges, the overall performance of the Air Force was commendable and avoided fratricide even with friendly ground forces in close proximity to the assigned targets.90 After the initial shock and surprise, the Army also displayed tremendous grit and courage, particularly at the junior levels, to recapture the heights and evict the intruders despite heavy casualties.91 Nevertheless, there is a view that this war was another instance of the Indian political and military leadership muddling through while exposing many deficiencies in the national security apparatus and senior leadership.92 However, to be fair, some of the factors affecting status-quoist powers could have initially lulled the Indian military.93

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Recent Events In the recent standoff between China and India in Ladakh from May 2020, despite significant improvements in surveillance capability since Kargil, including satellites, India was undeniably again pre-empted, politically and militarily. But then, the Indian defence community always seemed to consider China only as a potential downstream threat.94 The renewed Chinese aggression has, once again, highlighted the futility of trying to appease China in an attempt to maintain the status quo on the borders.95 Admittedly, Prime Minister Narendra Modi made serious attempts to build bridges with China in his inimitable style through personal rapport and summits at Wuhan in April 2018 and Mamallapuram in October 2019. However, some experts saw these efforts as mere appeasement96, ignoring clear warnings about China’s longterm objectives and its duplicity over the years.97 A recent article claims that China would keep seeking accommodation and concessions from India while working towards its disintegration, and goes to the extent of predicting an invasion of India between 2035–2040 in collusion with Pakistan.98 While this may be extremely unlikely, India cannot ignore China’s strategic objectives. It has to prepare itself for the worst-case scenario of Mao’s ‘five fingers of the Tibetan palm’ with the stated goal of liberating the fingers,99 and be aware of current opinion in Chinese strategic circles that conflict with India is inevitable, along with the advocated strategy of forming a joint front that would see India ‘reduced to its princely state era’.100 If Modi’s moves were to buy time to build a credible deterrence capability, the overtures may have been applauded as a Kautilyan move of surviving to fight another day.101 Unfortunately, the military remained under-funded and without any significant reforms except establishment of the Chief of Defence Staff (CDS), which only came after Modi’s first term of five years. The continuing neglect of the military is evident from the crisis-purchase of 12 Su-30s, 21-mothballed MiG-29s and other urgently required items.102 Such shortages, despite numerous lessons of the past, raise a question on the claims of being prepared for any eventuality. The leadership fails to realise that military capabilities are not built overnight with such knee-jerk emergency purchases, perhaps at much higher costs. Notably, in Exercise Gagan Shakti of April 2018, the IAF generated over 11,000 sorties, with whatever it had, in simulated contingencies on all fronts. However, statements like ‘The [Gagan Shakti] Exercise must have been monitored by the Chinese and the Pakistanis with great interest. They must have drawn appropriate lessons from it’,103 unnecessarily followed this impressive performance instead of highlighting the progressively depleting capability of the IAF, both quantitatively and qualitatively, that has been a cause of concern for some time now.104 Also, signifying a shift in the political will from the earlier strategic restraint against Pakistan-sponsored terrorism, the Army carried out surgical strikes across the LoC after the Uri incident in September 2016. This was followed by an air strike in Balakot on 26 February 2019 after the Pulwama attack. Without going into the much-debated results of these strikes,105 a detailed analysis indicates that having lured

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Pakistan to respond, the IAF lost an opportunity to inflict significant casualties on the intruding force for a more lasting impact.106 Almost a year later, the ex-Air Chief, B. S. Dhanoa, admitted that the desired behavioural change would have been immediate if the IAF had shot down ‘four or five [Pakistani] aircraft’.107 The appointment of the CDS in December 2019, a long-awaited reform in India’s higher defence organisation, came with hopes of major improvements in the functioning, modernization and capabilities of the armed forces. However, the high expectations seem to have been belied so far. The Defence Secretary continues to be responsible for defence and policy formulation with the department of military affairs under the CDS just another vertical in the MoD. In almost his first move, the CDS announced the setting up of an integrated tri-services Air Defence Command, obviously without adequate internal discussion and clarity on integration of required resources, particularly fighters and other combat support elements,108 thus also indicating a defensive mind-set. Concurrently, ostensibly in view of budgetary constraints, the CDS indicated that the IAF’s proposal for the acquisition of 114 fighters is unlikely to fructify, scuttled the Navy’s plans for a third aircraft carrier and talked of staggered acquisition of almost every major system, which may actually turn out to be a bit of everything at higher costs.109 The CAS contradicted this statement almost immediately, reconfirming a lack of consultations and joint assessment of security issues within the military.110 With regard to the functioning of the CDS, Air Chief Marshal P. C. Lal’s views after 1971 are still worth serious consideration.111

Conclusions and Recommendations This chapter has argued that since independence, the Indian military has functioned largely without political strategic direction or dialogue, except in crises. Nevertheless, it has performed reasonably well at the tactical levels, and sometimes beyond, depending on circumstances and individual commanders. Some have done well in this environment on their own initiative while others have floundered, fortunately without catastrophic consequences so far. However, India cannot always depend on such a roll of the dice given the rapidly increasing security threats to its integrity and sovereignty. For the military to function efficiently, it needs to have clear strategic direction, with assured and adequate funding to build approved capabilities. The first step for such capability-building in an efficient manner is an institutionalized politico-military dialogue. That should define the type of wars India is likely to fight in a nuclear overhang as also the roles and missions of each Service towards the desired capability. Regular dialogue and discussions can be expected to lead to more innovative measures like force-multipliers, cost-effective platforms and technology, a greater focus on cyber and space, areas in which in-country capabilities exist, and joint planning for all possible contingencies leading to an appropriate command structure. A greater focus on maritime and air forces should also emerge in a refined joint strategy to exploit India’s unique geo-strategic position in the Indian Ocean.

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Such complex and contentious security issues require a professionally competent military with visionary leaders who can think beyond their own turf. Only such military leaders can persuade the politicians on a suitable higher defence organisation and assured funding for the envisaged capabilities. Towards this, the systems and processes for human resource development in the military also need an overhaul with an intent to identify true merit to improve the quality of leaders, with greater emphasis on professional military education while encouraging unconventional approaches in addressing security issues. Meritorious people also progressively improve the organisation and processes while adapting to the existing system without egoism or turf-wars. Incompetence at senior levels has been a problem for almost all militaries in the world resulting in studies on why the military attracts and then promotes people of questionable abilities.112 At various stages, the Indian Army and its promotion system have also been questioned.113 Recently, an insider spoke of politicisation of the armed forces. Since these issues are vast subjects by themselves, suffice it here to leave the reader with a recommendation on the assessment and promotions in the armed forces for incubating a more meritorious system while concurrently minimising political/bureaucratic interference.114 Hopefully, as the CDS system stabilizes, the Indian military will undergo a well-planned transformation, not some ill-conceived changes in the name of reforms, to perform more effectively at all levels.

Notes 1 D. K. Palit, War in High Himalaya: The Indian Army in Crisis, 1962, New Delhi: Lancer International, 1991, p. 79, 91. 2 Pradip R. Sagar, ‘How will India Handle a Two-front War? Army Chief General Naravane Explains’, The Week, 11 January 2020, https://www.theweek.in/news/india/ 2020/01/11/how-will-india-handle-a-two-front-war-army-chief-general-naravaneexplains.html (accessed on 13 March 2020). 3 Harsh V. Pant and Pushan Das, ‘China’s Military Rise and the Indian Challenge’, Observer Research Foundation, 19 April 2018, https://www.orfonline.org/expert-speak/ china-military-rise-indian-challenge/ (accessed on 23 April 2018). 4 Brahma Chellaney, ‘India’s Appeasement Policy Begins to Unravel’, The Japan Times, 8 June 2020, https://www.japantimes.co.jp/opinion/2020/06/08/commentary/worldcommentary/indias-appeasement-policy-toward-china-unravels/#.Xt4lhCPytbU (accessed on 8 June 2020). 5 Bharat Karnad, Staggering Forward: Narendra Modi and India’s Global Ambition, New Delhi: Penguin India, 2018, pp. 229–232. 6 Bharat Karnad, Why India is Not a Great Power (Yet), New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 2015, pp. 1–30. 7 Roger Boesche, ‘Kautilya’s Arthasastra on War and Diplomacy in Ancient India’, The Journal of Military History, January 2003, 67(1): 17. 8 Shiv Kunal Verma, 1962: The War that Wasn’t, New Delhi: Aleph Book Company, 2016, p. 3, 24. 9 Verma, 1962, p. 6. 10 Palit, War in High Himalaya, p. 425. 11 Jasjit Singh, ‘Some Aspects of Our Wars in Future’, Air Power Journal, 2011, 6(3): 5. 12 George K. Tanham, ‘Indian Strategic Thought: An Interpretive Essay’, Rand R-4207USDP, 1992, p. 1, https://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/reports/2007/ R4207.pdf (accessed on 20 May 2021).

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Boesche, ‘Kautilya’s Arthasastra’, p. 15. Boesche, ‘Kautilya’s Arthasastra’, p. 15 and Tanham, Indian Strategic Thought, p. 17. Boesche, ‘Kautilya’s Arthasastra’, pp. 11–15. Tanham, Indian Strategic Thought, pp. 17–18. Peter A. Garretson, ‘Tanham in Retrospect: 18 Years of Evolution in Indian Strategic Culture’, South Asia Journal, 22 January 2010, http://southasiajournal.net/tanham-in-retrosp ect-18-years-of-evolution-in-indian-strategic-culture/ (accessed on 12 January 2020). Tanham, Indian Strategic Thought, p. 13. Tanham, Indian Strategic Thought, p. 22. Author’s personal experience. For renewed interest in this area, see Vinay Vittal, ‘Kautilya’s Arthashastra: A Timeless Grand strategy’, unpublished thesis, School of Advanced Air and Space Studies, Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama, June 2011. Karnad, Why India is Not a Great Power (Yet), p. 4. Karnad, Why India is Not a Great Power (Yet), pp. 306–309, 11. Verma, 1962, pp. 24–25. Verma, 1962, pp. 25–28. Arun Prakash, ‘Government, Military, Babu’, The Indian Express, 13 August 2012, https:// indianexpress.com/article/opinion/columns/government-military-babu/ (accessed on 1 February 2020). P. C. Lal, My Years with the IAF, New Delhi: Lancer International, 1986, p. 342 and J. F. R. Jacob, Surrender at Dacca: Birth of a Nation, New Delhi: Manohar Publishers, 1997, p. 166. Lorne J. Kavic, India’s Quest for Security: Defence Policies 1947–1965, Berkeley: University of California Press, 1967, pp. 140, 142–143. N. N. Vohra, ‘1st Air Commodore Jasjit Singh Memorial Lecture’, Centre for Air Power Studies, 18 July 2014, p. 13, http://capsindia.org/files/documents/1ST-AIR-COM MODORE-JASJIT-SINGH-MEMORIAL-SECTURE-SPEECH.pdf, (accessed on 7 February 2020). C. Dasgupta, War and Diplomacy in Kashmir: 1947–48, New Delhi: Sage Publications, 2002, p. 98. H. S. Sodhi, Significant Battles Since Independence, Chandigarh: Omni Graphics, 2007, pp. 36–38. Dasgupta, War and Diplomacy in Kashmir, pp. 200–210. Palit, War in High Himalaya, pp. 124–126. Harish Masand, ‘Measures for Enhancing the Image of the Armed Forces in India’, The Owl, Defence Services Staff College, Wellington, Vol. XXXVIII, 1982, pp. 62–65. Singh, ‘Some Aspects of Our Wars in Future’, p. 5. Kavic, India’s Quest for Security, p. 146 Kavic, India’s Quest for Security, p. 193, 207. Dasgupta, War and Diplomacy in Kashmir, pp. 47–50. Arjun Subramaniam, India’s Wars: A Military History, 1947–1971, Noida, Uttar Pradesh: HarperCollins Publishers India, 2016, pp.148, 154–165, Sodhi, Significant Battles since Independence, pp. 31–38, 46–50 and Dasgupta, War and Diplomacy in Kashmir. For detailed accounts, see Verma, 1962 and Palit, War in High Himalaya. Subramaniam, India’s Wars, pp. 221–224, 254, Palit, War in High Himalaya, pp. 91–105 and Verma, 1962, pp. 38–47, 387–394. Palit, War in High Himalaya, pp.166–168, 179–180, 204, 211, 224, 334, 341, and 375. R. Sukumaran, ‘The 1962 Indo-China War and Kargil 1999: Restrictions on the Use of Air Power’, Strategic Analysis, July–September 2003, 27(3): 332–356, Jasjit Singh, ‘The Indian Air Force in Wars’, Air Power Review, Autumn/Winter 2011, 14(3), pp. 85–87, Verma, 1962, pp. 381–385 and Palit, War in High Himalaya, pp.166–168. Sukumaran, The 1962 Indo-China War and Kargil 1999, pp. 332–356. Jasjit Singh, Defence from the Skies, New Delhi: Knowledge World International, 2007, pp. 82–91.

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45 Subramaniam, India’s Wars, pp. 261–335. For a detailed account, see S. N. Prasad and U. P. Thapliyal (eds), The India-Pakistan War of 1965: A History, New Delhi: Natraj Publishers, 2011. 46 Subramaniam, India’s Wars, p. 327 and Jasjit Singh, The Icon: Marshal of the Indian Air Force Arjan Singh, New Delhi, KW Publishers, 2009, pp. 168–172. 47 Singh, The Icon, pp. 141–143. 48 Subramaniam, India’s Wars, p. 277. 49 Singh, The Icon, pp. 168–169 and Lal, My Years with the IAF, p. 162. 50 Singh, The Icon, pp. 168–169, Lal, My Years with the IAF, p. 162, and Palit, War in High Himalaya, pp. 423–428. 51 Singh, The Icon, pp. 119–120, 163, Lal, My Years with the IAF, p. 164 and Subramaniam, India’s Wars, pp. 329–330. 52 Subramaniam, India’s Wars, pp. 309–310. 53 Subramaniam, India’s Wars, p. 333. 54 Palit, War in High Himalaya, p. 428. 55 Subramaniam, India’s Wars, p. 335. 56 Singh, The Icon, p.168. 57 Mihir Roy, War in the Indian Ocean, New Delhi: Lancer Publishers, 1995, pp. 80–90. 58 Subramaniam, India’s Wars, p. 332, Singh, The Icon, p. 208 and P. V. S. Jagan Mohan and Samir Chopra, The India-Pakistan Air War of 1965, Delhi: Manohar, 2005, Appendix A-C for claims and actual losses. 59 Subramaniam, India’s Wars, p. 317. 60 Kapil Bhargava, ‘Tactics and Combat Development and Training Establishment (TACDE)’, Bharat Rakshak, 10 November 2012, http://www.bharat-rakshak.com/ IAF/units/squadrons/13-tacde.html (accessed on 17 March 2020). 61 Author’s personal experience. 62 Randhir Singh, A Talent for War: A Military Biography of Lt Gen Sagat Singh, New Delhi: Vij Books India, 2013, pp. 73–84. 63 Singh, A Talent for War, pp. 74–75, 84. 64 Arjun Subramaniam, ‘For Operation Falcon, Maj Gen Jimmy asked for Mules but Army Chief Sundarji Gave Helicopters’, The Print, 15 May 2020, https://theprint.in/ opinion/for-operation-falcon-maj-gen-jimmy-asked-for-mules-but-army-chief-sundarjigave-helicopters/421730/ (accessed on 19 May 2020). 65 Singh, A Talent for War, pp. 97–233. 66 Singh, A Talent for War, pp. 115–118, Lal, My Years with the IAF, pp. 171–172 and Jacob, Surrender at Dacca, p. 159. 67 Singh, A Talent for War, p. 191 and Subramaniam, India’s Wars, p. 374. 68 Singh, A Talent for War, pp. 222–224 and Lal, My Years with the IAF, p. 171. 69 Singh, A Talent for War, pp. 198–199. 70 Singh, A Talent for War, p. 237. 71 Lal, My Years with the IAF, pp. 178–180, 280–285. 72 Subramaniam, India’s Wars, pp. 392–419. 73 Subramaniam, India’s Wars, p. 348, 360. 74 Subramaniam, India’s Wars, pp. 401–403. 75 Subramaniam, India’s Wars, pp. 337–438 and Pushpindar Singh, Himalayan Eagles: History of the Indian Air Force, Volumes I-III, New Delhi: The Society for Aerospace Studies, 2007, Vol. II, pp. 152–196. 76 Subramaniam, India’s Wars, pp. 387–388 and Harish Masand, ‘Eagles over Bangladesh: Getting the Facts Right’, Vayu Aerospace & Defence Review III/2014, pp. 110–114, https:// www.vayuaerospace.in/Issue/202005312051329266.pdf (accessed on 21 May 2021). 77 Masand, ‘Eagles over Bangladesh’, p. 114. 78 Jacob, Surrender at Dacca, p. 152 and Prasad and Thapliyal (eds), The India-Pakistan War of 1965, pp. 432–438. 79 Jacob, Surrender at Dacca, p. 152 and Prasad and Thapliyal (eds), The India-Pakistan War of 1965, pp. 432–438.

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80 ‘Simla Agreement July 2, 1972’, Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India, https:// mea.gov.in/in-focus-article.htm?19005/Simla+Agreement+July+2+1972 (accessed on 25 June 2020). 81 Jasjit Singh (ed), Kargil 1999: Pakistan’s Fourth War for Kashmir, New Delhi: Knowledge World, 1999, p. 63. 82 Singh (ed), Kargil 1999, pp. 81–83. 83 Singh (ed), Kargil 1999, pp. 60–88 and B. G. Verghese ‘Facts vs Bluff on Siachen: Kayani’s Suggestion Worth Pursuing’, The Tribune, 21 April 2012, https://www.tribuneindia. com/2012/20120421/edit.htm#4 (accessed on 25 July 2020). 84 Ashok Kalyan Verma, Kargil: Blood on the Snow, Manohar Publishers, New Delhi, 2002, p. 56. 85 Verma, Kargil, p. 60, 88. 86 V. P. Malik, Kargil: From Surprise to Victory, New Delhi: HarperCollins Publishers India, 2006, p. 79 and ‘From Surprise To Reckoning: Kargil Committee Report Executive Summary’, The Nuclear Weapon Archive, 25 February 2000, https://nuclearweaponarchive. org/India/KargilRCA.html (accessed on 10 July 2020). 87 Verma, Kargil, p. 100. 88 Sukumaran, The 1962 Indo-China War and Kargil 1999, pp. 349–350 and Benjamin S. Lambeth, ‘Air Power at 18,000’: The Indian Air Force in the Kargil War’, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 20 September 2012, p.14, https://carnegieendowment. org/2012/09/20/airpower-at-18-000-indian-air-force-in-kargil-war-pub-49421 (accessed on 21 May 2021). 89 Lambeth, ‘Air Power at 18,000’, pp. 11–15 and Malik, Kargil: From Surprise to Victory, pp. 119–122. 90 Lambeth, ‘Air Power at 18,000’, pp. 27–28. 91 Malik, Kargil: From Surprise to Victory, p. 155 and A. K. Verma, Kargil, p. 111. 92 Verma, Kargil, pp. 156–159. 93 Singh (ed), Kargil 1999, pp. 213–215. 94 Lambeth, ‘Air Power at 18,000’, p. 4, Chellaney, ‘India’s Appeasement Policy Begins to Unravel’, and Karnad, Staggering Forward, pp. 229–232. Also see Palit, War in High Himalaya, p. 79, 91, and Sagar, ‘How Will India Handle a Two-front War?’ 95 Press Trust of India, ‘China has Little Respect for India’s Long-standing Efforts to Freeze Status Quo: US Think Tank’, The Economic Times, 6 June 2020, https:// economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/defence/china-has-little-respect-for-indias-longstanding-efforts-to-freeze-status-quo-us-think-tank/articleshow/76229839.cms (accessed on 1 August 2020). 96 See Chellaney, ‘India’s Appeasement Policy Begins to Unravel’, and Karnad, Staggering Forward, pp. 229–232. 97 Harish Masand, ‘Beijing Reaches Out to Bridge Differences: Co-operation on Chinese Terms?’ India-China Chronicle, September–October 2019, 6(6), pp. 36–41, http://www. icec-council.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/02/ICC-Sept-Oct-2019-book.pdf (accessed on 10 June 2020). 98 Richard D. Fisher Jr. ‘China is Just Getting Started’, Sunday Guardian Live, 27 June 2020, https://www.sundayguardianlive.com/news/china-just-getting-started#.Xvm 8X0_U65z.whatsapp (accessed on 30 June 2020). 99 Suhasini Haidar, ‘History, the Standoff, and Policy Worth Rereading’, The Hindu, 18 June 2020, https://www.thehindu.com/opinion/lead/history-the-stand-off-and-policyworth-rereading/article31854822.ece (accessed on 25 June 2020). 100 Antara Ghosal Singh, ‘Is China Avoiding Conflict or Secretly Planning a Counterattack Against India?’ India Today, 18 September 2020, https://www.indiatoday.in/ news-analysis/story/china-avoid-conflict-secretly-planning-counterattack-india-ladakhstandoff-1722957-2020-09-18 (accessed on 30 September 2020). 101 Vittal, ‘Kautilya’s Arthashastra’, p. 21.

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102 Manu Pubby, ‘IAF to Urgently Procure 21 MiG 29s, 12 Su 30s’, The Economic Times, 19 June 2020, https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/defence/iaf-to-urgently-p rocure-21-mig-29s-12-su-30s/articleshow/76452881.cms (accessed on 20 June 2020). 103 Arvind Gupta, ‘Significance of Exercise “Gagan Shakti-2018”’, Vivekananda International Foundation, 7 May 2018, https://www.vifindia.org/article/2018/may/07/sig nificance-of-exercise-gagan-shakti-2018 (accessed on 21 May 2021). 104 Ashley J. Tellis, ‘Troubles, They Come in Battalions: The Manifold Travails of the Indian Air Force’, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 28 March 2016, https://carnegieendowm ent.org/files/Tellis_IAF_final.pdf (accessed on 21 May 2021), and Harish Masand, ‘Stemming the Slide’, Vayu Aerospace & Defence Review V/2019, pp. 44–56, https://www.vayua erospace.in/Issue/vayu-issue-Vayu-Issue-V-Sep-Oct-2019.pdf (accessed on 21 May 2021). 105 On the Balakot strike, see Bharat Karnad, ‘IAF’s Goofs and Delhi’s Post-Pulwama Debacle: A Post-mortem’, bharatkarnad.com, 19 March 2019, https://bharatkarnad.com/ 2019/03/19/iafs-goofs-and-delhis-post-pulwama-debacle-a-post-mortem/ (accessed on 20 July 2020), and Harish Masand, ‘Air Marshal Harish Masand on The “Real Thing”’, Vayu Aerospace & Defence Review II/2019, pp. 29–31, https://www.vayuaerospace.in/ Issue/vayu-issue-Vayu-Issue-II-Mar-Apr-2019.pdf (accessed on 21 May 2021). 106 Harish Masand, ‘The F-16 Vs MiG-21 Bison: More Questions than Answers’, Indian Defence Review, 21 March 2019, http://www.indiandefencereview.com/news/the-f-16-vsmig-21-bison-more-questions-than-answers/ (accessed on 10 June 2020). 107 Harish Masand, ‘Lessons Learnt? A Year after Pulwama’, Indian Defence Review, 17 February 2020, http://www.indiandefencereview.com/news/lessons-learnt-a-yearafter-pulwama/ (accessed on 10 June 2020). 108 S. S. Soman, ‘Air Defence Command – Need for A Rethink’, Salute, 10 June 2020, https:// salute.co.in/air-defence-command-need-for-a-rethink/ (accessed on 25 August 2020). 109 Times News Network, ‘Air Defence Command Within a Year, Southern Peninsular Command by End-2021: CDS’, The Times of India, 18 February 2020, https://timeso findia.indiatimes.com/india/air-defence-command-within-a-year-southern-peninsularcommand-by-end-2021-cds/articleshow/74183180.cms (accessed on 23 April 2018). 110 Brijesh Dhar Jayal, ‘No Luxury of Experimentation in Handling of Security Issues’, The Times of India Blogs, 29 May 2020, https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/blogs/jay-speak/ no-luxury-of-experimentation-in-handling-of-security-issues/ (accessed on 10 June 2020). 111 Lal, My Years with the IAF, pp. 324–329. 112 Norman Dixon, On the Psychology of Military Incompetence, London: Jonathan Cape, 1976, p. 169. 113 Verma, Kargil, p. 56, K. K. Khanna, ‘Army’s Most Critical Deficiency: Good Generals’, Indian Defence Review, 27 November 2012, http://www.indiandefencereview.com/news/ armys-most-critical-deficiency-good-generals/2/ (accessed on 25 July 2020), and P. R. Shankar, ‘Generally, on Generals’, Gunners Shot, 5 June 2019, https://www.gunnersshot. com/2019/06/generally-on-generals-by-lt-gen-p-r.html (accessed on 30 April 2020). 114 Harish Masand, ‘Politics Invading the Armed Forces?’ Mission Victory India, 27 April 2020, https://missionvictoryindia.com/politics-invading-the-armed-forces/ (accessed on 25 August 2020).

7 THE REAL TENSION BETWEEN INDUSTRIALISATION AND INDIGENISATION How Realistic Is India’s Approach to Self-Reliance in Armaments? Ajai Shukla

The realist school of international relations regards the global arena as a largely unregulated field of contestation in which individual states compete with each other in the pursuit of power and influence. In this global anarchy, inter-state relations are governed primarily by self-interest, rather than by cooperative impulses stemming from goodwill or from benevolent controlling entities such as international and regional institutions. To maximize their influence in this environment of relentless antagonism, countries vie to create powerful and well-equipped militaries, backed by advanced capabilities in science and technology and by defence industrial ecosystems that enable states to design, develop, manufacture, and maintain combat-winning weaponry and control systems. In the realist world, states ensure they possess the military power needed for deterrence and coercion, without compromising their autonomy through equipment or technological dependencies.1 How a country’s sovereign autonomy could be compromised by dependence on other states for weaponry is illustrated in India’s quest to acquire Russia’s S-400 Triumf air defence missile system. Washington strongly opposes this proposed transaction although New Delhi and Moscow are not violating any international law or convention in agreeing to the transaction. However, through a 2017 law titled ‘Countering America’s Adversaries Through Sanctions Act’ (CAATSA), the US government has unilaterally threatened to impose sanctions on countries that engage in ‘significant transactions’ with Russian defence and intelligence entities.2 CAATSA is directed primarily at Iran and North Korea, but it is possible that sanctions will be imposed on New Delhi as well. Realising CAATSA’s potential for damaging relations with key partners like India, the US Congress has legislated a national security waiver from CAATSA. However, while the US might condone the on-going Indian procurements of Russian utility helicopters and assault rifles on the grounds that those are not ‘significant transactions’, Washington is far less inclined to extend that forbearance to the S-400 Triumf. Furthermore, the US has voiced its DOI: 10.4324/9781003093343-7

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objection to deploying the Russian missile system in proximity to US military aircraft that form a significant part of India’s military fleet.3 This on-going bickering between Washington and New Delhi highlights the pitfalls of overseas dependency. Like other countries at the middle stages of their military industrialization, India finds itself struggling with two competing objectives. On the one hand is the felt need to acquire, in timely fashion, the high-quality weaponry needed to fight and win wars. Counterposed to this is the desire for autonomy in defence production that would ensure India sources a significant part of its military equipment from within the country. New Delhi faces challenges on the supply side as well as the demand side in achieving substantial autonomy in the design and production of high-quality military equipment. On the supply side, India’s science and technology base must acquire capabilities for designing and developing advanced defence equipment; the technological capability needed for this does not exist, especially within the private sector. Another supply side drawback is the adversarial relationship and the lack of synergy between India’s public and private sector since they are both competing for the same handful of contracts. Four-fifths of India’s defence research and development (R&D) and manufacture is in the public sector.4 Meanwhile, private sector defence firms remain unwilling to expend resources on creating the technological capabilities needed for developing the defence equipment that India requires. Instead, they argue for being given ‘a level playing field’, by which they mean the same kind of financial sops and preferential treatment that the public sector defence firms have benefited from over the decades.5 On the demand side, the budgetary allocations for defence capital expenditure have proved insufficient for sustaining a high-tech defence industrial base. In recent years, growth in India’s defence capital expenditure (capex) has failed to keep up even with the rise in Gross Domestic Product (GDP). Slow capex growth is intertwined with the burgeoning manpower expenditure, which leaves a progressively smaller share of the already constrained defence budget for equipment modernization.6 Finally, there is New Delhi’s tendency to reduce complex policy reform to simplistic slogans that are directed more towards pandering to nationalist sentiment than galvanising defence production. Given these unresolved supply and demand side problems, the rhetoric of indigenisation is far ahead of the reality. India has achieved only limited success in equipping the military adequately, while simultaneously achieving self-reliance and import substitution. Through numerous crises, India’s military has made do without essential equipment – such as fighter aircraft, helicopters, warships, submarines, air defence weapons, personal protective gear, small arms, sonars, and torpedoes, to name a few – because Indian design and development agencies have failed to deliver within their deadlines and budgets and to promised performance levels. The country’s premier defence R&D agency, the Defence Research & Development Organisation (DRDO), has a record of late delivery and cost overruns, which makes it well-nigh impossible for the military to formulate and adhere to an equipment management programme.7

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Supply Side: India’s Weak Technological Base The battlefield effectiveness of a country’s military is a direct function of the resources – financial, organisational, technological, and administrative – that the country’s leadership is able to allocate to the development of defence equipment. A key reason for the Indian military having to enter operations without adequate weaponry has been its inability to canalise an adequate number of high-quality scientists and project managers and sufficient financial resources into well-conceived projects to design, develop and manufacture such equipment.8 India’s total annual R&D expenditure has never exceeded 0.81 percent of the GDP. Since 2014–15, the Gross Expenditure on R&D (GERD) has remained static at 0.7 percent of GDP.9 In comparison, China spent 2.1 percent, Brazil spent 1.3 percent, the Russian Federation spent 1.1 percent, and even South Africa outdid India by spending 0.8 percent of GDP on GERD. The gap with China is only growing, with the communist country’s 14th Five-Year Plan 2020–25 and its Long Range Objectives for 2020–35 mandating a 7 percent annual growth in R&D spending and a larger component allocated to basic research.10 Meanwhile, the Indian government touts as an accomplishment a three-fold rise in GERD over the preceding decade.11 According to a New Delhi survey, the number of researchers per million population in India has increased to 255 in 2017, from 218 in 2015 and 110 in 2000. The report finds that India occupies third place globally in terms of PhDs awarded in science and engineering (S&E), behind only the US (39,710 in 2016) and China (34,440 in 2015).12 The same report found India in 9th place in terms of resident patent filing activity. Indians applied for patents mainly in disciplines such as mechanical and chemical engineering, computer science, electronics and communication, which are all essential for designing and developing military equipment. Furthermore, India’s R&D expenditure per researcher, adjusted for purchasing power parity (PPP), was ahead of the Russian Federation, Israel, Hungary, Spain, and the UK. Yet, paradoxically, India, with an estimated 17.7 percent of the world’s population, accounted for only a 2.9 percent share of the world’s GERD in 2017–18.13 Of India’s total R&D expenditure in 2017–18, the Central Government and public sector industry spent 50 percent while private sector industry spent 36.8 percent.14 During the year 2017–18, 93 percent of the R&D expenditure incurred by Central Government sources came from twelve major scientific agencies. Amongst those, the DRDO accounted for the largest share of 31.6 percent. With public sector units spending a mere 0.29 percent of their sales turnover on R&D and the private sector spending just 1.48 percent in 2017–18, there are severe supply side limitations on achieving autonomy in defence production in the foreseeable future.15

Demand Side Limitations: Low Budgetary Support India is hardly lacking in the quantitative dimension of military power. Its 1.5 million active-duty soldiers, sailors and airmen comprise the world’s second-largest

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standing military.16 Internal security is partly managed by the world’s largest paramilitary and armed police forces. The Indian Navy’s roughly 140 warships make the force the world’s seventh largest fleet. And notwithstanding the Indian media’s drumbeat about declining numbers of combat aircraft, India has the world’s fourth-largest air force.17 Yet, there are debilitating inadequacies in the budget that New Delhi allocates towards defence each year. While acquisition policies and incentives to help indigenous defence companies are important, ultimately it is the money allocated to defence procurement – as reflected in the capex budget – that determines the extent to which the government is able to support indigenisation through subsidising design and development and the placement of substantial orders on Indian firms. This, of course, presumes that India possesses the science and technology base needed to design and develop (and not just licence produce) cutting edge systems for the military – a prior condition that must be satisfied for increased capital budgets to deliver. A tabulation of defence allocations since Financial Year 2012–13 (attached as Appendix A) indicates that the defence budget, as a share of total government spending, has declined marginally over the preceding decade, from 16 percent in 2012–13 to about 15.5 percent in 2020–21.18 During the same period defence spending, as a share of India’s GDP, has declined from 2.23 percent to 2.10 percent of GDP.19 No government policy or document stipulates a spending level at which national security could be deemed to be adequately funded. However, in 2017–18, the Parliamentary Standing Committee on Defence noted that the defence spending of 1.56 percent of GDP20 is way below the 3 percent mark which is considered to be optimal and necessary for ensuring the operational preparedness of the forces.21 In fact, pegging defence expenditure to a certain percentage of GDP, while feasible in times of steady economic growth, has serious limitations in situations such as the current COVID-19-driven global slowdown. According to World Bank estimates, India’s GDP is likely to shrink by 3.2 percent in the current Financial Year 2020–21.22 Any overt linkage between the defence budget and the GDP would legitimise defence budget cuts in such an environment of overall economic decline. A negative trend in India’s defence allocations, albeit marginal, is worrisome, given that China and Pakistan are evidently strengthening their collusion. There is even greater cause for alarm in the steady decline in the capital budget – which caters for equipment modernisation – as a share of the overall defence budget. As the chart in Appendix A shows, capital allocations have fallen from over 30 percent of the defence budget a decade ago, to 25 percent in 2020–21. This decline has come about as a progressively larger share of the defence allocations go towards rising personnel costs, while combat capability languishes. Factoring the effects of inflation and foreign exchange rate variation (FERV) into the defence capital allocations, it becomes evident that, over the last decade, the capital budget has risen by barely five percent in real terms each year.23 Twice during this period, in 2012–13 and 2015–16, the adjusted capital budget was actually less than the previous year’s allocations. Incredibly, the average annual

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increase in the capital budget would have been much less than five percent had it not been for two large spending hikes by the second United Progressive Alliance (UPA-2) government – a 23.38 percent rise in 2009–10 and an 18.98 percent rise in 2010–11. Leaving out those two sharp boosts, the annualised increase in the capital budget over the next eight years – from 2012–13 to 2019–20 – averages out to just 1.6 percent annually with forex spending rising from around $6.97 bn in 2010–11 to $7.73 bn in 2018–19 and domestic capex in constant rupees going from Rs. 343 bn (2011–12) to Rs. 398 bn (2018–19).24 The analysis adjusts each year’s capital budget for two variables. First, the domestic spending is adjusted for inflation, using the deflator given when the Budget and quarterly GDP numbers are presented. The deflator is a ratio of the value at current prices of all the goods and services in the economy in a given year to the value during the base year, which is 2011–12. The capex figures for the two preceding years – 2009–10 and 2010–11 – have been adjusted ‘forwards’. The analysis assumes that half the defence capital allocation is spent in rupees on domestic sources of equipment, including from the forty-one Ordnance Factories (OFs), eight defence public sector undertakings (DPSUs) and Indian private firms. The deflator is applied only to this fifty percent, which is spent domestically. The other fifty percent, which is assumed to be spent in foreign exchange, is adjusted for FERV, using the median US dollar exchange rate of the respective financial year. While some equipment is paid for in Euros, most international defence transactions – even with Russia and Israel – are invoiced in US dollars. To arrive at the constant capital allocation for each year, the inflation-adjusted half for domestic procurement is fused with the FERV-adjusted half of the capital budget. The analysis illustrates that growth in the military’s modernisation budget has trailed some distance behind growth in the GDP, which has risen at 6–8 percent annually over the preceding decade. In the circumstances, there is little substance in the MoD’s frequent assertions, in forums such as Parliament, while replying to members’ questions, that the government has instituted a plethora of policy reforms to galvanize the defence industry.25 The measures the MoD cites include: a ‘negative list’ of 101 defence items that are embargoed for import beyond specified timelines; prioritising indigenously designed, developed and manufactured equipment for procurement; simplifying the ‘Make’ procedure to encourage indigenous development of weaponry; launching an innovation ecosystem titled Innovations for Defence Excellence (iDEX); notifying two ‘defence industrial corridors’ in Tamil Nadu and Uttar Pradesh; notifying a new ‘Strategic Partnership’ acquisition model in May 2017 in which the MoD establishes long-term partnerships with select Indian companies; enhancing the permissible ‘foreign direct investment’ in Indian defence firms; and easing licensing norms by extending the validity of defence production licences from three years to fifteen years. Yet, as executives from both private and public sector defence companies point out, there is little advantage to be obtained from such measures when there are inadequate funds with which to procure equipment. When the defence capital

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budget is insufficient to support the procurement of significant quantities of defence kit, it is meaningless, even counter-productive, to urge industry to expand manufacture. Procurement has to be the grease in the wheels of manufacture.

‘Make in India’ Versus ‘Made in India’ MoD officials frequently pay obeisance to the goal of galvanising India’s defence industry and furthering ‘indigenisation’, but they do so without imparting clarity on what exactly the latter term constitutes (‘Made in India’). ‘Make in India’ often loosely refers to the licensed manufacture in India of any foreign defence kit. From this standpoint, the worth of indigenisation is assessed through the metric of production turnover and job creation, rather than its technological worth. Only a few regard indigenisation as what it really should be: the creation of intellectual property in the country through the ground-up design, development and manufacture of defence platforms and systems. This lack of clarity is unsurprising, given that Prime Minister Narendra Modi has himself contributed two slogans –‘Make in India’ in 2014 and ‘Atmanirbhar Bharat’ (self-reliant India) in mid-2020 – without imparting clarity about what each one means, how they differ from one another and their relationship with the multiple procurement categories in the MoD’s capital procurement handbooks. Government statements often illustrate this confusion. On 2 July 2020, the MoD announced: ‘In line with Prime Minister Shri Narendra Modi’s clarion call for “Atmanirbhar Bharat”, the Defence Acquisition Council… accorded approval for capital acquisition of various platforms and equipment required by the Indian armed forces’.26 Amongst the acquisitions referred to in the context of Atmanirbhar Bharat was one for manufacturing twelve Sukhoi-30MKI fighter aircraft at Hindustan Aeronautics Ltd (HAL), Nashik. However, a closer look at the IAF contract to build 180 Sukhoi-30MKIs in HAL reveals a limited level of indigenisation. Russia insisted and HAL accepted that all the raw material that goes into the Sukhoi, including 5,800 titanium blocks and forgings, as well as aluminium and steel plates, would be sourced from Russia.27 Similarly, HAL builds the Sukhoi’s AL-31FP engines in Koraput, Odisha, but is contractually bound to import 47 percent of the engine, including high-tech composites and special alloys – crucial industrial secrets that Russia refused to transfer.28 Despite the MoD’s vocal adherence to Atmanirbhar Bharat, most of the major defence platforms that India has recently acquired are foreign built, albeit with some token components or assemblies built in India. The C-130J Super Hercules and C-17 Globemaster III transport aircraft, P-8I Poseidon multi-mission maritime aircraft, Rafale fighters, Pilatus PC-7 Mark II basic trainer aircraft, Apache AH-64E, Chinook CH-47F, MH-60 Romeo and Mi-17V5 helicopters, M777 ultralight howitzers, and S-400 air defence systems – have all been bought off-the-shelf as fully-built platforms. Other weapons systems procured under the ‘Make in India’ category involve the transfer of only manufacturing technology to assemble the platforms in India.

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It is of concern that the bulk of India’s defence acquisitions are carried out in the lowest-priority procurement categories. Procurements such as the Hawk advanced jet trainers, Scorpene submarines, Krivak-III class frigates, Kamov-226T helicopters, Kalashnikov AK-203 assault rifles, and K-7 Vajra self-propelled artillery guns are all in the lowest-priority categories of ‘Buy Global’, ‘Buy & Make’, ‘Buy & Make (Indian)’ and ‘Buy (Global – Manufacture in India)’. By virtue of being forms of import, these are lower in priority than the categories of ‘Buy Indian’, ‘Buy – Indian (Indigenously Designed, Developed and Manufactured)’ and ‘Make’, which involve the ground-up development of indigenous defence gear. In ‘Make in India’ procurements that involve assembling a platform in India, foreign original equipment manufacturers (OEMs) are paid for a manufacturing licence, the jigs and tooling and the transfer of manufacturing technology to guide the Indian manufacturer in assembling components, sub-systems and systems into a full-fledged combat platform. Hard bargaining might sometimes induce the OEM to part with some medium-level proprietary technology. There is, however, little chance of inducing OEMs to part with the intellectual property that goes into complex and high-tech systems. The OEM would have incurred an enormous cost in developing those products and would demand appropriate compensation for parting with the technology. A realist approach towards licensed manufacture knows that this does not create the technological capability to upgrade the platform to keep it in step with the march of technology. In fact, licensing conditions usually prohibit the buyer from making any substantial alterations to the licensed product, since much of the money in weapons sales is made on life-cycle support – which includes maintenance, repair, overhaul, and upgrades. India, after building successive variants of the MiG-21 fighter since 1963, had to go back to Russia when it upgraded the fighter. The IAF estimates that the MiG-21, over its service life, cost India 40–60 times its purchase cost.29 Similarly, the cost of ownership of the Mirage 2000 is an estimated ten-to-twenty times more than its production cost. In contrast, a genuinely ‘Made in India’ aircraft, such as the Tejas, can be upgraded without permissions or licences, modified and customised for various roles, and supplied anywhere in the world. The ongoing upgrades on the Tejas Mark I into the Mark 1A and Mark 2 versions testify to the autonomy that comes with genuinely ‘Made in India’ platforms. It is disingenuous to argue that India’s leverage as the world’s biggest arms buyer allows it to dictate terms to foreign vendors and to induce them to part with proprietary high technology as a precondition for being awarded a contract. That is a fallacy, not just because of the commercial valuation of high technology, but also due to the strategic value that governments place on strategic technology. Consequently, governments place tight controls, on the grounds of national security, on the export of technology by OEM firms. Even in a favourable strategic environment, of the kind that currently prevails between New Delhi, Washington, London, and Paris, the transfer of high-end technology – which could well result in the transfer of manufacturing – is often restrained by the political risk associated with job losses in the sensitive and

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nationalistic field of national security. This is especially pronounced in the current era of defence budgetary cutbacks, where skilled workmen are already being laid off due to reduced procurement. A realist approach to weapons development would be heavily biased towards ‘Made in India’, which involves not just shifting manufacture, but also conceiving, designing and building a defence platform as well as creating associated intellectual property (IP) in the country. In DAP 2020, the ‘Make’ category projects involve Indian-led consortia developing defence platforms, with the MoD funding much of the development cost. Foreign components and systems go into these platforms, but the basic design is custom-tailored for Indian operational requirements and user preferences. There are not the ‘end-user’ issues that dog foreign platforms. Maintenance, repair, spares, and overhaul are not such bugbears and, having designed the basic platform, the Indian integrator can continually upgrade it through its service lifetime, evolving it incrementally into the platform’s next generation. This is not to say that ‘Make in India’ serves no purpose. First, it creates jobs, a key government goal. Second, building even low-tech defence equipment creates high-quality manufacturing capability, which goes into creating the broad-based manufacturing eco-system that is essential for ‘Made in India’ projects. Weapon system designers and integrators can then focus on high-level design, assured that components – from the lowest level of nuts, bolts, washers and fuse boxes to higher levels of pumps, actuators and sensors – are available without needing to import or establish manufacturing units to supply them.

Uncoordinated Policymaking During the year 2020, the MoD released a new draft Defence Production and Export Promotion Policy (DPEPP-2020)30 on 3 August and a new Defence Acquisition Policy (DAP-2020) on 30 September.31 According to ministry statements, the two are together intended to promote the design, development and manufacture of home-grown weapons platforms, to boost the indigenous content of weaponry the military buys and to promote defence exports in order to provide a market for domestic defence producers. DPEPP-2020 targets the annual production of indigenous aerospace and defence goods and services worth Rs 175,000 crores (US$ 25 billion) by 2025. Of that, Rs 35,000 crores (US$ 5 billion) worth of equipment is to be exported annually – a pledge that the Prime Minister earlier made at the Defexpo 2020 in February.32 While targets must be ambitious, even MoD officials are rightly sceptical about meeting these. India’s annual defence production currently amounts to about Rs. 70,000 crores, so achieving the DPEPP-2020 target requires India’s aerospace and defence industry to almost double domestic sales over the coming five years and more than triple exports from the current levels of about Rs. 11,000 crores.33 True, the current targets are slightly more achievable than the 2018 policy, which stipulated completely unachievable goals, such as India becoming one of the world’s top five defence producers by 2025 and

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becoming self-sufficient that year for the Indian military’s entire requirement of fighter aircraft, helicopters, warships, tanks, missile systems, gun systems, and small arms and ammunition. Yet, it is hard to envision the current defence production framework yielding such dramatic returns. Alongside the new DPEPP 2020 and DAC 2020, the MoD has also promulgated a list of 101 weapons platforms and defence items that are embargoed for import, with year-wise timelines, from 2021 to 2024.34 The purported intention of this list is to provide domestic defence companies the confidence to design and develop import-embargoed defence equipment, using their own technology or capability sourced from the Defence R&D Organisation (DRDO), with the assurance that the military will not eventually import those. In fact, much of the equipment that features on the import-embargoed list is already being procured by the military from indigenous sources. The K-9 Vajra self-propelled artillery gun is already being built near Pune by Larsen & Toubro (L&T), while the DRDO is developing the Advanced Towed Artillery Gun System (ATAGS) and the Pinaka multi-barrelled rocket launcher (MBRL) in partnership with private sector firms – L&T, the Tata Group and the Kalyani Group. The overwhelming majority of the navy’s warships and submarines are already being built in Indian shipyards, while Hindustan Aeronautics Ltd (HAL) has licence-produced the Sukhoi-30MKI and Tejas fighters for two decades. HAL also upgrades the Jaguar, Hawk and Mirage 2000 aircraft. Meanwhile, the Ordnance Factory Board has long built the army’s entire requirement of T-90 and Arjun tanks at Avadi and infantry combat vehicles at its Medak factory. With India’s automobile industry capable of supplying world-class ground transport vehicles to the military, there is little need to import in that category. True, the new export-embargoed list serves the limited purpose of formalising existing production or export arrangements. However, there is no real emphasis on indigenising the high import content – in many cases, more than fifty percent by value – in the defence equipment that is built in India with technology transferred from global vendors. The government has taken the cosmetic step of earmarking almost half the capital procurement budget for 2020–21 towards indigenous acquisitions. However, it is misleading to take credit for reserving Rs 52,000 crore for domestic procurement, when over 50 percent of that flows out to foreign sub-vendors who import the systems and sub-systems that go into these ‘indigenous platforms’. Besides the infirm science and technology base that lies at the root of most delays, there is also managerial incompetence in assessing, and making decisions on, developmental timeframes. The inevitable consequence of endemic delays is an erosion of trust between the military and development agencies such as the DRDO. An embargo on the import of specified equipment is welcome from the standpoint of self-sufficiency and technological autonomy. But import bans serve a purpose only when they are accompanied by well-crafted developmental projects that ensure that high-quality indigenous alternatives are made available in the desired timeframe. Failures on this count create capability voids, which engender institutional resistance to the notion of import substitution and indigenisation of

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military platforms and equipment. This is especially so if the import of urgently needed equipment is held back on account of an indigenous solution having been promised but not delivered by the DRDO or private industry. Therefore, a pre-requisite for implementing a measure as draconian as an import embargo is a robust oversight mechanism that ensures technology and equipment is delivered in the planned timeframe. This oversight structure must anticipate and warn of impending delays and development failures, so that the military can shift in a timely fashion to importing that equipment and avoiding an operational capability void.

Incremental Development The indigenisation challenge would become far more manageable for India were the military to stop insisting on importing state-of-the-art weaponry, which is not just prohibitively expensive, but also creates dependencies on foreign OEMs. The alternative is to partner domestic industry in going through the process of creating home-grown alternatives, which would be less than perfect at the start but would be incrementally improved through successive iterations – Mark 1, Mark 2 and so on – with each ‘Mark’ being more operationally capable than its predecessor. This process is routinely followed by advanced weapon-producing countries. The Block 70 F-16 fighter that Lockheed Martin currently supplies is far superior to the initial F-16 A/B that entered operational service in the 1970s. US aircraft like the Chinook helicopter and the B-52 bomber have been in service for over half a century, with capability improvements at regular intervals along the way. The Israeli Merkava tank has been developed through four variants, each one with major improvements over its predecessors. The advantage of incrementally developing an indigenous platform is not just the periodic infusion of technological improvements, but also the benefit of having one’s own soldiers, sailors and airmen feeding into its development and suggesting improvements that are suited to one’s own geography, operational and maintenance philosophy, and personnel capabilities. In India, however, the numerous indigenous platforms that have been built over the years – such as the Tejas fighter, Arjun tank, Pinaka multi-barrelled rocket launchers, and tactical missiles such as Nag, Astra and Akash – have not entered service at an early stage and not been taken through this evolutionary process. Instead, the military has stood in judgement over the developmental agencies, demanding an unreasonably high performance before they are willing to accept it into operational service. Over the preceding two decades, the DRDO, in partnership with private sector defence firms, has proven its ability to deliver relatively advanced strategic and tactical weapons and equipment. Promising indigenous solutions that are in the pipeline include the advanced towed artillery gun system (ATAGS), air-independent propulsion (AIP) systems for submarines and the Pinaka rocket launcher. Meanwhile, ballistic missiles of the Agni series form the core of India’s nuclear deterrent, and an anti-satellite system (ASAT) has extended kill-power into space.

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The three services, therefore, have reason to abandon entrenched mistrust of development agencies, to accept indigenous equipment into their arsenals and then to work with industry in incrementally improving Indian products into world-class systems. However, that would require a realist government to exercise a firm controlling hand.

Pursuing Defence Exports Since the current defence capital budget stands at just Rs. 135,061 crores and only limited raises are possible, a massive jump in exports would be essential for absorbing Rs. 175,000 crores worth of defence production.35 Towards that, the government has laid down an annual Rs 35,000 crore export target and instituted measures to realise that: defence attaches in Indian embassies abroad have been charged with exploring export opportunities. A liberalised environment has been created for defence exports by obtaining Indian entry into three of the four global export control regimes: Missile Technology Control Regime, the Wassenaar Arrangement and the Australia Group. Entry into the fourth – the Nuclear Suppliers Group – is being pursued but is being resolutely blocked by China. Friendly foreign countries such as Myanmar, Maldives, Seychelles, and Sri Lanka have been offered ‘credit lines’ for purchasing Indian defence equipment. A nodal agency, the Indigenous Defence Equipment Exporters Association, was set up last year for processing defence export inquiries from prospective customers across the globe. However, a hard-nosed assessment would conclude that a major boost in defence exports would require a switch in emphasis from the production of lowand-medium-technology, moderately priced items to the design, development and manufacture of high-value combat platforms such as aircraft, helicopters, tanks, air defence systems, and warships. This would raise the value of domestic defence production, while introducing these platforms into operational service would provide the stamp of Indian military approval that is needed to encourage potential foreign buyers.

The Import Dependency Trap Despite the growing capability of its public and private sector defence companies and a strong streak of realism in its security planning, India’s military has traditionally relied, and continues to rely, on military platforms sourced from overseas. This has had multiple drawbacks. Besides paying a high purchase price for foreign weaponry, India’s military has been locked over the years into relationships of dependency on foreign suppliers for maintenance, spares, overhaul, and upgrades. Over the typical 30–40 year-long service life of military equipment, these expenses can amount to four-to-ten times the purchase cost. Further, buying rather than building military platforms and equipment, especially software-driven systems relating to intelligence gathering and processing, command and control, electronic warfare and data transmission systems, runs the risk of key decision-making and action processes being

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subverted through embedded software vulnerabilities. Furthermore, through ‘end-user’ agreements, weaponry often comes with restrictions on who it can be used against and in what circumstances. An example of how a dependency on foreign weaponry can adversely affect a country’s interests is playing out between India, Russia and the US. For three decades starting from the late 1970s, New Delhi grew addicted to arms supplied by the Soviet Union. India’s military regarded this weaponry as rugged, reliable, cheap, technologically acceptable, and available quickly without awkward questions from the vendor. In short order, New Delhi became the world’s biggest buyer of Soviet/Russian weaponry, leading to a heavy dependence on Moscow for spares, maintenance, repair, and overhaul of the roughly 8,000 Russian tanks and infantry combat vehicles, artillery and air defence guns, warships, submarines, aircraft, and helicopters in India’s arsenal.36 Without continuous back-up from Russia, India’s military would quickly grind to a halt. But in arms supplies, as elsewhere, there are no free lunches. In return for keeping its legacy fleet running, New Delhi faces unsubtle pressure from Moscow to continue buying weaponry from Russia. In some cases, such as the $1.3 billion purchase of the 9K338 Igla-S Very Short-Range Air Defence System (VSHORADS), New Delhi is being arm-twisted into buying a 16-year-old missile that the Russian military itself replaced in 2014 with the far more capable 9K333 Verba missile.37 In other transactions, such as the Indian Navy’s 10-year lease of an Akula-class nuclear-propelled attack submarine (SSN), or India’s $5.4 billion acquisition of five regiments of the S-400 Triumf advanced air defence systems, there is a compelling techno-economic logic for India to buy high-end Russian equipment that is available from nowhere else. Yet India’s dependence on Soviet/Russian weaponry might have been sharply reduced had New Delhi applied a realist mindset to the opportunity provided by the collapse of the Soviet Union. In 1989, Moscow spent some 2.03 percent of its GDP on research and development (R&D), with some 4,600 research institutions producing a range of military technologies and products. A year later, with the Soviet Union collapsing and left without money to even pay salaries, serving Soviet Army soldiers were begging in Moscow’s underground metro railway. Military spending plummeted, in real terms, to one-thirtieth of the 1989 figure. What little money there was went towards salaries, pensions and housing. R&D spending dropped from 18.6 percent of the handsome Soviet budget to 5.7 percent of the Russian pittance. Legendary design bureaus, such as MiG and Sukhoi, were gasping for oxygen; 1,149 individual R&D projects were cancelled by the bankrupted state.38 The Russian defence industry struggled to survive in this bleak fiscal landscape till 2005 when windfall oil revenues allowed Moscow to resume funding the dozens of design bureaus that deal with conventional weaponry and to resume arms purchases. Instead of taking advantage of the large numbers of out-of-work Russian scientists whose expertise was available for a pittance, India bankrolled the design, development and production of several Russian conventional platforms that Moscow itself could not afford. India’s refusal to take advantage of the plight of

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Russia’s tottering defence industry raises serious questions about New Delhi’s realist credentials. During that period, New Delhi paid for over 300 T-90S tanks, six Krivak-class frigates from Russian shipyards, the aircraft carrier, Admiral Gorshkov, and the MiG-29K/KUB fighters that India paid to develop into capable, aircraft carrier-capable fighters. India’s greatest gift to Moscow was an order to the cash-strapped Sukhoi design bureau to rebuild its Sukhoi-27 fighter into the far more advanced Sukhoi-30MKI fighter, kitted out with French and Israeli avionics. The evident capability of the Sukhoi-30MKI soon translated into orders on Moscow from Malaysia and Algeria. New Delhi quickly placed orders for building 180 Sukhoi-30MKIs in India but failed to leverage its position as the world’s largest buyer of this fighter into persuading Russia to part with high-end design and manufacturing technology. New Delhi’s benevolence during this period – when the Russian military could not afford a single aircraft or ship and bought just 62 T-90 tanks for the army – is evident also in its subsidizing of Russia R&D. Russian defence industry expert Ruslan Pukhov estimates that by 2000 as much as 70 percent of nonnuclear military R&D in Russia was directed towards export orders from India. When New Delhi and Moscow signed a deal on 28 December 2000 to manufacture the Sukhoi-30MKI in India, the Russian media outlet Kommersant-Vlast reported that the contract specified that Russia could not sell the fighter to any third country since ‘it has been developed on Indian money and India has a share in (its) technology rights’.39 Besides the T-90S tanks, frigates, an aircraft carrier and MiG-29K/KUB and Sukhoi-30MKI fighters, New Delhi also modernized its vintage MiG-21 fighters into the MiG-21–93 (the BISON) and funded the development of the Uran-E and Klub anti-ship missiles, which were eventually bought by both countries’ navies. In contrast to India’s approach, a far more realistic and cannier Beijing had taken full advantage of its purchase of a lesser number of Sukhoi-27s by reverse engineering the Russian fighter into the J-11B ‘Chinese’ fighter. Beijing also launched a carefully directed effort to locate out-of-work Russian scientists and technologists and offer them employment in China’s fledgling design bureaus. These Russian expatriates played no small role in building up the Chinese defence industrial complex into what it is today.

Israel’s Realist Example Israel, one of India’s key weapons suppliers, illustrates for New Delhi’s policy planners the realist approach to building its defence industry, for which India has paid hundreds of millions of dollars annually. In becoming one of India’s biggest defence suppliers, Israel has implemented a hard-nosed, realist strategy that New Delhi policymakers would do well to grasp.40 Since Israel does not market major defence platforms such as aircraft or ships, it has addressed the Indian defence market through the lucrative upgrading of its predominantly Russian weaponry, including fighter aircraft, ship-borne missiles and T-72 tanks. Israeli defence electronics firms, such as Elta, Rafael and Israeli

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Aerospace Industries, began by providing their engineers with the opportunity to study and grasp Russian technology by quoting for initial Indian contracts at cost price. At New Delhi’s expense, Israeli engineers progressively learned to upgrade Russian MiGs and to develop avionics and customize radars for a range of other aircraft. Gaining expertise and experience, Israeli designers progressively graduated up the complexity scale. Today, after honing their capabilities across a generation of Russian platforms, these Israeli companies can bid across the globe where vast opportunities await. Having provided night vision sights for India’s 2,500 T-72 tanks, Israeli firms are well positioned to do the same for another 30,000 in service in other militaries. India should have learned on its own Russian fleet and then fattened on the global upgrade market. Instead, New Delhi provided Israel with the opportunity, the tanks and the money, ignoring India’s own defence industry, which could have been harnessed instead, had it possessed the technological acumen needed for delivering weapons and systems in short order. An example of how Israel played this game is its building of the Phalcon Airborne Warning & Control System (AWACS) for the IAF. This airborne radar, mounted on a Russian IL-76 aircraft, enables airborne flight controllers to monitor and control airspace for hundreds of kilometres around. No Israeli company had ever designed such an AWACS before, which required integrating an Israeli radar onto a Russian aircraft. India paid over $1.1 billion (Rs. 5000 crores) to Israel Aerospace Industries (IAI) and Elta, enabling hundreds of Israeli designers to learn on the job.41 Having developed expertise on Indian money, Israel then built another three AWACS for India, several for the Israeli Air Force, and exported more to Chile and Singapore. Israel’s game plan involved a high degree of confidence in its defence industry. Israeli defence firms also benefited from upgrading the technologically challenging software for ‘net-centric operations’ on the Indian Navy’s warships. This digitally interlinks the fleet’s sensors and weapons – in the air, on the surface and underwater – into seamless information and command networks. Rafael Advanced Defence Systems and IAI began by building the capability to fit Indian warships with the Barak missile early this decade. This gave the engineers detailed knowledge of the warships’ Russian combat management system, which the Israelis then took forward into designing the net-centric operations system.

Conclusion In the final balance, an Indian government that is oriented to realism would create technological and industrial capabilities that can provide world class weaponry, equipment and network systems to its armed forces at affordable cost. Such a defence industrial estate would allow India to achieve operational objectives in moments of crisis, without turning to other countries that may oblige only in return for a heavy price.

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However, Indian military planners and the defence industry as a whole remain constrained by multiple inadequacies. On the supply side, there is a dire shortage of expertise in science and technology, of management and technological skills, and of the academic and industrial networks that are essential for developing quality military products. The overall spending on research and development, and the proportion that is dedicated to military equipment, remains too low to expect any turnaround in the near future. On the demand side, the overall defence budget remains too low to procure the quantities of military equipment that would support the required expenditure on research, development and manufacture of defence equipment of the required quality. Weapons exports provide a way to reduce costs through economies of scale, but India’s military remains addicted to importing weaponry. With little support from the military for home-grown equipment, the export market remains unenthusiastic too about buying Indian kit. India’s defence industrialisation is about the desire to procure high-quality equipment that enables the Indian military to fight and win wars and, ideally, get all this equipment from within the country, rather than through imports. However, given the multiple problems on both the supply side and the demand side, the tension between these two objectives cannot be satisfactorily resolved.

Notes 1 Read for instance, Ajay Shankar, ‘Time to recalibrate defence manufacturing’, The Hindu Business Line, 7 April 2021, https://www.thehindubusinessline.com/opinion/timeto-recalibrate-defence-manufacturing/article34265978.ece (accessed on 29 May 2021). 2 ‘Countering America’s Adversaries Through Sanctions Act’, Section 231, US Department of the Treasury, https://www.state.gov/section-231-of-the-countering-americas-adversa ries-through-sanctions-act-of-2017/ (accessed on 13 April 2021). 3 US officials say that operating the S-400 system alongside the P-8I Poseidon, C-17 Globemaster III, C-130J Super Hercules, Apache AH-64E and Chinook CH-47 might compromise their avionics and electronic warfare system. 4 ‘The Annual Turnover as reported by companies operating in Defence and Aerospace sectors in the private sector for the year 2018–19 is approximately Rs. 15,000 crores, while the corresponding figures for Public sector is Rs. 63208 crores’, stated the Ministry of Defence, in ‘Private Sector Investment in Defence Production’, Press Information Bureau, 22 July 2019, https://pib.gov.in/Pressreleaseshare.aspx?PRID=1579736 (accessed on 29 May 2021). 5 Multiple conversations and interviews with defence private sector executives. 6 Ajai Shukla, ‘Defence allocation remains same, IAF gets highest capital boost in budget’, Business Standard, 2 February 2021, https://www.business-standard.com/budget/article/ defence-allocation-remains-same-iaf-gets-highest-capital-boos t-in-budget-121020102022_1.html (accessed on 29 May 2021). 7 Stephen P. Cohen and Sunil Dasgupta, Arming without Aiming: India’s military modernization, Washington, D. C.: Brookings Institution Press, 2010. 8 Testifying before the Parliament’s Standing Committee on Defence, the army’s vice chief, Lieutenant General Sarath Chand stated in March 2018: ‘Typically, any modern Armed Forces should have one-third of forces, one-third of its equipment in the vintage category, one-third in the current category and one-third in the state of the art category. As far as we are concerned, the state today is 68 per cent of our equipment is in the vintage category, with just about 24 per cent in the current, and eight per cent in the

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9 10 11 12 13

14 15 16

17 18 19 20 21 22

23

24 25 26

state of the art category’, in Ajai Shukla, ‘Defence budget not sufficient to cater committed payment: Army vice chief’, Business Standard, 14 March 2018, https://www.business-standard. com/article/economy-policy/defence-budget-not-sufficient-to-cater-committed-paymentarmy-vice-chief-118031301204_1.html (accessed on 29 May 2021). ‘Research & Development Statistics at a Glance: 2019–20’, Department of Science & Technology, Government of India, March 2020, https://dst.gov.in/sites/default/files/R% 26D%20Statistics%20at%20a%20Glance%202019-20.pdf (accessed on 30 March 2021). Shyam Saran, ‘Chinese dreams of the future’, Business Standard, 8 April 2021, https://www. business-standard.com/article/opinion/chinese-dreams-of-the-future-121040701528_1. html (accessed on 29 May 2021). Saran, ‘Chinese dreams of the future’. The report states that GERD has consistently increased over the preceding decade, nearly tripling from Rs 39,437 crores in 2007–08 to Rs 1,13,825 crore in 2017–18. It is estimated to be Rs. 1,23,847 crores in 2018–19. ‘India’s R&D expenditure & scientific publications on the rise’, Press Information Bureau, 1 May 2020, https://pib.gov.in/PressReleasePage.aspx?PRID=1620083. Department of Science & Technology, ‘Research and Development Expenditures at a Glance, 2019–20’, Ministry of Science & Technology, Government of India, p. 2, https://dst.gov. in/sites/default/files/R%26D%20Statistics%20at%20a%20Glance%202019-20.pdf (accessed on 31 May 2021). India’s Gross Expenditure on R&D (GERD) increased to 63.2 billion PPP $ in 2017–18 from 50.3 billion PPP$ in 2014–15. It is estimated to be 68.8 billion PPP $ in 2018–19 (p. 3). The author’s conversion from INR into USD figures. Department of Science & Technology, ‘Research and Development Expenditures at a Glance, 2019–20’, p. 3. ‘Research & Development Statistics at a Glance 2019–20’, Ministry of Science & Technology, Government of India, https://dst.gov.in/sites/default/files/R%26D%20Statistics%20at%20a% 20Glance%202019-20.pdf (accessed on 30 May 2021). The actual strength is somewhat lower at 1.44 million, according to the defence ministry’s reply in Lok Sabha, Shortage of Jawans and Officers, Starred Question No.128, 27 December 2017, http://164.100.24.220/loksabhaquestions/annex/13/AS128.pdf (accessed on 30 May 2021). See, for example, Ashley Tellis, ‘India: Capable But Constrained’, in Gary J. Schmitt (ed), A Hard Look at Hard Power: Assessing the Defense Capabilities of Key US Allies and Security Partners, 2nd edition, Carlisle, PA: US Army War College Press, 2020, pp. 119–154. Defence budget figures in this article include spending on defence pensions. Tabulation by author, based on annual budget documents issued by Ministry of Finance. That figure excludes allocations for defence pensions, which should rightly be included in defence allocations. Ministry of Defence, ‘Standing Committee on Defence (2016–2017), (Sixteenth Lok Sabha), Government of India, demands For Grants (2017–18)’, section on ‘General Defence Budget’, no pagination in the report. Gaurav Noronha, ‘India’s economy to contract by 3.2 per cent in fiscal year 2020–21: World Bank’, The Economic Times, 8 June 2020, https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/ economy/indicators/indias-economy-to-contract-by-3-2-per-cent-in-fiscal-year-2020-21world-bank/articleshow/76266999.cms?from=mdr (accessed on 30 May 2021). Ajai Shukla and Devangshu Datta, ‘Defence modernisation budget rises just 5% each year in real terms’, Business Standard, 10 February 2019, https://www.business-standard.com/a rticle/economy-policy/defence-modernisation-budget-rises-just-5-each-year-in-real-terms119021000728_1.html (accessed on 30 May 2021). Shukla and Datta, ‘Defence modernisation budget rises just 5%’. Also see chart in Appendix B of this chapter. ‘Measure to help domestic defence manufacturing’, Press Information Bureau, 14 September 2020, https://www.pib.gov.in/PressReleasePage.aspx?PRID=1654092 (accessed on 30 May 2021). ‘DAC approves capital acquisition of various platforms & equipment worth Rs 38,900 crore; Focus on indigenous design and development: acquisitions from Indian industry

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27 28 29 30 31 32 33

34

35 36 37

38 39 40 41

of Rs 31,130 crore’, Press Information Bureau, 2 July 2020, https://pib.gov.in/Press ReleseDetailm.aspx?PRID=1635916 (accessed on 30 May 2021). Briefing to author during a visit to HAL, Nashik in April 2014. Briefing to author during a visit to HAL, Nashik in April 2014. Estimate provided by Pushpinder Singh Chopra, combat aviation expert and Editor, Vayu Aerospace and Defence Review. ‘MoD releases draft Defence Production and Export Promotion Policy 2020’, Press Information Bureau, 3 August 2020, https://pib.gov.in/PressReleasePage.aspx?PRID= 1643194 (accessed on 12 April 2021). ‘Defence Acquisition Procedure 2020’, Ministry of Defence, Government of India, 30 September 2020, https://www.mod.gov.in/dod/sites/default/files/DAP2030new.pdf (accessed on 16 March 2021). ‘Prime Minister inaugurates DefExpo in Lucknow’, Press Information Bureau, 5 February 2020, https://pib.gov.in/PressReleasePage.aspx?PRID=1602107 (accessed on 30 May 2021). ‘Make in India, for India, for world: PM to defence manufacturers at DefExpo’, Business Standard, 6 February 2020, https://www.business-standard.com/article/economypolicy/make-in-india-for-india-for-world-pm-to-defence-manufacturers-at-defexpo120020501925_1.html (accessed on 30 May 2021). ‘MoD’s big push to Atmanirbhar Bharat initiative; Import embargo on 101 items beyond given timelines to boost indigenisation of defence production’, Press Information Bureau, 9 August 2020, https://pib.gov.in/PressReleasePage.aspx?PRID=1644570 (accessed on 12 April 2021). ‘Union Budget 2021–2022, Demands for Grants, Demand No. 20, Capital Outlay on Defence Services’, Ministry of Finance, Government of India, 1 February 2021, https:// www.indiabudget.gov.in/doc/eb/dg20.pdf (accessed on 30 May 2021). Ajai Shukla, ‘From Russia with love!’ ajaishukla.com, 30 January 2007, https://www. ajaishukla.com/2007/01/from-russia-with-love.html?m=0 (accessed on 12 April 2021). Ajai Shukla, ‘Saab threatens defence ministry with legal action over Russia contract’, Business Standard, 30 November 2018, https://www.business-standard.com/article/defence/saa b-threatens-defence-ministry-with-legal-action-over-russia-contract-118112901370_1.html (accessed on 30 May 2021). Shukla, ‘From Russia with love!’ ‘Russia, India to ink Sukhoi deal on Dec 28’, Rediff, 26 December 2000, https://www. rediff.com/news/2000/dec/26sukhoi.htm (accessed on 30 May 2021). Ajai Shukla, ‘Ajai Shukla: In the arms of Israel’, Business Standard, 14 June 2013, https://www. business-standard.com/article/opinion/ajai-shukla-in-the-arms-of-israel-106081501064_1. html (accessed on 30 May 2021). G. D. Sharma, ‘India Israel Defence Cooperation’, Centre for Joint Warfare Studies (CENJOWS), 23 October 2017, Para 53, https://cenjows.in/upload_images/pdf/India% 20Israel%20by%20Gp%20Capt%20GD%20%20Sharma.pdf (accessed on 30 May 2021).

1663673 17.10% 12488205

1590434

16.40%

11320463

2.29%

1410367

16.00%

10113281

2.23% 2.28%

143671 80884 60450 285005

136080 79128 45500 260708

111277 70499 43368 225144

(Source: compiled by the author from budget documents)

Revenue allocation Capital allocation Pension allocation TOTAL DEFENCE BUDGET Central government spending Share of government spending Total Gross Domestic Product Percentage of GDP

2014–15 (Actual)

2013–14 (Actual)

2012–13 (Actual)

2.15%

13675331

16.40%

1790783

154236 79846 60238 294320

2015–16 (Actual)

2.33%

15075429

17.80%

1975194

177367 86357 87826 351550

2016–17 (Actual)

Appendix A: Defence Allocations: Falling Share (in Rupees Crores)

2.23%

16784679

17.10%

2217750

192273 95431 92000 379704

2017–18 (Actual)

2.16%

18722302

17.40%

2315113

202070 99611 101775 403456

2018–19 (Actual)

2.18%

20442233

16.60%

2698552

215660 115350 117810 448820

2019–20 (RE)

2.10%

22489420

15.50%

3042230

219020 118534 133825 471378

2020–21 (BE)

100 Ajai Shukla

41700

52020

63258

69476

72063

80195

83022

83560

91483

95431

98473

108133

2008–09

2009–10

2010–11

2011–12

2012–13

2013–14

2014–15

2015–16

2016–17

2017–18

2018–19 ^

2019–20 *

54066.5

49236.5

45741.5

41780

41511

40097.5

36031.5

34738

31629

26010

5.1

3.74

3.61

1.79

3.05

6.19

7.93

8.54

8.98

6.07

39811.92

38103.28

36722.46

34752.95

35146.05

34986.04

33384.14

34738

34330.84

30766.5

54066.5

49236.5

45741.5

41780

41511

40097.5

36031.5

34738

31629

26010

69.9159

64.4418

66.9663

65.7418

61.2455

61.52625

54.565

48.9135

45.38

47.16

Median rupee to dollar exchange rate

7.73

7.64

6.83

6.36

6.78

6.52

6.6

7.1

6.97

5.52

Forex component adjusted for exchange rate (in USD billion)

Forex component (in Rs)

Domestic component (In constant 2011–12 Rs)

Domestic component (In current rupees)

Implied inflation Deflator (% per year)

US dollar component (Assumed to be 50% of capital allocation)

Indian rupee component (Assumed to be 50% of capital allocation)

(Source: compiled by the author and Devangshu Datta) ^ Revised estimates * Budget estimates

Capital allocation (current Rs)

Financial Year

Appendix B: Defence capital allocations: running flat

4.48%

3.76%

5.67%

(-) 1.12%

0.46%

4.80%

(-) 3.90%

1.19%

11.59%

17.61%

Annual change in rupee component

1.21%

11.86%

7.48%

(-) 6.24%

4.00%

(-) 1.31%

(-) 7.02%

1.90%

26.37%

29.14%

Annual change in US dollar component

Percentage rise/fall per year

2.84%

7.81%

6.57%

(-) 3.68%

2.23

1.74%

(-) 5.46%

1.55%

18.98%

23.38%

Combined annual change

Industrialisation and Indigenisation 101

Realism in Diplomacy

8 INDIAN FOREIGN POLICY REALISM AND INDIA’S WEST ASIA POLICY Rajendra M. Abhyankar

This chapter deals with India’s relations with West Asia and primarily the Mashreq. It argues that Indian foreign policy towards the region has seen a change from a Nehruvian idealism-realism balance to a more starkly realist stance under Narendra Modi. The term idealism has never been clearly defined as a school of thought in international relations theory that admits of many versions of realism, some more optimistic than others.1 Nehru’s foreign policy towards West Asia emerged, on the other hand, from more ‘realistic’ considerations arising from India’s historical ties with the region and its influence on domestic politics in the aftermath of Partition which left the second largest Muslim community in the world in India. That policy was gradually transformed, in response to the changing regional environment, by a more realist posture at the core of which are economics and national security, particularly during the tenure of Narendra Modi as prime minister. Ties between the Indian subcontinent and West Asia (defined here as the region from Iran at one end to Israel and Lebanon at the other end) were characterized by commercial and cultural exchanges going back to the Silk Road. India’s continuous and shared history and culture with the region goes back three or four millennia. With the world’s second-largest Muslim population, it shares cultural affinities and economic complementarities with the region. India’s deep and diverse ties encompass India’s proximate neighbourhood – countries in the ‘Mashreq’ for the most part – as well as its extended neighbourhood of Israel, Iran, Turkey, and countries in the Horn of Africa. The Nehruvian approach was therefore understandable. With time, as India’s economy grew and its security concerns over energy and religious extremism in the region became more central, it moved towards a more realist stance. The chapter focuses on India’s relations with countries that together may be thought of as the central part of India’s larger West Asia conception: Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates and Qatar in the Mashreq, and Iran, Israel, and the Palestinian National Authority. We begin with some preliminary thoughts on the DOI: 10.4324/9781003093343-8

106 Rajendra M. Abhyankar

duality of Indian foreign policy between Nehruvian idealism and a growing realism and demonstrate how that duality affected Indian policy in the region. The chapter then goes on to set the larger regional context against which Indian policies towards the selected countries must be understood – that includes the Arab Spring, India’s ‘Look West’ stance, and the rise of multinational terror groups like Al Qaeda and the Islamic State (IS) in the region. Finally, the chapter addresses Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s foreign policy towards West Asia that itself has seen significant change. Modi’s personal role in reshaping relations with West Asia with the diplomatic outreach to Israel and select Gulf countries has been considered by some analysts as one of his major foreign policy achievements. New Delhi has deepened a security partnership with Israel – and brought it out of the shadows, not least with the first Indian prime ministerial visit to that country. Modi has also invested heavily in personal diplomacy with select Gulf States, seeking investment funds, better protections for the Indian diaspora in the region and shoring up access to oil supplies. Throughout, the Modi government has been driven to directly address India’s domestic security problems, particularly transnational terrorism. It has also advanced its long-running effort to loosen the ties that some of these states, like Saudi Arabia, have with Pakistan, as it seeks to isolate Islamabad over its support for terrorist groups operating from its territory. While the outreach to Israel was due to Modi’s personal preference, his policy towards the Gulf countries exploited the geopolitical changes to develop a new agenda towards the region.2 In this context the chapter looks at initiatives and policies towards Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Qatar, Iran, Israel, and the Palestinian National Authority. The West Asian region is the world’s most polarized because of the number of conflicts – military, sectarian and ideological. At the same time, its integrated character arises from the fact that all the countries in the region are Islamic (apart from Israel) and their common language is Arabic (except for Israel and Iran). Its weak state structures, powerful non-state actors and multiple ongoing transitions make it among the most volatile parts of the world. For India, this larger region is part of its extended neighbourhood. Given the turmoil in the region, the safeguarding of India’s interests has never been more challenging. India’s multiple interests have ensured that, while it has found it difficult to abandon its Nehruvian ethic, a realist perspective has increasingly provided the leitmotif of its policies. Indian policy has followed principles that have accorded with its interests: first, India has sought to ensure against being enmeshed in regional conflicts; second, to protect its homeland and nationals in the region, India has advanced bilateral relationships to include economic and security cooperation and intelligence exchange; third, the security and welfare of Indian nationals in the region are of prime concern; and finally, when called upon, India has striven to find a middle ground between conflicting parties.

Indian Foreign Policy and Realism In international relations theory, ‘realism’ is the view that all nations work to increase their power and those that produce power most efficiently thrive. Power

Indian Foreign Policy Realism and India’s West Asia Policy 107

behaviour is motivated by the instinct of self-preservation and the belief that continuously gaining power is a social, economic and political imperative.3 On the other hand, there is a belief that rather than the outright pursuit of material interests, it is a nation’s belief systems – historical, social and cultural – that explains its foreign policy behaviour.4 India’s foreign policy since independence has swung like a pendulum between these two tendencies. The tension between the two tendencies can be seen in every foreign policy decision, particularly India’s West Asia policy. The first foreign policy decisions relating to the region, both by the Indian nationalist movement and then the government of independent India, had a ‘realist flavour’. These were decisions on the Khilafat Movement, on the Palestine issue and on Israel. The Indian National Congress’ support, following Mahatma Gandhi’s decision, to the Khilafat Movement5 (1919–1924) – in support of the Caliph in Istanbul – was thought to be necessary to promote Hindu-Muslim unity and thereby strengthen the movement for independence from British rule. Alas, the funds collected by the Khilafat Movement were only received in Istanbul after Mustafa Kamal Ataturk had abolished the Caliphate. Similarly, in the 1947 UN Special Committee on Palestine (UNSCOP), India, Yugoslavia and Iran proposed a minority plan calling for a federal Palestine to avoid a partition like India had endured.6 When the UN General Assembly voted for the majority plan providing for the creation of two States – Arab and Jewish – in Palestine, India joined the Arab and Islamic countries in opposing the partition of Palestine. While there were historical-cultural concerns informing India’s approach, there were also Indian concerns over the security implications of yet another partition in the international system, and perhaps, the effect on India’s Muslim population, and therefore, the country’s internal security. Yet the new reality in West Asia, with the establishment in May 1948 of the state of Israel, had to be addressed. Despite its opposition to the partition of Palestine, India eventually recognized Israel but withheld diplomatic relations. Here again, India’s stand was driven in part by recognition of the strong international political support for the establishment of a Jewish homeland, while at the same time, sensitivity to the concerns of Indian Muslims over the creation of Israel. The decision on Israel brought into the open the strong discord between two views of an emerging India – Mahatma Gandhi and Jawaharlal Nehru’s secular view and V. D. Savarkar’s view of a Hindu nation and polity.7 Jawaharlal Nehru delayed diplomatic relations, apparently under the influence of Maulana Abul Kalam Azad, fearing the recognition of Israel could be misread by India’s Muslim community emerging from the trauma of partition. India waited till September 1950 to formally recognize Israel. India’s long-standing commitment to the Palestinian cause, and its disapproval of Israel’s military retaliation and appropriation of Arab territory prevented any further steps towards normalisation. It was only after the commencement, in January 1992, of the Arab-Israel dialogue that India opened formal diplomatic relations.8 A Savarkarite Hindu India might have been less sensitive to Muslim opinion in India and more likely to have recognized Israel much earlier.

108 Rajendra M. Abhyankar

Indian policy in the region has continued to feature the duality of its guiding principles in pursuing its foreign policy objectives. The following examples illustrate the extent to which India remains torn between the goals of the Nehruvian ethic and realpolitik. For example, India’s decision in August 1990 to allow US aircraft, as part of the American-led coalition’s operations to expel Saddam Hussein from Kuwait, to refuel in Bombay, Madras and Agra was a major departure from India’s nonaligned stance. India had traditionally opposed Washington’s involvement in regional disputes and had close ties with Baghdad. Iraq reacted strongly to India’s 1990 decision, saying that the action was ‘unacceptable from a friendly country like India’.9 In February 1991, the coalition government led by S. Chandrasekar, facing strong pressure from the public and its political partners, was forced to retract its decision. India remained uncomfortable that the US aircraft had carried lethal equipment and troops, and New Delhi was angered by US misrepresentations of India being supportive of American actions in the Gulf. India faced a similar dilemma following the 2003 US invasion of Iraq, waged on the illusory grounds of Saddam Hussein possessing weapons of mass destruction, when the real goal was to oust Saddam and build a Greater Middle East in line with US preferences. Following the fall of Baghdad on 9 April 2003, Prime Minister Atal Behari Vajpayee was under strong pressure from President George W. Bush to militarily assist the US in Iraq. The American request was for a division of Indian troops to police north (Kurdish) Iraq. The Indian government was loath to outright reject the request since it was in the midst of preliminary discussions on an India-US Civil Nuclear Agreement (it is significant that Delhi seriously considered the request, given that India had always only sent its troops abroad under a UN mandate).10 In the end, the government decided to reject the request despite apprehension that this could jeopardize the nuclear deal. In 2010, the duality of India’s principles came to the fore once again when it had to respond to issues arising from the Arab revolutions, popularly ‘the Arab Spring’, that beset the region. As a non-permanent member of the UN Security Council, it voted to abstain on Security Council Resolution 1973 (2011) that approved NATO aerial attacks on Libya even when it was known that the safety of civilians could not be assured. Clearly, the goal of the permanent members was to target the Libyan leader, Muammar Gaddafi. In explaining its vote, India said that political efforts must assume priority in resolving the situation. The Indian decision to abstain was a free ride since it did not offend the Libyans yet did not stand in the way of military action. Interestingly, India had supported UNSC Resolution 1970 (2011) that called for the Gaddafi regime’s actions against its own people to be referred to the International Court of Justice (ICJ). India had opted for the creed of ‘thus far and no further’ in supporting the ICJ referral and at the same time abstaining from the resolution on military action.11 In the case of Syria, India maintained good relations with the Bashar al-Assad government even as the Syrian crisis worsened. As a non-permanent member of the UN Security Council (2012–13), it opposed attempts at regime change. It voted instead for draft UN Resolutions on 4 February 2012 calling on Assad to

Indian Foreign Policy Realism and India’s West Asia Policy 109

step down and voted against draft Resolution SC/10714 of 19 July 2012 that called for action under Chapter VI to continue the UN mission in Syria. Both resolutions were vetoed by Russia and China.12 Surprisingly, India abstained on UNSC Resolution 2118 (2013) of 27 September 2013 that unanimously decided to eliminate Syria’s chemical weapons stockpile. It argued that the action could mean regime change.13 It also opposed the US’s proposed punitive missile strikes in 2013 against Syria. While the US had drawn a ‘red line’ on Assad’s use of chemical weapons, President Barack Obama did not follow up on his threat (though President Donald Trump would later twice launch missile attacks on Syria). India has supported an inclusive Syrian peace, despite its alignment with Russian and Iranian policy, but has had no role beyond that. Again, India’s close and long-standing relations with Iran have been tense and uneven most of the time.14 Before the current tensions (detailed below), India’s duality of principles introduced an element of double jeopardy. In 2013, India tried in several ways to evade the US ban on purchases of Iranian oil by using a bank in Kolkata and also the Turkish Halkbank. When, however, Iran proposed opening a branch of an Iranian bank in Kolkata, India did not agree. It sought to convey that while Iran was important, it could not be at the cost of India’s commitment to international law, financial transparency regimes and relations with the US. The above examples indicate that the duality of principles courses through India’s foreign policy veins, imparting a degree of flexibility in articulating its interests. We will see this duality when we deal with Indian policies towards Saudi Arabia, Abu Dhabi, the UAE, Iran, Israel, and the Palestinian Authority. We shall consider these relations in the context of three developments in the region, the ‘Arab Spring’, India’s broader ‘Look West’ approach and Narendra Modi’s approach to the region.

‘The Arab Spring’, an Ideal Gone Rogue The Arab Revolutions – misnamed the ‘Arab Spring’ – were the single greatest force for change in the region. The revolutions started in Tunisia in December 2010 and spread like wildfire across the Arab world. The disruption caused by these revolutions left behind an unstable region. The consequential political and economic changes in the region and their continuing effects have posed a major dilemma for India’s policy towards West Asia. The Arab revolutions were an assertion of the popular will for a voice in the governance of these countries. Uniformly, these popular revolutions demonstrated that they could only succeed if the popular will could be melded into a cohesive set of goals and could generate a competent leadership. The upheavals were ‘not a simple revolt but an epochal revolution’.15 However, the high hopes for a new, free and democratic Arab world soon turned into civil wars in Syria, Libya, Yemen, and Iraq.16 Instead of democracies, Egypt, Bahrain and Morocco have become repressive dictatorships. Tunisia, the only success, has also gone the way of the repressive dictatorships. The most barbaric outcome from this chaos has been the rise of al Qaeda and the Islamic State (Islamic State of Iraq and Syria) or

110 Rajendra M. Abhyankar

Daesh.17 Once started, the revolutions continued in a quietist state till 2019, when their re-emergence became virtually inevitable. The cause was the doubling, in two decades, of the Arab population coupled with three other factors – the greater access to the internet, the incidence of inflation and the economic collapse due to the fall in tourism and fluctuating oil prices. The period was marked by stronger repression, the arrest and torture of innocent citizens by state intelligence agencies and an increasing threat to minorities. The revival of revolutionary fervour gave renewed hope to the Arab masses, though violent government reaction to popular protests in Libya, Algeria and Sudan again stymied anti-regime agitations. In Libya, following Gaddafi’s death, two governments rule the country in parallel, kept in place by European countries dependent on the uninterrupted flow of Libyan oil. An on-going civil war continues between a renegade general and the UN-recognized government complicated by the support and participation of foreign powers. In Algeria, the ‘Hirak’(smiles) movement led to a referendum on a flawed army-inspired constitution (it was held on 1 November 2020).18 In Sudan as well, after Omar Bashir’s exit in April 2019, the interim government in power faces economic problems and a lack of popular support.19 In Yemen, the mass protest that after thirty years forced President Ali Abdullah Saleh to flee did not bring in democracy. Foreign military intervention led by Saudi Arabia and like-minded Sunni Arab countries spawned armed opposition leading to another brutal, often forgotten, civil war. The sectarian dimension of the war dominates, and an end to hostilities seems a long way off. In Egypt’s military republic, once again the Army is the arbiter of the country’s polity and economy. In Tunisia, on 25 July 2022, a year after the overthrow of the Ennahda government, President Kais Saied secured popular approval (with a twenty-five percent voter turnout) of a new constitution which envisions an authoritarian, hyper-presidential system.20 India has had to recognize these profound changes, ranging from the demise of a secular ethos and the increasing role of Islam, the violent reaction to the democracy movements by autocrats and establishment forces and the fundamental changes in the Palestine-Israel relationship marked by the growing acceptability of Israel.21 In pursuing its policy, India has, in addition, contended with the US’s changing role from a peace-maker to an interested player, Russia’s growing activism intended to boost its regional equities, Iran’s expanding ideological, military and political involvement in every on-going regional conflict, and China’s rising economic profile. While the salience of the Pakistan factor and of the Organization of Islamic Cooperation has diminished, the challenge of terrorism, particularly the rise of multinational terrorist outfits like Al Qaeda and IS, presents serious challenge to India’s interests.

India’s ‘Look West’ Approach West Asia has always carried great political weight in Indian foreign policy because of the region’s historical, cultural and political salience.22 Increasingly, though, it is seen as an area that can enhance India’s economic growth and boost its status as a

Indian Foreign Policy Realism and India’s West Asia Policy 111

global player. The key components of relations with West Asian countries have been economic – energy, trade and investments, remittances, health tourism – and more lately, security. Over the last decade, then, Indian policymakers have increasingly seen West Asia in strategic terms.23 From Independence until 1990, the India-West Asia relationship remained one-sided. It was India and Indians who were dependent on the region – for the supply of crude oil, for the employment of Indian workers and their remittances and for the spiritual needs of India’s Muslim community. While these remain major considerations, it is only in this millennium that the relationship has become truly two-way. West Asian oil producers now look upon the growing market for oil and gas in India as a major opportunity, which was never the case traditionally. Regional states also look to expanding opportunities for investments in Indian industry and financial markets. In addition, they look to India for strategic partnerships aimed at widening the range of bilateral contact particularly in defence and intelligence exchanges. In short, the last thirty years has seen the foregrounding of newer economic and security interests as never before. The most striking change has been that India’s sustained high rate of economic growth, from the mid-1990s, changed the region’s view of India. The tragedy of 9/11 provoked the Gulf countries above all to look at India as a trade partner, an investment destination and as a secure buyer of their crude. While India’s trade with the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) countries has varied in volume between 2014 and 2019, in 2018–19 it amounted to $121.33 billion, making the region India’s largest trade relationship (the UAE and Saudi Arabia were India’s biggest trading partners among the GCC countries).24 Trade with the Gulf will inevitably have declined given the Covid pandemic, yet it is fair to say that the volume has averaged $100 billion over the past 5–6 years. The Gulf countries and India have come to regard foreign investment as a major element of their economic relationship. The region has sought partnerships to build its own tech-driven entrepreneurial ecosystem.25 As much as Gulf calculations have changed, Indian political and business leaders too have realised that countries like Saudi Arabia, the UAE and Qatar are potential sources of foreign investment. In 2019, Saudi Arabia was slated to invest over $100 billion in Indian ‘infrastructure, refining, agriculture, energy, petrochemicals and others’.26 The Abu Dhabi Investment Authority (ADIA) and other sovereign wealth funds in the UAE are among the largest FDI investors in India. ADIA’s strategic shareholding in, and DP World’s joint ventures with, the National Investment and Infrastructure Fund (NIIF) augur well for scaling up India’s infrastructure to world-class levels. In 2018, ADIA agreed to invest $1 billion in NIIF in energy, transportation, water and infrastructure projects. DP World in partnership with NIIF invested in Kribhco Infrastructure Limited which is a railways logistics company. Saudi Aramco and Abu Dhabi National Oil Company (ADNOC) are contracted to develop what could be ‘the largest greenfield refinery in the world’ in Maharashtra.27 ADIA has also invested $1 billion in HDFC’s affordable housing scheme and $500 million in renewable energy and highways in India.28 Investors like the Qatar Investment

112 Rajendra M. Abhyankar

Authority, a sovereign wealth fund, are not shying away from funding Indian companies of different size and in varied sectors such as startups like Byju, Zomato, Ola, Big Basket, and a host of others.29 Another crucial part of the economic relationship is Indian participation in white collar and low-wage jobs in the region and the remittances back to India from them. Since the oil boom of the mid-1970s, the number of Indians living and working in Gulf states, particularly Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Qatar, Bahrain, Oman, and the UAE, increased rapidly. While many found employment in white collar jobs, seventy percent worked in low-wage, low-skill sectors like construction. The Gulf countries are home to nearly 10 million Indians while their remittances were $68.97 billion in 2017 and $52 billion in 2019.30 In 2020–21, out of total inward remittances of $85.6 billion, the US accounted for 23 percent, surpassing the UAE at 18 percent, mainly because of its ability to withstand better the economic shocks from the pandemic.31 A growing economic link between the Gulf and India is medical tourism. While the region is trying to develop its own medical tourism facilities, India continues to receive large numbers of patients. Patients from Oman are the largest group from the Gulf, followed by the UAE and Saudi Arabia.32 In 2016, it was estimated that roughly eight percent of India’s medical tourists came from the region.33 The attraction to India is on account of its proximity, the quality of care and its affordability. It also provides a range of alternative medical treatments (e.g., homeopathy, Ayurveda, etc.). The pandemic has adversely affected medical tourism, but in 2020, India and the region cooperated on the repatriation of Indians, on the supply of hydrochloroquine (HCQ) from India and the assistance of Indian doctors and healthcare professionals (e.g., in Kuwait).34 Most of the major countries in the region have signed health-related memoranda or agreements with India, with assistance being sent to UAE, Kuwait, Jordan, Bahrain, Syria, and Israel. Beyond a growing economic involvement with West Asia, India is increasingly linked to security in the region. The last six decades have seen increasing instability and the weakening of states like Egypt and Jordan, civil wars in Libya, Syria, Sudan, and Yemen, the rising importance of new regional players like Saudi Arabia and UAE, and the changing involvements of global powers like the US, Russia and China. India’s policy towards the region has moved from a ‘genuine’ nonalignment dating back to the early years after Independence to a more nuanced and cynical policy arising from current Indian goals. India’s concerns include: 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6.

Increasing instability and weakening of regional states that threaten oil supplies. As a rising power, the continued deepening of trade and investment with the region. Support for multi-polarity in the region. A generalized opposition to foreign military intervention, particularly outside a United Nations mandate. The security and welfare of the Indian diaspora in the region; and Growing security aspirations including an increased role in the Indian Ocean region to protect sea-lanes of communication.

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Given its energy dependence on the region, any instabilities and weakening in governance that threaten the stability of oil supplies become potential strategic worries for India. In addition, as noted earlier, a rising India’s economic stakes in the region, particularly in trade and investment, mean that Indian conceptions of security have expanded. India would want to be able to protect the flow of goods and capital both ways. Overall, it is in India’s interest to see a multipolarization of power in the region. While the US had traditionally been the dominant player in West Asia, under President Trump its approach became increasingly partisan and transactional, favouring Israel and Saudi Arabia. Russia’s growing presence, after its intervention in Syria, has inserted an alternative power-player into regional affairs. China too has increased its presence, particularly economically but also diplomatically. Its growing influence is a challenge for India but is part of the on-going multi-polarization. Amongst regional states, Saudi Arabia, Iran and Israel continue to be important players. Amidst these changes, India has continued to reject foreign military intervention especially if it does not have UN backing. The US’ interventions since 2001 have arguably led to greater instability and created space for Islamic extremism and terrorism. India’s vulnerability to cross-border terrorism from Pakistan make it wary of the churning in West Asia that could have a blowback effect on it if Islamic extremism continues to fester. A direct danger from the instability and extremism is the safety and welfare of the Indian diaspora in the region. India would be placed in a difficult position if its citizens abroad were under threat – the domestic pressures to protect and rescue them would be great. Lastly, as the region opens out on to the Indian Ocean, it is becoming increasingly important for India’s maritime and coastal security and control of sea-lanes.

India’s Focus Countries in the Modi Period We come now to Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s handling of India’s policy towards the region. That Modi’s personal style is a diplomatic asset has been widely noted, and it was evident in his visits to the Gulf and other Arab countries. Since 2014, he has visited eight countries in the region, some like Saudi Arabia and UAE more than once. During his visits to Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Palestine, and Bahrain he became the first Indian prime minister to receive their high civilian award, a remarkable achievement given his domestic Hindu nationalist agenda. Modi’s visits to the region were also marked by personal acts of graciousness by his hosts to highlight the closeness of the two countries.35 The King of Jordan, for example, offered his personal helicopter for Modi’s visit to Palestine. The advancement of national interest during these visits, including the reiteration of India’s continued commitment to the cause of Palestine and the first strategic acquisition of an oil field in the Gulf, were facilitated by Modi’s assiduous cultivation of friendships with leaders in the Gulf. Oman, the most pro-Indian Gulf country, in 2018 offered its Duqm port for use by the Indian Navy, to assist its naval operations in the Indian Ocean in the context of India’s thrust into the Indian Ocean region (IOR) and the setting up of a Chinese military base in Djibouti.36

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Modi’s engagement with the Gulf states has also been politically beneficial. For one, public messaging to the Islamic world is no longer the exclusive domain of Pakistan. In March 2019, External Affairs Minister Sushma Swaraj was invited to address the Organization of Islamic Cooperation (OIC), despite Pakistan’s objections. That same year, even as Islamabad condemned Modi’s decision to revoke the limited autonomy of Indian Kashmir and the introduction of a new citizenship law that allegedly discriminated against Muslims stirred controversy, most of the Arab Islamic countries remained silent. The new policies in Kashmir led to protests in parts of India, but the lack of criticism from West Asian countries helped to prevent the situation from escalating. This may be in part due to Modi’s tough stand on terrorism which earned the respect of Gulf leaders like the UAE’s Crown Prince Mohamed Bin Zayed who has tried to eradicate radical groups including the Muslim Brotherhood. In the aftermath of the 2018 Uri terrorist attack, the UAE also supported Modi’s retaliatory strikes against Pakistan. In recent years, the Gulf states have in addition turned over suspected members of crime and terrorist syndicates to India to face the law. Security cooperation with India also includes arms sales. At the same time, Modi’s outreach to select West Asian countries will continue to be subject to the vicissitudes of domestic politics––for instance, after the outrage in the Gulf countries over remarks about the Prophet by a BJP spokesperson.37 The subsequent dip in India’s bilateral relations with the Muslim countries was palpable till it was reset in Modi’s meetings with representatives from Iran and the UAE. In the following sub-sections, we elaborate on India’s ties during Modi’s prime ministership with Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Qatar, Iran, Israel, and the Palestinian National Authority (also known as the Palestinian Authority or PA).

Saudi Arabia India’s ties to Saudi Arabia have grown significantly over the past two decades, with bilateral trade hitting $28 billion, making it India’s fourth-largest trading partner.38 It is also the top source of India’s energy supplies, supplying twenty percent of its crude oil and is home to more than 2.7 million Indian expatriates. During Crown Prince Mohammad bin Salman’s (MBS) visit to Delhi on 22 February 2019, he announced investments in India to the extent of $100 billion.39 Interestingly, the announcement came against the background of India’s revocation of Article 370 on Jammu and Kashmir and despite Pakistan’s appeals for international support. In addition, Saudi Arabia has already committed an investment of $44 billion in a petrochemical project in Maharashtra.40 During Modi’s visit on 30 October 2019 to Riyadh, Saudi Arabia confirmed the proposed investment. MBS also announced a major shift in Saudi policy stating that his government will cooperate with India in its counterterrorism efforts by sharing intelligence on terrorism.41 Interestingly, he stated that ‘terrorism and extremism is a common concern’ for India and Saudi Arabia without explicitly mentioning Pakistan and probably referring to radical Sunni groups in Syria. He also added, ‘I want to state

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that we are ready to cooperate with India in every way, including through intelligence sharing’.42 No doubt MBS’s positive gestures were aimed at getting India to put more diplomatic distance between itself and Iran. However, given India’s deep and extensive relationship with Tehran, Delhi is unlikely to give in to the Saudis – another instance of India’s realism as it navigates between Saudi Arabia and Iran. Beyond a focus on terrorism, India and Saudi Arabia established a Joint Committee on Defense Cooperation (JCDC) in 2012 to discuss potential areas of security cooperation such as joint training and intelligence exchange. This opened the way for a memorandum of understanding on defence cooperation that was signed in 2014 and an agreement in 2019 for the procurement and joint production of defence equipment.43 Joint military cooperation has also expanded. India’s air force made its maiden visit to Saudi Arabia in 2015.44 Their first-ever joint naval exercise was planned to take place in March 2020 but had to be postponed due to the Covid-19 pandemic.45 However, both navies carried out a short Passage Exercise in the Persian Gulf in April 2021, likely as a prelude to the full joint exercise in the future. Their first bilateral army exercise is also expected to take place sometime in 2021.46

The UAE and Qatar Modi gave a major thrust to ties with the Arab Gulf countries when he visited Abu Dhabi in August 2015, the first Indian prime minister to do so since Indira Gandhi 34 years earlier.47 During his next visit in April 2019 he was awarded Abu Dhabi’s highest civilian honour, the Zayed Medal, consolidating a sea-change in India’s relations with the Gulf Arabs. During Modi’s visit to Abu Dhabi, the Crown Prince with his five brothers received the Prime Minister at the airport, a rare honour for any visiting dignitary. The UAE’s Crown Prince Mohammad bin Zayed paid two return visits to India, in 2016 and 2017, promising to invest $75 billion in infrastructure development and increase bilateral trade by sixty percent over the next five years.48 Additionally, Abu Dhabi’s allowing Indian equity participation in its oil sector made it possible for state-owned ONGC Videsh to secure a ten percent stake for $600 million in an offshore oilfield. ADNOC is storing crude at two of India’s strategic reserves at Padur and Mangalam. The ISPR (Indian Strategic Petroleum Reserve) has a capacity of 5.33 million tonnes at three locations, namely, Vishakapatanam, Mangaluru and Padri.49 It meets India’s nine days requirement (whereas the International Energy Agency mandates eighty days). With the UAE, India engages in strategic discussion through the Joint Defence Co-operation Committee, as well as other forums like the Annual Defense Dialogue. There are also regular high-level exchanges at the level of Service Chiefs and military education exchanges between the countries. The Desert Eagle exercise allows both sides to conduct bilateral air combat exercises;50 and in 2021, India was invited to be part of the multilateral Desert Flag air exercise held in the UAE, participating alongside the US, France, Saudi Arabia, South Korea, and Bahrain.51 India and the UAE also conducted their maiden bilateral naval drills in 2018.52

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India signed a defence cooperation agreement with Qatar in November 2008, which was extended for five years in 2013 and further extended for another five years in November 2018. The agreement covered areas like maritime training and joint exercises and established the Joint Defence Cooperation Committee (JDCC) to implement the areas of cooperation. India is a regular participant at the Doha International Maritime Defence Exhibition and Conference (DIMDEX) in Qatar, and Indian coast guard and naval vessels often visit Qatar as part of their bilateral cooperation.53 In 2019, India and Qatar also began their inaugural bilateral naval exercise at Dohan.54 Finally, the UAE and Qatar (and Saudi Arabia) have all shown an interest in purchasing the BrahMos missile system. India has signed an agreement to supply the UAE with 40,000 artillery shells for Bofor guns in 2017 and later agreed to supply another 50,000 shells worth nearly $50 million in 2019.

Iran India’s historical relations with Iran have been based on people-to-people contact, trade exchanges, education ties, and Shia pilgrimage. Many Indian cities have longsettled Iranian communities, and the Indian business community has struck deep roots in Iran. Relations with Iran have never reached the predicted evolution because of the impact of their respective relations with the US.55 Iran’s conflictual relationship with the US and India’s deep stakes in a strong relationship with the US limit the extent to which India-Iran relations can develop. In May 2019, India was forced to stop oil imports from Iran. India has sought to adopt a neutral stance in the face of these on-going tensions to pursue its economic and security interests.56 The Biden Administration is expected to revive the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action or JCPOA on Iran’s nuclear programme ‘compliance for compliance’ mode.57 If this happens, it will open the possibility of India being able to restore crude imports from Iran. India is equally conscious not to get enmeshed in Iran’s ideological and other contests with its Gulf neighbours. India’s equidistance policy is evident in how it deals with the Saudi Arabia-Iran rivalry, the tensions between Israel and Iran and Iran’s nuclear programme which raises alarms among the Gulf states. Despite the current US embargo and its difficulties with Gulf neighbours, Iran remains India’s key energy supplier. Its role in helping to enhance India’s security and transit of goods to Central Asia makes it crucial to India’s Central Asia strategy. Its multidimensional role in Pakistan and Afghanistan, the Gulf countries, and Syria also makes it vital in India’s regional policy. According to Guy Burton of the Middle East Institute in Washington, D.C., ‘For Iran and India alike, the path to constraining Pakistan lies through Afghanistan, which has become a base for militant groups whose threats transcend the country’s borders’.58 India has equally understood that despite its strong ideological bent the Iranian government is pragmatic when its own interest is involved. India’s involvement in the development of Chabahar port, and the associated infrastructure, signed during Modi’s 2016 visit, has significance for its outreach to

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Central Asia and Afghanistan, firstly, by making it easier to import oil from Iran, and secondly, by stimulating trade and economic exchanges with Central Asia. New Delhi has been able to deliver tangible results despite tightening US sanctions. It runs the Shahid Behesti terminal, the first phase of the Chabahar project inaugurated in December 2017. It has also been able to immunize the project, including the Chabahar-Zahedan railway link, from US sanctions. Nevertheless, the slow and tardy progress on the development of Chabahar, with an Indian commitment of $1.6 billion, has taken the shine off the initiative.59 The uncertainty of cargo, continuing economic sanctions preventing participation by global companies, and above all, deteriorating US-Iran relations have been a damper. The growing proximity of Iran and China is a consequence of tightening US sanctions and the EU’s failure to come up with its promised support. As Harsh V. Pant of the Observer Research Foundation notes, ‘The US$400-billion, 25-year economic and security partnership that Iran is reportedly finalising with China exemplifies the frustration of an Iranian regime that had looked initially to the West for a reopening’.60 This growing proximity came at a time when relations between China and India were strained because of the military confrontations in Ladakh in 2020. A usually reticent Iran commented on the Indian government’s decision to revoke Article 370 and the earlier communal riots in 2020. This led to back-toback visits to clear the air. On 6 September 2020, Rajnath Singh, India’s Defence Minister visited Iran, a day after he voiced India’s deep concern about the situation in the Persian Gulf and called upon the countries in the region to resolve their differences through dialogue.61 The two Defence Ministers discussed ways to take forward bilateral cooperation and exchanged views on regional security issues. This was followed by the visit of Subrahmanyam Jaishankar, India’s External Affairs Minister, who stopped over in Tehran just two days later, on 8 September 2020, to further underline the importance that India places on its relations with Iran.62 The two visits were intended to get over any sense of neglect of the bilateral relationship. They came on the heels of reports that China and Iran were close to signing a 25-year strategic partnership in trade, politics and security.

Israel and the Palestinian National Authority India’s relations with Israel are close, considering the two countries did not open formal diplomatic relations till 1992. Having said that, before 1992 they intermittently had fairly close relations – for instance, during India’s 1965 war with Pakistan, Israel supplied Indian forces with weapons.63 Overall, though, India’s total support of Palestine, an article of faith since Jawaharlal Nehru, had introduced a strong element of idealism in India’s policy and had slowed the normalization with Israel. Nevertheless, idealism was always tempered by a degree of realpolitik, and this allowed Israel in 1950 to open a consulate in Mumbai, principally to facilitate the migration of Indian Jews – while this was a humanitarian issue, it was also motivated by the fact that India could not ignore international opinion backing the

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right of Jews from all over the world to move to Israel. Forty years later, India timed the opening of normal diplomatic relations with Israel with the start in 1992 of the Middle East Peace Process (MEPP): it did so ostensibly to be in touch with all sides in the discussions. While the pace of normalization was predicated on that of the MEPP, India soon abandoned the linkage.64 In part this was because it judged that relations with Israel would have a positive effect on India-US relations. During the last three decades India-Israel relations have grown in diversity and depth, with the crowning event being Modi’s visit in July 2017. The visit reduced the salience of the Palestine issue in India’s foreign policy and gave a major boost to bilateral relations. Initially, India’s motive in pursuing normalization was its need for hard-to-get sophisticated military hardware and systems from Israel. However, the relationship expanded to include agricultural technology and techniques, medical start-ups and investment in real estate. The growing rapprochement between Israel and the Gulf Arab states led to the 2018 visits to Oman and the UAE by Israeli leaders and the beginning of Israel’s unofficial relations with Saudi Arabia.65 The agreements on 15 September 2020, brokered by President Donald Trump to normalize relations between Israel and the UAE and Bahrain, followed by normalization with Sudan and Morocco, represented a strategic realignment against Iran.66 The visit added these four countries to Egypt (1979) and Jordan (1994) in the list of countries that had normalized relations with Israel. Israel signed separate agreements with each of Gulf states, and the US signed a common document on normalization known as the Abraham Accords, described by the White House as a ‘declaration of peace’.67 Israel Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu agreed to suspend a plan to annex parts of the occupied West Bank. This was seen as a plus for the Palestinian cause. He however stressed that Israel would one day annex the Jordan Valley and Jewish settlements across the occupied West Bank. On 14 October 2020, upending the Abraham Accords68 and placing the UAE and Bahrain in a dilemma, Netanyahu served notice of his intention.69 Israel’s importance for India stems partly from its position as a key arms supplier. In 2017, India was Israel’s largest customer, purchasing some $715 million worth of arms.70 In addition, Israel’s hi-tech economy and culture of innovation makes it an attractive investment destination for Indian tech companies.71 In July 2017, during the Modi visit, the two sides signed agreements enhancing cooperation in the areas of science, agriculture, technology, and defence, and establishing a $40 million technology innovation fund.72 In 2018, Air India launched a new direct flight between New Delhi and Tel Aviv, with permission to use the airspace over Saudi Arabia.73 The route was the first of its kind and reflected India’s growing diplomatic clout in the region. India and Israel cooperate on security issues beyond the arms trade, for instance in the Joint Working Group on Counterterrorism. In 2014, they concluded three agreements on Mutual Legal Assistance in Criminal Matters, Cooperation in Homeland Security and Protection of Classified Material. Starting in 2015, there have been training exchanges for Indian and Israeli police trainees.74 In 2020, a

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memorandum of understanding was signed to strengthen cooperation in the field of cyber security, pledging to enhance the exchange of technological assistance and mutual services.75 The Palestinian leadership, that had long accused Trump of a pro-Israel bias, was deeply disappointed by the Arab League’s refusal to condemn the UAE for formally recognizing Israel.76 Its objections were based on the fear that the League’s actions would pave the way for other Arab states to move towards recognition. Palestinian Authority Foreign Minister Riad Maliki insisted the agreements violated the Saudi ‘Arab Peace Initiative’ of 2002 in which normalization was only to happen in exchange for a full Israeli withdrawal to the pre-1967 lines and the establishment of an independent Palestinian state with east Jerusalem as its capital.77 The Arab League’s actions provoked Hamas in the Gaza Strip and Fatah in the occupied West Bank to negotiate more diligently with each other in renewed Palestinian unity talks and to plan general elections for first time since 2007.78 In all this churning, India’s excellent relations with Israel are no longer an issue. So much so that under Modi, Indian support for Israel extended to issues discussed in multilateral forums, an arena in which India had traditionally supported the Palestinian cause. For example, India voted against granting the Palestinian group ‘Shahed’ observer status at the UN Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC).79 On the other hand, as a balance, India continued to maintain high-level contacts with the PA. In 2015, President Pranab Mukherjee made the first ever presidential visit to Palestine. This was followed in 2018 by the first ever Indian prime ministerial visit. In between, in 2016, the Indian external affairs minister too visited Palestine. On the PA side, President Mahmoud Abbas visited India in 2017. The two sides set up their first ever Joint Commission in November 2016. Broadly, India provided budgetary support to the PA, built schools, libraries, ICT centres, vocational training centres, and hospitals and various other medical facilities. It also provided scholarships for Palestinian students, for technical training.80

Conclusion West Asia has seen great changes of direction since 2010 and the Arab Spring, which have left the region unstable and susceptible to newer crises. With the continuing crises in Syria and Yemen, we now see in addition a possible crisis in Palestine stemming from the breaking of long-held principles on the Palestine-Israel issue. Since India’s independence, West Asia has been a crucial partner and interlocutor. Not only history but also economics made it inevitable that India would have multifaceted relations with the region. As India moved up the economic growth curve over the last seven decades, its relations with the countries in the Gulf, the rest of West Asia and North Africa have become increasingly diverse, complex and mutually beneficial. With all the Muslim countries in the greater region being part of the nonaligned movement, they looked to India as a natural leader diplomatically and politically, particularly in multilateral arenas. At the same time, Indian policymakers had confidence that the

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region’s relations with India were not seen only via the prism of other relationships and in particular not just through the lens of relations with Pakistan. Gradually, a greater sense of realism has entered Indian policymaking toward West Asia. As the chapter has tried to show, India’s regional policy now has a healthy dose of realism, often verging on the cynical, particularly towards the Gulf states. It is towards them that we have seen the most significant results of Modi’s personal diplomacy. Yet, the duality of principles – of a Nehruvian ethic and realpolitik – remains a hallmark of India’s policy in West Asia.

Notes 1 Andrew B. Kennedy, ‘Nehru’s Foreign Policy Realism and Idealism Conjoined’, in David Malone, C. Raja Mohan, and Srinath Raghavan (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Indian Foreign Policy, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015. 2 Nicolas Blarel, ‘Modi Looks West? Assessing Change and Continuity in India’s Middle East Policy since 2014’, International Politics, 2022, 59: 90–111. 3 Stephen M. Walt, ‘The World Wants You to Think Like a Realist’, Foreign Policy, 30 May 2018, https://foreignpolicy.com/2018/05/30/the-world-wants-you-to-think-likea-realist/ (accessed on 19 May 2021). 4 Sarina Theys, ‘Introducing Constructivism in International Relations Theory’, eInternational Relations, 23 February 2018, https://www.e-ir.info/2018/02/23/intro ducing-constructivism-in-international-relations-theory/ (accessed on 19 May 2021). 5 Gail Minault, ‘Khilafat Movement’, International Encyclopedia of the First World War 1914–1918, 26 May 2015, https://encyclopedia.1914-1918-online.net/article/khilafat_ movement (accessed on 19 May 2021). 6 ‘United Nations Special Commission on Palestine, 1947 (UNSCOP)’, Encyclopedia.com, 7 October 2020, https://www.encyclopedia.com/humanities/encyclopedias-almanacs-tra nscripts-and-maps/united-nations-special-committee-palestine-1947-unscop (accessed on 19 May 2021). 7 Rajendra Madhukar Abhyankar, ‘The Evolution and Future of India-Israel Relations’, S Daniel Abraham Center for International and Religious Studies, Tel Aviv University, Research Paper no. 6, March 2012, https://www.tau.ac.il/humanities/abraham/india-israel.pdf (accessed on 19 May 2021). 8 Abhyankar, ‘The Evolution and Future of India-Israel Relations’. 9 ‘India Revokes Permission for US Aircraft to Refuel’, UPI Archives, 17 February 1991, https://www.upi.com/Archives/1991/02/17/India-revokes-permission-for-US-aircra ft-to-refuel/6876666766800/ (accessed on 19 May 2021). 10 Jayshree Bajoria and Esther Pan, ‘The U.S.-India Nuclear Deal’, Council on Foreign Relations, 5 November 2010, https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/us-india-nuclear-deal (accessed on 19 May 2021). 11 Sanjeev Kumar Shrivastav, ‘India’s Response to the Libyan Crisis’, IDSA Issue Brief, 13 April 2011, https://idsa.in/system/files/IB_IndiaLibyaCrisis.pdf (accessed on 19 May 2021). 12 Paul Harris, Martin Chulov, David Batty and Damien Pearse, ‘Syria Resolution Vetoed by Russia and China at United Nations’, The Guardian, 4 February 2012, https://www.theguardia n.com/world/2012/feb/04/assad-obama-resign-un-resolution (accessed on 19 May 2021). 13 Press Trust of India, ‘Address Claims on Chemical Weapon Use in Syria Through Consultation: India’, Business Standard, 6 January 2021, https://www.business-standard. com/article/international/address-claims-on-chemical-weapon-use-in-syria-through-con sultation-india-121010600219_1.html (accessed on 19 May 2021). 14 Ankit Panda, ‘In India, Iranian Foreign Minister Discusses Sanctions, Crude Exports, and More’, The Diplomat, 9 January 2019, https://thediplomat.com/2019/01/in-india-irania n-foreign-minister-discusses-sanctions-crude-exports-and-more/ (accessed on 19 May 2021).

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15 Koert Debeuf, ‘The Arab Spring is Far From Over’, Politico, 24 January 2017, https://www. politico.eu/article/arab-spring-not-over-repercussions-for-middle-east-region-unrest/ (accessed on 19 May 2021). 16 Rajendra M. Abhyankar, Syria, The Tragedy of a Pivotal State, Singapore: Palgrave MacMillan, 2020, pp. 60–9. 17 Mapping Militant Organizations, ‘The Islamic State’, Stanford University, last modified April 2021, https://cisac.fsi.stanford.edu/mappingmilitants/profiles/islamic-state (accessed on 19 May 2021). 18 Ines Osman, ‘Algeria: The Arab Spring’s Late Bloomer?’ The Tahrir Institute for Middle East Policy, 9 February 2021, https://timep.org/commentary/analysis/algeria-the-arab-sp rings-late-bloomer/ 19 Ali Younes, ‘A Year After Bashir’s Removal, Sudan Still has a Long Road Ahead’, Al Jazeera, 11 April 2020, https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2020/4/11/a-year-after-ba shirs-removal-sudan-still-has-a-long-road-ahead (accessed on 19 May 2021). 20 Sharan Grewal, Salah-Dean Satouri and Ian DeHaven, ‘Tunisia’s New Constitution Will Only Worsen its Political Crisis’, Brookings, 6 July 2022, https://www.brookings.edu/blog/ order-from-chaos/2022/07/06/tunisias-new-constitution-will-only-worsen-its-politicalcrisis/ (accessed on 5 September 2022). 21 Arvind Gupta, Meena Singh Roy, Rajeev Agarwal, P. K. Pradhan, and M. Mahtab Alam Rizvi, ‘Arab Spring: Implications for India’, IDSA Policy Brief, 2 January 2014, https://idsa.in/system/files/pb_arabindia.pdf (accessed on 19 May 2021). 22 Nadeem Ahmed Moonakal, ‘India and the Evolving Geopolitics of the Middle East’, The Diplomat, 31 December 2018, https://thediplomat.com/2018/12/india-and-the-e volving-geopolitics-of-the-middle-east/ (accessed on 19 May 2021). 23 Anubhav Gupta, ‘India’s Evolving Ties with the Middle East’, Asia Society Policy Institute, 8 August 2019, https://asiasociety.org/asias-new-pivot/india (accessed on 19 May 2021). 24 Annapurna Mitra and Ria Kasliwal, ‘Twin Crises in the Gulf: Implications for India’, ORF Special Report No. 105, April 2020, p. 9, https://www.orfonline.org/wp-content/uploads/ 2020/04/ORF_Special_Report_105_GulfCrises.pdf (accessed on 14 April 2021). 25 Thimmaya Poojary and Sameer Ranjan Bakshi, ‘Arabian Nights and Indian Startup Dreams: Middle East Investors Eager to Fund Tech Businesses’, Yourstory, 29 July 2019, https://yourstory.com/2019/07/india-startups-middle-east-investors-funding (accessed on 14 April 2021). 26 Mitra and Kasliwal, ‘Twin Crises’, p. 11. 27 Gupta, ‘India’s Evolving Ties with the Middle East’. 28 Mitra and Kasliwal, ‘Twin Crises’, p. 11. 29 Poojary and Bakshi, ‘Arabian Nights and Indian Startup Dreams’. 30 Pavithra K. M., ‘Remittances to India: Where Does the Money Come From and What Does It Mean?’ Factly,11 July 2019, https://factly.in/remittances-to-india-wheredoes-the-money-come-from-and-what-does-it-mean/ (accessed on 19 May 2021); James Mathew, ‘Rise in Indian Remittances From the Gulf Hides Tales of Coronavirus Heartbreak’, Arabian Business, 9 September 2020, https://www.arabianbusiness.com/ banking-finance/451664-how-rise-in-indian-remittances-from-the-gulf-hide-tales-ofcoronavirus-heartbreak (accessed on 19 May 2021). 31 Mimansa Verma, ‘The US Economy’s Recovery From Covid Helped Boost Remittances to India’, 22 July 2022, https://qz.com/india/2191298/the-us-has-surpassed-ua e-as-the-top-remittance-source-for-india/ (accessed on 5 September 2022). 32 ‘India Targets Gulf Medical Tourists’, LaingBuisson, 9 November 2018, https://www.la ingbuissonnews.com/imtj/news-imtj/india-targets-gulf-medical-tourists/ (accessed on 19 May 2021). 33 Sarah Algethami, ‘India Targets Medical Tourists from Gulf Region’. Gulf News, 9 October 2016, https://gulfnews.com/business/tourism/india-targets-medical-touristsfrom-gulf-region-1.1909595 (accessed on 19 May 2021).

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34 Alvite Ningthoujam, ‘India’s Covid-19 Cooperation with the Middle East’, The Diplomat, 20 April 2020, https://thediplomat.com/2020/04/indias-covid-19-cooperation-with-themiddle-east/ (accessed on 19 May 2021). 35 Kabir Taneja, ‘How Modi Turned the Gulf to His Favour’, Observer Research Foundation, 2 July 2019, https://www.orfonline.org/expert-speak/how-modi-turned-the-gulf-tohis-favor-52652/ (accessed on 19 May 2021). 36 Eleonora Ardemagni, ‘“The Indian Gulf”: Modi’s Visit in the UAE and Oman’, Reset Dialogues, 27 February 2018, https://www.resetdoc.org/story/indian-gulf-modis-visit-uaeoman/ (accessed on 19 May 2021). 37 Sharbani Banerjee, ‘Muslim Outrage over Prophet’s Remark Puts BJP in a Diplomatic Spot’, The Statesman, 6 June 2022, https://www.thestatesman.com/india/muslim-worldsoutrage-prophets-remark-puts-bjp-diplomatic-tight-spot-1503078605.html (accessed on 5 September 2022). 38 Shreya Upadhyay, ‘Modi in Saudi Arabia: Upping the “Look West” Game’, The Diplomat, 9 November 2019, https://thediplomat.com/2019/11/modi-in-saudi-arabia-uppingthe-look-west-game/ (accessed on 19 May 2021). 39 Vinay Kaura, ‘India and Saudi Arabia Move Beyond Energy’, The Diplomat, 8 February 2019, https://thediplomat.com/2019/02/india-and-saudi-arabia-move-beyond-energy/ (accessed on 19 May 2021). 40 Press Trust of India, ‘Saudi Aramco, Adnoc Committed to $44 bn West Coast Refinery Project: IOC Chairman’, The New Indian Express, 15 October 2020, https://www.new indianexpress.com/business/2020/oct/15/saudi-aramco-adnoc-committed-to-44-bn-westcoast-refinery-project-ioc-chairman-2210690.html (accessed on 19 May 2021). 41 Alvite Ningtoujam, ‘India and Saudi Arabia Ties: Scaling New Heights’, The Diplomat, 28 October 2019, https://thediplomat.com/2019/10/india-saudi-arabia-ties-scaling-newheights/ (accessed on 19 May 2021). 42 Zeenat Saberin, ‘India, Saudi Arabia Sign Investment Agreements as MBS Meets Modi’, Al Jazeera, 20 February 2019, https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2019/2/20/india-saudiarabia-sign-investment-agreements-as-mbs-meets-modi (accessed on 19 May 2021). 43 Prasad, ‘India-Saudi Defense Ties on the Upswing’; Nayanima Basu, ‘Saudi Arabia Looking at India to Procure and Jointly Produce Defence Equipment’, The Print, 31 October 2019, https://theprint.in/diplomacy/saudi-arabia-looking-at-india-to-procure-and-jointly-produ ce-defence-equipment/313798/ (accessed on 19 May 2021). 44 Irfan Mohammed, ‘Indian Air Force Fighter Contingent Makes Maiden Visit to Saudi Arabia’, The Times of India, 5 August 2015, https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/nri/citi zen-journalists/citizen-journalists-reports/irfan-mohammed/Indian-Air-Force-fightercontingent-makes-maiden-visit-to-Saudi-Arabia/articleshow/48360473.cms (accessed on 18 May 2020). 45 N. Ram Prasad, ‘India-Saudi Defense Ties on the Upswing’, Arab News, 25 January 2021, https://www.arabnews.com/node/1798361/saudi-arabia (accessed on 19 May 2021). 46 Sidhant Sibal, ‘In a First, Indian and Saudi Arabia Armies to Undertake Joint Bilateral Exercises’, DNA India, 12 February 2021, https://www.dnaindia.com/india/report-in-a-firstindian-and-saudi-arabia-armies-to-undertake-joint-bilateral-exercises-2874816 (accessed on 19 May 2021). 47 Nayanima Basu, ‘Modi has Transformed India’s Relations with the Arab World in 5 Years as PM’, The Print, 6 April 2019, https://theprint.in/diplomacy/modi-has-tra nsformed-indias-relations-with-the-arab-world-in-5-years-as-pm/217784/ (accessed on 19 May 2021). 48 ‘India-UAE Joint Statement during State visit of Crown Prince of Abu Dhabi to India (January 24–26, 2017)’, Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India, 26 January 2017, https://mea.gov.in/bilateral-documents.htm?dtl/27969/India++UAE+ Joint+Statement+during+State+visit+of+Crown+Prince+of+Abu+Dhabi+to+India+ January+2426+2017 (accessed on 19 May 2021). 49 ‘India’s Strategic Oil Reserves Reach 74 days Capacity; 3 New Storage Locations Added’, ET Now News, 3 February 2021, https://www.timesnownews.com/busi

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ness-economy/economy/article/indias-strategic-oil-reserves-reach-74-days-capacity-3new-storage-locations-added/715485 (accessed on 19 May 2021). ‘Exercise Desert Eagle-II Concludes’, India Strategic, June 2016, https://www.indiastrategic. in/exercise-desert-eagle-ii-concludes-2/ (accessed on 19 May 2021). ‘IAF to Join Desert Flag Exercise in UAE’, Arabian Aerospace, 2 March 2021, https:// www.arabianaerospace.aero/iaf-to-join-desert-flag-exercise-in-uae.html#:~:text=For% 20the%20first%20time%2C%20the,27%20at%20Al%2DDhafra%20airbase (accessed on 19 May 2021). ‘Two Indian Ships Take Part in UAE-India Naval Exercise’, Gulf News, 18 March 2018, https://gulfnews.com/uae/two-indian-ships-take-part-in-uae-india-naval-exercise-1. 2190342 (accessed on 18 May 2020). ‘India-Qatar Bilateral Relations’, Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India, 31 January 2020, https://mea.gov.in/Portal/ForeignRelation/India-Qatar_January_2020.pdf (accessed on 19 May 2021). Press Trust of India, ‘Navies of India, Qatar Begin 5-day Joint Exercise at Doha’, Business Standard, 18 November 2019, https://www.business-standard.com/article/pti-stories/ navies-of-india-qatar-begin-5-day-joint-exercise-at-doha-119111801727_1.html (accessed on 19 May 2021). Harsh V. Pant, ‘If India is Losing Iran, Tehran too is Responsible for Dip in Ties’, The Print, 24 July 2020, https://theprint.in/opinion/if-india-is-losing-iran-tehran-too-is-resp onsible-for-dip-in-ties/467483/ (accessed on 19 May 2021). Guy Burton, ‘India’s “Look West” Policy in the Middle East under Modi’, Middle East Institute, 6 August 2019, https://www.mei.edu/publications/indias-look-west-policy-m iddle-east-under-modi (accessed on 19 May 2021). Michael Singh, ‘Biden’s Iran Dilemma’, The Washington Institute for Near East Policy, February 2021, https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/bidens-iran-dilemma (accessed on 19 May 2021). Burton, ‘India’s “Look West” Policy in the Middle East under Modi’. Sudha Ramachandran, ‘India Doubles Down on Chabahar Gambit’, The Diplomat, 14 January 2019, https://thediplomat.com/2019/01/india-doubles-down-on-chabahar-gambit/ (accessed on 19 May 2021). Pant, ‘If India is Losing Iran’. Abhijnan Rej, ‘Indian Defence Minister Visits Tehran Amid Predictable Complications in Ties’, The Diplomat, 7 September 2020, https://thediplomat.com/2020/09/indiandefense-minister-visits-tehran-amid-predictable-complications-in-ties/ (accessed on 19 May 2021). ‘Jaishankar Set to Make Stopover in Iran En Route to Russia for Meeting of SCO Foreign Ministers’, Hindustan Times, 7 September 2020, https://www.hindustantimes.com/indianews/jaishankar-set-to-make-stopover-in-iran-en-route-to-russia-for-meeting-of-scoforeign-ministers/story-VQ3IsQ4BEPNb4iPZYgp1iL.html (accessed on 19 May 2021). Ofra Bengio, ‘India and Israel: Deciphering Enigmatic Relations’, Observer Research Foundation, 19 December 2018, https://www.orfonline.org/expert-speak/india-israeldeciphering-enigmatic-relations-46365/ (accessed on 19 May 2021). Abhyankar, ‘The Evolution and Future of India-Israel Relations’. Kristian Coates Ulrichsen, ‘Israel and the Arab Gulf States: Drivers and Directions of Change’, Center for the Middle East, Rice University’s Baker Institute for Public Policy, September 2016, https://www.bakerinstitute.org/media/files/research_document/13eaaa71/ CME-pub-GCCIsrael-090716.pdf (accessed on 19 May 2021). Jeffrey Goldberg, ‘Iran and the Palestinians Lose out in the Abraham Accords’, The Atlantic, 16 September 2020, https://www.theatlantic.com/ideas/archive/2020/09/win ners-losers/616364/ (accessed on 20 May 2021). ‘Remarks by President Trump, Prime Minister Netanyahu, Minister bin Zayed, and Minister Al Zayani at the Abraham Accords Signing Ceremony’, Trump White House Archives, 15 September 2020, https://trumpwhitehouse.archives.gov/briefings-statements/

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remarks-president-trump-prime-minister-netanyahu-minister-bin-zayed-minister-al-zayaniabraham-accords-signing-ceremony/ (accessed on 31 May 2021). ‘In First Since Annexation Suspended, Israel Approves 2100 New Settlement Homes’, The Times of Israel, 14 October 2020, https://www.timesofisrael.com/israel-advances-pla ns-for-over-2100-new-settlement-homes/ (accessed on 20 May 2021). Kabir Taneja, ‘West Asia: Deal Making and Deal Breaking for Peace in the Middle East’, Observer Research Foundation, Raisina Debates, 2 November 2020, https://www.orfonline. org/expert-speak/west-asia-deal-making-and-deal-breaking-for-peace-in-the-middle-east/ (accessed on 20 May 2021). Harsh V. Pant, and Ambuj Sahu, ‘Israel’s Arms Sales to India: Bedrock of a Strategic Partnership’, ORF Issue Brief 311, 4 September 2019, https://www.orfonline.org/research/ israels-arms-sales-to-india-bedrock-of-a-strategic-partnership-55101/ (accessed on 20 May 2021). Guy Burton, ‘India’s “Look West” Policy in the Middle East under Modi’. Saheli Roy Choudhury, ‘India, Israel Expand Cooperation from Defense to Science, Agriculture and Technology’, CNBC, 7 July 2017, https://www.cnbc.com/2017/07/ 06/modi-visit-to-israel-agreements-signed-in-defense-and-technology.html (accessed on 19 May 2020). Rishi Iyengar, ‘Saudi Skies are Now Open to Flights to Israel’, CNN, 7 March 2018, https://money.cnn.com/2018/03/07/news/india-israel-saudi-arabia-airspace-delhi-tel-aviv/? iid=EL (accessed on 20 May 2021). ‘India-Israel Bilateral Relations’, Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India, June 2019, https://mea.gov.in/Portal/ForeignRelation/India-Israel_relations.pdf (accessed on 20 May 2021). Harinder Mishra, ‘India and Israel Sign Agreement to Expand Cooperation in Cyber Security’, Livemint, 16 July 2020, https://www.livemint.com/news/world/india-and-israelsign-agreement-to-expand-cooperation-in-cyber-security-11594893659048.html (accessed on 20 May 2021). ‘Arab League Refuses to Condemn Israel-UAE Normalisation’, Middle East Eye, 9 September 2020, https://www.middleeasteye.net/news/palestine-arab-league-uae-israeldeal-fail-condemn (accessed on 20 May 2021). ‘The Arab Peace Initiative’, Al Jazeera, 28 March 2010, https://www.aljazeera.com/ news/2010/3/28/the-arab-peace-initiative (accessed on 20 May 2021). Omar H. Rahman, ‘Elections in Palestine: Prelude or Ploy?’ Brookings, 24 February 2021, https://www.brookings.edu/blog/order-from-chaos/2021/02/24/elections-inpalestine-prelude-or-ploy/ (accessed on 20 May 2021). Press Trust of India, ‘Israel PM Thanks Modi for India’s Vote Against Palestinian Group’, The Economic Times, 13 June 2019, https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/politicsand-nation/israel-pm-thanks-modi-for-indias-vote-against-palestinian-group/articleshow/ 69769915.cms (accessed on 19 May 2020). ‘India-Palestine Relations’, Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India, August 2018, http://mea.gov.in/Portal/ForeignRelation/Updated_Note_on_India-Palestine_Relations_ for_MEA_Website.pdf (accessed on 19 May 2020).

9 LOOK EAST, ACT EAST How Realist are Indian Policies Towards the ASEAN States? Gurjit Singh

India has had a historical, economic and socio-cultural relationship with Southeast Asia. The Association of Southeast Asian States (ASEAN) developed three pillars for its own agenda of work, political, economic and socio-cultural, to which India responded in varied ways. India is included in the East Asia Summit (EAS), is a Dialogue Partner (DP) with ASEAN and a member of the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF). These three provide the diplomatic engagement with ASEAN. In addition, the India-ASEAN FTA and the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP) were key elements in the economic engagement with the Association. In all these, ‘ASEAN centrality’ – that ASEAN would be the lead in taking forward cooperation – was a declared mantra which was accepted by its partners. ASEAN as a community was born and nurtured as a liberal, not realist entity. As a plurilateral organization it hopes that norms, rules, trade, economy, and socio-cultural links between the member states and with external partners will reduce conflict and expand cooperation. Its basis is the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation (1976), to which India is a signatory since 2003.1 Since it neither had the military power, nor seemed ready to acquire it for external use, it resorted to external balancing as the main tool for security. The US remained the main guarantor of defence, albeit in understated terms. The development of the Indo-Pacific idea, the deepening Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (or ‘Quad’, consisting of India, Australia, Japan, and the US) and the crafting of the RCEP all have China as the focal point. Since 2014 and in this changing context, India is seeking to alter its terms of engagement with the ASEAN states through its Act East Policy (AEP) which places Southeast Asia more firmly within a larger ‘neighbourhood’.2 The Look East Policy (LEP) from the 1990s onwards took India’s ASEAN policy from an emphasis on socio-cultural engagement to an emphasis on economic engagement. A more realist engagement with the region would place a greater emphasis on DOI: 10.4324/9781003093343-9

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defence and security arrangements. This essay will look at how India has associated with ASEAN, EAS and other regional entities in the context of the three ASEAN pillars and what else it can do to pursue its interests as a growing realist power. It argues that India has begun to move towards a more realist policy towards Southeast Asia in the sense of more clearly foregrounding its strategic interests there and increasing its political and defence links with ASEAN states who tend towards liberal-functional relationships with outside powers.

The Background India announced its LEP in 1992 to enhance its economic partnership with East and Southeast Asia. The LEP was concomitant with India’s economic liberalization, and New Delhi hoped that engaging with the countries of this economically dynamic region would help make a success of its opening up to the world.3 Engagement did not immediately occur. Japan, the Republic of Korea (ROK) and others were willing to associate with a reforming India, but they could not get India a seat in the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) group. When the East Asia Economic Group was initiated in the 1990s, Mahathir Mohamed of Malaysia opposed India’s (and Australia’s) inclusion. For Japan, Asia ended in Myanmar, and India fell outside the region. The only time India was included as part of the Asia-Pacific in Japan, in the early 1990s, was at the Fukuoka Film Festival! The East Asia Study Group in 2002 restricted the EAS to ASEAN+3 (ASEAN Plus Three being ASEAN, Japan, Korea and China).4 However, Indonesia and Singapore, in the main, led a drive to include India as a charter member of the EAS after the Vientiane ASEAN Ministerial Meeting (AMM) in 2005.5 EAS was conceived finally as the ASEAN 10 with their six Dialogue Partners (DPs) including India. The US and Russia were included in 2011. Canada and the EU are DPs but are not in the EAS even though they are included in the ARF. For some ASEAN countries the importance of the ASEAN Plus Three mechanism was economic, but for others it was political-strategic, and this meant bringing in India, Australia and New Zealand. Indonesia, for instance, tried to bring India into APEC during its Chairmanship in 2013 but was thwarted by China.6 India became a Sectoral Partner of ASEAN in 1992, a Dialogue Partner in 1996 and a Summit Partner in 2002. The upgrading to Strategic Partnership during the 20th anniversary Commemorative Summit at New Delhi in 2012 was a natural corollary to the growth of the India-ASEAN relationship during the previous two decades. Thus, India became a part of the ASEAN-India Summit, EAS, the Post Ministerial Conference with India (PMC+1), the ARF, the ASEAN Defence Ministers’ Meeting (ADMM) Plus, and other ASEAN-India ministerial/sectoral mechanisms.7 In fact, nearly thirty joint mechanisms exist in functional areas.8 What was significant between 2012 and the 25th Anniversary in 2017 was that the geopolitical situation in Asia altered, and both India and ASEAN were to face the disruptive challenge of an aggressive China. The challenge from China has intensified since the 2020 Covid crisis. The ASEAN response has been at two

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levels. At one level, the Southeast Asian states have their apprehensions and want to see other partners play a more visible external balancing role. They welcome a greater role by India, Japan and Australia. At another level, they realize that in the absence of a robust engagement of the US in Southeast Asia, the developments in the South China Sea require ASEAN to adjust to new realities. They have therefore acquiesced in the slow unfolding of the Code of Conduct with China. In the meantime, India’s LEP transformed into its AEP: India would no longer just ‘look East’, it would also ‘act East’. In 2014 Prime Minister Narendra Modi announced the transition of the LEP into the AEP and explained that …[the Act East Policy] focuses on the extended neighbourhood in the Asia-Pacific region. The policy which was originally conceived as an economic initiative, has gained political, strategic, and cultural dimensions including establishment of institutional mechanisms for dialogue and cooperation. The key principles and objectives of [the] “Act East Policy” is to promote economic cooperation, cultural ties and develop strategic relationship with countries in the Asia-Pacific region through continuous engagement at bilateral, regional and multilateral levels thereby providing enhanced connectivity to the [Indian] States of [the] North Eastern Region with other countries in our neighbourhood.9 From this it would appear the AEP was more robust than the LEP in the sense that it incorporated added dimensions of interaction including strategic dimensions. In actual terms, it also included more grants and credits to support development in the region. Administratively, at home, it sought more cohesion in policy and more effective implementation as well. The 25th Anniversary Summit between India and ASEAN in January 2018 preceded India’s Republic Day celebrations. Its significance was far greater than the photo opportunities of ten ASEAN leaders standing with Modi. This show of harmonious unity in an evidently fractured world was notable. More important were the discussions on maritime security and cooperation at the ensuing Retreat.10 India-ASEAN Summits are held annually in November, but normally last an hour on the sidelines of the EAS Summit. The 2018 celebratory summit was more substantive. It added firm cooperation in the political-strategic pillar to the existing efforts in the socio-cultural and economic pillars of ASEAN. ASEAN countries often complain that India does not do enough in the political-strategic dimension of engagement, i.e. that India is not sufficiently realist in its policies in the region. For India, ASEAN is more liberal than realist, with the grouping wanting India to balance China but hesitant when it came to cooperating strategically.11 ASEAN, with its own cleavages in how to deal with an aggressive China, seemed amenable to deal with India as part of its external balancing but seemed to be unable to articulate precisely how.12 In India, there were differences in the policy community in deciding if it was ASEAN or the EU which was the least

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performing of India’s regional partnerships. With both regional groupings, the transition to a more realist engagement remained the issue for New Delhi.

The Political and Defence Pillar India has Strategic Partnerships with ASEAN, Japan, the Republic of Korea, Australia, and four ASEAN members.13 India holds exercises with regional navies.14 Six ASEAN countries have bilateral maritime engagements with India including coordinated patrols and exercises. India, Singapore and Thailand hold a trilateral maritime exercise, SITMEX, in the region. Some of these exercises also include the armies, air forces and coast guards. In addition, India participates in the ADMM+, the Shangri-La dialogue and the Jakarta International Defence Dialogue, and in the last few years, India has been more regular at these fora and in the surrounding seas. It is also a leader in Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief (HADR) specially around the ‘Ring of Fire’.15 For ASEAN members, these are signs of a realist policy. The determining factor in the ASEAN calculation of security is the aggressive intent of China. The impact of China’s insistence on its control of the seas up to the nine-dash line is a reality that ASEAN lives with. Simultaneously, the high level of Chinese economic engagement cushions the strategic discomfort, and most ASEAN countries find accommodation easier to accept than confrontation. ASEAN sees this as strategic autonomy, but it is a balance between its economic and security interests. The policy changes adopted by the Philippines under President Rodrigo Duterte are a case in point.16 ASEAN realizes that it has taken a decade to move from a Declaration on a Code of Conduct (DCOC) in the South China Sea to a negotiation on a Code of Conduct (COC), and such an imperceptible change is publicly believed to be a positive development. In 2012, ASEAN Foreign Ministers for the first time did not agree on a joint statement as Cambodia stood against any critical reference to China vis a vis the South China Sea. In 2017, Vietnam alone challenged ASEAN ministers to be critical of China; the others were accepting of incremental steps as there was recognition that China had moved substantially into supporting infrastructure and economic development in all ASEAN countries. This made the Southeast Asian countries circumspect about strategic disagreements with uncertain outcomes compared to the clear economic advantages of Chinese aid, investments and projects. During this period, ASEAN was appreciative of India’s consistent position on the South China Sea which was amplified in the following statement: India supports freedom of navigation and over flight, and unimpeded commerce, based on the principles of international law, as reflected notably in the UNCLOS. India believes that States should resolve disputes through peaceful means without threat or use of force and exercise self-restraint in the conduct of activities that could complicate or escalate disputes affecting peace and stability.17

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This viewpoint was enunciated again after the award under the Arbitral Tribunal to the Philippines in July 2016. In my interactions with ASEAN interlocutors, I always asked, ‘when will ASEAN speak more vocally about its own problems?’ My question was asked in the context of the fact that ASEAN insisted on negotiating a COC with China, while China took the position that South China Sea issues were bilateral and ASEAN was not involved. During the Chairmanship of Brunei in 2013, Myanmar in 2014 and Malaysia in 2015 the Chinese position seemed to be accepted. During Thailand’s term as Chair, there was some shift towards a determination of the group to evolve a common stand. Vietnam carried forward the idea of greater unity in 2020, though many misread it as a hardening of ASEAN’s position.18 From India’s point of view, ASEAN seeks centrality but rarely exerts its responsibility in the region in the context of the South China Sea dispute and issues related to freedom of navigation. India’s major steps in this period were to start regular participation at the Shangri-La dialogue and the ADMM+ meetings. The aversion among Indian policymakers to taking a more political-strategic stance in the region was overcome. In 2018, Modi in his speech at the Shangri La Dialogue in Singapore enunciated India’s vision of the Indo-Pacific. For India, the South China Sea is a part of the Indo-Pacific concept, and the wider rules that apply to the Indo-Pacific also apply to the South China Sea. In his Shangri-La speech Modi said: For India, no region now receives as much attention as this. And, for good reasons…Our interests in the region are vast, and our engagement is deep. In the Indian Ocean region, our relationships are becoming stronger. We are also helping build economic capabilities and improve maritime security for our friends and partners. We promote collective security through forums like Indian Ocean Naval Symposium…We are advancing a comprehensive agenda of regional co-operation through [the] Indian Ocean Rim Association. And, we also work with partners beyond the Indian Ocean Region to ensure that the global transit routes remain peaceful and free for all.19 This enunciation kept ‘ASEAN centrality’ at the core. The centrality concept first emerged in the ASEAN Charter and signifies that ASEAN desires to play a leading role in plurilateral institutional frameworks of the Asia-Pacific region.20 Modi’s speech spelt out the ASEAN-as-neighbour idea, the Indian commitment to contribute to shaping the region, the role of the Indian navy, and the notion that India’s policy in the Indo-Pacific was not, as he noted, …directed against any country…South-east Asia is our [India’s] neighbour by land and sea. With each Southeast Asian country, we have growing political, economic and defence ties. With ASEAN, from dialogue partners, we have become strategic partners over the course of 25 years.21

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This gave comfort to ASEAN. A former minister from an ASEAN country said to me at the time that this is what Southeast Asian states wanted to hear! As Indonesia led ASEAN to an Indo-Pacific ‘Outlook’,22 India valued these steps and stood by them.23 On the other hand, though four ASEAN States are members of the Indian Ocean Rim Association (IORA), their participation could show greater vigour and attention. Indonesia was Chair of IORA in 2015, but some members feel that the concept detracts from ASEAN centrality, excludes China and is too oriented towards functional cooperation to provide external balancing. The ambivalent ASEAN stance of balancing against but also not wanting to offend China led India, Japan and Australia, all EAS members and DPs of ASEAN, to revive the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (Quad) along with the US which had failed to pivot to Asia after 2011. When President Donald Trump avoided the EAS meetings,24 the AEP of India, the Free and Open Indo Pacific (FOIP) of Japan and Australia’s adherence to the Quad sought to fill part of the space vacated by the US. The intent of the four powers is clearly to see that international rules on the seas are maintained.25 Following Covid 19, the Quad moved to counter China more pragmatically even though at times India was seen as the weak link in the Quad.26 The absence of ASEAN from the Quad makes it almost the first arrangement in the region which does not have ASEAN centrality. What political-strategic role may be expected of ASEAN in the region? It remains wary of China and hence the Quad. It will not confront China due to lack of power to do so. It believes that like Indonesia, ASEAN too can have its strategic autonomy and not have to take sides between China and others,27 even when China is taking over South China Sea islands. Malaysia, Philippines, Vietnam, Indonesia,28 and others have countered China’s physical transgressions in the Seas with statements and little else.29 ASEAN expects India’s support of its statements and actions or even to take up the matter in the UN. At the same time, it avoids any reference to Chinese intrusions into Indian territory or other security threats arising from Beijing’s actions. Indonesia, Myanmar and Vietnam are countries for which the Quad needs to stand up, even if they don’t stand with the Quad. All three Southeast Asian powers are desirous of obtaining military hardware from India. These include patrol vessels and missiles.30 India must not hesitate to strengthen their defence and overcome the delays which have mired these transactions. The defence engagement with Vietnam is quite public, and the visit of the Indonesian Defence minister to India in July 2020 is an important pointer to the possibilities with Jakarta.31 A closer policy coordination between the Ministry of External Affairs (MEA) and the Ministry of Defence (MOD) is of the essence if India is to supply weapons and give real effect to a more realist policy towards Southeast Asia. The strengthening of the Quad beyond a security dialogue, in its first summit in March 2021, shows the value of the Indo-Pacific will not diminish. This is India’s opportunity to adopt a firmer realism. China has bared its fangs, and its business-asusual approach has been set aside. India’s current land-based strategy is validated by

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the Chinese incursion in Ladakh in 2020 and by the threat of Pakistan, but its maritime strategy needs revision. The Quad and the role of the Indian navy in the South China Sea and beyond into the Pacific and to the Western Indian Ocean are pragmatic further steps which India must take if it is to challenge China’s hegemonic aims.32 The Indo-Pacific is India’s opportunity to further develop a strategic maritime dimension to its traditional options. Diplomatically, the Indo-Pacific is now part of the Indian lexicon, with a focus on the Indian Ocean islands.33 What is needed is an expansion of naval capacities and the development of the Andaman and Nicobar Islands. The cross-accession to bases agreements with the US, France and Japan, which allow India and its three partners access to each other’s naval facilities, could expand India’s reach.34 The physical wherewithal for a larger role in the maritime domain is what needs greater investment. A clear commitment to stay the course set by the Quad is imperative to give the ASEAN countries the confidence that they have dependable friends. India must create this perception about its own individual role in Southeast Asia and not just as a member of the Quad.

The Economic Pillar The establishment of the ASEAN Economic Community (AEC) in 2015 was a major effort in its economic integration agenda. It offers a huge market of $2.6 trillion and over 650 million people. India has an FTA with ASEAN in Goods since 2009 and in Investment and Services since 2015. The latter was signed after the launch of the RCEP in 2012. In the RCEP region, India has bilateral Comprehensive Economic Partnership Agreements or Free Trade Agreements (CEPA or FTAs) with Japan, Republic of Korea, Singapore, Thailand, and Malaysia, and studies exist for agreements with Indonesia and New Zealand. More recently, Australia, Cambodia and Philippines have shown interest in bilateral FTAs even after India withdrew from the RCEP. The purpose of the LEP and then the AEP was economic integration between the Indian and ASEAN economies and beyond to include Japan and the Republic of Korea. The FTAS/CEPAs were facilitators of this idea which were then all built into RCEP in the sense that all those agreements were included in RCEP. India’s engagement with RCEP in 2012 was based on strategic calculations, as an LEP without its participation in the new economic structures of the region would not achieve much. By 2019, however, India found that the FTAs were not really working for it, and the promised support from friendly countries within RCEP did not translate into clear support for Indian interests. The loss of momentum started with the separate signing of the Goods and Investment FTAs with ASEAN. As the Investment FTA was an Indian priority, India should have signed a single agreement dealing with both areas. In RCEP, the same division plagued India, and it seems that Indian industry remained apprehensive of a market opening particularly to China and Australia. The withdrawal from RCEP shook the perception among ASEAN countries that India would

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undertake commitments simply for political-strategic reasons without the economics being sufficiently accommodative of its concerns. As things stand, India is keen to renegotiate the FTA in Goods with ASEAN and a CEPA with Japan since these agreements have led to a trade imbalance. India needs to prioritise sectors where it is advantageous and secures access for its producers. The lure of the Indian market was a prize for RCEP since China would not open its market wider. Without India, RCEP loses some lustre.35 India’s levers with ASEAN were compromised by the perceived benefits Southeast Asian states expected from an agreement with China. Nor did they share India’s apprehensions of a flood of Chinese goods into their markets. India needs to now rationalize the FTAs with ASEAN, improve the verification under bilateral arrangements with ASEAN members and increase bilateral FTAs. ASEAN must take a more responsible position and recognise India as an equal economic and strategic partner and not merely as a power balancer. ASEAN economies have been hurt by Covid. The fruits of globalisation like tourism flows (including from China) and investments have suffered. Southeast Asia needs an economic revival, and closer economic links with India and its assimilation into Regional Value Chains (RVCs) could be welcomed.36 ASEAN has taken for granted the large inflows of Indian tourists and the open skies for ASEAN airlines which contribute to strong hubs in Singapore, Kuala Lumpur and Bangkok. ASEAN has also taken for granted various advantages vis-a-vis India that it enjoys with respect to its ports – this is particularly so in the case of Singapore. Looking ahead, India and ASEAN need to work together to construct a better balance between the facilities and gains for both sides. ASEAN overtook the European Union (EU) as China’s largest trading partner in the first quarter of 2020 due to the extended lockdown within the EU. China’s ASEAN trade became 15 percent of its total trade.37 India’s could benefit from the decoupling of some value chains (VCs) from China. Its initiative with Japan and Australia to launch resilient value chains is important.38 This is an economic initiative with strategic goals to reduce dependence on China. For Japan and Australia, decoupling is a reaction to bilateral conflicts with China. For India, decoupling is an opportunity to join regional VCs to access Japanese companies and Japan’s larger markets.39 India will need to temper its own priorities in seeking FDI, the priorities being companies who want to create alternate VCs with a rush of new Japanese investment.40 Australia is not a harmonious trade partner with India and was part of the problem for India at the RCEP negotiations and will be difficult in a bilateral FTA. It now seeks to alter its calculations and work out a bilateral strategic economic engagement but seems to lack the complementarity that Japan has with India in the manufacturing sector.41 The unbundling of manufacturing with importance to RVCs ought to be a priority for India outside the RCEP: it will bring focused gains in both trade and investment. While realism is usually focused on military power, trade and investment power in the current era are very much a part of a modified realism. Indian companies are not great utilizers of FTAs. This reduces the value of these agreements. However, Japanese companies in India use the India-ASEAN FTA

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quite well. A survey showed that Japanese companies in India had integrated with ASEAN VCs, and 26 percent of their exports went to ASEAN, 12 percent to Japan and 6 percent to China.42 The US, EU and neighbouring countries attracted 52 percent of Japanese exports from India. Africa, Oceania and West Asia are the next targets as they expand their global export hubs in India. However, foreign companies face problems operating from India, and these need to be addressed so that both on policy and in practice at the State level the ease of doing business is real. India does a considerable amount to support the CLMV countries (Cambodia, Laos, Myanmar, Vietnam) within ASEAN under the IAI-NDG programme.43 Until 2015, India’s grant-based vocational training centres (VTCs), IT centres, English language centres, and entrepreneurship centres, etc. attracted attention in Southeast Asia. That phase appears to be over, and newer initiatives by which to engage ASEAN have developed in which India participates in a low-profile way. From 2002–2020, $10.6 million were allocated to twelve projects.44 For the ASEAN-India fund of $150 million India has little to show in terms of major projects. Neither the Science & Technology Fund nor the Green Fund have achieved anything notable. Now the competition for functional engagement with the region is much larger, since countries like Germany, Norway and others who are not DPs of ASEAN are actively involved with them. A Special Purpose Vehicle (SPV) was announced at the 12th India-ASEAN Summit in 2014 for financing India-ASEAN projects in connectivity and infrastructure. Modi announced a line of credit of $1 billion for such projects.45 This remains unutilized due to unfavourable assessment of the conditions India attaches to it, while China has roped in ASEAN for many Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) projects. ASEAN sees BRI differently from India. Chinese projects are now widely regarded as being a part of BRI though most did not start under such a plan. All ASEAN countries joined the AIIB, and together they account for 8.96 percent of the vote compared to 7.745 percent for India. Between them, they have over 15 percent of the total voting rights, approximately half of China’s share.46 ASEAN wants to see more Indian involvement but believes it is playing below par in infrastructure development. The Trilateral Highway is considered as aiding connectivity, but the pace of its development is too slow. The Highway manifests the spirit of connectivity between India and ASEAN and with BIMSTEC. It connects northeast India, Myanmar and Thailand, and is linked with ASEAN’s connectivity plans.47 Still under development, its potential for the betterment of the region is undoubted.48 The Kaladan facility between Myanmar and Kolkata is also seriously delayed.49 There is great demand in the ASEAN countries for infrastructure, and they are looking for FDI and funding options. While Indian projects are delayed, China’s BRI has had a deep impact in shaping ASEAN policy.50 The Maritime Silk Road was in fact announced in Jakarta in 2013.51 Fifty-three BRI projects in seven ASEAN countries are listed on the BRI website. Thirteen are in the Philippines, ten in Myanmar, seven each in Indonesia, Malaysia and Vietnam, and six in Laos.52 These are mainly railways, hydropower plants, Special Economic Zones (SEZs), ports, airports, tourist facilities, and industrial corridors.53 The Philippines is now getting connectivity between the former US bases at Clark and Subic Bay under the BRI.54

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The India-Japan Act East Forum, which involves Japan in connectivity and infrastructure projects in India’s northeast with a view to improving links to neighbouring Bangladesh, Myanmar and beyond, needs to be given more leeway to enable it to work faster.55 Its terms and ambit are wide enough, but it requires a determined effort to make its projects a reality.56 Connectivity and supply chain projects are the primary objectives.57 Working with Japan in Bangladesh, Myanmar and Sri Lanka on trilateral infrastructure projects is an idea that needs to fructify strategically.58 India needs to utilise the strategic space in economic terms to enhance partnership with ASEAN. The ASEAN Master Plan for Connectivity has several options, including in the maritime sector, to develop projects in conjunction with regional partners. As the Trilateral Highway is a land-based connectivity project linking the northeast of India with ASEAN, it is time to consider a maritime project involving an economically sustainable strategic port in an ASEAN country. The Southeast Asian port may be linked to ports in Chennai or Visakhapatnam and their hinterland (the Bengaluru-Chennai corridor). Jointly developed with Japan, it could be a new model which is regional and supportive of East Asian connectivity. Such a port ought to be located in Sumatra. This will service the bulk of Indonesian exports of palm oil and coal to India and will be useful when joint patrols are organized. In 2011, during the visit of President Yudhoyono such an approach was attempted, and eighteen infrastructure projects were agreed upon including a port in South Sumatra. Fourteen of those projects were dropped and four continue slowly.59 In the meantime, Indonesia has offered Kuala Tanjung in North Sumatra to a Dutch-DP World combine and added Zhejiang Provincial Seaport Investment & Operation Group Co. of China to transform it into a maritime hub featuring integration with nearby industrial parks, thereby strengthening its position in the Malacca Strait under BRI.60 Indonesia chose to offer the remote port of Sabang in Aceh, which is close to the Nicobar Islands, to India. Sabang presently serves only dhow-based trade with southern Myanmar and Thailand and has little strategic value for India. However, if India did build up Sabang, this could very well help develop Nicobar. A more important initiative would be to secure Banten (in the Sunda Straits) on a commercial bid, but unfortunately this was never seriously pursued as late as 2018. India needs to understand the port business more strategically and with steadfast purpose. The operation of the Japan-US-Australia infrastructure trilateral61 and the India-Japan-US Trilateral Infrastructure Working Group62 must be activated more vigorously including towards common goals such as developing a port such as Banten. It should not be overlooked that despite the BRI, Japanese infrastructure investment in ASEAN is $230 billion compared to China’s $155 billion.63 This kind of approach to security in Southeast Asia could be a core part of a modern Indian realism.

The Socio-Cultural Pillar The influence of the Ramayana and Mahabharata, and regional kingdoms in Southeast Asia adhering to Hindu and Buddhist traditions of statecraft, have left a lasting sociocultural imprint in most of ASEAN. Later, as British colonies,

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Myanmar, Singapore, Malaysia, and Brunei had close connections to India. Subsequently, the similarity between India’s and Indonesia’s independence struggle and the solidarity against imperialism that India shared with Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia gave it a more contemporary link to the countries of the region. Building on India’s ancient cultural links with the region, while important, needs careful handling. The Ramayana and Mahabharata unite ASEAN and India deeply, with localized versions embedded in traditional culture in several Southeast Asian countries. This is soft power indeed for India. During the television screenings of the Mahabharata in Indonesia in 2015 viewership was very high. However, while India has nurtured the link to the two great epics with periodic joint performances, what needs to be recognized is that Southeast Asians consider both epics to be equally theirs, and they want their versions to be respected and not assimilated to the original. India can promote biannual Ramayana workshops in which the Ramayana-based art forms are thought of as joint projects with newer idioms. The Indian Council for Cultural Relations (ICCR) Chairs should look at developing these kinds of initiatives in the region. As for using the Buddhist links to the region, India started the Nalanda University Project as part of the EAS in 2009. Whatever its later travails in India, the project failed to enthuse enough ASEAN countries: Nalanda University has only two Memoranda of Understanding (MOUs) with ASEAN countries.64 Scholarships are awarded to students from Cambodia, Laos, Myanmar, and Vietnam (CLMV), and Australia, Cambodia, Singapore, Brunei, New Zealand, Thailand, and Laos were among the original associates. On the other hand Indonesia, despite the efforts of former Foreign Minister Hassan Wirajuda, has never contributed to the university.65 Besides Nalanda University, India leads three projects on the ‘harmonization of national qualification frameworks to assure their interoperability and facilitate student and people mobility in the region, the EAS regional leadership development program and facilitating technical and vocational training (TVET) teacher-student mobility’.66 Also in the EAS, Australia and India are co-chairs of the Task Force for Access to Quality Medicines and other Technologies Task Force (AQMTF). This partnership will likely become more important because of the fight against Covid-19. A flagship ASEAN-India Programme for combating malaria was announced at the 11th East Asia Summit in 2016. The malaria and pandemic programmes can be converted into major leadership projects using India’s pharmaceutical base as the core strength. India could also do more to attract students from Southeast Asia. Malaysia has the largest number of ASEAN students in India, 3.5 percent of all foreign students. It has 1087, Myanmar 479, Thailand 398, Vietnam 240, Indonesia 190, and Singapore 112 students.67 In total, ASEAN has only 2476 students in India. The initiative that India took to invite 1000 ASEAN students to IITs in India at the 25th Anniversary Summit is thus a quantum leap. Forty-two scholars were selected in the first two years of the programme.68 An earlier programme for school students was also well received, and these are effective ways to engage ASEAN youth who are otherwise far more engaged with popular culture from Korea, Japan and China and could do with a stronger Indian interface. Unless India engages the

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minds of young ASEAN people, the future of India’s relations with the region will not be particularly bright.69 Indian strengths in science, ICT and pharmaceuticals need to be leveraged with consistency and persistence to attract the talented youth of Southeast Asia. By using the ASEAN India Network of Think Tanks, the youth exchanges and cultural cross fertilization, it is time for less government-to-government and more people-to-people interactions. Media exchanges remain weak, even though an Indian media team normally accompanies the Foreign Minister on an ASEAN visit. The greater role of civil society organisations (CSOs) is necessary and must be encouraged.70 The focus on SHARE – supply chain, health, academics, regionalism and multilateralism, and environment – are good focal points for further cooperation.71 Can India leverage CSOs and corporate social responsibility (CSR) funds to pursue these activities in the socio-cultural community with the help of ICCR and related institutions to build a more promising functional engagement with ASEAN?

Conclusion ASEAN seeks a secure space in which to develop economically. It is not a common defence and security organisation. Each country follows its own instincts, and even collectively they lack the military power to influence or to stand up to big powers. Thus, ASEAN’s approach is to maintain as much of a balance as possible between rival powers in the region at any given time. They call this strategic autonomy, resulting from the centrality of ASEAN to the regional architecture and particularly the EAS. ASEAN thus would like to embed its outlook on the Indo-Pacific within the EAS.72 ASEAN is not based on realism but rather on a liberal-functional approach to conflict resolution and currently is in a strategic neutrality which it brands as strategic autonomy. It retains relations with many powers but does not embrace all equally. This is so even as China threatens ASEAN states openly and dominates its trade. ASEAN is also especially concerned with non-traditional threats like terrorism, piracy, illegal migration, HADR, and the like. In this India is a preferred partner.73 India’s willingness to engage without asking ASEAN states to trumpet their anxiety over China and the Indian Navy’s speedy provision of HADR in the region makes cooperation over HADR issues a basis of a growing understanding with regional countries. HADR cooperation may be built with individual countries. India has made efforts to be more helpful here and to engage the region better both diplomatically and militarily. With respect to the latter, Modi specially flew from Indonesia to Malaysia in 2018 to greet the politically resurrected Mahathir Mohammed. That did not work out well, but the effort was worth it. Similarly, the continuous engagement with Jakarta, despite the economic and social tensions,74 is leading to a quiet but positive engagement.75 Vietnam and Indonesia can be engaged at the track 1.5 level outside the Quad, in a trilateral setting. Indonesia is more comfortable in a trilateral with India and

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Australia, and Vietnam with India and Japan. This is for both strategic and economic reasons. By providing them with military hardware, bilateral partnerships can be nurtured – something that India has traditionally avoided. Myanmar, despite its internal troubles, also needs to be in this category of partners. Singapore, as the most developed country in the region and an economic hub on the Malacca Strait, remains important but must be engaged in a more nuanced way. Similarly, on the economic side, India must engage better with an eye to its strategic interests and with greater finesse. Its withdrawal from RCEP must be matched with a well-designed review of the FTA with ASEAN in which both Goods and Services need to be taken together. Indian investment must be guided into the more friendly countries with strategic financing options to support FDI without seeking sovereign guarantees, which have reduced the efficacy of the Lines of Credit (LOC). The strategic value chains with Japan and Australia (or with France) should choose to enter countries such as Thailand and Malaysia which are more developed and with whom stronger strategic understandings exist (than say Cambodia and Laos). While continuing to deal with ASEAN in a traditional friendly manner, India’s strategic attention must be focused on a few countries. The special terms offered to CLMV countries who will not be a part of an ASEAN + strategy could be curtailed. However, Myanmar will always remain special due to its proximity and size. The slow implementation of Indian development projects in the region gives the impression that India is not terribly committed or effective. China, despite its poor showing in many such BRI projects, seems to escape such a tarnish. India needs to speed up implementation with innovative methods of public-private partnerships well as strategic financing. This needs to be considered as part of a modern realism that will advance India’s strategic interests. These projects will buy India good feelings but above all will balance against Chinese influence in the region which must be a clear Indian goal. Finally, in the social-cultural field, the opportunity to have more civil society, non-government contacts, more students and improved participation in Nalanda University, the ASEAN-India Centre (embedded in the Research and Information System for Developing Countries or RIS, Delhi), and the like are important. A new India-ASEAN version of the Ramayana and Mahabharat, and Bollywood films supported by Southeast Asian tourism boards and produced in ASEAN locations are ways of increasing social and cultural engagement.76 India is clearly on its way to a policy of realism towards the region as part of its Indo-Pacific policy. It has activated its own naval support in the region as well as Quad-related activities. ASEAN as an organization cannot undertake these kinds of missions since it has no joint military force. India’s realist policy includes a large naval presence in the area, the activation of the Quad, working with regional navies, and enhancing maritime cooperation with individual ASEAN members states. Among them Myanmar, Singapore, Vietnam, and Indonesia merit special attention and collaboration. ASEAN as a liberal institution requires functional engagement as well, which India is doing through its economic and socio-cultural

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cooperation. These must be maintained, while an expansion in the security arena, to compensate for ASEAN’s inability to deal with China, is necessary. The security commitment in particular needs a larger provision of resources. In the post Covid-19 world, India will need to be more realist. It can develop a Quad-plus strategy as well as an ASEAN-plus strategy. These will need a bigger Indian heart and hand to deal with pandemics and their outcomes. It is an opportunity that India, despite its own Covid-19 challenges, must grasp in a fulsome manner.

Notes 1 Susumu Yamakage, ‘Evolving ASEAN and Changing Roles of the TAC’, in Aileen Baviera and Larry Maramis (eds), ASEAN@50 Volume 5: Building ASEAN Community: Political-Security and Socio-Cultural Reflections, ERIA, https://www.eria.org/ASEAN_at_ 50_4A.3_Yamakage_final.pdf, pp. 39–47 (accessed on 13 September 2020). 2 S. Jaishanker, The India Way: Strategies for an Uncertain World, New Delhi: Harper Collins, 2020. 3 I had a ringside view of this effort from Tokyo in 1991–1994. 4 ‘Final Report of the East Asia Study Group’, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, 4 November 2002, https://www.mofa.go.jp/region/asia-paci/asean/pmv0211/report.pdf (accessed on 13 September 2020). 5 ‘India at the East Asia Summit’, Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India, August 2018, https://mea.gov.in/aseanindia/about-eas.htm (accessed on 13 September 2020). 6 Author’s conversation with Indonesian Director-Generals (DGs), October 2013 Jakarta. 7 India joined the ARF in 1996. Since 2015, it has become more active in its work. See ‘ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF)’, Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India, May 2016, https://www.mea.gov.in/Portal/ForeignRelation/ARF_May_2016.pdf (accessed on 24 September 2020). 8 ‘ASEAN-India Relations’, Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India, August 2017, https://www.mea.gov.in/Portal/ForeignRelation/ASEAN_India_August_2017.pdf (accessed on 13 September 2020). 9 Rajya Sabha Debates, Question No.26 Act East Policy, 2 February 2017, https://www. mea.gov.in/rajya-sabha.htm?dtl/27982/question+no26+act+east+policy (accessed on 13 September 2020). 10 Delhi Declaration of the ASEAN-India Commemorative Summit to Mark the 25th Anniversary of ASEAN-India Dialogue Relations, 25 January 2018, para 6, https://asean.org/storage/2018/ 01/Delhi-Declaration_Adopted-25-Jan-2018.pdf (accessed on 13 September 2020). 11 When the Strategic Partnership between India and ASEAN was being negotiated in 2012, some ASEAN representatives sought clarity on what the phrase ‘strategic’ meant to India and if they would be comfortable with it! 12 Gurjit Singh, ‘India and ASEAN: The “Masala Bumbu” Effect’, The Jakarta Post, 31 January 2018, https://www.thejakartapost.com/academia/2018/01/31/india-and-aseanthe-masala-bumbu-effect.html (accessed on 27 May 2021). 13 The four ASEAN members are Singapore, Indonesia, Vietnam, and Malaysia. 14 Kalyan Ray, ‘Indian Navy Takes Part in Multi Nation Exercise in SCS’, Deccan Herald, 9 May 2019, https://www.deccanherald.com/national/indian-navy-takes-part-in-multi-na tion-exercise-in-scs-732990.html (accessed on 17 September 2020). 15 Dominic Faulder, ‘Is the Ring of Fire Becoming More Active?’ Nikkei Asian Review, 4 April 2018, https://asia.nikkei.com/Spotlight/The-Big-Story/Is-the-Ring-of-Fire-becoming-m ore-active (accessed on 14 September 2020). 16 In 2013, the Philippines filed a case at the Permanent Court of Arbitration (PCA) against China’s nine-dash line territorial claims. Though the PCA ruled in favour of the Philippines in 2016, China neither recognised the ruling nor withdrew its claims. This led

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the new Duterte government to adopt a different stance, downplaying the PCA ruling, and focusing instead on engagement with China. ‘Statement on Award of Arbitral Tribunal on South China Sea Under Annexure VII of UNCLOS’, Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India, 12 July 2016, https://mea. gov.in/press-releases.htm?dtl/27019/Statement_on_Award_of_Arbitral_Tribunal_on_ South_China_Sea_Under_Annexure_VII_of_UNCLOS (accessed on 28 May 2021). Gurjit Singh, ‘Is ASEAN Really Calling out China?’ Gateway House, 2 July 2020, https:// www.gatewayhouse.in/asean-china/ (accessed on 14 September 2020). Narendra Modi, ‘Prime Minister’s Keynote Address at Shangri La Dialogue (June 01, 2018)’, Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India, 1 June 2018, https://www.mea.gov. in/Speeches-Statements.htm?dtl/29943/Prime+Ministers+Keynote+Address+at+Shangri+ La+Dialogue+June+01+2018 (accessed on 14 September 2020). Amitav Acharya, ‘The Myth of ASEAN Centrality?’ Contemporary Southeast Asia: A Journal of International and Strategic Affairs, August 2017, 39(2): 273–279. Modi, ‘Prime Minister’s Keynote Address at Shangri La Dialogue (June 01, 2018)’. ‘ASEAN Outlook on the Indo-Pacific’, Association of Southeast Asian Nations, 23 June 2019, https://asean.org/asean-outlook-indo-pacific/ (accessed on 14 September 2020). Narendra Modi, ‘Address by Prime Minister at the Inaugural Ceremony of the 16th India-ASEAN Summit’, Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India, 3 November 2019, https://www.mea.gov.in/Speeches-Statements.htm?dtl/31996/Address_by_Prime_ Minister_at_the_inaugural_ceremony_of_the_16th_IndiaASEAN_Summit (accessed on 18 September 2020). In 2017, Trump attended ASEAN’s 50th Anniversary celebrations in Manila but did not stay on for the EAS. Rajeswari Pillai Rajagopalan, ‘How China Strengthens the Quad’, The Diplomat, 4 September 2020, https://thediplomat.com/2020/09/how-china-strengthens-the-quad/ (accessed on 14 September 2020). Derek Grossman, ‘India Is the Weakest Link in the Quad’, Foreign Policy, 23 July 2018, https:// foreignpolicy.com/2018/07/23/india-is-the-weakest-link-in-the-quad/ (accessed on 14 September 2020). Dewi Fortuna Anwar, ‘Indonesia’s Vision of Regional Order in East Asia amid U.S.-China Rivalry: Continuity and Change’, Asia Policy, 2018, 13(2): 57–63. Ika Inggas and John Bechtel, ‘In Letter to UN Chief, Indonesia Takes Stand on South China Sea’, Benar News, 28 May 2020, https://www.benarnews.org/english/news/indo nesian/unclos-letter-05282020172147.html (accessed on 14 September 2020). Germany, France, UK, Australia have also taken up the matter at the UN. See ‘Germany, France, UK Rebuke Beijing Over South China Sea’, Laosnews.net, 18 September 2020, https://www.laosnews.net/news/266432984/germany-france-uk-rebuke-beijingover-south-china-sea (accessed on 20 September 2020). ‘From Gulf Countries To ASEAN, “Made In India”’ Missiles In High Demand: Countries Across Globe Seek BrahMos, Akash’, Swarajya, 15 March 2019, https://swara jyamag.com/insta/from-gulf-countries-to-asean-made-in-india-missiles-in-high-demandcountries-across-globe-seek-brahmos-akash (accessed on 24 January 2021). Amruta Karambelkar, ‘Indonesian Defence Minister’s Visit to India’, Vivekananda International Foundation, 22 August 2020, https://www.vifindia.org/article/2020/august/22/ indonesian-defence-minister-s-visit-to-india (accessed on 13 September 2020). Gurjit Singh, ‘The Indo-Pacific Concept and Its Africa Connect’, Forbes Africa, 23 February 2021, https://www.forbesafrica.com/opinion/2021/02/23/the-indo-pacific-conceptand-its-africa-connect/ (accessed on 14 April 2021). Since 2019, Mauritius, Madagascar, Seychelles, Comoros, Maldives, and Sri Lanka have been brought under the ambit of the MEA’s newly created Indian Ocean Division. The Acquisition and Cross-Servicing Agreement (ACSA) signed between India and Japan is an example. See Agreement Between the Government of Japan and the Government of the Republic of India Concerning Reciprocal Provision of Supplies and Services Between the Self-Defense Forces of

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Japan and the Indian Armed Forces, 9 September 2020, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, https://www.mofa.go.jp/files/100091751.pdf (accessed on 28 May 2021). Gurjit Singh, ‘Will RCEP Miss India?’ Vivekananda International Foundation, 31 August 2020, https://www.vifindia.org/article/2020/august/31/will-rcep-miss-india (accessed on 14 September 2020). Kentaro Iwamoto, ‘ASEAN “Crisis Like No Other” Shifts Focus from COVID to Economy’, Nikkei Asian Review, 21 August 2020, https://asia.nikkei.com/Economy/ ASEAN-crisis-like-no-other-shifts-focus-from-COVID-to-economy (accessed on 16 September 2020). Ayman Falak Medina, ‘ASEAN Overtakes EU to Become China’s Top Trading Partner in Q1 2020’, ASEAN Briefing, 15 May 2020, https://www.aseanbriefing.com/news/aseanovertakes-eu-become-chinas-top-trading-partner-q1-2020/ (accessed on 26 January 2021). ‘India, Australia and Japan to Launch Resilient Supply Chains for Indo-Pacific’, Hindustan Times, 1 September 2020, https://www.hindustantimes.com/india-news/india-australiaand-japan-to-launch-resilient-supply-chains-for-indo-pacific/story-0e4j7CfG9kz0Am H0tK1ndL.html (accessed on 14 September 2020). Shruti Srivastava and Isabel Reynolds, ‘Japan, India and Australia Eye “Supply Chain Pact” to Counter China’, The Japan Times, 23 August 2020, https://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/ 2020/08/23/business/economy-business/japan-india-australia-supply-chain-china/ (accessed on 28 May 2021). Gurjit Singh, ‘The Japanese Plan for Strategic Investment in India’, Raisina Debates, Observer Research Foundation, 31 August 2020, https://www.orfonline.org/expert-speak/ japanese-plan-strategic-investment-india/ (accessed on 15 September 2020). Thomas S. Wilkins, ‘Australia and the Indo-Pacific: A Region in Search of a Strategy, or a Strategy in Search of a Region?’ Italian Institute for International Political Studies (ISPI), 4 June 2018, https://www.ispionline.it/it/pubblicazione/australia-and-indo-pacific-regionsearch-strategy-or-strategy-search-region-20694 (accessed on 29 September 2020). Japan External Trade Organization (JETRO), ‘Survey Results of Supply Chain Mechanisms for Japanese Companies Based in India’, New Delhi, 14 May 2020, presentation by JETRO attended by the author. ‘Initiative for ASEAN Integration (IAI), and Narrowing the Development Gap (NDG), Association of Southeast Asian Nations, 17 February 2017, https://asean.org/asean-econom ic-community/initiative-for-asean-integration-iai-and-narrowing-the-development-gapndg/overview-2/ (accessed on 14 September 2020). Author’s calculation based on data from Association of Southeast Nations (ASEAN) websites. See IAI Work Plans I, II, and III. See IAI Work Plans I and II, https://asean. org/wp-content/uploads/2017/02/List-of-Projects-for-IAI-Work-Plan-I-and-II.pdf and IAI Work Plan III, https://asean.org/asean-economic-community/initiative-for-aseanintegration-iai-and-narrowing-the-development-gap-ndg/activities/ (accessed on 31 May 2021) and personal communication from ASEAN official, 31 May 2021. ‘Brief on ASEAN-India Relations’, Indian Mission to ASEAN, n.d., https://www.indm issionasean.gov.in/pages/MTk (accessed on 14 April 2021). Gurjit Singh, ‘Taking ASEAN to the Bank’, The Indian Express, 27 January 2018, https:// indianexpress.com/article/opinion/columns/taking-asean-to-the-bank-5040717/ (accessed on 17 September 2020). Harsh Vardhan Shringla, ‘Remarks by Foreign Secretary on the “Impact of Neighbourhood First and Act East Policies on the North East”’, Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India, 10 September 2020, https://mea.gov.in/Speeches-Statements.htm? dtl/32953/Remarks_by_Foreign_Secretary_on_the_Impact_of_Neighbourhood_First_a nd_Act_East_Policies_on_the_North_East (accessed on 18 September 2020). Economic Research Institute for ASEAN and East Asia (ERIA), ‘The India-MyanmarThailand Trilateral Highway and Its Possible Eastward Extension to Lao PDR, Cambodia and Viet Nam: Challenges and Opportunities’, ERIA Research Project Report 2020 No.2, June 2020, https://www.eria.org/research/the-india-myanmar-thailand-trilateral-highwa

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y-and-its-possible-eastward-extension-to-lao-pdr-cambodia-and-vietnam-challenges-andopportunities/ (accessed on 17 September 2020). Sreeradha Datta, ‘Kaladan Multi-Modal Transit Transport Project: Navigating Myanmar’s Ethnic Conundrum’, Briefing Paper, CUTS International, September 2020, https:// cuts-citee.org/pdf/briefing-paper-kaladan-multi-modal-transit-transport.pdf (accessed on 17 September 2020). Zhang Guoping, ‘BRI Projects in ASEAN: Implementation, Mechanism and Suggestions’, China Development Institute, 5 July 2019, http://en.cdi.org.cn/component/k2/item/ 558-bri-projects-in-asean-implementation-mechanism-and-suggestions (accessed on 29 May 2021). Xue Gong, ‘The Belt & Road Initiative and China’s Influence in Southeast Asia’, The Pacific Review, 2019, 32(4): 635–665, DOI: 10.1080/09512748.2018.1513950. Angela Tritto, Dini Sejko, Albert Park, ‘The Belt and Road Initiative in ASEAN’, HKUST IEMS Reports No. 2021–03, December 2020, https://iems.ust.hk/publications/ reports/uob-bri-overview (accessed on 24 May 2021). ‘BRI Projects’, Belt and Road Initiative, n.d., https://www.beltroad-initiative.com/p rojects/ (accessed on 13 September 2020). Cliff Venzon, ‘China to Fund $940m Philippine Railway Linking Former US Bases’, Nikkei Asia, 16 January 2021, https://asia.nikkei.com/Politics/International-relations/China-tofund-940m-Philippine-railway-linking-former-US-bases (accessed on 29 May 2021). Shringla, ‘Remarks by Foreign Secretary’. ‘Launch of India-Japan Act East Forum’, Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India, 5 December 2017, https://www.mea.gov.in/press-releases.htm?dtl/29154/Launch_of_ IndiaJapan_Act_East_Forum (accessed on 18 September 2020). Sanjay Kathuria, ‘India’s North East Can Become the Connector’, Rising Asia Journal, January–April 2021, 1(1): 26–33, https://www.rajraf.org/10282/uploads/article/1009/ 7_SANJAY_KATHURIA.pdf (accessed on 26 January 2021). Press Trust of India, ‘India, Japan Looking at Working in Third Countries: Jaishankar’, Mint, 18 September 2020, https://www.livemint.com/news/india/india-japan-loo king-at-working-in-third-countries-jaishankar-11600445194173.html (accessed on 18 September 2020). ‘India-Indonesia Economic and Commercial Relations’, Embassy of India, Jakarta, 30 July 2020, https://bit.ly/3vzNYkm (accessed on 18 September 2020). Apriadi Gunawan, ‘Dutch and Chinese Operators to Help Expand Kuala Tanjung Port’, The Jakarta Post, 22 November 2019, https://www.thejakartapost.com/news/2019/11/ 22/dutch-and-chinese-operators-to-help-expand-kuala-tanjung-port.html (accessed on 17 September 2020). Aakriti Bachhawat, ‘United States-Japan-Australia Infrastructure Trilateral: India’s Missed Opportunity’, South Asian Voices, 16 August 2018, https://southasianvoices.org/us-japa n-australia-infrastructure-trilateral-indias-missed-opportunity/ (accessed on 18 September 2020). ‘India-Japan-US Trilateral Meeting’, Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India, 4 April 2018, https://mea.gov.in/press-releases.htm?dtl/29744/IndiaJapanUS+Trilateral+ Meeting (accessed on 18 September 2020). James Crabtree, ‘Suga Must Expand Abe’s Assertive Indo-Pacific Vision’, Nikkei Asian Review,16 September 2020, https://asia.nikkei.com/Opinion/Suga-must-expand-A be-s-assertive-Indo-Pacific-vision (accessed on 20 September 2020). He quotes Fitch Ratings who had originally provided this information to Bloomberg in 2019. ‘MoUs’, Nalanda University,https://nalandauniv.edu.in/mous/ (accessed on 18 September 2020). Hassan Wirajuda, personal conversations with author, 2015. ‘India at the East Asia Summit’, Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India. Data obtained from ‘AISHE: All India Survey on Higher Education 2018–19’, Ministry of Education, Government of India, August 2019, p. T-16, https://www.education.gov.in/

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sites/upload_files/mhrd/files/statistics-new/AISHE%20Final%20Report%202018-19.pdf (accessed on 29 May 2021). Sagar Kulkarni, ‘National Education Policy: India Launches Fellowship Program for ASEAN Scholars’, Deccan Herald, 16 October 2020, https://www.deccanherald.com/ national/national-education-policy-india-launches-fellowship-program-for-asean-scholars902888.html (accessed on 29 May 2021). In 2015, the Indian Embassy in Jakarta released a comic book on India-Indonesia relations in Bahasa Indonesia to bridge this growing gap. IANS, ‘Yoga day: In Indonesia, a Comic Book to Commemorate Cultural Links’, Business Standard, 21 June 2015, https:// www.business-standard.com/article/news-ians/yoga-day-in-indonesia-a-comic-bookto-commemorate-cultural-links-115062100146_1.html (accessed on 29 May 2021). Baladas Ghoshal, ‘India-ASEAN Engagement in the Covid-19 Period’, AIC Commentary No 8. August 2020, p. 3, http://aic.ris.org.in/others/files/pdf/AIC%20commentary% 20No8%20August%202020.pdf (accessed on 29 May 2021). Don Pramudwinai, ‘Opening Remarks by H.E. Mr. Don Pramudwinai, Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Kingdom of Thailand at the Inaugural Session of the 6th ASEAN-India Network of Think Tanks (AINTT) on “ASEAN-India: Strengthening Partnership in the Post COVID Era” Thursday, 20 August 2020’, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Kingdom of Thailand, 25 August 2020, https://www.mfa.go.th/en/content/ opening-remarks-by-h-e-mr-don-pramudwinai-deputy-p?page=5d5bd3dd15e39c306002a b20 (accessed on 18 September 2020). Dewi Fortuna Anwar, ‘Indonesia and the ASEAN Outlook on the Indo-Pacific’, International Affairs, January 2020, 96(1): 111–129. I Gede Ngurah Swajaya, ‘Indonesia-India Strategic Partnership: Enhancing Security Cooperation and Addressing Traditional and Non-Traditional Threats’, in Gurjit Singh (ed), Masala Bumbu: Enhancing the India-Indonesia Partnership, Jakarta: Berita Satu, 2015, pp. 156–161. Gurjit Singh, ‘Indonesia and the Growing Influence of Islam’, Vivekananda International Foundation, 6 August 2020, https://www.vifindia.org/article/2020/august/06/indonesiaand-the-growing-influence-of-islam%20 (accessed on 18 September 2020). ‘Official Visit of External Affairs Minister to Indonesia (September 04–06, 2019)’, Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India, 5 September 2019, https://www.mea.gov. in/press-releases.htm?dtl/31800/Official_Visit_of_External_Affairs_Minister_to_Indonesia_ September_0406_2019 (accessed on 18 September 2020). The ASEAN-India Centre at RIS was set up in 2013. See ASEAN-India Centre at RIS, https://aic.ris.org.in/ (accessed on 26 January 2021).

10 INDIA’S MODERATED REALISM VS. CHINA’S HARD REALISM Srikanth Kondapalli

A number of explanations of India-China dynamics over the past seven decades of their diplomatic relations have come to the fore in academic and policy communities. Some have identified realism as a tool to explain the unresolved territorial dispute, the war of 1962, differences over ‘core issues’ such as Tibet, Taiwan, Kashmir, and the South China Sea, the role and influence of a third country (such as Pakistan or the United States), the maritime competition in the Indian Ocean, and the larger geopolitical tussle in Asia.1 This chapter outlines Indian and Chinese policies vis-à-vis each other by examining in brief certain contentious issues in bilateral relations. It identifies the main drivers of insecurity bilaterally, policy initiatives to address these insecurities, and proposes to test realist notions and their various interpretations in the India-China context.2 It is argued here that given the asymmetry in power relations and due to other factors, India’s policies towards China can be termed ‘moderated realism’, while China’s policies exhibit ‘hard realism’ given Beijing’s penchant for hard power, i.e., military or coercive diplomatic instruments, in pursuing its national interests. India’s moderated realism encompasses a concern about national security and measures to protect it, but in light of the increasing asymmetry in power with China, it has avoided, for the most part, a head-on collision on issues of vital importance to its security. It was preoccupied with establishing stability in the border areas through diplomatic measures rather than military assertion. It accepted Beijing’s ‘one China’ policy demand, to the extent of not seeking reciprocity for a ‘one India’ policy. It also repeated unilateral announcements about not ‘containing China’ but got little endorsement from Beijing of India’s rising importance in the international system. Indian policy-makers have largely exhibited a defensive position towards China lest the bilateral relationship be harmed, with even greater dangers for Indian interests. Having said that, more recently Indian policy has featured several exceptions to the above noted defensive stance, above all the recent Indian military actions at DOI: 10.4324/9781003093343-10

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Doklam and Ladakh (at the Kailash Ridge). Whether these actions are part of a long-term concerted policy of greater military assertiveness is not yet clear. Diplomatically, too, India has lately been more assertive. For instance, it walked away from the Chinese backed Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP), refused to join the Chinese-led Belt and Road Initiative, entered into strategic partnerships with the US and Japan, and joined the Indo-Pacific and Quadrilateral Security Dialogue. On the other hand, China’s policies can be characterized as hard realism given its penchant for the use of military force and coercive diplomacy in pursuing its security interests. Its decisive actions in the 1962 border clashes, ‘salami slicing’ of the disputed territories beyond its stated claims and ‘conditional’ diplomacy for normalising relations are examples of its hard realism. Other instances could be cited. These include: China’s reluctance to resolve the territorial dispute with India; military modernisation in Tibet; China’s transfer of nuclear and ballistic missiles or technologies and conventional weapons to Pakistan to balance India; arms transfers to other South Asian countries; its growing presence in the Indian Ocean (through thirty-six naval visits so far) and construction of dual-use facilities in the region; and Beijing’s reluctance to explicitly support India’s candidature in the United Nations Security Council or Nuclear Suppliers Group. The chapter is organized in the following sections. The first section deals with the broad nature of the bilateral relationship to show that India exhibits moderated realism while China exhibits hard realism. The second section then goes on to examine the causes and consequences of the 1962 war. The third section focuses on the India-China territorial dispute in the aftermath of the war and Indian and Chinese approaches to the dispute. The fourth section deals with China’s insistence on a ‘One China’ policy and India’s failure in getting acceptance of an equivalent ‘One India’ commitment from Beijing. Fifth, the chapter assesses their different attitudes to the role of third parties. The sixth section deals with the emerging maritime competition between the two countries. A connecting theme is the extent to which India has displayed moderated realism while China has displayed hard realism.

Broader Bilateral Relations India-China relations exhibit realism in the sense that both have emphasised the centrality of the state in their interactions with the outside world, evolved policies to adjust to the anarchic conditions in the global and regional orders, taken power as a crucial variable, practised balance of power as one of the main instruments of state policy, and experimented with alliances.3 India and China have a long history of realist thought. Kautilya’s Arthashastra has elements of realpolitik and ways and means of enhancing the ruler’s powers via its mandala conception. In the case of China, apart from Sun Zi’s Art of War that recommends overcoming the adversary through various strategies, ancient thought during the Warring States period shows a predilection for vertical and horizontal alliances.4

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The sources of uncertainty and insecurity in the India-China context can be traced to a number of factors, viz., negative perceptions and views of each other, the memory of the 1962 border clashes, unresolved territorial disputes, and differences over Tibet, Kashmir, Taiwan, the South China Sea, the Indian Ocean, and the role of third parties.5 Bilateral relations evolved over a period of time through a series of twists and turns, from bonhomie in the 1950s to the border clashes in 1962, a cold war freeze till a modicum of diplomatic normalcy in 1976, to a phase of engagement since 1988.6 The constructive cooperative security strategy regulating the relationship from the late 1980s on became a ‘strategic and cooperative partnership’ after the Indian nuclear tests in 1998 and the US-India civil nuclear agreement in 2005.7 Later, the overall bilateral framework shifted to a ‘developmental partnership’ after 2014.8 In this milieu, while the engagement process was strengthened with over thirty dialogue processes between different ministries, the burgeoning of trade, and growing people-to-people interactions, the relationship also exhibited acute differences. The goalposts were changing, even as ‘core interests’ were not resolved to mutual satisfaction. Moreover, despite rising Indian hard and soft power, with a few exceptions, commensurate long-term and stable re-adjustments have not been forthcoming from Beijing. With the leverages that it has built over the decades, China was able to confine India to the South Asian region. Even after India became a $2 trillion economy, with considerable science and technology (S&T), conventional and strategic capabilities, and regional and international outreach and recognition, Indian decisions were soft and moderated.9 China’s actions on issues such as Tibet, Taiwan, the South China Sea, among others, also reflected a hard realism, even if many of these issues may not have been resolved to Beijing’s satisfaction. Indian military actions against Pakistan at Uri and Balakot and against China at Doklam and the Kailash ranges were departures from its usual soft/moderated responses, but it remains to be seen whether they represent a new thrust in strategic policy. India’s moderated realism and China’s hard realism are reflected in other ways too. For instance, Indian statements on the relationship outline themes such as the need for stability on the borders, the existence of cooperation and competition between the two but also sufficiency of space for both countries to pursue their interests, and the rise of both countries that could lead to their increasingly providing global public goods. China’s statements on the other hand stress the need to enhance strategic communication, economic cooperation, ‘mutual understanding’, multipolarity, and handling differences ‘properly’.10 In other words, India emphasizes the possibilities of security, political, and global cooperation. By comparison, China does not seem to be particularly interested in actually resolving security issues, perhaps given the growing power differential between the two countries in favour of China, and instead accents procedures towards accommodation.

The 1962 Border War One of the main sources of insecurity for India has been its loss in the 1962 border clashes with China.11 As China’s official party-state controlled media, academics

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and some policy circles utilise the victory to wage ‘psychological warfare’ against India, the 1962 border clashes have impacted the Indian psyche substantially. While President A. P. J. Abdul Kalam stated that Indians have overcome the bogey of 1962 – in the sense that today, India has become stronger in many parameters – the painful view of the debacle refuses to go away. India’s policy towards China has therefore been ‘cautious’ (to paraphrase the Dalai Lama) before and after it lost the 1962 border clashes, while China’s military transgressions in Sikkim in 196712, Tulungla in Arunachal Pradesh in 1975, Depsang Plains in 2013, Chumar in 2014, Burtse in 2015, Doklam in 2017,13 and Galwan in 202014 have only served to sustain and revive images of Chinese aggressiveness. The 1988 agreement, that peace and stability on the borders is essential for the development of bilateral relations and that the two sides should at the same time develop relations in other fields, as well as the agreement at the Astana Summit meeting of the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation in 2017 that ‘differences should not become disputes’15 have all become redundant with the troop mobilisations on both sides, the killing of twenty Indian soldiers on 15 June 2020 and the firing in the air by both sides on 7 September 2020 in the conflict in Ladakh. In this context, Mao Zedong in 1962 stated that the reasons to wage war on India were two-fold, viz., that India was interfering in the internal affairs of China by supporting the Dalai Lama and secondly that India’s Forward Policy of setting up a series of border outposts had violated China’s territorial integrity. He called for ‘armed coexistence’ with India lasting for thirty years. While Mao’s conclusions about Indian behaviour are debatable, what is clear is that those two reasons still exist in the Chinese mind and therefore could lead to conflict any time. China used a long period of preparation from 1951 onwards to achieve success in its limited objectives. Crucial to its military strategy was the local concentration of troops and firepower superiority and simultaneous mobilisation in both the western and eastern sectors. The 1962 clashes left 1,383 Indian soldiers killed and nearly 4,000 captured.16 The US did offer military support, but within a day of that announcement the Chinese side announced a ceasefire. In sum, China was able to take hard and quick decisions and impose its will on India while the Indian leadership appeared confused and unprepared for actual conflict. The 1962 conflict may have left as deep an imprint on the Indian psyche as China’s defeat at the hands of Japan in 1895, and China’s decision-makers have counted on this factor against India periodically. For several decades, as a result of the scars of the war, India adopted a policy in its Himalayan regions in which local trade, economic development, infrastructure, and people-to-people contacts with counterparts across the border languished. While India redeemed itself militarily in various encounters with China (e.g., Nathu La in 1967, Sumdurong Chu in 1986–87), the war of 1962 still impacts India-China relations. The defeat also resulted in India’s influence being confined to South Asia. After the war, the emergence of the ‘all-weather’ relationship between China and Pakistan and the US’ veering towards China after 1971 further diminished Indian influence in its region. As a result, India lost influence in the Afro-Asian bloc too. It took several

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decades for India to regain lost ground, with its Look East/Act East policies and higher economic growth rates after 1991. Another impact of the 1962 clashes was that under pressure from China, India stopped the Tibetan community from participating in any anti-China political activities on Indian soil. In addition, New Delhi refused a visa to World Uighur Congress leader Rubaiya Kadeer in 2009 and to Uighur dissident Dolkun Isa in 2016 in deference to China’s assertion that all states respect its ‘core interests’ including in Tibet and Xinjiang. However, it is not clear if India, by following the ‘one China’ policy, has demanded reciprocity from China by insisting on a ‘one India’ policy on Kashmir and the curbing of Northeast insurgents living in China. In neither case has China respected Indian sensitivities. In sum, China’s hard realism during the 1962 border clashes and after – reflected in its swift decision-making to initiate and terminate the war and other military clashes, its implementation of concerted military actions to impose costs on India and its assertive ‘one China’/ ‘core interests’ policy – stands in contrast to the knee-jerk and accommodative responses from the Indian leadership.

The Territorial Dispute After 1962 Another source of uncertainty – more for India than for China – is the unresolved territorial dispute across the 3,488 km-long border which is divided into the eastern, middle and western sectors. Despite more than three decades of discussions between their officials, the two sides have not been able to define the Line of Actual Control (LAC). On-the-ground delimitation and demarcation are therefore nowhere on the horizon. Acute differences persist between India and China on the dispute, extent of land involved, principles for resolution, and methods to address the conflict. Nevertheless, in several joint statements, both have agreed to resolve the dispute in the framework of ‘fair, reasonable and mutually acceptable’ outcomes. They have also mentioned – as in 1988 and subsequently – that pending final resolution of the dispute, peace and stability on the borders shall be maintained. When the discussions on the territorial dispute began in 1981 (after three rounds in 1960), the Indian position was that the issue needs to be resolved ‘immediately’. While China concurred with this position, since the second round in 1982, its interlocutors have suggested that the dispute shall be resolved ‘ultimately’ and by the ‘next generation’ given the complexity of the problem. China seems unwilling to resolve the border quarrel for several reasons. First, given the PLA’s upper hand in Tibet and other border areas in Xinjiang, China perceives that it has a considerable military presence in the border areas. This presence could be utilised to gradually encroach upon and eventually occupy vast tracts of land in the ‘grey’ zones offered by a fuzzy LAC. Successive Indian directives till recent times to its military and paramilitary to neither ‘provoke nor escalate’ in the border areas only contributed to the further assertiveness of China. India’s defensive actions can be seen as a part of its moderated realism. Moreover, while the Chinese expanded their infrastructure in Tibet and Xinjiang, including laying down

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feeder lines to their perceived LAC, Beijing often successfully objected to similar infrastructure development up to India’s perceived LAC. Second, any resolution of the territorial dispute with India could lead to firming up mutually agreed formal borders and to the eventual reduction of the forces in the border areas that could increase Indian pressures on China’s ‘all weather’ friend, Pakistan. According to Tang Shiping, in order to ensure a balance of power in South Asia, China should avoid a rapid reconciliation with India.17 Third, as the issue under discussion is related historically to the Indo-Tibetan borders, without the resolution of the Tibetan issue (with the Dalai Lama playing the crucial role), China has an interest in keeping pending a resolution of the territorial dispute. Fourth, as Ye Hailing has argued, non-resolution of the territorial dispute with China has prevented India’s drive for parity with its northern neighbour, a factor that is significant for the Asian balance of power.18 Fifth, according to Zeng Xianghong and Luo Jin, China adopted differential policy responses depending on the leadership’s perception of whether the dispute is politico-security in nature, or economic in nature, or whether it is based on the level of threat. Thus, its response in 1962 was different from its actions in the 2017 Doklam incident and from the approach it adopted in the 1956 Sino-Burmese border dispute.19 Overall, for China, the spectrum of policy options ranged from the use of force, intent to use force, diplomatic negotiations, and mutually beneficial cooperative measures. Thus, here again, on the territorial dispute, India’s moderated realism is reflected in a defensive posture, while China’s hard realism is showcased in its active intervention to change the dynamics in Beijing’s favour. The exception to this pattern is the recent Indian completion of forty-four roads and other infrastructure facilities in the border areas.20

‘One China vs One India’ Policies India’s policies towards Tibet and Taiwan can be said to be part of its moderated realism, while China has pursued hard realism towards India on these issues, without conceding anything to India on the Kashmir issue. China considers Tibet as its ‘core interest’ and has taken measures to protect its security interests in the region. Its takeover of Tibet in 1951 and implementation of the party-state system in the region have had spill over effects that have intensified India’s security concerns: for the first time in history, China has a massive military presence on India’s borders. The Dalai Lama fled to India in 1959 citing Chinese oppression in Tibet. The support the Dalai Lama received in India since 1959 was cited by Mao Zedong as one of the reasons for waging war on India in 1962. China’s insecurities in Tibet stem from the region’s huge territory (about 2.5 million sq.km out of the country’s total land area of 9.5 million sq.km), the large and influential Tibetan diaspora including the Dalai Lama living in India, the possibility of another Khampa-like rebellion (aided by outsiders) as in the 1950s, the growing global criticism of China’s handling of its ‘autonomy’ pledges and the repression of Tibet’s non-violent struggles, the role of India’s Special Frontier

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Forces (with a significant number of Tibetan troops) since 1962, and the overall Chinese perception that India is using the ‘Tibet card’ and has plans to ‘split’ Tibet off from China. In the backdrop of the disintegration of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union leading to the disintegration of the Soviet Union, China’s paranoia in this regard is high. Beijing’s ten round of talks with the Central Tibetan Administration led nowhere in terms of resolving the problem. On the other hand, China’s apex Tibet Forum meetings, specifically the latest on 29 August 2020, that intends to ‘sinicize’ Tibet and its Buddhism further, has only added to Tibetan woes. The inability of China to resolve the Tibet issue clearly indicates the limitations of China’s hard realism – this despite the fact of its extensive physical control of Tibet. Following the ‘setting up a different kitchen’ statement of Mao Zedong in 1949, China insists that the international community consider Taiwan a part of the PRC. During the 1945 to 1971 period, the Republic of China had been part of the United Nations Security Council. From December 1949 to April 1950, discussions in the run-up to establishing diplomatic relations between India and the PRC, China insisted on India following the ‘One China’ policy. The ensuing ‘India model’ – that China later proposed to the rest of the world – was based on acceptance of Taiwan as an ‘inalienable’ part of the PRC. In 1976, when diplomatic relations were resumed, China insisted on three conditions: India should not evolve diplomatic/ formal relations with Taiwan; official Indian statements should not depict China in a negative manner or as a security threat; and Indian media coverage of China should desist from negative depictions.21 While India conveyed that it would be able to abide by the first two conditions, it expressed its inability to comply with the third as the Indian media is not controlled by the government. After the freeze in diplomatic ties in 1998, following the Indian nuclear tests, these three conditions were once again proposed to the visiting foreign minister Jaswant Singh in 1999. The then defence minister George Fernandes, who reportedly called China a ‘potential enemy number one’ in the run-up to the nuclear tests in May 1998, retracted his statement and called China a friend during his visit to Beijing at a time when the Chinese were facing the SARS crisis in 2003.22 These are clear signs of India’s moderated realism, as New Delhi has not insisted on counter conditionalities. To return to the Taiwan factor in the bilateral relationship, India-China joint statements repeatedly acknowledged the ‘one China’ policy, and in 2008, during the visit of Prime Minister Manmohan Singh it was stated that both ‘oppose all activities which are opposed to the one China policy’.23 This came in the backdrop of the then Taiwanese government under Chen Shuibian having introduced policies seen in Beijing as drifting the island towards independence. However, once the Chinese embassy in New Delhi began issuing stapled visas to Kashmir residents in 2009, Indian policy underwent some change. First, India discontinued its mention of the ‘one China’ policy. This was clear in the 2010 joint statement, although New Delhi continued to state that the previous statements on the subject were valid. Secondly, in the September 2007 Malabar Exercise in the Bay of Bengal, the Quad navies reportedly worked with scenarios that involved the blocking of the Straits of Malacca

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in the event of a Chinese military invasion of Taiwan. Thirdly, India began more openly to signal diplomatic contact with Taiwan. Most of the directors-general of the India-Taipei Association since 1995 have been serving officers of the Indian Ministry of External Affairs or those who had recently retired. In response, Beijing imposed an additional three conditions on India: the Indian national anthem cannot be sung in any joint meetings with the Taiwanese; Indian officials cannot travel by the official airliner, Air India, to Taiwan; and the Indian flag cannot be hoisted in Taiwan or among the Taiwanese in public functions. Likewise, similar conditions were imposed on the Taipei Economic and Cultural Centre (TECC) in New Delhi including no formal or public meetings for its personnel. It is said that on this issue channels of communications between Beijing and New Delhi are ongoing and regular in order to cater to China’s sensitivities. While the outgoing US Secretary of State Mike Pompeo removed all such self-imposed restrictions on US interactions with the Taiwanese, India did not make any such moves nor seek diplomatic reciprocities, further underlining its moderated realism. While India and Taiwan ‘missed’ several chances of establishing diplomatic or formal relations – in the light of China’s aggressive behaviour and actions such as in the 1962 border clashes and after India’s 1998 nuclear tests and various other diplomatic and border confrontations – India restrained itself from developing further relations with Taiwan. These Chinese conditions and compliance by India are indicative of China’s hard realism. By contrast, India’s inability to seriously insist that China adhere to a ‘one India’ commitment on Kashmir and the Northeast suggest that it is content with a moderated realism. Much of India’s foreign and security policy is concerned with the Kashmir region. India’s insecurities in Kashmir stem from the legal implications of the United Nations Security Council resolutions since 1948, continuing violence in the Valley despite the intensification of democracy since the 1980s, China’s recent activism in the UNSC 1267 committee on counter-terrorism and its siding with Pakistan on terrorism-related issues, construction of the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) that passes through Pakistan-occupied Kashmir, and China’s occupation of land in the Ladakh border regions with India.24 With China declaring the ‘illegality’ of the newly created Ladakh Union Territory (with the abrogation of Article 370 of the Indian Constitution in 2019), a new stage is set in the spiral of security moves and countermoves between the two countries. In the 1980s, China used to support the view that the Kashmir dispute was ‘bilateral’ in nature and that it should be resolved peacefully. This has changed recently with China’s investments in the CPEC as well as the stationing of ‘security guards’ in the area.

The Role of Third Countries The role of third countries has become one of the major security concerns for India and China. The main third countries that affect the India-China relationship are Pakistan and the US.

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While China exported conventional and strategic weapons platforms or technologies and systems to Pakistan, it is interesting that Beijing has never concluded a military alliance with Islamabad (despite, for instance, President Mohammad Ayub Khan’s suggestion in 196325). In the 1965, 1971 and 1999 India-Pakistan wars, despite the ‘all-weather’ friendship between China and Pakistan, Beijing avoided playing the role overtly of an alliance partner. Instead, it supported Pakistan indirectly during these wars.26 China’s involvement in the $62 billion CPEC projects may be altering China’s stance in South Asia, as the 2020 Galwan incident, the construction of Gwadar port and other such measures indicate.27 The US factor has also divided India and China for a number of reasons.28 India’s non-aligned stance, its alliance-like partnership with the then Soviet Union in 1971, President Richard Nixon’s visit to Beijing in 1972, the Bangladesh war, the 1998 nuclear tests by India and Pakistan, the US-India nuclear agreement, the US’ flirtation with the idea of a ‘Group 2’ (i.e., a US-China condominium) in 2005, and most recently the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue have complicated relations between Beijing and New Delhi.29 China’s worry is mainly that India would become a ‘frontline’ state for the US in a ‘containment’ against it. China cites growing US military sales to India as evidence in support of this view (even when during the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan, and under the Peace Pearl programme, China received arms from the US in the 1980s – until the Tiananmen Square incident stopped American sales). However, while Beijing has never assured New Delhi that it would not contain India through its support of Pakistan, New Delhi has reportedly twice given such assurances to China – once again indicating its commitment to moderated realism. The first such assurance came from then prime minister Manmohan Singh to President Hu Jintao in 2009, and the second in prime minister Narendra Modi’s speech at the Shangri La Dialogue in June 2018 when he alluded to ‘[i]nclusiveness, openness and ASEAN centrality and unity…at the heart of the new Indo-Pacific. India does not see the Indo-Pacific Region as a strategy or as a club of limited members. Nor as a grouping that seeks to dominate. And by no means do we consider it as directed against any country…our friendships are not alliances of containment’.30

Maritime Security Issues Two maritime regions – the South China Sea and the Indian Ocean Region (IOR) – have become increasingly securitised in India-China relations. China claims over three million sq. km of the South China Sea based on ‘historical’ evidence, although this was rejected by the Permanent Court of Arbitration (PCA) in its ruling in July 2016. China’s insecurities in the region relate to the ‘outside’ powers (US, Japan, India, Australia, and to an extent, Russia) who diplomatically support other claimants in the region (such as Vietnam, Malaysia and the Philippines) or could come to their support in the case of hostilities. Beijing had proposed a formula in the 1980s of ‘sovereignty is mine, postpone the dispute, [let us] mutually exploit resources’. It then changed course to an active

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militarisation of the region in the last decade. While the claimant regional states are concerned about the sovereignty dispute and ownership of the resources, others are concerned about regional stability, freedom of navigation and overflight rights. Indian security anxieties relate to the fact that over half its trade passes through the region, that investments by its public sector firm ONGC Videsh Limited in the Vietnam-claimed areas of blocks 128 and 129 are unsafe given China’s threat to cut the company’s sea-cables and that China will dominate the region diplomatically, militarily and politically. While China has exhibited hard realism here through its massive militarisation of the reefs with the emplacement of Hongqi-9 surface-to-air missiles (SAMs), airfield construction, deployment of fighter aircraft, and harassment of US naval vessels since 2009, Indian efforts have been confined to working with ASEAN initiatives, sailing with other navies in the region, bilateral naval exercises, port calls, and indirect support to Vietnam.31 In addition, India has been reluctant to implement the 2015 joint vision statement with the US in the South China Sea for fear of China’s reprisals.32 It has no bases in the region and only configures the South China Sea and Pacific Ocean as ‘secondary’ in its emerging naval strategy since 2007 with its focus ‘primarily’ on the Indian Ocean. Also, despite periodic hints that it might cooperate more with smaller East Asian states at the military level, India has not supplied ballistic missiles to Vietnam or others, unlike China which has felt free to make such transfers to Pakistan. In short, the Indian posture has been defensive in nature consistent with moderated realism. While China objects to Indian (or other extra-regional) navies entering the South China Sea, it has made inroads into the far away IOR. The security concerns of China in the IOR are based on its dependence on the region for the transit of energy resources from West Asia and Africa that account for nearly eighty percent of its imports. This worry was termed the ‘Malacca Dilemma’ by Hu Jintao. China also worries about Indian control over the IOR, increase in non-traditional security challenges like piracy, terrorism, oil slicks, Indian efforts to protect its interests in the region, overcoming the Indian connectivity initiative of ‘Project Mausam’ (which could compete with China’s Maritime Silk Road), the emerging Indo-Pacific strategy, and other obstacles to its ‘two Ocean strategy’ (Indian and Pacific Oceans). Indian insecurities in the IOR stem from its dependence on trade and energy flows, the rise of piracy, China’s efforts to dominate the IOR and revive Admiral Zheng He’s 16th-century dream of a Chinese-led maritime order, Beijing’s ‘string of pearls’ encirclement of India, and the submarine visits of the PLA Navy to regional countries. While China despatched 36 naval contingencies to the IOR from 2008 to 2020 (with some of the missions exhibiting submarine and air defence roles), established a naval base at Djibouti in November 2015, took control of Hambantota in Sri Lanka on a 99-year lease, built Gwadar port in Pakistan, and thus gave effect to hard realism, Indian efforts by contrast have been devoid of matching ‘force level to force level’ (in the words of the Indian naval chief33), and instead focused on reaching an agreement with China for humanitarian and disaster relief (HADR) cooperation and avoidance of incidents at sea.34

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Conclusions In the course of seven decades of diplomatic relations between India and China, the strategic responses of both countries have exhibited many features of realism. Each had their set of fears and security concerns. Due to the nature and development of the state in India (through non-violence) and the party-state in China (through the barrel of the gun), their respective concerns, perspectives and solutions differed substantially. China’s penchant for using its hard power in pursuing its national interests is visible. It is prepared to take risks with stronger adversaries such as the US during the Korean War or opt for prompt tactical actions such as during the final stages of the 1962 border clashes when the US decided to supply arms to India. Beijing was also able to balance India over a long period through Pakistan. On many contentious issues with India, China was able to push through its ‘conditionalities’. However, it is striking that on several of its core interests, Beijing was unable to fulfil its objectives even after seven decades of exercising its military/coercive diplomatic might. In fact, on many issues, China has ‘pocketed insults’ or made ‘small compromises’, as Deng Xiaoping said in pursuing his ‘Taoguangyanghui’ (keep a low profile) policy. This indicates the limitations of its hard realism. Beijing’s recent assertiveness has also alienated it from several of its neighbours, potentially imposing costs on China in the future. With Covid-19 spreading from Wuhan, these costs could multiply. India on the other hand lost the 1962 war, although at some places Indian troops defended bravely. It also exercised hard power in the 1947–48, 1965, 1971, and 1999 wars with Pakistan and has used its military in dealing with insurgencies and non-traditional security challenges like natural disasters. Critics say that as a ‘soft state’, India was not able to protect its national interests and its actions have been unduly defensive. The glaring failures of Indian security policy include being unable to integrate Kashmir, repulse China’s encroachment into its territory and safeguard its energy interests in the South China Sea. On the other hand, India stood up to China on several occasions – during the 2013 (Depsang), 2014 (Chumar), 2015 (Burtse), 2017 (Doklam), and 2020 (Galwan) confrontations. It has also continued to send high-level political leaders, or even the Dalai Lama, to Arunachal Pradesh, refused to participate in the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), constructed over forty strategic infrastructure projects in the border areas, strengthened conventional and strategic deterrence capabilities, deployed the Agni series of missiles in its Northeast and the BrahMos missiles in Arunachal Pradesh, and banned Chinese apps and curbed its investments after China’s aggression in Galwan. In sum, India’s moderated realism and China’s hard realism are evolving – with the crucial drivers being their growing economic and military capabilities and domestic political trends.

Notes 1 See John W. Garver, Protracted Contest: Sino-Indian Rivalry in the Twentieth Century, Seattle: University of Washington Press, 2001, Mohan Malik, China and India: Great Power Rivals, Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 2011, and Jeff M. Smith, Cold Peace: ChinaIndia Rivalry in the Twenty-First Century, Lanham: Lexington Books, 2014.

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2 On the state of realism in Chinese IR discipline, see Li Shaojun, ‘Xifang lilun wuli jieshi zhongguo de duiwai guanxi xingwei’ [Western Theories are Unable to Explain China’s External Relations Behaviour], Zhongguo shehui kexue bao [Chinese Academy of Social Science News], 7 July 2014, http://theory.people.com.cn/n/2014/0707/c136457-25246304.html (accessed on 27 July 2021), Li Yihu, ‘Guoji geju yanjiu de xianshi zhuyi quxiang he “zhongguo xuepai” – guoji guanxi xueke zhenghe yanjiu zhi yi’ [The Realist Orientation and the “China School” in the Study of International Patterns – One of the Integrated Studies of International Relations], Guoji zhengzhi yanjiu [The Journal of International Studies], 2004, 41(2): 28–36 reprinted on 11 March 2016, http://www.aisixiang.com/data/ 97721.html (accessed on 27 July 2021). 3 See David M. Malone, C. Raja Mohan and Srinath Raghavan (eds.), Oxford Handbook of Indian Foreign Policy, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015. 4 See Shyam Saran, How India Sees the World: From Kautilya to the 21st Century, New Delhi: Juggernaut, 2017, and Aparna Pandey, From Chanakya to Modi: Evolution of India’s Foreign Policy, Noida: Harper Collins, 2017. 5 Zhang Minqiu, ‘Shi xi fazhan zhong yin guanxi de ji da zhang ai’ [An Analysis of Major Obstacles to the Development of Sino-Indian Relations], Guoji zhengzhi yanjiu [The Journal of International Studies], November 2002, 39(4): 33–44. Security dilemmas play a major role here given the differential perceptions of each other as well as the threat itself. See Zhu Cuiping and Colin Flint, ‘“Anquan kunjing” yu yindu dui hua zhanlüe luoji’ [The “Security Dilemma” and India’s Strategic Logic Toward China], Dangdai yatai [Journal of Contemporary Asia-Pacific Studies], 2009, no. 6: 26–46. 6 Shivshankar Menon, Choices: Inside the Making of India’s Foreign Policy, Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, 2016. 7 Zhao Bole, ‘Zhong yin guanxi: xinxing de daguo guanxi’ [Sino-Indian relations: New Type of Major Power Relations], Dangdai yatai [Journal of Contemporary Asia-Pacific Studies], 2005, no. 8: 31–36. 8 See ‘Joint Statement between the Republic of India and the People’s Republic of China on Building a Closer Developmental Partnership’, Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India, 19 September 2014, https://www.mea.gov.in/bilateral-documents.htm?dtl/24022/ Joint+Statement+between+the+Republic+of+India+and+the+Peoples+Republic+of+ China+on+Building+a+Closer+Developmental+Partnership (accessed on 27 July 2021). 9 Foreign Minister S. Jaishankar traces the roots of India’s relative softness and moderateness to the 1947 division of the country, the delay in economic reforms (fifteen years after China’s) and the postponement of the nuclear option, all of which served to provide China more strategic space in Asia. See S. Jaishankar, The India Way: Strategies for an Uncertain World, Noida: HarperCollins, 2020, p. 18. 10 See Lan Jianxue, ‘Zhong yin guanxi xin siwei yu “zai pingheng”’ [New Thinking on Sino-Indian Relations and Rebalancing], Guoji wenti yanjiu [International Relations Studies], 2013, no. 3: 99, and Wu Tao, ‘Xijinping zhoubian waijiao linian xia de zhong yin guanxi zhanwang’ [Prospects for China-India Relations under Xi Jinping’s Peripheral Diplomacy Ideas], Xiandai shangmao gongye [Modern Trade Industry], 2020, no.13: 41–42. 11 See Zhang Yifei, ‘Does Sun Tzu ‘s The Art of War Influence China’s Military Behaviour? A Case Study of the 1962 Sino India War’, unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Iowa State University, 2014, https://lib.dr.iastate.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=4709&context=etd (accessed on 27 July 2021), Gerry Van Tonder, Sino-Indian War-Border Clash OctoberNovember 1962, South Yorkshire: Pen & Sword Military, 2018, Arjun Subramaniam, India’s Wars: A Military History, 1947–1971, Noida: HarperCollins, 2016, part IV, and Liu Huijun, ‘Weishe shijiao xia de zhong yin bianjie zhengduan yanjiu’ [China-India Border Dispute: A Study from Deterrence Perspective], Nanya yanjiu [South Asian Studies], 2011, no.3, pp. 1–28. 12 Probal DasGupta, Watershed 1967: India’s Forgotten Victory Over China, New Delhi: Juggernaut Books, 2020. 13 For Hu Shisheng, the Doklam crisis ushered in a ‘new era’ as it was the first ‘large-scale military confrontation’ after the Sumdurong Chu incident in 1987. It reflected acute

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14

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16

17 18 19

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structural differences and contradictions that outweighed the complementarities between the two countries. See Hu Shisheng, ‘Dong lang duizhi weiji yu zhong yin guanxi de weilai’ [Donglang Area Standoff and the Future of Sino-India Relations] Xiandai guoji guanxi [Contemporary International Relations], 2017, no.11: 9–22. For Ye Hailin, China needs to consider the power distribution, the ability to use force and the determination to implement its strategies in order to effectively check challengers. See Ye Hailin, ‘Zhongguo jueqi yu ci yao zhanlue fangxiang tiaozhan de yingdui – yi dong lang shijian hou de zhong yin guanxi wei li’ [China’s Rise and Response to the Challenges of Secondary Strategic Directions-taking: The Sino-Indian Relations after the Donglang Incident as an Example], Shijie jingji yu zhengzhi [World Economics and Politics], 2018, no.4, pp. 106–128. Yang Siling, ‘Jia le wan hegu liuxue chongtu: Yindu de weixian youxi ji qi dui zhong yin guanxi de yingxiang’ [The Bloody Conflict in the Galwan Valley: India’s Dangerous Game and its Impact on China-India Relations], Yun meng xue kan [Journal of Yunmeng], September 2020, 41(5): 1–10. ‘Transcript of Media Briefing by Foreign Secretary on the Sidelines of SCO Summit in Astana (June 09, 2017)’, Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India, 9 June 2017, https:// www.mea.gov.in/media-briefings.htm?dtl/28522/Transcript_of_Media_Briefing_by_For eign_Secretary_on_the_sidelines_of_SCO_Summit_in_Astana_June_09_2017 (accessed on 27 July 2021). Bethany Lacina, ‘The PRIO Battle Deaths Dataset, 1946–2008, Version 3.0: Documentation of Coding Decisions’, The Peace Research Institute Oslo (PRIO), September 2009, pp. 131–32, https://www.prio.org/Global/upload/CSCW/Data/PRIObd3.0_documenta tion.pdf (accessed on 27 July 2021), for India’s official figures released by the Ministry of Defence. Tang Shiping, ‘Zhongguo – yindu guanxi de boyi he zhongguo de nanya zhanlue’ [The Game of Sino-Indian relations and China’s South Asia Strategy], Shijie jingji yu zhengzhi [World Economics and Politics], 2000, no.9, pp. 24–29. Ye, ‘China’s Rise and Response to the Challenges of Secondary Strategic Directionstaking’, p. 122. Zeng Xianghong and Luo Jin, ‘Bianjie gongneng, weixie ren zhi yu zhongguo dui lu shang bian jie wenti de yingdui’ [Border Function, Threat Perception and China’s Response to Land Border Issues], Dangdai yatai [Journal of Contemporary Asia-Pacific Studies], 2020, no. 1, pp.113–132. Zeng and Luo argue that China’s decision-makers adopted differential responses to the border incidents, viz., use of force, shows of determination (including military confrontation), border talks, or even cooperation. They base their conclusions on their analysis of the 2017 Doklam incident between China and India, the 2004 resolution of the border dispute with Russia and the 1956 border talks with Burma. They also studied China’s differential responses during the 1962 border war and the Doklam incident in 2017. They argue that the differentiated response to border issues is based on the leadership’s threat perceptions and the context of the border incident. Geeta Mohan, ‘Ladakh Union Territory “Illegally” Established: China after India Builds 44 Bridges in Border Areas’, India Today, 13 October 2020, https://www. indiatoday.in/india/story/ladakh-union-territory-illegally-established-china-after-indiabuilds-44-bridges-in-border-areas-1731207-2020-10-13 (accessed on 27 July 2021). These demands were broadcast by Radio Peking on 6 November 1970 and are cited in Giri Deshingkar, ‘India: A Non-antagonistic Contradiction’, in Manoranjan Mohanty and Mira Sinha Bhattacharjea (eds.), Security and Science in China and India: Selected Essays of Giri Deshingkar, New Delhi: Samskriti, 2005, p. 54 and ‘China – Sino-Indian Ties Must Drop Idea of “Threat”’, China Daily, 15 June 1999. Srikanth Kondapalli, ‘What Will Parrikar Achieve in China?’ Rediff, 18 April 2016, https:// www.rediff.com/news/column/what-will-parrikar-achieve-in-china/20160417.htm (accessed on 27 July 2021). ‘A Shared Vision for the 21st Century of the Republic of India and the People’s Republic of China’, Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India, 14 January 2008, https://mea.gov.

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24 25 26

27

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29 30

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in/outoging-visit-detail.htm?5145/A+Shared+Vision+for+the+21st+Century+of+the+ Republic+of+India+and+the+Peoples+Republic+of+China (accessed on 27 July 2021). On the CPEC, see Andrew Small, ‘Returning to the Shadows: China, Pakistan, and the Fate of CPEC’, The GMF Report No. 16, September 2020, https://www.gmfus.org/p ublications/returning-shadows-china-pakistan-and-fate-cpec (accessed on 27 July 2021). Samina Yasmin ‘Chinese Policy Towards Pakistan (1969–1979)’, Ph.D. dissertation, University of Tasmania, April 1985, p. 44, https://eprints.utas.edu.au/14546/2/Yasm een_part1.pdf (accessed on 27 July 2021). During the 1965 India-Pakistan war, Premier Zhou Enlai visited Karachi and told the Pakistan army to wage a ‘people’s war’. China gave no military assistance. Then, in the 1971 India-Pakistan War, China unleashed yaks on the borders with India. At the UNSC, it opposed Bangladesh’s formation and exercised a veto on the issue of the return of Pakistani prisoners-of-war (POWs). During the Kargil conflict in 1999, the Chinese were seen at Skardu but in the role of training the Pakistan Air Force (PAF) rather than being directly involved in the fighting. Finally, it is worth noting that China never took the Kashmir issue to the UNSC except in 2019–20 after India abrogated Article 370 of its Constitution relating to Jammu and Kashmir’s autonomy. China had protested the Indian decision. Among the other ways in which Beijing has supported Islamabad recently are: the quality and content of Chinese arms transfer to Pakistan (four F-22P frigates, the light submarine programme with the Pakistani navy, JF-17 aircraft, missile tracking devices, and AWACS); the ‘grandfathering’ of the Chashma nuclear plants; support to Pakistan in the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) for a ‘clean waiver’; raising the Kashmir issue thrice at the UNSC; deploying 36,000 ‘security guards’ in Pakistan-occupied Kashmir (POK) and other disputed areas; submarine visits to Karachi (and Colombo) in 2015; and defending Pakistan in the 1267 committee of the UNSC on the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) on the funding of terrorism. George J. Gilboy and Eric Heginbotham, ‘Double Trouble: A Realist View of Chinese and Indian Power’, Washington Quarterly, Summer 2013, 36 (3): 125–142, https://csis-websiteprod.s3.amazonaws.com/s3fs-public/legacy_files/files/publication/TWQ_13Summer_ Gilboy-Heginbotham.pdf (accessed on 27 July 2021). Tanvi Madan, Fateful Triangle: How China Shaped U.S.-India Relations During the Cold War, Washington, DC: Brookings Institution, 2020. On these two Indian statements, see Ananth Krishnan, ‘China Hails India’s Commitment’, The Hindu, 30 March 2012, https://www.thehindu.com/news/international/ china-hails-indias-commitment/article3262399.ece (accessed on 27 July 2021), and Narendra Modi, ‘Prime Minister’s Keynote Address at Shangri La Dialogue’, Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India, 1 June 2018, https://www.mea.gov.in/Speeches-Sta tements.htm?dtl/29943/Prime+Ministers+Keynote+Address+at+Shangri+La+Dialogue+ June+01+2018 (accessed on 27 July 2021). In March 2009, in the USS Impeccable incident, China’s naval vessels came perilous close to the US naval vessel. There were more such incidents involving US naval vessels, such as the Bowditch, Bruce C. Heezen, Victorious, Effective, John McDonnell, Mary Sears, Loyal and others. See Clarence J. Bouchat, Dangerous Ground: The Spratly Islands and U.S. Interests and Approaches. Carlisle Barracks, PA: US Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute, 2013. The India-US joint statement had stated that ‘Regional prosperity depends on security. We affirm the importance of safeguarding maritime security and ensuring freedom of navigation and over flight throughout the region, especially in the South China Sea’. See Office of the Press Secretary, The White House, ‘U.S.-India Joint Strategic Vision for the Asia-Pacific and Indian Ocean Region’, Obama White House Archives, 25 January 2015, https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/2015/01/25/us-india-join t-strategic-vision-asia-pacific-and-indian-ocean-region (accessed on 27 July 2021).

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33 Rahul Singh, ‘India No Match for China: Navy Chief’, The Hindustan Times, 11 August 2009, https://www.hindustantimes.com/india/india-no-match-for-china-navychief/story-OYkJQjfLtOR9rOjmrECJ4H.html (accessed on 27 July 2021). 34 C. Raja Mohan, Samudra Manthan: Sino-Indian Rivalry in the Indo-Pacific, Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2012, and David Brewster (ed.), India and China at Sea: Competition for Naval Dominance in the Indian Ocean, New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 2018.

Beyond Realism

11 INDIA AND THE UNITED STATES Clashing Interests and Geopolitics Jon Dorschner

It has long been commonly accepted that realism is the dominant theory underlying International Relations (IR). This has been the case since IR first emerged as a formal discipline in the 19th century and is unlikely to change for the foreseeable future. Realist proponents assert that while liberalism and other competing theories have emerged, and new theories continue to be put forth, realism will continue its dominance, because it is an all-encompassing world view that provides the best roadmap for policy makers on how to manage the international system. Realists make this assertion because they believe in the pre-eminence of the nation state, the dynamics of power and the overwhelming force of national interest. They cast these factors as perennials that will continue to dominate the international system in perpetuity. If this is indeed the case, an examination of the India-US bilateral relationship should fit neatly within this paradigm. We would observe a relationship dominated by power and national interest, in which both states attempt to maximize their selfinterest, cooperating when necessary and clashing when there is no mutual agreement on the inherent self-interest of a proposed policy. We will test the proposition to determine whether this bilateral relationship fits neatly within the realist paradigm. To cast doubt on the realist proposition, the data would have to indicate that, over the course of their relationship, both countries have at times pursued policy options not in their inherent national interest and have not taken advantage of opportunities to cooperate to pursue mutually beneficial policies. If this proves to be the case, we would have to provide variables to explain what realists dismiss as irrational behaviour. In this work I will focus primarily on US policy, leaving a systematic analysis of Indian behaviour and motivation to my Indian colleagues. Systematic analysis and the application of differing variables can substantiate or refute the premise that the US has pursued a realist foreign policy in its relations with India. The same DOI: 10.4324/9781003093343-11

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approach can be used to analyze India’s management of its bilateral relationship with the United States. Such analysis should confirm whether realism possesses sufficient explanatory power to explain the Indo-US relationship. I would contend that exclusive devotion to a narrow interpretation of realism is no longer sufficient. While realism retains much of its power, the overwhelming complexity of the 21st century world now requires the analyst to venture outside the confines of strict realism and examine elements that ardent realists have long dismissed as irrelevant. For example, realists argue that nation-states are sovereign and that therefore domestic affairs are of no concern when formulating a bilateral relationship. However, an examination of US foreign policy since the end of the Second World War and its resulting ascension to world power status reveals several elements unique to the US that have prevented it from pursuing a purely realist policy towards India. These include the unique structure of the American political system, culture and history. A failure of Indian policy makers to appreciate these unique elements would prevent them from fully comprehending what drives American policy. Likewise, American policymakers have often ignored these nonrealist elements, thereby deluding themselves into believing they are pursuing a realist policy, when their policies work against American national interests. Objective analysts agree that the Indo-US relationship has been and continues to be characterized by clashing interests, and it has been mishandled by policymakers in both countries. I would contend that this complex relationship can be best analyzed and understood by introducing previously dismissed elements, most particularly domestic political and cultural variables.

The Tenets of Realism and the Influence of Domestic Politics The basic tenets of realism are well-defined. The nation state is the relevant unit in International Relations, and ‘the distinguishing feature of the state is sovereignty… Sovereign states are sovereign because no higher body has the right to issue orders to them’. Likewise, ‘the relationship between states is one of anarchy’, meaning ‘the absence of a formal system of government’. The anarchic international system leaves each sovereign state on its own, in a self-help system characterized by competition, in which ‘security is the overriding concern of states’. Realists contend that because of the system’s anarchic nature, force and compulsion must play a strong role and that diplomats are the seasoned professionals best qualified to manage formal relationships between states. Classical realists believe that since interstate relations are the provenance of professional diplomats, there is no serious role for non-diplomatic bodies and persons in the formulation and execution of foreign policy. In their view, ‘activities that take place across state boundaries, economic, social, cultural and so on, are equally secondary to the diplomatic-strategic relations of states’.1 IR is not a static field of study. Because it must contend with a dynamic and rapidly changing world, it must constantly review and reinvigorate its basic premises. As a result, new theories are constantly proposed and applied. Even within realism itself, new schools of thought have emerged. Classical realism is no longer

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sufficient to address the dynamic and ever-changing international system because it fails to take important factors into account. The world has seen so much rapid and intensive change that the current international system would not be recognizable to those who devised realism in the 19th century. This rapid change has rendered obsolete some long-held realist conclusions about the world and how it functions. For example, realists strongly contend that national boundaries are inviolate, rendering what goes on inside those boundaries as irrelevant to the formulation of foreign policy. The analyst should therefore disregard ‘irrelevant’ data concerning what goes on within the boundaries of the ‘black box’, (the sovereign territory encompassed within the national borders of a sovereign state). By this formulation, cultural variables should be dismissed. I will in the next section analyze two contending cultural viewpoints that dominated the Narendra Modi and Donald Trump administrations and played a key role in the bilateral relationship during the Trump era. The analysis demonstrates how cultural variables prevented India and the US from constructing a closer bilateral relationship, even when the relationship was clearly within the national interests of both states. Realist orthodoxy asserts that countries with mutual national interests will cooperate but does not provide the variables that would explain why two states fail to cooperate, even when it is in their mutual national interest to do so. My analysis examines two contending book publications representing the ideological underpinnings and cultural make-up of key constituencies of India’s ruling Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) and former President Trump’s Republican Party. In 1927, American author Katherine Mayo, published a book titled Mother India,2 ‘a polemical attack against Indian self-rule’.3 Mayo’s work was ‘a strong indictment of the demands for Indian self-rule and an argument in favor of continued British rule over India’.4 Mayo asserted that India then occupied a spot at the bottom of world civilizations because Hinduism was the religion of a large majority of its population. She further contended that India would remain in that unenviable position as long as Hinduism retained this position. In the 2016 US presidential election, 81 percent of American voters who defined themselves as Christian Evangelicals voted for Donald Trump.5 Trump relied on Christian Evangelical support to not only win the election but also ensure his continued dominance of the Republican Party. Mother India had an enormous impact on US Christian Evangelicals’ perceptions of India and that influence has survived into the present day. Both Trump’s Vice President and Secretary of State were outspoken Evangelical Christians. The New York Times relates that ‘Secretary of State Mike Pompeo has linked Christian beliefs with foreign policy’, and ‘[t]hat has increasingly raised questions about the extent to which evangelical beliefs are influencing American diplomacy’.6 Arun Shourie, Minister of Communications and Information Technology (1998–2004) in the government of BJP Prime Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee, published a book in 2000 entitled, Harvesting Our Souls: Missionaries, Their Design, Their Claims.7 Shourie’s work was a Hindu nationalist response to modern-day missionaries following in the footsteps of Mayo, who he contended were pursuing

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a devious and diabolical agenda based on their assumption of cultural and religious superiority. In the book, he argued that evangelical Christianity, by definition, is inherently antithetical to India and its culture. Shourie and Mayo are flip sides of the same coin. Just as Mayo found nothing good to say about Hinduism, Shourie found nothing positive to say about Christianity. Indian Prime Minister Modi shares Shourie’s hostility against Christianity and Christian Evangelicals. These important cultural data regarding the religious attitudes of present-day Republicans and BJP members are important, but would have been dismissed or overlooked by classical realists. Although the Trump and Modi administrations repeatedly stated their determination to pursue closer Indo-US ties and work together to pursue mutually beneficial agendas, deeply embedded cultural and religious factors stood in the way. The Christian Evangelical agenda embraced by the US Republican Party clashed headlong with the Hindu nationalism of the BJP. As a result, members of both governments looked at each other with suspicion and cultivated deeply ingrained negative views of the other.

Applying the Realist Paradigm I have put forth the thesis that the realist paradigm, in and of itself, does not possess sufficient analytical power to provide a cogent, applicable, analysis of the Indo-US relationship. One way to test this thesis is to apply the realist paradigm to the relationship to construct a snapshot of how it would look if both countries stuck to realist principles. If American policymakers practised classical realism, they would have viewed the newly independent India as an agrarian state, lacking in manufacturing, and a weak military power. In 1947, the British colony of India had recently been divided into two independent states, an Islamic republic, Pakistan, which advertised itself as the homeland of India’s Muslim minority, and the secular republic, India, which was a multiethnic, multireligious state.8 In the realist view, this division further weakened an already weak national entity, especially since the bloody partition process left India and Pakistan locked in seemingly perpetual conflict. Realists would have first and foremost asked, ‘what are American interests in this region?’ ‘How can a US-India bilateral relationship benefit the United States?’ Their principal concern would have been the power ranking of the new Indian state. Realists rely on two principal factors, economic capacity and military might, to measure the relative power of nation states and how they are likely therefore to behave towards each other. They would have applied these measures to ascertain where India stood. They would have then used these measures to determine whether this new state posed a threat to the US, was within the American sphere of influence and whether India and the US had overlapping national interests that would have provided a basis for cooperation. I would contend that a realist analysis would have convinced American policymakers to pursue a light footprint and not pursue actively close ties to the new nation state. They would have conceded that India was the most powerful

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state in the region and should therefore have been recognized as the regional hegemon. They would have dismissed the conflict with Pakistan as a parochial matter of no concern to the United States. As a former British colony, they would have concluded that India fell within the British sphere of influence. They would have seen little opportunity for the US to increase its power and seek economic benefit in India. They would have determined that as a low-income country, India provided no large market for US exports, had few products or resources needed by the US and did not provide an attractive destination for US investments. Locked into conflict with Pakistan, India was eager to acquire sophisticated weapons. In our scenario, American policymakers would have determined that while such arms sales could provide some benefits to American arms manufacturers, these would be negated by dragging the US into an active conflict in a far-off region in which the US had limited interests. American policymakers would have been well aware of India’s need for investment and foreign assistance, as it sought to rapidly industrialize and combat endemic poverty. American realist policy makers would have been willing to provide such aid only if it were tied to the export of American-made products and provided an incentive for India to open its markets to American exports. As realists, the Americans would not have seen a moral imperative to combat poverty, would not have been concerned about India’s domestic politics and would not have cared whether the Indian government pursued socialism or capitalism as its chosen engine of development. They would have viewed these elements as events occurring ‘inside the black box’ and therefore beyond the purview of US foreign policy. American policymakers would also have objectively determined that the Soviet Union had made the same calculations and come to the same conclusions and therefore likewise had no designs on India. The US-USSR rivalry was the dominant factor in the post-Second World War world, and American realist policymakers would have concluded that India had only a limited impact on that rivalry. This would have been based on their assessment that India did not have the capability to upset the international balance of power and was therefore a low priority. The realist imperative to pursue US national interests would have therefore convinced policy makers to limit US involvement in the region. A realist US would not have pursued an Indo-US alliance, as India did not fall within the US sphere of influence. As India developed its economy and raised its standard of living, the US would have continued to press the Nehru dynasty to open the country to US investment exports. However, this process would be seen as one of ‘give and take’, as American policymakers would not have expected India to accept measures not in the Indian national interest. Instead, the US would have expected a ‘quid pro quo’ arrangement, in which trade and investment agreements provided benefits to both countries. It would only have cooperated with India when its policy makers determined that such cooperation was in the US national interest and when the resulting policies were determined to be mutually beneficial.

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What Actually Happened, 1941 to the Present A large body of literature documents the Indo-US relationship and analyzes its successes and failures. Retired US diplomat Dennis Kux, for example, looked in detail at the relationship from 1941, when India was still a British colony, until 1991. His study characterized the relationship as one between ‘estranged democracies’.9 He assessed that while the two states shared many natural affinities, with a great potential for mutually beneficial cooperation, mutual missteps and misapprehensions prevented the cultivation of close ties. Our examination of what actually transpired confirms that American policymakers did not strictly follow realist dictates, but instead involved the US in South Asian conflicts to the detriment of its national interests. In addition, the US attempted to dictate domestic economic policy to India, involving itself in matters within the ‘black box’ and therefore out of bounds for classical realists. Many of these problems originated in US conduct of the Cold War. From the onset, Americans did not view the conflict in strictly realist terms. Instead of a power conflict between two ‘poles’ in a bipolar world, Americans viewed the Cold War in moral terms, as one between good capitalist democracies and bad communist dictatorships, leading the US to embrace policies often based on emotion rather than cold calculation. One such decision was to extend an anti-Soviet alliance system to the subcontinent, even though there was no evidence of a Soviet threat to the region. The US enlisted Pakistan into this alliance system, provided it with military aid and denigrated India when it embraced ‘non-alignment’. Instead of providing a defence against Soviet aggression, this decision inadvertently involved the US in the Indo-Pakistani conflict, as the Pakistan Army attempted to use American equipment to gain a military advantage against India. In a further rejection of realist principles, the US defined India as a ‘pro-Soviet state’ within the ‘Soviet sphere of influence’ because of its socialist economic system and non-aligned stance. The US then chose to characterize Pakistan as a ‘friendly’ state because of its stated commitment to capitalism and anti-Communist stance. The resulting enmity prevented India and the US from cooperating to address mutual problems. This US decision fell outside realist paradigms because the US did not address its relations with these states in a dispassionate and detached manner, allowing ‘irrelevant’ domestic concerns to affect its foreign policy. Indo-US tensions culminated in the US ‘tilt towards Pakistan’ during the 1971 Bangladesh war. When the people of East Pakistan rose in revolt, initially demanding autonomy and later full independence, the Pakistani military dictatorship unleashed its military to crush the outbreak, committing a wave of human rights abuses in the process that sent a flood of refugees into India, leading directly to India’s 3 December invasion of East Pakistan and the founding of Bangladesh. US UN representative H.W. Bush labelled India the aggressor state responsible for the war in the UN. On 2 December, the US suspended military sales to India. On 6 December, it froze US economic assistance. ‘Believing that Moscow was egging New Delhi on to humble US “ally” Pakistan, the President decided to press the Soviets to get their South Asia “client” to call off its attack’.10 The US inexplicably

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demonstrated its pro-Pakistan stance by dispatching the aircraft carrier USS Enterprise and its task force from East Asia into the Bay of Bengal in what was apparently an attempt to pressure Indira Gandhi’s government. India interpreted this event as American coercion and reacted with outrage. Secretary of State Henry Kissinger, an ardent classical realist, justified this decision by citing his then secret negotiations with the People’s Republic of China to open diplomatic relations. Kissinger asserted that if he had responded to international condemnation by disavowing Pakistan, it would have demonstrated to the Chinese that the US was an unreliable partner. However, the US would not have become involved in this massive human rights imbroglio had it adhered to realist principles and never enlisted Pakistan into a military alliance in the first place. The US made another disastrous misstep in its reaction to the 1979 invasion of Afghanistan. Realists would have dismissed the 1979 invasion as irrelevant to the US, as Afghanistan was a ‘little state’ falling outside the purview of the great powers and incapable of influencing the balance of power between the US and USSR. Realists would have dispassionately weighed the pros and cons and concluded that the USSR invasion was against its national interests and the imposition of a pro-Soviet government there would only drain the USSR of precious resources. The Republican administration of Ronald Reagan that decided to support an anti-Soviet insurgency in Afghanistan purported to view this decision in realist terms, although it was heavily influenced by anti-Communist moralizing and romanticism. The administration concluded that the US could undermine the Soviet Union and drain it of resources by supporting Mujahideen proxies. However, this decision actually ran counter to American interests. Critics contend that the USSR would have collapsed regardless, while the US was immersed in an Afghan quagmire that continues unabated to the present day, resulting in an enormous expenditure of American blood and treasure, with no gains to American interests. Both the Bangladesh and Afghanistan decisions needlessly soured the Indo-US relationship. US dominance over the international system was significantly aided by its absolute victory in two worldwide conflicts, the Second World War and the Cold War. The Second World War left the US as one of two dominant superpowers, with enormous influence over world affairs. It used its dominance to create the post-1945 international system. The US Cold War victory was signified by the demise of the USSR. India was largely cut off from US military aid throughout the Cold War and compelled to increasingly rely on Soviet support. A realist would have critiqued the irrationality of US South Asia policy and would have asked why the US was supporting a ‘small power’ (Pakistan) and alienating the most powerful state in South Asia, the natural regional hegemon? The rapid and mostly unforeseen collapse of the Soviet Union made the US the undisputed world hegemon in a unipolar world. Unable to maintain the status quo without Soviet support, India was forced to abandon many socialist/mercantilist policies and embrace much of the ‘Washington consensus’. American policymakers welcomed this development, spurring widespread speculation in the US that India

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would fully renounce ‘Nehruvian socialism’ and embrace the liberal economic order championed by the US. India scholars Stephen P. Cohen and Teresita C. Schaffer authored two works that capture this key moment in Indo-US relations.11 They reflect the hopes nurtured by scholars and diplomats for decades that these two democracies could finally craft a mutually beneficial relationship that could reach its enormous potential. However, that was not quite how things developed. The end of the Cold War resulted in an American attempt to win a ‘victory bonus’, step back from extensive international commitments and concentrate on domestic concerns and economic developments. As a result, US interest in the South Asian region waned. Cohen points out that the US stance ‘hardened as American differences with India over non-cold war issues came to overshadow India’s declining value as a player in the cold war’.12 No issue proved as contentious as nuclear proliferation. India’s nuclear weapons programme ran headlong into US proliferation concerns. In 1968, India had refused to sign the Non-proliferation Treaty, and it eventually tested a nuclear bomb in 1974. In response, ‘the United States isolated India for twenty-five years, refusing nuclear cooperation and trying to convince other countries to do the same’.13 As Cohen states, when sanctions ‘were applied to what many Indians regarded as a vital national interest—the maintenance of the nuclear option—they proved to be ineffective and even counter-productive….In India’s view, Washington’s recent sanctions-led policy has not only been punitive but is designed to cripple a great state’.14 The US and India conducted intensive negotiations in an effort to resolve this impasse, culminating in the India-US nuclear deal introduced in a joint statement by President George W. Bush and Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh on 18 July 2005 and ratified by the US Congress on 1 October 2008. As a Council on Foreign Relations backgrounder noted, ‘The deal lifts a three-decade U.S. moratorium on nuclear trade with India. It provides U.S. assistance to India’s civilian nuclear energy program and expands U.S.-India cooperation in energy and satellite technology’.15 Deal proponents heralded it as a game changer, but the optimistic assessments of Cohen, Schaffer and other analysts, like so many such predictions in the past, did not fully come to pass. The 2016 ascent of Donald J. Trump to the White House led many to speculate that the Trump Administration could break the logjam in Indo-US relations and craft a relationship based on shared ideology and outlooks. Trump had rebuilt the Republican Party in his own image. His election symbolized the final transformation of the GOP into a right-wing populist party bent on ‘America First’. Observers pointed to a supposed ideological overlap between Trump’s Republican Party and Narendra Modi’s Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP), opining that this could herald a new dawn in the bilateral relationship. While Indo-US cooperation increased during the Trump years, particularly in the military area, the rosier forecasts never came to pass. In the end, the two countries grew closer but failed to construct a ‘soft alliance’. Ironically, the long-term inability of India and the US to forge genuinely close ties was perpetuated by the advent of populism in both countries. Donald Trump in the US and Narendra Modi in India both disparaged the liberal

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internationalism that lies at the heart of the current international system. They instead embraced a ‘blood and soil’ nationalism suspicious of other states, multilateral cooperation and international organizations. This nationalist orientation prevented rosy predictions of ever-closer Indo/US relations from materializing.

The Impact of Covid 19 and US-India Bilateral Relations Covid 19 has proven to be a once in a lifetime, unforeseen challenge to the very foundations of the international system. The virus will affect almost every country on this planet, but some countries more than others. In the fall of 2020, the US and India were at the top of the list for the frequency of covid infections, with the US at number one and India at number two. The US, with only 4 percent of the world’s population, was experiencing 20 percent of the world’s covid virus deaths.16 The pandemic will have an enormous long-term impact on the US-India relationship. This will be most apparent if, as many predict, the US carries out a systematic recovery, while India is left with high infection and death rates into the medium term. The worst-case scenario for India would be a repeat of what happened in the 1918–1919 worldwide flu pandemic. In that outbreak, India experienced the highest death rate in the world, with 18 million persons, or 6 percent of the Indian population dying.17 There are many indicators pointing to a similar result this time. The biggest factor is India’s woefully inadequate medical infrastructure. Due to India’s low per-capita medical spending (currently $61 per year), its medical system is characterized by endemic shortages, which magnify the impact of the covid virus on the Indian population. There are not enough testing kits, essential medical supplies or hospital beds. These shortages are most acute in India’s rural areas, where the medical infrastructure is often non-existent. This leaves many rural Indians with no option but to accept their fate. In addition, widespread air pollution and the prevalence of drug-resistant tuberculosis result in a population highly susceptible to the virus.18 US performance in combatting the pandemic has been dismal, as attested by its extraordinary coronavirus infection and death rates. But much of the misery in the US was the direct result of a failure of leadership at the top rather than any inherent infrastructural shortcomings. Trump’s persistent inability and unwillingness to address the pandemic crippled American efforts. During the contentious 2020 presidential campaign, Trump’s presidential rival, Joe Biden, contrasted his approach to that of Trump, promising to rigorously abide by the advice of public health experts and implement a systematic approach to bring the US into line with other industrial countries, promising that a Biden Administration would bring down US infection rates to match those of other industrialized states. When it comes to per capita medical expenditure the contrast between India and the US could not be starker. While India spends $61 per capita annually, the US spends $8,000. When competent leaders ensure this vast and highly advanced medical infrastructure is effectively utilized, it can be mobilized to address a public health emergency like the pandemic. This enabled the US to quickly develop coronavirus vaccines, and systematically distribute them and inoculate the general population.

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Earlier, we noted that realists believe that the international system is characterized by competition for power between nation states. As a result, realists are concerned with measuring the relative power of competing states. Realists rank-order the world’s nation states, dividing them into three categories: ‘small states’ with so little power that they cannot play an active role in the international system; ‘regional states’ which have sufficient power to dominate within their own region; and ‘super (or great) powers’ with the ability to coerce less powerful states to do their bidding and craft an international system to their own benefit. We saw previously that realists rely on economic and military factors as their principal measures of state power. In the realist view, military and economic power are inter-related, for a country without sufficient economic resources cannot fund a military capable of projecting power. The covid pandemic will impact the economic and military capabilities of both India and the US. However, if the ultimate impact of the virus is far more severe on India than on the US, it will likely result in yet another restructuring of the Indo-US relationship. This will play out in the economic sphere. Covid’s impact on the Indian economy could be devastating. Some economic analysts project that the virus could wipe out four decades of India’s economic growth, returning the Indian economy to its state prior to the restructuring and reform in the 1990s. By this assessment, India could return to anaemic economic growth rates of three or four percent, insufficient to lift many Indians out of poverty, while India’s large population results in high numbers of people living below the poverty line. There are some initial economic indicators pointing to such a potential outcome. Between April and June of 2020, India’s economic output fell by 23.9 percent. This was India’s first year of economic contraction since reforms were initiated in 1996 and among the worst declines in the world. By contrast, the American GDP fell by 9.1 percent during the same period.19 The economic performance of any nation state is related to its political performance. In the 2020 presidential contest, the American electorate replaced Trump as President with Joe Biden and returned a Democratic majority to the US Senate. Leading economists agree that the Biden administration could implement a solid (although slow and measured) economic recovery from the virus-induced recession. This is borne-out by Biden’s performance in the US recovery from the great recession after the 2008 financial crisis. According to Nouriel Roubini, ‘[i]n early 2009, the US unemployment rate surpassed 10%, growth was in free fall, the budget deficit had already exceeded $1.2 tn, and the stock market was down almost 60%. Yet, by the end of Obama’s second term in early 2017, all of those indicators had massively improved’.20 As president, Biden has promised to implement a detailed economic recovery programme aimed at repeating the same recovery from the current recession. Economists, favourably impressed with Biden’s economic approach, predict it will stimulate the US economy and relieve much, if not most of the damage caused by the covid pandemic over the course of his four-year term.21 Unlike Trump who faced massive rejection by voters after a disastrous first term, Modi continues to solidify his hold on political power, with no indication that he will step down or be replaced. With no fresh face to

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introduce new policies, India will retain a BJP-dominated political system which remains tied to economic policies that are not working. These unforeseen corona-induced developments could change the relative positions of India and the US, resulting in a recalibrated relationship. India was on the American radar screen because it was viewed as an ascending power. It was set to break out of its status as a regional hegemon and emerge on the world stage. Should the coronavirus set India back, it could again become a low priority for the US.

Domestic Politics as an Essential Variable We have seen that while US policymakers espouse a realist foreign policy orientation, US policy regarding India has proven to be inconsistent and sometimes incoherent, with decisions made on an ad hoc basis, being driven by events, emotions, and misunderstanding rather than realist policy recommendations. What explains this inconsistency and how can it be corrected? I would argue that an effective foreign policy requires US policy makers to open the Indian ‘black box’ and look within its domestic politics and cultural factors. Indian policy makers would benefit from the same recommendation. The US political system is presidential rather than parliamentary and dominated by two-parties. Unlike the parliamentary system, there is no provision for a ‘vote of confidence’. A head of state cannot be voted out of office by a simple majority vote of Congress but can only be removed by a two-thirds vote in the Senate following a lengthy impeachment process. The American two-party system prevents third parties from gaining congressional representation or playing a serious role in American government. The two main parties, which previously were slightly left-of-centre (the Democratic Party) and slightly right-of-centre (the Republican Party), with considerable overlap between the two groups, allowed for extensive cooperation to address mutual issues. Both parties have since become more extreme. This process was precipitated by the Republicans. While the Democratic Party is moving further to the left, it is largely in response to the Republican Party’s eschewing of moderation and embrace of right-wing extremism. As a result, frustration has increased, as opportunities for cooperation shrink, vastly reducing the ability of Congress to address the pressing issues facing the nation, and public regard for Congress has declined dramatically. It is currently one of the least respected institutions in America. The growing political divide has become ‘tribal’, with the Republican Party a white, rural party, and dominant in the Southern states, while the Democratic Party is multicultural, urban and centred along the East and West coasts and in urban areas in the rest of the country. During the Cold War, the US entangled capitalism with democracy and was unable to separate the two. For many American policymakers, it was impossible to conceive that democratic India could embrace a socialist economic system. They depicted India as a state within the Soviet orbit, with hostile intentions towards the US, thus shutting off areas of cooperation. The same policymakers also conceived

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of the economic relationship in exploitative terms, rather than as a two-way economic relationship benefitting both states. Many American policy makers expected India to accept a subordinate status and subsume its own economic interests to those of the US, serving as a passive market for American exports and investment. US policymakers also have viewed India as an enormous market for military hardware. They market American products as superior to those of any competitor, therefore justifying their high cost. These policymakers want India to concentrate its arms acquisitions on American-produced weapons and equipment. India, by contrast, wants to diversify its markets in hopes of finding quality arms that are not as expensive as those produced by the US. It also hopes to cultivate an indigenous arms production capability. This inherent contradiction has led to mutual frustration. As the US systematically eliminated its racially based immigration policies in the 1960s, it opened up opportunities for talented Indians, who took full advantage of the changing dynamic. Over time, Indian Americans and their Indian relatives grew complacent. They came to believe that Indian citizens had assured access to US higher education institutions and US employment, and they came to view this as a de-facto immigration process. The Trump Administration, driven by the discriminatory views of its base, overturned these assumptions, placing barriers in the path of Indian immigration. This shift angered many within India, providing a serious irritant in the Indo-US relationship and drying up Indian enthusiasm for immigration to the US. Although the Biden administration will quickly attempt to remove Trump-imposed barriers and encourage Indian immigration, India’s previous high immigration rates to the US may never return, as Indians look elsewhere for educational and employment opportunities. The Trump Administration’s inconsistent foreign policy, arising partly out of its domestic preoccupations and the whims of the president, made it difficult for India to pursue cooperation with the US. For example, India and China are regional rivals engaged in intense competition that over the past decade has seen an increasing number of border confrontations between their forces along the two countries’ poorly demarcated border. India sought increased US support to counter China’s hegemonic ambitions. However, while the Trump Administration repeatedly asserted its support for India and promised to serve as a counterweight to China, its approach to Asia undermined these assertions. The US showed little interest in constructing actively a mutual defence arrangement with Asian states to counter possible Chinese aggression, while downplaying existing US alliances with Taiwan, South Korea and Japan. This set off alarm bells in East Asia, with staunch US allies fearful that the US will not come to their aid if they are attacked by China and confirming Indian suspicions that the US is an unreliable partner. The US and India have been locked into an uneasy relationship, with the two countries taking one step forward and two steps back. This dynamic cannot be adequately explained utilizing only a classical realist paradigm. Analysis that takes domestic political and cultural factors into account possesses far more explanatory power than reliance on classical realism.

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Indian policymakers need to understand that the US is trapped in a classic thesis/ antithesis situation. Reactionary forces, represented by the Republican Party, want to halt the rapid pace of change taking place at home and entertain nostalgic visions of a return to a golden past. This runs headlong into a growing and increasingly progressive Democratic Party, that is young, multicultural, multiethnic, secular, and urban. These two ‘tribal’ forces are almost mirror images of each other. The resulting political division is now deeply rooted in the US’s historic, cultural and regional divides. Biden has promised to unite a divided America and return to a more centrist, bipartisan approach in hopes of ending the seemingly endless confrontation and division that has sapped American strength. He has also moved to rejoin the liberal international system that Trump rejected and restore close ties to American partners and allies around the world. The Republican Party is likely to reject Biden’s overtures, continue to pursue a policy of intentional division and adopt a policy of deliberate obstruction while hoping to return to power in 2024. Indian policy makers and opinion leaders can expect the continuation of a disjointed US policy regarding India that mirrors the classic IR divide between theoretical liberals and realists. The Republican Party under Trump locked itself into a jingoistic ideology based on an assumption of innate US superiority. Because of the Trumpian flirtation with white supremacy, his foreign policy was tinged with racial overtones. The Republican Party will continue to cultivate a strong suspicion and even repugnance for developing states with non-white populations. The party’s emphasis on nationalism discourages participation in multilateral organizations, most particularly the United Nations, and results in drastic cuts to foreign aid. Under Trump, it embraced a stark realist amorality, all but ceasing to care about human rights. By contrast, the Democrats will continue to embrace classical liberal concerns. These include: strong support for multilateral institutions, most especially the United Nations, multiculturalism, human rights, anti-racism, and an embrace of diplomacy over military options. This expected 180-degree pivot in the US approach will provide both opportunities and obstacles for both states.

Conclusion The US has a deeply entrenched two-party system, resulting in a ‘yo-yo’ effect. Each change of administration, from Republican to Democrat and vice versa, is accompanied by an almost complete policy reversal. India has developed into a political dynamic similar to that of the US. Like the Republicans under Trump, India’s ruling BJP has embraced right-wing populism, disavowing India’s constitutional basis in secularism, devising policies that discriminate against religious minorities, most particularly Muslims and Christians, increasing authoritarianism, committing widespread human rights abuses, and blatantly using state power and violence to crush opposition groups. The Trump Administration’s almost total lack of concern regarding international human rights abuses provided a solid opening for the Modi government to pursue closer ties. This ideological overlap between the BJP and Republican administrations provided the Modi government with some room to pursue its policies

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without facing US criticism, although the Republican Party’s inherent cultural prejudices made true cooperation inherently difficult. The return of the US administration to Democratic hands will end the respite enjoyed by the BJP. Should the BJP remain in power, the Democrats will express widespread repugnance for its human rights abuses and anti-democratic practices. For example, Vice President Kamala Harris, who is herself of Indian descent, has criticized the Modi government’s Kashmir policies, citing them as a potential hurdle to closer ties.22 The Democrats can also be expected to be highly suspicious of India’s nuclear weapons programme and press for India to address its non-proliferation concerns. It is a political reality that the Democratic Party is more comfortable dealing with the Indian National Congress (INC), as there is considerable overlap in both the demographics and ideology of the two parties. This inherent incompatibility between the BJP and the Democratic Party will likely cool US-India ties as long as the two governments remain in power. There is a growing consensus among American South Asia experts that China’s international behaviour could prove to be the biggest influence on the US-India bilateral relationship. Should Sino-Indian relations deteriorate to the extent that China poses a clear danger to Indian sovereignty, this could compel the Biden Administration to conclude that it has no choice but to provide solid military and economic support to an India under threat. This could occur in an increasingly China-dominated international dynamic in which China is viewed as an increasingly aggressive threat to its neighbours and to democratic states around the globe. The Indian American community is another crucial factor in the US-India relationship. For many years, the community has been largely apolitical, as it focused on economic stability and getting established in the US. With the passage of time, the Indian-American community has found success, becoming the most affluent ethnic group in the country, and has become more involved in American domestic politics, reflecting its status as a high-income community with inherent political interests and the time and money to donate to political causes. The Republican embrace of Trump, and his emphasis on white supremacy and support for Christian evangelicals and their agenda, has alienated this increasingly powerful group. As a result, Indian Americans now overwhelmingly support the Democratic Party: The 2016 post-Election National Asian American Survey (NAAS) found that 77% of Indian Americans voted for Hillary Clinton, and only a mere 16% voted for Donald Trump. Indeed, as polling and voting data has repeatedly demonstrated, Indian Americans have historically favoured the Democratic party…the largest concentrations of Indian-American voters live in heavily Democratic areas like California, Illinois, and the Northeast.23 American politics has become increasingly dominated by money, and groups with money to contribute have the greatest influence. Although they constitute around one percent of the US population, as the wealthiest ethnic group, Indian Americans have political influence far beyond their numbers. This gives them the ear of

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the Democratic Party. It is likely that the Indian American community will take an increasingly active anti-Modi and anti-BJP stance should the BJP remain in power over the longer term.

Policy Recommendations It is a given of foreign affairs that a successful foreign policy is not ad hoc. It must be developed over time and take a long-term view. The application of domestic analysis confirms that the Indian and American political systems make it almost impossible for the US to develop and apply such a cogent policy. Its deep political divides result in a political dynamic that changes dramatically with each change in administrations. This makes it all but impossible for the US to cultivate close ties with India or embark on long-term programmes, as there is too strong a likelihood that these programmes will be stopped dead in their tracks when a new administration comes into power. The requisite political and ideological stability is just not there. This leaves US policy makers with fewer options when crafting the Indo-US relationship. Long-term cooperation is only possible when dealing with the noncontroversial or sufficiently non-ideological problems and issues that can survive a change in administrations. Any talk of converting the current Indo-US relationship into a formal alliance should be ruled out as inherently unrealistic and unattainable. This can only happen if India faces an existential threat, such as a Chinese invasion, that will supersede all other factors. Instead, the US and India should identify areas of cooperation that are short term and attainable within the confines of the current administration. The US’ India policy has long been short-changed by a shortage of South Asia experts within the American government. Prior to Indian independence, the US focused on East Asia, left South Asia to Britain and developed few academic programmes concentrating on the region. The US government could address this problem by identifying promising South Asia scholars while they are still undergraduates and recruiting them actively for a future role in government. It should also rely on the expertise of its trained South Asia experts to overcome cultural/ historic misunderstandings and devise mutually beneficial policies. The US should pursue a relationship based on mutual respect while acknowledging that India is the South Asian regional hegemon, thus removing a longstanding irritant in the bilateral relationship. It should also optimize policymaking by consciously crafting policies that benefit both countries whenever possible. When this is not possible, the US should be willing to compromise, rather than attempting to dictate. This may mean accepting policies that benefit India more than the US. The demonstration of magnanimity would provide bargaining chips for use in future negotiations, as the US would expect India to make similar concessions to American concerns. The US should embrace and fully participate in the crafting of norms that consciously exclude cultural and religious prejudices from policymaking. While this policy recommendation does not fall within the purview of realism, it satisfies a

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principal objective of realism, in that it benefits the US national interest. Further, the US should stick to the realist premise that international borders are inviolate and that countries engaged in a bilateral relationship should refrain from interference in the domestic affairs of the other state whenever possible. This is particularly true when it comes to economics. The United States should not attempt to compel India to mimic the American economic or political system, and it should respect India’s freedom to devise and implement its own economic system and economic policies. The issue of human rights is one overarching exception to the non-interference rule. Classical realism was devised in an era when human rights concerns did not fall within the purview of the international system. The contemporary international system excludes human rights issues from the realist black box. Human rights abuse is universally condemned and is an inherent roadblock to bilateral cooperation. This is not going to change and will become even more consequential over time. American policymakers should fully expect to press human rights issues, even when it makes the bilateral relationship more difficult. The US has been rightfully accused of hypocrisy on human rights, as it has been ever ready to condemn the human rights practices of other countries, while keeping its own human rights practices safely locked up in a realist black box. US policymakers will have to abandon this practice and fully recognize the right of other countries, including India, to criticize US human rights practices.

Notes 1 This succinct synopsis of classic realism is from Chris Brown, Understanding International Relations, London: Red Globe Press, 2019, p. 3. 2 Katherine Mayo, Mother India, New York: Blue Ribbon Books, 1927. 3 Mrinalini Sinha (ed.), Mother India: Selections from the Controversial 1927 Text, New Delhi: Kali for Women Press, 1998, p. 1 4 Sinha, Mother India, p. 3 5 Jessica Martinez and Gregory A. Smith, ‘How the Faithful Voted, A Preliminary 2016 Analysis’, Pew Research Center, 9 November 2016, https://www.pewresearch.org/fact-ta nk/2016/11/09/how-the-faithful-voted-a-preliminary-2016-analysis/ (accessed on 21 July 2021). 6 ‘The Rapture and the Real World: Mike Pompeo Blends Beliefs and Policy’, The New York Times, 30 March 2019, https://www.nytimes.com/2019/03/30/us/politics/pompeochristian-policy.html (accessed on 21 July 2021). 7 Arun Shourie, Harvesting Our Souls: Missionaries, Their Design, Their Claims, New Delhi: ASA Publications, 2000. 8 In the course of decolonization, British India would be divided into the separate states of Pakistan, India, Sri Lanka (then Ceylon), and Myanmar (then Burma). 9 Dennis Kux, India and the United States: Estranged Democracies 1941–1991, Washington, D.C.: National Defense University Press, 1992. 10 Kux, India and the United States, p. 304. 11 Teresita C. Schaffer, India and the United States in the 21st Century: Reinventing Partnership, Washington, D.C.: CSIS Press, 2009, and Stephen P. Cohen, India: Emerging Power, Washington D.C.: Brookings Institution Press, 2001. 12 Cohen, India, p. 278.

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13 Jayshree Bajoria and Esther Pan, ‘The U.S.-India Nuclear Deal’, Council on Foreign Relations, 5 November 2010, https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/us-india-nuclear-deal (accessed on 21 July 2021). 14 Cohen, India, pp. 280–281. 15 Bajoria and Pan, ‘The U.S.-India Nuclear Deal’. 16 Nouriel Roubini, ‘Why Joe Biden is Better than Donald Trump for the US Economy’, The Guardian, 29 September 2020, https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2020/sep/ 29/why-joe-biden-is-better-than-donald-trump-for-the-us-economy (accessed on 21 July 2021). 17 ‘If Covid-19 Takes Hold in India the Toll will be Grim’, The Economist, 21 March 2020, https://www.economist.com/asia/2020/03/21/if-covid-19-takes-hold-in-indiathe-toll-will-be-grim (accessed on 21 July 2021). 18 ‘If Covid-19 Takes Hold in India the Toll will be Grim’. 19 ‘India’s Economy Shrinks by a Quarter as Covid-19 Gathers Pace’, The Economist, 3 September 2020, https://www.economist.com/asia/2020/09/03/indias-economy-shrinks-by-aquarter-as-covid-19-gathers-pace (accessed on 21 July 2021). 20 Roubini, ‘Why Joe Biden is Better than Donald Trump for the US Economy’. 21 ‘Joe Biden Would Not Remake America’s Economy’, The Economist, 3 October 2020, https://www.economist.com/briefing/2020/10/03/joe-biden-would-not-remake-americaseconomy (accessed on 21 July 2021). 22 ‘Biden is Expected to Expand U.S.-India Relations While Stressing Human Rights’, The New York Times, 24 December 2020, https://www.nytimes.com/2020/12/24/world/asia/ biden-india.html (accessed on 21 July 2021). 23 Anu Mandavilli and Raja Swamy, ‘Trump, “Howdy, Modi!” and the Diaspora: Do Indian Americans Support a Hindutva Agenda?’ Economic and Political Weekly, 29 November 2019, https://www.epw.in/engage/article/trump-%E2%80%98howdy-modi%E2%80%99-anddiaspora-do-indian (accessed on 21 July 2021).

12 COSTS TO INDIA, PAKISTAN OF CONFRONTATIONAL POLICIES Regional Challenges and Opportunities* Shuja Nawaz

South Asia has changed dramatically in the past two decades. Yet it remains a flashpoint for conflict. If past trends bear out, the region could continue to become more politically and economically active and influential on the global stage despite its many challenges. However, this is contingent on its leaders providing responsive governance and a clear and consistent economic direction. If that happens, South Asia may be able to surmount over time its persistent security challenges, both within countries and from hostile neighbours. For all South Asian nations, and especially for the rivals India and Pakistan, the key building blocks for relative peace and greater development of their societies are in domestic issues that could provide the glue for concerted regional integration efforts. The challenge for both India and Pakistan will be to balance their internal battles with the need to create a more congenial regional atmosphere that fosters stability and economic growth. Imprisoned by its geography, the South Asia region must learn to live and thrive in its neighbourhood. Otherwise, both countries risk the high opportunity cost of conflict that has bedevilled their relationship since independence in 1947. In response to a suggestion from former US Secretary of State, George Shultz, at Stanford University, Mohan Guruswamy and I jointly examined the opportunity cost of this conflict and estimated it at 1.5 percent of GDP annually.1 This is no small loss given the mounting economic pressures on both countries. The current global pandemic of COVID 19 has magnified that dire situation. A peek at the regional situation over the horizon may be in order. By 2030, South Asia could be poised to play a pivotal role on the regional economic and political scene and as a global player, with India in the lead and Pakistan playing either a major supporting role or a critical spoiler if its polity deteriorates instead of stabilizing and improving. A youthful Afghanistan may well offer a springboard for a new regionalism. And Iran, if it can fully rejoin the global community, may integrate into South Asia’s economy, while playing a key role in the stabilization of Afghanistan and the DOI: 10.4324/9781003093343-12

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neighbourhood. An economically and militarily stronger India may well work out a balanced relationship with arch-rival China, building on trade dependency to either dampen territorial disputes or to confine them to quiet negotiations. The growing arsenal of nuclear weapons in the hands of India and Pakistan and the potential ability to deliver them from sea, land and air platforms as well the emergence of ‘MIRVing’ and tactical weapon capabilities could provide a checkmate situation that might preclude regional conflict. Growing economies and the presence of more involved and affluent urban populations could act as an additional brake on conflict. Yet, there is a discernible lobby in the security establishments of both India and Pakistan that prepares for the dangerous possibility of conventional warfare under a nuclear overhang. Countries would have too much to lose if they stray from the path of socio-economic development. But there is much to cloud the future, including the growing influence of the militaries on civilian decision making and the possibility of declining interest of distant superpowers, like the US and Europe, in South Asia in general and Pakistan in particular. Economic actions and developments in the region and the world will lie at the heart of change in the region in the next two decades. The enormous challenge posed by the COVID 19 pandemic has created a massive hurdle for economic development worldwide, especially so in India and Pakistan. Leading economists have been predicting that the US may well be stuck in the economic hole for some time to come.2 South Asia may well have a longer period of recovery, up to 2030 perhaps, provided the right actions are taken to re-order domestic priorities and recast cross-border relationships. The scary part of looking at the crystal ball for the region is the possibility that the counterfactual to the positive scenario is equally possible, if individual countries continue to fall into the trap of religious, sectarian or economic selfishness and intolerance. Sound economic policies in Pakistan and India could mitigate the corrosive effects of religious ideology on political thinking. The creation of a culture of entitlement, based on preferred access to state resources and lack of transparency and accountability, has undermined the effectiveness of civil and military institutions, especially in Pakistan. Within India, the pervasive and growing reliance on religion-based politics and a veering towards the extreme right-wing Hindu supremacist thinking may erode its position as a home of democracy and a source of stability in the region. Both India and Pakistan have suffered economically from COVID 19. India declined to 4 percent annual growth before heading into negative territory,3 while in 2020 Pakistan hit the negative slope at minus 0.4 percent growth of Gross Domestic Product.4 Job creation, which is the key to creation of economic stability and growth, has also been sliding. India has lost millions of wage earners’ jobs and day-labourers’ jobs. It needed to create 12 to 15 million new jobs a year. Instead, it has been losing jobs: ‘According to the private think tank Centre for Monitoring Indian Economy (CMIE), around 1.89 crore salaried persons were let go since April 2020.’5 Pakistan too needed to add at least a million new jobs a year to stay ahead of the population growth curve. It has been losing jobs instead, with an

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estimated 700,000 jobs lost in 2020 alone.6 Further losses may be expected due to the Covid pandemic. The Pakistan economic survey 2020–2021 estimated the possibility of 1.4 million up to 18.53 million going jobless.7 In the long run, security will stem from economic development and concomitant social and political progress. Overlaying everything will be the state of governance as well as the orderly provision of services and regulation of economic and political activity that is transparent, efficient and effective. Rapid urbanization in South Asia and the increasing introduction of labour-saving technologies pose massive challenges to both business and government. A look at the night-time imagery of the region reflects the urban agglomerations in northern India and its coastline as well as in the Punjab in Pakistan. These conurbations extend cities in a connected network across the map. Essentially, the world’s largest city now extends from Delhi to Islamabad! Five of the world’s megacities are in South Asia, (Karachi, Mumbai, Delhi, Lahore, and Dhaka). Three of these, Karachi, Delhi, and Mumbai, each have populations exceeding 20 million.8 The massive urbanization also produces pollution, creating micro-climatic zones in and around these major cities and adding to the health and other economic costs of their inhabitants. While these megacities often contribute to overall economic growth, they also exacerbate income differences between the rich and the poor that can lead to social unrest. The penetration of new communication technologies, such as the cell phone and the internet, into the cities and countryside, and the interconnectedness of youth across the globe has led to a network of discontent with the status quo. It also facilitates ideological recruitment and sustainment of subversive ideas, as recent events in Syria and Iraq have shown with the self-styled Islamic State enticing youth from South Asia and the South Asian diaspora into its ranks.

Dark Scenarios Emerging politico-economic conflicts in South Asia and its surrounds will play a key role in shaping future events. In the near term, Iran’s rivalry with Saudi Arabia and the Gulf States could lead South Asian states into Shia-Sunni conflict. Labourhosting countries in the Arabian Peninsula could express their displeasure with labour exporting countries’ political stances by returning South Asian workers to their homelands. Returning workers would disrupt the domestic labour markets of the exporting countries that have been unprepared for a reverse flow of their workers. Lack of direct support for Kashmir from the Arabian Peninsula may deepen the rift with Pakistan. If that happens, Pakistan stands to lose some or all of $9 billion annual remittances from its workers in this region if they depart from the Gulf and Saudi Arabia.9 The potential for nuclear proliferation or demands from Saudi Arabia for the Pakistani nuclear umbrella to cover the Arabian Peninsula could also add to regional imbalances. China’s plans to use South Asia and Iran as an economic gateway to the Bay of Bengal and the Arabian Sea will affect its trading relationship with India.

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Massive natural disasters and climatic changes, including a secular shift in the monsoon patterns, could result in the frequent appearance of ‘100-year floods’.10 Deforested mountains and ravines capture and transmit speeding floodwaters that cannot be contained by the dams and barrages on Pakistan’s rivers. Extreme fluctuation of monsoon patterns will lead to uncertainty for South Asian farmers, according to research done at Purdue University. According to Noah Diffenbaugh, ‘Agricultural production, water availability and hydroelectric power generation could be substantially affected by delayed monsoon onset and reduced surface runoff. Alternatively, the model projects increases in precipitation over some areas, including Bangladesh, which could exacerbate seasonal flood risks.’11 Notwithstanding the powerful influence of natural and man-made disasters, overall and in the longer term, domestic issues and actions will likely play the greatest role in determining the future of South Asia as a region and in shaping the path of individual countries. It may be useful to examine both the endogenous and exogenous factors that will mold events and actions in the region.

The Near-term Continuum South Asian societies are not designed for rapid change. Complicated and overlapping caste and religious divisions, language and ethnic barriers, and geography that divides neighbours within countries and one state from another, all help shape the nature and retard the speed of change. Despite these and the huge demographic challenges facing the region, individual countries have shown a remarkable resilience and produced an enviable economic growth record in the past. Pakistan economist Ishrat Husain describes how Pakistan tumbled from its once leading position as a poster child for developing economies to an also-ran.12 World Bank economist Shahid Yusuf indicates that Pakistan maintained a long-term growth rate that only came in second to China’s growth from the late 1970s to the early 2000s, while India maintained a much lower ‘Hindu rate of growth’ hovering around 3 percent.13 India, however, caught up and accelerated past Pakistan in the 1990s and was poised to overtake China’s growth rate in the next decade, if it could maintain its momentum of change and reform in the face of the COVID pandemic. The relative size of India’s economy, however, will likely remain much smaller than China in the next two decades. Meanwhile, Arvind Subramanian, Chief Economic Advisor to the Government of India, opined that India’s natural growth rate was around seven percent per annum, ascribing the drag to rampant rent-seeking in India: In the last few years, the Indian economy has become increasingly afflicted by the curse of rents. There have been terrestrial rents (from the allocation of land), subterranean rents (from the allocation of rights to coal mining and oil and gas exploration) and ethereal rents (from the allocation of spectrum). The curse has not just been the unfair sharing of the rents between the government and private sector at the expense of the consumer. It has really been the

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resulting efficiency cost, whereby corruption has impaired the supply capacity of the economy…The private sector is far from blameless for the surge in rentseeking, but this government [i.e. the UPA government] is its root cause because it decides and controls the allocation of scarce resources.14 If the BJP government can start removing some of these deep-rooted ills from the Indian system, the country could rise to number three behind China and the US on the global economic scale. Will it be capable of doing so? To a large extent, the positive economic trends in South Asia have been not because of governmental actions but despite them. Witness the growth of the informal sector and the underground economies in all South Asian countries in Table 12.1. These data may not capture the informal sector services and small-scale manufacturing that reside outside the orbit of the tax authorities plus the flow of direct remittances via the private hundi or hawala system of transfers from overseas workers. Pakistan’s official remittances, currently in the $20–24 billion per year range15, which are credited with keeping the country afloat, may be matched by an equal amount of private and unofficial transfers. But the sudden surge in remittances after the emergence of COVID 19 may be a blip, sparked by the removal of hundi and hawala following the pandemic travel restrictions and the return of workers whose jobs have been eliminated. In India, flight capital is often parked in Mauritius and Singapore ‘through a process known as round tripping’.16 Rough estimates of the black economy in Pakistan put it in the range of 30–50 percent of the formal documented economy but these figures do not capture the extent of the illegal transactions, such as drug related activities, that would normally not be captured by official data. India and the other South Asian countries face similar challenges on the extent of illegal transactions. None of these shares or trends is likely to change dramatically in the next decade, unless government regulations and controls become more transparent and

TABLE 12.1 The Size of the Shadow Economy in South Asian Countries (as percentage of

official GDP) No.

Country

1999/00

2001/02

2002/03

1 2 3 4 5 6

Bangladesh Bhutan India Nepal Pakistan Sri Lanka

35.6 29.4 23.1 38.4 36.8 44.6

36.5 30.5 24.2 39.7 37.9 45.9

37.7 31.7 25.6 40.8 38.7 47.2

Source: Based on data compiled from Friedrich Schneider, ‘Shadow Economies and Corruption All Over the World: What Do We Really Know?’ IZA Discussion Paper No. 2315, September 2006, pp. 52–54, http://ftp.iza.org/dp2315.pdf (accessed on 29 June 2021).

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less onerous, bureaucratic inefficiencies are removed and political rent-seeking is replaced by less obtrusive governmental participation in the economy.

Centrifugal Forces Domestically, all the countries of the region suffer from vast inequalities in terms of their component provinces, states or regions. Both democratic and autocratic governments have favoured a centralized command structure despite attempts at freeing market forces to open up their economies. Local government is treated more as an afterthought than a critical foundation for a burgeoning democratic system that could foster an open economy. India is now seeing signs of a slippage of power from Delhi to the states of the Union. Different regional political forces, in the south and the east especially, are testing the federal structure and intruding even into the exercise of foreign policy by the central government. The Bengal government, for instance, managed to torpedo a near certain agreement with Bangladesh on the sharing of waters passing through the Farakka Barrage. Similarly, the issue of Bangladeshi economic refugees continues to bedevil relations with that country. States in the south are critical to India’s Sri Lanka policy, and a change of government in Colombo may allow a greater integration of the economies of those states with Sri Lanka. On the western border, the natural economic alignment of the two Punjabs in India and Pakistan appeared to be getting some traction before the revocation of Article 370 on Jammu and Kashmir’s autonomy in India led to the sealing of that border. A common language as well as cultural and historical ties will help lay the basis for cross-border movement and some first steps at joint investments between Pakistan’s Punjab and Sindh and the contiguous Indian states. Meanwhile, in Pakistan’s western border region, the potential for economic interaction with Afghanistan remains more a hope than a reality. Decades of distrust and the underlying Indo-Pakistani rivalry inside Afghanistan will stand in the way of better integration despite the aspirations of the new Afghan leadership to make the country into a regional trade hub and a revived terminus of the Grand Trunk Road that links Kabul to Dhaka. Connectivity through Afghanistan could easily outdo the positive effects of Silk Road initiatives that are on everyone’s lips these days. The best that can be hoped in keeping the centre meaningfully tied to its periphery would be to work with regional political parties in crafting links with potential economic partners across international borders. For Pakistan, this means Afghanistan and Iran in the west and China in the north. For India, this would mean opening up trade routes and travel points into Pakistani Punjab and Sindh, facilitating the formation of regional markets in the south to include Sri Lanka and in the east to include Bangladesh and Myanmar. Much will depend on the availability of visas. In the past, India and Pakistan have raised security-related concerns about visa-free travel. A new push by the Asian Development Bank to expand visa-free travel appears to be gaining some traction. But Indian and Pakistani bureaucracies and security services will likely continue to drag their feet.

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The few-and-far between efforts to discuss regional trade tend to rely on support for major business deals whereas a critical element of both the Indian and Pakistani economies is the middle class and medium and small-scale enterprises. In thinking of expanding Indo-Pakistani trade relations, the authorities need to understand that middle-class entrepreneurs can create cross-border relationships more successfully. As one major Indian industrialist in Mumbai told me, ‘Delhi needs to get out of the way, for we can understand Islamabad much better than them.’ This is the reason the momentum for regional trade and travel needs to come from the middle classes. A major obstacle to this remains the strong perception that the military would not allow the Indo-Pakistani hostility to die down since it might diminish its role within Pakistan. This hypothesis and the accompanying view that the military has monolithic and self-serving thinking on the subject needs to be challenged against the advantages to Pakistan as a whole.

Balkanization? The counterfactual to the current imbalance of power inside countries involves the strengthening of the centre’s ties to the periphery in the region. Pakistan appears the most vulnerable to splintering, with Balochistan becoming even more restive. The continued availability of support networks in Afghanistan for Baloch nationalists and reported Indian assistance as a response to Pakistan’s fomenting of trouble in Indian-held Kashmir remains a threat, unless greater economic and political integration is fostered by the centre.17 The creation of new provinces and an internally balanced administrative system in Pakistan may forestall some of these moves, especially the treatment, as an independent entity, of the 25 million-strong population of Karachi who are presently governed by largely feudal Sind. The best scenario for the next five to ten years is the emergence of a true confederation as envisaged in the original call for Pakistan. India represents another conglomeration of virtual nation-states that have benefited from being together rather than separating into its component parts. The constitutional glue that has held India together since 1947 will be tested by its arbitrary actions in Kashmir, as a new generation of globally connected and aware Kashmiri youth enters the political arena and carves out an independent space for itself, free of direction and control from either Delhi or Islamabad. Pakistan has failed to allow its part of Kashmir to operate fully autonomously within the federation and has already sloughed off the Northern Areas of Gilgit-Baltistan, in the face of strong Indian protests. Delhi too will have to work more broadly to remove the bureaucratic impediments to autonomous economic decision-making by the states of the Union. But its actions in Kashmir undercut its democratic aspirations.

Centripetal Forces The greatest recent change in the region with regard to centre-periphery relations has occurred in Pakistan. The 18th Amendment of the constitution altered the fiscal

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and financial ties between the centre and the provinces. Concurrently, the National Finance Commission Award gave the relatively poor states a larger share of federal revenues. While politically this is a beneficial move that will tie the province together, it also raises the spectre of unfettered provincial spending and revenue generation from unpaid loans that could well become liabilities for the centre. External threats, to Pakistan from India and to India from China, may help hold the unions together. And as growth resumes in the region, the larger economic pie could generate a larger share for the constituent units. But external largesse might also help. Pakistan looks to reap some benefits from the emergence of the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) that will start bearing fruit in the next decade by creating jobs in the construction sector and by alleviating the energy shortages that have held back the economy in the past decade or so. It remains to be seen if China brings its own labour to speedily complete the jobs or relies on Pakistani labour to build and maintain the projects. Another possible impediment might be the speed with which Pakistan can muster counterpart funding for these projects. Initial reports indicate that the development budget will be cannibalized to give priority to the CPEC effort. Much of the $46 billion investment promised by China over the next fifteen years is in the energy and infrastructure sectors, with energy taking the lion’s-share at nearly $34 billion.18 If the government can deftly manage the initial investment in the pathway from China to Gwadar on the Arabian Sea, by not tilting the investment toward the Punjab-centric highway, this could help knit the provinces together. A securitization of CPEC and protection of the infrastructure and cordoning of Gwadar may tend to isolate the benefits of CPEC from the inhabitants of the rest of Balochistan. It would behove the Pakistani government to begin urgent work on the Baloch segment of the CPEC routes first, mandating the use of local labour and bringing the tribal populations into ownership. All indications, however, are that this is not the preferred option. If the use of Chinese labour and military construction units persists, it will be a huge missed opportunity with negative political and economic implications for Pakistan, given the strategic location of Balochistan across three countries of the region: Iran, Pakistan and Afghanistan. Surprisingly, India’s rival, China, is also willing to help knit together India’s disparate and distant regions into an infrastructural whole. In 2014, China promised to invest $20 billion in India’s infrastructure over a period of five years. Under the investment proposal, China would help upgrade India’s ageing railway system with high-speed links, in addition to setting up other manufacturing and infrastructure projects.19 According to McKinsey, ‘India’s logistic infrastructure is insufficient, illequipped and ill-designed to support the expected growth rates of 7 to 8 percent over the next decade.’20 The constraints will remain India’s sclerotic bureaucracy and inter-state rivalries over revenue sharing as well as the emergence of regional political satraps who will want to challenge the emerging power of the Modi government in Delhi.

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Challenge of Urbanization One of the largest and most dramatic social transformations taking place in the world today is the rapid urbanization in large parts of Asia and Africa. According to a report in Deutsche Welle (DW) in 2010, ‘The South Asian megacities of Karachi, Delhi or Dhaka are the fastest-growing conurbations in the world. This rapidly increasing urbanization poses more and more risks to people and society…Clearly, one of the biggest problems of the megacities are the ever-growing slums. It is estimated that Karachi’s Orangi Town is currently the largest slum in South Asia, leaving the Dharavi slum in Mumbai behind. All over South Asia, the slum dwellers receive very little or no support from the government for their welfare.’21 A World Economic Forum report warns of the growing roster of mega cities in India, for example. A megacity, according to the UN definition, is an urban area with a population of 10 million people (the numbers include ‘urban sprawl’ and ‘populations beyond official city limits’). Based on these criteria, India has five megacities in population terms–New Delhi (26.5 million), Mumbai (26.4 million), Kolkata (15 million), Bengaluru (10.5 million), and Chennai (10.2 million). Drawn by the prospects of jobs, financial security and children’s education, migrants are flooding into Hyderabad and Ahmedabad and will turn those into megacities by 2030 as well.22 The other nations in South Asia have experienced less explosive growth, but urban centres like Dhaka, Kathmandu, Karachi, and Colombo are now at the heart of very large conurbations too. Most of this recent growth has taken place in urban centres and new towns that long ago outgrew their colonial or even older historical grids. The city as we know it, and most of our assumptions of what constitutes and drives urban life, may have to be revised and rethought in the 21st century. Cities provide the safety valve for burgeoning rural populations that face economic hardships and resort to internal migration to eke out a subsistence living initially while establishing a foothold in urban and peri-urban economies. The implications of rapid urbanization are many and furiously accelerating, posing a huge challenge for the authorities and the established political and economic order. But the powers that be do not wish to confront this reality, partly to help preserve the political status quo. According to Nadeem ul Haque, former deputy chairman of the Pakistan Planning Commission, and others, the country is already close to 65 percent urban, based on UN definitions of a town as any place with a population above 10,000. Redrawn political boundaries would shift power from the traditional feudal countryside to the cities and dramatically alter the political balance. In mega-cities like Karachi, for instance, the infusion of large numbers from the hinterland has changed the political landscape. Karachi is now the world’s largest Pakhtun city with an estimated five million Pakhtuns. The demand for services by growing numbers of city dwellers creates new political tensions for the authorities and between different ethnic and sectarian groups. The result is often violence at an unprecedented scale. Pakistan is a striking example of these negative developments. Population profiles are also changing in

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the region, with the median age creeping up steadily. By 2030, all South Asian countries will have a higher median age and hence a larger segment of the older population. Without jobs for the rising number of youth, displaced by technology on the one hand and lack of economic opportunities due to poor governmental policies, the situation may become highly volatile. Another McKinsey study looks at the strong possibility of an undersupply of educated and trained workers and an oversupply of untrained low-skill labour, especially in developing regions like South Asia: ‘in 2020 the global labor supply could have 40 million too few workers with tertiary education and 90 million to 95 million too many medium- and low-skill workers’.23 India and the ‘young developing’ economies could have ‘45 million too few workers with secondary school education’ or 15 percent of the demand for such workers.24 Most of the additions to the global labour force will occur in India and the ‘young developing’ economies of Africa and South Asia. Aging will likely add 360 million older people to the world’s pool of those not participating in the labour force, including 38 million college-educated workers, whose skills will already be in short supply.25 Cities, if properly planned and managed, using a vertical approach rather than the colonial sprawl method, could provide a springboard for innovation and more efficient use of manpower and technology to bolster development efforts. This could transform South Asia’s businesses from inefficient entities to more productive ones. The challenge for government will be to provide the right regulatory and infrastructural environment. Current trends are not very hopeful. South Asia fares badly on the global index for ‘ease of doing business’ developed by the World Bank. Afghanistan ranks 183rd, Bangladesh 173rd, India 142nd, and Pakistan 128th. Above them are Bhutan 125th, Maldives 116th, Nepal 108th, and Sri Lanka 99th. These rankings clearly indicate that the region has a long way to go to provide a business-friendly environment.26 Despite the avowed policies of governments in India, Pakistan and Sri Lanka to foster the growth of an efficient business sector, early indications are that South Asia will continue to lag behind the rest of the world in both the near- and the longer-term. Complicating the challenge is the well-established fact that South Asia is the least commercially integrated region of the world but one with a potential to become a major economic powerhouse if it could only open its borders to people and trade. Regional trade in South Asia accounted for only some 6 percent of all its trade in 2019, according to the UN Comtrade database.27 This compares with more than 15 percent in Western Asia and North Africa and over 17 percent in Sub-Saharan Africa.28 Intra-regional foreign direct investment in South Asia is also abysmally low. An IMF Coordinated Direct Investment Survey in 2011 barely registered 1 percent of regional FDI in the share of total outgoing FDI from South Asian countries29, compared with 5 percent for Western Asia and North Africa and around 18 percent for Sub-Saharan Africa.30 Overall, the World Bank calculates that the region received some 20.9 percent of global remittances, amounting to some $147 billion.31

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Security Concerns and the Rise of the Middle Class Security concerns and long-lasting territorial and natural resource issues (for example, sharing of water across borders) add to the difficulties of intra-regional trade. Opening borders would enhance the natural complementarities that exist among countries in South Asia and create co-dependencies. Enhanced trade would benefit consumers but is constrained largely due to man-made barriers that will require far-sighted political leadership to surmount. And sharing of water resources and cooperation across borders to deal with climatic changes and to stem environmental degradation that has no respect for manmade boundaries also is held hostage by politics. Despite the relatively strong political position of the prime ministers of the two leading protagonists, India and Pakistan, there does not appear to be much movement to reaching practicable agreements. High tariffs and non-tariff barriers persist. As mentioned at the outset, the opportunity cost of conflict in the region remains high. The near-term prospects seem bleak, as leaders are caught up in domestic squabbles and internal security challenges. Added to these problems are sectarian and ethnic conflicts and the lack of protection of minorities and of human rights in general in all South Asian countries. If their growing urban and middle-class populations become politically aware and active over the next decade or so, they may precipitate a change in political behaviour. The rising share of the middle class, especially in India and Pakistan may become a game changer for their internal and external politics and hence economics. According to the Asian Development Bank, some 32.94 percent of Pakistan’s population falls into the middle-class category, while India’s share is 20.45 percent. Both have increased the share of the middle class over the period 1990–2008 by 36.5 percent and 12.8 percent, respectively.32 These trends are likely to continue. Though most of the middle class belong to the relatively lower-income brackets within that grouping, collectively they represent a growing and potentially important economic and political entity. As this growing class becomes more educated and politically active it may produce checks and balances on traditionally heavy-handed governments and challenge also the hegemony of the security establishments.

Leading Edge of Change: Governance Strong and consistent governance will be the key to altering the South Asian landscape. Ceding fiscal and management authorities to local communities, creating a more balanced regional and sub-regional set of administrative structures (read new provinces in Pakistan and even India) and greater transparency in the use of domestic and foreign resources will be critical if South Asia is to prosper and grow in the next two decades. Domestic investment will be key to move South Asian economies to a higher plane. Pakistan, for example, needs to double its foreign exchange reserves, domestic investment and foreign direct investment in the next five years to transform its economic system. All this is doable, if there is the political will, in both India and Pakistan.

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Unfortunately, the dynastic and spoils-based system of political parties throughout the region remains a major hindrance to change, forcing the best and brightest of South Asians to exit their own countries and head to developed countries to create new opportunities for themselves. Pakistan’s leading political parties are all nondemocratic in their internal structure and management. Power resides in the hands of a few families. In India, as noted by Professor Kanchan Chandra of New York University, there was a fall in the number of dynastic members of parliament after the May 2014 election. But their numbers are still high. According to a BBC report, based on the work of Chandra, ‘most parties, including the ruling BJP, are favourable to dynastic politicians: 15% of the BJP’s MPs and 26% of its cabinet are dynastic, and a number of its chief ministers have had their family members follow them in political positions.’33 The resultant system of decision-making is whimsical and prompted more by personal gain than the public good. Kitchen cabinets undermine the process of elections and systems of government. The persistence of antique bureaucratic systems adds to the ballast holding back change. Good government is the best antidote to the creeping menace of religious extremism, signs of which have begun appearing in all South Asian countries. Security remains a looming concern. For that, the current sequencing of first security and then economic development needs to be reversed. Expanding economic opportunities can help trigger and sustain changes in social systems. If these developments were accompanied by better governance and devolution of fiscal authority to local levels, security would become the business of the populace and not just the state alone. The command economy approach has not worked well in South Asia. Its leaders need to trust the inherent capacity of their people to work hard and to innovate, as they do when they resettle in the developed world or the Middle East. If this happens, South Asia could create the world’s largest contiguous market and a source of jobs not just for itself but also for the developed world with which the region now has burgeoning economic, trade and investment ties. Yet all this could be jeopardized if the region suffers a single massive natural disaster, such as a series of earthquakes that extend along the Himalaya and affect Bangladesh, India, Nepal, and Pakistan all at once. Damming of rivers with landslides, flooding and the displacement of populations would test the ability of governments to provide relief. Similarly, an accompanying or separate disaster from the sea, like the tsunami of 2004, could affect India and Bangladesh adversely. Climatic change poses an ever-present danger, especially if it fortifies emerging trends of a change in the direction and latitude of the monsoon. South Asia must be better prepared for altering its water management practices if it is to overcome such changes. The bigger fear remains man-made disasters: poor governance and corruption that would lead to the inability of governments to provide jobs or to create market conditions on a regional basis that would allow all countries of South Asia to thrive. Internal security will continue to be a drag on political and economic decision making, as simmering unrest in India and Pakistan and regional tensions in Sri Lanka continue, despite a heavy military presence and operations. The contagion of jihadi ideology, assisted by speedy web-based transmission

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mechanisms, will add an extra layer of uncertainty. Protected economies operating at sub-optimal levels may lead South Asia to miss the opportunity to make the region the fulcrum of the global economy by 2030. Pakistan can stay ahead of the curve and help transform itself as well as the region around it. Will its civil-military misalliance allow it to make the right choices? Will India do so too by escaping the short-term lure of single party dominance based on right-wing Hinduism? The future remains clouded unless rationalism forces behavioural change in the region as a whole.

Notes * This chapter is based on research conducted for my new book The Battle for Pakistan: The Bitter US Friendship and a Tough Neighbourhood (Penguin Random House, 2019, Liberty Books, Pakistan 2019, and Rowman and Littlefield, USA 2020). 1 Shuja Nawaz and Mohan Guruswamy, ‘India and Pakistan: The Opportunity Cost of Conflict’, Atlantic Council South Asia Center, 24 April 2014, https://ciaotest.cc.columbia. edu/wps/atlanticco/0031830/f_0031830_25839.pdf (accessed on 19 June 2021). 2 Nouriel Roubini, ‘The Coming Greater Depression of the 2020s’, Project Syndicate, 28 April 2020, https://www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/greater-depression-covid19headwinds-by-nouriel-roubini-2020-04?barrier=accesspaylog (accessed on 19 June 2021). 3 India’s GDP growth was 4 percent in 2019–2020 and dropped to -7.3 percent in 2020–2021. Ministry of Statistics & Programme Implementation, ‘Provisional Estimates of Annual National Income, 2020–21 and Quarterly Estimates (Q4) of Gross Domestic Product, 2020–21’, Press Information Bureau, 31 May 2021, https://pib.gov. in/PressReleasePage.aspx?PRID=1723153 (accessed on 19 June 2021). 4 Erum Zaidi, ‘Pakistan Saw Negative Economic Growth First Time After 1952: State Bank’, The News International, 19 November 2020, https://www.thenews.com.pk/print/ 745560-pakistan-saw-negative-economic-growth-first-time-after-1952-sbp (accessed on 19 June 2021). 5 Roshni Balaji, ‘COVID-19: 1.89 Crore Salaried Employees Lost Their Jobs Since April in India, Says CMIE’, YourStory, 20 August 2020, https://yourstory.com/socialstory/ 2020/08/covid-19-salaried-employees-job-loss-india-cmie (accessed on 19 June 2021). 6 Shahram Haq, ‘Job Losses in Pakistan Reach 0.7m in 2020’, The Express Tribune, 20 May 2021, https://tribune.com.pk/story/2300696/job-losses-in-pakistan-reach-07m-in-2020 (accessed on 20 June 2021). 7 IANS, ‘Pakistan May See Job Losses of up to 18.5 Million Due to Covid’, Times of India, 13 June 2020, http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/articleshow/76357441.cms?utm_source= contentofinterest&utm_medium=text&utm_campaign=cppst (accessed on 19 June 2021). 8 ‘Megacities of the World’, Nations Online Project, no date, http://www.nationsonline. org/oneworld/bigcities.htm (accessed on 16 May 2015). 9 In 2018–2019, for instance, Pakistan received remittances of around $4.18 billion from Saudi Arabia, $3.79 billion from the UAE and $1.72 billion from other GCC countries. ‘Pakistan Economic Survey 2018–19’, Finance Division, Government of Pakistan, 10 June 2019, p. 119, https://www.finance.gov.pk/survey/chapters_19/Economic_Survey_ 2018_19.pdf (accessed on 19 June 2021). 10 Devjyot Ghoshal, ‘India’s Vital Monsoon Rains are Changing—and Not For the Better’, Quartz India, 11 August 2014, http://qz.com/246563/indias-vital-monsoon-rains-arechanging-and-not-for-the-better/ (accessed on 19 June 2021). 11 Elizabeth K. Gardner, ‘Purdue Study Projects Weakened Monsoon Season in South Asia’, Purdue University, 26 February 2009, http://www.purdue.edu/uns/x/2009a/ 090226DiffenbaughMonsoon.html (accessed on 19 June 2021).

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12 Ishrat Husain, ‘Economic Reforms in Pakistan: One Step Forward, Two Steps Backwards’, The Pakistan Development Review, 2012, 51(4): 7–22. 13 World Bank (2002) ‘Pakistan Development Policy Review: A New Dawn?’ World Bank Group, 3 April 2002, https://documents1.worldbank.org/curated/en/ 833071468774947340/pdf/multi0page.pdf (accessed on 28 June 2021). 14 Arvind Subramanian, ‘Arvind Subramanian: What is India’s Real Growth Potential?’ Business Standard, 20 January 2013, http://www.business-standard.com/article/opinion/a rvind-subramanian-what-is-india-s-real-growth-potential-112052300014_1.html (accessed on 19 June 2021). 15 Remittances to Pakistan reached $21.8 billion in FY2019, $23.1 billion in FY2020, and $24.2 billion in FY2021. Muzaffar Rizvi, ‘Pakistan Remittances Poised to Hit Record $23 Billion’, Khaleej Times, 12 October 2019, https://www.khaleejtimes.com/business/ global/pakistan-remittances-poised-to-hit-record-23b-1 (accessed on 28 June 2021); ‘Overseas Pakistanis Sent Record Remittances in FY20 at $23.12bn: SBP’, The News International, 13 July 2020, https://www.thenews.com.pk/latest/686173-overseas-pakista nis-sent-record-remittances-in-fy20-at-2312bn-sbp (accessed on 28 June 2021); Mark Battersby, ‘Remittances to Pakistan Soar to Record High of $24.2bn’, International Investment, 19 May 2021, https://www.internationalinvestment.net/news/4031521/rem ittances-pakistan-soar-record-usd-2bn (accessed on 28 June 2021). 16 Ministry of Finance, ‘White Paper on Black Money’, PRS Legislative Research, May 2012, p. 17, https://www.prsindia.org/uploads/media/White%20Paper%20Black%20Money/ WhitePaper_BackMoney2012.pdf (accessed on 28 June 2021). 17 Hamid Mir, ‘India and the Baloch Insurgency’, The Hindu, 28 July 2009, http://www.the hindu.com/todays-paper/tp-opinion/India-and-the-Baloch-insurgency/article16564162.ece (accessed on 28 June 2021). 18 ‘China’s Xi Jinping to Visit Pakistan, Invest $46 billion’, DW, 20 April 2015, https://www. dw.com/en/chinas-xi-jinping-to-visit-pakistan-invest-46-billion/a-18393074 (accessed on 28 June 2021). 19 Avaneesh Pandey, ‘China to Invest $20B In India Over The Next 5 Years’, International Business Times, 18 September 2014, https://www.ibtimes.com/china-invest-20b-india -over-next-5-years-1691057 (accessed on 29 June 2021). 20 ‘Building India: Transforming the Nation’s Logistics Infrastructure’, McKinsey & Company, 3 September 2010, p. 5, https://www.mckinsey.com/~/media/mckinsey/industries/travel %20logistics%20and%20infrastructure/our%20insights/transforming%20indias%20logistics% 20infrastructure/building_india%20transforming_the_nations_logistics_infrastructure.pdf (accessed on 28 June 2021). 21 Jaisu Bhullar, ‘Growing Risks Facing South Asia’s Megacities’, DW, 30 July 2010, https:// www.dw.com/en/growing-risks-facing-south-asias-megacities/a-5852359, (accessed on 4 July 2021). 22 Simon Torkington, ‘India Will Have 7 Megacities by 2030, Says UN’, World Economic Forum, 5 October 2016, https://www.weforum.org/agenda/2016/10/india-megacitiesby-2030-united-nations/ (accessed on 4 July 2021). 23 Richard Dobbs, Anu Madgavkar, Dominic Barton, Eric Labaye, James Manyika, Charles Roxburgh, Susan Lund, and Siddarth Madhav, ‘The World at Work: Jobs, Pay, and Skills for 3.5 Billion People’, McKinsey Global Institute, June 2012, p. 45, https://www.mckinsey. com/~/media/mckinsey/featured%20insights/employment%20and%20growth/the%20wo rld%20at%20work/mgi%20global_labor_full_report_june_2012.pdf 24 Dobbs et al., ‘The World at Work’, p. 2, 10. 25 Dobbs et al., ‘The World at Work’, p. 8. 26 ‘Doing Business 2015 Fact Sheet: South Asia’, World Bank Group, 29 October 2014, https://www.google.com.sg/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&source=web&cd=&cad=rja &uact=8&ved=2ahUKEwirz-2n9bnxAhWe-nMBHcb7ASUQFjAAegQIAxAD&url=https %3A%2F%2Fwww.doingbusiness.org%2Fcontent%2Fdam%2FdoingBusiness%2Fmedia%2F Fact-Sheets%2FDB15%2FDB15SouthAsiaFactSheetEnglish.pdf&usg=AOvVaw01Q_U3riM iyGLOZqdj-_9N (accessed on 28 June 2021).

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27 United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs, ‘2019 International Trade Statistics Yearbook: Vol I’, UN Comtrade, p. 12, https://comtrade.un.org/pb/downloads/ 2019/VolI2019.pdf (accessed 21 June 2021). 28 United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs, ‘2019 International Trade Statistics Yearbook’, p. 14, 13. 29 Tabulated by author based on data from International Monetary Fund, ‘CDIS Table 6: Direct Investment Positions by All Reporting Economies Cross-classified by Counterpart Economies, as of end-2011’, International Monetary Fund Data: Coordinated Direct Investment Survey (CDIS), https://data.imf.org/regular.aspx?key=61227426 (accessed on 21 June 2021). 30 Tabulated by author based on data from International Monetary Fund, ‘CDIS Table 7: Regional Inward Direct Investment Positions Cross-classified by Region, as of end-2011’, International Monetary Fund Data: Coordinated Direct Investment Survey (CDIS), https://data.imf. org/regular.aspx?key=60564265 (accessed on 29 June 2021). 31 World Bank Group, ‘Resilience: Covid-19 Crisis Through a Migration Lens’, Migration and Development Brief 34, May 2021, p. 3, https://www.knomad.org/sites/default/ files/2021-05/Migration%20and%20Development%20Brief%2034_1.pdf (accessed on 29 June 2021). 32 Asian Development Bank, ‘Key Indicators for Asia and the Pacific 2010’, Asian Development Bank, August 2010, p. 8, https://www.adb.org/sites/default/files/publication/27726/ key-indicators-2010.pdf (accessed on 29 June 2021). 33 Soutik Biswas, ‘Is India’s Politics Becoming Less Dynastic?’ BBC, 27 July 2014, https:// www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-india-28478544 (accessed on 29 June 2021).