Horkos: The Oath in Greek Society 9781904675679, 1904675670

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HORKOS The Oath in Greek Society

What was an oath? When were oaths necessary? How seriously were oaths taken? How did literary artists exploit them? How did Greek oath practices relate to those of neighbouring cultures? This volume derives from a large-scale ongoing research project funded by the Leverhulme Trust on the oath in ancient Greece, and comprises seventeen chapters by experts in law, in political and social history, in literary criticism, and in cross-cultural studies, exploring a wide range of aspects of the oath in Greek society. Topics covered include the nature of ancient Greek oaths; the functions they performed within communities and in relations between them; their exploitation in literary texts and at critical moments in history; and connections between Greek oath phenomena and those of other cultures with which Greeks came into contact, from the Hittites to the Romans. This book will be of interest not only to scholars of classics and ancient history, but to their colleagues working in the fields of ancient Greek religion, law, social studies and literature.

Editors: Alan Sommerstein is Professor of Greek at the University of Nottingham and Director of the 'Oath in Archaic and Classical Greece' project He has published widely on Aeschylus, Aristophanes and other Greek dramatists. Judith Fletcher is Associate Professor of Archaeology and Classical Studies at Wilfrid Laurier University, Waterloo, Ontario, and cer editor with Bonnie MacLachlan of Viiginity Revisited: The Autonomy of the Unpossessed Body (2006).

HORKOS The Oath in Greek Society

edited by Alan H. Sommerstei,n and Judith F'letcher

BRISTOL PHOENIX

PRESS

First published in 2007 by Bristol Phoenix Press an imprint of The Exeter Press Reed Hall, Streatham Drive Exeter EX4 4QR

UK www.exeterpress.co. uk © 2007 Alan H. Sommerstein,Judith

Fletcher and the individual contributors

The right of Alan H. Sommerstein,Judith Fletcher and the individual contributors to be identified as authors of this work have been asserted by them in accordance with the Copyright, Designs and Patents Acts 1988. British Libnry Cataloguing in Publication Data

A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library. ISBN 978 I 904675 67 9

Typeset in New Baskerville by XL Publishing Services, Tiverton Printed in Great Britain by Athenaeum Press Ltd, Gateshead, Tyne & Wear

CONTENTS

Preface Notes on Contributors Introduction (Alan H. Sommerstein)

VII IX

1

Part I: Oaths and their Uses 1 2 3 4 5

6 7

Oaths in political life (PJ. Rhodes) Oaths in Greek international relations (Sarah &lmarcich) Litigants' oaths in Athenian law (Michael Gagarin) The dikast's oath and the question of fact (David C. Mirhady) Could a Greek oath guarantee a claim right? Oaths, contracts and the strtucture of obligation in classical Athens (David Carter) Oath and contract (Edwin M. Carawan) 'An Olympic victory must not be bought': oath-taking, cheating and women in Greek athletics (Jonathan S. Perry)

11 26 39 48

60 73 81

Part Il: Case Studies 8 9 10

Epinician swearing (Bonnie MacLachlan) Horkos in the Oresteia(Judith FI.etcher) Masters of manipulation: Euripides' (and Medea's) use of oaths in Medea (Arlene Allan) 11 Cloudy swearing: when (if ever) is an oath not an oath? (Alan H. Sommerstein) 12 Thucydides and Plataian perjury (Simon Hornblower) 13 The oath of Demophantos and the politics of Athenian identity (Julia L. Shear)

91 102

113 125 138 148

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14 Hierophantic performances: the Syracusans' Great Oath and other examples (Tarilr. Wareh) Part

m: From

161

East, to West

15 Oath and allusion in Alcaeus fr. 129 (Mary R. BachvaTShas suggested that in some respects the oaths imposed when Athens recovered control of an allied state served as a model for the oath imposed when the democrats recovered control of Athens in 410/09 (ap. Andoc. l.9~98: cf. above). The oath of 410/09 begins, 'I shall kill by word and deed and vote and my own hand' - while recovered allies swear not to defect 'by word or deed' (Colophon, Chalcis, Eretria) 'or by any craft or contrivance' (Chalcis, Eretria). Anyone who does overthrow Athens' democracy, 'is to be killed with impunity' (\ITllTOIVEITE8vaTeu)54 - and the word TE8vaToappears (not in the oath but in the further stipulations) in the major decree for Erythrae. Such a person's property was to be confiscated, and a tithe given to the goddess Athena - and this provision was included in Athens' fragmentary decree, probably of 426/5, for Miletus (/G i3 21 tr. Fornara 92.28). Bertelli cites also the invocation of great benefits if the oath is kept and utter destruction (exoleia;adjective exoles)if it is broken - as in the major decree for Erythrae and the decree for Colophon - but that was probably so widespread that we need not look for any particular precedenL 55 In the Second Athenian League of the fourth century the prospectus spelled out various aspects of what was to be understood by 'freedom and autonomy' for the member states, including the retention of whatever consitution they wished (/G ii 2 43 = Rhodes and Osborne 22 tr. Harding 35, front, 19-25); the alliance was technically a defensive alliance, in which the members were bound to give support 'if anyone goes for war against those who have made the alliance, either by land or by sea' (11.~51). The allies were certainly allies of one another as well as of Athens (cf. above), and when a new member was admitted oaths were sworn by the representatives of the existing allies in the sunedrionas well as by Athens (e.g. JG ii2 42 = Rhodes and Osborne 23 tr. Harding 37. 11-19, for Methymna). We have one inscri~ tion dealing with the recovery of an allied state after revolt, a decree of 363/2 for Iulis and the other cities of Ceos: first we are given the Athenian oath, which begins with a promise not to rake up past wrongs ( mnisikakein) or to kill or exile any Ceans who abide by the oaths and agreement, but not to allow 'by any craft or contrivance' anyone to break the oaths and agreement; that is followed by the oath of the Ceans, to be an ally of the Athenians and the allies and not to defect from the Athenians and the allies, to allow an appeal to Athens in major lawsuits against Athenians, not to allow anyone to wrong any of the Ceans who have returned from exile or the Athenians and the allies; finally we have the beginning of a third oath, sworn by the Ceans who have returned from exile, which like the Athenian oath begins with a promise not to rake up past wrongs ( mnisikakein), and probably continued with an undertaking not to kill or exile any Ceans who abide by the oaths and agreement (/G ii 2 111 = Rhodes and Osborne 39 tr. Harding 55; oaths 11.57~nd).

Harkos

24

For the League of Corinth established by Philip of Macedon in 338/7, which reinforced a 'common peace' treaty by forming its participants into a league of allies, an inscription gives us a fragment from the oath sworn by the members and a fragment from the list of members, and there is further information in a speech in the Demosthenic corpus. The members probably swore to abide by the peace themselves and not to attack any state which did abide by it, not to overthrow the kingdom of Philip or his descendants or the constitutions existing in each state when it swore to the peace, and if the peace was broken to support the victim 'as decided by the sunedrion and called on by the higemim' (JG ii2 236 = Rhodes and Osborne 76 tr. Harding 99, a). From [Dern.] 17 we can add that the member states swore to a common peace (§§2, 6) under which they were to be free and autonomous (§8); the guarantee for existing constitutions did not apply if the existing regime was a tyranny (§§7, 10), 56 but to reinforce the guarantee various kinds of revolutionary action which were not to be allowed were specified (§15). The higemim was, of course, Philip; and there was a 'committee of public 4>uAaicfi TETayµevot)'which probably exercised safety' (oi ETTITOKOi Philip's powers in his absence (§15). 57 Thus in leagues oaths of allegiance could involve various commitments. The minimum undertaking was not to harm any other member, from the Delphic Amphictyony to the League of Corinth (including the Delian League, if the members were allies of one another, but apparently not including the Peloponnesian League 58 ). Whenever the members of the league were allies of one another, they were obliged to support any member which was attacked, and, if the alliance was a full offensive and defensive alliance, to take part in any war decided on through the league's proper procedures, whatever they might be. If the alliance was intended to be permanent, there was an obligation not to defect - insisted on by Athens in the Delian League, from the early revolt of Naxos onwards (Thuc. 1.98.4-99, cf. the oaths imposed after the suppression of revolts). Constitutional commitments could vary. In the Delian League Athens sometimes imposed a democracy after a revolt, and the oath demanded of Colophon may have included a commitment to the democracy; 59 in the Second Athenian League having whatever constitution a member wished was the first of the components of freedom and autonomy specified in the prospectus (JG ii2 43 = Rhodes and Osborne 22 tr. Harding 35, front. 20-21); in Philip's League of Corinth what was guaranteed was the constitution which a member had at the time of joining. One final point. The extent to which the higemon could swear to further agreements on behalf of the whole league seems to have been a matter of what the hegemon could get away with. 60 When the Peace of Nicias was made in 421, the members of the Peloponnesian League and Sparta's other allies 61 swore, or in some cases refused to swear, individually, but Athens swore for the whole of the Delian League (Thuc. 5.17.2-19: notice 18.9). On the other

vu

Oaths in PoliticalLife

25

hand, at the end of the Peloponnesian War, in 404, Sparta gave Athens more generous terms than some of its allies wanted, and there is no sign that they were given the opportunity to swear or not to swear on that occasion (cf. Xen. Hell. 2.2.19-23). For the common peace treaty before the battle of Leuctra, in 371, the Spartans swore for the Peloponnesian League-but refused to let the Thebans swear for the whole of Boeotia-while the members of the Second Athenian League swore individually (Xen. Hell. 6.3.19-20). We noticed above that at the foundation of the Second Athenian League the oath to admit a new member was sworn by the representatives of the existing members in the sunedrion;and, if I interpret the texts aright, in 368 Athens was unable to admit Dionysius of Syracuse to the League because the members did not want him (/G ii2 103, 105 + 523 = Rhodes and Osborne 33, 34 tr. Harding-, 52); but in 361 /0, when the Athenians angrily broke with Alexander of Pherae and instead made an alliance with his opponents in the Thessalian lwinon, the alliance was made between the Athenians and their allies and the Thessalians and their allies, but there is no indication that the members of the League were consulted or were given the opportunity to swear or not to swear (/G ii2 116 = Rhodes and Osborne 44 tr. Harding 59). When the Peace of Philocrates was made between Athens and Philip in 346, the sunedrion of the Second Athenian League made proposals but said it would accept whatever Athens decided (Aeschin. 2.60). The treaty finally made was between Athens and its allies and Philip and his allies: whether 'Athens and its allies' meant Athens and the League or Athens and every state which had an alliance with Athens, including Phocis and Halus, might be, and was, disputed, but it was Athens and the representatives of the League in the sunedrion that actually swore to the treaty, and on Athens' second embassy to Philip it appears that Aeschines formally accepted that first interpretation but vainly hoped that Philip would in fact spare the Phocians. 62

2 Sarah Bolrnarcich OATHS IN GREEK INTERNATIONAL REIATI0NS

1

Oaths were central to Greek international relations. Coleman Phillipson observed, 'It may in truth be said that the oath is, in a certain sense, the underlying basis of the whole body of the ancient law of nations.'! Specifically, as DJ. Bedennan has stated, 'Ancient treaties were, as a matter of definition, an exchange of oaths. ' 5 Yet treaty-oaths were often violated, partly because in the sphere ofintemational relations they presented unique difficulties, but also because one of the parties chose not to fulfill their obligations, an odd occurence in light of the binding nature of an oath. As RA Bauslaugh writes, 'states repeatedly acted as if the right to refrain from involvement in certain of the conflicts of their allies was assumed to exist.' 4 This article assumes that right, and focuses on oaths in fifth-century Greek treaties, since in the fifth century a greater variety of treaty-oaths was available to those making treaties than at any other time in classical Greece, 5 and on the ways in which Greek states regarded treaty-oaths, especially when they appeared to violate them; I argue that oaths in some Greek treaties were meant to have a flexibility, so that under certain circumstances the failure to fulfill an oath was not necessarily the same as violating it. Oaths in Greek treaties were of necessity very different from oaths in, say, Greek law or ordinary conversation (although similar in appearance) and as a consequence they were susceptible to several significant problems when it came to their fulfillment. Those who swore them were individuals, 6 while the parties that saw to the fulfillment of the oaths were city-states, in the sense of a collective body of citizens. 7 Those who swore oaths, then, were not necessarily those who fulfilled them, a problem especially clear in Thucydides' narrative of the breakdown of the Peace of Nicias, 8 and so treaties were left vulnerable to the changing of the guard in the govemmen t of a Greek state. 26

Oaths in GreekInternationalRelations

27

Oaths associated with treaties also had to have, again of necessity due to the fact that they dealt with such long-term issues as war and peace, a longer 'shelf life' than many other Greek oaths: Greek treaties and truces could be made from a period of anywhere from ten days to eternity. Circumstances as well as state officials could change radically in the time period that a treaty was meant to cover. And although arbitration was available to states in disagreement over the fulfillment of the oaths of a treaty, 9 there was no strong, central, disinterested authority among Greek city-states that could enforce the oaths of a treaty or an arbitration decree upon other city-states. Oaths in the sphere of Greek diplomacy, then, could be quite problematic. To date, what scholarship there has been on oaths in Greek treaties 10 has focused on their negative aspects--e.g. how easily broken they were and, consequently, how little trust there apparently was between Greek states. 11 This article takes a more positive approach: it argues that the Greeks were very much aware of the unique problems of enforcement and continued validity faced by the treaty-oaths taken between city-states, and that oaths taken in the context of treaties had some built-in flexibility, based on the type of treaty and the relationship that the treaty envisioned between the states party to it. Parties that were to all intents and purposes 'equals' and independent of one another had more flexibility with respect to their oaths. This does not mean that oaths were unimportant in Greek diplomacy, or that they could be ignored at a city-state's whim; there was a difference between violation of an oath without cause, and failure to fulfill the obligations of an oath when asked due to circumstances--violation by commission and violation by omission, as it were. The examples of oath-breaking discussed in this article fall largely into the latter category, and it is for such situations, I believe, that the flexibility of an oath was designed, so that a citystate that found herself in circumstances that made it difficult to fulfill an oath would not find herself compelled to do so by an ally against her interests. This flexibility was achieved in several ways: one was to have built-in 'escape-clauses', e.g., an oath that would read 'I shall do x unless the gods and heroes forbid iL' This may also have covered such eventualities as failure to fulfill a treaty obligation because of, e.g., the celebration of a religious festival. 12 Another was by the insertion of what E.L. Wheeler terms 'antideceit clauses', clauses such as 'by any trick or deceit whatsoever', or, alternatively, 'without deceit'. I shall focus largely on the second type of circumvention here, since it occurs more frequently in the sources and over a range of treaties. Before I turn to the oaths, a few caveats must be given. First, in terms of determining the actual historical impact of the language used by oathdauses, the nature of the evidence is indirect at best. There are records of treaty-oaths in both literary and epigraphic sources. I employ both types of evidence, but pay especial attention to the oaths preserved in epigraphic

Horkos

28

texts, which are the best source for the actual language of oaths. 1' Epigraphic evidence, however, does not tell us whether the oath was fulfilled, and it may never be remarked upon by literary evidence. This does not always allow us to know the outcome of a given treaty and its oath, or whether an oath referred to by literary evidence was part of an actual treaty. Thus I have not attempted to make any systematic or extensive arguments about the efficacy of the language of the oath in question, although I do discuss examples of apparent violation of oaths or failure to fulfill the obligations imposed by an oath. My conclusions are thus ultimately speculative. It is also sometimes difficult to distinguish in any source between a treatyoath and the terms of its treaty; thus, I sometimes discuss both, focusing as much as possible on the language of the oath, but referring to clauses within the terms of an agreement as well, either because they are similar in language to treaty-oaths or to illustrate my argument further. I would also add that a study of the language of oaths might seem unpromising and naive in the face of the reality of power politics; after all, powerful states like Sparta or Athens could and did dictate to their allies no matter what they had sworn to one another. Yet there was a complexity in and a variety of oaths that simple power politics does not explain; this would suggest that there was more to ancient diplomacy and the fulfillment of oaths than the mere whim of powerful states and the fear of smaller states.

'Gods and Heroes' The oaths preserved in treaties sometimes invoke the gods, and even if the oath did not specify a god by name, gods could be involved as the theoihorkioi, whose identity might vary from city-state to city-state. 14 The oracle at Delphi sometimes played a role in diplomacy when it was consulted on questions of war and peace, and treaties were posted at such pan-Hellenic sanctuaries as Olympia. Thus, religion and the gods could play a significant role in the creation and in the enforcement of a treaty and oaths between states. But their presence could be just as immediate if they were invoked not to enforce oaths but to avoid the obligations imposed by oaths. This is the case at Thuc. 5.30. The Corinthians, who had refused to assent to the Peace of Nicias (Thuc. 5.21.2, 22.1-2, 25.1) and who had recently made a summachiawith the Argives promising mutual defence (Thuc. 5.27.2, 48.2), make their excuses for both actions to the Spartans: In the meantime the Lacedaemonians, perceiving that this agitation was going on in the Peloponnese, and that Corinth was the author of it and was herself about to enter into alliance with the Argives, sent ambassadors thither in the hope of preventing what was in contemplation. They accused her of having brought it all about, and told her that she could not desert Lacedaemon and become the ally of Argos

Oaths in GreekInternationalRelations

29

without adding violation of her oaths to the crime which she had already committed in not accepting the treaty with Athens [the Peace ofNicias], when it had been expressly agreed that the decision of the majority of the allies should be binding, unless the gods or heroes n hPc..J(,JV kc..JAUµa should somehow stand in the way (nv µ~ TI 8Ec,.)V TI).Corinth in her answer . . . refrained from openly stating the µev~cSIICOIJVTO OUcS11AouVTE5 CXVTlkpus), injuries she complained of (),' is confined to a very specific time-frame, the thirty years between 450 and 420. These clauses are found most commonly in the regulatory decrees that the Athenian Empire imposed upon her formerly rebellious subjects; some exceptions will be discussed below. The oaths in these decrees run along the lines of: 'I shall give good counsel as best I can to the Athenian Ac,J5 was also used by Athens in fifth-century treaties with Rhegium and Leontini (/G ill 53.11, 54.22, 26-27), Halieis (/Gill 75.5-6), the Thracian Bottiaeans (/Gill 76.17-18), and possibly Egesta (/G ill 11). 48 It also occurred in the Peace of Nicias (Thu c. 5.18.3) 49 and the subsequent Spartan-Athenian alliance (Thuc. 5.23.1), as well as the 420 treaty between Athens, Argos, Elis, and Mantinea (Thuc. 5.47.1, /Gill 83.3). The language of this oath, 'I shall be a faithful and just ally without harm or deceit to x', would seem to be rather vague. This 'anti-deceit clause' is less concrete than the first discussed, which envisioned means of deceit-trick, device, word, deed. What did it mean to be a faithful, just, or strong ally without harm or deceit? Who defined such terms? Presumably the parties involved; but they might have very different interpretations of the same language. For instance, 61Katc,J5:in 506 Corinth, a Spartan ally.joined her expedition against Athens, intended to restore the Peisistratidae and destroy

36

Horkos

Cleisthenes' reforms for once and for all (Hdt. 5.74-76). At Eleusis, the Corinthians balked: if we attack Athens, they decided, we would not be doin~ Ta l>11ea1a,'what is just.' 50 Cawkwell suggests that the Corinthian use of Ta cS11ea1a refers to a treaty they had with the Spartans, and a natural place to find justice in a treaty is in the oath to be a just ally.51 If this is correct, the Corinthian interpretation of the oath is rather odd: they are not deciding what is just with respect to Sparta (by which argument they should attack Athens), but what is just with respect to their behavior as a Spartan ally dealing with other states (by which argument they should not attack Athens). In other words, it is the Spartans who may have violated their oath to be a just ally, by asking Corinth to do something she regarded as unjust. Corinth was a constant thorn in Sparta's side in Peloponnesian history; nearly as powerful as Sparta, and possessed of a navy as well, she did not always take kindly to Spartan commands, and she had the power to indulge her reluctance. If she swore an oath to be Sparta's just ally, it would have allowed her some leeway in making decisions about her activities under the aegis of Sparta, the sort of autonomy that a state of her wealth and power would require. Corinth's withdrawal from the expedition against Athens was a violation by omission: her concerns about justice led her to recuse herself from her obligations to Sparta, as well as maintain her status as independent of Sparta. Sparta did not decide what war was just in this situation; Corinth did. Similarly, at Thuc. 5.30.2, quoted above, when Corinth invoked the 'unless the gods and heroes prevent' clause of an oath, she also expressed a concern that she behave justly; as noted above, this also was a violation by omission. While the invocation of justice was frequent in Greek diplomatic rhetoric, 52 some of these instances of acS11ew5 or cSiica1ovmay refer to actual provisions in a treaty or oath, and might be taken to refer to those provisions. The other words in such promises to be a just ally, a&>Aw5, rrpo8uµw5, rr10Tc.35, a~Aa~~5, etc., rarely appear in diplomatic discussions, and it is therefore again difficult to judge the effect of a&>Aw5 as an anti-deceit clause. That there was even a question of what was 'just,' however, suggests the ambiguity of such adverbs when it came to the enforcement of an oath or treaty. 55 This ambiguity is perhaps also present in another example of a violation of an oath by omission. Athens and Rhegium stood in a relationship of ~ust allies' to one another (JG i5 53.11-16). 54 Rhegium gave military support in the fonn of ships to Athens in her first expedition against Sicily (Thuc. 3.86.2, 4, 4.25.1, 4), which had involved the invasion of Rhegian territory by the Locrians (Thuc. 4.1.2-4, 24.2). In 415, although she allowed the Athenian fleet to harbour there en route to Sicily (Thuc. 6.44.2-3, 46.1), the Rhegians, to Athens's surprise, refused their aid, saying they would take neither the Athenian nor the Syracusan side, but abide by the decision of the other Italian states (Thuc. 6.44.3). The other Italian cities had already denied the Athenian fleet anything more than water and anchorage; Taren tum and Locri had denied them even that (Thuc. 6.44.2), so it was

Oaths in GreekInternationalRe/.ations

37

hardly in doubt what decision Rhegium would make. Thucydides records no Athenian outrage at Rhegium's breach of contract, only disappointment (Thuc. 6.46.2),just as Herodotus recorded no Spartan outrage at Corinth's desertion. Given the size of the Athenian expedition, Athens might easily have attempted to remind Rhegium forcibly of her treaty obligations, but this was not done. Rhegium, however, was not in violation of the oath that we assume she swore: she had not explicitly promised Athens military aid. The Rhegian failure to fulfill her oath was also a violation by omission: she simply did not fulfil! the Athenian request for aid. The position in which Rhegium found herself-caught between a powerful ally and powerful (and nearer) neighbours-is exactly the sort of situation in which an intentional elasticity in oaths between city-states would be most helpful. Smaller states like Rhegium would benefit more immediately from such elasticity, although of course they would still be exposed to attacks from the allies with whom they had sworn such an oath. Likewise, Camarina, who feared both Athens and Syracuse, interpreted her oaths to them as allowing her to remain neutral (Thuc. 6.88.2). But larger states would also benefit; they too could be sticklers for the language of the oath and use it as a means to avoid a military engagement they wanted no part of. For instance, Sparta promised to invade Attica if Athens attacked Potidaea (Thuc. 1.58.1), which in fact the Athenians were already planning to do (Thuc. 1.57.6). Yet Potidaea was already in revolt when the Athenian fleet arrived (Thuc. 1.59.1). The Spartan promise of invading Attica was taken by the Potidaeans as an incentive to revolt (Thuc. 1.58.1). But the Spartans had made that promise in the face of an Athenian fleet sailing north, and with every expectation that Potidaea would be attacked by that fleet. They did not expect Potidaea to attack Athens first, and her role as aggressor meant that the agreement with the Spartans was no longer one of defense, as the Spartans had envisioned it, but one of aggression; 55 Sparta's care and desire not to be seen as the violator of the Thirty Years' Peace meant that she would be less likely to help a state revolt from Athens than to defend the same state from Athenian attack. 56 Powerful states too could then benefit from the elasticity of the terms of an agreement or a sophistic interpretation of them. For instance, at Hell. 6.3.18, Xenophon gives as a clause in a treaty between Sparta, Athens, and their allies a provision that parties to the treaty might go to the assistance of a wronged state, but did not have to do so if they did not wish. The examples of Sparta, Corinth, and Rhegium discussed above are all violations by omission-failure to fulfill an oath or conform to expected behavior in response to a request. A violation by commission was very much frowned upon; for instance, as noted above, the Spartan failure to honor the Peace of Nicias qualified as such a violation, and was so repulsive to the Athenians that, at the urging of Alcibiades, they took the highly unusual step of inscribing at the bottom of their stele of the Peace that the Spartans had

38

Horlws

violated their oaths (Thuc. 5.56.3). 57 But a violation by omission could be excused, and the elasticity of oath-language parallels this. Thucydides himself might seem to subscribe to this view: at 4.98.6 he sums up the justification of an Athenian violation of a Boeotian sanctuary with the words, 'transgression was the term applied to those who did evil without being under constraint, not for those who were victims of circumstance. ' 58

Conclusion Is it fair, then, to characterize such interpretations of oaths or other terms of agreement between Greek states as 'sophistic'? The word implies to modem English speakers an attempt to weasel out of one's obligations to others, and Wheeler seems to use it in this sense. 59 Yet the existence of clauses that allowed states to excuse themselves from their diplomatic obligations when called upon to fulfill them because of simultaneous religious obligations, or on the grounds that the circumstances under which the aid was offered did not apply, or because offering aid would put her in danger, suggests that these clauses perhaps had less to do with any single intellectual movement than with the needs of states in Greek international relations. A treaty should not be wantonly violated, but it was understood that sometimes city-states could not fulfill their treaty obligations due to changing circumstances. Language that could be meant to prevent sophistic interpretation of an oath was also loose enough to allow city-states to interpret their own behavior in ways that did not necessarily violate their treaty obligations. Some freedom and sovereignty was necessary.

3

Michael Gagarin LITIGANTS' OATHS IN ATHENIAN

LAW

Discussion of litigants' oaths in classical Athens must start from David Mirhady's study of 'The Oath-Challenge in Athens' (Mirhady 1991b). As Mirhady obseives, all litigants' oaths, except for those sworn formally by each side at the beginning of a trial, involve a ~usually translated 'challenge,' though often 'offer' or 'proposal' better captures the force of the term. 1 Thus, a litigant or potential litigant would propose that he himself, or his opponent, or some third party swear an oath concerning some point of fact. This kind of prokwis and others are a common feature of Athenian forensic pleadings, and litigants in court often recall a challenge they, or less often their opponents, have issued before the trial.' The essential feature of a proklesisis that the proposed action is only put into effect if the proposal is accepted by the other litiganL If it is not accepted-and it usually is not-no action ensues, though litigants commonly argue that their opponent's rejection of a challenge is incriminating evidence against them. About forty prokleseis for basanos are mentioned in the orators, but none of these results in an interrogation. With oath-challenges the situation is similar: about twenty-three oath-challenges are mentioned in the orators, 3 and in only two of these is the challenge accepted. In one of these, moreover (Dern. 33.1~14), although Apaturius agrees to the proposal, he does not appear when it is time to swear. Thus, the only oath-challenge that is accepted and actually sworn is in the dispute between Mantias' sons chronicled in Demosthenes 39 and 40. 4 The speaker in both these speeches is a certain Mantitheus, and regardless of the truth of his story, it is generally accepted as an accurate representation of how an oath-challenge could work. Mantitheus is suing Boeotus, who claims to be his half-brother, to prevent him from using 39

40 Mantitheus' name. Mantitheus claims that Boeotus and a brother of his are the sons of a woman named Plangon, not by his own father Mantias but by some other man, and that Mantias has never recognized the boys as his own. The difficulty Mantitheus faces is that some time earlier, when the brothers were claiming that they were the sons of Mantias, Mantias made an arrangement with Plangon that he would pay her thirty minas if she would refuse when he proposed to her that she swear an oath that the boys were his sons. Plangon, we are told, agreed to refuse this proposed oath, in effect admitting that the boys were not Mantias' sons, but when the time came and Mantias formally proposed the oath to her, Plangon double-crossed him, accepted the proposal, and swore that the two boys were legitimate sons of Mantias. Mantias was then forced to register his sons in his phratry. This is the only case of a proposed oath being accepted and carried out, and it was decisive for the issue at hand, although the losing side later reopened the dispute by raising a different but related issue. This example is the principal evidence for the conclusion reached by Mirhady and others, who argue that an accepted oath-challenge was considered 'a means of settlement alternative to a proceeding before a dikasterion or other third party' (Mirhady 1991b, 80). Certainly Mirhady is right that Plangon's acceptance of this particular oath-challenge put an end to the possibility of litigation on the matter of paternity. But we cannot necessarily conclude from this that all the proposed oaths we hear of would have been similarly decisive, because the oath offered to Plangon was highly unusual, in that when it was proposed, it was intended to be decisive by being refused, not accepted. 5 In other words, the oath proposed by Mantias was intended to be decisive, in the same way as the 'action-deciding' oaths 6 common in many early legal systems and found occasionally in Greece, in the laws of Gortyn (e.g. /Cret 4. 72.3.5-9) and elsewhere. Action-deciding oaths are normally imposed by a judge on one of the litigants only, and that litigant then either swears and wins the case or declines to swear and loses. In other words, the oath is decisive whether the party swears or declines to swear. In this respect, Plangon's oath differs from other oaths in the orators, which are not decisive when they are refused. To understand what makes Plangon's oath different, we must first distinguish between a proposal by a litigant that he or a supporter or a third party swear an oath and a proposal that the opponent or a supporter of the opponent swear an oath. Litigants and their supporters commonly offer to swear an oath concerning the central issue in the case. In Isaeus 12.9-10, for example, the speaker, a brother of Euphiletus, reports that Euphiletus' mother and father have offered to swear oaths, and he too is willing to swear, that Euphiletus is the legitimate son of two Athenian citizens; this is the central issue in Euphiletus' attempt to force his deme to register him as a citizen. Offers by a litigant or a supporter to swear an oath constitute 17 of the 23 oath-challenges in the orators, 7 and they are all rejected. Many may

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as when a speaker asserts not even have been presented as a formal proklesis, some fact and then adds, 'And I am ready (or someone else is ready) to swear that this happened.' On the other side, besides Plangon's oath, there are only four instances where a litigant offers an oath to his opponent. 8 We must examine these four more closely. First, Demosthenes' third speech against Aphobus was delivered on behalf of Phanus, one of his witnesses in his original suit against Aphobus, in which he won a verdict requiring Aphobus to pay him ten talents. Demosthenes is defending Phanus against a charge of false testimony, since if Phanus is convicted, this would invalidate that verdicL Phan us had testified that a certain Milyas was a free man and that Aphobus once admitted this. Demosthenes first says he will swear an oath affirming Phan us' testimony, and he then offers Aphobus an oath (29.52): 'Hyou [Aphobus] swear by your daughter the contrary of that, I will then give up to you the whole of the amount with regard to which you are shown to have been asking [for Milyas] at the beginning.' Since the amount Aphobus had claimed in connection with Milyas was 30 minas, it is perhaps not surprising that Demosthenes is willing to take the risk that Aphobus will swear this oath, since even though in that case Demosthenes would lose 30 minas, Aphobus would effectively be giving up his claim to have Demosthenes' original award of ten talents invalidated. Aphobus, of course, refuses the offer. Next, in Dern. 33.13-14, we are told that Parmeno offered Apaturius an and that Apaturius oath on some of the charges (nept T1vwv'eyicAJUJCXTeuv) accepted the offer. But when the time came to swear, Apaturius backed out. We know nothing about which parts of the case the oath would have concerned, but when Apaturius does not appear at the oath-swearing, the two sides after some legal maneuvering agree to go to arbitration ( though they never in fact carry out this plan either). The third case is actually a denial that such an offer took place. In Dern. 52.15, Apollodorus, the speaker and probable author of the speech, accuses some friends of his opponent Callippus of claiming that in an earlier suit Callippus had offered Apollodorus' father Pasion an oath and that at the arbitration hearing Pasion had refused to swear, but the arbitrator Lysitheides still decided in his favor. Apollodorus claims that if Pasion had refused to swear the oath that was offered-or as he puts it, had refused to be a judge in his own case-Lysitheides would surely have decided immediately against him. 9 Therefore, he concludes, the story must be false. Apollodorus implies that if Pasion had actually been offered an oath, his refusal to swear it would have settled the matter in Callippus' favor-not formally but for practical purposes; thus the fact that Lysitheides ruled against Callippus shows that such an oath could not have been offered and refused. H this oath had been offered, however, it would have been like Mantias' oath-offer to Plangon, since a refusal to accept the offer would probably have been decisive.

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Finally, in his suit concerning Neaera (Dern. 59.59-60, repeated in 63), Apollodorus reports that when Phrastor, one of the men who had married Neaira's daughter Phano, tried to register the son Phano bore him with his phratry and genos, the members of the genos refused. Phrastor then sued and they offered him an oath to swear at the arbitration hearing-that he regarded the son as born to him from an Athenian woman, legally married to him-but Phrastor refused to swear. We do not know what happened then. Apollodorus implies that Phrastor's request was denied because he refused to swear, in which case this oath-offer may have been decisive, like the oath Mantias offered Plangon. But because Apollodorus does not explicitly mention the outcome of the arbitration, some scholars think the arbitrator decided for Phrastor (see Kapparis 1999: 282-84). Just why Phrastor refuses to swear is unclear; it may have had something to do with the precise wording of the proposed oath. Taking these four passages together with the report of Plangon's oath, we see that an unconditional offer of an oath to one's opponent creates a situation where if the opponent accepts the offer and swears the oath, this weighs very strongly, probably decisively, in his favor on the issue addressed by the oath. If he refuses to swear the oath, it will weigh strongly, even decisively, against him, but only on the specific matters covered by the oath. Whether a refused or accepted oath settles the entire case depends on whether the proposed oath, whose precise wording is determined by the proposer, addresses the central issue in the case. In Plangon's case, the oath affirmed the central issue-whether the boys were the sons of Mantias--and the oathoffer was meant to (and did) decide the entire case. But in the other cases, the proposed oath may have been more carefully worded so as not to cover the central issue or to attach conditions that would favor the proposer. Much more common than offers that an opponent swear an oath were offers to swear an oath oneself or to have a supporter or neutral third party swear. These were not taken so seriously, and did not need to be so carefully worded. A litigant could include such an offer in connection with almost any fact he was asserting and the offer to swear would only add rhetorical emphasis to an assertion. There was no expectation that the opponent would accept the oath, and sometimes, when the speaker says only that he was or is ready to swear, the opponent may not even have a chance to accept the offer. Moreover, if the proposed oath concerns the central issue of the case, then in essence it just repeats the litigant's sworn assertion before the trial, that he did not commit the alleged offense or that his opponent did. It is not surprising that such oath-offers are common, or that they are routinely ignored. Two further points arise in connection with oath-offers. First, as many have noted, women's oath-offers may function as substitutes for testifying in court, which women were not allowed to do. Take Dern. 29.33:

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First, Therippides, who was his fellow-guardian, testified that he had given [Aphobus' mother's dowry] to him. Second, Demon, his uncle, and others who were present testified that Aphobus agreed to give my mother maintenance because he had her dowry. [Aphobus] did not make any accusation against those witnesses, evidently because he knew their testimony was uue. Besides, my mother was willing to set me and my sister beside her and give a pledge (rr10T1vem&1va1) by us that Aphobus had received her dowry in accordance with my father's will. 10

Therippides, Demon, and other men have testified in court but Demosthenes' mother could not testify, so instead she declares herself willing to swear an oath. Were she male, she would presumably have been a witness like the other male relatives. This aspect should not be overemphasized, however. The majority of oath-offers in the orators are by males, most often by the litigant himself. And in some cases men and women are treated the same, as in Isaeus 12.9-10, where, as we noted earlier, Euphiletus' mother, father, and brother all offer to swear oaths (see further below). Elsewhere, information may be commonly attributed to a woman without any mention of an offer to swear (e.g. Dern. 27.40-'so my mother tells me'). Secondly, as Mirhady notes, both Aristotle and the orators sometimes speak of an oath when they really mean an oath-challenge. Isaeus 12.9-10 is a good example. After reporting the offers to swear oaths by Euphiletus' three relatives, the speaker tells the jurors 'you should rightly consider our oaths more credible than their words.' 11 In fact, none of the oaths has been sworn, but the speaker still refers to 'our oaths' rather than to 'our oathoffers'. Mirhady speaks of this usage as a clever 'sleight of hand', and even a careful scholar like Harrison mistakenly understands this case as involving actual oaths: 12 but this may not be entirely a matter of deception, since the identification (or confusion, if you will) of oath-offers with oaths has deep roots in earlier Greek culture. Oath-offers in epic poetry have been the subject of two articles by Callaway (1993, 1998), who discusses five oath-offers in Homer and two in the Hymn to Hermes,and argues that only one of these is actually sworn. 1~ But her argument depends on the absence of certain formal elements that she thinks are required to complete an oath, and this factor may not be relevant to these less formal offers to swear. Let us look briefly at two of the Homeric examples and the two in the Hymn to Hermes. At the beginning of the Iliad an angry Achilles vows that one day the Achaeans will miss him, and Agamemnon will be sorry for what he did (1.233-46): 'I will tell you and I will swear a great oath, Verily by this sceptre, which never more will grow leaves or roots, etc. ' 14 A few lines later Achilles adds, 'and this shall be a great oath'. 15 Finally, when he finishes speaking, Homer says, 'So Achilles spoke, and he threw the golden-studded sceptre on the ground and sat down.' Scholars are divided on whether Achilles actually

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swears this oath. Achilles always speaks of his oath in the future, which suggests that it is only an oath-offer, but the act of throwing the sceptre to the ground and the formal language of oaths (va1µex TOOE CJKTlTTTpov) suggest 16 that he does, in fact, swear. In the end, however, it makes little or no difference to the effect of the scene on the Achaeans or on the poet's audience. In the Odyssey,there are three scenes in which the disguised Odysseus offers to swear an oath to the effect that Odysseus will return. The first is in Book 14 (148-73), where he says to Eumaeus, 'I will speak not in the same way (as you-i.e. pessimistically) but with an oath, that Odysseus is returning. ' 17 A few lines later he adds, 'May Zeus be witness, first of the gods, and the guest table, and the hearth of blameless Odysseus to which I have come. Truly, all these things are being accomplished as I say.' 18 Eumaeus answers, 'Old man, I will not pay you that reward, nor will Odysseus come home again. Relax, drink up, let's think of other things. Don't keep reminding me of this, for my heart grieves in my breast when I remember my dear lord. We'll leave your oath aside. Would that Odysseus might come back.' Callaway's analysis of this scene is that Eumaeus' response shows that he refuses Odysseus' offer to swear and thus 'refused to participate in the religious act of the oath, an act which involves two parties' ( 1993, 17, 1998, 163). She may be correct in a technical sense, but surely the formal invocation of Zeus, which is also part of Odysseus' two later oath-offers, conveys the strong impression that the oath is actually being sworn. Here too, I would conclude, it makes no difference in the end whether Odysseus in fact swears or only offers to swear. The other four Homeric examples are similar and suggest the same conclusion, namely that whenever someone in Homer offers to swear and then states the content of the proposed oath, those who are listening respond as if the oath has in fact been sworn and the audience would naturally respond in the same way. Thus, even if not formally sworn, such oath-offers are meant to strengthen an assertion in the same way as oaths, and are thus essentially equivalent to oaths. Perhaps more relevant to the subject of this article (because they occur in a judicial context) are Hennes' two oath-offers during his dispute with Apollo in the Hymn to Hermes.The Hymn tells the story of the infant Hennes stealing Apollo's cattle and concealing the theft by giving the cattle reverse hoof prints. When Apollo learns that Hennes is the culprit, he comes to his cave, searches it, and finding no cattle asks Hennes where they are. Lying in his cradle wrapped in swaddling clothes, Hennes says he has not seen them. He is just a baby, who could not possibly do such a thing, and no one would believe Apollo if they heard what he is saying: 'If you like, I'll swear a big oath, by my father's head: I promise I'm not to blame personally, and I haven't seen anyone else stealing your cows--whatever cows are, I've only heard talkofthem.' 19 Later, the two gods take their dispute to Zeus for settlement, and after Apollo presents his plea, Hennes answers, accusing Apollo

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of wrongfully searching his cave and denying his role in the theft. He concludes: 'I'll give you a great oath too: by these finely adorned porches of the gods, I will never ever pay him compensation for that ruthless theft, strong though he is. You must support us younger ones. ' 20 Critics have focused on the precise wording of Hennes' oaths with a view to determining whether the god commits perjury, with some claiming that both oaths are false, others that both are so carefully worded as to be literally true, and yet others concluding that the god perjures himself to Apollo but not before Zeus. Callaway's view (1993, 22-24) is that the wording is not relevant to the question of perjury because Hennes does not, in fact, swear either oath; he only offers to swear. Thus, even if he lies, he does not commit perjury. Callaway may be correct-as a factual matter no oath is sworn-but how important is this? Hennes' oath-offers, though in some ways less formal than those we noted in Homer, are similarly treated as if they were oaths by those present. In these cases, the line between oath-offers and oaths is so fine that it no longer exists. As for perjury, Hennes clearly lies to Apollo when he says 'I did not see ( ouJcidon) the cattle,' but this is before he offers to swear an oath. The words of his actual oath are not so clearly false ('I'm notto blame. . . I haven't seen anyone else stealing your cows ... I've only heard talk of them'). Both the first and the last of these claims are arguably false-Hennes is to blame and he has done more than hear talk of the cattle-though they are not as clearly false as his earlier ~rtion that he did not see the cattle. With Zeus, Hennes is more careful from the beginning, saying for example, 'I didn't drive his cows home' (which is true) and the oath he swears is arguably true: 'I'll never pay him compensation.' Hennes' oaths, then, are certainly misleading and the first at least is arguably false in some respects. But is perjury really the question here? We might expect a god's perjury to be a serious matter, but both Apollo and Zeus respond to Hennes' oath-offer with laughter (281,389), and show no concern about possible perjury. It seems other factors are at play. In stealing the cattle Hennes has a larger goal in mind-gaining respect and a higher status among the gods for his mother. In this context, he needs to gain respect among the gods more than to win his case. His cleverness and audacity impress the other two gods, and Zeus imposes no penalty for the theft, as he could legitimately do, but simply tells him to be reconciled with Apollo and show him where his cattle are. And as the poet keeps reminding us, Hennes has another bargaining chip, the newly invented lyre which he keeps hidden in his swaddling clothes until later, when he will give it to Apollo as part of their reconciliation. In this context, Hermes' pleadings and the two oath-offers they contain accomplish their purpose as displays of skill and cleverness-displays whose purpose may be less to persuade than to impress. In the context of a judicial plea, these oath-offers are treated as equiva-

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lent to oaths, and no one seems concerned with the question of perjury. This tempts me to suggest that from the earliest times the Greeks understood that there were two different kinds of oaths, which we might call religious and rhetorical. Religious oaths are what we normally think of-solemn assertions, formally sworn and backed by divine and other forces that convey the strongest possible assurances of their truth. Rhetorical oaths are technically not oaths but oath-offers that occur as part of a legal pleading or other speech and serve to reinforce the speaker's case. These have many of the same features as religious oaths but occur in a different context. Their truthfulness is important only to the extent that the truthfulness of the entire plea is important, and they are generally not taken as seriously as religious oaths. Both kinds of oaths were later incorporated into the Athenian legal system. Litigants' initial oaths are sworn before the trial itself begins: the plaintiff swears that, for example, the defendant stole something, and the defendant swears he did not. These oaths probably included some of the particulars of the charge, since they are occasionally introduced as evidence in the course of a speech (e.g. Isaeus 5.4). In homicide cases these oaths are especially solemn and are accompanied by special rituals. These oaths were expected to be true, but a litigant could not be indicted for perjury, as a witness could be indicted for false testimony. Thus, even these oaths may not have been taken completely seriously. For example, litigants often remind the jurors of their dicastic oath, but to my knowledge, no litigant urges his opponent to remember his initial oath. 21 Rhetorical oaths, in the form of oath-offers, are a common feature of forensic pleadings, but when a litigant offers to swear an oath, although this offer may be treated as an oath, it has only the rhetorical effect of adding emphasis. A litigant may add some formal trappings of religious oaths to his offer, such as proposing to swear on the heads of his children, or using solemn language (~ µ~v) in stating the content of his oath, but as an oathchallenge, it has no validity unless the opponent accepts it. And unlike a litigant's proposal that his opponent swear an oath, which could lead to a formal swearing (as with Plangon), a litigant who offers to swear does not expect his offer will be accepted, since acceptance of the offer would be tantamount to accepting one's opponent's entire case. Obviously a litigant who is contesting a case in court would not normally accept an offer that would amount to conceding the case-unless, of course, this was prearranged. And rejecting an opponent's offer to swear would not prejudice the case against a litigant except to the extent that his opponent could make a convincing rhetorical argument that rejection is an admission of guilt. Thus the only serious oath-challenges--those where a real option exists for the opponent to accept or reject the proposed oath-are the oaths that are offered to an opponent to swear, and these are rare and are often conditional or narrowly worded. In fact, the only oath-offer to an opponent that

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is clearly unconditional and concerns the central issue in the case was the oath offered to Plangon, and that was by prearrangemenL There is no reason to think the offer would ever have been made otherwise.

4

David C. Mirhady THE DIKASTS' OATH AND THE QUESTION OF FACT

The dikasts' oath embodied the fundamental statement of Athenian jurisprudence. In swearing it, Athenian dikasts solemnly declared what reasoning guided their judicial decisions. The oath included two key elements: first, that they cast their votes 'according to the laws' (KaTcxTouc; voµovµ'{l TUc511c:aioTµt} Athenaion Politeia reports that the archons swear that they will be archon ~ustly and according to the laws'. 44 The language resembles the dikasts' oath. Perhaps it reflects especially the judicial function of the archons. The Ath. PoL also tells us that in 50 I, as part of the Cleisthenic reforms, the Athenians began using the oath of the Council of Five Hundred that was still in use (22.2). That suggests that a dikastic oath was also introduced then, though one that may have changed. The historical background is thus fragmentary, but it suggests a long history TUcS1katOTCXTt} and its association with judifor the language of the yvCA>µt} cial decisions and oath swearing. It even predates statutory laws.45 Before their introduction.judges relied on such a concept for their jurisprudence. Customs also offered vague guides, but judges were ultimately expected to Tex form an understanding of the inherent issues of justice (yvCA>oea8a1 cS1ka1a)in particular situations. Aeschines argues that the Athenian democracy not only introduced laws into the oath but put them in the primary position: 'therefore the lawgiver also placed this first in the dikasts' oath, "I will vote according to the laws." For he certainly knew this well, that if the laws are upheld for the pous,the democracy is also preserved. ' 46 That is, the democracy required that the dikasts deal with the question of law (the ~tio iuris) 'according to the laws'. In general, that will have left the yvCA>µTI T) cS1katOTCXTT) to apply only to questions of fact. The Athenians did not make the distinction as strictly as, for instance, Aristotle wished: 'the only business of the litigant is to prove that the fact (pragma) in question is or is not so, that it has happened or not. But whether it is important or minor or just or unjust, as much as the legislator has not defined, the dikast must really underby himself and not learn from the disputants. ' 47 In stand (y1yvCA>OKe1v) deciding, for instance, which p,ragmataare even relevant to the truth or falsity of the prosecution's charge, the dikasts must necessarily have had to decide the dikaia, issues relevant to the justice of the case. In a sense, the dikaia correspond to what appears in Black 'sLaw Di.ctionaryunder 'merits': 'I. The elements or grounds of a claim or defense; the substantive considerations to be taken into account in deciding a case as opposed to extraneous or technical points, esp. of procedure.' 48 'Merits' may even be an appropriate translation for TexcS1katain many cases. But 2. in Black's lemma identifies

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'merits' also with 'equity (3) ', i.e. 'the recourse to principles of justice to correct or supplement the law as required by particular circumstances' .49 This second meaning from Blacks does not seem to be what the Athenian logographers are referring to in passages such as Hyp. Dem. 39, where 'the laws' and the dikaia appear side by side. 50 The 'equity' of the dikaia is to conform to the laws. The emphasis of the logographers in such phrases is generally on the particular facts of the case. The distinction between que~ lions of fact and law is made strikingly at the beginning of the SecondTetral.ogy. \vhere the facts are agreed upon, the laws and decrees, which are sovereign over the entire politeia, decide, but where there is disagreement over facts, the dikasts must form an understanding. ' 51 Several passages in which the wording yvwµuTl} cS1Ka10TaT(l is loosely echoed seem to illustrate the general understanding of the phrase in the orators. In some, the complementary nature of acting according to the laws and acting justly is emphasized. 52 Many passages include the phrase 'according to the laws' and give only implicit reference to the 'most just gnome'. For instance, Demosthenes argues, 'all of you, if you wish to learn correctly about these matters and to judge the suit according to the lawsjustly, must not only direct your attention to what terms are written into the decree, but also look at their consequences. ' 5' Here, as in several other passages, the adverb cS1Ka1euc seems to stand in for the phrase yvwµu TTIcS1Ka10TaT(l. In order to judge justly the dikasts must, as the passage says, 'learn correctly about these matters' and 'look at their consequences'. That is, they must go beyond the legal language to knowledge of the specific circumstances. In Dern. 43.34 the dikasts are urged to vote for 'whoever seems to speak more according to the laws and more justly'. 54 From subsequent passages we learn that in a previous trial the dikasts were deceived (43.38) and that, through lies, the opponents 'said nothing just' (cS1Ka1ov «SeoucSeveAeyov 43.42). A ~ust' statement here would apparently have given the dikasts accurate information about the facts. At the end of the speech the speaker appeals, 'help the laws and take care for the dead ... ; by doing these things you will vote what isjust (Ta «Si Kaia) and what is consistent with your oaths. ' 55 By a chiastic arrangement Ta cS1Ka1a seems to refer to the specific facts related to the interests of the deceased. But, interestingly, adherence to the laws is referred to as euopKa('consistent with the oath'), which suggests a closer connection between the oath and adherence to the laws than between the oath and the 'just understanding'. Hyperides provides a similar formulation: 'having looked at the eisangelia and the laws vote whatever to you seems just and consistent with the oath. ' 56 The laws are explicitly mentioned in the oath, so there is a connection between 'laws' and euopKa.The eisangelia will have included a statement of facts, leaving again a connection between a statement of the facts and the phrase 'what seems just'. In the Athenian oath the laws appear first, as Aeschines emphasizes. Fidelity to them seems the primary criterion for consistency with the oath.

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Some passages reflect the phrase by offering the word gnomein its verbal form, e.g. Dern. 33.38 KaTa TOOC VOtJOU1Kaia)and according to the laws, help me.' 61 Again the surrounding passage draws a connection between the dikaiaand the facts of the case as opposed to the laws. He urges the dikasts to look at the matter itself and not at the fact that he is only a young man speaking and not Demosthenes. The laws, he says, have the same authority regardless. In some contexts, the gnome represents not only the dikasts' understanding of the particular facts, but also their judicial decision as a whole. That seems to be what Isaeus is getting at when he says that his opponents are persuading the dikasts 'to vote opposite to the laws, to justice, and to the gnomeof the deceased'. 62 He draws a parallel between the gnome of the deceased and the dikasts' gnome.In Dern. 24.78, since a specific law is under debate, politeiareplaces laws. 63 The gnome,however, is concerning the particular matters upon which the dikasts have voted. Again, that seems other than the question of law. Lysias 9.19 refers to a judgement by Treasury officials, but the language is similar. He writes, 'don't invalidate those who have deliberated better and justly, for they did everything both according to the laws and according to what was probable.' 64 The laws are linked here with what is better (~EATIOV) and 1ustly' with what is probable (TO eiKoc),a determination of fact. Two sections later, he makes a clearer connection between 1ust things' and gnome, saying that he has confidence in the dikasts' gnomethat he will achieve 1ust 65 things'. Lysias elsewhere offers ouyyvwµ11in place of yvwµ11, but the ouyyvwµ11would be 'contrary to the laws'. The point is 9ualified later, where the speaker explains that the lawgiver gives no O\JyyvCtltJTI to what is said in 66 anger, unless what is said is true, again, a question of fact.

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An extended passage at the end ofLysias 15 seems to exploit the dikasts' (Tex oath repeatedly. 67 Starting in §8 he suggests that understandingjustice 61Kij5 611ca1015, we begin to get a picture of the agreement as the source of the speaker's rights. Later, when the speaker describes the creditors' brief inclination to waive some of these terms, TOEK Tfl5 ouyypa4>ij5 ~1Ka1ovappears in the singular (cf. Demosthenes 35.45, discussed above), and can be translated as 'our right from the written agreement'. ~ In both of these speeches, the speaker is able to argue that the written agreement should be binding (and was therefore, in our terms, a contract), and that the debtors, who have allegedly violated the terms of this contract, are acting in a manner that cannot be described as dikaios. Both speakers claim justice for themselves in the sense that they wish to see a solution that is advantageous to them, and which they perceive to be just. In other words, they claim that they are owed justice under the terms of a contract. They make a case for a claim right. IV

We now have a good idea of what an ancient Greek assertion of a claim right might look like, at least in a certain legal context. But where does this leave the role of the oath? There are no dikai emporikai of which I am aware in which the parties to the agreement swore an oath to abide by its terms. In fact, oaths were not generally sworn alongside contracts, and this does not seem so surprising: to call down a conditional curse on oneself was not a risk to be taken lightly. For that reason, one suspects that a Greek did not voluntarily swear a promissory oath unless there was a risk that he might be mistrusted.'9 (An apparent exception is the kind of oath taken as part of some initiation procedure, as an ephebe, perhaps, or indeed a dikast; but these oaths were not voluntary for those to whom they applied.) Hence, in Sophocles' Oedipus at Colonus,Oedipus tells Theseus that he has no need of 40 an oath that he will not betray him, as if he were a bad man~5 KaKOV. Theseus in tum assures him that his word is as good as his oath. The exchange is meant as an illustration of goodwill from both sides, strangers though they are. Jebb usefully draws a comparison with a passage from

68

Homos

Euripides' Medea, where Aegeus is taken aback by Medea's request for an oath, as if she did not trust him. 41 Now, if an oath was indeed only necessary to seal an agreement where there were grounds for mistrust, it is highly unlikely that a maritime loan agreement would need one: no lender would enter into such an expensive and risky agreement if he already had reason not to trust the merchant with his money. If an oath had been sworn to observe the terms of any of the maritime loan agreements for which we have literary evidence, we would surely have heard about it in one of the speeches, since it would have strengthened the speaker's argumenL For an idea of what this argument might have looked like, we must look at a different kind of speech from the Demosthenic corpus: number 48 against Olympiodorus. 42 Olympiodorus has, at the second attempt, won the legal battle to claim the inheritance of a relative called Comon. The speaker is Olympiodorus' brother-in-law, Callistratus. He says that he and Olympiodorus had agreed jointly to claim the dead man's estate, which they would split half and half. Olympiodorus is now keeping everything for himself, and Callistratus is bringing a dike blabesto claim his share. Crucially for the present discussion, when they originally agreed to share the estate, Olympiodorus and Callistratus not only produced written terms of their agreement but swore an oath to keep to them. The oath became necessary because there was substantial disagreement between the two as they came towards the agreement. 43 Callistratus therefore had reason not to trust Olympiodorus. They followed the procedure of swearing their oath before witnesses and depositing the agreement with a third party. As we have seen, an important part of any agreement, if it was to stand up in court, was that it should be witnessed (this was true of the maritime loan agreements also). The striking element of an agreement to which oaths have been sworn is of course that gods are included among these witnesses. Now, Athenian law seems not to have included a procedure that could specifically be used against oathbreakers. 44 (Part of the explanation, one assumes, is that an oath-breaker must answer to a higher power.) But if one's adversary had patently broken an oath, it was worth one's while to refer to this in one's speech, as this could only strengthen the argument. The speaker in Demosthenes 48 certainly does this, referring frequently to the terms of the agreement and the oath in the same breath, 45 where in a different speech reference would have been made to the agreement only. It is clear that he feels an injustice has been done, in that he is claiming what is justly his under the terms of an agreement (which in this case is a sworn agreement). 46 But there is perhaps a tendency to draw a distinction between the agreement and the oath sworn to it, as we see in the following two examples:

OlTCoJS ... EYCAl ICQTV eµov µep05. Kai WVET01µ05E1µ1TaµauTOUAa~CilV 1

70

Horkos OTpOTOV µev E~c..J TJlOcS' CXTTOOTEIAOI x8ov6s-' OIKEIV cSeTOVeµov oiKOVcxvcxµepos- AOl3c..>v KOiT~(S' cxq,EIVOI TOV,IOOV 00815 ae1v represents a promise to deal with any contingency: Dicaeogenes must do whatever is required in future to deliver that parcel (especially settling with third parties who now hold the property). It is, arguably, that deeper understanding that is bound by-oath; for, Menexenus repeatedly says, Dicaeogenes swore before the court, µ~V... TTCXpcxcSu>OEIV. So here we have a second case in which oath seems to embody the essence of the obligation. But the same distinction applies: in both cases the basis for promissory obligations is the bar against further dispute, as a closing to the settlement of their prior claims. Menexenus tries to minimize this aspect of the agreement, but it is clear from what he says that a set of fairly specific conditions were drawn up (esp. §§28-29). Dicaeogenes must have acknowledged that the property belonged to his cousins and that he would vacate it 'on these terms', KCXTCX auv!hi1OEIV ' ·-i:t' ru,aJJ_~~nmnx. We may construe these commitments as 'consensual' obligations in the sense that the parties are bound by a promise, a meeting of minds about what they will do in future. But the Greeks seem to have understood it somewhat differently: this sort of oath means essentially that the parties will not con test hereafter what is hereby resolved about the past. It thus covers many contingencies, but it is strictly 'consensual' in this more limited sense: the parties are bound by what they consenttoor acknowledge about the here-andnow-there is no going back on those commitments. The best-known examples of this principle are treaties of warring states and parties in civil _conflict.But we should not suppose that the principle applies only to historic events. The same principle applies even to petty disputes over inheritance. 24 From this pattern I conclude that where an oath seals a contract it serves primarily as a negative, a bar against further dispute, not as a positive commitment to new obligations. In the particular case of Isaeus 5, it does not naturally entail an open-ended promise, however much the plaintiff insists. If it was to be understood that Dicaeogenes (Ill) must restore all the original property and deal with any encumbrance, there was standard language to express that: the property should be 'free and clear,' e/,eutheraand kathara, or 'intact,' anepapha. Plead as he will, Menexenus cannot find that language in the contract; so he argues that this is what they honestly understood. He is trying to stretch the obligation beyond its ordinary reach, to encompass the very meeting of minds. And of course the jury may have accepted his argument-the very fact that he could make the argument shows that it was

n

n

Oath and Contract

79

within their discretion. But the special pleading suggests that it was not an obvious assumption. The effect of oath in such commitments is perhaps clearest where the document is cited incidentally and no one is arguing over what it means. Consider the evidence on what we might call 'contracts for personal service' .25 The most notorious is the deal in [Dern.] 59.45--46, for the favours of Neaera. A man named Phrynion, Neaera's former keeper, brought suit against Stephanus for wrongfully 'liberating' his property; the two men submitted their dispute to an arbiter whose decision they swore to accept and abide by. Stephanus and Neaera would give back most of the valuables she had taken; thereafter she must divide her time between the two men; each has an equal claim on her days in service, and each would be responsible for her expenses when she is in his keeping. The contract then concludes with a version of the customary clause forestalling further dispute: any further arrangement they agree upon shall be valid; and thereafter they shall be philoi and must not mmsikakein (45--46). That closing, 'not to recall wrong', belongs to an oath and it is this that reinforces the obligations that reach beyond the quid proquo.Any difficulty yet to be discovered will be resolved according to this rule. 26 There are probably exceptions; the regularity does not seem to obey a particular statute. But the preponderance of the evidence suggests that ordinarily-by custom and common assumption-contracts are bound by oath only if they involve the settlement of some dispute. The oaths sworn in Greek business tend to be 'assertory' rather than promissory; 27 the oath recognizes certain rights and relationships as a current reality, not as a scenario to be realized in future. Contracts creating entirely new obligations, where the parties have no prior claims upon one another, invoke no oath but secure the obligation with the initial payment or transfer of assets; the binding 'agreement' recognizes this transaction and covers any contingencies. That pattern is suggestive if we are to theorize about the origins of con tract among the Greeks. In settlement contracts, as in the case against Olympiodorus, oath was invoked as the strongest form of acknowledgement that the parties have resolved their claims about the past and will offer no further dispute on those issues. But ordinary contracts for new business, for lease or loan or performance of some service, did not rely upon an unsecured promise and do not seem to derive their characteristics from oath. It is only when such dealings end in dispute that an oath is invoked as part of a settlement. The most instructive examples are those where business begins without oath, simply with some transfer of money or goods, and then, later, a dispute arises; past claims are settled and the obligations are recalculated. It is only at that second stage that an oath is required. 28 Thus in the year 393 (or soon thereafter) as documented in Isocrates 17, 'the Banker's Case', in the initial transaction the son of Sopaeus deposited 6 talents with Pasion, without oath. When he later came to reclaim his deposit, Pasion at first denied the transaction but later, facing some embarrassment in a related lawsuit, Pasion reconciled with him. On the acropolis, our plaintiff says, 'we gave pledge of faith', TTIOTIV T eooµev(19), and the setting suggests that they swore to that 1

80

Hurlws

pledge. Pasion would repay the funds in his depositor's homeland (Bosporus) and Sopaeus' son would make no further complaint. 29 In this instance they drafted an 'arbitration' on fixed conditions, dimta epi rhitois. This is not an agreement to arbitration in the usual sense (for a third party to resolve outstanding differences) but an instrument to guarantee compliance, a way of dealing with contingencies: if either party fails to do as he agreed, the 'arbiter' will assess a penalty. Such 'disposition on stated terms' practically translates Wolff's Zweckverfogunginto Greek. In this one respect it is at odds with his model but consistent with the other evidence on how oath entered into Greek contract it is not a way of creating promissory obligations but for canceling past liabilities. How far back does this principle apply? The law itself is uncertain but suggestive. Solon, supposedly, enjoined that 'the plaintiff, when he has neither sumbolaia nor witnesses [must] swear' (F 42 Ruschenbusch). This may be a genuine 'Solonian' law, if not Solon's own at least a statute oflong standing. H so, it probably means that in ordinary contract disputes the plaintiff should point to the real goods or 'receipts' or bring witnesses to the transaction; if he cannot, he will have to swear to his claim. !10 Whatever the law means about the other forms of evidence, it naturally suggests that oath enters into the proceedings only when the contract is in dispute. The evidence of archaic cases is slim, but there is the anecdote in Herodotus (6.86), the tale Leotychidas told about Glaucus, three generations before his time. ' 1 Glaucus was widely respected for dikaiosune. There came to him a man of Miletus who had decided to convert half of his property and deposit the proceeds with the righteous Glaucus. They made sumbola by way of receipt. But when the depositor died and his heirs came to claim the parathike, Glaucus was tempted to deny his obligation. He consulted Delphi and asked if he might swear an oath 'not to recall'. To which the Pythia responded: 'Swear (if you choose), since even one true to his oath meets death in the end. The child of Horkos is nameless and limbless (yet) swiftly pursues, catches up and destroys all a man's house and descent.' Glaucus gave back the parathikeand gave up any notion of swearing a false oath. The doom the Pythia foretold befell him nonetheless for even contemplating epiorkia.none of his descendants survived. The original relevance is dubious, but for our inquiry the implication is clear enough: No oath was sworn to enforce the original obligation. Oath only enters into the transaction when it comes to canceling claims from the past.

7 Jonathan S. Perry

'AN OLYMPIC OATH-TAKING,

VICTORY MUST NOT BE BOUGHT'

CHEATING AND WOMEN IN GREEK ATHLETICS*

The first, and the most renowned, of the women to have won a crown at Olympia was the Spartan Kyniska, the sister of Agesilaos. 1 This victory (either in one or in two separate Olympic cycles) seems to have taken place in the 390s BCE, 2 and it is recorded in several-though contradictory-sources. The most familiar of these is the inscription attached to her (now lost) statue/ 1 fragments of which have been recovered at Olympia, and the full text of which is known from the Palatine Antlwlogy. 4

I TTCXpTa5 µev [~aatAJ1E5 eµo1] rranpe5 KOia~eA4>1. a[pµan ~· c.:,KUTTOO8ey~aio, 1TOAAW\I mipaTa OUVTawaa1s EV!3paxe1,µeiwvElTETalµwµos-av8pCA>1TWV"

C8ovosaM' oµws'Kpeaaovyap OIKTlpµou µ~ 1rap1e1ic:aAa.\ICA>µa 61Kal'¥ 1TT)6aAl'¥0TpaTov· a~u6e 1TpAaupov 1Tapa18uaae1, µeya TOIct>epeTai 1Tapae8ev.lTOAACAlV Taµias 1TOAAOI µCXpTUpES aµcl>onpo151TIOTOI. I

&,

eaa,.

98

Hmi.os If you should speak to the point, pulling together the strands of many things in brief, less blame follows from men, for wearisome excess dulls eager anticipation and when townsmen hear of the success of other good performers it really weighs down their hearts (in private). But nonetheless, for begrudging is better than pitying, do not pass over noble things. Guide your people with a rudder of justice and on an anvil that knows no falsehood forge your tongue. If any word, even a slight one, falls from you it is carried along as a matter of substance. You are the steward of many people. Many are the witnesses, convincing on either side. (Pindar, ~th.1.81-88)

Pindar is advising Hieron on the arts of good government, but in terms that apply equally well to his own function as a praise-poet. Accuracy was as crucial to the success of the Sicilian tyrannos as it was to the poet, but accuracy of a certain sort: to 'speak kairos' as Pindar urges, is to keep in mind the threedimensional world, where the ultimate reference-points lie beyond the human sphere. In the latter realm the pleasure principle operates with µCAlµs, KOPs and 4>8ovs. In the First ~thian Pindar acknowledges that the poet-like his patron-must function in a world where individuals are poised to blame those in a position of authority, or to begrudge those whose success is being hailed. But he is unambiguous about his belief that assuming power or praising a winning athlete is a good thing, as long as one does not go off-course, forgetting to steer with a rudder or forgetting to speak 'without falsehood'. In the two-dimensional world witnesses are ready to give credible testimony on either side of a dispute, committing perjury by swearing oaths that have no respect for justice, but poets and tyrants must maintain an athletic-style accuracy and steer a straight course. These are metaphors in this third dimension Justice and that link Pindar's advice to cosmic c51KTJ; Truth conform to a divine apportionment, a dispensation that poets can learn, uncover and report as a >.oys. Perhaps the strongest oath in the epinician corpus, the one most plagued by emotional intensity and scholarly controversy, is the one taken by Pindar in the Seventh Nemean. It occurs at a pivotal moment in an ode filled with treacherous shoals of interpretation. The victor for whom it was composed is Sogenes of Aigina, youthful winner of the boy's pentathlon (the year is disputed). The central myth concerns Neoptolemos, a figure memorably described by Glenn Most as 'the first great war criminal of Greek cultural history'. 29 The entire poem is filled with juridical allusions, and we have the

Epinician Swearing

99

strong feeling that we are in an exculpatory situation. Scholars have argued that it is a palinode, an attempt by Pindar to clear his own name, which had been tarnished among Aiginetans for his condemnation of their hero in the Sixth Paean. In the Seventh Nemean Pindar gives Neoptolemos a more sympathetic treatment, focusing on his activities as a cult hero at Delphi.~ The poet is careful to bolster his own position in Aigina by the claim to enjoy a relationship of 1rpotev1awith the descendants of Neoptolemos, a tenn normally used to reflect a contractual relationship sworn under oath:

Kai trp~evtc;xll'Ell'Ol8' I EV TE6aµoTa1soµµaT16epKoµa1Aaµtrpov,oux ump~aAc.>V, eu,pwv ~1a1atraVT'EKtro&,s-epuoais-·0 6e AOITl'OSll'OTIXPOVOS" EptrOI.µa&lv 6e TIS"CXVEpEt, e'1trap µeAos-epxoµai \jxxy1ovoapov ewerrwv. Eu~ev16all'CXTpa8e Ic.iyeves-I CXTTOIJVUCt.> 1-1~ npµa rrpo~a1s-CXKov8' WTExaAKorrapaovopoai e~emµ\J,Ev rraAaioµcxTwv 8oav yAc.oooav,&sauxevaKai o8EVOS" cx6tavTOV,a18wv1trp1vcxA1~yuiov eµrreoe,v. e'1rrovos-~v. TOTEprrvovTTAEOV m6epxeTa1. I trust in this bond of host-friendship, and among his demesmen I look brightness from my eyes, not overstepping the mark, keeping at bay any aggression from my steps. May the time that remains for me advance favourably. One who has figured it out will say whether my song comes reproaching, an utterance out-of-tune. Sogenes from the clan of the Euxenidae, I swear That I have not stepped forward to the line, hurling my quick tongue Like a bronze-cheeked javelin that releases the neck and its strength from the wrestling-match without the sweat, before the limb falls under the blazing sun. If there has been strain, greater is the pleasure that follows. (Pindar, Nem. 7.65-74) Pindar claims to be speaking as an eye-witness, 'looking brightness' and stepping within appropriate limits as he engages in the act of revelation of Sogenes' success, the poet's truth-claim. This, he says, is not a claim forcibly extracted (~1aia, 67). One could recognize in this a certain nervousness, as if his credentials-presented to a suspicious audience-were not at all comfortably received. It is possible that dissonance will be detected in his song (v. 69), and his claim must await the judgement of time. It also needs to be bolstered by his taking a strong oath. Just what this oath entails is

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anything but clear, couched as it is in metaphors drawn from the athletic arena. The scholiasts are divided on whether the javelin's TEpµa and the wrestling bout refer to a foul committed by Sogenes leading to his disqualification, or to his making such an impressive show in the javelin toss that his competitors declined to wrestle with him. 51 Applied to Pindar's oath the first reading of the metaphors would imply an admission of foul play on the part of the athlete and the poet but the second interpretation suggests a claim to triumph, presumably Pindar's presenting a 'true' record of Sogenes' success. 52 Pindar knows he is working-like ourselves-in a world where, as he says of Homer in the Eighth Nemean, 'shifty falsehood' is often awarded the top prize. Even he may not be immune to this, despite his claims to superior authority: the pleasure principle may have intervened. His defensive stance and courtroom language may be directed mainly at dispelling this suspicion, without having recourse to troublesome relations with the Aiginetans: euc.5wµovES-~tKav Tpta etrea ~,apKEOEI' OU'¥SU~l50 µapTU5 epyµao,v ETTIOTaTEt, Aiy,va, TEWVi:l105T' EKyOVc.>V. 8paou µ01 TOO'EITTEIV aevva15 apeTa15 ooov KUptavAoyc.>v oiKo8ev· As for an auspicious trial, a few words will suffice: no lying witness oversees the accomplishments of the offspring from you and Zeus. Aigina, I am emboldened to say this that I have a lawful course of words because of the glorious achievements coming from your home. (Pindar, Nem. 7. 48-52)

Despite the syntactic difficulties of the text 55 we can see that Pindar feels entitled, emboldened even, to make the claim that his speech is 'legally correct' (KUptav,v. 51). The reference to the offspring of Aiginaand Zeus must refer to Neoptolemos (and by extension all the Aeacids). The µcxpTUSwho acts as guarantor for him, ou "1eii~15,is plausibly the god who guarantees truth, Apollo, as Glenn Most argues. 54 If Pindar was on trial as much as was Neoptolemos, and his audience felt that he lacked 'positional advantage' in giving testimony, the removal of the charges against poet and hero could emerge from divine testimony. With his name and that of the notorious Aeacid cleared, Pindar can go on to make his strong oath. When working with the epinician genre we are all conscious, since Bundy's work, of the 'praise-principle': everything in the odes, even the suggestion of tensions between poet and audience, should be regarded as teleological, aiming at the praise of the victor. 55 When we look at oath-taking in Pindar

Epinician Swearing

101

and Bacchylides we can indeed see this activity as a rhetorical trope, a means of fortifying the tribute being awarded to an athlete. Like the use of touchstones, an infallible test of veracity that was used as metaphor by both Pindar and Bacchylides, oath-taking grounded their truth-claims in the divine, cosmic order and gave them enhanced credibility among their audience. 36 But these poems were much more than this: they conveyed paideia to the listeners; the fact that they were not supplying new information but a reformulation of familiar material did not vitiate their claims nor their oath-taking: theirs was not epistemic truth but part of a process that was ultimately metaphysical in nature. They reminded their audiences of the ultimate Jons for their claims--divinity-and the incorruptibility of revealed truth was an essential component of praise-poetry. It was not only relevant but central, and in this it contributes to another generic discussion. Since 1988 there has been a lively debate about whether the odes were performed by a chorus or were monodic. ' 7 A secondary question, and one to which the above discussion is germane, is that of the poetic persona in this genre.!111In considering the performance venue for these odes, were the truth-claims being made in every case by the poet himself, or could the 'I' refer to performers of the song? Given the importance of establishing credibility for the claims made by the poets, for their 'positional advantage' in having access to divinely revealed truth, it seems clear that no matter whose voice uttered these claims the audience knew who carried the credentials.

9

Judith Fletcher HORKOS IN THE 0RESTEIA

Hur1r,os, its cognates

and related terms recur throughout the Oresteia,which seems only natural given that the oath is such an essential feature of Greek justice and this drama is aboutjustice. 1 Yet although much has been written on diki in the Oresteia,commentary on the oaths which structure and obtain this justice is surprisingly scant, limited only to remarks on individual oaths sworn or mentioned at various points in the drama. Oaths are verbal bonds, and in a literary work which employs nets and binding as one of its central image systems one might reasonably expect the persistent reference or enactment of the oath to be of some significance. 2 In this article I offer a synthetic analysis of the oaths of the Oresteia, tracing how their interconnection and evolution give meaning to the tragic events of the house of Atreus. Until the dikastic oath tendered by Athena establishes the institutionalized forms of diki and horkos familiar to the fifth-century audience, horkosfunctions to bind members of this unhappy family to retribution and violence. And until Orestes swears his oath of alliance in Athens, no character seems competent to swear a proper oath on stage. Yet as dikiis refined with its operations distanced from retaliatory familial violence and finally secured within the operations of the polis, horkosdevelops correspondingly. 11 Congruent with this development is the changing nature of the Erinyes, oath goddesses, who like the oath itself have the potential for both blessings and curses, and who evolve from vindictive fiends to beneficent spirits. The eventual suppression of the malignant aspect of the Erinyes contributes to the establishment of civic patriarchy, as scholars such as Froma Zeitlin and Laura McClure have argued. 4 A brutal cycle of familial vengeance, associated with the feminine principle, gives way to a more rational political organization aligned with the masculine. The progress of

102

Horlt.osin the Oresteia

103

horlws is articulated within this conflict between male and female in such a way that the oath becomes a gendered speech act. 5 From the essentialist perspective of an Athenian audience the authoritative oath would naturally be aswciated with masculinity, as Susan Guettel Cole has argued. 6 Women certainly did swear oaths but mostly in private or religious contexts. 7 Although their testimony might be used in civil disputes in the form of an oath challenge, women did not participate in political or legal life, which public oaths helped to construcL 8 The lives of male citizens in classical Athens, on the other hand, would be shaped by the various oaths that they swore: the ephebic oath when they reached maturity, oaths such as the oath ofDemophantos, sworn collectively, individual oaths sworn when accepting a political office, and many others. 9 My analysis suggests that the Oresteiais informed by this implicit distinction. A close reading of the trilogy reveals that its male characters seem to enjoy particular advantages in terms of authoritative language throughout. Orestes, whose development into an adult male shapes the action of the last two plays, swears a conspiratorial oath, but one sanctified by a god; his final words in the drama are the impressive Argive oath of alliance. On the other hand, female characters, even (or especially) Clytemnestra, experience disabilities in terms of the oaths that they try to perform, and are especially inept at making male characters swear oaths. This opposition between the flawed or corrupt oath and the good oath is represented as part of the tension between male and female in part because it allows the drama to delineate a progress from a family-centered revenge to a polis-based legal system. When Athena, a female divinity with masculine associations, effectively commands the dikasts to swear an oath, this tension begins to dissipate until eventually the Erinyes are absorbed into the polis.

I We begin by looking at how oaths are first implicated in the repetitive vengeance of the house of Atreus. By the middle of the trilogy, at latest, it seems apparent that Clytemnestra swore an oath to kill her husband in revenge for the sacrifice of lphigenia. The first hint of this pledge occurs towards the end of the Agamemnonas she stands over the corpses of her husband and his captive, Cassandra. 'Now you hear the justice of my oaths' (Kai TllV~ exKO\JE15 opKICalV 'eµwv 8eµ,v·I431), she proclaims to the Chorus. The passage is fraught with interpretive problems, to which we must return, but for now it is enough to note that Clytemnestra has in some way, at some point in time, sworn an oath. Matters are more obvious in the Choephori,when Orestes, in a scene mirroring Clytemnestra's vaunt to the Chorus, announces over the corpses of his two victims, f/

,,

,

'

opKOS-T eµµEVEI1TICTCAJµaa,v·

104

Horiws ~uvc.5µooavµev 8civaTOVa8A1~ TTaTpt exe1. Kat ~uv6ave108a1· Kat Tao euopKc.>S'

And their oath abides by its pledges; together they swore to kill my poor father. They kept their oath. ( Ch. 977-80) And just as the killing of Agamemnon is the consequence of an oath, so too the retributive murder of Clytemnestra and Aegisthus is set in motion by the oath of Orestes. This becomes evident when Pylades, as he prods the hesitant Orestes to kill his mother, speaks his only lines. TTOU «Sa,TOAOITTOV A~iou µavnuµaTa TCXrru8oxpTJOTa, TTIOTCI T' EUopKc.5µaTa;

What then becomes thereafter of the oracles declared by Loxias at Pytho? What of sworn oaths? ( Ch. 900-1) Pylades' remarkable intervention suggests that Orestes too had sworn an oath, probably at the seat of Apollo and at the god's behest, to avenge his father's murder. 10 The site of the oath, at Apollo's sacred seat, attests to the authority of this important utterance. The association of Apollo's oracle with Orestes' oath also evokes the earlier pronouncement of Cassandra, who prophesied the vengeance of Orestes before she died and spoke of it enigmatically as an oath: oµc.5µoTalyap opKOS' EK8ewv µeyas I at' eyc.5, ouI.JOI~ IJEAa8pov EATTIS" eµrrant, E(,.)S" av ai&; wp e4>'EOTtasEIJT)S" Aiy1o8os-... You hear now the righteousness of my oaths: by the Justice accomplished for my daughter, by Ate and the Erinys, for whom I have slaughtered this man, the expectation of fear does not tread my home, as long as Aegisthus keeps the fire burning in my hearth ... (Ag. 1431-37)

The term horlcilmproperly refers to oath sacrifices, and it would seem that in this disturbing ritual the corpses of Clytemnestra's victims have become the special sacrifice over which an oath is sworn, a grim parody of wellordered ritual, and clearly a specimen of what Froma Zeitlin has labelled a perverted sacrifice. 15 Oath sacrifices were offered as a guarantee against perjury, perhaps symbolizing the fate of a would-be perjurer, and they were offered at the time an oath was swom. 14 Yet in Clytemnestra's distorted rite the offering is apparently made after her oath to avenge her child. Of course the audience does not learn for certain that she made this oath until Orestes refers to it in the next play; the tenor of her oath is quite unclear. But what are we to assume she is swearing to? Is she avowing that she feels protected byAegisthus? After the intensity of her invocation this seems a most insignificant declaration, and as future events prove she is not safe. Although the

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exact terms of her oath are not yet clarified it is obvious that Clytemnestra's oath is a deficient and ineffectual speech act. Clytemnestra warps a second oath ritual shortly after this when she attempts to end the cycle of vengeance by making a compact with the daimon of the Pleisthenids: 'I want to make a hor/wswith the daimon... ' ( ... 'eyw IS' OU\Ie8EAulcSa,µ0111 T~ TlAe108ev1cSciv op1.1opKouµevo1,joinedthem in their escape (3.20.1). Presumably these Athenians are the garrison which we were told about in the previous book (above). The total of the escaperswas 212 (24.2), but this is not broken down by Thucydides into Plataians and Athenians. We shall however see that some Athenians stayed behind to the bitter end and shared the Plataians' fate. This slice of narrative gives way to a slice of the story of Mytilene (3.25-50). The latter includes a sentence which has been felt 'particularly worrying'. 14 The Spartan Salaithos has been captured in Mytilene and taken to Athens where he is summarily executed 'although he made various offers, including one to get the Spartans to withdraw from Plataia, which was still under siege' (36.2). Why did the Athenians show such 'lack of interest' (West's expre~ sion) 15 in this offer by Salaithos? We do not know. But we should not assume that everyone at Athens felt the same way (see the closing part of section I above). The general Athenian mood at this moment was undoubtedly one

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opyiis-in the next line); but it would be surprising if some of of anger (um:> the cooler heads--Thucydides himself among them? 16-were not intrigued by this astonishing offer, and would at least have liked to probe it further. (Thucydides admired Salaithos, I think; see 25.1 for the dry description of his remarkable single-handed exploit, getting into Mytilene down a ravine, all very different from that other Spartan commander who is prominent in this episode, the supine and cruel Alkidas, chs. 31-32). But it was not really very likely that Salaithos could, in the modern expression, 'deliver'. So his execution does not prove much about Athenian attitudes to Plataia and the Plataians. And so to the tragic finale. Two hundred Plataians were executed and that verb again for 'sharing a twenty-five Athenians who ~uvenoA1op1aoh,aUTOUS .. TTAaTa1ijscS'oux oµoAoyouo, TOUS cxvcSpas eu8us UTTOCJXE08at CXTTOOc.lOEIV, CXAACX Aoyc.JvTTpc...lTOV yevoµEVc,JV ~v TI ~uµf3atVc,JOI, KatETTOµooai OU4>ao1v,'this is the Theban version, and they add that the Plataians swore an oath. The Plataians do not admit that they promised to give the men back immediately but only if they came to an agreement after negotiations, and they deny that they swore an oath.' (2.5.6). West is quite right (p. 438) that it is unusual for Thucydides to give unadjudicated alternatives like this: 'we shall find no parallel to this report of conflicting accounts between which he could not decide.' What is unusual is not so much that he gives two versions but that he does not decide between them. (At 4.122.6 he says firmly that 'the truth', haA~8e1a,lay with the Athenians rather than the Spartans on the important issue whether Skione was taken before or after the truce of 423, and at 8.87 he wonders why the Phoenician fleet did not arrive and says that different people offer different explanations. He plumps for one of these himself.-the wrong one, as David Lewis [1958] argued nearly fifty years ago.) There is no hope of retrieving the truth about the Plataian oath if Thucydides was not able to do so. We can only ask how important it was in the minds of contemporaries, in particular Athenian contemporaries including Thucydides himself. For the full understanding of the episode we must look not only at §6, but at §5 which gives the matching Plataian claim against the Thebans, namely that their actions, in trying to take their city in time of peace, were impious,

OUTE TCX TTETTOIT)µeva oo,a cSpcxoe,av ev otrovcSats04>c..3v TTEtpcxoaVTES KaTaAaf3EtV TllVTTOAIV. This is an accusation of perjury because spondai, the libations which accompanied the ma.king of a peace treaty, in this case the Thirty Years Peace of 446, were themselves routinely sealed by oaths ( cf., oicSeKatEOTTEVOOVTO, and from Thucydides' own narrative, 5.19.2, wµvuov«Se for the terms of the oath see 5.18.9). We shall go wrong ifwe forget that the

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Theban claim against the Plataians was a counter-claimof perjury. This sort of tu quoque('you, too') accusation was, as we have seen in section I, a standard sort of move in Greek diplomacy. To say so much is neither to deny the truth of the The ban claim ( though Thucydides as we have seen was not sure), nor to deny that the Plataians had at very least made a conditional promise on the lines set out in §6 (a promise to give the prisoners back if that should be agreed after negotiation) and it was shocking to break it. Of the two perjury accusations, that against the Thebans was by far the longer-lasting (cf. Arr. Anab. 1.9.7). The Theban invasion of Plataia was remembered by the Spartans in 413 as a reli~ous offence which they themselves had committed by proxy (7.18.2, a4>eTepovTO napavoµru.ia; for the noun cf. the verb napavoµn8e1aav at 5.16.1, of the irreligious recall of king Pleistoanax). This religious offence by their Theban allies, the Spartans now believed, 'explained their [own] misfortunes' in the years after 431: EIK0TCll5 cSuaTUXEIV. On these two words Dover well comments: 'the belief that the gods punish the breaking of oaths is one of the oldest and firmest in Greek theology. The parties to an international agreement swore oaths that they would keep it; if they broke it, they must expect divine punishment' .18 But if we keep in mind that the Theban attack on Plataia was itself a breach of oaths, then certain other key passages treated by West will (I suggest) look rather different. (ii) Let us tum to the supposed divine inteivention (2.77.5--6): 'if there had been a wind to fan the flames, as the enemy hoped there would, they [ the Plataians] could not have escaped; but in fact this also is said [AeyeTa1] to have occurred, that heavy rain and thunder quenched the flames and the danger was averted.' It has been contended 19 that Thucydides' AeyeTai may here indicate religious uneasiness: 'a claim to divine inteivention in this emergency, if it could be made to seem cogent, might be regarded as effective refutation of the charge of perjury' [sc. committed by the Plataians]. But there is another possibility (always on the assumption that AeyeTa1 does indeed have a religious flavour), namely that it might be regarded as effective confirmation of the charge of perjury committed by the Thebans (and Spartans; see section IV below). Indeed, we can go further. There are 20 three weather phenomena here (lack of wind, rain and thunder), and though the lack of wind made the fire less dangerous, and the rain put it out, the thunder was not worth mentioning unless it was seen by some as an indication of the attitude of Zeus. It would surely have been taken to show that Zeus was on the side of the Plataians, which would suggest, not only that the Plataians had not offended him, but that the Thebans had. Thucydides, whatever he himself thought of such reasoning, will have known that most of his readers would sympathise with it, and by choosing to mention the event (thunder and all), he deliberately makes it very difficult for his readers to believe that the Plataians had in fact been guilty of oath-breaking.

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(iii) Third and finally, the speeches in book 3. There is a remarkable omission in the Theban speech, which deals among other things with the killing of the prisoners: the Thebans do not repeat the charge of perjury but use 'promising', about the the weaker and non-religious word UTTOO)(µevo1, Plataians' undertaking not to kill them (3.66.2; it is only to be expected that the Plataians themselves should pass over this topic quickly and vaguely, 3.56.2). This does not necessarily show that Thucydides wants us to think that the Thebans (considered as artificial speakers) have abandoned the accusation, still less that the real-life Thebans really had abandoned it. But it does surely weaken very considerably the suggestion that Thucydides wants us to remember the issue of Plataian perjury over the prisoners, or that he wants to suggest that other people remembered it. He evidently wants us to focus our minds elsewhere. It is a fact that he never, either in narrative, speech, or authorial comment, returns to this alleged initial Plataian perjury after he has once recorded it (at 2.5). He does by contrast return to the undisputed The ban perjury as late as book 7, as we have seen. IV The oaths of 479

The Plataian perjury which is solemnly alleged by the Spartan king Archidamos in the second Plataian episode in 429 (2.71-79, esp. 72) is quite different: nothing is now said about the killing of the prisoners two years earlier. The background is that two years after the original Theban attack, the Spartans invaded Plataia rather than plague-ridden Attica. 21 The Plataians protest against this Spartan breach of oaths, but this time they do not invoke the Thirty Years Peace (that was now a dead letter) but the special oaths sworn after the battle of Plataia in 479. These oaths guaranteed to the Plataians their territory and city and their autonomy and promised to defend the Plataians if anyone marched against them unjustly or to enslave them (2. 71 .2). Archidamus (ifThucydides has reported him correctly, and for the sake of argument I assume that he did) has had plenty of time, two years in fact, to think of a reply. 22 He knows perfectly well that the Plataians will protest in something like this way, and his reply, as Kagan says, 'shows that sophistry is not foreign to Sparta'. 23 He says that the Plataians should keep their oaths by joining in the liberation struggle against Athens, ~uveAeu8epoihe. It is an impudent suggestion, made only as a tu quoqueallegation of a kind we are beginning to be familiar with, and Thucydides makes clear that Archidamos himself does not take it seriously because he immediately settles for less. He says 'if you can't or won't do that [e'1cSeµ~], then stay neutral'. This is surely a cavalier way of treating an oath: had Archidamos checked with the gods that mere neutrality would be acceptable as an alternative to keeping an alleged oath to joining actively in liberation? Ernst Badian argues that the Plataians themselves do here accept their own perjury because at no stage do they deny Archidamos' interpretation of the oaths,

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but I agree with Christopher Pelling that Badian makes too much of this because Thucydides does not give the Plataians a proper reply at all. The Plataians are given one direct speech alleging Spartan perjury, then Archidamus makes his counter-accusation, also in direct speech, and the Plataians are given no further full reply in direct speech but ask to consult the Athenians. As Pelling says, 'for all we know, they did protest'. 24 But in any case the crucial opinion is that held at Athens and at this point we must remind ourselves what, on Archidamos' interpretation of the undertakings made in 479, would have amounted to oath-keeping by the Plataians, namely the obligation to fight against the Athenians not just now but as part of a liberation process which ought to have been conducted over the past fifty years. Where? Badian suggests, as candidates for the cities whose liberation Archidamos has in mind, Aigina, Megara, Potidaia. 25 But it is not plausible to suppose that even the most god-fearing Athenian (let us call him Nikias), before or after 429, would have lost sleep over the idea that the Plataian allies of Athens were breaking oaths by not fighting against themselves, the Athenians. And the Athenian robust response, discussed above (seep. 142 on 2.73.3, the official and public Athenian message of encouragement to the 'wronged' Plataians) shows that this obvious reading of Athenian attitudes is in fact the correct one.

V Conclusion I do not think the Athenians showed continuing unease at Plataian perjury. They did not leave the Plataians to their fate completely. On the two occasions when the Plataians are accused of perjury, it is as a reply to better-founded accusations of perjury which they themselves have just made.

13 Julia L. Shear THE OATH OF DEMOPHANTOS AND THE POLITICS OF ATHENIAN IDENTI1Y*

The oath, said Lykourgos in 330 BC in his speech against Leokrates, binds the democracy together. 1 Swearing oaths, he could have added, reaffirms the unity of the community and assures its permanence. 2 Oaths also create bonds between the humans swearing them and the gods invoked by them.' These functions made the oath a potent weapon for communities reconciling after stasis, civil strife, a familiar feature of many Greek cities in the fifth century BC.• For Athenians during most of this century, however, stasiswas something which happened in other communities, such as Korkyra, but certainly not in their own. As Aristophanes indicates, Kleon 'stalk of anti-democratic conspirators could be regarded by Athenians as a source of comic amusement and as a way of winning battles played out between individuals who would not dream of actually subverting the democracy ... until 411, when it really happened: democracy was dissolved and the oligarchs seized power. 5 Our sources for the coup of the Four Hundred are concerned to explain why it happened: Thucydides discusses the effects of the defeat in Sicily and the skill of the conspirators in giving the impression that they had general support; the Aristotelian Athenaion Politeiaprovides us with what are almost certainly propaganda pamphlets circulated to make the case for constitutional change. 6 When they come to the end of the regime of the Four Hundred, neither source tells us how the democracy actually was restored and we do not even know exactly when in 410 the demosregained full power. 7 In any case, the restoration of democracy was not simply a matter of throwing out the oligarchs: the community's trust, ruptured when the demosvoted itself out of existence, needed to be restored and the stability of the democracy needed to be demonstrated. 148

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In this article, I want to consider one part of the larger project to set the democracy on a firm footing again: the oath and decree proposed by a certain Demophantos. 8 This document is regularly cited in discussions of late fifth-century Athens, but their focus is on the political context. 9 Douglas MacDowell's view is typical of this approach; according to him, the decree 'was intended to ensure that the democracy was not overthrown again'. 10 Scholars have also examined this document in the context of the development of the Athenian legal system. 11 Beyond these rather specific discussions, Demophantos' document has not caught scholarly fancies and the very interesting light which it sheds on Athenian identity in the aftermath of the oligarchies of the Four Hundred and Five Thousand has been ignored. As I shall argue, this text provides crucial evidence for the ways in which the images of the Athenians and their city were updated in response to these events. This imagery was promulgated not only by the inscribing of the document's text, but also by the actual process of taking the oath. Sited in the city's topography, the inscription and the images which it promoted firmly announced that the democracy was here to stay and would be protected by the citizens of the city. The Text of the Decree and the Oath The decree and oath written by Demophantos to mandate the ways in which Athenians should act if the democracy were overthrown in the future are the first recorded action of the restored democracy. Although it was originally inscribed on a stone stili, we now know it only from Andokides' speech on the Mysteries, in the course of which he quotes the document. 12 Our text preserves the opening preamble specifying that it was passed by the bou/iand the dimos when the tribe Aiantis was in prytany, when Kleigenes was first secretary, and when Boethos was epistatis.Comparison with the accounts of the loans of Athena Polias and Nike from the year 410/09 indicates that Demophantos' document was passed in the first prytany of this year when Glaukippos was archon. 1~ The decree itself specifies that anyone who overthrows the democracy or holds office after the democracy has been overthrown is to be an enemy of the Athenians and may be killed with impunity. His property is to be confiscated with a tenth given to the goddess, and his killer and any accomplices are to be pure and without guilt. The Athenians, organised by tribe and by deme, are to swear before the Dionysia to kill such a man and their oath is explicitly provided in the text of the legislation. It reads: I shall kill both by word and by deed and by vote and by my own hand, if I can, anyone who overthrows the democracy at Athens, and if anyone holds office after the democracy has been overthrown in the future, and if anyone set himself up to be tyrant or if anyone helps to

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set up a tyrant. And if anyone else kills him, I shall consider him to be pure before both the gods and daimonesbecause he killed an enemy of the Athenians, and after selling all the property of the dead man, I shall give half to the killer and I shall not withhold anything. If anyone dies killing or attempting to kill such a man, I shall give benefits both to him and to his children just as to Harmodios and Aristogeiton and their descendants. Whatever oaths were sworn in Athens or in the camp or anywhere else against the demos of the Athenians, I annul and dissolve them. At the end of the oath, the decree then repeats the specifications for swearing and adds that the Athenians are to pray for many good things for the man who keeps his oath and for destruction for the man who breaks the oath and for his genos.14 In this article, I want to discuss five aspects of the document: first, the oath's emphasis on democracy as the only possible politeiafor the city; second, the way in which the oath's provisions for treating those who overthrow the democracy retrospectively justify the killing of the oligarch Phrynichos; third, the oath's stark and unnuanced image of the proper Athenian; fourth, the creation of a novel oath-taking ceremony which literally parades the citizen body in its democratic divisions; and fifth, the decision on where this document should be erected. Democracy and the Oath The opening lines of the oath focus directly on democracy through their subject, the proper treatment for someone who overthrows the democracy at Athens, who holds office after the democracy has been overthrown, who sets himself up as a tyrant, or who helps to set up a tyrant. This individual is identified as a public enemy, pol.emios,of the Athenians and may be killed with impunity. These clauses apply both to the specific circumstances surrounding the Four Hundred and more generally. After overthrowing the democracy, one man will set up a tyranny, but a man holding office after the fall of the democracy will be part of an oligarchy using democratic trappings to legitimate itself. Tyranny and oligarchy, accordingly, are specifically proscribed both by the concrete terms of the oath as well as by the more general phrases of the decree. Since all regimes following the overthrow of the rule of the demos are proscribed, democracy is the only possible politeia for Athens. This idea is reinforced by the text of the accompanying decree. The opening preamble is in the standard form for decrees approved by the dimos and the bouli with the identification of the tribe in prytany, the secretary, and the epistates,but the added and unusual specification that the bouli was elected by lot emphasises the associations between this form and the rule of the dimos. The text itself complements this stress on the popular nature of

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the city's politeiabecause it concerns the preservation of the democracy itself. The opening phrases of the decree proper signal its subject: 'if anyone overthrows the democracy at Athens'. The use of the term demokratiahere and in the next clause picks up on and reinforces the phrases of the oath itself. The repeated references to Athens and the Athenians leave no doubt that this democracy is specifically at Athens, once again properly under the rule of the avTat TOOV X8ovtc,JV 9eoov6tETEAEOV EOVTES' IT TlAIVEc,J EVOS' TEOTOOV rrpoyOVc,JV KTT10aµevou TTOAIV TT)V UTTEp fEATlS' oiKTlµevriv TpOTTCt;) TOt~6e. 'Es- MaKTCalptov ecpuyovciv6pe5rEA~c,JV OTuOKwv or q,uaywv,711was noted by Diogenes Laertius 1.8175 as one of the insults directed against Pittacus by Alcaeus, along with such terms as 'drag-foot', 'cracked-foot', 'braggart', 'bellied', 'eating in the dark', and 'bedraggled'. 74 The term, related to the verb q>uocxw 'swell, 'large intestine, black-pudding, blow up, distend', and the noun q>UOKll blister, gall-bag (bot.)', connotes not just obesity, but illness. 75 It is this 'low style' word in particular that has provoked critics. Kurke devotes an entire article to explaining the word, seeing the incongruous mix of styles as 'Alkaios' response to a two-fold crisis in voice--of authoritative utterance', 76 arguing that the term can apply to a scapegoat, who represents evil and pollution which must be expelled from the community. Thus, she claims, Alcaeus is attempting to escape his exile by implementing 'saying makes it so', to exchange roles with Pittacus. 77 I agree that it is appropriate to look for a ritual background to the image, and it could be that scapegoating is one of the many connotations that Alcaeus intends here, but it is more efficient to interpret the image within the context of the oath that lies behind the prayer. Certainly Alcaeus is combining the image of greedy tyrant with that of disease caused by guilt, but the combination of disparate images is not a radical departure for magic spells, as Versnel (1996) has shown in detail in his discussion of the creativity of incantations. One can compare for example, from 'Esarhaddon's Succession Treaty', the creative combining of suggestive mutilation of the victim with both cannibalism and blocking of the mouth, a typical curse and anti-.1ov,8eou5TTClVTa[5 KQITTCl]oa5 KQIQUTOVTOVIe~aa[T]ov, EUVOT][OEIV Ka'1]oap1 Ie~ao~ KQIT015 T[EK]VOl5eyyovo15 TE QUTOUTTClV[T]a[T]ov TOU[~IOU] XPOVOV K[at Ao]y~ [K]at spy~ KQIyvc..,µ[TI,4>'1Aou5 ~youµevosou5 civ EKEIVOI ~ywvTa[1] EKx8pou5TE v[oµ'1~wv] 005 civ QUTOIKplVC.OOIV, ump TETWVT[OUT015] 61a4>epOVTWV µT]TEoc..,µaTs4>e'1oeo8[ QI µT]]TE\Jlu)(Tl5µT]TE~IOUµT]TETSKVWV, aA[AcxTTav]TI TpoTT~uTTepTwv EKe'1vo15 aVT1Ko[vTwv] TTClVTQ ic'1v6uvov urroµeve1v·0 TI TEcx[v aio]8wµa111aKOUOc,J UTTEVQVTIOV TOUT[015Ae]yoµevov 11~uAeuoµevov 11TTpaooo[µevov], TOUTOeyµ11woe1vTEKQIex8pov eo[eo8ai T~] AeyoVTI11~uAeuoµev~ 11TTPClOOO[VTI TI TOU]Tc,JV'OU5TEciv ex8pous-QUT[O]I KplVC.OOIV, TOU]TOU5KQTCX YTJVKQI8aAaooav OTTA015 TE KQIoi6np~ 61~e1v KQIaµuve1o8a1]· ECXV OETI UTTEVQVTIOV TOUT~T[~ opK~] TTOT]Oc,J 11µT)OTOIXOUVT(,.)5 Ka8w[5 cJµo]-

214

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30

35

40

oa, errap~µai mhbs-TEKaT' eµou Kai o[wµa]TOS-TOUeµaUTOU Kai 4'\')(T)S" Kai ~IOUKa[t n]KVC...:>V Kai TTCXVTOSTOUeµaUTOU yev[ous-] Kai ouv4>epOVTOSE~WAElaV Kai rrav[WAEl]av µexp1TTV is mentioned in that 'perjury' on all twelve occasions on which the 6iKTJ orator's extant works; and the Loeb translator of Demosthenes' private orations, AT. as 'false testimony', Murray ( 1936-39), while normally translating "1£u6oµapTUpic.>v KOKOTE)(Vl~V (brought against a person who procures nevertheless speaks of the 6iKTJ anotherto bear false witness) asan action for 'subornation of perjury' (e.g. [Dern.] 47.1). Much more recently, scholars as careful as MacDowell (1962, 66), Parker (1983, 187), and Todd (1993, 262 n. 4) can still be found speaking offalse witnesses in ordinary trials as perjurers or as having perjured themselves. It means 'Do not swear deceitfully' (cf. Psalm 24.4), and its placement makes it the third of a triad of fundamental duties to God (the others being to worship no other deity, and to make no cult-images). It should be added that the teachers also failed to explain 'Thou shalt not commit adultery', but at least (in those days) they could plead embarrassment. Rhodes (this volume, 220 n. 4) cites an amusing vignette to show how completely the distinction between oaths and affirmations can now be elided in American practice, with 'swear-or-affirm' functioning virtually as a single verb. Cecil 1970, 105. Janko (1992, 194), on Iliad 14.271-79; he cites Burkert (1985, 200 [should be 250]) in support, but Burkert's definition of an oath does not include the crucial elements of Janko's, emphasizing instead a different (and, in classical times, inessential) feature, 'a ritual which is stamped with an irrevocable character and often imprints an unforgettable experience of terror'. This need not always be made explicitly, since it may be implied by the context or the culture. In Aesch. Eum. 762-74 Orestes swears that, in his posthumous capacity as a hero, he will prevent the Argives from making any attack on Athens, but will bless them if they

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9 10 11 12

13

14 15

16 17 18 19

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act as faithful allies to the Athenians. He does not specify by which god (s) he is swearingbut his promise is actually made to Athena, and she is well capable of punishing its breach. In modern western practice, as Rhodes notes, it is quite common not to identify the divine witness; but this is doubtless because for well over a thousand years the cultures to which most westerners are heirs have known (at most) one God, so that specification has been unnecessary. Normally these are divinities, heroes, etc., but sometimes we find sacred or cherished objectsfilling the corresponding place in oath-formulae-as in one of the earliest examples, Achilles' oath by (or on) the sceptre he is holding (Iliad 1.233--46). lt seems to make little difference whether a person swears 'by' such an Eideslwrt (l use the German word because no English word is available) or whether (as in the challenge of Iliad 23.579--85) he swears 'by' a god while touching an Eideslwrt.Perhaps it is best to think of contact with the object as equivalent to contact with the god to whose province it belonged, and as making that god a witness to the oath; similarly, as in the Bakchylidean passages discussed by MacLachlan (5.42, 8.19; cf. Iliad 14.272), an utterance may be turned into an oath (presumably an oath by Gaia) by the act of laying one's hand on the earth. Such as (to take, again, a Homeric example) the sacrificial slaughter, and spilling of wine, in Iliad 3.268-301. On which see MacDowell 1963, 90-109. A wide range of parallels from other Eastern Mediterranean/Near Eastern cultures are discussed in Bachvarova's article. For an eloquent, but not exaggerated, statement of their significance and power, see Parker 1983, 18fHJ. Cf. Thucydides' texts of the Peace of Nikias (5.19) and the subsequent Athenian-Spartan alliance (5.24.1), and many inscribed treaties (e.g. JGi 5 48, 53, 54, 76, 83; ii2 16, 96, 102, 116,175). In the Peace ofNikias, for example, the oath, taken by seventeen Athenians and seventeen Spartans, ran merely 'I will abide by this treaty and its terms honestly and without deception' (Thuc. 5.18.9); it was to be renewed annually, but at any given time the vast majority of those who determined Athenian policy would never have personally taken it. Andok. 1.90--91. In the fourth century the juror's oath qualified him not only to try cases in the courts but also to serve on panels of nomothetai for the consideration of changes in the law, and accordingly it seems to have been expanded to include clauses relevant to this function, such as a promise not to allow a cancellation of debts, a redistribution of land or the establishment of any political system other than democracy (Dern. 24.149). Thus the oath in effect served to 'entrench' certain laws and make them unalterable. On this procedure (exiimosia) see Carey 1995. Todd 1990 ( contra,Carey 1994 and Mirhady 2002). Hyp. PhiL 12. The ideology of slavery itself does not, paceTodd 1990, 34, explain why slaves at Athens were examined under 'torture' rather than under oath. We know there were other Greek states in which slaves were permitted to give evidence under oath in judicial proceedings; at Gortyn, indeed, the law prescribed (JCIV 72.ii.12-17) that if a female slave made a sworn accusation of rape (presumably against a man other than her master) and the accused man made a sworn denial, it was the slave's oath that was to be believed. Athenian masters routinely inflicted pain on their own slaves, or threatened to do so, in order to extract information (Ant. 1.20, 5.29-52; Lys. 1.18-19; [Dern.] 48.1~18; Soph. OT1142-72; cf. Mirhady 2000, 60, 68-70), and a fortiori will have felt entitled to do so if a slave had actually caused serious damage to them; a slave who had caused the death of his/her owner could be summarily executed (Ant. 1.20), and we even hear of the summary execution of a slave who had confessed under torture (real torture, this time) to being involved in the murder of a kinsman of his owners beforetheyhad boughthim (Ant.

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5.31-35, 47). CT.MacDowell 1978, 245, Mirhady 2000, 67. For this oath see Tod ii 204 = Rhodes and Osborne 88. It can properly be called an 'ephebic' oath only from about 350 onwards, since the very word ecj>q~ only came into use at Athens at that time; it is first attested in 346/5 (Aischines 1.49) and was apparently unknown to Xenophon in 355 when he wrote the Puroi(note the circumlocutions in Puroi 4.52). CT.Siewert 1977, 109-11. One might have expected, by analogy with the oaths of magistrates and councillors, something like rroA1TEuaoµai51Ka1w5KaTcxT0\15 \IOµou5: the text contains nothing of the sort. T&lv8Eaµ&l11 ... 0\15011TOA01lT()ll'15puaCullTQI 'eµcj>po11w5 (lines 13-14 of the inscriptional text): the subject appearsto be 01 ae1 Kpai11011n5(lines 11-12). The manuscript versions of the oath change '15puOCul/TQI to '15pUOT1TQI TOrr>.~Oosand make other adjustments in a democratic direction (Siewert 1977, 110); perhaps they reflect amendments made after the date of the inscription (which Rhodes places 'probably not far from 348'), amendments which fail, however, to alter the basic character of the oath. Compare the councillors' oath to 'act as councillor in the manner that is best for the city' (Lys. 31.1). CT.Ar. Thesm. 331-71; Dern. 18.130, 282, 19.70, 20.107, 23.97; Dein. 1.47, 2.16. So in the women's assembly in Ar. Thesm. a character bids the chorus EU)(Ea8E [the terms of a curse follow] and they reply (352) ;u11£uxoµea8a and repeat the terms of the curse (though with different wording, since they are singing rather than speaking). The orators, likewise, while they usually speak of the curse as pronounced by the herald, can also speak of the people as uttering it themselves; contrast Dern. 18.130 o 5~µ05 KaTapciTal with ib. 282 o ~pu; KaTapciTal. See the reviews by Boegehold 1971, MacDowell 1972 and F.W. Mitchell 1972. My full-time co-workers on the project, which is based at Nottingham, are Andrew Bayliss and Isabelle Torrance (research fellows) and Lynn Kozak and Kyriaki Konstantinidou (research students). Judith Fletcher, who has a research grant from the Canadian Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council for her own work on oaths, is continuing her association with the Nottingham project, and intends to be a resident member for part of the project's duration. This introduction owes a great deal to all five, especially to my co-editor Judith Fletcher who read it in draft and suggested many improvements. Andok. 1.98. It might seem that such a provision would make nonsense of the whole concept of an oath, since if such cancellations became commonplace, no one would be able to know whether his fellow-man's sworn pledge might not hereafter be nullified. However, the oath seems to have been carefully drafted to avoid this risk. The Greek phrase effecting the cancellation was Mw KQIacj>iqµ1,literally 'I dissolve and release', and this lays the emphasis not on the retraction of such oaths by~ who sworethem but on the renunciation by~ to whom tht swearm had plblg,,dthtmselvesof all claims upon the promises thereby made; this reading is confirmed by the use of the phrase 'all oaths which have been sworn' (orrooo1. .. opKOIC>µt,llJ011Ta1) rather than 'all oaths which I have sworn'. In reality, of course, the swearers and the 'swearees' (to use the phraseology of the Oaths Project) would have been the same people; but it is significant that they are now required to say to each other, in effect, not 'My oath of loyalty to you no longer counts' but 'You should not consider yourself bound by your oath of loyalty to me'. Eventually replaced by the soldiers' sacramentum(whence French serment) or the lawyers' iuramentum (which prevailed in the southern Romance languages). The existence of the verb iura~strongly suggests that ius by itself once meant 'oath', but it early took on other senses and its original one had to be taken over by a tautologous phrasal form.

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1 Oaths in Political Life 1

2 3

4

5 6 7 8

9 10 11

12

13

My thanks to Professor Sommerstein for inviting me to write this paper and commenting on a draft, and to Dr L. Rubinstein for her comments; also to Dr P. Liddel for retrieving an elusive reference, to Professor J. Marincola for help with American oaths and to Professor J.S. Roisman for help with conspirators. I use the following abbreviations for collections of inscriptions not listed in OW: Agoro = volumes in the series The Athenian Agor-a:Results of Excavations Conducted by the A mmcan Schoolof ClassicalStudies at Athens, Buck= Buck 1955; C. Delphes= Corpustks inscrifr lions de Delphes,Crawford = Crawford 1996; Rhodes and Osborne = Rhodes and Osborne 2003. Though I give references to published translations of inscriptions, the translations used here are my own. The one occasion on which I have been required to swear an oath was when I acted as executor of a will. Provision for an affirmation is due particularly to the atheist Charles Bradlaugh, whose demand for an affirmation when he was a witness in a law-court in 1867 led to the Evidence Amendment Act of 1869, and whose election as Member of Parliament for Northampton in 1880 led (after the failure of attempts to allow affirmation) eventually to his swearing the oath in which he did not believe in 1886, and to provision for affirmation under the Oaths Act of 1888. Details of federal oaths of office can be found at http:/ /bensguide.gpo.gov/35/symbols/oaths.html. However, the USA has reduced the concept of swearing almost to vanishing-point: at an enquiry into the circumstances of the attacks on 11 September 2001 the witnesses were asked, 'Do you swear, or affirm, to tell the whole truth and nothing but the truth?' (with no indication of what they might swear by), and with right hand raised they replied simply, 'I do' (BBC 1 Ten O'ClockNews, 23 and 24 March 2004) - but which were they thereby doing? Dr Rubinstein tells me that in Denmark oaths have been abandoned and there is now only affirmation. See Gagarin and Mirhady, this volume. Rhodes 2004. See Bolmarcich, this volume. In the USA the Pledge of Allegiance (strictly, not an oath) 'to the Flag of the United States of America and to the Republic for which it stands' was first used in public schools (in the US sense of that term) in 1892 (http://bensguide.gpo.gov/35/symbols/pledgeallegiance.html); various colleges and other institutions, beginning with City College, New York, in 1909-13 under the presidency ofJ. H. Finley, Sr., have used a version of the Athenian ephebic oath (Hedrick 2003/4). The USA has for a long time had an oath (or affirmation) for newly naturalised c1uzens (http://bensguide.gpo.gov/9-12/citizenship/oath.html), and the UK used an oath (or affirmation) for this purpose for the first time on 26 February 2004 (The lnkpendent, 27 February 2004, broadsheet ed., p. 8). The same inscription also contains, and Lycurgus also quoted, the 'oath of Plataea', on which see p. I 6 with n. 25, below. Whether the remodelled ephibeia was limited to those qualified to fight as hoplites is controversial, but I believe that it was: cf. Rhodes 1981, 503 and (1993 reissue) 778. Cf. in the UK the oath sworn (or affirmation made: p. I 1 with n. 3, above) by Members of Parliament; in the USA the oaths sworn (or affirmations made), for instance at federal level by the President, the Vice-President, members of both Houses of Congress and Justices of the Supreme Court (p. 11 with n. 4, above). It is not clear whether the oath sworn by the generals, mentioned in Lys. 9.15, was a regular oath of office or a specific oath sworn on a specific occasion: MacDowell 1994 does not discuss the question. For the stone see T.L. Shear 1971, 259-60, Camp 1990, 83, 275.

Notes:pages 11-19

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14 Where the statue is said to be required if they broke any of the laws: cf. p. 16, below. 15 em1Ta is probably a logical rather than a temporal 'next'. 16 I believe the council always held the dolcimasiaof the following year's councillors, and acquired the dolcimasia of the arch ons from the Areopagus as a result of Ephialtes' reform in 462/1: cf. Rhodes 1981, 316-17, 542, 615--17. 17 Athens normally, and the council (as far as we know) invariably, used imprisonment as a precautionary measure rather than as a punishment for those convicted: cf. Rhodes 1981, 540,580. 18 On apagogai, mdeixtit and ephigtw to the council see Hansen 1971, 30-35. 19 JG does not restore where ML restore two verbs of punishing. I do not need to discuss here the date of the decree or what is meant by 'the former decree of Clearchus'. 20 On the oath and on this inscription see particularly Wade-Gery 1932/3 and Rhodes 1972a, 17~207,esp. 194-99. 21 On witnesses' exomosiaisee Carey 1995, 114-19, and Rubinstein 2005. 22 Cf. Tenos, where those - including the mother - introducing a candidate for admission to a phratry swear to the truth of their claims (/Gxii Supp. 303 = Rhodes and Osborne 61). 23 For the archons' oath cf. p. 12 with nn. 13-14, above. 24 We do not know whether Solon 's council of four hundred (in which I believe: cf. Rhodes 1981, 153-54) had an oath of office. 25 This is a more sceptical verdict than that given by Rhodes and Osborne. For a general study of the alleged fifth-century documents which are first attested in the fourth century see Habicht 1961; and for doubts about the Amphictyonic oath, also cited by Aeschines, see p. 21 with n. 44, below. 26 On this decree see especially Berte Iii ( 1994) and Shear, this volume. Whatever the mechanism for administering the oath, it must somehow have been sworn by the citizens away from Athens in the navy as well as by those in the city, since after the divisions of 411 it will have been important to emphasise that both sets of men belonged to the same democratic polis. 27 Cf. also /G i5 105; earlier laws in Ath. Pol 8.4, 16.10; the comic versions of the proclamation at the Dionysia, Ar. Birds 1071-87, and of the (prayer and) curse with which meetings of the assembly began, Thesm. (295--311 and) 331-51; and the later law Agoro xvi 73 = Rhodes and Osborne 79 (n. 54, below), where I believe the threat against the Areopagus is new but 7-11 restates the existing law. 28 Bracketed exceptions are given by Ath. Pol but not by the manuscripts of Andocides: whether the omissions are due to Andocides himself or a copyist we cannot tell; some editors have added the first but not the second to Andocides, MacDowell considered both doing that and (which I should not do) deleting the second from Ath. Pol 29 Also commonly used of plotting is the verb sunistamai,which does not in itself imply the swearing of an oath (but when the active is used in Hdt. 6. 74.1 of Cleomenes' combining the Arcadians against Sparta it is added that he administered oaths to them). 30 It is therefore not necessarily a sinister sign when the Potidaeans revolt against Athens in 432 µeTa XaAK1~fo.>v Kai BoTT1a'1oov Ko1vfituvoµooavns (Thuc. 1.58.1); but it may be a sign ofThucydides' belief that Harmodius and Aristogeiton were not principled opponents of the Pisistratid tyranny that he uses the noun tuvc.,µ0Ta1 (6.57.2), as well as the participle tuvooµoµ01Cons (56.3) of their supporters. 31 Cf. Rhodes 2000, 1~30. 32 Neither does Plutarch in connection with the suspectfriendsofCimon, Cim. 17.4-7, Per. 10.1-3. 33 Used in this passage of the political hdaimai which were already in existence. 34 Cf. Rhodes 1994, 88-91. 35 Newman 1887-1902 ad we.thinks it most likely in states where an oligarchy has ousted a

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39 40

41 42

43 44 45

46 47

48

49

50

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democracy, and, following Jowett, compares the oath sworn by the agtlaioi (= ephilxn) of late-third-century Drerus in Crete, 'I shall strive after what harm I can for the city ofLyttus' (Syll.9 527 = Buck 120 = /C i.9 1.41-3). With that we may compare the claim that Cleomenes I of Sparta, when in exile in Arcadia, united the Arcadians against Sparta, making them swear inter alia to follow wherever he might lead (cf. the Peloponnesian League: pp. 21-2 with n. 45, below), and taking their leaders to Nonacris to swear by the Styx (Hdt. 6.74.1). For by now far from complete lists see Ziebarth 1892, 28-30; Glotz 1899, 757-58. Cf. the oath sworn by the hieromnhrumesbefore deciding a particular case in the first century (Syll.9 826. C, revised fD iii. 4 278). Most recently discovered is an oath to be sworn by envoys to Rome from Maronea in the time of Claudius, to exert themselves for the preservation of the privileges which Maron ea had obtained from Rome: Clinton 2003, decree C (text and translation 397-400, discussion of oath 402). It was reinscribed in the first century BC: what now survives is the end of the original text followed by the whole of the reinscribed text. There is no mention of an oath in the document for the absorption of Helisson by Mantinea, early in the fourth century (SEGxxxvii 340 = Rhodes and Osborne 14) or in that for the absorption of Medeon by Stiris, in the second century (/G ix.I 32 = Syll.9 647)-but that does not, of course, prove conclusively that there was no oath. i.e. not a secret ballot but a public exercise in which the oligarchic leaders could see how individuals voted. Cf. Rhodes with Lewis 1997, 16-17, 524-25; Cole 1995, 306-9; and for the curses Ziebarth 1895 and Latte 1920, 61-96. When a curse is combined with the oath, it is usually invoked on the swearers of the oath if they should fail to keep the oath. See Bolmarcich, this volume. The oath is considered by Sanchez ( 1997) to be a fourth-century invention. Cf. the oath of Plataea (also quoted by Aeschines), p. 16 with n. 25, above. Although I think de Ste. Croix 1972, 101-24, 339-40, is too legalistic in his reconstruction of the •constitution' of the League, I accept his argument (108-10) that this was not just a later phenomenon but Sparta had imposed this kind of oath from the beginning: notice Hdt. 6.74.1, where the disaffected Cleomenes is said to have made the Arcadians swear to follow wherever he might lead (cf. n. 35, above). The earliest attested occurrence of the formula is now Sparta's alliance with the Erxadieis, perhaps in the 420s (SEG xxviii 408 = ML [1988 reissue] 67bis. 4-10; a new edition by Pikoulas [2~3], who dates it to the 450s or 440s); for the most recent suggestion that this obligation was not being imposed in the sixth century, and preference for a later date for the alliance with the Erxadieis, see Yates 2005. Meiggs 1972, 45 thought that this formulation was used in the original oath of the Delian League and that what we are given in Ath. PoL is a reformulation adopted later. Meritt et al. 1950, 227. Similarly de Ste. Croix 1972, 298-302 argues that the members were not bound to follow wherever Athens might lead (on which I am sure he is right) and that the oath was sworn between Athens on one side and the allies collectively on the other. In the earliest surviving oath imposed on an ally after the suppression of a revolt, in the case of Erythrae (below), the undertaking is not to defect 'from the people of Athens or Athens' allies'. The evidence is assembled by Meiggs 1972, 579-82. I cite the Greek inscriptions from ML and from /Gi 9, with the warning that most of the texts concerned were edited for /G by Meritt and McGregor, and have been restored there more adventurously than by Meiggs and Lewis. In such contexts dimos is not limited in reference to the democratic constitution, but it

Notes: pages 19-26

51 52 53 54

55

56 57

58 59

60 61 62

223

tends to be used where the constitution is democratic and not where it is noL There is an interesting alliance between Athens and a group of Peloponnesian states, in 362/1, in which the Peloponnesians undertake to support the dimos of Athens against attempts to establish either a tyranny or an oligarchy, while Athens undertakes to support the dimos of Phlius and the pouteia of Achaea, Arcadia or Elis (JG ii' 112 = Rhodes and Osborne 41 tr. Harding 56.24-26, 29-32: restored, but convincingly). At this point ML leave the text unrestored, /G restores 'and the colony'. The fragmentary /G i5 39, for Eretria, is restored with exactly the same oath. Cf. n. 26, above. A substitute formulation for the atimia of the law ap.A.th. Pol 16. l 0, now that the notion of atimia had been tamed (on which see Rhodes 198 I, 22~2): the law of 337 /6 has a paraphrase of the newer formulation, 'whoever kills the one who does any of these things is to be pure' (oSCX\I TO\/TOUTc..>\I TI no,~oaVTa anOKTE,IVTJI OOloS EOTc..>: A.gv,uxvi 73 = Rhodes and Osborne 79 tr. Harding I O1.1~ 11). Since this law was not enacted in circumstances comparable to those of 4!.Q/09, I do not see in the fact that the citizens swore an oath in 4!Q/09 but did not in 337 /§ the significance seen by Ober 2003, 22~24. Cf. for contemporary Athens Ar. Tham. 349-51 (and another instance of exolis in Pax 1072), Andoc. 1. 126; earlier the West Locrian decree, ML 13 tr. Fornara 33Al5-16; later the oaths exchanged between Athens and the cities of Ceos in 363/2, /G ii2 111 = Rhodes and Osborne 39 tr. Harding 55.68-69, ~l (and exolis in mid-fourthAou1ea1CllTCJTfl, 'without deceit and treachery,' in the treaty between Croesus and Sparta (Hdt. 1.69.2) and the proposed agreement between Mardonius and the Athenians (Hdt. 8. l 40a4, 9. 7a.1). The language of and IJTJXOVU, then, may be what is due to the sophists, for Herodotus' language is closer to the second type of anti-deceit clause discussed below. It is not clear whether the clause identified by Wheeler, a&>Ac.:,s, 'without deceit and treachery' applies to both parties or only one. While Mardonius has

nxvn

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47 48

49

50 51 52 53

54

55

56

Horlws

the upper hand over the Athenians, it is not certain that Croesus is regarded as superior to the Spartans. Both agreements, however, are between two very different groups, Greeks and non-Greeks,just as the groups who swore anti~eceit clauses in the Athenian imperial decrees differed greatly in power. Greek and barbarian, such different peoples in diplomatic practice (cf. L.G. Mitchell 1997, 111-33), might well wish to bind each other with very strong language. Wheeler 1984, 258. The word occurs in the classical literary record with respect to oaths or treaties at Ar. Birds 633, Lys. 169; Dern. 16.28; Xen. Ag. 1.10, An. 2.2.8 and 3.26, 3.2.24, Hell 3.4.5--6. The instances in the Agmlaus and Hel/mua show the violation of the oath ac5oAt.>5.None of these passages contradict the conclusion offered below. Of course Sybaris was destroyed multiple times, so multiple dates are possible (van Effenterre 1980, 173). This last is contingent upon the restorations of Chambers et al. 1990 (line 5). Their restoration of a6]o[A]05, however, requires it to occur alone, in conjunction with no other adverbs like 'faithfully' or 'without harm,' a situation unparalleled in the contemporary Athenian epigraphic record, although found at JG xii.5.109.7, an agreement between Thasos and Neapolis. Plescia 1970, 60 argues that the occurrence of 611ca1w5and ac5oAt.>5in the Peace ofNicias were only 'a Thucydidean precis,' but since Thucydides appears to preserve at least one other treaty accurately (Thuc. 5.47, /Gi 5 83), this is unlikely. Demosthenes offered the Megalopolitans the same justification for escaping their treaty obligations to Thebes in 352 (Dern. 16.6). Cawkwell 1993, 367. Cf. Piccirilli 2002, 65-118, with bibliography throughout, on common themes in Greek diplomatic rhetoric. Here the rise of the sophists, with their interest in relativism, may have affected the interpretation of these clauses; the fact that these clauses date back to the sixth century, however, casts doubt on Wheeler's association between them and the sophists. On the sophists and relativism see Beu 1989 n. 1 for bibliography, Guthrie 1969, 164-75, Kerferd 1981, 83-110 (106 on justice), de Romilly 1992, 111-12 (on justice). For doubts on the association of sophists with relativism, see Beu 1989. Some sophists certainly were associated with diplomacy as envoys for their states (Gorgias of Leontini, Prodicus of Ceos, Hippias of Elis); as Pl. Ap.l 9e makes clear, this freedom of movement aided their careers as sophists. Beu 1989, 148 argues that the sophists did not believe in different ideas of justice; different circumstances affected a single concept of justice. It was really Plato (cf. Phdr. 263a) who raised serious questions about 'what is just?' Only the Athenian oath to the Rhegians survives on the stele. Therefore we do not know precisely what the Rhegians swore to the Athenians. To my mind, this is not a problem for my argument below: the close association between the Athenian treaties with Rhegium and Leontini (cf. ML 63-64) suggests that the Rhegians swore the same oath to the Athenians that the latter swore to them, for that is what the Leontines did (JG i5 54.2~27). The Athenians swore to the Rhegians that everything would be m]OTCXKQI a[6oAa Kat hl[anAa, 'trusty and without deceit and plain,' and that they would be xcruµ]µaxo1 ... mo-1[TOIKQI6tKQIOIKQI'1a]xupo1 KQIaj3Aaj3e5' 'al]lies ... faith[ful and just and st]rong and doing no harm' (/Gi 5 53.11-12, 13-14). Sparta appears never to have sent the Potidaeans any aid before Potidaea was reduced by Athens; any Peloponnesian troops in the area to help Potidaea appear to have been Corinthian. Sparta made a similar promise to invade Attica in order to help Thasos (which had already revolted from Athens) at Thuc. 1.101.l, but was prevented by an earthquake and subsequent helot revolt (Thuc. 1.101.2). The Thasians asked the Spartans for defense

Notes:pages34-43

227

(enaµu11m1). On the basis of that parallel, the Spartans expected a similar defensive arrangement with the Potidaeans, not to provide the second front in a two-front war in which she would be the aggressor against Athens. The promise to the Thasians may not be historical (Badian 1993, 92-94), but as both episodes are part ofThucydides' account, I believe that they can be regarded as parallels. A similar situation, in which a promise to help was negated by the aggression of the intended recipient of the help, is recorded at Xen. HeU.7.5.4, in which Phocis refuses to aid the Thebans in attack when they had only agreed to provide defense. 57 On the unusual nature of this action, see Bolmarcich (forthcoming). 58 I do not take this as a sophistic argument, but cf. Gomme [et al.] 1945-81 ad 4.98. 59 Cf. Wheeler 1984, 254-55, 269.

3

Litigants' Oaths in Athenian Law

Johnstone 1999 translates prolclisisas 'dare,' stressing the element of gamble in the treatment is process. In most cases, I think, there was little if any risk, butjohnstone's well worth reading nonetheless. was that a slave be allowed to be interrogated under torture; 2 The most common prolclisis others include that a dispute be submitted to arbitration, or a document be produced. On the first of these, see the magisterial study by Thiir 1977. 3 I include several references to 'confirmation' (pistis), when this seems to designate an oath (cf. Dern. 49.42). In some cases it is hard to know whether the reference is to an oath or not. 4 Dern. 39.3-4, 40.8-11. The case was well known, and is cited by Aristotle in Rhmnic 2.23.11. 5 As Mantitheus puts it, Plangon was supposed to refuse to swear Mantias' proposed oath, and then, 'the boys would no longer be able to cause trouble for my father' (T~ naTpt 1,10\JOUKETI cSu11110Ea8a1 QUT0\15npayµaTa napexe111,Dern. 40.10). 6 The term is from Parker 2005, 72. 7 Dern. 29.26, 29.33 (cf. 29.56), 29.52, 31.9, 49.42, 49.65 (2x?), 50.31, 52.12, 54.39-42, 55.27 (2x), 55.35, 12.9-10 (3x), Lys. 32.13. 8 Dern. 29.52, 33.13--14, 52.15, 59.59-60 (cf. 59.63). I omit Isaeus 9.24, where the speaker says sarcastically that Hierocles, an ally of his opponent, would no doubt be willing to swear an oath if anyone offered one to him. In 55.27 the speaker reports offering an oath both to his own mother and to the mother ofCallicles, his opponent; but he implies that both mothers would be neutral observers of fact if allowed to swear, so I have counted this among the offers that a third party swear (above, n. 7). 9 'Still, some of Callippus' friends were so lacking in shame that they dared to testify that Callippus challenged my father to swear an oath, but he had refused to swear in Lysitheides' presence. They think, I suppose, they will persuade you that Lysitheides, a close friend of Callippus, who was acting as the arbitrator, would have refrained from immediately giving ajudgment against my father, when my father was refusing to be a • &e>.011T05 cStKQOTOU yevea8a1 TOUlTQTpS"). judge in his own case' (aUTOUye 'eaUTG\)IJTJ 10 By saying that his mother is ready to 'give a pledge,' Demosthenes means she is ready to swear an oath, as is clear from the detail that the mother would have her children next to her, for oaths were commonly sworn on the heads of one's children. 11 The full passage reads as follows: 'First, Euphiletus' mother, whom they agree is an Athenian, said at the arbitration that she was willing to swear in the Delphinium (opKov etc.) that Euphiletus here is the oµooa, ElTITOUcStatTI]TOU ejk,u>.no ElTIAe>.~t\llC\) IJTJII son of her and our father. And who is more appropriate than she to know that? Then, gentlemen of the jury, our father, who along with the mother probably knows his son

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best, was willing then, and is now, to swear (KOiTOTEKOiW\I f3ouMTOI01,10001 1,111\1 etc.) that Euphiletus here is his son by a lawfully married Athenian woman. [10] In addition, gentlemen of the jury, I was thineen, as I said, when he was born, and I am ready to swear (ETOl!,105 5 e'11,1101,100011,111\1 etc.) that Euphiletus here is my brother by the same father. Thus you should rightly consider our oaths more credible than their words (TOUS" ~ T0\15 TOUTc.>\I Aoyous-), for we have precise ~µenpous- opKou5 mOTonpous- \101,lt~otTE knowledge and are willing to swear oaths concerning him (oµooai mp1 auTou 8EAoµev), whereas they are just repeating what they have heard from his enemies or are fabricating it themselves.' Note that all three oaths that are offered begin with 1,11111, giving the impression that actual oaths are being stated. 'The mother of Euphiletus took an oath as to his paternity before the arbitrator; she too swore at the Delphinion' (Harrison 1971, 151). So too Usher 1999, 168: 'The prominence given to oaths sworn by the principals (9-10) is, at first sight, puzzling.' Usher adds ( 1999, 169) that the oath of 'a mother confirming the paternity of her child commanded exceptional respect.' The scenes are Iliad 1.233-46 (see below), 15.33-46 (Hera to Zeus); Odyssey14.148-73 (see below), 19.302-11 (Odysseus to Penelope), 20.226-37 (Odysseus to Philoetius); Hymn to Hermes273-80, 373-90 (see below). a>..>..'EKTOIepec.>KOiE1TIµeyav 0pKO\I01,1ou1,1a1· 4>u>..Aa KOic5l;ou5 \1011,10: TOOECJICl11TTpo\l, TO l,IE\IOU1TOTE 4>ucm... (233-35) 6e TOI 1,1eya5EOOETOI Of>K05.(240) So Callaway 1988, 160-61, 1993, 18. a>..>..' eye,.)OUKOUT(a)51,1u8Jiao1,1ai, a>..Ao:OU\/ Of>K'¥, ~ \IEITOI'06UOEU5.(151-52) iOTc.>W\I Zeus-npwTa 8ewv te\ltfl TETpCITl'E~a. '10Ttfl T, •06uaiiasb.1,1u1,10VoS, ~" b.4>1Kavc.>· l,IE\ITOITa6e 1TQ\ITO nAEIETOI~ ayopeuc.>. (158-60) El 6e 8EAe15'traTps-KE4>aA1111 µeyav Of>KO\I 01,1001,101 · / IJlllJE\Ieyc.>l,l~T OUTOSU1TICJ)(Ol,IOI ah105 elva,, / µ~TET1v ci>..Aov onc.>na~" KAonovuµenpac.>v, / a'i TI\IES" a'1 f¼es-e'1a1· TO6e KAeas olov O.KOUCrJ. (274-77). µeyav 6' em&..iao1,1a10pKO\I"/ 1,10: Ta6' a8avaTCrJ\I EUKOOl,lflTO npo8upa,a / 1,1~tToT' / KOiKpOTEP'\)mp EO\ITI. 6 01TAonpo1a111CXpflyE Eye,.)TOUT'¥TEIOCrJ 1TOTE \lflAEO4>c.>Pll" (383-86). The speakers in Antiphon 1 and 6 cite their opponent's oath in order to refute it but not as a reminder to observe it. This may indicate that in the fifth century these oaths were taken more seriously than later and oaths in homicide cases more seriously than in other cases-though the speak.er in Lysias 3, which also follows homicide procedure, refers only to what his opponent 'says' (e.g. 3.27-28).

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4 The Dikasts' Oath and the Question of Fact 1 2 3

4 5

See, most recently, E.M. Harris 2004a, 19-34 and 2004b, 12-13, in the latter of which he puts emphasis on the plural 'laws' in the oath. Meyer-Laurin 1965, 28-31, Wolff 1957, 34, Meinecke 1971, 280. Hirzel 1900, 51, Vmogradoff 1922, 68, Bonner 1927, 73, Paoli 1933, 39, Gernet 1955, 67. Biscardi 1970, 219-32 and O'Neil 2001, 20-29 have championed a middle path. See also J.W.Jones 1956, 135 and Plescia 1970, 28. BlacJc's(Garner 1999) 1260. Frankel 1878, 464. See also Lipsius 1905, 151-53, Cronin 1936, 18, Bonner&Smith 1938, 152-56, Hansen 1991, 182, Scafuro 1997, 50-51. This translation, and all others, are my own.

Notes: pages 43-50

229

Pollux 8.122 oli' opkoc; l}11TWIIli1Ka0Tw11, mpi 1.1e11 c!>11 1101.101 eioi, kOTO:TOOV, aUo: e>.a(3ovTO:.eiai; ouc; a~lpEtTQI \/\IllOUToc; T4',1101.1~. kOImp, QV lql()I ka8' ouc; 1B)G>OI, yvr..llJ'Q TtJauca10TCXT() ICplVIIV.KaAwi;. TO TOIWVl'JIIJOKao,v, qlie l'JIv 13 Dern. 23.96 )'W,.)J.ltl CXV akOUOc.>01 rrapiOTaTa1·oTETOIWVkaTO:TaUTflVE8eVTo TIJV"'1]~v. EUOE(3ouo1v. Dern. 51ka1onx111vyw.;µqv Kai kaTO:TOOa.' A8., kakEtv' ev8uµe'io6a,Kai opa11,OTI WVOIJc.>IJOkOTEV ~ kaTO:TOO.XETTi T~ KptVEIV TaUTa·KaiOIJC&>IJOKEV OU xap11io8a1 ok CXV OOklJ auT~, aMa 6tKCXOEIV yap Touc;mp, T6>Vouµ~Aal(A)VKplVOVTac; ou KaTa Touc;voµouc;.Cf. Isoc. 7.33 6C&>p(A)V Tate;ETTIEIKE1a1c; XP(A)IJEVO\Jc;, aMa TOie;voµo1c;TTEt8oµevouc;. Aeschines 3.233 oµevopKoc; ov 01.Jc.)IJOKc.::,c; 61Kcx~e1, ouµTTapaKo>.ouec;:,v auTov AuTTfr61' auTov yap o1µa, yeyove To ~ 61:xap,c; TTpoc; ov EXap1~ETO a6riAoc;YEYEVTJTal; Dern. 21.211; Din. 1.17 CXIJCXPTTJIJQ' 6tKal(A)I; CXV Kai ouyyvc.ll.lT)f; Kai xcxp1Toc; ETU)')(QVE TTapaT6>VEVEKEIVOtc; TOie;xpovo1c; OUIJTTETTOAtTEUIJEV(A)V; Isoc. 2.18 Tac; KplOElc; TTOIOU lTEplc!>v CXV npoc; aMqAouc;aµ4>10~T)T6>0I, 1.1h1Tpoc;xcxptvI.IT)6'EVQVTtac; aMqAa,c;, au' CXEI TQUTC1. TTEpl T6>VQUT6>V y1yvc..xnce· Kaiyap TTPETTEI Kaiouµ4>epEt TT)V T6>V ~ao,AE(A)V y\lCA)IJT)V CXKtvqT(A)I; EXEIV mp, T6>V 6tKQl(A)V, ~TTEPTUC; voµouc;TUC; Ka>.c;:,c; KEtµevouc;; lsoc. 18.34 OUK at,ov CUTE KQT(J xcxp,v CUTEKaT' ETTIEIKEIQV OUTEKaT' aM' ou6ev ~ KaTa TUC; opKouc;mp, QUT6>V lj,T)4l1oao8a1; (Andoc. 1.91 TI oµooavnc; 6tKCX~ETEj "lea, ou IJVT)OIKQkqO(A), ou6e aMf.\) voµouc;.") TTEIOOµa,, lj,T)4>1ouµa1 61:KaTCJ TUC; KEtµevouc; Note that both the major clauses seem to be reflected. KplVEtv TaUTa contrasts with KaTaxapi~eofla,TCJ6iKata and reflects yvc..,µnTU 6tKQIOTCXTTI, and xap1e1ofla1contrasts with 6tKCXOEIV KQTC,. TUC; voµouc;. Aeschines 1.154 UIJElc; 6e TI 01.Jc.)IJOkQTEj UTTEP QUT6>V lj,T)4>1iiofla1 ~,, avTI6i~,c ti (cf. 170, 175-6, 179.). Dern. 45.50 6tKCXOEIV yap 01Jc.)IJOkQ8' UIJElc; ou TTEpl c!>vCXV o4>Euy(A)V at101, aM' ump QUT6>V ~,, avTI6i~,c ti.Dern. 24.151 above Cf. Dern. 29.13 'iJEUOOµapTUpt(A)V 6tc..>K(A)V, Kai mp, TouTou TTJV""14>ovi,µc;:,v µeMovT(A)V oioe,v Kat OIJ(A)IJOKOT(A)V. Dern. 18.56. Lye. Leoc. 13 6e1 Kai uµac; CXTTo(3AeTTOVTac; 1.1hETTITpETTEIV TOie;~c.> TOU,rpa)11cm:,,; Aeyouo,v· OIJT(A) yap EOTQITOie;TE Kp1voµevo1c; CXVEU 6,a~Aric; () ayc..>v,KQITOie; 61c..>Kouo1v ~K10TaouK04lavTE1v, Kat uµ'iveuopKOTCXTTJV

""14>ov EVEYKE'iv. Cf. Hyp. Eux. 31. See Rhodes 2004. Dern. 22.43 ou TTEpl TO\IT(A)V 61KCXOEIV 01.Jc.)IJOkQTE, aM' ei KQTC,. TUC; voµouc;TO¥14>•0IJ· e1TTEV, and Dern. 44.14 TOyap KE4lcxAa1a TOUayc;:,vcx;'KQIump c!,v01.Jc.)IJOKOTEc; oiOETE TT)V ""14>ov, oXEOOV TI TauT· EOTIV. Ath. Pol. 67.1 KQI61oµwouo1voi CXVT161KOI Ek QUTO TOTTpayµaEpEIV. Dern. 18.1-2 TOUTOTTapaOTT)OQI TUC; 8eouc; UIJIV,1.1hTOVCXVTl6tKOV ouµ~Aov no1qoaofla1mpi TO\ITTc;:,c; CXKOUEIV uµac; El.JOU 6e1... aMa Touc;voµouc;Kai TOV0pKOV, KQITOUTO yeypa1TTa1,TO OJJC)IC,XlxJ+,iv EV~ TTpoc;anao, TOie;aMo,c; 61Ka101c; aicpoaaao8a1. TOUTO 6 EOTI VOU µovovTO1.1h TTpOKaTEyvc.>KEVa I IJT)6ev' ou6eTOTT)V E\IVOI av iOTJV CXTTOOOUVat, a>.AaTOKai TU Tate, Kai TU CXTToAoyiQ, c.:x~E~AT)Tal Kai TTPOTIPTJTal T6>Vayc.>vt~OIJEVt.>V EKaOToc;' OOT(A)I; Eaoa, xpqoaoflat. 6 6eoµa1 TTCXVTt.>V OIJOlc.>c; UIJ6>V CXKOUoai I.IOUmpi T6>VKaTTJyopT)IJEV(A)V anoAoyouµevou 61Ka1c.>c;, ~mp oi \IOI.JOI ooc;()Tt8Ek et apxric; IoA(A)V,EUVouc; WVUIJIV Kai 6T)IJOT1Koc;, OUµovov T~ KEAEUOUOIV, ypcxljla1kUptouc;~ETO6e1ve1va,, aMa Kai T~ Touc;61KCX~OVTac; 01.Jc.)IJOKEVat (cf. 18.7). TOVEVlaUTOV fi 1.1hv OJJ(>IC,Xaicpoaaso8a1 T6>V KaTTJlsoc. 15.21 oµwvai µevKatfEKaOTOV (cf. 15.17). Dern. 24.151. Aeschines 2.1 yopoUVT(A)V Kai T6>VCXTToAoyouµEV(A)V 01.Jc.)IJOKOTac; T6>VCXVTl61K(A)V ~oic,x- aµ+c,-ripc.>v lncouosoea,. Hyp. Lye.fr.I T6>I0pK(A)I, oc;KE[AEUEI] uµac;oµoic,x[CXKOUIIV] T6>V TEKaTTJ[YC>p(A)V Kai T6>]Vano[AoyouµEVCa>V) Cf. Lys. 15.1; Dern. 34.1. Ar. Wasps724-25, and Eur. HeracL179-80, make no reference to the oath. Bonner & Smith 1938, 156 point out Lysias14.47, where the speaker instructs that the

Notes:pages50-55

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laws, oaths, and charge (graphe)be read out, but see Dern. 24.2 and 191. 28 Dern. 18.2 ou µovov TOµh 1TpokaT£yvc.>ICEVa1 µ116ev,ou6ETO~v EUVOIQV iariv CX1TOCX>Uva1, a>J.a TOicai TlJTate• icai TlJCX1TOAOYIQ, ~ ~E~AllTQI icai 1Tp0TIPl1TOI TWVaywvt~oµEVc.JV eicaoToc;. 29 On canonization of arguments regarding different forms of evidence, see Mirhady 1991a and Mirhady 1996, 128-131. 30 Aeschines 2.7 ion TlJeuvoiQaicouoVTac;,3.57, Andoc. 1.6, Dern. 29.4, Lys. 19.3. 31 Andoc. 1.31 opicouc;µeya).ouc; oµooavnc; oioen ~v "'1i4>ovlTEpieµou, icai apaoaµevo1 Tac; µey10Tac;apac; uµ'iv TEauTo'ic;icai 1Ta1oiTOie;uµenpotc; aUTWV,fi µhv ""14>tE1o8a1 lTEpieµou Ta 6iicaia. Dern. 18.217 WVuµac; at101 ""1tioao8at Too; C>µc.JµOICC>Tac; Too; 8e0'1Jc;.Dern. 24.151 actually names Poseidon in place of Apollo. Anecd. Gf'. (Bekker 1.443.31) names Helios. Poll. 8.122 wµwoav 6e EV'Ap6TJTT~611COOT11P•~ 'A 1rOUc..> ffllTpcp 1ea1 A~JITITP(I 1ea1 Aia ~01>Ja. Cf. Din. 1.86, Ar. Knights941, Dern. 32.23, 52.9, Lye. Leoc..146.

32 Andoc. 1.91 uµe'ic;5 au, c:,.AB11va101, TI oµooavnc; 61ica~ETE; "icaiOU IJVl)OIICcmJOC,>, ~ ~ miaoµa1,""1+1ouµa1 61icaTIX-rour; 1e11JJivou,; voµour;." Cf. Isoc. 18.34 YTEpi TOUTlll; 6u' opicouc;oµooavTEc;61Ka~ETE, TOVµev, OVlTEp E1TiTQIC:a>J.a1c;ei81a8e,TOV6' ov E1Ti Ta'ic;ouv8fiKa1c; E1TOIT)Oaa8e. TaUTllVa611Cc.Jc; yvovnr; OUTOUC: TT)c: lTOAEc.Jc: µovov voµouc; a>J.a icai TOUC: CX1TaVTc.JV ICOIVOUC: 1Tapa~fioea8e.~· OUKat1ov OUTEKQTKOUt; mpi aUTWV""1tioao8a1. KaT' ElTIEIKElaV UTE ICaT'a>J.' ou6EvTjICaTaTOUC: 33 See note 12 above. 34 ArisL Rhet. 1375a29-30 Kai OTI To'yvooµu TlJCXplOTlJ' TOUT.EOTIV,TO µh 1TQVTEAWC: apiOTlJ'AEKTEOV OTIou TOU1Tapa XP~o8a1TOIC: yeypaµµevo1c;. 1375bl6 TOTI'yvc.>µuTlJ ,; Myll Ovoµor;, IJ'1 i1nopeciJ. TOVvoµov EVEKa 61Ka~EIV EOTIV,a>J.' 'iva, iavcryvor)CJU 1376al 9 µapTUpac;µev µh EXOVTI, OTIitt 'm>V 1i1Ccma>V &'i 1epiw1v Kai TOUTEOTiTO'yvc.>µu TlJapiOTlJ'. Cf. 1402b33. 35 I gratefully borrow this paragraph from Alan Sommerstein's comments on an earlier draft. 36 Thanks to Julia Shear for pointing this out. 6e Toe:~01>.iac; aiT.1o[v] 4>oy[o] 37 /G i2 115 (i' 104) 11-13 (Stroud, modified) 6]11eal;lv e[iTETOVaUTOXElpaeiT]E[~]OAEUOaVTa, TOC: 6e e4)hac: 61ayv[~]v[a]I. Cf. Lys.3.28, 43. 38 On public arbitrators see At/a.PoL53.1-2. Sometimes they simply 'make known their arbitrations' on oath (oi 61a1T11Tai oµooaVTEc;a1ro4>aivovTa1TCXC: 61aiTac;At/a.Pol. 55.5). 39 /Civ 72, 1.14-15, 24-25, 38-39, 2.55--3.1,5.42-44. Cf. Arist. PoL3.1285bl~l2 Kai 1rpoc; TOUTOIC: TCXC: 6tKQC: EKplVOV. TOUTO ElTOIOUV oi µev OUIC oµVUOVTEc; oi oµvuovnc;· o opicoc;fiv Tou OICTJlTTpou e1ravaTao1c;. 40 Herodas 2.85 aµapTUpc.JVEUVTc.JV yvc.>µ111 61Kai111 ~v KplOIV 61a1TaTE. 41 Hes. 0028~4 ei yap Tic:K' E8eAU Ta6itca1'ayopeuoat I YI~, T~ µev T•o).(3ov 61001eupuo1TaZeuc:·Ioc;6eKEµap,vpit)OIEKWV E1Tl0pKOV oµoooac; I IJ,Euona1,EV6E6t1CT1V ~Aaljxlc:VTJKEOTOV aao8n, I TOU6e -i aµauponp11 yeveh µET01Tta8e AEAEllTTal. Note Isaew 12.9, a father swearing to what he knows best (ap10Ta ... Ylyvc.>OICEIV);cf. Aristotle (n.34 above). 42 Aeschylw, Eum. 674-5 a1To~ 4>Epe1v "'1i4>ov 61icaiac;.See Sommerstein 1989, 212. Cf. 709-10 Kai "'1i4>ovaip&tVKai 61ayvwva1 6t1CT1V ai6ouµevouc; TOVOf)ICOV. See also an approximation of a dikastic oath at 488-9: 61a1pe1vTOUTO1Tpayµ. ETllTUµc.Jc;, Of)ICOV lTEpc.>VTac; µ116Ev eK6iK01c; 4>Peoiv,and 573 KaTayvc.x,8u6i1CT1. 43 /G ii2 1126.3-4 luKa[tew T]ac; 6iKac; ~ Ka 6[1)1CatoTaTa[1]yvc.>µa1, T[CX]µey yeypaµµ[eva KQTCI TOC: voµoc;, lTEpic!>v6e µh ye]lypa[1TTa1ic]aTa yvc.>µavTCXV auT[ou] icai empa a[va TCIV 6[iic]av OU[&toµa1 ... 44 Ath. PoL 55.5 C>µWOUOIV 61Katc.Jc; apte1v Kai ICQT.e1, ''1nlcj>1ooµa1 icaTaToo; \IOµouc;,eice1\/0ye euei&.x;,TI &v61a111p118wo1voi \10µ01TO Cf. Aeschines 1.4-5, Dern. 24.5, 59.115, Lye.Leoc.1.79, Hyp. o~eTa1 ica1h 6qµ01CpaT1a. Phil 5.

47 Arist. RM. 1354a27-31 TOUµE\Icxµcj>1~11Tou\/Toc; ou5evEOTI\I etc.>TOU5e1ta1TOtrpayµa TIeOT1vq ouiceonv, q yeyovev q ou yeyovev· ei 5i µeya q µ1icpov,q 51ica1ovq &5,icov, ooa µh O voµo8E~ 51wp11CE\I, oc; µh cxico>.ou&oc; Y£"'1Ta1To'ic;\10µ01c; ica1To1c;51ica101c;, TouTo trap' Uµt\lEOTQI 1CaTa>.e>.e1µµe110v. 5q, ~ av6pec;511Ca0Ta1, 51 Ant. 3.1.1 TOµE\Ioµo>.oyouµevaTW\ItrpayµaTc.>\IUlTOTETOU\IOµou1CaTaiceicp1Ta1 UlTO 1ro>.1TE1ac; eioiv· Ea\/5e TI cxµcj,1~11~01µ011 TETW\I'lnlcl>•oaµevc.:,v, oi 1CUp101 tramy; b,TOUTO uµ1v,~ av5pec;1ro>.ha1'trpOOTETQICTQI 5ux~va,. Thanks to Edwin Carawan for pointing out this passage. Cf. 3.4.1. 52 See, e.g. Isoc. 19.16 aiaxuv8e111vyap &v UtrEpTOUTETEAEU1111COToc;, ei µh ffCl\lTEc; c:xICQTO Too; \IOµouc;a>.>.'c:xICQI 5ncaiCtlC TauT· etrpatev. m1o8e111TE, µh µ0\10\1 mp1 TOUTC.:,\I µa8e1vKai ICQTO Too; 53 Dern. 23.2 5e, 5h lTCl\/Tac; uµac;, ei j3ou>.eo8'op8ooc; voµouc;5ucaiCtlC icp1va1Thv ypacj,qv, µh µ011011 TOie;yeypaµµe1101c; E\IT~ 'inlcl>•oµaTI Cf. Dern. 52.33. pqµao1v 1rpooexe1v,cx>.>.a Kai Ta ouµ~qooµev'et QUTW\I OICOlTEI\I. 54 Dern. 43.34ICQ I OlTOTEpoc; TOUTc.>\1511,au:mpa >.eyeI\I56te I KaI KCXTCI TOUt: ~ t,1allov. 55 Dern. 43.84 Tott;11voµo1t; ~118e1TE ica\TwvTETEAeu111icoTc.>\I Emµe>.e1o8e, ... ica1TauTa TIX115iKa1a'lnlcl>•e1o8e ica\ Ta&UOpKa. 1ro1ouVTEc; 56 Hyp. Ewe. 40 EiC 5e TT)\I V01JC.,)V oicelj,aµEl/01 () TI Q\Iuµ1v5otqJ5iKalOV Kai IUOplCOV elva1, TOUTO'lnlcl>•oao8e.Cf. Hyp. Eux. 10 Too; 5,icaOTac;urnp TOU trpayµaToc; Ta 51ica1a516ata1. 29 Thveioayye>.iaveypaljla 51KaiavKai c:iomp OVOIJOI; ice>.el'.m and Dern. 21.24. ooc;OUToc; TE 57 Isaeus 3.12 CXICOUOa\lTEc; 5E Kai uµe1c;aUTW\ITW\IµapTUplW\I,y\lCalCJ&o8& mp1cj,avwc;TO\j,EUOT] µeµaprupqicE,ica\op&c;xKai ICaTaToo; voµouc; oi 51icaoaVTEc; Thv 511C11V iyw.x,av Thvic>.11povoµ1av µh 1r~ice1v TO µh op8ooc; yeye"'lµevuyuva1ic1. Ta 58 Andoc. 1.2 1TIOTEUOac; 5E µa>.10Taµev T~ 51ica1(1t1, ElTEITa 5e ICQIuµ,v, yw.>Ol(J8a, 5iKala Kai µh 1TEptolj,eo8a1 µe o:5,icc.:,c; UlTOTW\Iex8pwv TW\Ieµwv 51acj,8apeVTa, a>.>.a 1ro>.uµa>.>.ovOc..>OEt\l 51KaiCtlC KaTCX 'TI TOUt: 1/0fJout' Too; uµenpouc; ICQI Too; opicouc;ooc; uµe1c;oµooa\lTEc;µe>.>.enThvljlrJcj,ov oioe,v... [8] Q\Iyap op8ooc; µa8qTETanpax8wra, p~61c.:,c; ywf.x,eaf µou ICOTE\jleuoa\lTO oi ica~yopo1. [9] Ta µE\IOU\/ 5iKa1ay1yvc.m1v uµac; hyouµa1 KaiauTouc:;1rapeoiceuao8a1, ofomp ey~ monuoac; umµEt\la, bpc;,vuµac; ica1ev To1c;i6101c;ica\ ev To'ic;611µ001oic; mp1 1r>.e10Tou TO\ITo1ro1ouµevouc;, 'lnlcl>•~eo8a1 ICQTO Too; opicouc;.Cf. 1.123. 59 Antiphon 5.8 ICO\I CX\lc.>µOTOtc; uµ1v ICQIµh ICaTa\IOµO\Iµq6eva emTpeljla1µ1mpl TOU owµaToc; TOUeµoo 61a'in1cj,1oao8a1, E\IEICCl ye TOU1TIOTEUEI\I eµoi TEµq5Evet11µapTita9a1 1k 1'05e1'0npayµa ica\ uµac; yw.>Ol(J8a, Ta5iKa1a.Cf. 5.86. trpayJJa auTO ica8' QUTO 60 [Dern.] 52.2 5foµat OU\/uµwv, eimp TI ICQIa>.>.o1Tc..>1TOTE ye\lOµE\101' µqTEµETaTwv61c.>1CO\ITC.:,\I µqTEµETO e61icaoaTE, µq5eµEIJenpc.:,vThvyvc.ll.lllV TW\Icj>euyo\/Tc.>\I, a>.>.aTO5iKalOVOICElj,aµe1101, OOTC.:, ica\ \1\1\151~va1. 61 Dern. 58.41 olµat &111uµac;, ~ av5pec; 61ica0Ta1,urnp auTilU1'0Unpayµan,,; Kai ICaTaToo; \IOµouc;,~118e1vµ01.Cf. 58.61. OICE\jlaµevouc;, ei µEv5iKala>.eye.:, 62 Isaeus 1.26 m18ouo1vuµac; E\la\/Tla Kai TOie;\10µ01c;ICQIT~ 6ticat(1t1 Kai TOTOU nTEAEu111icoToc; yw.>JJtJ 'lnlcl>•oao8a1 (cf. 1.51 yvwva1). 63 Dern. 24.78 Eitrepuµwv EICClOT(1t1 µe>.e,TI ,iic; m>A111ia,; ICQI 6eiv oina, ICUpta\l elvai Thv yvc.ll.ll1V 111p1QV Q\I oµc.>µOIC~'inlcl>•OllTOI, >.unoc; Kai OUKeanoc; OUTQC; 0 QUTOU

*

a

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TOIOUTO!;' \10µ0!;'KUplOt;" wvi yevfo8a1. Cf. Andoc. 1.3. 64 Lys. 9.19 µJlTETO\JC; p.ATIOVKOi5uc:ai6)1; J3ouAeuoaµevooi;c:11rupoui; KQTOOTTJOTJTE. oi& µev yap QlTQVTQ KOiICaTCI T0UC vq,ouc; KOiICaTCI n, 1i1COC Etrpatav. 9.21 TUXWV µev yap µeiva1µ1CXV (ev) TTItr0Ae1. TOOV cS1Kaic.>v (manuc.> c5ETTIuµenpc;x~) 65 Lys. 10.26 µh Toiwv CXKOUO'QVTCl eeoµVT]OTOV KOK~ Ta 1Tp00'1KOVTQ eAEEITE, Kai u~pi~OVTIKOiAeyoVTItrapa TO\JC; voµouc;CJU)'YVCA)µ11v EXETE, Cf. 30. 66 See Mirhady 1990, 398, and Arist. EN 1143a19-20 ii cSeKaAouµeVT] yvc.Jµ'l, Ka8' ~v iiTOUeme1Kouc;EOTIKp101t;op8Jl. CJU)'YVCA)µovat; KOiexe,v ~µev yvc.Jµ11v, Ta5iic:a,ayvc..ic,&a8a,, aAA' 67 Lys. 15.8 OUKCXV cStKQIC&>C; xapi~o,o8e Q\ITOtt;... OJJc.>µOKaTE OOTOI KEAEUCtlOI ""1cl>1eio6at, OOOTE oucSevaXPh TOOV cSeoµevc.>v mpi trAEIOVO!;' oux O TI CXV UIJOOV Q\ITOOV KOiTOOV C>pKC&>V 1T01eio6a1. .. 9 ei T~ OOKEI µeya>.11i-J~11µiae1va, KOiAiav 0 vopo:, µeµvrio6a1XPh OTIOUvoµo8eTJlOOVTEt; mpi Q\ITOOV T}KETE, aAAa ICaTCI ·,O)(Upc:>e; T0UC ICIIIJ&VOUr; vqJouc; ""1•ouµevo1. .. 10 OOTC&>C; uµck a1-1e>.11oaVTat; TOUTOU ll) lfOMI TaP.ATIOTIX ""1ct>ioao6a1, aAAc.>t; TEKOiopKouc;OJJc.>µOKOTQt; ... 11 Tac; TOUTC&>V cSe11oe1c; mpi eAaTTOVO!;' (TOOV VOIJC&>V) 1T01'10011JEVOI Ta cSiKala""1ct>ioao8e.12 cSfoµa1Ta5iic:a,a ""1ct>ioao6a1 ·uµat; c5E XPhTl1" CIV111V yw.>tJl1V EXOVTat; Thv lj,r)cl>ov 4>epe1v, T)VtrEp OTEt\)Eo8e trpoc; Touc;troAeµiouc;cS1aK1vcSuveuoe1v. 68 In §I I editors have inserted (Toovvoµc.>v):'Vote what is just, having made their requests ofless account .' The emendation is wrong. Since the requests would tend to create favour, they would corrupt understanding of Ta6hc:a1a. As in §8, the speaker means, 'having made their requests of less account (than Ta6i1c:a1a) '. In §9, comparison is made between existing laws and whatever the dikasts might legislate if they were legislators. The factual and legal questions are kept separate in §8 and §9. Cf.Isaeus11.18. 69 Dern 48.58 ""1cl>i~eo6a1 () TI CXV uµiv OOICTI ~eATIOTOV Kai cS1Ka10TaTOV e1va1. Kai TQUTQ lTOIOUVTEt; Ta TEcS1Ka1a yvc.x,eo8eKai Ta ouµ4>epoVTa.On Aristotle, see Mirhady 1990, 400-3. 70 Note that the passage has no reference to the laws. By 'best' and 'what is beneficial' he seems to be referring partly to the legislation of Solon as a guide (§§52, 57); by 'most just' he seems to be referring largely to the factual issues (§48). 71 Isaeus 6.65 eav mpi Q\ITOU TOUTO\I KEAEU'lTE emcSEIICWVQI C:.X,mpKOicS1eµaprup11oev, UIJEIov ICQI ICaTCI TCUC vq,ouc; 8Jloeo8e,To'iacSen Ta5iic:a,a yEVJlOETQI. 72 Isaeus 7.3 µh erricS1KOV e1va1TOVICAT]pOV we;rro111aa1-1evou IJEuov AtroAAocSwpou KOTaTO\JC; voµouc;.em1cSh OUcS1a4>euye1 Ta5iic:a,aµh OUKOTaTOUTOV Y1YWA>O!Clo8cxl TOVTp01TOV, auToc; T}Kc.> cS1aAetoµeVOt;" mpi ToovmtrpayµeVC&>v. On the linkage between nomoi and dilraiacf. also Ar. Clouds 10~. where the Worse Argument says he earned his name by becoming the first to understand how To'iaiv vo1-101c; Kai Ta'ic; cS1Ka1r; TavavTi' CXVT1Aeta1. 73 Hyp. Ewe. 32 TOUc5EAeyOVTO!;' KQK0'18ia KOiUtrOAJNllt; ek TO\JC; cS1KaOTac; OUcS1Kaia,we; aAAo8ilTOUOOTOI-ri)v~ CXV axoi110av q etr' QUTOU 1'0U,rpayµcmx;, KOilTOTEpov acS1KEI uµat; () KplVOIJEVO!;' qOU.Cf. 36 a>.Xoµc.>t;oi cS1KOOTQI OUtrpoc;Tac; TOUKOT'lYC>pOU UlTOoXEOEI.oyc:ja1,KUpla e111a1,vel sim.), see Isaeus 5.1, wµo>.0YllµE11a... KUp1a;Dern. 47.77; 48.54; 56.1-2; Hyp. Ath. col. 6, §13; Pl. Symp. 196b-c; Laws920d; Arist. Rhet.1375b. As Thur observed (1977, 180-85), this 'agreement' is kin to 'confession' of some crime or liability. The binding stipulations (ooa QI/ oµo>.oyc;')a1)are contained in synthllcai (written terms, orally affirmed). Cf. [Dern.] 48, esp. 30; other inheritance settlements treated below. The protocol combining settlement and contract is not invariable. In the case of Hyperides Against Athenogmes,the two men first reconciled orally and only afterward was the written contract for sale agreed to and deposited. Cf. Whitehead 2000, 291, 305; and see n. 28 below. Cf. /G i' 75, treaty with Halieis (424/3); /G i' 76, Bottiaean decree = Tod 68 (422) with closing oath; /G i' 118, Treaty with Selymbria =Tod 88 (408) with provisions for settling ( dialuein) property and contractual disputes ( 14-21); /G ii 2 111, settlement at Iulis = Tod 142 (363/2) with closing oath; see now Carawan 2002, 5-7. The only cases where the law of agreement applies without some transfer of money or

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goods are those where the parties postpone a duty deriving from some prior legal obligation, not 'new business': [Dern.] 47.7~78 (to pay a court judgement); Dern. 42.12 (to list property for antidosis). Cf. Mitteis 1891, 459-75, regarding Hellenistic loans with further obligations tied to the growth or yield of the principal. On the fourth century cases see, in general, lsager and Hansen 1975. [Dern.] 56.38: h 6e ovyypa~ii TI Aeye1;... ECXII µq an~ TO6a\lEIOI/KQITOU5TOIC0\15 ~ µq napaaxns- TIXUlTOICEtµeva Eµ~avii Kai avena~. ~ ci>.AoTI napa TT}II ovyypa~T}II no1naos-I IX1TOTI\IEIII K£Aeue1 OE61n>.aa1a TIXxpnµaTa. The same point is emphasized §45. Such penalties are expressly recognized in statute (10): Darius protests that the defendants, by off-loading their cargo of grain in Rhodes, 'have shown contempt for the agreement and for the penalties which they wrote into the contract to bind themselves if they commit any violation'. [Dern.] 34 (esp. §4) involves a similar security arrangement leading to double indemnity.' [Dern.] 48.8: 'I gave judgement for him and he for me, for each of us to receive half of what Comon left, and therehe no unpleasantnessthertafter.'QUTOS" yap 'eye.>E6tKaaa TOUTC-\) Kai OUTOS" EµOI TIXhµiOEa EK0TEpovhµwv Aaf!,£111 c!>vKan>., 1T£Koµc.>11, KQIµ11&µia11 a116ia11e111a1rnpa1Tepc.>.Callistratus repeatedly refers to this principle of 'equal shares' i.somomin,and no taking advantage, plffmdctein. Cf. Dern. 41.5, release from all claims, allowing no further enmity on condition that future 61eAu8rioa11, E~· ~TE inheritance would be divided in a certain way: KOiTOTEAEUTQIOII K0µ1aaµe11011 TOIiAec.>Kp0TTJII arnp ~IIEIS"Tf}IIouoiav EIOEl/ll\/EyµEl/05 I µnTEKQK0IIOVII e111a1 T~ TToAuEUKTC-\), TWIITE1TP05a>.>.n>.ousEYICA11µaTc.>II 1X1T11>.Aa)(8a1 lT0I/Tc.>11. lsaeus 5. 7-8: 'Ern16ii 6e EVEiµal/TOTOIi l.axe· KOiEll TOOOUTC-\) 61KWI/ou6e15 auTWII qtic.ooe TIX 1T£1Tpayµe11aEl1T£111 a61Kc.>5 1TE1Tpci:x8a1, 1Tp111 6ua-ruxrloa0115~5 noAec.>5Kai OTQOECa.>5 yevoµe11115 A1Ka1oye11115 OUTOOI ... qµ~eaf!,nTE1 hµ'iv a1Ta11T05TOUlpUIITCa.>11 yap hµwv T~ cipxovTI µq auvap18µii11,a>.Aa OVYXEOI TCX5 ""1'°"5, a~iOTaTO µEllA1Ka1oye11115 TOIi/6uo'iv µepo'iv TO\Jl.005 TWIInoAtTWIIIXKp1TOV51X1TOICTEII/QI/TQ5 61a>.Aaye11TE5 EµµE\IETE Ta'is-oµoAoyiats- I c..3ornp XPT}T0\15KaAou5Kaya8ou5 ci116pa5I TOUTC-\) 6e npos- TOIinanpa ~wl/Ta KQI61a>.u8£11T1 KOi no>.Aa napa TO 6iKa1011nAeol/EKTnOOIITI 1/UIIµ1111atKQKEIII ElTITpEIJ,ETE Kai KQKW5 Aeye111 EKEll/011. On the popular model of contract as law or treaty, cf. Carawan 2007. Cf. Lys. 4.1-3; Hyp. Ath. col. 2 §5. A useful study of Greek Prostitution is forthcoming from Edward Cohen, with eh. 3 treating prostitution contracts (which he kindly sent me). On the 'amnesia clause' cf. Scafuro 1997, 123. In the same speech (52-54) there is also the contract with Epaenetus, where he agrees to pay a thousand drachmas in return for the companionship of Phano, Neaera 's daughter. The crux of the con tract is that he must abandon his suit against Stephan us for wrongly seizing him as a moichos:Epaenetus would compensate Stephanus with 1000 drachmas for Phano's dowry; meanwhile Stephanus shall make Phano available to Epaenetus whenever he is in town; but as for the charge that he was wrongly held captive as a moichos, hereafter he must 'make no mention' (µ11&µia11µVEiavexe111).For that disclaimer, barring further legal action, the thesmothetai as diallaktaiwould probably require an oath (as the archon did in the case oflsaeus 5, treated above).

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27 This is a remarkably persistent feature even in the Hellenistic period (when consensual contracts emerge). As Wenger 1902 found in the Greek papyri, the great majority of oaths involving legal responsibility are 'assertory' rather than promissory (174 et passim). A late but suggestive parallel to the situation ofLeochares in Isaeus 5 is discussed by Wenger 1902, 179-80, PPetr2.46 (c. 200 BC): Theotimus acknowledges (oµo).oyC::,)that he has pledged his property as security for the debt of Philippus (who has evidently gotten into some difficulty) and he has sworn to that pledge 'the royal oath• as recorded in the symbolon. 28 The reverse situation is also suggestive: in Hyp. Ath. the parties first swear to end their quarrel, then make a contract (for sale of the slaves and their perfume business); Athenogenes offered the contract to show his 'friendship' (§5); and the rising authority of the written document allows him to dispense with the old formality of witnesses (as Pringsheim acknowledged, [1955) 1961, 405-6). But it remains essentially a cash sale: the buyer pays the money on the premises, clearly signifying that he takes immediate possession. The oath itself appears to have no relevance to the issue at trial: the plaintiff is suing for 'damage' ( blabi), in compensation for the huge debts that came with his property (Whitehead 2000, 268-69). There is no suggestion that the 'damage' is aggravated by the violation of oath. 29 Isoc. 17.19; see (for now) Thur 1975. For effect the speakersaystheysworeto 'keep silent' sii,pesesthai,as though Pasion was simply intent on concealing his attempted fraud. The diaita epirhitois captures some of the elements that we associate with consensual contract (esp. obligations based upon verbal commitment, without security), and as a sort of judicial wager it resembles Roman sponsio. 30 On the meaning of symbolaia,see now Mirhady 2004; Maschke 1926, 60 supposed that symbolaiahere means simply symbola,receipt tokens (followed by Kussmaul 1969, 26). By either reading, the witnesses would attest to the actual transaction, the 'real contract' in the making, not some prior oath. 31 The Spartan king had come to Athens to reclaim hostages from Aegina and the Athenians refused to deliver them on grounds that the hostages were entrusted to them by two kings, not one; thus Leotychidas alone was not entitled to recover the parathilri. The tale of Glaucus is not a perfect parallel to this situation (though presumably Leotychidas challenged the Athenians to swear their denial); on its function in the narrative see esp. Immerwahr 1966, 210-16;Johnson 2001, 20-23; and Dugdale 2004.

7

'An Olympic victory must not be bought'

•

The author wishes to express his gratitude to the generous scholars who have read (or heard) this paper and suggested many improvements, including Nigel Crowther, Stephen Hodkinson, Donald Kyle, James Roy, and Kevin Wamsley. I am especially grateful to Alan H. Sommerstein, for providing the original forum in which to present this paper, and for offering to read the paper for me, when I was unable to attend the conference. None of these is responsible for any errors that still remain. Pausanias (3.8.1) notes that other women, and especially Spartan women, had won at Olympia, but that none was 'as famous as she'. Among her successors in this regard was Bilistiche, the paramour of Ptolemy II Philadelphus, who also won two races (specifically the four-horse chariot race for foals) in the third century. Further, on women in athletic competitions against men, see Golden 1998, 132-40, and, more generally, S. Miller 2004, 150-59. It is unclear whether Kyniska was Agesilaos' full- or half-5ister--5ee Moretti 1953 for various attempts to reconstruct her familial connections. Pausanias refers to her 'victory' at many other points in his Periegtsis,including 3.15.1 (a shrine in her honor in Lakonia), 5. 12.5 (statues of her horses in front of the Temple of Olympian Zeus), and 6.1.6 (further description of the statues, with additional reference

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to the statue of herself, the fact that the artist was Apelles, and the inscriptions she erected at the site). However, at 6.1.6, he mentions that she had won 'victories' (plural) at Olympia. While the dates are uncertain, most scholars have concluded that she won the prize-though she could not have attended the Games in person, because of the general ban on women-in both 396 and 392. (See Moretti's arguments, n. 4, below.) The statue is included in the table compiled by H.-V. Herrmann 1988, 130 and 151, #7. Moretti 1953 #17, 40-44; Moretti 1957 #373, 114-15; Ebert 1972 #33, 11(}..13. Pomeroy 2002, 21-23 argues that Kyniskahad been 'champing at the bit herself for several years' to enter her horses into Olympic competition, and that her monuments 'were examples of conspicuous consumption equal to those of men.' Scanlon 2002, 21-23 takes a more measured approach, concluding that the existence of these sources, at odds with one another, suggests that Kyniska 'resides in that ambiguous middle ground between male and female athletic values ... '. Kai TOVTpotrov UtrEOTI10aTOTOTOUTTepoou Xen. A~. 9.1-7: •• AAAa µ~v 'epw YE 005 KaAov Kai µeyaAoyvc.>µov, TOaUTOVµev av6P05 a>.a~ovei1r1... [6] EKEl\10 YEµ~v nwsipyo15 Kai KT11µao1KOOµEIV TOV'eauTOUolKov, KUVa5TE noAAous-8rJpEUTO.S' Kai 'itrtrOUS' trOAEµIOTTIPIOUS' TpE'°VTa, KuviOKav 6e a6e>.4>~vouoav tre'ioa, apµaTOTpo4>EIVKai 'em6e1;a1 VIKc.x,JJS'au-riis- 0TI TO 8peµµa TOUTOO\JK av6paya8iasaAAa trAOUTOU 'eni6e1yµa EOTI; ... [7] ... OUT(ol)S' civ EiTJVIKTJ4>PosTWV KaAAtOT(ol)V Kai µeya>.otrpE'ITEOTCXT(ol)V ay(,)v,oµaT(ol)v ... • It must be admitted that this general sentiment, attributed to Agesilaos, suspiciously mirrors Xenophon's own, expressed in Cyr.2.3.7-15, among other passages. It is, therefore, possible that Agesilaos' perceived 'attitude' has nothing at all to do with the actual events surrounding Kyniska's chariot-horses. (Many thanks to Professor Sommerstein for pointing out this consideration.) KCXAAIOTOV Kai µeya>.otrpEtrEOTaTOVvoµ,~oµevov elva, Xen. Himm 11.5-7: 'To 6e trCXVT(ol)V Etr1T116euµaapµaTOTpo4>iav ... VIKCJV 6e tronpa OOKEIS' KaAA,ovelva, apµaT05 apeTfi ~ tr0AE(ol)S' ~S' trpooTaTEUEIS'eu6a1µovi1r1;... [6] ... VIKWV µev yap O\JKciv 8auµa~OIO aAAa atro troAAwv oiK(,)VTO.S'6anava5 no,ouµevos- ...• 4>8ovoio, 005 Shipley 1997, 245-46. TWVtrOAITWV0:4>''mtr0Tpo4>1a5 OOKOUVTa5 Plut. A~. 20.1: ·Ou µ~v o:AA'opwv EVIOUS' elvai TIVa5 Kai µeya 4>PovouVTa5, E'ITEIOE ~v a6e>.4>~v KuviOKavapµa Ka8e'ioav ·o>.uµnia01v ay(ol)VIOao8at, f3ou>.oµevos-iv6ei;ao8m TOIS'"EAATJOIV WS' 006eµ1ci5 EOTIV hVIKTJ.' ape-rij5, aAAa trAOUTOU Kai 6atrCXVTJS' Shipley 1997, 247. Cartledge 1987, 150. Hodkinson 2000, 310. Hodkinson 2000, 327-28. Kyle 2003a. Professor Kyle was kind enough to send me an advance copy of his submission, together with his perceptive analysis of the subject. Nevertheless, D.C. Young 2004 suspects that the story of Agesilaos' intervention in Kyniska's decision-making 'was either politically motivated or a bit of misogynist propaganda' (114). Paus. 5.21.2-4: 'TaiiTa 'eno1~8ri IJEVCitro XPTJIJ.uµm~v EOTIVeupeo8m VIKTJV,... ElTI 6e T~ U1TOAOl1T~ 616a0KaAiav 1TCJOIV ''EAATJOIV elvai TO.aya>.µaTa µTJ6EvaElTI• O>.uµmicn VliqJ 616ova1 XP~µaTa ... ' For a collection of and commentary on the documents relating to the cheating scandals, see Panagiotopoulos 1991, 92-103. Weiler 1991, 55-64; Llmmer 1993, 141-48. I am grateful to the Library staff of the

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Amateur Athletic Foundation of Los Angeles, for sending me a copy of the former article, and to Prof. Kevin Wamsley, of the International Centre for Olympic Studies at the University of Western Ontario, for sending the latter. I had despaired of ever finding these articles, and these scholars have confirmed how welcoming and supportive the community of sport historians is. On Pausanias' narrative goals in describing the Altis, see Elsner 2001. Donald Kyle has demonstrated this important point, in a related context, in Kyle 2003b. See also, on Pausanias' reference to the 'Heraia' contest, Scanlon 2002, 98-120. Paus. 5.24.9-11: •... ayaAµaTa ~105 µaAIOTa ES'EIC1TAT)t111 acStKc.>\I a~\/ 1TE1TOIT)TQI ... [ 111 OUTc.> µev TOapxa1011 TOTOIQIJTQ E\IO~U~O\I' EOTIcSe1Tp0T~\I 1ro6oo11 TOU'Op1e1ou 1Tl\l(Xl(l0\I xaAICOU\I, emyiypalTTQI cSe EAEyEIQ err auTou, cSetµae8eAo\/Ta TOIS'E1T10plCOOOI 1rap10Ta11a1.' On the importance of age categories, and their larger cultural implications, see Golden 1998, 104-16. Weiler 1991, 58-59: 'All dies spricht jedenfalls fiir ein hohes Alter der Schwurzeremonie, wozu noch kommt, da6 fiir Eidesformeln an sich ein Hang zum Konservativismus kennzeichnend sein durfte ... Schlie8lich la8t sich normwidriges Verhalten nicht nur direkt anhand der Korruptionsbelege und indirekt durch das kodifizierte Regelwerk nachweisen, sondern auch durch die Existenz eines schiedsrichterlichen und polizeilichen Kontrollapparates, der die Einhaltung der konstitutiven und regulativen Normen uberwacht und ihr Uberschreiten sanktioniert. • Lammer 1993, 145-46. See especially Hodkinson 2000, 328, with Ducat 1999, who concludes that 'La cite a voulu proposer Kyniska auxjeunes filles comme le modele d'une femme ayant atteint l'aristeia' (168). He could not have been present at Olympia itself for the Games of 396, of course, but he may have reacted to his sister's victory in the presence of others. The events surrounding the Games in 420 are described by Thuc. 5.49-50. The stages of this 'Elean War' are chronicled by Xenophon (Hell. 3.2.21-31), but there is still considerable debate concerning the conflict's precise date and motivation. See, among others, Hamilton 1991, 89, and Falkner 1996. Hornblower 2000. Roy 1998. Crowther 1997 explores the context of the event, providing insightful commentary-and even modem comparisons. On the Eleans' general reputation for impartiality, and exceptions to this rule, see especially Crowther 2003. As Professor Sommerstein has pointed out, this is not, despite its formal title in International Olympic Committee documents, a true 'oath' at all. The text of the 'oath• is listed in the Bye-Law to Rule 69 of the Olympic Charter, and may be read at http://www.allstates-flag.com/fotw/flags/[email protected]#bye69. The clause 'without doping and without drugs' was added for the Sydney Olympics in 2000-though perhaps, thus far, without sufficient elcplb:is1

8

Epinician Swearing

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On this see Faraone 1993; Plescia 1970, 10-11; Burkert 1985, 251-52. Plescia 1970, 85 points out that the magic spell cast by the oath becomes a curse enacted upon the perjurer; the spell is only broken with the fulfillment of the oath. Throughout this article, when referring to either poet I include the voice of the performing chorus, but see p. 101. Jebb [1905) 1967, 274 ad v. 42: 'The act of touching the sacred Earth meant that the

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person who did so invoked the x8ov101to punish him if he swore falsely.' Verse 14 contains the phrase ev K[ec:.>1 and an inscription has been found on the island with the (restored) name of Liparion accompanied by a list of athletic victories attril>uted to him (Maehler 2004, xiv). T.W. Allen et al. [1936)1980, 249 adv. 333 provide a list of the relevant passages. On Bacchylides' use of this oath see also von der Muhll 1964, 56. Although as praise poetry it shares some features with epideictic oratory. See Carey 1999, 17, with n.2. So Carey 1999, 17: 'The patron who commissions praise claims superiority to other men and the audience ( on the spot or in the Greek world in general) resembles a jury which must be convinced that the claims made on the patron's behalf are justified.' On 'truth' as it is found in Pindar, see Komomicka 1972, who distinguishes five different types: (i) that which is contrasted with a 'forgetting', (ii) truth as an actualizing force, (iii) truth as correspondence to reality, (iv) didactic truth, e.g., divine mysteries, the will of the gods, and (v) truth that is contrasted with falsehood, lies. Although these are all genuine features of epinician 'truth' I propose a connection between them that would see these features as less discrete. Most 1985, 176-77 argues that valid testimony from µapTUpE5 in court was only acceptable when the claim was made by a witness who had had first-hand experience of the alleged event. It is for this reason, Most alleges, that Pindar provides authoritative figures to back his claim when he could not assert that he had been physically present at the winning performance. In fact, in Athens (and doubtless elsewhere), hearsay evidence was acceptable if nothing better was available (several examples can be found in Dern. 43.35-37). Civic acceptance of verbal testimony given by kin and sundry acquaintances underscores the superiority of Pindar's authentication by higher powers when he had not been an eye-witness. In addition to the passage under discussion Pindar identifies himself or others as µapTUpE5 in OL 6.21, OL 13.108 and lsthm..5.48. In Athens, the 'untrustworthiness' of a party swearing an oath could cancel its validity. In Aristophanes, Achorn. 308 there is doubt cast on the reliability of the Spartans. How could one make peace with these people olo,v OUTEfx.>µ05 ouTE1r10T15ouft opKsµeve1? Demosthenes ( Or. 57.63) quotes the dikast's oath-formula that was designed to override yvc..iµc:; tji 61Ka10TaTTI Kai OUTE these temptations: EKTEyap TOIJOf)KOU ... TOljn]4>1E'ia8a1 xap1T5EVEKaOUT.e)(8pa5. See further Mirhady, this volume. Perhaps the best-known formulation of Pindar's sensitivity to the seductive power of his Xap15 cS.' amp atravTa TEU)(EITa µE1A1xa8vaT015. / art is found at OL l.~32: em~po1oa Tlµav Kai amOTOVeµqoaTO lrlOTOV/ eµµEval TO 1TOAAQK15. The /ocw das.ricusfor the persuasive power of poetry to succeed in conveying untruths is, of course, Hes. Theog.27-28, where the Muses lay claim to the ability to make the false appear to be true. Here we must acknowledge the Spanish plaz.adetoros, which witnesses the momentoorhoro dela vm:lad, the exact time of the final sword-thrust in a bullfight. By extension, in English we speak of the 'moment of truth,' the crisis or turning-point in a testing situation (OED). (My thanks to Alan Sommerstein for bringing this to my attention.) While I would argue that the testing of the athlete was part of the 'truth' that was at home in a Greek stadium, epinician o:Aa8Etaentailed much more. See below. Cf. Komomicka's second type of truth, above, n. 9. Cf. I OL 4.3e: µapTUpa 6EOVTI TOIJuµvrrniv· 61a yap TWV lrOITIIJCXTc:.>V Kai Ul,JVc:.>V EK611AoTEpo1 01 VIKWVTE5 Kai 0:16105hµapTUpta. For the Greeks, the security of a truth-claim was strengthened by a connection with prophetic truth. The Athenian archons swore by Pythian Apollo. On the connection between oaths and prophetic truth, see Hine! 1902, 29, 37 with nn. 2, 46. For a recent discussion of o:Aa8E1aand its opposition to Aa8a in Pindar, see Komomicka

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30

Horkos

1972, 233. See also Heitsch 1962 and Krischer 1965. Maehler (2004) in his most recent commentary on Bacchylides 5 (adv. 96) points out that most Greek poets after Hcs. Theog. 233-36 incorporated the etymological force of the word with its a-privative, maintaining the sense of 'not ignoring,' 'revealing.' Further on the force of oaths in the courts see Plescia 1970, 33-40 and 100; Aristotle (Rh.et.1377a) discusses the use of oaths as evidence. In this respect the revelation brought about by the ode-its actualizing power-resembles the ability of Time, Xpovosto effect and to immortalize an event otherwise hidden. At OL 10.53-55 Pindar refers to Xpovosas having exclusive power to declare the 'very truth' (aAa8E1av hr\wµov); at OL 1.33-34 the 'future' (eniAOllTOIaµepa1) is described as giving the 'best -informed' testimony (µapwpes- O~TaTOI). The actualizing power of words uttered in oaths may also be compared to prayers. On the connection between Polyphemus' prayer/curse (Od. 9.528-35) and oaths see Bollack 1958, 30. See nn.8 and 10 above. The implication of this is that the recipient of the challenge needs to justify his claim; as Parker points out (1983, 187) the oath-'to agree', 'to promise' or 'to betroth', while at OL 13.53, he employs T18T]µ1. Hesiod's TheogvnJ(992-1002) merely tells us that Jason brought Medea with him from Colchis and made her his voluptuous bedmate (icai µ111 8a>.ep~v 1TOl~OaT'(]ICOITIV, 999).

46 47 48 49

11 Cloudy Swearing 1 2

3

4 5 6 7 8 9

10

11 12 13 14 15 16

On two further occasions (825, 1240--41), a character makes a comment on an oath uttered a short time previously by another character. The longest possible simple oath by Zeus is ~ T0V ~,a, which consists of two long and two short syllables (i.e. six 'morae', a mora being equal to one short syllable or half a long syllable). The shortest other affirmative oath by a named god that is known to have been in use in classical Athens is~ T0V 'Epµ~v 'by Hennes' (e.g. Clouds 1277), which is seven morae in length; however, the euphemistic quasi~ath formula~ T0VKUVa'by the dog' (e.g. Pl. ApoL22a) is only six morae long. Negative oaths, which begin (in Attic) with µa, are regularly one mora shorter than affirmative ones (and the aposiopetic formula µa T0V'by the-' [Frog:t1374, Pl. Gorg.466e], if followed by a vowel, has a length of only two morae). This occurs at 425-26, when, having been asked by Socrates if he will henceforth recognize as gods only Chaos, the Clouds and the Tongue, he replies 'I'd absolutely refuse even to speak to the other gods ifl met them; and I won't sacrifice to them, or pour libations to them, or put incense on their altars.' 217,250-51,261,327-28,329-30,343--44,346--47,408-ll. 121, 372, 386-88. 483,652,733, 1234-35, 1238-39, 1338-39, 1406-7. 454-56, 664-65, 72~24, 732, 781. See especially Green 1979 and Woodbury 1980. The audience can never be quite certain whether Xanthias is actually seeing Empusa or only pretending to do so (Dionysus himself never sees her, doubtless being too frightened ever to look). Xanthias' appeal to Heracles for protection (298) indicates prima facie that he is himself afraid, but it could also be just part of the game he is playing to expose his master's cowardice. The ratio in Clouds (seven informal Zeus-oaths with the article, out of a total of twentysix) is fairly typical. Across the eleven extant plays, just under a quarter of all informal Zeus-oaths (90 out of 362) have the article; the highest proportion (in Achamian.s) is 37.5%, the lowest (in Knights) 12.5%. All except the first of them, at 217. 733, 1234-35, 1338-39, 1406-7. Typical examples are Isaeus 3.73, 4.20; Dern. 6.13, 6.14, 19.158, 19.272, 21.160, 21.222; Hyp. Ewe. 14; Dein. 2.8. The idiom is also used by Xenophon (Mem. 1.2.9, Hell. 7.3.10). Cf. Pl. Grat. 400e, Phil. 12c; see Fraenkel 1950, 99-100, on Aesch. Ag. 160-1. As if confusing him with the notorious (and later outlawed) scoffer at religion, Diagoras ofMelos. He is starving, which is why he is willing to give so much for so little.

Notes:pages 121-136

249

17 Lys. 443-44, 447-48, 554, 738-39; Thesm. 858. 18 Lys.403, where the Proboulos, swearing by Poseidon Halykos ('the Briny'), says that men, because of their laxness in controlling their wives, have only themselves to blame for the women's current hybristic behaviour. 19 Fn>g1738-39, 1433; EccL79-81, 760-61, 1045--46, 1102-4; Wealth877-79. 20 At EccL 1045--46 the young man thinks that his girlfriend has rescued him from the clutches of a hideous old woman by putting her to flight (alas, she in tum will be put to flight a moment later by an even more hideous old woman); at Wealth877-79 an honest man rejoices in Wealth's discomfiture of a sykophant and, he hopes, of all his kind. 21 Fn>g3738 directly follows the parabasis, whose main subject has been how best to secure the survival of Athens; in 143~34 Dionysus, who has just said ( 1418-19) that he has come to Hades to find a poet 'so that the City may survive', expresses for the last time his inability to choose between Aeschylus and Euripides, prior to subjecting the pair to a final test by asking them for 'one more suggestion each about a way ... for the City to secure her survival' ( 1435--36) . 22 Rhodes & Osborne 2003, no. 88. 23 Who swears (or makes his client swear) by Zeus and another god or gods at 8.49, 9.54, 9.65, 18.129, 21.198 ('by Zeus, Apollo and Athena'), 23.188, 25.13, 25.65, 32.10, 35.40, 36.53, 36.61, 48.2 and 52.9 ('by Zeus, Apollo and Demeter') 24 These three were the 'Oath-Gods' ( lwrlcioithem) by whom were sworn oaths of particular solemnity (Deinarchus fr. 29 Conomis) including that of the Athenian jurors (Pollux 8.122); see Fisher 2001, 254-55, and Mirhady, this volume. 25 In an explicitly signalled parody (cf. Lys. 188-89) of the conquer-or-die oath taken by the Seven against Thebes (Aesch. Seven42-48) with their hands touching the blood of a sacrificed bull collected in the hollow of a shield. 26 Russo 1962, 172 (1994, 110) argues that the image need not necessarily be visible to the audience; but see Dover 1968, 104-5. 27 So e.g. Dover 1968, lxxvi, 265; Sommerstein 1982, 231; Russo 1994, 110. 28 Of the original version of Clouds,that is; but it is reasonable to assume, as the author of Hypothesis A7 Holwerda (I Dover) does, that when Aristophanes revised the script it was with a view to producing it again. On the relationship between the surviving and the original versions see Sommerstein 1997 (with references to earlier studies) and, disagreeing on some points, Casanova 2000. 29 He means that Zeus is regularly vanquished by desirefor mortal females; but that is not what he says. 30 Wasps 1474; Peaa 109, 1277; Birds 171,501, 1370; Eccl. 344, 357, 422. 31 However, the three oaths of this type in Ecclesiazw-the only ones to be found in Aristophanes' last five plays--are of interest for a different reason: they all occur in the same scene, and all in the mouth of the same character, Blepyrus, who in this scene, and in this scene alone, is wearing his wife's clothes (she having 'borrowed' his). May this be related to Dionysus' well-known tendency to wear women's garments (as he does in Fn>g1)? 32 a. Allan, this volume. 33 Hippolytus famously complains of having been tricked in this way in Eur. Hipp. 612, 657. 34 Excluding two which refer to events in the world outside the comic fiction: the alleged Spartan breach of the Peace ofNicias (cf. Lys. 51~14) and the boys who are persuaded by lovers' gifts to break oaths of chastity (Birds 705--7). 35 Hesiod fr. 124; Philonides fr. 7 K-A;Pl. Symp. 183b. 36 Assembly meetings regularly began at sunrise (cf. Ach. 19-20); the second cock-crow is mentioned in Eccl. 30-31 as having already been heard, and yet the women, who are anxious to reach the Pnyx early, do not depart thither until 285. 37 He has not in fact sworn any such oath during the play, but no spectator will think of that

250

Horlr.os

while watching this scene. 38 In Lys. 12~38, the Athenians' objective is simply to spare the Spartans embarrassment; their falsehood cannot do the Spartans any harm and may indeed benefit them (e.g. by helping them win a symposiac game). In Eccl. 553, if Praxagora tells the truth, she risks losing the opportunity to implement a social revolution which she believes will be greatly to the benefit of men and women alike-including Blepyrus, to whom she is speaking. 39 Xanthias' deception (he is claiming to be the god Heracles, whose costume he was wearing when arrested) is unmasked when he and Dionysus are taken before Pluto and Persephone (Frogs669- 71, 741-42). oµc.iµox',TlcSe cj,p~vavc.iµoT5 'my tongue has sworn, but my mind is not under 40 Tly">..&xJd oath' (cf. Tham. 275--76, Frogs101-2, Arist. RJiet.1416a28-35). 41 I wish to acknowledge the enormous contributions of Andrew Bayliss and especially, so far as the subject matter of this chapter is concerned, oflsabelle Torrance, who has been responsible, inter alia, for all of the Oaths database entries from poetic texts, including those from Aristophanes.

12 Thucydides and Plataian Perjury I am grateful to Riet van Bremen, Esther Eidinow, Robert Parker and Alan Sommerstein for reading and improving this paper. 1 S.R. West 2003. References in my text or notes without author or date, in the form 'p. 443', are to this article. I have followed West in using the English word 'perjury', although nowadays it has become altogether secularised and suggests a legal not a religious offence. 'Oath-breaking' would be better. 2 West (p. 442) speaks of 'Athenian failure to act in support of the city [Plataia] '. 3 It goes on: 'it has neither hands nor feet. But it is swift in pursuit, until it has seized all a man's offspring, all his house, and destroyed them. But the offspring of a man who keeps his oath will be better off in the long run.• 4 See Johnson 2001, 20-24. The story is adduced in another connection by Carawan (this volume) sub finnn. 5 Johnson 2001, 21, citing earlier literature (lmmerwahr 1966, cf. also 20 n.51: How and Wells 1912). is the unanimous reading of the mss.) 5a But note that at 6.86 (unlike 6. 73, where rrapa8r\lCT] some mss. have not rrapa8r\lCT] but rrapaKaTa8r\lCT], which would reduce the echo: see now Scott 2005, 313 (note on 6.86). 6 It is a weakness ofJohnson's treatment that it does not mention oaths at all. I do not, incidentally, acceptJohnson's own ingenious theory that Leotychides' story is meant as a warning to the Aiginetans not the Athenians. 7 For an example of some important oaths altogether neglected by Gomme see 4.86.1 and 88. l (Brasidas at Akanthos) with Hornblower 1991-, ii 10, 281, and Badian 1999. 8 It is nevertheless true, as Robert Parker points out to me, that if it is rhetorically useful to represent as oath-breaking an offence which was not, then that confirms the odium associated with oath-breaking, whereas if the Athenian offence was not really oathbreaking then there was no reason for them to be punished for it. I agree with this; my argument is designed to show that the Glaukos story is treacherous in its implications. 9 Religious scruples might also, in a competitive elite, be a way for one side to retreat without losing face; for another competitive elite cf. Liebeschuetz 1979, 14, discussing religious 'vitiation' of elections to a magistracy. 10 Hornblower 1994, 148 n.55, though Pelling 2000, 265 n.44 may well be right that there could have been Spartan scruples earlier than 414/3 (perhaps this is another way of saying that there was more than one opinion at Sparta, as there certainly was). 11 Indeed, 'could have changed' is too weak a formulation. Thucydides (5.16.1, under 421)

NoU!S: pages137-149

251

convinced that the return of king Pleistoanax (426) had helped to re-align Spartan policy in a more pacific direction. Gomme [et al.] 1945-81, on 2.5.7, a1reicn1vav TOU5civ6pa5, says 'presumably the Plataians, Naukleides and his friends (2.2) suffered the same fate', i.e. were killed along with the The ban prisoners. But Gomme himself goes on to cite 3.68.3: at the end of the affair the territory of Plataia was given over to some Megarian exiles and those proSpartan Plataians who still survived, 0001 ... 1rep1~oav.Gomme evidently stresses the fact that some did not survive, but equally clearly some did, and we can only wonder what role they played in the siege. I think that such very short speeches in Thucydides stand a better chance of being authentic than his long and elaborate ones, though this can hardly be proved. S.R. West 2003, 442 n.20. S.R. West l.oc.cit. This is the likely period ofThucydides' maximum political activity and awareness, in the period immediately before his generalship. Hornblower 1991-, i 465f., quoted by West (p. 446) but without my bracketed continuation. Dover in Gomme et al. 1945-81, iv 394 (on treaty-oaths see further Bolmarcich, this volume). West (p. 446 n.44) cites this Thucydidean passage briefly. West (p. 440-1) (whence the quotation in my text); for the 'uneasiness' she cites Westlake 1977, 354. I owe the point which follows, and the formulation of it, to Alan Sommcrstein. Kagan 1974, 102. Note Thucydides' emphatic presentation by negation, in effect 'they did not invade Attica (because of the plague) but instead ... ' No doubt in consultation with advisers. Kagan 1974, 103; see also his discussion on 104. Badian 1993, 111, 115; Pelling 2000, 265 n.44. These are two valuable studies from which I have learned much. Badian 1993, 115-16. was

12

13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25

13 The Oath of Demophantos and the politics of Athenian identity

*

1 2 3 4

5 6 7 8

It is my pleasure to thank both Alan Sommerstcin and Judith fletcher for their invitaand the tion to contribute to their stimulating conference The Oath in GrtelcSociet-J participants for their helpful comments and suggestions. This essay was written while I was a post~octoral researcher funded by the AHRB Anatomy of Cultural Revolution Project at the Faculty of Classics, University of Cambridge, and King's College, Cambridge. A very early version was presented in Cambridge at the project's regular seminar and I would like to thank the participants for their help and advice. Especial thanks arc also due to S.D. Goldhill, S.D. Lambert, D.M. MacDowell, R. Osborne, P J. Rhodes,and IA Ruffell. Any remaining mistakes arc, of course, my own. Lyk. Leolc.79. Rudhardt 1958, 212; Cole 1996, 241; cf. Loraux 2002, 130. Rudhardt 1958, 209-10; Cole 1996, 230. On the use of oaths for reconciliation, sec e.g. Loraux 2002, 139-41; Rhodes and Carawan, this volume. E.g. Aristophanes, Knights257, 451-52, 475-79, 62&-29, 860-63; cf. Wasps488-99. Thucydides8.l,48.2-3,53--54,63.3-64.l, 65-67; [Arist.J Ath. Pol.!ID--32.1with the helpful comments of R.G. Osborne 2003, 259-61. For discussions of these problems, see e.g. Hignett 1952, 375-78; de Stc. Croix 1956; Rhodes 1972b; Sealey 1975; Ostwald 1986, 395-400; Harris 1990. Andok. 1.96--98; other testimonia: Dern. 20.159; Lyk. Leolc.124-27. The overall project

252

9 10 11 12 13

14

15 16 17

18

Horkos

of restoring democracy is part of my on1?;oing study on the Athenians' responses to the oligarchic revolutions of 411 and 404-403; see J.L.Shear in progress a. E.g. Plescia 1970, 78; Ostwald 1986, 414, 418; Munn 2000, 159-60; Ober 2003, 223; Raaflaub 2003, 70; cf. Ostwald 1955, 112-14. MacDowell 1962, 135. E.g. Ostwald 1955; Carawan 1993, 312-19. Above, n.8. Inscribed: Andok. 1.95; Dern. 20.159; Lyk. LeolL124, 126. JG i' 375.1-3. That Glaukippos is not mentioned in the preamble of Demophantos' decree is not a cause for concern. His name may have been inscribed on the text's heading, as for example the archon's name was on JGi' 104 and 126 and JGii 2 13, and would, therefore, have been omitted when the text was transcribed. Alternatively, his name may have been omitted entirely, as the archon's name was on e.g. JG i5 92, 119, 123, 126, and JG ii2 3, 6, 7, 17. As the text now stands, there is no evidence to support Carawan's statement that Demophantos' document was reinscribed after the fall of the Thirty; Carawan 2002, 19. Furthermore, the epigraphical evidence indicates that, when documents were reinscribed, the new text was added at the beginning and/ or end of the document, but the original document itself was either left unchanged, as in the cases of JG i 5 227 and 228 and JG i5 127 + JG ii2 1, or was excerpted as in the case of JG i5 104. These texts also show that, when the documents were reinscribed, a few new words were not introduced into the original text as Carawan suggests that the 'starting date, apxe1 xpovos-'probably was. For the phrase •the /Jouleelected by lot', see Thucydides 8.66.1, on the situation in Athens in 411 just before the arrival of Peisandros and his fellow conspirators, and 8.69.4, on the eviction of the properly elected boultby the Four Hundred; and also [Arist.] Ath.Pol. 32.1. Assassination of Phrynichos: Thucydides 8.92.2; Lysias 13.70-73; Lyk. LeolL112; JGi' 102; MJ. Osborne 1982, 16-21. Decree not retroactive: Ostwald 1986, 418. Note that he does not connect Demophantos' document with the assassins of Phrynichos. Despite these clear connections, both Ostwald and Munn take the document as not being vindictive; Ostwald 1986, 418; Munn 2000, 160. See, however, the comments of R.G. Osborne 2003, 261. Phrynichos: Lyk. Leolt.112-15; Krateros FGf"H342 Fl7; cf. Plut. Alk. 25.14 with Gomme et al. 1945-81, v 309. Archeptolemos, Onomakles, Antiphon: [Plut.]. Mor. 833e-834b = Krateros FGf"H342 F5b; Antiphon frr. 1-6 (Thalheim); for the date, see [Plut.] Morolia 833d-e with Gomme et al. 1945-81, v 197. Ar. Frogs686- 705. Andok. 1.77-79.

19 20 21 KTE\100

CllTOOTEp~oc.> ouc5ev. TCX i]µ1ofoTt;,CllTOICTEl\la\lTI [KaiAoy~ Kaiepy~ Kai'l"l~]. KaiOUK

See the apparatus criticus in MacDowell 1962 and cf. Lyk. Leolt.127. The striking phrase 'by word, by deed, by vote, and by the person's own hand' finds a parallel in certain treaties between Athens and her allies, but the allied representatives swear in the negative not to revolt from Athens either in word or in deed; JGi' 37.46-47; 39.7-9; 40.21-24; 48.17-20; cf. JGi' 62.23. In JGi' 61.18-21, the Aphytaians seem to have sworn to help the Athenians in word and deed if someone attacked them or their colonists at Potidaia. See further Bertelli 1994, 11-13; Bolmarcich this volume. 22 For the Tyrannicides as 'founders' of democracy, see e.g. Harmodios slwlia PMG nos. 893, 896 = Athenaeus 15.695a-b, nos. 10, 13; Taylor 1991, 6-7, 9; Castriota 1998, 202-3, 209, 21 l; Raaflaub 2003, 66. 23 Sitesis:JGi' 131.1-9; cf. Isaios 5.47 . .Pro«lriaand ateltia:Isaios 5.47; cf. Dern. 20.18, 127-30.

Notes:pages 149-157

24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31

32 33 34 35 36 37

38 39

40

41 42 43 44 45 46

253

Since Kleon requested and obtained both sitesisand proedriaafter his victory at Sphakteria, these two honours must have been awarded to the descendants of Harmodios and Aristogeiton before 425; Ar. Knights 573-76 with 280-81, 702-9, 766, 1404-5; Gauthier 1985, 95-96. That Konon received ateleia along with his bronze statue after Knidos suggests that this benefit had already been awarded to the descendents of the Tyrannicides by 394/3 and before Isaios mentions it in c. 389; Demosthenes 20.70; Gauthier 1985, 96-97. For the exemptions conferred by ateleia, see MacDowell 2004, 127-29. For the cult. see Taylor 1991, 5-9; Parker 1996, 123, 136-37;].L Shear 2001, 205-22. Andokides 1.95; Lyk. Leolt. 124, 126. Thompson and Wycherley 1972, 157-58; Ajootian 1998, 3-7;].L. Shear 2001, 689-92. For the anti-tyrannical nature of the statues, see e.g. Boardman 1985, 25; Stewart 1996, 73; Ajootian 1998, 1, 9; Steiner 2001, 221;].L. Shear in progress b. Rudhardt 1958, 209-10. Loraux 2002, 142. For the rituals of oath-taking, see Cole 1996, 230-33 with further references. A pos.sible parallel may exist in Herodotos' report that the Athenians swore great oaths to obey Solon's laws for ten years, but the Athenians cannot have been arrayed by tribe and by deme on that occasion and so the situation is not especially similar to what Demophantos specifies in his decree; Herodotos 1.29.2; cf. Bertelli 1994, 9-10. Whatever date we choose to as.sign to Herodotos' work, it must belong before Demophantos' document and, in 410/09, this tradition was certainly known. Whether the Athenians actually took this oath in the early sixth century is hard to know with any certainty; it is accepted as historical by Rhodes, this volume. MacDowell 1962, 136. Andrewes 1953; contra: Kagan 1987, 265-69. /G i' 4.820; /Gii 1 1629.183-90; cf. /G ii2 1361.17-19. SEG 1168 col. A2.5, 30, 51; /G ii1 1244.3-5; cf. SEGxxi 519.16. /G i5 5.3 is very probably correctly restored with this usage. E.g. Agvm xv 70.5-6; 71.10; 76.8; 78.5-6; 80.9; 81.5; 84.4-5; 87.10-11; 89.7; 111.3 and passim.The texts in Ago,u xv alone provide sixty-one examples. E.g. Goldhill 1990, 97-114; Ober and Strauss 1990, 237-40; Henderson 1990, 285-87; Sourvinou-Inwood 1994, 270-73; Goldhill 1994, 363-65, 367-69; Goldhill 2000, 35, 42-47; Sourvinou-lnwood 2003b, 71-72. Mikalson 1975, 34, 183-85. /Gi' 375.5-7. For discussion of the calendrical complications and references to the earlier literature, see Pritchett 1977; Meritt 1978. Even if the Panathenaia of 410/09 took place in the first prytany of the year, it must have been held after Demophantos' decree was pas.sed by the drJdhia. Goldhill 1990, 98-114 and Goldhill 2000, 43-47, both with further references. Carter's recent discussion (2004b, 5-10) is regrettably incorrect about the epigraphic evidence for the announcement of gold crowns; for this material, see Henry 1983, 22-38. Tribute: Meritt 1936, 386-89; Meritt etal. 1950, 91-92, 363; Meiggs 1972, 438-39; Munn 2000, 156. Crowns: /Gi' 102.6-14. A full discussion of the Philolttms in the context of the Dionysia of 409 lies outside of the scope of this es.say. Crowns announced al a festival: see e.g. /G i' 102.12-14; 125.23-29; /G ii2 448.24-26; 555.6-7; 646.29-31; 657.61-63; SEGxxviii 60.92-94; Henry 1983, 28-33. Mikalson 1975, 123-30, 137. Seating by tribes: Wmkler 1990b, 37-42; Goldhill 1994, 364-65. Militaryservice: Andok. 1.45; Siewert 1982, 10-13, 142; Traill 1986, 112-13 with further references. Archons: [Arist.] Ath.Pol. 7.1, 55.5; Pollux 8.86; PluL Sol. 25.3; cf.

254

Horkos

Harpokration, Photios, Suda s.v. >.iOos-. 47 Sourvinou-Inwood 1994, 278-88, 2003b, 89-99. 48 Lyk. uolr. 126. By 330, Demophantos' decree must have been superseded by the law of Eukrates (Agvraxvi 73) passed in 337 /6, but it not quite clear if the decree was valid until that year. If Hansen is correct that the nomos eisangeltilwsquoted by Hypereides dates to 411/0, then it has no bearing on the date ofDemophantos' document as Ostwald argued; Hyp. Eu:x.7-8; Hansen 1975, 17; Ostwald 1955, 115-19. Demosthenes' reference to the document in 355/4 (Dern. 20.159) and its continuing presence in the cityscape suggest that it did not become completely invalid in 403/2; MacDowell 1962, 137; contra: Ostwald 1955, 115-19; Rhodes 1981, 221; Michael Edwards 1995, 181. 49 For the role of rituals in creating memory, see e.g. Cressy 1994, esp. 66-67, 70-7l;J.E. Young 1993, 263-81; Hedrick 2000, 89-91, 101, 106-7, 126-30, 220-41 and cf. 11~26; Elsner 2003, 222-25. These dynamics are often implicit rather than explicitly stated, e.g. Sherman 1994, 189-90, 205-6 and Zerubavel 1994. 50 JG i5 27 and 71, both copies of texts erected on the Akropolis and placed in front of the Bouleuterion; Liddel 2003, 81, 88-89. Note that JG i5 82 was to be erected in the sanctuary of Hephaistos and so was not erected in the Agora itself. 51 JGi 5 104. For other laws, sec JGi 5 236, 237; S.D. Lambert 2002. JGi 5 105 is related to this material, but its fragments were found on the Akropolis and so its original setting is not entirely clear. 52 I discuss the setting of the laws in the Stoa Basileios in detail in J .L. Shear in progress and I respond there to Robertson's arguments against this location (N. Robertson 1990, 59-60, 64-65). 53 A:xonesand kyrbeis:for various views, see e.g. Stroud 1979, 41-44; Rhodes 1981, 131-34; Sealey 1987, 140-45; Rhodes 1991, 91 with n.23; T.L. Shear 1994, 240-41. I discuss the ramifications of this change in epigraphical practice in further detail in J .L Shear forthcoming. 54 Governmental buildings: T.L. Shear 1994, 228-45 with further bibliography; T.L. Shear 1984,24-30, 1993,41S-29, 1995, 157-71. 55 Athenians from Phyle: SEGxxviii 45; Aischines 3.187, 190-91. Konon and Euagoras: Isok. 9.56-57; Dern. 20.69-70; Pausanias 1.3.2-3. I discuss both sets of honours in detail inJ.L. Shear in progress. On the politics, see also J.L. Shear forthcoming.

14 Hierophantic Performances 1 2

3

4

Plescia 1970, lOf. Faraone 1993, 64 with n.23. For Semitic covenantal 'great oaths,' see Weinfeld 1973,198 and n.108. An interesting parallel to the Syracusan oath is the annual mutual binding with oaths of the Molossian king (who swore cipte1v KaTo:TOU5voµou5) and people (who swore TflV~QOIAEIQV cS1a4>u>.ate1v KQTO:TOIJSvoµous), on which see PluL Pyrrh.5 and Cataldi 1990. Krob 1997,448, speaks of magistrate oaths in general as 'un contrat moral avec la cite, sous le regard des dieux,' but I am unaware of any systematic treatment of this genre of oath. de Polignac 1995,119 well remarks upon the 'integrating power of the chthonic cults' in colonial identity-formation as exemplified by this event which 'made Demeter and Kore the true guarantors of social cohesion and political harmony.' See further Privitera 1980, where (contrary to Polignac's implication, loc. ciL) the propagandistic use of the goddesses' cult, and the dangers of taking Herodotus' account as a guide to the exact course of the cult's diffusion in Sicily, are discussed with due attention to the context of the deeply rooted religious traditions and sentiments which Demeter and Kore inspired among the Greeks. For Telines' role as an outsider, note Luraghi's recent argument concerning Telines'

Notes:~

255

157-167

position relative to the stasisand exile described by Herodotus. Telines' action would not have been taken in accord with the victorious faction, but rather Herodotus' account becomes clearer under the supposition that Telines was either part of the exiled faction or else taking advantage of his family's special situation - connected with Gela's early history but sharing neither the Cretan nor the Rhodian origins of the city's founders (Luraghi 1994,122-23, endorsing an idea formulated by Wentker 1956 and Kesteman 1970). The scholia to Pindar both corroborate the family's priestly status from Telines' time, showing some independence in mentioning also the priesthood of Zeus Aitnaios, and make explicit what Herodotus only implies, that Gelon and Telines' ancestor, named Deinomenes by the scholiast, brought the sacred objects, these potent possessions of the family, with him when he migrated to Sicily. I Pind. Olymp.6, 158a, corr. Boeckh, Tav 'lepc,.,v:iepc.xruVTJV

0 'lepc,.,v ~~µT]T~ KOiKopTJ5Kai ~105 AiTVaiou EVI1Ke>.ic;r Ek61a&>xfi5AivouTOUnpoyovou auT~V. ('Hieron had the priesthood of Demeter and Kore and of Zeus Aitnaios in Sicily in succession from their ancestor Telines. ') I Pind. Pyth.2, 27b, 61a1TopEITOI 6e, TI 6~ 1TOTE eis-T0\15TOUlepc,.,vos-enaivous- TOVK,vupav npoaijKTa1, ei JJTJ0T1 Ta'iv 8eo,v ie~VTTJ5 cim6e&1KT0· ~e1voµevou5 yap uiiis- eia,v oi mpi TOV'lepc,.,va TOUT.iav KOJJIOQVT05. 0 6e K1vupa5 OUTOSEOTIV,act>' OUoi EVKunf)C,\)K1wpi6a1 TU OE~ CXVIEpc,.>VTal. ('Why has he introduced Kinyras into the praises of Hieron, if not because he had been indicated as the two goddesses' hierophant? For Hieron and the others are sons of the Deinomenes who brought the laierrJfrom Triopion on Cyprus to Sicily. Kinyras is the one since whom the Kinyridai in Cyprus are dedicated to the goddess.') For Hieron as the goddesses' hierophant, apart from the back-story, see also I Pind. Olymp.6, 156d, 15&, 160d; for the full breadth of the ancient sources, see van Compemolle 1957, 475f. Roisman 1985, 265. Hdt. 3.142. Plut. Mur. 261e-262d. Grote 1870, v 62, cited by Luraghi 1994, 122 n.17. Hdt. 1.60. Hdt. 7.155. The rise of Aristodemus in Dionysius of Halicamassus 7.3-11. Luraghi 1994,82,85,91-94. Cf. Privitera 1980, 405f. White 1964, 261-79. Diodorus, in designating Sicily as (already) laiernn auton, suggests a sacred homecoming. (For the tradition of the island's consecration to the goddesses, see the evidence, beginning with Pindar (Nnn. l.13f.) and Simonides, laid out by Zuntz 1971, 70-75. The idea of sacred space on such a large scale, which is not considered in such recent reflections as Rudhardt 2001, is worthy of closer comparative study.) In the Timoleon story, then, it almost appears that the goddesses are drawing Timoleon to Sicily. In both narratives, their protective role causes remarkable political consequences only with the transfer (with their sacred objects or presence) of preexisting, non-Sicilian local or family cult to 'the goddesses' own' Sicily. In this respect the logic is opposite to the foundation of a 'daughter' culL PluL TimoL8.6. Head 1874, 39 (and see Plate VIia, no. 7), a compelling interpretation, in the context of Head's other material (esp. pp. 31-39 for the period ofTimoleon; also p. 44 for a type of Agathocles' time combining Kore, barleycorn, and torch, which confirms that we are dealing with an enduring regional theme also available to Agathocles), though Head duly notes that this coin's obverse portrays Apollo Archagetas, a fact somewhat obscured by Evans 1894, 353, and then omitted by White 1964, 267. Privitera 1980, 402£., situates the political use of the goddesses' cult at Syracuse in an earlier period alongside the 0

5

6 7 8 9 10 11

12 13 14 15

16 17

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patronage of other gods' cults. 18 This is the claim of Hippol. Haer. 5.8.39f. For an insightful recent discussion, see Sowvinou-Inwood 2003a, 35-38, who reconstructs that 'the ear of corn was the sign of the divine advent at the end of the search,' as part ofa larger advent pattern of' ta hiera. .. returned to their usual place,' a movement that 'expressed meanings pertaining to the cult's territorial/poliadic aspects and helped place the territory under Demeter's protection. Those meanings were created by the specific forms of the movement ... [Demeter] must have been believed to have given the hiera to the [Eleusinian] princes when she founded the Mysteries.' These essentially structural conclusions about the inner logic and meaning of cult activities from a synchronic, Athenian perspective are attractive quite apart from Sourvinou-Inwood 's more radical arguments, in this article and in SowvinouInwood 1997, against the tradition of a pre-polis, local Eleusinian context for the cult's foundation. (I thus accept much of the analysis in Sourvinou-Inwood 1997, 144-50, which stresses the Mysteries' place in 'Athenian polis religion' and their role on Athens' periphery in 'the political articulation of the polis,' while doubting that these features of the Classical cult totally define its religious character or should be taken per seas support for the author's archeological arguments about the cult's origin. Note also that Sourvinou-Inwood does not cite the arguments of White 1964 for the Megarian affiliations ofEleusinian Demeter's most ancient traditions, approved by Privitera 1980, 401.) 19 D.S. 20.7. CC.Justin 22.6, who mentions the practical motive and not the goddesses. 20 Cic., // Verr.4.1~11, D.S. 14.63, 14.70. 21 Plat. Ep.VII 333e. 22 Plut. Dio54.l. 23 Clinton 1974. 24 ArisL Rhet.1373al9. eteµeoc..:,µev TO\ISOf)KOUS. For the association between oath 25 Polyaen. 5.3, liEllMlOOVTES validity and ingestion, see Bachvarova, this volume. The story preserved in Polyaenus may well derive from such a ritual context; it is interesting that it puts Agathocles in the same context of conviviality with hetairoithat is familiar from Alcaeus' poetry. If Bachvarova is correct that Ale. fr. 129 would have been performed in the exiles' proxy-temple, the resemblances to the Sicilian politics of religion and exile in our period are even more interesting. Compare how the ingestion of the /culceimcan solemnize a hierophantic performance, as discussed below. 26 22A3b DK= Plut. De gr,rr. 17, 511 be (oi 6eavµ~AIKWSQVEU ~"'lS ci6e'icj>pa~OVTES OUK ~ 'HpaKAEIToS' cit,ouvTc..>V OUTOV TWV ElTOI\IOUVTOI KOi8ouµa~OVTOI 61ocj>epovTc..:,s; rroA1T~vyvc.',µrivT1v' eirre'ivrrep1oµovoios, civol3as err1To !3~µ0KOi).o~v ~xpou ICUAIKO KQI TWVaAcj>ITc..>V E1Tl1TOOQS KOi Tc;, yA~Xc..>VI Kl~OOS EK1TIWV ci~A8ev, ev6e,taµevas OUTOIS OTITOTOISTUXOUOIV apKElo8atKOilJT)6e'io8a1TWV1TOAUTEAWV EV eip~vo Kai oµovoi~ 610TT1pE1 T1Tc..>1JEVO TTI arr0Kp1oe1

XP~TOIrrpas TOVNeOTopo ... OTIlie EXPWVTO KQIT~E Tc;,Tpom:,;,~s CXlTOKpioec..:,s' 'E4>fo101 1TEp1 XPlllJCXTc..>V" rropeA8wvlie 61'urro6eiyµOToSnopoa~oc..:,· EOTaoia~ov1TOTE eis TT)V eKKA11oiov' HpaKAEIToS ElTI rraaas ICUAIKI aAcj>ITO eteme TOVKUKEW, eµcj>aivc..:,v OTI 6e'i~llAOUV auTapKetav.This last passage is important for establishing that the pennyroyal

Notes:pages 167-174

257

mixture prepared in Plutarch's account is in fact appropriately called a h.von. 27 228125 DK, a text crucial for establishing Heraclitus' interest in the h.von. 28 Delatte 1955, 725-26. 29 Pliny, NH20.152-57, I Ar. Peace712b-e. This passage has nothing to do with the contraceptive or abortifacient use of pennyroyal, paa Riddle 1992, 59, where the English translation leads to a misconstrual of the subject ofemrrio1s, and the interpretation of 'the humorous point' is not as sound as the scholiast's (I Ar. Peace710a). In fact, Hermes graciously (or disgustedly) ignores the insinuation ofTrygaeus' Kan>.cxoas. Cf. Olson 1998ad lac. 30 There are, in addition, a passage in Nicander (Alex. 128-32) directly alluding to the Eleusinian story of the Hymn to Demeter,and the explanations of scholiasts and lexicographers who comment under the direct influence of the texts they sought to explain (I Ar. Peace712b, 712d- but the kukemJwith thyme at Peace1169 is a different drink, vid. Delatte, op. cit.; Suda s.v. ~A~X(.,)\I; and the scholia and periphrasis dependent on the text of Nicander). 31 61a Xp\10\1 (710), 'after so long,' as Olson 1998 ad Joe. 32 For Nicander (A.L130), the kukemJis even \ITJOT61PflS ~flOUSµopoev TTOTO\I, for which the ~ TOIJETQTTO\IOU y1voµE\IO\I scholia's explanations E\IKQKOTTa8Ei9 &eev and errc.>&,\1011, Kai E"11lEVO\I may be about right, though some caution is called for given the obscurity of the epithet µopoe1s in Homer and elsewhere in Nicander (A.L455). (LSJ is not satisfactory here.) 33 Mylonas 1961, 243, 258-60, 294. 34 See e.g. Strabo 9.1.24, Hesychius s.vv. ye~upis, ye~up10Tai. 35 Likewise, the chorus of Eleusinian initiates in Frogsis one appropriate choice (among many Aristophanes could have made) for a drama of civic salvation. That they exclude from their revel anyone who does not resolve stasisor who is not euJwlosin political life (359), on the other hand, is unremarkable in a catalog of standard comic desiderata (Dover ad lac. compares Thesm. 788). 36 Arist. A.th.PoL 39.2. 37 For the usual view see e.g. Burkert 1985, 95, 97 ('Greek religion might almost be called a religion without priests: there is no priestly caste as a closed group with fixed tradition, education, initiation, and hierarchy, and even in the permanently established cults there is no disciplinabut only usage, nomos. .. In Greece the priesthood is not a way of life, but a part-time and honorary office'). This authoritative opinion rests on a well-established scholarly tradition ('Aber ein eigen tlicher Priesterstand hat in Griechenland nie existiert. Es gab keinen Religionsunterricht, keine Predigt ... Eine Vorbildung und Erziehung fiir das priesterliche Arnt gab es nicht,' Stengel 1920 [first ed. 1890) 33). In more recent Anglophone scholarship, the classification of ancient religious phenomena as primarily political is a main theme of the articles in Beard and North 1990 (on Classical Athens specifically, Garland 1990 in that volume: 'there was no Athenian category or Greek equivalent to our own word "religion'", p. 75; 'priests lack a corporate identity or priestly perspective on politics', p. 78; the claim that 'the demos. .. controlled all aspects of the city's life, including automatically the sphere of religion' is justified by religious phenomena obviously subservient to political authority, e.g. the sacrifice at ecclisiameetings, p. 85). 38 Clem. Al. Strom. 5.11.71.1, Iambi. Protr. 10. For a more general connection between the Mysteries and paideia,see Clem. Al. Strom. 7.2.6.1, EpicL 3.21.15, I Ar. Frogs886. 39 Lys. 6.10. 40 /GV/1, 1390=1..SCGno.65. 41 For another possible instance of a priestly official making public use of a cult narrative, we may note the fact that our largest fragment of Euripides' Ertchtheusis quoted in the sole extant oration of Lycurgus, whose Athenian gmos held the priesthood of Apollo

258

42 43 44 45

Hor/cos Erechtheus, and who may well have been priest, as his son was after his death. Lycurgus makes King Erechtheus' speech on the theme of sacrifice for the state into an exemplary statement of patriotism. Not forgetting Plutarch's designation ofCallippus as initiate and mustagogru. Above, n. 2. Even if gmeper se are part of the classificatory apparatus of the polis,their nature and significance (and certainly their traditional self-perception) are partly prepolitical. Of course, the actual origins and nature of the Eleusinian cult remain controversial and are beyond the scope of this article; it is to be hoped that as they are investigated further, the ancient evidence for cognate cults, with their related programmatic emphases, will be more fully explored.

15 Oath and Allusion in Alcaeus fr. 129 1 2 3 4

5 6 7 8

9 10 11 12 13 14

15 16 17

For example Burnett 1998a [1983], 159. I build on the discussions of magical language by Tambiah 1968, 1973 and Versnel 1996. Mendenhall 1955, 24-50; Fensham 1993 [ 1962]; Hillers 1964; Weinfeld 1970, 1972, 1976; refined by Tadmor 1982 and Lemaire 1996. The Hittite military oaths were edited and translated into German by Oettinger 1976, and more recently translated into English by Collins in Hallo and Younger 1997, 165-68. The Hittite treaties are translated in Beckman 1999. Approx. 750 BC, ed. and trans. Fitzmyer 1995, and trans. in Hallo and Younger 2000, 21~17. Approx. 820-670 BC, ed. and trans. Parpola and Watanabe 1988. Bickerman 1976 [1950); Priest 1964; Weinfeld 1976, 1990; Karavites 1992; Brown 1995, 253-89; M.L. West 1997, 19-24. Burkert 1992, 67-68; Faraone 1993, 70-71; Brown 1995, 284-86 provides a full list of primary texts. The bibliography of translations of the Near Eastern texts provided by Faraone 1993 can now be supplemented by Hallo and Younger 1997, 2000, 2002. Borger et al. 1983 provide translations into German of the Near Eastern treaties. I refrain from exhaustively listing comparanda, as they have been well covered by the scholars cited above; rather I point out typical examples and occasional references not cited in earlier works, and cite secondary sources which will lead the interested reader to other primary texts. I cite the Near Eastern texts according to the conventions of that discipline, see abbreviations in the ChicagoHittite Dictionary,Guterbock and Hoffner 1989-. Composite texts created by editors are cited only by the line numbers of their edition. I use Voigt's 1971 edition of Alcaeus, except where noted. I use May and Metzger's translation of the Bible (1973). Translations without attribution from Greek and Hittite are by myself. Weinfeld 1990, 175-76. Burkert 1992; M.L. West 1997. Burkert 1992, 68. Weinfeld 1976; refined in Weinfeld 1990. Plato Laws 753d, Gen. 15, 7-27,Jer. 34, 18--19; see Eitrem 1947, 36-39; Bickennan 1976 [1950], 13; Faraone 1993, 71-72. Note that all but the last feature may still be found in the loyalty oath to Augustus discussed by Serena Connolly (this volume), OG/S523 = /LSIII 8781, which comes from a region which had formerly been within the scope of the Hittite empire. Alcaeus fr. 129, 15. Priest 1964, 49-53; D. Cohen 1980, 51. The earliest equivalent of the Greek term opk1a nµvc.:,, Sumerian nam ... tar/Jw,d,, first appears with reference to an oath in the 'Vulture Stele' of Eannatum (2500 BC), Edzard 1976; most recent trans. in Borger et al. 1984, 297-308, and see further discussion in B.

Notes: pages 174-182

259

Lafont 1996, 31-34. Weinfeld 1990, 179 argues that the terminology spread to West Semitic and then Greek. The use of cut-up animals is extensively discussed by Faraone 1993, 65-72. 18 Alcaeus fr. 129, 15-20 . ... [

:. ]v. "

µricSaµaµT]Oeva Tc.>V haipc.,v

b.M' i\ Bavovns ycivemeµµevo1 Keioea8'im' c:xvcSpc.,v oi ToT'emK .'. TI" KQKKT.q1av [K]ucSa).iµav eiov ff(X\IT(,.)11 ysve8>.av,TOIicSenpTOV TOIi&KEµqAIOV ~wµaoo[a]v

Zowuoaov ~µqOTav. c:x[yt]T'EU\IOOV 8uµovOKE8oVTEs aµµenpa[s] apas aKouaaT' ... 28 The ritual function of accurate naming in vows and rcqucsu is discussed in Bachvarova 2002, 167-68. The use of names and the application of incomprehensible words as divine epithcu is discussed by Versnel 1996, 242-48. On the epitheu of Dionysus sec Hutchinson 2001, 198-99. 29 The use of a temple in Greece for the ratification of oaths is discussed by Burkert ( 1985, 252-53); in Mesopotamia by Mercer 1912, 10-13, 34-35 and Gregoire 1991, 352, 361-62; cross-cultural evidence by Billacois 1991, 23-24. Also see the comparative discussion of Karavites 1992, 188-91. The oath is made before the gods: 'Sefirc Treaty' (7-13, ed. and trans. Fitzmyer 1995, 42-43), 'Esarhaddon's Succession Treaty' (13-24, ed. and trans. Parpola and Watanabe 1988, 29); copies of the tablet are kept before various gods as a reminder of the oath (New Hittite 'Bronze Tablet Treaty', iv 44-51, ed. Otten 1988, 28, trans. Hoffner in Hallo and Younger 2000, 106). 30 Perhaps the same precinct in which Alcaeus observes a celebration in fr. 130b, in which the poet describes himself as 'having a rustic portion' (µ01pav exc.,vaypoiTtKav (2)). See Giordano (1999, 57) and Hutchinson (2001, 193).

260

Horlcos

31 Kurke 1994, 87; Nagy 1993, 223. 32 ] . pa. a To6EAfo'3101 ws,_ '\ , , . . . ] . ... EUIJI: l/\0\1TEIJE\/05µeya ~U\10\1 KCX [TE]ooav, E\I f.x.i1.1015 a8a11CXTC.,l\l IJOKCXpc.l\l e&T]Ka\l. 33 Wiseman 1958, 14-22. 34 W1Seman 1958, 1, and foreword by M.E.L. Mallowan. 35 Key discussions of Alcaeus and his hetairia: Rosier 1980, esp. 191-204, Burnett 1998a [1983), Gentili 1988, 197-215, Nagy 1993, Kurke 1994, Stehle 1997, 213-37, MacLachlan 1997, 135-55, Giordano 1999, 57-9. 36 Rosier 1980. 37 M. Davies (1984, 171) claims that there is no reason to believe that the oath mentioned by Alcaeus did in fact take place, arguing that accusing an opponent of perjury is a typical form of invective. Yet, the examples he cites of 'invective', Din. 1.47 and Ant. 6.33, are both clearly more than just idle accusations. Dinarchus had the curse levelled against perjurers read aloud during the trial after he accused Demosthenes of perjury. Of course, the difference between a curse and invective is primarily the intended audience, either divine or human. Furthermore, while some invective was surely libelous, much no doubt had at least a grain of trnth. (Also see the objections of Kurke 1994, 76, n.17, against M. Davies.) Burnett (1998 [1983), 159--60, with n.5) argues that the oath mentioned by Alcaeus could hardly have been the oath by which the hetairiawas constituted. Alcaeus mentions oaths elsewhere in his extant political poems (fr. 167.1, 306g.ll), the latter fragment mentioning the supposed tyranny of Pitt.acus and therefore not refening to the same events as fr. 129. 38 There is no need however to take recourse in the supposed secret code of Alcaeus' circle that has been discussed by Rosier 1980, 42-45 and Gentili 1988, 213. 39 Kurke 1994, 76. 40 Similarly, the Hittite loyalty oaths include the warning that a transgressor will be swallowed by the earth, 1ust as the earth swallows down this water' ('Second Soldiers' Oath', KUB XLIII 38 rev. 8'-12', ed. Oettinger 1976, 20, trans. Collins in Hallo and Younger 1997, 167). eoao XITW\10KOKW\I EIIEX'ooaa eopya5, see Hutchinson 41 IL 3.56-57 ~ KE\/~61'1/ >.cx"ivov 2001, 201. 42 A piece of the fringe of one's garment can be used in witchcraft ('Maqlii' 1.133, ed. and trans. G. Meier 1967, 12; anti-witchcraft incantation 20, ed. and trans. W.G. Lambert 1957-58, 291); a Hittite spell can be cast by casting a cloak over someone ('Ritual for the Infernal Deities' KUB VII 41 obv. 13 with KBo X 45 I 3', ed. Otten 1961, 116. I do not agree with the trans. by Collins in Hallo and Younger 1997, 168; 'Ritual of Pupuwanni' IBoT 2.115.1-7, ed. and trans. Collins 1990, 222); a Hittite oath can be nullified by removing one's cloak (KUB XXVI 1 iv 46-48, see Guterbock and Hoffner 1989- L 67); and removing one's garment can be part of breaking an Akkadian spell (anti-witchcraft ritual 12, ed. and trans. W.G. Lambert 1957-58, 297, see 288). 43 'Esarhaddon's Succession Treaty' 419-20 (ed. and trans. Parpola and Watanabe 1988, 45); 'Kudurru [boundary marker] of Melishihu' 6.8-51, from Susa, approx. 1150 BC (ed. and trans. Scheil 1900, 109); 'Sin-sharru-ishkun's Treaty with Babylonian Allies' (MLC 1302 10'-11', ed. and trans. Parpola and Watanabe 1988, 72). Hillers 1964, 15-16 discusses other examples; see also Abusch 1987, 68-73. 44 A typical curse threat, see Karavites 1992, 112. 45 'They bring the clothes of a woman, a distaff and a spindle. They break an arrow. You say to them, "What is this? Is this not the fine dress of a woman? We have them for the oath. Who transgresses these oaths of the god, and who devises evil for the king, the queen and the children of the king, let these oaths of the god make him from a man into

6e

n

Notes:pages 182-184

46

47

a woman. Let them make his troops into women. Let them dress them like women. Let them put women's headdresses on them. Let them break in their hands bows, arrows and weapons. Let them put into their hands distaff and spindle."' (' First Soldiers' Oath' KBo VI 34 ii 42-iii 1, filled in with KUB XL 16 +, ed. Oettinger 1976, 10-12). Another example of mixing and matching motifs: Xenophon (A nab.2.2.4) describes the loyalty oath taken by his Greek soldiers, in which they dipped their weapons into the blood of a sacrificial victim. This combines blood imagery with weapon imagery, and is similar to touching the victim, touching its blood (for example, Aesch. &vm 45), or holding its guts (for example, HdL 6.67-68). It also is a variation on the common curse that one's weapons be broken (see Karavites 1992, 111-12; Brown 1995, 277, 2000, 149-51). lalvc.>V ~Co>v 61EA&taTo 1Tp05 8uµov, ~a'i61c.>5 lTOOIV [e)µ~a15 C>pKIOIOOI 6a1TTE1 '\ " ' Tav lTOI\IV aµµ1. .. Kurkc 1994, 87-92, following Fdcni 1983. It appears in the prelude to Achilles' oath to withdraw from battle, addressed to Agamemnon: 611µofx>pos~ao1AEu5'people-devouring king' (/l 1.231). Less severe is the warning in Dcut. 28:33: 'A nation which you have not known shall cat up the fruit of your ground and of all your labors; and you shall be only oppressed and crushed continually ... '. Although note that 'Esarhaddon's Succession Treaty' (377-78, ed. and tram. Parpola and Watanabe 1988, 44) is aware of spells that can be used to retract an oath. Karavites 1992, 187 claims it is a standard component of treaties. 'This spring lamb has not been brought out of its fold for sacrifice, nor for a banquet. nor for a purchase, nor for (divination concerning) a sick man, nor to be slaughtered for [ ... ] : it has been brought to conclude the treaty of Ashshur-nerari king of Assyria, with Mati'-ilu. HMati'-ilu [sins] against th[is] sworn treaty, then.just as this spring lamb has been brought from its fold and [not behold] its fold again, (in like manner) may, alas, Mati'-ilu, together with his sons, daughters, [magnates] and the people of his land [be ousted] from his country ... ' ('Treaty of Ashshur-nerari V with Mati'-ilu of Arpad', K 15272 + I 10-20', ed. and trans. Parpola and Watanabe 1988, 8). Hillers 1964, 82-85, 88. 'The Lord will bring a nation against you from afar, from the end of the earth, as swift as the eagle flies, a nation whose language you do not understand, a nation of stem countenance, who shall not regard the person of the old or show favour to the young, and shall eat the offspring of your cattle and the fruit of your ground, until you are destroyed . . . . They shall besiege you in all your towns, until your high and fortified walls, in which you have trusted, come down throughout all your land; and they shall besiege you in all your towns throughout all your land, which the Lord your God has given you. And you shall eat the offspring of your own body .... The most tender and delicately bred woman among you ... will grudge to the husband of her bosom, to her son and her daughter, her afterbirth that comes out from between her feet and her children whom she bears, because she will eat them secretly, for want of all things ... ' (Dcut. 28:49-57). Ed. and trans. Parpola and Watanabe 1988, 48. Kurke 1994, 90. Tambiah 1973. Compare the Hittite demand that the gods devour the perjurer, quoted above, which is paired with symbolic destructive eating by the oath-taker (KBo V 134 ii ~30. ed. and trans. Oettinger 197610-11). All. im. 551-54, ed. and trans. Parpola and Watanabe 1988, 52.

o

ou

aMa

e1r'

48 49

50 51 52

53 54

55 56 57 58

59 60

261

262 61 62 63 64 65 66

67 68

69 70

71

72 73 74

Horlws

Akk. irri. Billacois 1991, 32; Bekombo 1991, 57-58. Polyaenus Stmt. 5.3.1. I thank Tarik Wareh for this reference. Charpin 1996. Oettinger 1976, 71-73. Dropsy: 'Esarhaddon's Succession Treaty' (521-22, ed. and trans. Parpola and Watanabe 1988, 51): 'May Ea, king of the Abyss,lord of the springs, give you deadly water to drink, and fill you with dropsy.' Also, 'Melishihu Kudurru' (6.41-47, ed. and trans. Scheil 1900, 109); /tudurru (boundary stone) without title (18, ed. and trans. Scheil 1900, 114), both from Susa. See Hillers 1964, 13, 16-17with further refs. Other examples are provided in Oettinger (1976, 71-73). The translation presented here was aided by the unpublished class notes of Prof. Harry A Hoffner,Jr. from 1994. K8o VI 34 iii 12-19, ed. Oettinger 1976, 12. Borker-Klahn 1992: esp. 70, 72. Such a statue with a swollen belly, apparently swollen with blood, is manipulated in oath ceremonies in Chad (Tubiana and Tubiana 1981, 302-5, 309). This apparently unrelated yet similar ritual begs the question of whether edema of the belly can be intuitively associated with lying. Further investigation into the medical rationalization of such edema in the light of humoral theory is desirable but lies beyond the scope of this article. The Vedic examples of this punishment (Rig-Veda 7.89, Atharoa-Veda 4.16.7, TaitteriyaBmhmana 7.15) are considered to be the purview ofVaruna, the god of water who upholds the world order, and oaths may be accompanied by the gesture of holding a pot full of water (Luders 1951, 667-69; Fdliozat 1964, 95). Thus, the semantic space of the image of the swollen belly varies according to its cultural context. Dolls are commonly manipulated in a variety of magic rituals, from erotic incantations and curses, to purification rituals and oaths, as Faraone ( 1993, 60-65) has already discussed. Wax effigies are melted and destroyed in the Theran oath of the colonists who were sent to Cyrene (SEG9.4 = Meiggs and Lewis 1988, 5-9, no. 5). In a typicalAkkadian incantation against witchcraft (22-25, ed. W. G. Lamben 1957-58, 291-92), the participant uses images of witches, while giving a very thorough listing of all the things he suspects a witch has done to an image of himself. The oath in 'Esarhaddon's Succession Treaty' (60~12A, ed. and trans. Parpola and Watanabe 1988, 55) involves manipulation of a variety of objects including a smelly bug and a chariot sprayed with blood, melting a wax doll and dissolving a clay one in water (discussed briefly by Wiseman 1958, 26, also note 'Sefire Treaty' 35-42, ed. and trans. Fitzmyer 1995, 46-47). See Faraone (1993, 62-63 with notes) for further bibliography. The ms. reading of Alcaeus fr. 129.21. = Alcaeus fr. 429. TouTov 'A>.Ka1os-oapcirro& 1.1evKai ociparrov arrOKa>.e,61a To rr>.arurrouv elva1 Kai emaupe1v Tc.lrro6e· )(E1potro6TJV .Se61a Tel5EVT015 rrooi payci6a5' as- xe1pci6a5 EKCIAouv· yaupTJKa 6e W5EIICJl yaup1&JVTa· "'°"c.:>va .SeKai yaOTpc.:>va0TI rraxusaMa IJ~V Kai ~ocj>oooprri&xv W5a>.uxvav· ayciaupTOV.SeW5ETTIOEOUPIJEVOV Kai purrapov. Fileni 1983, 33. Alcaeus elsewhere (fr. 306 (14) ii 8-13, ed. Lobel and Page 1955) uses the image of unclean swelling to describe the unfit state of the state, as we can glean from the commentary in the margin of the papyrus fragment, on a barely preserved poem that involves the ship of state metaphor, here described in the words of the commentary as: 8Al~IJEVfl5auriis- Kai mpalV01JEVfl5rroM~ CXKa8apoiaavarropruna1 Kai AE\IICfl" eipTJTal lie TOAEUKOS61a TOerrapµa. 'When she is squeezed and penetrated, much uncleanliness and whiteness is sent upwards. "Whiteness" is mentioned because of the swelling.' The state qua ship seems to be compared to an aged, diseased prostitute (Gentili 1988, 2~11).

n,r

75

Notes:pages 184-188

263

76 Kurke 1994, 76. 77 Kurke 1994, 70-73, 84-86. Another explanation may be found in Burnett 1998a [1983), 162-63. 78 'Maqhi' (1.9-10, ed. G. Meier 1967, 7), anti-witchcraft ritual (12, 17, 289, 290, ed. W.G. Lambert 1957-58); similarly the 'Treaty of Ashshur-nerari V with Mati'-ilu of Arpad' (Kl5272 + i 10'-35', iv 11, ed. and trans. Parpola and Watanabe 1988, 8-9). 79 'Esarhaddon 's Succession Treaty' 547-50, ed. and trans. Parpola and Watanabe 1988, 52. 80 KBo VI 34 iii 25-28, ed. Oettinger 1976, 12. 81 Faraone 1993, 70. 82 Demosthenes 23.67-68. Also note the Homeric image of transgressing an oath as trampling in IL 4.15 7, when the penalty for breaking one's oath is activated. Although it would be silly to attempt to find an allusion to oath-breaking in every insult directed at Pittacus byAlcaeus, it is worth noting that the images of lameness mentioned by Diogenes Laertius and noted by Kurke 1994, 86 could echo a typical (oath) curse, demanding that the victim's feet be bound so that he may not escape (KBo VI 34 i 29' -30', ed. Oettinger 1976, 6; trans. Collins in Hallo and Younger 1997, 165). This approach of course is very different from that of M. Davies 1985, who looks upon these insults as stock themes of invective, as opposed to Giordano 1999. xepa1vaAoia 83 tro>J.ci«SiKQIya'iav 1TOAU~j311v

KtKA~CJKouo' 'A1611v Kaii.1ra1vriv TTepae'°ve,av, ... TilS'o ijEpocpOITIS' 'Epl\lUS' EKAuev E~'Ep&j3ea,,v.(/L 9.568-72) Furthermore in Aesch. Eum. 372-76 the Erinyes describe their own dance which is meant to bind Orestes before his trial:

µaAa yap oov aAoµiva , awKa8evj3apu1TETTJ KaTa,Epc.l1TOCX>S" aKµav? *Aepci Taw6popo1sKc;jAa-&Jopov aTav.

84 85

86 87 88 89

90

91

92

(ed. M.L. West 1990) For leaping down from above I bring down the heavr-falling edge of my foot, limbs tripping up even swift-runners, hard to bear ate. This seems to be an allusion to such a ritual action. Gestures are a key component of the oath ritual (Lecointre 1991, 15-17). On the terms referring to bonding, see Weinfeld 1990, 176-78. See Fensham 1993 [1962], 250-51 and Brown 1995, 259 on the imagery of breaking a covenant, and see discussion by Mallowan in the foreword of WJSCman 1958, i-ii on the fate of the 'Esarhaddon Succession Treaty'. Collins 1990, 219. HdL 7.39. Middle Hittite 'Ritual between the Pieces', ed. Collins 1990, 220, n.44, trans. Collins in CurL 10.9-12. Hallo and Younger 1997, l~l; Laws 753d. Biclr.erman 1976 [1950), 14, 26 made an attempt to wrestle with the significance of this coincidence, by arguing that the intention of the participants in both rituals is strengthened and intensified by the release of the victim's life force. Eitrem 1947, 43 thought of the action as demonstrating disunity repaired. Collins 1990, 218-24 discusses this ritual action in Hittite purification rites and lists the comparanda. Iliad 5.115ft'. Paradigmatic critiques of the poem during the course of the twentieth century: Cameron 1939, Page 1955, 16, Winlr.ler 1990a, 167-70, 1996, Petropoulos 1991, Greene 1994, C.P. Segal 1998, Faraone 1999, 136-40. See discussion in Bachvarova 2002, 177-82. Compare Hutchinson 2001, 204: 'The prayer provides a present moment, which draws

264

Horlcos all the elements together, and desires a future that would end the plot and satisfy morality.' Or Faraone 1993, 76on the oath of /liad3: 'As many readers have noticed, the entire oath serves as a prophecy of sorts, because the Trojans do in fact break their oath, and the destruction envisaged by the self1aT. 6\IOUUEOOVTQ5 I a'18EPoS ~\/£KEC.,STETaTall>1aT CllTAETOU auyq5. Cf. the monarchy in Eur. Phom. 476-83, where Eteocles in Thebes takes and breaks such an oath. Lloyd 1966, 222-23 wrongly remarks that this image is 'consistent with an oligarchic or aristocratic constitution'. At this point one could object that. when Strife comes into power, the use of the verb avopouoe presents us with an image of aggressive assault and thus the oath is undermined, since the succession in power does not seem to take place voluntarily. However, not only is this consonant with the violent nature of Strife, but it could even vaguely point to the absolute necessity that underlies the notion of the oath. Vlastos [1947) 1970, 63. al>uda,TIOl5I Tatis are metaphorically transferred from In this fragment the terms l>1Kq, human society to describe the whole universe. See Vlastos (1947) 1970, 7~76; Lloyd 1966, 212 and especially Kahn 1974. Black 1962, 25-47. Cf. also Black 1993, 28, 'In the context of a particular metaphorical statement, the two subjects •interact" in the following ways: (a) the presence of the primary subject incites the hearer to select some of the secondary subject's properties; and (b) invites him to construct a parallel implication-complex that can fit the primary subject; and (c) reciprocally induces parallel changes in the secondary subject.' Black further contended (p. 38) that metaphors may be creative in themselves, enabling 'us to see aspects ofreality that the metaphor's production helps to constitute'. Cf. Empedocles DK.31 B129 with Wright 1981 ad loc. Empedocles is simply cited as

.-

25

26

27 28

29

30

265

0

266

31 32 33

34 35 36

37 38

39 40

41

42 43 44

45 46

47

48

49

Horlcos

evidence for Pythagoreanism. For references see Burkert 1972, 220 n.12. See also Kingsley 1995; Trepanier 2004, 123-26. Diog. Laert. 7.22, Diod. Sic. 10.9.2, Iambi. VP9.47, 28.144.5, 28.150, 29.162. See Hirzel 1902, 99-102, Plescia 1970, 87-88. Pythagoras DK58 Bl5 (Aet. I.3.8), Philolaw DK44 All. Cf. also SexL Emp. Mall&.7.94, Porph. VP20, Iambi. VP28.150. Chrysippw Ethics314-26 SW. Cf. Pl. Grg.483e. See Fowler 2002, 379 ad 2.302; Watson 1971; Striker 1987 and Inwood's reply 1987. For the ancient notion of natural law see Kullmann 1995. Fowler 2002, 380. For foedem naturoe in general see DeLacy 1969; Long 1977; Droz-Vincent 1996; Fowler 2002, 376f. ad 2.302; Campbell 2003, 178 ad 5.923-24; Schiesaro (forthcoming). 5.1025, 5.1155, 5.1443 with Campbell 2003, 282 ad 5.1025. Cf. also the /oedw between animw and anima in 3.416, 3.781. Jobst 1907, 1~ 17. See also Em out and Robin 1925-28, i 128. I should also call attention to the fact that there is an etymological connection of foedem with faJa (Enn. ap.Vam>U 5.86, Cic. ap.Sero. auct. Am. 8.641, Paul. Fest. 84, Isid. orig. 8.2.4, 18.1.11), a word that is often matched with iw iurandum (e.g. Caes. BG 1.3.7 intn" ... Kai trtOTI\I sefidnn et iw iurandum dant). Cf. the corresponding Greek phrases 0pKOU5 a>J.ri>.015 &>TE(Ar. L-ys.1185), fflOTI\I TEKai 0pKlaEffOIEU\ITO (HdL 9.92.1). Davies 1931-32, 37; Cabisiw 1984-85, 114. For linguistic, poetical and philosophical allwions see Furley 1970; Sedley 1998, 1-M. In fact, the overall affinity seems to be here so patent that Sedley, relying closely on Lucretiw' proem goes so far as to present us with a remarkable reconstruction of Empedocles' now lost proem to his own poem. As Gale 1994, 219 summarises it 'Venw is represented as the force which like Empedocles' Philia brings things together. . . She has dominion over the four Empedoclean elements and finally she is the force that inspired peace, just as Philia is the source of friendly thoughts among men.' Gale 1994, 72. Gale 1994, 212-13. One could claim that an oath along with its religiow implications and the threat of divine punishment for the perjurer would not retain any value within an Epicurean poem which proclaims exactly the opposite, freedom from the shackles of superstition and divine fear. Yet, although there is evidence that Epicurus used expressions such as 1,1a f1ia or \lfJ f1ia in his writings (fr.389 Usener), opinions as to whether these oaths should be considered purely colloquialisms, as Hirzel 1902, 102 n.3 believes, are divided. See Obbink 1996, 425-26 ad Phld. De Piet. col. 29, lines 818-22. Schiesaro (forthcoming). Cf. Fowler's distinction 2002, 378 ad2.302, 5.~10. 5.5~1: duration, the agreement is for how long the compound is to last. 1.584-92, 5.91~24, 6.~7: properties of compounds, in particular those which form the basis of the classification into natural kinds. See also 5.309-10, where Lucretiw, trying to prove that every world is mortal, points to its mortal parts and in particular the gods' temples and their images that wear out and crack according to nature's laws. Cf. also 5.57, where the phrase is used in general terms and 6.906, where Lucretiw discusses by which specific law of nature it comes about that iron can be attracted by a magneL Schiesaro (forthcoming). Cf. also Long 1977, 86, 'Epicurw was anxious to free human actions from necessity. But in other respects he developed the model of a world which conforms to natural law.' Cabisius 1984-85, 113 sees between nature and the atoms an agreement similar to the

Notes:pages 195-203

50

51 52

53 54 55

56 57

58

59 60

61 62 63

64

65 66

267

relationship between Rome and her foederataetivitateswith Natura like Roma being superior and the allied states (i.e. the atoms) still retaining internal independence. Cf. Fowler 2002, 243 ad 2.168, who ascribes to nature seven functions: creatrix/daedala, provider, permitter/forbidder, demander, forcer, governor (gubt!mans), destroyer. For the notion of nature in Lucretius see also Merrill 1891; Heidel 1910; Sallmann 1962; Pellicer 1966; Clay 1983, 89; Gigandet 1996. Cf. 2.~. 5.795-96 with Campbell 2003 ad loc. On Personification in Lucretius see Gale 1994, 39 and passim. For the relationship of this monologue with 8ion 's Hellenistic diatribe see now Wallach 1976; Reinhardt 2002. Even Epicurus himself, who was by no means prepared to leave any space for teleological interpretation in his mechanics, in his ethical writings inevitably yielded to nature's personification (fr.469 Usener). Reich 1958, 125. Long 1977, 81. Frisk 1954, 418-19; Luther 1954, 86 who likens this idea of encloBoisacq 1950, s.v. Of)KoS. down around himself through a self-curse; sure to the oath-taker bringing a magic EPKoS Hiersche 1958; Callaway 1993, 18. For objections see Benveniste 1948; Leumann 1950, 91-92, Chantraine 1980. For ancient etymologies of 0pKoSsee Hirzel 1902, 3 n.5. With particular reference to Empedocles see Bollack 1958 and Schreckenberg 1964, 110-13. Bollack refen to a gloss in Hesychius: opK01·&c,µ01a~ay1005. However, his overall interpretation especially ofDK31 830 is rather unconvincing. Cf. Wright 1981, ad loc. Clay 1998, 126. Cf. Friedlander 1941. For Epicurus' theory of language and his rather hostile attitude towards the use of metaphon in philosophical treatises unless under certain conditions see Sedley 1973; Wigodsky 1995; and especially Fowler 2002, 181 ad 2.102 and 186-87. See also DeLacy 1939; Dalzell 1987; Long 1971a; Silk 1974; Uoyd 1987. For another striking example of this Lucretian technique of 'vivification' see Clay 1998, 121-37 with particular reference to Empedocles and more generally Clay 1998, 161-73. Empedocles (DK31 88, 89) appean to be conscious of linguistic and etymological issues. For the use of this metaphor see also 1.76-77, 2.1087, 5.90, 6.66. For the role of tmninw in Rome see oaY ad loc. About the relationship of Lucretius with the Stoics and possible consequences of other such Stoic connotations within DRN see Furley 1966, 30-31; Kleve 1978; Schmidt 1990 especially 170-81; Sedley 1998, 73-82; Fowler 2000, 140. For aevum see Berns 1976 and Luciani 2000, 120-26 with further bibliography. For another, more neutral (and thus less problematic) occurrence of the law-metaphor see 2.719 legibushisa, tadnn ratio distmninat omnia. Cf. also 2.251 conectiturwhich clearly corresponds to the Stoic notion of Fate as a chain of interconnected material causes (e'1pµ05). See Fowler 2002 ad loc.For the Stoic Latin imagery see Lapidge 1979 and 1980. However, Lapidge 1979, 356 believes that Manilius was the first to translate Stoic 'physical bonds' between various parts of the universe with fotdw. Cf. Fowler 2002, 342 ad2.254 and his remark that 'Jotdera may suggest the concrete contilia in the animwwhich the clinamm disrupts'. Cf. on the contrary Long 1977, 86, 'the fotdera naturoi are probably identical to the fotdera fati except in the case of liberovoluntas'. Schiesaro (forthcoming). Lapidge 1979 and 1980. Cf. also Verg. G. 2.47-72 with Gale 2000, 208-19.

17 The Greek Oath in the Roman World 1

The first major discussion of this text is that of Cumont 1901, who makes only brief mention of the oath's Greek influences.

268 2

3 4 5

6

7

8

9

10

11 12

13

14 15

16

17

Horkos

PHI CD-ROM Version 7. Packard Humanities Institute, Los Altos, CA. Oaths that are too brief or fragmentary to be analysed are omitted from the list. Most oaths sworn by judicial witnesses or officials at the start of their tenure have also been left out because they emphasise loyalty to the office and its responsibilities rather than to a ruler or city. The Roman texts mentioned are an oath by the Baeticans to Augustus (Gonzalez 1988), and oaths by the Aritians and the Assians to Gaius ( C/L ii 172; S,lLJ 797). For example, /Gii 2 127; /Gii 2 687; SEGxxv 381; SEGxli 322; I.Pergi 13; /OSPEi 2 401; 1./asos i 2; PH/Carla, Theangela 8.1; /Gix(l) 98; SylLJ366. Mileti, 3 148. Gods do not appear in all oaths: texts that are called opkot and begin with ~118rJoc.,J or eµµEv~. not µWc.,J or oµwµ1 tend not to list them. See, for example, SEG xxxv 59; IGSKi 9; BCH 112 (1988) 272-4; /Gii 2 97; /Gxii(5) 109. Oaths featuring strings of named divinities without this inclusive phrase: JG ii2 127; JG ii2 687; SEG xxix 405; JG xii (9) 190. I have found a couple of oaths naming only one god, Hermes: Mileti, 3145; SEGxxvii 261. Three divinities followed by 'all the gods and goddesses': SEGxli 50; /Gv(2) 344; perhaps /Gv(2) 419.1; /OSPEi 2 402. Longer strings of named divinities followed by 'all the gods and goddesses•: JGii 2 1135 (very similar to SEGxxxiii 638); SEGxxv 381; SEGxli 322; /.Pergi 13; 1./asosi 2; l.Iasos i 3; PHI Carla, Theangela, 8.1; JG ix ( 1) 98; F.Delphesiii I (each party swears by same gods); SylLJ 366 (this combination of 'Zeus, Land, Sun, Poseidon, Ares, Arean Athene and all ... • occurs repeatedly-see also IGSK iii 45); SEG xxvii 261; JG ix2 1109. Gods and heroes: /OSPE I' 401. 'I swear by all the gods': /Gv(l) 1390. Oaths to Seleucus are sworn not by the king himself, but by his TUXrJ. See, for example, /GSKxxiv.1 573, which lists Seleucus' T\l)('{I after the inclusive phrase 'all the gods and goddesses'. Use only of the future tense: /OSPE i2 402; 1./asosi 2. Brothers: JG ii2 127. Sons: JG v(2) 344. Offspring: JG ii 2 687; I.Pergi 13; SEGxxv 381; /GSKxxiv.1 573 to Seleucus and his offspring; SEG xxxviii 603 to Philip and his offspring; /GSK iii 45 to Antioch us and his offspring. SEG xii 322. lL 8-9. The closest expression I have found in an inscription is in SEGxxv 381: c.'.ion kat xpl)08a1 e)(8po15kQI ~1Ao15TOl5 QUT015.Xen. HelL 2.2.20, tells us that when the Peloponnesians made peace with Athens in 404 BC the Athenians swore TOVauTov e)(8pov icat 4>1Aov voµ'1~0VTa5AakE6a1µov'1015E1TEo8a1 kQI kQTa yT)VKQIKQTs chez Pin dare', Eos 60, 235-53. Kovacs, P.O. ( 1993) 'Zeus in Euripides' Medell',AJP114, 45-70. Kovacs, P.O. (1994) Euripides: Cyclops,Alastis, Mtdea, Cambridge MA. Kranz, W. (1944) 'Lukrez und Empedocles', Philologus96, 68-107. Krischer, E. 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Schiesaro, A (1990) Simulacrum and imago, Pisa. Schiesaro, A (1994) 'The palingenesis of the De &rum Natura', PCPS40, 81-107. Schiesaro, A (forthcoming) 'Rhetoric, politics and didaxis in Lucretius'. Schlesinger, E. (1983) 'On Euripides' Medea', trans. W. Moskalew, in Segal (ed.), 294-310 [first published in Hmnes94 (1966) 26-53]. Schmidt,J. (1990) Lulcrez.,der Keposund die Stoiker,Frankfurt. Schreckenberg, H. (1964) Ananke, Munich. Scott, L. (2005) Historical commentaryon Herodotus, Boole6, Leiden. Seaford, R.A.S. (1994) Reciprocityand ritual:.Homer and tragedyin the developing ci~ state,Oxford. Sealey, R (1975) 'Constitutional changes in Athens in 410 B.C.', CSCA 8, 271-95. Sealey, R (1987) The Athenian republic:democracyor the role of law 1,University Park PA Sedley, D.N. (1973) 'Epicurus, on Nature Book XXVIII', CrrmacheErrolanesi3,5-83. Sedley, D.N. (1998) Lucretius and the transformation of Greekwisdom, Cambridge. Sedley, D.N. (2003) 'Lucretius and the new Empedocles', UCS2.4, 1-12. Segal, C.P. (1996) 'Euripides' Medea:.vengeance, reversal and closure', PALLAS 45, 15-44. Segal, C.P. ( 1998) Aglaia: thepoetryof Aleman, Sappho,Pindar, Bacchylides,and Corinna, Lanham MD. Segal, E. (ed.) (1983) Oxford mulings in Greektragedy,Oxford. Sfyroeras, P. ( 1994) 'The ironies of salvation: the Aigeus scene in Euripides' Medea', CJ90, 125-42. Shaw, M. (1975) 'The female intruder: women in fifth-century drama', CPh 70, 255--66. Shear ,J .L. (2001) Polis and Panathenaia: the historyand developmentof Athena festiva~ Diss. Univ. of Pennsylvania. Shear,J.L. (forthcoming) 'Cultural change, space, and the politics of commemoration in Athens' in Osborne (ed.) Debating the Athenian cullural revolution: art, literatuTl!,phil.osophy,and politics 430-380, Cambridge. Shear, J .L. (in progress) Polis, demos, and revolution: respondingto oligarchyin Athens,

s

411-380 B.C.

Shear, T.L., Jr. (1971) 'The Athenian Agora: excavations of 1970', Hespe,ia 40, 241-79. Shear, T.L.,Jr. (1984) 'The Athenian Agora: excavations of 1980-1982', Hespe,ia 53, 1-57. Shear, T.L., Jr. (1993) 'The Persian destruction of Athens: evidence from Agora deposits•, Hespe,ia 62, 383-482. Shear, T.L.,Jr. (1994) "loovoµous- T' • A8flva5 eno111oaTT)v:the Agora and democracy' in Frost et al. (eds), 225-48. Shear, T.L., Jr. (1995) 'Bouleuterion, Metroon and the archives at Athens' in Hansen and Raaflaub (eds), 157-90. Sherman, DJ. (1994) 'Art, commerce, and the production of memory in France after World War I' in Gillis (ed.), 186-211. Shipley, D.R ( 1997) A commentaryon Plutarch s Life of A~laos. Oxford. Siewert, P. (1977) 'The ephebic oath in fifth-century Athens',JHS97, 102-11. Siewert, P. (1982) Die Trittyen Attilcasund die Heeresreform-47: 115 3.2~301: 218 n.9 3.269: 244 n.10 3.276-80: 107; 265 n.19 9.454: 242 n.26 10.149: 256 n.26 14.271-79: 217 n.6 14.272: 218 n.8 15.3~: 228 n.13 15.36--37: 265 n.19 19.258-60: 107; 265 n.19 23.566-613: 5 Od.

5.184-86: 265 n.19 9.528-35: 242 n.20 11.510-16: 242 n.29 14.148--73: 44; 228 n.13 19.302-311: 228 n.13 20.226-237: 228 n.13 23.579-85: 218 n.8 23.581--85: 97 HomericHymm to

Hmtll!S 27g....so;228n.U 274-77: 228 n.19 281:45 373--90: 228 n. 13 383-86: 228 n.20 389:45

toDffitde.-

201-11: 170

Hypaiclea Atla.

5 : 237 n.25; 238 n.28 13: 234 n.8, 11; 236 n.12 Dnt. l: 229 n.9 39: 55; 229 n.10; 232 n.50 £""-

4:58 7-8: 17; 254 n.48 10: 232 n.56 14: 248 n.13 29: 232 n.56 31: 230 n.25 32: 233 n.73 36: 253n.73

laeua

1.26: 232 n.62 1.51: 232 n.62 3.12: 56; 232 n.57 3.73: 428 n.13 4.20: 428 n.13 5.1: 236 n.12 5.4: 46 5.7-8: 237 n.22 5.18: 237 n.23 5.28--9: 77 5.47: 253 n.23 6.65: 58; 229 n.10; 233 n.71 7.3: 58; 233 n.72 9.24: 227 n.8 11.6: 229 n.9 11.18: 233 n.68 11.20-1: 236 n.l 12.9: 231 n.41 12.9--10: 40; 43 boaates 2.18: 230 n.20 7.33: 230 n.20 9.56-57: 254 n.55 15.l 7: 230 n.26 15.21: 51, 230 n.26 15. 173: 229 n.9 17: 236n.7 17.19: 79; 238 n.29 18.34: 230 n.20, 231 n.32 19.15: 229 n.9 19.15--16: 229 n.15 19.16: 232 n.52 19.44: 229 n.10 19.46: 229 n.10 Lucretius 1.1-145: 197 1.31-40: 197 1.76-77: 267 n.59; 267 n.60 1.584-92: 266 n.46 1.584-98: 200 2.102: 267 n.57 2.168: 267 n.50 2.251: 267 n.64 2.251--60: 201 2.254: 201; 267 n.65 2.301--02: 198 2.302: 266 n.33, 46 2.644-60: 267 n.51 2.712-13: 197 2.719: 267 n.63 2.1087: 267 n.59, 60 3.416: 266 n.36 3.781: 266 n.36 3.931-77: 199

301 5.55--58: 201 5.56-61: 266 n.46 5.57: 266 n.47 5.90: 267 n.59; 267 n.60 5.306--10: 266 n.46 5.309--10: 266 n.47 5.795--96: 267 n.51 5.916-24: 266 n.46 5.1025: 266 n.36 5.1155: 266 n.36 5.1443: 266 n.36 6.66: 267 n.59; 267 n.60 6.906: 266 n.47 6.906-07: 266 n.46 Lywrgus

uoc.

13: 230 n.23 76-78: 12 79: 232 n.46; 251 n.l 80-82: 16 112: 252 n.15 112-15: 252 n.18 124: 252 n.12; 253 n.25 124-27: 252 n.8 126: 252 n.12; 253 n.25; 254n.48 127: 252 n.21 143: 229 n.10 146: 231 n.31 147: 17

Lyms

1.18--19: 218 n.20 3.27-28: 228 n.21 3.28: 231 n.37 3.43: 231 n.37 4.1-3: 237 n.25 6.10: 257 n.39 9.15: 220 n.15 9.19: 57; 233 n.64; 229 n.10 9.21: 233 n.64 10:53 10.26: 233 n.65 10.30: 233 n.65 10.32: 229 n.10, n.11 12.43: 18 12.43--7: 29 13.20-2: 29 13.70-3: 252 n.15 14.22: 229 n.11 14.47: 230 n.27 15.1: 230 n.26 15.8: 233 n.67 19.3: 231 n.30 22. 7: 229 n.9 23.6: 143 26.8: 13 30.10: 13 31.1: 13; 219 n.26 31.2: 13 32.13: 227 n.7

Nlc:ancler AL

128--32: 257 n.30

Hurlcos

302 l!W: 257 n.32 455: 257 n.32

P.1-'• 1.3.2-3: 254 n.55 2.3.10-11: 245 n.1 3.5.8: 225 n.23 3.8.1: 238 n.1 3.15.1: 86; 238 n.2 5.12.5: 238 n.2 5.21.2-4: 239 n.17 5.24.9-11: 240 n.22 6.1.6 : 239 n.2 6.3.7: 87

Pbereaates fr. 102 K-A: 5 Pbilodemm DtPiet. col. 29, lines 818-22: 266 n.44

Pbllolam All DK: 195 n.32 Pbilonide9 fr. 7 K-A: 249 n.35 Plndar lstha 5.48: 241 n.10

Nntt. l.13f: 255 n.15 7: 243 n.!W 7.20-27: 94 7.48-52: 100 7.65-74: 99 8.32-34: 95

-6: 2.77.6: 144 3.20.1: 141; 142 3.20-24: 142 3.25.1: 143 3.2!">-50:142 3.31-32: 143 3.34: 33 3.36.2: 142 3.55.3: 143 3.56.2: 141, 146

303

Index Lororum 5.65.1-2: 141 5.66.2: 146 5.68.1: 16 5.68.2: 145 5.68.5: 251 n.12 5.68.5: 145 5.82.6: 19 5.86.2: 56 5.86.4: 56 4.1.2-4: 56 4.5.l: !Kl 4.24.2: 56 4.25.1: 56 4.74.2-5: 20 4.98.6: 38 4.105.l: 145 4.107.1: 145 4.122.6: 144 4.134: 225 n.58 5.16: 140 5.16.1: 145; 251 n.11 5.17.2: 19 5.18.5: 55 5.18.4: 55; M 5.18.5: !Kln.20 5.18.9: 24; 144; 218 n.15 5.19: 218 n.12 5.19.2: 144; 224 n.8 5.21: 224 n.8 5.21.2: 28 5.22.1-2: 28 5.25.1: 55 5.24.1: 218 n.12 5.25.1: 28 5.27.2: 28; 224 n.5 5.!Kl:28 5.!Kl.2:56 5.52.1: 145 5.55.5: 55 5.56.1: 224 n.8 5.57.l: 224 n.8 5.38.5: 17, 224 n .8 5.59.5: 55 5.42: 55 5.45-47: 224 n.8 5.46.4: 224 n.8 5.47: 226 n.49 5.47.1: 55 5.47.2: 55; M 5.47.8: 55; 54; 55 5.48.2: 17, 28 5.49-50: 240 n.28 5.50.4: 225 n.19 5.54: 225 n.25 5.56.1-2: 55 5.56.5: 38; 159 5.61.2: 55 5.80.2: 17 5.90: 71 6.18.1: 17 6.27.5: 18 6.44.2-5: 56 6.46.1: 56 6.46.2: 57

6.56.5: 221 n.!Kl 6.57.2: 221 n.!Kl 6.60.1: 18 6.61.1: 18 6.88.2: 57 7.18.2: 140, 145 7.57.5: 145 8.1: 251 n.6 8.9: !Kl 8.48.2: 18 8.48.2-5: 251 n.6 8.49: 18 8.55-54: 251 n.6 8.54.4: 18 8.65.~.l: 251 n.6 8.65-67: 251 n.6 8.66.1: 252 n.14 8.69.2: 18 8.75.2: 18 8.75.5: 19 8.75-75.l: 16 8.75.2-5: 16 8.75.5: 17 8.81.2: 18 8.87: 144 8.92.2: 252 n.15 8.95: 55

Xenopbon Ap. 1.10: 226 n.46 9.1-7: 259 n.6 Anab. 2.2.4: 261 n.46 2.2.8: 226 n.46 2.5.26: 226 n.46 5.2.24: 226 n.46 Alla.Pol. 2.17: 224 n.6

~-2.5.7-15:

259 n.7 Hell. 2.2.19--25: 25 2.2.20: 22; 224 n.5; 268 n.12 2.4.20-22: 172 2.4.50: 225 n.19 5.2.21-25: 225 n.19 5.2.21-51: 240 n.29 5.4.5--6: 226 n.46 5.5.5: 225 n.19 4.2.16: 51 4.7.2-5: 225 n.25 5.1.29: 225 n.25 5.2.2!>-29: 141 5.5.26: 21; 224 n.5 6.5.6: 175 6.5.18: 57 6.~.19--20: 25 7.1.42: 224 n.5 7.5.10: 248 n.15 7.5.4: 226 n.56

Hin-. ll.!>-7: 259 n.8

Mm&.

l.1.18: 15 l.2.9: 248 n.15 4.4.16: 19 Poroi 4.52: 219 n.22

lmaipdom IC iv 72:1.14-15: 251 n.59 IC iv 72:1.24-25: 251 n.59 IC iv 72:1.58-59: 251 n.59 IC iv 72:2.12-17: 218 n.19 IC iv 72:2.5!>-5.l, 251 n.59 IC iv 72:5.42-4: 251 n.59 IC iv 72.5.!>-9:40 IG i1 115 (i' 104) 11-U: 251 n.57 IG i' 4.820: 255 n.M IG i' 5.5: 255 n.55 IG i' 11: 55 IG i' 14, see ML 40 IG i' 14.21-25: 225 n.59 IG i'l5: 22 IG i'21: 25 IG i'27: 254 n.50 IG i' 57, see ML 47 IG i'57.45-56: 52 IG i'57.46-47: 252 n.21 IG i'57.52: 225 n.29 IG i' 59:225n.52 IG i'59.7-12: 52 IG i' 59. 7-9: 252 n.21 1G i' 40, sec ML 52 IG i' 40.21-24: 252 n.21 IG i' 40.21-56: 52 IG i' 48: 218 n.12; also sec ML56 IG i'48.l!>-21: 52 IG i' 48.17-20: 252 n.21 IG i' 55: 218 n.12 IG i'55.ll-14: 55, 56,218 n.12, 226 n.54 IG i' 54: 218 n.12 IG i' 54.20-27: 55, 226 n.54 IG i'61.18--21: 252 n.21 IG i'62: 25 IG i'62.18--21: 55 IG i'62.25: 252 n.21 IG i' 71: 254 n.50 IG i'75: 256 n.14 IG i' 75.5--6: 55 IG i' 76 218 n.12, 256 n.14 1Gi'76.17-18: 55 lG i' 82: 254 n.50 IG i'85: 226 n.49 IG i'85.5: 55 IG i'85.6-7: 55 IG i' 92: 252 n.15 IG i' 102: 252 n.15 IG i' 102.12-14: 255 n.45 IG i' 104: 252 n.15, 14; 254 n.51 IG i' 105: 14; 221 n.27; 254 n.51

304 IG i' 118: 2~ n.14; also see ML87 IG i' 119: 252 n.13 IG i' 123: 252 n.13 IG i' 125.23-29: 253 n.43 IG i' 126: 252 n.13 IG i' 127: 252 n.14 IG i' 131.l-9: 253 n.23 IG i'227: 252 n.14 IG i' 228: 252 n.14 IG i'236: 254 n.51 IG i' 237: 254 n.51 IG i' 375.1-3: 252 n.13 IG i'375.5-7: 253 n.39 IG i' 1453, see ML 45 IG ii2 1: 252 n.14 IG ii' 3: 252 n.13 IG ii2 6: 252 n.13 IG ii2 13: 252 n.13 IG ii2 16: 218 n.12 IG ii2 17: 252 n.13 IG ii 2 42 = Rhodes & Osborne 23: 23 IG ii2 43 = Rhodes & Osborne 22: 22, 23, 24 IG ii2 96: 218 n.12 IG ii2 97: 268n.5; 269n.l 7 IG ii2 102: 218 n.12 IG ii2 103, 105 + 523 = Rhodes & Osborne 33, 34:25 IG ii2 111 = Rhodes & Osborne 39: 23; 223 n.55; 236 n.14 IG ii2 l 12 = Rhodes & Osborne 41: 222n.50 IG ii2 l 16 = Rhodes & Osborne 44: 25, 218 n.12 IG ii 2 127: 268n.4, 6, 9, 12, 15; 269 n.17, 20 IG ii2 175: 218 n.12 IG ii2 2~ = Rhodes & Osborne 76: 24 IG ii 2 448.24-26: 253 n.43 IG ii2 555.6-7: 253 n.43 IG ii2 646.29-31: 253 n.43 IG ii2 657.61-63: 253 n.43 IG ii2 687: 268n.4, 6, 9; 269 n.17, 20 IG ii2 l 126.3-4: 54 IG ii1 1135: 268n.7, 12, 15 IG ii2 II 76: 2~ n.9 IG ii2 l l83 = Rhodes & Osborne 63. 1-27: 15 IG ii2 1237 = Rhodes & Osborne 5: 15 IG ii2 1241: 2~ n.9

Horkos IG ii2 l244.3-5: 253 n.35 IG ii2 l~l.l 7-19: 253 n.34 IG ii 2 1629.183-90: 253 n.34 IG ii2 2492: 75 IG ii2 2499: 236 n.10 IG ii2 2501: 75, 2~ n.10 IG v(l) 1390 = LSCG 65: 257 n.40; 268n. 7 1Gv(2) 344: 268n.7, 9; 269n.20 1Gv(2) 419.l: 268n.7 IG ix(l) 32 = Syll. iii 647: 222 n.40 IG ix(l) 98: 268n.4, 7 IG ix(2) ll09: 268n.7 IG xii(2) 526 = Rhodes & Osborne 83: 54 IG xii(5) 109: 225 n.29, 226 n.48, 268 n.5 IG xii(8) 262 (rev. & suppl. SEG xxxviii 851 8.19-21): 21 IG xii(9) 190: 268n.6, 15; 269n.20 IGSK i 9: 268n.5; 269n.18 IGSKiii 45: 268n.7, 9, 12, 15; 269 n.20 IGSK xxiv.l 573: 268n.8, 9, 12, 15; 269 n.17, 19, 20, 39 1K Mylasa 1-3 = Rhodes & Osborne 54: 223n.55 ILS iii 8781: 203 IOSPE i2 401: 268n.4, 7, 12, 15; 269 n.21 IOSPE i2 402: 268n.7, 8, 15; 269 n.17, 39 Miln. i, 3 145 = Syll. iii 577.42-48: 20; 268n.6; 269n.20 Miln. i, 3 148: 268n.5 ML2: 21 ML 5: 262 n. 71 ML 5.23-51: 20 ML 13 A 14-16: 21 ML 13 A 15-16: 223 n.55 ML 20.ll-14: 20 ML30: 21 ML32: 21 ML 40 = IG i' 14: 22 ML 45 §12 = IG i' 1453 §10: 13 ML 47 = IG i' 37: 22 ML 52 = IG i' 40: 22 ML 56 = IG i'48: 22 ML 67 bis.4-10: 222 n.45 ML 87 = IG i' 118: 223 n.59

OGI 229 = SdA 492 = 1K Magnesia ad Sipylum I: 20 OGIS 523: 203 SdA297: 20 SdA ii 263. 16-38: 35 SEG ix 4, see ML 5 SEG xxi 519.16: 253 n.35 SEG xxi 527: 75 SEG xxv 381: 268n.4, 7, 9, 12, 15,20 SEG xxvii 261: 268n.6, 7; 269n.20 SEG xxvii 942 = Rhodes & Osborne 78.26-35: 21 SEG xxviii 45: 254 n.55 SEG xxviii 60.92-94: 253 n.43 SEG xxviii 408, see ML 67 bis SEG xxix 405: 268n.6, 12, 15; 269 n.17 SEG xxxi 985: 21 SEG xxxiii 638: 269n.20 SEG xxxv 59: 268n.5; 269n.17 SEG xxxvi 750 + 752 = Rhodes & Osborne 85. A+B: 21 SEG xxxvii 340 = Rhodes & Osborne 14: 222 n.40 SEG xxxviii 603: 268n.9; 269n.20, 27, 39 SEG xii 50: 268n. 7 SEG xii 322: 268n.4, 7, 10; 269 n.17, 20 SEG xlvii 1563: 20 SEG 1168 col. A2.5, 30, 51: 253 n.35 SVA 2.110.3-5: 33 Syll. iii 4: 20 Syll. iii 360: l 9 Syll. iii 366: 268n.4, 7, 12; 269 n.17, 20 Syll. iii 526 = IC iii 4.8: 19, 223 n.55 Syll. iii 527 = Buck 120 = IC i 9.41-43: 222 n. 35 Syll. iii 797: 268n.3 Syll. iii 826.C (revised rn iii. 4 278): 222n.37 Tod ii 141=SdA287.14-17: 20 Tod ii 202 = Rhodes & Osborne 101. 57-66: 21 Tod ii 204 = Rhodes & Osborne 88: 219 n.22