How Islam Rules in Iran: Theology and Theocracy in the Islamic Republic 1009460889, 9781009460880

Table of contents :
Cover
How Islam Rules in Iran
Contents
Preface
1. Introduction
2. The Setting
3 A Question of Jurisprudence
4 Social Protection and Guidance
5 Rethinking the Islamic Republic
6 Theorizing Islamic Democracy
7 Legitimate Authority
8 Khameneism and the Absolute Velayat-e Faqih
9 Whither the Islamic Republic?
Appendix: Brief Biography of Some of the Figures Discussed
Glossary
Bibliography
Index

Citation preview

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How Islam Rules in Iran

This study provides a comprehensive examination of the evolution of Islam as a ruling framework in postrevolutionary Iran up to the present day. Beginning with the position and structure of Iran’s clerical establishment under the Islamic Republic, Kamrava delves into the jurisprudential debates that have shaped the country’s political institutions and state policies. Kamrava draws on extensive fieldwork to examine various religious narratives that inform the basis of contemporary Iranian politics, also revealing the political salience of common practices and beliefs, such as religious guardianship and guidance, Islam as a source of social protection, the relationship between Islam and democracy, the sources of divine and popular legitimacy, and the theoretical justifications for religious authoritarianism. Providing access to many Persian-language sources for the first time, Kamrava shows how religious intellectual production in Iran has impacted the ongoing transformation of Iranian Shi‘ism and ultimately underwritten the fate of the Islamic Republic. mehran kamrava is Professor of Government at Georgetown University in Qatar. He also directs the Iranian Studies Unit at the Arab Center for Research and Policy Studies. Kamrava is the author of a number of journal articles and books, including, most recently, Righteous Politics: Power and Resilience in Iran (Cambridge University Press, 2023); A Dynastic History of Iran: From the Qajars to the Pahlavis (Cambridge University Press, 2022); Triumph and Despair: In Search of Iran’s Islamic Republic (Oxford University Press, 2022); and A Concise History of Revolution (Cambridge University Press, 2020).

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How Islam Rules in Iran Theology and Theocracy in the Islamic Republic

mehran kamrava Georgetown University in Qatar

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Shaftesbury Road, Cambridge CB2 8EA, United Kingdom One Liberty Plaza, 20th Floor, New York, NY 10006, USA 477 Williamstown Road, Port Melbourne, VIC 3207, Australia 314–321, 3rd Floor, Plot 3, Splendor Forum, Jasola District Centre, New Delhi – 110025, India 103 Penang Road, #05–06/07, Visioncrest Commercial, Singapore 238467 Cambridge University Press is part of Cambridge University Press & Assessment, a department of the University of Cambridge. We share the University’s mission to contribute to society through the pursuit of education, learning and research at the highest international levels of excellence. http://www.cambridge.org Information on this title: http://www.cambridge.org/9781009460835 DOI: 10.1017/9781009460880 © Mehran Kamrava 2024 This publication is in copyright. Subject to statutory exception and to the provisions of relevant collective licensing agreements, no reproduction of any part may take place without the written permission of Cambridge University Press & Assessment. First published 2024 A catalogue record for this publication is available from the British Library Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Names: Kamrava, Mehran, 1964- author. Title: How Islam rules in Iran : theology and theocracy in the Islamic Republic / Mehran Kamrava, Georgetown University, Doha. Description: Cambridge ; New York, NY : Cambridge University Press, 2024. | Includes bibliographical references and index. Identifiers: LCCN 2023045102 (print) | LCCN 2023045103 (ebook) | ISBN 9781009460835 (hardback) | ISBN 9781009460842 (paperback) | ISBN 9781009460880 (epub) Subjects: LCSH: Islam and state–Iran–History–21st century. | Islam and politics–Iran– History–21st century. | Iran–Politics and government–1997Classification: LCC BP63.I68 K36 2024 (print) | LCC BP63.I68 (ebook) | DDC 297.2/ 720955–dc23/eng/20231213 LC record available at https://lccn.loc.gov/2023045102 LC ebook record available at https://lccn.loc.gov/2023045103 ISBN 978-1-009-46083-5 Hardback ISBN 978-1-009-46084-2 Paperback Cambridge University Press & Assessment has no responsibility for the persistence or accuracy of URLs for external or third-party internet websites referred to in this publication and does not guarantee that any content on such websites is, or will remain, accurate or appropriate.

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Contents

Preface 1

Introduction The Book’s Plan

2

The Setting The Clerical Establishment The Institutional Context The Qom Theological Seminary Conclusion

3

A Question of Jurisprudence Fiqh and Politics The Historical Context Khomeini’s Fiqh and the Islamic Republic Khomeini’s Conception of Velayat-e Faqih Conclusion

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Social Protection and Guidance Marja‘iyat Post-Khomeini Conceptions of Velayat-e Faqih A Constrained Guardianship? Conclusion

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Rethinking the Islamic Republic Religious Reformism Deconstructing Islamic Hermeneutics Ijtihad Islamic Democracy Conclusion

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Theorizing Islamic Democracy Hasan Yousefi Eshkevari Mohsen Kadivar Mohammad Mojtahed Shabestari

page vii 1 6 11 12 30 37 55 58 59 62 68 82 103 105 107 113 131 141 142 145 158 169 182 200 202 203 211 219

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Contents A New Generation? Conclusion

230 236

Legitimate Authority

238 241 246 256 261

Legitimacy from God Legitimacy and the People Legitimacy and the Velayat-e Faqih Conclusion

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Khameneism and the Absolute Velayat-e Faqih Ali Khamenei The Absolute Velayat-e Faqih Theorizing Religious Authoritarianism Conclusion

264 266 271 288 295

Whither the Islamic Republic?

297

Appendix: Brief Biography of Some of the Figures Discussed

305

Glossary

312

Bibliography

314

Index

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Preface

There is no shortage of books on Iran, and topics related to Islamist politics in Iran have been expertly examined by a number of gifted scholars. Among this expansive literature, many scholarly contributions are available that have advanced our general knowledge of Iran and its maddeningly complex politics. For about three decades, however, little or none of this literature deals with the intricacies of state– religion relations in the Islamic Republic. More specifically, while the politics of the Islamic Republic continue to be extensively studied, the ideological foundations of the Iranian state, and especially the jurisprudential underpinnings of the country’s theocracy, remain highly understudied. This book is designed to address this gaping hole in our understanding of Iran. Shia theology and jurisprudence in Iran have changed drastically over the past fifty years or so, going, in broad strokes, from sources of political protest and mobilization in the 1970s to theocratic authoritarian consolidation in the 1980s, religious reformism in the 1990s, and conservative traditionalism since then. None of these political– intellectual trends have completely dissipated with the emergence of newer interpretations, with successive layers building on existing ones, at times appearing simultaneously as, and complementing or competing with, other currents. Each of these currents, meanwhile, has impacted the social and political lives of Iranians in quite tangible ways. In the pages to come, I examine the theoretical arguments and practical contributions to Iranian Shia thought as produced by clerics and lay thinkers, both those who are relatively famous and those who are unknown or are lesser known. My goal here is to present the compound social and political effects that these arguments have generated in the public sphere. More specifically, I analyze the ways in which current religious intellectual production in Iran has shaped evolving political–religious discourses in the country, impacted the ongoing

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transformation of Iranian Shi‘ism, and has ultimately underwritten the political survival and fate of the Islamic Republic. In wading through these concepts and theories, I have relied on the extant literature produced inside and outside Iran. Inside Iran, the literature on the social and religious sciences witnessed something of a renaissance in the years immediately following Hojatoleslam Mohammad Khatami’s election to the presidency in 1997. In the short-lived “reform movement” that ensued, hundreds of books and thousands of articles were published that explored and critiqued, often in great detail and with piercing insight, some of the very foundational notions on which the Islamic Republic is based. While some of this literature is by now more than two decades old, many of the themes it explores are still salient today. Iran’s book publishing frenzy of the early 2000s has now subsided under the increasing weight of censorship. But trickles of it continue to this day. Fortunately, there has also been an inverse rise in recent years in the publication of methodologically rigorous, refereed journal articles, giving us a window into the robust debates and discussions occurring in Iran over matters of theology and jurisprudence. I have relied extensively on the literature that is produced in Iran. All translations from Persian are my own. In recent years, it has become common practice in Iran to also include English translations of some book or article titles and author names in the publication. Unless I considered these original translations far too inaccurate, I have retained them here. I have also kept some of the transliterations of author names if they appear in English in books or articles even if my own transliteration would have been different. In all other cases, I have used a simplified version of the transliteration system of the International Journal of Middle East Studies that avoids the use of diacritical marks for vowels. Whenever possible, I have avoided use of jargon to make the book’s arguments accessible to nonspecialist readers. For greater clarity and convenience, a brief Glossary of some of the religious terms used in the book appears at the end.

A Word of Thanks Several generous faculty research grants from my home institution, Georgetown University in Qatar, enabled me to conduct fieldwork in Iran and to collect many of the sources cited here. The Arab Center for

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Research and Policy Studies provided another highly supportive environment for me to work on completing the book. Grateful acknowledgment also goes to a number of friends and individuals who helped with the work on this book in various important ways. Shakiba Abolkheirian was instrumental in compiling the biographic data contained in the Appendix. Hamideh Dorzadeh cheerfully assisted with several time-sensitive research questions. Colleagues Akintunde Akinade, Abdullah Al-Arian, Jeremy Koons, and Patrick Laude kindly read earlier drafts of different chapters and gave me invaluable advice and suggestions on how to sharpen my focus and strengthen my arguments. Of course, I alone am responsible for whatever shortcomings the book still has.

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Introduction

In today’s Iran, state–religion relations exhibit three key features. An obvious feature is the deep basis of the state in innovative interpretations of Shia jurisprudence. The Islamic Republic is based on the system of the velayat-e faqih, generally translated in English as the “guardianship of the jurisconsult.” As a concept, the notion of the velayat-e faqih had existed in Shia thought for some time before Ayatollah Khomeini elaborated on it in his 1970 book by the same name. Khomeini’s contribution lay in his innovative interpretation of the velayat-e faqih as a supreme political leader who oversaw not just religious affairs, as previous theologians had theorized, but was in overall charge of all affairs of the entire community, profane and political, as well as religious. Today, Khomeini’s conception of velayat-e faqih underlies the institutional and political foundations of the Islamic Republic. The Iranian political system is far more ideologically informed, and hence ideological, than may at first meet the eye. A second characteristic of state–religion relations in Iran is the internal theoretical challenges to the prevailing jurisprudential interpretations that inform the state. The clerical establishment has been highly bureaucratized after the revolution and has been brought under the state’s political and organizational control. But the state leaders’ jurisprudential interpretations, and their politically modulated theories of the ideal Shia order, have not gone uncontested. In the revolution’s second decade, in fact, serious challenges to the way the theory of velayat-e faqih had evolved were voiced from within both clerical ranks and non-clerical circles. It took about a decade for the state to effectively sideline these theoretical challenges, some of which came from figures affiliated with it. But these voices of dissent, or at least difference, have not been altogether eliminated. To this day, different interpretations of an ideal Shia order, political and otherwise, rear their head, sometimes more faintly and sometimes more forcefully.

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The state’s reassertion of its idealized relationship with religion, evidenced most starkly after 2009, marks the third feature of today’s Islamic Republic. Once dissenting views about the nexus between Islam and politics had been effectively quieted, the state found room and opportunity to fully institutionalize its own conception of the ideal order. This “official orthodoxy” has found its expression in what may be called Khameneism. This Khameneism exhibits features that are starkly conservative in its jurisprudential orientations, is authoritarian in its politics, and is paranoid about matters of security and therefore intolerant of any indication of dissent. In making its arguments, the book traces the journey of Iranian Shi‘ism from the success of the 1978–1979 revolution until today. It focuses specifically on Shi‘a jurisprudence and the innovations it has undergone, its relationships with and use by the state, and where it stands today. In the prerevolutionary era, starting from the 1960s and lasting into the late 1970s and the first couple of years of the revolution, until about 1981, Iran witnessed something of a golden era of jurisprudential thought and religious intellectual production, with significant innovations being made in the study and application of theology, jurisprudence, Islamic history, and ijtihad (independent reasoning). War and revolution, along with parallel and reinforcing processes of state-building and political consolidation, eclipsed Iranian Islam’s intellectual dynamism in the 1980s. It wasn’t until the mid1990s when the gates of ijtihad were thrown open once again, this time in response to more than a decade of a grand theocratic experiment the world had come to know as the Islamic Republic. The “intellectual revolution” gripping the country at the time crystalized itself in Hojatoleslam Mohammad Khatami’s election as president in 1997, and, like all revolutions, in its early years ushered in an exciting period of free thinking and intellectual innovation. But revolutions of this kind seldom live up to their promises, and an Iranian renaissance of intellectual thought, of rethinking and reimagining the role of religion in state and in society, was not to be. The Green Movement of 2009 was the last gasp of the intellectual revolution, the painful death of which had started some years earlier. Both movements, the earlier one of scholars and academics writing articles and publishing books, and the later one of people in streets decrying the theft of their votes, were mercilessly suppressed by an unbending orthodoxy now firmly in control of the state and all its

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repressive, political, cultural, and ideological institutions. States rule not just by repression or by dominance of the public space. They rule also by controlling the narrative, the story, or stories, that govern people’s lives from one day to the next. By the late 2000s, the Islamic Republic had outgrown its genesis as an experiment. It was now a reality, a hard, brute reality unwilling to give an inch, to compromise on the ideological universe it had made and on which it relied. The Islamic Republic’s political reality has been highly complex and complicated. As the official ideology of the state, the travails and transformations of Iranian Shi‘ism have been particularly profound. My goal here is to map out the evolution of key theoretical concepts guiding Iran’s Islamic government since the success of the revolution. The book examines several themes that have emerged as key constitutive elements of how Iranian theologians see their ideal world. These areas of scholarly focus encompass related notions and concepts that are central to Iranian Shi‘i political cosmology. The first of these areas includes debates and discussions over jurisprudence in general and the extent to which it can be interpreted and adapted – its dynamism – in changing times and contexts. This relates directly to a second area of considerable discussion and theorizing, namely the very nature of legitimate authority and how, and through what sources, legitimacy is bestowed on those with the power to rule. These debates might be academic, but for Iran their social and political impact are real and immediate. Related to legitimacy is the question of rulership, specifically who has the right to rule, and how the ruler ought to behave while in power. Another question, the exploration of which has become especially necessary since the final decades of the twentieth century, is the role and nature of democracy in an ideal Islamic order. Lastly, especially since about 2009–2010, Iranian politics has experienced the steady development of Khameneism, an ideological-political posture of the state that is centered around Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, the country’s “leader” (rahbar) and velayat-e faqih since 1989. Khameneism, the book maintains, forms the backbone of the state’s official religious, political, and ideological orthodoxy. Through this book, I hope to push our collective understanding of the relationship between religion and politics in Iran in several new directions. The book presents a deep dive into the ideological underpinnings of the Islamic Republic. In the pages to come, I delve below the level of discourse, exploring specific concepts and theoretical

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constructs that continue to guide – in what is a living, dynamic manner – the relationship between religion and politics in Iran. Through the study of some of the key religious concepts currently being used and operationalized in Iran, one important conclusion the book reaches is that there is far more theoretical substance and depth to the structure, institutions, and functions of the Islamic Republic than we generally assume. Iran’s is no run-of-the-mill authoritarian system; there are complex theoretical and ideological constructions undergirding it. I and a number of others have explored these institutional complexities of the Islamic Republican state.1 Apart from practical power considerations, this institutional complexity is a product of the fact that the early crafters of the Iranian state set out to design and maintain a political system that is at once faithfully both Islamic and republican. Reconciling these two distinct areas of operation into a cohesive, workable political system has necessitated the design of a highly elaborate, institutionally complex state, one with equally detailed theoretical and ideological underpinnings. These theoretical underpinnings, articulated mostly by senior clerics who move seamlessly between the religious and political establishments and who organically tie the two together, form the main focus of the chapters to come. Since its establishment, the Islamic Republic has thoroughly politicized Shia jurisprudence. At the same time, the state’s elaborate theoretical underpinning is being continuously produced and reproduced. This production and reproduction occur at various levels and in multiple arenas. At the broadest level, there are three sites of ideological reproduction in the Islamic Republic: within the official institutions of the state; in semi-governmental bodies such as statesupported research institutes, media outlets, and the expansive theological establishment; and among clerical and lay theorists, whose affiliation with the state is at best loose and indeterminate. Given the Islamic Republic’s modus operandi, its patterns of institutional evolution and consolidation, and its ideological and practical priorities, the boundaries between these different sites are highly blurred, and it is often difficult if not impossible to determine where one ends and the other begins. Where, for example, mosques and Hussainiyas belong in 1

See, for example, Mehran Kamrava, Righteous Politics: Power and Resilience in Iran (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2023).

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this spatial triumvirate is unclear, and the same thing could be said about panegyrists, vast religious endowments, and parastatal foundations. Finally, and perhaps most obviously, is the existence of a highly pronounced, almost direct symbiotic relationship between theoretical constructs on the one hand and actual political developments on the other. At the broadest level, the postrevolutionary theological dispositions in Iran fall into two categories. On the one side, there is conservative clerical traditionalism, which may alternatively also be seen as clericalism, Khomeinism, and Khameneism. At the opposite extreme of the spectrum is a hermeneutically centered discourse that defines itself in reaction to this clerical traditionalism, called reformist, modernist, or by some other similarly “new” designation. In the first decade of the revolution, within a political context that saw the institutionalization of a nascent Islamic Republic and then its consolidation under conditions of war and repression, Khomeinist clericalism reigned supreme. By the middle of the revolution’s second decade, in the 1990s, with war having given way to reconstruction and repression easing up slightly, a discourse of reformism, of “new thinking,” began to be articulated by devout intellectuals deeply committed to the project of the Islamic Republic but eager to make it adapt to the abstract ideals of a forward-looking, progressive Islamic democracy. Despite the excitement their ideas generated in learned circles and among many ordinary Iranians in the middle classes, the inability of the “new thinkers” to translate their abstractions into concrete political outcomes – especially in the form of resilient institutions – robbed them of meaningful, long-term staying power. What came to be known as the “reform movement” lasted barely a decade. Ascendant in its place was Khomeinism 2.0, this time under the auspices of a newly assertive velayat-e faqih in the person of Ali Khamenei. What for the sake of convenience I call here Khameneism has Khamenei at its center, but he is hardly its sole intellectual architect. Khamenei is, of course, quite prolific in articulating his ideal version of Islamic rule in frequent speeches and in ensuring the political salience of these ideas through an array of powerful supporting institutions that see to their enforcement and resilience. But his version of conservative, clerical traditionalism is supported by a host of scholars and jurists whose theoretical expositions provide the necessary jurisprudential justification for the political state of things.

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As the official orthodoxy, Khameneism has dominated the country’s post-2000s intellectual atmosphere. No one admits that the gates of ijtihad are now shut, much less claim credit for it. But the intellectual vibrance of Iranian Islam is now a thing of the past, for the time being at least, and little scholarly innovation is emanating from the universities and seminaries of Tehran and Qom, once Iran’s intellectual nerve centers, or from any of the country’s other corners. Intellectual waves and currents have their own ebb and flow, of course. No doubt this is not the end of the story, and the fact that Iranian politics is what it is today, an Islamic Republic nearing the half-century mark, is itself reason to believe that much thinking and theorizing is yet to follow. For now, however, the snapshot that this book captures, starting with the theoretical foundations of the theocracy and ending with its institutional and ideological consolidation, concludes with Iran’s Shia jurisprudence and ijtihad at standstill, forced by the weight of circumstances and the political dictates of the day to thread not new paths but often to rehash old insights and to decipher what religious elders have said.

The Book’s Plan The arrangement of the chapters corresponds roughly with the ebbs and flows of the politics of Iran’s theocracy and corresponding intellectual trends in theological and jurisprudential thinking. Chapter 2 focuses on the larger context within which Iran’s theocracy is situated and its impact on ongoing intellectual discussions concerning religion and politics. More specifically, the chapter offers a brief sketch of the country’s political setting, followed by more focused discussions of the clerical establishment and, specifically, the epicenter of clerical scholarship, the seminary in Qom, the Howzeh Elmiyeh-e. Chapter 3 turns the focus on Shia jurisprudence (fiqh). The chapter examines some of the supporting pillars of the foundational jurisprudential thinking that originally informed the Islamic Republic on the eve of its inception. Focusing on jurisprudential debates, the chapter starts with a broader discussion of the relationship between fiqh and politics, examining fiqh’s historic categorization into one tendency that has favored traditionalism and conservatism, another cluster that has been more dynamic and progressive, and a somewhat in-between tendency straddling a middle path. Briefly situating these debates

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within a historic context, the chapter divides contemporary Shia fiqh into the version that dominated the country’s first postrevolutionary decade, as articulated by Khomeini, and its fragmentation once more after Khomeini into dynamic-progressive, conservative-traditional, and pragmatic-moderate clusters. As Chapter 3 demonstrates, Khomeini’s contributions to and innovations in jurisprudence, enthusiastically supported by a host of eager deputies, informed the theoretical and institutional foundations of the Islamic Republic. What cumulatively became “Khomeinism” is discussed in Chapter 4. This chapter explores Khomeini’s jurisprudential innovations, and adjustments, as he sought to adapt his theoretical conceptions of the Islamic Republic with the actual complexities of running a modern state. These include the notions of political guardianship of the jurisconsult, or velayat-e faqih, state or governmental injunctions (ahkam-e hokumati), and expedience (maslahat). The chapter also explores the contributions of some of Khomeini’s chief lieutenants and disciples in the early years of the revolution. These include the comrades-in-arms Ayatollahs Mohammad Beheshti and Mahmoud Taleghani, and Khomeini’s chosen successor, until his resignation once his position became untenable, Ayatollah Hosseinali Montazeri. I have chosen to highlight the contributions of these three individuals to the early establishment of the Islamic Republic. At the center of the Islamic Republic’s theocratic experiment stands the notion and position of velayat-e faqih. Chapter 4 offers an in-depth examination of the concept as originally employed and then put into practice by Khomeini. Chapter 5 then explores velayat-e faqih beyond, and largely since, the innovative deployment of the concept by Khomeini as a supreme political office. The notion of the velayat-e faqih is based on a simple assumption: societies, all societies, need guidance and protection. For Shii Muslim societies, guidance takes the form of having a “source of emulation,” a marja‘-e taqlid, whose learned status in law and jurisprudence allows members of the community to avail themselves of his advice. Protection, velayat, is also provided by a learned scholar of jurisprudence, a faqih. Ever since Khomeini resurrected the notion, one of the key questions of Shia theology – not a new question, but one that has come back into theological circles – revolves around the scope of protection: by whom, for whom, from what, for how long, and in what forms. For the time

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being, the question has been settled politically. The scope of the velayat-e faqih’s responsibilities is unending, goes the underlying logic of the Islamic Republic system, and his ascension to the position is divinely ordained. His judgments are final. He is, in one word, absolute (mutlaq). An important dimension of Islamic and especially Shia jurisprudence has been the invitation to engage in independent reasoning, or ijtihad. In Shii communities, the so-called gates of ijtihad have been open or shut at different times in history depending on the preferences of theologians and the larger circumstances within which they have found themselves. Khomeini’s theological and jurisprudential innovations, and the political system to which they gave rise, threw the gates of ijtihad wide open in Iran beginning in the late 1980s and the 1990s, though perhaps not in ways he would have necessarily approved. In the Iran of the 1990s, a number of theologians and intellectuals – collectively known as “new thinkers” (no-andishan) – found the political space and opportunity to present a new hermeneutic of Islam by deconstructing received Shia wisdom, engaging in ijtihad, and offering ideas about the fundamental compatibility of Islam and democracy. Chapters 6 and 7 respectively discuss the Shia hermeneutics of the 1990s and some of the key intellectuals whose ideas caused both excitement and consternation in scholarly and clerical circles. Chapter 8 extends the discussion to competing notions of legitimacy, namely questions revolving around its genesis as divine or popular or some combination of the two. More specifically, Chapter 6 starts by focusing on the slow but steady change of heart by some of the revolution’s earliest erstwhile ideological foot-soldiers from diehard radicals in the early 1980s to committed reformists in the mid-1990s. As the radicals of yesteryears became reformists of the day, they undertook a noisy, very public, unpicking of Iranian Shia thought as it had been handed down from generation to generation. These reformist public intellectuals, many having quickly become household names, came from both lay and clerical backgrounds, called for continuous dynamism in ijtihad, and sought to deconstruct the Islamic hermeneutics that had been handed down through the generations, or at least from 1978 to 1979 downwards. Several of these intellectuals, whose ideas are studied in some depth in Chapter 7, theorized a democratic Islam as a potentially feasible form of government for Iran. I zero in on the ideas of four specific

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individuals, all of them current or former clerics: Mohsen Kadivar (b. 1959), Hasan Yousefi Eshkevari (b. 1950), Mohammad Mojtahed Shabestari (b. 1936), and Abolfazl Mousavian. The first three became household names in the 1990s and the early 2000s and went on to pay heavy personal and professional prices as a result. Kadivar’s writings landed him before the Special Court for the Clergy in 1999, and he was sentenced to prison for eighteen months. Teaching philosophy at various Tehran universities, in 2007 he was fired from all his posts and subsequently left the country. He is currently a philosophy professor in the United States. Eshkevari was also tried by the Special Court for the Clergy in 2000 after he declared in one of his speeches that “the historical time of despotism in Iran has come to an end.” He was sentenced to prison for four years and defrocked. In 2009, in the midst of the crackdown on the Green Movement, he left for Germany and sought asylum there. Mojtahed Shabestari was never tried or imprisoned, but in 2006 he was forcibly retired from his position as Professor of Philosophy at the University of Tehran. He subsequently abandoned the clerical garb in protest and now lives in retirement. The last scholar studied in the chapter, Abolfazl Mousavian, is different in several respects. Born in 1955, he represents a younger generation of democratically inclined Shia thinkers. He is also the least well-known of those studied here, which probably accounts for the fact that he is still gainfully employed – as Professor of Divinity at Qom’s Mofid University. I have deliberately chosen to highlight his arguments here in order to demonstrate the ongoing impulse to devise a democratic theory of Islam despite the pervasive authoritarianism in which Mousavian and others like him find themselves. One of the central planks of democracy is legitimacy, and questions revolving around the divine versus popular genesis of legitimacy permeated much of the hermeneutics discussion of the 1990s and the first decade of the 2000s. To this day, even the steady ascendance of hardline religious traditionalism, complemented by steady doses of repression and a growing tilt toward authoritarianism, has failed to definitively settle the issue. State theorists continually amplify the constitution’s rather unconvincing argument that legitimacy comes from God while it is acceptance that comes from the people, and the state needs both in order to function properly. This argument, some central and others challenging or supporting it, and its institutional consequences for the ruling theocracy, are discussed in Chapter 8.

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Dynamic ijtihad’s moment in the sun did not last long. The gates of ijtihad, made slightly ajar by the Khatami presidency, did not remain open for very long. As the “reform era” petered out and stalled by the end of the new millennium’s first decade, clerical traditionalism (re)asserted itself both politically and intellectually, seeing to it that the voices of jurisprudential reformism were silenced one after another, often by force and coercion. This ascendant “Khameneism” that won the day, which has steadily ruled Iran politically and discursively since the early 2010s, is the subject of Chapter 9. Pushing the boundaries of the “absolute” velayat-e faqih into greater levels of political involvement and control, Khameneism has proven itself to be highly intolerant of dissent of any kind, whether political or intellectual. The Appendix presents brief biographies of some of the main figures whose ideas and works are discussed in the book. This is not by any means meant to be an exhaustive list of the key figures of the Islamic Republic. Instead, it is designed to serve as a quick reference guide for some of the individuals named here. By way of conclusion, Chapter 9 wonders out loud what the future is likely to hold for the Islamic Republic. More specifically, the chapter explores most likely scenarios for the evolving, ever-changing nature of Islam and politics in Iran. How long, and in what shape and form, will Khameneism outlast Khamenei? Even supreme leaders, after all, die one day. Iran’s future trajectory is far from certain. What is certain is a continuation of change and transformation in Iranian jurisprudence, politics, and society.

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The Setting

The broader context within which theocratic rule in Iran takes place may be best explained through developments within and initiatives taken by the clerical establishment. Clerics have historically been one of the most consequential social classes in Iran, with a long tradition of involvement in politics. By the late 1970s, the clergy’s uneasy relationship with the Pahlavi monarchy has deteriorated into overt hostility and conflict, thanks largely to the ideas and sermons of Ayatollah Khomeini. Khomeini’s exile from Iran in 1965 had done little to dampen his following among a small but local cohort of disciples. It had also further emboldened the Ayatollah to theorize about a theocratic alternative to the monarchy. The advent of the revolutionary movement in the late 1970s propelled Khomeini, and his ideas along with him, to the top of the anti-Shah campaign. Putting those ideas into practice once the revolution succeeded, Khomeini led the clergy to capture the state and its highest offices. This clerical capture of the state was steady, methodical, and constitutionally codified. The Islamic Republic thus became a theocratic state par excellence, with a clerical monarch at the top and other clergy functioning as gatekeepers and moral enforcers. At the same time, consistent with the impulse of all postrevolutionary states, the Iranian theocracy set its sights on the one politically autonomous institution that the clergy itself had, namely the seminary (howzeh). Khomeini was, and Khamenei has been, unrelenting in seeking to ensure the state’s control over the howzeh and the howzeh’s jurisprudential conformity with what quickly became official orthodoxy. As a consequence, today the howzeh’s administrative and financial dependence on the state is near-complete, and whatever infrequent jurisprudential innovations once emanated from it have all but dried up. This chapter begins by tracing the clergy’s march from indifferent compliance with the state up to the 1970s to opposition group 11

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afterward and then controller of the state. It also chronicles the state’s capture by the clergy and the codification of its institutional powers. Lastly, it examines how the state, with the clergy at its helm, set out to capture the howzeh, and what that means for the howzeh today and also for howzeh–state relations.

The Clerical Establishment In 1946, as Iran was reeling from the devastating consequences of the Second World War – the Anglo-Soviet Occupation of 1941–1946, chaos and political instability, and rampant poverty and disease – a new political grouping calling itself the Fadaiyan-e Islam burst onto the scene. For the next several years, the Fadaiyan-e Islam, made up mostly of young, radical traditionalist Islamists, assassinated a number of high-profile individuals, beginning with the famous historian and secularist intellectual Ahmad Kasravi (1890–1946). Some of the others killed by the Fadaiyan-e Islam included Abdolhossein Hazhir, who had once served as prime minister and was the court minister at the time of his assassination in 1949, and, in 1951, Prime Minister Ali Razmara. In 1949, the Fadaiyan-e Islam even tried, unsuccessfully, to assassinate the Shah. Even though few historians and scholars have drawn so much as a dotted line between the Fadaiyan-e Islam of the early 1940s and the later Islamists of the 1960s and the 1970s, the former were in many ways the ideological forefathers of the latter.1 For although Khomeini and his band of Islamists were at the time seen as revolutionaries with progressive ideals, the programs of many of those who by the 1980s had elbowed out their former comrades and were the only ones left standing were eerily close to those of the Fadaiyan-e Islam. Blinded by the enthusiasm of the revolutionary moment, in the late 1970s few Iranians could possibly imagine Khomeini as anything other than progressive and revolutionary in the romanticized sense of the word. But the parallels between the thrust of the militant Fadaiyan’s ideas and the outcomes of Khomeini’s revolutionary project are hard to dismiss. Here therefore I set the scene in the lead-up to the revolution 1

A valuable, concise examination of the group can be found at Farhad Kazemi, “State and Society in the Ideology of the Devotees of Islam,” State, Culture, and Society, Vol. 1, No. 3 (Spring 1985), pp. 118–135.

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in relation to Iran’s revolutionary clergy by starting with a brief discussion of the Fadaiyan-e Islam. The Fadaiyan-e Islam was mostly made up of seminary students in Qom in their twenties, many of whom came from lower- or lowermiddle-class backgrounds. The group was led by a young militant named Mojtaba Mirlowhi, who went by the nom de guerre Navvab Safavi (1924–1956). Safavi often wore military fatigues under his clerical garb and acted like a soldier, “as if he were ready to go to war.”2 The group was popular within seminary circles and, mostly through assassinations and other militant activities, made its presence felt from the mid-1940s to the early 1950s. Once it was disbanded, many of its members became absorbed into the wider clerical establishment. Agitating for immediate and radical change, the Fadaiyan-e Islam were highly disruptive of, and disrespectful toward, the older Qombased clerical establishment. Many had stopped listening to sermons by senior clerics, including especially Grand Ayatollah Hossein Boroujerdi, who at the time was the only living marja‘-e taqlid (source of emulation) and was widely considered to be the country’s most prominent religious figure. Boroujerdi was particularly distressed and considered the radicalism of the Fadaiyan-e Islam to be a serious threat to the Qom seminary establishment. He therefore asked a few of the clerics he trusted to intercede and to dissuade the Fadaiyan-e Islam from using the howzeh as a launchpad for their revolution. The group eventually left Qom for Tehran, and the Qom clerical establishment, which had been gripped with suspicions surrounding which clerics supported or sympathized with the group, was finally able to breathe more easily.3 The Fadaiyan-e Islam’s platform included the establishment of an Islamic government. The group wanted all government ministries to have an “Islamic appearance” by having a mosque on their premises, hoisting the green flag of Islam next to the national flag, and hosting Friday prayers. It should be the responsibility of the Ministry of the Interior, according to the Fadaiyan, to conduct Friday prayers in all cities, to implement Islamic law in society at large, and to ensure that 2

3

Davood Feirahi, Feqh va Siyasat dar Iran-e Mo‘aser (Jurisprudence and Politics in Contemporary Iran) (Tehran: Nashr-e Ney, 1393/2014), p. 146. Hosseinali Montazeri, Khaterat (Memoirs) (Los Angeles, CA: Ketab Corp., 2017), pp. 62–63.

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everyone is properly attired according to Islamic values. The group paid particular attention to the relationship between the Ministry of Culture and the country’s universities. In all disciplines, the Fadaiyan-e Islam argued, professors and students need to receive training in Islamic perspectives related to their fields. The Fadaiyan also advocated the implementation of Islamic law as the basis of the penal code and the application of the shari‘ah as the basis of the justice system.4 Navvab Safavi also called for the cleansing from the clergy of those who were not worthy of wearing the clerical garb. According to Safavi, the highest Shia clerical authority, the marja‘iyat, has three key responsibilities. First, the marja‘ has to cleanse from the ranks of the clergy those who are corrupt or who collaborate with the state. Second, he needs to engage in education and proselytizing and to administer compulsory exams in Islamic history, the Hadith, and other Quranic sciences, such as interpretation (tafsir). Lastly, there needs to be a more systematic organization of the finances of the religious establishment. This includes owning large factories, the profits of which could be directed toward religious affairs and initiatives.5 The Fadaiyan-e Islam did not mind the autocracy of Reza Shah or the authoritarianism of his son, Mohammad Reza. They simply preferred an Islamic system to a secular one.6 In most of its objectives, moreover, the group found common cause with many of the politically inclined clerics, including Khomeini. Where they differed from Khomeini was their advocacy of violence and their efforts to assassinate their opponents, especially key figures affiliated with the monarchy.7 The ideas they espoused at the time – such as the Islamization of the judiciary and the educational system, to take just one example – turned out to be very similar to the Islamic Republic’s campaigns decades later to Islamize Iran’s cultures, the judiciary, and the universities. Following another assassination attempt, this one on the life of Prime Minister Hossein ‘Ala, Navvab Safavi and some of his key associates were arrested in November 1955 and executed shortly afterward. By the mid-1950s, as monarchical authoritarianism was becoming fully consolidated, the Fadaiyan-e Islam was all but 4

5

Feirahi, Feqh va Siyasat dar Iran-e Mo‘aser (Jurisprudence and Politics in Contemporary Iran), pp. 159–160, 165–166. 6 7 Ibid., pp. 154–156. Ibid., p. 166. Ibid., p. 147.

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destroyed.8 Despite the group’s noisy activities even when it existed, the dominant atmosphere of the city of Qom and the larger clerical establishment had generally remained nonpolitical. This was largely a result of Ayatollah Boroujerdi’s preference for avoiding politics and instead trying to maintain some sort of modus vivendi with the monarchy. Khomeini, by contrast, had made his political preferences known as early as 1941 with the publication of his book Kash alAsrar (Discovery of Secrets). This made the relationship between the two men at times tense, though always polite. The much younger Khomeini is said to have adopted a wait-and-see policy, as the Shah had done, until Boroujerdi’s death.9 Once the eighty-five-year-old cleric died in 1961, Khomeini respected Boroujerdi’s preference rather than risk an open rift within the clerical establishment. It did not take long for Khomeini to start his oppositional activities. When in October 1962 newspapers reported that women and religious minorities could vote and become candidates in local and provincial elections, Khomeini openly launched his anti-Shah campaign, thus once again making the clergy political.10 A short while later, in January 1963, the state announced the start of what it called the White Revolution, many of the main principles of which, such as land reform and women’s rights, Khomeini bitterly opposed. Following a series of incendiary sermons against the reforms and the government, in June Khomeini was arrested. The following year he was exiled to Turkey, and found his way to Najaf in 1965. There, he resumed his teaching and writing, and, slowly, laid the theoretical groundwork for an Islamic system meant to replace the monarchy. Khomeini was one of the first and only clerics to adopt a revolutionary stance in the 1960s, viewing the very institution of monarchy as illegitimate and reactionary. He set two tasks for himself, namely, proposing an alternative to the monarchy, and a means – a revolution – for its overthrow. Of course, not all clergymen agreed 8

9

10

Similar fates were suffered by the National Front and the Tudeh Party, and, later on, by the two active guerrilla groups: the People’s Mojahedin Organization and the People’s Fadaiyan Organization. Vanessa Martin, Creating an Islamic State: Khomeini and the Making of a New Iran (London: I. B. Tauris, 2000), p. 73. Emadeddin Baqi, Rouhaniyat va Qodrat: Jame‘h Shenasi-e Nahad-haye Dini (The Clergy and Power: Sociology of Religious Institutions) (Tehran: Saraee, 1383/2004), pp. 160–161.

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The Setting

with him, and for a whole host of reasons, both theological and practical, many continued to prefer staying clear of politics.11 Regardless of where they stood, nevertheless, Khomeini’s activities and jurisprudential arguments made the clergy inherently political.

The Clergy and the Revolution Entering the revolution, the clerical establishment had a clear functional hierarchy. At the top were senior grand ayatollahs charged with interpreting texts. Engaged in teaching and scholarship for decades, most were also known and respected for having published their own treatise. These grand ayatollahs, many of whom were “sources of emulation” (marja‘-e taqlid), were followed by “ordinary” ayatollahs, who studied the canons and the texts produced by their seniors. The ayatollahs interpreted the ideas of senior clerics and were often active in local mosques. After the revolution, many became involved in local government. The third tier were younger, junior clerics and seminary students who would make up future recruits.12 By the late 1970s, as the foundations of the Pahlavi monarchy were crumbling, Grand Ayatollah Khomeini’s position of prominence inspired many of those lower in the clerical hierarchy to also advocate the monarchy’s replacement with an Islamic government. Khomeini’s ideas about rule by velayat-e faqih (guardianship of the jurisconsult) may not have been widely shared by the other prominent ulama. But they were enthusiastically endorsed by an overwhelming majority of lower-ranking clerics. The clergy’s successful ascent to the top of the revolutionary movement has been studied extensively in the literature on the Iranian Revolution.13 Paradoxically, Khomeini and many of the other 11

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13

Abdolvahab Forati, Rouhaniyat va Siyasat: Ma‘el va Payamad-ha (The Clergy and Politics: Issues and Consequences) (Tehran: Sazman-e Entesharat-e Pazhoheshgah-e Farhang va Andisheh-e Eslami, 1395/2016), pp. 16–17. Nikola Schahgaldian, The Clerical Establishment in Iran (Santa Monica, CA: Rand, 1988), p. x. The excellent literature on the topic is far too extensive to cite. Two examples include Ahmad Ashraf and Ali Banuazizi, “The State, Classes and Modes of Mobilization in the Iranian Revolution,” State, Culture, and Society, Vol. 1, No. 3 (Spring 1985), pp. 3–40; and Saïd Amir Arjomand, “Iran’s Islamic Revolution in Comparative Perspective,” World Politics, Vol. 38, No. 3 (April 1986), pp. 383–414. My own take on the subject can be found at Mehran

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“revolutionary” clergy continued to remain deeply conservative throughout the revolution and especially afterward. The clergy who were commonly perceived as politically progressive before the revolution overwhelmingly became politically conservative once the revolution succeeded. Not only did they seek to conserve the new political order, they sought to infuse it with highly traditionalist social and cultural mores. Before the revolution, only a minority of the clergy were considered “revolutionary.” The same pattern was repeated two decades after the revolution succeeded, when only a minority of the clergy were seen as “reformist.”14 Emadeddin Baqi, once a revolutionary radical and later a reformist activist and author, identifies a number of reasons for the clerical establishment’s continued, innate institutional and ideological conservatism both before and after the revolution.15 First, official efforts and actual state policies notwithstanding, there continues to be a large gap between traditional clerical and secular, ostensibly modern, institutions of learning and research, especially in relation to methodologies, perspectives, and functions. Second, Baqi maintains, while there is a minority of clerics who welcome change and would like to upgrade the production of knowledge in the seminary, their efforts lack organizational backing and supportive institutions. Along similar lines, those advocating new perspectives – what is commonly referred to in Iran as “new thinking” (no-andishi) – have become voices in the wilderness, at best politically and institutionally marginalized and at worst legally prosecuted by the Special Court for the Clergy.16 Equally important, as we shall see shortly, has been the state’s steady, near-complete institutional dominance of the clerical establishment. Mosques, seminaries, research centers, publishing houses, and nearly every other similar institution once available to the clergy for the articulation and expression of religious views are now controlled by the state, a state that only allows certain, narrow interpretations of

14 15

16

Kamrava, Revolution in Iran: The Roots of Turmoil (London: Routledge, 1990). Baqi, Rouhaniyat va Qodrat (The Clergy and Power), p. 169. Baqi’s steady transformation from a radical revolutionary in the early 1980s to an ardent reformist typifies a larger trend among many notable figures of his generation. For the causes and consequences of this metamorphosis, see Mehran Kamrava, Triumph and Despair: In Search of Iran’s Islamic Republic (New York: Oxford University Press, 2022), pp. 94–101. Baqi, Rouhaniyat va Qodrat (The Clergy and Power), p. 169.

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The Setting

religion it deems appropriate. One of the historical characteristics of the clergy has been its self-reproduction through and especially inside the seminary, whether by resort to text and the Hadith or through deductive logic or philosophy and ethics. Each of these arenas has served as the main avenue through which great religious figures have emerged and have inspired others.17 But the Islamic Republic has effectively put a stop to this process, or at least has severely curtailed it, through its extensive control over the clerical establishment and its production of knowledge. This control over and penetration of the clerical establishment has not necessarily required too many clerical foot soldiers. The state does not release statistics on the precise number of the country’s clergy, an omission that is most likely deliberate. One estimate puts the total size of Iran’s clerical establishment anywhere between 350,000 to 500,000.18 A better-sourced report claims that Iran has 130,000 clergymen, of whom approximately 80,000 live in Qom.19 Of these, approximately 1,000 are thought to be Ayatollahs, of whom about 30 are Grand Ayatollahs.20 Of the country’s total clerical population, less than 5,000 are estimated to be involved in different state agencies, many of them concentrated in the judiciary, the political–ideological offices of the armed forces, or as representatives of the velayat-e faqih in foundations (bonyads), universities, provinces, and elsewhere.21

State Capture The capture of the state by the clergy since the revolution has been near-complete. An important section of the clergy has been active in several key institutions of the state from their very inception, such as 17

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21

Soleiman Khakban, Jame‘h Shenasi-e Rouhaniyat-e Iran-e Mo‘aser (Sociology of Contemporary Iranian Clerics) (Tehran: Sazman-e Entesharat-e Pazhoheshgah-e Farhang va Andisheh-e Eslami, 1397/2018), p. 86. Saeid Golkar, “Clerical Militia and Securitization of Seminary Schools in Iran,” Contemporary Islam, Vol. 11 (2017), p. 221. “200 Hezar Talabeh va Rouhani-e Khahar va Baradar-e Irani va Khareji dar Keshvar Vpjod Darad” (200,000 Iranian and Foreign Seminary Students and Cleric Brothers and Sisters Exist in the Country), Pegah News (20 Khordad 1400/June 10, 2021), https://bit.ly/3cP1jRq. Golkar, “Clerical Militia and Securitization of Seminary Schools in Iran,” p. 221. “Te‘dad-e Tollab va Rouhaniyoun-e Iran” (Number of Seminarians and Clergy in Iran), https://bit.ly/3zKSRvM.

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the Construction Jihad, the Revolutionary Guards, the police force, the various intelligence agencies, and the Ministries of Higher Education and Culture and Islamic Guidance. With the passage of time, the clergy’s leadership in these and similar institutions has given way to various “cultural activities and influences,” and now it often takes the form of serving in them as “representatives of the leader.” Whatever shape or form the clergy’s involvement in the state takes, it affords them various opportunities to interact with members of the public on multiple fronts. In the armed forces, through the ideological education of the rank and file, the clergy have been quite instrumental in shaping the army’s belief system. Additionally, the armed forces frequently ask noted theologians to take part in special events and ceremonies. When young students enter universities, they are also likely to come into contact with the leader’s representatives. In most universities, a majority of professors of philosophy (ma‘aref) are clerics, and, more importantly, many of the textbooks written in these and other similar disciplines are authored by clergymen. Even those youths who enter the workforce instead of the university system will experience clerical ideological indoctrination when they enter national service and come into contact with the leader’s representatives.22 Importantly, these clergy–public interactions occur under the auspices of the state, whereby the clergy is seen more as state functionaries rather than as spiritual leaders. How much of the state’s religious content translates to popular religious belief – religious beliefs as interpreted by the state – is open to question.23 Prior to the revolution, the clergy saw many of its functions steadily taken over by the state – from the management of the awqaf (religious endowment) to judicial functions, running schools, acting as trustees, and the like. The spread of universities especially challenged the clergy’s ability to provide specialized education, and new forms of socialization and entertainment greatly undermined traditional religious propagandists and panegyrists.24 The revolution reversed all this, 22

23 24

Alireza Pirouzmand, Tahavol-e Howzeh-e ‘Elmiyeh va Rouhaniyat dar Gozashteh va Hal (Transformation of the Howzeh in the Past and Present) (Qom: Ketab-e Farda, 1391/2012), pp. 390–391. I have explored this question in, Kamrava, Triumph and Despair, pp. 280–289. Mehdi Soleimanieh, Pol ta Jazireh: Ta‘amoli Jame‘h Shenakhti dar Moqe‘iyat-e Pasa-Enqelabi-e Rouhaniyat (Bridge to Island: A Sociological Analysis of the Postrevolutionary Position of the Clergy) (Esfahan: Arma, 1397/2018), p. 33.

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The Setting

and the clergy’s state capture has left few areas of life outside of clerical influence. Whereas previously the clergy was losing ground to the state and many of its institutions, now it has captured many of those very institutions.25 Throughout the 1980s, for example, the state set out to systematically Islamize the judiciary, beginning with the closure of the Bar Association (Kanun-e Vokala-ye Dadgostari) in June 1980. The legal profession underwent a steady clericalization, with a large-scale replacement of judges and attorneys with clerics and others trained in Islamic jurisprudence. The 1989 constitutional amendments replaced the Supreme Judiciary Council with a single head of the judiciary, which by law must be a cleric appointed by the velayat-e faqih. In 1994, sweeping changes were introduced to the penal code, which further Islamized the judiciary.26 The state also vigorously promoted communal Friday prayers. Khomeini carefully selected Tehran’s Friday prayer Imams from among his trusted lieutenants – Ayatollahs Montazeri and Taleghani and Hojatoleslam Khamenei – and their sermons were seen as important indications of the new system’s domestic and foreign policies.27 By one count, in 2021, the country had approximately 70,000 mosques, of which 2,000 were located in Tehran. A total of 840 Friday prayer Imams existed, although some 35 to 40 percent of all mosques were left without Imams.28 Also, by law, the Minister of Intelligence has to be a cleric. By tradition, the Minister of Interior has also often been a clergyman.29 Along with the howzeh, another key state institution in which the clergy have been active is the legislature, with several of the speakers of the Majles having been clerics.30 Not surprisingly, the clergy have 25 26

27

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30

Ibid., p. 35. Saïd Amir Arjomand, “Shi‘ite Jurists and the Iranian Law and Constitutional Order in the Twentieth Century,” in The Rule of Law, Islam, and Constitutional Politics in Egypt and Iran, Saïd Amir Arjomand and Nathan Brown, eds. (Albany, NY: SYNY Press, 2013), pp. 44–48. Ali Akbar Mohtashamipour, Chand-Sedai dar Jame‘h va Rouhaniyat (Multiplicity of Voices in Society and Among the Clergy) (Tehran: Khaneh-e Andisheh-e Javan, 1379/2000), p. 60. “200 Hezar Talabeh va Rouhani-e Khahar va Baradar-e Irani va Khareji dar Keshvar Vpjod Darad” (200,000 Iranian and Foreign Seminary Students and Cleric Brothers and Sisters Exist in the Country), Pegah News (20 Khordad 1400/June 10, 2021), https://bit.ly/3cP1jRq. Pirouzmand, Tahavol-e Howzeh-e ‘Elmiyeh va Rouhaniyat dar Gozashteh va Hal (Transformation of the Howzeh in the Past and Present), pp. 389–390. Ibid., p. 388.

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been instrumental in shaping the country’s political system at the highest levels in a variety of ways. Most key institutions of the state are set aside as the preserve of the clergy. The most important political institution in the land, of course, is the velayat-e faqih. The Constitutional Assembly of Experts, overwhelmingly dominated by the clergy, ensured the Islamic character of the system. Today, all eighty-eight members of the Assembly of Experts, whose chief responsibility is to select the velayat-e faqih, must be clergymen. Another key dimension of the clergy’s dominance over the system is through the Guardian Council, made up of six clerics and six lay legal experts, whose primary function is to qualify candidates for elected office and to ensure that Majles bills do not contravene Islam. There is also extensive clerical presence and influence in the Majles and in the Expediency Council, as well as in the Supreme Council of Cultural Revolution.31 One of the most important sources of power for the clergy since the revolution has been access to the economic resources of the state. Whereas before the revolution the clergy needed the people to make a living, now an increasing share of the clergy’s financing comes from the state. This has changed the clergy’s relationship with society, reducing its need for and reliance on the people.32 This financial dependence on the state, in both direct and indirect forms, has had several consequences. Over the past four to five decades, the composition and functions of the clergy have changed because of the country’s various transformations in general and the 1978–1979 revolution in particular. Whereas previously most clergy came from rural areas and smaller towns, now most have middle-class and urban backgrounds. After the revolution, the clergy’s easier access to power and sources of economic mobility has provided further incentives for some lay individuals from urban- and middle-class backgrounds to seek entry into the clerical establishment.33 At the same time, the clergy’s unprecedented involvement in multiple fields – from sports management to movie directing and leadership of many executive offices – has led to a loss of depth and “superficialization” of its social relations with many groups in society.34 The breadth 31 33 34

32 Ibid., pp. 406–408. Soleimanieh, Pol ta Jazireh (Bridge to Island), p. 34. Forati, Rouhaniyat va Siyasat (The Clergy and Politics), p. 46. Soleimanieh, Pol ta Jazireh (Bridge to Island), p. 35.

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The Setting

of the clergy’s scope of responsibilities has come at the expense of the depth of its relations with social classes. Political and administrative responsibilities also appear to have taken a toll on jurisprudential and other scholarly innovations by the clergy. As Chapters 6 and 7 make amply clear, apart from what transpired during the reform era, few innovations mark today’s ijtihad (independent reasoning), tafsir (interpretation of the Quran), and fiqh (jurisprudence). Ironically, the clergy seem to also suffer from a dearth of understanding the science of politics. Extensive and consequential involvement in state machinery has not necessarily meant that the clergy are devoting time and resources to understanding how state institutions operate. According to one set of statistics, of the more than 6,000 books published by the clergy around 2010–2011, only 2 percent dealt with topics related to institutions and state machinery. Another 29 percent of the books examined society and social issues, and nearly 69 percent dealt with personal ethics and morals.35 The capture of the state, meanwhile, has been driven by a pointed ideological agenda. Politics means the management of human societies, maintains the official orthodoxy. But this management cannot be only mechanical and without values. It also entails guidance toward divine objectives.36 Ayatollah Khomeini himself claimed that since the very appearance of Islam until today, all Islamic political systems have featured spiritual guidance of the people and have been driven by divine wisdom and inspiration. Hojatoleslam Ahmad Jahan-Bozorgi (b. 1955), known for his arch conservatism, maintains that “politics entails reforming people, enlightening them, and guiding them so that at the End of Time they can have salvation.”37 The state must, therefore, actively engage in social engineering, ensuring, at the very least, that the Islamic command of “prohibiting evil and enjoining good” is observed. Islam does place a high value on popular vote and on the people’s ability to choose. But humans are not completely free, and 35

36

37

Pirouzmand, Tahavol-e Howzeh-e ‘Elmiyeh va Rouhaniyat dar Gozashteh va Hal (Transformation of the Howzeh in the Past and Present), p. 422. These percentages are compiled by Pirouzmand himself, who has studied 6,000 published by the Iranian clergy, including books, articles, dissertations, online materials, and other similar publications. Ahmad Jahan-Bozorgi, Osul-e Siyasat va Hokumat (Principles of Politics and Government) (Tehran: Pazhoheshgah-e Farhang va Andisheh-e Eslami, 1378/ 1999), pp. 14–16. Ibid., p. 17.

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their free will has certain limits. Free will needs to be formulated within a certain framework, one that does not contradict Islam and its precepts. This balance between representing the people’s will and observing Islam is what Ayatollah Khomeini and other constitutional crafters had in mind when they proposed the idea of a “republic” that was also “Islamic.”38

Divisions within the Clergy Perhaps the biggest drawback to the clergy’s capture of the state has been the emergence of multiple new fractures within the clerical establishment and the amplification of preexisting ones. As an institution, the clerical establishment has always had a strong corporate identity.39 But the attainment of political power has been especially detrimental in undermining the clergy’s internal cohesion as a social class.40 From the outside, the clergy might seem monolithic as a group. But internally it has little uniformity and is marked by differences in its ideological and political preferences and its position on various jurisprudential positions.41 Different interpretations of jurisprudence and the shari‘ah are nothing new. But in Iran the revolution considerably raised the stakes for the clergy and sharpened potential dividing lines within them. Besides differences in interpretation, many of the disagreements revolve around the very essence of the Shia religion as a faith, as a means for social organization, and as a blueprint for governing and for political rule. The earliest divisions, in fact, emerged around Ayatollah Khomeini’s leadership of the postrevolutionary polity under the auspices of his own interpretation of the notion of velayat-e faqih. As Khomeini was consolidating his rule, many of the prominent ulama who disagreed with his jurisprudential interpretations were either formally or informally placed under house arrest. Some of the most renowned of these “dissident” high-ranking clerics included Ayatollahs Kazem 38

39

40 41

Jaber Amiri, Mabani-e Andisheh-haye Eslami (Foundations of Islamic Thought) (Qom: Mo‘aseseh-e Farhangi ve Entesharati-e Gorgan, 1380/2001), p. 89. Alireza Pirouzmand, “Enqelabigari, Hoviyatsaz-e Howzeh va Rouhaniyat” (Revolutionism, Identity-Maker for the Howzeh and the Clergy), ‘Olum-e Siyasi, Vol. 20, No. 80 (1396/2017), p. 12. Forati, Rouhaniyat va Siyasat (The Clergy and Politics), p. 35. Ibid., p. 24.

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Shariatmadari (1982), Hassan Tabatabaei Qomi (1984), Mohammad Sadeq Rouhani (1985), and, eventually, his disciple and former student Hosseinali Montazeri (1989).42 To this day, a number of prominent clerics – such as Grand Ayatollahs Vahid Khorasani, Shobairi Zanjani, and Makarem Shirazi, and those based in Iraq such as Ali Sistani and Muhammad Fayaz – all abstain from involvement in politics and have preferred to continue performing the historic roles and responsibilities of the clergy.43 The prominent clerics’ involvement in or abstention from politics finds parallels across the rest of the clerical hierarchy. Throughout the clerical establishment, a relatively small minority are directly involved at the various levels of the state and are present in its manifold institutions. As mentioned earlier, they are estimated to number around 5,000. These clergymen are directly employed by the state and benefit from its largesse. A second group of clerics, considerably larger in size compared to the first group, are not directly involved in the state or its institutions but nonetheless greatly benefit from its economic and political policies by default. Many enjoy the services, financial and otherwise, provided by the plethora of institutions that the state has created specifically for the clergy’s benefit.44 The city of Qom alone, for example, is estimated to have close to 2,000 state-supported religious institutions. The state does not reveal the annual budgetary allocations for many of these institutions. The budgets of a few institutions are, however, released. For example, the budget for the Services Center for the Qom Seminary, established in 1991 on Khamenei’s orders to support seminarians and their families, rose by 100 percent in 2022–2023 compared to the year before. The Center’s 2022–2023 budget of 2,157,000,000,000 tomans by far exceeds the budget of many of the other agencies of the state, including, for example, the Environmental Protection Organization.45

42

43 44 45

Mirjam Künkler, “The Special Court for the Clergy (Dadgah-e Vizheh-ye Ruhaniyat) and the Repression of Dissident Clergy in Iran,” in The Rule of Law, Islam, and Constitutional Politics in Egypt and Iran, Saïd Amir Arjomand and Nathan Brown, eds. (Albany, NY: SYNY Press, 2013), p. 59. Forati, Rouhaniyat va Siyasat (The Clergy and Politics), p. 24. Soleimanieh, Pol ta Jazireh (Bridge to Island), p. 34. “Taghyir-e Budjeh-e Nahad-haye Mazhabu dar Budjeh-e 1401” (Changes in the Budgets of Religious Institutions in the 1401 Budget), Tabnak News (23 Azar 1400/December 14, 2021), https://bit.ly/3vvsyHk. This page lists at least twenty-

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A third, small minority of the clergy, discussed more fully in Chapters 6 and 7, are opposed to the state on ideological grounds. In the 1990s and the early 2000s, members of this small minority found the space and the opportunity to express themselves through the vibrant press at the time, though since then in one way or another most have been silenced. The clergy who are somehow tied to the state, directly or indirectly, almost all of whom are ideologically rightists, have control over or ready access to various sources of power and to political, cultural, economic, judicial, and military institutions. These clerics enjoy special protection and privileges. On the other side, those who are known for their reformist tendencies or are oppositional face multiple restrictions, are often harassed, and their freedom of movement and expression is severely curtailed.46 The grand revolutionary coalition that Ayatollah Khomeini came to lead in 1978–1979 found itself with multiple ideological fractures soon after the revolution succeeded. Throughout the 1980s and the 1990s, within the ruling circle, two clusters of thinkers and activists began to form. One cluster was made up mostly of left-leaning religious intellectuals with professional backgrounds, such as engineers, physicians, and university students. The most notable representative of this group was former prime minister Mirhossein Mousavi, in office from 1981 to 1989. At the opposite end stood groups generally classified as the “traditional right” and comprised of the Qom Theological Teachers’ Association, the Society of Militant Clerics, an overwhelming majority of Friday prayer Imams, and other state-affiliated clerics.47 The right was ardently opposed to land reform and to changes in labor law, and, despite occasional pronouncements by Khomeini that reforms in these two areas were necessary, members of the Society of Militant Clerics and other rightist clerics would either drag their feet or even voice opposition to what had become a pro-business status quo.48 For its part, the left underwent a steady ideological transformation of sorts. In the 1980s, the left advocated statist economics and emphasized the

46

47

48

four religious institutions, the annual budget of which grew substantially compared to the previous year. Hasan Yousefi Eshkevari, Yad-e Ayam (Memory of the Times) (Tehran: Gam-e No, 1379/2000), p. 37. Mohtashamipour, Chand-Sedai dar Jame‘h va Rouhaniyat (Multiplicity of Voices in Society and Among the Clergy), pp. 28–29. Ibid., pp. 31–33.

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The Setting

importance of the cooperative sector of the economy, positions which by the 1990s it had largely abandoned in favor of greater political liberties. The “modern left” became a strong advocate of civil society, popular participation, and dialogue.49 The main issues that divided the clergy from one another in the early 1980s included the role of the state in the economy, issues related to land reform and the labor law, foreign trade, and efforts to dismantle monopolies.50 Equally divisive was the issue of taxation, with the right claiming there is no such thing as tax and that funds collected through khums (one-fifth, denoting the amount of tax to be paid to the ruler from one’s profits) and zakat (mandatory alms in Islam) should sufficiently provide for the state’s financial needs.51 These political and ideological differences finally came to the surface in 1987, when a group of clerics broke away from the rightist Society of Militant Clerics (Jame‘h Rouhaniyat-e Mobarez) and formed a more leftist organization called the Association of Combatant Clerics (Majma’-e Rouhaniyoun-e Mobarez). The Society of Militant Clerics was established in 1977, and after the revolution clerics affiliated with it gained considerable influence in several key institutions of the state, notably in the Islamic Republic Party, the Assembly of Experts, the Guardian Council, the Supreme Council of Cultural Revolution, and among the Friday prayer Imams.52 Its members were instrumental in the impeachment of President Banisadr and the onslaught on the Mujahedeen-e Khalq Organization in 1981, and they hegemonized the postrevolutionary discourse for a number of years. In the meanwhile, another discourse, this one belonging to the Society of Militant Clerics, emerged and steadily became a serious competition to the earlier clerical discourse. The internal unity of the clergy gradually deteriorated. By 1987, two main clerical groups had emerged, one the older, existing Society of Militant Clerics, and the other the

49

50

51 52

Mehdi Haqbin, Melli Mazhabi-ha (The Religious Nationalists) (Tehran: Markaz-e Asnad-e Enqelab-e Eslami, 1396/2017), pp. 40–41. Saideh Amini, Tahavvol-e Gofteman-e Majma’-e Rouhaniyoun-e Mobarez dar Jame‘h-e Pasaenqelabi-e Iran (Transformation of the Discourse of the Society of Militant Clerics in Iran’s Postrevolutionary Society) (Tehran: Kavir, 1397/2018), p. 152. Ibid., p. 153. Mohtashamipour, Chand-Sedai dar Jame‘h va Rouhaniyat (Multiplicity of Voices in Society and Among the Clergy), p. 27.

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Traditional Left

Modern Left

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Modern Right

Traditional Right

Figure 2.1 The clergy’s ideological spectrum in the Islamic Republic

comparatively leftist Association of Combatant Clerics.53 The two groups formally split from one another in 1988, near the end of Moussavi’s term as prime minister.54 History will record the 1990s as a time of profound ideological transformation and jurisprudential innovation in Iran. Religious discourses of different shades evolved in reaction to inter-elite politics. These discourses were, and continue to be, outcomes of the ways elites act, interact, and compete.55 Ideologically, the traditional groups on the left and right gave rise to modern varieties of their former selves, resulting in overlapping ideological tendencies that can be best described as traditional and modern left and traditional and modern right (Figure 2.1). The traditional right, made up almost entirely of arch-conservative clerics, never loosened its grip on the key institutions of the state. Besides the overwhelmingly important institution of the velayat-e faqih, the “absolute” iteration of which had by now been well entrenched, the traditional right controlled the highly influential Guardian Council, which had interpreted its constitutional responsibility of “supervising elections” (Article 99) to mean determining the qualification of candidates for elected office. Underestimating the popularity of the modern left, in 1997 the Guardian Council allowed the cleric Mohammad Khatami to run. Khatami’s presidency was initially wildly popular, having come about and then sustained through what came to be known as “the reform movement.” The right 53

54 55

Amini, Tahavvol-e Gofteman-e Majma’-e Rouhaniyoun-e Mobarez dar Jame‘he Pasaenqelabi-e Iran (Transformation of the Discourse of the Society of Militant Clerics in Iran’s Postrevolutionary Society), pp. 12–13. Ibid., p. 15. Mohammad Ayatollahi Tabaar, Religious Statecraft: The Politics of Islam in Iran (New York: Columbia University Press, 2018), p. 11.

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The Setting

backpedaled for the next eight years, doing what it could to stop or undermine Khatami’s reforms. From the earliest days, the religious right saw itself as the rightful protector of “Muhammad’s Islam” and accused the left of being a proponent of what it derogatorily called “American Islam.”56 According to the reformist cleric Yousefi Eshkevari, prior to Khatami’s election culture was the intellectuals’ only refuge.57 As it turned out, Khatami could not provide much political cover for the throngs of like-minded intellectuals and “new thinkers” anyway. The right’s wrath was unrelenting. Supposedly “rogue elements” within the Intelligence Ministry engaged in “chain killings” of notable reformists. Newspapers were shut in droves and their publishers fined, sometimes imprisoned. Having learned its lesson, in future elections the Guardian Council resorted to mass disqualification of aspiring candidates. By the early 2000s, the Islamic Republic was facing “a serious ideological crisis.”58 This crisis culminated in the eruption of the Green Movement, resolved only by brute force and reinvigorated authoritarianism after 2009.59 Today, as of this writing in 2023, the traditional right stands victorious. It is at most willing to share power with the modern right. But, as shown by the disqualification of long-time Majles speaker Ali Larijani in the presidential election of 2021, even that is not always guaranteed. Reflecting on the clerical establishment’s journey from the prerevolutionary to the postrevolutionary periods, it is worth asking whether it was the clergy who captured the state, or if it was the state that captured the clergy. The 1979 revolution marked a historically unprecedented turning point for Iran’s Shia clergy. Whereas previously they were at best advisors to power, as in during the Safavids and the Qajars, now, for the first time in Iranian history, they actually hold power. This hold on power was facilitated through a tripartite 56

57

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59

Mohtashamipour, Chand-Sedai dar Jame‘h va Rouhaniyat (Multiplicity of Voices in Society and Among the Clergy), p. 34. Mohammad Qoochani, Dowlat-e Dini va Din-e Dowlati (Religious Government and Government Religion) (Tehran: Saraee, 1379/2000), p. 9. Emadeddin Baqi, Gofteman-haye Dini-e Mo‘aser (Contemporary Religious Discourses) (Tehran: Saraee, 1381/2002), p. 257. I examine the reformist interlude and retrenched authoritarianism of postreform movement in Triumph and Despair, Chapters 4 and 5.

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arrangement made up of the velayat-e faqih, the Qom-based howzeh, and the Islamic government.60 With the revolution, the clergy was transformed from having once been a civil society organization – perhaps civil society’s most effective and at times its only element – into a primary pillar of the political establishment, and by far its most powerful component. Those clerics who wished to remain outside the orbit of the state and preferred the domain of civil society often run afoul of the political establishment.61 Hasan Yousefi Eshkevari, one of the most vocal of the reformist clergy during the reform movement, complains that “in our religious system today, the clergy who are not part of the system or whose views differ from the official orthodoxy are subject to especially harsh treatment and are singled out for special punishment.”62 As we shall see more fully in the next two sections, bureaucratization was one of the first strategies employed by the emerging state to control the clerical establishment and seminary schools. More ominously, the city of Qom is highly securitized, crawling with plainclothes officers from the country’s many intelligence agencies. In fact, the Islamic Republic’s efforts at controlling the clerical establishment have been far more expansive and pervasive than that ever attempted by the Pahlavi state.63 In addition to controlling the religious establishment in Iran, the Iranian state has also shown indications of wanting to control Iraq’s theological centers as well. So far, Grand Ayatollah Sistani (b. 1930) has been able to safeguard the political autonomy of Najaf-based seminaries, having fostered the most tolerant era in the

60 61

62 63

Soleimanieh, Pol ta Jazireh (Bridge to Island), pp. 13–14. An example occurred in 2018, when the archconservative Ayatollah Mohammad Yazdi (1931–2020) attacked Grand Ayatollah Mousa Shubairi Zanjani (b. 1928). Shubairi Zanjani has always retained his political independence, has abstained from supporting any clerical candidates for public office, and has remained politically outside of the system. Yazdi, who had served as judiciary chief and as head of the Assembly of Experts, criticized Shubairi Zanjani for his apparent lack of commitment to the Islamic Republic. Yazdi subsequently faced a huge backlash and had to backtrack. For more on this, see Hanif Mazroie, “Be Bahane-ye Nameh-i be Yek Marja‘ Taqlid” (An Excuse to Send a Letter to a Source of Emulation), BBC Farsi (November 1, 2018), www .bbc.com/persian/iran-46064456. Yousefi Eshkevari, Yad-e Ayam (Memory of the Times), p. 39. Golkar, “Clerical Militia and Securitization of Seminary Schools in Iran,” p. 217.

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The Setting

city’s storied intellectual history to date.64 Whether his successors can continue his tradition of independence from the state and tolerance remains to be seen.

The Institutional Context The clergy’s capture of the state occurred through several institutional means, by far the most important of which was the establishment of the position of velayat-e faqih. The jurisprudential arguments and innovations behind the velayat-e faqih require separate treatments of their own, found later, in Chapter 4. Here I will discuss the capture of the state through several other, additional institutional means, not the least of which included the constitution, the legislature, the judiciary, and the Guardian Council. Along with the presidency, these institutions constitute the key state bodies through which overall policy directions are set, state priorities are articulated and executed, the nature of state–society relations are decided on and put in place, and the broader profile of the state is formed and continually regenerated. Although a majority of the Islamic Republic’s presidents so far have been clerics, three of these clerical presidents – Rafsanjani, Khatami, and Rouhani – found many of their policies obstructed while they were in office by other state clerics. All three, in fact, were steadily marginalized as their tenures in office wore on, and they were largely treated as opposition figures by the deep state once they left office.65 Although the first couple of drafts of the postrevolutionary constitution were ostensibly secular, with no mention of the velayat-e faqih for example, the document that was eventually drafted through the deliberations of the Constitutional Assembly of Experts turned out to be thoroughly theocratic. According to one estimate, there were altogether five drafts of the constitution: an early draft prepared in Paris, a slightly modified version prepared in Tehran, a draft prepared by the provisional government, another one prepared by the Revolutionary Council, and the final draft as debated and drawn up

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Abbas Kadhim and Barbara Slavin, “After Sistani and Khamenei: Looming Successions Will Shape the Middle East,” Atlantic Council (July 2019), p. 4. For a fuller treatment of this topic, see Mehran Kamrava, Righteous Resilience: Power and Politics in Iran (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2023), chapters 4 and 5.

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by the Constitutional Assembly of Experts.66 The Constitutional Assembly of Experts was dominated by the clergy, a large majority of whom considered themselves to be dedicated to the person and the ideas of Ayatollah Khomeini. Perhaps the constitution’s crafters genuinely believed that “the Imam” could not possibly have autocratic tendencies. Or maybe they assumed that the country’s salvation lay in the institution of the velayat-e faqih. More likely, both assumptions guided their deliberations and final decisions. Whatever the motivation, the new republic’s constitution ended up designing a political system, the highest office of which looked very much like a monarchy but with a far more expansive scope of authority and more extensive powers. More importantly, the new monarch had express divine sanction, deriving his authority from none other than the Prophetic tradition and the twelve Shia imams. Simply put, the constitution outlined a political system that was theocratic through and through. Within the document, the largest number of articles are devoted to the religious nature of the system, nineteen articles altogether, followed by articles about security (sixteen), religious democracy (twelve), human dignity (eight), justice (seven), freedom (seven), welfare (seven), international relations (six), labor and capital (four), unity (four), Islamic-Iranian identity (four), and science (two).67 As part of the constitution’s “general principles,” the new system is said to be based on faith in “divine revelation and its foundational role in legislation,” “resurrection and its constructive role in human evolution toward God,” and “God’s justice in creation and legislation.” These are stipulated in Article 2, which also points to “continuous leadership and imamate as essential to the longevity of the Islamic revolution.” The article also highlights the importance of “ijtihad by qualified faqihs based on the Book and the hadith” as key to ensuring “human dignity, worth, and freedom combined with responsibility toward God.” More concretely, Article 4 of the constitution mandates that “all rules and regulations concerning civil, criminal, economic, administrative, cultural, military, political, and other matters must be based on the principles of Islam.” This article has resulted in the intimate tying 66

67

Meysam Belbasi, Hoviyat-e Melli dar Asnad-e Faradasti-e Jomhuri-e Eslami-e Iran (National Identity in High-Level Documents of the Islamic Republic of Iran) (Qom: Pazhoheshgah-e ‘Olum va Farhang-e Eslami, 1397/2018), p. 134. Ibid., p. 149.

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up of the Shia jurists in complex political matters across the machinery of the state. It has also prompted many clerics, even those who are not directly tied to the state, to think carefully about the state and its multiple needs.68 In many respects, the constitution, and the broader political system as a whole, have made it all but impossible for Iran’s contemporary clergy not to be somehow included within the orbit of the state. More broadly, they have made the country’s clerical class thoroughly politicized. Within itself, the constitution includes mechanisms for important political changes to be made to the system. Article 59 allows for a referendum, and Article 177 outlines processes for revisions to the constitution. In reality, however, holding a referendum is extremely difficult as it is subject to the approval of all twelve clerical and lay members of the Guardian Council.69 More importantly, Article 177 is explicit in those defining features of the constitution and the political system that cannot be changed: [T]he contents of those articles related to the Islamic nature of the system, the rules and regulations that are based on Islam, the foundational beliefs and goals of the Islamic Republic, the republican nature of the system, the guardianship of affairs (velayat-e amr), the people’s imamate, the basis of the system on Islam, and the official religion of the country, all are immutable and cannot be changed.

Starting in the earliest days of the new system, as the tenor of the constitution indicated, the steady Islamization of Iranian society continued apace. Soon after the revolution, Khomeini decreed the establishment of Revolutionary Courts, to be presided over by a clerical, shari‘ah judge (hakem-e shar’). The initial assumption was that these courts would be temporary and would deal with the various ethnic or ideological groups that sought to use the chaos of the revolution to their own advantage. But in 1983 the Majles recognized them as a permanent feature of the judiciary, and a subsequent law in 1994 put them on par with regular courts.70 The Revolutionary Courts have 68

69

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Ebrahim Shafi‘i Sarvestani, Feqh va Qanun-gozari (Fiqh and Law-Making) (Qom: Teh, 1381/2002), p. 13. Mohsen Esmaili, “Hamehporsi va Shoura-ye Negahban” (Referendum and the Guardian Council), Howzeh va Daneshgah, Vol. 9, (1382/2003), p. 26. Arjomand, “Shi‘ite Jurists and the Iranian Law and Constitutional Order in the Twentieth Century,” p. 33.

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jurisdiction over political offenses and cases dealing with national security, thus playing critically important roles in the system. For the Islamic Republic, the important task of Islamizing the judiciary has been somewhat fraught. More specifically, the experience of turning Shia fiqh into legal jurisprudence has not been easy. The resulting impasse has often left many issues unresolved, or it has resulted in laws that are largely inapplicable to existing times and circumstances. In many instances, the judiciary also lacks the necessary professional skills to pass judgments that do not require quick and extensive revisions.71 The judicial process itself remains subject to ongoing adjustments and tweaking. The need to have a judicial appeals process, for example, was first discussed in August 1979. Initially, however, appeals were made virtually impossible. After much internal discussion and debates on legal and procedural matters, the final regulations for an Appeals Court were passed in August 1985. The actual appeals process had been decided on in 1982. But the law was revised in August 1983, and the appeals process was reintroduced.72 Finally, in effect, the appeals process is by no means speedy and can take up to a decade.73 The judiciary underwent significant institutional changes when the constitution was revised in 1989. Originally, the highest judicial body in the land was a Supreme Judicial Council comprised of the head of the Supreme Court, the Chief Prosecutor, and three prominent mujtahids who would be elected by the country’s judges. In 1989, the Supreme Judicial Council was replaced by a single head of the judiciary, to be appointed for a five-year term by the velayat-e faqih from among the country’s prominent mujtahids (Article 157). Since then, Khamenei’s practice has been to reappoint the incumbent judiciary head to one additional five-year term. One of the responsibilities of the judiciary head is to recommend a list of candidates for the minister of justice to the president (Article 158), further ensuring the Islamization of the country’s judicial process. The Islamization of the legislative functions of the state has been somewhat problematic. The state has had an especially difficult time introducing and ratifying legislation that addresses contemporary needs but is also compatible with Islam. This became starkly evident 71 72

Shafi‘i Sarvestani, Feqh va Qanun-gozari (Fiqh and Law-Making), p. 261. 73 Ibid., p. 191. Ibid., pp. 175–209.

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in the case of labor law, as well as laws on usury and criminal conduct. The labor law, to highlight one example, was introduced in 1979 but only ratified in 2000. The law on whether or not banks can charge interest on loans was first discussed in 1980 but passed only in 1990.74 The law on criminal punishment was also first introduced in 1980, finally ratified by the Majles in 1991, and finalized by the Expediency Council the same year.75 In each case, the process is similar. The issue is first discussed and debated in the Majles. Often, in order to advance their own positions on a particular issue, the relevant cabinet ministers or MPs are likely to seek an initial endorsement from a living marja‘. If they are lucky, they may get advance endorsement from Khamenei. The bill’s passage in the Majles can still take a few years. After it clears the Majles, the bill is referred to the Guardian Council, which may either reject it altogether or raise concerns about specific aspects of it. After referring the matter to the Expediency Council, which can add its own modifications, the bill can become law. The whole process can take a decade or more. One of the key institutions designed to ensure the continued Islamization of the state and the political process is the Guardian Council. The Council is made up of six prominent clerics appointed by the velayat-e faqih and six legal experts nominated by the head of the judiciary and approved by the Majles. One of the key functions of the Guardian Council is to safeguard the compatibility of Majles bills with Islam. Within the Council, only the six clerical members can make such a determination, resulting “in the increasing subservience of the lay lawyers” in the council and making “the clerical jurists of the council its only consequential members.”76 Another important function of the Guardian Council is interpreting the constitution. In the 1980s, in fact, because of its activist interventionism in the legislative process, the Council played an important role in constitutional jurisprudence, especially during the tenure of its traditionalist secretary, Ayatollah Lotfollah Safi, from 1980 to 1988. It also began playing a gatekeeper function of determining candidate eligibility in standing for elections. This approbationary (estesvabi) function grew significantly under the leadership of the 74 76

75 Ibid., p. 120. Ibid., p. 135. Arjomand, “Shi‘ite Jurists and the Iranian Law and Constitutional Order in the Twentieth Century,” p. 35.

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archconservative Ayatollah Ahmad Janati (b. 1927), who had been the Council’s secretary in 1992.77 The views and opinions of the Guardian Council may be divided into three broad categories: those views expressed in relation to bills passed by the Majles, opinions expressed in regard to other laws that may contradict Islam, and interpretations of some of the articles of the constitution. When the Guardian Council examines laws other than those being proposed by the Majles, they might be government regulations, existing laws being examined for their compatibility with or contravention of Islam, or legal opinions in response to questions from those with administrative responsibility.78 So far, these opinions have not been compiled into a legal, jurisprudential corpus. Despite its considerable significance, in fact, unlike the discussions of the Majles that are all recorded, the deliberations of the Guardian Council are neither recorded nor made available to the public.79 The result has been an absence of written precedent or accumulated jurisprudential contributions by the Guardian Council. As the scholar Saïd Arjomand observes, “[O]wing to the absence of a written jurisprudence remotely comparable to the jurisprudence of the Egyptian and other constitutional courts (or the Supreme Court in India, Israel, and the United States), it can be stated categorically that the Guardian Council has made no contribution to institution building in the Islamic Republic of Iran.”80 In addition to its array of institutions meant to foster clerical inclusion in and control over the state, the Islamic Republic has also devised an institutional mechanism for ensuing compliance by and punishment for the noncompliant clergy. Shortly after the revolution, in order to deal with those clerics who had collaborated with the monarchy, Khomeini decreed the establishment of what he called the Special Court for the Clergy. A few years later, in 1987, he decreed the court’s revival, and in 1999 the Majles formalized the Court’s establishment and gave its ruling binding, legal status. Separate and unrelated to the

77 78

79 80

Ibid., p. 39. Mohsen Kadivar, Daghdagheh-haye Hokumat-e Dini (Concerns of Religious Government) (Tehran: Nashr-e Ney, 1376/1997), p. 53. Ibid., p. 56. Arjomand, “Shi‘ite Jurists and the Iranian Law and Constitutional Order in the Twentieth Century,” p. 39.

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regular judiciary, the Special Court is meant only to deal with legal infractions involving the clergy. These legal infractions may fall into any one of four categories: all forms of crimes committed by a clergyman, instances of moral turpitude, any activity that disrupts public security, and any special investigation referred to the court by the velayat-e faqih.81 There is an internal appeals process, and a decision may be appealed once, but the final decision of the court cannot be appealed to any other body. Defendants are not allowed to have an attorney present during the court’s proceedings. The Special Court was very active during the reform era, doing its best to silence reformist clerics and to debunk their ideas. The clerics summoned before the court were often charged with broad and vague crimes – the reformist cleric Mohsen Kadivar, for example, was accused of “spreading propaganda against the Islamic Republic” and “publishing falsehoods” – revealing that accusations are often actually motivated by factional and ideological considerations.82 Not surprisingly, in his memoirs, Ayatollah Montazeri condemned the Special Court as being in contravention of the constitution and maintained that its judgments violate the shari‘ah.83 The court’s judgments have ranged from prison sentences to flogging (especially for moral crimes), sending one to exile, and temporary or permanent defrocking. At the very least, the threat of being summoned before the court, or the actual legal hassles of being summoned, serve as deterrents to jurisprudential innovation, much less nonconformity. Reformist clergy accuse the Special Court for the Clergy, rightly, of trying to keep the gates of ijtihad shut through fear and intimidation. Through its actions, the court has shown an intolerance for research, science, and the expert opinion of mujtahids and jurists. This, reformist clerics maintain, has dire consequences for the hundreds of clergy and mujtahids whose views fall outside of the official orthodoxy.84 Shia history is replete with debates and disagreements among famous mujtahids. But now that intellectual vibrancy has been brought to a halt by the Special Court for the Clergy, which has given itself the right

81

82 83 84

“Dadgah-e Vizheh-e Rouhaniyat” (Special Court for the Clergy), Vakil-e Top (2 Mordad 1401/July 24, 2022), https://bit.ly/3BK4Hrg. Yousefi Eshkevari, Yad-e Ayam (Memory of the Times), p. 61. Montazeri, Khaterat (Memoirs), pp. 409–410. Yousefi Eshkevari, Yad-e Ayam (Memory of the Times), p. 60.

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to determine the scope and parameters of the kinds of ijtihad that are officially tolerated and accepted.85

The Qom Theological Seminary Besides the formal institutions of the state, another important source of power in the Islamic Republic is the seminary establishment in the city of Qom, formally called the Howzeh-e Elmiyeh-e Qom, or howzeh for short. Howzeh can refer to the formal educational establishment for the specialized training of the clergy – what is generally referred to as “seminary” – and is often also used in a more generic sense to refer to the clerical establishment, especially that large portion of it which is based in the city of Qom. In Iran, except for those located in the cities of Mashhad and Esfahan, which operate independently, all seminaries in other cities are under the supervision of the Qom howzeh.86 A Howzeh ‘Elmiyeh is usually comprised of several schools or seminaries and a few prominent scholars. According to one report, in 2020 there were more than 100,000 seminary students in Iran, with a large majority of them located in the city of Qom.87 The Qom howzeh is by far the country’s most prominent center of Shia learning and scholarships. Seminarians see their institution more as a religious-cultural entity that occasionally feeds the state with advice and suggestions. Qombased cleric and scholar Alireza Pirouzmand divides the howzeh’s activities and significance into a number of overlapping areas. The biggest area of focus for the howzeh is the larger society, whereby the howzeh ensures and facilitates the Islamic character of Iranian society by preserving Islam and Islamic values. Another area of significance for the howzeh, according to Pirouzmand, is inside the institutions of the state, where the howzeh works to preserve the Islamic character of key state institutions, including especially the civil service. “It is incumbent upon the howzeh to be present

85 86

87

Ibid., pp. 60–61. Saeed Halalian, Negah-i beh Howzeh (A Look at the Howzeh) (Qom: Ketab-e Farda, 1393/2014), p. 375. “Akharin Amar Darbareh-e Te‘dad-e Tollab dar Howzeh-e ‘Elmiyeh” (Latest Statistics Concerning Seminary Students in Howzeh ‘Elmiyeh), Din Online (February 28, 2020), https://bit.ly/3SmMjun.

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The Setting

and active in the fields of cultural, economic, and political engineering of society,” Pirouzmand writes. This requires that those who are active in cultural affairs, and those who are at the helm of the howzeh and who are committed clergymen, to be present in policymaking circles at the highest levels of the state so that they can influence and direct national policy. Today, the clergy is present at all levels and fields of decision-making, and this is a result of the fact that the howzeh has provided them with professional, specialized training.88

Lastly, the howzeh works at the level of the individual person, nurturing Islamic beliefs within the believer.89 Another howzeh insider, the cleric Saeed Halalian, maintains that the howzeh has a multidimensional identity that goes beyond educating seminary students and promoting religion. The howzeh is a center for analysis, understanding, propagation, strategizing, and at times even for engaging in administrative and executive work. The goal of establishing a howzeh, or any other type of a clerical establishment, is for the clergy to promote religion in society in an organized, coordinated manner.90

History of the Howzeh Largely informal with mostly indirect connections to the various institutions of the state, the howzeh is an important component of the Islamic Republic’s rule in several respects. With its concentration of religious scholars engaged in teaching and research on Islamic sciences, the howzeh serves as the intellectual and ideological nerve center of the state. According to the state’s official narrative, the “Islamic revolution” originated at the howzeh, from where Khomeini launched his revolutionary activities against the Shah. But the howzeh’s significance is more than just symbolic. The institution is also an important source of recruitment of future cadres of state functionaries. Equally important is the howzeh’s function as a center for the articulation and reproduction of ideological and jurisprudential orthodoxy. Today, within the howzeh, the Qom Theological Teachers Association (Jame‘h-e Modarresin-e Qom) has emerged as an archconservative 88

89 90

Pirouzmand, Tahavol-e Howzeh-e ‘Elmiyeh va Rouhaniyat dar Gozashteh va Hal (Transformation of the Howzeh in the Past and Present), p. 97. Ibid., pp. 21–22, 24. Halalian, Negah-i beh Howzeh (A Look at the Howzeh), p. 60.

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body that regularly issues strongly worded proclamations and statements against advocates of reforms and other “deviations from the straight path.”91 Qom’s rise to Shia prominence dates back to the first century of Islam, when political pressures prompted many Shia scholars to relocate from Kufa to Qom, which at the time was “like an island because of its Sunni surrounding.”92 The city’s religious significance steadily increased during the reign of the Safavids, who made Shi‘ism Iran’s state religion, and then the Qajars, who continued to rely heavily on the Shia clergy for their political legitimacy. In 1922, just as a new dynasty was being established in Iran, Grand Ayatollah Abdolkarim Haeri established the Howzeh Elmiyeh there. Significantly, the howzeh was one of two institutions of higher learning that started operating during Reza Shah’s reign. The University of Tehran was established in 1934, meant to serve as the country’s epicenter of modern science and modernity. Since then, there has been a palpable gap in the cultural and intellectual orientations of the university and the howzeh, despite the fact that for more than four decades now the Islamic Republic has sought to reverse the trend. With Haeri’s death in 1937, the howzeh experienced a steady decline until 1945, when another Grand Ayatollah, Hossein Boroujerdi, moved to Qom and once again revitalized the institution. The howzeh’s size and stature grew considerably under Boroujerdi’s leadership. The fact that Boroujerdi assiduously avoided politicizing the howzeh and was therefore largely left alone by the state was no doubt consequential in its growth. Ayatollah Montazeri estimated that the number of seminary students went from 800 in 1941, the year Montazeri went to Qom as a young man, to about 3,000 in 1961, when Boroujerdi died.93 Up until Boroujerdi’s death, religious activist thought had a cultural tone to it. Only afterward did it become political.94 Equally 91

92

93 94

Mohtashamipour, Chand-Sedai dar Jame‘h va Rouhaniyat (Multiplicity of Voices in Society and Among the Clergy), p. 54. Mohammad Saeed Bahmanpour, “The Howzah Ilmiyyah of Qom and the Production of Religious Knowledge in the Contemporary Era,” Journal of Shi‘a Studies, Vol. 1, No. 3 (Summer 2008), p. 87. Montazeri, Khaterat (Memoirs), p. 45. Baqi, Gofteman-haye Dini-e Mo‘aser (Contemporary Religious Discourses), p. 248.

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The Setting

importantly, throughout Boroujerdi’s life and even afterward, the city of Qom and the howzeh were steeped in traditionalism, both culturally and intellectually. Qom and the howzeh became havens for those repulsed by the pseudo-modernism of the Pahlavi monarchy and its ostentatious, Western-oriented materialism. The two polar opposites of Pahlavi pseudo-modernism and Qom-centered traditionalist conservatism fed off of each other. The Fadaiyan-e Islam did not emerge in a cultural vacuum. They represented extremist versions of what many, especially in Qom, felt. Within such an environment, jurisprudential or other intellectual innovations did not find hospitable arenas for growth. Beginning in the 1940s, for example, a group of clerics emerged who, while devout believers, adopted critical views toward traditionalist Shia beliefs and sought to reform them. Once such cleric was Sheikh Mohammad Khalesizadeh (1888–1963), who maintained that Iranian society was divided into a pole of “proponents of modernity” on the one side and “pretenders of religiosity” on the other, neither of which had a real interest in Islam. In fact, they both hamper the prospects for real reform and rethinking of the central tenets of Islam and Shi‘ism.95 Khalesizadeh found himself isolated within the howzeh, with Boroujerdi going so far as to prevent the publication of a book that Boroujerdi had initially encouraged him to write. Before long, the intellectual current that Khalesizadeh represented died out, and the howzeh resumed its traditional intellectual culture of jurisprudential conservatism. One of the sharpest critics of this intellectual conservatism was none other than Khomeini, whose relations with Boroujerdi had often been tense while the old master was alive. Khomeini saw the howzeh as one of the main sources of social malaise in Iran.96 Khomeini’s criticism of the howzeh was both direct and indirect. Directly, he called for reforms in the curriculum, in teaching methods and pedagogy, in propagation efforts, and in making Islam relevant to prevailing social and political

95

96

Fereihi, Feqh va Siyasat dar Iran-e Mo‘aser (Jurisprudence and Politics in Contemporary Iran), pp. 57–59. Soleimanieh, Pol ta Jazireh (Bridge to Island), p. 101. For a detailed examination of Khomeini’s critique of the howzeh and the larger clerical establishment, see Khakban, Jame‘h Shenasi-e Rouhaniyat-e Iran-e Mo‘aser (Sociology of Contemporary Iranian Clerics), pp. 250–315.

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conditions.97 Among other things, Khomeini also called for “the intellectual and moral reform of individuals within the howzeh.”98 He also wanted the howzeh to become politically aware, provide guidance for deep and meaningful social change, and to build “a system based on divine teachings.”99 Khomeini also believed that the howzeh had done very little to promote Islam through propagation and missionary work.100 As far back as 1970, Khomeini maintained that “the howzeh needs to be reformed so that old and stale teaching, and methods of propagation can be brought up to date. Laziness, indolence, despair, and lack of trust and confidence, which are currently so pervasive in the howzeh, need to be replaced with seriousness, proactive effort, and self-confidence.”101 The howzeh shows the consequences of colonialism. There is only laziness in the howzeh, and only abstract issues and prayers are discussed at the howzeh. Besides these, nothing else happens at the howzeh.102 The institution, he claimed, needs a good cleansing. It must be purged of those who keep it from growing.103 While he was still in Qom prior to his exile from Iran in 1964, Khomeini’s politicized lectures made him popular among young seminarians. By the same token, he was unpopular among older, more conservative clerics who preferred to continue operating below the state’s radar. Immediately before his exile from Qom to Najaf, Khomeini is estimated to have had as many as 1,200 seminary students. Although he did not articulate his ideas on the velayat-e faqih until later, he did call on seminary students to be politically aware and to proactively spread the message of Islam: “Now you have neither a country nor an army. But propagation of the cause is still one of your responsibilities. The enemy has not yet been able to take away your ability to propagate your cause.”104 Many of these students, from his time both in Qom and in Najaf, went on to occupy prominent positions in the Islamic Republic.105 97

98 101

102 105

Khakban, Jame‘h Shenasi-e Rouhaniyat-e Iran-e Mo‘aser (Sociology of Contemporary Iranian Clerics), p. 250. 99 100 Ibid. Ibid., p. 256. Ibid., p. 293. Ruhollah Khomeini, Velayat-e Faqih: Hokumat-e Eslami (Velayat-e Faqih: Islamic Government) (Tehran: Mo‘aseseh-e Tanzim va Nashr-e Asar-e Emam Khomeini, 1379/2000), p. 137. 103 104 Ibid., p. 143. Ibid., pp. 146–147. Ibid., p. 127. Eric Hooglund and William Royce, “The Shi‘i clergy of Iran and the Conception of an Islamic State,” State, Culture, and Society, Vol. 1, No. 3 (Spring 1985), p. 103.

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The Setting

The Howzeh and the Revolution In the years immediately before the revolution, the howzeh found itself in great intellectual turmoil. This turmoil was being fed from both inside and outside of the country. From the outside, at the same time as Qom sought to maintain its precarious modus vivendi with the Shah, Khomeini, now in Najaf, called for the monarchy’s overthrow and its replacement with an Islamic government. Khomeini’s early years in Najaf had not been happy ones, having been shunned by the city’s prominent clerics and unable to attract many students. But he persisted, continued teaching, and in 1970 published his magnum opus, The Islamic Government. Suddenly, many in the Qom howzeh found themselves out of sync with what at the time seemed like a giant jurisprudential leap. This was occurring at the same time as a young intellectual inside the country was presenting “revolutionary” interpretations of Shi‘ism to throngs of enthusiastic audiences in Tehran and elsewhere. Ali Shariati was a sociology professor at Mashhad’s Ferdowsi University. But it was his lectures at a Tehran religious salon named Hosseiniyeh Ershad that spoke to the anxieties of politically alienated middle classes searching for answers. Shariati’s revolutionizing of Shia ideology found receptive ears deep inside the seminary itself, their effects compounded by radical arguments of a Khomeini who was finding himself increasingly intellectually rehabilitated. There were, of course, clerical scholars who were intellectually active. An example was the erudite Ayatollah Morteza Mottahari, whose many publications included a multivolume refutation of Marxist materialism. Nevertheless, by and large the howzeh found itself out of step with the increasingly revolutionary tenor of the times.106 The howzeh, and the clerical establishment in general, entered the revolution as they themselves faced profound turmoil. Despite its intellectual dearth in the 1970s, the revolution turned out to be a boon for the howzeh. The revolution in many ways also revolutionized the howzeh in resulting in a rapid expansion of the number of seminary students, fostering major changes in the howzeh’s leadership structure, and placing marja‘s at the helm of the seminary.107 The 106 107

Forati, Rouhaniyat va Siyasat (The Clergy and Politics), pp. 122–127. Soleimanieh, Pol ta Jazireh (Bridge to Island), p. 99.

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revolution’s success was soon followed by a proliferation of new seminaries in Qom, with four new ones established between 1980 and 1984 alone. New universities and specialized libraries were also founded, as were journals such as Howzeh, all of which encouraged intellectual activity and knowledge production among young clerics. Before the revolution, there were fifteen religious educational and research institutions in the city of Qom, six of which were either libraries or were under the control of libraries. Since the revolution, the number of Qom’s educational and research institutions has exceeded 200. Of these 200 institutions, no less than 80 are either official state bodies or are somehow related to the state, 28 belong to various marja‘-e taqlids, 18 fall under the Office of the Leader, 14 belong to the Howzeh ‘Elmiyeh-e Qom, and 8 belong to private endowments and are completely independent of the state.108 The number of seminaries and seminary students, tollab, also increased substantially after the revolution. Accurate data on the precise number of seminarians is not available. A 2016 report put the number of the country’s seminary students at 130,000, of whom 80,000 live in Qom. There are about 60,000 female seminary students, of whom 8,000 live in Qom and the rest tend to be concentrated in the cities of Esfahan and Mashhad.109 Another report, this one from 2020, put the number of seminarians at “more than 100,000.”110 In 2014, 17,000 new students were reported to have entered the country’s seminary schools, bringing their total number to about 150,000. Of the new students, 1,200 went to seminaries in Qom, bringing the total number of seminarians there to about 80,000.111 There are an additional 3,000 muballeqs (propagators) in Iran.112 Today there are

108

109

110

111

112

Pirouzmand, Tahavol-e Howzeh-e ‘Elmiyeh va Rouhaniyat dar Gozashteh va Hal (Transformation of the Howzeh in the Past and Present), p. 456. “Amar-e Howzeh-haye ‘Elmiyeh va Rouhaniyoun beh Ravayat-e Moshaver-e Vazir-e Farhang” (Statistics on Howzeh ‘Elmiyehs and the Clergy according to Advisor to Minister of Culture), Islamic Republic of Iran News Agency (July 26, 2016), https://bit.ly/3vskCq6. “Akharin Amar Darbareh-e Te‘dad-e Tollab-e Howzeh-e ‘Elmiyeh” (Latest Data Concerning the Number of Seminary Students in Howzeh ‘Elmiyeh), Din Online (9 Esfand 1398/February 28, 2020), https://bit.ly/3SmMjun. “Akharin Amar-e Tollab-e Howzeh-haye ‘Elmiyeh” (Latest Data on Seminary Students in Howzeh ‘Elmiyehs), Tabnak (September 1, 2014), https://bit.ly/ 3zZmg5u. Ibid.

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The Setting

estimated to be a total of 860 seminary schools around the country, with 410 for men and 450 for women.113 If the success of the revolution led to a renaissance of sorts in the howzeh, it all came to a crashing halt in 1989, when Ayatollah Montazeri was removed as Deputy Leader and his appointees and disciples were steadily dismissed and replaced.114 The intellectual vibrance that Qom was experiencing in the first few years of the revolution soon saw a precipitous dampening. This occurred at the same time that the state was increasingly asserting its control over the clerical establishment. Throughout the 1980s and the 1990s, the howzeh became increasingly bureaucratized and procedural, with procedures being devised for issues such as student admissions, statistical records, transcripts, coordinated exams, dormitory assignments, and offices looking after provincial seminaries.115

Bureaucratization and Administrative Control After the Islamic Republic was established, a Council for the Management of the Qom Seminary (Shoura-ye Modiriyat-e Howzeh ‘Elmiyeh) was established in 1981 in order to regulate and coordinate seminary affairs.116 This was part of a broader effort to assert state control over the clerical establishment and to further bureaucratize it. The need for some sort of institutionalized leadership of the howzeh was first discussed by Ayatollah Khomeini in 1979. In 1981, a Leadership Council of the Qom Theological Seminary was inaugurated, made up of three representatives each of Ayatollahs Khomeini and Golpaygani and also three representatives from the Qom Seminary Teachers’ Society. Although the Leadership Council was disbanded in 1991, the thrust toward bureaucratization and state control of the howzeh continued apace.117 The trend toward greater bureaucratization picked up pace with the political ascent of Khamenei to the position of velayat-e faqih. As a 113

114 115 116

117

Golkar, “Clerical Militia and Securitization of Seminary Schools in Iran,” p. 219. Baqi, Rouhaniyat va Qodrat (The Clergy and Power), pp. 170–172. Soleimanieh, Pol ta Jazireh (Bridge to Island), p. 42. Golkar, “Clerical Militia and Securitization of Seminary Schools in Iran,” p. 218. Halalian, Negah-i beh Howzeh (A Look at the Howzeh), p. 379.

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mid-ranking cleric with scant scholarly contributions to his name, Khamenei was keen to consolidate his hold over the clergy. What ensued was the emergence of a vast administrative network designed to control most, if not all, aspects of the clergy’s life. One observer has called this the “statization of Shia Islam” in Iran.118 In 1991, Khamenei took a much-celebrated trip to Qom and announced the formation of the “Supreme Council of the Qom Theological Seminary” in place of the Leadership Council that Khomeini had established earlier.119 That same year the state also created a hierarchical structure for control of the clerical establishment. At the top of the pyramid is the Supreme Council for the Seminary (Shoura-ye ‘Ali-ye Howzej ‘Elmiyeh), the clerical members of which are appointed by Khamenei and are responsible for planning the main strategies and policies of all seminaries in Iran. Below this body is the Center for the Management of the Seminary (Markaz-e Modiriyat-e Howzeh ‘Elmiyeh), which oversees all seminary and clerical activities. Since 2010, branches of both of these bodies have been established in each of the country’s provinces.120 In his first few years as the velayat-e faqih, Khamenei paid considerable attention to the structural organization of the howzeh and the importance of established, formal procedures for the howzeh’s governance and internal operations.121 He emphasized the need for the howzeh to become even more procedural, professional, and centralized. Following procedural changes, the howzeh now has mechanisms for internal self-review.122 Khamenei also maintained that the howzeh underutilized its own resources, including especially its human resources, as the expertise of its scholars and its students are often not used to their full potential. “We must employ efforts,” he once exhorted seminarians, “and engage in everything possible to modernize the howzeh so that it can address the needs of Islam in the country and also the system.”123 Khamenei also called for an upgrading of the 118

119 120

121

122 123

Golkar, “Clerical Militia and Securitization of Seminary Schools in Iran,” p. 218. Soleimanieh, Pol ta Jazireh (Bridge to Island), p. 44. Golkar, “Clerical Militia and Securitization of Seminary Schools in Iran,” pp. 218–219. Saeed Solh-Mirzaie, Howzeh va Rouyhaniyat (Howzeh and the Clergy) (Tehran: Markaz-e Asnad-e Enqelab-e Eslami, 1390/2011), pp. 193–196. Soleimanieh, Pol ta Jazireh (Bridge to Island), pp. 43–44. Solh-Mirzaie, Howzeh va Rouyhaniyat (Howzeh and the Clergy), pp. 63–64.

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The Setting

howzeh’s propaganda efforts, the updating of its textbooks, and an expansion and upgrading of fiqh that would enable it to deal with contemporary problems. He has called the absence of progress on Islamic philosophy “a real catastrophe.”124 According to Khamenei, the howzeh has lagged behind in scientific and scholarly production in areas such as law, philosophy, ethics, and religious studies. This, he argued, has caused the howzeh to be behind the times.125 Like Khomeini, Khamenei has paid close attention to the howzeh, in terms of its larger relevance, its management and internal organization, and its integration into and relationship with the rest of the state. One evidence of this careful attention is the number of speeches Khamenei gave to the howzeh, especially in his first decade of tenure as the velayat-e faqih, along with his administrative appointments to various research and educational institutions that are either directly or indirectly affiliated with the howzeh. Through the establishment of a number of state-funded organizations – such as the Center for Digital Research in the Social Sciences, and the Center for Providing Support Services to the Seminaries – Khamenei’s office provides financial support to seminary students and has been able to involve itself in the operations of the howzeh.126 The howzeh’s bureaucratization has had several unintended consequences, some of the most notable of which include loss of charisma by the Shia marja‘s; reduced creativity, individuality, and innovation by seminary students and teachers alike; and overwhelming dependence on the state and its various institutions. Today, much of the impetus for change, scholarly creativity, and jurisprudential innovation is coming from outside of the howzeh. Not surprisingly, the exhortations of the velayat-e faqih notwithstanding, the howzeh now often finds itself reacting to innovative ideas rather than spearheading them, having to grapple with ijtihad instead of generating it internally.127

Howzeh Structure and Curriculum As a result of all the changes made over the course of the last couple of decades, the power structure of a contemporary typical howzeh 124 126 127

125 Ibid., pp. 216–221. Ibid., pp. 65–66. Forati, Rouhaniyat va Siyasat (The Clergy and Politics), p. 50. Soleimanieh, Pol ta Jazireh (Bridge to Island), p. 73.

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resembles a hierarchy. At the bottom of the pyramid is the pool of seminary students, and above them a smaller number of teachers and researchers. Above the teachers are an even smaller group of mujtahids, of whom at least one subscribes to the notion of velayat-e faqih. Above the mujtahids is another, yet smaller group of marj’-e taqlids, usually numbering around four, again at least one of whom is supportive of, and is supported by, the velayat-e faqih. At the top of the pyramid is the chief marja‘, again most likely supportive of both the position and the person of velayat-e faqih.128 Within the howzeh itself, the highest decision-making body is the Supreme Council of the Qom Seminary, which is responsible for overall policies in areas such as curriculum, ethics, propaganda, social issues, tuition and fees, and other similar matters.129 There is also the Higher Council of Qom Theological Seminary, which oversees the various theological seminaries in the country. The High Council’s charter was enacted in 1995 by Khamenei and a number of senior marja‘s. The Council is made up of senior theologians who are responsible for policymaking and programming in areas of education, ethics, propagation, and social works at the Qom howzeh and the other howzehs across the country that use its services and facilities. Council members also choose their own Council Head and the director of the Qom Theological Seminary. As such, overseeing the works of other seminaries is among the Higher Council’s most important functions.130 In addition to its own elaborate internal organization, the city of Qom houses a number of institutions related to the howzeh that are dependent on, and are supported by, the Office of the Leader. They include: Al Mustafa International University Qom Theological Seminary Office for Islamic Propagation (est. 1979) Al Zahra University (est. 1984) Imam Khomeini Institution for Education and Research The Ahl-e Beyt World Assembly Global Assembly for the Unity of Muslim Religions

128 129 130

Forati, Rouhaniyat va Siyasat (The Clergy and Politics), p. 50. Halalian, Negah-i beh Howzeh (A Look at the Howzeh), p. 378. Forati, Rouhaniyat va Siyasat (The Clergy and Politics), p. 55.

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The Setting

Center for Hajj Research Center for Computer Research in the Social Sciences131 Recent decades have also seen a significant expansion in the howzeh’s curriculum and the range of subjects that are taught there. Broadly, propagation and teaching are two of the most important and basic activities of the clergy. Through teaching and propaganda, the assumption goes, faqihs can lay the groundwork for the establishment of an Islamic government.132 Since its initial founding, the Qom Howzeh ‘Elmiyeh has come to specialize in the production of knowledge in four specific areas: law and jurisprudence, with a focus that would “delve into more practical and contemporary issues and avoid entering into purely hypothetical topics”;133 a revival of biography of Hadith narrators (rajal) and Hadith investigators; tafsir, or exegesis of the Quran; and philosophy, including, somewhat uniquely, comparative philosophy.134 After the revolution, the howzeh has witnessed a proliferation of highly specialized subjects of study, such as Islamic management, Islamic behavioral studies, political fiqh, fiqh and new technologies, fiqh and journalism, and a number of other similar subjects. Initially, the howzeh resisted the study of the social sciences in general and sociology in particular. But today sociological theory is widely discussed, and the howzeh has even started to grant doctoral degrees in sociology. There has been a parallel attempt to indigenize the social sciences, economics, and humanities. A similar effort has sought to promote those natural sciences with deep roots in Islamic culture and civilization, such as medicine and mathematics.135 Originally, the country’s 450 seminary schools for men taught 16 disciplines. That number of disciplines taught has now significantly increased, with seminaries in Qom teaching a total of 37 different disciplines. In 12 other provinces, the seminaries located there teach 20 disciplines.136 131 132

133

134 135

136

Halalian, Negah-i beh Howzeh (A Look at the Howzeh), pp. 396–432. Khomeini, Velayat-e Faqih: Hokumat-e Eslami (Velayat-e Faqih: Islamic Government), p. 128. Bahmanpour, “The Howzah Ilmiyyah of Qom and the Production of Religious Knowledge in the Contemporary Era,” p. 92. Ibid., pp. 92–93. Halalian, Negah-i beh Howzeh (A Look at the Howzeh), p. 271. For a detailed discussion of the curricular offerings at the howzeh, see ibid., pp. 285–313. “Akharin Amar’e Tollab-e Howzeh-haye ‘Elmiyeh” (Latest Data on Howzeh ‘Elmiyehs), Tabnak (September 1, 2014), https://bit.ly/3zZmg5u.

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When the Cultural Revolution was launched in 1981, in order to bridge the gap between the universities and the howzeh, some social science professors went from Tehran to Qom and started discussion groups with seminarians on various topics in history, anthropology, and sociology. This led to the establishment in 1983 of a new office in Qom called “The Howzeh and the University,” and the formation of a Social Sciences Group under its auspices. The group sponsored research and scholarship, published books and a journal called Islam and the Social Sciences, and accepted graduate students and granted doctoral degrees in the social sciences.137 Islamic jurisprudence and especially the velayat-e faqih are two of the new favorite subjects being studied in the howzeh since the revolution.138 Fiqh, especially political fiqh, has become a particularly popular subject of study and specialization.139 Despite this popularity, however, there have been little theoretical advances in jurisprudence, especially after the first few years of the revolution. This is largely a result of the political atmosphere that has prevailed over the howzeh in recent decades, in turn causing many of the most renowned ulama – such as Ayatollahs Vahid Khorasani, Mousa Shubairi Zanjani, Mirza Aki Asghar Falsafi, and Fazel Lankarani – to focus their lectures and lessons on the topic of velayat-e faqih instead.140 The howzeh has not, of course, been a passive recipient of changes forced on it. Given its long history and its own internal dynamics, in fact, the howzeh has seldom been receptive to institutional or cultural changes.141 A number of powerful figures within the howzeh, for example – chief among them Ayatollahs Asadollah Bayat-Zanjani (b. 1941), Lotfollah Safi (1919–2022), and Hossein Vahid Khorasani (b. 1921) – have voiced criticism against the ongoing changes in the howzeh and its growing bureaucratization, complaining that such processes undermine the institution’s unique identity and its overall 137

138

139 141

Mohammad Hossein Pooryani, “Tahlil va Arzyabi-e Amuzesh va Pazhohesh-e ‘Olum-e Ejtema‘i dar Howzeh ‘Elmiyeh,” in ‘Olum-e Ejtema‘i dar Iran va Chemandaz-e Ayandeh-e An (Social Sciences in Iran and Its Future Prospects), Zia Hashemi and Mehri Sadat Mousavi, eds. (Tehran: Pazhouheshgah-e ‘Olum-e Ensani va Motale‘at-e Farhangi, 1390/2011), p. 169. Abdolvahab Forati, Danesh-e Siyasi dar Howzeh-e ‘Elmiyeh-e Qom (Political Knowledge in the Qom Theological Seminary) (Tehran: Sazman-e Entesharat-e Pazhoheshgah-e Farhang va Andisheh-e Eslami, 1390/2011), p. 177. 140 Ibid., p. 194. Ibid., p. 198. Soleimanieh, Pol ta Jazireh (Bridge to Island), p. 44.

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social and religious relevance. Others, like Ayatollah Abdolkarim Mousavi Ardebili (1926–2016), have sharply criticized the howzeh’s loss of autonomy and its dependence on the state.142

Divisions within the Howzeh The political forces brought to bear on it, along with the country’s larger postrevolutionary milieu, have combined to divide the howzeh’s scholars and teachers into three loosely divided groups, two of them minorities and one in majority. One minority is tied to the state. Another minority, located at the opposite pole, is silently oppositional. A majority of seminarians, located between these two polar opposites, are largely nonpolitical and are more interested in religious scholarship rather than political endeavors.143 The first group of seminarians are ideologically committed supporters of the state, especially the concept of velayat-e faqih as articulated by Ayatollah Khomeini and now put into practice by Khamenei. This group can itself be divided into those who are not in power and abstain from holding influential political positions, and those who immerse themselves in the state’s high offices, to many of which the clergy have privileged access.144 This small group of politically connected and influential clergy also has at its disposal a number of Qom-based institutions that are influential in public policy. Two of the most important of these institutions are the Qom Seminary Office for Islamic Propaganda (Daftar-e Tablighat-e Eslami-e Howzeh-e Elmiyeh-e Qom) and the Imam Khomeini Institute for Research and Education (Mo‘aseseh-e Amouzeh va Pazhohesh-e Imam Khomeini).145 The precise nature of the organizational and institutional relationship between the velayat-e faqih and the howzeh is not quite clear. Similar ambiguity marks the relationship between those marja‘s who are protective of their political and scholarly independence on the one side and the howzeh on the other.146 What is clear is that a number of key executive positions are exclusively the preserve of individuals from the howzeh. These include the velayat-e faqih; the marja‘s; seminary 142 143 144 145 146

Ibid., pp. 71–72. Baqi, Rouhaniyat va Qodrat (The Clergy and Power), pp. 179–180. Forati, Rouhaniyat va Siyasat (The Clergy and Politics), pp. 51–52. Ibid., p. 52. Halalian, Negah-i beh Howzeh (A Look at the Howzeh), p. 377.

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directors and instructors; Friday prayer Imams; khums and zakat collectors; judges and prosecutors; the heads of the judiciary, the Supreme Court, and the Ministry of Intelligence; members of the Assembly of Experts; clerics of the Guardian Council; and social and cultural leaders such as the representatives of the velayat-e faqih in the universities, in the security forces, and oversees endowments.147 Today, in many respects the howzeh has actually become part of the deep state.148 There is a second group of marja‘s and religious personalities who generally reject the idea of political guardianship by a religious scholar. While most hold generally positive views toward the Islamic Republic, they are not in favor of the clergy’s direct involvement in politics. Moreover, cautiously, they are concerned about the howzeh’s growing dependence on the state and the political establishment’s interference in howzeh affairs.149 The third group, which is numerically preponderant, generally tends to be more traditional in its assumptions about the clergy’s social role and functions. Many of the clergy with research responsibilities in the seminary are preoccupied with their traditional scholarly responsibilities and simply want to guard their political and financial independence.150 While broadly supportive of the Islamic Republic, this group does not always actively endorse state policies and agendas. Some within the group do not even see it as necessary or desirable to interact with state-affiliated clerics. As a result, many of its members find themselves on the margins of political life.151 There are also intellectual divisions within the howzeh, with seminary scholars broadly divided into the right and the left, or traditional and progressive, respectively, with the principal dividing issues revolving around matters such as sources of political legitimacy (divine versus popular) and domestic and foreign policy preferences. Loosely dividing themselves into the right and the left, after the 2009 elections 147 148

149 150

151

Ibid., 121–122. For a discussion of the Islamic Republic’s deep state, see Kamrava, Righteous Resilience, chapter 9. Forati, Rouhaniyat va Siyasat (The Clergy and Politics), p. 52. After his dismissal by Khomeini as the deputy leader, for example, Ayatollah Montazeri met with senior ayatollahs in the howzeh, most notably Ayatollahs Golpaygani and Araki, and pleaded for the howzeh’s political and intellectual independence. Montazeri, Khaterat (Memoirs), pp. 412–413. Forati, Rouhaniyat va Siyasat (The Clergy and Politics), p. 53.

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the terms “conservative” and “moderate,” widely used in the larger society, became prevalent in the howzeh also. Today, seminarians can be divided into three broad groups: the rightist Society of Militant Clerics (Jame‘h Rouhaniyat-e Mobarez) and the Qom Seminary Teachers’ Association; the leftist Association of Combatant Clerics (Majma’-e Rouhaniyoun-e Mobarez) and the Association of Qom Seminary Researchers; and those who may be considered as “culturalists” and belong to neither camp but preoccupy themselves with purely religious matter and focus on the preservation of values.152

Criticism from Within I will end this discussion of the howzeh with revisiting some of the criticism leveled against it, this time by figures who were themselves once closely affiliated with the institution. Mention has already been made earlier of the damning condemnation of the howzeh by both Khomeini and Khamenei, the former when he was out of Iran and in Najaf, and the latter when he first became the velayat-e faqih and sought to turn the howzeh into one of his badly needed bases of support. These earlier criticisms, in other words, can be seen as politically motivated moves meant to advance specific agendas. But these have been far from the only criticisms the howzeh has faced, some coming from within the institution itself. For example, Hojatoleslam Saeed Halalian (b. 1979), himself a student in and a researcher of the howzeh, describes the seminary as having become another arm of the state, an over-bureaucratized “organization” (sazman) as opposed to an “institution,” a “system,” or a “corporate group.”153 Even influential members of the Supreme Council of the Qom Theological Seminary have called for changes in the howzeh, some claiming that unless the howzeh’s curriculum is revamped to become more practical and up to date, the clergy will soon find themselves politically and professionally obsolete.154 The legal scholar and social scientist Mohammad Reza Bandarchi argues that the dominant intellectual atmosphere of the howzeh has long resisted change. It therefore remains stale and does not invite 152 153 154

Ibid., p. 54. Halalian, Negah-i beh Howzeh (A Look at the Howzeh), p. 66. Soleimanieh, Pol ta Jazireh (Bridge to Island), p. 47.

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critical thinking. There is little dialogue within the seminary between professors and their pupils, he maintains. “Professors show few innovations, and new subjects are never or rarely discussed. Students are similarly unqualified and do not have the necessary preparation to question their professors’ perspectives. The dominant atmosphere [of the seminary] does not allow for intellectual dynamism either.”155 Equally sharp criticism has been voiced by former member of the Majles and a one-time rising ideologue of the right, Emad Afrough. According to Afrough, the howzeh has consistently failed to address social, cultural, and even jurisprudential issues, and its ijtihad is no longer dynamic. It is neither a source of unofficial power, nor is it a civic force for supervision of society. With its vast repertoire of knowledge and resource, and its history and heritage, the howzeh can articulate a philosophy of education, rival universities in its knowledge production and its cultural and scientific impact, and be a powerful force in influencing politics and society. But it has failed in all of this.156 Afrough maintains that the howzeh has significant potential to foster free and creative thought, something for which there is great popular thirst.157 But since the revolution, the institution has failed to live up to its potential. Perhaps because of its loss of political and financial independence, it has lost all intellectual vigor. Not only does it not produce science and literature, it has abandoned its mission of exploring and contributing to fiqh and Islamic philosophy. It does not provide answers and solutions to jurisprudential issues regarding the management and administration of the country, and it has failed to generate a new political philosophy or political jurisprudence. Its primary preoccupation instead is simply to justify its continued existence. Moreover, very much like a university, the howzeh has become preoccupied with rank and title. If not careful, the howzeh is running the risk of inadvertently replicating the religious hierarchy of Christian churches.158 155

156

157

158

Mohammad Reza Bandarchi, “Roshd va Poyai-e ‘Elm-e Feqh” (Growth and Dynamism of the Science of Fiqh), in Noandishi va Ejtehad (New-Thinking and Ijtihad), Vol. 1, Jalal Mir-Aqaie, ed. (Tehran: Majma’-e Jahani-e Taqrib-e Mazaheb-e Eslami, 1382/2003), p. 365. Emad Afrough, Ma Ghal wa Man Ghal, Vol. 2 (What Was Said and Who Said It, Vol. 2) (Tehran: Hamshahri, 1392/2013), p. 387. Emad Afrough, Ma Ghal wa Man Ghal, Vol. 3 (What Was Said and Who Said It, Vol. 3) (Tehran: Hamshahri, 1392/2013), p. 151. Ibid., pp. 683, 701.

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Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani, an even bigger political insider, was far more damning in his critique of the howzeh. Rafsanjani criticized the howzeh for spending far too much of its time and intellectual energy on what he called a “jurisprudence of worship” as opposed to “jurisprudence of transactions,” fiqh-e ‘ebadat and fiqh-e mo‘amelat, respectively. The jurisprudence of worship deals with issues such as ritual cleansing, fasting, khums, zakat, and hajj, topic on which the howzeh over-publishes. But there are far too few jurisprudential works on some of the more practical and immediate issues with which contemporary society must also deal, among them farming, economic competition, remittances, power of attorney, compensation, as well as fate, free will, and martyrdom.159 Rafsanjani’s criticism of the howzeh was blunt: My advice to all the howzehs, to the ulama, and all the seminary teachers is that if you want the system to remain Islamic and for it to take your views into account, first you must change the howzeh. You must engage with issues that concern society’s needs. . . . Prayer is one act of worship in our lives, but politics is all of our life. Education, economy, culture, sports, leisure, travel, and other similar matters have rules and regulations. The correct thing for the howzeh to do is to explore each of these areas from an Islamic perspective. . . . I do not think that the howzeh can properly explore matters of politics and government yet, and neither has the government provided the proper support for the howzeh to fulfill its important function of ijtihad. This requires an understanding between the leader, who is himself a mujtahid, and the howzeh. . . . The howzeh has properly done the function for which it was set up only if it takes governmental fiqh seriously and studies all its different dimensions.160

According to Rafsanjani, from a theoretical perspective, we have all the needed ingredients, such as the appropriate foundations, dynamic ijtihad, and capable mujtahids. What we need more of is close collaboration between state officials and the howzeh so that the howzeh does more than just criticize politics. This way if there is a

159

160

Hamidreza Esmaili, Andisheh-ye Ayatollah Hashemi Rafsanjani (Political Thoughts of Ayatollah Rafsanjani) (Tehran: Pazhouheshgah-e ‘Olum-e Ensani va Motale‘at-e Farhangi, 1397/2018), p. 111. Quoted in, Reza Sanati, Mashru‘iyat-e Asemani (Divine Legitimacy) (Qom: Salman-e Farsi, 1394/2015), pp. 80–81.

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state policy that runs counter to someone’s fatwa, there is broad consensus over how to deal with the issue.161

Afrough, Rafsanjani, and other insiders may criticize the howzeh’s lack of intellectual vigor and innovativeness. But the institution itself, having effectively become another arm of the state, is reportedly soliciting negative reactions from local residents in Qom. Residents and visitors to the city report rising levels of popular anger at the clergy, not only because of their archaic views but, perhaps more significantly, because of their wealth and their numerous privileges. Many of Qom’s religious centers and institutions, both private and semi-private, have benefitted considerably from government largesse, being housed in shiny, modern buildings with comfortable amenities and ample resources. These centers especially benefited from the Ahmadinejad presidency, so much so that by 2011 the government’s budget allocation to Qom seminaries was seventeen times higher than it had been in 2005.162 A bifurcation is emerging among the city’s residents, many of whom struggle to make ends meet, and seminarians and clerics, benefitting from direct and indirect forms of state largesse, who are mostly well paid and often live quite comfortably. As hundreds of millions of dollars are spent on the facilities of religious institutions and salaries for seminary students and teachers, many of Qom’s residents live in poverty or are economically stressed.163

Conclusion The clerical establishment was instrumental in the launch of the social movement that ended up in the 1978–1979 revolution and in shaping its tenor and its direction. Most consequentially, it was the clerical establishment that ascended to the top of the revolutionary movement, therefore being most perfectly positioned to reap the rewards of postrevolutionary victory when the monarchy finally collapsed in February 1979. That the Iranian revolution turned out “Islamic” was by no means a foregone

161 162

163

Quoted in Ibid., p. 85. Mehdi Faraji, “Protesting Clerical Welfarism in Iran’s Pious City,” MERIP (January 28, 2019), https://bit.ly/3E7qoPp. Ibid.

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conclusion. But the clergy’s contribution and later leadership of the movement, especially as it neared victory in its final months, cannot be denied. Long a voice in the wilderness, Khomeini had been calling for the Shah’s overthrow for at least a decade by the time his revolutionary dreams came true. This he had done through a jurisprudential innovation radical for its time, namely direct rule by a faqih. Khomeini took an old idea – that of the velayat-e faqih, or guardianship of the jurisconsult – and revolutionized it by making it explicitly political and giving it the responsibility to rule. In that sense, Khomeini’s jurisprudential innovation, and his single-minded crusade against the Shah, were both revolutionary. In nearly every other respect, however, the Ayatollah was animated by a desire to stop or to reverse the changes that the monarchy’s pseudo-modernity was fostering in Iranian society. Resistance to Pahlavi-initiated social change had deep roots in Iranian society, and it had most recently been violently expressed by the short-lived Fadaiyan-e Islam. Khomeini’s ideas of an ideal Iranian society were eerily close to – some would say inspired by – those of the Fadaiyan-e Islam’s founder, Navvab Safavi. As the 1978–1979 revolution approached, and as popular revolutionary enthusiasm swept aside any semblance of reasoned discourse and dialogue, Khomeini’s reactionary conceptions of the ideal social order were all but forgotten. The popular assumption, reinforced by the intellectuals who pledged their support and loyalty to him, was that Khomeini and, along with him, the rest of the clerical establishment were “revolutionary” in the true sense of the word. But the clerical establishment, which had long been divided among itself, had engaged in little innovation of any kind, either on its own or through the institution of the howzeh. And its capture of the state starting in 1979 did little to reverse its intellectual barrenness. If anything, by significantly raising the stakes, state capture made the clergy all the more protective of the status quo, determined to hold on to power at all costs. Equally valuable for the victors of the revolution has been the howzeh, from which many of the clergy actually hail. The howzeh has been a hallowed institution of religious teaching and learning for the better part of a century. For nearly as long, it has been a bastion of jurisprudential traditionalism. Khomeini saw it as archaic and out of date in 1970. Two decades later, when Khamenei became the velayat-e faqih, he said the same thing. The new leader did not stop there, however. He extended the state’s capture to the howzeh,

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bureaucratized it, ensured its financial dependence, and, through added administrative units, made it a practical extension of the state. If the howzeh was ever a forum for jurisprudential innovation, that rare possibility is even rarer now. Not surprisingly, what jurisprudential innovation has taken place, by Khomeini and by successive generations of religious scholars, has been overwhelmingly outside of the howzeh.

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3

A Question of Jurisprudence

If we take shari‘ah to mean the corpus of Islamic law as revealed through the Quran and the traditions of Prophet Muhammad (Hadith), then the understanding and practice of the shari‘ah is called fiqh. In English, fiqh is commonly translated as Islamic jurisprudence, with jurisprudence itself conventionally meaning philosophy or theory of law. Political fiqh, therefore, can mean a body of Islamic legal theory as it relates to politics. This chapter traces the politicization of Shia fiqh in Iran, and the historical context within which this politicization has occurred. The chapter also explores Khomeini’s contributions to Shia political fiqh, and the journey that Iranian Shia fiqh has had as it entered the 1978–1979 revolution and led to the establishment of the Islamic Republic. Khomeini, the chapter demonstrates, constructed a new fiqh, a jurisprudence that was political and, with the passage of time, steadily more radical and expansive. Khomeini was by no means the first theologian to politicize Shia fiqh. But he was indeed the first to theorize about direct rule by a scholar of fiqh, a faqih. The chapter therefore begins with an examination of Khomeini’s contributions to and innovations in fiqh. It then situates Iranian Shia fiqh within a broader historical context from its inception up to the 1978–1979 revolution. Moving the focus to the postrevolutionary period, the chapter examines how fiqh, now an instrument of rule and political control, underwent further transformations, and fragmentations, before and after Khomeini was alive. The chapter ends with examining some of the major innovations made to Iranian fiqh by the country’s postrevolutionary thinkers, activists, and even prominent officeholders.

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Fiqh and Politics Let us first start with a fuller definition of fiqh. In its most commonly used form, fiqh is equal to religion.1 More specifically, fiqh may be defined as a body of knowledge that is based on understandings of and insights into religious affairs.2 Fiqh literally means knowledge and understanding of the rules and regulations of Islam that are derived through reason and elaboration. These rules and regulations include humans’ responsibility to God, to the self, and to others as outlined in Islam.3 In simple terms, fiqh means the deductive understanding of Islamic laws and regulations, its ahkam.4 The sources of fiqh include the Holy Quran, the traditions attributed to the Prophet, one’s own reason (ijtihad), and the consensus of the community (ijma’).5 The past one hundred years or so have seen a variety of theories by Shia faqihs in the various seminaries.6 For some, political fiqh is simply the science of making politics more pious.7 For others, it is all the answers that fiqh presents for political questions that exist now or may emerge in the future, such as issues related to legitimacy, elections, and separation of powers.8 In Iran, the politicization of fiqh over the past several decades did not just change fiqh’s focus onto social and political matters. It also profoundly transformed both its primary functions and also popular assumptions about it. What we see in Iran is the transformation of Shia political jurisprudence from “knowledge of shari‘ah regulations concerning political life” 1

2

3

4

5 6

7

8

Sadeq Haghighat, “Feqh-e Siyasi va Democracy” (Political Fiqh and Democracy), Andisheh-e Siyasi dar Eslam, Vol. 1, No. 4 (1394/2015), p. 39. Masood Matlabi, Mohammad Mehdi Naderi, and Mohsen Hedayat Manesh, “Enghelab-e Eslami-e Iran va Bast-e Fiqh-e Siyasi-e Shia” (Iran’s Islamic Revolution and the Growth of Shia Political Jurisprudence), Faslnameh-e Motale‘at-e Siyasi, Vol. 4, No. 16 (1391/2012), p. 119. Abolfazl Mousavian, Mabani-e Dini-e Mardomsalari (Religious Foundations of Democracy) (Qom: Mofid University Press, 1395/2016), p. 137. Ebrahim Shafi‘i Sarvestani, Feqh va Qanun-gozari (Fiqh and Law-Making) (Qom: Teh, 1381/2002), p. 36. Haghighat, “Feqh-e Siyasi va Democracy” (Political Fiqh and Democracy), p. 39. Mohsen Kadivar, Nazariyeh-haye Dowlat dar Feqh-e Shia (Theories of Government in Shia Jurisprudence) (Tehran: Nashr-e Ney, 1378/1999), p. 30. Mansour Mirahmadi, Feqh-e Siyasi (Political Jurisprudence) (Tehran: Samt, 1395/2016), p. 39. Matlabi et al., “Enghelab-e Eslami-e Iran va Bast-e Fiqh-e Siyasi-e Shia” (Iran’s Islamic Revolution and the Growth of Shia Political Jurisprudence), p. 124.

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A Question of Jurisprudence

to “knowledge of political Islam regarding arranging life” and as a “maker of systems.”9 Political fiqh, then, is made up of those regulations that govern people’s relationships with each other. In recent decades, one of the tasks that the ulama in Iran have set for themselves, starting especially with Khomeini, has been to make the scope of fiqh more expansive, moving beyond the realm of law only and including other arenas of human activity within it. Ali Khamenei, to take just a more recent example, maintains that fiqh involves the totality of social, political, economic, and personal life.10 He defines fiqh as science and knowledge of religion in its totality, and a keen awareness of what this means and entails. Khamenei claims that fiqh “outlines all dimension of life from birth to after death, including the individual’s personal and private life, social and political life, and economic and cultural life.”11 It is the responsibility of the faqih, therefore, to find rules and regulations for every hallmark in a person’s life. Later clerics have sought to put a fine point on this. Fiqh may be allencompassing, but political fiqh is not. Political fiqh, some have argued, does not deal with personal issues or matters of worship, since the government does not have the right to interfere in the personal lives of individuals, except in instances that relate to the public good.12 This expansiveness of fiqh extends especially to the domain of politics. Khomeini’s steady politicization of Shi‘ism was not without jurisprudential justification. Islam is inherently political because of its philosophical and jurisprudential underpinnings, and also because it regulates individual and social relations.13 Since it sets goals and ideals for people and for entire societies, the separation of Islam from politics is simply not possible.14 And Islam has permeated polities for the entirety of the premodern and early modern periods. In essence, what 9 10

11

12

13

14

Ibid., p. 115. Abdullah Ebrahimzadeh Amoli, “Mansha’-e Mashru‘iyat-e Velayat-e Faqih az Didgah-e Emam va Rahbari” (Source of Velayat-e Faqih’s Legitimacy from the Perspective of the Imam and the Leader) Hokumat-e Eslami, Vol. 19, No. 3 (Autumn 1993/2014), p. 105. Matlabi et al., “Enghelab-e Eslami-e Iran va Bast-e Fiqh-e Siyasi-e Shia” (Iran’s Islamic Revolution and the Growth of Shia Political Jurisprudence), pp. 120–121. Mousavian, Mabani-e Dini-e Mardomsalari (Religious Foundations of Democracy), p. 141. Esmael Darabkalaie, Negaresh-i bar Falsafeh-e Siyasi-e Eslam (A Look at the Political Philosophy of Islam) (Qom: Bostan-e Ketab, 1380/2001), p. 40. Ibid., p. 43.

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Khomeini was trying to do was to wed traditional modes of Islamic legal and political governance to a modern nation-state and its institutions. According to Khomeini, Islam is so concerned with politics that the ratio of verses in the Quran dealing with social and political issues as compared to matters of worship is a hundred to one.15 As a religion, Islam is far more than a system of beliefs or a series of ethical guidelines. By setting rules for proper behavior at the individual and collective levels, and by regulating the management of society, it is innately political.16 The proposition that Islam and politics are inseparable has now become an ingrained aspect of mainstream Shia thought in Iran, at least in official postrevolutionary circles. There are theoretical and practical bonds between religion and politics, the general assumption goes. God revealed religion to man for purposes of guidance, and the theory and practice of politics is no exception. The easiest way for religion and politics to be connected is for man not to consider the various dimensions of social life – such as economics, law, and ethics – as separate from religion. Religion is made up of a series of rules and regulations sent from God to facilitate man’s ascent to more noble planes of existence, some of the most important of which are the ways the community is socially and politically organized. Therefore, the political systems in existence should be consistent with the tenets and philosophical underpinnings of religion, so that each member of society can become a more pious and noble person.17 Not surprisingly, Shia jurists and specialists of fiqh have devoted most of their attention to political questions. A majority of contributions to Shia fiqh revolve around issues such as imamate and the leadership of the Muslim community, loyalty and allegiance, jurisprudential knowledge, ijtihad, and imitation.18

15

16

17

18

Mousavian, Mabani-e Dini-e Mardomsalari (Religious Foundations of Democracy), p. 141. Haghighat, “Feqh-e Siyasi va Democracy” (Political Fiqh and Democracy), p. 38. Darabkalaie, Negaresh-i bar Falsafeh-e Siyasi-e Eslam (A Look at the Political Philosophy of Islam), p. 37. Abolfazl Shakoori, Feqh-e Siyasi-e Eslam (Islam’s Political Jurisprudence) (Qom: Markaz-e Entesharat-e Daftar-e Tablighat-e Eslami, 1377/1998), p. 217; Mousavian, Mabani-e Dini-e Mardomsalari (Religious Foundations of Democracy), p. 141.

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The Historical Context Given the long history of political instability in Iran and other Muslimmajority territories, the collapse of ruling dynasties, and the emergence and consolidation of new ones, Islamic political thought did not have the opportunity to grow and develop in a cohesive manner.19 Shia clergy, in fact, have adopted different perspectives on fiqh at various times based on prevailing conditions and developments. Shia jurisprudence has therefore experienced several different iterations, each having been shaped by larger historical and political forces and each having left a mark on its transformation and evolution. One of the earliest periods in the evolution of Shia fiqh started with the Occultation in 941 and lasted until the early 1500s, during which time most Sunni rulers were rabidly anti-Shia.20 This led some ulama to justify the practice of dissimulation (taqiyyah) in order to enable the Shii to evade persecution. Largely out of necessity, some of the clergy during this period adopted a generally tolerant attitude toward the state, distinguishing between just and unjust rulers. Beginning near the end of the Abbasid dynasty (750–1517), a number of Shia clerics theorized that if it benefitted their community, it was permissible to collaborate with the sultan and to even enter into his service. Others preferred to remain politically silent during this period, limiting their activities to matters of worship and the seminary, theorizing that matters such as congregational Friday prayers, religious festivals, offensive jihad, and other similar endeavors would be made possible only with the appearance of the Hidden Imam.21 As a result, there was something of a flourishing or personal, private fiqh and a relative disregard for public fiqh. During this phase, political and legal issues 19

20

21

Javad Tabatabai, Daramadi bar Tarikh-e Andisheh-e Siyasi dar Iran (A Look at Political Thought in Iran) (Tehran: Kavir, 1395/2016), p. 23. Shia theologians agree that Imam Mahdi’s Greater Occultation started on 329 AH/941 CE. There is a lack of consensus, however, over the length of the Hidden Imam’s earlier, Lesser Occultation, with some theologians maintaining it was sixty-nine years, while others claiming it was seventy-four years. Hussein Elahinejad, “Mahdaviyat Mabna-ye Din Shenakhti-e Velayat-e Faqih dar Tahkim-e Nezam-e Jomhuri-e Eslami” (Mahdism as the Basis for Religious Understanding of Velayat-e Faqih in Strengthening the Islamic Republic System), Faslnameh-e ‘Elmi-Tarviji Pazhohesh-haye Mahdavi, Vol. 4, No. 15 (Winter 1394/2015), p. 69. Matlabi et al., “Enghelab-e Eslami-e Iran va Bast-e Fiqh-e Siyasi-e Shia” (Iran’s Islamic Revolution and the Growth of Shia Political Jurisprudence), p. 116.

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were largely ignored, and most faqihs were neither willing nor intellectually qualified to discuss them. When faqihs did venture into discussing politics, most of their treatise revolved around questions of political cooperation with those in power.22 A new phase in the evolution of Shia fiqh began with the establishment of the Safavid dynasty in the early 1500s and lasted until the Constitutional Revolution in the early 1900s. With Shi‘ism as the official state religion of Iran, and with clergy receiving considerable support and patronage from the state, there was little or no discussion of velayat-e faqih at this time, except in relation to the private affairs of the needy, widows, orphans, and others left similarly on the margins of society. With the coming to power of the Safavids, al-Muhaqqiq alKaraki (1461–1534) elaborated on the notion of the velayat-e faqih as a representative of the Hidden Imam to look after the affairs of the community, socially and economically but not politically. Al-Karaki also argued that as long as the sultan was just, Shia clergy could consider him righteous and his rule was legitimate. In such cases, alKaraki maintained, it would be permissible to pay taxes to the state and to even accept handouts and gifts from the sultan.23 Sheikh Ali Naqi Kamarehi (1546–1622) similarly claimed that although the clergy were the rightful political heirs of the Twelve Imams, a just sultan was permitted to rule during the Occultation.24 The demise of the Safavids did not bode well for the Shia clergy, who adopted what one scholar has called a “discourse of silence” from the end of the Safavid period in 1736 until after the start of the Qajars in the mid-1780s.25 Similar to their status during the Safavid, owing largely to their close collaboration with the monarchy, the clergy acquired more freedom of thought and expression in the Qajar era. This period saw the start of Shia political theory. More specifically, Qajar ulama introduced concepts such as the general guardianship of the faqih, especially the faqih’s shari‘ah responsibilities to the 22

23

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Mousavian, Mabani-e Dini-e Mardomsalari (Religious Foundations of Democracy), p. 142. Mohammad Baqeri, “Seyr-e Tarikh-e Andisheh-e Siyasi-e Fuqaha-e Shia” (History of the Political Thoughts of Shia Clergy), Faslnameh-e Motale‘at-e Afkar-e ‘Omumi, Vol. 3, No. 10 (1393/2014), pp. 94–95. Ibid., p. 95. Abolfazl Morshedi, “Tahavvol-e Gofteman-e Siyasi-e Shia dar Iran” (Changes to Shia Political Discourse in Iran), Cheshmandaz-e Iran, No. 82 (1392/2013), p. 94.

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community.26 This results in a fiqh that has as its cornerstone the notion of “general velayat and authorized monarchy” (velayat-e ‘ame and saltanat-e ma‘zun).27 During this period, especially from the late 1700s until the start of the 1900s, the ulema were also effectively empowered to vet and evaluate various theologies, often rejecting and at times even condemning innovations such as Sufism, Babism, and Ismailism.28

Fiqh in Twentieth-Century Iran In the past two hundred years or so, especially since the Constitutional Revolution a hundred years ago, Shia jurisprudence has witnessed significant transformations, in the process becoming more relevant to the social and political lives of Iranians.29 Since the beginning of the twentieth century, in fact, major transformations in the general thrust of Shia fiqh in Iran have been occurring with unprecedented frequency. This rapidity of transformations was a combined product of the emergence of the modern state, the spread of literacy, and the increasing ease of access to different schools of thought through books and other publications. The twentieth century started in Iran with a series of political events that later came to be referred to as the Constitutional Revolution. The revolution, generally dated from 1905 to 1911, created a new era in Shia political thought as it confronted the ulema with new realities to deal with. Concepts and phenomena such as Majles, parliamentary procedures, separation of powers, elections, and political participation were all new to the Iranian body politic and had to be incorporated into or at least addressed by Shia jurisprudence. Most prominent ulama of the time sided with the cause of the revolution and endorsed constitutionalism. Others, of whom the court-tied Sheikh Fazlollah Nouri was a prime example, bitterly opposed constitutionalism, 26

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Kadivar, Nazariyeh-haye Dowlat dar Feqh-e Shia (Theories of Government in Shia Jurisprudence), pp. 13–19. Morshedi, “Tahavvol-e Gofteman-e Siyasi-e Shia dar Iran” (Changes to Shia Political Discourse in Iran), p. 94. Hossein Kamaly, God and Man in Tehran: Contending Visions of the Divine from the Qajars to the Islamic Republic (New York: Columbia University Press, 2018), p. 35. Matlabi et al., “Enghelab-e Eslami-e Iran va Bast-e Fiqh-e Siyasi-e Shia” (Iran’s Islamic Revolution and the Growth of Shia Political Jurisprudence), p. 116.

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arguing that only the shari‘ah could legitimately be the basis of law and not a parliament. Nouri’s spirited rejection of constitutionalism, which ultimately cost him his life in 1909, did not necessarily produce a jurisprudential milestone. But on the opposite side, the defense of constitutionalism by some other ulama, did make important contributions to Shia fiqh. One of the period’s most ardent defenders of constitutionalism was Ayatollah Mohammad Hussein Naini (1860–1936). According to Naini, from the perspective of both the Shari‘ah and profane law, in the absence of just rule during the Occultation, limiting the powers of the state makes justice and equality more possible. Such a limited government, Naini maintained, is far more acceptable and less problematic as compared to an autocratic government. This limited government should take a constitutional form.30 In endorsing constitutional government (hokumat-e mashruteh) and calling for a politically supervisory role for the ulama, Naini conceived of fiqh in less holistic terms as compared to Nouri.31 Naini and other like-minded clerics sought to theorize a political system that had both divine and popular legitimacy.32 After the Constitutional Revolution, the clergy did not find the space and opportunity to express their political views until the early 1960s, fostering, first under Ayatollah Haeri and then Boroujerdi, a fiqh of “political avoidance” from the start of the Pahlavi dynasty in the 1920s until the 1960s.33 Starting in the 1960s, with Boroujerdi gone, there was once again the steady ascent of political fiqh with, increasingly, the notion of velayat-e faqih as its central hallmark. Although not the only representative of this period, Ayatollah Khomeini and his arguments represented a new trend in Shia thought, one in which fiqh was no longer simply a scholastic and classical subject of study. Instead, at this time fiqh entered the realm of the state and public

30

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Baqeri, “Seyr-e Tarikh-e Andisheh-e Siyasi-e Fuqaha-e Shia” (History of the Political Thoughts of Shia Clergy), pp. 96–98. Kadivar, Nazariyeh-haye Dowlat dar Feqh-e Shia (Theories of Government in Shia Jurisprudence), pp. 19–20. Baqeri, “Seyr-e Tarikh-e Andisheh-e Siyasi-e Fuqaha-e Shia” (History of the Political Thoughts of Shia Clergy), p. 99. Morshedi, “Tahavvol-e Gofteman-e Siyasi-e Shia dar Iran” (Changes to Shia Political Discourse in Iran), p. 94.

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policy, both in the domestic and in the international arenas.34 In the late 1970s, Shia fiqh entered, and eventually led, the Iranian Revolution with a real concern over state politics. Whereas in the Constitutional Revolution the clergy wanted to influence the political system and policymaking in particular, by the time of the 1978–1979 revolution they settled for nothing less than direct control of the state.35 As the postrevolutionary state would later officially declare, Khomeini’s fiqh was indeed “velayat-centered.” But the extent to which this fiqh was at the time actually understood is hard to determine. As initial reactions by several prominent ulama indicated, nevertheless, it was less than uniformly endorsed by Iran’s senior clergymen. Before offering a more in-depth exploration of changes to and innovations in fiqh by Khomeini and future generations of the postrevolutionary ulama, I will briefly mention the importance of ijtihad, independent reasoning, and the Usuli school within which the Shia ulama were operating. From the beginning, Shii thinkers viewed ijtihad as belonging to the representatives of the Twelfth Imam, and as something they did in opposition to the oppressive ruler. They also perceived of the position and powers of the mujtahid in much the same way.36 More importantly, Shii scholars have historically expressed pride at the fact that the “gates of ijtihad” have remained open in their faith as compared to Sunnism.37 Whether or not Shii ulama indeed welcome and embrace innovations in fiqh is, as we shall see here and in subsequent chapters, a matter of serious debate within Shii scholarly circles. Nevertheless, at least theoretically, Shi‘ism is meant to endorse new interpretations derived from reason and logical assessments of prevailing circumstances. This accounts for one of the reasons why over time, from the start of the Occultation until today, Shia

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Matlabi et al., “Enghelab-e Eslami-e Iran va Bast-e Fiqh-e Siyasi-e Shia” (Iran’s Islamic Revolution and the Growth of Shia Political Jurisprudence), p. 127. Somayeh Mo‘meni, “Jame‘h Madani, Dowlat va Nousazi dar Iran-e Mo‘aser” (Civil Society, the State, and Modernization in Contemporary Iran), Cheshmandaz-e Iran, No. 82 (1392/2013), p. 93. Faez Dinparast, “Moqadameh-i bar Bonyan-e Nazari-e Nezam-e Jomhuri-e Eslami-e Iran” (An Introduction to the Theoretical Foundations of the Islamic Republic System), in Siyasat va Hokumat dar Jomhuri-e Eslami Iran (Government and Politics in the Islamic Republic of Iran), Gholamreza Khajehsarvi, ed. (Tehran: Emam Sadeq University Press, 1390/2011), p. 46. Shakoori, Feqh-e Siyasi-e Eslam (Islam’s Political Jurisprudence), pp. 35–35.

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jurisprudential theory has become increasingly more sophisticated and complex.38 Innovations in Shia jurisprudential thinking have also been further aided by the fact that they have been formulated within what is known as the Usuli school. Deriving its name from “principles of fiqh” (usul al-fiqh) and dating back to the tenth century, the Usuli school is a rationalist theological tradition in Iran and Iraq. With time, Usuli thinkers became especially influential under the Safavids. Usulis hold that Shii jurists should not rely on the interpretations of the ancients for religious learning but must seek out contemporary guidance. A key aspect of the Usuli school is the flexibility of rational interpretation.39 Moreover, the Usulis held that instead of relying on the interpretations of the ancients, the Shii must seek guidance from contemporary authorities, a position that in turn facilitated the emergence of the marja‘iyyat. By referring to contemporary marja‘-e taqilids, “each generation of seminarians was encouraged to establish distinct interpretations.”40 As with any other school of thought, the Usulis are not without variations and broad differences within themselves. Thanks to contributions by clerics such as Akhund Khorasani and Mohammad Hossein Naini, who discussed and rationally justified constitutionalism, some Usuli discourse moved conceptions of political authority away from absolutism and instead emphasized self-determination and accountability. This was especially the case with Naini’s arguments.41 More recently, Ayatollah Montazeri and to a somewhat lesser extent Rafsanjani similarly justified their arguments regarding constraints on the powers of the velayat-e faqih. Another variation has been over attention to independent reason versus context and precedent. Broadly, the jurisprudential school of Najaf – as represented by Ayatollahs Akhund Khorasani, Abolqasem 38

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Baqeri, “Seyr-e Tarikh-e Andisheh-e Siyasi-e Fuqaha-e Shia” (History of the Political Thoughts of Shia Clergy), p. 103. Babak Rahimi, “Democratic Authority, Public Islam, and Shi‘i Jurisprudence in Iran and Iraq: Hussain Ali Montazeri and Ali Sistani,” International Political Science Review, Vol. 32, No. 2 (2012), p. 205. Charles Kurzman, “Critics Within: Islamic Scholars’ Protest against the Islamic State in Iran,” International Journal of Politics, Culture, and Society, Vol. 15, No. 2 (Winter 2001), p. 343. Rahimi, “Democratic authority, public Islam, and Shi‘i jurisprudence in Iran and Iraq,” p. 197.

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Khoei, and Ali Sistani – pays more attention to Usuli principles and tends to examine issues related to fiqh irrespective of time, conditions, and context. This stands in contrast somewhat to the Qom school, as represented especially by Ayatollahs Boroujerdi and Khomeini, who tend to pay closer attention to historical context and patterns of change when considering an issue. Boroujerdi and Khomeini also relied on the interpretation of Sunni scholars, and at times even viewed the Najaf school as too reliant on Usuli principles.42 With the establishment and consolidation of the Islamic Republic, and with its formal adoption of specific interpretations of fiqh as official state ideology, the Usuli school in Iran has taken a dramatic turn toward statism.

Khomeini’s Fiqh and the Islamic Republic The lead-up to and the establishment of the Islamic Republic put an end to centuries of theoretical and doctrinal status of Shia thought. Moreover, for the first time, the period of the Islamic Republic has seen the practical application of Shia theory to politics.43 The Islamic Revolution resulted in major changes in some of the core suppositions of Shia political jurisprudence. The biggest change that fiqh underwent during this time was in its assumptions about politics and the arrangement of society, specifically how to reconcile an Islamic government with republicanism.44 This ascendance to official state ideology brought with it a number of other important changes to Shia political fiqh. To start with, regardless of where they stood in relation to the new state, as compared to before, after the revolution Shii ulama had no choice but to pay serious attention to political fiqh. Many research centers, institutions, and journals devoted to the study of political fiqh were established after the revolution. As we saw in the previous chapter, an overwhelming majority of such institutions are state-funded and 42

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Farzad Hosseini and Mansour Mirahmadi, “Tabyeen-e Ekhtelaf-e Andishehhaye ‘Allameh Naini va Emam Khomeini dar Mored-e Maqoleh-e Velayat-e Faqih bar Asas-e Nazariyeh-e Tafsiri-e Eric Hirsch” (Understanding the Theoretical Differences between ‘Allameh Naini and Imam Khomeini Concerning the Issue of Velayat-e Faqih Based on the Interpretive Theory of Eric Hirsch), Pazhoheshnameh-e ‘Olum-e Siyasi, Vol. 12, No. 3 (1396/2017), p. 129. Kadivar, Nazariyeh-haye Dowlat dar Feqh-e Shia (Theories of Government in Shia Jurisprudence), p. 28. Matlabi et al., “Enghelab-e Eslami-e Iran va Bast-e Fiqh-e Siyasi-e Shia” (Iran’s Islamic Revolution and the Growth of Shia Political Jurisprudence), p. 129.

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therefore their intellectual products are broadly in line with official state ideology. Nevertheless, the potential for generating some political fiqh that is dynamic and transformative has occasionally become real. At the very least, there has been a deepening of the political understanding of fiqh, which is now widely recognized as a scientific discipline of study and exploration. Lastly, again thanks largely to Khomeini’s jurisprudential innovation, there has been a revival of the role of interest and expediency (maslahat) in Shia political fiqh, which had previously been far more prevalent in Sunni thought.45 In addition to politics, political fiqh has also undergone some transformations in the area of economics. Right before the revolution, economics was largely overlooked by Shia scholars, with only two books on the subject having been produced by prominent clerics – Our Economics (Eqtesad-e Ma), by Ayatollah Mohammad Baqer Sard, in 1978, and Ayatollah Morteza Motahhari’s A Look at Islamic Economic System (Nazar-i beh Nezam-e Eqtesadi-e Islam), first published posthumously in 1989. To this day, economics continues to receive scant attention from Shia clerics. Nevertheless, in response to some of the slogans of the revolution and subsequent state policies, a robust debate developed within clerical and ruling circles over the prudence of the free market versus state control of the economy. Three broad policy preferences emerged, with a group of conservative traditionalists calling for a removal of obstacles to the accumulation of private capital, another group calling for extensive government involvement in the economy, and still a third group calling for a mixed economy.46 These different policy preferences, which ultimately ended up in favor of advocates of a mixed economy, have so far not resulted in the emergence of streams of fiqh scholarship on economics.47 What the revolution did result in was the emergence of two decidedly divergent streams of Shia political fiqh in Iran, one quickly assuming a posture of traditional conservativism and another progressive dynamism. Of the two, the former has been politically, and therefore intellectually, dominant. After the revolution succeeded and was 45 47

46 Ibid., p. 134. Ibid., p. 130. Significantly, economics was not necessarily a distinct field within traditional Islamic scholarship but was bound up with other fields of state and social relations, and bodies of law, governing activities such as commerce, property ownership, inheritance, and the like.

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consolidated, the same fiqh that had made the revolution possible turned into a bastion of the status quo. With the narrowing of the postrevolutionary coalition after 1981 and the elimination of opponents, Khomeini oversaw the progressive rise of “clerical Islam” under the auspices of what was quickly becoming “traditional fiqh.”48 Once Khomeini was gone and the Islamic Republic’s immediate postrevolutionary predicaments had changed, especially first its war with Iraq and then its frenzied postwar reconstruction ended, a new strand of fiqh emerged that was dynamic and reformist. The state’s traditional fiqh was therefore seriously challenged by “dynamic fiqh” in the second decade of the revolution, which was based on, and was a defender of, new ijtihad.49 Tensions between traditional and dynamic fiqh were soon settled, politically and by force though not intellectually, in the former’s favor. Much of this traditional fiqh was articulated by Ayatollah Khomeini in the final years of his life, when his overriding concern was the preservation of the political system he had been so instrumental in crafting.

A Brief Biography of Khomeini Khomeini’s political life can be divided into several different periods: quietist, from the 1920s to the 1940s; constitutionalist, from the 1940s to 1971; revolutionary, from 1971 to 1979; velayat-e faqih, from 1979 to 1987; and absolute velayat-e faqih, in the last two years of his life, from 1987 to 1989.50 Early on in his clerical career, either by choice or out of respect for the elders of the clerical establishment, and in keeping with the general tenor of the times, the young Khomeini abstained from politics. Ayatollah Abdolhakim Haeri, who had established the Howzeh ‘Elmiyeh seminary in Qom in 1922, preferred a quietist approach to politics and instead focused on the training and education of young clerics. In these early years, clerical activism was mostly directed at safeguarding against prevailing social currents such 48

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Emadeddin Baqi, Gofteman-haye Dini-e Mo‘aser (Contemporary Religious Discourses) (Tehran: Saraee, 1381/2002), p. 251. Ibid., pp. 251–252. Mojtaba Mahdavi, “The Rise of Khomeinism: Problematizing the Politics of Resistance in Pre-Revolutionary Iran,” in A Critical Introduction to Khomeini, Arshin Adib-Moghaddam, ed. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2014), p. 43.

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as anticlericalism and the ban on hijab and the clerical garb. Other clerical areas of interest and occasional activism, such as anticommunism, anti-Bahaism, and, later, support for Palestine, were either implicitly supported by the state or were tolerated so long as they did not get out of hand.51 Haeri’s successor in Qom, Hossein Boroujerdi, had similar quietist preferences and sought to maintain polite, if not always friendly, relations with the royal court. From the very beginning, Khomeini believed in the inseparability of religion and politics, if not in practice certainly in theory. In deference first to Ayatollah Haeri and then Boroujerdi, he refrained from overt political activism and instead concentrated on learning and teaching, so much so that in the 1940s and the 1950s he was considered one of the top teachers of the howzeh.52 Khomeini specialized in philosophy. But within the Qom theological establishment, not everyone shared his belief in the importance of philosophy.53 Nevertheless, Khomeini excelled as a teacher and a scholar. According to his former pupil Montazeri, Khomeini was also a superb speaker, and his lectures on ethics, which were open to the public, were frequently attended by local merchants and by other clerics.54 Toward the end of Boroujerdi’s life, his relations with Khomeini had grown cold because the senior ayatollah saw the younger cleric as far too politically minded and even suspected him of having ties with the Fadaiyan-e Islam.55 As marja‘, Boroujerdi had the authority to keep Khomeini from writing and preaching his heterodox opinion, and had Khomeini placed “under virtual house arrest.”56 Despite his stellar scholarly and teaching reputation, most other senior clerics in Qom did not look favorably at Khomeini’s political proclivities. Montazeri, no one paid a visit to Khomeini. According to tradition, visits by other prominent clerics would have been a sign that Khomeini was accepted as a marja‘. Only sometime later, when he vocally opposed the 51

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Mohammad Hussein Bahrani, Tabagheh-ye Motevasset va Tahavollat-e Siyasiye Iran-e Mo‘aser (The Middle Class and Political Changes in Contemporary Iran) (Tehran: Agah, 1388/2009), pp. 195–198. Davood Feirahi, Feqh va Siyasat dar Iran-e Mo‘aser (Jurisprudence and Politics in Contemporary Iran) (Tehran: Nashr-e Ney, 1393/2014), p. 89. Hosseinali Montazeri, Khaterat (Memoirs) (Los Angeles, CA: Ketab Corp., 2017), p. 97. 55 Ibid., p. 32. Ibid., pp. 80–81. Kurzman, “Critics Within: Islamic Scholars’ Protest against the Islamic State in Iran,” p. 342.

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principles of the White Revolution, did Khomeini begin to attract attention in Qom and in Tehran and elsewhere.57 It was only when Khomeini was jailed and faced the possibility of being sentenced to death, and since the constitution banned the execution of a marja‘, that four of the living marja‘s – Ayatollahs Shariatmadari, Milani, Mar‘ashi Najafi, and Mohammad Taqi Amoli – issued a declaration in which they recognized Khomeini’s marja‘iyyat.58 The death of Boroujerdi, who had been the sole marja‘ up until that point, in 1961, opened up space for Khomeini to openly engage in political activities. According to one interpretation, this activism was actually motivated by Khomeini’s relatively junior rank within the clerical establishment and the disputability of his jurisprudential credentials. From that point on, and even before, Khomeini’s “instrumental use of religion” was “an integral part of [his] strategic calculations and daily political struggles.”59 Khomeini’s political sentiments had been cemented through the experience of the 1953 coup. Following the coup, many politically minded clerics had concluded that the monarchy had to go.60 In the meanwhile, Boroujerdi’s death and the ensuing lack of centralized decision-making at the top of the Qombased clerical establishment resulted in the emergence of three main groups within the clergy. By far the largest group were those who, like Boroujerdi, continued to remain nonpolitical and instead preferred to focus on religious issues. A second group could be considered politically moderate clerics, the most prominent of whom included Ayatollahs Mohammad Reza Golpaygani, Mohammad Hadi Milani, and Kazem Shariatmadari. A third, smaller group was based mostly in Iraq and led by Ayatollah Khomeini and his student Hosseinali Montazeri. Highly political and generally viewed as extremist, they were assisted in Iran by the active and astute Ayatollah Mohammad Beheshti.61

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58 Montazeri, Khaterat (Memoirs), p. 100. Ibid., p. 122. Mohammad Ayatollahi Tabaar, Religious Statecraft: The Politics of Islam in Iran (New York: Columbia University Press, 2018), pp. 32–33. Feirahi, Feqh va Siyasat dar Iran-e Mo‘aser (Jurisprudence and Politics in Contemporary Iran), p. 175. Mehdi Mottaharnia and Abolfath Fakhr Mohammadian, “Arzesh-haye Nahadin dar Enqelab-e Eslami: Azadi dar Qanun-e Asasi va az nazar-e Rouhaniyun-e Fa‘al dar Enqelab-e Eslami” (Fundamental Values in the Islamic Revolution: Freedom in the Constitution and from the Perspective of Clergy

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The mid-1960s marked a turning point in Shia clerical activism, when clerics such as Khomeini went from defensive reactivism, trying to preserve the status of religion and the clergy in society, to proactively calling for the overthrow of the monarchy. From that point on, Shia resistance discourse changed. Ayatollah Khomeini, in fact, had initially not said anything about rule by the clergy until 1963, especially in Kashf al-Asrar. It was only in the 1960s that he developed his conceptions of state and society, having been reluctant earlier to formulate new notions.62 In 1970, he proposed the notion of Islamic Government and presented his interpretation of the velayat-e faqih. This in turn provoked much sharper suppression of religion by the state.63 But from the safety of his exile in Najaf, Khomeini continued to develop his arguments on the ideal shape of a postmonarchy Iran. With cassette tapes of his sermons circulating inside the country, Khomeini managed to keep both his name and his ideas relevant among a small but active group of devout followers. In the lead-up to and throughout the revolution, Khomeini’s pronouncements amounted to a series of theological and jurisprudential innovations that had little or no historical precedence in Shia fiqh. As the revolution progressed, Khomeini came to be commonly called the “Imam.” The designation was not readily accepted by all members of the clerical establishment, some believing that the title should be reserved for the Twelve Imams of Shi‘ism only. As Khomeini’s postrevolutionary position was consolidated, however, a number of commentators found justification within Shia jurisprudence, arguing that it is permissible to call someone Imam if he meets the preconditions of imamate such as ijtihad, justice, vision, and jurisprudential learning.64 The Imam, as it turned out, was not very tolerant of dissent, jurisprudential or otherwise. The 1982 defrocking of the comparatively moderate Ayatollah Kazem Shariatmadari (1908–1986) was the start of an ideological purge and an unmistakable sign to other marja‘s that

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Active in the Islamic Revolution), Faslnameh-e Motale‘at-e Siyasi, Vol. 6, No. 24 (1393/2014), p. 193. Ervand Abrahamian, Khomeinism: Essays in the Islamic Republic (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1993), pp. 21–22. Bahrani, Tabagheh-ye Motevasset va Tahavollat-e Siyasi-ye Iran-e Mo‘aser (The Middle Class and Political Changes in Contemporary Iran), p. 244. Abolqassem Gorji, Tarikh-e Fiqh and Foqaha (History of Jurisprudence and Jurisprudents) (Tehran: Samt, 1381/2002), pp. 299–300.

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Khomeini was now institutionally dominant over Iran’s Shia hierarchy.65 Montazeri maintains that former foreign minister Sadeq Qotbzadeh, who implicated Shariatmadari of complicity in a plot to kill Khomeini, was pressured into doing so in exchange for a promise of freedom. Qotbzadeh was executed nonetheless. The whole accusation was staged, according to Montazeri, so that Shariatmadari could be eliminated.66 Montazeri, who never personally criticized Khomeini, was himself removed from his position as Khomeini’s successor in 1989 and spent the rest of days under house arrest. For his own fate, and for many other unsavory decisions, Montazeri actually blames Khomeini’s son Ahmad, who had steadily accumulated considerable powers and who did indeed make decisions in his father’s name as the Imam’s death neared.67 Montazeri does not, of course, absolve Khomeini of responsibility for the Islamic Republic’s reign of terror from 1981 to 1988.68 Following the Mujahedeen’s ill-fated attack on Iranian soil once the war with Iraq ended, a letter that was said to have been dictated by Khomeini and handwritten by Ahmad was distributed to the country’s judges that gave them the authority, based on the majority opinion among them, to execute any Mujahedeen prisoner who was already in custody.69 Then, at the bottom of the letter, the following note, signed by Khomeini, appears: “In all the matters outlined above, anyone who disagrees at any stage is to be executed. Destroy the enemies of Islam quickly. Look into the files of the criminals immediately.”70

Khomeini’s Fiqh Over the course of his decade at the helm of the Islamic Republic, at different times and in different circumstances, Khomeini gave numerous speeches, had several press interviews, and made pronouncements here and there concerning the various issues of the day. Combined with 65

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Abbas Amanat, Iran: A Modern History (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2017), p. 808. 67 Montazeri, Khaterat (Memoirs), p. 270. Ibid., p. 297. I have discussed the Islamic Republic’s reign of terror at some length at Mehran Kamrava, Triumph and Despair: In Search of Iran’s Islamic Republic (New York: Oxford University Press, 2022), pp. 56–62. The text of the letter appears in Montazeri, Khaterat (Memoirs), pp. 351–352. Quoted in Ibid., p. 352.

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his scholarly writings while in Najaf and in Qom, the intellectual, jurisprudential thought that is left of Khomeini today does not amount to a single, coherent corpus of thought. Given that a number of these theological positions and arguments were unprepared rather than calculated, some of Khomeini’s arguments about authority can even be contradictory.71 Khomeini’s jurisprudence evolved over time as he went from a young activist cleric in Qom to an exiled revolutionary in Najaf, a revolutionary leader in Paris, and then Iran’s Imam and velayat-e faqih in a time of postrevolutionary chaos and war. Today one can find in Khomeini what one wants to find – a learned scholar of Shia jurisprudence, a passionate revolutionary with fanciful ideas of an Islamic government, a revolutionary leader determined to consolidate his vision of postrevolutionary Iran, the velayat-e faqih, a clever pragmatist, the absolute velayat-e faqih, and much more. Shia thinkers have historically been divided into three general groups: those who avoided politics and instead focused on the essentials of leading an ethical life during the Occultation; those who focused on the responsibilities of the velayat-e faqih to members of the community in need of protection, such as the needy, the infirm, widowers, and the like; and those who focused on the velayat (guardianship) of the Muslim community in its entirety, not just morally but also politically.72 Khomeini belonged to the latter group, though as we have seen his ideas about the extent of the velayat-e faqih’s powers evolved over time. While in Najaf, Khomeini produced a number of lengthy studies on topics such as jurisprudence and trade, including a five-volume book titled Al-Bey’ (Trade), published in Arabic over a fifteen-year period between 1961 and 1976. A collection of his earlier seminary lectures in Qom was also published under the title of Al-Rasa‘el (Messages), later reissued after the revolution as Al-Ijtihad wa Taqlid (Ijtihad and Imitation).73 None, however, had the impact of his Velayat-e Faqih and Islamic Government, also 71

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Behrooz Ghamari-Tabrizi, “The Divine, the People, and the Faqih,” in A Critical Introduction to Khomeini, Arshin Adib-Moghaddam, ed. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2014), p. 226. Davood Feirahi, Qodrat, Danesh va Mashro‘iyyat dar Eslam (Power, Knowledge, and Legitimacy in Islam) (Tehran: Nashr-e Ney, 1396/2017), p. 93. Mohammad Hossein Jamshidi, Andisheh-e Siyasi-e Emam Khomeini (Imam Khomeini’s Political Thought) (Tehran: Pazhoheshkadeh-e Emam Khomeini va Enqelab-e Eslami, 1385/2006), pp. 69–77.

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drawn mostly from his seminary lectures and published in 1970. It was only then that Khomeini’s conception of politics as we know it today began to take shape. There are some broad points to Khomeini’s theoretical discourse. His conception of politics was not far off the mark from what many other Shii theologians have theorized, seeing politics in terms of “the reform, guidance, and enlightenment of the people toward their path of salvation in the world.”74 From the start of his political activism, Khomeini regarded the clergy as “the self-evident intellectual and spiritual leaders of society.”75 “Islam is politics. It is the essence of politics,” he maintained.76 The depoliticization of Islam confronts it with a “grave danger.”77 For Islam to be fully realized in society, it needs to form a government. It is therefore incumbent on all Muslims to actively prepare for, plan, and establish an Islamic government by fighting unjust rulers and assisting faqihs in planning for an Islamic government. This Islamic government, the establishment of which is one of the primary injunctions of Islam, means rule by velayat-e faqih.78 In Velayat-e Faqih and Islamic Government, Khomeini envisioned a “planning council” instead of a legislative assembly that would assign tasks to the ministries based on Islamic law, and, according to Islamic plans, would determine the nature of the kinds of services to be offered to the public.79 For Khomeini, the Shari‘ah is all-encompassing and takes into account every aspect of life.80 Khomeini saw Islam as a comprehensive legal, political, and belief system that touches on all aspects of private, social, and political life. It includes everything from private matters 74 75

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Shakoori, Feqh-e Siyasi-e Eslam (Islam’s Political Jurisprudence), p. 74. Fakhreddin Azimi, “Khomeini and the ‘White Revolution,’” in A Critical Introduction to Khomeini, Arshin Adib-Moghaddam, ed. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2014), p. 20. Quoted in Jamshidi, Andisheh-e Siyasi-e Emam Khomeini (Imam Khomeini’s Political Thought), p. 201. Ibid., p. 17. Kadivar, Nazariyeh-haye Dowlat dar Feqh-e Shia (Theories of Government in Shia Jurisprudence), p. 22. Ruhollah Khomeini, Velayat-e Faqih Hokumat-e Eslami (Velayat-e Faqih Islamic Government) (Tehran: Mo‘aseseh-e Tanzim va Nashr-e Asar-e Emam Khomeini, 1379/2000), p. 44. Ali Shirkhani, “Qanun va Qanungozari dar Manzumeh-e Fekri-e Emam Khomeini” (Law and Law-Making in the In Imam Khomeini’s Theoretical System), Faslnameh-e Motale‘at-e Siyasi, Vol. 2, No. 8 (1389/2010), p. 128.

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between a man and a woman to industrial and commercial law.81 Khomeini believed that jurisprudential contributions need to have three essential characteristics. First, they need to go beyond theoretical abstractions and must apply themselves to the practical dimensions of life. Second, this practicability must be intellectually sound and cannot be devoid of the intellectual content with which fiqh is deeply pregnant. Third and finally, any jurisprudential contributions must be based on and supported by valid and original sources (asnad) and cannot be derived from personal views and preferences alone.82 Of course, Khomeini recognized the importance of reason and knowledge in political rule and the management of society.83 Nevertheless, equally important is the notion of ‘urf. ‘Urf – which can be translated as the customs, or collective knowledge, of a given society – played an important role in Khomeini’s jurisprudence. ‘Urf can be defined as a collection of habits that are commonly held among a people, made up of their oral traditions, their deeds, and their customs. ‘Urf is composed of what is generally accepted as common practice by all or an overwhelming majority of society and is repeated over time. According to Khomeini, if a follower does not agree with a mujtahid’s opinion because of ‘urf, it is not incumbent upon the follower to follow the mujtahjid.84 Khomeini saw the individual as free and bestowed with willpower but not independent of the power, will, and wishes of the Almighty.85 In Khomeini’s conception, in the Islamic Republic ‘urf can be best determined by the Majles. In fact, he maintained that “the Majles is the representative of ‘urf.”86 This embedding of ‘urf within the Majles was emblematic of Khomeini’s 81 82

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Ibid., p. 126. Reza Tabesh and Jafar Mohseni Darebidi, Mabani-e Mashru‘iyyat-e Nezam-e Jomhuri Eslami Iran (Principles of the Legitimacy of the Islamic Republic of Iran) (Tehran: Pazhouheshgah-e ‘Olum-e Ensani va Motale‘at-e Farhangi, 1390/ 2011), p. 182. Ali Maleki, “Mabani-e Mashru‘iyat-e Nezam-e Jomhuri-e Eslami-e Iran: Ta‘addod-e Tafsir-ha; Chalesh-ha va Rahkardha” (Principles of the Legitimacy of the Islamic Republic of Iran: Multiple Interpretations; Crises, and Approcahes), Siyasat-e Mote‘aliyeh, Vol. 6, No. 21 (1397/2018), p. 84. Feirahi, Feqh va Siyasat dar Iran-e Mo‘aser (Jurisprudence and Politics in Contemporary Iran), p. 193. Jamshidi, Andisheh-e Siyasi-e Emam Khomeini (Imam Khomeini’s Political Thought), p. 242. Quoted in, Feirahi, Feqh va Siyasat dar Iran-e Mo‘aser (Jurisprudence and Politics in Contemporary Iran), p. 195.

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innovative jurisprudential amalgam of Islamic traditionalism on the one hand and constitutionalism/republicanism on the other. Khomeini saw justice as inherent to human nature, something that humans naturally seek after.87 In Khomeini’s conception, justice means the elimination of poverty and destitution, and it is the ruler’s responsibility to see that justice prevails.88 No one in society should have special privileges, and everyone, from the peasant to the ruler, is equal.89 In his earlier, pre-1970 writings, Khomeini emphasized the “divine gift” of wealth and private property. Later on, especially as the revolution drew closer, he emphasized the plight of the poor, the oppressive proclivities of the upper classes, and the evils of palace dwellers. With time, his rhetoric became increasingly more radical. Nevertheless, in his forty-six years of activism, Khomeini always defended private property.90 Significantly, the bulk of Khomeini’s assumptions about politics are fundamentally nondemocratic. In fact, although the “prevention of autocracy” is a main plank of his writing, he sees an activist, intrusive role for the state in which civic and political liberties have little or no place. “Politics,” he once wrote, “means guiding society, walking society. It means considering all of the interests of society, and all societal and human dimensions. Politics is guiding society toward what is in the interests of the nation and the individual. And this is a task that only the divinely ordained can do. Others cannot engage in such a politics.”91 Beginning in the early 1940s, as the ideological competition between Islam, secularism, and capitalism intensified, and as Reza Shah’s abdication temporarily opened up space for political debate and discussion, some scholars began theorizing about the role of Islam in politics.92 Khomeini’s Discovery of Secrets was part of this broader trend. In the

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Mohammad Hassan Jabbari, ‘Edalat dar Andisheh va ‘Amal-e Dowlat-haye Jomhuri-e Eslami Iran (Justice in Theory and Practice of the Governments of the Islamic Republic of Iran) (Tehran: Markaz-e Asnad-e Enghelab-e Eslami, 1396/ 2017), p. 63. 89 Ibid., pp. 67–68. Ibid., pp. 70–71. Abrahamian, Khomeinism, pp. 26, 39. Quoted in Jamshidi, Andisheh-e Siyasi-e Emam Khomeini (Imam Khomeini’s Political Thought), p. 197. Feirahi, Feqh va Siyasat dar Iran-e Mo‘aser (Jurisprudence and Politics in Contemporary Iran), p. 269.

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book he argued, “[W]e do not say that government must be that of the faqih. But we do say that government must be administered based on divine laws that are in the interest of the country and the people, and this cannot take place without the supervision of the clergy.”93 He further argued, “If a divine and just system is to be established, the legislature should either be comprised of clerics or it should be supervised by them. This parliament should explore divine laws and examine the ways in which they can be implemented by the executive branch.”94 The supervisory political role that Khomeini advocated for the clergy appears to have informed his earliest steps in postrevolutionary Iran. When in February 1979 he finally returned home from his exile, Khomeini initially chose to live in Qom, with the intention of assuming a supervisory role rather than a directly executive one. It was only through the course of events, as he felt that his direct personal involvement was becoming necessary, that he took a more active role in the political events that were unfolding.95 Until 1981, he also expressly forbade the clergy from running in the country’s presidential elections, a trend that has since been reversed with a vengeance. By most accounts, Khomeini’s realization that he needed to be more directly involved in the affairs of the revolutionary state was the start of a process that ultimately led to the introduction of the notion of absolute velayat-e faqih.96 Before delving deeper into Khomeini’s conception of velayat-e faqih, it is worth noting that for his time and context, especially before and after the revolution, Khomeini stood out as an innovative faqih. According to Rafsanjani, the very politicization of fiqh after decades of quietism was an important innovation by Khomeini.97 Khomeini also transformed the historically quietist position of velayat-e faqih into an activist one, within which, over time, absolutist and democratic

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94 Quoted in Ibid., p. 271. Quoted in Ibid., pp. 96–97. Farhad Vafaei Fard and Mansour Mirahmadi, “Tahlili bar Mahiyat-e Zazariyeh-e Velayat-e Faqih-e Emam Khomeini” (An Analysis of the Nature of Imam Khomeini’s Theory of Velayat-e Faqih), Siyasat-e Mote‘aliyeh, Vol. 6, No. 20 (1397/2018), p. 90. Mohsen Kadivar, Daghdagheh-haye Hokumat-e Dini (Concerns of Religious Government) (Tehran: Nashr-e Ney, 1376/1997), p. 159. Zahra Shidvash and Mohammad Mahmoudi, Maslehat Nameh (Book of Expediency), Vol. 2 (Tehran: Sales, 1395/2016), p. 217.

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strands emerged.98 Khomeini is the first Shia cleric to propose direct, and absolute, rule by a faqih.99 Moreover, his theory of velayat-e faqih has a number of separate but related components, each of which involves a fair amount of jurisprudential innovation, or, at the very least, detailed knowledge of the relevant fiqh. Of the different components of the theory of velayat-e faqih, three stand out, namely the rights and responsibilities of the velayat-e faqih; the faqih’s qualifications and characteristics; and the basis of the legitimacy of Islamic rule.100 Furthermore, in relation to the velayat-e faqih, Ayatollah Khomeini was responsible for another theoretical innovation, with the concept of absolute velayat-e faqih, as well as a practical one, being the first person to actually occupy the position.101 The notion of absolute velayat-e faqih itself entails certain innovations in fiqh. These include the need for and importance of attention to social and political interests and expedience; attention to the role of context, place, and time in ijtihad; the use of fiqh as the basis for theorizing about the management of society and social relations; the capacity of fiqh to address evolving social and economic needs of society; and the assumption that politics is an inseparable component of fiqh.102 After the revolution, Khomeini came up with additional jurisprudential innovations in order to adapt the theoretical underpinnings of the Islamic Republic to changing, often fluid, postrevolutionary circumstances. Some of these jurisprudential innovations included “the rights and responsibilities of the absolute Islamic government” under the auspices of absolute velayat-e faqih; “the interests of society as the most important measure of the state’s conduct during the period of Occultation,” or expedience; and “support for experts in determining 98

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Alireza Nader, David E. Thaler, and S. R. Bohandy, The Next Supreme Leader: Succession in the Islamic Republic (Santa Monica, CA: Rand, 2011), p. xv. Farzaneh Ranjbarzadeh and Abbas Javarshakian, “Maqbuliyat va Mashru‘iyat-e Hokumat-e Eslami dar Andisheh-e Mulla Sadra va Emam Khomeini” (The Acceptance and Legitimacy of Islamic Government in the Thoughts of Mulla Sadra and Imam Khomeini), Faslnameh-e Motale‘at-e Siyasi, Vol. 6, No. 24 (1393/2014), p. 68. Vafaei Fard and Mirahmadi, “Tahlili bar Mahiyat-e Zazariyeh-e Velayat-e Faqih-e Emam Khomeini” (An Analysis of the Nature of Imam Khomeini’s Theory of Velayat-e Faqih), p. 81. Mohsen Kadivar, Hokumat-e Velayati (Government of Guardianship) (Tehran: Nashr-e Ney, 1377/1998), p. 107. Tabesh and Mohseni Darebidi, Mabani-e Mashru‘iyyat-e Nezam-e Jomhuri Eslami Iran (Principles of the Legitimacy of the Islamic Republic of Iran), p. 54.

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the best interests of the system.”103 Especially in the last two years of his life, from 1987 to 1989, Khomeini paid considerable attention to some of the most important dimensions of the state and Islamic rule. These included issues such as the absolute nature of the velayat-e faqih’s rule, limits on the scope of power of the Islamic ruler, the institutionalization of the Expediency Council, and other similar matters that went to the core of the Islamic Republic’s rule.104 Despite his seemingly uncompromising dogma, Khomeini was highly pragmatic, and his interpretations were adaptable on the basis of changing social, economic, or political needs.105 As a general rule, nonetheless, while he was alive, Khomeini’s interpretations of jurisprudence were not challenged or questioned.106 Once he was in power, two main themes could be discerned in Khomeini’s discourse: one a strong state and the other independence, especially from the United States.107 Khomeini had long been deeply troubled by the fact that Iran and Iranians had held a position of subservience in relation to the great powers. Iran, he believed, should not have a lower position as compared to any other country.108 Also, the concept of “martyr” (shahid) had become an integral component of Khomeini’s rhetoric beginning in the 1970s, having seldom been used prior to the 1960s.109 Once Iraq invaded Iran in 1980, the concept was no longer an abstract, becoming widely adopted by Khomeini, and also by the rest of the Islamic system, as a signifier of its identity. From Khomeini’s perspective, the Islamic Republic contains within it a number of highly important characteristics: its organizing principles, its constitution, and its officials are all faithful to Islam; the system depends on popular vote for some of its core functions, such as being republican in its selections of leaders; it is independent and follows 103

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Matlabi et al., “Enghelab-e Eslami-e Iran va Bast-e Fiqh-e Siyasi-e Shia” (Iran’s Islamic Revolution and the Growth of Shia Political Jurisprudence), p. 131. Shafi‘i Sarvestani, Feqh va Qanun-gozari (Fiqh and Law-Making), p. 13. Abrahamian, Khomeinism, p. 4. Kurzman, “Critics Within: Islamic Scholars’ Protest against the Islamic State in Iran,” p. 343. Arshin Adib-Moghaddam, “Introduction: Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini: A Clerical Revolutionary?” in A Critical Introduction to Khomeini, Arshin Adib-Moghaddam, ed. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2014), p. 15. Gorji, Tarikh-e Fiqh and Foqaha (History of Jurisprudence and Jurisprudents), p. 302. Abrahamian, Khomeinism, pp. 27–29.

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neither the East nor the West; it is based on social justice; and it allows freedoms, even to those with different ideological views or religious beliefs.110 Moreover, following what he believed were also Imam Ali’s criteria, he argued that the ruler must above all else have two essential characteristics, namely be knowledgeable of the law and be just.111 These same two qualifications are also essential for all judges.112 More importantly, they are essential to ascending to the position of velayat-e faqih.

Khomeini’s Conception of Velayat-e Faqih In historical terms, the velayat-e faqih that exists in Iran today is a recent invention. Until about two-hundred years ago, the system of velayat-e faqih was never discussed as a system of rule. It was instead seen as a social and cultural institution.113 Well into the early and middle decades of the twentieth century, there is little mention of velayat-e faqih in the context of government and the maintenance of order. The scholar Said Amir Arjomand lists no more than a handful of instances in which Shia theologians discuss the concept throughout the 1920s to the 1950s.114 In Discovery of Secrets, Khomeini’s focus had been to attack the reign of Reza Shah. But the book’s most important contribution is the early outline of the theory of velayat-e faqih.115 From then on, Khomeini set out to steadily and systematically theorize rule by a faqih. 110 111

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Kadivar, Hokumat-e Velayati (Government of Guardianship), pp. 172–173. Khomeini, Velayat-e Faqih Hokumat-e Eslami (Velayat-e Faqih Islamic Government), p. 47; Mohsen Sheikholeslami, “Hokumat-e Eslami va Rahbarie an az Nazar-e Emam Khomeini” (Islamic Government and Its Leadership in Imam Khomeini’s Views), Hokumat-e Eslami, Vol. 4, No. 2 (1378/1999), p. 31. Feirahi, Feqh va Siyasat dar Iran-e Mo‘aser (Jurisprudence and Politics in Contemporary Iran), p. 335. Kadivar, Daghdagheh-haye Hokumat-e Dini (Concerns of Religious Government), p. 81. Said Amir Arjomand, “Ideological Revolution in Shi‘ism,” in Authority and Political Culture in Shi‘ism, Said Amir Arjomand, ed. (Albany, NY: SUNY Press, 1988), p. 193. Ranjbarzadeh and Javarshakian, “Maqbuliyat va Mashru‘iyat-e Hokumat-e Eslami dar Andisheh-e Mulla Sadra va Emam Khomeini” (The Acceptance and Legitimacy of Islamic Government in the Thoughts of Mulla Sadra and Imam Khomeini), p. 66.

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Khomeini’s conception of velayat-e faqih evolved over time from its earliest iterations. The evolution of the concept owed much to changing circumstances and what were often highly fluid political dynamics.116 Initially, in Discovery of Secrets, Khomeini called for political “supervision” by the faqih, especially over the legislative and executive branches of government. In 1943 he wrote: “[W]e do not claim that the government should be in the hands of the jurists, but that it should act according to the divine law in which lies the welfare of the nation and the people. This is not attainable without the supervision of the scholars – a fact that was confirmed also by the proponents of constitutionalism.”117 Khomeini at this point was essentially calling for a constitutional government, with the supervision of elected jurists. By 1953, he had expanded the scope of the concept to include governance as well. In his teachings in Qom, Turkey, and Najaf, he steadily introduced the theory of general guardianship by faqihs.118 By the end of the 1960s, Khomeini’s concept of velayat-e faqih had evolved to encompass very specific characteristics for the jurist in terms of his legal responsibilities under certain specific conditions and toward particular groups in the community – for example, guardianship over the insane, authority over the estate of the heirless, etc. It was not until early 1970 when Khomeini took the bold step to assume that the concept meant “the mandate of the jurist to rule.”119 In the months immediately before and during the heady days of the revolution, he reintroduced the concept of velayat in the sense of political guardianship in the newly coined “Islamic Republic.”120 The new interpretation was nothing less than revolutionary in allowing for theocratic rule under the interchangeable concepts of “imamate” and “leadership.”121 Even after being formally declared as the velayat-e 116 117

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Kadivar, Hokumat-e Velayati (Government of Guardianship), p. 145. Quoted in Hamid Mavani, “Khomeini’s Concept of Governance of the Jurisconsult (Wilayat al-faqih) Revisited: The Aftermath of Iran’s 2009 Presidential Election,” Middle East Journal, Vol. 67, No. 2 (Spring 2013), p. 214. Kadivar, Daghdagheh-haye Hokumat-e Dini (Concerns of Religious Government), p. 161. Arjomand, “Ideological Revolution in Shi‘ism,” p. 194. Kadivar, Hokumat-e Velayati (Government of Guardianship), pp. 141–143. Arjomand, “Ideological Revolution in Shi‘ism,” p. 195; Maryam Mahmoodi and Ziba Fallahi, “Barresi-ye Velayat az Didgah-e Imam Khomeini va Hakim Tirmizi” (Analysis of Velayat from the Perspective of Imam Khomeini and

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faqih in the constitution of 1979, Khomeini was not fully in favor of extensive clerical involvement in state affairs. In August 1983, Khomeini made the following statement: I have repeatedly stated that the clergy must maintain their role of popular guidance and must not become rulers. We [clerics] cannot do something that would prompt people to say that the clergy could not reach anything before, but became this way as soon as they gained access to power. Religious autocracy is an insult that we cannot take lightly.122

Nearly a decade into the Islamic Republic, in 1987–1988, Khomeini called for “a full-fledged and comprehensive authority that would permit the jurisconsult to override [Islam’s] primary injunctions or avoid acts of worship or suspend articles of the constitution if he deemed such actions to be in the interest of the people and the state.”123 This was part of the expanded scope of authority of the “appointed absolute velayat-e faqih” ruling over the Islamic Republic.124 An important dimension of this latest iteration of the velayat-e faqih was a significant expansion of the scope of the position’s authority through “state injunctions,” ahkam-e hokumati, as issued by faqih, over even the primary injunctions of Islam.125 Critically, Khomeini’s notion of absolute velayat-e faqih was meant to address those needs of the time that Shia fiqh up to that point had not taken into account.126 With his passing shortly thereafter, it was Khomeini’s successor, Khamenei, who put the concept of absolute velayat-e faqih to full use.

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Hakim Tirmizi), Faslnameh-e ‘Orfan-e Eslami, Vol. 14, No. 56 (1397/2018), p. 140. Ahmad Bakhshayesh Ardestani and Ghorbanali Soleymanpour, “Daramadi Jame‘h Shenakhti bar Kheslat-haye Madani-e Nahad-e Rouhaniyat va Naghshe an dar Vogho’ Enghelab-e Eslami” (A Sociological Study of the Civic Character of The Institution of the Clergy and Its Role in the Appearance of the Islamic Revolution), Faslnameh-e Motale‘at-e Siyasi, Vol. 1, No. 1 (1387/ 2008), p. 25. Mavani, “Khomeini’s Concept of Governance of the Jurisconsult (Wilayat alfaqih) Revisited,” pp. 214–215. Kadivar, Hokumat-e Velayati (Government of Guardianship), pp. 141–143. Vafaei Fard and Mirahmadi, “Tahlili bar Mahiyat-e Zazariyeh-e Velayat-e Faqih-e Emam Khomeini” (An Analysis of the Nature of Imam Khomeini’s Theory of Velayat-e Faqih), p. 86. Kadivar, Daghdagheh-haye Hokumat-e Dini (Concerns of Religious Government), pp. 154, 156.

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Theorizing the Velayat-e Faqih Khomeini’s contributions to Shia fiqh in general and his particular interpretation of velayat-e faqih draw on a rich tradition of jurisprudential thought. Before exploring Khomeini’s notion of velayat-e faqih, it would be useful to briefly present an account of the idea’s history within Shia fiqh. To start, let us clarify the meaning of the term as commonly used by Shia thinkers. Vali means guardian and executor, or administrator of affairs.127 Velayat comes from vali and can mean “friendship and love,” “guardianship,” “kindness and camaraderie,” “victory and assistance.”128 Velayat-e faqih is made up of a combination of two words: velayat, as in guidance, custodianship, supervision, wisdom, spirituality, closeness to God, and empathy and bond. Faqih refers to an expert and specialist in jurisprudence. Velayat-e faqih therefore means that the faqih has the authority to administer the affairs of Muslims during the Occultation and is their custodian.129 The notion of velayat-e faqih was first introduced by Lebanese Shia clerics who were brought to Iran by the Safavids.130 According to Mohsen Kadivar, himself both a scholar and a theologian, while alMohaqiq al-Karaki is generally assumed to be the first real theoretician of the notion of velayat-e faqih, the first time the exact term was actually used was in 1548 by the scholar Zayn al-Din al-Juba’i alAmili (1506–1559), also known as Shahid Thani, in his book Masalek al-Afham (Ways of Understanding). Shahid Thani’s conception of velayat-e faqih was limited in scope to “those recognized to issue

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Mohammad Ganj Khanlu, “Vakavi-e Mashru‘iyat-e Velayat-e Faqih dar ‘Asr-e Gheybat az Manzar-e Feqhi va Kalami” (Analysis of the Legitimacy of the Velayat-e Faqih in the Age of Occultation from the Perspective of Jurisprudence and Kalam), Sokhan-e Jeme‘h, Vol. 4, No. 5 (1394/2015), p. 114. Ibid., p. 115. Others have similarly defined velayat as closeness, providing support, kindness, ownership, management, and acquisition. See Mahmoodi and Fallahi, “Barresi-ye Velayat az Didgah-e Imam Khomeini va Hakim Tirmizi” (Analysis of Velayat from the Perspective of Imam Khomeini and Hakim Tirmizi), p. 140. Elahinejad, “Mahdaviyat Mabna-ye Din Shenakhti-e Velayat-e Faqih dar Tahkim-e Nezam-e Jomhuri-e Eslami” (Mahdism as the Basis for Religious Understanding of Velayat-e Faqih in Strengthening the Islamic Republic System), pp. 67–68. Maleki, “Mabani-e Mashru‘iyat-e Nezam-e Jomhuri-e Eslami-e Iran” (Principles of the Legitimacy of the Islamic Republic of Iran), p. 80.

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opinions in ijtihad on religious matters during the Occultation, and to act as people’s representatives whenever needed.”131 Since Thani’s original contribution, the theory of velayat-e faqih has gone through several different phases from its inception until today. Shia faqihs universally agree that the earliest form of velayat belonged to the Prophet, who was bestowed the right of guardianship by God. After the Prophet, guardianship was the responsibility of the Twelve Imams, which was the same as that of the guardianship of the Prophet and of God but now only through His imams.132 One of the central questions of Shia fiqh since then has revolved around the precise meaning of velayat after the Twelfth Imam went into hiding. Since political power has been in the hands of the Sunni majority, Shia faqihs have pondered over the scope of the authority of the Imam’s successors in general and his relationship with the state in particular. Is it permissible to cooperate with the ruler, and if so under what circumstances? And, how is the Imam’s successor determined to begin with? These questions – the scope of the faqih’s authority, his relationship with the state, and the manner of his selection – have formed an important strand in Shia jurisprudence that today has led to the velayat-e faqih as we have come to know it. The velayat-e faqih system is not a new phenomenon, in fact, and an original form of it can be observed during the rule of the Twelve Imams (first centuries of Islamic history) since they were also selected by God to rule over their societies. In the earliest days, when the Twelve Imams were present, the basis and foundations of the velayat-e faqih were articulated. This is one of the main reasons that velayat-e faqih so closely resembles the system of imamate.133 Once the imamate of the Twelve Imams was over, a second phase of Shia theorizing began, with the start of the Occultation period, and lasted until the official establishment of Shi‘ism in Iran. In the early years of the Occultation, the common assumption about the velayat-e 131 132

133

Kadivar, Hokumat-e Velayati (Government of Guardianship), p. 103. Mohammad Shahidi, “Mas‘aleh-e Velayat-e Faqih dar Tool-e Tarikh-e Gheybat” (The Issue of Velayat-e faqih during the History of Occultation), Majaleh-e Beinolmelali-e Pazhohesh-e Melal, Vol. 3, No. 32 (1398/ 2018), pp. 117–118. Mohammad Taqi Mesbah Yazdi, Porsesh-ha va Pasokh-ha, Vol. 1 (Questions and Answers) (Qom: Mo‘aseseh-e Amouzeshi va Pazhoheshi-e Emam Khomeini, 1380/2001), p. 53.

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faqih was that the guardianship of the Shia community should ideally be entrusted to a “just faqih.” However, the realization of such a position would not be possible under the circumstances that prevailed.134 Lasting for no less than a millennium, therefore, for much of this time the velayat-e faqih did not entail any responsibilities for administration and social and political management.135 Because the Shia did not have political power during the period, they instead devised concepts and practices such as zarurat (necessity), maslahat (expedience), and taqiyyeh (dissimulation) in order to cope with prevailing circumstances. Some jurists even went so far as to justify cooperation with an unjust ruler but only under extraordinary circumstances.136 While the position of velayat-e faqih technically existed in Shia communities during this period, the responsibility of the vali-e faqih was limited to looking after the needs of the community, not always openly. These included looking after widows and orphans, settling disputes among community members, prohibiting evil and enjoining good, leading communal and Friday prayers, administering and spending religious taxes, and attending to other similar matters.137 A third phase in the evolution of Shia theory evolved after the establishment of the Safavids, when social and political pressure on the Shia ulama was reduced and a number of works on Shia jurisprudence began to appear. Some of the more notable ulama, in fact, became active and influential in the royal court, as was especially the case with the jurist al-Muhaqqiq al-Karaki in Shah Tahmasp’s court. Though their situation was far from ideal, in return for privileged access to the court and unprecedented social and political freedoms to express their ideas, the ulama justified bestowing legitimacy on Safavid rulers so long as the rulers remained just.138 After some six hundred years of theorizing about the velayat-e faqih coexisting along with unjust rulers, the ascension to power of the Safavids changed the way the Shia ulama viewed and justified the 134

135 136

137 138

Mohammad Javad Aqajari and Mohammad Baqeri, “Teori-e Velayat-e Faqih dar Nezam-e Siyasi-e Eslam” (Theory of Velyat-e Faqih in the Political System of Islam), Andisheh-e Siyasi-e Eslam, Vol 2, No. 4 (1390/2011), p. 8. Kadivar, Hokumat-e Velayati (Government of Guardianship), p. 101. Aqajari and Baqeri, “Teori-e Velayat-e Faqih dar Nezam-e Siyasi-e Eslam” (Theory of Velyat-e Faqih in the Political System of Islam), pp. 10–11. Kadivar, Hokumat-e Velayati (Government of Guardianship), p. 100. Aqajari and Baqeri, “Teori-e Velayat-e Faqih dar Nezam-e Siyasi-e Eslam” (Theory of Velyat-e Faqih in the Political System of Islam), p. 12.

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position of the velayat-e faqih. Safavid kings involved the ulama in the political system. Al-Muhaqqiq al-Karaki was the first cleric to accept the Safavids’ invitation. Karaki argued that while the qualified faqih is ordained by the Twelve Imams to strive for the creation of Islamic government, the faqih can also cooperate with the ruler so long as the ruler is just. He maintained that the faqih was ordained by the Twelve Imams and was jurisprudentially obligated to work toward the establishment of an Islamic state by cooperating with the just ruler. This was a major theoretical innovation in Shii fiqh, especially in its premise that the legitimacy of the faqih was separate from that granted by the ruler. Comprising a second generation of theories on the velayat-e faqih, this line of thinking was commonly accepted for about two hundred years under the Safavids, and for another one hundred years after that.139 The Safavid-era jurist Ahmad Bin Mohammad Ardebili Najani, commonly known as Muhaqqiq Ardebili (d. 1585), presented fairly similar ideas concerning the velayat-e faqih. Ardebili claimed that society would erupt into chaos without the velayat-e faqih. As the rightful successors to the Twelve Imams, Ardebili maintained, contemporary velayat-e faqihs should emulate Imam Ali’s rule and involve themselves in all affairs of society.140 Another Safavid jurist, Feyz Kashani (1598–1680), similarly argued that governments were divided into legitimate and illegitimate ones, and that there were three kinds of legitimate government: the government of the Prophet, the governments of the Twelve Imams, and the government of the velayat-e faqih. Since Islam is a comprehensive social and political system, according to Kashani, the implementation of Islamic rules must be entrusted to a specialist of fiqh, a velayat-e faqih. Another cleric, Sheikh Mohammad Hassan Najafi (1787–1850), also known as Saheb Jawaher, argued that rulers are either just or unjust, with just rulers being only the Prophet, the Twelve Imams, and the velayat-e faqih. What set Saheb Jawaher apart from other jurists was his insistence that collaboration

139

140

Mohsen Mohajernia, “Talaqi-e Seh Danesh-e Siyasi-e Eslami va Tahavol-e Nazariyeh-e Velayat-e Faqih” (Confluence of Three Islamic Sciences of Politics and Changes to the Theory of Velayat-e Faqih), ‘Olum-e Siyasi, Vol. 21, No. 82 (1397/2018), pp. 42–43. Abolfazl Qadimabadi, “Barresi-ye Tarikhi-e Pishineh-e Nazariyeh-e Velayat-e Faqih” (Analysis of Theoretical Background of Theory of Velayat-e Faqih), Za‘er, Vol. 24, No. 252 (1396/2017), p. 22.

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with unjust rulers was forbidden and that qualified faqihs should actively seek to become leaders of Muslim community.141 Steadily, throughout the Qajar period, the powers of the clergy increased in relation to the powers of the monarch as shahs became more dependent on the clergy to gain legitimacy for their rule.142 Before long, a third generation of theorists of velayat-e faqih were making innovative contributions to Shia fiqh. The Iraqi-born Mohammad Hussein Kashef Al-Gheta (1877–1953), for example, maintained that rule belongs only to God and must be bestowed upon the ruler by Him. Although Al-Gheta did not call for the direct rule of the faqih, he did insist on the importance of the faqih’s endorsement of the profane ruler to govern as he deemed fit. The faqih’s approval is even necessary in instances when the ruler decides to declare war.143 This line of thinking continued until near the end of the Qajar period, when fewer ulama were willing to accept the legitimacy of the king. Ayatollah Mohammad Hussein Naini (1860–1936), for example, tried to limit the scope of the king’s authority. The dominant theoretical perspective that emerged at this time was “faqih plus constitutional monarch.” This trend was expedited during the Constitutional Revolution, which fostered a new phase in the evolution of Shia fiqh. Many members of the ulama, led especially by Naini, sought to limit the arbitrary powers of the king and curtail royal despotism. One of the main theoretical developments of this period was the articulation of jurisprudential and theological justifications to ensure supervisory or at least advisory roles by the clergy in political matters. Albeit indirectly, references were made to the political role of the velayat-e faqih. This was one of the main, and important, contributions of Ayatollah Naini. Naini was of the view that the absence of a velayati system inhered three types of injustice: injustice against God, as lawmaking belongs only to Him; injustice against the Twelve Imams, since rulership belongs only to the Imams and their designees; and injustice against the people, whose rights are ignored. According to Naini, in a constitutional system, only one of these forms of injustice remains, 141 142 143

Ibid., pp. 23–24. Kadivar, Hokumat-e Velayati (Government of Guardianship), p. 104. Qadimabadi, “Barresi-ye Tarikhi-e Pishineh-e Nazariyeh-e Velayat-e Faqih” (Analysis of Theoretical Background of Theory of Velayat-e Faqih), p. 24.

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namely injustice against the Imams. And if there is a mechanism whereby the imams can supervise the constitutional system, then this last form of injustice is also removed.144 A fifth and final phase in the evolution of the theory of velayat-e faqih started with Khomeini’s articulations. Whereas in his earlier writings Khomeini had emphasized the importance of justice in lawmaking and rulership, in the late 1960s he articulated his theory of velayat-e faqih. According to Khomeini, “the presence of vali-e amr (guardian of affairs) is a necessity, meaning there needs to be a ruler who safeguards public order and ensures the implementation of Islamic law, one who prevents injustice and violations of the rights of others and is guardian and protector of God’s people.”145 Whereas after the Constitutional Revolution (1905–1911) the clergy saw a need for a Sultan, at least theoretically, they saw no such need after the Islamic Revolution.146 Instead, they envisioned themselves as rulers. The Islamic Revolution brought about a new generation of thinkers on velayat-e faqih. This generation, led by Khomeini, expanded the scope of the faqih’s authority. During this period, the central question to which the ulama devoted much of their attention became whether God specified the kind of government necessary during the Occultation. In this conception, as Ayatollah Javadi Amoli maintained, the faqih is obligated to perform his responsibilities to the community, and the people are obligated to obey him in politics. In such a scenario, the establishment of an Islamic system headed by a faqih is inevitable.147 Ultimately, Amoli and others maintained, the Muslim community should be ruled over by none other than the velayat-e faqih. Significantly, whereas after the Constitutional Revolution (1905–1911) the clergy saw a need for a sultan, at least theoretically,

144

145 146

147

Aqajari and Baqeri, “Teori-e Velayat-e Faqih dar Nezam-e Siyasi-e Eslam” (Theory of Velyat-e Faqih in the Political System of Islam), pp. 13–14. Quoted in Ibid., p. 15. Javad Emamjome‘hzadeh, Masoud Shahramnia, and Majid Nejatpour, “Rouhaniyat-e Shia va Moqayeseh-e Se Dahe Naqsh-e an Pas az Mashruteh va Pas az Enqelab-e Eslami” (Comparison of Shia Clergy in the Three Decades after the Constitutional Revolution and the Islamic Revolution), Faslnameh-e Elmi-Pazhoheshi-e Shiashenasi, Vol. 19, No. 39 (1391/2012), p. 173. Mohajernia, “Talaqi-e Seh Danesh-e Siyasi-e Eslami va Tahavol-e Nazariyeh-e Velayat-e Faqih” (Confluence of Three Islamic Sciences of Politics and Changes to the Theory of Velayat-e Faqih), pp. 44–45.

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they saw no such need after the Islamic Revolution.148 Instead, the ulama envisioned themselves as rulers. As this brief historical survey indicates, over time Shia ulama have theorized about different kinds of velayat-e faqih. These kinds of velayat can be divided into two broad categories. One is takvini velayat, roughly translated as “guardianship over life” or original guardianship, which belongs to God and His select prophets. The other form of velayat is tashrihi, an approximate translation of which is “guardianship over the profane,” or legislative guardianship. This kind of velayat deals with policymaking and matters involving law, politics, and governance.149 The faqihs are responsible for tashrihi velayat, and the people are responsible for obeying the faqihs’ rules and the laws they make.150 The debate has been over the scope of authority in tashrihi velayat. Some Iranian clerics have maintained that even though the principle of velayat-e faqih is eternally valid and is unchangeable, the actual administrative form of the position is not constant and is changeable.151 Ayatollah Mohammad Hossein Esfahani (1878–1942), for example, argued that there is a significant difference between original and legislative guardianships, which would give the faqih the right to make laws. Esfahani maintained that both types of velayat belong to God. Therefore, tashrihi velayat by a faqih is acceptable only when there is an absolute need for it.152 At the opposite extreme is the notion of the absolute velayat-e faqih, which Khomeini devised and, in practice at least, Khamenei perfected.153 148

149

150

151

152

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Emamjome‘hzadeh et al., “Rouhaniyat-e Shia va Moqayeseh-e Se Dahe Naqshe an Pas az Mashruteh va Pas az Enqelab-e Eslami” (Comparison of Shia Clergy in the Three Decades After the Constitutional Revolution and the Islamic Revolution), p. 173. Jaber Amiri, Mabani-e Andisheh-haye Eslami (Foundations of Islamic Thought) (Qom: Mo‘aseseh-e Farhangi ve Entesharati-e Gorgan, 1380/ 2001), pp. 139–140. Khanlu, “Vakavi-e Mashru‘iyat-e Velayat-e Faqih dar ‘Asr-e Gheybat az Manzar-e Feqhi va Kalami” (Analysis of the Legitimacy of the Velayat-e Faqih in the Age of Occultation from the Perspective of Jurisprudence and Kalam), p. 115. Reza Sanati, Mashru‘iyat-e Asemani (Divine Legitimacy) (Qom: Salman-e Farsi, 1394/2015), p. 87. Mousavian, Mabani-e Dini-e Mardomsalari (Religious Foundations of Democracy), p. 173. Moteza Alavian and Farzad Hosseini, “Saz o Kar-e Feqhi va Qanuni-e Mahar va Kontrol-e Qova-ye Hokumati dar Nazariyeh-e ‘Velayat-e Motlaq-e Faqih’” (The Jurisprudential and Legal Basis for Constraining State Power in Theory of

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Khomeini’s Velayat-e Faqih The roots of Khomeini’s ideas on the velayat-e faqih can be easily traced to Sheikh Fazlollah Nouri’s concept of Shari‘ah-based constitutionalism. Both clerics believed in divine legitimacy, the implementation of Islamic injunctions in society, lawmaking based on Islam, and strengthening of the position of the clergy as a social and political class. While Nouri believed in the continuation of the monarchy under the supervision of the faqih, Khomeini eventually came to call for the direct rule of the faqih over the state.154 In doing so, Khomeini articulated a maximalist conception of Islam that encompasses all social and political dimensions of life.155 In devising his theory of velayat-e faqih, Khomeini showed a good deal of flexibility as time went by, especially when he felt that evolving political circumstances necessitated ideological and practical flexibility. Four specific changes stand out. First, Khomeini’s early formulation, in the 1970s, had the velayat-e faqih as an appointive position, with one becoming the velayat-e faqih by simple appointment. A second iteration came about as the revolution was unfolding, when Khomeini mentioned, though did not necessarily elaborate on, the idea that the velayat-e faqih should be elected. Third, Khomeini articulated the theoretical notion of an absolute velayat-e faqih. Closer to the end of his life, a fourth phase in the concept of velayat-e faqih emerged when the theoretical concept of its absolute nature was actually put into practice.156 Every society naturally needs an executive. Khomeini maintained that Islamic fiqh mandates the formation of Islamic government headed by a just and knowledgeable faqih. Both the precepts of fiqh and the dictates of the faqih must be obeyed by the faithful.157

154

155 156

157

“Absolute Velayat-e Faqih”), Hokumat-e Eslami, Vol. 21, No. 2 (1395/2016), p. 7. Ranjbarzadeh and Javarshakian, “Maqbuliyat va Mashru‘iyat-e Hokumat-e Eslami dar Andisheh-e Mulla Sadra va Emam Khomeini” (The Acceptance and Legitimacy of Islamic Government in the Thoughts of Mulla Sadra and Imam Khomeini), p. 60. Ibid., p. 68. Baqi, Gofteman-haye Dini-e Mo‘aser (Contemporary Religious Discourses), p. 339. Mohajernia, “Talaqi-e Seh Danesh-e Siyasi-e Eslami va Tahavol-e Nazariyeh-e Velayat-e Faqih” (Confluence of Three Islamic Sciences of Politics and Changes to the Theory of Velayat-e Faqih), p. 45.

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In Muslim societies, there are a number of Islamic injunctions (ahkam) that require the existence of a faqih as an executive. One set of injunctions are financial, especially as they relate to the collection and distribution of various forms of taxes and khoms and zakat. A second set of injunctions relate to national defense, and a third set have to do with legal and judicial rules.158 These injunctions cannot be properly carried out by anyone other than a ruling faqih. Khomeini saw any government that was not headed by the velayat-e faqih as corrupt and evil.159 Moreover, any ruler not guided by Islamic injunctions and principles is corrupt and unjust.160 Every political system that is not Islamic is sinful and its leader is a rapacious unbeliever. For these reasons, all Muslims are responsible for creating the appropriate set of conditions that nurture pious and knowledgeable individuals.161 In articulating the concept of velayat-e faqih, Khomeini maintained that although the position has not received the attention it deserves, anyone with even a scant understanding of Islam understands the necessity of having a velayat-e faqih.162 We need a ruler, he argued, a khalif, someone who would execute laws. Laws always need an administrator. Similar to the Prophet, the khalif is not meant to make laws; laws are made by God. The khalif is meant only to carry out the laws of God.163 But he must be just, especially given that his powers are expansive and absolute. In Khomeini’s view, resort to experts and their advice is needed only when the ruler does not have the necessary expertise in a particular field. When the ruler does have the needed expertise, he can make the required decisions by himself even in cases when others may recommend alternative courses of action. This applies to the relationship between the vali-e faqih and the Expediency Council, one of whose tasks is to give advice and suggestions to the leader.164 158

159

160

161 164

Khomeini, Velayat-e Faqih Hokumat-e Eslami (Velayat-e Faqih Islamic Government), pp. 31–34. Mohammad Javad Nowruzi, “Eslam, Moderniteh va Hakemiyat-e Melli dar Jomhuri-e Eslami-e Iran” (Islam, Modernity and National Sovereignty in the Islamic Republic of Iran), Ma‘refat-e Siyasi, Vol. 3, No. 2 (1390/2011), p. 138. Khomeini, Velayat-e Faqih Hokumat-e Eslami (Velayat-e Faqih Islamic Government), p. 41. 162 163 Ibid., p. 35. Ibid., p. 9. Ibid., p. 21. Mohammad Mousavi Bojnourdi and Ali Seyedmousavi, “Rahbari va Nezarat-e Mashverati-e Majma’-e Tashkis-e Maslehat-e Nezam ba Roykardi bar Nazar-e Emam Khomeini” (The Leadership and the Supervisory Consultation of the

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One of the most essential features of the leader of the Muslim community is to be just and to actively fight for justice. For Khomeini, the ideal ruler is a “philosopher king” in the platonic understanding of the term, someone, much the same way as Plato had envisioned, with justice as his primary concern.165 Today and every day, it is necessary to ensure the existence of a “guardian of time” (vali-e amr), a ruler committed to establishing and safeguarding a just system of Islamic laws and politics. Muslims need a ruler who would protect them from rapaciousness and oppression, both domestically and internationally.166 The ideal ruler must also help Muslims put an end to their subjugation at the hands of colonial masters. How can we sit by quietly and idly, Khomeini asked, and look on as a bunch of traitors, usurpers, and foreign puppets forcibly steal the hard-earned wealth of hundreds of millions of Muslims? It is the responsibility of every clergyman and every Muslim to put an end to this unjust situation, and in doing so to overthrow unjust political systems, and to establish an Islamic government in its place.167 Through their propaganda and their missionaries, and because of our own stupor, Khomeini argues, foreigners have created our conditions for us. They have taken Islam out of political and judicial laws and replaced it with materials from Europe. They have belittled Islam and have placed their own puppets in control of us and our laws and resources. The West’s local allies have lost their own identity and culture.168 Earlier it was mentioned that Khomeini’s assumptions about political fiqh are decidedly undemocratic. In his 1970 book, Khomeini specified that Islamic government is neither autocratic nor absolutist (motlaq). But he also mentioned that it is not conditional (mashruteh) either, and power and legitimacy are not derived from the people. The constitution becomes the highest and most important document in the country, and in it the principal rights of all people

165

166

167

Expediency Council in Imam Khomeini’s Perspective), Pazhoheshnameh-e Matin, Vol. 19, No. 75 (1396/2017), pp. 73, 95. Hamid Dabashi, Theology of Discontent: The Ideological Foundations of the Islamic Revolution in Iran (New York: New York University Press, 1993), p. 413. Khomeini, Velayat-e Faqih Hokumat-e Eslami (Velayat-e Faqih Islamic Government), p. 40. 168 Ibid., p. 38. Ibid., p. 19.

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are respected.169 But this does not necessarily mean that people get to choose their leader. For Khomeini, the qualified faqih is the rightful successor to the Twelve Imams.170 Khomeini was a proponent of appointed rather than elected velayat-e faqih. While he mentioned elections on occasion, he did so only in passing, and the bulk of his theoretical contributions were directed at the appointive nature of the faqih’s position.171 This topic – which later became one of the Islamic Republic’s defining questions – is explored in greater detail in later chapters. Importantly, the idea that the ruler is installed in his position through some higher power that is above and beyond the power of the people was first applied to Iran’s contemporary politics by Khomeini. Khomeini also endorsed and put into practice the idea of installation by the velayat-e faqih when he “installed” Mehdi Bazargan as the prime minister of the provisional government after the revolution, and also when he “installed” the Expediency Council before it was constitutionally sanctioned.172 In Khomeini’s formulation, therefore, the velayat-e faqih derives his legitimacy from the fact that he is the successor to the Infallible Imams and is a representative of the Hidden Imam during the Occultation. Just as the Prophet selected a ruler to follow him as Imam, and the successor selected others, so were subsequent guardians selected.173 This ruler needs to be a “guardian” and provide guardianship (velayat). In this context, velayat means governing, administering, and managing. Governing entails the responsibility of executing the laws of Islam and establishing a just Islamic order. The ruler must be knowledgeable about Islam’s injunctions (ahkam) and be just in their execution.174 Not surprisingly, the scope of the faqih’s responsibilities is quite extensive, including the supervision and management of society 169 170

171

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173

174

Ibid., p. 43. Ranjbarzadeh and Javarshakian, “Maqbuliyat va Mashru‘iyat-e Hokumat-e Eslami dar Andisheh-e Mulla Sadra va Emam Khomeini” (The Acceptance and Legitimacy of Islamic Government in the Thoughts of Mulla Sadra and Imam Khomeini), p. 69. Kadivar, Daghdagheh-haye Hokumat-e Dini (Concerns of Religious Government), p. 75. Maleki, “Mabani-e Mashru‘iyat-e Nezam-e Jomhuri-e Eslami-e Iran” (Principles of the Legitimacy of the Islamic Republic of Iran), p. 88. Khomeini, Velayat-e Faqih Hokumat-e Eslami (Velayat-e Faqih Islamic Government), p. 20. Ibid., pp. 49–54.

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and the economy. Mission and responsibility are at the core of the velayat-e faqih. As such, for the velayat-e faqih, ruling is not just a right; it is indeed a responsibility.175 This responsibility is mutual: the just faqih is obligated to rule, and the people are obligated to obey him. Jurists and faqihs are responsible for carrying out divine law, collecting taxes, and defending borders. Just as Prophet Muhammad was responsible for ensuring that laws are obeyed and that Islamic order is maintained, and in the same way that God had chosen him as the head of the Islamic government to which obedience was obligatory, just clerics must also establish a social order based on Islamic injunctions.176 During the Occultation, if someone who is just and knowledgeable of Islamic injunctions rises up and forms an Islamic government, obedience to him is mandatory.177

Applying Theory to Practice The articulation of the position of velayat-e faqih in the 1979 constitution drew primarily from two sources. One was Ayatollah Khomeini’s book Islamic Government. The other was a detailed reply published by the Najaf-based Ayatollah Muhammad Baqer al-Sadr, who was responding to a query by a group of Lebanese Shia clerics regarding the nature of the nascent Islamic state in Iran. Sadr, himself most likely drawing on work by Khomeini, postulated that supreme power should be vested in a just and knowledgeable marj‘a qaed, or supreme marj‘a.178 As the Constitutional Assembly of Experts began deliberating on a draft constitution, one of the earliest articles it drafted, Article 5, instituted the position of velayat-e faqih: During the Occultation of the Hidden Imam, the guardianship and leadership of the community will be the responsibility of a just and pious faqih, who is fully aware of the circumstances of his age, and is courageous, resourceful, and administratively capable. He will assume the responsibilities of this office in accordance with Article 107.

175 176

177 178

Mirahmadi, Feqh-e Siyasi (Political Jurisprudence), p. 84. Khomeini, Velayat-e Faqih Hokumat-e Eslami (Velayat-e Faqih Islamic Government), pp. 55, 72. Ibid., p. 50. Siavush Randjbar-Daemi, The Quest for Authority in Iran: A History of the Presidency from Revolution to Rouhani (London: I. B. Tauris, 2018), p. 14.

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Article 107 further stipulated that the velayat-e faqih needs also to be a marja‘-e taqlid. After Article 5 was ratified, Khomeini made the following statement: I assure the nation and all security personnel that if there is supervision by a faqih and we have a velayat-e faqih, no harm will come to the country. Speakers and writers should not be afraid of Islamic government and the velayat-e faqih. The velayat-e faqih is what Islam has mandated, which our Imams have installed, and it harms no one. The velayat-e faqih will not act against the interests of the state, and if the president or anyone else acts against the people, the velayat-e faqih will prevent it.179

Khomeini, of course, was one of a number of marj‘as. The question of who would occupy the position of velayat-e faqih as stipulated in the constitution was settled by the de facto recognition of Ayatollah Khomeini as occupying the position of leadership of marja‘iyyat, therefore avoiding a potentially divisive chasm within the revolutionary and clerical leaderships.180 Khomeini’s concept of velayat-e faqih was most enthusiastically endorsed and vocally defended by second-tier clerical elites, while most senior ayatollahs had doctrinal reservations about it. Grand Ayatollahs Abolqasem Khoi, Hossein Qomi, and Kazem Shariatmadari, as well as Ayatollahs Mahaeddin Mahalati, Sadeq Rouhani, Ahmad Zanjani, Ali Tehrani, and Moreza Haeri were some of those who had reservations about Khomeini’s interpretation of the concept of velayat-e faqih. As was often the case in the Qom clerical establishment, these and other clerics not enthusiastic about the concept preferred to stay silent on the matter rather than to publicly present jurisprudential arguments against it.181 By 1982, Khomeini’s conception of velayat-e faqih had become the new political orthodoxy, with the Society of Militant Clerics in charge of enforcing it. Soon, starting in 1983, it became customary for associations and revolutionary foundations to pass resolutions declaring allegiance and obedience to the velayat-e faqih. As the new state orthodoxy, all state functionaries, from senior clerics 179

180 181

Mohsen Beheshti Seresht and Hossein Saber, “Tarikhcheh-e Tadvin-e Qanun-e Asasi-e Jomhuri-e Eslami-e Iran” (A Brief History of the Drafting of the Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Iran), Faslnemeh-e Zharfapazhoh, Vol. 2, Nos. 2–3 (1393–1394/2014–2015), pp. 56–57. Randjbar-Daemi, The Quest for Authority in Iran, p. 15. Said Amir Arjomand, The Turban for the Crown: The Islamic Revolution in Iran (New York: Oxford University Press, 1998), pp. 155–156.

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to Friday prayer Imams, promoted Khomeini’s doctrine of velayat-e faqih in conferences, conventions, sermons, lectures, and school lessons.182 It did not take long for Khomeini to discover that running a modern state required making adjustments to the scope of the velayat-e faqih’s authority. Specifically, Khomeini realized that sometimes the needs of the state and public policy contradict the dictates of Islam. When that happens, Khomeini maintained, the injunctions of Islam take a backseat to those of the state. The issue came up in the form of a point that Khamenei made in one of his Friday prayer sermons when he was also serving as president. In his Friday prayer sermon on January 1, 1988, Khamenei implied that there are certain limits to the powers of the velayat-e faqih as leader when it comes to religious matter, especially insofar as Islam’s primary injunctions (ahkam-e avvaliyeh) such as prayer, fasting, and the hajj are concerned. Five days later, on January 6, in a public letter to the president, Khomeini admonished the president for his incorrect jurisprudential understanding: Based on Your Excellency’s assertions during Friday Prayers, it appears that you do not consider the rule of Absolute Velayat-e Faqih to be anointed by God and, as the successor to the Prophet, be based on divine religious edicts. And, the interpretation of what I have said – that within the framework of divine laws the state has responsibilities – was completely opposite to what you said . . . I must state that governance, which is a branch of the absolute velayat of the Messenger, is one of the primary injunctions of Islam, and takes priority over all secondary injunctions, including even prayer, fasting, and hajj.183

This became one of the most clear articulations of what came to be known as “state injunctions” (ahkam-e hokumati).184 Ayatollah Khomeini devised the notion of state injunctions and placed them 182 183

184

Arjomand, “Ideological Revolution in Shi‘ism,” pp. 196–197. Quoted in, Vafaei Fard and Mirahmadi, “Tahlili bar Mahiyat-e Zazariyeh-e Velayat-e Faqih-e Emam Khomeini” (An Analysis of the Nature of Imam Khomeini’s Theory of Velayat-e Faqih), pp. 89, 278. An English text of the Khomeini’s letter to Khamenei, with a slightly different translation than what appears here, can be found in Yvette Hovsepian-Bearce, The Political Ideology of Ayatollah Khamenei: Out of the mouth of the Supreme Leader of Iran (London: Routledge, 2016), p. 95. Ahkam is the plural of hokm. Hokm can mean injunction, ordinance, directive, obligation, prohibition, judgments, or a command issued by a ruler to perform an act or to abstain from it. Fatemeh Rajaei, “Barresi-ye Mabani-e Mashruiyat-

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alongside, and above, Islam’s “primary” and “secondary” injunctions, or ahkam-e avvaliyeh and sanaviyeh, respectively. According to this formulation, state injunctions are comprised of “detailed orders and plans of action, the establishment of general laws and regulations, and the order to execute Shari‘ah laws and regulations, as determined by the legitimate ruler of society, based on the rights given to him by the Almighty and by the Innocent Imams, which he carries out in the interests of society.”185 State injunctions must be based on what is in the interests of society (maslahat), and they must also broadly encompass the principles of the Shari‘ah. A necessary precondition for state directives is that they must be issued with the public’s general interests in mind, in order to protect social order and Islam.186 Subsequent theorists argue that the Prophet Muhammad, Imam Ali, the Twelve Imams, and prominent contemporary Shii clerics have all issued state injunctions at one point or another.187 The ruler of the Muslim community has the right to intervene and to make decisions (political, social, cultural, economic, and military). Of course, his decisions and his commands are valid only so long as they are in the interests (maslahat) of Muslim society.188 When the velayat-e faqih deems state injunctions to have greater importance, those divine injunctions that are usually considered primary become secondary and ancillary, ahkam-e far‘iyeh. The decisions and declarations of the absolute velayat-e faqih have priority over “secondary” divine injunctions, and the people are obliged to obey the velayat-e faqih.189 Closely related to the notion of state injunctions is that of “the greater good.” In the evolution of his theory of velayat-e faqih, near

185

186 187

188 189

e Hokm-e Hokumati” (Analysis of the Basis of Legitimacy of State Directives), Feqh-e Hokumati, No. 2 (1395/2016), p. 38. Mohammadali Sheikh Movvahed, Mohammadali Heidari, and Ahmadreza Tavakoli, “Nesbat-e Qa‘edeh-e Fiqh-i ‘Hormat-e Tanfir az Din’ ba Hokm-e Hokumati dar Hokumat-e Eslami” (The Fundamental Relationship between the Principle of “Prohibition on Alienation from Religion” and State Directive in Islamic Government), Rahyaft, Vol. 13, No. 48 (1389/2010), pp. 153–154. Ibid., p. 157. Rajaei, “Barresi-ye Mabani-e Mashruiyat-e Hokm-e Hokumati” (Analysis of the Basis of Legitimacy of State Directives), p. 48. Ibid., p. 39. Ranjbarzadeh and Javarshakian, “Maqbuliyat va Mashru‘iyat-e Hokumat-e Eslami dar Andisheh-e Mulla Sadra va Emam Khomeini” (The Acceptance and Legitimacy of Islamic Government in the Thoughts of Mulla Sadra and Imam Khomeini), p. 69.

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the end of his life Khomeini introduced – or, more accurately, incorporated into his arguments – the concept of maslahat, expedience, which was necessitated due to the specific political conditions that the newly established Islamic Republic faced at the time.190 The notion of maslahat was employed by Khomeini as a matter of political necessity. At times Khomeini found the Guardian Council to be so hung up on religious doctrine as to be obstructionist when it came to approving reasonable legislation passed by the Majles. At first Khomeini suggested that if the Majles pass a law by a simple majority of 50 percent plus 1, then the Guardian Council should not oppose its passage. This was specifically in reference to the labor law, which had been passed by the Majles but which the Guardian Council repeatedly rejected. Khomeini then suggested the threshold be raised to passage of a law by two-thirds of Majles deputies. Around this time, he also began discussing the question of the “expediency” of the system (maslahat-e nezam). The problem was that initially there was no normative base for determining maslahat. Through his Friday prayer sermons, Rafsanjani slowly built a jurisprudence of maslahat by repeatedly discussing “the spirit of Islam,” which Khomeini implicitly endorsed.191 Rafsanjani had originally raised the issue of expediency in a 1981 letter to Khomeini asking for help in overturning the Guardian Council’s objection to a land reform bill passed by the Majles. When the notion was first brought up, and before Khomeini’s formal endorsement years later, Grand Ayatollah Mohammad Reza Golpaygani (1899–1993) seriously opposed the idea, seeing expedience as a violation of the primary injunctions of the Shari‘ah.192 By the late 1980s, consistent with his articulation of state injunctions and the growing acceptance of the notion of absolute velayat-e faqih, Khomeini institutionalized the practice of expedience. In February 1988, he declared that “out of caution, in cases when the Majles and 190 191

192

Ibid., p. 72. Lotfollah Meisami, “Hashemi va Qabeliyat-e Nezam Shodan-e Eslam” (Hashemi and Islam’s Capacity to Become the System), Cheshmandaz-e Iran, No. 102 (1395–1396/2016), p. 26. Among other things, this shows that for Khomeini, constitutionalism, and institutions such as the Majles in general, was not mere afterthoughts in his innovative take on the velayat-e faqih and that he actively sought to balance the institution with the challenges and demands of a modern state and its institutions. Said Amir Arjomand, After Khomeini: Iran under His Successors (New York: Oxford University Press, 2009), p. 31.

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the Guardian Council cannot come to a legal or theological agreement, they should refer the law to a council dedicated to the system’s expedience.”193 On April 23, 1989, only a few weeks before his death, Khomeini issued a decree calling for the formation of a twenty-member assembly to amend the 1979 constitution and to resolve some of the problems that had arisen because of the original draft. One of the amendments to the constitution codified the notion of maslahat. The 1989 constitution did so by formalizing the Expediency Discernment Council of the System (Showra-ye Tashkhis-e Maslahat-e Nezam), which Khomeini had earlier established and tasked with resolving conflicts between the Majles and the Guardian Council. At the time, this was considered a major jurisprudential innovation. The establishment of the Expediency Council and other 1989 constitutional amendments signaled the victory of politics over religion.194 Now that the notion of expedience has been formally adopted – or, more accurately, formally borrowed from Sunnism – a number of Shii theorists and scholars have sought to deepen its jurisprudential justifications. According to one interpretation, for example, Surah AlBaqarah (2:38), in which God commands Adam and Eve to trust Him and to have no fear, is a vindication of the principle of maslahat and its endorsement in the Quran.195 Maslahat is also said to have been practiced by both Prophet Muhammad and Imam Ali, and therefore has a rich tradition (sunna) in its support.196 Revolving around the greater good, maslahat is also seen in communal terms. In cases where there is an inconsistency between what is expedient for the individual and the larger society, society always takes priority. In all instances, the collective spirit is far more important and takes precedence over the maslahat of the individual.197 Maslahat does not mean worldly benefit but provides for the ultimate protection of 193 194

195

196 197

Quoted in Mirahmadi, Feqh-e Siyasi (Political Jurisprudence), p. 83. Sussan Siavoshi, Montazeri: The Life and Thought of Iran’s Revolutionary Ayatollah (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2017), p. 158. Hadi Azimi Gorkani, “Jaygah-e Feqhi va Hoquqi-e Majma’-e Tshkhis-e Maslahat-e Nezam” (The Jurisprudential and Legal Position of the Expediency Council), Majaleh-e Feqhi va mabani-e Hoquq Vahed-e Babol, Vol. 2, No. 2 (1381/2002), p. 63. Ibid., pp. 64–65. Abdollah Javadi Amoli, Velayat-e Faqih: Velayat, Feqahat, va ‘Edalat (Velayate Faqih: Guardianship, Learnedness, and Justice) (Qom: Esra’, 1381/2002), p. 68.

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religious precepts through what is to the benefit of the self, religion, reason, property, and even survival.198 Determining what is expedient is therefore not a matter of personal choice but must occur on the basis of established norms and traditions.199 Khomeini applied the notion of maslahat in a wide context, interpreting it as what is in the interest of the country, the system, Islam, the general public, and the dispossessed.200 By adopting the Sunni principle of maslahat and institutionalizing it in the form of the Expediency Council, Khomeini in essence ensured that the velayat-e faqih had more powers than even the Ottoman Sultans did and that he could issue state injunctions with implicit divine sanction.201 Today, the two notions of state injunctions and expediency form central pillars of politics and public policy in the Islamic Republic. Alongside the innovative concept of absolute velayat-e faqih, they have given the Islamic Republic considerable flexibility in theoretically adapting to or justifying its positions in changing, at times unforeseen, circumstances. Khomeini’s jurisprudential innovations have enabled the system to retain its essential ideological character as Islamic while at the same time maintaining jurisprudential flexibility when needed. Referring to the constitutional codification of expediency, the sociologist Said Amir Arjomand highlights instances of what he calls the “Sunnitization of the political thought of the Islamic Republic,” as evident also by the emphasis on the notion of allegiance to the leader, or bay‘at.202 Arjomand is correct in pointing to the ironic operationalization of Sunni jurisprudential concepts by Iran’s Shia state. But perhaps even more ironic is the fact that the Islamic Republic state appears to have become the most important element in the desacralization of politics.203 As one observer has noted, “Khomeini intended to 198

199

200

201 202 203

Azimi Gorkani, “Jaygah-e Feqhi va Hoquqi-e Majma’-e Tshkhis-e Maslahat-e Nezam” (The Jurisprudential and Legal Position of the Expediency Council), p. 61. Emad Afrough, Ma Ghal wa Man Ghal, Vol. 3 (What Was Said and Who Said It, Vol. 3) (Tehran: Hamshahri, 1392/2013), p. 132. Mohammad Mansournezhad, “Barresi-ye Tatbiqi-e Mafhoum-e Maslahat az Didgah-e Emam Khomeini va Andishmandan-e Gharbi” (Comparative Analysis of the Concept of Maslahat from the Perspective of Imam Khomeini and Western Thinkers), Hokumat-e Eslami, Vol. 4, No. 2 (1378/1999), p. 158. Arjomand, After Khomeini: Iran under His Successors, p. 41. Ibid., p. 55. Saeed Hajjarian, Az Shahed-e Qodsi ta Shahed-e Bazari: ‘Orfi Shodan-e Din dar Sepehr-e Siyasat (From the Sacred Witness to the Profane Witness: The

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sacralize politics, but he succeeded in secularizing Islam.”204 What the state and its theoreticians justify as expedience or state injunctions, the ordinary Iranian sees as politics as usual, with hardly any Islamic content or basis in fiqh. For most Iranians, the Islamic Republic has become, just like most other states, neither necessarily Islamic nor, for that matter, quite successful.

Conclusion Islamic jurisprudence, fiqh, has long had the potential to become political by virtue of the scope of issues that fall under its purview. The vicissitudes of history made Shii fiqh mostly politically quietist up until the Safavids, then again politically relevant under the Qajars, and, for the better part of five decades, politically quiet and largely compliant again under the Pahlavis. Beginning in the 1960s Shii quietism began being reversed, thanks mostly to Ayatollah Khomeini’s unrelenting radicalism. The fact that the 1978–1979 revolution did not start out as an Islamic movement should not detract from the profoundly important movement that at the same time was underway in Iranian Islam. That movement, which politicized and in many ways revolutionized Iranian fiqh, was set into motion by none other than Ayatollah Khomeini. In the contemporary era, Ayatollah Khomeini is responsible for the most important transformation of Shia political jurisprudence. By making fiqh address real issues and problems effecting people’s lives, Khomeini fostered its theoretical and practical growth and development.205 Today, fiqh finds itself addressing issues that it did not have to deal with before, or which did not exist at all. Some of these larger issues include the establishment and maintenance of the state, insurance, organ transplantation, organic life, and many other new and emerging issues.206 Revisionist history would have us believe that Khomeini’s ideas did not go through an evolutionary process, from advocating supervision by the clergy to direct and absolute rule of the

204 205

206

Secularization of Religion in the Sphere of Politics) (Tehran: Tarh-e No, 1380/ 2001), pp. 94–95. Ghamari-Tabrizi, “The Divine, the People, and the Faqih,” pp. 211–238. Matlabi et al., “Enghelab-e Eslami-e Iran va Bast-e Fiqh-e Siyasi-e Shia” (Iran’s Islamic Revolution and the Growth of Shia Political Jurisprudence), p. 117. Ibid.

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velayat-e faqih, and that he always believed in the idea of rule by the faqih.207 But the reality is different. In fact, it was perhaps because of their very evolutionary, piecemeal nature that Khomeini’s ideas ended up having the traction that they did. Khomeini’s arguments were foundational to the Islamic Republic. The significance of his jurisprudential contributions and innovations cannot be overstated. For the first time, he theorized about direct rule by a faqih. He revolutionized the position of velayat-e faqih by taking it out of the social and cultural realms only and planting it firmly in the domain of politics. First, he made the velayat-e faqih a political supervisor, then a ruler, and finally an absolute ruler. Khomeini gave the absolute ruler the authority to issue injunctions that superseded the injunctions of religion if necessary, and empowered him to decide on what was expedient and in the interest of the greater good. These ideas continue to remain foundational to the Islamic Republic. Today, Khomeini the ruler has been all but forgotten. His portraits continue to adorn government buildings, his mausoleum is a frequent stop for visiting dignitaries, and his legacy is duly praised on official occasions and in state ceremonies. But the state has long moved on from what one scholar aptly called “Khomeinism.”208 From the 1990s on, it has been “Khameneism” that has ruled Iran politically and jurisprudentially, with its own conceptions of velayat-e faqih. 207

208

An example of this kind of argument can be found in Mohammad Hossein Jamshidi, Mohammad Javad Ghorbi, and Mehrdad Jamshidian, “Nazariyeh-e Velayat-e Faqih va Sobat-e An dar Andisheh-e Siyasi-e Emam Khomeini” (The Theory of Velayat-e Faqih and Its Consistency in the Political Thought of Imam Khomeini), Hokumat-e Eslami, Vol. 19, No. 2 (1393/2014), pp. 5–30. Abrahamian, Khomeinism.

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Social Protection and Guidance

Khomeini theorized about the velayat-e faqih (guardianship of the jurisconsult), and the 1979 constitutions enshrined it as the basic organizing political principle of the Islamic Republic. Then came the task of actually operationalizing the concept and making it politically functional. Even after the adjustments that Khomeini made to the position – by making it absolute, empowering it to prioritize public interest and expedience, and enabling its injunctions to supersede all others – the concept of velayat-e faqih needed additional justifications and theorization. After all, the notion that the velayat-e faqih would be an actual political ruler had never been put into practice prior to 1979, and it had hardly ever been voiced as an idea before 1970. Since the early days of the revolution, therefore, there has been considerable intellectual energy in Iran directed at analyzing and more fully explaining, and at times even slightly adjusting and tweaking, the notion of velayat-e faqih. This chapter examines post-Khomeini intellectual productions meant to better facilitate and operationalize Khomeini’s concept of velayat-e faqih. The overall focus of the chapter is the overriding assumption in Shia fiqh (jurisprudence) in general and theories of the velayat-e faqih in particular that society is in need of proactive protection and guidance. The notion of velayat is neither exclusively nor predominantly Shia in origin and development. However, it has played a central role in Shia theology.1 The logic underlying the notion of velayat-e faqih is that society needs proper guidance and protection, both from the hostile world in which it exists and from itself. Guidance needs to be provided by a specialist of fiqh, a mujtahid who has reached the esteemed position of marja‘iyat and is a “source of emulation,” a marja‘-e taqlid. 1

Hossein Kamaly, God and Man in Tehran: Contending Visions of the Divine from the Qajars to the Islamic Republic (New York: Columbia University Press, 2018), p. 32.

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Protection, or velayat, meanwhile, in its fullest sense is also to be provided by a specialist of fiqh, a faqih, who would be selected to serve in a system based on the velayat-e faqih. In relation to Iran, the clergy have long assumed that Iranian society needs protection from a number of clear and present dangers, be they communism, secular nationalism, unchecked republicanism, modernity, indiscriminate autocracy, or, more recently, the reformist “sedition” (fitna).2 The clergy who are tied to or are supportive of the state call for the routinization and normalization of the concept of velayat-e faqih into Shia political theory. Excerpts from a Friday prayer sermon in Tehran by the ultra-conservative Ayatollah Mesbah Yazdi are representative: “Every day we must deepen our belief in the notion of velayat-e faqih, and strengthen this theory so that our own belief in it is strengthened, and also to impress upon future generations that the Islamic Republic can only survive under the auspices of the velayat-e faqih.”3 According to another cleric, the Qom-based Hojatoleslam Morteza Hosseini Esfahani, in the same way that it is incumbent on all Muslims to obey the Prophet and his rightful successors, the velayat-e faqih occupies a similar position in relation to the Muslim community, and obedience to and following him is obligatory.4 Through various official and semiofficial channels, Iranians are told repeatedly that the notion of velayat-e faqih is one of the oldest historical principles in Islam and has considerable precedence.5 The chapter starts with an examination of the history and social functions of the marja‘iyat and its eventual political decoupling from velayat-e faqih. The discussion then moves to examining postKhomeini conceptions of velayat-e faqih, focusing on efforts to justify the position, why it is needed and is important, the centrality of leadership to it, its functionality, the method of being selected, and 2

3

4

5

Fakhreddin Azimi, “Khomeini and the ‘White Revolution,’” in A Critical Introduction to Khomeini, Arshin Adib-Moghaddam, ed. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2014), p. 21. Mohammad Taqi Mesbah Yazdi, Nazariyeh-e Siyasi-e Eslam: Qanun-gozari (Political Theory of Islam: Lawmaking) (Qom: Qom: Mo‘aseseh-e Amouzeshi va Pazhoheshi-e Emam Khomeini, 1380/2001), p. 34. Morteza Hosseini Esfahani, Eslam va Azadi (Islam and Freedom) (Qom: Entesharat-e Farhang-e Quran, 1379/2000), p. 107. Abedin Mo‘meni, “Velayat-e Faqih az Didgah-e Mazaheb-e Eslam” (Velayat-e Faqih from the Perspective of Schools of Islam), Dofaslnameh-e ‘Elmipazhoheshi-e Feqh-e Mogharen, Vol. 3, No. 6 (1394/2015), p. 11.

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the necessary qualifications for it. The chapter ends with an examination of a brief moment in the Islamic Republic’s history, when some ulama began musing about possible constraints on the velayat-e faqih. These theorized constraints revolved around the very logic of guidance and protection, the manner of the faqih’s ascension to his exalted position, and the scope of his authority and responsibilities. Before long, these theoretical assumptions were forgotten, if, that is, their proponents were lucky. Those who were not so fortunate often found themselves on the wrong side of the law. For many, the best option was to leave the country.

Marja‘iyat The marja‘iyat is a recent historical invention. While the institution of marja‘iyat existed for some time, it was only in the nineteenth century that it emerged as the supreme religious authority separate from the state.6 In 1846, when Sheikh Mohammad Hassan Najafi (d. 1850) suddenly became a marja‘ and all his competitors were gone, the office of marja‘-e taqlid appeared as a formal institution.7 The institution largely owed its genesis to the Shii mujtaheds’ financial independence, thanks to regular donations from the faithful and the ulama’s ensuing practice of assuming responsibility for the economic welfare of their seminary students. This financial independence was reinforced by proceeds and donations derived from Muharram processions and pilgrimage to Shia holy sites. By the mid-nineteenth century, the marja‘iyat was formally institutionalized.8 A century later, in 1946, the quietist Ayatollah Boroujerdi became the soul marja‘ of the Shii. When Boroujerdi passed away in 1961, the marja‘iyyat lost its centralization and became distributed among a number of clerics. In Qom, Ayatollahs Golpaygani, Shariatmadari, and Mar‘ashi Najafi were considered to be marja‘s by most other senior clerics and seminary students. Some seminary students also discussed Ayatollah Khomeini, although his treatise had not yet been 6

7

8

Ziba Mir-Hosseini and Richard Tapper, Islam and Democracy in Iran: Eshkevari and the Quest for Reform (London: I. B. Tauris, 2006), p. 10. Ahmad Kazemi Moussavi, “The Institution of Marja‘-i Taqlid in the Nineteenth Century Shi‘ite Community,” The Muslim World, Vol. 83, Nos. 3–4 (1994), p. 280. Ibid., p. 293.

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published. The Shah, through his condolence cable to Ayatollah Mohsen al-Hakim, who was based in Najaf, signaled his recognition of Hakim as marja‘, by doing so also hoping to move the marja‘iyat out of Iran.9 The Shah also did not want the marja‘iyat to be concentrated within one person as he may pose a formidable challenge, therefore preferring its dispersion. His efforts did not fully bear concrete fruit. In the years leading up to the revolution, the marja‘iyat was dispersed and was no longer concentrated within one person. At the same time, however, most marjar‘s remained in Iran, almost all in Qom, while a few resided in Najaf and elsewhere.

Debating the Marja‘iyat The marja‘iyat rests on the basic premise that at its core leadership is about providing for the spiritual needs of society. Therefore, in addition to the political management of society, the Shii leader is further tasked with providing spiritual leadership for society and acting as a source of religious emulation.10 This argument became an article of faith only after the Islamic Republic was politically consolidated. In fact, well into the new republic’s establishment, there was a robust debate over the very nature of the institution. Ayatollah Morteza Jazayeri (1930–2008), for example, dismissed the idea that the marja‘-e taqlid needs to be “the most learned” as a recent historical innovation and an incorrect one. He maintained that there is always a plurality of views and that one cannot have expertise in all fields.11 Ayatollah Mahmoud Taleqani (1911–1979) similarly found several aspects of the marja‘-e taqlid problematic, most notably the recognition of a single individual as “the most learned” and the dangers inherent in elevating one person to a superhuman position. Moreover, as the marja‘ ages, expectations of knowledge of fiqh place undue burden on him.12 Taleghani also believed that the marja‘iyat 9

10

11

12

Hosseinali Montazeri, Khaterat (Memoirs) (Los Angeles, CA: Ketab Corp., 2017), p. 92. Hossein Javan Arasteh, Mabani-e Hokumat-e Eslami (Foundations of Islamic Government) (Qom: Markaz-e Entesharat-e Howzeh-e Elmiyeh-e Qom, 1379/ 2000), pp. 120–121. Ann K. S. Lambton, “A Reconsideration of the Position of the Marja’ Al-Taqlid and the Religious Institution,” Studia Islamica, No. 20 (1964), p. 124. Ibid., p. 125.

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must be consultative and argued his case in an article published in March 1961 shortly after Ayatollah Boroujerdi’s death. Taleghani believed that while the sacred principles of Islam are eternal, and while determinations of what is proper and appropriate depend on the independent reasoning (ijtihad) of learned clerics, “the centralization of [issuing] fatwas and management [of affairs of community] do not have a basis in the shari‘a, and are neither in the interests of religion nor those of society.”13 Ayatollah Taleghani’s critique of sole marja‘iyat rests on the premise that by the time a faqih becomes a marja‘, he is usually old and frail, and is often surrounded by several deputies and assistants, not all of whom are experts or have the necessary qualifications in matters that come before the marja‘. This frequently results in the marja‘ remaining unaware of real-world conditions, or the circumstances of his followers. This dissonance has been one of the main contributing factors in the break in the bonds between the marja‘ and his followers. As is also obvious, the centralization of the marja‘iyat can easily foster autocracy. In addition to eroding the clergy’s standing among the people, this spread of autocracy can also undermine the internal solidarity of the clerical establishment.14 Himself a marja‘, Ayatollah Montazeri did not necessarily critique the institution of marja‘iyat, but he did call for greater specialization within it: Even on the religious issues, considering the complexity and vastness of the juridical issues and the multiplicity of the emerging problems [masa’el-e mostaheddeseh] in the modern age, it would be more appropriate to separate various subjects, so that the people could have the opportunity to emulate the most knowledgeable [a’lam] in every specific field, similar to specialization in the branches of other sciences in the modern time.15

Moreover, Montazeri maintained, marja‘iyat does not have to be within one person, and it can even be through a council. And, emulation from a council is not problematic and can be done.16 13

14 15

16

Quoted in, Davood Feirahi, Feqh va Siyasat dar Iran-e Mo‘aser (Jurisprudence and Politics in Contemporary Iran) (Tehran: Nashr-e Ney, 1393/2014), p. 134. Ibid. Geneive Abdo, “Re-Thinking the Islamic Republic: A ‘Conversation’ with Ayatollah Hossein ‘Ali Montazeri,” Middle East Journal, Vol. 55, No. 1 (Winter 2001), p. 19. Montazeri, Khaterat (Memoirs), pp. 424–425.

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The plurality of the marja‘s has now become a well-established fact in the Islamic Republic. Ayatollah Mohammad Taqi Mesbah Yazdi, who prior to his death in 2021 was in many ways considered one of the chief theoreticians of Khameneism, theorized that it is permissible to have multiple marja‘-e taqlids since there may be slightly different interpretations of what is proper in the conduct of individual, personal affairs. It is conceivable that different faqihs who are the marja‘ of different people, or the same faqih at different times and in different circumstances, may propose interpretations of the same law or even declare laws that are altogether different. People are free to choose their own marja‘ and also to determine for themselves which legal interpretation they choose to adopt. Differences of opinion and interpretation among different marja‘s are not only common, they are also permissible.17 At the opposite theoretical pole, Mesbah Yazdi is Hasan Yousefi Eshkevari, who also supports the plurality of marja‘iyat. Yousefi Eshkevari maintains that in its thousand-year history, two features have distinguished the marja‘iyat. The first feature has been the formal acceptance of the principle of ijtihad, not just by one mujtahid but by mujtahids, thus keeping the gates of ijtihad open in the Shia school as compared to Sunnism. A second, related feature has been political independence and autonomy, thus keeping the marja‘iyat close to the people and, when necessary, enabling it to assume the leadership of popular social movements.18 Shii theologians, it must be mentioned, have not offered logical and valid justifications for the fact that women cannot occupy either of the positions of velayat-e faqih or marja‘-e taqlid. Overwhelmingly, they have simply assumed that both institutions are staffed exclusively by men. Over time, any criticism this assumption has encountered has been at best timid and muted. Javadi Amoli cites women’s insufficient religious credentials as grounds for having no female vali-e faqihs.19 The only other response that some theologians have come up with is 17

18

19

Mohammad Taqi Mesbah Yazdi, Hokumat-e Eslami va Velayat-e Faqih (Islamic Government and Velayat-e Faqih) (Tehran: Sazman-e Tablighat-e Eslami, 1380/2001), p. 59. Mohammad Qoochani, Dowlat-e Dini va Din-e Dowlati (Religious Government and Government Religion) (Tehran: Saraee, 1379/2000), p. 53. Mohsen Kadivar, Hokumat-e Velayati (Government of Guardianship) (Tehran: Nashr-e Ney, 1377/1998), p. 123.

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that women have “delicate feelings,” which, they claim, come in the way of requirements for marja‘iyat and velayat.20

Marja‘iyat and the Islamic Republic When the Islamic Republic was established, it was assumed that similar to Khomeini, all future velayat-e faqihs will also be marja‘-e taqlids. Ayatollah Beheshti, author of the constitution’s all-important Article 5, which codifies the position of the velayat-e faqih, believed in the need for the marja‘iyat of the leader, someone whose rule would be as similar as possible to those of the Infallible Imam.21 This view was enshrined in Article 109 of the constitution, which stipulated that to become a vali-e faqih, one had to have social and political acumen, courage, administrative experience, and sufficient scholarly credentials to be considered a marja‘. This constitutional requirement worked so long as Khomeini was alive. However, as Khomeini’s life was nearing an end, finding a suitable candidate who met both requirements proved highly problematic. When Ayatollah Montazeri, the only living marja‘ at the time who shared Khomeini’s conception of the Islamic Republic, was dismissed by Khomeini as his designated heir, the system faced a constitutional crisis. The crisis was resolved when the marja‘iyat and velayat-e faqih were separated from each other and decoupled.22 When some of the articles of the 1979 constitution were revised and amended in 1989, Article 109 no longer mandated that the vali-e faqih needed to be a marja‘-e taqlid also. By some accounts, Khomeini himself endorsed the idea that the velayat-e faqih does not have to be a marja‘ since he realized it would be difficult to find qualifications for both positions within the same individual.23 Since his passing, state-tied clerics have done their best to present theoretical justifications for the separation of the two positions of marja‘iyat and velayat-e faqih. Mohammad Javad Nowruzi, for example, whose books are taught at the Qom howzeh, maintains that the marja‘-e taqlid is someone to whom people turn for advices on 20

21

22 23

Abolfazl Shakoori, Feqh-e Siyasi-e Eslam (Islam’s Political Jurisprudence) (Qom: Markaz-e Entesharat-e Daftar-e Tablighat-e Eslami, 1377/1998), p. 229. Feirahi, Feqh va Siyasat dar Iran-e Mo‘aser (Jurisprudence and Politics in Contemporary Iran), p. 350. Mir-Hosseini and Tapper, Islam and Democracy in Iran, pp. 19–21. Reza Sanati, Mashru‘iyat-e Asemani (Divine Legitimacy) (Qom: Salman-e Farsi, 1394/2015), p. 101.

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jurisprudential rules and regulations. The velayat-e faqih, on the other hand, is someone who is aware of what is good and evil, what is in the interest of society and what is not, and he is therefore responsible for making decisions on social and political matters. Given this division of labor, separating the two positions from each other does not pose any challenges to the veracity of Islamic rule.24 Similarly, while acknowledging that there are benefits to having both positions combined within a single individual, Mesbah Yazdi also endorses the separation of the two positions of the marja‘iyat and velayat since the purview of each position, and their areas of focus, are distinct and different.25 In 1982, the Society of Qom Theological Teachers (est. 1963) was put in charge of determining who should be a marja‘, as well as determining the ranks of Ayatollahs and Hojjatoleslam. In 1989, with the passing of Ayatollah Khomeini, the Society recognized two candidates for the marja‘iyat: Ayatollah Mohammad Ali Araki (d. 1994) and Ayatollah Mohammad Reza Golpaygani (d. 1993). In 1994, when Ayatollah Araki died, the Society published a new list of candidates for marja‘iyat, this time including Khamenei’s name. The effort was spearheaded a by number of influential clerics with powerful political positions, namely Judiciary head Mohammad Yazdi, Majles Speaker Ali Akbar Nateq Nuri, and head of the Guardian Council Ahmad Jannati. The move was met by surprising and persistent opposition, including, publicly, by a sizeable minority of Majles deputies, which at the time was dominated by reformists. Jannati and others maintained that Khamenei’s accumulated political knowledge and experience should outweigh other concerns related to his scant contributions to fiqh. Following a huge outcry, especially by Grand Ayatollah Makarem Shirazi, Khamenei asked his name to be withdrawn from the list. Khamenei made another attempt in 1997, but again he was forced to back off.26 In December 1999, Khamenei finally disavowed the effort. A compromise was subsequently reached in which Khamenei withdrew 24

25

26

Mohammad Javad Nowruzi, Nezam-e Siyasi-e Eslam (The Political System of Islam) (Qom: Howzeh-e Elmi-ye Qom, 1381/2002), pp. 195–196. Mohammad Taqi Mesbah Yazdi, Porsesh-ha va Pasokh-ha, Vol. 2 (Questions and Answers, Vol. 2) (Qom: Mo‘aseseh-e Amouzeshi va Pazhoheshi-e Emam Khomeini, 1380/2001), p. 33. Mirjim Künkler, “The Special Court for the Clergy (Dadg Vizheh-ye ¯ ah-e ¯ Ruhaniyat) and the Repression of Dissident Clergy in Iran,” in The Rule of Law, ¯ Islam, and Constitutional Politics in Egypt and Iran, Saïd Amir Arjomand and Nathan Brown, eds. (Albany, NY: SUNY Press, 2013), p. 60.

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for consideration for the marja‘iyat inside the country but asserted himself as a marja‘ outside Iran. Even this novel compromise, which remained in effect for the duration of Khamenei’s tenure as vali-e faqih, was not universally endorsed by all living marja‘s. Mesbah Yazdi, always eager to find jurisprudential justifications for Khamenei’s positions, soon theorized that, ultimately, the velayat-e faqih is much more important than the marja‘iyat. There can only be one velayat-e faqih since multiplicity in social and political decision-making can lead to chaos, contention, and confusion, he argued. The need for a single velayat-e faqih is rooted in society’s need to have an official, guiding opinion by someone whose views are informed by a comprehensive knowledge of social and political affairs. This person must be endorsed by other faqihs, a privilege enjoyed by the velayat-e faqih.27 Accordingly, whereas the marja‘-e taqlids have their own position and role in society, in social and political matters, it is the velayat-e faqih who has the final say, and no other faqih can express contrary opinion to what has already been enunciated by the velayat-e faqih.28 Regardless of what the Islamic Republic’s political expedience may dictate, among the ulama and experts on Shia fiqh, there is indeed no consensus over the merging of the two positions of marja‘iyat and velayat during the Occultation.29 Ultimately, the velayat-e faqih is a position that may or may not be combined with marja‘iyat, and both conditions – the vali-e faqih being a marja‘ or not being a marja‘ – are seen as equally valid and legitimate.30 For Khamenei, despite repeated efforts, becoming a marja’ for Shii Iranians proved unfeasible. At least back in the 1990s, even the absolute velayat-e faqih could not force his way into the marja‘iyat. Whether the clerical establishment or the Majles would have the wherewithal or the clout to mount a similar challenge to Khamenei’s marja‘iyat bid in later years is an open question.

Post-Khomeini Conceptions of Velayat-e Faqih Khomeini’s important innovation of a ruling velayat-e faqih formed the country’s political backdrop after 1979. Since his passing, Iran’s 27

28 29 30

Mesbah Yazdi, Porsesh-ha va Pasokh-ha, Vol. 2 (Questions and Answers, Vol. 2), p. 31. Ibid., p. 37. Shakoori, Feqh-e Siyasi-e Eslam (Islam’s Political Jurisprudence), p. 233. Ibid., p. 238.

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Shii clergy have been busily theorizing about the various aspects of the faqih’s rule. For the past three decades or so, in fact, there has been little or no innovation in Iranian Shia fiqh in areas other than those related to the velayat-e faqih. And even there, the scope of innovations has been quite limited, veering off from the official orthodoxy only temporarily and for about a decade starting in the 1990s. What innovations there were still occurred in relation to the rule of the faqih and revolved around limits on his powers and the manner of his ascension to the position. Before exploring these temporary innovations in fiqh, which were politically cast aside and quickly expunged by the official orthodoxy, it is important to examine some of the themes that have become hallmarks of contemporary fiqh in Iran. Nearly all revolving around the rule of the velayat-e faqih, some of the more important of these themes include the significance to society of leadership, society’s need for having a velayat-e faqih, the manner of the faqih’s installation into his position, his qualifications, and the nature and scope of his responsibilities.

Importance of Leadership When it comes to politics, Islamic sources pay great attention to the role of leadership, and it is clear that in Islamic thought, imamate is central to politics. In Islam in general and in Shi‘ism in particular, politics is imamate-centered. According to most dominant interpretations of Shia jurisprudence, whenever the imam or the leader takes charge of leadership of society based on God’s will, all state institutions, leaders, and procedures are bestowed with legitimacy. Conversely, if the leadership of society does not take place according to God’s will, undoubtedly laws in society have no guarantees of correctness, and all institutions of the government, and all the principles on which they are based, have no legitimacy.31 Without leadership and imamate, Islam is incomplete.32 Literary every treatise and every Shia book on topics such as theology, jurisprudence, ijtihad, and philosophy point to the critical importance of leadership in Islam. Hojatoleslam Ahmad Jahan-Bozorgi, for instance, just to take one 31 32

Nowruzi, Nezam-e Siyasi-e Eslam (The Political System of Islam), p. 15. Jaber Amiri, Mabani-e Andisheh-haye Eslami (Foundations of Islamic Thought) (Qom: Mo‘aseseh-e Farhangi ve Entesharati-e Gorgan, 1380/2001), p. 143.

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lesser-known example, writes: “Leadership plays a critical role in utilizing and mobilizing national resources. The significance of leadership is particularly important in times of war. Throughout Iranian history, the Shii clergy have been a central component of national power.”33 According to the ulama who are supportive of the state, the notion of velayat-e faqih can be validated through theological principles as well as jurisprudential ones.34 In fact, a number of the prominent ulama who have theorized about the velayat-e faqih – most notably Shahid Thani, Muhaqqiq Ardebili, and Ayatollahs Khomeini and Javadi Amoli – have based their arguments as much on Shia theology as on fiqh.35 Still, it is through Shia fiqh that a direct relationship between the velayat-e faqih and imamate is established. The theory of velayat-e faqih is linked directly to the notion of imamate both in terms of legitimacy and in the scope and range of responsibilities.36 In the theory of velayat-e faqih, the imamate is considered to be of continued necessity, and, in the period of the Great Occultation, the only legitimate form of government that comes closest to the imamate is that of the velayat-e faqih. This line of thought was originally most forcefully advocated by Khomeini.37 Velayat-e faqih is necessarily a product of, and related to, the political philosophy of awaiting the return of Imam Mahdi.38 This relationship, the argument goes, is one of completeness and perfection of Islam. Equally important is the deep and foundational relationship between Mahdism and the velayat-e faqih. Mahdaviyat – Mahdism – is 33

34

35

36

37 38

Ahmad Jahan-Bozorgi, Osul-e Siyasat va Hokumat (Principles of Politics and Government) (Tehran: Pazhoheshgah-e Farhang va Andisheh-e Eslami, 1378/ 1999), p. 108. Mohammad Mehdi Babapour, “Roykard-e Kalami beh Nazariyeh-e Velayat-e Faqih” (Theological Approach to the Theory of Velayat-e Faqih), Faslnameh-e ‘Elmi-Pazhoheshi-e Pazhohesh-haye Enqelab-e Eslami, Vol. 2, No. 7 (1392/ 2013), p. 33. Ali Shams, “Mabani-e Kalami-e Nazariyeh-e Velayat-e Faqih” (Theological Foundations of the Theory of Velayat-e Faqih), Faslnameh-e ‘Elmi-Pazhoheshi-e Pazhohesh-haye E‘teqadi-Kalami, Vol. 5, No. 22 (1395/2016), p. 106. Mansour Mirahmadi, Feqh-e Siyasi (Political Jurisprudence) (Tehran: Samt, 1395/2016), p. 73. Ibid., p. 74. Davood Mahdavizadegan, “Emam Khomeini va Falsafeh-ye Siyasi-e Entezar” (Imam Khomeini and the Political Philosophy of Awaiting), Siyasat-e Mote‘aliyeh, Vol. 3, No. 11 (1394/2015), p. 7.

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the context, the provider of foundations, and the structural principles of the velayat-e faqih.39 In addition to political jurisprudence, both political philosophy and theology support the notion of velayat-e faqih. As a science, Islamic theology emerged over the very issue of leadership in light of the crisis that developed over the leadership of the Muslim community following the Prophet’s death.40 The theological dimensions of the concept of velayat-e faqih are similarly tied to the phenomenon of imamate. This is a distinctively Shia proposition, because Shi‘ism considers imamate divinely ordained and the Imam to be chosen by God to rule during the period after the Prophet’s death.41

The Need for Velayat-e Faqih According to proponents of the concept, Shia societies do not just need leaders; they need velayat-e faqih. The velayat-e faqih explains its philosophy of existence and its legitimacy in Mahdism.42 According to the official orthodoxy, so long as Imam Mehdi has not returned and remains in Occultation, only the velayat-e faqih has the right to rule. This right was conferred by God to his Infallible Imams, and then it passed on from the Imams to the velayat-e faqih.43 During the Occultation, the velayat-e faqih is needed so that the shari‘ah can be properly protected.44 The notion of velayat-e faqih goes to the heart of 39

40

41

42

43 44

Hussein Elahinejad, “Mahdaviyat Mabna-ye Din Shenakhti-e Velayat-e Faqih dar Tahkim-e Nezam-e Jomhuri-e Eslami” (Mahdism as the Basis for Religious Understanding of Velayat-e Faqih in Strengthening the Islamic Republic System), Faslnameh-e ‘Elmi-Tarviji Pazhohesh-haye Mahdavi, Vol. 4, No. 15 (Winter 1394/2015), pp. 65–66. Mohsen Mohajernia, “Talaqi-e Seh Danesh-e Siyasi-e Eslami va Tahavol-e Nazariyeh-e Velayat-e Faqih” (Confluence of Three Islamic Sciences of Politics and Changes to the Theory of Velayat-e Faqih), ‘Olum-e Siyasi, Vol. 21, No. 82 (1397/2018), p. 32. Babapour, “Roykard-e Kalami beh Nazariyeh-e Velayat-e Faqih” (Theological Approach to the Theory of Velayat-e Faqih), p. 34. Elahinejad, “Mahdaviyat Mabna-ye Din Shenakhti-e Velayat-e Faqih dar Tahkim-e Nezam-e Jomhuri-e Eslami” (Mahdism as the Basis for Religious Understanding of Velayat-e Faqih in Strengthening the Islamic Republic System), p. 70. Nowruzi, Nezam-e Siyasi-e Eslam (The Political System of Islam), p. 151. Elahinejad, “Mahdaviyat Mabna-ye Din Shenakhti-e Velayat-e Faqih dar Tahkim-e Nezam-e Jomhuri-e Eslami” (Mahdism as the Basis for Religious Understanding of Velayat-e Faqih in Strengthening the Islamic Republic System), p. 75.

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the legitimacy of an individual’s actions based on ijtihad – having a vali, a guardian, legitimizes the actions people take and the decisions they make.45 Society needs a guardian, a vali, for its administration, and, necessarily, the person who is a guardian must be a faqih, a specialist in jurisprudence (fiqh). Therefore, it is only appropriate and logical to have a system of velayat-e faqih.46 More than having a specific structural form, the notion and theory of velayat-e faqih is said to have an essence and content that makes it eternally applicable for all times and conditions.47 The formation of political order is an a priori matter and a given; it is a “non-litigious affair” (‘omur-e hasbiyeh) that is a commonly accepted and endorsed social good. Based on this conception, the velayat-e faqih is an accepted notion since Islam mandates the formation of government based on Islamic precepts. Equally important, and related to the formation of government, are protection of borders, preventing chaos, and the pillage of natural resources, the protection of national heritage and treasures, and combatting anti-Islamic propaganda.48 The philosopher Ayatollah Mohammad Hossein Tabatabai (1903–1981), commonly referred to as Allameh Tabatabai, arrives at velayat-e faqih through Aristotelian logic more than through the shari‘ah: Society needs a protector, and Muslim society needs a mujtahid gifted in administration, a Muslim philosopher who can rule, as its protector. Unlike Ayatollahs Khomeini or Motahhari, Tabatabai never fully and explicitly elaborated on the notion of velayat-e faqih. But he did advocate the concept of velayat, guardianship, as a critical element in modern society. “According to the exclusive view of Shia Islam,” he argued, “during the absence of the Twelfth Imam, which is our current period, Islamic society has been left without a guardian, and, like a herd without its shepherd, it is lost and confused. The importance of guardianship during the Occultation is therefore a critical one.”49 45

46 47

48 49

Mo‘meni, “Velayat-e Faqih az Didgah-e Mazaheb-e Eslam” (Velayat-e Faqih from the Perspective of Schools of Islam), pp. 33–34. Ibid., p. 11. Sajjad Izadhi, “Zarfiyat-haye Mosharekat-e Siyasi dar Qara‘at az Nazariyeh-e Velayat-e Faqih” (Capacities of Political Participation in Conceptions of Theory of Velayat-e Faqih), Siyasat-e Mote‘aliyeh, Vol. 4, No. 14 (1395/2016), p. 98. Ibid., p. 102. Quoted in, Taqi Rahmani, Naqqadi-ye Qodrat: Mavane‘e Nazari-ye Esteqrar-e Demokrasi dar Iran (Critique of Power: Subjective Obstacles to the Establishment of Democracy in Iran) (Tehran: Saraee 1381/2002), p. 66.

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Ayatollah Morteza Motahhari (1919–1979) was another traditionalist faqih who believed that society’s frailties require guardianship by a faqih with the responsibility of determining what is good for society and making laws and rules accordingly. This, Motahhari maintained, is the philosophy of the imamate, according to which certain individuals have the right and the responsibility to be guardians and leaders of society, not because of any special nature or inheritance but because of their possession of knowledge, wisdom, and justice. Velayat, Motahhari claimed, cannot be elected; it is divinely ordained.50 According to Mohsen Kadivar, a Muslim society is in permanent need of velayat by members and followers of the Prophet’s household irrespective of time and place.51 Ayatollah Javadi Amoli agrees and outlines several important reasons for the necessity of the velayat-e faqih to rule. They include, first and foremost, the continuation of the imamate; the comprehensive and all-engrossing nature of religion; the need for the imamate and the velayat-e faqih to adjudicate in certain areas; and the need for the Islamic society to have a guardian and a guide.52 Velayat over society, he further adds, is an obligation, not a privilege.53 In Iran’s Islamic system, the velayat-e faqih is resolving the challenges and crises that the political system faces. He serves as the protector of the constitution and the laws of Islam, as well as the values and principles of the revolution.54 The velayat-e faqih has a right to express his views on divine injunctions and on religious ahkam (Islamic injunctions). The people, and other faqihs, are all obligated to obey the velayat-e faqih not just in his views on matters revolving around religion and ahkam but on nonreligious matters as well.55 It is perfectly permissible, indeed preferable, to seek advice on personal matters from multiple mujtahids whom one seeks to emulate. In political matters, however, having multiple sources of authority will lead to chaos and confusion. It is therefore appropriate by the Assembly of Experts to select a single mujtahid who would 50 51 52

53 54 55

Ibid., pp. 67–68. Kadivar, Hokumat-e Velayati (Government of Guardianship), p. 37. Abdollah Javadi Amoli, Velayat-e Faqih: Velayat, Feqahat, va ‘Edalat (Velayat-e Faqih: Guardianship, Learnedness, and Justice) (Qom: Esra’, 1381/ 2002), pp. 212–225. Ibid., p. 252. Nowruzi, Nezam-e Siyasi-e Eslam (The Political System of Islam), p. 127. Jahan-Bozorgi, Osul-e Siyasat va Hokumat (Principles of Politics and Government), pp. 160–162.

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serve as the velayat-e faqih and perform the duties of leader.56 So long as the velayat-e faqih is legitimate, he must be obeyed.57

Selection, Not Election One of the more vexing questions facing the Islamic Republic has been the manner in which the vali-e faqih is determined. As we shall see later in this chapter, one of the most persistent jurisprudential challenges to the official orthodoxy has been the notion that the velayat-e faqih should be an elected position. But the state and the clerics tied to or supportive of it have steadfastly rejected the notion of an elected faqih. Instead, the state has adopted the approbative principle (asl-e estesvabi). The approbative principle maintains that during the Occultation, qualified faqihs have been approved and installed in positions of guardianship. They can therefore take control of the affairs of society, and it is incumbent upon the people to obey them.58 According to the approbative principle, for the velayat-e faqih to be realized, three essential conditions must be met. First, there needs to be a faqih who is qualified for velayat. Second, the qualified faqih simply cannot engage in velayat if he is not properly installed in the position, and the proper installation must take place. Third, acceptance by the people is important, either directly or indirectly. Only at that point can the faqih engage in his velayat.59 The basis of the legitimacy of rule by the velayat-e faqih is popular acclamation and appointment, nasb-e ‘am, which refers to the fact that during the Occultation, those with qualities similar to the Imams would be able to lead the Islamic state. The velayat-e faqih needs to be chosen by qualified faqihs from among themselves.60 The constitutional device that the Islamic Republic has created to ensure the velayat-e faqih’s institutionalized operationalization is to have him be selected by the Assembly of Experts, members of which are elected to 56 57

58

59 60

Nowruzi, Nezam-e Siyasi-e Eslam (The Political System of Islam), p. 197. Habibollah Sha‘bani Movasaqi, “Velayat-e Faqih va Qanun Garai” (Velayat-e Faqih and Obedience of the Law), Hokumat-e Eslami, Vol. 18, No. 1 (1392/ 2014), p. 6. Esmael Darabkalaie, Negaresh-i bar Falsafeh-e Siyasi-e Eslam (A Look at the Political Philosophy of Islam) (Qom: Bostan-e Ketab, 1380/2001), p. 250. Ibid., pp. 251–252. Mirahmadi, Feqh-e Siyasi (Political Jurisprudence), p. 75.

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their positions. Sovereignty and the right to rule, the official assumption goes, belong to God. God has bestowed this right to the Prophet, and the Prophet has passed it on to the Twelve Imams. In the same way that the Twelve Imams are selected by God to govern over the affairs of the Shii, so is the velayat-e faqih. The velayat-e faqih derives his legitimacy through his selection by God, and his acceptance through indirect election by the people. Selection without election does not withstand logic and reason, and election without selection is bereft of legitimacy and substance.61 I shall have much more to say about the notion of an elected velayate faqih later in the chapter. Before elaborating on the politically dominant thesis of the faqih being divinely ordained and then selected by fellow mujtahids, I will mention one of the earliest arguments in favor of electing the velayat-e faqih by one of the concept’s most ardent believers, Ayatollah Mohammad Beheshti. For Beheshti, there are two ways to determine the leader. One is through appointment (entesab) and the other through election (entekhab). Appointment, or selection, is by God and is reserved for the Prophet and the Twelve Imams. A selected leader, Beheshti claims, is a divine leader, and his selection is beyond elections. Since the leader is not selected by God, he must necessarily be elected, either directly or indirectly. Elections, therefore, even indirect ones, are essential to determining the velayate faqih.62 Beheshti does not elaborate on precisely who should be involved in selecting the velayat-e faqih, or how that selection should be made. He only specifies that the velayat-e faqih’s election cannot be conducted by other faqihs alone and needs to have a wider scope. It is the faqihs’ responsibility to determine the qualification of the velayat-e faqih. But they cannot be the only ones determining who occupies the position of the velayat-e faqih. Ideally, Beheshti argues, the leader’s election should approximate “multi-level, systematic party elections,” not very different from what is outlined in the Islamic Republic’s constitution.63

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Ali Akbar Razaqi, “Hakemiyat va Velayat-e Faqih dar Andisheh-e Siyasi-e Shia” (Rulership and the Velayat-e Faqih in Shia Political Thought), Pazhohesh dar Tarikh, Vol. 4, No. 13 (1392/2013), p. 25. Feirahi, Feqh va Siyasat dar Iran-e Mo‘aser (Jurisprudence and Politics in Contemporary Iran), pp. 350–351. Ibid., pp. 353–354.

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Over the years since Beheshti offered these thoughts, there have been various, similar arguments that have instead concluded in favor of a nonelected velayat-e faqih. The legitimacy of the notion of velayat-e faqih can be summed up in the two notions of deputyship and installation (nasb). The notion of deputyship is tied to succession, and the question of how this succession is determined – that is, elected or not – is settled through the notion of installation (nasb). Installation is divine; election is people-based.64 The divine installation of the ruling faqih is mediated through selection by other qualified mujtahids. Those who argue against the direct election of the velayat-e faqih, such as Ayatollah Mesbah Yazdi, maintain that since the velayat-e faqih is a mujtahid, he should be selected by other mujtahids.65 As outlined in the constitution, the ulama who are qualified to become the velayat-e faqih do not automatically ascend to the position unless they are specifically approved for it.66 They are “discovered” by the mujtahids who have been elected to the Assembly of Experts. Constitutionally, the “discovery” (kashf) of the velayat-e faqih is the task of the Assembly of Experts. The logic underlying the notion of discovery is that the task of determining the ruling faqih requires a high level of specialization and expertise, and therefore it must be left up to a group of specialized ulama such as those in the Assembly of Experts.67 In the same way that Imam Ali’s rule was legitimized by virtue of his infallibility, this infallibility was transferred to the Shii Imams who followed, and then on to their heirs, who today are the rightly qualified faqihs.68 Mulla Ahmad Naraghi (1806–1866), whose writings on the velayat-e faqih are generally assumed to have inspired Khomeini’s views on the topic, endorsed the idea of velayat by the Prophet and 64

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Elahinejad, “Mahdaviyat Mabna-ye Din Shenakhti-e Velayat-e Faqih dar Tahkim-e Nezam-e Jomhuri-e Eslami” (Mahdism as the Basis for Religious Understanding of Velayat-e Faqih in Strengthening the Islamic Republic System), p. 70. Akbar Ganji, Talaqi-e Fashisti Az Din va Hokumat (Fascist Perceptions of Religion and Government) (Tehran: Tarh-e No, 1378/1999), p. 108. Darabkalaie, Negaresh-i bar Falsafeh-e Siyasi-e Eslam (A Look at the Political Philosophy of Islam), p. 251. Mohammad Shetabdar, “Tabyeen-e Veyalat-e Motlaqeh Faqih beh Manzour-e Gozinesh-e Sanjeh-e Roykardi dar Negareh-haye Zarurat, Maslehat va Estabdad” (Explanation of Absolute Velayat-e Faqih for Purposes of Choosing Evaluative Perspectives on Necessity, Expedience, and Autocracy), Pure Life, Vol. 4, No. 9 (1396/2017), p. 157. Mirahmadi, Feqh-e Siyasi (Political Jurisprudence), p. 80.

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the Twelve Imams only, except in cases when velayat by someone else has been endorsed by God, or by the Prophet, or the Twelve Imams.69 This assumption continues to inform justifications for the installation and selection of the velayat-e faqih. For Javadi Amoli, the velayat-e faqih is the vice-regent of the Hidden Imam on Earth, and his rule is divinely ordained.70 As such, he is already divinely ordained and simply needs to be discovered. That discovery occurs through selection by other mujtahids. In the early years, Montazeri also believed in the divinely ordained rule of the velayat-e faqih and his selection rather than election.71 Although in later years he called for the position to be elected, at the time of the drafting of the constitution he favored the notion of the faqih’s divine ordainment and subsequent selection. A clear articulation of the assumption of the velayat-e faqih’s selection was offered by Ayatollah Mohammad Daneshzadeh Momen (1940–2019), who was an influential figure within the system, though mostly from behind the scenes. A member of the Guardian Council, Momen had one of the most authoritarian interpretations of the notion of velayat-e faqih. To start, he preferred the much more expansive designation of velayat-e amr (guardian of affairs), the implication being that the faqih’s scope of responsibilities is inclusive of all social and political affairs. The decisions of the velayat-e amr govern all public affairs, according to Momen, and the rule of the faqih is not subject to any vote, condition, or even allegiance. Instead, Momen maintained, it is the legitimacy of all elections and electoral institutions that depend on the will of the velayat-e amr. For Momen, the appointment (nasb) of the faqih is directly through God, and the people do not play any role in his selection, even indirectly or through pledging allegiance (bey‘at). All rights belong to God alone, and especially in determining who the velayat-e faqih is, the people do not play any role.72

Qualifications The ulama have spelled out a fairly consistent set of qualifications for becoming a vali-e faqih. Because of the need for spiritual leadership 69

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Abolfazl Mousavian, Mabani-e Dini-e Mardomsalari (Religious Foundations of Democracy) (Qom: Mofid University Press, 1395/2016), p. 174. Javadi Amoli, Velayat-e Faqih (Velayat-e Faqih), p. 211. Feirahi, Feqh va Siyasat dar Iran-e Mo‘aser (Jurisprudence and Politics in Contemporary Iran), p. 381. Ibid., p. 447.

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and the stringent qualifications that the position demands, very few faqihs qualify for velayat.73 As Khomeini saw it, the ruler must above all else have two essential characteristics, namely be knowledgeable of divine law, and be just.74 These same two qualifications are also essential for all judges.75 Along the same lines, Mesbah Yazdi set the qualifications of Muslim rulers as, first and foremost, the ability to engage in ijtihad, followed by piety and moral righteousness, as rulers who are not righteous are likely to be corrupted by power. According to Mesbah Yazdi, during the Occultation, rule by the velayat-e faqih is essential because the ruler must share as many characteristics with the Twelve Imam as possible. These include piety, justice, integrity, moral righteousness, and intimate familiarity with the tenets of Islam. The discovery of such an individual, and his installation as ruler, Mesbah Yazdi maintains, is extremely important.76 Moreover, the ruler must be aware of the conditions and interests of the people and how to properly manage and administer social affairs.77 Another cleric, Esmael Darabkalaei, enumerated on the qualifications of the ruler as follows: knowledge of the law; knowledge of the interests of society; practical knowledge and experience; sound morals and ethics; and, most importantly, permission and approval (azn) from God to rule.78 Others have added being skilled in the management of social and political issues, knowledge of international affairs, courage to confront enemies, and the ability to determine the right priorities for society and politics.79 73

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Arasteh, Mabani-e Hokumat-e Eslami (Foundations of Islamic Government), p. 144. Feirahi, Feqh va Siyasat dar Iran-e Mo‘aser (Jurisprudence and Politics in Contemporary Iran), p. 279; Mohsen Sheikholeslami, “Hokumat-e Eslami va Rahbari-e an az Nazar-e Emam Khomeini” (Islamic Government and Its Leadership in Imam Khomeini’s Views), Hokumat-e Eslami, Vol. 4, No. 2 (1378/1999), p. 31. Feirahi, Feqh va Siyasat dar Iran-e Mo‘aser (Jurisprudence and Politics in Contemporary Iran), p. 335. Mohammad Taqi Mesbah Yazdi, Porsesh-ha va Pasokh-ha, Vol. 1 (Questions and Answers, Vol. 1) (Qom: Mo‘aseseh-e Amouzeshi va Pazhoheshi-e Emam Khomeini, 1380/2001), p. 56. Ibid., p. 51. Darabkalaie, Negaresh-i bar Falsafeh-e Siyasi-e Eslam (A Look at the Political Philosophy of Islam), pp. 242–244. Nowruzi, Nezam-e Siyasi-e Eslam (The Political System of Islam), p. 200.

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Javadi Amoli maintains that the ruler must also be free from having sinned and from making mistakes.80 The absolute velayat-e faqih needs to be just and equitable, carry out all the rules and regulations of Islam, and, based on his determination, he can suspend these rules and regulations in the greater interest of the community and country.81 The faqih must also be proficient in absolute ijtihad, be equally absolute in his application of justice, have management skills, and have the ability to rule.82 According to Javadi Amoli, “absolute ijtihad” means detailed and accurate knowledge and understanding of the times.83 Moreover, the faqih must have the courage needed in leadership, be endowed with the right vision of leading the Islamic society, and be just and prudent in his decisions.84 Reason and knowledge dictate that during the Occultation, the faqih with the right qualification and who is close to the Infallible Imams has the right to rule.85 The velayat-e faqih must be Shii, male, mature, just, and of legitimate birth.86 The precondition that the velayat-e faqih needs to be knowledgeable about prevailing circumstances cannot in any way be compromised.87 While these credentials are seen as rather standard for the velayat-e faqih, some clerics have articulated additional or specific qualifications for the position. One such jurist was Ayatollah Beheshti, for whom the leader, in addition to having unshakable belief, must be aware of, steeped in, and respectful of the heritage and ways of society. But he must also be willing to veto them and to go against the wishes of society when and if necessitated by the interests of Islam. The leader must pay attention to the cultural dimensions of people’s lives, and also their livelihoods.88 Ayatollah Reza Madani Kashani (1903–1992) similarly maintained that each faqih might be better at a specific task – serving as a judge, 80 82 85

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81 Javadi Amoli, Velayat-e Faqih (Velayat-e Faqih), p. 97. Ibid., p. 251. 83 84 Ibid., p. 136. Ibid., p. 249. Ibid., p. 139. Darabkalaie, Negaresh-i bar Falsafeh-e Siyasi-e Eslam (A Look at the Political Philosophy of Islam), p. 246. Elahinejad, “Mahdaviyat Mabna-ye Din Shenakhti-e Velayat-e Faqih dar Tahkim-e Nezam-e Jomhuri-e Eslami” (Mahdism as the Basis for Religious Understanding of Velayat-e Faqih in Strengthening the Islamic Republic System), p. 68. Mofideddin Hosseini, “Shart-e A‘lamiyat dar Rahbari” (Knowledgeability Qualification in Leadership), Hokumat-e Eslami, Vol. 3, No. 2 (1377/1998), p. 177. Feirahi, Feqh va Siyasat dar Iran-e Mo‘aser (Jurisprudence and Politics in Contemporary Iran), p. 351.

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spreading the faith, waging jihad on corruption, etc. The one faqih who can combine all these qualifications and who can also manage politics can become the velayat-e faqih.89 There are hierarchies to being a velayat-e faqih, the highest of which is assuming control of political affairs and ruling. The skills required for attaining this esteemed position include the ability to prepare and command armies, knowing how to govern, protecting the country, collecting taxes and providing various forms of social goods and services, ensuring that expenses are paid, waging Jihad in the direction of God, and ensuring the country’s protection against enemies.90

Scope of Responsibilities Insofar as the scope of the ruling faqih’s responsibilities are concerned, they have become increasingly more expansive with time. Although the extensive range of these powers may be a political reality in today’s Iran, the scope of the velayat-e faqih’s powers remains one the biggest sources of disagreement and contention among the clergy based in Qom and elsewhere.91 In what has now become mainstream Shia fiqh in Iran, in fulfilling his guardianship duties, the leader has three primary responsibilities: proffering opinions (fatwas) on various matters; providing political guardianship in the form of administrative and managerial oversight of the community; and, ensuring guardianship in judicial matters and engaging in adjudication.92 It is incumbent on the qualified faqih to involve himself in social and political affairs. For a faqih to be inactive in politics is to ignore Islamic injunction.93 There are some injunctions (ahkam) that are mandated by God and cannot be changed. These 89

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Reza Madani Kashani, “Rasaleh-i dar Esbat-e ‘Velayat-e Faqih” (In Thesis in Proof of “Velayat-e Faqih”), Hokumat-e Eslami, Vol. 12, No. 1 (1386/2007), p. 202. Ibid., p. 203. Ali Darabi, Jaryan Shenasi-e Siyasi dar Iran (Understanding Political Currents in Iran) (Tehran: Sazman-e Entesharat-e Pazhoheshgah-e Farhang va Andisheh-e Eslami, 1397/2018), p. 220. Alireza Saibani and Aminallah Salari, “Barresi-ye Jaigah-e Rahbari az Manzar-e Hokumat-e Eslami va Qanun-e Asasi” (Analysis of the Position of Leadership in Islamic Government and the Constitution), Mahnameh-e Pazhohesh-e Melal, Vol. 2, No. 15 (1395/2016), p. 106. Madani Kashani, “Rasaleh-i dar Esbat-e ‘Velayat-e Faqih” (In Thesis in Proof of “Velayat-e Faqih”), p. 192.

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injunctions are beyond the purview of the velayat-e faqih.94 There are also injunctions that are issued by the vali-e faqih, and obedience to these injunctions is also obligatory for all Muslims.95 Even Ayatollah Montazeri, whose later views on the velayat-e faqih diverge greatly from those of the official orthodoxy, sees the faqih’s key responsibilities in fairly similar ways. In Montazeri’s conception, the velayat-e faqih has three principal duties: the management of the affairs of Muslims based on the tenets of Islam; being a source of emulation, a marja‘-e taqlid; and guardianship (velayat) of justice.96 Other jurists, at least those whose views are officially tolerated and allowed printed circulation in the Qom seminary, have been more explicit in detailing the precise nature of the velayat-e faqih’s many duties. According to Javadi Amoli, for example, the people’s job is to get to know and to accept the velayat-e faqih, not to elect him. Javadi Amoli does not explain how the faqih should be identified to begin with.97 However, he describes the velayat-e faqih as “the most qualified faqih of the time” who must possess three features: absolute ijtihad, absolute justice, and political management skills. Such a person is necessarily an absolute vali-e faqih. This means that the absolute velayat-e faqih, through validation and approval (tanzif), can bestow legitimacy on the Islamic system and its laws. The velayat-e faqih is also involved in the execution of all social laws of Islam, or the appointment of qualified individuals for purposes of implementing them. Based on the interest of the state, the absolute velayat-e faqih can give priority to some laws of Islam at some points over others.98 For Javadi Amoli, the scope of the absolute velayat-e faqih’s power is context specific. He maintains that the absolute velayat-e faqih has as many responsibilities as the state and the community require at any given point, no more and no less.99 In Javadi Amoli’s formulation, the velayat-e faqih’s tasks include the management and administration of Islamic society, looking after society’s material and spiritual needs, and

94 95 96 97

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Nowruzi, Nezam-e Siyasi-e Eslam (The Political System of Islam), p. 114. Mesbah Yazdi, Nazariyeh-e Siyasi-e Eslam (Political Theory of Islam), p. 319. Montazeri, Khaterat (Memoirs), p. 255. Feirahi, Feqh va Siyasat dar Iran-e Mo‘aser (Jurisprudence and Politics in Contemporary Iran), p. 435. Ibid., pp. 440–441. Javadi Amoli, Velayat-e Faqih (Velayat-e Faqih), p. 250.

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the protection of the system from enemies. Additionally, “the velayat-e faqih entails the guardianship of Islamic society in ways that divine laws are implemented and religious values are put into practice.”100 These, Javadi Amoli argues, are responsibilities, not privileges. At the same time, the ruler is in every respect equal to everyone else before the law.101 In Ayatollah Momen’s perception, the velayat-e faqih has nearly unlimited discretion in the exercise of his authority. Obedience to the Islamic leader is an unconditional, unquestionable requirement.102 Similar to many other scholars of jurisprudence, Momen divides the laws of Muslim societies into fixed and variable ones. Fixed laws are the laws of Islam. They are unchangeable and are eternal. The state only has the responsibility to implement them, nothing else. As for those laws that are variable, Momen, unlike most others, sees their determination and implementation only as the job of the velayat-e faqih and no one else.103 Momen refers to two verses in the Quran, Al-Imran (3:159) and Ash-Shura (42:38), which most others have referred to as evidence of the need for consultation, to maintain that in public matters and in the affairs of the state, there are actually no requirements for consultation.104 By far the biggest area of the faqih’s responsibility is in politics. “Guidance of the system” is considered to be one of the most critical tasks of the leader during Occultation.105 in Iran, the faqih’s political responsibilities are outlined in the constitution, which is vague enough to give the velayat-e faqih wide latitude to act as the most dominant center of power in the country. According to the jurisprudential interpretations that today are politically dominant in Iran, Islam does not recognize the separation of powers. Some of the most important of these reasons include absolute nature of God’s rule; the comprehensive scope of guardianship (velayat) of the Prophet and the Twelve Imams, the expansive scope of authority granted to Shii ruler after the Twelve 100 102

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101 Ibid., pp. 128–129. Ibid., p. 255. Feirahi, Feqh va Siyasat dar Iran-e Mo‘aser (Jurisprudence and Politics in Contemporary Iran), p. 451. 104 Ibid., p. 453. Ibid., p. 456. Mohammad Shafi‘i-far, “Jaygah-e Velayat-e Faqih dar Hoquq-e Asasi-e Jomhuri-e Eslami-e Iran” (The Position of Velayat-e Faqih in the Basic Laws of the Islamic Republic of Iran), Hokumat-e Eslami, Vol. 4, No. 3 (1378/1999), p. 68.

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Imams, and the political system on which the Imamate is based.106 What the Islamic Republic has done is to reconcile Islamic principles with the notion of separation of powers by adapting this separation of power to Islam in Article 57 of the constitution.107 The article stipulates that while the three branches of government are separate and independent from each other, they operate “under the supervision of the absolute velayat-e faqih.” One possible perspective is to view the velayat-e faqih as a fourth branch of the government that is more powerful and is located above the other branches.108 According to Ayatollah Montazeri, during the drafting of the constitution, all of the drafters feared the prospects of autocracy reemerging as a result of concentration of power in the hands of a single person. Some viewed that such powers should be concentrated in the hands of the president, whose tenure in office is limited. Others believed that such a concentration of powers and responsibilities in the faqih would not lead to despotism. This latter group, which included Montazeri himself, was so impressed by the magnanimous and spiritual personality of Ayatollah Khomeini that it could not imagine he would abuse the powers vested in his position.109 In addition to his administrative and executive responsibilities, the velayat-e faqih has a particularly expansive legislative remit. For a number of theologians, such as Ayatollahs Makarem Shirazi, Hussein Tehrani, and Ja‘far Sobhani, the fact that the velayat-e faqih can and must issue fatwas means that he has powers akin to the legislature.110 If, as experience has shown, the Majlis passes a law that is deemed to 106

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Hussein Javan Arasteh, “Tafkik-e Qova dar Nezam-e Siyasi-e Eslam va Jomhuri-e Eslami Iran” (Separation of Power in Political System of Islam and in Islamic Republic), Fiqh va Mabani-e Hoquq-e Eslami, Vol. 49, No. 1 (1395/ 2016), p. 56. While being a proponent of electing the velayat-e faqih, early on in the life of the Islamic Republic Ayatollah Montazeri also maintained that there is no separation of powers in Islam and that the faqih should have responsibility for all of the affairs of the community. Ibid., p. 63. Ibid., p. 51. Faezeh Salimzadeh Kakroudi, “Tafkik-e Qova dar Feqh va Qanun” (Separation of Powers in Fiqh and the Law), Pazhohesh dar Feqh va Hoquq, No. 1 (1395/2016), p. 142. Feirahi, Feqh va Siyasat dar Iran-e Mo‘aser (Jurisprudence and Politics in Contemporary Iran), p. 214. Arasteh, “Tafkik-e Qova dar Nezam-e Siyasi-e Eslam va Jomhuri-e Eslami Iran” (Separation of Power in Political System of Islam and in Islamic Republic), p. 63.

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contradict the shari‘ah, the velayat-e faqih can, through issuing a state injunction, mandate the priority of the state law on a temporary basis. “Governing, which is a component of the Prophet’s absolute velayat, is one of the primary injunctions (ahkam-e avaliyeh) of Islam, including even prayer and hajj.”111 Some clerics have even gone so far as to maintain that in addition to the public domain, the velayat-e faqih’s decisions can reach into the private, personal lives of individuals.112 The expansiveness of the faqih’s scope of responsibility, of course, is rooted in the assumption of the absoluteness (mutlaqeh) of his power. With Khomeini’s jurisprudential innovation, the theory of absolute velayat-e faqih became the official policy of the Islamic Republic state. For his part, as faqih, Khamenei has ensured that this aspect of Khomeini’s theory is carried out to the letter. Thanks largely to the ideas of Ayatollah Mesbah Yazdi, the divine mandate of the absolute velayat-e faqih has only grown with time under Khamenei, as Mesbah Yazdi intimately linked the mandate of the velayat-e faqih with references to the Hidden Imam.113 According to Mesbah Yazdi, anyone who follows the Shia school of Islam is obligated to obey the velayat-e faqih. Given that the divine proof of the need for the rule of the guardian is incontrovertible and cannot be questioned, there is no choice but to obey the velayat-e faqih, and the people are responsible to obey him in the same manner that people were obligated to obey the Twelve Imams. This involves obedience in all issues of rule, including managing society, commanding the faithful, and forbidding evil and enjoining the good.114 In Mesbah Yazdi’s formulation, the velayat-e faqih is effectively a sacred monarch in regular contact with the Divine and is the temporary successor to the Hidden Imam until such day as he returns.115 The rights and responsibilities of the velayat-e faqih, therefore, go beyond those outlined in the constitution since the constitution cannot anticipate all the circumstances and conditions that may develop at different 111 112

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Mirahmadi, Feqh-e Siyasi (Political Jurisprudence), p. 82. Mo‘meni, “Velayat-e Faqih az Didgah-e Mazaheb-e Eslam” (Velayat-e Faqih from the Perspective of Schools of Islam), p. 34. Ali M. Ansari, Crisis of Authority: Iran’s 2009 Presidential Election (London: Chatham House, 2010), p. 15. Mesbah Yazdi, Porsesh-ha va Pasokh-ha, Vol. 1 (Questions and Answers, Vol. 1), p. 62. Ansari, Crisis of Authority, pp. 60–61.

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times. The “absolute” nature of the velayat is designed to deal with any unforeseen circumstances that may arise in running the country.116 Within this context, it is not just the velayat-e faqih’s right to establish laws and institutions that would enable him to directly participate in politics. It is also his responsibility. In fact, the direct intervention of the velayat-e faqih in a number of social and political matters is important and necessary in order to prevent chaos and lawlessness.117 Ayatollah Mesbah Yazdi’s jurisprudential expositions on the powers of the absolute velayat-e faqih are not simply academic in nature. They are actual guides for, and reflections of, the way that Khamenei has approached his position since 1989. The official orthodoxy would have us believe that the theory of velayat-e faqih has a number of practical political functions, some of the most notable of which include being against oppression, making religious democracy a reality, ensuring the public good, and making active political participation possible.118 According to the official narrative, the velayat-e faqih system is innately against injustice and oppression for several reasons, not the least of which include its basis in divine law and the constitutional arrangements on which it is based. Such a system rests on the principle of “enjoining good and forbidding evil,” therefore making injustice impossible, and it allows for criticism of the ruler, therefore banning oppression.119 The system is innately democratic because it allows for the public’s participation in politics. It also ensures the people’s freedom to choose their own destiny, guarantees equality before the law, and is premised on the acceptability (maqbuliyat) of the ruler and the satisfaction of the people.120 It gives people the right to elect their representatives, the right to be elected (so long as one has the right qualifications), and the right to express 116

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Mesbah Yazdi, Porsesh-ha va Pasokh-ha, Vol. 1 (Questions and Answers, Vol. 1), p. 57. Hamid Zarrabi and Majid Ashrafi, “Tabyeen va Tasmimat-e Velayat-e Faqih (Hokm-e Hokumati) dar Hokumat-e Eslami az Manzar-e Fegh-e Siyasi va Qanun-e Asasi-e Jomhuri-e Eslami-e Iran” (Explanations and Decisions of the Velayat-e Faqih (State Directives) from the Perspective of Political Jurisprudence and the Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Iran), Pazhoheshnameh-e Tarikh, Siyasat va Rasaneh, Vol. 1, No. 2 (1397/2018), p. 203. Mehdi Qorbani, “Tabyeen-e Nazari-e Karamadi-e Siyasi-e Nezam-e Velayat-e Faqih” (Theoretical Explanation of the Functionality of the Velayat-e Faqih System), Hokumat-e Eslami, Vol. 19, No. 2 (1393/2014), p. 65. 120 Ibid., pp. 69–72. Ibid., pp. 72–79.

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opposition.121 Moreover, the velayat-e faqih system ensures the greater good of the public by making allowances for state injunctions (ahkam-e hokumati), instituting consultation and advice (nasihat), and enjoining good and forbidding evil.122 The reality of Iranian politics is far more complicated. No matter how charitably it might be interpreted, there is little in Khomeini’s jurisprudence that is democratic, and his notion of velayat-e faqih is even less amenable to elements such as political accountability, transparency, and representativeness. The innovation of absoluteness for the velayat-e faqih’s scope of authority, coupled with his discretionary powers, further cemented clerical authoritarianism in both theory and practice. Chapter 8 will show that Khamenei has been decidedly untheoretical in his deployment of the notion of absolute velayat-e faqih. But he has instead been ably assisted by a number of ranking jurists, Mesbah Yazdi a notable one among them, who have enthusiastically constructed the theoretical framing of a clerical authoritarian system. For a brief moment in the history of the Islamic Republic, starting incipiently in the late 1980s and lasting into the early 2000s, an intellectual revolution of sorts began to take shape on the pages of Iranian journals and books and, slowly, also in seminar rooms and lecture halls. The full scope of this intellectual revolution is beyond the task at hand here.123 But an important dimension of it was directed at curtailing the powers of the absolute velayat-e faqih. The next section will highlight some of the important jurisprudential contributions made in that direction during the brief period that came to be known as the reform era.

A Constrained Guardianship? The criticism directed at the notion of velayat-e faqih fell into three broad categories. One group of jurists questioned the very basis of a 121 122

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Ibid., pp. 85–90. Ibid., pp. 79–85. An almost identical set of explanations and justifications for the functionality of the velayat-e faqih system appears in, Sajjad Izadhi, “Nazm-haye Siyasi dar Feqh-e Shia va Zarfiyatsanji-e Anha dar Khosus-e Mosharekat-e Siyasi” (Political Systems in Shia Jurisprudence and Their Capacity in Relation to Political Participation), ‘Olum-e Siyasi, Vol. 7, No. 66 (1393/2014), p. 40. I have explored this episode in Iranian history in, Mehran Kamrava, Iran’s Intellectual Revolution (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008).

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velayat-e faqih who would not only be politically active but would actually rule and do so in an absolutist manner. These ulama mostly critiqued all or specific dimensions of the logic underpinning a ruling, absolute velayat-e faqih. A second set of criticisms, by some of these same clerics along with others, revolved around the manner in which the velayat-e faqih was determined. Questioning the very notion of the faqih’s divine ordainment, the general thrust of this critique was that ensuring the faqih’s accountability would be possible only through direct election by the people. Along the same lines, third, the velayat-e faqih’s vast and seemingly unlimited authority has been challenged, with most calling for the position to be at most supervisory rather than the central fount of all political power. Combined, these criticisms amounted to an alternative corpus of jurisprudential thought concerning the very essence and functions of the velayat-e faqih. Before it had a chance to emerge as serious challenge to the official orthodoxy, however, its proponents were either politically cast aside or their arguments were at best ignored and at worst labeled as heresy.

Questioning the Velayat-e Faqih Well into the life of the Islamic Republic, Ayatollah Khomeini’s innovative interpretation of the concept of velayat-e faqih was not universally accepted within the Shia establishment. As we have already seen, as far back as the early 1900s, many prominent clerics rejected the idea of extensive political involvement by the clergy, never mind direct rule by them. Ayatollah Mohammad Hussein Naini (1860–1936), who was actively involved during the Constitutional Revolution, advocated for separation of powers as a guarantee against the autocracy of the Qajars.124 Ayatollah Naini was a follower of the Najaf school and therefore did not see a political, ruling role for the faqih. He viewed the faqih’s role as one of legitimating profane laws, meaning that his only role is to declare that certain profane laws do not contradict divine laws.125 Another prominent cleric, Grand Ayatollah 124

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Arasteh, “Tafkik-e Qova dar Nezam-e Siyasi-e Eslam va Jomhuri-e Eslami Iran” (Separation of Power in Political System of Islam and in Islamic Republic), p. 59. Farzad Hosseini and Mansour Mirahmadi, “Tabyeen-e Ekhtelaf-e Andishehhaye ‘Allameh Naini va Emam Khomeini dar Mored-e Maqoleh-e Velayat-e Faqih bar Asas-e Nazariyeh-e Tafsiri-e Eric Hirsch” (Understanding the

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Muhammad Hussein Kashef Al-Ghita (1876–1954), claimed that except for God no one has a right to velayat, and only God can select someone to be a guardian (vali), as He did with the Prophet and the Twelve Imams.126 After the revolution, a number of prominent jurists, such as Ayatollahs Kazem Shariatmadari, Mohammad Shirazi, Mohammad Rouhani, and Reza Sadr (brother of Imam Musa Sadr), openly opposed the notion of velayat-e faqih as politically operationalized in Iran.127 Grand Ayatollah Abdul ‘Ala Sabzevari (1910–1993), as an example, argued that no one can have guardianship over the life, character, or property of someone else unless there is a compelling, religious reason for it.128 Similar to Sabzevari, many of the clergy who do not accept the principle of rule by the velayat-e faqih argue that rightfully, rulership can only be performed by the Innocent Imams. Therefore, until the return of Imam Mahdi, the clergy need to focus on preparing the moral groundwork for his return instead of trying to rule.129 Others questioned the saliency of the concept within the broader corpus of Shia thought. In general, some argued, from the beginning of the Occultation until today, faqihs and other Shia thinkers do not consider rule by anyone other than the Twelve Imams as legitimate. Instead, most Shia theologians have focused their intellectual energies on proving the legitimacy of the Imams’ rules. A primary principle has been the absence of necessity, and also the lack of validity, of the velayat of humans over one another.130 A number of clerics such as Ayatollahs Montazeri and Yusuf Saanei and Hojjatoleslam Mohsen Kadivar claimed that the current manifestation of the velayat-e faqih is

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Theoretical Differences between ‘Allameh Naini and Imam Khomeini Concerning the Issue of Velayat-e Faqih Based on the Interpretive Theory of Eric Hirsch), Pazhoheshnameh-e ‘Olum-e Siyasi, Vol. 12, No. 3 (1396/2017), p. 130. Mousavian, Mabani-e Dini-e Mardomsalari (Religious Foundations of Democracy), p. 174. Mehdi Khalaji, “The Last Marja: Sistani and the End of Traditional Religious Authority in Shiism,” Policy Focus, No. 59, The Washington Institute for Near East Policy (September 2006), p. 20. Mousavian, Mabani-e Dini-e Mardomsalari (Religious Foundations of Democracy), p. 175. 130 Ibid., p. 79. Ibid., p. 176.

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very different from the rule of Imam Ali.131 Kadivar maintained that the velayat-faqih has not been a central tenet or even one of the necessary injunctions of Shi‘ism132 He goes so far as to question the very necessity of even having a velayat-e faqih under today’s circumstances.133 One of the most trenchant criticisms against the velayat-e faqih has come from none other than one of its earliest and most ardent early defenders, namely Ayatollah Montazeri. Montazeri later claimed that he never defended the concept of the velayat-e faqih in the way it evolved in practice in the Islamic Republic. He claimed to have found the theoretical foundations of the absolute velayat-e faqih problematic from the very beginning, and that in his seminary lectures he questioned its unelected nature. Going as far back as 1979, in one of his Friday prayer sermons he even raised the possibility that the velayat-e faqih may be a noncleric.134 As far back as 1984, Montazeri understood velayat-e faqih to be a “legal doctrine” to guide Muslim society rather than an absolute format for rule.135 Sometime around 1985, Montazeri claims, he changed his mind about the appointment of the velayat-e faqih, instead believing that the position should be an elected one. Reinforcing this was his growing belief in the need to give people greater responsibilities in determining their own destiny and their leaders.136 In his 2009 book Criticism of the Self (Enteqad az Khod), published on the Internet, Montazeri laments the fact that there was haste in the preparation and ratification of the constitution. “We should not have hurried to devise a constitution without the experience of government 131

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Hamid Mavani, “Ayatullah Khomeini’s Concept of Governance (wilayat alfaqih) and the Classical Shi‘i Doctrine of Imamate,” Middle Eastern Studies, Vol. 47, No. 5 (September 2011), p. 807. Kadivar, Hokumat-e Velayati (Government of Guardianship), p. 112. Ibid., p. 226. Hosseinali Montazeri, Enteqah az Khod (Criticism of the Self ) (Tehran: n.p., 1387/2009), pp. 24–25. The book is comprised of detailed answers to fourteen questions that were posed to Montazeri by his son Said. The work was completed in 2006, but its publication was deliberately delayed until after Montazeri’s death. After his father’s death in December 2008, Said Montazeri self-published the book online in 2009. Babak Rahimi, “Democratic Authority, Public Islam, and Shi‘i Jurisprudence in Iran and Iraq: Hussain Ali Montazeri and Ali Sistani,” International Political Science Review, Vol. 32, No. 2 (2012), p. 200. Montazeri, Enteqah az Khod (Criticism of the Self ), p. 30.

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or having first confronted its difficulties,” he writes.137 Another criticism was that “we should have made the leader subject to popular oversight, and we were unaware that given the complex nature of economic, political, and international issues, power should not have been concentrated in the hands of a cleric.”138 According to Montazeri, during the reigns of the Innocent Imams, since the Imams were infallible, people were obligated to obey them. But during the Occultation, when there are no infallible individuals, it is the responsibility of the people, within the framework of the conditions that God has determined, to elect a noble person from among those who are qualified. “The election of the leader by the people,” Montazeri wrote, “entrusting him with public affairs, and his acceptance of velayat, is a form of contract, an agreement between the guardian and the people.”139 The elected imams need to have those qualifications that are enumerated in the Quran and the sunna.140 As part of his revisions of the powers of the velayat-e faqih, Montazeri came to call for time limits on the tenure of the person elected to the position, as well as a curtailing of his scope of power and responsibilities. According to Montazeri, the elective theory of the velayat-e faqih inheres flexibility, thus enabling it to take different forms in different settings depending on prevailing conditions and circumstances.141 For Montazeri, the expansive executive, judicial, legal, and legislative powers of the velayat-e faqih, and the velayat-e faqih’s elevated position, only facilitates the possibilities for autocracy.142 As an alternative, Montazeri proposed a conception of the velayat-e faqih that was highly democratic: Except for the Twelve Imams, no one has been selected by God to rule on earth. The absolute velayat-e faqih does not mean that the velayat-e faqih can act without restraint and to do as he pleases. He must act within the tenets of Islam and the pledges he has made. God told Prophet Muhammad to “govern among them with what God has commanded.” We have outlined certain principles for the velayat-e faqih in the constitution, and he cannot deviate from them, meaning that he is not above the law. The people can also 137 139

140 141

138 Ibid., p. 168. Ibid., pp. 169–170. Quoted in, Rahmani, Naqqadi-ye Qodrat: Mavane‘e Nazari-ye Esteqrar-e Demokrasi dar Iran (Critique of Power: Subjective Obstacles to the Establishment of Democracy in Iran), p. 72. Montazeri, Khaterat (Memoirs), p. 255. 142 Montazeri, Enteqah az Khod (Criticism of the Self ), p. 32. Ibid., p. 26.

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pledge allegiance (bey‘at) to the velayat-e faqih within the framework of the constitution. And the people can also elect the velayat-e faqih for a set number of years, like four or five years. People can also give this responsibility to a council made up of a number of individuals, and if the velayat-e faqih is no longer qualified, they can remove him from office. In the constitution, we have given the people a free hand and have given them several responsibilities in relation to the velayat-e faqih. Even during the rule of the Infallible Imams, which in our view was ordained by God, if people stopped their support, in practice the Imams could not govern.143

Election, Not Selection The idea of an elected velayat-e faqih is by no means a marginal one within Iran’s clerical circles. Even within the conservative Qom howzeh, there is an acknowledgment that some clerics favor the idea of electing the velayat-e faqih.144 Proponents of “election” see the argument of “selection” as fundamentally flawed since, in their view, legitimacy rests with the people.145 Those who see the velayat-e faqih as an elected position see him as a political representative of the people, bound to them through a contractual arrangement.146 Only through such an arrangement can the legitimacy of the velayat-e faqih be secured. Kadivar, for example, claimed that a velayat-e faqih that is not elected but is installed in the position through means other than an election has no rational basis in fiqh and is therefore devoid of legitimacy.147 Along similar lines, Ayatollah Nematollah SalehiNajafabadi (1923–2000) considered the velayat-e faqih’s legitimacy to be contingent on bey‘at, allegiance, which he likened to a social contract between the people and the person of the velayat-e faqih. This thesis was supported and cited by Ayatollah Montazeri in support of

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Montazeri, Khaterat (Memoirs), p. 256. Arasteh, Mabani-e Hokumat-e Eslami (Foundations of Islamic Government), p. 214. Mirahmadi, Feqh-e Siyasi (Political Jurisprudence), pp. 77–78. Mohammad Mansournezhad, “Tafkik-e Qova, Velayat-e Mutlaqeh Faqih va Estaqlal-e Qova” (Separation of Powers, Absolute Velayat-e Faqih, and Independence of the Branches), Hokumat-e Eslami, Vol. 4, No. 1 (1378/1999), p. 53. Kadivar, Hokumat-e Velayati (Government of Guardianship), p. 392.

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his own arguments, which were pretty similar.148 Those who favor the notion of an elected velayat-e faqih, such as Ayatollah Montazeri, maintain that selection by God is indeed superior to election by the people. But since in today’s world such a selection cannot be proven, then election by the people is the preferred alternative, especially since Islam’s insistence that people have control over their own destiny extends also to people’s control over their political affairs.149 A spirited defense of the idea of an elected velayat-e faqih came from the ultimate political insider, Ayatollah Rafsanjani, toward the final years of his life. Rafsanjani maintained that Apart from the Prophet and the Twelve Infallible Imams, Islam does not dictate a form of political power. The means of determining a political system are non-sacral. Of course, all different forms of political systems depend on the will of the people. We can conclude that Islam, republicanism, and elections are all compatible. . . . In relation to the velayat-e faqih, some people believe that God has ordained the faqih and that the faqih can make any decision he likes. Imam Khomeini gave a lot of powers to the velayat-e faqih, and we saw this in relation to the Salman Rushdie affair. Although the Imam did not set limits on the powers of the velayat-e faqih, he also did not permit interference in people’s lives. Some notable figures, however, seek to minimize or deny the importance of elections. The Imam believed in the velayat-e faqih that is highly qualified, and at times he himself acted as if he were above the law. Examples of this assumption include the creation of the Expediency Council before it was codified in the constitution, or the establishment of the Supreme Defense Council during the war. But the Imam did not wish to see this type of extra-legal initiative become the norm, and his own conduct outside of established procedures was rare.150

Rafsanjani further maintains that the Twelve Imams were indeed infallible and sin-free. However, after them, their successor must meet certain conditions, and these conditions have been outlined in the constitution of the Islamic Republic. In our system, God has not selected the velayat-e faqih, and it is therefore possible that a number of the faqihs have the necessary qualifications to be the velayat-e 148

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Ahmad Kazemi Moussavi, “A New Interpretation of the Theory of Vilayat-i Faqih,” Middle Eastern Studies, Vol. 28, No. 1 (January 1992), p. 102. Razaqi, “Hakemiyat va Velayat-e Faqih dar Andisheh-e Siyasi-e Shia” (Rulership and the Velayat-e Faqih in Shia Political Thought), p. 33. Quoted in, Sanati, Mashru‘iyat-e Asemani (Divine Legitimacy), pp. 57–58.

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faqih. It is for this reason that elections start with the leadership. . . . According to Imam Khomeini, whose views we very much agree with, when someone want to exert control over the people’s destiny and interfere in their lives and to devise laws that impact daily life, he needs to secure the people’s permission. Today, this permission can be acquired through elections. In previous eras, elections were at the level of leaders of groups or parties. But in the present era people can take part in direction elections. As a contemporary form of allegiance (bey‘at), not only do elections have religious roots, they are also a source of acceptance for the system. . . . Elections are the most appropriate means of making a political system functional. They are, equally importantly, a means of making the system republican. Therefore, Islam is compatible with republicanism.151

Several of the conservative clergy located on the right of the political spectrum accused Rafsanjani of changing his position on the two, related questions of the velayat-e faqih and legitimacy from the 1980s to the 2000s. They argued that these and other shifting theological positions were meant to enhance Rafsanjani’s chances in the 2005 presidential election among more moderate middleclass voters.152 According to Esmael Darabkalaei, the views of scholars such as Rafsanjani and Montazeri, who claim that the velayat-e faqih should be elected, are incorrect since legitimacy is derived only from God. “People do not have the right to interfere in the affairs of guardianship and leadership, and electing the leader is not one of their responsibilities. The leader can only be elected by those who are also qualified for guardianship themselves, a task that is beyond the people’s responsibility. A faqih elected by the people is their representative, not their guardian.”153 Moreover, the idea of an elected velayat-e faqih is that it bestows sovereignty onto the people, whereas sovereignty belongs only to God.154 At any rate, the very notion of an elected velayat-e faqih rests on a flawed premise: Not everyone gets to vote in an election, and the idea of electoral participation remains only an abstract idea rather than an actual reality.155 151 153

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152 Quoted in, ibid., pp. 56–57. Ibid., pp. 91–92. Darabkalaie, Negaresh-i bar Falsafeh-e Siyasi-e Eslam (A Look at the Political Philosophy of Islam), p. 248. Razaqi, “Hakemiyat va Velayat-e Faqih dar Andisheh-e Siyasi-e Shia” (Rulership and the Velayat-e Faqih in Shia Political Thought), p. 35. Ibid.

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Scope of Responsibilities In addition to serious debate over the manner of the faqih’s ascension to the exalted position of leadership, there have been persistent discussions and debates over the precise meaning of the “absolute” velayat-e faqih and the scope of his responsibilities. This debate goes back to the contextual meaning of velayat both jurisprudentially and in relation to the contemporary world. Guardianship is either absolute or conditional.156 In today’s context and circumstances, it should be conditional and limited, limited, that is, to supervision rather than actual administration. Ayatollahs Motahhari, Montazeri, and Seyyed Mohammad Baqer Sadr all maintained that the velayat-e faqih should have only a supervisory role.157 At most, velayat should be seen as a form of a social contract, which, based on the Quran, relies on consultation and asks people about their daily problems and the social issues they face.158 Its primary focus should be in the social domain, not politics. Some theorists like Kadivar have argued that instead of guardianship (velayat) by the faqih, there should be supervision (nezarat) by the faqih. They maintain that reason and intellect dictate that no one can have guardianship over others, whereas supervision is permissible.159 Kadivar argues that if the faqih is a supervisor, then an absence of his opposition to certain issues signals his approval of them, whereas in the system of faqih as vali, or guardian, all matter derive their legitimacy from him and therefore he must be proactively involved in multiple arenas and events. In the system of faqih as supervisor, the faqih has no executive position, nor does he appoint others, whereas in the velayat-e faqih system, the faqih occupies the highest executive position.160 156 157

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Kadivar, Hokumat-e Velayati (Government of Guardianship), p. 54. In November 1997, Montazeri gave a much-publicized public sermon in which he argued that the velayat-e faqih should engage in supervision and not guardianship. See Mir-Hosseini and Tapper, Islam and Democracy in Iran, pp. 103–108. Ali Maleki, “Mabani-e Mashru‘iyat-e Nezam-e Jomhuri-e Eslami-e Iran: Ta‘addod-e Tafsir-ha; Chalesh-ha va Rahkardha” (Principles of the Legitimacy of the Islamic Republic of Iran: Multiple Interpretations; Crises, and Approcahes), Siyasat-e Mote‘aliyeh, Vol. 6, No. 21 (1397/2018), p. 84. Ahmad Habibnezhad, “Velayat-e Faqih or Nezarat-e Faqih” (Velayat-e Faqih or Supervision of Faqih), Feqh-e Hokumati, No. 2 (1395/2016), pp. 22–23. Ibid., p. 28.

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For his part, Montazeri’s break with Khomeini’s absolutist conception of velayat-e faqih developed over the course of the 1980s and culminated in his refusal to vote in the 1989 constitutional referendum that codified absolute velayat-e faqih and gave it seemingly limitless authority. His post-Khomeini writings, like his 2004 Treatise on the Law (Risali-ye Hoquq), explicitly defended the notion of velayat-e faqih as a spiritual authority with strong democratic elements.161 “Every person in society,” he wrote in that book, including those who are in favor or against the government, has the freedom of expression; they have the right to promote their particular ideas and reform programs or change in the policies of the ruling regime on the basis of rationality, logic and law, and they get involved in political participation and organization of parties.162

The Najaf-based Ayatollah Sistani’s political quietism, it appears, sat well with the later Montazeri. In a 2005 letter to Sistani and other high-ranking clerics in Najaf, Montazeri urged them to ensure the unity of Iraq and to also engage in supervision (nezarat) and guidance (hedayat) in leading their communities toward national unity.163 One of the assumptions about limiting the powers of the velayat-e faqih has been to replace the person with a leadership council. This is not a new idea. In fact, a leadership council was accounted for in Article 107 of the original 1979 constitution for cases when a suitable vali-e faqih could not be found. This provision was removed after the 1989 revisions to the constitution, as it was deemed unworkable. Throughout his lifetime, nonetheless, Rafsanjani would occasionally mention the idea as a not-so-subtle alternative to Khamenei-style clerical absolutism. But the idea never gained much traction, largely because the official media either ignored it altogether or, if it was mentioned, it was done so with ridicule and derision. At best, the notion of having a leadership council govern as the velayat-e faqih is on theoretically weak ground and is practically fraught.164 161

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Rahimi, “Democratic Authority, Public Islam, and Shi‘i Jurisprudence in Iran and Iraq,” p. 200. 163 Quoted in, ibid. Ibid., p. 204. Shetabdar, “Tabyeen-e Veyalat-e Motlaqeh Faqih beh Manzour-e Gozinesh-e Sanjeh-e Roykardi dar Negareh-haye Zarurat, Maslehat va Estabdad” (Explanation of Absolute Velayat-e Faqih for Purposes of Choosing Evaluative Perspectives on Necessity, Expedience, and Autocracy), p. 161.

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Conclusion One of the processes underway in Iran over the past few decades has been the transformation of Shia authority from a pluralistic, diffuse structure to a monopolistic one. Previously, clerical power and authority rested on three primary sources: knowledge of the texts, financial and economic support of the faithful, and trust of followers. Now, under the Islamic Republic, what is important is access to institutions.165 By far the most important of the state institution is that of the velayat-e faqih, an institution that the state and its theoreticians claim to be a continuation of the rule of the Twelve Imams, a modernday imamate, backed by divine sanction and legitimacy. Shortly before he died, Khomeini articulated the notion of absolute velayat-e faqih. It was up to the younger cohorts of clerics he left behind to fill-in the jurisprudential blanks. Many did, and did so with a vengeance. The velayat-e faqih is critical and necessary, they maintained. It is selected and not elected, and his vast knowledge and insights, coupled with his abiding sense of justice, enable him to have absolute authority over the system and its subjects. For a brief period, lasting no more than a few years, voices arose from deep within the system that cautioned against the direction it was heading. The velayat-e faqih is no longer as relevant and needed today as it once might have been, some maintained. And if it has to exist then it should be an elected, supervisory position rather than an administrative, executive one. In the end, apart from some intellectual excitement, not much else that was tangible emerged from the few jurisprudential interpretations on constraining the powers and position of the velayat-e faqih. Nevertheless, this was part of a wider, deeper move, with a rich jurisprudential and philosophical base, to rethink and reformulate the religious basis of state–society relations in Iran. The goal of this broader intellectual trend was to deconstruct religious knowledge as it had been handed down and to reconstruct it anew, free of the historical barnacles that had supposedly led it astray so far. This trend, seeking to come up with a new dynamic, democratic fiqh for Iranian Shi‘ism, is the subject of Chapters 5 and 6. 165

Majid Mohammadi, “Iranian University Students’ Politics in the Post-Reform Movement Era: A Discourse Analysis,” Iranian Studies, Vol. 40, No. 5 (December 2007), p. 625.

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Rethinking the Islamic Republic

Chapter 4 ended with a discussion of possible constraints on the powers and tenure of the velayat-e faqih. While some of these topics continue to be explored today on a philosophical and theoretical level in academic journals and in seminary lectures, it was during the reform era, from the mid-1990s to the early 2000s, that serious efforts were undertaken to reimagine the relationship between state and religion in postrevolutionary Iran. It is difficult to pinpoint the actual start of the so-called reform movement with precise accuracy. What eventually grew into the reformist interlude started in the late 1980s as a journalistic renaissance of sorts with the publication of articles in the cultureoriented offshoot of Keyhan, one of Iran’s main daily newspapers. The publication, Keyhan-e Farhangi, included theoretically rich articles that explored the various aspects of the relationship between religion and politics, now that a decade on the near complete merger of the two in Iran had passed. Keyhan-e Farhangi paved the way for a host of new journals that began appearing in the early 1990s, some of which included Jame‘h-e Salem (Healthy Society), Kiyan (Foundation), Zanan (Women), Iran-e Farda (Iran of Tomorrow), Goftogu (Dialogue), Andisheh (Thought), and Touse‘h (Development). Written by newly emboldened activists and intellectuals, the essays in these and other similar publications showed a genuine willingness to reassess old priorities, engage in dialogue and exchange of ideas, and give currency to new interpretations of Islam as consistent with changing times and circumstances.1 By the early 2000s, Iranian academics, myself included, were excitedly declaring the dawn of a new era in the evolution of Iranian thought. “Shi‘a jurisprudence in Iran today,” I wrote with confidence, “stands

1

Ziba Mir-Hosseini and Richard Tapper, Islam and Democracy in Iran: Eshkevari and the Quest for Reform (London: I. B. Tauris, 2006), p. 27.

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at the cusp of major doctrinal change.”2 The writer and activist Emadeddin Baqi, himself a major contributor to the discourse of reformism at the time, pointed to the dawn of a “new Iran.”3 Others called the period the latest iteration in a long line of intellectual trends in the country, now marked by pluralism, dialogue, and mutual understanding.4 Most of the publications did not last beyond twelve to eighteen months, often having their publishing licenses suspended or revoked by the Ministry of Culture and Islamic Guidance. Similarly, due to the government’s deliberate control over the price of paper, many journals found it commercially difficult to sustain themselves. Despite overt and indirect harassment by the authorities, however, by the mid-1990s a clearly identifiable current of thought had emerged in Iran. Its main figures were intellectuals from diverse backgrounds – engineers, civil servants, university professors, journalists, and initially a few clerics – who found in the country’s burgeoning publications outlets for their ideas. What they did have in common was their abiding loyalty to the ideals of the revolution and the Islamic Republic. A majority, in fact, had been among the Islamic Republic’s most radical supporters in its early days, having spearheaded the attack on the US embassy in Tehran in November 1979, served in the Revolutionary Guards or the Intelligence Ministry, and supported the Islamization of the universities and the purge of professors under the auspices of the Cultural Revolution. With impeccable revolutionary credentials, these intellectuals sought to tweak and reform the theocratic basis of the state. The compound effect of their intellectual production was not just theoretically significant. In 1997, the “reformist” candidate, Hojatoleslam Mohammad Khatami, won the presidential election by a wide margin. What had started as a spontaneous intellectual movement to rethink and reimagine the Islamic Republic had now resulted in political developments that only helped reinforce it. 2

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Mehran Kamrava, Iran’s Intellectual Revolution (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008), p. 221. Emadeddin Baqi, Hoquq-e Mokhalefan: Tamrin-e Demokrasi Baraye Jame‘h Irani (The Rights of Opponents: The Practice of Democracy for Iranian Society) (Tehran: Nashr-e Saraee, 1381/2002), p. 15. Gholamreza Godarazi, Tajaddod-e Natamam-e Roshanfekran-e Irani (The Incomplete Modernity of Iranian Intellectuals) (Tehran: Akhtaran, 1387/ 2008), pp. 107–108.

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Despite a number of highly consequential political milestones – among them municipal council elections, a loosening of social and cultural strictures, and inroads in enabling civil society organizations to operate – the reform movement was blocked and undermined by the deep state at every turn.5 The election of the populist conservative Mahmood Ahmadinejad in 2005 as the new president put the death knell on whatever by then remained of the reform movement. The 2009 elections offered the electorate one last chance to resuscitate the dying reformist trend, ultimately resulting in the Green Movement, green having been the color of the reformist candidate Mirhossein Mousavi. Mousavi had himself been another former radical in the 1980s who served as the country’s wartime prime minister. The Green Movement was brutally suppressed, its leaders accused of sedition and placed under house arrest. Simultaneously, the state did what it could to block the intellectual current that had been rethinking the basis of state–society relations and the nature of Islam’s relationship with politics. The Special Court for the Clergy was particularly active in ensuring that the clerics who veered off from what was officially acceptable received appropriate punishment. Nevertheless, the state was less than successful in completely erasing the intellectual contributions of reformist thinkers. The journals in which the reformists published may have been banned, but their books were still available and in circulation. More importantly, their alternative conceptualizations compared to what was officially acceptable remained, even if faintly, in the intellectual backgrounds of the politically aware. Ali Akbar Mohtashamipour (1947–2021) was representative of many of the radical revolutionaries who in their later years advocated milder, even reformist policies. A former student of Khomeini, he reached the rank of hojatoleslam and served as the Islamic Republic’s Interior Minister in the early 1980s. Earlier, as the Islamic Republic’s ambassador to Syria, he is rumored to have been the principal figure behind the establishment of the Lebanese Hezbollah in 1981. Considered a spiritual guide to the students who attacked the US embassy in 1979 and took American diplomats hostage, in 1992 he 5

For more on the rise and demise of the reform movement, see Mehran Kamrava, Triumph and Despair: In Search of Iran’s Islamic Republic (New York: Oxford University Press, 2022), pp. 87–118.

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called on Iran and Iraq to join forces in fighting the United States. Later in life, however, Mohtashamipour became a harsh critic of those on the right. Directing his comments to Mesbah Yazdi, he once wrote: [T]he violent Islam that you advocate is the Islam of the Kharijites, which only leads to collapse, escapism, and suspicion throughout society, especially among the youth. . . . The pure Muhammadan Islam, which Imam Khomeini supported, has nothing to do with your Islam, because it is pure Islam, the Islam of love and kindness, Islam of empathy and unity, an Islam that is attractive to all social classes, especially to the youth. . . During the Shah’s regime, because of his autocracy, advocating violence could perhaps be justified. But today, under the Islamic Republic, clerics should not be advocating lawlessness and disorder, and not be the catalysts for dictatorship and autocracy to once again appear.6

Mohtashamipour’s journey from radical to reformist represented a particular phase in the life of the Islamic Republic that saw many of its most loyal figures call for changes to its underlying doctrines. This chapter explores this phase in the theocratic and theological life of the republic. The chapter starts with an overview of efforts to reform the theoretical underpinnings of Iranian Islamism. An important component of this effort was to deconstruct the hermeneutics of Islam by pointing to the importance of time and context. Specifically, many theorists called for situating Islam’s teachings within the particular circumstances in which they were revealed. A natural corollary of deconstructing Islamic hermeneutics is ijtihad. Constructing new conceptions of Islam’s role in state–society relations requires that ijtihad rely on contemporary knowledge and science. The outcome, the reformists concluded, are a number of ingredients that are inherent in Islam, such as tolerance of differences, consultation, allegiance, and participation, which are key to democracy.

Religious Reformism Religious reformism has a long pedigree in Iran, dating back to before the Constitutional Revolution and the arguments of Jamal al-Din 6

Ali Akbar Mohtashamipour, Chand-Sedai dar Jame‘h va Rouhaniyat (Multiplicity of Voices in Society and among the Clergy) (Tehran: Khaneh-e Andisheh-e Javan, 1379/2000), pp. 49, 53.

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Al-Afghani in the 1880s and the 1890s.7 The religious reformist discourse that emerged at the time included presenting a new hermeneutics of religion. The discourse employed religious thought in areas such as politics, culture, society, and economics. Many prominent intellectual figures also applied hermeneutics as a methodology to present new interpretations. As we shall see shortly, unlike Biblical hermeneutics, this reinterpretation went beyond the Quranic text and was employed to also include deconstruction and reinterpretation of existing religious roles, knowledge, obligations, and hierarchies in broad strokes. Along the same lines, the emerging discourse called for engaging in a rational critique of Islam while maintaining its spirit, its foundations, and its principles.8 Since then, Iran’s religious reformist intellectuals have consistently performed two main functions: one social and political, the other intellectual.9 As intellectuals, they have helped raise critical questions about the state of things and offered theories for reaching their ideals. Socially and politically, they have pressed against the established order and have tried, in direct and less direct ways, to effect tangible changes. These religious intellectuals have shared a number of common characteristics together across the different periods of Iran’s recent history. Primarily, they have had rational and critical outlooks, and they have shared a belief in the critical importance of fellow human beings. In addition to pointing to the importance of responsibility toward the destiny of others, they have invariably been religiously devout and see religion as a path for social and personal fulfillment. Along the same lines, they have shared a belief in the social mission and functions of religion.10 Al-Afghani’s ideas partially laid the ground work for the Constitutional Revolution a few decades later. After a brief flowering of intellectual production following the Constitutional Revolution and the early years of the Pahlavi period, by the 1930s the state activity discouraged and suppressed those intellectuals who fell outside its 7

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Jamal al-Din’s original last name was Asadabadi. To lend himself additional credibility in the Ottoman court and in the Arab world, however, he dropped the Persian-sounding (and presumably Shii) Asadabadi in favor of Al-Afghani. Abbas Khalaji, Nasazi-haye Nazari va Nakami-e Siyasi-e Gofteman-e Eslahtalabi (1376–1384) (Incongruities and Political Ineffectiveness of the Reformist Discourse [1997–2005]) (Boye Kaghaz, 1397/2018), pp. 58–59. Alireza Alavitabar, Roshanfekri, Dindari, Mardomsalari (Intellectualism, Religiosity, Democracy) (Tehran: Farhang va Andisheh, 1379/2000), p. 11. Ibid., pp. 14–16.

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narrow ideological ambit. Iranian intellectuals once again found temporary breathing room during the first decade of Mohammad Reza Pahlavi’s rule, from 1941 until about 1953. Secular nationalism, communism with more than a hint of pro-Moscow sympathies, and religious conservatism all competed with one another during the difficult 1940s and the early 1950s. All three currents were crushed after the 1953 coup by a monarchical authoritarianism that promoted social and cultural Westernization while pointedly excluding political development. In the 1960s and the 1970s, despite heavy political repression, a number of authors and academics – chief among them Ahmad Fardid (1909–1994), Jalal Al-e Ahmad (1923–1969), and Ali Shariati (1933–1977) – articulated a discourse of nativist anti-Westernism, one that set the tone and the tenor of the revolution that followed. The next intellectual wave emerged after 1989, when the war with Iraq was over and a number of former revolutionaries began to take stock of the revolution’s first decade. For many of the country’s intellectuals, the end of the war with Iraq presented a critical juncture. A decade into the revolution, a number of pressing issues now presented themselves that needed to be urgently addressed. One of the key questions had to do with the precise nature of the relationship between state and religion, given the prevailing system of the velayat-e faqih and the constitutional revisions of 1989. Equally important was the country’s position in relation to tradition and modernity. There was also much discussion over the ideal patterns of social and economic development, especially in light of shifting conceptions of groups on the “left” and “right” of the political spectrum. Lastly, a number of intellectuals wondered what changes and improvements could be made to existing systems of political decisionmaking to make them more responsive and transparent.11 Broadly, the answers that emerged were motivated by ideals of Islam, reliance on popular sovereignty, and democratic development through deepening economic, political, social, and cultural advances. The main object of intellectual criticism was Iran’s continued history of autocracy and its consequences on the lives of Iranians, including on their religious beliefs and practices. Change, the intellectuals argued, would come through the institution of civil society, through deep and fundamental reforms, through political participation, and through 11

Ibid., p. 7.

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dialogue of civilizations.12 Equally important would be systematic assessment of the popular and political shapes that Iranian Islam has assumed over time. What was urgently needed was a sustained deconstruction of the knowledge of Islam, its hermeneutics, as historically accumulated, and its reconstruction anew through resort to reason and the scientific method. A number of reasons account for the fact that the dominant intellectual discourse that emerged in postwar Iran remained religious in nature and did not turn secular. Given the country’s changing social, political, and historical circumstances a decade after the revolution, a number of devout, committed intellectuals, many of whom had been involved in the revolutionary struggle and the “sacred defense” war that followed, felt that a new hermeneutic of religion was needed to fit the new times.13 Reflecting on their reality, one that by then was socially, culturally, and politically permeated by religion, these devout intellectuals sought to provide answers to pressing contemporary issues using the analytical tools in which they had been schooled and in which they believed, namely those of Islam. One of the central preoccupations of Iranian intellectuals, religious and otherwise, has been the problematic of modernity and Iran’s tormented entanglement with it. For the traditionalist Iranians, the age of modernity simply does not exist in Iran. If there is something that is modern, then it must necessarily belong to a non-Muslim country.14 Religious intellectuals, on the other hand, believe in the foundations of modernity, and they use modern critical knowledge to review and revise traditional religious understandings. A religious reformist discourse, in fact, cannot come about on its own and is dependent on other discourses, such as the discourse of modernity, and on other developments.15 In fact, religious reformism may be considered as one of the forms in which intellectual reaction to the West has manifested itself in Iran, the other manifestations being variations of fundamentalism, traditionalism, or modernism. More 12 13

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Ibid., p. 33. Khalaji, Nasazi-haye Nazari va Nakami-e Siyasi-e Gofteman-e Eslahtalabi (Incongruities and Political Ineffectiveness of the Reformist Discourse), p. 59. Abbas Kazemi, Jame‘h Shenasi-e Roshanfekri-e Dini dar Iran (Sociology of Religious Intellectualism in Iran) (Tehran: Tarh-e No, 1383/2004), p. 8. Emadeddin Baqi, Gofteman-haye Dini-e Mo‘aser (Contemporary Religious Discourses) (Tehran: Saraee, 1381/2002), p. 16.

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specifically, religious reformism has often found itself in a reactive mode, responding to the religious practice and precepts it has found archaic rather than proactively taking the initiative to articulate new conceptions of fiqh.

Reforming Political Islam At the broadest level, religious reformism has three main currents, all three of which call for a return to true religion. The earliest current holds that religious principles have been corrupted through popular, everyday practices, as people try to give meaning and reality to their beliefs. For the early reformers, the tools for correcting and reforming religion can be found within it, not outside, and so reforming religion is possible only by going to the religion itself. These reformist philosophers – some of the most notable of whom included Abu Hanifa, Abu Hamid Al Ghazali, and Rumi – assumed there to be certain redlines within Islam beyond which they were unwilling to step. To reform religion, these philosophers generally maintain, there is nothing better than religion itself. Today’s reformists critique this early generation for its inability to grasp the depth of ongoing changes in the world. The early philosophers were far too steeped in tradition, they maintain, and too detached from reality, to propose a feasible, religious framework for contemporary life.16 A second current seeks to reform religion through reliance on rationality and science. This intellectual current does not give itself the right to question the core, foundational principles of religion. But it does resort to tools outside of religion, tools such as rationality and science, to reform it. There are numerous examples of such thinkers, both Shia and Sunni thinkers, some of whom include Ibn Sina (Avicenna), Abu Nasr Al-Farabi, Ibn Khaldun, Mulla Sadra, Muhammad Abduh, Rashid Rida, Hassan Al-Banna, Muhammad Iqbal, and Yahya Dowlatabadi. More recent thinkers in this category have included Mohammad Hossein Naini, Mohammad Hossein Tabatabai, Mahmoud Taleghani, Morteza Mottahari, and Hosseinali Montazeri. In general, these philosophers are willing to recognize and employ some of the analytical tools offered by the social sciences in their 16

Mohammad Baqer Tajaddin, “Eslah-e Andisheh-e Dini” (Reforming Religious Thought), Cheshmandaz-e Iran, No. 107 (1396/2017), p. 55.

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reexamination of religious beliefs. But their willingness to engage in critical self-examination and their employment of tools of rationality and social science are deliberately constrained.17 A third intellectual current is an outgrowth of the scientific revolution, as well as the intrusion of modernity into Iran. It is also greatly influenced by the growth of secular and humanist ideas. Philosophers belonging to this current fully believe in the rational validity of scientific findings. In reforming religion, they go much further than the first intellectual current by traversing what most others would consider red lines. Many in this latest category, in fact, appear to believe more in ethics rather than in religion per se. Some of the most important thinkers in this third category include Ali Abdel Raziq, Taha Hussein, Ahmed Sobhy Mansour, Nasr Hamed Abu-Zayd, and Tariq Ramadan. The category’s Iranian thinkers include Ali Shariati, Mehdi Bazargan, Abdolkarim Soroush, Mohammad Mojtahed Shabestari, and Mustafa Malekian.18 One of the more recent examples of intellectuals in this category is philosophy professor Abolghassem Fanaee. According to Fanaee, since the beginning of Iran’s confrontation with modernity, the central issue facing Iranians has been the tension between religion and ethics. Iranians need a clear understanding of this relationship, an understanding that cannot come from within religion or religious texts alone. “We can acquire the necessary insight from philosophy of ethics,” he writes. “Sometimes the ulama justify unethical behavior on the basis of the shari‘ah. We therefore have to resort to hermeneutics and to philosophy of ethics to become closer to God. In a number of important respects, ethics is more important than religion.”19 Grasping right and wrong does not necessarily need to be formulated in the language of religion. When God is called “just,” “generous,” and “kind,” we do not need the language of religion to understand what each of these means. There can also be a system of ethics outside of religion. We can know what is good and what is bad without religion.20 It is only the content and substance of a religion that brings one closer to spirituality 17 19

20

18 Ibid., p. 57. Ibid., p. 56. Abolghassem Fanaee, Din dar Tarazo-ye Akhlaq (Religion in Balance of Ethics) (Tehran: Mo‘aseseh-e Farhangi-e Sarat, 1384/2005), pp. 50–51. Hadi Tabatabai, Hadis-e Noandishan-e Dini: Yek Nasl Pas az Abdolkarim Soroush (Story of Religious New Thinkers: One Generation After Abdolkarim Soroush) (Tehran: Kavir, 1397/2018), pp. 33–34.

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and ethics. It is the understanding of religion – its hermeneutics and methodology of grasping it – that brings one closer to the ethics of religion. Instead of trying to reconcile religion and modernity, Fanaee contends, Iranian intellectuals ought to reconcile religion with ethics.21 This third group of thinkers generally adhere to their own foundational logic and see an elevated, special position for reason and science, pushing critical thinking to previously unknown limits. They are aware of the need to recognize various sciences and scientific methods and to engage in a critical dialogue with the modern world. They also recognize that religion provides the path toward salvation, but it cannot do so without critically engaging in dialogue with the modern world.22 The religious reformists in this group can themselves be divided into an earlier generation who sought to make religion ideological, and a later generation who shunned ideology in favor of social capital. Capturing the imagination of Iranians in the 1960s and the 1970s, members of the earlier generation, like Ali Shariati, sought to awaken Shi‘ism from its supposed historic stupor by making it ideological. The voice of this generation, Shariati saw the original purpose of religion as resolving those contradictions and crises with which people have to deal in their social and political lives. For Shariati, most of these contradictions could be resolved through making religion political and turning it into an ideology of liberation. But for later generations of religious reformists, the needs and contradictions that people face are individual and social, material and spiritual, mundane and divine, to all of which religion is the answer. For the likes of Abdolkarim Soroush and others in this later generation, religion cannot be reduced to an ideology. Doing so, they reasoned, overlooks its expansive, spiritual, and divine dimensions.23 Emadeddin Baqi, for example, adopts a conception of religion that is unabashedly human-centered. From such a perspective, he maintains, if we compare human rights with fiqh, many principles of fiqh will be violated. But from the perspective of the Quran, the right of the people to freely choose their belief system is guaranteed, and there is no 21 22 23

Ibid., p. 30. Tajaddin, “Eslah-e Andisheh-e Dini” (Reforming Religious Thought), p. 57. Mohammad Fouladi, “Nesbat-e Din va Ideolozhi: Din-e Ideolozhik, Ideolozhi-e Dini” (Relationship between Religion and Ideology: Ideological Religion, Religious Ideology), Faslnameh-e ‘Elmi-pazhoheshi-e Andisheh-e Novin-e Dini, Vol. 11, No. 43 (1394/2015), p. 148.

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contradiction between fiqh and the modern world.24 The Quranic injunction that “there is no compulsion in religion” indicates an emphasis on the human-centeredness of the Quran and it being a basis for human free choice. According to Baqi, the Quran calls on individuals to adopt their religion not on the basis of imitation or inheritance but instead to do so knowingly and based on research. If people have done research, they should not change their religion readily.25 Saeed Hajjarian is another figure belonging to later generation of intellectuals, though, before the attack by hardliners that left him paralyzed, he was far more political than the philosopher Soroush. Hajjarian fully endorses Shariati’s frontal attack on traditionalist religion. He points to the emergence of a “culture of mourning,” or an “Ashura culture,” in which retelling the tragic story of Imam Hussein’s martyrdom has become a source of comfort, perhaps a wailing outlet to avoid the painful realities of life. Before the revolution, as Shariati used to say, Imam Hussein’s blood had turned into the opium of the masses. During the revolution, the culture of mourning was rebuilt into an aggressive culture of struggle, followed afterward by a culture of sacrifice, one nurtured by postrevolutionary war and hardship. Today, the culture of mourning that Shariati decried half a century ago has reemerged.26 Hajjarian does, nevertheless, also criticize the treatment of religion as an ideology. Those who think of religion as a mere ideology, he argues, understand neither its essence nor its potential as a source of social capital. Unintentionally, they actually end up hastening secularization.27 It was within this broader historical context that in the second decade of the revolution, a number of public intellectuals emerged and led what many called the “age of revision.” They sought to present pragmatic solutions driven from Islam to the country’s social and political problems of the day. Searching for a social program, the 24

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Baqi, Gofteman-haye Dini-e Mo‘aser (Contemporary Religious Discourses), pp. 108–109. Ibid., p. 106. Saeed Hajjarian, Az Shahed-e Qodsi ta Shahed-e Bazari: ‘Orfi Shodan-e Din dar Sepehr-e Siyasat (From the Sacred Witness to the Profane Witness: The Secularization of Religion in the Sphere of Politics) (Tehran: Tarh-e No, 1380/ 2001), pp. 224–229. Ibid., p. 163.

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intellectuals presented rational interpretations of religion and religious concepts, and critiqued social systems, behaviors, institutions, and their underlying relationships with one another.28 The religious reformists played two main functions. In the first place, they presented critiques of the political system and its theoretical and jurisprudential underpinnings. At the same time, some offered programs of theoretical and jurisprudential reforms meant to realign the system while continuing to allow Islam to play important roles in relation to the state. The religious reformist movement wanted to revive the original ideals of the revolution and at the same time to move the body politic in a forward direction.29 Not surprisingly, the public intellectuals who were popularly identified with religious reformism presented a serious competition to the traditionalist clergy.30 Traditionalists have good reason to view the religious reformists with suspicion. One of the main criticisms levied against the traditionalist clergy, especially by religious reformists, is the clergy’s neglect of their social and political responsibilities.31 One of the main concerns of the religious reformist discourse is politics. The central figures within the discourse believe that through deconstruction of received religious knowledge, by critiquing tradition, and through presenting new interpretations of religion, they can offer solutions to contemporary political issues.32 Religious intellectuals seek to engage in “reconstruction of religion” in a manner that touches on the entirety of what it means to be Muslim.33 Many traditionalists, especially traditionalist clerics, see this as a threat. An interesting distinguishing point that separates Iranian reformists from their conservative counterparts is the language and literature they 28

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Kazemi, Jame‘h Shenasi-e Roshanfekri-e Dini dar Iran (Sociology of Religious Intellectualism in Iran), pp. 100–101. Khalaji, Nasazi-haye Nazari va Nakami-e Siyasi-e Gofteman-e Eslahtalabi (Incongruities and Political Ineffectiveness of the Reformist Discourse), pp. 15–16. Kazemi, Jame‘h Shenasi-e Roshanfekri-e Dini dar Iran (Sociology of Religious Intellectualism in Iran), p. 121. Abdolvahan Forati, Rouhaniyat va Siyasat: Ma‘el va Payamad-ha (The Clergy and Politics: Issues and Consequences) (Tehran: Sazman-e Entesharat-e Pazhoheshgah-e Farhang va Andisheh-e Eslami, 1395/2016), p. 22. Baqi, Gofteman-haye Dini-e Mo‘aser (Contemporary Religious Discourses), p. 21. Kazemi, Jame‘h Shenasi-e Roshanfekri-e Dini dar Iran (Sociology of Religious Intellectualism in Iran), p. 123.

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often employ in their speeches and expositions. Individual variations notwithstanding of course, by and large Iran’s reformist intellectuals and activists tend to use literary prose that is more learned and poetic, not necessarily ostentatious but closer to the ideal elevated art form with which Iranians generally treat their language and literature. Speeches by Presidents Khatami and Rouhani, to take two admittedly extreme examples, all too often were what in Iran is approvingly called hakimaneh, roughly translated as “philosophical.” On the opposite extreme, again perhaps unfairly, stood the likes of Ahmadinejad and Raisi, representing a political current that sees itself closer to the people and therefore speaks the language commonly spoken in the streets. Ahmadinejad’s language wasn’t just populist; it was often coarse, at times even crass. Raisi for his part is particularly ungifted in the art of public speaking, his butchery of Persian a favored topic of jokes and internet memes. Somewhere in-between these two poles stands Khamenei. Khamenei’s literary style is neither philosophical nor populist (or, more aptly, what in Iran is called mardomi, people-centered). The seasoned politician and long-time leader speaks directly, plainly, concisely, and to the point. While Khamenei’s love of and respect for poetry and literature are well-known, as a lifelong preacher he has long mastered the art of delivering sermons, making his point bluntly and persuasively. This brief digression into literary styles and language delivery preferences has consequences for who the intended audiences of the different political groupings are and how they connect with them. Most likely unintentionally, the reformists connect more readily with the more educated segments of society, the university crowd, and with those in the middle classes fond of or with the luxury of time to read learned tracks and essays. The rightist Principlists, those I have called Khameneists here, connect more easily with broader swaths of the population for whom simplicity is more digestible, those whose concerns are more tangible and more immediate. To say that the reformists’ literary style betrays their elitism and the Khameneists’ their populism is to place too much emphasis on subtle linguistic preferences. Nevertheless, the differences in dominant patterns of articulating discourses, and the consequences of such differences, are not without importance. Ironically, many of the issues that were raised in the reform movement of the 2000s were similar to those that first had been debated

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during the Constitutional Revolution a hundred years ago. Some of the earlier issues included the role of religion in facilitating freedom, constitutionalism, and the shura. One of the contentious issues of the early 1900s revolved around the religious propriety of parliamentary politics. Religious traditionalists saw parliament as a Western invention and unnecessary, some going so far as to call the legislative branch a forum for apostasy.34 The religious modernists of the time saw the issue through diametrically opposed lenses. A century later, the language used and the specific references are different, but the underlying logics of the arguments of each side remain fairly similar. Today, the debate is over the scope of the velayat-e faqih’s authority and whether and how he can be supervised; the extent to which the Islamic state can intrude into the public and private domains; and issues related to freedom of the press, the enforcement of hijab, and the state’s forceful promotion of the kind of life style it deems acceptable.35 Some of the other issues that contemporary religious reformists are concerned with include questions related to definitions of apostasy and the punishment for it; the relationship between punishment and human rights; inheritance rules and equality between men and women; and approbative supervision of elections versus free elections. The overall thrust of contemporary Islamic reformism, then, is that Islam is a relevant, indeed necessary, force in modern life. Islamic thought and culture inhere a form of internal dynamism and adaptability that ensure their continued relevance to changing times and circumstances. This makes Islam perfectly compatible with phenomena such as democracy, which should not be seen as a purely Western construct.36 In fact, a number of Islamic precepts and practices, such as allegiance and consultation, are the bedrocks of democracy. Many of the key features embodied in democracy can be found in Islam. These include equality of all citizens before the law, the right to freely choose one’s leaders, and separation of the public and private domains.37 A significant portion of the jurisprudence that deals with Islamic science, philosophy, and hermeneutics deals with issues related to freedom, especially to discussions concerning “desire and restraint”

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Baqi, Gofteman-haye Dini-e Mo‘aser (Contemporary Religious Discourses), p. 10. 36 37 Ibid., pp. 255–256. Ibid., p. 297. Ibid., pp. 302–306.

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and “predestination and willpower.”38 Admittedly, the relationship between Islam and republicanism, especially as outlined in the 1979 constitution, has never been properly theorized.39 But themes such as freedom and democracy, long salient in Islamic reformist discourse, formed a significant corpus of the literature on the topic in the late 1990s and the early 2000s.

The Khatami Phenomenon No discussion of religious reformism in Iran in the 1990s and the early 2000s would be complete without taking into account the highly consequential role played in it by the Khatami presidency. In the 1997 presidential elections, Hojatoleslam Mohammad Khatami (b. 1943), a dark horse candidate whose tenure as culture minister had been cut short by an intolerant Majles, rode into office in a tsunami of popular support. Although long affiliated with the Islamic Republic in various official capacities, Khatami represented a new breed of Iranian politicians – part activist, part philosopher, a cleric with respectable revolutionary credentials. Largely because he ran against the establishment candidate, the conservative Ali Akbar Nategh-Nouri, and because his election slogans promised a new era for Iranian civil society, Khatami was readily identified with the religious reformist current. And he did not disappoint, at least initially. Soon, reformism emerged as both an intellectual discourse of “religious new thinking” and a political movement, both developing simultaneously and reinforcing one another. The travails of Khatami’s presidency and the eventual failure of his promises, partly because he was blocked at every turn and partly because of his own moderate temperament, are beyond the scope of the discussion here.40 But his presidency did provide the space and the opportunity for like-minded intellectuals to hurriedly produce a 38

39

40

Mohammad Baqer Khorramshad and Eshaq Sayyad Roudkar, “Amr-e beh Ma‘rouf, Nahy az Monker va Tose‘h Siyasi dar Jomhuri-e Eslami Iran” (Enjoining Good, Forbidding Evil and Political Development in the Islamic Republic of Iran), Faslnameh-e Pazhohesh-haye Rahbordi-ye Siyasat, Vol. 6, No. 23 (1396/2017), p. 46. Ebrahim Salehabadi, Manteq-e Jame‘eshenasan-e Siyasi-e Iran (The Logic of Iran’s Political Sociologists) (Tehran: Kavir, 1396/2017), p. 351. For my own take on Khatami’s presidency, see Kamrava, Triumph and Despair, pp. 87–118.

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sizeable corpus of religious reformist thought. Khatami himself, through frequent speeches and even occasional writings while in office, produced an impressive body of contributions to the intellectual current sweeping the country. The President based his religious reformist ideas on a critique of prevailing conceptions of modernity. For Khatami, questioning the contemporary situation is key to being a modern human being. According to Khatami, there are two dimensions to the West. One is its intellectual-cultural dimension, which must be understood, critically analyzed, and, when appropriate, adopted and employed. The other dimension is political. For Khatami, reformism means “finding out what the people’s difficulties are and coming up with profitable solutions.” These solutions must be based on the principles of Islam.41 Khatami views the reform era as a product of the consolidation of the Islamic Republic. In fact, he maintained, it was the political consolidation of the system that had given rise to the discourse of reformism. In constructing his arguments, Khatami relies on Iranian culture, heritage, and historical trajectory, on the one hand, and on dependence on and love of Islamic tradition, on the other. When the two come into conflict, Khatami tries, at times unsuccessfully, to reconcile them. Khatami believes that democracy does not belong to a specific people or nationality but belongs to all of humanity and is therefore adaptable to all cultures and religions. Democracy requires a realization of the rights and dignity of each person and each nation and people. It is not exclusive to anyone.42 For Khatami, the role that religion has played in Iranian culture and history can be a basis for religious democracy, with religion and the observance of people’s rights becoming solid foundations for the legitimacy of the system. A central pillar of Khatami’s thought is civil society, as he sees politics as electoral and healthy competition among civil society organs. Khatami argues that in the Islamic Republic, Islam and republicanism are the two dimensions of the system, one in which people vote and determine the character and personnel of the institutions of the state. The democratic essence of the system, he maintains, has been confirmed in the constitution, which makes the 41

42

Khalaji, Nasazi-haye Nazari va Nakami-e Siyasi-e Gofteman-e Eslahtalabi (Incongruities and Political Ineffectiveness of the Reformist Discourse), p. 67. Ibid., p. 151.

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legitimacy of the Islamic system contingent on popular vote and the people’s ability to avail themselves of their rights and freedoms within the limits of the law.43 Khatami believes that religion and freedom have a mutually reinforcing relationship with one another. Religious society requires the consolidation of freedom so that the possibility of chaos and violence is eliminated. Freedom does not mean lawlessness or anarchy, and neither is absolute freedom acceptable. The only normative standard for freedom is the constitution, which has set parameters for freedom based on Islam and public law.44 According to Khatami, the concept of velayat-e faqih is one jurisprudential concept among many, one that happens to be codified in the constitution.45 The president’s own theoretical arguments, coupled with his more permissive policies – within the limited purview of the Islamic Republic’s presidency, that is – combined to result in a flourishing of intellectual production by religious reformists. The intellectual current, as already mentioned, had started much earlier, and had in fact prepared the groundwork for Khatami’s election and subsequent policies. But the Khatami presidency was also key in further aiding and facilitating the expansive production of scholarship and the theorizing that followed by religious reformists. This scholarship had three, mutually reinforcing components, each of which appeared in roughly chronological order and led to and supported the other. The three components were deconstructing the old hermeneutics of Islam and removing the historical barnacles that had weighed it down; reconstructing a new fiqh through resort to independent reasoning, ijtihad; and articulating a conception of Islam that was democratic.

Deconstructing Islamic Hermeneutics One of the more prominent components of the religious reformist current was comprised of efforts to deconstruct the knowledge of Islam that had been accumulated and handed down from one generation to another. What we know as Islam, the main argument went, is not real Islam but conceptions of Islam as transmitted through time. Over time, these transmissions have been influenced by prevailing contexts and considerations that have steadily changed its very

43

Ibid., p. 69.

44

Ibid., p. 119.

45

Ibid., p. 70.

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meaning and functions. Islamic hermeneutics, in other words, needs to undergo a sustained process of deconstruction, whereby commonly held notions and practices are unpicked, understood within their proper context, and applied in ways they were meant in the Quran rather than as interpreted through the centuries. Emadeddin Baqi uses the example of apostasy to make a point about the need to deconstruct the received wisdom on fiqh. From the perspective of the Quran, he maintains, apostasy does not have a worldly punishment and can only be punished by God in the afterlife. Those perspectives concerning apostasy that lead to a punishment of death or other forms of violence are null and void.46 According to Baqi, in none of the verses of the Quran in which apostasy is discussed – such as AnNisa [4:137], Muhammad [47:25], Al-Baqara [2:217], Az-Zumar [39:65], An-Nah [16:109], Al-An’am [6:21, 54, 71], and Al ‘Amran [3:85–91] – is there a punishment of death prescribed, although there is mention of punishment in the afterlife. There is, of course, endorsement of the principle of punishment in the Quran but not the penalty of death for apostasy.47 In better understanding fiqh and presenting a new fiqh, Baqi calls for placing the person at the center of analysis, paying attention to the individual rather than to ideas as the central point of analysis. He calls for a paradigm shift in the relationship between belief and man, whereby man is given primacy and is seen as the important subject.48 Key to the deconstruction of Islamic hermeneutics are the two notions of tafsir and ta‘vil. Tafsir means interpretation. It is commonly taken to mean explanation and clarification of some of the more complicated language used in the Quran. There is considerably less consensus over ta‘vil, which is variously taken to mean original meaning, allegory, essence, meaning in context, and intended meaning.49 Proponents of deconstructing Islamic hermeneutics tend to adopt more expansive conceptions of ta‘vil, as Mojtahed Shabestari does for example, while its opponents favor more restrictive meanings of the 46

47 49

Baqi, Gofteman-haye Dini-e Mo‘aser (Contemporary Religious Discourses), p. 99. 48 Ibid., pp. 105–106. Ibid., pp. 100–101, 104. Mohammad Mansournezhad, “Hermeneutic va Nesbat-e An ba Din” (Hermeneutics and Its Relationship with Religion), in Noandishi va Ejtehad (New-Thinking and Ijtihad), Vol. 2, Jalal Mir-Aqaie, ed. (Tehran: Majma‘-e Jahani-e Taqrib-e Mazaheb-e Eslami, 1382/2003), p. 23.

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concept.50 For Mojtahed Shabestari and other like-minded intellectuals, Islamic hermeneutics revolve around deconstructing assumptions and unpacking the received wisdoms that have come to constitute what Iranians consider to be Islam. At the broadest level, the theorists who engage in the deconstruction of Islamic hermeneutics seek to roll back religion’s expansive reach across the manifold domains of life and to bring its focus back to ethics and proper social values. More specifically, the intent is to debunk assumptions of innate linkages between fiqh and particular forms of political rule. According to this “minimalist” conception of fiqh, Islam simply prescribes values and norms concerning justice and political behavior, not specific methods and manners of rule.51 For proponents of minimalist fiqh, politics and fiqh comprise two different methodologies. Fiqh relies on ijtihad and on original sources in order to learn about Islamic injunctions and rules. But politics is evidencebased, examining dependent and independent variables to prove or disprove prevailing theories. In terms of subject also, fiqh is incapable of analyzing political programs and actions, whereas politics focuses on political behavior.52 Fiqh, the argument goes, can answer only jurisprudential issues in society. This perspective acknowledges that not all problems can be addressed through jurisprudence and therefore require specialized knowledge for the religion life of the individual. Mojtahed Shabestari, Soroush, and Baqi are among those subscribing to this minimalist conception of fiqh. Baqi’s condemnation of “maximalist fiqh” is unequivocal: “The reality is that our fiqh and religious sciences belong to the discourse of pre-industrial revolution times, in which there is no trace of the complexities of labor, capital, economy, civic and political rights, medical and biological discoveries, and the age of computers and satellites.”53 The contrast to minimalist fiqh is that which sees “hermeneutical equality” between fiqh and politics, as most notably advanced by Khomeini, which has a specific understanding of religion, and 50

51

52 53

Mohammad Mojtahed Shabestari, Hermeneutic, Ketab, va Sunnat (Hermeneutics, the Book, and the Tradition) (Tehran: Tarh-e No, 1379/2000), p. 121. Mansour Mirahmadi, Feqh-e Siyasi (Political Jurisprudence) (Tehran: Samt, 1395/2016), p. 17. Ibid., p. 18. Baqi, Gofteman-haye Dini-e Mo‘aser (Contemporary Religious Discourses), p. 138.

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therefore of fiqh. In this sense, fiqh is seen as the “knowledge to administer the life of the individual and society.”54 The expectation is for fiqh to put forward rules and foundations according to which personal lives and social and collective matters would be governed. Khomeini considered fiqh to be highly inclusive in its scope: “from cleanliness to reparation, our fiqh needs to be attentive to the administration of the country, the administration of society, and the administration of a political system.”55 This conception has led to what can be called “state fiqh,” according to which fiqh has emerged as the basis of the state and is responsible for governance. This maximalist fiqh goes beyond social and political issues and includes the personal affairs of the individual as well. Naturally, the ulama and lay thinkers are far from unanimous in their positions on Shia hermeneutics. In fact, especially within conservative clerical circles, theoretical opposition to the study of Islamic hermeneutics tends to be strong and trenchant. The cleric Mohammad Asef Javadi, for example, maintains that the Quran simply does not lend itself to the science of hermeneutics, the genesis of which lies in Christianity. Unlike the Bible, he argues, the Quran is a product of revelation and is considered to be a miracle. As a self-contained and complete document, the Quran is also immune to distortions.56 “Considering the ‘secular’ nature of the religion of Christianity,” he writes, and fundamental and essential differences between the Quran and different religions, and taking into account the conditions in the West that have resulted in the emergence of new hermeneutics, the hermeneutics that is prevalent in the West is neither worthy nor appropriate to be applied to the Quran. It is inappropriate and unfair to compare the Quran with the divine books before it.57

Similarly, the prolific author Ayatollah Jafar Sobhani (b. 1929) warns that hermeneutics runs the risk of ascribing multiple meanings to the message of Islam and can easily slip into relativism and vagueness.58

54 56

57 58

55 Mirahmadi, Feqh-e Siyasi (Political Jurisprudence), p. 20. Ibid., p. 21. Mohammad Asef Javadi, “Hermeneutic dar Andisheh-e Eslami” (Hermeneutics in Islamic Thought), in Noandishi va Ejtehad (New-Thinking and Ijtihad), Vol. 2, Jalal Mir-Aqaie, ed. (Tehran: Majma’-e Jahani-e Taqrib-e Mazaheb-e Eslami, 1382/2003), pp. 140–141. Ibid., p. 144. Mansournezhad, “Hermeneutic va Nesbat-e An ba Din” (Hermeneutics and Its Relationship with Religion), pp. 232–233.

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How does all this relate to politics? Ezzatollah Sahabi (1930–2011), one of the prominent figures within religious reformist current, presents a simple answer: [T]here is no direct relationship between religion and the form of rule.59 In actual practice, in fact, “religious government” is “government of the religious.” It is not a government that has a right to ever become sacred, or absolute, even if it is led by successors to the Prophet Muhammad.60 The Quran does not prescribe a particular form of state, Sahabi maintains, and while it does provide specific instructions on a whole host of social and personal issues, it does not mandate or specify particular forms of government at all.61 Similar to physics and chemistry, politics is a science. It requires specialized skills, and it has its own rules and regulations. It is not the preserve or one group, and we cannot say that only one class in society, the clergy, has special access to it and others do not.62 As in the former Soviet Union, where the political system was based on an ideology that people stopped believing in, Iran’s Islamic Republic cannot forcibly instill religious beliefs among the people. If anything, the forced imposition of religion only turns people away from what they are meant to believe in.63 Sahabi’s views on the relationship between politics and religion were by no means unique among religious reformists of the 1990s and the 2000s. He was simply echoing one of the main themes in the religious reformist discourse that was dominant in Iran in the first decade of the 2000s. One of the earliest and most prominent figures responsible for the emergence of the discourse, and specifically for critiquing the hermeneutics of Islam, was the philosopher Abdolkarim Soroush.

Abdolkarim Soroush Abdolkarim Soroush (b. 1945) threw the question of Islamic hermeneutics out into the open with the 1991 publication of his magnum 59

60 61

62

63

Ezzatollah Sahabi, “Emkan-e Hokumat-e Dini” (The Possibility of Religious Government), in Din va Hokumat (Religion and Governance), Anjoman-e Eslami-e Mohandesin, ed. (Tehran: Rasa, 1377/1998), p. 189. Ibid., p. 209. Hasan Yousefi Eshkevari, “Hokumat-e Demokratik-e Eslami” (Democratic Islamic Government), in Din va Hokumat (Religion and Governance), Anjoman-e Eslami-e Mohandesin, ed. (Tehran: Rasa, 1377/1998), p. 332. Sahabi, “Emkan-e Hokumat-e Dini” (The Possibility of Religious Government), p. 213. Ibid., p. 221.

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opus, The Expansion and Contraction of the Theory of the Shari‘ah. Since Soroush’s arguments have been covered extensively elsewhere, here I will limit the discussion of his ideas to those presented in this book, which to this day remains the most thorough and devastating of the earlier critiques of accumulated Islamic knowledge.64 Soroush questioned the utility of shari‘ah to religion. He instead pointed to the importance of a critical understanding of religion. Religious knowledge is essentially human knowledge, and, as such, it is changeable and incomplete. He also cast doubt on the traditionalist clergy’s claim of political and economic independence from the state or from other vested interests. By the same token, given the archaic nature of most clergy’s frames of reference, he distrusted their ability to question superstition and other commonplace practices, the compound effects of which have kept society back.65 Soroush reserved his sharpest critique for fiqh and the way that knowledge of fiqh has accumulated over time. Instead of discussing fiqh and the rules governing it, Soroush focused on the questions and assumptions that inform it.66 His arguments in regard to fiqh revolve around four principal points. First, he maintained, since fiqh is comprised of human knowledge, it is necessarily flawed and incomplete. Second, knowledge and sciences derived from outside of fiqh are necessary for the proper conduct of public life. Life, in other words, cannot revolve around fiqh only. Third, religious government cannot impose values on people but must instead facilitate conditions that encourage spiritual fulfillment. Fourth and finally, in a rebuke to Shariati and his generation of Islamist intellectuals, Soroush maintained that religion should not be made ideological but must instead be understood without the weight of historical interpretations, the motivations and veracity of which can be easily questioned. To start, Soroush maintains that fiqh is a science made by humans and, as such, is incomplete, worldly, and experiential. Given that fiqh is 64

65

66

For other treatments of Soroush’s ideas, see Mahmoud Sadri and Ahmad Sadri, eds. Reason, Freedom, and Democracy in Islam: The Essential Writings of Abdolkarim Soroush (New York: Oxford University Press, 2000); and, Kamrava, Iran’s Intellectual Revolution, especially pp. 156–161. Khalaji, Nasazi-haye Nazari va Nakami-e Siyasi-e Gofteman-e Eslahtalabi (Incongruities and Political Ineffectiveness of the Reformist Discourse), p. 61. Baqi, Gofteman-haye Dini-e Mo‘aser (Contemporary Religious Discourses), p. 100.

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a product of prevailing ethics and is influenced by existing social structures and hidden interests, it is subject to change and transformation over time.67 “Jurisprudential Islam is not real Islam,” be boldly declares.68 Knowledge of religion is human knowledge. All human knowledge evolves, and so does knowledge of religion. Knowledge of the shari‘ah needs to be similarly deconstructed. Whereas the shari‘ah is constant, our understanding and knowledge of it is varied and changeable over time.69 Human conceptions of the shari‘ah, similar to conceptions of nature, are in constant flux.70 It is our understanding of a phenomenon that is in constant flux, not the phenomenon itself.71 There are distinct differences between religion and our understanding of it.72 Soroush calls for a new philosophy, one whose central preoccupations are addressing religious doubts, answering evolving questions, and understanding the science of religion.73 Fiqh’s shortcomings can be overcome by employing other sciences in service of religion. Religion can only be properly understood if we use analytical tools that fall outside of it. In other words, there is a direct relationship between religious and nonreligious sciences, including especially reason and rationality, spirituality, and emotional experiences.74 Soroush argues that public life needs to employ modern science and technology in management, economics, politics, and other related disciplines. “The same dialogue that exists among all sciences,” he claims, “also exists between human sciences and the science of religion.” This means that in a systematic way, human sciences pose questions to the shari‘ah and interrogate it. These questions do not necessarily yield answers. But they instigate further research and transformation, and their systematic 67

68

69

70 74

Sadeq Haghighat, “Feqh-e Siyasi va Democracy” (Political Fiqh and Democracy), Andisheh-e Siyasi dar Eslam, Vol. 1, No. 4 (1394/2015), p. 42. Abdolkarim Soroush, “Tahlil-e Mafhoum-e ‘Hokumat-e Dini’” (Analysis of the Concept of “Religious Government”), in Andarbab-e Ejtehad: Darbari-ye Karamadi-e Feqh-e Eslami dar Doya-ye Emrooz (On Ijtihad: On the Effectiveness of Islamic Jurisprudence in Today’s World), Sa’id Edalat-Nejad, ed. (Tehran: Tarh-e No, 1382/2003), p. 176. Abdolkarim Soroush, Qabz va Bast-e Teorik-e Shari‘at: Nazariyeh-e Takamol-e Ma‘refat-e Dini (The Expansion and Contraction of the Theory of the Shari‘ah: The Theory of Evolution of Religious Knowledge) (Tehran: Sarat, 1374/1995), pp. 86, 106. 71 72 73 Ibid., p. 168. Ibid., p. 117. Ibid., p. 56. Ibid., p. 78. Ibid., pp. 157–169.

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nature also facilitates their orderliness and also answerability. Questions, therefore, have the two consequences of orderliness and answerability. Through answering (or not answering) those questions, shari‘ah better reveals its essence and its nature, and presents a better image of itself. Since religious knowledge is a collection of answers, in relation to the questions directed at it, it assumes a particular calculous and order.75

Islamic philosophy and our understanding of the shari‘ah have not yet found consistency with new sciences and with our evolving conceptions of things.76 Just as nonreligious sciences such as mathematics, physics, astronomy, and geology change over time and become deeper, so must the sciences of fiqh, tafsir (interpretation), and kalam (speculative theology).77 Philosophy and history are critically important in properly understanding religion. The contemporary understanding of religion is a product of history and the knowledge that was prevalent at any given moment in history.78 For Soroush, there is no direct correlation between religion on the one side and specific forms of government on the other. The essence of government, he argues, is nonreligious. Just because a state calls itself religious, it does not mean that its population is or will become religious.79 It is neither the job nor the responsibility of religious government to lead people into paradise; that would shackle them in chains. The basis of religious government is voluntary belief rather than compulsion and imposition. To have a successful religious government, the rights of the people must be respected.80 The principal function of religious government is to improve the religious and spiritual lives of the people rather than to impose its will on them. Religion can be categorized into two main forms: one being belief, the other moral and jurisprudential action. If by religious government we mean imposing moral and jurisprudential dictates, that government will be totalitarian.81 According to Soroush, in order to properly understand religion, we must divorce it from ideology and deconstruct its hermeneutics. Ideological religion is neither possible nor desirable. Worse still is 75 79

80

81

76 77 78 Ibid., pp. 272–273. Ibid., p. 172. Ibid., p. 118. Ibid., p. 33. Khalaji, Nasazi-haye Nazari va Nakami-e Siyasi-e Gofteman-e Eslahtalabi (Incongruities and Political Ineffectiveness of the Reformist Discourse), p. 61. Soroush, “Tahlil-e Mafhoum-e ‘Hokumat-e Dini’” (Analysis of the Concept of “Religious Government”), pp. 165, 171, 181. Ibid., pp. 180, 185.

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making religion an official ideology, which is both unworkable and antireligious.82 Similarly detrimental to Islam has been the staleness of jurisprudential conceptions of it and the legal frameworks that have accompanied it through historical epochs; in other words, its fiqh and the shari‘ah. This ossification of Islamic hermeneutics over time has not always been deliberate but a product of our limited, continued capacity and willingness to intellectually innovate and learn new perspectives on humanity and the human condition.83 We must recognize that our understanding and conception of religion changes over time, Soroush maintains. What remains constant is religion itself. It is our knowledge of religion, and the hermeneutics of religion, that changes.84 In every age, knowledge and understanding has its own calculous, and religious knowledge is always a product of its own era. Every new conception of the shari‘ah is based on two pillars of knowledge: one internal and indigenous to the religion, and another external and exogenous from it. New issues, new problems, call for new theories. New understandings transform existing, previous ones. Even if these new understandings do not completely supplant older ones, they take over their essence and give them new meanings and manifestations.85 Sourosh’s efforts at deconstructing the hermeneutics of religion allow room for a plurality of religious perspectives. These arguments only help strengthen religious democracy among believers.86 According to Soroush, one of the goals of the shari‘ah is to ensure people’s rights to their opinion. Another right that people have is to arrive at their own opinion through research and thinking. Similarly, people can change their opinion without being punished. All of these rights must receive equal protection, none being more important than another.87 In retrospect, Soroush’s arguments fit into a broader trajectory of recent Islamic intellectual thought in Iran. In the 1960s and the 1970s, Shariati sought to inject ideology into Iranian Shi‘ism In his efforts to 82

83 86

87

Soroush, Qabz va Bast-e Teorik-e Shari‘at (The Expansion and Contraction of the Theory of the Shari‘ah), pp. 34–35. 84 85 Ibid., pp. 173–174. Ibid., p. 55. Ibid., p. 178–199. Alavitabar, Roshanfekri, Dindari, Mardomsalari (Intellectualism, Religiosity, Democracy), pp. 132, 136. Abdolkarim Soroush, “Feqh dar Tarazoo” (Fiqh in the Balance), in Andarbab-e Ejtehad: Darbari-ye Karamadi-e Feqh-e Eslami dar Doya-ye Emrooz (On Ijtihad: On the Effectiveness of Islamic Jurisprudence in Today’s World), Sa’id Edalat-Nejad, ed. (Tehran: Tarh-e No, 1382/2003), p. 19.

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make Islam ideological, Shariati went to the very foundations of the religion to redefine and reinterpret it. His goal was to deconstruct and then reconstruct Islam as revolutionary ideology. Decades later, after the revolution, Soroush made a distinction between “ideological religion” and “religious ideology,” rejecting the former and accepting the latter. Soroush’s distinction may be theoretically plausible, but it does not exist in reality.88 Nevertheless, his theory on “the expansion and contraction of religious knowledge” inspired a whole generation of intellectuals. At the very least, it compellingly articulated what a number of other religious intellectuals also believed. One of the more notable of those thinkers was Mohammad Mojtahed Shabestari.

Mohammad Mojtahed Shabestari Similar to Soroush, Mohammad Mojtahed Shabestari (b. 1936) calls for the articulation of a new shari‘ah, one in which the permissible and the forbidden, halal and haram, and what God has commanded and has forbidden remain as they are, but their meaning, scope, and essence undergo major transformations.89 A review of the assumptions, likes, and expectations of interpreters and jurists in any period is an essential and basic precondition of any interpretation of the shari‘ah, and the evolution of religious knowledge should not occur without such a fundamental recalibration.90 What the scientists of religion introduce to society as religion “is a human construct, because these religious jurists are human, and it is through human lenses that they understand prophetic mission and revelation.”91 All interpretations, and all scientific knowledge, are based on received wisdom and accumulated assumptions. It is important to recognize the role that assumptions play in informing Shia fiqh. These assumptions are often taken for granted, with commentators frequently critiquing only the methodology and perhaps some of the core principles on which 88

89

90

91

Hajjarian, Az Shahed-e Qodsi ta Shahed-e Bazari (From the Sacred Witness to the Profane Witness), pp. 160–162. Mohammad Mojtahed Shabestari, Ta‘amoli dar Qara‘t-e Ensani az Din (Reflections on a Humane Reading of Religion) (Tehran: Tarh-e No, 1383/ 2004), p. 25. Mojtahed Shabestari, Hermeneutic, Ketab, va Sunnat (Hermeneutics, the Book, and the Tradition), pp. 9, 17. Ibid., p. 205.

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jurisprudence is based. Seldom is any attention paid to the philosophical, anthropological, sociological, and psychological assumptions that have guided commentators’ influences on interpretations of the Book and the prophetic tradition.92 Obviously, without preexisting assumptions and knowledge, we cannot arrive at new knowledge. But in understanding the shari‘ah, it is important that these preexisting assumptions do not assume the form of scientific truths.93 The interpreter cannot take the meaning of a single word or single concept out of the larger context. Only the whole text, in its entirety, can be interpreted.94 More than anything else, the conflict among interpreters and faqihs concerns the different parameters they adopt. To resolve this, the different branches of Islam must resort to the science of hermeneutics in order to understand Islam through ijtihad.95 “I invite the architects of official Islam to stop issuing threats and condemnations,” Mojtahed Shabestari writes, “and to instead engage in discourse and dialogue on the hermeneutics of religion. Without a discussion on hermeneutics, there can be no resolution of differences over the meanings and analyses of religious doctrine.”96 Social and cultural changes that occur over time can change the implied teachings of that society’s religious and nonreligious texts. The “actual implications” that apply in one era may become “virtual implications” in another era. We therefore need to ask to what extent the political issues described in fiqh of previous eras apply to the conditions of today.97 There are teachings of the Prophet and the Quran that are unchangeable. The command not to do evil, for example, is immutable. These are primary injunctions (ahkam-e avaliyeh). But there are also secondary injunctions (ahkam-e sanavi), teachings that are products of specific times and circumstances that no longer apply. Our challenge, the challenge of hermeneutics, is to distinguish primary and secondary injunctions from one another and to use them as guide for our lives. To go about the difficult task of distinguishing between primary and secondary injunctions, we must engage in historical phenomenology. This would entail understanding each verse of the Quran 92 96

97

93 94 95 Ibid., pp. 7–8. Ibid., pp. 22–23. Ibid., p. 28. Ibid., p. 33. Mohammad Mojtahed Shabestari, Naqdi bar Qara‘t-e Rasmi az Din (A Critique of the Official Perspective on Religion) (Tehran: Tarh-e No, 1379/ 2000), p. 47. Ibid., p. 175.

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within the specific context of the time and place it was revealed. Prophet Muhammad’s prophecy was fourteen centuries ago. We need to understand the original context of Islam’s appearance and the social, material, spiritual, and historical contexts within which it appeared.98 What clerics present to society as religion is a human knowledge that has been accumulated over time.99 Without exception, all divine, spiritual, moral, and jurisprudential propositions in Islamic tradition have developed internal logics of their own. These internal logics are open to being questioned and interpreted. None of the forms that religious dictates have come to assume are final and complete. All, in fact, are as yet incomplete, open to being questioned and criticized, and ripe for development.100 Mojtahed Shabestari sees the constitution of the Islamic Republic as a step in the right direction. The constitution includes a number of innovative notions, he maintains. While not uniformly influenced by modernity, many of these concepts are products of ijtihad. From the perspective of hermeneutics, the constitution, which was approved by religious scholars, represents an important milestone because it contains concepts such as “people’s rights” and “people’s sovereignty.”101

Ijtihad Unpacking the ways in which Islamic knowledge in general and fiqh in particular have been accumulated throughout history requires the employment of reason and rationality. This is the task of ijtihad, independent reasoning. Religion and reason have a complementary relationship.102 Hasan Yousefi Eshkevari, who was arrested and tried by the Special Court for the Clergy for his heterodox views, holds to an expansive conception of ijtihad: Ijtihad in the sense of novel thinking and the reconstruction of religious thought, in its bases and branches, [may be called] the motor of the deepening and grounding of Islamic thought and culture. Ijtihad also makes possible the critique of tradition, as well as critiques of modernity and the 98 101 102

99 100 Ibid., pp. 268–270. Ibid., p. 294. Ibid., p. 337. Ibid., pp. 186–187. Mohsen Kadivar, Daghdagheh-haye Hokumat-e Dini (Concerns of Religious Government) (Tehran: Nashr-e Ney, 1376/1997), p. 45.

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reformists, and it makes feasible the independent design of an Islamic renaissance and the carrying forward of reforms. Without ijtihad, no piety is possible in the contemporary era, and there is no use or utility in science and technology and the products of human experience. Of course, ijtihad does not mean only jurisprudential ijtihad. . . . For example, under present circumstances, the laws of retribution and some of the rights of women need to undergo a fundamental review through ijtihad. Of course, this sort of ijtihad depends first of all on the reconstruction of the bases and methods of traditional religion and education.103

Yousefi Eshkevari sees ijtihad as necessary and unavoidable. Even traditionalists who want to establish a state have no choice but to issue wide-ranging fatwas. At any rate, without ijtihad religion cannot address the necessities of the times and continues to remain relevant.104 All Shii faqihs accept the principle of independent interpretation. The question that is debated is the extent to which prevailing social, political, and economic circumstances, as well as changing times, change interpretations of a particular Islamic injunction in ways that would impact its very essence.105 For most faqihs, so long as the underlying intensions of Islam’s injunctions remain the same, it is permissible for ijtihad to take into account the impacts of times and place.106 According to Ayatollah Morteza Jazayeri (1930–2008), ijtihad is a relatively recent development. At the time of the Twelve Imams and during the two centuries of the Occultation, Shia fiqh was based only on the traditions of the imams.107 Ayatollah Mottahari also claimed that ijtihad was accepted by Shia faqihs only beginning in the fifth century AH.108 For many reformist thinkers, ijtihad is an inseparable dimension of religion. The cleric and university professor Abolfazl Mousavian 103

104

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106 107

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Quoted in, Charles Kurzman, “Critics Within: Islamic Scholars’ Protest against the Islamic State in Iran,” International Journal of Politics, Culture, and Society, Vol. 15, No. 2 (Winter 2001), p. 352. Hasan Yousefi Eshkevari, Kherad dar Ziyafat-e Din (Wisdom in the Service of Religion) (Tehran: Qasideh, 1979/2000), pp. 229–230. Abbas Zoheiri, “Naqsh-e Zaman va Makan dar Ejtehad” (The Role of Time and Place in Ijtihad), in Noandishi va Ejtehad (New-Thinking and Ijtihad), Vol. 1, Jalal Mir-Aqaie, ed. (Tehran: Majma’-e Jahani-e Taqrib-e Mazaheb-e Eslami, 1382/2003), pp. 69–70. Ibid., p. 79. Ann K. S. Lambton, “A Reconsideration of the Position of the Marja’ Al-Taqlid and the Religious Institution,” Studia Islamica, No. 20 (1964), p. 124. Ibid., p. 126.

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rhetorically asks how fiqh can address changing human needs. At the broadest level, he argues, there are two types of human needs. There are primary needs that go to the depths of the physical and spiritual constitution of the person, such as the need for food, clothing, shelter, spouse, goodness, beauty, manners, devotion, and more. These primary needs stay constant and do not change. There are also secondary needs, such as customs, habits, social, political, and economic relations, and tools and materials for life, and these change according to times and circumstances.109 Because these secondary needs and conditions change, jurisprudence needs to also evolve in order to address the specifics of the times. This “science of fiqh,” as the Shia thinker Khajeh Nasir al-Ain Tusi (1201–1274) called it, takes the timeless principles of Islam and applies it to changing times and evolving circumstances. As Ayatollah Mottahari argued, this requires several things, most notably the entry of science and knowledge into the realm of religion; attention to the goals and spirit rather than the appearance of religion; anticipation of changeable conditions and laws; consistency of rules of religion with promoting good and preventing evil; and the responsibility of Islamic government.110 Along similar lines, Mousavian ascribes several important responsibilities to the ulama, including the protection of original documents, elaborating on the principles of religion and applying them to existing circumstances, understanding and explaining the pressing issues that every era entails, guarding against the ossification of rules, determining limits on the powers of the government, assuming responsibility for lawmaking, and ensuring that their social plans are consistent with the needs of the day.111

Shia faqihs have recognized four sources for understanding divine injunctions (ahkam). They are the Quran, traditions of the Prophet, reason (‘aql, also intellect), and consensus (ijma‘).112 ‘Aql, which means reason or intellect, is important for two purposes, one in understanding the original sources of Islam, as in the Quran, and the other in reaching independent judgments. These independent judgments and decisions are important in ijtihad. Ijtihad needs to shed light on preexisting assumptions and understandings. The principles of Islamic jurisprudence are only a small part of ijtihad. The scientific method 109

110

Abolfazl Mousavian, Mabani-e Dini-e Mardomsalari (Religious Foundations of Democracy) (Qom: Mofid University Press, 1395/2016), p. 143. 111 112 Ibid., p. 145. Ibid., pp. 145–146. Ibid., p. 146.

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requires that contemporary faqihs engage in new, foundational ijtihad. As Mojtahed Shabestari sees it, the topics and subjects related to this ijtihad need sciences other than fiqh and usul. They need knowledge of anthropology, sociology, history, economics, political science, psychology, and other similar disciplines in order to more thoroughly address prevailing social issues through the prism of Islam.113 This does not mean that the contemporary faqih needs to be an expert in these disciplines. It means that in understanding and revising his own assumptions, the contemporary faqih needs to be familiar with the research in these disciplines. These sciences did not exist in previous eras, but now they do, and without them fiqh is incomplete and incompatible, or at best only partially applicable, with the contemporary lives of societies. The faqih must answer and address the issues of his era. Otherwise, he is engaging in imitation rather than in ijtihad. Unfortunately, Mojtahed Shabestari laments, imitation in fiqh is quite common. Far too often, therefore, the faqih only addresses those issues that faqihs before him, in previous eras, addressed.114 We must revisit and revise the assumptions that have existed in every age concerning the Book and the Prophetic tradition, and this cannot be possible without reference to the knowledge and the sciences that existed in every age.115 Yousefi Eshkevari maintains that what the Prophet Muhammad did in his ten years of rule in Medina was based on the conditions and interests of the time.116 Ever since then, however, one of the biggest problems with Islamic jurisprudence is that it has not changed and has not kept up with the times. This lack of dynamism and the resulting ossification have made jurisprudence out of touch with prevailing conditions and realities with which people grapple on a daily basis.117 Context, especially in terms of time and place, is critically important in properly interpreting jurisprudence.118 113

114 116

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Mojtahed Shabestari, Hermeneutic, Ketab, va Sunnat (Hermeneutics, the Book, and the Tradition), pp. 47, 50. 115 Ibid., p. 63. Ibid., p. 51. Mohammad Qoochani, Dowlat-e Dini va Din-e Dowlati (Religious Government and Government Religion) (Tehran: Saraee, 1379/2000), p. 20. Mostafa Katiraie, “Hokumat az Didgah-e Din” (Government from the Perspective of Religion), in Din va Hokumat (Religion and Governance), Anjoman-e Eslami-e Mohandesin, ed. (Tehran: Rasa, 1377/1998), pp. 32–33. Lotfollah Meisami, “Hokumat-e Dini va Qanun-e Asasi” (Religion Government and the Constitution), in Din va Hokumat (Religion and

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For Ayatollah Montazeri, ijtihad is not a task with which everyone can be trusted. “In order to properly understand divine rules during the period of Occultation, one must naturally resort to the Book of God and the traditions of the Prophet and the Infallible Imams,” he writes. “Those who do not have the ability to engage in ijtihad should seek guidance from wise and knowledgeable experts whom the community considers as ‘trustworthy faqihs.’”119 This also justifies the need for religious specialists, that is, the clergy. Akbar Gangi (b. 1960), a self-declared former religious fundamentalist turned famous reformer, maintains that the shari‘ah itself is immutable and does not lend itself to change. But our understanding of shari‘ah changes and evolves. Similarly, our understanding of the Quran keeps improving and becomes deeper with time as our own horizons continue to expand.120 Ganji sees ijtihad as a relative, changeable, and evolutionary enterprise that in every era is influenced by the particular prevailing understandings and perceptions of the time. This continuous evolution in our understanding of religion is in turn facilitated by an unending capacity of Islamic sources for discovery and research, and by the fact that science and human intellect naturally continue to evolve.121 The establishment of the Islamic Republic has necessitated a proliferation of innovation and ijtihad. But this has not been deep and has only dealt with some of the marginal rules of Islam, with most issues having been dealt with through governmental laws.122 Mohsen Kadivar maintains that the new jurisprudence that is getting a hold in Iran inheres certain features, namely the needed attention to politics and society; attention to the importance of time and place in engaging in ijtihad; the ability to address the political, social, cultural, economic, and military problems plaguing the world, and therefore the ability to lead Islamic and non-Islamic societies; jurisprudence as a holistic system for

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Governance), Anjoman-e Eslami-e Mohandesin, ed. (Tehran: Rasa, 1377/ 1998), p. 125. Hosseinali Montazeri, Az Aghaz Ta Anjam dar Goftego-ye Do Daneshju (From the Beginning Until Implementation in Conversation with Two University Students) (Qom: Saraee, 1383/2004), p. 215. Akbar Ganji, Talaqi-e Fashisti Az Din va Hokumat (Fascist Perceptions of Religion and Government) (Tehran: Tarh-e No, 1378/1999), pp. 19, 24–25. Ibid., p. 28. Yousefi Eshkevari, Kherad dar Ziyafat-e Din (Wisdom in the Service of Religion), p. 228.

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managing societies and politics; and politics as a subset of religion and a branch of fiqh.123 Kadivar, as we have seen so far, was not alone in his advocacy of continuous ijtihad. Figures associated with the comparatively “leftist” Association of Militant Clergy (Majma’-e Rouhaniyoun-e Mobarez) also insist on the need to continually contextualize fiqh.124 Starting in the late 1990s, Ayatollah Rafsanjani was also slowly emerging as a defender of more social opening and limited political freedoms. “I firmly believe,” he said in an interview at the time, that in present circumstance, at a time when the world is witnessing rapid development, if Muslim thinkers and specialists are allowed to think about and understand Islam freely, and if they are permitted to operate in a truly free environment and to analyze issues through ijtihad, we will see great efficiency on the part of Islam. Under such circumstances, we will discover that Islam can perfectly address the individual, social, and international needs of the people.125

Which Ijtihad? Ijtihad may occur in relation to religious knowledge, meaning in our understanding and conception of religion, or it may be in jurisprudence or Islamic law.126 In relation to all of these arenas, ijtihad is likely to take one of two forms, namely narrative or story-centered (naql), or reason-centered (aql). After the first four caliphs, Sunni theologians considered ijtihad to be a potential source of divisiveness among Muslims, therefore relying instead on a type of story-centered ijtihad that was based mostly on imitation. This form of ijtihad soon also 123

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Mohsen Kadivar, “Velayat-e Enteshabi-e Motlaqeh-e Faqihan” (The Appointed Absolute Guardianship of Faqihs), in Din va Hokumat (Religion and Governance), Anjoman-e Eslami-e Mohandesin, ed. (Tehran: Rasa, 1377/ 1998), p. 11. Saideh Amini, Tahavvol-e Gofteman-e Majma’-e Rouhaniyoun-e Mobarez dar Jame‘h-e Pasaenqelabi-e Iran (Transformation of the Discourse of the Society of Militant Clergy in Iran’s Postrevolutionary Society) (Tehran: Kavir, 1397/ 2018), p. 200. Ali Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani, “Karamadi-e Nezam- Jomhuri-e Eslami-e Iran” (Functionality of the System of the Islamic Republic of Iran), Hokumat-e Eslami, Vol. 4, No. 4 (1378/1999), p. 32. Yousefi Eshkevari, Kherad dar Ziyafat-e Din (Wisdom in the Service of Religion), pp. 227–228.

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became prevalent among the Shia.127 It appears that in better understanding fiqh, reason has seldom been used as an independent resource for arriving at an Islamic injunction (hukm). In both the Shia and Sunni traditions, reason is an instrument for better understanding the text of the religion and clearing up its internal contradictions. God, it is assumed, has not given the key of reason to the clergy so that they could use it to open any locks. Reason is only to solve the secrets of the text. It is up to the text to serve as a guide for the personal and social lives of Muslims. Since God through the Prophet (and for the Shii also through the Twelve Imams) has told people all there is to say, there is no longer any need for human reason and thinking in regard to social and political issues. We must learn the shari‘ah and immerse ourselves in it. In the process, we can use reason to better understand the shari‘ah and its related texts. This pattern of ijtihad, arrived at through narratives, can be called “story-centered” ijtihad.128 Proponents of storycentered ijtihad maintain that the “gates of ijtihad” are not closed. However, in engaging in ijtihad, the role of the past cannot be ignored. Those who advocate reason-centered ijtihad, on the other hand, claim that the gates of ijtihad have actually been largely closed. What is needed, they argue, is an in-depth transformation of fiqh based on an ijtihad of principles. Another perspective maintains that the contemporary world around us cannot be merely summed up in the newness of instruments and the material dimensions of civilization. More profoundly, the assumptions, imaginations, and goals of modern society – meaning society’s cultural and spiritual dimensions – have changed fundamentally, and today’s humans have profoundly changed since the times of our ancestors. Therefore, if we want to employ the teachings of Islam for the good of society, and address today’s social and political issues, “storycentered” ijtihad can no longer be relied on to make only minor adjustments. This type of ijtihad is no longer useful, and there is a need for reason-centered ijtihad. This reason-centered ijtihad does not mean doing away with received religious wisdom or historical texts. It means recognizing reason as an independent source used in arriving 127

128

Sa’id Edalat-Nejad, “Moqadameh: Kodam Ejtehad” (Introduction: Which Ijtihad?), in Andarbab-e Ejtehad: Darbari-ye Karamadi-e Feqh-e Eslami dar Doya-ye Emrooz (On Ijtihad: On the Effectiveness of Islamic Jurisprudence in Today’s World), Sa’id Edalat-Nejad, ed. (Tehran: Tarh-e No, 1382/2003), p. 8. Ibid., p. 10.

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at conclusions. In reason-centered ijtihad, when there is a question or ambiguity in interpreting Islamic ordinances, priority is to be given to reason over received wisdom, traditions, and stories. When there is a difference between reason and traditional stories, the laws derived from reason should be given priority. Therefore, another way of describing reason-centered ijtihad is “ijtihad in principles.”129 Reason-centered ijtihad or ijtihad in principles pays serious attention to the influence of time and place on the process of accumulation of knowledge. Being much closer to the Usuli as compared to the Akhbari school, it goes beyond mere changes in subject and in rules, and also beyond the mere compatibility or incompatibility of what is good for society. The establishment of justice is one of its core considerations. It has a collectivist impulse and favors collective wisdom over individual and exclusivist decisions. At the same time, it seeks to protect Islamic cultural legacy by interpreting the products of this legacy within the context of the time. Proponents of reason-centered ijtihad believe that Islam’s cultural legacy must be contextualized for people to realize its continued relevance to their lives.130 Soroush was one of the earliest, and therefore most celebrated, proponents of reason-centered ijtihad in the postrevolutionary period. He maintains that as part of their right under the shari‘ah, people are free to have religious opinions that are different from the opinions of those in power. This difference in opinion cannot put anyone’s life or property in danger.131 According to Soroush, as long as there is no fundamental rethinking of jurisprudential worldviews, especially presumptions about humans and rationality, we will not be able to address contemporary issues. Haphazard adjustments to specific topics within fiqh are not far enough. There are still archaic jurisprudential rules on topics such as the impurity of unbelievers, the sale and purchase of slaves and servants, the right to kill apostates, and the rights of freed slaves. If we put all these rules together, it becomes clear that our jurisprudence is based on a specific conception of human understanding with a particular legal horizon. This human understanding has, consciously or unconsciously, informed the mindset of our faqihs and their decisions. So long as this human understanding is not openly discussed and made transparent, and is not subject to deep 129 131

130 Ibid., p. 11. Ibid., pp. 11–12. Soroush, “Feqh dar Tarazoo” (Fiqh in the Balance), pp. 19–20.

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and sustained criticism – something that faqihs have not done so far – all of their fatwas regarding human freedoms and social issues are suspect and are problematic. Fiqh that belongs to the past will only create difficulties in the future. Because logic changes and conditions and circumstances change from one period to the next, jurisprudential notions that were relevant in previous eras do not apply in relation to today’s realities. It is therefore important to engage in ijtihad that goes to the core of fiqh, ijtihad in principles, rather than an ijtihad that only skims the surface.132 Soroush argues that as long as perceptions informing fiqh remain untouched, using fiqh to assess the interests of society will be useless. The most urgent task facing Muslims is revising their hermeneutic. Faqihs must engage in deep and fundamental rethinking of the foundations of their assumptions concerning human rights, freedom, and politics. The new world is not the world of minutia, according to Soroush. It is the world of new fundamentals. As long as faqihs think only of minutia, they have no solutions to offer to real problems.133 Soroush reminds his readers that humans are historical beings. They live in different societies, and they are subject to intellectual, social, and political changes. As human societies and histories change, so too must the fiqh governing their lives change. The science of jurisprudence is a human science and is therefore incomplete. But it is capable of evolving. Fiqh contains complex dynamics within itself, not the least of which are research, along with advances in the study of its principles (ususl). These internal dynamics can greatly facilitate fiqh’s transformation. To maintain that fiqh has already reached perfection is to overlook its complexities.134 As compared to Soroush, Ayatollahs Montazeri, Jafar Sobhani, and Ahmad Abedini are some of the more notable proponents of storycentered ijtihad. For this group of faqihs, fiqh still has useful relevance even if it relies on traditional sources and methods.135 Montazeri rejects Soroush’s assertion that the naqli tradition has hampered ijtihad in Shia religion. Unlike the case of Sunnism, Montazeri claims, in Shia fiqh the gates of ijtihad remain open. Montazeri admits that some foundational notions in Shi‘ism have yet to undergo ijtihad and 132 135

133 134 Ibid., p. 22. Ibid., pp. 23–24. Ibid., pp. 31–33. Edalat-Nejad, “Moqadameh: Kodam Ejtehad” (Introduction: Which Ijtihad?), p. 12.

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reconsideration. Shii faqihs, he maintains, will continue with ijtihad in these areas. Especially in the current age, with changes and advances that have been made in the sciences, some principles of fiqh need to be reconsidered. But this does not mean that every old or preexisting view is invalid, or, alternatively, that every new theory is valid. It means that new perspectives must be thoroughly analyzed and discussed by faqihs and by other experts prior to being either adopted or discarded.136 Montazeri calls on “learned clerics and seminarian researchers,” whom he calls “the custodians of Islamic philosophy and jurisprudence,” to familiarize themselves with different theories and schools of thought, and to learn different jurisprudential subjects based on scientific methods, so that they can answer questions and clear up any issues that may be raised by academics and other seminarians. Otherwise, the religious values of society will be irreversibly damaged. For Montazeri, knowledge is important but is by itself an insufficient guide to exploring the shari‘ah and fiqh. Received wisdom and the historically accumulated contributions of scholars of fiqh should not be dismissed altogether.137 This is especially important since people can freely choose and even change their marja‘-e taqlid, as in a nonspecialist going to a specialist for advice.138 Soroush takes issue with Montazeri’s criticism of fiqh for not going far enough. According to Soroush, Montazeri presents a critique of fiqh and tries to present a new fiqh, using analytical tools and concepts that are endogenous to fiqh itself. In the process, according to Soroush, Montazeri ignores the contradictions that often arise between fiqh and evolving circumstances. This is why fiqh needs to resort to analytical tools that are not necessarily endogenous to it.139 Sa’id Edalat-Nejad, a nonclerical professor of fiqh who studied at the howzeh, maintains that the gates of ijtihad have indeed been closed for some time. If a new ijtihad takes place, the dominant interpretations that exist in the clerical establishment rush to brand it as deviant. Edalat-Nejad accuses the clerical establishment of being “like a 136

137 139

Hosseinali Montazeri, “Bab-e Maftouh-e Ejtehad” (The Open Gate of Ijtihad), in Andarbab-e Ejtehad: Darbari-ye Karamadi-e Feqh-e Eslami dar Doya-ye Emrooz (On Ijtihad: On the Effectiveness of Islamic Jurisprudence in Today’s World), Sa’id Edalat-Nejad, ed. (Tehran: Tarh-e No, 1382/2003), p. 37. 138 Ibid., pp. 44–45. Ibid., p. 47. Baqi, Gofteman-haye Dini-e Mo‘aser (Contemporary Religious Discourses), p. 104.

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factory that produces ijtihad in an assembly-line fashion,” without much critical reflection or original intellectual contributions.140 Simple tweaks and quick fixes by the faqihs cannot adequately address the scientific, social, and cultural transformations that are taking place at unprecedented scale and speed.141 According to Edalat-Nejad, Shii jurists often speak of the openness of the gates of ijtihad in the Shia faith and mock the ossified fiqh of Sunnism. But the reality is actually different. For example, the principle of the good of the community, maslahat, common in the Sunni tradition for centuries, became accepted in Iran only after the revolution.142 Dry, dull dependence on classical texts and interpretations does not allow faqihs to engage in real ijtihad. Seldom do the faqihs understand the true meaning of what these texts and interpretations are trying to convey. Edalat-Nejad considers this to be the case with the ijtihad of Ayatollah Montazeri and others like him, whom he accuses of deliberate obfuscation and resort to abstractions in order to avoid meaningful ijtihad.143 Issues such as punishments for various crimes, maturity of girls and the age of consent, shaving of beards, paying khoms, building statutes, stoning as a form of capital punishment, blood money, and many other similar topics remain unexplored since the gates of ijtihad have remained closed. Moreover, according to Edalat-Nejad, one of the main reasons for the closure of the gates of ijtihad in Shi‘ism is the innate opposition of Shii faqihs to an overwhelming majority of the injunctions coming out of the Sunni tradition.144 Edalat-Nejad also criticizes the literary styles of Iran’s Shii ulama. The treatise of many imminent Shii jurists, he argues, even those like Montazeri who insist that the gates of ijtihad are open, are written in a style of Persian from the 1950s and the 1960s meant to impress other, usually older clerics rather than connect with wider audiences. In terms of substance also, most such treatise deal with obscure and personal issues and lack broader social and political relevance. Within the howzeh itself, and in the wider clerical establishment, the teaching of

140

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Sa’id Edalat-Nejad, “Bab-e Masdood-e Ejtehad” (The Closed Gate of Ijtihad), in Andarbab-e Ejtehad: Darbari-ye Karamadi-e Feqh-e Eslami dar Doya-ye Emrooz (On Ijtihad: On the Effectiveness of Islamic Jurisprudence in Today’s World), Sa’id Edalat-Nejad, ed. (Tehran: Tarh-e No, 1382/2003), p. 48. 142 143 144 Ibid., p. 49. Ibid., p. 62. Ibid., p. 53. Ibid., p. 57.

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ijtihad is done through concepts that are obscure, paradoxical, repetitive, and focus on matters without wider social and political relevance.145 In addition to arriving ijtihad through reliance on reason (‘aql) or preexisting narratives (naql), there is also the notion of “dynamic ijtihad.” Dynamic ijtihad seeks to tackle modern problems beyond the traditional framework that is the legacy of historic religious thinkers. As such, the conclusions of dynamic ijtihad stand in contradiction to those of traditional ijtihad. The logic of traditional ijtihad is comprised of composite, accumulated knowledge. According to proponents of dynamic ijtihad, this knowledge never experienced the paradigmatic revolution it needs but instead simply expands on past, historical, conceptions.146 What ijtihad needs is to be constantly dynamic and changing. Yousefi Eshkevari defines dynamic ijtihad as follows: There is a constant and logical principle in fiqh that stipulates that the law (hukm) is contingent on the subject, so that if the subject changes, so does the law.147 Yousefi Eshkevari maintains that our problem is that we think our laws and regulations are unchangeable and valid for all times. This assumption can only lead to being stuck in the past. People must be in control of their own destiny, and that control comes through political participation.148 Here is how another well-known reformist author, Emadeddin Baqi, who incidentally does not come from a clerical background, defines dynamic ijtihad: In order to put past conditions behind and to successfully enter the third millennium, existing contradictions between religion and society need to be removed. Today, along with the current of religious progressivism, the generation of progressive clerics who eye the future have a historic responsibility. Since the revolution succeeded and continues to evolve, contemporary fiqh must also undergo similar processes of evolution. Fiqh can either become paralyzed and dysfunctional in the face of these changing circumstances and become a relic of the past, or it can provide appropriate and

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Ibid., p. 63. Kazemi, Jame‘h Shenasi-e Roshanfekri-e Dini dar Iran (Sociology of Religious Intellectualism in Iran), p. 122. Qoochani, Dowlat-e Dini va Din-e Dowlati (Religious Government and Government Religion), p. 22. Ibid., p. 32.

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meaningful answers to current questions, and to renew and reconstruct itself in the process.149

Baqi points to some essential measures needed for ijtihad to become dynamic. They include expanding the educational scope of the howzeh to teach topics other than those strictly related to fiqh; establishing specialized councils for ijtihad that are made up of clerics from Iran and from around the world; and the proactive establishment of institutions that would foster the long-term institutionalization of these trends.150 One of the topics that remains woefully unexplored by religious reformist intellectuals is the position of Iranian women. At best, the subject is vastly underexplored in comparison to the many other topics that have been subject to dynamic ijtihad or ijtihad in principle. According to Alireza Alavitabar (b. 1960), a once-leading figure within the reform movement, religious intellectuals need to clarify their position regarding fiqh regulations about women and women’s social, political, and family rights.151 Religious intellectuals and scholars need to articulate viable solutions to women’s positions in modern society. This can only be done, Alavitabar maintains, by devising a new fiqh through “ijtihad in fiqh’s principles.” Only then will there be a workable, realistic, and relevant fiqh that addresses women’s issues in contemporary society. This new perspective requires taking into account the influence of time and place in relation to ijtihad.152 According to Alavitabar, Islam was revealed in a tribal society. Every believer, in every period, should separate the essence of the divine message from life at the time of revelation and try to understand Islam within the frame of his or her own time.153 The broader topic of women’s positions in religious texts is reflective of the conditions, culture, context, and time of the revelation. What is important is the essence and nature of the divine message, not the actual text of what is written. Overall, Alavitabar maintains, religious intellectuals have done a passable job in trying to improve women’s position by opposing 149

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Emadeddin Baqi, Rouhaniyat va Qodrat: Jame‘h Shenasi-e Nahad-haye Dini (The Clergy and Power: Sociology of Religious Institutions) (Tehran: Saraee, 1383/2004), p. 176. Ibid. Alavitabar, Roshanfekri, Dindari, Mardomsalari (Intellectualism, Religiosity, Democracy), p. 54. 153 Ibid., p. 57. Ibid., p. 58.

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fundamentalism, recommending laws, and doing background work.154 But women continue to be unequal before the law, lack equal opportunities, and do not have civic institutions that support their empowerment.155 Alavitabar’s charitable reflection on the works of religious reformists in this area notwithstanding, even the most prominent advocates of dynamic or ‘aqli ijtihad have shied away from tackling issues such as women’s rights in inheritance, compulsory hijab, and legal equality between the sexes. Alavitabar’s writings on the topic, published back in 2000, remain among the very few in this genre that call attention to the need for ijtihad in relation to women’s position in Iran. It is difficult to determine whether this omission on the part of religious reformists – almost all of whom are men – is a reflection of their own views regarding women’s position or a deliberate strategy to prioritize their theoretical battles. Do they not find the position ascribed to women in Iranian Shia fiqh not problematic, or do they calculate that first they need to sell the ideas of dynamic and aqli ijtihad and then to bring up the women’s issues at a more opportune time? I do not think we will ever know the answer to this question. What is certain, however, is that the intellectuals were subject to great pressure and harassment by the authorities at the time. The “chain killings,” mentioned in Chapter 2, were at their height, and arrests, trials by the Special Court for the Clergy, attacks by the conservative media, and other legal and extra-legal pressures on intellectuals and activists were commonplace. In a Friday prayer sermon at the University of Tehran in September 1999, for example, Mesbah Yazdi declared that “whoever says they have a new interpretation of Islam must be smacked in the mouth and be told to knock it off.”156

Islamic Democracy The subject of women’s rights might have been ignored at the time (as of this writing, in 2023, it still is). But considerable ink was spilled nonetheless in efforts to define and appropriate the notion of “Islamic democracy.” The notion has a rich intellectual pedigree in Iran, with 154 156

155 Ibid., pp. 63–65. Ibid., pp. 61–62. Quoted in, Ganji, Talaqi-e Fashisti Az Din va Hokumat (Fascist Perceptions of Religion and Government), p. 116.

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the widespread belief among the country’s religious intellectuals that the best and most optimal way to run a religious society is through democratic decision-making.157 There are different conceptions of religious democracy, with some saying that democracy is a product of specific historical, social, and political conditions that emerged in the West and has little or nothing to do with Islam. Others disagree, maintaining that as a method of organizing social and political relations, democracy has no contradictions with Islam.158 Nevertheless, even individuals known to have highly undemocratic tendencies have sought to appropriate the concept and make it their own. Khamenei, for example, defines Islamic democracy in the following terms: In an Islamic system, meaning in a religious democracy, the people elect, decide on, and are in charge of their own destiny and how they are governed. These choices are guided by the spirit of Islam and never stray from the Straight Path of Islam.159

This kind of discussion of democracy can be found in the writings of both Khomeini and especially Khamenei, who argues that “from the perspective of religion (of Islam), the basis of religious rule, religious power, and religious influence all rely on a single foundation, namely the people.”160 Similarly, in Khomeini’s book Islamic Government, Velayat-e Faqih, a number of concepts appear that are foundational to democracy. Some of the most notable of such concepts include justice, freedom, the humanitarian nature of law, combatting poverty, and social and political participation.161 Khomeini’s primary focus, nonetheless, is more on the idea of progress than on democracy, which at times he seems to conflate with one another. He thinks of progress as the opposite of backwardness, viewing it in terms of economic progress, freedom, justice, industrialization, and access to proper healthcare and food.162 157

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Alavitabar, Roshanfekri, Dindari, Mardomsalari (Intellectualism, Religiosity, Democracy), p. 124. Mirahmadi, Feqh-e Siyasi (Political Jurisprudence), p. 89. 160 Quoted in, ibid., p. 91. Quoted in, ibid. Mehdi Soleimanieh, “Towse‘h va Velayat-e Faqih” (Development and Velayate Faqih), Cheshmandaz-e Iran, No. 105 (1396/2017), pp. 44–45. Some of the other ideas and notions that are discussed in Khomeini’s book include independence, struggle against colonialism, efficiency of the state bureaucracy, industrialization, healthy diet, cultural authenticity, and security. Ibid., p. 45.

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Emad Afrough, former MP and noted Principlist thinker, has offered his own conception of Islamic democracy. Religious democracy, he maintains, provides the answer to the age-old question of “who should be obeyed?” In religious democracy, we should obey an individual who is just and pious and who has the acceptance and satisfaction of the population.163 In Islamic democracy, there is a strong connection between “justness” and the characteristics of the ruler, and the consent and acceptance of the ruled.164 This is a form of direct democracy that is “wisdom-centric,” one in which the ruler cannot cast doubt on the votes of the people and be indifferent to their wishes. Islamic democracy observes human rights both in their political and religious dimensions. This means that at the same time as human rights are rights of the people, there must also be regulations such as consultation, the prohibition of evil and enjoinment of good, advice from Muslim clerics, equality before God, and human’s free destiny. In Islamic democracy, we have both “the ruler’s directives” and “the vigilant presence of the people.” It is therefore important to pay careful attention to the people’s needs in order to secure their satisfaction. In religious democracy, the state’s mechanisms for control and constraint of the population are minimal. The state does not have a free hand to do whatever it wants, and the scope of its powers and its responsibilities have been clearly delineated.165 According to one of the principal textbooks used in the Qom seminary, one of the most basic points about democracy is that while its general principles are acceptable, the practice of democracy must have certain parameters and take place within clearly defined limits.166 An ideal political system has four components – structure, leadership, ideas, and citizens – none of which can be ignored and sidestepped.167 This is not to imply that there is absolute freedom in Islamic government, and it is the responsibility of the government to set the limits of 163

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Emad Afrough, Ma Ghal wa Man Ghal, Vol. 1 (What Was Said and Who Said It, Vol. 1) (Tehran: Hamshahri, 1392/2013), p. 108. Emad Afrough, Ma Ghal wa Man Ghal, Vol. 3 (What Was Said and Who Said It, Vol. 3) (Tehran: Hamshahri, 1392/2013), p. 134. Ibid., pp. 134–135. Mohammad Javad Nowruzi, Nezam-e Siyasi-e Eslam (The Political System of Islam) (Qom: Howzeh-e Elmi-ye Qom, 1381/2002), p. 43. Mohammad Javad Nowruzi, “Nezarat-e ‘Omumi; Mardomsalari-e Dini” (Public Supervision; Religious Democracy), Andisheh-haye Hoquq-e ‘Omumi, Vol. 3, No. 2 (1393/2014), p. 7.

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what is socially and politically permitted based on the principles of Islam. In religious democracy, people have a series of responsibilities to society, including legal responsibilities. Some of the most important of such responsibilities include “enjoining the good and forbidding evil,” the establishment of institutions that perform public services, and creating other people-centered organizations that enhance the supervision of those in positions of power.168 Based on this line of thought, one of the most important features of religious democracy is supervision and political vigilance. In a religious democratic system, people cannot be indifferent and oblivious to social and political developments around them.169 There are two kinds of political supervision that are found in religious democracies, one being internal, or indigenous, as practiced by the self-discipline and selfregulating mechanisms of those in power, and the other external, or exogenous to the system, as exercised by the people.170 Moreover, religious democracy is made up of an amalgam of divine legitimacy and popular acceptance. It does not mean a combination of religion and democracy. Instead, it is a form of rule that is conditional on religion and religious values, where rule is based on God’s will and on the principles of Islam.171 Another conservative politician, Ali Darabi (b. 1961), maintains that Islam is naturally democratic. According to Darabi, some of the key principles of religious democracy include divine rule and the centrality of God, ensuring the establishment of justice, fostering meritocracy and the rule of law, heeding collective will and ensuring the satisfaction of Muslim people, and respecting collective wisdom and the will of the people in policymaking and in social programming. These are all ingredients of political development, meaning that there is a direct relationship between religious democracy and political development.172 Religious democracy is innate to Islam, Darabi maintains, and dictatorship and autocracy are inherently distant from Islam. There are, in fact, no obstacles to the growth of democracy in Iran, especially when we consider that the two pillars of rule in the Islamic Republic, namely Islam and republicanism, revolve around the notion of allegiance 168 172

169 170 171 Ibid. Ibid., p. 8. Ibid., p. 18. Ibid., p. 10. Ali Darabi, “Madromsalari-e Dini va Nesbat-e an ba Tose‘h-e Siyasi dar Jomhuri-e Eslami Iran” (Religious Democracy and Its Relationship with Political Development in the Islamic Republic of Iran), Faslnameh-e Motale‘at-e Siyasi, Vol. 5, No. 18 (1391/2012), p. 61.

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(bay‘at). In fact, religious principles such as ijtihad, ijma’ (consensus), authority, councils, electoral rights, participation, and accountability of the system all show deep compatibility with democracy.173 In the religious reformists’ conception of religious democracy, the key features of liberal democracy figure prominently. The overall goal, in fact, is to establish a democratic system in a religious society.174 There is no compulsion in Islam, and Islam will not force individuals to believe in it.175 Religion, therefore, should only play its political role through democratic means. Otherwise, if someone tries to impose religion on society through persuasion or by eliminating ideological competition, then religious democracy is undermined. Religious democracy is possible only when members of society freely endorse the role of religion in public affairs.176 For their part, Ayatollahs Sistani and Montazeri articulated conceptions of Shii traditional authority that are closely related to the democratic values of popular sovereignty and accountability, what may be called “democratic usulism.” This “envisions a form of religious legitimation that is led by elected rulers who are ultimately ‘guided’ by the sacred law of Islamic legal norms, while being held accountable to the people.”177 The scholar Babak Rahimi maintains that the ideals of Sistani and Montazeri are emblematic of a “paradigm shift in the cohesive structure of traditional authority,” and “represent a major trend in Shi‘i political theology.”178 Regardless of which conception of political system we consider in Shia political jurisprudence, people play a key and important political role in Islamic democracy.179 There are teachings in Islam that contradict neither democracy nor socialism. Imam Ali’s careful attention to 173 174

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Ibid., p. 71. Khalaji, Nasazi-haye Nazari va Nakami-e Siyasi-e Gofteman-e Eslahtalabi (Incongruities and Political Ineffectiveness of the Reformist Discourse), p. 150. Nowruzi, Nezam-e Siyasi-e Eslam (The Political System of Islam), p. 57. Alavitabar, Roshanfekri, Dindari, Mardomsalari (Intellectualism, Religiosity, Democracy), pp. 193–194. Babak Rahimi, “Democratic authority, public Islam, and Shi‘i jurisprudence in Iran and Iraq: Hussain Ali Montazeri and Ali Sistani,” International Political Science Review, Vol 32, No. 2 (2012), p. 193. Ibid., pp. 193–194. Sajjad Izadhi, “Nazm-haye Siyasi dar Feqh-e Shia va Zarfiyatsanji-e Anha dar Khosus-e Mosharekat-e Siyasi” (Political Systems in Shia Jurisprudence and Their Capacity in Relation to Political Participation), ‘Olum-e Siyasi, Vol. 7, No. 66 (1393/2014), p. 55.

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the wishes of the people is often held up as an ideal model for democracy, and, along the same lines, Ayatollah Mottahari called Islam a system of moral socialism in which the people play a central role in the political system.180 At the same time, obedience to the ruler is repeatedly mentioned as obligatory for all members of the Muslim community.181 Ultimately, Islamic democracy is a form of government in which the primacy of Islam as the underlying principle of power, popular will, and political participation are all officially recognized.182 In specific relation to today’s Islamic Republic, this has meant striking a precarious constitutional balance between Islam and republicanism. This, at least in theory, is the task of the constitution. The reality of Iranian politics, especially as we shall see in Chapter 8, is quite different. In Iran today, the expansion or contraction of political space, for elites and the electorate alike, does not really depend on the constitutionally designed hybrid authoritarian system. It is instead far more dependent on the conception of the velayat-e faqih that happens to be dominant at any given time, as in absolute or more constrained, and on how and the extent to which the velayat-e faqih chooses to exercise his authority.183 It is worth recounting here the trial of former interior minister, Hojatoleslam Abdollah Nouri. Nouris was a cabinet minister under Rafsanjani and again briefly under Khatami. In 1998, he was impeached and taken before the Special Court for the Clergy on charges of insulting the revolution and Ayatollah Khomeini. In a spirited defense that was widely circulated in the media, Nouri claimed he was being tried for observing the Islamic Republic’s constitution and for putting republicanism alongside Islam. What Iran has become, he daringly declared, is an “Islamic monarchy.” “This means that a ruler with unlimited powers reigns and is not bound by any elections or

180 181

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Baqi, Hoquq-e Mokhalefan (The Rights of Opponents), p. 199. Alijan Heidari, “Mabani-e Feqhi-e Mosharekat-e Siyasi dar Hoquq-e Asasi-e Jomhuri-e Eslami-e Iran” (Jurisprudential Foundations of Political Participation in the Basic Laws of the Islamic Republic of Iran), Andisheh-e Hoquq-e ‘Omumi, Vol. 6, No. 1 (1395/2016), p. 51. Mirahmadi, Feqh-e Siyasi (Political Jurisprudence), p. 91. Sajjad Izadhi, “Zarfiyat-haye Mosharekat-e Siyasi dar Qara‘at az Nazariyeh-e Velayat-e Faqih” (Capacities of Political Participation in Conceptions of Theory of Velayat-e Faqih), Siyasat-e Mote‘aliyeh, Vol. 4, No. 14 (1395/2016), p. 97.

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restrictions.”184 Nouri argued that no fallible human can claim to be in possession of truth. Religious knowledge is relative, and there are various and diverse readings of religion. There is, according to Nouri, no red line limiting debate, except that which is specifically prohibited in the constitution. Citizens are entitled to enjoy cultural rights, and cultural circles are independent of politics. Security and stability, Nouri argued, will not be possible without recognizing the right of the opposition. Applied to geopolitics, this means that détente and civilizational dialogue are preferable to international confrontation and disputes.185 Nouri’s ideas were shared by a number of others who at the time found the space to express their views. Mojtahed Shabestari saw the infusion of democratic norms into jurisprudential discourses as inevitable. Globalization has had consequences for Iranian political culture that have been very context specific, he argued, and there have been resulting consequences for Islamic conceptions of democracy, human rights, and civil society.186 Fiqh must therefore necessarily be formulated in an open atmosphere in which there is debate and discussion, where political, social, and economic views are openly discussed and analyzed.187 Others pointed to the wide latitude that Islam gives to various forms of political management. The Quran discusses, or at least mentions, a variety of types of political systems, each based on its own time and circumstance, from one ruled by a woman, namely Queen Sheba, to another ruled by a man, King David. It discusses hereditary monarchy, and it also endorses the mission of those prophets who did not rule but focused only on spiritual well-being.188 184

185 186

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Quoted in, ‘Ezzatollah Vali Poorkani, Shoukaran-e Eslah dar Botteh-e Naghd (A Critique of Hemlock for Advocate of Reform) (Tehran: Tarh-e No, 1380/ 2001), p. 139. Kurzman, “Critics Within,” pp. 350–351. Javad Emamjomehzadeh and Saeed Mousavi. “Jahani-shodan va Ravand-e ‘Am-garaei va Khas-garaei dar Farhang-e Siyasi-e Jomhuri Eslami-e Iran” (Globalization and Generalization and Specialization in the Political Culture of the Islamic Republic of Iran), Faslnameh-e Motale‘at-e Siyasi, Vol. 2, No. 7 (1389/2010), p. 92. Mojtahed Shabestari, Hermeneutic, Ketab, va Sunnat (Hermeneutics, the Book, and the Tradition), p. 102. Abdolali Bazargan, “Marz-haye Miyan-e Din va Hokumat” (Boundaries between Religion and Government), in Din va Hokumat (Religion and Governance), Anjoman-e Eslami-e Mohandesin, ed. (Tehran: Rasa, 1377/ 1998), p. 114.

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Crucially, however, the Quran does not mandate any specific form of government for the Muslim community. More specifically, it presents no religious justification or requirement that all levers of power be controlled by the clergy and that key positions be occupied by them.189 Instead, the religious reformists argue, what the Quran does specifically mention is the importance of consultation, allegiance, and tolerance and freedom. When placed within the context of contemporary life, they maintain, the language of the Quran is quite clear. Forbidding evil and enjoining the good is akin to political participation. Shura is consultation with the people, and bey‘at is election.190

Consultation Consultation, shura, is seen by religious reformists as one of the key teachings of Islam. At a time when there was no democracy and the people’s rights in politics was not yet an issue, Islam emphasized the concept of shura, as repeated in several verses of the Quran, especially Surahs Al-Shura (42:38) and Al-Imran (3:259).191 Shura provides space and opportunity for the growth and development of society and the collective good. It empowers members of society to reach their full potential, disperses decision-making among different social actors, and prevents autocracy.192 In the Shia faith, the need for consultation is all the more necessary during the Occultation, on the part of both the ruler and the people.193 Imam Ali’s promise to his army commanders – in Nahj al-Balagha, Letter 50 – is often cited as evidence of the importance of consultation: 189

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Katiraie, “Hokumat az Didgah-e Din” (Government from the Perspective of Religion), p. 34. Mehdi Mohammadi Azizabadi, “Tahlil-e Azadi-e Ahzab az Didgah-e Fuqaha dar Jomhuri-e Eslami-e Iran” (Analysis of Freedom of Parties from the Perspective of Faqihs in the Islamic Republic of Iran), Rahavard-e Siyasi, Vol. 16, No. 49 (1396/2017), p. 61. Mousavian, Mabani-e Dini-e Mardomsalari (Religious Foundations of Democracy), pp. 277–278. Ibid., pp. 284–286. Ahmad Mirhosseini and Mohammad Jafar Sadeqipour, “Barresi va Tahlil-e Mashru‘iyat-e Namayandegi-e Majles ba Tavajoh beh Jaygah-e Aan dar Sakhtar-e Nezam-e Mardomsalar-e Dini” (Examination and Analysis of Legitimacy of Representation in the Majles with Reference to Its Place in Institutions of Religious Democracy), Fiqh va Mabani-ye Hoquq-e Eslami, Vol. 49, No. 1 (2016), p. 156.

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Beware, that it is obligatory on me that I should not keep anything secret from you except during war, nor should I decide any matter without consulting you except the commands of religion, nor should I ignore the fulfilment of any of your rights nor desist till I discharge it fully, and that for me all of you should be equal in rights.194

As far as the Shia ulama are concerned, their rule must be based on consultation. Rule that is imposed on the people is not Islamic.195 Repeatedly, the Muslim ruler is called upon to seek advice. Some observers have gone so far as to assert that the command to seek advice is itself a form of supervision over rulers.196 The state can also offer advice. However, in its shura function, in consulting, according to reformist interpretations, the state can only seek and offer advice on public and social matters not on issues that are personal and revolve around the individual.197 As for advice to the state, it may take different forms. One is nasihat, or unofficial and public advice, which is essentially a form of supervision. Another type of advice is ebtedai, elementary or fundamental, which is called for in circumstances when the ruler needs to urgently change his ways and his manner of rule. There is also voluntary advice, estensahi, when the ruler solicits advice.198 It appears that the first Shii faqih to point to the important role of consultation in political decision-making was Mirza Mohammad Hossein Naini (1860–1936). Naini insisted on the need for the ruler to consult with the people’s representatives and to obey majority opinion. He supported his views through extensive references to the Quran, stories from the Prophet’s life and his pronouncements, and the teachings of renowned religious scholars before him.199 194

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Ali Shirkhani, “Shiveh-haye Nezarat bar Hakem dar Feqh-e Siyasi-e Shia” (Methods of Supervising the Ruler in Shia Political Jurisprudence), Faslnameh-e Motale‘at-e Siyasi, Vol. 6, No. 22 (1392/2013), p. 164. Heidari, “Mabani-e Feqhi-e Mosharekat-e Siyasi dar Hoquq-e Asasi-e Jomhuri-e Eslami-e Iran” (Jurisprudential Foundations of Political Participation in the Basic Laws of the Islamic Republic of Iran), p. 47. Shirkhani, “Shiveh-haye Nezarat bar Hakem dar Feqh-e Siyasi-e Shia” (Methods of Supervising the Ruler in Shia Political Jurisprudence), p. 155. Mousavian, Mabani-e Dini-e Mardomsalari (Religious Foundations of Democracy), p. 281. Shirkhani, “Shiveh-haye Nezarat bar Hakem dar Feqh-e Siyasi-e Shia” (Methods of Supervising the Ruler in Shia Political Jurisprudence), p. 163. Davood Feirahi, Feqh va Siyasat dar Iran-e Mo‘aser (Jurisprudence and Politics in Contemporary Iran) (Tehran: Nashr-e Ney, 1393/2014), p. 130.

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Pointing to the importance of the shura also had a powerful precedent in the person of Ayatollah Taleghani, one of the revolution’s most prominent early figures. Taleghani expressed deep concern about the possibility of creeping autocracy in Iran following the revolution, and he saw the shura as the perfect antidote. This largely accounted for his resolute opposition to the long tradition of fatwa by only one mujtahid, and he referred to the Quran to support his advocacy of fatwa based on consultation. “The outcome of consultation is consensus majority vote,” he wrote. Although majority vote does not appear in the canons of jurisprudence, the results of consultation, as explicitly stated in the Quran, is agreement by a majority, which is similar to the consensus (ijma’), on which the Quran insists.200 According to Taleghani, a fatwa by a single person represents his interpretation based on individual circumstances, and the philosophical and practical scope of the surrounding environment. “Considering limitations inherent in any one person’s existing circumstances, a single mujtahid cannot satisfactorily answer all questions posed to him,” Taleghani maintained. It is also possible, indeed probable, that a mujtahid may have much greater familiarity with one issue as compared to others.201 Taleghani was not just a theorist of shura but also an ardent advocate of consultation in practice. Immediately after the revolution, he proposed the establishment of a “fatwa council” to Khomeini, to meet on a regular basis and to decide on the fatwas that were to be issued. The proposal was ignored. Nevertheless, Taleghani was largely responsible for having the institution of councils codified in the constitution (Articles 100–106), which mandates the election and operations of councils at almost all levels of decision-making.202 Other, later religious reformists have similarly emphasized the importance of consultation. According to Ayatollah Montazeri, “Shura in Islam is not a mere formality, not even a mere ethical issue; rather, it is a divine duty.”203 Mojtahed Shabestari is more explicit in linking consultation with democracy. He sees councils as one of the key mechanisms of democracy, and that is precisely what their function in the constitution is meant to guarantee. They are institutions that 200 203

201 202 Ibid., pp. 134–135. Ibid., p. 135. Ibid., pp. 135–138. Geneive Abdo, “Re-Thinking the Islamic Republic: A ‘Conversation’ with Ayatollah Hossein ‘Ali Montazeri,” Middle East Journal, Vol. 55, No. 1 (Winter 2001), p. 22.

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actually give shape to democracy and make it more inclusive.204 According to Mojtahed Shabestari, when the Prophet discusses the shura in the Quran, he is discussing a time-specific institution in the Hijaz. Today, in its commonly understood meaning, shura is meant to guarantee equitable political participation and justice in our contemporary context.205 Along somewhat similar lines, Ayatollah Nematollah Najafabadi (1923–2006) constructed a notion of velayat-e faqih using a number of comparatively modern concepts, chief among them majority rule, social contract, and representation.206 Because of his insistence on the importance of consultation, however, he was banned from teaching by the Special Court for the Clergy and spent a number of years under house arrest. Najafabadi maintained that if the velayat-e faqih rules without consultation, and if he imposes his will on various matters and violates his oath, he should be removed from his position.207

Allegiance Similar to the shura, a number of democratically inclined clerics have paid detailed attention to the contractual bond between the leader and his flock, a form of allegiance known as bey‘at. Bey‘at is mentioned in three of the verses of the Quran, and the Prophet put it into practice on at least eight different occasions. It continues to remain an important notion in Islam today.208 “Bey‘at is a contract between the people and their leader. Once entered into, the people cannot back out of the contract. However, from the start, bay‘at can be subject to a time limit and to certain conditions.”209

204

205 206

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Mojtahed Shabestari, Naqdi bar Qara‘t-e Rasmi az Din (A Critique of the Official Perspective on Religion), pp. 154–155. Ibid., p. 158. Ahmad Kazemi Moussavi, “A New Interpretation of the Theory of Vilayat-i Faqih,” Middle Eastern Studies, Vol. 28, No. 1 (January 1992), pp. 103–105. Mohammad Mansournezhad, “Tafkik-e Qova, Velayat-e Mutlaqeh Faqih va Estaqlal-e Qova” (Separation of Powers, Absolute Velayat-e Faqih and Independence of the Branches), Hokumat-e Eslami, Vol. 4, No. 1 (1378/ 1999), pp. 54–55. Mousavian, Mabani-e Dini-e Mardomsalari (Religious Foundations of Democracy), p. 261. Mohammad Hossein Mahsouri, “Bey‘at ya Entekhab” (Allegiance or Election), Hokumat-e Eslami, Vol. 3, No. 3 (1377/1998), p. 79.

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Under current circumstances, with tremendous changes occurring to the structure of societies, bey‘at is simply not possible. The exercise has therefore been replaced by voting. The two practices are the same as they serve the same function. According to Mousavian, those who declare that bey‘at is merely a declaration of friendship or fondness are wrong. Bey‘at is loyalty to the ruler in exchange for just and judicious rule.210 In reality, bey‘at is the election of the leader by the people. By the same token, it also indicates obedience to the leader.211 Bey‘at is a form of obligation to obey, so long as the person elected acts according to the conditions of the bey‘at. Otherwise, the electors have the right to change their mind.212 The only difference between bey‘at and voting is that there are multiple candidates involved in a vote while bey‘at involves only one person as the ruler.213 At the same time, bey‘at is valid for specific conditions and particular contexts. If the person who has been legitimized through bey‘at exceeds or acts outside of the conditions set through the bey‘at, people are allowed to withdraw their allegiance.214 For the Shii, during the Occultation, bey‘at plays three important roles. First, it makes the system functional by tying to it the necessary ingredient – the people – which the system of rule needs. Second, bey‘at conditions the activities of the velayat-e faqih. Third, it makes the velayat-e faqih functional by bestowing it with legitimacy.215 All Twelve Imams were installed in the position of imamate by God, through the endorsement of the Prophet. But, even in their case, the imamate would not have become functional had it not been for the acceptance of the people through bey‘at. Bey‘at, in fact, played a central role in the rule of the Twelve Imams and in bestowing on them a sense of legitimacy.216 Since rule without people’s satisfaction is not acceptable, Islam reaffirms the importance of legitimacy and acceptance, mashru‘iyat

210

211 212 213

214 215

Mousavian, Mabani-e Dini-e Mardomsalari (Religious Foundations of Democracy), pp. 262–263. Mahsouri, “Bey‘at ya Entekhab” (Allegiance or Election), pp. 65, 68. Ibid., pp. 72–73. Mousavian, Mabani-e Dini-e Mardomsalari (Religious Foundations of Democracy), p. 269. Mahsouri, “Bey‘at ya Entekhab” (Allegiance or Election), p. 72. 216 Ibid., pp. 76–78. Ibid., pp. 69–70.

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and maqbuliyat respectively, through bey‘at.217 All rulers, including the Prophet himself, are bound as much by bey‘at as are those who have given their allegiance to him.218 The basis of bey‘at is a contractual agreement based on which people put their material and spiritual belongings, their life’s opportunities, and the determination of what is in their interest at the disposal of the ruler, who in turn must rule justly and must prevent chaos.219 Leadership must be elected by a vote of the majority. When a leader is elected, obedience to the leader is a necessity. By the same token, the leader may not treat those who did not vote for him any differently as compared to anyone else, regardless of whether or not they are Muslim. Those who voted differently must enjoy all the political, social, economic, and other rights enjoyed by the majority.220 For Shii theologians, bey‘at poses somewhat of a dilemma: Does it mean discovery or election? In the Sunni tradition, bey‘at is conventionally taken to mean a method of selecting and paying allegiance to the caliph or imam. But if the ruler’s legitimacy comes from the Almighty, and the people’s task is merely to make this divine legitimacy functional by bestowing acceptance on it, then how is bey‘at meant to enable people to discover who the rightful ruler is?221 Shia theologians have not quite answered this question. Those inclined toward democratic thought have simply adopted the Sunni conception of bey‘at, viewing it as nothing other than the election of the leader and a contractual arrangement between a leader and those who have given him their allegiance. Others, especially those who see legitimacy as being bestowed by God and not through elections, see bey‘at not as a means of selecting a leader but as a mechanism for discovering who the leader ought to be. Still others, particularly those who endorse the underlying logic of the Islamic Republic system, see bey‘at as a composite of the two positions. Ayatollah Amid Zanjani (1937–2011), a

217

218 220 221

Mousavian, Mabani-e Dini-e Mardomsalari (Religious Foundations of Democracy), p. 248. 219 Ibid., pp. 252–253. Ibid., p. 255. Mahsouri, “Bey‘at ya Entekhab” (Allegiance or Election), p. 79. Abassali Amid Zanjani, “Ab‘ad-e Feqhi-e Mosharekat-e Siyasi” (Jurisprudential Dimensions of Political Participation), in Mosharekat-e Siyasi (Political Participation), Ali Akbar Alikhani, ed. (Tehran: Nashr-e Safir, 1377/ 1998), p. 40.

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member of the committee that revised the constitution in 1989, offers the following explanation: It can be said that in every dimension of Islam, even in the election of the leader, there are provisions for popular participation. People participate in the elections of the Assembly of Experts, and the Assembly in reality also elects the leader. All of these amount to popular participation. Nevertheless, there is a secondary interpretation that maintains this election is not for purposes of determining who the ruler is but is meant to simply discover the leader.222

Tolerance and Freedom Perhaps the most voluminous contribution of Iran’s religious reformist intellectuals was in relation to issues of tolerance, freedom, and political participation. As with their other arguments, religious reformists support their advocacy of tolerance and freedom by reference to the Quran and the sunna. Islam, they argue, not only allows for tolerance and freedom, it actually institutionalizes them in society. This includes freedom for everyone, both supporters and opponents, and also tolerance for everyone, even those who are a burden or are inconvenient.223 People also have the right to freedom of action, as guaranteed by the Quran’s insistence that humans are in charge of their own destiny. In numerous verses of the Quran – 2:111, 135, 139; 3:20, 61; 16:125; and 29:64 – the Quran discusses the importance of freedom of thought, without which the attainment of justice is impossible and human evolution is blocked. Freedoms of speech and writing have also been guaranteed in the Quran in the form of the right to be heard (Surah Zuma 39:17–18), which specifies “the right” to tell the truth. According to 39:17–18, humans have the right to even say things that may not be good or pleasing to others. Their right to say things that are correct and just is even more guaranteed.224 The writer Emadeddin Baqi specifically zeroed in on tolerance. If you want to defend the rights of the believers, he maintained, first you must defend the rights of unbelievers. If the rights of others are 222 224

223 Ibid. Baqi, Hoquq-e Mokhalefan (The Rights of Opponents), p. 54. Khorramshad and Sayyad Roudkar, “Amr-e beh Ma‘rouf, Nahy az Monker va Tose‘h Siyasi dar Jomhuri-e Eslami Iran” (Enjoining Good, Forbidding Evil and Political Development in the Islamic Republic of Iran), p. 47.

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violated, so are the rights of believers. The Quran commands not to insult unbelievers, because if you do, they will insult your God. Freedom is a right that everyone must enjoy. But tolerance is a reciprocal relationship: Respect begets respect, and disrespect elicits rudeness. The Quran even commands the faithful to treat enemies wisely and in a conciliatory manner rather than with anger.225 Tolerance means making a distinction between rights and ideology. It means having empathy and observing good manners, and also coexistence with everyone in ways that boundaries are observed. It means friendship and kindness, but not uniformity and a blurring of differences; it means friendship but not in ways that overwhelm and cover up differences in personality and opinion.226 In the realm of politics, tolerance translates to acceptance of legitimate opposition activities in general and party politics in particular. Islamic jurisprudence considers party activism both necessary and critical. It does not, however, endorse party activism in its Western form.227 Both Ayatollahs Khomeini and Khamenei endorsed the idea of parties as important components of democracy. Both, however, believed that Western-style democracy is devoid of spirit and connection to the people, and instead endorsed Islamic democracy.228 Islam fully endorses political parties, they both maintain. One Iranian academic defines parties as follows: “A party (hezb) is a mobilized group of individuals who are politically and administratively organized around common principles, norms, and values. In order to achieve their goals and attain power, they make decisions, pursue policies, and follow their objectives.”229 Defined as such, parties are seen as means of supporting Islam and its goals in society. In fact, the academic reasons, surahs Al Imran (3:104), At-Taubah (9:71), Ahzab (33:20),

225 226 227

228

229

Baqi, Hoquq-e Mokhalefan (The Rights of Opponents), p. 51. Ibid., p. 53. Mohammadi Azizabadi, “Tahlil-e Azadi-e Ahzab az Didgah-e Fuqaha dar Jomhuri-e Eslami-e Iran” (Analysis of Freedom of Parties from the Perspective of Faqihs in the Islamic Republic of Iran), p. 57. Bahram Akhavan Kazemi, “Tahazob dar Andesheh-e Rahbaran-e Jomhuri-e Eslami” (Parties in the Thoughts of Leaders of the Islamic Republic), Hokumat-e Eslami, Vol. 12, No. 4 (1386/2008), p. 173. Mohammadi Azizabadi, “Tahlil-e Azadi-e Ahzab az Didgah-e Fuqaha dar Jomhuri-e Eslami-e Iran” (Analysis of Freedom of Parties from the Perspective of Faqihs in the Islamic Republic of Iran), p. 62.

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and Al-Mujadila (58:22) all endorse parties and present them in a positive light.230 Political parties are seen as especially necessary during the reign of the velayat-e faqih. Since at any given point there are likely to be several qualified faqihs, each faqih can be better introduced to the people through one or more political parties. Parties are also seen as important for increasing the people’s political knowledge and serve as viable means for political participation. Equally important is the fact that parties enable people to articulate and express their collective and national interests. Tolerance of different viewpoints and party politics points to the broader importance of political participation. The notion of political participation itself is not specifically mentioned in the Quran. But the phenomenon of political participation has been discussed in various forms, especially as the Quran repeatedly gives individuals the responsibility to control their own destiny.231 Moreover, both in the Quran and in other primary sources, custodians of Muslim societies are repeatedly reminded of their obligation to secure the acceptance and approval of their peoples. In fact, public satisfaction is the fundamental basis of a political order, and this public satisfaction cannot be made possible without collective political participation. The Quran and other Islamic sources also emphasize the ruler’s obligations to his subjects.232 Islam has devised a number of ways in which the Muslim ruler is subject to supervision, including especially the enjoining of good and prohibiting evil, as well as emphasis on advice to the ruler.233 Political rule should be based on the will of the people, because God gave people free will and enabled them to govern on their own. Many religious intellectuals reject the notion that God continues to ordain a single individual with divine legitimacy, who is then installed as ruler.234 230 231

232 233

234

Ibid., p. 63. Heidari, “Mabani-e Feqhi-e Mosharekat-e Siyasi dar Hoquq-e Asasi-e Jomhuri-e Eslami-e Iran” (Jurisprudential Foundations of Political Participation in the Basic Laws of the Islamic Republic of Iran), p. 44. Ibid., p. 49. Shirkhani, “Shiveh-haye Nezarat bar Hakem dar Feqh-e Siyasi-e Shia” (Methods of Supervising the Ruler in Shia Political Jurisprudence), p. 149. Mansournezhad, “Tafkik-e Qova, Velayat-e Mutlaqeh Faqih va Estaqlal-e Qova” (Separation of Powers, Absolute Velayat-e Faqih and Independence of the Branches), p. 55.

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If obedience to the ruler and political power are derived from and are anchored in the beliefs of the people, popular loyalty to the system is deepened, and the system will have unsurpassed strength. If the system is not anchored in the people’s beliefs, then it is weak and is prone to collapse.235 Islam gives to the individual the right to choose and elect for himself, and the ruler is not allowed to impose his will on the people without their consent.236 In Islam, political participation goes beyond voting in elections. It means active involvement in the social and political arenas. Each person has a right to express criticism without fear of reprisals. The committed Muslim, in fact, has a responsibility to be an active participant in the social and political lives of the community.237 Political participation, in the sense of people having important roles in the political process and in determining their own destiny, is integral to Shia jurisprudence.238 There are three conceptions of “representation” in Shia fiqh. Once conception sees representation as the relationship between the people and those who are more knowledgeable. A second conception sees representatives as the deputies of the velayat-e faqih responsible for carrying out his initiatives. The third, most commonly held conception, sees representatives as advocates for the people and for the greater good.239 Ayatollah Naini, whose advocacy of constitutionalism formed an important corpus of religious thought during the Constitutional Revolution, used jurisprudential arguments to lend his strong support to the notion of having elected representatives.240 In today’s Islamic Republic, jurisprudentially, the Majles represents one of the central elements of religious 235

236

237

238 239

240

Esmael Darabkalaie, Negaresh-i bar Falsafeh-e Siyasi-e Eslam (A Look at the Political Philosophy of Islam) (Qom: Bostan-e Ketab, 1380/2001), p. 38. Bazargan, “Marz-haye Miyan-e Din va Hokumat” (Boundaries between Religion and Government), p. 118. Heidari, “Mabani-e Feqhi-e Mosharekat-e Siyasi dar Hoquq-e Asasi-e Jomhuri-e Eslami-e Iran” (Jurisprudential Foundations of Political Participation in the Basic Laws of the Islamic Republic of Iran), p. 45. Ibid., p. 59. Mohsen Malekafzali Ardekani, Mohsen Taheri, and Hossein Dehnavei, “Mahiyat-e Namayandegi az Manzar-e Feqh-e Siyasi va Qanun-e Asasi-e Jomhuri-e Eslami-e Iran” (The Nature of Representation from the Perspective of Political Jurisprudence and the Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Iran), Hokumat-e Eslami, Vol. 19, No. 1 (1393/2014), p. 33. Abbas Kaabi and Sajjad Hakimi, “Mahiyat-e Namayandegi-e Majles dar Hoquq-e Asasi-e Jomhuri-e Eslami-e Iran” (Nature of Majles Representation in the Basic Laws of the Islamic Republic of Iran), Hokumat-e Eslami, Vol. 19, No. 2 (1393/2014), p. 136.

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democracy. The velayat-e faqih has delegated to the Majles the task of representation, and the people have the right and the responsibility to participate in elections for Majles deputies.241 At a broader, theoretical level, there are two different jurisprudential conceptions concerning the people’s role in the political process. According to one conception, the people play an important and integral role in elections and voting. Regardless of whether or not they believe in the notion of the velayat-e faqih, the people’s electoral rights and their vote is central to politics. This is what the constitution is based on, and according to this conception even the velayat-e faqih is an elected position. There is a second conception that cannot be found in the text of the constitution but nonetheless exists and currently is politically dominant. In this conception, the position of the velayat-e faqih does not depend on the choice of the people. Even if legally, or religiously or based on custom, the will of the people is not considered as important, they should nevertheless give their consent and agree to the velayat-e faqih. Even in this conception, therefore, people play an important role.242 It is therefore little surprise that the constitution of the Islamic Republic expressly guarantees freedom of speech and political participation, which it claims to be among the basic civil rights of the people.243 Adding strength to the notions of political freedom and participation are expansive interpretations of the Islamic junction to “do good and prevent evil” (al-amr bi al-ma‘ruf ¯ wa al-nahy ‘an almunkar). This injunction can apply to a whole host of activities, including, for reformists, preventing autocracy and engaging in political participation and representation. The Islamic Republic state is constitutionally mandated to abide by the injunction to enjoin good and forbid evil. Article 8 of the constitution sees three dimensions in relation to the injunction: people in relation to each other, the state in relation to the people, and the people in relation to the state.244 For 241 242

243

244

Ibid., p. 140. Masoud Adib, “Entekhab Bedoun-e Estesvab-e Khobregan” (Assembly of Experts Elections without Approbation), Cheshmandaz-e Iran, No. 95 (2015), p. 32. Khorramshad and Sayyad Roudkar, “Amr-e beh Ma‘rouf, Nahy az Monker va Tose‘h Siyasi dar Jomhuri-e Eslami Iran” (Enjoining Good, Forbidding Evil and Political Development in the Islamic Republic of Iran), p. 48. Ibid., pp. 31–33.

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reformists, freedom is a critical element of forbidding evil and enjoining the good, which, they maintain, is all about safeguarding the values of Islam. Freedom of expression is especially central to this injunction, as it is one of the essential freedoms that individuals are bestowed with.245 The constitution also stipulates the right to supervision, nezarat, which is impossible without enjoining good and forbidding evil.

Conclusion Despite producing a significant corpus of reformist books and articles in the 1990s and the early 2000s, most of the efforts of “reformist” clerics and intellectuals were focused on politics and administration rather than on intellectual and academic endeavors. In fact, the reformists’ contributions to the fields of jurisprudence and Islamic philosophy (kalam) were at best sparse and sketchy. Their impact in jurisprudence, therefore, was mostly superficial compared to the impact that the religious right had, which controlled most levers of power and, at the same time, busily produced scholarship justifying its hold on power. Of the scholarship that was produced, the intellectual production of the right was, and remains, mostly proactive and often offensive, or, at the very least, protective of the status quo. The intellectual products of the left, on the other hand, were largely defensive and reactive. The reformist religious intellectuals of the 1990s and the 2000s sought to articulate a new jurisprudence that drew inspiration from dynamic, reason-centered ijtihad. The characteristics of the new, reconstituted fiqh were meant to include a comprehensive research program of reformism, deconstruction of commonplace understanding of religion and religion hermeneutic, and reexamining religious experiences and expectations. It was also meant to historicize religion and reimagine jurisprudence through the application of secular and scientific tools and methods.246 The project’s spectacular failure, slowly made clear about a decade after its zenith in the mid-2000s, owed much to the right’s merciless and multipronged onslaught. But that failure – more accurately, its violent obstruction – did not come until 245 246

Ibid., p. 48. Kazemi, Jame‘h Shenasi-e Roshanfekri-e Dini dar Iran (Sociology of Religious Intellectualism in Iran), pp. 137–142.

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after the project of deconstructing hermeneutics and ijtihad had been taken to their logical extension, namely efforts to construct a sustained theory of Islamic democracy. Some of the main jurisprudential components of an Islamic democracy – namely consultation, allegiance, and tolerance and freedom – were discussed in this chapter. Chapter 6 looks more specifically at the arguments of the main theorists who at the time sought to present theoretical frameworks for Islamic democracy.

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As if reflecting on his own self-ascribed social role and position, the one-time Iranian cleric Hojatoleslam Mohsen Kadivar (b. 1959), who is now a university professor in the United States, describes an intellectual as “someone who has something new to say in relation to his time and place. He is critical, and he approaches issues with reason and insight.” Kadivar sees the intellectual as being “steeped in knowledge, seeking freedom, and wanting to change and reform the status quo for the better.” A religious intellectual, in addition to these characteristics, also has a religious mindset. Such an intellectual is therefore “someone who both relies on logic and reason and is at the same time faithful to revelation and revelatory laws.”1 This chapter focuses on the arguments of precisely the kind of individual described by Kadivar. More specifically, within the intellectual reformist current described in Chapter 5, the arguments of a number of particular figures associated with it deserve more in-depth treatment. These individuals took the hermeneutics movement started by Soroush one step further by theorizing about Islamic democracy. They made explicit one of the key dimensions that is implicit in the hermeneutics movement, namely that, interpreted correctly, there is deep theoretical and structural consistency between Islam and democracy. As with their intellectual predecessors, this new crop of scholars start with the assumption that religious teachings are powerfully influenced by social conditions. Many religious rules came about to address specific social conditions that existed at a particular time and place, they argue, and therefore may not apply at other times. By the same token, understanding the teachings of religion and acquiring religious knowledge also depend on prevailing conditions.2 1

2

Mohsen Kadivar, Daghdagheh-haye Hokumat-e Dini (Concerns of Religious Government) (Tehran: Nashr-e Ney, 1376/1997), p. 463. Emadeddin Baqi, Gofteman-haye Dini-e Mo‘aser (Contemporary Religious Discourses) (Tehran: Saraee, 1381/2002), pp. 197–199.

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This chapter focuses on the writings of some of the most renowned religious intellectuals who presented theories of Islamic democracy beginning in the 1990s. I zero in on the arguments of three of the most prolific of such figures, namely Hasan Yousefi Eshkevari, Mohsen Kadivar, and Mohammad Mojtahed Shabestari. As discussed in Chapter 5, the religious intellectual trend of the 1990s no longer held sway – or, more accurately, was forcibly stopped – after a decade or so. But even the state’s unrestrained repression did not altogether kill the reformist religious intellectual current. By the 2010s, a new generation of scholars, again with deep religious convictions, picked up where the likes of Yousefi Eshkevari, Kadivar, and Mojtahed Shabestari had left off. Abolqassem Fanaee and Abolfazl Mousavian, who unlike the earlier crop of scholars still live and teach in Iran (at least as of this writing in 2023), represent this second generation of religious reformists. Their writings are also examined here. For both first- and second-generation religious intellectuals, a number of themes related to political Islam appear to be of primary importance. First, similar to Soroush, Baqi, and others, they critique how Islam has evolved into what it is today, and present alternative conceptualizations of what an ideal Islam looks like. They claim that most, but by no means all, of the blame for Islam’s current predicament lies with the state. The intellectuals point to the highly significant role that the state plays in shaping the practical manifestations and functionalities of Islam in society. Most significantly, they highlight the ways in which democratic impulses in Islam have been extinguished over time and can be reawakened. Combined, a somewhat cohesive corpus of thought regarding Islamic democracy, with an intellectual pedigree dating back to the 1880s, continues to circulate among some of the country’s religious and academic circles.

Hasan Yousefi Eshkevari Born in 1950, Hasan Yousefi Eshkevari entered the Qom seminary in 1965 and eventually reached the rank of hojatoleslam. A prolific writer from an early age, he wrote essays and articles for a number of newsmagazines before and especially after the revolution, having also been elected to the first postrevolutionary parliament in 1980. Out of the Majles in 1984, he devoted most of his energies to writing and other intellectual endeavors, and from 1985 to 1989 he served as a lecturer

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at Tehran’s Allameh Tabatabai University. That year he was barred from teaching after speaking at the funeral of one of the state’s opponents, who had been killed under suspicious circumstances. Resuming his scholarly and writing activities throughout the 1990s, in 2000 he was tried by the Special Court for the Clergy following a speech at a controversial conference in Berlin. The Special Court initially sentenced Yousefi Eshkevari to death, but the sentence was eventually commuted to a seven-year jail term and to being defrocked. He was released in 2005 after serving two-thirds of his sentence, eventually moving to Germany, where he currently lives and continues to write.3

Conception of Islam Yousefi Eshkevari defines religion as a perspective, a worldview, a system of values and ahkam regulations regarding one’s conduct and actions. Religion’s two primary pillars are guidance and justice.4 Guidance has no place in, and no relationship with, the linkage between the state and the people. It is only God that guides the people, not the state. Justice, on the other hand, is where religion and politics intersect, because justice is central to both the message of religion and the purpose of the government. In this sense, justice also includes freedom. Thus, religion and politics are intimately intertwined, as are politics and democracy.5 Religion in general and Islam in particular assign roles and responsibilities to individuals. In Islam, the Quran repeatedly mandates that individuals perform social responsibilities, many of which are political in nature, such as ensuring there is social justice and that people do good and prohibit evil. No Muslim can therefore remain indifferent toward politics. Islam recognizes both rights and responsibilities. But responsibility does not mean that in the fields of power and state and

3

4

5

A more complete biography of Yousefi Eshkevari is available on his website, www.yousefieshkevari.com. Hasan Yousefi Eshkevari, “Hokumat-e Demokratik-e Eslami” (Democratic Islamic Government), in Din va Hokumat (Religion and Governance), Anjomane Eslami-e Mohandesin, ed. (Tehran: Rasa, 1377/1998), p. 291. Hasan Yousefi Eshkevari, Kherad dar Ziyafat-e Din (Wisdom in the Service of Religion) (Tehran: Qasideh, 1379/2000), p. 16.

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government, no one can be made to obey others without their consent. This would be a violation of the shari‘ah.6 According to Yousefi Eshkevari, what the world of Islam needs is a renaissance, a cultural rebirth. Before that, what is needed is the will to change. In many Muslim societies, especially in Iran, the desire for change and transformation, even a revolution of sorts, is found among intellectuals, but such a desire has not become popularized among most groups in society, which remain politically largely traditional. “As the Muslim pioneers of social and religious reforms have repeatedly maintained,” Yousefi Eshkevari writes, “we believe that the conditions of us Muslims and Iranians will not change for the better unless our thoughts and our manners change fundamentally. We need to go from superstition to truth, ignorance to knowledge, lack of wisdom to wisdom, illiteracy to science, and lowness to elevation.”7 Moreover, Muslims cannot be stuck in the past, or, alternatively, fear or be enamored with modernity and the West. They must have the moral courage and the willpower to foster change and reform on their own, and they cannot lose sight of their goal of bringing about an Islamic renaissance. “We must be aware, and we must engage in ‘production’ and ‘establishment,’ which are two essential factors in building the future. Unless we stop worshipping the past, and unless we stop allowing the new world to dominate our life, we will never get anywhere.”8 In the past two centuries, Yousefi Eshkevari maintains, Muslims have neither remained completely in the world of tradition, which is impossible, nor have they become fully Western and modern, which cannot be done. At the same time, they have not been able to follow the path shown to them by Muslim intellectuals such as Seyed Jamal Eddin Asadabani (Al-Afghani), Iqbal, Ali Shariati, and others, whose goal was to articulate local models of modernity. Because of all this, today Muslim countries are facing multiple confusions at the local level, and crises and collapse at the social level. They are threatened by fundamentalism and anti-modernity on the one hand, and by selfdefeatism and surrender to modernity on the other. This has resulted in a loss of historical, national, and religious identity. One way to overcome the dead-end of backwardness is to adopt some of the perceptive recommendations that the various reformist Muslim 6

Ibid., pp. 16–17, 46–47.

7

Ibid., p. 5.

8

Ibid., pp. 5–6.

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intellectuals have made over time. A useful start, according to Yousefi Eshkevari, would be systematic critiques of both tradition and modernity, and compiling valuable elements of each into a workable system of thought and a modern ideology. Another productive effort would be the articulation of a form of local, Iranian-Islamic identity.9 Yousefi Eshkevari refutes the idea of predestiny. The world is governed both by destiny and by free will, he argues. Destiny means that the world is based on certain rules, and this means everything is run according to rules and regulations. God’s absoluteness means that nothing other than divine will can impact the destiny of the people. At the same time, humans also have free will, meaning that through their own power of determination and the norms they have acquired through revelation and wisdom, they can choose between good and evil.10 These norms in turn facilitate the crafting of laws. As with other religious reformist intellectuals, Yousefi Eshkevari sees laws as important guarantors against personal whims and arbitrariness, something from which Muslim societies have long suffered. Laws also make it possible for civil society to develop. One of the important features of civil society is its basis in law. This means that each person is placed in a position whose legal foundations and limits are clearly defined, and no individual, group, class, or institution can traverse these legally defined limits. In such a society, “institutions” are communications bridges between the nation and the state. Therefore, the state and the government emerge out of the will and the choices of majority of society, and the state is therefore obligated to follow the culture, ideology, and values that are common in and which govern that society.11

Islam and the State Yousefi Eshkevari also devotes considerable attention to the relationship between Islam and the state. In Islam’s intellectual tradition, he argues, all Islamic sources attest that power, the state, and the government have earthly and people-centered origins rather than divine genesis. And those with political power are not appointed by God or by

9

Ibid., p. 6.

10

Ibid., p. 37.

11

Ibid., p. 13.

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His successors to exercise power.12 In terms of form and content, the state is fundamentally a human creation, one that is constantly changing and is dependent on, and limited to, the prevailing, and therefore impermeant, conditions that are contingent on time and place. Political rule, and the formation of institutions for the management of society, is a human necessity. For Muslims, according to Yousefi Eshkevari, governing has to be consistent with the goals and values that Islam has determined. Power, state, and government are all innately human and social phenomena. They are not products of religion or the shari‘ah. As a phenomenon, government belongs in the same category as art, architecture, science, and technology. Adding a prefix of “religious” or “Islamic” only indicates that this government has been established by Muslims, that it takes Islamic values and priorities into account, and that it ultimately favors Islam. The logic of government cannot be found in the shari‘ah. In the Quran and the Sunnah, government has never been discussed alongside religious rules such as prayer, fasting, and the hajj. In particular, Islam does not prescribe a specific form for the structure and institutions of rule. What the Quran and especially the Sunnah do discuss is the significance of government and its role in the felicity or wretchedness of society. They also recommend that certain ground rules be observed while governing. None of this means that the government has to be based on the shari‘ah. In no verse of the Quran, and in no tradition of the Prophet, has government been mentioned as part of shari‘ah responsibilities. In only one instance, attributed to Imam Muhammad al-Baqir, the fifth Imam of the Shii, is there an apparent mention of velayat, but only in the sense of the importance of rule.13 What is important, Yousefi Eshkevari maintains, is that Muslims consider Islamic government as a product of human effort and not as divine in genesis and nature. As such, the state is not beyond criticism, and it can be reformed or changed. As with all man-made phenomena, Islamic government is not without flaws, and these flaws can be addressed and corrected. Democracy is not without flaws either. But as a method of government, both in its principles and in its institutions, 12

13

Yousefi Eshkevari, “Hokumat-e Demokratik-e Eslami” (Democratic Islamic Government), p. 300. Yousefi Eshkevari, Kherad dar Ziyafat-e Din (Wisdom in the Service of Religion), pp. 39–40.

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democracy comes closest to the method of management that was practiced by the Prophet Muhammad. As such, a true Islamic government is one that is humanist, pluralist, democratic, and dependent on the vote of the general public.14 Humans create institutions, and religion as a phenomenon cannot exist without institutions. These institutions include places of worship and clerics, both of which can be causes for enlightenment and progress. But they can also foster stagnation and even oppression.15 The biggest threat to religion, in fact, is posed by its own institutions. Yousefi Eshkevari sees this as one of the central contradictions in the social and political manifestations of religion. On the one hand, religion cannot exist without institutions and symbols, such as prayer, while on the other hand, it is often endangered by these very institutions.16 Yousefi Eshkevari sees religious government as a practical and strategic necessity for those who are pious, but not an ideological necessity.17 According to both the Quran and Imam Ali, he maintains, the primary purpose of government is to establish social justice. In practical terms, this means establishing just and equitable relations in law, politics, culture, and economics in areas such as production, distribution, and consumption. The assumption that the state and the people are separate and are two different entities is incorrect. The proper notion to adopt is that of the “nation-state,” which connotes that the state has evolved from the people. This, Yousefi Eshkevari argues, is one of the signs of civil society. Along the same lines, Yousefi Eshkevari maintains that the relationship between state and society is governed by a contract. This contract remains in effect as long as one of the sides has not violated it. This was especially the case with Prophet Muhammad, who assiduously observed his covenant with the people. Imam Ali did the same thing, as evident in Sermon 216 of the Nahj al-Balagha. It is obvious that there are mutual responsibilities between the ruler and the ruled. These 14

15

16 17

Yousefi Eshkevari, “Hokumat-e Demokratik-e Eslami” (Democratic Islamic Government), pp. 51–52, 311. Yousefi Eshkevari, Kherad dar Ziyafat-e Din (Wisdom in the Service of Religion), pp. 176–177, 179. Ibid., p. 180. Yousefi Eshkevari, “Hokumat-e Demokratik-e Eslami” (Democratic Islamic Government), p. 309.

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mutual obligations are at once both Islamic and democratic, once again highlighting the innate compatibility between Islam and democracy.18 There is no evidence, in fact, according to Yousefi Eshkevari, through either reason or revelation, that any particular individual or group has been determined by God to rule over human societies and that they should be obeyed. If we agree, based on what occurred at Ghadir Khumm, that government should remain within the household of Imam Ali, it becomes clear that this rule is not indefinite, since the rule of the imams lasted with twelve individuals and then ended with the Occultation.19 During the Occultation, no individual or group has inherited the right to rule.20 For Yousefi Eshkevari, justice serves as a critical link between religion and the state. Given the true essence of Islam, he believes, it is impossible to have an Islamic state that is undemocratic. Even if the state is based on religion and claims to act on behalf of Islam, it cannot interfere with people’s beliefs and opinions. As the Prophet Mohammad and Imam Ali envisioned and dictated, Islam should be the foundation of the state, and democracy is its method of rule and its means of conduct.21 At the same time, according to Yousefi Eshkevari, we should not think of any one form of government as eternal or holy.22 In any given period, the shape and form of government may change, even if it is based on religious values and principles.23

Islam and Democracy As the critical link between state and society, according to Yousefi Eshkevari, justice cannot be achieved through force and compulsion. It can, however, be acquired quite easily, through democracy. This 18

19

20

21

22 23

Yousefi Eshkevari, Kherad dar Ziyafat-e Din (Wisdom in the Service of Religion), pp. 43–44. Ghadir Khumm, a location between Mecca and Medina, refers to a sermon delivered in 632 by the Prophet Muhammad in which, the Shii believe, he announced that Ali is his rightful successor. Yousefi Eshkevari, Kherad dar Ziyafat-e Din (Wisdom in the Service of Religion), p. 40. Yousefi Eshkevari, “Hokumat-e Demokratik-e Eslami” (Democratic Islamic Government), p. 319. Ibid., p. 304. Yousefi Eshkevari, Kherad dar Ziyafat-e Din (Wisdom in the Service of Religion), p. 52.

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prompts Yousefi Eshkevari to openly declare his support for a “democratic Islamic government.”24 Democracy is not without its problems, he believes, an important one being its division of people into a majority and a minority, and it also does not address issues involving justice or its absence. But scientific consensus and experience have both shown that democracy reduces chances of mistakes in decision-making while at the same time paving the way for attaining social justice.25 Islam can present a form of democracy that addresses the shortcomings that are inherent in both liberal and social democracies. The democratic method, according to Yousefi Eshkevari, is the most appropriate, most rational, and actually most Islamic method for managing society.26 Questions, doubts, inquiries, and other forms of intellectual exploration are all allowed in the Quran and in Islam. In fact, they were practiced and encouraged by the Prophet and the Imams. Whether by mujtahids or by ordinary people, questioning can never be subject to punishment.27 More than a hundred years since the Constitutional Revolution, Yousefi Eshkevari laments, concepts such as freedom, democracy, law, elections, and citizens’ rights still do not have clear, official acceptance in Iran. In particular, it is not clear at all how the official institutions of the state, or those clergy who are affiliated with the state, view these concepts.28 What the traditionalist clergy need to accept, he maintains, is that in Islam absolute rule belongs only to God, and no one else has the right to absolute rule or absolute guardianship.29 If we believe that during the period of Occultation the faqihs as a group are representatives of the Hidden Imam and therefore have the right to govern, we must still accept the will of the people as the basis of political power. Only the people’s will makes it possible for the faqihs

24

25

26

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28 29

Yousefi Eshkevari, “Hokumat-e Demokratik-e Eslami” (Democratic Islamic Government), p. 290. Yousefi Eshkevari, Kherad dar Ziyafat-e Din (Wisdom in the Service of Religion), p. 14. Yousefi Eshkevari, “Hokumat-e Demokratik-e Eslami” (Democratic Islamic Government), p. 305. Hasan Yousefi Eshkevari, Yad-e Ayam (Memory of the Times) (Tehran: Gam-e No, 1379/2000), pp. 124–125. Ibid., p. 209. Yousefi Eshkevari, Kherad dar Ziyafat-e Din (Wisdom in the Service of Religion), p. 52.

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to rule.30 It is wrong, Yousefi Eshkevari insists, to assume that only the ulama have the right to act as specialists of religion and that only they can specialize in interpreting it. As a thousand-year-old institution, the clergy cannot claim to have a monopoly over the truth. In fact, in the first two centuries of Islam, there was no clergy.31 When they did emerge as a class of religious specialists, their knowledge of religion was not meant to be exclusive, nor were they ordained to rule over others.

Mohsen Kadivar Yousefi Eshkevari’s ideas find a number of parallels in the writings of Mohsen Kadivar. Born in 1959, Kadivar entered the Qom seminary in 1981 and studied with Ayatollahs Javadi Amoli and Montazeri, attaining the rank of hojatoleslam in 1997. Two years later he also earned a doctorate degree in Islamic philosophy from Tehran’s Tarbiat Modares University. Both before and after his PhD degree, he taught at the Qom seminary and in a number of universities in Tehran. In 1998, Kadivar gave a speech in which he condemned violence in the name of religion, and shortly afterward criticized the conduct of the Islamic Republic in a newspaper interview. The speech and the interview landed him before the Special Court for the Clergy, which sentenced him to eighteen months in jail. Freed in 2000, he secured a faculty position at Tarbiat Modares University, where he was formally employed until 2011. In 2009, the government placed a complete ban on all of Kadivar’s publications, forcing him since then to publish his books and articles on the Internet. In 2011 he was fired from his university teaching position, by which time he had secured several visiting fellowships at various universities around the world. Since 2015, he has been employed as a research professor in religious studies at Duke University in the United States.32 During his time in Iran, Kadivar devoted his intellectual energies to three main topics. They included, similar to most other reformist 30

31

32

Yousefi Eshkevari, “Hokumat-e Demokratik-e Eslami” (Democratic Islamic Government), p. 301. Mohammad Qoochani, Dowlat-e Dini va Din-e Dowlati (Religious Government and Government Religion) (Tehran: Saraee, 1379/2000), p. 36. Kadivar’s full biography can be accessed through his website, www.kadivar .com.

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religious intellectuals, ideal conceptions of Islam and democracy. Where Kadivar differed from most others was his detailed critique of the evolution of the position of velayat-e faqih. This was no doubt a product of Kadivar’s mentorship by Ayatollah Montazeri.

Conception of Islam For Kadivar, there is an intimate connection between religion and reason. Religion shows us the way and the ultimate direction in which society should evolve, and reasons and logic point to the means and methods of getting there.33 Historical circumstances have severed the important connection between religion and reason in Islam in general and in Shia fiqh in particular. According to Kadivar, because of the difficulties that Shii communities experienced once the Occultation began, and even before that, Shia jurisprudence did not seriously study the question of imamate and its relationship with the act of government. The assumption of the need for an infallible ruler, and the prudence of not rising up against unjust rulers, stunted the growth of Shia political thought, and over time made it overly abstract, idealistic, and distant from social realities. Shia theology has therefore largely concerned itself more with personal and individual issues rather than social and political ones. When there have been theological discussions about politics, they have frequently revolved around who the ruler should be rather than how the ruler should behave once in office.34 Since the Islamic Revolution, according to Kadivar, the clergy have been far too preoccupied with state administration to pay adequate attention to the evolving philosophical needs of religion. From a religious perspective, the Islamic Republic state has many legal issues for which religion has not yet found satisfactory answers. Also, the sciences of kalam, philosophy, the social sciences, and the humanities still have much to answer and explore.35 Nevertheless, Kadivar maintains, circumstances since the revolution have forced Islamic thought to 33

34

35

Kadivar, Daghdagheh-haye Hokumat-e Dini (Concerns of Religious Government), p. 191. Mohsen Kadivar, Nazariyeh-haye Dowlat dar Feqh-e Shia (Theories of Government in Shia Jurisprudence) (Tehran: Nashr-e Ney, 1378/ 1999), pp. 9–11. Kadivar, Daghdagheh-haye Hokumat-e Dini (Concerns of Religious Government), p. 563.

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confront certain issues. Most notably, Shia fiqh has had to address a number of the issues that it had long neglected, among them judicial rulings, matters involving jihad, and the enjoinment of good and forbidding of evil. In the public arena, therefore, fiqh has begun to slightly develop. Also, religious thinking has necessarily become less abstract and philosophical and more practical. An example is Ayatollah Khomeini’s jurisprudential attention to the issue of expediency (maslahat), which, according to Kadivar, represents an important turning point in Shia thought.36

Islam and Democracy Similar to fellow reformist religious intellectuals, Kadivar sees a deep connection between Islam and democracy, maintaining that faith grows in free will, liberty, and justice. In the Quran, he maintains, two different logics are clearly delineated, one being the logic of freedom and the other that of autocracy. The logic of freedom invites people to be careful, not to be blindly obedient, to become knowledgeable, and to make informed choices. But heresy wants us to close our eyes and ears, to make noise so that the voice of Quran is downed. The heresy of autocracy wants us to close our ears because if we hear the voice of the Quran we will let go of the voices of repression. So repression wants us to keep making noise so that we hear only our own voice.37

If there is no freedom in society, especially freedom of speech, and no one dares criticize the actions of the state and the leader, it is the state itself that will suffer the most. A society that has closed itself off to the benefits of criticism is one that encourages hypocrisy, cheating, and false flattery. Hypocrites will never allow for the appearance of what is right and in the interest of society. For Kadivar, freedom of choice is of cardinal importance, even in choosing one’s faith. Those who choose Islam are required to do so 36

37

Quoted in Zahra Roodi, Baha-ye Azadi: Defa‘iyat-e Mohsen Kadivar dar Dadgah-e Vizheh-e Rouhaniyat (The Price of Freedom: Mohsen Kadivar’s Defense in the Special Court for the Clergy) (Tehran: Nashr-e Ney, 1379/ 2000), pp. 161–162. Kadivar, Daghdagheh-haye Hokumat-e Dini (Concerns of Religious Government), p. 360.

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after research and exploration, not through blind imitation and careless acceptance. In exploring whether or not to embrace Islam, one should resort not to force and compulsion but instead to tools such as philosophy, logic, and reasoning. This, according to Kadivar, is where jihad comes in. The intent of jihad is not to impose Islam through the force of the sword. Islam has instituted jihad in a very careful and considered manner, for purposes of removing barriers to freedom and to create an open arena so that people can worship their own God. Whenever Islam has conquered a territory and freed it from its autocratic rulers, people have enthusiastically embraced Islam in droves. For those who refused to do so, it was prohibited to force them to accept Islam, and they could not be denied any of their rights unless they expressed anti-Islamic views. If any Muslims turn away from Islam and do not reveal their conversion, they cannot face worldly punishment. Suppression of belief or opinion is not allowed in Islam. To prevent such a possibility in a religious government like Iran’s, Kadivar proposes the establishment of an independent supervisory body, the main function of which would be to guarantee religious freedoms.38 At the same time, Kadivar firmly believes that freedom without religion can cause harm. In a society devoid of religion, spiritual freedom is sacrificed at the altar of illicit, worldly pleasures. At the same time, religion is vulnerable to corruption when there is no freedom as it can become elitist and incoherent, paving the way for religious autocracy. In this case, what suffers the most is religion itself. To protect religion, one must be free. Only with freedom will religion flourish.39 For Kadivar, importantly, this freedom is not unlimited. Freedom without religion is freedom without conscience, he argues. It is devoid of ethics. Religion without freedom also decays. The essence of religion grows in freedom.40 To place Islam at the opposite end of legal freedoms and the people’s rights is to violate the principles of religion. Since religion and freedom have a symbiotic relationship, individual and social freedoms cannot contradict shari‘ah law. At the level of the individual person, the question of what is and what is not permissible is made by a mujtahid. According to Kadivar, at the broader, societal level, the determination of permissible freedoms should be made by a 38

Ibid., p. 688.

39

Ibid., p. 421.

40

Ibid., p. 434.

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council of faqihs who are elected by Muslims. In Muslim societies, the public arena is managed on the basis of the public’s will and in accordance with the principles of Islam. The collective supervision of Muslims occurs through a number of rational, logical means, such as the enjoinment of good and the forbidding of evil, engaging in consultation and giving advice, and being able to question and if necessary to impeach.41 The question of freedom has not really been explored in Iran’s national or religious literature. The deep, thousand-year-old tentacles of autocracy have not allowed questions of freedom and liberty to be studied on their own merits, and they have not allowed for an independent, stand-alone corpus of literature to be formed by Muslim thinkers and philosophers. This failure to indigenize conceptions of freedom, according to Kadivar, is one of the main failings of Iran’s religious intellectuals. In an effort to remedy this neglect, Kadivar outlines a number of features that he considers important to a free society: - The broader policies of society are derived through the participation of the public; - Political power is not centralized within one group or a single individual; - The three branches of the government are separated from each other and the judiciary is especially independent; - All political decisions and decisionmakers at all levels are supervised, can be criticized, and may be subject to impeachment; - There must be laws and established procedures at all levels of power, and no one can be above the law; - An institution that is separate and independent of the executive will ensure that the constitution is not violated; and, - Interpretations of religion will not be in the hands of the government, so that religion will not be subject to political considerations.42

Kadivar also sees civil society as an important guarantor of social and political freedom. He was writing at a time, it is important to remember, when, thanks to Khatami’s election slogans and his speeches, civil society was perceived as a key component of democracy. In Kadivar’s conception of civil society, individuality and the protection of individual identity are of critical importance, as is citizenship, and the rights and responsibilities that come along with it. 41

Ibid., p. 445.

42

Ibid., pp. 427, 438–439.

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Civil society also inheres a culture based on reason and meritocracy, progress through competition, and passage from state of nature into relationships underwritten by a social contract. Moreover, civil society means observing the rights of citizens, meaningful participation of citizens in the political process, and the equality of all citizens before the law.43 For Kadivar, civil society means that people have rights that cannot be ignored by the ruler. Civil society is made up of free and autonomous institutions that come about as a result of the people’s free will and without state intervention. Civil society results in limitations on state power through empowering members of society. In fact, through having greater control over their own social conditions and their destiny, people are better able to control their own and their country’s future. Kadivar calls on Iranians to take charge of their own circumstances and predicaments, going so far as to argue that blaming domestic difficulties on foreigners is tantamount to treason. At the same time, he states, the more that civil society is active, and the more freely that people are involved in it, the more legitimacy the state has. The problem is that many state leaders have a unidimensional conception of power and assume that if they remove all power intermediaries between themselves and the people, they will become more powerful. In reality, Kadivar warns, they actually become weaker.44 Kadivar insists that in Islam, political criticism is permitted at all levels, be it of the government, the system of rule, or the leader. So long as legal procedures are followed, such a criticism is neither against profane law nor the shari‘ah. It is quite permissible to criticize the specific deeds or speeches of the leader, in fact, so long as that criticism is not in the form of an insult. Imam Ali, for example, routinely invited and received criticism.45 This is only one of a number of limits on political power outlined by Kadivar. There is no such thing in Islam as lifetime political tenure, for example, he maintains. The temporary nature of political rule has not been rejected in any of the verses of the Quran or the stories of the Prophet or the Imams or the consensus of the faqihs or the laws of reason.46 He calls for free access to information, seeing a lack of information by the people as an important facilitator of dictatorship. The people’s avoidance of and 43 46

Ibid., pp. 258–260. Ibid., p. 688.

44

Ibid., p. 661.

45

Ibid., p. 502.

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disenchantment with politics can be a similarly dangerous prelude to authoritarianism.47 Politics, Kadivar further argues, must be based on meritocracy rather than the sheer determination to stay in power. In a not-toosubtle reference to the Islamic Republic, he maintains that using religion as a justification for staying in power poses one of the biggest threats to both the people’s beliefs and to the essence of religion itself.48 Moreover, absolute obedience is to be given only to the Prophet and the Infallible Imams and to no one else. To all others, obedience is only conditional and must be given to a ruler whose term of rule is limited and who accepts criticism. Similar to other like-minded religious reformists, Kadivar believes the principal foundations of a democratic political system can be acquired through reference to the Quran and the sunna. The Quran and the traditions of the Prophet facilitate the emergence of a democratic religious government, one that is at once democratic and Islamic.49 Such a government is not easy to maintain and requires active support and vigilance. In fact, Islam expects each member of society to perform their share in keeping democracy functioning. One of these responsibilities is to proactively hold political leaders accountable for their decisions and their actions. Kadivar maintains that there are multiple benefits to criticizing the leader, an important one being reducing the cumulative number of bad and harmful decisions the leader is likely to make.50

Kadivar on the Velayat-e Faqih With the possible exception of Ayatollah Montazeri, Kadivar is perhaps the one contemporary religious scholar who has devoted the most attention to critiquing the notion of the velayat-e faqih. To start with, he questions the very intellectual pedigree of the concept, especially in its “absolute” variant: The official conception of “Islamic Republic” on the basis of the “absolute velayat-e faqih” is not in our religion or our belief system. It does not appear in any of the verses of the Quran, and cannot be attributed to the sayings of the Prophet or any of the Infallible Imams. It is not part of our religious teaching, and it is not based on the theories of any of the faqihs. Our faqihs 47

Ibid., p. 19.

48

Ibid., p. 411.

49

Ibid., pp. 353, 359.

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50

Ibid., p. 173.

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have historically been influenced by their local circumstances. Their conceptions of rule are distinctively Eastern. They have no other conceptions of rule, governing, or running a country. And in their subconscious, they have decided for themselves that their conceptions have religious legitimacy.51

In place of the absolute velayat-e faqih, Kadivar proposes, along the same lines as Montazeri did in his final years, a much more restricted version of the position. “Elected, conditional velayat-e faqih” is how Kadivar perceives the position. This version of the velayat-e faqih is directly elected by the people and can be impeached or otherwise voted out of office. In such a system, the velayat-e faqih is also supervised by the people’s representatives and can be criticized by them. And, Kadivar maintains, the velayat-e faqih should be subject to term limits instead of lifetime tenure in office.52 Kadivar warns that there is a current within the clergy that is seeking to turn the “Islamic Republic” into an “Islamic state,” one in which the people and their vote have no relevance. Similarly, there is a current of thought that assumes all legitimacy derives from the velayat-e faqih. The delicate constitutional balance between Islam and republicanism, he warns, painstakingly crafted after the revolution, is in danger.53 The powers of the velayat-e faqih as they have evolved in Iran are more extensive, Kadivar claims, and more arbitrary, than those held by the prerevolutionary monarchy. In the 1999 press interview that landed Kadivar before the Special Court for the Clergy, he had not minced any words: We see a reproduction of relations from the time of the monarchy. People had a revolution so that they could decide for themselves, not to have someone decide for them. The goal of the revolution was to fundamentally change social, political, and cultural arrangements in society. But in many ways the methods and the nature of the Islamic government have no differences with those of the monarchy. The only difference is that at the head of the system there must now be a person who is just, not dependent on foreign powers, and is knowledgeable about religion. Whether or not arrangements are as they were in the past, or how this person has come [to power], if we take these [matters] into account, then the issue is that in both theory and practice we had a monarchical system, and now we have a supposedly Islamic system. But the same norms and arrangements exist. Now the system is an Islamic monarchy. This means a system in which one ruler has absolute 51

Ibid., p. 165.

52

Ibid., p. 141.

53

Ibid., p. 176.

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and unlimited powers. Unfortunately, we saw all of this in the monarchical system, meaning that absolute authority, in a monarchical fashion that is not based on elections and supervision by the people. This is a government that is not limited by law. If we take all these factors into account, the result of the revolution, which was meant to change the system, has merely changed the system’s name and a few other features, such as dependence on foreign powers and or repression. This is not a fundamental transformation and has no relationship with the Islamic Republic that we wanted.54

Even in the relatively permissive atmosphere of the early 2000s, Kadivar’s analysis was deemed unacceptable by the Special Court for the Clergy and by other bastions of the state’s orthodoxy. It was imperative to silence him. Before long, the cleric found life in Iran untenable and joined the tens of thousands of other Iranians migrating out of the country.

Mohammad Mojtahed Shabestari Mohammad Mojtahed Shabestari was born in 1936 and entered the Qom seminary at age fifteen, where he spent the next eighteen years studying philosophy, kalam, and osul with the likes of Ayatollah Khomeini and Allameh Tabatabai. In 1969, he was asked to head the Islamic Center in Hamburg, Germany, during which time he further immersed himself in the comparative study of religions and philosophy. Returning to Iran at the start of the revolution, he briefly started a journal devoted to philosophy and political theory, and in 1980 was elected to the first Majles. He was also appointed to a teaching position at the University of Tehran and eventually reached the rank of full professor of Islamic philosophy. Mojtahed Shabestari’s book Hermeneutics, the Book, and the Tradition, based on his lectures at the university and the Qom seminary and originally published in 1997, thrust the clerical professor into the national limelight. As we saw in Chapter 5, the book in many ways further deepened the study of 54

Quoted in Roodi, Baha-ye Azadi (The Price of Freedom), pp. 157–158. Accused of “spreading propaganda against the Islamic Republic” and “publishing lies and distressing public opinion,” before defending his views on the velayat-e faqih, Kadivar went to great lengths to question the legal basis and legitimacy of the Special Court, maintaining also that the court did not have the expertise and qualification to assess the charges it was leveling against him. See ibid., pp. 39, 49–67.

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hermeneutics in the Islamic Republic that Soroush had begun. In 2006, Mojtahed Shabestari was included in the wave of forcible retirements of numerous university professors (as well as diplomats and other high-ranking government officials) undertaken by the Ahmadinejad administration. Since then, in a semi-retired fashion, Mojtahed Shabestari has continued his scholarly activities in the Center for the Great Islamic Encyclopedia, located in Tehran.55

Conception of Islam Mojtahed Shabestari sees religion in general and Islam in particular as being deeply imbued with humanitarian values. “Because I am a human,” he writes, “every time I approach religion from a humane perspective I understand it better.”56 As humans, every aspect of our communication can only be done from a humane perspective. Mojtahed Shabestari then links this humane conception of religion, derived from ijtihad, with the notion of human rights. Based on this new shari‘ah and the revisions to take place to old assumptions through ijtihad, human rights can enter the culture of Muslims and be popularly accepted as the central pillar around which Muslim politics revolves.57 The contextualization of Islam figures prominently in Mojtahed Shabestari’s arguments. From his perspective, Islam has presented people with basic, foundational principles. But it has left it up to the people themselves to come up with their own modes of social and political organization in each era, based on their own context and time. Democracy is a recent phenomenon that did not exist in the historical tradition of Muslims. Once they remove the rust of history from their religion, and reform their understanding of it, democracy becomes perfectly compatible with Islam.58

55

56

57 58

Mojtahed Shabestari’s full biography can be accessed on his website, www .mohammadmojtahedshabestari.com. Mohammad Mojtahed Shabestari, Ta‘amoli dar Qara‘t-e Ensani az Din (Reflections on a Humane Reading of Religion) (Tehran: Tarh-e No, 1383/ 2004), p. 7. Ibid., pp. 25–26. Abbas Khalaji, Nasazi-haye Nazari va Nakami-e Siyasi-e Gofteman-e Eslahtalabi (1376–1384) (Incongruities and Political Ineffectiveness of the Reformist Discourse [1997–2005]) (Tehran: Boye Kaghaz, 1397/2018), p. 149.

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Several of the concepts discussed in Islamic philosophy no longer apply today. Many of the concepts and phenomena that were important in classical times – the umma, imamate, religious philosophy, religious leadership over all religious and political matters – no longer apply today. Mojtahed Shabestari argues, for example, that everything mandated by Islam in relation to hudud (fixed penalties under Islamic law), qisas (retaliation in kind), diyat (blood money), and political and judicial affairs is a series of regulations that were established because of preexisting practices at the time of the Prophet, and within the context of the time and the circumstances then they were major steps forward. In the Quran and the tradition, according to Mojtahed Shabestari, only the principal values of governance and the shari‘ah have been outlined. Both in his deeds and in his sayings, the Prophet is silent on many issues, especially those involving science, philosophy, politics, and religious and political freedoms that were not relevant in the Hijaz of fourteen centuries ago. There are fundamental differences in the conditions and circumstances that existed at the time of the Prophet and today.59 When it comes to these new arenas, Muslims have freedom of action.60 The replacement of many of the fatwas and religious opinions that have been rendered in the past in regard to circumstances that existed at the time does not in any way detract from religion or lessen its force and power. Conversely, many of the issues that are of critical importance today – such as social and political freedoms, individual and personal rights, citizenship, rational management of society, policy planning, and political participation – did not exist when the classical texts were written, and traditions formed. For many of these critical and pressing issues, there is no precedent in Islamic tradition.61 Similarly, Mojtahed Shabestari maintains, political fiqh has serious limitations in its applicability to the modern world. By itself, he argues, fiqh is not enough to understand political systems, and we need other 59

60

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Mohammad Mojtahed Shabestari, Naqdi bar Qara‘t-e Rasmi az Din (A Critique of the Official Perspective on Religion) (Tehran: Tarh-e No, 1379/ 2000), pp. 276–277. Khalaji, Nasazi-haye Nazari va Nakami-e Siyasi-e Gofteman-e Eslahtalabi (1376–1384) (Incongruities and Political Ineffectiveness of the Reformist Discourse [1997–2005]), p. 219. Mojtahed Shabestari, Naqdi bar Qara‘t-e Rasmi az Din (A Critique of the Official Perspective on Religion), pp. 67–68.

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sciences such as sociology, political science, and public administration. At most, fiqh can tell us whether various political institutions do not contravene the shari‘ah. The science of fiqh cannot determine the content of these institutions or their functions, or whether or not they are even necessary.62 Mojtahed Shabestari questions the notion of marja‘-e taqlid, which, he maintains, has precedence in neither the Sunni nor Shia traditions. It is precisely because of this reason that the gates of ijtihad have remained open. Religion does not need a guardian, he maintains, and there is no place in religion for its guardianship. What is allowed are interpretations of religion, not having someone as its custodian.63 By the same token, religious opinions and fatwas are not beyond criticism. It is important to have open and critical discussions concerning religion. And, in forming religious views and opinions, there must be input from as wide a circle of faqihs as possible.64 Iranian society, according to Mojtahed Shabestari, is in need of renewing its religious culture. In this effort, the clergy can play an important role in liberating religion from the grip of officialdom by focusing instead on teaching people about Islam’s spiritual and emotional dimensions. It is up to social actors, not the state, to encourage and instill values among people. The spread of values in society does not occur through state prohibitions on various activities or cultural products.65 One of the biggest challenges facing Iran today is to reconcile society’s contemporary needs with its heritage and its past. The best perspective for Iran to adopt is one that is both religious and is also based on the modern era. For this worldview to be attainable, Iranian politicians and the larger political system need to allow the reconciling of religion and modernity to occur on its own.66 According to Mojtahed Shabestari, Muslims need to emulate the religious discourse of Prophet Muhammad, which had several specific 62

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Mohammad Mojtahed Shabestari, Hermeneutic, Ketab, va Sunnat (Hermeneutics, the Book, and the Tradition) (Tehran: Tarh-e No, 1379/2000), p. 47. Mojtahed Shabestari, Naqdi bar Qara‘t-e Rasmi az Din (A Critique of the Official Perspective on Religion), p. 334. Mojtahed Shabestari, Hermeneutic, Ketab, va Sunnat (Hermeneutics, the Book, and the Tradition), p. 94. Mojtahed Shabestari, Naqdi bar Qara‘t-e Rasmi az Din (A Critique of the Official Perspective on Religion), p. 300. Ibid., p. 195.

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characteristics. To start with, it was centered on reason; the invitation to accept the oneness of God (tauhid) was deeply rational. In addition to its rationality, the discourse sought the establishment and spread of justice. Moreover, it was a discourse that reflected existing realities and did not play on or deepen superstitious beliefs. Finally, the discourse invited people to be more merciful than vengeful. Today’s religious discourse therefore needs to be similarly rational, justice-centered, realistic, and merciful.67 The Holy Quran must be understood in a similar vein. As a book of religion and revelation, and as a book meant to guide people, the Quran offers guidelines for the material, political, social, and cultural lives of the people. The Book conveys God’s meaning so that believers can subject themselves to God’s divine message. But the Quran does not outline a specific socio-political philosophy.68 In devising society’s political arrangements, Mojtahed Shabestari argues, humans have been given the freedom to make their own choices. One of the most serious deviations that religion can suffer from is for the invitation to God to undermine social justice.69 Islam expressly forbids compulsion in religion. Similarly, for the faithful, there should be no redlines, and people should not be told when and what they can or cannot criticize. When a faithful person comes across a range of criticisms, the crucial choice is which one of these criticisms is consistent with their beliefs. The worst thing that can happen to a religious perspective is for it to fall into the whirlpool of politics. Such a condition will rot religion from within, and make any productive, enlightened thought impossible. Belief in God must always be due to selfmotivation and through independence of thought.70

Islam and the State Political legitimacy, according to Mojtahed Shabestari, cannot be maintained in the long term unless it is rationally backed up by people’s votes.71 This is one of the main reasons that the Iranian state’s 67 69

70 71

68 Ibid., pp. 342–348, 353. Ibid., p. 362. Mohammad Mojtahed Shabestari, Iman va Azadi (Belief and Freedom) (Tehran: Tarh-e No, 1379/2000), p. 145. Ibid., pp. 111–112. Mojtahed Shabestari, Naqdi bar Qara‘t-e Rasmi az Din (A Critique of the Official Perspective on Religion), p. 36.

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discourse on religion has hit a serious crisis, and this crisis is negatively impacting both the essential message of religion and its political role in society. In fact, for several reasons, the official Islam that the state enforces encountered severe crises in the second decade of the revolution. These crises arose from a number of factors, namely official Islam’s inability to devise a workable democracy; its willingness to employ violence against many segments of society, including the youth, women, thinkers, writers, and artists; and its inability to hold on to the legitimacy it had earned in the revolution.72 Today, Mojtahed Shabestari claims, the instrumentalization of religion for official political purposes has created serious crises for Islam and jurisprudence. Using fiqh to justify political rule, as is the case in the Islamic Republic, is a danger to both religion and society. The abuse of religion, or specific religious concepts, for political purposes is unforgivable. When that happens, religion rots from the inside.73 Those who are currently in charge of the official, jurisprudential narrative in Iran think they are implementing a traditional and orthodox jurisprudence in relation to politics and government. But, Mojtahed Shabestari argues, this is a clear mistake. Orthodox jurisprudence belongs to traditional society, he argues, and the cultural structures of traditional society stand in sharp contrast to our contemporary, modern society. The assumption that old understandings of fiqh and their functionality can be applied to today’s world demonstrates that the guardians of the official interpretations of religion do not really understand fiqh.74 Instead, the state-tied clergy have only deepened the gap between themselves and the rest of society, especially the youth. This divide is hardly surprising, given that the ulama often preoccupy themselves with issues of little interest or relevance to the lives of the ordinary individual. Mojtahed Shabestari is unequivocal in his endorsement of democracy. The only grand policy in relation to religion that a government can adopt, he maintains, is to protect complete freedom of speech. It is only through such a policy that religion can flourish. The state can seek help through reliance on the people’s religious beliefs and values. But this resort to religious values should have very clear boundaries and 72 74

73 Ibid., p. 31. Ibid., p. 302. Mojtahed Shabestari, Ta‘amoli dar Qara‘t-e Ensani az Din (Reflections on a Humane Reading of Religion), p. 73.

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cannot result in corrupting the essence of religion.75 Rulers who must resort to nondemocratic means to govern, and who cannot engage in dialogue and exchange of ideas, are weak and have flawed rationality. Politics and policymaking depend less on religious principles and are more intimately dependent on popular political participation.76

Islam and Democracy “Political freedom has priority over religious responsibility,” Mojtahed Shabestari boldly declares in one of his books.77 There can be no redlines even in criticism of religion. A true believer is one who is confronted with serious questions and whose faith is so solid that he can search for answers while still believing in his religion.78 In today’s world, a democratic system is the only system in which the two important realities of justice and freedom befitting of humans can be realized. It is through these two factors, justice and freedom, that people can give meaning to their humanity and fulfill their responsibilities before God.79 Freedom means to be free from unjust government, not freedom from religious beliefs and obligations. To be free means being free from the government, not from God. As for justice, in every era, Muslims are obligated to determine the basis of justice according to the circumstances and conditions that exist in that specific era.80 God has created humans to be free and responsible, according to Mojtahed Shabestari. Since being free and responsible is part of human nature, a person does not have a choice except to be free and responsible. The person does, of course, have a choice, choosing to act on the responsibilities with which they are faced, or ignoring them. Choice of action on responsibilities is the choice of belief or ignoring it. Therefore, belief is an act of choice. Belief is realized through action,

75

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Mojtahed Shabestari, Naqdi bar Qara‘t-e Rasmi az Din (A Critique of the Official Perspective on Religion), pp. 338–339. 77 Ibid., pp. 36, 113. Ibid., p. 261. Mojtahed Shabestari, Hermeneutic, Ketab, va Sunnat (Hermeneutics, the Book, and the Tradition), p. 203. Mojtahed Shabestari, Ta‘amoli dar Qara‘t-e Ensani az Din (Reflections on a Humane Reading of Religion), pp. 147–148. Mojtahed Shabestari, Naqdi bar Qara‘t-e Rasmi az Din (A Critique of the Official Perspective on Religion), p. 179.

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not through theory.81 There are different ways to define and conceptualize belief. Belief can be seen in terms of being “witness” to the mission of the Prophet. It can, alternatively, be seen as acting on an innate human responsibility. It may be seen as seeking philosophical knowledge, or belief in God. However belief is defined, it is inseparable from human will and free thought. The elimination of all internal and external obstacles to freedom of thought and human will is an absolute necessity for the realization of belief and benefiting from such a divine blessing.82 The logic of belief dictates that believers construct a social and political reality, and a structure of power, in which they can choose their beliefs freely, and they can therefore better devote themselves to God. Such a system, obviously, cannot be coercive and dictatorial.83 Mojtahed Shabestari rejects the constructed notion of “Islamic democracy” and maintains that there is an innate, natural compatibility between the two. Islam, he maintains, is democracy. In fact, he argues, “Islamic democracy” can actually be harmful in a number of respects. To begin with, in such a system, the executive is responsible for propagating Islam, and this is good for neither Islam nor democracy. The restrictions that Islam places on social relations and on cultural norms, according to Mojtahed Shabestari, are perfectly compatible with those found in democracy as well. Moreover, Muslims are allowed to revisit and revise their opinions and the fatwas of previous jurists who called for restrictions on or discrimination against individuals.84 According to Mojtahed Shabestari, the only social and political message that Islam has is emphasis on social justice and observing ethics in politics. Composite concepts such as “Islamic human rights,” “Islamic rationality,” and “Islamic conciliation and understanding” are later constructions that have no meaningful basis in Islamic philosophy and kalam. Service, kindness, and human ethics are the best ways for Muslims to make human rights the basis of their social relations. Human dignity is the common denominator of divine religions, especially Islam, Christianity, and Judaism. The essence of the mission of divine prophets in the social domain is to ensure human 81 82 84

Mojtahed Shabestari, Iman va Azadi (Belief and Freedom), p. 15. 83 Ibid., p. 22. Ibid., p. 79. Mojtahed Shabestari, Naqdi bar Qara‘t-e Rasmi az Din (A Critique of the Official Perspective on Religion), pp. 145, 148–149.

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dignity and to observe justice. Today we call this human rights. This is how Mojtahed Shabestari creates a philosophical bridge between Islam and modern society and politics. Mojtahed Shabestari believes Islam does not have a political philosophy of its own. What Muslims need to do is to observe the values of Islam and to base their social and political orders on those values. This is consistent with democracy and pluralism.85 Mojtahed Shabestari argues that the identity of democracy cannot be religious, that is, Islamic, since democracy is a method of government. As such, he maintains, the theoretical foundations of his views are based on analytical methods drawing from hermeneutics, pluralism, historicism, humanism, ethical and moral spiritualism, and pragmatism. The emphasis on pragmatism, as providing organization to ideal social and political life, made Mojtahed Shabestari’s ideas especially consistent with the reformist movement.86 According to Mojtahed Shabestari, the Quran has not mandated any specific form of government but has only laid out values: “The Quran does not see it worthy to spend time outlining methods and systems of government. But it does consider it worthwhile to determine values that relate to the act of governing.”87 In Mojtahed Shabestari’s perspective, whatever model of government upholds freedom and justice, regardless of its actual format, has the approval of religion. At present, he claims, only democracy is the one form of government that has the capability of ensuring both freedom and justice.88 For Mojtahed Shabestari, pluralism constitutes the essence of a democratic society. Democracy is the base, the foundation, and basic freedoms constitute its essence. Religious democracy must recognize individualism, pluralism, and responsible freedoms. Religious values manifest themselves in society on their own, and the state has no right to impose any values on people in the name of democracy.89 85

86 87

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Khalaji, Nasazi-haye Nazari va Nakami-e Siyasi-e Gofteman-e Eslahtalabi (1376–1384) (Incongruities and Political Ineffectiveness of the Reformist Discourse [1997–2005]), p. 65. Ibid., p. 66. Quoted in Farajollah Rahnavard and Nematollah Mahdavirad, Modiriyyat-e Entekhabat (Management of Elections) (Tehran: Ettela‘at, 1393/2014), p. 115. Ibid., p. 115. Khalaji, Nasazi-haye Nazari va Nakami-e Siyasi-e Gofteman-e Eslahtalabi (1376–1384) (Incongruities and Political Ineffectiveness of the Reformist Discourse [1997–2005]), p. 150.

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A plurality of religious interpretations is an important aspect of democratic security, and preventing such a plurality is anti-democratic. No society can be democratic unless all different interpretations of religion can have an equal right to emerge and grow. In such societies, of course, there are scientific methods of ijtihad and qara‘t, which is the knowledge of reading the Quran. But it is also possible to discuss these methods, and, if and when appropriate, to replace them with new methods. In other words, transformations in paradigms of religious thought and religious knowledge are quite possible, and no corporate group is allowed to impede them or to use violence to back them up. In such a society, interpretation of religion is allowed, and people are permitted, in an open atmosphere of discussion, dialogue, and ijtihad, to adopt the interpretation of religion that is acceptable to them. Blocking this free adoption of religious interpretation is a violation of democracy. In democracy, the rights of all citizens are observed regardless of belief, chosen path, and allegiance, and power cannot be concentrated within one group.90 A meaningful and sustainable democracy in Iran, according to Mojtahed Shabestari, is not possible without religious reforms. There needs to be fundamental reforms in religious views, beliefs, rules, and values. Many of the fatwas need to change. Those beliefs that favor men, or groups, over others need to change, as do the accumulated collection of values, beliefs, and rules that we call religion. All have been historically frozen, and many Muslims have forgotten the spiritual meaning of Islam. Therefore, there needs to be a fundamental reconstruction of our conceptions of the core meanings of Islam, of its spiritual dimensions, and the relationship of the person with God.91 Iran has a naturally plural society, with many ethnicities and religious communities. Uniformity will not work unless at great cost. It is important to be tolerant. Without presenting a solution, Mojtahed Shabestari highlights the fact that in fiqh men and women and Muslims and non-Muslims have unequal rights. He also reminds his readers that the Islamic Republic’s constitution leaves room for multiple interpretations of Islam rather than a single one. Although human rights is not religious, it is integral to the integrity of the individual and 90

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Mojtahed Shabestari, Ta‘amoli dar Qara‘t-e Ensani az Din (Reflections on a Humane Reading of Religion), pp. 148–150. Ibid., p. 177.

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to peace among people.92 The distribution of power in society must be just and equitable, and social justice is the only limitation that can be imposed on personal freedoms.93 This is why in the contemporary world, democracy is the only legitimate form of government. Theorizing a form of government that is not democratic in essence means justifying violence, and today this is exactly what the official interpreters of religion in Iran are doing.94 Mojtahed Shabestari argues that the traditional principles of fiqh and religious philosophy (kalam) are not comparable with democratic government. Prophet Muhammad did not address issues of religious and political freedom in the Quran and in the Hadith, because at the time these issues did not exist.95 This is not to imply, however, that having freedom means abandoning ethics and morality. Freedom is not the same thing as ethics and it cannot replace ethics, but neither does it have an adverse relationship with ethics. For every individual, there are two kinds of freedoms, one internal and the other external. External freedom is freedom from outside forces such as constraints by authorities, and freedom from physical and political forces. Limits on freedoms of speech, press, and political participation all constitute constraints on external freedoms. Internal freedoms, meanwhile, are philosophical and revolve around the philosophy of ethics and whether the individual has free will or forced will. Can the individual act out of self-motivation, or does an individual not have free will? Here, the person’s struggle is against internal forces rather than external ones. The internal freedom of the person can be realized when an individual’s reason and wisdom can determine their ethical responsibilities. We can adduce that at the core of human responsibility is reason and intellect (aql). And, by the same token, having external freedom is essential to attaining internal freedom.96 As compared to Yousefi Eshkevari and Kadivar, Mojtahed Shabestari’s arguments are more philosophical, articulated more 92

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Mojtahed Shabestari, Naqdi bar Qara‘t-e Rasmi az Din (A Critique of the Official Perspective on Religion), p. 264. Ibid., p. 63. Mojtahed Shabestari, Ta‘amoli dar Qara‘t-e Ensani az Din (Reflections on a Humane Reading of Religion), p. 75. Mojtahed Shabestari, Naqdi bar Qara‘t-e Rasmi az Din (A Critique of the Official Perspective on Religion), pp. 178, 275. Mojtahed Shabestari, Ta‘amoli dar Qara‘t-e Ensani az Din (Reflections on a Humane Reading of Religion), pp. 131–132, 139.

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through books and university lectures rather than through media interviews and the popular press. He remains one of the few members of the older generation of reformist clerics who was not hauled before the Special Court for the Clergy and made to answer for his views. Although today he is most retired and out of the limelight, similar to many others of his generation, he mostly eschews writings that could be construed as political, preferring a life of quiet scholarship to pressure or outright harassment by the security services.

A New Generation? Mohsen Kadivar, Hasan Yousefi Eshkevari, and Mohammad Mojtahed Shabestari made their most significant impact on Iranian politics and society in the 1990s and the early 2000s. All three remain active scholars today, Kadivar and Yousefi Eshkevari outside of the country and Mojtahed Shabestari inside Iran. But their current impact is not nearly as directly felt today as it was in the earlier years, when their arguments not only formed a larger discourse of religious reformism but gave theoretical substance to the reformist politics of the day. Given that out of necessity Kadivar and Yousefi Eshkevari publish their materials online, it is all but impossible to assess the current impact of their arguments among Iranian scholars and academics, much less the interested reader. For his part, Mojtahed Shabestari, now largely retired, writes mostly on philosophical and jurisprudential topics that have little bearing on politics. Today a new generation of religious intellectuals have emerged, one generation after Soroush and Kadivar, who build on the theories and insights of those before them.97 Their arguments are not fundamentally different from those of the earlier generation and revolve around many of the same themes – hermeneutics, ijtihad, the role of the state, and the relationship between Islam and democracy. What differences there are center mostly around the ways in which the new generation of intellectuals construct their arguments, namely often less bluntly and more indirectly, in order to circumvent state censors. Not surprisingly, much of the new generation’s arguments revolve around ethics instead 97

Hadi Tabatabai, Hadis-e Noandishan-e Dini: Yek Nasl Pas az Abdolkarim Soroush (Story of Religious New Thinkers: One Generation after Abdolkarim Soroush) (Tehran: Kavir, 1397/2018), pp. 18–19.

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of politics. Moreover, the audiences with whom they now connect also have the priorities of a different generation. In the first decade of the 2000s, the foot soldiers of the reform movement were the youth, mostly university students in their twenties and early thirties. Today, if public opinion polls are to be believed, Iranian youths, especially the twenty- and thirty-something generations, are largely disinterested in politics. Instead, their primary interests revolve around quality of life issues, including, especially, migration out of the country.98 In the remaining pages of this chapter, I focus on two religious intellectuals belonging to this later generation, both of whom happen to be academics. Abolqasem Fanaee was born in 1959, studied at the Qom seminary, and then earned a graduate degree in philosophy from the University of Qom, followed by a doctorate in the same field from Sheffield University in England. He is currently a professor of philosophy and divinity at Mofid University in Qom. Abolfazl Mousavian (b. 1955) is also a professor at Mofid University, specializing in theology and jurisprudence, having acquired his Ph.D. in Islamic jurisprudence and principles of Islamic law in 2005 at the Qom seminary. Among Mousavian’s seminary teachers and mentors, Ayatollah Montazeri figures prominently, which undoubtedly accounts for the overall nature of some of his views.

Abolqassem Fanaee Representing many scholars in his generation, Fanaee believes that today’s Islam, politicized as it is, pays insufficient attention to ethics and spirituality. This is particularly the case with the fatwas and views of prominent ulama active in the postrevolutionary period, such as Grand Ayatollahs Mohammad Reza Golpaygani (1988–1993) and Abolqassem Khoie (1899–1992), who often overlooked, or deliberately compromised, the spiritual and ethical dimensions of Islam. This was done either out of expedience (maslahat) or other, more immediate considerations.99 Fanaee does not want to make religion ethical; it already is. He wants to make understanding of religion and 98

99

For more on the preferences of today’s Iranian youth see Mehran Kamrava, Triumph and Despair: In Search of Iran’s Islamic Republic (New York: Oxford University Press, 2022), pp. 253–263. Tabatabai, Hadis-e Noandishan-e Dini (Story of Religious New Thinkers), pp. 29–30.

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religiosity ethical. Religion itself does not contradict ethics; properly understanding religion makes it ethical. Religion and ethics are deeply and profoundly intertwined.100 Religious teachings and beliefs provide the rational basis for ethical commitments. Contrary to what the Iranian ulama have historically claimed, closeness to God is not possible only through fiqh, according to Fanaee. Neither is the image of God that most intellectuals present, as indescribable and with undefinable characteristics but positive names, correct. Fanaee maintains that God is the “Supervisor of Ideals. God is sufficiently aware of realities concerning ethical regulations, is kind, judicious, and objective. In addition to being honest and trustworthy, God approaches issues from the perspective of ethics, does not hold grudges, and considers the ethical judgements of others.”101 Religion cannot continue to be abstract, according to Fanaee, and its practical, functional manifestations in society are far more important than some of the ritualistic practices that over time have come to be associated with it. Fanaee advocates what he calls a “functional fiqh.” Seminaries should train their students so that they can provide normative answers to new and emerging questions that are fit for evolving times and circumstances.102 Today, ijtihad requires more than knowledge of fiqh. We need to have a proper understanding of the times and the context in order to reach appropriate interpretations that apply to contemporary circumstances.103

Abolfazl Mousavian While Fanaee is more concerned with the ethical dimensions of religion, Mousavian’s arguments, reminiscent of those made in the 1990s, are more pointedly political. Mousavian outlines his vision of the ideal religious government as one in which the official institution of religion, namely the howzeh, maintains its independence, and religious scholars keep their distance from institutions of power. According to 100

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Abolghassem Fanaee, Din dar Tarazo-ye Akhlaq (Religion in Balance of Ethics) (Tehran: Mo‘aseseh-e Farhangi-e Sarat, 1384/2005), p. 72. Tabatabai, Hadis-e Noandishan-e Dini (Story of Religious New Thinkers), p. 52. Ibid., p. 59. Abolghassem Fanaee, “Jaygah-e Mozo’-shenasi dar Ijtihad” (The Position of Contextualization in Ijtihad), Naqd o Nazar, Vol. 2, No. 5 (1375/1996), p. 89.

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Mousavian, despite being a prominent member of the howzeh and holding the highest position of the land, Ayatollah Khomeini himself always insisted on the independence of the howzeh. Everyone must guard the independence of the howzeh, Mousavian maintains, and ensure that the howzeh does not become a tool for political oppression. Mousavian further cites Mulla Mohammad Kazem Khorasani (1839–1911), who warned that the clergy’s direct involvement in the political process will result in their absorption into the corrupt state, erode their supervisory role, and ultimately undermine their social position.104 Political independence, Mousavian maintains, would give the ulama the space and opportunity to guide the public independently and without political pressure. Moreover, religious scholars would not be forced to justify the actions of rulers who could potentially be oppressive and corrupt. Only the ulama who are politically independent of the state should be allowed to preach and propagate religion. Clerics are useful for society when rulers turn to them for advice and wisdom, not when they go after political power and position.105 Similar to religious intellectuals before him, Mousavian argues that Islam does not recommend a specific form of government. Both Prophet Muhammad and Imam Ali were willing to work with different political systems. Instead of proposing a particular model for political rule, similar to many social and cultural practices that existed, Islam largely reformed what was already practiced by making changes and adjustments to it. For example, commercial dealings stayed as they were, and only usury was banned. The main changes that occurred were in worship, as in prayer and tithings, but not necessarily in the system of political rule that existed.106 Calling on the ulama to abstain from becoming part of the state does not mean advocating separation of religion from politics. “We are of the belief,” Mousavian writes, that religion has noble objectives in social, political, economic, and cultural domains, and God has provided divine guidance for humans in each of these fields. It is for this reason that rulers and people alike must pay attention to religion so that society can be healthy and continue to evolve. It follows that the ulama must have a supervisory role in public affairs.107 104

105

Abolfazl Mousavian, Mabani-e Dini-e Mardomsalari (Religious Foundations of Democracy) (Qom: Mofid University Press, 1395/2016), pp. 84–85. 106 107 Ibid., pp. 82–83. Ibid., p. 86. Ibid., p. 85.

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While Islam does not prescribe a particular type of system of rule, there are some common denominators that Muslim political systems must have. To start with, the ruler must be ethical and a self-made person, with the point of politics being service rather than seeking after power and position. Humility, honesty, and fidelity are all characteristics that the ruler must have. And, so long as he remains just, the people have a responsibility to obey their ruler. Justice, according to Mousavian, remains one of the oldest and most important of values in Islamic government.108 There is no autocracy in the culture of the Quran, and true Islamic government entails rule by the people and is not autocratic. In Islamic government, kindness and conciliation are preferred to violence and harshness.109 Rule cannot be imposed on the people without their consent, as people have a right to their own political preferences. The people’s consent is so important that it must be observed even in matters of worship, and the people can choose their own imam to lead them in prayer. Ultimately, the government cannot intervene in the personal and private lives of individuals.110 Mousavian devotes a fair amount of attention to the responsibilities of Muslim rulers. One of the responsibilities of leaders in Islamic government, he argues, is to be at the same level in their personal lives as the weakest members of society. This has multiple benefits. Significantly, the leaders will experience the same challenges and issues as their people, and people will see that their leaders are faced with the same problems as they are.111 Islam also mandates that rulers be wise, knowledgeable, and just. At the same time, there is a need to safeguard against the possibility of autocracy as no leader can possibly know all the issues that need to be addressed at any one given time. This is why there is a need for a plurality of expert opinions that would determine what is in the people’s interests. If the leader is one of these experts, then he only has one vote, equal to that of everyone else. The scope of a ruler’s power is limited to what is necessary and sufficient. It is not unlimited.112 Despite all their differences in wealth, race, nationality, gender, wealth, and everything else, at their core individuals are equal in their willpower and their free will. In this respect, no one has superiority over others, and no one has the right to impose their will on others. 108 111

109 Ibid., pp. 88–101, 113. Ibid., p. 124. 112 Ibid., p. 126. Ibid., p. 168.

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110

Ibid., pp. 117, 120.

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People are even free to choose their own religion, and God commanded Prophet Muhammad not to impose his views on others if they do not want to obey him. Mousavian reminds his readers that the Quran specifically states that “there is no compulsion in religion.”113 For Mousavian, the ideal conception of rule is intimately democratic. To start, he maintains, all individuals, are created equal. Still somewhat uniquely among his peers, Mousavian insists that the Quran gives women the same political rights and responsibilities as men (in Surah al-Mumtahanah, 60:12).114 The state must also be respectful of the private domains of individuals. Not even the Prophet or Imam Ali had permission to interfere in the personal lives of individuals.115 Mousavian also gives greater weight to the opinion of the majority in contrast to the minority, since, he maintains, the majority’s rights will be upheld, and the collective wisdom of the majority is likely to be closer to the truth.116 In Islam, Mousavian concedes, majority opinion is not necessarily the right opinion, and minority decision is not necessarily the wrong opinion. There has long been a debate as to the legitimacy of majority versus minority opinion.117 Ultimately, according to Mousavian, what matters is the opinion of the majority, which nonetheless must be subject to certain rules and regulations so that it does not degenerate into mob rule. The majority still needs to give the minority the right to explain its position, and the majority cannot ignore the opinion of the minority.118 Shia belief holds that God has installed the Imams for leadership of the people. At the same time, obedience to the leader is up to the people. They can obey and be rewarded, or they can oppose and be reprimanded. God’s appointment of the Imam is a necessity. But the realization of the Imam’s leadership depends on the will of the people.119 According to Mousavian, if a ruler claims to have been appointed by God to rule and tries to rule without the people’s consent, his claims are false and he has no legitimacy whatsoever.120 113 116

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114 115 Ibid., pp. 183–185. Ibid., p. 252. Ibid., pp. 214, 220. Abolfazl Mousavian, “Jaygah-e Aqaliyat va Aksariyat dar Andisheh-e Siyasi-e Eslam” (The Position of Minority and Majority in the Political Thought of Islam), Baztab-e Andisheh, No. 15 (1380/2011), p. 22. 118 Ibid., pp. 14–15. Ibid., p. 22. Mousavian, Mabani-e Dini-e Mardomsalari (Religious Foundations of Democracy), p. 189. Ibid., p. 219.

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Mousavian argues that the principle of consultation (shura), which is repeatedly mentioned in the Quran, invalidates the notion of guardianship of one person over another.121 God never mandated that people obey the Prophet and the Twelve Imams, he argues, but left the people free to choose on their own, and left it up to the people to allow the Imams to form a government. Just as there is no compulsion to accept religion, there is no compulsion to accept political rule. Mousavian quotes Prophet Muhammad as having told Imam Ali, “If people accept your guardianship without opposition, then accept to rule. But if they oppose you, let them be and leave them alone.”122

Conclusion Within the context of sustained attention to Islamic hermeneutics and ijtihad, a number of reformist religious intellectuals set out to construct the theoretical foundations of an Islamic democracy. In doing so, they repeatedly examined three main themes: conceptions of Islam as it ought to be in comparison to what currently prevails, the relationship between Islam and the state, and the relationship between Islam and democracy. Specific variations in their arguments notwithstanding, the theorists all believe that Islam respects individual choices regarding one’s destiny, beliefs, and manners of political rule. The strength of Islam as a belief system lies in its emphasis on the importance of individual choices and on justice, not its forcible imposition by power elites. Freedom, of course, should be bounded within the framework of ethics and the greater good. But these boundaries do not include preordained political systems that privilege rule by one group, such as the clergy, over others. Islam, literally all reformist intellectuals insist, does not prescribe a specific political system. In the context of today’s Iran, making this point signals the endorsement of systems other than the velayat-e faqih, if not outright opposition to it. Yousefi Eshkevari maintains that prior to the revolution, the clergy lived in the world of ideas and hardly grasped the difficulties of religious government.123 The jurisprudential and institutional innovations that the Islamic Republic has had to come up with out of 121 123

122 Ibid., p. 189. Ibid., p. 210. Qoochani, Dowlat-e Dini va Din-e Dowlati (Religious Government and Government Religion), p. 10.

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necessity only validate Yousefi Eshkevari’s point. But if a scorecard is to be tallied, the reformist religious intellectuals themselves have not done much better in terms of presenting viable alternatives to the status quo. At best, it can credibly be argued, they have seriously questioned the basis of the velayat-e faqih system. As argued previously, part of the problem may well be the hostility and outright repression of the political establishment and its overreaction to anything that may even remotely hint at political alternatives. But the intellectuals’ own blind spots, for example to the question of women’s position in society, cannot be overlooked. Today, following mass migration out of Iran or forcible early retirements, the reformist religious intellectual discourse appears largely stalled. Little progress has been made to the corpus of literature, whose numerical expansion and philosophical depth were stopped in the early 2000s. The state’s intellectual critiques inside the country having been mostly silenced, the Special Court for the Clergy today busies itself with cases of clerical moral infractions, not theoretical expositions. But the reformist religious literature, and the theoretical groundwork it laid out, are still out there. Whether later generations of thinkers pick up where their predecessors left off, or end up reinventing the wheel, remains to be seen.

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Legitimate Authority

From its inception until today, one of the ongoing questions confronting the Islamic Republic revolves around conceptions of its political legitimacy. The political system’s multilayered basis in rule by a jurisconsult on the one hand, and the people’s vote on the other, lends itself to the question of the precise source of the state’s legitimacy. Is the state’s legitimacy divine, derived from the velayat-e faqih’s position as the rightful successor to the Twelve Imams, or does it emanate from the republican dimensions of the system through various forms of popular participation? Or, alternatively, does it rest in some combination of divine and popular sources? This question, which goes to the heart of the Islamic Republican system’s ideological cosmology, is the central focus of this chapter. At the broadest level, conceptions of the Islamic Republic’s political legitimacy are guided by one of three assumptions. The first assumption is that legitimacy is divinely bestowed, with the velayat-e faqih installed by God as someone who has the wisdom necessary to guide his people. There is no need for popular vote for the system to become legitimate, although there is no harm in it either. This popular vote is valid only when it has the leader’s approval. A second perspective assumes that God has given people the right and the ability to determine their own destiny and their affairs. Therefore, according to the shari‘ah, legitimacy rests with the people.1 A third outlook bridges these two perspectives, maintaining that while legitimacy is exclusively divine in genesis, it is practically irrelevant without acceptability, which makes the system functional when people participate in it.2 Legitimacy comes only from God, while it is the people who give the 1

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Sadeq Haghighat, “Feqh-e Siyasi va Democracy” (Political Fiqh and Democracy), Andishe-e Siyasi dar Eslam, Vol. 1, No. 4 (1394/2015), p. 45. Mohsen Kadivar, Nazariyeh-haye Dowlat dar Feqh-e Shia (Theories of Government in Shia Jurisprudence) (Tehran: Nashr-e Ney, 1378/1999), p. 47.

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system the acceptance it needs by deciding what is in their interests. Moreover, acceptance has the added benefit of drawing people closer to the political system.3 The question of whether legitimacy originates from God or from the people was originally discussed extensively in the Constitutional Assembly of Experts. The outcome is the jurisprudential innovation that is Article 56 of the Constitution. Importantly, the article conflates legitimacy (mashru‘iyat) with sovereignty (hakemiyat): Absolute sovereignty over the world and mankind belongs to God, and He has given people the right to determine their own destiny. No one can take this divine right away from the people or to put it in the service of a specific individual or a group. The people can exercise this God-given right according to procedures outlined in subsequent articles.4

This new interpretation of sovereignty/legitimacy is a composite of divine and popular notions of the two interrelated concepts. This amalgam of divine roots and popular input runs throughout the constitution. The document allows, for example, for both divine and man-made laws, as articulated in Article 4. The article stipulates that “all laws and regulations pertaining to civil, criminal, financial, economic, administrative, cultural, military, political, and other matters must be based on the laws and principles of Islam.” The task of ensuring that this is indeed the case is in turn entrusted to the Guardian Council, whose primary function is to safeguard the Islamic essence of the system.5 Popular elections, which the system sees as central to its legitimacy and its functions, are similarly subject to “supervision” by the Guardian Council. Presidential elections need the “approval” of the leader. Unlike in liberal democracies, in which the people’s vote is the sole criterion for legitimacy, in the Islamic Republic 3

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Abbas Khalaji, Nasazi-haye Nazari va Nakami-e Siyasi-e Gofteman-e Eslahtalabi (1376–1384) (Incongruities and Political Ineffectiveness of the Reformist Discourse [1997–2005]) (Tehran: Boye Kaghaz, 1397/2018), pp. 163–164. Jalal Derakhsheh, “Sakhtar-e Siyasi va Hoququ-e Nezam-e Jomhuri-e Eslami-e Iran” (Political and Legal Structure of the Islamic Republic System), in Siyasat va Hokumat dar Jomhuri-e Eslami Iran (Government and Politics in the Islamic Republic of Iran), Gholamreza Khajehsarvi, ed. (Tehran: Emam Sadeq University Press, 1390/2011), pp. 84–85. Qasem Sha‘bani, Hoquq-e Asasi va Sakhtar-e Hokoumat-e Jomhuri-e Eslami-e Iran (Basic Rights and the Structure of Rule in the Islamic Republic of Iran) (Tehran: Ettela‘at, 1396/2017), p. 50.

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people’s vote is subject to validation (tanfiz) by the velayat-e faqih. The state considers this to be the essence of its successful mixture of Islam and republicanism.6 Although the state’s official discourse seems certain on the question of where legitimacy comes from, in practice there continues to be a robust debate over the very meaning of the concept of legitimacy and its genesis. In both conservative and leftist circles, the notion of legitimacy is hotly debated in academic books and journals, media interviews, and letters to the editor.7 A number of different conceptions of legitimacy started to appear in the 1990s, around the same time as other theoretical expositions on Islam and reformism were becoming popular. The roots of these different interpretations go back to the fact that Ayatollah Khomeini himself discussed different sources of political legitimacy, in turn giving rise years later to different political currents in Iran, most notably reformists and Principlists.8 The debate over legitimacy did not, and does not, take place in a historical and political vacuum. In pre-Islamic Iran, legitimacy rested with the king, who in turn acquired his legitimacy from God. Obedience to the king was the same as obedience to God, and disobeying the king meant disobeying God. This type of legitimacy resulted in state institutions that were highly personalized, were not easy to break into for those not already connected to the system, and were highly centralized and autocratic.9 During the Qajars, the introduction of modern values and ideas challenged traditional conceptions that saw the monarch as bestowed with divine legitimacy. But both Qajar and Pahlavi monarchs continued to perpetuate notions of divine legitimacy, with the king portrayed as God’s representative on earth. Paradoxically, neither the monarchical constitution nor the 6

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Abbas Heidari and Hamidreza Gardashti, “Naqsh-e ‘Jomhur’ dar Sakhtar-e Siyasi-e Jomhuri-e Eslami-e Iran Mobtani bar Didgah-e Emam Khomeini va Qanun-e Asasi” (The Role of “Republic” in the Political Structure of the Islamic Republic Based on the Perspectives of Imam Khomeini and the Constitution), Siyasat-e Mote‘aliyeh, Vol. 4, No. 14 (1395/2016), p. 123. Reza Sanati, Mashru‘iyat-e Asemani (Divine Legitimacy) (Qom: Salman-e Farsi, 1394/2015), pp. 144–157. Ali Maleki, “Mabani-e Mashru‘iyat-e Nezam-e Jomhuri-e Eslami-e Iran: Ta‘addod-e Tafsir-ha; Chalesh-ha va Rahkardha” (Principles of the Legitimacy of the Islamic Republic of Iran: Multiple Interpretations; Crises, and Approaches), Siyasat-e Mote‘aliyeh, Vol. 6, No. 21 (1397/2018), p. 78. Ibid., p. 80.

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constitution of the Islamic Republic definitively settled the question of where legitimacy comes from. In each case, the democratic impulses of the revolutions that brought the documents’ crafters together were insufficient to overcome the centuries-old traditions of divinely ordained rule. Many of the country’s powerful clerics have long maintained, after all, that regardless of their form or shape, all governments during the Occultation are illegitimate unless they have divine sanction.10 Some observers have argued that Khomeini’s introduction of the notion of rule by the velayat-e faqih destroyed whatever remaining legitimacy the shah had had.11 In reality, by claiming that the velayat-e faqih represented a continuation of the imamate, Khomeini was building on a long tradition of Iranian thought that saw political rule as divinely ordained. After Khomeini’s death, Principlists and other rightists remained true to the letter and spirit of his notion of legitimacy, whereas the reformists combined Khomeini’s notions of legitimacy with other, mainly democratic elements. It is these different conceptions of legitimacy that the present chapter explores.

Legitimacy from God The notion that legitimacy is acquired only through divine sources forms the central assumption of the Iranian right. The rightists’ beliefs revolve around rule by God, the Prophet, the Twelve Imams, and, during the Occultation, by the velayat-e faqih. Given that Islam and shari‘ah comprehensively address all necessary dimensions of politics, they argue, there is no need for people to make laws; products of modernity such as human rights, democracy, humanism, and freedom need to be treated with skepticism and suspicion. Political rule needs instead to be legitimated by God. As such, the scope of the powers and authority of the velayat-e faqih go beyond the constitution, which is, after all, only a man-made document.12

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Taqi Rahmani, Naqqadi-ye Qodrat: Mavane‘e Nazari-ye Esteqrar-e Demokrasi dar Iran (Critique of Power: Subjective Obstacles to the Establishment of Democracy in Iran) (Tehran: Saraee, 1381/2002), p. 97. Maleki, “Mabani-e Mashru‘iyat-e Nezam-e Jomhuri-e Eslami-e Iran” (Principles of the Legitimacy of the Islamic Republic of Iran), p. 81. Ibid., p. 82.

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Rightist Notions of Legitimacy Proponents of divine legitimacy maintain that the Infallible Imams have made just faqihs responsible for the affairs of society. Divine guardianship has been bestowed directly on the faqih that Islam considers just, and the Muslim community does not play a role in the process. Instead, the just faqihs are God’s representatives on earth and represent the Prophet and the Infallible Imams. They are charged by God with the responsibility to look after the affairs of the Muslim community.13 As Hojatoleslam Ahmad Jahan-Bozorgi puts it, “in Shia thought, all forms of government are illegitimate, in whatever form they may be, unless they are ruled by one of the Infallible Imams or his designee, and impose divine rule on society.”14 In this sense, the system of velayat-e faqih, as a temporary form of rule that is established in order to hold society together until the Hidden Imam returns, is the only system that is legitimate. In Muslim societies, Jahan-Bozorgi maintains, the basis of law and regulations is made up of divine rules and injunctions, not the demands of the people.15 By itself, the people’s vote does not have the credibility needed to bestow legitimacy on the ruler. Only God is the source of all things that exist, and the justification for and legitimacy of all things depend on Him and His will rather than on the wishes of anyone else.16 Based on this worldview, political and legal rules of the state, and all other principles that are relevant to the government, must necessarily emanate from God and religion. Any form of governance that has its roots in God’s commands has legitimacy.17 Along the same lines, when God bestows legitimacy on a person, obedience to that person becomes obligatory. A person without such a divine sanction cannot be considered legitimate.18 A person who does not have legitimacy through God cannot be obeyed. In fact, people must resist such

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Kadivar, Nazariyeh-haye Dowlat dar Feqh-e Shia (Theories of Government in Shia Jurisprudence), p. 48. Ahmad Jahan-Bozorgi, Osul-e Siyasat va Hokumat (Principles of Politics and Government) (Tehran: Pazhoheshgah-e Farhang va Andisheh-e Eslami, 1378/ 1999), p. 129. Ibid., p. 148. Esmael Darabkalaie, Negaresh-i bar Falsafeh-e Siyasi-e Eslam (A Look at the Political Philosophy of Islam) (Qom: Bostan-e Ketab, 1380/2001), p. 179. 18 Ibid., p. 75. Ibid., p. 77.

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an illegitimate ruler and to make way for a legitimate ruler to come to power. The author Esmael Darabkalaei similarly argues that “in our worldview, no individual has the right to rule over others without permission from God. Therefore, the legitimacy of the executive branch must ultimately be approved by the Almighty through the mechanism of Leadership. Otherwise, it has no legitimacy.”19 “We do not recognize any of the legal-political orders that exist,” Darabkalaie writes, “and believe that all legal and political systems need to come from God, to whom the people must surrender.”20 By extension, people must obey such a divinely blessed political system and its leader. Based on such an assumption, Islam has devised a universal political order for all mankind in which political borders will eventually disappear and all nations will live as one. Paradoxically, neither Darabkalaie nor other theorists with similar ideas elaborate on this form of pan-Islamism. In Islam, the legitimacy of all laws, and everything else that is just, is derived from God.21 Nevertheless, a system does not automatically become legitimate just because its leaders wish to have some form of connection with God. A legitimate system is one that truly reflects the will of God.22 What this exactly means is left unclear, except in the form of a leadership that resembles the imamate. At the same time, having election is the people’s right, and no one can take that right away. The legitimacy of the law, the government, and the state is derived from God, and the people’s freedom to elect their leaders and legislatures must take place within the framework of Islam.23 Democracy is fully compatible with and is contained within Islam, because it observes the will of the people and pays attention to their willpower. But democracy is acceptable only when it is within the 19 21

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20 Ibid., p. 134. Ibid., pp. 81–82. Mohammad Javad Nowruzi, Nezam-e Siyasi-e Eslam (The Political System of Islam) (Qom: Howzeh-e Elmi-ye Qom, 1381/2002), p. 75. Nowruzi maintains that there are three categories of divine law in society. The first category are laws decreed by the Almighty, in which the Prophet and his Imams have had no role. A second category of laws are those devised by the Prophet and the Twelve Imams, based on divine permission. Third, there are laws that are devised by qualified jurists during the period of Occultation (p. 81). Darabkalaie, Negaresh-i bar Falsafeh-e Siyasi-e Eslam (A Look at the Political Philosophy of Islam), p. 232. Nowruzi, Nezam-e Siyasi-e Eslam (The Political System of Islam), p. 57.

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framework of religion. In this sense, the Islamic Republic is the most ideal form of democracy.24 Today, because of how its legitimacy is derived, the Islamic Republic system is the only truly legitimate system in the world.25

Mesbah Yazdi on Legitimacy Perhaps the most articulate proponent of the rightist conception of legitimacy was Ayatollah Mesbah Yazdi (1935–2021), who is often considered the theoretician of Khamenei’s Islamic Republic. According to Mesbah Yazdi, the word for legitimacy, mashru‘iyat, comes from the root shar’, religion. Therefore, legitimacy belongs to the person who has the right to rule – rightful ruler – and people are obliged to follow him.26 For Mesbah Yazdi, being ordained by God is the only criterion for a ruler’s legitimacy. Both Sunni and Shia traditions agree, he argues, that if God selects the ruler, then that ruler is legitimate. No one has the right to rule over others unless he has been selected by God to do so. Only then is the ruler legitimate.27 For Mesbah Yazdi, Islam and the religious nature of the political system have much greater weight over its republicanism, especially since republicanism can take many different forms.28 The republicanism of the Islamic Republic relates to its function, and its Islamic nature relates to its legitimacy. Mesbah Yazdi appears to equate “republicanism” with “civil society,” and endorse both in theory. “Civil society has several characteristics,” he writes, including ensuring people’s rights, encouraging popular participation, and bringing social, cultural, and economic benefits to the people. It benefits popular opinions and in enables people to devise optimal solutions to the issues facing them. Civil society prevents administrative corruption and makes it difficult for the government to neglect the people. It also reduces the burden on the state and deepens social obligations such as the prevention 24

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Jaber Amiri, Mabani-e Andisheh-haye Eslami (Foundations of Islamic Thought) (Qom: Mo‘aseseh-e Farhangi ve Entesharati-e Gorgan, 1380/ 2001), pp. 133–134. Darabkalaie, Negaresh-i bar Falsafeh-e Siyasi-e Eslam (A Look at the Political Philosophy of Islam), p. 87. Mohammad Taqi Mesbah Yazdi, Porsesh-ha va Pasokh-ha, Vol. 1 (Questions and Answers) (Qom: Mo‘aseseh-e Amouzeshi va Pazhoheshi-e Emam Khomeini, 1380/2001), pp. 9–10. 28 Ibid., p. 17. Ibid., p. 30.

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of evil and enjoinment of good. As such, there are no tensions and contradictions between civil society and Islamic society.29

Civil society derives its legitimacy from the religious system, and the religious system derives its functionality from civil society. Therefore, civil society only helps and further facilitates religious society, and there is no contradiction whatsoever between the two.30 Mesbah Yazdi sees democracy as null and void because it rests on the will of the people and not on divine will.31 “From our perspective,” he bluntly declares, “elections and voting have no bearing on legitimacy. The legitimacy of the Islamic system depends on divine dictates, not the people’s vote.”32 Through their vote for the Assembly of Experts, people select religious experts and qualified faqihs. This is not a new development, as people have long deferred to the judgments of the faqihs in determining who their marja‘-e taqlid should be. In this sense, elections become a means for “discovering” the leader, not a means of bestowing legitimacy on him. The determination of the velayat-e faqih through the Assembly of Experts is both appropriate and consistent with religious tradition.33 During the period of Occultation, under specific conditions and with God’s indirect selection, the ruler of Muslim societies is determined. It is then the people’s responsibility to get to know the velayat-e faqih, to discover him, and to perform their Islamic duties before their ruler and the political system.34 In a system based on the rule of the velayat-e faqih, the right to rule is that of God, and belief in such a system is rooted in the idea of the oneness of God.35 For many people, Westernstyle democracy has assumed greater importance and attraction over the laws of religion. Putting the people’s vote before divine laws is tantamount to abandoning the oneness of God and endorsing polytheism. Mesbah Yazdi warns against what he sees as “a new form of idolworshipping.”36 29

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Mohammad Taqi Mesbah Yazdi, Porsesh-ha va Pasokh-ha, Vol. 3 (Questions and Answers) (Qom: Mo‘aseseh-e Amouzeshi va Pazhoheshi-e Emam Khomeini, 1380/2001), pp. 26–27. Ibid., p. 28. Maleki, “Mabani-e Mashru‘iyat-e Nezam-e Jomhuri-e Eslami-e Iran” (Principles of the Legitimacy of the Islamic Republic of Iran), p. 83. Mesbah Yazdi, Porsesh-ha va Pasokh-ha, Vol. 1 (Questions and Answers), pp. 32–33. 34 35 36 Ibid., p. 25. Ibid., p. 49. Ibid., p. 48. Ibid., p. 41.

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A correct understanding of Islam, and grasping the depth and breadth of Islamic values, strengthens the legitimacy of the Islamic system.37 Rule belongs to the Almighty and those directly or indirectly selected by Him. This can only be made possible in a system that is governed by a velayat-e faqih.38 In such a system, people do not have a right to devise laws, even in matters that concern them. Mesbah Yazdi claims that all laws necessary for the betterment of society and the benefits of humanity have already been devised by Islam and the Holy Quran, and the making of such laws is beyond the capability of people or their representatives. Lawmaking, therefore, is a form of polytheism. In Islamic society, the parliament is not for purposes of lawmaking but is actually meant for consulting the velyat-e faqih when and if needed.39 For Ayatollah Mesbah Yazdi, the work of the three branches is acceptable and can be finalized only when it is validated by the velayat-e faqih.40 Similarly, a system is legitimate only if its laws and its conduct are based on divine rule. Since his efforts are directed at doing God’s will, the rule of the velayat-e faqih is legitimate and obedience to him is mandatory.41

Legitimacy and the People Even within the rightist camp, Mesbah Yazdi’s arguments on legitimacy stand out for their almost complete disregard of the role of the people. Contrary to most other theoreticians of the right, for example, he maintains that acceptance (maghboliyat) and legitimacy (mashru‘iyat) are not contingent on one another. Since his rule represents a continuation of rule by the Twelve Imams, the velayat-e faqih’s legitimacy does not depend on whether or not he is accepted. Absence of acceptance does not take away the legitimacy of the rule of the

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Mohammad Taqi Mesbah Yazdi, Hokumat-e Eslami va Velayat-e Faqih (Islamic Government and Velayat-e Faqih) (Tehran: Sazman-e Tablighat-e Eslami, 1380/2001), pp. 15–16. Mesbah Yazdi, Porsesh-ha va Pasokh-ha, Vol. 1 (Questions and Answers), p. 49. Maleki, “Mabani-e Mashru‘iyat-e Nezam-e Jomhuri-e Eslami-e Iran” (Principles of the Legitimacy of the Islamic Republic of Iran), pp. 86–87. Ibid., p. 88. Mesbah Yazdi, Hokumat-e Eslami va Velayat-e Faqih (Islamic Government and Velayat-e Faqih), p. 162.

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velayat-e faqih. It only encounters his rule with some problems.42 A counterexample would be Khomeini, for whom the righteousness of the political leadership was not enough; leaders also needed to be legitimized through public accountability.43 The overwhelming majority of Shii scholars envision some role for people in crafting political legitimacy. The question is the extent to which this popular role defines legitimacy as compared to making it functional in a practical sense. In broad strokes, reformist thinkers tend to argue that both the legitimacy and the acceptance of the state, and therefore of political leaders, come from the people and not from anywhere else. People must therefore be allowed to choose their leaders through elections, not through what God, or His Messenger, or their religion, dictate to them.44 At the opposite pole are proponents of what may be called “divine and popular legitimacy.” God has given political discretion to members of the Muslim community, these theorists argue, so that they can look after their own affairs within the framework of Islam. God has made people responsible for their own affairs, and no one can take this divine right away from them. People will elect their own leaders and other administrators from among those who are qualified so that they can represent the people and look after their affairs according to the tenets of Islam.45 In this sense, the people’s role is to decide on the acceptance of a system whose legitimacy rests with the Almighty.

“Reformist” Notions of Legitimacy It would be simplistic at best and inaccurate at worst to claim that Iranian reformists speak with a single voice or have the same perceptions of concepts such as legitimacy. By and large, however, not unlike the rightists, the reformists’ conceptions of legitimacy tend to have a number of common denominators. A majority of reformists accept the 42

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Mesbah Yazdi, Porsesh-ha va Pasokh-ha, Vol. 1 (Questions and Answers), p. 27. Arshin Adib-Moghaddam, “Introduction: Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini: A Clerical Revolutionary?” in A Critical Introduction to Khomeini, Arshin Adib-Moghaddam, ed. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2014), p. 16. Hasan Yousefi Eshkevari, “Hokumat-e Demokratik-e Eslami” (Democratic Islamic Government), in Din va Hokumat (Religion and Governance), Anjoman-e Eslami-e Mohandesin, ed. (Tehran: Rasa, 1377/1998), p. 301. Kadivar, Nazariyeh-haye Dowlat dar Feqh-e Shia (Theories of Government in Shia Jurisprudence), p. 49.

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idea of rule by God, the Prophet, the Twelve Imams, and, during the Occultation, by an elected velayat-e faqih with limited powers. While they see Islam as a comprehensive religion that outlines the necessary dimensions of politics, there is also need for a man-made legislation that would address certain aspects of political life and complement the shari‘ah. They also selectively endorse certain products of modernity, such as democracy, freedom, human rights, and political parties. Many tend to reject calls for strict political secularism. Rule needs to be legitimated by the people, they maintain, or by a combination of God and the people.46 In the reformist discourse, God has given humans willpower over their social and political lives, and human rule is consistent with God’s rule. When it comes to questions of legitimacy, the reformists maintain, it is incorrect to assume that the shari‘ah has mandated a specific form of government. Moreover, God has not chosen an individual, or a group of individuals, to monopolize political power and guardianship over the community. Just as the position of the Prophet as a ruler was not dependent on his position as a messenger of God, the velayat-e faqih cannot automatically claim the mantle of rulership over society by virtue of his rank and position.47 Power must be justly distributed in society, and it cannot be concentrated in one individual or one group. Legitimacy emanates from the people, and it is the people who give some individuals the right to rule. While direct democracy is not possible, the wider and more meaningful the people’s participation, the better. This can be done through civil society, syndicates, unions, political parties, and other participatory institutions.48 Despite popular assumptions, the reformists point out, Khomeini’s theory of velayat-e faqih called for “limited guardianship” and identified several kinds of political legitimacy in the form of popular consent to the government, public approval of the guardian, and popular representation in a legislative assembly.49 As the new republic’s 46

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Maleki, “Mabani-e Mashru‘iyat-e Nezam-e Jomhuri-e Eslami-e Iran” (Principles of the Legitimacy of the Islamic Republic of Iran), pp. 82–83. Hasan Yousefi Eshkevari, Kherad dar Ziyafat-e Din (Wisdom in the Service of Religion) (Tehran: Qasideh, 1979/2000), p. 38. Ibid., p. 44. Nura Hosseinzadeh, “Ruhollah Khomeini’s Political Thought: Elements of Guardianship, Consent, and Representative Government,” Journal of Shi‘a Islamic Studies, Vol. 7, No. 2 (Spring 2004), p. 129.

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constitution was being written, in several of his speeches, interviews, and writings, Khomeini emphasized the importance of legitimacy as resting with the people, especially in terms of active popular participation in the political process, having representatives, and being able to take part in the selection of the velayat-e faqih, even if only indirectly and through the Assembly of Experts.50 In Islam, the establishment of Islamic government is a necessity in every era, at the time of the Twelve Imams and during the Occultation alike.51 But the people are equally consequential in relation to the state. Even those who see legitimacy in divine terms do not completely overlook the role of the people in ensuring the legitimacy of the political system. One of the main proponents of the theory that legitimacy can be acquired through election was Ayatollah Montazeri. Montazeri believed that faqihs should present a number of qualified candidates to the people, who would in turn give them legitimacy through their votes. Montazeri viewed the theory of divine installation to be impossible to materialize, because, he argued, the velayat-e faqih cannot be realistically installed by God or, during the Occultation, by the Twelve Imams.52 It is important to have elections, according to Montazeri, because at any one time it is possible to have more than one qualified faqih. It is therefore important for the people to have a choice and to be able to make their preferences known. This also helps prevent chaos and indecision regarding who should assume the faqih’s position.53 In the early days of the revolution, Montazeri saw no place for “national sovereignty” or the separation of powers. “Government and law must be entrusted to those faqihs who are knowledgeable about the contemporary world. The executive branch must also be under their control. At the very least, the executive must operate under the direct supervision of the clergy. Members of the legislature must

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Ibid., p. 146. Sohrab Salahi and Ali Fattahi Zafarqandi, “Jaygah-e Mardom dar Tashkil-e Hokumat-e Eslami” (The People’s Place in the Formation of Islamic Government), Faslnameh-e Barresi-haye Hoquq-e Omumi, Vol. 2, No. 1 (1392/ 2013), p. 99. Abdullah Ebrahimzadeh Amoli, “Mansha’-e Mashru‘iyat-e Velayat-e Faqih az Didgah-e Emam va Rahbari” (Source of Velayat-e Faqih’s Legitimacy from the Perspective of the Imam and the Leader), Hokumat-e Eslami, Vol. 19, No. 3 (Autumn 1993/2014), pp. 84–85. Ibid., pp. 86, 89.

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also be made-up of faqihs, or at least their decisions must meet with the approval of the velayat-e faqih. Judicial power must also rest within the clergy. This means that the three branches of the executive, legislature, and the judiciary cannot be separated from each other, and all three must be subservient to the velayat-e faqih.”54 As already mentioned, with time, Montazeri steadily changed his political, and, ultimately, more importantly, his jurisprudential, positions. As scholars have observed, “Montazeri, who once helped design and implement Iran’s Islamic polity, came to formulate a theory for its dissolution.”55 Following the highly contentious June 2009 presidential elections that controversially led to Ahmadinejad’s re-election and the eruption of the Green Movement, which was violently suppressed, on July 10 Ayatollah Montazeri issued what was to become his final fatwa. Called “the most radical fatwa of his active life,” Montazeri outlined “the theory of automatic annulment of a political system if and when its leaders lose the trust of the people.”56 The fatwa came in the form of a response to a letter by Mohsen Kadivar, one of Montazeri’s former students. The fatwa left no room for a nondemocratic system. It is incumbent upon believers to struggle against those who usurp power, the ayatollah emphatically declared. Political struggle for freedom is not optional. It is an obligation. According to the fatwa, leaders must prove they are worthy of the people’s confidence and trust. In cases when people lose confidence in their leader, it is not necessary to prove misconduct by the leader. Instead, given his position of leadership, the burden of proof is on leaders to demonstrate that he deserves the people’s trust and continued support. In the case of the Islamic Republic, an impartial body needs to adjudicate the conditions under which trust between people and their leaders is broken down. This adjudicating body cannot be made up of any of the state’s existing institutions – the Guardian Council, the Assembly of Experts, the 54

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Quoted in, Davood Feirahi, Feqh va Siyasat dar Iran-e Mo‘aser (Jurisprudence and Politics in Contemporary Iran) (Tehran: Nashr-e Ney, 1393/2014), p. 385. Ahmad Sadri and Mahmoud Sadri, “Delegitimizing the Islamic Republic of Iran with a Fatwa: The Significance of Ayatollah Montazeri’s Post-Election Legal Ruling of July 2009,” in The People Reloaded: The Green Movement and the Struggle for Iran’s Future, Nader Hashemi and Danny Postel, eds. (Brooklyn, NY: Melville House, 2010), p. 154. Ibid., p. 153.

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Expediency Council, etc., since none of these is politically impartial.57 Montazeri saw the task of the Assembly of Experts as “determining the qualifications” of candidates for the position of velayat-e faqih. The Assembly is not meant to elect the leader. Once the Assembly has determined a list of qualified faqihs, it is up to the people to elect one of them. Currently, as the theory of divine installation has evolved in actual practice, it is the Assembly of Experts that gives legitimacy to the faqih by electing him.58 For Montazeri, not only does legitimacy come from the people, they also have the right to supervise the conduct of the velayat-e faqih.59 He similarly believed that political parties were indispensable to the process of representation of interests in society and that establishing them was indeed mandatory and a “canonical duty.”60 Similar arguments were presented by Ayatollah Rafsanjani, also in the later years of his long career in Iranian politics. Rafsanjani rejected the notion that the successors to the Infallible Imams are chosen by God. “I do not accept this. What God told us is the characteristics of the ruler, and it is the people who determine if these features can be found in a certain faqih. People elect the Assembly of Experts, which in turn selects the leader. Therefore, all institutions are legitimized through the vote of the people.”61 According to Rafsanjani, unlike the first generation of revolutionaries, who had a metaphysical conception of politics, the conceptions of subsequent generations are grounded in reality. . . From the first day, our conception of politics has been Earthbound and realistic. There have been individuals with metaphysical assumptions about politics, and they insist on it. But we do not accept that. From the very beginning, this is what Imam Khomeini said; he gave people the power to bestow legitimacy.62 57 58

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Ibid., pp. 153–154. Ebrahimzadeh Amoli, “Mansha’-e Mashru‘iyat-e Velayat-e Faqih az Didgah-e Emam va Rahbari” (Source of Velayat-e Faqih’s Legitimacy from the Perspective of the Imam and the Leader), p. 88. Salahi and Fattahi Zafarqandi, “Jaygah-e Mardom dar Tashkil-e Hokumat-e Eslami” (The People’s Place in the Formation of Islamic Government), p. 108. Shahrough Akhavi, “The Thought and Role of Ayatollah Hossein‘ali Montazeri in the Politics of Post-1979 Iran,” Iranian Studies, Vol. 41, No. 5 (December 2008), p. 654. Quoted in, Sanati, Mashru‘iyat-e Asemani (Divine Legitimacy), pp. 59–60. Ibid., pp. 60–61.

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Rafsanjani maintained that Islam outlines different kinds of legitimacy. One form of legitimacy, which has existed since the time of the Prophet, can be considered “two-phased,” whereby God chose Mohammad, and after the Prophet the people chose the ruler either through consensus or appointment by the previous ruler or through previously set rules and guidelines. Another type of legitimacy is the will of the people. This kind of legitimacy, resting with the people, came about after the Prophet and the Twelve Imams, who uniquely enjoyed divine legitimacy. There is also a type of legitimacy that is twopronged, based on which the Infallible Imams have divine legitimacy, and then during the Occultation the people elect one of the marja‘s who has the right qualifications. A final kind of legitimacy is comprised of an amalgam of divine and popular legitimacy, in which rule is bestowed on the Infallible Imams and then on the faqihs with the support of a majority of the people.63 Inevitably, matters related to political participation, elections, and the people’s relationship with the system raise the issue of political parties. What role, if any, should political parties play in politics, and how does that complement or contradict jurisprudential notions of legitimacy? Grand Ayatollah Yusef Saanei (1937–2020) saw political parties as important components of human rights and democracy. He credited the fact that an African-American rose to be the president of the United States, despite pervasive discrimination in the United States against blacks no less than fifty years ago, to the role of political parties in facilitating democracy.64 Due to a lack of political parties, he argued, Iranian politics lacks any rules of the game and an agreement among political actors to disagree. In a country like Iran, which has frequent elections, political parties are an essential feature of the political landscape. The country has suffered a great deal from their absence.65 Saanei and others who share his views often remind audiences that “party” and other terms related to it have been mentioned nineteen times in the Quran.66 Political parties in Iran, they recall, date back to 1905 and the start of the Constitutional Revolution, and began as dowrehs, informal gatherings in which men or women would discuss 63 64

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Ibid., p. 10. Davood Feirahi, Feqh va Homkrani-e Hezbi (Jurisprudence and Party Governance) (Tehran: Nashr-e Ney, 1396/2017), p. 36. 66 Ibid., p. 37. Ibid., p. 91.

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various issues of interest.67 Today, the Ministry of Interior claims that there are more than 240 officially registered political parties and associations. But Iran’s narrowing political space has not lent itself to party politics, and most political parties exist only on paper. As a cleric once lamented, “in reality our society continues to exist in preparty conditions.”68 Theologians like Ayatollah Mesbah Yazdi originally questioned the need for political parties, dismissing them as Western creations and proposing Islamic alternatives as replacements. But even the archconservative ayatollah later saw political parties as keys to political collaboration and cooperation.69 In a speech in 2011, Khamenei also explicitly endorsed the idea of a political party, arguing that there are two types of parties. There are some political parties that challenge power and provide clarity and direction to people’s thoughts and ideological beliefs, he said. These types of parties are positive for the political system and are, in fact, necessary. A second type of party, found especially in the West, is designed primarily for purposes of capturing political power and holding on to it, therefore presenting the political system with a potential source of threat. For Iran, Khamenei argued, “political parties are necessary for the continuation of the revolution.”70 Rhetoric aside, the leader has shown little inclination to encourage the widespread and active participation of parties in the political process.71

Legitimacy and Acceptance Rightist scholars insist on distinguishing between legitimacy and acceptance. The people’s role in government is nuanced, they maintain. There are two dimensions to rule. One is legitimacy, which is based on divine rightfulness (haqqaniyat), and the other is acceptance. People have no role to play in legitimacy. This means that the people’s acceptance of, and obedience to, someone does not bestow rightfulness on the government or the leader. Popular elections do not amount to divine rightfulness. Such rightfulness is only determined by God and is in turn bestowed by Him onto individuals who are specifically selected 67 71

68 69 70 Ibid., p. 103. Ibid., p. 51. Ibid., p. 38. Ibid., p. 415. I have explored this topic is some depth in Mehran Kamrava, Righteous Politics: Power and Resilience in Iran (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2023).

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to rule. Only then does the selected person have the legitimacy to rule. The people’s primary role is to bestow acceptance. In short, legitimacy emanates from God and acceptance comes from the people.72 Darabkalaie contends that the only perspective acceptable in Shia religion is the one ascribing no role in legitimacy, which comes only from God. People are a source of acceptance, not legitimacy. This acceptance makes the system functional but not legitimate.73 A government that does not have popular acceptance is not legally valid, even if it is based on religion.74 Legitimacy (mashru‘iyat) should not be seen as the same thing as religiosity (shar‘iyat). Legitimacy means the legality of a political system and requires two key elements, acceptance (maqbuliyat) and justice (as defined in Islam). A system is fully legitimate only when it is popularly accepted and is just.75 The ability of a government to rule is not a sign of its legitimacy. Legitimacy is separate from acceptance, and the two cannot be combined. Legitimacy involves very specific norms and principles and goes beyond popular satisfaction.76 Acceptance, meanwhile, in the form of a popular vote – as in bay‘at, or allegiance – is a necessity in rule. By itself, however, it is insufficient.77 The people’s acceptance is a necessary but insufficient condition for the legitimacy of a system, since legitimacy ultimately rests with the Almighty.78 Acceptance means ruling over, or the manifestation of rule, whereas legitimacy means justness and legality. In systems in which there are free and fair elections, found mostly in the West, there is no difference between “acceptance” and “legitimacy.” In fact, such a distinction does not exist in any system in which legitimacy is based on the will of the 72

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Amiri, Mabani-e Andisheh-haye Eslami (Foundations of Islamic Thought), pp. 111–112. Darabkalaie, Negaresh-i bar Falsafeh-e Siyasi-e Eslam (A Look at the Political Philosophy of Islam), pp. 156–259. Sanati, Mashru‘iyat-e Asemani (Divine Legitimacy), p. 87. Emad Afrough, Ma Ghal wa Man Ghal, Vol. 2 (What Was Said and Who Said It, Vol. 2) (Tehran: Hamshahri, 1392/2013), p. 135. Darabkalaie, Negaresh-i bar Falsafeh-e Siyasi-e Eslam (A Look at the Political Philosophy of Islam), p. 72. Mohammad Shetabdar, “Tabyeen-e Veyalat-e Motlaqeh Faqih beh Manzour-e Gozinesh-e Sanjeh-e Roykardi dar Negareh-haye Zarurat, Maslehat va Estabdad” (Explanation of Absolute Velayat-e Faqih for Purposes of Choosing Evaluative Perspectives on Necessity, Expedience, and Autocracy), Pure Life, Vol. 4, No. 9 (1396/2017), p. 159. Nowruzi, Nezam-e Siyasi-e Eslam (The Political System of Islam), p. 150.

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people. But in an Islamic system, legitimacy means “rationally justifying the just and legal nature of the laws needed to rule over the people.”79 In such a system, “acceptance” does not lead to “legitimacy.” Only legitimacy fosters acceptance, not the other way around. The conservative thinker Emad Afrough argues that the Islamic Republic’s political system is based on a new conception of political legitimacy, one with several complementary components. The most important of these components include justness, religiosity, ensuring the people’s satisfaction with the ruler, and popular acceptance of the system. This composite conception of legitimacy was first introduced by Khomeini and subsequently reinforced by Khamenei.80 Among Khamenei’s many political and ideological pronouncements, in fact, in addition to detailed defense of the theory of velayat-e faqih, there are frequent references to the importance republicanism and the voices and votes of the people.81 Khamenei sees the people’s votes as the basis of legitimacy. Accordingly, trust is key to governing. Without mutual trust between the government and the people, state–society relations suffer from inevitable decay.82 At the same time, Khamenei sees legitimacy as being above and beyond elections and as having a divine dimension. He accepts the duality of legitimacy and acceptance – divine and popular – and their complementary relationship with one another.83 Ayatollahs Javadi Amoli and Rafsanjani both make a similar argument. Because of the importance of acceptance to make a system operational, Javadi Amoli maintains, regardless of our prevailing 79

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Reza Tabesh and Jafar Mohseni Darebidi, Mabani-e Mashru‘iyyat-e Nezam-e Jomhuri Eslami Iran (Principles of the Legitimacy of the Islamic Republic of Iran) (Tehran: Pazhouheshgah-e ‘Olum-e Ensani va Motale‘at-e Farhangi, 1390/ 2011), p. 201. Emad Afrough, Ma Ghal wa Man Ghal, Vol. 3 (What Was Said and Who Said It, Vol. 3) (Tehran: Hamshahri, 1392/2013), p. 134. Masoud Moinipour and Mohammad Reza Abdolahnasab, “Rabeteh-ye Velayat va Jomhuriyat dar Andisheh-e Siyasi-e Ayatollah Khamenei” (The Relationship of Guardianship to Republicanism in the Political Thought of Ayatollah Khamenei), Siysat-e Mote‘aliyeh, Vol. 4, No. 15 (1395/2016), p. 83. Jalal Dorakhshah, Asghar Eftekhari, and Mohsen Radadi, “Tahlil-e Mazmoni-e E‘temad dar Andisheh-e Ayatollah Khamenei” (Thematic Analysis of Trust in Ayatollah Khamenei’s Thoughts), Jostar-haye Siyasi-e Mo‘aser, Vol. 6, No. 3 (1394/2015), p. 53. Moinipour and Abdolahnasab, “Rabeteh-ye Velayat va Jomhuriyat dar Andisheh-e Siyasi-e Ayatollah Khamenei” (The Relationship of Guardianship to Republicanism in the Political Thought of Ayatollah Khamenei), p. 88.

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conceptions of legitimacy and acceptance, in either case the role of the people in the Islamic system is a central one. This was also the main argument that Ayatollah Khomeini made.84 For Javadi Amoli, the people’s acceptance is all the more important in light of the notion of installation (nasb), according to which the velayat-e faqih is installed into his position through the choice of other faqihs, who have “discovered” his eminence and his qualifications for the position.85 In this so-called two-pronged legitimacy, which Rafsanjani also advocated, people confer on members of the ulama the right that God has given them, whereas in entesab (appointment/installation) perspective, the people’s allegiance (bey‘at) is an external condition merely meant to make government operational. Insofar as the velayat-e faqih is concerned, Rafsanjani was a proponent of this two-pronged legitimacy and not in any way the leader’s direct election.86 The position of the velayat-e faqih is far too important, he maintained, to be determined by the masses through popular elections. The task is best left to experts and specialists.87

Legitimacy and the Velayat-e Faqih However the notion is conceived, insofar as the legitimacy of the Islamic Republic is concerned, the velayat-e faqih plays a central role. As we have seen so far, some theorists maintain that the justness and legitimacy of a political system depend solely on popular vote.88 This conception is found largely, though not exclusively, among theorists with nonclerical backgrounds. Proponents of a second school hold that the faqih’s legitimacy is derived from both God’s will and the people’s vote. Ayatollah Montazeri, for example, maintained that while the velayat-e faqih has the right to rule based on the fact that he is a just ruler, he must also secure the people’s “acceptance” through a popular vote.89 Still others believe that the faqih’s legitimacy is divine and is 84

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Salahi and Fattahi Zafarqandi, “Jaygah-e Mardom dar Tashkil-e Hokumat-e Eslami” (The People’s Place in the Formation of Islamic Government), p. 110. Ibid., p. 107. Sanati, Mashru‘iyat-e Asemani (Divine Legitimacy), pp. 97–98. Ibid., p. 102. Mohsen Kadivar, Daghdagheh-haye Hokumat-e Dini (Concerns of Religious Government) (Tehran: Nashr-e Ney, 1376/1997), p. 65. Sanati, Mashru‘iyat-e Asemani (Divine Legitimacy), pp. 39–40.

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derived from God alone, who in turn installs the faqih in his position. Elements from all these different schools concerning the faqih’s legitimacy can be found in the speeches and writings of Ayatollahs Khomeini and Khamenei. Ultimately, however, they both believe in the notion of the divine legitimacy of the faqih.90 For Kadivar, it is actually the different sources of legitimacy that constitute the critical difference between the velayat-e faqih and the absolute velayat-e faqih. The velayat-e faqih derives his legitimacy from the people, according to Kadivar, whereas the absolute velayate faqih’s legitimacy comes from the Almighty.91 Given this divine legitimacy, in a system of absolute velayat-e faqih, acceptance of the ruler is compulsory and is based on a one-way flow of influence rather than one of interaction and mutual influence. In each of the two systems, therefore, republicanism has a different meaning. In absolute velayat-e faqih, Islam determines the people’s destiny; in velayat-e faqih, it is the people who control their own destiny. In absolute velayat-e faqih, no institution can question what the faqih does because he is accountable only to God. The Assembly of Experts can question the faqih only at the beginning of his rule, and only God can remove the absolute velayat-e faqih. But in limited velayat-e faqih, because he is elected either by the people directly or by the Assembly of Experts, if he does not perform his duties, or if he is incapacitated, he can be removed from office.92 Kadivar himself believes that legitimacy should be both divine and popular (mashru‘iyat-e elahi-e mardomi).93 With Khomeini’s foundational rule in the 1980s and then the consolidation of power by Khamenei beginning in the early 1990s, the notion that the velayat-e faqih’s reign is divinely sanctioned became part of the official orthodoxy. This notion, importantly, is not an innovation that can be credited to the Islamic Republic and builds on a long tradition of clerical conviction of the right to rule. Iran’s Shii clergy have long been deeply convinced of their political legitimacy and their right to rule. “Ruling with God to realize his wishes for man, they

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Ebrahimzadeh Amoli, “Mansha’-e Mashru‘iyat-e Velayat-e Faqih az Didgah-e Emam va Rahbari” (Source of Velayat-e Faqih’s Legitimacy from the Perspective of the Imam and the Leader), pp. 81–110. Kadivar, Daghdagheh-haye Hokumat-e Dini (Concerns of Religious Government), p. 65. 93 Ibid., p. 69. Ibid., p. 143.

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project a sense of rightness that constitutes grandiosity.”94 Shii thinkers as far back as Sadr ad-Din Muhammad Shirazi, better known as Mulla Sadra (1571–1635), believed that humans have come from the direction of God, and move toward God, with life being one of the stages in the journey. Prophets and Imam, Mulla Sadra maintained, are guides in that journey.95 The people have no say in choosing them, but their acceptance makes the Imam’s rule functional. The same principle applies during the Occultation. A majority of clerics, from Mulla Sadra to Khomeini, believe in the theory of divinely sanctioned installation (entesab) of the faqih.96 Shii faqihs, the argument goes, “are leaders of people on behalf of Imams, and all affairs of Muslims have been delegated to them.”97

The Official Orthodoxy Khomeini’s conception of the legitimacy of the velayat-e faqih in its absolutist manifestation now forms the official position of the Islamic Republic. In this conception, since the velayat-e faqih is in charge of administering and supervising the affairs of the country, he derives his legitimacy from the shari‘ah, as the successor of the Twelfth Imam. The people’s role is at best secondary. This position has now become part and parcel of the state’s formal ideological stance: Although the people have no role in bestowing legitimacy on the velayat-e faqih, a task that falls on the shari‘ah and religion, manifesting the rule of the velayat-e faqih and ensuring its realization, depends on the public’s acceptance and acquisition. This means that after acquiring legitimacy from God and from the Hidden Imam, if the velayat-e faqih cannot accept public consensus and acceptance, in reality he cannot exercise velayat over the 94

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Marvin Zonis, “The Rule of the Clerics in the Islamic Republic of Iran,” The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Sciences, Vol. 482 (November 1985), p. 96. Farzaneh Ranjbarzadeh and Abbas Javarshakian, “Maqbuliyat va Mashru‘iyate Hokumat-e Eslami dar Andisheh-e Mulla Sadra va Emam Khomeini” (The Acceptance and Legitimacy of Islamic Government in the Thoughts of Mulla Sadra and Imam Khomeini), Faslnameh-e Motale‘at-e Siyasi, Vol. 6, No. 24 (1393/2014), p. 136. Ibid., p. 141. Mohsen Sheikholeslami, “Hokumat-e Eslami va Rahbari-e an az Nazar-e Emam Khomeini” (Islamic Government and Its Leadership in Imam Khomeini’s Views), Hokumat-e Eslami, Vol. 4, No. 2 (1378/1999), p. 41.

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people. Therefore, the phenomenon of velayat-e faqih depends on both legitimacy and acceptance, the former a divine matter and the latter the responsibility of the people.98

Khomeini’s immediate successor did not veer off from the founder’s position. According to Khamenei, “based on the principles of Twelver Shiism, in every age and period the velayat-e faqih has the right of leadership in Islamic society and can manage the affairs of the community. The role of the faqih is the guidance of society and leadership of the people. This is an integral principle of our religion.”99 Before long, state-tied ideologues busied themselves with elaborations supporting the official orthodoxy. “In reality, the basic fundamentals of political power in the Islamic Republic are explained in the position of the velayat-e faqih,” one such ideologue claims for example, “and all government branches have a division of labor, which, according to Article 57 of the constitution, are all under the supervision of the Velayat-e Faqih. In this respect, while they are obligated to work with each other, each is independent of the other and cannot intrude on the purview of the other.”100 In the constitution of the Islamic Republic, another one maintains, the nature and identity of political power is divine, and its primary manifestation is in the position of the velayat-e faqih, from which all power emanates. There is, at the same time, separation of powers, which means independence of each branch of the government and separation of responsibilities, all under the supervision of the velayat-e faqih.101 According to the official orthodoxy, in the age of the Prophet, he was the legitimate ruler. During the Imamate, it was the Twelve Imams who enjoyed the legitimacy to rule, and now, during the Occultation, it 98

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Hussein Elahinejad, “Mahdaviyat Mabna-ye Din Shenakhti-e Velayat-e Faqih dar Tahkim-e Nezam-e Jomhuri-e Eslami” (Mahdism as the Basis for Religious Understanding of Velayat-e Faqih in Strengthening the Islamic Republic System), Faslnameh-e ‘Elmi-Tarviji Pazhohesh-haye Mahdavi, Vol. 4, No. 15 (Winter 1394/2015), p. 71. Quoted in, Ebrahimzadeh Amoli, “Mansha’-e Mashru‘iyat-e Velayat-e Faqih az Didgah-e Emam va Rahbari” (Source of Velayat-e Faqih’s Legitimacy from the Perspective of the Imam and the Leader), p. 101. Esmail Ajorloo and Danyal Taheri, “Ashnaee ba Mafahim-e Huquq-e Omumi: Barresi-ye Mafhoom-e ‘Qodrat-e Siyasi’” (Familiarity with Public Law Concepts: Analysis of the Concept of ‘Political Power),’” Pazhoheshkadeh-e Shura-ye Negahban (1395/2016), p. 17. Ibid., p. 18.

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is the divine sage and qualified mujtahids who are at the apex of legitimate political power.102 The velayat-e faqih’s supervisory role over the three branches of the government goes to the heart of the legitimacy of the system. If the system’s legitimacy rested only with the people, then the velayat-e faqih would be undermining this legitimacy. But since in the Islamic Republic legitimacy is acquired through divine rule and religion, then the guardianship of the system by the velayat-e faqih is the source of its legitimacy. More specifically, it is through the velayat-e faqih’s endorsement (tanfiz) of the system, both in its entirety and of its individual components, that the political system acquires its legitimacy.103 Since the qualification of the imam cannot be determined by the people, imamate is only possible through divine installation. This is because the qualifications of the Twelve Imams included innocence and knowledge of the unseen. In the case of the velayat-e faqih, which is realistically the closest system to the imamate, the leader, as the rightful successor to the Imams, is determined by other qualified faqihs.104 For Mesbah Yazdi, the Prophet, the Twelve Imams, and the velayat-e faqih all have divine legitimacy and sanction. Therefore, during the Occultation, the legitimacy of the system is derived from the velayate faqih.105 He goes so far as to maintain that those who claim that legitimacy comes from God, but it is the people who choose the velayat-e faqih are mistaken. During Occultation, the people’s responsibility is to make the political system functional and to ensure that it works properly, not to bestow legitimacy on the ruler. The legitimacy of the velayat-e faqih comes from God, as was the case with the legitimacy of the Twelve Imams, not from popular vote by the people.106 102

103

104 105

106

Ranjbarzadeh and Javarshakian, “Maqbuliyat va Mashru‘iyat-e Hokumat-e Eslami dar Andisheh-e Mulla Sadra va Emam Khomeini” (The Acceptance and Legitimacy of Islamic Government in the Thoughts of Mulla Sadra and Imam Khomeini), p. 133. Hossein Javan Arasteh, Mabani-e Hokumat-e Eslami (Foundations of Islamic Government) (Qom: Markaz-e Entesharat-e Howzeh-e Elmiyeh-e Qom, 1379/ 2000), p. 27. Ibid., p. 117. Mohammad Taqi Mesbah Yazdi, Nazariyeh-e Siyasi-e Eslam: Qanun-gozari (Political Theory of Islam: Lawmaking) (Qom: Qom: Mo‘aseseh-e Amouzeshi va Pazhoheshi-e Emam Khomeini, 1380/2001), pp. 108–109. Mesbah Yazdi, Porsesh-ha va Pasokh-ha, Vol. 1 (Questions and Answers), pp. 21–22.

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Proponents of the official orthodoxy maintain that logic, intellect, and reason (‘aql), as well as references to original sources (naql), all support the divine legitimacy of the velayat-e faqih.107 The ‘aqli justification for the velayat-e faqih’s divine legitimacy includes God’s compassion for his subjects, the fact that divine wisdom mandates guidance, the importance of being guided by someone who is kind and caring, and the significance of being grateful for being guided. The naqli evidence for the velayat-e faqih’s divine legitimacy, meanwhile, includes verses from the Quran, stories transmitted from Islamic personages, and the Hadith.108 According to an examination of the various surahs of the Quran, and the views of the great experts, “the Almighty has selected certain people from among others to rule over Muslim, and by doing so He has ensured that Muslims are not without guardians and protectors.”109 In the context of the Islamic Republic, this translates into the absolute legitimacy of the velayat-e faqih. The Assembly of Experts does not bestow legitimacy on the velayat-e faqih through its vote, but rather gives him the “social responsibility” to rule in a just manner.110 Allegiance (bay‘at) to the velayat-e faqih is mandatory, and the people have no choice but to abide by it. Those who conceive of the velayat-e faqih as elected, however, see bay‘at as voluntary, and so long as the people have not given their allegiance to the ruler, he does not have the right to rule.111

Conclusion The question of where and how Iran’s Islamic system draws its legitimacy is as old as the revolution itself. When the Constitutional Assembly of Experts met to draft the new republic’s founding 107

108 110

111

Mohammad Ganj Khanlu, “Vakavi-e Mashru‘iyat-e Velayat-e Faqih dar ‘Asr-e Gheybat az Manzar-e Feqhi va Kalami” (Analysis of the Legitimacy of the Velayat-e Faqih in the Age of Occultation from the Perspective of Jurisprudence and Kalam), Sokhan-e Jeme‘h, Vol. 4, No. 5 (1394/2015), p. 119. 109 Ibid., pp. 120–125. Ibid., pp. 113–114. Ahmad Saber Hamedani, “Khobregan va Sharayet-e Rahbari” (The Assembly of Experts and the Qualifications of Leadership), Hokumat-e Eslami, Vol. 3, No. 2 (1377/1998), p. 157. Mohsen Velayati, “Mahiyat-e Feqhi va Hoquqi-e Entekhab-e Rahbar Tavasote Majles-e Khobregan” (The Jurisprudential and Legal Nature of Election by the Assembly of Experts), Hokumat-e Eslami, Vol. 19, No. 2 (1393/2014), p. 179.

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document, the body was dominated by clerics deeply loyal to Ayatollah Khomeini and what they assumed to be his political and ideological preferences. Although Khomeinist Islam guided much of the deliberations over the constitution, the revolution’s republican and populist impulses could not be completely overwhelmed and discarded. The outcome was a political system heavily reliant on the centrality of the velayat-e faqih but also with republican features. Ten years later, when Khomeini’s death and dysfunction in the relationship between the president and the prime minister prompted a revision of the original document, the velayat-e faqih, which by then had been elevated to a position of “absoluteness,” was made even more central to the political system. All power emanates from him today, and, by extension, so does the legitimacy of the system’s many components, big and small. Clerical and lay scholars have in the meanwhile debated the people’s role in the legitimacy of the Islamic system. Those generally on the right of the political spectrum, the ones here broadly called rightists, see legitimacy as only God’s to bestow, with the people’s role at best one of only acceptance. Legitimacy comes from the Almighty, and the people’s task is to lend their acceptance to the system and thereby make it functional. The reformists, on the other hand, place the emphasis on the will of the electorate, arguing that God gave humans free will to decide their own destiny, determine their system of government, and choose their own leaders. Legitimacy, they argue, comes from the people. When the drafting of the constitution was completed, each side saw in it what it wanted to see. The Khomeinists saw the system’s legitimacy as dependent on the velayat-e faqih, whose own legitimacy is derived by virtue of his continuation of the system of imamate. The fact that there are elections is merely meant to facilitate the people’s acceptance of the system. Scholars generally to their left, on the other hand, see elections in far more important terms and as central to the system’s legitimacy. Seen in this light, the heavily “engineered” presidential elections of 2021, in which all meaningful opponents of Khamenei’s preferred candidate, Ebrahim Raisi, were disqualified by the Guardian Council in order to facilitate his easy win, are seen as perfectly valid by the rightists and as thoroughly illegitimate by those on the left. For the left, the elections further narrowed the scope of the system’s legitimacy by

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robbing the people of an opportunity to express their real preferences. For the right, however, the elections performed their designated function of providing people with an opportunity to accept the system. It is this rightist current that has been steadily ascendant in Iran over the past several decades and is responsible for its narrowing political space. As the country’s hybrid authoritarian system has shed more and more elements of its hybridity and has turned more authoritarian, the expansive powers of the absolute velayat-e faqih have grown. The right’s political and ideological triumph is now complete.

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8

Khameneism and the Absolute Velayat-e Faqih

Ayatollah Khomeini, founder of the Islamic Republic, died on June 3, 1989. Back in 1985, Khomeini had chosen his former pupil and protégé, Ayatollah Hosseinali Montazeri, as his designated successor. But Montazeri’s repeated public denunciations of the excesses of the revolutionary state – among them the mass killing of prisoners sympathetic to the Mujahedeen-e Khalq Organization following the group’s ill-fated invasion of Iran once the Iran–Iraq war was over – led to his removal from the position by Khomeini just a few weeks before Khomeini passed away. Montazeri’s designation as Khomeini’s successor had not been met with universal approval, with some of more senior clerics, Grand Ayatollah Mohammad Reza Golpaygani (1899–1993) among them, arguing that the selection of a velayat-e faqih should come from among the faithful rather than as a political decision.1 A few years later, when the Assembly of Experts met to choose a successor for Khomeini, two individuals were nominated. One was none other than Golpaygani, who received only fourteen votes from the seventy-four delegates present. The other nominee, the republic’s incumbent president, Ali Khamenei, received sixty votes and was elected as the new velayat-e faqih.2 Khamenei was a most unlikely candidate. A political insider from the earliest days of the new republic, his comparatively sparse religious credentials at the time of his selection meant he had to be summarily promoted from hojatoleslam to ayatollah, through being addressed as such by others of equal rank. The fact that a commission was meeting simultaneously to revise the constitution meant that the marja‘iyyat requirement for the velayat-e faqih could be conveniently dropped in order to accommodate the new reality. Khamenei’s selection owed 1

2

Marvin Zonis, “The Rule of the Clerics in the Islamic Republic of Iran,” The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Sciences, Vol. 482 (November 1985), p. 94. Sussan Siavoshi, Montazeri: The Life and Thought of Iran’s Revolutionary Ayatollah (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2017), p. 160.

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much to the political maneuvers of his erstwhile ally Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani, the wily political operative and Majles speaker. In the elections held in July 1989 to fill the position vacated by Khamenei, Rafsanjani was elected as the new president. As leader, Khamenei moved slowly but methodically to consolidate his position. The system was still under Khomeini’s larger-than-life shadow, and it was politically run largely by Rafsanjani and his enthusiastic cohort of technocrats. By the early 2000s, when the winds of reformism had subsided – more accurately, forced to die down – Khamenei’s dominance of the system was near-complete. Within a few years, especially by 2009–2010, when the Green Movement was effectively crushed and a noncompliant President Ahmadinejad was reigned in, Khamenei had emerged as the most powerful figure in Iran. The sociologist Said Arjomand once described post-Khomeini Iran as “a system of rule by clerical councils,” with a monarchical cleric at the top who is supported by three distinctive councils: the Guardian Council, the Expediency Council, and the Assembly of Experts.3 Today, the extent to which these and the other deliberative institutions of the state have any meaningful significance can be seriously questioned.4 More accurately, according to Arjomand, The Leader [is] a theocratic monarch ruling in the name of God with more extensive powers than any constitutional monarch or elected president in the world. His bureau, the Office of the Leadership (rahbari), has representatives in all the military and administrative organs of the state. In addition to his extensive constitutional powers, the Absolute Guardianship of the Jurist entitles him to issue “governmental ordinances” (ahkam-e hokumati), and he has done so at some critical points.5

This chapter traces the emergence and consequences of what may be called Khameneism.6 Occupying the position of absolute velayat-e 3

4

5

6

Saïd Amir Arjomand, “Shi‘ite Jurists and the Iranian Law and Constitutional Order in the Twentieth Century,” in The Rule of Law, Islam, and Constitutional Politics in Egypt and Iran, Saïd Amir Arjomand and Nathan Brown, eds. (Albany, NY: SUNY Press, 2013), p. 34. See Mehran Kamrava, Righteous Politics: Power and Resilience in Iran (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2023). Arjomand, “Shi‘ite Jurists and the Iranian Law and Constitutional Order in the Twentieth Century,” p. 34. My inspiration for the term comes from Ervand Abrahamian and his excellent book on “Khomeinism.” Ervand Abrahamian, Khomeinism: Essays on the Islamic Republic (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1993).

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faqih for more than three decades, Khamenei has emerged as one of contemporary Iran’s most consequential leaders. Increasingly, through deeper involvement in state affairs, Khamenei continues to expand the scope of the absoluteness of the velayat-e faqih’s powers and authority. In the process, he has progressively narrowed down the marginal space the state has allowed for political openness, tilting the hybrid authoritarian system away from any democratic hybridity and toward a fullblown theocratic dictatorship. The chapter begins with a brief discussion of Khamenei’s background and thoughts, looking also at how he has operationalized Khomeini’s innovative idea of the absolute velayat-e faqih. In this endeavor, Khamenei has been ably assisted by a number of theologians of varying ranks, one of the most senior and famous of whom was Ayatollah Mohammad Taqi Mesbah Yazdi (1935–2021). As we have seen so far, Mesbah Yazdi has been one of the most vocal defenders of conservative jurisprudential positions on a whole host of issues. Here, I will more fully explore his views on the notion of absolute velayat-e faqih. These reinforcing elements – Khamenei’s steady dominance of the system at the expense of elected and other alternatives, the operationalization of the notion of absolute velayat-e faqih, and the supporting theoretical expositions of Mesbah Yazdi and the many others like him – have combined to result in today’s Iran as a patriarchal theocratic dictatorship. Khameneism might have been slow to emerge. But today its shadow casts an iron grip over the entirety of Iranian body politic. As such, when Khamenei does depart from the scene, for even absolute velayat-e faqihs are mortal, there are bound to be changes in Iranian politics, however cosmetic and stylistic at first they might be.

Ali Khamenei In the lead-up to the revolution and soon thereafter, Khamenei was known less for his contributions to fiqh and more for his poetry.7 In the 1960s and the 1970s, he concentrated on articulating an Islamic, revolutionary ideology by translating the works of Sayyid Qutb from Arabic into Persian. From his introduction to Sayyid Qutb’s book, it appears that Khamenei was pleased to see increased Islamic sentiments 7

Abbas Amanat, Iran: A Modern History (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2017), p. 761.

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among the youth and was optimistic about the future of the Islamic movement. In his translation of Qutb’s second book into Persian in 1970, he discussed the evils of infatuation with the West and ways of “returning to the self” through religion.8 Although a highly political cleric, and therefore often in the crosshairs of the monarchy’s secret police SAVAK, Khamenei did manage to teach some classes in Qom on religious philosophy and interpretations of the Quran. Immediately following the revolution, he also taught classes on religious ideology at Tehran University’s mosque.9 Montazeri claims that he was impressed with Khamenei’s ability to deliver good sermons, which prompted him to recommend his appointment as the Tehran Prayer Imam to Khomeini in 1980.10 Throughout the 1980s, as the revolution sought to consolidate itself politically and institutionally, Khamenei served in a variety of political offices, most notably as president from 1981 to 1989. He also gained invaluable organizational experience through the Islamic Republican Party from its establishment in 1979 until its dissolution in 1987. At the time of his selection as the new velayat-e faqih, Khamenei made up in political experience what he lacked in jurisprudential contributions. To compensate for his sparse religious credentials, and to also carve out a place for himself out of Rafsanjani’s shadows, he began exploiting factional politics to his advantage and to also expand his control over the security forces, especially the Revolutionary Guards.11 As we saw in Chapter 2, he also encouraged and patronized a whole host of religious, educational, and research institutions in the city of Qom. Still, when in 1992 he issued his first fatwa, on organ transplantation, it was not challenged by the leading ayatollahs, thus opening the door for a series of other fatwas that in turn helped establish his religious authority.12 8

9 10

11

12

Hamidreza Esmaili, Hossein Masoudnia, Javad Emamjomezadeh, and Reza Aqahosseini, “Tahlili bar Ideolozhi-e Siyasi-e Ayatollah Khamenei dar Seh Dahe-e 1340 ta 1360” (An Analysis of Ayatollah Khamenei’s Political Thought in the Three Decades from the 1960s to 1980s), Faslnameh-e ‘Elmi-Pazhoheshi-e Pazhoheshnameh-e Enqelab-e Eslami, Vol. 6, No. 19 (1395/2016), pp. 57, 61. Ibid., p. 52. Hosseinali Montazeri, Khaterat (Memoirs) (Los Angeles, CA: Ketab Corp., 2017), p. 247. Naghmeh Sohrabi, “The Curious Case of Ali Akbar Hashemi-Rafsanjani,” Middle East Brief, No. 38, Crown Center for Middle East Studies, Brandeis University (November 2009), p. 3. Ibid.

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Khamenei’s Ideas Whereas before the revolution Khamenei’s focus was on Islam as a revolutionary force, after the revolution he directed much of his attention to the superpowers, Zionism, and national independence. He also advocated the mobilization of a “million man army” of the masses, along with the formation of a powerful “anti-imperialist front.”13 Not surprisingly, some of the key dimensions of Khamenei’s theoretical perspectives include a deep mistrust of and dislike for the West, rooted in the belief that Western colonialism and neocolonial machinations are responsible for the underdevelopment of Iran and other developing countries. On the domestic front, he believes that the seminary must be proactively involved in social and cultural affairs, fostering spiritual renewal, righteous living, and empowering people to take charge of their own lives and their destiny.14 In Khamenei’s formulation, nationalism can enhance ethnic, linguistic, and kinship ties. At the same time, however, it has the potential to undermine the people’s religious and intellectual sentiments. As such, nationalism can pose manifold threats to Islam by adding to the divide between Muslim peoples and nations, creating ethnic and sectarian divisions among them, weakening political institutions and the powers of Muslim countries, undermining Islamic and religious identity, and undermining spirituality among Muslims.15 Khamenei has also always been an advocate of organizational strength, as evident in the Islamic Republican Party, seeing the party’s primary mission as one of propagating Islamic ideology.16 Some of the most salient topics in Khamenei’s speeches include themes on preserving Islamic values, the deficiencies of secularism, 13

14

15

16

Esmaili et al., “Tahlili bar Ideolozhi-e Siyasi-e Ayatollah Khamenei dar Seh Dahe-e 1340 ta 1360” (An Analysis of Ayatollah Khamenei’s Political Thought in the Three Decades from the 1960s to 1980s), pp. 65, 67. Karim Mehri, “Nazariyeh-i dar Khosoos-e Enqelab-e Eslami bar Asas-e Bayanat-e Maqam-e Mo‘azam-e Rahbari” (A Theory Concerning the Islamic Revolution Based on the Speeches of the Supreme Leader), Rahyaft-e Enqelab-e Eslami, Vol. 10, No. 34 (1395/2016), p. 47. Mehdi Qeyzi-Sakha, “Nasionalism az Manzar-e Ayatollah Khamenei” (Nationalism from the Perspective of Ayatollah Khamenei), Pazhoheshnameh-e Enqelab-e Eslami, No. 27 (1397/2018), pp. 81–106. Esmaili et al., “Tahlili bar Ideolozhi-e Siyasi-e Ayatollah Khamenei dar Seh Dahe-e 1340 ta 1360” (An Analysis of Ayatollah Khamenei’s Political Thought in the Three Decades from the 1960s to 1980s), p. 67.

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the West’s innate hostility to Islam and Iran, the need for a “normative jihad” in order to preserve Islamic values, the importance of prayer, and the harmful effects of self-doubt.17 Starting in the early and mid1990s, Khamenei began paying special attention to issues having to do with culture, which for him means overwhelmingly if not entirely Islamic culture. He views culture as central to the project of the Islamic Republic.18 He has called on seminary students to be politically engaged and to become knowledgeable about national and international politics. Seminary students must ensure that religion remains consistently political, he maintains. He has also called on the howzeh and the larger clerical establishment to become proactive in examining, analyzing, and proposing laws, regulations, and priorities for the political system. “We cannot continue to look to books from the past,” he once lamented, “for awareness of contemporary issues and problems.”19 In 2003, Khamenei issued what he called “The Twenty-Year Outlook,” directing the heads of the government’s three branches to implement its various principles. Intended as a developmental manifesto of sorts, the one-page document, which is often seen as reflecting Khamenei’s priorities,20 outlines the following goals: - Social development, consistent with the moral, cultural, historical, and religious characteristics of society, based on religious democracy, social justice, ethical values, and human dignity; - Scientific advancement, based on technological production and reliance on human and social capital and national production; - Security, independence, and national strength based on prudence and nexus between the people and the government; - National health, welfare, social security, food security, equal opportunities, equitable distribution of wealth, strength in the institution of the family, an absence of poverty and discrimination, and environmental protection; 17 18

19

20

Ibid., pp. 128–141. Meysam Belbasi, Hoviyat-e Melli dar Asnad-e Faradasti-e Jomhuri-e Eslami-e Iran (National Identity in High-Level Documents of the Islamic Republic of Iran) (Qom: Pazhoheshgah-e ‘Olum va Farhang-e Eslami, 1397/2018), p. 344. Saeed Solh-Mirzaie, Howzeh va Rouyhaniyat (Howzeh and the Clergy) (Tehran: Markaz-e Asnad-e Enqelab-e Eslami, 1390/2011), p. 89. Belbasi, Hoviyat-e Melli dar Asnad-e Faradasti-e Jomhuri-e Eslami-e Iran (National Identity in High-Level Documents of the Islamic Republic of Iran), p. 450.

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- Proactively accepting responsibility, being socially constructive and having a cooperative spirit, committed to the revolution and the Islamic system, and taking pride in Iran and being Iranian; - Having economic, scientific, and technological prominence in all of southwest Asia, stretching from Central Asia to all of the Middle East, through scientific production, being active in the software revolution, and increasing economic output and per capita income; - Active presence in the world of Islam through strengthening the Iranian model of religious democracy, social ethics, innovation and dynamic thinking, and reliance on Ayatollah Khomeini’s views; and, - Constructive and effective moderation with the rest of the world based on mutual respect, wisdom, and expedience.21

A final word on a notion that Khamenei often mentions but seldom explains, namely Islamic democracy. For Khamenei, religious democracy is firmly planted in Islam. “This democracy has no relationship with the roots of Western democracy,” he is quoted as having said, “which is something very different. To start, religious democracy is not something we import from the West and then attach religion to it. The very essence of this democracy belongs to religion.”22 He also once maintained that “everyone must be mindful of others . . . You are all responsible for me, and I am responsible for you. If I take the wrong step, you have the responsibility to hold me accountable, stop me from becoming wrongfooted, and demand answers.”23 By and large, however, apart from such declarations, which are not atypical of all political leaders with or without democratic inclinations, Khamenei has spent little time elaborating on his conception of the relationship between Islam and freedom. By comparison, Khamenei’s pronouncements on the importance of Islamic ethics, the importance of safeguarding cultural values from foreign intrusions, and the dangers of “sedition” and “colored revolutions” are far more frequent and 21

22

23

The one-page document can be accessed https://farsi.khamenei.ir/amp-content? id=9034. Quoted in, Ali Darabi, “Madromsalari-e Dini va Nesbat-e an ba Tose‘h-e Siyasi dar Jomhuri-e Eslami Iran” (Religious Democracy and Its Relationship with Political Development in the Islamic Republic of Iran), Faslnameh-e Motale‘at-e Siyasi, Vol. 5, No. 18 (1391/2012), p. 69. Mohammad Baqer Khorramshad and Eshaq Sayyad Roudkar, “Amr-e beh Ma‘rouf, Nahy az Monker va Tose‘h Siyasi dar Jomhuri-e Eslami Iran” (Enjoining Good, Forbidding Evil and Political Development in the Islamic Republic of Iran), Faslnameh-e Pazhohesh-haye Rahbordi-ye Siyasat, Vol. 6, No. 23 (1396/2017), p. 53.

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substantive. Together, these pronouncements form the corpus of how he has over time positioned the office of the absolute velayat-e faqih.

The Absolute Velayat-e Faqih The Qajar era cleric Ayatollah Abolhussein Lari (1848–1924) is the first cleric known to have used the term “velayat-e faqih-e multaq,” absolute velayat-e faqih, and, similar to many of his intellectual predecessors, he saw no difference between the rule of the velayat-e faqih and that of the Twelve Imams.24 Some researchers have maintained that previous theoreticians of velayat-e faqih essentially described absolute velayat-e faqih without actually mentioning the designation of “absolute.” This is incorrect. Khomeini first employed the term when he theorized that the velayat-e faqih can use expedience (maslahat) to arrive at decisions.25 The notion of absolute velayat-e faqih did not officially exist before Khomeini introduced it in 1987.26 The notion was formally adopted by the state in January 1988.27 When the constitution was revised the following year, the relevant articles on the velayat-e faqih were changed accordingly. In Article 57, velayat-e faqih was changed to absolute velayat-e faqih. Also, two sections were added to Article 110, in which the duties of the faqih are seen as “determining general policies of the system, in consultation with the Expediency Council, which cannot be resolved through ordinary means.”28 Taken in its entirety, the constitution of the Islamic Republic is the legal 24

25

26

27

28

Abolfazl Qadimabadi, “Barresi-ye Tariskhi-e Pishineh-e Nazariyeh-e Velayat-e Faqih” (Analysis of Theoretical Background of Theory of Velayat-e Faqih), Za‘er, Vol. 24, No. 252 (1396/2017), p. 25. Akbar Ashrafi and Ghodsi Alizadeh Seilab, “Velayat-e Motlaqeh Faqih dar Andisheh-e Siyasi-e Ayatollah Khamenei” (Absolute Velayat-e Faqih in the Political Thought of Ayatollah Khamenei), Faslnameh-e ‘Elmi-Pazhoheshi-e Pazhohesh-haye Enqelab-e Eslami, Vol. 6, No. 21 (1395/2016), p. 24. Mohsen Kadivar, Daghdagheh-haye Hokumat-e Dini (Concerns of Religious Government) (Tehran: Nashr-e Ney, 1376/1997), p. 127. Said Amir Arjomand, “Ideological Revolution in Shi‘ism,” in Authority and Political Culture in Shi‘ism, Said Amir Arjomand, ed. (Albany, NY: SUNY Press, 1988), p. 203. Morteza Alavian and Farzad Hosseini, “Saz o Kar-e Feqhi va Qanuni-e Mahar va Kontrol-e Qova-ye Hokumati dar Nazariyeh-e ‘Velayat-e Motlaq-e Faqih’” (The Jurisprudential and Legal Basis for Constraining State Power in Theory of “Absolute Velayat-e Faqih”), Hokumat-e Eslami, Vol. 21, No. 2 (1395/2016), p. 10.

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and institutional manifestation of Khomeini’s theory of absolute velayat-e faqih.29 State-tied theorists argue that absolute velayat-e faqih means an expansion of the faqih’s scope of responsibility to ensure the greater good of society, ensuring justice, and looking after the welfare of the people.30 According to Ayatollah Khomeini, velayat-e faqih and leadership are indispensable aspects of Islamic Government, and the legitimacy of the government depends on the existence of the qualified faqih at the head of the state and his careful supervision of the administration of rules and regulations. The vali (guardian) of Muslims is in reality the inheritor of the legacy of the Prophet and the Twelve Imams.31

In Khomeini’s formulation, absolute velayat-e faqih does not mean that he can judge the qualification of other faqihs, to install them as or disqualify them from being a faqih. The absolute velayat-e faqih does not have a rank that is higher compared to other faqihs.32 The notion of absolute velayat-e faqih does not revolve around the individual at all. Instead, it centers on questions of jurisprudence and the scope of the velayat-e faqih’s responsibilities in social and political matters, in a manner that is highly regulated.33 The absolute velayat-e faqih has complete responsibility in Islamic government and is selected for purposes of looking after the interests of society. Paradoxically, some reformist thinkers have capitalized on this notion of absoluteness to argue in favor of the democratic essence of the velayat-e faqih. Emaddedin Baqi, for example, argues that the position of absolute velayat-e faqih will eventually lead to the secularization of religious 29

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Mohammad Shafi‘i-far, “Jaygah-e Velayat-e Faqih dar Hoquq-e Asasi-e Jomhuri-e Eslami-e Iran” (The Position of Velayat-e Faqih in the Basic Laws of the Islamic Republic of Iran), Hokumat-e Eslami, Vol. 4, No. 3 (1378/ 1999), pp. 62–63. Ashrafi and Alizadeh Seilab, “Velayat-e Motlaqeh Faqih dar Andisheh-e Siyasi-e Ayatollah Khamenei” (Absolute Velayat-e Faqih in the Political Thought of Ayatollah Khamenei), p. 25. Quoted in, Alavian and Hosseini, “Saz o Kar-e Feqhi va Qanuni-e Mahar va Kontrol-e Qova-ye Hokumati dar Nazariyeh-e ‘Velayat-e Motlaq-e Faqih’” (The Jurisprudential and Legal Basis for Constraining State Power in Theory of “Absolute Velayat-e Faqih”), p. 8. Davood Feirahi, Feqh va Siyasat dar Iran-e Mo‘aser (Jurisprudence and Politics in Contemporary Iran) (Tehran: Nashr-e Ney, 1393/2014), p. 337. Emad Afrough, Ma Ghal wa Man Ghal, Vol. 3 (What Was Said and Who Said It, Vol. 3) (Tehran: Hamshahri, 1392/2013), p. 131.

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government, since in secular, Western systems the state also has absolute authority to act in the interests of society and to make laws on the basis of the needs of the times.34 Kadivar, meanwhile, maintains that since the velayat-e faqih is just, there is no danger that the absolute velayat-e faqih become a dictator or an autocrat.35 In fact, says another theorist, the innovation in Khomeini’s theory of velayat-e faqih is in its description as “absolute,” derived from the velayat-e faqih’s ability, and obligation, to determine what is in the best interest of the system and the Muslim community.36 Khomeini outlined several key responsibilities for the absolute velayat-e faqih. They include, chiefly, responsibilities for all political matters, including all issues related to the state and its relationship with society; responsibility not just for personal and individual issues but for the affairs of the whole community; having the same range and scope of responsibilities as those of the Prophet Muhammad and Imam Ali; and responsibilities beyond those that are outlined in the constitution.37 Using this same logic, the late Ayatollah Beheshti believed that the leader should not appoint the head of the state radio and television broadcaster, IRIB, as it gave him too specific of a responsibility.38 Significantly, allegiance (bay‘at) is central to velayate faqih, although in the case of absolute velayat-e faqih, allegiance is not a precondition for obedience. In the theory of absolute velayat-e faqih, obedience to the faqih is mandatory even if allegiance has not taken place.39 34

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Emadeddin Baqi, Gofteman-haye Dini-e Mo‘aser (Contemporary Religious Discourses) (Tehran: Saraee, 1381/2002), p. 149. Mohsen Kadivar, “Velayat-e Enteshabi-e Motlaqeh-e Faqihan” (The Appointed Absolute Guardianship of Faqihs), in Din va Hokumat (Religion and Governance), Anjoman-e Eslami-e Mohandesin, ed. (Tehran: Rasa, 1377/1998), p. 11. Bahareh Dadashi, “Negahi beh Nazariyat-e Feqhi va Siyasi-e Emam Khomeini dar Bareh-ye Velayat-e Faqih” (A Look at the Jurisprudential and Political Theories of Imam Khomeini Concerning the Velayat-e Faqih), Za‘er, Vol. 24, No. 252 (1396/2017), p. 30. Kadivar, Daghdagheh-haye Hokumat-e Dini (Concerns of Religious Government), p. 113. Davood Feirahi, Feqh va Homkrani-e Hezbi (Jurisprudence and Party Governance) (Tehran: Nashr-e Ney, 1396/2017), p. 421. Habibollah Sha‘bani Movasaqi, “Velayat-e Faqih va Qanun Garai (Velayat-e Faqih and Obedience of the Law), Hokumat-e Eslami, Vol. 18, No. 1 (1392/ 2014), pp. 5, 28.

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Clerical figures with ties to the state maintain that the absolute velayat-e faqih does not contradict republicanism or undermine the republican nature of the state for several reasons. To start, the velayate faqih is an elected position, with the task of the election falling on the Assembly of Experts. Moreover, the tenure of the absolute velayat-e faqih lasts only as long as he is qualified for the office. Moreover, the position is not hereditary.40 At the same time, however, since the constitution derives its legitimacy from the absolute velayat-e faqih, the faqih can abandon or violate the constitution when he determines that doing so is in the interests of society.41 Khamenei himself has expressly stated that the velayat-e faqih is divinely ordained and is the only proper and permissible system of rule during the Occultation.42 In a 2011 speech in the city of Kermanshah, which was billed as “a review of the overall identity and nature of the Revolution and structure of the Islamic Republic,” Khamenei presented the following point about the position of the leader and the velayat-e faqih: Absolute velayat-e faqih does not mean that leadership in the Islamic Republic system is absolute and beyond all laws and regulations. . . . The leader is subject to laws. The velayat-e faqih is a form of a leader but not an executive. . . . Since the beginning of the revolution, the velayat-e faqih is mistakenly seen as an executive leader. It is clear that executive leadership rests in the powerful executive branch. This responsibility is clear. The responsibilities of the judiciary are also clear, as are those of the legislative branch. The leader supervises all these branches, and looks after the system’s overall health. In reality, the job of the leadership is management at the highest level. Sometimes, due to circumstances and the exigencies of the time, the system may lack the necessary flexibility. It is the leader’s responsibility to make sure this does not happen. Some people like to say that certain decisions are made only by the leader. But this is not the case. In different areas, only if there is a deviation from the path of the revolution, can the leader step in and make decisions.43

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Mohammad Javad Arasta, “Jomhuriyat va Eslamiyat: Tazad ya Tavafoq” (Republicanism and Islamism: Contradiction or Complementary?), Howzeh va Daneshgah, Vol. 9 (1382/2003), p. 15. Kadivar, “Velayat-e Enteshabi-e Motlaqeh-e Faqihan” (The Appointed Absolute Guardianship of Faqihs), p. 10. Ashrafi and Alizadeh Seilab, “Velayat-e Motlaqeh Faqih dar Andisheh-e Siyasi-e Ayatollah Khamenei” (Absolute Velayat-e Faqih in the Political Thought of Ayatollah Khamenei), p. 34. Feirahi, Feqh va Homkrani-e Hezbi (Jurisprudence and Party Governance), pp. 419–421.

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In Khamenei’s conception, the state has a number of responsibilities, including leadership, planning, policymaking, and “supervision, support, and guidance” of society. In return, the people’s responsibility is political obedience, participation, and, when appropriate, critique and reform of the system. The state can interfere in the affairs of the people only in exceptional circumstances, when the interests of Islam and Muslim people necessitate it.44

Justifying the Absolute Velayat-e Faqih At the broadest level, the theoretical arguments of supporters of the absolute velayat-e faqih, and the narratives that have coalesced to form the official orthodoxy, fall into three categories. First, it is assumed that a system led by the absolute velayat-e faqih is one that best serves the interests of Islam. This is particularly the case during the Occultation, when the absolute velayat-e faqih is seen as a necessity.45 Second, through his oversight of the entire system, the absolute velayat-e faqih guarantees its practicability and proper function. In fact, safeguarding the protection and growth of society makes the position and task of the leader all the more important in terms of ensuring society’s evolution or its demise.46 Finally, supporters of the position see it as a bulwark against autocracy and dictatorship. Khomeini himself is often cited on this issue: If there is no velayat-e faqih, then there is autocracy. Either autocracy or God. If not according to God’s command, and if the president is not installed by the faqih, then there is no legitimacy. And when there is no legitimacy there is autocracy. . . . Autocracy is destroyed when by command of the gracious God someone is installed [to rule].47 44

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Najaf Lakzaee and Roghayeh Javidi, “Nazariyeh-e Dowlat dar Andisheh-e Siyasi-e Ayatollah Khamenei” (Theory of State in the Political Thought of Ayatollah Khamenei), ‘Olum-e Siyasi, Vol. 21, No. 81 (1397/2018), p. 159. Mohammad Shetabdar, “Tabyeen-e Velayat-eMotlaqeh Faqih beh Manzour-e Gozinesh-e Sanjeh-e Roykardi dar Negareh-haye Zarurat, Maslehat va Estabdad” (Explanation of Absolute Velayat-e Faqih for Purposes of Choosing Evaluative Perspectives on Necessity, Expedience, and Autocracy), Pure Life, Vol. 4, No. 9 (1396/2017), p. 167. Esmael Darabkalaie, Negaresh-i bar Falsafeh-e Siyasi-e Eslam (A Look at the Political Philosophy of Islam) (Qom: Bostan-e Ketab, 1380/2001), pp. 94–95. Quoted in, Abdullah Ebrahimzadeh Amoli, “Mansha’-e Mashru‘iyat-e Velayate Faqih az Didgah-e Emam va Rahbari” (Source of Velayat-e Faqih’s Legitimacy

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Let us begin with those arguments that maintain the absolute velayat-e faqih is the best way to serve Islam. In simplest terms, as we have already seen, a number of theologians believe that rulership belongs to God, and in the age of Occultation, it needs to be entrusted to qualified jurists on behalf of the Hidden Imam.48 The faqih’s right to guardianship, his velayat, gives him the right to assume custodianship over the worldly belongings of his followers and to protect them in ways that are in the interests of his followers and the larger community and its values. The velayat-e faqih’s rule cannot be conditional. To set conditions for the ruling faqih is to contravene divine injunctions, and, specifically, to call for only a selective implementation of divine rule.49 The implicit assumption in all these arguments, especially Khomeini, and perhaps to a lesser extent Khamenei, is that the absolute velayat-e faqih enjoys “quasi infallibility.”50 According to Esmael Darabkalaie (b. 1951), a former pupil of Ayatollah Mesbah Yazdi and later a professor of divinity at Tehran’s Shahid Beheshti University, God has entrusted all issues regarding guardianship and the protection of society in the first instance to the Prophet Mohammad and after him to the Twelve Imams. During the period of Occultation, the Twelve Imams have in turn delegated all responsibility for social affairs and the administration of society to a qualified faqih. This faqih has responsibility and control over all legal matters and law-making, including implementing the laws of Islam, devising regulations concerning evolving and new circumstances, and being responsible for the implementation of new rules and regulations. He must also serve as a judge.51 Another scholar arrives at the need for the absolute velayat-e faqih through a series of hypothetical scenarios. If for sake of argument we assume that the faqih does not rule during the period of Occultation, he postulates, then one of three conditions will prevail: There will be

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from the Perspective of the Imam and the Leader), Hokumat-e Eslami, Vol. 19, No. 3 (Autumn 1993/2014), p. 104. Mohammad Javad Nowruzi, Nezam-e Siyasi-e Eslam (The Political System of Islam) (Qom: Howzeh-e Elmi-ye Qom, 1381/2002), p. 57. Mohammad Reza Shayegh, “Esbat-e Velayat-e Motlaq-e Faqih az Tariq-e Borhan-e Khalaf va Mostaqim” (Proof of Absolute Velayat-e Faqih through Direct and Reverse Logic), Olum-e Siyayi, Vol. 18, No. 2 (1394/2015), p. 107. Zonis, “The Rule of the Clerics in the Islamic Republic of Iran,” p. 90. Darabkalaie, Negaresh-i bar Falsafeh-e Siyasi-e Eslam (A Look at the Political Philosophy of Islam), pp. 118–119.

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rule by an oppressor, there will be an absence of any rule, and there will be an in-between rule that is both just and unjust. The last condition, rule that is both just and unjust, is impossible and will never prevail. Based on the first two alternatives, therefore, the only rule that is just and appropriate is that of the faqih. Rule of the faqih is also supported through resort to direct logic. To begin with, divine law must be applied during the Occultation, and this implementation must be done by someone who has expertise in them, namely a faqih. And, this faqih must engage in judgment, be a guide, and have custodianship over the properties of believers. In other words, he needs to also be a vali and to engage in velayat.52 A second set of arguments revolve around the practicability of having an absolute velayat-e faqih. At the highest level of leadership, whether by one of the Twelve Imams or by one of their designees, there is no separation of powers, no independence of each branch of government from the other. The leader stands above and beyond the system. Only at the level below the leader does the separation of powers and the notion of “branches of government” make sense, either directly or indirectly.53 This only reinforces the need for an absolute velayate faqih. Darabkalaie maintains that the tasks of leadership cannot be entrusted to just anyone. The burdens of leadership include both the scientific and spiritual needs of society, protecting the material and cultural values of society by guarding against outside cultural invasions, ensuring internal order and protecting against outside enemies, managing relations with outside powers, and ensuring domestic growth.54 Such enormously weighty responsibilities must necessarily be entrusted to someone with the absolute velayat-e faqih’s knowledge, wisdom, and authority. A slightly different argument is presented by political scientists Morteza Alavian and Farzad Hosseini. They see the absolute velayat-e faqih as a means to facilitate the solving of possible systemic problems that may arise in the Islamic Republic but for which there are no provisions in the constitution or the law. According to this 52

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Shayegh, “Esbat-e Velayat-e Motlaq-e Faqih az Tariq-e Borhan-e Khalaf va Mostaqim” (Proof of Absolute Velayat-e Faqih through Direct and Reverse Logic), p. 95. Darabkalaie, Negaresh-i bar Falsafeh-e Siyasi-e Eslam (A Look at the Political Philosophy of Islam), p. 119. Ibid., p. 94.

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interpretation, the absolute velayat-e faqih is in reality the guardian of the system and its legal and constitutional framework.55 A third and final set of theoretical justifications for the absolute velayat-e faqih revolve around how the position actually safeguards democracy. Mesbah Yazdi claims, for example, that the “absolute” nature of the velayat-faqih does not mean he can do whatever he wishes, with no limits or constraints. It simply means that the scope of his powers is not limited and they are not conditional – his position is not one of velayat-e moqayyed, or conditional velayat – and his purview is not limited only to certain, necessary cases and extends to all decisions, even to those that do not involve emergencies.56 A number of reformist thinkers, such as Mohsen Kadivar, argue that the absolute velayat-e faqih places himself above the law and that the law derives its legitimacy from his position. This proposition is challenged by most rightists, who maintain that since in Islamic society shari‘ah forms the basis of the law, which is divinely inspired, the faqih is never allowed to violate it. The current velayati system that exists in Iran, they argue, is in fact both republican and democratic, ensuring the democratic election of a velayat-e faqih whose powers are limited by law.57 The absolute velayat-e faqih means that within the scope of laws and rules set by Islam, the velayat-e faqih is responsible for all affairs of Muslims and is unencumbered by any other restrictions. In other words, whatever rights and responsibilities the Twelve Imams of Shiism had, the velayat-e faqih also has.58 Moreover, it is incorrect to maintain that the faqih cannot have any rights to interfere in matters that are personal and private and can only concern himself with matters of worship. The clergy can be involved in all matters that are personal and social. The mandate of the faqih to rule does not have conditions attached to it, and therefore all believers are obligated to 55

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Alavian and Hosseini, “Saz o Kar-e Feqhi va Qanuni-e Mahar va Kontrol-e Qova-ye Hokumati dar Nazariyeh-e ‘Velayat-e Motlaq-e Faqih’” (The Jurisprudential and Legal Basis for Constraining State Power in Theory of “Absolute Velayat-e Faqih”), p. 5. Mohammad Taqi Mesbah Yazdi, Porsesh-ha va Pasokh-ha, Vol. 1 (Questions and Answers) (Qom: Mo‘aseseh-e Amouzeshi va Pazhoheshi-e Emam Khomeini, 1380/2001), p. 60. Arasta, “Jomhuriyat va Eslamiyat” (Republicanism and Islamism), pp. 22–24. Jaber Amiri, Mabani-e Andisheh-haye Eslami (Foundations of Islamic Thought) (Qom: Mo‘aseseh-e Farhangi ve Entesharati-e Gorgan, 1380/2001), p. 160.

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obey the faqih unconditionally and in all matters.59 Nevertheless, equating the position of the absolute velayat-e faqih with absolutism is incorrect. The absolute velayat-e faqih has to conduct himself within the framework of law, divine dictates, and public interests.60 He can otherwise be publicly criticized. According to Ahmad Tavakoli, a staunch defender of absolute velayat-e faqih and a well-known figure affiliated with the far right, criticism of the leader is allowed but it should be polite, and it is best if it is in written form and is conveyed to the leader privately rather than in public.61 A number of theorists have claimed that assumptions about the undemocratic nature of the absolute velayat-e faqih arise from superficial observations. In the Islamic Republic, they maintain, the separation of powers is “relative,” not absolute.62 Due to inadequate familiarity with the meaning of velayat-e faqih, some have likened it to other political systems and think it is at the same level as absolutist, monarchical, patrimonial, and sultanistic systems. But these analyses do not understand that there are quite important differences in the structural, foundational, ideological, legal, judicial, and belief systems between various regime types and a system based on the velayat-e faqih. They also do not fully grasp the connection between the system of velayat-e faqih and republicanism. The structure and the roots of the Islamic Republic are democratic, the system’s defenders maintain, with the constitution outlining a system that is at once both democratic and Islamic. Political structures and institutions, and also their interactions with one another, are republican, but their content is Islamic.63 The

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Shayegh, “Esbat-e Velayat-e Motlaq-e Faqih az Tariq-e Borhan-e Khalaf va Mostaqim” (Proof of Absolute Velayat-e Faqih through Direct and Reverse Logic), p. 106. Amiri, Mabani-e Andisheh-haye Eslami (Foundations of Islamic Thought), p. 159. Ahmad Tavakoli, “Qanun-e Asasi Fasl Alkhatab Ast?” (Is the Constitution the Final Word?), Cheshmandaz-e Iran, No. 98 (1395/2016), p. 21. Mohammad Mansournezhad, “Tafkik-e Qova, Velayat-e Mutlaqeh Faqih va Estaqlal-e Qova” (Separation of Powers, Absolute Velayat-e Faqih and Independence of the Branches), Hokumat-e Eslami, Vol. 4, No. 1 (1378/1999), p. 57. Mohammad-Taqi Al-e Ghafoor and Rashid R. Kabian, “Naqd-e Nazariyeh-e Dowlat dar Mored-e Dowlat-e Jomhuri-e Eslami-e Iran” (Critique of the Theory of the States Concerning the State of the Islamic Republic of Iran), Rahyaft-e Enqelab-e Eslami, Vol. 8, No. 26 (1393/2014), pp. 123–125.

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absolute velayat-e faqih ensures that the interconnected democratic, republican, and Islamic features of the system are protected.

Qualifications and Responsibilities According to the official orthodoxy, the only velayat-e faqih whose qualifications were universally known and accepted by the people was Ayatollah Khomeini. All subsequent leaders need to be endorsed and selected by the Assembly of Experts.64 In selecting the absolute velayate faqih, the Assembly of Experts must take into account certain essential credentials. These include detailed knowledge of Islam, piety, and expertise in and knowledge of administration.65 The velayat-e faqih’s most important qualification lies in political leadership and the management of society.66 “Familiarity with contemporary issues” is equally significant.67 Also essential is knowledge of Islamic ordinances (ahkam) and their sources, as well as knowledge of the Islamic Republic’s constitution so that the velayat-e faqih can engage in ijtihad concerning the country’s evolving interests.68 The absolute velayat-e faqih must know and execute all rules and directives of Islam, and be able to resolve conflicts and potential blockages that arise from the implementation of various religious directives. And, unlike absolutist systems of rule, the absolute velayat-e faqih must be bound by the laws and principles of Islam, must be just, and must act with wisdom.69 64

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Mohammad Kazem Taqavi, “Majles-e Khobregan az Negah-e Qanungozar” (The Assembly of Experts from the Perspective of the Legislature), Hokumat-e Eslami, Vol. 11, No. 3 (1385/2006), p. 11. Mohammad Taqi Mesbah Yazdi, Hokumat-e Eslami va Velayat-e Faqih (Islamic Government and Velayat-e Faqih) (Tehran: Sazman-e Tablighat-e Eslami, 1380/2001), pp. 151–153. Mesbah Yazdi, Porsesh-ha va Pasokh-ha, Vol. 1 (Questions and Answers), p. 94. Mohammad Yazdi, “Majles-e Khobregan va Chegonegi-ye Nezarat bar Rahbari” (The Assembly of Experts and the Conditions of Supervision over the Leadership), Hokumat-e Eslami, Vol. 11, No. 3 (1385/2006), p. 79. Mohammad Taqi Mesbah Yazdi, Porsesh-ha va Pasokh-ha, Vol. 2 (Questions and Answers) (Qom: Mo‘aseseh-e Amouzeshi va Pazhoheshi-e Emam Khomeini, 1380/2001), p. 13. Ashrafi and Alizadeh Seilab, “Velayat-e Motlaqeh Faqih dar Andisheh-e Siyasi-e Ayatollah Khamenei” (Absolute Velayat-e Faqih in the Political Thought of Ayatollah Khamenei), p. 26.

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The absolute velayat-e faqih has two sets of powers. One set of powers are constitutional, in terms of appointment and removal authority, command of the armed forces, and the like. Another set of powers are political, in the form of expansive and “absolute authority” to issue “state directives.”70 Darabakaei claims that the most essential duties of the leader, whom he sees as the vali-e amr (guardian of affairs), include the following: the teaching and explanation of the laws and immutable rules of Islam based on sound religious sources; where preexisting laws do not exist, legislating laws based on Islamic precepts and valid sources; the implementation of the immutable and flexible laws of Islam in society; rendering judgments and adjudicating social conflicts; making policy; and, most importantly, ensuring the overall protection of the system.71 Other theorists of the right see the responsibilities of the absolute velayat-e faqih along similar lines. According to two social scientists, for example, the scope and the nature of the responsibilities of the absolute velayat-e faqih are as follows: - Has all the responsibilities and rights of the Prophet and the Twelve Imams; - Is bound to execute laws in a precise and exact manner and without diversions; - Is limited in action to the scope of divine law; - Must ensure the greater good of the public; - Must have the ability to determine the importance of directives (ahkam) and to prioritize their implementation; - Must have the ability to issue and implement state directives (ahkam-e hokumati); - And, must have the ability to ensure the system’s legitimacy on the basis of his approval and validation.72

Khamenei ascribes the same qualifications to the absolute velayat-e faqih.73 In addition to being underwritten by the vote of the people, he 70

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Alavian and Hosseini, “Saz o Kar-e Feqhi va Qanuni-e Mahar va Kontrol-e Qova-ye Hokumati dar Nazariyeh-e ‘Velayat-e Motlaq-e Faqih’” (The Jurisprudential and Legal Basis for Constraining State Power in Theory of “Absolute Velayat-e Faqih”), p. 26. Darabkalaie, Negaresh-i bar Falsafeh-e Siyasi-e Eslam (A Look at the Political Philosophy of Islam), pp. 122–123. Ashrafi and Alizadeh Seilab, “Velayat-e Motlaqeh Faqih dar Andisheh-e Siyasi-e Ayatollah Khamenei” (Absolute Velayat-e Faqih in the Political Thought of Ayatollah Khamenei), p. 30. Ibid., p. 47.

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maintains, for a state to be considered legitimate, it needs to have rulers that are just and wise.74 Khomeini, it will be recalled, devised the notion of state directives (ahkam-e hokumati) as the most important dimension of Islamic rule. For Khomeini, the scope of the absolute velayat-e faqih’s responsibilities is the same as the Prophet’s, and, when circumstances dictate, the rule of the velayat-e faqih takes priority over the primary injunctions of Islam such as prayer and pilgrimage to Mecca.75 While consultation is desired, the absolute velayat-e faqih does not need to follow expert advice if he deems a different decision is more appropriate.76 According to one interpretation, the decrees of the velayat-e faqih themselves constitute “systemic” rules and ahkam that need to be obeyed. The job of the other organs of the state, especially the Guardian Council, is to determine what these systemic rules are, based on the wishes and directives of the leader, and to ensure their implementation across the political system.77 A state directive is made up of “orders, rules, and regulations that are directly or indirectly enacted by the ruler of Islamic community on the basis of what is for the greater good of society, in all matters involving society, in the execution of the shari‘ah, and in governing the country.”78 Such directives are either for purposes of political 74

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Lakzaee and Javidi, “Nazariyeh-e Dowlat dar Andisheh-e Siyasi-e Ayatollah Khamenei” (Theory of State in the Political Thought of Ayatollah Khamenei), p. 159. Alavian and Hosseini, “Saz o Kar-e Feqhi va Qanuni-e Mahar va Kontrol-e Qova-ye Hokumati dar Nazariyeh-e ‘Velayat-e Motlaq-e Faqih’” (The Jurisprudential and Legal Basis for Constraining State Power in Theory of “Absolute Velayat-e Faqih”), p. 8. Mohammad Mousavi Bojnurdi and Ali Seyyed Mousavi, “Rahbari va Nazarat-e Mashverati-e Majma’-e Tshkhis-e Maslahat-e Nezam ba Roykardi bar Nazar-e Emam Khoimeini” (Leadership and Consultative Views of the Expediency Council in Imam Khomeini’s Perspective), Pazhoheshnameh Matin, Vol. 19, No. 75 (1396/2017), p. 78. Aminollah Zamani, “Tahlil-e Karkard-e Ahkam-e Nezamiyeh-e Velayat-e Faqih dar Ara va Nazar-haye Shoura-ye Negahban” (Analysis of the Function of the Systemic Rules of the Velayat-e Faqih on the Views and Opinion of the Guardian Council), Faslname-e Danesh-e Hoquq-e Omumi, Vol. 5, No. 15 (1395/2016), p. 1. Hamid Zarrabi and Majid Ashrafi, “Tabyeen va Tasmimat-e Velayat-e Faqih (Hokm-e Hokumati) dar Hokumat-e Eslami az Manzar-e Fegh-e Siyasi va Qanun-e Asasi-e Jomhuri-e Eslami-e Iran” (Explanations and Decisions of the Velayat-e Faqih [State Directives] from the Perspective of Political Jurisprudence

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management or for the implementation of the shari‘ah, in the form of legislative or executive decisions, and may be directly issued by the ruler or indirectly implemented through other responsible officials. These state directives must revolve around social and political matters and may deal with domestic or international issues. State directives are not meant to contravene and contradict Islam’s primary directives (ahkam-e avaliyeh). In certain, specific instances, state directives may trump religious ones when the greater good of the community is involved. Khomeini uses the example of trespassing through private property. In ordinary time, passing through one’s private property without permission is forbidden. But if a lifeguard runs through a private property to save someone’s life, that is permissible.79 State directives, in fact, can be divided into two categories. One category is made up of those directives that can be found in the Quran, the Hadith, or the works of the Twelve Imams regarding the management of the state and the affairs of society. These directives need to be implemented by the faqih. A second category of state directives is made up of the rights and responsibilities that the Prophet, the Imams, and the velayat-e faqih have in their efforts to manage the political affairs of society.80

Contesting the Absolute Velayat-e Faqih It should come as little surprise that the notion of absolute velayat-e faqih has its fair share of detractors both within and outside of the clerical establishment. At the very least, some argue, the notion has not been subject to sustained critical analysis and study. According to Emadeddin Baqi, for example, because the position of velayat-e faqih was codified in the constitution and was institutionalized before it could be theoretically discussed and debated, any discussion of it after

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and the Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Iran), Pazhoheshnameh-e Tarikh, Siyasat va Rasaneh, Vol. 1, No. 2 (1397/2018), p. 210. Dadashi, “Negahi beh Nazariyat-e Feqhi va Siyasi-e Emam Khomeini dar Barehye Velayat-e Faqih” (A Look at the Jurisprudential and Political Theories of Imam Khomeini Concerning the Velayat-e Faqih), p. 30. Zarrabi and Ashrafi, “Tabyeen va Tasmimat-e Velayat-e Faqih (Hokm-e Hokumati) dar Hokumat-e Eslami az Manzar-e Fegh-e Siyasi va Qanun-e Asasie Jomhuri-e Eslami-e Iran” (Explanations and Decisions of the Velayat-e Faqih [State Directives] from the Perspective of Political Jurisprudence and the Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Iran), pp. 209–210.

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the establishment of the Islamic Republic provokes sharp political reactions. Therefore, the concept has not been subject to the same thorough discussion and scrutiny that many other Islamic concepts have undergone.81 Much of the criticism directed at the notion has come from those identified as belonging to the reformist camp. According to the author and activist Akbar Gangi, for example, whereas velayat-e faqih is a product of a religious state, the absolute velayat-e faqih is a product of state religion. Velayat-e faqih, he explains, emerged out of fiqh. This is a government that is conditional and constitutional (hokumat-e mashruteh). But in state religion, the velayat-e faqih has absolute authority. Ganji quotes Khomeini’s earlier writings on the concept of velayat-e faqih: “Islamic government is neither autocratic nor absolute; it is ‘constitutional.’ This does not mean constitutional according to the conventional meaning, of laws being subject to a majority vote of individuals. It means that rulers are obligated to govern based on the conditions outlined in the Quran and the traditions of the Prophet.”82 In outlining of the absolute velayat-e faqih, Ganji continues, Khomeini revised his original assessment as follows: To govern, which is part of the absolute velayat of the Messenger of God, is one of the primary injunctions of Islam, and it has priority over the secondary injunctions of Islam such as prayer and fasting . . . The government can abrogate the religious agreements it has struck with the people if those agreements contravene the interests of the people and Islam.83

Ganji maintains that Khomeini’s conception of Islam and politics started out as religious state but ended as state religion. In this state religion, the absolute velayat-e faqih is the central element and all other relevant institutions – the state, the clergy, the seminary, etc. – derive their legitimacy from the absolute velayat-e faqih.84 Another reformist activist and thinker, Saeed Hajjarian (b. 1954), who survived an assassination attempt on his life in 2000, is unrelenting in his criticism of the notion of absolute velayat-e faqih. The theory 81

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Emadeddin Baqi, Hoquq-e Mokhalefan: Tamrin-e Demokrasi Baraye Jame‘h Irani (The Rights of Opponents: The Practice of Democracy for Iranian Society) (Tehran: Nashr-e Saraee, 1381/2002), p. 287. Quoted in, Akbar Ganji, Talaqi-e Fashisti Az Din va Hokumat (Fascist Perceptions of Religion and Government) (Tehran: Tarh-e No, 1378/ 1999), pp. 84–85. 84 Ibid., pp. 84–85. Ibid., p. 96.

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of absolute velayat-e faqih turns Shi‘ism into an all-compassing party, he argues, a totalitarian state with all the power and no accountability.85 This religious autocracy has the paradoxical effect of turning Shi‘ism into a profane phenomenon and, in the long run, will result in the secularization of politics. By becoming a theory of the state, and an authoritarian state at that, the concept of absolute velayat-e faqih results in the de-sacralization of religion and its eventual distance from the state. Such an intimate mixture of religion and politics invariably leads to the overshadowing of religion and religious concerns by politics – what Ayatollah Khomeini theorized as “state directives” – thus lessening the overall efficacy of religion on the one hand and facilitating the possible appearance of Salafist and other extremist movements on the other.86 Mohsen Kadivar similarly presents a sobering analysis of the scope of the absolute velayat-e faqih’s powers and authority, warning that such a position is devoid of many of the constraints to which ordinary believers are subject. According to Kadivar, when the velayat-e faqih is considered “absolute,” he is no longer responsible for upholding the society’s general good and moral affairs (omour-e hasbi), is placed beyond all man-made laws, including the constitution, is no longer bound to obey the ahkam of Islam and can abrogate them based on his discretion, and is responsible for all matters revolving around politics, governing, and the interests of the Muslim society.87 Kadivar maintains that the absolute velayat-e faqih, whose legitimacy is supposed to come from God, contradicts republicanism and undermines the republican nature of the Islamic Republic.88 According to Kadivar, in absolute velayat-e faqih, no institution can question what the faqih does because he is accountable only before God. The Assembly of Experts can question the faqih only at the beginning of his rule, and only God can remove the absolute velayate faqih. As an alternative, Kadivar proposes a velayat-e faqih whose 85

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Saeed Hajjarian, Az Shahed-e Qodsi ta Shahed-e Bazari: ‘Orfi Shodan-e Din dar Sepehr-e Siyasat (From the Sacred Witness to the Profane Witness: The Secularization of Religion in the Sphere of Politics) (Tehran: Tarh-e No, 1380/ 2001), pp. 82–83. Ibid., pp. 87–88, 91. Kadivar, “Velayat-e Enteshabi-e Motlaqeh-e Faqihan” (The Appointed Absolute Guardianship of Faqihs), p. 9. Arasta, “Jomhuriyat va Eslamiyat” (Republicanism and Islamism), p. 10.

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scope of authority is limited. Because he is elected either by the people directly or by the Assembly of Experts, if the limited velayat-e faqih does not perform his duties, or if he is incapacitated, he can be removed from office.89 In limited velayat-e faqih, placing limits on freedoms is considered a grave crime, whereas in absolute velayat-e faqih, some limits on freedoms are considered inescapable and in fact necessary. Moreover, whereas the absolute velayat-e faqih is not obligated to seek advice, in the case of limited velayat-e faqih, getting advice is institutionalized.90 Others have been equally vocal in questioning the expansive purview of the absolute velayat-e faqih’s authority. The cleric and scholar Abolfazl Mousavian cites the prominent Shia jurist Sheikh Morteza Ansari (1781–1864) in insisting that velayat cannot be absolute and the faqih cannot assume absolute velayat.91 For his part, Rafsanjani believed that although the velayat-e faqih is absolute, that does not give him the right to interfere in people’s private lives.92 Others, most notably Ayatollah Javadi Amoli, have rejected such a position. If a faqih has the qualifications for velayat, Javadi Amoli maintains, then he must necessarily become the absolute velayat-e faqih. And, the velayat-e faqih cannot be absolute some times and have limited powers at other times.93 One scholar suggests changing the notion’s label in order to make it more palatable. Absolute velayat-e faqih can have negative political connotations, he suggests, and therefore a better term for it may be “inclusive” velayat-e faqih.94 But such cosmetic changes do not address the essence and substance of a position that claims divine sanction for enormous and seemingly unrestrained powers. The question, according to the reformist Yousefi Eshkevari, ultimately boils 89

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Kadivar, Daghdagheh-haye Hokumat-e Dini (Concerns of Religious Government), p. 69. Ibid., pp. 72–73. Abolfazl Mousavian, Mabani-e Dini-e Mardomsalari (Religious Foundations of Democracy) (Qom: Mofid University Press, 1395/2016), p. 173. Reza Sanati, Mashru‘iyat-e Asemani (Divine Legitimacy) (Qom: Salman-e Farsi, 1394/2015), p. 71. Abdollah Javadi Amoli, Velayat-e Faqih: Velayat, Feqahat, va ‘Edalat (Velayat-e Faqih: Guardianship, Learnedness, and Justice) (Qom: Esra’, 1381/2002), p. 473. Shayegh, “Esbat-e Velayat-e Motlaq-e Faqih az Tariq-e Borhan-e Khalaf va Mostaqim” (Proof of Absolute Velayat-e Faqih through Direct and Reverse Logic), p. 106.

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down to whether the absolute velayat-e faqih is a “shari‘ah velayat” or a “profane velayat.” Khameneists maintain that the position is shari‘ah velayat, which places it above the law, including the constitution. This was the case during the Qajar era, when the clergy, along with the shah, were themselves the law. The constitution has sought to make the position of velayat-e faqih both shari‘ah-based and profane. But this has proven neither optimal nor really workable in the modern world.95 There are also jurisprudential arguments in favor of the elected nature of the rule of the velayat-e faqih. Some of these arguments date back to the Constitutional era in the early years of the twentieth century, as advocated by Ayatollah Assadollah Khareqani (b. 1838), and continue into the twenty-first century, as represented by the writings of Ayatollah Montazeri.96 The reformist Hojjatoleslam Hussein Ansari-Rad (b. 1937) argues that according to the constitution, the vali-e faqih can be directly elected by the people, and those who see the position as being beyond the constitution are inadvertently undermining the position’s foundations and placing it in danger.97 Given the enormity of his jurisprudential contributions, first as a proponent of the absolute velayat-e faqih and later as its critique and an advocate of elections to the position, I will end this section with a brief discussion of the views of Ayatollah Montazeri on the subject. Montazeri’s own articulation of the concept of velayat-e faqih was much more detailed and elaborate than that of his teacher, Khomeini.98 Montazeri saw the velayat-e faqih as the only guarantor for the implementation of Islamic ordinances, and the only viable foundation for national sovereignty and popular representation.99 In his later years, however, he was unequivocal in his rejection of absolute velayat-e faqih. “The absolute velayat-e faqih is a mistake. 95

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Hasan Yousefi Eshkevari, Yad-e Ayam (Memory of the Times) (Tehran: Gam-e No, 1379/2000), pp. 173–176. Sohrab Salahi and Ali Fattahi Zafarqandi, “Jaygah-e Mardom dar Tashkil-e Hokumat-e Eslami” (The People’s Place in the Formation of Islamic Government), Faslnameh-e Barresi-haye Hoquq-e Omumi, Vol. 2, No. 1 (1392/ 2013), p. 105. Hussein Ansari-Rad, “Qanun-e Asasi Bozorgtarin Ma‘rouf Ast” (The Constitution Is the Biggest Good), Cheshmazdaz-e Iran, No. 89 (1393/2014), p. 31. Shahrough Akhavi, “The Thought and Role of Ayatollah Hossein‘ali Montazeri in the Politics of Post-1979 Iran,” Iranian Studies, Vol. 41, No. 5 (December 2008), p. 661. Ibid., pp. 661–662.

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A marja‘-i taqlid must tend [solely] to religious and juristic matters. The administration of political and economic affairs must be entrusted to experts. They are the ones who must take decisions, not ruling clerics.”100 According to Montazeri, “the most important point to be highlighted is that Islam is for separation of powers and does not recognize the concentration of power in the hands of one fallible individual.”101 Montazeri called for separation of powers rather than its concentration in the person of the velayat-e faqih, who, in Article 57 of the constitution, is given powers above and beyond all three branches of the government.102 Montazeri also calls for the direct election of the velayat-e faqih by the people, in the same way as the people directly choose their own marja‘-e taqlid. This, he admits, was an oversight by the Constitutional Assembly of Experts, which was well-intentioned but inexperienced, feared the potential of a despotic president and so gave considerable powers to the velayat-e faqih, and was carried away in its devotion to the personality and arguments of Ayatollah Khomeini.103 “What is certain is that the external actualization and legitimacy of this position is rooted in its election by the nation,” Motazeri maintained, and in fact it is a social contract between the nation and the vali-e faqih, and as such it is subject to the logic of faithfulness to agreements and covenants . . . And since the vali-e faqih is selected by the nation to bear a specific responsibility, and since he is not infallible, he should naturally remain open to public criticism, and held accountable with respect to his responsibilities.104

Theorizing Religious Authoritarianism Given that today Khameneism and the absolute velayat-e faqih reign supreme in Iran, it is only befitting to conclude this chapter with an 100 101

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Quoted in, ibid., p. 649. Geneive Abdo, “Re-Thinking the Islamic Republic: A ‘Conversation’ with Ayatollah Hossein ‘Ali Montazeri,” Middle East Journal, Vol. 55, No. 1 (Winter 2001), p. 11. Faezeh Salimzadeh Kakroudi, “Tafkik-e Qova dar Feqh va Qanun” (Separation of Powers in Fiqh and the Law), Pazhohesh dar Feqh va Hoquq, No. 1 (1395/2016), p. 141. Abdo, “Re-Thinking the Islamic Republic,” p. 17. Quoted in, ibid., p. 16.

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examination of some of the theoretical justifications for the country’s theocratic system. Specifically, I draw attention to the arguments of one of Khameneism’s most vocal defenders, the late Ayatollah Mesbah Yazdi. Chapter 4 alluded to the ideas of Mesbah Yazdi on the velayat-e faqih, both as a general concept and in its absolutist iteration. Here I will elaborate on these ideas as they pertain to the nature of the political system in general and the absolute velayat-e faqih in particular.

Mohammad Taqi Mesbah Yazdi Ayatollah Mesbah Yazdi was one of the most spirited, and often controversial, defenders of extremist politics in the Islamic Republic. From the very early years of the revolutionary system, Mesbah Yazdi advocated Islamization of the system under the auspices of the velayate faqih’s rule. In 1982–1983, for example, he came up with the idea of setting up the “Office for the Collaboration of the Howzeh and the University” as a means of purging universities from secular influences. More specifically, the office was meant to revise the curriculum and the textbooks of university programs in the social sciences and the humanities and to inject them with Islamic precepts instead.105 In addition to being a member of the Assembly of Experts from 1991 until his death in January 2021, Khamenei appointed Mesbah Yazdi to several key bodies, including the Supreme Council for Cultural Revolution.106 In November 1987, Mesbah Yazdi established a nonprofit cultural and educational institution in Qom called Baqer ol-‘Olum International Cultural Charity, which, among other things, trains and gives degrees to seminary students. In 1995, “with spiritual and financial help from the Esteemed Leader,” Mesbah Yazdi also established the Imam Khomeini Educational and Research Institute. This is “an official institution” within the Qom Theological Seminary, open only to advanced seminary students interested in ultraconservative interpretations of Shi‘a jurisprudence. Until his passing, Mesbah Yazdi served as the Institute’s director himself.107

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Reza Sanati, Mesbah-e Doostan (Mesbah of Friends) (Qom: Homaye Ghadir, 1383/2004), pp. 110–111. 107 Ibid., p. 125. Ibid., p. 123.

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Writing in the 1990s and the early 2000s, Mesbah Yazdi began advocating for the comprehensive powers of and complete obedience to the velayat-e faqih. At that time, the velayat-e faqih’s position was by no means one of paramount political power in the country. It was only gradually, over time, that Khamenei came to assume the full range of powers that Mesbah Yazdi theorized about. With time, the relationship between Khamenei and Mesbah Yazdi became increasingly one of mutual respect and admiration, with Khamenei appointing the cleric to various state positions and with Mesbah Yazdi heaping theological praise on Khamenei’s conduct as the absolute velayat-e faqih.108 “Ayatollah Khamenei has conducted himself with such grace and wisdom,” he is on the record as having said, “that both friends and enemies praise his qualification as the velayat-e faqih.”109 In addition to his close alliance with Khamenei, Mesbah Yazdi was known for his dislike for anyone with views different from the official orthodoxy. In 1999, to take one example, he was reported to have said in at least one occasion that “assuming all citizens are equal is worse than worshipping cows.”110 In another speech in February 2000, he claimed that a former head of the American Central Intelligence Agency had visited Iran with a suitcase full of dollars that he had distributed to reformist clerics and intellectuals, urging them to use the money to publish reformist newspapers and journals. He also praised Navvab Safavi, founder of the militant of the Fadaiyan-e Eslam in 1946. Praising Safavi’s “struggles against deviation,” Mesbah Yazdi turned his attention to the reformists: “They think that the views and spirit of Navvab Safavi has been destroyed in this country. But this spirit continues to exist among many of our committed youth.”111 108

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Significantly, a similar relationship exists between Khamenei and another erstwhile ally, Ayatollah Ahmad Jannati (b. 1927), who has been appointed to the Guardian Council by Khamenei since 1992. Mesbah Yazdi, Porsesh-ha va Pasokh-ha, Vol. 1 (Questions and Answers), p. 74. Quoted in, Akbar Ganji, Alijenab Sorkhpoosh va Alejenaban-e Khakestari: Asibshenasi-e Gozar beh Dowlat-e Demokratik-e Tose‘hgara (Red-Wearing Excellency and Grey Excellencies: Pathology of Transition to a Developmental, Democratic State) (Tehran: Tarh-e No, 1378/1999), p. 28. Ali Akbar Mohtashamipour, Chand-Sedai dar Jame‘h va Rouhaniyat (Multiplicity of Voices in Society and among the Clergy) (Tehran: Khaneh-e Andisheh-e Javan, 1379/2000), pp. 44–45.

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Mesbah Yazdi was often called “the theoretician of violence” by those, for example, who pointed to his Friday prayer sermon in March 1999, in which he condoned violence against reformists and was accused of issuing a fatwa in favor of unleashing terror against them.112 To these critics, Mesbah Yazi frequently replied that punishments such as execution, qisas retribution, and flogging are not just necessary in cases of moral infraction or criminal behavior; they are commanded in the Quran.113 “In fulfilling my duty, I have decided to break the taboo against violence. We cannot say that all violence is bad and lenience is always good. . . . Under different conditions, violence or lenience may be appropriate.”114 In times when Islam is insulted, he argued, it allows the use of violence to defend itself.115 Beginning in the 2000s, Mesbah Yazdi began to lay the ideological foundations of the “counter-reformation” with ideas similar to those that existed before the Constitutional Revolution in the early 1900s.116 Mesbah Yazdi argues that either God needs to be the main source of law, or humans. “We need to be either Allahist or humanist,” he maintained sardonically. “We cannot be both.”117 The choice is obvious. According to Mesbah Yazdi, if by democracy we mean free elections by the people for purposes of freely electing the president and parliamentary representatives, and question and impeach their leaders, of course this freedom must exist and we support it one hundred percent . . . [But] when concepts are used that are vague, general, and unclear, naturally we cannot render a clear judgement on them. These include concepts such as freedom, democracy, civil society, culture, and civilization. These are concepts that are vague, and debate over them is never a rational endeavor. Tell me what they mean exactly, and I will then tell you whether or not they are consistent with Islam.118

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Sanati, Mesbah-e Doostan (Mesbah of Friends), pp. 233–234. 114 115 Ibid., pp. 339–340. Quoted in, ibid., p. 340. Ibid., p. 342. Ali M. Ansari, Crisis of Authority: Iran’s 2009 Presidential Election (London: Chatham House, 2010), p. 16. Quoted in, Abbas Khalaji, Nasazi-haye Nazari va Nakami-e Siyasi-e Gofteman-e Eslahtalabi (1376–1384) (Incongruities and Political Ineffectiveness of the Reformist Discourse [1997–2005]) (Tehran: Boye Kaghaz, 1397/2018), p. 239. Quoted in, Sanati, Mesbah-e Doostan (Mesbah of Friends), p. 332.

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For Mesbah Yazdi, the ideal Islamic state must ensure society’s protection from internal as well as external enemies: When, based on divine law, Islamic government is formed, the laws and regulations of Islam must be implemented in society. Like any other government, there are instances under Islamic government in which force majeure becomes necessary. Governments need to have the necessary instruments to deal with law-breakers. Prisons, fines, and different forms of punishment are needed to deal with law-breakers, and security and defense forces are needed to deal with external enemies and their domestic lackies. The state cannot merely give moral advice. The ruler who does not resort to force majeure and who only provides moral guidance is an ethics teacher, not a ruler.119

He continues: Concerning those with whom one cannot have a rational conversation, those who deliberately and brazenly block invitation to the Prophet’s call, or deliberately wage war on Islam, the Quran has commanded that they be dealt with harshly. Muslims must strike fear in the hearts of these people so that they cannot entertain the thought of raping, hurting, or betraying Muslims. It is impossible to tell people like this “you have your own religion, we have ours. Let us live side by side like friends and brothers.”120

For Mesbah Yazdi, the preservation and protection of the Islamic system depends on the people having the correct understanding of Islam and believing in its principles.121 The notion of velayat-e faqih is the most important feature of Iran’s Islamic system, on which the survival of the entire system is predicated.122 The fact that the velayat-e faqih is the vicegerent of the Twelve Imam is based on jurisprudential and doctrinal teachings in Islam, Mesbah Yazdi maintains, and the legitimacy of the rule of the faqih is derived from the fact that he is God’s vicegerent on earth.123 God decides which infallible person rules over society. Now that such an infallible person cannot be found until the return of Imam Mahdi, the responsibility to rule goes to someone who is the vicegerent to the Imams and has the necessary piety, moral standing, and administrative expertise.124 The Islamic system therefore derives its legitimacy from the velayat-e faqih because he is backed by the shari‘ah, is approved by the

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120 Quoted in, ibid., pp. 336–337. Quoted in, ibid., p. 339. Mesbah Yazdi, Hokumat-e Eslami va Velayat-e Faqih (Islamic Government and Velayat-e Faqih), pp. 13–14. 123 124 Ibid., p. 17. Ibid., p. 159. Ibid., pp. 157–158.

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Hidden Imam, and the people are willing to sacrifice their lives and their property for him.125 For Mesbah Yazdi, the only disagreement among faqihs is over the scope of the velayat-e faqih’s powers, not over the need for such a position of guardianship and rule.126 Except in very rare instances, he claims, the powers and responsibilities of the velayat-e faqih are similar to those of the Prophet and the Twelve Imams.127 According to Mesbah Yazdi, the theory of entesab – appointment, installation – holds that the velayat-e faqih has an absolute right to rule, and references to the people’s will has no bearing whatsoever on the legitimacy of his rule.128 In every field, it is important to consult the views of experts. In an Islamic state, in matters of law, the views of the velayat-e faqih have the greatest salience and priority.129 If there are differences in the opinions (fatwas) of the velayat-e faqih and other faqihs on personal matters, then reference can be made to the opinion of a marja‘-e taqlid. But in social and political matters, the view of the velayat-e faqih takes priority over those of all others. Disobedience to the velayat-e faqih is not an option and is forbidden (haram).130 The position of velayat-e faqih is essential to the Islamic nature of the Islamic government, and without the velayat-e faqih the system cannot call itself Islamic.131 At the same time, criticism of the velayat-e faqih is permissible and indeed a requirement for all Muslims, and personal profits and interests should not be considerations in expressing valid criticisms of the velayat-e faqih. Nevertheless, such criticisms must be expressed within certain parameters. In criticizing the faqih, Islamic ethics should be observed; the criticism cannot be made frivolously and should be for constructive purposes; it cannot be made in a

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Ibid., pp. 161–162. Mesbah Yazdi, Porsesh-ha va Pasokh-ha, Vol. 1 (Questions and Answers), p. 62. Ibid., p. 64. Sanati, Mashru‘iyat-e Asemani (Divine Legitimacy), pp. 96–97. Mesbah Yazdi, Hokumat-e Eslami va Velayat-e Faqih (Islamic Government and Velayat-e Faqih), p. 57. Mesbah Yazdi, Porsesh-ha va Pasokh-ha, Vol. 1 (Questions and Answers), p. 68. Mesbah Yazdi, Porsesh-ha va Pasokh-ha, Vol. 2 (Questions and Answers), p. 54.

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way that would benefit the enemy; and it should be expressed in ways that would maintain the dignity of the velayat-e faqih.132 The Muslim leader has no right to interfere in the private lives of individuals, and in their personal lives people are free from state intervention. The state can, however, interfere in those areas in which personal freedoms spill over into the public domain, disrupt the privacy of others, or spread unIslamic or anti-Islamic values in society. In this respect, the velayat-e faqih can prevent lawmakers from going down the wrong path of facilitating the spread of anti-Islamic values throughout society. This the faqih can do first through advice, and, if that proves insufficient, through the use of state power.133 Mesbah Yazdi maintained that “if by democracy we mean that every law passed by the people is valid and must be implemented and respected, such a conception is definitely contradictory to religion . . . If democracy means that people’s vote stands in contrast to God’s command, then democracy has not validity.”134 “It is our opinion,” he wrote, “that in the Islamic system no one or no institution other than the velayat-e faqih has the right to independently make laws. All individuals and assemblies are merely for purposes of consulting the leader. They may prepare certain plans, but these plans can become law only after they are approved by the leader.”135 In this respect, therefore, Mesbah Yazi sees only a consultative role for the Majles. “From the perspective of Islam,” he maintains, the consultative assembly, or other legislative bodies, are only for purposes of consulting the leadership, meaning that experts from every field examine an issue and proffer opinion. If this happens, the interests of society are better served. Then the velayat-e faqih can consider the voracity of the suggestions based on the shari‘ah, and decree them into law. This is the philosophy of the consultative assembly in the Islamic system.136

132

133

134

135

136

Mesbah Yazdi, Porsesh-ha va Pasokh-ha, Vol. 1 (Questions and Answers), pp. 69–70. Mohammad Taqi Mesbah Yazdi, Porsesh-ha va Pasokh-ha, Vol. 3 (Questions and Answers) (Qom: Mo‘aseseh-e Amouzeshi va Pazhoheshi-e Emam Khomeini, 1380/2001), p. 41. Quoted in, Farajollah Rahnavard and Nematollah Mahdavirad, Modiriyyat-e Entekhabat (Management of Elections) (Tehran: Ettela‘at, 1393/2014), p. 115. Mesbah Yazdi, Hokumat-e Eslami va Velayat-e Faqih (Islamic Government and Velayat-e Faqih), p. 113. Ibid., p. 95.

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The notion of electing legislative deputies from geographic regions is at any rate a Western import that needs changing, he claims. The appropriate manner of selection is to have deputies represent their professions. This way instead of having one legislature with 300 deputies, there will be 30 legislatures with 10 deputies each. This better addresses the needs of constituencies.137 Significantly, the ideas of Mesbah Yazdi constitute more than mere ideological musings of a Qom cleric. Apart from his longtime membership in the Assembly of Experts, from 1998 to 2016, Mesbah Yazdi was one of the most influential clerics within the Qom religious establishment, with considerable following among seminary students and younger clerics. Many of his former pupils today serve as university professors and as senior clerics with ties to the state. Importantly, one of the courses that is taught at Mesbah Yazdi’s Imam Khomeini Educational and Research Institute, “with the approval and support of the office of the leader,” is a special training course in “the core principles of Islam.” Titled “The Plan of Velayat,” the course is conducted in cooperation with the Basij forces and is offered annually for Basiji academics and university professors.138 Mesbah Yazdi’s ideas continue to resonate within the different echelons of both the clerical establishment and the larger machinery of the state.

Conclusion In the committee convened to revise the constitution in 1989, two complementary positions regarding the velayat-e faqih became steadily dominant. The first was that the position was permanent and that there would be no time limits imposed on the office. A second, related position was the “absolute” nature of the office, based on the evolution of Ayatollah Khomeini’s conception of the role.139 While the drive toward centralization led to many responsibilities being entrusted to the post of the velayat-e faqih, it also resulted in an absence of meaningful oversight and control over the leader.140 At the same time, those faqihs in control of key state institutions such as the Guardian Council 137 138 139

140

Ibid., pp. 98–99. Sanati, Mesbah-e Doostan (Mesbah of Friends), p. 125. Feirahi, Feqh va Siyasat dar Iran-e Mo‘aser (Jurisprudence and Politics in Contemporary Iran), p. 265. Ibid., p. 261.

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and Assembly of Experts, all firmly believing in the notion of absolute velayat-e faqih, see the people’s role today as the same as it was during the time of the Twelve Imams.141 For them, for all intents and purposes, elections are more advisory than determinative. Ali Khamenei, a least likely leader on Khomeini’s death, capitalized on his years of political and organizational experience to outmaneuver and outfox friends and foes alike and to emerge as Iran’s paramount leader. Khamenei’s ascent was slow and by no means certain, with the leader having to take a back seat to the likes of Rafsanjani on the political front and to Montazeri in matters of jurisprudence. Steadily, however, with political assistance from the Revolutionary Guards and the Basij, and ideological support from Mesbah Yazdi and other ascendant figures within the Qom clerical establishment, Khamenei’s position was increasingly strengthened. Simultaneously, Khamenei’s traditionalist, conservative brand of Shia theology emerged as the formal ideology of the state. Starting with the second term of the Ahmadinejad presidency in 2009, “Khameneism” became politically and ideologically dominant in Iran. Today, whatever this Khameneism is meant to signify is far from uncontested. But its political, ideological, and jurisprudential dimensions rule over the country. The absolute velayat-e faqih, a position devised and first occupied by Khomeini, has found its full expression during Khamenei’s long tenure as Iran’s leader. 141

Farzaneh Ranjbarzadeh and Abbas Javarshakian, “Maqbuliyat va Mashru‘iyat-e Hokumat-e Eslami dar Andisheh-e Mulla Sadra va Emam Khomeini” (The Acceptance and Legitimacy of Islamic Government in the Thoughts of Mulla Sadra and Imam Khomeini), Faslnameh-e Motale‘at-e Siyasi, Vol. 6, No. 24 (1393/2014), p. 135.

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9

Whither the Islamic Republic?

As the official doctrine of the Islamic Republic, the journey of Iranian Shia jurisprudence in many ways resembles the travails of the state that has instrumentally employed it since 1979. In the early years of the revolution, like the embryonic state that was still unsure of its footing, Iranian Shi‘ism was in a state of great flux. It had just emerged as the dominant force among those that overthrew a once mighty monarchy, and it sought at once to redefine and consolidate itself as the official ideology of a state that was simultaneously revolutionary, republican, populist, and Islamic. The devastating war with Iraq from 1980 to 1988, overlapping almost perfectly with an unrelenting reign of terror from 1981 until the war’s end, swept most jurisprudential debates under the rug, seemingly minimizing them for the sake of war-time unity. As the dissolution of the Islamic Republican Party in 1987 indicated, however, such tensions remained, often not even that far below the surface. In the 1990s they resurfaced in the form of a reformist intellectual revolution of sorts, and when in 2009 they met with an unbending state’s intransigence, they exploded in the form of a popular, nationwide Green Movement. The Green Movement was suppressed with a brutality that was soon to become the state’s trademark, and the proponents of jurisprudential reforms were silenced one after another, some more harshly than others. By the end of the first decade of the 2000s, Khamenei’s interpretation of the absolute velayate faqih, along with his political conservatism and jurisprudential traditionalism, was being upheld as the undeclared official ideology of the state. Khameneism, and its chorus of supporters, both lay and clerical, had now triumphed politically. It was far from uncontested. But it formed the central core of the official orthodoxy. This is the version of Islam that governs over Iran today. It is austere and humorless in its approach to the people, suspicious and combative when it comes to the outside world and is highly conservative and traditional in its jurisprudential and political frames of reference. This 297

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Khameneism has no patience for those notions and precepts that once, back in the 1990s and the early 2000s, had emerged as Iranian Islam’s popular identifiers: civil society, dialogue, dynamic jurisprudence, elections, and limits on authority. Instead, it upholds the ideas of divine sanction, the continuation of the imamate, the necessity of guardianship, the absoluteness of authority, and the special mission of the clergy to rule. The mismatch between a state that is guided by absolutist ideals, controlled by men whose values are unbending and archaic, and a society that yearns to engage its universe on its own terms, a society that keeps changing and only grows in complexity, cannot possibly be any more stark. Under such circumstances, the best the state can hope for is forced compliance, or perhaps even benign neglect, on the part of the people. The state machinery keeps forcing the official ideological agenda on the people. A small percentage adopt it voluntarily, their exact size indeterminable under authoritarianism, but most people brush it off with ambivalence. They tacitly accept it in public, then mock it in private. Until, that is, they can no longer take it. As the scholar Mohamoud Pargoo observes, “the very project of Islamization self-destructively led to the substantive secularization of Iranian society.”1 This is why Iranians lash out against their recalcitrant state frequently – when the prices of fuel shoot up overnight, when water is unavailable in the summer heat, and when an innocent girl is killed at the hands of the morality police. Official Islam, it seems, has become woefully out of touch with the realities of life in Iran. It spews out ideological edicts with little or no relevance to people’s daily lives. On a good day, it repeats mantras popular back in the late 1970s and the early 1980s. Most days it resurrects references to what was obtained decades and centuries earlier. The result has been incongruence at multiple levels. Besides a growing state–society gap, what we see in Iran is a polity containing within itself several historical, political, and ideological anomalies. Contradictions abound – within the political system itself, in its ideological cosmology, its ideal approach to and its use of religion for purposes of political rule. For Iran, this of course is nothing new. 1

Mohamoud Pargoo, Secularization of Islam in Post-Revolutionary Iran (London: Routledge, 2021), pp. xii–xiii. For more on this see also, Mehran Kamrava, Triumph and Despair: In Search of the Islamic Republic (New York: Oxford University Press, 2022), chapter 9.

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The self-contradicting Islamic Republic is but the latest in a long line of anachronistic systems that have ruled over the country. “Traditional” systems of rule have a long history in Iran, while “modern” government is relatively recent. Contemporary government in the country has therefore featured contradictory characteristics of rule such as autocracy and constitutionalism, nationalism and globalism, centralism and federalism, individualism and institutionalism, parliamentarianism and sultanism, legalism and shari‘ah, and representation and guardianship. Governing in Iran today is not the product of a rational transition from a traditional to a modern administrative system. In the words of one observer, it resembles a car with several different engines, each wanting to go in a completely different direction.2 “Our political system is not well,” lamented the former rightist MP Emad Afrough. “I saw politics close up and saw its ugliness with my own eyes. I witnessed many ugly and destructive things, most of them with a religious veneer. And this religious veneer makes things all the more destructive.”3 Afrough goes on to complain about the instrumentalist use of religion and ethics, which he says has emerged as one of the country’s biggest problems. The howzeh, once a beacon of innovative thought, today lacks independence and therefore has no ability to engage in critical thinking, much less critical self-examination.4 Instead of critical self-awareness, the state incessantly insists on the sacredness of authority. As the sociologist Said Arjomand puts it, there is an “ongoing sacralization of the political order.”5 The clergy’s ascension to power has had other profound consequences, especially in terms of their own historic, traditional areas of focus and responsibility, their internal organization, and, of course, the institutions of political power.6 For one thing, the revolution and developments since resulted in the growing specialization of the 2

3

4 5

6

Davood Feirahi, Feqh va Siyasat dar Iran-e Mo‘aser (Fiqh and Politics in Contemporary Iran) (Tehran: Nashr-e Ney, 1393/2014), p. 13. Emad Afrough, Ma Ghal wa Man Ghal, Vol. 2 (What Was Said and Who Said It, Vol. 2) (Tehran: Hamshahri, 1392/2013), p. 275. Ibid., p. 32. Said Amir Arjomand, “Ideological Revolution in Shi‘ism,” in Authority and Political Culture in Shi‘ism, Said Amir Arjomand, ed. (Albany, NY: SUNY Press, 1988), p. 202. Abdolvahan Forati, Rouhaniyat va Siyasat: Ma‘el va Payamad-ha (The Clergy and Politics: Issues and Consequences) (Tehran: Sazman-e Entesharat-e Pazhoheshgah-e Farhang va Andisheh-e Eslami, 1395/2016), p. 23.

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clergy’s knowledge in various fields.7 The state resorts to a variety of means to ensure clerical compliance, including cooption through paying salaries and privileged access to resources, and also through coercive means such as the Special Court for the Clergy. By its very nature, nonetheless, the clergy cannot be apolitical. Even when out of power, clerics tend to care deeply about politics as it profoundly impacts prevailing social and political circumstances.8 The clergy is in fact a “political being” with three sets of functions: those functions that the clergy have historically played in society; functions that are context-specific, as in the context of the Islamic Republic; and functions that are informal.9 Under the Islamic Republic, the clergy have expanded their presence and functions in all areas of the state and power, both formally and informally. Instead of “institutional secularization” in modern society, in which structural differentiation gives religion a very specific and narrow function in society, in Iran the state has tried to foster a process of “sacralization of institutions,” one in which religion is meant to permeate most aspects of society.10 Once they directly entered the political arena, the clergy forever changed their political position and their social status. In the early days of the Islamic Republic, they were popularly perceived as leaders and vanguards of the revolution, their presence and activism in various social and political arenas seen as a source of comfort and assurance that the right thing was being done. Historically, the clergy were seen as the moral guardians of society. In the years following 1978, they also acquired – more accurately, they claimed for themselves – the role of the guardians of the political order and the revolution’s protectors. Steadily, as the revolution failed to deliver on its promises, and as clerics and their allies resorted to repression to hold on to power and suppressed mass dissent, the clergy’s once-elevated social position eroded. By the early 2020s, it was no longer “isolated malcontents” who opposed the state; the popular dislike for the clergy, especially in 7

8

9 10

Abdolvahab Forati, Danesh-e Siyasi dar Howzeh-e ‘Elmiyeh-e Qom (Political Knowledge in the Qom Theological Seminary) (Tehran: Sazman-e Entesharat-e Pazhoheshgah-e Farhang va Andisheh-e Eslami, 1390/2011), p. 27. Forati, Rouhaniyat va Siyasat: Ma‘el va Payamad-ha (The Clergy and Politics: Issues and Consequences), pp. 28, 32. Ibid., p. 29. Mehdi Soleimanieh, Pol ta Jazireh: Ta‘amoli Jame‘h Shenakhti dar Moqe‘iyat-e Pasa-Enqelabi-e Rouhaniyat (Bridge to Island: A Sociological Analysis of the Postrevolutionary Position of the Clergy) (Esfahan: Arma, 1397/2018), p. 53.

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urban quarters, though impossible to prove statistically, was also impossible to ignore. What does all this portend for the Islamic Republic and for Iran in the coming years and decades? And, what are the trajectories that Islam is likely to take in shaping the nature of the state and state– society relations in Iran in the years to come? A few scenarios appear likely. The first is a continuation of the status quo, with the state of affairs continuing as they have been since about 2010. This entails the theocracy continuing to be led by a traditionalist absolute velayat-e faqih, with the state’s ideology, overall profile, and general approach to society informed by traditional, conservative interpretations of Shia jurisprudence. This is, in essence, the prolonging of Khameneism even when and if Khamenei is no longer around. Society, meanwhile, will continue to change on its own, mostly not because of impetus by the state but in fact despite the state’s efforts at shaping social values and orientations. In recent years, we have witnessed increases in the frequency and intensity of spontaneous protests by Iranians from all walks of life. For the status quo to continue, therefore, the state will need to rely on ever greater coercive means to ensure the compliance of the different social actors, or, at the very least, their ambivalence. With Khamenei’s advanced age, and the rising cost of keeping the status quo going, both politically and in human life, a continuation of Khameneism as it has taken shape over the past decade or so, especially beyond Khamenei, seems highly unlikely in the long run. Even if the Revolutionary Guards become politically more powerful, which in the immediate aftermath of Khamenei’s death seems highly likely, the possibility of a stale, archaic state ruling over a dynamic society appears untenable in the long run. The state will have no alternative but to modify some of its austere approach toward society if it is to survive. This is not to predict a return of Islamic reformism. As we saw in Chapters 5 and 6, reformist ideas may be intellectually intriguing, but they suffer from several internal shortcomings and contradictions that make them largely unworkable in practice. The political scientist Mansour Farhang correctly believes that in the context of the Islamic Republic, reformism may be a noble idea, but it is unrealistic. He argues that after Khomeini’s death, the reformists have had no impact on the system’s behavior. Even reformists with influential positions within the state hierarchy – Hosseinali Montazeri, Mehdi

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Karrubi, Mirhossein Mousavi, and Mohammad Khatami, for example – were either arrested or were placed under house arrest, or, at best, were politically marginalized.11 Perhaps the brevity of the reformist era did not afford it the opportunity to resolve its internal shortcomings. The hermeneutic revolution of the 1990s, spearheaded by a dozen or so “new thinking” public intellectuals, represented an Islamic reformation of sorts. But what transpired lacked two key ingredients that the Protestant Reformation had, one being a meaningfully prolonged period of time, the other institutions that could sustain it over time. The state easily sidelined or altogether eliminated one individual thinker after another. As the ill-fated intellectual reformation of the 1990s and the 2000s subsided, two decades later Iranian society itself began addressing those issues that the “new thinkers” had ignored or chosen to brush aside for the sake of expedience. Chief among these was the issue of inequality of the sexes and the insistence of the official orthodoxy to treat women as second-class citizens. Iran’s religious authorities have long exhibited deep fear and insecurity toward the issue of gender equality and female empowerment. As society experienced transformations and as circumstances and daily life necessitated changes to traditional norms concerning gender roles and the segregation of the sexes, the state insisted on regressive policies regarding the position of women outside of the house, especially in the formal labor market, in schools and universities, and in relation to the state. By late 2022, Iranians of all walks of life, especially the young and particularly young women, took matters into their own hands, removed their compulsory hijabs en masse, shouted slogans about women’s freedom, and refused to eat in segregated university cafeterias. As the Islamic Republic entered its fourth decade, young Iranian women and men demonstrated with their deeds what their father’s generation had pretended to care for but had failed to theorize about. Making laws that are based strictly on fiqh, or at least laws that do not contradict it, has long proven to be a serious challenge for Iran’s Islamic state. More than two decades ago, an Iranian scholar warned that if these challenges are not resolved somehow, the result will be the 11

Mansour Farhang, “Ravanshenasi-e Farafkani va Mo‘azel-e Eslah-talabi dar Jomhuri-e Eslami” (Psychology of Projection and the Problem of Reformism in the Islamic Republic), BBC Persian (June 2, 2018), www.bbc.com/persian/blogviewpoints-44341696.

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growth of secular and temporal laws, and ultimately creeping secularism, in the country’s legal system.12 But the issue today goes far beyond the country’s legal system. Iranian society appears unwilling to compliantly obey the normative strictures of the state. Two complementary, self-reinforcing processes appear to be simultaneously underway in Iran, one the state’s own unintentional slide toward greater secularization, its best efforts to the contrary notwithstanding, the other society’s unwillingness to observe the brand of Islam forced onto it by state. According to the long-time political activist Said Hajjarian, the absolute velayat-e faqih leads, ironically, to the secularization of the polity. In fact, he maintains, the Islamic Republic can be considered a “self-secularizing revolutionary Islamic state.”13 This selfsecularization is occurring in two ways. At one level, through its increasing domination of the Shia religious and clerical establishment, the state continues to give primacy to the profane over the sacred, and to the political over the religious. Simultaneously, the state increasingly separates itself from the traditional Shia establishment.14 The state has succeeded in securing its institutional and organizational hegemony over the howzeh and other religious institutions. It has also succeeded in ensuring that its own interpretations of Islam, what I have called Khameneism here, is the only perspective that is dominating the country’s ideological discourse. But it is not clear to what extent it has won over the hearts and minds of those with Islamist sensibilities. As far as ordinary Iranians are concerned, if the proverbial “street” is any indication, the state’s forcible and domineering official orthodoxy has only managed to alienate many of its citizens and push them toward open acts of defiance. Asef Bayat aptly labels the phenomenon I just described as postIslamism. According to Bayat, post-Islamization is “a complex process of breaking from an Islamist ideological package by adhering to a different, more inclusive, kind of religious project in which Islam 12

13

14

Ebrahim Shafi‘i Sarvestani, Feqh va Qanun-gozari (Fiqh and Law-Making) (Qom: Teh, 1381/2002), p. 14. Yasuyuki Matsunaga, “The Secularization of a Faqih-Headed Revolutionary Islamic State of Iran: Its Mechanisms, Processes, and Prospects,” Comparative Studies of South Asia, Africa and the Middle East, Vol. 29, No. 3 (2009), p. 469. Original emphasis. Ibid., p. 481.

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nevertheless continues to remain important both as faith and as a player in the public sphere.”15 A “critical departure from Islamist politics,” post-Islamism is a process of “transcending from the dutycentered and exclusive Islamist politics toward a more rights-centered and inclusive outlook that favors a civil/secular state operating within a pious society.”16 Over the past three decades, the dominant discursive identity of the Islamic Republic has encountered serious challenges. At the same time, as a competing identity, post-Islamism has not been able to gain complete dominance. In essence, there are competing political identities in Iran, among which Islamist and postIslamist ones stand out.17 What we see in contemporary Iran is the growth of a postpolitical Islam alongside political Islam. This postIslamism also emerged within the body politic and assumed different iterations, each corresponding with a significant development in the Islamic Republic’s history: reconstruction, reforms, the Green Movement, and moderation.18 The state’s authoritarian retrenchment and its reinvigorated embrace of ideological conservatism and orthodoxy, as manifested in the presidency of Ebrahim Raisi in 2021, triggered the social backlash of 2022. At least for the foreseeable future, the state’s violent response appears to have bought it more time. What all of this means for the future trajectory of the Islamic Republic is not clear. What is obvious is that the state cannot help but change. The real question revolves around the nature and extent of the change. Khamenei’s departure from the scene will, of course, foster changes in style of rule and the inflection of Iranian politics. But whether these inevitable changes will be accompanied by more profound transformations – in areas such as state–society relations, in the normative milieu that the Islamic Republic seeks to enforce in its relations with society, and in Shia jurisprudence – is a question that only history will answer. 15

16 17

18

Asef Bayat, “Post-Islamism at Large,” in Post-Islamism: The Changing Faces if Political Islam, Asef Bayat, ed. (New York: Oxford University Press), pp. 25–26. Ibid., 29. Rahman Qahremanpour, Barresi-ye Chahardahe Tahavvol-khai dar Iran (Analysis of Four Decades of Seeking Change in Iran) (Tehran: Rouzaneh, 1396/ 2017), p. 12. Ibid., p. 5.

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Appendix Brief Biography of Some of the Figures Discussed

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Name

Years Alive

Rank/Credential

Brief Biography

Alavitabar, Alireza

b. 1960

PhD in Political Science

Amoli, Mohammad Taqi Ansari-rad, Hossein Abdolkarim, Soroush

1887–1971

Ayatollah

b. 1937 b. 1945

Hojjatoleslam Former professor of philosophy at the University of Tehran

Abedini, Ahmad

b. 1959

Ayatollah

Member of Islamic Participation Party, public intellectual active in the reform movement, faculty member at the Institute for Planning and Development Shia jurist, philosopher, and mystic; his most important works are his Notes on Admonitions Shia Mujtahed and author Renowned thinker, reformer, Rumi scholar, public intellectual; arguably the most influential figure in the religious intellectual movement of Iran; currently a visiting scholar at the University of Maryland in College Park, Maryland. He was also affiliated with other institutions, including Harvard, Princeton, Yale, Columbia, the Leiden-based International Institute as a visiting professor for the Study of Islam in the Modern World (ISIM) and the Wissenschaftskolleg in Berlin. Soroush’s ideas, founded on relativism, prompted both supporters and critics to compare his role in reforming Islam to that of Martin Luther in reforming Christianity Religious writer and thinker

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Baqi, Emadeddin

b. 1962

Journalist, human rights activist, prisoners’ rights advocate, investigative journalist

Beheshti, Mohammad

1928–1981

Ayatollah

Boroujerdi, Hossein

1875–1961

Grand Ayatollah

Edalat-Nejad, Sa’id Eshkevari, Hasan Yousefi Fanaee, Abolghassem

b. 1962 b. 1950 b. 1959

Fayez, Muhammad

b. 1930

PhD in Islamic studies Hojatoleslam, cleric, researcher, journalist, reformist, and former political prisoner PhD in philosophy from University of Sheffield Grand Ayatollah

Golpaygani, Mohammad Reza

1899–1993

Grand Ayatollah

Founder and head of the Committee for the Defense of Prisoners’ Rights and the Society of Right to Life Guardians in Iran; most of his books are banned in Iran; imprisoned because of his writings on the so-called chain murders, which occurred in Autumn 1998 Jurist, philosopher, cleric, and politician who was known as the second person in the political hierarchy of Iran after the revolution Leading marja‘-e taqlid in Iran from approximately 1947 to his death in 1961; for seventeen years he also headed the Qom seminary Professor of philosophy Reformist religious scholar

307

Professor of Philosophy at Mofid University in Qom One of the most senior Shia marja‘-e taqlid living in Iraq after Ali al-Sistani Prominent Shia marj’-e taqlid, in 1989 was considered as a possible successor to Khomeini but did not receive sufficient votes in the Assembly of Experts

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(cont.) Name

Years Alive

Rank/Credential

Brief Biography

Haeri, Abdolkarim

1859–1937

Grand Ayatollah

Hashemi Rafsanjani, Akbar

1934–2017

Ayatollah

Jahan Bozorgi, Ahmad

b. 1955

Hojatoleslam; PhD in Political Science from the University of Tehran

Javadi Amoli, Abdollah

b. 1933

Ayatollah

Jazayeri, Morteza al-Karaki, al-Muhaqqiq Kadivar, Mohsen

1930–2008 1461–1535

Ayatollah Shaykh al-Islam

b. 1959

Hojatoleslam

Khorasani, Vahid

b. 1921

Grand Ayatollah

Makarem Shirazi, Naser

b. 1927

Grand Ayatollah

Established the Qom Howzeh Elmiyeh in 1922. Twelver Shia Muslim scholar and marja‘-e taqlid; one of Khomeini’s teacher Politician, writer, and one of the founding fathers of the Islamic Republic who was the fourth president of Iran from 1989 to 1997 Lecturer at universities in Tehran and at religious seminaries; author and researcher, known for his arch conservatism and his defamatory remarks against reformists and especially President Hassan Rouhani Member of Constitutional Assembly of Experts, prominent scholar and philosopher in the Qom Seminary A religious intellectual and author Shia jurist of Safavid era. He played an important role in spreading Shia beliefs in Iran Mujtahid, Islamic theologian, philosopher, writer, leading intellectual reformist, and research professor of Islamic Studies at Duke University Author and Shia marja‘, head of the Qom seminary and considered as one the most learned Shia religious authority alive Shia marja‘ and religious leader

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Mar‘ashi Najafi, Mahmoud

b. 1941

Ayatollah, PhD in sociology from University of London

Mesbah Yazdi, Mohammad Taqi

1935–2021

Ayatollah

Milani, Mohammad Hadi

1895–1975

Ayatollah

Mojtahed Shabestari, Mohammad

b. 1936

Former professor of philosophy at University of Tehran

Montazeri, Hosseinali

1922–2009

Shia theologian, Islamic democracy advocate, writer, and human rights activist

309

Teaching and writing in Qom and heads his own private library the Mar‘ashi Najafi Library, which he claims to be one of the largest libraries in Iran and the world Shia cleric, philosopher, and conservative political theorist who served as the spiritual leader of the Front of Islamic Revolution Stability An Iraqi-Iranian marja‘-e taqlid. He supported the Islamic Revolution of Iran and the Iraqi movement. He contributed to the establishment of Islamic seminary schools, including Haqqani Seminary School Philosopher, theologian, hermeneutist. Formerly a political activist and MP, he retired himself from politics in 1984; also served as Imam of the Islamic Centre of Hamburg between 1970 and 1978 Once the designated successor to Ayatollah Khomeini, Montazeri spent his later years in Qom and remained politically influential but was placed in house arrest in 1997 for questioning Khamenei’s rule. Montazeri was viewed by many as the most knowledgeable senior Islamic scholar in Iran

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(cont.) Name

Years Alive

Rank/Credential

Brief Biography

Mesbah Yazdi, Mohammad Taqi

1935–2021

Ayatollah

Mousavian, Abolfazl

b. 1956

Naini, Mohammad Hossein Nouri, Abdollah

1860–1936

PhD in Fiqh and Islamic Law from Howzeh ‘Elmiyeh Qom Ayatollah

b. 1949

Cleric and reformist politician

b. 1926

Grand Ayatollah

Shia cleric, philosopher, and conservative political theorist who served as the spiritual leader of the Front of Islamic Revolution Stability Professor of Jurisprudence at Mofid University in Qom marja‘-e taqlid; considered to be the most famous theoretician of Iran’s Constitutional Revolution Despite his long history of service to the Islamic Republic, he became the most senior politician to be sentenced to prison after the revolution Shia marja‘-e taqlid

Rouhani, Mohammad Sadeq Sadr, Mohammad Baqer Saanei, Yousef

1935–1980

Grand Ayatollah

1937–2020

Ayatollah

Sistani, Ali

b. 1930

Grand Ayatollah

An Iraqi philosopher and the ideological founder of the Islamic Dawa party Twelver Shia marja‘-e taqlid and politician, a member of the Islamic Republic of Iran’s powerful Guardian Council from 1980 to 1983 and also Attorney-General of Iran from 1983 to 1985 A highly influential Iranian-Iraqi Shia marja‘-e taqlid

https://doi.org/10.1017/9781009460880.011 Published online by Cambridge University Press

Shariatmadari, Kazem

1906–1986

Grand Ayatollah

Shobairi Zanjani, Mousa Sobhani, Jafar

b. 1928

Grand Ayatollah

b. 1929

Ayatollah

Sahabi, Ezzatollah

1930–2011

Politician and journalist

Tabatabaei Qomi, Hassan

1912–2007

Grand Ayatollah

Tehrani, Mohammad Sadeqi

1926–2011

Ayatollah

Prominent cleric favored keeping clerics away from governmental positions and was a critic of Ayatollah Khomeini Twelver Shia marja‘-e taqlid Twelver Shia marja‘-e taqlid, influential theologian and writer; a former member of the Society of Seminary Teachers of Qom and founder of Imam Sadiq Institute in Qom Prominent political activist and a member of the Majles from 1980 to 1984 Prominent marja‘-e taqlid who was born in Najaf and was active in the revolutionary struggle against the Pahlavis An Iranian Twelver marja‘-e taqlid; studied in seminaries of Qom under Grand Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini and Muhammad Husayn Tabatabaei

311

Glossary

ahkam (pl.), hukm (sn.) beyt

bey‘at faqih (sn.), fuqaha (pl.) Hadith hesbiyyeh Husainiya ijtihadi

‘irfan kalam Khums

ma‘rifat marja‘-e taqlid marja‘iyat

Islamic injunction or ruling that is final and must be obeyed home office, used primarily by marja‘ for purposes of teaching seminar students and answering religious inquiries oath of allegiance, usually to an amir or religious leader someone learned in the science of fiqh, jurisprudence deeds and sayings attributed to Prophet Muhammad that which is considered good for society a commemoration hall for mourning ceremonies and religious lectures independent reasoning, especially regarding issues not explicitly covered in the Quran or in Hadith gnosis; knowledge of the divine speculative theology literally one-fifth, denoting the amount of tax to be paid to the ruler from one’s profits to be distributed to those in need wisdom and knowledge acquired through experience Source of Emulation the position of marja‘-e taqlid; a source of religious knowledge and wisdom to follow and emulate

312

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Glossary

mujtahid

Occultation

Qasis shura ‘urf velayat velayat-e faqih vali Vali-ye Amr

Zakat

313

someone who engages in ijtihad, often referred to learned clerics formulating independent decisions in jurisprudential or theological matters based on interpretations of Islamic law and doctrine the eschatological belief that Mahdi, the Twelfth Imam of Shi‘ism, will return to establish peace and justice on earth retribution or retaliation for crimes committed intentionally consultation the customs, or collective knowledge, of a given society guardianship guardianship of the jurisconsult guardian literally, Guardian of Command; another designation for vali-ye faqih used by ultraconservative theologians to denote the faqih’s extensive authority mandatory alms in Islam, often considered as a form of obligatory charity to be paid to the community

https://doi.org/10.1017/9781009460880.012 Published online by Cambridge University Press

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Index

Introductory Note References such as ‘178–79’ indicate (not necessarily continuous) discussion of a topic across a range of pages. Wherever possible in the case of topics with many references, these have either been divided into sub-topics or only the most significant discussions of the topic are listed. Because the entire work is about ‘Iran’ and ‘Islam’, the use of these terms (and certain others which occur constantly throughout the book) as entry points has been restricted. Information will be found under the corresponding detailed topics. Cross-references such as “see also individual names” direct the reader to entries in a category (e.g. in this case ‘Khamenei’) rather than a specific “individual names” entry. Abedini, Ayatollah Ahmad, 177, 306 absolute authority, 141, 219, 273, 281, 284 absolute freedom, 158, 184 absolute guardianship, 210, 265 absolute ijtihad, 124, 126 absolute rule, 103–104, 210 absolute velayat-e faqih; See velayat-e faqih, absolute. absolutism, 67, 79, 94, 140, 279 academics, 2, 147, 178, 230–231, 295 acceptance, 119–120, 135, 138, 184, 193, 196–197, 239, 246–247, 253, 254, 255, 256, 257, 258, 262 and legitimacy, 253–256 popular, 185, 253–256, 262 accountability, 67, 131–132, 186, 247, 285 activism, 70–72, 78, 300 clerical, 70, 72 party, 196 activists, human rights, 307, 309 administration, 53, 87, 117, 126, 139, 161, 272, 276, 280, 288 administrators, 85, 93, 247 advocacy, 14, 174, 191, 195, 198 Afrough, Emad, 53, 55, 184, 255, 299

ahkam, 93, 95, 118, 125, 171, 280–282, 285, 312; See Islamic injunctions. ahkam-e hokumati, 7, 84, 98, 131, 265, 281–282 Ahmadinejad, Mahmood, 55, 144, 154, 220, 250, 265, 296 Al Ghazali, Abu Hamid, 149 ‘Ala, Hossein, 14 Al-Afghani, Jamal al-Din, 145–146, 205 Alavitabar, Alireza, 181–182, 306 Al-e Ahmad, Jalal, 147 Al-Imran Surah, 127, 189 al-Karaki, Al-Muhaqqiq, 63, 88, 308 Allameh Tabatabai University, 204 allegiance, 97, 102, 136, 138, 185, 189, 192–194, 261, 273 amendments, constitutional, 20, 101 analytical tools, 148, 149, 164, 178 Anglo-Soviet Occupation, 12 Ansari-rad, Hossein, 306 anti-Islamic values, 294 apostasy, 155, 159 approbative principle, 119 ‘aql (reason/intellect), 171, 174, 180, 229, 261 Ardebili, Muhaqqiq, 88, 115

335

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336 Arjomand, Said Amir, 35, 82, 102, 265, 299 armed forces, 18–19, 281 Assembly of Experts, 118–119, 121, 245, 249–251, 257, 261, 264–265, 280, 285–286, 295–296 Association of Combatant Clerics, 26–27, 52 attorneys, 20, 36, 54 authoritarian system, hybrid, 187, 263, 266 authoritarianism, 2, 4, 9, 14, 28, 122, 131, 147, 217, 263 monarchical, 14, 147 religious, 288 authority, 313 absolute velayat-e faqih, 277, 285 future direction for the Islamic Republic, 298, 299 institutional context of state capture, 31 jurisprudence, 71, 74–75, 83–86, 104 Khameneism, 266 legitimate; See legitimate authority. religious, 267, 302, 308 rethinking the Islamic Republic, 143, 182, 186–187 social protection and guidance, 107, 118, 127, 131, 141 theorizing Islamic democracy, 229 autocracy, 109, 132, 135, 145, 147, 185, 189–191, 213–215, 234, 275 religious, 84, 214, 285 awqaf, 19 ayatollahs, 3, 11, 16, 18, 56, 112, 250, 264, 267, 306–311 See individual names. ordinary, 16 Baqi, Emadeddin, 17, 143, 151–152, 159–160, 180–181, 195, 203, 207, 272, 283, 307 Bar Association (Kanun-e Vokala-ye Dadgostari), 20 bay‘at (allegiance), 102, 186, 192, 254, 261, 273 Beheshti, Ayatollah Mohammad, 72, 111, 120–121, 124, 273, 276, 307

Index beliefs, 61, 106, 146, 149, 223, 225–226, 228, 232, 236, 245 religious, 19, 82, 147, 150, 162, 224–225 Shia, 40, 235, 308 systems, 76, 151, 217, 236, 279 believers, 38, 166, 181, 195–196, 223, 225–226, 250, 277, 278 bey‘at (oath of allegiance), 122, 136, 138, 189, 192–194, 256 definition, 312 bonds, 61, 85, 109, 192 Boroujerdi, Grand Ayatollah Hossein, 13, 15, 39–40, 65, 68, 71, 72, 107–109, 307 death, 15, 71–72 candidates for office, 15, 21, 27, 33–34, 111–112, 143, 156, 249, 251, 262–263 capital, 31, 160 civil society, 26, 29, 156–157, 206, 208, 215–216, 244–245, 248, 291, 298 organizations, 29, 144 classes, social, 11, 22–23, 145 clergy See clerics and Introductory Note. divisions within, 23–30 ideological spectrum, 27 reformist, 17, 29, 33, 36, 200, 230, 290 and revolution, 12–27 Special Court for the Clergy, 9, 35–36, 182, 187, 192, 204, 211, 218–219, 230, 237 traditionalist, 153, 210 clerical activism, 70, 73 clerical establishment, 12–18, 21–24, 28–29, 37–38, 42–45, 55–57, 70–73, 109, 178–179, 295–296 clerical garb, 9, 13–14, 71 clerical hierarchy, 16, 24; See individual titles. clerical traditionalism, 5, 10 clerics, 307, 311 See individual names. absolute velayat-e faqih, 286 Association of Combatant Clerics, 26–27, 52

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Index conservative, 27, 41 divisions within clergy, 24–25, 26, 29 future direction for the Islamic Republic, 300 howzeh, 40, 51, 55 influential, 112, 295 institutional context of state capture, 30, 32, 35–36 jurisprudence, 60, 67, 71, 73, 79, 84, 88, 92, 96, 97 learned, 109, 178, 313 Lebanese Shia, 85, 96 legitimate authority, 241, 253, 258, 262 prominent, 24, 34, 42, 69, 132, 311 See clergy and individual names. reformist, 36, 200, 230, 290 rethinking the Islamic Republic, 13, 143, 144–145, 156, 169, 170, 179, 181, 192 senior, 4, 13, 16, 71, 97, 107, 264, 295 social protection and guidance, 106–107, 119, 123–124, 129, 132–135, 141 Society of Militant Clerics, 25–26, 52, 97 state capture, 19–21 state-affiliated, 25, 51 young/younger, 43, 70–71, 295 collective wisdom, 176, 185, 235 colored revolutions, 270 communism, 71, 106, 147 community, 1, 7 and absolute velayat-e faqih, 273, 276, 283 jurisprudence, 59, 61–64, 75, 83, 87, 90, 96 legitimate authority, 248, 259 rethinking the Islamic Republic, 173, 179, 198 social protection and guidance, 109, 124–126, 140 consensus, 54, 59, 113, 159, 186, 191, 210, 216, 252, 258 consent, 179, 184, 198, 199, 205, 234, 235 conservatism, 6, 22, 40, 308 ideological, 17, 304 intellectual, 40

337 political, 297 religious, 147 consolidation, 4–5, 62, 68, 157–158, 257 political, 2, 157 constitution, 9, 295 and absolute velayat-e faqih, 271, 273–274, 277, 279, 283, 285–288 amendments, 20, 101 institutional context of state capture, 30–36 jurisprudence, 72, 81–84, 94, 96–97, 101 Khameneism, 264 legitimate authority, 239, 241, 259, 262 rethinking the Islamic Republic, 156, 157–158, 169, 187–188, 191, 195, 199–200 social protection and guidance, 105, 111, 118, 121–122, 127–129, 134–137, 140 theorizing Islamic democracy, 215 Constitutional Assembly of Experts, 21, 30–31, 96, 239, 261, 288, 308 constitutional government (hokumat-e mashruteh), 65, 83, 284 Constitutional Revolution, 63–66, 89–90, 132, 145–146, 155, 198, 210, 252, 291, 310 constitutionalism, 65, 83, 155, 198, 299 constraints, 67, 107, 142, 184, 229, 278, 285 consultation(s), 127, 131, 139, 145, 155, 184, 189–192, 201, 271, 282 consultative assembly, 294 contract, 135, 192, 208 social, 136, 139, 192, 216, 288 contradictions, 151–152, 175, 178, 180, 183, 208, 245, 298, 301 cosmology ideological, 238, 298 political, 3 councils, 34, 44, 47, 101, 109, 136, 186, 191, 215 Expediency Council, 21, 34, 81, 93, 95, 101–102, 137, 251, 265, 271

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338

Index

councils (cont.) Guardian Council, 21, 26–28, 30, 32, 34–35, 100–101, 112, 122, 239, 262–263 Higher Council of Qom Theological Seminary, 47 Supreme Council of Cultural Revolution, 21, 26, 289 Supreme Council of Qom Theological Seminary, 44–45, 52, 289 Supreme Defense Council, 137 Supreme Judicial Council, 33 crises, 28, 111, 116, 118, 151, 205, 224 cultural affairs, 38, 268 Cultural Revolution, 49, 143 culture, 14, 19, 143, 146, 152, 157, 206, 208, 216, 269

religious reformist, 146, 148, 153, 162 dissent, 2, 10, 73 divine injunctions, 99, 118, 276 divine laws, 79, 83, 96, 98, 123, 127, 130, 132, 277, 281 divine legitimacy, 92, 185, 194, 197, 240–242, 252, 257, 260–261 divine rules, 173, 185, 242, 246, 260, 276 divine sanction, 31, 141, 241, 242, 286, 298 divine wisdom, 22, 261 Duke University, 211, 308 dynamic ijtihad, 10, 54, 180 dynamism, 3, 69, 155, 172 continuous, 8 intellectual, 2, 53

dangers, 106, 108, 176, 218, 224, 270, 273, 287 Darabi, Ali, 185 Darabkalaie, Esmael, 123, 138, 243, 254, 276–277 democracy, 3, 8, 9 Islamic; See Islamic democracy. Khameneism, 270 legitimate authority, 241–245, 248, 252 religious, 31, 157, 166, 183–186, 198, 227, 269–270 rethinking the Islamic Republic, 145, 155–156,157,183–189,191–192, 196 theorizing religious authoritarianism, 291, 294 deputies, 7, 109, 198 Majles, 100, 112, 199, 295 deputyship, 121 dignity, human, 31, 157, 226, 269 directives religious, 280 state, 99, 281–283, 285 disciples, 7, 11, 24, 44 disciplines, 14, 19, 48, 69, 164, 172, 185 discourse, 3, 5, 26–27, 146–148, 153–154, 160, 162, 168, 223, 230 reformism, 5, 143, 148 religious, 27, 222–223

economics, 48, 61, 69, 146, 164, 172, 208 economy, 26, 54, 69, 96, 160 Edalat-Nejad, Sa’id, 178–179, 307 education, 14, 47, 50, 53–54, 70, 170 ideological, 19 elections, 28, 34, 51, 296, 298 and absolute velayat-e faqih, 274, 287–288 direct, 121, 132, 256, 288 free, 155, 291 jurisprudence, 59, 64, 95 and Khameneism, 265 and legitimate authority, 243, 245, 247, 249, 252, 255, 262–263 popular, 239, 253, 256 presidential, 28, 79, 138, 143, 156, 239, 250 rethinking the Islamic Republic, 144, 155, 187–189, 191–195, 198–199 social protection and guidance, 120–122, 135–138 theorizing Islamic democracy, 210, 219 empathy, 85, 145, 196 emulation, sources of, 7, 16, 105, 126, 312 endorsement, 34, 89, 100–101, 159, 193, 196, 224, 236, 260 entesab (appointment), 120, 256, 258, 293

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Index equality, 65, 130, 155, 160, 182, 184, 216, 302 Esfahan, 37, 43 Eshkevari, Hasan Yousefi, 9, 28–29, 110, 169–170, 172, 180, 203–211, 229–230, 236–237, 286, 307 conception of Islam, 204–206 Islam and democracy, 209–211 Islam and the state, 206–209 ethics clerical establishment, 18 future direction for the Islamic Republic, 299 howzeh, 46, 47 Islamic, 270, 293 jurisprudence, 61, 71 philosophy of, 150, 229 and religion, 150, 232, 299 rethinking the Islamic Republic, 150–151, 160, 164 social protection and guidance, 123 theorizing Islamic democracy, 214, 229, 230–232, 236 evil, 87, 93, 129–131, 184–185, 197, 199–200, 204, 206, 213, 215 executions, 72, 95, 282, 291 exile, 11, 36, 41, 73, 79 expediency, 7, 69, 80, 87, 100–103, 105, 113, 213, 231, 270 Expediency Council, 21, 34, 81, 93, 95, 101–102, 137, 250, 265, 271 expertise, 45, 93, 108, 121, 277, 280 Fadaiyan-e Islam, 12–14, 40, 56, 71, 290 faith, 23, 31, 66, 108, 125, 213, 225, 304 Fanaee, Abolghassem, 150–151, 203, 231–232, 307 faqihs, 7, 82–85, 88–92, 117–120, 122–129, 137–139, 176–179, 249–252, 256–258, 272–279, 292–294 See velayat-e faqih. ascension to exalted position, 107, 139 authority, 86, 90 contemporary, 172 definition, 312

339 divine ordainment, 122, 132 legitimacy, 256–257 qualified, 88, 95, 119, 121, 125–126, 245, 249, 251, 272, 276 responsibilities, 95, 127 ruling, 93, 121, 276 scope of responsibility, 129, 272 Shia, 59, 86, 170–171, 178, 179, 258 trustworthy, 173 Fardid, Ahmad, 147 fasting, 54, 98, 207, 284 fatwas, 125, 128, 191, 221–222, 226, 228, 250, 267, 291, 293 Fayez, Grand Ayatollah Muhammad, 307 Ferdowsi University, 42 financial independence, 51, 53, 107 fiqh, 48–49, 58–62, 64–70, 80, 103, 160–161, 163, 168–178, 180–181 contemporary, 114, 180 knowledge, 108, 163, 232 maximalist/minimalist, 160–161 new, 58, 158–159, 178, 181 political, 48–49, 58, 59–60, 65, 68–69, 94 politicization, 59, 79 and politics, 6, 58–61, 160 principles (usul al-fiqh), 67, 151, 178, 181 scholars, 58, 178 science, 165, 171, 312 Shia, 58, 62, 64–66, 84–86, 88–89, 103, 105, 113–114, 177, 212–213 specialists, 88, 105–106 traditional, 70 in twentieth-century Iran, 64–68 fitna (sedition), 106 followers, 73, 77, 109, 118, 132, 141, 276 foreign powers, 218–219 free elections, 155, 291 free will, 23, 54, 197, 206, 213, 216, 229, 262 freedom, 31, 155–156, 158, 195–196, 200–201, 213–215, 221–223, 225, 227, 229 absolute, 158, 184 of choice, 213

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340 freedom (cont.) external, 229 internal, 229 political, 87, 199, 215, 221, 225, 229 of speech, 195, 199, 213, 229 Friday prayers, 13, 20, 62, 87, 98, 100, 106, 134, 182, 291 Front of Islamic Revolution Stability, 309 fundamentalism, 148, 182, 205 Ganji, Akbar, 173, 284 gates of ijtihad, 2, 6, 8, 10, 36, 66, 110, 175, 177–179, 222 Germany, 9, 204, 219 God, 85–86, 89–91, 120, 122–123, 135–138, 233–236, 238–249, 256–258, 260–262, 275–276 belief in, 223, 226 messenger of, 248, 284 oneness of, 223, 245 Golpaygani, Grand Ayatollah Mohammad Reza, 44, 231, 264, 307 governance, 45, 61, 83, 91, 98, 161, 221, 242 government See Introductory Note. branches of, 128, 259, 277 constitutional (hokumat-e mashruteh), 65, 83, 284 democratic, 217, 229 legitimate forms, 115, 229 provisional, 30, 95 religious, 128, 162, 163–165, 208, 214, 217, 236, 272 systems of, 227, 262 grand ayatollahs, 16, 18, 39, 307–311; See individual names. Great Occultation; See Occultation. Green Movement, 2, 9, 28, 144, 250, 265, 297, 304 Guardian Council, 21, 26–28, 30, 32, 34–35, 100–101, 112, 122, 239, 262–263 guardians, 85, 95, 117–118, 129, 133, 135, 138–139, 222, 224, 277–278 of affairs, 90, 94, 122, 281 of time, 94

Index guardianship, 1, 32, 56 absolute, 210, 265 future direction for the Islamic Republic, 298–299 jurisprudence, 63, 75, 83, 85–87, 95–96 legitimate authority, 248, 260 political, 7, 51, 83 social protection and guidance, 117–118, 126–127, 133, 138–139 theorizing Islamic democracy, 222, 236 velayat-e faqih’s right to, 276 guidance, 7, 22, 61, 67, 76, 85, 105–107, 204, 259, 261; See social protection and guidance. Hadith, 14, 18, 31, 48, 58, 229, 261, 283, 312 Haeri, Grand Ayatollah Abdolkarim, 39, 308 Hajjarian, Saeed, 152, 284 Hamburg, 219, 309 Haqqani Seminary School, 309 Hashemi Rafsanjani, Ayatollah Akbar, 30, 54–55, 100, 137–138, 140, 251–252, 255–256, 265, 286, 296 Hassan Najafi, Sheikh Mohammad, 88, 107 Hazhir, Abdolhossein, 12 hermeneutics, 146, 148, 150–151, 155, 177, 220, 227, 230 Islamic, 8, 145, 158–169, 236 movement, 202 of religion, 166–168 science of, 161, 168 Shia, 8, 161 Higher Council of Qom Theological Seminary, 47 Hijaz, 192, 221 hojatoleslam, 112, 144, 203, 211, 264, 306–308; See individual names. hokumat-e mashruteh (constitutional government), 65, 83, 284 house arrest, 23, 71, 74, 144, 192, 302, 309

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Index howzeh, 11–12, 13, 29, 37–57, 111, 136, 178–179, 181, 232–233 See Qom, Theological Seminary. criticism from within, 52–55 divisions within, 51–52 history, 38–46 structure and curriculum, 46–50 hukm, 175, 180 human dignity, 31, 157, 226, 269 human knowledge, 163–164, 169 human rights, 151, 155, 184, 188, 226–227, 228, 248, 252, 307, 309 human sciences, 164, 177 human societies, 22, 177, 209 human understanding, 176 humanities, 48, 157, 166, 212, 225, 246, 289 Hussein, Imam, 152 hybrid authoritarian system, 187, 263, 266 ideological conservatism, 17, 304 ideological cosmology, 238, 298 ideological education, 19 ideological religion, 165–167 ideological underpinnings, 3–4 ideology, 151–152, 162, 165, 196, 206 official, 3, 68–69, 166, 297 religious, 167, 267 revolutionary, 167, 266 ijtihad, 2, 6, 8, 10, 75, 169–182, 313 absolute, 124, 126 definition, 312 dynamic, 10, 54, 180 gates, 2, 6, 8, 10, 36, 66, 110, 175, 177–179, 222 howzeh, 46, 53–54 institutional context of state capture, 31, 36 jurisprudence, 59, 61, 66, 73, 80, 86 in principles, 176–177 reason-centered, 175–176, 200 rethinking the Islamic Republic, 145, 158, 160, 168, 169–175, 177–182, 186, 201 social protection and guidance, 109, 110, 114–117, 123 state capture, 22 story-centered, 174–175, 177

341 theorizing Islamic democracy, 220, 222, 228, 230, 232, 236 traditional, 180 and velayat-e faqih, 280 illegitimate rulers, 242 imamate future direction for the Islamic Republic, 298 institutional context of state capture, 31 jurisprudence, 61, 73, 83, 86 legitimate authority, 241, 243, 259–260, 262 social protection and guidance, 114–118, 128, 141 system, 86, 262 theorizing Islamic democracy, 212, 221 Imams, 20, 63, 73, 82, 86–90, 95–97, 99, 101, 114, 116, 119–123, 127–129, 133–137, 141, 170, 175, 186, 189, 193–194, 207–210, 216, 233–236, 238, 241, 246–248, 249, 252, 258, 259–260, 272–273, 276–278, 281–283, 292–293, 296, 309 See individual Imams. Friday prayer, 25–26, 51, 98 Hidden Imam, 62–63, 95–96, 122, 129, 210, 242, 258, 276, 292 Infallible, 95, 111, 116, 124, 136–137, 173, 217, 242, 251–252 Innocent, 99, 133, 135 Twelfth, 66, 86, 117, 258, 313 Twelve, 86–89, 120, 122, 127–129, 133, 246–248, 259–260, 271–272, 276–278, 281–283 imitation, 61, 75, 152, 172, 174, 214 independence, 30, 81, 223, 232–233, 259, 269, 277, 299 economic, 163 financial, 51, 53, 107 national, 268 political, 110, 233 infallibility, 121 Infallible Imams, 95, 111, 116, 124, 136–137, 173, 217, 242, 251–252 injunctions, 93, 98, 104, 125–126, 134, 179, 199–200, 242 divine, 99, 118, 276 Islamic, 92–93, 95–96, 125, 160, 170, 175, 312

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342 injunctions (cont.) primary, 76, 84, 98, 100, 129, 168, 282, 284 secondary, 98–99, 168, 284 state, 84, 98–100, 102–103, 129, 131 injustice, 89–90, 130 Innocent Imams, 99, 133, 135 innovations, 2, 7, 53, 56–57, 64, 66, 79–80, 113–114, 270, 273 intellectual, 2, 40 jurisprudential, 7, 8, 11, 27, 36, 56–57, 69, 73, 80, 101–102 scholarly, 6, 22 theoretical, 80, 88 installation, 95, 119, 121–123, 256, 293 divine, 121, 249, 251, 260 institutions, 4, 5, 306 absolute velayat-e faqih, 279, 284–285 autonomous, 11, 216 clerical establishment, 15, 17, 56 divisions within clergy, 23, 24 educational, 46, 289 formal, 37, 107 future direction for the Islamic Republic, 299, 302 howzeh, 37–41, 43, 46–47, 49–50, 52–53, 55 institutional context of state capture, 30–31, 35 jurisprudence, 61, 68 key, 18, 20–21, 26–27, 34, 37, 295 Khameneism, 269 legitimate authority, 250–251, 257 marja‘iyat, 107, 109 political, 222, 268 religious, 24, 55, 303 rethinking the Islamic Republic, 147, 153, 157, 181, 185, 191–192 social protection and guidance, 107–108, 110, 114, 130, 141 state capture, 19–20, 22 theorizing Islamic democracy, 206–208, 211, 215, 222, 232 theorizing religious authoritarianism, 294 intellect, 139, 171, 229, 261 intellectual energies, 54, 105, 133, 211

Index intellectual production, 2, 105, 143, 146, 158, 200 intellectual revolution, 2, 131 intellectuals, 8, 142–143, 146–147, 150, 153, 182, 200, 205, 230, 232 like-minded, 28, 156, 160 public, 8, 152–153, 302 religious, 146, 148, 181, 183, 200, 203, 212–213, 215, 230–231, 233 reformist, 146, 181, 195, 206 Intelligence Ministry, 28, 143 interpretations, 22, 23, 67–68, 72–73, 98, 101, 110, 167–168, 179, 228 innovative, 1, 132 jurisprudential, 1, 23, 127, 141 new, 66, 83, 142, 146, 153, 182, 239 rational, 67, 153 religious, 228 Iranian Shi‘ism, 2–3, 141, 166, 297 Iranian society, 32, 40, 56, 106, 222, 298, 302–303 Islamic character, 21, 37 Islamic democracy, 182–184, 186–187, 200, 270, 309 theorizing, 202–237 Islamic Government, 73, 96 Islamic hermeneutics, 8, 145, 158–169, 236 Islamic injunctions, 92–93, 95–96, 125, 160, 170, 175, 312 Islamic jurisprudence, 20, 49, 58, 103, 171–172, 196 Islamic law, 58–59, 76, 94, 174, 231, 310, 313 implementation, 14, 90 Islamic monarchy, 187, 218 Islamic ordinances, 280, 287 Islamic philosophy, 46, 53, 165, 178, 200, 211, 219–220, 226 Islamic precepts, 23, 117, 155, 281, 289 Islamic Republic, 1–7, 68, 80–84, 104, 108–111, 143–145, 217–220, 236–237, 257–261, 300–304 See Introductory Note. constitution; See constitution. future, 297–304 rethinking, 142–201

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Index state, 102, 129, 199, 212 system, 8, 194, 244, 274 Islamic Republican Party, 267, 268, 297 Islamic Revolution, 31, 38, 68, 90, 212, 309 Islamic rule, 5, 80–81, 88, 112, 282 Islamic sciences, 38, 155 Islamic system, 14–15, 81, 118, 126, 245–246, 255–256, 261–262, 270, 292, 294 Islamic tradition, 157, 169, 221 Islamist politics, 304 Islamists, 12, 304 Islamization, 14, 32–34, 143, 289, 298 Jahan-Bozorgi, Ahmad, 22, 114, 242, 308 Javadi Amoli, Ayatollah Abdollah, 72, 90, 110, 115, 118, 122, 124, 126–127, 211, 255–256, 286, 306, 308 Jazayeri, Ayatollah Morteza, 108, 170, 308 journalists, 143, 307, 311 journals, 43, 49, 68, 143, 144, 219, 240, 290 judgments, independent, 171 judiciary, 14, 18–20, 30, 32–34, 36, 51, 74, 82, 123, 215 jurisconsult, 1, 7, 56, 84, 238, 313 jurisprudence, 2–3, 7, 22, 35, 58–104, 114–117, 172–174, 176–178, 200, 310–311 applying theory of velayat-e faqih in practice, 96–103 fiqh and politics, 6, 58–61, 160 historical context, 62–68 Islamic, 20, 49, 58, 103, 171–172, 196 Khomeini’s conception of velayat-e faqih, 82–96 Khomeini’s fiqh and the Islamic Republic, 68–82 political, 53, 59, 68, 103, 116, 186 Shia, 1–2, 6, 8, 62, 64, 73–75, 86–87, 114, 301, 304 jurisprudential arguments, 16, 30, 97, 198, 287

343 jurisprudential innovations, 7, 8, 11, 27, 36, 56–57, 69, 73, 80, 101–102 jurisprudential interpretations, 1, 23, 127, 141 jurists, 5, 36, 83, 87, 88, 96, 124, 126, 131, 167 Shii, 67, 179 justice, 313 institutional context of state capture, 31, 33 jurisprudence, 65, 73, 78, 90, 94 legitimate authority, 254 rethinking the Islamic Republic, 160, 176, 183, 185, 192, 195 social, 82, 204, 208–210, 223, 226, 229, 269 social protection and guidance, 118, 123–124, 126, 141 theorizing Islamic democracy, 204, 209–210, 213, 223, 225–227, 234, 236 Kadivar, Mohsen, 9, 85, 118, 134, 136, 139, 173–174, 202–203, 211–219, 229–230, 250, 257, 273, 278, 285, 308 conception of Islam, 212–213 Islam and democracy, 213–217 on the velayat-e faqih, 217–219 kalam (speculative theology), 200, 212, 219, 226, 229 Kamarehi, Sheikh Ali Naqi, 63 Kanun-e Vokala-ye Dadgostari, 20 Kashani, Ayatollah Reza Madani, 124 Kashani, Feyz, 88 Kasravi, Ahmad, 12 key institutions, 18, 21, 26–27, 34, 37, 295 Keyhan-e Farhangi, 142 Khalesizadeh, Sheikh Mohammad, 40 Khamenei, Ayatollah Ali, 3, 5, 11, 34, 44–46, 47, 50, 52, 56, 60, 84, 91, 98, 112–113, 129–131, 154, 183, 196, 253, 255, 257–259, 262–263, 266–271, 274, 276, 289–290, 296, 301 Khameneism, 2, 3, 5–6, 10, 264–296, 301, 303 Khameneists, 154, 287

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344 Kharijites, 145 Khatami, Hojatoleslam Mohammad, 2, 10, 27, 28, 30, 143, 154, 156–158, 187, 302 election, 28, 158, 215 presidency, 10, 27, 156, 158 Khoei, Ayatollah Abolqasem, 67, 231 Khoi, Grand Ayatollah Abolqasem, 97 Khomeini, Ayatollah, 1, 11, 12, 14–15, 22–23, 25, 31, 44, 50, 65, 103, 107, 112, 117, 128, 132, 187, 213, 219, 233, 240, 256, 262, 270, 272, 280, 285, 288, 311 applying theory of velayat-e faqih in practice, 96–103 biography, 70–74 conception of velayat-e faqih, 82–96 contributions, 1, 7, 58, 85 death, 241, 262, 296, 301 fiqh and the Islamic Republic, 68–82 ideas, 1, 77–78, 79, 82–83, 97 as Imam, 137–138, 145, 251, 289 jurisprudence, 75, 77, 131 jurisprudential innovations, 7, 56, 69, 102, 129 successor, 74, 84, 264 theory, 129, 248, 272, 273 thought on fiqh, 74–82 Khomeinism, 5, 7, 104 Khorasani, Grand Ayatollah Vahid, 24, 308 khums, 26, 51, 54, 312 knowledge, 17–18, 59–60, 123–124, 141, 161, 163–166, 168, 171–172, 280, 312 collective, 77, 313 of Islam, 148, 158, 280 production, 17–18, 48 religious, 141, 153, 163, 165–167, 174, 188, 202, 228, 312 labor, 31, 112, 160, 259 laws, 25–26, 34, 100 land reform, 15, 25–26, 100 language, 153–155, 159, 189 religion, 150 Lari, Ayatollah Abolhussein, 271 laws, 7 absolute velayat-e faqih, 273–274, 277–281, 284, 285–287

Index divine, 79, 83, 96, 98, 123, 127, 130, 132, 277, 281 howzeh, 46, 48 institutional context of state capture, 32–35 jurisprudence, 58, 60, 61, 65, 82, 91, 93–96, 99, 100–101 Khameneism, 269 legitimate authority, 239, 241–243, 245–246, 249, 255 of Islam, 95, 118, 126–127, 276 rethinking the Islamic Republic, 155, 158, 170, 171, 176, 180–182, 183, 185 social protection and guidance, 107, 110, 114, 123, 126–128, 130, 135, 137–138, 140 state capture, 20 theorizing Islamic democracy, 206, 208, 210, 215–216, 219 theorizing religious authoritarianism, 291–293, 294 leaders, 3, 93–95, 124–125, 192–195, 216–217, 234–235, 245–247, 250–251, 273–275, 279–282, 294–296 See individual names. political, 217, 247, 270, 280 religious, 308, 312 spiritual, 19, 76, 309 state, 1, 216 leadership absolute velayat-e faqih, 272, 274–275, 277 clerical establishment, 56 council, 44–45, 140 institutional context of state capture, 34 jurisprudence, 61, 83, 96 Khameneism, 265 legitimate authority, 243, 259 political, 247, 280 rethinking the Islamic Republic, 184, 194 social protection and guidance, 106, 110, 114–116, 124, 138–139 state capture, 21 theorizing Islamic democracy, 235 theorizing religious authoritarianism, 294

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Index Lebanese Shia clerics, 85, 96 lecturers, 203, 308 lectures, 42, 49, 71, 98, 219 seminary, 75–76, 134, 142 legislation, 31, 33, 100, 248; See laws. legislature, 20, 30, 79, 128, 243, 249–250, 295 legitimacy, 9, 88–89, 114–117, 119–122, 136, 193–194, 238–249, 251–262, 274–275 and acceptance, 253–256 divine, 92, 185, 194, 197, 240–242, 252, 257, 260–261 faqihs, 256–257 from God, 241–246 Mesbah Yazdi on, 244–246 notions, 240–241, 247 and the people, 246–256 political, 39, 223, 238, 247, 248, 255, 257 reformist notions, 247–253 rightist notions, 242–244 rulers, 194, 244 of the system, 260, 262, 281 two-pronged, 256 and velayat-e faqih, 136, 246, 256–261 legitimate authority, 238–263 legitimacy and the people, 246–256 legitimacy and velayat-e faqih, 136, 246, 256–261 legitimacy from God, 241–246 legitimate rulers, 99, 242, 259 literature, 16, 53, 153–154, 156, 215, 237 religious, 215, 237 Mahdi, Imam, 115, 133, 292, 313 Mahdism, 115–116 Majles, 20–21, 32–35, 53, 64, 77, 100–101, 113, 128, 198–199, 203 bills, 21, 34 deputies, 100, 112, 199 speakers, 112, 265 Majma’-e Rouhaniyoun-e Mobarez, 26, 52, 174 Makarem Shirazi, Grand Ayatollah, 24, 308

345 management, 19, 22, 44–46, 77, 80, 123, 126, 207–208, 280, 283 political, 87, 108, 126, 188, 282 maqbuliyat (acceptance/acceptability), 130, 254 Mar‘ashi Najafi, Ayatollah Mahmoud, 72, 107, 309 marja‘-e taqlid, 7, 307–312 and absolute velayat-e faqih, 288 clerical establishment, 13, 16 definition, 312 howzeh, 43 jurisprudence, 97 legitimate authority, 245 rethinking the Islamic Republic, 178 social protection and guidance, 105, 107–111, 113, 126 theorizing Islamic democracy, 222 theorizing religious authoritarianism, 293 marja‘iyat, 14, 67, 97, 105–113 definition, 312 institutions, 107, 109 marja‘s, 14, 34, 42, 47, 50–51, 71–72, 73, 107–113, 308 Mashhad, 37, 43 mashru‘iyat (legitimacy), 193, 239, 244, 246, 254; See legitimacy. maslahat (expediency), 7, 69, 87, 99–102, 179, 213, 231, 271 maximalist fiqh, 160–161 Mesbah Yazdi, Ayatollah Mohammad Taqi, 112–113, 121, 123, 129–131, 145, 182, 244–246, 253, 260, 266, 276, 278, 289–296, 309 methodologies, 17, 146, 151, 160, 167 Milani, Ayatollah Mohammad Hadi, 72, 309 minimalist fiqh, 160 minorities, 15–17, 24–25, 50, 210, 235 Mirlowhi, Mojtaba, 13 modernism, 40, 148 modernity, 39, 106, 147–148, 150–152, 157, 169, 205–206, 222, 241, 248 Mofid University, Qom, 9, 231, 307, 310 Mohtashamipour, Ali Akbar, 144–145

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346 Mojtahed Shabestari, Mohammad, 9, 159–160, 167–169, 172, 188, 191–192, 203, 219–230, 309 conception of Islam, 220–223 Islam and democracy, 225–230 Islam and the state, 225–236 Momen, Ayatollah Mohammad Daneshzadeh, 122, 127 monarchical authoritarianism, 14, 147 monarchical system, 218–219 monarchs, 89, 240 constitutional, 89, 265 monarchy, 11, 14–15, 31, 35, 55, 63, 72–73, 92, 218, 297 Islamic, 187, 218 Pahlavi, 16, 40 Montazeri, Ayatollah Hosseinali, 7, 20, 24, 36, 39, 44, 67, 71–74, 109, 111, 122, 126, 128, 133–140, 149, 173, 177–179, 186, 191, 211–212, 217–218, 231, 249–251, 256, 264, 267, 287–288, 296, 301, 309 morality police, 298 morals, 22, 123 mosques, 4, 13, 16, 17, 20 Mottahari, Ayatollah Morteza, 69, 118, 170–171, 187 Mousavian, Abolfazl, 9, 170, 193, 203, 231, 232–236, 310 movements Green Movement, 2, 9, 28, 144, 250, 265, 297, 304 reform, 5, 27–29, 142, 144, 154, 181, 231, 306 reformist, 153, 227 revolutionary, 11, 16, 55 social, 55, 110 Muhammad, Prophet, 86, 120, 171–173, 192–194, 207–210, 216–217, 221, 235–236, 252, 281–284 Mujahedeen-e Khalq Organization, 26, 264 mujtahids, 33, 36, 47, 54, 110, 118, 121–122, 191, 308 definition, 313 Muslim community, 61, 89, 90, 94, 99, 106, 116, 187–189, 242, 247 Muslim societies, 93, 99, 117–118, 127, 197, 205–206, 215, 242, 245, 285

Index Naini, Ayatollah Mohammad Hussein, 65, 89, 132, 190, 198, 310 Najaf, 15, 41–42, 52, 73, 75, 83, 107–108, 140, 309, 311 school, 68, 132 naql (narratives), 174, 180, 261 Naraghi, Mulla Ahmad, 121 nasb (installation), 121–122, 256 nasihat (advice), 131, 190 national sovereignty, 249, 287 nationalism, 268, 299 secular, 106, 147 necessity, 87, 90, 93–94, 115, 118, 133–134, 170, 235–237, 249, 254 new thinkers (no-andishan), 5, 8, 17, 28, 302 nezarat (supervision), 139–140, 200 no-andishan (new thinkers), 5, 8, 17, 28, 302 nonreligious sciences, 164–165 norms, 102, 137, 160, 186, 188, 196, 206, 218, 226, 254 Nouri, Abdollah, 65, 92, 187–188, 310 obedience, 96, 97, 126, 127, 129, 193–194, 240, 242, 246, 273 obligations, 118, 146, 193, 197, 225, 250, 273 observers, 45, 102, 190, 241, 299 Occultation, 115 absolute velayat-e faqih, 274–277 definition, 313 jurisprudence, 62–63, 65, 66, 75, 85–86, 90, 95–96 legitimate authority, 241, 248, 249, 252, 258, 259–260 period, 80, 86, 173, 210, 245, 276 rethinking the Islamic Republic, 170, 189, 193 social protection and guidance, 113, 116–117, 119, 123–124, 127, 133, 135 theorizing Islamic democracy, 209, 212 official ideology, 3, 68–69, 166, 297 official orthodoxy, 2, 6, 114, 116, 119, 126, 130, 132, 257–261, 302–303 oneness of God, 223, 245

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Index opposition, 66, 131, 139, 188, 236 oppression, 94, 130, 208 orthodoxy, official, 2, 6, 114, 116, 119, 126, 130, 132, 257–261, 302–303 Pahlavi, Mohammad Reza, 14, 147 Pahlavis, 11, 16, 40, 103, 311 parties, 138, 140, 196–197, 248, 251–253, 268, 285 perfection, 115, 177 phenomena, 64, 116, 155, 164, 197, 207–208, 221, 259, 303 philosophers, 149–150, 156, 215, 306–309 philosophy, 18–19, 46, 48, 53, 71, 116–118, 212–214, 219–221, 231, 306–309 of ethics, 150, 229 Islamic, 46, 53, 165, 178, 200, 211, 219–221, 226 political, 115–116, 227 religious, 221, 229, 267 piety, 123, 170, 280, 292 Pirouzmand, Alireza, 37–38 pluralism, 143, 227 plurality, 108–110, 166, 228, 234 policies public, 50, 65, 98, 102 state, 17, 51, 54, 69 policymaking, 38, 47, 66, 91, 185, 225, 275 political affairs, 113, 122, 125, 137, 283 political developments, 5, 143, 147, 185 political establishment, 4, 29, 237 political fiqh, 48–49, 58, 59–60, 65, 68–69, 94 political freedoms, 87, 199, 215, 221, 225, 229 political guardianship, 7, 51, 83 political independence, 110, 233 political institutions, 222, 268; See individual institutions. political Islam, 60, 203, 304 reforming, 149–156 political issues, 61, 123, 161, 168, 175 political jurisprudence, 53, 59, 68, 103, 116, 186

347 political leaders/leadership, 217, 247, 270, 280 political legitimacy, 39, 223, 238, 247, 248, 255, 257 political life, 51, 59–60, 70, 76, 227, 248 political management, 87, 108, 126, 188, 282 political order, 17, 117, 197, 227, 299–300 political participation, 140, 147, 180, 183, 187, 189, 192, 195–199, 221, 229 political parties; See parties. political philosophy, 115–116, 227 political power, 86–87, 132, 137, 198, 206, 210, 215–216, 248, 253, 259 political preferences, 15, 23, 234 political pressures, 39, 87, 233 political process, 34, 198–199, 216, 233, 249, 253 political rights, 160, 235 political roles, 79, 89, 186, 224 political rule, 23, 77, 160, 197, 207, 216, 224, 233, 236, 241 political science, 172, 222, 306–308 political space, 8, 187, 253, 263 political system, 1, 4, 8 absolute velayat-e faqih, 279, 282 future direction for the Islamic Republic, 298–299 institutional context of state capture, 31–32 jurisprudence, 61, 65–66, 70, 88, 93 Khameneism, 269 legitimate authority, 238–239, 243–245, 249–250, 253–256, 260, 262 rethinking the Islamic Republic, 153, 161–162, 186–188 social protection and guidance, 128, 137–138 state capture, 21 theorizing Islamic democracy, 221–222, 233–234, 236 theorizing religious authoritarianism, 289 political theory, 63, 106, 219 political thought, 62, 64, 102, 212

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348 politicians, 156, 222, 307–308, 310–311 politicization, 58 fiqh, 59, 79 politics and fiqh, 6, 59–61, 160 Islamist, 304 popular legitimacy; See legitimacy, and the people. popular sovereignty, 147, 186 popular vote, 22, 81, 158, 223, 238–239, 242, 245, 254–256, 260, 294 post-Islamism, 303–304 power, 3–5 absolute velayat-e faqih, 285, 288 clerical establishment, 56 divisions within clergy, 23, 25, 28 future direction for the Islamic Republic, 299–300 howzeh, 37, 46, 50, 53–54 jurisprudence, 63, 77, 81, 84–87, 94–96 legitimate authority, 242, 248, 250–251, 253, 257–260, 262 political, 86–87, 132, 137, 198, 206, 210, 215–216, 248, 253, 259 rethinking the Islamic Republic, 176, 183, 185, 187–189, 196–198, 200 separation of powers, 59, 64, 127–128, 132, 249, 259, 277, 279, 288 social protection and guidance, 115, 123, 126–129, 132, 135, 137, 141 state capture, 21 theorizing Islamic democracy, 204, 206–207, 210, 215–217, 218, 221, 226, 228–229, 232–234, 236 theorizing religious authoritarianism, 290, 294 powers of the velayat-e faqih, 75, 125–126, 266, 285, 293 prayer, 41, 54, 98, 129, 207–208, 233–234, 269, 282, 284 precepts, 92, 117, 149, 155, 281, 289, 298 predecessors, 237 intellectual, 202, 271

Index presidential elections, 28, 79, 138, 143, 156, 239, 250 presidents, 2, 33, 97, 98, 157, 158, 252, 262, 267, 275; See individual names. primary injunctions, 76, 84, 98, 100, 129, 168, 282, 284 principles of fiqh, 67, 151, 178, 181 of Islam, 31, 128, 157, 185, 215, 239, 280, 295 Principlists, 154, 240–241 private property, 78, 283 privileges, 25, 55, 113, 118, 127 production, 4, 205, 208 intellectual, 2, 105, 143, 146, 158, 200 knowledge, 17–18, 48 professors, 14, 19, 49, 53, 143, 220, 295, 306 propaganda, 36, 47–48, 94, 117 propagation, 38, 41, 47–48 property, 102, 133, 176, 277, 292 private, 78, 283 Prophet Muhammad, 86, 120, 171–173, 192–194, 207–210, 216–217, 221, 235–236, 252, 281–284 prophetic tradition, 31, 168, 172 protection, 7, 75, 105–107, 117, 127, 171, 215, 275–276, 281, 292 protectors, 28, 90, 117–118, 261 public affairs, 122, 135, 186, 233 punishments, 34, 35, 144, 155, 159, 179, 210, 291–292 Qajars, 28, 39, 63, 89, 103, 132, 240, 287 Qom Mofid University, 9, 231, 307, 310 Theological Seminary, 6, 13–15, 18, 24, 29, 37–55, 70–72, 75, 79, 83, 97, 107–108, 125–126, 184, 203, 211, 219, 231, 267, 289, 295–296, 307–311; See howzeh. qualifications, 107, 109, 111, 114, 120, 122–125, 135, 137, 260, 280–281 qualified faqihs, 88, 95, 119, 121, 125–126, 245, 249, 251, 272, 276

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Index Quran, 22, 48, 58, 61, 101, 127, 135, 139, 151–152, 159, 161–162, 168, 171, 173, 188–192, 195–196, 197, 204, 207–210, 213, 216–217, 221, 223, 227–228, 229, 234–236, 252, 261, 267, 283–284, 291–292, 312 Rafsanjani, Ayatollah Akbar Hashemi, 30, 54–55, 100, 137–138, 140, 251–252, 255–256, 265, 286, 296 rahbar (leader), 3 rahbari, 265 Raisi, Ebrahim, 154, 262, 304 rational interpretations, 67, 153 rationality, 140, 149–150, 164, 169, 176, 223, 225 Razmara, Ali, 12 reason-centered ijtihad, 175–176, 200 reform era, 10, 22, 36, 131, 142, 157 land, 15, 25–26, 100 movement, 5, 27–29, 142, 144, 154, 181, 231, 306 reformism, 5, 143, 156–157, 200, 240, 265, 301 discourse, 5, 143, 148 jurisprudential, 10 religious, 145–158, 230 reformist movement, 153, 227 reformists, 5, 8, 307–308 clergy/clerics, 17, 29, 36, 200, 230, 290 divisions within clergy, 28 future direction for the Islamic Republic, 297, 301 intellectual, 202, 308 jurisprudence, 70 legitimate authority, 240–241, 247–248, 262 rethinking the Islamic Republic, 143–145, 154, 170, 199–200 social protection and guidance, 106, 112 theorizing Islamic democracy, 203, 211, 236–237 theorizing religious authoritarianism, 290–291 thinkers, 144, 170, 247, 272, 278

349 reforms, 15, 25, 39–40, 76, 143, 145, 149, 170, 202, 205 fundamental, 147, 228 regulations absolute velayat-e faqih, 272, 274, 276, 282 howzeh, 54 institutional context of state capture, 31–32 Islam, 59, 124, 292 jurisprudence, 59–60, 61, 99 Khameneism, 269 legitimate authority, 239, 242 rethinking the Islamic Republic, 162, 180, 184 social protection and guidance, 112, 124 theorizing Islamic democracy, 206, 221, 235 religion, 2, 59–61, 146–155, 160–171, 185–186, 204, 209–212, 214–215, 217–225, 227–229, 231–236 See Introductory Note. and ethics, 150, 232, 299 hermeneutics of, 166–168 science of, 164 religiosity, 232, 254–255 religious affairs, 1, 14, 59 religious authoritarianism, 288–295 religious authority, 267, 302, 308 religious autocracy, 84, 214, 285 religious beliefs, 19, 82, 147, 150, 162, 224–225 religious concepts, 4, 224 religious democracy, 31, 157, 166, 183–186, 198, 227, 269–270 religious discourses, 27, 222–223 religious establishment, 14, 29, 295 religious government, 162, 163–165, 208, 214, 217, 236, 272 religious ideology, 167, 267 religious institutions, 24, 55, 303 religious intellectuals, 146, 148, 181, 183, 200, 203, 211–213, 215, 230–231, 233 religious interpretations, 228 religious knowledge, 141, 153, 163, 165–167, 174, 188, 202, 228, 312

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350 religious philosophy, 221, 229, 267 religious reformism, 145–158, 230 religious reformists, 151–153, 155–156, 158, 162, 182, 186, 189, 191, 203 discourse, 146, 148, 153, 162 intellectuals, 146, 181, 195, 206 religious scholars, 38, 51, 57, 169, 190, 232–233, 307 religious society, 158, 183, 186, 245 religious teachings, 56, 202, 217, 232 religious texts; See texts. religious values, 127, 178, 185, 209, 224 religious veneer, 299 representation, 192, 198–199, 251, 299 representatives, 18, 44, 51, 66, 130, 198, 210, 242, 246, 249 people’s, 86, 190, 218 repression, 3, 5, 9, 213, 219, 237, 300 reproduction, 4, 38, 218 republicanism, 137–138, 156, 157, 185–187, 240, 244, 255, 257, 279, 285 unchecked, 106 research, 36, 38, 46, 47, 50, 152, 164, 166, 172–173, 177 centers/institutions, 17, 43, 68, 267 responsibilities legal, 83, 185 people’s, 138, 245, 260, 275 social, 204, 261 velayat-e faqih, 122–140, 280–288 restrictions, 25, 188, 226, 278 revelation, 161, 167, 181, 202, 206, 209, 223 revisions, 32–33, 135, 140, 220, 262 revolution, 1–3, 15–17, 21, 42–44, 55–57, 64–66, 68–70, 152–153, 218–219, 266–268 colored, 270 intellectual, 2, 131 Islamic, 31, 38, 68, 90–91, 212, 309 Revolutionary Courts, 32 Revolutionary Guards, 19, 143, 267, 296, 301 revolutionary ideology, 167, 266 revolutionary movement, 11, 16, 55 Reza Shah, 14, 39, 78, 82 rightists, 25–26, 52, 241, 246–247, 262–263, 278

Index rights, 307 absolute velayat-e faqih, 278, 281–283 electoral, 186, 199 human, 151, 155, 184, 188, 226–228, 248, 252, 307, 309 jurisprudence, 80, 89–90, 94, 99 people’s, 157, 166, 169, 189, 214 political, 160, 235 rethinking the Islamic Republic, 147, 157–158, 165–166, 170, 176, 190, 194, 195–196 social protection and guidance, 122, 129 theorizing Islamic democracy, 204, 210, 214, 215–216, 228 women’s, 15, 182 roles gender, 302 of the people, 199, 247, 253, 258, 262, 296 political, 79, 89, 186, 224 Rouhani, Grand Ayatollah Mohammad Sadeq, 24, 97, 133, 310 Rouhani, Hassan, 30, 154, 308 rulers, 3, 312 See individual names. absolute, 104 absolute velayat-e faqih, 282–284 ideal, 94 illegitimate, 243 jurisprudence, 78, 82, 84, 86–91, 93–94, 95, 99, 104 legitimacy, 194, 244 legitimate, 99, 242, 259 legitimate authority, 242, 244–245, 248, 251–252, 255–257, 260–261 Muslim, 123, 190, 197, 234 rethinking the Islamic Republic, 184, 187–190, 193–195, 197–198 social protection and guidance, 123–124, 127, 130 Sunni, 62 theorizing Islamic democracy, 208, 212, 216–217, 218, 225, 233–234 theorizing religious authoritarianism, 292 unjust, 62, 76, 87–89, 212 rulership, 3, 89–90, 133, 248, 276

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Index rules divine, 173, 185, 242, 246, 260, 276 religious, 183, 202, 207 systemic, 282 Saanei, Ayatollah Yusef, 133, 252, 310 Sadr, Ayatollah Reza, 133 Sadr, Grand Ayatollah Mohammad Baqer, 96, 139, 310 Sadr, Imam Musa, 133 Sadra, Mulla, 149, 258 Safavi, Navvab, 13–14, 56, 290 Safavids, 28, 39, 63, 67, 85, 87–88, 103 Safi, Ayatollah Lotfollah, 34 Sahabi, Ezzatollah, 162, 311 sanction, divine, 31, 141, 241, 242, 286, 298 scholarly innovations, 6, 22 scholars, 2, 5, 9, 12, 306 absolute velayat-e faqih, 276, 286 fiqh, 58, 178 future direction for the Islamic Republic, 302 howzeh, 45 jurisprudence, 58, 63, 71, 78, 82–83, 85, 101, 104 legitimate authority, 250, 262 religious, 38, 51, 57, 169, 190, 232–233, 307 rethinking the Islamic Republic, 178, 181 Shia, 39, 66, 69, 247 social protection and guidance, 127, 138 Sunni, 68 theorizing Islamic democracy, 203, 230–231 scholarship, 16, 37, 49, 158, 200 schools, 37, 64, 67, 178, 257, 302 Najaf, 68, 132 seminary, 29, 43, 48, 289 Usuli, 66–68 sciences fiqh, 165, 171, 312 howzeh, 53 human, 164, 177 institutional context of state capture, 31, 36 jurisprudence, 59

351 modern, 39, 164 nonreligious, 164–165 political, 172, 222, 306–308 religious, 160 rethinking the Islamic Republic, 145, 149, 151, 162–165, 170, 171–173, 177–178 social, 46, 48–49, 149–150, 212, 289 social protection and guidance, 109, 116 state capture, 22 theorizing Islamic democracy, 205, 207, 212, 221–222 secular nationalism, 106, 147 secularization, 152, 272, 285, 298–300, 303 security, 2, 31, 188, 269, 292 sedition, 106, 144, 270 seminarians, 37, 41, 43, 49–52, 55, 67, 178 seminaries, 6, 11, 17–18, 37, 42–48, 51–53, 59, 62, 232 See howzeh; Qom Theological Seminary. students, 13, 16, 37, 39, 41–43, 46–47, 107, 269, 289, 295 seminary schools, 29, 44, 48, 289 senior clerics, 4, 13, 16, 71, 97, 107, 264, 295 separation of powers, 59, 64, 127–128, 132, 249, 259, 277, 279, 288 sermons, 11, 13, 15, 20, 73, 98, 154, 208, 267 services, 19, 24, 37, 47, 62, 76, 226, 230, 234, 239 Shah, 12, 15, 38, 42, 56, 89, 108, 241, 287 Shah, Reza, 14, 39, 78, 82 Shahid Beheshti University, 276 shari‘ah absolute velayat-e faqih, 278, 282–283, 287 divisions within clergy, 23 future direction for the Islamic Republic, 299 institutional context of state capture, 32, 36 jurisprudence, 58, 59, 63–65, 76, 99–100 legitimate authority, 238, 248, 258

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352 shari‘ah (cont.) rethinking the Islamic Republic, 150, 163–168, 173, 175–176, 178 social protection and guidance, 116–117, 129 theorizing Islamic democracy, 205, 207, 214, 216, 220–222 theorizing religious authoritarianism, 292 Shariati, Ali, 42, 147, 150–152, 163, 166–167, 205 Shariatmadari, Grand Ayatollah Kazem, 23, 72–74, 97, 107, 133, 311 Shia beliefs, 40, 235, 308 Shia clergy/clerics, 39, 62–63, 69, 309 Shia communities, 8, 87, 212 Shia faqihs, 59, 86, 170–171, 178, 179, 258 Shia fiqh, 58, 62, 64–66, 84–86, 88–89, 103, 105, 113–114, 177, 212–213 Shia hermeneutics, 8, 161 Shia jurisprudence, 1–2, 6, 8, 62, 64, 73–75, 86–87, 114, 301, 304 Shia theology, 7, 105, 115, 212, 296 Shia thought, 1, 65, 68, 87, 133, 213, 242 Shia ulama, 66, 87, 190 Shia, thinkers, 66, 75, 85, 133, 258 Shii jurists, 67, 179, 306, 308 Shii scholars, 39, 66, 69, 247 Shii theologians, 76, 82, 110, 133, 194, 309 Shi‘ism, 40, 42, 60, 63, 66, 114, 116, 177, 179, 278 Iranian, 2–3, 141, 166, 297 Shobairi Zanjani, Grand Ayatollah Mousa, 24, 311 shura (consultation), 155, 189–192, 236, 313 Sistani, Grand Ayatollah Ali, 24, 29, 68, 140, 186, 310 Sobhani, Ayatollah Jafar, 128, 161, 177, 311 social affairs, 123, 276 social classes, 11, 22–23, 145 social contract, 136, 139, 192, 216, 288 social issues, 22, 47, 139, 172, 177 social justice, 82, 204, 208–210, 223, 226, 229, 269 social movements, 55, 110

Index social protection and guidance, 105–141 social relations, 21, 60, 80, 226 social responsibilities, 204, 261 social sciences, 46, 48–49, 149–150, 212, 289 Society of Militant Clerics, 25–26, 97 Soroush, Abdolkarim, 150, 151–152, 160, 162, 167, 176–178, 202–203, 220, 230, 306 sources of emulation, 7, 16, 105, 126, 312 sovereignty, 120, 138, 239 national, 249, 287 popular, 147, 186 Special Court for the Clergy, 9, 35–36, 182, 187, 192, 204, 211, 218–219, 230, 237 specialists, 61, 85, 117, 174, 178, 211, 256 speculative theology (kalam), 165, 200, 212, 219, 226, 229, 312 speeches, 9, 74, 154, 204, 211, 215–216, 224, 249, 253, 257 spiritual leaders, 19, 76, 309 spirituality, 85, 150, 164, 231, 268 state capture, 18–23, 56 institutional context, 30–36 state control, 11, 44, 69 state directives, 99, 281–283, 285 state functionaries, 19, 38, 97 state injunctions, 84, 98–100, 102–103, 129, 131 state institutions, 22, 114, 141, 240 state leaders, 1, 216 state machinery, 22, 298 state policies, 17, 51, 54, 69 state power, 216, 294 status quo, 25, 56, 70, 200–201, 237, 301 story-centered ijtihad, 174–175, 177 students, 13–14, 37–38, 41–43, 45–47, 52–53, 107, 144, 231–232, 269, 289 seminaries, 13, 16, 37, 39, 41–43, 46–47, 107, 269, 289, 295 successors, 7, 30, 88, 95, 98, 106, 137, 251, 258–260, 264 to Ayatollah Khomeini, 74, 84, 264 sultans, 62–63, 90 sunna, 101, 135, 195, 217 Sunni, 39, 194, 222, 244 rulers, 62

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Index scholars, 68 theologians, 174 thinkers, 149 tradition, 175, 179, 194 Sunnism, 66, 101, 110, 177–179 supervisory role, 65, 79, 139, 233, 260 supporters, 195, 275, 297, 306 Supreme Council of Cultural Revolution, 21, 26, 289 Supreme Council of Qom Theological Seminary, 44–45, 52, 289 Supreme Defense Council, 137 Supreme Judicial Council, 33 suspicion, 13, 145, 153, 241 Tabatabaei Qomi, Grand Ayatollah Hassan, 24, 311 Tabatabai, Allameh, 117, 219 Tabatabai, Ayatollah Mohammad Hossein, 117 tafsir (interpretation of the Quran), 14, 22, 48, 159, 165 Taleghani, Ayatollah Mahmoud, 7, 20, 108–109, 149, 191 Tarbiat Modares University, 211 tashrihi velayat, 91 ta‘vil, 159 teachers, 46–47, 50, 55, 71, 287 Tehran, 6, 9, 13, 20, 30, 39, 42, 49, 219–220, 306–309 universities, 9, 39, 182, 219, 267, 306–309 Tehrani, Ayatollah Mohammad Sadeqi, 311 texts, 16, 18, 141, 150, 168, 175, 179, 181, 199, 221 Thani, Shahid, 85, 115 theocratic, 11, 30–31, 145 theologians, 1, 8, 76, 82, 85, 110, 128, 133, 194, 309 Sunni, 174 theology, 2, 64, 114, 231 speculative (kalam), 165, 200, 212, 219, 226, 229, 312 theoretical expositions, 5, 237, 240, 266 theoretical underpinnings, 4, 80, 145 theorists/theoreticians, 99, 103, 236, 243–244, 246–247, 256, 271, 273, 279, 281

353 thinkers, 25, 90, 149, 151, 161, 167, 224, 237, 284, 306 new, 5, 8, 28, 302 reformist, 144, 170, 247, 272, 278 Shia, 66, 75, 85, 133, 258 threats, 13, 36, 153, 168, 208, 217, 253, 268 tolerance, 30, 145, 189, 195–197, 201 traditional authority, 186 traditionalism, 40, 148 clerical, 5, 10 traditionalists, 153, 170, 210, 301 traditions, 58–59, 101–102, 147, 149, 169–171, 173, 176, 177, 205–206, 221 Islamic, 157, 169, 221 long, 191, 241, 257 prophetic, 31, 168, 172 Sunni, 175, 179, 194 treatises, 16, 63, 107, 114, 179 trustworthy faqihs, 173 Twelve Imams, 86–89, 120, 122, 127–129, 133, 246–248, 259–260, 271–272, 276–278, 281–283 Twelver Shia, 308, 310–311 ulama howzeh, 49, 54 jurisprudence, 60, 62, 65, 87–90 legitimate authority, 256 prominent, 16, 23, 64–66, 115, 231 rethinking the Islamic Republic, 150, 161, 171 social protection and guidance, 107, 113, 115, 121, 122, 132 theorizing Islamic democracy, 211, 224, 233 unchecked republicanism, 106 United States, 9, 35, 81, 145, 202, 211, 252 unity, 31, 140, 145 universities, 6, 14, 18–19, 49, 51, 143, 211, 302 See students and individual universities. professors, 14, 19, 49, 53, 143, 220, 295, 306 University of Tehran, 9, 39, 182, 219, 267, 306–309

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354 ‘urf, 77 definition, 313 usul al-fiqh (principles of fiqh), 67, 151, 178, 181 Usulis, 66–68, 176 vali (guardian), 85, 117, 133, 139, 272, 277, 313 vali-e amr, 90, 94, 313; See guardians, of affairs. values, 22, 160, 163, 196, 204, 206–207, 222, 224, 227–228, 234 velayat (protection/guardianship), 7 definition, 313 jurisprudence, 64, 75, 83–86, 91, 95 social protection and guidance, 106, 111, 117–119, 121–123, 126, 127, 130, 133, 135, 139 theorizing Islamic democracy, 207 theorizing religious authoritarianism, 295 velayat-e amr, 32, 90, 94, 122, 281 velayat-e faqih, 1, 44–47, 79–100, 102–103, 113, 217–218, 236–237, 245–251, 255–263, 271–290, 292–296 See Introductory Note. absolute, 84, 98–99, 124, 126, 128–130, 134–135, 263, 265, 271–289 contesting, 283–288 justifying, 275–280 qualifications and responsibilities, 280–288 applying theory to practice, 96–103 authority, 98, 155, 286 as constrained guardianship, 131–140 definition, 313 election not selection, 136–138 and Kadivar, 217–219 Khomeini’s conception, 82–96 and legitimacy, 136, 246, 256–261 need for, 116–119 post-Khomeini conceptions, 113–131

Index powers, 75, 125–126, 266, 285, 293 qualifications, 122–125 questioning, 132–136 scope of responsibilities, 122–140 selection not election, 119–122 system, 131, 139, 147, 237 violence, 14, 145, 158–159, 224, 234, 291 voices, 10, 17, 56, 141, 151, 213, 255 votes, 2, 307 absolute velayat-e faqih, 281 clerical establishment, 15 Khameneism, 264 legitimate authority, 240, 245, 249, 251, 255, 261 popular, 22, 81, 158, 223, 238–239, 242, 245, 254–256, 260, 294 rethinking the Islamic Republic, 184, 193–194, 199 social protection and guidance, 122, 138–140 theorizing Islamic democracy, 208, 218, 234 war, 2, 5, 13, 70, 74–75, 89, 115, 137, 147, 297 wealth, 55, 78, 94, 234, 269 welfare, 31, 83, 269, 272 White Revolution, 15, 72 wisdom, 159–160, 176, 178, 205–206, 229, 233, 238, 277, 280, 312 collective, 176, 185, 235 divine, 22, 261 women, 15, 44, 110–111, 142, 155, 181–182, 224, 228, 235, 302 positions, 181–182, 237 rights, 15, 182 worldviews, 204, 222, 242–243 youths, 19, 145, 224, 231, 267 zakat, 26, 51, 54, 93, 313 Zanjani, Ayatollah Amid, 194 Zanjani, Ayatollah Mousa Shubairi, 49 zarurat (necessity), 87

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