How German Parties Select Candidates of Immigrant Origin: Neutrality, Opening or Closure? [1st ed.] 9783030594503, 9783030594510

Table of contents :
Front Matter ....Pages i-xv
The Relevance of Party Candidate Selection for Immigrant Representation (Sara Ceyhan)....Pages 1-9
The Political Representation of Immigrant Origin Citizens in Germany (Sara Ceyhan)....Pages 11-22
Candidate Selection as a Bottleneck on the Way to Parliament (Sara Ceyhan)....Pages 23-41
Party Selection Behavior Toward Immigrant Origin Candidates—A Framework of Analysis (Sara Ceyhan)....Pages 43-67
Variances in Party Selection Behavior Toward Immigrant Origin Candidates (Sara Ceyhan)....Pages 69-81
Research Design (Sara Ceyhan)....Pages 83-100
Are Immigrant Origin Candidates Any Different? (Sara Ceyhan)....Pages 101-114
Requirements for the Nomination of Immigrant Origin Candidates (Sara Ceyhan)....Pages 115-146
How Political Parties Support the Nomination of Immigrant Origin Candidates (Sara Ceyhan)....Pages 147-189
Variances in Party Selection Behavior (Sara Ceyhan)....Pages 191-225
Conclusion (Sara Ceyhan)....Pages 227-233
Back Matter ....Pages 235-255

Citation preview

Springer Series in Electoral Politics Series Editors: Daniel Stockemer · Daphne Halikiopoulou

Sara Ceyhan

How German Parties Select Candidates of Immigrant Origin Neutrality, Opening or Closure?

Springer Series in Electoral Politics Series Editors Daniel Stockemer School of Political Studies, University of Ottawa, Ottawa, ON, Canada Daphne Halikiopoulou University of Reading, Reading, Berkshire, UK

This book series offers an outlet for cutting-edge research on voting behaviour and election-related topics, with a global, regional and country specific focus. Electoral Politics welcomes theoretically sound and empirically robust monographs, edited volumes and handbooks from various disciplines and approaches on topics such as electoral turnout, electoral campaigns, political parties, voting behaviour, electoral systems and related fields. Manuscripts can also link elections and political behaviour to broader political concepts, including democracy, the economy and foreign policy. All books published in this series are peer-reviewed.

More information about this series at http://www.springer.com/series/16216

Sara Ceyhan

How German Parties Select Candidates of Immigrant Origin Neutrality, Opening or Closure?

123

Sara Ceyhan Faculty of Social Sciences Goethe University Frankfurt Frankfurt, Germany

ISSN 2524-8103 ISSN 2524-8111 (electronic) Springer Series in Electoral Politics ISBN 978-3-030-59450-3 ISBN 978-3-030-59451-0 (eBook) https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-59451-0 © The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2021 This work is subject to copyright. All rights are solely and exclusively licensed by the Publisher, whether the whole or part of the material is concerned, specifically the rights of translation, reprinting, reuse of illustrations, recitation, broadcasting, reproduction on microfilms or in any other physical way, and transmission or information storage and retrieval, electronic adaptation, computer software, or by similar or dissimilar methodology now known or hereafter developed. The use of general descriptive names, registered names, trademarks, service marks, etc. in this publication does not imply, even in the absence of a specific statement, that such names are exempt from the relevant protective laws and regulations and therefore free for general use. The publisher, the authors and the editors are safe to assume that the advice and information in this book are believed to be true and accurate at the date of publication. Neither the publisher nor the authors or the editors give a warranty, expressed or implied, with respect to the material contained herein or for any errors or omissions that may have been made. The publisher remains neutral with regard to jurisdictional claims in published maps and institutional affiliations. This Springer imprint is published by the registered company Springer Nature Switzerland AG The registered company address is: Gewerbestrasse 11, 6330 Cham, Switzerland

Acknowledgements

I would like to thank all the people who supported me in my research. My special thanks go to Prof. Dr. Thomas Zittel, who has made significant contribution with critical questions, inspiring input and professional advice, and who in many ways shaped my view of political research. Further, I would like to thank Prof. Dr. Sigrid Roßteutscher, Prof. Dr. Brigitte Geißel, Prof. Dr. Claudius Wagemann, and Prof. Dr. Richard Traunmüller for their helpful support. For many exciting discussions, input, and motivation even in difficult times, I would like to thank my former colleagues—especially Dr. Dominic Nyhuis, Dr. Olga Herzog, Lisa Schwenk, Juri Diels, and Dr. Annika Hennl. My thanks also go to Fabian Schorb, Fabienne Rauschenplatt, Jan Hefter, Jong-Chan Chung, Lena Ehret, Marc-Christian Schäfer, Marie Wittenius, Natalie Köhle, Sven Heim and especially Anna Krämling and Andreas Herzog, without whose support in data collection this study would not have been possible. I would also like to thank all those who took the time to participate in the candidate survey and interviews, upon which this study has built. My greatest thanks go to Florian, my parents, my family, and friends, who have run with me through all the ups and downs of research. Sara Ceyhan

v

Contents

1

2

3

4

The Relevance of Party Candidate Selection for Immigrant Representation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . The Political Representation of Immigrant Origin Citizens in Germany . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.1 Definition of Immigrant Origin . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.2 Immigration and Immigrant Political Representation in Germany . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.3 Immigrants as a Representational Group . . . . . . . . . . . . References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

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Candidate Selection as a Bottleneck on the Way to Parliament 3.1 Context: Legislative Recruitment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.2 Setting the Stage: Reasons for Studying Parliamentary Candidates . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.3 Critical Success Factors in Candidate Selection . . . . . . . . . 3.3.1 General Requirements for Nomination . . . . . . . . . . . 3.3.2 Supportive Measures in Candidate Selection . . . . . . References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

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Party Selection Behavior Toward Immigrant Origin Candidates— A Framework of Analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4.1 The Present State of Research . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4.2 How to Select Immigrant Origin Candidates—Neutrality, Opening, and Closure . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4.3 Neutrality— “We Want You Just Like We Want Any Other Candidate!” . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4.4 Opening— “We Want You at Any Price!” . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4.5 Closure— “You Must Work Twice as Hard!” . . . . . . . . . . . . . References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

43 43 50 51 53 57 61

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5

Contents

Variances in Party Selection Behavior Toward Immigrant Origin Candidates . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5.1 Differences across Political Parties . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5.2 Differences across the Mode of Candidacy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5.3 Differences across the Level of Ethnic Concentration in Single-Member Districts . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5.4 Differences across the Level of Social Deprivation in Single-Member Districts . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

6

Research Design . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6.1 Why Germany? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6.2 How to Measure Candidate Selection Behavior? . 6.2.1 Quantitative Approach . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6.2.2 Qualitative Approach . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6.3 Operationalization . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6.3.1 Immigrant Origin . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6.3.2 Dependent Variables . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6.3.3 Conditioning Factors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6.3.4 Controls . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

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7

Are Immigrant Origin Candidates Any Different? . 7.1 Exploring the Socio-Demographic Background . 7.2 Exploring Immigrant Origin . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7.3 Exploring Political Backgrounds . . . . . . . . . . . References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

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8

Requirements for the Nomination of Immigrant Origin Candidates . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8.1 Years of Party Membership . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8.2 The Role of Political Office Experience . . . . . . . . . 8.3 The Role of Localness in Single-Member Districts . References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

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How Political Parties Support the Nomination of Immigrant Origin Candidates . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9.1 The Role of Encouragement . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9.2 The Role of Competition in Candidate Selection . . . . . . . 9.3 The Role of Support in the Candidate Selection Process . 9.4 The Role of Electoral Viability . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9.5 Interim Conclusion: Which Selection Behavior Prevails? . References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

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69 69 71

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147 147 156 168 175 185 186

Contents

10 Variances in Party Selection Behavior . . . 10.1 Do Immigrant Subgroups Matter? . . . 10.2 Do Political Parties Matter? . . . . . . . . 10.3 Does the Mode of Candidacy Matter? 10.4 Does the SMD Context Matter? . . . . . References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

ix

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191 191 200 207 213 223

11 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 227 Appendix . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 235

List of Figures

Fig. 3.1 Fig. 7.1 Fig. 7.2 Fig. 7.3 Fig. Fig. Fig. Fig.

7.4 7.5 7.6 7.7

Fig. 7.8 Fig. 8.1 Fig. 8.2 Fig. 8.3 Fig. 8.4 Fig. 8.5 Fig. 8.6 Fig. 8.7 Fig. 8.8 Fig. 8.9

Legislative recruitment process . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Difference in mean age for native and IO candidates . . . . . . Gender difference between native and IO candidates (in %) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Difference in education for native and IO candidates (in %) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Country of origin (absolute numbers) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Difference in religion for native and IO candidates (in %) . . Immigrant generation (in %) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Difference in the mode of candidacy for native and IO candidates (in %) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Difference in incumbency for native and IO candidates (in %) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Difference in mean years of party membership at first candidacy for native and IO candidates . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Difference in mean age at party entry for native and IO candidates . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Predictors of the years of party membership at first candidacy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Difference in the mean years of party membership at first candidacy for native and IO candidates . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Predictors of the years of party membership at first candidacy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Difference in the number of political offices at first candidacy for native and IO candidates . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Difference in the type of political office at first candidacy for native and IO candidates . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Difference in level of political office at first candidacy for native and IO candidates . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Predictors of the number of political offices at first candidacy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

.. 24 . . 102 . . 103 . . . .

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. . 109 . . 110 . . 116 . . 117 . . 119 . . 120 . . 120 . . 127 . . 128 . . 129 . . 130 xi

xii

List of Figures

Fig. 8.10 Fig. 8.11 Fig. 8.12 Fig. 8.13 Fig. 8.14 Fig. 8.15 Fig. 9.1 Fig. 9.2 Fig. 9.3 Fig. 9.4 Fig. 9.5 Fig. 9.6 Fig. 9.7 Fig. 9.8 Fig. 9.9 Fig. 9.10 Fig. 9.11

Fig. 9.12 Fig. 9.13 Fig. 9.14 Fig. Fig. Fig. Fig.

9.15 9.16 9.17 10.1

Fig. 10.2

Difference in the number of political offices at first candidacy for native and IO candidates . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Predictors of the number of political offices at first candidacy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Difference in local residence in SMDs for native and IO candidates . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Predictors of local rootedness in SMDs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Difference in local residence in SMDs for native and IO candidates . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Predictors of local rootedness in SMDs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Difference in encouragement to run for election for native and IO candidates . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Predictors of encouragement to run for election . . . . . . . . . . Difference in encouragement to run for election for native and IO candidates . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Predictors of encouragement to run for election . . . . . . . . . . Difference in the level of competition in SMDs for native and IO candidates . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Difference in the level of competition on party lists for native and IO candidates . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Predictors of the competition for nomination . . . . . . . . . . . . Difference in the level of competition in SMDs for native and IO candidates . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Difference in the level of competition on party lists for native and IO candidates . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Predictors of the competition for nomination . . . . . . . . . . . . Difference in importance of support from state party leaderships in candidate selection for native and IO candidates . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Difference in importance of support from local party chapters in candidate selection for native and IO candidates . . . . . . . Predictors of the importance of party support in candidate selection . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Difference in the electoral viability of SMD nominations for native and IO candidates . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Predictors of the electoral viability of SMD nominations . . . Difference in the list margin for native and IO candidates . . Predictors of the list margin on party lists . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Difference in years of party membership at first candidacy for native and IO candidates across immigrant subgroups . . . . . Difference in number of political offices at first candidacy for native and IO candidates across immigrant subgroups . . . . .

. . 132 . . 133 . . 137 . . 138 . . 140 . . 140 . . 148 . . 149 . . 150 . . 151 . . 157 . . 158 . . 160 . . 166 . . 167 . . 167

. . 169 . . 169 . . 171 . . . .

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175 177 179 180

. . 192 . . 193

List of Figures

Fig. 10.3 Fig. 10.4 Fig. 10.5 Fig. 10.6

Fig. 10.7 Fig. 10.8 Fig. 10.9 Fig. 10.10 Fig. 10.11 Fig. 10.12 Fig. 10.13

Fig. 10.14 Fig. 10.15 Fig. 10.16 Fig. 10.17 Fig. 10.18

Fig. 10.19 Fig. 10.20 Fig. 10.21

xiii

Difference in local rootedness in SMDs for native and IO candidates across immigrant subgroups. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Difference in encouragement to run for election for native and IO candidates across immigrant subgroups. . . . . . . . . . . Difference in competition for nomination for native and IO candidates across immigrant subgroups. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Difference in importance of party support in candidate selection for native and IO candidates across immigrant subgroups . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Difference in list margin for native and IO candidates across immigrant subgroups . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Difference in years of party membership at first candidacy for native and IO candidates across political parties . . . . . . . . . . Difference in number of political offices at first candidacy for native and IO candidates across political parties . . . . . . . . . . Difference in local rootedness in SMDs for native and IO candidates across political parties . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Difference in encouragement to run for election for native and IO candidates across political parties . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Difference in competition for nomination for native and IO candidates across political parties . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Difference in importance of party support in candidate selection for native and IO candidates across political parties . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Difference in list margin between native and IO candidates across political parties . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Difference in years of party membership at first candidacy for native and IO candidates across mode of candidacy . . . . . . . Difference in number of political offices at first candidacy for native and IO candidates across mode of candidacy . . . . . . . Difference in encouragement to run for election for native and IO candidates across mode of candidacy . . . . . . . . . . . . Difference in importance of party support in candidate selection for native and IO candidates across mode of candidacy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Difference in years of party membership at first candidacy for native and IO candidates across SMD context factors. . . . . . Difference in number of political offices at first candidacy for native and IO candidates across SMD context factors. . . . . . Difference in local residence in SMDs for native and IO candidates across SMD context factors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

. . 194 . . 195 . . 196

. . 198 . . 199 . . 201 . . 202 . . 203 . . 203 . . 204

. . 206 . . 207 . . 209 . . 210 . . 211

. . 212 . . 214 . . 216 . . 217

xiv

Fig. 10.22 Fig. 10.23 Fig. 10.24

List of Figures

Difference in encouragement to run for election for native and IO candidates across SMD context factors . . . . . . . . . . . . . 219 Difference in competition for a nomination for native and IO candidates across SMD context factors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 220 Difference in importance of party support in candidate selection for native and IO candidates across SMD context factors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 221

List of Tables

Table Table Table Table Table Table Table Table Table Table

2.1 2.2 4.1 4.2 4.3 4.4 6.1 6.2 7.1 A.1

Table A.2 Table A.3 Table A.4 Table A.5 Table A.6 Table A.7 Table Table Table Table

A.8 A.9 A.10 A.11

Definition criteria of immigrant origin . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . IO legislators in the German Bundestag . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Party selection behavior toward IO and native candidates . . Indicators of neutrality . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Indicators of opening. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Indicators of closure . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Electoral system characteristics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Sample description . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Party affiliation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Years of party membership at first candidacy (negative binomial regression) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Number of political offices at first candidacy (Poisson regression). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Local rootedness in SMD (binary logistic regression) . . . . . Encouragement to run for election (binary logistic regression) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Competition for nomination (binary logistic regression) . . . Importance of party support in candidate selection (binary logistic regression) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Importance of party support in candidate selection (binary logistic regression) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Viable SMD nomination (binary logistic regression) . . . . . . Party list margin (OLS regression) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Representativeness of the German Candidate Study 2013 . . Representativeness of the state-level candidate surveys . . . .

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. 12 . 14 . 51 . 52 . 56 . 59 . 90 . 92 . 108

. . 236 . . 238 . . 240 . . 242 . . 244 . . 246 . . . . .

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248 250 252 254 255

xv

Chapter 1

The Relevance of Party Candidate Selection for Immigrant Representation

Germany’s ethnic diversity is on the rise. Though immigration is far from a new phenomenon, it has become one of the most ubiquitous elements of globalization (Castles and Miller 2009). It challenges the former notion of nation states, originally defined as culturally and ethnically homogenous entities (Brubaker 1992). The source of Germany’s ethnic diversity relates not only to the influx of migrant workers in the 1950s and 1960s, but also more recent immigration movements. In 2015, Germany recorded the highest number of immigrants in its post-war history, with immigrants from non-European countries outnumbering those from Europe for the first time. Germany accepted over one million refugees, leading to a surge in support for the far-right Alternative for Germany (AfD) party. Of the OECD countries, Germany is the second-largest immigration country (after the USA) (OECD 2014). The inflow of immigrants has significantly changed the face of the country. In light of increasing ethnic diversity, new segments of the population need representation in Germany’s legislative bodies. Political integration processes have so far failed to match these social changes. Although citizens of immigrant origin (IO)1 make up a high percentage of the population of all Western European countries, they remain underrepresented in most legislative bodies (Bird et al. 2011; Ruedin 2009, 2013: 39; Schönwälder 2012). This is problematic, as political decisions are made by elected representatives in contemporary representative democracies, who decide what citizens must and must not do. When stating that parliaments remain unrepresentative of certain groups, I allude to the notion of descriptive representation, which conceives parliaments as a microcosm of the nation. Descriptive representation describes the degree to which elected institutions mirror the socio-demographic composition of the population they represent (Pitkin 1967). It builds upon the central premise that parliaments should 1 The

author uses the terms immigrant origin and immigrant background interchangeably.

© The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2021 S. Ceyhan, How German Parties Select Candidates of Immigrant Origin, Springer Series in Electoral Politics, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-59451-0_1

1

2

1 The Relevance of Party Candidate Selection …

mirror the population from which they are drawn. Unlike substantive representation, it is not about representative actions or decisions, but how well they represent the socio-demographic composition of the population (Mansbridge 2000). Even Germany, which experienced its first immigration wave after World War II, cannot yet record representational parity. While about 26% of the German population were of immigrant origin in 2018, the same applied to only 5.9% of the Members of Parliament (MPs) in the German Bundestag in 2013 (Mediendienst Integration 2013) and 8.2% in 2017 (Mediendienst Integration 2017). Apart from the city states Berlin, Bremen, and Hamburg, even larger gaps prevail in the German state parliaments (Donovan 2007: 462; Schönwälder 2013). In the 2013 Hessian state parliament for example, 5.5% of the MPs had immigrant origin, while IO citizens made up 25% of the population. A serious disconnect between the population and legislature composition is evident. One question concerns whether parliaments are drifting apart from society—not only in terms of substantive, but also in descriptive representation. Why do IO citizens remain underrepresented in parliament? And what role do political parties play in this? Can they actually help bring about change? These are the questions at the core of the following analysis. Through candidate selection, political parties form a crucial nexus of the population to be represented and its legislative bodies (Katz 2001: 278; Zeuner 1970: 3–4). They constitute the key channels through which societal dynamics are translated into parliaments. Thinking of political parties as institutions that connect legislative bodies with their societal environment (Mair et al. 1999), altering demographics should impact their candidate selection—a fundamental task in producing sociodemographically representative candidate samples and establishing representational ties with the entire population. In other words, representation is a two-sided process, which calls not only for endeavors of underrepresented groups but also of party organizations. Beyond the representation of their traditional voter groups, political parties must look for new voter groups—IO citizens included—to capture societal changes and represent the entire population (Mair et al. 1999). Faced with increasingly multicultural societies on the one hand but a poor representation of IO citizens in parliaments on the other, political parties are coming under increasing pressure to produce candidate portfolios which better reflect the population’s ethnic diversity. Anecdotal evidence suggests that most German political parties are indeed under pressure to improve their representational ties with IO citizens. The conservative CDU party submitted a resolution at its 2015 party convention which, among other claims, postulated a stronger incorporation of IO citizens into the party organization (CDU 2015). When presenting the state leadership’s proposal for the state party list in the run-up to the 2013 Bundestag election, Nils Schmid, chairman of the social democratic party SPD in Baden-Wuerttemberg, highlighted the number of IO candidates in viable slots. The intra-party “Migration, Integration and Anti-Racism” organization of the leftist party DIE LINKE prompted its state party organizations to field more IO candidates in promising slots (Die Linke 2013). Before the 2013 Bundestag election, members of the liberal FDP party founded the “Liberal Forum Diversity” association, with the intention of wooing IO citizens. The environmental BÜNDNIS 90/DIE GRÜNEN party started focusing on IO citizens years ago. With

1 The Relevance of Party Candidate Selection …

3

Cem Özdemir, the party sent a Turkish-origin legislator into the German Bundestag in 1994, together with Leyla Onur of the SPD. As anecdotal evidence indicates, ethnic diversity exerts noticeable pressure on party organizations to respond to the descriptive underrepresentation of IO citizens. These examples underscore the significance of understanding how political parties use candidate selection to answer immigrant underrepresentation. But why does the descriptive representation of IO citizens matter? Normative theorists attribute both a symbolic and a substantive value to descriptive representation. Legislative bodies that fail to reflect society’s socio-demographic diversity have a lower de facto legitimacy (Mansbridge 2000: 100; Norris and Franklin 1997: 185). Seeing group representatives in parliament can make marginalized groups feel better represented and more affiliated to the political system. Even if native parliamentarians adequately represented IO citizens’ preferences, their exclusion from parliament would reinforce their perception of having no voice in politics (Dovi 2002; Griffin 2014; Pantoja and Segura 2003). For the majority population, it might create the impression that IO citizens are ill-suited to holding positions of political power, further thwarting their political integration (Mansbridge 1999: 649). Additionally, voters show greater trust in representatives with shared socio-demographic characteristics (Banducci et al. 2004; Bobo and Gilliam 1990; Mansbridge 1999, 2000; Pantoja and Segura 2003).2 Further, descriptive representation can produce positive policy effects (Mansbridge 1999; Phillips 1995; Williams 2000). Some groups need group representatives to find their interests adequately represented in parliament (Mansbridge 2005). This is the case if group representatives pay more attention to issues which are relevant to the specific groups they represent.3 In addition, members of the same social group can communicate more effectively with each other, due to a higher level of mutual trust (Mansbridge 2000). The physical presence of parliamentarians from underrepresented groups can remind other legislators of these groups and make them pay more attention to group interests (Goodin 2004; Phillips 1993). Finally, group representatives can represent group concerns more authentically, for which they can claim credit more reliably than other legislators (Mansbridge 2005: 626). Based on both previous insights that descriptive representation matters and that political parties have considerable influence on representational outcomes through their candidate selection, it comes as a surprise that research on how the party candidate selection affects minority representation remains limited. The access to German parliaments almost inevitably comes through candidate selection within political 2 Prior

research indicates that ethnic minorities feel better represented by legislators of the same socio-demographic background (Abney and Hutcheson 1981; Banducci et al. 2004; Barreto 2007, 2005; Bergh and Bjørklund 2011; Bobo and Gilliam 1990; Gay 2001, 2002; Gilliam 1996; Griffin and Keane 2006; Griffin 2007; Lublin 1997; Matson and Fine 2006; Rocha et al. 2010; Tate 2003; Zingher and Farrer 2016). 3 IO MPs address more migration-related issues than native MPs (Saalfeld and Bischof 2013; Wüst 2014b; Wüst and Saalfeld 2011). Experiments in the US context have shown that black MPs are more responsive to black constituents than white MPs (Broockman 2013, 2014a; Butler and Broockman 2011).

4

1 The Relevance of Party Candidate Selection …

parties. Only contenders who come out on top can compete for a seat in parliament. Given the gatekeeper role of political parties, certain informal career trajectories have emerged which need to be completed by the vast majority of parliamentary candidates before running for a state or national mandate (Borchert 1999: 7; Borchert and Golsch 1999: 125; Herzog 1975: 45). These patterns result from party selectorates defining the informal rules of legislative careers by applying certain criteria to candidate selection. The most valued characteristic is a longstanding track record of services to the party (Best et al. 2011: 171; Borchert 1999: 27; Borchert and Zeiss 2003: 151–152; Herzog 1975). Despite the pivotal role of candidate selection in shaping who will run for election, the question of how IO candidates fare in the candidate selection and whether the selection criteria are the same for IO candidates as for native candidates remains a blind spot in research. Studying party selection behavior poses a real challenge to researchers: Neither national legislations nor party statutes stipulate selection rules, they instead have a more informal character. While formal selection rules apply equally to IO and native candidates, informal selection criteria can make a profound difference. It is therefore essential to peer into the “secret garden of politics” (Marsh and Gallagher 1988) to scrutinize how political parties cope with the political underrepresentation of IO citizens in their candidate selection processes. Motivated by this, I have attempted to answer the question of how political parties respond to the legislative underrepresentation of IO citizens in their candidate selection, and whether IO candidates must meet the same selection criteria as native candidates to compete for a seat in parliament. In other words, the present study explores the thresholds IO candidates need to overcome to run for office. The most interesting questions concern how political parties go about selecting IO and native candidates and which contextual factors drive their selection behavior. The research will be centered on the following question: 1. How do political parties select IO and native candidates? 2. Which contextual factors affect the selection of IO candidates? My main argument advances from the notion that most parliamentary candidates must show certain political biographies before being selected to compete for a state or national mandate. By building upon these default selection criteria, the study provides a systematic framework of how political parties can act in the selection of IO candidates. Understanding whether political parties are able to flexibly adapt their selection criteria helps assess their ability to respond to the legislative underrepresentation of IO citizens. However, a paucity of data on the applicants who were not selected rules out contrasting the recruitment profiles of successful applicants with those of failed contenders, thereby assessing whether IO candidates need different profiles to native candidates to stand for election. As a solution, I use the recruitment profiles of native candidates as empirical reference points. By comparing the recruitment profiles of native candidates to those of IO candidates, I will explore whether political parties use deviant selection criteria for IO candidates. Generally, political parties have three options for selecting IO candidates—referred to here as neutrality, opening, and closure. These options are important benchmarks that help

1 The Relevance of Party Candidate Selection …

5

in finding patterns in the empirical data. If political parties act neutrally, IO candidates must complete the same recruitment process as their native counterparts, while receiving a similar amount of party support in the candidate selection. Consequently, political parties are willing to nominate IO candidates but only on the same conditions as for their native peers. In the case of opening, political parties respond to the legislative underrepresentation of IO citizens. They treat IO candidates preferentially by applying less demanding selection criteria and providing extra party support in the candidate selection. By doing so, political parties downsize the selectivity of their candidate selection to make it more permeable for candidates from underrepresented groups. However, it is also true that political parties cannot foresee how established voter groups will react if they have closer representational ties to IO citizens. Previous research has indicated that at least some voter segments remain prejudiced to IO candidates (for Germany: Bieber 2013; for France: Brouard and Tiberj 2011; for GB: Fisher et al. 2015; for GB: Stegmaier et al. 2013; for Germany: Street 2014). As IO candidates’ electoral implications are hard to predict, political parties might favor a risk-averse approach by acting in a defensive manner toward aspiring IO candidates. IO candidates must then therefore outperform native candidates in their political merits, while receiving less party support during candidate selection. As detailed above, studying party selection behavior poses a tremendous challenge to researchers (Bjarnegård 2015; Marsh and Gallagher 1988). To cope with this challenge, this book integrates the advantages of quantitative analysis, intended to identify broader patterns in party selection behavior, with the advantages of qualitative analysis being used to validate the quantitative findings and unveil underlying mechanisms. The examination of candidate recruitment profiles does not thus follow a candidate-centered approach, but is supposed to provide information about party selection behavior toward IO candidates. Candidate recruitment profiles—their political experience and the amount of party support in the nomination process— substantially reflect party selection behavior. Candidate surveys can therefore provide detailed information on candidates’ personal recruitment profiles, which alternative data sources cannot provide similarly detailed accounts of (Bailer 2014). By employing a unique data set that combines aggregate data on constituency characteristics with survey data on the personal recruitment profiles of candidates, the book attempts to provide a recent snapshot of how political parties go about selecting IO and native candidates. To validate the quantitative findings, I conducted face-toface, semi-structured interviews with IO candidates from the SPD, CDU/CSU, FDP, and BÜNDNIS 90/DIE GRÜNEN. While the quantitative analysis aims at revealing broader and generalizable patterns in party selection behavior toward IO candidates, the qualitative approach inspects whether the patterns found are truly related to party selection behavior by adding more complexity to the findings (Coppedge 1999). This book speaks to two distinct bodies of research: It addresses scholars in the field of legislative recruitment and candidate selection and appeals to researchers of minority representation. It contributes to research in two ways. Firstly, it sheds more light on how political parties cope with the legislative underrepresentation of IO citizens in candidate selection. Recruitment literature has focused chiefly on the

6

1 The Relevance of Party Candidate Selection …

most visible recruitment patterns of parliamentary candidates, while neglecting the extent to which they apply to candidates from underrepresented groups. However, the adaptivity of party selection behavior is highly relevant, as it affects how well legislative bodies can capture changes in the socio-demographic composition of the population. It explains how well political parties are able to respond to increasingly diversified voter markets. By exploring how political parties go about selecting IO candidates, this book provides a deeper understanding of whether political parties can make their candidate selection more permeable for those from underrepresented groups to contribute to better representation. Second, party selection behavior toward IO candidates has been a blind spot of research on minority representation (Bloemraad and Schönwälder 2013: 571–572). Despite the gatekeeper role political parties play in minority representation, there has been comparably little scholarly attention to IO candidate selection. Instead, the main thrust of research has been the institutional and cultural factors which shape levels of minority representation. Although these studies have significantly advanced scholarly knowledge of minority representation, they have failed to provide insight into party candidate selection behavior, something that—along with other factors— impacts aggregate patterns of minority representation. To understand the reasons for the scant presence of IO citizens in parliaments, we need to better comprehend IO candidate selection behavior. This would help to clarify whether political parties and their selection behavior contribute to the low proportion of IO citizens in parliaments. Furthermore, scholarly focus has remained on legislators of immigrant background. However, the candidate selection constitutes the real eye of the needle in the legislative recruitment process, as most selection happens prior to elections (Hazan and Rahat 2010; Rahat 2007). In fact, voters only represent the last stage of political representative selection. Further, previous studies have suffered from a lack of reference. To understand whether IO candidates take unique pathways to parliament or whether their recruitment profiles simply reflect patterns which apply to most parliamentary candidates, I will consult the recruitment profiles of native candidates. By comparing the recruitment profiles of IO and native candidates, this book breaks from previous research by providing insights into the specific selection behavior political parties use for IO candidates. The remainder of this book is structured as follows. Chapter 2 is devoted to IO citizens whose descriptive representation takes center stage in this study. By identifying factors that play the most pivotal role in candidate selection, Chap. 3 lays the foundation for later framework analysis. Building upon insights from Chaps. 3 and 4 moves on to party selection behavior toward IO candidates. It sets out three heuristic models for analyzing this from an empirical perspective. Before delving into the empirical analysis, I shall derive four contextual factors from the minority literature, which presumably impact party selection behavior (Chap. 5). Chapter 6 begins to describe the research design of the empirical analysis, while Chaps. 7– 10, organized alongside the analytical framework, present an empirical analysis. Chapter 11 concludes with a summary of the empirical findings, adding a discussion on the study’s implications for future research.

References

7

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CDU (2015) Beschluss. Meine CDU 2017. Die Volkspartei. https://www.cdu.de/system/tdf/media/ dokumente/beschluss-meinecdu2017.pdf?file=1. Accessed 15 July 2020 Coppedge M (1999) Thickening thin concepts and theories. Combining large N and small in comparative politics. Compar Polit 31(4):465–476 Die Linke (2013) Migrantinnen und Migranten auf aussichtsreiche Plätze zur Bundestagswahl 2013. http://www.die-linke.de/fileadmin/download/zusammenschluesse/appell.pdf. Accessed 2 Feb 2017 Donovan B (2007) Minority representation in Germany. German Polit 16(4):455–480 Dovi S (2002) Preferable descriptive representatives: will just any woman, black, or Latino do? Am Polit Sci Rev 96(4):729–743 Fisher SD, Heath A, Sanders D, Sobolewska M (2015) Candidate ethnicity and vote choice in Britain. Br J Polit Sci 45(4):883–905 Gay C (2001) The effect of black congressional representation on political participation. Am Polit Sci Rev 95(3):589–602 Gay C (2002) Spirals of trust? The effect of descriptive representation on the relationship between citizens and their government. Am J Polit Sci 46(4):717–732 Gilliam FD (1996) Exploring minority empowerment: symbolic politics, governing coalitions and traces of political style in Los Angeles. Am J Polit Sci 40(1):56–81 Goodin RE (2004) Representing diversity. Br J Polit Sci 34(3):453–468 Griffin JD (2014) When and why minority legislators matter. Annu Rev Polit Sci 17:327–336 Griffin JD, Keane M (2006) Descriptive representation and the composition of African American turnout. Am J Polit Sci 50(4):998–1012 Griffin JD, Newman B (2007) The unequal representation of latinos and whites. J Polit 69(4):1032– 1046 Hazan RY, Rahat G (2010) Democracy within parties: candidate selection methods and their political consequences. Oxford University Press, Oxford/New York Herzog D (1975) Politische Karrieren: Selektion und Professionalisierung politischer Führungsgruppen. Westdeutscher Verlag, Opladen Katz RS (2001) The problem of candidate selection and models of party democracy. Party Polit 7(3):277–296 Lublin D (1997) The paradox of representation. Racial gerrymandering and minority interests in Congress. Princeton University Press, Princeton, NJ Mair P, Müller WC, Plasser F (eds) (1999) Parteien auf komplexen Wählermärkten: Reaktionsstrategien politischer Parteien in Westeuropa. Signum, Wien Mansbridge J (1999) Should blacks represent blacks and women represent women? A contingent “yes”. J Polit 61(3):628–657 Mansbridge J (2000) What does a representative do? Descriptive representation in communicative settings of distrust, uncrystallized interests, and historically denigrated status. In: Kymlicka W, Norman W (eds) Citizenship in diverse societies. Oxford University Press, Oxford/New York, pp 99–123 Mansbridge J (2005) Quota problems: combating the dangers of essentialism. Polit Gend 1(4):622– 637 Marsh M, Gallagher M (eds) (1988) Candidate selection in comparative perspective: the secret garden of politics. Sage, London Matson M, Fine TS (2006) Gender, ethnicity, and ballot information: ballot cues in low-information elections. State Polit Policy Q 6(1):49–72 Mediendienst Integration (2013) Abgeordnete mit Migrationshintergrund im 18. Deutschen Bundestag. https://mediendienst-integration.de/fileadmin/Dateien/Abgeordnete_Bundestag_Erg ebnisse.pdf. Accessed 15 July 2020 Mediendienst Integration (2017) Abgeordnete mit Migrationshintergrund. https://mediendienst-int egration.de/artikel/abgeordnete-mit-migrationshintergrund.html. Accessed 15 July 2020 Norris P, Franklin M (1997) Social representation. Eur J Polit Res 32(2):185–210

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OECD (2014) Is migration really increasing? http://www.oecd.org/berlin/Is-migration-really-inc reasing.pdf. Accessed 15 July 2020 Pantoja AD, Segura GM (2003) Does ethnicity matter? Descriptive representation in legislatures and political alienation among Latinos. Soc Sci Q 84(2):441–460 Phillips A (1993) Democracy and difference. Polity Press, Cambridge Phillips A (1995) The politics of presence. Clarendon Press, Oxford Pitkin HF (1967) The concept of representation. University of California Press, Berkeley Rahat G (2007) Candidate selection: the choice before the choice. J Democ 18(1):157–170 Rocha RR, Tolbert CJ, Bowen DC, Clark CJ (2010) Race and turnout: does descriptive representation in state legislatures increase minority voting? Polit Res Q 63(4):890–907 Ruedin D (2009) Ethnic group representation in a cross-national comparison. J Legislat Stud 15(4):335–354 Ruedin D (2013) Why aren’t they there? The political representation of women, ethnic groups and issue positions in legislatures. ECPR Press, Colchester Saalfeld T, Bischof D (2013) Minority-ethnic MPs and the substantive representation of minority interests in the house of commons, 2005–2011. Parliament Aff 66(2):305–328 Schönwälder K (2012) Cautious steps: minority representation in Germany. In: Givens TE, Maxwell R (eds) Immigrant politics. Lynne Rienner Publishers, Boulder/London, pp 67–85 Schönwälder K (2013) Immigrant representation in Germany’s regional states: the puzzle of uneven dynamics. West Euro Polit 36(3):634–651 Stegmaier M, Lewis-Beck MS, Smets K (2013) Standing for parliament: do black, Asian and minority ethnic candidates pay extra? Parliament Aff 66(2):268–285 Street A (2014) Representation despite discrimination: minority candidates in Germany. Polit Res Q 67(2):374–385 Tate K (2003) Black faces in the mirror: African Americans and their representatives in the U.S. Congress. Princeton University Press, Princeton, NJ Williams MS (2000) Voice, trust, and memory. Marginalized groups and the failings of liberal representation. Princeton University Press, Princeton Wüst AM (2014) A lasting impact? On the legislative activities of immigrant-origin parliamentarians in Germany. J Legislat Stud 20(4):495–515 Wüst AM, Saalfeld T (2011) Abgeordnete mit Migrationshintergrund im Vereinigten Königreich, Frankreich, Deutschland und Schweden: Opportunitäten und Politikschwerpunkte. In: Edinger M, Patzelt WJ (eds) Politik als Beruf, PVS-Sonderheft 44. VS Verlag, Wiesbaden, pp 312–333 Zeuner B (1970) Kandidatenaufstellung zur Bundestagswahl 1965. Nijhofl, Den Haag Zingher JN, Farrer B (2016) The electoral effects of the descriptive representation of ethnic minority groups in Australia and the UK. Party Polit 22(6):691–704

Chapter 2

The Political Representation of Immigrant Origin Citizens in Germany

This chapter elaborates upon IO citizens, whose descriptive representation will take center stage. It tackles the question of what defines immigrant origin, and how IO citizens in Germany are seen. After introducing a definition of immigrant origin, the country-specific situation of immigration to Germany is illustrated briefly. Taking into account the religious and ethnic heterogeneity of IO citizens in Germany, I furthermore discuss why I have treated IO citizens as one representational group in the following analysis, and debate the implications of this approach.

2.1 Definition of Immigrant Origin In order to identify IO citizens independently of their citizenship status and personal immigration experience, the German Federal Statistical Office introduced the concept of immigrant background in 2005 (Statistisches Bundesamt 2015: 4–5). In contrast to previous indicators, such as foreign citizenship or birth in a foreign country, the definition is more comprehensive. It is essentially an attempt to adapt the statistical indicators to social reality after increasing numbers of IO citizens were naturalized,1 or born in Germany with German2 or foreign citizenship. 1 Legislators reduced the requirements for naturalization in 2000. After eight years of legal residence

in Germany (instead of 15 years), German citizenship can be obtained. the citizenship reform in 2000, children born in Germany to legal foreigners can obtain German citizenship at birth (ius soli). Children born on or after January 1, 2000, to non-German parents can obtain German citizenship at birth if at least one parent has a permanent residence permit for at least three years and has lived in Germany for at least eight years. Unlike the ius sanguinis, the descent is no longer decisive, but the country of birth. This represents a departure from ius sanguinis as the central criterion for naturalization.

2 After

© The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2021 S. Ceyhan, How German Parties Select Candidates of Immigrant Origin, Springer Series in Electoral Politics, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-59451-0_2

11

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2 The Political Representation of Immigrant Origin …

Table 2.1 Definition criteria of immigrant origin Group

Subgroups

Immigrant origin First generation

Definition criteria • Born in a foreign country and immigration after 1949 • Born with foreign citizenship

Second generation • Born in Germany • At least one parent born in a foreign country with foreign citizenship Third generation

Native

• Born in Germany • At least one parent born in Germany with foreign citizenship • Born in Germany • German citizenship at birth • Parents born in Germany with German citizenship

Source Statistisches Bundesamt (2015)

The Federal Statistical Office distinguishes between three immigration generations (see Table 2.1). Its concept of generations does not refer to age cohorts, but to the generational distance from the immigration event. First-generation immigrants are born in a foreign country with foreign citizenship and immigrated to Germany after 1949 (Statistisches Bundesamt 2013: 6). They have immediate immigration experience and are therefore immigrants in a narrow sense. Since war-related migration reached its peak prior to 1949 (due to expulsion during and after World War II), the time restriction is intended to exclude war-related migration. Even though the immigration of displaced Germans (“Vertriebene”) still occurred after 1950, numbers were far below those of migrant workers whose immigration started in 1955 (Statistisches Bundesamt 2015: 4). The focus is therefore on postwar immigration. Secondgeneration immigrants are born in Germany and, therefore, lack personal migration experience. However, as at least one parent was born in a foreign country with foreign citizenship, they have an immigrant background which is conveyed by at least one parent. Second-generation immigrants can be German citizens (either by naturalization or by birth), foreign citizens, or both. Third-generation immigrants were born in Germany, but have at least one parent born in Germany with foreign citizenship. Unlike IO citizens, those commonly defined as native were born in Germany with German citizenship, and both parents were born in Germany with German citizenship. This volume will make use of the definition by the Federal Statistical Office. Its definition is comprehensive enough to take into account all relevant subgroups (such as second-generation immigrants), and the majority of previous studies in the German context (Claro da Fonseca 2011; Wüst 2014a) have relied on this definition. In order to link my empirical findings to other research results, I decided to draw on the same definition.

2.2 Immigration and Immigrant Political Representation in Germany

13

2.2 Immigration and Immigrant Political Representation in Germany To illustrate the growing relevance of ethnic diversity in Germany, this chapter provides a concise portrait of migration flows to Germany and non-autochthonous citizens (for a detailed overview, see Bade 2000; Green 2004; Koopmans 1999; Münz 1999). Broadly speaking, we can distinguish between three migration movements (Geddes 2003; Koopmans 1999; Martin 1994). First, repatriates of German ancestry emigrated from Poland, the former Soviet Union, Romania, and other Eastern European countries (Green 2004; Thränhardt 2002: 353). Since (due to their German ancestry) they were victims of discrimination in their countries of residence, Germany guaranteed them naturalization upon arrival (Geddes 2003: 84–85). While ethnic German repatriates were entitled to naturalization until 1999, they obtained German citizenship without undergoing formal naturalization proceedings after 1999 (Currle 2004: 27; Treibel 2008: 32). In the wake of the Soviet Union’s collapse, the influx of repatriates increased significantly, to 2.5 million between 1990 and 2013 (Bundesamt für Migration und Flüchtlinge 2015: 102). Second, migrant workers contributed to Germany’s ethnic diversity. After World War II, Germany experienced an economic upswing that sparked an extraordinary need for industrial workers (Thränhardt 2002: 350–351). As the domestic labor market was unable to meet the high demand for industrial workers, Germany started recruiting industrial workers from other countries. It made recruitment agreements with Italy (1955), Spain (1960), Greece (1960), Turkey (1961), Morocco (1963), Portugal (1964), Tunisia (1965), and Yugoslavia (1968) (Dancygier 2010: 225; Green 2004: 32). For a long time, the German government saw no reason to take integration measures, as labor migration was expected to remain temporary (Rensmann 2014). However, temporary migration turned into permanent residence after some guest workers decided to stay in Germany, with their spouses and children joining them. In 1966 (after the recession), Germany began providing monetary incentives for migrant workers to return to their countries of origin. After the oil crisis of 1973, the recession aggravated, with the German government banning any further recruitment of migrant workers (Green 2004: 36–37; Thränhardt 2002: 351). The belated declaration of being an immigration country by the German government in 1998 and the late adoption of publicly funded integration measures caused a backlog of integration, reflected in lower educational attainment and income among IO citizens (Alba et al. 1994; Diehl and Fick 2016; Granato 2003; Granato and Kalter 2001). Third, Germany received asylum seekers from the late 1970s onward, as political asylum is a constitutionally guaranteed right (Green 2004: 5). In the wake of political and humanitarian conflicts, growing numbers of refugees and asylum seekers from Turkey, the Middle East, former Yugoslavia, Africa, and Asia immigrated to Germany. In the 1990s, Germany experienced a new wave of asylum seekers from Bosnia-Herzegovina and Kosovo. In response, Germany aggravated its legislation in 1993 by defining safe countries for which the right of asylum was suspended (Geddes 2003: 87–88). Nevertheless, the number of asylum seekers and refugees

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2 The Political Representation of Immigrant Origin …

Table 2.2 IO legislators in the German Bundestag CDU/CSU

FDP

SPD

Election

N

%

N

%

N

1990

4

1.2

0

0

3

1.2

0

1994

4

1.3

0

0

5

1.9

1998

4

1.5

0

0

5

1.6

2002

5

2.0

0

0

5

2005

4

1.7

0

0

7

2009

4

1.6

4

4.0

4

2013

9

2.9

–

–

13

6.7

7

11.1

8

12.5

37

5.9

2017

7

2.9

5

6.3

15

9.8

10

14.9

13

18.8

58

8.2

N

Bündnis 90/Die Grünen

Die Linke

Total

%

N

N

0

1

5.3

8

1.1

1

2.0

2

6.5

12

1.7

2

4.0

2

5.1

13

1.9

1.9

4

7.0

0

0

14

2.2

3.1

5

8.9

4

7.33

20

3.1

2.6

7

9.3

7

9.0

26

3.9

%

%

%

Source Mediendienst Integration (2013, 2017); Schmuck et al. (2016: 5)

has been increasing since 2009, due to military conflicts in Central Asia, Africa, and the Middle East. These sources of immigration led to growing ethnic diversity in the German population. Most IO citizens originate from Turkey (17.4%), Poland (9.9%), the Russian Federation (7.3%), Kazakhstan (5.6%), and Italy (4.7%). The share of IO citizens increased from 18.5% in 2011 to 25.5% in 2018 (Statistisches Bundesamt 2018). In the 2013 Bundestag election, about 9.4% of those eligible to vote were of immigrant origin (Bundeswahlleiter 2013). In 2005, the same figure was only 8.1% (Statistisches Bundesamt 2009). Unquestionably, these numbers reflect increasing ethnic diversity in the German population, putting political parties under pressure to ensure fair and descriptive representation. When comparing the ethnic diversity of the German population to the descriptive representation of IO citizens in the German Bundestag, a clear mismatch is apparent. As Table 2.2 shows, the descriptive representation of IO citizens lags behind considerably, amounting to only 5.9% in the 2013 Bundestag and 8.2% in the 2017 Bundestag. Although a bias persists, the number of IO parliamentarians increased markedly, especially in BÜNDNIS 90/DIE GRÜNEN and DIE LINKE, which record the highest share of IO parliamentarians of all political parties. The strongest increase occurred after the citizenship reform in 2000, when political parties started realizing the untapped voter potential of IO citizens (Claro da Fonseca 2011). Up to this point, the SPD had counted on winning electoral support from IO citizens by default and came under increasing pressure to compete more actively for their electoral support. The main reason for this was that the CDU had become aware of the electoral impact of IO voters, and therefore started to distance itself from critical stances on immigration (Schönwälder and Triadafilopoulos 2016: 372). Changing party affiliations reinforced increasing attention to IO voters. Traditionally, labor migrants felt affiliated to the SPD (Kroh and Tucci 2009; Wüst 2002). They had a blue-collar background and were organized in trade unions (Öztürk 2002; Schmidtke 2016). Repatriates felt

2.2 Immigration and Immigrant Political Representation in Germany

15

affiliated to the CDU, which had supported their immigration to Germany (Brubaker 1992). However, traditional party affiliations were eroding, and second-generation immigrants started departing from established voting patterns (Kroh and Tucci 2009; Wüst 2012, 2014b). Political parties therefore began to compete for the votes of IO citizens.

2.3 Immigrants as a Representational Group As the previous chapter illustrated, IO citizens are no homogenous group, but originate from a wide range of countries. Against this backdrop, I have to discuss whether IO citizens can be treated as one representational group, when their only common denominator is their immigration to Germany. This chapter therefore puts forward arguments for legitimately considering IO citizens as one representational group. Following Bartolini and Mair’s (1990: 215) definition of social cleavages, which builds upon Lipset and Rokkan’s (1967) original work, social representation relates to conflicts between different socio-structural units within societies. These units have a set of shared values and policy positions in common, giving rise to a sense of common identity. Enyedi (2008) expanded this definition by including not only socio-structurally defined units, but also political-cultural groups. Representational groups can essentially be defined as socio-structurally or political-culturally distinct units of society that share certain policy preferences, which diverge from the policy preferences of other groups, and have a collective sense of unity, making necessary group-specific party appeals in terms of substantive and descriptive representation. IO citizens may have preferences for a separate set of issues or priorities to their native counterparts, making them their own representational group. Their political preferences might mirror personal experiences of discrimination, dissenting perspectives on multiculturalism and immigration, or feelings of societal exclusion and otherness. Moreover, immigration-related issues such as voting rights for foreigners, dual citizenship or foreign policy issues might be of greater importance to IO citizens than other citizens. However, existing research showed that IO and native citizens do not differ markedly in their policy preferences (Dancygier and Saunders 2006; Saggar 2000; Sobolewska 2005; Wüst 2002, 2014b, 2016). No immigrant-specific policy agenda seems to exist—evidently, IO citizens do not form a distinct representational group as far as policy preferences are concerned. There is a lack of empirical research on whether IO citizens believe they have more in common with each other than native citizens. IO citizens may develop a sense of shared fate or mutual empathy due to their joint experiences with immigration (such as racial discrimination or integration difficulties), which may give rise to group solidarity and override internal differences. However, an immigrant background represents a personal characteristic rather than a collective identity. It is no homogenous marker, but captures nationally and religiously diverse groups. A collective sense of identity is probably only weakly pronounced among IO citizens as a whole, but more visible within national and religious subgroups.

16

2 The Political Representation of Immigrant Origin …

However, for my research question, it is less important whether IO citizens form one distinct representational group than whether political parties tend to perceive them as such. If political parties perceive IO citizens as part of other social groups, such as women, employees, employers, seniors, or youths, group-specific appeals (such as descriptive representatives) become dispensable. Whether political parties define social groups as distinct depends on a group’s characteristics but political parties also have some agency in constructing representational groups (Bartolini and Mair 1990; Enyedi 2005, 2008). This explains why, though immigration is certainly no new phenomenon, IO citizens have been recognized as a relevant representational group only in the aftermath of the citizenship reform of 2000. Political parties have some bearing not only on the relevance of representational groups, but on their definition: They can downplay internal group subtleties or highlight their commonalities (Enyedi 2005). Even if differences in structure and attitude prevail within representational groups, political parties can “identify symbols that unite various groups by tapping what is common in them” (Enyedi 2005: 700). Accordingly, I assume that political parties are aware of the existence of intra-group differences and the possibility of multiple group membership. Nonetheless, to them, the external differentiation of IO citizens is more relevant than their internal differentiation. This is for two major reasons: First, vote-seeking is a major motivation for political parties when establishing representational ties with social groups, and updating these ties if new, relevant groups emerge (Mair et al. 1999). Political parties can establish representational ties by either proposing policy programs geared to the concerns of specific groups or nominating group representatives. Consequently, one way of intensifying political parties’ representational ties to IO citizens is nominating IO candidates for election. However, political parties must reduce the complexities of social reality by focusing on broader sociological categories, such as trade unionists, blue-collar workers, women, seniors, LGBTs, farmers, environmentalists, IO citizens, or youths. Without question, each group is internally heterogeneous and can be split up further (Goodin 2004). However, political parties cannot consider the myriad of representational groups and all their particularities, but must bundle them together to keep representation efficient. To win the maximum number of votes, they try to cover a broad universe of representational groups. Subordinating the internal differentiation of IO citizens to their external differentiation and treating them as one representational group is therefore a rational way to handle the complexities of representational claims. Second, political parties are aware that voters make use of heuristics in their voting decisions (Lupia 1994a, b). The acquisition and processing of information for making a voting decision involves lots of time, money, and cognitive effort. Voters can instead employ selective heuristics, such as candidates’ party affiliation or descriptive characteristics, rather than looking at all the information available (Cutler 2002; Lau and Redlawsk 2001; Lupia 1994a, b; McDermott 1997, 1998; Mueller 1970; Popkin 1994; Stambough and O’Regan 2003). For political parties, candidates’ descriptive characteristics are therefore selling points that help to establish representational ties with specific social groups. To convey their central message

2.3 Immigrants as a Representational Group

17

to the electorate, it is enough to have IO candidates listed on their ballot paper, rather than covering all national and religious particularities. First, voters impute policy positions to political parties based on their candidate tableaus. In other words, “the candidates [a party] nominates play an eminently important role in defining what the party is” (Katz 2001: 278). If political parties nominate IO candidates, they want to show that they include IO citizen interests, offer equal participation opportunities, do not act in discriminatory ways, and acknowledge ethnic diversity. Second, voters ascribe different areas of expertise to parliamentary candidates, depending on their descriptive characteristics. Bieber (2013) found that voters attribute more expertise in immigration-related issues to candidates with foreign names than to candidates with German names.3 Therefore, IO candidates signal political parties have expertise in immigration policy and pay attention to migration-related issues. Finally, the nomination of IO candidates might serve political parties as a confidence-building measure (Valdini 2012: 742). Indeed, voters seem to place more trust in representatives with shared socio-demographic characteristics (Banducci et al. 2004; Bobo and Gilliam 1990; Mansbridge 1999, 2000; Pantoja and Segura 2003). But even if, in the view of political parties, IO citizens’ external differentiation outruns their internal differentiation, the parties are aware of IO citizens’ heterogeneity. In fact, certain subgroups stand out more clearly (Czymara and SchmidtCatran 2016; Ford 2011). Their nomination therefore sends out a particularly strong signal of political parties’ openness to multiculturalism. Indeed, various studies have indicated that country of origin and religious denomination matter most for the acceptance of immigrant groups (Appelbaum 2002; Czymara and Schmidt-Catran 2016; Dustmann and Preston 2007; Fietkau 2016; Ford 2011; Hainmueller and Hangartner 2013; Hainmueller and Hopkins 2015; Iyengar et al. 2013). Generally speaking, more distinct cultural groups face stronger opposition, as they cause more concern for the own cultural traditions and values, and their cultural habits are more likely to be viewed as incompatible with the own lifestyle. Muslims are perceived as the most distinct religiously, while people from non-European countries are considered the most distinct geographically. Mäs et al. (2005) found that Muslims are perceived to be less German than Christians, and Czymara and Schmidt-Catran (2016) found that Muslim immigrants gain less acceptance from the German population than Christian immigrants. Moreover, Muslims face growing Islamophobia in most Western countries, including Germany (Adida et al. 2013; Creighton and Jamal 2015; Green 2015; Helbling 2012, 2014; Kalkan et al. 2009; Peucker and Akbarzadeh 2014; Sides and Gross 2013; Stolz 2006; Strabac et al. 2014; Strabac and Listhaug 2008; Yendell 2013). They represent a contested group, as their lifestyle is considered less compatible with the liberal and secular lifestyle of the autochthonous population. With regard to geographical distance, Czymara and Schmidt-Catran (2016)

3 In

the USA, McDermott (1998) found that black candidates are stereotyped as being more concerned with minority rights than white candidates. Similarly, Sigelman et al. (1995) found that Hispanic and African-American candidates are perceived as being more compassionate toward disadvantaged groups.

18

2 The Political Representation of Immigrant Origin …

revealed that immigrants from Kenia or Lebanon face more opposition than immigrants from France. Apparently, immigrants from European countries gain more acceptance than those from non-European countries. Hainmüller and Hangartner (2013) studied Swiss referendums on citizenship applications from foreigners. The country of origin outperformed any other characteristic (such as language skills or economic status) in predicting successful naturalization. Immigrants from former Yugoslavia and Turkey faced the strongest opposition in the naturalization process. I therefore claim that political parties generally treat IO citizens as one representational group. Within this group, political parties consider Muslims and IO citizens from non-European countries to be particularly distinct. Consequently, IO candidates from such backgrounds are a stronger commitment to ethnic diversity and the representation of IO citizens than IO candidates of Christian denomination, or those from European countries. Muslims are viewed as the group which struggles most with integration, reflected in lower educational achievements and a lower presence in wellpaid jobs (Brettfeld and Wetzels 2007; Haug et al. 2009; Peucker and Akbarzadeh 2014: 33, 39; Sauer 2007). Muslim candidates are therefore important signals that political parties acknowledge Muslims as part of German society. Against this backdrop, variances in party selection behavior toward IO candidates across different immigrant subgroups will be taken into account in the following analysis.

References Adida CL, Laitin DD, Valfort M (2013) Region of origin or religion? Understanding why immigrants from Muslim-majority countries are discriminated against in Western Europe. https://ssrn.com/ abstract=2324280. Accessed 15 July 2020 Alba RD, Handl J, Müller W (1994) Ethnische Ungleichheit im deutschen Bildungssystem. Politische Vierteljahresschrift 46(2):209–237 Appelbaum LD (2002) Who deserves help? Students’ opinions about the deservingness of different groups living in Germany to receive aid. Soc Just Res 15(3):201–225 Bade KJ (2000) Europa in Bewegung: Migration vom späten 18. Jahrhundert bis zur Gegenwart. C.H. Beck, München Banducci SA, Donovan T, Karp JA (2004) Minority representation, empowerment, and participation. J Polit 66(2):534–556 Bartolini S, Mair P (1990) Identity, competition, and electoral availability. The stabilisation of European electorates 1885–1985. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge/New York Bieber IE (2013) Benachteiligung von Minderheiten: Eine experimentelle Untersuchung der Wirkung des Kandidatengeschlechts und der -herkunft auf das Wählerverhalten. In: Faas T, Arzheimer K, Roßteutscher S, Wessels B (eds) Koalitionen, Kandidaten, Kommunikation. Analysen zur Bundestagswahl 2009. VS Verlag, Wiesbaden, pp 105–128 Bobo L, Gilliam FD (1990) Race, sociopolitical participation, and black empowerment. Am Polit Sci Rev 84(2):377–393 Brettfeld K, Wetzels P (2007) Muslime in Deutschland. Integration, Integrationsbarrieren, Religion sowie Einstellungen zu Demokratie, Rechtsstaat und politisch-religiös motivierter Gewalt. Ergebnisse von Befragungen im Rahmen einer multizentrischen Studie in städtischen Lebensräumen. http://dx.doi.org/10.15496/publikation-4432. Accessed 15 July 2020 Brubaker R (1992) Citizenship and nationhood in France and Germany. Harvard University Press, Cambridge

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Chapter 3

Candidate Selection as a Bottleneck on the Way to Parliament

This chapter will probe the significance of party candidate selection in presetting representational outcomes in legislative bodies, entering party candidate selection as the central recruitment stage of interest. This chapter serves as a starting point for heuristic models of analyzing the party selection behavior for IO candidates developed in the subsequent chapter. To begin with, I will present a definition of legislative recruitment to mark off the broader research context. Afterward, I will explain why the study’s focus is on parliamentary candidates by portraying the candidate selection as the bottleneck of legislative recruitment. By thoroughly reviewing legislative recruitment literature, I will finally identify which factors are most relevant in coming through candidate selection, and which serve as a basis for the development of my heuristic models for scrutinizing party selection behavior for IO candidates.

3.1 Context: Legislative Recruitment Legislative recruitment is a multistage selection process through which candidates for legislative offices are recruited. In their much-cited work, Norris and Lovenduski (1995: 1) introduced a heuristic model of legislative recruitment, which they defined as “the critical step as individuals move from lower levels into parliamentary careers.” As Fig. 3.1 illustrates, legislative recruitment comprises four sequential stages that individuals must travel through to win a seat in parliament (Norris and Lovenduski 1993: 376; 1995: 15). Eligible members first apply for a candidacy. Their applications are either confirmed by the party or rejected. Candidates competing for a seat in parliament are then either elected or fail to enter parliament. By analogy with economic market models, Norris and Lovenduski (1995: 14–15) compared legislative recruitment to supply and demand-side processes. According

© The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2021 S. Ceyhan, How German Parties Select Candidates of Immigrant Origin, Springer Series in Electoral Politics, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-59451-0_3

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24

3 Candidate Selection as a Bottleneck … Resources Political motivation

Eligible party members

Party selectorates

Applicants

Voters

Candidates

MPs

Fig. 3.1 Legislative recruitment process. Source Norris and Lovenduski (1995: 16)

to their work, the complex interplay of supply and demand-side factors can explain the final composition of parliaments. While supply-side factors shape the “‘offer’ on the recruitment market” (Best and Cotta 2000: 11) by affecting who is available to be selected, demand-side factors determine the reasons some applicants are preferred over others. Accordingly, supply-side approaches explain IO citizen underrepresentation in parliament because only a few are available to be selected (Juenke and Shah 2015; Shah 2014, 2015). Not every eligible party member at the grassroots level who meets the legal requirements for nomination is willing to stand for election. According to Norris and Lovenduski (1995: 15, 108), political resources (such as time, money, education, rhetorical skills, political expertise, political networks, and party experience) and motivational predispositions (such as political ambition and involvement) make individuals able and willing to strive for office. As both requirements are not evenly distributed among the population, the scholarly community has argued that IO citizens lack the required resources and motivational predispositions to enter the electoral arena in the same numbers as native citizens. With socioeconomic inequalities being systematically related to the immigrant origin, disparities in education, income, language skills, networks, and interest in politics result in a biased supply, imposing a bias on candidate selection (Norris 1997d: 1). Additionally, the political socialization of first-generation immigrants in foreign countries might negatively impact their political involvement, as they are less familiar with the political system of the host country (Bloemraad and Schönwälder 2013: 568). But equally important to being able and willing to stand for election are demandside factors which determine who comes forward in the recruitment process. Here, party selectorates and voters constitute the crucial gatekeepers (Norris 1996, 1997e; Patzelt 1999b). In intra-party selection processes, party selectorates choose candidates from the pool of applicants (Ranney 1981: 75). Their selection decisions are based on: […] complex choices considering the probable value of the contenders’ resources for electoral success, to their ideological fit with and their practical function for the selectors themselves and their likely loyalty, that is, their expected obedience to the implicit and explicit expectations of the selectors after becoming a parliamentary actor (Best and Cotta 2000: 11–12).

Demand-side studies, which place stress on nominating bodies, attribute IO citizen underrepresentation to discriminatory behavior on the part of party selectorates (Ashe

3.1 Context: Legislative Recruitment

25

and Stewart 2012; Dancygier et al. 2015; Durose et al. 2013). As in most cases applicants are not well known to nominating bodies, prejudices affect their evaluations (Norris and Lovenduski 1993: 377). In this context, Norris and Lovenduski (1995: 14) introduced a distinction between direct and indirect prejudices. In the case of direct prejudices, party selectorates harbor personal feelings against specific groups, which inevitably enter their selection decisions. In the case of indirect prejudices, party selectorates themselves are unbiased but impute prejudices to voters. This in turn has an effect on their selection decisions, as they are eager to make appealing offers to the electorate. Owing to direct or indirect prejudices, party selectorates may hesitate to pick IO candidates, leading to their underrepresentation in parliament. In democratic political systems, voters make the ultimate decision about the selection of their political representatives. Besides party selectorates, voters therefore constitute important gatekeepers on the demand side. Essentially, nominee credibility, socio-demographic characteristics, political experience, competence, rhetorical skills, and conformity to voter preferences drive voting decisions (Best and Cotta 2000: 12; Campbell and Cowley 2014). Triggered by prejudices against IO candidates and doubt as to whether candidates of such background are able to represent them, individual voters might hesitate to elect IO candidates, leading to a misrepresentation in parliament. Consequently, demand-side studies on the electorate’s role trace IO citizen underrepresentation back to voter prejudices—albeit with mixed findings, ranging from clear punishment (Stegmaier et al. 2013) to rather weak effects (Bieber 2013; Brouard and Tiberj 2011; Street 2014).

3.2 Setting the Stage: Reasons for Studying Parliamentary Candidates After showing the complete recruitment process, I will shift the focus to parliamentary candidates. The first reason for this is that I am primarily interested in party responses to the legislative underrepresentation of IO citizens. I will therefore ignore recruitment factors that lie outside the sphere of influence of political parties, including both the application and election stage. As the candidate selection remains entirely in the hands of political parties, the recruitment profiles of parliamentary candidates are the most instructive for my research (Hazan and Rahat 2006b). Second, candidate selection processes are crucial for responding to IO citizens’ underrepresentation—their outcome presets the final composition of legislative bodies. Although voters have the final say on which candidates will enter parliament, they can only vote for nominees that got through candidate selection. Conversely, applicants vetoed by party selectorates remain absent from the ballot papers. Consequently, party selectorates limit the options offered to voters to a great extent (Arnim 2003; Atmor et al. 2011; Hazan and Rahat 2006a; Hazan and Voerman 2006; Rahat 2007), and most competition for parliamentary seats does not take place at the ballot box, but in candidate selection.

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Third, party selectorates not only decide who will run for office, but also the prospects with which candidates will run. The electoral prospects of nomination can either make or break candidates’ legislative careers: “In marginal seats, who gets into parliament is determined by voters. But in safe seats with a predictable outcome the selector have the de facto power to choose the MP” (Norris and Lovenduski 1995: 2). In safe seats, the candidate selection therefore becomes equivalent to an election (Detterbeck 2011b: 245; Norris and Lovenduski 1995: 2; Rush 1994: 570; Schüttemeyer 2002: 145). If political parties use IO candidates as sacrificial lambs in less sought-after districts or ballot positions, the doorway to equal representation remains barred. Party influence over the electoral prospects of nomination is particularly great in Germany, with most candidates running for election on closed party lists. In closed-list settings, voters can choose between various political parties while remaining unable to alter the party-determined order in which candidates are elected into parliament. Which candidate makes it into parliament therefore depends on candidate selection. Similarly, in open-list settings, such as Bavarian state elections, the intra-party candidate selection matters tremendously for the final composition of parliament (Karvonen 2011: 120; Katz 1986). Although voters can engage in intraparty voting by picking one particular nominee on a party list to change the rank order of candidates, nominating bodies determine the candidates’ initial positions (Kunovich 2003: 157). Candidates ranking very low on party lists have hardly any chance of winning enough preference votes to enter parliament. In fact, voters tend to pick candidates at the top of party lists (Blom-Hansen et al. 2016; Brockington 2003; Faas and Schoen 2006; Geys and Heyndels 2003; Lutz 2010; Marcinkiewicz 2014).

3.3 Critical Success Factors in Candidate Selection After shifting the book’s focus onto party candidate selection, the real bottleneck for a fair descriptive representation of social groups in parliament, I will further elaborate on the critical success factors in candidate selection. The reason particular political biographies prevail among parliamentary candidates relates to the qualifications political parties seek in their selection processes. In accordance with Downs’ (1957) landmark theory, I define political parties as rational actors who strive to maximize votes through their selections. The goal of vote-seeking is superordinate to any other objective, such as office- or policy-seeking (Strøm and Müller 1999). If political parties fail to win sufficient numbers of votes, they obtain few (or, at worst, no) candidates in elective office, and this curtails any impact on public policy-making (Strøm 1990). Against this backdrop, candidates with the ability to pull the maximum number of votes are the most wanted. The most successful vote earners are contenders who are politically experienced, qualified, credible, and knowledgeable. Voters not only prefer candidates with such properties (Bochel and Denver 1983; Campbell and Cowley 2014; Norris and Lovenduski 1995: 139), but politically experienced candidates can also better anticipate voter expectations.

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However, political parties not only have the forthcoming election in mind, but let future considerations enter their selection. To ensure that they can enact their policy goals most effectively (Strøm 1990: 567) without losing agency, political parties favor nominees who reliably represent party interests, act as team players, toe the party line, show commitment, and do not threaten party unity once they enter parliament (Andeweg and Thomassen 2011; Becher and Sieberer 2008; Bowler et al. 1999; Carey 2007; Sieberer 2006). Party loyalists nourish the image of a cohesive party organization and help seek policy goals most effectively. But both vote maximization and party loyalty are to no purpose if candidates cannot make their voices heard in parliament. Therefore, political parties also look for politically experienced candidates who are familiar with politics as a profession and have the political and strategic ability to help reach the party goals. Novices are familiar neither with the numerous tasks that parliamentarians need to perform nor the rules of the political game. While the list is by no means exhaustive, it certainly touches upon the most crucial considerations in candidate selection. How can political parties ensure that selected nominees meet the outlined expectations? Generally speaking, access to candidacies at state and national level is hallmarked by a great deal of uncertainty, as no standardized pathway to professional politics seems to exist (Borchert and Stolz 2003: 152). This is even more true in Germany, as candidate selection is regulated by law, unlike most other Western European countries (Hazan and Rahat 2006a; Schüttemeyer 2002: 148). However, it only stipulates formal procedures without defining political requirements, except for age and German citizenship. More precisely, candidate selection in Germany must conform to the principle of intra-party democracy according to the Basic Constitutional Law (Roberts 1988: 97). The German mixed-member electoral system combines a PR electoral tier with (closed) party lists in multimember districts (MMDs), with a nominal tier with plurality rule in single-member districts (SMDs) (Ferrara et al. 2005; Kaiser 2002; Manow 2016; Massicotte and Blais 1999; Shugart and Wattenberg 2003b). Consequently, candidates can compete in SMDs, on party lists, or on both electoral tiers. The candidate selection in SMDs and MMDs has to be made either through party membership meetings or by a caucus of delegates, elected by meetings of eligible party members, to prevent undemocratic top-down nominations. The Electoral Law, the Federal Election Regulation, and the Party Law add further requirements, including the selection of candidates by secret ballot. Consequently, most of the criteria for candidate selection are informal in nature rather than laid down by law, thus granting party selectors considerable leeway. However, although access to candidacies appears to be very open at first, legislative career patterns do not emerge accidentally. Instead, legislative careers follow certain sequences that resemble standardized career patterns (Borchert 2003a: 29– 30; Herzog 1990: 35; Schlesinger 1966: 118). These patterns point to the “shadowy pathways” of candidate selection (Bjarnegård and Kenny 2015: 749), which are not based on legally defined rules but on informal practices, defined as “socially shared rules, usually unwritten, that are created, communicated and enforced outside of officially sanctioned channels” (Helmke and Levitsky 2004: 727). The fact that most

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nominees have common political biographies discloses the informal selection practices of political parties (Herzog 1975: 45; 1982: 90). By establishing certain criteria in their candidate selection, political parties, and most notably their party selectorates, generate these patterns. The reason for this is that party selectorates have no perfect information on whether applicants will meet the expectations outlined above. The most reliable indicator is therefore the contenders’ political biographies. To reduce their information deficit and predict a contender’s future performance, political parties draw on the applicant’s previous political experience. By looking closely at the contender’s track record, political parties try to keep aspirants at bay that do not contribute to vote maximization and policy-seeking (Müller 2000: 327– 328). The most valued factor in this regard is a longstanding track record of services within and on behalf of the own party organization. Best et al. (2011: 171) and Müller (2000: 327–328) call these probation periods “screening processes.” The process of working one’s way up a own party organization through longstanding party membership and previous experience in political office—the so-called Ochsentour—helps screen potential candidates for higher office (Best et al. 2011; Golsch 1998: 142). The grueling recruitment process thus serves as a training ground for acquiring and honing political skills for higher-level mandates. Although political experience does not guarantee that contenders hold all the qualifications required to maximize votes and pursue policy goals, it increases their chances (Pemstein et al. 2015: 1424). Only in very exceptional cases can candidates take a direct route to professional politics (Bailer et al. 2013; Borchert and Stolz 2003: 156; Herzog 1975; Lorenz and Micus 2009: 13; Mögel 2008; Römmele 2004: 272; Wolf 2007, 2011). Lateral entrants, broadly defined as legislators with little or no political experience, form a clear minority in parliament (Bailer et al. 2013: 16; Borchert and Stolz 2003: 156; Lorenz and Micus 2009: 13). Usually, they are allowed to skip the exhausting probation period within party organizations due to precious networks outside the party context, celebrity status, specific sought-after characteristics, or expertise in policy fields from which political parties hope to benefit (Bailer et al. 2013; Lorenz and Micus 2009: 12). According to Herzog’s findings (1975) on the 1965 Bundestag, only 9% of all the legislators switched from leading positions outside the political sphere to top political positions. In the same vein, Bailer et al. (2013) found that for the 2009 Bundestag only 10% of the legislators were lateral entrants. Both findings buttress the significance of intra-party recruitment processes for attaining professional legislative mandates. The following chapters will detail the specific factors which are most crucial for candidate selection. I will start from the assumption that not only candidate-related factors matter for individual success in candidate selection, but also if political parties put obstacles in a contender’s way. For the sake of analytical lucidity, I will therefore distinguish candidate characteristics that define the general requirements for nomination from process-related factors which indicate the extent to which political parties support IO candidates in seeking nominations.

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3.3.1 General Requirements for Nomination 3.3.1.1

Length of Party Membership

The vast majority of legislative careers start with political engagement as a party member. Although it is legally possible to run for election as an independent candidate, the support from party organizations is nearly indispensable for winning a seat in parliament (Herzog 1975: 175). In most cases, longstanding party membership is therefore an essential prerequisite for candidacy (Edinger 2009: 194; Herzog 1990). Accordingly, Best et al. (2011: 171) have shown that most MPs in West Germany were party members for 17 years before entering parliament for the first time, and ten years in East Germany. Golsch (1998: 128) found an average of 13 years for the 1994 Bundestag. These numbers demonstrate that longstanding party membership plays a crucial role in candidate selection. The first reason is that party selectorates want candidates who can represent party positions in a reliable way. Since party selectorates cannot foresee how closely candidates will toe the party line, seniority is a decisive indicator of candidate reliability, diligence, and loyalty. Second, party seniority helps establish intra-party alliances to beat potential competitors at the nominating convention. Lateral entrants often face acceptance problems within party organizations and lack the intra-party networks necessary for gaining enough selectorate support. Third, longstanding party members tend to be more familiar with political rules and routines. Since political parties can expect them to be more politically knowledgeable than novices, they are more likely to be entrusted with a nomination.

3.3.1.2

Political Office Experience

Working one’s way through the party ranks by holding lower-level offices before competing for a professional mandate at the state or national level is an integral part of party screening processes (Burmeister 1993: 68, 79). This refers to longstanding and grueling career trajectories through lower-level offices, in which candidates can hone their political profiles, increase visibility in their own party organization, and pile up political resources, such as intra-party networks, rhetorical skills, and knowledge of the political rules, routines, and party structures. By gradual qualification in lowerlevel offices, a solid foundation for higher-level offices is laid (Herzog 1975: 64). While party offices such as chairmen positions in the district or sub-district party executive are almost obligatory when running for a mandate at state or national level, experience in elected and executive offices—for example, in a city or county council—is certainly helpful (Borchert and Golsch 1999: 126; Borchert and Zeiss 2003: 151; Fiers and Secker 2007). This service to the party organization serves as a way to prove reliability and loyalty. Having a so-called Stallgeruch by being deeply anchored in the party organization is crucial for nominations at state or national level. Furthermore, party offices are helpful vehicles for gathering important resources for being nominated, such as becoming familiar with intra-party rules, structures, and

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processes, developing a political profile within the party organization, increasing visibility, and establishing relevant contacts. When it comes to the level of previous office experience, the political recruitment literature noted the importance of local-level offices. Local-level politics is the breeding ground for most legislative careers at the state or national level, and serves as a training ground for higher-level mandates (Gruber 2009: 150; Herzog 1975: 85). Party members must prove themselves loyal to the party organization by accepting less prestigious and unpaid positions at local level, learning to address local problems, and cultivating a local power base before being deemed qualified to hold higher-level mandates. Whether contenders have served party interests by accepting less prestigious local-level positions is an acid test in assessing applicant commitment. In this regard, chair and vice-chair positions as a district or sub-district party executive are most important. They provide influence over the district party and its candidate selection and help form local alliances of supporters (Borchert and Golsch 1999: 127; Borchert and Stolz 2011: 215; Borchert and Zeiss 2003: 152; Gruber 2009: 141). Due to their strategic importance, legislators not only start their political careers at the local level, but often attempt to maintain local positions throughout their political career, or try to obtain such positions ex post (Borchert and Stolz 2003: 167–168; Herzog 1975: 71; 1990: 36). Such vertical office profiles can ensure re-selection in SMDs, as it is the district party which controls local candidate selection (Bailer et al. 2013: 37–38; Borchert 1999: 27, 2003b: 17, 2011b: 133; Borchert and Stolz 2003: 167–168; Burmeister 1993: 79–80; Detterbeck 2010: 150–151, 2011b; Herzog 1975: 88–90, 1990: 36–37; Kaack 1969b: 72; Zeuner 1970). Through local-level positions, incumbent legislators can keep in touch with rank-and-file party members and secure their support. Against this backdrop, it is not surprising that most legislators at state and national levels have previous office experience. Experience in local-level and party offices is most widespread in this regard (Best et al. 2011: 172–173; Borchert and Golsch 1999: 125; Borchert and Stolz 2003: 158, 2011: 211; Detterbeck 2010: 149, 2011a). For the 2009 Bundestag, Bailer et al. (2013: 38) found that 80% of all legislators had held a local party office before. According to Borchert and Stolz (2011: 213), 75% of German state legislators have experience in local-level offices.

3.3.1.3

Localness in Single-Member Districts

Most parliamentary candidates that compete in SMDs are locals (Burmeister 1993: 65; Kaack 1969b: 70; Zeuner 1970: 93-100). Personal ties with a local constituency and party organization play a pivotal role in local candidate selection. As district candidates seek personal votes (André and Depauw 2014; Cain et al. 1984; Carey and Shugart 1995; Gallagher 1980; Shugart et al. 2005), candidates from outside the electoral district that lack a local name recognition will find it difficult to convince local nominating bodies (Marsh and Gallagher 1988: 251; Pedersen et al. 2007). Rush (2001: 204) defined localism as “being born, educated, living or working in the constituency; having property interests or serving or having served as a member of

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a local government body in the constituency […].” Based on this definition, we can distinguish between two dimensions of localness. Political localness takes the shape of experience in local-level offices, while biographical localness relates to personal ties with the electoral district in terms of birth and residence in the constituency (Gschwend and Zittel 2018; Pedersen et al. 2007; Tavits 2010: 221). It is biographical localness which creates an emotional bond with the electoral district, and boosts motivation for representing local concerns. Political localness, by contrast, increases the ability to succeed in the local candidate selection, represent local concerns, and mobilize voters at the ballot box (Gschwend and Zittel 2018). Localness is a great benefit in candidate selection of SMDs, which is the exclusive dominion of district party organizations (Burmeister 1993: 64; Reiser 2011; Schüttemeyer 2002; Schüttemeyer and Sturm 2005; Zeuner 1970). The chances of nomination increase significantly if aspirants are personally acquainted with the district party organization and can command support from local party authorities, local rank-and-file party members, and the local party selectorate (Zeuner 1970). In addition, locals can win more personal votes due to their close bonds with the local constituency. Empirical research corroborated the value of localness as an important vote-earning attribute in SMDs (Arzheimer and Evans 2012, 2014; Blais and Massicotte 1996; Campbell and Cowley 2014; Cowley 2013; Górecki and Marsh 2012; Jankowski 2016; Marsh 1987; Pedersen et al. 2007; Put and Maddens 2015; Shugart et al. 2005; Studlar and McAllister 1996; Tavits 2010; Vivyan and Wagner 2015). The electoral benefits of localness therefore generate strong incentives for party selectorates to favor locally anchored candidates over external candidates. Finally, localness provides both party selectorates and voters with information on a candidate’s familiarity with local needs, and their will to advocate these in parliament (Tavits 2010: 217).

3.3.2 Supportive Measures in Candidate Selection 3.3.2.1

Encouragement

The personal decision to run for elected office, discussed as candidate emergence among scholars, has attracted surprisingly scant attention in the recruitment literature (Maisel et al. 1990; Maisel and Stone 1997). The individual decision to compete for a legislative mandate follows from complex considerations that frequently imply cues from the party organization. The political ambition theory took aspiring politicians for granted (Schlesinger 1966) and therefore conceived candidacies as a pure matter of self-recruitment, motivated chiefly by the individual desire for political power. However, in most cases, candidates did not arrive at the decision to strive for a mandate by themselves. Instead, external encouragement from other party actors plays a decisive role. Party actors can set off office-seeking ambitions among party

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members who would not otherwise strive for a mandate—either by bolstering their confidence in their own political abilities or bringing this idea to their attention (Sanbonmatsu 2006: 31). Researchers on women representation have carved out the relevance of encouragement. Most female candidates needed encouragement to run for election, while only a minority made a bid for office on their own (Carroll 1994; Crowder-Meyer 2011; Crowder-Meyer 2013; Fox and Lawless 2004, 2010; Lawless 2012; Lawless and Fox 2005; Niven 1998; Preece and Stoddard 2015; Rallings et al. 2010; Sanbonmatsu 2006). Although women hinge more on external encouragement due to lower political self-confidence, they tend to receive less encouragement from party leaders or elected officials than male aspirants (Allen 2013; Allen and Cutts 2017; Carroll and Sanbonmatsu 2013; Fulton et al. 2006; Lawless and Fox 2010; Preece and Stoddard 2015; Preece et al. 2016). In Germany, party actors play a pivotal role in motivating potential candidates to run for a mandate (Patzelt 1999a: 262). In 80% of cases, other party actors had asked candidates to make a bid, while only 20% made the decision on their own. In the same vein, Broockman (2014b) found that US party organizations decisively shape candidate pools by encouraging specific individuals to run for election. His field experiment revealed that encouragement notably increases interest in a mandate. Evidently, encouragement from other party actors plays an essential role in candidate selection and allows party actors to have an influence on the final pool of contenders.

3.3.2.2

Level of Competition in Candidate Selection

The chance of passing through the candidate selection process depends—among other things—on the level of intra-party competition. In contested selection procedures with a large number of competitors, it is more of a challenge to be picked than in uncontested ones. By strengthening a potential candidate’s political ambition or discouraging them, party leaders can attempt to pre-structure the level of competition in candidate selection (Niven 2006; Reiser 2011: 254–255). In other words, they can try to clear the field of contenders to increase their control over the outcome. As a research field, competition for nomination first attracted scholarly attention in the 1960s and 70s. After realizing that party selectorates heavily pre-shape the composition of parliaments and derogate voters from their democratic influence, the research focus shifted from the democratic quality of elections to the democratic quality of candidate selection procedures. Scholars assume that a minimum level of competition is a condition precedent to the democratic quality of candidate selection. But in their pioneering studies on Germany, Zeuner (1970) and Kaack (1969a) ascertained that only one contender actually made a bid for nomination in most selection procedures (see also Kaufmann 1961; Mintzel 1980; Roberts 1988). If the party leadership had already agreed upon its favored contender in the run-up to the official nominating convention, as is the case most of the time, the nominating body was deprived of influence. However, if alternative contenders competed at the nominating convention, party selectorates had a genuine influence on selection.

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In the 2000s, research on the level of intra-party competition received renewed interest. For the 2002 Bundestag election, Schüttemeyer and Sturm (2005: 547–548) found that, in 80% of the BÜNDNIS 90/DIE GRÜNEN, FDP and PDS local selection procedures, only one applicant could be selected. In the nomination proceedings of the SPD and CDU, a choice between two applicants was given in 34 and 43% of the analyzed cases. As SPD and CDU win most nominal races, their selection procedures generally tend to be more contested. Reiser (2011: 250) reproduced these findings for the 2009 Bundestag election: In 23% of the nomination procedures in SMDs, two or more applicants struggled for a candidacy, whereas party selectorates could only confirm one contender in 77% of cases. Generally, vacancy of the electoral district, electoral prospects, and incumbency impact the amount of intra-party competition in SMDs the most (Reiser 2013; Roberts 1988; Zeuner 1970). Both vacant SMDs in which the incumbent legislator no longer runs for election and electorally promising SMDs systematically feature higher levels of contestation. Conversely, incumbents who made it into parliament in the previous election face less competition (Reiser 2013; 2014: 135; Zeuner 1970). It is a common practice in German party organizations for incumbents not to be challenged. One reason for this is that incumbents help boost the nominal and PR vote share, due to name recognition and previous service to voters (Hainmueller and Lutz Kern 2008; Hainmueller et al. 2006). Moreover, political parties know what to expect from incumbents in terms of election campaigning and office tenure.

3.3.2.3

Party Support in Candidate Selection

The amount of party support is another factor that steers the likelihood of nomination. In SMDs, candidate selection is completely in the hands of district party organizations. Either the local membership or delegates elected from within the ranks of local party members make the decision. Therefore, the support from district party leadership, the local party selectorate, and rank-and-file party members can tip the balance in local candidate selection (Zeuner 1970: 58–59). State party leaders cannot place their preferred candidates in SMDs, as they lack legal access to local candidate selection (Reiser 2011: 251; Schüttemeyer 2002: 151; Schüttemeyer and Sturm 2005: 546). On state party lists, however, it is support from the state party executive that can tip the scales. In most cases, the placement on state party lists falls to the state party leadership and the responsible party selectorate, which is either an assembly of all the eligible party members of the state party organization or a delegate assembly elected by the district party organizations (Schüttemeyer 2002; Schüttemeyer and Sturm 2005). To facilitate the complex nomination process, in which manifold representational claims clash (Reiser 2014; Roberts 1988; Zeuner 1970), state leadership presents proposals for the list ranking before the nominating assembly gives its vote (Burmeister 1993: 64; Roberts 1988: 106; Wessels 1997: 79). As state leaderships pre-structure list proposals, they can try to place their favored candidates. However,

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their proposals are only approved if they are in accordance with the representational claims of the various intra-party groups, the regional party branches, and the district party organizations (Schüttemeyer 2002: 151; Schüttemeyer and Sturm 2005: 546). Otherwise, crucial votes will occur at the nominating convention, which would heavily disturb the proposed list ranking.

3.3.2.4

Electoral Viability

Even though voters are the pivotal decision-makers, determining who is elected into parliament (Norris and Lovenduski 1995: 16), a candidate’s electoral prospects are strongly affected by candidate selection. A candidate’s electoral fate depends on the party-determined electoral prospects. Owing to their monopoly on candidate selection, political parties can therefore either make or break a candidate’s legislative career. With respect to the electoral viability of SMD nominations, empirical research has not yet addressed which candidates can run in viable electoral districts. However, with regard to party lists, some informal but highly institutionalized rules for the assignment of viable list positions exist (Reiser 2014; Roberts 1988; Zeuner 1970). First, nominees that have succeeded in coming forward as SMD candidates are prioritized in party list ranking. Although mixed-member electoral systems give the impression that two independent electoral tiers are combined (Moser and Scheiner 2004: 575), this is misleading. Scholars pointed to contamination effects across both electoral tiers that are specific to mixed-member electoral systems (Cox and Schoppa 2002; Ferrara et al. 2005; Herron and Nishikawa 2001). These contamination effects are most evident in dual nominations, which apply to 80% of all parliamentary candidates in German Bundestag elections (Manow 2012: 53; 2016). The main reason for priority being given to SMD candidates is that a candidate’s local presence in electoral districts and their campaign activities boost not only the parties’ nominal vote share, but also their PR vote share (Ferrara and Herron 2005; Manow 2011). By placing SMD candidates on higher ballot positions, political parties can create incentives that motivate candidates to run for election in SMDs and campaign on behalf of their party organizations, even though the electoral race is hopeless (Manow 2013: 289). A SMD nomination—especially if the nominal race is in vain—forms therefore one precondition for receiving electorally viable party list slots (Borchert and Reiser 2010; Kaack 1969a: 80–82; Reiser 2014: 59; Zeuner 1970: 149). As a second priority rule, incumbents usually receive the most viable slots on party lists (Reiser 2014; Zeuner 1970). Owing to their name recognition and legislative record, incumbents are at an electoral advantage (Dahlgaard 2016; Erikson 1971; Hainmueller and Lutz Kern 2008; Lee 2001; Levitt and Wolfram 1997; Mayhew 1974). The incumbency advantage creates strong electoral incentives for political parties to place incumbents on visible list positions. Moreover, political parties know what to expect from incumbents in terms of election campaigning and performance in parliament. These

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candidates have already proven their ability to win elections and master the complex tasks of parliamentary work. Furthermore, they are familiar with the institutional working processes of parliament. Therefore, they can continue their legislative work as soon as they reenter parliament.

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Borchert J (2003a) Die Professionalisierung der Politik. Zur Notwendigkeit eines Ärgernisses. Campus Verlag, Frankfurt/New York Borchert J (2003b) Professional politicians: towards a comparative perspective. In: Borchert J, Zeiss J (eds) The political class in advanced democracies: a comparative handbook. Oxford University Press, Oxford, pp 1–27 Borchert J (2011) Individual ambition and institutional opportunity: a conceptual approach to political careers in multi-level systems. Reg Federal Stud 21(2):117–140 Borchert J, Golsch L (1999) Deutschland: Von der „Honoratienzunft“ zur politischen Klasse. In: Borchert (ed) Politik als Beruf. Die politische Klasse in westlichen Demokratien. Opladen: Leske + Budrich, pp 114–140 Borchert J, Reiser M (2010) Friends as foes: the two-level game of intra-party competition in Germany. In: Annual meeting of the American Political Science Association, Washington, DC, 2–5 Sept 2010 Borchert J, Stolz K (2003) Die Bekämpfung der Unsicherheit: Politikerkarrieren und Karrierepolitik in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland. Politische Vierteljahresschrift 44(2):148–173 Borchert J, Stolz K (2011) German political careers: the state level as an arena in its own right? Reg Fed Stud 21(2):205–222 Borchert J, Zeiss L (2003) Germany: from “guilds of notables” to political class. In: Bochert J, Zeiss J (eds) The political class in advanced democracies: a comparative handbook. Oxford University Press, Oxford, pp 142–161 Bowler S, Farrell DM, Katz RS (eds) (1999) Party discipline and parliamentary government. Ohio State University Press, Columbus Brockington D (2003) A low information theory of ballot position effect. Polit Behav 25(1):1–27 Broockman DE (2014) Mobilizing candidates: political actors strategically shape the candidate pool with personal appeals. Exp Polit Sci 1(2):104–119 Brouard S, Tiberj V (2011) Yes they can. An experimental approach to the eligibility of ethnic minority candidates in France. In: Bird K, Saalfeld T, Wüst AM (2011) The political representation of immigrants and minorities. Voters, parties and parliaments in liberal democracies. Routledge, London, pp 164–180 Burmeister K (1993) Die Professionalisierung der Politik am Beispiel des Berufspolitikers im parlamentarischen System der Bundesrepublik Deutschland. Duncker & Humblot, Berlin Cain BE, Ferejohn JA, Fiorina MP (1984) The constituency service basis of the personal vote for U.S. representatives and British members of parliament. Am Polit Sci Rev 78(1):110–125 Campbell R, Cowley P (2014) What voters want: reactions to candidate characteristics in a survey experiment. Polit Stud 62(4):745–765 Carey John M (2007) Competing principals, political institutions, and party unity in legislative voting. Am J Polit Sci 51(1):92–107 Carey JM, Shugart MS (1995) Incentives to cultivate a personal vote: a rank ordering of electoral formulas. Electoral Stud 14(4):417–439 Carroll SJ (1994) Women as candidates in American politics. Indiana University Press, Bloomington Carroll SJ, Sanbonmatsu K (2013) More women can run: gender and pathways to the state legislatures. Oxford University Press, Oxford Cowley P (2013) Why not ask the audience? Understanding the public’s representational priorities. Br Polit 8(2):138–163 Cox KE, Schoppa LJ (2002) Interaction effects in mixed-member electoral systems: theory and evidence from Germany, Japan, and Italy. Comp Polit Stud 35(9):1027–1053 Crowder-Meyer M (2011) Candidate recruitment and party networks: how the characteristics and choices of local party leaders affect women’s representation. Presented at the 2011 meeting of the American Political Science Association, Seattle, WA. https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm? abstract_id=1901327. Accessed 15 July 2020 Crowder-Meyer M (2013) Gendered recruitment without trying: how local party recruiters affect women’s representation. Polit Gend 9(4):390–413

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Chapter 4

Party Selection Behavior Toward Immigrant Origin Candidates—A Framework of Analysis

The present study aims to probe the relationship between party candidate selection and the descriptive representation of IO citizens in parliament more closely: How do political parties select IO candidates, and what implications does this behavior have for the number of IO citizens in parliament? After showing the most important factors for success in party candidate selection, this section turns to the party selection behavior concerning IO candidates. For this purpose, I will map out three ideal-typical benchmarks of how political parties can treat IO candidates in candidate selection, and discuss the respective consequences for the descriptive representation of IO citizens in parliament. I will first summarize the present state of research, situating my analysis in the field of existing studies and showing how I will contribute to this.

4.1 The Present State of Research This study delves into the effect of party candidate selection on IO citizen descriptive representation. But before going into detail about my research approach and framework of analysis, I will briefly discuss central findings within this research field and detail how I contribute to the present state of research. The subsequent description of existing research does not claim to be exhaustive, but is focused on obstacles IO candidates face in the legislative recruitment process of political parties. Based on the persistent underrepresentation of IO citizens in spite of rising immigration, the scholarly community has started paying more attention to the causes of this gap. Broadly speaking, we can separate studies on minority representation into two clusters. While the first cluster treats minority representation as a dependent variable for tracking down explanatory variables that limit or promote the presence of

© The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2021 S. Ceyhan, How German Parties Select Candidates of Immigrant Origin, Springer Series in Electoral Politics, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-59451-0_4

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ethnic minorities in parliament, the second treats individual immigrant background or minority representation as independent variables for tracing their effects. The first cluster tends to look upon aggregate patterns of minority representation and tries to identify macro-level factors that explain these patterns—either in a crosscountry, sub-country or cross-time comparison. Studies which fall into this cluster usually employ the relative share of IO candidates or IO legislators as dependent variables. Above all, such studies strive to understand the context or institutional factors which provide explanations for variances in the level of minority representation. This body of research is particularly diverse, as it examines different minority groups in various countries, and covers a wide range of institutional and cultural variables and their effects upon group representation. Not only so-called political opportunity structures like national citizenship and integration regimes or the party system turned out to be decisive (Koopmans and Statham 2000a; Michon and Vermeulen 2013), but also the electoral system (Canon 1999; Kostadinova 2007; Moser 2008; Ruedin 2013; Rule and Zimmerman 1992, 1994; Togeby 2008), ethnic concentration in SMDs (Dancygier 2014; Shah 2014; Trounstine and Valdini 2008), economic deprivation in SMDs (Dancygier 2013), attitudinal patterns (Bird et al. 2011; Ruedin 2009, 2013), and party ideology (Eelbode et al. 2013). It seems that there is not one but a multitude of explanations for the numerical strength of ethnic minorities in parliament, which can vary from case to case and interact in highly complex ways. Among these, a leftist party ideology was found to boost minority representation, due to the egalitarian stances leftist parties usually represent (Eelbode et al. 2013). The higher the share of leftist parties in parliament, the greater the chance of a fair minority representation. Conservative or center-right parties find IO candidates a rather risky choice, which might lead to the alienation of their traditional constituencies. Another factor that seems to make an impact on minority representation is the social composition of the electoral district. Wherever IO citizens are densely concentrated, they attract the attention of political parties (Dancygier 2014). This is particularly true in candidate-centered electoral systems, where political parties use IO candidates to court voters from the same background. In electoral districts with high shares of ethnic minorities, fair minority representation therefore becomes more likely. In turn, institutional explanations focus on the political opportunity structure, including national citizenship rules and immigration policies. Due to path dependence, countries’ traditional notions of citizenship and nationhood have a longstanding impact on ethnic minorities’ political participation and integration (Brubaker 1992). In political systems where ethnic minorities enjoy easy access to political rights and naturalization, fair and equal representation is more likely. However, while this body of research has significantly advanced our scholarly understanding of how context and institutional factors shape the overall level of minority representation and has helped explain macro-level variances within or across countries, it remained unable to bring the exact micro-level mechanisms which lie beneath these aggregate patterns to light. One consequence is that these studies have offered little help in understanding and disentangling the processes that eventually lead to ethnic minorities’ descriptive underrepresentation in parliament. Which actors,

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mechanisms, and behavioral patterns contribute to the weak presence of ethnic minorities in parliament, what are the exact reasons, and how can this be changed? What are the main obstacles IO citizens face in achieving a mandate in parliament, and which strategies exist to overcome these obstacles? The strong focus on aggregate patterns while leaving out underlying mechanisms remains a major weakness of this research strand. Without looking into micro-level processes that result in specific aggregate patterns described by scholars within this research cluster, our understanding remains confined to context factor effects on minority representation but not the mechanisms, processes, and actors behind it. The second research cluster treats the individual immigrant background or the share of ethnic minorities as independent variables which go into their specific effects, ranging from policy to electoral effects. Within this research cluster, scholars have studied the impact which the individual immigrant background has on the behavior of IO legislators in parliament. They not only ascertained that MPs of an immigrant background ask more parliamentary questions relating to the rights of ethnic minorities and immigration, but also that IO legislators have a higher probability of sitting in migration-related committees (Aydemir and Vliegenthart 2016; Saalfeld and Bischof 2013; Saalfeld and Kyriakopoulou 2011; Wüst 2014; Wüst and Heinz 2009). Apparently, immigrant backgrounds prompt legislators to pay more attention to issues that are relevant to the daily life of ethnic minorities. However, if minority constituents are geographically concentrated, native MPs also tend to be more responsive to group interests, due to electoral incentives. Besides policy effects, electoral effects have attracted the research community’s interest. Scholars have investigated whether a nominee’s immigrant background is a tool for convincing IO voters to go to the polls. They found hints of mobilization effects (Banducci et al. 2004; Fisher et al. 2015; Martin 2016), with the selection of IO candidates leading to higher turnout rates among IO voters. Furthermore, they have tested whether IO voters favor IO candidates at the ballot box, finding partly positive effects in Australia, the UK (Zingher and Farrer 2016), and Norway (Bergh and Bjørklund 2011). Thus, we have evidence that a candidate’s ethnic background matters, and that IO candidates can receive electoral advantage from members of their own ethnic group. Voters might support candidates from their own group because they identify more strongly with them, or because they expect gains from having that candidate in office. However, in other cases, co-ethnic voting did not apply to all immigrant groups, but was limited to specific minority groups (Sanders et al. 2014). Another research angle relates to minority MPs’ political responsiveness. Field experiments demonstrated that black legislators are more intrinsically motivated to advocate black interests than their white counterparts (Broockman 2013; Butler and Broockman 2011). It seems that descriptive representatives have a higher personal drive to advance group interests—this attests to the fact that descriptive representation can help secure substantive representation, and that minorities fare better when fellow group members sit in parliament. Other studies dealt with general voter willingness to support IO candidates at the ballot box, measured by IO candidate electoral performance. However, the empirical findings cannot unequivocally answer the question of whether candidates with an immigrant background face electoral disadvantages.

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While some authors observed disadvantages (Stegmaier et al. 2013), others noted only weak deterrents (Bieber 2013; Brouard and Tiberj 2011; Street 2014). The latter argued that party affiliation acts as an intervening variable, with the effects of the immigrant background wearing down once party affiliation is taken into account. Minority candidates seem only to suffer electoral disadvantages from right-wing voters, but as minority candidates mostly run for center-left parties, this seldom takes place. If in place, voter discrimination is described by two distinct mechanisms: Either voters harbor negative attitudes toward specific minorities candidates belong to (Street 2014), or voters use the minority status as a cognitive heuristic to infer a candidate’s ideological orientation (Terkildsen 1993). In Germany, respondents associated candidates with a Turkish background more often with BÜNDNIS 90/DIE GRÜNEN and the SPD (Bieber 2013). Though variances in the overall level of minority representation (including both the causes and consequences) have been thoroughly studied, the main obstacles at the micro-level which explain why ethnic minority members experience difficulty in achieving a mandate in parliament remain largely untold. As seen before, candidate selection is a key to minority representation. Its outcome widely presets the final composition of legislative bodies, for which candidate selection is a bottleneck on the pathway to parliament. Despite widespread acknowledgment that candidate selection processes have far-reaching consequences for minority access to parliament, scant attention has been paid to the selection of IO candidates. The lack of empirical evidence can be traced back to a strong focus on aggregate patterns of minority representation at the expense of micro-level studies on intra-party selection processes. Only more recently have scholars started to consider candidate selection processes as one of the main reasons for the legislative underrepresentation of ethnic minorities. They have criticized party candidate selection for being too selective and discriminatory to allow for the equal representation of marginalized groups (Durose et al. 2013; Kittilson and Tate 2005). So far, only a handful of studies have examined how IO candidates fare in candidate selection (Ashe and Stewart 2012; da Fonseca 2011; Dancygier et al. 2015; Durose et al. 2013; Markowis 2015; Nergiz 2014; Norris and Lovenduski 1995; Schmitz and Wüst 2011; Sobolewska 2013; Softic 2016; Soininen 2011; Thrasher et al. 2013). They largely share the view that ethnic minorities not only have a low presence in parliament, but tend to be underrepresented at the candidate level. One section of the existing research adopted a candidate-centered perspective to identifying handicaps that IO candidates perceive in their selection. While Nergiz (2014) studied how German MPs from immigrant backgrounds have coped with their origin in party recruitment processes, Schmitz and Wüst (2011) focused on German city councilors of immigrant background and their personal recruitment experiences. Both studies reveal that although some of the respondents faced difficulties arising from cultural misunderstandings at the beginning of their party engagement, most stated that they had not experienced racial discrimination in the party organization. Markowis (2015), in a study on German state legislators of immigrant background, found that they perceived their immigrant background to be an advantage for securing a viable position on the party list—this applied chiefly to female parliamentarians

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of immigrant background. At the same time, however, native parliamentarians used the practice of “othering” to keep IO parliamentarians out of the race for legislative mandates. Moreover, respondents felt reduced to the role of immigration experts, which curtailed their chances of demonstrating proficiency in other policy fields. While these studies focused more on personal experience in the recruitment process, others attempted to offer more general explanations for persistent underrepresentation of immigrants at the candidate level and potential solutions. Sobolewska (2013) focused on party strategies for increasing minority representation in the 2010 British General Election. She noted that both Labor and Conservative Party embarked on strategies for increasing minority representation, such as selecting more IO candidates into winnable seats. At the same time, however, political parties did not make full use of the available options for increasing minority representation. She found the selection method, the supply of potential candidates, and the perceived quantity of voter prejudices to be the most critical for the success of minority candidates in candidate selection. Decentralized selection procedures, lower socioeconomic resources, and fear of alienating voters when running IO candidates for election formed the main obstacles to fair minority representation among parliamentary candidates. Based on qualitative interviews with IO legislators, Durose et al. (2013) further showed that, for the 2010 British General Election, IO MPs had to conform to the characteristics of the average native parliamentarians where they were elected, such as having a university degree, longstanding party activism, experience in local-level office and in politics-facilitating professions. Dancygier et al. (2015) disputed this finding, at least for the Swedish municipal elections. Here, immigrants did not reap the same rewards from favorable individual resources or opportunity structures as natives, indicating discriminatory behavior from party gatekeepers. Even if immigrants had similar resources and faced identical opportunity structures, party elites harbored reservations when evaluating IO candidates. Through qualitative interviews with local party selectorates and party leadership in Sweden, Soininen (2011) identified the local level as the real impediment to the nomination of IO candidates. This finding corresponds to Dancygier et al. and Sobolewska’s observation that local selection procedures diminish IO candidate nomination prospects. Informal local networks within party organizations, which have the say in the candidate selection by providing party selectorates with information about potential candidates, seem to systematically shut out IO candidates. Furthermore, the prejudicial attitudes of local party members prevent party selectorates from nominating IO candidates, as they fear electoral damage. Other studies emphasized the importance of district characteristics for the selection of minority candidates. Where ethnic minorities are densely concentrated, party selectorates seem to be more inclined to give candidates of immigrant background a chance to compete for votes (Black and Hicks 2006; Farrer and Zingher 2018; Wüst 2006). However, this relationship appears to be more complex and interacts with an electoral district’s socioeconomic status. Dancygier (2013) demonstrated that for British Muslims, a strong Muslim presence impairs another Muslim’s prospects for nomination if the district suffers from high economic deprivation. In cases where

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core voters feel threatened by Muslim political advances and their economic gains, Muslim candidates find it difficult to make the party lists. Farrer and Zingher (2018) pointed to interaction effects between the ethnic composition of an electoral district and party ideology. Apparently, center-left parties respond more to a strong presence of ethnic minorities in the electoral district than center-right parties. Furthermore, candidates from minority groups seem to compete more often in electoral districts where an electoral victory is out of sight. By doing so, political parties can diversify their candidate tableau without taking any electoral risk (Matland and Brown 1992). Accordingly, two-thirds of the IO candidates in the Conservative and Liberal Party fought over unwinnable seats in the 2010 British General Election (Sobolewska 2013). In the same vein, Muslim candidates’ chances of nomination rode on electoral safety, but remained conditioned by local Muslim strength. Generally, Muslim candidates stand less of a chance of coming on a party ticket in auspicious SMDs, but Muslims’ presence in an electoral district critically shapes their participation in local politics (Dancygier 2014). Overall, the empirical findings draw an ambiguous picture of party selection behavior toward IO candidates. Some findings point to efforts to nominate IO candidates more viably, and, in doing so, remedy poor minority representation in parliament (Sobolewska 2013). Others found evidence for neutral selection patterns, in which IO candidates must conform to the recruitment profiles of native candidates in order to run for election (Durose et al. 2013), and others referred to party tendencies for closure (Dancygier et al. 2015; Soininen 2011). As the above studies address disparate research questions, employ distinct empirical approaches, and take place in varied settings, the inconsistent patterns come as little surprise. In addition to this comes a lack of reference groups, the consequence being that it remains mostly unclear whether the patterns identified are unique to IO candidates and disclose specific party selection strategies, or whether they reflect patterns that simply apply to the vast majority of parliamentary candidates. The lessons which can be learned about party selection behavior toward underrepresented groups therefore remain inconclusive. The present study draws conclusions from this research gap by contributing to current research in two ways. First, it tackles this limitation—common to the majority of empirical work—by inspecting party selection behavior toward IO candidates and comparing it to native candidates, adding to scholarly debate on societal changes and associated party responses (Arzheimer 2006; Dalton 2009; Mair et al. 1999). The notion of candidate selection as vote-seeking strategy is closely related to scholarly debate on fluctuating and changing voter markets. As highlighted at the outset, political parties face massive societal shifts, involving an erosion of class structures, a decline of traditional party affiliations, and the emergence of new voter groups, such as IO voters in more recent times. In other words, the electorate’s face has changed vastly over the past few decades, giving party organizations the challenging task of responding to these changes. As political parties form the principle vehicles for translating societal dynamics into parliament, scholars researched electoral reactions to increasing immigration. While most research has been focused around voter reactions to ethnic diversity, studying how immigration affects the native population’s

4.1 The Present State of Research

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voting behavior, reasons for the rise of right-wing parties, and IO voter electoral behavior, little has been done for party selection behavior toward IO candidates, though this has far-reaching consequences for their access to parliament. The present study therefore aims forward knowledge of how political parties respond to the gap between growing ethnic diversity and the low presence of immigrants in parliament, and helps clarify whether selection behavior reinforces the low proportion of IO citizens in parliament or not. Ethnic diversity can thus be seen as a specific case for learning more about general party selection behavior and its adaptability. Do political parties make vigorous efforts in their selection processes to close the persistent gap between immigrant presence in the population and in parliament, do they act indifferently, or do they thwart IO aspirants’ selection? An improved understanding of the adaptivity of party selection behavior is highly relevant, as it affects how well and how quickly legislative bodies can emulate changes in the sociodemographic composition of the population. If we see that political parties find it difficult to elevate the number of IO candidates for specific reasons, we can draw more general conclusions about whether this is likely to apply to other emerging groups as well. In the event that political parties find it difficult to select more IO candidates and that the found reasons apply to other groups as well, political parties have a hard time swiftly responding to social changes in the population by selecting more nominees from such a background. As diversification and complexity in modern electorates grow (Mair et al. 1999), the likelihood that society and parliament are further drifting apart in their composition would then increase in the future. Second, as argued above, this study adds to existing research by drawing on native candidates as a reference group in the investigation into party selection behavior toward IO candidates. Only by understanding how IO candidates are treated in party candidate selection when compared to native candidates (whether they face more opposition or receive stronger party support, and why) can we unveil the microlevel mechanisms that intervene during the selection process and shape minority representation in parliament. Examining the makeup of legislatures or candidate pools does not provide information about the individual-level factors that foster or hinder immigrant access to parliament, and whether these candidate selection characteristics are different for IO candidates than for natives. I go beyond comparing aggregate rates of immigrant representation, but study variation at an individual level. By comparing how political parties treat IO and native candidates, the present study helps address whether political parties and the way they select parliamentary candidates form one of the main reasons for IO citizens’ underrepresentation in parliament. Due to a lack of suitable data, previous research has largely left this question aside.

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4.2 How to Select Immigrant Origin Candidates—Neutrality, Opening, and Closure As the previous section showed, existing literature has had difficulty pinning down the individual-level mechanisms that explain how easy immigrants find it to access candidacies. Finding empirical strategies for analyzing party selection behavior toward IO candidates is far from straightforward, as candidate selection processes equal a “secret garden of politics” (Marsh and Gallagher 1988) that mainly takes place in backrooms. This is one of the main reasons for party selection behavior toward IO candidates remaining out of most research focus. However, and this is how the present study plans to bridge this research gap, candidates’ personal recruitment profiles can provide indirect but highly valuable information about party selection behavior. The qualifications candidates require when standing for election and the amount of party support they receive can help us approach party selection practices, even though we lack direct information about party selection behavior. In this sense, the present study takes an innovative approach to unlocking party selection behavior toward IO candidates. As political parties define the informal rules of candidate selection, candidate recruitment profiles can give some indication of the party selection practices in use. However, to unearth how political parties treat IO candidates in their candidate selection and whether they undergo a different treatment to native candidates, I need benchmarks to help me spot patterns in my empirical material. To develop these benchmarks, I will resort to the factors that I previously identified as most germane to coming through the candidate selection. They can help us come to know whether these characteristics are different for IO candidates than for natives when political parties select their candidates and whether the way political parties select IO candidates is at the bottom of immigrant underrepresentation in parliament. It is important to keep in mind that these heuristic benchmarks do not serve explanatory but purely descriptive purposes: First and foremost, they ought to help identify patterns in the recruitment profiles of parliamentary candidates that can give some indication of the respective party’s selection behavior. The array of potential party selection practices toward IO candidates that I might encounter in my empirical data comprises three ideal-typical patterns, here referred to as neutrality, opening, and closure (see Table 4.1). They emanate from systematic conceptualizations of deviations from default selection patterns, defined by the recruitment profiles of native candidates. As argued earlier, the recruitment profiles of native candidates will serve as both analytical and empirical reference points for unveiling whether political parties treat IO candidates differently from the vast majority of candidates when it comes to finding suitable nominees. This approach helps me shed more light on the role that party candidate selection plays for immigrant access to parliament by taking a rare look at how IO candidates fare in candidate selection. While neutrality implies adherence to the default selection criteria, also employed in the selection of native candidates, both opening and closure emphasize alternative selection patterns. More precisely, opening refers to a relaxing of the standard selection criteria if an aspirant has an immigrant background, whereas closure

4.2 How to Select Immigrant Origin Candidates—Neutrality, Opening, … Table 4.1 Party selection behavior toward IO and native candidates

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Selection behavior

Indicators

Party selection policy

Neutrality

Equal political qualifications Equal amount of party support

Neutral

Opening

Less political Offensive qualifications More party support

Closure

More political qualifications Less party support

Defensive

Source Author’s own illustration

refers to stricter observance of the standard selection criteria. But what does this actually mean for immigrant representation? For opening, political parties and their selection processes help improve immigrant access to candidacies, while the opposite applies to closure, with political parties impeding immigrant access to candidacies. Which selection pattern is valid depends on the costs and benefits of putting IO candidates into the electoral race. In the following sections, I will further detail how political parties balance the costs and benefits of nominating IO candidates and how this affects their respective selection behavior.

4.3 Neutrality— “We Want You Just Like We Want Any Other Candidate!” I speak of neutrality if political parties act as if they were blind to contenders’ ethnic background. To them, it does not matter whether aspirants have an immigrant or native background, as this does not make any difference to their selection criteria. On the one hand, this means that political parties are basically willing to respond to the underrepresentation of immigrants in parliament, as they do not bar immigrant access to candidacies. On the other hand, they remain reluctant to particularly facilitate immigrants’ access to candidacies, but instead impose the same conditions on IO and native candidates. In short, two criteria point to neutral selection practices: IO candidates need equivalent political qualifications as native candidates to stand for election, and they receive comparable party support in the selection process. In other words, neutrality refers to selection behavior that stresses equal pathways to candidacies rather than alternative selection practices. The standard selection criteria define the meritocratic rules of the game, and these apply to all contenders—irrespective of whether they belong to an underrepresented group or not. But what is the logic behind neutral selection behavior from the viewpoint of political parties? As the above discussion suggests, established selection criteria help

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political parties and their gatekeepers to evaluate an applicant’s political qualifications and suitability for higher-level mandates. However, if contenders skip significant parts of the default recruitment process, political parties run the risk of choosing candidates who lack essential experience with politics. At worst, they may select dissenters who trample on party loyalty and lack the necessary knowledge for doing politics successfully. To avoid such a scenario, political parties might decide to uphold their standard selection criteria—regardless of whether nominees belong to underrepresented groups or not. This is to say that IO candidates cannot circumvent the toilsome selection process and its requirements, but must undergo the same probation period as their native peers in order to vie for a seat in parliament. In the trade-off between facilitating immigrant access to candidacies to elevate minority representation and ensuring that candidates are best qualified to sit in parliament, political parties prioritize meritocracy. Consequently, there is no way around standard selection criteria, but each candidate, without exception, is subject to the same requirements. After having sketched out the basic idea being neutral selection behavior, I need to formulate clear-cut indicators that point to neutral selection practices, vis-àvis IO candidates. The indicators build upon the framework set out in Sect. 3.3, which contained the most relevant factors for successful candidate selection. While some factors (including the length of party membership, office experience, and localness) belong to the dimension of political qualification, other indicators (such as encouragement, level of competition, party support in the candidate selection, and electoral viability) capture the dimension of party support. I refrain from going into detail about each indicator, but will rather give individual examples of when to speak of neutral selection behavior (see Table 4.2 for details). As widely acknowledged, a minimum length of party membership is in most cases absolutely essential for a parliamentary career at state or national level (Edinger 2009: 194). Rookies have very little chance of being selected, but must wait patiently for their turn (Borchert and Golsch 1999: 126–127; Borchert and Stolz 2003: 156–157; Herzog 1975). Neutral selection behavior is when IO candidates are party members for the same amount of time as native candidates before standing for election for the first time. In other words, they must prove that they are reliable and stalwart Table 4.2 Indicators of neutrality

Requirements for nomination 1. Equal length of party membership 2. Equal office experience 3. Equal localness in SMDs Supportive measures 1. Equal probability of encouragement 2. Equal competition in the candidate selection 3. Equal party support in the candidate selection 4. Equal electoral viability Source Author’s own illustration

4.3 Neutrality— “We Want You Just Like We Want Any Other Candidate!”

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party loyalists who are unlikely to break party unity in parliament, just as any other candidate must do. But it is not only the length of party membership but also the amount of office experience that serves as important selection criteria for the party gatekeepers. Working one’s way through lower-level offices before competing for a professional mandate at state or national level is integral to party screening processes (Borchert 1999; Borchert and Golsch 1995; Burmeister 1993: 68, 79; Edinger 2009; Golsch 1998; Herzog 1975; Saalfeld 1997). If IO candidates must show the same levels of office experience as any other contender, I speak of neutrality. Thus, aspiring candidates must first slog their ways through lower-level positions before being in line for professional mandates, irrespective of representing a marginalized group or not. Besides holding impressive political qualifications, party support is a key aspect of legislative recruitment that impacts the personal prospects of being nominated. Regarding the latter, political parties can inspire party members to strive for mandates that would otherwise not take their chance to compete for elected offices (Allen and Cutts 2017; Broockman 2014; Carroll and Sanbonmatsu 2013; Fox and Lawless 2010; Lawless and Fox 2005). I speak of neutral selection patterns if IO candidates have equal chances of encouragement from other party actors as any other nominee. They neither record more attempts at encouragement than native candidates nor are they self-recruiters in larger numbers. Furthermore, intra-party competition determines individual chances of selection (Reiser 2011, 2013; Schüttemeyer 2002; Schüttemeyer and Sturm 2005). Through negative recruitment, such as advising aspirants to revoke their applications, political parties can attempt to clear the field of contenders and have influence on the degree of intra-party competition (Niven 2006). In line with my reasoning, neutral selection behavior is shown if IO candidates are exposed to the same levels of competition as native candidates. They are neither privileged by being nominated without the burden of challengers nor do they experience a higher counter-mobilization by standing up to more competitors.

4.4 Opening— “We Want You at Any Price!” In the case of neutrality, political parties select IO candidates just like any other candidate. It is a different story for opening. According to the scholarly community, it is candidate selection that inhibits IO citizens from claiming more seats in parliament (Ashe and Stewart 2012; Durose et al. 2013; Kittilson and Tate 2005). They consider candidate selection too selective to spawn equal shares of IO candidates: “[…] this ‘traditional’ pathway to national politics is narrow and has not been very effective in providing access for underrepresented groups, including ethnic minorities” (Durose et al. 2013: 253). However, it is precisely the party monopoly on candidate selection that turns political parties into potential drivers of equal minority representation. Even if we face a dearth of IO applicants, due to fewer socioeconomic resources in the immigrant population (Alba et al. 1994; Butterwegge 2010; Diefenbach 2007, 2009;

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Diehl and Fick 2016; Granato 2003; Granato and Kalter 2001; Kristen 2002; Kristen and Granato 2007; Stanat and Edele 2011), a more pronounced interest in home country politics (Caballero 2009; Diehl 2002) and language barriers (Becker 2011; Esser 2006a, b, 2008), political parties can still counteract by helping immigrants come forward as candidates. As da Fonseca (2011: 113) pointed out, “[…] if there is a strategic intention to mobilize a new target group by means of candidate nomination, supply-side factors will hardly be an impediment.” Against this backdrop, the real question is: If political parties intend to increase the number of IO candidates in their rows to canvass electoral support from voters of such background, how can they ensure that more candidates of this category forge ahead? The simple answer is: by treating aspirants of immigrant background preferentially in the candidate selection. We can speak about opening if IO candidates have to meet lower requirements than their native peers to get nominated, and if they receive more party support. By relaxing their selection criteria for aspiring IO candidates and providing them with extraordinary support, political parties can lower hurdles for candidate selection and make it more permeable for representatives of marginalized groups. In opening, the standard selection criteria still define the general meritocratic rules of the game but they are partly suspended, in order to let more applicants of immigrant background come through the candidate selection successfully. Besides the standard selection criteria, opening shows up alternative pathways to parliament, helpful to give a boost to candidates from underrepresented groups. However, one has to bear in mind that opening effort to foster immigrant access to candidacies comes at a considerable cost. As discussed earlier, to avoid unfortunate decisions, political parties thoroughly check applicants’ political qualifications for holding higher-level mandates in the run-up to the candidate selection. It is for exactly this reason that lateral entrants who skipped parts of the standard recruitment process only form a minority in the ranks of legislators (Bailer et al. 2013; Herzog 1975; Lorenz and Micus 2009). In the trade-off between opening strategies to tackle the persisting underrepresentation of IO citizens in parliament and a closure to ensure that only the most qualified, experienced, and reliable contenders come forward in the candidate selection, political parties give priority to the former. But from the party perspective, opening strategies are enormous concessions, as the party gatekeepers run the risk of selecting ill-suited candidates. Why, then, should political parties be inclined to pursue opening strategies? As argued earlier, vote-seeking is one of the main motives for who the party gatekeepers finally pick (Best et al. 2011: 171). To further boost electoral support for their party, party gatekeepers keep an eye out for relevant voter groups when deciding who will become the party’s public face for the voters. With a share of 9% in 2013, IO voters are becoming an increasingly relevant voter group in the German electorate (Bundeswahlleiter 2013). This means political parties increasingly need to woo voters from immigrant backgrounds (da Fonseca 2011). Such efforts can take two forms: either through policy programs nursing the political needs and preferences of IO voters or by picking IO candidates as the party’s public face in elections. One way to establish closer representational ties with IO citizens without revising the party program is to place more IO candidates

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on the ballot paper. The reasoning behind this is that at the ballot box, voters are called upon to choose between candidates they have little knowledge about. In such low-information settings, the cue theory (Lupia 1994a, b) claims that voters draw on information shortcuts such as party labels or candidates’ descriptive characteristics (Cutler 2002; Lau and Redlawsk 2001; Lupia 1994a, b; McDermott 1997, 1998; Mueller 1970; Popkin 1994; Stambough and O’Regan 2003).1 Consequently, the candidates’ descriptive characteristics are important selling points, which political parties can use to address specific voter groups. Running IO candidates for election is therefore a way to appeal to voter groups of immigrant background (da Fonseca 2011; Zingher and Farrer 2016). If political parties face a dearth of potential candidates with immigrant origins but are anxious to attract more immigrant voters, they can employ opening measures in their candidate selection to promote suitable candidates. By doing so, political parties can help immigrants come forward as candidates in greater numbers. This behavior is geared toward increasing immigrant representation in the ranks of legislators. Opening measures touch upon scholarly debate on affirmative action (Baldez 2006; Dahlerup 2006b; Krook 2009, 2014; Krook and O’Brien 2010; Krook and Zetterberg 2014; Norris 1997, 2001). Affirmative action refers to measures taken to promote marginalized groups in their political representation (Bacchi 2006: 32– 33). Norris (2001) and Lovenduski (2005) distinguish three forms of affirmative action. First, party actors can develop rhetorical strategies for committing to the equal representation of hitherto underrepresented groups. Rhetorical commitments can be purely symbolic, or they might herald further steps in eliminating the political underrepresentation of specific groups. Second, political parties can implement affirmative action programs, to which opening strategies in the candidate selection belong. Affirmative action programs, ranging from training courses to mentoring, financial aid, and other forms of selective support, seek to remove systematic barriers in the legislative recruitment process. Third, political parties can guarantee equal representation by defining mandatory quotas (Dahlerup 2006a: 9). Quotas not only promote equal representation but guarantee it (Dahlerup 2006a: 19). Krook and Norris (2014) rightly point out that in political settings where no quotas are in use, scholars have to find alternative action of the second type, as otherwise they risk overlooking political attempts at achieving representational parity besides quotas. Currently, all the German party organizations renounce candidate quotas for immigrants (on ethnic quotas, see Bird 2014; Htun 2004; Krook and O’Brien 2010). Only the SPD stipulated a 15% quota for immigrants in its national executive board (Medick 2011). Against this backdrop, it becomes imperative to pay attention to alternative measures of affirmative action, including opening efforts in party candidate selection. But how can opening tendencies be recognized in the empirical data, and how do opening efforts manifest themselves? I will again go without a detailed description of each indicator, but rather focus on individual examples for speaking about 1 There

is ample evidence that gender (Huddy and Terkildsen 1993a, b; McDermott 1997), race (McDermott 1998; Sigelman et al. 1995), occupation (McDermott 2005), and attractiveness (Banducci et al. 2008) serve as information shortcuts for voting decisions.

56 Table 4.3 Indicators of opening

4 Party Selection Behavior Toward Immigrant Origin Candidates … Requirements for nomination 1. Shorter length of party membership 2. Less office experience 3. Less localness in SMDs Supportive measures 1. Higher probability of encouragement 2. Lower competition in the candidate selection 3. More party support in the candidate selection 4. Higher electoral viability Source Author’s own illustration

opening efforts in candidate selection (see Table 4.3 for details). As the above account demonstrates, legislators at state and national levels were party members for a while before being considered qualified enough to participate in the race for a professional mandate (Best et al. 2011; Edinger 2009: 194; Herzog 1975). However, for underrepresented groups such as immigrants that still lack longtime party involvement (Bertelsmann Stiftung 2009; da Fonseca 2011; Diehl 2002; Hunger and Candan 2009; Müssig and Worbs 2012; Santel 2002; Wüst 2011), this forms a significant hurdle. By giving aspirants from immigrant backgrounds the opportunity to take a faster track into professional politics, political parties can downsize the selectivity of their candidate selection and facilitate immigrant access to candidatures. I therefore speak of opening efforts if political parties choose to reduce long probation periods and give IO candidates the opportunity for a mandate earlier than native candidates. As candidate selection in SMDs rests exclusively on local party organizations, local credit represents a general prerequisite for achieving a district nomination (Reiser 2011; Schüttemeyer 2002; Schüttemeyer and Sturm 2005). But if most electoral districts are already promised to local top dogs (like well-known incumbents or notables), underrepresented groups stand less of a chance of securing a district nomination (Reiser 2014; Zeuner 1970). They must wait patiently, until the incumbents evince no further interest in rerunning for election. One forceful strategy for elevating the number of immigrants in the rows of district candidates therefore can be to relax the golden rule of localness. External candidates who strive for a mandate in SMDs where they have neither political nor biographical ties are called parachutists (Pedersen et al. 2007). By parachuting IO candidates into SMDs, political parties can raise the number of such candidates without facing strong constraints concerning localness. If I observe that more parachutists are among IO candidates than is the case among their native peers, opening efforts become evident. Party support is another factor that strongly shapes an applicant’s chances of nomination. While the backing of local party organizations is a key in SMDs, state party leaderships can tip the scales on state party lists (Schüttemeyer 2002; Schüttemeyer and Sturm 2005; Steg 2016; Zeuner 1970). If political parties want to increase their numbers of IO candidates, they can provide aspiring IO candidates with

4.4 Opening— “We Want You at Any Price!”

57

extraordinary support in candidate selection, improving their nomination chances. For opening, I should therefore see that IO candidates experience greater levels of party support in candidate selection than other candidates. We have to keep in mind that even though IO candidates might compete at the ballot box, this does not guarantee them a seat in parliament. Rather, a candidate’s likelihood of securing a seat in parliament depends on the party-determined viability of their nomination. To effectively enlarge the number of legislators with immigrant origins, political parties must nominate more IO candidates with realistic chances of winning—either in SMDs with a realistic chance of coming off as winners or in hopeful list positions. If IO candidates run for election with higher electoral prospects than the vast number of native candidates, political parties indeed engage in opening efforts.

4.5 Closure— “You Must Work Twice as Hard!” I will now attend to the last selection strategy that I might encounter in the empirical material. Researchers on women representation insinuate a closure tendency toward female aspirants in party candidate selection, explaining why women remain in the minority in most parliaments (Anzia and Berry 2011; Black and Erickson 2000, 2003; Carroll and Sanbonmatsu 2013; Fulton 2012; Lawless and Pearson 2008; Milyo and Schosberg 2000). This research strand claims that female candidates must earn higher levels of political qualification than their male counterparts in order to stand for election. While Black and Erickson (2000, 2003) refer to this pattern as compensation, Carroll and Sanbonmatsu (2013: 36) speak of a “double standard,” and Milyo and Schosberg (2000: 43) call it a “cream-of-the-crop-effect.” Researchers surmise that the core reason for compensation effects in candidate selection lies in the fact that voters are biased toward female nominees, and view them as less capable of holding positions of political power. To convince voters and eventually win a seat in parliament, female candidates must therefore outperform their male competitors in terms of political experience, skill, and qualification. With this reasoning, female candidates can only earn enough votes if their considerable political qualifications do not allow any other electoral choice. But it is not only voters who are prejudiced against female candidates. Party selectorates likewise shy away from nominating women, as they call into doubt whether female candidates can indeed reach the majority of voters on election day. To compensate for a real or imputed voter bias, female applicants must surpass male contenders to win over the party gatekeepers and come out on top. This implies that only women of the utmost political quality come forward as candidates. Informed by these arguments from research on women representation, I hypothesize that political parties likewise deem the selection of IO candidates a dangerous decision for two main reasons. First, existing research suggests that at least some voter segments harbor prejudices against IO candidates and therefore hesitate to support IO candidates at the ballot box (Bieber 2013; Brouard and Tiberj 2011; Fisher et al.

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2015; Stegmaier et al. 2013; Street 2014). This behavior either results from negative attitudes toward multiculturalism and immigration (Terkildsen 1993) or follows from political views voters impute to IO candidates, such as a leftist political profile (McDermott 1998). Voters support candidates for elected office, depending on the extent to which they approve or oppose the ideological positions they ascribe to the respective candidates. If they stereotype IO candidates as more leftist but disagree with leftist political positions, voters should be less inclined to support IO candidates in the election. Voters might further fear that IO candidates only engage in identity politics by catering purely to the needs and interests of IO citizens and by being more concerned with minority rights, while leaving aside the interests of the remaining electorate. Additionally, in light of a lingering underrepresentation of immigrants in parliament, the impression that IO citizens are incapable of holding positions of political power might solidify in the electorate (Mansbridge 1999: 649). This can make voters reluctant to support IO candidates in the election. Others might simply not be able to imagine being represented by a legislator of immigrant background, as this continues to be a rather marginal phenomenon. The unfortunate thing is that even if none of the outlined voter biases works against IO candidates, party selectorates might still impute a voter bias, which makes them hesitant about nominating IO candidates (Norris and Lovenduski 1995: 107). Given that political parties are unsure about general voter reactions to IO candidates, they are indeed better off acting defensively toward aspiring IO candidates. A second reason political parties might deem the selection of IO candidates risky is that they cannot foresee how their established representational groups will react if they strengthen ties with IO voters. If political parties make attempts to establish closer ties with new representational groups, their established representational groups unavoidably become stressed. The reason for this is that, in candidate selection, a contest between different representational groups takes place, which is “nothing less than control of the core of what the party stands for and does” (Ranney 1981: 103). The group representatives political parties select reflect, in far-reaching ways, the priority social groups have within party organizations (Katz 2001). From the view of established representational groups, newly emerging groups are therefore additional competitors in the contest for attention, putting their representational claims in danger (Carnes 2015). Faced with the above problems, political parties might opt for risk-averse behavior by acting defensively toward aspiring IO candidates in candidate selection. But how does risk-averse behavior manifest itself? Even if aspirants of immigrant background hold the same political qualifications as their native counterparts, party selectorates might have reservations when it comes to their nomination. Due to potential objections raised by established representational groups and a real or imputed voter bias, political parties might favor native candidates over IO candidates, despite their otherwise equal merits. To come off as a winner in candidate selection, contenders from immigrant backgrounds therefore need to outperform native aspirants in both political experience and qualification. In other words, defensiveness toward aspiring IO candidates is manifested in the stricter screening of their political qualifications (Soininen 2011: 153).

4.5 Closure— “You Must Work Twice as Hard!”

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In a way, a double standard exists, which is why IO candidates must work twice as hard to run for election. By stricter screening, the perceived electoral risk of nominating IO candidates is mitigated. Only if aspiring IO candidates have extra political qualifications that their contestants lack can party gatekeepers be convinced to support their nomination. Moreover, defensiveness can appease other representational groups, as it demonstrates to them that they maintain priority in candidate selection. Like opening, closure places emphasis on alternative selection strategies toward IO candidates. The standard selection criteria define the general meritocratic rules of the game, but these rules are tightened for aspiring IO candidates. They must surpass these standards and outshine their native counterparts by holding more of the political qualifications required to run for election, and receiving less party support in candidate selection. The IO candidates that survive the process of elimination constitute a highly selective sample of the most highly qualified contenders who came out on top in candidate selection. As the hurdles are selectively higher for IO candidates, it is indeed party candidate selection that actively contributes to poor minority representation in parliament. After setting forth the core idea of closure, the question that remains is: How can we locate hints of closure in party candidate selection? As in previous sections, I will here refrain from going into detail about each indicator, but give individual examples of a closure tendency (see Table 4.4 for details). As depicted above, the prerequisite of having worked one’s way through lower-level positions before getting the chance to compete for a professional mandate at the state or national level helps the party gatekeepers identify diligent and experienced partisans (Borchert 1999; Borchert and Golsch 1995; Burmeister 1993: 68, 79; Edinger 2009; Golsch 1998; Herzog 1975; Saalfeld 1997). If political parties really tighten the selection criteria for aspiring IO candidates, with IO candidates undergoing stricter screening tests than native candidates, I expect IO candidates to show more office experience at their first candidacy. Only those with extraordinary office experience are deemed sufficiently qualified to forge ahead as nominees. Accordingly, I obtain evidence of closure if IO candidates must possess more office experience than their native peers to stand for election. Table 4.4 Indicators of closure

Requirements for nomination Longer length of party membership Higher office experience Stronger localness in SMDs Supportive measures Lower probability of encouragement Higher competition in the candidate selection Less party support in the candidate selection Lower electoral viability Source Author’s own illustration

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Besides longstanding party membership, strong local ties and a local support base represent the most crucial resources in local candidate selection. As district party organizations hold the monopoly on local candidate selection, local ties are great advantages in the nomination procedure (Burmeister 1993: 64; Reiser 2011; Schüttemeyer 2002; Schüttemeyer and Sturm 2005; Zeuner 1970). External candidates will have a hard time convincing local party selectorates of their political qualities, as they are entirely unknown to the local party selectorate, the local party leadership, the rank-and-file party members, and the local electorate. As opposed to local heroes, external candidates cannot draw upon personal links to the local constituency and a local reputation (Arzheimer and Evans 2014; Tavits 2010; Vivyan and Wagner 2015). If political parties really assume that their electoral victory is put in jeopardy with IO candidates on their ballot paper, only contenders with firm local roots that can lure local voters without fail are deemed suitable for nomination. I therefore speak of closure tendencies if IO candidates must surpass their native counterparts in terms of local ties. Added to this, political parties have no occasion for reaching out and prospecting for external IO candidates if taking a strong defensive position. However, not only remarkable political qualifications, also party support are key aspects of legislative recruitment that shape the prospects of those being nominated. In this respect, encouragement is a highly effective measure to awaken ambitions for office (Allen 2013; Broockman 2014; Carroll and Sanbonmatsu 2013; Fox and Lawless 2004, 2010; Lawless and Fox 2005). Theoretically, party actors could prompt more party members from immigrant backgrounds to bid for a mandate. But for us to really observe closure tendencies, aspiring IO candidates should be less likely than native candidates to receive suggestions to run for office. By not asking party members from immigrant backgrounds to make a bid for office, the likelihood that party members from this background would eventually aspire to a nomination is diminished. Moreover, encouragement mostly proceeds within existing party networks, which creates barriers to party newcomers like IO citizens who are not yet part of these networks (Bjarnegård 2015; Niven 2006; Soininen 2011). Accordingly, for closure, I should find that IO candidates are more likely to be self-recruiters than native candidates. Another recruitment aspect that bears heavily on individual chances of standing up to other aspirants in candidate selection is the amount of intra-party competition. Fierce competition reduces each applicant’s chances of being successful (Reiser 2013; Zeuner 1970). As the literature on women recruitment demonstrates, female candidates are faced with more opponents in the candidate selection than their male colleagues, a result of higher counter-mobilization (Lawless and Pearson 2008; Sanbonmatsu 2006). If political parties really fear electoral losses through IO candidates, they can try to thwart their nomination by mobilizing more challengers for races in which applicants from immigrant backgrounds aspire to run for office. If I see that IO candidates face higher levels of intra-party competition than is the case among their native peers, closure becomes apparent. Party selectorates predetermine a candidate’s electoral fate to a significant extent. A nomination alone is worth nothing, as a seat in parliament is only within a candidate’s grasp if the candidacy has good prospects of winning. If political parties do not

4.5 Closure— “You Must Work Twice as Hard!”

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grant IO candidates the same electoral chances as native candidates, using them to fill up less desirable seats, immigrant representation will remain at a low level. In this way, political parties could circumvent the electoral risk associated with the nomination of IO candidates, because they only compete in electoral races which are in vain anyway. If IO candidates stand for election as sacrificial lambs in hopeless races more often than native candidates, this confirms closure. In sum, these indicators will help notice patterns in the empirical material and arrive at a better understanding of how political parties treat IO candidates in their candidate selection and how their selection behavior, in turn, molds immigrant representation in parliament.

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Chapter 5

Variances in Party Selection Behavior Toward Immigrant Origin Candidates

Beyond the general selection behavior that political parties show toward IO candidates, we need to better understand the contextual settings that impact which selection strategy is being used. Obviously, selection processes do not operate in a vacuum, but are embedded in contextual settings that shape the respective selection outcome to some degree. Therefore, in order to arrive at a better picture of party selection behavior toward IO candidates, I will introduce contextual factors that are believed to impact selection. As minority research has taught us, I expect variances across political parties (5.1), the mode of candidacy (5.2), the ethnic concentration in SMDs (5.3), and the social deprivation in SMDs (5.4).

5.1 Differences across Political Parties The first factor that is presumed to impact party selection behavior toward IO candidates is the party organizations themselves. An impressive body of evidence has demonstrated that left-wing parties tend to be more hospitable to IO candidates than those on the center-right of the political spectrum (Claro da Fonseca 2011; Kittilson and Tate 2005; Wüst 2011). What does this mean in the German context? We can assume that center-left parties, such as the SPD, BÜNDNIS 90/DIE GRÜNEN and DIE LINKE, are more likely to open up their candidate selection for IO candidates, while political parties on the center-right, such as the CDU/CSU and FDP, adopt neutral or even defensive selection strategies. But why do I expect to come across these party patterns? First, center-left parties espouse values like social equality, fairness, justice, and equal access to both institutions and resources for marginalized groups, such as IO citizens, women, and sexual minorities (Caul 1999; Immerzeel et al. 2016; Kittilson and Tate 2004; Matland and Studlar 1996; Reynolds 1999).

© The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2021 S. Ceyhan, How German Parties Select Candidates of Immigrant Origin, Springer Series in Electoral Politics, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-59451-0_5

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This set of values makes an opening for IO candidates more likely, as this selection behavior perfectly corresponds to leftist party positions. If center-left parties, which advocate values like social equality and fairness, obstruct access to parliament for marginalized groups, this seriously undermines their credibility. Conversely, political parties on the center-right generally take more critical attitudes toward immigration and multiculturalism, which they conceive as a threat to the national cultural identity, its traditions and values. Further, they tend to perceive immigration as a menace to the nation’s economic well-being—particularly if low-status immigration is concerned. This assumption about party patterns is in line with previous research that has concentrated on both substantive and descriptive representation effects. It showed that center-left parties attend more strongly to the concerns and interests of IO citizens (Aydemir and Vliegenthart 2016; Ohlert 2015; Saalfeld 2011; Saalfeld and Bischof 2013; Wüst 2014b) and have a larger number of parliamentarians with immigrant origins on board (Claro da Fonseca 2011; Wüst 2011, 2014a). The second reason relates to the electoral calculus of political parties. With the exception of ethnic German repatriates, IO voters tend to generally support center-left parties (Bird et al. 2011; Kroh and Tucci 2009; Wüst 2002, 2007). On the one hand, this pattern results from the liberal stance that center-left parties take on immigration and multiculturalism (Ohlert 2015; Tietze 2008). On the other hand, many IO citizens in Germany originate in the labor migrant context, are of lower socioeconomic status and therefore feel affiliated to center-left parties, which put more focus on social equality. But how does this impact the electoral calculus of political parties? Centerleft parties suffer greater electoral losses if they fail to mobilize IO citizens than political parties on the center-right of the political spectrum. If center-left parties alienate IO voters, they lose a substantial voter potential that they usually can rely on. Such parties are therefore more inclined to open up their candidate selection to IO candidates. If they fail to accommodate any IO candidate in their candidate portfolio, this seriously damages their image of being open to immigrants and espousing egalitarian ideologies. Center-right voters hold more critical positions on immigration and multiculturalism. They might even penalize a stronger inclusion of IO candidates on the ballot paper—either by voting for another political party or by abstaining from voting (Claro da Fonseca 2011: 112; Rensmann 2014). Fielding IO candidates might therefore lead to the alienation of their core constituencies. Experimental studies indeed found moderate negative effects of foreign names on the likelihood of being elected (Bieber 2013; Street 2014). These effects were more pronounced among voters with right-wing positions (Street 2014). As political parties on the centerright apparently face a greater electoral risk in nominating IO candidates, they are less likely to open their candidate selection but rather embark on defensive selection strategies.

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5.2 Differences across the Mode of Candidacy It is not only party organizations that matter in terms of minority representation. Other work shows that the electoral system, as a core institution of democracies, plays a crucial role in the composition of legislative bodies. Existing research demonstrates that the level of descriptive representation varies according to the type of electoral system. This raises the following questions: How does the German electoral system look, and how does its configuration impact minority representation? In German Bundestag elections and most state-level elections, a mixed-member proportional (MMP) system is in use. The MMP system combines a PR electoral tier with closed party lists in MMDs with a nominal electoral tier with plurality rule in SMDs (Shugart and Wattenberg 2003a). Consequently, parliamentary candidates can run for election in SMDs, on party lists, or simultaneously on both electoral tiers (Kaiser 2002; Manow 2016; Massicotte 2011; Massicotte and Blais 1999; Saalfeld 2005; Shugart and Wattenberg 2003b). Half of the 598 regular MPs in the German Bundestag election are elected in SMDs by personal vote. In the 299 SMDs, each voter can cast one nominal vote for his or her constituency representative. The winner is determined by a first-past-the-post rule, which means that the candidate with most nominal votes is the winner. The party’s overall seat share, however, depends on the party vote share in the 16 MMDs, formed by the German states. Voters therefore cast a second ballot for the closed state party lists, which determines the party’s overall seat share by the rule of proportionality.1 Once the total number of seats is allocated to each political party in each state, the SMD seats are subtracted. The remaining seats are filled by the list candidates in the order of their party-determined ballot positions. It is important to highlight that in the Bavarian state election, which is one of the cases that will take center stage in the following, a mixed-member majoritarian (MMM) system with open party lists is in place (Shugart and Wattenberg 2003b). In this electoral system, the vote share of both electoral tiers is added up to calculate a party’s total seat share (Leunig 2012; Massicotte 2003; Trefs 2008). This German mixed electoral system provides us with the perfect opportunity to explore electoral system effects without having to account for variations at the country level. Thus far, I have focused on the electoral system itself. Now, I will move forward to the question of which incentives these electoral rules create for political parties regarding candidate choice. Electoral system effects have received remarkably broad attention in the scientific community. As is widely acknowledged, the electoral system is key to the descriptive representation of ethnic minorities and women (Bernauer et al. 2015; Canon 1999; Darcy et al. 1994; Duverger 1955; Engstrom 1987; Fortin-Rittberger and Eder 2013; Fortin-Rittberger and Rittberger 2014; Hennl and Kaiser 2008; Kostadinova 2007; Lijphart 1994, 2004; Matland 1993, 1998b, 2006; 1 Two factors limit the proportionality of the vote and seat shares: First, only political parties which

win at least 5% of list votes nationwide or three SMDs are considered in seat distribution. Second, if a party wins more SMDs in one state than seats, overhang mandates emerge. To compensate for a distortion, adjustment mandates were introduced in 2013 (for details see Behnke 2012, 2014).

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Matland and Studlar 1996; Matland and Taylor 1997; Moser 2001, 2008; Norris 1997a, 2004, 2006; Ruedin 2009, 2013; Rule 1981, 1987, 1992, 1994a, b; Rule and Norris 1992; Rule and Zimmerman 1992, 1994; Salmond 2006; Togeby 2008). Overall, SMD systems appear to engender lower levels of minority representation than proportional systems. The main reason for this is that political parties generally avoid fielding candidates from marginalized groups in SMDs, but lean toward candidates who resemble the average legislator type (Taagepera 1994). As political parties can select only one candidate in each electoral district, they have only one shot at maximizing votes. This turns candidate selection in SMDs into a zero-sum game, which creates the electoral incentive to select candidates with the broadest voter appeal. In other words, SMDs “[…] create[s] an incentive for party bosses to stand lowest common-denominator candidates in geographical districts; these rarely turn out to be women or minorities” (Reynolds 1999: 555). But it is not only at the selection stage but also during the election that strong incentives for the nomination of average candidate types prevail in SMDs. Here, a backlash from voters with reservations about IO candidates is a likely scenario. The reason for this is that, due to their candidate-centered nature, SMDs feature a high visibility of the candidates competing for a mandate. Voters with critical or uncertain stances toward IO candidates cannot switch to alternative candidates of the same party, as only one candidate from each political party is up for election. Therefore, they can only decide to abstain from voting or support a competing political party. To play it safe and avoid causing a stir, political parties give preference to less disputed candidate types. Both at the selection and election stage, the electoral logic of SMDs therefore urges political parties not to pick IO candidates. On party lists, by contrast, political parties have the possibility of fielding more than one candidate, which offers ticket-balancing opportunities (Matland 1998a; Norris 2004; Rule 1987). By picking candidates that represent distinct voter groups, political parties attempt to cater to a wide range of voter segments to maximize electoral support (Hennings and Urbatsch 2015; Hennl and Kaiser 2008; Valdini 2012). IO candidates on party lists notwithstanding, voters with critical stances on IO candidates probably nevertheless vote for their preferred political party, as list candidates compete as teams under the party label, and are therefore less visible to voters than SMD candidates. Against this backdrop, IO candidates are seen as a benefit to the diversification of party lists, without deterring immigration-critical voters. I expect that the depicted electoral incentives flow into party selection behavior toward IO candidates, as party gatekeepers try to anticipate prospective voter effects in candidate selection. In the light of the above arguments, political parties should be more inclined to open their candidate selection to IO candidates if they allocate list slots. In this way, they can ensure that IO candidates run on their ticket to appeal to IO voters without alienating other voter groups. SMD nominations, in turn, should induce more defensive selection strategies in terms of neutrality or even closure, as political parties prefer more average candidate types here.

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5.3 Differences across the Level of Ethnic Concentration in Single-Member Districts As the above section illustrated, one of the most persistent findings by scholars of minority representation is that SMD races tend to work to the detriment of underrepresented groups (Norris 2004; Rule 1986; Rule and Zimmerman 1992, 1994). As contenders in SMDs must mobilize the broadest possible crowd of voters, party selectorates avoid choosing IO candidates, instead preferring nominees that resemble the average native voter. However, scholars are becoming increasingly aware that this assumption is too simplistic, in the sense that the electoral formula does not steer minority representation independently of its demographic context, as district demographics shape local voter demands widely. It is therefore no surprise that party selectorates try to anticipate the electoral consequences of nominating IO candidates in the respective demographic setting (Dancygier 2014; Grofman and Handley 1989; Norris 1997b; Valdini 2012). In some environments, the selection of IO candidates might be a wise electoral decision, while in others, it turns out to be a disadvantage. But how does the demographic setting affect the selection of IO candidates? Even though it is a matter of SMDs, the dense local concentration of IO citizens can act as a strong electoral incentive to nominating IO candidates for election (Anwar 1994; Bird 2005; Dancygier 2014; Marschall et al. 2010; Trounstine and Valdini 2008; Wüst 2016). Against the conventional wisdom that SMDs are inevitably obstacles to the selection of IO candidates, political parties are therefore expected to open their candidate selection to IO candidates if electoral districts harbor a large immigrant population. However, I have to briefly emphasize that this argument does not hold for MMDs, which consist of larger regional entities. Their size abrogates the electoral leverage of geographically concentrated groups (Dancygier 2014; Engstrom and McDonald 1981; Marschall et al. 2010; Trounstine and Valdini 2008). If we follow conventional wisdom, political parties should avoid fielding IO candidates in SMDs, as they are ascribed only limited voter appeal. Instead, party selectorates tend to pick candidates that belong to the majority population and receive broad approval from different voter segments here (Rule 1987; Rule and Zimmerman 1992, 1994). Yet in places where IO voters are densely concentrated, concern about the electoral appeal of IO candidates is widely dispelled (Dancygier 2013, 2014; Marschall et al. 2010; Trounstine and Valdini 2008). Faced with a high spatial agglomeration of IO citizens, political parties would risk substantial electoral losses if they ignore contenders from immigrant backgrounds in candidate selection and leave this voter potential to other competing political parties. Accordingly, party gatekeepers have a strong incentive for fielding IO candidates in SMDs where IO citizens account for a significant percentage of the local population. This assumption gains further support from the so-called contact hypothesis, which suggests that individuals living in areas with a high local concentration of immigrants tend to be more tolerant, due to increased inter-ethnic contacts and less inter-group prejudices (Allport 1954; Forbes 1997; Hopkins 2010; Jackman and

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Crane 1986; Kaufmann 2014; Kaufmann and Harris 2015; Newman 2013; Oliver and Mendelberg 2000; Oliver and Wong 2003; Pettigrew and Tropp 2006; Sigelman et al. 1996; Welch and Sigelman 2000).2 Individuals who adopt hostile stances to immigrants either leave areas in which IO citizens form a majority or refuse to move into such areas. Besides electoral incentives, reservations about IO candidates are therefore less grave in SMDs which house a large number of immigrants—this makes the nomination of IO candidates less risky. Furthermore, IO citizens find it easier to make their claims for equal representation heard if they live spatially concentrated. In cases where they form only a small minority, their representational claims will be drowned out by stronger local groups. The reason for this is that the groups that are most engaged with voicing their representational claims usually turn out to be the most successful in having their group representatives nominated. IO citizens therefore have greater leverage in candidate selection if they are spatially concentrated. They can join forces in political parties and other social organizations to generate the electoral pressure necessary for demanding parity. There is some empirical evidence for the above reasoning. For the English municipality council elections from 2002 to 2010, Dancygier (2014) demonstrated that demographics indeed play a role in candidate selection. Muslim candidates were more likely to run for election if Muslims were densely concentrated in the ward. Trounstine and Valdini (2008) found the same relationship in US city council elections (see also Marschall et al. 2010). SMDs helped increase the share of Blacks and Latinos in city councils, but only if they were spatially concentrated in the local constituency. If the local concentration of IO citizens really matters for political party electoral calculus, I expect them to be more inclined to open candidate selection to IO candidates when the size of the IO population in SMDs increases. Conversely, party selectorates should act more defensively in candidate selection if the local percentage of IO citizens is at a low level, as they look for candidates with a broader electoral profile.

5.4 Differences across the Level of Social Deprivation in Single-Member Districts When faced with the choice of nominating IO candidates in SMDs or not, political parties try to anticipate the most likely voter reactions before taking decisions. The literature predicts that IO candidates have better chances of being selected if immigrants are highly concentrated and compose a substantial portion of the population. Besides the local concentration of immigrants, I assume that social deprivation plays a role in the selection of IO candidates, as in socially deprived SMDs, more voters tend to feel animosities against immigrants (Dancygier 2013; Dancygier and Donnelly 2014). The nomination of IO candidates in socially deprived SMDs can 2 In fact, empirical findings are mixed. Apart from positive effects, negative (Semyonov et al. 2004;

Sides and Citrin 2007) or no effects (Quillian 1995; Sides and Citrin 2007) were found.

5.4 Differences across the Level of Social Deprivation in Single-Member Districts

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therefore backfire and turn into an electoral drawback. In the face of a potential backlash in underprivileged SMDs, I expect that political parties close their candidate selection to IO candidates in areas with high social deprivation, whereas in well-off SMDs, such defensive selection behavior toward IO candidates is unlikely. By closing candidate selection, political parties try to ward any electoral risk off that comes with the nomination of IO candidates. But how does social deprivation manifest itself, and in which ways does it relate to critical attitudes toward immigrants? Scholars have intensely debated the various sources of anti-immigrant sentiment, most notably the role of perceived economic and cultural threats. Many scholars explain opposition to immigrants by the fact that they represent competitors in the struggle for scarce material resources, threatening socioeconomic status (Borjas 1999; Brader et al. 2008; Branton and Jones 2005; Dancygier 2013; Dancygier and Donnelly 2013, 2014; Dancygier and Laitin 2014; Hainmueller and Hiscox 2010; Helbling and Kriesi 2014; Malhotra et al. 2013; Mayda 2006; O’Neil and Tienda 2010; O’Rourke and Sinnott 2006; Quillian 1995; Scheve and Slaughter 2001; Semyonov et al. 2006; Sides and Citrin 2007; Sniderman et al. 2004). For obvious reasons, different social groups gain and lose from the inflow of immigrants, which makes them feel threatened to varying degrees. The burden of immigration in the distribution of social services and resources from the welfare state and in the competition for jobs and wages on the labor market usually falls more heavily on individuals that are highly dependent on these—that is to say, on economically deprived individuals, such as unemployed or low-wage earners (Schmidt-Catran and Spies 2016). As competition for welfare resources and jobs increases, the perceived threat of immigration intensifies—this is particularly pronounced among individuals suffering from economic hardship. Accordingly, the view on immigrants taking away jobs from the native population and exploiting social services provided by the state is most prevalent in economically disadvantaged areas (Hainmueller and Hiscox 2007). In line with my previous argumentation, IO candidates serve as information shortcuts for strengthening party ties with IO voters and signal openness to immigrants (Zingher and Farrer 2016). But in economically deprived SMDs, more voters tend to be opposed to immigration and multiculturalism, as they fear significant shifts of social resources and welfare services to the IO population, and worry that they will get a raw deal (Dancygier 2013). As voters fear that IO legislators will only advocate group-specific interests in the distribution of social resources, social services and jobs and will turn their back on the needs of the majority population, they might shy away from supporting IO candidates. In places of economic deprivation, the nomination of IO candidates may therefore result in electoral losses. This not only concerns political parties on the center-right of the political spectrum, whose voters are more critical of immigrants anyway, but center-left political parties too (Alonso and Claro da Fonseca 2011; Bale et al. 2010; Dancygier 2013; Schmidtke 2016). In deprived SMDs especially, left-wing parties that represent low-wage earners find themselves in a dilemma: either they nominate IO candidates to demonstrate openness to ethnic diversity, or they avoid selecting IO candidates to retain the electoral support of low-wage earners (Dancygier 2013).

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However, immigration not only reinforces the sense of economic threat under social deprivation, but also of cultural threat. Underprivileged districts are usually characterized by lower educational attainment. Some studies have stated that individuals with a low level of education tend to be more prejudiced against immigrants than those with a higher level of education. The reason is that uneducated are more likely to see immigrants as threats to their own national identity, with its inherent values, traditions, and social cohesion (Bobo and Licari 1989; Coenders and Scheepers 2003; Fuchs et al. 1993; Hagendoorn and Nekuee 1999; Hainmueller and Hiscox 2007; Hainmueller and Hopkins 2014; Sniderman et al. 2004). In this vein, Hainmueller and Hiscox (2007: 436) note that educational levels are grounds for greater tolerance toward immigrants: “More educated respondents are significantly less racist and place greater value on ethnic diversity; they are also more likely to believe that immigration generates benefits for the host economy as a whole.” The reason for the relationship between education and tolerance is that prejudices and anti-immigrant sentiment, in which immigrants are blamed for social and political conflicts, often result from simplifications and generalizations which are more pronounced among individuals who lack education (Coenders and Scheepers 2003). With increasing levels of education, the understanding of the complexities of social reality is enhanced, which thwarts oversimplifications and generalizations, such as strict anti-immigrant sentiment. Based on the above reasoning, party selectorates should act more defensively toward aspiring IO candidates in wards with a considerable degree of social deprivation, while they have no reason to do so in high-status settings.

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Rule W, Zimmerman JF (eds) (1992) United States electoral systems: their impact on women and minorities. Greenwood Press, New York Rule W (1994a) Women’s underrepresentation and electoral systems. Polit Sci Polit 27(4):689–692 Rule W (1994b) Parliament of, by, and for the people: except for women? In: Rule W, Zimmerman JF (eds) Electoral systems in comparative perspective: their impact on women and minorities. Greenwood Press, Westport/Connecticut/London, pp 15–30 Rule W, Zimmerman JF (eds) (1994) Electoral systems in comparative perspective: their impact on women and minorities. Greenwood Press, Westport/Connecticut/London Rule W, Norris P (1992) Anglo and minority women’s underrepresentation in Congress: is the electoral system the culprit? In: Rule W, Zimmerman JF (eds) United States electoral systems: their impact on women and minorities. Greenwood Press, New York, pp 41–54 Saalfeld T (2005) Germany: stability and strategy in a mixed-member proportional system. In: Gallagher M, Mitchell P (eds) The politics of electoral systems. Oxford University Press, Oxford/New York, pp 209–229 Saalfeld T (2011) Parliamentary questions as instruments of substantive representation: visible minorities in the UK House of Commons, 2005–10. J Legislative Stud 17(3):271–289 Saalfeld T, Bischof D (2013) Minority-ethnic MPs and the substantive representation of minority interests in the House of Commons, 2005-2011. Parliamentary Aff 66(2):305–328 Salmond R (2006) Proportional representation and female parliamentarians. Legislative Stud Q 31(2):175–204 Scheve KF, Slaughter MJ (2001) Labor market competition and individual preferences over immigration policy. Rev Econ Stat 83(1):133–145 Schmidt-Catran AW, Spies DC (2016) Immigration and welfare support in Germany. Am Sociol Rev 81(2):242–261 Schmidtke O (2016) The ‘party for immigrants’? Social democrats’ struggle with an inconvenient electoral issue. Ger Polit 25(3):398–413 Semyonov M, Raijman R, Gorodzeisky A (2006) The rise of anti-foreigner sentiment in European societies, 1988–2000. Am Sociol Rev 71(3):426–449 Semyonov M, Raijman R, Yom Tov A, Schmidt P (2004) Population size, perceived threat, and exclusion: a multiple-indicators analysis of attitudes toward foreigners in Germany. Soc Sci Res 33(4):681–701 Shugart MS, Wattenberg MP (eds) (2003a) Mixed-member electoral systems: the best of both worlds? Oxford University Press, Oxford/New York Shugart MS, Wattenberg MP (2003b) Mixed-member electoral systems: a definition and typology. In: Shugart MS, Wattenberg MP (eds) Mixed-member electoral systems: the best of both worlds? Oxford University Press, Oxford/New York, pp 10–24 Sides J, Citrin J (2007) European opinion about immigration: the role of identities, interests and information. Br J Polit Sci 37(3):477–504 Sigelman L, Bledsoe T, Welch S, Combs M (1996) Making contact? Black-white social interaction in an urban setting. Am J Sociol 101(5):1306–1332 Sniderman P, Hagendoorn L, Prior M (2004) Predispositional factors and situational triggers: exclusionary reactions to immigrant minorities. Am Polit Sci Rev 98(1):35–50 Street A (2014) Representation despite discrimination: minority candidates in Germany. Polit Res Q 67(2):374–385 Taagepera R (1994) Beating the law of minority attrition. In: Rule W, Zimmerman JF (eds) Electoral systems in comparative perspective: their impact on women and minorities. Greenwood Press, Westport/Connecticut/London, pp 235–245 Tietze K (2008) Einwanderung und die deutschen Parteien. Akzeptanz und Abwehr von Migranten im Widerstreit in der Programmatik von SPD, FDP, den Grünen und CDU/CSU. LIT Verlag, Münster Togeby L (2008) The political representation of ethnic minorities: Denmark as a deviant case. Party Polit 14(3):325–343

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Trefs M (2008) Die Wahlsysteme der Länder. In: Hildebrandt A, Wolf F (eds) Die Politik der Bundesländer. Staatstätigkeit im Vergleich, VS Verlag, Wiesbaden, pp 331–344 Trounstine J, Valdini ME (2008) The context matters: the effects of single-member versus at-large districts on city council diversity. Am J Polit Sci 52(3):554–569 Valdini ME (2012) A deterrent to diversity: the conditional effect of electoral rules on the nomination of women candidates. Electoral Stud 31(4):740–749 Welch S, Sigelman L (2000) Getting to know you? Latino-Anglo social contact. Soc Sci Q 81(1):67– 83 Wüst AM (2002) Wie wählen Neubürger? Politische Einstellungen und Wahlverhalten eingebürgerter Personen in Deutschland. Leske + Budrich, Opladen Wüst AM (2007) Wahlverhalten und politische Repräsentation von Migranten. In: Frech S, MeierBraun KH (eds) Die offene Gesellschaft. Zuwanderung und Integration. Wochenschau Verlag, Schwalbach, pp 145–173 Wüst AM (2011) Migrants as parliamentary actors in Germany. In: Bird K, Saalfeld T, Wüst AM (eds) The political representation of immigrants and minorities: voters, parties and parliaments in liberal democracies. Routledge, New York, pp 250–265 Wüst AM (2014a) Immigration into politics. Immigrant-origin candidates and their success in the, 2013 Bundestag Election. Ger Polit Soc 32(112):1–15 Wüst AM (2014b) A lasting impact? On the legislative activities of immigrant-origin parliamentarians in Germany. J Legislative Stud 20(4):495–515 Wüst AM (2016) Incorporation beyond cleavages? Parties, candidates and Germany’s immigrantorigin electorate. Ger Polit 25(3):414–432 Zingher JN, Farrer B (2016) The electoral effects of the descriptive representation of ethnic minority groups in Australia and the UK. Party Polit 22(6):691–704

Chapter 6

Research Design

The previous chapters have illustrated the variety of behavioral patterns that political parties might show in the selection of IO candidates. The next question concerns how to access party selection behavior toward IO candidates from an empirical angle. The research that is required for looking into party selection behavior is data intensive and entails collecting information that is not easily accessible. I have therefore developed a research design which attempts to take a rare look at how party selectorates treat IO candidates in their selection procedures. In the following, I will first discuss the case selection, before outlining the empirical approach taken in the subsequent analysis and describing the types of data I will use. This will be concluded with a description of the operationalization of the central dependent and independent variables.

6.1 Why Germany? One difficulty that plagues researchers of minority representation is the small number of observations available (Bloemraad 2013). A small number of cases and a lack of data on the immigrant origins of parliamentary candidates and legislators are the main obstacles preventing researchers from studying minority representation more thoroughly. Owing to its federal structure, the German political system provides fertile ground for overcoming this problem. Germany’s federalism makes party organizations important actors both at state and national level and allows for the study of the presence of IO candidates at both levels simultaneously. By pooling candidate data from national and state levels, I can therefore achieve a sample size of IO candidates which allows me to explore how political parties treat IO candidates in their selection processes. The present study accordingly suggests a pragmatic but reasonable

© The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2021 S. Ceyhan, How German Parties Select Candidates of Immigrant Origin, Springer Series in Electoral Politics, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-59451-0_6

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approach to increasing the number of IO candidates and contributing to filling the research gap on party selection behavior toward IO candidates. However, combining candidate data from national and state levels is only legitimate if both candidate groups are sufficiently similar, meaning they do not differ systematically in their biographical and political backgrounds. We have to be sure that the requirements for becoming a parliamentary candidate correspond at both levels. In the following, I will therefore present arguments for assuming that pooling candidate data from national and state levels is indeed legitimate—the arguments derive from the research strand on political careers. Although legislators can of course freely switch from the state to the national level and vice versa, their career trajectories do not move in random directions. In the wake of Schlesinger’s (1966) work on US Congressmen, most scholars conceived state legislative careers as stepping stones toward the national level. In Schlesinger’s unidirectional career model, legislators were envisioned climbing up a territorial hierarchy of power and prestige from the local via the state to the national level (Francis and Kenny 2000). The impetus toward higher elective office was ascribed to a greater sphere of power, prestige, financial, and material incentives (Copeland and Opheim 2011: 145; Francis and Kenny 2000). But we have to keep in mind that the unilinear career model was developed in a US context, and therefore does not travel easily to Germany (Borchert 2011a). With German state parliaments having been undergoing a profound professionalization since the 1970s, scholars have therefore challenged the notion of a hierarchical career model (Borchert 2011a; Borchert and Stolz 2011; Stolz 2003). Today, German state parliaments are fully professionalized, as far as parliamentary allowances, infrastructure, full-time requirements, and staff size are concerned— except for Bremen and Hamburg, both of which are part-time parliaments (Borchert and Stolz 2011: 210; Borchert and Zeiss 2003; Greß and Huth 1998: 103). The German state parliaments have turned into career arenas in their own right, which serve no more as mere stepping stones to the national level: “While the national level is still considered the center of power and status, the state and the local level have made headway in recent decades and are considered a real alternative by many career politicians” (Borchert and Stolz 2011: 208). Borchert and Stolz (2011) found that even though Germany’s federalism theoretically provides a high permeability between state and national levels, state parliaments have turned into career arenas in their own right (see also Borchert 2011a; Borchert and Golsch 1999: 129; Herzog 1982: 94; Zeuner 1970: 106–107). Legislators rather tend to stay at one political level—either the national or the state level, which constitute alternative career fields—instead of permanently switching back and forth (Borchert 2011b: 131). Saalfeld (1997: 36) shows political careers at the state and national level as “parallel careers of almost equal ‘value’.” According to him, the selection criteria and requirements for state and national careers widely match. I therefore consider Germany’s state elections valuable laboratories for gaining insights into party candidate selection, more so than if I analyzed Bundestag elections only. By pooling candidate data collected at national and state levels, I can achieve an acceptable sample size of IO candidates,

6.1 Why Germany?

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which allows to see whether party selection behavior contributes to better or worse immigrant representation in parliament.

6.2 How to Measure Candidate Selection Behavior? Unfortunately, devising empirical strategies for the analysis of party selection behavior toward IO candidates is far from straightforward. The selection criteria are not legally defined, which makes their identification a rather intricate matter (Bjarnegård 2015; Marsh and Gallagher 1988). A large body of research has chosen qualitative interviews as an empirical avenue for investigating the legislative recruitment of representatives with immigrant origins (Durose et al. 2013; Nergiz 2014; Schmitz and Wüst 2011; Softic 2016; Soininen 2011). Although qualitative interviews can provide valuable insights into the personal recruitment experience, it remains unclear whether their findings reflect generalizable patterns, or whether they only disclose individual, one-off experiences. Therefore, the general conclusions we can draw from these findings remain open. In addition, the studies cited suffer from a lack of reference groups. The consequence is that they cannot indicate whether political parties use different selection criteria for IO candidates than for native candidates, or whether all parliamentary candidates share similar recruitment patterns. Other studies, in turn, have chosen quantitative data as an empirical approach to the legislative recruitment of representatives with immigrant origins. Their main focus, as Chap. 4 illustrated, is on the recruitment stage at which most distortion emerges, and which institutional or contextual factors are the main culprits (Ashe and Stewart 2012; Dancygier 2014; Ruedin 2009, 2013). Although these studies provide a thorough understanding of how macro-level factors shape minority representation, the underlying intra-party selection processes and their role for minority representation remain mostly unknown. Accounting for the upsides and downsides of quantitative and qualitative approaches, the present study plans to integrate both: For identifying broader patterns in party selection behavior toward IO candidates, I will make use of candidate surveys, while qualitative data will help validate quantitative patterns and unveil underlying mechanisms. One promising way of gaining access to party selection behavior is to survey party selectors and leaders about how their political parties treat IO candidates in candidate selection (Bochel and Denver 1983; Norris and Lovenduski 1995; Soininen 2011). However, using this approach entails two major shortcomings. First, party actors either hesitate to reveal the truth about their selection strategies, or—owing to social desirability—they do not confess a bias against IO candidates, even if one exists. Second, a mismatch might prevail between the perception of party selectors or leaders and the de facto employed selection criteria. While party actors might feel confident that their selection processes are open to marginalized groups, the selection practices used might still discriminate against aspiring IO candidates. For these two reasons, asking party actors about party selection behavior toward IO candidates might not

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match what really happens in candidate selection. Alternatively, and this is what the present study makes use of, candidates’ personal recruitment profiles provide valuable data sources for exploring party selection behavior retrospectively. In other words, the analysis of personal recruitment profiles does not follow a candidatecentered perspective, but takes place through the lens of political parties. The political qualifications that aspiring candidates must hold in order to stand for election and the amount of party support they receive both mirror party selection behavior in far-reaching ways. As political parties (and more precisely, their selectorates) define the informal rules of candidate selection, candidate recruitment profiles are closely related to their selection practices. This empirical approach is innovative in that it makes use of available data that has so far remained untapped to look at the selection behavior of political parties. The best way to make full use of this data is to define the success or failure in the candidate selection as a dependent variable and study the individual characteristics which are most important in candidate selection, and whether these characteristics are different for immigrants and natives. This empirical approach helps to understand whether these individual characteristics provide a boost for political careers, irrespective of immigrant origins, or whether aspiring IO candidates need to exceed native contenders to achieve the same level of success in candidate selection. Unfortunately, due to the paucity of data on failed applicants, I cannot compare the recruitment profiles of successful applicants to failed ones, and therefore determine whether IO candidates need more or fewer qualifications to prosper in candidate selection. As I only have data on selected candidates, I face a constraint on the dependent variable. A solution to this is to treat the recruitment profiles of native candidates as empirical references. By comparing the recruitment profiles of IO candidates to those of native candidates, we can see whether party selectorates treat IO candidates differently to native candidates. The qualifications IO and native candidates hold when standing for election and whether their qualifications differ can give some indication of the respective party selection behavior. Do IO candidates hold more political qualifications than their native peers when standing for election, which points to closure, or do they need fewer qualifications, indicating preferential treatment? In contrast to selector surveys, which are based on perceptions and assessments, candidate recruitment profiles can provide unbiased information about the criteria and practices actually employed in candidate selection. As previously discussed, lateral entrants form a minority among German legislators (Bailer et al. 2013; Herzog 1975), making the cross section of native candidates a sound reference for assessing whether political parties raise or lower selection requirements for aspiring IO candidates. Critical voices might remark that candidate recruitment profiles not only reflect the selection behavior of political parties, but are affected by a candidate’s personal ambition and motivation, both of which are beyond the party’s sphere of influence (Schlesinger 1966), or by the political opportunity structure (Borchert 2011b). However, I argue that the emergence of certain patterns across a vast number of recruitment profiles is very likely to relate to the selection behavior of political

6.2 How to Measure Candidate Selection Behavior?

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parties. As political parties and their selectorates define the informal rules of candidate selection, candidate recruitment profiles are closely linked to the selection practices of political parties. The focus of the following analysis is solely on factors that lie in a party’s sphere of influence. This ensures that candidate recruitment profiles can indeed provide information on party selection behavior. For example, candidates might stand for election in electoral districts they have no relationship with, either because they are politically ambitious or because the electoral district remained vacant. At the same time, however, it depends on local party selectorates to approve their lack of local ties. As they usually nominate local notables, party selectorates must wave through external candidates. Accordingly, the recruitment profiles of parliamentary candidates mirror not only their individual motivation or the respective opportunity structure but, to a great extent, the selection behavior of political parties.

6.2.1 Quantitative Approach As previously noted, I will draw upon candidates’ personal recruitment profiles to explore party selection behavior toward IO candidates, and whether they receive the same treatment as native candidates. Candidate surveys are the most detailed sources for gaining access to the recruitment profiles of parliamentary candidates and their individual experiences in candidate selection (Bailer 2014). They can bring to light personal background information from the “secret garden of politics” (Marsh and Gallagher 1988) that is difficult to obtain from other sources. Fortunately, the German Candidate Study (GCS), initially conducted for the 2002 Bundestag election (Schmitt et al. 2005) and continued for the 2005 (Wüst et al. 2009), 2009 (Rattinger et al. 2012), 2013 (Rattinger et al. 2014), and 2017 (Roßteutscher et al. 2018) Bundestag elections provides comprehensive data on candidates’ personal recruitment profiles. To tackle the problem that IO candidates are rather hard to find among parliamentary candidates, I have combined the 2013 GCS with state-level surveys, conducted for the state elections in Bavaria and Hesse in 2013, and Saxony in 2014 (Zittel and Ceyhan 2014).1 By providing a sample size of IO candidates which allows for a valid analysis of the party selection behavior toward IO candidates, the pooled data help get a grip on the small-N problem. Furthermore, the pooled data from 2013 and 2014 can give us a rather recent snapshot of how political parties treat IO candidates in their candidate selection processes. Keeping the time dimension widely comparable across all the surveys analyzed is considered important. The reason for this is that party selection behavior toward IO candidates may have changed over time, due to altered electoral incentives resulting from the growing electoral impact of IO voters (Claro da Fonseca 2011). If I pool data that is far apart in terms of time, I risk failing to recognize patterns in 1 The

Chair of Comparative Politics at the Goethe University Frankfurt conducted and financed the state-level candidate surveys.

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the data, as they are blurred by variances across time. In addition to data from 2013 and 2014, I will, wherever possible, make use of the latest data—the 2017 GCS—to check whether the empirical findings have remained robust over time. As the conflict in Syria and the continuing violence in Afghanistan and Iraq sparked a refugee crisis in 2015, with Germany and other European countries struggling to cope with the influx of migrants, this reinforced the politicization of migration and contributed to a further rise in ethnic diversity in the German population. Therefore, it is all the more interesting to test whether political parties responded differently in their candidate selection to the legislative underrepresentation of IO citizens in 2017 than in 2013, before the refugee crisis occurred. To avoid adding a time dimension to the pooled election data, I will not combine the data but conduct a separate analysis of the 2017 candidate data. As the 2017 data primarily serves to check the robustness of my main findings, I will partly estimate reduced statistical models, with fewer control variables. The quantitative analysis will proceed in three steps: I will present descriptive evidence of party selection behavior toward IO candidates, followed by a multivariate analysis of statistical relationships, followed by interaction effects. As different indicators form the dependent variables in the subsequent analysis, I will have to make use of different regression methods, which are introduced at the beginning of each chapter. Apart from candidates’ immigrant background, which is the main independent variable of interest, I will check for other confounding factors. The intuition of this modeling strategy is to disclose differences in the recruitment profiles caused by immigrant origins, under otherwise equal conditions. This approach helps me in disentangling how much variance in the recruitment profiles is indeed explained by immigrant origin, and how much variance is owed to other factors. In this way, I can determine whether political parties really treat IO candidates differently due to their immigrant origins, or whether other factors (like a lack of political experience) are responsible for the difference in selection behavior. Given a limited sample size of IO candidates, I will concentrate on patterns in the data instead of centering exclusively on statistical significance. It is important to keep in mind that, as they equal seamless continuums, defining thresholds for neutrality, opening or closure is pointless. I assume neutral selection patterns if no strong disparities between the recruitment profiles of native and IO candidates are evident. A closure is revealed if IO candidates must outperform native candidates in their political qualifications, and receive less party support in candidate selection. Of course, closure is not dichotomous, but can vary in strength. The same holds true for opening, in which IO candidates need fewer political qualifications than native candidates to stand for election, and receive more party support. Like closure, opening is not binary, but can be more or less pronounced.

6.2 How to Measure Candidate Selection Behavior?

6.2.1.1

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German Candidate Study 2013

The GCS on the 2013 Bundestag election (Rattinger et al. 2014) builds one part of my data set.2 It contains responses from SPD, CDU/CSU, BÜNDNIS 90/DIE GRÜNEN, FDP, DIE LINKE, PIRATENPARTEI, and AFD parliamentary candidates. Two options for participation kept the unit non-response rate low: postal paper-based participation or online participation, with personal access codes. Out of the 2,776 candidates, 1,137 returned the questionnaire (41%) and formed a widely representative sample (see Table A.10 in the Appendix). It is important to note that responses from PIRATENPARTEI and AFD candidates will be ignored in the following analysis. As both political parties were relatively new3 in 2013 and had no immediate precursor in the German party system (other than DIE LINKE, which is a successor to the PDS), their intra-party recruitment processes were less entrenched at the time of election. This makes it difficult to detect clear patterns in the reference group, which is essential for identifying deviations in party selection behavior toward IO candidates. After discarding both, 826 candidates remain in the dataset (CDU/CSU = 171, SPD = 186, FDP = 143, BÜNDNIS 90/DIE GRÜNEN = 170, DIE LINKE = 156).

6.2.1.2

Candidate Surveys at State Level

To get a grip on the small-N problem in the analysis of IO candidates, I draw on additional candidate surveys on the occasion of the 2013 and 2014 German state elections in Bavaria, Hesse and Saxony (Zittel and Ceyhan 2014). To allow for data pooling, they adopted large parts of the GCS questionnaire. I selected these state elections for a variety of reasons: First, they were the closest to the 2013 Bundestag election. While the state election in Bavaria4 occurred on 15 September 2013, the election in Hesse5 followed on 22 September 2013, and the election in Saxony6 took place on 31 August 2014. By choosing elections in close proximity to the 2013 Bundestag election, I rule out time variances that might impact party selection behavior toward IO candidates. Second, these state elections are particularly suited to studying the above assertions. In common with the Bundestag election, all three state elections operate under a variant of the mixed-member electoral system (see Table 6.1). For this reason, they can provide instructive insights into how the mode of candidacy affects party selection behavior toward IO candidates. However, it is important to highlight that, unlike with the other elections, Bavaria uses an open party list system, where voters have influence on the order in which candidates are elected (Eder and Magin 2008; Massicotte 2003). A second particularity is that candidates 2 For

details on the election, see Mader (2014). PIRATENPARTEI was founded in September 2006, the AfD in February 2013. 4 For details on the election, see Schultze (2014). 5 For details on the election, see Faas (2014). 6 For details on the election, see Jesse (2015). 3 The

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Table 6.1 Electoral system characteristics Election

Electoral system

Seats in parliament

List form

Number of MMDs

Number of votes

Threshold (%)

Bundestag

MMP

598

Closed

16

2

5

Bavaria

MMM

180

Open

7

2

5

Hesse

MMP

110

Closed

1

2

5

Saxony

MMP

120

Closed

1

2

5

Source Eder and Magin (2008)

must run for election on party lists—a pure SMD nomination is not possible. A third idiosyncrasy is that it is not the party vote share that determines the total number of seats, as in MMP systems, but nominal votes and party votes are totaled (Massicotte 2003; Shugart and Wattenberg 2003b). Despite these peculiarities, I consider the Bavarian state election to be suited to addressing my research question. Even in open party list systems, the candidates’ initial ballot position provides valuable insights into the party priorities in the list ranking. State-level surveys were sent to SPD, CDU/CSU, FREIE WÄHLER, FDP, BÜNDNIS 90/DIE GRÜNEN, DIE LINKE, PIRATENPARTEI, AFD, ÖDP, NPD, and REPUBLIKANER candidates. To keep the unit non-response rate low, we offered postal paper-based participation and online-survey participation. Out of the 597 candidates in Hesse, 297 returned the questionnaire (49.7%). In Bavaria, 599 of the 1,494 candidates contacted responded (40.1%). Of the 556 candidates surveyed in Saxony, 240 returned the questionnaire (43.2%). After confining the sample to SPD, CDU/CSU, FDP, BÜNDNIS 90/DIE GRÜNEN, and DIE LINKE candidates, responses from 720 candidates remained (CDU/CSU = 151, SPD = 161, FDP = 118, BÜNDNIS 90/DIE GRÜNEN = 164, DIE LINKE = 126). The composition of the survey participants is widely in accordance with the baseline of all the candidates (see Table A.11 in the Appendix).

6.2.2 Qualitative Approach As stated above, I will expand the quantitative analysis through a qualitative approach. While the quantitative analysis will help me identify generalizable patterns in the party selection behavior toward IO candidates, the qualitative approach will help validate the quantitative findings by adding personal and contextual information (Coppedge 1999). More specifically, the goal of the qualitative approach is to show that the patterns I identify in my quantitative analysis are truly related to candidate selection, uncover intra-party dynamics at work in candidate selection, unveil microlevel mechanisms which lie beneath the quantitative patterns, throw light on the actors who play key roles in the selection of IO candidates, and capture IO candidates’ personal experiences in the selection process.

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91

My qualitative approach is composed of two components: I first searched through candidate websites to gain background information on the nomination of IO candidates. Most candidates briefly describe their political career trajectories on their personal websites, including their previous offices and their motivation for joining the party organization. Besides information from candidate websites, Nexis provided news articles about parliamentary candidates and their nomination proceedings. Nexis archives news articles from regional, national, and international daily newspapers, weekly newspapers, and magazines.7 IO candidates’ full names served as search keywords for downloading all the relevant articles related to their political careers. Furthermore, the self-written biographies in Kürschners Volkshandbuch (2014a, 2014b, 2015, 2016) provided background information on the IO candidates who succeeded in occupying one of the parliaments investigated. Second, eight face-to-face semi-structured interviews with IO candidates helped to illustrate, deepen and validate the quantitative findings through the interviewees’ candidate selection experiences. Previously gathered information on the candidates’ career trajectories served as preparatory material for the interviews. It allowed me to ask case-specific questions and contextualize the information given by the interviewees. The interviews took 50 to 90 minutes, and were all conducted by the same interviewer. A guideline questionnaire ensured that the interviewer addressed all the relevant aspects of candidate selection. At the same time, open questions allowed the interviewees to make personal issues of concern a subject of discussion, while giving the interviewer the opportunity to react to emerging topics, or ask explanatory questions. For the sake of anonymity, I removed all personal information from the interview transcripts.

6.3 Operationalization Now that I have detailed the research design, case selection, and data of my empirical analysis, this chapter turns to the operationalization of the central variables studied in the following. Table 6.2 provides a first snapshot overview of all the relevant variables, outlined in greater detail hereafter.

6.3.1 Immigrant Origin The focus of the following analysis is on candidates’ immigrant origins. To find out whether IO candidates are selected by different criteria to their native peers and corroborate that this difference really relates to their immigrant background, I will single out the effect of having an immigrant background while holding other 7 For a full overview of the sources, see https://www.lexisnexis.de/quellen/deutschsprachige-que llen.

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Table 6.2 Sample description Dependent variable

Min

Max

N

Years of party membership

0

58

1,502

Mean 16.08

SD 11.57

Number of political offices

0

5 (= more than 5 offices)

1,546

1.87

1.09

Residence in SMD

0 (= no)

1 (= yes)

1,093

0.84

0.36

Encouragement

0 (= no)

1 (= yes)

805

0.80

0.40

Competition in SMD

0 (= not/hardly contested)

1 (= somewhat/highly contested)

1,114

0.30

0.46

Competition on party list

0 (= not/hardly contested)

1 (= somewhat/highly contested)

1,192

0.55

0.50

Support from state party leadership

0 (= not important)

5 (= very important)

688

2.28

1.30

Support from local party chapter

0 (= not important)

5 (= very important)

692

3.70

1.22

Viable SMD nomination

0 (= no)

1 (= yes)

1,112

0.22

0.42

List margin

-85

42

1,294

-12.29

17.02

Independent variable

Min

Max

N

Mean

SD

IO candidate

0 (= no)

1 (= yes)

1,489

0.07

0.25

Muslim IO candidate

0 (= no)

1 (= yes)

1,405

0.01

0.1

Christian IO candidate

0 (= no)

1 (= yes)

1,435

0.03

0.17

Non-European IO candidate

0 (= no)

1 (= yes)

1,428

0.03

0.16

IO candidate from Muslim country

0 (= no)

1 (= yes)

1,417

0.02

0.14

European IO candidate

0 (= no)

1 (= yes)

1,448

0.04

0.2

Political party: SPD

0 (= no)

1 (= yes)

347

CDU/CSU

0 (= no)

1 (= yes)

322

FDP

0 (= no)

1 (= yes)

261

Bündnis 90/Die Grünen

0 (= no)

1 (= yes)

334

Die Linke

0 (= no)

1 (= yes)

282

Mode of candidacy: SMD nomination

0 (= no)

1 (= yes)

234

Party list nomination 0 (= no)

1 (= yes)

431

Dual nomination

1 (= yes)

881

0 (= no)

(continued)

6.3 Operationalization

93

Table 6.2 (continued) Independent variable

Min

Max

N

Mean

SD

SMD: foreigner share (in %)

0.01

0.32

1,115

0.08

0.06

SMD: unemployment rate (in %)

0.01

0.15

1,108

0.05

0.03

SMD: high school graduates (in %)

0.12

0.65

1,111

0.36

0.09

Control

Min

Max

N

Mean

SD

Gender

0 (= female)

1 (= male)

1,530

0.68

0.46

Age (in years)

18

89

1,523

47.74

12.01

Education

1 (= no graduation, Hauptschule)

5 (= doctorate)

1,515

3.63

0.94

Incumbent

0 (= no)

1 (= yes)

1,546

0.13

0.33

Note Min = Minimum, Max = Maximum, SD = standard deviation Source GCS 2013; state-level candidate surveys

confounding factors constant. To measure candidates’ immigrant backgrounds, I will draw on the main concepts discussed in the above-cited literature. Previous research has found different ways of operationalizing immigrant origins, ranging from biographical to visual and name-based approaches (Bloemraad and Schönwälder 2013: 655–657). In line with the German Statistical Office and the abovecited definition, the present volume adopts a biographical approach that distinguishes between three generations of immigrants (Statistisches Bundesamt 2015: 5). Firstgeneration immigrants are born outside Germany with foreign citizenship. For candidates born after 1945, this refers to the present-day territory of Germany, while for those born before 1945, it refers to the German Reich (Wüst 2011: 253). I decided to treat both candidates born in a foreign country with foreign citizenship and candidates born in a foreign country to parents of foreign citizenship as first-generation immigrants. This twofold strategy proved to be most appropriate, as respondents often only provided one of the required piece of information. It is important to emphasize that respondents born in the eastern territories of the German Reich but indicated being born in Poland, Romania, Russia, or the Czech Republic are not treated as first-generation immigrants, due to their German citizenship at birth. Children born in a foreign country with German citizenship to parents born in Germany with German citizenship are also not considered first-generation immigrants. As I lack detailed information on the reasons for and duration of their stay abroad, I opted for a conservative approach. For obvious reasons, they enjoy language, legal and cultural advantages over first-generation immigrants. Second-generation immigrants are born in Germany, but have immigration experience via their parents. They are born either with foreign citizenship or German citizenship, but have at least one

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foreign-born parent. Third-generation immigrants are born in Germany with German citizenship, but at least one parent was born in Germany as a foreign national. Native candidates have a special role in my empirical analysis. They form the reference group that helps me figure out whether political parties deviate from their prevalent selection behavior when nominating IO candidates. Native candidates were born in Germany with German citizenship, to parents both born in Germany with German citizenship. Based on these indicators, 99 of the 1,489 candidates in my core survey sample had immigrant origins (6.65%).8 It should be noted that the sample only includes first- and second-generation immigrants, but no third-generation immigrants. Most IO candidates were to be found in Hesse, with 8.4%, followed by the 2013 Bundestag election with 7.2% and the Bavarian state election with 5.9%, while Saxony came in last, at a great distance (2.7%). One likely reason for the weak presence of IO candidates in Saxony is the lower number of immigrants living in East Germany, while another might be the higher levels of xenophobia in East Germany, preventing political parties from selecting such candidates. In the 2017 data set, which I use to check the validity of my results, 59 of the 665 candidates had immigrant origins (8.87%).9 The rise in the number of IO candidates in comparison to the 2013 Bundestag election is in line with other observations (Mediendienst Integration 2017).

6.3.2 Dependent Variables To gauge party selection behavior toward IO candidates, I will include the set of indicators presented in Chaps. 3 and 4. They comprise the key factors that hold sway over personal success in candidate selection. One of these indicators is the length of party membership. It indicates how many years candidates have been party members at the time at which the respective election took place. Another important requirement for nomination is how much office experience contenders have accumulated. It measures which of the following positions candidates held in the run-up to candidate selection: local and state party office, national party office, local legislative office, state legislative office, national legislative office, mayor and state executive office. The index counts the number of prior offices, ranging from 0 (= no office) to 5 (= five or more offices). The offices enter the index equally, although some offices may carry more weight in candidate selection than others. However, weighting remains arbitrary, which is why I adopted a more straightforward approach. In SMDs, local roots are essential requirements for nomination. Localness measures whether candidates live in the SMD in which they ran for office (0 = no; 1 = yes). Besides candidate characteristics that define the general requirements for nomination, I will consider process-related factors which indicate the extent to

8 In 9 In

57 cases, information was incomplete and thwarted a reliable classification. 31 cases, information was incomplete and thwarted a reliable classification.

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which political parties support IO candidates in seeking nominations. Here, encouragement captures whether candidates applied for a seat in parliament after other people or groups had encouraged them (= 1), or whether it was their own decision (= 0). Unfortunately, this question is only available in the GCS. Another aspect of party support is how stiff competition for nomination was. The measurement of competition is based on subjective assessments. Candidates were asked how contested their nomination in SMDs and on party lists was. Due to weakly occupied response categories for IO candidates, I changed the 4-point scale into a binary variable (0 = not contested at all/hardly contested; 1 = somewhat contested/highly contested). To measure the amount of party support in candidate selection, I drew upon subjective evaluations of how important support from the state party leadership and the local party organization was in achieving a nomination. Due to poorly occupied response categories for IO candidates, I decided to conflate the 5-point scale (0 = not important/not very important/indifferent; 1 = important/very important). Finally, party gatekeepers are highly influential in deciding who will receive an electable nomination with a realistic chance of winning a seat in parliament. Researchers presented many suggestions for modeling electoral viability in mixedmember electoral systems. With respect to SMDs, the vote margin for the district winner is most widespread (Abramowitz et al. 2006; Johnston et al. 2002; Zittel and Gschwend 2008). In accordance with this approach, I defined SMDs as viable (= 1) if the candidates’ nominal vote share was within 10% of the winner’s vote share in the previous election, or if their own political party succeeded in winning the electoral district. More complex methods of modeling (Stoffel 2014) are of little use here. Political parties do not have perfect or secure information on the electoral viability of SMDs, but make a snap judgment based on concrete and ready-tohand information—this is, in most cases, their electoral performance in the previous election. To test whether party selectors grant IO candidates the same chances as native candidates to be placed on winnable list positions, I have to measure candidates’ electoral prospects on party lists. Scholars have proposed a variety of methods of measuring electoral viability on party lists. Some have used the number of ballot positions the political party could win in the previous election and subtracted a certain number of list positions (one standard deviation, for example) (Luhiste 2015). Others used the average number of list slots won in the previous election (Hennl and Kaiser 2008). Schmitt and Wüst (2004) created a binary variable that captures whether list slots were enough to win a seat in parliament, whereas Manow and Nistor (2009) developed an index based on all election results since 1949. More recently, Stoffel (2014) proposed running probit models, in which candidates’ list positions are regressed on their success in entering parliament and using election probabilities in further analysis. In my view, the list margin provides a fine, nuanced indicator of candidates’ electoral prospects on party lists. Here, candidates’ ballot positions are subtracted from the number of list slots their political parties managed to win in the previous election. The higher the list margin, the more auspicious their prospects of entering parliament.

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6.3.3 Conditioning Factors As discussed above, previous research has drawn attention to the broader context of minority representation, consisting of the party organizations, electoral rules, and other demographic contextual factors. I assume that these contextual factors leave their mark on party selection behavior toward IO candidates, as they flow into political parties’ electoral calculus. The first factor I expect to shape the selection of IO candidates is their immigrant background. There is good reason to believe that party selection behavior varies across immigrant subgroups. Within IO citizens, Muslims and IO citizens from non-European countries are considered particularly distinct from the German majority population when compared to Christians or IO citizens from European countries. To unmask intra-group variances, I will measure whether IO candidates are Muslims (= 1), Christians (= 1), whether they originate from outside the European borders (= 1) or within them (= 1). As not all IO candidates indicated their denomination, and they might originate from a predominantly Muslim country while belonging to a Christian minority, I created an additional variable for Muslim countries (= 1), where the majority of society is Muslim. Another assumption is that center-left parties are more conducive to minority representation than center-right parties. To capture potential variances across political parties, I will incorporate party affiliations as binary variables. Building upon literature on electoral system incentives, I further assume that political parties are more inclined to open selection to IO candidates if party list positions are allocated, while more defensive selection strategies should prevail in SMDs. The respective mode of candidacy—nominal, party list or dual—is measured by binary variables. Where immigrants are spatially concentrated, political parties face strong incentives to open their candidate selection and place IO candidates on their ticket, in order to appeal to IO voters. Unfortunately, no SMD-based data on the local share of IO citizens is available. However, the local foreigner shares in 2012 can serve as proxies.10 Although the percentages of foreigners only contain IO citizens of non-German citizenship, they turned out to be solid proxies. Based on the 2011 census data, Wüst (2014) demonstrated that the local foreigner share correlates with the share of IO citizens at Pearson’s r = 0.92. While the spatial concentration of IO citizens in SMDs should imply opening, the contrary applies to the degree of social deprivation in SMDs. The literature provided ideas of how social deprivation diminishes tolerance toward immigrants, including economic and cultural dimensions of the relationship. The share of unemployed people in SMDs, receiving SGB II or SGB III in 2013, measures the economic dimension. To map the cultural dimension, I will use the share of high school graduates at the end of the school year 2012/13 in relation to the total number of graduates. All SMD contextual factors are centered at their mean values.

10 In

Bavaria, data are only available at the Landkreis level. The same foreigner share is therefore allocated to SMDs belonging to the same Landkreis.

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6.3.4 Controls To disentangle the effect of a candidate’s immigrant background on the party selection behavior from other factors spoiling the relationship, a set of standard control variables will be included in all statistical models. To gauge the importance of individual resources, I will include the standard set of independent variables, such as gender (0 = female; 1 = male), age (in years), age squared and education (1 = no education or Hauptschule; 5 = doctorate). To account for the pooled character of the data set, election and party fixed effects enter all statistical models. They control for remaining idiosyncrasies, such as unequal supply pools of potential IO candidates, which might impact party selection behavior toward IO candidates. Beyond these standard variables, I will include specific variables tailored to the respective selection indicator to be analyzed. These are either based on the variables described under 6.3.2 or will be depicted next. Most of them capture the amount of party activity and political experience. The more time candidates spend on party activities and the more political experience they have, the greater their visibility within the party organization and the better their reputation as competent and reliable contenders—this helps their successful nomination. In this respect, incumbency (0 = no; 1 = yes) measures whether candidates had already moved into parliament in the preceding legislative term. While incumbency measures successful election in the previous legislative term, the number of legislative terms adds a quantitative perspective. It counts how many legislative periods candidates have already spent in parliament. The counting starts from 1990 for Bavaria and Saxony (ranging from 0 to 5), 1991 for Hesse (ranging from 0 to 6), and 1994 for the Bundestag (ranging from 0 to 5). The number of prior candidacies additionally includes non-successful candidacies (those which did not result in a mandate). The amount of party activity records the hours devoted to party activities per week. The repeated candidacy in SMDs (0 = no; 1 = yes) measures whether candidates had already competed in the same electoral district in the previous election, but without winning. To gauge organizational networks, I will count candidates’ affiliations to subsequent organizations based on an index: trade union, professional organization, religious organization, environmental organization, human rights organization, sports and leisure club, immigrant organization. The more networks the candidates have, the more interesting they are for the parties, since they can serve as potential multipliers to attract votes. The last control variable concerns vacant electoral districts where the previous winner withdraws (0 = no; 1 = yes). These SMDs are usually fiercely fought over, having negative effects on chances of nomination (Reiser 2013: 137).

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References Abramowitz AI, Alexander B, Gunning M (2006) Incumbency, redistricting, and the decline of competition in U.S. house elections. J Polit 68(1):75–88 Ashe J, Stewart K (2012) Legislative recruitment: using diagnostic testing to explain underrepresentation. Party Polit 18(5):687–707 Bailer S (2014) Interviews and surveys in legislative research. In: Strøm K, Saalfeld T, Shane M (eds) The Oxford handbook of legislative studies. Oxford University Press, Oxford/New York, pp 167–193 Bailer S, Meißner P, Ohmura T, Selb P (2013) Seiteneinsteiger im Deutschen Bundestag. VS Verlag, Wiesbaden Bjarnegård E (2015) Gender, informal institutions and political recruitment. Palgrave Macmillan, New York Bloemraad I (2013) Accessing the corridors of power: puzzles and pathways to understanding minority representation. West Eur Polit 36(3):652–670 Bloemraad I, Schönwälder K (2013) Immigrant and ethnic minority representation in Europe: conceptual challenges and theoretical approaches. West Eur Politics 36(3):564–579 Bochel J, Denver D (1983) Candidate selection in the labour party: what the selectors seek. Brit J Polit Sci 13(1):45–59 Borchert J (2011a) Drei welten politischer karrieremuster in mehrebenensystemen. Die USA, Deutschland und Brasilien im Vergleich. In: Edinger M, Patzelt WJ (eds) Politik als Beruf, PVS-Sonderheft 44, Wiesbaden, VS Verlag, pp 273–311 Borchert J (2011b) Individual ambition and institutional opportunity: a conceptual approach to political careers in multi-level systems. Reg Fed Stud 21(2):117–140 Borchert J, Golsch L (1999) Deutschland: Von der „Honoratienzunft“ zur politischen Klasse. In: Borchert J (ed) Politik als Beruf. Die politische Klasse in westlichen Demokratien, Opladen, Leske + Budrich, pp 114–140 Borchert J, Stolz K (2011) German political careers: the state level as an arena in its own right? Reg Fed Stud 21(2):205–222 Borchert J, Zeiss L (2003) Germany: from “guilds of notables” to political class. In: Bochert J, Zeiss J (eds) The political class in advanced democracies: a comparative handbook. Oxford University Press, Oxford/New York, pp 142–161 Bundesamt S (2015) Bevölkerung und Erwerbstätigkeit. Bevölkerung mit Migrationshintergrund– Ergebnisse des Mikrozensus 2014. Fachserie 1, Reihe 2.2. Wiesbaden, Statistisches Bundesamt Copeland G, Opheim C (2011) Multi-level political careers in the USA: the cases of African Americans and women. Reg Fed Stud 21(2):141–164 Coppedge M (1999) Thickening thin concepts and theories. Combining large N and small in comparative politics. Comp Polit 31(4):465–476 Claro da Fonseca S (2011) New citizens—new candidates? Candidate selection and the mobilization of immigrant voters in German election. In: Bird K, Saalfeld T, Wüst AM (eds) The political representation of immigrants and minorities: voters, parties and parliaments in liberal democracies. Routledge, London, pp 109–127 Dancygier RM (2014) Electoral rules or electoral leverage? Explaining muslim representation in England. World Polit 66(2):229–263 Durose C, Richardson L, Combs R, Eason C, Gains F (2013) ‘Acceptable difference’: diversity, representation and pathways to UK politics. Parliamentary Affairs 66(2):246–267 Eder C, Magin R (2008) Wahlsysteme. In: Freitag M, Vatter A (eds) Die Demokratien der deutschen Bundesländer. Opladen, Barbara Budrich, pp 33–62 Faas T (2014) Die hessische Landtagswahl vom 22. September 2013: Schwarz-grüne „hessische Verhältnisse“. Zeitschrift für Parlamentsfragen, 45(2):349–365 Francis WL, Kenny LW (2000) Up the political ladder: career paths in U.S. politics. Thousand Oaks, Sage

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Schmitt H, Wüst AM, Semetko HA, Karp J (2005) Deutsche Kandidatenumfrage zur Bundestagswahl 2002 (Deutsche Kandidatenstudie 2002). GESIS Datenarchiv, Köln. ZA4225 Datenfile Version 1.0.0 Schmitz C, Wüst AM (2011) Was bewegt Politiker mit Migrationshintergrund? Befunde aus deutschen Großstädten. Zeitschrift Für Parlamentsfragen 42(4):850–862 Schultze RO (2014) Die bayerische Landtagswahl vom 15. September 2013: Bund und Land Hand in Hand. Zeitschrift für Parlamentsfragen, 45(2):326–348 Shugart MS, Wattenberg MP (2003) Mixed-member electoral systems: a definition and typology. In: Shugart MS, Wattenberg MP (eds) Mixed-member electoral systems: the best of both worlds? Oxford University Press, Oxford/New York, pp 10–24 Softic D (2016) Migranten in der Politik. Eine empirische Studie zu Bundestagsabgeordneten mit Migrationshintergrund. Wiesbaden, VS Verlag Soininen M (2011) Ethnic inclusion or exclusion in representation? Local candidate selection in Sweden. In: Bird K, Saalfeld T, Wüst AM (eds) The political representation of immigrants and minorities: voters, parties and parliaments in liberal democracies. Routledge, London, pp 145–163 Stoffel MF (2014) A unified scale of electoral incentives. Representation 50(1):55–67 Stolz K (2003) Moving up, moving down: political careers across territorial levels. Eur J Polit Res 42(2):223–248 Volkshandbuch K (2014a) Bayerischer Landtag. 17. Wahlperiode/2013–2018. Rheinbreitbach, NDV Volkshandbuch K (2014b) Hessischer Landtag. 19. Wahlperiode/2014–2019. Rheinbreitbach, NDV Volkshandbuch K (2015) Sächsischer Landtag. 6. Wahlperiode/2014–2019. Rheinbreitbach NDV Volkshandbuch K (2016) Deutscher Bundestag. 18. Wahlperiode/2013–2017. Rheinbreitbach, NDV Wüst AM (2011) Migrants as parliamentary actors in Germany. In: Bird K, Saalfeld T, Wüst AM (eds) The political representation of immigrants and minorities: voters, parties and parliaments in liberal democracies. Routledge, New York, pp 250–265 Wüst AM (2014) Immigration into politics. immigrant-origin candidates and their success in the 2013 Bundestag election. Ger Polit Soc 32(112):1–15 Wüst A, Schmitt H, Gschwend T, Zittel T (2009) Deutsche Kandidatenumfrage zur Bundestagswahl 2005 (Deutsche Kandidatenstudie 2005). GESIS Datenarchiv, Köln. ZA4923 Datenfile Version 1.0.0. Zeuner B (1970) Kandidatenaufstellung zur Bundestagswahl 1965. Nijhofl, Den Haag Zittel T, Ceyhan S (2014) Deutsche Landtagskandidatenstudie. Goethe Universität Frankfurt, Frankfurt am Main Zittel T, Gschwend T (2008) Individualised constituency campaigns in mixed-member electoral systems: candidates in the 2005 German elections. West Eur Polit 31(5):978–1003

Chapter 7

Are Immigrant Origin Candidates Any Different?

Before moving on to a full-fledged analysis of party selection behavior toward IO candidates and exploring how political parties approach their selection, I will compare the composition of IO and native candidates in a descriptive manner. This will provide a better account of both groups of candidates, which will take center stage later, in the analytical section. The descriptive comparison can help us to develop an understanding of whether both groups of candidates differ only with regard to their having an immigrant background, or whether other characteristics set them apart and impact their nomination for a mandate.

7.1 Exploring the Socio-Demographic Background Before turning to the set of indicators that are of great influence in determining success in the candidate selection, I will examine a number of standard individual-level characteristics to see whether these vary systematically between IO and native candidates. Studying candidates’ socio-demographic characteristics (their age, gender, and education) helps to see whether and to what extent IO and native candidates constitute distinct groups of candidates. As argued above, this can help us work out how much variance in their recruitment profiles is indeed explained by immigrant origin, and how much variance is due to other factors. Figure 7.1 presents the age distribution in both groups of candidates. The results show that native candidates are on average 48 years old, 45 for IO candidates. IO candidates thus tend to be somewhat younger than their native peers. Taken as a whole, the age distribution widely corresponds to the empirical findings in the recruitment literature, stating that the mean age of German legislators varies between 46 and

© The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2021 S. Ceyhan, How German Parties Select Candidates of Immigrant Origin, Springer Series in Electoral Politics, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-59451-0_7

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Fig. 7.1 Difference in mean age for native and IO candidates. Note Difference is significant at p ≤ 0.01 (t-test). N = 1,483. Source GCS 2013; state-level candidate surveys

52 years (Best et al. 2000: 185; 2001; Saalfeld 1997; Wessels 1997). Evidently, officeholders tend to be older than the population they represent. In the 2013 Bundestag, the mean age was 50 years, while it was only 44 for the German population (Höhne and Kintz 2017: 266). The main reason is that, in the wake of increasing professionalization in legislative careers, legislators usually must undergo a long and strenuous recruitment process, in which they advance from low to higher-level positions before being considered for a mandate at the state or national level (Borchert 2003a, b; Fiers and Secker 2007; Saalfeld 1997). All this culminates in the poor presence of younger candidates in the ranks of legislators. However, the distortion to the detriment of young contenders applies chiefly to native candidates. The mean age among IO candidates widely corresponds to that of the population. One reason for this pattern is that the average age of legislators is higher in the SPD, FDP, and CDU/CSU than in BÜNDNIS 90/DIE GRÜNEN and DIE LINKE (Bailer et al. 2013: 21–22; Höhne and Kintz 2017: 266). However, due to their immigration-friendly positions, BÜNDNIS 90/DIE GRÜNEN and DIE LINKE might include more IO candidates in their ranks, resulting in the age difference found between IO and native candidates. Moreover, with an average age of 35.4 years in 2014, IO citizens are significantly younger than the native population, whose average age was 46.8 years (Statistisches Bundesamt 2015). Along with age, gender belongs to the set of standard socio-demographic characteristics which I will take a look at. As Fig. 7.2 demonstrates, I hit upon clear gender patterns in the data, much to the detriment of female contenders (Bieber 2013a; Davidson-Schmich 2016; Fortin-Rittberger and Eder 2013; Fortin-Rittberger et al. 2016; Höhne and Kintz 2017; Magin 2011). This is still surprising, as all political parties under scrutiny—apart from the FDP and CSU—have imposed gender quotas (Davidson-Schmich 2006, 2016; Reiser 2014). The persistent gender gap that applies

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Fig. 7.2 Gender difference between native and IO candidates (in %). Note χ2 -test value is 0.26. The result is not significant at p ≤ 0.1. N = 1,483. Source GCS 2013; state-level candidate surveys

to most political systems has fueled international scholarly debate on the most prevalent sources of women’s underrepresentation, ranging from personality differences to traditional role models, discrimination by voters and party selectors and differences in socioeconomic resources (Baer 1993; Bieber 2013b; Carroll 1994; Carroll and Sanbonmatsu 2013; Christmas-Best and Kjar 2007; Dahlerup 2006; Darcy et al. 1994; Lawless and Fox 2005; Mateo Diaz 2005; Sanbonmatsu 2006). With the caveat that the difference falls short of statistical significance, I can still say that women seem to be slightly more underrepresented among IO candidates: Female candidates make up 32% of native candidates, but only 26% for IO candidates in the sample. Besides an advanced age and being a man, educational resources are key to legislative careers, as they facilitate the acquisition of rhetorical, analytical, and information processing skills, and indicate proficiency (Best 2007; Gaxie and Godmer 2007). Figure 7.3 provides a summary of the candidates’ highest school-leaving qualification, or, if given, their highest university degree. The majority of candidates hold university degrees, including Bachelor, Master, Magister, and Diploma. About one tenth hold doctoral degrees. Conversely, lower school-leaving qualifications, such as those earned from secondary schools, are barely represented. When studying education from a longitudinal perspective, we can observe undeniably an increasing academization of parliaments, which has led to mounting proportions of legislators with university degrees (Best et al. 2001, 2000; Gaxie and Godmer 2007; Höhne and Kintz 2017; Saalfeld 1997; Wessels 1997). In this sense, parliaments have increasingly departed from the population they represent. However, the phenomenon of an overrepresented high education seems to apply equally to IO and native candidates. Both groups of candidates tend to be drawn from the highest educational strata of society, with no strong imbalances between them. Nonetheless, the weight that

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Fig. 7.3 Difference in education for native and IO candidates (in %). Note Fisher’s exact test value is 1. The result is not significant at p ≤ 0.1. N = 1,469. Source GCS 2013; state-level candidate surveys

educational resources carry for legislative careers might impede IO citizens more on their way to parliament than the native population because, on average, they are equipped with fewer educational resources (Becker 2011; Diefenbach 2007, 2009; Heath et al. 2008). If only the most educated come forward as candidates and IO citizens tend to be equipped with fewer educational resources, this inevitably leads to their political underrepresentation.

7.2 Exploring Immigrant Origin Even though I claimed that political parties subordinate the external differentiation of IO citizens to their internal differentiation, it is reasonable to assume that they do not lump IO citizens together but remain aware of the group’s internal heterogeneity. Sensing IO citizens’ internal diversity, this should leave its mark on how political parties select IO candidates. I therefore assume that the immigrant origin itself plays a role in party selection behavior toward IO candidates. For this reason, the present chapter inspects the different facets of candidate immigrant origins in greater depth. The most obvious facet of candidates’ immigrant origins is the countries they come from. Figure 7.4 therefore summarizes the countries from which the IO candidates in the sample originate. For first-generation immigrants, it depicts the country of birth, while it describes the parents’ country of birth in the case of second-generation immigrants. What is most striking is that Turkish-origin candidates strongly outnumber any other immigrant group. About one fifth of the IO candidates in the sample

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23 15 8 0

Fig. 7.4 Country of origin (absolute numbers). Note Native candidates are excluded. N = 99. Source GCS 2013; state-level candidate surveys

were born in Turkey or have at least one parent from there. This comes as no surprise, considering the fact that Turkish-origin citizens make up 17.4% of the IO population and constitute the largest national group of immigrants in Germany (Statistisches Bundesamt 2015). This not only results in a larger number of Turkishorigin applicants in the candidate selection, but by the virtue of its group size and high level of organization, the Turkish community can exert considerable pressure on party organizations to place Turkish-origin candidates on their candidate lists (Schönwälder 2013: 642). Their institutional networks within party organizations or at least in the close environment of political parties provide Turkish-origin citizens with leverage for making demands for political representation (Blätte 2014a, b, 2015; Cetinkaya 2000; Kücükhüseyin 2002). These organizational networks not only encourage Turkish immigrants’ general political participation (Berger et al. 2004), including their political engagement in party organizations, but the nomination of Turkish-origin multipliers with vast contacts to organizations in the Turkish community can help political parties to specifically address this voter group. Its size turns the Turkish community into an electorally weighty voter group that is relevant to party electoral success. The second largest candidate group originates from Czechoslovakia (n = 9), followed by Austria (n = 6), Romania (n = 6), the UK (n = 6), Yugoslavia (n = 6) and Italy (n = 5). Interestingly, few IO candidates originate from Southern Europe, although many labor migrants came from Italy, Spain, and Greece. They, however, returned home in larger numbers than Turkish labor migrants (Thränhardt 2002). I have expanded the analysis of candidates’ immigrant backgrounds by adding a breakdown of their religious denominations. Figure 7.5 pictures the distribution of candidates’ religious affiliations.1 Among IO candidates, Muslims make up a remarkable share with 14%, which sets this candidate group apart from native candidates. Only 20% of the IO candidates but 37% of the native candidates are Protestants. Catholics, by contrast, are represented almost equally in both groups of candidates, with 29% among native candidates and 26% among IO candidates. It is therefore reasonable to conclude that it is chiefly the group of Muslims that distinguishes IO

1 As

only one candidate in the sample was Jewish, I excluded this category.

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Fig. 7.5 Difference in religion for native and IO candidates (in %). Note Fisher’s exact test value is 0.00. The result is significant at p ≤ 0.01. N = 1,463. Source GCS 2013; state-level candidate surveys

candidates from autochthonous candidates. This finding echoes the strong presence of Turkish-origin candidates in the sample. IO candidates not only differ from each other in their countries of origin and their denominations. Their relationship to immigration also plays a role. As defined earlier, first-generation immigrants were born in a foreign country and then immigrated to Germany themselves, while second-generation immigrants were already born in Germany but have a parental immigrant background (Statistisches Bundesamt 2013: 6). While first-generation immigrants have to cope with all the challenges associated with their immigration, including learning a new language, the legal recognition of their educational and occupational qualifications, acculturation and making new contacts, second-generation immigrants face less structural challenges. They have already been born and socialized in Germany, even though identity problems gain currency in this generation (Esser 1980; Fincke 2009; Hämmig 2010). This means I would expect second-generation immigrants to form the majority of IO candidates. As Fig. 7.6 reveals, however, 53% of the IO candidates in the sample belong to the second generation, while 47% are first-generation immigrants. The high proportion of first-generation immigrants is noteworthy, as mastering the German language and becoming familiar with the political institutions and processes in Germany are significant hurdles for political engagement. This finding may be explained by the fact that politically driven immigration increased from the late 1970s onwards, because of political prosecution, repression, and instability (Green 2004). First-generation immigrants that had fled for political reasons were highly politicized, which might explain the high share of first-generation immigrants among parliamentary candidates. What this all amounts to is that IO candidates are a highly diverse group,

7.2 Exploring Immigrant Origin

107

Fig. 7.6 Immigrant generation (in %). Note Native candidates are excluded. First-generation immigrants are born in a foreign country with foreign citizenship, and second-generation immigrants are born in Germany with at least one parent belonging to the first generation. N = 99. Source GCS 2013; state-level candidate surveys

spanning various countries of origin, denominations, and immigrant generations. It is therefore more than advisable to account for intra-group differences when studying the party selection behavior toward IO candidates.

7.3 Exploring Political Backgrounds When exploring whether immigrant background is the main feature that distinguishes IO candidates from native candidates or whether further characteristics set both groups apart and impact their selection, a descriptive analysis of their political background can give some further useful indications. Initially, I should consider whether and how the party contexts matter for the presence of IO candidates. Following on from previous reasoning, I expect party differences in the distribution of IO candidates, with center-left parties contributing to a stronger presence of IO candidates than center-right parties (da Fonseca 2011; Kittilson and Tate 2005; Wüst 2011). Indeed, the descriptive results in Table 7.1 give some credit to the assumption that political parties differ in their incorporation of immigrants at the candidate level. With 28%, the SPD put forth almost one third of all IO candidates in the sample. In comparison with native candidates, IO candidates are thus clearly overrepresented in the SPD’s rows—the difference is 6.4 percentage points. A comparable share of IO candidates was to be found on the party ticket of DIE LINKE—the difference to native candidates is even 11 percentage points. The hypothesis that center-left parties

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Table 7.1 Party affiliation

Party affiliation (in %) No immigrant origin (N = 1,390)

Immigrant origin (N = 99)

SPD

21.9

28.3

CDU/CSU

21.3

16.2

FDP

17.1

15.2

Bündnis 90/Die Grünen

22.4

12.1

Die Linke

17.3

28.3

Note Fisher’s exact test value is 0.01. The result is significant at p ≤ 0.01. N = 1,489. Source GCS 2013; state-level candidate surveys

are particularly open to immigrants, as they espouse equal rights for minorities in general and immigrants in particular, finds an echo in their tally of IO candidates. On the one hand, IO citizens might gravitate more to the policies of center-left parties, especially with regard to immigration policy. On the other hand, such parties might be more eager to enhance immigrants’ political participation and therefore encourage more aspirants from an immigrant background to make a bid for office. Furthermore, as mentioned earlier, a large proportion of IO citizens in Germany derive from the labor migrant context, which makes them traditionally more affiliated to center-left parties (Kroh and Tucci 2009; Wüst 2002, 2007). A different picture emerges when shifting focus to the CDU/CSU. Here, I found only 16% IO candidates but 21% native candidates. As conservative political parties take a more critical stance on immigration and multiculturalism, this finding comes as no surprise. Among the party organizations under scrutiny, the CDU/CSU takes the most skeptical view of immigration and multiculturalism. While they introduced generous measures for ethnic German repatriates, their attitude toward other immigrant groups, especially Muslims, is more hostile and defensive. In the FDP, the percentage of IO candidates widely corresponds to that of native candidates, at 15 and 17%. This pattern dovetails with the FDP’s proclaimed position of neither acting in discriminatory ways toward specific groups nor taking any steps toward a preferential treatment. Unexpectedly, only 12% of the IO candidates in my sample belonged to BÜNDNIS 90/DIE GRÜNEN. As multiculturalism and equal rights for marginalized groups represent the genuine core issues of BÜNDNIS 90/DIE GRÜNEN (Ohlert 2015; Probst 2013; Tietze 2008), this finding points to a bias in the data. This suspicion draws support from the Mediendienst Integration, which presented evidence that the majority of IO candidates in the 2013 Bundestag election were actually affiliated with BÜNDNIS 90/DIE GRÜNEN, followed by DIE LINKE and the SPD (Mediendienst Integration 2013). The good news is that a party bias presents no major problem for my research into the party selection behavior toward IO candidates, as long as their recruitment profiles can provide unbiased insights into the way political parties go about nominating IO candidates. To validate this, qualitative data will play a key role in the subsequent analysis.

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Another important facet of an IO candidate’s nomination trajectory is how they compete for office—on a party list, in single-seat districts or on both electoral tiers. If I give credence to the claims in the literature of electoral system incentives, political parties should shy away from placing IO candidates in single-seat districts, as their scope of voter appeal is believed to be limited. Multiseat party lists, by contrast, profoundly change party nomination logic. Here, ticket-balancing is the guiding idea of party nominations, which is to the great benefit of IO candidates (Kostadinova 2007; Norris 2004; Rule and Zimmerman 1992, 1994). Figure 7.7 offers good evidence for this assumption: About 16% of the native candidates competed for elective office in SMDs, while among IO candidates this applied to only 10% of the cases. When turning to party list nominations, no notable group difference is apparent. In both groups, 28% of the candidates got hold of party list positions. Nearly two-thirds of the IO candidates (62%) but only 57% of the native candidates managed to grab a dual nomination. However, these findings have to be taken with a pinch of salt, as holding a party list nomination is compulsory in Bavarian state elections (Massicotte 2003; Trefs 2008). This electoral rule ensures a candidate’s stronger dependency on regional party organizations. When excluding Bavaria from the sample to check the robustness of the previous findings, I again observe that one fifth of the native candidates but only 13% of the IO candidates competed in SMDs. Yet again, no striking difference becomes evident on party lists (23%). Also, I obtain similar results on dual nominations as those from before, with 65% of the IO candidates and 57% of the native candidates running on a dual ticket. Going hand in hand with the literature on electoral system incentives, the descriptive results suggest that political parties tend to avoid fielding IO candidates in SMDs while, if party list nominations are concerned,

Fig. 7.7 Difference in the mode of candidacy for native and IO candidates (in %). Note Fisher’s exact test value is 0.34. The result is not significant at p ≤ 0.1. N = 1,489. Source GCS 2013; state-level candidate surveys

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no such trend is observed. Whether the mode of candidacy not only conditions the number of IO candidates standing for election but also the party selection behavior toward IO candidates in terms of an opening or closure is something that will be addressed more thoroughly in the following. When making attempts to understand whether it is candidates’ immigrant background that genuinely explains differences in party selection behavior or whether different levels of political experience account for disparities, incumbency is a key variable to look at. Based on an informal but highly institutionalized rule, incumbents who managed to enter parliament in the previous legislative term are usually re-selected (Kaack 1969b; Reiser 2014; Roberts 1988; Zeuner 1970). They enjoy advantages over novices, which range from name recognition, higher visibility within and outside the party organization, contacts, and administrative resources (Erikson 1971; Gelman and King 1990; Hainmueller and Lutz Kern 2008; Lee 2001; Levitt and Wolfram 1997). Moreover, they are already versed in parliamentary working processes and do not need long training periods, being able to continue their legislative work immediately. All this makes incumbent legislators party favorites when it comes to re-selection. On the downside, this incumbency advantage means there is a disadvantage for groups that are new to politics, including IO citizens (SchwindtBayer 2005). Figure 7.8 confirms that fewer incumbents are present among IO candidates. In fact, 13% of native candidates are officeholders, but only 8% of IO candidates. This largely mirrors the legislative underrepresentation of IO citizens in recent decades (Wüst 2011). While immigrants are making strides in their attempts to achieve mandates, this shows that IO citizens have started making inroads into party politics only rather recently.

Fig. 7.8 Difference in incumbency for native and IO candidates (in %). Note Fisher’s exact test value is 0.09. The result is significant at p ≤ 0.1. N = 1,489. Source GCS 2013; state-level candidate surveys

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Although a descriptive comparison of how IO and native candidates are composed can provide first helpful hints whether both groups of candidates differ first and foremost with regard to having an immigrant background or whether other characteristics set them apart and shape their nomination chances, we need to probe more deeply into party selection behavior to really understand how candidate selection contributes to representation gaps across groups. I address this issue below by examining whether IO candidates must meet the same selection criteria as native candidates to have the chance to compete for a seat in parliament.

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Chapter 8

Requirements for the Nomination of Immigrant Origin Candidates

As emphasized previously, to really understand whether and how candidate selection is related to IO citizen representation, it is not enough to contrast the composition of IO and native candidates in a descriptive manner. Therefore, the selection practices which are in use for IO candidates now come to the fore. To measure party selection behavior toward IO candidates, I will draw upon the set of indicators presented in Chaps. 3 and 4. As a quick reminder, these indicators embrace the key factors that determine personal success in candidate selection. They cover characteristics that define general requirements for nomination and process-related factors, which indicate the extent to which political parties support IO candidates in seeking nominations. I shall start by looking into general requirements for nomination, to see whether IO candidates appear to face higher obstacles to getting nominated, in as far as their political experience is concerned.

8.1 Years of Party Membership One of the most valued properties of candidate selection is a long and proven track record within the party organization. This applies to candidates who have a long history of activism and participation within and on behalf of their party organization (Best et al. 2011: 171; Borchert and Golsch 1999: 126–127; Borchert and Stolz 2003: 156–157; Detterbeck 2010: 149; Edinger 2009: 191; Herzog 1975). But for IO citizens who are not yet fully integrated into the party landscape, seniority might constitute a significant hurdle to candidate selection. This notwithstanding, we do not have a good grasp of how the length of party membership shapes the nomination chances of IO candidates—whether it plays the same role as for native candidates,

© The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2021 S. Ceyhan, How German Parties Select Candidates of Immigrant Origin, Springer Series in Electoral Politics, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-59451-0_8

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Fig. 8.1 Difference in mean years of party membership at first candidacy for native and IO candidates. Note Difference is significant at p ≤ 0.01 (t-test). N = 845. Source GCS 2013; state-level candidate surveys

or whether it is of a different level of importance. This is what this chapter therefore brings attention to. To study how long it takes for IO and native candidates to achieve their first nomination for a seat in state or national parliament, I will first of all present some descriptive statistics. To this end, Fig. 8.1 displays the mean years of party membership at first candidacy.1 It is important to note that I have excluded respondents with previous candidacies, as no information on the length of party membership at their first candidacy was available. A closer look at the results shows that native candidates are party members for 13 years before coming up for election for the first time, while this is only nine years for IO candidates. Even though IO candidates appear to take a somewhat faster track to their first candidacy, the descriptive results furnish preliminary evidence that the majority of IO candidates cannot skip the laborious probation period within party organizations. The option to circumvent a longstanding party commitment seems to be the exception rather than the rule. When looking more closely at the underlying distribution, a somewhat clearer picture emerges. For native candidates, a peak occurs after 5 to 15 years of party membership. After 15 years, the share of first-time candidates steadily decreases. This pattern is plausible, as party members with political ambition will attempt to make a bid for office as early as possible. In contrast to native candidates, the peak is below five years for IO 1 In

the CDU, EU citizens can become party members, while IO citizens with non-EU citizenship can only hold a guest status (CDU 2016 § 4). In the CSU, citizens of EU states can become party members immediately, while IO citizens with non-EU citizenship can become party members after three years of legal residence in Germany (CSU 2016 § 3). In the FDP, foreign citizens can join the party after two years of legal residence in Germany (FDP 2019 § 2). In the party statutes of the SPD, BÜNDNIS 90/DIE GRÜNEN and DIE LINKE, no requirements are prescribed.

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Fig. 8.2 Difference in mean age at party entry for native and IO candidates. Note Dashed lines represent the mean age. Five-year intervals are displayed. N = 1,444. Source GCS 2013; state-level candidate surveys

candidates. About 40% of IO candidates are party members for less than five years when standing for election for the very first time. This suggests that a considerable percentage of the IO candidates in the sample could enter the electoral arena at a slightly quicker pace, although this does not mean that they had a better chance of winning a mandate. To complete this picture, I have considered when candidates became party members. Figure 8.2 illustrates the age at which candidates joined their party organization. Most of the candidates in the sample became party members aged between 20 and 25, which is in keeping with previous research. Patzelt (1999: 252) found that legislators in West Germany joined party organizations at 24 years. In the same vein, Golsch (1998: 143) gave a mean age of 25 years. These numbers show that most candidates became party members quite early in life. This applies equally to IO and native candidates, for which similar age patterns become evident. While the mean age is 32 years for native candidates, it is 33 years for IO candidates. Overall, a peak is seen at 20 to 25 years, with percentages descending steadily after 25. What catches the eye is that IO candidates are more equally distributed across age categories than native candidates. Since first-generation immigrants moved to Germany later in life and therefore also joined German party organizations later on, this pattern comes as no surprise. To isolate the effect of candidates’ immigrant background from other confounding factors and establish how it relates to the length of party membership at first candidacy, multivariate regression models are used. This helps to determine how much variance in years of party membership at first candidacy is really explained by immigrant origin, with otherwise equivalent political qualifications. The multivariate analysis

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then proceeds in two steps. I will first present simple bivariate regressions between a candidate’s immigrant origin and length of party membership. Individual control variables and election and party fixed effects then enter the statistical model. This two-step approach is best suited to counteracting potential over-control, which might lead to statistically insignificant effects of immigrant origin as the underlying mechanisms of the relationship are filtered out. If I cannot see any statistically significant effect of immigrant origin in the bivariate model, any non-finding in the full model hardly arises from an over-control but bears witness to no effect of the immigrant background. Unfortunately, previous studies provide little guidance on the control variables which I need to include to unravel the effect of immigrant origin on years of party membership upon first candidacy. Besides the standard set of socio-demographic variables, I will include indicators of candidate party engagement, as they are assumed to accelerate legislative careers. Candidates with extensive political engagement as party members and previous experience in office are more likely to achieve their first nomination quickly, as they are considered more qualified to stand for election than novices (Bailer et al. 2013: 61). Election and party fixed effects account for the pooled character of the data set. As the length of party membership is a variable that takes on positive integer values but faces over-dispersion in the data, negative binomial regression models are estimated (Gardner et al. 1995; Greene 1994; Lawless 1987). Though I am chiefly interested in effect sizes, the log count yielded by negative binomial regression models is difficult to interpret. To ease this, average marginal effects (AMEs) at observed values are presented in the following (Brambor et al. 2006; Hanmer and Kalkan 2013; King et al. 2000). The AMEs in Fig. 8.3 tell us a great deal about how the length of party membership matters for native and IO candidates seeking elected office. Compared to native candidates, IO candidates appear to take a somewhat faster track to their first candidacy at state or national level. In the bivariate model (gray dashed estimate), the difference in predicted years of party membership is 4.2, and statistically significant at a 0.01 level. It diminishes once the control variables are added to the statistical model and now amounts to only 1.6 years. Apparently, everything else being equal, IO candidates reach their first candidacy only slightly sooner than native candidates. The predicted difference in the full model is not statistically significant—albeit only narrowly (pvalue = 0.12). Nevertheless, the difference in the length of party membership is not large enough to conclude that IO candidates are lateral entrants by a majority. The finding rather suggests that, in some cases, IO candidates can skip the lengthy probation period within their party organization and run for office as party newcomers, as a so-called wild card. But for most of them, longstanding party membership remains a critical and inevitable requirement for nomination. The overall trend is broadly supportive of the observation that, while individual IO candidates can skip longterm party engagement, the majority must wait for their first nomination for as long as most native candidates. For the control variables, we can see that the number of prior political offices does not behave as one would expect. Contrary to my assumption, the predicted years of party membership at the first candidacy are not negatively but positively

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Fig. 8.3 Predictors of the years of party membership at first candidacy. Note The Figure displays AMEs at observed values, based on negative binomial regression models. Coefficients are displayed in model 3 in Table A.1 in the appendix. Gray dashed marker is the coefficient from the bivariate model. The horizontal lines represent the 90% confidence intervals around point predictions. The vertical line represents the zero line. Dependent variable coding is a count. References: native, female, mean age, low education, mean party activity rate, mean number of political offices, no local-level office, no party office, mean number of org. affiliations, Bundestag election, SPD. N = 813. Source GCS 2013; state-level candidate surveys

associated with the number of prior political offices. Political office experience does not seem to accelerate political careers, but individuals spend more time in alternative offices before making a bid for a mandate at state or national level. Strikingly, no marked difference between the studied elections becomes evident, which once more demonstrates that the length of party membership is of equal importance at state and national levels. What is remarkable is that party seniority is less pronounced in the FDP, BÜNDNIS 90/DIE GRÜNEN and DIE LINKE than in the SPD. As the former have a smaller membership pool (Niedermayer 2016) and more of their candidates must compete in unwinnable races, they face more difficulties in finding party members that are willing to shoulder the burdens of nomination. This forces them into nominating candidates earlier in their party careers. Now that we have seen that party newcomers of immigrant origin are more of a rarity than a standard case, I should consider whether the same pattern recurs in the candidate data for the 2017 Bundestag election. A glance at the descriptive findings in Fig. 8.4 points in a similar direction: Although native candidates are, on average, party members two years longer before standing for election for the first time (13.9 versus 11.8), the difference with IO candidates remains small and statistically insignificant. To further test the robustness of the relationship between a candidate’s immigrant origin and the length of party membership at first candidacy, I have used the same negative binomial regression models as above (see Fig. 8.5).

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Fig. 8.4 Difference in the mean years of party membership at first candidacy for native and IO candidates. Note Difference is not significant (t-test). N = 462. Source GCS 2017

Fig. 8.5 Predictors of the years of party membership at first candidacy. Note The figure displays AMEs at observed values, based on negative binomial regression models. Gray dashed marker is the coefficient from the bivariate model. The horizontal lines represent the 90% confidence intervals around point predictions. The vertical line represents the zero line. Dependent variable coding is a count. References: native, female, mean age, low education, mean party activity rate, mean number of political offices, no local-level office, no party office, mean number of org. affiliations, SPD. N = 450. Source GCS 2017

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The substantive results of these analyses are similar to those presented above. In the bivariate model, immigrant origin seems to diminish the length of party membership until first candidacy by more than two years, albeit with a statistically insignificant coefficient. When incorporating further controls into the statistical model, I have observed that the effect of immigrant origin is now reversed. It indicates that time until first nomination is extended by one year when the contender has immigrant origins, but again the relationship is statistically insignificant. The analysis of the 2017 data therefore widely confirms the above finding, meaning that, irrespective of immigrant background or not, longstanding party membership remains a critical requirement for most nominations. This brings up the problem of explaining the 2013 data, in which the coefficient for the immigrant origin pointed in a negative direction, while this effect was less pronounced in the baseline model with the 2017 data, and even pointed in a positive direction in the full model. One could expect that, with the surge of refugees into the country, political parties would become more open to IO candidates, not only to demonstrate that they can cope with ethnic diversity, but also to showcase their acceptance of ethnic diversity and immigration. The reason the 2017 data unveiled no stronger opening may have something to do with the supply of aspiring candidates: Previous research has revealed that the share of Bundestag MPs with immigrant origins increased from 5.9% in 2013 to 8.2% in 2017 (Mediendienst Integration 2017). This rise suggests a shift in the political parties’ supply pools of potential IO candidates. If more of the latter gear up for a nomination, party selectors have to pick newcomers of immigrant origins less often than if the supply pool is small. In line with what I have found in the quantitative analysis, most IO candidates reported that they did not get the chance to run for elected office immediately after joining their party organization, but rather became involved gradually. The pathway to parliament is now, as before, marked by longstanding involvement with a party organization. Before competing for professional legislative office, learning how the party organization works, forging intra-party alliances, cultivating a personal reputation within the party organization, understanding formal and informal party structures, and gaining experience in lower-level positions were described as indispensable preconditions. Consequently, most IO candidates have not ran for election as party newcomers, but have spent years climbing up the intra-party career ladder by proving themselves in lower-level positions and engaging in volunteer party activities, such as election campaigning: I joined the very first meeting I was invited to. It was both giving and taking: “Do you want to become a delegate?”, “Do you want to join the campaign team?”, “Do you want to join the leadership team?”. I accepted all the offers. The party recognized my interest and was in need of willing people (Interview 6). Owing to a lack of information, we had […] a completely incorrect idea of how political parties worked. […] we assumed we would join a party organization and have all the opportunities at once. This quickly turned out to be wrong (Interview 2).

When keeping track of how IO candidates find their way to party organizations, I can state that most IO candidates did not receive an invitation from other party actors

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to join. Instead, the motivation for joining a party organization emanated chiefly from the candidates themselves. After having made the decision to join a party organization, most IO candidates felt welcome, without any feelings of resentment or discrimination: I always sympathized with my political party. After becoming a German citizen, I was allowed to vote and always voted for this party […]. One day, I thought, “So far, you always voted for the political party which – as you think – does the best job. Now you must put your cards on the table and become politically active. Become a party member, support the party not only at the ballot box but as a party member […]. In my hometown, I called the local party chairman […] and said, “I am interested.” By name, it was obvious that I am not native German. The local party chairman said: “Welcome! Do you want to join our next meeting?” This happened to take place two weeks later. I went there and it was very friendly (Interview 7).

I found exceptions to this positive experience at party entry, however. While it is reasonable to say that open hostility toward IO citizen participation in party politics is dropping, IO candidates who joined their party organizations in the early 1980s said they faced blatant hostility to their immigrant origins. At this juncture, IO citizens were not considered part of German society (Koopmans 1999; Rensmann 2014; Thränhardt 2002), as reflected by a blatant animosity toward party members of immigrant background. Having said this, two factors have brought about a more recent change in the treatment of party members of immigrant background. First, public stances on IO citizens have undergone a transformation after the German government—formed by the SPD and BÜNDNIS 90/DIE GRÜNEN—acknowledged Germany’s status as an immigration country for the first time in 1998. Second, political parties started realizing the immense voting potential that lies in immigrant communities following the citizenship reform in 2000, which reduced hurdles for the acquisition of German citizenship: I am talking about the 1980s and 90s […]. Some people said, “If you don’t like the political situation here, you can change it in [your country of origin].” Even my own party colleagues said so. I answered, “I am paying membership fees just like you and I decide when to leave” (Interview 1).

When focusing on personal decisions for joining a party organization, IO candidates pointed out the importance of political socialization within their families, which is in line with previous research (Gruber 2009: 101; Herzog 1975: 49). Unlike native candidates, however, their political socialization was closely related to their political experience from their country of origin. In the case of IO candidates that came from autocratic countries, their personal or their parents’ experience with political repression or political and religious prosecution served as a major motivation for a political activism. A second motivation for joining German party organizations was the perceived minority status in Germany. Being part of a minority provided IO candidates with a deep sense of responsibility for representing IO citizens within German party organizations: If you are one of 80 million, you tend to say, “Things are going well, so should I engage? I can consume instead of producing something.” If you are part of a minority […] you say, “I participate to ensure that everything goes well” (Interview 2).

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If my name was Georg Meier, I would not have been under pressure to join a political party […]. My immigrant background was the starting point for my political activism” (Interview 8).

As a third reason for political engagement, personal experience of discrimination was mentioned. One can cite, by way of example, the CDU signature campaign against dual citizenship in the 1999 Hessian state election, which prompted many IO candidates to join one of the center-left parties. In this way, they sought to voice their political protest: I saw these information stands with petitions against dual citizenship. They sought to set public opinion against immigrants […]. People went there asking, “Where can I sign against immigrants?” […]. This was a horrifying experience, and then I joined my party (Interview 6).

As a fourth motive for their party activism, IO candidates pointed out the role model function of legislators from immigrant communities. By attaining top political positions, they wanted to show that a political career is possible for IO citizens and in this way inspire other immigrants to follow the same path. This highlights the symbolic benefits of descriptive representation, which can encourage the political involvement of underrepresented groups by strengthening their political selfconfidence and changing their political self-perception, from politically passive to active citizens: My party involvement was encouraged by politicians [of immigrant background] […]. When a Turkish-origin MP entered parliament […], I realized that this political party not only supports immigrant-friendly positions but also the political careers of people with immigrant origins (Interview 5). When I came to Germany, […] I saw a legislator of immigrant background on television. In this moment, I realized, “It is possible to join a party organization – even for me!” I received German citizenship at a much later date (Interview 8).

Hence it was mostly candidates’ immigrant background that prompted involvement with the party. Immigrant background thus appears to be an inherent part of the personal decision to join a party organization. However, not in all cases did IO candidates find a direct way into party organizations. Affiliated organizations formed alternative routes into party politics. Turkish-origin immigrants in particular went through political organizations which were offshoots of foreign political parties, such as the Föderation der Immigrantenvereine aus der Türkei e.V. (GDF), the Föderation der Demokratischen Arbeitervereine (DIDF), or the Föderation der Volksvereine türkischer Sozialdemokraten (HDF). Only after realizing that improving the political situation in their country of origin does not matter for their everyday life in Germany did some of the interviewees decide to join a German party organization, as the following quote illustrates: The traditional immigrant groups – Greeks, Spaniards, Turks and Italians – were politically active but homeland-oriented […]. Our daily lives were not shaped by the political circumstances here [in Germany] but by homeland politics. Let’s put it like this: our feet were here, but our heads were in Turkey, Greece or Spain. One day, I decided that my head should be where my feet are. I then joined the party youth organization (Interview 1).

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Other IO candidates took a detour through the Councils of Foreigners before joining a German party organization. Criticism leveled at the Councils of Foreigners was their negligible political impact, caused by limited administrative capacities, poor links to other local councils and the internal heterogeneity and disunity (Liebau 1999). Nevertheless, they seem to have played a key part in fostering the political socialization of IO citizens and providing them with the organizational skills to successfully navigate through party organizations. Established politicians from immigrant background have identified their initial difficulties in accessing politics. The initial period as a party member was perceived as a great challenge in most cases. Understanding how party structures and processes work and becoming familiar with the language used within party organizations was described as extremely tedious. This is especially true for first-generation immigrants that made their first steps toward politics in their country of origin, where party language, structure, and culture significantly depart from German organizations. Against this backdrop, one IO candidate found the guidance and instructions by a longstanding party member very helpful: There was a man whose job was to explain to new party members what will happen. Without his introduction, I would have left straight away. He said that the language will be peculiar, that everybody calls each other comrade, and suchlike (Interview 8).

Another aspect the analysis revealed is that most IO candidates did not run for election as party newcomers, but spent years climbing up the intra-party recruitment ladder. Again, in individual cases, political parties were willing to play so-called wild cards, allowing IO candidates to skip the lengthy probation period within party organizations. But newcomer recruitment was only called into action if contenders were equipped with resources that made them eminently qualified to forge closer party ties with IO voters and enhance party expertise in immigration-related issues when no contenders with comparable resources were available in the own membership pool. Above all, close contacts with immigrant organizations, a name recognition and network in the immigration field, and expertise in immigration-related issues turned out to be the main resources for motivating newcomer recruitment. These resources can be gathered either by volunteer engagement, for example, in a foreigner council or integration committee, or by professional work in the immigration field, such as in a social organization, a ministry, or a municipal administration. What we can learn from this is that it is not the immigrant background as such but rather its interplay with other immigration-related properties which can push the political careers of IO candidates. Placing IO candidates that have a credible issue ownership on immigration on their ballot papers is a way for political parties to strengthen their ties with IO voters and signal expertise in immigration to the broader electorate. Moreover, political parties can try to use IO candidates’ networks in the immigration field as means of mobilizing a group of immigrant voters that would have remained untapped otherwise. In other words, it is not the immigrant background itself which usually triggers an opening in candidate selection, but rather its combination with a reputation, expertise and network in the immigration field, which together merge into a strong and credible signal that political parties foster

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the political representation of IO citizens and acknowledge the ethnic diversity of the population: My immigrant background was an important reason [for my early nomination], but it was certainly not the only reason. Due to my voluntary work, I was in regular contact with political organizations, religious organizations and other groups that were involved in integration issues. I thus enjoyed a reputation in this field. My party approached me […] as my nomination was a strategic benefit due to my networks, contacts and expertise […]. The party wanted a known face in the field of integration and migration (Interview 3).

If political parties recruited newcomers of immigrant background, this thrust emanated chiefly from the state party leadership—especially from the party chairman. This comes as no surprise, as it is the state party leadership that defines the general electoral tactic employed in the upcoming election. If the party leadership aspires to signal expertise in migration, while defining IO voters as electorally relevant, it has good reason for prospecting to potential IO candidates that can credibly represent this policy expertise and connect with IO voters. Where necessary, it can recruit party newcomers if no candidate with the required profile is available in their own membership pool. Initial contact between party leadership and external IO candidates usually results from previous meetings, due to a candidate’s prior work on immigration: The party leadership gave me a call because we had a good relationship [due to my prior work on immigration] and asked whether I would like to support this party [in the election]. I took some time for reflection, and then made the decision to join the party (Interview 3).

In explaining why political parties do not make more use of newcomer recruitment to improve minority representation, we have to recall its perils. Not only do native party members feel passed over if newcomers of immigrant background are favored at their expense, but party members from an immigrant background feel disregarded if external IO candidates are chosen over longstanding party members of immigrant background by virtue of their networks and visibility in the immigration field. For them, it is difficult to understand why an external IO candidate without a track record of services on behalf of the party organization would receive a professional mandate, while they remain left out. This predicament is more likely to strain center-left parties, as more immigrants are found among their members: Criticism emanated chiefly from party members who had an immigrant background themselves. Of course, there is an explanation: Generally, you must work your way up, but as a lateral entrant, I got to the top immediately. This caused resentment among parts of the party members of immigrant background […]. I know party members who had tried to get this position for 30 years, and now someone completely new gets the position (Interview 3). In my political party, we do not have the luxury to say, “We will pick an external candidate [of immigrant background]!” There are numerous party members [of immigrant background] who aspire to a political career. […] Therefore, I am against external candidates who come and simply say, “Here I am” (Interview 1). Somebody, a migrant, came to me and said: “Mr. X, I want to go into politics. I want to have a career, quickly.” […]. But this is not possible, as many aspire to come forward within party organizations. There is a conflict of interests (Interview 4).

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But it is not only a potential clash of interests within party organizations which makes newcomer recruitment a hazardous strategy for increasing immigrant representation. There is also the fact that party seniority crucially indicates contender loyalty to party interests and their familiarity with the political realm. Owing to a lack of political experience, novices are more likely to come into difficulty when running election campaigns and organizing their parliamentary work: There are people [of an immigrant background] that are party members for six weeks and then say, “Everyone knows me […], why not nominate me?” The answer is that this is not enough. It is not necessary to be in the party for years, but some basic rules must be followed. One basic rule is that candidates should be known [within the party organization]. We have picked too many candidates that we did not know before, simply because they appeared likable, and then we noticed that it does not work. We need to know whether someone is capable and reliable (Interview 8).

I can conclude by saying that, while the majority of IO candidates joined their political party years before seeking candidacy for the first time, there are exceptional cases where IO candidates run for office as party newcomers on a “wild card”. This usually transpired if IO candidates were in possession of certain resources, such as networks in the immigration field, that were much in demand but could not be covered by longstanding party members from immigrant backgrounds. The crucial point here is that although political parties have the possibility to compensate for the skewed nature of their pool of IO aspirants through newcomer recruitment, this does not seem to be a popular strategy, as it is fraught with intra-party conflicts.

8.2 The Role of Political Office Experience Previous experience in political office is another factor which serves as an acid test to applicant capability at higher-level positions. This said, we have to be aware that previous office experience presents another set of barriers in candidate selection— most notably for groups that are new arrivals in party politics, such as IO citizens. The entrenchment of this trajectory into elected office implies that pathways into parliament remain narrow and exclusionary. As incumbents and party members with experience in political offices are disproportionately native, this impairs immigrant political opportunities. Notwithstanding its relevance, the role that previous experience in political office plays for the nomination of IO candidates—whether it matters to the same degree as for native candidates, or whether it is of more or less importance—has remained unaddressed so far. What is therefore undertaken here is an attempt to nail down the role of office experience for the selection chances of IO candidates. To quantify the amount of experience in office, a count index was generated. The index assembles the subsequent positions: local and state party office, national party office, local legislative office, state legislative office, national legislative office, and mayor and state executive office. To measure the scope of office experience at the juncture at which candidates stood for election for the first time, I have excluded all

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Fig. 8.6 Difference in the number of political offices at first candidacy for native and IO candidates. Note Mean values are indicated by the dashed lines. Difference is significant at p ≤ 0.01 (t-test). N = 864. Source GCS 2013; state-level candidate surveys

candidates that competed for a seat in parliament for the second or third time, or even more often. As Fig. 8.6 demonstrates, the maximum number of held offices at first candidacy amounts to three. A marginal, albeit statistically significant, difference of 0.35 in the mean number of positions between IO and native candidates can be seen. This finding is at first vague, but shows that more newcomers are among the IO candidates, at least as far as office experience is concerned. More specifically, 80% of the IO candidates had won either nothing or one office in advance, compared to only 51% of the native candidates. This may be interpreted as first evidence for political parties seeing office requirements in a more relaxed manner if aspirants of immigrant background try to earn a nomination. However, whether this pattern really relates to their immigrant background or whether other confounding factors lie beneath the relationship can only be found through a multivariate analysis. Another angle from which to look at the office experience that parliamentary candidates bring with them is to break down the type of political office. Accordingly, I have grouped the positions held into party, legislative and executive office.2 As Fig. 8.7 illustrates, party offices are most common, followed by legislative offices, while executive offices are rather rare. Party offices seem to serve as the main springboard for state and national legislative positions. 78% of the native candidates and only 64% of the IO candidates had gained prior experience in the party terrain. This shows that more IO candidates can skip the long recruitment trajectory through a party apparatus that is otherwise integral to legislative careers (Borchert and Zeiss 2003: 151–152). As party offices are immediately in political parties’ sphere of 2 Party office includes local, state, and national party offices. Legislative office includes local, state,

and national legislative offices. Executive office includes mayor and state executive offices.

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Fig. 8.7 Difference in the type of political office at first candidacy for native and IO candidates. Note Fisher’s exact test value is 0.020 for party office, 0.027 for legislative office and 0.066 for executive office. The results are significant at p ≤ 0.1. N = 865. Source GCS 2013; state-level candidate surveys

power, this finding is plausible. In addition to this, 52% of the native candidates and only 38% of the IO candidates came into legislative offices in advance. This serves as a further acknowledgment that IO candidates can take a faster track to their first state- or national-level candidacy than native candidates. Compared to party and legislative offices, executive offices seem to play a minor role in candidate career profiles—either because they form an alternative career arena to the other offices or they constitute the peak of political careers. 5% of the native candidates and none of the IO candidates in the sample had prior experience of executive offices. A third instructive way of looking at prior office experience is to cluster positions by their specific levels. Accordingly, I have grouped them into local-, state-, and national-level offices.3 While local-level offices are said to be integral parts of legislative careers (Herzog 1975), as is clearly reflected in Fig. 8.8, state- and national-level offices are rather exceptional. Usually, a run for local-level office constitutes the main entrance into legislative careers at higher levels and serves as a training ground for acquiring the professional qualifications and resources needed 3 Local

office includes local party office, local legislative office, and mayor office. State office includes state party office, state legislative office, and state executive office. National office includes national legislative office and national party office.

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Fig. 8.8 Difference in level of political office at first candidacy for native and IO candidates. Note Fisher’s exact test value is 0.099 for local-level, 1.0 for state-level, and 1.0 for national-level office. The results are significant at p ≤ 0.1 for local-level office. N = 865. Source GCS 2013; state-level candidate surveys

for higher-level offices. Existing evidence shows the relevance of experience in local politics to staging a candidacy at higher level (Borchert and Zeiss 2003; Detterbeck 2010, 2011; Gruber 2009; Herzog 1975; Rebenstorf 1995). Hard work at a grassroots level helps to make one’s name among local rank-and-file party members, establish a local power base, make one’s face known in the local party, and prove reliability by accepting less prestigious (and mostly unpaid) positions as a volunteer for the party apparatus. Interestingly, despite the centrality of the local level, my findings suggest that IO candidates need less participation in local politics than their native counterparts. While 56% of the IO candidates occupied a local-level office, this applies to 67% of the native candidates. Evidently, more IO candidates can skip the lengthy recruitment trajectory through local-level positions. Once state- and national-level offices come to the fore, however, I cannot see any remarkable differences between IO and native candidates. Even though the descriptive findings have made us assume that IO candidates are less obliged to gain experience in local and party offices, we cannot be certain that their immigrant background is the reason for this. Having established significant differences between IO and native candidates, it is necessary to examine whether this holds once control variables are introduced. To understand the extent to which

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immigrant origin is related to the level of office experience, and not other underlying factors, I ran multivariate regression models. However, with the dependent variable being a count that takes on nonnegative integer values, OLS regression models are inappropriate. Instead, Poisson regression models with robust standard errors should be used here (Cameron and Trivedi 1986; Coxe et al. 2009; Gardner et al. 1995; Gelman and Hill 2007; Lawless 1987). In addition to the socio-demographic background variables, I will hold constant different indicators of political experience, as with increasing party seniority, office experience should also grow. Another factor that might have an impact on candidates’ prior office experience is their engagement with civil society organizations. More precisely, political parties might release candidates from the probation period in previous political offices if compensated by the membership in social organizations that can serve as alternative training grounds. Finally, elections and party fixed effects again account for the pooled structure of the data set. As the coefficients of Poisson regression models are hard to interpret, I have presented AMEs at observed values to allow for a more intuitive interpretation (Cameron and Trivedi 2010: 576). Figure 8.9 visualizes the extent to which each predictor contributes to the explanation of political office experience. What I can derive from the multivariate analysis is that IO candidates are expected to have less office experience than native candidates. This difference withstands statistical controls for the aforementioned

Fig. 8.9 Predictors of the number of political offices at first candidacy. Note The figure displays AMEs at observed values, based on Poisson regression models with robust standard errors. Gray dashed marker is the coefficient from the bivariate model. Coefficients are displayed in model 3 in Table A.2 of the appendix. The horizontal lines represent the 90% confidence intervals around point predictions. The vertical line represents the zero line. Dependent variable coding is a count. References: native, female, mean age, low education, mean years of party membership, mean party activity rate, mean number of org. affiliations, Bundestag election, SPD. N = 813. Source GCS 2013; state-level candidate surveys

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confounding factors. On average, when taking the office index as a basis, IO candidates are expected to have filled 0.18 fewer positions—the difference is statistically significant at a 0.05 level. In the bivariate model (gray dashed estimate), the immigrant origin is even associated with 0.35 fewer previous positions—the marginal effect is statistically significant at a 0.01 level. All in all, this points to a weak preferential treatment of IO candidates over native candidates. Although there is no detailed information on the exact length of time served in office, from the analysis of the length of party activism, it can be seen that slightly more IO candidates are new party members than native candidates. Combing these findings, I can conclude that IO candidates appear to take a somewhat faster track to first candidacy, meaning fewer previous positions and more quickly. Beyond this relationship, I came across some other noteworthy effects. Increasing education comes along with more office experience. Clearly, highly educated individuals are perceived as being more capable of mastering the tasks office-holding entails. Furthermore, in line with my expectations, party seniority and how much time party members invested in party activities are both positively correlated with the amount of experience in prior office. Longstanding and very active party members not only nurse more ambition for winning offices, but they also have a higher likelihood of being entrusted with such a position. The results further suggest, contrary to expectations, that the membership of a social organization does not compensate for office experience. Instead, candidates active in civil society organizations gained more experience in political office. This shows that both membership in party and civil society organizations characterize socially active and highly involved individuals, explaining the positive relationship. Compared to the federal level, state contenders in Hesse are predicted to have more office experience, while no statistically significant effects emerged in Bavaria and Saxony. This clearly demonstrates that state-level candidates have no less professionalization than Bundestag candidates, but that office-holding experience is a pivotal selection criterion both at the state and national level (Borchert and Stolz 2011; Saalfeld 1997). When defining the SPD as a baseline, we can see that candidates for the FDP have accumulated less experience in political positions before winning a nomination at the state or national level, while those of the CDU/CSU have more office-holding experience. One of the reasons for this is that smaller party organizations face greater difficulties in finding enough candidates willing to take the burden of nomination. In general, they not only have smaller supply pools, but also lower prospects of winning. The bulk of the prior findings suggested that the pathway to politics is, on average, somewhat quicker for IO candidates than for native candidates. Where progress has been made by IO candidates, this was, at least in some cases, a reflection of a more open candidate selection, indicated by shorter party membership and fewer prior offices. However, in terms of effect size, immigrant background had a notable but not overly powerful effect, suggesting that it was not the majority of IO candidates who were rookies. Now, to test the robustness of the relationship identified, I will reiterate the same analysis for the 2017 Bundestag election. Migration was one of the key issues of this election. This resulted from German Chancellor Angela Merkel’s unprecedented and divisive decision to open Germany’s borders to refugees

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Fig. 8.10 Difference in the number of political offices at first candidacy for native and IO candidates. Note Mean values are indicated by the dashed lines. Difference is not significant (t-test). N = 469. Source GCS 2017

and abandon border controls between September 2015 and March 2016. The 2017 data can therefore be revealing to understanding the extent to which party selection behavior toward IO candidates is shaped by how much space migration and integration issues take up in public debates. Either political parties make more of an effort to bring IO candidates into legislative seats to demonstrate their acknowledgment of the fact that Germany is an increasingly diverse country, or they avoid selecting IO candidates to sidestep this conflict-ridden topic. A glance at the data from the 2017 Bundestag election reveals that IO candidates held, on average, 1.3 previous positions, while this is 1.5 positions for native candidates—the difference is small and statistically insignificant (see Fig. 8.10). Correspondingly, in the bivariate model, immigrant origin seems to go together with a lower amount of office experience, albeit with a statistically insignificant coefficient (see Fig. 8.11). Once further controls enter the statistical model, the effect of immigrant origin vanishes completely. This is in contrast to the findings above. In the 2017 federal election, it seems that less of an opening was noticeable when compared to 2013. One reason might be that, while in 2013, all the political parties (including the conservative CDU/CSU) attempted to capitalize on the high mobilization potential of voters with immigrant origins, in 2017, the fear of losing votes to the AfD as a new right-wing party was thought to have grown if there were too many immigrants in the party. The appearance and strengthening of the AfD may have let wariness in the selection behavior of centerright parties increase. Proof that this cannot be denied is that the CDU/CSU had less MPs of immigrant background in the current Bundestag than the previous legislative period (Mediendienst Integration 2013, 2017). In this sense, the refugee crisis might

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Fig. 8.11 Predictors of the number of political offices at first candidacy. Note The figure displays AMEs at observed values, based on Poisson regression models with robust standard errors. Gray dashed marker is the coefficient from the bivariate model. The horizontal lines represent the 90% confidence intervals around point predictions. The vertical line represents the zero line. Dependent variable coding is a count. References: native, female, mean age, low education, mean years of party membership, mean party activity rate, mean number of org. affiliations, SPD. N = 450. Source GCS 2017

have been a game changer for the CDU/CSU, leading to a greater tentativeness with respect to the electoral payoffs of IO candidates. Nevertheless, this all boils down to the fact that office experience was somewhat less pronounced among IO candidates, at least in the 2013 and 2014 elections. It is nonetheless important to acknowledge that the difference to native candidates remains rather weak, indicating that skipping participation in political office is far from being a rule. Most IO candidates at state or national level began their foray into legislative careers with experience in local-level and party offices, both of which form crucial training grounds for professional skills and qualifications for higher-level positions to be acquired, and where loyalty to party interests can be proven: I first started in the Council of Foreigners […]. It took a while until I joined my party organization. I started at the local level, and took part in all the party meetings (Interview 4).

Therefore, only on very rare occasions can IO candidates stand for election without involvement in previous political positions. But what characterizes these rare occasions? In line with what I found in Sect. 8.1, political parties only work toward a suspension of their office requirements if IO candidates are considered particularly qualified for tying political parties closer to IO voters and enhancing party expertise in immigration-related issues. This is the case if potential IO candidates have access to much sought-after resources (such as close contacts to immigrant organizations or expertise in immigration-related issues) that the other contenders in the membership pool lack. Hence, it is not the immigration origin itself which makes an opening,

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but rather its interaction with other migration-related resources. Whenever political parties are unable to find candidates with these qualities in their conventional candidate pools, they are forced to reach out to IO candidates with little or no previous experience in office. Usually, the desire to nominate IO candidates with no or little prior office experience emanates chiefly from the higher party ranks, such as state or district party leadership, who intend to establish closer electoral ties with IO citizens through the nomination of IO candidates. However, we must be aware that preferential treatment of inexperienced IO candidates comes at a high price. Party members who can draw on a long record of services to the party organization, including party members of immigrant background, feel overlooked in candidate selection: Usually, you must work your way up. This starts with exhausting election campaigns, putting up posters, doing whatever has to be done in a political party. You must pass through these stages one by one […]. It is hard work […]. In my case, this has been eased [by the party leadership]. I think this is the right decision, because it is not enough to climb up step by step within a party organization. It is also important to remain in touch with the social environment [outside the party organization] […]. This [proceeding] has led to dissatisfaction within the party. Those who work towards elected office for a long time have complained (Interview 3).

At this point, it is important to consider that even skipping the typical intra-party recruitment ladder through lower-level positions does not mean that IO candidates are wholly free of them. Instead, the lack of office experience must be caught up on. Usually, this compensation takes place in advances in candidate selection, as it helps to improve the personal prospects of being selected by boosting visibility in the party organization. Party positions on the district, sub-district, or state party executive boards are the most sought-after, as they provide a broad party network and help cultivate name recognition within the organization. Of course, such compensation attempts are a tremendous challenge, in terms of time. Contenders must juggle their jobs and honorary offices outside the party organization with new party offices: It was an intense period of two years. It [the nomination] did not fall into my lap. This was just the start. Afterwards, you must not only defend your reputation within the party organization, but you must be ten times better than the others. Not because I have an immigrant background, but because I am the favored candidate of the party leadership. […] The real problem was that I lacked the time to participate in all the party boards and committees needed to make myself known within the party. […] This was a time challenge, because I still had my job and my honorary offices [outside the party] (Interview 3).

While the quantitative results suggest that IO candidates gained somewhat less experience in lower-level positions than native candidates when competing for a state or national mandate for the first time, some IO candidates nevertheless felt they came under stricter scrutiny than other party members. Language proficiency seems to be a particularly important criterion for assessing IO candidates’ ability to master higher-level positions. Of course, communicating with voters, writing and delivering speeches are central tasks which come with a mandate: What is true is that some things are expected in a more perfect way from people of immigrant backgrounds than from others who are from the party stable, who have been active in the electoral district for years, who are local natives. But if you have another standing, because

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you are not locally rooted and do not have a large group which supports you, then you must win by yourself […]. It is seen whether a person speaks German very well, and whenever there is an accent, this is regarded as a problem. People from rural areas use dialects, do not speak standard German. But this is then regional, and therefore accepted (Interview 5). 100% is not enough, you must give 110, 120% to have the same chances. In many aspects, it is more natural to take someone [a candidate] without an immigrant background than someone of immigrant background (Interview 2).

IO candidates often still faced the notion that they would not yet be ready for the highest ranks of German politics. In many cases, IO candidates felt exposed to disparaging remarks about their political inexperience. According to these comments, they were not yet prepared for higher-level positions, but had the advice to first gain further experience in lower-level positions. They felt a perception remained that they lacked the appropriate experience in politics and were not yet assertive enough. In the interviews, IO candidates said these remarks were being used as tactics to exclude party members of immigrant background from the contest for legislative seats by sowing doubt about their abilities. By engaging in mudslinging, negative information about an aspirant can be disseminated within the party organization to stop them being selected. Wherever new social groups make successful inroads into party politics and lay claim to political positions, this reduces the number of positions left for other groups in the party organization. To defend their jobs and positions, established groups develop strategies to resist making concessions. Accordingly, the immigrant origin played no notable role until party members of immigrant background started striving for professional mandates that were both scarce and hard-fought. Suddenly, their immigrant background turned into an “immigrant foreground”, as some IO candidates put it. By highlighting the “otherness” (Jensen 2011) of aspirants of immigrant background and stressing their political inexperience, other contenders tried to keep them out of the race for professional mandates: In politics, […] you are confronted with some alleged deficits to kick you out of the race. In the case of people of immigrant background, it is the immigrant background which is considered to be a deficit, while it is something different in other cases […]. In the past, women were excluded because they were women, and they said: “We think you are not capable; you must care for your children.” Now they say: “We think you are not capable yet, your language abilities are insufficient, you cannot make it.” It is an instrument that can be used against you […]. As long as you volunteer for local-level office, which is not about professionalism, full-time office and financial benefits, everything is relaxed […]. But if parliamentary allowances play a role, fighting starts and it becomes harder to get in […]. The air becomes thinner the higher you get. Competition is fierce, and the mechanisms for kicking others out become stronger (Interview 5). As long as you are a follower, you are welcome. But when you want to play a leadership role, they say, “Hold on!” Because then you turn into a competitor. Suddenly, they find things which count against you (Interview 1). As volunteers, immigrants are welcome within the party, but then [at a professional level] infighting with native party members starts (Interview 4).

Overall, I can state that, while office-holding was somewhat less pronounced among IO candidates, involvement in political office remains the rule. Where skipping the trajectory through prior office, IO candidates had to make up the leeway

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to cultivate a party network, as otherwise their political career would be in danger. Although IO candidates had less office experience on average, they partly expressed the feeling that their suitability for high office had been tested more rigorously than in other cases.

8.3 The Role of Localness in Single-Member Districts Geography is considered a fundamental principle of political representation, reflected by its importance in candidate selection. For this simple reason, the vast majority of candidates in SMDs are locals who originate from the electoral district where they run for election (Burmeister 1993: 65; Tavits 2010; Zeuner 1970: 99). Usually, they were born and grew up in the district in which they stand for election and have close contact with the voters on the ground. This gives them the credibility to act as servants on behalf of local voter interests. Local origins provide voters with an indication of a candidate’s familiarity with the needs of the locality and their loyalty. However, we have to recall that party selectors in Germany usually yield to incumbents. This means that most electoral districts are already promised to local incumbents or notables, creating barriers for new groups that stand less of a chance of securing a district nomination. The more local incumbents come out on top in the local candidate selection, the fewer opportunities for new groups like immigrants to safeguard any district nomination. Against this backdrop, local nativity remains an obstacle to mounting the percentage of IO candidates rapidly. These points question the degree to which localness matters in the selection of IO candidates to SMDs, and whether I would find more “parachutists” than among native candidates. Before tapping into a candidate’s rootedness in the electoral district, I needed a valid indicator of localness. While previous research often employed place of birth as an indicator, I decided to undertake an analysis based on the candidates’ residence in the electoral district. This was because, by definition, first-generation immigrants cannot be born in the electoral district where they apply for a mandate. A descriptive comparison of residence in the electoral district between IO and native candidates can provide insights into the role localness plays in the selection trajectories of IO candidates. Figure 8.12 presents a descriptive summary, which contrasts how many of the IO candidates and how many of the native candidates resided in the electoral district where they competed for a mandate. What I can see from the analysis is that, in full conformity with the literature, most candidates indeed live in the district where they stand for election (Burmeister 1993: 65; Pedersen et al. 2007; Tavits 2010; Zeuner 1970: 91–100). The reasons for this are that candidate selection in SMDs remains the dominion of district party organizations and their nominating bodies, making a local reputation and local support networks virtually indispensable for securing a district nomination. Without a doubt, these resources can be acquired most effectively by residing in the electoral district where candidates are striving for a mandate. Localness also provides party selectors with valuable information about the contenders’ familiarity with local needs and preferences and indicates how much

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Fig. 8.12 Difference in local residence in SMDs for native and IO candidates. Note Fisher’s exact test value is 0.17. The result is not significant at p ≤ 0.1. N = 1,057. Source GCS 2013; state-level candidate surveys

vigor they will care with once in parliament. Local residence thus works as a signal of a candidate’s first-hand knowledge of the locality’s specific problems and their willingness to actively engage in advancing these needs. For group comparison, I see that around 85% of the native candidates in the sample but only 78% of the IO candidates lived in the district where they ran for election. Despite a remarkable gap of 7 percentage points, it lacks statistical significance. The findings insinuate that parachuting occurs somewhat more regularly among IO candidates. Localness, however, appears to be a set condition in the candidate selection of SMDs, which can be circumvented only under exceptional circumstances. To fully fathom how immigrant origin is associated with the probability of being a local native in the own electoral district under otherwise equal conditions, it is necessary to move beyond a descriptive analysis and run multivariate regression models. To create equal conditions, I will not only control for socio-demographics, but assume that candidates who have already stood for election in this specific electoral district are more likely to be locals, as they would probably have moved into the electoral district back then. The chance of running for election in the electoral district where candidates live further improves with social and political involvement. It provides the necessary name recognition among local party membership, the selectorate, and the voters to be entrusted with a nomination. The electoral viability of SMDs also plays a role. Political parties might only parachute external candidates into electoral districts if these are in vain, and there is very little to lose. Furthermore, political parties should make use of parachuting to fill open candidacies. SMDs are considered vacant if the previously elected legislator decides not to rerun (Reiser 2013: 134).

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Fig. 8.13 Predictors of local rootedness in SMDs. Note The figure displays AMEs at observed values, based on binary logistic regression models. Coefficients are displayed in model 3 in Table A.3 of the appendix. Gray dashed marker shows the coefficient from the bivariate model. The horizontal lines represent 90% confidence intervals around point predictions. The vertical line represents the zero line. Dependent variable coding is binary: local residence (=1), no local residence (=0). References: native, female, mean age, low education, no repeated candidacy in SMD, mean years of party membership, mean party activity rate, mean number of political offices, no locallevel office, no party office, mean number of org. affiliations, non-viable SMD, no vacant SMD, Bundestag election, SPD. N = 981. Source GCS 2013; state-level candidate surveys

Figure 8.13 provides a visual impression of how much each predictor contributes to the explanation of candidates’ local rootedness. With candidates’ local residence being measured by a dichotomous variable, I have drawn on binary logistic regression models. As binary logistic regression models are nonlinear, their logit coefficients cannot indicate the effect sizes of the predictors (Ai and Norton 2003; Berry et al. 2010; Brambor et al. 2006; Buis 2010; Hosmer 2013; Long and Freese 2001; Norton et al. 2004; Pampel 2001). To nevertheless assess the effect size of each predictor, AMEs at observed values are presented in the following (Hanmer and Kalkan 2013; King et al. 2000; Verlinda 2006). The previous descriptive findings receive full support from the multivariate analysis. Although IO candidates (if equally credentialed) are 4 percentage points less likely than native candidates to originate from the district where they stand for election, the marginal effect clearly lacks statistical significance. Parachuting seems to take place slightly more often for IO candidates, but overall, being a local seems to be a major requirement for securing a district nomination. What I can derive from the findings is that parachuting is in no way a predominant party selection strategy for increasing the number of immigrants in parliament. Where IO candidates entered local district races, this was mostly because they were locals. As several findings emerge from Fig. 8.13, I want to highlight some of the most noteworthy effects of the control variables. Candidates with experience in local

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office are 13 percentage points more likely to be locals. This underlines how much importance political localness gains in the candidate selection of SMDs. Only a local “top dog” that is deep-rooted, both politically and biographically, stands a good chance of becoming the local party face. As hypothesized, political parties are less eager to parachute external candidates into electoral districts if these are winnable. One obvious reason for this is that in viable SMDs, more contenders are poised to run for mandates. If more local contenders strive for office, there is simply no need for external candidates. Another reason is that local rootedness is a crucial voteearning attribute in SMDs (Arzheimer and Evans 2012, 2014; Tavits 2010). Given this, political parties avoid taking the risk of parachuting in the case of promising electoral districts. Compared to the Bundestag candidates, those in Saxony have a 12 percentage points lower probability of being locals, whereas no significant effects are found in the other state elections. Due to smaller party membership in Saxony’s party organizations (Niedermayer 2016), the number of locally rooted contenders on offer might be lower in some places, which makes parachuting a more common selection strategy. A key conclusion from the previous analysis is that attributes like local residence and local rootedness are important in the selection of district seats. Locality works as a cue that provides party selectors and voters with information about candidates’ knowledge of and attachment to local needs. To the extent that locality matters in the candidate selection of SMDs, it becomes a great asset for native and IO candidates alike. Without local origins, very few ways lead to district nomination. For the sake of robustness checks to see whether this finding holds for other elections as well, I re-estimated the previous statistical models, this time using the more recent 2017 Bundestag election data. Note, however, that for the robustness test, I used a somewhat reduced model, with less control variables. Figures 8.14 and 8.15 provide considerable support for the validity of the previous results. While in the descriptive comparison as well as in the bivariate model, no remarkable effect comes from immigrant background, the same finding holds under the control of other confounding factors. This provides enough evidence for drawing robust conclusions from the role that local ties play in the selection of IO candidates. Apparently, being locally based still represents the traditional route to a district nomination for IO candidates, and the 2015 refugee crisis did not bring any change about in circumstances. To conclude, there is unambiguous evidence that no sharp disparities between IO and native candidates exist with respect to biographical localness. Obviously, local origins serve as the main pipelines to candidacies in SMDs—irrespective of having an immigrant background or not. This primarily results from the fact that most candidates started their party activities in the district or sub-district party organizations of the municipalities where they lived (Golsch 1998; Gruber 2009: 149–150; Herzog 1975; Zeuner 1970: 93–95). An apprenticeship in local-level offices—often labeled the “school of politics” (Herzog 1975: 85)—and immediate contact with the local constituency are important pre-stages that prepare aspirants for higher-level offices and help demonstrate political skills and commitment to the party organization. After climbing the career ladder within the own district party organization (the chairman position is most

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Fig. 8.14 Difference in local residence in SMDs for native and IO candidates. Note Fisher’s exact test value is 0.306. The result is not significant at p ≤ 0.1. N = 512. Source GCS 2017

Fig. 8.15 Predictors of local rootedness in SMDs. Note The figure displays AMEs at observed values, based on binary logistic regression models. Gray dashed marker shows the coefficient from the bivariate model. The horizontal lines represent the 90% confidence intervals around point predictions. The vertical line represents the zero line. Dependent variable coding is binary: local residence (=1), no local residence (=0). References: native, female, mean age, low education, mean years of party membership, mean party activity rate, mean number of political offices, no local-level office, no party office, mean number of org. affiliations, SPD. N = 483. Source GCS 2017

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helpful in cultivating local name recognition and forging alliances within the district party organization), running for office at the state or national level can be a next career move. Against this backdrop, participating in district races as an external candidate is the exception rather than the rule. Personal links with the district party organization are an important resource in local candidate selection, which can only be tapped by hard work at the grassroots level. Seeking candidacy in the electoral districts where candidates live comes with the advantage of having certain resources that help with the nomination. This includes local visibility, personal links with the local constituency, and familiarity with the local needs of the electoral district, often gained in private life by membership of local sports clubs or other associations, through work or by having visited a local school: I grew up in the district […] where I have been socially active since my childhood; school, sports and so forth. Because I live there, it is automatically my district (Interview 4). If you run for election, your place of residence is automatically your electoral district. This is my local reference […]. I live there and this is my electoral district. I was in the county council, the city council, I was active in local politics (Interview 5). You run for election where you live. There are of course exceptions. It is not a rule, but it is easier if you run for election where you live.[…] I am active there and I am rooted in the local structures (Interview 1). I am sure that many of the votes I won were not due to my knowledge or experience, but simply because voters said, “I see this candidate every second week. The candidate is in my sports club, at the football field […]!” (Interview 7).

While stating that parachuting is not a prevalent selection strategy for IO candidates, it still occasionally occurs. If their home districts are already pledged to other longstanding local party members, parachuting can be a strategy to accommodate IO candidates in other electoral districts. However, the acceptance of an external candidate hinges on district and sub-district party leadership, which the organizers of local selection proceedings are. Usually, parachuting only occurs in vacant SMDs, where no local party member has indicated having any political aspirations (Zeuner 1970: 66). The reason is that any attempt by local party leaderships to nominate external candidates by ignoring locally rooted aspirants provokes a backlash from the local nominating body and the members of the rank and file: either the local party selectorate demonstrates its disapproval by supporting locally rooted contenders with a track record of services on behalf of the district party organization, or a backlash from the local party members is threatened, resulting in a higher number of local competitors who challenge the external contender. However, even when parachuting succeeds, the grassroots party members might feel overlooked. This is a problem, as it is chiefly the local party membership which helps with the local election campaigns, with party members donating their time and energy to campaign activities. It is therefore essential that SMD candidates enjoy the full backing of the rankand-file party members. This means that parachuting usually only occurs in electoral districts which had remained vacant. If no local contender is available, it is the district party leadership that is responsible for either finding a local contender, bringing an external candidate into play, or taking the opportunity to make their own bid. If the district party leadership fails in its search, it can appoint a finding committee, mostly

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comprising party actors from the district party organization, such as former legislators or leadership members. Such committees help search for qualified contenders inside and outside the electoral district. But even if SMDs had remained vacant, the planned nomination of an external IO candidate could prompt local party members to fight back, as demonstrated by the following case: I live in district A, but this district was already promised to someone else – a person who has worked towards a nomination for 30 years. If I had contested this person, I would have destroyed a party structure that had grown over decades […]. In district B, however, no one had indicated their aspirations when the district party leadership started prospecting for a potential candidate […]. They worked hard to implement me in this electoral district. When my application became official, competitors appeared (Interview 3).

Another example that illustrates the pitfalls of parachuting is Charles M. Huber’s nomination for the 2013 Bundestag election—a Senegalese-German television actor nominated by the CDU in the Darmstadt electoral district. After Huber failed to run for the CSU in his home district München-Ost, as another contender was planned to follow the incumbent legislator, a Darmstadt CDU findings commission approached him. The reason was that the former candidate, Andreas Storm, failed to be elected in 2009, therefore switching as a state secretary to Saarland. The CDU candidacy in Darmstadt had thus remained vacant. With the nomination of Huber, the CDU hoped to benefit from his celebrity status (Street 2012; Wolf 2011), outplaying the incumbent SPD candidate, Brigitte Zypries, who had won the electoral district consistently since 2005. While Huber succeeded in the candidate selection, securing 89.3% of the delegate votes with no opposing candidate, he publicly complained about a lack of campaign support from the local party membership (Rundschau 2013a, b). Huber eventually lost against Zypries with a vote margin of 1.4 pecentage points, but could enter the Bundestag at position 19 of the state party list. In 2014, however, the district party leadership ceased to cooperate, criticizing Huber for his rare presence in the electoral district (Rundschau 2014). This case shows that while parachuting may succeed, it still entails problems with election campaigning and legislative work. No natural relationship with the district party organization exists, providing external parliamentarians with a strong local support base in situations of conflict. Parachuted candidates further lack personal involvement with local issues, so that it is more difficult for them to represent local perspectives in parliament and be fully committed to local needs and interests. Instead, they devote themselves to their specific topics, for which they are experts, and tend to lose sight of constituency issues. What the qualitative interviews further brought to light was that, in most cases, it was the state party leaderships that came up with the idea of parachuting IO candidates into electoral districts. Parachuting is a way to accommodate IO candidates that are considered particularly qualified to forge closer electoral ties with IO voters and hone party expertise in immigration issues while lacking local anchoring in the district party organization to beat other locally rooted aspirants, or where the home district is already promised to another local party member. However, parachuting always requires the consent of the district party organization—and most crucially, the approval of the local party leadership. The reason is that the candidate selection in SMDs is invariably in the hands of district party organizations and their nominating

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bodies (Schüttemeyer 2002; Schüttemeyer and Sturm 2005; Zeuner 1970). Therefore, state party leaderships have no formal access to the local candidate selection that would allow them to oblige district party organizations to abide by their candidate preference. With local party organizations feeling ignored if the state party leadership intervenes in the local candidate selection by dictating who is to be nominated, a backlash becomes very likely. Against this backdrop, district leaderships usually first declare electoral districts vacant. This, in turn, opens an opportunity window for state leaderships or finding committees to propose a potential candidate. But if the state leadership’s favored contender lacks support from the district leadership and local nominating body, parachuting is doomed to failure. While in the run-up to the candidate selection, parachuted IO candidates are released from the hard work at the grassroots level, this needs to be compensated for as quickly as possible. As parachuted candidates lack the electoral advantages that come with local rootedness, local links must be established as quickly as possible in the run-up to the election. With the support of district leadership, parachuted candidates are therefore systematically implemented in the electoral district; they have to aspire to local party or elected offices, join local organizations, participate in local party assemblies, and acquaint themselves with local voters and issues. However, many of the IO candidates who did not live locally had to work part-time due to the time demands of seeking candidature and election: It was difficult for me. It would have been easier to run for election in my home ward [where I live]. Then, I would not have gone onto the streets so often. This made work more difficult. It was a huge investment in terms of time and effort, with long tours through the district and a lot of appointments, which would have been unnecessary in my home district (Interview 3).

All in all, the findings suggest that local nativity is key to seeking candidacy in SMDs. Without local roots, district nomination is mostly out of reach for native and IO candidates alike. Whenever parachuting occurred, there was widespread discontent in local party membership, leading to a greater number of local competitors who challenged the external contender. This explains why parachuting is not commonly used, although it is theoretically an effective way to compensate for the skewed nature of the party supply pools of IO aspirants by accommodating more of those in SMDs.

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Chapter 9

How Political Parties Support the Nomination of Immigrant Origin Candidates

After focusing on the individual political characteristics party selectors look for in a candidate, I will move on to the process-related measures parties can use to support IO candidates in their political aspirations for candidate selection. More specifically, I will look at the relationship between immigrant origins and party support measures for IO candidates. Such supportive measures can take different forms, ranging from encouragement to a winnable nomination.

9.1 The Role of Encouragement To draw in new and more diverse candidate types, political parties can invite party members to consider standing for election. The consideration of a candidacy widely depends on the extent to which a person obtains encouragement to run. Encouragement can thus be employed as a targeted measure for sparking the office ambitions of party members that would not strive for office on their own initiative. If reliant on encouragement in making the initial decision to run for office, any reluctance by political parties to issue invitations would lead to less candidates from immigrant backgrounds. Given the fact that encouragement is a fairly set component of legislative recruitment, I shall examine the manner in which immigrant background interacts with the initial decision to run for office, and the exact process by which IO and native aspirants emerge as candidates for legislative office. With the knowledge that underrepresented groups are the most reliant on an invite to stand for election, I want to better understand whether IO candidates are encouraged to the same degree as native candidates. Figure 9.1 provides a descriptive account of encouragement attempts among IO and native candidates. It reveals that only one-fifth of the candidates made the decision to stand for election entirely by

© The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2021 S. Ceyhan, How German Parties Select Candidates of Immigrant Origin, Springer Series in Electoral Politics, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-59451-0_9

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Fig. 9.1 Difference in encouragement to run for election for native and IO candidates. Note Fisher’s exact test value is 0.603. The result is not significant at p ≤ 0.01. N = 780. Source GCS 2013

themselves. The majority threw their hats into the ring after others had asked them to make a bid for nomination, which confirms previous findings (Allen and Cutts 2017; Broockman 2014b; Carroll and Sanbonmatsu 2013; Fox and Lawless 2010; Lawless and Fox 2005, 2010; Sanbonmatsu 2006a). The results strongly suggest that the decision to strive for a candidacy is not made individually in most cases, but is largely affected by social impulses. This gives a competitive edge to individuals that are deeply embedded in party networks. Only by having manifold contacts within the party organization can aspirants receive encouragement to run for office. When comparing IO and native candidates, only a small difference (3 percentage points) emerges. While fewer IO candidates in the sample were encouraged in their ambitions to run for office, the group difference is weak and statistically insignificant. This means that although political parties can theoretically attempt to shape their candidate pools by inviting certain individuals to make a bid for office (Broockman 2014b), they do not seem to use encouragement as a targeted measure to increase the number of IO candidates in practice. To disentangle the degree to which immigrant origin affects chances of encouragement under otherwise equal conditions, binary logistic regression models are presented next. This modeling strategy aims to capture how much variance in chance of encouragement is explained by immigrant origin under otherwise equivalent political qualifications. As binary logistic regression models are nonlinear, AMEs at observed values are presented, allowing for a more intuitive interpretation of the results (Hanmer and Kalkan 2013; King et al. 2000; Verlinda 2006). Besides socio-demographic background variables, I will check for incumbency status, with incumbents usually having an electoral edge over novices, given their reputation and networks (Erikson 1971; Gelman and King 1990; Hainmueller and Kern 2008; Lee

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2001; Levitt and Wolfram 1997). I also assume that longstanding, highly experienced, and well-connected party members are considered more qualified to compete for office, increasing their chance of encouragement (Allen 2013; Niven 2006). In addition, they have more of the party contacts from which encouragement might originate. Figure 9.2 provides further confirmation of the above observation: Immigrant background has no impact on the chance of encouragement. We can see that the lack of effect is sustained by the data also when holding other factors constant. The marginal effect clearly suggests that an immigrant background forms no decisive factor in shaping the likelihood of encouragement. More specifically, the estimated size of the marginal effect is only 3 percentage points and lacks statistical significance. In other words, no systematic difference between IO and native candidates exists for their chance of being invited to make a bid for nomination. As already suggested by the descriptive statistics, encouragement plays an important role in the recruitment of both groups of candidates, immigrant origin or not. IO candidates are just as likely as native candidates to receive a political source’s encouragement to run for office. While this suggests a neutral treatment of IO candidates, it also means that party recruiters do not make full use of the recruitment activities they theoretically have to increase the number of IO candidates.

Fig. 9.2 Predictors of encouragement to run for election. Note The figure displays AMEs at observed values, based on binary logistic regression models. Coefficients are displayed in model 3 in Table A.4 of the appendix. Gray-dashed marker is the coefficient from the bivariate model. The horizontal lines represent the 90% confidence intervals around point predictions. The vertical line represents the zero line. Dependent variable coding is binary: encouragement (=1), no encouragement (=0). References: native, female, mean age, low education, no incumbent, mean number of legislative terms, mean number of prior candidacies, mean years of party membership, mean party activity rate, mean number of political offices, no local-level office, no party office, mean number of org. affiliations, SPD. N = 731. Source GCS 2013

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Unexpectedly, most control variables fail to meet conventional levels of statistical significance, with some exceptions that deserve attention. Male candidates are 11 percentage points less likely than their female counterparts to be emboldened by others. This sides with research on women recruitment (Carroll and Sanbonmatsu 2013; Sanbonmatsu 2006b). While men more often tend to be self-recruiters, who have the self-confidence to enter electoral races of their own accord and deem themselves qualified enough to stand for election, women remain more dependent on external impulses to make a bid for nomination. Moreover, we can see that candidates from the FDP have 13 percentage points less probability than SPD candidates of being invited to step forward and seek candidacy. This is fully in line with the party’s liberal ideology, which gives weight to the notion of personal responsibility. Candidates of BÜNDNIS 90/DIE GRÜNEN are also less likely to be asked to run for election—here, with a gap of 15 percentage points. To test whether the above finding has remained firm over time or whether the refugee crisis in 2015 brought about a change in how vigorously political parties encourage potential IO candidates to seek candidacy, I reiterated the above analyses, but now based on the 2017 Bundestag data (see Figs. 9.3 and 9.4). The substantive results of these analyses underpin the previous ones. In a descriptive comparison, we see that 28% of the IO candidates were self-recruiters, compared to 25% of the native candidates—the difference is small and statistically insignificant. A similar picture emerges in a multivariate analysis: While in the bivariate model (gray-dashed estimate) no statistically significant difference between IO and native candidates’ likelihood of experiencing encouragement to enter electoral contests arises, this does not change after checking for a series of socio-demographic and political variables. This further underscores the fact that there appears to be no difference between IO

Fig. 9.3 Difference in encouragement to run for election for native and IO candidates. Note Fisher’s exact test value is 0.343. The result is not significant at p ≤ 0.01. N = 654. Source GCS 2017

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Fig. 9.4 Predictors of encouragement to run for election. Note The figure displays AMEs at observed values, based on binary logistic regression models. Gray-dashed marker is the coefficient from the bivariate model. The horizontal lines represent the 90% confidence intervals around point predictions. The vertical line represents the zero line. Dependent variable coding is binary: encouragement (=1), no encouragement (=0). References: native, female, mean age, low education, no incumbent, mean number of legislative terms, mean number of prior candidacies, mean years of party membership, mean party activity rate, mean number of political offices, no local-level office, no party office, mean number of org. affiliations, SPD. N = 621. Source GCS 2017

and native candidates at this initial stage, where the decision to seek candidacy for a political party through external encouragement is made. Encouragement being no specific measure that political parties adopt in order to increase their numbers of IO candidates is a particularly striking finding, but it seems to be integral to candidate emergence more generally. Accordingly, most IO candidates said they had received encouragement from other party actors, but this in no way related to their immigrant background. They instead described making a bid for nomination without being asked by other party actors as a clear evidence of missing intra-party support, curtailing the chances of nomination. To be invited to stand for election, high intra-party visibility is usually required, earned through previous political positions or other party activities, such as canvassing. Only with these conditions can aspirants be seen by potential recruiters who can embolden office-seeking ambitions. Many IO candidates emphasized the importance of targeted encouragement in making the decision to stand for election. This helped them to see office-seeking as something reachable, and became confident enough to put themselves forward. In party-centered recruitment systems like the German one, being asked by other party actors to run for election seems to be integral to candidate emergence. At the same time, however, encouragement did not happen without previous indications of political ambition (Allen and Cutts 2017). Approaching other party actors and declaring the own political aspirations,

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while being backed in these plans, was described as a key to candidate emergence. Together, these findings suggest that encouragement only reproduces patterns of self-recruitment and is therefore not an effective remedy for a low supply of applicants from immigrant backgrounds. Only those who had thought about a mandate anyway and became active in this regard are the ones who were finally asked to do so. Those who weeded themselves out by never having considered entering an electoral contest are not usually offered encouragement. Consequently, party members of immigrant origin still need the self-confidence and political ambition to step out and signal their political aspirations to stand for election. If they lack political aspirations, as they deem themselves not qualified enough, do not yet know how to play the political game, or had never thought about standing for election, as immigrants in parliament are still rare, they are unlikely to receive any invites to seek candidacy. Only in cases where such signaling of political aspirations would be suspended as a condition of encouragement can political parties mobilize more party members from underrepresented groups to seek office. Another hurdle in candidate selection that the interviews described was the perception of closed cliques and informal patronage. As encouragement mostly happens within established cliques of party organizations, this was argued to reinforce existing underrepresentation. Aspiring candidates from underrepresented groups first need to expand their networks within the party organizations to come under the radar of party recruiters, receiving more invites to stand for election. Currently, underrepresented groups were described as having just started out on this path. Not being part of an entrenched party circle therefore weakens aspirants from underrepresented groups in seeking candidature in greater numbers. In the run-up to candidate selection, party members keen on being nominated usually start proclaiming their political aspirations to other party actors. Most of the IO candidates interviewed therefore started approaching other party members and local party leaders about their aims two years before the election. After declaring their political aspirations, they needed to wait for feedback. This helped in seeing whether they have enough intra-party support to potentially succeed in candidate selection, and are considered qualified to represent their political party in the election. Being too pushy by ignoring negative feedback is generally disapproved and was described as leading to a failure in candidate selection in most cases: Generally, you toss your hat into the ring by saying, “I would like to run for office.” There are cases in which candidates are asked whether they would be interested. But, generally, you must signal your interest in the run-up (Interview 4). […] I signaled to certain positions, “Yes, I can image [running for election], why not?” or, “If you don’t want to continue, I can do it” and so on. Then you have to wait until someone says, “It would be great if you did it!” and then you can simply say, “Yes, of course.” [In my case], it was the district party chairman (Interview 2). There was a time when I was asked whether I could imagine [standing for election], but I rejected […]. Then a thought came to my mind: “If more people of immigrant background are to go into politics, people that are willing to do so are needed.” Always demanding more people of immigrant background in politics but then saying no and staying in your comfort zone is not possible. I got up the courage to say: “I want to stand for election!” and then I started calling people to see whether I had a chance or not. Of course, you ask your district

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party by saying, “I would like to become a candidate, what do you think, would you support my candidacy?” You ask other party members—“Could you imagine supporting me, what should I consider?” You simply talk to the people you know, and then act strategically: who is the party chairman, who are the other people that aspire to be in office? You also talk to them (Interview 5).

All the IO candidates interviewed mentioned rank-and-file party members or higher-ranking party actors, such as the local party leadership, as the chief sources of encouragement. Private social environments like family or friends played a minor role, as it is only the party environment that can provide realistic and honest feedback on individual selection chances. Instead, the private environment was consulted before any political aspirations were notified publicly, as election campaigning and office-holding are time-consuming and usually come at the expense of one’s personal life. As highlighted in one of the above interviews, it is only in rare cases that party actors approached IO candidates to consider seeking a candidacy when not having signaled any political aspirations before. Whenever this happened, it was either because candidacies remained vacant and party organizations came under pressure to reach out to potential candidates, or party newcomers possessed big networks, visibility, and expertise in the immigration field, which political parties hoped to benefit from in the election: Due to my honorary offices [in the immigration field], I was not affiliated to any political party […] to keep the doors open for negotiation and cooperation […]. Because of my volunteer work, I was approached by different state party representatives (Interview 3). The proposal came from the local party leadership […]. I was approached and asked whether I would do it […]. The idea was not mine, but I was approached and asked (Interview 6).

As mentioned, close links to immigrant organizations and expertise in the immigration field were the driving forces, triggering targeted encouragement attempts toward potential IO candidates. In most cases, immigrant origin as a stand-alone characteristic did not induce an opening, but its conjunction with other migrationrelated resources led to invites to stand for election. This combination was thought to boost an IO candidate’s ability to establish electoral ties with IO citizens and improve political parties’ proficiency in migration policy. While certainly helpful in candidate selection, the relationship described above turned out to be a double-edged sword. IO candidates generally face strong incentives to present themselves as experts on migration policy that can credibly represent party positions on immigration issues, and act as bridge-builders to immigrant communities. Migration-related assets, such as links to immigrant organizations, can provide IO candidates with strong issue ownership in this field. Accordingly, some IO candidates said that their close links with immigrant organizations helped them with their nomination. This was mostly the case if party leaders picked out immigration as a key issue in the upcoming election and looked for potential IO candidates with credible issue ownership in this field. Whenever no alternative contenders with equal qualities were prepared to run for election, the strong issue ownership of migration policy turned into a career accelerator. Links to immigrant organizations and expertise on migration policy can therefore provide aspirants of immigrant background with a unique selling point,

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which can boost candidate selection in cases where no alternative contenders with similar qualifications are available. To place particular emphasis on their intermediary roles, some IO candidates mentioned their links with immigrant organizations in their application speech at the nominating convention. They reported feeling pigeonholed as cultural brokers by political parties and immigrant communities anyway, and, therefore accepted this role and took advantage of it. Several IO candidates had the feeling that parts of the immigrant population ascribed to them increased understanding, empathy, and shared experiences in German society. They were further assumed to represent immigrant interests more authentically than native candidates and better transmit immigrant interests to the political arena: “Outside the party, some think ‘they are one of us’ and place their trust in you” (Interview 5). Political parties were described to hold the belief that immigrant communities will receive party messages more clearly if they were imparted by IO candidates. But fellow party members also ascribed the role of immigration experts to IO candidates. They perceived them as specialists in certain policy fields, in particular, migration and integration policy, even if the IO candidate had a completely different policy profile. “I knew I did not want to work on this topic. But still, party colleagues were calling to ask, ‘What do you think about the burqa debate?’” (Interview 8). Others reported that, after they had been pushed into a middleman role for years, they finally resigned: “A fellow party member said, ‘Don’t accept this immigrant role!’ […] I said, ‘Why? For 30 years, the party has tailored this role to me even though I refused’” (Interview 1). Conversely, IO candidates also expressed concern about being reduced to the role of cultural brokers and falling into the trap of being perceived as token migrants. Being seen as a party expert in immigration issues but not in the major policy fields (like finance, economy, defense, or infrastructure) can turn into a glass ceiling that keeps party members from immigrant backgrounds from rising beyond a certain level of the political hierarchy. Some of the IO candidates interviewed therefore decided to skirt any broker role or the position of immigration experts in their party organizations from the very beginning of their party engagement. Such candidates also tended to emphasize that their immigrant background does not automatically translate into expertise in migration policy, even though political parties partly seem to insinuate such a relationship. To surmount the marker of being brokers to immigrant communities and experts on immigration issues, they had not only established links with immigrant organizations but either expanded their portfolio by additional organizational affiliations or even reported avoiding any close contacts with immigrant organizations: I did this consciously: I did not want to be hustled into the role of a token migrant. This can happen in political parties. If they have a person who works on the [immigration] topic, other persons feel less obliged to deal with this topic, while thinking they can deal with the more important issues (Interview 6). I tried to establish links with Muslim, Turkish, Moroccan, Russian, Croatian organizations. I tried to forge links with the whole immigrant spectrum in my electoral district. But I also tried to establish links with non-migrant associations, to not allow anyone to think I only represent immigrants (Interview 5).

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It was important for me to make it clear to people who didn’t know me and thought “this candidate only works on integration topics” that the well-being of all the people in my electoral district was important to me, not only IO citizens. This would have been deadly in the election (Interview 3). I did not emphasize migration and integration topics. I learned from other candidates that voters then asked: “Is there somebody who represents our interests and not only migrants’ interests?” (Interview 4).

Often, those party actors that encouraged IO candidates to stand for election also served as mentors in candidate selection. They provided crucial information about the informal rules and routines of candidate selection and prevented aspiring candidates from violating these principles, such as to which other party actors the political aspirations should be signaled. In the interviews, IO candidates also stressed their mentor’s psychological and emotional importance in strengthening perseverance throughout the lengthy recruitment process. Such backing was acknowledged as helping candidates continue to build a successful career and pull them through the tedious candidate selection process. Furthermore, mentors were partly equipped with high intra-party visibility and name recognition. Their advocacy then was important when demonstrating that a prospective candidate has the intra-party support required to become the party face and voice in an election. Empirically, mentoring can take various forms, ranging from having a politically experienced person to ask practical questions to, to public advocacy, information on the informal party rules, routines and structures, advice on the application speech at the nominating convention, and access to important party networks: [The mentor] said that my speech [at the nominating convention] should not exceed five minutes, that I should present myself and refer to one political topic […]. A member of the district party leadership proofread my speech (Interview 6). You can ask questions in a closed room by saying “I have the feeling that certain people will not agree with my candidacy, how can I find out, how can I protect myself, how can I react?” Or “how do I give a speech, how do I detail what is important?” […]. But the mentor did not call others and say “this is a good contender!” It was more about the questions I had, and I could go to someone who was familiar with the business and who was trustworthy (Interview 5). [Mentoring works through] a) advice, b) advocacy, and c) the investment of time. You meet, talk about things, introduce these people into certain networks by saying “look, I brought this person. He or she is good and together we support this person.” You introduce someone into existing networks, existing structures, […] you pull someone on his or her way and make sure that this person will develop quickly (Interview 2).

Especially for party newcomers from immigrant backgrounds, encouragement from other party actors and mentor support played a key role when considering standing for election. Mentoring for party newcomers of an immigrant background often takes place top-down. As the party leadership is the key actor in reaching out to external IO candidates, it is the party leadership which mostly provides them with advice. Conversely, IO candidates that are already deeply anchored in the own party organization receive mentorship chiefly from their district or the sub-district party where they are politically active, or from other experienced officeholders in the electoral district, such as current or former legislators. Unlike externally recruited IO

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candidates, they find mentors through party networks, resulting from their previous party activities at a local level. A final point to make is that IO candidates who previously worked as parliamentary assistants to legislators often find mentors in these former or current officeholders. This shows that occupations in the political realm can give a competitive edge in candidate selection, providing aspirants with relevant party contacts. As has been shown, encouragement is not specifically in use to improve the diversity of political parties’ candidate lists, but is integral to candidate emergence more generally. Candidates have to signal their political aspirations in advance before being asked to make a bid for office, meaning that political parties usually recruit candidates within the narrow circle of ambitious contenders, while making little effort on outreach to increase the number of IO candidates. Because the pool of aspirants from immigrant backgrounds is skewed anyway, these neutral encouragement patterns imply that the pool of candidates also remains skewed toward native candidates.

9.2 The Role of Competition in Candidate Selection The degree to which candidate selection is contested impacts individual nomination chances. The more contestants an aspirant faces in the candidate selection, the more difficult it becomes. Political parties can, at least to some extent, shape the amount of competition in candidate selection by mobilizing aspirants to seek nomination or attempting to reduce the number of intra-party competitors by thwarting their aspirations. While it is acknowledged that intra-party competition has a bearing on the individual chances of being picked as a candidate, we have little knowledge of whether IO candidates need to beat a larger number of competitors than native candidates, explaining their underrepresentation, or whether political parties support their nomination by trying to keep competitors out of the race. This is important to clarify, because a systematically higher counter-mobilization against IO candidates would suppress immigrants’ political ambition and ultimately curtails their aspirations for a candidacy. It is in the run-up to nominating conventions in SMDs that contenders usually go around the local party chapters, introduce themselves and their political positions to local party members in 15 to 30 minute speeches, and address their questions. When party member assemblies decide who will vie for office, these tours help introduce the contenders to the local party membership and mobilize their support. Where delegate assemblies make the selection, these tours give the delegates a sense of the preferences which prevail in local party membership. In some cases, party members are even asked for non-binding votes that flow into the decision-making of the delegates. If contenders feel that they lack the intra-party support required to be nominated, or are unable to shoulder the burden which comes along with a nomination, they usually revoke their applications. Only toward the end of these tours does the actual number of contenders that will make a bid for a nomination

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emerge. In cases where the electoral district embraces more than one district party, the candidate selection is often organized in a multistage way. Each district party selects its favored candidate before the candidates of each district party compete at the joint nominating convention. To understand whether the level of competition in candidate selection is a factor that impedes the selection of IO candidates into district seats, Fig. 9.5 shows a descriptive summary of the level of competition in SMDs. Although the measurement is based on subjective perceptions, candidates have a fairly realistic and comparable grasp of competition, as this forms a prominent subject in intra-party discussion. Against the backdrop of previous insights, we have to keep in mind that the measurement only refers to competitors at the official nominating convention, possibly underrating the overall level of competition at earlier informal selection stages (Reiser 2011: 251; 2013: 138). Surprisingly, most of the candidates in the sample indicated having faced no competition in the selection. This corresponds to Reiser’s findings on the 2009 Bundestag election (2011: 250), in which 77% of the nomination proceedings in SMDs remained entirely uncontested. The finding suggests that local selection is, at least to some extent, orchestrated by a circle of local party leaders, clearing the field of competitors according to their preferences and depriving the party selectorate of its influence on the selection outcome (Kaack 1969b; Zeuner 1970). When focusing on the differences between IO and native candidates, it occurs to me that fewer IO candidates ran in uncontested proceedings—the difference is 9 percentage points and statistically significant at a 0.1 level. More IO candidates stood in highly contested selection procedures: The difference to native candidates is 5 percentage

Fig. 9.5 Difference in the level of competition in SMDs for native and IO candidates. Note Fisher’s exact test value is 0.10. The result is significant at p ≤ 0.1. N = 1,078. Source GCS 2013; state-level candidate surveys

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points here. This offers tentative evidence that the number of competitors in SMDs is systematically higher for IO candidates, making it harder to succeed. For party lists, committees (often formed by state party leadership) usually prepare proposals for the list ranking. This eases the complex approval process (Schüttemeyer 2002: 151; Schüttemeyer and Sturm 2005: 546), in which myriads of claims and aspirations need to be balanced (Reiser 2014; Roberts 1988; Zeuner 1970). One exception is BÜNDNIS 90/DIE GRÜNEN, which mostly draws on open selection processes. However, even if list proposals are prepared in advance, this does not rule out competition. At the nominating convention, contenders with lower ballot positions can still challenge competitors at higher slots. After finding some preliminary evidence that IO candidates face a larger number of competitors when seeking candidacy in SMDs, it would be interesting to see whether the same applies to party lists. Figure 9.6 therefore provides a descriptive summary of the level of competition on party lists. What strikes me most is that the overall level of competition seems to be fiercer than in SMDs. While only 19% of the native candidates and 24% of the IO candidates in the sample competed in highly contested SMD selection proceedings, 37% felt highly contested on party lists. This difference can first be explained by the size of electoral districts. The constituency of MMDs is much larger than in SMDs, resulting in a higher number of contenders competing for a list slot. Second, as only SPD and CDU/CSU have realistic prospects of winning nominal races, viable list nominations are virtually the only way into parliament for FDP, BÜNDNIS 90/DIE

Fig. 9.6 Difference in the level of competition on party lists for native and IO candidates. Note Fisher’s exact test value is 0.45. The result is not significant at p ≤ 0.1. N = 1,158. Source GCS 2013; state-level candidate surveys

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GRÜNEN, and DIE LINKE candidates, reflected by more competition for a list position.1 By a small difference (of 3 percentage points), more IO candidates felt entirely uncontested when compared to native candidates. Overall, however, the difference between both groups of candidates is small and lacks statistical significance. Taken together, descriptive evidence for a stronger mobilization against IO candidates in SMDs is provided, whereas on party lists, neutral patterns become evident. But descriptive statistics alone are insufficient for determining whether and to what extent immigrant background is related to the level of intra-party competition. To explore how the probability of running in contested selection proceedings depends on the immigrant background if otherwise similarly situated, binary logistic regression models were used. Besides socio-demographics, I will check for a clutch of indicators covering the individual amount of political experience, including incumbency, number of terms served in parliament, number of previous candidacies, years of party membership, party activity rate, number of political offices, experience in locallevel and party office, and number of organizational affiliations. As such resources make a candidate a top-notch choice, competition should drop off accordingly. Longstanding, highly experienced, and well-connected candidates will probably find more acceptance within their party organizations, diminishing the likelihood of countermobilization. For SMD nominations, I will further include local residence in the electoral district, as external candidates should witness more contestation. In addition, while having stood for election in the same district in the previous election but failing to secure a seat in parliament reduces competition, open candidacies where the formerly elected legislator no longer runs for election tend to be highly contested (Reiser 2013; Steg 2016: 132; Zeuner 1970). Finally, previous research revealed that electorally viable nominations attract more aspirants than unpromising races (Reiser 2013: 143–144; Zeuner 1970: 35). To disclose predictors’ effect sizes, AMEs at observed values are reported in Fig. 9.7, based on binary logistic regression models. The marginal effects offer additional evidence for IO candidates being more likely to encounter contestants than native candidates if seeking nomination in SMDs—the difference in probability is 10 percentage points and statistically significant at a 0.01 level net of other confounding variables. In the bivariate model (gray-dashed square), the difference is even 13 percentage points, with a statistical significance at a 0.05 level. The multivariate results confirm the fact that IO candidates are more likely to face rivalry when aspiring to run for election in SMDs. Despite comprehensive control of confounding factors, a positive effect of immigrant origin on the probability of being contested emerges. Consequently, evidence suggests that IO candidates are more likely to witness counter-mobilization, meaning that they must face more challengers to become nominees in SMDs. When IO candidates stood for election, they

1 There

are some exceptions. In the Saxon state election, DIE LINKE won Leipzig 2. In the Bundestag election, Berlin-Treptow-Köpenick, Berlin-Marzahl-Hellersdorf, Berlin-Pankow, and Berlin-Lichtenberg were won by DIE LINKE. BÜNDNIS 90/DIE GRÜNEN won BerlinFriedrichshain-Kreuzberg-Prenzlauer Berg Ost.

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Fig. 9.7 Predictors of the competition for nomination. Note The figure displays AMEs at observed values, based on binary logistic regression models. Coefficients are displayed in models 3 in Table A.5 of the appendix. Gray-dashed markers display the coefficients from the bivariate models. The horizontal lines represent the 90% confidence intervals around point predictions. The vertical line represents the zero line. Dependent variable coding is binary: somewhat to highly contested (=1), not or hardly contested (=0). References: native, female, mean age, low education, no incumbent, mean number of legislative terms, mean number of prior candidacies, mean years of party membership, mean party activity rate, mean number of political offices, no local-level office, no party office, mean number of org. affiliations, no local residence in SMD, non-viable SMD, no repeated candidacy in SMD, no vacant SMD, Bundestag election, SPD, non-viable list position. N for SMDs = 962; N for party lists = 1,076. Source GCS 2013; state-level candidate surveys

had to compete against more candidates than their native peers, and this is regardless of their political credentials or the district’s electoral prospects. Party restraint can be attributed to the anticipated perception of the electorate’s preferences and the endeavor to pick candidates who will gain acceptance by the majority of voters. I can therefore conclude that local candidate selection constitutes a significant barrier for able IO candidates. While previous studies have frequently attested to such a relationship, I can now pinpoint one of the underlying mechanisms: the higher competition that IO candidates tend to face in SMD candidate selection. The finding goes well together with electoral system literature (Norris 2006; Ruedin 2013; Rule 1986; Rule and Zimmerman 1994; Siaroff 2000), bringing forward the argument that candidate selection in SMDs is a zero-sum game which is largely to the detriment of underrepresented groups. SMDs give an advantage to candidates that resemble the average (male and native) voter. This reflects the assumption by local political parties that fielding an IO candidate will curb their electoral success. To prevent aspiring IO candidates from coming forward as candidates, higher mobilization against them seems to occur. In other words, where IO

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candidates competed in SMD races, they had to face a larger number of contestants. It looks as though local political parties are conservative when it comes to candidate selection. The analysis therefore suggests that local candidate selection constitutes a significant barrier to aspiring IO candidates on their path to standing for election. From the control variables, I can make some interesting observations: Male candidates have a 6 percentage points lower probability of being contested than women. This highlights the zero-sum logic of SMDs, being a bar to the nomination of candidates from underrepresented groups. Apparently, this not only applies to IO candidates, but concerns women as well. By a difference of 17 percentage points, incumbents are less likely to face contestants than novices or candidates who failed to enter parliament in a previous election. This results from an informal rule within German party organizations, stipulating that incumbents are usually not challenged (Reiser 2013: 134; Schüttemeyer and Sturm 2005: 550; Zeuner 1970). As long as their constituency work and service to the electoral district find general approval, they remain unchallenged (Zeuner 1970: 93). Even if they come in for criticism, incumbent re-selection is mostly a foregone conclusion, as they receive better list positions than novices. This can guarantee representation in parliament even if the electoral district is not won (Reiser 2013: 135–136). In support of the above expectation, winnable districts are more contested than hopeless districts—the gap amounts to 16 percentage points. Seeking candidacy in a promising district is nearly the same as competing for a seat in parliament, motivating more people to enter the race. Candidates with a previous but unsuccessful candidacy in an electoral district face less rivalry. This shows that not only does an incumbency advantage exist, but holding a candidacy can turn into an advantage as well. Conversely, candidates in vacant SMDs are more likely to face opponents—the difference to non-vacant SMDs is 20 percentage points. This is explained by the fact that, as an officeholder withdraws, a unique, albeit rare, window of opportunity opens for aspiring candidates. As long as the officeholder seeks renomination, they have priority in the candidate selection. The last effect I want to highlight pertains to the political parties. Candidates from FDP, BÜNDNIS/DIE GRÜNEN, and DIE LINKE are less likely to face contestation than those from SPD and CDU/CSU. This is hardly surprising, as only SPD and CDU/CSU have realistic prospects of winning in SMDs (Schüttemeyer and Sturm 2005: 548). In smaller political parties, it is more difficult to find volunteers willing to spend the time on the campaign trail without reaping any electoral rewards. Mirroring the above findings, there was the widespread perception in the interviews that local parties are more conservative than state parties when it comes to candidate selection. Indeed, one IO candidate detailed that, prior to their nomination, competitors were mobilized with the aim of thwarting the IO candidate’s nomination. But the candidate also pointed out that, in this specific case, the reason was not the immigrant background itself, but the fact that the contender was a party newcomer, recruited outside the party context due to extensive expertise and networks in the immigration field. This candidate therefore enjoyed strong backing from state and district leadership. As a direct consequence, other longstanding party members that had assumed they were next in line on the ballot felt ignored and exploited, resulting in greater counter-mobilization. This case shows the intra-party conflicts that can

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follow efforts to open up candidate selection to IO citizens or other underrepresented groups. Obviously, preferential treatment is one of the mechanisms that can fuel higher competition for SMD nominations: There was this district nominating convention […]. In advance, they tried to prevent my selection. […] state-wide, they tried to influence my district party (Interview 3).

While counter-mobilization occurred, the party leadership did not try to convince other contenders to withdraw but approached the party selectors, as the IO candidate reported. The party leadership voiced their candidate preference by making a well-grounded recommendation, calling on the nominating body to support their candidate. While these endeavors often cause other challengers to withdraw, as they see no chance of winning, the party leaders’ top-down influence did not go so far as to try to curb intra-party competition by asking contenders to revoke their applications, though this is not ruled out in each and every case (Reiser 2011: 255). The main reason for restraint was that the state party has no legal access to candidate selection in SMDs, which remains the exclusive domain of district parties (Schüttemeyer 2002: 151; Schüttemeyer and Sturm 2005: 546; Zeuner 1970). The district party leaders also held back from overtly interfering in local candidate selection, as attempts to clear the field of contenders to the benefit of their preferred candidates come with problems. Undermining intra-party democracy by trying to convince contenders to revoke their applications is strongly opposed, potentially provoking a backlash from local members. To punish excessive top-down interventions, local party members tend to support rival contenders on purpose, making the candidate selection less predictable for the district leaders. Eventually, this can turn into a drawback for their favored candidate: There have been opponents. […] In public debates, we competed and then the vote took place. In no way, did they try […] to keep others out of the race just because party leadership wanted me to enter parliament. It was a democratic election (Interview 3).

Another example from the 2013 Bundestag election showed that preferential treatment can stir up anger within party organizations, bringing other contestants to the scene. Though Cemile Giousouf had little office experience and joined the CDU recently (in 2009), she succeeded in securing the candidacy in the electoral district Hagen-Ennepe-Ruhr-Kreis I, which stands out due to its large IO population (Fröhlingsdorf and Gezer 2013). Armin Laschet, CDU chairman in North RhineWestphalia, strongly supported her nomination, as he strived to open up the CDU to IO citizens to tap their electoral support; Muslims with conservative values were the main addressees. Since Giousouf is a Muslim whose parents belong to a Turkish minority in Greece, her nomination was used to demonstrate that the CDU acknowledges ethnic diversity and takes great interest in IO citizens’ political representation. Overall, it was hoped that her nomination would help the CDU get rid of its reputation for being skeptical of immigration. Although Giousouf was an active party member in CDU Aachen, she became a candidate in the electoral district Hagen-Ennepe-Ruhr-Kreis I after local candidates were lacking and a finding commission failed to find a suitable candidate. The

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district party leaders approached the state party to recommend a potential candidate. The state leadership recommended Giousouf. At that time, she worked at the State Ministry of Labor, Integration and Social Affairs. Despite her backing from the district party leadership, which considered her nomination a viable chance for challenging the incumbent SPD, the discontent of the local party membership about her nomination grew (Richter 2013). Some felt ignored, seeing that an external and inexperienced candidate without service for the district party planned to run for election for purely strategic reasons. This anger and resentment led to the emergence of a locally anchored contestant. In the end, Giousouf succeeded in winning the candidacy with 53 of 79 delegate votes, after extensively touring the local party chapters to gain enough intra-party support (Frigelj 2013c). As in the previous case, it was not her immigrant background which evoked a counter-mobilization, but the fact that Giousouf was a party newcomer with strong support from the state and district party leadership for electoral reasons. As the interviews revealed, mobilization against IO candidates in SMDs did not always occur as publicly as described in the above cases. While political aspirations from party members of immigrant background were not always openly criticized, more competition than usual sometimes became evident at the nominating convention. One IO candidate reported being the only incumbent to run against other challengers. In such cases, the actual reasons for more counter-mobilization remained fairly vague: An open counter-mobilization is difficult. It is unwise to mobilize against a candidate who made no mistakes. Then, it would become obvious that someone has other interests, and, therefore, discredits someone else […]. I think there have been some conversations in the back room to impede my candidacy. […] I was the only incumbent who had competitors (Interview 5).

Cemile Giousouf’s case points to a second mechanism which can trigger mobilization against IO candidates. Criticism came not only from some of the local party members, but from the Women’s Union, an auxiliary organization which represents female party members within the CDU. The Women’s Union openly turned against the preferential treatment of a female candidate without previous office experience at the expense of other longstanding female party members who had been waiting for a nomination for years. The Women’s Union felt disenchanted, as none of their candidates was nominated. In cases where district and state party leaders start treating IO candidates preferentially, as they attempt to strengthen party ties with IO citizens, the supremacy of other representational groups, such as the Women’s Union, is put in danger. Supposing that new representational groups are considered relevant, the established groups should fear making concessions in candidate selection. Many groups within the party aspire to win the party’s endorsement, with each group favoring its representatives to those of other factions. The increasing importance of new representational groups can therefore lead to a counter-mobilization by established groups, trying to defend their claims for representation. By running rival candidates, they can send a strong message to their party that their claims for representation must be reconciled with other claims and rewarded. In SMDs where

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only one seat is up for nomination, competition between different groups is probably more pronounced than on party lists. Accordingly, IO candidates pointed toward a disconnect between national party leadership and local parties. While national party levels tend to hold more progressive views, keen on opening up the party to underrepresented groups, local levels are faced with the problem of accommodating all of the groups satisfactorily, therefore remaining more closed: If you are talking to the federal party leadership by saying: “look, we need more candidates from immigrant backgrounds”, they say “yes, great, we need more candidates of immigrant background” […]. At the local level, they say “you want more candidates from immigrant backgrounds, but this is complicated. Now immigrants want candidacies, but the districts are already allocated. How can we satisfy all the groups?” (Interview 2).

While most party organizations now have ancillary organizations with a focus on immigration that can theoretically serve as inner-party support networks to help up-and-coming IO candidates in candidate selection, the qualitative interviews question their significance for the nomination of IO candidates. Their leverage in the nomination process is far from comparable to the political clout of more established ancillary organizations like the Women’s Union. In none of the party organizations studied do informal selection rules exist that grant a certain number of nominations to the intra-party organizations on immigration. They have not yet been able to build sufficient political clout to allow them to claim a certain number of nominations: We said that the network wants some of its members sent to parliament. But then someone [of immigrant background] from outside of the network was nominated (Interview 4).

Overall, I can conclude that, in most cases, anti-immigrant sentiment was not the main reason for IO candidates facing more competitors in SMDs, though this cannot be ruled out in each and every case. Instead, one reason was that established groups perceived IO citizens as new competitors in the contest for nomination. If party members from immigrant backgrounds aspired to seek candidacy in SMDs, established groups tried to defend their claims for representation by putting forward their own contestants: They do not say “[we don’t want you] because you are an immigrant.” But you remain a competitor. It is the same story as with women. If no gender quotas were introduced, they would never have succeeded. Because every woman was a competitor for a man, and every immigrant is a competitor for other party members (Interview 1). I never had the feeling that I am not welcome in my party, or that they would say “what is this immigrant doing here?” I have never had such feelings. That some people became envious […] and say “I have been in this party for 25 years, I am not a legislator and now an immigrant comes”, this happened, but it is normal. I have never experienced any immigrant-specific discrimination (Interview 7).

When turning to competition for party lists, a different picture emerges. Compared to native candidates, IO candidates are 9 percentage points less likely to be contested. The marginal effect is statistically significant at a 0.1 level when controlling for other confounding factors. There is clear evidence that party lists give IO candidates better chances at making a successful bid for nomination than SMDs. The reason

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is that, unlike SMDs, party lists offer more flexible options for ticket balancing, with numerous group representatives contemporaneously accommodated on the ballot paper (Hennl and Kaiser 2008b; Norris 2006; Ruedin 2013; Rule 1986; Rule and Zimmerman 1994; Siaroff 2000). Consequently, party selectors are not forced into making an either-or decision, but have enough list positions available to place different candidates and balance the party ticket. Party list nominations create strong incentives to strike a balance between different group-related interests in order to appeal to more voter segments and uphold party peace. In SMDs where only one seat is up for selection, the emergence of new representational groups, such as IO citizens, sharply increases competition for representation. Party lists, however, allow political parties to accommodate numerous groups, mitigating competition, as shown above. In line with the quantitative results, some IO candidates perceived their immigrant status as an advantage in the allocation of party list positions—this applied chiefly to female IO candidates that benefited greatly from gender quotas. Several IO candidates argued that aspirants with multiple sought-after attributes stand a better chance of being nominated, without facing any challengers. The first reason is that the number of potential contestants with identical traits is very limited. The more searched-for characteristics, traits, or contacts an aspirant has, the smaller the circle of coequal contestants. Second, such candidates allow political parties to cover various representational aspects at once, while allocating the saved list positions to candidates with other traits or other organizational affiliations to broaden their voter scope. If nominating a female candidate from immigrant background, two sought-after characteristics can be covered at once: I meet all the advantageous criteria: I am female, I am a mother and I am a migrant […]. These are all a given in my case (Interview 6). It was a mixture of aspects. I was born in Germany. I know how to articulate. I think I was not a candidate who was selected just because nobody else was found. I think I was a convincing candidate due to my previous political work and qualifications. In addition, [I am] female, so the gender quota was met, and I have an immigrant background. Three labels were met by one [person] (Interview 5).

Now that I have inspected the effect of immigrant origin on the competition for list nomination, I want to highlight some of the control variables. First, female candidates seem less likely than males to face competitors when aspiring to a list nomination. This further corroborates the ticket-balancing logic of party lists (Hennl and Kaiser 2008b), which applies not only to IO candidates but also to female contenders. This effect is reinforced by the fact that, except for the FDP and CSU, all political parties under investigation have imposed gender quotas on their party lists (DavidsonSchmich 2016; Reiser 2014). Insofar as male contenders are denied access to list positions that are reserved for women, this results in the lower likelihood of female contenders being contested. Second, by a gap of 6 percentage points, incumbents are less likely to be contested, but the effect is weaker than in SMDs. Evidently, the informal rule for which incumbents are unchallenged holds more for SMDs than for party lists. Third, contenders in promising positions have 27 percentage points

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more probability facing competitors than those in unwinnable slots. As winnable list slots serve as tickets to parliament, this comes as no surprise. Competing for a viable ballot position is tantamount to vying for a seat in parliament. Compared to the SPD, intra-party competition turns out to be higher for FDP, BÜNDNIS 90/DIE GRÜNEN, and DIE LINKE. The reason is that, in these smaller political parties, list nominations are the only way into parliament, as emerging victorious in nominal races is hardly possible. In a final step, I want to validate previous findings with the help of the 2017 Bundestag data. Because of data availability, the validation will be based on reduced statistical models, which nevertheless contain the majority of important control factors. If the effects of immigrant origin point in the same direction as above, this can be taken as strong evidence for the identified effects being valid, with no specifics about the time frame. Looking at Figs. 9.8–9.10 reveals how the effects of immigrant backgrounds dovetail with previous findings, albeit failing statistical significance narrowly. What I can nevertheless derive from this is that IO candidates are 13 percentage points more likely to find themselves in a competitive selection situation when seeking candidacy in SMDs, while the opposite seems to be true on party lists. The negative effect of immigrant origin is much weaker for party lists, showing that immigrant background is more of an obstacle in SMDs than an advantage on party lists. In SMDs, IO candidates are often put in a situation where they have to stand up to more rival contenders, irrespective of their political experience. While local parties play a significant role in SMD candidate selection, they seem to be the ones that put obstacles in IO candidates’ paths to candidacies, with these candidates facing up to more opposing candidates. Party restraint can be attributed to the anticipated

Fig. 9.8 Difference in the level of competition in SMDs for native and IO candidates. Note Fisher’s exact test value is 0.52. The result is not significant at p ≤ 0.1. N = 583. Source GCS 2017

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Fig. 9.9 Difference in the level of competition on party lists for native and IO candidates. Note Fisher’s exact test value is 0.12. The result is not significant at p ≤ 0.1. N = 550. Source GCS 2017

Fig. 9.10 Predictors of the competition for nomination. Note The figure displays AMEs at observed values, based on binary logistic regression models. Gray-dashed markers display the coefficients from the bivariate models. The horizontal lines represent the 90% confidence intervals around point predictions. The vertical line represents the zero line. Dependent variable coding is binary: somewhat to highly contested (=1), not or hardly contested (=0). References: native, female, mean age, low education, no incumbent, mean number of legislative terms, mean number of prior candidacies, mean years of party membership, mean party activity rate, mean number of political offices, no local-level office, no party office, mean number of org. affiliations, no local residence in SMD, SPD. N for SMDs = 475; N for party lists = 476. Source GCS 2017

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perception of the electorate’s preferences and the endeavor to pick candidates who gain acceptance by the majority of local voters. In this sense, I can conclude that local candidate selection constitutes a significant barrier to aspiring IO candidates. A key finding that emerged from this analysis is that IO candidates are more likely to find themselves in tense and competitive situations than native candidates when seeking candidacy in SMDs. While they must face more challengers to come forward as nominees in SMDs, the opposite seems to be true for party lists. There was a feeling that local parties are more conservative than state parties when it comes to selecting IO candidates. This was reinforced by the fact that, in SMDs where only one seat is up for nomination, intra-party groups fight harder for their representatives to become candidates. Both reveal the mechanisms underlying the much-cited observation that fewer IO candidates are available for election in SMDs.

9.3 The Role of Support in the Candidate Selection Process In candidate selection, receiving support from their own political party is make-orbreak for aspiring candidates. While state party support is of particular importance in getting onto a party list, district party organizations pull the strings in local candidate selection (Schüttemeyer 2002; Schüttemeyer and Sturm 2005; Wessels 1997; Zeuner 1970). To promote greater diversity among candidates, political parties could provide aspiring IO candidates with extraordinary support to improve their chance of nomination. This directly leads up to the question whether IO candidates indeed receive extraordinary party support to make them succeed in the candidate selection or whether they suffer disproportionately from political parties’ reluctance, due to the perceived electoral disadvantages of being from a minority group. Before commencing with a careful analysis, it is vital to note that party support was only measured at state level. To grasp how much party support IO candidates command in comparison with native candidates when seeking candidacy, I will start with some descriptive statistics. The measurement is based on subjective perceptions of the importance of party support in coming forward as a candidate. To this end, Fig. 9.11 shows the extent to which the support from state party leadership was considered crucial to being nominated. For more than 60% of the candidates in the sample, the support by state party leadership was not crucial to being nominated, or not important at all. Conversely, only one-fifth of the candidates regarded support from state party leadership as decisive or very decisive. Unlike native candidates, more IO candidates deemed support from state party leadership irrelevant to their nomination. About 61% of the native candidates compared to 67% of the IO candidates viewed support from state party leadership as not very or not at all important. At the same time, more IO candidates perceived support from state party leadership as important or very important, by a gap of 4 percentage points (23 vs. 19%). The difference to native candidates is thus weak and statistically insignificant. Overall, the descriptive results underpin how support from state party leadership does not play a remarkable role in IO candidate selection.

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Fig. 9.11 Difference in importance of support from state party leaderships in candidate selection for native and IO candidates. Note Fisher’s exact test value is 0.38. The result is not significant at p ≤ 0.1. N = 664. Source State-level candidate surveys

Figure 9.12 complements previous findings by bringing the importance of local party support in candidate selection into play. Unlike support from state party leadership, the bulk of candidates in the sample considered support from local party

Fig. 9.12 Difference in importance of support from local party chapters in candidate selection for native and IO candidates. Note Fisher’s exact test value is 0.32. The result is not significant at p ≤ 0.1. N = 668. Source State-level candidate surveys

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important or very important in being selected. This underpins the crucial role local parties play in candidate selection—most notably in SMDs but also on party lists (Zeuner 1970: 59). Only 17% of the native candidates compared to 21% of the IO candidates viewed support from the local party as not at all or not very important for their nomination. At the same time, 65% of the native candidates attributed high or very high importance for local party chapters, but only 50% of the IO candidates. The descriptive results hint that local parties are more hesitant to provide aspiring IO candidates with party support. However, as the difference lacks statistical significance, its needs more thorough inspection in a multivariate framework to validate such a relationship. To examine this relationship under multivariate conditions, I will test the effect of immigrant origin on party support in candidate selection, while checking for alternative explanations of party support. Considering the limited number of IO candidates in the sample, the answer options “important” and “very important” were combined, measuring a high importance of party support (=1), and 0 otherwise. In order to assess whether, among similarly situated candidates, immigrant background makes a difference for the importance of party support in candidate selection, I will therefore use binary logistic regression models. Beyond socio-demographic background variables, I will control for candidate political experience, ranging from indicators such as incumbency to years of party membership. Well-connected and highly experienced contenders are regarded as more capable of standing for election, and they have larger support networks within their party organization. Furthermore, the mode of candidacy should shape support patterns. While support from the state party, hosting state party conventions, and being involved in drafting state party lists, should help with party list nominations, the district party’s help is key in SMDs (Schüttemeyer 2002; Schüttemeyer and Sturm 2005). Finally, election and party fixed effects account for the pooled character of the data set. Figure 9.13 displays the AME of each predictor that impacts the amount of party support offered in candidate selection. The results suggest that, in keeping with the descriptive results, immigrant background does not shape the importance of state leadership support. Both in the bivariate (gray-dashed square) and in the multivariate model, no statistically significant effects of immigrant origin emerge, further showing that no strong disparity between IO and native candidates exists. This is to say that IO candidates deem state party support as important to their selection as native candidates. Moving to the qualitative interviews, I find support for the notion that state party leadership provides assistance to IO candidates only in very exceptional cases. This is again given if contenders from immigrant backgrounds are considered eminently qualified to help forge closer ties with IO voters or to improve party expertise in immigration matters by having certain sought-after resources, such as close contacts to immigrant organizations, while lacking the standing within the political party to come out on top in candidate selection. To compensate for this drawback and improve selection chances, state leadership can offer additional support to aspiring IO candidates. In this sense, close contact and support from state party leadership

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Fig. 9.13 Predictors of the importance of party support in candidate selection. Note The figure displays AMEs at observed values, based on binary logistic regression models. Coefficients are displayed in model 3 in Tables A.6 and A.7 of the appendix. Gray-dashed markers show coefficients from the bivariate models. The horizontal lines represent the 90% confidence intervals around point predictions. The vertical line represents the zero line. Dependent variable coding in binary: important (=1), not important (=0). References: native, female, mean age, low education, no incumbent, mean number of legislative terms, mean number of prior candidacies, mean years of party membership, mean party activity rate, mean number of political offices, no local-level office, no party office, mean number of org. affiliations, SMD nomination, Saxon state election, SPD. N for state party leadership support = 631; N for local party chapter support = 635. Source State-level candidate surveys

can help less established IO candidates to get past the party’s internal closed cliques to stand for selection and thereafter election. If it is a state nominating convention that has to approve the party list, state party leadership will find it easier to endorse IO candidates. The reason for this is that, in most cases, state leadership is involved in the list ranking proposal (Schüttemeyer and Sturm 2005: 546). It can therefore try to accommodate IO candidates in viable list positions. In SMDs, it is more difficult for state leadership to stamp its authority, as candidate selection in SMDs is the playing field of local parties. Here, district party leadership and local rank-and-file party members that form the selectorate have the say. Even if state leadership makes IO candidates a priority, such candidates need support from the district party to seek candidacy in SMDs. However, at no time (neither on party lists nor in SMDs) did state leadership support go so far as to oblige the party selectorate to vote for their favored contender. In fact, state leadership has no legal means to coerce party selectorates into voting in agreement with their candidate preference and dictate who will appear on the ballot paper. State leadership support rather takes the shape of recommendation

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and endorsement. State leadership can add weight to their candidate preference by stressing the contender’s political qualities: for instance, their importance in addressing IO voters and signaling openness to multiculturalism. But they cannot compel party selectorates to follow their candidate priorities, though their recommendation is influential in candidate selection. Any excessive interference is more likely to be seen as a suspension of intra-party democracy, making mobilization against the contender likely. Moreover, if state leadership support goes too far, it is also harder for the candidates (if elected) to find acceptance among party colleagues and be considered one of them. They are suspected of overturning the principle of meritocracy and are assumed not to deserve the mandate. This can seriously handicap work in parliament if they are regarded as being gifted with a mandate instead of having earned office by diligence and political merit: The state party leadership supported my start, saying “we want this candidate!” I was therefore welcomed with open arms at the local and state level. But this did not mean that I could skip the democratic process within the party organization. There were elections for each candidacy […]. I had to overcome the normal hurdles of political parties. But it was very benevolent from the beginning (Interview 3). [The state party leader] served as an advocate at the nominating convention pleading for my nomination. This demonstrated that I was intended to be nominated […] due to my competence, networks and work [in the immigration field]. [But the state party leadership] would never dare to say “I want you to vote for this candidate.” It only emphasized the fact that my nomination would be strategically important for the party reputation, and this certainly had some weight (Interview 3).

After I found that the immigrant origin does not impact the amount of support received by state leadership, I will shift focus to the control variables, and some noteworthy effects in this respect. Compared to female nominees, males have a lower probability of regarding the support from state party leaders as significant to their nomination. State leadership must ascertain that gender quotas are met on party lists. On these grounds, they seem to lend more support to female applicants, who continue to be underrepresented in parliament. Furthermore, state leadership support is more important for candidates running on party lists or holding dual nominations than for those in SMDs. This reflects that, while state party leaderships participate in the allocation of party list positions, responsibility for district nominations lies with district parties (Reiser 2011; Schüttemeyer 2002; Schüttemeyer and Sturm 2005; Zeuner 1970). Compared to the Saxon state election, state party support plays only a minor role in Hesse and Bavaria. Obviously, interference by state party leaderships in the candidate selection of SMDs is a more common phenomenon in East Germany than in West Germany (Reiser 2011: 251). Unfortunately, the robustness of the above finding that the immigrant origin has no effect on state party support cannot be additionally tested with the 2017 Bundestag data, as this question was not part of the survey. While a candidate’s immigrant origin does not appear to have bearing on state party support, a second aspect of party support that remains to be examined is the support by local party. Coming back to Fig. 9.13, I find that IO candidates have a lower probability of deeming the support by local parties important than native

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candidates—the gap amounts to 12 percentage points. Even though the marginal effect narrowly lacks statistical significance (p-value = 0.15) due to the small sample of IO candidates and is therefore tainted by some statistical uncertainty, it appears that IO candidates find it harder to cultivate a local support base than their native peers. IO candidates summarized local party support as having support from rank-andfile party members and the local party leadership that organizes candidate selection in SMDs. While having the full backing from the district party was thought of as the most decisive factor in seeking candidacy in SMDs, the previous finding (that IO candidates viewed the support from local party chapters as less important for their selection) therefore hints at a strong handicap, partly explaining why fewer IO candidates enter parliament via single seat districts. However, weaker backing from the local party not only diminishes the selection chances in SMDs but affects also the allocation of viable list slots. The list ranking is usually worked out in close agreement with the district parties, with disaffirmation looming if the list proposal does not come up to the regional balance of power within the state party (Schüttemeyer and Sturm 2005: 546). While state party leaderships appear to employ rather neutral selection practices, a tendency toward closure emerged at the local level. It seems local parties are more reluctant to help IO candidates with their political ambitions and aid their progress. This unearths one mechanism behind the recurrent finding that fewer IO candidates enter parliament via SMDs (Wüst 2014a). Apparently, local party levels remain more closed to candidates from underrepresented groups than higher party layers. Unlike local party chapters, state and national party actors are more aware of the necessity of promoting immigrant representation in order to respond to changes in the population, and hope for electoral advantage by looking more inclusive and progressive (Caul 1999; Kittilson and Tate 2005). With responsibility for the strategic positioning of the party organization, they keep a wary eye on shifts at the voter market (Durose et al. 2013; Soininen 2011). Some IO candidates accordingly described how their announcement to seek candidacy was met with initial reluctance by their district party. While hesitation remained throughout the preselection period, this usually ended after IO candidates prospered in local candidate selection: My district party was rather pessimistic […]. After three, four weeks, one party member came to me and said “you are doing well in the local party. People are talking about you.” Then I finally felt accepted as a candidate (Interview 4). I toured through the local party chapters and introduced myself. Some of them said “it is not necessary. We already know who to vote for.” In some, I was not allowed to introduce myself, because they could not imagine voting for me (Interview 1).

Reservations about IO candidates mostly resulted from a supposed backlash from local voters (Durose et al. 2013: 256). The most important consideration for a political party in the candidate selection is to present a candidate that is believed to appeal to the broadest possible range of voters. Whenever a certain candidate type is considered to be a liability, party selectors shy away from nominating them. In this vein, local parties fear that the nomination of IO candidates will jeopardize their electoral success, as local voters are believed to not yet be ready for representatives

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from immigrant backgrounds. In the interviews, it was widely repeated that political parties assume that local voters have a certain notion of an ideal candidate, who is, in essence, native, middle-class, male and looks very much like preceding officeholders. This was in part countered by arguing that local parties overestimate the adverse electoral consequences of selecting a candidate from an immigrant background. IO candidates highlighted a severe disconnect between local party pursuit of appearing more inclusive and progressive, and what they think their voters will accept. Immigrant origin and alleged negative voter reactions to it were sometimes used against aspirants from immigrant backgrounds in the selection process: [The voter] does not know me as a person, and decides differently [from the party]. The voter has only some information, and one part is the name. The name can be a criterion for exclusion (Interview 2). [Within the party organization] it is feared that if a person from an immigrant background runs for political office, the party will lose votes because of their background. We are talking about latent discrimination, which still prevails in society (Interview 4).

However, concern about potential electoral losses is by no means completely unfounded, rather an outgrowth of negative experience. The majority of IO candidates reflected on incidents of discrimination on the grounds of their immigrant origins, especially on the campaign trail. Even if they are isolated incidents, they serve as indicators to assess local voter attitudes toward IO candidates and flow into future candidate selection: One of the local party chapters [in my electoral district] said to me one or two weeks before [the election took place] “let’s campaign in front of the bakery.” […] My party colleagues were really shocked when someone started insulting me due to my immigrant background […]. But this indeed happens (Interview 4). I think my nominal votes were downsized by my name. I could see that results were fantastic for my political party […]. I suppose that nominal vote share would have been higher with another name (Interview 2).

When finally turning to the control variables in Fig. 9.13 for local party support, we see that, in comparison with SMD candidates, support of local parties is less important for those on party lists. The finding largely reflects that candidate selection in SMDs is incumbent on district parties, while party lists remain more under the control of state parties (Reiser 2011; Schüttemeyer 2002; Schüttemeyer and Sturm 2005). Compared to SPD candidates, the support from local level is more crucial in the CDU/CSU, and of minor importance in BÜNDNIS 90/DIE GRÜNEN. One explanation is that the latter is, to a lesser extent, locally anchored—particularly in rural areas. Overall, I can conclude that, while state party leaderships act neutrally toward prospective IO candidates, it seems that local party levels remain more reluctant to support such candidates in their political ambitions. In most cases, it was an imputed voter bias against IO candidates and related fears of electoral losses that were at the bottom of local party reservation. This offers one explanation for the recurrent theme of less IO candidates being available for election in SMDs.

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9.4 The Role of Electoral Viability While the factors examined above tell a great deal about how hard or easy it is to become a candidate, we should remember that coming through the candidate selection does not necessarily guarantee a seat in parliament. Just because IO candidates are selected to stand for election does not mean they are granted winnable candidacies. While being from immigrant backgrounds may increase aspirants’ chances of being selected, it may concurrently decrease their chances of being granted a winnable candidacy. Therefore, scrutinizing candidate selection without considering electoral prospects is an incomplete analysis. If political parties run IO candidates for election but these struggle disproportionately to secure winnable seats, immigrants’ underrepresentation in parliament is inevitable. The electoral quality of nomination therefore merits attention, as only if IO candidates have the chance of emerging victorious in the election will immigrant representation improve. For obvious reasons, candidates’ likelihood of entering parliament crucially depends on the constituency in which they stand for election. Before tapping into candidates’ chances of securing a mandate, I therefore need a valid indicator of a constituency’s electoral prospect. To measure electoral viability in SMDs, I have generated a dichotomous variable, taking on the value of 1 if the nominal vote share was within 10 percentage points of the winner’s vote share in the previous election, or if the political party had won the electoral district, and 0 otherwise. To elaborate on group differences, Fig. 9.14 contrasts the share of IO and native candidates in viable and unwinnable electoral districts. As evidenced by the graph, the share of IO candidates in viable SMDs clearly departs from the share of native candidates in such electoral districts. About 15.5%

Fig. 9.14 Difference in the electoral viability of SMD nominations for native and IO candidates. Note Fisher’s exact test value is 0.09. The result is significant at p ≤ 0.1. N = 1,073. Source GCS 2013; state-level candidate surveys

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of the IO candidates but 23.1% of the native candidates secured viable SMD nominations—this difference is statistically significant. It appears that when political parties nominate IO candidates in SMDs, they do so disproportionately in constituencies with lower election prospects. This provides tentative evidence that IO candidates are overrepresented among hopeless SMD contenders. While this suggests that closure for IO candidates takes place when it comes to the allocation of viable electoral districts, no clear conclusion can be drawn as to whether the finding really relates to immigrant background or to other confounding factors, such as less political experience. It might be the case that IO candidates are overrepresented in hopeless electoral districts as they had just embarked upon their political careers. To study the degree to which immigrant origins have an independent effect on the probability of running in viable SMDs, I present binary logistic regression models. I have to discard FDP candidates, as none of them ran viably in 2013 or 2014. Since politically experienced aspirants that are highly engaged in party activities, possess greater intra-party visibility and larger support networks have better chances of obtaining promising electoral districts, I will check for a plethora of such factors. Building upon the above insights, I further control for local residence. Political parties should tend to nominate locally rooted candidates in viable electoral districts, as their local name recognition and personal links with the local constituency are considered conducive to personal vote-seeking (Tavits 2010). The results of the multivariate analysis presented in Fig. 9.15 underpin the way in which IO candidates have a disadvantage when it comes to the allocation of winnable electoral districts. By a gap of 6 percentage points (statistically significant at a 0.1 level), IO candidates have a lower probability than native candidates of securing a candidacy in viable SMDs. In the bivariate model (gray-dashed estimate), the difference in probability is even 8 percentage points, but lacks statistical significance. Immigrant origin thus deprives candidates, at least to some extent, of the chance to become a district candidate with good prospects. One explanation relates to potential party variance behind identified patterns. Political parties with the best record for the descriptive representation of IO citizens—namely BÜNDNIS 90/DIE GRÜNEN and DIE LINKE (Mediendienst Integration 2013; Wüst 2011)—win the majority of their seats via party lists, not in SMDs. While they select the majority of IO candidates, this largely happens in non-viable electoral districts. This empirical pattern corresponds to expectations formulated in the literature on electoral system incentives (Kostadinova 2007; Matland 1993; Matland and Taylor 1997; Norris 2004; Ruedin 2009, 2013; Rule and Zimmerman 1992, 1994). Whenever the district magnitude is one, the party gatekeepers have no chance of balancing the party ticket but must prospect for a single candidate who can appeal to a wide range of voters. Accordingly, political parties avoid fielding candidates from underrepresented groups in SMDs, tending to nominate candidates who resemble the incumbent legislator type. The latter is believed to appeal to a broader scope of voter segments and encounter less opposition from local voters. It is for this reason that political parties tend to let IO candidates come forward in less promising SMDs. In doing so, they can demonstrate an openness to multiculturalism while having no risk of losing crucial votes:

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Fig. 9.15 Predictors of the electoral viability of SMD nominations. Note The figure displays AMEs at observed values, based on binary logistic regression models. Coefficients are displayed in model 3 in Table A.8 of the appendix. Gray-dashed marker is the coefficient from the bivariate model. The horizontal lines represent the 90% confidence intervals around point predictions. The vertical line represents the zero line. Dependent variable coding is binary: viable (=1), non-viable (=0). References: native, female, mean age, low education, no incumbent, mean years of party membership, mean party activity rate, mean number of political offices, no local-level office, no party office, mean number of org. affiliations, no local resident in SMD, Bundestag election, SPD. N = 799. Source GCS 2013; state-level candidate surveys

[…] Immigrant background plays a minor role for political parties. But this changes when elections are approaching, because then the voter comes into play. The party says “this is our member. He/she is part of the whole, and there is solidarity.” But the voter looks at it [immigrant background] differently. […] Voters do not know me, and use other criteria to choose candidates. Voters only have some information, and one part of this is the name. This is a criterion for exclusion for some voters […]. In SMDs, only one candidate runs for each political party, and voters cannot switch to another candidate from the same political party (Interview 2).

Each political party can send only one candidate whose name is printed on the ballot paper into the electoral race in SMDs. In low-information settings, where voters have little information about contenders, candidate names are decisive (Lupia 1994a, 1994b; Matson and Fine 2006; McDermott 1998). Therefore, the electoral risk ascribed to IO candidates is bigger than that associated with native candidates. Their foreign sounding names are believed to act as a deterrent to voters, who cannot imagine being represented by a legislator from an immigrant background (Thrasher et al. 2015). In SMDs, voters cannot vote for alternative candidates of their favored political party and must either abstain from voting or vote for a competing political party. Even if the voter effects described above are a little exaggerated, since IO candidates usually run for political parties for which discriminating voters would not have voted anyway (Street 2014), the anticipation of a potential backlash often

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prevents political parties from nominating IO candidates in highly promising SMDs, as they fear election victory would be in danger. IO candidates therefore struggle more to secure winnable seats, with local parties prospecting for candidates who reflect the characteristics of previously successful candidates, finding acceptance by the largest proportion of the local constituency. I would like to call attention to some further notable observations I have made in relation to promising SMD nominations. The chance of standing for election in a winnable SMD improves with the number of years spent in a party organization, and increasing experience in political office. Being a longstanding and experienced party member therefore pays off when it comes to the allocation of viable SMDs. This is because amateurish election campaigns can seriously jeopardize electoral success. Surprisingly, previous experience in party office has a negative effect on the chance of running in viable SMDs, while experience in local-level office has no effect at all. One explanation is that both office types are not only the determining factor in attaining a viable SMD, but in achieving a nomination at all, therefore common among the majority of candidates. Furthermore, local residents are 5 percentage points more likely to run in viable SMDs than external candidates. Localness is a pivotal vote-earning attribute in SMDs (Arzheimer and Evans 2014; Tavits 2010). In winnable SMDs, political parties are therefore less willing to nominate external candidates who could threaten their electoral success. Unsurprisingly, CDU/CSU candidates are more likely to run in viable SMDs than SPD candidates, while the opposite holds true for BÜNDNIS 90/DIE GRÜNEN and DIE LINKE. This reflects the CDU/CSU’s outstanding success in winning nominal races. As unfortunately no data on the vote margin in the 2017 Bundestag election are available, I will move on to candidates’ likelihood of being elected on a party list next, which complements the analysis of election probability. Promising ballot positions can provide a second pathway to parliament in mixedmember electoral systems. Complementary to SMD electoral prospects, candidates’ likelihood to enter parliament therefore depends on their electoral list placement. In closed party list settings (as given in the German Bundestag election as well as the Hessian and Saxon state elections), the party-determined list position affects candidates’ electoral fortune in far-reaching ways, by pre-shaping the choices given to voters. In preference voting systems (as employed in Bavaria), it is the initial ballot position (which is party-determined) which impacts candidates’ electoral prospects (Brockington 2003; Faas and Schoen 2006). Usually, candidates seated on electorally hopeless places cannot win enough preference votes to make it into parliament. Partydetermined viability on party lists is therefore a meaningful indicator of efforts to increase the number of IO parliamentarians. If political parties really want to compensate for the skewed nature of their pool of IO aspirants, they can systematically place them in higher list slots and improve their chance of election. To measure how political parties place IO candidates in electoral lists, candidates’ ballot positions in the recent election are subtracted from the last ballot position their political parties could secure in the previous election. The higher the list margin, the higher the priority given to a specific contender in the list ranking. The list ranking distribution is presented in Fig. 9.16. As can be seen, IO candidates have an average

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Fig. 9.16 Difference in the list margin for native and IO candidates. Note Difference is not significant at p ≤ 0.1 (t-test). N = 1,244. Source GCS 2013; state-level candidate surveys

list margin of −10, −12 for native candidates. The results of the descriptive analysis show that the majority of candidates run for election on ballot positions which are far from the last ballot position won in the previous election. However, there is some evidence to suggest that IO candidates enjoy more viable list rankings than their native counterparts. Nonetheless, descriptive evidence provides only a weak indication of an advantage for IO candidates, because the difference in list margin between IO and native candidates is small and has no statistical significance. But descriptive evidence alone is not enough to assess an immigrant origin’s role in viable list selection. To step beyond descriptive analysis and see how immigrant origin affects ballot positions of IO candidates, I use ordinary least squares (OLS) regression models—based on robust standard errors due to heteroscedasticity. In the allocation of the top list slots, political parties usually favor incumbents (=1) over newcomers (Borchert and Reiser 2010; Kaack 1969a: 78; Reiser 2014: 59; Zeuner 1970). Incumbents—due to name recognition and their political track record—can capitalize on an electoral advantage at the ballot box (Erikson 1971; Hainmueller and Kern 2008; Levitt and Wolfram 1997; Zaller 1998). By fielding incumbents on the top list positions (such as the first five that are visible to voters by name), political parties can attempt to boost their vote share. It is further believed that the chance of getting hold of a viable ballot position rises with the degree of party involvement. To minimize the risk of awarding viable list positions to renegade and unqualified contenders, aspiring candidates must prove themselves reliable and competent by being party members for years, spending time and energy engaging with party activities, and having experience in political office. Moreover, it is integral to party screening processes that newcomers accept nonviable list positions and prove their willingness to serve party interests before being acknowledged with winnable ballot positions (Reiser 2014: 59). Another variable that

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Fig. 9.17 Predictors of the list margin on party lists. Note The figure displays OLS regression coefficients with robust standard errors. Coefficients are displayed in model 3 in Table A.9 of the appendix. Gray-dashed marker is the coefficient from the bivariate model. The horizontal lines represent the 90% confidence intervals around point predictions. The vertical line represents the zero line. Dependent variable coding is metric. References: native, female, mean age, low education, no incumbent, mean number of legislative terms, mean number of prior candidacies, mean years of party membership, mean party activity rate, mean number of political offices, no local-level office, no party office, mean number of org. affiliations, no SMD nomination or viable SMD nomination, Bundestag election, SPD. N = 1,173. Source GCS 2013; state-level candidate surveys

affects electoral viability is the number of organizational affiliations. Well-connected candidates who are engaged with civil society organizations have a greater mobilization impact at the ballot box. Finally, previous studies further suggest that SMD candidates—most notably those in hopeless districts—who ask for an additional list placement are positioned more highly on party lists than list-only candidates (Reiser 2014: 59; Zeuner 1970: 149). Figure 9.17 offers a clearer picture of the relationship between immigrant origin and chances of a viable candidacy on the party list. Immigrant origin is associated with a higher list margin, indicating a weak preferential treatment of IO candidates. More precisely, the difference to native candidates is 3.2 list positions and is statistically significant at a 0.05 level.2 While IO candidates have a disadvantage in the allocation of winnable SMDs, they seem to enjoy preferential treatment when it comes to the allocation of promising ballot positions. This is echoed by the fact that the majority of IO legislators in Germany are elected into parliament via party lists (Wüst 2014a). 2 As

the list margin does not directly capture the electoral viability of list slots, I re-checked the robustness of the findings. To this end, I generated a binary variable, which takes on 1 (=viable) if the margin to the last won list position in the previous election was three positions or smaller or the list slot was won and 0 (=non-viable) otherwise. In doing so, the robustness of the results was confirmed.

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The finding corresponds to expectations held by the literature on electoral system incentives (Canon 1999; Darcy et al. 1994; Fortin-Rittberger and Eder 2013; FortinRittberger and Rittberger 2014; Hennl and Kaiser 2008b; Kostadinova 2007; Matland and Studlar 1996; Norris 2004; Ruedin 2009, 2013; Rule and Zimmerman 1992, 1994). As already noted, the driving force behind IO candidates doing better on party lists is the ticket-balancing logic, which prevails when the district magnitude is greater than one. Compared to SMDs, party lists offer more flexible options for ticket balancing, with more than one candidacy being available. Party selectors are therefore able to reconcile various representational groups on the party lists, including IO citizens. Instead of being forced to find a single candidate who can reach out to the broadest possible range of voters, party selectors can pick different candidate types, each appealing to specific voter subgroups. By including candidates from all relevant social groups, political parties aim at a broad voter appeal in order to maximize their electoral support, while ensuring that certain voter groups are not driven away. An IO candidate on the party list benefits a party’s overall voter appeal, while not compelling the party to disregard other powerful voter groups. In order to address IO voters, political parties partly attempted to place IO candidates in high positions. Some IO candidates therefore considered their immigrant background helpful in running on promising ballot positions. According to them, it provided a unique selling point in the nomination: I was placed on list slot x by the state party leadership. It was rather uncommon for a non-incumbent to be proposed for this slot in the first election […]. During the nomination process, it was important that a migrant appeared on the list, because we required a good mixture—enough men, women, young people, elderly people, housewives, academics, workers, butchers. We try to have a good mixture on party lists, which reflects the composition of all the party members (Interview 7). I think it [immigrant background] was a label which was decisive for many […]. For some, it became easier to vote for me—for those who make strategic decisions (Interview 5).

The IO candidates interviewed shared the perception that meeting several soughtafter characteristics at once, such as being from immigrant background and being female, can help in getting a viable list position, since in such cases a double quota is fulfilled. On party lists, political parties generally try to field candidates with ties to different social groups that can appeal to specific subgroups of voters and help attract voters to their political party. Political parties are thus tempted to meet as many representational claims as possible. However, since the number of viable list positions is limited, candidates that meet several sought-after criteria at once are particularly appreciated, as more slots for other groups are left open. Recalling that immigrant origin has a positive effect on list placement, the negative effect in SMDs must be re-assessed. The earlier finding, that IO candidates are more likely to run in unwinnable SMDs than native candidates, might reflect a strategic calculus of the district party organizations, stemming from contamination effects across both electoral tiers. The nominating bodies in SMDs usually try to anticipate the selection logic which prevails for party lists—all the more so if electoral districts are unwinnable (Borchert and Reiser 2010; Zeuner 1970: 149). In non-viable districts,

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party selectors might therefore be tempted to nominate IO candidates, as they expect IO candidates will receive higher list slots. This can guarantee the representation of the electoral district, though the district itself remains unwinnable. Compiling party lists is a complex process of balancing a myriad of representational claims. Except for gender quotas, representational claims derive chiefly from informal rules that are not laid down in the party statutes (Reiser 2014). The first principle of representation is regional representation (Kaack 1969a: 158–159; Mintzel 1980; Zeuner 1970: 158–167). In large state party organizations, list slots are usually allocated to regions—either along the number of party members or electoral strength—to guarantee fair regional representation in parliament and steer clear of intra-party conflicts. In regional party conventions, party branches then select preliminary candidates for those list positions assigned to them. After all regional nominating conventions have approved their list rankings, the regional list proposals are merged. In most cases, the top list positions (most visible to the voters) remain in the hands of state party leadership. Usually, prominent politicians or candidates with policy profiles in demand are placed here. At the state nominating conventions, the regional proposals and the state party leadership proposal are merged before winning approval by the nominating body. It is important to observe that empirical variance in nomination proceedings is enormous. In other cases, state list proposals are put to the vote directly: either because a committee or state party leadership works out the entire list proposal, or because list approval is a completely open process. At the nominating convention, contenders have the right to present themselves to the nominating body. By secret ballot, each ballot position is then voted on in descending order.3 However, anyone from the floor interested in a specific list slot can still stand up, present himself or herself to the nominating assembly, and face their ballot. Also, defeated applicants can still challenge contenders for lower positions. While party lists are not necessarily approved as initially proposed, crucial votes are rather rare. The reason is that in advance of candidate selection, political parties try to anticipate intra-party interests to guarantee an undisturbed selection process. Besides the consideration of regional quotas, higher ballot positions are usually reserved for incumbents and SMD candidates—especially those in non-viable SMDs (Kaack 1969a; Reiser 2014; Zeuner 1970). Moreover, gender quotas (Davidson-Schmich 2016) and intra-party factions (Köllner and Basedau 2006; Trefs 2007) must be taken into account: You make a list of 130 people, but you have 6,000 party members. The compilation of party lists is a very unpleasing work; you cannot satisfy everyone. If you nominate someone at slot ten, they ask “why not slot five?” (Interview 7).

Faced with a huge number of representational claims, the compilation of party lists is a highly intricate balancing process. It is a matter of utmost importance, helping to mobilize the electoral support of a wide range of voter segments, while maintaining party unity and avoiding crucial votes that would disturb the list ranking. At the 3 With the consent of the party selectorate and the contenders, lower list positions are usually balloted

in blocks.

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same time, however, the number of list positions remains limited, forcing political parties into giving priority. Against this backdrop, the nomination of IO candidates to higher list positions reveals strong party endeavors to strengthen electoral ties with IO citizens. According to the interviews, the impetus for placing IO candidates in higher list positions emanated chiefly from state party leaderships. Usually, they define a party’s strategic course, keeping an eye on untapped voter groups (Detterbeck 2012). Whenever they consider IO voters to be a relevant constituency or immigration a salient policy field that requires more attention within the party, they can try to place IO candidates in upper ballot positions. To illustrate the strategic calculus that may lie behind IO candidates’ viable nomination on party lists, I will look at some concrete cases. In the 2013 Hessen state election, Corrado Di Benedetto obtained one of the SPD top list positions (position five), with 268 votes in favor and 35 votes against. Di Benedetto was born in Italy and only joined the SPD in 2011. Nonetheless, the state party leadership wanted him to run for a top spot (Hartmann 2013). The idea behind this was to highlight the SPD’s focus on integration and migration policy issues, and enrich the party’s competence in this policy field through Di Benedetto’s involvement in the executive board of the Hessian Council of Foreigners, his networks, and knowledge in the immigration field. In a similar vein, Ismail Tipi, born in Turkey and a CDU party member since 1999, helped the CDU to signal competence in integration and migration policy issues. In the 2009 Hessen state election, Tipi was nominated far down the list, at position 67. Although he did not enter parliament in 2009, he still followed in 2010 as a replacement candidate in the electoral district Offenbach Land II. In parliament, he developed strong expertise in the fields of integration, migration, and religious extremism. He became chairman of the CDU state committee on integration and migration, party spokesman on integration, and joined the parliamentary committee on social affairs and integration. In the next election, the 2013 state election, he suddenly moved up to list position ten. The state party leadership had decided to nominate an IO candidate with expertise in the areas of integration and religious extremism, as it was expected that these issues would play a prominent role in the upcoming election (Stang 2013). Moreover, the nomination of an IO candidate in a visible ballot position was to help the CDU to get rid of its reputation of being hostile to immigrants and multiculturalism. As explained above, however, any attempt to put IO candidates on higher list positions also means that other group representatives have to be moved further down on party lists, which can cause resentment: I was surprised to learn that the state party leadership proposed me for a viable list position […]. That was a clear signal of the importance of integration and migration. This triggered some resentment. Some people planned to challenge me, but they finally withdrew their proposals at the state party conference (Interview 3).

Cemile Giousouf’s case further illustrates the pitfalls associated with the strategic nomination of IO candidates to winnable list positions. In the 2013 federal elections, Giousouf was proposed for the promising 25th place on the state list in North RhineWestphalia, although she had little experience in office at that time and had only joined the CDU in 2009. The North Rhine-Westphalian party leadership strongly supported

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her nomination, as they wanted to open the CDU more to IO citizens. However, the fact that the state leadership pushed a representative of the Women’s Union further down the party list in order to place a politically inexperienced IO candidate on a winnable list position provoked strong criticism from the Women’s Union (Frigelj 2013b; Hüwel and Stenzel 2013). At the nomination congress, Giousouf was thus confronted with a challenger from the Women’s Union (Frigelj 2013a). After the state party chairman had emphasized the strategic importance of Giousouf’s nomination in a plea at the nomination congress, she actually secured 66.3% of the delegate votes (Hüwel 2013). Against the background of such inner-party conflicts, the fact that IO candidates receive higher list positions on average is all the more remarkable. Beyond immigrant origin, there are some other noteworthy effects on list placement that I would like to highlight. Going back to Fig. 9.17, we can see that male candidates’ list margins are negative—the difference to female nominees is 3.5 list positions and statistically significant at a 0.01 level. This is consistent with the findings of Hennl and Kaiser (2008a, 2008b) that party gatekeepers use party lists to meet their gender quotas. Interestingly, education goes hand in hand with a higher list ranking. With each unit increase in education, the candidates on party lists climb 1.10 positions higher—the effect is statistically significant at a 0.05 level. This result can be explained by the skills which come with higher education. Highly educated candidates are more eloquent, which makes them attractive candidates to approach voters, and they might perform better at the nominating conventions, which gives them higher list positions. With each term served in parliament, the list margin increases by 3.5 list slots. Furthermore, each previous candidacy additionally improves the list margin by 1.5 list slots. Apparently, it is an integral part of party screening processes that newcomers must first accept lower list positions to prove their commitment before they are rewarded with higher ballot positions. In addition, candidates who run for election in hopeless SMDs run on higher list positions than dual candidates with winnable SMD nominations, or candidates who are only placed on party lists. The gap is 6.9 list slots and statistically significant at a 0.01 level. On the one hand, the priority rule for non-viable SMD candidates guarantees the representation of all electoral districts, so that even districts that cannot be won directly are represented. On the other hand, it creates incentives to participate in nominal races, even if these are in vain. This is important, because the local presence of the candidates and their election campaign activities at grassroots level shape the party PR vote share (Ferrara and Herron 2005; Ferrara et al. 2005; Manow 2011). The priority rule motivates candidates to bear the burden of nomination in hopeless districts and to conduct election campaigns despite low election chances in a district. The more pronounced this rule is, the greater the influence of district party organizations on party list rankings at state level.

9.5 Interim Conclusion: Which Selection Behavior Prevails?

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9.5 Interim Conclusion: Which Selection Behavior Prevails? The starting point for this investigation was the assumption that the selection behavior of political parties has far-reaching effects on IO citizen representation in parliament. However, it is anything but easy to develop empirical strategies to study party selection behavior toward IO candidates, since candidate selection processes mainly take place in party organization backrooms. This work bridged this difficulty by using the candidates’ personal recruitment profiles to obtain indirect but revealing information about party selection behavior. This unique information can help us understand how political parties go about selecting IO candidates, in comparison with their native peers. The qualifications that candidates need in order to stand for election, and the level of party support they receive, help us to grasp party selection practices, even if we lack direct information about party selection behavior. With regard to the qualifications a candidate must have in order to stand for election, it has been seen that there are more party newcomers among IO candidates who are newer party members, and have less experience in office. On the whole, this is not a rule but an exception, which was always the case when IO candidates brought with them resources that made them particularly qualified to forge closer party ties with IO voters and to improve party competence in immigration issues when no candidates with comparable resources were available in the party’s membership pool. One reason inexperienced IO candidates are only selected in exceptional cases has to do with the fact that, in such cases, internal conflicts of interest are inevitable. Party members who have rendered great service to their own party organization feel that they are overlooked in the selection of candidates, which can lead to their alienation from the party, or a counter-mobilization against the preferred IO candidate. A second aspect that influences the selection of candidates is the level of support from the party. What becomes clear here is that the local level is more of a hurdle for the selection of IO candidates than the state or national level. This applies to the extent of competition in the nomination process, the level of party support, and how promisingly an IO candidate was nominated. Any reluctance at local level was mostly due to local parties’ feeling that local voters were not yet ready for an IO candidate, and would therefore penalize such a nomination in an election. In order not to take unnecessary electoral risks, they were therefore hesitant about the selection of IO candidates. Up to this point, I have dealt with party nomination behavior toward IO candidates in general, without going into any underlying variances. In the next sections, I shall examine the contextual conditions that affect selection behavior toward IO candidates in more detail. This will help us to arrive at a more differentiated picture of party selection behavior toward IO candidates.

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Chapter 10

Variances in Party Selection Behavior

Beyond the general selection behavior shown by political parties toward IO candidates, I want to better comprehend the conditions that affect which selection strategy is applied. These contextual conditions are derived from the literature on minority representation. While previous studies have investigated the effect of contextual factors on the overall level of minority representation, I will trace whether these variances, visible at the aggregate level, are also reflected in the party selection behavior toward IO candidates at the micro-level. In line with theoretical reasoning, I expect variances across immigrant subgroups (Sect. 10.1), political parties (Sect. 10.2), the mode of candidacy (Sect. 10.3), and SMD context (Sect. 10.4).

10.1 Do Immigrant Subgroups Matter? Until now, no distinction has been made between different subgroups of immigrants: Instead, they have been presented as a single group. This approach dovetails with my initial argument that—from the perspective of political parties—the external differentiation of IO citizens overshadows their internal differentiation, making the nomination of IO candidates a way of signaling general openness to IO citizens and strengthening party ties to IO voters. It is also true, however, that some immigrant groups stand out more clearly from the German majority population than others. Accordingly, there is a reason to believe that political parties do not lump immigrants together, but are aware of their internal diversity. In both cultural and religious terms, some immigrant groups diverge more from the majority population than others (Czymara and Schmidt-Catran 2016). Their nomination therefore sends a stronger

© The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2021 S. Ceyhan, How German Parties Select Candidates of Immigrant Origin, Springer Series in Electoral Politics, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-59451-0_10

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signal that the political parties are striving for the political integration of IO citizens and are concerned about their political representation. Building upon the empirical insights presented in Sect. 2.3, Muslim candidates, candidates from non-European countries and candidates from Muslim countries stand out more from the German majority population than IO candidates of Christian background or from European countries, in terms of religion, appearance, language, and names. Based on these observations, the findings presented above run the risk of overlooking differences in party selection behavior toward IO candidates in various subgroups of immigrants. All presented regression models have therefore been reestimated, while including different immigrant subgroups as independent variables instead of immigrant origin as such. The AMEs for each immigrant subgroup are plotted alongside the estimate for IO candidates as a whole, to allow for comparison. In this way, I have accounted for the internal heterogeneity of IO candidates when analyzing their individual selection experiences. The estimates in Fig. 10.1 confirm previous expectations for length of party membership. While the distance in predicted years of party membership to native candidates is the lowest for IO candidates from European countries, at only 0.71 years, Muslim candidates and candidates from non-European and Muslim countries ran for election slightly earlier in their party careers. For Muslim candidates, the difference in predicted years is 1.4, while it is 2.1 for IO candidates from non-European countries and 2.4 for IO candidates from Muslim countries. For IO candidates of Christian

Fig. 10.1 Difference in years of party membership at first candidacy for native and IO candidates across immigrant subgroups. Note The figure displays AMEs at observed values, based on negative binomial regression models. The horizontal lines represent the 90% confidence intervals around point predictions. The vertical line shows the zero line. Dependent variable coding is a count. References native, female, mean age, low education, mean party activity rate, mean number of political offices, no local-level office, no party office, mean number of org. affiliations, Bundestag election, SPD. Source GCS 2013; state-level candidate surveys

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denomination, a difference of 1.9 years is found. Even though all estimates fail statistical significance due to small group sizes, the findings suggest that political parties do not treat IO candidates equally. Instead, they seem to nominate IO candidates from more culturally distinct immigrant subgroups earlier in their party membership, since such candidates send stronger signals to voters that political parties care about the representation of IO citizens and are open to multiculturalism. At the same time, however, the weak effects also stress that a minimum length of party membership is nearly indispensable in candidate selection. This pattern finds further validation when looking at prior office experience at first candidacy (see Fig. 10.2). Nominees from European countries or who are of a Christian denomination do not strongly differ from native candidates in their predicted number of offices held. For both groups, the effects remain statistically insignificant. Conversely, Muslim candidates are predicted to possess less office experience than native candidates—the difference in the predicted number of previous positions is 0.52 and statistically significant at a 0.01 level. For candidates from non-European and Muslim countries, the predicted difference is somewhat weaker, with 0.32 and 0.34, but both statistically significant at a 0.01 level. Overall, the findings demonstrate that a preferential treatment is more likely to be given in the case of contenders from culturally distinct immigrant subgroups. Such candidates are—due to their visible immigrant background—considered more qualified to convey the message

Fig. 10.2 Difference in number of political offices at first candidacy for native and IO candidates across immigrant subgroups. Note The figure displays AMEs at observed values, based on Poisson regression models with robust standard errors. The horizontal lines represent the 90% confidence intervals around point predictions. The vertical line shows the zero line. Dependent variable coding is a count. References native, female, mean age, low education, mean years of party membership, mean party activity rate, mean number of org. affiliations, Bundestag election, SPD. Source GCS 2013; state-level candidate surveys

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that political parties care for the political representation of IO citizens and acknowledge multiculturalism as part of German society. If the higher party ranks intend to establish closer electoral ties with IO citizens, but cannot find suitable IO candidates among party members with access to sought-after resources such as close contacts with immigrant organizations or high expertise in immigration issues, they may resort to recruiting newcomers, and they seem to do so more often if the IO candidates belong to a more visible immigrant subgroup. Muslims are considered to be the group that struggles most with social and political integration. The nomination of Muslim candidates is therefore intended to demonstrate equal opportunities for Muslims in Germany, promote their political participation, and recognize their membership of German society. But once attention is turned to candidates’ localness for the electoral district they stand in (see Fig. 10.3), the pattern changes. Although the estimates feature strikingly large confidence intervals due to the fact that the individual immigrant subgroups comprise only a small number of observations, the predictions clearly refute the assumption of systematic differences between immigrant subgroups. Regardless of their geographical and religious distance from the majority population, political parties did not take the option of parachuting external IO candidates into the electoral districts. Similarly to their native counterparts, IO candidates must be locally rooted in the electoral districts where they make a bid for office, regardless of the immigrant subgroup to which they belong. This again highlights geography as a fundamental principle of political representation in SMDs, reflected in its importance in candidate selection. Obviously, the nomination of external candidates (including IO candidates) is not a strong option in the electoral wards, but local candidates usually have priority. We have seen that, as far as conditions for nomination were concerned, the more IO candidates stand out from the majority society, the less party-related resources they had to bring with them to stand for election—with the exception of local rootedness.

Fig. 10.3 Difference in local rootedness in SMDs for native and IO candidates across immigrant subgroups. Note The figure displays AMEs at observed values, based on binary logistic regression models. The horizontal lines represent the 90% confidence intervals around point predictions. The vertical line shows the zero line. Dependent variable coding is binary: local residence (=1), no local residence (=0). References native, female, mean age, low education, (no repeated candidacy in SMD), mean years of party membership, mean party activity rate, mean number of political offices, no local-level office, no party office, mean number of org. affiliations, non-viable SMD, no vacant SMD, Bundestag election, SPD. Source GCS 2013; state-level candidate surveys

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Fig. 10.4 Difference in encouragement to run for election for native and IO candidates across immigrant subgroups. Note The figure displays AMEs at observed values, based on binary logistic regression models. The horizontal lines represent the 90% confidence intervals around point predictions. The vertical line shows the zero line. Dependent variable coding is binary: encouragement (=1), no encouragement (=0). References native, female, mean age, low education, no incumbent, mean number of legislative terms, mean number of prior candidacies, mean years of party membership, mean party activity rate, mean number of political offices, no local-level office, no party office, mean number of org. affiliations, SPD. Source GCS 2013

Support measures that political parties can pursue in order to support IO candidates in their political endeavors come to the fore next, starting with external encouragement to seek candidacy. As Fig. 10.4 shows, it makes no difference at all whether IO candidates come from another European country or belong to a Christian denomination—their probability of being asked to pursue a political career in parliament is the same as that of native candidates. This is different, however, if one looks at the remaining immigrant subgroups. Muslim candidates and IO candidates from non-European or Muslim countries have less chance of being encouraged by others to seek parliamentary office. For Muslim candidates, the chance of encouragement is 27 percentage points lower than for native candidates, 16 percentage points for candidates from non-European countries, and 19 percentage points for candidates from Muslim countries. Despite these large differences, the AMEs fail statistical significance due to the small number of observations in each subset of IO candidates. Nevertheless, the results clearly indicate that IO candidates from more culturally distinct immigrant subgroups are less likely to be encouraged to participate in the selection process for a mandate than native candidates. If they want to have a seat in parliament, they must self-recruit, seeking legislative office on the basis of their political ambition and self-confidence. This is a partial explanation for why citizens from such backgrounds are underrepresented in parliament. Motivating more party members from a Muslim background or

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from outside Europe to run for political office could help increase the number of such candidates. If the political parties made more effort to go beyond their entrenched recruitment pools, they would be able to attract more diverse candidates. Overall, the findings clearly show the field of tension, in which parties operate: While on the one hand, parties are tempted to give preferential treatment to candidates with clearly visible immigrant origins in order to demonstrate openness, on the other hand they are unsure how voters will react to such contenders and in such cases tend to a closure. Another aspect of candidate selection that can make it easier or harder for someone to get a nomination is the extent of the competition for nomination. What stands out in Fig. 10.5 is that estimates for Muslim candidates and candidates from nonEuropean and Muslim countries turn out to be higher in SMDs. While the probability of IO candidates competing in contested selection procedures exceeds that of native candidates by an average of 10 percentage points, it is 44 percentage points for Muslim candidates (p-value = 0.003), 28 percentage points for candidates from non-European countries (p-value = 0.007), and 31 percentage points for candidates from Muslim countries (p-value = 0.007). Conversely, no statistically significant

Fig. 10.5 Difference in competition for nomination for native and IO candidates across immigrant subgroups. Note The figure displays AMEs at observed values, based on binary logistic regression models. The horizontal lines represent the 90% confidence intervals around point predictions. The vertical line shows the zero line. Dependent variable coding is binary: somewhat to highly contested (=1), not or hardly contested (=0). References native, female, mean age, low education, no incumbent, mean number of legislative terms, mean number of prior candidacies, mean years of party membership, mean party activity rate, mean number of political offices, no local-level office, no party office, mean number of org. affiliations, no local residence in SMD, non-viable SMD, no repeated candidacy in SMD, no vacant SMD, Bundestag election, SPD, non-viable list position. Source GCS 2013; state-level candidate surveys

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effect emerges for IO candidates from European countries. In other words, the earlier observation that IO candidates have to stand up to a larger number of competitors if they want to run in SMDs than native candidates is particularly true for subgroups of immigrants who are more clearly distinguishable from the majority population. Party lists, on the other hand, do not show strong imbalances between different immigrant subgroups. The previous observation that IO candidates are less likely to run against opposing candidates when it comes to party list nominations applies equally to all immigrant subgroups. Overall, the results dovetail with the assumption that political parties tend to avoid placing representatives of marginalized groups in SMDs (Norris 2004; Rule 1987). This is because parties fear that voters will object more to IO candidates when these differ from the majority population. Parts of the local electorate probably cannot imagine being represented by a Muslim parliamentarian, as this is still not normal. As a result, political parties fear that Muslim candidates could act as a deterrent to voters during the election. On party lists, however, the selection logic changes. Here, there is no evidence of such reservations on the part of the voters. Instead, political parties strive to diversify their party lists in order to reach the broadest possible spectrum of voter groups. This makes it easier for IO candidates to run for list positions without being exposed to a higher level of counter-mobilization. Party fears are also allayed by the fact that it is unlikely voters who are prejudiced against IO candidates will be deterred if IO candidates make it onto a party list, since candidates are available to vote under the party label and therefore gain less individual visibility. Similar patterns emerge when looking at party support in the selection of candidates (see Fig. 10.6). For IO candidates from European countries and with a Christian denomination, no significant differences to native candidates can be observed with regard to the importance of support from state party leadership. By contrast, candidates from Muslim countries are 13 percentage points more likely to consider the support of the state party leadership important for their nomination. However, the AMEs fall short of statistical significance due to the small number of cases for candidates from Muslim countries. Nevertheless, the results suggest that state party leadership is more likely to help with a nomination if it is believed that IO candidates can send clear and strong signals to IO voters (and especially to the Muslim population) that the party will cater to their political interests. Since it is usually state party leadership that sets the strategic course for the coming election, it is also the leadership that looks for untapped voter potential and develops strategies to exploit it. For this reason, the leadership is more inclined to support the nomination of IO candidates, especially those with a Muslim background, as it assumes that they send the strongest signal to the outside world that the party is open to IO citizens. However, when it comes to the importance attached to support from local party organizations, a reverse pattern comes about. With a difference of 12 percentage points, IO candidates are less likely than native candidates to perceive the support of local party organizations as important for their own nomination; this reaches even 20 percentage points for Muslim candidates. Obviously, local party organizations are more hesitant to support IO candidates when these markedly differ from the majority population. This attests to previous findings on election concerns harbored

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Fig. 10.6 Difference in importance of party support in candidate selection for native and IO candidates across immigrant subgroups. Note The figure displays AMEs at observed values, based on binary logistic regression models. The horizontal lines represent the 90% confidence intervals around point predictions. The vertical line shows the zero line. Dependent variable coding in binary: important (=1), not important (=0). References native, female, mean age, low education, no incumbent, mean number of legislative terms, mean number of prior candidacies, mean years of party membership, mean party activity rate, mean number of political offices, no local-level office, no party office, mean number of org. affiliations, SMD nomination, Saxon state election, SPD. Source state-level candidate surveys

by local party organizations. Since Muslim candidates differ more markedly from the majority population in terms of name, appearance, and denomination, there is a fear that they will be met with resistance from local voters, which would in turn weaken the party’s electoral success. While state party leadership is more inclined to support IO candidates the more they deviate from the majority for strategic reasons, local party organizations react in exactly the opposite way. Finally, a look at the chance of winning a seat in parliament can provide insights into how parties deal with different immigrant subgroups in their candidate selection. The better the prospect of a mandate, the more political parties prioritize improving the representation of the respective group. However, I will only look at the chances of winning on party lists, since the number of IO candidates in winnable constituencies is too small for estimating variances across different immigrant groups. As Fig. 10.7 shows, Muslim candidates and candidates from Muslim countries run on higher ballot positions than native candidates—the respective list margins are 7.6 (p-value = 0.04) and 5.7 (p-value = 0.04). For IO candidates from European countries, it is only 3.0 (p-value = 0.14), for candidates of Christian denomination 1.7 (p-value = 0.49) and for candidates from non-European countries 3.0 (p-value = 0.14). It appears that political parties generally give preference to IO candidates when awarding higher ballot positions, and this is all the more true when it comes to Muslim candidates and

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Fig. 10.7 Difference in list margin for native and IO candidates across immigrant subgroups. Note The figure displays OLS regression coefficients with robust standard errors. The horizontal lines represent the 90% confidence intervals around point predictions. The vertical line shows the zero line. Dependent variable coding is metric. References native, female, mean age, low education, no incumbent, mean number of legislative terms, mean number of prior candidacies, mean years of party membership, mean party activity rate, mean number of political offices, no local-level office, no party office, mean number of org. affiliations, no SMD nomination or viable SMD nomination, Bundestag election, SPD. Source GCS 2013; state-level candidate surveys

IO candidates from Muslim countries. One reason for this is that, presumably, political parties can more credibly emphasize that they take the political representation of IO citizens seriously when placing IO candidates who are clearly different from the majority of the population in higher list positions. In addition to this, in public debate, the social and political integration of Muslims is considered particularly difficult. Their denomination (which differs from that of the majority population), differences in cultural values, views, and growing Islamophobia (Esposito and Kalin 2011; Ford 2011; Green 2015; Helbling 2012) have led to the social and political marginalization of Muslims. By placing IO candidates from Muslim backgrounds at higher list positions, parties can express their intention to involve Muslims more in the political decision-making process and to recognize their membership of German society. As a final conclusion, it can be seen that, in most cases, the patterns found previously have been further reinforced when the immigrant group in question was more distinct from majority society. While, in the case of neutrality, no variances could generally be observed over immigrant groups, in the case of openness, this was more pronounced when an immigrant group differed more from German society. Conversely, the same applied in the case of closure, with party hesitance growing

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the more an immigrant group differed from German society. This makes it clear that the previous findings, with regard to opening and closure tendencies, were caused in particular by groups that differ more from the majority of the population, such as Muslims or candidates from non-European countries.

10.2 Do Political Parties Matter? As shown above, any attempt to better understand party selection behavior with regard to IO candidates should take into account the environmental conditions that impact selection behavior. One assumption, which has high currency in scholarly debates, is that political parties play a crucial role as the main gateways to parliament in this regard. Center-left parties, such as the SPD, BÜNDNIS 90/DIE GRÜNEN, and DIE LINKE, are believed to be more open to IO candidates than political parties further on the center-right of the political spectrum (Kittilson and Tate 2005; Koopmans and Statham 2000b; Saggar 2000). Because of their high proportion of voters from immigrant backgrounds and their inclusive party ideologies (Kittilson and Tate 2005), leftist parties have more to lose if they exclude immigrants from the ballots. In order to find out the underlying party dynamics, I will rerun the above statistical models, this time adding interaction effects between immigrant origin and candidate party affiliation, while keeping the control variables constant. This will help to understand whether political parties all follow similar selection patterns or whether the effect of immigrant origin actually varies from party to party. If one checks this assumption against the length of party membership, a visual examination shows that IO candidates reach their first candidacy at state or federal level faster than native candidates if they are members of the SPD (see Fig. 10.8). The difference of 5.2 years is remarkable and statistically significant at a 0.01 level. Similarly, IO candidates in the FDP achieve their first nomination 2.9 years earlier, but the group difference misses statistical significance. In view of the liberal political orientation of the FDP, which stresses meritocratic criteria and rejects any form of affirmative action, this finding is rather unexpected. In all other political parties, however, only weak and statistically insignificant differences between the two groups of candidates are evident. With regard to the CDU/CSU, this finding confirms the initial assumption that political parties on the center-right tend to refrain from favoring IO candidates, as they would run an increased risk of alienating conservative voters and party members. Overall, it is first and foremost the SPD that seems to nominate IO candidates earlier in their political career trajectories. For BÜNDNIS 90/DIE GRÜNEN and DIE LINKE, the results are extremely surprising. Because of their left-wing ideology (Kittilson and Tate 2004) and their traditionally stronger electoral support from immigrant voter groups (Wüst 2002), leftist parties would be expected to be more amenable to opening strategies. However, it must also be remembered that BÜNDNIS 90/DIE GRÜNEN and DIE LINKE both form the spearheads of immigrant representation. They have recruited party members from immigrant backgrounds much earlier and in larger numbers than other parties

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Fig. 10.8 Difference in years of party membership at first candidacy for native and IO candidates across political parties. Note The figure displays AMEs at observed values, based on negative binomial regression models. The horizontal lines represent the 90% confidence intervals around point predictions. The vertical line shows the zero line. Dependent variable coding is a count. References native, female, mean age, low education, mean party activity rate, mean number of political offices, no local-level office, no party office, mean number of org. affiliations, Bundestag election, SPD. N = 813. Source GCS 2013; state-level candidate surveys

(da Fonseca 2011). The pool of party members from immigrant backgrounds that they can choose from is therefore larger. This makes preferential treatment less urgent when compensating for a low supply of potential IO candidates and provides an explanation for the counterintuitive finding. These parties would even risk offending longstanding party members with immigrant origins if they were to give preferential treatment to party newcomers from immigrant backgrounds. As I was only able to ascertain an earlier nomination of IO candidates for the SPD, the question now arises as to whether this also applies to the previous office experience that candidates must have for being nominated for an election for the first time. Interestingly, the marginal effects in Fig. 10.9 point in a negative direction for all the political parties examined. This means that IO candidates in all the political parties I scrutinized required less previous experience in office than native candidates in order to stand on a ballot. The strongest effect, of 0.25 predicted offices on average, was seen for DIE LINKE. However, as with all the parties studied, the effect is rather weak and did not reach statistical significance due to the comparatively small number of IO candidates per party. Nevertheless, the initial assumption of leftist parties being more inclined to lower their office requirements for IO candidates does not seem to be true, though all political parties seem to be somewhat flexible in this regard. However, statistically insignificant estimates also make it clear that preferential treatment is only given to individual IO candidates with access to certain sought-after resources (such as close links to immigrant organizations) which are intended to help political

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Fig. 10.9 Difference in number of political offices at first candidacy for native and IO candidates across political parties. Note The figure displays AMEs at observed values, based on Poisson regression models with robust standard errors. The horizontal lines represent the 90% confidence intervals around point predictions. The vertical line shows the zero line. Dependent variable coding is a count. References native, female, mean age, low education, mean years of party membership, mean party activity rate, mean number of org. affiliations, Bundestag election, SPD. N = 813. Source GCS 2013; state-level candidate surveys

parties establish closer electoral ties with IO voters and tap into their electoral support, while most other IO candidates are subject to similar access rules to native candidates. Local roots in an electoral district were shown to be another factor which plays a central role in local nomination proceedings. In line with what I had expected, the AMEs in Fig. 10.10 indeed point in the hypothesized direction. While IO candidates in the SPD (-6 percentage points), BÜNDNIS 90/DIE GRÜNEN (-12 percentage points), and DIE LINKE (-8 percentage points) have a lower probability than native candidates of being locals, a different picture emerges for the CDU/CSU (+11 percentage points) and FDP (+4 percentage points). All in all, center-left parties seem to resort more frequently to the recruitment of external IO candidates. However, it is important to stress that all these estimates are statistically insignificant. This reaffirms that, for the reasons already given, the nomination of external candidates in the SMDs is an option that is only rarely chosen. In addition to the individual traits which party selectors look for in a candidate, party support in candidate selection also allows conclusions to be drawn about the extent to which parties are open to candidates with immigrant origins. For encouragement to run for office, though, the results go entirely against the above expectations (see Fig. 10.11). No statistically significant effect can be found in any of the parties investigated. While IO candidates in DIE LINKE are 8 percentage points more likely

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Fig. 10.10 Difference in local rootedness in SMDs for native and IO candidates across political parties. Note The figure displays AMEs at observed values, based on binary logistic regression models. The horizontal lines represent the 90% confidence intervals around point predictions. The vertical line shows the zero line. Dependent variable coding is binary: local residence (=1), no local residence (=0). References native, female, mean age, low education, no repeated candidacy in SMD, mean years of party membership, mean party activity rate, mean number of political offices, no local-level office, no party office, mean number of org. affiliations, non-viable SMD, no vacant SMD, Bundestag election, SPD. N = 982. Source GCS 2013; state-level candidate surveys

Fig. 10.11 Difference in encouragement to run for election for native and IO candidates across political parties. Note The figure displays AMEs at observed values, based on binary logistic regression models. The horizontal lines represent the 90% confidence intervals around point predictions. The vertical line shows the zero line. Dependent variable coding is binary: encouragement (=1), no encouragement (=0). References native, female, mean age, low education, no incumbent, mean number of legislative terms, mean number of prior candidacies, mean years of party membership, mean party activity rate, mean number of political offices, no local-level office, no party office, mean number of org. affiliations, SPD. N = 731. Source GCS 2013

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than native candidates to be asked to apply for a nomination, the marginal effects in the CDU/CSU and BÜNDNIS 90/DIE GRÜNEN point in a negative direction, while in the SPD and FDP there are no noteworthy effects at all. The overall weak effect sizes and that effects are statistically insignificant make clear that IO candidates, regardless of their political party, have similar chances of being encouraged as native candidates. This once again confirms that the call to stand for election is inherent in the candidate recruitment process and, therefore, does not characterize any particular political party in its recruitment behavior toward IO candidates. When candidates stood for election, it was mostly after they had been asked to do so. Regardless of their immigrant background, candidates are generally dependent on encouragement from other party actors, as this is part of the common candidate recruitment process and has nothing to do with a specific political party. Another piece that fits in with party support in the nomination process is the extent to which candidates face counter-mobilization (see Fig. 10.12). The expectation that the center-left parties would welcome IO candidates with open arms, and that such candidates would experience less counter-mobilization, is not confirmed. In SMDs, IO candidates from the SPD have a 29 percentage points higher probability of facing competitors than native candidates—the difference is statistically significant at a 0.01

Fig. 10.12 Difference in competition for nomination for native and IO candidates across political parties. Note The figure displays AMEs at observed values, based on binary logistic regression models. The horizontal lines represent the 90% confidence intervals around point predictions. The vertical line shows the zero line. Dependent variable coding is binary: somewhat to highly contested (=1), not or hardly contested (=0). References native, female, mean age, low education, no incumbent, mean number of legislative terms, mean number of prior candidacies, mean years of party membership, mean party activity rate, mean number of political offices, no local-level office, no party office, mean number of org. affiliations, no local residence in SMD, non-viable SMD, no repeated candidacy in SMD, no vacant SMD, Bundestag election, SPD, non-viable list position. N for SMDs = 962; N for party lists = 1,076. Source GCS 2013; state-level candidate surveys

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level. In BÜNDNIS 90/DIE GRÜNEN, IO candidates have a 30 percentage points higher chance of being contested. For the other political parties, however, there are no clear differences between IO and native candidates. If I look at nominations on party lists, none of the political parties studied showed any significant effects. The results provide further confirmation of the assumption that SMDs represent greater hurdles for the nomination of IO candidates than party lists—a higher number of challengers must be outperformed in the SMDs. However, the empirical results contradict the assumption that center-left parties are the main pillars of opening aspirations by keeping the number of challengers low. An obvious explanation for this unexpected result is that the SPD and BÜNDNIS 90/DIE GRÜNEN are traditionally more open toward IO citizens anyway (da Fonseca 2011; Wüst 2011, 2016). The number of party members from immigrant backgrounds is therefore likely to exceed that of the FDP and CDU/CSU. In some cases, this may lead to increased competition for nomination between aspiring IO candidates: When five immigrants seek a nomination, they must compete with each other and say “not this one, but me!” In my party, this is not the case […]. There are too few. That makes it easier. On the one hand, you have fewer people to support you by saying “I have to support this person because he or she has the same background”. On the other hand, you don’t have any competition (Interview 2).

Continuing with the amount of party support in candidate selection, Fig. 10.13 shows how the effect of an immigrant background varies across political parties. It is important to note that no IO candidate from the FDP or BÜNDNIS 90/DIE GRÜNEN felt that the support of the state party leadership was important, which is why no effects can be shown for them. What can be derived from the analysis for the remaining political parties is that the candidates’ immigrant origins barely shape the perceived importance of state party support in the selection process. The effect sizes are small, with estimates failing statistical significance throughout. If I turn attention to local party support, what emerges is that the estimates now point in a negative direction for most political parties. Although effect sizes are small and fail statistical significance due to a low number of observations, the results further lend credibility to my previous findings: local party organizations are generally more reluctant to provide party support to IO candidates, fearing that they will attract fewer voters than native candidates. It seems that this is the case for all the parties under investigation. The next step is not to check the requirements for a nomination, but the quality of the nomination: how promisingly a candidate has fought for an office. Since the number of IO candidates in winnable wards is too small for estimating interaction effects between their migration background and party affiliation, the following analysis is limited to the chances of winning on party lists. As revealed in Fig. 10.14, the strongest difference in the list margin between IO and native candidates becomes evident in the SPD and CDU/CSU. In the SPD, the predicted list placement of IO candidates is 4.6 positions higher than that of native candidates. The effect is statistically significant at a 0.1 level. In the CDU/CSU, the effect amounts to 4.9 list positions but lacks statistical significance (p-value = 0.36). No notable effects can be observed

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Fig. 10.13 Difference in importance of party support in candidate selection for native and IO candidates across political parties. Note The figure displays AMEs at observed values, based on binary logistic regression models. The horizontal lines represent the 90% confidence intervals around point predictions. The vertical line shows the zero line. Dependent variable coding in binary: important (=1), not important (=0). References native, female, mean age, low education, no incumbent, mean number of legislative terms, mean number of prior candidacies, mean years of party membership, mean party activity rate, mean number of political offices, no local-level office, no party office, mean number of org. affiliations, SMD nomination, Saxon state election, SPD. N for state party leadership support = 622; N for local party chapter support = 635. Source state-level candidate surveys

for the other parties in the sample. Summarizing the results, the initial assumption that center-left parties are more inclined to place IO candidates on promising list positions is rejected. In fact, only the SPD and CDU/CSU appear to give preferential treatment to IO candidates in the allocation of promising list places in order to intensify their relations with IO voters or, in the case of the CDU/CSU, to shed their image of being hostile to multiculturalism. The missing effect in the FDP, on the other hand, is hardly surprising. The main reason lies in the party’s liberal ideology, which opposes all measures of affirmative action. For BÜNDNIS 90/DIE GRÜNEN, the explanation for the absence of an effect presumably relates to the party’s supply pool. BÜNDNIS 90/DIE GRÜNEN are the pioneers for representing IO citizens in parliament (Mediendienst Integration 2013; Wüst 2011, 2014). Under these conditions, the party comes under less pressure to put IO candidates on disproportionately higher list positions in order to counter their underrepresentation in its own ranks. Correspondingly, the interviews explained how, in BÜNDNIS 90/DIE GRÜNEN, there has now been extensive integration of IO citizens into the party organization. Preferential treatment or special support networks, as presented by ImmiGrün in the past, were therefore meanwhile regarded as dispensable. Overall, the party effects are less straight forward than expected and offer no clear picture of party patterns in selection behavior for IO candidates. One possible

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Fig. 10.14 Difference in list margin between native and IO candidates across political parties. Note The figure displays OLS regression coefficients with robust standard errors. The horizontal lines represent the 90% confidence intervals around point predictions. The vertical line shows the zero line. Dependent variable coding is metric. References native, female, mean age, low education, no incumbent, mean number of legislative terms, mean number of prior candidacies, mean years of party membership, mean party activity rate, mean number of political offices, no local-level office, no party office, mean number of org. affiliations, no SMD nomination or viable SMD nomination, Bundestag election, SPD. N = 1,173. Source GCS 2013; state-level candidate surveys

explanation for the unclear pattern is that the issue of immigrant representation has gained resonance recently in the wake of fluctuating voter markets and the increasing importance of IO voters in Germany. Party differences are therefore less pronounced, with all parties having recognized IO citizens as potential voters. In addition, it could also be argued that center-left parties, where the strongest opening was expected, tend to treat IO candidates neutrally in their candidate selection, since they have a greater supply of prospective IO candidates. They do not need to make more of an effort to target more IO candidates, as they already have enough. If their eligibility pool is not skewed but representative of the immigrant population, neutral nominating rules will therefore automatically lead to fair representation.

10.3 Does the Mode of Candidacy Matter? Past research has identified the institutional setting as another factor which has an impact on the party selectors’ candidate preferences and their corresponding selection behavior (Norris 2006; Ruedin 2013; Rule 1986; Rule and Zimmerman 1994; Siaroff 2000). Political parties are not completely free in their choice of candidates, but electoral rules shape their candidate preferences in far-reaching ways. In this respect, the

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mode of candidacy is discussed as a key factor in forming the institutional incentive structure in which candidate selection is embedded. As detailed above, political parties have strong electoral incentives to prevent IO candidates from running for office in SMDs, while on electoral lists they try to offer a balanced choice of candidates, in order to appeal to a broad spectrum of voters, which makes IO candidates a welcome contribution to ticket balancing (Ruedin 2009, 2013; Rule 1986; Rule and Zimmerman 1994). Political parties thus avoid putting up IO candidates in SMDs, as it is assumed that their attractiveness to voters is limited to certain voter segments. Instead, party selectors tend to choose candidates that take after the average voter, who is “white, middle aged, able-bodied, heterosexual and male” (Durose et al. 2013: 258). Derived from this, one can assume that the allocation of party list slots is more likely to be accompanied by an opening in candidate selection, while in SMDs, more defensive selection behavior is expected. In order to understand whether and how the mode of candidacy affects how IO candidates are recruited for candidacies, I will re-estimate the above statistical models but this time incorporate interaction effects between candidate immigrant origin and the mode of candidacy, in order to plot the effect of immigrant origin across the mode of candidacy. However, I will skip a handful of dependent variables, as they already refer to a specific mode of candidacy (such as residence in the electoral district, competition, and electoral viability), which renders a separate analysis obsolete. To start with, Figure 10.15 presents both IO and native candidates’ predicted years until the first candidacy. The difference between both provides preliminary confirmation of the above assumption. As can be seen, only in the case of party list nominations does preferential treatment of IO candidates seem to occur, while in the other cases no difference to native candidates emerges. IO candidates are predicted to reach their first list nomination 3.8 years earlier than their native peers, even if they are otherwise similarly situated. Unlike SMDs, party lists allow political parties to nominate more than one group representative. IO candidates are consequently valued as an important contribution to the diversification of party lists by helping to establish closer electoral ties with IO voters without the parties having to neglect other important groups. As political parties strive to keep their party lists as balanced as possible by selecting different group representatives (Hennl and Kaiser 2008; Valdini 2012), they tend to nominate IO candidates earlier to ensure that, despite a low supply, enough IO candidates make it onto their lists. Since it is only in recent years that IO citizens have made successful inroads into party organizations and can still be seen as the political underdogs, political parties can compensate for the small number of longstanding party members with a migration background by selecting them for candidacy earlier than their native peers. IO candidates that run for election on both electoral tiers—SMDs and party lists— are party members for a similar time period as native candidates. This suggests that the selection logic of SMDs dominates in the case of dual nominations. Since the nominating conventions in SMDs usually precede those for state party lists (Manow and Nistor 2009: 603; Roberts 1988: 100; Zeuner 1970: 149), this is not unexpected.

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Fig. 10.15 Difference in years of party membership at first candidacy for native and IO candidates across mode of candidacy. Note The figure displays AMEs at observed values, based on negative binomial regression models. The horizontal lines represent the 90% confidence intervals around point predictions. The vertical line shows the zero line. Dependent variable coding is a count. References native, female, mean age, low education, mean party activity rate, mean number of political offices, no local-level office, no party office, mean number of org. affiliations, Bundestag election, SPD, SMD nomination. N = 813. Source GCS 2013; state-level candidate surveys

Dual candidates must first overcome the hurdle of nomination in SMDs before they can apply for a nomination on party lists. Overall, the results illustrate how the characteristics of the electoral system can influence the probability of prospective IO candidates being selected by the party gatekeepers at an earlier stage in their careers. In line with expectations, pure list nominations increase an IO candidate’s likelihood of being given an early candidacy. Most importantly, the results show that party lists are the candidacy mode that allows party newcomers from immigrant backgrounds the easiest entry. In SMDs, by contrast, the same selection conditions seem to apply to IO and native candidates, which can be a real impediment for aspiring party members from immigrant backgrounds who still lack long-term party involvement. The next step is to examine whether party lists offer IO candidates an easier entry into political careers than SMD candidacies, and this can also be observed for previous experience in office (see Fig. 10.16). Surprisingly, all the marginal effects point in a negative direction. Accordingly, predictions suggest that IO candidates come forward as candidates, despite lower levels of office experience than native candidates, though this is valid for each mode of candidacy. While IO candidates in SMDs are predicted to have attained 0.27 positions less than native candidates, this is 0.14 for list-only candidates and 0.18 for dual candidates. Overall, effect sizes are markedly small, failing statistical significance. But it can undoubtedly be concluded that the type of candidacy is not a decisive factor for the tendency to open up candidate selection or close it as far as office experience is concerned.

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Fig. 10.16 Difference in number of political offices at first candidacy for native and IO candidates across mode of candidacy. Note The figure displays AMEs at observed values, based on Poisson regression models with robust standard errors. The horizontal lines represent the 90% confidence intervals around point predictions. The vertical line shows the zero line. Dependent variable coding is a count. References native, female, mean age, low education, mean years of party membership, mean party activity rate, mean number of org. affiliations, Bundestag election, SPD, SMD nomination. N = 813. Source GCS 2013; state-level candidate surveys

If I move to encouragement, the result is a negative estimate for nomination on party lists (see Fig. 10.17). With a gap of 21 percentage points, which lacks statistical significance though, IO candidates have a lower probability of being asked to seek candidacy than native candidates. Both in the case of SMD and dual nominations, however, neutral selection patterns are evident. Contrary to expectations derived from literature on electoral system incentives, IO candidates are not more likely to be encouraged to run for office if they are allocated party list seats, even though political parties have considerable electoral incentives to diversify their party list in the interest of maximizing votes. One explanation for this is that the encouragement to run for office is so widespread that there is little difference between the modes of candidacy. No matter how candidates are put up for election, they are usually asked to do so in advance. Furthermore, pure list candidates usually run further down on party lists, with lower chances of victory, which could explain why they are less often the target of attempts at encouragement, something which seems even more true for IO candidates. It could also be the case that IO candidates with a strong backing from their party are usually safeguarded by dual nominations, while only those with little party backing run exclusively on party lists and must motivate themselves accordingly. We can further probe this assumption discussed in the electoral system literature by assessing the amount of party support offered in the nomination process (see Fig. 10.18). A closer look at the interaction effect shows that IO candidates are more

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Fig. 10.17 Difference in encouragement to run for election for native and IO candidates across mode of candidacy. Note The figure displays AMEs at observed values, based on binary logistic regression models. The horizontal lines represent the 90% confidence intervals around point predictions. The vertical line shows the zero line. Dependent variable coding is binary: encouragement (=1), no encouragement (=0). References native, female, mean age, low education, no incumbent, mean number of legislative terms, mean number of prior candidacies, mean years of party membership, mean party activity rate, mean number of political offices, no local-level office, no party office, mean number of org. affiliations, SPD, SMD nomination. N = 731. Source GCS 2013

likely to regard support of state party leadership as important for their own nomination when competing in SMDs—the difference is considerable, with 51 percentage points, and statistically significant at a level of 0.1. On party lists, however, the reverse can be observed. Here, IO candidates are less likely to consider support of state party leaderships as decisive for their nomination: The difference to native candidates is 16 percentage points and statistically significant at a level of 0.05. This unexpected result may be related to the fact that IO candidates with backing from their party are usually secured by double nominations, while those with less backing run exclusively on party lists. In the case of dual nominations, which apply to the majority of candidates, there is indeed no significant group difference. Contrary to expectations, support of state party leaderships plays an important role in SMDs although candidate selection here is the domain of district party organizations and leaves little room for interference by state party leadership (Schüttemeyer 2002; Schüttemeyer and Sturm 2005). It can be presumed that the results reflect individual cases in which SMDs have remained vacant, and district party organizations therefore asked state party leadership to recommend prospective candidates. What is still surprising, however, is that state party leadership does not offer extra support to IO candidates who only run for election on a party list, although they organize state nominating conventions and therefore have the opportunity to do so. One possible

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Fig. 10.18 Difference in importance of party support in candidate selection for native and IO candidates across mode of candidacy. Note The figure displays AMEs at observed values, based on binary logistic regression models. The horizontal lines represent the 90% confidence intervals around point predictions. The vertical line shows the zero line. Dependent variable coding in binary: important (=1), not important (=0). References native, female, mean age, low education, no incumbent, mean number of legislative terms, mean number of prior candidacies, mean years of party membership, mean party activity rate, mean number of political offices, no local-level office, no party office, mean number of org. affiliations, SMD nomination, Saxon state election, SPD. N for state party leadership support = 631; N for local party chapter support = 632. Source state-level candidate surveys

explanation for this is that excessive support for IO candidates makes a countermobilization more likely, as other aspiring candidates feel they are at a disadvantage, and state party leadership therefore refrains from such measures. More importantly, however, as already stated, IO candidates who receive broad support from their state party leadership are likely to be backed by double nominations, for which a neutral pattern has emerged. When looking at support from local parties, I find that, of the IO candidates only competing for office in SMDs, none considered support from local party organizations as irrelevant to their nomination. As this means a complete separation in the data, no marginal effect can be shown. Nevertheless, this highlights the importance of having the support of district and sub-district party chapters to compete in SMDs (Schüttemeyer 2002; Schüttemeyer and Sturm 2005; Zeuner 1970). Meanwhile, the probability that IO candidates consider support from local party organizations to be important is 20 and 14 percentage points lower, respectively, than the probability estimated for native candidates when running on a party list or as a dual candidate. Although these estimates fail statistical significance by a narrow margin, the results nevertheless suggest that IO candidates have more difficulty building a local alliance of supporters than native candidates, which is a major disadvantage in the selection

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of candidates. It is vital that candidates are fully supported by their own district party organizations, as these can put pressure on the list committees to put their preferred candidates in promising list positions (Schüttemeyer and Sturm 2005: 546). These findings are interesting, because they indicate one mechanism that explains why IO citizens are still underrepresented in the ranks of parliamentary candidates. Whenever IO candidates are nominated on party lists or dually, they have to do so more often despite less support from their local party organization. This represents a real disadvantage in the selection of candidates, which not only compromises the own chances of being nominated, but also the chances of obtaining a high-ranking list position.

10.4 Does the SMD Context Matter? Besides institutional rules, the wider contextual setting is likely to affect IO candidate selection by forming party selector perception of voter preferences. In SMDs, where a zero-sum logic determines candidate selection, underrepresented groups have a hard time asserting themselves. Instead, political parties prefer to nominate candidates who correspond to the average voter and therefore meet minimal opposition from local voters (Rule 1986; Rule and Zimmerman 1992, 1994). However, this initial argument of electoral system research completely ignores the demographic context of SMDs. The nomination logic alters as a function of demographic circumstances. In constituencies with a high concentration of IO citizens, they form the largest voter block and define the average voter (Anwar 1994; Bird 2005; Dancygier 2014; Grofman and Handley 1989; Marschall et al. 2010; Trounstine and Valdini 2008; Wüst 2016). Consequently, the spatial concentration of IO citizens in a constituency can be an incentive to nominate IO candidates and thus to address IO voters more effectively. Bird (2003: 14) accordingly suggests that SMDs are conducive to minority representation “if their [minorities’] geographic concentration coincides with constituency boundaries”. I therefore expect parties to be more likely to open up candidate selection to IO candidates if SMDs host a large IO population, while more defensive selection strategies can be expected in SMDs with low ethnic concentrations. Before IO candidates are nominated in SMDs, political parties further try to anticipate the probability that local voters will reject IO candidates. The literature on attitudes toward immigration has amply demonstrated that prejudices against immigrants are more pronounced in socially disadvantaged places than in affluent localities (Dancygier 2013; Dancygier and Donnelly 2014; Hainmueller and Hiscox 2007; Hainmueller and Hopkins 2014). Since the nomination of IO candidates in places with a low status threatens a loss in votes, parties should refrain from giving preference to IO candidates here. In the view of a likely backlash against IO candidates, I therefore expect political parties to be more likely to close their candidate selection for IO candidates if there is a high level of social disadvantage in the SMDs. To measure the degree of economic deprivation, I have used unemployment figures

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in the SMDs, while for a cultural dimension, the local proportion of high school graduates serves as an indicator. In order to investigate how local context affects the selection strategies of political parties toward IO candidates, the above statistical models are estimated again, but this time including the three SMD context factors discussed earlier. The predictions presented below are based on cross-level interaction terms between migration background and the SMD context variables, with the other context and control variables kept constant. Since the candidates are nested in SMDs, two-level regression models with random intercepts for SMDs will be presented (Gelman and Hill 2007; Snijders and Bosker 2012). In this way, I can observe how the effect of migration background changes depending on the respective contextual factor. Yet the estimates in Fig. 10.19 disprove the assumption of systematic variances along the spatial accumulation of immigrants, at least with respect to the length of party membership. Contrary to expectations, the marginal effect of the migration background remains largely stable, despite varying proportions of foreigners in SMDs. The plotted estimates run nearly parallel to the zero line, indicating that the selection behavior of political parties is in no way conditioned by the local concentration of IO citizens. Even in SMDs with high voting potential for IO citizens, political parties are not more inclined to recruit newcomers from immigrant backgrounds in order to ensure that they can put up such candidates. Instead, IO candidates are party members for a similar period to native candidates, regardless of the local proportion of IO citizens.

Fig. 10.19 Difference in years of party membership at first candidacy for native and IO candidates across SMD context factors. Note The figure displays AMEs at observed values, based on twolevel negative binomial regression models. The dashed lines represent the 90% confidence intervals around point predictions. The horizontal lines show the zero lines. Dependent variable coding is a count. References native, female, mean age, low education, mean party activity rate, mean number of political offices, no local-level office, no party office, mean number of org. affiliations, Bundestag election, SPD, SMD context factors at their mean. N = 527. Source GCS 2013; state-level candidate surveys

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One explanation suggested by the qualitative interviews is that demographic aspects play only a minor role in the local selection of candidates. Party newcomers are usually only placed in SMDs if these have remained vacant—otherwise, one runs the risk of offending longstanding local party members. Consequently, the strategic calculation of recruiting candidates with a migration background for SMDs with a large IO population is displaced by other considerations, such as the vacancy of SMDs. If vacant SMDs are characterized by a high percentage of IO citizens, this is considered a very fortunate circumstance. However, demographic considerations are only incorporated into the selection decisions of the political parties in a second step. Another reason for no effect change being apparent is that the supply of longstanding party members with a migration background is likely to be greater in SMDs, which are characterized by a high proportion of IO citizens. If political parties find enough potential IO candidates among their rank-and-file party members, they are not forced to resort to recruiting newcomers, while in constituencies with a lower proportion of IO citizens, they have no incentive to put such candidates up for election. When the economic dimension of social deprivation comes into play, it emerges that political parties do not close their candidate selection for IO candidates when constituencies have higher unemployment rates. In fact, effect changes are hardly noticeable and therefore statistically insignificant, showing that unemployment rate has basically no impact on the selection behavior of political parties. A somewhat different picture emerges if one looks at the cultural dimension of social deprivation, measured by the local share of high school graduates. Here, higher levels of education make an opening in terms of newcomer recruitment more likely . When the level of education is low, IO candidates are party members for a similar period of time as native candidates at their first nomination. However, when the proportion of high school graduates is above the average, IO candidates are predicted to enter the election five years earlier than native candidates. Overall, however, the social deprivation of the SMDs does not have a strong influence on the party selection behavior toward IO candidates. One reason for this is that political parties do not close their candidate selection process only when they fear losing votes by nominating IO candidates. They will already make it clear at previous stages of recruitment that candidates with a migration background have no chance of running for office. The IO candidates who have made it through candidate selection despite hostile demographic conditions are therefore an extremely selective sample, and one that obviously cannot be easily excluded from the recruitment process. Among IO candidates, there was the widespread perception that political parties come under increasing pressure to respond to the heterogeneous composition of the electorate. Their established recruitment processes were no longer able to capture the growing diversity of the electorate, but tended to reproduce the type of candidates in office. Most of the IO candidates therefore considered it necessary to deviate from the established recruitment processes and play more “wild cards”. Otherwise, they argued, political parties cannot reflect the diverse composition of the electoral markets and will lose their connection to important voter segments:

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Fig. 10.20 Difference in number of political offices at first candidacy for native and IO candidates across SMD context factors. Note The figure displays AMEs at observed values, based on twolevel Poisson regression models with robust standard errors. The dashed lines represent the 90% confidence intervals around point predictions. The horizontal lines show the zero lines. Dependent variable coding is a count. References native, female, mean age, low education, mean years of party membership, mean party activity rate, mean number of org. affiliations, Bundestag election, SPD, SMD context factors at their mean. N = 527. Source GCS 2013; state-level candidate surveys

In large cities, political parties have no electoral prospects if they are not able to respond to the lifestyle of the population, which is very diverse (Interview 1). I think political parties are self-centered: they have their established circles and networks. The accusation of parallel structures applies not only to IO citizens, but also to party organizations (Interview 5).

If we move on, we see that, in accordance with findings on the length of party membership, there is also no effect of ethnic concentration with regard to prior office experience (see Fig. 10.20). The local concentration of IO citizens does not impact the marginal effect of immigrant origin on the predicted number of offices held at first candidacy. Apparently, the local presence of a large IO population has no influence on party selection behavior toward IO candidates. The main reason for this is, as the qualitative interviews suggested, that preferential treatment to circumvent a low supply of potential IO candidates becomes less urgent with a large local IO population. Under these demographic conditions, the supply of potential IO candidates is usually large enough, as demographics are reflected in local party membership. Similarly, the effect plot also shows that the influence of a migration background on the predicted number of political offices does not change with differing levels of unemployment. Thus, economic deprivation has no influence whatsoever on party selection strategies for IO candidates in terms of experience with previous offices. If I turn next to the local proportion of high school graduates, the effect plot even clearly refutes the above expectations. With an extremely low proportion of high school graduates, it is predicted that IO candidates will hold 0.48 fewer previous offices than native candidates when they are first nominated, and the difference is statistically

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significant at a level of 0.05. On the other hand, with a peak of high school graduates, it is predicted that IO candidates will hold 0.21 more offices, although the effect has now lost statistical significance. The results unquestionably show that, contrary to initial expectations, a higher level of education does not lead to the opening of candidate selection to IO candidates. Undoubtedly, higher education does not necessarily promote a greater opening to migrants, but other factors, such as the vacancy of the SMDs, seem to play a more crucial role in this respect. A different effect to that expected is also apparent when looking at local residence in electoral district. The effect plot in Fig. 10.21 points in a positive direction. In other words, the probability that IO candidates are locals increases as constituencies move toward a greater spatial concentration of IO citizens. For the lowest proportion of foreigners, the probability of IO candidates being locals is 12 percentage points lower than for native candidates. However, this is reversed when the proportion of foreigners increases. For the highest proportion of foreigners, IO candidates have a 26 percentage points higher probability of being local natives—the marginal effect reaches statistical significance at a level of 0.05. The empirical data clearly counter the assumption that political parties become increasingly willing to nominate external IO candidates when the electoral power of IO voters increases, in order to be able to nominate an IO candidate despite a low local supply of them. Firstly, one can argue that more locals from immigrant backgrounds are involved in district party organizations if the SMDs are characterized by a high

Fig. 10.21 Difference in local residence in SMDs for native and IO candidates across SMD context factors. Note The figure displays AMEs at observed values, based on two-level binary logistic regression models. The dashed lines represent the 90% confidence intervals around point predictions. The horizontal lines show the zero lines. Dependent variable coding is binary: local residence (=1), no local residence (=0). References native, female, mean age, low education, no repeated candidacy in SMD, mean years of party membership, mean party activity rate, mean number of political offices, no local-level office, no party office, mean number of org. affiliations, non-viable SMD, no vacant SMD, Bundestag election, SPD, SMD context factors at their mean. N = 973. Source GCS 2013; state-level candidate surveys

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proportion of IO citizens. Demography is usually reflected, at least to some extent, in grassroot membership. Political parties therefore do not need to parachute external IO candidates in if SMDs are characterized by a high ethnic concentration. Secondly, the qualitative interviews indicated that political parties do not send external IO candidates to electoral districts with a high IO population at any price. Rather, they look for vacant SMDs to avoid a backlash from the local nomination committee and local party members. If a vacant SMD accommodates a large IO population, this is a happy coincidence. However, this strategic consideration is only made when a candidacy remains vacant: The socio-demographic context of the district was irrelevant. It was simply a matter of finding an electoral district for me without too much bloodshed. There was another possible district, but there were two aspirants who had been working towards a mandate for decades. This district was therefore the option […] with which most conflicts [within the party organization] could be avoided (Interview 3).

If attention is focused on the unemployment rate in the SMDs, the effect trend corresponds to the above expectation. The probability that political parties will refrain from nominating an external IO candidate increases as soon as the proportion of unemployed voters rises. More precisely, with the lowest unemployment rate, IO candidates are 8 percentage points less likely to be locals than native candidates. In contrast, at the highest unemployment rate, they have an 8 percentage points higher probability of being from the locality. It seems that IO candidates in electoral districts with high unemployment become only acceptable to political parties and voters if they have strong local roots. Only if they are local personalities is the danger that they will be considered non-eligible by the majority of voters predictable for the parties. However, the change in effect is only weak, and the AMEs remain statistically insignificant throughout. The effect of migration background behaves in a similar way if plotted against the share of high school graduates. As soon as constituencies move toward higher levels of education, the probability increases that parties will accept external IO candidates. This affirms that external IO candidates become more acceptable both within the party and among local voters when the overall educational standard in the constituency is high. However, the estimates should be treated with caution due to weak effect sizes and high statistical uncertainty. All of this indicates that parachuting is more about vacancies in electoral districts than a strategic calculation based on demographic conditions. So far, the analysis suggested that demography plays a rather minor role in the party selection behavior for IO candidates. After considering key traits that increase aspirants’ chances of selection as a candidate, my next step is to examine measures that political parties can take to support the selection of IO candidates, starting with encouragement. As Fig. 10.22 demonstrates, IO candidates are slightly more likely to be invited to stand for election than native candidates, so long as the proportion of foreigners is low. Contrary to theoretical expectations, however, this reverses as soon as the proportion of foreigners increases. With a foreigner share of 20 percentage points above the average across all constituencies, IO candidates are encouraged 23 percentage points less often than

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Fig. 10.22 Difference in encouragement to run for election for native and IO candidates across SMD context factors. Note The figure displays AMEs at observed values, based on two-level binary logistic regression models. The dashed lines represent the 90% confidence intervals around point predictions. The horizontal lines show the zero lines. Dependent variable coding is binary: encouragement (=1), no encouragement (=0). References native, female, mean age, low education, no incumbent, mean number of legislative terms, mean number of prior candidacies, mean years of party membership, mean party activity rate, mean number of political offices, no local-level office, no party office, mean number of org. affiliations, SPD, SMD context factors at their mean. N = 557. Source GCS 2013

native candidates. It is important to note, however, that the marginal effects are statistically insignificant throughout. Nonetheless, the assumption that IO candidates are more likely to be emboldened in their ambitions for office if the geographical concentration of IO voters is high must clearly be rejected. The results instead suggest that encouragement tends to become obsolete in constituencies with a high proportion of IO citizens. The reason for this is that political parties are confronted with a sufficient number of potential IO candidates willing to stand for election (Schönwälder et al. 2001), so any directed encouragement to mobilize more IO candidates becomes unnecessary. Turning to the two indicators of social deprivation, I find that neither the local level of unemployment nor the level of education brings about any noticeable change in the effect of the immigrant origin on the chance of encouragement. Obviously, an IO candidate’s likelihood of encouragement is not a function of social deprivation in constituencies, but IO candidates have similar prospects of encouragement as those of native candidates. This is in full keeping with my previous observation that the invitation to stand as a candidate is part of the usual candidate recruitment process and therefore applies to the majority of candidates but does not distinguish specific types of candidates. Another aspect of party support is the extent to which IO candidates are shielded from counter-mobilization (see Fig. 10.23). While no significant immigrant back-

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Fig. 10.23 Difference in competition for a nomination for native and IO candidates across SMD context factors. Note The figure displays AMEs at observed values, based on two-level binary logistic regression models. The dashed lines represent the 90% confidence intervals around point predictions. The horizontal lines show the zero lines. Dependent variable coding is binary: somewhat to highly contested (=1), not or hardly contested (=0). References native, female, mean age, low education, no incumbent, mean number of legislative terms, mean number of prior candidacies, mean years of party membership, mean party activity rate, mean number of political offices, no local-level office, no party office, mean number of org. affiliations, no local residence in SMD, non-viable SMD, no repeated candidacy in SMD, no vacant SMD, Bundestag election, SPD, SMD context factors at their mean. N = 953. Source GCS 2013; state-level candidate surveys

ground effect emerges at lower foreigner share levels, this pattern alters considerably when the foreigner share increases. With a foreigner share of 22 percentage points above average, IO candidates are 27 percentage points more likely than native candidates to face challengers—the marginal effect is statistically significant at a 0.1 level. The result shows that, contrary to expectations, the probability that IO candidates will be exposed to a competitive nomination situation increases as the local IO population grows. An explanation for this surprising finding probably lies in the supply pools of candidates: The number of migrant candidates is likely to be higher in constituencies where IO citizens make up a substantial part of the local constituency, as demographics are reflected in party membership. This could force up-and-coming IO candidates to compete with each other in the selection of candidates. The previous analysis further pointed to a second mechanism that could be hidden behind the pattern found. If there are no local party members of immigrant origin qualified for office, party leaders sometimes choose to recruit party newcomers from immigrant backgrounds for constituencies with a high spatial concentration of IO citizens. However, such strategic ventures can feed great dissatisfaction among local party members who feel left out in the candidate selection process, which can eventually lead to a counter-mobilization. While the first mechanism applies chiefly to SMDs where the number of local IO candidates is particularly high, the second is

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more likely to be effective in SMDs where no local IO candidate is available, even though the constituency is characterized by a large IO population. Surprisingly, the extent to which a constituency is socially deprived does not play a role in the marginal effect of migration background. The assumption that greater efforts are being made to discourage potential IO candidates from standing for election by means of greater counter-mobilization when the social prospects in a SMD are particularly bleak must be rejected. Both in terms of unemployment rate and educational level, IO candidates’ nomination situation remains largely undisturbed by local contextual factors. Obviously, it is not the extent of social deprivation that causes inner-party mobilization against IO candidates, but there are other reasons, such as the degree of competition between intra-party groups or the marked preference of a specific candidate by the party leadership, which ultimately determine the extent of competition. Finally, the strength of perceived party support in candidate selection can give a further indication of how difficult or easy parties make it for IO candidates to reach a candidacy, and on which contextual conditions in the constituency this depends (see Fig. 10.24). Contrary to my expectations, the effect of a migration background on the importance attached to state party leadership support remains completely unaffected by the proportion of foreigners in the SMDs. The spatial concentration of IO citizens

Fig. 10.24 Difference in importance of party support in candidate selection for native and IO candidates across SMD context factors. Note The figure displays AMEs at observed values, based on two-level binary logistic regression models. The dashed lines represent the 90% confidence intervals around point predictions. The horizontal lines show the zero lines. Dependent variable coding in binary: important (=1), not important (=0). References native, female, mean age, low education, no incumbent, mean number of legislative terms, mean number of prior candidacies, mean years of party membership, mean party activity rate, mean number of political offices, no local-level office, no party office, mean number of org. affiliations, Saxon state election, SPD, SMD context factors at their mean. N for state party leadership support = 417; N for local party chapter support = 417. Source state-level candidate surveys

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obviously does not create sufficient electoral incentives to induce party leaders to give extraordinary support to IO candidates. However, since the selection of candidates in SMDs is primarily an area of power for the district party organizations, this can hardly be surprising. As soon as support of local party organizations is brought into play, the picture alters. It turns out that IO candidates, at a low proportion of foreigners in a constituency, are 23 percentage points less likely than native candidates to feel that the support of the local party is important for their nomination. As the proportion of foreigners increases, however, their probability exceeds that predicted for native candidates by 14 percentage points. Even if the effects do not achieve statistical significance, the pattern points in the hypothesized direction. In view of a low proportion of foreigners, local party organizations are more hesitant to support IO candidates in their nominations, as it is assumed that they are less likely to attract local voters. Once the proportion of IO citizens in the SMDs increases, however, they are more inclined to support the nomination of IO candidates in order to secure the electoral support of IO voters, who form a large and highly visible voter segment in the local constituency. Moreover, under such conditions it is more likely that there are immigrants among the local party members who are more likely to rally behind someone from their ranks. As for unemployment, it appears that IO candidates are more likely than native candidates to consider support from the state party leadership as relevant to their nomination under a low unemployment rate: The difference is 34 percentage points and significant at a level of 0.05. However, as soon as the unemployment rate rises, the effect tends toward zero. As expected, state party leaders renounce support for IO candidates as the economic disparities in SMDs grow. A similar picture emerges for support from local party organizations. With the lowest unemployment rate, there is still no significant effect which comes from having a migration background. Yet, this changes as soon as the unemployment rate is above average. Now IO candidates have a 40 percentage points lower probability of receiving support: The marginal effect is statistically significant at a level of 0.1. As local constituencies become economically marginalized and more local voters resent immigrants, both state party leaders and local party organizations lose their willingness to endorse IO candidates in their political ambitions, as their appointment could cost votes. While such an effect is apparent in relation to the economic dimension of social deprivation, it is not present in relation to the cultural dimension. Surprisingly, the correlation here is exactly the opposite. IO candidates are more likely than native candidates to find support from state party leaders crucial to their nomination if the local proportion of high school graduates is below average—the difference is 34 percentage points and is statistically significant at a level of 0.1. However, as soon as the proportion of high school graduates grows, the marginal effect tends toward zero. A similar pattern emerges for support from local party organizations. An ad hoc explanation for this puzzling result is that the indicator is not suitable for tapping into the cultural dimension of social deprivation. Admittedly, it blurs constituency boundaries, as school leavers may have attended schools in neighboring constituencies. Another reason could be that the educational level is less important

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in candidate selection than the unemployment level or the spatial concentration of IO citizens, which makes it less relevant for the selection behavior of political parties, as it is simply less visible—both for the voters and for the parties. What can be noted generally is that the contextual factors of SMDs have a greater impact on support from local party organizations than on support from state party leadership. The first reason for this is that local party organizations are more in touch with the socio-demographic and socio-economic realities of their constituencies. Secondly, local party organizations have a monopoly on the selection of candidates in SMDs, which greatly limits the possibility of state party leadership interfering. Unfortunately, I cannot estimate the odds of winning in SMDs as a function of the context factors, because the number of IO candidates in winnable constituencies is too small for this. What the analysis of the influence of SMD context factors on nomination behavior of political parties toward IO candidates has nevertheless revealed is that, even if in some cases the assumptions were correct, in most cases either no or only weak effect was visible or it contradicted assumptions. One explanation from the qualitative interviews, as already mentioned, is that local context conditions play less of a role in the local selection of candidates than the extent to which suitable candidates can be found. If there is an opening for IO candidates, then this is usually only where no suitable candidates are available, or where the constituency has remained vacant. Rational considerations (with respect to contextual conditions) and which candidate is best suited under these conditions therefore only play a role at a later stage. In other words, strategic considerations as to which type of candidate can address most voters under the given contextual conditions are less common than assumed, since there is no such variety of potential local candidates, and if certain types of candidates are recruited specifically, then usually only where no other party members have aspirations for office.

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Rule W (1986) Does the electoral system discriminate against women? Polit Sci Polit 19(4):864–867 Rule W (1987) Electoral systems, contextual factors and women’s opportunity for election to parliament in twenty-three democracies. Western Polit Q 40(3):477–498 Rule W, Zimmerman JF (eds) (1992) United States electoral systems: their impact on women and minorities. Greenwood Press, New York Rule W, Zimmerman JF (eds) (1994) Electoral systems in comparative perspective: their impact on women and minorities. Greenwood Press, Westport Saggar S (2000) Race and representation: electoral politics and ethnic pluralism in Britain. Manchester University Press, New York Schönwälder K, Sinanoglu C, Volkert D (2001) Vielfalt sucht Rat. Ratsmitglieder mit Migrationshintergrund in deutschen Großstädten. Eine Studie des Max-Planck-Instituts zur Erforschung multireligiöser und multiethnischer Gesellschaften. In: Kooperation mit der Heinrich-BöllStiftung und gefördert durch die Stiftung Mercator. https://www.boell.de/sites/default/files/201112-Vielfalt_sucht_Rat.pdf. Accessed 15 July 2020 Schüttemeyer SS (2002) Wer wählt wen wie aus? Pfade in das unerschlossene Terrain der Kandidatenaufstellung. Gesellschaft – Wirtschaft – Politik 51(2):145–159 Schüttemeyer SS, Sturm R (2005) Der Kandidat – das (fast) unbekannte Wesen: Befunde und Überlegungen zur Aufstellung der Bewerber zum Deutschen Bundestag. Zeitschrift für Parlamentsfragen 36(3):539–553 Siaroff A (2000) Women’s representation in legislatures and cabinets in industrial democracies. Int Polit Sci Rev 21(2):197–215 Snijders TAB, Bosker RJ (2012) Multilevel analysis. An introduction to basic and advanced multilevel modeling. Sage, London Trounstine J, Valdini ME (2008) The context matters: the effects of single-member versus at-large districts on city council diversity. Am J Polit Sci 52(3):554–569 Valdini ME (2012) A deterrent to diversity: the conditional effect of electoral rules on the nomination of women candidates. Electoral Stud 31(4):740–749 Wüst AM (2002) Wie wählen Neubürger? Politische Einstellungen und Wahlverhalten eingebürgerter Personen in Deutschland. Leske + Budrich, Opladen Wüst AM (2011) Migrants as parliamentary actors in Germany. In: Bird K, Saalfeld T, Wüst AM (eds) The political representation of immigrants and minorities: voters, parties and parliaments in liberal democracies. Routledge, New York, pp 250–265 Wüst AM (2016) Incorporation beyond cleavages? Parties, candidates and Germany’s immigrantorigin electorate. German Polit 25(3):414–432 Wüst AM (2014) Immigration into politics. Immigrant-origin candidates and their success in the 2013 Bundestag election. German Polit Soc 32(112):1–15 Zeuner B (1970) Kandidatenaufstellung zur Bundestagswahl 1965. Nijhofl, Den Haag

Chapter 11

Conclusion

In view of the persisting underrepresentation of IO citizens in German parliaments, repeated calls were made for political parties to diversify their candidate tableaus and get to grips with misrepresentation. While the gap is gradually closing, the pace of change toward equal representation is slow, and the underrepresentation of IO citizens in German state parliaments and the German Bundestag remains. The slow pace of change brings up the question of how to open up politics more effectively, and in particular candidate selection, as the eye of the needle of legislative recruitment. Many have argued the case for affirmative action as a practicable and necessary political intervention for accelerating progress toward equal representation in politics. Of course, such measures would be highly effective and very forthright in establishing the fair representation of IO citizens in parliament. However, the de facto selection behavior of political parties toward IO candidates has largely fallen by the wayside in previous research although it could reveal to a great deal the extent to which parties are already seeking to involve migrants more in parliaments. Thus far, very few studies have been able to dig deeper into the specific selection behavior of political parties toward IO candidates, which would help bring to light whether party actors are already engaged in facilitating access to candidatures for IO citizens or whether the candidate selection is really the culprit for persistent underrepresentation. The main reason for this blind spot in research is that the selection of candidates takes place behind the scenes and, therefore, indeed remains very difficult for political scientists to access. As a consequence, many studies have concentrated on minority representation and relevant factors driving its magnitude at the aggregate level, while the missing link has remained the micro-level: more precisely, how IO candidates fare in the candidate selection process and the specific experiences they have in this process. Despite these empirical obstacles, this study contributed to previous research by finding an indirect way of interrogating the selection of IO candidates.

© The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2021 S. Ceyhan, How German Parties Select Candidates of Immigrant Origin, Springer Series in Electoral Politics, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-59451-0_11

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11 Conclusion

This indirect way of measuring comprises two components, with which this study has wisely made use of the available data to learn more about the specific selection behavior of parties toward IO candidates. It has done this first by looking closely at the recruitment profiles of the IO candidates available for election. In this way, information could be gained about what IO candidates need to bring with them to be able to apply for a mandate. However, this alone does not provide any information about whether parties make it any easier for IO candidates to stand for election or whether the opposite is the case, with forms of discrimination prevailing, as has often been argued. The present study therefore complemented existing research by integrating the recruitment profiles of native candidates as a point of reference into the investigation of party selection behavior toward IO candidates. Only if we understand how IO candidates are treated in the selection of parliamentary candidates in comparison with native candidates (whether they encounter more opposition or stronger support from their party, and why) can we uncover the mechanisms that intervene in the selection process and, as a consequence, eventually shape the representation of IO citizens in parliament. By comparing how political parties treat IO and native candidates, the present study helped to see whether political parties and the way they select parliamentary candidates form the main reasons for IO citizen underrepresentation in parliament. In this way, one can approach a phenomenon that is still hard to access for political scientists. The empirical results drew an extremely mixed picture of the selection strategies used by political parties for IO candidates, with individual indications of an opening (in terms of the length of time until the first candidacy, the number of previous political offices, or the chances of winning on party lists), and some indications of closure (with regard to intra-party competition in SMDs, local party support, and chances of winning in SMDs). What has emerged is that higher party levels in particular, such as party leadership at state or district level, are the drivers of opening efforts, while party members at local levels tended to react less enthusiastically to the nomination of IO candidates. Overall, it is the party in central office and not the party on the ground that pushes for an opening of candidate selection. This reminds us that political parties are by no means uniform actors who are in complete agreement on the selection strategies they wish to apply to candidates from underrepresented groups. Instead, various party actors involved in the selection of candidates pursue strategies that, in part, diverge widely. This makes it difficult for parties to pursue one single coherent selection strategy, though this would be most effective in rapidly increasing numbers of IO candidates. Obviously, this is a partial answer to the question of why progress in producing equal descriptive representation tends to proceed at a snail’s pace. Even if only certain higher-level party players have a strong interest in the higher presence of IO candidates (e.g. for strategic electoral reasons), the question remains as to why they cannot push through a greater opening of candidate selection for IO candidates. In fact, this study has revealed that the overwhelming majority of indicators has shown a general trend toward neutral selection patterns. The party selectorates have thus tended to select IO candidates with similar criteria and merits to native candidates and offered them comparable support in the selection process. However, it is important to note at this point that, for reasons of data availability, I have

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only examined the selection profiles of candidates who were awarded a nomination in the candidate selection process. Accordingly, I can only come to the conclusion that those IO candidates who actually bid for office did so under similar conditions to native candidates. The data employed do not allow for the conclusion that all IO contenders are generally treated neutrally in the selection of candidates. I cannot exclude the possibility that there is stronger empirical evidence of discrimination in the group of non-selected IO applicants, which would also explain their non-selection. But what I can infer is that the IO candidates who were successful in the selection of candidates did not generally do so thanks to preferential treatment or in spite of discrimination, but were mostly simply selected like most other candidates. The question now is why neutrality is the dominant selection strategy, even though all the political parties investigated here have, in one way or another, committed themselves to equal descriptive representation of IO citizens in parliament. As this study has revealed, the underlying reason for this is that opening strategies are accompanied by serious pitfalls that undermine inner-party peace. The flexible adaptation of selection behavior and thus different selection strategies within a party, depending on which group one is dealing with, is often not an option for parties as it causes numerous problems. The ability of political parties to open up their candidate selection to make it more permeable to underrepresented groups is therefore severely limited by the potential drawbacks associated with preferential treatment. This is also the main reason that party inclusionary rhetoric, as outlined in the beginning, is in most cases not reflected in their candidate selection behavior. Instead, neutral selection practices—which are also the most widely used—are the most sustainable and hazard-free selection strategies that political parties can generally pursue toward candidates from underrepresented groups. As this study has shown, a first source of conflict arises because the preference for inexperienced IO candidates often provokes a backlash from other longstanding party members who have been waiting for a long time for the opportunity to get a mandate. The latter feel ignored if IO candidates enjoy preferential treatment in the selection of candidates, which leads to stronger counter-mobilization at the nomination congress and makes it fundamentally more difficult for party leadership to pre-structure the field of competitors in favor of their preferred contender. This in turn makes the selection of candidates less predictable overall. Moreover, it is the party members at the grassroots level who contribute the most important resources to the election campaign by spending both time and energy on the candidates’ campaign activities. Preferential treatment of IO candidates can therefore cost party organizations the crucial activist support at a grassroots level and ultimately lead to the loss of seats. In addition to a counter-reaction from party members, party selectorates at the local level tend to vote for challengers in strategic efforts by party leaders to place inexperienced newcomers with a migration background, in order to demonstrate their disapproval of privileged treatment. A second complication arises because the selection of candidates is tantamount to competition for representation between different internal party groups. If the representation of a new group becomes more important within a party organization, this

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poses a threat to the representation of the established groups. A mobilization against favored IO candidates thus follows not only from the ignorance of longstanding party members who have been waiting for a long time for a nomination and have already invested a lot of time in party activities for this purpose, but also from the competition for seats between different party groups. As soon as competition in the selection of candidates surges, other contenders and their supporters tend to present immigrant background as a weakness, in order to keep up-and-coming IO candidates in check and secure their own nomination, while an immigrant background remains unmentioned as long as competition for nomination is low. In order to avert the risk of their established representative groups turning away, which could lead to a decline in electoral support and endanger party cohesion, political parties generally choose to treat IO candidates neutrally when selecting candidates. The reluctance of political parties to open their doors wide to IO candidates thus results from a fear of counter-reactions within the party organization. Where an opening for IO candidates occurs, the previous analysis recognized the vacancy of candidacies as a decisive factor. Whenever candidacies remained unfilled, this was an opportunity for the political parties to bring IO candidates with little party experience into the game while not offending other aspirants or inner-party groups. Conversely, the incumbency factor proved to be a major obstacle to the opening of political parties. The more candidacies were already filled by previous incumbents, the lower the chances of accommodating newcomers from immigrant backgrounds. What this study adds to existing research is not only more knowledge about how exactly, on the basis of which conditions and criteria, IO candidates are selected by their parties, but also why they are selected in this way and not any other. In previous research, candidate selection and the discrimination it involves were considered a prime suspect for the persistent underrepresentation of IO citizens. What this study showed is that, at least for already selected candidates, no discriminatory behavior on the part of the political parties can be proven in most cases, but that neutral selection behavior prevails for the most part. Beyond dealing with the question of how exactly political parties treat IO candidates in their selection processes, this study has revealed that the main reason for the predominance of neutral selection patterns is that the political parties often have no other choice. They are pluralistic organizations in which a variety of groups, interests, career goals, and demands come together, all of which have to be reconciled. The preference for one group in the selection of candidates is diametrically opposed to this principle and causes problems. Whenever the representation of one group is to be improved, this is at the expense of another group, which makes candidate selection a difficult political tightrope walk. Therefore, the question asked at the outset of this study, how flexible and adaptable political parties are in their selection behavior and to what extent they can use their candidate selection to counteract instances of misrepresentation, must be answered with: they are only conditionally adaptable. While parties theoretically have the power to make their selection processes more permeable for members of underrepresented groups, in practice this fails because of the inner-party conflicts that ensue from such behavior.

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The analysis thus provides a deeper understanding of why political parties experience difficulty in making candidate selection more permeable to underrepresented groups through preferential treatment in candidate selection. Overall, normative arguments advocating greater descriptive representation of IO citizens are not sufficiently reconciled with practical debates that take place in the pragmatic world of party politics about how choosing more IO candidates will impact intra-party cohesion. What this research has therefore identified is a gap between what parties want (or say they want) and what they can do—mainly caused by the threat of intra-party conflict. From a normative point of view, an opening might be desirable in order to effectively counteract the descriptive underrepresentation of certain social groups in parliament and to adapt the composition of the legislative bodies to changes in society, which is conducive to closer links between citizens and representative bodies. However, as the analysis has shown, this can give rise to intra-party conflicts that seriously endanger the unity of the parties. In order to avoid any opposition to preferential treatment that could endanger peace within the party, political parties tend to focus more on meritocratic criteria in their nomination procedures. In this way, possible criticism that an unqualified or less qualified person from an underrepresented group is given preferential treatment over a more qualified person from a dominant group can be averted. Surprisingly, most IO candidates also preferred candidate selection based solely on meritocratic criteria, as enshrined in the neutrality model, and not affirmative action. Indeed, the hard and diligent work at the party base to make a name for themselves in the party organization, building up an inner-party support network and gaining professional experience in lower-level positions, was considered the most sustainable career path into parliament. IO candidates argued that preferentially treated IO parliamentarians are more often seen as token migrants, who owe their seat in parliament more to their migration background than to their political competence, qualification, reliability, commitment, or diligence. Even if a particular IO candidate is best for the job, it might raise suspicion in the minds of other candidates or legislators that they were only appointed because they are from an underrepresented group. The performance and achievements by people identified as part of supported groups are questioned, regardless of whether or not individuals have actually been supported in any way. The suspicion of others of having received preferential treatment is doubly frustrating if they have not received any special support, but their nomination is nevertheless accredited to such patronage. Thus, opening efforts were argued to contribute little to long-term changes in representation, since they considerably limit the candidates’ political assertiveness and credibility within their own party organization and inevitably limit the longevity of their political careers. It is not conducive to a political career in parliament to give the impression that a position was earned through preferential treatment and not political qualifications. Preferential treatment in candidate selection processes therefore undoubtedly remains an extremely effective means of increasing the number of IO candidates. However, it is not necessarily a sustainable selection strategy, since politically inexperienced, “wild card” IO candidates more often fail due to a lack of knowledge of the professional rules of the game or their lower acceptance among ordinary party

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members and other parliamentarians. Their failure makes it all the more difficult for future applicants from immigrant backgrounds to apply as candidates, since it casts a negative light on their nomination and solidifies the impression that IO citizens are not yet ready to take on professional legislative mandates. In view of the observation that political parties neither take special opening measures to bring more IO candidates into office nor use selection strategies that disproportionately hurt IO citizens, instead mostly adopting neutral selection approaches, the question arises as to what this means for the political representation of IO citizens. If the eligibility pool is distorted, which is likely to be the case, neutral nomination rules for IO contenders lead to a pool of candidates which remains skewed in favor of native candidates. When only a few IO citizens dare to aspire to professional political office, even neutral nomination processes do little to correct existing underrepresentation, translating it directly into parliament. Accordingly, increasing the number of rank-and-file party members from immigrant backgrounds rather than amending selection practices would ultimately be the most sustainable and least conflictual way to bring the ethnic diversity of the population into parliament. The number of IO parliamentarians would grow in the long term as a result of a higher number of party members with a migration background who are seeking a political career. Overall, the problem of underrepresentation of IO citizens, as the analysis has revealed, stems more from the party base than from the selection of candidates. Significant efforts to recruit hard-to-find candidates may increase the number of IO candidates standing for election. This may, in turn, encourage other citizens with a migration background to become politically active, but it does not guarantee any change in the supply pool of potential IO candidates. To remedy this situation and recruit more potential IO candidates, mentoring programs can help with stepping up efforts to enhance the number of party members with a migration background. Mentoring programs for party members with an immigrant background have been rare in German parties so far. Within a structured framework, mentoring programs attempt to establish contacts between mentees and politically experienced mentors, offer training on relevant topics, create party networks, and facilitate an exchange of experience. Mentoring programs can thus help to guide party members from immigrant backgrounds through the recruitment processes of political parties, introduce them to party structures and culture, integrate them into relevant party networks, and encourage them to be patient and not give up. Many party members with a migration background—especially in the first generation of immigrants who had acquired their political socialization in a foreign country—have little idea about the internal party recruitment processes when joining a political party, which often leads to disappointment and withdrawal if their expectations are not met. They sometimes imagine that they will soon be able to run for political office and are disillusioned if this expectation does not materialize. Some of the IO candidates interviewed were strong supporters of mentoring programs for party members with a migration background. They saw such programs as helpful in guiding party members from immigrant backgrounds through the strenuous recruitment process and encouraging them not to give up. Mentoring programs can avoid the pitfalls of preferential treatment, as I have described above,

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while at the same time increasing the number of party members with an immigrant background who successfully pass through the parties’ recruitment processes: One possibility would be the implementation of coaching, seminars, training for people [with migration background]. It is difficult to make progress [within a party organization] just because one is interested or active […]. You have to go through a certain career within the party organization (interview 6). We need a protected space where people can share their personal experiences, disappointments and achievements, where they can learn to understand the party organization and where they can find support networks, so that people [with a migration background] do not give up halfway through because they feel left alone (Interview 5). The party organizations in [country of origin] are very different from those in Western European countries. The discussion culture is different. If you start making politics in this way here, you will fail after a few months because it is not accepted. The party culture is decisive. With a culture of discussion like in [country of origin], you don’t get very far [in German political parties]. An introduction to German party culture would therefore be helpful (Interview 4).

As shared in the qualitative interviews, there were attempts in most center-left parties to implement mentoring programs for IO citizens. These attempts originated mainly from the party’s internal working groups on migration. However, due to a lack of financial support from the state or the national party organization, they have so far been in vain: We have tried to introduce a mentoring program for immigrants. But in the end, nothing came of it. The financial budget was missing. You need money for mentoring programs (Interview 8).

One should nonetheless be aware that mentoring programs are only aimed at people who have already found their way into party organizations on their own initiative and supervise them further on their political career path. In order to diversify their rank-and-file membership, party organizations must begin to go beyond their established recruitment pools by stepping up efforts to reach out: It is important to develop concepts at all levels, from the party leadership to the lower party chapters, on how to recruit party members with a migration background. So far, this has been done rather unsystematically (Interview 3). If political parties want to mobilize people [with a migration background], they must be more present where these people are […]. The translation of party programs and the party website into different languages and the organization of events to pick up these people where they are [is important] (Interview 5).

Appendix

Tables A.1, A.2, A.3, A.4, A.5, A.6, A.7, A.8, A.9, A.10 and A.11.

© The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2021 S. Ceyhan, How German Parties Select Candidates of Immigrant Origin, Springer Series in Electoral Politics, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-59451-0

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Appendix

Table A.1 Years of party membership at first candidacy (negative binomial regression)

Dependent variable Years of party membership (1)

(2)

(3)

−0.411***

−0.138

−0.131

(0.11)

(0.10)

(0.09)

Male

0.040

0.029

(0.05)

(0.05)

Age

0.026***

0.028***

(0.00)

(0.00)

−0.000**

−0.000

IO

Age squared

(0.00)

(0.00)

Education

0.053**

0.018

(0.02)

(0.02)

Party activity rate

−0.001

0.000

(0.00)

(0.00)

Number of political offices

0.319***

0.219***

(0.06)

(0.05)

Local-level office

0.111

0.122*

(0.07)

(0.07)

Party office

0.060

0.121

(0.08)

(0.08)

0.063***

0.051***

(0.02)

(0.02)

Number of org. affiliations Election Hesse

−0.059

Bavaria

−0.061

Saxony

−0.034

(0.07) (0.06) (0.08) Political party CDU/CSU

−0.007 (0.07)

FDP

−0.286*** (0.07)

Bündnis 90/Die Grünen

−0.425***

Die Linke

−0.739***

(0.06) (continued)

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237

Table A.1 (continued)

Dependent variable Years of party membership (1)

(2)

(3)

2.564***

2.146***

2.473***

(0.03)

(0.13)

(0.13)

−0.589***

−1.062***

−1.285***

(0.06)

(0.06)

(0.07)

813

813

813

McFadden’s Pseudo 0.002 R2

0.061

0.083

χ 2 of likelihood ratio test

12.66***

347.06***

472.87***

Log likelihood

−2850

−2683

−2620

AIC

5706.5

5390.1

5278.3

BIC

5720.6

5446.5

5367.6

(0.08) Intercept Ln Alpha N

Note Cell entries represent unstandardized regression coefficients from negative binomial regression, with standard errors in parentheses. Dependent variable coding is a count: years of party membership at first candidacy. References: native, female, mean age, low education, mean party activity rate, mean number of political offices, no local-level office, no party office, mean number of org. affiliations, Bundestag election, SPD. ∗p ≤ 0.1; ∗∗p ≤ 0.05; ∗∗∗p ≤ 0.01 Source GCS 2013; state-level candidate surveys

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Table A.2 Number of political offices at first candidacy (Poisson regression)

Dependent variable Number of political offices (1)

(2)

(3)

−0.238***

−0.151**

−0.142*

(0.08)

(0.07)

(0.07)

Male

−0.042

−0.021

(0.04)

(0.04)

Age

−0.004**

−0.002

(0.00)

(0.00)

−0.000

−0.000

IO

Age squared Education

(0.00)

(0.00)

0.037*

0.035

(0.02)

(0.02)

Years of party membership

0.021***

0.018***

(0.00)

(0.00)

Party activity rate

0.009***

0.008***

(0.00)

(0.00)

Number of org. affiliations

0.026*

0.035**

(0.01)

(0.02)

Election Hesse

0.166***

Bavaria

−0.065

(0.05) (0.05) Saxony

0.086 (0.06)

Political party CDU/CSU

0.106**

FDP

−0.116*

(0.05) (0.06) Bündnis 90/Die Grünen

0.055

Die Linke

−0.081

(0.05) (0.07)

Intercept

0.335***

0.176*

0.120

(0.02)

(0.09)

(0.10) (continued)

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Table A.2 (continued)

Dependent variable Number of political offices (1)

(2)

(3)

N

813

813

813

McFadden’s Pseudo R2

0.002

0.035

0.041

Wald χ 2 (df)

9.48*

217.10***

269.35***

Log likelihood

−1073

−1037

−1030

AIC

2149.1

2091.4

2092.7

BIC

2158.5

2133.7

2168.0

Note Cell entries represent unstandardized regression coefficients from Poisson regression, with robust standard errors in parentheses. Dependent variable coding is a count. References: native, female, mean age, low education, mean years of party membership, mean party activity rate, mean number of org. affiliations, Bundestag election, SPD. ∗p ≤ 0.1; ∗∗p ≤ 0.05; ∗∗∗p ≤ 0.01 Source GCS 2013; state-level candidate surveys

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Table A.3 Local rootedness in SMD (binary logistic regression)

Dependent variable Local residence in SMD (1)

(2)

(3)

−0.451

−0.295

−0.289

(0.31)

(0.32)

(0.33)

Male

0.078

0.076

(0.20)

(0.21)

Age

−0.001

0.002

(0.01)

(0.01)

−0.000

−0.000

IO

Age squared Education

(0.00)

(0.00)

−0.241**

−0.306***

(0.11)

(0.12)

Repeated candidacy in SMD

0.666***

0.641**

(0.25)

(0.25)

Years of party membership

0.000

−0.001

(0.01)

(0.01)

Party activity rate

−0.004

−0.002

(0.01)

(0.01)

Number of political offices

−0.291**

−0.297**

(0.14)

(0.14)

Local-level office

0.738***

0.895***

Party office

(0.22)

(0.25)

0.492*

0.466

(0.28)

(0.29)

Number of org. affiliation

0.159**

0.153*

(0.08)

(0.08)

Viable SMD

0.120

0.576

Vacant SMD

(0.28)

(0.38)

1.158*

1.244*

(0.65)

(0.67)

Election Hesse

−0.077

Bavaria

−0.173

(0.32) (0.28) Saxony

−0.805*** (0.27) (continued)

Appendix

241

Table A.3 (continued)

Dependent variable Local residence in SMD (1)

(2)

(3)

Political party −0.475

CDU/CSU

(0.42) FDP

0.498 (0.33)

Bündnis 90/Die Grünen

00.349

Die Linke

−0.116

(0.30) (0.31)

Intercept N McFadden’s Pseudo

R2

10.694***

1.438***

10.593***

(0.09)

(0.53)

(0.59)

982

982

982

00.002

000.047

00.067

χ 2 of likelihood ratio test

20.00

41.00**

59.43***

Log likelihood

−431

−411

−403

AIC

865.1

852.3

849.0

BIC

874.9

925.7

956.6

Note Cell entries represent unstandardized regression coefficients from binary logistic regression, with standard errors in parentheses. Dependent variable coding is binary: local residence (=1), no local residence (=0). References: native, female, mean age, low education, no repeated candidacy in SMD, mean years of party membership, mean party activity rate, mean number of political offices, no local-level office, no party office, mean number of org. affiliations, non-viable SMD, no vacant SMD, Bundestag election, SPD. ∗p ≤ 0.1; ∗∗p ≤ 0.05; ∗∗∗p ≤ 0.01 Source GCS 2013; state-level candidate surveys

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Table A.4 Encouragement to run for election (binary logistic regression) Dependent variable Encouragement IO Male

(1)

(2)

(3)

−0.074

−0.076

−0.196

(0.34)

(0.35)

(0.35)

−0.786***

−0.758***

(0.23)

(0.23)

Age

−0.006

−0.005

(0.01)

(0.01)

Age squared

0.001*

0.001**

(0.00)

(0.00)

−0.005

0.020

Education

(0.10)

(0.11)

Incumbent

0.174

0.116

(0.58)

(0.59)

Number of legislative terms in parliament

0.111

0.066

(0.25)

(0.25)

−0.061

−0.047

Number of prior candidacies

(0.13)

(0.14)

Years of party membership

−0.006

−0.015

(0.01)

(0.01)

Party activity rate

0.019*

0.016

(0.01)

(0.01)

0.034

0.071

Number of political offices

(0.21)

(0.21)

Local-level office

0.218

0.184

(0.28)

(0.28)

Party office

−0.299

−0.279

(0.34)

(0.34)

0.114

0.065

(0.08)

(0.08)

Number of org. affiliations Political party CDU/CSU

−0.363

FDP

−0.838***

Bündnis 90/Die Grünen

−0.936***

(0.32) (0.32) (continued)

Appendix

243

Table A.4 (continued) Dependent variable Encouragement (1)

(2)

(3) (0.32) −0.427

Die Linke

(0.38) Intercept

1.326***

1.892***

2.296***

(0.09)

(0.59)

(0.66)

N

731

731

731

McFadden’s Pseudo R2

0.000

0.037

0.053

Log likelihood

−376

−362

−357

χ 2 of likelihood ratio test

0.05

27.78**

39.52***

AIC

756.7

754.9

751.2

BIC

765.8

823.8

838.5

Note Cell entries represent unstandardized regression coefficients from binary logistic regression, with standard errors in parentheses. Dependent variable coding is binary: encouragement (=1), no encouragement (=0). References: native, female, mean age, low education, no incumbent, mean number of legislative terms, mean number of prior candidacies, mean years of party membership, mean party activity rate, mean number of political offices, no local-level office, no party office, mean number of org. affiliations, SPD. ∗p ≤ 0.1; ∗∗p ≤ 0.05; ∗∗∗p ≤ 0.01 Source GCS 2013

244

Appendix

Table A.5 Competition for nomination (binary logistic regression) Dependent variable Contested candidate selection SMD (1) (2) (3) IO Male Age Age squared Education Incumbent Number of legislative terms in parliament Number of prior candidacies Years of party membership Party activity rate Number of political offices Local-level office Party office Number of org. affiliations Viable SMD/viable party list slot Local residence in SMD

0.644** (0.26)

Party list (1) (2)

(3)

0.703** (0.28) −0.324* (0.17) −0.015* (0.01) −0.001** (0.00) −0.091 (0.09) −1.143*** (0.38) −0.218 (0.19)

0.524* −0.284 (0.29) (0.24) −0.325* (0.18) −0.011 (0.01) −0.001* (0.00) −0.112 (0.09) −1.147*** (0.39) −0.296 (0.20)

−0.482* (0.25) 0.102 (0.14) 0.002 (0.01) −0.000 (0.00) 0.024 (0.07) −0.339 (0.31) −0.409*** (0.14)

−0.430* (0.26) 0.301** (0.15) −0.000 (0.01) −0.000 (0.00) −0.023 (0.08) −0.281 (0.33) −0.319** (0.14)

−0.028 (0.13) 0.018* (0.01) 0.008 (0.01) −0.176 (0.14) 0.183 (0.21) 0.128 (0.26) −0.021 (0.06) 1.260*** (0.24)

0.093 (0.14) 0.007 (0.01) 0.009 (0.01) −0.220 (0.15) 0.358 (0.24) 0.206 (0.27) −0.121* (0.07) 0.863*** (0.30)

0.165* (0.09) −0.023*** (0.01) 0.004 (0.01) 0.024 (0.12) −0.214 (0.18) −0.123 (0.22) 0.024 (0.05) 1.227*** (0.17)

0.121 (0.09) −0.008 (0.01) 0.002 (0.01) −0.105 (0.13) 0.076 (0.21) −0.080 (0.23) 0.001 (0.06) 1.294*** (0.18)

−0.242 (0.21)

−0.264 (0.21) (continued)

Appendix

245

Table A.5 (continued) Dependent variable Contested candidate selection SMD (1) (2) (3) −0.836*** (0.28) 0.938** (0.42)

Repeated candidacy in SMD Vacant SMD Election Hesse Bavaria Saxony Political party CDU/CSU

−1.058*** (0.29) 1.018** (0.44) −0.293 (0.26) −0.332 (0.24) −0.723*** (0.28)

−0.214 (0.21) −0.680*** (0.18) −0.156 (0.26)

0.181*** (0.06) 1.076 0.001

−0.032 (0.37) 1.076 0.063

−0.298 (0.20) 0.318 (0.21) 1.499*** (0.22) 0.671*** (0.25) −0.442 (0.41) 1.076 0.121

−0.949*** (0.07) 962 0.005

−0.377 (0.50) 962 0.120

5.90**

139.11***

168.00***

1.45

92.82***

179.39***

−575 1154.9 1164.6

−509 1055.7 1148.2

−494 1040.8 1167.4

−742 1487.3 1497.3

−696 1424.0 1503.6

−653 1351.4 1465.9

Bündnis 90/Die Grünen Die Linke

N McFadden’s Pseudo R2 χ 2 of likelihood ratio test Log likelihood AIC BIC

(3)

−0.429 (0.33) −0.973*** (0.28) −1.098*** (0.25) −0.972*** (0.28) 0.491 (0.54) 962 0.145

FDP

Intercept

Party list (1) (2)

Note Cell entries represent unstandardized regression coefficients from binary logistic regression, with standard errors in parentheses. Dependent variable coding is binary: somewhat to highly contested (=1), not or hardly contested (=0). References: native, female, mean age, low education, no incumbent, mean number of legislative terms, mean number of prior candidacies, mean years of party membership, mean party activity rate, mean number of political offices, no local-level office, no party office, mean number of org. affiliations, non-viable nomination, no local residence in SMD, no repeated candidacy in SMD, no vacant SMD, Bundestag election, SPD. ∗p ≤ 0.1; ∗∗p ≤ 0.05; ∗∗∗p ≤ 0.01 Source GCS 2013; state-level candidate surveys

246

Appendix

Table A.6 Importance of party support in candidate selection (binary logistic regression) Dependent variable Importance of support from state party leadership in candidate selection IO Male Age

(1)

(2)

(3)

0.244

0.221

0.071

(0.40)

(0.42)

(0.45)

−0.790***

−0.893***

(0.22)

(0.24)

0.008

0.017

(0.01)

(0.01)

Age squared

0.000

0.000

(0.00)

(0.00)

Education

−0.138

−0.089

(0.11)

(0.11)

−0.782*

−0.812*

Incumbent

(0.44)

(0.47)

Number of legislative terms in parliament

0.034

−0.053

(0.18)

(0.19)

Number of prior candidacies

0.051

0.029

(0.13)

(0.13)

−0.014

−0.012

(0.01)

(0.01)

0.011*

0.012

Years of party membership Party activity rate

(0.01)

(0.01)

Number of political offices

0.317*

0.291

(0.18)

(0.19)

Local-level office

−0.220

−0.439

(0.47)

(0.52)

−0.561

−0.486

Party office

(0.44)

(0.48)

−0.017

0.103

(0.09)

(0.10)

Party list

0.329

0.918*

(0.40)

(0.47)

Dual

0.465

0.887**

(0.38)

(0.42)

Number of org. affiliations Mode of candidacy

(continued)

Appendix

247

Table A.6 (continued) Dependent variable Importance of support from state party leadership in candidate selection (1)

(2)

(3)

Election Hesse

−0.494

Bavaria

−1.360***

(0.31) (0.32) Political party CDU/CSU

0.442

FDP

0.687*

(0.33) (0.37) Bündnis 90/Die Grünen

−0.644*

Die Linke

0.492

(0.38) (0.37) −1.414***

−0.120

0.039

(0.10)

(0.66)

(0.75)

N

631

631

631

McFadden’s Pseudo R2

0.001

0.048

0.109

χ2

Intercept

0.37

29.84**

68.60***

Log likelihood

of likelihood ratio test

−314

−299

−280

AIC

631.8

632.3

605.6

BIC

640.7

707.9

707.9

Note Cell entries represent unstandardized regression coefficients from binary logistic regression, with standard errors in parentheses. Dependent variable coding is binary: important (=1), not important (=0). References: native, female, mean age, low education, no incumbent, mean number of legislative terms, mean number of prior candidacies, mean years of party membership, mean party activity rate, mean number of political offices, no local-level office, no party office, mean number of org. affiliations, SMD nomination, Saxon state election, SPD. ∗p ≤ 0.1; ∗∗p ≤ 0.05; ∗∗∗p ≤ 0.01 Source State-level candidate surveys

248

Appendix

Table A.7 Importance of party support in candidate selection (binary logistic regression) Dependent variable Importance of support from local party chapter in candidate selection IO Male Age

(1)

(2)

(3)

−0.528

−0.430

−0.528

(0.34)

(0.35)

(0.35)

−0.306

−0.442**

(0.19)

(0.20)

−0.004

−0.004

(0.01)

(0.01)

Age squared

0.000

0.000

(0.00)

(0.00)

Education

−0.012

0.013

(0.09)

(0.09)

0.059

0.095

Incumbent

(0.38)

(0.40)

Number of legislative terms in parliament

0.008

−0.077

(0.16)

(0.17)

Number of prior candidacies

0.032

0.067

(0.11)

(0.11)

0.006

0.002

(0.01)

(0.01)

−0.003

−0.006

Years of party membership Party activity rate

(0.01)

(0.01)

Number of political offices

0.215

0.204

(0.15)

(0.15)

Local-level office

0.148

0.007

(0.40)

(0.41)

−0.060

0.032

Party office

(0.37)

(0.38)

−0.017

−0.002

(0.07)

(0.08)

Party list

−0.212

−0.579

(0.30)

(0.36)

Dual

0.017

−0.161

(0.28)

(0.32)

Number of org. affiliations Mode of candidacy

(continued)

Appendix

249

Table A.7 (continued) Dependent variable Importance of support from local party chapter in candidate selection (1)

(2)

(3)

Election Hesse

0.308

Bavaria

0.255

(0.26) (0.26) Political party CDU/CSU

0.446

FDP

−0.004

(0.28) (0.30) Bündnis 90/Die Grünen

−0.451*

Die Linke

−0.026

(0.26) (0.31) Intercept

0.633***

0.850

0.926

(0.09)

(0.54)

(0.59)

N

635

635

635

McFadden’s Pseudo R2

0.003

0.021

0.035

χ2

2.43

17.01

28.69**

Log likelihood

of likelihood ratio test

−412

−404

−398

AIC

827.2

842.6

842.9

BIC

836.1

918.3

945.4

Note Cell entries represent unstandardized regression coefficients from binary logistic regression, with standard errors in parentheses. Dependent variable coding is binary: important (=1), not important (=0). References: native, female, mean age, low education, no incumbent, mean number of legislative terms, mean number of prior candidacies, mean years of party membership, mean party activity rate, mean number of political offices, no local-level office, no party office, mean number of org. affiliations, SMD nomination, Saxon state election, SPD. ∗p ≤ 0.1; ∗∗p ≤ 0.05; ∗∗∗p ≤ 0.01 Source State-level candidate surveys

250

Appendix

Table A.8 Viable SMD nomination (binary logistic regression)

Dependent variable Viable SMD nomination (1)

(2)

(3)

−0.461

−0.436

−0.841

(0.35)

(0.41)

(0.53)

Male

0.352*

−0.082

(0.21)

(0.29)

Age

−0.037***

−0.041**

(0.01)

(0.02)

−0.001*

−0.002*

IO

Age squared

(0.00)

(0.00)

Education

0.269**

0.141

(0.12)

(0.15)

Incumbent

0.867***

0.723*

(0.27)

(0.39)

Years of party membership

0.084***

0.058***

(0.01)

(0.02)

Party activity rate

0.016***

−0.002

(0.01)

(0.01)

Number of political offices

0.472***

0.483**

(0.16)

(0.23)

Local-level office

0.023

0.102

(0.28)

(0.42)

Party office

−1.294***

−1.121**

(0.34)

(0.47)

Number of org. affiliations

−0.319***

−0.315***

(0.08)

(0.12)

Local residence in SMD

0.441

0.654

(0.28)

(0.42)

Election Hesse

0.039

Bavaria

−1.810***

Saxony

−0.909*

(0.39) (0.48) (0.47) Political party (continued)

Appendix

251

Table A.8 (continued)

Dependent variable Viable SMD nomination (1)

(2)

CDU/CSU

(3) 3.521*** (0.43)

Bündnis 90/Die Grünen

−3.382***

Die Linke

−1.152***

(0.64) (0.41) −0.970***

−1.856***

−0.983

(0.08)

(0.65)

(0.92)

799

799

799

of likelihood 1.93 ratio test

225.74***

540.44***

McFadden’s Pseudo R2

0.002

0.243

0.581

Log likelihood

−464

−352

−195

AIC

932.7

732.9

430.2

BIC

942.0

798.4

523.8

Intercept N χ2

Note Cell entries represent unstandardized regression coefficients from binary logistic regression, with standard errors in parentheses. Dependent variable coding is binary: viable (=1), non-viable (=0). References: native, female, mean age, low education, no incumbent, mean years of party membership, mean party activity rate, mean number of political offices, no local-level office, no party office, mean number of org. affiliations, no local residence in SMD, Bundestag election, SPD. ∗p ≤ 0.1; ∗∗p ≤ 0.05; ∗∗∗p ≤ 0.01 Source GCS 2013; state-level candidate surveys

252

Appendix

Table A.9 Party list margin (OLS regression) Dependent variable List margin IO Male

(1)

(2)

(3)

1.877

2.464

3.224**

(1.75)

(1.57)

(1.53)

−3.179***

−3.450***

(0.93)

(0.89)

Age

−0.015

−0.108**

(0.04)

(0.04)

Age squared

0.002

−0.002

(0.00)

(0.00)

1.005*

1.117**

Education

(0.58)

(0.54)

Incumbent

3.380

−0.857

(2.14)

(2.39)

Number of legislative terms in parliament

2.048**

3.458***

(1.01)

(1.09)

1.532***

1.468***

Number of prior candidacies

(0.53)

(0.53)

Years of party membership

−0.001

0.081

(0.05)

(0.05)

Party activity rate

0.154***

0.203***

(0.04)

(0.04)

1.887***

2.784***

Number of political offices

(0.73)

(0.82)

Local-level office

−2.418**

−1.463

(1.18)

(1.25)

Party office

−1.159

−2.323

(1.50)

(1.44)

0.254

−0.082

Number of org. affiliations Non-viable SMD nomination

(0.37)

(0.36)

10.017***

6.933***

(0.91)

(0.93)

Election Hesse

−10.245***

Bavaria

3.275***

(1.80) (continued)

Appendix

253

Table A.9 (continued) Dependent variable List margin (1)

(2)

(3) (0.96) −0.169

Saxony

(1.54) Political party CDU/CSU

−3.837**

FDP

4.334***

(1.69) (1.23) Bündnis 90/Die Grünen

1.622

Die Linke

4.987***

(1.10) (1.55) −12.556***

−17.762***

−14.791***

(0.52)

(2.92)

(2.92)

N

1.173

1. 173

1.173

R2

0.001

0.227

0.310

F-test

1.15

25.12***

18.90***

Log likelihood

−4983

−4832

−4766

AIC

9969.6

9696.1

9577.5

BIC

9979.8

9777.2

9694.1

Intercept

Note Cell entries represent unstandardized regression coefficients from OLS regression, with robust standard errors in parentheses. Dependent variable coding is metric: margin to the last won list position in the previous election. References: native, female, mean age, low education, no incumbent, mean number of legislative terms, mean number of prior candidacies, mean years of party membership, mean party activity rate, mean number of political offices, no local-level office, no party office, mean number of org. affiliations, no SMD nomination/viable SMD nomination, Bundestag election, SPD. ∗p ≤ 0.1; ∗∗p ≤ 0.05; ∗∗∗p ≤ 0.01 Source GCS 2013; state-level candidate surveys

254

Appendix

Table A.10 Representativeness of the German Candidate Mode of candidacy Study 2013 Party list

Sample

Population

25.2

30.6

SMD

23.8

22.1

Dual

51.1

47.3

Yes

20.4

22.7

No

79.6

77.3

CDU/CSU

15.0

19.2

SPD

16.3

15.4

FDP

12.6

13.1

Bündnis 90/Die Grünen

15.0

13.2

Die Linke

13.7

12.4

Piraten

16.1

13.8

AfD

11.3

13.0

28.1

28.9

Elected

Political party

Gender Female Male

71.9

71.1

Age in years (mean)

45.9

46.1

Share (percent)

41.0

100.0

Number (absolute)

1.137

2.776

Appendix

255

Table A.11 Representativeness of the state-level candidate surveys Hesse

Bavaria

Saxony

Sample

Population

Sample

Population

Sample 9.6

11.0

Party list

33.3

38.4

41.7

43.0

45.8

42.8

SMD

17.9

17.3

44.6

46.2

Dual

48.8

44.4

58.3

57.0

Yes

19.2

18.4

10.7

12.1

20.8

22.7

No

80.8

81.6

89.3

88.0

79.2

77.3

CDU/CSU

22.2

21.8

8.7

11.0

13.8

14.6

SPD

19.5

18.4

12.7

11.0

11.3

11.0

FDP

9.8

9.2

11.2

11.8

9.2

12.2

Bündnis 90/Die Grünen

11.8

11.6

14.4

12.1

17.9

11.3

Mode of candidacy

Population

Elected

Political party

Die Linke

12.1

10.4

9.7

10.5

13.3

12.8

Freie Wähler

9.1

10.6

10.7

9.9

7.5

7.0

Piraten

8.1

8.0

8.2

8.8

13.8

11.2

7.1

8.1

7.4

9.1

15.2

12.1

AfD

4.0

5.7

Republikaner

1.7

2.7

ÖDP NPD

1.7

1.6

2.0

3.8

6.3

11.9

24.5

29.3

25.4

26.3

26.7

23.9

Gender Female Male

75.5

70.7

74.6

73.7

73.7

76.1

Age in years (mean)

48.8

47.8

50.6

49.4

43.6

44.8

Share (percent)

49.7

100

40.1

100

43.2

100

Number (absolute)

297

597

599

1.494

240

556