Hizbullah's Documents: From the 1985 Open Letter to the 2009 Manifesto 9789048513376

Table of contents :
About the authors
A Note on Transliteration
Prologue
Abstract
Introduction
1. Primary Documents
2. Election Programs
3. Agreements, Understandings, Pacts
4. The New Manifesto (30 November 2009)
Chronology of Events (1975-2010)
List of Abbreviations
Glossary
Notes
Index

Citation preview

Hizbullah’s Documents

For a better understanding of Hizbullah, Hizbullah’s Documents ought to be read in conjunction with Joseph Alagha: Hizbullah’s Identity Construction, Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press (2011), ISBN 978 90 8964 297 4. Both titles are fully searchable on Amazon.

Cover design and lay-out: Maedium, Utrecht ISBN 978 90 8555 037 2 e-ISBN 978 90 4851 337 6 NUR 697 © Joseph Alagha / Pallas Publications – Amsterdam University Press, Amsterdam 2011 All rights reserved. Without limiting the rights under copyright reserved above, no part of this book may be reproduced, stored in or introduced into a retrieval system, or transmitted, in any form or by any means (electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording or otherwise) without the written permission of both the copyright owner and the author of the book.

To my family

Table of Contents

A Note on Transliteration | 9 Prologue | 11 Abstract | 13 Introduction | 15 1 The Salient Points of the Open Letter | 15 2 Hizbullah’s Eight Conclaves | 22 3 Analysis of the New Manifesto | 29 4 Thematic Analysis | 31 5 Conclusion | 36 1 Primary Documents | 39 1 The Text of Hizbullah’s Open Letter Addressed to the Oppressed in Lebanon and the World, 16 February 1985 | 39 2 Hizbullah: Views and Concepts, Manar TV, Beirut, 20 June 1997 | 56 3 Statement of Purpose: Hizbullah Press Office, 20 March 1998 | 59 4 Hizbullah: Identity and Goals (August 2004) | 60 2 1 2 3 4 5 6 7

Election Programs | 63 Hizbullah’s 1992 Parliamentary Elections Program (my translation) | 63 Hizbullah’s 1996 Parliamentary Elections Program | 69 Hizbullah’s 2000 Parliamentary Elections Program (my translation) | 75 Hizbullah’s 2004 Municipal Election Program (my translation) | 81 Hizbullah’s 2005 Parliamentary Elections Program (my translation) | 88 Hizbullah’s 2009 Legislative Election Program: 6 April 2009 | 89 Nasrallah’s Post-elections Press Conference: 8 June 2009 | 97 7

3 Agreements, Understandings, Pacts | 105 1 Paper of Common Understanding between Hizbullah and The Free Patriotic Movement: 6 February 2006 | 105 2 The Beirut Declaration: 15 May 2008 | 110 3 Doha Accord: 21 May 2008 | 111 4 Hizbullah’s Understanding with the Salafi Movement: 18 August 2008 | 112 5 President al-Assad Issues a Decree Stipulating the Establishment of Diplomatic Relations with Lebanon: 14 October 2008 | 113 4 1 2 3 4

The New Manifesto (30 November 2009) | 115 Hegemony and Mobilization | 118 Lebanon | 122 Palestine & The Settlement Negotiations | 133 Nasrallah’s Press Conference: 30 November 2009 (in full) | 138

Chronology of Events (1975-2010) | 151 List of Abbreviations | 185 Glossary | 187 Notes | 193 Index | 211



table of contents

8

A Note on Transliteration

The transcribing of words and phrases in Modern Standard Arabic into English is in conformity with the transliteration system of the International Journal of Middle East Studies, with a few modifications that cater to the guidelines of the highly simplified transliteration system of Amsterdam University Press, where all diacritical marks have been omitted save for the ‘ayn (‘) and hamza (’). Concerning the translation of controversial terms, the author gave the English equivalent and included the original Arabic word in transliterated form in brackets beside each term.



9

Prologue

There are hardly any reliable publications in English, or for that matter in any other language, which include Hizbullah’s primary documents, starting with the Party’s 1985 Open Letter; passing through all of its legislative and municipal election programs from 1992 to 2010; including all the Agreements, Understandings, and Pacts the Party ratified over the years; and ending with its 2009 Political Manifesto. The dearth of these documents and the distortions that resulted from inaccurate translations prompted the author to embark on the task of rectifying the misrepresentations that resulted from these recondite translations, especially when these might negatively impact academics and policymakers alike. Through a privileged access to the Party, the author was able to compile over the years these original primary documents in Arabic. He dedicated his efforts to translate them in a thorough, comprehensive, and meticulous way, while offering adequate footnoting, commentary, and relevant background information, in order to draw attention to the metamorphosis Hizbullah has been going through. The author paid scrupulous attention to not offering literal translations that might distort the original meaning and message. Rather, his translations carefully examine the content, framework, and context of these documents, specifically highlighting the underlying religio-political and ideological background. In addition, this unique book offers a detailed “Chronology of Events”, which accurately surveys the history of Hizbullah to the extent that one could claim that it portrays the history of the Party par excellence. The “Chronology” is indeed an added asset to the proper understanding of these documents. In addition, a glossary of Arabic terms is included for a smooth reading of the book. All of these are at the readers’ fingertips so that they may use them in construing the complex domestic, regional, and international dynamics and geopolitical implications that surround Hizbullah. The author believes that a proper understanding of Hizbullah can avert grave policy implications that are based on wrongly disseminated information readily made available in this globalized 

11

age. The author hopes that this book will become a reliable reference work. While the author acknowledges that any shortcomings are his, he would like to thank anonymous reviewers, the editorial board of Amsterdam University Press (AUP), the editor and the copy-editor, and all the AUP family who contributed to polishing this work and making it accessible. Joseph Alagha The Netherlands, February 2010

Prologue

12

Abstract

In over a quarter of a century, Hizbullah’s identity has undergone serious revisions. The Lebanese resistance movement Hizbullah was able to modify its identity from its founding as an Islamic movement of social and political protest (1978-1985), to a full-fledged social movement (1985-1991), to a parliamentary political party (1992 to the present). Hizbullah tried to preserve its Islamic identity while at the same time work within the confines of the Lebanese political system. On these grounds, the Party recognized the Lebanese state. In spite of being perceived as having a political-strategic partnership with Syria1 and a strategic-ideological alliance with Iran2, Hizbullah is not a mere tool of policy in Syrian and Iranian hands. Rather, the Party has pursued an independent course of decision-making in conformity with the specificities (khususiyyat) of the Lebanese political equation, until it succeeded in May 2008 in obtaining veto power in the Cabinet, the Council of Ministers, the main executive body of the country, thus controlling the political system to a greater extent. After its defeat in the June 2009 legislative elections, it backtracked and contented itself with the participation of two ministers in a power-sharing cabinet, waiving its earlier gain of veto power for the sake of consensual democracy, as was revealed in its 2009 Manifesto. This introductory chapter aims to situate these changing dynamics within the Party’s domestic, regional, and world view.



13

Introduction

This introduction surveys Hizbullah’s overhaul in its identity over a period of a quarter of a century from the time of the propagation of its first Manifesto, the “Open Letter”1 in 1985, passing through all of its eight clandestine conclaves, to the publication of its second watershed Manifesto in 2009. In order to map these changes, the author begins by analyzing the Open letter.

1 The Salient Points of the Open Letter Hizbullah’s political declarations; al-‘Ahd2, its weekly newspaper; the discourse of its leaders and cadres; and most notably the Open Letter specify the constituents of the Party’s political ideology: oppressors and oppressed; Islamic state; relations with Christians; anti-Zionism; pan-Islamism; anti-imperialism; and jihad and martyrdom. Hizbullah employs Qur’anic legitimization of its political ideology in the form of Qur‘anic verses to justify its stance. One may notice that only the first section of the Open letter explicitly refers to Hizbullah’s religious ideology: belief in Shi‘a Islam, wilayat al-faqih (guardianship of the jurisprudent), and jihad (struggle) in the way of God. Oppressors and oppressed The concept of oppressors (mustakbirin) and oppressed (mustad‘afin) is central to a proper understanding of Hizbullah’s political ideology. Although Hizbullah seems to employ an exclusivist discourse3 in which it classifies people according to the Qur’anic dichotomy of Hizbullah (The Party of God) (5:56) or Hizb al-Shaytan (The Party of the Devil) (58: 19), Hizbullah uses the Qur’anic term or Islamic expression of oppressed and reproduces it as an all-inclusive concept in order to uphold political and social justice. On the face of it, it appears that Hizbullah is using Marxist terminology, which is translated or interpreted in 15

Islamic terms along the lines of economic, political, and social justice, thus producing a kind of “Islamic socialism”, as some scholars have claimed.4 However, Hizbullah clearly argues in the Open Letter and its political declarations that its friends are the oppressed of the entire world, irrespective of their color, race, or religion. The Party interprets and applies the contemporary concept of mustad‘af by stressing that it is a Qur’anic concept that came to prominence with the advent of the Islamic Revolution. Hizbullah emphasizes that this usage conveys and is in conformity with its identity as an Islamic jihadi movement struggling to address and redress the injustices that the oppressed suffer. However, the Party clarifies that its usage of the term mustad‘af is different from the political concept that is used by the socialists to refer to the poor peasants or the proletariat, the Qur’anic concept being more encompassing and holistic in its orientation because it touches upon the existential level of oppression and offers prescriptions and remedies in dealing with the oppressors and warding them off. Hizbullah emphasizes that mustad‘afin applies to the wronged, unjustly treated, tyrannized, and impoverished who do not own their daily bread, and who are oppressed in their freedom, dignity, and endeavors without any consideration whether they are Christians or Muslims. Therefore, Hizbullah’s political ideology stresses the universality of the Qur’anic concept – as opposed to the specificity of the Marxist concept – that cuts across class, cultural, and religious cleavages. Even though Ayatullah Fadlallah is not part of the main establishment of Hizbullah, the Party might have been influenced by Fadlallah’s views on oppression. The point of convergence is that both Fadlallah’s and Hizbullah’s Islamic theory of oppression differs from liberation theology. Although liberation theo­ logy places the oppressed, marginalized, discriminated minorities, women, workers, etc. at the center of its discourse, siding with the oppressed in their struggle for their rights, it does not call for an overall Christianization of society nor does it aim at establishing a religiously based society and political system. Rather, liberation theology builds on religious sources, reinterpreting them for secular-Marxist aims by supporting the struggle of the oppressed “wretched of the earth” for social justice. In spite of that, there seems to be a considerable difference between the two views since Fadlallah’s political-ideological legitimization conveys specificity in his characterization of oppression that is at variance with Hizbullah, especially his Qur’anic legitimizations, which distinguish between two groups of the oppressed. It seems as if Fadlallah is insinuating a distinction between negligent, idle oppressed who let grass grow under their feet and do not even exercise persuasive jihad, on the one hand, and committed oppressed who mobilize in order to confront their oppressors (smaller military jihad) or alter their condition of oppression by emigrating to the Muslim heartland, if they are capable of doing so, on the other.5 Introduction

16

Islamic state The Open Letter, inter alia, classifies Hizbullah as a social movement that calls for the establishment of an Islamic state6 in Lebanon modeled on Iran’s Islamic Republic. Hizbullah’s political ideology advocates an end to political Maronism7 and rejects any participation in Lebanon’s sectarian-confessional political system. In spite of that, Hizbullah’s political ideology stresses that it would not impose an Islamic state in Lebanon by coercion, rather Hizbullah would erect an Islamic state if and only if the majority of the Lebanese populace demand it and consent to it since it is necessary to choose a political system in Lebanon by mutual agreement between the Muslims and the Christians. Thus, Hizbullah invited others to become part of an Islamic state in Lebanon, refusing to be under the governance of or to co-opt with the un-Islamic Lebanese regime. The Open letter does not specify the political-ideological content of the Islamic order; it only refers to the Islamic state as an ideological doctrine, political order, and mode of governance. However, Muhammad Z‘aytir did outline the most salient traits of the Islamic or Qur’anic government, Islamic state, or Islamic republic.8 Hizbullah uses these terms interchangeably because it is concerned with instating an Islamic order (nizam Islami), and it does not matter which label it is given. According to Z‘aytir, the Islamic order is based upon the practical application of the shari‘a and divine injunctions; organization of social, economic, and political relations in order to inculcate social solidarity and disseminate social justice; mutual agreement and trust between the subjects and rulers; and justice, fairness, equity, compassion, as well as an equilibrium between rights and duties. However, Z‘aytir’s views on the Islamic state were couched in stronger terms than what the Open Letter and other cadres expressed since he stressed the forceful application of God’s governance and sovereignty. Z‘aytir seemed to be much more radical in his political-ideological views than the Hizbullah establishment. This might suggest that he represented a certain militant trend within the Party that advocated the establishment of the Islamic state by force to effectively annihilate the political Maronites.9 He seemed to be against the too conciliatory and too compromising attitude of the Party. Z‘aytir’s criticism of the Islamic milieu might be interpreted as an indirect attack on Ayatullah Fadlallah who, according to Z‘aytir, was not forceful enough in his Islamization project. Z‘aytir did not accept Fadlallah’s Qur’anic logic of truce (muhadana)10 and the step by step application of Islamization through a bottom-up process. He called for a violent and radical overthrow of the regime through a top-down process, even if the balance of power did not favor the Islamists. Hizbullah adopted the idea of Islamic order from Imam Khumayni, being influenced by his views on wilayat al-faqih. Hizbullah’s anathematizing of the Lebanese political system

1 The Salient Points of the Open Letter

17

might also be attributed to Imam Khumayni’s views.11 However, in practice, the official Hizbullah establishment does not heed Z‘aytir’s views. In its Islamic order, Hizbullah maintains the dhimmis12 category, and as such, Hizbullah stresses that the common grounds between ahl al-dhimma and Muslims are the social values of mutual tolerance, respect, brotherhood, and solidarity. On this basis, Hizbullah accords the Christians their human freedom, i.e. social and religious freedom, but not political freedom. Thus, contrary to the Prophetic tradition that granted non-Muslims partnership in the political structure, Hizbullah’s tolerance or inclusiveness clearly excludes Christians from political life. Hizbullah seems to imply that tolerance is the responsibility of the “majority” and integration is the responsibility of the “minority”. Most likely Hizbullah’s treatment of the Christians as dhimmis is a specific interpretation of the Prophet’s political constitution of Medina, which was also inspired by the Islamic Republic’s constitution. In addition, possibly Hizbullah might also have been influenced by Sayyid Muhammad Husayn Fadlallah who, grounding his argument on the Qur’an, argued that the Muslim stance towards the Christians is anchored in the horizon of mutual coexistence, cooperation, and dialogue that should be based on points of convergence and common grounds that all parties agree upon.13 Relations with Christians Hizbullah’s political ideology is selective in its treatment of the Lebanese Christians. Although on face value it appears that Hizbullah’s call was addressed to all Christians, in reality Hizbullah shunned any contact with political Maronism, Maronites, and any collaborator with Israel. Though Hizbullah had some lowlevel contacts with the Christians living in its constituencies, nonetheless no high-level or tangible dialogue materialized between Hizbullah and the Christians. In spite of Hizbullah’s exhortation of the Christians to convert to Islam, it did not impose this conversion by force, but applied its theory of tolerance to those Christians living in the areas it controlled, as well as to other Christians as long as they were not treacherous or aggressive. Some writers claimed that Hizbullah was abiding by a political ideology that was intolerant not only towards the Christians, Hizbullah was also accused of imposing its will and its Islam on all Lebanese from different denominations, sects, and religions.14 I acknowledge that there appears to be a certain tension between Hizbullah’s two propositions: 1) Hizbullah’s intention not to impose Islam nor coerce the Christians to adhere to its call; and 2) Hizbullah’s mission of establishing an Islamic order. Maybe the confusion has to do with Z‘aytir’s denial of the need to convert Christians and the Hizbullah establishment’s call for conversion through peaceful means. Nevertheless, both Z‘aytir and the Hizbullah establishment agreed that there should be “no compulsion in religion” Introduction

18

(2:256) and an “equitable world” or common grounds (3:64) should guide the relationship between the Muslims and Christians. Anti-Zionism Hizbullah’s anti-Zionist political ideology often seems to conflate Jewish identity with Zionist ideology, thus equating Jews with Zionists. Also, there seems to be a contradiction between Hizbullah’s views concerning the people of the book and how it treats the Jews in Israel. However, the Open Letter and the political declarations clearly state that Hizbullah equates all Israelis with “Zionists”. Further, Hizbullah’s al-‘Ahd and the discourse of its leaders clarify that the Party does not discriminate against the Jews as a race or religion, and it would accord them their human and civil rights as the constitution of Medina had done, in spite of their discouraging Qur’anic and historical precedents of treachery, hypocrisy, and breaking the covenant with the Prophet and fighting him at Khaybar. Hizbullah’s doctrinal behavior is also warranted by Khumayni’s ideology that distinguished between the Jews living in Muslim countries under Muslim rule and the “Zionists” in Israel. Simply stated, Hizbullah’s political ideology considers that there are no Jews in Israel, only Zionists. That is why the Zionists can be driven out and their country annihilated. From this stance, Hizbullah unleashed its venom towards the “Zionist Entity” that has occupied Palestine by military force. Hizbullah characterizes Israel as an aggressive, racist, expansionist, anti-humanist, cancerous gland instated by Western colonial powers in the Muslim heartland. Hizbullah’s political ideology conveys no recognition of Israel, calls for wiping it out of existence, and stipulates a continual commitment to the liberation of Palestine. This political-ideological stance mirrors that of the Islamic Revolution: “Today Iran, and tomorrow Palestine”, i.e. the liberation of Iran from the Shah would be followed by the liberation of Palestine from the “Zionists”. From a principal and doctrinal perspective, Hizbullah’s political ideology seeks to restore Arab-Muslim historical rights in Palestine and is totally against any ceasefire, truce, land for peace, peace negotiations, or normalization of relations with Israel. Pan-Islamism Hizbullah’s political ideology heeds Imam Khumayni’s call for pan-Islamism, especially in the wake of what he termed the worldwide conspiracy against the unity of the Muslims. Hizbullah’s political ideology has always called for unity, both in the Islamic and domestic fronts, in order to avoid the dangers of discord. In its Open Letter, Hizbullah allotted section 22, entitled “God is with the Unity of the Muslims”, to advocating pan-Islamism in order to render special attention to the dangers of discord, stressing a revolutionary distinction between upright 1 The Salient Points of the Open Letter

19

Muslim religious scholars and the corrupt ones, or state jurists who follow the injunctions of the imperialist colonizers by applying the precept of divide and conquer. Hizbullah based its call for the unity of Muslims and warding off fitna on a host of Qur’anic verses: (3:103); (6:159); (2:191); (2:193); (8:28); (8:73). On the basis of section 22, it seems that the conspiracy theory has governed a lot of Hizbullah’s visions. That is why Hizbullah considered any political or military dispute between Sunnis and Shi‘as as an oppressor-colonizer’s conspiracy aimed at spreading discord and dissension among the Muslims. Thus, Hizbullah blames internal discord on the West. Hizbullah has repeatedly warned against this and called upon the Muslims to uphold common grounds that ultimately lead to enforcing the power of the Muslims in the face of the mounting challenges facing the umma. Hizbullah’s discourse is general in the sense that it does not give specific examples of Sunni-Shi‘ite disagreements, since this would lead to discord, when Hizbullah’s aim is to unite all the Muslims. However, Hizbullah’s efforts to unify the Muslims remained on a theoretical level as a kind of persuasive smaller jihad by the tongue and heart, rather than real Sunni-Shi‘a unity, mainly due to mutually branding each other with infidelity (khutab al-takfir) and the disintegration that the Islamic community was passing through. Nevertheless, in the local Lebanese context “The Union of Muslim ‘Ulama”15 has covered some ground on the way to unifying Islamic work among the Sunni and Shi‘a ‘ulama as well as their respective populaces. Hizbullah argues that respecting the jurisprudential differences among the Sunni and Shi‘ites does not preclude unity and cooperation among the Sunni and Shi‘a Islamists on common political-ideological concepts such as anti-imperialism, anti-Zionism, “the liberation of Jerusalem”, etc. In fact, such political-ideological concepts forged a unity of interests and common goals between Hizbullah and Sunni Islamists such as the Lebanese Harakat Al-Tawhid Al-Islamiyya and Al-Jama‘a Al-Islamiyya16, as well as Palestinian Sunni Islamists, who all receive material support from Iran. Anti-imperialism Hizbullah stresses that it is exercising its legitimate right of defending the rights and the dignity of the umma by confronting its basic enemies: the US, France, and Israel. Imam Khumayni clarified that the sensitivity of the Iranians is not towards the American people, rather the American government.17 Thus, Hizbullah is against Westoxification18 and does not practice xenophobia (antipathy to the West and East). Nevertheless, Hizbullah’s Westoxification is rooted in its hatred of the US administration, not the US people. Hizbullah employs a specific reading of Khumayni since it took one aspect, namely reforming the individual before reforming others, and integrated it in another debate as a critique of Western concepts of revolution. By this Hizbul Introduction

20

lah intended to convey the superiority to the Islamic order – that is holistically concerned with all aspects of life, especially the spiritual dimension – over the materialist outlook of the East and West, socialism and capitalism. Hizbullah does not address the assumption that Western capitalism is rooted in specific cultural and societal traits. Thus, Hizbullah’s political ideology claims a sense of moral superiority visà-vis the West. By building a holistic-coalescent individual, Hizbullah purports that the project of the Islamic Revolution does not aim at modernizing Islam, but rather aspires to Islamize modernity, which poses a binary threat to the materialism and rationalism that are found in the West. According to Hizbullah, this is what Islam has to offer in response. Jihad and martyrdom Hizbullah distinguishes between smaller military jihad and greater jihad, relegating the role of the former to defensive jihad in the battlefield against the enemies of Islam and the latter to the internal struggle against one’s self. Hizbullah practices the smaller military jihad against the local enemies of Islam, the political Maronites, as well as against the regional and international enemies – Israel, France, and the US. Hizbullah emphasizes the ideological-political dimension of greater jihad whereby mere membership of the Hizbullah amounts to engaging in the greater jihad in the generic, overall encompassing metaphorical sense of membership in the community of ‘the son’s of Hizbullah’s umma’. By this, Hizbullahis would accomplish their legitimate political responsibility (taklif). Therefore, Hizbullah amplifies the greater jihad to encompass all stages of membership in Hizbullah’s activity. Employing a high-level theological discourse, Nasrallah distinguishes between greater jihad and smaller jihad, arguing along the lines of Khumayni that the greater jihad should be practiced before engaging in the smaller military jihad. Based on Khumayni and Fadlallah, it could be inferred that Hizbullah’s conception of greater jihad, as spiritual-transcendental jihad, aims at constructing a distinct Islamic identity of the individual. Hizbullah consciously extolls martyrdom as a religiously sanctioned legitimate defensive jihadi act conducted in order to face a superior invading or occupying army equipped with a high-tech arsenal. While Hizbullah views the reward of martyrdom as eternal life in heaven, it vilifies suicide as a ticket to hell in a moment of despair, hopelessness, and frustration. Hizbullah legitimizes its martyrdom operations on the basis of religious edicts and reiterates its prohibition of conducting them if the same objectives could be realized by smaller military jihad.

1 The Salient Points of the Open Letter

21

The obsoleteness of the Open Letter The events that have occurred since 1985 changed some of the basic details of Hizbullah’s vision, especially after the end of the Iraq-Iran war in 1988 and after the collapse of the Eastern Bloc and the Soviet Union in 1989-1990, which led to the emergence of a unipolar system and New World Order headed by the US. In Hizbullah’s reading, this garnered more and more support for Israel from the US and the international community at the expense of the Arabs, and specifically the Palestinians in the Arab-Israeli conflict. All of these events acted as catalysts to change Hizbullah’s orientation and tactics as well as some of its near- and medium-range interests and targets. Indeed, the intellectual foundation and background to Hizbullah’s Manifesto did not change much because it is based upon jihad against Israel and its allies, spearheaded by the US and the UK.19 Also, Hizbullah’s classification of foes and friends has undergone a radical revision dictated by domestic changes in Lebanon and the regional and international state attitudes towards the Islamic Revolution in Iran. However, Hizbullah’s animosity towards Israel and its existence remains a fixity in Hizbullah’s thinking, at least on the rhetorical level.20

2 Hizbullah’s Eight Conclaves First three conclaves Bearing this in mind, in 1989 Hizbullah held its first conclave and revealed the identity of its leaders and cadres. The conclave resulted in the creation of the post of the secretary-general and the election of Shaykh Subhi al-Tufayli as Hizbullah’s first secretary-general and the nomination of a Shura (Consultative) Council that included Hajj Muhammad Ra‘d, one of the founders of the Party.21 Starting 22 May 1991, Hizbullah held its second conclave and elected Sayyid ‘Abbas Al-Musawi as its second secretary-general, and Shaykh Na‘im Qasim as his deputy. Unlike the first conclave in which the seven-member Shura Council was nominated, in the second conclave they were elected. The conclave set written moral precepts upon which dialogue would be conducted with the Christians.22 Thus, the most salient decision of the conclave was Hizbullah’s infitah (“opening-up”). This development was reflected in Hizbullah’s 1991 political program, authored by Sayyid ‘Abbas al-Musawi. In the early summer of 1993, Hizbullah held its third conclave, in which it re-elected Sayyid Hasan Nasrallah as its secretary-general, and Shaykh Na‘im Qasim as deputy secretary-general. It is important to note that the Islamic Resistance, Hizbullah’s military wing, was rewarded by electing Hizbullah’s “Central Military Commander”, Hajj Muhsin Al-Shakar, as one of the seven members of the Shura Council.23

Introduction

22

Fourth conclave In July 1995 Hizbullah held its fourth conclave. Some of the basic organizational changes that Hizbullah made were the following: 1) The Politburo was renamed as the “Political Council” and its jurisdiction was enlarged; 2) The creation of the “Jihadi Council”, headed by Sayyid Hashim Safiyyeddine, the only new member of the Shura Council; 3) The “Executive Council” replaced the “Executive Shura” with, more or less, the same jurisdictions; 4) In order to evaluate Hizbullah’s experience in the parliament, the Party formed a new body called the “Parliamentary Bloc Council”. In addition to its pledge to liberate occupied Lebanese land from the Israeli army, Hizbullah reiterated its commitment to continuing dialogue consolidating ties with all the constituents of the Lebanese myriad. The secretary-general and his deputy were re-elected. Hajj Hasan Khalil was elected as Nasrallah’s political aide or advisor and MP Muhammad Ra‘d as the head of the “Political Council”. Shaykh Nabil Qawuq replaced Sayyid Hashim Safiyyeddine24 as Hizbullah’s political representative in the South; MP Muhammad Yaghi was elected as the Party’s political representative in the Biqa‘; and ‘Ali D‘un remained in his post as Hizbullah’s political representative in Beirut. Nayef Krayyem replaced ‘Ali Rashid as the head of the Party’s Central Information Office, while the latter became the head of a specialized committee in the Political Council; and Abdallah Qasir remained the head of the Executive Council.25 Fifth conclave Shaykh Subhi al-Tufayli was officially expelled from Hizbullah by a political declaration issued on 24 January 1998. On 30 January a violent military confrontation erupted between the Lebanese army and al-Tufayli’s supporters, who occupied Hizbullah’s religious seminary in ‘Ayn Burday, near B‘albak by military force. The bloody face-off – which resulted in some casualties, the most important being the deaths of a Christian army lieutenant and ex-Hizbullah MP Khudr Tluys, Tufayli’s son-in-law, and many others wounded – ended with the destruction of Tufayli’s headquarters and the Lebanese state’s issuing of an arrest warrant against Tufayli. However, he is still at large to this day. After solving the problem of internal discord, Hizbullah held its fifth conclave between 20 June and the end of July 1998. Nasrallah was elected for a third term. For this move to be made, Hizbullah had to amend its internal bylaws by deleting the stipulation that the secretary-general cannot serve for more than two consecutive terms. Shaykh Na‘im Qasim was elected as deputy secretarygeneral; Hajj Hasan Khalil as Nasrallah’s political aide; Muhammad Ra‘d as the head of the Political Council; and Sayyid Hashim Safiyyeddine as the head of the Executive Council. Thus, out of sixteen incumbents, seven were elected to the Shura Council, the ones who could work together harmoniously and efficiently, according to Shura Council member Muhammad Ra‘d. Ra‘d clarified that 2 Hizbullah’s Eight Conclaves

23

the Party evaluated its performance on four main junctures: 1) the 1996 Israeli “Grapes of Wrath” and means to boost Hizbullah’s military readiness in any future confrontation with Israel, especially in light of the deterioration in the prospects of a comprehensive peace settlement between Israel and the Arabs; 2) al-Tufayli’s uprising and its repercussions; 3) the 1998 municipal elections; 4) the 1996 legislative elections. Ra‘d added that the conclave also discussed the necessity of rehabilitating the Party’s cadres culturally and politically. Hizbullah’s leaders also discussed the most efficient means to attract leading personalities in the social, economic, artistic, and intellectual domains to the Party, without being organizationally tied to it, thus guaranteeing their independence. The Shura Council is incumbent on following the progress on this matter and reporting to the rest of the cadres the progress achieved in this regard. Ra‘d stressed that in domestic Lebanese politics, Hizbullah pursues “the Lebanese national interest” over any narrow interest in its alliances and dealings with the state and the political groupings in the country. In answering criticisms about Hizbullah’s alleged authoritarian nature of appointing its leadership and cadres, Ra‘d claimed that making drastic changes or a complete overhaul of the leadership and cadres in every conclave will lead to instability, rather than being conducive to democratic practice.26 Sixth conclave Hizbullah’s sixth conclave that ended on 30 July 2001 had a different flavor. The Party evaluated its 18-year struggle against the occupying Israeli forces that withdrew in May 2000 due to the relentless Lebanese resistance and war of attrition spearheaded by the Islamic Resistance. Concerning the Party’s organizational changes, Nasrallah was re-elected for life, and Sayyid Ibrahim Amin Al-Sayyid and Hajj Jawad Nureddine (Imad Mughniyyé’s pseudonym) replaced Hajj Muhammad Ra‘d and Hajj Muhsin Shakar in the Shura Council. Hizbullah placed its media institutions under the direct command of Nasrallah aided by the head of the Political Council and that of the Executive Council. This was done in order to upgrade the role of Hizbullah’s media, and pursue its ideological hegemony. Also, Hizbullah abolished its “Central Planning Council”, and strengthened internal audit and accountability mechanisms. From this perspective, the roles and duties of the municipal councils were expended (horizontally) and upgraded (vertically).27 Most importantly, the Party took the decision to revise its Open Letter in light of the changing political arena and dynamics since 1985. This would only bear fruit in 2009. The controversy over a new Open Letter, Manifesto Acknowledging the difficulty of implementing the stipulations of the Open Letter in the Lebanese public sphere and its clash with the political system, in Introduction

24

October 1994 Nasrallah hinted at a possible rewording of the Open Letter: “The Open Letter conveyed general precepts and general guidelines of our identity… some time ago, we reviewed the Open Letter, and I do not consider that there are major alterations that have occurred to our overall doctrines and orientations, although we should account for the changes and eventualities that took place in the previous years”.28 In October 2002 a rumor surfaced that Hizbullah was in the final phases of launching a new updated version of its Open Letter in conformity with an earlier decision taken in its sixth conclave. The rumor was substantiated by Qasim’s interview in the Daily Star on 28 October 2002. Qasim argued, “Much has happened and much has changed between 1985 and now… Our basic principles remain the same because they are the heart of our movement, but many other positions have changed due to evolving circumstances developing around us.” Locally, Qasim stressed that Hizbullah’s position towards the Phalagists has obviously changed, stressing that they are now partners in dialogue. Regionally, concerning Hizbullah’s stance towards Israel, Qasim affirmed Hizbullah’s outright animosity towards the “Zionist entity” and the “Small Satan” from an immutable, doctrinal perspective: “Since many positions have changed, we need to be flexible and change ours too… But the resistance against Israel has been the core of our belief and that has never changed” since “the struggle against Israel remains the central rationale of Hizbullah’s existence.” Internationally, Qasim argued that Hizbullah’s relationship with the West had witnessed many changes in line with its infitah policy and the West’s changing perception towards the Party, especially France: “The French were considered our enemy because they attacked our bases in the Biqa‘… France’s position has changed towards us, so we have to change ours.” However, he added that Hizbullah’s perception towards the US29 was still the same, since the Party still regarded it as the “Great Satan.”30 Leenders observes: “Even earlier hints of a fundamental revision of the Party’s outlook – such as amending its now largely obsolete founding document – have failed to materialise”.31 Well, not quite. In February 2003, a leading cadre – who is currently a member of the Shura Council – told me that the newly reconstructed, updated, and modified Open Letter/Manifesto is ready, but its launching has been postponed due to the deteriorating regional and international situation and the imminent US-led invasion of Iraq (March 2003).32 Keeping in mind that the Open Letter delineates Hizbullah’s local, regional, and international stance, it seems that the regional dimension froze its launching for more than six years. Sobelman aptly remarks, “Today Hizbollah views the original platform [Open Letter] as outdated… [There is] an increasingly apparent metamorphosis [identity reconstruction] in the organization at the declaratory level and in the practical sphere… Hizbullah has traveled from the time of its founding and its more recent decision to choose pragmatic integration into 2 Hizbullah’s Eight Conclaves

25

the Lebanese system over pure ideology”.33 Sobelman attributes this stance to Hizbullah’s infitah policy. He argues that Hizbullah’s decision to publish a “new and updated” version of its Open Letter, “which according to Na‘im Qasim will be more moderate in its relations with the Lebanese Christians and Western countries like France, a country understood to oppose Hizbullah’s inclusion on the European Union’s list of terror organizations, is no coincidence”.34 Whatever the case, these instances illustrate Hizbullah’s serious attempts to aim at identity construction and reconstruction, since over the years its ideology, political strategy, and future outlook have undergone drastic and dramatic changes. Seventh conclave From June to 16 August 2004, Hizbullah held its seventh conclave. Unlike the previous conclaves where information was leaked to the media, hardly any information was disseminated. It seems that Hizbullah’s extra clandestine tactic maybe had to do with the dismantling of a network of underground operatives allegedly linked to Israel as well as the assassination attempts the Party’s rank and file had suffered from in the preceding two years.35 It is worth mentioning that the followers of Subhi al-Tufayli released a political declaration chastising the conclave and asking it to reinstate him and his followers to their “natural, normal position of leadership” in the Party after being ousted due to conspiracies that occurred a few years ago. The political declaration added that the convening of this conclave offered a historical chance to conduct honest elections in Hizbullah’s rank and file in order to choose leaders who would retain Hizbullah’s earlier glory as a religious, Shi‘ite social movement. The declaration accused Nasrallah of planting discord in the Shi‘ite house by his “total hegemony and tyrannical control” over the Party and its capabilities and directing them in a way that was not conducive to the Shi‘ites, for instance, as exemplified by the criticisms directed towards Sayyid Fadlallah36 in favor of some personalities (Iranian) and marja‘s.37 Hizbullah released a political document in the form of two political declarations. The first political declaration conveyed that no changes took place within Hizbullah’s seven-member Shura Council, which included the following members: Sayyid Hasan Nasrallah, Hizbullah’s Secretary General and the head of the Jihadi Council; Shaykh Na‘im Qasim deputy secretary-general; Sayyid Hashim Safiyyeddine head of the Executive Council; Sayyid Ibrahim Amin AlSayyid the head of the Political Council; Hajj Hasan Khalil, Nasrallah’s political aide or advisor; Shaykh Muhammad Yazbik head of Religio-Judicial Council, “responsible for the dossier of the shar‘i matters and Islamic scholars’ affairs”; and Sayyid Jawad Nureddine (Imad Mughniyyé’s pen name/alias). In its second political document, Hizbullah listed four priorities and eight basic modifications or amendments. The most salient amendment was Hizbullah’s division Introduction

26

of the South into two administrative geographical areas: the first south of the Litani river, and the second to its north. Both function under the auspices of one central organizational leader in order to secure organizational structures that are capable of improving local administration and activate polarization. In addition, Shaykh Abd al-Karim ‘Ubayd was appointed as the head of Hizbullah’s social institutions, and Shaykh Hasan Izzeddine, Hizbullah’s spokesman at the Central Press Office, was appointed as Hizbullah’s political representative in the South. He was replaced by Nasrallah’s media aide or advisor, the engineer Hajj Muhammad Afif.38 First woman appointed to a prominent political role In the beginning of December 2004 and in light of the decisions taken in Hizbullah’s seventh conclave, Hizbullah, for the first time in its history, appointed the head of its Women’s Organization, Rima Fakhry, as a member of its 18-member Political Council (Politburo). Also, Hizbullah appointed Wafa’ Hutayt, the person responsible for political programs in al-Nour radio, as deputy of Hizbullah’s Central Information Office.39 These two moves came as a result of internal debates among Hizbullah cadres and of amending some of the Party’s bylaws.40 As a practical political dimension, Hizbullah founded its “Jihadi Council” in 1995 in order to closely monitor and supervise its jihadi activities. It is worth mentioning that the Jihadi Council gained more importance after the May 2000 nearly complete Israeli withdrawal, since in its seventh conclave, the secretarygeneral himself became its head. However, this turned out to be a hoax and a smart maneuver aimed at hiding the real identity and function of Imad Mughniyyé. It is noteworthy that the infamous Imad Mughniyyé – Hizbullah’s exmilitary cadre on whose head the US put a $25 million reward – was assassinated by a car explosion in Damascus on 12 February 2008. Eighth conclave The eighth conclave was supposed to take place in 2007 – in accordance with the every three years dictum – but, in conformity with Realpolitik, the situation on the ground dictated another course of action. The repercussions of the July 2006 War and fear of assassination of the leaders and cadres were conducive factors that kept on postponing the eighth conclave till the leadership took the decision to hold it in spite of all the political and security threats. Starting in the summer of 2009 and lasting over a time span of around four months, thousands of middle- and high-rank Party cadres embarked on an intensive evaluation of previous policies through a thorough political-organizational workshop that witnessed, in conformity with the Party’s scalar principle, the election of the primary electoral college that elects its representatives to the Shura Council.41 On 19 November 2009 the Party released the following political declaration: “Hiz2 Hizbullah’s Eight Conclaves

27

bullah ended its general congress, which lasted for several months42, whereby a new political document was adopted, the second of its kind after the Open Letter of 1985. It also approved a number of organizational amendments commensurate with the nature of new developments in its movement over the last few years at various levels. The election of members of the Shura Council took place and their responsibilities were nominated for the new mandate. They are the following: 1. Sayyid Hasan Nasrallah, secretary-general. 2. Shaykh Na‘im Qasim, deputy secretary-general. 3. Shaykh Mohammad Yazbik, chairman of the Religio-Judicial Council. 4. Sayyid Ibrahim Amin Al-Sayyid, chairman of the Political Council. 5. Sayyid Hashim Safiyyeddine, chairman of the Executive Council. 6. Hajj Husayn Khalil, political aide to the secretary-general. 7. MP Hajj Muhammad Ra‘d, head of the Loyalty to Resistance Bloc. The secretary-general of Hizbullah will hold a press conference in the next few days, God willing, to announce the new political document.”43 What the Party did not reveal was that an eighth member was added to the Shura Council. However, fearing assassination44, the name of the leading resistance cadre in the Council was not revealed. Electing Hajj Muhammad Ra‘d is telling since it reflects an innovative trend that accords parliamentary work a great status. It could also be regarded as a personal recognition for all the hard work and dedication on his part since he represented the Party in the national dialogue sessions after a failed assassination attempt on Nasrallah’s life made the latter shun public events. This move is also indicative of the role Hizbullah is according to its MPs in order to reveal its new face in light of the new manifesto since many of them have already met EU diplomats, including foreign ministers and ex-foreign policy chief Solana. In a similar vein, the Party established a special unit in an attempt to boost its involvement in the cabinet’s work and take an active role in the administrative apparatus of the state in an endeavor to stamp out corruption. It is noteworthy that the great achievement of the eighth conclave is par excellence the new Manifesto, rather than the slight changes to the Party’s organizational structure or structural formations. Finally, Hizbullah’s decision in its sixth conclave bore fruit. After almost a quarter of a century, on 30 November 2009 the Party revealed its new Manifesto/Political Platform delineating its domestic, regional, and international policy dynamics.45 The Party’s spokesman Sayyid Ibrahim al-Musawi told me: “It will send waves of awareness about the Party and help shatter negative, preconceived ideas.”46 The Manifesto also addresses issues such as the resistance; political, social, economic, administrative, and judicial reform; and contains a stance on the abolition of political sectarianism and the implementation of the Ta’if Introduction

28

Agreement. The Manifesto outlines the Party’s political and intellectual vision in light of a dynamic world. It is worth mentioning here that from the perspective of the Party’s call for the establishment of a strong, capable, and just state, Hizbullah started to give the Dahiya a facelift a month before announcing the manifesto, whereby law and order were being imposed by the Lebanese police and all breaches of public facilities and criminal offences were penalized. As part of its campaign, entitled “Order is Part & Parcel of Faith” and headed by the general coordinator Sayyid Husayn Fadlallah, the Party founded a new NGO called “Qiyam (Values)” in order to spread and inculcate civic consciousness among the population through a combination of Qur’anic verses, hadith prohibitions, and popular sayings and aphorisms exhorting the masses to employ their religious discipline in order to uphold law and order. Some of the banners and slogans read: “It is prohibited to make use of water and electricity through illegal means; God has organized your daily dealings; encroaching on public order is a haram; abiding by traffic signs is a measure of intelligence; be careful in using water, etc.”47 The same message was reiterated again in a lengthy speech by Nasrallah on the seventh day of Muharram, where he stressed to his followers their religious duty to abide by law and order citing a consensus among the jurisprudents to the obligation of complying with laws that uphold public order.48 So no wonder that in its eighth conclave Hizbullah added new political, organizational, media, and cultural units in order to accommodate this new development. The need for drastic organizational changes concomitant with the Party’s rotation policy, not only in its military structure but also in its civil organs, has been growing ever since the end of the July 2006 War, where great deficiencies have been noted in this regard.49

3 Analysis of the New Manifesto Hizbullah’s world view Hizbullah’s world view was not drastically altered in its 2009 Manifesto. In line with its 1985 Open Letter, its first Manifesto, it replaced the bipolarity of the West facing the East with Imam Khumayni’s ideological bipolarity that divides the world into the Qur’anic notions of “oppressors” and “oppressed”. Hizbullah upheld its “liberation theology” and called for the “unity of the oppressed”: According to Hizbullah’s vision and approach, the criteria of divergence and conflict are based upon political-moral grounds, primarily between the arrogant and wretched, the oppressor and oppressed, the haughty occupier and a pursuer of freedom.50

3 Analysis of the New Manifesto

29

The central goal of the American hegemony resides in dominating the nations politically, economically, culturally and through all aspects… as it is the base of controlling the world economy not to mention resorting to all merciless, inhumane and unethical means including the use of extreme military power whether directly or through a mediator. To achieve this goal, Washington… provided the Zionist entity with stability guarantees, in such a way that allows this entity to play the role of a cancerous gland that absorbs and sucks out all the energies and capabilities of the nation as to destroy its ambitions and aims.51 We look with great interest and appreciation at the liberalization, independence and dominance rejection experiences of Latin America countries. We see vast grounds for overlap between the endeavors of these countries and the resistance movements of our region, overlap which should lead to the creation of a more equitable and balanced international order… our motto “Unity of the Oppressed” shall remain as one of the pillars of political thought, shaping our understanding, relationships and attitudes towards international issues.52

Hizbullah did not change its stance towards the US nor Israel. In rhetoric, although the ideological slogans of the “Great Satan” and the “Small Satan” were dropped, the “Zionist entity” and the “cancerous gland” remained the most used descriptions of Israel. The unlimited US support for “Israel” and its cover for the “Israeli” occupation of Arab lands, in addition to the American domination of international institutions, the double standards in the criteria of issuing and applying international policies… puts the American administration in the position of the aggressor and holds it responsible for producing chaos in the international political system.53 We categorically reject any compromise with “Israel” or recognizing its legitimacy. This position is definitive, even if everyone recognizes “Israel.”54

In the question-and-answer session of the press conference, Nasrallah was careful to fend off any accusations of anti-Semitism against Hizbullah: “I have clearly stated in the Manifesto that our problem with the Israelis is not that they are Jews; our problem with them is not religious, ethnical, or racial. Rather, the core of the problem is that they are occupiers who are raping our land and holy places.”55 However, Hizbullah’s stance towards NATO’s Western European countries and the EU, which now comprises 27 countries, did undergo serious revisions. Nevertheless, based on a common historical experience of war and occupation, Hizbullah wanted to uphold its cherished distinction between “resistance” and “terrorism”:

Introduction

30

The Bush Administration decided to establish a correlation between “terrorism” and “national resistance”, and this in order to disarm the resistance of its humanitarian legitimacy and its righteousness of cause, and to justify the waging of all forms of wars against it…. “Terrorism” was transformed into an American alibi for hegemony.56 As for the European policies (EU), these hang between being barely effective on one side and being a follower of the American policies on the other, and this actually leads to the hollowing out of the moderate drift in Europe at the expense of and in service to the “Atlantic drift” (NATO) of colonial backgrounds. The EU’s following of US policies constitutes a strategic mistake that will increase the problems of the Middle East and the world and will ultimately lead to more problems and complications in the European-Arab relations. Europe holds responsibility for the damage it has caused due to the colonial “inheritance” it has left behind – of which our people still suffer the consequences and results. Since some European people have a history in resisting the occupier, Europe’s ethical and humanitarian duty – in addition to being a political duty – is to acknowledge the right of the people to resisting the occupier, on the basis of distinguishing between resistance and terrorism. The preconditions of stability and cooperation in European-Arab relations require a European approach that is more independent, just, and objective (than that of the US).57

4 Thematic Analysis The 71-page 2009 Manifesto begins with a “Foreword” and is divided into three chapters: “Hegemony and Mobilization”; “Lebanon”; and “Palestine and the Settlement Negotiations”. I will highlight the most salient statements in each. Lashing the US and Israel Hizbullah contends that the US’s unipolar hegemony shatters the world balance, security, and stability. The Party claims that the US administration’s unwavering support to Israel puts the former in the position of enmity towards the Arab and Muslim nation. Starting in the “Foreword”, Hizbullah admonishes: We are witnessing great historical changes that point in the direction of a retreat of the US role and decline in the hegemony of the Zionist Entity (Israel)… The path of resistance and opposition to hegemony, which is based upon military victories and political successes, is gaining ground (p. 11).

4 Thematic Analysis

31

In Chapter 1 entitled “Hegemony and Mobilization”, Section 1: “The World and Western-American Hegemony”, Hizbullah continues lashing the US, and to a lesser extent, Israel. Globalization reached a one-time high when it took a military shape through war in Afghanistan, Iraq, Lebanon, and Gaza (p. 18)… American terrorism is the basis of all terrorism in the world (p. 22)… The grave fiasco of the US war on resistance (movements) in Lebanon and Palestine through Israeli hands led to the deterioration of the US credibility on the international scene (p. 22)…

The same trend continues in Chapter 1, Section 2, “Our Region and the American Plot” where Hizbullah contends that the main purpose of US colonialism is to exercise hegemony over the countries and their capabilities (pp. 24-6). Lebanon and the political system In Chapter 2: “Lebanon”, Section 1: “The Homeland”, contrary to its first Manifesto, the Open Letter, Hizbullah stresses that it is against establishing cantons or “states within a state” and also in opposition to founding an Islamic state in Lebanon. Hizbullah regards Lebanon as its country “homeland” par excellence: Lebanon is our country and the country of our fathers and forefathers; it is also the country of our children and grandchildren and all future generations. We want it strong and unified… we reject partition and federalism… Lebanon is the country that we have offered the most precious sacrifices and the most dignified of martyrs for the sake of its sovereignty, honor, dignity, and the liberation of its land… (p. 30).

However, this was not all. After Hizbullah recognized the ultimate sovereignty and territorial integrity of Lebanon, stressing the building of a “capable, strong, and just state” (p. 30), in Section 3 entitled, “The State and the Political System”, the Party voiced its demand to reform the political system in line with the Ta’if Agreement, Lebanon’s 1990 constitution: The main ill in the Lebanese political system is political sectarianism… (p. 38) Consensual democracy represents a proper political formula to assure true partnership and contributes in opening the doors for everyone to join the phase of state building… (p. 39)58 The state that we are looking forward to taking part in is the one that upholds public freedoms and is concerned for national unity… (p. 40)

In Section 2 entitled “The Resistance”, Hizbullah exposes what it perceives as the Israeli threat calling for the adoption of a national defense to face it: Introduction

32

Because of its historical expansionist policy, Israel poses a perpetual existential danger to Lebanon… The Zionist entity, being a racist state, represents a peril to the very concept of multi-religious coexistence that Lebanon uniquely manifests (p. 32)… The perpetual Israeli military threat to Lebanon requires the founding of a national defense strategy… (pp. 35-6)

Lebanese-Palestinian relations Although in Section 4, entitled “Lebanon and Palestinian-Lebanese Relations” Hizbullah is vehemently against naturalizing the Palestinian refugees in Lebanon, it urgently calls on the Lebanese government to grant them their civil rights so that they can lead a dignified life while awaiting the right of return: The Palestinian refugees in Lebanon should be accorded their civil and social rights in such a way to safeguard their identity and just cause, without naturalizing them… Upholding the Palestinians’ Right of Return and refusal of their permanent settlement in Lebanon (p. 46).

Relations with Syria and Iran In conformity with the Open Letter and Lebanese reality, Hizbullah calls on the Lebanese state to have privileged relations with Syria and good relations with Iran. Syria has recorded a distinctive and steadfast stance in its struggle against the Israeli enemy. This came through its support of regional resistance movements amidst their most difficult of circumstances, and through seeking to concert Arab efforts towards securing the interests of the region and confronting its challenges. We hereby emphasize the need to adhere to the distinguished relations between Lebanon and Syria, for this is in the common political, security and economic interest of both countries.59 Iran is a central and important state in the Islamic world and it is the main supporter of the causes of the umma… Hizbullah considers Islamic Iran to be a focal nation in the Islamic world. For Iran was the country that thwarted the ZionistAmerican scheme through its national revolution, supported resistance movements in our region, and stood with courage and determination alongside Arab and Islamic causes, at the forefront of which is the Palestinian cause.60

Pan-Arabism and pan-Islamism Like its Open Letter, in its 2009 Manifesto, Hizbullah calls for pan-Arabism and pan-Islamism: “The Arabs should put their hands together in order to transcend conflicts that rupture Arab unity (pan-Arabism)…61 The Arab and Islamic world is facing challenges whose dangers should not be undermined…62 4 Thematic Analysis

33

Hizbullah is an ardent advocate of the unity of the Muslims. In both Manifestos it called for the unity of the Muslims invoking Qur’anic verses and religious sensibilities. Section 22 of the Open Letter entitled: “God is with the unity of the Muslims” stressed the need to: Be aware of the malignant colonial discord (fitna) that aims at rupturing your unity in order to spread sedition among you and enflame Sunni-Shi‘a sectarian feelings. Be knowledgeable that colonialism was not able to control the natural resources and riches of the Muslims except after breaking up their unity… inciting Sunnis against the Shi‘as and vice versa. Later on the colonizer left this mission of spreading dissension among the Muslims to its collaborators, be it the governing elite, the corrupt Muslim religious scholars (state jurists), or the feudal leaders (zu‘ama). God is with the unity of the Muslims… It is the rock that breaks all the conspiracies of the oppressors; it is the hammer that crushes the evil schemes of the oppressors… Do not allow the policy of “divide and rule” to be practiced among you; rather fight it by recourse to the Qur’an: “And hold fast to Allah’s bond [His religion], all of you, and do not fall apart. And remember Allah’s grace is upon you; how you were enemies, then He united your hearts [by becoming Muslims] so that you have become, by His grace, brethren. You were on the brink of the pit of Fire, but He saved you from it” (3:103). “Those who have made divisions in their religion and become sects, thou art not of them in anything” (6:159).63

In a watered-down version, the 2009 Manifesto reiterates: We therefore remind you of the importance of unity among Muslims. The Almighty has said: “And hold on fast, together, to the rope of God, and be not separated” (3:103). We take heed of those causes of division between the people, such as confessional provocations that are instigated especially between Sunnis and Shi‘ites. We count on the awareness of all Muslims in addressing what is being contrived against them at this level.64

The Arab-Israeli conflict and the peace process Chapter III, entitled “Palestine and the Settlement Negotiations”, repeats the same old story of the Open Letter with the same emphatic terms. Section 1: “The Palestinian Cause and the Zionist Entity” paints a grim picture of the creation of the state of Israel and the displacement of the Palestinians: A crime against humanity was committed by the West when this extraneous entity (Israel) was implanted in the heart of the Arab and Muslim world, and was nur-

Introduction

34

tured to become a hostile infiltration, standing as a leading front for Western plots of dominion, and posing as a base for control and dominion over the region (p. 58).

It adds that Israel is supported by the West, especially the US, branding both the US and Israel with “terrorism”: The Zionist movement is a racist movement both in terms of thought and practice. It is the product of a despotic, authoritarian mentality, the basis of which is founded on a Judaization project of settlement and expansion. The state entity that emerged from the Zionist movement has thrived through occupation, aggression, massacres and terrorism, all with the support and under the custody of colonialist powers, particularly with the aid of the United States of America with which the Zionist state is strategically allied – a true partner in war, massacres and the practice of terrorism. The struggle that we are embarked upon against the Zionist project emanates from the duty of self-defense (p. 59).

In Section 2: “Jerusalem and the Aqsa Mosque”, Hizbullah warns that the serious attacks against the Aqsa Mosque (in Jerusalem) constitute a real and present danger that might lead to serious consequences. Hizbullah adds that supporting Jerusalem and liberating it are a religious duty and a humanitarian and ethical duty (p. 62). In upholding its own resistance identity and its own model of resistance, Hizbullah gives legitimacy to the Palestinian resistance, arguing that it is “sanctioned by heavenly messages and international laws”. In the third section, entitled “The Palestinian Resistance”, Hizbullah adds that the precepts of practice have proven the efficiency of military resistance to liberate the land and regain lost rights (p. 63): Resistance is indeed the only viable alternative… [in 2006] the Lebanese Resistance recorded a divine and historical victory, a strategic success that dramatically changed the shape of the conflict. This was the first defeat of its kind for the Israeli enemy, a gun-down to the all-time myth of an “invincible army” (p. 64).

The fourth and final section, entitled “Settlement Negotiations”, reinforces the Open Letter’s dictum of no recognition of Israel and no negotiations with it, claiming that this policy embodies the will of the people: “We call upon the Arab rulers to be committed to the choices of their people by reconsidering the options of negotiations” (p. 67).

4 Thematic Analysis

35

Our standpoint towards the settlement process [peace negotiations]… is a position of absolute rejection of the very foundation and principles of the settlement option with the Zionist entity. The settlement option is founded on legitimizing the Zionist entity’s existence and relinquishing seized Palestine land, an Arab and Islamic land. This is our immutable, permanent and final standpoint towards the negotiation option, one that is not subject to recoil or compromise, even if the entire world recognized “Israel” as a state (p. 67)…We call on the Arabs and Muslims to reject all schemes for normalization with the Zionist enemy, to uphold the right of return of all Palestinian refugees to their lands and homes from which they were expelled, and to unequivocally reject all presented alternatives for Palestinian resettlement, compensation or relocation (p. 69).

5 Conclusion This introductory chapter presents a good example of Hizbullah’s identity construction and reconstruction. It compares Hizbullah’s first and second manifestos and evaluates the Party’s eight conclaves, all analyzed from the standpoint of the domestic, regional, and international dynamics. Drastic changes were noted. In 1985 when Hizbullah propagated its first manifesto, the Party was a small fighting force where all its resource mobilization65 was directed towards its war effort in fighting Israel to provoke its withdrawal from the vast territories it occupied in Lebanon. In 2009, the dynamics changed. Hizbullah is considered as one of the constituent pillars of the Lebanese political system, calling for its reform along the lines of consensual democracy. At the time the Party earned an Arab and Islamic recognition for liberating Lebanese territories from the Israeli occupation in May 2000 and for standing its ground against the Israeli offensive in the 2006 July war. That is why its second Manifesto had to be along the lines of a pragmatic political document, rather than the ideological-utopian one propagated in the mid-1980s. Nevertheless, the 2009 Manifesto is not a political document par excellence, as Nasrallah claimed in his 30 November 2009 press conference and as Hizbullah tried to portray it in its extensive media campaign; rather it has important ideological undertones such as the enmity towards Israel and the US. It seems Shaykh Na‘im Qasim was right in his 2002 predictions that Hizbullah’s hostility towards Israel and the US administration would not be changed in the new Manifesto. However, this enmity is only in rhetoric and semantics since Hizbullah is a patriotic Lebanese resistance movement and does not operate in the US or Israel; rather it leaves it to the Palestinians to liberate their land, while granting them all kinds of moral and in-kind support. As mentioned earlier, Hizbullah is careful to clarify that its animosity is towards the US administration, and not the US people. This seems to be in conformity Introduction

36

with Imam Khumayni’s discourse on “God’s Sovereignty” (hakimiyyat Allah), which is tolerant towards the populace, but not the ruling elite. This stands in sharp contrast to al-Qa‘ida’s and Bin Laden’s nihilist discourse that does not distinguish between the two.

5 Conclusion

37

1 Primary Documents

1 The Text of Hizbullah’s Open Letter1 Addressed to the Oppressed in Lebanon and the World, 16 February 1985 The cover page of the Manifesto opens with the following Qur’anic quote: “Whoever takes Allah, His Apostle and those who believe as their friends, [must know] that Allah’s party [Hizbullah] is indeed the triumphant”. (5:56)

Dedication * To the torch that has increased in light and brightness, so that it lit the path to a free dignified life for the oppressed in Lebanon, and burned with its pure glittering blood [jihad and martyrdom] the power of the “Zionist Entity” [Israel] and its myth. * To the leader who confided in and trusted his people and led them in jihad [Shaykh Raghib Harb]. He sacrificed his soul and was martyred in order to grant them victory2, and was a witness to the tyranny and oppression of the world oppressors. * To the emblem of the victorious Islamic Resistance, and the great uprising (Intifada) against the Israeli occupation in southern Lebanon and Western Biqa‘, where our people are adamantly resisting with sweat and blood, emboldened by Imam Husayn’s martyrdom in Karbala’. * To the one who shattered the American dream in Lebanon and fought (resisted) the Israeli occupation, raising the banner of action according to wilayat al-faqih, the leader, who liked to be addressed as the prince of the Muslims, [Imam] Abdallah (the servant of God) al-Khumayni…

39

* We [Hizbullah] dedicate this, “Open Letter to the oppressed of the world”, to the Shaykh of the martyrs, Raghib Harb (may God’s blessings be upon him), consolidating between its lines the Islamic revolutionary-political path that was personified by our happy martyr, with his brothers the martyrs, so that he will become a leading example [to emulate] and a clear guide to all the freedom fighters (mujahidin) in Lebanon… We ask God, glory be to Him and highly exalted, to endow us with patience, consolidate our grounds, and make us victorious over the oppressors (al-qawn al-zalimin).3 The main text of the Manifesto opens with the following Qur’anic substantiation: “And say: ‘The truth is from your Lord. Whoever wishes, let him believe; and whoever wishes, let him disbelieve’. We have prepared for the wrongdoers a Fire whose canopy encompasses them all. If they call for relief, they will be relieved with water like molten brass which scars the faces. Wretched is the drink and wretched is the resting-place!” (18:29).4

Section 1: Who are we, and what is our identity? We, the sons of Hizbullah’s umma, whose vanguard God has given victory in Iran and which has established the nucleus of the world’s central Islamic state, abide by the orders of a single, wise and just command represented by the guardianship of the jurisprudent (waliyy al-faqih), currently embodied in the supreme Ayatullah Ruhallah al-Musawi al-Khumayni… who has detonated the Muslims’ revolution, and who is bringing about the glorious Islamic renaissance. Therefore, we in Lebanon are neither a closed organizational party nor a narrow political framework. Rather, we are an umma tied to the Muslims in every part of the world by a strong ideological-doctrinal and political bond, namely, Islam, whose message God completed at the hands of the last of His prophets, Muhammad… God has established Islam as a religion for the world to follow: “This day I have perfected your religion for you, completed My favor upon you, and have chosen for you Islam as your religion” (5:3). Therefore, what befalls the Muslims in Afghanistan, Iraq, the Philippines, or elsewhere befalls the body of our Islamic umma of which we are an indivisible part. From this perspective, we move to confront this out of a “religious duty” (wajib shar‘i) primarily and in light of a general political visualization decided by the leader: al-waliyy al-faqih. The main sources of our culture are the venerable Qur’an, the infallible Sunna [Traditions], and the rules and religious edicts made by the jurist (faqih), the authority of emulation. These sources are clear, uncomplicated, and accessible to all without exception, and they need no theorization or philosophy. All they need is abidance and application. 1 Primary Documents

40

No one can estimate our military capabilities since our military apparatus is part and parcel of our society of resistance. Thus, each and every one of us is a combatant when the call of jihad demands it, and each of us undertakes his task in the battle in accordance with the “legitimate and religious responsibility” (taklif shar‘i) of the Wilayat al-Faqih, the leader. God is with us; He supports us by sheltering us with His care; by placing fear in our enemies’ hearts; and by granting us His dear and resounding victory. (Bold is mine)5 Section 2: The “Oppressors” are in concordance about fighting us The countries of the oppressor world, in the East and the West, have coalesced to fight us. Its rulers incited its collaborators against us. They try to defile our reputation and spread lies… in a hypocritical attempt to sow a wedge between us and other oppressed. All of this in order to diminish our great achievements in confronting America and its allies. Through its local collaborators, the US has tried to persuade the people, that those who crushed their arrogance in Lebanon and frustrated their conspiracy against the oppressed (mustad‘afin) were nothing but a bunch of bigots and terrorists who have nothing to do except detonate liquor stores, gambling venues, instruments of diversion, and the like [i.e. all things that lead to debaucheries (al-fawahish)6]. We are confident that such innuendos cannot and will not mislead our umma. For the whole world knows that whoever wishes to oppose the US, that arrogant superpower, does not indulge in these marginal acts that deflect us from our major goal.7 Section 3: America is behind all our catastrophes8 We are dedicated to fighting and uprooting vice and debauchery… The first root of vice is America [the US]… All endeavors to push us into marginal action would be of no avail if measured in relation to our adamant stance of opposing America… Imam Khumayni has stressed time and again that America is behind all our catastrophes, and it is the mother of all vice… When we fight it, we only exercise our legitimate right of defending our Islam and the dignity of our umma. We declare openly and loudly that we are an umma who fears only God and is by no means ready to tolerate injustice, aggression, and humiliation. The US, its NATO allies, and the Zionist entity in the holy land of Palestine [Israel] attacked us and continues to do so without respite. Their aim is to continuously humiliate us. This is why we are, more and more, in a state of permanent alert in order to repel aggression and defend our religion, our existence, and our dignity. They invaded our country, destroyed our villages, slit the throats of our children, violated our sanctuaries, and appointed 1 The text of Hizbullah’s open letter addressed to the oppressed

41

rulers who committed the worst massacres against our umma. Those rulers do not cease to support the allies of Israel; they do not allow us the right of selfdetermination. In a single night the Israelis and the Phalangists butchered thousands of our sons, women and children in Sabra and Shatila.9 No international organization seriously protested or denounced this ferocious massacre, a massacre perpetrated in coordination with the NATO forces that vacated their positions a few days, perhaps a few hours before the massacre in the Palestinian camps. The Lebanese defeatists [government] accepted placing the Palestinian camps under the protection of the [NATO] wolf, in conformity with what the shrewd US envoy Philip Habib has dictated. 10 “You shall find the most hostile people among the believers to be the Jews and the polytheists” (5: 82).11

Section 4: We have no choice except confrontation From this perspective we saw that the only way to face aggression is with sacrifice… Dignity can only be upheld with the sacrifice of blood. Freedom is not given; rather, it is regained with costly sacrifices… We have chosen faith (religion), freedom, and dignity to living under continuous humiliation by America and its allies: the Zionists and the Phalangist collaborators… We revolted to free our land, to throw out the colonialists and the invaders from it, so that we can exercise our right of self-determination. We could not exercise patience any more; we have already waited ten years and seen only that the situation has deteriorated from bad to worse.12 Section 5: Zionist-Phalangist coordination A hundred thousand victims is the approximate number of the casualties slain by America, Israel, and the Phalangists… Almost half a million Muslims were forced to vacate their homes in the areas controlled by the Lebanese Forces.13 The Muslim neighborhoods were totally devastated in Nab‘a, Burj Hammud, Dikwané, Tal al-Za‘tar, Sibnih, Ghawarina district, and Jubayl.14 The Zionist occupation continued to rape the lands of the Muslims till it succeeded in occupying two-thirds of Lebanon. All this in full coordination with the Phalangists who condemned all attempts to resist the invading forces. The Phalangists took part in executing Israeli plans and policies so that they could be rewarded with the seat of the presidency in Lebanon. The Phalangist dream was realized. The butcher [massacre committer] Bashir Jumayyel15 seized power with the help of Israel, rich Arab petroleum countries, and the political Maronites. Through a consorted effort to embellish his image, 1 Primary Documents

42

Bashir joined the six-member Committee of Public Safety16, which proved to be nothing but an American-Israeli bridge exploited by the Phalangists in order to exercise their hegemony over the oppressed. However, our people could not bear humiliation any longer, so they shattered the dreams of the Zionists and their allies. Nevertheless, America was adamant in continuing its foolish behavior by replacing the dead Bashir Jumayyel with his brother Amin.17 Amin Jumayyel destroyed the homes of the displaced; exercised his aggression against the mosques; ordered the [Lebanese] army to heavily shell the oppressed people in the southern suburbs of Beirut; invited the NATO troops to help him against us; and signed the 17 May 1983 agreement with Israel, which aimed at making Lebanon an Israeli protectorate and an American sphere of influence.18 Section 6: Our main enemies Our populace could not bear any more treachery, so they decided to stand firm against the nations of infidelity (a’immat al-Kufur)19: America, France, and Israel. Our populace has chastised them: on 18 April and 29 October 1983.20 The Islamic Resistance (Hizbullah’s military wing) launched a war of attrition against the invading Israeli forces (IDF) and was able to destroy two leading military headquarters 21, thus inflicting heavy casualties and forcing the enemy (IDF) to vacate occupied land, which is a precedent in the so-called Arab-Israeli conflict.22 For the bare truth we declare: the sons of Hizbullah’s umma know who their major foes are in the Middle East: Israel, America, France, and the Phalangists. Section 7: Our objectives in Lebanon We are now in a state of progressive confrontation with our foes, until we achieve the following goals: 1 To expel Israel (IDF) for good from Lebanon, as a prelude to its total annihilation, and the liberation of Jerusalem and its holy cites from the occupation; 2 To expel the Americans, the French, and their allies from Lebanon for good, thus rooting out any influence of any colonial power on Lebanon; 3 To submit the Phalangists to just rule23, and make them stand trial for the crimes they have committed against Muslims and Christians, through encouragement from America and Israel; 4 To allow our populace the right of self-determination; to freely choose the political system that they aspire to. We do not hide our commitment to (the rule of) Islam, and we invite everybody to choose the Islamic system (of government/governance), which alone is capable of guaranteeing

1 The text of Hizbullah’s open letter addressed to the oppressed

43

justice and dignity to everyone, thus preventing any colonial attempt to invade our country again.24 Section 8: Our Friends So… These are our goals in Lebanon; those are our foes. Regarding our friends, they are all the world’s oppressed; anyone who fights our enemies25 and is careful not to offend us… whoever they might be: individuals, political parties, or organizations… we address them and say: Friends, wherever you are in Lebanon, and no matter which thoughts you entertain and although we disagree with the tactics and manner of confronting [our enemies]… we share with you our primary strategic goals… the necessity of breaking the chains of American hegemony in Lebanon… ridding our country from the despicable Israeli occupation… and frustrating all Phalangist endeavors to exercise hegemony over politics and administration. So let us consolidate our front and bury our differences so that we can achieve our common goals of making Lebanon the burial place of American and Zionist projects. You [our friends] carry ideas that do not conform to Islam… but this does not preclude cooperation with you in order to achieve these goals… especially since we feel that the motives which exhort you to struggle are Muslim motives in the first place, originating from confronting oppression and tyranny that have been practiced and imposed upon you… even if these motives were harbored by un-Islamic ideas, they have to converge back to its essence, then you witness that revolutionary Islam spearheads the struggle to face tyranny and oppression…26 Section 9: We are committed to Islam, but we do not impose it by force We are an umma that abides by the message of Islam. We would like the oppressed and all the people to study this heavenly message because it is conducive to establishing justice, peace and tranquility in this world: “There is no compulsion in religion; true guidance has become distinct from error. Thus he who disbelieves in the Devil and believes in Allah grasps the firmest handle [bond] that will never break. Allah is All-Hearing, All-Knowing. Allah is the Supporter of the believers. He brings them out of darkness into light. As for those who disbelieve, their supporters are the devils who bring them out of light into darkness. Those are the people of the Fire in which they shall abide forever” (2:256-7). From this perspective, we do not want to impose Islam on anyone, like we do not want others to impose upon us their convictions and their political systems. We do not want Islam to govern Lebanon by force, as political Maronism is governing now. However, we affirm our conviction in Islam as a doctrine, political system, intellectual foundation, and mode of governance. We call on all the populace to 1 Primary Documents

44

be conversant with it and its religious injunctions. We also call upon the populace to adhere to its teachings at the individual, political, and social levels. If our populace could freely choose the system of government in Lebanon, then they would definitely opt for Islam. From this standpoint, we call for the implementation of an Islamic order on the basis of direct and free choice exercised by the populace, and not on the basis of force, as others might entertain…27 Section 10: The bare minimum of our aspirations in Lebanon On this basis, the bare minimum that we aspire to achieve in order to realize this religious-legal obligation is the following: saving Lebanon from following East and West; forcing the Zionist occupation to evict Lebanese land; and adopting a political system freely chosen by the sheer will and freedom of the populace.28 Section 11: Why do we confront the existing regime? This is our vision and prediction of the Lebanon we want. Based on this we confront the existing regime with the following two standpoints: 1 it is the product of world arrogance and oppression and part of the political map that is an adversary to Islam; 2 it is an unjust regime in its very foundations, which is resistant to any change or reform. Rather it is incumbent upon us to completely uproot it in conformity with the Qur’anic verse (5:45): “Whoever does not judge according to what Allah has revealed, those are the evildoers!”29 Section 12: Our stance towards the opposition (to the Lebanese political system30) From the aforementioned two perspectives, we specify our stance from any opposition to the Lebanese political system… We consider any opposition that maneuvers within the specified guidelines of the regime or those specified by the oppressive world powers to be a scarecrow opposition that in the end accomplishes nothing since ultimately its interests converge with the existing regime. Furthermore, any opposition that maneuvers within the stipulations of the current Lebanese constitution, and is committed to not affecting a radical change to the political system, is again a scarecrow opposition that accomplishes nothing because it does not look after the interests of the oppressed masses. Thus, we are not concerned with any call of political reform that is based on [upholding the privileges of] the rotten sectarian system. Likewise, we are not concerned about the formation of any cabinet or fielding any [Hizbullah] member to become a minister, since any governmental ministry is part and parcel of the oppressive, unjust regime.31

1 The text of Hizbullah’s open letter addressed to the oppressed

45

Section 13: Words to the Christians in Lebanon You honorable oppressed, Through you we address in a few words the Christians of Lebanon, in general, and the Maronites in particular. The [discriminatory and unjust] policies followed by the leaders of political Maronism through the “Lebanese Front”32 and the “Lebanese Forces” cannot achieve peace and tranquility for the Christians of Lebanon because these policies are based on tribal blood-ties (‘asabiyya), sectarian privileges, and alliance with colonial powers and Israel… The Lebanese predicament has proven that sectarian privileges were the key source of the great explosion [civil war] that destroyed the country. The [Lebanese] Christians’ alliances with America, France, and Israel proved to be of no avail when they needed their help the most… The time has come for the fanatic Christians to leave behind their sectarian bigotry and illusions of monopolizing privileges at the expense of others, and heed the call of heaven, so that they can have recourse to reason rather than weapons, [recourse ] to conviction rather than sectarianism… Jesus is absolved from the massacres committed by the Phalangists in the name of Christianity; and Prophet Muhammad is absolved from the evils committed by Muslims who do not abide by the tenets of Islam. If you review your calculations and know that your interest lies in what you decide by your own free will, not in what is imposed upon you, then we renew our call to you: “Say: ‘O People of the Book, come to an equitable world between you and us, that we worship none but Allah, do not associate anything with Him and do not set up each other as lords besides Allah’” (3:64). You Lebanese Christians, If you cannot bear the Muslims to share with you some domains of governance… God too has absolved us from participating in an unjust rule that is neither based upon His religious injunctions, nor upon the divine law (shari‘a) that has been consummated with the seal of the Prophet [Muhammad]… If you want justice, then who is more worthy than the God of justice? He is the one who has revealed the message of Islam from Heaven by dispatching his prophets to rule among the people with justice and fairness so that every individual can claim what is rightfully his… If you were duped and terrorized into believing that we will chastise those of you who live in our midst for the crimes that the Phalamgists committed against us, then rest assured that no one will disturb or trouble you and nothing can taint the peaceful coexistence among us… We wish you no evil. We call upon you to adhere to [the message of] Islam so that you can achieve felicity in this life and the life to come. If you decline, we 1 Primary Documents

46

will not coerce you to do otherwise; rather we only expect you to uphold your covenants with the Muslims and do not engage in aggression against them. You Christians…, Absolve yourselves from the residues of despicable sectarianism; free your minds from the captivity of bigotry and fanaticism; and open your eyes to what we call upon you to follow from Islam, in it you will find your success and felicity as well as the goodness in this world and the world to come. This call is addressed to all oppressed non-Muslims. However, those who are confessionally classified as Muslims, we call on them to abide by the tenets of Islam in actual practice [their daily dealings], and absolve themselves from bigotries that are despised by religion… We assert to all that this age is the age of victory of Islam and righteousness, and the defeat of infidelity (kufr), deception, and falsehood (batil)… so follow the path of righteousness before there comes a time when repentance does not pay off anymore: “… Oh! Had I but taken the (straight) path with the Messenger [Prophet Muhammad]. Ah! Woe is me! Had I but never taken him for a friend! He led me astray from the Message (of Allah). Ah! the Evil One [Satan] is but a traitor to man!.. (25: 27-29).33

Section 14: Our story with the world oppressors You noble oppressed, Our story with the world oppressors can be summarized in these few words: We think that the ideological struggle between America and the Soviet Union is a bygone… both have drastically failed in achieving felicity for mankind since both capitalism and communism have failed in solving human problems by establishing a just, balanced society… We believe that this ideological struggle was replaced by a struggle over obtaining spheres of influence in this world that serve their ultimate interests and policy perspectives. Thus, both camps are struggling for material gains and are attempting to outstrip the oppressed of their natural resources and [historic] rights. From this stance, we stand firm against any colonial intervention, be it Eastern or Western… We censure the crimes perpetrated by America in Vietnam, Iran, Nicaragua, Granada, Palestine, and Lebanon… We condemn the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, and the interference with Iran’s sovereignty and territorial integrity through supporting the Iraqi aggression… Concerning Lebanon and Palestine, we are mainly engaged in facing America because it has the biggest influence among the world’s colonial powers, 1 The text of Hizbullah’s open letter addressed to the oppressed

47

and also Israel which is the product of global Zionism… afterwards we will concentrate our efforts on fighting the American allies from the NATO forces, which had implicated themselves in aiding America against the peoples of the region [Middle East]… We admonish the countries that have not yet followed the American scheme not to serve the American interest at the expense of the freedom and interests of our umma.34 Section 15: Israel must be completely wiped out of existence We consider Israel the spearhead of America in our Islamic world… Israel is a rapist enemy that we will continue to fight till the raped land is returned to its [Palestinian] rightful owners… This enemy [Israel] constitutes a grave and present danger to the future of our generations and the destiny of our umma because of its expansionist settling policy, which was initiated in occupied Palestine, and continues to grow and expand till it comprises Greater Israel from the Nile to the Euphrates… Our struggle against the rapist Israel emanates from a doctrinal-historical understanding that affirms that this Zionist entity is aggressive in its founding and constituency since it is erected on raped land at the expense of Muslim rights… That is why our confrontation with this Entity will only cease when it is completely obliterated from the face of the earth. From this perspective, we do not recognize any cease-fire, truce, or peace treaty with it, whether arrived at by individual states or communally. We vehemently blast all attempts at mediation between us and Israel. We consider the mediating parties as aggressors because their mediation will only serve to legitimize the Zionist occupation of Palestine… On this basis, we vehemently reject the Camp David Agreements [between Egypt and Israel], the proposals of King Fahd, the Fez [Morocco] and Reagan plans, Brezhnev’s and the French-Egyptian proposals, and each and every plan or proposal that serves to legitimize, overtly or covertly, the Zionist occupation of Palestine or the existence of the Zionist entity. We condemn all the wayward countries and organizations that are running after recapitulative solutions with the enemy [Israel] and that agree to the principle of “land for peace,” which we consider as a blatant betrayal of the blood of the Palestinian-Muslim people and the holy Palestinian cause. From another perspective, the Jewish call that has been recently launched for settlement in the [occupied] south Lebanon, as well as the immigration of Ethiopian Jews and others to occupied Palestine, we consider these as part of the Israeli expansionist project in the Muslim world… and an indicator of the grave and present danger that results from granting recognition to this Entity [Israel] or coexisting with it…35 1 Primary Documents

48

Section 16: Escalation in the operations of the Islamic Resistance (against the IDF) The dignified Islamic Resistance, which has underscored and is still underscoring the best epics of heroism against the occupying Zionist forces [Israeli Army], has destroyed, with the religious belief of its fighters, the myths of the invincible Israel. It has put the “Rapist Entity” [Israel] in real trouble due to the daily war of attrition it waged against its military as well as human and economic resources, which has led its leaders to concede to the severity of the confrontation they are facing at the hands of the Muslims [Hizbullahis]… This Islamic Resistance is destined to continue and grow, God willing. All Muslims in the world are expected to provide all the support and backing in order to uproot the “Cancerous Gland” [Israel] and wipe it out of existence. In conformity with reality, we [Hizbullah] insist and stress the Islamic character of our Resistance, which is concomitant with its nationalist-patriotic nature.36 Section 17: Appeal for broad Islamic participation We take the opportunity to call upon all the Muslims in the world to share, with their brothers in Lebanon, the honor of fighting against the occupying Zionists, either directly or by supporting the mujahidin (Hizbullah’s freedom fighters) because it is the responsibility of all the Muslims to do so, and not only the residents of Jabal ‘Amil and Western Biqa‘ (which were the areas under Israeli occupation). The Islamic Resistance was able, with the blood of its martyrs and the jihad of its heroes, to force the enemy [Israel], for the first time in the history of struggle against it, to take the decision and withdraw from Lebanon without any American influence. On the contrary, the [Israeli] decision to withdraw led to a real American concern, and it resulted in a historical overturn in the history of the struggle against the “rapist Zionists”. Hizbullah’s freedom fighters have proven that the umma, if left alone to conduct its own affairs freely, is capable of making miracles, and changing the illusionary predestination [of defeat].37 It is worth mentioning that the Islamic Resistance is not only composed of young men whose weapon is the rifle and a religiously strong will, but also of women, children, and the elderly.38 Section 18: The mercenary politics of the (Lebanese) government and its treacherous negotiations We pay little attention to the occasional boasting of the Lebanese government, which attempts to delude people that it is supporting the Resistance against the occupation… We overtly declare that the [alleged] verbal and media support is a source of contempt to our populace… Even if some declarations have emanated from some members of the ruling elite, our informed public cannot be deceived by 1 The text of Hizbullah’s open letter addressed to the oppressed

49

these declarations because they represent the official stance of the Lebanese government, especially since it is unwilling to deploy the (Lebanese) Army in order to participate in the honor of liberating occupied land… The contended financial support to the resistance is useless if the money does not reach Hizbullah’s freedom fighters and is not used to buy ammunition, weaponry, and the like… Our populace rejects the mercenary policies [the Lebanese government is engaged in] at the expense of the Resistance. There will come a day, when all of those – who debased and “traded” with the blood of the heroic martyrs and built for themselves glories at the expense of the mujahidin’s wounds – will be brought to justice. We can only assert that the policy of negotiations with the enemy [Israel] is a grave treason towards the Resistance that the Lebanese state contends to stand by and support… The insistence of the Lebanese government to join the negotiations with the enemy can only be regarded as a conspiracy aiming at acknowledging the Zionist occupation and according it legitimacy as well as privilege for the crimes it committed against the oppressed in Lebanon… The Islamic Resistance, which has openly declared its unwillingness to abide by any outcome resulting from the negotiations, stresses the continuity of jihad until the Zionists evacuate the occupied lands, which is seen as a step in the right direction to obliterate them from the face of the earth.39 Section 19: International forces and their suspicious role The International Forces that the world oppressors are trying to deploy on Muslim lands – in the areas that the enemy withdraws from, so that it makes up a security zone that protects Israel and shelters its occupying forces derailing the movements of the Resistance – are totally rejected as condemned conspirators with Israel… we might be compelled to treat them as we engage with the Zionist occupying forces… May everyone know that the commitments of the Phalangist regime [to Israel] are totally rejected and are unbinding, in any way whatsoever, for the freedom fighters of the Islamic Resistance [who wash their hands of these commitments]… These countries [which sent their forces to Lebanon] have to deeply think before they indulge in the quicksand that Israel has drowned itself in.40 Section 20: Defeatist Arab Regimes Concerning the Arab regimes which are running after reconciliation with the Zionist enemy, these regimes are impotent and short-sighted in accompanying the ambitions and aspirations of the umma… These regimes cannot think of confronting the Zionist entity that raped Palestine because they were founded

1 Primary Documents

50

under colonial guardianship, which had a great role in the shaping of these rusty regimes… Some reactionary rulers, especially those in the oil-producing countries, do not hesitate to make of their countries military bases for America and Britain. They are not ashamed of being dependent on foreign experts whom they appoint in official high places. They abide by and execute what the “White House” [US administration] dictates to them, especially the policies of getting out the natural resources and the riches (of their countries) and distributing them to the colonizers, using all possible means (to accomplish that)… Some of those who claim to be the guardians of the Islamic Shari‘a [The Saudi regime] employ this claim to cover up their treason as well as to find a pretext for their yielding to the US administration. At the same time, they [The Saudi regime] vehemently ban and prohibit any revolutionary Islamic book… [A reference to Imam Khumayni’s books] As a result of the defeatist policy employed by these reactionary regimes towards Israel, the latter was able to convince a lot of them that it has become fait accompli and that there is no way out save to recognize it and concede the need to its demand of providing it security… This policy of yielding encouraged the deceased Sadat to commit a grave treason by reconciling with Israel and signing a disgraceful peace treaty… This policy of yielding governs and constrains the movement of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), and the Jordanian-Egyptian axis, Iraq, and the Arafati Organization [i.e. the PLO]… The defeatist policy in front of America directs the attitude of the reactionary rulers concerning the aggressive war imposed on the Islamic Republic of Iran… It stands behind the unlimited financial, economic, and military support the agent Saddam Husayn is showered with. They [the US] think that the Takriti [Tikrit is Saddam’s hometown] Zionist regime can annihilate the Islamic Revolution and can stop the emanation of its revolutionary light and ideals. This defeatist policy pushes reactionary regimes to make the people ignorant; to brainwash them and make their Islamic personality wither away; to repress any Islamic mobilization that is against America and its allies in these countries. The defeatist policy also makes the reactionary governments fearful of the vigilance of the oppressed, banning them from interfering in its political affairs because it possesses a grave danger for the survival of these regimes, especially since the populace is aware of the corruption of its governments and its suspected relations/linkages [with other states], as well as the sympathy this populace shows towards liberation movements in all parts of the Islamic world as well as the world at large… We find in these reactionary Arab regimes an impediment against the increase in consciousness raising and the unity of the Islamic populace. We con1 The text of Hizbullah’s open letter addressed to the oppressed

51

sider them [reactionary Arab regimes] responsible for stalling the attempts to keep the wound open and the struggle with the Zionist enemy going on… We have huge hope in the Muslim populace that obviously started to complain, in most Islamic countries, and was able to benefit from experiences of the world’s revolutions, especially the victorious Islamic Revolution… The day will come when these barely standing [Arab] regimes will fall under the fist of the oppressed, like the throne of despotism [the Shah’s monarchy] had collapsed in Iran. We are fighting a ferocious battle against America and Israel and their plans for the region [Middle East]. We warn these reactionary [Arab] regimes not to work against the dominant reformist current in the umma, which is against colonialism and Zionism. These [reactionary Arab regimes] have to learn from the Islamic resistance in Lebanon grand lessons in the persistence of fighting the enemy in order to completely defeat it. We warn these regimes against being engaged in new defeatist projects, or in aggressive projects targeting the young Islamic Revolution… because that will lead these regimes to the same fate that was accorded to Anwar al-Sadat, and before him Nur al-Sa‘id.41 Section 21: International front for the oppressed We turn our attention to all the Arab and Muslim populace in order to declare to them that the experience of the Muslims in Islamic Iran does not leave a pretext to anyone, because it has proven beyond the shadow of a doubt that bare chests that are driven by a faithful volition, with the great aid of God, were able to break all the iron [power] of the tyrannical regimes… That is why we call upon this populace to unify their ranks, plan their objectives, mobilize to break the chains that engulf its volition, and overthrow the despotic collaborating governments [with the “enemy”]. We exhort all the oppressed in the world to the necessity of forming an international front comprised of all their liberation movements in order to fully coordinate their efforts so that an efficient action will transpire, thus concentrating on the weaknesses of the enemies… So if the colonizing countries and regimes have shown a consensus on fighting the oppressed… so the oppressed must bond together in order to face the conceit of the world oppressors. All the oppressed populace, especially the Arab and Islamic ones, should understand that only Islam is capable of becoming the intellectual foundation or thinking that is capable of resisting and confronting the aggression because all man-made ideologies have been disbanded forever in the interest of the deterrence among the Americans and the Soviets as well as others.

1 Primary Documents

52

The time has come to be cognizant of the fact that all foreign ideas, concerning the origin of man and his instinct, are incapable of answering his ambitions or saving him from the darkness of ignorance and waywardness… Only Islam leads to man’s reform, progress, and creativity because “it is kindled from a blessed olive tree, neither of the East nor the West. Its oil will almost shine, even if no fire has touched it. Light upon light, Allah guides to His light whomever He pleases…” (24:35).42 Section 22: God is with the unity of the Muslims A call on the Muslim populace: Be aware of the malignant colonial discord (fitna) that aims at rupturing your unity in order to spread sedition among you and enflame Sunni-Shi‘a sectarian feelings. Be knowledgeable that colonialism was not able to control the natural resources and riches of the Muslims except after breaking up their unity… inciting Sunnis against the Shi‘as and vice versa. Later on the colonizers left this mission of spreading dissention among the Muslims to their collaborators, be it the governing elite, the corrupt Muslim religious scholars (state jurists), or the feudal leaders (zu‘ama). God is with the unity of the Muslims… It is the rock that breaks all the conspiracies of the oppressors; it is the hammer that crushes the evil schemes of the oppressors… Do not allow the policy of “divide and rule” to be practiced among you; rather fight it by recourse to the Qur’an: “And hold fast to Allah’s bond [His religion], all of you, and do not fall apart. And remember Allah’s grace upon you; how you were enemies, then He united your hearts [by becoming Muslims] so that you have become, by His grace, brethren. You were on the brink of the pit of Fire, but He saved you from it”. (3:103). “Those who have made divisions in their religion and become sects, thou art not of them in anything” (6:159).43

Section 23: (An appeal/call to the) ‘ulama of Islam You Muslim ‘ulama, You have a grave responsibility, as grave as the calamities that strike the Muslims… You are the best in conducting your duty of leading the umma towards Islam… And in alerting it to what the enemies are plotting in order to control and enslave it as well as rob it of its treasures… No wonder you are conversant that the Muslims look upon you as bearers of the Prophet’s trust (amana) in your capacity as successors to the prophets and messengers… So be the hope and the good lead in overtly calling for right and 1 The text of Hizbullah’s open letter addressed to the oppressed

53

standing up against the tyrants and despots. Be the lead in austerity, the passion to [go to] Heaven, and martyrdom in the way of God… You have the good lead of Prophet Muhammad who used to share hunger and satisfaction with the people; he used to lead the prayer at the Mosque; he used to lead the populace in jihad… He used to guide the people in missions; they used to get warmth from his guidance and in being around him; they followed him being assured and comforted… You Muslim ‘ulama, Imam Khumayni repeatedly stressed the need to rectify, reform, and refine the self, before rectifying, reforming, and refining others and the world at large. He said on more than one occasion that if people knew that a shopkeeper is dishonest and immoral, then they say that Mr. X is dishonest and immoral; if they found out that a merchant is cheating them, then they say that Mr. X is a cheater; however, if they knew that a Muslim religious scholar (‘alim), God forbid, is not upright, then they would generalize and say that all religious scholars are not upright (tainted) and the religion (Islam) as a whole is not upright.44 You Muslim ‘ulama, For this and other reasons… You have a grave responsibility, so invoke God in order to be able to conduct it in a proper way, and invoke Him with the calling of Imam ‘Ali: “God, we do not ask you [to take] a small burden, rather we ask you to be a strong bulwark supporting us”. Then the umma will respond to your call, guidance, and leadership. Be knowledgeable about the importance of your position in the umma because the colonizer has known its importance. That is why the colonizer has vehemently targeted the ‘ulama al-mujahidin… so the colonizer prepared a devilish conspiracy to conceal Imam Musa al-Sadr after recognizing him as an impediment hurdling the colonizer’s aggressive plans… The colonizer killed the Islamic philosopher Ayatullah Murtada Mutahhari45… and executed the grand Islamic marja‘ Ayatullah Sayyid Muhammad Baqir al-Sadr46 because the colonizer felt the danger of his stance, which was personalized in these words: “Melt in Imam Khumayni as Islam has melted in you”. That is why the colonizer is stalking and ambushing every religious scholar who is executing his Islamic duty to the best of his knowledge. From another perspective, the colonizer started to penetrate the Muslims with state jurists who do not fear God. They make religious edicts (fatwas) where there is no place for fatwas; therefore, they sanction peace with Israel, prohibit fighting it, and find excuses for the treason of tyrant rulers…

1 Primary Documents

54

The colonizer would not have done that without [knowing] the important impact a religious scholar has on the people… That is why, one of your most important responsibilities, for you Muslim ‘ulama, is to nurture the Muslims to abide by the religious injunctions, to clarify to them the righteous political path that they should follow, and to lead them to glory and honor… Also you have to take care of the religious seminaries so that the umma can graduate leaders who are faithful to God and who are committed to the victory of the religion and the umma.47 Section 24: A final word regarding international organizations Finally, there is a need for a few words concerning international organizations such as the UN, the Security Council and others… We note that these organizations do not constitute a podium for the oppressed nations, and in general, they remain ineffective and inefficient due to the procedural hegemony and domination of the world oppressors on its decisions… The veto right, which is accorded to some countries, is a testimony to what we say… From this perspective, we do not predict these organizations to issue anything serving the interests of the oppressed. We call on all the countries that respect themselves to adopt a resolution banning the right of veto, which is accorded to the oppressor countries… We also call on all countries to adopt a resolution to fire Israel from the UN because it is an illegitimate-rapist entity, which is opposed to humanity at large. You will free the oppressed… These are our visions and goals, and these are the basic regulations that guide our path… There are those who have wholeheartedly and righteously accepted us [our discourse], God is the only Truth; and there are those who have contested our views. We patiently await till God has judged us, and the oppressors (al-qawm al-zalimin). May God’s blessings and peace be upon all of you, Hizbullah48

1 The text of Hizbullah’s open letter addressed to the oppressed

55

2 Hizbullah: Views and Concepts, Manar TV, Beirut, 20 June 199749 Introduction Freedom, rights, justice and peace are essential values for any society to rise and develop. Freedom is the basis for this rise, while justice cannot be applied without rights, and peace is inaccessible with the exclusion of justice. Adopting and practicing these human values requires commitment and credibility, for they make one importable whole; freedom cannot be enjoyed by one group and denied to another, right should not prevail here and be paralyzed there; if abated, justice turns into injustice; peace cannot be achieved unless it is comprehensive. These values have been established by the divine religions, the clearest and most comprehensive of which has been Islam, whether in theoretical or practical conception. Hizbullah-Lebanon Hizbullah-Lebanon is an organized striving current that has been established on the basis of its commitment to the above-mentioned values, seeking with its noble religious and national struggle to achieve these values in Lebanon and the region and to eliminate all the artificial barriers that would obstruct that purpose. Hizbullah has faithfully, courageously and persistently resisted the Zionist invasion of Lebanon and prevented it from achieving its political objectives that were represented at that time by dominating this small country and establishing a political regime whose decision was to be controlled by the desires of the racist Zionist Jews. In order to liberate the occupied land, maintain the national dignity and materialize these values, Hizbullah has sacrificed hundreds of martyrs, injured and disabled as an act of faith in the legitimacy of its resistance against the usurping invaders. Hizbullah between Peace and Violence Hizbullah has a strong belief in the necessity of achieving the security and peace that are based on rights and justice in Lebanon, the region and the world. Consequently, it rejects all forms of aggression and terrorism; at the same time Hizbullah views the Zionist Jews’ occupation of Palestine, displacing its people and establishing the entity of Israel on its usurped land, as the living materialization of the most hideous kinds of aggression and organized terrorism that is supported by the USA, the sponsor of international terrorism, and some other states that claim to be democratic and protecting human rights whilst they support 1 Primary Documents

56

Israel that was founded on invasion, killing and bloodshed, besides its daily violations of human rights in Lebanon and Palestine. Hizbullah does not believe it is right for some people in the world to view the Zionist Jewish occupation as accepted violence and terrorism, while they condemn the counter-violence, which is a natural human reaction to the Zionist violence and terrorism. Hizbullah and the Resistance Hizbullah has benefited from the experiences of the nations and peoples of the world and read the history of the French people’s resistance against the Nazi occupation, and the resistance of the American people against the colonialists as well; it saw how the free world countries and the peoples of the world respect these resistances and annually commemorate their memory because they had expressed the will of freedom and the longing for rights, justice and peace. When Hizbullah in Lebanon resists the Zionist Jewish occupation lying heavily on its soil in the South and West Biqa‘, it is exercising its legitimate and sacred right that was once exercised by the French and American peoples. Considering Hizbullah’s resistance to the Zionist Jewish occupation as “terrorism” is a kind of injustice, discrimination, besides being a renunciation of the Bill of Human Rights and the Charter of the United Nations. Therefore, we call on the peoples of the world to distinguish between aggression, which is none other than terrorism, and the honest resistance that is the only way to deter the aggression and confront the terrorism resulting from that aggression. Israel is an aggressive entity that practices terrorism; occupation is one of the forms of terrorism. Hizbullah of Lebanon is a popular resisting trend against occupation and terrorism. Hizbullah and Dialogue Hizbullah observes the creed of the genuine Muhammadan Islam and the sublime human values emanating from it. This observance arises from ideological conviction that is established with proofs and evidence and does not originate from emotional liking or sectarian, denominational or racial group spirit. Since reason is the source of this observance, Hizbullah has always been ready to have dialogue with others over its convictions and creeds or even its method and positions; Hizbullah does not seek to impose its convictions on anyone, as it does not like anyone to impose their convictions on it. It is attached to having mutual understanding with the others. It does not think of annulling anyone, as it does not accept anyone to annul it. Therefore, continuing and incessant dialogue is the best way to rectify visions and positions; it is also a feature of Hizbullah.

2 Hizbullah: Views and Concepts, Manar TV, Beirut, 20 June 1997

57

Hizbullah and the Political System in Lebanon Lebanon’s political system, which is based on the principle of political confessionalism, can never achieve justice or realize rights and peace. Perhaps one of the most important reasons for the civil war that broke out in 1975 lies within the confessional tendency that had been established by the political system. The Ta’if Charter of National Reconciliation did not resolve this dilemma, but rather established it and redistributed the sectarian quotas anew. This implies a foundation for a future crisis. That document, nevertheless, is viewed by Hizbullah as a bridge to transfer Lebanon from the stage of bloody conflicts to a new stage of internal peace that we, Hizbullah, very strongly and definitely desire. In spite of that, it wil never stop us looking forward to more change and development in the Lebanese political system in order to abolish the abhorred sectarian discrimination and achieve justice among the citizens. Hizbullah and Human Rights It is axiomatic to say that Hizbullah considers, as its religious task, serving human beings, protecting their rights, maintaining their interest, and exerting effort to provide them with the requirements of a dignified life and developing their society. If the existing regimes are remiss in fulfilling their duties toward that human being, Hizbullah has efficiently contributed in providing humanitarian services to the citizens in various Lebanese areas without discrimination between one citizen and another, or one sect and another. These services have included many domains; some of them are restoring damaged buildings, farming guidance, providing utilities for the lowest cost prices and sometimes for free, providing medical care and hospitalization at the health care centers that are distributed in the areas and in private hospitals, providing primary and intermediate schooling, providing needy students with scholarships to continue their college schooling plus providing them with scientific orientation, and securing fresh water for the neighborhoods that the public water network does not reach. However, the most important human right that Hizbullah sacrifices blood and lives for is the right of the Lebanese to their land and to determine the political system they desire.

1 Primary Documents

58

3 Statement of Purpose: Hizbullah Press Office, 20 March 199850 Hizbullah is an Islamic freedom-fighting movement founded after the Israeli military seizure of Lebanon in 1982, which resulted in the immediate formation of the Islamic Resistance units for the liberation of the occupied territories and for the expulsion of the aggressive Israeli forces (IDF). In addition to shouldering the burden of resisting the Israeli occupation as is stated by the International Bill of Human Rights, Hizbullah is also concerned with the presentation of Islam which addresses the mind and reason. Hizbullah is concerned with presenting Islam as being confident of its fundamentals, with a highly civilized understanding of man, life and the universe, and self-assured about its capability to achieve the basis of rights and justice. Without subjection or bewilderment, we are anxious to present Islam as being open-hearted to all countries, irrespective of their different political and cultural trends and experiences. We are anxious to present Islam as being the guardian of human rights, defining choices, adopting convictions and socially expressing them. We opt for the use of political lobbying in education, pedagogy, medical care and other social benefits promulgated in the Bill of Human Rights. We are anxious to define the priorities for our cultural project that utilizes persuasiveness and polarization through civilized and human methods as stated in the Bill of the Human Rights. Without using force and without coercion, we are anxious to offer a model of how to perform in a struggle targeting the enemy, which represents a challenge for the existence of the whole nation (umma), along with its regimes and people. We also circumvent conflicts that do not serve the main aim of fighting the enemy, or that could create discord at the battlefront, which should be unified through common interests. The hope is to rid ourselves of the pressuring threats practiced by the foreign Zionist Entity, which has been thrust upon the Islamic and the Arab contemporary nation. It should be clear that the kind of Islam we want is a civilized endeavor that rejects injustice, humiliation, slavery, subjugation, colonialism and blackmail, while we stretch our arms for communication among countries on the basis of mutual respect. The Islam we mean is the religion that never accepts control or delegation by others for the sake of manipulating the rights and the interests of the nation. The Islam we mean is the religion that recommends communication among civilizations and rejects divisive collisions between those civilizations. An Islam that believes in cultural communication among nations, refuses to set up barriers and embargoes, and sees that it is our right to remove those barriers by diplomatic means. However, when others intend to launch wars against Islam, Hizbullah finds it a natural right to defend itself whilst protecting its constituency.



Statement of Purpose: Hizbullah Press Office, 20 March 1998

59

Islam as we understand it is a message that aims at establishing justice, security, peace and rights for all people, no matter to which country, race or religion they belong. We do not have any complexes toward others, but we feel the responsibility toward them, to make them understand the essence of our religion free from obligation and fanaticism. We do not seek the application of Islam by force or violence, but by peaceful political action, which gives the majority in any society the opportunity to adopt or reject it. If Islam becomes the choice of the majority, then we will apply it; if not, we will continue to coexist and discuss with others until we reach a common ground based upon correct beliefs. We hereby affirm that our Islam rejects violence as a means to gain power, and we believe this should also be the modus operandi for the non-Islamists as well.

4 Hizbullah: Identity and Goals51 (August 2004) Hizbullah is an Islamic struggle (jihadi) movement. Its emergence is based on ideological, social, political, and economic factors in a special Lebanese, Arab, and Islamic context. As a result of this background, Hizbullah passed through various decisive moments in its history; the most important being 1982, the year of the Zionist invasion of Lebanon. This invasion led to the occupation of the capital Beirut, making it the second Arab capital after Jerusalem to be occupied during the Arab-“Israeli” conflict. This milestone speeded up the emergence of Hizbullah as a struggle movement that is wholly dedicated to the long, complicated, and complex fight against the Zionist enemy. The starting point of that struggle was the Zionist occupation of Palestine, and it then went on to occupy parts of Arab countries such as Egypt, Syria and Jordan, and it ended up with occupying Lebanon. All of this led to the establishment of the identity of Hizbullah as a struggle movement against the Zionists. Many social, economic, political and cultural ideals of the Shi‘ites in Lebanon were also desicive factors that came into play. Another very important factor that further developed Hizbullah was the establishment of the Islamic Revolution in Iran, which was led by the late Imam Khumayni. This revolution consolidated new concepts in the field of Islamic political thought, mainly the concept of Wilayat Al-Faqih. The Revolution also devised Islamic/Qur’anic concepts against the West such as “arrogance”, the “Great Satan”, “hypocrites”, and the “oppressed”. Historic ties between Iranian and Lebanese Shi‘ites have been consolidated on doctrinal, religious, ideological, and social grounds. It is well-known that Iran hosts the second most important religious seminary of the Shi‘ites in Qum; 1 Primary Documents

60

the first being the Najaf seminary in Iraq. However after the victory of the Islamic Revolution, Qum became the number one Shi‘ite seminary in the world. Due to that, it was only natural for the ideological doctrine in Iran to take root in Lebanon. This bond was very quickly translated on the ground by direct support from the Islamic Republic of Iran through dispatching its Revolutionary Guards to aid Hizbullah that was resisting the “Israeli” occupation. This religious and ideological tie between Hizbullah and Iran following the 1979 Revolution, with its rejectionist stance towards the Zionist Entity, had a great tangible and moral effect on Hizbullah. This support speeded up the acknowledgement of making Hizbullah one of the leading struggle movements against the Zionists, to the extent that in 1985 Hizbullah had hardly any contenders. It was not by sheer coincidence that Hizbullah turned into a struggle movement against the “Israeli” occupation because Hizbullah’s ideological ideals grant no legitimacy to the existence of “Israel”, the existential enemy to all the Arabs and Muslims.52 Thus, the conflict became one of legitimacy that is based on religious ideals. The seed of resistance is also sowed deep in the ideological beliefs of Hizbullah, a belief that is expressed in the struggle against the Zionist occupation of Lebanon. And that is why we also find the slogan of the liberation of Jerusalem rooted deeply in the ideals of Hizbullah. Another one of its ideals is the establishment of the Islamic Republic53. The Islamic Resistance was able to direct very painful blows to the Zionist enemy, forcing it gradually to withdraw. One of the principal withdrawals was that of 1985 leading up to the withdrawal from the Christian area of Jezzine, which finally left the enemy with no choice but to withdraw completely as a means to solve its problems. Hizbullah also used one of its own special types of resistance against the Zionist enemy, namely the suicide attacks (“martyrdom operations”). These attacks dealt great losses to the enemy on all thinkable levels: militarily, mentally, and psychologically. The attacks also raised the morale across the whole Islamic nation (umma). It is also of vital importance to state here that the Resistance gained high credibility and recognition amongst the people and in all official statuses, both locally and internationally. The US also once stated that the Resistance is a justified movement in facing the “Israeli” occupation.54 The Resistance also established an internal national axis in a way that was never witnessed in Lebanon before. This matter is of vital interest when we notice how Lebanon is divided into various religions, sects, ideologies, societies, cultures, etc. Today, Hizbullah is one of the most prominent Lebanese political parties that has its presence in the parliament (with eight MP s).

Hizbullah: Identity and goals (August 2004)

61

Hizbullah today also commands respect politically after it proved its powerful presence through a high level of efficiency measured by rationalism, steadfastness, and high moral values aimed at respecting the values of others. This made Hizbullah inaugurate innovative political processes. Hizbullah is also committed to introducing the true picture of Islam, the Islam that is logical, and to introducing the civilized Islam to humanity. Hizbullah is committed to introducing the Islam that is confident in achieving justice, as well as introducing the Islam that protects all human rights. It is committed to introducing the Islam that supports education and that offers medical support. Hizbullah also has its own cultural plan to attract and convince others through civilized and humanitarian means as specified in human rights laws, free from any use of violence or coercion. It should also be clear that the kind of Islam that Hizbullah seeks is a civilized one that refuses any kind of oppression, degradation, subjugation and colonization. Hizbullah reaches out its arm of friendship to all on the basis of mutual self-respect. The Islamic path that Hizbullah follows is one that aims to establish peace and justice to all humanity, irrespective of race or religion. Hizbullah does not have a problem with anyone, but it feels responsible to clarify the true Islam without fanaticism. Hizbullah does not wish to implement Islam forcibly, but rather in a peaceful and political manner, which gives the majority the chance to either accept or refuse it. If Islam becomes the choice of the majority, only then will it be implemented. If not, it will then continue to coexist with others on the basis of mutual understanding using peaceful methods to reach peaceful solutions. And that is how the case should be for the non-Islamists as well.

1 Primary Documents

62

2 Election Programs

1 Hizbullah’s 1992 Parliamentary Elections Program1 (my translation) In the name of God, the Merciful, the Compassionate “Those who, if we establish them firmly in the land, will perform the prayer, give the alms, command the good and prohibit evil. To Allah belongs the outcome of all affairs” (22:41).2

From the stance of our legal (shar‘i) responsibility towards our oppressed people in Lebanon, that gives due concern to the populace’s grand destining causes and its neglected daily demands; in light of a deep-conscientious reading to the nature of the degrading situation in Lebanon, and the changes in the international arena and their domestic impact, and the need to stand up against conspiracies that are being contrived against the land, rights, and dignities of our populace; based on a realistic diagnosis of the clear and possible dangers as well as the opportunities available to the Islamists in order to take a leading role, while avoiding slippery slopes, in the path to fortify the Islamic project, and consolidate its steps and fruits; in harmony with the jurisprudential (fiqhi) stipulations that, for us, act as a guide and an authority of emulation (marja‘)… In conveying our gratitude to the righteous expression of our populace’s aspirations, pains and hopes; from the stance of the people’s trust in Hizbullah’s integrity and its great sacrifices, and its vigilance for public interest, and its principled stance. We [Hizbullah] made up our mind, relying on God, and decided to participate in electoral politics on the basis of a comprehensive political program, in

63

which our candidates are obliged to do their utmost best to put it [political program] into operation, asking our populace to support it and follow up on it.3 The dignified Lebanese, The loyal oppressed, In this sensitive and grave period of the history of our wounded country; in the midst of grand international changes that ravaged our existence and led to the collapse of regimes and changed the features of policies and alliances; at the time when the Zionist enemy [Israel] is still occupying a beloved section of our country, the South and the Biqa‘, portraying the ugliest pictures of conquest and extortion, while the project of the oppressors, spearheaded by the US, continues its bet on subduing Lebanon and the region [Middle East] in order to seal the deal of recognition in the legitimacy of the Zionist Entity, and normalize relations with it, thus fusing the cultural identity of the people of the region and tying its destiny to the [market] economy and Western mode of production and what it leads to in the sense of plundering riches and natural resources, the imposition of regimes, and the execution of programs [policies and plans].4 In these circumstances, Lebanon has embarked upon the preparation for the first parliamentary elections in twenty years. The Lebanese are facing an enormous historical eventuality that will paint the future picture of the general political situation in the country, be it on the level of the building of a new [political] system, or on the level of its role, performance, and relations. And if it is assumed that the performance of the parliamentary elections will be conducive to finding a new formula for the [political] system that repels political sectarianism and builds the foundations of a state that personifies the will of the Lebanese people, then Hizbullah’s decision to participate, with its brothers and friends, in these elections is based on perpetual principled political convictions, enforced by the blood of its martyrs, and the suffering and pain of its prisoners of war, detainees, wounded, families of the martyrs, and the oppressed; Hizbullah has sacrificed for these [principles and convictions] its best cadres and holy warriors (mujahidin), led by the leader of the martyrs of the Islamic resistance, Sayyid Abbas al-Musawi and his wife and child, and the Shaykh of the martyrs, Shaykh Raghib Harb, and Al-Sayyid the martyr Abdulatif al-Amin, and the Shaykh of the prisoners of war and the detainees, Shaykh Abd al-Karim ‘Ubayd, and others from the heroes of the caravan of martyrdom and resistance who expelled the Zionist Occupation5 and enforced on it defeat and withdrawal, without any conditions, setting a precedent in the history of conflict against it, thus regaining for the umma the hope of victory and confidence in itself. It also gave Lebanon a chance to catch its breath and solve its plight away from direct Zionist [Israeli] intervention.

2 Election Programs

64

These convictions became embedded in our peoples’ souls, rendering them [convictions] a daily jihadi and political path, which revolves around two basic objectives: 1 Lebanon’s liberation from the Zionist occupation and from the oppressors’ influence and following. 2 The abolishment of political sectarianism. Hizbullah had a leading role in accomplishing important steps towards the realization of these two goals. And Hizbullah has to continue, with the cooperation of other faithful [dedicated people], the necessary steps in order to achieve total liberation [the total withdrawal of the Israeli army from Lebanon] and strengthen the path to domestic peace, on the basis of political consensus, away from the despicable sectarian strife and narrow zealous partisanship and fanaticism; the removal of the traces of the devastating [civil] war, and objectively, constructively, and responsibly address its causes and consequences so that no party can feel duped, and so that privileges will not be accorded to any group [at the expense of another]. Today, as Hizbullah embarks on participating in the parliamentary elections in Lebanon, it [Hizbullah] is trying to elevate the level of political work by selecting its nominees for the elections both on the basis of merit and a political program that is dedicated, in full honesty and seriousness, to addressing and solving people’s problems. Hizbullah’s responsible performance materializes in paying perpetual attention to accord the best care to the interests and the causes of the people, from the stance of its [Hizbullah’s] integrity in [honoring] word and deed as well as fidelity in securing people’s rights and defending their rights, honor, and dignity. Hizbullah’s nominees have no desire to compete with others over power, wealth, or material possessions; rather, they want to be dedicated to a religious duty (taklif shar‘i) in front of God, in order to preserve the country, uphold the interests of the people, and achieve the objectives that the holy warriors and the martyrs fought for. From this stance, they [Hizbullah’s nominees] are committed to perpetual, industrious work, both within the confines of the parliament and outside it, in order to achieve the following objectives in the different domains: On the general political stance: First: The Resistance The conservation of a unified Lebanon that belongs to the civilized world, especially its Islamic-Arab milieu, requires our [Hizbullah’s] serious commitment to the Resistance as an alternative against the Zionist occupation until the libera1 Hizbullah’s 1992 Parliamentary Elections Program

65

tion of all the occupied soil, especially as it has been proven on the ground that the Resistance is capable of foiling the conqueror’s [Israeli] plans, whose aim is to impose a political reality that is against the interest of Lebanon and the Lebanese. It has become crystal clear that the Resistance is the only choice that is capable of standing up to the enemy and its extortions. In addition, the Resistance stands for the right way of liberating Lebanon and upholding its unity and the unity of its people. This choice [of Resistance] requires the endeavor to achieve the following: A To be committed to the alternative of the Resistance by supporting the fighters, backing up their ways of jihad, and embracing them and granting them popular and governmental support. B To found programs that develop the capabilities to defend our populace and erect a withstanding resistance society (mujtama‘ al-muqawama)6 on all levels and domains, especially in the South and Western Biqa‘ [the occupied areas at the time]. C The Lebanese state, with all its institutions, especially the army, should contribute to the operation of liberation and the defense of the land, the people, and the dignities. D Accordingly, serious and practical attention should be paid to the occupied “Security Zone”, and all necessary measures should be taken in order to foil the Zionist normalization project. E To exhort the Lebanese government to secure the lives of the families that have either lost their breadwinners or whose breadwinners have became permanently handicapped in the detention camps or as a result of Zionist aggressions. F To stand up firmly against and to condemn every attempt of normalization of relations or establishing peace with the “Zionist Entity”, which, in the first place, is founded upon aggression and raping other people’s land. Second: The abolishment of political sectarianism7 Political sectarianism is one of the gravest ills in the corruption of the system in Lebanon. It is also the result behind all cultural, political, security, social, and developmental misfortunes and disasters that have plagued the Lebanese people. It also offered the malignant entry to the oppressive greedy forces to interfere in domestic Lebanese issues and jeopardize Lebanon’s future and destiny. The first duties of Hizbullah’s nominees is to follow up the conducive efforts, in cooperation with all friends and loyal ones, to abolish it [political sectarianism], during the first constitutional cycle of the new parliament.8

2 Election Programs

66

Third: The electoral law Amending the electoral law so that it will be more representative of the populace, by adopting the following two measures: 1 Lebanon as one election district. 2 Reducing the age of voting to 18. Fourth: Political and media freedoms – Secure the freedom of belief and practicing religious rituals and rites, as well as respect the sanctity of Abrahamic religions. – Enact laws that guarantee the freedom of political work. – Organize the media within the following framework: A Harmonization between the media, on the one hand, and Lebanon’s [Arab-Muslim] cultural identity, on the other. B Abide by the sanctity of public conduct and morals. C Preserve the right of private media [institutions] to work within the points suggested above [A and B], without any government guardianship [censorship]. Fifth: The nationality – Enact a modern naturalization law based on meritocracy, rather than sectarianism and favoritism. – Grant the Lebanese nationality to the residents of the “Seven Villages” and the Arabs of Wadi Khaled.9 – – –

Sixth: The displaced Secure the full return of all the displaced.10 Find [conducive] solutions to the displaced of the “Security Zone”. Set up a comprehensive developmental plan targeting all the geographical areas where the displaced are present.

Seventh: Administrative, social, and educational issues The need to fix and reform the infrastructure of the country in the administrative, educational, social, and developmental domains. In addition, to constructively address many pressing issues along these lines; issues which call for a convergence of efforts in order to be accomplished. First: At the administrative level: A Abolish the sectarian factor in public and private jobs and appointments. B Merit and open examinations should be used as a basis for selecting employees instead of favoritism.

1 Hizbullah’s 1992 Parliamentary Elections Program

67

C Periodic rehabilitation of employees according to the demands of technological advancement. D Increase the effectiveness of administrative inspection. Second: On the developmental level: A Protect the domestic produce; support the agricultural and industrial sectors by developing individual capabilities and providing external markets. B Develop the infrastructure of the oppressed [deprived] areas; enhance the lines of transportation, communication, electricity, and water. C Secure job opportunities for all the Lebanese and protect the working force. D Support animal produce, help fishermen, and encourage handicrafts. E Agricultural guidance; the inauguration of agricultural centers, cooperatives, and laboratories. F Develop deprived areas in order to reach the level of flourishing areas in Lebanon; after that accomplish a balanced development. Third: On the educational and cultural levels: A Reinforce public education in all its stages and sectors, especially vocational education. B Realize mandatory education, at least till the middle level [preparatory for high school]. C Buttress the Lebanese University, in particular the faculties of applied sciences. D Sponsor those who excel, and consolidate research at the [Lebanese] University. E Rewrite the history [school] books based on an objective curriculum, and be committed to the cultural heritage of Lebanon in its Arab and Islamic milieu.11 F Reinforce and protect religious education. G Re-stimulate the teachers’ education and rehabilitation centers, across the education spectrum or levels. H Strengthen the teachers’ financial conditions as well as their educational and scientific qualifications. I Arabization of the academic curriculum. Fourth: On the social level: – Enact a law so that all Lebanese, including self-employed and daily workers, can benefit from social security, social and health benefits, and an oldage retirement plan.

2 Election Programs

68

– Reform [governmental] institutions that are responsible for social and health benefits and insurance [social security]. – Erect public hospitals and public medical centers in all Lebanese areas. Based on this program, Hizbullah, through its nominees, presents itself to the parliament, while being resolute in protecting the interests of the oppressed in Lebanon, invoking God Almighty for acceptance and success. Hizbullah hopes to achieve victory, honor, glory, and progress (towards the better). God is AllHearing and All-Responding. Peace be upon you, God’s Mercy and Blessings Hizbullah July 1992

2 Hizbullah’s 1996 Parliamentary Elections Program12 In His Exalted Name The Electoral Program of Hizbullah, 1996 And those who strive [jahadu] for our (cause), – we will certainly guide them to our paths13 for verily Allah is with those who do right. (Holy Koran)14 Faithful Lebanese; In persistence with our political course that is based on divine values, In commitment to our vast cultural affiliation with all its diversity, richness and sublime human value, within a framework of integration and unity, On the basis of our firm pledge to the Lebanese people’s interests in liberating our land in the South and West Biqa‘, of maintaining our security and right to a decent life and an honorable living, besides looking forward to a political society of more balance and justice, a society more capable of understanding the internal flaw points and confronting the foreign challenges and a more stable society, We continue the unlimited course of giving, the giving of blood, the honesty of our standpoint, the courageous word, and the political behavior that aims at changing instead of submitting to the status quo, to come to a balance instead of falling because of them, and to seek a nation beyond sectarianism, a state with no monopolization or absorption, a state of development with no discrimination and participation with no exclusion or elimination.

2 Hizbullah’s 1996 Parliamentary Elections Program

69

In the light of a conscious reading of the magnitude of the perils and challenges that overwhelm the regional situation due to the policies of American hegemony and Zionist terrorism, Out of the position of deep realization of the historic stage through which our country is passing, Under the staggering production of a sound political life and the disappointing results of the state institutions’ performance and their alleged attempts at development, Before the regression of the state situation due to a combination of many factors surging from the unbalanced nature of the Lebanese political system and the wrong practices by the men of authority that led to deepening the status of corruption, favoritism and migration of qualifications, besides establishing the sectarian, confessional and regional divisions, In the light of all that, and after four years, during which we had the honor of contribution in serving the Lebanese from the parliamentarian post, we run with you for the scheduled parliament elections with established responsibility and greater insistence on shouldering the trust that our dear Lebanese people made us carry to complete the course of all the noble martyrs who died while defending our sacred soil and the dignity, freedom, future and welfare of our people, on top of whom the Master of the Islamic Resistance martyrs Sayyid Abbas Mussawi and Shaykh of its martyrs Shaykh Raghib Harb (May Allah be pleased with them). As has always been the case, Hizbullah will continue to be, with a greater drive and increasing responsibility, the party of Resistance and Liberation, the party of steadfastness and construction and the party of change for a better status, according to the following program: First: Resisting the Occupation: Through its liberating and striving course and its field and political achievement, the most distinguished of which were the steadfastness and victory in two large-scale wars, July 1993 and April 1996, the Islamic Resistance has affirmed resistance is the only option towards a dignified liberation with no conditions or prices that would15 damage the sovereignty, resources and right; it has also affirmed that [Hizbullah] is an element of unity and dignity for the Lebanese and a major guarantor for their security and their regional and international presence. Therefore, we confirm the following: – We will work on the strong and efficient continuation of the Resistance until our occupied land is completely liberated and restored to the national sovereignty, until our people in the occupied strip are released and able to secure a free honorable decent living away from any direct or indirect presence of the usurping Zionists. We will also work on confronting the 2 Election Programs

70

logic of the theatrical negotiations that seek to establish Israel’s position at the expense of the people of the land. – Protecting the Lebanese civilians will remain essential in the Resistance performance, this protection being a major objective and main role performed by the Resistance with wisdom, awareness and responsibility. – We will carefully endeavor with all the Lebanese people (of all religious denominations and walks of life), that they continue to embrace the Resistance and to continue to be the source from which the Resistance derives its strength and presence. The sought-after liberation – if Allah is willing – will be a gift to all the Lebanese and a major contribution to constructing a country with complete sovereignty and a state of consideration and estimation in the arena of regional and international conflict. – We will continue seeking to achieve more effective state involvement in the operation of liberation and to embrace the Resistance men, and the prisoners, detainees and martyrs’ families, plus provide the steadfastness requirements through establishing and developing foundations for these ends, besides supporting any action that assists in fighting normalization and cultural invasion along with rejecting any form of reconciliation with the enemy. Second: Achieving Equality and Establishing the Just State: Achieving justice and equality among the Lebanese is considered one of the main bases for establishing a stable, dignified and prosperous country in which all the Lebanese engage in the process of construction with motivation and solidarity under equality of opportunities, equality of all, individuals, classes and areas, in rights and duties, whether political, economical or social. Consequently, we will continue working until we achieve: – The abolishment of political sectarianism that represents the center of the essential flaw in the formula of the Lebanese political system and its social structure, besides producing most of the domestic instability features, and being fertile soil for the disturbance that marks the authority institutions and the inter-confessional relations. – A just and balanced electoral system that treats all the Lebanese equally, that allows for real representation, and leads to developing the Lebanese political status through the approbation of Lebanon as one constituency with a proportional representation system. – Establishing real political institutions that cannot be reduced to individuals, nor emptied by the dominance of parties or groups, or employed to serve the “favorites” and “the guys”. The most dangerous thing that confronts the state and topples its logic is politicizing the administration and

2 Hizbullah’s 1996 Parliamentary Elections Program

71

linking it to political loyalties away from the criteria of qualification and equality. – Applying the principle of administrative decentralization through a consistent and proportionate law that guarantees achieving administrative divisions capable of accomplishing efficient development in the various areas besides reviving the municipal and mayor councils to allow for real participation by the civil society in running its development and social affairs. Third: At the Economical Level: We will work on making the state adopt economic policies that give priority to achieving integral human development instead of being confined to imported economic policies that do not consider in their priorities the economic and social particularities caused by the war and that led to increasing rates of poverty, unemployment, and the evanescence of the middle class that is considered the scales of economic justice. Moreover, we will work on realizing justice in the distribution of taxes and charges among citizens according to their capabilities.16 What is required is the rearrangement of development priorities and subsidizing the sectors of industry, agriculture, animal breeding and fishery, plus providing loans and production requirements, protection, and marketing, in addition to supporting all forms of craftsmanship. The state’s role in the economic operation must be based on a delicate harmonization between the necessity of activating the public sector, prosperity of its movement and investments, on one hand, and the necessity of not deserting the state’s responsibilities towards the citizens and the public utilities, especially what concerns supporting the steadfastness of the areas confronting the Zionist occupation. Fourth: At the Educational and Syndical [Syndicate] Levels: The chronic demand of enhancing and reforming public schooling has not been seriously and effectively implemented until today. Therefore, it is vital to seek enhancing and developing public schooling, as well as schools, teachers and administrations. Furthermore, the development of the educational structure must be followed by the policy of reestablishing and modernizing the curriculums in harmony with the modern necessities, besides drafting history books on an objective basis and working on increasing the interest in vocational education, taking into account the necessity of linking it to the Lebanese market needs. Uplifting the Lebanese University is a vital demand that we will work on achieving through modernizing its curriculums, uniting the branches of the capital and the surrounding areas, enhancing the branches of the areas, reviv2 Election Programs

72

ing specialization scholarships and the sponsoring of top students, strengthening research methods to get out of the currently adopted dictation method and allowing for developing talents and qualifications. Reinforcing the labor movement and the syndical frameworks is a civil and political obligation that ought to be free from pressure, intimidation,and harassment that are being practiced by the authorities at times of crises and critical phases. Moreover, justice for teachers and university professors in achieving their various demands, without procrastination and postponement is an urgent measure for the stability of these two sectors. Therefore, Hizbullah affirms its persistence in supporting the syndical movement and supplying it with political and popular support and power. Fifth: At the Social and Health Levels: We affirm the importance of the role of the youth in constructing their country and the necessity of providing them with the essentials for strengthening their personalities and filling their time with constructive activities. The woman’s role is based on her being the other half who rears children and is effective in all the political, educational, social, cultural and economical life. Women must not be treated as supplements nor as commodities of advertisement. Enhancing and maintaining the unity of the family that is the cornerstone in building a good society and providing all the educational and social conditions to establish this direction. The completion of resolving the two issues of naturalization and the displaced so that those who have the right to the [Lebanese] nationality obtain it, and all the displaced can return to their houses or villages in dignity, plus giving the displaced of the occupied strip special priority attention and consideration. Completing the task of improving public hospitals and health clinics with the required equipment, spreading these health centers all over the country, especially in remote areas and the steadfast and resisting areas in the South and West Biqa‘, in addition to making health security accessible to all the sectors of the Lebanese society. Developing the social welfare foundations, supporting the social care institutions, adopting old-age pension, and establishing institutes specialized in treating the various social problems and perversions.17 The necessity of reforming and developing prisons, establishing reformations for juvenile delinquents in all the Lebanese provinces. Activating the foundations and legislative laws that protect the public resources and the environment, adopting a forestry policy that will restore the balance to the Lebanese environment, protect it from the jeopardy of aridity,

2 Hizbullah’s 1996 Parliamentary Elections Program

73

maintain the water resources, set projects to be used in all the Lebanese areas and reclaim the lands in order to increase the arable areas. Making serious plans that secure a gradual resolution for the housing problem in Lebanon, plus considering this issue one of the great challenges that confront the Lebanese society and have negative social results at numerous levels. Sixth: Safeguarding Public Freedoms: To work carefully and persistently on safeguarding public freedoms, i.e. the freedom of belief, freedom of syndical [syndicates] and political activity, freedom of practicing religious rituals and schooling, in addition to accomplishing the regulation of the media without abating the freedom of the press, on the one hand, while preserving the maintenance of the identity, public ethics and morals on the other. Seventh: Foreign Policy: From the stance of a practical application of Lebanon’s Arab affiliation, Hizbullah calls for maintaining strong Lebanese-Syrian relations that will fortify Lebanon against regional and international designs aiming at destabilizing the country. Furthermore, the previous years have proven that these relations comprise factors of stability that sustain the uneasy Lebanese formula. To work on cementing the Lebanese stand in the face of the American pressure policies which are being practiced against Lebanon politically and economically, to reject the continuous American interference in its internal affairs and to deal with the American policy on the grounds of its being identical to and supportive of the positions of the Israeli enemy that occupies our land, kills our children and targets our villages with its incessant daily aggressions. The necessity of adopting serious policies and efficient plans to communicate with the Lebanese communities in the countries of expatriation; sponsoring the frameworks that organize those communities’ existence; protecting them from attempts to expose them, weaken them or damage their economic presence (as has been the case in more than one African country); working effectively and persistently on rehabilitating the Lebanese expatriate existence and precluding its being vulnerable and without political protection before the challenges and plots it confronts. To emphasize developing normal and balanced relations with the Arab and Islamic countries and all the countries of the world on the basis of independence and strengthening the ties that assist in confronting the plots of the American arrogance and allow for honorable and constructive cooperation.

2 Election Programs

74

Dear Lebanese People, From the stance of representing the people, with the religious, national and ethical dimensions and responsibilities that this representation entails, and with the full realization of the magnitude of the complications and obstacles that our Lebanese society is experiencing, and with our realization of the long time needed to achieve all that our people anticipate, Hizbullah’s candidates are committed to doing their utmost best to put into effect this electoral program that will formulate the framework for the political-legislative role of Hizbullah’s parliamentary bloc. Success is Granted by Allah Hizbullah Summer 199618

3 Hizbullah’s 2000 Parliamentary Elections Program19 (my translation) The elections offer a chance to participate in the parliamentary life in order to continue defending the rights of our people, country and causes. We work for the continual readiness of the [Islamic] Resistance, the populace, and the official stance of defending the country. The unique relations with Syria are an element of strength for Lebanon and Syria in facing the challenges. Alleviating the economic problem requires extraordinary efforts to propagate a general reformist economic plan. We work to give due care to the deprived areas, especially the Biqa‘ and Akkar, and allocating to them the necessary attention in order to develop them. In the name of God, the merciful, the compassionate “But seek, thanks to what Allah gave you, the Hereafter, and do not forget your part in the here and now [the present world]. Be charitable, as Allah has been charitable to you, and do not seek corruption in the land; for Allah does not like the seekers of corruption” (28:77).20

Our loyal Lebanese populace: Based on the experience that we provided [through our work in] the Lebanese political life, and using as a point of departure our immutable and clear intellectual-political curriculum, which is based upon our civilizational belonging and commitment that makes religious norms the fulcrum of human life, and which aims at providing felicity to man in conjunction with upholding his/her dignity 3 Hizbullah’s 2000 Parliamentary Elections Program

75

and elevating his/her status… we continue the road to offering, giving, sacrifice, and ithar21 or “preference” in all positions and domains, putting our mind to continuing to defend our people’s and country’s rights and causes. [We] face the dangers and challenges that target our umma, primarily the “Zionist” conquest and US hegemonic projects. [We] stress national unity, and we uphold national coexistence with all the religious denominations in Lebanon. From this perspective, our engagement in the elections constitutes an opportunity for us to take part in Lebanese parliamentary life in order to continue our course in defending our people’s and country’s rights and causes. First: Resistance and liberation The Resistance has proven over the course of the past eighteen years of continuous sacrifice and jihad, and through the blood of its dignified martyrs, that it is the only road to deter [Israeli] aggression and face “Zionist” greed, uphold the security and dignity of our people, [achieve] the liberation of our land and a true national unity based upon a national consensus in rejecting the occupation and its corroborators, and in buttressing the resistance. The Resistance was able to regain occupied Lebanese land and enforce its stance in the regional and international equation, forcing the Zionist enemy to capitulate and withdraw in humiliation, a precedent that the region [Middle East] has never experienced in the history of struggle against the “Zionist Entity”. Moreover, the resistance has proven its salient civilizational [cultured] behavior during the liberation, that it is up to the great national responsibility, and its upholding of the security of all the citizens, without any discrimination among their groups and sects, and the country. This great achievement [liberation] has been accomplished by the cooperation of the public government, and the Lebanese army. This was conducive to the creation of a general positive atmosphere, which has shielded the victory [liberation]. The Resistance imposed itself as a serious option that the Lebanese could bet upon in order to regain their rights and liberate occupied land, without any conditions or dictated peace treaties. It [the Resistance] became a model to emulate and to be adopted by all the people in the region, especially the oppressed Palestinian people inside Palestine [Occupied Territories]. That is why it is a duty to consolidate and generalize the experience of the Islamic Resistance in Lebanon [Hizbullah’s model], in order to awaken and elevate the umma as well as to strengthen the stances of its rulers and regimes, and to stop normalization of relations with the Zionist enemy. This will lead to inflicting a “retreat” on the US-Israeli project, which aims at imposing their hegemony on the region and imposing their dictates, forcing its people to grant them concessions.

2 Election Programs

76

We work to continuously keep the Resistance on guard as well as the readiness of the populace and the official [Lebanese] stance to defend our country against any aggression or “Zionist” threat. [This is in line with] our continued convictions and belief in facing the Israeli enemy in order to prevent its schemes and dangerous projects from materializing in the region [Middle East]. In order to continue the path and aims of liberation we stress the following: – Exhort the government to decree and execute a developmental serviceoriented socio-economic program for the liberated areas and their peripheries, and work on the reconstruction and development of human resources, the economic cycle, and the return of all the displaced, without discriminating against them and giving their cause the appropriate care without humiliating them and forcing them to seek favors.22 (Italics are added for emphasis). – The continuation of different and rapid efforts in order to liberate the prisoners of war, detainees, and the purified bodies of the martyrs. The activation and development of the necessary social care for the families of the martyrs, the liberated prisoners of war and detainees, and the wounded and handicapped of the Resistance. – Being cautious to safeguard our rights, security, and national interests in order to accomplish a total liberation of Lebanese soil and exercise total sovereignty over our land and territorial waters without compromising any part of it, especially in regard to points of territorial disagreement23 and the Shib‘a Farms. – Resisting normalization [of relations with Israel], opposing the cultural conquest, refusing coexistence with the Zionist invaders [by not] giving legitimacy to their “Rapist Entity”, and refusing the naturalization [of the Palestinians living in Lebanon]24 and insisting on their right of return to their land in Palestine. Second: Lebanese foreign policy Work on consolidating the Lebanese stance in the face of the aggressive US policy, which is always biased towards and supportive of the “Zionist Entity”, covering up all its crimes, aggressions, and terrorism against our people. Reject the continuous US interference in Lebanese domestic affairs, which is against all norms and diplomatic standards. Consider the special and destined relations with Syria as an element of force for both Lebanon and Syria in order to confront the challenges facing them, especially the dangers posed by the “Zionist Entity”. Follow a governmental policy for taking care of the matters of the Lebanese expatriates and diaspora. This will make them an effective lobby (in the inter-

3 Hizbullah’s 2000 Parliamentary Elections Program

77

national domain) as well as an element of economic support for the Lebanese residing inside the country. Aspire to consolidating Lebanon’s relationships with the Arab and Islamic countries as well as other friendly countries in the world of nations. Fortify common economic interests with the Arab nations. Further develop the relations with the Islamic Republic of Iran, which has always been a staunch supporter of Lebanon. Third: Socio-economic problems The aggravation of the social problem has reached a serious level, making most Lebanese suffer from poor living standards, which are marked by severe shortages. This calls for exercising extraordinary efforts in order to solve the problem by propagating a general economic reform plan that aims at materializing the following: Close the budget deficit by adopting a general and balanced economicdevelopmental plan among the different sectors in order to increase revenues, decrease expenses, and increase the levels of growth. Austerity in expenditure, dealing with the public debt, and reducing its burdens. Follow homogeneous fiscal, monetary, and economic policies, which aim at developing economic growth, increasing employment, and encouraging investment. Energize the national productive sectors of industry and agriculture by increasing government spending on these sectors and by following stimulating policies and animating procedures. Protect local production; be committed to the principle of [fair] competition, increase the ability to compete in foreign markets, and protect the interests of the consumer. Develop the sectors [material resources] and human resources by adopting up-to-date plans and programs aimed at rehabilitation, organization, and guidance. Take due care of the deprived areas, especially in the Biqa‘ and Akkar, and allocate to them due attention needed to develop them, especially the agricultural sector and work on accomplishing the following: 1 Find a plan to buttress agricultural products. 2 Make agricultural loans available and ensure investment. 3 Begin actual work in the Public Foundation for Alternative Agricultural products in the Biqa‘ region. Put into practice a scientific agricultural timetable that is capable of reverting the grave catastrophe that has ravaged this struggling, hardworking area.

2 Election Programs

78

4 Engage in a continual effort in order to make the necessary funding required for alternative agricultural products available. 5 Decrease the role of the middleman between the farmer and the consumer by activating the role of cooperative agricultural farms. 6 Fortify the interests, of domestic products and protect them through contracts and agreements. 7 Reduce the cost of insecticides, fertilizers, electricity, and water. 8 Give due attention to natural resources, and prepare the ground for exploiting them, and searching for them, especially oil and water. Fourth: The building of the state of law and institutions, and the promotion of political participation Our concern is focused on: the development of political life and the establishment of social justice among all the Lebanese without any discrimination; the building of a stable country; of a fruitful future that offers equal opportunities to all individuals, groups, and geographical areas, and where all people are equal in rights and duties, we [Hizbullah] will continue to work so that the following will materialize: – Establish the “National Body for the Abolishment of Political Sectarianism”. – Accord special attention to the youth in order to activate their role in public and political life, and to found specialized centers in order to rehabilitate the youth on different levels or scales. – Strengthen the role of women and open the doors for them to participate in the building and activation of public life. – Enact an election law that is conducive to the development of political life and which better represents the political programs according to proportional representation, and reduce the voting age [from 21] to 18 in order to offer the youth the opportunity to express their genuine nationalistic choices. – Strengthen the role of political parties, the institutions of civil society, and the associations and syndicates [that are engaged] in the public life. – Develop surveillance and accountability bodies, and activate their role free from the politics of arbitrary decisions and the centers of power. – Accomplish administrative and political reform, and fight and prevent corruption and waste. – Accomplish an administrative decentralization law. – Accomplish a new and modern naturalization law. Fifth: Educational [Pedagogical] and cultural issues Strengthen public education and increase the efficiency of the teachers; furnish the schools with the necessary equipment in order to cope with the implemen3 Hizbullah’s 2000 Parliamentary Elections Program

79

tation of the new educational curricula; make education available to all walks of life, especially the poor and deprived; give proper attention and care to the deprived areas in this respect. Pay serious attention to vocational education according to market demand. Develop the Lebanese University and give it an active role; encourage specialized scientific studies and research. Enact [a law making] religious education obligatory in both public and private schools. Reactivate the National Union of the Students of the Lebanese University. Sixth: Social and health issues Close the displaced file or dossier justly, with particular attention to the special circumstances of the displaced in light of the [Israeli] occupation and “Zionist” attacks. Develop and activate the institutions of social care that all strata of society are in need of, especially social security; reconsider and re-evaluate social security legislation in order to increase the benefits and the circle of the services so that they extend to all Lebanese strata [and not only to those registered in social security] and contribute to economic development and addressing the housing problem with the available social security budget. Increase and expand social benefits and public services based on a wellstudied plan in order to help the families residing in Lebanon, because 40% of these families are poor or deprived and live below the poverty line. That is why it is incumbent upon [the state] to provide a dignified way of living for these families. Constructively remedying the social problem according to a general developmental-economic vision to root it out. Put into practice the old-age retirement plan, and improve it for the benefit of the citizen.25 Develop the state hospitals, and extend social security to cover all hospitalization cases pertaining to the poor. Continue to deal with the loopholes that resulted from the naturalization decree. Reform and develop the prisons, establish and universally introduce rehabilitation centers; place mandatory safeguards to uphold ethical norms, moral values, and public mores in all domains, especially in the media; launch national consciousness-raising campaigns aimed at reducing the crime rate. Work on carrying out practical plans, which are conducive to solving the difficult and severe housing problem. Implement the necessary programs and carry out plans aimed at providing total, safe, and real care for the children. 2 Election Programs

80

Encourage private initiatives and work; ensure the availability of work for Lebanese manual labor; work to put an end to the aggravated unemployment problem. Seventh: Environmental issues Develop and organize recycling plants for sanitary sewer water, and continue the installation of sanitary sewer networks. Put accurate, scientific plans into practice to deal with the issue of “solid” garbage. Work on preserving forestry; launch a campaign to plant trees in all geographical areas in order to face desertification; legislate the necessary laws to protect forestry and establish nature conservation. Activate the role of municipalities in environmental activities. Universally introduce a general guided program for gravel and rock excavation and appropriation. Activate the institutions that cater for consumer protection through increased control and supervision of domestic and imported goods in order to ensure their validity and quality. Increase supervision and control the way factories dispose of their chemical waste; legislate laws that protect the environment, especially the rivers, sea, and underground waterbeds, from the dangers of pollution. Dear dignified Lebanese, By counting on you, and with our confidence in the loyalty and consciousness of our populace that has given and sacrificed a lot, we boldly embark upon [contesting] the elections, renewing the oath to dispense all efforts and potentials [do our best] within the narrow confines of the parliament and outside it, in every place and domain, “to serve you with our eyelashes” – as the leader of the martyrs of the Islamic Resistance, Sayyid Abbas al-Musawi, may God have mercy on his soul – and to continue, with you, our march in order to attain all the goals that we aspire to achieve, spearheaded by this election program. God is behind our intention. Hizbullah

4 Hizbullah’s 2004 Municipal Election Program26 (my translation) 1 Hizbullah’s principles dictate that the populace constitutes the main pillars behind its movement. From this perspective, Hizbullah is under a respon4 Hizbullah’s 2004 Municipal Election Program

81

sibility to fight all oppression and injustice in order to serve the populace and protect its dignity. 2 One of Hizbullah’s aims is to adopt the plight of the oppressed and the disenfranchised populace by protecting them and actively working to put an end to the oppression and discrimination towards the deprived areas in order to raise the standards (of living) in all respects.27 I Core Program 1 Administration and organization: – Find a unified internal order for the employees that takes into account the need to develop municipal work. – Be strict in enforcing remuneration and punishment as well as a rotation policy targeting the appraisal of employees by developing a special magnetic card for that purpose. – Consider serving the citizens as a legal and ethical obligation. – Employ state-of-the-art communication and technology as well as rehabilitate, train, and modernize the administrative cadre in order to efficiently render services to the citizens. – Apply accountability, objectivity, and transparency to dealing with the citizens in taking decisions and on a procedural basis. – Regularly publish a brochure, which clearly indicates the accomplishments of the municipalities and their activities as well as a detailed appraisal of the employees and their responsibilities to the municipal councils, in order to build a two-way street with the public and keep it informed.28 2 The efficiency of the municipal council and boosting the confidence of the citizens in it: – Make sure that the members of the municipal councils are conversant with the municipal and administrative rules and regulations. – Assemble efficient municipal committees, composed of specialized and authoritative individuals that could be chosen from outside the municipal council, according to a promulgated internal order, specifying their role and jurisdiction, making sure that the same person cannot participate in more than two committees. – Lay out an annual plan, to be adopted by the municipal council, and followed up by regular appraisal sessions. – Maintain good relations with the authority of administrative surveillance and public institutions.

2 Election Programs

82

– Maintain good relations with the deputies of the region and cooperate with them in order to effectively follow up people’s administrative transactions or “dossiers” (mu‘amalat) and the developmental projects. – Establish dialogue sessions between the municipal council and the citizens, which include debating the projects and submitting a summary of the municipal achievements as well as the impediments facing it. Also, listen to the problems and complaints of the citizens. – Launch campaigns that encourage the submission of innovative projects and reward these projects with valuable financial prizes. – Sponsor conflict resolution by peaceful means between feuding families. – Establish a special “complaint box”, and respond in an efficient way to the complaints of the people. – Use transparency and accountability in executing promises. – Establish committees assembled from the people in order to react and interact with the municipal work. – Erect big bulletin boards at the center of the towns and villages in order to communicate the decisions and news of the municipal councils.29 3 Expand the financial revenues of the municipalities – Specifying in detail the expenditures and the incomes that the municipalities incur. – Incomes are divided along the following lines: the money that the municipality derives directly from the people as well as the money that the state levies on behalf of the municipalities, which is distributed accordingly among them.30 4 Developmental projects A Guiding plans: – Study the possibility of redefining the municipal enclosures or boundaries with respect to the projects and studies of every town. – Form specialized committees within the central committees in various districts or areas. – Lay out “guided planning” (mukhatat tawjihi) in conformity with the demographic, social, and touristic stance of the towns concerned, considering the present situation and the benefit of each and every town. Also, activate the role of the municipality by voicing its opinion during the propagation of studies and guided planning by the official governmental institutions. – Supervise (public) works taking place within the municipal domain.

4 Hizbullah’s 2004 Municipal Election Program

83

– Work on detailing the “guided planning” for each municipality, divide the projects by specifying the technical and financial needs for every project, and the time needed to execute it. – Divide the town according to the deprivation index, (level of) oppression, different walks of life (social, economic, and touristic). Also, set priorities in taking proper care of the various areas according to the recommendations of the proposed studies. – Prepare topographies and computerized maps that clearly indicate real estate, roads, planned projects, in order to make use of them in all engineering, developmental, and financial studies for the town.31 B Specific projects: – Study and execute a sanitary sewer and drainage network for all the streets that are included within the municipal domain, and seriously think about establishing a recycling factory in conjunction with the neighboring municipalities. – Erect central water tanks in the municipalities and villages in order to make use of rain or ground water. Also construct dams and ask the Ministry of Water and Energy to help find other sources of water to construct a water network in the towns and villages lacking it. – Organize garbage collection without resorting to containers placed on the streets; rather work hard to establish garbage recycling factories. – Supply streets and internal alleys with lights. – Build bridges for pedestrians above the main roads and highways, especially at the entrance of villages and towns. – Encourage agriculture and the free reclamation of barren land to make it agriculturally productive. Rehabilitate and secure irrigation networks, ponds, and dams as well as constructing agricultural roads and encouraging the founding of cooperatives and establishing seminars and special guidance sessions. – Construct markets (groceries, fish, meat) or reorganize what is available according to the stipulated requirements. – Build and rehabilitate shelters in a good manner, especially in the southern areas adjacent to the “Occupied Territories” (Palestine) occupied by the “Zionist Entity” (Israel). – Put an end to building violations (mukhalafat al-bina’) and act firmly when handling encroachments on public and private property. – Build parking lots and make use of unused land as well as constructively working on solving the traffic problem. – Build care and recreational centers for ages ranging between 56-75 in order to find good substitutes for what is presently available. – Work on executing the modal street and take proper care of ruins. 2 Election Programs

84

– Help private companies to construct housing complexes for low income families in an attempt to help the youth32 to get married and solve the escalating problem of housing.33 5 Giving importance to environmental conditions within the municipal jurisdiction – Regular check-ups on the state of the environment in order to determine the polluters of sanitary sewers, drinking water, air, garbage, etc., while keeping in touch with private companies, local ministries, and foreign associations that are all specialized in executing projects capable of fighting pollution, and being strict in regular follow-up inspections and supervision. – Be strict in spreading environmental awareness. – Planting trees and various plants as well as establishing public gardens and greenhouses. – Using temporary solutions as well as long-term ones in order to get rid of all kinds of garbage and polluters of the environment, in coordination with the concerned ministries as well as competent international associations. – The preservation of the environmental and national heritage. – Encouraging/motivating private initiatives aimed at establishing model/exemplar neighbourhoods. – Be strict in giving permits that might affect the environment. – Conduct efficient health inspection of restaurants, slaughterhouses, and food factories. – Regular medical examinations and check-ups of school pupils. – Cleaning and protecting beaches and river banks.34 6 Social care A Consolidating the resistance society (in order to substantiate the already existing “resistance identity”) – Naming the streets within the municipal jurisdiction in such a way as to reflect the identity of the village, town, or city (article 49 of the municipal law). – Erecting monuments (article 62 of the municipal law). – Protecting the youth from the causes of immorality or vices (article 62 of the municipal law) by erecting gyms, public gardens, children’s playgrounds as well as helping in ridding society of social problems. – Caring for the oppressed families (article 49 of the municipal law).

4 Hizbullah’s 2004 Municipal Election Program

85

– Supporting and encouraging clubs and associations working within the geographical areas of the municipalities (article 49 of the municipal law). – Helping in building mosques and husayniyyat. – According special attention to religious occasions and public holidays through decoration and congratulatory calls on feast days. – Consolidating commendable societal customs and habits. – Erecting a special praying place (musalla) in the town hall so that people can pray at the stipulated times. – Exhort the citizens to form special committees, under the jurisdiction of the law, in order to deal with procedural matters concerning their dwellings. – Regulate and strictly observe, within the narrow confines and the jurisdiction of the municipal law, media and information activities situated within the confines of the municipalities.35 B Caring for the youth – Appointing a committee, headed by one of the members of the municipal council, in order to follow up on the matters or affairs of youth associations, thus providing a variety of activities such as scouts, athletics, and cultural activities. This also would lead to the erection of clubs aimed at attracting the highest possible number of youths. – Setting up handicrafts, vocational, athletic, scientific, mathematical and cultural training courses in cooperation with the specialized ministries, UN programs, and local associations, which are concerned with the youth’s welfare and their (scientific) development. – Encouraging the youth to acquire scientific and cultural education by helping them to pursue higher education in their own fields of specialization. – Stimulating the successful, creative, innovative youths by organizing an annual celebration in their honor. – Doing our utmost best to create job opportunities and establish athletic playgrounds and well-equipped facilities for the youth. – Encouraging the youth to visit holy places by organizing competitions and offering them prizes. – Establishing a monthly or seasonal journal or brochure specifically for the youth.36 C Children, motherhood, old age, and handicap (disability)37 – Collecting information and data on the orphans, old people, working children and handicapped children, to be studied and evaluated in order to find the appropriate ways to deal with these groups.

2 Election Programs

86

– Fighting illiteracy in society and establishing pedagogical and educational training courses. – Reducing child labor and dealing with difficult cases through guidance, rehabilitation, and working effectively to find them schools. – Establishing training and vocational courses for mothers in order to help them to perform their role in a satisfactory way by helping them raise more income for their families. Also, finding or building day care centers (for children) in order to help working women. – Upgrading contact with specialized international associations in order to guide the nursing mother and give her what she needs. – Constructing gardens for children and the old aged. – Helping the poor as much as possible, especially the elderly, to pay state and municipal taxes. – Making health and social care available for the elderly, orphans, handicapped and the needy through municipal associations and other governmental and private institutions. – Celebrating grandfather’s, grandmother’s, mother’s, and children’s day and honoring the eldest man or woman with special celebrations and meetings, or by according them media coverage.38 D Pedagogical care – Honoring directors, faculty, and educational staff. – Setting up educational training courses and reinforcements for the public degree [state diplomas]. – Celebrating the “Day of Victory and Resistance” (25 May)39 in the domain of the municipal school. – Celebrating “Teacher’s day” at schools located within the municipality. – Working on rehabilitating public schools located within the municipal domain. – Adopting (as a course of action) and encouraging the organization of cultural and technical fairs. – Working on the erection of a public library and cultural center.40 7 The domestic, regional, and international resources that the municipalities benefit from – Local or domestic institutions: The Ministry of Social Affairs, The Ministry of Health, The Ministry of the Environment, The Ministry of Public Works, The Ministry of Energy and Waterworks, The Institution of Civil Planning/Organization; and the Lebanese Army. – Regional and international institutions and organizations: UNICEF, UNDP, (Iranian) Jihad Al-Bina‘, etc.41

4 Hizbullah’s 2004 Municipal Election Program

87

II Recommendations 1 Accord special attention to the Lebanese diaspora42 and encourage them to invest their capital in developmental projects within the municipal domain.43 2 The relationship between the municipalities and Hizbullah and its civil institutions and NGOs should be one of coalescence in such a way that it ought to serve the objectives of the party, which are the same as the objectives of municipal work, since the latter aims at actively redressing deprivation at the level of the municipalities, which ultimately leads to a constructive political society.44 3 Organize detailed studies targeting the following: – Establishing a union of municipalities to carry out evaluations and address obstacles/impediments. – Twin-city programs. – A new municipal elections law. – The jurisprudence of municipal work (the religious safeguards, dawabit shar‘iyya, for municipal work and municipal decisions). – A general evaluation of municipal work in every municipality with specific mention of the weaknesses in order to constructively address them.45

5 Hizbullah’s 2005 Parliamentary Elections Program46 (my translation) 1 Safeguard Lebanon’s independence and protect it against the Israeli menace by safeguarding the (Islamic) Resistance, Hizbullah’s military wing, and its weapons to accomplish total liberation of Lebanese occupied land (a reference to the Shib‘a farms). 2 Facilitate the mission of the UN’s team investigating Hariri’s assassination. 3 Take practical measures to organize a special relationship between Lebanon and Syria. 4 Reject all foreign tutelage or intervention in Lebanese domestic affairs under any pretext or in any form. 5 Contest the parliamentary elections with the intention to achieve the broadest and most encompassing national and populist representation in order to come up with an efficient parliament that protects the established fixities or national set of values (thawabit wataniyya). 6 Affirm the recourse to the constitutional apparatus and state institutions, while urging the employment of a national discourse through openness and dialogue in a national-comprehensive framework. 2 Election Programs

88

7 Stress the need for establishing a comprehensive socio-economic program aimed at stamping out poverty by boosting productive sectors such as agriculture, industry, and trade, which are conducive to rendering basic services to the Lebanese citizens.

6 Hizbullah’s 2009 Legislative Election Program: 6 April 200947 On Monday the head of the Loyalty to the Resistance parliamentary bloc MP Muhammad R‘ad announced Hizbullah’s electoral platform during a press conference he held at the Jinan Hall on the airport road in Beirut’s southern suburb, in the presence of all Hizbullah election candidates. The following is the complete text of Hizbullah’s vision and electoral platform: Fellow Lebanese… On the threshold of parliamentary elections due on the seventh of June, we are all invited to take advantage of this opportunity in order to re-orientate political choices and to address the imbalance in power which has produced a series of crises that negatively impacted the life of the nation and placed the country in a spiral of instability. The parliamentary election, though seasonal, is greatly important at this stage as it is the entrance to the renewal of political life, the stabilization of national options, and a repeat of the declaration of commitment to Lebanon as a country, not an arena belonging to the mercenary. This obliges us all to deal with the elections with the necessary seriousness and responsibility. Lebanon has been, over the past four years, in difficult throes particularly since the adoption of resolution 1559, some of the stipulations of which formed a gateway to internal civil strife and opened the doors of the country to the winds of regional and international interventions and sharp and dangerous divisions where international forces, the United States of America being at their forefront, took advantage of these divisions and tensions to draw the Lebanese arena into its sphere of influence, thereby flouting the national interests of unity, reconciliation and genuine sovereignty. When we sat down at the dialogue table, we were prompted by hope that this would be an opportunity for the reformulation of the national consensus beyond the reality of line ups and away from the dominance logic, because we believed, and still believe, that preserving the homeland, its unity and its causes can only prevail in the spirit of understanding and dialogue. We have always been supporters of Islamic unity in word and in deed, and strive for national

6 Hizbullah’s 2009 legislative election program: 6 April 2009

89

unity in good faith and effectiveness, out of our commitment to state-building and strengthening unity. The Lebanese opposition composed of public figures, parties, and national and Islamic forces… has been able to restore the image of national unity which does not continue to be a hostage to confessions and sects. Then came the historic understanding between Hizbullah and the Free Patriotic Movement as a pioneering step in this context, particularly with regard to the Lebanese themselves and the promotion of internal peace and the development of shared qualities among them, and the work on developing a genuine partnership. Perhaps it [the understanding] is the first time a consolidation of a real and active meeting among the Lebanese occurs, since as Lebanese we have grown accustomed to such meetings being limited to leadership ranks, without having any effects or implications on the ground. This understanding has had a profound impact on consecrating unity on the internal front, and remarkable resilience in the face of the Zionist aggression and its repercussions in July of the year 2006. This war of aggression formed the height of international onslaught against Lebanon. It aimed at breaking the Lebanese will to resist and to completely subjugate Lebanon within the context of what was then called ‘the New Middle East project’. Nevertheless, the great achievements and remarkable heroic acts achieved by the mujahidin of the Islamic Resistance turned the brutal aggression – backed by international and regional powers – into a shamefaced defeat with repercussions ranging from a total defeat of all the Zionist entity’s components to the fall of their political and military crew and the dispersion of illusions of control over the region by the US. Lebanon’s victory in the war was radiant, admitted and confessed to by the whole world, even by the enemy itself, except for a few who ill-received the scene of cohesion between the heroic resistance, the army and the people. Rather than making it a matter of pride and a source of national honour, some sought to spear it [the victory] with arrows of doubt, slander and attenuation. Fellow Lebanese… The resistance you have wagered on, and given your confidence to, with the help of your sacrifices has created the honorable historical situation of protecting the country and the future of its generations. This resistance was, still is, and will continue to be at your side through all important matters and calamities. Thanks to the great sacrifices and offerings made by its martyrs, wounded and prisoners… and at their forefront offerings are made by martyr leaders Sayyid Abbas al-Musawi, Shaykh Raghib Harb, and Hajj Imad Mughniyyé. This resistance, which has achieved the liberation of a greater part of the Lebanese 2 Election Programs

90

territory as well as the largest number of prisoners and bodies of martyrs… is determined to complete the liberation of the remaining occupied territories, particularly in the Shib‘a Farms and Kfar Shuba hills. While it places its powers and capabilities in the context of strengthening Lebanon’s strength, in this same context we believe that any defense strategy around which a consensus is to be formed must start from the axiom of benefiting from the existing capabilities of the resistance, the army, and the people, alongside a plan to develop, strengthen and integrate these capabilities, particularly those of the Lebanese army, to be able to confront the “Israeli” occupation, threats and ambitions in our land and water resources. Fellow Lebanese… Consolidating the bonds of national unity, strengthening stability and civil peace, state-building within the rule of law and institutions, the preparation of sound environments for a true culture of national citizenry, the rehabilitation of the spirit of belonging to a nation and land, the achievement of brotherhood, justice and equality among citizens… are, from our point of view, all duties that are sacrosanct. Therefore, our adherence to the national charter, as expressed in the Ta’if Accord and all chartered items included in the constitution, urge us along to struggle with you for the creation of a balanced authority, one that respects and implements this charter and does not depart from it, nor abuse it or its requisites; an authority entrusted with the national destiny, proper application of the law, respect for freedom and management of public affairs… to address social, economic and developmental issues and problems, an authority which does not accumulate debts nor squander public funds, that does not cripple the judiciary nor cause regulatory institutions to be absent, an authority that does not upset the national balance in development and administration, an authority that does not, through its policies, widen the economic and social gaps between the Lebanese, an authority that concerns itself with supporting the national army’s capacity, to strengthen its potential, and raise the readiness of all security forces, one that fights crime rather than toys with it and uses it as a scarecrow for intimidation and a path to politicization. We insist on Lebanon being a home for all its citizens, and on our hostility to “Israel”. We support and back our Palestinian brothers in their struggle to liberate their land and sanctities. We reject all forms of settlement, partition and federalism. Our desire is to build the best distinguished brotherly relations with the Syrian Arab Republic and develop cooperative relations with other brotherly and friendly states. These represent a system of constants and axioms for us from which we will not depart.

6 Hizbullah’s 2009 legislative election program: 6 April 2009

91

The Doha agreement formed a real opportunity to escape the crisis that ravaged Lebanon. A President of the Republic was elected, and a government of national reconciliation was formed. An electoral law was agreed on with elections to be held on time. This agreement formed a necessary station that led to a breakthrough in the internal situation during a sensitive and delicate phase. We believe that the spirit of accord that contributed to its formulation and the climate of reconciliation that launched it… represent a gateway to strengthening national partnership and consensus work in the interests of Lebanon and the Lebanese. In Political Reform A Abolition of political sectarianism: The formation of the national committee for the abolition of political sectarianism, as stipulated in the Lebanese national accord document, is to commence its work and take practical actions in implementing the recommendations based on its findings. B Election Law The proper pathway to reform lies in the completion of a modern electoral law based on proportional representation, certainly alongside the completion of the constitutional amendment on lowering the voting age to eighteen, in addition to the completion of another amendment, the separation of Parliament from Cabinet. C Balanced Development The principle of balanced development represents one of the pillars of political reform, for which reason it was stipulated in the covenantal constitution’s preface. In order to achieve this, we call for the reintroduction of the Ministry of Planning, subject to ten- or five-year plans, which observe the needs of all regions in the various sectors. D Decentralized Administration The Constitution’s preface stipulates the reconsideration of administrative divisions, taking into account national assimilation, the preservation of coexistence and administrative decentralization according to: granting broader administrative powers to micro-units (municipalities, governorships, provinces), designed to enhance development opportunities, and facilitate a speedy completion of transactions and administrative tasks.

2 Election Programs

92

E Judicial System Since the Lebanese constitution states that the judiciary is an independent authority, alongside the two legislative and executive authorities, and since a fair and impartial judicial system guarantees the rule of law and safeguards the rights of individuals and the community as a whole, and thus no reform can occur without political reform, we see the need to work on completing and implementing the law which deals with the organization of the judiciary under the authority of the highest independent judicial body. In Administrative Reform Administrative reform is a significant challenge in all societies, smooth and efficient management is a characteristic of the modern state, whereby management reform aims to alleviate citizens’ burdens, mobilize energies and skills, and for the swift and satisfactory completion of tasks. In moving toward this goal, work efforts should be focused according to the following: A A comprehensive plan of guidelines drawn up by the management, which describes its needs and fills in vacancies. B A focus on scientific competence and practical skills. C Modernization, automation, networking of information and fighting redtape in bureaucracy. D Activation of control and accountability, strengthening and fortifying the control institutions (the Civil Service Council, Central Inspection, General Board of Corrections, the Office of Accounting). E The development of laws and regulations employed in the management and budget area, to ensure speedy accomplishment of tasks, stopping waste and the elimination of bribery. F To adopt a scientific and systematic plan in the process of recruiting staff, especially senior staff (levels I and II), in the context of promoting efficiency and good performance in the public administration. G Work on implementing the law to establish the two districts of Baalbekal-Hermel and Akkar, and completing the issuance of practical decrees in this regard. In Economic and Financial Reform Since independence, Lebanon has suffered a lack of researched economic and development visions that are based on available resources, national needs and regional relevance, which is the reason why the process of economic-performance development and improvement is random and has led to a decrease in productive sectors, congestion in others and the unreasonable, oversized growth of others, leaving the Lebanese economy with the prevalent characteristic of 6 Hizbullah’s 2009 legislative election program: 6 April 2009

93

service and revenue focus, and resulting in the destruction of industries that are productive and labor absorbing, such as agriculture, and national expertise, such as manufacture. In order to initiate real economic reform, it is necessary to first adopt a new role for the state, through the transition from the reality of the neutral state, with its limited social and economic contributions, to the reality of a state that is responsible for achieving development and justice. Therefore, work is required on the following tracks: 1 Developmental: through a balanced development of the sectors and regions, developmental partnerships between public and private sectors, and a fair distribution of gains. 2 Economic: through the achievement of lasting and stable growth in the gross domestic product, raising competitive productivity of economic sectors, and regional integration (Arab and Islamic markets). 3 Social: the reduction of unemployment levels, fighting poverty, developing the means for redistribution of incomes and the provision of basic services. 4 Financial: break the vicious circle of public debt and reduce its cost, reduce the budget deficit, fight squandering and bring about fair tax reforms. 5 In this context emphasis should be placed on the need for the development and continuance of a policy of stimulating the productive sectors, such as agriculture, industry and tourism… by providing soft loans, provision of tax incentives, encouraging small enterprises to merge, strengthening collaborative work, provide equipment guidance and support, increase irrigated areas, study the needs of both local and foreign markets, move toward agricultural industrialization trend, develop the animal production sector and subsidize exports of all kinds. The ultimate goal is to fight poverty and social marginalization, this requires joint efforts from both public and private sectors, to focus on economic activities and provide employment opportunities, to be directed toward rural and remote areas. The Education Sector The Lebanese University (LU) is considered the most important higher education institution in Lebanon in terms of its wide coverage, the broad range of specializations it provides and its number of students, particularly those belonging to low-income families. It is also assumed that this university shapes the future generations of the nation. This requires support and development through the implementation of laws specific to the LU, which guarantee its financial and

2 Election Programs

94

administrative independence, ensure its development and enhance its scientific research capabilities. Addressing outstanding issues is also required, such as full-time professors, promotions, support of the contracting fund and the revival of the LU Students National Union. As for the general education sector, duty calls for the introduction of a comprehensive education scheme, with emphasis on raising the level of teaching qualifications to provide schools with the necessary requirements, securing their fuel supply for the winter season, advancing the school fund, re-mapping the distribution of schools according to balanced development requirements, in addition to developing educational institutes, education inspection and the promotion of its powers, implementing compulsory education as well as making education free of charge, promoting public, vocational and technical education and addressing the longstanding demands of teachers from different levels in a positive and responsible spirit. Civil Society Organizations In the context of developing a sense of national responsibility, the development of party and trade union work should be sought, civil society institutions and organs should be allowed to become active in playing a vital ancillary role, to play the role of an active observer of the performance of formal institutions, leading to the promotion of community awareness to exercise its duties in the management of public life; in this context, we focus on the following areas: 1 Media: Freedom of expression should be maintained and protected as stated in the preface of the constitution, as an inalienable right that cannot be harmed in the framework of safeguarding the law, hence the freedom of media work. The review of certain laws, particularly the law on publications, in a manner that removes the looming threat on the media. 2 Women: Take action to strengthen the role of women and the development of their participation in the areas of political, cultural, educational, informational and social activities, and to benefit from this role in the creation of a psychological and moral balance in society. 3 Youth: Provide care for the emerging generations and youth groups, develop their energies and talents, and direct them towards national, humanistic and higher goals, protect them from corrupt thoughts and from the means and tools of corruption and profligacy. 4 To combat deviation and harmful traits in our society, whether through the media or other means, to focus on educational and media guidance, to warn of the dangers of the spread of corruption and the decaying of values, and the strict control of scenes and images that are imposed on public decency and harm the humanistic image of women. 6 Hizbullah’s 2009 legislative election program: 6 April 2009

95

5 To protect the privacy of citizens through banning indiscriminate wiretapping of their telephone calls, to respect the laws governing this issue, and to call to account any would-be violators, no matter who they are. Improvement and Development of Social Services In the light of our conviction that the state should never resign its fostering role, and that it does not act impartially or indifferently toward the needs of its citizens, work must focus on improving the services in the areas of health, education, housing and social welfare; of these we mention the following: A Activate the public health sector, mainstream the principle of health care and prevention, put an end to the monopoly of the pharmaceuticals market and consolidate health funds. B Support the development and reform of the National Social Security Fund, to broaden its base of beneficiaries. C Develop a housing strategy, which takes into account the overall development of all regions in addition to the development of state-supported housing loans. D Complete the process of planning and land classification, speed up the completion of the annexation and partitioning works, and address the problems of common and jointly owned property and building property violations. Energy and Resource Protection The waste of water and natural resources is one of Lebanon’s long-term problems, despite the high rainfall percentage and the many other water sources, suffering [from its shortage] is still significant, especially in times of scarcity, and for that action the following is needed: A The protection of water resources, especially those threatened by the “Israeli” enemy. B Accomplishing the planned Litani Project with a water level of 800 meters. C Serious work on accomplishing the projects of dams and ponds, according to a specific timetable. D The expansion and rehabilitation of irrigation systems, especially in agricultural areas. E The completion of the establishment and rehabilitation of domestic water systems. F In the Electricity Sector, what is needed is the completion of feed lines, the modernization of production plants, addressing technical wastage and combating violations and the expansion into new environmentally friendly production means.

2 Election Programs

96

G As for the Communications Sector, what is required is the preservation of this national wealth through development of the sector and the improvement of its services, along with providing more facilities for the consumers, with low-priced, better service always being the goal. Environment Protection The environment in Lebanon has been exposed to a wide process of destruction and violation: from the burning of forests, to the work of indiscriminate cutting of trees, to the chaos of stone quarries and crushing plants, to polluting rivers with sewage, to the indiscriminate dumping of solid wastes, all of which calls on us to sound the alarm and declare a state of national emergency to achieve the following: A The adoption of a plan of guidelines that is scientific, environmentally friendly and final for the stone quarries and crushers. B To expedite the completion of the construction of sewage plants in all regions. C Run a modern study for best solid waste disposal methods, for converting waste into energy rather than burying it in the ground. D The provision of effective fire-combating means (aircrafts, etc…), stringent prevention of tampering with the environment, and fighting infringements on sea shores and river banks. E Launch a national campaign to stop the deforestation of Lebanon in cooperation with domestic and foreign organizations and associations that are interested in this matter. Dear Lebanese, This is our vision and commitment. This is our pledge, the pledge of the martyrs, of Sayyid Abbas, Shaykh Raghib and Hajj Imad, and just as we have always been, we will stay with you and by you, faithful to and supportive of the resistance; based on this vision and this platform we approach you asking for your valued and precious confidence. Peace and God’s mercy and blessings be upon you Hizbullah

7 Nasrallah’s Post-elections Press Conference: 8 June 200948 The text of the speech delivered by Hizbullah secretary-general Sayyid Hasan Nasrallah on al-Manar Television after the Lebanese elections on 8 June 2009: 7 Nasrallah’s post-elections press conference: 8 June 2009

97

I take refuge in Allah from the stoned devil. In the Name of Allah, the Compassionate, the Most Merciful. Praise be to Allah, the Lord of the world. Peace be on our Master and Prophet – The Seal of Prophets – Abi Al-Qasim Muhammad Bin Abdullah and on his chaste and kind Household, chosen companions and all the prophets and messengers. Peace be upon you all and Allah’s blessing and mercy. Tonight I will move from the general to the private, then I will end up with two general topics. Indeed I will address you all in my speech that tackles the event we passed through together, which is the parliamentary election and its outcome. First: I would like to congratulate all the Lebanese people with all their political parties, movements and groups on this great important national achievement. I would like also to praise the popular showing at voting stations in all regions and from all sects which reflects a great political responsibility towards national causes and the present and future of this nation and people. This is indeed a very great positive point which must be lauded and which also must be stressed and strengthened because it sets a clear track that shows that we as a Lebanese people deserve to take this chance and to resort to this means in face of essential causes. Second: I would like to thank all ministries and political, judiciary and security administrators, especially the Lebanese Army and the security forces, on their running of this process and on preserving security, stability and peace which gave the Lebanese the great chance to vote and express their views. This is noticeable especially because these political, security and judiciary administrators stood before a great challenge, which is to hold elections on one day. So despite the defects and flaws which will be evaluated so as to be addressed later, we believe it was a major challenge, and we believe that it was faced with great responsibility. Third: I would like to congratulate all the winners in the parliamentary elections whether from the Loyalists [governing coalition] or from the Opposition and in all parliamentary districts. They all must know that now they have assumed the responsibility of the people and the future of this country. So Insha’Allah (God willing) they will live up to this assumed responsibility. Fourth: We accept the results announced by the Interior Minister, while preserving the right of candidates in the various districts. If any of them has any information that enables him to appeal before the Constitutional Council, this would be a particular issue. As for the official results which were announced, we accept them with sportsmanship and democratic spirits. We also accept that the other contesting group – i.e. the Loyalists – has won the majority of seats in the parliament though the Opposition preserved its previous parliamentary position in sum (as it lost some districts and won others).

2 Election Programs

98

Indeed, we accept the parliamentary majority. Well, at previous ceremonies, I used to say that there is a difference between parliamentary majority and popular majority. The parliamentary majority might or might not be the popular majority. Anyway, we accept the parliamentary majority. As for the popular majority, it seems that it needs centers for studies and statistics to review figures closely so as to know who gains the popular majority. I believe that we all can resort to the ballot boxes to help us in deciding the popular majority (as we resorted to ballot boxes to decide the parliamentary elections), and if most of the votes in sum were for the interest of the other party, I will accept that they are also the popular majority. Now we accept the results regardless of our evaluation of the election process and the means used in this regard, despite the huge expenditure which will be clearly illustrated within days, the sectarian, factional – and at times racial – incitement which was illustrated during the election campaign days, the accusations and lies which aimed at intimidating the public opinion, especially within some sects and some districts and the overt foreign interference. Anyway, I will not interfere in such an evaluation. I just wanted to point this out. We will have our evaluation of the election process from A to Z, just as the other forces will make such evaluations, although that will not influence our acceptance of the results. In this framework and as we are talking about results and accepting results, I would like to point out two big lies (which have been prompted through the election campaign) that have been thwarted. As these points are directly related to us, especially the Opposition and more precisely to Hizbullah, I feel that I am obliged to single them out and clarify them. First, lie number one is the political rhetoric that has been exploited for months regarding the Opposition as seeking to cripple elections and ruining the political and security status to prevent elections from taking place. [It was being said that] if the Opposition would find out that it was losing the elections and not moving towards a parliamentary majority while voting was taking place it would destroy the ballots and blur the situation. Also [it was said that] after counting the votes or when the results would be announced, the Opposition would not accept the results and would challenge the parliamentary elections and consider them illegitimate and consequently push the country towards political, popular and security crises. This has been said, if not by all Loyalist leaderships (to be on the safe side), by most of them. Well today (Monday) here I am at your service. The results were announced, and we are dealing with them normally. This is the first proof of the big lie invested in the election campaigns. The election day was normal, natural and excellent. The security status was excellent and stable. The turnout was huge. The vote counting was calm. Results were announced, and no problems occurred. 7 Nasrallah’s post-elections press conference: 8 June 2009

99

It was clear that all were fearful. I was following up with the Interior Minister – whom we address with a special salutation – while he was saying that now the election was over, and the great event was issuing the results via vote counting. We have to accept the outcome because there was anxiety about this. This is the first point. We could say that this was one of the big lies which were invested in the election campaign. Now it has been exposed. Now comes the second lie, which is even bigger than the first and which was invested more in the election campaign. Well, when I handle such points I do not mean to record lies to highlight the upcoming stage. We want to benefit from the past to highlight the future. In recent months, speeches, statements and interviews focused on how elections would be held while the resistance arms are still there. That means that elections are not fair; people are under pressure; they cannot express themselves as these arms are imposing choices on the people; the people are not convinced of their choices. This was also said by most of the other party leaderships. They wrote articles and did lengthy interviews on this issue. Indeed, if the opposition won the parliamentary elections, that issue would be raised again. They would have said the fairness of the elections was challenged because it was held in the presence of the Resistance’s [Hizbullah’s] Arms. Now, because the Loyalists won the parliamentary elections, no one is tackling that issue. I am reminded of that because after the results of the elections were announced and we accepted them, this great lie was exposed. The elections were held in Lebanon in all districts in the presence of the armed resistance. In the presence of the resistance arsenal which had never been present since 1982, people voted; there was no pressure; no one imposed anything on them, results were issued today, and nothing untoward took place. So one of the most important conclusions is that these arms are not used to impose political realities. One of the most important political events is the parliamentary election because the role played by the parliament in the Lebanese regime is well known, whether electing the president (we are through with the lie of shortening the presidential tenure, too), forming the government, lawmaking, public budget, agreements… So if we wanted to say which is the single most important internal political event? It is the parliamentary election. Well, people voted with utmost ease and freedom. Neither the armed resistance nor their acts were noticed. This proves what we have always said, that these arms are not to impose political realities and not to put people in power or take them out of power. It has a clear role, which is that of resistance and defending the country. Here I stress that the election process as a whole has proved before all accusers and misleaders the soundness of the direction into which these arms are pointed. I conclude this point by saying that the Lebanese have proved their ability as a state, people and political and security forces to preserve security, stability, civil peace, political and media election competition – even sharp com2 Election Programs

100

petition – without touching on the pillars of security and stability. Now we must guard and preserve this. We have always said that we have to resort to the ballot boxes. The whole story of the Opposition since the July [2006] War until now was resorting to the polls. We could have spared our country all these troubles. Fifth: I like to greet with high estimation all the Lebanese National Opposition leaderships, cadres, movements, parties and masses. I say to them: Dear ones, together we have set a noble national goal, which is to work to achieve a great reform in every sector whether legal, political, economic, social, living, financial… Thus we – the Lebanese National Opposition – sought to gain the parliamentary majority to serve the reform project and not to seize power and have hegemony over the country. All of us in the Lebanese National Opposition exerted our utmost legitimate efforts in the election battle. We have all faced what was properly called by General Michel ‘Aun a global war because no one in the whole world has tried to interfere in the elections. The Opposition masses got involved in this great national battle with the utmost faithfulness and zeal. Now, if we cannot serve this reform project that we believe in from the parliamentary majority post, that does not mean that we have no obligation as national forces to serve this reform project from another position, whether as parliamentary, popular and political Opposition from outside or inside the government. These options are open to debate. But this responsibility towards the reform project that we believe in and want to achieve remains valid. Today, I renew the pledge and call on all the Opposition leaderships to renew the pledge and commitment along with all the popular groups who have voted for the Opposition in all the districts to serve the reform project which the masses believe in and have worked for. They bore all these sufferings in the past period and stood by the opposition forces. This responsibility never ends or stops. Indeed, the parliamentary elections, despite their importance, are not more than a station on the long road of the national political struggle to achieve these noble goals. We in the Opposition are supposed to make consultations very soon – Inshallah – to decide our steps, course and the way to deal with the upcoming events. Indeed, before naming the speaker and the premier and forming the government, we have to decide on how to deal with these events as an Opposition. Now I do not want to have the final word in any matter because this needs studying, consultations and an agreement among the National Opposition. That will take place in the next few days – Inshallah. I whole-heartedly and on behalf of all my brethren in the Hizbullah leadership thank and highly esteem especially the masses of the resistance and the masses of Hizbullah. Here I would like to mention the categorization resorted to in the electoral districts. In some districts there was no election competition. We considered them present at the line of fire, such as in the south, B‘albak-Hirmel, Beirut Southern Suburbs (which was both at the line of fire and a competition 7 Nasrallah’s post-elections press conference: 8 June 2009

101

district). In the districts where there was no competition we still called on people to come in masses to the ballot stations to express their political choices, especially regarding the resistance (as it is they who paid the tax of blood, displacement, house demolition during the July War and other things). We found out that despite the fact that the southern and B‘albak-Hirmel districts did not witness election competition, the percentage of voters was very high and in some cases exceeded the districts which did witness sharp and tough competition. This huge popular turnout in the various regions is highly appreciated. Indeed, it was not surprising because it is the conviction, wish and will of the people. I also want to thank the masses who participated in the districts where there were election competitions: Western Biqa‘, Rashaya, Mid Biqa‘, Mount Lebanon districts, the North and Beirut in general, where we have popular masses, brethren and activists who exerted great efforts. Also, I would like to thank the campaign staff in all the regions who worked for months with great and obvious effort, which yielded this great popular presence. This was their right, whether in the districts where there are Shi‘ite seats or not and whether in the districts where there were Hizbullah voters or not because we worked on the basis that the Opposition as a whole is involved in the battle, and it is our normal right to be present. We have electors in northern Matn who want to vote also in Kisirwan, Jubayl and Koura and all the other districts. Here I again want to condemn some sectarian, factional, racist rhetoric which does not agree with others having the final word in the district when the majority in that district is of a definite sect. In fact, this is what took place in most of the districts. In some districts the final word was for sects and in others for factional minorities. So why is the speech sectarian here and national there? Every Lebanese person, whatever his religious sect or faction has the right and it is even his duty to vote in the region where he is registered in the electoral lists. That is his national obligation, and if he fails to fulfill this obligation, he would be abandoning his national responsibility. I sincerely salute all the campaign staffs. I also congratulate all my brethren in the Loyalty to Resistance Bloc in all the districts, because all the Bloc’s candidates won in all the districts with very high votes, and they have gained unprecedented public support. I conclude with two general points. The first has to do with the people and the massive vote of confidence they gave to Hizbullah in these districts, which was much more like a referendum. The people have addressed the whole world with a message: the choice of the resistance is not that of an armed party or gang. It is not a choice imposed on people by force and pressure. No one could oblige the people, especially not in districts where there was no competition, to leave their regions and go to ballot boxes with such a huge turnout, especially with new obstacles as a result of the new administration that was used in the elections. Those people who showed up sent a message to the whole world: the choice of 2 Election Programs

102

resistance is a popular choice, especially in areas which face the threat of aggression. Consequently, the choice of resistance is an expression of the will of these people, their inclination, culture, awareness and life. This must be respected. The second message is that resistance is not a weapon to be debated but rather a popular will. This point is to be discussed at the dialogue table. The people’s will and choices must be discussed, especially concerning those people who live in the arena under threat. In regard of this point in particular, I heard some statements or discussions which expressed fear about this point in the upcoming stage. I say that there is no need for fear in any case. As long as the resistance is a popular choice embraced by the people, there is no need for fear because no one can do anything with the popular will. I stressed this point before the elections and after the elections, regardless of who might have won. This is left for a quiet dialogue and objective discussion. I believe this is the right path which all parties are supposed to have announced their commitment to. Consequently, there is no need to fear or polarize this topic, be it now or in the upcoming stage. The last point, which I would like to end with, is that after this great national achievement in elections, the chance of establishing a strong, capable, fair state is still possible regardless of the election results. We agree that there are great challenges before us as Lebanese, whether on the economic level (financial crisis) or on the social, political, administrative and other levels. So I believe we all must have reached the conviction of saving this country, developing it, solving its troubles, raising its status and guarding its independence, freedom and dignity. That needs the cooperation of all Lebanese, regardless of the nature of this cooperation. The chance is still there. This is linked to the will of all political forces which have proved their popular political parliamentary presence in the ballot boxes. Ballot boxes have proved that even those who did not win parliamentary seats have great popular support in their regions, and this must not be neglected. To a great extent this has to do with the will of the political forces and parties. But I believe that this is essentially and primarily linked to the party which gained the parliamentary majority in these elections. How will it conduct itself? What is its true program? Let us put aside what was said before the elections. Tell us after the elections: what is the true program? What is the program that it wants? This program must be known to the Lebanese because this is the future of their country. What are the priorities of this party? How will they behave? In what spirit will they deal with the public affairs? Will they benefit from the previous years’ experiences, especially those of the last four years? Will they blunder in classifying priorities or will they classify them in the right way? After the parliamentary elections, the party which has become the parliamentary majority is more concerned with how to deal with the coming period, 7 Nasrallah’s post-elections press conference: 8 June 2009

103

whereas the National Opposition, which has preserved its parliamentary position, will work from this popular and political position. This might be more on the popular level, but that will have to be illustrated by the figures in the coming few days. So the majority is concerned with the fate of the country. It cannot quit my stance by any means. It is concerned in the coming period with being clear to the Lebanese. Nothing whatsoever must be hidden. That is because transparency and clarity and truthfulness are very important elements in our country, in order to overcome troubles and disputes and to open doors wide for dialogue and agreement. So let us try to build a republic based on truthfulness. Enough with fabricating events that have to do with the state or with deciding priorities based on lies, accusations, fears and worries. Tonight I would like to answer all that was said in the election campaign. Let it go. The days ahead will prove like this day did that there were two lies that were exploited for the elections, concerning the position of the opposition from the elections and holding elections while Hizbullah retains its weapons. Let us put what has been said behind us. Let us depend on faithfulness, transparency and clarity. Let us be open with each other, whether we are Loyalists or Opposition, so as to build a country together and to defend and develop it. Let us together help this country out of the crises which it has been suffering from for so long. We stand before a new stage and status. May Allah bless all those who have exerted great efforts in the previous stage. This was a station. Let us deal with it with all its results. Let us benefit from the lessons of the past. Let us see where the gaps were. What are the good and bad points? What are the points of strength and points of weakness? Let us develop our presence. But what must not be touched ever is our responsibility towards our people and country, especially those who offered blood and great efforts to liberate this nation and defend its existence. This station must furnish us with more determination and will to continue working and struggling with hope and confidence in the future so that we may be able to see our country for which our brethren, sons and dear ones have offered their chaste souls and blood. We must preserve it, defend it and move it forward, God willing. Peace be upon you and Allah’s mercy and blessing.

2 Election Programs

104

3 Agreements, Understandings, Pacts

1 Paper of Common Understanding between Hizbullah and The Free Patriotic Movement:1 6 February 2006 I Dialogue National dialogue is the only avenue to find solutions to Lebanon’s crises on stable and firm bases that are a reflection of a unifying consensual will. The following conditions must be obtained to ensure its success: A The participation of parties that have a political, popular and national standing with a round table as the venue. B Transparency, openness, and placing the interests of the nation above any other interest, through the reliance on self-driven will and free and committed Lebanese decision-making. C Include all national issues that require general consensus. II Consensual Democracy Consensual democracy remains the fundamental basis for governance in Lebanon because it is the effective embodiment of the spirit of the Constitution and of the essence of the pact of shared coexistence. From this standpoint, any approach for dealing with national issues according to a majority-minority formula depends on historic and social conditions for practicing effective democracy in which the citizen becomes an independent value. III The Electoral Law The reform of political life in Lebanon requires the adoption of a modern electoral law – where proportional representation may be one of its effective means 105

– that guarantees accurate and just popular representation and contributes to the accomplishment of the following objectives: 1 Activate and develop the role of political parties in achieving civil society. 2 Limit the influence of political money and sectarian fanaticism. 3 Make available equal opportunities for using the various means of the media. 4 Ensure the required means to enable the Lebanese expatriates to exercise their voting rights. We ask the government and parliament to commit to the shortest possible deadline to enact the required electoral law. IV Building the State Building a modern state that has the trust of its citizens and is able to meet their needs and aspirations, and provide them with the sense of security and safety as to their present and future, requires that the state should be erected on strong and solid foundations that make it impervious to destabilization and periodic crises whenever it is faced by difficult challenges and changing circumstances. This requires the following: A Adopt the standards of justice, equality, parity, merit and integrity. B An equitable and impartial judiciary is the essential condition for creating a state of rights, laws and institutions based on: 1 The complete independence of the judiciary and the selection of judges with recognized competence in order to activate the work of all courts. 2 The respect for the actions of the constitutional institutions while keeping them away from political polarization; ensure the continuity of their work and prevent their blockage (the Judicial Council and the Constitutional Council). What happened in the Constitutional Council is an example of such a blockage, when the legal challenges of parliamentary elections submitted to it have not yet been acted upon. C Eradicate corruption from its roots, because temporary and partial solutions are no longer sufficient. They have in fact become an exercise in bluff that the beneficiaries of corruption at all levels carry out to perpetuate their theft of the resources of the state and its citizens. This requires: 1 Activating the institutions and boards of financial and administrative control and inspection, while ensuring their strict separation from the executive power to guarantee that their work is not politicized. 2 Conducting a complete survey of the cases of corruption, in preparation for opening judicial investigations that would lead to the prosecution of those responsible for corruption, and to the return of embezzled public funds. 3 Agreements, Understandings, Pacts

106

3 Legislating the required laws that contribute to combating all aspects of corruption and calling upon the government to sign the United Nations Convention Against Corruption. 4 Working toward a comprehensive administrative reform that ensures that the right person is assigned to the right position, particularly those whose merit, competence and integrity are recognized. This can be accomplished by empowering the Civil Service Council to assume its full prerogatives. 5 Setting deadlines for actions on these issues because the factor of time has become critical. This matter requires fast and judicious solutions which would use the time factor to their advantage instead of the corrupt using it to theirs. V The Missing During the War To turn the page of the past and achieve a comprehensive national reconciliation, all the outstanding files of the war must be closed. The file of the missing in the war requires a stance of responsibility to end this anomalous situation and put the parents’ minds at ease. The parents cannot be asked to forgive without respecting their rights to know the fate of their children. This is why we ask all parties involved in the war for their full cooperation to uncover the fate of the missing and the locations of the mass graves. VI The Lebanese in Israel Whereas both sides are convinced that the presence of Lebanese citizens in their homeland is better than their presence in enemy territory, a resolution of the question of the Lebanese residing in Israel requires a speedy action to ensure their return to their country while taking into consideration all the political, security and livelihood circumstances surrounding the matter. On this basis, we call upon them to promptly return to their country in the spirit of the call by Sayyid Hasan Nasrallah following the Israeli withdrawal from south Lebanon and the speech delivered by General Michel ‘Aun at the first session of parliament. VII The Security Question First, Political Assassinations: Any form of political assassination is condemned and rejected because of its violation of basic human rights and of the most important foundations of the existence of Lebanon represented by difference and diversity, and of the essence of democracy and its practice. Therefore, to the extent that we condemn the assassination of Former Prime Minister martyr Rafiq Hariri and all assassinations and assassination attempts that preceded and followed it, leading to the Paper of Common Understanding

107

assassination of MP Gebran Tueni, we emphasize the importance of moving forward with the investigation according to the officially approved mechanisms in order to uncover the truth. This is an issue that cannot be subjected to any compromise because it is a required condition to achieve justice and serve it against the criminals, as well as to bring an end to the cycle of murder and bombings. For this reason, it is an obligation to keep these issues away from any attempts at political exploitation, which would harm their essence, and the essence of justice that must remain above any political conflicts or disagreements. Second, Security Reforms: A reform of the Security Services is an inseparable part of the broader reform process of state institutions and their rebuilding on sound and solid bases. Given the delicate position that the Security Services occupy in protecting and defending a stable security environment in the country against any breaches or threats, the process of building those Services must be given special attention. Therefore, the government is urged to assume its full responsibilities as follows: A Put in place an integrated security plan based on the centralization of security decisions and on a clear definition of enemy versus friend, the determination of security threats, including the issue of terrorism as well as the security breaches that must be dealt with. B Dissociate the Security Services from any political considerations and clientelism, for their full loyalty should be to the nation. C Assign the responsibility of the Services to personalities with recognized competence and integrity. D Security measures must not be in conflict with the basic freedoms guaranteed by the Constitution, most of all the freedom of expression and political action, which do not threaten security and public stability. E Constitute a parliamentary Intelligence Committee that would oversee the reform and building processes of the Security Services. VIII Lebanese-Syrian Relations The establishment of balanced and sound Lebanese-Syrian relations requires a review of the past experience while drawing the necessary conclusions and lessons in order to avoid the accumulated mistakes, blemishes, and breaches. This is in order to pave the way to build these relations on clear bases on parity and the full and mutual respect for the sovereignty and independence of both states, on the grounds of rejecting the return to any form of foreign tutelage. Therefore, it is necessary: A That the Lebanese government take all legal measures and procedures pertaining to the assertion of the Lebanese identity of the Shib‘a Farms and

3 Agreements, Understandings, Pacts

108

present them to the United Nations, now that the Syrian state has declared the Shib‘a Farms to be fully Lebanese. B To demarcate the borders between Lebanon and Syria away from the tensions that could block this operation which both Lebanon and Syria have had a long-standing need to achieve through a mutual agreement. C To ask the Syrian state to fully cooperate with the Lebanese state to uncover the fate of the Lebanese detainees in Syrian prisons without the provocation, tension, and negativity that would hinder a positive settlement of this file. D Establish diplomatic relations between the two countries and provide appropriate conditions for them, thus transferring them from a relation between individuals and groups to a relation between institutions in order to secure their permanence and stability. IX Lebanese-Palestinian Relations Addressing the Palestinian file requires a comprehensive approach that asserts, on the one hand, the respect by the Palestinians of the authority of the Lebanese state and their compliance with its laws and, on the other hand, the reaffirmation of solidarity with their cause and the recovery of their rights, in accordance with the following rules: A The social condition of the Palestinians requires strong attention to im­­ prove their living conditions and secure a decent standard for a dignified human life on the basis of bilateral cooperation and the human rights charter, in addition to facilitating their movement inside and outside Lebanese territory. B The Right of Return of the Palestinians is a fundamental and permanent right, and the rejection of the settling of Palestinian refugees in Lebanon is an issue that has the consensus of the Lebanese people and cannot be conceded under any circumstances. C Define the relationship between the Lebanese state and the Palestinians in a single institutional Palestinian framework that would be a legitimate representative of the Palestinian people in Lebanon in a manner conducive to proper coordination and cooperation. D The issue of putting an end to Palestinian weapons outside the camps and controlling the security situation inside them should be dealt with as part of a serious, responsible and close dialogue between the Lebanese government and the Palestinians, leading to the exercise of the state’s authority and laws over the entire Lebanese territory. X The Protection of Lebanon and the Preservation of its Independence and Sovereignty Paper of Common Understanding

109

Protecting Lebanon and preserving its independence and sovereignty is a national public responsibility and duty, guaranteed by international treaties and the Human Rights Charter, particularly in confronting any threats or dangers from any source. Therefore, carrying arms is not an objective in itself. Rather, it is an honorable and sacred means exercised by any group whose land is occupied, similar in this way to the methods of political resistance. In this context, Hizbullah’s weapons should be addressed as part of a comprehensive approach that falls within two bounds. The first bound is the reliance on justifications which meet national consensus, and which would constitute a source of strength for Lebanon and the Lebanese people for keeping the weapons, and the other bound is the definition of objective conditions that would lead to a cessation of the reasons and justifications for keeping those weapons. And since Israel occupies the Shib‘a Farms, imprisons Lebanese resistance members and threatens Lebanon, the Lebanese people should assume their responsibilities and share the burden of protecting Lebanon, safeguarding its existence and security, and protecting its independence and sovereignty by: 1 Liberating the Shib‘a Farms from Israeli occupation. 2 Liberating the Lebanese prisoners from Israeli prisons. 3 Protecting Lebanon from Israeli threats through a national dialogue leading to the formulation of a national defense strategy which the Lebanese agree to and subscribe to by assuming its burdens and benefiting from its outcomes.

2 The Beirut Declaration: 15 May 2008 In conformity with the decisions of the Arab Foreign Ministers in the Arab League meeting held on May 11, 2008, in order to contain the Lebanese situation, the ministerial committee headed to Beirut from 14 to 15 May in order to meet with the Lebanese leaders to discuss the situation in Lebanon and agree on the implementation of the Arab Initiative in an effort to contain the perilous situation that is hovering over Lebanon, and in light of the consultations performed by the committee on the basis of the principles of the Lebanese constitution and the Ta’if Agreement, the following points were agreed upon: – Welcoming the Lebanese Cabinet’s decision to agree to the Army’s decision pertaining to the head of security at the airport and Hizbullah’s telecommunications network. – Putting an immediate end to the infighting, the withdrawal of all fighters from the streets, and opening all roads as well as the International Airport and the Beirut Port.

3 Agreements, Understandings, Pacts

110

– Placing peace and security in the hands of the Army, the return to normal civilian life, and the effective functioning of the public and private institutions. – The formation of a national unity cabinet. – Agreeing on a new election law (for the legislative elections to be held in June 2009). – Ending the sit-in in downtown Beirut in the wake of the election of the consensus President General Michel Sulayman. 1 A return to the status quo ante of May 5, 2008. 2 Agreement on the return to the national dialogue sessions among the 14 leading Lebanese politicians, while working on building confidence among the warring parties on the basis of the following points: 3 The launching of dialogue aimed at buttressing the Lebanese state’s authority over its territories and upholding security while maintaining good relations with the different parties that form the Lebanese fiber. The dialogue is to be launched in Doha and continued in Beirut under the leadership of the president immediately after his election, under the auspices of the Arab League. 4 All the parties solemnly declare the renunciation of carrying arms or resorting to violence for the sake of achieving political gains. 5 The dialogue begins as soon as this declaration is made public by the implementation of the first article in Doha on May 16, 2008, under the auspices of the Arab League; this dialogue continues on a non-abating basis until an agreement is reached. 6 All the parties should immediately abide by halting political and sectarian incitement discourse.

3 Doha Accord: 21 May 2008 1 The immediate election of the consensus president (General Michel Sulyman, the commander of the Lebanese Army). 2 The formation of a national unity cabinet according to the following distribution: sixteen ministers for the majority, eleven ministers for the opposition, and three ministers to be appointed by the president. 3 Basing the June 2009 legislative elections on the 1960 election law, while keeping the Marji‘yyun-Hasbayya area as one election district; likewise Ba‘albak-Hirmel. Divide Beirut into three districts: 10 seats in Mazra‘a, 5 in Ashrafiyyé, and 4 in Bashura. Agreement on forwarding the draft election law of the Fuad Butrus Committee to the parliament. 3 Doha Accord: 21 May 2008

111

4 Stressing the implementation of points 4, 5, and 6 of the “Beirut Declaration” pertaining to the enforcement of the Lebanese state’s sovereignty and authority and upholding national unity and coexistence, the non use of arms or violence in political struggles, and the banning of treason and incitement discourse.

4 Hizbullah’s Understanding with the Salafi Movement: 18 August 20082 1 Starting from the prohibition of shedding the blood of a Muslim, we prohibit and condemn any aggression committed by any Muslim group on another Muslim group. In case of any aggression or onslaught, the aggrieved party has the right to recourse to any legitimate means to defend itself. 2 Avoiding sedition and provoking the public because this ultimately leads to discord, thus slipping the carpet from underneath the feet of the eggheads and placing the decision in the hand of the rash, vile people or the foes of the Islamic umma. 3 Standing firm in the face of the Zionist-US project, which aims at disseminating discord through the dictum of “divide and conquer”. 4 Doing our utmost best to uproot infidel (takfiri) thinking that is existent among both the Sunnis and the Shi‘as because branding all Shi‘as as infidels is rejected by Salafis and vice versa. 5 If Hizbullah or the Salafis are oppressed or attacked by any domestic or foreign actor, then the other party must stand firm with the aggressed party as much as its capabilities allow. 6 Forming a committee from Hizbullah’s religious scholars and those of the Salafi movement to discuss points of contention between the Sunnis and Shi‘as, which contributes to confining disagreement among the members of the committee, thus avoiding any spill over to the public, to the street. 7 Every party is free in what it believes in. No party has the right to impose its ideas and its jurisprudential concepts on the other. 8 Both parties (Hizbullah and the Salafis) regard the Understanding as a means to ward off discord among Muslims, and promote civil peace and coexistence among the Lebanese.

3 Agreements, Understandings, Pacts

112

5 President al-Assad Issues a Decree Stipulating the Establishment of Diplomatic Relations with Lebanon: 14 October 2008 President al-Assad issues a Decree Stipulating the Establishment of Diplomatic Relations with Lebanon Tuesday, 14 October 2008 – 11:05 AM www.sana.sy/eng/21/2008/10/14/196550.htm Damascus, (SANA – Syrian news agency) President Bashar al-Assad on Tuesday issued Decree No. 358 for the year 2008 stipulating the establishment of diplomatic relations between Syria and Lebanon. Following is the text of the decree: Article (1): Diplomatic relations are established between the Syrian Arab Republic and the Lebanese Republic. Article (2): A diplomatic mission of embassy level is created in the capital of the Lebanese Republic. Article (3): The Lebanese capital, Beirut, is classified in the eighth category of the Decree No. 78 dated 28.2.2006. Article (4): This decree is to be enforced upon publishing. The decree is a translation of the agreement between President Bashar al-Assad and the Lebanese President, Michel Sulayman, at their summit which was held last 13 August, on the establishment of diplomatic relations between Syria and Lebanon on the ambassadorial level in conformity with the UN Charter and international law. The two sides stressed in the final statement their commitment to consolidate the Syrian-Lebanese ties which are based on reciprocal respect of sovereignty and independence of each country.

President al-Assad issues a Decree

113

4 The New Manifesto (30 November 2009)1

In the name of Allah, Most Gracious Most Merciful Hizbullah - The Political Manifesto 1430Hijri / 2009 AD

Π Praise be to the Lord of all creation, and peace be upon the last of all prophets, our master Muhammad, upon his pure kin, his worthy companions, and on all divine prophets and messengers. God our Lord has said in his Glorious Book: “And those who strive in Our Cause, We will certainly guide them to Our Paths: for verily Allah is with those who do right”. (Al Ankabut: 69) And the Almighty also said: “O ye who believe do your duty to Allah, seek the means of approach unto Him and strive with might and main in His cause: that ye may prosper.” (Al Mai’da: 35)

115

Contents Foreword | 116 1 Hegemony and Mobilization | 118 1.1 The World and Western-American Hegemony | 118 1.2 Our Region and the American Plot | 121 2 2.1 2.2 2.3 2.4 2.5 2.6 2.7

Lebanon | 122 Homeland | 122 The Resistance | 123 The State & the Political System | 125 Lebanon and Palestinian-Lebanese Relations | 128 Lebanon and Arab Relations | 129 Lebanon and Islamic Relations | 130 Lebanon and International Relations | 131

3 3.1 3.2 3.3 3.4

Palestine & the Settlement Negotiations | 133 The Palestinian Cause and the Zionist Entity | 133 Jerusalem and Al-Aqsa Mosque | 134 The Palestinian Resistance | 135 Settlement Negotiations | 136

Epilogue | 137

Foreword This manifesto is a disclosure of Hizbullah’s political views. It brings to light our stance and perceptions, our ambitions, hopes, and concerns. First and foremost, it is a representation of what we have experienced firsthand in the realm of pioneering endeavors and primacy of sacrifice. Amidst this exceptional political phase of proliferating change, it is no longer possible to weigh transformations without taking note of the special stance that our Resistance has come to occupy, or that ensemble of accomplishments that our course has realized. It is therefore important to perceive change in a comparative context between two key opposing paths, and whatever lies between them in the form of growing reverse proportionality: 1 The first is the path of resistance and opposition, a growing movement that thrives on military victories, political successes, an established model both at the popular and political levels, and an unwavering persistence 4 The New Manifesto (30 November 2009)

116

to secure a political stance in spite of the mass of direct targeting and the magnitude of challenges. This path has secured a swing in power balances at the regional level in favor of the Resistance and its supporters. 2 The second is the path of US-Israeli oppression and hegemony, with its various dimensions, alliances and direct as well as indirect extensions. This course has been witnessing a series of debacles, military defeats and political fiascos, and has demonstrated successive failures for US plans which have tumbled one after the other, leading to confusion, retraction and diminishing ability to control amidst the stream of developments and events predominating over our Arab and Islamic world. These givens integrate within a wider international scene, which in itself lends a hand to uncovering the US dilemma and the retreat of unipolar domination in favor of some form of pluralism, the profile of which is still unclear. The global financial crisis only served to deepen the predicament experienced by the oppressive world order. Its plunging of the US economy into chaos and deficit was a clear reflection of the extent to which the arrogant capitalism model has been structurally affected. We can therefore say that we are amidst historical transformations that foretell a retreat of the US as a supreme world power, the disintegration of the unipolar world order, and the historical commencement of the Zionist entity’s accelerated decline. At the heart of such transformations, resistance movements emerged as a focal and strategic certainty on the current world scene, this of course being the result of the central role these movements assumed in terms of creating or encouraging that part of change which relates to our region. The resistance in Lebanon, and particularly by our Islamic Resistance, had led the confrontation against occupation and hegemony starting two and a half decades ago. The Resistance held fast to this option at a time when the inauguration of the American Era was being presented to the world as if the end of all history was about to be marked. In light of prevailing power balances at the time, some perceived the option of Resistance as an illusion, a form of political recklessness or negligence that contrasts with rational, levelheaded thinking. In spite of this, the Resistance2 pressed on with its rightful struggle – its Jihad march – never in doubt of the cause’s virtue or of its own ability to create victory through ceaseless confidence in God Almighty, affiliation to the Arab nation as a whole, commitment to Lebanon’s national interests, trust in its own constituents, and upholding of the basic human values of righteousness, justice and freedom. Throughout its long Jihad progression and its substantive victories – led by halting the Israeli occupation of Beirut and Mount Lebanon in 1982, forcing foreword

117

Israeli retreat to Sidon, Tyre and Nabatiyyé, all the way to the July 1993 Israeli aggression, the April 1996 aggression, the May 2000 liberation and the July 2006 war on Lebanon – the Resistance has laid the anchors for its credibility and standards even before crafting out its victories. From a liberating force to a commander of balance and confrontation to a power of defense and deterrence, the Resistance has built on its development phases to finally add an internal political role, one that is pivotal and influential for the creation of the capable and impartial Lebanese state. In tandem, the Resistance was destined to develop its political and human status. It was therefore elevated from being a national Lebanese merit to becoming a celebrated Arab and Islamic value as well. Today, the Resistance has become an international human value, with its model representing a source of inspiration and its achievements a paradigm to be emulated by all those seeking freedom and independence across the world. In spite of Hizbullah’s recognition of all the promising change that prevails, and in spite of what we perceive as the enemy’s swerve between ineffective war strategies and an inability to impose conditional compromises, Hizbullah does not underestimate the magnitude of impending challenges and risks, and by no means considers the confrontational road ahead to be paved or undervalues the scale of sacrifices that would be required if this convoy of resistance is to reclaim human rights and contribute to the arousing of the Arab nation. Nevertheless, in retrospect, the Party now makes its choices with higher lucidity, stronger will and further trust in God, in itself and in its constituents. In this context, Hizbullah shall outline what represents the Party’s main political-intellectual framework as well as views and standpoints towards the challenges that lie ahead.

1 Hegemony and Mobilization 1.1 The World and Western-American Hegemony Following World War I, the Unites States adopted a first-of-all-time mission: that of crafting a plan for centralized world domination. In US hands, this quest witnessed substantial development in terms of instituting historically unprecedented authoritarian and subjugation mechanisms. The US benefitted from a composite outcome of multifaceted achievements at various scientific, cultural know-how, technological, economic and military levels, and was backed by a political-economic agenda that blatantly perceived the world as an open market to be governed solely under US-made rules. The most dangerous aspect of Western, and particularly of US, hegemony is the consideration that the world is owned by the superpower, and that such 4 The New Manifesto (30 November 2009)

118

power has the right to rule out of sheer superiority at more than one level. When combined with schemes based on the economics of capitalism, Western expansionary strategies – and particularly those of the US – took on an international dimension characterized by unbounded greed. Control by the ferocious capitalist powers is primarily manifested through monopolistic networks of multinational corporations and a variety of international and particularly financial firms that are backed by military superiority. Such control has led to a further deepening of conflicts and incongruities, and of no little importance are those conflicts across identities, cultures and civilization patterns, alongside of course the battle of wealth versus poverty. Brutal capitalism has transformed globalization into a vehicle for spreading divisions, propagating discord, demolishing identities and exercising the most perilous of cultural, economic and societal pillage. Globalization reached the most dangerous of its limits when the founders of Western hegemony transformed it into a form of military globalization. The Middle East most intensely witnessed this transformation, starting from Afghanistan to Iraq to Palestine and Lebanon, the latter receiving its share through a full-scale aggression at the hands of Israel in July 2006. The American agenda for world domination had never reached that level of menace which it has recently treaded unto, especially after the last decade of the 20th century and the disintegration of the Soviet Union created the launch pad for accelerated attainment of unipolar world domination and represented a historical opportunity for the American schema. Such power monopoly was promoted to the world as being a historical American duty with benefits that would by no means be restricted to the US but that would be equally shared by the rest of the world. Such domination agenda witnessed its peak performance when the neo-conservative current managed to hold the strings in the George W. Bush Administration. The neo-conservatives expressed their views through their manifesto: “Project for the New American Century”. It was neither strange nor surprising that the said manifesto insisted mostly on rebuilding American capabilities, and reflected a strategic new vision for national security. It was clear that military strength was to be enhanced not only for defensive purposes but also for creating a proactive intervention force, be that for undertaking “preventive” operations through engaging in pre-emptive strikes or for dealing with crises after they occur. Following the events of September 11, 2001, the Bush Administration found a window of opportunity to exercise the greatest influence and impact possible through putting into practice its strategic vision for monopolistic domination of the world – “War on Terror” became the slogan. This administration initiated what were considered as successful initial attempts: 1 Hegemony and Mobilization

119

1 Militarization of American relations and foreign politics to the highest extent possible; 2 Avoiding dependence on multilateral frameworks; monopolization of strategic decision-making, and coordination where there is a need only with those reliable allies; 3 Resolving the war in Afghanistan rapidly in order to liberate resources for the more important step on the agenda: dominating Iraq, a country upon which hinged a “New Middle East” that is befitting of a post-September 11 world. The Bush Administration did not stop short of using any camouflage, deception or outright lies to justify its wars, especially the War on Iraq. It stood in the face of all opposition to its new colonialist program whether such opposition was initiated by countries, movements, forces or personalities. In this framework, the Bush Administration decided to establish a correlation between “terrorism” and “national resistance”, and this in order to disarm the resistance of its humanitarian legitimacy and its righteousness of cause, and to justify the waging of all forms of wars against it. The last bastions of defense that peoples and countries use to uphold their freedoms, dignity and pride were to be removed. The rights to undiminished sovereignty, to building states out of peoples’ own experiences, and to assuming the historical roles that people select for themselves, whether culturally or intellectually, became targets in this context. Through a number of measures, “Terrorism” was transformed into an American alibi for hegemony. Persecution, seizure and arbitrary detention, absence of the most basic elements of fair trial as we have seen in Guantanamo, direct intervention in state sovereignty, and the transformation of sovereignty into a registered US trademark have all been used in the quest to legalize arbitrary criminalization of countries and the collective punishment of their people, leading finally to outright waging of destructive wars that leave no room for distinction between the innocent and the culprit, the child and the old, the man and the woman. The cost of the US terrorism wars have thus far been millions of people, visible mass destruction that has not been restricted to brick and mortar but that has reached out to affect the structure and composition of societies as well. In fact, societies have been fragmented and, in contrast to their historical developments, were forced to revert to previous confessional and sectarian conflicts. This is of course an aside to the targeting of their very cultural heritage and civilization. It is doubtless that US terrorism is the mother of all world terrorism. In all respects, the Bush Administration has transformed the US into a threat against the world at all levels. Should an opinion poll be conducted today, the US would feature as the most hated nation in the world. 4 The New Manifesto (30 November 2009)

120

The futile War on Iraq, the development of resistance in the country, regional and international resentment towards the Iraqi war, the fiasco of the “War on Terror” in Afghanistan, and the disastrous failure of the American-led, Israeliexecuted wars on the resistance in Lebanon and Palestine have all led to the erosion of American prestige on the international scene, resulting in a strategic American recoil towards any engagement in new adventures. The above does not mean that the United States will be exiting the arena easily. “Strategic interests” will be protected with whatever it takes, since American hegemony rests on ideologies that are nurtured by extremist trends, waves of power that form part of a military-industrial complex, the gluttony of which knows no bounds. 1.2 Our Region and the American Plot For reasons related to history, civilization, resources and geography, our Arab and Islamic world suffers the most under the yoke of this arrogant hegemony, more heavily so than the entire world of subjugated countries. For centuries, our Arab and Islamic world has been exposed to vicious colonialist incessant wars, although the most advanced phases of such wars started with the implantation of the Zionist entity in our region, within a framework of fragmenting the region into conflicting entities under various pretexts. The epitome of this phase came with the US inheritance of old colonialism in this region. The central and most prominent goal of American hauteur is represented by dominance over the people in all forms through political, economic, or cultural dominion or through the looting of public wealth. At the forefront is the pillaging of oil wealth, a principal tool for controlling the essence of world economies. Such control was exercised without any restrictions or human or moral standards. Excessive use of military force was applied, directly or by proxy. Here are some of the notable US guidelines and operational policies adopted in this quest: 1 Ensuring all means of stability for the Zionist entity – the forward base and focal point for colonizing the region and planning its collapse. The Zionist entity was to be supported with all power and sustainability dynamics, and a protective web was to be made available to guard its existence in order for it to qualify as the cancerous gland that should drain the Arab world of its capabilities, fragment the region’s potentials and disperse its hopes and aspirations. 2 Undermining the psychic, civil, and cultural potentials of our people, and working on weakening our morale through media and psychological wars that encroach upon our values, Jihad symbols, and Resistance movement. 3 Supporting satellite states and tyrannical regimes in the region. 1 Hegemony and Mobilization

121

4 Taking control of the strategic geographical zones in the region representing key land, sea or air nodes, and deploying military bases throughout these critical joints in support of US wars and apparatus. 5 Hindering the rise of any form of renaissance in the region that may lead to possession of power, advancement, or playing a historical world role. 6 Implanting feuds and divisions in various forms – especially sectarian feuds amongst Muslims – in order to instigate unending civil strife. It is evident that any regional conflict across the world today has to be viewed in light of prevailing global strategies. The American threat is not local or restricted to a particular region, and as such, confrontation of such a threat must be international as well. Doubtlessly, such a confrontation is difficult and delicate, as it bears a historical aspect and is consequently a battle of generations that requires the employment of all powers. Our Lebanese experience has taught us that difficulty does not mean impossibility. In contrast, interactive and vigorous people led by wise, informed and prepared leaders who worked hard to accumulate achievements ended up reaping one victory after another. As true as this situation is vertically throughout history, it is also horizontally true through geographic and geopolitical extension. American oppression has left our nation and its people with no choice but to resist for a better life, for a more humane future, for brotherly diversity and interdependence, for peace and harmony – exactly as religious prophets and great historical reformers have intended, and precisely as the spirit of humanity would want the world to be.

2 Lebanon 2.1 Homeland Lebanon is indeed our homeland and that of our fathers and forefathers, just as it shall be the homeland to our children, our grandchildren and generations to come. Lebanon is the homeland to which we have offered the dearest of sacrifices and the most treasured of martyrs in order to safeguard it as dignified and sovereign. We want Lebanon to be the homeland to all Lebanese, equally, a homeland that embraces them all and that takes pride in all of their accomplishments. We want Lebanon to be one and united – land, people, government and institutions. We refuse any form of division or federation, whether camouflaged or blatantly declared. We want Lebanon to be free, sovereign and independent, generous, impregnably strong and able, a presence within the equations of the 4 The New Manifesto (30 November 2009)

122

region, and a main contributor shaping the present and the future as it has always contributed to the configuration of history. One of the key conditions for the creation of such a homeland and for ensuring its sustainability is the presence of a strong, capable and impartial state, a political system that truly reflects the will of the people and their aspirations for justice, freedom, security, stability, well-being and dignity. These goals are shared by all the Lebanese. We are all working hand in hand towards their achievement. 2.2 The Resistance Israel represents a continuous threat to Lebanon – both as an entity and a statutory government. It is a constantly impending menace with historical desires for Lebanon’s land and water resources. The Zionist entity, being a racist state, represents a peril to the very concept of multi-religious co-existence that Lebanon uniquely manifests. When we add to this Lebanon’s geographical presence on the borders of occupied Palestine, the need to take on national responsibilities becomes imperative. Israel’s menace of our nation began in the wake of implantation of the Zionist entity on Palestinian land, an entity that never hesitated to disclose its desires for annexing parts of Lebanon or taking over our wealth and resources, at the forefront of which are water resources. Israel has manifestly attempted to achieve its ambitions over the years. Starting in 1948, Israel launched its first aggression against Lebanon, progressing over the years from the border all the way to the depths of the nation. From the Houla massacre in 1949 to the attack on Beirut International Airport in 1968, years of repetitive attacks on the land, population and wealth of border areas were carried out in between. Such strikes were but a prelude to the direct seizure of terrain through recurring invasions, which culminated with the March 1978 invasion and occupation of the border area and its subjugation to Israeli security, political and economic authority. These raids formed part of a comprehensive framework, and were the prologue to the all-out 1982 invasion which subdued the entire country. All of this was being fully supported by the United States of America, and was ignored – to the extent of complicity – by the so-called “international community” and its international institutions. The silence of the official Arab world was also suspicious, while Lebanon’s national authority remained absent. Such absence and failure of the state to uphold its national responsibilities and patriotic duties left the land and its people at the mercy of Israeli occupation, looting and massacres. With a national tragedy of this magnitude, and as the people suffered amidst worldwide abandonment in the absence of a national Lebanese authority, the 2 Lebanon

123

loyal patriotic Lebanese people found no other option but to exercise their patriotic, moral and religious rights and duties of defending the land. Their clear choice was to launch an armed popular resistance to confront the Zionist menace and permanent aggression on their lives, livelihoods and future. Restoring the nation through armed resistance was launched as a goal, especially in light of the grave occupational circumstances and the absence of a capable Lebanese state. Reclaiming both occupied land as well as political authority were to form the prelude for the restoration of the State and the rebuilding of its constitutional institutions. Most importantly, the aim was to re-establish those national values that form the pillars of a nation: National Sovereignty and National Dignity. These values are what confer on freedom its true dimensions. Freedom was not to remain a slogan; it was literally manifested by the Resistance through the liberation of land and man. This national value became the fulcrum for modern Lebanon, a country that is to be reckoned with on the world map, one with re-established respect on the international scene, and the compatriots of which take pride in as the homeland of freedoms, culture, knowledge and diversity, just as it is the homeland of dignity, sacrifice and heroism. All of these dimensions put together were crowned by the Resistance through achieving liberation of most of the occupied land in the year 2000, and through recording a historic victory against Israel during the July 2006 war on Lebanon. A live experience of homeland defense was presented, one that is exemplary to other peoples and nations who carry the quest of guarding the nation, protecting its independence and safeguarding its sovereignty. The Resistance accomplished its national triumph with the support of a faithful populace and with the collaboration of the Lebanese Army. The enemy witnessed a historic defeat as its objectives were successively thwarted, while the Resistance emerged, with its fighters and martyrs, and along with it the people and Army of Lebanon, as a grand victor. Such a victory laid the foundations for a new era in the region, at the core of which are the role and function of the Resistance as a deterrent to enemy aggression, an assurer of that level of protection which is necessary for national independence, sovereignty, public defense and the conclusion of territorial liberation. This role, along with the functional duty it represents, remains a permanent national need as long as the Israeli menace and its far-reaching ambitions continue to threaten our land and water resources, and as long as a capable and solid Lebanese government is absent. It is even more so in light of the power imbalances between the Lebanese state and its military enemy – an imbalance that usually forces weak states and targeted peoples to search for optimizing their capacities amidst threats of dominion from powerful countries. Constant Israeli threat requires Lebanon to create a permanent defense formula that is based on matrimony between a popular Resistance which contributes to such 4 The New Manifesto (30 November 2009)

124

national defense in the event of Israeli invasions, and a National Army that protects the country and secures its stability. This combination has proven its success over the past in the realm of managing conflict with the Israeli enemy, and has achieved victories for Lebanon while providing the country with the necessary means of protection. If such a modus operandi is developed within the context of a national defense strategy, it would represent Lebanon’s protective cap. This is especially true following the failure of all bets on Arab and international alternative solutions, or in the context of negotiations with the enemy. Adoption of the Resistance option has indeed accomplished the liberation of land for Lebanon, the recovery of State institutions, the protection of sovereignty and the realization of a genuine independence. In this framework, the Lebanese, with all their political forces, social factions, cultural elites and economic agencies, have a vested interest in safeguarding this modus operandi and subscribing to it, for the Israeli danger threatens the entirety of Lebanon with all its components, a fact that requires the widest possible Lebanese participation in the assumption of national defense responsibilities. The Resistance must continue in its quest to enhance its own capabilities, especially in view of the successful confrontational experience it has demonstrated against the enemy and the shattering of all plots to annihilate it, entrap the “resistance” alternative, or disarm it altogether. On the other hand, persisting Israeli danger against Lebanon and the continued threats voiced by Israel make it imperative for the Resistance to continue its relentless pursuit of further capacity in order to fulfill its national duties of contributing to the liberation of remaining Lebanese land under Israeli occupation in the Shib‘a Farms, Kfar Shuba Hills, and the Lebanese town of Ghajar. It is also the duty of the Resistance to liberate those prisoners of conflict, missing fighters and martyrs, and to continue participating in the function of national defense and protection of the land and the people. 2.3 The State & the Political System Political sectarianism has been the root cause behind the Lebanese political system’s troubles, a situation that has continuously hindered the system’s reform, development and modernization. A political system that is established on sectarian grounds faces rigid obstacles on the path towards true democracy where the elected majority rules and the elected minority represents the opposition. In a true democracy, the door remains ajar for the proper alternation of power between ruling government supporters, on the one hand, and the opposition or various political coalitions, on the other. As such, the central condition for the implementation of this type of factual and genuine democracy would be the elimination of political sectarianism – a condition stated in the “Ta’if Accord” 2 Lebanon

125

which necessitated the formation of a higher national council for the achievement of such an aim. Until the Lebanese achieve this historical and sensitive feat – abolition of political sectarianism – and do so through national dialogue, and as long as the political system continues to be based on sectarian grounds, consensual democracy remains the fundamental basis for governance in Lebanon, for such a type of democracy is what would embody the spirit of the constitution and the essence of the co-existence Charter. Based on this, any contemplation of national issues that is based on majority and minority considerations would continue to hinge on the actual realization of those historical and social prerequisites for the effective exercise of democracy, where the citizen represents a value in and of himself. The will of the Lebanese to live together under a plethora of dignity and equality in rights and duties necessitates that they constructively cooperate in order to effectively achieve true national partnership, for such partnership is the best possible formula for protecting their diversity and ensuring complete stability, especially after an era of insecurity that was brought about by various political systems founded on the tendency to monopolize, annul or exclude the other. Consensual democracy is an appropriate political blueprint for achieving real participation by all. It represents a confidence factor for national constituencies, and significantly contributes towards paving the way for building the reassuring state that all citizens would feel has been built for them.3 The State that we look forward to participating in building along with the rest of the Lebanese is: 1. The State that protects public freedoms, and provides the appropriate background environment for the exercise of such freedom. 2. The State that safeguards national unity and national cohesion. 3. The State that is capable of protecting the land, the people, national sovereignty and independence; one that has a strong, capable and wellequipped national army, and effective security institutions that are vigilant in guarding the security and interests of the people. 4. The State that is founded on modern, effective and cooperative institutions, ones that are organized around clear and specific functions, authorities and duties. 5. The State that is committed to applying the rule of law on all constituents within a framework of respect for public freedoms, and impartial application of citizens’ rights and duties, irrespective of religious sect, home region or the citizen’s views. 6. The State where proper and correct parliamentary representation can only be achieved through a modern Electoral Law which allows Lebanese vot4 The New Manifesto (30 November 2009)

126

ers to choose their representatives at a distance from financial influences, partisanships or various other pressures, and where such law realizes the widest possible representation of the various segments of the Lebanese population. 7. The State where the public sector recruits based on educational qualifications, practical skills and personal integrity, regardless of sectarian affiliation; one which places uncompromising, stringent and effective mechanisms to purge its administration of corruption and the corrupt. 8. The State where the High Judicial Authority is an independent entity that operates at a distance from political controls; where qualified, upright and free judges exercise their critical duties of administering justice amongst the people. 9. The State that primarily bases its economic plan on those productive sectors, especially the agricultural and industrial sectors, and that works on their mobilization and growth; one that provides productive sectors with the appropriate plans, programs and support to where improved production can be better marketed, and to where opportunities for employment are rendered adequate and sufficient, especially in rural areas. 10. The State that adopts and applies the principle of balanced regional development, and works to bridge economic and social gaps between regions. 11. The State that pays attention to its citizens, and that works to appropriately provide them with the public services of education, medical care and housing; one that secures decent living for its constituents, addresses their poverty issues, provides them with employment opportunities, and so on. 12. The State that takes the young generations into custody, assists them in developing their talents, guides them towards their humanitarian and national goals, and protects them from wrongdoing and vice. 13. The State that works to strengthen the role of women in society, and enhances their participation in all fields of activity, to where women’s potentials and influence are capitalized on and their status is respected. 14. The State that attaches adequate importance to the educational system, particularly in what relates to public schooling and growth of the Lebanese University at every level; one where compulsory free of charge education is set as an implementation goal. 15. The State that is based on a decentralized administrative system, where broad administrative authority is provided to the various administrative units (Governorates / districts / municipalities) with the aim of enhancing opportunities for development and facilitating the citizens’ dossiers formalities, without permitting such decentralization to turn into a form of federalism at a later stage.

2 Lebanon

127

16. The State that diligently works to curb emigration from Lebanon, that emigration which is draining the homeland of its young generations, families, wealth of capabilities and human capital, within what seems to be a comprehensive and realistic scheme. 17. A State that supports its expatriate citizens in every corner of the world, defends and protects them, and benefits from their spread, status and positions in the service of national issues. The establishment of the Lebanese State with these provisions and conditions is the goal of this Party and of every honest and sincere Lebanese citizen. We in Hizbullah shall exert every effort towards achieving this noble national goal, and will do so in collaboration with the various political and popular groups who share this vision. 2.4 Lebanon and Palestinian-Lebanese Relations The predicament of the Palestinian refugees in Lebanon remains one of the tragic consequences of the emergence of the Zionist entity on the land of Palestine and the dispossession of the Palestinian people. Palestinians had moved to Lebanon to live as temporary guests with their fellow Lebanese, pending their return to their homes from which they were expelled. The real and direct cause for what the Palestinians and the Lebanese have suffered as a result of this displacement was Israel’s occupation of Palestine. The ensuing tragedies and calamities that befell the peoples of the entire region were not limited to what the Palestinians have suffered. Further, the suffering of Palestinian refugees in Lebanon has not been limited to the pain of forced migration and asylum; it was further aggravated by the repeated vicious Israeli massacres and atrocities that have destroyed both man and home. The completely annihilated Nabatiyeh camp stands witness to this effect, as do the harsh living conditions at Palestinian refugee camps where the most basic elements of decent living remain absent. The Palestinian in Lebanon is deprived of civil and social rights. Successive Lebanese governments have not fulfilled the state’s duties towards these people. It has now become imperative for the responsible Lebanese authorities to take charge of this abnormal situation and to build Palestinian-Lebanese relationships on solid and legal grounds, to where virtue, justice and the common interests of both peoples are brought into balance. The Palestinian presence in Lebanon and Palestinian relations with the Lebanese must no longer be governed by local political whims, tempers of internal turmoil or international interventions. We believe that this endeavor will realize its success through: 1. Engaging in direct Lebanese-Palestinian dialogue 4 The New Manifesto (30 November 2009)

128

2. Enabling the Palestinians in Lebanon to elect their representative in such a dialogue, irrespective of the general discrepancies facing the broader Palestinian situation 3. Awarding the Palestinians in Lebanon their civil and social rights, as befits their human condition and as would preserve their identity and cause 4. Upholding the Palestinians’ Right of Return and refusal of their permanent settlement in Lebanon 2.5 Lebanon and Arab Relations Lebanon’s identity is Arab, and the country practices such identity and affiliation as a natural condition that is inherent in the composition of the Lebanese community. Further, Lebanon’s dynamic reach, geopolitical significance and strategic considerations, along with those regional and Arab clustering policies and interests – all representing strategic determinants of Lebanon’s stance and vital interests – collectively make it imperative for Lebanon to commit to those righteous Arab issues, at the forefront of which is the quest of Palestine in its conflict with the Israeli enemy. There is an unambiguous need to exert concerted efforts towards overcoming those conflicts that run through Arab ranks. Differing strategies or the diversity of coalitions, no matter how serious or intense, do not justify being driven into adopting targeting policies or engaging in external plans that are based on the deepening of discord and the inciting of sectarianism, or the use of divisive instruments. This will exhaust the nation and deplete is resources, and will only serve Zionist interests and American objectives. Developing the political approach of conflict containment to where discord is prevented from expanding into open conflict is an option that deserves adoption, for a qualitative and responsible approach to dealing with national issues may ripen as a result. Searching for common ground and creating sufficient room for constructive communication at the levels of people and governments should achieve the broadest framework for solidarity which will only serve our cause. Here, adopting the choice of Resistance becomes a fundamental need and an objective factor in terms of congealing the Arab stance and weakening the enemy, irrespective of the nature of prevailing strategies or political choices. Based on all of the above, the Resistance only finds it appropriate to publicize the returns and benefits from its option, to where such benefit reaches various Arab locations; this is of course contingent on such benefit being within the desired framework of weakening the enemy and strengthening the Arab stance. In this context, Syria has recorded a distinctive and steadfast stance in its struggle against the Israeli enemy. This came through its support of regional 2 Lebanon

129

resistance movements amidst their most difficult of circumstances, and through seeking to coordinate Arab efforts towards securing the interests of the region and confronting its challenges. We hereby emphasize the need to adhere to the privileged/distinguished relations between Lebanon and Syria, for this is in the common political, security and economic interest of both countries. The interest of both peoples, the imperatives of geopolitics and the requirements for Lebanese stability as well as the confrontation of common challenges, all summon such adherence. We also call for putting an end to all negative sentiment that has marred bilateral relations over the past few years, and urge the return of such relations to their mode of normalcy as soon as possible. 2.6 Lebanon and Islamic Relations Our Arab and Muslim world is facing a number of challenges that affect our communities and their diverse compositions. These are challenges with a level of danger that calls for zero tolerance. Our societal cohesion is threatened by heightened sectarian tensions and instigated confessional frictions, especially between the Sunnis and the Shi‘ites. The fabrication of national contradictions between the Kurds, Turkmen and Arabs, and between the Iranians and the Arabs, the intimidation of minorities, the continuous hemorrhage suffered by Christian Arabs in the East and especially in Palestine, Iraq, and Lebanon are all factors that menace our societal structure, reduce collective immunity, and intensify those barriers against renaissance and development. In lieu of capitalizing on religious and ethnic diversity as a source of communal vitality, such diversity has been abused and employed in a quest of infusing disintegration and societal break-up. The situation resulting from such abuse is the consequence of an overlap between deliberate Western policies – US policies in particular – and internal practices of radical irresponsibility, to which an unstable political environment is to be added. Taking these facts into account seems compelling, and it is both important and worthwhile to consider them as part and parcel of the core concerns that current political programs and directions are drawing, especially those Islamic movements on whose agenda lies the distinctive responsibility to address such challenges and problems. Hizbullah hereby confirms the importance of cooperation between Islamic countries in all fields, for such cooperation provides the Islamic world with the power of solidarity in the face of arrogant plots, guards against cultural and media invasion, and encourages the Islamic world to capitalize on its own resources in the realm of a cross-country trade of advantages. 4 The New Manifesto (30 November 2009)

130

In this context, Hizbullah considers Islamic Iran to be a focal nation in the Islamic world. For Iran was the country that thwarted the Zionist-American scheme through its national revolution, supported resistance movements in our region, and stood with courage and determination alongside Arab and Islamic causes, at the forefront of which is the Palestinian cause. The policy of the Islamic Republic of Iran has been clear and coherent in terms of supporting the central and most paramount issue of importance to Arabs and Muslims, this being the Palestinian issue. Support commenced since the announcement of the Islamic Revolution’s blessed victory led by JuristTheologian Imam Al-Khumayni, and was evidenced by the establishment of the Palestinian Embassy in lieu of the Israeli Embassy. Such espousal of the cause has continued in various forms to this day under the leadership of Jurist-Theologian Imam Al-Khamina’i, and has culminated in the realization of significant first-time victories in the history of conflict with the Zionist invaders. The instigation of discord with the Islamic Republic of Iran by a number of Arab states and non-state actors poses as self-gouging, a stab at own Arab causes that only serves to benefit Israel and the United States of America. Iran, which has drafted its political ideology and built its dynamic reach on the basis of “Centrality of the Palestinian Cause”, hostility towards “Israel”, confrontation with the US policies, and integration with the Arab and Islamic environment, must be met with a will for cooperation and brotherhood. Iran should be perceived as the mobilization base and strategic center of gravity, a model for sovereignty, independence and liberalism, a supporter of the contemporary Arab-Islamic independence plan, and a force that strengthens the power and imperviousness of our region’s countries and peoples. The Islamic world is strengthened by the cooperation and alliance of its various states. We stress the importance of capitalizing on those sources of political, economic and human power that are present in each Islamic world country, and on achieving such bonding strength on the basis of complementarities, mutual support and independence from dominion. We therefore remind you of the importance of unity among Muslims. The Almighty has said: {And hold on fast, together, to the rope of God, and be not separated}.4 We take heed of those causes of division between the people, such as confessional provocations that are instigated especially between Sunnis and Shi‘ites. We count on the awareness of all Muslims in addressing what is being plotted for them at this level. 2.7 Lebanon and International Relations In terms of Hizbullah’s perceptions and approach, the principles for conflict and divergence primarily rest on political-moral grounds, whereby divergence is

2 Lebanon

131

between the arrogant and the wretched, the oppressor and the oppressed, the haughty occupier and the pursuer of freedom and independence. Hizbullah also considers that unilateral dominance tips the international balance for peace, security and stability. The US administration’s unwavering support for “Israel”, its funding of Israeli aggressions, and its sanctioning of Israeli occupation of Arab territories, in addition to US dominance over international organizations, exercise of doublestandards in the issuance and implementation of international resolutions, adoption of intervention policies in the affairs of other communities, militarization of the world, espousal of the logic of mobile wars in the realm of international conflicts, and instigation of unrest and turbulence throughout the world consign the US administration as an enemy to our nation and people, and place the brunt of primary and fundamental responsibility for the creation of international imbalances and turmoil on US shoulders. As for European policies, these oscillate between incapacity and ineffectiveness on the one hand, and unjustified tagging along with American guidelines on the other, a fact that renders the Euro-Mediterranean movement hollow in comparison to and in favor of Atlantic dominion, that which rests on colonialist pillars. Subscription to American politics – especially during this era where such politics are manifesting historic failure – is a strategic mistake that will only serve to aggravate the problems, obstacles and complications in Euro-Arab relations. Europe has an exceptional responsibility towards our region, one that is a product of Europe’s colonialist legacy that had inflicted grave damage, the consequences of which are still being suffered by our people. Because the people of Europe have had a history of resistance against occupation, it is the moral and humanitarian duty of Europe – before being the political duty – to recognize the rights of other peoples to freedom from the occupier on the basis of a clear distinction between resistance and terrorism. In our view: The prerequisite for stability and cooperation in the realm of Euro-Arab relations calls for the building of a more independent, equitable and objective European approach. It would be impossible to construct a common political and security dynamic range without achieving such a transformation that is capable of treating those defects and shortcomings which lie at the source of crises and instability. On the other hand, we look with great interest and appreciation at the liberalization, independence and dominance rejection experiences of Latin America countries. We see vast grounds for overlap between the endeavors of these countries and the resistance movements of our region, overlap which should lead to the creation of a more equitable and balanced international order. 4 The New Manifesto (30 November 2009)

132

Those experiences should instill promising hopes at the global level, where human identity and political and moral backgrounds should seek and find commonality. In this context, our motto “Unity of the Oppressed” shall remain as one of the pillars of political thought, shaping our understanding, relationships and attitudes towards international issues.

3 Palestine & The Settlement Negotiations 3.1 The Palestinian Cause and the Zionist Entity Since raping Palestine and displacing its inhabitants in 1948 – which took place under the auspices and support of the international powers of hegemony at the time – the Zionist entity has represented a direct aggression and a serious threat that have affected the entire Arab region, designating a real menace to the region’s security, stability and interests. Damage and harm were not confined to the Palestinian people or to those States and peoples neighboring Palestine. The assaults, tensions and wars witnessed by the whole region as instigated by aggressive Israeli atrocities and practices serve only as evidence and witness to the magnitude of injustice inflicted on the Palestinian people and on Arabs and Muslims as well. A crime against humanity was committed by the West when this extraneous entity was implanted in the heart of the Arab and Muslim world, and was nurtured to become a hostile infiltration, standing as a leading front for Western plots of dominion, and posing as a base for control and dominion over the region. The Zionist movement is a racist movement both in terms of thought and practice. It is the product of a despotic, authoritarian mentality, the basis of which is founded on a Judaization project of settlement and expansion. The state entity that emerged from the Zionist movement has thrived through occupation, aggression, massacres and terrorism, all with the support and under the custody of colonialist powers, particularly with the aid of the United States of America with which the Zionist state is strategically allied – a true partner in war, massacres and the practice of terrorism. The struggle that we and our nation undertake against the Zionist-colonialist plan for Palestine is but a duty of self-defense against occupation, aggression and the hegemonic Israeli oppression, a threat to our very existence and a menace to our rights and future. From our end, the struggle is by no means based on religious confrontation, or racial and ethnic partisanship, although the owners of the Zionist-colonialist plan have never shied away from employing religion and the religious mind-set to achieve their goals and objectives. What US President Bush, his successor Obama, and Zionist leaders have demanded of the Palestinians, Arabs and Muslims in terms of recognizing the 3 Palestine & The Settlement Negotiations

133

Judaism of the “State of Israel” is only the most obvious proof of this. The natural and inevitable consequence is for this usurper, artificial entity, to live an existential dilemma that haunts its leaders and supporters, for it is an abnormal creation, an entity that is not viable for continuity and that is prone to demise. Here lies the historical responsibility of the umma (Muslim nation) and its people to repudiate this entity whatever the pressures and challenges, and to drive forward for the liberation of all usurped land and the restoration of all pillaged rights irrespective of how long this takes and how great the sacrifices. 3.2 Jerusalem and Al-Aqsa Mosque The whole world is aware of the status and sanctity of Jerusalem and of the AlAqsa mosque, that which is the first of Islam’s two Qiblas5, the third of Islam’s holiest sites, the stage of our Prophet’s ascension, and the meeting point of all prophets and apostles (peace be upon them all). No one denies the Mosque’s great standing and sacredness amongst Muslims, or the depth of its relationship to Islam. Al-Aqsa is one of the most important Islamic symbols on earth. The City of Jerusalem, the host of Islamic and Christian holy sites, is also a place of high regard amongst Muslims and Christians alike. The continued Israeli occupation of this holy city and the accompanying plots for its Judaization [tahwid], expulsion of its people and confiscation of their homes and properties are all atrocious measures to be condemned. So are the entrapment of Palestinian neighborhoods by Jewish settlement belts and their smothering with a wall of apartheid. Added to this the ongoing US and Israeli efforts towards declaring Jerusalem as the eternal Jewish capital with secured international recognition. Further, the serious and incessant attacks on the blessed Al-Aqsa Mosque, the scope of excavation undertaken in its vicinity, and the plots drawn for its destruction, all pose as serious and genuine hazards to the Mosque’s existence, and warn of severe repercussions for the entire region. The duty of rising as a proponent of Jerusalem and of defending and protecting Al-Aqsa Mosque is but a religious duty, an ethical human responsibility for every free and honorable son of our Arab and Islamic world and every free and honorable person in the world. We invite and call upon Arabs and Muslims at both the official and popular levels, and on all countries that are devoted to world peace and stability, to coordinate their efforts and resources for the liberation of Jerusalem from Zionist occupation, and to work on maintaining Jerusalem’s true identity, and Islamic and Christian sacred sites.

4 The New Manifesto (30 November 2009)

134

3.3 The Palestinian Resistance The Palestinian people are waging a battle of self-defense and struggle to restore their legitimate national rights to Palestine, with whatever such right embodies in terms of historical and geographical realities. Through their struggle, they are but exercising a legitimate birthright that is recognized by all divine messages, international laws and human values. Such right encompasses resistance in all its forms – of which armed struggle is most prominent, a struggle exercised with whatever means available to the Palestinian resistance. Legitimacy of the entitlement to resist is especially true in light of the prevailing power imbalance that heavily tips in favor of the militarized Zionist enemy, owner and operator of the latest eradication, destruction and murder arsenal. Experience has demonstrated the significance and viability of the resistance alternative – in fact, experience during the course of conflict and confrontation between our nation and the Zionist entity since the rape of Palestine and to this day has presented doubtless and categorical evidence of how the resistance is indeed the only viable alternative. Practice has proven the viability of resistance and armed struggle in the face of aggression, in the quest for land liberation, reclamation of privileges, achievement of balance of power, and bridging of strategic supremacy gaps. What resistance can achieve in view of its given capabilities, will and confrontational determination is best witnessed by what the Lebanese Resistance has marked: successive victories accumulated in terms of field, military and moral triumphs, a Jihad march that has forced Israeli Zionists in May 2000 to engage in a substantial withdrawal from most of the occupied Lebanese territories, and a resounding fiasco for the Zionist army in the July 2006 aggression on Lebanon. At that time, the Lebanese Resistance recorded a divine and historical victory, a strategic success that dramatically changed the shape of the conflict. This was the first defeat of its kind for the Israeli enemy, a gun-down to the all-time myth of an “invincible army”. Further evidence is manifested through the Palestinian resistance, where the Palestinian revolution has demonstrated successive accomplishments through adopting the option of armed struggle. From the first “stones” Intifada to the second Al-Aqsa Intifada6, the Israeli army was forced into capitulation – leading to a full and unconditional withdrawal from the Gaza Strip in 2005. At that time, Israel withdrew without negotiations, and without any political, security, or geographical gains. This was to represent the first field victory of its magnitude and significance for the Palestinian resistance, for it was the first Israeli withdrawal within Palestine’s historical borders that was impelled by the power of resistance. Such accomplishment speaks volumes about the course of our conflict with the Zionist entity at the strategic level. The Palestinian people’s superb per-

3 Palestine & The Settlement Negotiations

135

sistence during the Zionist invasion of Gaza in 2008 is a message of steadfastness for future generations and a moral lesson for invaders and aggressors. If such was the outcome of resistance in Lebanon and in Palestine, what were really the benefits of settlement negotiations? What are the results, interests and gains derived from negotiations across all stages and concluded agreements? Is it not further Israeli arrogance and intransigence, additional Israeli gains and interests, and more Israeli conditions? As we affirm our permanent support of the Palestinian people and the Palestinian cause with its historical, geographical and political principles, we hereby declare our unequivocal and firm support of the Palestinian people, of Palestinian resistance movements, and of the struggle in confrontation of the Israeli project. 3.4 Settlement Negotiations Our standpoint towards the settlement process – the path of the Madrid negotiations through to the Wadi ‘Araba Accord and its annexes, all the way to the Oslo Agreement and its annexes, and before them, the Camp David Accord and its annexes – is a standpoint of absolute rejection of the very foundation and principles of the settlement option with the Zionist entity. The settlement option is founded on legitimizing the Zionist entity’s existence and relinquishment of seized Palestine land, an Arab and Islamic land. This is our fixed, permanent and final standpoint towards the negotiation option, one that is not subject to recoil or compromise, even if the entire world recognizes “Israel” as a state. As such, and from a standpoint of brotherhood, responsibility and concern, we call upon Arab leaders to commit themselves to the options of their people, and to reconsider the negotiation option. We call upon them to review the outcomes of those agreements signed with the Zionist enemy, and to abandon once and for all the unjust and falsely labeled, phantom “peace process”. Those who have wagered on successive US administrations as true partners and impartial brokers in the peace process have witnessed firsthand how such administrations have failed them, pressured and extorted them, manifested hostility towards their people, their issues and interests, and sided fully barefaced with the strategic US ally – the Zionist entity. Posing as a peace partner, the Zionist entity has demonstrated throughout all negotiation stages that it neither asks for peace nor seeks it, and that it is employing “negotiations” as a stage to impose its own conditions, strengthen its stance, promote its own interests, break the blade of enmity and the psychological barriers of hostility that the people of the region harbor towards it. The Zionist entity seeks through these negotiations to achieve a free, official and popular wave of normalization, one that would ensure a normal coexistence for it and a 4 The New Manifesto (30 November 2009)

136

natural integration within the regional system. The Zionist entity seeks to establish itself as a fait accompli in the region, an accepted, recognized and legitimate existence, one that enjoys the abandonment of that Palestinian territory which it has manifestly raped. From here, we hope and expect of all Arabs and Muslims at both the official and popular levels to reinstitute Palestine and Jerusalem as a central issue for all, as a root cause for Arab unity. We call upon them to subscribe to the aim of releasing Palestine and purging it from the smear of Zionist occupation, to fulfill their religious duties towards the holy sites of Palestine, and their fraternal and humanitarian commitment towards its oppressed people. We call upon them to make all sources for Palestinian support available in order to strengthen the steadfastness of the Palestinian people and enable them to persist throughout their resistance. We call on them to reject all schemes for normalization with the Zionist enemy, to uphold the right of return of all Palestinian refugees to their lands and homes from which they were expelled, and to unequivocally reject all presented alternatives for Palestinian resettlement, compensation or relocation. We urge them to work immediately towards breaking the siege imposed on the Palestinian people, and particularly the comprehensive blockade on the Gaza Strip, to take up the cause of thousands of prisoners and detainees in Israeli prisons, and to develop plans and practical programs for their freedom.

Epilogue Such are our views and visions. While seeking them, we were ardent in the search of truth and virtue. The standpoints and commitments we have manifested have been drafted with truth and loyalty, for we are believers in righteousness; we speak in its defense and sacrifice in its quest until martyrdom. Throughout, we seek only the contentment of God our Creator, Lord of the heavens and earth, and hope only for the rectitude, well-being, and happiness of our umma (Muslim nation) and people, both in this world and in the Hereafter. God our lord, you know that our deeds were neither conquests for the post of sultan nor a search for benefit amongst the wreckage, but were meant for the revival of virtue, the abolition of falsehood, the defense of your oppressed followers, the upholding of justice on your land and an appeal to your approval and nearness. For this our martyrs have died, and for this we continue to strive. You have promised us one of the two better goals: either victory or the honor of encountering you through martyrdom.7

epilogue

137

Our promise to you Lord and to all of your oppressed servants is that we shall remain men who are true to their covenant, who await your promise, and who stand firm, unswerving.8

4 Nasrallah’s Press Conference: 30 November 2009 (in full)9 Questions & Answers Question: To my surprise, I noted the absence of any mention of or emphasis on Lebanon’s Arab identity in the entire section on Lebanon. As a state or political entity, this was also evident in Hizbullah’s political perception or perspective, the only mention appeared later in the second part. The second political observation I made falls in the same context, in that the manifesto lacks socio-economic programs, an area one would assume many of Hizbullah’s primary Lebanese audience and key sectors expect the party to be ahead and a pioneer in. The poor, the peasants, low-income earners and workers who hardly reach middle-income would assume Hizbullah to lead in a class struggle sense, if we are to use modern terms, to right the injustices. In other words, workers, laborers, poor peasants and the middle class would be anticipating some kind of integrated political program? Answer: First, we do not have any problems in dubbing this insistence as a development and transformation, because people as well as the whole world transformed in the last twenty-four years. The international and regional systems have changed, the situation within Lebanon has also changed, and this is a normal process. Regarding Lebanon’s Arab identity, Mr. Talal (Salman) notes that under the heading of Lebanon we actually included all the points of state, resistance and Arab and Islamic relations. Therefore, I say when we addressed Arab relations in a later part, we did so considering it would be naturally seen as part of the section on Lebanon. The third point is that today, rather than programs, we offer a manifesto in which we express our vision, concepts, outlines and general positions. As for programs, we only covered specifications on the election law but we did not go into detail, because while the manifesto takes into account outlines only, programs are independently announced in due course, as was our experience with the announcement of our electoral platform during the last election. I believe even back then when there was enough space for a wide range of Hizbullah views and ideas to be included under the economic program section 4 The New Manifesto (30 November 2009)

138

of our electoral platform, under the State title we still only spoke about specifications and conditions; for programs we need to reach understandings with our partners in the country. Question: The Manifesto’s reference to the civil rights of the Palestinian refugees in Lebanon in general seems like any political speech made by any Lebanese political force on Lebanese civil rights of Palestinian refugees in Lebanon. Considering Hizbullah’s seventeen years of experience in parliament and in government, of being one way or another inside the decision-making circle, how can we imagine that the party will take a step to transform the motto of giving Palestinian refugees in Lebanon their civil rights into an actual process? Answer: This subject was contained in the ministerial statement of the previous government, but unfortunately prevalent tension in the country at the time prevented anyone from achieving anything at this and most other levels. The priority was focused on finding an exit from the state of tension. The current government which reflects a national coalition, cooperation and unity government has explicitly mentioned this item, and I believe this subject is taken seriously by the prime minister as well as a number of political forces; we too will invest our efforts. Ultimately, this issue depends on follow-up efforts spent in the context of State institutions, the government, and certain aspects are also related to Parliament House work. God willing, we will spend the necessary efforts with the political forces with whom we meet on this objective, within the mentioned constraints, to assure that they maintain their cause and identity. A forbiddance is always presented that giving civil and social rights to Palestinians may lead to their resettlement, and that such an action forms one of only two and no other options: offer civil rights as a lead up to naturalization or keep the Palestinian refugees in their current tragic living situation. We suggest there is a compromise, whereby they can be given civil and social rights that do not lead to naturalization and resettlement, one which preserves their identity and cause. This issue will certainly need following up and effort but definitely more action than talk. Question: On the difference between consensual democracy and a true democracy based on the abolition of political sectarianism, what in your opinion is the way to abolishing political sectarianism without stirring any problems in Lebanon, seeing that the sectarian principle is deeply rooted and infested among a large number of our Lebanese society, a principle they are accustomed to? How can this issue not cause problems again in Lebanon?

4 Nasrallah’s Press Conference: 30 November 2009 (in full)

139

Answer: Let’s be realistic, the abolition of political sectarianism in Lebanon is one of the most difficult issues. Unfortunately, many of those who call for and advocate for the abolition of political sectarianism are not serious about the issue. They only use it as a political slogan to present themselves as civil, openminded and civilized, as opposed to the ancient tribal sectarian system that goes back centuries. As a matter of fact, this is a difficult subject, and it is like skating on thin ice. That is why no one can tell you in a few words how political sectarianism can be abolished without risking conflict. In any case, the invitation speaker Nabih Berri made to form a national body for abolishing political sectarianism provoked some conflict, when this need not have been provoked, because when we call for forming a national body for the abolition of political sectarianism, it means exactly that, the formation of a national committee, not the elimination of sectarianism. This committee or body may continue its dialogue for five, ten, twenty or even thirty years, God knows, because ultimately, no one can just simply describe a method of how to abolish political sectarianism, but we must sit down together and openly share our fears and concerns, assurances and guarantees and then discuss how to realize this abolition. Possibly, after a long debate among representatives of the different Lebanese sects and confessions, the popular political and other diverse forces, in addition to representatives from civil society and the like, we may reach the conclusion that realism necessitates that we accept sectarianism and that any efforts to the contrary would be a complete waste of time; that abolishing political sectarianism in this country is impossible. Upon reaching a conclusion on the issue, the media can then rest easy, political stands and debates on that point would end too and so would the misemployment of useless slogans. We may reach a decision that this item in the Ta‘if Accord cannot be achieved, since political sectarianism cannot be abolished, hence attempt to fix, modify, develop or modernize the existing sectarian system instead, so as not to remain where we are. I think that a natural next step toward this goal would be the formation of a higher national dialogue committee that sits down to calmly discuss this topic without pressure and without haste. This is a basic and vital issue. Question: Ongoing talk about the Lebanese resistance, its role, its support and adopting it as a strategic choice is offset by internal dispute among some Lebanese sides, disputes which prevent the resistance from performing the expected active role described in the political manifesto. How do you find a way out of this?

4 The New Manifesto (30 November 2009)

140

Answer: It is true, there is a point of contention, and we understand this point of difference, regardless of its motives and the truth behind these motives. We do not claim nor have we ever claimed that the resistance in Lebanon receives wide national consensus. On the contrary, I have on some occasions made the claim that throughout history no resistance has ever received unanimous national backing. In history, there was contention round the resistance theme. People stood with it, some against, others neutral or indifferent, but throughout the history of occupations, there were always people who resisted. Some who cooperated with the occupation, others just sat on the fence watching. Even among those who refused the occupation, there are people who resisted politically, while others took up arms in their resistance. This is a natural process, but why do we in Lebanon find it odd that there is contention round this point, when right through history this has been a point of disagreement, and remains so. As long as we understand each other and communicate with each other, there is no problem. Second, I frankly say to you that a national consensus on the resistance is a condition for reaching a perfect situation behind the resistance but not for its existence. Throughout history, people had disputes over the issue of resistance. If a segment of the people took the option to fight the occupiers, they did so without acquiring consensus. Of course, the consensus makes the resistance stronger, better and faster at achieving victory. This is the least confusing of national dilemmas. However, we are not unwilling to get national consensus on the resistance. On the contrary, we are always keen on making efforts to acquire national consensus, because it is a precondition to an absolute resistance situation, as I said. I believe that in the meetings, the dialogue, among the Committee in charge of the ministerial statement, tomorrow when we work together in Cabinet, at the dialogue table, during debates, and in cooperating between the different political forces – we have no enemy in the internal Lebanese arena – we are ready to cooperate with everyone for this government’s success and the achievement of its priorities, in isolation from the reservations expressed by some on the resistance item. This does not necessarily mean we revert back to political lineups and monopolization; hence this is a point we differ on, but there are many points we are in agreement on. So, let us cooperate in what we agree upon and continue dialogue on the differences. Question: By specifying the centrality of the resistance role, function and its defense strategy foundations, have you in a sense already reached a resolve on the defense strategy and therefore there is no point of having the dialogue table?

4 Nasrallah’s Press Conference: 30 November 2009 (in full)

141

Also, does this mean that the decisions of war and peace remain exclusively in the hands of the resistance? Answer: There is nothing new in what I said today on the issue of resistance. The issue of seeking to find a form of cooperation between the national army and the popular Lebanese resistance… Now this form of cooperation requires confirmation, elaboration and discussion, and I have already raised this matter at the dialogue table in the last two sessions before the July war. It is our known vision, and in saying so we are not disclosing a secret; and today the various political forces are putting their visions of a defense strategy at the dialogue table in order to come to a conclusion, which will then be drafted. Of course, the rest asked us to submit our vision in writing after I made a verbal submission of our idea of a defense strategy. We have no problem doing that after we give everyone the chance to share and discuss their own ideas of a defense strategy. Furthermore, the discussions of all the proposed ideas may further develop our position and ideas. But until now experience has been one of cooperation between the resistance and the army governed by a good set of controls. An experience that has proved successful, so much so that we are able to say we can benefit from this experience in order to protect the country and to formulate a defensive strategy; this requires discussion and more details. Regarding the subject of the state having exclusivity to the decisions of peace and war, we have already acknowledged that the state is responsible for the political decision-making in all public affairs. To us this is not a topic of debate. Some say they need to hear us say it, and I am prepared to testify this in front of witnesses (and the whole world can be my witness), we have no problem with that. The problem lies in the absence of the State and its duty. It is not enough to put this responsibility and privilege on the state when it is absent. I ask the State to be present, strong and capable to take the decision, and to the contrary, I am ready to go further than this – if you remember my speech on September 22 after the July war, we were clear that once we have a strong, capable, fair State that is able to protect the country and liberate the land, we would not even need to discuss a defense strategy, because then it is the state that would be protecting the country… the reason why popular resistance came into existence in the first place. Here we say that we concede and acknowledge, even if I consider it a purely theoretical debate, because the decision of war and peace in the region is in the hands of “Israel”, not the Lebanese state, or in the hands of the resistance, nor in the hands of the Arabs or Muslims unfortunately, the ones who take the decisions of war and peace in the region are only America and “Israel”.

4 The New Manifesto (30 November 2009)

142

Question: In 1985, you spoke about a single wise leadership, the Supreme Leader or (al-waliyy al- faqih) the jurisprudent, today you are speaking about a transformation in the party, how will you harmonize between state-building and your commitment to this leadership, and has Hizbullah become a full Lebanese party? You also talked about building state institutions; does this mean Hizbullah has abandoned recourse to arms and the theory of arms to defend the resistance’s weapons in any circumstance? Answer: First: here we have provided a political document but have not dealt with aspects of belief, ideology, or intellectual culture. I like to be clear that our position on the question of al-waliyy al-faqih is an intellectual, ideological and religious one and not a political position subject to review. Second: To ask the question, how do we combine the two, our allegiance to the faqih and engagement in political life of Lebanon and the building of State institutions, the answer to that is simple, proof of the possibility of something occurring is its occurrence. We have been engaged in Parliament through an effective parliamentary bloc, we have participated in parliamentary elections in the years 1992, 1996, 2000, 2005 and also the recent elections. We participated in successive governments through ministers who were present and active, we also joined the 2005 Lebanese government, but political conditions and tensions in the country prevented us and the entire Cabinet from making any real achievements. Having said that proves in our opinion that there is no contradiction between our understanding of our commitment to the Jurisprudent and our sense of engagement in political life and participation as a Lebanese society segment, of some weight I might add, in the building of State institutions as presented earlier. On the second part of the question, you are actually restarting a dispute all over again. Anyway, in the negotiation sidelines on forming a national unity government, this subject was well covered in debates with a number of political forces, Prime Minister Shaykh Sa‘d al-Hariri at their forefront, and everyone feels the results are reassuring enough that there is no need to raise issues or questions of this nature. Question: After Hizbullah acted as the protector of Lebanon through creating a deterrent force against “Israel”, and since you did not mention that Hizbullah’s weapons will be used to help the Palestinians liberate Palestine, can you say that the armed resistance or defense formula has dropped down to secondary position behind the project of building a reassured State?

4 Nasrallah’s Press Conference: 30 November 2009 (in full)

143

In this context, particularly regarding the strengthening and support of the Lebanese army, we see President Suleiman making several visits to the US for the purpose of rallying support for the Lebanese Armed Forces. Are there any blocs within the new Cabinet that encourage aid from countries other than the US, including the Islamic Republic of Iran, especially since we heard this mentioned by several leaders, particularly Minister Walid Jumblatt? Answer: No, the document is clear that the resistance remains the essential task, and I do not think we pushed it down to second place, it remains a first level priority and still exists within us, but we can say we have raised the subject of contribution in the national project of State-building to first level as well. Because the most important conditions of state-building is institution building, founded on a bedrock of peace, stability and security, which come from having a secure, strong and immune homeland capable of facing constant “Israeli” threats. This is why I believe the real and effective presence of the resistance is one of the most important conditions to enable the Lebanese to build the state of their choice. On arming the LAF, we consider any attempt to arm the LAF a good endeavor, and have no “Vetoes” or problems in this regard. As a result of the US administration’s conduct and performance, our position towards it is clear in that we do not have enmity against the US as such, but we do have a purely topical animosity in this regard. We do not have problems with the US if it decides to arm the LAF to a level making it capable of providing defense for the country. Yet I believe the US and its allies in the world have not and will not arm the LAF to defend Lebanon. But that should not deter efforts in that regard. We have no objection if the government tries asking other countries to arm the LAF, and we offer assistance in this regard during the elections. The Islamic Republic of Iran is open to offering such assistance and so are Syria and some other Arab countries. Arming the LAF does not require miracles, only investments, mainly on the intellectual level, and the level of will, determination, military doctrine and military fighting school according to the Lebanese defense strategy we adopt. Thus arming the Lebanese army and rendering it able to defend the homeland becomes possible in my opinion so long as we do not insist on our enemy to equip and strengthen our armed forces, which they will never do. Question: A new Lebanese Cabinet will win a confidence vote in about a week, made up of both pro-government and opposition camps, whereas up until now the opposition within the government has not been Hizbullah and its allies, but a basic team of March 14 Christians, i.e. pro-government! 4 The New Manifesto (30 November 2009)

144

Is there a coup or a change in roles? Will the Lebanese arena witness new political alliances in the future? Answer: I think it is too early to say for certain that things are going in this direction, in any case, we in the allied political forces in the opposition are now represented in government through our Ministers, and we have declared that our presence in government would not be on the basis of opposition and progovernment, but rather our ministers will be in their ministries serving all the Lebanese people. We have also declared our keenness to be over and done with barricades, to work as one team instead, and we insist on this approach. I imagine coalitions and political lineups may continue outside the Cabinet, which is natural, but inside it we may witness different opinions, varying ideas and stands. We may see members from opposition and pro-government share similar views and vote orientations, while members of the same camps may differ on certain topics or issues. This allows for subjectivity in handling different files within the Cabinet, which helps serve higher national interests, rather than give priority to the interests of our own political alliances, parties or religious sects. I believe this is the logic of the coming period. Question: 1). It was said you expressed satisfaction with PM Hariri’s position, but how do you view the statements made by some members of his parliamentary bloc against the resistance, and that having the resistance listed in the Ministerial Statement actually contravenes Resolution 1701? 2). Where is Hizbullah heading in its relationship with the Progressive Socialist Party (PSP) and the Future Movement? Another point is that you did mention national consensus, yet we hear talk of the party having lost popular legitimacy after the recent parliamentary elections despite it being listed in the Ministerial Statement. The question is what do you say to those who claim the resistance has lost its popular legitimacy? Answer: Regarding statements made by some brothers in the Future parliamentary bloc, well, they have the right to express their views, and we respect these opinions whether we agree with them or not, but we consider the stand of their bloc’s official head – PM Hariri himself – to represent the bloc’s official stand, seeing his government will receive a vote of confidence based on this Ministerial Statement. That is why I think such talk does not form a problem. Of course one would expect a unified stand and voice among their different bloc members, this is an issue they have, and God willing they will resolve it.

4 Nasrallah’s Press Conference: 30 November 2009 (in full)

145

There are no limits to where Hizbullah’s relationship with PSP and Future Movement will go. We are keen to have no limits on our relations with all Lebanese political forces, as long as they serve national cohesion, stability and peaceful coexistence, not only shared living but unified living, to serve the goals set forth in the manifesto, most of which receive Lebanese unanimity. And as long as we are meeting, communicating and discussing common goals, we have no objection to any internal relationship. I believe relationships develop over time, we may differ with some sides, but what unifies us now is what separated us in the past, and since the cause of our separation expired, there are no more reasons not to meet on whatever serves higher national interests. Regarding talk about the resistance having lost its popular legitimacy, such talk is completely baseless. If reference is being made here to the election results, everyone in Lebanon and outside it knows they are subject to a sectarian confessional electoral law, and that parliamentary majority does not necessarily express popular majority as it may or may not reflect it. Higher share of total votes favored the opposition during the last elections, although I believe that large segments which voted pro-government actually also supported the resistance, and therefore, I do not believe we can judge the popularity of the resistance based on parliamentary election results driven by current laws and the circumstances at the time. Question: The Lebanese constitution considers Lebanon a finite homeland for all its citizens, with regard to the manifesto you just read, you refuse any division of Lebanon or its federalization, but you do not clearly express Hizbullah’s doctrinal or cultural stand in relation to joining or merging Lebanon with its Arab or Islamic surroundings, bearing in mind that this has been a concern among many of the Lebanese parties since Lebanon’s independence. Does the party have a clear stand on this point? The second question relates to the defense strategy. You did mention in the manifesto that the strategy must stand on a combination between the popular resistance and an army that protects Lebanon. Is this not a retreat from the previous party position that the resistance is staying until the rise of a strong, capable and fair State? This stand hints that the resistance will stay regardless if we have a strong army capable of defending Lebanon or not? The last question relates to your previous talk on drug dealers. In the past, the party called on the government to review cases and arrest warrants against drug dealers, traffickers and the like, to take into account a compounding humanitarian situation in specific areas of Lebanon, yet recently

4 The New Manifesto (30 November 2009)

146

you portrayed a tougher stand by which the party called for tough sentences against traffickers! Why this change of position on this matter? Answer: We have been clear that we consider Lebanon our country. On the debate about whether Lebanon is a finite country or not, I would like to say that this country is a blessing in light of its variety and geography and the many great historic accomplishments it has made. As for having to announce it as a finite homeland, His Eminence Sayyid Musa al-Sadr was very clear on the subject, and he used to speak on behalf of this entire path, when he considered Lebanon a finite homeland. But anyone may say it is finite only to abandon this view at a later moment, hence such slogans do not offer reassurance to the people as much as our unanimity, accord and consensus do in matters that govern our country. Incidentally, all national, pan-Arab and Islamic movements have their own visions of the Arab or Islamic nation, and the subject of “Sykes-Picot”10 division plan of the Arab and Islamic world into smaller entities. We believe an Arab union of these smaller entities under an agreement which preserves the independence of all countries and respects each nation’s thoughts and ideologies can bring about an added group strength, this way individuals not only can continue to dream up and talk of an Arab or Islamic nation, but even see global earth as one nation home. If we are to take events and facts into account, we find this to be the ideal formula. Naturally, there are other Islamic movements with their own strict views on the subject, but there is no problem with having differences. As for pairing between the Resistance and the LAF, I did say that as long as there is an imbalance in strength and an absence of the strong capable state, this pairing would be essential, but if the strong and capable state is established, such a formula would become redundant and no longer necessary, because then the State would assume the full responsibility of defending the country. On the arrest warrants I mentioned during the electoral campaigns, I spoke about the general situation of the arrest warrants in the Biqa‘ area, and not only pertaining to drugs. I want to bring to attention that there are thirty thousand arrest warrants against people in the Biqa‘, a part of them are related to building without permit, infringements, errors in land divisions, etc… The 30,000 warrants are not all for drugs, drug cultivation and trafficking. During election times we did not ask for an amnesty or a pardon, but we asked for forming a legal, parliamentary, ministerial or justice and rights committee, to meet and look into these warrants, some of which date back twenty or thirty years.

4 Nasrallah’s Press Conference: 30 November 2009 (in full)

147

Some citizens have been reformed and have not committed any violations for thirty years, yet there are arrest warrants still out against them. Arrest warrants for matters that may be disregarded for being trivial or because the issue has lingered need reconsideration, however major cases such as murder should not be disregarded. Drug cases are sensitive, and we consider drug trafficking as murder since drugs kill the mental state and stability of our youth. I call for being firm with drug dealers as they are killing a whole society’s culture, spirit and morals, its security and integrity of spiritual, psychological, mental aspects, and therefore its peace and stability. Therefore, I go back and reiterate the call to continue to be tough with all the pushers and drug dealers. Question: In the manifesto a section is connected with inter-Arab, LebaneseArab or resistance-Arab relations, how can benefit be derived from the resistance status of approvability among certain sides and countries, in resolving some inter-Arab or internal Arab conflicts? Here I ask what happened to the appeal you made to the Yemeni President ‘Ali Abdullah Saleh regarding their internal war. Did your efforts produce any results? What are your views on the Saudi intervention in the Yemen war and its targeting of civilians? Answer: As I said in the manifesto, we have no objection, and we are keen to see the Arab nation, governments and peoples, the other resistance and political forces benefit from the resistance’s accomplishments and triumphs. Among the advantages is that the resistance began to enjoy a status which we employ wherever it can bring unity and uniformity, sometimes we do so away from media spotlights to avoid causing official, political and media embarrassment to others. On the Yemen subject, we had a position and sent out appeals on more than one occasion, but in fact we did not offer mediation, because of the complexity of the situation in Yemen and our estimation that our mediation might be counterproductive, as was the case with certain other political currents, such as the Sadrist movement under the leadership of His Eminence Sayyid Muqtada al-Sadr. They contacted the Yemeni embassy and offered a delegation from the Sadrist movement to act as mediators between the disputing sides in Yemen, but President ‘Ali Abdallah Saleh described the offer to mediation as evidence that the Sadrist movement is linked to the Huthis, even though it does not form any evidence. Here, I am describing things as they are… at a time when we read in some newspapers especially Arabic ones, that Hizbullah finances, trains and arms the 4 The New Manifesto (30 November 2009)

148

Huthis, other newspapers went as far as saying Hizbullah is even fighting in Yemen and leading battles there… I read a report in one Arabic newspaper a few days ago that calls for a complete laugh, which in brief claims “Hizbullah lost fifty martyrs in Yemen” and that “Hizbullah is trying to find a way to hide this fact and is having difficulty burying its dead!” How can we hide burying our dead?! When we may be one of the very few resistance movements in the world that announces its martyrs and is proud to announce its martyrs, the one resistance movement that is transparent on the subject, one that is concerned with providing detailed reports to the families of the martyrs about the place of their son’s martyrdom, because this human being has a certain sanctity to him. When we get to this level of being accused of supporting, backing, arming, training and leadership of operations to the extent of participation and the fall of martyrs from the party, you expect me to go and introduce mediation in Yemen after such accusations! There are people who do not have any evidence but still want to plunge Hizbullah in this conflict, so they come and tell us that the Huthi fighters are benefitting from Hizbullah fighting tactics. It is not our fault that the resistance in Lebanon has come up with a military fighting school others can benefit from in Yemen, in Latin America, even the “Israelis” may learn and benefit from it, this is not a condemnation to us, but a condemnation to all those who do not benefit from our fighting school to liberate their land and restore the holy places, for example. We called for fighting to be stopped in Yemen, and now I renew this call. In the Manifesto we talked about the school that will reduce conflict, increase communication and encircle disputes, we are not advocates of conflict-widening but advocates of hostility cessation, both within Yemen, between Yemen and Saudi Arabia or Huthis in Yemen; we call on everyone to cooperate and make every effort to stop this bleeding in which everyone loses. And let no one fuel the fire. This is our position, however I would still like to make an announcement and say: If anyone believes we can do something in Yemen, we would consider it our obligation and would take action on whatever level might be necessary, but the given premises, data and circumstances of the matter and its complexity have not brought us as Hizbullah to reach such a conclusion.

4 Nasrallah’s Press Conference: 30 November 2009 (in full)

149

Chronology of Events (1975-2010)

1975

13 April witnessed the beginning of the 16-year Lebanese civil war.

1976

In response to an official request by the Lebanese government, on 20 July, the Syrian army entered Lebanon as a contingent to the Quwwat Al-Rad‘ Al‘Arabiyya (Arab Deterrent Forces) in order to help the Lebanese government enforce law and order in the civil-war-torn Lebanon.

1978

Hizbullah came into being in 1978 when Sayyid Abbas al-Musawi, one of its primary founders and its second secretary general, came back from Najaf to Lebanon and in the Biqa‘ established the religious and ideological foundations of the party, along with other Lebanese and Iranian clergy and cadres. Sayyid Abbas established religious seminaries (hawzas) and started his Islamic propagation or call (da‘wa), in B‘albak, in the Biqa‘. This also coincided with the arrival of dissident Iranian clergy and military personnel (most notably Ali Akbar Muhtashami and Mustafa Shamran), who established religious and military training centers with substantial material and spiritual backing from Imam Khumayni who was himself banished in Najaf for a period of thirteen years. On 14 March Israel launched “Operation Litani” by invading Lebanon and eventually occupying a 500 square kilometer “Security Zone”, which included 61 cities and villages. On 19 March, the UNSC issued resolution 425 calling for the unconditional withdrawal of the Israeli forces from Lebanon, a resolution that fell on deaf ears. In order to help restore the Lebanese state’s sovereignty, the UN 151

established the UNIFIL, a 5,000 interim peacekeeping force, which was sent to Lebanon as of 23 March.1 However, Israel did not allow the UNIFIL to deploy all the way to the border. On 31 August, Imam Musa al-Sadr, the leader of the Lebanese Shi‘a community and the head of the Islamic Shi‘ite Higher Council, disappeared in Libya under mysterious circumstances. All of these factors were conducive to the emergence of Hizbullah’s rudimentary foundations that crystallized in the birth of its religious ideology.

1979

On 1 February, Imam Khumayni landed in Tehran, thus ushering in the victory of the Islamic Revolution in Iran on 11 February. Many Lebanese Shi‘ites were inspired by Imam Khumayni’s revolutionary ideology, which led them to actively mobilize and struggle for a more active role in the Lebanese political system. Thus, after the victory of the Islamic Revolution, Sayyid Abbas AlMusawi, together with his students and other leading ‘ulama, officially founded “The Hizbullah of Lebanon”.

1982 At a time when the Arabs and the international community were preoccupied with the Iraq-Iran war, on 6 June Israel invaded Lebanon for a second time through its “Peace for Galilee” operation. From 8 to 13 June, the Khaldé battle (which was spearheaded by many of Hizbullah’s founding cadres, many of whom were wounded) heralded the initiation of Hizbullah’s military wing, the “Islamic Resistance”. Khaldé, a small town near Beirut, was the only location where the Israeli invasion was temporarily halted because of the stiff resistance it met, a resistance that resulted in heavy Israeli casualties (16 dead and 176 wounded) and led the Israelis to change their military strategy and tactics. As early as July, the political framework of Hizbullah was embarked upon, a task that passed through different stages, most notably in 1984-85. On 23 August, Bashir Jumayyel, the head of the Phalangist Christian militia, was elected president. On 21 August, the Multi-National Forces, made up of contingents of US, French, UK, and Italian forces, landed in Beirut in order to supervise the implementation of the agreement between the PLO and Israel. The agreement dictated the withdrawal of PLO fighters, cadres, and leaders from Beirut, including Yasser Arafat who left Beirut on 30 August. In Tyre, in south Lebanon, on 31 August during the fourth anniversary of the disappearance of Imam Musa al-Sadr, a massive popular uprising, in the hundreds of thousands, paid allegiance to al-Sadr, avowing that Israel would remain the enemy, shouting: “Israel is the absolute evil, and dealings with it are

Chronology of Events (1975-2010)

152

religiously prohibited (haram)”. This event culminated in violent confrontations with the Israeli forces in Jibshit, in south Lebanon. On 3 September, PLO fighters left Beirut, thus ending a military presence that had lasted for decades. After 83 days of besieging it, the Israeli army entered Beirut on 14 September in the wake of the assassination of president-elect Bashir Jumayyel by a car bomb. 15-17 September witnessed the massacres of the Palestinian civilians in the Sabra and Shatila refugee camps. On 23 September, Amin Jumayyel, Bashir’s brother, was elected as president of the Lebanese Republic. On 28 September, the Israeli army withdrew from Beirut. On 11 November Ahmad Qasir, Hizbullah’s first suicide bomber (“martyr”), detonated his car in the Israeli headquarters in Tyre killing around 76 soldiers and military personnel and wounding 20. Thus, the military birth of Hizbullah, as an Islamic jihadi (resistance/struggle) movement, was a direct result of the Israeli invasion – in which Israel killed around 20,000 people (mostly Lebanese and Palestinian civilians, but also some Lebanese, Palestinian, and Syrian fighters) as well as occupied almost one-third of Lebanon (3,560 square kilometres) including 801 cities and villages.

1983 January witnessed the first massive launch of Katyusha rockets at Israel’s northern settlements as well as the capture of the first Israeli soldier by the Islamic Resistance. The Israeli soldier died from wounds suffered during his abduction, and his body was left behind. In March Shaykh Raghib Harb, the leader of the popular uprising in the south, was captured by Israeli forces. On 13 April, Hizbullah conducted its second martyrdom operation when ‘Ali Safiyyeddine detonated his car in an Israeli convoy in Dayr Qanun al-Nahr killing 6 soldiers and wounding 4 others. On 18 April the US Embassy in West Beirut was targeted by a suicidal attack resulting in the death of 63 people, of whom 17 were Americans, including the entire Middle East contingent of the CIA. On 17 May, Israel and the Lebanese government signed a peace agreement. In July Israel withdrew from Mount Lebanon to the Awwali River, near Sidon, in the south. October witnessed the ‘Ashura uprising in Nabatiyyé, in the south, in response to Israeli’s defilement of the ritual. On 14 October Hizbullah conducted its third martyrdom operation when Ja‘far Al-Tayyar blew himself up in Tyre in a UNRWA building housing Israeli soldiers, killing 29 soldiers, as acknowledged by Israeli sources. 1983

153

On 23 October the “Islamic Jihad” committed twin suicidal attacks against the Marine’s barracks and the French paratroopers, which resulted in the death of 241 American and 58 French soldiers. It is worth mentioning that Hizbullah put a lid on an aborted double suicidal operation when the car of the two suicide bombers got blown up prematurely on its way to Tyre. In November the Israeli air force started targeting Hizbullah’s training bases in the Biqa‘. On 23 November the Israelis released 4,500 Lebanese and Palestinian detainees from the Ansar detention camp (in southern Lebanon) and 63 other Palestinians in exchange for the release of one Israeli pilot and six soldiers.

1984

Hizbullah’s Shura Council, or main decision-making body, passed through different stages from 9 members to 5 and finally settled on 7 as of 1984. Hizbullah released several political declarations bearing its name and established its politburo. In March the Lebanese parliament abrogated the 17 May 1983 agreement with Israel. On 18 June Hizbullah’s mouthpiece and weekly newspaper al-‘Ahd first appeared. On 16 February Saykh Raghib Harb, Hizbullah’s most influential resistance leader in the south, was assassinated by Israeli forces. On 20 September the US Embassy in East Beirut was targeted by a suicide operation.

1985

On 16 February Hizbullah published its “Open Letter” or Political Manifesto, ushering the birth of its political ideology. The Open Letter officially announced the establishment of Hizbullah, and its military wing, the Islamic Resistance. The Open Letter was read by Sayyid Ibrahim Amin Al-Sayyid, its spokesman at that time. In February Israel withdrew from Sidon. In March Israel blew up the Husayniyya (religious gathering place) of Ma‘raké and assassinated two leading Hizbullah cadres. In April Israel withdrew from Nabatiyyé and Tyre. The Jalil Operation on 20 May between the General Command of the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP) and the Israeli government resulted in the release of 1,150 Lebanese and Palestinian detainees from the Atlit detention camp in Israel, in exchange for three Israeli soldiers. In June the Israeli Army announced that it had finalized its withdrawal and established an 1100 square kilometer “Security Zone”, which included 168 cities and villages. The “Security Zone” comprised around 15% of Lebanese territory

Chronology of Events (1975-2010)

154

along Lebanon’s southern border with Israel, which is reminiscent of the 1978 invasion that aimed at creating a similar security arrangement in order to protect the northern Israeli settlements from missile attacks across the Lebanese border.

1986 On 16 February the Islamic Resistance captured two Israeli soldiers in an operation in the Kunin area of Bint Jubayl. Israel launched a limited incursion into 17 villages for six consecutive days in order to retrieve the two soldiers, but to no avail. The Islamic Resistance waged a relentless war against the SLA posts, aiming at occupying them and destroying them, killing and detaining all members, then blowing up the entire post. In October an Israeli jet fighter was downed, and Ron Arad, the assistant pilot, was captured. Hizbullah standardized the practice of videotaping military operations against Israeli forces in order to convey the exact number of Israeli dead and wounded to the Israeli public, thus belying Israeli claims of low casualties. 1987 On 15 June, the Lebanese government issued the official double annulment of the 17 May 1983 Agreement and the 3 November 1969 Cairo Agreement. Nasrallah assumed the newly established “chief executive officer” post, in addition to being a member of the Consultative Council, which is Hizbullah’s highest leading panel. This year witnessed the reinvigoration of the war of attrition against SLA posts in an unprecedented manner. December marked the beginning of the first Palestinian “stones” Intifada (popular uprising). 1988

The first major military encounter and direct confrontation took place between the Islamic Resistance and the Israeli Army in an Israeli attack on Maydun, in the Western Biqa‘. On 11 March Hizbullah conducted its fifth martyrdom operation when ‘Amer Kalakish blew himself up in an Israeli convoy near the Mtulé settlement at the Lebanese border killing 12 Israeli soldiers and wounding 14 others. The Amal-Hizbullah control war – secular Shi‘ites against Islamist Shi‘ites – started on 5 April in the south and spread to the Dahiya on 6 May, which led to the ousting of Amal fighters from the Dahiya. This control war ended more than two years later in November 1990. The Consultative Center for Studies and Documentation (CCSD), Hizbullah’s think tank, was founded. 1986

155

On 9 May Hizbullah’s al-Nour radio station started broadcasting. On 19 August Hizbullah conducted its sixth martyrdom operation when Haytham Dbuq blew himself up in an Israeli convoy on the Marji‘yun road, killing one Israeli soldier and wounding three others, according to Israeli military sources. The seventh operation occurred on 19 October when Abdallah ‘Atwi blew himself up near the Fatima Gate on the border between Lebanon and Israel, killing eight soldiers and wounding another eight, as acknowledged by Israeli sources. The tenure of the then Lebanese President Amin Jumayyel ended without the Lebanese parliament electing a successor. (It is worth mentioning that Jumayyel was “voluntarily” banished to France from 1988 till 2000.) So, on 23 September 1988, Jumayyel appointed General Michel ‘Aun, the Lebanese Army Commander, to head a military government composed of three Christians and two Muslims. Deeming the appointment unconstitutional, Muslim spiritual leaders met and issued a fatwa banning any Muslim from participating in the military government. So General ‘Aun virtually ruled the Christian areas in East Beirut and Mount Lebanon, while the rest of the country was under the mandate of prime minister Salim Al-Hoss, who formed a second government in West Beirut. Thus, at that time, Lebanon had two governments, a situation that lasted for almost two years.

1989

Hizbullah held its first conclave and revealed the identity of its leaders and cadres. The conclave resulted in the creation of the post of the secretary-general and the election of Shaykh Subhi al-Tufayli as Hizbullah’s first secretary-general. On 28 July the Israeli army abducted Shaykh Abd al-Karim ‘Ubayd, a leading Hizbullah cadre, from his hometown, Jibshit. In an attempt to drive the Syrian Army out of Lebanon, on 14 March, General Michel ‘Aun, waged a “Liberation War” against the Syrian forces who had been present in Lebanon since 1976. On 9 August Hizbullah conducted its eighth martyrdom operation when Shaykh As‘ad Birru blew himself up in an Israeli convoy across the Marji‘un road killing five soldiers and wounding five others, according to Israeli military sources. The Ta’if Agreement, a “bill of rights” or a blueprint for national reconciliation and reform aimed at a more equitable political system for all sectarianconfessional groups, was drafted and ratified between 30 September and 22 October in Ta’if, Saudi Arabia. On Saturday, 22 October at 10:45 pm, it was officially announced, from the Palace of Conventions at Ta’if, that the civil war was ended. ‘Aun issued a decree dissolving the parliament, but it fell on deaf ears.



Chronology of Events (1975-2010)

156

1990

The proposed changes in the Ta’if Agreement were officially written into the Constitution in August and September 1990. The final document is known as “The Constitution of Lebanon after the Amendments of 21 August”. 13 October witnessed the actual ending of the 16-year civil war through the ousting of General Michel ‘Aun and banishing him to France. On 9 November the two and a half year Amal-Hizbullah war ended in a final accord negotiated between the warning factions through intensive Syrian and Iranian pressure.

1991 In line with the Ta’if Agreement, in March the Lebanese government officially declared the dissolution of the militias. The end of April was set as a deadline for the militias to hand in their heavy weapons and to close their military and training centers. Hizbullah was a notable exception, and to a lesser extent Amal. Starting on 22 May, Hizbullah held its second conclave and elected Sayyid ‘Abbas Al-Musawi as its second secretary-general. Unlike the first conclave in which the seven members of the Shura Council were nominated, in the second conclave they were elected. On 3 June Hizbullah’s al-Manar TV station was created. The first swap operation between Hizbullah and Israel, which was mediated by the UN2, took place in three installments, between 11 September and 1 December. Israel released 91 Lebanese detainees (one from an Israeli prison and 90 from the Khyam detention camp, including ten women), and the remains of nine fighters, in exchange for information about two Israeli soldiers who were detained by Hizbullah on 16 February 1986. 1992

16 February witnessed the assassination of Sayyid Abbas al-Musawi, his wife, and his son, by an Israeli helicopter. Two days later, Sayyid Hasan Nasrallah, Hizbullah’s third secretary-general, was elected as well as Shaykh Na‘im Qasim as deputy secretary-general. Both Nasrallah and Qasim retain their posts to the present day. Israel attacked the two villages of Kafra and Yatir, an act that was met with forceful resistance from Hizbullah fighters. Hizbullah started employing the Katyusha weapon as a deterrent strategy to protect Lebanese civilians from Israeli aggressions. Hizbullah launched its political program as a distinct manifestation (or extension) of its political ideology. Hizbullah participated in the first parliamentary elections, which had been frozen for a period of twenty years due to the Lebanese civil war. The Party won 1990

157

all of the twelve seats on its election list: eight were reserved for party members, and four for affiliated sympathizers: two for Sunnis and two for Christians (a Greek Catholic and a Maronite): ‘Ali Ammar, Ibrahim Bayan (Sunni), Muhammad Berjawi, Muhammad Fnaysh, Munir al-Hujayyri (Sunni), Rabi‘a Kayruz (Maronite), Muhammad Ra‘d, Sa‘ud Rufayyel (Greek Catholic), Sayyid Ibrahim Amin Al-Sayyid, ‘Ali Taha, Khudr Tlays, Muhammad Yaghi. On 21 September Ibrahim Dahir conducted Hizbullah’s ninth martyrdom operation when he targeted an Israeli convoy on the Jarmaq road, killing and wounding 25, according to Hizbullah.

1993 During its third conclave, Hizbullah re-elected Sayyid Hasan Nasrallah as its secretary-general, and Shaykh Na‘im Qasim as deputy secretary-general. It is important to note that the Islamic Resistance was rewarded by electing Hizbullah’s “Central Military Commander”, Hajj Muhsin Al-Shakar, as one of the seven-member Shura Council. 23-31 July: “The seven-day war” or the Israeli “Operation Accountability” erupted as a direct result of the Islamic Resistance’s killing of seven Israeli soldiers. “The seven-day war” led to the death of 130 people, mostly Lebanese civilians, and it displaced around 300,000. “Operation Accountability” resulted in an unwritten agreement between Hizbullah and Israel to sideline the civilians on both sides of the border. (Italics added for emphasis.) On 13 September, when Hizbullah was protesting peacefully against the Oslo Agreement, the Lebanese Army and ISF (Police) killed thirteen Hizbullah supporters – including two women – and wounded 40 because they took to the streets when the Hariri government imposed a ban on demonstrations. 1994

21 April: the Lebanese state jailed Samir Geagea, the leader of the right-wing Christian Lebanese Forces (LF), and banned the LF. In October the Islamic Resistance stormed the Israeli post of Dabshé. Hizbullah exploited the camera as a primary weapon in its psychological warfare against Israel by airing, through its al-Manar TV, details of the operation and the Israeli casualties. On 31 May an Israeli commandos unit abducted Hajj Mustafa al-Dirani, an Islamic Amal leading cadre, from his hometown, Qsarnaba, in the Biqa‘.

1995 On 17 May Imam Khamina’i appointed Sayyid Hasan Nasrallah, Hizbullah’s secretary-general, and Shaykh Muhammad Yazbik, Hizbullah’s Shura Council member, as his religious deputies (wakilayn shar‘iyyan) in Lebanon “in the

Chronology of Events (1975-2010)

158

hisbi3 domain and shar‘i issues, taking over from him the religious duties and disposing them to the benefit of the Muslims; warding off oppression and injustice; conducting shar‘i reconciliations for the khums4 people; and appointing their own deputies”.5 On 25 April Salah Ghandur conducted Hizbullah’s tenth martyrdom operation when he blew himself up at an SLA post in Bint Jubayl, wounding eleven, according to Israeli military sources. Hizbullah’s fourth conclave was held in July. The secretary-general and his deputy were re-elected. Some of the basic organizational changes that Hizbullah made were the following: 1) The Politburo was renamed as the “Political Council” and its jurisdiction was enlarged; 2) The creation of the “Jihadi Council”, headed by Sayyid Hashim Safiyyeddine, the only new member of the Shura Council; 3) The “Executive Council” replaced the “Executive Shura” with, more or less, the same jurisdictions; 4) In order to evaluate Hizbullah’s experience in the parliament, the party formed a new body called the “Parliamentary Bloc Council”.

1996

On 20 March ‘Ali Ashmar conducted Hizbullah’s eleventh martyrdom operation in the Town of Rub Thalathin in al-‘Daysé, killing two according to Israeli military sources. From 11-18 April, the Israeli military operation of the “Grapes of Wrath” ended with the Qana massacre, where more than 100 Lebanese civilians, seeking shelter in a UN complex, were killed by Israeli shelling. The Israeli aggression resulted in what became known as the “April 1996 Understanding/Agreement” that protected both Israeli and Lebanese civilians from military operations. The UN, France, Syria, and the US mediated the 26 April written Agreement between Israel and Hizbullah, which established the “Monitoring Group for the Understandings of Operation Grapes of Wrath”. The “Grapes of Wrath” led to the death of more than 150 Lebanese civilians and displaced around half a million others. (Italics added for emphasis.) In the parliamentary elections Hizbullah managed to keep ten seats: seven were occupied by party members; two by Sunnis and one by a Maronite Christian, non-party members. Only the head of Hizbullah’s Parliamentary Bloc was a clergyman, Sayyid Ibrahim Amin al-Sayyid. Here is a list of the names with (O) and (N) beside the names to denote old [i.e. previously elected] and new, respectively: Abdallah Qasir (N), Ammar al-Musawi (N), Nazih Mansur (N), Husayn al-Hajj Hasan (N), Ibrahim Bayan, Sunni (O), Muhammad Fnaysh (O), Isma‘il Sukariyyé, Sunni (N), Rabi‘a Kayruz, Maronite (O), Muhammad Ra‘d (O), Sayyid Ibrahim Amin Al-Sayyid (O).

1996

159

Under German sponsorship, on 21 July Hizbullah exchanged the bodies of two Israeli soldiers (kidnapped on 16 February 1986) and 17 SLA collaborators for 45 Lebanese detainees and 123 remains.

1997

In February, while attempting to avoid being spotted by Hizbullah, 73 Israeli soldiers were killed on board of two helicopters, which collided into each other while they were on a mission aimed at deploying troops in south Lebanon. On 7 April a swap operation between Hizbullah and Israel resulted in the exchange of three Lebanese detainees for the body of a dead SLA sergeant. Conflict between Hizbullah’s identity and the Lebanese state sovereignty: on 4 May, Shaykh Subhi al-Tufayli founded the “Revolution of the Hungry”, and on 4 July he called for civil disobedience against the Lebanese government, which culminated in blocking roads on 26 October. On 5 September the Israeli operation of al-Ansariyyé resulted in the death of twelve high-ranking officials of an elite Israeli military commando while not a single member of the resistance was injured. On 12 September, Sayyid Hadi Nasrallah, Sayyid Hasan Nasrallah’s son, died in a confrontation with the Israeli soldiers in southern Lebanon. On 3 November, Hizbullah formed Al-Sarayah Al-Lubnaniyya Li-Muqawamat Al-Ihtilal Al-Israeli or the Multi-confessional Lebanese Brigades to fight Israel (Lebanonization of the resistance).

1998 Shaykh Subhi al-Tufayli was officially expelled from Hizbullah by a political declaration issued on 24 January. On 30 January a violent military confrontation erupted between the Lebanese army and al-Tufayli’s supporters, who occupied Hizbullah’s religious seminary in ‘Ayn Burday, near B‘albak, by military force. The bloody face-off ended with the destruction of Tufayli’s headquarters and the Lebanese state’s issuing of an arrest warrant against him. However, to this day, Tufayli is still at large. After solving the internal discord problem, Hizbullah held its fifth conclave between 20 June and the end of July. Nasrallah was elected for a third term. For this move to be made, Hizbullah had to amend its internal bylaws by deleting the stipulation that the secretary-general cannot serve for more than two consecutive terms. The May-June 1998 municipal elections – that reflect true populace representation and which had not been carried out since 1963 – were carried out only after pressure and lobbying from Hizbullah. The Lebanese government used the pretext of lack of financial and technical resources and manpower, but Hizbullah insisted on the reactivation of the elections. Eventually, Hizbullah won a landslide victory in its main constituencies (with the exception of the B‘albak

Chronology of Events (1975-2010)

160

district), including electoral districts that were supported by the Lebanese government and its candidates. On 26 June, by mediation of the Lebanese government, the remains of an Israeli soldier, who died during the Ansariyyé battle of September 1997, were exchanged for 60 detainees (10 of whom were detained in Israel) and the remains of 40 Lebanese resistance fighters, including Hadi Nasrallah. On 13 September Israel released Suha Bshara (who ten years ago attempted to take the life of the SLA leader, Antoine Lahd) after ten years of imprisonment and torture at the notorious Khyam prison. In September 1998 Hizbullah overtly acknowledged that it does not consider the Open Letter as a primary authoritative frame of reference anymore (la ya‘tamiduha masdaran asasiyyan min adabiyatihi)7, which conveys more and more Hizbullah’s Lebanonization and infitah policy.

1999

On 28 February the Islamic Resistance blew up the convoy of Erez Gerstein, the Israeli brigadier-general in Lebanon, which resulted in his immediate death. Gerstein was the highest-ranking Israeli soldier to be killed in 17 years. In early June Israeli forces and SLA withdrew from Jezzin (a predominantly Christian enclave) that comprised around 6% of the “Security Zone”, thus reducing the total size of the “Security Zone” to 9% of the Lebanese territory. Through German mediation, Israel released, in two installments, thirteen Lebanese freedom fighters, five of whom were released on 26 December from the Israeli Ayalut detention camp, in exchange for a promise from Hizbullah to help track the missing Israeli pilot, Ron Arad, whose plane was gunned down over south Lebanon in 1986. On 30 December ‘Ammar Husayn Hammud conducted Hizbullah’s twelfth martyrdom operation on the road to al-Qlay‘a, killing seven Israeli soldiers and wounding seven others, according to Hizbullah, while according to Israeli military sources the operation resulted in no Israeli casualties due to premature detonation on behalf of the suicide bomber.8

2000 In February the Islamic Resistance blew up the farm of the SLA’s second man in rank, ‘Aqil Hashim, who died in the blast. On 19 April Israel released thirteen Lebanese detainees from the Israeli Ayalut detention camp. On 24 May Israel withdrew from southern Lebanon after 22 years of occupation. (Israel failed to relinquish the Lebanese Shib‘a farms, which are a bone of contention between Israel and Lebanon.) On 28 September the second Palestinian Intifada was inaugurated in the wake of Sharon’s visit to the Dome of the Rock (al-Masjid al-Aqsa). 1999

161

Hizbullah won twelve seats in the parliamentary elections held in the summer. Hizbullah’s nine candidates, along with two Sunnis and one Maronite Christian, received the highest number of votes in the country. In the 2000 parliamentary elections all Hizbullah’s representatives in the parliament were civilian (no ‘ulama). ‘Ali Ammar (O); Muhammad Berjawi (O); Abdallah Qasir (O); Muhammad Fnaysh (O); Nazih Mansur (O); Muhammad Ra‘d (O); Husayn al-Hajj Hasan (O); Ammar al-Musawi (O); Husayn Yaghi (O); George Najm, Maronite (N); Ibrahim Bayan, Sunni (O); Mas‘ud al-Hujayyri, Sunni (N). On 7 October Hizbullah captured three Israeli soldiers from the Lebanese Shib‘a farms. On 15 October, Hizbullah lured and apprehended Elhanan Tannenbaum, a retired Israeli Mossad colonel.

2001

In Hizbullah’s sixth conclave that ended on 30 July 2001, Nasrallah was reelected for life, and Sayyid Ibrahim Amin Al-Sayyid and Hajj Jawad Nureddine replaced Hajj Muhammad Ra‘d and Hajj Muhsin Shakar in the Shura Council. Hizbullah placed its media institutions under the direct command of Nasrallah, aided by the head of the Political Council and that of the Executive Council. This was done in order to upgrade the role of Hizbullah’s media, and pursue its ideological hegemony. Also, Hizbullah abolished its “Central Planning Council”, and strengthened internal audit and accountability mechanisms. From this perspective, the roles and duties of the municipal councils were expanded (horizontally) and upgraded (vertically).

2002

On 27-28 March the Arab Summit was held in Beirut, and the Arab initiative of ending the Israeli-Palestinian conflict was propagated. In late March/early April, the Israeli army conducted a deadly incursion into the West Bank. Hizbullah responded by conducting twelve-day military operations in the Shib‘a farms in order to buttress the Intifada. On 10 June in light of the revival of the prisoner-exchange negotiations and as a goodwill gesture towards Hizbullah, Israel released Muhammad al-Birzawi, a Hizbullah fighter, who had been detained since 1987.

2003 On 21 August Israel returned the remains of two Hizbullah fighters in return for a meeting between the detained Mossad colonel and the German mediator. In response to a suicide operation in Israel a day earlier, in which 19 Israeli civilians died, on 5 December Israeli jets violated Lebanese airspace and bombed an alleged Palestinian training camp near Damascus. This was the first Israeli air strike on Syria in thirty years, since the end of the October 1973 war.

Chronology of Events (1975-2010)

162

2004

On 19 January Hizbullah destroyed an Israeli military bulldozer after it crossed the “Blue Line”. Hizbullah targeted it by firing an anti-tank rocket when it was 26 meters inside Lebanese territory by the concession of the UNIFIL. One Israeli soldier was killed, and another was seriously wounded. This confrontation came at a time when the prisoner-exchange negotiations between Israel and Hizbullah were at their peak. This exemplifies Hizbullah’s two-track policy: military confrontation and negotiations. On 29-30 January, Hizbullah and Israel conducted the first phase of a watershed prisoner exchange deal after four years of negotiation by Germany. Hizbullah released the Israeli colonel and the bodies of three Israeli soldiers captured in October 2000 in return for 400 Palestinians, 23 Lebanese and Arabs (including two Hizbullah senior cadres: Shaykh Abd al-Karim ‘Ubayd and Hajj Mustafa al-Dirani), and the remains of 59 Lebanese guerrilla fighters, eleven of whom belonged to Hizbullah. It was a watershed operation since it was the first time that Israel acquiesced to Hizbullah’s demands and released Palestinians, setting a precedent and bestowing Hizbullah an unprecedented role in the Intifada, thus regionalizing the conflict. By this move, Israel granted Hizbullah a de facto recognition as a legitimate resistance movement. On 7 May an Israeli incursion reminiscent of Ansariyyé occurred after the elite Israeli Egoz commandos unit crossed the “Blue Line”. Hizbullah fighters ambushed it, killed one soldier and wounded five others, by the concession of the Israelis. Unlike the precedent set by Ansariyyé and in spite of Hizbullah’s intensive firing power, the Israelis were able to evacuate their dead and wounded, but they left behind a dead dog. Between 2-30 May the second municipal elections were held after a lapse of six years. Hizbullah achieved a landslide victory in Beirut (100%), the Biqa‘ (almost 95%), and the south (almost 61%). 21 May: Hizbullah held a big demonstration to protest the desecration of the holy sites in Iraq. Around half a million Hizbullah supporters wearing white burial shrouds chanted “death to Israel” and “death to America”. This show of force came two days before the municipal elections in the South, which was considered an Amal den and a strong constituency. 27 May: Events reminiscent of 13 September 1993 occurred: licensed demonstrations spread over the country in protest against the pressing socio-economic situation triggered by a severe hike in fuel prices. In Hayy al-Sulum, in Dahiya, the Lebanese Army fired at the demonstrators who where throwing rocks at them, killing five and wounding several others. As a result, riots spread in the Dahiya, and the demonstrators burned the first floor of the Ministry of Labor. 29 May: Nasrallah held a news conference in which he accused the US Embassy in Beirut of infiltrating the demonstrators and perpetrating the vio 2004

163

lence, thus giving weight to the hidden hand explanation or the conspiracy theory. He called on the cabinet and parliament to hold emergency sessions to discuss the issue, and he called on the government to launch an investigation into what had happened. 30 May: Hariri visited Nasrallah and conducted a meeting with him in the house of the latter’s political advisor/aide. 31 May: Conceding to Nasrallah’s demands, the Lebanese cabinet held an urgent meeting in which it vehemently condemned the 27 May shootings and offered, as blood money, around $33,000 for each victim. The cabinet asked the Justice Minister and the Defense Minister to conduct an investigation into the unrest and report directly to it. Between June and 16 August, Hizbullah held its seventh conclave. Shura Council members retained their same functions. Sayyid Hasan Nasrallah, Hizbullah’s secretary-general became the head of the Jihadi Council. The most salient administrative amendment was Hizbullah’s division of the south into two geographical areas: the first south of the Litani river, and the second to its north. Both function under the auspices of one central organizational leader in order to secure organizational structures that are capable of improving local administration and activate polarization. In addition, Shaykh Abd al-Karim ‘Ubayd was appointed as the head of Hizbullah’s social institutions. Shaykh Hasan Izzeddine, Hizbullah’s spokesman at the Central Press Office, was appointed as Hizbullah’s political representative in the south, and Nasrallah’s media aide or advisor, the engineer Hajj Muhammad Afif, replaced him. 2 September: The UN Security Council issued Resolution 1559 censuring Syrian intervention in Lebanese affairs and criticizing both Syria and Lebanon for the intended constitutional amendment that will extend President Lahud’s tenure for three more years, to 25 November 2007. Among other things, Resolution 1559 called on the Lebanese government to disband and disarm Lebanese militias, which is a direct reference to Hizbullah since it is the only Lebanese political party that still bears arms. 3 September: The Lebanese parliament amended the constitution, thus allowing President Lahud to remain in office for a second half-tenure, or a three-year term. 1 October: A failed assassination attempt targeted MP Marwan Hamadé in West Beirut and left his bodyguard dead and wounded his driver. 11 November: On Hizbullah’s Martyrs day, the party set a precedent in its “balance of terror” with Israel. For the first time since its founding, Hizbullah flew an unmanned drone, which is a small spying plane supplied with state of the art cameras and is capable of carrying 40 to 50 kilograms of explosives and can be programmed to hit any target in Israel, for fourteen minutes. It took pictures of the northern Israeli settlement of Keryat Shmona. Israel confirmed

Chronology of Events (1975-2010)

164

the flight and claimed the drone flew over Israel for five minutes. The Israeli government issued a statement condemning the act as a serious breach of Israeli sovereignty forgetting the 9,400 breaches Israel conducted of Lebanese sovereignty, by air and sea, since its nearly complete withdrawal in May 2000.9 30 November: Around 250,000 Lebanese people, one-third of whom were Hizbullahis, demonstrated against resolution 1559. All the participants carried Lebanese flags including Hizbullahis. It was the first time that Hizbullah participated in a demonstration without portraying flags, banners, and special slogans. The only two features that pointed out that it concerned Hizbullah were 1) the chanting of “death to Israel” and “death to America” and 2) the Hizbullahi veiled women who outnumbered Hizbullahi men by a great margin. Some of the banners raised by the Hizbullahis were the following: “Unity, unity in Lebanon so that we can defend our country”; “We do not want democracy American style”. In the beginning of December and in light of the decisions taken in Hizbullah’s seventh conclave, Hizbullah, for the first time in its history, appointed the head of Hizbullah’s Women’s Organization, Rima Fakhry, as a member of its 18-member Political Council (Politburo). Also, Hizbullah appointed Wafa’ Hutayt, the person responsible for political programs in al-Nour radio, as deputy of Hizbullah’s Central Information Office.10 13 December: France banned Hizbullah’s satellite TV, al-Manar, from broadcasting to France and other EU countries. Hizbullah abided by the ruling and al-Manar voluntarily stopped transmission. However, al-Manar continued to broadcast from six other satellites covering most of the globe, including three in Europe which did not fall under France’s jurisdiction. 17 December: the US followed suit and banned al-Manar, classifying it as a “terrorist organization”.

2005

29 January: Hizbullah’s first annual celebration of the “Day of Freedom” marking the watershed prisoner release operation a year ago. 14 February: ex-PM Rafiq al-Hariri was assassinated by a massive suicide truck bomb. The assassination polarized the country into two political groupings: March 8 and March 14. The Western-backed March 14 group, which initiated the Cedar Revolution, is led by the Sunni Future Movement, but also included the Progressive Socialist Party (PSP) of Druze leader Walid Jumblatt and the Christian Phalange and Lebanese Forces. And while Hizbullah is the leading party in the March-8 coalition along with another Shi‘a group Amal, the party of the Speaker of the Parliament, this group also contains the Free Patriotic Movement (FPM) of Michel ‘Aun11, Lebanon’s largest Christian party and several more marginal Christian parties. March 14 is supported by the United States, EU, and Saudi Arabia, and preaches an armed ceasefire with Israel. Con 2005

165

versely, March 8 attains its regional support from Syria and Iran and has a more social justice agenda that is linked to its doctrinal struggle against Israel. Since then, political instability has reigned in Lebanon, a country known for its fragile democratic tradition. 8 March: Hizbullah organized a pro-Syrian demonstration. Around half a million Hizbullahis along with their supporters and sympathizers filled the streets of the capital waving Lebanese flags. Nasrallah delivered a speech calling for national unity, dialogue, and coexistence. 14 March: The “Cedar Revolution”: one million people took to the streets in Downtown Beirut to demand the withdrawal of Syrian troops and the truth about Hariri’s assassination. 19 April: Omar Karami’s government resigned, and Nagib Miqati’s 14-member Cabinet took office. The cabinet included Trad Hamadé, a Hizbullah affiliated sympathizer (non-official member), for the first time in its history. 26 April: Syria ended its military presence in Lebanon after all its remaining 14,000 soldiers along with its intelligence personnel left Lebanon after a 29-year presence. 7 May: Michel ‘Aun returned to Lebanon after being banished to France for almost 15 years. 23 May: The UN verified the Syrian military pullout from Lebanon. 29 May-19 June: Hizbullah contested the first parliamentary elections after the Syrian withdrawal on the basis of a temporary four-partite alliance between Sa‘d Hariri’s “Future Trend”, Amal, and the PSP. Hariri’s “Future Trend” and his allies won 72 seats out of the 128. Hizbullah won 14 seats, adding two seats to its previous gains. Here is a list of the 14 names: Muhammad Ra‘d (O); Muhammad Fnaysh (O); Muhammad Haydar (N); Hasan Fadlallah (N); Hasan Huballah (N); Amin Sherri (N); Ali Ammar (O); Pierre Serhal, Maronite (N); Isma‘il Sukariyyé, Sunni (N); Kamel al-Rifa‘i, Sunni (N); Ali al-Miqdad (N); Husayn al-Hajj Hasan (O); Jamal al-Taqsh (N); Nawwar al-Sahili (N). 27 June: Trad Hamadé signed a memo allowing the Palestinians who were born in Lebanon to work. Early July: Syrian trade embargo begins; a de facto economic embargo. 18 July: 100 MPs voted for the parole of Samir Geagea – the leader of the right-wing, outlawed Christian Lebanese Forces (LF), who served a jail sentence for eleven years – and the Sunni Islamists who served a five-year jail sentence. 19 July: Fu’ad al-Sanyura forms the first cabinet after Syrian withdrawal, where Hizbullah joins with an official member, MP Muhammad Fnaysh, and an ally, Trad Hamadé. 22 July: Condoleezza Rice visits Lebanon, the first visit of a Secretary of State since Colin Powell’s visit in May 2003. 30 July: Sanyura’s cabinet wins a parliamentary vote of confidence of 92 votes.

Chronology of Events (1975-2010)

166

31 July: Sanyura visited Syria in an attempt to end the Syrian economic embargo. 1 August: Syria partially lifted its economic embargo and opened its border to Lebanese transit trucks. 31 July-6 August: Nasrallah along with members of the Shura Council visited Tehran in order to attend the inauguration of the newly elected president Mahmud Ahmadinejad on 3 August as well as conduct meetings with him, Imam ‘Ali Khamina’i, and other Iranian officials. The Iranian leadership assured Hizbullah that disarming it was a mirage. 17 August: Israel relinquished the Gaza strip after 38 years of occupation and started evacuating its settlers. Nasrallah termed this eventuality as the final victory for the model of resistance in five years: “The choice of resistance liberates Gaza”. He added that this constitutes further proof for the utility of holding on to the weapons of Hizbullah’s Islamic Resistance. 12 September: Israel officially ended its occupation of Gaza after the complete withdrawal of its military. 21 October: Detlev Mehlis, the head of the UN investigation team into Rafiq Hariri’s assassination, presented a legally inconclusive, but politically powerful report that implicated high-ranking Syrian and Lebanese officials. 24 October: Amal and Hizbullah released a joint declaration blasting the Mehlis report for failing to convey the truth, sided with the Syrian regime in its face-off with the international community, but endorsed the Lebanese government’s decision to extend Mehlis mandate until 15 December. 12 December: On the same day the Nahar anchor MP Gebran Tuéni was assassinated, the Lebanese cabinet met with the UN Commission investigating the Hariri murder (Special Tribunal for Lebanon: STL) and referred this case and other politically motivated assassinations to them. They also asked for the formation of an International Tribunal to bring the perpetrators of these crimes to justice. When the issue was voted on, the five Shi‘ite ministers walked out, as an apparent sign of disapproval, eventually suspending their participation in the Council of Ministers for a period of seven weeks. 20 December: Shaykh ‘Afif al-Nabulsi issued a fatwa barring any other Shi‘ite from joining the cabinet in the absence of the five ministers.

2006 1 January: The Belgian judge/prosecutor Serge Bramerts/Brammertz took over from Detliv Mehlis as the head of the UN Commission investigating the Hariri murder. 5 February: After one day of mobs torching the Danish Embassy in Damascus as a protest against the cartoons of the Prophet, mobs in the Christian East Beirut neighborhood also attempted to set the Danish Embassy on fire. May 2006

167

hem erupted, and many shops, cars, and Churches were vandalized, and the population was verbally abused. Lebanese security forces failed to bring the matter to order, and as a result the Minister of Interior resigned, and Lebanon offered Denmark a formal apology. 6 February: In order to contain the negative repercussions of what had happened and prevent Christian-Muslim discord, the leader of the FPM, General Michel ‘Aun, and Sayyid Hasan Nasrallah met in a symbolic Church across the old “green line” and signed a historic ten-point understanding addressing political, economic, administrative, and security issues, as well as the relations with Syria. The understanding also addressed domestic affairs such as administrative reform, election law, fighting corruption, and the investigations into the Hariri murder. 2 March: The inauguration of the “National Convention of Dialogue” in the Lebanese parliament under the patronage of the Speaker, Nabih Berri. Fourteen leading Lebanese politicians, including Nasrallah, participated in the proceedings. 4 May: UNSC adopted Resolution 1680, which, among other things, called on Syria to normalize relations with Lebanon. 30 May: The Lebanese judiciary exonerated Sultan Abu Al-‘Aynayn, the secretary-general of the Fatah Movement in Lebanon. 1 June: The mocking of Sayyid Hasan Nasrallah, in a TV comedy show, sparked Hizbullah’s constituency to take to the streets, threatening to go all the way to the Christian heartland and burn the LBCI. After Hizbullah’s MPs failed to contain and control the infuriated masses, in an unprecedented move, Nasrallah addressed the masses in person, via the Hizbullah media, asking them to immediately vacate the streets. They obeyed. 30 June: In the wake of the formation of a Lebanese-Palestinian Committee to discuss the plight of the Palestinian refugees in Lebanon, a delegation of Lebanese ministers, including the Hizbullah-affiliated minister Trad Hamadé, visited the Palestinian refugee camps. 12 July: In an attempt to free Samir al-Quntar, the oldest-serving Arab prisoner in Israeli jails and other Lebanese POWs, Hizbullah kidnapped two Israeli soldiers (Eldad Regev and Ehud Goldwasser) in a cross-border raid. Eight Israeli soldiers died in the confrontations that ensued on that day, an eventuality that triggered the July 2006 War. 12 July - 14 August: Israel’s 34-day offensive against Lebanon. 26 July: The Rome conference failed to agree on a ceasefire to end the 15-day conflict. Sanyura launched his Seven Points. 11 August: UNSC unanimously passed Resolution 1701, which called for a complete cessation of hostilities in Lebanon.



Chronology of Events (1975-2010)

168

19 August: Marked the arrival of the first contingents of the UNIFIL II forces in Lebanon. 20 August: The Lebanese MPs staged a sit-in inside the Lebanese parliament, demanding the lifting of the Israeli air and sea blockade on Lebanon. 31 August: The Stockholm conference pledged $940 million in aid to Lebanon. 7 September: Israel lifted its air blockade of Lebanon at 4:00 GMT. 8 September: Israel ended its sea blockade of Lebanon. 1 October: Israel withdrew from the South, after it nibbled a lot of land from Lebanese territory across the “Blue Line”, including the Lebanese side of Ghajar village. 11 November: After the failure of the “National Consultations Conference/ convention” mediated by Nabih Berri, the five Shi‘ite ministers resigned from the cabinet. This symbolic day marks Hizbullah’s “Martyrs’ Day”. 21 November: The assassination of MP and Minister of Industry, Pierre Jumayyel, who was also a member of the Phalangist politburo. 1 December: Hizbullah, the FPM, and other members of the Lebanese opposition took to the streets in downtown Beirut – completely filling Martyrs’ Square and the Riyad Al-Solh Square – demanding the formation of a national unity cabinet where the Lebanese opposition wields one-third veto power. 1 and 10 December: More than one million protestors and demonstrators made themselves heard in downtown Beirut, while peacefully attempting to block the roads to the Grand Sérail, the prestigious headquarters of the Council of Ministers.

2007

22 January: Nasrallah’s mobilization speech: He contended that the strike that was organized for the next day would determine the destiny of Lebanon for future generations, and he warned about domestic infighting and a division in the Lebanese Army. 23 January: After 53 days of sit-ins and protests in downtown Beirut, the Hizbullah-led opposition crippled the country through a general strike, coupled with the blocking of main roads, burning wheels, etc. On 25 January, coinciding with the Paris III conference, the civil unrest continued, and dangerous actions reminiscent of the civil war were undertaken: sniping, automatic weapons, gunfire, mayhem, burning cars, destruction of property, etc. In an unprecedented move, Nasrallah issued a fatwa calling on his supporters and all the Lebanese to vacate the streets immediately. 27 January: Tufayli held a conference in ‘Ayn Burday12 (B‘albak) vehemently censoring Hizbullah’s leadership, accusing Nasrallah of executing Khamina’i’s policies in Lebanon. (Khamina’i has openly and repeatedly declared that Lebanon will be the battleground where the US will be defeated.) 2007

169

7-8 February: Around midnight, at least two incidents of crossfire were reported between the Lebanese Army and the IDF after an Israeli bulldozer crossed the Blue Line in an attempt to remove mines across the border. This was the first reported incident (military confrontation) between the two parties since the cessation of hostilities on 14 August 2006. 8 February: The Lebanese Army confiscated a weapons truck from Hizbullah. Hizbullah demanded its return; the Lebanese Army refused, arguing that the weapons would be used to confront the IDF in the south. 14 February: The divide between the March-14 and March-8 camps was painstakingly visible when the two parties were separated by a mini metal “Berlin wall”. 21 March: Serge Bramerts/Brammertz submitted his seventh report to the UNSC, which unanimously issued Resolution 1748 on 27 March that officially extended the mandate of his Commission for a year, starting June, i.e. till June 2008. (UNSC Resolution 1747 enforced the 1701 ban against arms smuggling.) 2 April: Seventy Lebanese legislators supportive of the Sanyura cabinet, the March-14 trend, met at the parliament and ratified a letter asking the UNSC to found the International Tribune as soon as possible. On 10 April, PM Sanyura forwarded the letter to Ban Ki-Moon, the UN secretary-general, arguing that impediments standing in the way of ratifying the statutes of the tribunal were mainly related to the paralysis of the legislature. 8 April: Nasrallah’s “Easter speech”: In an attempt to end the deadlock with the Lebanese Cabinet, Nasrallah lowered his demands from veto power to a national referendum or early legislative elections. 17-21 April : Ban Ki-moon dispatched Nicolas Michel, the UN Undersecretary-general for Legal Affairs, to Lebanon in order to discuss the issue of the tribunal with Lebanese state officials and the opposition leaders. Michel, who was instrumental in drafting the text of the pact on the tribunal between the UN and the Sanyura government, insisted the UN had no intention of getting involved in the nitty-gritty of domestic Lebanese politics, especially the debates surrounding the tribunal. After a meeting between Hizbullah’s resigned Minister of Power Fnaysh and Michel, Fnaysh refused to hand Michel the party’s reservations on the tribunal, maintaining Hizbullah’s discourse of only doing so to a national unity government. 5 May: Nasrallah in a talk show with the Iranian Satellite TV “Al-‘Alam” (The World), recorded one day earlier, tried to calm the waters. 30 May: UNSC Resolution 1757 established, under chapter seven, the International Tribunal of the Hariri murder, effective June 10. 13 June 13: Walid ‘Ido, a March-14 MP, was assassinated by a car bomb in Roushé, Ras Beirut. The explosion claimed the life of his son Khalid, and eight other civilians. In a political declaration, Hizbullah vehemently condemned

Chronology of Events (1975-2010)

170

the assassination, considering it part of the “mobile terror” that was targeting the stability of Lebanon. Hizbullah said that the best way to face the terror is through uniting and working very hard to find the perpetrators and bring them to justice. Like the case with the previous politically motivated assassinations, March 14 pinned the blame directly on the Syrian regime. (It was the second assassination that had claimed the life of a Sunni Muslim after the 14 February 2005 assassination of Rafiq al-Hariri.) With ‘Ido’s and Pierre Jumayyel’s assassinations, two parliamentary seats became vacant. Fearful for their lives after ‘Ido’s assassination, forty March-14 MPs left the country. 10-14 June: Within four days Hamas took control of the entire Gaza strip and established its Islamic Emirate after a bloody military coup that ousted Fatah and the Palestinian Authority (PA) from the Gaza strip. 14-15 July: Breaking-the-ice dialogue sessions in Saint-Cloud, France, among second-class cadres of the March-14 and March-8 groups were organized by the French Foreign Minister, Bernard Cuisenaire, with help from his special envoy, Ambassador Cousseran. 31 representatives of Lebanon’s 14 leading parties participated in closed-door talks. Cuisenaire was scheduled to visit Beirut on 28 July in order to follow up on the French initiative aimed at breaking the political deadlock that had been rupturing the country for more than eight months. No substantial or tangible results were reported from either the dialogue sessions or Cuisenaire’s visit. In addition to the representatives of the leading politicians in the country, the French introduced representatives of civil society organizations, although they do not have much power on the ground. 19 July: To Israel’s military intelligence’s surprise, Nasrallah met with both the Iranian president Ahmadinejad, who was visiting Damascus, as well as the Syrian president Bashar al-Asad. 21 July: In an interview with Qatari-based al-Jazeera satellite TV, Nasrallah affirmed: “We can strike any city in Israel… not a single place in Israel is not within the range of our missiles”.13 23 July: Ban Ki-Moon informed Sayura that The Hague, in the Netherlands, had been chosen as a place for the International Tribunal investigating the Hariri murder (STL). 24 July: The general of the Lebanese Army threatened to resign if another cabinet was formed, in which case Lebanon would repeat the negative precedent of 1988, when the country was split between two cabinets, where each one controlled a certain geographical area.14 If this scenario had materialized, it might eventually have led to the dissolution of the military establishment and the disintegration of Lebanon. 24 July: The US administration branded two Hizbullah NGOs “The Good Loan” and “The Martyr’s Foundation” as “terrorist organizations” and froze

2007

171

their assets, including those of Qasim ‘Ulayq and Hasan Shami, their respective directors. 28 July: Nasrallah’s first “victory speech”, delivered at Bint Jubayl, was transmitted live via al-Manar TV by projection on a large screen to Hizbullah’s constituency. 3 August: Nasrallah’s second “victory speech” delivered at Marjat Ra’is al‘Ayn, Ba‘albak, the Biqa‘, “the reservoir of the Resistance” at 20:30 hours local time, was transmitted live via al-Manar TV by projection on a large screen. 6 August: By-elections in Matn and Beirut to replace the two assassinated March-14 MPs Pierre Jumayyel and Walid ‘Ido. Amine Jumayyel, Pierre’s father, lost by 418 votes to FPM candidate Kamile Khoury. Muhammad Itani from the Future Trend won 22,988 votes, while the next candidate received 3,556 votes. Voter turnout was 48% in Matn and 18.9% in Beirut. In Beirut, Hizbullah and Amal got around 7,000 votes, although they did not officially participate in the by-elections because they considered the Cabinet as unconstitutional. 14 August: Nasrallah’s third “victory speech” delivered at the Raya field, Sfeir in Dahiya, the southern suburb of Beirut, transmitted live via al-Manar TV by projection on a large screen. 24 August: UNSC unanimously adopted Resolution 1773, which extended the UNIFIL’s mandate for one year until 31 August 2008, thus maintaining the status quo and extending the “cessation of hostilities” for another year. And so, even though one year had passed since the end of hostilities, there was no ceasefire. 31 August: On the occasion of the 29th anniversary of the disappearance of Imam Musa al-Sadr, Nabih Berri launched his initiative, which practically eroded the Hizbullah-led opposition’s demand for the formation of a national unity Cabinet, even “half an hour before the presidential elections”, and shelved the demand till the election of a new president, as the March-14 group had repeatedly requested. 6 September: Israel violated Syrian airspace and apparently attacked a supposed nuclear facility. 19 September: Around 17:30 hours, a powerful explosion rocked the eastern sector of Beirut, killing the Phalangist MP Antoine Ghanem and eight others (including two of his bodyguards) and wounded 56. The Lebanese government blamed Fatah al-Islam (FI) militants for the assassination, which came just two days after his return from a two-month vacation outside Lebanon. This was the eighth assassination of an anti-Syrian politician – the fourth MP from the antiSyrian governing majority – since the high-profile assassination of PM Rafiq Hariri in 2005. 25 September: The two-thirds quota required for the election of a new president was not met. The Speaker scheduled another parliamentary session on 23 October.

Chronology of Events (1975-2010)

172

5 October: Nasrallah delivered the Jerusalem Day speech via a big screen placed at Majma‘ Al-Shuhada’. The speech was divided into three parts, which gave it a regional flavor: Palestine, Iraq, and finally Lebanon. 15 October: Israel and Hizbullah exchanged prisoners: One dead Israeli settler of Ethiopian origin who drowned in Haifa two years earlier and whose body had drifted to Lebanese territorial waters. His body was exchanged for the bodies of two dead Hizbullah fighters (who died in the July 2006 war) and one prisoner (suffering from health problems). The negotiations took place for a long time behind closed doors. 22 October: The Speaker postponed the second round of the parliamentary session to elect the president to 12 November, hoping that by then a consensus would have been reached on a candidate acceptable to all parties (the March-14 and March-8 Group). 10 November: The Speaker postponed the third round of the parliamentary session to elect the president to 21 November. 20 November: The Speaker postponed the fourth round of the parliamentary session to 23 November, the final constitutional deadline to elect a president. 23 November: The two-thirds quota required for the election of a new president was not met. The Speaker scheduled another parliamentary session on 30 November. 27 November: 45 countries, including fifteen Arab states, attended the oneday peace conference at Annapolis, Maryland. 29 November: The Speaker postponed the fifth round of the parliamentary session to elect the president to 7 December. 1 December: The Hizbullah-led opposition celebrated the first anniversary of the sit-in in downtown Beirut through a symbolic rally. 10 December: The Speaker postponed the eighth round of the parliamentary session to elect the president to 17 December. 17 December: The Speaker postponed the ninth round of the parliamentary session to elect the president to 22 December. 22 December 22: The Speaker postponed the tenth round of the parliamentary session to elect the president to 12 January 2008. 12 December: Lebanese Army (LA) Brigadier General François al-Hajj, the chief of military operations and the presumed successor to Lebanese Army commander General Michel Sulyman, was killed with three other military personnel by a car bomb in B‘abda, near the presidential palace.

2008 8 January : In the wake of President Bush’s visit to the Middle East and one day before the visit of the chief of Arab diplomacy, the secretary-general of the Arab League, Amr Musa, and one day after Shakir al-‘Absi released his first message 2008

173

via the al-Qa‘ida-affiliated website threatening the Lebanese Army with retribution, one of his cells targeted the UNIFIL with a roadside bomb – for the first time outside the area of their operations at Rmaylé, near the northern entrance of Sidon – slightly wounding two Irish soldiers. Two Katyusha rockets were fired from southern Lebanon into northern Israel. State prosecutor, John Fahd, issued thirty arrest warrants against affiliates of al-Qa‘ida. 10 January: Nasrallah delivered a speech on the first day of ‘Ashura.15 10-11 January: The ISF and LA arrested Shaykh Nabil Rahim, the main coordinator between al-Qa‘ida’s groups in Lebanon and FI, along with his aide Bassam Hammud (alias Abu Bakr al-Turkmani) and Rahim’s leading student, Zakariyya Trabulsi.16 11 January: The Speaker postponed the eleventh round of the parliamentary session to elect the president to 21 January. 15 January: Around 16:30 hours local time: A reconnaissance vehicle of the US Embassy was targeted by a roadside bomb in the Karantina area, in the Christian East Beirut. Three people died and twenty were wounded, including two Lebanese employees. Jeffrey Feltman, the outgoing US Ambassador to Lebanon, had been invited by the March-14 group to the Phoenicia Hotel in order to be honored for his services to Lebanon. Attacking a US Embassy convoy is unprecedented. This attack came in the wake of Bin Laden’s tape, which called for derailing Bush’s visit to the Middle East by launching attacks on US interests in the region. Nasrallah delivered a speech on the sixth day of ‘Ashura. 17 January: Nasrallah delivered an important speech on the conception of martyrdom: “Islam considers that the gravest sin, after shirk (partnership with God) is killing the dignified self (an innocent human being).17 19 January: Nasrallah, in person, and not on a giant TV screen, delivered a speech on the 10th day of ‘Ashura in Dahiya. It was the first time since the 22 September 2006 “Victory Speech” that Nasrallah appeared in person – protected by a sea of people, who gave him the perfect human shield. Nasrallah revealed for the first time since the abduction of the two Israeli soldiers on 12 July 2006 that Hizbullah had many body parts of Israeli soldiers in its possession, including a near-complete body. He boasted that the Israeli Army (IDF), which prided itself on evacuating all its dead and wounded, failed to accomplish that due to the relentless attacks of the Hizbullah fighters. Nasrallah reiterated what he mentioned in the first anniversary of the “Divine Victory” on 14 August 2007: “If Israel launches a new war on Lebanon, we [Hizbullah] promise them a war that will change the course of the [Arab-Israeli] battle, and will change



Chronology of Events (1975-2010)

174

the destiny of the entire region [Middle East],” which is an indirect reference to Hizbullah’s possession of unconventional arms.18 19 January: The Speaker postponed, for the thirteenth time, the parliamentary session to elect the president to 11 February, at 12:00 noon. 25 January: The assassination of Lieutenant Wissam ‘Id, a senior intelligence officer, the IT brain of the ISF (an expert in surveillance), and his aide Usama Mer‘ib, by a 75 kg bomb hidden in a parked car in the Chevrolet area, in East Beirut. Five other civilians died and 37 were wounded. This was the biggest explosion since the assassination of PM Hariri. 26 January: Death of George Habash (1925-2008), the founder of the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP). 27 January: Nine died and fifty were wounded in a seven-hour civil unrest, mainly across the old green line in Mar Michael. 9 February: The Speaker postponed, for the fourteenth time, the parliamentary session to elect the president to 26 February. 12 February: The assassination of Imad Mughniyyé – Hizbullah’s ex-military cadre on whom the US put a $25 million reward – by a car explosion in Damascus. 22 April: The Speaker postponed, for the eighteenth time, the parliamentary session to elect the president, without scheduling another. Ayman al-Zawahiri, the second man in al-Qa‘ida, said that Lebanon has a pivotal role in al-Qa‘ida’s jihad. He threatened to make Lebanon the launching pad of the jihad against the “Jews and Crusaders” in order to liberate Palestine. He attacked Hizbullah and its al-Manar satellite station for doubting al-Qa‘ida’s role in 9/11. 6 May: The Lebanese cabinet took two measures: In a politically charged atmosphere, the Cabinet decided to confront Hizbullah for the first time since Ta‘if. After a long meeting it deemed Hizbullah’s telecommunications network as an “onslaught against the state’s sovereignty and its financial resources” or as illegitimate and a threat to the state’s financial security. The cabinet affirmed that it was going to bring to justice all those who were involved in deploying this network, which was tantamount to an arrest warrant against Nasrallah. Also, the Cabinet dismissed the pro-Hizbullah-Amal Beirut Airport head of security who had been serving in this post since 2000. LA General Wafiq Shuqayr was accused of deploying cameras across the airport’s lane number 17 in order to monitor the travelers. Four-partite meeting: Shi‘ite religious and political leaders met to evaluate the situation in the wake of the general strike the next day: Qabalan, Fadlallah, Berri, Nasrallah. 7 May: A day reminiscent of 23 and 25 January 2007.

2008

175

8 May: In a press conference, Nasrallah considered the government’s decisions as “a declaration of war”.19 After this fiery speech, Sunni-Shi‘ite sectarian fighting raged in the West Beirut streets. The next day, Hizbullah controlled West Beirut which houses key government ministries. 11 May: Hizbullah controlled al-Shouf, Jumblatt’s den. Subhi al-Tufayli held a press conference condemning Hizbullah’s actions. 12 May: For the nineteenth time, Berri postponed the 13 May session to elect the president to 10 June at 12:00 noon. 14 May: Heading an Arab committee, the secretary-general of the Arab League, Amr Musa, arrived via Beirut International Airport after turf battles claimed the lives of around 80 people. 16 May: The Higher Shi‘ite Council sacked Mufti ‘Ali al-Amin after he vehemently criticized Amal and Hizbullah. 21 May: The Doha Accord: After five days of intense negotiations between the March-14 and March-8 groups, Hizbullah achieved a resounding political victory by obtaining the one-third veto power in the Cabinet. After eighteen months of political stalemate, a political settlement was reached. Hizbullah’s media announced that national unity had been achieved after 537 days. Berri announced from Doha, Qatar, the disbanding of the sit-in in downtown Beirut. Solidere’s20 market stock jumped from $ 29.8 to $ 40. 25 May: After six months of vacuum in the seat of the presidency, something unprecedented in Lebanese history, the consensus president Sulayman was elected by 118 votes out of 127 MPs.21 26 May: Hizbullah celebrated the eighth anniversary of the nearly complete Israeli withdrawal from Lebanon through a fiery speech by its secretary-general, Nasrallah, who stressed that Hizbullah abides by the Ta’if Agreement and would honor the Doha Accord to the letter.22 1 June: The Israeli citizen Nasim Nisr – Hizbullah’s detainee in an Israeli prison who was arrested in Israel on 27 June 2002 – was released as a goodwill gesture to an upcoming groundbreaking prisoner release in which Israel would get back the two soldiers Hizbullah abducted on 12 July 2006. Israel got back the remains of five of its soldiers who died during the confrontations with Hizbullah in the Second Lebanon War. Nisr’s mother was born a Jew, but she converted to Islam. Nisr resided in Bazuriyyé. He was accused of spying for Hizbullah and had already served his six-year sentence. 19 June: Truce between Hamas and Israel for the duration of six months started at 3:00 GMT. 23 June: Vienna conference, Austria: An international donors conference for the rebuilding of Nahr al-Barid and its vicinity raised $122 million, including $22 million from the US.



Chronology of Events (1975-2010)

176

2 July: The UK classified Hizbullah’s military wing as a terrorist organization, while France affirmed that Hizbullah is an “important player in Lebanese political life and has a strong social base… We hope that Hizbullah will completely integrate in the political life in Lebanon.”23 11 July: Ten months before the parliamentary elections of June 2009; after 53 days of the Doha Accord (more than seven weeks); 48 days after the election of President Sulayman; 45 days after Sanyura was charged with forming the Cabinet; and after almost three years of the tenure of the previous government (1378 days), Lebanon announced the formation of a 30-member national unity Cabinet in which Hizbullah obtained its long-awaited veto power. The Cabinet included 9 ministers from the previous Cabinet; six ex-ministers, fourteen new ministers; and eight MPs. According to the power-sharing deal, Hizbullah was supposed to obtain three ministerial seats, but it granted two to its allies, making a big concession. 16 July: The commencement of a three-day groundbreaking prisoner ex­­­chan­ge, which marked the closure of a contentious file in the war with Israel. Hizbullah termed it Operation Radwan (‘Amaliyat al-Radwan), in tribute to Imad Mughniyyé, who was assassinated in Damascus on 12 February 2008. The 199 bodies of mainly Lebanese, Palestinian, and other Arab fighters who died in action confronting the IDF in the previous decades were returned, including eight refrigerated Hizbullah fighters’ bodies. The exchange culminated in the release of the notorious Samir al-Quntar, the dean of Arab prisoners, who was arrested on 22 April 1979, with four other members of the PLO. He served 29 years in prison out of a life sentence, actually five life sentences, which is a total of 542 years. He is regarded as a murderer by the Israelis since he was convicted of killing three Israelis: two civilians and a policeman. Remarkably, Quntar is neither a member of Hizbullah nor a Shi‘ite, but a Druz who believed in the leftist revolutionary cause. Aiming at freeing al-Quntar, Hizbullah kidnapped the two Israeli soldiers Eldad Regev and Ehud Goldwasser on 12 July 2006. The swap also included four Hizbullah fighters who were kidnapped by Israel during the July 2006 war: Khudr Zaydan, Maher Kawtharani, Husayn Sulayman, and Muhammad Srur. With the swap, Israel aimed at closing this contentious file with Lebanon. There were clear differences between the strategy and tactics of both sides: Hizbullah media portrayed the scene as a “very somber and sad day for Israel,” while it echoed the following slogan: “Lebanon is on a date with the victory of Freedom.” The exchange was celebrated in Lebanon as a triumph. According to Hizbullah, Israel succumbed to Hizbullah’s demands, thus breaking three fixities: 1) releasing a convicted felon with Israeli blood on his hands; 2) the stipula-

2008

177

tion of not exchanging dead Israeli soldiers for living Arab POWs; 3) halting any exchange operation till the fate of Ron Arad is fully revealed.24 18 July: Burial of eight Hizbullah fighters fallen in the July 2006 war. 18 August: Hizbullah and the Salafi movement signed a watershed 8-point Understanding. 28 August: A Lebanese Army helicopter was shot down in the south while it was flying over a Hizbullah stronghold, and its pilot was killed. Hizbullah described the incident as “tragic”. The Lebanese Minister of Defense tried to absolve Hizbullah by arguing that the downed helicopter looked different than the others the Army has and that the Lebanese flag was not visible on it.25 (Usually, and as routine dictates, the LA informs Hizbullah of such flights over its controlled areas in order to avoid it being mistaken for an Israeli helicopter). 29 August: The Council of Ministers appointed John Qahwaji as the new Commander of the LA. 10 September: The assassination of the pro-Syrian MP Salih al-‘Aridi, a senior member of Youth and Sports Minister Talal Arslan’s Lebanese Democratic Party (LDP).

A CAPITULATION OF KEY LEBANESE ASSASSINATIONS SINCE 2005 February 2005: Ex-PM Rafik Hariri (March 14) April 2005: MP Basil Flayhan, succumbed to his wounds (March 14) June 2005: Anti-Syria journalist Samir Qasir (March 14) June 2005: Ex-Communist leader George Hawi (March 14) December 2005: Anti-Syria al-Nahar anchor MP Gebran Tuéni (March 14) November 2006: Industry Minister Pierre Jemayyel (March 14) June 2007: Anti-Syria MP Walid ‘Ido (March 14) September 2007: Anti-Syrian MP Antoine Ghanim (March 14) December 2007: LA Brigadier General François al-Hajj January 2008: ISF investigator Wissam ‘Id September 2008: Pro-Syria MP Salih ‘Aridi (March 8)

16 September: First national dialogue session in the presidential palace under the auspices of the President. The main issue on the agenda was Hizbullah’s weapons and Lebanon’s defense strategy. March 14 thought that Hizbullah would not disarm; it was simply buying time till the tide changed in its favor. 27 September: A Fatah al-Islam Saudi suicide bomber, by the name of Abu ‘A’isha, detonated a car packed with 200 kg of explosives near a security complex on the way to the international airport south of Damascus, killing 17 people.



Chronology of Events (1975-2010)

178

4 October: The Lebanese daily al-Liwa’ claimed that Shakir al-‘Absi was arrested in Syria and was being used as a bargaining chip to improve relations with the West, most notably France. 14 October: President Bashar al-Assad issued a decree stipulating the establishment of diplomatic relations with Lebanon. 15 October: A signing ceremony was held in Damascus between the Syrian Foreign Minister Walid Mu‘allim and his Lebanese counterpart Fawzi Sallukh, for the first time establishing diplomatic relations between Syria and Lebanon since the independence of the two countries from the French colonial mandate in 1943. By this move, one of the ten points in the Understanding between Hizbullah and the FPM had been realized. 6 November: Syria aired the confessions of ten Fatah al-Islam members connected to the blast along with al-‘Absi’s daughter Wafa. Fatah al-Islam’s security officer Abd al-Baqi al-Husayn and ten other suspects planned to attack Syrian security offices and foreign diplomats. 22 November: The second session of national dialogue mediated by the president took place. 30 November: The Lebanese Cabinet approved forming full diplomatic relations with the Palestinian Authority, thus elevating the office of the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) in Beirut to the status of an embassy. 3-7 December: ‘Aun embarked on a five-day visit to Syria. 8 December: A Fatah al-Islam-affiliated website announced that al-‘Absi and two of his companions were either arrested or probably “martyred” after a bloody confrontation with the Syrian security forces near Damascus. 9 December: American ex-president Jimmy Carter started a five-day visit to Lebanon. Hizbullah declined to meet him. 14 December: Tens of thousands of people in Gaza celebrated the 21st anniversary of the founding of Hamas. 14-15 December: President Sulayman went on an official visit to Jordan. 22 December: Lebanon and Syria exchanged ambassadors. Third session of national dialogue held. 27 December 2008-20 January 2009: Israel conducted its military campaign “Operation Cast Lead” in the Gaza strip aimed at stopping Hamas rockets from targeting southern Israel after a six-month truce between the two parties expired on 19 December 2007. According to Israeli sources, “Operation Cast Lead” resulted in 1,166 Palestinian deaths and eleven Israeli deaths.26 According to Palestinian sources 1,505 Palestinians died.27 28 December: After a four-hour meeting, the UNSC called on both parties to cease violence. The EU called for a cessation of hostilities. Nasrallah delivered a speech in support of the Palestinians, but stressed that his party would not open the south Lebanon front against Israel. He blasted 2008

179

Arab regimes for their “complicity in the assault”, especially Egypt, but praised Syria for its resistance stance. 31 December: The foreign ministers of the Arab league held an emergency meeting in Beirut at 11:00 am. Nothing emerged except rhetoric.

2009 9 January: Fatah al-Islam operatives succeeded in firing three Katyusha rockets at northern Israel, lightly wounding two people. It was the first time since the end of the “Second Lebanon War” that the IDF returned fire. 26 January: Fourth session of national dialogue. 10 February: Israeli general elections. 21 February: Fatah Al-Islam fired two Katyusha rockets at northern Israel. One fell short and exploded in Lebanese territory; the second wounded a 20-year old woman in Ma‘alot, northern Israel. The IDF retaliated by firing eight shells. PM Sanyura blasted Israel for violating UNSC resolution 1701 while, at the same time, vehemently censured the shooters. 2 March: Fifth session of national dialogue. 16 March: Lebanon opened its first embassy in Damascus five months after establishing diplomatic relations with Beirut. 24 March: Lebanon approved the Syrian ambassador. 28 April: Sixth session of national dialogue. 29 April: The Special Tribunal for Lebanon (STL) released the four generals Jamil al-Sayyid, Ali al-Hajj, Raymond Azar, and Mustafa Hamdan, who were detained in connection with the 2005 bombing. The STL said that the court’s pre-trial judge, Daniel Fransen, had received the request from prosecutor Daniel Bellemare to decline to seek continued detention of the generals. The prosecutor concluded that the evidence was insufficient at this time to warrant filing indictments against these four generals. 25 May: Nasrallah delivered a reconciliatory speech aiming at easing the tensions before the elections and reaching out to the other side. 26 May: Agreement on the appointment of the ten members of the constitutional council, the body that looks into the constitutionality of the elections and takes the decisions in impeachment (ta‘n) cases. 27 May: Syrian ambassador ‘Ali Abd al-Karim arrived in Beirut and assumed his job at the Syrian embassy, located in Makdisi Street, Hamra, West Beirut. 1 June: Seventh session of national dialogue. 3 June: Israeli spokesman Sivan Shalom warned that Hizbullah’s victory in the elections would lead to grave dangers in the Middle East. 4 June: A precedent: Around 11,500 civil servants (public sector employees) voted ahead of the elections (since they themselves would be running the show on 7 June, i.e. supervising the electoral boxes). Turnout was almost 80%. The

Chronology of Events (1975-2010)

180

arrival of ex-US President Jimmy Carter to head the international team supervising the elections. 7 June: Legislature elections according to the amended 1960 election law: 71 seats were won by March 14 and 57 seats went to March 8, in an election that witnessed 54,8% turnout. March 14 won 55% of the seats and March 8 only 45% of the votes. In terms of public mandate, March 8 earned 55% of the votes, but only 45% of the parliamentary seats. This resulted in almost the same status quo as the 2005 elections. Hizbullah won twelve seats: ten for Party members and two for Sunni allies. Due to its alliance with the FPM, this time Hizbullah had no Christians on its election list. Here is a list of the twelve names: Muhammad Ra‘d (O); Muhammad Fnaysh (O); Husayn al-Musawi (N); Hasan Fadlallah (O); Ali ‘Ammar (O); Walid Sukariyyé, Sunni (N); Kamel al-Rifa‘i, Sunni (O); Ali al-Miqdad (O); Husayn al-Hajj Hasan (O); Ali Fayyad (N); Nawwaf Al-Musawi (N); Nawwar al-Sahili (O). 12 June: The Iranian president Ahmadinejad was reelected for a second term. According to official figures, he won 62.6% of the votes in an election marked by a turnout of 85%. Riots erupted for a few weeks as his main contender, Mir Husayn Musawi, accused the government of fraud. The al-‘Arabiya Tehran bureau was closed, and foreign journalists were barred from covering the unrest. It was a show of political protest, which had been unprecedented in Iran for many years. Mobile phones and text messages stopped functioning, many websites were filtered, and the government banned the right of assembly as a threat to the regime. 13 June: ex-European Union Foreign Policy Chief Javier Solana met with Hizbullah’s MP Husayn Hajj Hasan. 24 June: US to send ambassador Robert Ford to Syria after a four-year hiatus. 26 June: UNIFIL finds twenty Katyushas ready for launch, after Fatah al-Islam operatives planted them. 28 June: Hariri nominated as PM candidate by 86 MPs. 2 August: Jumblatt’s undertones towards March 8 and Syria, which he had not visited for five years. Week of 2 August: The beginning of the renovation of the Magen Avraham synagogue in the Wadi Abu Jmil area, downtown Beirut. There are around 200 Jews in Beirut. There are two other synagogues in Lebanon: one in ‘Alé and one in Sawfar. Before the outbreak of the 1975 war, there were eight synagogues in Beirut alone. In 2006, Hizbullah gave its permission for the renovation, but the July 2006 war froze the whole project for almost four years. 10 August: Israel threatened Lebanon with military action if Hizbullah joins the cabinet. 27 August: To Israel’s disappointment, the UNSC renewed Resolution 1701 for one year with the same rules of engagement. 2009

181

1 September: the Kuwiati daily “Al-Ra’i” reported that Daniel Bellemare, the chief judge appointed by the UN Tribunal to investigate Lebanese PM Rafiq Hariri’s murder28, interrogated al-‘Absi in a Syrian prison.29 24 November: Nasrallah met with Assad in Damascus (New TV, as reported by al-Nahar). 25 November: Reconciliatory meeting between ‘Aun and Jumblatt at the presidential palace in B‘abda, the first since Jumblatt’s visit to ‘Aun in Paris mid-April 2005. 30 November: Nasrallah announced Hizbullah’s new Manifesto through an extensive press conference. 2 December: ‘Aun met Cardinal Sfeir, and the Cabinet approved the policy statement with the reservation of five March-14 ministers. As a ritual practice and from the stance of upholding state sovereignty, five March-14 ministers registered their reservations regarding the policy statement: the two Lebanese Forces ministers Ibrahim Najjar and Salim Wardé; the two Phalangist ministers Michel Phar‘un and Salim al-Sayyigh; and Butrus Harb. 9 December: In a surprise visit that lasted only a few hours, ‘Aun met Bashar al-Assad at the “People’s Palace” in Damascus. 12 December: Hizbullah’s MP Dr. ‘Ali Fayyad gave a lecture at the Sorbonne, Paris. 14 December: President Michel Sulayman visits the US and holds a meeting with President Barack Obama. 19-20 December: A groundbreaking visit by Sa‘d al-Hariri to Damascus where Bashar al-Assad bent the protocol and hosted him in the Tishrin Presidential Palace that is reserved for presidents and kings. The meeting resulted in “positive and constructive talks” that diffused around five years of tensions between the two countries (ironically putting Hizbullah’s manifesto into effect and the policy statement also).

2010 10 January: A watershed reconciliatory meeting between Hizbullah and the PSP in Shwayfat in order to close the bad chapter of 11 May 2008 for good. 11 January: After 72 days of the first meeting at the presidential palace, Jumblatt visited ‘Aun at Rabyé. The meeting was intended to calm the waters of the popular base of both. March-8 MP Sulayman Franjiyyé affirmed that Hizbullah’s weapons were preventing the naturalization of the Palestinians in Lebanon. 12 January: In response to rumors that claimed that the Palestinian refugee camps had become a safe haven for al-Qa‘ida, Abu Muhjin – the Emir of the jihadi Salafi ‘Usbat Al-Ansar in ‘Ayn al-Hilwé – asserted on behalf of all the Palestinian factions in the camps: “We will not allow any person who does not



Chronology of Events (1975-2010)

182

have a Palestinian agenda to enter the camps.” He cited close cooperation in this regard between the PLO, Hamas, the Islamists, and Lebanese security forces.30 13 January: In a press conference, Nabih Berri explained his vision on a gradual plan for the abolition of political sectarianism. 14 January: Engineer Hasan Jishi, the CEO of Hizbullah’s Wa‘d project (Jihad al-Bina’), held a press conference where he announced that Wa‘d was rebuilding 244 of the 281 living complexes destroyed by the July war.31 25 January: The downing of an Ethiopian civilian airplane by a rocket fired from Na‘mé minutes after its departure from Beirut, killing the wife of the French ambassador to Lebanon as well as publicly unknown, leading Hizbullah cadres, as some media outlets claimed.32 Hizbullah’s Media Relations Office and its MPs vehemently denied that any of its cadres were on board. 16 February: Nasrallah delivered a televised speech celebrating a quarter of a century since the publication of Hizbullah’s first manifesto, the “Open Letter”, and in commemoration of the week of the Islamic Resistance honoring the Party’s three leading cadres: Shaykh Raghib Harb, Sayyid ‘Abbas Al-Musawi, and Hajj Imad Mughniyyé. In that mobilizational speech Nasrallah threatened to retaliate against any Israeli attack on Lebanon, asserting that his party has the military capabilities to strike any place in Israel. The Hizbullah leader threatened retribution for Imad Mughniyyé’s death at a convenient time for his party. 26 February: Extensive meeting in Damascus between President Bashar al-Asad of Syria, Ahmadinejad of Iran, Sayyid Hasan Nasrallah of Hizbullah, Hamas and other Palestinian cadres in order to coordinate efforts against the Israeli rhetoric of a new and major war.

2010

183

List of Abbreviations

AFP BDL CCSD CEO EU FI FM FPM GCC GLC IDF ISF IT LA LAF LBCI LDP LF NATO NGOs NNA MP PA PFLP PLO PM POWs

Agence France-Presse Banque du Liban – The Central Bank of Lebanon Consultative Center for Studies and Documentation (Hizbullah’s think tank) Chief Executive Officer European Union/Community Fatah al-Islam Foreign minister Free Patriotic Movement Gulf Cooperation Council Labor Unions Israeli Defense Forces Internal Security Forces (Lebanese Police) Information Technology Lebanese Army Lebanese Armed Forces Lebanese Broadcasting Corporation International Lebanese Democratic Party Lebanese Forces North Atlantic Treaty Organization non-governmental organizations (Lebanese) National News Agency Member of parliament Palestinian Authority Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine Palestinian Liberation Organization Prime minister Prisoners of war 185

PSP SLA SSNP STL UNDP UNICEF UNIFIL UNRWA UNSC



Progressive Socialist Party South Lebanon Army (now defunct) Syrian Social Nationalist Party Special Tribunal for Lebanon United Nations Development Program United Nations Children’s Fund United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon United Nations Relief and Works Agency (for Palestine Refugees in the Middle East) United Nations Security Council

List of Abbreviations

186

Glossary

Ahl al-dhimma, dhimmis

‘Amma Ajr Arkan al-Islam

Awliya’ Dahiya Batin Din Faqih

Fara’id Fatwa Fiqh Fitna Fuqaha’ Hadi

Non-Muslim residents within an Islamic state holding limited rights and required to pay a poll tax (jizya) in lieu of zakat ordinary people remuneration the five pillars of Islam: al-shahadatayyn Muslim credo: Testimony that there is no god but Allah (God), and that Muhammad is His Prophet, salat (prayer), sawm (fasting), hajj (pilgrimage to Mecca), and zakat (almsgiving) saints the southern suburb of Beirut that houses around 850,000 Shi‘ites esoteric religion jurisprudent or jurisconsult: an authority or expert in fiqh; in Shi‘ism faqih is synonymous with mujtahid religious duties a guiding, non-binding religious edict religious jurisprudence, elucidation, and application of Shari‘a discord, internal strife jurists guide

187

Hadith (Sunna)

Hajj Al-hala al-Islamiyya Halal Haqiqat Haram Hikma Hisbi

Hizbullah Hizbullahi Hujja Husnayayyn Ijtihad Ilgha’ al-ta’fiyya al-siyassiyya fi al-nufus, qabla al-nusus ‘Ilm Al-‘ilm al-muhit or al-ihatah fi al-‘ilm Infitah ‘Isma (ma‘sum) Al-istikhlaf bi al-nass wa al-ta‘yyin Al-istikhlaf bi al-shura wa al-bayy‘a Istishhad Jahiliyya Al-Jihad al-asghar

Glossary

traditional accounts of the sayings and doings of Prophet Muhammad, which became an important source for determining Islamic Law. They are made up of two parts: the names of the transmitters (isnad); and the text (matn) pilgrimage to Mecca Islamic religious-political sphere religiously sanctioned truth religiously prohibited divine wisdom (obeying) the religious and moral instructions of Islam. It can also cover a wide range of financial, administrative, political, and social matters. In short, hisbi matters are things that God does not allow us to forsake “Party of God” A member or follower of Hizbullah apodictic proof outcomes or rewards of jihad (martyrdom and victory) making religious decisions on the basis of independent reasoning the abolition of political sectarianism in the mentality, before abolishing it in the texts religious knowledge the Imam is the most learned in all branches of religious knowledge “opening-up” or Hizbullah integration in the Lebanese public sphere entails the impeccability, sinlessness, and infallibility of the Imams the Shi‘ites consider the Imamate a divine appointment the Sunnis consider the Caliphate as a political process that is the product of consensus martyrdom pre-Islamic pagan period in Arabia (smaller jihad): struggle (holy war) against the enemies of Islam 188

Al-Jihad al-akbar

Jizya Juhhal Kafir Khass wa ‘amm Khums (one-fifth)

Kitman Khususiyyat Lebanonization Ma‘nawi Madad Marja‘ al-taqlid/ muqallad

Marja‘iyya Al-mas’uliyya al-shar‘iyya Al-mas’uliyya al-shar‘iyya wa al-taklif al-shar‘i al-Ilahi (taklif) Mubaya‘a Mujahidin Mujtahid Muqallad Muqalidin Murshid ruhi Mustad‘afin Mustakbirin Muwatana Nass Al-Qada Glossary

(greater jihad): struggle against the self (jihad al-nafs) or individual’s service for the cause of religion poll tax ignorant people infidel private and public a religious tax comprising 20% of a person’s surplus on income over necessary living expenses. Half is paid to the marja‘ as the representative of the Imam (sahm al-Imam), and half to the Sayyids concealment specificities or particularities Hizbullah’s enrolment in Lebanese domestic political life moral influence support and reinforcement The supreme Islamic legal authority to be emulated or accepted for emulation by the majority of the Shi‘a in matters of religious practice and law religious authority legitimate and religious responsibility to the marja‘ or muqallad is loosely translated as “legitimate and religious responsibility” homage and pledge of allegiance, usually to God those who carry out jihad or freedom fighters a ‘alim or a high ranking Shi‘ite jurist who exercises ijtihad or independent reasoning see marja‘ al-taqlid followers of the muqallad in law and ritual spiritual guide or leader oppressed oppressors citizenship textual designation, or the specific designation of an Imam by the preceding Imam leaders 189

Rahbar

Fi sabili Allah Salat Sawm Shahada Shahid Shari‘a (divine or Islamic law)

Al-Sirat al-Mustaqim Sunna (hadith)

Al-ta‘a Ta‘bi’a Tafsir Tahkim Taklif Al-taklif al-shar‘i al-Ilahi Taqiyya Taqlid Taqwa Ta’wil Thawabit ‘Ulama Umma ‘Urfan Wajib Wakilayn shar‘iyyan Wilaya Glossary

leader of the Islamic Revolution. This title was assumed by Khumayni, and after his death, it was accorded to Khamina’i when he became the official marja‘ al-taqlid in 1995 in the way of God prayer fasting martyrdom martyr The whole set of norms, morals, and laws derived from the Islamic sources (mainly Qur‘an and hadith) pertaining to the various aspects of life of individual Muslims and the Muslim umma The “Straight Path” or the path of the righteous Traditions: the sayings and doings of Prophet Muhammad, which are considered the second source of Islamic Law (shari‘a), the Qur’an being the first strict obedience and discipline, which conveys a religious connotation mobilization textual, literal, or scriptural interpretation of the Qur‘an arbitration religious-legal obligation delegated responsibility/obligation of the muqalidin towards the muqallad expedient dissimulation emulation piety Shi‘ite hermeneutics or allegorical interpretation of the Qur‘an fixities, immutable principles, established sets of values and norms Muslim religious scholars the entire community of Muslims Shi‘ite theosophy religious duty or obligation religious deputies spiritual guidance 190

Wilayat al-Faqih Wilayat al-umma ‘ala nafsiha La yughsl wa la yukaffan Yaqin Yutashhad/ istashhadu Zahir Zakat Zu‘ama

Glossary

governance of the jurisprudent or jurisconsult the self-governance of the umma neither washed nor wrapped in a burial shroud strong conviction martyred exoteric almsgiving feudal leaders

191

Notes

abstract 1 Hizbullah’s Political Manifesto, Chapter II: “Lebanon”, Section 5: “Lebanon and the Arab Relations”. First edition. Beirut: Media Relations Office, 2009, 49. 2 Ibid., Chapter II, Section 6: “Lebanon and Islamic Relations”, 51-2.

introduction 1 The Open Letter was published as “Al-Nass Al-Harfi Al-Kamil li-Risalat Hizbullah ila al-Mustad‘afinin [The Original Text in Full of Hizbullah’s Open Letter to the Oppressed]”, al-‘Ahd (Friday 3 Jamadi al-Thani 1405 AH, 22 February 1985), 5-8. The Open Letter was read at the Uza‘i mosque one week earlier, on Saturday, February 16, 1985, by Hizbullah’s spokesman at the time, Sayyid Ibrahim Amin al-Sayyid. 2 Al-Intiqad is Hizbullah’s official mouthpiece and weekly newspaper. It was established on 18 June 1984 as al-‘Ahd, but changed its name and orientation in 2001, thus conveying a “secular” image by dropping the Qur’anic substantiation (5:56), on the right side, and removing the portrait of Khumayni and Khamina’i, on the left side. The last issue of al-‘Ahd was number 896, dated 6 April 2001 or 12 Muharram 1422 AH; the first issue of al-Intiqad was number 897, dated 20 April 2001 or 26 Muharram 1422 AH. The last hard-copy issue of Al-Intiqad was number 1267, dated 30 May 2008. Since number 1268, dated 6 June 2008, Al-Intiqad was only available electronically and initially published bi-weekly on Fridays and Tuesdays, until it settled as a Friday weekly once more, but with only the date, no number. See http://www.alintiqad.com/

193

3 Hizbullah is not monopolizing the use of religion, as Roy seems to imply, rather the party employs the word Hizbullah in an extended, inclusive, and progressive sense, which includes all believers from all religious denominations. Hajj Muhammad Al-Jammal, Hizbullah’s spokesman at the time, argued along these lines on the occasion of receiving a Danish delegation – composed of students, researchers, and faculty, mainly from Arhus University and the University of Southern Copenhagen, and some Danish journalists – at the Central Information Office, 30 March 1999. Cf. Olivier Roy, Globalised Islam: The Search for a New Umma. Revised and updated edition. London: Hurst and Company, 2004, 249, 329. 4 Cf. As‘ad Abu Khalil, “Ideology and Practice of Hizbollah in Lebanon: Islamization of Leninist Organizational Principles”, Middle Eastern Studies, 27 (July 1991), 3, 395; and Roy, op. cit, 247-248. 5 Sayyid Muhammad Husayn Fadlallah, Ma‘ Al-Hikma fi Khat Al-Islam [Wisdom in the Way of Islam]. Beirut: Dar Al-Wafa’, 1985, 46-54. This bears some similarity to the Prophetic tradition where the Prophet spent 13 years in Mecca practicing his call and succeeded in converting only 83 people to Islam. When his life was in danger, according to Islamic belief, God ordered him to emigrate to Medina. He heeded and consolidated his call, and made Medina the base for spreading the mission of Islam. 6 “Now, whether or not an Islamist movement [Hizbullah] becomes truly radical hinges on whether or not it rejects the very validity and legitimacy of the local state and seeks universal revolution to undermine it in the name of the ideal umma (italics in original)… Yet other Muslim radicals, perhaps non-violent, possess utopian views that perceive the creation of an ‘Islamic state’ as the solution to all problems, or as a way to empower the Muslim world and restore the power of the Muslim civilization”. Graham E. Fuller, The Future of Political Islam. New York: Palgrave, Macmillan, 2003, 17, 88. 7 By political Maronism, Hizbullah means the leading Maronite notables and their retinue, which constitute the symbols of the Lebanese political system. Their retinue included the Sunni prime minister (PM) and the Shi‘a speaker who were completely under their command, blindly exercising their political whim and will. The late PM Sami al-Solh said that the PM was only “ketchup” in the hands of the president. Thus, from 1943 to 1990 the Muslims, in general, and the Shi‘ites, in particular, had been politically marginalized since the Maronites wielded economic and political power and had absolute control over the country’s resources and riches. Joseph Alagha, The Shifts in Hizbullah’s Ideology. Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press, 2006, 23. 8 Muhammad Z‘aytir, Nazra ‘ala Tarh Al-Jumhuriyya Al-Islamiyya fi Lubnan [ A look at the Proposal of the Islamic Republic in Lebanon]. Beirut: Al-Wikala AlSharqiyya lil-Tawzi‘, 1988. Notes

194

9 Muslim attitudes towards the Maronites might have been influenced, in part, by the Maronite role outlined by the French colonial mandate following the SykesPicot Agreement of 1916, which partitioned the Levant between the French (Lebanon and Syria) and the British (Palestine, Jordan, and Iraq). The National Pact of 1943, which is an oral agreement not drafted in the 1926 Constitution, stipulated that the PM be Sunni Muslim, the Speaker Shi‘ite, and the following Maronites: The President of the Republic; the Commander of the Army; the Governor of the Central Bank (BDL); and the Head of the Labor Unions (GLC). However, article 95 of Section 6 of the 1943 Constitution – which was amended by a constitutional law issued on November 9, 1943 – gave some hope for the Shi‘ites of a fairer representation in the future: “Temporarily and from the stance of justice and national reconciliation, the sects are represented in a just manner in public employment and in the formation of the Council of Ministers, without harming state interest”. Alagha, op. cit., 23. 10 Sayyid Muhammad Husayn Fadlallah, Al-Islam wa Mantiq Al-Quwwa [Islam and the Logic of Power]. Beirut: Dar Al-Huruf, 1987, 258ff. 11 Imam Khumayni issued a fatwa stressing that the Lebanese system is illegitimate and criminal. In 1986 Khamina’i clarified Khumayni’s fatwa, arguing for the necessity of the Muslims to rule Lebanon since they comprise the majority of the population. (Tawfiq Al-Madini, Amal wa Hizbullah fi Halabat al-Mujabahat al-Mahaliyya wa al-Iqlimiyya [Amal and Hizbullah in the Arena of Domestic and Regional Struggles]. Damascus: Al-Ahli, 1999, 162-163; Waddah Sharara, Dawlat Hizbullah: Lubnan Mujtama‘an Islamiyyan [The State of Hizbullah: Lebanon as an Islamic Society], 4th. ed., Beirut: Al-Nahar, 2006, 342). The chief of staff of the Iranian revolutionary guards in Lebanon stressed that Hizbullah and the Revolutionary Guards are going to bring down the Maronite regime just as the Iranians brought down the Shah. (Al-Anwar 9 February 1988) 12 Residents within an Islamic state holding limited rights and required to pay a tax in lieu of almsgiving (zakat). 13 Sayyid Muhammad Husayn Fadlallah, “Reflections on the Muslim-Christian Dialogue”, a lecture delivered at the American University of Beirut, 22 December 1987. 14 Sharara, op. cit., 348. 15 “The Union of Muslim ‘Ulama” was established in the wake of the Israeli invasion in June 1982. 16 Al-Harakat Al-Islamiyya fi Lubnan [Islamic Movements in Lebanon]. Beirut: Al-Shira‘, 1984; and ‘Ali Al-Kurani, Tariqat Hizbullah fi Al-’Amal Al-Islami [Hizbullah’s Method of Islamic Mobilization]. Tehran, Maktab Al-I‘lam Al-Islami: Al-Mu’assa Al-‘Alamiyya, 1985, especially 147-163. 17 Imam Khumayni, Al-Kalimat Al-Qisar: Al-Islam wa A‘malina [Short Words: Islam and our Works], p. 193, as cited in: Rafiq Sulayman Fidda, Athar Al-Imam notes to introduction

195

Al-Khymayni ala Al-Qadiyya Al-Filastiniyya [Imam Khymayni’s Impact on the Palestinian Cause]. Beirut: n.d., 170. 18 Westoxification, a term coined in the 1960s by an Iranian intellectual called Jalal al-Ahmad, denotes the venomous Western civilizational influence and hegemony over other civilizations and cultures. 19 The UK has replaced France, which is classified by Hizbullah as a neutral state, rather than the original position of being regarded as a foe. It is worth noting that France was on Iraq’s side during the 1980-1988 Iraq-Iran war. 20 Fadeel M. Abun-Nasr, Hizbullah: Haqa’iq wa Ab‘ad [Hizbullah: Facts and Dimensions]. Beirut: World Book Publishing, 2003, 72-73. 21 Al-Madini, Amal wa Hizbullah…, 172; and documents collected by the author from the Party’s think tank, the Consultative Center of Studies and Documentation (CCSD). 22 Hasan Fadlallah, Al-Khiyar al-Akhar: Hizbullah: al-Sira al-Dhatiyya wa alMawqif [The Other Choice: Hizbullah’s Autobiography and Stance]. Beirut: Dar al-Hadi, 1994, 137. 23 Al-Madini, Amal wa Hizbullah…, 172-4; and documents collected by the author at the CCSD. 24 Nasrallah’s cousin from his mother’s side (ibn khaltu). 25 See Hizbullah’s political declaration of 7 July 1995; Al-Madini, Amal wa Hizbullah…, 174-5; al-Safir 8 July 1995: “Hizbullah Reelects Sayyid Nasrallah as Secretary General”, and al-Nahar 29 July 1995: “Leadership Changes in Hizbullah”. 26 Al-Safir 6 August 1998; Al-Madini, Amal wa Hizbullah…, 178-9; and Imad Marmal, “The Results of Hizbullah’s Conclave”, al-Safir 1 August 1998. Marmal is al-Safir columnist and al-Manar political talk show presenter. 27 According to documents collected by the author at the CCSD. 28 Interview with al-Bilad 12 October 1994. 29 Hizbullah is careful to clarify that its animosity is towards the US administration, and not the US people. (This seems to be in conformity with Khumayni’s discourse on hakimiyyat Allah or “God’s Sovereignty”, which is tolerant towards the populace, but not the ruling elite. This stands in sharp contrast to Bin Laden’s nihilist discourse that does not distinguish between the two.) 30 See Nicholas Blanford, “Hizbullah to issue updated version of manifesto: New ‘Open Letter’ will reflect changes”, Daily Star (28 October 2002), 2. 31 Reinoud Leenders, “Hizbullah: Rebel Without a Cause?” ICG Middle East Briefing Paper, 30 July 2003, 19. (http://www.crisisweb.org/projects/middleeast/ arab-israeliconflict/reports/A401070_30072003.pdf). 32 Interviewee wishes to remain anonymous. This person contended 16 February was the intended date of launching the new document.

Notes

196

33 Daniel Sobelman, Rules of the Game: Israel and Hizbullah After the Withdrawal from Lebanon. Memorandum no. 69. Tel Aviv University: Jaffee Center for strategic Studies, 21, 23. 34 Ibid., 103. 35 Two leading cadres in the Islamic Resistance were assassinated by blowing up their cars: Ghalib Awali on 19 July 2004 and Ali Husayn Salih on 2 August 2003. The Lebanese government and Hizbullah accused Israel of being behind these assassinations; Israel repeatedly denied any involvement or responsibility in these attacks. 36 The late Ayatullah Sayyid Muhammad Husayn Fadlallah (d. 4 July 2010) was the highest ranking religious authority in Lebanon and the local authority of emulation (marja‘) who still has following among the Shi‘ite community in Lebanon and who wielded power and influence over the Islamists. Many considered him Hizbullah’s spiritual leader, a charge which he persistently denied. It is interesting to note that Fadlallah’s declaration of ‘id al-fitr at the end of Ramadan in 2002, which coincided with that of the (Sunni) Mufti of the Lebanese Republic, split the Dahiya, Hizbullah’s main constituency in Beirut, between Hizbullah’s adherents of the Iranian religious authority and Fadlallah’s followers who celebrated the ‘id a day before the Hizbullahis. Such eventualities increase the tensions between Hizbullah and the Iranians, on the one hand, and Fadlallah and his followers, on the other. 37 See “ ‘Abna’ Al-Tufayli’ Yuhajimun Nasrallah [Tufayli’s Followers Chastise Nasrallah]”, al-Safir 5 July 2004. 38 Compiled from al-Safir 17 and 18 August 2004; Lebanese daily newspapers of 18 August 2004; and “Hizbullah’s Seventh Conclave: Vivid Organization, Stability of Leadership, and A Follow-up on Recent Events”, al-Intiqad 1071 (20 August 2004). 39 At the time of the appointment, Rima Fakhry was a 38-year-old mother of four. She has been a Hizbullah member since the age of 18. She also holds a BSc in Agriculture from the American University of Beirut. Al-Safir 5 January 2005; Daily Star 6 and 7 January 2005; al-Intiqad 1091 (7 January 2005). 40 This seems to suggest, more and more, the credibility of Hizbullah’s infitah policy. 41 See Lebanese daily newspapers of 20 November 2009, especially al-Safir 11452; and al-Safir 11454 (24 November 2009). 42 No wonder the conclave took a lot of time since a new manifesto was also in the works. 43 http://www.moqawama.org/essaydetails.php?eid=16230&cid=199; http://english. moqawama.org/essaydetails.php?eid=9567&cid=214

notes to introduction

197

44 The leadership realized that the pen name of Jawad Nureddine did not save Imad Mughniyyé from assassination. So, they decided not only to keep the name a secret, but also not to announce the eighth member at all. 45 After the Manifesto was released, it attracted a lot of media coverage to the extent that it was item number one on the news, and Nasrallah’s press conference took center stage by being portrayed on the front page and in editorials of most Lebanese dailies. 46 Personal interview, 23 November 2009. 47 Most of these rhyme in Arabic; so it is difficult to capture the exact meaning and implications/connotations in an English translation. See “Order Stems from Religious Belief and its Reflection on the Street”, al-Intiqad (20 November 2009), p. 4. 48 http://www.almanar.com.lb/NewsSite/NewsDetails. aspx?id=116716&language=ar (Accessed 24 December 2009). 49 See Lebanese daily newspapers of 20 November 2009, especially al-Safir 11452; and al-Safir 11454 (24 November 2009). Although in its 17 November 2009 copy under “Press Secrets” al-Akhbar was the first to announce the end of the conclave, it is interesting to note that it is perhaps the only Lebanese daily that did not mention anything on the issue in its 20 November editorial. Al-Safir showed the most extensive coverage, but it mistakenly stated the seventh conclave instead of the eighth. 50 Chapter II, Section 7: “Lebanon and International Relations”, p. 54. 51 Chapter I, Section 2: “Our region and the American Scheme”, pp. 24-25. 52 Chapter II, Section 7: “Lebanon and International Relations”, p. 56. 53 Chapter II, Section 7: “Lebanon and International Relations”, pp. 54-55. 54 Chapter III, Section 1: “Palestine and the Zionist entity”, p. 60. 55 Chapter III, Section 1: “Palestine and the Zionist entity”, 58. 56 Chapter I, Section 1: “The World and Western-American Hegemony”, p. 21. 57 Chapter II, Section 7: “Lebanon and International Relations”, pp. 55-56. 58 This sentence is taken from Hizbullah’s understanding with the FPM, Section II, entitled “Consensual Democracy”. See page 105. 59 Chapter II, Section 5: “Lebanon and Arab Relations”, p. 49 60 Chapter II, Section 6: “Lebanon and Islamic Relations”, pp. 51-2. 61 Chapter II, Section 5: “Lebanon and Arab Relations”, p. 47. 62 Chapter II, Section 6: “Lebanon and Islamic Relations”, p. 50. 63 Al-‘Ahd (Friday 3 Jamadi al-Thani 1405 AH), 8, as cited in: The Shifts in Hizbullah’s Ideology, 236. 64 Chapter II, Section 6: “Lebanon and Islamic Relations”, p.53. 65 “The term resource mobilization is used to refer to the ways a social movement utilizes such resources as money, political influence, access to the media, and personnel. The success of a movement for change will depend in good part on Notes

198

how effectively it mobilizes its resources.” Richard T. Schaefer and Robert P. Lamm, Sociology. Sixth Edition. New York: McGraw-Hill, Inc., 1998, 584.

1 Primary documents 1 The Open Letter was published as “Al-Nass Al-Harfi Al-Kamil li-Risalat Hizbullah ila al-Mustad‘afinin [The Original Text in Full of Hizbullah’s Open Letter to the Oppressed]”, al-‘Ahd (Friday 3 Jamadi al-Thani 1405 AH, 22 February 1985), 5-8. The Open Letter was read at the Uza‘i mosque one week earlier, on Saturday, 16 February 1985, by Hizbullah’s spokesman at the time, Sayyid Ibrahim Amin al-Sayyid. 2 The word husnayayyn in (9:52) is taken to refer to martyrdom (of the self) and victory (for the umma): “Say: ‘Do you expect from us anything other than one of the two fairest outcomes (martyrdom and victory); while we await that Allah will smite you with punishment, either from Him, or at our hands?’ So wait and watch, we are waiting and watching you.” 3 Al-‘Ahd (Friday 3 Jamadi al-Thani 1405 AH), 5. 4 Al-‘Ahd (Friday 3 Jamadi al-Thani 1405 AH), 5. It is most likely that this verse shelters Hizbullah with a religious legitimacy for its political ideology. The verse refers to the idea of free choice and free will, whereby in the end the people (believers) find out that religion is the Truth. Thus, religion is found through freedom of choice, and not by imposition of the truth. The application of this is that Hizbullah will not impose its faith or ideology on anyone. The choice is ultimately left to the individual, but s/he must beware of the Qur’anic injunction. My interpretation is borne out by the following explanation: “Our choice in our limited Free-will involves a corresponding personal responsibility. We are offered the Truth: again and again it is pressed on our attention. If we reject it, we must take all the terrible consequences which are prefigured in the Fire of Hell. Its flames and roof will completely enclose us like a tent. Ordinarily there is water to quench the heat of thirst: here the only drink will be like molten brass, thick, heavy, burning, sizzling. Before it reaches the mouth of the unfortunates, drops of it will scald their faces as it is poured out”. A. Yusuf Ali, The Holy Qur’an: Translation and Commentary. Fourth printing. Lahore: Islamic Propagation Center, 1993, 738. 5 Al-‘Ahd (Friday 3 Jamadi al-Thani 1405 AH), 5. According to Shaykh Na‘im Qasim, the three terms denoted in bold above are the constituents of Hizbullah’s religious ideology: 1) belief in Shi‘a Islam; 2) wilayat al-faqih (guardianship of the jurisprudent or jurisconsult); 3) and jihad (struggle) fi sabili Allah (in the way of God). Na‘im Qasim, Hizbullah: Al-Manhaj, Al-Tajriba, Al-Mustaqbal

notes to Primary documents

199

[Hizbullah: The Curriculum, the Experience, the Future]. Seventh revised and updated edition. Beirut: Dar Al-Mahajja Al-Bayda’, 2010, 40-90. 6 This reasoning seems to be in conformity with the Qur’anic verse (7:33): “the things that my Lord has indeed forbidden are: shameful deeds/debaucheries, whether open or secret.” 7 Al-‘Ahd (Friday 3 Jamadi al-Thani 1405 AH), 5. 8 It is worth mentioning that as late as the summer of 1998, a Hizbullah poster appeared, in its major constituencies, with this slogan and below it a US flag was depicted with bombs instead of stars. 9 In reference to the September 1982 “massacres” of the Palestinian civilians in the Sabra and Shatila refugee camps bordering Hizbullah’s stronghold in southern Beirut. 10 Philip Habib was a Lebanese-American envoy and negotiator sent by the US administration to diffuse and solve the crisis that resulted from the June 1982 Israeli invasion of Lebanon, which resulted in the besiegement of Beirut for 83 days and the evacuation of the PLO. 11 Al-‘Ahd (Friday 3 Jamadi al-Thani 1405 AH), 5. 12 This is a direct reference to the Lebanese civil war that was started on 13 April 1975. 13 The Lebanese Forces became the military wing of the Phalangists. 14 A reference to the “ethnic cleansing” that was practiced by the Christian militias against the Muslims in East Beirut and the Christian areas between 1975-1976. According to the right-wing al-Nahar daily, the Christian militias stormed and destroyed the Palestinian Jisr al-Basha camp on 29 June 1976 and the Tal alZa‘tar camp on 12 August 1976, killing around 1,600 persons in the latter camp. (Al-Nahar 13 August 1976). Palestinian sources claimed that 2,500 were killed, out of a total estimated population of 35,000. Nab‘a, Burj Hammud, Sibnih, Ghawarina district and Jubayl housed a good number of Shi‘a ghettos at the time. 15 In reference to his presumed role in the Sabra-Shatila massacre. Bashir Jumayyel, the head of the Phalangist Christian militia, was elected president on 23 August 1982. On 14 September 1982, he was assassinated by a car bomb. 16 Under the auspices of ex-President Elias Sarkis, the Lebanese president from 1976-1982. 17 Amin Jumayyel, Bashir’s brother, was elected as president of the Lebanese Republic on 23 September 1982. He remained in office for the next six years. 18 Al-‘Ahd (Friday 3 Jamadi al-Thani 1405 AH), 5-6. Actually, Lebanon was the second Arab country to sign a peace treaty with Israel. However, this was short lived since in March 1984 the Lebanese parliament abrogated the 17 May 1983 agreement with Israel.

Notes

200

19 Ironically, this expression is reminiscent of al-Qa‘ida and Bin Laden’s discourse, who might have appropriated the term from Hizbullah, their ideological enemies. 20 A direct reference to the suicidal attacks against the US Embassy in West Beirut, on the one hand, and Marines barracks and the French paratroopers headquarters, on the other. See the “Chronology of Events”. 21 In reference to Hizbullah’s first suicidal operation by Ahmad Qasir on 11 November 1982 and the third suicidal operation by Ja‘far Al-Tayyar on 14 October 1984. See the “Chronology of Events”. 22 At the time of the publication of the Open Letter, the IDF had already with­ drawn from Sidon; in April it withdrew further south from Nabatiyyé and Tyre; and finally in June it withdrew to its 1978 established “Security Zone.” See the “Chronology of Events”. 23 A reference to the establishment of an Islamic state in Lebanon. 24 Al-‘Ahd (Friday 3 Jamadi al-Thani 1405 AH), 6. 25 A common aphorism is the following: “The enemy of my enemy is my friend.” 26 Al-‘Ahd (Friday 3 Jamadi al-Thani 1405 AH), 6. 27 Ibid. 28 Ibid. 29 Ibid. 30 By the “Lebanese political system”, Hizbullah was referring to “political Maronism”, or the sectarian division of governmental and vocational posts, where the Maronites appropriate the top positions, including the President of the Republic; the Commander of the Army; the Governor of the Central Bank (BDL); and the head of the Labor Unions (GLC). 31 Al-‘Ahd (Friday 3 Jamadi al-Thani 1405 AH), 6. 32 A political-military consortium of the Christian right militias. Now it is defunct. The “Lebanese Front” and the “Lebanese Forces” are in quotation marks because Hizbullah does not grant either any legitimacy whatsoever. 33 Al-‘Ahd (Friday 3 Jamadi al-Thani 1405 AH), 6-7. 34 Al-‘Ahd (Friday 3 Jamadi al-Thani 1405 AH), 7. 35 Ibid. 36 Ibid. 37 Cf. The Syrian Social Nationalist Party (SSNP) nationalist discourse of: “In you is a power, which if actualized will change the course of history”. 38 Al-‘Ahd (Friday 3 Jamadi al-Thani 1405 AH), 7. 39 Ibid. 40 Ibid. 41 Al-‘Ahd (Friday 3 Jamadi al-Thani 1405 AH), 7-8. 42 Ibid., 8. 43 Ibid. notes to Primary documents

201

44 Hizbullah appropriated this section of the Open Letter, almost word by word, from the section entitled, “The Grave Responsibilities of the Muslim ‘ulama”, in: Imam Khumayni’s Al-Jihad Al-Akbar [Greater Jihad]. Translated by Husayn Kurani. Tehran: Islamian Grand Library, 1980, 9-10. The same statement of refining the self before refining others is repeated and borne out in the article entitled, “The Spiritual-Dynamic Force of the Islamic Revolution – Second Episode: The Ideological and Social Change… A New Conception of Jihad”, in: al-‘Ahd (10 Shawwal 1405/28 June 1985), 9. Cf. Norton’s inability to translate and contextualize this concept of greater jihad, thus leaving this section blank in his translation of the Open Letter. Augustus Richard Norton, Amal and the Shi‘a Struggle for the Soul of Lebanon. Austin: University Press of Texas, 1987, 185. 45 It is alleged that he was killed because of his multi-volume book entitled, The Causes Responsible for Materialist Tendencies in the West. See http://www.alislam.org/al-tawhid/1-west.htm 46 The Iraqi regime executed him on 9 April 1980 after making him watch his sister being raped. It is no wonder that Hizbullah considers Imam Musa al-Sadr and Sayyid Muhammad Baqir al-Sadr among its ideologues and leaders. (See http://www.nasrollah.org/english/index.htm; last accessed August 2004.) Hizbullah leaders (al-qada or ideologues) are listed, from ascending to descending order, as follows: Imam Khumayni (Iranian), Imam Khamina’i (Iranian), the martyr al-Sayyid Muhammad Baqir al-Sadr (Iraqi), Sayyid Musa al-Sadr (Iranian-Lebanese), the martyr al-Sayyid Abbas al-Musawi (Lebanese), Sayyid Hasan Nasrallah (Lebanese), and the martyr Shaykh Raghib Harb (Lebanese). Thus, not all of Hizbullah’s leaders are fuqaha’ (plural of faqih), even though they are all clergymen. Also, it appears that Hizbullah’s most prominent ideologues are transnational, rather than Lebanese. The word “Rahbar” in Persian, which means leader of the Islamic Revolution, is the title assumed by Khumayni, and after his death, it was accorded to Khamina’i when he succeeded him in 1995. 47 Al-‘Ahd (Friday 3 Jamadi al-Thani 1405 AH), 8. 48 Al-‘Ahd (Friday 3 Jamadi al-Thani 1405 AH), 8. Thus, the Open Letter ended as it started: with a Qur’anic substantiation. Hizbullah is not claiming the absolute Truth, since Truth is from God. God is the only Truth, we (Hizbullah) do not know if our discourse reveals the Truth. If there is anybody who refuses our ideas and discourse, then God will be the ultimate judge. However, Hizbullah claims the truth, but not the ultimate Truth, which is only known by God. This seems in line with classical Islamic discourse where the wrong is perceived from the self, and not from God. Therefore, Hizbullah is trying to employ a pluralist discourse, which is very different from post-modernist discourse and philosophy because it is based on the metaphysical underpinning of relations underscoring the difference between the relative truth and the absolute transcendent Truth. While the post-modernists seem to be agnostic, the Islamists, Notes

202

including Hizbullah, seem to be theists. After all, God is transcendent: “No one knows God but God” (la y‘rif Allah illa Allah). This seems in line with what Imam ‘Ali has said: “incapability of cognizance is cognizance” (al‘ajzu ‘ann al-idrak idrak). The solution might be the hadith qudsi: “I [God] was a hidden treasure and I wanted to be known, so I created and through me, they knew me” (kuntu kanzan makhfiyyan fa aradtu an u‘raf fa khalaqtu al-khalq fa bi ‘arafuni). [I think this hadith is related to the Islamic explanation of cosmology. Although there is a controversial discussion among Islamic scholars about the validity of this hadith, making it highly vulnerable to criticism, there seems to be a clue in the Qur’an to justify this hadith since it is written that human beings are created in the image of God. Thus, the existential aspect of human life is related to or goes back to or is ultimately referred back to God. It is worth mentioning that Ibn ‘Arabi argued that this hadith is correct through God’s revelation to him (sahih bi-al-mukashafa), which is a speculative way of defending his argument]. The weakness is that human beings never fully understand God; this is the true understanding. Thus, one does not know God, but only the signs of God, i.e. ‘alam (creature) and verses of the scripture, both are referred to as aya, and both are signs; this is the way God reveals Himself to us. That is why we say Rab al-‘alamin (God of the creatures). Thus, human beings understand the signs, not the absolute, and Hizbullah seems to imply and abide by this interpretation. In short, when Hizbullah opposes itself and its discourse to the oppressors (al-qawn al-zalimin), it is indirectly claiming truth on its side. Therefore, there is an aspect of relativism in Hizbullah’s discourse. It is worth mentioning that from a theological perspective, aya has different meanings; however, it is very important to look at the generic meaning. The generic meaning of aya is sign, but the specific meaning is a sentence in the scripture (verse). Both uses are warranted in the Qur’an. Generic sense: “There are in the creation of Heavens and the earth and the alteration of night and day real signs [ayat] for people and understanding” (3:190); verse in the scripture: “Yet they are not all alike. Within the People of the Book, there is an upright nation [group] who recites Allah’s revelations/signs [ayat], throughout the night, while prostrating themselves” (3:113). 49 http://almashriq.hiof.no/lebanon/300/320/324/324.2/hizballah/hizballah-background.html (Last accessed August 2005). 50 http://almashriq.hiof.no/lebanon/300/320/324/324.2/hizballah/statement01.html (Last accessed August 2005). 51 http://www.hizbollah.org/english/frames/index_eg.htm (Last accessed August 2004). 52 Hizbullah believes that Israel has nuclear capabilities to wipe out all Arab countries, at least by destroying their capital cities. However, extending that claim to all Muslim countries seems a bit exaggerated and untenable. notes to Primary documents

203

53 Although Hizbullah translated jumhuriyya Islamiyya (Islamic Republic) as Islamic Government, I prefer to stick to the exact translation as mentioned in the original Arabic text. 54 The 1996 April Understanding.

2 election programs 1 My translation is based upon Hizbullah’s original document released by Hizbullah’s Central Press Office in July 1992. 2 It is worth mentioning that “establish them firmly in the land” connotes grant­ ing them political power. This is reminiscent of the Prophet who established the Islamic community in Medina. So once Hizbullah obtains authority or political power, it will pay due attention to the private sphere of prayer, and the social or public sphere of alms-giving as well as commanding the good and prohibiting the evil. Yusuf ‘Ali comments on the following verse by arguing: “The justification of the righteous in resisting oppression when not only they but their Faith is persecuted and when they are led by a righteous Imam, is that it is a form of self-sacrifice. They are not fighting for themselves, for land, power, or prestige. They are fighting for the right”. The Holy Qur’an…, 862. 3 It seems that Hizbullah is asking for the legitimacy of the people. I also think that Hizbullah’s apologetic discourse, which sanctions the Islamists to participate in the electoral process, reflects the heated internal debates among Hizbullah’s cadres and leadership, which eventually led to the production and propagation of such a program. 4 This is reminiscent of socialist-Marxist discourse. 5 A reference to the 1985 Israeli withdrawal and the formation of its self-declared “Security Zone”. 6 Hizbullah is stressing its resistance identity as an Islamic jihadi movement. 7 It is worth mentioning that the abolition of political sectarianism is stipulated in article 95 of the Ta’if Agreement. 8 All that has been achieved on the way to the abolishment of political sectarianism until now is that, in 2004, the Lebanese parliament formed a committee which is supposed to look into the abolishment of political sectarianism. 9 Lebanon lost the Seven Villages to Israel during the 1948 war. (See for instance, Al-Jam‘iyya Al-Ijtima‘iyya Al-Thaqafiyya Li-Abna’ Al-Qura Al-Sabi‘, Al-Qura Al-Sabi‘ Al-Lubnaniyya Al-Muhtalla: Dirasa Qanuniyya-Ijtima‘iyya [The Seven Lebanese Occupied Villages: A Legal-Social Study]. First edition. Beirut: Al-Markaz Al-Istishari Lil-Dirasat, November 2003). The Arabs of Wadi Khaled were granted Lebanese nationality in 1994.

Notes

204

10 It is ironic to note that three decades after the end of the Lebanese civil war, the file of the displaced citizens has still not been closed. 11 This was accomplished in 2003 by the government-sponsored Center of Research and Development (Markaz Al-Buhuth wa Al-Inma’). However, till now there is no unified national history textbook at the university level, precisely because the notion of consensual history is entirely lacking. 12 http://almashriq.hiof.no/lebanon/300/320/324/324.2/hizballah/hizballah-platform.html (Last accessed August 2005). As translated from a four-page document entitled “Al-Barnamaj Al-Intikhabi Li-Hizbullah”, issued by Hizbullah’s Central Press Office in the summer of 1996. In the translation, I denote where every page ends in the original Arabic text. 13 Yusuf ‘Ali argues, “The Way of God (al-sirat al-mustaqim) is a Straight Way. But men have strayed from it into all directions. And there are numerous Paths by which they can get back to the Right Way, the Way in which the purity of their own nature, and Will and mercy of God, require them to walk. All these numerous Paths become open to them once they give their hearts in keeping to God and work in the right Endeavor (jihad) with all their mind and soul and resources. Thus they will get out of the Spider’s web of this frail world and attain eternal Bliss in the fulfillment of their true destiny”. The Holy Qur’an…, 1048. 14 I prefer this translation: “But those who struggle [jahadu] in Our cause, surely We shall guide them in Our ways [paths]; and God is with the good-doers” (29:69). This Qur’anic justification is usually used to sanction jihad, or holy war. Theologically it falls within the domain of the controversy regarding free will and predestination. Those who argue for free will employ this verse by claiming, “God will help us if we struggle”. Thus, Hizbullah broadens the mandate of the term jihad employing it in the elections, and does not confine it only to the battlefield. This falls within the earlier distinction made between jihad in the battlefield (smaller jihad) and jihad against the self (greater jihad), which is the context in which this verse is employed. 15 Ibid., p. 1. 16 Ibid., p. 2. 17 Ibid., p. 3. 18 Ibid., p. 4. 19 My translation is based upon “The Electoral Program of Hizbullah: Priorities and Continuations”, Al-‘Ahd 863 (18 August 2000), 4. 20 Based on this Qur’anic verse, one can argue that Hizbullah’s engagement in the elections is based on the stance that one should not neglect the here and now, the present life for the sake of the hereafter since any Hizbullahi aspires for “felicity in this world and the world to come” (al-sa‘ada fi al-darayyn). Yusuf ‘Ali comments on the verse by arguing, “That is, spend your wealth on charity and good works. It is God who has given it to you, and you should spend it on God’s notes to election programs

205

cause. Nor should you forget the legitimate needs of this life, as misers do, and most people become misers who think too exclusively of their wealth. If wealth is not used properly, three evils will follow: 1) its possessor may be a miser and forget all claims due to himself and those around him; 2) he may forget the higher needs of the poor and needy, or the good causes which require support; and 3) he may even misspend on occasions and cause a great deal of harm and mischief ”. The Holy Qur’an…, 1023. 21 “And they give food, despite their love of it, to the destitute, the orphan and the captive. [They say]: “We only feed you for the sake of Allah; We do not want from you any reward or gratitude” (76:8-9). Hizbullah broadens the mandate of ithar – from fasting for three days and preferring to feed others, rather than the self – to include the giving of blood for the sake of the umma. 22 In addition to being plagued by sectarianism and confessionalism, the Lebanese system is characterized by nepotism and favoritism. It is based on the slogans “I’ll scratch your back, if you scratch mine” and “What will I get out of it?”, etc. 23 This seems to refer to the demarcation of the Blue line, in which Lebanon gained back 17,756,600 square meters of its southern land along the Israeli border, and the ‘Seven Villages’ that were seized from Lebanon during the 1948 war with Israel. 24 This clause is mentioned in the Preamble to Lebanon’s 1990 constitution that was the fruit of the Ta‘if Agreement. 25 On 5 August 2004, a new pension-retirement plan, which would create the much anticipated public retirement system, was approved by the Lebanese Cabinet; however, its implementation still awaits the parliament’s approval. It is ironic to note that such a plan was proposed in 1965 by the Social Affairs Minister, but then never came into effect. 26 I was told by Hizbullah cadres that this is an edited and appended version of the 1998 municipal election program after the recommendations of Hizbullah’s “First Municipal Conference” held on 16 July 2002. It is worth mentioning that these points have been outlined before, during, and after the elections, but not in considerable detail, in the following al-Intiqad issues: 1054 (23 April 2004); 1055 (30 April 2004); 1056 (7 May 2004); 1057 (14 May 2004); 1058 (21 May 2004); 1059 (28 May 2004); 1060 (4 June 2004). 27 See the cover page of Mu’tamar Al-Baladiyyat Al-Awwal [The First Municipal Conference/Convention]. Beirut: Hizbullah’s Central Press Office, 16 July 2002. 28 Ibid., 3. 29 Ibid., 4. 30 Ibid., 5-6. 31 Ibid., 7. 32 This is a pressing problem in Lebanon that causes many men to emigrate. 33 Mu’tamar Al-Baladiyyat…, 7-8. Notes

206

34 Ibid., 9. 35 Ibid., 10. 36 Ibid., 10-11. 37 In the Pre-Ta’if Lebanese constitution, there was an article placing women, children, and handicapped in the same clause (al-mar’a wa al-tifl wa al-mu‘aq). Hizbullah added old age to this category/classification. 38 Mu’tamar Al-Baladiyyat…, 11. 39 This refers to the Israeli withdrawal that was completed by 24 May 2000. The Lebanese state declared 25 May as the “Day of Liberation” and added it to the calendar of official holidays. 40 Mu’tamar Al-Baladiyyat…, 12. 41 Ibid., 13. 42 It is estimated that there are 20 million Lebanese expatriates; 5 times more than the total population of Lebanon, which is estimated to be 4 million. See “The diaspora: Lebanon’s secret weapon against economic collapse ”, AFP (Agence France-Presse), 20 July 2004. 43 Mu’tamar Al-Baladiyyat…, 14. 44 Ibid., 15. 45 Ibid., 16. 46 Although Hizbullah did not publish a full-fledged political program, its 2005 election program could be discerned in the speeches and stances of its leaders, most notably Shaykh Na‘im Qasim. See Qasim’s interview with al-Intiqad 26 April 2005: “Our alliances are political par excellence and are based on a political program”; Qasim’s speech on 29 April 2005 commemorating the death of Prophet Muhammad; and al-Nour 5:00 GMT News 30 April 2005. 47 http://www.alintiqad.com/essaydetailsf.php?eid=5564&fid=20; http://english. moqawama.org/essaydetailsf.php?eid=8199&fid=29 48 http://enduringamerica.com/2009/06/10/lebanons-election-text-of-Hizbullahs-concession-speech-8-june/; http://www.alintiqad.com/essaydetails. php?eid=8474&cid=27 (Last accessed: 10 July 2009).

3 Agreements, Understandings, Pacts 1 http://www.tayyar.org/files/documents/fpm_hezbollah.pdf;http://english. moqawama.org/essaydetailsf.php?eid=4442&fid=25 http://www.moqawama. org/essaydetailsf.php?eid=467&fid=19 (Last accessed: 18 July 09). 2 Shaykh Na‘im Qasim, Hizbullah: Al-Manhaj, Al-Tajriba, Al-Mustaqbal [Hizbullah: The Curriculum, the Experience, the Future]. Seventh revised and updated edition. Beirut: Dar Al-Mahajja Al-Bayda’, 2010, 275-9; Joseph Alagha, Hizbullah: Al-Tarikh Al-Aydiyulugi wa Al-Siyasi 1978-2008 [Hizbullah: The Ideological notes to Agreements, Understandings, Pacts

207

and Political History]. Beirut: Institute for Strategic Studies, 2008, 414-5; NNA, 18 August 2008; al-Intiqad 15 August 2008 (no. 1290); al-Intiqad 18 August 2008 (no. 1291), p. 5; al-Intiqad 29 August 2008 (no. 1294), p. 3.

4 The New Manifesto (30 November 2009) 1 This is the official Hizbullah translation as published by its Media Relations Office in 2009. 2 From now on, Resistance refers to Hizbullah’s Islamic Resistance. 3 This sentence is taken from Hizbullah’s understanding with the FPM, Section II, entitled “Consensual Democracy”. 4 A reference to the Qur’anic verse (3: 103), which was previously quoted in the same context in the Open Letter: “And hold fast, all together, by the rope which Allah (stretches out for you), and be not divided among yourselves; and remember with gratitude Allah’s favor on you; for ye were enemies and He joined your hearts in love, so that by His Grace, ye became brethren; and ye were on the brink of the pit of Fire, and He saved you from it. Thus doth Allah make His Signs clear to you: That ye may be guided.” 5 The direction in which Muslims turn to pray. The second Qibla is the Ka‘ba structure in Mecca. 6 A reference to the December 1987 initiated first Palestinian “stones” Intifada (popular uprising) and the second September 2000 military Intifada, respectively. 7 I would like to repeat that the word husnayayyn in (9:52) is taken to refer to martyrdom (of the self) and victory (for the umma): “Say: ‘Do you expect for us anything other than one of the two fairest outcomes (martyrdom and victory); while we await for you that Allah will smite you with a punishment, either from Him, or at our hands?’ So wait and watch, we are waiting and watching you.” 8 This is a reference to the Qur’anic verse (33:23): “Among the Believers are men who have been true to their covenant with Allah. Some of them have completed their vow (to the extreme), and some (still) wait: but they have never changed (their determination) in the least.” 9 http://english.moqawama.org/essaydetails.php?eid=9632&cid=214 (Accessed: 2 December 2009). 10 The May 1916 Sykes-Picot Agreement between the British and the French carved out Lebanon and the current Arab Middle Eastern states after the collapse of the Ottoman Empire. See The Shifts in Hizbullah’s Ideology, op. cit., 21ff; 131.

Notes

208

CHRONOLOGY OF EVENTS (1975-2010) 1 According to the UN website, the “UNIFIL was created in 1978 to confirm Israeli withdrawal from Lebanon, restore the international peace and security, and help the Lebanese Government restore its effective authority in the area.” http://www. un.org/Depts/dpko/missions/unifil/index.html 2 See Nasrallah’s speech on the 5th day of Muharram, 1425 A.H., 24 March 2004. 3 (Obeying) the religious and moral instructions of Islam. It could also cover a wide range of financial, administrative, political, and social matters. 4 One-fifth: a religious tax comprising 20% on a person’s surplus of income over necessary living expenses. Half is paid to the marja‘ as the representative of the Imam (sahm al-Imam), and half to the Sayyids, in conformity with the Shi‘ite interpretation of the Qur’anic verse (8:41). 5 Al-Safir 18 May 1995. 6 It is worth mentioning that this name has a religious/Qur‘anic connotation. When the Prophet participated in a battle, it was called a ghazwa; when he did not, it was called a sariyya, singular of saraya. 7 See “Hizbullah: Identity and Role” in “Hot Spot” (Nuqta Sakhina) on Al-Jazeera TV, 24 September 1998. The entire episode is based on interviews with Hizbullah’s leading cadres, rank and file as well as journalists and political analysts considered close to the party. The above-mentioned statement was made by Nasrallah and commented upon by Ibrahim al-Amin of al-Safir. 8 Sobelman, Rules of the Game…, 47-48. 9 See Nasrallah’s speech in the commemoration of “Jerusalem Day” on 12 November 2004. http://www.nasrollah.org/audio/hassan/2004/quds12112004.html 10 Rima Fakhry is a 38-year-old mother of four. She’s been a Hizbullah member since the age of 18. She also holds a BS in Agriculture from the American University of Beirut. Al-Safir 5 January 2005; Daily Star 6 and 7 January 2005; al-Intiqad 1091 (7 January 2005) http://www.alintiqad.com 11 It is noteworthy that the FPM shifted its allegiance from March 14 to March 8 after it signed a ten-point understanding with Hizbullah on 6 February 2006.  12 It is of symbolic significance because it is the same place where the deadly confrontations took place between the Lebanese Army and Tufayli’s followers in 1998. 13 Al-Safir 10756 (23 July 2007), 1; 14. Al-Hayat (23 July 2007), 7. 14 Back then BDL funded both cabinets. This possibility seems out of the question these days because of the severe public debt that is rupturing Lebanon. 15 Al-Safir 10894 (11 January), p. 4. 16 Al-Safir 10894 (11 January), p. 5. 17 An outline of the speech appeared briefly on the al-Intiqad website, but it was not included in the forthcoming issue of Al-Intiqad 1251 (26 January 2008) as notes to CHRONOLOGY OF EVENTS (1975-2010)

209

expected. The author got hold of the entire document through private contacts with party cadres. 18 See the Lebanese daily newspapers of 21 January 2008; al-Intiqad 1251 (26 January 2008). 19 Lebanese daily newspapers the next day; al-Intiqad 1264 (9 May 2008). 20 www.lebanon.com/construction/solidere/index.htm 21 The vacant seat of assassinated MP Antoine Ghanem was not filled by conducting partial elections, which explains the sum total of 127 MPs when there should have been 128 MPs. 22 Lebanese daily Newspapers the next day; NNA; al-Intiqad 1267 (30 May 2008). 23 http://www.alnour.com.lb/newsdetails.php?id=2049 24 http://www.alnour.com.lb/newsdetails.php?id=2178; NNA; and al-Safir (25 July 2008). 25 Al-Intiqad 1249 (29 August 2008). 26 For instance, see “IDF releases Cast Lead casualty numbers”, by Yaakov Lappin at: http://www.jpost.com/servlet/Satellite?cid=1237727552054&pagename=JPost %2FJPArticle%2FShowFull (Accessed 26 March 2009). 27 See “Medics identify 1,505th victim of Gaza assault”, at: http://www.maannews .net/en/index. php?opr=ShowDeta ils&ID=39171 (Accessed 11 July 2009). 28 Hariri was assassinated on 14 February 2005 by a massive suicidal truck bomb attack in the predominantly Muslim West Beirut. The explosion killed MP Basil Flayhan and 22 other people from Hariri’s motorcade, as well as innocent pedestrians. An unknown group by the name of “The Organization for Victory and Jihad in the Levant” claimed responsibility through a video message read by the Palestinian Abu ‘Adas. Lebanese security forces at the time tried to implicate the Salafis in the assassination. 29 See “Political Opposition to Damascus: If the Syrian surprise is Bellemare’s interrogation to al-‘Absi, then it is not a surprise because al-‘Absi is the product of the Syrian intelligence”. http://www.metransparent.com/spip. php?article8146&lang=ar (Accessed 1 September 2009). 30 Future TV News: 8:00 pm, local Beirut time. 31 Al-Manar, 7:30 pm News. 32 See the issues of the dailies al-Liwa’ and al-Sharq al-Awsat of 27 January; and the news bulletins of al-‘Arabiyya and al-Jazeera of 25 and 26 January, respectively.

Notes

210

Index

Abd al-Karim, ‘Ali 180 al-‘Absi, Shakir 174, 179 Abu ‘A’isha 179 Abu Al-‘Aynayn, Sultan 168 Abu Khalil, As‘ad 194 Abu Muhjin 183 Abun-Nasr, Fadeel M. 196 Accountability 24, 79, 82-83, 93, 158, 162 Afghanistan 32, 40, 47, 119-121 Afif, Muhammad 27, 164, 167 Agriculture 72, 78, 84, 89, 94, 197, 209 al-‘Ahd 15, 19, 154, 193, 198-202, 205 Ahmadinejad, Mahmud 167, 171, 181, 183 Alagha, Joseph 12, 194, 207 al-Amin, Abdulatif 64 al-Amin, Mufti ‘Ali 176 Ali, A. Yusuf 199, 204-205 Alliance 13, 24, 46, 64, 117, 131, 145, 166, 181, 207 Amal 155, 157-158, 163, 166-167, 172, 175-177, 195-196, 202 America 43-44, 46-49, 51-52, 57, 70, 74, 89, 116-123, 129, 131-

133, 142, 149, 153-154, 163, 165, 179, 195, 197-198, 200, 209 Ammar, ‘Ali 158, 162 Ansar (detention camp) 154, 183 al-Ansariyyé 160-161, 163 Aqsa Intifada 135 Aqsa Mosque 35, 116, 134, 162 Arad, Ron 155, 161, 178 Arab Deterrent Forces 151 Arab-Israeli conflict 22, 34, 43 (Ibn) ‘Arabi 203 (Pan-)Arabism 33 al-‘Arabiyya 181, 210 Arafat, Yasser 152 Arafati 51 al-‘Aridi, Salih 178 Arslan, Talal 178 Ashmar, ‘Ali 159 ‘Ashura 153, 174 al-Assad, Bashar 113, 179, 182 Atlit detention camp (prison) 154 ‘Aun, Michel 101, 107, 156-157, 166, 168 Awali, Ghalib 197 Awwali River 153 ‘Ayn Burday 23, 160, 170 ‘Ayn al-Hilwé 183 211

Azar, Raymond 180 B‘abda 174, 182 Balanced development 68, 92, 94-95 B‘albak 23, 110, 151, 160-161, 170 B‘albak-Hirmel 101-102 Bayan, Ibrahim 158, 160, 162 Bazuriyyé 176 Beirut 23, 43, 56, 57, 59-61, 101-102, 110-113, 117, 123, 152-154, 156, 162-166, 168-169, 171-176, 179-183, 187, 193-197, 200-201, 204, 206-210 Beirut Declaration 110, 112 Bellemare, Daniel 180, 182, 210 Berjawi, Muhammad 158, 162 Berri, Nabih 140, 168-169, 172, 176, 183 Bin Laden 37, 174, 196, 201 Bint Jubayl 155, 159, 172 Bipolarity 29 Biqa‘ 23, 25, 39, 49, 57, 64, 66, 69, 73, 75, 78, 102, 147, 151, 154155, 158, 163, 172 Birru, Shaykh As‘ad 156 al-Birzawi, Muhammad 162 Blanford, Nicholas 196 Blue Line 163, 169-170, 206 Bramerts/Brammertz, Serge 168, 170 Brezhnev 48 Burj Hammud 42, 200 Bush, President George W. 31, 119-120, 133, 174 Cabinet 13, 28, 45, 92, 110-111, 141, 143-145, 164, 166-167, 169-170, 172, 175-177, 179, 182, 206, 209 Cairo Agreement 155 Index

Camp David 48, 163 Campaign 29, 81, 83, 102 election 99-100, 104 media 23 military 197 national 97 Cancerous gland 19, 30, 49, 121 Cantons 32 Capitalism 21, 47, 117, 119 Cartoons of the Prophet 168 Cast Lead 179, 210 Cedar Revolution 166 Central Information Office 23, 27, 165, 194 Central Military Commander 22, 158 Central Planning Council 24, 162 Christians 15-19, 22, 26, 43, 46-47, 134, 144, 156, 158, 181 CIA 153 Civil rights 19, 33, 139 Civil society 72, 79, 95, 106, 140, 171 Civil war 46, 58, 65, 151, 156-158, 169, 200, 205 Civilization 59, 75-76, 119-121, 194, 197 Coexistence 18, 33, 46, 76-77, 92, 105, 112, 136, 146, 166 Colonialism 32, 34, 52-53, 59, 122 Common Understanding between Hizbullah and the FPM 105-110 Compassion 17 Compassionate 63, 75, 98 Conclaves 15, 22-23, 25-27, 36 Confessionalism 58, 206 Consensual democracy 13, 32, 36, 105, 126, 139, 198, 208 Consultative Center for Studies and Documentation (CCSD) 155, 158, 196 212

Convention 107, 156, 168-169, 206 Corruption 28, 51, 66, 70, 75, 79, 95, 106-107, 127, 168 Council of Ministers 13, 167, 169, 178, 195 Cousseran, Jean-Claude 171 Crusaders 175 Cuisenaire, Bernard 171 Culture 40, 61, 76, 91, 103, 119, 124, 143, 148, 196 Dabshé 158 Dahir, Ibrahim 158 Dahiya (Southern Suburb) 29, 155, 164, 172, 174, 187, 197 Dayr Qanun al-Nahr 153 Decree 77, 80, 93, 113, 156, 179 Detainees 64, 71, 77, 109, 137, 154, 157, 160-161 Devil 15, 44, 54, 98 Dhimmis, ahl al-dhimma 18, 187 Dignity 16, 20, 32, 41-42, 44, 56, 65, 70, 73, 75-76, 82, 103, 120, 123-124, 126 Dikwané 42 Diplomatic Relations 109, 113, 179-180 al-Dirani, Mustafa 158, 163 Discrimination 57-58, 69, 76, 79, 82 Disintegration 20, 117, 119, 130, 172 Displaced 43, 67, 73, 77, 80, 158159, 205 Displacement 34, 102, 128 Divine Victory 175 Doha Accord 11, 176-177 Dominion 35, 121, 124, 131-133 Double standards 30 Drone 165 D‘un, ‘Ali 23 Index

Eastern Bloc 22 Economic development 80 Education 59, 62, 67-68, 72-73, 79-80, 86-87, 94-96, 127 Egypt 48, 51, 60, 180 Elections see parliamentary elections, municipal elections Electoral law 67, 92, 105-106, 126, 146 Embargo 59, 156-157 Environment 73, 81, 85, 87, 91, 96-97, 108, 126, 130-131 Equality 71-72, 91, 106, 126 EU 28, 30-31, 165-166, 180, 185 Euphrates 48 Executive Council 23-24, 26, 28, 159, 162 Executive Shura 23, 159 Fadlallah, Ayatullah Al-Sayyid Muhammad Husayn 16-18, 29, 194-195, 197 Fadlallah, Hasan 166, 181, 196 Fadlallah, Husayn 29 Fahd, John 174 Fahd, King 48 Fakhry, Rima 27, 165, 197, 209 Fatah 168, 171 Fatah al-Islam 173, 179-181, 185 Fatwa (religious edict) 54, 156, 167, 170, 187, 195 Favoritism 67, 70-71, 206 Fayyad, Ali 181-182 Federalism 32, 91, 127, 146 Feltman, Jeffrey 174 Fez 48 Fitna 20, 34, 53, 187 Flayhan, Basil 178, 210 Fnaysh, Muhammad 158, 160, 162, 166-167, 170, 181 Ford, Robert 181 213

France 20-21, 25-26, 43, 46, 156157, 159, 165, 171, 177, 179, 196 Franjiyyé, Sulayman 183 Fransen, Daniel 180 Free Patriotic Movement (FPM) 166, 168-169, 172, 179, 181, 185, 189, 208-209 Freedom fighters 40, 49-50, 161, 189 French paratroopers 154, 201 Fuller, Graham E. 194 Future Trend 166, 172 Gaza 32, 135-137, 167, 171, 179, 210 Geagea, Samir 158, 166, 168, 177 Gerstein, Erez 161 Ghandur, Salah 159 Ghanem, Antoine 172, 210 Ghazwa 209 Globalization 32, 119 Goldwasser, Ehud 168, 177 The Good Loan 172 Granada 47 Grapes of Wrath 24, 159 Great Satan 25, 30, 60 Greater Israel 48 Guardianship 15, 40, 51, 67, 199 Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) 51, 185 Habash, George 175 Habib, Philip 42, 200 Hadith 29, 188, 190, 203 al-Hajj, Ali 180 al-Hajj, François 174, 178 al-Hajj Hasan, Husayn 160, 162, 166, 181 Hamadé, Marwan 165 Hamadé, Trad 166-168 Index

Hamdan, Mustafa 180 Hammud, ‘Ammar Husayn 161 Hammud, Bassam 174 Handicap 66, 77, 86-87, 207 Harakat Al-Tawhid Al-Islamiyya 20 Harb, Butrus 182 Harb, Shaykh Raghib 39-40, 64, 70, 90, 153-154, 183, 202 Hariri, Rafiq 88, 107, 158, 164168, 171, 173, 175, 178, 182, 210 Hariri, Sa‘d 143, 145, 166, 181-182 Haydar, Muhammad 166 Hayy al-Sulum 164 Hawi, George 178 Health 58, 68-69, 73, 80, 85, 87, 96, 173 Hegemony 24, 26, 30-32, 43-44, 55, 70, 76, 101, 116-121, 133, 162, 196, 198 Hezbollah 207 Hisbi 159, 188 Hizb al-Shaytan (Party of the Devil) 15 Hizballah 203, 205 Hizbullah (Party of God) 11, 13, 15-33, 35-36, 39-40, 45, 49, 56-65, 69-70, 73-75, 79, 81, 88-90, 97, 99, 101-102, 104-105, 112, 115, 118, 128, 130-132, 138, 143-145, 148-149, 151-173, 175-179, 181, 183, 188, 193197, 199-209 Homeland 32, 89, 107, 122-124, 128, 144, 146-147 Honor 32, 49-50, 55, 65, 69-70, 86-87, 137, 174, 176, 183 Honorable 46, 69-70, 74, 90, 110, 134 al-Hoss, Salim 156 Huballah, Hasan 166 214

al-Hujayyri, Mas‘ud 162 al-Hujayyri, Munir 158 Human rights 56-59, 62, 107, 109110, 118 Humiliation 41-43, 59, 76 Husayn, Saddam 51 Husayniyya 86, 154 Husnayayyn 188, 199, 208 Hutayt, Wafa’ 27, 165 Huthis 148-149 ‘Id, Wissam 175, 178 Identity and goals 60-62 Identity construction 26, 36 ‘Ido, Walid 171-172, 178 (anti-)Imperialism 15, 20 Industry 72, 78, 89, 94, 169, 178 Infidelity (kufr) 20, 43, 47 Infitah 22, 25-26, 161, 188, 197 Injustice 16, 41, 56-57, 59, 82, 133, 138, 159 Integration 18, 25, 96, 94, 131, 137, 188 Internal Security Forces (ISF) 158, 174-175, 178, 185 International community 22, 123, 152, 167 International Forces 50, 89 International organization 42, 55, 132 Intifada 39, 135, 155, 162-163, 208 al-Intiqad 193, 197-198, 206-210 Invasion 25, 47, 56-57, 60, 71, 123, 125, 130, 136, 152-153, 155, 195, 200 Iran 19-20, 22, 33, 40, 47, 51-52, 60-61, 78, 131, 144, 152, 166, 181, 183, 196 Iraq 22, 25, 32, 40, 51, 61, 119121, 130, 152, 163, 173, 195-196 Iraq-Iran war 22, 152, 196 Index

Islamic Jihad 154 Islamic jihadi movement 16, 153, 204 Islamic movement 13, 130, 147, 195 Islamic order 17-18, 21, 45 Islamic Republic 17-18, 51, 61, 78, 131, 144, 194, 204 Islamic Resistance 24, 39, 43, 49-50, 52, 59, 61, 64, 70, 75-76, 81, 88, 90, 117, 152-155, 158, 161, 167, 183, 197, 208 Islamic Revolution 16, 19, 21-22, 40, 51-52, 60-61, 131, 152, 190, 202 Islamic Shi‘ite Higher Council 152 Islamic socialism 16 Islamic State 15, 17, 32, 40, 187, 194-195, 201 (Pan-)Islamism 15, 19, 33 Islamization 17, 194 Israel 18-22, 24-26, 30-36, 39, 41-43, 46, 48-52, 54-57, 61, 64, 77, 84, 91, 107, 110, 119, 123125, 131-132, 134-136, 142-143, 151-163, 165-167, 169, 171-180, 182-183, 197, 200, 203-204, 206 Israeli Defense Forces (IDF) 43, 49, 59, 170, 175, 177, 180, 185, 201, 210 Italian forces 152 Izzeddine, Shaykh Hasan 27, 164 Jabal ‘Amil 49 Jalil Operation 154 al-Jammal, Hajj Muhammad 194 Jarmaq road 158 al-Jazeera 171, 179, 209-210 Jerusalem 35, 60 (Liberation of) Jerusalem 20, 43, 61, 116, 134, 137, 173 215

Jerusalem Day 209 Jews 19, 30, 42, 48, 56, 175, 181 Jezzin 61, 161 Jibshit 153, 156 Jihad (struggle) 15-16, 20-22, 39, 41, 49-50, 54, 76, 117, 121, 135, 154, 175, 188-189, 199, 202, 205, 210 Jihad al-Bina’ 87, 183 Jihadi Council 23, 26-27, 159, 164 Jishi, Hasan 183 Jisr al-Basha 200 Jubayl (Byblos) 42, 102, 200 Judaism 134 Judaization 35, 133-134 Judicial 28, 93, 106, 127 July 2006 War 27, 29, 118, 124, 169, 173, 177-178, 182 Jumayyel, Amin 43, 153, 156, 200 Jumayyel, Bashir 42-43, 152-153, 200 Jumayyel, Pierre 169, 171-172 Jumblatt, Walid 144, 166, 172 Jurisconsult 187, 191, 199 Jurisprudent 15, 20, 29, 40, 63, 112, 143, 187, 191, 199 Jurist 20, 34, 40, 53-54, 131, 187, 189 Ka‘ba 208 Khaldé battle 152 Khalil, Hasan 23, 26 Karami, Omar 166 Karantina 174 Karbala’ 39 Katyusha 153, 157, 174, 180-181 Kawtharani, Maher 177 Kayruz, Rabi‘a 158, 160 Keryat Shmona 165 al-Khamina‘i, al-Imam 131, 159, 167, 170, 190, 193, 195, 202 Index

Khaybar 19 Khumayni, Ruhallah 17-21, 29, 37, 39-41, 51, 54, 60, 131, 151152, 190, 193, 195-196, 202 Khums 159, 189 Khususiyyat (specificities) 13, 189 Khyam 157, 161 Krayyem, Nayef 23 Kunin 155 al-Kurani, ‘Ali 195 Kurani, Husayn 202 Lamm, Robert P. 199 Latin America 30, 132, 149 Lebanese Army 23, 43, 50, 76, 87, 91, 98, 111, 124, 144, 156, 158, 160, 164, 169-170, 172, 174, 178, 185, 209 Lebanese Forces 42, 46, 158, 166, 182, 185, 200-201 Lebanese Front 46, 201 Lebanon 17, 22, 31-33, 36, 39-50, 52, 56-61, 63-69, 71, 74-78, 80, 88-93, 97, 100, 102, 105, 107, 109-110, 113, 116-119, 121-129, 131, 135-136, 138-141, 143-144, 146-147, 149, 151-154, 156-157, 159-162, 164-181, 183, 186, 193, 195-198, 200-210 Lebanonization 160-161, 189 Leenders, Reinoud 25, 196 Legislative 11, 13, 24, 73, 75, 89, 93, 111, 170 Legislature 170, 181 Liberation theology 16, 29 Liberation War 156 Libya 152 Litani river 27, 96, 151, 164 Loyal 64, 66, 72, 75, 81, 102, 108, 124, 137 Loyalist 98-100, 104 216

Loyalty to Resistance Bloc 28, 102 al-Madini, Tawfiq 195-196 Madrid Conference/negotations 136 Magen Avraham synagogue 181 al-Manar 56, 97, 157-158, 165, 172, 175, 196, 198, 210 Mandate 28, 156, 167, 170, 172, 179, 181, 195, 205-206 Manifesto 11, 13, 15, 22, 24-25, 28-34, 36, 39-40, 115-116, 118-119, 138-140, 146, 148-149, 154, 182-183, 193, 196-198, 208 Mansur, Nazih 159, 162 Ma‘raké 154 March 8 165-166, 170-171, 173, 176, 178, 181, 183, 209 March 14 144, 165-166, 170-174, 176, 178-179, 181, 182, 209 Marine’s barracks 154, 201 marja‘ (religious authority to emulate) 26, 53, 64, 189-190, 197, 209 Marji‘yun 111, 156 Martyrs’ Day 169 The Martyr’s Foundation 172 Martyrdom (operations) 15, 21, 39, 54, 61, 64, 137, 149, 153, 155-156, 158-159, 164, 174, 188, 190-191, 199, 208 Marxist 15-16, 204 Massacre 35, 42, 46, 123, 128, 133, 153, 159, 200 17 May 1983 agreement 43, 153155, 200 Maydun 155 Mecca 187-188, 194, 208 Medina 18-19, 194, 204 Mehlis, Detlev 167-168 Merciful 63, 65, 98, 115 Index

Mer‘ib, Usama 175 Merit 65, 67, 106-107, 118 Middle East 31, 43, 48, 52, 64, 76, 79, 90, 119-120, 153, 174-175, 181, 186, 208 Military wing 22, 43, 88, 152, 154, 177, 200 Militia 152, 157, 164, 200-201 Minority 18, 105, 125-126 Miqati, Nagib 166 al-Miqdad, Ali 166, 181 Mobilization 31-32, 36, 51, 116, 118-119, 121, 127, 131, 169, 183, 190, 195, 198 Ki-Moon, Ban 170-171 Mu’allim, Walid 179 Mughniyyé, Imad 24, 26-27, 90, 175, 177, 183, 189 Mujahidin see freedom fighters Muharram 29, 193, 209 Muhtashami, Ali Akbar 151 Multi-National Forces 152 Municipal elections 24, 88, 160, 163 Musa, Amr 173, 176 al-Musawi, ‘Abbas 22, 64, 89-90, 151-152, 157, 183, 202 al-Musawi, Ammar 159, 162 al-Musawi, Husayn 181 al-Musawi, Ibrahim 28 Mustad‘afin see oppressed Mustakbirin see oppressors Mutahhari, Murtada 54 Nab‘a 42, 200 Nabatiyyé 118, 153-154, 201 al-Nabulsi, al-Saykh al-‘Allama ‘Afif 167 Najaf 61, 151 Najjar, Ibrahim 182 Najm, George 162 217

Nasrallah, Sayyid Hadi 160-161 Nasrallah, Sayyid Hasan 21-30, 36, 97, 107, 138, 155, 157-160, 162, 164, 166-169, 172-176, 180, 182-183, 196-198, 202, 209 National Convention of Dialogue 168 National defense strategy 33, 110, 125 National dialogue 28, 105, 110111, 126, 140, 178-181 National Pact 195 NATO 30-31, 41-43, 48, 185 Naturalization 67, 73, 77, 79-80, 139, 183 Nepotism 206 New World Order 22 Nicaragua 47 Nile 48 Nisr, Nasim 176 Normalization 19, 36, 66, 71, 76-77, 136-137 Norton, Augustus Richard 202 al-Nour radio 27, 156, 207 Nureddine, Jawad see Imad Mughniyyé Occupied Territories 59, 76, 84, 91 Open Letter 11, 15-17, 19, 22, 24-26, 28-29, 31-35, 40, 154, 161, 183, 193, 196, 199, 201202, 208 Operation Accountability 158 Operation Litani 151 Operation Radwan (‘Amaliyat al-Radwan) 177 Oppressed 15-16, 29-30, 39-41, 43-47, 50-53, 55, 60, 63-64, 68-69, 76, 82, 85, 112, 132-133, 137-138, 189, 193, 199

Index

Oppressors 15-16, 29, 34, 39, 40-41, 47, 50, 52-53, 55, 64-65, 189, 203 Oslo Agreement 136, 158 Pact 105, 170, 195 Palestine 19, 31-32, 34, 36, 41, 47-48, 50, 56-57, 60, 76-77, 84, 116, 119, 121, 123, 128-130, 133, 135-137, 143, 154, 173, 175, 179, 185-186, 195, 198 Palestinian camps 42 Palestinian refugees 33, 36, 109, 128, 137, 139, 168, 186 Pan-Arabism 33 Pan-Islamism 15, 19, 33 Paris III conference 169 Parliamentary Bloc Council 23, 159 Parliamentary elections 63-65, 69, 75, 88-89, 98-101, 103, 106, 143, 145, 158-159, 162, 166, 177 Parliamentary majority 99, 101, 103, 146 Peace process 34, 136 Peace settlement 24 Peace for Galilee operation 152 PFLP 154, 157, 185 Phalange 42-44, 46, 50, 152, 166, 169, 172, 182, 200 Phar‘un, Michel 182 PLO 51, 152-153, 157, 179, 183, 185, 200 Pluralism 117 Polarization 27, 59, 106, 164 Political Council (Politburo) 23-24, 26-28, 159, 162, 165 Political declarations 15-16, 19, 26, 154 Political equation 13

218

Political ideology 15-19, 21, 131, 154, 157, 199 Political Maronism 17-18, 44, 46, 194, 201 Political party 13, 164 Political program 22, 27, 63-65, 79, 130, 138, 157, 165, 207 Political protest 13, 181 Political Sectarianism 28, 32, 64-66, 71, 79, 92, 125-126, 139140, 183, 188, 204 Political system 13, 16-17, 24, 30, 32, 36, 43-45, 58, 64, 70-71, 116, 123, 125-126, 152, 156, 194, 201 Powell, Colin 167 Press conference 28, 30, 36, 89, 97, 138, 176, 182-183, 198 Primary documents 11, 39, 199 Prisoner exchange 162-163, 177 Public debt 78, 94, 209 Public sphere 24, 188, 204 PSP 145-146, 166, 182, 186 Qabalan, ‘Abd al-Amir 176 Qahwaji, John 178 al-Qa‘ida 37, 174-175, 183, 201 Qana 159 Qasim, Shaykh Na’im 22-23, 25-26, 28, 36, 157-158, 199, 207 Qasir, Abdallah 23, 159, 162 Qasir, Ahmad 153, 201 Qasir, Samir 178 Qawuq, Shaykh Nabil 23 Qibla 134, 208 Qiyam (Values) 29 al-Qlay‘a 161 Qsarnaba 158 Qum 60-61 Quntar, Samir 168, 177 Ra‘d, Muhammad 22, 24, 28, 162 Index

Rahim, Shaykh Nabil 174 Ramadan 197 Rapist Entity 49, 55, 97 Rashid, ‘Ali 23 Reactionary 51-52 Reagan, President Ronald 48 Realpolitik 27 Regev, Eldad 168, 177 Religio-Judicial Council 26, 28 Religious ideology 15, 152, 199 Religious seminary 23, 60, 160 Renaissance 40, 122, 130 Resistance movement 13, 30, 33, 36, 117, 121, 130-132, 136, 149, 163 Resistance society 66, 85 Resolution 425 151 Resolution 1559 89, 164, 165 Resolution 1680 168 Resolution 1701 145, 169, 180, 182 Resolution 1747 170 Revolution of the Hungry 160 Rice, Condoleezza 167 al-Rifa‘i, Kamel 166, 181 Right of Return 33, 36, 77, 109, 129, 137 Rmaylé 174 Rome conference 169 Rotation policy 29, 82 Roy, Olivier 194 Rub Thalathin 159 Rufayyel, Sa‘ud 158 Sabra 42, 153, 200 Sadat, President Anwar 52 al-Sadr, Musa 54, 147, 152, 172, 174, 176, 202 al-Sadr, Sayyid Muhammad Baqir 54, 202 Safiyyeddine, ‘Ali 153 219

Safiyyeddine, Hashim 23, 26, 28, 159 al-Sahili, Nawwar 166, 181 Saint-Cloud 171 Salafi Movement 112, 178 Saleh, president ‘Ali Abdallah 148 Salih, Ali Husayn 197 Sallukh, Fawzi 179 Salman, Talal 138 al-Sanyura, Fu’ad 166, 169-170, 177, 180 Al-Saraya Al-Lubnaniyya Li-Muqawamat Al-Ihtilal Al-Israeli (The Multiconfessional Lebanese Brigades to fight Israel) 160 Sariyya (pl. sarayya) 209 Satan 47 Saudi 179 Saudi Arabia 51, 148-149, 156, 166 al-Sayyid, Ibrahim Amin 24, 26, 28, 154, 158-160, 162, 193, 199 al-Sayyid, Jamil 180 al-Sayyigh, Salim 182 Schaefer, Richard T. 199 Second Lebanon War 167, 180 Sectarianism 46-47, 67, 69, 129, 140, 206 Security Zone 50, 66-67, 151, 154, 161, 204, 210 September 11 119, 120 Grand Sérail 169 Serhal, Pierre 166 Seven Points 169 Sfeir, Cardinal 182 Shah (of Iran) 19, 52, 195 al-Shakar, Muhsin 22, 24, 158, 162 Shalom, Sivan 181 Shami, Hasan 172 Shamran, Mustapha 151 Index

Shuqayr, Wafiq 176 Sharara, Waddah 195 Shari‘a 17, 46, 51, 187, 190 Shatila 42, 153, 200 Sherri, Amin 166 Shib‘a Farms 77, 88, 91, 108-110, 125, 162 Shura Council 22-28, 154, 157159, 162, 164, 167 Sidon 118, 153-154, 174, 201 SLA 155, 159-161, 168 Small Satan 25 Sobelman, Daniel 25-26, 197, 209 Social Justice 15-17, 79, 166 Social movement 13, 17, 26, 129 Socialism 21 Socio-economic 77-78, 89, 138, 164 Social services 96 Solana, Javier 28, 181 Al-Solh, Riyad 169, 194 Soviet Union 22, 47, 119 Special Tribunal for Lebanon (STL) 167, 171, 180, 186 Srur, Muhammad 177 SSNP 186, 201 Statement of Purpose 59-60 Stockholm conference 169 Suicide 21, 61, 153-154, 161, 163, 175, 179 Sukariyyé, Isma‘il 160 Sukariyyé, Walid 181 Sulayman, Husayn 177 Sulayman, Michel 111, 113, 176, 177, 182 Sykes-Picot Agreement 147, 195, 208 Syria 33, 60, 75, 77, 88, 109, 113, 129-130, 144, 159, 163-164, 166-168, 178-181, 183, 195

220

Taha, ‘Ali 158 Ta’if Agreement 28-29, 32, 58, 91, 110, 125, 156-157, 176, 204, 207 Taklif 21, 41, 65, 189-190 Tal al-Za‘tar 42, 200 Tannenbaum, Elhanan 162 al-Taqsh, Jamal 166 al-Tayyar, Ja‘far 153, 201 Tehran 152, 167, 181, 195, 202 Tel Aviv 197 Terrorism 30-32, 35, 56-57, 70, 77, 108, 120, 132-133 Tikrit 51 Tishrin 182 Tluys, Khudr 23, 158 Trabulsi, Zakariyya 174 Tuéni, Gebran 108, 167, 178 al-Tufayli, Shaykh Subhi 22-23, 26, 156, 160, 170, 176, 197 Tyre 118, 152-154, 210 ‘Ubayd, Shaykh Abd al-Karim 27, 64, 156, 163-164 UK 22, 152, 177, 196 ‘ulama 20, 53-55, 152, 162, 190, 195, 202 ‘Ulayq, Qasim 172 Umma 20, 21, 33, 40-44, 48-50, 52-55, 59, 61, 64, 76, 112, 134, 137, 190-191, 194, 199, 206, 208 UN Commission investigating the Hariri murder 167-168 Understanding with the Salafi Movement 112 United Nations (UN) 55, 57, 86, 107, 109, 113, 159, 164, 166168, 170, 182, 209 UNDP 87, 186 UNICEF 87, 186 UNIFIL II 169 Unipolar 22, 31, 117, 119 Index

United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) 186 United Nations Security Council (UNSC) 151, 168-172, 180, 182, 186 Unity of the Muslims 19-20, 34, 53 UNRWA 153, 186 US Administration 20, 31, 36, 51, 132, 136, 144, 172, 196, 200 Veto 55, 144 Veto power 13, 169-170, 176, 177 Vice 41, 127 Victory Speech 172, 174 Vietnam 47 Views and Concepts 56-62 Violence 56-57, 60, 62, 111-112, 164, 180 Wa‘d project 183 Wadi Abu Jmil 181 Wadi ‘Araba Accord 136 Wadi Khaled 67, 204 Wakilayn shar’iyyan (religious deputies) 159, 190 Wardé, Salim 182 Weapons 46, 88, 104, 109-110, 143, 157, 167, 169-170, 179, 193 Westoxification 20, 196 Wilayat al-faqih (guardianship of the jurisprudent) 15, 17, 39, 41, 60, 191, 199 Al-waliyy al-faqih 40, 143 Women’s Organization 27, 165 World view 13, 29 (Mr.) X 54 Yaghi, Husayn 162 Yaghi, Muhammad 23, 158

221

Yazbik, Shaykh Muhammad 26, 28, 159 Zakat 187, 191, 195 al-Zawahiri, Ayman 175 Zaydan, Khudr 177 Z‘aytir, Muhammad 17-18, 194

Index

Zionism 48, 52 (Anti-)Zionism 15, 19-20 Zionist entity 19, 25, 30-31, 33-34, 36, 39, 41, 48, 50, 59, 61, 64, 66, 76-77, 84, 90, 116-117, 121, 123, 128, 133, 135-137

222