Hong Kong's Watershed : The 1967 Riots [1 ed.] 9789888052363, 9789622090897

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Gary Ka-wai Cheung

To Christine, Henry and Crystal

Hong Kong University Press The University of Hong Kong Pokfulam Road Hong Kong www.hkupress.org © Hong Kong University Press 2009 First published 2009 Reprinted 2010, 2011, 2014 ISBN 978-962-209-089-7 All rights reserved. No portion of this publication may be reproduced or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic or mechanical, including photocopy, recording, or any information storage or retrieval system, without prior permission in writing from the publisher. British Library Cataloguing-in-Publication Data A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library.

10 9 8 7 6 5 4 Printed and bound by Goodrich Int’l Printing Co., Ltd. in Hong Kong, China

Contents

Preface

vii

Introduction The 1967 riots: A watershed in the postwar history of Hong Kong

1

Chapter 1

Prelude to the 1967 riots

9

Chapter 2

Labour dispute at the Hong Kong Artificial Flower Works: The immediate trigger of the 1967 riots

23

Chapter 3

The Garden Road incident on May 22, 1967

43

Chapter 4

People’s Daily editorial on June 3 and the general strikes

57

Chapter 5

The Sha Tau Kok incident and bomb attacks

71

Chapter 6

Britain’s plan for emergency evacuation of Hong Kong

95

Chapter 7

Hawks and doves within the British government in handling the disturbances

101

Chapter 8

The arson attack on the office of British chargé d’affaires and the murder of Lam Bun

109

Chapter 9

Finale to the Hong Kong-style Cultural Revolution

121

Chapter 10

Impact of the 1967 riots

131

Chapter 11

Recollections and reflections by key players in the disturbances

143

Appendices

221

Notes

227

Bibliography

237

Index

239

Preface

The 1967 riots appear to have vanished from Hong Kong history if you tour around the Hong Kong Museum of History which features The Hong Kong Story, a permanent exhibition at the government-run museum. The exhibition traces the city’s development from prehistoric times to the reunification with China in 1997. However, none of the over 4,000 exhibits displayed in the galleries is related to the 1967 disturbances. In the “Modern Metropolis and the Return to China” gallery, there is no mention of the disturbances in the graphic panels. It looks as if the 1967 riots, widely seen as a watershed in the postwar history of Hong Kong, have never taken place at all. The omission of the 1967 disturbances in The Hong Kong Story is testament to the Hong Kong government’s subtle efforts to play down that controversial chapter in Hong Kong history. The public are denied access to nearly all confidential documents related to the riots held by the Public Records Office in Hong Kong. The leftist camp in Hong Kong has also regarded the riots as a taboo in the past four decades. Thus, despite their importance, there have been few publications written on the 1967 events. I developed interest in the 1967 riots when I wrote for Yazhou Zhoukan’s special issue on the 30th anniversary of the Cultural Revolution in 1996. I was writing on the 1967 riots, which were seen as a spillover from the Cultural Revolution. During the process, I interviewed several participants of the disturbances and later decided to write a book that would describe the course and impact of the events in detail. It would be examining the events from an objective perspective and I was hoping that it would fill a vacuum in Hong Kong history. By early 1999, I had interviewed more than a dozen participants of the disturbances and former Hong Kong government officials including Jack Cater, who was special assistant to the governor in 1967. The book, which had been written in Chinese, was published in 2000. It has drawn attention from readers who are interested in the historical development of Hong Kong. In 2001, the then chief executive Tung Chee-hwa awarded the Grand Bauhinia Medal to Yeung Kwong, who was the director of the All-Circles Anti-Persecution

viii

Preface

Struggle Committee during the 1967 disturbances. I was subsequently approached by a number of expatriate readers who asked whether there would be an English version of my book. Encouraged by my friends and readers, I began writing an English account of that tumultuous period of Hong Kong. The declassification of British government files since 2000 has also enabled me to update my original work and provide readers with a complete picture of the historical event. My thanks go to Hong Kong University Press for their support and encouragement. I am also grateful to Dr Ray Yep Kin-man and Dr Colin Day for their encouragement and advice. Readers who would like to share their views on the book are welcome to email to [email protected].

Introduction The 1967 riots: A watershed in the postwar history of Hong Kong After the Hong Kong Artificial Flower Works sacked about 650 workers in April 1967 for refusing to accept new work regulations, few would have expected it to have repercussions that are still felt today. In those days when Hong Kong was described by some Western media as a colonial “sweatshop”, sacking workers was routine as factory workers had virtually no protection for their basic labour rights and dismissals by employers without compensations were an everyday fact of life. Factory workers in the colony were expected to toil more than 12 hours a day without taking leave. However, the April 1967 sacking of the workers was the immediate trigger for Hong Kong’s worst political violence that would claim 51 lives and prompt a huge social shake-up. On May 6, 21 people were arrested when a group of sacked workers tried to prevent goods from being transported out of the factory. Leftist unions staged protests over the arrests and demanded the release of the arrested workers. Lau Chin-shek, a mainland-born worker who became a prominent unionist from the 1970s onwards and a Hong Kong legislator from 1991 to 2008, recalled that he was thrilled when he read about the workers’ fight for their legitimate rights in the newspaper. “I thought that the workers in San Po Kong voiced our discontent and grievances,” he said. Lau, who was working in a factory in Kwai Chung after fleeing from mainland China in 1963, said that he was exploited by the factory owner and was paid a daily wage lower than what his local colleagues received. He was disgusted with the suppression of workers by the riot police on May 6, 1967 and was one of those who showed sympathy towards the workers in the labour dispute. Liu Yat-yuen, then president of Sun Luen Film Company, also sympathized with the workers in the labour dispute. When the leftist camp launched the struggle campaign against the Hong Kong government, the veteran leader of the leftist film industry believed that it was nothing more than a struggle through nonviolent means like propaganda. Both he and Lau regretted that the anti-British campaign subsequently resorted to violent means.

2

The Hong Kong government was also puzzled as to why the labour dispute escalated into bloody disturbances. Jack Cater, then deputy colonial secretary and special assistant to the governor, revealed in an interview in 1999 that there was a tacit understanding between the colonial administration and the leftist camp on conditional tolerance of the protests. He said that he had met some leaders of the leftist camp before the demonstrations and was assured that the demonstrators would leave Government House after their protest and would not cause any trouble. At the beginning, the government was tolerant of the protest and exercised restraint towards the leftists. But Cater was upset that after a few days, the leftist camp began to “stir up troubles” and the protests became violent disturbances. He said it was unfortunate that the demonstration turned into riots. Although he insisted that the action taken by the Hong Kong government during the upheaval was necessary for maintaining order in the city, he admitted that there were some individual cases of abuse of power by the police. It appeared that the escalation of a labour dispute into a full-scale anti-British campaign also caught the then Chinese premier Zhou Enlai off guard. During the early stage of the anti-British protests, Zhou, who had adopted a pragmatic approach towards Hong Kong since 1949, repeatedly reminded mainland officials responsible for Hong Kong affairs of the need to exercise restraint in the struggle against the British authorities. He dismissed the idea of copying the practices of the Red Guards, which went on rampage in the mainland, to Hong Kong and ruled out the possibility of a military invasion of Hong Kong. He had reservations about the ultra-leftist actions staged by the leftist leaders in Hong Kong who were less amenable to control from Beijing as the central leadership was paralysed by internal power struggle. However, it was politically impossible for him to publicly stop the struggle in Hong Kong during the height of the Cultural Revolution. The Communist Party leadership’s lack of consensus on how to handle the situation in Hong Kong also helped fuel the escalation of the anti-British protests. The left wing was inspired by Beijing’s support for the anti-British struggle in the propaganda front, particularly in the People’s Daily editorial on June 3, 1967, which called on the Hong Kong Chinese to “be ready to respond to the call of the motherland and smash the reactionary rule of the Hong Kong British authorities”. The confrontation between the leftists and the government escalated in the second half of 1967 when extremists planted bombs on the streets. On July 8, 1967, five Hong Kong policemen were killed and eleven wounded when the police post in Sha Tau Kok, New Territories, came under machine-gun fire during border violence with mainland militia. The disturbances brought the colony to a standstill and triggered an exodus of capital amid fears of a military invasion from China. Secret files recently declassified by Britain’s National Archives showed that an interim report was prepared by the British government in July 1967 on the prospects for withdrawal from the colony if a military invasion from China was forced upon the British government.

Introduction

3

The bloody disturbances claimed 51 lives, with 15 of the deaths caused by bomb attacks. A total of 1,936 people were convicted during the 1967 riots. Of those, 465 were jailed for “unlawful assembly”, 40 for possessing bombs and 33 for explosion-related offences. The situation calmed down in December after Beijing reined in the Hong Kong leftists. As Italian historian and philosopher Benedetto Croce contended that “all history is contemporary”, the 1967 riots illustrate how events of the past are very much alive in the present. The event, widely seen as a watershed in the postwar history of Hong Kong, is not just a chapter in history but also has relevance to Hong Kong today. The riots prompted the colonial administration to introduce sweeping social reforms in labour rights, education, public housing and social welfare. The disturbances also reinforced the entrenched division between the left wing and mainstream society. The traditional leftist camp had developed a “siege mentality” after the riots as they felt that they were marginalized by mainstream society. Even a decade after the handover, such mentality still exists among some leaders of the traditional leftist camp. The 1967 riots were certainly one of the most controversial events in the history of Hong Kong. The government’s official annual report, the Hong Kong Yearbook 1967, describes it as a “communist-initiated confrontation” during which communist organizations in Hong Kong sought to impose their will on the people by intimidating workers and fomenting work stoppages, riots and “indiscriminate violence”. However, to this day, the leftist camp still insists that the riots were a “righteous mass movement” in the wake of colonial oppression by the Hong Kong government and had forced the authorities to introduce social reforms. There is even controversy over how the event should be labelled. The pre-handover government described the disturbances as “riots”, while the pro-Beijing organizations call it an “anti-British and counter-violence” movement (fanying kangbao). The 1967 riots were widely seen as a spillover from the Cultural Revolution that Mao Zedong had begun in the mainland a year earlier. It was obvious that such a large-scale event would not have taken place in Hong Kong in 1967 if the Cultural Revolution had not happened in the mainland. What was more intriguing was that the leftist camp did not express support for the Star Ferry riots in 1966, which took place a month before Mao Zedong launched the Cultural Revolution, and pro-Beijing newspapers even called for Hong Kong people’s co-operation with the colonial government to restore social order. It spoke volumes for the impact of the Cultural Revolution on instigating the 1967 riots. The Hong Kong branch of Xinhua News Agency (or New China News Agency) could not evade the responsibility for instigating the leftist masses during the disturbances. Although the terrorist means employed during the uproar was broadly condemned at the time and the impact of the Cultural Revolution could not be dismissed, many independent observers agree that the social background to the

4

disturbances cannot be ignored. Prior to the riots, the colonial administration was criticized for their slow progress in improving welfare standards and education attainment to the level commensurate with rapid economic development in Hong Kong. Of the 10 to 14-year-olds in the 1966 census, only 13 per cent received some form of secondary education. The colonial government did not introduce free primary education until 1972 and nine-year compulsory education was implemented six years later. Derek Davies, editor of the Far Eastern Economic Review, wrote in June 1967 that the people involved in the riots were essentially frustrated lower-middleclass people. “The government must not be allowed to convince itself that the overwhelming expression of public support for its recent actions in maintaining law and order means that the community wholeheartedly approves of its policies in normal times,” he wrote.1 The report of the Commission of Inquiry on the 1966 riots, sparked by Star Ferry’s fare increase in April that year, had revealed the largely sociological background to the disturbances. However, the colonial administration had not taken any action to address the problems and the underlying social unrest was allowed to escalate in the run-up to the labour dispute in San Po Kong. The British government, which was led by the Labour Party at the time, stepped up its pressure on the Hong Kong government to implement social reforms after the riots. Members of British Parliament and even senior officials from the Labour government called for greater influence on the Hong Kong government to implement the long-awaited reform in the colony. According to the files declassified by the British government several years ago, Lord Malcolm Shepherd, the minister of state at the Commonwealth Office, wrote in a note to the secretary of state in May 1968 that “much [was] needed to be done in Hong Kong” when he commented on the pros and cons of extending Sir David Trench’s tenure as governor. “The disturbances of last year mark, in some respects, the end of a long chapter of laissez-faire. There is a need for change,” he wrote. The British government noted that before the riots, the business community and many unofficial members of the Executive Council and Legislative Council resisted the introduction of social reforms. The riots unexpectedly gave London an opportunity to press ahead with social reforms in Hong Kong. One unintended consequence of the riots was the renewed momentum for reforms which helped overcome the opposition of the business community to improve the conditions of the labour force. In a memorandum to Britain’s Defence and Overseas Policy Committee in May 1967, secretary of state for Commonwealth affairs Herbert Bowden said, “the employers [in Hong Kong], who have in the past shown a considerable amount of resistance to reforms are at present very anxious about the general situation and we could immediately carry through extensive and long-overdue labour reforms. It would be welcomed by the average workers and would give us a better moral position.”2

Introduction

5

In an interview in 1999, Jack Cater described the 1967 riots as a watershed of Hong Kong’s postwar history. “The government learned the lesson from the riots and introduced a series of reforms. Certainly we took the opportunity of producing a new system and reform,” he said. “Before 1967, there was no real channel of contact between the government and the people. I don’t think there would have been any reform at all [without the riots],” he said. The riots prompted the colonial administration to introduce nine-year compulsory education, shorter working hours and an ambitious public housing project. In December 1967, the government amended the law to reduce the maximum working hours for women and young people to 57 hours a week, which would ultimately be reduced to 48 hours a week by 1971. The colonial government sped up social reforms after Murray MacLehose, a career British diplomat, succeeded David Trench as governor in 1971. The government introduced free primary education for all in 1972 and implemented compulsory nine-year education in 1978. MacLehose introduced the ten-year housing programme in 1973 to alleviate housing problems in the colony. The government also introduced the public assistance scheme for the disadvantaged in April 1971. The 1967 riots aroused the “Hong Kong consciousness” and a sense of belonging to the city among the young generation. Members of the public, particularly those who were better educated, became increasingly critical of the social problems in Hong Kong. ICAC 25th Anniversary, a booklet published by the Independent Commission Against Corruption in 1999, notes that “people were getting sick of corruption and more and more in the late 1960s began to express their anger at corrupt officials and ineffective government. The riots of 1966–67 had challenged many old assumptions about government. The people of Hong Kong increasingly began to openly condemn corruption, and the indifference of the government towards it.”3 It is beyond doubt that the growing awareness of social inequalities among Hong Kong’s young generation at the time served as the catalyst for student and social movements in the 1970s. In an attempt to win support for quelling the leftist-inspired disturbances, the colonial administration also strived to foster the “Hong Kong identity” among the local populace. Matthew Turner, a former anthropology professor at the University of Hong Kong, notes that “it was not until 1967 that the rhetoric of ‘citizenship’, of ‘community’ and ‘belonging’ was first deployed on a grand scale as anti-communist counter-propaganda. By the end of the sixties the idea of ‘community’ was no longer an irrelevance to the majority of the population. For alongside the official discourse, a local and largely unarticulated sense of identity had begun to emerge in Hong Kong.”4 In the aftermath of the 1967 riots, many Hong Kong people began to treasure the colony — a “refugee society” that served as a haven for those fleeing from political upheavals in the mainland — as their “genuine home”. Nelson Chow Wing-sun, professor of social work and social administration at the University

6

of Hong Kong, said, “at the time of the 1967 riots, I felt Hong Kong people were generally lukewarm towards the government but they were disgusted with the acts of the leftists. Hong Kong people realized that they had to unite together in support for the government. From then on, Hong Kong people appeared to start treasuring this place. At least Hong Kong was their haven where they were sheltered from the disasters arising from the Cultural Revolution.”5 The disturbances have been embedded in the collective memory of Hong Kong people and still have impact on local politics today. At an election forum during the 1995 Legislative Council election, Andrew To Kwan-hang, campaign manager of Democratic Party candidate Mak Hoi-wah who contested in the Kowloon Northeast constituency, argued that Chan Yuen-han, a candidate representing the Federation of Trade Unions (FTU), should bear the responsibility for the bloody riots. The FTU contended that the social ills should not be ignored and the incident had facilitated social reforms in Hong Kong. When waves of lay-offs and pay cuts swept across Hong Kong in 1998, some union leaders reminded the then chief executive Tung Chee-hwa of the painful lessons of the 1967 riots in the hope that he would beware how he handled the social discontents exacerbated by the Asian financial crisis. It is an irony that Beijing has inherited the official discourse deployed by the colonial government during the 1967 riots. Exploiting Hong Kong people’s phobia about social upheavals, the Hong Kong government emphasized the importance of maintaining “prosperity and stability” amid the mayhem wrought by the leftists. After the signing of the Joint Declaration on Hong Kong’s future, Beijing took the banner from Britain by using the catchphrase of “maintaining Hong Kong’s prosperity and stability” since the 1980s to sum up its policies towards the city. Despite the importance of the 1967 riots, the disturbances were rarely covered in Hong Kong’s history. The leftist camp, which hails the disturbances as a “righteous patriotic movement” in 1967, has regarded the riots as a taboo in the past four decades and Beijing has seldom mentioned the event. The most obvious explanation for the leftist hush is Beijing’s long-stated disapproval of the disturbances. In early 1968, Zhou Enlai criticized ultra-leftists in Beijing and the Xinhua News Agency’s Hong Kong branch for having mistakenly instigated the riots. He ordered them to stop their agitation. However, the real reason for the leftists’ reticence is a secret understanding in the early 1980s that China would neither raise the issue of “colonial oppression” nor attempt to settle old scores from the 1967 riots and those from the 1950s deportations of more than 100 leftists. Choi Wai-hang, a veteran leftist leader detained at the Victoria Road Detention Centre (Mount Davis Concentration Camp) in Western District in 1967, revealed that Qi Feng (祈烽), deputy director of the Xinhua News Agency’s Hong Kong branch during the riots, admitted to him that Beijing reached a settle-no-old-scores agreement with Britain when the two countries were hammering out the terms of the Joint Declaration. The deal was seen as a means to foster stability in post-handover Hong Kong, and Beijing has since remained tight-

Introduction

7

lipped about it. Both sides stuck to the approach of “letting sleeping dogs lie” in the decades following the riots. That explains why Beijing has over the past two decades seldom mentioned, let alone condemned, “British oppression” of “compatriots in Hong Kong” since 1949, including the crackdown of the 1967 riots. In an interview with the author in 2002, Zhang Junsheng (張浚生), former deputy director of the Xinhua News Agency’s Hong Kong branch, said that Beijing saw no point in bringing up the 1967 riots again during the transitional period prior to the handover. “The 1967 incident is part of history, and attempts to settle old scores are not conducive to harmony and unity in Hong Kong,” he said. The 1967 riots are seldom mentioned in mainland publications about Hong Kong’s history. Choi said he understood that Zhou Nan (周南), former director of the Xinhua News Agency’s Hong Kong branch, repudiated the disturbances on the ground that it was a struggle wrongly staged by the leftists. But old wounds were re-opened in July 2001 when Yeung Kwong, director of the All-Circles Anti-Persecution Struggle Committee during the 1967 riots, was awarded the Grand Bauhinia Medal. Pro-democracy politicians saw it as an official endorsement of the anti-British riots and bombing campaign that rocked Hong Kong back then, and angry calls flooded popular radio talk shows. The decision sparked a debate on whether the Hong Kong government was trying to rewrite colonial history and reverse mainstream condemnation of the riots. Official reassessment of the riots actually started within a few months after China resumed sovereignty over Hong Kong. Yeung Kwong and a group of his fellow ageing leftists were invited by Tung Chee-hwa to a tea gathering at Government House in September 1997. The then secretary for justice Elsie Leung Oi-sie, who comes from a pro-Beijing family, told Wu Tai-chow (who was sentenced to three years’ imprisonment in 1967 for publishing “seditious articles”) that the 1967 incident had been handled in a way that was very “unfair” to the “patriots” and pledged that the Hong Kong government would “tackle the issue gradually”. Elsie Leung’s uncle, Wong Cho-fun, was detained at Victoria Road Detention Centre in Western District during the riots. He was the former principal of Chung Hwa Middle School which was de-registered in 1968. The award of the SAR’s top honour to Yeung was the latest in a series of such awards to be bestowed, since the handover, on key figures in the 1967 riots. Lee Chark-tim, former president of the Federation of Trade Unions and a member of the All-Circles Anti-Persecution Struggle Committee, was awarded the Grand Bauhinia Medal in July 1999. Wong Kin-lap, the committee’s vice-director and former principal of Hon Wah College, was given the Gold Bauhinia Star in the same year. Liu Yat Yuen, former president of pro-Beijing film company Sil-Metropole Organisation Ltd., was awarded the Silver Bauhinia Star in 2000. Liu, who died in 2002, was a member of the Standing Committee of the Struggle Committee.

8

The “1967 riots” is obviously a subject rarely studied in Hong Kong history. This is attributable to the dearth of historical materials and reluctance of the participants in the riots to recollect the incident. Despite the enduring consequences of the riots, there has been no English publication that documents the disturbances and analyses their repercussions over the past four decades, apart from John Cooper’s Colony in Conflict, which was published in 1969. However, the book was largely based on newspaper cuttings at the time and stood on the standpoint of the colonial administration, without recording the recollection of the participants from the leftist camp. The declassification of British archives related to the 1967 riots since 2000 provides an opportunity for a more in-depth study of this chapter in Hong Kong history. The present volume cites the British secret files substantially so as to present the British government’s deliberation on the strategy to handle the 1967 riots and the Sino-British relationship. However, any account of the 1967 riots is incomplete without the recollection of the key players in the incident. This book covers interviews with more than a dozen key figures in the disturbances, including the then special assistant to the governor Jack Cater and then deputy director of the Hong Kong branch of Xinhua News Agency Liang Shangyuan. In an attempt to present a more balanced and comprehensive account of the event, I have also interviewed the worker whose beating by the foreman of the Artificial Flower Works triggered off the riots, some victims of the riots, leftists who planted bombs on the streets, and policemen who helped quell the disturbances.

1

Prelude to the 1967 riots

For passers-by near Star Ferry pier in Central and commuters rushing there to catch ferries, April 4, 1966 appeared to be just another uneventful day. Yet the appearance of a 25-year-old man in the Star Ferry Concourse at 11 a.m. upset the hush and changed the course of Hong Kong history. The young man wore a black jacket with the English words “Staging hunger strike, Opposing fare increase” painted on its back, and the Chinese and English words “Support Elsie” were painted on its left and right sleeves respectively. The man, So Sau-chung, vowed to go on a hunger strike until the Star Ferry withdrew its proposal to increase the fare of ferry service between Central and Tsim Sha Tsui. The one-man hunger strike was unprecedented in Hong Kong where demonstrations rarely happened before the early 1970s. People crowded around him and his actions drew sympathy from some members of the public and 11 young people, including a young man called Lo Kei, joined the hunger strike. But even So himself did not expect that his action would spark a riot two days later. The Star Ferry lodged an application to the government on October 1, 1965 for increasing the fare for first-class seats by 10 cents and the charge for a monthly ticket would be increased from HK$8 to HK$10. The ferry service was then a vital link between Hong Kong and Tsim Sha Tsui. The unpopular decision drew protests from the Urban Council, the Chinese Chamber of Commerce, and the Hong Kong and Kowloon Trade Union Council. Most of the local newspapers’ editorials also opposed the fare increase. The fare rise was proposed against the backdrop of an economic crisis since the mid-1960s. The then urban councillor Elsie Elliott (now Elsie Tu) noted that there were bankruptcies and bank runs in 1964 and 1965. “Many poor people lost all their savings in banks that had overspeculated, and they found that the government had made no laws to protect them. Just at this most inopportune time, the monopoly companies controlling utilities began to talk of fare rises. It started with the Star Ferry Company, but the Kowloon Motor Bus Company was waiting on the sidelines to do likewise. In fact, they were all lined up for the kill,” Tu wrote.1

10

Hong Kong’s Watershed

The proposed 10-cent fare increase, though negligible nowadays, was substantial in 1966 when a newspaper cost 10 cents and many low-income workers only earned a few dollars a day. The Star Ferry’s application for fare increase, which was the first among public utilities at the time, was widely seen as a harbinger of further surges in fees and charges that would affect people’s livelihood. Elsie Elliott, who sympathized with the plight of low-income community, started a petition requesting a delay in any talk of fare rises while workers were still suffering from the aftermath of the economic crisis. However, the overwhelming opposition to the fare increase failed to impress the Transport Advisory Committee, which recommended on March 17, 1966 to the government that the first-class fare of Star Ferry be increased by 5 cents and the charge for monthly tickets be increased to $12. The government subsequently announced a series of increases in government charges, such as postage increase for mail to mainland China and 10 per cent increase of rents for public flats. Members of the public were generally discontented with the government’s approval of the fare increases. A newspaper ran an eye-catching headline, “Public opinion is not even worth a 5-cent coin”, with the connotation that the administration ignored public opinion. Henry Hu Hung-lick, the then urban councillor and founder of Hong Kong Shue Yan University, criticized the committee for being manipulated by the government. He said that the “opinions” of the committee were tantamount to those of the government. Hu urged the government to shut the “door of fare increase” right away. Realizing that nothing would prevent fares from being increased, Elsie Elliott urged leaders of various organizations to speak up urgently “before it was too late”. So, who was a translator at the time, was asked by two policemen at 4 p.m. on April 5, the second day of his hunger strike, to leave the Star Ferry concourse. He was arrested after he refused to do so and was taken to Central Police Station. He was then charged with “obstruction”. A dozen young people who supported So demonstrated outside the Government House and demanded his release. Starting from 9 p.m. on April 5, more than 10 youngsters demonstrated at the Star Ferry Pier in Tsim Sha Tsui. Carrying banners opposing the fare increase and chanting slogans, they marched from Tsim Sha Tsui to Mong Kok via Nathan Road, and then to Shek Kip Mei.2 The police arrested four protesters in the early morning of April 6 and the protest escalated into riots in the evening. About 4,000 people gathered in Yau Ma Tei and Mong Kok after 10 p.m. and scuffle broke out between the riot police and the crowd after unidentified persons threw stones at the riot police. The police fired tear gas at the crowd, who smashed garbage cans, traffic signs, bus stop signs and shop signboards when they dispersed in various directions and brought traffic along Nathan Road to a standstill. The confrontation escalated in the early hours of April 7. A number of buses and police vans on Nathan Road were attacked by the rioters. Stones and glass

Prelude to the 1967 riots

11

bottles were thrown at the policemen in several places in Kowloon. The police and riot police attempted to disperse the crowds by firing tear gas. Scores of buses were seriously damaged and some were set on fire. Nine private cars parked near the Mong Kok main branch of HSBC were turned upside down and set on fire. A number of bus stops were damaged and the shop windows of Shui Hing Department Store in Mong Kok were smashed. Governor David Trench imposed curfew from April 6 to April 8. Gurkhas were deployed to quell the disturbances and fired nearly 100 bullets during their operation. According to the Report of Commission of Inquiry into Kowloon Disturbances 1966, a total of 1,465 persons were arrested, 905 of whom were charged with breach of curfew and other offences. The disturbances claimed one life while twentysix were injured. Thirty government vehicles were damaged while government departments such as the Fire Services Department, Urban Services Department and post offices were damaged by the rioters. Lo Kei, who led the demonstrations in support of So Sau-chung, later claimed that he was beaten by the police after the disturbances. He was found dead in his flat in a public housing estate in Ngau Tau Kok in January 1967 and the police claimed he hanged himself from a bed frame. Unconvinced by the claim that Lo had committed suicide, So and several youngsters hoisted a piece of white cloth painted with words “memorial meeting for Lo Kei” in a protest in Mong Kok. They were arrested and So was sentenced to 14 days’ observation at Castle Peak Hospital. So Sau-chung, who became a Buddhist monk in the early 1990s, said that his protest had been inspired by the non-violent activism of Mahatma Gandhi in India. “I was then prepared for the worst-case scenario that I could be killed in the police station and die for my cause,” he said in an interview with the author in 2006. “I am adamant that my actions have emboldened many Hong Kong people to express their views publicly. Now the people’s awareness of their rights is much higher than that in the 1960s.” The government appointed a commission of inquiry into the Kowloon disturbances on May 3, 1966 to look into the events leading to the disturbances and the causes. The four-member commission was chaired by the then chief justice Michael Hogan and other members included Kenneth Lo Ching-kan, then chief commissioner of the Scout Association of Hong Kong, solicitor Maurice Wong Ping-kin and Lindsay Ride, former vice-chancellor of the University of Hong Kong. In its report released in December 1966, the commission concluded that the measures taken by the police, which had “generally been characterised by restraint” and the introduction of curfews proved entirely effective in bringing rioting and disorder to an end. The commission did not believe that “political, economic and social frustrations were the direct causes of the 1966 riots”. The commission noted that the increase in average cost of living had been approximately 2 per cent per annum over the past eight years before 1966 which had been more than compensated by an average increase of 8 per cent per annum

12

Hong Kong’s Watershed

in wage rates in the manufacturing industries. “It appears that many wage earners have been able to improve their position and their standard of living with continuing growth of the economy and the existence of a large number of vacancies in industry and the service trades,” the report said. However, the commission made some oblique, though mild, criticism of the deficiencies in the governance of the colonial administration. It noted that the evidence relating to the outbreak of disturbances indicated a failure in communication between the government, the press and the general public. “The emergence of existence of a gap between the government and the people is a continual danger and anxiety for any form of administration, whilst a colonial or bureaucratic government tends to be at a disadvantage in evoking or securing the support of its people, even though it may provide the most efficient administration and offer the best chances for their economic and social progress,” the commission said. It noted that the centralization of the government had tended to create an image of “detachment from the actual problems of the man in the street. . . . Some witnesses [of the hearing conducted by the commission] spoke of resentment caused by being shuffled around between offices — ‘They have to talk to too many people before they find someone who can do anything about it’; the domineering attitude of certain minor civil servants; and the apparent inhumanity with which social services are administered,” the report said. “Considerable emphasis was laid by some witnesses on the effects of a feeling in Hong Kong of impermanence, of a lack of belonging and of elements of misunderstanding between government and people,” the report noted. The commission emphasized the importance of ensuring that the government’s policies and problems were clearly explained. “Possible means of achieving this are by a greater degree of decentralisation of administration and by developing local representation on advisory, consultative or executive bodies at a local level; and by a greater consciousness of the need for public relations at all levels,” the report said. The commission said that the remedy for the perception of domineering attitudes of some government officials lay in the government’s demonstration of more its responsiveness to public opinion, the creation of improved channels of communication, as well as the development of more personal contacts between civil servants and the public. The commission also agreed that worries about the general economic situation and uncertainty as to the future together with psychological fears of inflation arising from a number of reported cost increases in the public sector were a source of public concern and created an atmosphere in which demonstrations could find support. “Whilst the economic situation did not cause the riots it contained factors which contributed to an ill-defined and vague sense of uneasiness,” the report said. The commission concluded that there was evidence of a growing interest among young people in Hong Kong and a tendency to protest in a situation to which their

Prelude to the 1967 riots

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parents might tacitly agree. “Within the economic and social fields there are factors, to which we have drawn attention and that need to be watched, lest they provide inflammable material which could erupt into disturbances should opportunity arise in the future.”3 The Star Ferry riots exposed the long-standing social problems and the discontent with the colonial administration in some quarters. After the Second World War, the lower-middle-income residents struggled to make their ends meet and the government virtually did not provide any social welfare until 1960, leaving the burden to voluntary organizations. There were only a handful of labour legislations on industrial safety before the 1960s and workers enjoyed scant legal protection for their legitimate rights. A local academic noted that there was little redistribution of income in Hong Kong between 1957 and 1966, and the newly created wealth was not dispersed throughout the society but remained in the hands of factory owners.4 Ian Scott, a former political scientist at the University of Hong Kong, said that workers’ standard of living did not materially improve and conditions in many factories were “reminiscent of descriptions of industrial maladies in Dickensian England”.5 He contended that improvements in social policy and labour legislation were minimal or largely cosmetic. “The government generally stayed out of the workplace, frightened perhaps by the spectre which businessmen raised of rising labour costs and a noncompetitive economy if rigorous labour regulations were introduced,” he wrote. In its report on the riots released in 1966, entitled Investigation Report on the Kowloon Disturbances, the Hong Kong Social Democratic Party argued that the fare increase proposed by Star Ferry triggered the disturbances, the roots of which lay in a litany of public housing rent increases and fare rises of public utilities in the years preceding the riots. The report said that the underlying cause was the public’s reservations about colonial rule which resulted in a lack of sense of belonging to Hong Kong. “There was a gap between the people and the Hong Kong government and the public were even antagonistic towards the government,” the report said. “The disturbances were a manifestation of the public discontent with the government, with some poor people airing their grievances with the wealth gap. The riots also reflected a certain extent of nationalistic sentiment. The primary targets of attack were policemen, police vehicles, traffic lights and fire stations, as well as vehicles owned by Kowloon Motor Bus Company which was awarded franchise by the government. “Hong Kong residents have not yet enjoyed civil rights. That is why policemen arrested and beat people arbitrarily while firemen do not bother to put out fire if the residents affected do not give them gifts. The Public Works Department and public utilities consider construction companies and restaurants sources of ‘extra income’. Officials are so arrogant and domineering that there is no protection of basic rights of ordinary people. Staff at public utilities treated their customers as if they are their slaves and the staff used to swear at customers. Under such circumstances,

14

Hong Kong’s Watershed

how can’t the government and the majority of the people be antagonistic to each other?” the report said. The editor’s note in Undergrad, the journal published by the student union of the University of Hong Kong, criticized the government for “turning a blind eye to public opinion and bent on going its own way” in the Star Ferry incident. “The lukewarm responses to the voter registration for last year (1966)’s Urban Council election indicated that many people are not willing to echo the government’s ‘façade democracy’. We can’t say they are not concerned about the issues affecting their daily life but they have no way to express their concern,” the commentary said.6 Some media also noted that the Star Ferry incident reflected Hong Kong people’s discontent with the colonial government. In a commentary published a month after the disturbances, the Far Eastern Economic Review pointed out the widespread doubts in the public’s mind that the colony’s officials were only concerned with Hong Kong’s interests when it discussed the controversy over the Star Ferry fare increase. “The vast majority of the public is convinced that the UK makes a profit out of Hong Kong and that the local administration’s function is to make money for London. This view is held not only by coolies and hawkers but even by quite senior Chinese members of the civil service. The important question is how it comes to be so popular,” the commentary said.7 So Sau-chung told a seminar in 1997 that “in the eyes of the government, public opinion is worth less than 5 cents [the Star Ferry fare increase approved by the government]. The protests in 1966 were inevitable.” The Social Democratic Party also criticized the government’s handling of the riots, which originated from peaceful protests. “Those people who staged hunger strike in protest of Star Ferry fare increases were arrested by police arbitrarily. It is a very natural development for members of the public to take part in protests and demonstrations after they find their expression of views in written and oral forms ineffective. On the first day of demonstrations, the participants simply showed placards and chanted slogans and no vandalism was reported. However, the peaceful protests were interfered by police and some protesters were arrested. It sparked public outcry and confrontation between the protesters and police,” the report said. The government’s suppression of the disturbances was backed by some organizations and media. In a statement issued on April 8, 1966, the student union of the University of Hong Kong condemned the disturbances for endangering public order and peace. The student union called on students and other sectors to safeguard tranquility of the society. Ming Pao’s editorial said that the public had the right to express their views through normal channels in democratic societies. “But we hope Hong Kong people would express their views through legal and legitimate means and not to undermine public order. The goal of opposing fare increase is to maintain stability of the society but it is not in line with the original purpose if the protests undermine social stability,” the editorial said.8

Prelude to the 1967 riots

15

It was noteworthy that the leftist press had virtually ignored the Star Ferry riots. The leftist newspapers, which described the government’s suppression of the labour dispute in San Po Kong in 1967 as “national oppression”, maintained neutrality during the Star Ferry riots and their commentaries even supported the government’s handling of the disturbances. In a commentary entitled “Opponents to fare increases should not engage in disturbances”, published on April 9, 1966, Wen Wei Po emphasized that Hong Kong residents hoped that public order would be restored as soon as possible so that their life could return to normal. “We hope that the authorities would attach great importance to the expectation of the residents and take reasonable measures to remove all factors which undermine the interests of the residents,” the commentary said.9 Ta Kung Pao, another major leftist newspaper, also called on various sectors of the community to “join hands to ensure the situation that would calm down as quickly as possible”. Lo Fu, then deputy chief editor of Ta Kung Pao, said that the Star Ferry incident was the spontaneous action of the Hong Kong residents and had nothing to do with the leftist camp. “The leftist camp suspected that the Trotskyites had a hand in instigating the disturbances. That’s why they remained neutral during the 1966 riots,” he said. Chak Nuen-fai, a printing company director who was jailed during the 1967 disturbances, said that he heard some rioters had sought assistance from the Federation of Trade Unions but to no avail. “Otherwise, the 1967 riots would have happened a year earlier,” Chak said. The information available showed that the Star Ferry riots were spontaneous actions by the protesters and the leftist camp had not taken part in the Star Ferry riots. The colonial government did not heed the wake-up call by the Star Ferry riots to alleviate public discontent. On April 26, three weeks after the disturbances, the government approved the Star Ferry’s application for fare rise based on the recommendation of the Transport Advisory Committee. The government’s approval widened the gap between the government and the people. Hardly had the ink of the inquiry report on the Kowloon Disturbances dried when the Hong Kong society braced for another large-scale disturbance. The government suspected that Elsie Elliott instigated the disturbances and she was summoned by the inquiry commission to testify at the inquiry. She believed that the violence was set up by some corrupt policemen, led by infamous syndicate leader Lui Lok, as a part of the frame-up in retaliation of her exposure of their misdeeds. So Sau-chung refused to take the required oath in the witness box when he was summoned to testify at the riots inquiry. “There is so much perjury going on in this court that I refuse to take an oath in it,” he said. He was found guilty of contempt and sentenced to three months’ imprisonment. It shocked the public and he was eventually set free.

16

Hong Kong’s Watershed

The riots in Macau and the shock brought by the Cultural Revolution While the Star Ferry riots exposed the long-standing social ills in Hong Kong, the riots in Macau in December provided a spiritual boost to the leftist camp in Hong Kong and served as a warm-up for the anti-British campaign in 1967. On November 15, 1966, urban services officers in Taipa blocked the construction of a school sponsored by leftist organizations. The colonial administration of Macau had earlier granted the plot of land for building the school, but the public works bureau did not give the green light for starting the project. The school sponsoring body decided to begin construction before obtaining the formal approval but was met by interference from the departments concerned, sparking scuffles between the police and the protesters. According to a secret report by Portugal’s secret police unit in February 1967, the Macau government had granted a free site to the leftist organization concerned for building a new school, but some officials delayed processing building permits because they failed to get any bribes. It gave the leftists in the Portuguese enclave a pretext to instigate anti-colonial struggle. Inspired by the ultra-leftist thought during the Cultural Revolution, the masses in Macau’s leftist organizations staged largescale protests and their confrontation with the police escalated. On November 30, 1966, hundreds of leftist union members, workers and students protested outside Government House and read Quotations from Chairman Mao Tse-Tung. The masses demanded that Taipa officials and the police officers who ordered the crackdown step down. On December 2, Beijing Radio criticized the Macau government for stirring up trouble by “fascist means”, and this gave the Macau leftists the impression that their actions were backed by Beijing. The Macau government dispatched army soldiers to suppress the protests on December 3 and imposed a curfew that night. Eleven Chinese were shot dead during the suppression and more than 100 people were injured. Macau’s leftist organizations mobilized merchants to close up shop while leftist masses charged government departments, including the police headquarters. Worse still, Guangdong authorities closed the border checkpoint between Macau and Zhuhai and cut water and food supply to the colony. Premier Zhou Enlai discussed the situation in Macau with Foreign Minister Chen Yi and Liao Chengzhi (廖承志), who was in charge of Hong Kong and Macau affairs, on December 6 and December 15.10 The riots and blockade imposed by the Guangdong authorities brought the colonial government to its knees. The Macau government was forced to accept the demands of the leftist camp, including a compensation payment of 3 million patacas and prohibition of all Kuomintang activities in Macau. Those officials involved in the dispute over the building permits for the school and suppression of leftist masses, including the acting governor, had to leave Macau and the city fell to the hands of the leftists since then.

Prelude to the 1967 riots

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Leaders of the leftist camp in Hong Kong were inspired by the victory of their fellow leftists in Macau. Officials of the Hong Kong branch of Xinhua News Agency claimed that the struggle in Macau was a “victory of Mao Zedong Thought” and emboldened them for the upcoming struggle against the Hong Kong government. The Xinhua News Agency and leftist organizations mobilized their supporters to travel in groups to Macau, so as to learn the “victorious experience” of fellow leftists in preparation for the struggle against the Hong Kong British authorities. Lo Fu revealed that Liang Weilin (梁威林), director of the Hong Kong branch of Xinhua News Agency, and his deputy Qi Feng chaired an internal meeting in Shenzhen that summed up the “victory” in Macau and decided to initiate a “big struggle” in Hong Kong. The leftist camp in Hong Kong, whose activities had been closely watched by the colonial government since 1949, became restless after experiencing the shock wave from the Cultural Revolution and Macau. Shortly after the Macau disturbances, leaders of the Hong Kong leftist camp, including Ta Kung Pao publisher of Fei Yiming and Wen Wei Po president Lee Tze-chung, went to Macau to “learn” the experience of the struggle there. When they returned to Hong Kong, Hong Kong customs officials searched their luggage and examined their suitcases one by one. Fei, who was usually mild-tempered, thumped the table and swore at the customs officers: “Who the hell are you?” Astonished by Fei’s wrath, the customs officers stopped the search and let them go. Ho Ming-sze, an official with the Hong Kong branch of Xinhua News Agency, also went to Macau to learn the “struggle experience”. He said that the Xinhua officials became restless and exuberant after returning from Macau. “Although Premier Zhou Enlai had reiterated that the practice of the Cultural Revolution would not be copied to Hong Kong, the leaders of Xinhua News Agency’s Hong Kong branch ignored the instruction. Amid prevailing ultra-leftist thoughts, we had no room for questioning the direction set out by the branch leaders and nearly everybody had no alternative,” he said. Ho was promoted to head of the united front department of Xinhua’s Hong Kong branch in the 1980s but withdrew from the Chinese Communist Party in protest of the Tiananmen Square crackdown in 1989. He was a close friend of the late tycoon Henry Fok Ying-tung who died in 2006. On August 5, 1966, Mao Zedong published an article entitled “Shelling the commander’s headquarters” which criticized some “leading cadres” at the local level of the central government for imposing “bourgeois dictatorship” in the country. Mao accused those leading cadres of “suppressing the Cultural Revolution” and imposing “white terror”. In a series of editorials in September and October, the People’s Daily called on toppling the “capitalist roaders” and opposing the “colonialism, revisionism and reactionaries” in the rest of the world. On August 8, the 11th Plenum of the Eighth Congress of the Chinese Communist Party endorsed the Decision on the Proletariat Cultural Revolution, which stated that the movement aimed at toppling the leading cadres who a embarked on a “capitalist road”.

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Hong Kong’s Watershed

Hong Kong leftists and officials from the Hong Kong branch of Xinhua News Agency, who believed they could not sit idle in the colony, had been waiting for opportunities to initiate a struggle against the colonial government since the Cultural Revolution erupted in the mainland. Liang Shangyuan, then deputy director of Xinhua’s Hong Kong branch, said, “many junior cadres and rank-and-file members of the leftist organizations in Hong Kong wanted to copy the practices of the Red Guards in the mainland to Hong Kong, such as posting big-character posters, seizing power and sidelining leading cadres.” Ho Ming-sze recalled that revolutionary thoughts ignited by the Cultural Revolution saw no border at that time, affecting Western countries such as the United States, Britain, France and Italy. “Black Panthers in the US waved Quotations from Chairman Mao Tse-Tung in the courtrooms during trials,” he said. The Black Panther Party was a radical organization founded by African Americans who dismissed Martin Luther King’s principle of non-violence in fighting for blacks’ rights. “Hong Kong leftists had been the primary target of oppression by the colonial government and they had become militant since the Cultural Revolution began. They wanted the Hong Kong British authorities to bow to their demands or withdraw from Hong Kong,” Ho said. Kam Yiu-yu, then chief editor of Wen Wei Po who was responsible for the Communist Party’s propaganda work in Hong Kong, said Liang Weilin, who was also party secretary of the Chinese Communist Party’s Hong Kong and Macau Works Committee, reminded the cadres in Hong Kong to reflect on whether they had intentionally or unintentionally embarked on the “capitalist road”. “We must reflect on the ideology of capitalism and exploiting class deep in our soul and strive to transform ourselves into leftists who adhere to permanent revolution. Otherwise, we would be eliminated by the historical trend,” Liang said.11 In the second half of August, the Hong Kong branch of Xinhua received a directive from Liao Chengzhi, vice-director of the State Council’s Foreign Affairs Office, which said that the Cultural Revolution was confined to the mainland and would not be exported to Hong Kong because the city was a capitalist society. “Premier Zhou said Hong Kong could not copy the practice in the mainland and the proletariat Cultural Revolution would not be launched in Hong Kong. On the propaganda front, we can’t give Hong Kong compatriots an impression that the Cultural Revolution would sweep across Hong Kong. We should not post bigcharacter posters inside our party apparatus and enterprises in Hong Kong, nor should we organize mass rallies. All comrades should bear Premier Zhou’s directive in mind that we must avoid internal struggle in our party organization and enterprises in Hong Kong because it would destroy our foundation and strategy in our works regarding Hong Kong.”12 Starting from September 1966, the Red Guards movement swept across the country and an editorial of the People’s Daily emphasized that the targets of the Cultural Revolution should be extended to cover “imperialists, revisionists and

Prelude to the 1967 riots

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reactionaries” in the rest of the world. “We should liberate two-thirds of the people in the world from the feet of imperialists, revisionists and reactionaries,” the editorial said. Kam Yiu-yu said that cadres of the Hong Kong branch of Xinhua News Agency began to be inspired by the ultra-leftist thought of the Cultural Revolution and the militant style of the Red Guards. “Some lower-middle-ranking officials started questioning the leading cadres in ‘small-character posters’ circulated among cadres at the Hong Kong branch. Are there any capitalist roaders in the party apparatus in Hong Kong? Capitalist roaders have been found on the socialist motherland; why isn’t there any in Hong Kong which is a capitalist society? Isn’t it logical? Do we need to oppose capitalist roaders, imperialists, revisionists and reactionaries in Hong Kong? Why aren’t we allowed to initiate struggle against these forces? Are there any agents of imperialists, revisionists and reactionaries in our party apparatus in Hong Kong?” Lo Fu, who was then deputy chief editor of Ta Kung Pao, also said that some cadres posted “big-character posters” inside the Hong Kong branch of Xinhua , and vowed to launch the Cultural Revolution within the branch. “The move prompted Zhou Enlai to summon some cadres to Beijing where he spent six or seven hours to persuade them to drop their plan,” Lo said. In the second half of September, Liang Weilin emphasized during an internal meeting at the Hong Kong branch that “in Hong Kong and Macau, we should unite together and join forces against external enemies. We have to focus on opposing imperialism and seize the opportunity to mobilize the masses. In this way, we will associate ourselves with the Cultural Revolution in the mainland,” he said.13 It was obvious that leaders of the Hong Kong branch of Xinhua intended to target the Hong Kong British authorities in an attempt to divert the attention of the masses in the leftist camp and retain their positions. It was plausible that the leadership of the Hong Kong branch of Xinhua instigated the riots so as to show their “determination” in taking part in the revolutionary struggle and to express loyalty to the Cultural Revolution Group under the Communist Party’s Central Committee. “The Hong Kong leftists were ordered not to launch the Cultural Revolution in Hong Kong and initiate struggle among themselves. However, the leftists still needed to engage in ‘revolution’ and express their activism. As they could not struggle among themselves, they could only launch a struggle against the Hong Kong British authorities,” Lo Fu said. In January 1967, the radical faction seized power at the State Council’s Foreign Affairs Office and vice-director Liao Chengzhi was sidelined. The radical faction set up a revolution leading group of the Foreign Affairs Office and informed the Communist Party’s Hong Kong and Macau Works Committee (the Hong Kong branch of Xinhua) to report to it in the future. Kam Yiu-yu said the incident indicated that Zhou Enlai’s power in the Foreign Affairs Office had been taken over by the Cultural Revolution Group and the Communist Party’s Hong Kong and Macau

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Hong Kong’s Watershed

Works Committee came under the command of the Cultural Revolution Group. “From then on, the party’s work regarding Hong Kong and Macau became part of the Cultural Revolution,” he said. According to Kam, Liang Weilin relayed the directive of the revolution leading group and urged the Xinhua cadres to “eliminate” their “remnants of rightist-leaning thoughts” so as to embark on the “road of revolution” again. “We should launch a review of the role of work in Hong Kong within the Cultural Revolution and push the work in Hong Kong and Macau to a new historical stage,” Liang said.14 The leftist camp in Hong Kong had been watched closely by the Hong Kong British authorities since 1949. Thirty-eight leftist organizations were disbanded by the colonial government in 1949 and dozens of leftists were deported by the authorities during the 1950s and 1960s. Some leftists might consider that it was opportune for them to strike back after the outbreak of the Cultural Revolution. A storm was brewing in the months before a labour dispute erupted in San Po Kong.

Labour disputes prior to the 1967 riots Hong Kong witnessed a series of labour disputes starting from February 1967, including those taken place at Royal Interocean Lines, Nan Fung Textile, Fung Hang Taxi Company, Central, Shanghai and Peninsula taxi companies. The labour dispute at Royal Interocean Lines originated from a scuffle instigated by the Chinese seamen on a vessel owned by the company in December 1966. Four Chinese seamen were injured when the expatriate captain and crew members fired shots at them during the conflict. The leftist union staged protests on a limited scale initially, but they escalated their actions following the leftists’ victory in Macau. On February 5, 1967, the Hong Kong Federation of Trade Unions lodged a “serious protest” against the company. Royal Interocean Lines apologized to the seamen concerned soon afterwards and transferred the expatriate captain to another cruise on which no Chinese seamen worked. But the leftist unions were not satisfied with the concession made by the company and stepped up their protests to pressurize the company to accept their further demand. On February 22, the Seamen Union sent the company’s letter of apology back and the company acceded to the union’s demand one month later. The Hong Kong government believed the leftist camp was adamant that they could copy the “victory” in Macau to Hong Kong after Royal Interocean Lines’ concession. On February 14, a scuffle erupted between left-leaning workers of Nan Fung Textiles Limited in Tsuen Wan and factory foreman Wong Kim-hung. Two workers were sacked after the factory management reported to the police. The leftist camp described the incident as a “premeditated political oppression orchestrated by spies close to the United States and Chiang Kai-shek”. In the latter half of March, a dozen members of the Hong Kong and Kowloon Spinning Weaving and Dyeing

Prelude to the 1967 riots

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Trade Workers General Union stepped into the factory manager’s office and recited Quotations from Chairman Mao Tse-Tung. They demanded dismissal of Wong whom they labelled as a “spy close to the US and Chiang Kai-shek” and protested against what they termed “collusion between Hong Kong police and spies close to the US and Chiang Kai-shek”. Some taxi drivers at Hong Kong and Shanghai Taxicab Co. Ltd staged stoppage on April 3. One of the demands raised by the taxi drivers was dismissing foreman Leung Kai-bun who was labelled by them as a member of “Chiang Kai-shek’s clique”. Gordon Wu Ying-sheung, managing director of Hong Kong and Shanghai Taxicab Co. Ltd., engaged in four rounds of talks with the disgruntled drivers and representatives of the Motor Transport Workers General Union. “I found they didn’t really care about the labour dispute. They were only interested in politicizing matters and espousing political extremism. In order to get a better understanding of the slogans they chanted, I bought a Little Red Book (Quotations from Chairman Mao Tse-Tung). In the final stage of the talk, I cited Mao’s quotations to rebuff them,” he said in an interview with the author. Wu reached an agreement with the taxi drivers under which the company’s fleet of taxis would be sold to the drivers, who only had to repay through a fixed monthly installment in three years and would keep all else earned by them. “The leftists had no opportunity to cause any trouble after I sold the taxis to the drivers,” said Wu, whose father Wu Chung started Hong Kong’s first taxi service. Gordon Wu is currently chairman of Hopewell Holdings. May 1967 was an eventful month for Hong Kong. On May 4, the police and squatter clearance officers were dispatched to dismantle some illegal structures near the now-demolished Kowloon Walled City. Two people were slightly injured during scuffles between the police and residents and two people were arrested. Nearly 100 people wearing badges that bore portrait of Mao Zedong gathered outside Kowloon City Police Station at around 1 p.m. Chanting quotations from Mao Zedong they demanded the release of the two arrested.15 A commentary published in Ta Kung Pao on May 6 described the incident near Kowloon Walled City as “atrocities perpetrated intentionally by the Hong Kong British authorities”. On April 29, workers at the Hung Hom works of Green Island Cement Company staged protests against the management over an alleged assault on some of their members by two European engineers. According to a statement issued by the board of directors of Green Island Cement Company, the two engineers were assaulted by workers and the workers who claimed to have been attacked failed to produce evidence for their injuries.16 In a six-point demand presented to the management, the workers, who launched work stoppages, stated that such an incident was “totally unacceptable” and should not be allowed to happen again. In a statement issued on May 4, the company’s board of directors said that there was “no need to continue operation” because of the disruption in production and the plant in Hung Hom would be closed from midnight. The management closed the factory gate to prevent

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Hong Kong’s Watershed

a crowd of 200 workers from getting into work. The angry workers marched off to the Labour Department and rallied at the factory. The workers agreed for their representatives to meet J. Brooker, managing director of the plant, proposed a meeting to be held at the Labour Department on May 6 so that they could seek an explanation on the closure of the plant. However, while picketing outside the factory that morning, the workers claimed that the Labour Department was no longer a suitable place for the meeting because the negotiation concerned the workers and the management alone, and the only place where the meeting could reasonably be held was within the factory itself. Hence, no meeting took place and the workers staged a sit-in outside the factory.17 A group of eight students from leftist schools, who wore Mao badges and carried Quotations from Chairman Mao Tse-Tung, came to the factory to show support for the workers and brought them tea. A left-wing “comfort mission”, with a supporting cast of three film stars, also came to the plant on May 9 to show support for the workers. The labour disputes and confrontation between administration and resident were signs of a storm brewing on the eve of the 1967 riots. The living standards of Hong Kong people gradually improved since the economy took off during the late 1950s. But the colony witnessed economic crisis since the mid-1960s. John Cooper, a British writer who wrote a book on the 1967 riots in the late 1960s, observed that “a dormant restlessness had underlined the industrial relation for some time, and all that had been required to stir this restlessness into effective action was an incident such as had happened in San Po Kong or at the Green Island Cement Factory”.18

2

Labour dispute at the Hong Kong Artificial Flower Works: The immediate trigger of the 1967 riots The hot summer of 1967 began in May, with the highest temperature reaching 34.4 degrees Celsius.1 The sweltering heat apparently presaged the upcoming heated political struggle between the colonial government and the leftist camp. The political storm started in a plastic flower factory in San Po Kong, Kowloon. The plastic flower industry had emerged as a booming industry in Hong Kong since the economy took off in the 1960s. By the end of 1962, there were 997 plastic flower factories in Hong Kong which employed more than 30,000 workers and churned out exports amounting to HK$300 million. The industry’s total value of exports increased to HK$823 million in 1967, accounting for 12 per cent of the total export of Hong Kong’s industrial output.2 Hong Kong Artificial Flower Works was one of the biggest plastic flower factories in the 1960s. The company had a plant at Belcher Street in Western District that employed 421 staff and another in San Po Kong, Kowloon, with 686 employees. On April 13, 1967, the factory management announced ten new conditions for workers, including the requirement of higher output (only those earning HK$160 per 15 days would be given an extra 10 cent bonus, compared with HK$120 beforehand) and those who were unable to earn HK$160 in two consecutive 15-day periods would be dismissed. The factory would not offer wages during periods when machines broke down and workers could only resume work after the machines were fixed. Besides, workers were not allowed to take leave and the factory would not retain the posts for the workers who took leave. Workers at the factory were dissatisfied with the new regulations which would reduce their wages and put their job security at risk. Under the new regulations, a worker would not be assigned to another machine if the one which he operated broke down. He would have to wait until that machine was repaired. It usually took half a month to repair a machine, making it difficult for a worker to earn HK$160 in two consecutive 15-day periods. The workers also found the ban on taking leave unreasonable. Shum Yat-fei, a commentator who studied at the Chinese University at the time, said the regulations issued by Hong Kong Artificial Flower Works were unreasonably harsh. “The management only cares about making profits and

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Hong Kong’s Watershed

disregards the plight of workers. The workers lack security of employment under the ban on taking leave and the factory’s decision not to offer wages during periods when machines broke down,” he wrote in a commentary.3According to an official report on social security published in 1967, Hong Kong workers in those days lacked security of employment. “For workers in industry, who now probably exceed half a million, there is little in the way of security of employment. It is very common practice for such workers to be employed on daily rates of pay and on piece rates. It becomes highly undesirable when this method of remuneration is widely regarded as implying casual employment which can be terminated at a moment’s notice. Cases of workers being laid off after many years of service, for reasons of doubtful adequacy, without any form of notice or wages in lieu or compensation for loss of employment are far too common,” the report said.4 In an article published in Undergrad, the journal published by the student union of the University of Hong Kong, a student who used the pseudonym Lung Chin said that the regulations were absolutely unreasonable and were testament to exploitation by the management. “The existence of such exploitation is a dirty mark for Hong Kong. Most civilised countries have gradually improved workers’ welfare and nearly eliminated the exploitation of workers,” he wrote.5 The workers decided to send representatives for negotiation with the management. They put forward a five-point demand to the management, including: (a) abolition of the conditions imposed on April 13; (b) payment of wages at $1.5 per hour whilst a worker was idle because of a defective mould; (c) fair allocation of moulds; (d) higher pay for producing low-priced parts; (e) no dismissals without good reason. But according to a veteran worker at Artificial Flower Works, the management found deliberate damage of machinery and go-slow since March that year. “Most workers believe that those who led the struggle make too much fuss over trifle and did not support them,” he said.6 The management did not respond to the workers’ demand. On April 28, the management dismissed 92 workers on the grounds of “drop in business”, including some workers’ representatives. On the following day, the management closed the moulding departments of both factories; as a result, a further 241 workers in the Western District plant and 325 in San Po Kong were sacked.7 According to the notice posted by the factory, every sacked worker was entitled to “subsidy of oneday wage” in accordance with the Labour Department’s regulations. On May 4, the police asked the workers protesting outside the plant in San Po Kong to leave the scene. At 2 p.m., 30 workers forced into the factory and demanded talk with the management. The police were called in to wait on alert after the management reported to the police while the workers posted 60 big-character

Labour dispute at the Hong Kong Artificial Flower Works

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posters and phrases from Quotations from Chairman Mao Tse-Tung outside the gate of the factory. More than 100 fully armed riot policemen arrived in the morning of May 5 at the gate of the factory in San Po Kong. They besieged the plant and imposed a blockade of the nearby streets. Shortly after 5 p.m., a lorry carrying boxes of finished products, which would be packaged to send to buyers, arrived at the main gate. The arrival of the lorry sparked protest from disgruntled workers who believed that the production should have ceased following the management’s decision to close the plant. They said the arrival of the lorry indicated that the management was outsourcing the production to outside contractors. They demanded the management to put the products back on the lorry and the management acceded to their demand.8 According to some workers who spearheaded the protests, they sent representatives to the factory’s office for three times on May 5, seeking talks with the management but to no avail. Elsie Elliott, the then urban councillor who was known for speaking for the underdog, said that workers had no faith at all in the Labour Department. “The lack of faith is justified — not so much by its actions, but by its lack of actions. It doesn’t really do anything, and this suits some employers,” she said in August 1967.9 The Far Eastern Economic Review, which was critical of the Hong Kong government’s lack of action to address social ills, criticized the Labour Department’s passivity in handling labour disputes and limiting its function to giving “gentlemanly encouragement” in facilitating dialogue between workers and management.10 Tsui Tim-fook, a senior industrial mediator at the Labour Department, said the department was “seriously concerned” about the labour dispute at Artificial Flower Works and was willing to try its best to facilitate talks between workers and management only after the incident on May 6.11 Tsui said on May 8 that the factory management had indicated their willingness to meet with workers at the Labour Department but the workers offered no comment.12 Governor David Trench said both the management and the labour union were evasive towards the Labour Department. “We in the Labour Department were never able to get to the truth of it and exactly what the dispute was about. In this case they did their best for weeks to offer their services as conciliator between workers and management. The manager holed up in a hotel, nobody could find out where he was. There was some difficulty in finding out where the union headquarters was. It was not where it was supposed to be, moved without telling anybody. The conciliator rang them and offered to do all we could to help. The girl at the other end of the telephone chanted the thoughts of Mao and every time they rang up to offer their services all they got was chanting.”13 He believed that the subsequent consequences had nothing to do with the labour dispute. According to a memorandum by the British commonwealth secretary, the Labour Department of the Hong Kong government offered to help the two parties

26

Hong Kong’s Watershed

to reach agreement but this was refused by both parties.14 According to Hong Kong Disturbances 1967, the government’s confidential report on the riots, a Labour Department officer calling in person at the premises of the Hong Kong and Kowloon Rubber and Plastic Workers Union before the confrontation on May 6 was refused admittance. On May 6, about 150 sacked workers gathered outside the main gate of the plant in Tai Yau Street in San Po Kong to protest against what they termed “unfair dismissals” and sought talks with the management but without success. After 2 p.m., several police vans arrived in nearby streets to stand by and left after staying for half an hour. But there were a number of plainclothes policemen on the scene. At 4 p.m., the management opened the rear gate of the factory in an attempt to send out some finished goods. The workers obstructed the move on the ground that the goods should not be sent out from the plant before the labour dispute was resolved. At 4:20 p.m., a lorry arrived at the rear gate and Hung Biu, a foreman of the moulding department ordered non-striking workers to put some goods on the lorry. The workers moved forward and rushed at Hung and a melee ensued, resulting in scuffles between the two sides. It was alleged that Hung beat a worker called Siu Kim-fai in the clash, sparking an outcry from the strikers. At 4:50 p.m., 22 policemen led by Senior Superintendent Cooper arrived at the scene to take control of the situation. Workers’ representatives demanded that the police detain Hung and prevent the factory from sending goods out of the plant. Cooper suggested taking Hung to the police station for interrogation while the allegedly injured workers be taken to hospital for medical examination. The police was of the view that the factory had the right to continue operation and the workers’ intention of preventing the removal of goods from the factory was not in line with law.15 Confusion erupted again after Cooper left the scene. The workers continued to obstruct the removal of goods from the factory and refused to take medical examination because they were worried that the management would remove goods from the factory while the injured workers went to hospital for medical check-up. Hung was besieged by workers outside the factory gate and 22 policemen attempted to mediate the dispute. Some stools at food stalls nearby were thrown at the melee and further heightened the tension in the scene. The police lost no time in summoning reinforcements from Fan Ling and a team of riot police arrived at the scene at 5:50 p.m. The riot police cordoned off streets close to Tai Yau Street, including Cheuk Luk Street, Sam Chok Street, Sheung Hei Street, and marched to the rear gate of the Artificial Flower Works. According to a report by Ming Pao, the policemen had drawn batons when they were besieged and a worker was dragged across the road. Twenty-one workers were arrested and were subsequently charged with unlawful assembly. According to the reports by leftist newspapers, the riot police “acted in a fiend-like manner and beat every worker of the Artificial Flower Works they saw.

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Brandishing their batons, they beat the workers and caused injuries among many of them, with some having their heads broken and bleeding. Some workers were led away or dragged onto police vehicles.” As they were taken to police vehicles, the arrested workers shouted communist slogans such as “Long live Chairman Mao” and “Down with the Hong Kong British authorities”. Some workers were injured during the scuffle and leftist newspapers and other media had different versions of the number of people injured in the clash. While leftist newspapers claimed that “nearly 100 workers” were injured by police beatings, Ming Pao reported that a worker was injured after being hit by police batons and some workers claimed they were injured after they were hit by policemen’s boots. Ming Pao estimated that the clash lasted about ten minutes. The police then cordoned off the area and allowed all finished goods to be loaded onto the lorries. Hundreds of kids and young men made uproars outside the cordoned area; some people were throwing glass bottles and iron cans from the upper floors of the industrial buildings along Tai Yau Street. Pointing their guns above, the riot police urged the people through loudspeakers to stop dumping articles. When the riot police were about to withdraw, some people who had gathered in Tseuk Luk Street threw stones and slippers at the riot police who immediately dispelled the crowd. The riot police withdrew from the scene, leaving the job of maintaining order to the police. Fung Kam-shui, chairman of the Hong Kong and Kowloon Rubber and Plastic Workers Union, and two union members, Au Yeung Chun-keung and Ng Ping-ming, went to Wong Tai Sin Police Station to seek an explanation and protest against police’s “suppression” of the workers. The trio was detained and was charged with unlawful assembly in Tai Yau Street. The clash in Tai Yau Street dominated headlines of major newspapers the following day. Ming Pao adopted the headline of “disturbances erupted abruptly in Tai Yau Street” while the Standard’s headline read “Violence in Kowloon”. Leftist newspapers jumped to the conclusion that the Tai Yau Street incident was a premeditated and planned action by the Hong Kong British authorities which “colluded” with factory management. A commentary published in Ta Kung Pao on May 7 said it was reasonable for the workers to put forward their demands and what they wanted was just negotiation with factory management in the hope of settling the dispute. What was intriguing was that the leftist newspapers remained neutral during the Star Ferry riots in 1966. Some of their commentaries even backed the government’s suppression of the disturbances and emphasized the importance of maintaining social order. The double standard the leftist newspapers applied to the two events lent credence to the claim that the leftist camp only chose to support the anti-British struggles under the impact of the Cultural Revolution. The public attention to the labour dispute at Artificial Flower Works was even less than the concern for the one surrounding Green Island Cement in April

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that year, which saw a number of leftist-organized “comfort missions” which comprised several prominent film stars. The leftist camp did not send any “comfort missions” to the factory to show support for the workers at Artificial Flower Works, except that a group of teenage girls from leftist schools handed out tea and cakes to the workers.16 Yeung Chun, one of the workers’ representatives, said that the protest was spontaneously organized by the workers without any assistance from the leftist union in the early stage. Siu Kim-fai, whose beating by Kung triggered off the disturbances, described the labour strike as largely unorganized and “leaderless” prior to the Tai Yau Street incident on May 6. “The Rubber and Plastic Workers General Union approached us since May 4 and invited us to discuss at their premise on the strategy in the dispute,” he said, “the unionists asked us to write big-character posters to uncover the ‘exploitation’ by the management. However, they reminded us not to make the posters too politicized.” He believed the leftist union did not want to stir up the confrontation. In a telegraph to the British Commonwealth Office on May 12, Governor David Trench said “all available information suggests that the disturbances at Artificial Flower Works on May 6 were not planned in advance by the Rubber and Plastic Workers’ Union nor by any other organisations. The rank and file had been encouraged to develop a ‘struggle’ against the management, and what started as peaceful picketing degenerated into violence”.17 The alleged assault on local workers by European engineers at Green Island Cement Company should have provided more ammunition for the leftist camp to escalate the situation. It was quite unexpected that the labour dispute at the Artificial Flower Works provided the actual spark for the riots. There were different schools of thought about the reasons why the police intervened in the labour dispute. There were unconfirmed rumours at the time that Lui Lok, the notorious station sergeant who commanded a corruption syndicate within the police in the 1960s, inspected the areas near the Artificial Flower Works plant in San Po Kong after the industrial dispute broke out. Lui and the owner of Artificial Flower Works shared the same ancestral home of Chiu Chow in Guangdong and it was speculated that Lui might exercise his influence to persuade the police to crack down on the workers. Wu Tai-chow, president of the pro-Beijing Hong Kong Evening News, who was jailed for publishing “inflammatory articles” during the riots, said he heard that some officers with the police force had received bribes. Elsie Elliott said: “Indeed, it was not the first time to my certain knowledge that the police had been called in to help employers . . . In this case, a friend of mine who reported the incident for his newspaper told me, ‘They [the workers] weren’t even touching the bloody gates.’ He said that the police must have been hiding very near, because at what seemed to be an arranged time, they rushed in and started battering the workers and students.”18 But the colonial government denied any interference with labour disputes. In a statement issued on May 15, Governor David Trench said

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the police did not interfere with labour disputes and would enforce laws only if they were violated. He stressed that the government’s policy of not favouring any party in labour disputes remained unchanged. Although the Hong Kong government dismissed the labour dispute as one of the few incidents “which had either been artificially inspired by the communists or were the result of deliberate political exploitation of a genuine industrial grievance”,19 recently declassified files indicate that the British government had a different perception of the labour dispute in San Po Kong. London recognized that the incident arose from a genuine labour dispute which was badly handled by the factory management. In a memorandum presented to Britain’s Defence and Overseas Policy Committee on May 24, 1967, Secretary of State for Commonwealth Affairs Herbert Bowden noted that “the present troubles in Hong Kong had their origin in a labour dispute, which was not handled wisely by management in its early stage, somewhat provocatively. It was after a lockout and wholesale dismissals that the first scuffles occurred, outside the concerned factories.”20 According to Hong Kong Disturbances 1967, the Hong Kong government’s confidential report on the riots, attempts by officers of the Labour Department to assist in settling the labour dispute were “curtly rejected” by the union. “An officer calling in person at the union premises was refused admittance and enquiries by telephone were answered by quotations from the works of Chairman Mao Tse Tung,” the report said.21 However, a secret file declassified from the Britain’s National Archives said the Labour Department of the Hong Kong government offered to help the parties to reach agreement but this was refused by both parties.22 The incident quickly escalated and started to be politicized. On the night of May 7, the Hong Kong and Kowloon Rubber and Plastic Workers Union held a mass meeting at which workers said the labour dispute at Artificial Flower Works arose from “ruthless exploitation” of the workers by the employers but the police exploited the opportunity to carry out “bloody suppression”. The union said in a statement that what the workers of Artificial Flower Works wanted was simply opposing the management’s massive dismissals and abolishing stringent regulations through talks with the management. But the management had refused to meet with the workers. The union criticized the police for its “fascist suppression” of the workers, saying it was a “premeditated and organized prosecution of the patriotic workers and masses”. “In the great era of Mao Zedong, the Chinese workers armed with Mao Zedong Thought cannot tolerate any bully and your bloody suppression cannot waver our strong will. We must give a stern warning to the Hong Kong British authorities that what you did only exposes your fascist true colour. We will certainly recover the bloody debt you owe us,” the statement said. The Rubber and Plastic Workers Union put forward four demands: (a) The Hong Kong government must cease its brutality forthwith and ensure no repetition.

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(b) All the arrested workers, including the union chairman and union representatives, must be released immediately. (c) Compensation must be paid by the government for all injuries and damage and those responsible must be punished. (d) There must be no government interference in labour disputes. The Federation of Trade Unions (FTU) declared its support and published its own demands, in substantially the same form as those already made. Meetings were held in leftist organizations in support of the arrested workers. Although the Rubber and Plastic Workers Union’s statement contained some Cultural Revolution-style language, the demands it raised in the initial stage were still related to labour dispute. At 4 p.m. on May 7, the FTU sent its chairman Yeung Kwong and other five representatives to the police headquarters, seeking a meeting with the commissioner of police to lodge a protest against the Tai Yau Street incident. But the representatives of the police declined to make any comment on the grounds that the case had been handled by courts. Leftist newspapers started to politicize the incident on May 7. The editorial of Ta Kung Pao, published on May 7, said the incident was not an ordinary labour dispute. “Since the police’s crackdown in Kowloon Walled City and San Po Kong, the Hong Kong British authorities have posed its posture of provoking the Chinese residents in Hong Kong,” the editorial said. It reminded those policemen who “beat the Chinese compatriots with their batons” that it was disgraceful for them to beat fellow Chinese, and they would certainly come to no good if they did not repent quickly. On May 8, the FTU issued a statement which described the Tai Yau Street incident as a move of “Britain and the US colluding to oppose China”. “The bloody suppression in San Po Kong was not an isolated incident. It occurred against the backdrop of US imperialism stepped up using Hong Kong as a military base to invade Vietnam and the various anti-China activities organized by imperialism, revisionism and counter-revolution. The incident was obviously orchestrated by Hong Kong British authorities.”23 The FTU criticized that the Hong Kong British authorities had been conniving with the “elements close to the US and Chiang Kai-shek”. It linked the labour disputes at taxi companies, Green Island Cement Company with the Tai Yau Street incident, claiming that it was a “conspiracy” of the Hong Kong British authorities. Storm of Hong Kong, an account on the riots published by the All-Circles AntiPersecution Struggle Committee in 1968, also described the British suppression as a “premeditated and planned national oppression” and was part of the conspiracy by the Britain and the “US imperialism” colluding to oppose China. “We are the Chinese workers in the great era of Mao Zedong and the people armed with Mao Zedong Thought are never scared of any kind of suppression. Our will to fight will never waver in the oppression by imperialism,” the FTU’s statement

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said. The FTU held an executive committee meeting on May 8 and urged workers in various industries to call meetings to condemn the “atrocities” by the colonial government and write letters in support of the workers of Artificial Flower Works. It signalled the FTU’s full involvement in the labour dispute and a bigger political storm was imminent. Starting from May 7, there was a deluge of “letters from the masses” in leftist newspapers which condemned the suppression by the colonial administration. On May 10, musical and drama workers held a seminar at which they condemned the Hong Kong government’s “atrocities”. On May 10, some workers of Artificial Flower Works assembled again outside the factory in San Po Kong and put up posters at the factory gate, which read “Protest against the Hong Kong British authorities’ interference in the labour dispute”, “blood debt must be repaid with blood”, “The great Chinese workers cannot tolerate any bully” and “Long Live the unity of workers in Hong Kong”. The workers also stuck scrolls featuring Mao Zedong’s quotations and “big-character posters”. Judging from the contents of the posters, their appeals had gone beyond the original orbit of labour dispute and seldom mentioned the calls for improvement of salaries and welfare. Instead, their appeals had become politicized and targeted at the colonial government. In the meantime, they received boost from comfort missions comprising workers from Chinese goods stores and banks, students from leftist schools. The Tai Yau Street incident escalated on May 11. In the afternoon of that day, a large number of leftist workers and students gathered outside the factory to express support for the workers. The factory management, who claimed that the crowd surged towards the factory gate and threatened to break in, asked for police assistance to control the situation. About 620 riot policemen were sent to the scene shortly after 3:30 p.m. and clashed with the workers and students. According to Hong Kong Disturbances 1967, the crowd refused to withdraw or disperse and bottles were thrown at the police. The government admitted that the police had fired “baton shells” and discharged wooden projectiles from a gas gun which could incapacitate at close range but were not likely to cause serious injury. But the leftist newspapers reported that the riot police beat the workers and students with batons and gun handles and fired gunshots. A teenager was injured after being hit by a projectile.24 Ta Kung Pao reported that the riot police beat “whoever they met” and even children were no exception. The leftist camp described the incident as “May 11 Bloodbath”. A 13-year-old boy Chan Kwong-san died in the clash when the riot police tracked down the rioters in the resettlement area in Wong Tai Sin. The leftist newspapers claimed that Chan was beaten to death by the riot police and the AllCircles Anti-Persecution Struggle Committee sent HK$500 to Chan’s mother in condolence. But other newspapers said he was hit by stones thrown by the rioters and his mother returned the money to the Struggle Committee.

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British writer John Cooper said the clash was instigated by youth bent on vandalism. “The streets in the San Po Kong area were quickly filled up with teenagers bent on vandalism and workers who were more or less content to jeer. As policemen moved through the area trying to restore order they were greeted with stones and abuse and assailed from above by angry mobs, who perched high up on the rooftops, hurled down bottle after bottle and dropped such unsavoury objects as urinals on their heads below. In view of the opposition encountered the police had to resort to stronger methods,” he wrote.25 Szeto Keung, a reporter from the Hong Kong branch of Xinhua News Agency, claimed that he was beaten by the police while he was covering the disturbances near Artificial Flower Works. The Xinhua staff protested outside the Government House the following day. Szeto is the younger brother of Szeto Wah, a veteran prodemocracy activist and chairman of the Hong Kong Alliance in Support of Patriotic Democratic Movements of China. The disturbances lasted until midnight. On May 13, staff from Wen Wei Po, New Evening Post, Clear Water Bay Studio, Sin Hua Bank and the China and South Sea Bank went to the Government House to protest against the suppression two days earlier. The police commissioner announced at 7:30 p.m. on May 11 the decision to mobilize auxiliary policemen and cancelled all leaves for policemen. The government announced at 9:30 p.m. to put Tung Tau Resettlement Estate, Lo Fu Ngan (which was later renamed as Lok Fu), Wong Tai Sin, Kowloon City, San Po Kong, Diamond Hill, Choi Hung Estate, and Ngau Chi Wan under curfew. According to the Government Information Services, the police arrested 127 people and another 11 were injured during the conflict on that day. The police fired 50 teargas shells and 70 wooden projectiles against the demonstrators. It was reported that the wooden projectiles used by the police were seven inches long with a diameter of nearly one inch. The crackdown by the police was condemned by the leftist newspapers. In its editorial published on May 12, Ta Kung Pao said that the suppression amounted to “escalation of the Hong Kong British authorities’ persecution of the Chinese compatriots. The latest atrocities further exposed the Hong Kong British authorities’ intention of provoking the Chinese residents in Hong Kong and their actions had ulterior political motive. It has torn away the gentlemen’s disguise and exposed the true face of fascists. The unarmed workers stood outside the factory gate and did not threaten anybody and other people just came to the factory to send their regards and show support for the workers. What law did they break? Why did the policemen shoot and beat them recklessly?”26 The editorial warned the colonial government that suppression would only be met with resistance and the government had to bear all the consequences. Liu Yat-yuen, a left-leaning filmmaker who was detained at Victoria Road Detention Centre during the riots, was sympathetic with the workers at Artificial Flower Works. Although he supported their struggle against the management, Liu

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had reservations about the leftist organizations’ decision to send comfort missions to the factory to show support for the workers. “The leftist camp subsequently mobilized a lot of members of the leftist organizations, workers and students to the factory. The leftist masses also waved Quotations from Chairman Mao Tse-Tung to express support for the workers. It was obvious that the Hong Kong branch of Xinhua was the mastermind. The high-profile actions unavoidably gave the Hong Kong British authorities the pretext to crack down on the workers and the masses,” he said. On May 12, the executive committee of the Federation of Trade Unions held an emergency meeting at which chairman Yeung Kwong criticized the colonial government for escalating a labour dispute to an “anti-China incident”. “Imperialism will not shed tears until it sees the coffin. We are determined to struggle against the enemies and are not afraid of sacrifice. We will escalate our resistance if the enemies escalate their oppression,” Yeung said. He also warned the Hong Kong British authorities not to play with fire. “They will find out eventually that they are drowned in the sea of people’s warfare,” he said. The FTU established the “All-Industries Workers Anti-Persecution Struggle Committee” and suggested various sectors to set up struggle committees. The FTU called on all left-wing unions to join the anti-British campaign and organize a donation campaign. The FTU demanded that: (1) the Hong Kong government cease its brutality and ensure no repetition; (2) all arrested workers and students be released immediately; (3) compensation be paid for all damage; and (4) the “culprits” be punished. The disturbances continued on May 12. At 12:15 p.m., some residents from Block 12 of Tung Tau Resettlement Estate defied the curfew and threw stones at the police. The police fired tear-gas shells and arrested some people who defied the curfew. At the Star Ferry Pier bus terminus in Tsim Sha Tsui, some fifty bus drivers and conductors of Kowloon Motor Bus Company chanted Mao Zedong’s quotations and stuck “anti-imperialist” posters on the back of the buses. In the afternoon, a crowd attacked a bus at the corner of Tai Sing Street and Choi Hung Road. Chief Superintendent M.C. Illingworth, who was in charge of operations in the riot areas, believed that it was a source of considerable enjoyment to the rioters to cause malicious damage to property. Some 1,000 demonstrators from the leftist camp in Macau protested outside the British consulate against the Hong Kong government’s suppression of the leftists in Hong Kong. The scale of the disturbances escalated on the following day. At noon time, a dozen youngsters in school uniforms set a wooden vehicle in Tseuk Luk Street on fire and threw stones at the police. Showers of bottles, stones and scrap iron hurled down from the upper floors of nearby factory buildings and residential flats. At 3 p.m., a garbage truck from the Urban Services Department which passed by Tung Tau Resettlement Estate was stopped by a crowd and was set on fire after the crowd

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poured gasoline on the trash. The staff quarter at Tai Sing Street Resettlement Estate was also set on fire. Riot police, police tactical units, marine police, police auxiliaries and even cadets were dispatched to the riot area to restore order and tracked down the rioters in the nearby residential flats. Ma Tau Wai Road in To Kwa Wan also went up in flames.27 It was not until May 14 that calm was restored. Between May 11 and May 14, 391 persons were arrested, of whom 367 were subsequently charged, and 32 persons were injured.28 On May 14, the Xinhua News Agency made its first report on the disturbances since May 6. The state-run media said the Hong Kong British authorities “joined hands with the US imperialists to orchestrate atrocities in a premeditated manner and antagonize compatriots in Hong Kong and 700 million Chinese”. On the same day, a spokesman for the All-Industries Workers Anti-Persecution Struggle Committee criticized the colonial government for “committing bloody atrocities and initiating a serious anti-China incident”. “Although your policemen are able to change their feet during parade but their weapons would change hands during fights. How many square metres are there in your concentration camps? Can it accommodate the patriotic compatriots who are not afraid of hardship and death? If you dare escalate oppression, we will not be afraid of struggling against you everywhere. We could struggle against you inside factories, in the streets, inside courts and prisons and even inside the Government House. It is up to you to decide whether the struggle would be conducted in an armed or verbal manner. We are the Chinese workers in Mao Zedong’s era and have a glorious tradition of resisting persecution. We are determined to continue the anti-persecution struggle to the end.” The spokesman called on “all compatriots in Hong Kong” to be prepared for a “new battle” and urged the Hong Kong government to accept the four demands made by the Struggle Committee. “We will not stop until we accomplish our goal,” the spokesman said.29 In a statement made on May 13, a “senior authoritative official” from the Hong Kong government said it could not accept the four demands put forward by the Struggle Committee. He said the administration could not make a judgment on the labour dispute at Artificial Flower Works because it had not got sufficient information about the incident. He said the government would strive to maintain law and order and would not be biased towards the left wing or the right wing.30 The official called on members of the public to support the government. “There is limit to the police’s restraint. The police cannot avoid taking further action if rioters endanger the residents’ lives and property. The British garrison has been put on alert.” Beijing made its first expression of support for the anti-British struggle initiated by the leftist camp in Hong Kong on May 15. Vice Minister of Chinese Foreign Affairs Luo Guibo (羅貴波) summoned British chargé d’affaires Donald Hopson to the Foreign Ministry and presented him with a statement which lodged the “most

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emergent and vehement protest” against “sanguinary brutality and fascist atrocities of the British imperialists”. The protest note said the alleged atrocities were “the result of long premeditation and are a component part of the British Government’s scheme of collusion with US imperialism against China”. “On the one hand, in coordination with the US imperialist war escalation in Vietnam, the British government continues to provide the United States with Hong Kong as a base for aggression against Vietnam in disregard of the Chinese government, and on the other, it is steadily stepping up various hostile measures against China in Hong Kong.” The statement also accused the Hong Kong government of turning loose on the “bare-handed workers, representatives of various circles and young students”, with a large number of armed troops, policemen and riot police “totalling more than 1,000 who repeatedly attacked them with clubs, riot guns and tear-gas bombs and even turned out military vehicles and helicopters”. It alleged that the British had used the labour dispute at Artificial Flower Works as “a criminal plan of sanguinary oppression”. “Particularly since the unfolding of the great proletarian Cultural Revolution in China, the Hong Kong British authorities have carried out repeated military and police manoeuvres hostile to China and aimed at the sanguinary suppression of Chinese residents in Hong Kong, vainly attempting to exclude the great influence of China’s great proletarian Cultural Revolution by high-handed tactics,” the ministry’s statement said. The statement included five demands which Beijing asked for the British government to instruct the Hong Kong British authorities to accept “immediately and unconditionally”: (a) All the just demands put forward by Chinese residents and workers in Hong Kong be immediately accepted. (b) All arrested persons, including workers, cameramen and journalists, be set free straight away. (c) All fascist measures be ceased. (d) All those responsible for the sanguinary atrocities apologize to the victims and offer them compensation. (e) A guarantee be given that there would be no repetition of similar incidents. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs stressed that “the Chinese government and the Chinese people are determined to continue the fight to the end. The British government and the British authorities in Hong Kong will have to bear all consequences if they are bent on going their own way”.31 The demands put forward by the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the leftist camp in Hong Kong were very similar to those raised by the Macau leftists during the 1966 riots. To the British authorities in Hong Kong, acceding to the demands put forward by the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs amounted to becoming the Portuguese authorities in Macau. Governor David Trench told a press conference held at the British Commonwealth Office on June 29 that he thought “their (the leftists in

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Hong Kong) aim is to Macau us”.32 In a telegraph to the British Commonwealth Office on May 12, Trench said “it was impossible for the H.M.G. (Her Majesty’s Government) to acquiesce in a situation comparable with what has recently developed in Macau”.33 His views were echoed by Secretary of State for Commonwealth Affairs Herbert Bowden. According to a memorandum by Bowden for the meeting of Defence and Overseas Policy Committee on May 24, the British government “could not tolerate the humiliation of remaining in Hong Kong without effective control”. “I am convinced that a Macau solution would be unacceptable. It would be damaging to our international prestige,” Bowden wrote.34 According to the notes for the cabinet meeting on September 24, Bowden said “the disturbances do not appear to have been directly instigated by Peking but rather to have been the result of local initiatives taken in response to the revolutionary atmosphere on the mainland and a local desire to achieve in Hong Kong a Macaustyle situation”.35 The People’s Daily, which was controlled by the Cultural Revolution Group under the Communist Party’s Central Committee, published a commentary entitled “Hong Kong British authorities must rein in at the brink of the precipice” on May 15. It commended the Hong Kong leftists for having shown dauntless mettle and warned that the British government and British authorities in Hong Kong “would not have good end if they did not rein in at the brink of the precipice and continue to go against historical trend”. The Hong Kong government showed no sign of yielding to Beijing’s demands. Governor David Trench issued a statement on May 15 which reiterated the assurances that “the policy of the government is now as always to maintain the law as impartially and as fairly as possible for the benefit of all; there has been no change in this policy of not taking sides in industrial disputes”. “I repeat them because I am sure that the preservation of peace and order is the dearest wish of almost everyone in our community”. The British government did not give any direct reply to the Chinese government’s statement. On May 18, the British government said in a statement that it fully supported the Hong Kong government to maintain law and order in the colony. “The Hong Kong government has an inescapable duty to maintain law and order as impartially and fairly as possible for the benefit of all in Hong Kong. H.M.G. fully support the Hong Kong government in fulfilling its duty both in maintaining law and order and in the efforts it is making to bring about a settlement of the industrial dispute,” the statement said. The escalation of the confrontation appeared to stem from the deep-seated mutual suspicion between the colonial administration and the left wing in Hong Kong prior to the Artificial Flower Works incident. According to a commentary by the Far Eastern Economic Review, a lack of communication between the authorities and those who sympathized with the demonstrators created a formidable barrier to

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any settlement. “The main area of non-compliance lies in the fact that both sides are apparently convinced that the other side is mounting a deep-laid plot. Those who sympathize with China lump together action taken against illegal structures in the Kowloon city area and the decision to bring out the riot police and claim that the local authorities are systematically confronting leftist movements in a campaign of ‘national oppression’. The Hong Kong government saw the sudden increase in leftist activities as possibly concerted and aimed at a Macao-like humiliation of the forces of law and order.”36 In the meantime, the Red Guards in mainland China staged protests in various cities in support of Hong Kong leftists. On the same day when the Foreign Ministry announced the statement, hundreds of thousands of demonstrators, including the Red Guards and workers, protested outside the office of British chargé d’affaires. Brandishing portraits of Mao Zedong and Quotations from Chairman Mao TseTung, the demonstrators chanted slogans such as “salute to the brave compatriots in Hong Kong” and “down with British imperialists, accomplice of US imperialists”. The demonstrators burned a straw effigy of the then British Prime Minister Harold Wilson. The Chinese staff of the office also left their jobs to join the protests. The demonstrators raised three demands: the use of Hong Kong as its naval base was to be stopped; the Kuomintang’s spies in Hong Kong were not to be pardoned for their oppression of those supporting the “socialist motherland”, and the promotion of Mao Zedong Thought in Hong Kong would not be obstructed. In Guangzhou, 40,000 demonstrators staged protests in the city. The Red Guards issued statements claiming that they would be “powerful backing for Hong Kong compatriots”. The Hong Kong leftists were in exuberance after the Ministry of Foreign Affairs issued the strongly-worded statement. Taking the statement issued by the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs as a strong backing for the left wing in Hong Kong, Wen Wei Po and Ta Kung Pao, the two leading pro-Beijing newspapers in Hong Kong, printed extra editions of the statement. Ta Kung Pao described the statement as “the most vocal noise from the motherland” and the news “delivered a strong boost to the compatriots in Hong Kong”. From then on, the leftist newspapers devoted prominent coverage to any gestures of support from the mainland authorities or the masses in the mainland. Whenever the People’s Daily published commentaries or editorials about the disturbances in Hong Kong, the pro-Beijing Joint Publishing Group printed booklets and gave them out free to the leftists. On May 16, a day after the Ministry of Foreign Affairs had issued the statement, the key figures of the leftist camp attended a meeting at the headquarters of the Federation of Trade Unions and announced the establishment of the All-Circles Anti-Persecution Struggle Committee. The participants wore badges featuring the portraits of Mao Zedong and carried Quotations from Chairman Mao Tse-Tung and chanted “revolutionary slogans”. The representatives from various sectors took turns to speak at the meeting. Addressing the participants at the meeting, FTU

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chairman Yeung Kwong described the actions taken by the Hong Kong government as “national oppression”. “We must expose the fascist atrocities committed by the Hong Kong British authorities and defeat it. The British authorities in Hong Kong are still launching reckless national oppression and the ongoing anti-persecution struggle is a national struggle. Workers and compatriots armed by Mao Zedong Thought must escalate the anti-persecution struggle and smash the conspiracy of the Hong Kong British authorities. We will not stop until we clinch the full victory,” he said. The 104-member Struggle Committee subsequently elected 17 representatives, including Yeung Kwong, Fei Yiming, publisher of Ta Kung Pao, vice-chairman of the Chinese General Chamber of Commerce K. C. Wong and chamber treasurer Tong Ping-tat, president of Sun Luen Film Company Liu Yat-yuen, Motor Transport Workers General Union chairman Kwok Tim-hoi, and headmaster of Hon Wah College Wong Kin-lap. Yeung was appointed as the person in charge of the committee. The Struggle Committee endorsed a protest letter against the “fascist atrocities” committed by the British authorities in Hong Kong and raised four demands: (1) a cessation of all “unlawful” arrests, trials, sentencing and torture; (2) immediate release of all arrested compatriots; (3) punishment of the culprits, apology to victims, and compensation, (4) a guarantee of no repetition of similar incidents. The Struggle Committee decided to send the 17 representatives, led by Yeung, to go to the Government House the following day to hand in the protest letter which urged the Hong Kong government to accept the four demands immediately and unconditionally. The protest note claimed that the colonial government intended to block the spread of Mao Zedong Thought through “brutal suppression”, and that “Hong Kong British authorities are bound to fail while Chinese compatriots will certainly claim victory”. Several Struggle Committee members recalled that the committee passed a motion stressing that the struggle against the colonial government should follow the principle of conducting “on just grounds, to our advantage and with restraint” (有 理、有利、有節). Struggle Committee member Wong Kin-lap said: “According to my understanding, the principle meant the struggle should be confined to nonviolent means,” he said. He said most members of the Struggle Committee agreed to the principle but there might be divergent views on how to implement the principle. However, that principle was not reported by the pro-Beijing media at the time. After the establishment of the Struggle Committee, the left wing issued statements and instructions in the name of the committee. But the committee was not the genuine mastermind of the anti-British struggle and it was Xinhua’s Hong Kong branch which called the shots. Liu Yat-yuen, a Struggle Committee member, said that committee members did not discuss the methods and strategies for the struggle.

Labour dispute at the Hong Kong Artificial Flower Works

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“Some people thought the Struggle Committee directed the actions of the antiBritish struggle, and even ordered the planting of bombs. It was a misunderstanding. People outside the leftist camp thought the Struggle Committee was a leading group for the riots but it was only a nominal leading organization or a ‘united front’ tool which did not even discuss the strategy for the struggle,” he said. “The committee only held two meetings during the riots and had no grasp of what happened in the later stages of the disturbances.” Liu said that even committee director Yeung Kwong did not know more than fellow committee members did and there was a behind-the-scene organization which made the decisions. At 11 a.m. on May 17, Yeung Kwong and another 16 representatives of the Struggle Committee arrived at the Government House in Upper Albert Road in four Mercedes Benz cars. They demanded to enter the Government House and submit the protest letter to the governor but their request was rejected. They brandished Quotations from Chairman Mao Tse-Tung outside the Government House and read quotations such as “The imperialists are bullying us in such a way that we will have to deal with them seriously”. They chanted slogans such as “Continue the anti-persecution struggle to the end” and “Long live the invincible Mao Zedong Thought”. A spokesman for the Struggle Committee criticized Trench for lacking the sincerity to resolve the problem and warned him “not to find troubles for himself”. “We give another warning to the British imperialists: it is up to you to choose verbal criticism or armed struggle, long or short fight. You cannot blame other people as you only have yourself to blame,” the spokesman said. There was a marked improvement in relations between Hong Kong and the mainland since early 1960s. The Chinese leadership, which accepted the status quo in Hong Kong, adopted a pragmatic approach in dealing with the colony in an attempt to make the most of the economic value of Hong Kong. The mainland authorities started supplying water from Dongjiang, or East River, to Hong Kong since 1963 and the move alleviated long-standing shortage of fresh water in Hong Kong. In 1963, three prominent Beijing opera actors and actress, Ma Lianliang, Zhao Yanxia and Zhang Junqiu were invited to stage Beijing opera performances in Hong Kong. The then Governor Robert Black invited the prominent actors from Beijing, who were seen as cultural envoys sent by Zhou Enlai, for a tea gathering at the Government House. But the tensions between Hong Kong and the mainland resumed after the outbreak of the Cultural Revolution. In Beijing, more than 400,000 people marched to the office of the British chargé d’affaires on May 16, 1967. The demonstrators vowed to be “the strong backing for Hong Kong compatriots”. Xu Kai, who was in charge of Beijing Workers’ Representatives Congress, said the workers and “revolutionaries” in Beijing was furious with “fascist atrocities” committed by the British authorities. “If the British imperialists are bent on going their own way, they will only speed up their own destruction,” he said.

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Chinese Premier Zhou Enlai tried his best to rein in the anti-British protests although he was forced to give verbal support to the anti-British struggle. Before the march in Beijing, Zhou instructed the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to draft several regulations regarding the march. The marchers were allowed to hand in petitions to the office of the British chargé d’affaires but were banned from rushing into the compound or beating members of the British diplomatic mission.37 Liang Shangyuan (梁上苑), the then deputy director of the Hong Kong Branch of Xinhua News Agency, told the author that after the establishment of the Struggle Committee, another deputy director, Zhu Manping, headed to Beijing to seek instructions regarding the struggle and sought support from the central authorities. “It was believed that the central government was divided over the situation in Hong Kong and Zhou adopted a negative attitude. Zhou even said ‘the central government is forced to endorse the struggle’. As the central authorities did not give clear instructions, Zhu’s message during internal briefings after her return was very vague, only saying that Beijing would give directives to Hong Kong later about the struggle,” Liang said. Some 100,000 people took part in an anti-British rally in Beijing on May 18. Zhou, Chen Boda, head of the Cultural Revolution Group under the Communist Party’s central committee, Minister of Foreign Affairs Chen Yi and his deputy Luo Guibo, Director of Beijing Municipal Revolutionary Committee and Politburo member Xie Fuzhi and other Chinese leaders attended the rally. Addressing the participants, Xie condemned the atrocities committed by the British authorities in Hong Kong and claimed that they were “premeditated” and “part of the plot by British imperialists to oppose the Chinese people by colluding with the US imperialist and Chiang Kai-shek’s faction”. “The British authorities in Hong Kong have ignored the repeated stern warnings from the Chinese people against providing Hong Kong as a base for the United States navy and air forces to invade Vietnam. The British government has been actively following US’s conspiracy to besiege China. It also attempts to form a new holy alliance with the US and Soviet revisionism to oppose China,” Xie said. “We must tell the stupid British government and British authorities in Hong Kong solemnly: you must shoulder the responsibilities as you have committed serious crime against the Chinese residents in Hong Kong,” he said. But it was notable that among the Chinese leaders who attended the rally, only Xie, who ranked the 25th, or the last, in the Politburo, spoke at the mass meeting. Some commentators in Hong Kong believed that Beijing had no intention of applying too much pressure on the British government at that time so as not to damage the bilateral relationship. Anti-British protests mushroomed in various mainland cities since the middle of May. Nearly 10,000 people in Shenzhen, a fishing village bordering Hong Kong, participated in a rally to show support for Hong Kong leftists. In a telegraph to Hong Kong leftists, the commander’s headquarters of the Red Guards in Guangzhou

Labour dispute at the Hong Kong Artificial Flower Works

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tertiary institutes said: “We have been standing ready in battle formation and will go to the front line to destroy the enemies once the motherland gives the order.” On May 19, rallies were held in Guangzhou, Shanghai, Guiyang, Harbin, and Lhasa to express support for the leftists in Hong Kong. A representative of the Guangzhou military command said during the rally in Guangzhou that “the 40 million people in Guangdong and troops stationed in Guangzhou are determined to be the strong backing for patriotic compatriots in Hong Kong to proceed with the anti-persecution struggle to the end”. “The British government and the British authorities in Hong Kong would come to no good end if they do not rein in on the brink,” he said. Director of the Hong Kong branch of Xinhua News Agency Liang Weilin, who was inspired by the statement issued by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, ordered leftist unions, schools, newspapers and mainland-funded companies to mobilize their members to send delegations to the Government House and protest at the government “brutality”.38 The first delegation, consisting of four men and a woman from a leftist newspaper, staged a protest outside the Government House on May 13. The number of delegations to the Government House increased in an organized exercise since the establishment of the Struggle Committee. Starting from May 19, thousands of students from leftist schools, workers and staff from mainland-funded companies took turns to march to the Government House. Uniformly dressed in white shirts and dark trousers, they formed up in the vicinity of Statute Square and marched to the Government House in groups of 30 to 50. The protesters, who wore badges featuring portrait of Mao Zedong and brandished Quotations from Chairman Mao Tse-Tung, formed a long queue from Lower Albert Road to Upper Albert Road and the number of demonstrators reached 3,000 during the height of protests but the delegations were largely orderly in the early days.39 The demonstrators chanted anti-British slogans such as “the British authorities must apologize”, “We will certainly win while the British authorities are bound to lose” and “Long live Chairman Mao”. The left-wing demonstrators plastered hundreds of big-character posters on the front gates of the Government House and painted the slogan “down with David Trench” on the road adjacent to the Government House. In the meantime, loudspeakers were installed at the top floor of the Bank of China Building which broadcast anti-British propaganda, including personal attacks on Governor David Trench, and quotations from Mao Zedong. On May 21, the Struggle Committee held a general meeting at which it called on the Hong Kong people to “continue the fight against suppression by the British authorities to the end”. The committee also decided to double the size of its membership and called for donations from the members of the left-wing organizations. The Struggle Committee issued “a letter to all compatriots in Hong Kong” which criticized the Hong Kong British authorities for the “persecution” since their occupation of Hong Kong. “Workers and peasants suffered from exploitation and find it hard to earn a living while hawkers and vendors are blackmailed. Residents

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in squatter areas face the constant threat of having their huts demolished and businessmen face discrimination. The persecutions of the Hong Kong compatriots by the British authorities are too many to enumerate piece by piece. The British authorities have also used high-handed tactics to block the spread of Mao Zedong Thought since the Cultural Revolution,” the letter said. The left wing also instigated nationalism and called for residents to make a “right choice” during the anti-British struggle. The letter issued by the Struggle Committee urged the policemen of Chinese descent to repent and stop giving support to the enemy.40 “Otherwise, the discipline of the nation would not condone you,” the letter said. Policemen of Chinese descent were often urged by leftist newspapers during the disturbances to turn against their officers “before it was too late”. After lodging a protest against the British government, the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs took a series of actions which were not in line with diplomatic convention. The ministry placed British chargé d’affaires Donald Hopson and another British diplomat under a travel ban and prevented them from going on the annual diplomatic tour arranged for all the heads of diplomatic missions in Beijing. On May 16, a large crowd broke into the compound of the house of Peter Hewitt, the British diplomatic representative in Shanghai. They went into the diplomat’s residence and sacked it completely, breaking up all the furniture and ornaments.41 Shen Ping, the Chinese chargé d’affaires in London, was summoned to the British Foreign Office where Arthur de la Mare, under-secretary in charge of Far Eastern affairs, handed in a strong protest “at the failure of the Chinese authorities to protect British property”. The protest note said it was essential that Shen obtained guarantees both for the safety of all British subjects in China and for the protection of British government property in Beijing and Shanghai. The British government reserved the right to claim compensation for damage done to British property. On May 19, British Foreign Secretary George Brown delivered a strong protest to Shen about the treatment of British diplomats in Beijing and Shanghai. Shen was told that Britain’s earlier protest had not been forwarded by him to the Chinese government and was asked to convey Britain’s “very strong views” to Beijing that such vehement overstatement as ‘fascist atrocities’ should no longer be used in describing British actions. In response, Luo Guibo summoned Donald Hopson on May 20 to lodge a protest at Brown’s “rude attitude” during his meeting with Shen. Luo said the British authorities in Hong Kong continued to suppress barehanded Hong Kong compatriots since the Ministry of Foreign Affairs issued the statement on May 15. Describing British actions as “completely fascist atrocities”, Luo urged the British government to stop persecution of the Chinese residents in Hong Kong right away.42

3

The Garden Road incident on May 22, 1967

Starting from May 19, demonstrators from the leftist camp besieged the Government House for several days under the watchful eyes of the policemen deployed outside the colonial mansion. In the first few days, the demonstrators managed to maintain reasonably good order. Their actions were largely confined to sticking “big-character posters” and reciting phrases from Quotations from Chairman Mao Tse-Tung outside the gate of the Government House. By and large, the government exercised restraint in the first few days of the protests. Jack Cater, then deputy colonial secretary and personal assistant to the governor, revealed that there was a tacit understanding between the colonial administration and the leftist camp on conditional tolerance of the protests. In an interview with the author in 1999, Cater said that he had met some leaders of the leftist camp before the demonstrations took place. “We had been assured that they would go down the hill quietly without causing any trouble.” Cater said the administration would allow the demonstrators to stage the protests outside the Government House so long as they proceeded in an orderly and peaceful manner. “We saw it a sensible thing to allow people from the communist side to march up to the Government House and go down peacefully. If that was what they wanted to do, we would accept that. Governor David Trench thought it was a good idea,” he said. He said he discussed with left-wing leaders and was told by the local communist leadership, “allow us to do this and we promise there will be no trouble”. “I said if that’s the sort of things you want to do, it’s okay. Do it in an orderly manner. But we won’t allow you to hit, kill or throw stones on the streets,” Cater said. Liang Shangyuan, deputy director of the Hong Kong branch of Xinhua News Agency, said it was difficult to judge whether such an understanding existed. “However, against the backdrop of the Cultural Revolution, it was impossible to implement such a consensus even if it was reached by the two sides.” Siu Tze, deputy manager of Joint Publishing Company during the riots, joined the protests outside the Government House two or three times. “In our first and

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second protests, the colonial government made no attempt to stop us. It was as if we were entering no man’s land,” he recalled. Siu was arrested when he led 20 company staff on a march to the Government House on May 22. He was jailed for 14 months for disturbing public order, claiming that he was beaten by police with batons. Wu Tai-chow, president of the Hong Kong Evening News, was apprehensive about the mounting tensions outside the colonial mansion. “I disagreed with the leftist camp’s move to besiege the Government House which was after all the symbol of British rule in Hong Kong,” he said. “The leftist camp kept on mobilizing workers and students to charge at the Government House for several days consecutively. It would result in serious casualties if the colonial government took actions to suppress the protests.” Wu told Kam Yiu-yu, then chief editor of Wen Wei Po, about what he saw while driving past the Government House. “Riot policemen and plainclothes officers had been stationed in the groves on the hillside along Garden Road while there was reinforcement of policemen on both sides next to the front gate of the Government House,” Wu said. “I told Kam, ‘I think David Trench is about to take actions. He has tolerated for several days and it seems his patience has been exhausted. I hope you would consider stopping such massive protests. We have won victory because the British have not dared to take actions in the past few days. Shouldn’t you consider a tactical retreat? You should halt the protests outside the Government House unless you intend to overthrow the British rule. But there is no need to organize such protests if you really wanted to topple the colonial government,” Wu said. Kam shared the pro-Beijing ally’s anxieties and pledged to convey his views to senior officials of the Hong Kong branch of Xinhua News Agency. Kam relayed Wu’s views to Xinhua director Liang Weilin and his deputy Qi Feng (祈烽) during a meeting held at the Xinhua headquarters in Wan Chai. But the officials criticized Wu’s views as “Right-deviationist conservatism”. John Cooper, author of Colony in Conflict, wrote that even whilst the demonstrations were in progress, efforts were apparently being made to facilitate a meeting between David Trench and leftist organizations to pacify the latter. “In this connection, the orderliness of their initial parades indicated that some leading leftists were trying to discipline their more ardent brethren and a certain number of European and Chinese merchants were of the opinion that the Government should bend its inflexible policy regarding demonstrators.”1 Nevertheless, the government did not see any reason to review its policy and no meeting between the governor and the demonstrators was arranged. But declassified files from Britain’s National Archives in London showed that the Hong Kong government did engage in secret discussions with the leaders of leftist organizations and even Hong Kong-based mainland officials through people who were close to the left wing. In a telegraph to Secretary of State for

The Garden Road incident on May 22, 1967

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Commonwealth Affairs Herbert Bowden on May 12, Trench said Richard Charles Lee (利銘澤), an unofficial member of the Executive Council with “good left-wing contacts”, had met Liang Weilin. “Lee endeavoured to persuade him (Liang) that the alleged new policy of Hong Kong of concerted action against left wing was a complete fiction.”2 “Liang had said that it would greatly help if those arrested [since March 6] were released and police undertook to play no part whatever in industrial disputes. Lee had, in reply, pointed out that the government could not interfere with the courts and that police had to maintain order if breaches of the peace occurred,” Trench said. The colonial administration adopted an intransigent attitude because London was adamant that Beijing would not forcibly take over Hong Kong and the confrontation was not orchestrated by Beijing. In a telegram to Trench on May 12, Herbert Bowden said the dispute arising from the Hong Kong Artificial Flower Works appeared to be spontaneous and local in origin.3 A Daily Telegraph editorial on May 18 said Beijing would not let the situation in Hong Kong get out of hand because the city was of great importance to the communist authorities. Its views were echoed by an editorial of Ming Pao on May 19. The editorial of the Chinese-language newspaper, which supported the Hong Kong government during the riots, said Britain would never wage a war with Beijing over Hong Kong, nor would London succumb to any demand in the way Portugal bowed to the demands unconditionally. “The attitude of British is very clear: we will go if you come [to Hong Kong] and we will stay if you don’t come. Going to a war? No way. Kowtowing? No,” the editorial wrote. The government announced on May 20 that any attempt to present a petition to the governor must be done in an orderly manner. No further processions would be allowed and delegations wishing to present petitions must not exceed 20 people. On May 22, thousands of left-wingers took turns to march in procession to the Government House. Shortly after 9 a.m., more than 20 staff from Joint Publishing Company gathered outside their bookshop in Wellington Street in Central. They subsequently walked through Queen’s Road Central and the High Court (currently the Legislative Council Building), then turning to Garden Road in the hope of marching to the Government House. They were followed by staff from the China and South Sea Bank, the Yien Yieh Commercial Bank and several leftist labour unions. Siu Tze led the procession to the Government House. “I was increasingly roused and indignant as the colonial government stepped up its suppression of the compatriots. I was aware of the mounting tensions before the procession set off and expected that some incident would occur. But I was duty-bound and went on undeterred by the dangers ahead,” he said. At 10:15 a.m., a procession comprising more than 100 demonstrators walked past the Bank of America Tower and Hilton Hotel (the original site of Cheung Kong Center). They were blocked by several hundred riot policemen who were already deployed there. The riot policemen ordered the demonstrators to turn back. Siu Tze

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was in the forefront of the procession and called on fellow demonstrators to wave the Little Red Book, or Quotations from Chairman Mao Tse-Tung, and chanted anti-British slogans. The procession waited for nearly an hour but both sides refused to budge. For the left-wingers, the heated confrontation between the leftist camp and the colonial government made it impossible for them to budge from the frontline and their only choice was to march forward. “We couldn’t retreat at that time because it was unjustifiable in the eyes of our superiors. What we could do was to charge forward no matter what dangers lay ahead,” Siu said. Of course, the demonstrators hit the stone walls of the riot policemen who beat them with batons. Siu bore the brunt with his head broken and bleeding. Many demonstrators fell to the ground after they were injured. The front door of the Bank of America Tower and the flower nursery was bloodstained, with glasses, shoes, big-character posters and batons spreading on the floor. Siu, whose watch and Quotations from Chairman Mao TseTung fell on the ground, was arrested by the police. Hui Wan-ching, a reporter of the Economic Weekly, was also beaten by batons and was arrested. John Cooper wrote that on May 22, the usual large crowd had gathered outside the Hilton Hotel, “orderly at first, but disorderly and violent as soon as it had been refused permission to visit the gates of the Government House except under the conditions laid down.” “First came insults and abuse, and then physical violence was offered. The police stood their ground without retaliation, as they had been instructed to do. When, however, one constable was brutally assaulted they began to use their batons and to make arrests,” Cooper wrote.4 Peter Godber, senior superintendent of police who was in charge of a platoon of policemen outside the Bank of America Tower to prevent processions of over 20 people from marching up Garden Road, said the demonstrators “did everything they possibly could to provoke us into an unwise or stupid move”.5 He told the crowd which came to Garden Road in the morning of May 22 that they could proceed to the Government House only if they were in groups of 20 at a time. “But they refused and stood in the streets, someone then urged the demonstrators to break the police cordon. They pushed right up to the constables and started to assault them. They landed blows on the constables’ stomachs and nostrils. One of them kneed a constable as hard as he could. The police took action and promptly arrested two people in a scuffle,” Godber said. He was jailed for four years in 1975 for amassing no less than HK$4.3 million before his retirement in 1973. The public furore over Godber’s corruption scandal prompted the Hong Kong government to establish the Independent Commission Against Corruption in 1974. Hong Kong Disturbances 1967 provided the official version of the event on May 22. It said the leftist camp was “plainly seeking a clash with the police in order to manufacture a propaganda ‘incident’ ”.

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“On the morning of May 22 crowds again began to gather at Garden Road and at 10 a.m. the police were faced by about 100 communists including students of both sexes. The demonstrators demanded to be allowed past the cordon and again shouted abuse and threats when this was refused. To provoke the police further they made threatening gestures, thrusting their fingers at the eyes of the constables in the leading files opposite them and kicking at their ankles . . . When this failed to produce the action they wanted, one of them kicked a constable in the groin. The man responsible was arrested; a general melee ensued and the police used their batons. At once the demonstrators fell to the ground en masse in simulated agony, whether they were hit or not. They produced bandages from their pockets, some already provided with artificial ‘bloodstains’, and they daubed themselves with the blood of those who had really been injured,” the report said. “The communists had achieved their incident, which was given wide publicity in their newspapers. Its effect however was limited by the fact that the scene was fully covered by non-communist reporters as well as by photographers and television cameramen, while an interested crowd was also watching from the windows of the Hilton Hotel . . . The incident tended to prove not the ‘brutality’ of the police but their very considerable restraint,” the report said.6 Powerful loudspeakers were mounted on the Bank of China Building in Des Voeux Road Central which broadcast a stream of provocative anti-British propaganda, including personal attacks on Governor David Trench and other senior officials. The report criticized the left-wingers for attempting to dramatize the event by “play-acting”.7 But pro-Beijing newspapers retorted that “when the beasts spring on you, can you afford to paint your face with blood?” The South China Morning Post reported that demonstrators were doing their utmost to provoke incidents and exploit them for “propaganda purposes”. “In one clash outside the Hilton Hotel, uninjured women smeared blood on their faces, produced bandages from their pockets and shouted that they were the victims of atrocity,” the SCMP report said.8 Cater said when the demonstrators started running down from the Government House, they threw stones and broke the windows in the streets of Central. “You can’t allow people to riot. You must do something to stop it and put it down. It was unfortunate that the demonstration turned into riot,” he said. Siu Tze, who was in the forefront of the confrontation, denied that the demonstrators had assaulted policemen or had engaged in play-acting. “I didn’t see anybody bringing mercurochrome or bandages. Why so unscrupulous? As far as I know, our superior has not given such an instruction,” he said. In her autobiography, Elsie Elliott writes that the demonstrators said they were brutally attacked while the government said the people carried red ink, which they poured over their faces to make themselves look as if they were wounded. “Friends staying at Hilton Hotel, in front of which the incident occurred, told me that the

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report put out by the Government Information Service was so different from what they had seen from their own eyes as to be unrecognizable,” she wrote.9 “I was concerned enough to write to the government asking for a photograph of the red ink incident since the whole episode had been filmed. I was told that this was impossible, because the film was unclear,” Elliott wrote. Did the colonial government suppress the demonstrators from the leftist camp? Did the left-wingers engage in any “play-acting”? A person working at the China Merchants Group during the disturbances told the author that he and his colleagues were told by their company to bring red ink when they were heading for the Government House. He said his superior instructed them to pour red ink over their bodies in the event of a clash with the police. “The move aims at creating the ‘evidence’ of oppression by the colonial government,” the worker from the China Merchants Group said. But it was undisputable that some demonstrators were beaten and injured by the police with batons. It seemed that both the colonial administration and the leftist camp had not told the whole truth and covered up the parts which were unfavourable to themselves. The arrested demonstrators, including Siu Tze, were sent to Central Police Station. The policemen ordered them to kneel on the floor for interrogation. Siu found that some of the staff from leftist organizations were in low morale. He chanted slogans in an attempt to inspire the spirit of fellow left-wingers but was quickly beaten by the policemen, resulting in bruises in his chest. They were subsequently escorted to Victoria Detention Centre at Hollywood Road in Central. In June 1967, Siu was charged for “disturbing public order” but he and his fellow demonstrators refused to hire lawyers to represent them in courts. “It was a gesture to show that we did not recognize the legitimacy of British rule in Hong Kong and we did not bother how they handed down the judgments,” he said. They were adamant that they were justified in “resisting the persecution” and showed contempt for the “illegal trials”. Siu represented himself in the court but he paid the price for what he did. He said that he was beaten by policemen after the court proceedings were adjourned. He was sentenced to 14 months’ imprisonment. He returned to Joint Publishing Company after leaving the prison and was promoted to become the company’s general manager in 1975. The left-wingers continued their protests in Central after the Garden Road incident. Crowds began to build up at Statue Square, outside Hilton Hotel and in the vicinity of the Government House. At 12:45 p.m., a police vehicle running past Central Market was hit by stones thrown by the demonstrators, marking the prelude to large-scale disorder in Central. Riot policemen were sent to Central and several trucks carrying British soldiers patrolled there. Planks were hammered on the front doors of shops in Central. The heart of the colony appeared to have entered into a state of war. Shortly after 2 p.m., the buses and trams stopped running. Some buses and taxis were abandoned in Central in an attempt to cause traffic jams. Most of the

The Garden Road incident on May 22, 1967

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traffic in Central was brought to a standstill. Demonstrators and riot policemen clashed outside the Bank of China Building, the High Court and the Causeway Bay Magistracy and a crowd at the Kowloon Star Ferry concourse had to be dispersed by tear-gas shells. The government admitted that the police used ball ammunition during that day, the first time since confrontation began. Since the demonstrators started the siege of the Government House in the middle of May, loudspeakers were installed at the Bank of China Building for broadcasting anti-British slogans. After the clash on May 22, the government broadcast jazz music and pop songs by the Beatles through six loudspeakers on the roof of the headquarters of the Government Information Services, which was located near the Bank of China Building. The noise drowned the Central area, forming the background music of the confrontation. At 6:30 p.m., for the first time since the Second World War, a curfew was imposed on Hong Kong Island and residents were unable to venture out into the streets. The government also announced that no demonstration or assembly would be allowed without prior consent by the police commissioner. “Any individuals who want to petition the Governor can do it by mail,” the government said. A total of 167 persons were arrested that day and pro-Beijing newspapers claimed hundreds of people were injured, more than 100 of whom were seriously injured or fell unconscious. The leftist camp described the bloody clash on May 22 as “Garden Road Bloodshed” or “May 22 Bloodshed”. However, the Hong Kong government said only one demonstrator had been injured seriously enough to be admitted to hospital.10 The Chinese government announced on May 22 the closure of the office of British diplomat in Shanghai and ordered British diplomat Peter Hewitt to leave Shanghai in 48 hours. The decision was announced to Donald Hopson “in the view of events in Hong Kong”.11 In its editorial published on May 23, Wen Wei Po described the government’s actions in the previous day as “massacre” and “bloody suppression”. “The warrior equipped by the invincible Mao Zedong Thought would never succumb to your (the colonial administration) force. We fear neither Heaven nor Earth. We are not daunted by deaths. We resolutely oppose you and are unswerving in struggling with you. We will resolutely struggle against you until we overthrow you,” the editorial said. The pro-Beijing media even dubbed the colonial government as the “fascist authorities”. The pro-Beijing newspapers abused expatriate policemen and their Chinese colleagues as “white-skinned pigs” and “yellow-skinned dogs” respectively. On the other hand, the colonial government remained intransigent and invoked the Emergency Regulations Ordinance to promulgate a series of emergency regulations. The regulations issued on May 24 prohibited “illegal broadcasting” and those violated the law would be subject to a $50,000 fine and ten years’ imprisonment. It was a measure aiming at the loudspeakers installed at the Bank

50

Hong Kong’s Watershed

of China Building. On June 1, the government introduced another regulation which banned the posting of “inflammatory posters”. It empowered the police to confiscate or destroy any posters “inciting violence, undermining the loyalty of the policemen or public servants”. Anybody who printed or distributed these posters would be fined $5,000 and imprisoned for two years. Even the owner or tenants of the buildings where the posters were put up could face such charges. On May 23, the Struggle Committee held an enlarged meeting. The committee approved the establishment of a standing committee which would be responsible for discussing and devising strategies for the anti-British campaign. The existing 17 representatives of the committee were renamed standing committee members, and Yeung Kwong was elected as committee director. Fei Yiming, Tse Hung-wai, Wong Kin-lap and K. C. Wong were elected as vice-directors while the number of committee members increased from 104 to more than 300. Chinese Premier Zhou Enlai had been concerned with the political struggles instigated by the leftist camp since May and opposed extremist actions to be taken in Hong Kong. He had discussed Hong Kong affairs with top officials from the State Council’s External Affairs Office, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Communist Party’s Hong Kong and Macau Works Committee. “The struggle against the British authorities regarding Hong Kong must adhere in strict accordance with the central government’s established policies. We must follow the principle of proceeding with the struggles ‘on just grounds, to our advantages and with restraint’,” Zhou said.12 The Chinese leader in charge of Hong Kong affairs also criticized the departments concerned for their ultra-leftist slogans and measures taken on Hong Kong affairs. According to a person who had taken part in Beijing’s handling of the 1967 riots, Zhou also said it was inappropriate to copy the practice of the Cultural Revolution to Hong Kong, saying it was “comical” to install loudspeakers at the Bank of China Building. “It is not a place in the mainland. Isn’t it a deliberate attempt to provoke the British? How can they tolerate it?” Zhou said.13 However, the Chinese government still showed support for the leftists in Hong Kong in public. Speaking at a National Day reception hosted by the Afghanistan embassy in Beijing on May 27, Chinese Foreign Minister and VicePremier Chen Yi (陳毅) reiterated that the Hong Kong government must accept the demands raised by the Chinese Foreign Ministry. He emphasized that the Chinese government and Chinese people supported the “righteous struggles of the compatriots in Hong Kong”. Marshal Chen condemned the Hong Kong government for ignoring the protests staged by the compatriots in Hong Kong and continuing the “bloody suppression” of the compatriots in the city. British chargé d’affaires Donald Hopson, at which the diatribe was directed, was also present as an invited guest. He walked out before Marshal Chen completed his speech.

The Garden Road incident on May 22, 1967

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Hours after the clash at Garden Road, Governor David Trench had come up with a package of tough measures against the left wing. In a telegraph to Secretary of State for Commonwealth Affairs Herbert Bowden on May 22, Trench wrote that “the key to the situation here is the maintenance of public confidence. There are signs that unless we are seen to take effective action to control the situation, public confidence will slip. A landslide could quickly follow”. Sir David suggested four measures to deal with the situation: (1) Picking up and if possible, deporting, and failing that detaining, a selection of up to 24 leaders of the leftist camp. (2) Taking action to neutralize several of the buildings from which the campaign was being directed, notably (a) the Bank of China and (b) the Federation of Trade Unions headquarters and the Workers’ Club in To Kwa Wan. This might be achieved by declaring 24-hour curfews in areas around the buildings, or possibly declaring them closed areas under the Public Order Ordinance. (3) Taking action against Wen Wei Po, the major pro-Beijing newspaper in Hong Kong. (4) Bringing British commando ship Bulwark on a visit to Hong Kong.14 Trench said after discussion with the commander of British forces in Hong Kong, deputy undersecretary of state in the Commonwealth Office Arthur Galsworthy and head of the Far Eastern Department in the Foreign Office E. Bolland, he recommended course (2) and (4) at that stage. The Commonwealth Office granted on the same day the approval for closing selected buildings and sending Bulwark to Hong Kong. In a telegraph to Bowden on May 23, Sir David Trench said the Executive Council agreed unanimously that morning that deportation would be the most damaging and effective action which the Hong Kong government could take against the communist leadership. “They have authorised me to deport all or any of a list of 24 persons at my discretion,” Sir David wrote.15 In a reply to Trench on May 25, Bowden said London agreed that action should be taken about selected communist leaders but had “some doubts” about the Hong Kong government being able physically to deport them. “We are advised that they might well not be accepted at the border, and that therefore we might lose face. But we must rely upon your judgment to weigh up the various factors here . . . You have authority to go ahead if the situation deteriorates but please keep me informed of any action you take,” Bowden wrote.16 He said that London also agreed that if the communist press continued to carry out or step up the campaign of sedition and intimidation, the governor should use the emergency regulations to close down the printing presses. But the secretary of state also called for caution and prior consultation from the governor before taking any action. “I would, however, wish to be consulted before any action is actually taken,” Mr Bowden said.

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Hong Kong’s Watershed

On May 26, British commando ship Bulwark entered the waters of Hong Kong to take part in a military exercise with the British navy stationed in the colony. The move was singled out by the People’s Daily on May 29 as the proof of Britain’s determination to clamp down physically on the Chinese people in Hong Kong. In a commentary entitled “Gunboat policy has already been dumped into rubbish bin”, the official newspaper said that the warship’s helicopters, crew and marine commandos had been purposefully lined up in deck “in a flagrant demonstration of strength in an attempt to intimidate Chinese compatriots in Hong Kong and Kowloon”. The commentary warned “the British imperialists” that their worn-out warships were “no big deal in the eyes of the brave compatriots in Hong Kong and the great Chinese people”. “American imperialism is only a paper tiger and so is British imperialism. Don’t people know your real abilities? American imperialism has been badly battered in Vietnam, you [Britain] are only an old-brand imperialism relying on American imperialism and now you attempt to provoke 700 million Chinese people. Isn’t what you are doing tantamount to throwing an egg against a rock? Aren’t you overrating your own abilities?” The commentary also said that Britain would only ask for trouble by adopting the “gunboat policy” again. “Let the gunboat policy of imperialism go to hell. If British imperialism is bent on going its own way, it will eventually eat its own bitter fruit!” the commentary said. The Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs even drafted a protest note which demanded the British government to “stop provocative military exercises at the gateway of China. Otherwise, the Chinese government will take necessary measures and the British government will have to be held responsible for all consequences.” During a meeting with officials from relevant departments on June 6, Zhou Enlai criticized the wording of “the Chinese government will take necessary measures” in the draft note. “What is meant by ‘we will take necessary measures’? Have you discussed the matter with the headquarters of the General Staff (of the People’s Liberation Army)? Stating that in the note before touching base with the PLA is merely an empty threat and is inconsistent with the Mao Zedong Thought. When we said in a statement in 1950 that China could not sit idle on US invasion of Korea, we had already mobilized troops in Northeast China,” he said.17 Despite the heated exchange of words between the colonial government and the left wing, the Hong Kong government had made attempts to engage in informal talks with the left wing and sources close to Beijing and was ready to make conciliatory gestures towards the leftist camp. In a telegram to Herbert Bowden on May 25, deputy undersecretary of State in the Commonwealth Office Arthur Galsworthy, who paid a visit to Hong Kong at the time, said Ho Yin, a prominent pro-Beijing tycoon in Macau and father of incumbent Macau Chief Executive Edmund Ho Hau-wah, had arrived in Hong Kong on the suggestion of executive councillor Richard Charles Lee who had contacts with key figures in the left wing. Trench said that Ho had indicated a desire to

The Garden Road incident on May 22, 1967

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make direct contact with Cater and the Hong Kong government was hoping that a meeting between Cater and Ho, with Richard Charles Lee, would take place in the afternoon of May 25 at the Hang Seng Building in Central. “It could be that Ho Yin may be probing (either for his own reasons or on instruction) for some face-saving gesture to enable the communists to disengage. If this and subsequent meetings go well, Cater has been authorized to make certain points: that the Governor, knowing a need to save face would raise [sic], had already deliberately permitted demonstrations outside the main gate of the Government House which were allowed to reach a degree of unruliness before being stopped that would not have been allowed; that he felt it probable the Governor would not wish to take retrospective legal action for offences committed in the last few days provided all communist action now ceased; that the Governor might in a television or radio interview make a generally conciliatory reference to recent events, including the theme of no victimisation. The major part of the subject matter in any such interview would be references to general progress in Hong Kong, including mention of steps to be taken to improve labour relations.”18 But in another telegram to the Commonwealth Office on May 26, Trench said that the meeting between Ho Yin and Cater did not take place. An opportunity for dialogue and even conciliation between the two sides was missed. Ho did meet Lee and a senior member of Hang Seng Bank who subsequently met Cater. The banker believed that Ho was not allowed to meet Cater because the left wing in Hong Kong were still awaiting instructions from the mainland and did not wish to take any premature action.19 In a telegraph to the Commonwealth Office, Trench said that Ho came to Hong Kong again on June 1 and held discussion with left-wing leaders. Ho later told the gist of the discussion to the senior member of Hang Seng Bank, who subsequently passed the information to Cater. “Ho reported that the local communist hierarchy was of the opinion that this was not the time to hold discussion with the Hong Kong government; that they were confident of final victory,” Sir David said.20

Stoppages staged by the leftist camp Starting from May 23, workers at bus companies, tram, the Hong Kong and China Gas Company, the China Light and Power Company, the Wharf, the Star Ferry, the Hongkong and Yaumati Ferry, the Whampoa Dock, Taikoo Dockyard, Marine Department, the Hongkong Post and the Dairy Farm staged token stoppages. The first stoppages were sporadic attempts to disrupt industry and communications and usually last for several hours to one day. The effects of these small-scale stoppages on their respective services were virtually negligible.

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In the evening of May 25, the leftist unions called on the workers at Star Ferry to take part in a one-hour stoppage. Some workers at Yaumati Ferry staged another stoppage from 6 a.m. to 9 a.m. three days later, affecting about 10,000 commuters. According to report by Pan Ku magazine, the stoppage at Yaumati Ferry was a result of intimidation from left-wing workers. In the early hours of May 29, several men dashed onto a ferry anchored at a pier and ordered the captain to drive the ferry to a designated place. The men claimed that anybody who did not obey their orders would be dumped into the sea.21 On May 26, nearly 1,000 staff at the Hongkong Post staged a one-day stoppage, resulting in the government’s announcement of one-day suspension of mail delivery. The end of May also saw a two-hour stoppage at Whampoa Dock and another fourhour stoppage at the Hong Kong and China Gas Company. But the stoppages in the textile industry were more serious. On May 29, Nan Fung Textiles Limited and Central Textiles (Hong Kong) Limited, both in Tsuen Wan, came almost to a halt from 7 a.m. to 11 a.m. as a total of 400 workers from the leftist camp boycotted work. The workers held a mass meeting in protest of “atrocious suppression” by the colonial government during the stoppage. On that morning, about 200 workers at Wyler Textiles Limited in To Kwa Wan organized a morning sit-down (the pro-Beijing newspapers claimed that more than 1,000 workers joined the action). The textile industry, which employed 41 per cent of the total labour force, was one of the pillars of Hong Kong’s economy at the time. Any major threat to the industry could have devastating effects on the economy. Pang Chun-hoi, chairman of pro-Taiwan Cotton Industry Workers’ General Union, said most of those on stoppages had only stopped work as a result of intimidation. According to Pang, at the Nan Fung mill, choppers, iron bars and lumps of wood had been used by left-wing workers to force young workers to return home, shortly after they had reported for the morning shift. He urged the workers to report for work the following day with the assurance that government protection would be sought for them against the intimidators. His call was heeded and all three textile mills were operating normally the next morning. On June 1, a large number of maintenance workers and carpenters at the government dockyard in Yau Ma Tei staged stoppage in protest against the government’s removal of anti-British posters in the workplace. The brief strike nearly brought the dockyard to a standstill. On June 6, left-wing workers at the Hongkong Electric Holdings and the Wharf and Taikoo Dockyard in Shau Kei Wan followed suit in the pretext of the management’s removal of anti-British posters. Four hundred workers at Star Ferry joined the chorus of stoppages that day, bringing the cross-harbour ferry service to a standstill. At the Public Works Department in Sung Wong Toi Road in Kowloon City, 450 workers stopped work and armed themselves with pieces of pipes and marched around the office chanting communist slogans. On June 10, workers at the Dairy Farm in Pok Fu Lam staged a stoppage and disrupted milk supply in most parts of the Hong Kong Island.

The Garden Road incident on May 22, 1967

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The government and the companies affected by the stoppages subsequently took disciplinary actions against those workers who took part in the stoppages. The Public Works Department dismissed 72 of its workers while the Hongkong Post fired 112 workers, representing 6 per cent of their staff who had not reported for work on May 26. The Star Ferry announced that starting from June 7, all workers who had taken part in stoppages would be suspended and the company would consider allowing those who registered later to resume their posts. The Star Ferry gradually restored its normal services from June 11. Speaking at the Legislative Council meeting on May 31, Colonial Secretary Michael Gass said, “Hong Kong was at enmity with no one. Our desire is to live peacefully with all without interference and Hong Kong has shown itself firm in this desire.” He also said, “disturbances and stoppages of work in recent days come about through the actions of a small minority using despicable means of intimidation and threats of violence. This government is determined to do all in its power to put an end to this intimidation and violence; it is determined to restore and maintain peace and good order and confidence in Hong Kong, which it believes to be [the] desire of all but a very small number. In this we now know that we have the overwhelming support of [the] people of Hong Kong and there can be no question of this government weakening in its resolve and determination.” According to declassified files at Britain’s National Archives, the British government had once deliberated the possibility of closing the Xinhua office in London in retaliation against the ransack of the residence of Peter Hewitt, the British consul in Shanghai, by Chinese protesters on May 16. In a telegraph to Bowden on May 24, Trench said that the closure of the Xinhua office in London would lead to Beijing’s greater involvement in Hong Kong and the Chinese government would step up their pressure in Hong Kong. “If we were to close NCNA [Xinhua] in London but not to close them in Hong Kong, not only Peking but also opinion here (both Communist and non-Communist) might well regard it as an admission on our part that we did not dare to take this action here,” Sir David said. “[The] fact that NCNA [Xinhua] is engaging in even more poisonous propaganda and activities here than in Britain would emphasise the point even more. But we would regard closing of NCNA in Hong Kong as a major escalation which we think would inevitably provoke a strong response from Peking,” he wrote, “in the interests of Hong Kong therefore I would feel happier if you could avoid taking such a step.”22 In a telegraph to Sir David on May 25, Herbert Bowden agreed that “any decision on action against the Xinhua in London must fully take into account the position in Hong Kong”. As the confrontation escalated, the British government started to deliberate the scenario of withdrawal from Hong Kong if Beijing went for all-out confrontation. Senior British officials first indicated their deliberation of such a possibility on May

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17, five days before the Garden Road incident. In a telegraph to Trench on May 17, Bowden said: “It would be very helpful to me to have your assessment of the ability of Hong Kong to cope with an all-out confrontation by the C.P.G. [Chinese People’s Government] short of armed intervention, i.e. widespread disorders, in the Colony coupled with the cutting off of Hong Kong’s water and food supplies from the mainland, and your assessment of the effect on the morale of Hong Kong Chinese if this situation lasted for some time.” “Once it became clear that the C.P.G. intended to go for all-out confrontation of this kind this might well be the point at which we should have to consider withdrawal from Hong Kong,” Bowden wrote.23 Bowden wrote that if Beijing had decided to sacrifice the economic benefits she derived from Hong Kong to Cultural Revolution purity of doctrine, and to drive British out of Hong Kong completely, “our alternatives would be to resist — which would mean war — or to withdraw. Withdrawal would represent an unpleasant recognition of the realities of the situation. I am very much concerned that if this proves inevitable, our decision to withdraw would be so made and so implemented as to preserve as much of our dignity as is possible.” Bowden added that he was in the meantime preparing contingency plans for withdrawal, in consultation with the secretary of state for defence.

4

People’s Daily editorial on June 3 and the general strikes

The British and Hong Kong governments recognized that Hong Kong would be indefensible if Beijing was determined to take over the colony forcibly. But based on the judgment that Beijing was not the mastermind behind the disturbances in Hong Kong and had no intention of taking back the colony by force, British authorities declined to accede to the demands put forward by the left wing and handled the disturbances with a tough hand. In a telegram to the Commonwealth Office on May 24, David Trench said, “it does not look as though Peking intends at present to force us out of Hong Kong. Our assessment is rather that the local communists felt they must act here increasingly in accordance with principles of the Cultural Revolution and accordingly seized the incident at the Artificial Flower Works as a suitable opportunity for doing so. This seems to have been a mistaken initiative by the local communists, representing their response to their understanding of current trends of thought in China, rather than a policy deliberately directed from authoritative mainland sources,” he wrote. “But once the local communists had committed themselves, Peking, on the basis of misleading reports of [the] local situation, felt not only that they must react in support, but also that they could exploit the situation in order at least to humiliate us to such an extent as to ensure that in future we would be much more quickly sensitive to Peking pressure, and if possible to force us to accept a Macau-type situation.”1 The governor’s views were echoed by Donald Hopson, British chargé d’affaires in Beijing. In a telegram to the Foreign Office on June 2, Hopson said, “from what has happened so far it seems probable that the CPG [the Chinese government] did not deliberately start the trouble. The left wing in Hong Kong may have gone further than the CPG wanted in blowing up the situation. The CPG was thereby forced to intervene politically in support of the left wing.”2 The Asia Communist Affairs section of the US State Department agreed that “the Chinese government were unlikely to want to alter the status of Hong Kong at the present juncture, in view of the Sino-Soviet dispute, the situation in Vietnam and their own internal difficulties. They must also realize by now that Hong Kong

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could not be softened up as easily as Macau . . . The Chinese government would probably like to maintain more or less the status quo in Hong Kong, with a certain amount of agitation to satisfy local enthusiasts.”3 On June 2, the People’s Daily published a commentary entitled “Salute to the brave compatriots in Hong Kong” which described the “Hong Kong compatriots” as “invincible”. “Although the British imperialists have army, police, agents, guns and emergency regulations in their hands, they are just a paper tiger and will be smashed by the great storm of revolution by the Hong Kong compatriots. The doomsday of British imperialism in Hong Kong is drawing closer as British persecution of our compatriots becomes more frantic. With the backing of 700 million of Chinese people, the Hong Kong compatriots must seek the repayment of the bloody debts from British imperialism and sentenced it to death penalty. This historic day is bound to come,” the commentary said. A spokesman for the Struggle Committee said on June 3 that the Hong Kong British authorities had been “besieged by the storm of anti-persecution struggle started by the Hong Kong compatriots”. He said that the struggle would continue regardless of the emergency regulations. Claiming that a larger scale of antipersecution struggle was about to happen, the spokesman called on the Hong Kong people to “take action right away and prepare for the fight”. The editorial of the People’s Daily published on June 3 lifted Beijing’s propaganda warfare against the British authorities in Hong Kong to a new height. The editorial, which was printed on the front page under the headline “Firmly rebuff provocation by British imperialism”, said that the Hong Kong compatriots would certainly firmly struggle, “oppose a stubborn enemy, pursue a tottering foe, bring down British imperialism and make it stink”. “British imperialism is the vicious colonizer of Hong Kong. It is the enemy of 4 million Chinese compatriots and of 700 million Chinese people. For the last 100 years decadent, corrupt imperialism has carried out cruel suppression of Hong Kong compatriots . . . The bloody debts and towering crimes of British imperialism over the last 100 years must be repaid.” “The fascist atrocities of British imperialism have obliged our compatriots to start a movement to hate and despise British imperialism and take all possible measures politically, economically and culturally to launch a counter-attack against the colonial rule by British imperialism. They (our compatriots in Hong Kong) must expose and publish a wide scale of the towering crimes of British imperialism over the last 100 years and launch mass accusation movements so that the aggressive nature of reactionary and decadent British imperialism will be made clear to every household in Hong Kong,” the editorial said. “If British imperialism continues to carry out bloody persecution of our patriotic compatriots, our Hong Kong compatriots and the 700 million Chinese people will certainly not tolerate this. Hong Kong and Kowloon compatriots, further mobilize yourselves, organize yourselves and launch a struggle against British imperialism.

People’s Daily editorial on June 3 and the general strikes

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Prepare yourselves at the right time to answer the call of the motherland and smash the reactionary regime of British imperialism. Tens of millions of Red Guards who have achieved victory in the Cultural Revolution support you. Hundreds of millions of revolutionary masses support you. The 700 million Chinese people, armed with Mao Zedong Thought, have sworn to provide a powerful backing for Hong Kong compatriots. Hong Kong and Kowloon compatriots, go bravely forward to a great victory,” the editorial said. The editorial even gave Hong Kong leftists the guidelines for anti-British struggle, emphasizing the need to mobilize students and workers to act as the “backbone” of the anti-British campaign. “In this struggle we shall mainly rely upon the Hong Kong working class as the main force of revolution. We should also fully mobilize youths and students so that the youth and student movements merge with the workers’ movement. With the working class at the centre, compatriots of all levels will focus on the struggle against the United States and British imperialism, and first and foremost against British imperialism,” the editorial said. The editorial was commonly known among the left wing in Hong Kong as the “June 3 editorial”. The call on the left wing to prepare to “answer the call of the motherland and smash the reactionary regime of British imperialism” was widely seen by the Hong Kong leftists as Beijing’s full backing for them and preparedness to take over Hong Kong. Ta Kung Pao described the editorial as a directive for the “anti-persecution struggle” and a final judgment on “struggling British imperialism”. Many leftist sympathizers believed that the editorial was an indication of the Chinese government’s intention of “liberating” Hong Kong. Wong Kin-lap, deputy director of the Struggle Committee and headmaster of Hon Wah College, said, “many people within our camp were in high spirits because they believed the central government would give us unconditional backing. They thought Beijing would take over Hong Kong very soon.” Siu Tze said many fellow leftists anticipated Beijing to liberate Hong Kong, Macau and Taiwan following the publication of the editorial. “We thought there was no need to retain the status quo of Hong Kong. I heard before the outbreak of the Cultural Revolution about the central government’s policy of maintaining status quo of Hong Kong. But I thought there was a change in the central government’s policy towards Hong Kong,” he said. However, the editorial from the Chinese official mouthpiece did not spark any panic in the British and Hong Kong governments. The British government was still convinced that the editorial did not imply Beijing’s intent to drive them out from Hong Kong and the editorial suggested that Beijing was contemplating a long drawn-out battle. Donald Hopson, British top diplomat in Beijing, played down the significance of the People’s Daily editorial. “My first impression of this People’s Daily editorial is that in spite of its prominence and loud tone it is rather feeble,” he wrote in a telegram to the Commonwealth Office.4 But he added that the left wing in Hong Kong would take it as a directive to carry on the anti-British campaign.

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Governor David Trench also noted that the emphasis of the People’s Daily editorial was “on the need for the local hierarchy to plan for a long struggle and to build up the necessary organization. It is possibly of some significance that there was no mention of the five demands [put forward by the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs on May 15] nor was there any direct threat of intervention by the C.P.G. The Hong Kong working class was named as the spearhead of the struggle and there was a definite implication that the local communists cannot expect active support, other than by way of propaganda, from China,” he wrote in a telegram to the Commonwealth Office on June 5.5 In a telegraph to Herbert Bowden on June 7, Trench said he believed that Beijing still intended to confine the dispute to a Hong Kong basis. “Our reading of the situation and in particular the article on June 3 in the People’s Daily is that in spite of the strong language used China still wishes to keep the dispute mainly on a local, i.e. Hong Kong basis,” Sir David wrote. Arthur de la Mare, undersecretary of the British Foreign Office in charge of Far Eastern affairs, made a similar interpretation. “Peking itself does not at present seem to be trying to force the issue. For over a week now they have not referred to the ‘five demands’. This is very different from the action they took against Macau when they insisted upon the Governor accepting their demands by enforcing a boycott and introducing Chinese warships into the inner harbor of Macau,” de la Mare said in an internal memo.6 The Hong Kong government continued to clamp down on the left wing. On June 1, emergency regulations were promulgated to outlaw the display of inflammatory posters and action was taken to remove them from government buildings and elsewhere. Special powers were conferred on the police to seize, remove or obliterate any inflammatory posters. Anyone found guilty of being concerned with the preparation, distribution or display of inflammatory material might be liable to a maximum penalty of a HK$5,000 fine and two years’ imprisonment. Owners, occupiers and other persons in charge of any buildings or vehicles willfully displaying inflammatory material were liable to similar conviction unless they could prove that they had taken all reasonable steps to have such material removed. After the promulgation of the emergency regulations, the police mounted operations to remove posters from buses, ferries and public buildings. On June 3, the police mounted another series of operations in leftist bookstores, banks, Chinese product shops and cinemas, and removed from the shop windows clippings of newspaper reports and photographs on “bloody suppression” by the colonial government. At 11 p.m., Xinhua director Liang Weilin lodged a “strongest and most serious protest” with Governor David Trench at the removal of the newspaper clippings. “This action taken by the British authorities in Hong Kong is inimical to patriotic compatriots in Hong Kong and Kowloon, and another serious political provocation to the Chinese people. This is something that patriotic compatriots in Hong Kong

People’s Daily editorial on June 3 and the general strikes

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and Kowloon and the Chinese people absolutely cannot tolerate . . . The British authorities in Hong Kong must immediately cancel this barbaric and unreasonable measure. Otherwise, the British authorities in Hong Kong will have to bear all serious consequences that may arise therefrom,” Liang said. On June 8, left-leaning workers at the electrical and mechanical workshop of the Public Works Department in To Kwa Wan, Kowloon depot of the Hong Kong and China Gas Company in To Kwa Wan, the Water Supplies Department’s depot in Kowloon and the Hongkong Electric attempted to block the police from tearing down anti-British posters and scuffles broke out between the workers and the police. The battle was fiercest in the Hong Kong and China Gas Company’s plant where the police fired tear gas and wooden projectiles at the workers while the latter counterattacked with wooden batons. Two workers, Lai Chung and Tsang Ming, died in the conflict. Left-leaning worker Chui Tin-po was beaten to death during the clash at the electrical and mechanical workshop of the Public Works Department in To Kwa Wan. A total of 545 workers were arrested in the two premises, 115 of whom were charged with various offences. The left wing described the trio as “martyrs”, claiming that the “bloody debts must be repaid”. The police mounted a raid against Sil-Metropole Theatre in Kwun Tong which was operated by a leftist film company, at 11 p.m. the following day. The riot police tore down posters, photographs and slogans in the theatre and arrested the theatre manger and more than 40 staff. The police claimed that they had seized offensive weapons and inflammatory material inside the theatre and suspended its licence on the charge of “unlawful assembly”. On June 23, a small police party was attacked by a group of men armed with iron bars, bottles and sharpened files when they cleared posters along Canton Road in Mong Kok. The policemen opened fire with their revolvers and in the ensuing battle two policemen were injured and one of the attackers was fatally wounded. The remaining assailants retreated into the premises of the Hong Kong Rubber and Plastic Workers Union nearby. The police forced an entry into the union premises and, after a seven-hour battle, a dozen of policemen were injured and 53 people, including union chairman Fung Kam-shui, were arrested. Three arrested persons later died of the injuries they had suffered during the battle but leftist newspapers claimed that they were “beaten to death” by the police. It was the first occasion that the police had raided the premises of a left-wing union. In another commentary published on June 10, the People’s Daily urged workers, peasants, the People’s Liberation Army and the “revolutionary masses” in mainland China to prepare to support the struggle in Hong Kong with “concrete actions”. In a move to protest at the raids mounted by the police, four left-wing government workers’ unions called for workers at various government departments such as the Water Supplies Department, the Hongkong Post, public hospitals, Marine Department and public utilities like Star Ferry and Dairy Farm to join a general strike on June 10. In a letter to government employees, the struggle committees of

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the relevant unions said, “[w]e have the support of millions of Red Guards and the backing of the invincible People’s Liberation Army. We will certainly claim victory in our anti-persecution struggle.” On June 12, struggle committees of the Star Ferry and Wharf held a meeting to protest at “persecution” by the government. The director of the All-Circles AntiPersecution Struggle Committee Yeung Kwong said during the meeting that more actions were to come. “British imperialism has committed vicious crimes in the last 100 years and we must settle the accounts. Now the initiative entirely rests on us and it is up to us to decide when to strike or stop. The road of the struggle is tortuous but the prospect is bright. We should further unite together and get ready for a bigger struggle,” he said. The left wing claimed that they would mobilize more than 10,000 workers to take part in the strikes but the response to the call for strikes was negligible. Most of the workers of the government departments concerned reported for duty, with 90 per cent of postal workers remaining at their jobs. But a general stoppage at Dairy Farm in Pok Fu Lam on June 10 held up milk delivery to all places except the hospitals. Ice production had reached an all-time low and full supplies were no longer available for markets and for the local fishing fleet. The leftist camp renewed their fight and launched a territory-wide general strike, a food strike and boycott of classes at the end of June. The Struggle Committee announced that workers from more than 20 industries, including transport, public utilities, dockyards, wharfs and textiles, would join a general strike from June 24. In a concerted effort to paralyse the colony, shopkeepers from 63 units or organizations of food supplies, construction materials, publishing and printing, and Chinese medicine staged a four-day strike from June 29 to July 2 during which all supplies from the mainland would be stopped and all food shops and market stalls would be closed. The leftist newspapers claimed that more than 200,000 hawkers, shopkeepers and traders took part in the strike. About 20,000 students from 32 leftist schools also staged a one-day boycott on June 27. The leftist newspapers described workers as the “main force of the antipersecution forces” while students were the “vanguard” of the forces. According to the government’s estimate, the total number of students in leftist primary and secondary schools amounted to about 20,000 in 1967; it was about two per cent of the total school population at the time. Ng Hon-mun, who was principal of Pui Kiu Middle School, said in an interview in 2004 that he only agreed to stage a symbolic boycott of classes as a gesture of opposing the government and had reservations about staging a long-term boycott. Piu Kiu is one of the leftist schools in Hong Kong. “Many people in left-wing educational circle called for boycotting the Hong Kong Certificate of Education Examination (HKCEE). But I disagreed with the idea of a formal boycott and we should let students decide whether to sit [for] the exam. Many students at the

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leftist schools were very critical of the Hong Kong British authorities in 1967 and 1968. The two years saw a significant drop in the number of students sitting [for] the exam,” Ng said, “I thought the HKCEE is part of Hong Kong’s examination system. Our students would face difficulties in seeking employment if they did not sit [for] the exam.”7 Kam Yiu-yu, the then chief editor of Wen Wei Po, said that the Hong Kong and Macau Works Committee of the Chinese Communist Party pointed out in the decision to stage a general strike, a food strike and boycott of classes. The moves were aimed at turning Hong Kong into a “smelly port” as it was during the general strike of 1925 and reducing the colony to a “dead port”. Kam said that the campaign aimed at “paralysing Hong Kong’s industries to deprive the Hong Kong government of sources of revenue and demolishing the base of the colonial rule in Hong Kong. The committee said it would be fine if the Hong Kong British authorities surrendered. If not, we would start from zero again and find a new face for Hong Kong.” Ho Ming-sze, an official with the Hong Kong branch of Xinhua News Agency, said that some key figures in the leftist camp staged the general strike and food strike because they hoped to repeat the history of the general strike of 1925, which successfully forced the Hong Kong government to make concessions. The general strike and food strike did bring inconvenience and disruption to people’s livelihood in the colony. The public road transport companies were severely affected as a considerable number of bus drivers responded to the call for strike by the Motor Transport Workers General Union, one of the strongest unions of the Federation of Trade Unions. The two bus companies had a complete stoppage on the night of June 23 and could only run half of normal services on June 24, with only 200 buses operating in Kowloon out of the normal 800. The government had to arrange trucks to send civil servants to their offices as public transport services were nearly paralysed. At the Hongkong Tramways, about half of the workforce reported for duty while all the left-wing union members stopped work. The Hongkong and Yaumati Ferry and the Star Ferry could only manage to operate reduced services. About a third of the usual number of taxis remained on the roads. Public road transport services returned to normal gradually on June 25 as more staff of the two bus companies reported for duty. However, bus services in Kowloon only ran until 8 p.m. while those for the Hong Kong Island had to cease at 11 p.m. According to a telegram sent to the Commonwealth Office by David Trench on June 25, about 60 per cent of the operational staff in the Hongkong Electric reported for duty while only 30 per cent of staff at China Light and Power, which supplied electricity for Kowloon and the New Territories, did so.8 Hong Kong suffered from shortage of water supply at the time and the leftwing union at the Water Supplies Department exacerbated the problem, forcing the government to implement a one-hour supply every four days.

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In 1967, 60 per cent of foodstuff in Hong Kong was imported from the mainland. Thirty per cent of imported rice came from mainland China while 85 per cent of Hong Kong’s consumption of pigs and 65 per cent of cattle were imported from China.9 Supplies from the mainland did stop during the strike, and nothing came in by sea, rail or roads during the best part of those four days. Some cattle and pigs from the mainland had arrived at Hong Kong’s railway station but the importer decided to send the livestock back to the north of the border. Fresh eggs, vegetables and pork were in short supply. The low-income households suffered the most as stall-holders put up the price of vegetables, eggs and pork. The price of pork rose from HK$3.4 per catty in normal days to over HK$6 per catty while the price of eggs increased from $1 for every six pieces to $1 for three pieces. While leftist newspapers played up the stories about stall-owners and wholesalers who insisted on taking part in food strike despite loss of business, the Hong Kong government sought to play down the impact of the food strike by claiming that food supplies such as fish, vegetables and meat were “normal”. An Emergency Food Control Committee headed by the defence secretary was set up on June 14 for maintaining an adequate supply of food to the public. The government also explored the possibility of securing alternative food supplies and sent missions to Japan and Korea for the purpose. The leftist camp announced on July 2 that the food strike ended “triumphantly”. Supplies from the mainland were resumed on July 2 and the markets gradually returned to normal. The colonial government said that there was no evidence that the mainland authorities had decided to withhold food supplies for a long period and the difficulties during the strike arose from the refusal of transport workers to handle supplies arriving at the frontier.10 Some students from non-leftist schools who sympathized with the left wing set up struggle committees in their own schools. More than 100 struggle committees were set up in schools which were not run by the leftist camp, including King’s College, St Paul’s College, Queen Elizabeth School, La Salle College, Pui Ching College, True Light College and Pui To Middle School. The school struggle committees and the organizers published statements declaring their establishment on leftist newspapers. Anti-British posters and leaflets were also found in secondary schools which were either run by the colonial government or British churches, such as Queen’s College, Clementi Secondary School and St Paul’s College. On September 28, Tsang Tak-sing, a Form Six student at St Paul’s College, was arrested for distributing anti-British leaflets on the campus and was subsequently sentenced to two years’ imprisonment. He became an adviser to the Central Policy Unit in 1998 and was appointed secretary for home affairs in 2007. A few students at the University of Hong Kong also expressed support for the left wing. Some students issued statements opposing the colonial administration

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in the capacity of “HKU students’ Anti-persecution Committee” and published an underground journal entitled New HKU. The leftist camp claimed that 50,000 workers took part in the general strike while over 100,000 workers took part in the strike of shops and traders. Yeung Kwong said that the general strike and food strike had dealt a severe blow to the colonial administration. In its editorial on July 5, the People’s Daily said the general strike “badly shook the Hong Kong authorities and demonstrated the power of the workers”. “The present task of Hong Kong compatriots is to press on resolutely with the struggle to win a great victory. To do this they must mobilize the masses, and with the working class as the nucleus, unite everyone possible in Hong Kong. All patriotic Chinese should unite under Mao’s anti-imperialist banner. Strike by workers is at present the main means of struggle against the British but traders, students, intellectuals and all patriots should use various forms of struggle against them,” the editorial said. “The objects of our struggle in Hong Kong are a handful of British imperialists and a very small handful of national renegades . . . If the enemy does not surrender then the mighty tide of the anti-imperialist revolutionary mass struggle in Hong Kong will overwhelm and drown him,” the editorial said. But the Hong Kong government stood firm and showed no mercy for the civil servants who took part in the strike. Those absentee employees were dismissed unless they could prove that they did not report for duty because of intimidation by leftist unions. According to the statistics released by the government, 1,651 civil servants were dismissed for participating in the strike, accounting for 2.35 per cent of the total number of civil servants.11 Other private companies and public utilities followed suit and sacked the absentees unless they applied for re-registration within a certain period. Kowloon Motor Bus fired 4,970 workers, accounting for two-thirds of its workforce. China Motor Bus, which hired a total of 2,360 employees, also dismissed 1,273 workers. Hong Kong Tramways sacked 690 employees while the Star Ferry and the Hongkong and Yaumati Ferry dismissed a total of 700 workers. During the stoppages of May and June, a total of over 17,000 men were dismissed.12 The colonial government alleged that a “subsistence allowance” of HK$500 a month was paid to workers who joined the strike. The struggle committee of Kowloon Motor Bus said in its letter to staff that the All-Circles Anti-Persecution Struggle Committee would pay the living expenses of the workers taking part in the strike no matter how long it took. “We will disburse salary if the company closes down. We will pay the living expenses if a worker is dismissed and the arrangement will continue until he is reinstated. It means we will certainly claim victory,” the bus company’s struggle committee said.13 The Hong Kong Seamen’s Union organized a strike on July 17 calling on seamen to stop delivering goods to and from Hong Kong. The union said that the Struggle Committee would provide “appropriate care” to the seamen taking part in the strike.

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Beijing offered HK$10 million to the Struggle Committee on behalf of the All-China Federation of Trade Unions on June 14. But the huge expenditure in subsidizing the living expenses of the workers who participated in the strike constituted a heavy burden for the left-wing. The China Mail, an English-language newspaper, estimated that the left wing paid a total of HK$10 million for subsistence allowances. Some conductors at Kowloon Motor Bus who took part in the strike told the author that they only received the allowances in the first few months and the subsidy was no longer given afterwards, putting them in a difficult situation. The general strike and the food strike failed to bring the colonial government to its knees. A total of 50,000 workers, or about 3.3 per cent of the city’s 1.5 million working population, responded to the left wing’s call to join the strike but the scale of the strike was not enough to paralyse the Hong Kong community. Many Struggle Committee members questioned the wisdom of staging the general strike and food strike. Wong Kin-lap, deputy director of the struggle committee, admitted that the general strike failed to make a big impact and the number of participating workers was not impressive. He said that the general strike had adverse impact on the public and voices of discontent could be heard from all quarters. He also doubted if the general strike had breached the central government’s policy of “long-term deliberation and making full use of Hong Kong” since the 1950s. Some of the Hong Kong residents who were not from the leftist camp sympathized with the protests staged by the left wing shortly after the Artificial Flower Works incident. However, the leftist camp quickly lost public support after the strikes brought inconvenience to members of the public. Xinhua deputy director Liang Shangyuan said that the leftists failed to bring the Hong Kong government to its knees even after the general strike. “The leftist camp had to provide financial support for families of the leftists who were killed in the riots and the workers who were fired during the general strike; they gradually lost their combat effectiveness,” he said. The general strike also heralded subtle changes in the livelihood of Hong Kong people. Private cars and nine-seater vans, also known as “pak pai” in Hong Kong, appeared on the streets. With the police turning a blind eye to their operation for the occasion, the minibus service successfully filled the transport gap caused by the bus strike. The colonial government, who had learned the lesson of over-reliance on the bus companies for public road transport, announced the legalization of minibus services in July 1969 as supplement to bus services. Apart from taking tough measures against the left wing, the colonial government also launched propaganda warfare to win the hearts and minds of the Hong Kong people. A publicity committee, or the government’s “war room”, was set up on May 16 to co-ordinate the government’s publicity programme, track down and refute rumours, and discredit the leftist camp. The British government archives in London identify several members of the committee, including Yeung kai-yin, who became chairman of the Kowloon-Canton

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Railway Corporation after his retirement as secretary for transport in 1993, and Jimmy McGregor, then deputy director of trade and industry, and a former executive and legislator councillor. The secret unit, headed by Jack Cater, at first met daily and in August met on a twice-weekly basis. Cater said in an interview in 1999 that McGregor had a team of writers “who put articles to the press” regularly. On May 21, the Government Information Services issued a press release revealing that Fei Yiming, deputy director of the Struggle Committee, joined the Hong Kong Country Club in 1964. The move aimed at telling the public that leaders of the leftist camp were leading a “capitalist lifestyle” and thereby discrediting the leftist camp. Fei’s daughter, Fei Fih, said that her father was described by the pro-government media as a “capitalist red cat”. The government also spread the rumour that key figures of the leftist camp such as Fei sought protection from the police in an attempt to demoralize the left wing. Radio Hong Kong, which was later renamed as RTHK, also produced a special programme, The People Who Serve You, for commending policemen and fire-fighters who stuck to their posts during the unrest. The colonial government also spared no effort in mobilizing public support. On May 15, the Federation of Students issued a statement that called for cessation of violent actions. “We believe that the majority of citizens realized that peace and stability are necessary . . . Prosperity can only come with stability, and the prosperity of Hong Kong is the well-being of the citizens. Any instability will result in an economic depression and unemployment, thus victimizing the residents of Hong Kong,” the federation’s statement said. It added that the federation did not in any way deny labour movements provided that they were peacefully carried out. On a resolution passed on May 17, the council of the student union of the University of Hong Kong expressed support for the government to maintain law and order. “To the series of riots that took place during the last few days, we totally disagree. We consider the recent labour movement not purely one of demonstration by labourers, but coloured with political overtone. We sincerely believe that the majority of the Hong Kong citizens are against the riots because riots will only break down the process of industrial promotion, prosperity and economic development of the place. The obvious consequences of any riots are an outflow of capital and a marked decrease in overseas investment in Hong Kong. This will easily result in general unemployment and a total disintegration of the public economy. “Stability, we believe, is what the Hong Kong public asks for. We are not siding with any party nor the government. We are only against any influence that might mould this disorder, disturbing and upsetting situation. We appeal to each and every Hong Kong citizen not to succumb to any party or commentary and not to participate in any activities that may result in disturbing civic peace. We sincerely hope that any civic-conscious person who feels as we do would rise up and join together in opposing any disruptive movement and uphold the peace,” the resolution read.

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In its editorial published on May 17, Undergrad, the journal published by the student union of the University of Hong Kong, said that it opposed those who instigated residents to take part in riots. “We believe that not only the government, but the majority of our citizens desire order and a peaceful existence. We therefore deplore all violent activity that disrupts the equilibrium of our everyday lives. We are against those who encourage our citizens to riot, who confuse and blind us with their slogans, who endorse disorder in our society,” the editorial said. The student union of the University of Hong Kong was one of the first batches of organizations which expressed support for the Hong Kong government. On May 18, 98 organizations voiced support for the government, including the Federation of Hong Kong Industries, the Indian Chamber of Commerce, the North Point Kaifong Association, the Buddhist Association, the Hong Kong Dental Society, Tung Wah Hospital, the Chinese Herbalists’ Association, the Hong Kong United Nations’ Association, the Private Anglo-Chinese Schools’ Association, the Cotton Weaving Association, the Pawn Shops’ Association, and the Eastern District Hawkers’ Society. On May 22, more than 300 organizations added voice to the chorus of support for the government to maintain public order in a joint statement published in Kung Sheung Yat Po and Wah Kiu Yat Po. Groups that signed on the joint statement included Po Leung Kuk, Tung Wah Hospital, Hong Kong Reform Club, the Hong Kong Civic Association, the Hong Kong Football Association, Student Union of the University of Hong Kong, Hong Kong Federation of Students, Kowloon General Chamber of Commerce, Hong Kong Council of Social Service, Hong Kong Teachers Association, and numerous kaifong associations. It was believed that the move was orchestrated by Paul Tsui Ka-cheung, then secretary for Chinese affairs. Colonial Secretary Michael Gass said during Legislative Council meeting on May 17 that maintaining peace and order in Hong Kong was the wish of the majority of the Hong Kong people. “It is encouraging to see the number of individuals and bodies that have come out with statements in favour of the present policy of maintaining peace and order over the last few days,” he said.14 Governor David Trench declared on May 26 that the government’s actions had won the support of over 95 per cent of the people in Hong Kong. But leftist newspapers claimed that “95 per cent [of Hong Kong people] side with us” and criticized the government’s declaration of getting the support of 95 per cent of people in Hong Kong was “100 per cent fascist tricks”. Trench told a press conference held at the British Commonwealth Office on June 29 that the government enjoyed the support of “98 per cent of the people in Hong Kong” and 592 organizations came out in support of the government. But asked where he got the figure of 98 per cent support, Trench said it was “just a figure”. When pressed whether it was “just a personal estimate”, the governor added that it was “the one the Chinese themselves give when they come up to me, saying we were right behind you, 98 per cent behind you. I do not think it is far wrong”.15

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The government later said the number of groups which expressed support for the government eventually increased to 620.16 Heung Yee Kuk, which represents indigenous villagers in the New Territories, issued a statement on May 25 to give backing to the government. Indigenous villagers staged an armed struggle in 1898 to oppose takeover of the New Territories by the British army. But Heung Yee Kuk sided with the government during the disturbances in the hope of maintaining social stability. Heung Yee Kuk chairman Pang Fu-wah spearheaded organization of patrols in rural areas to protect villagers from the struggle committees. Some rural leaders also initiated the campaign to catch the activists in the leftist camp and they were appointed justice of peace after the riots. Thanks to the support from the Heung Yee Kuk, situation in the New Territories was relatively tranquil apart from sporadic protests. The government’s tough measures against the left wing were also backed by prominent citizens. K. E. Robinson, vice-chancellor of the University of Hong Kong, and Li Choh-ming, vice-chancellor of the Chinese University of Hong Kong, said that only by supporting government policies could there evolve a peaceful atmosphere in which talks might be held. Urban Councillor A. de O. Sales even urged the government to review its present policy of restraint, where not only property but life and limbs were endangered. Speaking at the Legislative Council meeting on July 12, legislator Li Fook-shu, who was father of former secretary for education and manpower Arthur Li Kwokcheung, appealed to the “small minority responsible for the unrest” to call a halt to their demonstrations which were contrary to law. “I remind them that no small minority has any right to attempt to impose its wishes on the majority by force. I wish to warn the trouble-makers that if they feel so much resentment against the conditions they find in Hong Kong, they are always free to leave and start a new career elsewhere. No one has been compelled to come to live in Hong Kong or remain here against his or her own wish,” Li said.17 Non-communist media also threw their weight behind the colonial government. In its editorial on May 23, 1967, the South China Morning Post gave its support for the government to take tough measures against the left wing. “There is only one way to deal with troublemakers: make them pay thrice over for their trouble making. Central district is the heart of this huge trading and industrial community. Those who are out to clot its arteries are no good to Hong Kong, no good to fellow citizens. They must be treated with exemplary firmness. And if thereafter their presence here is banned in perpetuity, they will be no loss,” the editorial said.18 The colonial government also used economic means to force media organizations to take sides. After the Garden Road incident on May 22, the government sent a copy of advertisement entitled “Preserving stability and prosperity” to all newspapers, including Wen Wei Po and Ta Kung Pao. The publication of the advertisement was tantamount to expressing support for the government and the newspapers concerned

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could receive rates from advertising for the government. On the contrary, those newspapers that declined to publish the advert were seen as supporters of the leftist camp. “The government tried to force us to take sides between the government and the leftist camp,” said Wu Tai-chow, president of the New Evening News. The left-leaning journalist was sentenced to three years’ imprisonment for publishing “seditious articles” during the riots. After struggling over the dilemma, Wu finally decided to adhere to the “standpoint of the Chinese” and refused to publish the advertisement. “I saw no point in publishing the advert. It was impossible to stay neutral in such a polarized situation,” he said. On May 18, 30 leading businessmen in Hong Kong set up the Police Education Fund for the higher education of the children of police officers. Director of Commerce and Industry T. D. Sorby acted as the fund’s trustee and Assistant Director Jimmy McGregor was responsible for collecting donations. The fund raised a total of HK$3 million in a fortnight, including HK$1 million contributed by the Jockey Club and HK$125,000 from the Hong Kong General Chamber of Commerce. The government cited the positive responses to the fund as an indication of public support for the government’s crackdown on the disturbances. According to a report by the South China Morning Post, “in almost all cases, donations had been accompanied by letters giving overwhelming support and encouragement to the police and government. One letter from a group of industrial workers said: ‘please ask government and police to restore law and order quickly to assist the workers’.”19

5

The Sha Tau Kok incident and bomb attacks

The disturbances took a dramatic twist on July 8 when a border conflict erupted in Sha Tau Kok, a New Territories village bordering Shenzhen, taking the tension to an unprecedented level. According to the account by the Hong Kong government, hundreds of demonstrators began to gather in Sha Tau Kok (it lies half in China and half in the New Territories) at 9:30 a.m., July 8. A machine-gun mounted on the roof of a shop on the Chinese side of Chung Ying Street, through which the border runs. “At about 11 a.m., the crowd converged on the Sha Tau Kok police post in British territory about 50 yards from the border and a group of 300–400, apparently controlled and well-organised, surrounded the police post and threw home-made bombs over the perimeter fence. When the police attempted to disperse the crowd by firing baton shells and tear gas, automatic fire was opened on the post. At this time a riot company on its way up to support the post was fired upon by rifles and the machine gun,” Acting Governor Michael Gass wrote in a report to the Commonwealth Office.1 At 11:40 a.m., the government ordered one battalion of Gurkhas forward to the main police station 2,000 yards southwest of Sha Tau Kok. They began to arrive around 1 p.m. At 1:30 p.m., a group of 50 to 100-strong People’s Liberation Army soldiers were seen moving along the border some three miles to the east of Sha Tau Kok and another group was seen moving into Sha Tau Kok at 2:30 p.m. But none of these groups were seen in the immediate area of the border. There were renewed attacks on the police post shortly after 2:30 p.m., including the employment of a heavy machine gun from the Chinese territory. Fire bombs and home-made bombs were also used in the attack. Five policemen, including two Pakistanis and three Chinese, were shot dead and another eleven were wounded.2 It was the first armed conflict on the border since Hong Kong was ceded to Britain in 1842. Hong Kong Evening News, a pro-Beijing newspaper, reported on the evening of July 8 that militia crossed the border to give assistance to the villagers from the Chinese territory of Sha Tau Kok and fired on the police. The Hong Kong

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government cited the report in its call for London to lodge a protest to Beijing about the incident. Donald Hopson, the British chargé d’affaires, lodged a “strong protest” against the incursion into Hong Kong territory by armed demonstrators to the Chinese Foreign Ministry at 10 a.m. on July 9. Before Hopson presented his protest, Vice-Minister of Foreign Affairs Luo Guibo began reading a note about the incident. The note placed full responsibility on the Hong Kong police and accused them of opening fire first. The shooting killed one civilian and wounded eight. “Chinese frontier guards then opened fire to protect the masses,” the note read.3 The Chinese government demanded that the British government make a public apology for the “armed provocation” and immediately punished the “culprits”. The People’s Daily carried a report on the Sha Tau Kok incident on July 9 under the headline, “The blood debt incurred by British imperialism in slaughtering seven of our compatriots must be repaid”. “On July 8, people on our side of Sha Tau Kok and Chinese inhabitants of the ‘New Territories’ held a rally on our side to voice support for our patriotic countrymen in Hong Kong in their just struggle against brutal persecution by the British authorities in Hong Kong. When the Chinese inhabitants were returning to the ‘New Territories’ after the demonstration, fully armed policemen and ‘riot police’ of the British authorities in Hong Kong flagrantly carried out a premeditated sanguinary suppression of them, throwing tear bombs and opening fire at them, and at the same time fired at our side. The Chinese frontier guards at once fired warning shots against such atrocities and provocations by the British side. But in total disregard of the warnings from our side the policemen and riot police of the British authorities in Hong Kong continued to fire at the demonstrators, killing one and wounding eight of them. Our frontier guards also fired back at the policemen and riot police of the British authorities in Hong Kong,” the report reads.4 Chen Yangyong, a mainland academic who participated in compiling Zhou Enlai’s Chronicle, delivered the following version of the incident based on official archives from mainland authorities: “Some Chinese residents held [a] rally in the Chinese side and conflict broke out between the demonstrators and Hong Kong policemen. A Chinese worker was shot to death and another several people were injured. A small group of militia stationed on the frontier crossed the border to support the residents and were surrounded by Hong Kong policemen. The Chinese frontier guards, who were left with no alternative, opened fire to cover the retreat of militia and residents and killed several Hong Kong policemen.”5 The shooting sparked anxiety and tension among Hong Kong people; many feared about incursion of mainland troops into the colony and even an armed invasion from the mainland. News of the shooting quickly spread in the colony and most residents stayed indoors, either glued to their television sets or with one ear listening to the radio. The auxiliary police were mobilized at noon and all serving members were ordered to report to their respective headquarters with steel helmets.

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Michael Gass, who served as acting governor since David Trench returned to Britain on sick leave at the end of June, dismissed the idea that the border conflict was orchestrated by Beijing. He was of the view that the border conflict was stimulated by militant villagers on the Chinese side, including militia members, with the approval of local authorities. “I find it difficult to believe that there was any direction of events from Peking, though concerted demonstrations at several points on the border may have been arranged and sanctioned by local authorities,” he wrote in a telegram to the Commonwealth Office.6 Hong Kong 1967, the government’s annual report, stressed that it was not an attempt at armed invasion of the colony. “No regular units of the Chinese army were involved. All the evidence suggests that it was a purely local affair organised and executed by the villagers in the immediate vicinity,” the report said. However, a confidential report entitled “An assessment of the external threat to security in the border area”, which was submitted by the Special Branch of the Hong Kong Police in March 1968, showed that the situation could have been more dangerous than the government imagined at the time. The report said some members of the Anti-Persecution Struggle Committee in Sha Tau Kok, who fled to the Chinese territory, were responsible for the attacks on the police post in Sha Tau Kok on July 8, 1967. The Special Branch said that the People’s Liberation Army stationed along the border had given tacit consent to the militiamen’s armed attacks on the British territory. “It is pertinent to note that the C.C.A. [the Chinese Communist army] considered themselves to be part of the ‘masses’, in line with a general policy directive by the Peking government. Consequently the [Chinese] Border Regiment personnel felt bound to acquiesce in, if not to support, the ‘revolutionary’ actions of the villagers.” “During the period between the end of June and the beginning of September 1967, when tension was at its peak, there is no evidence that the C.C.A. made any sustained attempt to restrain these provocative acts. In fact, in several instances, C.C.A. personnel themselves took a threatening stance. The C.C.A. reacted to all British military moves, reinforcing when we brought up additional units and withdrawing when we did so,” the report said. “Even so there was never any indication that the C.C.A. were prepared to launch an attack on British territory and their intention not to do was confirmed by reliable intelligence sources. However, at times there was a danger that they might fire across the border or otherwise react to our handling of incidents [in the British territory].”7 The Special Branch’s report concluded that “throughout the last nine months there has been no indication that the C.C.A. intend to mount any attack on the colony. Indeed intelligence from reliable intelligence sources obtained during confrontation makes it quite clear that the C.P.G. [Central People’s Government] policy at present is not to attempt to take over the colony by forces of arm[s]”.

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After July 8 the border remained unsettled and the British garrison took over from the police the responsibility of patrolling the border area. Britain had never deployed troops along the 17-mile frontier that divided Hong Kong from mainland China since 1949, except for those regularly on duty at the Lowu checkpoint. The British Ministry of Defence had once deliberated the possibility of possible nuclear deterrence to prevent China from taking radical actions against Hong Kong.8 In a news report published in the Daily Express on July 13, reporter George Gale said “so far as I know, there is no stated British policy on Hong Kong’s longterm future.” “Until recently, it could be argued that there was no need for one. This cannot be argued any longer,” he argued. (See Chapter 6, “Britain’s plan for emergency evacuation of Hong Kong”.) On August 5, a group of about 30 mainlanders, believed to be labourers crossing the border to work on the British side, crossed the frontier at Man Kam To. According to a report by the Hong Kong government, upon reaching the bridgehead on the British side where a policeman and a Gurkha soldier were on duty, the labourers grabbed their weapons. The mainland labourers surrounded and entered the police post near the bridgehead in Man Kam To. The Hong Kong government later found that the removal of posters from the wall of the police post was the “cause of the trouble”.9 The incident concluded only after the Tai Po district officer and the local British military commander signed a document guaranteeing that “non-inflammatory” posters put up in the British territory, including excerpts from works of Mao Zedong, would not be defaced and the safety of those who came to work in the British territory was the Hong Kong government’s concern. The document also stated that there was no objection to those who came to the British territory to work holding “study meetings” (in which the labourers studied political works including Mao Zedong Thought).10 After receiving the statement, the arms were handed back and the Chinese labourers returned to the Chinese territory. The episode became front-page news in pro-Beijing newspapers the following day, giving the impression of a surrender by the Hong Kong government under pressure. Another minor incident took place in Man Kam To on August 10. On August 9, a group of coolies from the Chinese territory put up a number of inflammatory posters on the British side of the border and the posters were removed by Hong Kong police during the night. In the afternoon of August 10, there were minor conflicts in Man Kam To when a Chinese labourer pushing a barrow fell deliberately into a barbed wire barricade on the British territory and allegedly injured himself. Throughout the evening Chinese labourers attempted to force Hong Kong officials to admit responsibility for the accident and pay compensation. The Tai Po district officer was called in to negotiate.

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At 11 p.m., a large group of labourers mingling with British troops outside the police post succeeded in removing a barrier which separated them from the rest of the security forces and quickly surrounded the police post. The commanding officer of the Gurkha battalion and the Tai Po district officer who were present decided that the security forces and labourers were so mixed up that the use of tear gas or firearms was impossible. The labourers armed with cargo hooks and hatchets then disarmed mist of the soldiers and police. The security forces were then held at gun point and their weapons were taken back over the border bridge into the Chinese territory. The commanding officer and the district officer, also held at gun point, were pressed to sign a document entitled “Confession and Guarantee” which include three points: (1) the guarantee in the August 5 document that be fulfilled and those responsible for tearing down posters punished; (2) all our barbed wire must be removed; and (3) compensation to be paid for the injured man and holdups in traffic. After the signing of the document, the troops and officials were allowed to return to the British territory and their arms were handed back.11 Michael Gass conceded that the Man Kam To incidents on August 5 and 10 were “setbacks” and the left wing had been able to make “propaganda capital” out of the signed documents. In a commentary published on August 14, the People’s Daily praised the success of workers from Man Kam To in their dealings with the Hong Kong border officials and in particular in extracting the “signed admissions of guilt” from them. The commentary said that the Hong Kong British authorities continued to increase the blood debt to the Chinese people which must be repaid and the actions of workers in Man Kam To had given them a timely warning. In a telegraph to the Commonwealth Office on August 29, Michael Gass admitted that “we have to accept that we cannot exercise complete control of the border line. We may expect local incursions and demonstrations at the crossing points to continue for some time. There is always the possibility that these may become larger and penetrate deeper into the Northern parts of the border area. In addition there is the threat of a mass influx of refugees into Hong Kong if authority in Kwantung Province (Guangdong) breaks down.” “In the light of these threats I have authorised the building of a substantial wire obstacle on an alignment from the Shenzhen River immediately north of San Tin to Sha Tau Kok,” he wrote.12 Gass said that the Hong Kong government did not know the cost of erecting the wire obstacle but they were “likely to be substantial”. “We should now be considering locally the extent to which Hong Kong Government Funds should be used for these measures. Our present view is that they are defensive arrangements designed to meet an external threat and that therefore the charge should be on which this Government should not have to meet,” he wrote. But the British government argued that it should not be responsible for the expenses.

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The seizure of three Hong Kong policemen by the mainland in September and October accidentally facilitated a border talk between mainland authorities and the Hong Kong government. On September 29, police constables Ho Yat-keung and Chan Shu-wing inadvertently crossed the border at Man Kam To and were detained. On October 14, senior police inspector Frank Knight was dragged across the border bridge at Man Kam To by a group of mainland farmers on October 14 after an argument over a border fence. The incidents prompted the mainland officials and the Hong Kong government to hold talks in November. A total of ten meetings were held on the Chinese side of the border at Shenzhen from November 1 to November 25. The objective of the British side was to secure the return of the missing police officers and to seek dialogue with the mainland border authorities with a view to reducing tensions in the border area and establishing long-term procedure for negotiation with them. The Chinese side wanted to secure the return of five Chinese who had been arrested earlier for offences committed on the British territory and removal of the wire fence erected in 1962 on the fields of peasants from the Chinese territory. The Chinese side also demanded compensation to Chinese peasants for losses sustained as a result of the Hong Kong government’s closure of Man Kam To Bridge following a series of border incidents. Knight later escaped and returned to Hong Kong on November 20 after being detained for 36 days. His dramatic escape removed one of the obstacles of the border talks. The two sides reached an agreement on November 25 and the two constables were sent back to the Hong Kong side of the border the following day. In return, the British side returned five Chinese from Fu Sing People’s Commune at the moment of the release of the two Hong Kong policemen on November 26. The British side agreed to remove the wire fence between Man Kam To and Lowu by December 1 and dismantle all obstacles and barricades on Man Kam To Bridge by November 26. The British side gave an assurance for the personal safety of Chinese territory citizens when they crossed the border to work their fields or to visit villagers in the British territory so long as they behaved in a reasonably orderly manner. The Chinese territory residents were also allowed to study and propagate the Mao Zedong Thought while engaging in abovementioned activities in British territory provided that they observed the laws of Hong Kong. The British side also offered compensation for Chinese territory residents affected by the closure of the border bridge at Man Kam To.13 The deal eased the tension in the border area and fostered a working relationship between mainland border authorities and the Hong Kong government. There were no more serious incidents in the border area since the talks were concluded and anti-British propaganda was no longer broadcast at the Chinese territory of Lowu, Man Kam To and Sha Tau Kok. According to a confidential report compiled by the Commonwealth Office, the atmosphere throughout the talks was friendly and the British negotiators took

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the opportunity of making clear the Hong Kong government’s views for orderly behaviour in the border area.14 The talk unexpectedly laid the foundation for negotiation between the Hong Kong government and the mainland authorities in the future. In a report submitted in May 1968, the Far Eastern Department of Britain’s Foreign Office summed up the tactics of Chinese negotiators during the border talks in November 1967, which was largely based on the study of full records of the talks by George Walden, then assistant political adviser to the governor at the time. The report noted that throughout the discussions, the Chinese side maintained that the entire responsibility for border tension rested on the British. “They sought to inhibit the British side from frankly expressing its views on the origins of the border troubles by displays of anger, by threatening to sidetrack the discussion into sterile recriminations or by raising the general question of disturbances in Hong Kong. This tactic was bound to pay dividends given the natural desire of the British side to keep down tensions at the meetings. It also helped the Chinese to control and manipulate at will the temperature of the discussions.”15 “Another Chinese technique appeared to be the interminable repetition of their views and demands in almost identical language, thus forcing the British frequently to redefine their standpoint, revealing weak or flexible points in their position, in order to avoid deadlock. By constant requests for the clarification of the British side’s views and intentions, the Chinese sought to force us to shift our ground without corresponding movement on their side. They also sought to divide the ranks of the British delegation by appealing to different members in turn as having a ‘better understanding’ of the situation. The tactic failed.” “Recurrent accusations against the British of bad faith were clearly designed to put pressure on the British side to demonstrate its sincerity,” the report said. “During the later stages of the talks, when the Chinese felt assured of achieving their main aims, they became remarkably reasonable and affable in efforts to close the final gap, when hard-bargaining on the amount of ‘compensation’ and the time-limit for the removal of the wire fence was taking place. Despite the Chinese delegate’s previous outburst against ‘compromise’, he later expressed a desire to ‘find a compromise’ on the words to be used for ‘compensation’.” John Denson, a senior official with the Far Eastern Department of the British Foreign Office, said that it was worthwhile to draw some tentative conclusions on the Chinese negotiation tactics from the border talks as there was very little expertise on how to deal with Chinese negotiators in the West. “The Chinese negotiate from a position of invincible rectitude and moral superiority. They try to insist on acceptance of their principles and their version of the facts as the basis for discussion. They show no disposition to look at a problem from any but their own standpoint. They constantly attack and attempt to undermine the position of the other side and are rarely caught on the defensive,” he wrote in a confidential report in May 1968.

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“The Chinese are prepared to use abuse, cajolery and endless repetition of their views as a means of wearing down the other side. The Chinese are rarely in a hurry and exploit the desire of the other side to end a negotiation quickly . . . The Chinese do, however, have a realisation of the facts of a problem and the strengths and weaknesses of their position and that of the other side. If they wish to see a problem settled they are prepared to compromise within limits, preferably if the compromise can be presented in such a way not to cause them to lose face,” Denson wrote. Based on the border talks, Denson laid down several guidelines for future talks with the Chinese negotiators in the future. “It is desirable to have a clear understanding before negotiations start about the relative strength of the Chinese and British positions and about the ultimate objective of the negotiation. It is unwise to lay all one’s cards on the table too early in a negotiation. It is probably better to start by demanding terms more favourable than those which it is expected to obtain. A knowledge of modern China and the Chinese language is important in sensing the atmosphere of a meeting. It is useful to be versed in communist doctrine and jargon in order to sort out the negotiating grain from the ideological chaff,” he wrote.16 The Sha Tau Kok incident in July 1967 and the protest lodged by Beijing were widely reported by leftist newspapers in Hong Kong, which claimed that they were proof of armed support for confrontation by Beijing. Siu Tze, then deputy manager of the Joint Publishing Group who were jailed at Stanley Prison, said that he was encouraged by the news about Chinese militia flexing their muscles on the border. “I hoped the People’s Liberation Army would storm into Hong Kong as soon as possible and then I could leave the jail earlier,” he said. Inspired by the border conflict, some radical leftists resorted to violent means in the confrontation with the colonial government and a wave of violence swept urban areas afterwards. From July 9 to July 12, there were a series of incidents in Kowloon and on Hong Kong Island in which police were attacked and public transport vehicles were damaged and set on fire. In an attempt to clamp down on the extremists, the colonial government promulgated a number of emergency regulations in early July which banned demonstrations, protests, “inflammatory broadcast” and putting up of “inflammatory posters”. The regulations also empowered the police to enter premises to carry out searches and arrest suspects. On July 19, the government promulgated nine emergency regulations which granted police sweeping powers to quell unrest and outlaw any oral and written statements that might arouse “public fears”. The regulations also granted the police the power to ban private and open meetings and the courts could deny members of the public sit in on trial of criminal cases. An emergency regulation which was promulgated later even stated that any person who took part in an assembly comprising more than three persons would be liable to prosecution for “unlawful assembly”. On July 28, the government promulgated another emergency regulation which authorized the colonial secretary to order the detention of a person for up to a year without giving any reasons.

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The leftist newspapers vowed to continue the “anti-persecution struggle” despite the promulgation of emergency regulations. A spokesman for the Struggle Committee said that the leftists disregarded all the emergency regulations because they were “void”. “We only believe in a point: being patriotic is innocent and there are grounds for countering violence,” the spokesman said. The left wing turned to the method of “flying assemblies”, a tactic employed by former Chinese Communist Party leader Li Lisan (李立三) during the labour movement in the 1920s, after demonstrations and assemblies were restricted under the emergency regulations. During a so-called “flying assembly”, demonstrators who pretended they did not know one another gathered at a designated place where they delivered anti-British speeches, read protest announcements and distribute leaflets. They dispersed quickly after the impromptu protest. Liu Yat-yuen, a left-leaning filmmaker, said such protests brought inconveniences to members of the public. “The government used to dispatch scores of policemen to block off the nearby streets once they found people staging a flying assembly and fired tear gas. The shops nearby had to halt their business and hawkers had to run away,” he said. July 9 became a bloody Sunday when a policeman was killed in a scuffle in Western District. The police was sent to disperse 150 people who distributed anti-British leaflets outside No. 565–566 Queen’s Road West. When the policemen arrived at the scene, the men refused and surged forward, brandishing sharpened cargo hooks and bamboo poles. In seconds, the police and the demonstrators engaged in a scuffle and the policemen shot at the men. A police constable and a worker called Cheng Chit-po were killed in the scuffle. Wen Wei Po claimed that Cheng was shot to death when he attempted to stop the police from arresting a student from a left-wing school. “The fascist atrocities sparked the anger and determination of resisting violence from the compatriots in Western District. Glass bottles and stones fell from the upper floors of nearby buildings and a brave labourer, with strong national hatred, surged forward and grabbed a yellow dog [policeman of Chinese descent] and stabbed his neck, breast and back with a sharp cargo hook”.17 A police pathologist, however, revealed at the inquiry into the decease of the constable that his death was caused by “shock and internal haemorrhage from a gun-shot wound in the chest, with injuries to the heart and left lung”. The left wing said the incident was a symbol of “the beginning of the flame of anti-persecution spreading to streets” and “raising the curtain of guerrilla warfare and sudden attack in the streets of Hong Kong and Kowloon”. “Our anti-persecution army open battlefield in various places. We engage in armed struggle and verbal criticism against the British authorities simultaneously,” a report published by the Struggle Committee said.18 Around 5 p.m. on July 9, 300 youths gathered at the North Point tram terminal to protest against the recent defacing of left-wing posters and newspaper clippings on the wall of the tram station. The crowd began to daub slogans on the posters

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again under the watchful eye of a tram inspector, who cast an occasional glance across at the demonstrators. Shortly after 6 p.m., the riot police arrived at the tram terminal and removed the posters. The crowd hurled stones and bottles at police vehicles and cursed the tram inspector as a “running dog”. The crowd stormed into the inspector’s office and poured a bucket of red paint on him. The demonstrators then dashed into the Chinese Goods Centre building on King’s Road. The crowd smashed the windows of the tram terminal and traffic lights along the nearby section of King’s Road. They attacked a tram driver who was on duty. The general strike staged by the left wing was still ongoing and those public transport and taxi drivers who reported to duty were major targets of attacks by radical leftists. The rioters subsequently attacked the offices of Tin Tin Yat Pao, a Chinese-language newspaper, and set a newspaper vehicle and a bus on fire. The riot police fired tear-gas shells to disperse the crowd and the situation was put under control at midnight. The police faced further attacks from left-wing demonstrators in the ensuing days, who threw stones and quicklime at the officers. The rioters also threw stones at buses passing by. A curfew was imposed on northern Hong Kong Island on July 11. At 4 p.m. on the same day, a group of left-wing demonstrators put up posters that appealed to the policemen to “turn their guns at their masters” on a vacant shop premise near Chiyu Bank on King’s Road in North Point. The police quickly removed the posters but bottles were thrown at them. The police fired two dozen tear-gas shells at the Chinese Goods Centre where the demonstrators sought shelter. Police surrounded the building and quick-lime were thrown at the policemen. The shop was on fire at 10:35 p.m. The ground and mezzanine floors were damaged, but the occupants made further attacks on the police the next morning. According to reports by leftist newspapers, the confrontation between the Chinese Goods Centre’s staff and the riot police lasted about 13 hours and seven staff were injured. A spokesman for the Struggle Committee praised the left-wing demonstrators’ actions. “On July 9 and July 10, our patriotic workers, students and revolutionary masses took to the streets and employed various means to stage counter-attack against the Hong Kong British authorities,” the spokesman said, adding that the committee called on the leftist demonstrators to continue with their offensives. The violent actions were strongly condemned by the non-communist media. In its editorial on July 13, Ming Pao said Hong Kong had been reduced to a “horrible world” in which everybody was endangered. The newspaper urged left-wing leaders to stop the terrorist acts and called on the Hong Kong government to take effective action to restore order and peace.19 Speaking at the Legislative Council meeting on July 12, Acting Colonial Secretary Maurice Heenan said that the government was determined to grasp and maintain the initiative. “We are facing a prolonged and determined attempt by a small minority who do not believe in the principles which form the basis of our society, who has no regard for the law, who are dedicated to the use of violence to

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undermine the structure which we raised with so much effort and to destroy the confidence which is the basis of all we have done . . . Judging from the events during and since the weekend, we are now entering a new phase of violence and perhaps terrorism, for there is nothing so degraded that these men will not stoop to. We are convinced and determined now that the time come to grasp and retain the initiative in this contest, we shall have the whole-hearted support of the vast majority of the community. Meanwhile it is a time to be alert and resolute and steadfast,” he said.20 Hong Kong 1967, the Hong Kong government’s annual report, described July 12 as a “turning point”. Until that day, the Hong Kong government was largely on the defensive. Heenan’s pledge for counterattack was followed by immediate actions. At the night of July 12, a strong police party, backed by the British army for the first time, made simultaneous raids on the premises of the Motor Transport General Workers Union in Wan Chai and North Point. The union was one of the stronger member unions of the Federation of Trade Unions. They were met with no resistance at either place and a number of persons found on the premises were detained for questioning. Many home-made weapons, including 80 spears, were found as well as sticks of “inflammatory documents”.21 The FTU’s Workers’ Club and its associated buildings were cordoned off for 26 hours. A second raid was mounted in the early hours of July 12 against the Kowloon Dock Amalgamated Workers Union and the Hung Hom Workers Children’s School, both at Bulkeley Street in Kowloon. The police met with fierce resistance from a “combat team” comprising 60 workers. The police had to cut their way through iron grilles with oxyacetylene burners while under attacks from stones, bottles, fire bombs and acid. It took three hours for the police to break into the premises. Union secretary Ho Fung was shot dead and two others were seriously injured in the operation. Another 81 persons were arrested. On July 16, the police carried out a raid on the Workers’ Club of the Federation of Trade Unions where a large meeting was held. About 350 people were arrested, including some union officials who held high ranks in the Struggle Committee. The police claimed that they found improvised weapons in the premises, including crude fire bombs, bottles of petrol, stacks of bottles on the roof, and home-made spears. No actual firearms were found though there were many wooden models of rifles and machine guns. In another raid on the Taikoo Dock Workers’ Union Welfare Centre, the Taikoo Sugar Refinery Workers’ Union and Metal Industry Workers’ Union in Shau Kei Wan. The left-wing workers fired fish bombs and crude explosive devices (those that were illegally used by fishermen) during the two-hour battle. A total of 86 people were arrested during the operation. In a raid on Heung To Middle School in Kowloon Tong on the night of July 24, the police claimed that they found hundreds of thousands of “subversive leaflets”, 28 gas masks and 41 goggles.

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The colonial government was adamant that the raids had paid dividend. Michael Gass told the Commonwealth Office on July 21 that “reliable sources have indicated that the morale of the communist workers has been seriously affected by these actions and that the leaders are afraid to gather together in recognised communist buildings apart from Bank of China and Xinhua premises”.22 But he warned that there would be a renewed outbreak of anti-government activities and these may take the form of increased terrorist and sabotage activities. “The Communist leadership has still not surfaced and overt activities in many left-wing organizations have been brought to a standstill. Union members have, in many cases, been instructed to stay at home; employees of communist film companies have been given indefinite leave; and the detailed schedule of activities planned in the communist schools for the summer holidays have, to a large extent, been abandoned,” Gass said in a telegram to the Commonwealth Office.23 The government believed that after the raids, the left-wing leaders were driven underground and were no longer able to co-ordinate and direct the activities of their supporters. In the telegram to the Commonwealth Office on July 21, Gass noted that Beijing’s reaction to the offensive moves by the government against the left-wing protests had been “surprisingly mild”. The mild response from Beijing reinforced the colonial government’s belief that Beijing had no intention of mounting an invasion of Hong Kong despite the provocation from the Hong Kong authorities. The colonial government was then emboldened to go ahead with its crackdown on the leftist camp. According to the Struggle Committee, the colonial government raided on 60 leftist premises from July 11 to August 4, including the Workers’ Club of the Federation of Trade Unions, the Hong Kong Chinese Reform Association, and Yue Hwa Chinese Products Emporium Limited. During the raids, five people from the leftist camp were killed and 1,500 were arrested. The police used to display the “offensive weapons” on the streets which they seized in left-wing premises. Liang Shangyuan, deputy director of the Hong Kong branch of Xinhua during the riots, said: “The Hong Kong British authorities chose to mount raids on left-wing premises at night time in an attempt to test whether the leftist organizations stockpiled genuine weapons and whether Beijing had supplied weapons to the left wing. But the police was only able to find some wooden guns and wooden swords which were used in drama performances. The police displayed them on the streets and asked reporters to take pictures, claiming that they were offensive weapons. What they did was purely a show.” Elsie Elliott reveals in her autobiography that there was framing of people by the government during the disturbances. “People were putting weapons in the house of those they wanted to destroy, then reporting to the police so that those houses would be raided. One ex-policeman told me that when the police raided a house or premises of so-called leftists, they sometimes took weapons with them which were then said to have been found in the raided premises,” she wrote.24

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Faced with the increasingly violent means adopted by some radicals, the police sometimes overreacted and innocent people unfortunately became victims. On the night of May 12, Chow Shue-yuen, a second-year student in the department of physics of New Asia College, strolled with his classmates to the junction of Tam Kung Road and Ma Tau Kok Road in To Kwa Wan. A group of riot policemen came forward to disperse them and Chow suffered several hits by police batons. The riot police did not stop beating Chow until blood ran from his head to his chin. “I told the police repeatedly about my identity but what I got were punches on my ear and beatings from batons. A 15-year-old worker who was arrested also received the same treatment. We were ordered to squat on the ground when we arrived at an open space next to Kowloon City Police Station. The policemen kicked me with their boots and elbows,” he recalled. Chow was charged with taking part in “unlawful assembly” and was detained at a detention centre. He had to re-do his second year in the next academic year after missing the examination.25 Yip Mo-chiu also claims to this day that he was wrongfully convicted during the 1967 riots. Yip, who was 18 during the disturbances, was jailed for one month in May 1967 for violating a curfew during the riots. However, he said that he was arrested in his home in Shau Kei Wan when the riot police were searching for leftists in the area. He said the police beat him and sent him to Stanley Prison the day after his arrest without a trial. He spent a month there before being released. Yip said that he was never a leftist, but an ordinary worker at the Taikoo dockyard at the time. He petitioned the then Chief Executive Tung Chee-hwa in July 2001 to reexamine his case and help him clear his name. “I was just one of the hundreds of innocent victims during the riots. I hope Mr Tung can redress the wrongs,” said Yip, who now works as a part-time photographer and driver. The Journal of the Federation of Students, published by the Federation of Students, expressed concern about the abuse of police power during the riots. Its editorial criticized some policemen for beating up suspects arbitrarily. Although the journal supported the police’s raids on left-wing premises and the enforcement of emergency regulations, it urged that these actions be taken only for maintaining law and order and should not aim at purging those people holding certain political beliefs with “fascist measures”. The journal also called on the police to stop torturing suspects for extracting confession. A spokesman for the Struggle Committee described the raids since July 12 as a “roving exhibition of atrocities”. “Now that the Hong Kong British authorities declared the continuation and expansion of highhanded policy, it will face a bigger defeat at the end of the day,” the spokesman said. The Struggle Committee called on the Hong Kong compatriots to unite together and engage in “a full-scale fight”. “Resolutely use various means to struggle against the Hong Kong British authorities with all-out efforts! Act boldly! It is we who determine the fate of Hong Kong. We will force our enemies to perish if they refuse to surrender,” the spokesman said.

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All-Industries Workers Struggle Committee said in a statement: “The enemies have been driven to the wall. We should step up our struggles and push the wave of anti-atrocities struggles to the apex in every place. We can’t leave any breathing time for the enemies who will soon die.” The committee also vowed to take revenge against the Hong Kong British authorities for killing the workers in the raids. “The ongoing struggle is conducted in accordance with the principle of people’s war. Every street and district is a battlefield against persecution. We are the sea and will drown you if you do not surrender,” the committee said. Inspired by the call of the Struggle Committee, rank-and-file members of the leftist camp escalated their actions. On July 14, a police post in Shau Kei Wan Main Street East was demolished by fish bombs and a police vehicle was also damaged by fish bombs in Tung Tau Estate in Kowloon. On July 15, some leftists gathered at Chung On Street and Tai Ho Road in Tsuen Wan and threw fish bombs and bottles containing sulfuric acid at the riot police. The government promulgated an emergency regulation on July 22 which made it an offence to be in unlawful possession of corrosive substances and acids. It empowered police officers to enter and search premises without warrants where they suspected that arms, offensive weapons or explosives were held. Those found in such premises were subject to a maximum penalty of two years’ imprisonment. The regulation also stipulated that it was unlawful for anybody to spontaneously go in company with those who possessed offensive weapons and intended to engage in illegal activities. Apart from mounting raids on leftist premises, the colonial administration also started arresting key figures in the left-wing. At 4 a.m. on July 15, the police stormed to the residence of prominent film star Fu Che (傅奇) and his wife, Shek Hwei (石慧), who took part in protests outside the Government House in the middle of May, in Yau Yat Tsuen, Kowloon Tong. They were arrested and were subsequently detained at Victoria Road Detention Centre (or Mount Davis Concentration Camp) in Western District. On July 18, the riot police went to the residence of Choi Waihang, secretary of the Chinese Reform Association, and detained him at Victoria Road Detention Centre. Three days later, Tong Bing-tat, treasurer of the Chinese General Chamber of Commerce, was arrested. A total of 52 key figures of the leftist organizations were detained at Mount Davis during the 1967 disturbances. Under Regulation 31 of the Emergency (Principal) Regulations, proclaimed on July 28, 1967, the colonial secretary was empowered to detain any person for a period of up to one year without trial. There was no requirement for the detainee to be given any reasons for his detention. At the expiration of one year, the detention could be renewed. Even expatriate academics and barristers expressed concern about the infringement of human rights by the government’s detention of people under emergency regulations. In a letter to the Times in November 1968, John Rear, a lecturer at the University of Hong Kong, said the Hong Kong government had

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“totalitarian powers over the people of Hong Kong in the form of Emergency Regulations, particularly Regulation 31”. In a letter to member of British Parliament John Tilney in November 1968, Henry Litton QC, secretary of the Hong Kong Bar Association’s bar committee, said: “The powers which the Hong Kong government has at present over the liberty of the people of Hong Kong are as absolute as have ever been devised in the history of democratic government. The detention procedure is contrary to all ordinary standards of international behaviour as laid down by international courts and arbitration tribunals in decisions over many years.”26 Mr Litton became a permanent judge of the Court of Final Appeal in 1997 and is currently a non-permanent judge of the court. Referring to the powers under the Emergency Regulations in a speech delivered in January 1968, Attorney-General Denys Roberts said that “it [was] an extreme and dangerous power” but “it [had] been used sparingly”. However, Mr Litton said that the fact that the powers had been used sparingly did not make the exercise of such powers any more lawful. “The evil of the Emergency Regulations is that it leaves it to the benevolence of the Hong Kong government to observe the basic principles of the rule of law without making it a legal requirement,” Mr Litton wrote, “the Hong Kong government reserves to itself a complete discretion to act without legal restraints of any sort and the citizen is left with no better safeguard than the hope that the colonial secretary might exercise his powers benevolently.” “Although Regulation 31 authorises detention for one year there is nothing to prevent the renewed detention of a person simultaneously upon his release thereby in effect making the detention perpetually renewable from year to year.” The government’s refusal to disclose the names of the detainees also sparked concern from some members of the British Parliament. In a letter to the Foreign and Commonwealth Office on January 23, 1969, Governor David Trench said: “The security advantage gained in 1967 from non-publication was that the air of uncertainty so caused in the communist ranks threw them off-balance and led many of their leaders to go underground.”27 In a letter to British MP Charles Taylor on February 1969, Minister of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs Lord Malcolm Shepherd said that he was aware that concern had been expressed in some quarters that some persons in Hong Kong continued to be detained under emergency regulations without trial. “Neither we nor the Governor have any wish whatever that these people should remain in detention a moment longer than is necessary . . . But so long as it remains necessary, in the public interest, for them to remain in detention, it will be necessary for the relevant emergency legislation to continue in force. I fully realise that detention without trial is a departure from the normal processes of British justice, but the fact is that emergency legislation must often provide, in a situation affecting the security of the State, additional powers for the executive and a derogation from the normal procedures of the rule of law,” Shepherd wrote.28

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Far Eastern Economic Review, a Hong Kong-based regional magazine, also questioned the necessity of invoking the Emergency Regulations that granted police sweeping powers to enter premises without warrants in searching for arms. “The substitution of Emergency Regulations for the rule of law in quite wide areas of everyday life must always be viewed with regret, and it will be the responsibility of the press to denounce any cases where these are abused . . . It is essential that the authorities ensure that their latest moves do not seem like ‘fascist suppression’ to responsible overseas observers. Government must justify itself for every step which involves suspending some provision of the rule of law,” the magazine said.29 A large-scale operation was mounted with military support on August 4 at Kiu Kwan Mansion and New Metropole Building in King’s Road, North Point. Kiu Kwan Mansion was home to a considerable number of employees of mainlandfunded companies in Hong Kong and housed a number of leftist union offices. The Chinese Goods Centre, which occupied the ground floor to the third floor of the mansion, was regarded as the bastion of the leftist camp. The police had made several attempts to raid the mansion and had engaged in skirmishes with the leftists in the mansion. On that day, seven companies of riot policemen, seven platoons of British soldiers, a number of plainclothes police officers and three helicopters were deployed in the operation. It was the biggest raid on the leftist premises since the disturbances erupted in May. It was also the first time that helicopters were used in police and military raids on leftist premises. While one detachment of the raiding party gained entry through the ground floor, another, which included members of the army and the police, was dropped on the roof of the buildings from Royal Navy helicopters. The police discovered a small but well-equipped hospital on the first floor of New Metropole Building. The entrance to the hospital was through a small doorway disguised a metal panel. Inside the hospital there was a casualty ward, an operating theatre containing an operating table from Shanghai, a radiography clinic, a sterilizing plant for medical instruments, an X-ray machine, and a dispensary full of pills and bandages from the mainland. Of the 26 arrested three held key positions in left-wing organizations. Among them were Wong Kin-lap, deputy director of the All-Circles Anti-Persecution Struggle Committee and headmaster of Hon Wah College, and Ng Lun-wah, manager of Chinese Goods Centre. In a telegraph to the Commonwealth Office on August 4, the Hong Kong government said “reaction from China to the offensives by government is still very slight and has been confined to denunciations over the radio and in the press . . . No reference was made of liberation of the Colony, possibly indicating that there has been no change in China’s policy of physical non-intervention.”30 The government became increasingly confident in going ahead with the get-tough policy after repeated attempts in testing the water.

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As the colonial government stepped up its raids on leftist premises, mainland officials in Hong Kong and the Struggle Committee called on the masses of the leftist organizations to escalate their action and “take up weapons” to strike back on the government. In a strongly-worded statement issued on July 15, Xinhua director Liang Weilin said that the current situation of the anti-British struggle was “very good” and the wave of struggles had reached a “new apex”. “A great warfare which will drive you to the wall is beginning. As you [the colonial government] have employed various ruthless measures, our compatriots in Hong Kong have acquired the legitimate rights to stage counter-attacks against you,” he said. In a statement issued on the same day, the Struggle Committee called on the leftists to “take up arms”. “The full-scale persecution by the Hong Kong British authorities will certainly spark a full-scale resistance from our patriotic compatriots. As the Hong Kong British authorities have imposed military crackdown on our compatriots without consideration of consequences, we should take the initiatives and arm ourselves and take up various kinds of weapons to stage counter-attacks against these ruthless and cruel beasts,” the committee said. In a commentary entitled “Hong Kong compatriots continue to struggle resolutely” published on July 16, the People’s Daily said that despite brutal suppression by the British authorities, the resistance by Hong Kong compatriots was increasing. “The history of Hong Kong will be written by the Chinese people. The Hong Kong compatriots have already given British imperialism powerful blows but these are only the first thrust. We should step up the mobilization of the masses and continue the struggle resolutely. The seven hundred million Chinese people are watching the struggle closely and are determined to use all necessary measures to give complete support to their Hong Kong compatriots until final victory is achieved. Let British imperialism tremble before the Chinese people.” On July 20, a spokesman for the Struggle Committee said that there was a need to further mobilize and organize the masses to “flog the cur that has fallen into the water”. “We should start more flames and open more battlefields to pin down the enemies,” the spokesman said.31 Starting from the middle of July, the anti-British struggles entered a violent phase when some extremists began planting bombs on the streets. July 12 saw the first bomb explosion during the disturbances when Tai Po Rural Consultative Committee Building in Tai Po Market was attacked by a home-made bomb at 5 p.m. A time bomb exploded and completely shattered its interior. Nobody was injured during the incident. Most of the bomb attacks were directed at selected targets such as police stations and government buildings initially. On July 22, a bomb exploded near the army officers’ married quarters in Perth Street, Ho Man Tin. On the same day, a home-made bomb was thrown into the rear half of Hung Hom Police Station but failed to go off. On July 23, a bomb exploded in the rear compound of Western Police Station.

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A bomb attack in Tsuen Wan on July 24 changed the perception that only targets of an official nature were being singled out for attack. On that day, an explosive device went off in a lavatory of Grand Theatre in Chung On Street, Tsuen Wan. In the morning of July 26, a bomb exploded at the tram terminus in Whitty Street, Sai Ying Pun. Nine people who were waiting for trams were injured by the explosion. Three of them were children aged 11, 15 and 16 respectively. Hannah Cheng Yinfun, who was a 15-year-old girl at the time, was one of the victims. “I felt that many people around me were very scared and the situation was very chaotic. My friend [who had just left her] then came back to fetch me. My socks . . . were full of blood,” she recalled. Ms Cheng, who was at the time a student at St Margaret’s College in Wan Chai, suffered injuries to her neck, feet and back, but was released from hospital after two days, although her recovery took much longer. She said of those responsible for the explosion: “No matter how dissatisfied they were with society, they should not injure the innocent, and use other people’s lives as a bet [for achieving their goals]. If they wanted to fight for their rights, they should make their demands to the government.” There were bomb explosions in eight places in the colony on the night of July 26, including Mong Kok, Kwun Tong, Chatham Barrack in Tsim Sha Shui and Shau Kei Wan. Home-made bombs were thrown at a police vehicle moving along Nathan Road. A leftist was shot dead by the police. On July 27, two home-made bombs exploded at the tram plant in Percival Street, Wan Chai, and damaged two trams. On August 28, an expert of the British army’s bomb disposal unit died in a bomb explosion on Lion Rock when he attempted to detonate a bomb. Most of the bombs were fakes and many of them carried suspicious-looking bundles with such messages as “Compatriots do not come close!”. More than a dozen bombs, both genuine and fake, were sometimes found on the streets in a day. The majority of the real ones were made from black powder extracted from fireworks. The Hong Kong government’s investigation revealed that most of the bombs planted by extremists were made with primitive techniques and non-military grade explosives used in firework or fishery industries.32 However, the police had to treat every suspect object with the greatest caution. During such operations the surrounding area had to be kept clear, causing delays to traffic and pedestrians. Bomb attacks continued as an almost daily occurrence until the end of December. The bombings caused widespread jitters among the locals and nearly brought the colony to a standstill. The leftist newspapers affirmed the explosion, saying that it was a manifestation of the masses “starting more flames and open more battlefields”. “The eight explosions boost the morale of our compatriots and undermine that of the Hong Kong British,” Ta Kung Pao said.33 “The army and police were tired and exhausted when they dealt with the bombs which were difficult to determine

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whether they were genuine. The masses repeatedly lauded the anti-atrocities warriors for what they did,” the newspaper said.34 The Struggle Committee also supported the bombing campaign, saying that the “anti-atrocities heroes” had adopted the measures of “people’s warfare” and had made the Hong Kong British authorities “tired and exhausted”. The left-wing was, however, losing public support as the bomb attacks became indiscriminate and endangered ordinary people’s lives. In the morning of August 20, an eight-year-old girl, Wong Yee-man and her two-year-old brother, Wong Siu-fun, were ripped apart and killed by a bomb in Ching Wah Street, North Point. The South China Morning Post condemned the attack as the “most dastardly communist-inspired act to date”. A government spokesman described the incident as the “most cowardly murder” committed by people who could now be regarded as nothing but “criminals of the lowest sort”. The police offered a reward of HK$25,000 for information leading to arrest and conviction of any person responsible for the bomb explosion. The deaths of the siblings sparked a wave of bitter indignation in Hong Kong. The bomb campaign condemned the left wing in the eyes of some who might previously have supported them. Liu Yat-yuen, a left-leaning filmmaker and a member of the Standing Committee of the Struggle Committee, was also upset about the bomb attacks which erupted since July. “The bomb attacks adversely affected the daily lives and personal safety of ordinary residents. A little girl died in a bomb attack in North Point and it caused jitters among members of the public,” he said, “the original aim of the struggle should be to protect the legitimate interests of the compatriots, rather than attempting to topple the Hong Kong British authorities. The main victims of bomb attacks were ordinary residents, not the Hong Kong government.” Liu noted that the leftist-led struggle alienated a growing number of residents who originally did not stand by either side as the confrontation escalated. “They were very disgusted with the leftists, let alone supporting them. Some of my friends who were not from the leftist camp told me at that time that the actions of the leftists adversely affected their daily lives. It was beyond doubt that the leftists quickly lost support of the public and their struggle was bound to fail,” he said. Even left-wing leaders were anxious to disassociate the camp from the bomb campaign. Speaking at a hastily arranged press conference on August 22, Ta Kung Pao publisher Fei Yiming denied that the recent spate of bombings was work of the Struggle Committee. He said it was a “British fascist lie” that the committee had ordered or directed bombings. Fei said that some bombs were placed by people hoping to lay the blame on to others. Wu Tai-chow, president of Hong Kong Evening News, said the bomb attacks launched by some militant leftists indicated that the movement was running out of control. Describing the move as the leftists’ “staking everything in one throw”, Wu said the extremist activities were the last resort of the leftist camp who knew well

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that they were bound to fail in the disturbances. “The leftist camp failed to mobilize ordinary citizens to take to the streets at the time. The number of demonstrators who joined their protests and marches never exceeded 20,000. The leaders of the leftist camp might have resorted to extremist means after failing to get genuine support from Beijing,” he said. Wu said that the bomb attacks sparked public outcry and seriously undermined the reputation of the leftist camp. “The left wing quickly lost public support in the wake of bomb attacks. Members of the public thought that the leftists politicized the incident and were not sincerely concerned about labour rights,” he said. In the editorial published on July 28, Ming Pao said all actions taken by the left wing aimed at damaging the interests of the general public and they were bound to fail. Leung Yiu-wah, however, has a different perception of the bomb attacks. A member of a “combat group” formed by the leftists, he took part in making and planting bombs during the disturbances. “We made the bombs in secret premises provided by the leftist organizations. In a bomb attack staged in Chatham Road, Tsim Sha Tsui, our bomb injured some policemen,” he said, adding that he acted under the leadership of some influential left-wing figures and senior officials of Xinhua’s Hong Kong branch. “When an official from Xinhua’s Hong Kong branch contacted us, we knew we had some important new missions,” he said. Describing their campaign as “an eye for an eye”, he said that it was the only means the leftists had to resist “colonial suppression”. Leung, who was 17 during the 1967 disturbances, described the struggle against the colonial administration as a “righteous” campaign, adding, “we can hold our heads high. We love our country and the Chinese Communist Party.” But Paul Yip Kwok-wah, a special adviser to Tung Chee-hwa during his first term as chief executive, said extremists in the leftist camp were wrong to resort to using bombs. Yip, executive director of the Hok Yau Club and a teacher at Moral English College at the time, said the bombing was “divorced from the masses” and had damaged the public interest. He wrote several articles in the leftist newspapers which opposed “slavish education” and suppression by the colonial government during the disturbances. The club, a leftist student organization founded in the 1950s, is now politically neutral. Yip withdrew from the organization after the riots. The get-tough policies of the government also had the unintended consequence of left-wing leaders losing control of their masses after they were driven underground by the police raids on leftist premises. The operations of the rank-and-file members of the leftist camp became uncoordinated and ran out of control as the confrontation escalated. The government noted in August that the communist leadership laid low after the raids and there were no indications that the various incidents, including bomb attacks, had been under any form of centralized control.35

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Wong Kin-lap, vice-director of the All-Circles Anti-Persecution Struggle Committee, said the committee was originally supposed to take command of the struggle but it failed to operate efficiently after the promulgation of the Emergency Regulations at the end of May. “The regulations put stringent restrictions on public assemblies. Under the circumstances, the committee couldn’t meet at all, let alone taking command of the struggle. Consequentially, everybody proceeded with the struggle in his own way without a centralized command and it did no good for the Hong Kong British authorities.” Wong believed that the Struggle Committee might be able to impose some control on the situation if it was allowed to function properly. Speaking during a motion debate in the Legislative Council on August 23, legislator Kan Yuet-keung called on the government to extend the death penalty to cover those who took part in bomb attacks. He said those who perpetrated such crimes without regard for human life must be made to realize that if they were caught they might have to pay the most extreme penalty that law could impose. Shortly after Kan made his call for the death penalty on bomb planters, a blacklist comprising six prominent people being targeted for assassination was published in underground left-wing broadsheets. Kan and fellow lawmaker Li Fook-shu, Acting Secretary for Chinese Affairs Paul Tsui Ka-cheung, publisher of Ming Pao Louis Cha Leung-yung, Heung Yee Kuk Chairman Pang Fu-wah, and Luk Hoi, an editor of the now-defunct Truth Daily, were believed to be on the list. Kan received a parcel containing a small explosive device addressed to his office on August 28. The parcel was later removed by the police. The colonial government claimed that the left-wing schools were used as centres for confrontation and police raids on them found stocks of home-made weapons and explosives. Chung Hwa Middle School was closed by the government on November 28 after a student was severely injured in an explosion at the school a day earlier. The action evoked a protest from Beijing. Wong Kin-lap insisted that he and other key members of the leftist schools did not support violent means of struggle. However, he did not rule out the possibility that some students from the leftist schools might have been wooed by other people to plant bombs in the streets. “Students were still young and some might find fun in adventurous actions. But I think even if some students got involved in such activities, the number was very small,” he said. Liang Shangyuan said that all actions taken by the leftist camp during the anti-persecution struggle were orchestrated by Xinhua’s Hong Kong branch and the bomb attacks were no exception. “Regardless of who raised the idea or instigated the bomb attacks, they were the struggles led by the Hong Kong branch of Xinhua. The Hong Kong and Macau Works Committee failed to deal a serious blow to the Hong Kong British authorities after staging the general strike and the ‘food strike’ in June and July. Top officials of the Works Committee resorted to this unwise move after failing to come up with better options,” he said.

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“The traffic fell into chaos once suspected bombs were found and caused inconveniences to the public. The move aroused dissatisfaction from the general public who criticized the leftists as childish, and the leftists earned a bad name for themselves. The so-called bombs could hardly harm the enemies but the victims were mostly innocent children,” he said. Liang said he heard that Qi Feng, another deputy director at Xinhua, was very proud of and satisfied with the introduction of bomb attacks. Qi described the action as a “master blow” and claimed that they could provide a “new method of revolutionary struggle” in cities. “But most of the bombs were fakes because the mainland did not provide explosives for manufacturing the bombs. What the leftists did was nothing but tomfoolery,” Liang said. Ho Ming-sze, another Xinhua official, said that Beijing did not support bomb attacks launched by the Hong Kong leftists. “Otherwise, there would have been lots of genuine bombs,” he said. The leaders of the leftist camp denied that they had orchestrated the bomb attacks but Hong Kong Storm, a book published by the Struggle Committee in early 1968, affirms the violent means employed by the extremists, including the bomb attacks. It says that the “anti-atrocities warriors” started using fish bombs, home-made bombs on the “battlefields” because they were “forced to do so”. “As the fascists of the Hong Kong British authorities used guns to suppress our patriotic compatriots, our anti-atrocities warriors had no choices but picked up weapons and did what the enemies had done.” The book ridicules the Hong Kong government for getting itself burned by “playing [with] fire”. “Its violent suppression machines had been hit repeatedly by bombs and it only had itself to blame. The genuine and fake bombs had made the Hong Kong British authorities restless while sitting or standing. It is experiencing hardship and suffering the consequences of its actions.” In a move to stem the bomb attacks, the colonial administration promulgated two emergency regulations on September 5 and September 8 which stated that any objects which might arouse “reasonable fears” when they were found in public venues could be seen as “bombs”. Any person related to the objects could be charged with “possessing bombs”. The regulations empowered the government to seize and take into safe custody all fireworks in the possession of dealers or private individuals. Fireworks were classified as “illicit objects” and sale and possession was banned. Jack Cater, then special assistant to the governor, said they later learned from Beijing source that Zhou Enlai was firm in stopping the Cultural Revolution from spreading to Hong Kong and the actions taken by leftists in Hong Kong must be stopped. “Zhou Enlai was very firm in saying that this must be stopped and as we knew, it did stop eventually but it took some time,” Sir Jack said. In a telegram to the Commonwealth Office on August 11, Michael Gass said: “The morale of members of communist organizations is very low and many of them feel that confrontation will not succeed until the Chinese communist army intervenes.

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Despite this, in the course discussions held in communist concerns, stress is laid on the fact that the local communist movement must succeed by its own efforts and cannot rely on intervention by C.C.A.”36 But the bomb attacks instigated by the leftists showed no sign of abating and Cater said that message coming from Beijing during August was “sorry, we are unable to be helpful”. “We got this from Zhou Enlai’s Office,” he said. The bomb attacks subsided at the end of December. Since December 25, no explosive bombs have been planted though a number of suspicious objects continued to be reported. A total of 8,352 suspected bombs had been reported and checked by explosive experts, of which 1,420 proved to be genuine. Police dealt with 1,167 and there were 253 uncontrolled explosions.37 Anthony Grey, Reuters correspondent in Beijing during the 1967 riots, became one of the unexpected victims of the disturbances in Hong Kong. As he recounted in his book, Hostage in Peking, Grey, who arrived in Beijing in April, began to realize in late June that the disturbances in Hong Kong could have personal implications for him. Shortly after Xue Ping (薛平), a reporter of Xinhua News Agency, was arrested on July 11 and sentenced to two years’ imprisonment eight days later, on a charge of unlawful assembly and for taking part in an intimidating assembly, the mainland authorities took reprisal action for the “unjustified persecution” of leftwing reporters by confining Grey, who was born in 1938, to his Beijing quarters. In a telegram to the Foreign Office on July 20, Hopson said that he invited Grey to move to his residence and stay with him as a precautionary measure in the wake of the a Hong Kong court sentencing Xue to two years’ imprisonment a day earlier. “It is possible that the Chinese will try to take some retaliatory action against Grey,” Hopson wrote.38 Hopson’s worry was not unfounded. Grey’s exit visa was scrapped and put under house arrest on July 21. In a commentary published on July 22, the People’s Daily criticized the Hong Kong government for arresting Xinhua reporters Chan Fung-ying and Chan Tak-muk. “It is not in line with etiquette if we do not pay a return call on. The Chinese people must give a corresponding counter-attack to provocation from British imperialism.” Percy Cradock, then a counsellor at the office of British chargé d’affaires in Beijing, said for a short time the office was able to keep up telephone contact with Grey but then the line was cut.39 The situation got worse in August when the Red Guards dashed into Grey’s house, beat him up, killed his cat, trashed the premises and confined him to a tiny room.40 The Hong Kong government had contemplated the idea of deporting Xue and other leftists detained at Mount Davis Concentration Camp, or Victoria Road Detention Centre, in exchange of Grey’s release. In a report entitled “Study of the future disposal of persons held under Emergency Detention Regulations” submitted in June 1968, the Police’s special branch said that a study had been conducted on the 52 leftists detained at Victoria Road Detention Centre to ascertain whether

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there was any person among them who might be important enough to Beijing to be considered as a “bartering point” for the release of Grey and other British nationals detained in China. “The conclusion reached is that there is no such person at present detained by Special Branch. Although some are senior officials in various spheres of local communist activity, none is thought to be in possession of such important knowledge or holding positions of such note that the C.P.G. would be willing to relax their present principles concerning deportation in order to obtain his return to China,” the report said.41 The special branch noted that Beijing had made it clear that they would not accept any attempt by the Hong Kong government to effect the deportation of Chinese nationals from the colony to the mainland. On December 28, 1968, Xinhua published a report linking Grey with the news workers serving sentences in Hong Kong. It was the first publication of a statement by the Chinese government since Grey’s detention on July 21, 1967. “Since the Hong Kong British authorities continue to keep the thirteen patriotic Chinese journalists in jail, the Chinese Government is fully justified in continuing to restrict Grey’s freedom of movement,” the report said. In a letter to the Commonwealth Office on January 1969, Percy Cradock, British chargé d’affaires in Beijing, said the essential point of the statement was that Beijing “have now gone public on record on the price for Grey”.42 On May 15, the Chinese chargé d’affaires said: “if all the patriotic journalists were released Grey’s freedom of movement would be restored. The Chinese means what it says. It is now up to the British Government.” In a submission to the Foreign and Commonwealth Office in March 1969, James Murray, head of the office’s Far Eastern Department, said that on January 27 Jack Cater raised with his “Chinese contact” the British offer of releasing the convicted left-wing journalists to the mainland, in return for Grey’s early release. But Murray admitted that Beijing had not taken up this offer. “We must assume therefore that the Chinese intend to keep Mr Grey until the news workers have been released in Hong Kong,” Murray wrote.43 The British government then modified its original proposal to the extent of offering release in Macau, but the revised offer was also rejected by Beijing.44 Grey was released on October 4, 1969, after Xue and another 12 reporters from leftist newspapers and Xinhua News Agency walked free from prison.

6

Britain’s plan for emergency evacuation of Hong Kong

Despite a public undertaking by London and the colonial administration to maintain law and order in Hong Kong during the 1967 riots, the British government started to deliberate the scenario of withdrawal from Hong Kong as the confrontation escalated. The British government had prepared an evacuation plan for Hong Kong in the early 1950s (DIGIT), which provided for evacuation of 16,500 non-Chinese women, children and elderly men only.1 However, in 1967, the plan, which was known only to the governor, the commander of British forces and a small group of Hong Kong government officials, was considered out of date and incapable of effective implementation. Senior British officials first indicated their deliberation of such a possibility on May 17, five days before the Garden Road incident. In a telegraph to Sir David Trench on May 17, Secretary of State for Commonwealth Affairs Herbert Bowden said: “It would be very helpful to me to have your assessment of the ability of Hong Kong to cope with an all-out confrontation by the C.P.G. [Chinese People’s Government] short of armed intervention, i.e. widespread disorders, in the Colony coupled with the cutting off of Hong Kong’s water and food supplies from the mainland, and your assessment of the effect on the morale of Hong Kong Chinese if this situation lasted for some time.” “Once it became clear that the C.P.G. intended to go for all-out confrontation of this kind this might well be the point at which we should have to consider withdrawal from Hong Kong,” Bowden wrote.2 In a memorandum submitted to Britain’s Defence and Overseas Policy Committee for its meeting on May 25, Bowden expressed anxiety that political fervour during the Cultural Revolution might overshadow economic benefits brought by Hong Kong in Beijing’s deliberation on the status of the colony. “While Hong Kong was of great economic value to China than to the United Kingdom, there appeared to be a difference of view within the Chinese government about whether the present status of Hong Kong should be maintained. An element in Peking appeared willing to sacrifice the economic benefits China derived from Hong Kong to the purity of doctrines of the ‘cultural revolution’,” he wrote.

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“We could not rely on remaining in Hong Kong on present terms until our lease of the New Territories lapsed. We should therefore consider what adaptations of the status of Hong Kong might be possible and desirable after the conclusion of the present conflict in Vietnam. We should also consider what steps would be necessary if we were forced to evacuate the colony.”3 In a report to Saville Garner, permanent undersecretary at the Commonwealth Office, submitted on May 31, 1967, Arthur Galsworthy, deputy undersecretary of state in the Commonwealth Office, noted that an orderly withdrawal from Hong Kong would only be possible with co-operation of China. However, both Governor David Trench and Commander of British Forces in Hong Kong, Lieutenant-General John Worsley, believed that such co-operation would not be forthcoming and discount entirely the possibility of an orderly withdrawal on the part of the British. “Sir David Trench and General Worsley (commander of the British Forces) believe that there is nothing we can do at present to organise a general withdrawal from Hong Kong, or to plan for that contingency. They stated more than once that they believe we are trapped in Hong Kong. They feel that we have no option but to sweat it out on this basis until the post-Mao period, in the hope that we might then get back to a less dangerous relationship with mainland China,” Galsworthy wrote.4 “Our discussion [with the governor and General Worsley] led us to conclude that if Beijing decided to make an all-out effort to bring us to our knees in Hong Kong, the chances of our being able to negotiate our withdrawal from the colony with any semblance of orderliness or dignity would be virtually nil: we should rather have to face a humiliating capitulation,” said Galsworthy, who visited Hong Kong at the end of May 1967. But Galsworthy insisted that there was a need to deliberate the contingency planning for a possible British withdrawal from Hong Kong in London. “While fully accepting the view of Sir David and General Worsley that contingency planning for a possible British withdrawal from Hong Kong should not be undertaken locally because of the grave dangers to which we should be exposed if this should ever become known, we felt that we ought to try to give some more thoughts in London to the problems we could expect to face,” Galsworthy wrote. David Trench, who said that Galsworthy contingency planning for a British withdrawal should not be undertaken locally in Hong Kong, became more pessimistic when he took leave to return to England at the end of June 1967. In his meetings with Minister of State for Commonwealth Affairs Judith Hart and Garner, Trench concluded that Hong Kong could cope with the pressure from the left wing for several months and there might be two or three years of comparative calm. “But it would only be a matter of time before the pressure began to build up again. The Governor’s view was that H.M.G. should take a decision that we could not continue to remain in Hong Kong indefinitely and that plans for a withdrawal should be worked out and a date fixed for this,” a report prepared by the Commonwealth Office said.5 Trench estimated that including families, the number of people who would

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have to be evacuated from the colony would be about 250,000. About 70,000 or 80,000 of these would be troops and their families, British Commonwealth citizens and foreigners living in Hong Kong. In a report prepared in July 1967, the Defence Review Working Party under the British government’s Defence and Overseas Policy Committee concluded that it was essential that contingency plans for evacuation from Hong Kong should be drawn up in advance as soon as possible. It recommended establishing a small team in the Commonwealth Office, comprising an officer with local civilian experience of Hong Kong and representatives of the Foreign Office and the chiefs of staff. “This team should be assembled with instructions to produce an urgent plan. They should draw on advice from the Treasury and the Bank of England, and possibly also the Board of Trade, in studying the problem of financial and other assets locked up in Hong Kong . . . We cannot afford not to plan to save as much as we can if we are driven out,” the working party said.6 A report prepared by an interdepartmental working party of British officials on July 21 for the meeting of the British Cabinet’s Ministerial Committee on Hong Kong on July 24 painted a gloomy picture on the situation of Hong Kong. “China derives great material advantage from Hong Kong. For ideological reasons, which are reinforced by the history of the British connection with China, they have a strong wish to humiliate us and clearly their ends would be best served if they could do this while obtaining material advantage from Hong Kong,” the report said. “If the Hong Kong government loses control, Peking may then intervene to restore order and protect its compatriots . . . There is always the risk of a rapidly escalating series of incidents, not necessarily ordered by Peking, producing a situation in which Peking took a positive decision to expel us. The possibility exists that disturbances of this kind, even if they did not lead to loss of confidence in our ability to hold on, would lead to a falling off in the rate of investment necessary to maintain Hong Kong’s economy and hence at best to a slow decline in her economic position. There is a danger that this process would affect local confidence,” the report said.7 In a feasibility study on evacuation of Hong Kong prepared in September 1967, the British Commonwealth Office warned that in the event of an enforced withdrawal, “trams, ferries and taxis would be out of service and that the streets would be so crowded with people that private cars would have difficulty in moving. It is also by no means inconceivable that communist mobs, smelling victory and swelled by recruits to the winning side, would be out in pursuit of a number of the people who were to be evacuated . . . These dangers might be reduced if evacuation were to be effected by night,” the report said, “in the case of an enforced withdrawal, a limited evacuation of very vulnerable people would probably be possible. It would not seem possible that the total numbers could exceed about 2,000 and there could be no guarantee that even they could not get away. Any such operation would have to be very quick and very simple and would best be carried out at night.”8

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But several months later, the British government suspended the drafting of an evacuation plan after taking the technical difficulties and the need for secrecy into account. By December 1967, the evacuation plan had been quietly jettisoned in all but name, having been dismissed as impractical. In a memorandum submitted by the Hong Kong Department of the Commonwealth Office in January 1968, the department noted that the need for absolute secrecy for drafting the evacuation plan would prevent any detailed planning and prior preparation “on the ground”. “Once evacuation was ordered, the internal security situation would deteriorate very rapidly and plans would have to be implemented in a very short time (probably no more than 48 hours and very possibly much less),” the memorandum said. “In these circumstances it was concluded that in the absence of detailed arrangements and prior preparation, any outline plan for a large-scale evacuation could not be effectively implemented in the time-scale and conditions of enforced withdrawal, and that a very small-scale evacuation of vulnerable and ‘sensitive’ people, with their dependents, might be possible. “In the light of these conclusions, it has been decided that all action to plan for an evacuation should be suspended for the time being. In a rapidly deteriorating situation in which it became evident that it would not be possible to hold out for very long, all endeavours should be concentrated on mounting a ‘crash’ operation to effect the evacuation of as many vulnerable and ‘sensitive’ persons as possible,” the memorandum said.9 However, the British government was still pondering the scenarios for evacuating from Hong Kong against the backdrop of the Cultural Revolution and the mounting wave of unrest in Hong Kong. In a secret report entitled “Hong Kong: Long Term Study”, the Defence and Overseas Policy Committee spelled out the circumstances in which China might seek to reduce the Hong Kong government to a position of clear subservience, or even to take over the colony before the expiry of the lease in 1997. Such circumstances could be created by: (a) events in Hong Kong which directly and seriously damaged Chinese prestige or obliged the Chinese to take active steps to fulfil their self-assumed role of “protector” of all those of Chinese race; (b) a severe deterioration of law and order in Hong Kong coupled with economic chaos which might cause the Chinese to assume their role as “protector”; (c) an attempt to change the present status of Hong Kong in the direction of independence or closer association with Taiwan (or any third country), or to give it any other status which would impede its eventual reversion to China.10 A report prepared by the ministerial committee on Hong Kong under Britain’s Cabinet Office in March 1969, which was classified as “top secret”, mapped out a plan for withdrawal from the city at the height of the Cultural Revolution.

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“We might feel obliged to withdraw following a prolonged period of physical pressure by local communists. This, even without direct support from China, might make our position impossible . . . because of economic disruption and loss of business confidence within and without the colony might slowly sap its economic health,” the report said.11 “We would have seriously to consider withdrawal if such pressure had China’s support in furtherance of the aim to reduce us to a position of subservience,” the report said. It explained that the means available to Beijing might take an economic form such as denial of food and water supplies to Hong Kong and promotion of strikes or work stoppages. Beijing’s support for bringing the colonial administration to its knees might also take a political form, such as the open encouragement of subversion and violence among local communists and their supporters, with a clear indication of China’s support in the form of organized border incidents. The report said that the British government would have to make a special effort to discharge its responsibilities to those Hong Kong Chinese who were serving in the Hong Kong police force and the civil service in the scenario of Britain’s withdrawal from the colony. “A very rough estimate is that they would number about 20,000 to 30,000, with their dependants about 90,000 to 135,000,” the report said, adding that the figure might be a considerable underestimate. The cabinet’s report said that Taiwan would take “quite a large number of those Hong Kong Chinese while the US and Canada might also take a significant number”. The report noted that temporary transit areas for evacuating those people would be necessary, adding that the Philippines, Singapore and other British dependencies might be possible destinations. George Walden, who was assistant political adviser to Governor David Trench during the 1967 riots, said: “Responsible governments have to envisage all eventualities, and it would have been remiss of the British government not to have had a withdrawal plan for a colony which was indefensible, at a time when China seemed highly unstable, not to say a little crazy, even though our general assessment was that she was unlikely to walk into Hong Kong.”

Photo 1 Riot police raided on Hung Hom Workers’ Children’s School. Reprinted by permission of RTHK.

Photo 2 Riot police prepared to mount a raid on Fukien Secondary School in North Point. Reprinted by permission of RTHK.

Photo 3 A dozen people were arrested during a police raid on the premise of the Kowloon Motor Bus Workers’ Union. Reprinted by permission of RTHK.

Photo 4 British soldiers stood guard outside Kiu Kwan Mansion in North Point. Reprinted by permission of RTHK.

Photo 5 Bottles of corrosive substances and acids were seized during a police raid on the premise of the Hong Kong and Kowloon Spinning Weaving and Dyeing Trade Workers General Union in Tsuen Wan. Reprinted by permission of RTHK.

Photo 6 Police displayed simulated machine guns and rifles seized during a raid in July 1967 at the Workers’ Club of the Federation of Trade Unions in To Kwa Wan. Reprinted by permission of RTHK.

Photo 7 Police raid on New China Products Emporium (HK) Ltd. in Johnston Road, Wan Chai. Reprinted by permission of RTHK.

Photo 8 Riot police attempted to break into the premise of the Marine Department of the Chinese Employees’ Union. Reprinted by permission of RTHK.

Photo 9 A bomb disposal expert detonated a bomb found in Victoria Park. Reprinted by permission of RTHK.

Photo 10 Sir Jack Cater in 1999. Photo by Gary Cheung.

Photo 11

Tsang Tak-sing. Photo by Gary Cheung.

Photo 12 Tsang Yok-sing canvassed votes during the 1998 Legislative Council election. Photo by Gary Cheung.

Photo 13 Wu Tai-chow stood outside the front gate of Victoria Prison in Central in 2003. He was detained in the prison after his arrest on August 9, 1967. Photo by Gary Cheung.

Photo 14 Chak Nuen-fai in 2002. Photo by Gary Cheung.

Photo 15 Wong Kin-lap stood before Hon Wah College in Western District in 1998. Photo by Gary Cheung.

Photo 16 Liu Yat-yuen. Photo by Gary Cheung.

Photo 17 Choi Wai-hang in 1998. Photo by Gary Cheung.

Photo 18 Choi Wai-hang’s (third from the right in the back row) reunion with his classmates at Wah Yan College, Kowloon, in 1946. Courtesy of Choi Wai-hang.

Photo 19 Choi Wai-hang (right) and Tsang Chiu-for (first from the left), Choi’s classmate at Wah Yan College, Kowloon. Tsang was once the highest-ranking officer of Chinese descent in the Hong Kong police force and deputy head of the Police Training Institute. Tsang was deported to the mainland in the early 1960s on the suspicion that he was spying for China. Courtesy of Choi Wai-hang.

Photo 20 Choi Wai-hang at Reiss Bradley, a British firm in Hong Kong, in 1952. Courtesy of Choi Wai-hang.

Photo 21 Victoria Road Detention Centre in Western District. Photo by Gary Cheung.

Photo 22 Liang Shangyun (sixth from the right in the second row) led a delegation of Hong Kong businesspeople to visit Beijing in 1977. Li Ka-shing (right, on the locomotive) and Gordon Wu Ying-sheung (left, on the locomotive), as well as Wu Tai-chow (third from the left in the third row), were members of the delegation. Courtesy of Wu Tai-chow.

Photo 23 Siu Kim-fai, a worker of the Hong Kong Artificial Flower Works who was beaten by the factory foreman on May 6, 1967. He died in 2006. Photo by Gary Cheung.

Photo 24 Leung Yiu-wah, who planted bombs during the 1967 riots. Courtesy of Leung Yiu-wah.

Photo 25 Liu Yat-yuen attended the National Day Celebration in Tiananmen Square in Beijing in 1966. Courtesy of Liu Yat-yuen.

7

Hawks and doves within the British government in handling the disturbances

While the Hong Kong and British governments shared the consensus of standing firm against the leftist-inspired disturbances, there were subtle differences in the approach adopted by the Hong Kong government and that adopted by London and British diplomats in Beijing. The differences in their interpretation of the situations were also notable at times. While Governor David Trench adopted an aggressive and provocative stance towards local leftists, London and British diplomats in Beijing were sometimes more circumspect than the governor in assessing the situation in the colony and handling of the disturbances. The different considerations of the governor, Commonwealth Office officials and British diplomats in Beijing gave rise to a subtle tripartite relationship among the three parties during the disturbances. Trench was adamant that the disturbances were initiated by the left wing in Hong Kong and Beijing only played a passive role, such as giving propaganda support. He believed that the leftist camp felt that they must act in Hong Kong to keep in line with the prevailing “revolutionary thoughts” during the Cultural Revolution and that the confrontation did not arise from the policy deliberately directed by Beijing. In a telegram to the Commonwealth Office on May 13, he said that “there is no evidence at present to suggest that the C.P.G. had changed its policy towards Hong Kong or desires to ‘rock the boat’ ”. Based on such an assessment, Trench stood firm and did not hesitate to quell the disturbances and press London to endorse his tough stance. In a telegram to the Commonwealth Office on May 13, Trench said that he was pondering over the possibility of prosecuting Wen Wei Po and Ta Kung Pao for their “seditious” reports and commentaries and had sought legal opinion on it. “It seems inevitable that an attempt to prosecute or suppress these left-wing newspapers would result in formal protests from Peking . . . On the other hand, I am likely to be under increasing pressure from responsible local opinion and from the right-wing press to do something positive to preserve public confidence and to support the police,” he wrote.1 “I am reluctant to take overt action against the left-wing press since it would involve a direct confrontation from which retreat on either side would be very

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difficult. Equally, there are limits to what can be tolerated without risk of an irretrievable loss of public confidence and abdication of authority on Macau line,” Trench wrote. Trench believed that a prolonged crisis would be the “worst of all possible situations for Hong Kong”. In a telegram to the Commonwealth Office on May 13, he said that “for the time being I shall concentrate on trying to hold the present situation in Kowloon while seeking to reach some understanding with the Left that would eliminate the present disorder”.2 He believed there was a chance that by taking a very firm line, there might be some prospect of inducing a change of the mainland authorities’ attitude which would enable both sides to disengage from confrontation. London was, however, more cautious in handling the confrontation and strived to avoid unnecessary provocation. In a telegram to the governor on May 17, Secretary of State for Commonwealth Affairs Herbert Bowden said: “Our policy must be to continue to deal firmly with any disorders which the communists may try to instigate, but at the same time to avoid so far as possible action which would be regarded as unnecessarily provocative.” Bowden wrote, “while continuing to show our firmness in maintaining law and order, we must maintain contact with the left wing with a view to making clear to them that we are not prepared to face a Macau-type compromise.”3 In order to avoid “unnecessary provocation”, Bowden said it would be wise to avoid prosecution against the pro-Communist press for sedition, which was usually difficult to prove and generally provided considerable opportunities for propaganda. “The actual measures to be taken to deal with the situation at any given time must continue to be a matter of ‘most careful judgment’,” he said. The more measured approach adopted by the British government was underlined by the importance London attached to preserving Sino-British relationship. Britain was the first major Western power which recognized the People’s Republic of China. After her recognition of the People’s Republic in 1950, Britain maintained a diplomatic tie with the country at the level of chargé d’affaires. Britain began to vote for Beijing’s admission to the United Nations in 1961 and the two countries exchanged ambassadors in 1972. Trench sought approval on May 22 for neutralizing several left-wing-controlled buildings, such as the Federation of Trade Unions and the Bank of China Building, by imposing a 24-hour curfew in areas close to the buildings as well as arranging a visit of British warship Bulwark to Hong Kong.4 The Commonwealth Office approved on the same day for closing selected places and bringing Bulwark on a visit to Hong Kong. In a telegram to the Commonwealth Office on June 15, Trench sought permission to pick up and deport three or four agitators in left-wing unions responsible for the stoppages of work if and when he considered desirable.5 The Commonwealth Office gave its conditional approval in a reply to Trench on June 16. “We agree.

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You will of course bear in mind that there is certain to be an adverse reaction from Peking. But if you consider this step necessary you have our authority to take it,” the Commonwealth Office wrote.6 Trench, however, did not always have his ways. In another telegram to the Secretary for Commonwealth Affairs Herbert Bowden, Trench said that a series of diplomatic and economic moves should be considered by London to show support for the Hong Kong government, such as mobilizing support of friendly British Commonwealth nations and asking the United States to indicate greater interests and concern about the situation in Hong Kong. “I believe there may well no longer be any virtue in asking the United States to stand aside, and that an indication of American interest and concern, coupled with a renewal of visits by major vessels, would be regarded by the Chinese as a reminder of the need for caution on their part,” Trench wrote. Trench even suggested that the British government work more closely with the “political alignments comprising South East Asian countries to contain the threat of the mainland China . . . Should we not be making some gesture towards friendly Southeast Asian countries who are having rather similar troubles, e.g. Singapore and Malaysia and even Indonesia and Taiwan? The time may have come when Hong Kong should abandon its deliberate isolation from the budding political alignments of the region, for fear of Chinese reactions, and seek to see what strength and confidence we might be able to draw from these alignments,” Trench wrote, “as a start, we might seek to exchange visits of suitable officers with Malaya and Singapore for the mutual gathering experience, and publicize the visits.”7 Trench also proposed setting up an interdepartmental standing committee in London to study measures that would help Hong Kong from outside the colony. In its reply to Trench on June 16, the Commonwealth Office expressed reservations about a bigger involvement of the United States in Hong Kong affairs and closer alignments with Southeast Asian countries. “We feel some doubts about more direct indications of American interest and concern in Hong Kong. There is perhaps a danger that these might serve the purpose of the extremists in China rather than act as a deterrent.” “We see many difficulties in the idea that Hong Kong might seek closer alignment and identity of interests with countries in the region that are regarded by the Chinese as ‘anti’. What dividend this might bring for local confidence could be more than offset by the provocation it will give in Peking,” the office wrote.8 In the early stages of the disturbances, Donald Hopson, British chargé d’affaires, also shared David Trench’s views that the confrontation was not instigated by Beijing. In a telegram to the Commonwealth Office on June 2, Hopson wrote that “from what has happened so far it seems probable that the CPG [Chinese People’s Government] did not deliberately start the trouble. The left wing in Hong Kong may have gone further than the CPG wanted in blowing up the situation. The CPG was thereby forced (perhaps with some reluctance) to intervene politically in support of

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the left wing. From this I think we may tentatively conclude the CPG’s basic policy towards Hong Kong has not changed.” But the consensus ended there. Donald Hopson was more cautious in assessing Beijing’s attitude towards Hong Kong and called for self-restraint in dealing with the left wing. In the same telegram sent on June 2, Hopson noted that “the conditions in which this policy can operate have changed in the following ways: (a) owing to Cultural Revolution left-wing leaders in Hong Kong may be less amenable to control from Peking; (b) owing to present turmoil in Peking, level-headed professionals such as Chou Enlai [Zhou Enlai] and Chen Yi are more vulnerable to revolutionary pressures; (c) Chinese prestige has been to some extent engaged by their five-point demand.” “It would follow that it is not CPG’s present intention to take over Hong Kong by force. Ideally they would like to gain a cheap diplomatic victory as at Macao at minimum economic cost,” Hopson wrote, “but they may have probably realised by now that this is going to be very difficult if not impossible. They may try to keep the pressure up by fomenting strikes and thus play for time. “The chief danger is that the CPG may find that the situation in Hong Kong has got so far out of control that they are forced to intervene physically,” Hopson wrote, “it would seem to follow from the above that any future measures taken on your part should be taken quietly and piecemeal in order to provide the minimum purchase at any one moment for extremists here [Beijing] or in Hong Kong to insist on violent reaction.”9 In an earlier telegram to the Commonwealth Office, Hopson said that as Beijing was now putting “politics in command”, she might have decided to accept any necessary economic damage. “The problem of Hong Kong and its future has been brought to the surface with a bang, that we can no longer be sure that the Chinese will feel able to accept the continuation of the present status of Hong Kong almost indefinitely, as we might have imagined until recently. China today is in a very difficult and explosive mood. One cannot be sure that policy decisions will be taken on accord with the logic of the situation,” Hopson wrote.10 Situated at the forefront of the Red Guards movement in Beijing, Hopson viewed the situation from a different perspective. Trench’s primary concern was to maintain his effective governance in Hong Kong. For Hopson, maintaining effective operation, or at least presence, of the British diplomatic mission in Beijing was his top priority. Responding to the British government’s proposal of expelling acting Chinese chargé d’affaires in London in retaliation of Beijing’s expulsion of Peter Hewitt from Shanghai, Hopson said in a telegram to the Commonwealth Office on May 24 that he disagreed with the idea. He warned that the Chinese government was bound to retaliate. “The result would of course be to reduce drastically the effectiveness of this mission at a particularly vital point in Chinese history and with regard to Hong Kong in Anglo-Chinese Relations. Is this what we want?” Hopson asked.

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“I realise the need to make some retaliatory gesture but I must point out that in the game of diplomatic warfare the Chinese can trump our every card. They controlled everything here [Beijing], and they probably do not much care about how restricted their staff are abroad. I find it very difficult to think of any effective retaliatory measures which would not rebound more hardly on ourselves and reduce the effective function of this mission.” “The main interest of the H.M.G. as seen from here is to maintain the effectiveness of its mission in China. To jeopardise this in order to make a demonstrative gesture or retaliation would, I am sure, be wrong. I realise some response is necessary. But I hope this may be limited in the long-term interests of H.M.G. to something which not seriously affect our efficiency,” Hopson argued.11 In a note on the “present situation in China” circulated to officials of the Foreign Office and the Commonwealth Office on June 8, E. Bolland, head of the Far Eastern Department in the British Foreign Office, noted that moderates in the Chinese leadership, such as Foreign Minister Chen Yi, were under pressure to react more strongly than usual to external situations such as Hong Kong in which China’s interests or prestige were engaged. “This means that for Hong Kong we cannot rely to the same extent as in the past on China’s recognition of the economic value of the colony, causing her in all circumstances to maintain the status quo. There is no evidence that the Chinese intend to take over Hong Kong but if large-scale disturbances with attendant bloodshed were to occur in Hong Kong or undisciplined elements from neighbouring Kwangtung [Guangdong] province broke into the colony, a situation could arise in which the Chinese leadership in the present overheated and chauvinistic atmosphere of the Cultural Revolution would be impelled to give full support to local proCommunists and conditions might then be created which the Hong Kong government would be unable to control. The continuation of a firm but unprovocative policy in Hong Kong and the avoidance of unnecessary retaliatory actions against Peking for the treatment of our officials is therefore likely to remain the best means of helping Hong Kong to ride out the present storm.”12 London’s belief in a “firm but unprovocative policy” explained why it reined in David Trench’s proposal which was deemed unnecessarily provocative. In a telegraph to the Commonwealth Office on June 3, David Trench suggested two courses of actions, i.e. to refuse to allow selected Xinhua News Agency and newspaper officials who were in mainland China to return to Hong Kong, or refuse to renew the visas of some of those in Hong Kong when they ran out. The governor said that the type of persons against whom this action might be contemplated included the managing director of Wen Wei Po and the editor-in-chief of Xinhua.13 Lee Tze-chung was managing editor of Wen Wei Po at the time while Li Chong served as editor-in-chief of the Hong Kong branch of Xinhua. Both were not named in Trench’s telegram. Trench said that a probable effect of taking such actions would be to discourage others from making short visits to mainland China, or from going to Shenzhen to

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telephone Guangdong authorities for instructions. During the colonial rule, Xinhua officials of the Hong Kong branch and heads of left-wing newspapers used to travel to Shenzhen to make phone calls to their superiors in Guangdong and Beijing. In reply to Trench on June 6, the Commonwealth Office said that based on the Hopson’s assessment on June 2, the office judged that “it would be wiser to avoid action against their officials in Xinhua, Bank of China and China Resources Company if at all possible, since this would make it the most difficult for them to disengage from a policy of all-out confrontation”. “We must leave it to you to decide whether in the local circumstances such measures as you propose are required but we hope that you can hold your hand as long a possible,” the Commonwealth Office wrote.14 In a telegram to the Commonwealth Office on June 7, Trench proposed preventing the opening of new branches of mainland banks. “We are looking into the possibility of other lines of action which would involve working to the rule — the strict application to the mainland of already existing regulations in economic field as a reminder to them of the sort of pressure we are in a position to exact”, Trench wrote, “perhaps the most sensitive spot for the Chinese would be administrative delays in the delivery of specialised equipment and instruments such as I.C.T. computer and the temporary holding up of the purchase by British firms of Chinese goods.” Trench added that if mainland authorities were to take the initiative by taking economic measures against the colony, it would then be of the utmost importance from Hong Kong’s point of view for the British government to take retaliatory action in the same field by using the measures which he suggested.15 But London did not buy Trench’s views on the grounds that by doing so, Hong Kong’s economic values to China, which was vital for maintaining status quo of the colony, would be dented. However, there were occasions when Hopson and Trench joined hands to oppose the possibly provocative moves floated by London. Shortly after the Red Guards’ attacks on the offices of British diplomatic missions in Beijing and Shanghai in the middle of May, the British government considered the possibility of closing the London branch of Xinhua News Agency in retaliation. Trench said in a telegram to the Commonwealth Office on May 24 that the Hong Kong government’s main goal was to keep down tension and he feared that the mainland authorities would regard it in Hong Kong context and increase their pressure in the colony. “If we were to close NCNA [Xinhua] in London but not to close them in Hong Kong, not only Peking but also opinion here might well regard it as an admission on our part that we did not dare to take this action here. Fact that NCNA is engaging in even more poisonous propaganda and activities here than in London as a major escalation which we think would inevitably provoke a strong response from Peking affecting the colony,” Trench wrote.16

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Donald Hopson, who was “strongly in favour” of taking some retaliatory actions, sided with the governor in opposing London’s idea of closing the Xinhua branch in London. “I fear the closing of the NCNA office and expulsion of all its staff would in present circumstances not only lead to expulsion of Reuters but risk action against my staff too,” Hopson wrote in a telegram to the Commonwealth Office on May 24.17 “I agree that NCNA (in London) is the best target. We could as a gesture reduce the London NCNA staff from eight to four . . . Alternatively we could do something to NCNA in Hong Kong,” Hopson wrote.18 In a telegraph to Trench on May 25, Herbert Bowden agreed that “any decision on action against the NCNA in London must fully take into account the position in Hong Kong”. But acute disagreement arose again between Trench and Hopson on the deregistration of Chung Hwa Middle School and US naval visit to Hong Kong. The left-wing school was closed by the government on November 28 after a student was severely injured in an explosion at the school a day earlier. The closure order was due to expire in August 1968 and the Executive Council advised in December 1967 that the school be de-registered. Trench considered the move necessary to maintain the authority of the Hong Kong government. The governor warned that what was at stake was the cumulative effect of concessions on public confidence. “I do object very strongly to the uncontrolled spread of a communist school system which is merely a deliberate breeding ground for hate and violence . . . And I shall be gravely hampered if I am unable to take what steps I can, without too dangerous a communist reaction elsewhere, both to curb the more objectionable practices of existing ones and to restrict their expansion,” he wrote in a telegram to the Commonwealth Office.19 He was also adamant that the US naval visit would serve as a deterrent against Beijing. Hopson opposed the moves categorically because they would provoke strong reaction from Beijing and was not conducive to a normal relationship between London and Beijing. In a telegram to the Foreign Office on July 2, 1968, Hopson disputed Trench’s argument that “no practicable concessions in Hong Kong will ever do any good locally”. “Surely it is contradicted by the Border Agreement of November 1967, which involved concessions but brought distinct benefits for Hong Kong and was generally welcomed by public opinion there.” “It neglects the attitude of the Peking government which, since December last year, has sought to restrain and control the Hong Kong communists. If we show that the only result of Peking ending violence and controlling extremist forces in Hong Kong is that we increase our pressure on the communists in the colony, then we give a clinching argument to the extremists, whether in Canton, Peking or Commonwealth. We should remember that there are probably also people on the Chinese side arguing that no concessions are of any use. It is, or should be, our object to ensure that they do not take complete control. The policy now advocated

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by Hong Kong seems certain to worsen our general relations with China and may even risk provoking renewed violence in Hong Kong,” Hopson argued.20 “The implication seems like that we are to engage in a fight against communist education as such and will take the necessary measures, beginning with the deregistration of Chung Hwa. This is a policy which conflicts with our assurance of co-existence to Chinese and which will bring us into direct collision with Peking.” Hopson stressed that the Hong Kong government should not de-register the school since the move would be seen by the Chinese government as “provocative”. Obviously, Hopson looked at the broader picture of Sino-British relationship when he deliberated on the issue of whether to de-register the school and was particularly worried that the move would make the task for securing earlier release of Anthony Grey, the Reuters correspondent in Beijing who had been put under house arrest since July 1967, more difficult. The Foreign Office and Commonwealth Office decided on July 8, 1968, to side with Trench. They did not believe that given China’s other preoccupations, the de-registration and continuation of US naval visits would stimulate a fundamental change of China’s policy towards Hong Kong.

8

The arson attack on the office of British chargé d’affaires and the murder of Lam Bun

Since the outbreak of the riots in May, the colonial government had been of the view that “seditious” articles published by leftist newspapers had undermined public morale and was eager to take action against them. As early as May, Governor David Trench had suggested taking action against Wen Wei Po, a major pro-Beijing newspaper in Hong Kong, as one of the measures to maintain public confidence. London agreed that if the communist press continued to carry out or step up the campaign of sedition and intimidation, the governor should invoke the emergency regulations to close down the printing presses, although it called for caution and prior consultation from the governor before taking any action. Acting Governor Michael Gass expressed fully his displeasure with the leftwing newspapers in a telegram to the Commonwealth Office in July: As a consequence of the failure of communist moves so far and of the firm police actions, the [left-wing] press is now one of the communists’ few remaining weapons still intact. We know the major newspapers have for some time been daily expecting government action against them. Despite this, the press continues to pour forth a stream of seditious and libelous statements, incitement to disaffection and violence and false news. This is inevitably having some effect on public morale as well as being the main driving force behind the confrontation by sustaining the hard-core communists and encouraging the merely hooligan elements in lawlessness.1

According to the estimate by the police’s special branch, the nine left-wing newspapers had a total daily circulation of 352,000 in July 1967. Although it was substantially lower than 454,900 in May 1967 when the disturbances broke out, the government still considered the left-wing newspapers a major threat to its rule.2 Gass believed that the time had come to clamp down on the left-wing newspapers. He recognized that there were risks in acting against the three leading left-wing newspapers, namely Wen Wei Po, Ta Kung Pao and New Evening Post, which were owned by the Chinese government. On July 26, he sought approval from the Commonwealth Office for taking action against selected independently

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owned papers on the grounds that it should reduce the chances of Beijing’s reactions and might curb the activities of the leading newspapers. W. S. Carter, head of the Hong Kong Department of the Commonwealth Office, agreed on July 31 that the “constant stream of subversion and propaganda from the communist papers will, over a prolonged period, have some effects on the general public, particularly on those who are not so robust in their support for the Hong Kong government”.3 On August 1, the Commonwealth Office approved Gass’s request for action against selected independent left-wing newspapers. “We entirely understand arguments in favour of action against communist press now, and we accept that if action is to be taken it would be wise to move first against selected independently owned papers,” the Commonwealth Office said in a reply to Gass.4 The Commonwealth Office, however, also sounded a cautious note about the effectiveness of the action. “We are however very doubtful whether such action would curb activities of leading communist papers, especially the two mainlandowned ones. It seems to us that any measures taken against the former [independently owned papers] would lead very quickly to need to consider similar measures against the latter. A dangerous situation would arise if the leading communist press were to continue to publish virulent and inflammatory material with apparent immunity. It would give the impression that we were afraid to tackle that section of the press, no doubt lead to even greater excess on their part, and boost communist morale.” In a reply to the Commonwealth Office, Gass agreed that it might be necessary to proceed against the major left-wing newspapers in the future and would be prepared to do so in courts. “I believe there is a chance that action against the lesser papers might provide the bigger ones with an acceptable excuse for moderating their tone if the alternative were likely to be suppression,” he wrote in a telegram to the Commonwealth Office.5 Donald Hopson, British chargé d’affaires in Beijing who at times preferred a less confrontational approach, also supported action against left-wing newspapers in Hong Kong. “I see advantage in any action being comprehensive, effective and swift. Otherwise, there will be a long drawn-out propaganda campaign. . . . It is quite possible to predict what Chinese reactions would be. With their present internal preoccupations it might be limited to a very angry protest,” he wrote in a telegram to the Foreign Office.6 In a submission to the Commonwealth Office, undersecretary of state for the colonies in the Commonwealth Office Arthur Galsworthy admitted that the possibility of action against independent left-wing newspapers giving provocation to Beijing still remained. “But it is considered that, there is a risk which must be taken,” he said.7 On August 4, the Commonwealth Office granted its formal approval for Gass’ proposal to take action against selected independent left-wing newspapers. The moment came on August 9 when the police arrested five people who allegedly published and printed “seditious articles” in three independently owned left-wing newspapers. They included Wu Tai-chow, president of Hong Kong Evening

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News and Afternoon News, Poon Wai-wai, prominent horse-racing commentator and proprietor of Tin Fung Yat Po, publisher Chan Yim-kuen, Nan Cheong Printing Company president Li Siu-hung, and manager Chak Nuen-fai. Nan Fung printed the three newspapers which had a total daily circulation of 43,900 in August 1967. Mr Wu’s newspaper articles called on residents to take part in strikes and urged ethnic Chinese police officers to “turn their guns” at the colonial government. The five were charged on August 10 in connection with counts such as sedition and “attempting to cause disaffection among members of the Hong Kong Police Force”. On August 17, the publication of Hong Kong Evening News, Afternoon News and Tin Fung Yat Pao were ordered to be suspended. Two days later, the police raided the buildings which housed the offices of the three newspapers. Thirty-four arrests were made and printed material deemed inflammatory was seized. The arrests drew strong protests from the leftist camp and left-wing newspapers. In its editorial on August 10, Wen Wei Po criticized the arrests and the suspension of the three newspapers as “fascist atrocities” and “national oppression”. The paper urged the government to release the five persons immediately and rescind the suspension order. Struggle committees from various circles issued statements condemning the colonial government for intensifying their “suppressive activities against patriotic journalists” and the government was warned that they would “go to the gallows” if they did not stop the persecution and continued to play with fire. Struggle committees of various left-wing newspapers sent a telegram to press organizations in Beijing asking them to “expose” to the world the “crimes committed by the Fascist Hong Kong British authorities”. The decision to suspend publication of the three newspapers, which was made before the trial began, sparked strong protests from pro-Beijing newspapers. Ta Kung Pao’s editorial questioned why publication of the three newspapers was suspended before Wu and other three defendants were tried. “What sort of ‘laws’ and ‘rule of law’ is it? What sort of ‘press freedom’ is it? How can the colonial government close all patriotic newspapers and arrest all patriotic journalists?”8 The All-China Journalists Association, the People’s Daily and Xinhua News Agency issued a joint statement, calling on the Hong Kong government to release Wu and other defendants immediately. Or else, the Hong Kong government had to bear all the consequences and would “eventually get the taste of the iron fist of the Chinese people”. About 100,000 militia soldiers took part in a parade organized by Guangzhou military region, urging the Hong Kong authorities to release Wu and other defendants. On August 20, the Western European Department of the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs summoned Hopson and delivered him a note that demanded immediate release of 19 left-wing journalists, including Wu, Poon and Chak, lifting of the ban on the three newspapers within 48 hours and calling off the lawsuits pending against the three newspapers. Otherwise, the British government would be answerable for “all consequences”. Hopson, however, immediately rejected Beijing’s

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demands. In a commentary published on August 21, People’s Daily warned that the British government must accept the demands raised by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, or it had to shoulder “all serious consequences”. Beijing’s demand for releasing Wu and other journalists within 48 hours was the second diplomatic note issued by the People’s Republic of China since 1949 which amounted to an ultimatum. The first ultimatum issued by Beijing to another country was the one issued by Zhou Enlai in 1958, demanding the United States to dispatch an ambassador within a specified period to resume the Sino-US ambassadorial talks. It was very serious for a country to put forward an ultimatum because the next step could be declaration of war. The issue of the ultimatum in August 1967 stemmed from the seizure of power at the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs by the “rebel faction” a fortnight earlier. On August 7, Wang Li, a member of the Cultural Revolution Group under the Communist Party’s central committee, summoned representatives of the rebel faction at the ministry and expressed his “resolute support” for them. Inspired by Wang’s speech, the rebel faction stormed into the political department of the ministry on August 19 and took over the ministry. The rebels also closed down the offices of all vice-ministers and Vice-Minister Qiao Guanhua and Ji Pengfei were forced to write confessions at an underground chamber. The operation of the ministry was thrown into chaos.9 Yu Changgang, who claimed he had participated in Beijing’s policymaking process during the anti-British struggle, said that the ultimatum delivered to the British government was approved by Zhou Enlai who had not fully deliberated the possible consequences of issuing such an ultimatum.10 Liang Shangyuan, then deputy director of the Hong Kong branch of Xinhua, said that an ultimatum used to be approved by the Minister of Foreign Affairs and higher-ranking leaders because it would mean waging war in the next step. “It was the chaotic period of the Cultural Revolution and I did not know whether the ultimatum was approved by Zhou. But I guess it did not get Zhou’s approval,” he said. Percy Cradock, who was counsellor of the office of the British chargé d’affaires at the time, said: “There was nothing we could do about this. It was a demand for total surrender, and compliance or even partial compliance was out of the question, given the due legal processes in Hong Kong. We could only prepare for the worst,” he wrote in his memoir.11 Unfazed by the warning issued by Beijing, the Hong Kong government started the trial of five arrested, who faced a total of 99 charges, on August 21. The Hong Kong government had prepared for some scenarios which were likely to happen at the end of the 48-hour period. “It may include demonstrations in courts and possibly also at the border. Deliberate stoppage of food supplies is another possibility. There could also be a stepping up of violent incidents in the colony,” Gass wrote in a telegram to the Commonwealth Office.

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The acting governor also envisaged the possibility of British diplomatic mission being targeted for retaliation. “Beyond this I fear that the Mission in Peking and [Anthony] Grey [the Reuters correspondent in Beijing] may well be the principal targets of Chinese spleen and I very much regret this.”12 But Gass could not have imagined that the backlash from Beijing was way beyond the scenarios he envisaged. On August 22, rebel faction of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Red Guards from the Beijing Institute of Foreign Languages (currently the Beijing Foreign Studies Institute) and some members of the rebel faction of workers decided to stage protests outside the office of the British chargé d’affaires in Beijing that night. The 48-hour period expired at dusk of August 22 but the British government refused to accede to Beijing’s demands. The Red Guards dashed into the office of the British chargé d’affaires and staged an arson attack on the office. Fei Fih, Fei Yiming’s daughter and a second-year student of the Beijing Institute of Foreign Languages at the time, was one of the students protesting outside the office. She said that Yang Wenchang, also a second-year student at the institute, joined the protest as a group leader. Yang was a former vice-minister of foreign affairs from 1998 to 2003 and commissioner of the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Hong Kong from 2003 to 2006. She said that a vehicle from the Public Security Bureau equipped with loudspeakers roamed around the office that night. “It broadcast Premier Zhou Enlai’s prerecorded message that diplomatic affairs should be handled by the central government and that students should return to campus and workers should return to their work units,” she recalled. “As my father was deputy director of the Struggle Committee, I thought I should join the protest outside the office to express support for the anti-British struggle in Hong Kong but I disagree with taking extremist action against the office. When some student activists called on other students in the morning to join the protest, they vowed to charge on the office. When I expressed my reservations, I came under heavy criticism from a young lecturer at the institute and he forced me to recite phrases from Quotations from Chairman Mao Tse-Tung such as ‘Revolution is not a dinner party’,” she said. She and another female classmate spent the whole night sitting on the pavement outside the office while many of their schoolmates dashed into the compound. “The crowd did not meet with serious resistance from the soldiers in front of the British diplomatic compound. In fact, the country was in virtual anarchy at that time. Some students showed us the chair backs they cut down as souvenirs when they came out from the compound,” Fei said. Time Magazine reported that “on the dot of the ultimatum’s expiration, hundreds of Red Guards pushed past acquiescent Red Army and police guards. They crowded into the British diplomatic compound, shouting Mao-think slogans in English and French and throwing Molotov cocktails. Inside were 23 British diplomats, women and children. The mob set the chancellery afire, forcing the British to come out; nine of them, including Hopson, were beaten and kicked before being turned loose.”13

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In a telegram to British Foreign Secretary George Brown, Hopson reported the arson attacks on the office after the ultimatum expired: As night fell the crowd outside increased rapidly in numbers (the official Chinese report put it as 10,000). There were speeches, recitations, songs, and a rather festive atmosphere prevailed. . . . At 10:30 p.m. I heard a roar from the crowd outside. I ran to the window and saw that the masses had risen to their feet and were surging like an angry sea against the small cordon of soldiers, who linked arms three deep before the gates. Outside the crowd broke the glass of the windows, but the bars and plywood shutters held . . . the mob then started to burn straws at the windows. Smoke in the room was making breathing difficult, we could see the glare of many fires, and as it was now clear that the mob would soon be through the wall and there was a danger that we should be burned alive if we stayed. The mob greeted us with howls of exultation and immediately set about us with everything they had. . . . We were haled by our hair, half strangled with our ties, kicked and beaten on the head with bamboo poles. Most of the staff who had been at the Office had had similar experiences to my own. Some were paraded up and down, forced to their knees and photographed in humiliating postures. All were beaten and kicked. Most of those who were wearing wrist-watches had them removed, and shirts, trousers and kickers were torn. Most of the staff were eventually rescued by army and plan-clothes police agents and put temporarily in police-boxes as I was . . . My house was sacked and its contents including my clothes destroyed.14

Cradock also made a recollection of what happened to him and his colleagues in his memoir: I was dragged down to the steps and had a glimpse of Donald grappling with the crowd and half-strangled by his tie . . . I was swept along by the mob and beaten mainly about the shoulders and back. . . . Occasionally someone would hit me in the ribs. The man who had hold of me on the left kept saying ‘Bu da! Bu da!’ (‘Don’t hit him!). There were perhaps some restraints operating: the blows were painful but not crippling . . . There was a circle formed in the crowd and I was carried to a soap-box, where I was put up in order to be knocked down again, by the simple expedient of two men holding my arms and another hitting me in the stomach. Someone came up and brandished his fist in my face, asking whether I thought the Chinese people were to be trifled with. Someone then demanded that I say ‘Long Live Chairman Mao!’ I remained silent and fortunately the demand was not pressed. A photographer appeared and for his benefit . . . my head was pulled up by the hair or forced down, while the usual two men held my arms. It was difficult to decide where I was, since as soon as I tried to lift my head to look about, it was knocked down, or pulled down, to cries of ‘Di tou! Di tou! (‘Lower your head!).

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I was then carried off the soap-box and the man on the left, who turned out be a soldier, began dragging me through the crowd. Someone disputed me with him but, . . . I was flung into a gate-house belonging to the Albanian Embassy, which stood directly opposite our own. Here I found four members of the staff already collected. An army man gave us water and spoke reassuringly about our security, saying that several PLA men had been hurt trying to protect us. . . . After a while we were led off by the PLA to the side-road between the Office and the Residence, where we found most of the rest of the staff . . . guarded by military. Donald Hopson, his head in a bloodstained bandage, was brought to join us. We were led off to a lorry . . . and then driven to the diplomatic flats. . . . The Residence had been sacked; the Office itself had been burned. There had been no fatalities, though there were cases of concussion and all had been badly bruised and beaten.”15

Despite their ordeal, Donald Hopson advised against a rupture of relation with Beijing as they believed a break of diplomatic ties would be against Britain’s longterm interests. British Prime Minister Harold Wilson and Foreign Secretary George Brown hurried back to London from vacations in the wake of the arson attack on British diplomatic mission in Beijing. They ordered that all Chinese diplomats, journalists and trade representatives in London be restricted to a small area in the city’s centre. The 2,500 Chinese nationals in Britain were refused exit from the country without specific permission. Brown heeded Hopson’s views and stressed that Britain would not break off diplomatic relations with China. The burning of the office of the British chargé d’affaires in Beijing was the most serious incident regarding Beijing’s dealings with foreign countries since 1949. It was also an incident that illustrated how Beijing’s diplomatic policies were affected by ultra-leftist thought. Since the outbreak of the Cultural Revolution in May 1967, Beijing had disputes with more than 30 out of 40-plus countries with diplomatic relations or ties on the level of chargé d’affaires. From the end of June to early July, Zhou Enlai had twice managed to persuade rebel groups not to mount attacks on the Burmese embassy in Beijing. However, Zhou failed to stop the Red Guards and rebel groups to charge on the office of British chargé d’affaires partly because China’s diplomatic works had turned into a state of anarchy since rebel groups seized the power of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs on August 19. According to Zhou Enlai, the documentary produced by CCTV in 1998, Zhou broadcast his message that called on the Red Guards to behave rationally and remonstrate earnestly in an attempt to stop excessive actions of the rebel groups. The premier also dispatched the PLA to protect the office of the British chargé d’affaires. At 3 a.m. on August 23, a few hours after the arson attack on the British diplomatic compound, Zhou summoned leaders of the rebel groups of the ministries and departments responsible for foreign affairs at the Great Hall of People. He sternly

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criticized the rebel groups for staging the arson attack on the office of the British chargé d’affaires. He said that any person who had an elementary level of education should know that there was no point in encroaching upon the offices of foreign diplomatic missions and the country in which a diplomatic mission stationed had the duty to protect the personal safety of foreign diplomatic personnels. He stressed that the five principles of peaceful co-existence, which he advocated in the AsianAfrican Conference in Bandung, Indonesia, in 1955, should still be the guiding principles when China dealt with other countries.16 The five principles of peaceful co-existence are mutual respect for each other’s territorial integrity and sovereignty (changed to mutual respect for each other’s sovereignty and territorial integrity at the Asian-African Conference), mutual nonaggression, non-interference in each other’s internal affairs, equality and mutual benefit, and peaceful co-existence. Zhou also criticized the rebel groups’ actions as “anarchism” but the rebel leaders retorted that there was no way to “back down in front of imperialism”. Irritated by the rebel groups’ intransigence, Zhou stood up and said: “You said you can’t back down. Are you intending to take back Hong Kong today? Even [if] a decision is approved by the party, we still have to consult Chairman Mao and even I can’t make the decision. How come a combat group among you guys made the decision?” Zhou personally apologized to the British government for the arson attack and instructed the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to renovate the British diplomatic compound. As the incident was a serious incident which violated diplomatic convention, Beijing did not affirm it. But it was politically embarrassing for Beijing to denounce it publicly during the height of the Cultural Revolution. As a result, China’s official media reported the incident in an ambivalent manner. The state media acknowledged that “something unusual” had happened to the office of the British chargé d’affaires. The Xinhua News Agency reported that “over 10,000 Red Guards and revolutionary masses surged to the office of the British chargé d’affaires in a mighty demonstration against the British imperialists’ frantic fascist persecution of patriotic Chinese compatriots in Hong Kong”. It went on to say that “the enraged demonstrators took strong action against the British chargé d’affaires”.17 Fei Fih, who joined the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in 1973, said that the burning of the British diplomatic compound seriously undermined China’s external image. “It was a shame in diplomatic history and it put China in a very difficult position in the world for a long time. For some years only a few countries bothered to deal with our country,” she said. She is currently a Hong Kong deputy to the National People’s Congress. The burning of the British diplomatic compound strengthened the pragmatists in Beijing led by Zhou Enlai as the Communist Party leadership took it as a sign that the radical faction had gone too far. Cradock described the arson attack as a turning

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point in the Cultural Revolution; there was at least a change in its foreign policy manifestations. “The extremists had overplayed their hand and given an opportunity for brakes to be applied,” Cradock wrote in his memoir. In December 1970, Mao Zedong mentioned the rebel group’s seizure of power at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the burning of the British diplomatic compound. “The country was in complete chaos in July and August 1967. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs was in a mess and the power was grabbed by counter-revolutionaries,” he said. When he criticized the Lin Biao faction and the ultra-leftists in June 1967, Mao said: “What kind of people are our ultra-leftists? They are those who burned the office of the British chargé d’affaires. They wanted to topple Premier Zhou today and called for toppling [Minister of Foreign Affairs] Chen Yi tomorrow,” Mao said. Mao pointed out that “wicked people” directed the masses to stage the arson attack on the British diplomatic compound.18 Zhou Enlai also talked about the incident during his meeting with Burma’s head of state Ne Win in 1971. “When the movement [the Cultural Revolution] entered August, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs was also affected by ultra-leftist thought and some bad elements slipped into the ministry. The masses surrounded the office of the British chargé d’affaires in Beijing and we had no idea [about the behaviour of the masses] beforehand. It was already too late when I knew about it and the burning had started. At that time we ordered the masses to leave the scene but those wicked people did not heed our call. What was interesting was the British chargé d’affaires heard our broadcast calling for the masses to leave the scene. He believed it was our government’s position and sought protection from the PLA. He was not injured during the incident,” Zhou recalled.19 The renovation works of the British diplomatic compound was completed in the spring of 1971. Zhou instructed an official from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to relay the following message to the British chargé d’affaires before diplomats from other countries: “The burning of the office of the British chargé d’affaires was done by a tiny group of wicked people. Both the Chinese Communist Party and the Chinese government disagreed with the move. Now that we have renovated your office and you have moved into the new office, let’s drink a toast to celebrate!” But the Chinese official did not tell the message as instructed by Zhou because he was worried about the impact as there were many foreign ambassadors. Zhou was unhappy after he learned that the official did not follow his instruction. “It is not a big deal to tell that message in front of other ambassadors. Instead, you should have said it loudly! We practised the five principles of peaceful co-existence and we should treat other countries on an equal footing. It was wrong for the British side to persecute our compatriots in Hong Kong but we should not burn its office of chargé d’affaires. If you take action against the British, they may retaliate and that would only damage bilateral relations and even result in termination of diplomatic ties.” Zhou subsequently summoned the British chargé d’affaires in Beijing and told him the message.20

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The Hong Kong government learned from the Chinese government’s apology to the British side for the arson attack on the diplomatic compound that Beijing would not take back Hong Kong casually. The colonial government believed that the militant remarks in the People’s Daily were nothing more than empty threats and Beijing would not provide genuine support to the left-wing in Hong Kong. It reinforced the colonial government’s determination to clamp down on the Hong Kong leftists and their struggles were bound to fail. However, it was revealed recently that Zhou Enlai’s last-minute intervention had stopped a possible military invasion of Hong Kong during the height of the confrontation. In an interview with mainland satellite Dragon TV in June 2007, Lu Ping, former director of the State Council’s Hong Kong and Macao Affairs Office, said that some mainland officials considered taking back Hong Kong by force during the 1967 riots. “During the anti-British struggle, the British arrested a lot of people. Huang Yongsheng (黃永勝), the then commander of the Guangzhou military region, was prepared to order PLA troops to cross the border,” Lu said, “When Premier Zhou Enlai learned of it, he gave an instruction in the evening against the [PLA] proceeding.” Britain’s National Archives show that the arrests of Wu Tai-chow and Chak Nuen-fai were masterminded by Jack Cater, the then special assistant to the governor. “When I went to Beijing later on [in the 1980s], the then British ambassador Richard Evans introduced me to his colleagues that ‘this is the man who brought us the new embassy,” Cater said in an interview with the author in 1999. He said that Percy Cradock, who served as counsellor at the office of chargé d’affaires in Beijing at the time of the attack and was promoted to chargé d’affaires in 1968, was not happy with him for a long time because his decision to arrest the pro-Beijing newspaper bosses triggered the attack in Beijing. “In retrospect, I had no idea that the reaction to our dealing with those leftist journalists would be to burn down the British embassy,” Cater said. But he added that the government could not afford not to take action to stop the publication of such seditious articles. The burning of the British diplomatic compound in Beijing could not change the fate of Wu Tai-chow and other left-wing journalists. On September 4, Wu, Poon and Chak were found guilty and were each sentenced to three years’ imprisonment. They were the first people jailed in Hong Kong for breaching the Sedition Ordinance. The court also ordered the Hong Kong Evening News, New Afternoon News and Tin Fung Daily to be suspended for six months. A spokesman for the Struggle Committee said that the colonial government could force the suspension of the three newspapers but hundreds of “anti-persecution journals have mushroomed”. “What the Hong Kong British authorities do is like a mantis trying to stop a cart and their eventual fate is to go onto the guillotine,” the spokesman said.

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Two days after the burning of the office of the British chargé d’affaires in Beijing, Commercial Radio host Lam Bun, known for his sarcastic criticism and condemnation of the extremist actions of the leftists, became the most prominent victim of the 1967 riots. Militant members of the left wing had been campaigning against Lam for several months and posters were put up in Macau denouncing him as a traitor and threatening him with “punishment”. Commercial Radio was regarded as the number-one enemy by the extremists in the leftist camp because of its critical stance on the riots. On August 2, a letter to the editor published in Wen Wei Po criticized the broadcaster for “degenerating into bad elements of the nation”, with some programmes “glorifying the Hong Kong British authorities’ atrocities and slandering the patriotic compatriots”. “Commercial Radio has acted against the Chinese and Hong Kong people and has shamelessly served as the mouthpiece of the Hong Kong British authorities. It should think about its own future,” the letter said. Shortly after 9 a.m. on August 24, Lam and his cousin Lam Kwong-hoi were in his Volkswagen, driving from their flat in Waterloo Road to Commercial Radio Building when three men, who pretended to be road repairers, stopped their car by waving red flags in front. As he pulled over, one of the men tossed a petrol bomb and threw it into their car. The vehicle burst into flames immediately. As Lam and his cousin staggered from it, the assailants poured petrol over them and set them on fire. Both men were rushed to Queen Elizabeth Hospital. Lam, 37, died the following day, and his cousin passed away on August 30, six days after the attack. Lam’s wife, Cheng Kit-mui, is now living in France. Many people believed that the murder of Lam was related to his criticism of the left wing. Commercial Radio announced a reward of HK$100,000 for information leading to the arrest and conviction of those responsible. A reward of HK$50,000 was also offered by the police but the killer is still at large. Commercial Radio cancelled all programmes on August 24 and broadcast dirge to pay tribute to Lam. George Ho Ho-chi, managing director of Commercial Radio, said in a statement that he condemned the “atrocities committed by the thugs”. “The thugs are obviously scared about Commercial Radio’s exposure of their sabotage of peace in Hong Kong and employed this bloody measure to intimidate our staff. But the leftist thugs’ atrocities could not change the righteous stance of our radio station and staff. We will spare no efforts to help the government to quell the disturbances,” he said in the statement.21 In an editorial entitled “Communist brutality” published on August 28, the South China Morning Post said that the “communist minority” stood condemned before the entire community and all law-abiding people of the world for “cold-blooded murders” of Lam Bun and the two young children in North Point. But left-wing newspapers described Lam as an “anti-China spy” and criticized some newspapers close to the “Chiang Kai-shek faction and the United States” for

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calling for revenge on Lam. Left-wing newspaper New Evening Post published an indictment of Lam which was announced by a “combat group” formed by extremists. Starting from September 8, notices issued by the “underground sudden attack squad” were circulated in some districts. The squad claimed responsibility for killing Lam, saying that they had responded to the calls of patriotic compatriots in Hong Kong and Macau to “execute national discipline” on Lam. “Lam Bun, a bad element of the nation, had been hostile to our great socialist motherland and served as a running dog for the US and British imperialism. He spared no efforts in smearing patriotic compatriots who bravely resist persecution by the Hong Kong British authorities. Despite repeated warnings from our patriotic compatriots, Lam remained unrepentant and continued to follow the footsteps of enemies. By doing so, he alienated himself from the Chinese people. In order to uphold national dignity, our commander’s headquarters carried out national discipline by executing Lam on August 24,” the notice reads. The commander’s headquarters vowed to “resolutely crack down on a handful of British imperialists and bad elements of the Chinese nation who served the British and US imperialism”. The All-Industries Workers’ Struggle Committee said in a statement that “in order to retaliate for the killings of our patriotic compatriots, we must adopt all necessary measures of self-defence and counter-attack and punish elements of British imperialism and a handful of bad elements of the Chinese nation mercilessly”.22 The murder of Lam Bun further alienated the left wing from the general public. Ming Pao’s editorial said that “the goals which the local communists failed to achieve by legitimate means, such as strikes, cannot be achieved by hanky-panky tactics like planting bombs, arson and assassination”. “The killing of Lam Bun has sparked hatred among innumerable apolitical residents against the local communists,” the editorial said.23

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The burning of the British diplomatic compound in Beijing strengthened the hand of the moderate faction led by Zhou Enlai. It also set the stage for secret talks between the left wing and the Hong Kong government to ease the tensions in the colony. George Walden, assistant political adviser to the governor during the 1967 riots, said that the mainland authorities were looking for a way out after the mayhem. He said that he and Political Adviser Anthony Elliott were in touch with rich leftwing sympathizers close to Beijing before the incident. “The crux of our message was that we were in no mood for compromise and the Hong Kong government was not interested in a Portuguese-type solution. The spirit of the message we were conveying was, in a nutshell, that either you run this place or we do. The communists could break the British if they wanted to, but they could not make them bend,” Walden said in correspondence with the author. Walden reveals in his memoir that secret negotiations were held between the Hong Kong government and the mainland officials stationed in Hong Kong in the wake of the arson attack on the office of the British chargé d’affaires. Anthony Elliott and Walden took part in talks with two senior Hong Kong-based mainland officials, including Qi Feng, then deputy director of the Hong Kong branch of Xinhua.1 “The secrecy was essential to both sides. The communists did not want to be thought to be backing down and nor did we . . . Even agreeing to a location for the talks was difficult. Like petty gangsters, we met in the small back room of a Chinese restaurant in Wan Chai,” Walden wrote. “After the formalities, which is to say a tepid handshake and the grunts, the Number One Chinese communist read out the familiar list of demands in the usual choice language. Fascist atrocities, genocide, the determination of China’s patriotic compatriots to resist to the death — everything was there. Anthony said he had fought against Hitler in the war and would not be called a fascist. If they wanted the talks to get anywhere they had better learn to behave civilly, and treat us and our country with respect . . . After that the Chinese watched their language. We ignored their ‘demands’ and got down to details. We refused to release the rioters and murderers, but agreed to let Chinese representatives visit them in prison, in

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part exchange for visits to Anthony Grey [Reuters correspondent in Beijing],” Walden wrote.2 Walden told the author that there were two rounds of meetings and it became clear from the meetings that despite the huffing and puffing the Chinese were looking for chulu, or a way out. “The meetings did help cool things. The Hong Kong communists obviously had to retreat under a smokescreen by claiming that the righteous indignation of the people had forced us to grant consular access to imprisoned rioters, and so on. There was in fact a deal under which we got access to Anthony Grey. And they did calm the situation on the border. But of course they didn’t just agree to stop the riots. They were stopped, I assume, by Beijing,” he said. Starting from mid-September, the left wing launched large-scale celebration of the 18th anniversary of the National Day of the People’s Republic of China and the celebratory activities lasted until October 8. On September 18, Yeung Kwong said during a meeting of the standing committee of the Struggle Committee that the anti-British struggle was a “struggle between invasion and counter-invasion” and the “continuation of the struggle against imperialism by the Chinese nation in the past 100 years”. He described the campaign as a “part of international struggle against imperialism” and a “great revolutionary movement”. Yeung went on to say that the struggle had dealt a “serious blow” to the “reactionary rule” of the Hong Kong British authorities and had “gained a tremendous victory”, adding that the left wing should continue to mobilize the masses to take part in the struggle. Yeung, however, reminded the masses of the left wing about the “complexity” of the anti-British struggle. “We need to take note of the history of occupation of Hong Kong by British imperialism. It retains certain foundation of reactionary rule in Hong Kong and enjoys the support of other counter-revolutionary forces. The enemy will continue its suppression, coercion, bribery, spreading rumours and libels. It will even send spies to infiltrate into our camp and carry out activities to disintegrate and sabotage. The struggle and counter-revolution will continue for some time,” he said. Yeung said it might take a “somewhat longer time” to gain victory in the struggle. “The development of the struggle will look like waves which have ups and downs at times and we should be prepared about it,” he said. It appeared that the left-wing leadership had recognized the strength of the colonial administration and was not confident about bringing it to its knees. But Yeung still called on the masses of the leftist camp not to fear being arrested, jailed or tortured and “disregard death entirely in the pursuit of victory”. In an article entitled “We will certainly win while the Hong Kong British authorities are bound to lose” published at the end of September, the All-Circles Anti-Persecution Struggle Committee said “the days of the Hong Kong British authorities are numbered” and the authorities were “digging their own graves”. “Our struggle has created serious political crisis for the Hong Kong British authorities

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and exacerbated its economic crisis. Our struggle is pushing the reactionary rule of the Hong Kong British authorities to a place of doom,” the committee said. Although the left wing claimed that they would certainly win while the colonial government was bound to lose, the colonial government stood firm and the situation gradually calmed down by the end of 1967. The 1967 disturbances were the colony’s worst ever riots since the Second World War. According to the statistics by the Hong Kong government, the disturbances claimed 51 lives, with 15 of the deaths caused by bomb attacks, and 832 people were injured. As at December 31, 1967, a total of 1,936 people were convicted during the riots. Of those, 465 were jailed for “unlawful assembly”, 40 for possessing bombs, 33 for explosion-related offences and 209 for “possession of inflammatory posters”.3 According to the statistics compiled by the left wing, 26 people were killed from May and December while 4,979 people were arrested.4 The left wing and the Hong Kong government made completely different assessment of the impact of the disturbances. The left-wing played up the economic crisis facing the Hong Kong government while the colonial administration insisted that the mayhem had not seriously disrupted the economy. According to Storm in Hong Kong published by the Struggle Committee, Hong Kong’s economy was facing “all kinds of troubles” and danger might come any time. “Property market has suffered a slump and the industry’s value saw a loss of HK$3 billion. Tourism and external trade is in the doldrums. The number of closure and relocation of factories is on the rise while consumer price index hits the record high in 20 years. Stock market has plunged significantly, with market capitalisation falling by HK$1 billion from May to September. Bank deposits saw a sharp decrease of about HK$1.5 billion and capital outflow is estimated at more than HK$1.4 billion. The fiscal deficit between April and August was more than $70 million.”5 The left wing believed that the Hong Kong British authorities were in a place of doom because of its “anti-China activities and national oppression”. Hong Kong 1967, the government’s official annual report, delivered a more positive assessment of the impact of the riots. “In spite of the strident claims in the communist press, the efficiency of the colony has been surprisingly little disturbed. There has been no significant disruption in any of the major sectors. Industrial production was not affected at all, and exports continued at substantially higher levels than in previous years . . . At the height of the disturbances substantial deposits were withdrawn from banks. From the end of August deposits began to return to the banks at a satisfactory rate. There had been no significant adverse effects on public revenue,” the annual report said.6 Trading figures for 1967 showed that the value of exports increased by 17 per cent compared with 1966, while re-exports increased by 14 per cent. The then financial secretary John Cowperthwaite, however, admitted that the estimate of $75 million for land sales in 1967 proved overoptimistic and the revised figure was $34 million less.7 John Cooper, author of Colony in Conflict, noted that

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steel, cement and construction showed a marked decline. The number of building projects in particular was down nearly 40 per cent in the first ten months of 1967 compared with the corresponding period of the preceding year, and hopes of a building boom were dashed.8 The total value of new private buildings was only HK$577 million, compared with HK$1.058 billion during 1966.9 Tourist arrivals in September and October saw a year-on-year decrease of 9.9 per cent and 17.9 per cent respectively. A total of 527,365 tourists arrived in Hong Kong in 1967, compared with 505,733 in 1966. If the disturbances did not occur, tourist arrivals in 1967 might have exceeded 600,000. As troubles and disorders engulfed Hong Kong, neighbouring countries took initiatives to attract capital from Hong Kong. The Philippines government announced in July that the country would relax the restrictions on Hong Kong people travelling to the Philippines and set up a free-trade zone to attract capital from the British colony. Taiwan also set up a special working group to facilitate Hong Kong people who would like to visit and invest on the island. Those Hong Kong people who invested HK$250,000 to set up factories in Singapore would have their whole families granted permanent residency in the lion city. Many professionals such as doctors and engineers emigrated to North America and European countries during the disturbances. Sources close to Beijing said Zhou ordered the left wing in Hong Kong in December to stop bomb attacks and the anti-British struggle was called to a halt. Yu Changgang, who claimed that he had participated in Beijing’s policymaking process during the anti-British struggle, said Zhou instructed the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in December 1967 to review the anti-British struggle in Hong Kong. The conclusion was that the struggle started prematurely under the guidance of ultra-leftist thoughts and had divorced from reality. The anti-British struggle ended quietly and nobody was held responsible. Liang Weilin retained his post of director of the Hong Kong branch of Xinhua after the riots and stayed on until he was transferred to the post of deputy secretary of Guangdong Revolutionary Committee in December 1977. Liang’s deputy, Qi Feng, retired in 1984 and had served as a vice-chairman of the Guangdong People’s Political Consultative Conference. Liang died in May 2008 at the age of 98. Lau Nai-keung, former chairman of the Meeting Point, said that he treated Qi to lunch before the deputy Xinhua director returned to the mainland in 1984. “I asked Qi which post he would take up after returning to the mainland. Qi said he had made ‘serious mistakes’ in 1967 and his career has been adversely affected,” Lau said. Qi was responsible for maintaining contacts with the Meeting Point, which was a pro-democracy group at the time. The group merged with the United Democrats of Hong Kong in 1994 to form the Democratic Party. Lau is currently a member of the Basic Law Committee. In early January 1968, Zhou talked about the Hong Kong question and the disturbances in 1967 when he met some leftists from Hong Kong. “Between June

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and September, there were problems with mainland newspapers’ propaganda on Hong Kong and the slogans targeting Hong Kong were nearly the same as those we used in the mainland. The mainland newspapers adopted the slogans used by the Red Guards in the reports on Hong Kong.”10 Kam Yiu-yu, chief editor of Wen Wei Po at the time, recalled that Zhou ordered Xinhua’s Hong Kong branch in early 1968 to stop the riots. Zhou, who had just put the armed conflicts among different factions of the Red Guards throughout the country under control, told Liang and Qi to go to Beijing to present a briefing on the anti-British struggle. After returning to Hong Kong, Qi passed on Zhou’s directive to Kam: “Your anti-persecution struggle had gone on the wrong track. Of course there were people in Beijing who sent the misleading messages and I was tied up by other matters and did not have much time to care about the struggle.” “I recently sought the views of Chairman Mao on whether there was any change in the policy towards Hong Kong. Chairman Mao said there was no need to make any change and the status quo should be preserved. The chairman’s remarks show that he does not have any plan to change the status of Hong Kong, such as taking Hong Kong back. Some people in Beijing had given you directives on how to deal with the situation in Hong Kong, including editorials published in the People’s Daily. Now we should recognize that according to the spirit of Chairman Mao’s directives, those instructions had violated the policies decided by Chairman Mao and the central government towards Hong Kong and Britain,” Zhou said. Zhou instructed Qi to stop the “erroneous” “anti-persecution struggle” after he returned to Hong Kong. “You should immediately rectify the erroneous decisions and measures and mobilize different sectors to join hands in restoring the stability and prosperity of Hong Kong. You should also strive to start talks with the Hong Kong British authorities and try your best to restore peace and stability,” Zhou said, “you should also convey the views of Chairman Mao and mine to the groups and institutions under your supervision and apologize to them. You should differentiate your mistakes from the actions taken by ordinary cadres, Hong Kong compatriots, workers, farmers and students out of patriotism and affections towards the country. You should shoulder the responsibility of making the mistakes but they were innocent for taking action during the struggle. Their spirit is commendable.” There has been a long-standing debate on whether the riots instigated by the left wing were backed by Beijing. Between May and August, the People’s Daily published two editorials and eight commentaries in support of the leftist-inspired disturbances in Hong Kong. The left wing in Hong Kong also interpreted the protests made by the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs to the British government during the riots as full backing from Beijing. The All-China Federation of Trade Unions offered the Struggle Committee a total of HK$20 million for financing the general strikes organized by the leftist unions. Beijing, however, only showed passive and half-hearted support for the left wing in Hong Kong. Liang Shangyuan, deputy director of Xinhua’s Hong Kong

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branch at the time, said that the Communist Party’s policy towards Hong Kong since the 1950s was “long-term deliberation and making full use of Hong Kong” and Chinese leaders had said repeatedly that they did not intend to recover Hong Kong by force. “It was not Beijing who launched the anti-British struggle. Instead, the movement was initiated by Xinhua’s Hong Kong branch. They also masterminded and took command of the leftists during the riots,” he told the author. “However, the Hong Kong and Macau Works Committee of the Chinese Communist Party, which operated in Hong Kong in the name of Xinhua’s Hong Kong branch, could not initiate the struggle if it did not have support from Beijing. The central government’s policy towards Hong Kong was very clear and the Hong Kong and Macau Works Committee knew full well about it. However, the ultraleftists thoughts of Lin Biao [then vice-chairman of the Chinese Communist Party and heir apparent to Mao Zedong] and the ‘Gang of Four’ brought obstruction to Beijing’s handling of Hong Kong’s affairs. They also controlled certain important media organizations, such as the People’s Daily which was taken over by Chen Boda (陳伯達), head of the Cultural Revolution Group under the Communist Party’s Central Committee,” he said. “Under the circumstances, the Hong Kong branch of the Xinhua News Agency used the tactic of ‘implementing countermeasures to circumvent the central policies’ (上有政策，下有對策), and forced the central government to shoulder the responsibility with a fait accompli.” Liang said Premier Zhou Enlai was reluctant to initiate the anti-British struggle but the leadership of the Communist Party lacked consensus on how to respond to the situation in Hong Kong. Both Zhou and Mao Zedong had no intention of recovering Hong Kong but Mao wanted to show some gestures to threaten the British government. While Zhou disagreed with many policies during the Cultural Revolution, he did not dare to openly oppose the Mao-inspired political movement and the Red Guards movement. Meanwhile, Zhou had to handle plenty of problems in the mainland and could not take care of every aspect of external relations. In this context, the group led by Lin Biao and the Hong Kong and Macau Works Committee had room for manoeuvre during the riots. It resulted in a situation in which nobody was responsible for the event and it was also difficult to find out who was to blame. Liang said that Beijing had agreed to organize general strikes in Hong Kong but did not back the bomb attacks. “During the ‘anti-persecution struggle’ in 1967, Zhou Enlai ordered the People’s Liberation Army not to cross the border. The mainland did not provide arms and bombs to the leftists in Hong Kong and the official media had never explicitly spread the message of taking over the city,” he said. Liu Yat-yuen believed that Xinhua’s Hong Kong branch played a crucial role in orchestrating the anti-British struggle. He said that some top Xinhua officials in Hong Kong were worried that they would be sacked or transferred to the mainland

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where they could face political struggle. Senior leaders or heads of government departments in the mainland became targets of political struggles during the Cultural Revolution. “They [senior officials of Xinhua’s Hong Kong branch] launched the anti-British struggle on their own initiative and acted in an extremely antagonistic way towards imperialism so as to retain their official posts. They wanted to show that they were ‘politically reliable’ in order to win the recognition of the Cultural Revolution Group under the Chinese Communist Party’s central committee,” he said. Apart from the need to protect themselves, mainland officials stationed in Hong Kong, who were influenced by the ultra-leftist thoughts during the Cultural Revolution, also felt that there was a need to show their ideological purity and that they were “revolutionaries”. The colonial government was an obvious target to display their revolutionary fervour. Beijing’s half-hearted support for the Hong Kong leftists originated from its long-standing pragmatic policy towards Hong Kong since 1949. Shortly after the People’s Republic of China was founded, the Chinese Communist Party announced that it did not recognize the three unequal treaties which the Qing Dynasty signed with Britain in the nineteenth century. Beijing would, however, maintain the status quo of Hong Kong before resolving the Hong Kong issue through negotiation at an appropriate time. Zhou Enlai believed that maintaining the status quo of Hong Kong was conducive to breaking China’s diplomatic isolation imposed by the West. Hong Kong could serve as a link between mainland China and the rest of the world, which was essential for attracting foreign capital and foreign exchange, if it remained under Britain’s control. In 1966, China’s annual foreign exchange receipts from Hong Kong was between £200 million and £210 million, accounting for more than a third of her foreign exchange earnings.11 Of those earnings, £170 million came from trade surplus on visible trade with Hong Kong while £30 million to £35 million were from remittances by overseas Chinese in or through Hong Kong. China’s foreign exchange reserve only amounted to US$167 million in 1978. According to a report on the future of Hong Kong prepared by the British Defence and Overseas Policy Committee in August 1967, Hong Kong also provided China with a window on the outside world and an easy point of access for trade and travel. “It has served as a centre from which to mount subversive activities against the free world,” the report said, “Hong Kong is in addition a useful trading outpost for China, especially as regards commercial dealings with countries with whom it does not have diplomatic relations. Preliminary negotiations for grain deals with Australia and Canada have often taken place in Hong Kong. Western firms, too, can readily make contact with Chinese commercial negotiations in the colony.” The Chinese government stuck to its policy of “long-term deliberation and making full use of Hong Kong” even when it faced the challenge from the Soviet Union. Responding to Soviet Union leader Nikita Khrushchev’s attack on China’s failure to settle the issue of Hong Kong and Macau, the People’s Daily editorial on March 8, 1963 said:

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With regard to the outstanding issues, which are a legacy from the past, we have always held that, when conditions are ripe, they should be settled peacefully through negotiations and that, pending a settlement, the status quo should be maintained. Within this category are the questions of Hong Kong, Kowloon and Macau . . . There is no need for the Chinese people to demonstrate force on the questions of Hong Kong and Macau in order to prove our courage and determination in the fight against imperialism.

Zhou had been following the struggle organized by the left wing in Hong Kong since May and had warned against taking radical action in the colony. After the incident at Artificial Flower Works erupted, he said that it was necessary to react to the suppression by the Hong Kong government but the struggle should follow the principle of conducting “on just grounds, to our advantage and with restraint”. He disagreed with organizing armed struggle because it would give British a pretext to suppress the masses of the leftist camp.12 Zhou also opposed staging a general strike in Hong Kong. “Hong Kong workers can stage some short-term and impromptu strikes but should not copy the format of the general strike in 1925 because the situation is now different. The major investors in 1925 in Hong Kong were foreign businessmen and a general strike could reduce the colony to a ‘dead port’. But in the 1960s, most investors in Hong Kong are Chinese businessmen and 90 per cent of foodstuff consumed in Hong Kong was supplied by the mainland. Japanese businessmen would fill the vacuum in the market if there was a general strike in Hong Kong. Besides, Hong Kong workers would have no salary if there was a long-term strike and they would have to count on assistance from the country. It would exert a financial burden on the country,” Zhou said. When Zhou discussed the Hong Kong question with senior officials from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Communist Party’s Hong Kong and Macau Work Committee, he criticized the increasingly radical stance taken by the relevant mainland departments.13 He criticized the ultra-leftist slogans put forward by the departments responsible for Hong Kong affairs. The Communist Party’s Hong Kong and Macau Work Committee sought the central government’s approval for launching attack on several police posts in Hong Kong and for killing several “most unscrupulous police officers” in order to “warn others not to follow their example”. Zhou dismissed the idea as “anarchism”. “Hong Kong is still under the British rule. We do not intend to take back Hong Kong immediately, nor do we plan to wage a war against Britain. We should exercise restraint in our struggle against Britain. It doesn’t work if we copy the practices of the Red Guards to Hong Kong,” he said.14 On July 10, two days after the border conflict in Sha Tau Kok, Zhou talked about the Hong Kong question and called for restraint. “Hong Kong is not another Macau. Using force in Hong Kong is not in line with our current policies. The struggle in Hong Kong is a long-term process. We should not act rashly, otherwise

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we would be in a difficult position,”15 “Chairman Mao said yesterday [July 9] that we will not use force [against Hong Kong]. If we sent troops to Hong Kong, it would be a strike on our own initiative. If we sent units of the regular army in the fight, it would be impossible to stop the situation from worsening,” Zhou said.16 The premier instructed a vice-minister of Foreign Affairs to travel to Guangdong in the second half of July to pass on Mao’s directives on Hong Kong. Zhou Enlai told Malcolm MacDonald, a member of the British Parliament from the Labour Party, in October 1971 that China had no intention of taking Hong Kong back until the New Territories lease expired. Zhou apologized for the burning of the office of the British chargé d’affaires during his meeting with British Foreign Secretary Sir Alex Douglas-Home on November 1, 1972. “A country can’t be always correct. It is unavoidable that it makes some mistakes but recognition of them is necessary. The Chinese government disagrees with the actions taken by the extremists in 1967 and the policies they made in Hong Kong. But the problem got worse after you [the Hong Kong government] started suppression,” Zhou said, “the status quo of Hong Kong can be preserved so long as there is no major war in Asia. Maintaining Hong Kong as a free port is beneficial for both China and Britain.”17 Zhou also made the clearest expression of China’s policy on Hong Kong during the meeting with Douglas-Home. According to a file on the British Foreign Office’s record of the talk between Zhou Enlai and Douglas-Home on November 1, 1972, Zhou said: “The British were ruling Hong Kong and were responsible. The Chinese did not quarrel with that. They respected the British position.”18 Zhou said that India had taken back Goa without warning but that on the other hand China “had not taken over Macau”. He went on to say that “Sir Alec Douglas would understand the Chinese attitude to international issues of this kind. The Chinese view was that such matters should be settled through negotiation and consultation.” Zhou added that Hong Kong was “a matter left over by history” and that “the issue of Hong Kong was one which would be settled by negotiation. The Chinese government would take no ‘surprise action’.”19 It appeared that the left wing had recognized that Beijing did not support the anti-British struggle wholeheartedly when the struggle entered the final stage. In an article entitled “Regarding several questions about the anti-persecution struggle”, published by the Struggle Committee on July 2, 1967, the committee said that the anti-British struggle was a “long-standing, tough and volatile struggle”. “Some people are so quick-tempered that they want to fight a quick battle and finish it quickly. They simply hope that the People’s Liberation Army would march to Hong Kong,” the committee said, “the atrocities made by the Hong Kong British authorities are irritating and it is very natural to expect the PLA to march to Hong Kong to punish British imperialism and its running dogs. Whether the PLA would march to Hong Kong depends on the actual situation and we should not rely too much on it. We should recognize the fact that the strong support of the people on the motherland

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is indispensable for the victory of the ongoing anti-British struggle. But the victory must be secured through our arduous struggle. All support from the motherland is no substitute for the force shown by the masses in Hong Kong. We should count on ourselves to liberate ourselves and should not simply long for the arrival of the PLA.”20 The Struggle Committee aimed at cooling down the expectations of the leftist camp about Beijing taking over Hong Kong prematurely. The left wing frankly admitted their failure in the 1967 disturbances in 1978. On August 31, 1978, Qi Feng, deputy director of Xinhua’s Hong Kong branch, said during the first meeting of the Preparatory Committee for the National Day Celebrations that the 1967 riots violated the central government’s policy towards Hong Kong. According to a report by Ming Pao, Qi said that the anti-British struggle was an erroneous struggle manipulated by the faction headed by Lin Biao. “In the beginning of the labour dispute at Hong Kong Artificial Flower Works, there were opportunities for resolving the dispute. The Hong Kong government demanded negotiation with us in the hope of resolving the dispute peacefully but their request was rejected. When we review the decision made at that time, we made a mistake at that time. The masses who had been under oppression rose up to join the struggle in 1967 and they did not make any mistake. The mistakes lied in the leading officials,” Qi said. “There are common ground and differences between the Chinese and British government. We must not use the methods employed in 1967 to handle the conflicts with the British government in the future,” Qi said.21 Lo Fu, who was deputy editor of Ta Kung Pao in 1967, said he was present at the meeting and confirmed that Qi’s speech on the riots as reported by Ming Pao was accurate.

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The left wing paid a heavy price for instigating the riots which briefly brought the Hong Kong society to a standstill. In the beginning of the labour dispute at the Hong Kong Artificial Flower Works, some members of the public were sympathetic with the workers who joined the strike. The left wing, however, quickly dropped the labour issues and the call for improving labour rights. Instead, they positioned the incident as a “national oppression” by the colonial government. In an article published in the Far Eastern Economic Review, Derek Davies, chief editor of the regional magazine, wrote that “the local communists very soon dropped the industrial and labour issues (in which they had such a very strong case and which should have formed the basis of any proper, representative left-wing union movement in an industrial society) because in terms of the Cultural Revolution they would have been guilty of economism . . . So the campaign shifted onto the purely political level. Once the meaningful bases for a left-wing movement had been jettisoned, the campaign became rootless and purposeless, inspired by hate and a desire to destroy,” he wrote.1 The general strike and food strike caused huge inconvenience to the public and the image of the left wing was particularly undermined by the bomb attacks. It largely offset the progress that Beijing made in winning over the hearts and minds of Hong Kong in the 1950s and early 1960s. Wu Tai-chow, president of Hong Kong Evening News who was jailed for publishing “inflammatory articles” during the riots, said: “The leftist camp quickly lost the public support in the wake of bomb attacks. The members of public thought the leftists politicize the incident and were not sincerely concerned about workers’ rights.”2 Even some prominent leftist sympathizers distanced themselves from the left wing during the disturbances. Henry Fok Ying-tung, who made his first “bucket of gold” by shipping machinery, medicines and other vital supplies to the mainland while an international trade embargo was imposed on China during the Korean War in the early 1950s, did not join the Struggle Committee. He went to England and left his business in Hong Kong to his staff.

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The leftist newspapers were hit hard because of its support for the disturbances and they lost appeal among the general public after the riots. Their total daily circulation plunged from 454,900 in May 1967, when the disturbances broke out, to 240,500 in November.3 The left wing went into a self-imposed isolation after the disturbances. The Federation of Trade Unions (FTU) concentrated on its internal affairs and stopped participating in social affairs. The FTU boycotted advisory bodies on labour affairs such as the Labour Advisory Board and did not take part in the 1982 district board election. The left wing’s isolation from mainstream society lasted until the mid1980s. Wong Kwok-kin, former chairman of the Federation of Trade Unions, said that after the riots, the traditional leftist camp had developed a “siege mentality” as they felt they were marginalized by mainstream society. “Such a mentality has been receding gradually since the 1990s but it still exists among some leaders of the leftist organizations,” he said. The leftists’ self-imposed isolation after the riots allowed room for independent unions to develop in the 1970s. Lau Chin-shek, who became director of the Christian Industrial Committee in 1979, said that the FTU did not attempt to reassert their influence on labour legislation again until the early 1990s. “Otherwise, we would not have room for development in the 1970s,” he said.

Forcing the colonial government to introduce social reforms The colonial administration’s success in quelling the leftist-inspired disturbances did not mean that it enjoyed wholehearted support from the Hong Kong people. Until extremists launched bomb attacks in July, most people did not actively support the Hong Kong government although they disagreed with the actions taken by the left wing. Elizabeth Sinn, a Hong Kong academic who specializes in Hong Kong history, said: “Members of the public were ambivalent towards the labour dispute [in San Po Kong] in the early stage; some even thought that it was good to teach the colonial administration a lesson for its authoritarian style of government.”4 Lau Siu-kai, currently head of the Central Policy Unit, said that he was sympathetic with the left-wing demonstrators when they met with suppression by expatriate police officers. Lau was studying at St Paul’s College in 1967. “I felt China had enhanced its international standing when the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs summoned the British chargé d’affaires and lodged protest against the suppression by the Hong Kong government,” he said. Lau’s enthusiasm began to cool down when the protests caused mayhem. “There existed some social ills and inequalities at the time and the Hong Kong government gave differential treatment to Caucasians and the Chinese. That’s why the left wing’s anti-colonial slogans won some audience outside its own camp although most of the participants in the anti-British struggle came from left-wing organizations,” he said.5

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It was not possible to ascertain the views of the general public on the disturbances as public opinion polls were not popular at the time. The student union of the University of Hong Kong conducted a questionnaire survey on the campus in July 1967 to canvass students’ views on the riots. The student unions distributed 1,986 copies of questionnaires and received 524 replies. Of them, 437 said that they were “disgusted with” the riots while 53 claimed that they were not interested in the disturbances. Another 29 said that they were sympathetic with the rioters and 5 said that they “fully supported” the riots. There were a total of 2,466 students studying at the University of Hong Kong in 1967.6 It is noteworthy that the disturbances, which started with a labour dispute, generated sympathy among people outside the leftist camp and some even took part in the movement. Lui Tai-lok, professor of sociology at the University of Hong Kong, and Stephen Chiu Wing-kai, professor of sociology at the Chinese University of Hong Kong, said: “At least in the early stage of the riots, some ordinary citizens who had no connections with the left wing took part in the process of political mobilization. In the meantime, many citizens did not give their backing from the very beginning to the colonial government to quell the unrest.”7 As the unrest was escalated, the fear of communist rule drove Hong Kong people to side with the colonial government. Cheng Yuk-long, chief editor of Sing Tao Daily at the time, said: “The people do not have a high opinion of the Hong Kong British authorities but they have no choice but support them under the current circumstances. It is just like we have to support the driver after getting on a car and the Hong Kong British authorities are the driver. Hong Kong people have no alternative but support them.”8 Richard Hughes, a British journalist based in Hong Kong during the 1960s and 1970s, noted: “Bluntly, the May 1967 plot did fail not because the Chinese younger generation, who will determine Hong Kong’s future, loved the British more, but because they loved the Communists less.”9 It was ironic that the leftist-inspired riots, which embraced the anti-colonial slogans, ended up driving Hong Kong people to support the colonial government. Ian Scott, former professor with the University of Hong Kong’s department of politics, said: “Concern about working conditions in public circles and in the press was soon dissipated by the riots, by the strikes and by the results of indiscriminate bombing. Ironically, in the light of communist objectives, the end-result of the disturbances was to increase the support for, and the legitimacy of, the existing order. Faced with a choice between communism of the Cultural Revolution variety and the, as yet, unreformed colonial capitalist state, most people chose to side with the devil they knew.”10 Derek Davies, chief editor of the Far Eastern Economic Review, wrote in June 1967 that the people involved in the anti-British riots were essentially frustrated lower-middle-class people. “A depressingly small proportion of our four million people have begun to reap the benefits of Hong Kong’s economic growth . . . The

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government must not be allowed to convince itself that the overwhelming expression of public support for its recent actions in maintaining law and order means that the community wholeheartedly approves of its policies in normal times,” he wrote.11 He urged the government to address the social anomalies. “The government can afford no longer to refuse to commit itself in advance and must mobilise all the community’s resources to improving housing, education, medical services, recreational facilities and public welfare in general.” Although the terrorist means employed during the disturbances were widely condemned at the time, many independent observers agree that the social background to the 1967 riots cannot be dismissed. Before the disturbances, the colonial government paid little regard to the education and social welfare needs of the socially disadvantaged. For instance, spending on education in 1966 accounted for a mere 4.5 per cent of overall government expenditure, compared with more than 20 per cent in recent years. In 1965, only 18.3 per cent of primary school leavers were admitted to government and aided secondary schools, or were given assisted places in private secondary schools.12 Recognizing the fact that social and economic factors had played an important part in triggering off the disturbances, the English-language China Mail said: “Without dissatisfied workers the agitators would have been unable to start the trouble which has bothered Hong Kong since early May. Hong Kong’s labour laws have a base which dates back to the 1920s and those were archaic. However, a change of law is not all that is needed. What is urgently required is a change of attitude at the top in industry and commerce. Hong Kong has many good years of productivity ahead and enlightened management can insure this if it will recognise the need of improving the lot of the colony’s willing labour force.” A commentary in the Far Eastern Economic Review in January 1968 noted that “this sort of incident (the riots) should be unthinkable in a decent, progressive society. The administration must show that it is concerned with something more than the mere statistics of so many thousands resettled, educated or provided with medical treatment every year.” The commentary reminded the government that “it is the individual whose loyalty must be retained, and the government can only succeed in this by demonstrating that the man in the street is not ruled by a faceless, arrogant machine . . . Too often, the government seems not only faceless but deaf as well. No matter what suggestions are made — even from within the civil service — for improvement or reform of the government’s performance, all ideas of change were shrugged off at the top.”13 According to an official report on social security published in 1967, Hong Kong government recognized the fact that Hong Kong workers in those days lacked security of employment. “For workers in industry, who now probably exceed half a million, there is little in the way of security of employment. It is very common practice for such workers to be employed on daily rates of pay and on piece rates. It becomes highly undesirable when this method of remuneration is widely regarded

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as implying casual employment which can be terminated at a moment’s notice.”14 Workers did not have any paid leave and had to work for more than eleven hours a day and seven days a week. Hong Kong was described by some Western media as a “sweatshop” where working conditions were nightmarish. Elsie Elliott said the worst problem was that workers in Hong Kong were being paid on a daily basis and had no security. “I recently met a man who had worked for the same company for 10 years and who was dismissed with less than a day’s notice,” she said.15 Robert Kilpatrick, a United States academic who visited Hong Kong in August 1967, said he was amazed that there was no highly developed social security system, no unemployment insurance and no retirement plan in Hong Kong, which was a highly industrialized and commercialized city. He attributed economic unrest among the working class as one of the major causes of the disturbances.16 Commenting on the debate on the budget in April 1967, Leo Goodstadt, then deputy editor of the Far Eastern Economic Review, wrote that senior officials “failed to give an impression of real determination to find an early answer to our social problems. There were far too many excuses for the slow progress in raising welfare standards to the level that this modern economy can afford and has the right to demand. The public cannot be blamed if, unfairly, it comes to regard the Director of Education as reactionary after hearing his ultra-cautious views on free primary education for all.”17 Director of Education William Gregg said during the Legco debate in March 1967 that Legislator Ellen Li’s suggestion of achieving free primary education in 1971 was “not capable of early achievement . . . We are not yet able at this stage to gauge with any acceptable degree of accuracy what the total financial effects of all our desired development plans will be.” Gregg continued, “My attitude to the honourable member’s suggestion would have been rather different, if I believed that the charging of fees in primary schools at a modest level was a genuine hardship to parents and a serious discouragement to their sending their children to school.”18 Lord Rhodes, a former minister at the British Ministry of Trade, said on his return from Hong Kong to London in August 1967 that the colony could ride out the crisis but “a radical change in the attitude of government departments to the people were needed”.19 In a commentary published in the Far Eastern Economic Review on June 1, 1967, Derek Davies noted that the disturbances in San Po Kong revealed the existence of a “groundswell of discontent”, a widespread sense of frustration among youth, and a “bloody-minded resentment of anything which smacked of authority”. “The young men who threw stones and bottles at the police were reasonably welldressed misfits from Hong Kong’s vaunted estates and from the streets of Kowloon,” he wrote, “the Hong Kong authorities have shown no signs of appreciating the selfevident fact that the discontent is part of a ‘Revolution of Rising Expectation’.”20 The special booklet commemorating the 25th anniversary of the Independent Commission Against Corruption said that “people were getting sick of corruption and

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more and more in the late 1960s began to express their anger at corrupt officials and ineffective government. The riots of 1966–67 had challenged many old assumptions about government. The people of Hong Kong increasingly began to openly condemn corruption, and the indifference of the government towards it.”21 In its editorial published on December 1967, the South China Morning Post said: “If this community is to survive in the New Year, there must be a general recognition that the hard-won solidarity will not continue of its own accord. The challenge for 1968 lies in all-round recognition that there are a number of serious weaknesses in our society that demand urgent correction. The problems are well known: better links between government and the people not only through local government but decentralized administration; a start on the solution of labour problems, a massive effort for youth and young people and even greater efforts in the field of education,” the editorial said. However, Leo Goodstadt, head of the Central Policy Unit from 1989 to 1997, said in an interview with the author in April 2007 that the colonial administration did not do well in many aspects during the mid-1960s. “But it was not like ‘a revolution waiting to start’ in 1967 . . . When you walked around the streets [in 1967], there were complaints but not outrage,” he said, adding that there were very few worker activities in sympathy with the dispute in San Po Kong. The British government noted that before the riots the business community and many unofficial members of the Executive Council and Legislative Council resisted the introduction of social reforms. In early 1967, the “Report by the Interdepartmental Working Party to Consider Certain Aspects of Social Security” put forward an ambitious reform programme, including mandatory provident fund to provide retirement protection for workers and for social insurance to protect the labour force against illness, unemployment and other hazards. “We feel that this is the time to appeal to the members of the public to help set up their own old age protection scheme and when necessary, this should be done on a compulsory basis,” the report said.22 But the proposals were shelved because of opposition from the business community. Leo Goodstadt noted that Hong Kong’s business elite was rescued from the threat of compulsory contributions to finance pensions and other worker benefits by Sir John Cowperthwaite, the then financial secretary. “He ignored the Governor’s own support for the document which had been drafted within the government itself. He used a combination of personal prestige and bureaucratic wiliness to discredit its proposals. He alleged unfairly that they were ‘vitiated . . . by an emotional prejudice against employers in general and profits in particular’,” Goodstadt wrote.23 One of the unintended consequences of the riots was the renewed momentum for social reforms which helped overcome the opposition of the business community to improve the conditions of the labour force. The disturbances of 1966 and 1967 shocked the employers in Hong Kong and the need for legislative reforms was accepted. Secretary of State for Commonwealth Affairs Herbert Bowden noted

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in May 1967: “We could proceed vigorously and effectively to carry out labour reforms. There has been a considerable amount of opposition from the employers’ representatives on the Executive Council. “In early May I insisted on early action on one particular aspect. The employers are at present very anxious about the general situation and we could immediately carry through extensive and long-overdue labour reform. It would be welcomed by the average workers in Hong Kong and would give us a better moral position but it would be unlikely to satisfy China,” he wrote.24 At a meeting of the Labour Advisory Board in May 1967, the employers’ representatives still opposed the progressive reduction of working hours for women and young people. In December 1967, the government amended the law to reduce the maximum working hours for women and young people to 57 hours a week. It was further eliminated to 48 hours a week in 1971. The Employment Ordinance was passed in 1968 which regulated the duration and termination of contracts and provided for the protection of wages of employees. In 1969 it was amended to require employers to grant maternity leave and at least four rest days per month. It was undeniable that the confrontation had provided the impetus for labour reforms. In an interview with the author, Leo Goodstadt said there were clearly complaints about social conditions in 1967. “There were many things with the government which it did not do well in 1965, 1966 and 1967. Their policies were not good; they did not take care of the people who were in real need. But they were not special in 1967,” he said. But he noted that the disturbances changed the relationship between the government and the community. “Following the failure of the general strike in June 1967, the Hong Kong government had to accept that the city belonged to the people of Hong Kong and the fate of the city had been decided by the people of Hong Kong, not by the British or the Hong Kong government.” “Now the government had to admit that the community had rights. The business community could see that the morale of the workforce was high; law and order was extremely good. People were very diligent and had walked for one or two hours to go to work during the general strike. As soon as this happened, it became possible to overcome the opposition of the business community to improve conditions of the workforce,” he said. Goodstadt added that most of the ideas in the reform programme introduced after the disturbances had already been proposed but were held up before the riots because they could not get through the Executive Council because of opposition from the business community. He said that the colonial government did not become more democratic or transparent after the disturbances. “But in a way it’s true that the government seems to become more responsive. It was just clear and obvious to the government during the riots that Hong Kong people had social discipline and political maturity. It was

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a turning point in which it showed the quality of the community and you can see the stability of Hong Kong. We can’t deny that the people of Hong Kong had the rights to speak and we have to listen to them.” “It recognized that with this kind of community, if they asked for something good, you got to just say yes because you had no excuse to say no even if you didn’t like to do. For anti-corruption campaign and the Chinese language, the government just had to say yes even though there were not lots of protests on the streets,” he said.25 However, George Walden, assistant political adviser to the governor during the riots, disagreed with the notion that the social inequalities and people’s discontent with the government were the underlying causes of the disturbances. “Of course the social background cannot be ignored. No government ever does enough to alleviate public discontent, and all governments do more after disturbances. But to suggest that the ultimate cause of the riots and the bloodshed were social conditions in Hong Kong would be grossly misleading. If that had been the case the riots would have succeeded. They failed, not simply because of the vigour of the British reaction, but through lack of public support. The local communists were reckless and hamhanded,” he said. “In their desperation to save their necks from the mainland radicals the Hong Kong communists exploited industrial and social disputes to stage a political confrontation, with the results that we know. It would be fanciful (in fact farcical) to suggest that they had the interests of the workers primarily in mind,” Walden said.26 Lord Malcolm Shepherd, minister of state for Commonwealth affairs, said in May 1968 that “much needed to be done in Hong Kong” when he discussed the pros and cons of extending David Trench’s tenure as governor in a letter to the secretary of state in May 1968. “We have to accept there is much that needs to be done in Hong Kong. The disturbances of last year mark, in some respects, the end of a long chapter of laissez-faire. There is a need for change and there is a growing sense of frustration within many influential circles in the Colony that there must be a new drive from above,” Lord Shepherd wrote, “a further year’s service by Sir David Trench could lead to the return of the old attitudes which, I fear, would be fatal to Hong Kong. I am bound to say I would prefer a change in the governorship at this stage.”27 The British government approved extension of Trench’s tenure for a further year until April 1970 and his tenure was extended again to November 1971. He was succeeded by Murray MacLehose, who spearheaded an ambitious reform programme after taking up the governorship in 1971. The gap between the government and the people had been one of the top concerns of community leaders since the Star Ferry riots in 1966. Speaking at the Legislative Council meeting on January 1968, Legislator Woo Pak-chuen said: “Now that the situation in Hong Kong is returning to normal and the troublemakers

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appear to have stopped from trying to ruin our livelihood, it is time to give renewed attention to the further improvement of relationship, co-operation and understanding between government and people . . . There is an urgent and pressing need for an improvement in contact between government and people because of the problems caused by the growth in size of our population,” Woo said. Speaking at the Chinese YMCA Far East Training Institute in May 1968, Hilton Cheong-Leen, chairman of the Hong Kong Civic Association, said that Hong Kong people should be represented, whether directly or indirectly, on the Legislative and Executive Councils. “A colonial government, no matter how liberal or paternalistic, is basically authoritarian and therefore stultifying to political progress. The authoritarian nature of Hong Kong’s colonial government has been the main cause for the political sclerosis that widely exists among local residents with voting rights,” Cheong-Leen said.28 In an attempt to bridge the gap between the administration and the population, the Hong Kong government introduced the city district officer scheme after the disturbances. In January 1968, Colonial Secretary Michael Gass announced that six district offices in Kowloon and four on Hong Kong Island were to be set up in the urban area.29 They were responsible for maintaining contact with local organizations, receiving complaints and assessing the impact of government policies. Meanwhile, RTHK was allowed to set up its own newsroom in 1971 and was granted editorial independence, marking the end of the days when the Government Information Services handled the editorial and reporting work. Jack Cater, who had been deputy colonial secretary and special assistant to the governor during the 1967 riots, described the event as a watershed. “The government learned the lesson from the riots and introduced a series of reforms. Certainly we took the opportunity of producing a new system and reform,” he said, “before 1967, there was no real channel of contact between the government and the people. After the riots, we set up district offices to improve communication with the people. I don’t think there would have been any reform at all [without the riots].”30 In an internal document entitled “The Government in Hong Kong — Basic Policies and Methods” compiled in April 1969, the colonial secretariat of the Hong Kong government stated that continuous effort was needed to ensure progress in all fields of social and economic development designed to consolidate and improve the conditions of living in Hong Kong. Housing programme, including urban renewal, the development of an effective public assistance scheme and the drive against corruption were cited as areas where extra resources should be earmarked in the years to come. “The effects of government’s programme for material improvement in various fields can to some extent be lost if the public does not regard government as genuinely concerned about their individual problems, and anxious to resolve them. Government must also take the public into its confidence as far as possible as to its difficulties and intentions. All [government] staff should have a positive and

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co-operative attitude in all their dealings with the public. It is tempting for the uninterested or mediocre government employee to say ‘no’, because a negative approach will seem safer to him; the aim should always be to go as far possible in meeting reasonable requests. Rudeness towards the public [junior staff particularly tend to offend in this respect] must be firmly stepped out. All too often the public’s review of the government rests on their dealings with junior staff,” the document said.31 The colonial government fast-tracked social reforms after Murray MacLehose succeeded David Trench as governor in 1971. The government introduced free primary education for all in 1972 and implemented compulsory nine-year education in 1978. MacLehose also introduced the ten-year housing programme in 1973 to alleviate housing problems in the colony. The government also introduced the public assistance scheme for the disadvantaged. The reform introduced by the Hong Kong government reaped fruits in the mid-1970s. Many residents felt that the governance of the colonial administration had become relatively reasonable and was one of the most efficient governments in Asia even though it remained a colonial regime. Some British-owned firms in Hong Kong also changed their mindsets following the disturbances. Steven Poon Kwok-lim, former general manger of CLP Group, said that the riots heralded subtle changes for Hong Kong society. He recalled that when he joined the power company in the mid-1960s, lavatories inside the CLP offices were divided into three grades: one for the British, one for the Portuguese and one for Chinese employees. “The new general manager from Australia who took up the post after the riots appreciated that that racist arrangement was not sustainable and decided to scrap the measure,” said Poon, who became CLP’s first general manger of Chinese descent in the late 1980s.32 Meanwhile, the British government realized after the 1967 riots that Hong Kong’s future eventually lay in China and Britain’s objective must be to attempt to negotiate with Beijing the return of Hong Kong at a favourable time in the future. The 1967 riots prompted London to start planning to hand control of the colony back to China. According to Hong Kong: Long Term Study, a report prepared by Britain’s Defence and Overseas Policy Committee in April 1968, Britain admitted that it was inconceivable that any Chinese government would negotiate an extension of the Hong Kong lease which was due to expire in 1997. “There is no real prospect of any solution which does not provide for the resumption of Chinese sovereignty over Hong Kong,” the report said.33 In another report prepared by the ministerial committee on Hong Kong under Britain’s Cabinet Office in March 1969, the British government recognized the need to co-operate with China in finding a solution to the future of Hong Kong. The confidence crisis caused by uncertainty over the city’s future before the conclusion of the Joint Declaration in 1984 proved that the British officials who drafted the report in the late 1960s were already casting their minds on the future. The report

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showed that the British government had seen public confidence in Hong Kong’s future slip and it feared a possible wave of emigration in the 1980s if the 1997 question remained unresolved. It foresaw scenarios of Hong Kong professionals seeking to emigrate and foreign companies removing their assets by the mid-1980s. It expected that professionals with qualifications recognized in overseas countries would start emigration from the 1960s, and the situation was expected to become acute by the mid-1980s. The report spelled out four possible scenarios, with the best being an informal approach to Beijing with a view to reaching a tacit understanding. “The course best suited to our interests would be an informal and disavowable approach to the Chinese when the time is ripe aimed at reaching an eventual withdrawal at a suitable agreed date,” it concluded. “The purpose would be to tell the Chinese that we acknowledge that Hong Kong must eventually be returned to China and we are anxious to effect an orderly transfer as soon as public opinion would allow us to. “To this end, we will endeavour to avoid doing anything in Hong Kong to make the transfer more difficult, for example by constitutional changes towards representative and more responsible government.”34 The recommendation was in line with Britain’s postwar policy of rejecting full democracy for Hong Kong so as not to spark resentment and suspicion from Beijing. Former governor MacLehose had warned of holding free elections in the colony, saying, “if the communists won, that would be the end of Hong Kong. If the nationalists won, that would bring in the communists”. The informal approach to Beijing was preferred by the ministerial committee because it would minimize the dangers of a formal approach, giving Britain the means of withdrawing if it was rebuffed. The report recognized that meaningful negotiation could not be mounted in the foreseeable future, given the internal strife in the mainland during the Cultural Revolution. It also suggested that the British government approach Beijing no later than the early 1980s in the hope of negotiating an agreement on Hong Kong’s future. “The other end of the time scale is determined by the strong probability that public confidence in the colony’s future will start to slip and the economy to run down in the 1980s; it could become a serious liability to us and lose its value to China,” the report said. “All this points to an initiative on our part taken not later than the early 1980s or as soon as there emerges in China a regime with which we might be able to do business.” The moment came in 1979 when the then governor Murray MacLehose was invited by China’s minister of trade, Li Qiang, to visit China, a trip supposed to focus on cross-border trade and economic co-operation. During a meeting in the morning of March 29, 1979, the governor tactfully raised the lease of Hong Kong with China’s paramount leader Deng Xiaoping.

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The historic talks, during the first official visit by a Hong Kong governor, were viewed as a key step in securing a smooth transfer of Hong Kong’s sovereignty back to China. The fact is that Britain had been agonizing over the future of the colony since 1967 and that MacLehose merely followed a script from the report that had been drafted more than a decade before his visit.

11

Recollections and reflections by key players in the disturbances

Jack Cater: The man in charge of putting down the riots Cater was at times deep in thought when he recollected the disturbances in 1967, one of the most painful chapters in Hong Kong’s recent history. During the 1967 riots, Cater was then personal assistant to the governor and deputy colonial secretary (special duties). After Governor David Trench went on leave to England for health reasons at the end of June in 1967, Cater was one of the top government officials who directly handled the riots. In an interview with the author in April 1999, Cater insisted that the actions taken by the Hong Kong government during the upheaval were correct and necessary to maintain order in the city. However, he admitted that there existed some individual cases of abuse of power by the police force. During the interview, which might be one of the last interviews he offered before he died in April 2006, the ageing former official often relied on pieces of paper he prepared the night before the interview to recall his memories of the mayhem wrought by the leftist camp more than three decades ago. Since early May 1967, the leaders of the leftist camp in Hong Kong mobilized their supporters to protest outside the Government House. At the beginning, the government was tolerant of the protest and exercised restraint towards the leftists, Cater said. “We saw it a sensible thing to allow people from the communist side to march up to Government House and go down peacefully. If that was what they want to do, we would accept that. Governor David Trench thought it was a good idea,” he said. Cater revealed that there was a tacit understanding between the colonial administration and the leftist camp on conditional tolerance of the protests. He said that he had met some leaders of the leftist camp before the demonstrations took place. “We have been assured that they would go down the hill quietly without causing any trouble,” he said. “That was what we expected.”

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Asked whether he met the leaders of the leftist camp during the disturbances, he said: “Of course. I discussed with them. I knew such persons as Fei Yiming, publisher of pro-Beijing Ta Kung Pao, well before the confrontation happened. We were being told by the local communist leadership that ‘allow us to do this and we promise there will be no trouble’. If that’s the sort of things you want to do, it’s okay. Do it in an orderly manner. But we won’t allow you to hit, kill or throwing stones on the streets.” In the first few days, the demonstrators managed to maintain reasonably good order. Their actions were largely confined to sticking “big-character posters” and reciting Quotations from Chairman Mao Tse-Tung outside the gate of the Government House. “We even allowed them to shake the gate and leave the protest letter outside. The leaders and big names of the leftist camp were allowed to go up [to the Government House] in four big Mercedez Benz limousines. We also ordered the police to exercise self-restraint,” he said. The government provided police officers with perspex goggles to protect their eyes after learning that some demonstrators poked fingers at the policemen on duty, Cater recalled. Cater still remembered that there was a Mr Ng, whose full name he had forgotten, using a loudspeaker to broadcast anti-British slogans on the fifth floor of the old Bank of China building in Central. Ng also made verbal assaults on government officials like Cater and Anthony Elliott, the political adviser to the governor at the time. “Whenever Anthony Elliott and I walked through Statue Square, Ng would be cursing and shouting ‘Kill those British!’ ” In order to drown Ng out, the government started playing loud Chinese music from the rooftop of the Supreme Court (currently home to the Legislative Council). “In a way quite funny, they always gave in and closed down daily broadcasting at 5.30 p.m. every evening,” Cater said. Cater said that after a few days, the leftist camp began to stir up troubles by taking schoolchildren to the streets. He guessed that Beijing suddenly issued an instruction to the communist organizations here urging them to step up their activities. On May 22, the protests eventually turned into riots. The students from the leftist schools were told by their teachers to fall down and had red bandages wound around their heads. Cater said that they wanted to dramatize the event by “bloodying” themselves. “But luckily, many media stood by to record this documentary for world distribution. You got photographs of it and it was very much on television and radio at the time. It was stupid for the leftists to do so and a lot of people realized the façade. Great good fortune!” When the demonstrators started running down from the Government House, they threw stones and broke the windows in the streets of Central. “You can’t allow people to riot. You must do something to stop it and put it down. It was unfortunate that the demonstration turned into riots. That’s a great pity and I was upset about what they did,” Cater said.

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It was alleged by the leftist newspapers that many demonstrators were beaten by police officers during the May 22 incident. They depicted the incident as the “Garden Road Bloodbath”. Cater stressed that he had no knowledge that people waiting to go up to the Government House were beaten by batons. “It [leftists being beaten by police officers] did happen when they were rioting and breaking windows when they were coming down from Government House. What the leftists were trying to do was leaving out a large part of what happened,” he said. While stressing the police action was necessary, he admitted that there was some abuse of power by the police. “Most of the leftists who were arrested were taken to Central Police Station. I was given information that some people were beaten up and so on,” he said. Commissioner of Prisons Cuthbert James Norman, who stationed in Central at the time, rang Cater on the night of May 22. “He said, ‘Look, what is happening here [Central Police Station] is terrible. We can see from our office. We are getting people coming in trucks and they were being pushed out of the trucks. When they got down, five or six policemen were standing on one side and banged them up with big clubs,” Cater said. “Obviously it has got to be stopped. We decided that night these people [the leftists] would be taken away to somewhere there haven’t been any serious problem,” he said, “by and large that stopped the brutality.” “I’m not saying that the leftists were not clubbed. They were. I was upset by what I was told,” Cater said, “I have to say that the police had done this and in this circumstance, we have taken steps to prevent that,” he said. There was a missed opportunity for a high-level dialogue between the Hong Kong government and the leftist camp after the confrontation outside the Government House on May 22. Cater revealed that a person who was senior in the local communist camp was scheduled to meet him after the incident, but under the intense political pressure later on, they did not meet during the riots. According to recently declassified files at Britain’s National Archives (formerly known as the Public Record Office), Ho Yin, an influential Macau tycoon close to Beijing and father of serving Macau chief executive Edmund Ho Hau-wah, came to Hong Kong at the end of May 1967 and indicated a desire to make direct contact with Cater. In a telegram to the British secretary of state for Commonwealth affairs Herbert Bowden on May 25, 1967, undersecretary of state for colonies in the Commonwealth Office Arthur Galsworthy said that the Hong Kong government was hoping that a meeting between Jack Cater and Ho Yin, with executive councillor Richard Charles Lee, would take place that afternoon at Hang Seng Building in Central. If this and subsequent meetings had gone well, Cater would had been authorized to make the points that he felt it probable the governor would not wish to take retrospective legal action for offences committed in the last few days provided that all communist action was ceased. He would also state that the governor might make a generally conciliatory reference to recent events in a television or radio interview, including the theme of no victimization.”1

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However, in another telegram to the Commonwealth Office on May 26, Trench said that the meeting between Ho Yin and Cater did not take place. Ho Yin subsequently held joint meetings with Richard Charles Lee and a senior member of Hang Seng Bank. After the meetings, Cater met Lee and that senior executive of Hang Seng Bank who briefed him about their conversations with Ho Yin. Cater was deeply perturbed by the fact that two leftists under custody were killed by police officers. “Tom Counie, the deputy commissioner of police, requested to see me urgently. He told me that the policemen killed those two leftists, who were detained on charges of rioting, by breaking through their chests. To me, it was serious and it was one of the things which worried me,” Cater said. “I said to everybody [within the government] that it had to be stopped. Indeed, I made it public in those days that it was totally wrong to murder people in police custody,” Cater said, adding that he was still upset about the incident after three decades. The government launched an inquiry after the suppression of the riots. However, Chief Justice Sir Michael Hogan decided that the two men died “accidentally” and the authorities would not take any action. “I was upset that it had happened. It was a black mark on the Hong Kong government.” As the personal assistant to the governor, Cater maintained close contact with David Trench and their offices were next door to each other. Cater met the governor regularly every morning to brief him on what happened on the streets. “He did lose his nerve when the people were shouting outside (the Government House). After several weeks, it must have been a great problem for him. I guessed that two weeks since the demonstration, there was something wrong with Sir David. He was slimmer than he used to be.” He joked with the governor, “Why do you have difficulty? No, you should not stop smoking as the bloody doctor said. Please go back to smoking.” Sir David flew back to England for health reasons at the end of June and returned to Hong Kong in September. Michael Gass, then colonial secretary (the title was renamed as chief secretary in 1970s), became acting governor and Cater was transferred to the post of deputy colonial secretary (special duties). Starting from July 1967, some radical leftists launched bomb attacks in an attempt to escalate the disturbances. Cater still remembered the explosion in North Point. “A pro-communist man took his children with him while planting a bomb. The bomb exploded prematurely, killing his children. It was a dreadful thing to happen.” He dismissed the leftists’ allegation that some bombs were planted by the government itself as “absolutely ridiculous.” In a bid to quell the disturbances, the government drafted a series of draconian laws which were criticized by some critics for depriving civil rights. Several arrests of the leftists also triggered controversy in the society. Cater emphasized that the actions taken by the government were necessary at that time. “People on the streets were killing each other. We’d got to do something. You’re no Christian, saying ‘Oh dear, what a pity.’ We got 51 killed today, 20 tomorrow.”

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Starting from July, several leaders of the leftist organizations were arrested and detained at the Victoria Road Detention Centre, or Mount Davies Concentration Camp, in Western District. They were never tried at courts and they complained that they were being unfairly treated. “Special Branch of the police force picked them up because they were causing troubles. They were people who would have worsened the situation if they were not put away to the holiday home. “I’d gone around every week to ensure everything went well. They were well treated and were not beaten up. I’d gone around to make sure that this was not going on. It was not very nice to be there but, by and large, they were not prisoners,” Cater said. He stressed that the measures taken by the government had wholehearted support from the members of the Executive and Legislative Council. “Most people of Hong Kong supported us. I have no doubt that it was right,” he said. Cater went to the University of Hong Kong and asked for support from the students. “It is sure that people in the university strongly supported the government and once the support began, hundreds and hundreds came to our side,” he said. Cater said that young talents like Martin Lee Chu-ming, Jack So (former chairman of Mass Transit Railway Corporation), Tsim Tak-lung (then president of the student union of the University of Hong Kong) and Miriam Lau (now a legislator and chairwoman of the Liberal Party) came to see him to say “thank you very much indeed” during the disturbances. In June 3, the People’s Daily published an editorial which implied that Beijing might take back the British colony. On July 8, some armed personnels from the Chinese side crossed the border in Sha Tau Kok. The intrusion sparked the concern that Beijing might take over Hong Kong by force. “Once we knew what was happening, we held a meeting and decided to send Gurkhas to the border. This was the most difficult moment for Hong Kong,” Cater said. “The information we got was there had been a senior officer on the Chinese side and they weren’t quite sure what was happening and gesticulating and so on and then later a large number of civilians came across the border, and some males and a lot of pregnant woman came across. They were crying and shouting and they surrounded the police area. I think two or three policemen were killed,” Cater said.2 “There were some stupid reports at that time. Sunday Express reported that 2,000 PLA troops had come across the border,” he said in a chuckle. The government put the army on the border in the wake of the incident and they remained there until the early 1990s. Asked whether the Hong Kong government worried about the incident, Cater pointed out that the government had discussed the matter at that time. They later learned from Beijing source that Zhou Enlai, then Chinese premier, was firm in stopping the Cultural Revolution from spreading to Hong Kong and the actions taken by leftists in Hong Kong must be stopped. “Zhou Enlai was very firm in

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saying that this must be stopped and as we knew, it did stop eventually but it took some time,” Cater said. However, the bomb attacks instigated by the leftists showed no sign of abating and Cater said that the message coming from Beijing in August was: “Sorry, we are unable to be helpful.” “We got this from Zhou Enlai’s office,” Cater said. He said that the Americans were “quite helpful” with the equipment they provided to the British administration. But he did not elaborate on what sort of equipment and other assistance the US had offered during the 1967 disturbances. On August 9, the government arrested the editors of three pro-Beijing newspapers, namely the Hong Kong Evening News, New Afternoon News and Tin Fung Daily for printing “seditious” articles which called on Hong Kong people to “rise up against” the colonial administration. Archives at Britain’s National Archives show that the arrests of Mr Wu and Mr Chak were masterminded by Cater and approved by Britain’s Commonwealth Office. The arrests prompted the Red Guards to stage an arson attack on the British embassy in Beijing on August 22. “When I went to Beijing later on [in the 1980s], the then British ambassador Richard Evans introduced me to his colleagues that ‘this is the man who brought us the new embassy’,” Cater said in a chuckle. Cater said that Percy Cradock, who served as counsellor at the office of the chargé d’affaires in Beijing at the time of the attack, was promoted to chargé d’affaires in 1968. Cradock was not happy with him for a long time because his decision to arrest the pro-Beijing newspaper bosses led to the attack in Beijing. “In retrospect, I had no idea that the reaction to our dealing with those leftist journalists would be to burn down the British embassy,” Cater said. But he added that the government could not afford not to take action to stop the publication of such seditious articles. Cater’s personal experience in early 1967 confirmed his belief that Beijing had no intention to take Hong Kong back. For the whole of 1966, he was away from Hong Kong studying at the Imperial Defence College in London. In January 1967, he went to Macau to meet the Portuguese emissary to China who asked Beijing either to sort out the problem arising from the 1966 riots instigated by the leftists in Macau, or take back the enclave. The emissary, accompanied by the Portuguese ambassador to China, was dispatched to the Foreign Ministry in Beijing. The ministry had already been taken over by the Red Guards. Two Red Guards chanted Chairman Mao’s quotations in front of them and after more than one hour, a lower-middle-level official aged around 25 and 27 came down and said: “We don’t want Macau. We don’t want to take Macau back or anything else. We want you to stay in Macau.” Cater said, “That was the first time I realized that the Chinese were very sensible that they don’t want to cause problem there. When we got into troubles in 1967, we assumed that the problem wouldn’t be too serious in Hong Kong.” He believed that the actions taken by the leftist camp in Hong Kong were against the advice of Beijing.

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A well-known and influential person who maintained close contact with Beijing told Cater that “they (Beijing leadership) felt it was wrong and it must be stopped”. In October 1967, the government gradually put the situations under control and Cater agreed to move to the Trade Development Council. After starting up the council, he subsequently took up the post of director of commerce and industry and secretary for home affairs. He became founding commissioner of the ICAC in 1974. After all was over, the government officials and the leaders of the leftist organizations resumed the usual get-together. “They told me what happened in 1967 was awful and wrong and apology was made,’’ he said. Some academics argue that social injustices and income inequalities were among the underlying factors of the 1967 riots. Cater admitted that the government and many factory owners in the 1960s were not “good paymasters” (generous employers). “I was sad when I found that many people worked every day but only earned several dollars a day. The life of these people was very difficult and their employers did not treat them well. That was serious problem of our society,’’ he said. Cater described the 1967 riots as the most important event in the postwar history of Hong Kong and the watershed of its social development. “The government learned the lesson from the riots and introduced a series of reforms. Certainly we took the opportunity producing new system and reform,” he said. “Before 1967, there was no real channel of contact between the government and the people. After the riots, we set up district offices to improve communication with the people. The big thing I started was to bring in the city district officers scheme under which the government were put in touch with poorer people.” He said that the government introduced one-day paid leave every week in the early 1970s but nearly all businessmen opposed the policy. “Before 1967, there was no day-off a week for workers in Hong Kong. When I said we must have at least one day off a week, bang, everybody criticizing ‘no, the Chinese loved to work’,” he said. Asked whether the pace of social reform would have been slower if the riots had not broken out in 1967, Cater said: “I don’t think there would be any reform at all (if there were no riots in 1967).”

Interview with Liang Shangyuan, former director of the Hong Kong branch of the Xinhua News Agency Born in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia, in 1913, Liang Shangyuan (梁上苑) joined the Hong Kong office of the Communist Party’s Eighth Route Army (renamed as People’s Liberation Army at the end of the Second World War) in 1937. He was transferred to the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs in 1950 and served as cultural attaché of the Chinese embassy in Indonesia and counsellor of the Chinese embassy in Burma. He was appointed deputy director of the Hong Kong branch of Xinhua

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News Agency (NCNA) in the early 1960s and witnessed the 1967 riots during his six-year tenure in the de facto Chinese embassy in Hong Kong. He died in Beijing in July 1999 at the age of 87. Question: What were the causes of the 1967 riots? Answer:

We must analyse the complicated historical background before we are able to understand the real causes of a certain incident. Yeung Kwong, chairman of the Federation of Trade Unions and director of the All-Circles Anti-Persecution Struggle Committee during the riots, emphasized that the movement aimed at resisting the violent crackdown by the Hong Kong government. I think such arguments did not reflect the full picture. It is widely known that the “anti-persecution struggle” was triggered by the Cultural Revolution in the mainland. There were long-standing tensions and inequalities in the Hong Kong society and labour disputes were nearly everyday fact of life. Why did the labour dispute at the Hong Kong Artificial Flower Works quickly escalate into an “anti-persecution struggle” and develop along the track of the Cultural Revolution? The description of the incident as the “Hong Kong-style Cultural Revolution” or “leftist-led upheaval” by some Hong Kong people spoke volumes for the enormous influence of the Cultural Revolution on what happened in Hong Kong in 1967. Choi Wai-hang, who was detained at a concentration camp during the riots, said that the riots were caused by the incompetence of the colonial government. He only emphasized one side of the coin and his views did not represent the realities at the time. I am of the view that the real causes of the “anti-persecution struggle” were the impact of the Cultural Revolution and the high-handed governance of the colonial government.

Question: What was the role played by the leadership of the Hong Kong branch of Xinhua News Agency? Did they just act in accordance with the sentiment of the masses or add fuel to the flames? Answer:

We know well that the Communist Party’s policy towards Hong Kong since the 1950s was “long-term deliberation and making full use of Hong Kong” and Chinese leaders had said repeatedly they did not intend to recover Hong Kong by force. During the “anti-persecution struggle” in 1967, Premier Zhou Enlai ordered the People’s Liberation Army not to cross the border. The mainland did not provide arms and bombs to the leftists in Hong Kong and the official media had never explicitly spread the message of taking back the city. It showed that it was not Beijing who launched the anti-British struggle. Instead, the movement

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was initiated by the Hong Kong branch of Xinhua News Agency. They also masterminded and took command of the leftists during the riots. However, the Hong Kong and Macau Works Committee of the Chinese Communist Party, which operated in Hong Kong in the name of Xinhua’s Hong Kong branch, could not initiate the struggle if it did not have support from Beijing. The central government’s policy towards Hong Kong was very clear and the Hong Kong and Macau Works Committee knew full well about it. However, the ultra-leftists thoughts of Lin Biao [then vice-chairman of the Chinese Communist Party and heir apparent to Mao Zedong] and the “Gang of Four” brought obstruction to Beijing’s handling of Hong Kong’s affairs. They also controlled certain important media organizations, such as the People’s Daily which was taken over by Chen Boda (陳伯達), head of the Cultural Revolution Group under the Communist Party’s Central Committee. Against this backdrop, Xinhua’s Hong Kong branch used the tactic of “implementing countermeasures to circumvent the central policies” (上 有政策，下有對策), and forced the central government to shoulder the responsibility with a fait accompli. It was a key point for understanding the whole episode of the riots. Shortly after the police had beated demonstrators from the leftist camp on May 22, Xinhua’s Hong Kong branch sent one of its deputy directors, Zhu Manping (朱曼平), to Beijing to seek instructions from the central government. In a briefing to officials of Xinhua’s Hong Kong branch after her trip to Beijing, Zhu said that Premier Zhou Enlai considered the acts of Hong Kong leftists tantamount to “forcing the central authorities to join the fray”. Obviously Zhou was reluctant to initiate the anti-British struggle. The leadership of the Communist Party lacked consensus on how to respond to what happened in Hong Kong. Both Zhou and Mao Zedong had no intention of recovering Hong Kong but Mao wanted to show some gestures to threaten the British government. While Zhou disagreed with many policies during the Cultural Revolution, he did not dare to openly oppose the Mao-inspired political movement and the Red Guards movement. Meanwhile, Zhou had to handle plenty of problems in the mainland and could not take care of every aspect of external relations. In this context, the group led by Lin Biao and the Hong Kong and Macau Works Committee found the room for manoeuvre during the riots. It resulted in a situation in which nobody was responsible for the event and it was also difficult to find out who was to blame. In June and July 1967, the People’s Daily published a number of inflammatory editorials and commentaries. The Hong Kong and Macau Works Committee took these articles as instructions from Beijing and

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even “imperial orders” which legitimized the anti-British struggle. The committee was prepared to wage a life-and-death struggle with the Hong Kong British authorities. Guided by ultra-leftist thought, the top officials of Xinhua’s Hong Kong branch did not take into account the overall political situation and the strength of the two sides. They just imagined a repeat of the massive general strikes in the 1920s and mobilized masses blindly to take part in the struggle. Xinhua’s Hong Kong branch mobilized about 60,000 workers to join the general strike; many of them were working in government departments and Britishcapital companies. However, the participants of the so-called “general strike” were confined to those from the leftist camp and the strike was not effective in undermining the Hong Kong government. Worse, many workers lost their jobs after the general strike and they had to rely on the financial assistance provided by the Hong Kong and Macau Works Committee. It brought a heavy financial burden on the leftist camp. The leftist camp launched a “food strike”, or a general strike of shopkeepers, from June 29. It was apparently not a campaign well orchestrated by the central government but it had the backing of various provincial and transport authorities. The strike failed to get a stranglehold on the Hong Kong British authorities and bring them to their knees, and the leftist camp lost the business opportunities to its competitors. We can’t say that the leaders of Xinhua’s Hong Kong branch acted in accordance with the sentiment of the masses or added fuel to the flames by instigating such a large-scale general strike and a food strike. They were leading the leftist masses to failure. Question: Were there any different views within Xinhua’s Hong Kong branch regarding the direction of the movement? Were the low-ranking cadres more radical than top officials like Liang Weilin and Qi Feng? Answer:

There might be different views within the Hong Kong and Macau Works Committee but the difference was only in the way how enthusiasm should be manifested. Nobody dared to oppose the anti-British struggle. The rank-and-file members and low-ranking cadres of the leftist camp intended to follow the example set by the Red Guards in the mainland and instigate a similar movement in Hong Kong, such as posting “bigcharacter posters” and toppling their superiors. But the State Council, under the leadership of Zhou Enlai, had ordered all embassies not to copy the Cultural Revolution to the countries they stationed. Both the leaders of Xinhua’s Hong Kong branch and rank-and-file members of the leftist organizations were influenced by ultra-leftist thought and shared the view

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of instigating a struggle against the Hong Kong British authorities. It was difficult to tell who took the radical approach first. Obviously, the masses in the leftist camp followed the orders of their superiors and regarded the orders as instructions from the central government. However, their actions contravened the established policies of the central government towards Hong Kong. Question: Did the bomb attacks launched by members of the leftist organizations result from spontaneous moves by the masses or were they instigated by Xinhua’s Hong Kong branch? Answer:

All the leftist camp’s actions during the anti-persecution struggle, except the spontaneous visits to the Hong Kong Artificial Flower Works for showing appreciation to the workers, were orchestrated by Xinhua’s Hong Kong branch. The bomb attacks were no exception. Regardless of who raised the idea or instigated the bomb attacks, they were the struggles led by the Hong Kong branch of Xinhua. The Hong Kong and Macau Works Committee failed to deal a serious blow to the Hong Kong British authorities after staging the general strike and food strike in June and July. The top officials of the works committee resorted to this unwise move after failing to come up with better options. Starting from early August, the leftist camp launched bomb attacks and placed parcels or handbags bearing handwritten notes which said “Danger, don’t come close” on tramways or at public venues. The police stopped the traffic whenever suspicious objects were discovered and explosives experts were called to the site to detonate them. The traffic fell into chaos once suspected bombs were found and this caused inconveniences to the public. The move aroused dissatisfaction from the general public who criticized the leftists as childish, and the leftists earned a bad name for themselves. The so-called bombs could hardly harm the enemies but the victims were mostly innocent children. Some children were injured or even killed in the explosions. I heard that Qi Feng (祈烽), then deputy director of the Hong Kong branch of Xinhua, was very proud of and satisfied with the introduction of bomb attacks; he described the attacks as a “master blow” and could provide a “new method of revolutionary struggle” in cities. Most of the bombs were fake because the mainland did not provide explosives for manufacturing the bombs. What the leftists did was nothing but tomfoolery. Judging from the whole anti-British struggle, Liang Weilin (梁威 林) and Qi Feng were in an inferior position during the confrontation and had never claimed victory. The Hong Kong British authorities

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were authorized to mobilize the police for suppressing the leftists and promulgated emergency regulations at their will. The leftists could not resist the Hong Kong police and faced the peril of being thrown into jail. The leftists failed to bring the Hong Kong government to its knee even after staging a general strike. They had no other alternative but launched the bomb attacks which proved to be a tomfoolery. The leftist camp had to provide financial support for families of the leftists killed in the riots and for the workers who were fired during the general strike. The camp gradually lost their combat effectiveness as well as public support after the bomb attacks. All Hong Kong residents suffered huge economic loss due to the riots. The anti-British struggle was such a stupid and muddleheaded struggle but Beijing did not fix responsibility. None of the officials at Xinhua’s Hong Kong branch was punished or reprimanded. I must stress that the rank-and-file members of the leftist organizations had put up a brave fight against the brutal suppression by the Hong Kong police and there were abundant touching heroics. They did not fear being imprisoned when they condemned the “running dogs” serving for the Hong Kong British authorities. Siu Tze, deputy manager of Joint Publishing Company, still chanted the slogan, “it is innocent for being a patriot and there is ground for fight against persecution”, even when his head was spurting blood after he had been hit by a policeman’s baton. People like Siu were victims of the victims but they were the undisputed heroes during the confrontation.

Tsang Tak-sing: “I have no regrets for what I did in 1967.” Tsang Tak-sing would have embarked on a completely different path if the disturbances had not broken out in 1967. Unlike students from traditional proBeijing schools such as Piu Kiu Middle School and Hon Wah Middle School, he was by no means a usual suspect for taking part in anti-British activities. Instead, he was an outstanding student at St Paul’s College in the Mid-Levels, which has been a cradle for prospective pro-establishment elite, when the political upheavals brought Hong Kong to a standstill. He would have joined the colonial government or become a professional as most of his classmates did subsequently, or he would have continued his studies in the United States if the riots had not taken place. But Tsang, then an 18-year-old student discontented with colonial rule, was drawn into the 1967 disturbances. He was even locked behind the bars for 18 months, paying a heavy price for sticking to his political faith. Everything had gone as scripted for Tsang until September 1967. Tsang was in Form Seven at St Paul’s College when the new school year began in September

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1967 and it was just one year away from expected entrance to the University of Hong Kong. He was also a school prefect and leader of several student societies at his school. Founded in 1851, St Paul’s College is the oldest secondary school in Hong Kong and has been one of the most renowned schools in the city. During the era of “elitist education” when only one-eighth of primary school-leavers had access to secondary education, St Paul’s College was seen as the training ground for prospective elites in Hong Kong. Those who could enter the prestigious school were nearly guaranteed a place at the University of Hong Kong, the only tertiary institution in Hong Kong at the time. Tsang excelled at school and did well in public examination. He scored one Grade A and Grade B in six subjects in the Hong Kong Certificate of Education Examination in 1966, and he was one of the best students in the science stream at his school. One could hardly imagine that a fan of Ian Fleming’s James Bond fictions and novels by American humourist Mark Twain would stage anti-British campaigns during the riots. Although Tsang was a beneficiary of elitist education, he was dissatisfied with the colony’s education system. Tsang had become increasingly suspicious about the system. “The teaching methods at my school were quite simplistic and straightforward. Our teachers used to teach in English but the English proficiency of many teachers was inadequate,” he said. “They couldn’t teach in English fluently and even mispronounced some English words. Some teachers simply copied their teaching notes on the blackboard right from the moment they walked into the classroom,” Tsang said. At times, the young schoolboy, who used to question authority, mounted challenges to the teaching methods of some teachers. Lau Siu-kai, currently head of the Central Policy Unit of the Hong Kong government, was Tsang’s classmate during his junior secondary school years. Lau recalled that Tsang, who has served as an adviser to the Central Policy Unit since 1998, excelled academically but was a bit stubborn. “He often raised different views and even argued with teachers during classes,” Lau said. Lau said that Tsang was not a politically active student and seldom discussed political issues with his classmates. “Other classmates and I were surprised when we learned that he distributed leaflets in the school,” Lau said. Tsang’s father, Tsang Chiu-kan, was then a clerk at the Chinese General Chamber of Commerce, a proBeijing business organization, but his family did not have close connection with the leftist camp. According to an article published in Wen Wei Po in October 1967, Tsang “had not given any thought to how to serve the country and the people when he grew up. He just planned to apply for a place at the University of Hong Kong after graduating from St Paul’s College and then went to the United States.” “Prior to his awakening, Tsang was not concerned with the motherland nor his family . . .

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He categorically turned down his mother’s request to buy daily necessities such as soya sauce for her. He thought doing physical labour was not respectable and only those, like himself, who studied ‘Western books’ were noble.”3 However, Tsang’s sympathy towards the demonstrators from the leftist camp was mounting after the Hong Kong Artificial Flower Works incident in San Po Kwong on May 6, 1967. “After the outbreak of the anti-British and counter-violence movement, I saw a photograph in a newspaper featuring a group of students who expressed solicitude to the workers at the factory. The riot police fired tear gas at them but they were still holding their hands together. I was very impressed by that photo,” he said. Tsang decided to turn his sympathy into action. During the summer of 1967, he met with several classmates who were also sympathetic with the leftists and discussed their action plans. In early September, they hanged a banner featuring the slogan, “Opposing education aiming at enslavement”, opposite St Paul’s College. They mimeographed leaflets at the home of one of his classmates at the end of September. The contents of the leaflets were mainly about “condemning the education aiming at enslavement” and claimed that “colonial education was unreasonable”. They stored 375 copies of the leaflets in their classroom. During lunchtime on September 28, Tsang wore his prefect tie as usual and distributed anti-British leaflets in the classrooms with several classmates. “I put on the prefect tie as usual because I was adamant that what we did was above board and honourable. For me, there was nothing to hide,” he said. The school management reported to the police and summoned all teachers and students to hunt for those who handed out the leaflets. Tsang, who was widely known for his leading role in several student societies, was quickly recognized by junior students because he was wearing his prefect tie. In retrospect, Tsang said that he had no grudge against the Reverend G. L. Speak, the school principal at the time. “The colonial administration had promulgated numerous emergency regulations and the political atmosphere was very tense. The principal would have to bear huge risks if he had not reported us to the police at that time. Of course, it would have prevented the incident from escalating if he had handled the matter with more understanding and tolerance,” Tsang said. The classmates who joined Tsang for distributing the leaflets were not recognized and some went to study abroad later. Tsang was escorted to the police station where he claimed he was beaten by plainclothes policemen, resulting in bruises in his chest. “A teacher from our school witnessed the incident in the police station. But he turned a blind eye to what happened and did not file any complaint to the police. He had no sense of justice at all,” Tsang said. Tsang was subsequently prosecuted for “distributing inflammatory leaflets”. He said that students from the leftist schools who were arrested during the disturbances adhered to the “three-no” policy — they refused to step onto the witness stand, did

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not hire any lawyers and did not reply to charges. The leftist camp did not provide him any support because he did not have close connection with the camp. He opted for defending himself in the court because his family could not afford to hire a lawyer for him. “What I said [in the leaflets] was true and did not constitute any sedition,” Tsang told the court. However, his defence could not change his fate. The judge sentenced him to two years’ imprisonment. He did not reconcile with the judgment, saying that his action was simply aimed at “seeking justice” and was not taken upon instruction by other people. “Some people may not agree with my views but from today’s perspective, what I did in 1967 was just exercising my freedom of expression,” Tsang said. His father did not intercede with the judge who asked him whether he had anything to say before handing down the judgment. His father told the judge that he was “proud of what my son had done”. The two-year imprisonment cost Tsang the opportunity to enter university and the bright future in the years ahead. “My parents were very sad about my imprisonment,” he said. His parents were eager to clinch a place for him at St Paul’s College. His mother spent several days queuing outside the school to lodge application for admission to the college. “My parents wanted to send me to an English school which would ensure that I had a bright future. You have to bear in mind that in those days, you couldn’t apply for a home phone if you did not understand English. Nobody would bother to answer your inquiry if you could not write an English letter,” he said. Tsang’s parents were jubilant when they found his name on the list of students admitted to St Paul’s College. They were heartbroken when Tsang was sentenced to imprisonment. Shortly after he had been jailed in the Stanley Prison, Tsang’s younger sister, Lai-yu, who was studying at Belilious Public School in Tin Hau, was also jailed for taking part in anti-British activities. “My mother was on the brink of collapse after my brother and sister were jailed. She wept over their ordeal at home nearly every day,” said Tsang Yok-sing, Tsang’s elder brother and currently president of the Legislative Council. Tsang Tak-sing, who used to enjoy quiet campus life, faced tough prison life after being locked in the Stanley Prison. He was assigned to the so-called YP cells (the cells for young prisoners) where he stayed with more than 30 young prisoners. “The Independent Commission Against Corruption had not yet been established when I was jailed. The Prisons Department (renamed as the Correctional Services Department in 1982) was very corrupt and there was no protection of the inmates’ rights. Prisoners being beaten up by prison officers was everyday fact of life at that time,” he said, “some inmates were hostile to prisoners from the leftist camp and often beat the leftist in the cells.” He had heard some leftist prison being hit by prison officers in the cell next to his own. Even more than three decades after he was released from the Stanley

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Prison, the shrill cries from neighbouring cells still occasionally resonated in Tsang’s ears. “The sound of fists hitting flesh was very loud but those prisoners did not utter a word. Even after more than 30 years, the sound still rings in my ears,” he said, “many leftists were oppressed by the colonial administration at that time and their basic rights were infringed by the authorities. I find the concept of human rights espoused by Western countries quite ironic.” But he was not beaten by prison officers while serving his sentence, probably because of his schoolboy appearance. “The most dangerous moment was that I was taken by an officer known for his callousness to a quiet corner of the prison. He took me back to the cell after we wandered around for a while. I breathed a sigh of relief when I thought of the episode later,” Tsang said. Tsang, however, was grateful to a few prison officers who risked disciplinary action and passed newspapers to young leftist prisoners. “The officers did so after learning that we were jailed for political reasons,” he said. He recalled that the conditions in the prison were very poor and he was always “in a state of hunger”. “Although the prison management had stipulated how many calories the meals should provide, we never had enough to eat,” he said, “we usually had congee made from red beans for lunch. For dinner, we only had little rice, sweet potato, taro, a salt fish and a piece of pork that was as thin as a piece of tissue. The food was often mixed with hair and rats’ faeces.” Tsang said that he only knew what hunger meant until then. “Sometimes we ate the heads of the salty fish and the fish bones because there was not enough food,” he said. Tsang and several fellow inmates from the leftist camp, who believed in heroism and spirit of self-sacrifice, thought that other prisoners would have more food to eat if they ate less. “Some of us hid when the prison officers handed out meals; five people were sharing the food that was supposed to be eaten by three people. But the practice could only sustain for two or three days because all of us could not bear the hunger.” Apart from persistent hunger, Tsang also found it difficult to keep warm in the prison during the winter. The prisoners were only given undershirts and thin jackets made of cloth in the winter. They had to put the towel for daily use around their neck so as to keep warm. One day, two justices of peace, both Englishmen, inspected the Stanley Prison. Several older prisoners said: “Here come the justices of peace. Any complaint?” “They wore long coats made of cashmere but we sat on the floor and could hardly utter a word, shivering all over with the cold,” he said. Tsang said that he was aggrieved at the scene. “If the two Englishmen had a bit of humanitarian spirit, they should have noted that we were shivering. But they left without say anything. I then had the impression that the justices of peace were hypocritical,” he said. In November 1967, some adult prisoners staged protests at the Stanley Prison. Tsang led a strike that was joined by young prisoners, refusing to do the jobs assigned by the prison management. They were put in solitary confinement for 15

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days. “Solitary confinement was a bitter experience for us. Fortunately, a fellow prisoner had studied navigation skills and imparted messages in the Morse Code to the prisoners in neighbouring cells. We sent ‘telegrams’ using the Morse Code and helped one another to ease the feeling of solitude in those days,” he said. Tsang said that some younger prisoners he met in the Stanley Prison were arrested without knowing what offences they had committed. “Some pupils from the leftist schools were told to go to leftist trade unions to express solicitude to workers. They were seized by the riot police who raided the unions,” he said, “some pupils from the leftist schools were left in mental disorder after leaving the prison and led miserable lives afterwards.” Tsang’s deeds were hailed by the leftist camp as “brave” and “righteous” and the student from the elite school “rising up against” the colonial administrative was of huge propaganda value for the pro-Beijing newspapers. Wen Wei Po said that the process of Tsang’s “awakening” had set an example for “awakening thousands of college students”. “A student hoodwinked by the education aiming at enslavement has finally grown up to be a fighter resisting the violence, after getting nourishment from the great thoughts of Chairman Mao Zedong,” the newspaper said, “ ‘Black prison’ can temper a hero. Our young fighter Tsang Tak-sing is embarking on that path. We have every reason to predict that a more mature and stronger Tsang Tak-sing will appear before us when the day of final victory comes.” Tsang walked free from the Stanley Prison in February 1969. He was greeted by members of the leftist associations and “Youth’s Paradise”, a leftist association responsible for liaising youngsters and students, held a reception party for him. He was offered jobs by Piu Kiu Middle School, where his elder brother Tsang Yok-sing served as a teacher, and New Evening Post (新晚報). During an interview with Tsang, Ng Hon-mun, then principal of Piu Kiu Middle School, made a phone call to Lo Fu, chief editor of New Evening Post. “Lo Fu said he really wanted me to join his newspaper. I then decided to join New Evening Post as a reporter,” Tsang said. He said that he was willing to join the pro-Beijing media because he was inspired by the novels of Lu Xun, one of the greatest writers in modern China, who criticized social evils and backwardness in spiritual civilization in his novels. Tsang quickly became a rising star in the pro-Beijing media. He was subsequently promoted to deputy news editor, news editor and a senior editor. Lo Fu said that Tsang was promoted to key positions quickly because of his competence and the young journalist was subsequently chosen as his own successor. In the early 1980s, Lo was detained in Beijing on charges of espionage. Chiu Chak-lung, the then deputy chief editor of Ta Kung Pao (the sister newspaper of New Evening Post), took up Lo’s vacancy in New Evening Post in 1984. Tsang was asked to join Ta Kung Pao to fill Chiu’s post. Tsang was promoted to chief editor of Ta Kung Pao in 1988.

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He dismissed the notion that his imprisonment during the 1967 disturbances was the reason behind his quick promotion in pro-Beijing newspapers. “If one fails to deliver on his position, he will not be promoted to important position even though he has been imprisoned.” He has been serving as a Hong Kong deputy to the National People’s Congress since his first election in 1988. He was appointed an adviser to the Central Policy Unit in 1998. Tsang missed the opportunity to receive university education due to his distribution of leaflets in 1967 while many of his classmates subsequently rose to eminence; some have become senior officials and prominent academics. Tsang emphasizes that he has no regrets for what he did in 1967. “I have nothing to repent despite losing some time and opportunities. I benefit from what I learnt in the prison all my life. I couldn’t learn those things elsewhere, let alone from books,” he said. He added that he had a reassessment of goals in life and no longer attached great importance to wealth and honour treasured by ordinary people. Tsang learnt the importance of paying respect to the toiling masses after his experience in prison. “When I was studying at secondary school, I believed I was a cut above others because of the influence of elitist education,” he said, “I felt shameful when my mother asked me to go out and buy daily necessities for her. I was also ashamed when my mother took lunch to me while the servants of my classmates delivered the meals in chauffeur-driven cars.” Tsang’s education attainment was the highest among the inmates from the leftist camp, but he was impressed by the selfless spirit of many prisoners of working-class background. “A prisoner who was beaten by the policemen during the disturbances insisted on taking care of other inmates. I was impressed by his comradeship and selflessness,” Tsang said. “My outlook on life had a fundamental change after the 18-month jail [term]. I think the hardship was worth bearing.” Reflecting on the anti-British disturbances in 1967, Tsang insisted that the episode was a righteous resistance by patriotic masses against colonial oppression although certain acts of the masses in the leftist camp were somewhat excessive. “It was stupid for some people from the leftist camp to plant bombs in the streets. Once you planted a bomb in the streets, other people would follow suit,” he said. “Some friends from the leftist camp told me that some bombs were planted by the colonial government in an attempt to put the blame on the leftist camp.” “Certain actions by some members of the leftist camp were obviously too drastic because many participants did not have any experience,” he said. However, he was adamant that the actions taken by the leftist camp were by and large correct. “I won’t deny that some actions were stupid, unreasonable and too drastic. But you have to bear in mind that so many people took part in the movement. It was a legitimate resistance against colonial oppression and I think history should arrive at such a judgment,” Tsang said. Tsang was able to assess the 1967 riots rationally despite his ordeal in the Stanley Prison. He agreed that the masses in the leftist camp became out of control

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due to the Cultural Revolution in the mainland. “It contravened Premier Zhou Enlai’s pragmatic policy towards Hong Kong, which was to take a long view and make full use of Hong Kong’s strategic positions,” Tsang said. “The intention of some leftists to overthrow the rule of the colonial government was a very stupid idea.” However, Tsang disagreed with the mainstream society’s labelling the incident as an “ultra-left” uprising. “In Guangzhou, there is the Yellow Flower Cemetery where 72 martyrs of the revolution led by Dr Sun Yat-sen were buried. That uprising proved to be premature and they were defeated and slaughtered,” Tsang said. “In a sense that it failed, that uprising could be termed ‘ultra-left’ on the part of the Manchu leadership. But does it in any sense deny the honour that we bestow on the 72 martyrs?” Asked whether leaders of the leftist organizations should apologize for the damages resulted from the 1967 riots, Tsang said that many Hong Kong patriots were killed, beaten and imprisoned during the disturbances. “Has anyone apologized to us?” He stressed that the social evils in the 1960s were the major reasons leading to the disturbances. “Why were so many people involved in the incident? It was because the colonial rule was high-handed and the Star Ferry riots spoke volumes for the high-handedness of the government,” he said. Tsang surprised many people in June 2007 when he was appointed by Chief Executive Donald Tsang Yam-kuen as secretary for home affairs. He said he was adamant that his deeds during his adolescence would have no impact on his discharging of duty as home affairs secretary. He raised some eyebrows when he delivered a tirade on former chief secretary Anson Chan Fang On-sang during a Legco motion debate on social enterprises in December 2007. Tsang accused Anson Chan, who was elected a legislator in early December 2007, of being a “sudden democrat” who “suddenly cares about people’s livelihood”. With reference to her election promises of addressing the widening wealth gap, Mrs Chan said that the government should have done more to help people to help themselves. “Democracy and people’s livelihood cannot be separated and without democracy, there would not be justice and underprivileged groups would not receive the care they should get,” she said, adding that she had seen the difficulties faced by these groups on her campaign trail. But Mr Tsang launched an attack on Chan when he spoke on behalf of the government. “She said she discovered about the difficulties faced by the members of public during her campaign. So apart from being suddenly democratic, she also suddenly cares for people’s livelihood,” Mr Tsang said. Pointing out that Mrs Chan was in charge of economic and social welfare when she was in the British colonial government, Tsang said: “Our new legislator today is a former official . . . Unless she believes that colonial rule was democracy, I don’t know whether she has worked for people’s livelihood or officials’ livelihood.”

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Tsang Yok-sing: The winding road from the University of Hong Kong to the pro-Beijing camp In the summer of 1969, Tsang Yok-sing had been accepted by four prominent universities in the United States as he had plans to further his studies abroad. However, Tsang gave up his original plan due to the injustices suffered by his siblings during the 1967 riots and revolutionary fervour that was sweeping across the world at the time. The young man who graduated from the University of Hong Kong with first class honours a year earlier made a bold decision and joined the pro-Beijing camp. Like his younger brother Tak-sing, Tsang’s destiny was rewritten by the political upheavals in 1967. Tsang’s identification with the mainland had its roots during the years when he studied at St Paul’s College in the Mid-Levels. Run by Sheng Kung Hui, or the Hong Kong Anglican Church, the school was known for its anti-communist tradition. Tsang recalled that in the 1960s, many teachers in the school graduated from mainland universities before 1949 and fled communist rule by moving to Hong Kong. “They were very critical of the communist regime in China and often talked about the ‘dark side’ of the communist rule,” he said. But Tsang, whose father was a secretary at the Hong Kong Chinese General Chamber of Commerce, learnt about “Red China” in a different way. His father used to bring home a copy of Wen Wei Po after work every day and Tsang read the pro-Beijing newspaper carefully. “I learned about the scientific achievements and big projects in the mainland, which marked a stark contrast to what I had been told by my teachers,” he said. Tsang began to develop patriotic fervour towards the country and worshipped Qian Xueshen (錢學森), a renowned scientist who returned to the mainland from the US in the 1950s. After graduating from St Paul’s College in 1965, Tsang studied in the Department of Mathematics at the University of Hong Kong. In June 1966, he and his mother went on a sightseeing tour to his birthplace, Guangzhou. “At the time, it was politically sensitive for Hong Kong people to travel to the mainland. We went to Guangzhou via Macau so as not to leave any record of our trip to the mainland,” he said. The trip proved to be a turning point in his thinking as Tsang was very impressed by what he witnessed in Guangzhou. “The mainlanders led a simple and thrifty life and the social order was very good. Although the standard of living was quite low, the young people there had high ideals and pinned high hopes for the future of the country,” he said, “at least, it was not the same as what I had heard during my secondary school and university years.” Tsang has proclaimed himself a Marxist before the outbreak of the riots and joined like-minded classmates in studying the works of Karl Marx and Mao Zedong. He said that the majority of students at the University of Hong Kong at the time supported the colonial administration and had negative views on the communist regime in China. “That’s why I particularly treasured those classmates who shared similar views,” he said.

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Tsang, who was in his second year at the University of Hong Kong, had followed the industrial dispute at the Hong Kong Artificial Flower Works closely since the incident erupted in April 1967. “I was angry with the riot police’s suppression of the workers on May 6. I followed the relevant news reports and was often absent from classes,” he said. He regarded the incident as workers’ resistance to oppression by the capitalists and a righteous act against the “tyranny of the colonial government”. Tsang also joined several university students in making donations to the leftist unions through Wen Wei Po. In May and June, he used to stroll around Central which was the hot spot for marches and processions organized by leftist protesters. He joined two of the marches and his picture was published on the front page of English-language Star the following day. His father, Tsang Chiu-kan, spotted Tsang’s photo at the newsstand when he got off work that day. He rushed back home after purchasing a copy of the newspaper. “Too bad! The newspaper captured a photo of you!” Tsang felt isolated as his views on the 1967 riots were in stark contrast to those held by his classmates. The journal published by the student union of the University of Hong Kong, Undergrad, was critical of the riots at the time. Tsang, who had served as a freelance reporter of Undergrad, joined other like-minded fellow students in founding a publication called New HKU. He said at that time that majority of the students at the university sided with the colonial administration. “I lived in the dormitory in my university years and the other students living in the same hall used to watch evening news in the common room after dinner. As the confrontation of colonial administration and the leftist camp escalated, the shots of procession and protesters throwing stones dominated TV screen,” he said. “I often quarrelled with my classmates while watching the news broadcast. Some were some saying, ‘Why did you always leap to the defence of the leftists?’” Tsang said. “Afterwards, whenever I walked to the common room, my fellow students who were chatting with one another stopped talking abruptly and went away one by one. I felt snubbed by them.” The publication of two articles written by Tsang in Undergrad during the 1967 disturbances also caused a stir on the campus. “The articles were about Marxist theory, socialism, my views on the capitalists who were exploiting workers and my understanding of Marxism. After the publication of the articles, some classmates warned me to be ‘more cautious’ in the future and ‘never write such articles again’.” Tsang regarded those incidents as purely normal debates among classmates who held different views. However, he began to feel the heat after his younger brother, Tsang Tak-sing, was arrested for distributing “inflammatory leaflets” at St Paul’s College. “Most of my classmates saw me as a ‘dangerous person’ and were unwilling to maintain contact with me. They intentionally distanced themselves from me and avoided me once they spotted me,” Tsang Yok-sing said.

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He insisted that his brother was persecuted by the colonial government and his family decided not to hire a lawyer to represent Tsang Tak-sing as a gesture of “showing contempt for the colonial court”. Tsang’s young sister, Tsang Lai-yu, were subsequently jailed for one month for taking part in anti-British activities. “She was only 15 at the time and had caused no harm to anybody. But the colonial government locked her up behind bars. How can you preach human rights to me?” he said. Tsang still remembers that his mother cried every day after his brother and sister were convicted. Speculation was rife in May and June in 1967 that PLA gunboats would enter Hong Kong waters, fuelling the apprehension about Hong Kong’s future. “At that time I hoped the motherland would liberate Hong Kong,” he said. However, the disturbances subsided in early 1968 and Tsang believed that Beijing did not want any more trouble in Hong Kong. “I was very disappointed about it. The biggest displeasure was that I had to return to the university to sit the graduation examination. I had lost my interest in studies since the second half of 1967 and was absent from class most of the time. I suddenly found in early 1968 that there were only two or three months to go before the graduation examination came. My only choice was to concentrate on my studies again,” he said. Tsang heaved a sigh of relief when he graduated with first class honours in the summer of 1968. In the 1960s, it was a usual practice for graduates from the Department of Mathematics who planned to study overseas to serve as tutors in the department for a year before they went abroad. Tsang and three other first class honours graduates applied for the post shortly after their graduation. “The three classmates were offered the job very soon but I received no response from the department. It was really strange,” he said. When Tsang was baffled about his future, Wong Yung-chow, a professor in the Department of Mathematics, had an hour-long chat with him. “It is the golden period for pursuing academic research when you are young. It is something that you will still be able to do after you have completed your studies. It will be very difficult to resume your studies if you quit now,” the professor said. While Tsang was grateful for Professor Wong’s goodwill, Tsang replied, “I see your point. But you can’t set your mind at ease and hide yourself behind academic research if you find what happens around you is unfair.” Tsang was eventually hired by the department as a tutor. A lecturer told him afterwards that Professor Wong strongly recommended him for the post. “The university’s vice-chancellor warned the head of the Mathematics Department that I was a ‘troublemaker’. Professor Wong leaped to my defence before the vicechancellor, saying that there was no evidence showing that I have caused any trouble. He also praised me as a righteous person with good performance and stressed that he saw no reason to reject my application.” In a rare move, the department summoned all academic and administrative staff for a meeting to discuss whether Tsang should be offered the post. After a lengthy

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discussion, they gave him the green light. That lecturer also mentioned that there was a rumour circulating during the riots that a bomb, with Tsang’s photo placed next to it, was found on the university campus. Tsang burst into laughter when he heard about the rumour. “If it was really me who had planted the bomb, would I be so stupid as to put my own photo beside it?” Tsang came to the crossroads of his life in the summer of 1968 when four prominent universities in the United States accepted him for further studies. However, he declined the offers because he had hoped to work in the mainland. Another reason was the revolutionary fervour that was sweeping across the world at the time. There were widespread campaigns against the Vietnam War on US university campuses; protests and student strikes became a part of everyday life. Tsang also felt restless in such an atmosphere and asked himself if it was wise to go to the US. In retrospect, Tsang regretted his decision to forgo the opportunity to pursue an academic career. “As Professor Wong told me, it’s not that easy to pick up the books again if you abandon your studies when you are young. When I heard about the academic achievements of some of my classmates, I couldn’t help but think that I might be able to achieve something if I had continued my studies at that time,” he said. Tsang left the University of Hong Kong in 1969 in the hope of seeking a job in the mainland. But it was no easy task as the mainland was haunted by the Cultural Revolution. After he had tried in vain through various channels, Cheng Kai-ming, who graduated from the Department of Mathematics at the University of Hong Kong several years before Tsang did, suggested to Tsang that he might consider teaching at pro-Beijing Pui Kiu Middle School in North Point because it would be conducive to realizing his dream of working in the mainland. “Cheng said Pui Kiu has good connections with the mainland and I might be able to find work in the mainland after teaching at the school for a certain period,” Tsang said. Tsang then joined Pui Kiu although he did not intend to stay long. In the end, he spent nearly 30 years in the school and took up the post of principal in the mid1980s. Ma Lik, the late chairman of the Democratic Alliance for the Betterment and Progress of Hong Kong, was one of the thousands of students whom Tsang nurtured during his three-decade teaching career. In the 1960s, there were only a selected few number of university graduates. Tsang could have easily got a lucrative job in the government or the business sector. His choice meant that he only earned $600 a month at Pui Kiu, and he was earning $1,466 as a tutor in the University of Hong Kong. Tsang found out later that his salary at Pui Kiu was even higher than that of the school principal, Ng Hon-mun. Tsang was one of the first graduates of the University of Hong Kong who joined the leftist schools in Hong Kong. His move was particularly shocking in the sensitive period after the 1967 riots and raised many eyebrows in the higher education sector. Undergrad reported Tsang’s decision to join the leftist camp, sparking the controversy over whether there were “undercover communists” lurking

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on the university campus. Some former colleagues in the Department of Mathematics even speculated that he was bought off by the leftist camp. A lecturer who was at loggerheads with Tsang over the riots dismissed his colleagues’ speculation as “bullshit” and insisted that Tsang was not the kind of person who resorted to extremist means. As he was recollecting the disturbances in 1967, Tsang attributed the incident to social discontent and the impact of the Cultural Revolution. But he maintained that social discontent was the major cause of the riots. He said that the labour dispute in San Po Kong turned into a conflict between the colonial government and the leftist camp. “The society was seriously polarized. The leftist camp and the mainstream society held divergent views on the disturbances,” he said. “Most of the participants in the riots came from the leftist camp and few members of the public outside the leftist camp were sympathetic with the protesters from the leftist organizations.” Tsang admitted that there was some extremist behaviour among protesters from the leftist camp due to the ultra-leftist thoughts arising from the Cultural Revolution. While noting that the general strike and the food strike staged by the leftist camp in 1967 were condemned by mainstream society, Tsang said that workers from the leftist camp had no alternative but to fight against the colonial administration. He did, however, concede that the bomb attacks were “definitely wrong”. “There were people within the leftist camp who resisted these excessive acts at that time. Ng Hon-mun [principal of Pui Kiu Middle School] had voiced opposition,” he said. But he believed that those people who were sympathetic with the leftist camp would not be disgusted with the leftists simply because of the bomb attacks. The colonial administration claimed that the leftist camp used mercurochrome and bandages to manufacture the “illusion of bloody suppression” in the Garden Road incident on May 22. Tsang dismissed the claim, saying that he would never believe the “propaganda” of the colonial government. “Even if the leftists brought mercurochrome and bandages, they just did so for dressing wounds in case they were injured,” he said. Tsang recalled that one of his fellow students in the Department of Engineering at the University of Hong Kong was beaten up by the riot police when he was watching a protest staged by the leftist workers in Western District Pier. “His head was broken and bleeding when the riot police dispersed the crowd,” Tsang said. “After I joined Pui Kiu Middle School, I learned that some teenage students had been arrested and jailed during the riots and a teacher had his eyes bruised after being jailed for several months.” He said that it was not easy to discern right and wrong in the 1967 riots. “Can you say my younger brother was right or wrong for what he did at that time? I don’t think he was instigated by other people. He should have taken action because he could not put up with what the colonial government did and took action out of

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‘righteous indignation’. . . . You shouldn’t forget that many people lost their family members in the riots or witnessed a U-turn in their lives. My siblings excelled in academics and would certainly have gone to university if they had not fallen into trouble in 1967. Many of my sister’s classmates in Belilios Public School have promoted to top positions in the government. But if compared to what had happened to other people in the leftist camp, what we went through is no big deal. At least we did not have to go hungry. But some people broke their arms while others were jailed during their secondary school years and failed to catch up with their studies after they were released,” he said. Tsang was aware of the fact that many people were disgusted with the “thugs” after watching television coverage of innocent people injured by bomb attacks during the riots. “But for the participants from the leftist camp, the memory of being beaten up by the riot police remains. It’s inevitable that they became emotional when talking about the riots because it is different from telling other people’s stories. I still recall that my mother burst into tears shortly after my siblings were arrested,” he said. Some graduates from the University of Hong Kong and the Chinese University of Hong Kong joined the leftist newspapers, schools and banks after the campaign to defend China’s sovereignty over Diaoyu Islands in the early 1970s. Nearly 10 university graduates followed Tsang’s footsteps and joined Piu Kiu Middle School between 1972 and 1974. But the ideals of these young university graduates shattered after the downfall of the “Gang of Four” in 1976 and they quit the leftist camp gradually. “After Deng Xiaoping’s pragmatic approach became the governing philosophy, people in the leftist camp no longer stuck to ideology and the mentality of the leftist camp of confronting the mainstream society gradually subsided. Many people in our camp could not help but ask themselves why they were still in the leftist organizations and why they did not start a new life,” Tsang said. Tsang also began to question his own beliefs after the downfall of the “Gang of Four” but he decided to stay at Piu Kiu. “I am the kind of person who is able to adapt myself to different circumstances and I was on good terms with my colleagues, so I was happy with the status quo. At that time, I had been promoted to a managerial position and the school was having financial difficulties and problems in recruiting students. I think it would be irresponsible for me to walk away at that time,” he said. Given his good academic achievements, Tsang has become a high-flyer within the leftist camp in the past two decades. He was appointed a member of the Basic Law Consultative Committee in 1985 and founded the Democratic Alliance for the Betterment of Hong Kong in 1992. He has been an elected legislator since 1998 and was appointed an executive councillor in 2002. He was subsequently elected president of the Legislative Council in October 2008.

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Wu Tai-chow: The man who took part in writing history Wu Tai-chow, now a journalist-turned-businessman, is a man who took part in writing the most controversial chapter in Hong Kong history. The arrest of Wu and another four people during the 1967 riots for printing “seditious articles” eventually led to the arson attack on the office of British chargé d’affaires in August 1967. Wu was only a disinterested observer in the labour dispute at Hong Kong Artificial Flower Works when the standoff between workers and management broke out in April 1967. However, he changed his mind after the riot police cracked down on the workers. “In the past, the Hong Kong government used to assign labour officials to mediate the dispute and did not dispatch the riot police. The government was obviously biased in favour of the management of the Artificial Flower Works,” he said. Wu said that workers’ rights were not protected by the laws and the government used to side with the business community. “The workers at the Artificial Flower Works did not take on the policemen. The police could charge the workers for obstructing the roads or even locked them up in jail but they should not use force. Besides, the workers did not take on the policemen. The leftist unions’ visit to the factory to send appreciation to the workers did not constitute a pretext for the police to crack down on the workers,” he said. “I did not take side during the initial stage of the dispute but I was disgusted with the Hong Kong government after the police’s suppression on May 6,” he said. “After I was detained in August 1967, I heard from my fellow prisoners that some people within the police force were bribed by the factory. That was why the riot police intervened with the dispute,” Wu added. While the All-Circles Anti-Persecution Struggle Committee claimed that the incident was a “premeditated conspiracy” by the colonial government, Wu believed that the decision was not made by the top echelon of the government. Starting from May 16, 1967, thousands of students, workers and staff from leftist organizations marched to the Government House and posted big-character posters on the walls of the colonial mansion. “I was disturbed by the situation. I disagreed with the leftists laying siege to the Government House day after day. Like it or not, the governor was the symbol of British rule in Hong Kong. It was unwise for the leftist camp to mobilize workers and students to besiege the Government House. It would cause huge causalities if the colonial government took a heavy hand,” Wu said. On May 19, Wu went to the office of Wen Wei Po to meet chief editor Kam Yiu-yu and told him that he saw lots of riot policemen and undercover hiding in the groves near the Government House. “Mr Kam, I think David Trench is about to take action as he has tolerated the protests outside the Government House for four to five days. I am afraid he has exhausted his patience. Shouldn’t you consider a tactical withdrawal? We can claim victory and pause for a while because the government dare not take action for such

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a long time. You should halt the protests outside the Government House unless you intend to overthrow the British rule. But there is no need to organize such protests if you really want to topple the colonial government,” he told Kam. Kam agreed with Wu’s views and shared his anxiety. “Kam promised to convey my views when he attended meetings at Xinhua’s Hong Kong branch and asked Xinhua director Liang Weilin to consider my opinions,” Wu recalled. Kam, who condemned Beijing’s crackdown on the pro-democracy movement in 1989, died in 2005 in the United States. Kam was, however, criticized for holding “right-deviationist thinking” when he mentioned Wu’s opinions at the meeting held at the office of Xinhua’s Hong Kong branch. The protests outside the Government House escalated and the situation developed as Wu expected. On May 22, the riot policemen fired tear gas at the crowd outside the Government House and arrested hundreds of people from the leftist organizations. The police declared curfew that night. Hong Kong Disturbances 1967, the colonial government’s confidential report on the 1967 riots, criticized the left-wingers for bringing mercurochrome and bandages to outside the Government House to dramatize the event as a “bloody crackdown”. Wu dismissed the accusation of “play-acting” as an “absurd accusation” levelled by the Hong Kong government. “I recognized many people who were beaten by the police in the incident. They were simple and honest people and I can hardly believe they engaged in play-acting,” he said. Full-scale confrontation between the leftist camp and the colonial government was imminent following the Garden Road incident on May 22. Wu knew well what was meant by the dichotomy between “friends or foes”. “The government sent a copy of advertisement entitled ‘Preserving stability and prosperity’ to all newspapers, including Wen Wei Po and Ta Kung Pao. The publication of the advertisement was tantamount to expressing support for the government and the newspapers concerned could get advertising rates from the government. On the contrary, those newspapers that declined to publish the advert were seen as supporters of the leftist camps. The government tried to force us to take sides between the government and the leftist camp,” he said. Caught between the dilemma, Wu finally decided to adhere to the “standpoint of the Chinese” and refused to publish the advertisement. “I saw no point in publishing the advert. I couldn’t imagine calling Kam Yiu-yu and tell him I was going to publish this advert. It was too bad,” he said, “it was impossible to stay neutral in such a polarized situation.” Wu’s tie with the leftist camp originated in the 1950s when he served as a translator and editor at Ching Po Daily News, a pro-Beijing newspaper in Hong Kong. After working for the newspaper for five years, Wu and Mak Wai-ming, an editor of New Evening Post founded Hong Kong People’s Daily but the paper folded six months later. In 1961, the pair founded another newspaper, Hong Kong Evening News, and it proved to be a success. Its circulation hit 10,000 shortly after

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its inception and became a popular newspaper for its reports on some prominent crime stories. “Although I started my journalistic career in pro-Beijing newspaper, I just saw it as a job and profit-making was my primary motive,” Wu said. “I was on good terms with Kam Yiu-yu and Lo Fu (then deputy editor of Ta Kung Pao). I leaned towards the People’s Republic of China but I was not a core member of the pro-Beijing media.” Wu was aggrieved with the colonial government after learning that the leftist protesters were beaten by the police. His commentaries were increasingly critical and unavoidably irritated the government. In a commentary published in Hong Kong Evening News on June 23, Wu wrote that “the owner of Ming Pao Louis Cha Leung-yung became a traitor and betrayed his own country but the workers at the newspaper’s printing section were outstanding offspring of the Chinese people. They staged revolt at the heart of the enemies and established the Struggle Committee within Ming Pao and published an announcement in the newspaper calling on fellow journalists to revolt against the colonial government. Compatriots! There are few traitors and running dogs but there are countless revolutionary masses. The revolt staged by the workers at Ming Pao’s printing section is just a beginning.” Wu called on the Hong Kong people to “topple the evil British imperialism and bury its reactionary and corrupt rule. New hostilities are added up to old rancours, compatriots, we wipe off our tears, rise up together, tear down the most evil British imperialists and bury the rotten and reactionary rule.” On June 15, Afternoon News, where Wu was the president, reported the establishment of the anti-struggle committee by residents in Wong Tai Sin. “The Wong Tai Sin Kaifong’s Anti-British Persecution Struggle Committee was set up today. The kaifongs said resolutely that they would engage in the fight against the colonial government and would carry the anti-persecution fight to the end and completely smash the colonial rule. The kaifongs will run to the frontline once the motherland gives the command.” The newspaper also published the statement of the Wong Tai Sin Anti-Struggle Committee. “For over a month the Hong Kong-British imperialists have been brandishing their butcher knives before we kaifongs. We must defend ourselves immediately and take action to strike this Hong Kong paper tiger,” the statement said. The statement warned the “yellow-skinned dogs” (policemen of Chinese descent) and “white-skinned pigs” (expatriate policemen) that the kaifongs would smash their “dog heads” if they dared to carry out further suppressions. In an open letter to Governor David Trench published in Hong Kong Evening News in June 1967, Wu said that the Hong Kong people were not scared of suppression by the government and he called on the governor not to “go too far”. “I heard that David Trench was very annoyed after reading it. Apart from the leftists, nobody in Hong Kong dared to openly challenge the governor,” Wu said. However, his arrest was triggered by a report by the Hong Kong Evening News on June 23, 1967. A reporter from the newspaper learned from sources in the marine

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police vessels that a fleet of People’s Liberation Army gunboats appeared in the waters opposite to Castle Peak Bay and had taken up a position off the Brothers Islands. Wu phoned Kam Yiu-yu for confirmation and Kam instantly called Qi Feng, deputy director of the Hong Kong branch of the NCNA. “Qi said over the phone that it was good news. It was nothing strange that our South Sea Fleet stayed alert and was prepared for fighting. It’s a great encouragement for the Hong Kong compatriots and a support for the anti-British struggle,” Wu said. “Qi said that it was not possible to verify the incident. He thought Hong Kong Evening News was different from Wen Wei Po and Ta Kung Pao. Hong Kong Evening News could report the information we heard, including something not 100 per cent confirmed,” Wu said, “Qi said that it was no big deal even though it was a rumour because it was encouraging for Hong Kong compatriots. I decided to run the story after Kam passed on Qi’s messages to me.” The headline of “PLA gunboats suddenly appeared near Castle Peak Bay and drove towards Hong Kong waters” dominated the front page of Hong Kong Evening News which hit the newsstands at 3 p.m. that day. He heard that nearly 70,000 copies of the first edition were out of stock soon and about 60,000 copies of the second edition were sold. The circulation of the newspaper skyrocketed since and reached 100,000 copies during the height of the disturbances, second only to Sing Tao Evening News which closed in 1995. However, Wu had to pay a heavy price for this short-lived success. Wu was aware that the atmosphere became tense ahead of his arrest and Kam Yiu-yu had advised him to go underground for a while. But Wu rejected Kam’s goodwill, saying that he had to “show commitment to the Chinese people”. “You don’t have to worry about me. I take part in the anti-British struggle not because of the orders of the Communist Party. Instead, I do so because I am a son of the Chinese nation. You communists have no power to tell me to withdraw from the frontline. I would not cause any ignominy to the Chinese nation if I was arrested.” At 4:35 a.m. on August 9, 1967, six helmeted plainclothes policemen and two senior British police officers arrived at Wu’s flat and knocked on the door. Without waiting for Wu’s family to open the door, the armed policemen beat the door and broke into the flat and pointed their guns towards Wu and his family. The police officers urged Wu to put on his clothes and left with them. The British officers ordered Wu to sign on the warning letter issued by the police but he wrote down “Protest” on the paper. Poon Wai-wai, proprietor and editor of Tin Fung Yat Po, publisher Chan Yim-kuen, Nan Cheong Printing Company president Li Siu-hung, and manager Chak Nuen-fai were also arrested in the small hours of that day. Wu and the other four were charged on August 10 in connection with counts such as sedition and “attempting to cause disaffection among members of the Hong Kong Police Force”. On August 17, the publication of Hong Kong Evening News, Afternoon News and Tin Fung Yat Pao were ordered to be suspended. .

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The decision, which was made before the trial began, sparked strong protests from pro-Beijing newspapers. Ta Kung Pao’s editorial questioned why the publication of the three newspapers was suspended before Wu and the other three defendants were tried. “What sort of ‘law’ and ‘rule of law’ is it? What sort of ‘press freedom’ is it? How can the colonial government close all patriotic newspapers and arrest all patriotic journalists?”4 The All-China Journalists Association, the People’s Daily and Xinhua News Agency issued a joint statement, calling on the Hong Kong government to release Wu and the other defendants immediately. Otherwise, the Hong Kong government had to bear all the consequences and would “eventually get the taste of the iron fist of the Chinese people”. About 100,000 militia soldiers took part in a parade organized by the Guangzhou military region, urging the Hong Kong government to release Wu and the other four defendants. Even Wu himself could not have imagined that the “serious consequences” were the Red Guards’ arson attack on the office of the British chargé d’affaires in Beijing. The Department of Western European Affairs of the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs summoned British chargé d’affaires Donald Hopson on the night of August 20. The ministry presented Hopson a note which lodged the “most urgent and strongest protest” against the arrest of Wu and others by the Hong Kong British authorities. The note demanded that the British Government quash the order of suspending the publication of the three newspapers within 48 hours and release 34 staff of the three newspapers. Wu was transferred to Victoria Prison in Central after his arrest and the trial started in Central Magistracy on August 21. The charges against Wu and the others included sedition, “attempting to cause disaffection among members of the Hong Kong Police Force”, “publication of writing calculated to induce persons to commit an offence”, “aiding and abetting the printing of seditious articles” and distribution of false information. Chak Nuen-fai recalled that they were charged with 99 counts and it took the court three and a half days to read out all the charges. Wu was charged with 21 counts, including publication of false news, seditious articles and writing calculated to induce persons to commit an offence in Hong Kong Evening News and Afternoon News. The Afternoon News report on June 25 about the establishment of Wong Tai Sin Kaifong’s Struggle Committee and the publication of the committee’s statement was also run in other pro-Beijing newspapers. It appeared that Afternoon News’ handling was no more seditious than other pro-Beijing newspapers. On June 23, Afternoon News published the notice issued by the Struggle Committee which urged the government to return the bodies of three “martyrs”, the leftists who was killed during police’s raids on leftist premises. The publication of the notice, which was run in other pro-Beijing newspapers, was labelled as “seditious article” which “affected public opinion”.

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Hong Kong Evening News’s report on August 2 about a group of men stormed into Tsz Wan Shan resettlement office also constituted a charge against Wu. According to the report, 10 men smashed the windows in the office and left after placing two bombs. One exploded afterwards. The report said that “the ten men did a good job and all of them withdrew safely. The residents in the Tsz Wan Shan resettlement area were gratified by their deeds and their heroics were eulogized everywhere. The policemen rushed to the site after the explosion and illegally arrested a 13-year-old boy who was only a bystander and the kaifongs were aggrieved by the move.” The authorities said that the report had caused “fear and frustration” and became one of the charges against Wu. A commentary published in Hong Kong Evening News on July 5 contended that the “white-skinned pigs” (expatriate police officers) would soon be buried in the “sea of masses”. “Those expatriate police officers have become public enemy No. 1 and everybody wants to beat them. They have exposed the brutal nature of imperialism. Even some policemen of Chinese descent have gradually recognized the brutality of the expatriate police officers.” The commentary originated from a false alarm at a Hong Kong and Shanghai Bank branch in Lai Chi Kok on July 4. Policemen arrived at the site after the alarm went off and riot policemen were sent there after some passers-by gathered nearby. According to the report by Hong Kong Evening News, a number of expatriate officers “fired several shots aimlessly at a department store that sells mainland products and some passers-by fell to the ground after being shot”. The commentary said that since the Victorian era, the British had never treated Hong Kong Chinese as human beings. “Once they have guns in their hands, they shoot and kill indiscriminately,” the commentary wrote. Citing quotations from Mao Zedong, the commentary compared the government to a tiger and the only option was either killing it or being eaten by it. “Now we should hit back those who have launched attacks on us,” the commentary said. To the Hong Kong government, the commentary naturally amounted to a “seditious article”. Wu later retorted during the hearing that it was a persecution against the “patriotic journalists”, questioning why citations of Mao’s quotes amounted to an offence. In an editorial published on July 25, Afternoon News called on ethnic Chinese police officers to disobey orders and “turn their guns” at the colonial government. “For the ethnic Chinese police officers, you can clearly find that you are always sent to the forefront of the conflict [with the leftists] but the Commissioner of Police charged three Chinese police officers who were involved in the deaths of leftist demonstrators. Some of you have done something wrong but it does not matter. The motherland and the Chinese people welcome all your patriotic acts. [Chinese police officers] should be disillusioned and stand firm on the stance of the Chinese people,” the editorial said.

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The editorial wrote that although the police and British army joined force in raid operations of several leftist premises, the army’s involvement was to ensure that the army watched the police. “The Hong Kong British authorities do not want you to be a Chinese and do not allow you to love your country. They just want you to be the scapegoats. You should comply in public but disobey in private, leak intelligence [to the leftists] and avoid making arrests [of the leftists]. Bear in the mind your hatred against the British and turn your gun at the British once you have the opportunity to do so. Then we would welcome you and this would be your only way out,” the editorial wrote. The Hong Kong government said that the editorial was “attempting to cause disaffection among members of the police force” and was listed as one of the charges against Wu. There were grounds for the dissatisfaction of the Hong Kong government about the publication of allegedly seditious and inflammatory articles in Wu’s newspapers. The government had noted since early June that there was an antigovernment campaign which aimed at causing disaffection among the police force. In a telegram to the Commonwealth Office on June 9, Governor David Trench wrote that a sustained anti-government propaganda campaign reached its height on June 8 when articles appeared in local pro-Beijing press calling on civil servants to rebel and alleging that anti-suppression groups had been formed within the police force. “A new facet of the campaign to disaffect the police force has appeared, this time by dissemination of printed pamphlets containing an appeal allegedly from police officers who have ‘turned their guns’. These documents, which have been addressed to formations within the police force, call upon Chinese officers to turn against their ‘British leaders’,” Trench wrote.5 In retrospect, Wu admitted that his articles did constitute sedition during Hong Kong’s worst political upheaval. However, he said that he was prosecuted just because his papers were not run by the Chinese government. “My newspapers were not communist-funded newspapers and our commentaries and reports at that time were no more seditious and radical than those published in Wen Wei Po and Ta Kung Pao. I am afraid they were 10 times more seditious than those published in our newspapers,” he said. “The colonial government did not dare to take action against Wen Wei Po and Ta Kung Pao and we became the scapegoats,” said Wu, who is currently a consultant to a power generation firm. Wu said that sympathizers of the leftists, like Poon Wai-wai, Chak Nuen-fai and himself, were primary targets of the suppression by the colonial government. “It did not dare to take action against genuine communists and did not arrest Kam Yiu-yu and Fei Yiming [publisher of Ta Kung Pao],” Wu said. “The colonial government was so clever that they arrested ordinary citizens who joined the demonstrations staged by the leftists in an attempt to prevent the number of leftists from growing further.” Citing the circulation of Hong Kong Evening News and Afternoon News during the riots was 60,000 and 40,000 respectively, he said that the two newspapers had some influence in the society and appeal to a certain number of readers.

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He admitted that the reporter of Hong Kong Evening News had made a mistake in the report about the PLA gunboat appearing off the waters of the Brothers Islands. “The government later admitted that HMS Bulwark, British navy’s light fleet aircraft carrier, arrived in Hong Kong in early June 1967 and PLA gunboats sailed to the waters close to Hong Kong to monitor Bulwark. It showed that our report was not totally groundless,” he said. Wu was dissatisfied with the court’s failure to study whether the relevant report was accurate. “The court didn’t summon our reporter who wrote that report to explain how he got the story. The court should have allowed us to summon that reporter to give testimony and pointed out the source of the information. However, there is no such thing as fairness in turbulent times,” he said. He claimed that he was beaten by the police during interrogation. “I think the police wanted to teach me a lesson before the trial so that I wouldn’t be so aggressive during my self-defence in court,” he said. The government prosecutor pointed out the fact that Wu had been convicted twice for publishing obscene articles in an attempt to ruin Wu’s reputation. Some independent newspapers ridiculed Hong Kong Evening News as a paper which focused on pornographic novels and made money from publishing advertisements from brothels. Wu admitted that Hong Kong Evening News had published pornographic novels but it did not match some newspapers in recent years. He said that the prosecutor’s mention of that only aimed at smearing his image. He was, however, really scared when an ethnic Chinese police officer threatened to shoot him in his back during the trial. “He told me, ‘Wu Tai-chow, I know you are an important figure in the leftist camp. But I have the gut to push you from the [police] van and shoot you in the back. I would tell other people you are trying to escape.’ Although I knew he was only making a threat, his words sent cold shivers down my spine. Who knows whether he would take the law in his hands and fire a shot in my leg,” Wu said. “Sometimes the world is not as beautiful as people imagine.” Wu gave tit for tat against the magistrate after the hearing started at the Central Magistrates’ Court on August 21. Ta Kung Pao even described that Wu turned the Central Magistrates’ Court into a “forum where he protested against the Hong Kong British fascist authorities’ persecution of patriotic journalists” and exposed the “facade of press freedom and freedom of expression”. Wu said during his selfdefence that he was dissatisfied with the British police officers who fired shots in the incident in Lai Chi Kok. “I disliked the fact that they denied they had done so. They covered up what they did, claiming they just fired the shots in the sky,” Wu said. When he talked about the commentary published on June 23, he said scores of Chinese were shot dead by British troops in 1924 and the British had not changed their attitude towards the Chinese. Wu also criticized that the “British imperialists” had not treated the Hong Kong people well in the past hundred years. The magistrate

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regarded that comments such as “new hostilities are added up to old rancours, compatriots, we wipe off our tears, rise up together, tear down the most evil British imperialists and bury the rotten and reactionary rule” constituted sedition. “I have the absolute freedom to write such comments in terms of press freedom and freedom of expression. I believe people in all democratic countries enjoy such freedom,” Wu said during the hearing. “It is a very serious matter to close down a newspaper and it’s also unprecedented to prosecute journalists. Was there any newspaper closed down in Britain in the past two centuries? Many Hong Kong people are dissatisfied with the colonial government and they revolt against the government. People like us are patriotic and we believe we are fighting for the just cause. Victory will be on our side,” he said. Wu, Poon and Chak were found guilty on September 4 and were each sentenced to three years’ imprisonment. The court ordered that Hong Kong Evening News, New Afternoon News and Tin Fung Daily be suspended for six months. When the magistrate asked whether they wanted to make mitigation, they shook their heads and said, “we are innocent for being patriotic.” “It’s wrong to find me guilty because I am innocent. I am strongly opposed to ordering the suspension of my newspapers. The verdict amounts to a persecution against us. The truth is on our side and journalists around the world with conscience are supporting us. History will make a judgment on who is guilty,” Wu said after learning the judgment. The pro-Beijing newspapers described that the colonial government had torn down the facade of “press freedom” and “freedom of expression” and launched a “large-scale offensive” against the “patriotic journalistic undertaking”. Ming Pao, which was critical of the disturbances initiated by the leftists, gave a completely different description of Wu’s reactions to the verdict. The newspaper reported that Wu and the other defendants appeared “feeble” while they were yelling against the verdict and Wu looked pale when he was taken away from the court by the policemen. “The magistrate found me guilty on 21 counts but he was only empowered to sentence me to a three-year jail term because the Magistrate Ordinance states that the maximum penalty a magistrate could hand down is three-year imprisonment,” Wu said. He said that the colonial administration did not dare to transfer their case to the High Court because it usually handled cases involving serious offences. “I think the government did not want to send us to jail. It only wanted us to hire a lawyer to defend us in the court and follow the procedures under the law. If we had done so, we might have been released after going through the legal proceedings. But we refused to follow the rules of the game laid down by the British authorities and declined to hire a lawyer,” Wu said. Wu said that he was by no means the ringleader of the 1967 disturbances but he became a scapegoat in the political struggle between the colonial government and the leftist camp. Liang Shangyuan, deputy director of Xinhua’s Hong Kong Branch

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during the 1967 riots, was tasked by Premier Zhou Enlai to pay regular visits to Wu and the other people jailed at Stanley Prison for printing seditious articles. They were treated as political prisoners and were imprisoned in special wards. Wu said that they received reasonably good treatment from prison officers; some of them often sought tips on horse betting from Poon Wai-wai who was also a horseracing commentator. The three newspapers were allowed to resume publication on February 28, 1968. Mr Wu said that the circulation of Evening News dropped from more than 100,000 copies to below 10,000 after the episode. He wrote a series of articles in Evening News detailing his two-year ordeal at Stanley Prison after he was released in September 1969. Archives at Britain’s National Archives show that the arrests of Wu and Chak were masterminded by the then special assistant to the governor, Jack Cater, and approved by Britain’s Commonwealth Office. According to a telegram sent by the Hong Kong government to the Ministry of Defence on August 14, 1967, the arrests were “intended as a warning to pro-Beijing newspapers in Colony to tone down anti-government inflammatory articles”.6 To his surprise, Wu met with Cater again in the 1980s when he participated in the preparation for the Guangdong Daya Bay Nuclear Plant. Wu had been an agent of foreign power companies that manufactured power stations facilities since the mid-1970s. He was recommended by mainland officials to take part in the feasibility study of the Daya Bay Nuclear Plant. Cater was appointed chairman of Hong Kong Nuclear Company which was a subsidiary of the CLP Group. The rivals during the 1967 disturbances accidentally worked together for the project. “We talked about what happened in 1967 but of course we stuck to our own views,” Wu said. Cater died in April 2006 at the age of 84. In retrospect, Wu described the upheavals in 1967 as a “joke”. “The whole episode was actually a power struggle and it was nothing but a joke,” he said, adding that the riots were a spillover from the Cultural Revolution. “The Cultural Revolution accounted for 70 to 80 per cent of the causes of the riots in Hong Kong. The 1967 riots would not have erupted if there had been no Cultural Revolution,” Wu said. Before his arrest, Wu saw big-character posters entitled “It is necessary for Hong Kong to fall into chaos” in the streets of Guangzhou. He recalled that he had witnessed Huang Yongsheng (黃永勝), then commander of Guangzhou Military Region, joined director of Xinhua’s Hong Kong Branch Liang Weilin for lunch at a restaurant in Guangzhou. “If Huang gave an order to Liang, could Liang refuse to obey?” Wu said. According to Lu Ping, former director of the Hong Kong and Macau Affairs Office, Huang intended to send PLA troops to invade Hog Kong during the height of the 1967 riots but he was stopped by Premier Zhou Enlai. Wu said that he did not regret taking part in the riots. “Unfortunately I got myself entangled in the political upheavals. But I must insist on standing on the

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stance of the Chinese people. I was filled with righteous indignation when I saw compatriots beaten by the policemen and innocent student shot by the riot police. I have no regret for what I did in 1967,” he said. Attempting to perform a post-mortem of the leftist camp’s failure in 1967, Wu said that the leftists should have launched the struggle more skilfully. “The goal of the struggle should have been seeking reconciliation and resolution of the dispute, rather than a winner-get-all scenario. It was unwise for the leftist camp to besiege the Government House in May 1867. Had the dispute been settled earlier, the colonial government would not have arrested so many people and the hatred would not have run so deep afterwards,” he said. He said that the bomb attacks launched by some militant leftists indicated that the movement was running out of control. Describing the bomb attacks as the leftists “staking everything in one throw”, Wu said that the extremist activities were the last resort of the leftist camp as they knew well that they were bound to fail in the disturbances. “The leftist camp failed to mobilize ordinary citizens at the time. The number of demonstrators who joined their protests and marches never exceeded 20,000. The leaders of the leftist camp might have resorted to extremist means after failing to get genuine support from Beijing,” he said. Wu recalled that militia in Shenzhen kidnapped an expatriate police inspector in October 1967 but he was released afterwards. “I understood from that event that Beijing would not give full support to the leftists in Hong Kong. I told Kam Yiu-yu during a lunch, ‘we are bound to fail this time because the central government does not support us and I’m ready to go to jail’,” Wu said. While he had no idea who made the decision to launch the bomb attacks, he said the mentality of the Xinhua leaders in Hong Kong was: the more chaotic the situation in Hong Kong became, the better. Wu was disgusted with such extremist means. “I can bet nobody in the leftist media, even those from Wen Wei Po and Ta Kung Pao, supported the idea of planting bombs at the time,” he said. He added that the bomb attacks sparked public outcry and seriously undermined the image of the leftist camp. “The leftist camp quickly lost public support in the wake of bomb attacks. Members of the public thought that the leftists politicized the incident and were not sincerely concerned about labour rights,” he said. But he noted that some bombs were placed outside Chinese products emporiums which were seen as bastions of the leftist camp. “If I were a leftist who planted bombs, how could I plant a bomb to hurt our own people?” he asked. “The Hong Kong government was not stupid and it was unimaginable that it sat idle during the waves of bomb attacks.” Wu also criticized the mainstream media for their “exaggerated reports” on the bomb attacks which had misled the general public. But Wu admitted that the leftist camp easily exposed all of its strength during the struggle. “The leftist published lists of the struggle committees of different levels during the riots. The government didn’t need to spend much effort on grasping the

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details of the leftist camp, including information about the leading figures in the camp,” he said. Even Wu himself was also affected by the political fervour at the height of the riots. In an article published in the People’s Daily following his arrest, he was praised as “a model student of Mao Zedong Thought” and “a model warrior of the proletariat”. He was inspired by the commendation but felt ironic when he recalled that the Chinese official mouthpiece heaped praise on him more than 40 years ago. “Who was I before my imprisonment? I was, honestly, a playboy and often went to nightclubs after work. I am ashamed of the praise heaped on me by People’s Daily,” he said. He said that there was little room for rational thinking during the political turmoil because he could hardly keep a cool head at the time. Wu said that both the colonial administration and the leftist camp contributed to the escalation of the disturbances. Despite his ordeal in the prison, Wu affirmed the colonial government’s policy of mollification after the riots. “The government would not have introduced social reform if the riots had not taken place in 1967. The government had improved medical service and introduced public housing programmes since the early 1970s and set up the Independent Commission Against Corruption to combat corruption. Its governance after the riots was definitely better than before 1967,” he said. “Although the government eventually put down the riots but the victory was not really good for the British. The British government thought that it enjoyed the support of Hong Kong people after the riots. Margaret Thatcher [former British Prime Minister] would not have been arrogant during the Sino-British negotiation on the future of Hong Kong if she had not had the impression that Britain had the backing of Hong Kongers. Had the British government been less arrogant during the talks, Deng Xiaoping might have offered better terms to the British,” Wu said. He said it was unfair that Beijing had not yet explained clearly who should bear the responsibility for the disturbances in the past four decades. Wu believed that the mainland authorities did not want to bring up the issue again because it did not want the people to recall memories of the Cultural Revolution, which is seen as a taboo in modern Chinese history. “I have no regrets about the imprisonment but I was not the only person jailed at that time. We are talking about 1,700 people who had been locked behind bars,” he said. He found during his imprisonment at Stanley Prison that many people who were jailed during the riots had no connection with the leftist camp. Some of them were hawkers and manual workers. “Many people lost their jobs after echoing the leftist camp’s call for strikes. Isn’t it unfair to those people if the central government does not give a word on the incident? The central government should at least tell them: ‘You have paid a high price for your patriotic acts.’ What is needed is just asking an official to say a few words and those people are not asking for any honour or compensation,” he said.

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Wu recalled that when he attended a study course in Guangzhou in 1970, the leaders of the Guangdong People’s Committee in Support of the Hong Kong Compatriots’ Anti-Persecution Struggle told him: “There was loss of control in the top leadership of the central government for a certain period during the Cultural Revolution. The masses who took part in the struggle did not make any mistakes but the leaders in Hong Kong [Xinhua’s Hong Kong branch] had made mistakes in their methods of struggle.” In 1977, Wu and a group of leftists in Hong Kong were invited to attend a tennis tournament among countries in Asia, Africa and Latin America held in Beijing. They were received by the then vice-premier Li Xiannian who told them: “You have not made any mistakes [during the 1967 riots] and the patriotic fervour of Hong Kong compatriots should be affirmed. But some senior officials in Beijing should bear the responsibility.” Wu also recalled that Liao Chengzhi, former director of the Hong Kong and Macau Affairs Office, also told them in the early 1980s that “the patriotic fervour of Hong Kong compatriots should be affirmed”. However, Wu found mainland leaders’ off-the-cuff remarks insufficient to pacify the leftists who had suffered during the riots. “The central government should show some gestures, such as treating those who had participated in the movement a meal. I think the leftists who were jailed for several years are not asking too much if they expect a meal from the central government,” he said. The special administrative region government has already taken the initiative shortly after the handover. In September 1997, two months after China’s resumption of Hong Kong’s sovereignty, then Chief Executive Tung Chee-hwa invited a group of ageing leftists, including Wu, Yeung Kwong (former director of the Struggle Committee), and Liu Yat-yuen (member of the standing committee of the Struggle Committee), to attend a tea reception at the Government House. Then Secretary for Justice Elsie Leung Oi-sie told Wu: “This incident [the 1967 riots] had been handled in a way that was very unfair to the patriots. This was not a matter concerning you. Tsang Tak-sing [then an adviser to the Central Policy Unit, who became secretary for home affairs in July 2007] also faced unfair treatment at that time. The SAR government will tackle the issue gradually.” Ms Leung, who was a former Hong Kong deputy to the National People’s Congress, certainly had strong personal reasons for expressing such sympathy. Her uncle Wong Cho-fun was detained at Victoria Road Detention Centre during the riots. He was the former principal of Chung Hwa Middle School, a famous local leftist school which was deregistered during the height of the riots. Wu appreciated the government’s initiative, but he said the government should “do more in the future”.

Chak Nuen-fai: An accidental political prisoner Chak Nuen-fai had been preoccupied with the business of his publishing house until the moment he was arrested on the charge of “aiding and abetting the

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printing of seditious articles”. He had never taken part in any protests against the colonial government nor had he written any articles criticizing the authorities during the 1967 riots. He became an accidental political prisoner because he happened to be the owner of the company which printed the newspapers that published “seditious articles”. “I was by no means a core member of the leftist camp, let alone a supporter of the riots instigated by the leftists. I was only accidentally involved in that political upheaval,” Chak said. The leftist camp set up anti-persecution struggle committees in various sectors after the Hong Kong Artificial Flower Works incident in San Po Kong on May 6, 1967. The pro-Beijing supporters in the publishing industry also set up a struggle committee that comprised nearly 100 members of the trade. Lam Chun, head of Joint Publishing Company, was elected director of the struggle committee of the publishing sector. Chak became a committee member upon Lam’s invitation. Chak said that struggle committees in different sectors blossomed during the riots but those committees were only a “bluff”. “For instance, the struggle committee of the publishing industry did nothing except issuing some statements attacking the government,” he said. “Some people in the industry only knew that they had become committee members when they read the newspapers the following day.” Although Chak became a struggle committee member, he was preoccupied with the business of his publishing house, Wang Fung Book Company. As the confrontation between the government and the leftists escalated, Chak, as president of Wang Fung Book Company, organized an exhibition at City Hall on May 15, 1967 to promote science textbooks for primary pupils. “I had no inclination on the labour dispute in the Hong Kong Artificial Flower Works in San Po Kong. I was only worried about the impact on sales of our company’s textbooks if the confrontation escalated,” he said. In the 1960s, Chak and Commercial Daily president Li Siu-hung founded Nan Cheong Printing Company which printed Hong Kong Evening News, Afternoon News and Tin Fung Yat Pao. Li was president of the printing company while Chak seldom handled the company’s operation though he was the company’s manager and held half of the shares. He was not acquainted with Wu Tai-chow, president of Hong Kong Evening News and Afternoon News, and Poon Wai-wai, proprietor and editor of Tin Fung Yat Pao. Chak could not have imagined that the printing company in which he rarely took an interest would bring him big trouble. Chak saw no portent before his arrest and went swimming with his family in Deep Water Bay in the Southern District on August 8. At 4:30 a.m. on August 9, seven plainclothes policemen went to his home in Seymour Road in the MidLevels. Chak told his wife to open the door and the policemen asked whether he was manager of Nan Cheong Printing Company. “I nearly forgot that I was manager of Nan Cheong Printing Company because I seldom bothered about its operation. I only remembered that after a while,” he said.

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After a blanket search of his flat, the police officers took him to the police headquarters in Arsenal Street in Wan Chai. He found that Wu Tai-chow and Poon were also detained there. Chak later found that they were almost arrested simultaneously. They were subsequently escorted to Western Police Station and were sent to Victoria Detention Centre in Central the following day. Chak was charged with 21 counts which were mainly about violating the Sedition Ordinance and the Police Ordinance, including “aiding and abetting the printing of seditious articles”. Chak still kept the indictment which showed details of the charges against him on August 9, 1967. “Chak Nuen-fai, you are charged that on the 15th day of June, 1967, in Afternoon News, which contained the following words: ‘The Wong Tai Sin Kaifong’s Anti-British Persecution Struggle Committee was set up today. For over the month the Hong Kong-British imperialists have been brandishing their butcher knives before we kaifongs. We must defend ourselves immediately and come into action to strike this Hong Kong paper tiger. The Hong Kong British authorities carried out planned, premeditated and organized sanguinary suppression of our compatriots, with the result that thousands of them were killed or wounded and some are still missing. The streets, the dark cells and police stations were imbued with the blood of the kaifongs. Old men in their sixties and even ten-year-old children were killed, beaten and illegally tried and sentenced by the Hong Kong-British fascist mobsters. Indeed, the crimes committed by them are beyond description.’ ” When they were escorted to Victoria Detention Centre, Wu vowed not to hire any lawyer for the trial which started in the Central Magistracies on August 21. Chak and Poon echoed Wu’s view. “We were in exuberant high spirits at that time and felt as if we could rewrite the laws of Hong Kong,” Chak said. Describing the relevant laws as draconian and ambiguous, he said that the trial was a farce and they were bound to be found guilty whether or not they defended themselves during the hearing. Chak had no idea what he should say when the judge asked him to reply to the charges. He decided to turn the courtroom into a talk show and say what he liked to say. “I was not serious in the court and just waffled on. I even cited some poems written by Chairman Mao Zedong and the judge was baffled with what I said,” he said. Retorting the accusation of “abetting” and “sedition”, he said: “I didn’t abet others. I would be honoured if I had really done so.” Responding to the government’s accusation that the reports by the newspapers had caused “public alarm”, he said: “What kind of public alarm? A typhoon which swept Hong Kong in 1966 had also caused ‘public alarm’. Inmates would be omnipresent if the government charged the citizens with such an accusation.” In retrospect, Chak admitted that he intended to score points among the leftist camp by putting on a brave face during the trial. “I thought I should put up a good show in the trial because some of my relatives lived in the mainland at that time,”

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he said. He believed that the colonial government would not treat him too rudely because the British still upheld the rule of law. But he still cared about the operation of his publishing company during the trial. “I was worried that some schools would label me as a ‘leftist’ and refuse to use our textbooks in future,” he said. Wu was sentenced to three years” imprisonment on September 4 and Chak was also found guilty two days later. Chak was jailed for three years and Nan Cheong Printing Company was fined HK$12,000. He raised objection to the sentence before the judge and insisted that he was innocent. “In terms of sentence regarding offence involving publication and news reporting, our sentence should be the heaviest since Hong Kong became a colony,” he said. “I was prosecuted just because I happened to be the boss of the company which printed the newspapers concerned.” But Magistrate Light said in passing sentence that no reasonable tribunal in any civilized country would have reached any other conclusion. Chak was imprisoned in Stanley Prison with Wu, Poon and Li. Chak was initially in the same cell with Li and another inmate, but he was put into solitary confinement one month later. Chak said that he was given coarse rice and tiny salty fish for meals and could hardly eat his fill. He only had a blanket and a cotton coat in winter, making him shiver with cold in the cell. He was transferred to Victoria Detention Centre on the day of his release on September 6, 1969. When he walked out from the centre, he was greeted by hundreds of people from the leftist camp. He was also invited to report his experience of “struggling against the Hong Kong British authorities” inside the prison at a welcoming party organized by Commercial Daily. “The people who attended the party considered me a hero. I was hailed a ‘patriotic businessman’ after I walked free from jail,” he said. However, he suffered serious economic loss as his publishing company ceased operation during his imprisonment and he had to spend several years to put his company on track again. He believed that the riots were caused by the incompetence of the colonial government and social discontent. Chak said that the standoff between management and the workers of the Hong Kong Artificial Flower Works continued for more than 20 days but the Labour Department did not intervene. “The failure of the Labour Department to mediate the labour dispute resulted in growing tension between the management and workers. That was why some media criticized the department for being incompetent,” he said. “The factory was able to sack workers at will. It showed that Hong Kong workers lacked protection from labour legislation at the time.” Choi said that the labour dispute at the Hung Hom works of Green Island Cement Company in April drew wider public attention than the incident at the Artificial Flower Works. The workers staged stoppages and claimed that two European engineers beat local workers. “The leftist organizations mobilized its members to send appreciation to the workers who staged stoppages in Green Island Cement Company and prominent film stars staged performance outside the factory

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to amuse the workers,” he said. “There should be more room to cause a stir in Green Island Cement Company as there were alleged assaults on local workers by European engineers. However, the dispute in the Artificial Flower Works captured newspaper headlines because of the abuse of power by the police.” He believed that workers of the Artificial Flower Works wanted to resolve the dispute through peaceful means. “They only organized peaceful assembly outside the factory but riots erupted due to the excessive forces adopted by the police. In retrospect, it was quite ridiculous. Nowadays we witness hundreds of protests and assemblies but disturbances and curfews seldom occurred,” he said. He said that given the serious social discontent in the mid-1960s, some ordinary Hong Kong people would have staged protests against the colonial government even if the leftist camp had not initiated anti-British struggles. He said that the hunger strike staged by So Sau-chung, a translator with no political background, to protest against fare increases by Star Ferry and the public sympathy for him was an indication of Hong Kong people’s discontent with the government. Report of the Commission of Inquiry into Kowloon Disturbances 1966, released by the government-appointed commission in December 1966 to find out the causes of the Star Ferry riots, conceded that there was to some extent a failure in communication among the government, the press and the general public. “The emergence or existence of a gap between the government and the people is a continual danger and anxiety for any form of administration, whilst a colonial or bureaucratic government tends to be at a disadvantage in evoking or securing the support of its people, even though it may provide the most efficient administration and offer the best chances for their economic and social progress,” the report said. The report concluded that “within the economic and social fields there are factors that need to be watched, lest they provide inflammable material which could erupt into disturbances should opportunity arise in the future”. But Chak said that the government did not learn its lesson from the 1966 disturbances, nor did it heed any advice in the commission’s report. However, Chak believed that the Cultural Revolution which erupted in the mainland in 1966 was the “prevailing political climate” that precipitated the riots. “The history of Hong Kong in the past 100 years showed that Hong Kong was amenable to the influence from the mainland. Hong Kong was on the brink of political upheaval shortly before the labour dispute at the Hong Kong Artificial Flower Works. Some workers, who wore badges of Mao Zedong, demanded pay rises. It spoke volumes for the influence of the Cultural Revolution on Hong Kong,” he said. For leftists in Hong Kong, the concept of “down with the authority”, a popular political slogan in the mainland at the time, could easily be translated into “down with the Hong Kong British authorities”. “The leftist camp was suppressed by the

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colonial government in the 1950s and 1960s. Many leftists were deported to the mainland. The leftist camp’s discontent with the colonial administration’s highhanded policies was the underlying reason for their radical actions during the riots,” Chak said. However, he was very disappointed with the leftist camp and said that they were seriously divorced from the masses. “The leftists had made mistakes in their strategy in the struggle. Instead of hastily setting up the struggle committee and taking radical actions, they should have explained the Hong Kong Artificial Flower Works incident to the general public and win public sympathy.” Chak was surprised when the leftist camp staged a general strike and a food strike because he thought that the leftists would only organize some wildcat strikes. “Many ordinary people couldn’t understand why the leftists staged a general strike. I think the leftists overestimated their strength because of the impact of the Cultural Revolution and the victory of the Macau leftists. They became arrogant and acted rashly during the riots,” he said. Chak said that ordinary citizens seldom took part in the anti-British activities organized by the leftist camp but quite a number of people were sympathetic with the leftists because they were dissatisfied with the police who beat the demonstrators. “Most of the staff of our company was sympathetic with the leftists although they did not participate in their activities. Some of them even gave donations to the leftist camp,” he said. “However, many people were disgusted with the planting of bombs by some radical leftists and the leftists subsequently lost public support,” Chak said. Chak, who was born in 1920, met some people inside Stanley Prison who had planted bombs during the riots; most of them were workers and hawkers. Some of those bomb planters got their fingers blown off or lost their eyes in explosions. “Those who planted bombs should be condemned but they did so only because they faced suppression by the colonial government. They took the action desperately but I don’t think they were thugs,” he said. “A social movement was bound to fail once the participants adopted extremist actions. The leftists resorted to planting bombs because they had no alternative in the anti-British struggle. Although the leftist camp has refused to shoulder the responsibility for orchestrating the bomb attacks in the past four decades, they can’t change the history.” Chak, former publisher of pro-Beijing news magazine Wide Angle, admitted that he worshipped Mao Zedong and the Chinese Communist Party although he disagreed with the strategy of the leftist camp during the 1967 riots. But his views were different from those of other local leftists in recent years. He has been a local delegate to the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference since 1983, but has refrained from attending its meetings in Beijing following the 1989 Tiananmen Square massacre because he disagrees with the mainland authorities’ suppression of the pro-democracy movement.

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He is also opposed to the Hong Kong government’s national security legislation in 2003 for implementing Article 23 of the Basic Law, saying that it would undermine press freedom. Under the government’s proposed law, a publication will be defined as seditious if it incites people to commit acts of treason, secession or subversion. Mr Chak, who was charged under the then Sedition Ordinance for printing seditious articles, said that he did not want to see anybody repeat his tragedy. The ordinance was revoked before the handover. “The government proposal on sedition is vague and the media is likely to fall into a trap. The government should at least release a white bill for public discussion,” he said. “There is no need to put forth legislation to implement Article 23 because Hong Kong is a peaceful society where nobody intends to subvert the Hong Kong government and the mainland government,” he said. “Although I was prosecuted by the colonial administration during the riots, I still have confidence in British laws. But the Chinese Communist Party is notorious for abusing power.” During the patriotism debate sparked by a Xinhua statement in 2004, Chak rejected the idea that those opposing the national security bill and calling for democratization in the mainland are unpatriotic. The Xinhua statement stressed that “Hong Kong should be governed by Hong Kong people, with patriots as the main body”. “A person who loves our country does not have to love the Chinese government, let alone the ruling Chinese Communist Party,” Chak said. Some pro-Beijing figures had mixed up the concepts of country, party and government in the patriotism debate, he said. He saw no problem with democrats opposing the Article 23 legislation because he believed that the bill put forward in 2003 would curb freedom of expression. “If I had been younger and healthier, I would have taken part in the July 1 march in 2003,” said Mr Chak, who has known Mr Szeto for nearly 40 years. Mr Szeto also chairs the Hong Kong Alliance in Support of the Patriotic Democratic Movement in China which calls for an end to one-party rule in the mainland. “What’s wrong with people calling for democratization in China, or even appealing for an end to the one-party dictatorship in the mainland?” Mr Chak asked. He said throughout Chinese history, patriotism had been defined by those in power. “Rulers used to call on the people to love their country in an attempt to strengthen their positions.” In December 2005, Chak even joined the march that called for the introduction of universal suffrage. It takes just five minutes for a young person to walk from Pacific Place in Admiralty to the HSBC headquarters in Central. But Chak spent 25 minutes on the 650-metre journey during the march. It was the first march that he joined in his life.

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Even though he needed a stick to support himself, Chak insisted on walking on his own feet. “I will walk on my own feet so long as I can. It is necessary to fight for democracy no matter how old I am,” said Chak, who is diabetic and seldom walks more than 200 metres during each outing.

Wong Kin-lap: “The anti-British struggle had gone wrong.” Born in Guangzhou in 1923, Wong Kin-lap graduated from King’s College in the Mid-Levels, a prestigious government-run secondary school. He graduated from the Department of Chemistry at Zhongshan University in Guangzhou and became headmaster of Hon Wah College, a leftist school in Hong Kong, in 1949. He was vice-director of the All-Circles Anti-Persecution Struggle Committee during the 1967 riots and director of the Struggle Committee in Educational Circle. He was detained at Victoria Road Detention Centre (Mount Davis Concentration Camp) after he had been arrested in a police’s raid on Kiu Kwan Mansion in North Point. He served as a Hong Kong deputy to the National People’s Congress from 1993 to 1998 and was awarded a Golden Bauhinia Star in 1999. He died in 2003 at the age of 80. Despite his 17-month detention because of his leading role in the All-Circles Anti-Persecution Struggle Committee, Wong Kin-lap had no regrets for his involvement in the 1967 riots. However, the veteran leftist educator admitted that there was a lesson to learn during the disturbances. “In hindsight, there were some areas in which we should have done better. It was necessary to promote patriotic education in Hong Kong, particularly during the colonial rule. But in the meantime we should inspire students’ independent thinking and nurture their ability to distinguish between right and wrong,” said Wong, who was headmaster of Hon Wah College from 1949 to 1987. Wong’s observation was illuminating as thousands of students from the leftist schools lost their reason and sense during the riots. They formed the backbone of the army of demonstrators during the disturbances, with some resorting to radical means of struggle such as launching bomb attacks. For Wong Kin-lap, May 6, 1967 should have been an uneventful day. On that day, his school staged a drama performance at Astor Theatre in Yau Ma Tei (which closed in the 1990s) to commemorate PLA solider Wang Jie who was regarded as an icon of “studying Mao Zedong’s works” in the 1960s. When the performance was about to finish, several teachers came forward to him and said: “Something has happened in San Po Kong.” Wong dashed out of the theatre and saw that several trucks carrying riot policemen sped along Nathan Road and headed towards San Po Kong. Wong had followed the news report about the labour dispute at the Hong Kong Artificial Flower Works since late April. He believed that the riot police

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reinforcement must be related to the episode there. He told teachers to arrange for students to return home as soon as possible after the performance. “I felt the situation was very uncertain and did not dare to mobilize our students to San Po Kong to express support for the workers. I didn’t expect the situation would become so serious subsequently,” he said. Wong learned that a bloody conflict between the police and the workers erupted outside the factory in San Po Kong when he watched television news that evening. On May 11, the riot police fired tear gas and wooden bullets at workers from the leftist unions and students in San Po Kong and neighbouring areas. More than 100 people were arrested and several hundred people were injured. Wong said that the riot police had overreacted and unnecessarily fired tear gas and wooden bullets at the workers and students. The leftist educational circles staged a rally on May 15 and mobilized teachers, students and parents from all leftist schools to take part in the anti-British struggle. Wong said that many leftists had prepared to set up organizations for possible struggle against the Hong Kong British authorities in the wake of the incident at Hong Kong Artificial Flower Works. On May 16, the All-Circles Anti-Persecution Struggle Committee was set up. Wong joined the Struggle Committee at the invitation of Yeung Kwong, then chairman of the Federation of Trade Unions. The first meeting of the Struggle Committee was held at the headquarters of the Federation of Trade Unions in To Kwa Wan. The representatives of various sectors took turns to speak at the meeting. Speaking as the representative of the educational circle, Wong said: “The Hong Kong British authorities suppressed the Chinese compatriots. We can’t tolerate such fascist atrocities.” He added that he would resolutely heed the call of the Struggle Committee and mobilize the Struggle Committee in Educational Circle to fight together with Hong Kong compatriots. “If the Hong Kong British authorities escalate its persecution, we will also escalate the anti-persecution struggle. We must smash the Hong Kong British authorities’ conspiracy to persecute the compatriots and do our utmost to fight for victory.” Seventeen people, including Wong, were elected as representatives of the Struggle Committee during the meeting. The seventeen representatives, led by Yeung Kwong, Ta Kung Pao publisher Fei Yiming and Wong, went to the Government House on May 17 to submit a protest letter to the governor. The Struggle Committee set up a standing committee on May 23. Wong was elected one of the four vice-directors of the committee. Wong recalled that the participants of the Struggle Committee meeting emphasized that the anti-British struggle should follow the principle of conducting “on just grounds, to our advantage and with restraint” (有理、有利、有節). But that principle was not reported by the pro-Beijing media at the time. “According to my understanding, the principle meant that the struggle should be confined to nonviolent means,” he said. He added that most members of the Struggle Committee agreed to abide by the principle but there might be divergent views on how to implement it.

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The leftist educational circle set up its own struggle committee on June 2 and Wong was elected committee director. According to the reports of the pro-Beijing newspapers, “a group of patriotic education workers solemnly announced the establishment of the Struggle Committee in the educational circle under the portrait of Chairman Mao Zedong” and released a letter to the educators in Hong Kong. The letter denounced the colonial government for attempting to “further persecute patriotic schools and control the thoughts of their staff as well as deprive them of their rights to love the country and their freedom to learn Chairman Mao’s works”. It also criticized the Hong Kong government for stepping up “slavish and fascist education” in the colony. The struggle committee called on all teachers “who were not willing to be slaves” to unite in fighting against the colonial government. Wong recalled that the struggle committee in the education circle also passed a resolution which stated that the struggle should adhere to the principle of “on just grounds, to our advantage and with restraint”. The struggle committee in the educational circle held only one meeting during the disturbances and it was not possible to call another meeting as the confrontation escalated. He said that the All-Circles Struggle Committee was supposed to take command of the struggle but the committee failed to operate efficiently after the promulgation of the Emergency Regulations at the end of May. “The regulations, which put stringent restrictions on public assemblies, stated that it amounted to an unlawful assembly even if three people met together,” he said. “Under the circumstances, the committee couldn’t meet at all, let alone take command of the struggle. Consequently, everybody proceeded with the struggle in his or her own way without a centralized command and it did no good for the Hong Kong British authorities.” Wong believed that the Struggle Committee might have been able to impose some control on the situation if it had been allowed to function properly. Wong emphasized that leftist educational circle did not support violent means of struggle. He noted that the Federation of Trade Unions formed the backbone of the anti-British struggle. The activities of the educational circle were confined to cultural performances, publicity activities on Mao Zedong Thought, participation in demonstration and protests, sticking “big-characters posters” in the streets, and mobilization of students to distribute “mosquito broadsheets” (mini-posters). He added that Hon Wah College continued classes even after the Cultural Revolution had started and only staged performances on campus, such as The Red Detachment of Women (紅色娘子軍), a revolutionary drama which was popular in the mainland during the Cultural Revolution. The leftist newspapers described workers as a “new force” in the antipersecution struggle and dubbed students from the leftist schools as “vanguards” of the struggle. The leftist camp staged a general strike on June 24 and launched a four-day strike of shops and traders starting from June 29. More than 20,000 students from 32 leftist schools boycotted classes on June 27 in support of the workers who took part in the general strike.

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On July 5, students from the leftist schools stuck big-character posters outside the office of the Education Department. They sang revolutionary songs and attempted to charge towards the building. The leftist newspapers reported that the move unsettled the “black headquarters of slavish education” and the Hong Kong British authorities were “frightened out of its wits”. The leftist school students also formed scores of “cultural detachments” to promote Mao Zedong Thought and the “programmes of the anti-persecution struggle”. Some leftist school students even boycotted the Hong Kong Certificate for Education Examination (HKCEE). In a letter sent to leftist newspapers, “a group of HKCEE candidates” criticized the HKCEE system for forcing students to lose their souls and making them indifferent to politics. “The ‘future’ that you [the Hong Kong government] are talking about is to groom young students to be successors of the reactionary class and running dogs of the colonial rulers. We resolutely boycott the HKCEE you boast of and we do not care about the ‘future’ that you are talking about.” In a letter sent to leftist newspapers, a group of students from Hon Wah College also denounced the HKCEE as part of “slavish education promoted by the Hong Kong British authorities” which aimed at fettering young students in Hong Kong. The system attempted to force students to focus solely on their studies and ignore what was going on in their own nation and in the world. “We resolutely oppose the HKCEE system and will not sit [for] the examination, particularly during the struggle against the Hong Kong British authorities’ fascist atrocities,” the students wrote. According to a report by RTHK, leftist schools did not give out admission forms for the HKCEE to their students during the 1967 riots in an attempt to jeopardize their future. Wong dismissed RTHK’s report as groundless and said that a few students from Hon Wah College had registered for the HKCEE in 1966 and 1967. He said that the leftist schools opposed the HKCEE in the late 1940s on the grounds that it was part of “slavish education” implemented by the colonial government. But the schools had allowed students to sit for the examination since 1951 so their career prospects would be improved. Wong attributed the radical actions of the leftists in Hong Kong to the influence of ultra-leftist thoughts during the Cultural Revolution and the high-handed suppression by the Hong Kong British authorities. “The problem arose from our lack of understanding of the Cultural Revolution. We did not question the Cultural Revolution because we believed in the motherland and Chairman Mao,” he said. He admitted that he did not question the philosophy of the Cultural Revolution in its early stage because he supported the notion of “destroy the old and establish the new”, a popular slogan during the ten-year political upheaval in the mainland. He said that most students of Hon Wah College came from the lower-middle class and had first-hand experience of social deprivation during their upbringing. “They turned emotional and restless after being inspired by the ultra-leftist thoughts of the Cultural Revolution. There were many students who took part in the movement

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[the 1967 riots] enthusiastically. The movement could not have gathered so much momentum through our appeal alone,” he said. However, Wong’s faith in the anti-British struggle began to shake as the confrontation between the colonial government and the leftists escalated. Hong Kong leftists were in an exciting mood after the People’s Daily published an editorial entitled “Resolutely rebuff provocation by British imperialism” on June 3, 1967. The editorial called on Hong Kong leftists to launch a movement “to hate and despise British imperialism”. “Many people within our camp were in high spirits because they believed that the central government would give them unconditional backing. They thought Beijing would take back Hong Kong very soon. But I was disturbed at the height of the anti-British struggle because I thought some of the methods of struggle were incorrect,” he said. Wong admitted that the general strike staged by the leftist camp failed to make big impact and the number of workers taking part was not satisfactory. He said the general strike had brought adverse impact on members of the public and voices of discontent could be heard from all sectors. He also doubted if the general strike had breached the central government’s policy of “long-term deliberation and making full use of Hong Kong” since the 1950s. He pointed out that the nation’s foreign policy was anti-American. The country would struggle against Britain but tried to win its co-operation in the mean time. “In the 1950s, the central government put forward the policy of ‘long-term deliberation and making full use of Hong Kong’ and recognized the reality of British rule in Hong Kong,” he said. “State leaders had elaborated the country’s policy towards Hong Kong to heads of patriotic organizations who visited the capital. The policy had remained unchanged since 1950s and the leaders of leftist organizations should know it very well.” Wong said that the leftist camp had engaged in different kinds of struggle against the colonial government since 1949 and none of the previous struggles had led to serious consequences similar to those prompted by the 1967 riots. He said that what had taken place since 1949 showed that the leftist camp could have launched their struggle against the colonial administration in different ways. “The Education Department sent us a letter demanding explanation for hoisting a five-star flag on our campus on May 1, 1957. I put aside the letter and turned a blind eye to it. The Education Department did not take any action afterwards. Turning a blind eye to the colonial government was also one method to struggle against it,” he said. He felt that the anti-British struggle had embarked on the wrong path when bomb attacks erupted in Hong Kong since late July. “I thought the country was still in the early stage of economic construction and there was no reason for early resumption of sovereignty of Hong Kong. If the struggle had continued in this manner, the central government would have been forced to take over Hong Kong prematurely. I couldn’t see the advantages of taking such radical actions,” he said. But he only cast doubt on the direction and methods of the struggle. “I thought it

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was correct to launch an anti-British struggle and it was not convenient for me to publicly express dissenting views,” he said. Like some leaders of leftist organizations, Wong paid a price for his involvement in the disturbances. At 5 a.m. on August 4, 1967, he was woken up by thunderous noises from helicopters. He subsequently found that several helicopters from the British garrison on Hong Kong had landed on the roof of Kiu Kwan Mansion in North Point where he lived. The mansion was home to a considerable number of employees of mainland-funded companies in Hong Kong and housed a number of leftist union premises. The Chinese Goods Centre, which occupied the ground floor to the third floor of the mansion, was seen as the bastion of the leftist camp. The police had made several attempts to raid the mansion and had engaged in skirmishes with leftists in the mansion. Seven companies of riot policemen, seven platoons of British soldiers, a number of plainclothes police officers and three helicopters were deployed in the operation. It was the biggest against the leftist premises since disturbances erupted in May. It was also the first time helicopters were used by the police and military in raids against leftist premises. Wong woke up hastily and found that many policemen and plainclothes officers had laid siege to the mansion. He opened the door of his flat and saw that plainclothes officers were standing guard beside the lifts on his floor. Helmeted riot policemen launched blanket searches from the ground floor and had arrested some people before they arrived at Wong’s flat. The policemen knocked on the door and asked Wong to declare his name and occupation. The policemen reported to their superiors after finding that Wong was a key figure of the leftist camp. He was arrested shortly and was sent to Victoria Road Detention Centre, or Mount Davis Concentration Camp, in Western District. His arrest sparked fierce protest from the leftist camp. In a statement issued on the following day, the Struggle Committee in Educational Circle protested against the colonial government’s “unlawful kidnap” of Wong, describing the move as the “Hong Kong British authorities’ last-ditch struggle in its death throes”. The committee demanded Wong’s immediate release and an apology from the government. It also called on the government to pledge that no similar incidents would take place again in the future.7 On August 6, more than 100 teachers and students at Hon Wah College held a mass meeting on the campus. They demanded the government to release their headmaster immediately. “Hong Kong compatriots will not be scared by the fascist acts of terrorism and all students and teachers of Hon Wah College will not surrender. We will hold the red flag of Mao Zedong Thought even higher and will run the patriotic educational undertaking more successfully. We will keep the antipersecution struggle to the end and will not let off until securing total victory,” the students and teachers said.8

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Wong said that he was not beaten during his detention at Victoria Road Detention Centre. “My treatment was not too bad. Perhaps camp officials wanted to keep people like me as bargaining chips,” he said. He heard from the police officers stationed at the camp that some members of the leftist organizations continued bomb attacks on the streets. “The officers asked me whether I had instructed my students to do so. I told them that I never called on students to make or plant bombs,” he said. An expatriate police officer asked Wong why the leftists took part in bomb attacks. “I told him that we must launch struggle against you guys who killed and hurt many Hong Kong compatriots,” he said. “The officer also offered to give me a British passport and arrange for me to settle in Britain in return for my co-operation.” Wong rejected the offer, saying that he was not interested in emigrating to Britain. On August 23, the Red Guards in Beijing staged an arson attack on the office of the British charge d’affaires. He was questioned by another expatriate police officer why Beijing launched such an attack. Wong did not answer his question but was puzzled with the extremist action. According to a secret file declassified from the National Archives, Wong had “assisted in planning confrontation” during the riots.9 Wong insisted that he and other key members of the leftist schools did not support violent methods of struggle. But he did not rule out the possibility that some students from leftist schools might have been wooed by other people to plant bombs in the streets. “Students were still young and some might find fun in adventurous actions. But I think even if some students got involved in such activities, the number was very small,” he said. He added that no students from Hon Wah College participated in planting bombs. Some newspapers reported at the time that Wong Cho-fun, headmaster of Chung Hwa Middle School, “instigated students to manufacture bombs” during the disturbances. The school was deregistered after a home-made bomb exploded inside the school’s laboratory on November 29. Officials at Victoria Road Detention Centre gradually relaxed control on Wong and other detainees in early 1968 as the situation calmed down. The detainees were initially not allowed to read any newspapers but they were permitted to read newspapers such as Sing Tao Daily, Sing Pao and the South China Morning Post since the latter half of 1968. In the fourth quarter of the year, the doors of all cells were opened and the detainees were allowed to move freely within the camp and talked with one another. Wong was released in January 1969. Wong, who often reflected on the direction of the anti-British struggle during his detention, said that he and some of his fellow detainees had reservations about the planting of bombs by radical leftists. “I asked my colleagues after I had been released from the detention camp whether there was any problem with the ‘political line’ of the anti-persecution struggle. But they just said that it was only a matter of strategy. I was really doubtful about it,” he said.

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In retrospect, Wong insisted that it was correct for the leftists to oppose the colonial government but they had employed wrong methods. “Both the direction and methods of the struggle were wrong.” Wong said that they were not in line with the country’s foreign policy, i.e. to struggle against Britain while striving to co-operate with it. The struggle had brought adverse impact on the economy of Hong Kong and its people’s livelihood. “It stemmed from the political climate at the time. The whole country was on the wrong track at that time. The compatriots in Hong Kong should not bear the responsibility because they were just resisting suppression out of righteous indignation. But I must say that the patriotic masses took extremist actions after they had been instigated by ultra-leftist thoughts, particularly those of the gang led by Lin Biao,” he said. However, Wong believed that the anti-British struggle had its positive legacy. “The colonial administration summed up the lesson after the dust settled, and learned that high-handed policies were not sufficient to maintain its rule in Hong Kong. It decided to introduce social reform and organized balls in the Blake Pier (the original site of Exchange Square) in Central, in an attempt to ease the discontent of youngsters,” he said. But he added that the government also loosened its control on gambling and pornography in the meantime to “hypnotize” the residents. “Although the government granted Hong Kong a limited degree of freedom, it was by nature still a colonial government,” he said. Contrary to some people’s expectation, Hon Wah College did not suffer any setback after the riots. Wong said that his school saw rapid development after the disturbances. There were about 1,500 students studying at the school in Western District in 1967 and it opened branches in Aberdeen and Yuen Long the following year. He said that the number of students at the Aberdeen campus was about 1,000 while 2,000 were enrolled at the Yuen Long branch. However, since the college was a fee-charging institution, it suffered a setback after the government introduced nine-year compulsory education in 1978. The college closed its two branches in 1982.

Liu Yat-yuen: A leftist film giant who was full of bewilderment Born in Hong Kong in 1920, Liu Yat-yuen spent his whole life in media and film industries. A native son of Hong Kong, Liu graduated from the Hong Kong China News Academy in 1939. Lecturers of the academy included Qiao Guanhua (喬冠 華) who became China’s foreign minister in the early 1970s. He returned to the mainland to work as a reporter for a number of mainland newspapers during the Second World War. He became a member of the editorial committee of Wen Wei Po in 1951 and switched to the film industry and eventually became president of Sun Luen Film Company, Great Wall Film Company and Feng Huang Film Company. He was also the founding president of Sil-Metropole Organization Ltd. and president of the South China Film Industry Workers’ Union.

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Liu was a member of the 17-strong standing committee of the All-Circles AntiPersecution Struggle Committee. He was arrested in November 1967 and detained at Victoria Road Detention Centre in Western District. He was a novelist in the 1950s and was known for a number of his works that portrayed life of the grassroots in Hong Kong at the time. He died in 2002 at 82. Days after the confrontation between the police and workers at Hong Kong Artificial Flower Works in San Po Kong, Liu Yat-yuen recalled receiving a phone call at his office in Sun Luen Film Company. “I couldn’t recall whether it was an official from the Hong Kong branch of Xinhua News Agency or Ta Kung Pao publisher Fei Yiming who made the call. The caller invited me to join the All-Circles Anti-Persecution Struggle Committee,” he said. Hong Kong society became restless after the incident and the leftist camp lost no time in launching a struggle against the Hong Kong government. Liu recalled that the caller told him that they wanted to have representatives from various sectors in the struggle committee and asked him to attend the inauguration ceremony of the committee on May 16. Seventeen people, including Liu, were elected representatives of the struggle committee at the meeting. At 11 a.m. on May 17, Liu and his fellow representatives rode on four limousines to the Government House to protest against the police’s “suppression of the workers”. They demanded entry to the colonial mansion to submit a protest letter to Governor David Trench. But they were blocked by an adjutant at the front gate. The struggle committees formed by leftist organizations in various sectors mushroomed after the establishment of the All-Circles Struggle Committee and the film industry was no exception. The South China Film industry Workers Union set up a struggle committee for the sector, claiming that they would “fight to the end alongside workers, students and compatriot”. On May 12, a crew of Clear Water Bay Studio in Sai Kung was sent to Hong Kong Artificial Flower Works in San Po Kong to shoot a documentary. Cameramen Wong Ah-lam and Chiang Shi were beaten by the police and detained for a few days. They were acquitted by the court afterwards. The studio set up a struggle committee and held a mass meeting to denounce the “fascist atrocities” of the Hong Kong British authorities. Wong “furiously denounced” the government for arresting them “unlawfully”, saying that he would never falter in his love for Chairman Mao Zedong even under cruel torture by the Hong Kong police. The All-Circles Struggle Committee held another meeting on May 23 and decided to set up a standing committee. All 17 representatives elected at the first meeting on May 16 were renamed as members of the standing committee. Liu did not take part in the discussion on the strategy for the anti-British struggle although he was one of the leaders of the struggle committee. Instead, he was bewildered with the ensuing development. “As a longtime patriot, I saw no reason for not supporting a struggle against the British authorities but I and many other fellow

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standing committee members had no idea of how to launch the struggle,” he said. “The struggle committee’s meetings were just occasions for the members to meet one another and made some announcements. The meetings were very brief and ended very quickly. The members did not discuss the methods and strategies for the struggle. That was why I only had some vague impression of what happened during the meetings,” he added. Liu said some people thought that the struggle committee directed the actions of the anti-British struggle and even ordered the planting of bombs. “It was a misunderstanding. People outside the leftist camp thought that the struggle committee was a leading group for the riots but it was only a nominal leading organization or a ‘united front’ tool which did not even discuss the strategy for the struggle,” he said. “The committee only held one or two meetings during the riots and had no grasp of what happened in the later stages of the disturbances.” He said that even committee director Yeung Kwong did not know more than fellow committee members did and there was a behind-the-scene organization which made the decisions. “I have reservations about establishing a territory-wide struggle committee and I knew some pro-Beijing businessmen were not willing to join or set up struggle committees,” Liu said. “We should oppose the Hong Kong government’s suppression of the Hong Kong compatriots but was it necessary to set up an open organization to launch territory-wide and large-scale struggles? In retrospect, there must be some people who orchestrated and manipulated behind the scene.” “There were labour disputes before the outbreak of the Cultural Revolution and the Artificial Flower Works incident was just another dispute. It was legitimate for the leftist unions to send their members to express solace to the sacked workers and support their struggle against the management and fight for their labour rights. However, why did the struggle escalate?” he asked. “It was unusual for the leftist organizations, schools and mainland-funded enterprises to send their members to the factory and wave copies of Quotations from Chairman Mao Tse-Tung. It was likely that Xinhua’s Hong Kong branch orchestrated a full-scale campaign to mobilize the leftist organizations and students to show their support for the workers. It unavoidably offered a pretext for the Hong Kong British authorities to suppress the members of the leftist organizations.” Liu was baffled by the actions of the leftist camp during the 1967 riots, which were in stark contrast to the messages he got from a dialogue with Premier Zhou Enlai a year before the bloody disturbances. Liu was among a delegation of Hong Kong people who were invited to attend the National Day celebration held in Beijing on October 1, 1966. The celebration ceremony was unusually politically charged as the Cultural Revolution had already begun in the mainland. The delegation was received by Zhou Enlai and Vice-Premier Chen Yi. Zhou explained to them that the goals of the Mao Zedong-inspired political movement were to “destroy the old and establish the new” so that the “spiritual

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look” of the whole society would be changed. But the premier emphasized that the Cultural Revolution only proceeded in the mainland and should absolutely not be copied to Hong Kong. It would be a serious political mistake to do so. However, the ensuing development of the Cultural Revolution, which lasted for 10 years and pushed the nation to the brink of collapse, went beyond Zhou’s original expectations. Liu said he also did not expect that an anti-British struggle would erupt in Hong Kong one year after the outbreak of the Cultural Revolution, and that it would last for nearly a year. Liu recalled Zhou’s remarks after the Artificial Flower Works incident which broke out in May 1967. “I believe the struggle only aimed at filing verbal and written criticism of the Hong Kong British authorities and roused the patriotic spirits of Hong Kong compatriots,” he said. But the anti-British struggle eventually ended up with thousands of people jailed or injured and dealt a serious blow to the city’s economy. He had reservations about some of the actions taken by the leftist camp during the riots, such as posting “big-character posters” in the streets and staging “flying assemblies”. During the so-called “flying assembly”, demonstrators pretended that they did not know one another and gathered at a designated place where they delivered anti-British speeches, read protest announcements and distributed leaflets. They dispersed quickly after the impromptu protest. Liu said that such protests brought inconveniences to the public. “The government used to dispatch scores of policemen to block off the nearby streets. Once they found people staging a flying assembly and fired tear gases. The shops nearby had to stop doing business and hawkers had to run away,” he said. “This was the struggle method employed by former Chinese Communist Party leader Li Lisan during the labour movement in the 1920s and had been criticized by the party leadership as being ultra-leftist,” Liu said. “The struggle methods like flying assemblies could not win the support of the Hong Kong residents and some were very disgusted with them.” He also said that a lot of slogans put forward by the leftists were inappropriate and were not conducive to garnering support from the community. “The leftists labelled the local Chinese policemen as ‘yellow-skinned dogs’ and policemen of British descent as ‘white-skinned pigs’. Some policemen also had conscience but the leftists negated them completely.” He said that the leftist camp was unwise to launch a territory-wide general strike and food strike at the end of June because the move hurt the interests of the grass roots, shopkeepers and vendors. “Businessmen suffered huge losses during the food strike but the country suffered a bigger loss. Poultry and vegetables imported to Hong Kong from the mainland were kept in compartments in the railway stations after the railway staff had received orders to stop the supply to Hong Kong. A lot of the pigs that were supposed to be imported starved to death in the compartments during the hot summer while retailers and wholesalers had to close their business. The strike also upset social order and caused jitters among the people,” he said.

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Liu added that the suspension of bus and ferry services also caused inconveniences to people who went to work. “The general strikes failed to bring the colonial administration to its knees but the leftist camp had to pay a heavy price for the failed struggle. Many left-leaning workers who had been sacked by their companies during the strikes could not find new jobs,” he said. He felt that the struggle had gone off the track after the confrontation escalated from July and he was particularly upset about the bomb attacks which had begun since July. “The bomb attacks adversely affected the daily lives and personal safety of ordinary residents. A little girl died in a bomb attack in North Point and the incident caused jitters among members of the public,” he said. “The original aim of the struggle was to protect the legitimate interests of the compatriots; the struggle was not meant to topple the Hong Kong British authorities. The main victims of the bomb attacks were ordinary residents, not the Hong Kong government.” Liu noticed that the leftist-led struggle alienated a growing number of residents who had not taken sides as the confrontation escalated. “They were very disgusted with the leftists, let alone supporting them. Some of my friends who were not from the leftist camp told me at that time that the actions of the leftists adversely affected their daily lives. It was beyond doubt that the leftists quickly lost public support and their struggle was bound to fail,” he said. Even Liu, who did not agree with strategies such as general strikes and bomb attacks, was locked behind the bars in a concentration camp. Scores of armed policemen stormed to the Sun Luen Film Company office in Tsim Sha Tsui at 2 a.m. on November 15. Liu was arrested and subsequently detained at Victoria Road Detention Centre, or commonly known as Mount Davis Concentration Camp, in Western District. He was released in December 1968. The government did not explain the charges against him, but some newspapers reported at that time that he was involved in “illegal activities” in the film industry. Liu describes such reports as groundless accusations. Liu was put in solitary confinement in the concentration camp and he claimed to have suffered an ordeal during his 13-month detention. There was no bed in his cell and each meal only comprised coarse rice and several vegetable leaves, according to him. He attributed the 1967 riots to long-standing social discontent and the highhanded rule of the Hong Kong British authorities. “The government adopted highhanded measures even on minor incidents. There was rampant corruption in Hong Kong in the 1950s and 1960s and the lower-middle class was generally dissatisfied with the colonial administration,” he said. Citing his personal experience in the 1930s, he said: “The British police inspectors often ran wild with several Chinese policemen in the streets, such as charging fishermen who were selling salty fish for ‘abusing animals’. They often beat fishermen and hawkers unreasonably and kicked their goods to the ground. They then asked the hawkers how much money they had in their pockets.”

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He said that the Hong Kong government imposed stringent censorship in the 1950s and 1960s on films produced by the mainland. “The colonial government ordered censoring contents which they considered carrying national consciousness. Ten patriotic film industry workers were deported to the mainland without being given any reasons in 1952,” he said. In 1966, So Sau-chung staged a hunger strike to protest the government’s approval of the 50-cent fare increase by Star Ferry. His actions drew support from some youngsters. “Don’t underestimate a 50-cent fare increase and its impact on the lives of ordinary people. At that time, a lot of people earned only one or two dollars a day. The cross-harbour ferry fare increase would definitely spark a chain reaction and result in price hikes,” Liu said. He said that the protesters were beaten or thrown into jail. “The way the colonial government handled the Star Ferry riots indicated that it did not only suppress the patriotic force but also repressed ordinary residents’ expression of views on livelihood issues by peaceful means. The government employed a high-handed policy on both political and livelihood issues,” he said. Liu compared Hong Kong in the 1960s to a volcano which would erupt if there was a trigger. The immediate trigger came when the workers were unreasonably fired by the management of Artificial Flower Works. He believed that the long-standing high-handed rule of the colonial government was the internal factor leading to the disturbances while the Cultural Revolution was the external factor. “The Cultural Revolution had an impact on the riots; otherwise, the leftists would not post big-character posters everywhere,” he said. “The state media during the Cultural Revolution called on people to topple imperialism, revisionism and reactionary forces and the Red Guards labelled Hong Kong as ‘the city of anti-imperialism’. It was very natural that ultra-leftist thoughts had an impact on Hong Kong during the riots.” He said that the leftist camp in Hong Kong was also emboldened by the Macau riots in 1966, in which the leftists in the Portuguese enclave claimed victory over the colonial government. The Hong Kong leftists described the victory as a “great victory of Mao Zedong Thought” and Xinhua’s Hong Kong branch organized delegations to Macau to “learn” from the leftists there. Liu questioned the wisdom of Macau leftists to launch a large-scale struggle against the Macau government at that time. “The compatriots in Macau had been oppressed by the colonial government for a long time but I was puzzled by the radical methods of struggle adopted by the leftists,” he said. The leftists in Macau staged food strikes and mobbed the police stations during the confrontation in 1966. “I think the radical actions stemmed from the impact of the Cultural Revolution, particularly the instigation by the ultra-leftists led by Lin Biao,” he said. He said that some leaders of Hong Kong’s leftist camp were overjoyed with the victory in Macau and believed that they would score a similar victory in Hong Kong. “Some methods of struggle adopted by the leftists in Hong Kong were obviously

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copied from Macau,” he said. “The Cultural Revolution and the high-handed rule of the Hong Kong government was the major reason behind the anti-British struggle. However, the radical approach during the riots arose from the ultra-leftist leadership of Xinhua News Agency’s Hong Kong branch at the time.” Given Liu’s personal contacts with top leaders of the Chinese Communist Party before the riots, he was perplexed by the struggle methods in the later stage of the disturbances. He believed that senior Xinhua officials of the agency’s Hong Kong branch and leaders of the local leftist camp contravened the Communist Party’s longstanding policies towards Hong Kong. “The 17 members of the standing committee of the Struggle Committee often met the state leaders in Beijing in the 1950s and 1960s. Premier Zhou Enlai, Vice-Premier Chen Yi and Liao Chengzhi (廖承志), the state leader responsible for Hong Kong affairs, had repeatedly explained the central government’s policies towards Hong Kong.” When Liu was interviewed in 1998, he still recalled vividly the scene in which Zhou delivered a speech at a meeting in the 1950s. He quoted Zhou as saying, “The United States attempted to subvert China and our global strategy should be antiAmerican in the first place. Meanwhile, we should struggle against Britain but try to win their co-operation in the meantime.” Liu said the Chinese authorities believed that Britain would completely side with the US if China took back Hong Kong. “The Chinese government would support Hong Kong compatriots’ struggle against the Hong Kong British government if the legitimate interests of the Hong Kong compatriots were affected. But we will no longer be opposing the US if we focus our efforts on launching struggles against Britain. You [the leaders of leftist camp in Hong Kong] should fully understand the central government’s policy and deliberations and don’t put the central government in a difficult position,” Zhou told Liu and other leaders of Hong Kong’s leftist camp. Liu said that Zhou and other Chinese leaders had told them in the 1950s that Beijing adopted the policy of “long-term deliberation and making full use of Hong Kong”. “Long-term deliberation did not mean that Hong Kong would be ceded to Britain permanently. Beijing tolerated British rule of Hong Kong for the time being because they could make full use of the territory. According to the thinking of the top leaders of the Communist Party, tolerance of the status quo in Hong Kong and ‘long-term deliberation’ would last for more than two or three years. But Beijing did not set any time frame. Zhou Enlai and other senior leaders had emphasized that a country with greater strength was the prerequisite for resuming Hong Kong’s sovereignty and it should not be accomplished by political struggles involving the masses,” Liu said. It remained a mystery why some of Hong Kong’s top Xinhua officials and leaders of the leftist organizations, who should be familiar with Zhou Enlai’s policies towards Hong Kong, ignored the spirit of Beijing’s policies during the 1967 riots. Liu believed that it was related to the criticism of the “capitalist roaders” in the mainland. He said that senior leaders or heads of government departments in the

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mainland became targets of political struggles during the Cultural Revolution. “Many heads of Chinese embassies were summoned back to the mainland. The culture counselor of the Chinese embassy in France, Xima Wenshen (司馬文森), was tied up by the Red Guards when he arrived at Beijing Airport and subsequently became the target of criticism by the radicals.” “The radicals had seized power of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Foreign Minister Chen Yi had been sidelined. Some of the top Xinhua officials in Hong Kong were worried that they would be sacked or transferred to the mainland where they could face political struggles. They launched the anti-British struggle on their own initiative and appeared extremely antagonistic towards imperialism so as to retain their official posts. They wanted to show that they were ‘politically reliable’ in order to win the recognition of the Cultural Revolution Group under the Chinese Communist Party’s central committee,” he said. Liu said that some top Xinhua officials of the Hong Kong branch made use of the anti-British sentiment. “But the masses realized that the Xinhua officials launched the struggle simply for achieving their own objectives. They found that their patriotic fervour had been manipulated,” he said. He agreed that it was reasonable for the leftist unions to send appreciation to the workers who had been sacked by Artificial Flower Works and supported their struggle against the management. “But the leftist camp subsequently mobilized a lot of members of the leftist organizations, workers and students to the factory. The leftist masses also waved Quotations from Chairman Mao Tse-Tung and expressed support for the workers. The high-profile actions led to the crackdown by police,” he said. In retrospect, Liu questioned the wisdom of setting up a territory-wide antiBritish struggle committee. “Was it necessary to set up an all-circles struggle committee and sub-committees in various sectors to launch a large-scale struggle in Hong Kong? The action exposed the identity of all key members of the leftist camp. I believe that there must be some people orchestrating behind the scene,” he said. He participated in the struggle out of patriotism despite his doubt about the development of the campaign. “I proceeded with the struggle without hesitation and didn’t care about my personal safety,” he said. Liu had never thought that China would recover Hong Kong at that time because he was not convinced that taking back the city would be better than maintaining status quo. “As the confrontation escalated, the leftist camp chanted the slogan of ‘the Hong Kong British authorities must withdraw [from Hong Kong] if it does not bow its head’. I thought the struggle had deviated from the original goal of the struggle. The slogan amounted to kicking out the British, which was inconsistent with Zhou Enlai’s long-standing policies towards Hong Kong,” he said. He was baffled when the leftist camp staged general strikes and “flying assemblies” since June and even planted bombs on the streets. “I asked myself

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why we did such stupid things. Why were we taking actions which would lose the support of the general public?” When he was asked why he had not voiced objection publicly at that time, Liu explained that it was difficult to express different views during the confrontation between the leftist camp and the colonial government. “It was not convenient for me to publicly express different views although I had reservations about the extremist actions at the time. I was worried that I would be seen as dampening the enthusiasm of the masses if I did so.” Some leaders of the leftist camp have affirmed the anti-British struggle in 1967, claiming that the leftists at the time only aimed at opposing the “use of violence” by the colonial administration. “The leftists are reluctant to repudiate the mistakes made during the 1967 riots, particularly when Hong Kong was still under British rule before 1997,” he said. He believed that the confrontation between the colonial government and the leftist camp escalated due to a vicious cycle of interactions between the two sides. The police beat the protesters who were marching to the Government House on May 22 and the incident sparked more vigorous resistance from the leftist camp. “Oppression will certainly spark resistance and the resistance will be even more vigorous if the oppression becomes more intense,” he said. Liu said that the Hong Kong government learned from the Macau leftists’ victory over the Macau government and was determined to keep the leftists at bay at all costs. “At times there were rumours that the Red Guards were prepared to cross the Lowu Bridge and that Beijing planned to take Hong Kong back by force,” he said, “but Zhou Enlai apologized to the British government for the arson attack on the office of the British chargé d’affaires in Beijing in August 1967. Britain then realized that Beijing had no intention of taking back Hong Kong in the near future.” The 1967 riots were sparked by a labour dispute but the leftist camp denounced the colonial administration for orchestrating “national oppression”. Liu said the leftist camp gradually lost public support after they politicized the labour dispute in the later stage of the disturbances. “Some practices of the leftist camp alienated members of the public and their image were seriously tarnished. The leftist camp suffered a serious blow after the riots and some top cadres of Xinhua News Agency had made serious mistakes,” he said. Liu said that many workers who had taken part in the general strikes were sacked and led miserable lives afterwards. “Some members of the leftist organizations participated in the anti-British struggle with a spell of enthusiasm but they left the leftist camp later. Some of them even immigrated to other countries. The leftist camp must learn the lesson from the failure in 1967,” he said. However, Liu said that the riots facilitated social reform because the colonial government learned its lesson from the disturbances and adjusted its governing strategy. He said that Murray MacLehose, who succeeded David Trench as governor in 1971, introduced a policy of conciliation and pushed a series of social reforms

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ahead. “The struggle in 1967 enhanced the awareness of Hong Kong compatriots. They realized that the British imperialists were not as formidable as they had imagined and from then on, the Hong Kong residents gradually dared to fight for their rights,” he said. Liu said that the operation of leftist film companies was also adversely affected by the ultra-leftist thoughts during the Cultural Revolution. In the 1950s and 1960s, many films produced by Sun Luen Film Company, Great Wall Film Company and Feng Huang Film Company were blockbusters and were well received by cinemagoers. But Liu said that the films were heavily criticized by ultra-leftists in the mainland as products of “wrong political line”. He said that he was sidelined by Zhong Yunzhi (鍾允之), then deputy chief editor of Xinhua’s Hong Kong branch after the Cultural Revolution began. Liu said that many film stars of left-leaning film companies found the ultra-leftist practice of some Xinhua officials during the 1967 riots unacceptable. He said that Zhong demanded Hsia Moon (夏夢), dubbed as Great Wall’s “Crown Princess”, to take part in “flying assemblies”. “Hsia was pregnant at the time and it was inconvenient for her to take part in such high-risk assemblies. But Zhong criticized her as a coward who feared death,” he said. “Hsia later left the circle of leftist film companies because she couldn’t bear the ultra-leftist practices of Xinhua officials,” he said. “Some staff in our companies told me at that time that it was very difficult for them to earn a living in the wake of the ultra-leftist policies.” He said that prominent film star Fu Che (傅奇) and his wife, Shek Hwei (石 慧), who had participated actively in the anti-British struggle in 1967 emigrated to Canada in 1990. The couple was detained at Victoria Road Detention Centre during the disturbances. “They left Hong Kong partly because they disagreed with mainland authorities’ handling of some issues,” he said. A longtime follower of the mainland authorities, Liu was also baffled by some of the political movements in the mainland since 1949. He was very encouraged by the rapid development in the first few years of the People’s Republic. But he was puzzled when hundreds of thousands of intellectuals were labelled as “rightists” in the Anti-Rightist Campaign. “They just expressed some opinions different from those of the Communist Party but they were dismissed as ‘bourgeois rightists’ and ‘reactionary figures’,” he said. During the Lushan Conference in 1959, Peng Dehuai, the minister of defence at the time, was sacked after he called for Mao Zedong’s attention to the fact that many peasants starved because of the people’s communes movement. “I couldn’t understand why he fell into disgrace for conveying the voices of the people. Marshal Peng had been seen as a hero but he was suddenly described as ‘anti-Party and antisocialism’. I could not understand such a handling by the mainland authorities,” Liu said. His faith in the People’s Republic was further shaken during the Cultural Revolution. President Liu Shaoqi had been a veteran in the communist revolution

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but was suddenly dismissed as a “traitor”. He was sacked without a trial and given very inhumane treatment. Liu also lamented that many historic antiquities had been destroyed by the ultra-leftists during the upheavals. “Did the country treasure our own culture? The Cultural Revolution really brought disaster to our country,” he said. He hailed the Tiananmen Square incident in 1976 as the awakening of the Chinese people. The Chinese leadership’s decision to implement economic reforms revived his hope for the country. “Why did we fight for overthrowing the Kuomintang [Guomindang]? It was because the Chinese people suffered hardship under Kuomintang’s rule. What was the need for revolution if the people still lived in poverty under the rule of the Communist Party?” Liu fell into despair again in 1989 when the tanks crushed the pro-democracy movement in Beijing. “My family and I were very upset about the crackdown. The Chinese government shouldn’t have taken have such high-handed measures against its people,” Liu said.

Choi Wai-hang: “I do not want to be made a scapegoat for the riots.” Choi Wai-hang had a feeling that trouble was looming hours after he had attended the first meeting of the All Circles Anti-Persecution Struggle Committee held at the headquarters of the Federation of Trade Unions on May 16, 1967. He discovered that plainclothes policemen were following him and his fellow committee members after the meeting. Choi, a committee member and secretary of the Hong Kong Chinese Reform Association, received similar reminders from the staff of the association in the next few days. He planned to pack some clothes and left home for a haven. He said that the association had become one of the targets of the colonial government in their suppression of the leftist camp after the Struggle Committee was established. Percy Chen, chairman of the association, also had to go into hiding. He said that the Struggle Committee was unable to continue its operation after holding two meetings because of the mounting pressure from the government. “The leaders of the Federation of Trade Unions effectively took the helm of the Struggle Committee and I failed to keep in touch with the federation. I had no knowledge of the actions and statements by the committee after that,” he said. The trouble befell Choi before he finished packing. In the evening of July 18, 1967, Choi, who was then director of Hutchison International, returned to his home in Yau Ma Tei after work. He had dinner with his family as he did in normal days while watching the evening news on television. His children were staring at the television screen and yelled: “Dad, look!” Choi turned to the screen and saw that the riot police were raiding the three venues of the Chinese Reform Associations in Hennessy Road in Wan Chai, Kowloon and Shau Ki Wan. The riot police seized some artificial swords, knives and clubs which were used in performances by the

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Cantonese opera group of the association. His eldest daughter dashed to the balcony and saw a group of riot police officers gather outside the mansion where they lived. Repeated knocks on the door of Choi’s flat broke the silence and some people tried to break into his flat. “Open the door instantly!” they exclaimed. Choi found that several officers from the police’s special branch were standing outside his flat; two of them were pointing their submachine guns at the door. The corridor was packed with a lot of riot police officers. A special branch officer, who wore a shirt and a tie, produced a detention order signed by the governor and said that they were arresting him in accordance with the Emergency Ordinance. When responding to Choi’s question on reasons for the arrest, the officer said: “According to the Emergency Regulation, the governor can arrest anybody for a period not exceeding seven days, without giving any reason.” Another officer wasted no time in putting handcuffs on Choi and escorted him to the ground floor. Choi found that the street on which the mansion was located was under curfew. A private car and a vehicle carrying riot police officers were parking in the street. “I am not an armed bandit. Why do you send such a big team to arrest me?” he asked the police. The special branch officers took him to Queen’s Pier opposite to Tsim Sha Tsui Railway Station where a yacht was parking. Choi was put on board and the yacht anchored at a pier near the waterfront of Harcourt Road in Central. The officers pushed him into a small private vehicle which drove westward to the Mid-Levels. “An officer said to me, ‘Enjoy the night scene of Hong Kong and take a look of the Bank of China Building. You may have to say farewell to them’,” Choi recalled. Choi later found that Victoria Road Detention Centre, or Mount Davis Concentration Camp in Western District, where he was detained for 18 months, was designated for detaining political prisoners and some of them were eventually deported from Hong Kong. The car arrived at a building near Kennedy Town in Western District. Choi later found that it was Victoria Road Detention Centre. “From the deck of a Lammabound ferry, the building midway up Mount Davis looked like a holiday resort. In fact, it was a detention centre. Only the barbed wire and the iron gate suggested its real nature. Only those who were thrown into the camp knew that it was a detention centre, which treated its prisoners more cruelly than any prison they could ever imagine,” Choi said. The head of the concentration camp walked out from the building after the car drove into the car park. He gave a special branch officer a dressing down after he found that the police had forgotten to put a mask on Choi. All detainees had to wear a mask on their way to Mount Davis Concentration Camp so that they would not know where they were heading to. The special branch officer then put a black mask on Choi and took him to an interrogation room. The officers ordered him to take off all his clothes and belongings except his vest and underpants. “I only wore my vest and underpants in the concentration camp and I felt that my dignity was deprived,” he said. He was given a detainee number “452” and was told that he

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could only refer to himself as “452”. “You can’t mention your name nor talk with other people,” a special branch officer said. Afterwards, he was thrown into a tiny cell which was about seven feet by three feet. There was no bed in the cell and a board occupying part of the floor was the open space on which he could sleep. The cell was so small that he could hardly find any extra space to turn around. Hardly had he walked into the room when the camp official slammed and locked the door. The cell was composed of three white walls and there was a thick wooden door with a seven-inch-wide barred window. The window was covered by a board which could be slide-opened only from outside. There were glass peepholes on each of the three surrounding walls. “The peepholes ensured that I could be watched from three directions round the clock but I couldn’t see anything outside. There was no protection of privacy in the cell,” Choi said. He believed that the design of the cells was to ensure complete isolation of the detainees and the detainees could not communicate with one another, even if they hit the walls that divided the cells. He admitted that he was not beaten by camp officials during his 18-month detention but suffered serious “mental torment”. There was a ventilator on the ceiling of the cell while the ceiling lamp was on day and night. The chilly wind made Choi shiver and the only thing to protect him was a blanket made with stinging woven hair. “The noise of the ventilator was ear-piercing and the dazzling light made it difficult for me to sleep. The mental torment I suffered during those 18 months was even more unbearable than torture,” he said. Choi lost his sense of time as his watch was taken when he was to the concentration camp. He could not count hours and days and did not even know if it was day or night until the plastic bowl containing food was slipped through the door-hole. His meals comprised rotten fish, broken rice mixed with sand and a few pieces of dried vegetables. “Yet I awaited the meal anxiously, not because I wanted the food but because I wanted to regain my sense of time,” he said. A total of 52 leftists, including Choi, were detained at the camp during the 1967 riots. Other detainees included treasurer of the Chinese General Chamber of Commerce Tong Ping-tat, president of Sun Luen Film Company Liu Yat-yuen, prominent actress Shek Hwei and her husband Fu Che, Wong Cho-fun, principal of Chung Hwa Middle School, headmaster of Sai Kung Public School Ling Wang-yan, secretary of the Federation of Trade Unions Chan On, and vice-chairman of Sai Kung Rural Committee Tse Shu-ping. “From June to July of 1967, some compatriots were kidnapped to the concentration camp without any prior trial. They disappeared without any reasons and the police turned a blind eye to the request of assistance by their families. The families were told what had happened only two or three weeks later,” Choi said. The government was empowered under the Emergency Regulation to detain Choi without trial for a period “not exceeding seven days”. He also believed that the colonial government would only detain him for seven days but he later knew that he

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was too naïve. “The government made use of the loopholes in the laws by issuing a new detention order every seven days when the order lapsed. The camp officials read the contents of the detention order before me every seven days. After doing the formality for several times, the officials did not bother to repeat the ritual,” he said, “This was the ‘human rights’ I enjoyed in those days! Where did my human rights go?” Referring to the powers under the Emergency Regulation in a speech delivered in January 1968, Attorney-General Denys Roberts said that it was “an extreme and dangerous power” but “it [had] been used sparingly”. Choi’s family was not allowed to visit him even when a month had passed after his detention. Worse still, they were under threat and harassment and lived in fears. His family was allowed to visit him at the concentration camp every two weeks, but was given only ten minutes for each visit. He was put in solitary confinement in the first four months and he never saw anyone except the guard. He was not even allowed to speak to the guard and he never heard a word from him. “I had nearly lost my ability to speak and hear by the time I left that cell,” he said. Choi had his “honeymoon” when he was transferred to a bigger room which was shared by three other leftists, including treasurer of the Chinese General Chamber of Commerce Tong Ping-tat, secretary of the Motor Transport Workers’ Union (Kowloon Motor Bus Branch) Lau Wing and secretary of the Federation of Trade Unions Lam Shui-yung. But the good days did not last long. In October 1967, as a gesture of goodwill to the leftist camp, British Minister of State for Commonwealth Affairs Lord Malcolm Shepherd visited Victoria Road Detention Centre. When Shepherd walked near Choi’s cell, Choi took the chance and yelled at the top British official: “I have never touched any meat!” Caught off guard by Choi’s action, Shepherd and the accompanying Hong Kong officials were very embarrassed. The head of the concentration camp made Choi pay the price and threw him back to solitary confinement. The special branch officers had launched “psychological warfare” against Choi during his detention. “They attempted to persuade me to deflect from the leftist camp with huge rewards and promised to send me to Switzerland to seek political asylum. But I stood firm on my stance,” he said. Choi joined Reiss Bradley, a British firm in Hong Kong, as general manager of the company’s import and export trade department in the late 1940s. Choi was one of the pioneers of China trade in Hong Kong and represented Reiss Bradley in the first Canton Fair, which was also known as the China Import and Export Fair, in 1957. He became director of the China trade division in the Hutchison International Group after Reiss Bradley was taken over by Hutchison International in 1965. After Choi had been imprisoned, Sir Douglas Clague, chairman of Hutchison International, was also worried by his mysterious absence. “Clague told my wife that my arrest had caused serious disruption to the company’s operation and said

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that they were also doing business,” Choi said. Clague, who was also commandant of the auxiliary police, intended to visit him at the Victoria Road Detention Centre but Choi declined to meet him. “As he was commandant of the auxiliary police, I was worried that my meeting with him would cause misunderstanding in my camp during such a sensitive period,” he said. But he really treasured Clague’s friendship and concern because Hutchison International continued to issue him bonus and salary to Choi’s family during his detention. Clague even asked his staff to clean Choi’s room and waited for his return to office. Choi resumed his work at Hutchison International shortly after his release from the concentration camp. In January 1969, the guard took Choi out of his cell and led him to the wardrobe in the concentration camp. Choi was ordered to put on the clothes which he had worn on the day of his arrest. The guard then took him to the interrogation room. He found that his personal belongings were put on the table and a special branch officer said: “Your detention has ended and now you are released.” Two special branch officers accompanied him to a private car and drove him near his home. The car drove away immediately after dropping him off. He did not know where he was and only found his way back home after asking a few passers-by. His return also took his family by surprise. Until his release, Choi did not know the reasons for his arrest. “What crime did I commit? The Hong Kong government should produce the evidence related to my alleged wrongdoing,” he said. He only learned after his release that the colonial government claimed that the artificial weapons used by the Chinese Reform Association’s Cantonese opera group were offensive weapons. He believed that it was the prima facie that justified his arrest. However, Choi said that the true reason for his arrest was his participation in the Struggle Committee. “The Struggle Committee sounded like the Revolutionary Committee in China during the Cultural Revolution. That’s why some people in Hong Kong linked the Struggle Committee with the Cultural Revolution. But the composition of the Struggle Committee was similar to that of the Organizing Committee for the National Day Celebration or the handover anniversary. The committee was composed of representatives from various sectors. It was no big deal for me to join the Struggle Committee as I was a core member of the Chinese Reform Association at the time,” he said. Governor David Trench gave his verdict on Choi in a letter to the Commonwealth Office on December 23, 1968 in which he briefed the office about the remaining 16 leftists detained under the Emergency Regulation. Choi was described as “a very militant communist, the driving force behind the Chinese Reform Association, which has members throughout the Colony. . . . He used his influence to incite and organise extreme violence by his subordinates prior to his arrest,” the governor wrote.10 Choi, however, emphasized that the committee had called on members of the leftist organizations to launch struggles against the colonial government “on just ground and in a restrained manner”. “Until my arrest [on July18], the anti-British

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activities were largely confined to demonstrations and protests except that there were a few skirmishes,” he said. “I had never taken part in any protest because of my work. What I want to say is that it was guilty for being a patriot at that time and you should be ready to suffer various kinds of humiliations. It was by no means a joke.” Recalling the disturbances which took place four decades ago, Choi admitted that the riots had caused huge damage to the people of Hong Kong and had brought “disastrous consequences” to the community. He said it was stupid for the leftist camp to stage general strikes because it seriously disrupted the daily life of the general public. “It was difficult for the general public to go to work on public transport services and the general strike had to shoulder the financial burden of giving salaries to the workers who were taking part in the strike,” he said. However, Choi still maintained that the high-handed approach adopted by the colonial government was a major reason behind the riots. He said, “the outbreak of the riots was the manifestation of the long-standing discontent in Hong Kong. The anti-British sentiment would not have run so high if they had had no discontent with the government.” Choi added that the Federation of the Trade Unions (FTU) was the group that called the shots in the Struggle Committee while the real boss behind the FTU was Xinhua’s Hong Kong branch. “Yeung Kwong, director of the Struggle Committee, was merely a figurehead. Senior officials of Xinhua’s Hong Kong branch should shoulder a major responsibility for the riots. The members of the leftist organizations would not have become militant if there had been no instigation by Xinhua,” he said. Choi was sympathetic with the leaders of Xinhua’s Hong Kong branch. “The ultra-leftists was the dominant faction in the mainland in 1967 and the Xinhua leaders had to adopt a radical approach so as to protect themselves,” he said. Choi added that the leftist trade unions had to follow the orders of the Communist Party but the ultra-leftists had seized power at that time. “The ultra-leftists intended to stir up trouble in Hong Kong. That’s why the leftist unions in Hong Kong took some excessive and radical measures.” Choi insisted that the Struggle Committee opposed violent means in the antiBritish struggle but the 104-member committee failed to function properly because of the pressure from the colonial government. “The rank-and-file members of the leftist organizations then became out of control, and some took radical actions like planting bombs,” he said. “They became very angry after the police raided the venues of many leftist organizations and arrested leftist leaders in July.” He said that he was also opposed to planting bombs when he was detained at the concentration camp because it would undermine the interests of the general public and those of the leftist camp. But he believed that some bombs were planted by the colonial government so as to arouse grudges against the leftist camp. Choi, who was president of the Chinese Reform Association from the mid-1980s to the mid-1990s, felt that on the issue of “who should shoulder the responsibility

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for the riots”, many people held unfair views. He was aggrieved that a lot of people who had supported the cause of the struggle against the colonial government were made scapegoats for the disturbances. “Many people think that the leftists in Hong Kong staged a ‘Cultural Revolution’ in Hong Kong under the influence of the ultraleftists in the mainland and as a result brought disaster to Hong Kong society,” he said. “Those taking part in the disturbances out of righteous indignation were the biggest victims but they were not able to speak their minds. That political storm had indeed brought disaster to the society. People like me suffered during the riots while other compatriots also suffered a lot. But it is difficult to win the sympathy from the people who had no knowledge of the riots. Those who were discontented with the colonial rule and supported the anti-British struggle became scapegoats for the 1967 riots,” he said. He added that it was unfair to make a judgment on the riots out of the historical context. In May 1997, Choi published an article entitled “Resistance only comes after oppression: An analysis of the historical background of the anti-British and counter-violence movement” in pro-Beijing Ta Kung Pao. He lamented the fact that many people preferred to call themselves “pro-China” and were shy to say that they were “patriotic”. He attributed the phenomenon to the consequences of being patriotic in the 1960s. “Please treat compatriots who have stuck to their patriotic stance fairly,” he wrote. He was unhappy with the Hong Kong branch of Xinhua News Agency and the mainland media’s failure to mention the anti-British struggle on the eve of China’s resumption of Hong Kong’s sovereignty in 1997, which coincided with the 30th anniversary of the disturbances. Many media in Hong Kong devoted plenty of coverage on the anniversary of the riots but pro-Beijing media remained tight-lipped on the historical event. Choi learned from sources close to the Hong Kong branch of Xinhua that the then Xinhua director Zhou Nan wanted a “total repudiation” of the riots because it was a mistake made by the leftist masses. “I was very dissatisfied with that position and sought clarification from Xinhua,” said Choi, who was a Hong Kong deputy to the National People’s Congress from 1993 to 1998. Choi recalled that Liao Chengzhi, the late director of the State Council’s Hong Kong and Macau Affairs Office, talked about the responsibility for the riots when he received a group of leftists who were jailed during the 1967 disturbances. “Liao said that the central government was responsible for the mistake but the patriotic fervour of the compatriots should be recognized,” Choi said. He said that the intention of some top Xinhua officials was to repudiate the riots and the description of the riots as “a spontaneous mass movement” marked a departure from Liao’s views. In an interview in Hangzhou, Zhang Junsheng, former deputy director of Xinhua’s Hong Kong branch, said that the central government saw no point in mentioning the 1967 riots again during the transitional period just before the 1997 handover. “The 1967 incident [is] part of history, and attempts to settle old scores are not conducive to harmony and unity in Hong Kong,” he said.

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Choi said that thousands have had criminal records for the rest of their lives after they were jailed during the bloody disturbances. “Many people had difficulties in seeking jobs and applying for emigration. It would be a good idea for the Hong Kong government to set up a commission of inquiry to look into the event,” he said. Choi described himself as a “typical Hong Kong boy” as his background was markedly different from those of the ordinary leftists. He received his secondary education in the 1930s at Wah Yan College, Kowloon, a prominent AngloChinese school, where he was nurtured to become a fluent English speaker. One of his classmates, Tsang Chiu-for, joined the Hong Kong police force and was subsequently promoted as superintendent. He was once the highest-ranking officer of Chinese descent in the force and deputy head of the Police Training Institute. Tsang was deported to the mainland in the early 1960s on the suspicion that he was spying for China. In 1940, a year before the Japanese troops launched attacks on Hong Kong, secondary school students in the city were required to join St. John Ambulance Brigade, the Royal Hong Kong Regiment (The Volunteers), or the Air Raid Precaution Squad as a form of community service. Choi joined the Air Raid Precaution Squad. When the Japanese troops invaded Hong Kong in December 1941, he was dispatched to an air-raid shelter adjacent to the Government House. Whenever the Japanese troops launched air raids, the then governor Mark Young took refuge in the shelter where he often ran into Choi. Young was well aware that the British army could not defend Hong Kong beyond Christmas that year. On the eve of Britain’s surrender, he told Choi and his fellow squad members to take off their uniforms and flee so as to avoid being sent to concentration camps. Choi intended to go to Chongqing, China’s wartime capital, via Guilin after leaving the rank of the Air Raid Precaution Squad. But his hope was dashed when Guilin fell into the hands of the Japanese army. Choi had no alternative but fled to the rural area of Guangdong province. “My wartime experience reinforced my nationalistic and anti-colonial sentiment,” he said. Britain resumed control of Hong Kong after Japan’s surrender in 1945 and set up a military authority as a provisional governing body. Choi returned from Guangdong and joined the military as a translator. Choi was also a managing director of Oriental Machinery and Cosmos Machinery Enterprises which focused their business on their mainland. Choi also participated in social affairs through the Chinese Reform Association, a group founded by local professionals in response to the political reform blueprint put forward by Mark Young. On his return to Hong Kong resuming his post of governor in May 1946, Young announced that the British government considered “arrangements should be devised whereby inhabitants of Hong Kong may be enabled to play a fuller and more responsible part in the administration of public affairs in the Colony”. Recognizing the anti-colonial sentiment in Hong Kong, the governor,

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who had frequent encounters with Choi inside the air-raid shelter in 1941, proposed to set up an elected municipal council that would allow local inhabitants a share in managing local affairs. But the initiative was eventually abandoned by Governor Alexander Grantham, who succeeded Young in 1947. The Young Plan ignited the interests in local politics among some professionals and intellectuals in Hong Kong. Mok Ying-kwai and Percy Chen, both barristers, Chan Kwan-po, senior lecturer in the Department of Chinese, the University of Hong Kong, Wong San-yin, formerly a lecturer in pharmacology at the University of Hong Kong, and Wu Tat-biu, a doctor, founded the Hong Kong Chinese Reform Association in the hope of participating in political reform. Dr Wong was elected the association’s founding chairman. A declassified file entitled Constitution of Hong Kong (1946–1952), which includes correspondence between the governor and the British Foreign Office on the political reform proposal put forward by Governor Mark Young, shows that the Hong Kong government had kept a watchful eye on the Hong Kong Chinese Reform Association. Alexander Grantham wrote in the document that the association submitted their views on the proposal in a letter dated June 21, 1949. The association said that “all unofficial members of Municipal Council should be elected and the appointment system dropped”. Grantham also made a note on the background of the Chinese Reform Association: “The Hong Kong Chinese Reform Association was formed as a counterblast to the Reform Club (a group mainly comprised expatriate elite in Hong Kong). The moving spirit is said to have been Mr Mok Ying Kwai. This association naturally attracted several political adventurers, notably Moscow-trained Percy Chen. It is rumoured that the KMT group of merchants who made a determined effort last year to gain control of the Chinese Chamber of Commerce has now decided to join the Reform Association in a body, but it is probably more likely that the Communists may try to get control in the future,” Grantham wrote.11 The governor also mentioned a public meeting organized by the Chinese Manufacturers’ Union, the Kowloon Chamber of Commerce and the Chinese Reform Association on July 13, 1949. “It is claimed that 142 organisations in the colony were represented at the meeting and signed the petition subsequently presented to me,” Grantham wrote. The Chinese Reform Association evolved into a group fighting for the rights of Hong Kong residents following British’s abandonment of the Young Plan. Choi said that the association opposed unreasonable policies of the Hong Kong government, such as the increase of electricity tariff. The association was one of the few groups which hoisted five-star flags on the National Day of the People’s Republic of China and Mok Ying-kwai was the chairman of the first Preparatory Committee for the National Day Celebration. Choi said that the Chinese government sent medicine and rice to Hong Kong when the city was hit by natural disaster in the 1950s. “Our

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association and the Federation of Trade Unions were responsible for distributing the relief. It spoke volumes for the weight of our association at that time,” he said. In March 1952, riots broke out in Kowloon when the government refused entry of a Guangdong mission who had come to convey appreciation and solicitude to the victims of a fire in the Shek Kip Mei squatter area. The Chinese Reform Association bore the brunt of the riots because Mok Ying-kwai and Percy Chen went to Lowu to greet the mission. Mok was deported to the mainland and the association’s operation nearly came to a halt under the pressure of the government. Percy Chen subsequently sought help from the Hong Kong Chinese Clerks Association in reorganizing the Reform Association. Choi, then an executive committee member of the Clerks Association, joined the Chinese Reform Association at the end of 1952. He gradually became one of the leaders of the association and was chairman in the mid-1980s. He remained as association leader until 1999.

Faceless participants who paid a heavy price for their involvement in the riots History’s sidelines are littered with faceless participants who paid a heavy price for their accidental involvement in political upheavals. The legacy of the 1967 riots was no exception. Some people did not belong to the leftist camp but had their career ruined by the disturbances but their stories were seldom told by historians. Siu Kim-fai was beaten up by a factory foreman in 1967 and the incident gave rise to the disturbances. He led a miserable life after the riots. Siu was one of the workers at the Hong Kong Artificial Flower Works in San Po Kong who staged industrial action against the new work rules announced in April 1967. But he could hardly imagine that the labour dispute would escalate into territory-wide riots. Until the day he died, he had harboured bitterness towards the riot leaders who he felt had manipulated and then abandoned him. He said that he was not a member of any leftist labour unions at the time and the Hong Kong and Kowloon Rubber and Plastic Workers General Union, a member of the pro-Beijing Federation of Trade Unions (FTU), did not approach workers of the factory until early May. Siu, who had worked in the factory for more than a year when the dispute broke out, described the labour strike as unorganized and “leaderless” prior to the Tai Yau Street incident on May 6, in which 21 people were arrested when a group of the sacked workers tried to prevent goods from being sent away from the factory. “The Rubber and Plastic Workers General Union had approached us since May 4 and invited us to discuss the strategy in the dispute on their premise,” he said. “The unionists asked us to write big-character posters to uncover the ‘exploitation’ by the management. However, they reminded us not to make the posters too politicized.” He believed that the leftist camp did not stir up trouble.

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He recalled that the management had stopped giving wages to workers for two months and had no intention of resolving the dispute. “On May 6, my fellow workers and I tried to prevent goods from being sent out of the factory. Policemen arrived at the factory after the management reported to the police. I quarrelled with a foreman called Kung Biu. He kicked my chest and the incident sparked an outcry from the workers. The trouble then began,” Siu said. The riot policemen, who were on the alert nearby, intervened in the wake of the scuffle. Twenty workers, including Siu and Lee Sing, were arrested while a number of workers were injured after they were beaten by policemen. Siu said that the riot policemen clubbed his head with batons when they arrested him. “I learned from my family afterwards that some policemen went to my home on May 5. They told my wife that I should not go too far in the labour dispute, otherwise they would teach me a lesson,” he said. Siu was taken back to Wong Tai Sin Police Station where he claimed that he was beaten by five or six policemen. “They encircled me and each of them punched me six times. An inspector surnamed Mok pressed me on the floor and stepped on my back with his shoe on,” he said, “I told him, ‘Beat me to death. There are dozens of fellow workers continuing our struggle even if I die.’ ” He suffered nerve damage from the beatings and was unable to work since the late 1970s onwards. He lived on welfare until he died in 2006. Siu, Lee Sing, and Fung Kam-shui, chairman of the Rubber and Plastic Workers General Union, were prosecuted two days later for participating in “unlawful assemblies”. They were brought to North Kowloon Magistrates’ Court for trial, but Siu was not convicted. He was seen by the leftists as a hero in the anti-British struggle. “People from the FTU took me back from the court to their headquarters in To Kwa Wan. Yeung Kwong [FTU chairman and All-Circles Struggle Committee director] told me: ‘You don’t have to worry about your livelihood. We have plenty of money.’ ” Siu and Lee were asked to denounce the colonial government’s “persecution” and “fascist atrocities” at a mass meeting organized by the FTU on May 19. Siu, who was the first speaker at the meeting, recalled how he was beaten by the police on May 6. According to the report by Ta Kung Pao on May 20, Siu said: “Despite suffering serious injury from the cruel torture by fascist thugs, Siu Kimfai stepped onto the stage to tell the crime committed by the Hong Kong British authorities. Lying on a stretcher, he uncovered the fascist thugs’ atrocities which defied human nature. Siu displayed his proletariat spirit of unyielding integrity through his accusation against the enemies. His speech aroused fellow workers’ class hatred and national hatred, sparking wrath among all workers attending the meeting. Many people who seldom cry burst into tears after listening to his speech which touched everybody’s heart. After taking a short break, Siu asked: ‘Can you support the struggle against the paper tiger until we win the final victory?’ He was then speechless because of exhaustion.”12

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215

Yeung Kwong consoled Siu and other injured workers during the five-hour meeting, claiming that the Struggle Committee would continue the fight to the end and would not stop until “winning the full victory”. The federation paid him a monthly subsidy of HK$505, equivalent to nearly two months’ salary for an ordinary worker at the time. He was to live in the federation headquarters where Siu had the opportunity to have close-range contacts with Yeung. “He was on the government’s wanted list at that time. Fearing that he would be arrested by the police, he often put on a suit and wore a tie, and dressed like a boss,” Siu said. “He made a name for himself during the riots but most of the people died during the confrontation were workers.” Many core members of the Struggle Committee were arrested during the disturbances but the police did not take any action against Yeung. “I also found it strange. Perhaps the Hong Kong government didn’t intend to arrest him,” Siu said. Siu said that the federation stopped giving him the subsidy one year later and told him, “Make your ends meet by yourself.” “I asked Yeung Kwong why the federation stopped giving me financial support. He just said, ‘It was you who asked for the struggle’,” Siu said, “the federation turned a blind eye to my plight after manipulating me in the anti-British struggle.” He then moved away from the federation headquarters and had once worked at the construction site of the Cross Harbour Tunnel. But his nerve damage relapsed in 1968 and his limbs trembled ceaselessly. His wife later divorced him and his children also abandoned him. “The riots ruined my family and it was useless to regret for the past,” he said in his tiny flat in Shun Lee Estate in Kowloon. Until the day he died, he harboured bitterness towards the riots leaders who he felt had manipulated him. He said that the 1967 riots had its positive impact, such as forcing the colonial government to improve workers’ rights and welfare. “Before the riots, workers had virtually no protection and welfare. Employers did not have to pay any compensation for dismissing workers and workers did not receive any compensation after they were injured at work,” he said, “but many people were killed by the bombs planted by leftists and it was unforgivable that some children died in the bomb attacks.” Cheung Po-shuen is another person who shot to fame for her “heroics” during the anti-British struggle. Cheung grew up in a traditional leftist family and her father was a secretary of the Hong Kong Department Stores and Commercial Staff General Union. Her father was also a mentor to legislators Chan Yuen-han and Tam Yiu-chung, who became chairman of the Democratic Alliance for the Betterment and Progress of Hong Kong in 2007. After graduating from Hon Wah College in 1967, 17-year-old Cheung and her two classmates were allocated to work in the recreational centre of the Dairy Products Beverage and Food Industries Employees Union in Pok Fu Lam. On July 17, they were arrested when the riot police raided the recreational centre. She was angry with the riot policemen who tore off portraits of Mao Zedong posted in the

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premise. She therefore chanted “Long Live Chairman Mao”, and as a result, she was charged with “making seditious speeches”. She refused to sit down during her trial and queried the judge the definition of “sedition”. “There is no law for the people if there are fascist laws,” she said in the courtroom. The judge said that she was insane and sentenced her to one year’s imprisonment. She was locked in Lai Chi Kok Female Inmates Prison, which is now demolished. A report by Xinhua’s Hong Kong branch said that Cheung turned the court into her rostrum in which she “uncovered the loathsome face of the enemies”. The report lauded Cheung as a “young hero in the Mao Zedong era” and “raging fire in the furnace of revolution”. “I had browsed books on socialism and the Communist Party since I was a little girl. When I was sentenced to imprisonment, I felt it was worthwhile to sacrifice for justice and our country,” she said. Although she took part in two demonstrations outside the Government House in mid-May, Cheung was not an activist during the riots. Yet, she became an accidental hero during the disturbances and became a model student for the leftist schools. “In retrospect, I was just used by the leftist camp as a tool for propaganda,” she said. She returned to Hon Wah College to study Form Six after her release and taught at the school for nine years. Despite opposition from the school management, she sat the Hong Kong Certificate of Education Examination in 1978 and was enrolled at Jinan University in Guangzhou in the same year. Hon Wah College, however, did not recognize the qualifications she obtained from Jinan University when she applied for a teaching position at the school. She subsequently joined China Resources, a mainland-funded enterprise, and switched to a trading company in the early 1990s. “I have no regrets about what I did in 1967 but my experience enabled me to see the true colours of the leftist camp,” said. She was disgruntled with Beijing’s reluctance to shoulder the responsibilities for the riots. “By denying the 1967 riots, Beijing apparently denied all participants in the movement. It is very unfair to those who sacrificed their youth and prospects,” she said. “Many people took part in the movement without thinking much about their own interests and well-being, hoping that they could contribute to the country. But they ended up being manipulated by the Communist Party. Beijing could deny that they had instigated the riots but it should affirm the patriotic fervour of the masses.” “Beijing and the Hong Kong government should do justice to the participants,” Cheung said. She has long left the leftist camp. The book which she has recommended to her daughter is the memoir of Wang Dan, one of the student leaders of the 1989 pro-democracy movement in Beijing.

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217

Leung Yiu-wah and Luk Kai-lau: A bomb-planter and a policeman recalled the riots Although the bomb planters during the 1967 riots have been widely condemned in the past few decades, Leung Yiu-wah remains unrepentant about the bomb attacks that he and his fellow leftists launched in the hot summer of 1967. Unlike ordinary Hong Kong residents who witnessed the disturbances, Leung has a different perception of the bomb attacks in 1967. A 17-year-old construction worker and a dedicated member of the leftist labour union at the time, he joined a workers’ delegation in sending appreciation to the workers at Hong Kong Artificial Flower Works in San Po Kong. During a confrontation with the police on May 11, he was wounded by a wooden bullet fired by the riot police. He had taken part in the “street warfare” against the police since July 1967. “I used to block police vans and protected fellow leftists who staged street performances,” he said. During a confrontation with the riot police in Soy Street in Mong Kok, a fellow leftist standing beside Leung was shot by the police. “We sent the comrade to a clinic run by the Federation of Trade Unions but the person in charge told us to send him to Queen Elizabeth Hospital. As our clothes were bloodstained, we were arrested and beaten after we were taken to Yau Ma Tei Police Station,” he said. They were released on bail but they did not report to the police again. Leung, a member of a “combat group” formed by the leftists, took part in making and planting bombs during the disturbances. “We made bombs in secret premises provided by the leftist organizations. In a bomb attack staged in Chatham Road, Tsim Sha Tsui, our bomb injured some policemen,” he said, adding that he acted under the leadership of some influential left-wing figures and senior officials of the Hong Kong branch of the Xinhua News Agency. “When an official from Xinhua’s Hong Kong branch contacted us, we knew that we had some important new mission,” he said. He was wounded by a bullet fired by the riot police in a confrontation near Kai Tak airport in August 1967. He said that Yeung Kwong, director of the All-Circles Anti-Persecution Struggle Committee, and Ta Kung Pao President Fei Yiming visited him after he was injured. Leung listed the “achievements” of his combat group, such as breaking traffic light posts and blocking police vans. “We had once thought of robbing police pistols but the idea was rejected by our bosses,” he said. Describing their campaign as “an eye for an eye”, he said it was the only means which the leftists had for resisting “colonial suppression”. Leung described the struggle against the colonial administration as a “righteous” campaign, adding: “We can hold our heads high. We love our country and the Chinese Communist Party.”

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Leung, who is now a construction contractor, said that he was aggrieved at the lack of recognition for the “righteous and patriotic struggle” by the leftists during the 1967 riots. Leung’s perception of the disturbances is strikingly different from that of Luk Kai-lau, who was a police constable during the 1967 riots. He joined the police force in 1965 and took part in quelling the riots sparked by the Star Ferry fare increase in 1966. “The reason why I joined the police force was very simple; I wanted a meaningful job which could help to make my ends meet. It was just a job to me and it did not mean that I supported the colonial government,” he said. He was deployed to station outside the Government House when thousands of leftists besieged the colonial mansion in mid-May 1967. “The demonstrators chanted slogans using loudspeakers in front of me. Some of them spat at me and kicked my feet,” Luk said. “The colonial government was very clever. We were told to exercise utmost restraint in the early days of the demonstrations.” He said that nine companies of policemen (each company consisted of 130 policemen) were stationed near the Government House. The date of showdown came on May 22 when thousands of left-wingers marched to the Government House. “I heard that the ensuing confrontation on that day was sparked by an accident. A plank on the wall of Hilton Hotel (original site of Cheung Kong Center in Central) fell down accidentally on a group of riot police. The police then dispersed crowds nearby and the rest was history,” he said. A total of 167 persons were arrested that day. Luk said that Peter Godber, subsequently known as the infamous chief superintendent of police who fled from Hong Kong in 1973 while being investigated for corruption, was the field commander at the time. Godber had been hailed by the police force as one of their heroes of 1967 for confronting rioters on the streets. For Luk, the most memorable mission during the disturbances was his participation in the raid on Kiu Kwan Mansion in North Point, one of the leftist camp’s strongholds. Seven companies of riot policemen, seven platoons of British soldiers and three helicopters were deployed in the operation. “The helicopter in which we rode took off from a British aircraft carrier stationed in Victoria Harbour. We landed on the rooftop of the mansion and proceeded with the operation,” said Luk, who earned a monthly salary of HK$322 at the time. He said that both policemen and the general public were in a helpless situation during the riots. He said that he and his colleagues narrowly escaped the attack of a utensil full of acid when he was on duty in Johnston Road in Wan Chai. Responding to the leftists’ complaints about the use of excessive violence by the police during the disturbances, Luk said: “Policemen and leftists were on two rival camps, so it was natural for policemen to teach leftists a lesson when they fell into the hands of the police. It was just a manifestation of human nature.”

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Luk, who retired in 1998, agreed that many people felt that the management of Hong Kong Artificial Flower Works did exploit the workers. “The Hong Kong government had not done well enough in the 1960s but there was no channel for Hong Kong people to air their grievances,” he said. The labour dispute, however, was subsequently politicized by the leftist camp, Luk said. “The Police Children Education Fund, set up by the government after the riots, raised more than HK$3 million. It showed that the police won the support of the business sector and members of the public for its handling of the disturbances.”

Appendices Appendix 1: Rebuff provocation by British imperialism Editorial of the People’s Daily on June 3, 1967 A great struggle to oppose British imperialist bloody persecution has broken out in Hong Kong. From the beginning of May Hong Kong compatriots have flocked into the streets chanting Mao’s quotations despite armed suppression by British army and police. Workers in all kinds of enterprises have gone on strikes or stopped work. Despite several warnings from our government, the Hong Kong British authorities have not only refused to bow their heads and admit their guilt for the fascist atrocities committed by them but carried out even stronger provocations against the Chinese people. They are continuing to arrest and question our compatriots illegally. They have viciously beaten and tortured to death those arrested. They have issued a series of so-called emergency laws and planning even more large-scale arrests and persecution. They have brought in an aircraft carrier and are openly boasting of a show of force. British imperialism reckons that the Chinese people will be scared by a few police truncheons, laws and warships. This is an idiotic illusion. Our compatriots have said correctly that if the Hong Kong British authorities escalate their atrocities the anti-British struggle will also be escalated. They have warned the British imperialists that this struggle has only just begun. An even more heroic and largescale struggle is still to come. Our compatriots will certainly firmly struggle, oppose a stubborn enemy, pursue a tottering foe and will bring down British imperialism and make it stink. British imperialism is the vicious colonizer of Hong Kong. It is the enemy of the 4 million Chinese compatriots and of the 700 million Chinese people. For the last 100 years decadent, corrupt imperialism has carried out cruel suppression of Hong Kong compatriots. The Hong Kong army, police, agents, courts and prisons are all tools of persecution of our compatriots and have reduced them to poverty. They have corrupted them with the most decadent rotten Western culture. In the last few years they have colluded with United States imperialism to make Hong Kong a base for the Vietnam War and to oppose China. The bloody debts and towering crimes of British imperialism over the last 100 years must be repaid.

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Appendices

The fascist atrocities of British imperialism have obliged our compatriots to begin a movement to hate and despise British imperialism and to take all possible measures politically, economically and culturally to launch a counter-attack against British imperialism and its colonial regime. They will certainly expose and publish a wide scale of the towering crimes of British imperialism over the last 100 years and will launch mass accusation movements so that the aggressive nature of reactionary decadent British imperialism is made clear to every household in Hong Kong. In this struggle we shall mainly rely upon the Hong Kong working class as the main force of revolution. We should also fully mobilize youths and students so that the youth and student movements merge with the workers’ movement. With the working class at the centre, compatriots of all levels will focus the struggle on the United States and British imperialism, but first and foremost against British imperialism. However frantic or threatening British imperialism is in Hong Kong at present, if only compatriots will further unite and organize themselves, and form strong revolutionary ranks and launch a broad anti-imperialist mass movement, they will become a true rampart of revolution. British imperialism will smash itself to pieces on this rampart. If British imperialism continues to carry out bloody persecution of our patriotic compatriots, our Hong Kong compatriots and the 700 million Chinese people will certainly not stand for this. Hong Kong and Kowloon compatriots, further mobilize yourselves, organize yourselves and launch a struggle against British imperialism. Prepare yourselves at the right time to answer the call of the motherland and smash the reactionary regime of British imperialism. Tens of millions of the Red Guards who have achieved victory in the Cultural Revolution support you. Hundreds of millions of revolutionary masses support you. The 700 million Chinese people, armed with Mao Zedong Thought, have sworn to provide a powerful backing for Hong Kong compatriots. Hong Kong and Kowloon compatriots, go forward to a great victory.

Appendices

223

Appendix 2: Statistics of the 1967 disturbances (May 1967 to December 31, 1967) (1) Casualties (a) Killed Police Military Fire service Others (i)

Total:

10 1 1 39 51

Total:

2 2 6 10

Police Killed by explosion Killed by stabbing Killed by shooting

(ii) Military Killed by explosion (iii) Others Killed by explosion Shot by police Killed by incendiary attack Found dead, or found seriously injured and subsequently died Died in the course of riots but not through police action Died whilst in police custody

1 12 17 2 5

Total:

2 1 39

Total:

212 29 4 2 585 832

(b) Injured Police Armed forces Fire brigade Hawker control force Others

(2) Persons convicted (i) Riot (ii) Unlawful assembly (iii) Breach of curfew (iv) Possession of bombs (real)

318 465 232 40

(continued on p. 224)

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Appendices

(v) Possession of bombs (simulated) (vi) Explosive offences (vii) Possession of inflammatory posters (viii) Inflammatory speech (ix) Intimidating assembly (x) Other offences Total:

45 33 209 81 185 328 1,936

(3) Bombs Uncontrolled explosions Suspected bombs dealt with by bomb disposal teams Number of genuine bombs Sticks of gelignite seized Sticks of dynamite seized

253 8,074 1,167 164 564

(4) Police raids on suspected premises

1,281

Source: Hong Kong Disturbances 1967.

Appendix 3: Membership list of the Standing Committee of the All-Circles Anti-Persecution Struggle Committee Name Yeung Kwong

Occupation at the time chairman of the Federation of Trade Unions (FTU)

Fei Yiming

publisher of Ta Kung Pao

Tse Hung-wai

manager of Teck Soon Hong and committee member of the Chinese General Chamber of Commerce headmaster of Hon Wah College

Wong Kin-lap

K.C. Wong

vice-chairman of the Chinese General Chamber of Commerce

Title director of the Struggle Committee vice-director of the Struggle Committee vice-director of the Struggle Committee

Latest situation adviser of the FTU

vice-director of the Struggle Committee vice-director of the Struggle Committee

deceased in 2003

deceased in 1988

deceased in 1986

(continued on p. 225)

Appendices

Wu Kau

vice-chairman of the Hong Kong Union of Chinese Workers in Western-Style Employment Lau Him chairman of the KMB Union under the Motor Transport Workers’ General Union Ng Yi chairman of the Hong Kong and China Gas Co. Ltd. Chinese Employees’ Association Tang Chuen representative of the Hong Kong Tramway Workers’ Union Kwok Tim-hoi chairman of the Motor Transport Workers’ General Union Liu Yat-yuen president of Sun Luen Film Company Chan Hong deputy manager of the Bank of China (Hong Kong) Yam Yi-chee film director at Feng Huang Film Company Poon Tak-sing deputy chief editor of the Hong Kong branch of the Xinhua News Agency Wong Yin-fong chairwoman of the Hong Kong and Kowloon Spinning Weaving and Dyeing Trade Workers’ General Union Tong Ping-tat treasurer of the Chinese General Chamber of Commerce Wong Fu-wing student at Heung To Middle School

225

deceased

deceased

deceased in 2002 adviser of the Bank of China (Hong Kong) deceased

deceased

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Appendices

Appendix 4: Unofficial Members of the Executive Council, Legislative Council and Urban Council in 1967 Executive Council Albert Rodrigues Kwan Choi-yiu John Clague Fung Ping-fan Sidney Gordon Kan Yuet-keung Li Fook-shu John Saunders

Source: Hong Kong 1967.

Legislative Council Dhun Ruttonjee Kan Yuet-keung Li Fook-shu Fong Hon-chu Tang Ping-yuan Tse Yu-chuen Kenneth Watson Woo Pak-chuen George Ross Szeto Wai Wilfred Wong Sien-bing Ellen Li Shu-pui James Leach

Urban Council Brook Bernacchi Li Yiu-bor Woo Pak-foo Hilton Cheong-leen Alison Bell Elsie Elliott Solomon Rafeek Henry Hu Hung-lik Denny Huang Mong-hwa Woo Po-shing Arnaldo de Oliveira Sales Wilfred Wong Sien-bing Wilson Wang Tze-sam Ellen Li Shu-pui Daniel Lam See-hin Rogerio Lobo Hugh Forsgate Kenneth Lo Tak-cheung Peter Ng Ping-kin Derek Blaker

Notes

Introduction 1. 2. 3. 4.

5.

Derek Davies, “What’s to be done now?”, Far Eastern Economic Review, June 1, 1967, pp. 509–11. FCO 40/46, May 24, 1967. Independent Commission Against Corruption, ICAC 25th Anniversary (Hong Kong: The Commission, 1999), p. 14. Matthew Turner, “Hong Kong Sixties/Nineties: Dissolving the People”, in Matthew Turner and Irene Ngan (eds.), Hong Kong Sixties: Designing Identity, pp. 2–34 (Hong Kong: Hong Kong Arts Centre, 1995). 周永新，《目睹香港四十年》。香港：明報出版社，1990，頁40。 [Nelson Chow Wing-sun, Observing Hong Kong for 40 Years.]

Chapter 1 1. Elsie Tu, Elsie Tu: An Autobiography (Hong Kong: Longman Group [Far East] Limited, 1988), p. 203. 2. Ming Pao, April 6, 1966. 3. Report of the Commission of Inquiry into Kowloon Disturbances, 1966 (Hong Kong: Government Printer, 1966). 4. Stephen Chow Siu-man, “Economic Growth and Income Distribution in Hong Kong”. Unpublished PhD dissertation, Boston University, 1977. 5. Ian Scott, Political Change and the Crisis of Legitimacy in Hong Kong (Honolulu: University of Hawai’i Press), p. 73. 6. Undergrad, April 4, 1967. 7. Far Eastern Economic Review, May 5, 1966. 8. Ming Pao, April 7, 1966. 9. Wen Wei Po, April 9, 1966. 10. 中共中央文獻研究室編，《周恩來年譜（1949–1976）》。北京：中央文獻出版 社，1997，頁99。[Chronicle of Zhou Enlai (1949–1976), Volume 2, p. 99.] 11. 金堯如，《中共香港政策秘聞實錄》，香港：田園書屋，1998，頁86–97。[Kam Yiu-yu, The Secrets and Factual Records of the Chinese Communist Party’s Policies towards Hong Kong.] 12. Ibid.

228

13. 14. 15. 16. 17. 18.

Notes to pages 19–36

Ibid. Ibid. Ming Pao, May 5, 1967. Ibid. John Cooper, Colony in Conflict (Hong Kong: Swindon Book Company, 1970), p. 7. Ibid., p. 9.

Chapter 2 1. 2. 3.

4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9. 10. 11. 12. 13. 14. 15. 16. 17. 18. 19. 20. 21. 22. 23. 24. 25. 26. 27. 28. 29. 30. 31. 32. 33. 34.

Hong Kong 1967 (Hong Kong: Government Printer, 1968), p. 337. 劉蜀永，《香港史新編》。香港：三聯書店，1998，頁259。[Liu Shuyong, A New History of Hong Kong, 1988.] 岑逸飛，《對香港騷動的分析》，《盤古》，1967年6月號，頁12–18。[Shum Yat-fei, “An Analysis of the Disturbances in Hong Kong”, Pan Ku Magazine, June 1967.] A Report by the Inter-departmental Working Party to Consider Certain Aspects of Social Security (Hong Kong: Hong Kong Government Printer, April 1967). Undergrad, July 13, 1967. Ming Pao, August 25, 1967. Hong Kong Disturbances 1967, p. 5. Ming Pao, May 6, 1967. Star, August 7, 1967. Far Eastern Economic Review, May 10, 1967. Ming Pao, May 9, 1967. John Cooper, Colony in Conflict, p. 8. Note of a Press Conference held on June 29, 1967 in London by David Trench, file at the Commonwealth Office. FCO 40/46. Ming Pao, May 7, 1967. John Cooper, Colony in Conflict, p. 8. Telegraph No. 589, FCO 40/45. Elsie Tu, Elsie Tu: An Autobiography, p. 220. Hong Kong 1967, p. 2. FCO 40/46. Hong Kong Disturbances 1967, p. 5. Memorandum by the Commonwealth Secretary, FCO 40/46. Ta Kung Pao, May 9, 1967. Ta Kung Pao, May 12, 1967. John Cooper, Colony in Conflict, p. 12. Ta Kung Pao, May 12, 1967. Ming Pao, May 14, 1967. Hong Kong Disturbances 1967, p. 10. Ta Kung Pao, May 15, 1967. Kung Sheung Yat Po, May 14, 1967. Ta Kung Pao, May 16, 1967. FCO 40/48. Telegram No. 589, FCO 40/45. FCO 40/46.

Notes to pages 36–59

229

35. Ibid. 36. Far Eastern Economic Review, May 18, 1967, pp. 420–21. 37. 陳揚勇，《苦撐危局：周恩來在1967》)，北京：中央文獻出版社，1999，頁353 。[Chen Yangyong, Struggling Hard amid the Critical Situation: Zhou Enlai in 1967, p. 353.] 38. 金堯如，《中共香港政策秘聞實錄》，頁96。[Kam Yiu-yu, The Secrets and Factual Records of the Chinese Communist Party’s Policies towards Hong Kong, p. 96.] 39. Overseas Chinese Daily, May 20, 1967. 40. Ta Kung Pao, May 22, 1967. 41. John Cooper, Colony in Conflict, p. 67. 42. Ta Kung Pao, May 24, 1967. Chapter 3 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9. 10. 11. 12. 13. 14. 15. 16. 17.

18. 19. 20. 21. 22. 23.

John Cooper, Colony in Conflict, p. 72. FCO 40/45. Telegram No. 899, FCO 40/45. John Cooper, Colony in Conflict, p. 31. South China Morning Post, May 23, 1967. Hong Kong Disturbances 1967, p. 14. Ibid. South China Morning Post, May 23, 1967. Elsie Tu, Elsie Tu: An Autobiography, p. 221. Hong Kong Disturbances 1967, p. 15. South China Morning Post, May 23, 1967. Chronicle of Zhou Enlai (1949–1976), Volume 3, p. 155. Yu Cheung-geng, “The inside story of Zhou Enlai’s remote control of the ‘Anti-British persecution’ ”, The Nineties, May 1996, pp. 70–76. Telegraph No. 662, FCO 40/46. Telegram No. 677, FCO 40/46. FCO 40/46. 陳揚勇，《苦撐危局：周恩來在1967》。北京：中央文獻出版社，1999，頁355 。[Chen Yangyong, Struggling Hard amid the Critical Situation: Zhou Enlai in 1967, p. 355.] Arthur Galsworthy to the Commonwealth Office, Telegram No. 698, FCO 40/46. David Trench to the Commonwealth Office, Telegram No. 714, FCO 40/46. David Trench to the Commonwealth Office, Telegram No. 769, FCO 40/47. Pan Ku, June issue, 1967, pp. 5–10. FCO 40/46. Telegram No. 944 FCO 40/45.

Chapter 4 1. 2. 3. 4.

Telegram No. 688, FCO 40/46. Telegram No. 626, FCO 40/47. Telegram No. 1891, FCO 40/47. Donald Hopson to the British Commonwealth Office, June 3, 1967, Telegram No. 632, FCO 40/47.

230

5. 6. 7. 8. 9. 10. 11. 12. 13. 14. 15. 16. 17. 18. 19.

Notes to pages 60–79

David Trench to the Commonwealth Office, June 5, 1967, Telegram No. 776, FCO 40/47. FCO 40/47. Interview with the author in March 2004. David Trench to the Commonwealth Office, June 25, Telegram No. 908, FCO 40/48. FCO 40/48. FCO 40/48. A Report on the Public Service 1967/68 (Hong Kong: Government Printer, 1968), pp. 21–22. Hong Kong Disturbances 1967, p. 23. Wen Wei Po, July 2, 1967. Hong Kong Hansard, May 17, 1967. FCO 40/48. Hong Kong 1967, p. 7. Hong Kong Hansard, July 12, 1967. South China Morning Post, May 23, 1967. South China Morning Post, May 23, 1967.

Chapter 5 1. 2 3. 4. 5.

6. 7. 8. 9. 10. 11. 12. 13. 14. 15. 16. 17. 18.

Michael Gass to the Commonwealth Office, July 9, 1967, Telegram No. 988, FCO 40/74. Ibid. Donald Hopson to the Foreign Office, July 9, 1967, Telegram No. 858, FCO 40/74. People’s Daily, July 9, 1967. 陳揚勇，《苦撐危局：周恩來在1967》。北京：中央文獻出版社，1999，頁355 。[Chen Yangyong, Struggling Hard amid the Critical Situation: Zhou Enlai in 1967, p. 355.] Michael Gass to the Commonwealth Office, July 10, 1967, Telegram No. 995, FCO 40/74. An Assessment of the External Threat to Security in the Border Area, March 25, 1968, FCO 40/76. July 25, 1967, FCO 40/78. Michael Gass to the Commonwealth Office, August 5, 1967, Telegram No. 1171, FCO 40/74. FCO 40/74. Michael Gass to the Commonwealth Office, August 11, 1967, Telegram No. 1210, FCO 40/74. Michael Gass to the Commonwealth Office, August 29, 1967, Telegram No. 1320, FCO 40/74. FCO 40/76. FCO 40/75. Tactics of Chinese Negotiators at Hong Kong Border Talks, FCO 40/67. John Denson, Chinese Negotiating Tactics, FCO 40/67. Wen Wei Po, July 10, 1967. 港九香港各界同胞反對港英迫害鬥爭委員會，《香港風暴》。香港：港九各界 同胞反對港英迫害鬥爭委員會，1968，頁26–27。[The All-Circles Anti-Persecution Struggle Committee (ed.), Storm in Hong Kong, pp. 26–27.]

Notes to pages 80–96

19. 20. 21. 22. 23. 24. 25. 26. 27. 28. 29. 30. 31. 32. 33. 34. 35. 36. 37. 38. 39. 40. 41.

42. 43. 44.

231

Ming Pao, July 13, 1967. Hong Kong Hansard, July 12, 1967. Hong Kong Disturbances 1967, p. 38. Michael Gass to the Commonwealth Office, July 21, 1967, Telegram No. 1085, FCO 40/49. Michael Gass to the Commonwealth Office, August 4, 1967, Telegram No. 1166, FCO 40/49. Elsie Tu: An Autobiography, p. 222. 《被捕前後─周樹源同學訪問記》，The Journal of the Federation of Students（《學 聯報》），1967年8月10日。 Henry Litton to John Tilney, November 28, 1968, FCO 40/147. FCO 40/147. Malcolm Shepherd to Sir Charles Taylor, February 27, 1969, FCO 40/148. Far Eastern Economic Review, July 27, 1967. FCO 40/49. Ta Kung Pao, July 21, 1967. Report on the Communist Bomb Campaign by the colonial secretariat, October 20, 1967, FCO 40/51. Ta Kung Pao, July 27, 1967. Ta Kung Pao, September 1, 1967. Michael Gass to the Commonwealth Office, August 11, 1967, Telegram No. 1208, FCO 40/49. Michael Gass to the Commonwealth Office, August 11, 1967, Telegram No. 1208, FCO 40/49. Hong Kong Disturbances, p. 45. Donald Hopson to the Foreign Office, July 20, 1967, Telegram No. 912, FCO 40/49. Percy Cradock, Experiences of China (London: John Murray, 1994), p. 58. Anthony Grey, Hostage in Peking (London: Michael Joseph, 1970), pp. 83–108. Special Branch, Study of the Future Disposal of Persons Held under Emergency Detention Regulation Either by Departure from Hong Kong or Release in the Colony, June 20, 1968, FCO 40/67. FCO 40/147. James Murray’s submission, “Mr Anthony Grey of Reuters”, March 3, 1969, FCO 40/149. In a letter to Gerald Long, Reuters general manager, in July 1969, the Foreign and Commonwealth Office said that the British government “tried to ease the path for the Chinese by refraining from insisting that the newsworkers should go back to China and by offering them instead the possibility of release to Macau and the return to Hong Kong at a later stage”. FCO 40/149.

Chapter 6 1. 2. 3. 4.

Feasibility on Evacuation of Hong Kong, September 6, 1967, FCO 40/92. Telegram No. 944, FCO 40/45. Extracts from minutes of the Defence and Overseas Policy Committee held on May 25, 1967, FCO 40/47. Arthur Galsworthy to Saville Garner, “The possibility of a British withdrawal from Hong Kong”, May 31, 1967, FCO 40/77.

232

Notes to pages 96–108

5. 6.

H. P. Hall to Secretary of State for Commonwealth Affairs, June 28, 1967, FCO 40/77. Draft Interim Report: Hong Kong, Defence Review Working Party, Defence and Overseas Policy Committee, July 19, 1967, FCO 40/77. 7. Interim Report by Officials, July 21, 1967, FCO 40/78. 8. Commonwealth Office, Feasibility Study on Evacuation of Hong Kong, September 6, 1967, FCO 40/92. 9. Emergency Evacuation of Hong Kong, Hong Kong Department, Commonwealth Office, FCO 40/93. 10. Defence and Overseas Policy Committee, Hong Kong: Long Term Study, April, 1968, FCO 40/79. 11. Ministerial Committee on Hong Kong under British Cabinet Office, Hong Kong: Long Term Study, March 28, 1969, CAB 134/2945. Chapter 7 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9. 10. 11. 12. 13. 14. 15. 16. 17. 18. 19. 20.

David Trench to the Commonwealth Office, Telegram No. 595, FCO 40/45. David Trench to the Commonwealth Office, May 13, 1967, Telegram No. 600, FCO 40/46. Herbert Bowden to David Trench, May 17, 1967, Telegram No. 944, FCO 40/45. David Trench to the Commonwealth Office, May 22, 1967, Telegram No. 662, FCO 40/46. David Trench to the Commonwealth Office, Telegram No. 845, FCO 40/47. Commonwealth Office to David Trench, June 16, 1967, Telegram No. 1226, FCO 40/47. David Trench to the Secretary for Commonwealth Affairs, June 10, 1967, Telegram No. 809, FCO 40/47. Commonwealth Office to David Trench, June 16, 1967, Telegram No. 1228, FCO 40/47. Donald Hopson to the Commonwealth Office, June 2, 1967, Telegram No. 626, FCO 40/47. Donald Hopson to the Commonwealth Office, May 15, 1967, Telegram No. 480, FCO 40/45. Donald Hopson to the Commonwealth Office, May 24, 1967, Telegram No. 570, FCO 40/46. The Present Situation in China, June 8, 1967, FCO 40/47. Telegram No. 768, FCO 40/47. Telegram No. 1133, FCO 40/47. David Trench to the Commonwealth Office, June 7, 1967, Telegram No. 790, FCO 40/47. David Trench to the Commonwealth Office, May 24, 1967, Telegram No. 682, FCO 40/46. Donald Hopson to the Commonwealth Office, May 24, 1967, Telegram No. 560, FCO 40/46. Telegram No. 560, FCO 40/46. David Trench to the Commonwealth Office, June 29, 1968, Telegram No. 831, FCO 40/88. Donald Hopson to the Foreign Office, July 2, 1968, Telegram No. 620, FCO 40/67.

Notes to pages 109–123

233

Chapter 8 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9. 10. 11. 12. 13. 14. 15. 16.

17. 18.

19. 20. 21. 22. 23.

Michael Gass to the Commonwealth Office, July 26, 1967, Telegram No. 1112, FCO 40/ 113. Special Branch, daily comparative circulation figures of left-wing newspapers – 1967, October 26, 1967, FCO 40/114. W. S. Carter to Arthur Galsworthy, July 31, 1967, FCO 40/113. Commonwealth Office to Michael Gass, August 1, 1967, Telegram No. 1582, FCO 40/113. Michael Gass to the Commonwealth Office, August 2, 1967, Telegram No. 1151, FCO 40/113. Donald Hopson to the Foreign Office, August 2, 1967, Telegram No. 994, FCO 40/113. Arthur Galsworthy, “Measures against the Communist Press”, August 3, 1967, FCO 40/113. Ta Kung Pao, August 19, 1967. 《周恩來的最後歲月：在外交部奪權前後》，頁204–243。[The Final Years of Zhou Enlai, pp. 204–43.] 〈周恩來遙控反英抗暴內幕〉，《九十年代》，1996年6月號。[“The Inside Story of Zhou Enlai’s Control over the Anti-British Struggle”, The Nineties.] Percy Cradock, Experiences of China, p. 61. Michael Gass to the Commonwealth Office, August 21, 1967, Telegram No. 1276, FCO 40/113. “Ultimatum and Anarchy”, Time Magazine, September 1, 1967. Donald Hopson to George Brown, September 8, 1967, FCO 1/14. Percy Cradock, Experiences of China (London: John Murray, 1994), pp. 62–66. 中共中央文獻研究室，《周恩來》，陝西人民出版社／珠海出版社，1998年2 月，頁181。[Historical Data Research Office of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party, Zhou Enlai.] People’s Daily, August 23, 1967. 《中華人民共和國國史通鑒》第三卷 (1966–1976)，北京：紅旗出版社，頁38 。[General Collection of History of the People’s Republic of China, Volume 3 (1966– 1976), p. 38.] The Final Years of Zhou Enlai, pp. 204–43。 〈在外交部「奪權」前後〉，《周恩來的最後歲月》，頁204–243。 Ming Pao, August 25, 1967. Ta Kung Pao, September 1, 1967. Ming Pao, August 26, 1967.

Chapter 9 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7.

George Walden’s correspondence with the author, June 7, 2006. George Walden, Lucky George (London: The Penguin Press, 1999), pp. 94–97. Hong Kong Disturbances 1967, pp. 84–85. Storm in Hong Kong, p. 133. Storm in Hong Kong, pp. 48–49. Hong Kong 1967, pp. 16–17. John Cowperthwaite’s address to the Legislative Council meeting, Hong Kong Hansard, February 28, 1968, p. 52.

234

8. 9. 10. 11. 12.

13. 14. 15. 16. 17. 18. 19. 20. 21.

Notes to pages 124–135

John Cooper, Colony in Conflict, pp. 271–77. Address of David Trench at the Legislative Council meeting, Hong Kong Hansard, February 28, 1968, p. 43. Chronicle of Zhou Enlai, Volume 2, p. 211. Defence and Overseas Policy Committee, Hong Kong: Long Term Study, August 18, 1967, FCO 40/78. 陳揚勇，《苦撐危局：周恩來在1967》。北京：中央文獻出版社，1999，頁352 。[Chen Yangyong, Struggling Hard amid the Critical Situation: Zhou Enlai in 1967, p. 352.] Chronicle of Zhou Enlai (1949–1976), Volume 3, p. 155. Chen Yangyong, Struggling Hard amid the Critical Situation, p. 353. Chronicle of Zhou Enlai (1949–1976), Volume 3, p. 169. Chen Yangyong, Struggling Hard amid the Critical Situation, p. 356. Chen Yangyong, Struggling Hard amid the Critical Situation, p. 367. FCO 40/713. J. E. Hoare, China/Hong Kong, October 13, 1975, FCO 40/713. “Regarding several questions about the anti-persecution struggle”, Wen Wei Po, July 3, 1967. Ming Pao, September 5, 1978.

Chapter 10 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7.

8. 9. 10. 11. 12. 13. 14. 15. 16.

Derek Davies, “A position of strength”, Far Eastern Economic Review, August 3, 1967, pp. 260–63. Interview with the author in 1999. Special Branch, Daily comparative circulation figures of left-wing newspapers: 1967, October 26, 1967, FCO 40/114. 冼玉儀，〈社會組織與社會轉變〉，《香港史新編（上冊）》。香港：三聯書 店，1997, 頁157–209。 Personal interview with the author in 1999. Undergrad, July 13, 1967. 呂大樂、趙永佳，〈香港的社會運動與民主政治〉，《明報月刊》1997年6月， 頁26–29。[“Social Movements and Democracy in Hong Kong”, Ming Pao Monthly, June 1997, pp. 26–29.] 鄭郁郎，《在香港看香港》香港：懷樓書店，1967，頁9。[Cheng Yuk-long, Observing Hong Kong from a Person in Hong Kong, p. 9.] Richard Hughes, Borrowed Place, Borrowed Time: Hong Kong and Its Many Places (Hong Kong: Andre Deutsch, 1976), p. 51. Ian Scott, Political Change and the Crisis of Legitimacy in Hong Kong (Honolulu: University of Hawai’i Press, 1989), p. 104. Derek Davies, “What’s to be done now?”, Far Eastern Economic Review, June 1, 1967, pp. 509–11. Education Policy (Hong Kong: Hong Kong Government Printer), April 1965, p. 2. “In the pink”, Far Eastern Economic Review, January 4, 1968, pp. 36–37. A Report by the Inter-departmental Working Party to Consider Certain Aspects of Social Security (Hong Kong: Hong Kong Government Printer), April 1967. Star, August 7, 1967. The China Mail, August 21, 1967.

Notes to pages 135–214

235

17. Leo Goodstadt, “Star performance”, Far Eastern Economic Review, April 6, 1967, pp. 41–43. 18. Hong Kong Hansard, Session 1967, March 29, 1967. 19. Hong Kong Standard, August 6, 1967. 20. “What is to be done now?”, Far Eastern Economic Review, June 1, 1967, pp. 509–11. 21. Independent Commission Against Corruption, ICAC 25th Anniversary (Hong Kong: The Commission, 1999), p. 14. 22. A Report by the Inter-Departmental Working Party to Consider Certain Aspects of Social Security (Hong Kong: Hong Kong Government Printer), 1967. 23. Leo Goodstadt, Unequal Partners: The Conflict Between Public Interest and Private Profit in Hong Kong (Hong Kong: Hong Kong University Press, 2005), p. 124. 24. Herbert Bowden, Memorandum presented to Britain’s Defence and Overseas Policy Committee on May 24, 1967, FCO 40/46. 25. Personal interview with the author, May 2007. 26. Correspondence between George Walden and the author, June 2006. 27. Malcolm Shepherd to Secretary of State, May 13, 1968, FCO 40/43. 28. “Local people should have right to govern own affairs”, South China Morning Post, June 1, 1968. 29. Hong Kong Hansard, Session 1968, January 24, 1968, p. 20. 30. Personal interview with the author in 1999. 31. The Government in Hong Kong — Basic Policies and Methods, April 14, 1969, FCO 40/149. 32. Personal interview with the author in 2001. 33. Britain’s Defence and Overseas Policy Committee, Hong Kong: Long Term Study, April 23, 1968, FCO 40/79. 34. Ministerial Committee on Hong Kong under British Cabinet Office, Hong Kong: Long Term Study, March 28, 1969, CAB 134/2945. Chapter 11 1. 2.

FCO 40/46, The National Archives of the United Kingdom, Kew, London. According to the reports of Chinese newspapers at that time, five policemen were killed during the Sha Tau Kok incident. 3. Wen Wei Po, October 27, 1967. 4. Ta Kung Pao, August 19, 1967. 5. David Trench to the Commonwealth Office, June 9, 1967, Telegram No. 808, FCO 40/47. 6. FCO 40/49. 7. Wen Wei Po, August 5, 1967. 8. Wen Wei Po, August 7, 1967 9. FCO 40/147. 10. FCO 40/147: Disturbances 1967/1968 Detainees and Prisoners. 11. CO 882/31 Constitution of Hong Kong. 12. Ta Kung Pao, May 20, 1967.

Bibliography

Cooper, John. Colony in Conflict: The Hong Kong Disturbances, May 1967–January 1968. Hong Kong: Swindon Book Company, 1970. Cradock, Percy. Experiences of China. London: John Murray, 1994. Goodstadt, Leo. Unequal Partners: The Conflict Between Public Interest and Private Profit in Hong Kong. Hong Kong: Hong Kong University Press, 2005. Hong Kong 1967. Hong Kong: Government Printer, 1968. Hong Kong Disturbances 1967. Hong Kong: Government Printer, 1968. Hughes, Richard. Borrowed Place, Borrowed Time: Hong Kong and Its Many Places. London: Andre Deutsch, second revised edition, 1976. Report of the Commission of Inquiry into Kowloon Disturbances, 1966. Hong Kong: Government Printer, 1966. Scott, Ian. Political Change and the Crisis of Legitimacy in Hong Kong. Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 1989. Tu, Elsie. Elsie Tu: An Autobiography. Hong Kong: Longman Group (Far East) Limited, 1988. Far Eastern Economic Review Hong Kong Hansard South China Morning Post 《周恩來的最後歲月》。北京：中央文獻出版社，1995。 中共中央文獻研究室，《周恩來》。西安：陝西人民出版社／珠海：珠海出版 社，1998。 中共中央文獻研究室編，《周恩來年譜 （ 1949–1976 ） 》。北京：中央文獻出版 社，1997。 王賡武，《香港史新編》。香港：三聯書店，1998。 周永新，《目睹香港四十年》。香港：明報出版社，1990。 金堯如，《中共香港政策秘聞實錄：金堯如五十年香江憶往》。香港：田園書 店，1998。 香港社會民主黨，《九龍騷動事件調查報告》。香港：香港社會民主黨，1966。 許錫揮、陳麗君、朱德新，嶺南文庫編輯委員會，廣東中華民族文化促進會合編， 《香港跨世紀的滄桑》。廣州：廣東人民出版社，1985。 陳揚勇，《苦撐危局：周恩來在1967》。北京：中央文獻出版社，1999。

238

Bibliography

港九各界同胞反對港英迫害鬥爭委員會，《香港風暴》(Storm in Hong Kong)。香港： 港九各界同胞反對港英迫害鬥爭委員會，1968。 劉蜀永，《簡明香港史》。香港：三聯書店，1998。 鄭郁郎，《在香港看香港》。香港：懷樓書店，1967。 《九十年代》 《亞洲週刊》 《明報月刊》 《新亞學生報》 《盤古》 《學苑》 《學聯報》

Index

Afternoon News, 111, 118, 148, 170 All-China Federation of Trade Unions, 66, 125 All-China Journalists Association, 111, 172 All-Circles Anti-Persecution Struggle Committee, 7, 30, 37, 62, 122 All-Industries Workers Anti-Persecution Struggle Committee, 33, 84, 120 Black, Robert, 39 Bowden, Herbert, 4, 29, 36, 51, 56, 95, 102, 136–137 Brown, George, 42, 114–115 Carter, W. S, 110 Cater, Jack, 2, 43, 53, 67, 92, 118, 139, 143, 177 Cha, Leung-yung Louis, 91, 170 Chak, Nuen-fai, 15, 111, 171, 174, 180 Chan, Kwan-po, 212 Chan, Yim-kuen, 111, 171 Chan, Yuen-han, 6 Chen, Boda, 40, 126, 151 Chen, Percy, 204, 212 Chen Yangyong, 72 Chen, Yi, 16, 40, 50, 104, 196, 201 Cheng, Kai-ming, 165 Cheng, Yin-fun Hannah, 88 Cheng, Yuk-long, 133 Cheong-Leen, Hilton, 139 Cheung, Po-shuen, 215 Chiang, Kai-shek, 20 China Mail, 66, 134 Chinese Goods Centre, 80, 86 Chinese Reform Association, 84, 204

Choi, Wai-hang, 6, 150, 204 Chow, Wing-sun Nelson, 5–6 Chui, Tin-po, 61 Chung Hwa Middle School, 7, 91, 107 Clague, Douglas, 207 Commercial Radio, 119 Commonwealth Office, 4, 35, 51, 76, 94, 96, 97, 101, 102, 106 Cooper, John, 8, 22, 32, 44, 123 Cradock, Percy, 93, 112, 118 Croce, Benedetto, 3 Cultural Revolution, 2, 16 Davies, Derek, 4, 131, 133, 135 Defence and Overseas Policy Committee, 4, 29, 36, 95, 97, 127, 140 Deng, Xiaoping, 141 Denson, John, 77 Douglas-Home, Alex, 129 Elliott, Elsie, 9, 25, 47, 82, 135 Emergency Regulations, 49, 60, 78, 84–85, 92 Far Eastern Economic Review, 4, 14, 25, 36, 86, 131, 134 Federation of Students, 68, 83 Federation of Trade Unions, 6, 15, 20, 30, 37, 51, 66, 81, 102, 125, 132, 150, 188, 206, 213, 217 Fei, Fih, 113, 116 Fei, Yiming, 17, 38, 67, 89, 144, 174 Fok, Ying-tung Henry, 17, 131 Fu, Che, 84, 203 Fung, Kam-shui, 27, 61

240

Index

Galsworthy, Arthur, 51, 96, 110, 145 Garner, Saville, 96 Gass, Michael, 55, 68, 71, 75, 82, 92, 109, 139 Godber, Peter, 46, 218 Goodstadt, Leo, 135–137 Grand Bauhinia Medal, 7 Grantham, Alexander, 212 Green Island Cement Company, 21, 28, 30, 183 Gregg, William, 135 Grey, Anthony, 93, 108, 113, 122 Hart, Judith, 96 Heenan, Maurice, 80 Heung Yee Kuk, 69 Ho, Ho-chi George, 119 Ho, Ming-sze, 17, 63, 92 Ho, Yin, 52–53, 145–146 Hogan, Michael, 11, 146 Hon Wah College, 7, 38, 59, 86, 154 Hong Kong and Shanghai Taxicab Co. Ltd, 21 Hong Kong Artificial Flower Works, 1, 23, 45, 130, 150, 156, 168 Hong Kong Evening News, 71, 111, 118, 148 Hopson, Donald, 34, 42, 57, 103, 110, 115 Hsia, Moon, 203 Hu, Hung-lick Henry, 10 Huang, Yongsheng, 118, 177 Hughes, Richard, 133 Hui, Wan-ching, 46 Hung, Biu, 26 Independent Commission Against Corruption 5, 46, 135, 157, 179 Ji, Pengfei, 112 Kan, Yuet-keung, 91 Khrushchev, Nikita, 127 Kilpatrick, Robert, 135 Kim, Yiu-yu, 19, 44, 63, 125 Kiu Kwan Mansion, 86, 192, 218 Knight, Frank, 76

Labour Party, 4, 129 Lai, Chung, 61 Lam, Bun, 118 Lam, Chun, 181 Lam, Kwong-hoi, 119 Lau, Chin-shek, 1, 132 Lau, Nai-keung, 124 Lau, Siu-kai, 132 Lee, Chark-tim, 7 Lee, Chu-ming Martin, 147 Lee, Richard Charles, 45, 52, 145 Lee, Tze-chung, 17, 105 Leung, Oi-sie Elsie, 7, 180 Leung, Yiu-wah, 90, 217 Li, Chong, 105 Li, Ellen, 135 Li, Fook-shu, 69 Li, Qiang, 141 Liang, Shangyuan, 8, 18, 40, 66, 82, 91, 112, 149 Liang, Weilin, 17, 19, 41, 45, 60, 87, 124 Liao, Chengzhi, 16, 18, 180, 200, 210 Lin, Biao, 126, 130 Litton, Henry, 85 Liu, Shaoqi, 203 Liu, Yat-yuen, 1, 7, 32, 38, 79, 89, 126, 180, 194 Lo, Ching-kan, 11 Lo, Fu, 15, 19, 130, 159 Lo, Kei, 9, 11 Lu, Ping, 118 Lui, Lok, 15, 28 Lui, Tai-lok, 133 Luk, Kai-lau, 218 Luo, Guibo, 34, 40, 72 MacDonald, Malcolm, 4, 129 MacLehose, Murray, 5, 138, 140, 202 Mak, Hoi-wah, 6 Man Kam To, 74 Mao, Zedong, 3, 17, 117, 126 McGregor, Jimmy, 67 Ming Pao, 14, 26, 45, 80, 90, 120, 130 Mok, Ying-kwai, 212 Nan Fung Textiles Limited, 20, 54 New Evening Post, 32, 109, 119, 159 Ng, Hon-mun, 62, 159, 166

Index

241

Pan Ku magazine, 54 Pang, Fu-wah, 69 People’s Daily, 2, 17, 36, 52, 58, 61, 65, 72, 75, 87, 93, 112, 127 Poon, Kwok-lim Steven, 140 Poon, Wai-wai, 111, 171 Pui Kiu Middle School, 62, 165

Tsang, Ming, 61 Tsang, Tak-sing, 64, 154 Tsang, Yok-sing, 159, 162 Tung, Chee-hwa, 6, 83, 180 Turner, Matthew, 5

Qi, Feng, 6, 17, 44, 92, 121, 124, 130, 153, 171 Qiao, Guanhua, 112 Quotations from Chairman Mao Tse-Tung, 16, 21, 25

Victoria Road Detention Centre, 7, 32, 84, 93, 147

Rear, John, 84–85 Report of the Commission of Inquiry into Kowloon Disturbances 1966, 4 Ride, Lindsay, 11 Royal Interocean Lines, 20 San Po Kong, 4, 23 Scott, Ian, 13, 133 Sha Tau Kok, 71 Shek, Hwei, 84, 203 Shen, Ping, 42 Shepherd, Lord Malcolm, 4, 85, 138, 207 Shum, Yat-fei, 23 Sinn, Elizabeth, 132 Siu, Kim-fai, 26, 28, 213 Siu, Tze, 43, 48, 59, 78, 154 So, Sau-chung, 9, 11, 184 Social Democratic Party, 14 Sorby, T. D., 70 South China Morning Post, 47, 70, 89, 119, 136 Star Ferry riots, 13, 15, 27, 138, 161, 184, 199 Szeto, Keung, 32 Ta Kung Pao, 15, 21, 30 Taipa, 16 Tin Fung Yat Pao, 111, 118, 148 To, Kwan-hang Andrew, 6 Tong, Bing-tat, 84 Trench, David, 4, 11, 25, 28, 35, 51, 55, 57, 63, 68, 85, 96, 105, 109, 174, 208 Tsang, Chiu-for, 211 Tsang, Chiu-kan, 163 Tsang, Lai-yu, 164

Undergrad, 14, 24, 68, 163

Walden, George, 77, 99, 121, 138 Wang, Li, 112 Wen Wei Po, 15, 32, 49, 51, 69, 79, 101, 109, 119, 155 Wide Angle, 185 Wilson, Harold, 37, 115 Wong, Cho-fun, 7, 180, 193, 206 Wong, K. C., 38, 224 Wong, Kin-lap, 7, 38, 50, 59, 86, 91, 187 Wong, Kwok-kin, 132 Wong, Ping-kin Michael, 11 Wong, Yung-chow, 164 Woo, Pak-chuen, 138 Worsley, John, 96 Wu, Chung, 21 Wu, Tai-chow, 7, 28, 44, 70, 89, 110, 118, 131, 168 Wu, Ying-sheung Gordon, 21 Xie, Fuzhi, 40 Xinhua News Agency (Hong Kong Branch), 6, 17, 151 Xue, Ping, 93 Yang, Wenchang, 113 Yeung, Kai-yin, 66 Yeung, Kwong, 7, 30, 33, 38, 50, 62, 122, 180 Yip, Kwok-wah Paul, 90 Yip, Mo-chiu, 83 Young, Mark, 211 Zhang, Junsheng, 7, 210 Zhou, Enlai 2, 6, 16, 39, 50, 52, 92, 112, 115, 117, 118, 126, 129, 147, 151, 177 Zhou, Nan, 7, 210 Zhu, Manping, 40, 151