History of the Third Seminole War : 1849-1858 9781612005768, 9781612005775

Table of contents :
Cover
Title
Copyright
Contents
Preface
1 Florida Has Been Deeply Injured
2 By Th is Shot Capt. Payne and Dempsey Whidden Were Killed
3 We Must Take Time Enough to Avert War
4 It is the Intention of the Government to Remove the Indians
5 Our Citizens Are Now Compelled to Abandon Th eir Homes
6 The Bullets Whistled Over and Around Me Like Hail
7 The Evils of a Savage Warfare
8 This is a Mere Show of Doing Something
9 The Indians Cannot Hold Out Much Longer
10 Everything Was Destroyed Th at Could Be
Appendix: U.S. Military Killed in Action (Regulars and Volunteers) Th ird Seminole War
Picture Credits
Abbreviations
Bibliography
Endnotes
Index

Citation preview

HISTORY OF THE THIRD SEMINOLE WAR 1849–1858

Charles Ferdinand Wimar, American (born Germany), 1828–1862; Chief Billy Bowlegs, 1861; oil on canvas mounted on panel; 25 ¼ × 30 ¼ inches; Saint Louis Art Museum, Museum Purchase 9:1938.

HISTORY OF THE THIRD SEMINOLE WAR 1849–1858

JOE KNETSCH JOHN MISSALL MARY LOU MISSALL

Philadelphia & Oxford

Published in the United States of America and Great Britain in 2018 by CASEMATE PUBLISHERS 1950 Lawrence Road, Havertown, PA 19083, USA and The Old Music Hall, 106–108 Cowley Road, Oxford OX4 1JE, UK

Copyright © Casemate Publishers, Joe Knetsch, John Missall and Mary Lou Missall, 2018 Hardcover Edition: ISBN 978-1-61200-576-8 Digital Edition: ISBN 978-1-61200-577-5 A CIP record for this book is available from the Library of Congress and the British Library All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reproduced or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic or mechanical including photocopying, recording or by any information storage and retrieval system, without permission from the publisher in writing.

Printed and bound in the United States of America

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Contents Preface

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10

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Florida Has Been Deeply Injured By This Shot Capt. Payne and Dempsey Whidden Were Killed We Must Take Time Enough to Avert War It is the Intention of the Government to Remove the Indians Our Citizens Are Now Compelled to Abandon Their Homes The Bullets Whistled Over and Around Me Like Hail The Evils of a Savage Warfare This is a Mere Show of Doing Something The Indians Cannot Hold Out Much Longer Everything Was Destroyed That Could Be

Appendix: U.S. Military Killed in Action (Regulars and Volunteers) Third Seminole War Picture Credits Abbreviations Bibliography Endnotes Index

1 25 47 72 94 113 134 154 178 193

216 218 221 222 229 253

Preface For many students of Florida or Native American history, the Third Seminole War may appear to be nothing more than an afterthought to the much larger Second Seminole War. When the grueling, seven-year Second Seminole War ended in 1842, the few hundred Seminole who were still in Florida were allowed to remain in the inhospitable Everglades and Big Cypress Swamp. As far as the government was concerned, the arrangement was a temporary affair, its duration subject to the wants and needs of white Floridians. Officials believed that conflict between settlers and Indians on the expanding frontier was inevitable, and when the time came, the work of removing every last Indian from Florida would recommence and continue until the task was complete. The Seminole, of course, had a completely different outlook on the matter. As far as they were concerned, the war was over, and they had won the right to remain in their Florida homes. No one had put a time limit on the agreement, and as long as they kept their part of the bargain, why should things change? In truth, the whole idea of individual wars with the Americans was somewhat lost on the Seminole. From the Indian perspective, the Americans had been unrelenting in their attempts to take the Indians’ Florida homelands since at least 1812. In their eyes it had been one continual conflict, sometimes waged at the negotiating table, sometimes on the battlefield. True, there were periods of peace, but never could the Seminole feel secure in their homes. White covetousness might abate for awhile, but it would never go away. This difference in perspective is easy to understand. To the Seminole, the struggle to remain in their native land was the most important thing in their collective existence. To most whites, on the other hand, the Seminole were a minor consideration, at least until violence or warfare broke out. Where the Seminole saw continual diplomatic pressure to give up their homes, the whites saw peace. Notwithstanding, even the Seminole recognized that there were times when the status quo changed. Instead of angry words flying, deadly bullets were flying. Instead of wanting to kill and destroy, the restraints had broken down and people were actually doing it. They also recognized the opposite. There were times when the shooting stopped and at least the semblance of a normal existence could resume. As historians, we need to define certain time periods and give them names. Without such labels, how could we explain their significance? It’s all part of the

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human need to organize our world, just like putting mile markers along a highway or having a categorized bookshelf. In the conflict between the Seminole and the United States, three distinct periods of open warfare have historically stood out: The First Seminole War (1817–1818), the Second Seminole War (1835–1842), and the Third Seminole War (1855–1858). These are, of course, modern designations. People of the time had different names for the conflicts. The First War was generally known as “The Seminole War,” and the Second War was usually referred to as “The Florida War.” The Third Seminole war was different. Because most whites saw it as a resumption of the previous war, no special name was given it at the time. One name that seemed to stick was “The Billy Bowlegs War,” in reference to the most visible Seminole leader. Another thing that separated the Third War from the other two was the lack of a written history. Although no one at the time wrote a history of the First Seminole War, the fact that future president Andrew Jackson was in command meant it was well documented by his biographers. It had also been a subject of controversy in Congress, politics, and the press, which meant there was ample documentary evidence as to what had happened. The Second Seminole War, being a much larger conflict, was even better covered. After the war’s conclusion, Capt. John T. Sprague wrote The Florida War, using a wealth of official documents and his own personal recollections. Others who had served in the war also wrote journals or lengthy articles in the press. In contrast, little was written about the Third Seminole War. Those who kept journals or letters telling of their experiences didn’t publish them, or if they did it was long afterwards, and often as a small part of a life story that was more concerned with their service in the Civil War. Indeed, it wasn’t until some 120 years after the war’s conclusion that anyone attempted a true history of the Third Seminole War. Dr. James W. Covington of the University of Tampa had been researching the subject for years, and in 1982 the Mickler House published his book The Billy Bowlegs War. Written under a tight deadline and with the limited source material available at the time, the thin volume (82 pages) has stood the test of time and is still considered the standard on the subject. Unfortunately, the book had a small print run and has been out-of-print for some time and is now difficult to find. Those of us lucky enough to have a copy keep a close eye on it. So why this new history of the war? For one thing, we now have much more research material on which to base our work. Not only were there three of us working on the project, the advent of the Internet has allowed us to identify, locate, and collect source material much more quickly than Dr. Covington could ever have dreamed possible. By the time all the letters, journals, newspaper articles, and other material was transcribed and put into chronological order, we had approximately 2,000 pages of single-spaced material to use in constructing our history of the war. And while

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The Billy Bowlegs War does a fine job of telling the events of the war, we felt there was so much more to be added, especially in the way of first-hand accounts from those who were actually waging the war or having to live with its consequences. Readers will note that in the title of this work we show the dates for the war as being 1849–1858. Traditionally the dates have been 1855–1858, because that is when open warfare was taking place. We chose 1849 for a starting date because that is when hostile events started to happen, and the government began to take definite steps to complete the removal of the remaining Seminole. After the end of the Second Seminole War in 1842 there were seven years of relative peace. This doesn’t mean the long-standing animosities between Indian and white had disappeared, but simply that there was little contact between the two parties outside of normal trade. The Seminole, knowing their continued presence in the state depended upon their causing no trouble for the whites, did their best to keep their distance. On the other side of the coin, white settlement had yet to encroach upon the territory occupied by the Indians, so there was little opportunity for confrontation. All that changed when a series of murders took place in 1849 and 1850. Although the Indian outlaws who committed the crimes were surrendered to white authorities, relations could not return to normal. The citizens of Florida began to demand the final removal of the Indians to land that had been set aside for them in what is now Oklahoma. From that point forward, the state and federal governments did everything they could short of outright military action to bribe, talk, or force the Seminole out of Florida. The Seminole, in turn, did everything within their power to remain in their homeland. The outbreak of fighting in 1855 was simply the inevitable result of people with two irreconcilable points of view having reached the limits of their patience. Every story has at least two sides, and this can be easily forgotten when writing about the Seminole Wars. It’s not just the United States waging war against the Seminole; it’s the Seminole waging war against the United States. One side is really no more important than the other. Unfortunately, telling the Seminole side can be extremely difficult for the historian, no matter how well intentioned. Every one of those 2,000 pages of source material we used is written from the white perspective, and there is no way to build an accurate history from any other source. The task is even more difficult for the Third Seminole War than for other conflicts with Native Americans because the Indians were doing everything within their power not to be found, even to the point of refusing to discuss offers of peace. Their only hope of remaining in Florida was to outlast the American will to remove them. In our other works, especially those that deal with the Second Seminole War, there were numerous times when we could use translations of what the Indian leaders said at peace talks or treaty negotiations that would help give the Native perspective. In the Third War there are very few such opportunities. For the most part, when talks were being held no one was keeping minutes. Most of what we have showing the

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Native point of view is contained in small bits kept in letters or journals made by whites, and more as personal observations than as historical records. Aware of this, we used whatever sources were available as much as possible, fully understanding that it would never be enough. In order to help counter this built-in bias, the reader needs to keep in mind that much of what happens to people on one side of the conflict is also happening to those on the other. If the soldiers are slogging through a swamp in pursuit of the Seminole, the Seminole are retreating through the same swamp. If the mosquitoes and sand fleas are aggravating the soldiers, they’re aggravating the Indians as well. If white homes are being attacked by the Seminole, Seminole villages are being attacked by the whites. War is a two-sided affair, and just because one side didn’t write down their experiences doesn’t mean they weren’t suffering just as much, if not more. We would also like to point out that we have intentionally kept the focus of the book rather narrow. This is a history of the Third Seminole War, and we have tried to keep it as such. For that reason we do not delve deeply into the background of the first two wars or examine cultural matters in any great detail on either side. When we can add some point of interest in a clear, concise manner we do, but only if it does not interrupt the flow of the narrative. This is not because we don’t consider these important and fascinating subjects. Quite the opposite. These are areas of interest that deserve to be examined in greater detail than we have space for here, and we invite the reader to consult the bibliography to find works that deal with Seminole culture and other aspects of the Seminole Wars. This project has long been a dream for all three of us. Our separate books on all three Seminole Wars came out within months of each other (Knetsch, Florida’s Seminole Wars 1817–1858, Arcadia Press, 2003; Missall and Missall, The Seminole Wars: America’s Longest Indian Conflict, University Press of Florida, 2004), and in both of these works we felt the Third Seminole War didn’t get the attention it deserved. “Someday,” we often said, “we need to write a thorough history of the Third Seminole War.” Yet a work of this scope takes more than three people. First of all, we’d like to thank our family members who have encouraged and supported us in all our historical endeavors. We also extend our appreciation to our many friends in the Seminole Wars Foundation, whose own historical works have been an inspiration for many years and whose friendships we cherish. Particular thanks go to Patsy West and Annette Snapp for their detailed reviews of the manuscript and their numerous suggestions on how to improve it. Personal thanks go to the numerous individuals who have given their time and efforts to help us fill in the blanks of this complex story. Among them are Alan Aimone, then of the West Point Library Special Collections; Paul Backhouse, Ah-Tah-Thi-Ki Seminole Museum; historian and author Canter Brown, Jr.; James M. Denham of the Florida History Center, Florida Southern College; Rodney

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Dillon; Pamela Gibson of the Manatee County Public Library; the late Sarah Nell Gran; Tom Hambright; Hank Hendry; Dawn Hugh and Rebecca Smith of the then Museum of South Florida History; Claude Kennison; Christopher Kimball; Rodney Kite-Powell, Tampa Bay History Center; Samantha Mercer; Arva Moore Parks; Bea Reifeis (Ambrose Hill Papers); the late Art and Kari Rice of LaBelle; Cindy Russell; Kathy Slusser; Willard “Bill” Steele; Jerry Wilkinson; Irv Winsboro; and Debra Wynne. Our appreciation also goes to the many helpful staff members at the following institutions, whose assistance made our work so much easier: Florida State Library and Archives, Tallahassee; Lee County Library, Fort Myers; Sebring Historical Society; University of Florida Special Collections, James Cusick, Director; Bowdoin College Special Collections; Detroit Public Library, Burton Collection; and the Title and Land Records Section, Florida Department of Environmental Protection. We thank one and all.

chapter one

Florida Has Been Deeply Injured

Was the Second Seminole War (1835–1842) really over? People throughout the nation, and especially in Florida, had a right to be skeptical. For almost seven years, the Seminole Indians had fought against the government’s effort to remove them from their Florida homeland and send them to new homes west of the Mississippi River. It had been an embarrassing war for the government, costly in terms of dollars spent and lives lost, and in the end there were still hundreds of Seminole living in Florida. It was not the first time America had waged war upon the Seminole people. In late 1817 tensions along the border between Georgia and what was then Spanish Florida exploded into open conflict. General Andrew Jackson was sent into Florida with a force of more than 4,000 men including allied Lower Creek Indian warriors to destroy the Seminole and capture any runaway slaves living in the area. By May 1818 Jackson had pushed the Indians deep into the peninsula, destroying major settlements and taking much of their livestock. After devastating the Seminole, Jackson turned his attention to the Spanish capital at Pensacola, and contrary to orders, captured the city after a short siege. Having accomplished his mission, Jackson returned to his home in Tennessee, leaving it to Secretary of State John Quincy Adams to clean up the diplomatic mess. To the Spanish it had become obvious they could no longer hold on to the colony, and in 1819 the Adams-Onis Treaty was signed, ceding Florida to the United States. When the land changed hands in 1821, Andrew Jackson was appointed Military Governor.1 The Seminole, who had for the most part been left alone by the Spanish authorities, now had to deal with the Americans. The Natives occupied some of the best land in the peninsula and owned huge herds of valuable cattle. In addition, the Indians also held a large number of their own slaves and usually welcomed runaways. Disputes over land, livestock, and slaves were inevitable. In the Treaty of Moultrie Creek, signed in 1823, the Indians were granted a 4-million-acre reservation in central Florida, but the land was unproductive, and they found it difficult to survive.2 In 1830, at the urging of President Andrew Jackson, Congress passed the Indian Removal Act, which called for the relocation of all Native Americans who lived east

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of the Mississippi to a new Indian Territory in what is now Oklahoma. In 1832 the Treaty of Payne’s Landing was signed by a small number of Seminole leaders but was not presented to the Tribal Council for debate or ratification. In it the tribe supposedly relinquished all claim to land in Florida in exchange for new land in the West. The majority of the Seminole, including the Tribal Council, called the treaty fraudulent and refused to prepare for emigration. The government insisted they had no choice. Leave voluntarily, the Indians were told, or the army will force you out.3 Open warfare began in December 1835 with the annihilation of a detachment of 108 men under Maj. Francis Langhorne Dade at a point midway between Fort Brooke (Tampa) and Fort King (Ocala). For the United States Army, one defeat followed another. On New Year’s Eve the Seminole repulsed 750 men at the Withlacoochee River, and by the end of January virtually the entire sugar industry (Florida’s biggest business) had been destroyed. In early March a force of 1,000 men was held under siege for over a week before being rescued, and several weeks later an army of about 5,000 men failed to kill or capture any significant number of Seminole before the season for active campaigning ended in May. The Seminole, who refused to fight in the orderly, Napoleonic tactics the army was trained in, seemed to be winning the war.4 As it would be for the next five years, the war was put on hold for the summer. Daily rains made the roads impassible and flooded much of the land. Hordes of disease-bearing insects attacked the troops in their barracks, causing far more fatalities than Seminole bullets ever would. Posts in the interior, considered unhealthy, were abandoned. Troops were sent north to allow them to recover or to deal with other problems facing the nation. By the time autumn arrived, both sides were ready to resume the conflict. In November 1836 Florida Governor Richard Keith Call led about 2,100 men into the Seminole strongholds near the Withlacoochee River. After a sharp battle at the Wahoo Swamp, most of the Seminole made their escape. President Jackson then placed Maj. Gen. Thomas Jesup in charge of the war. Jesup understood that the only way to end the war was to wear the Seminole down. Fighting a prolonged war of attrition was new for the United States and would require an unprecedented effort on the part of the military. Half of the regular army was brought to Florida, and thousands of State Militia and Volunteer units were raised and sent to the war zone. Even the navy and marines were involved. Forts were built within a day’s march of each other, and patrols were sent out to constantly harass the Indians. Millions of dollars worth of supplies and weaponry were transported by wagon trains or ships. It took over a year, but by January 1838 Jesup had captured or killed hundreds of belligerents and forced many to surrender. Most of the remnant Seminole fled to the inhospitable Everglades, where they hoped the army couldn’t follow them.5 Feeling he had accomplished all that could be expected, Jesup asked the administration to declare the war over. He knew that chasing and rounding up the

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remaining Seminole hiding in the Florida wilderness would be an impossible task, and that the Seminole’s guerilla tactics rendered nearly every homestead and road in Florida vulnerable. Officials in Washington wouldn’t hear of it and told Jesup the war would not end until every last Indian was removed from Florida. Jesup was relieved by Brig. Gen. Zachary Taylor, who fortified the settled areas, but did little to capture the Seminole. In 1839 Maj. Gen. Alexander Macomb, the highest ranking officer in the army, was sent down to negotiate a peace with the Indians. It was the only time in American history that a Native nation had forced the government to sue for peace. Unfortunately, the agreement fell apart after a brutal attack on a trading post near the Caloosahatchee River.6 For the next three years, the government continued its war of attrition against the Seminole, who responded with guerilla tactics the army found difficult to counter. For the army, operating in Florida had proven a logistical nightmare, a place where adequate supplies and efficient transportation were difficult to come by. While military patrols scoured the Everglades, Seminole war parties raided throughout the peninsula. No one, Indian or white, could feel safe. Hundreds of soldiers fell victim to disease, while homesteaders and travelers perished in Indian raids. At the same time, Seminole families were killed or captured, forced from their homes, or saw their crops destroyed. After six years of warfare, people were dying and suffering on both sides, yet there seemed no end in sight to the fighting. So who were these seemingly invincible people who were able to hold off the might of the American nation for so long? Of all the tribes in the southeastern United States, the Seminole had been the smallest and least cohesive. Their population before the war had numbered only about 5,000 individuals, with perhaps 1,500 capable of being called “warriors.” The term “Seminole” was not one they had chosen for themselves but had been applied by others, the term generally implying “separatist” or “runaway” from the Creek Confederacy.7 For the most part they weren’t even aboriginal to Florida. There had been several hundred thousand Indians in Florida when the Spaniards arrived in 1513, but within two hundred years the Natives had been virtually wiped out by disease, warfare, and enslavement. Some moved north into the English colonies and were living among the closely related Creek tribes, while others fled Spanish-held territory and moved into the more remote areas of Florida. In the early 1700s Creek Indians from what is now Alabama and Georgia began to move into the sparsely inhabited peninsula. Some came to hunt game, others because they were displaced by white encroachment, and others were leaving behind political or personal disputes within their own tribes. They came from different places at different times, settled in different areas, and spoke different dialects. They were called Alachua, Mikasuki, Apalachee, Tallahassee, Uchee, and other tribal names. Some of them mixed with remnants of the Natives who were already in Florida. In the end “Seminole” came to mean any Indian living in Florida.8

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Theirs was an ancient and sophisticated culture that few whites of the time really understood. The fact that separate groups had migrated from widely spaced places meant that different languages were spoken. Even today, Florida’s Seminole speak two distinct tongues. It was, however, a common culture. In Creek/Seminole society, the primary social units were the clans. Seminole clans are matrilineal, unlike the common practice in European society where people tend to take their father’s surname and trace their lineage through the paternal line. Throughout a person’s life he or she would identify with his mother’s clan, even married men, who would traditionally move in with the wife’s clan. If a marriage dissolved, the husband would return to his own clan, but children and common property stayed with the wife.9 For the Seminole, “family” meant anyone of the same clan, no matter how many generations removed or how distant their residence. It still does.10 While a Seminole’s personal life was rooted in his or her clan, social life was centered on the town. A Seminole town was much more than a geographic entity, and a significant portion of the population might live some distance away from the town center in remote villages or camps, often populated by members of the same clan. The town was the ceremonial and political center of the Seminole’s world, the place where they would gather in times of celebration or danger.11 Ceremonies, rituals, and religious beliefs have always played an important part in the lives of the Seminole. Their most significant ritual was the annual Green Corn Dance. The term “dance” can be a bit misleading. Although tribal members spent a lot of time chanting and moving in rhythmic patterns around the central fire, it was much more than simple recreation. The dances had meaning, conveying tribal history, philosophy, and mores. Dancing helped bring continuity to the Indians’ lives, allowing them to come closer to the world in which they lived and the lives of their ancestors.12 Above all else, the Green Corn Dance was a time of spiritual purification and cleansing. By the end of the four-day ceremony the community was spiritually renewed and prepared to face the challenges of the coming year. The Green Corn Dance is still the most important event of the Seminole year.13 The Seminole were never friendly toward their northern neighbors. Many had come to Florida because of differences within the Creek tribes they had left or because of encroachment by colonists in Georgia. An animosity remained, and during the American Revolution, when Florida remained an English colony, they occasionally fought against the rebels in Georgia. During the War of 1812, some of them again sided with the British, which only served to make them more of an enemy in the eyes of the Americans.14 The Seminole were not alone in their hatred of the white Americans. Many Upper Creek Indians from what is now eastern Alabama, inspired by Tecumseh and his message of Indian solidarity and resistance to white expansion, formed the Red Stick faction, which sought more independent power from the Creek National Council. Opposed to them were many Lower Creeks from western Georgia and

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southern Alabama, who were more accepting of white culture. In 1813 war broke out between the two groups, and the United States soon became involved. The following spring General Andrew Jackson led a large army of volunteers from Tennessee and Kentucky and defeated the Red Sticks at the Battle of Horseshoe Bend. Hundreds of refugee Red Sticks fled to the safety of Spanish Florida and took up residence alongside the Seminole.15 There was yet another group of people living among the Florida Indians who had an even greater reason to fear white Americans. As long as Florida was in the possession of Spain, it was seen as a safe haven for runaway slaves from Georgia and the Carolinas. The Seminole welcomed these people, who possessed skills in farming, understood white culture, and could serve as interpreters. Some leading Seminole families also purchased slaves. The surplus crops produced by these people brought wealth to their owners, and the slaves were rewarded with a life that was less like slavery and more like share-cropping. Generally treated with respect by the Indians, the Black Seminole did everything in their power to remain free and were always a point of contention between the Indians and whites.16 Yet as diverse and at times antagonistic as these various groups could be, they were united in the defense of their homeland when faced with forced removal. Although their numbers were small, they enjoyed some major advantages over their white adversaries. At the beginning of the Second Seminole War, the army knew very little of the interior of Florida; few whites had ever been there. The Seminole, on the other hand, knew every lake, stream, swamp, wooded hammock, and hiding place in the peninsula. They knew where to find food, while the military was forced to import vast amounts of supplies from hundreds of miles away. Soldiers, who lived in crowded forts, were more prone to disease than the Seminole, who lived in small groups and were acclimatized to the sub-tropical conditions. The army, schooled in European-style combat, found it difficult to adjust to the tactics of guerilla warfare. The Indians, raised in a warrior culture, proved themselves to be excellent tacticians, executing deadly ambushes, selecting superior defensive positions, and choosing to fight when the advantage was with them. The Seminole’s tenacity and fighting prowess became legendary, almost mythic. The Second Seminole War appeared as if it could go on forever, but as the war progressed, the army’s skill and efficiency increased, allowing them to operate successfully in the Everglades. Small bands of Seminole, under continual pressure from the army, were either captured or forced to surrender. Those that managed to elude the patrols retreated deeper into the Everglades, and by May 1842 there were few Indians left to fight. President John Tyler’s secretary of war, John Spencer, informed Winfield Scott, the commanding general of the army, of the president’s wishes: The very reduced number of the hostile Indians now in Florida, believed not to exceed two hundred and forty, including probably eighty warriors, would seem to indicate that all has been accomplished which can be effected by the employment of a large military force in offensive

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history of the third seminole war 1849–1858 operations. Unless such operations are to be continued until the last Indian in the Peninsula shall be destroyed or captured, there must be some period when they should cease. That period, it is believed, has now arrived, and the protection of the inhabitants must be secured by other means, which it is believed can be effectually employed for that purpose.17

The people of Florida were certainly ready for the war to end, even if there were still a few Seminole left behind. Citizens of Leon County sent a Memorial to Congress that looked to the future while bemoaning the past: The undersigned would respectfully urge upon Congress the justice and the policy of making, in the act admitting Florida a State, a liberal donation of the public lands within her boundaries, to enable her to get the State Government into operation efficiently, beneficially and successfully. Florida has been deeply injured, nay well nigh ruined, by the deplorable war which has raged here for six years … Our most fertile fields, then in profitable cultivation, are now lying waste, with nearly every house and cabin, on a frontier of upwards of four hundred miles, burned to the ground, and hundreds of the best plantations deserted by their former possessors and grown up in bushes. Florida has been put back ten years by this war.18

As the tribe’s population began to dwindle, primary leadership fell into the hands of two people. The most visible was Holata Micco of the Alachua band, which had originally settled around the Alachua Prairie near present-day Gainesville. To whites he was known as Billy Bowlegs, a corruption of the Seminole name Bolek. He spoke English, which was unusual for a Seminole, and was a bit over thirty years of age.19 The other leader who stood out was Abiaki, better known as Sam Jones, headman of the Mikasuki. They had once lived northeast of present-day Tallahassee around Lake Miccosukee, the largest and most powerful Indian settlement in Florida previous to the First Seminole War. Born about 1781, he was already a respected elder when the Second Seminole War began and had proven himself a brilliant tactician in that conflict. He was also a powerful spiritual leader whose vehement opposition to emigration preserved his people in their Florida homeland. Eventually, Figure 1. Chief Holata Micco (Billy Bowlegs). Photo when supplies of ammunition began to taken on an 1852 trip to Washington, D.C. to meet run low, both men shifted their strategy President Millard Fillmore.

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to avoiding military confrontation, hoping the whites would tire of the war. By war’s end the Alachua and Mikasuki had migrated to the lands south of Lake Okeechobee, in areas known as the Big Cypress and Everglades. It was a region many of them had lived or hunted in for decades, and it proved an excellent refuge from the advancing white armies.20 Although whites considered Holata to be chief of the entire Seminole tribe, that was not the case. Abiaki was just as powerful, if not more, but he kept a low profile. There were also three or four small groups of Creeks living north of the Big Cypress and Everglades that were only loosely affiliated with the main body of Seminole. One group dwelt west of Lake Okeechobee and was led by a pair of Mikasuki brothers who had married into the group, Oscen Tustennuggee and Hospetarke. Another group, known as Tallahassees, lived along the Kissimmee River and was headed by Chipco. There was a sizable band led by Octiarche and Tiger Tail living far north, near the Suwannee River, and a possible fourth group, known as the Cow Creek, who may have lived west of Fort Pierce. Getting all these scattered bands to agree to any peace deal would prove a daunting task. On 21 July 1842, a parley was held at Fort Brooke, one of the larger military outposts in Florida and nucleus for the future city of Tampa. Fuse Hadjo, a representative of Holata Micco, had come to meet Col. William Jenkins Worth, commanding officer of the forces in Florida. Fuse Hadjo told Worth that Holata was happy to receive the news that the government was offering peace and that the Seminole and Mikasuki people would also be glad to hear it. He reported that “Bowlegs had gone to give the talk to such of his people as he could find, & that when he assembles them, which he expects to do soon, he hopes to have a talk himself, with the Colonel.”21 Fuse Hadjo had been sent to see Worth because Holata wasn’t convinced the offer of peace was real. Too many promises and treaties had been made and broken, and experience had taught the Seminole not to trust the whites. Figure 2. General William Jenkins Worth. Final Many of the foremost Seminole leaders, commander of the Second Seminole War, he including Micanopy, Coacoochee, and established peace with the Seminole.

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Osceola, had been seized while negotiating under a flag of truce, and Holata didn’t want his name added to the list. For both sides in the war, hope and skepticism went hand-in-hand. As far as the government was concerned, the Seminole had signed several treaties agreeing to remove to the West and had broken all of them. Each side had their own interpretations of the circumstances surrounding all these breaches of faith, but neither side seemed capable, or willing, to see things from the other’s point of view. Deep distrust had been building for 40 years and was not going to go away overnight. Worth told Fuse Hadjo that the president was giving them the option to remain in South Florida or emigrate to Indian Territory, whichever they preferred, though he recommended moving west. There would be incentives to move, such as cash payments and a rifle for each warrior and rations for a year. If they chose to remain they would get nothing and must agree to stay within the boundaries of the reservation set aside for them. The only exception would be to visit the trading post that would be set up at Tampa Bay. Having received the “talk,” Fuse Hadjo left Fort Brooke and headed south in search of Holata Micco, promising to return in 17 days.22 Ending the war meant removing troops from Florida, something the local white population was very much against. Floridians may have wanted peace, but they also wanted protection in case the peace didn’t hold. Many also wanted to take advantage of the economic opportunities a large number of troops provided, be it legitimate services or illegal trade. For his part, Secretary of War Spencer believed the frontiersmen of Florida should be responsible for their own protection, with initial support from the government: It is deemed advisable that a force equal to at least two regiments be retained to form a cordon, or line of protection, for the frontier settlements. The action of congress will be invited to aid in the defence of the territory, by the settlement of our citizens there, and offering to them inducements for such settlements, by gratuities of land, by allowing them rations for subsistence, and by the loan of arms. Until the decision of congress is had on the subject, it is desirable that the settlements to be made should be within such line of protection as shall be established by Colonel Worth, who will take the necessary measures to effect this arrangement.23

Worth had already begun the process of resettling the frontier by sponsoring several military colonies in the Territory, such as the one founded on the Manatee River by Col. Sam Reid. Yet there were limits to the amount of support Worth could offer. Most incentives would have to come from Congress, where many legislators believed that if settlers were given a bounty of land and armed, they would valiantly defend their new homes and force the Seminole deeper into the wilderness and eventually out west. To that end, Congress passed the Armed Occupation Act on 2  August 1842. The act offered potential settlers a quarter section (160 acres) of free land south of present-day Gainesville if the settler agreed to live on the land for five years, clear at least five acres, build a suitable habitation, and bear arms to protect

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the land against Indian aggression. It was one of the important models used for the later, more famous, Homestead Act.24 For potential settlers the act provided legal assurances, but vagueness in the wording allowed the General Land Office (GLO) to enforce its long-held policy requiring settlements to be on a previously surveyed quarter section of land. This created problems for settlers who followed natural boundaries (streams, tree lines, etc.) to establish their claims instead of moving onto lands that had been surveyed by GLO personnel. This difference of policy led to much ill-will between the GLO and the Deputy Surveyors, who were required to grant approval of the quarter sections assigned to those who had followed natural boundaries. Settlers who had made improvements prior to this edict from the GLO often had to give up a portion of their claim to satisfy the requirement.25 After five years of disagreement, the government sent James Archer to settle the disputes by gathering affidavits from two other settlers and the local sheriff, all stating that a settler who had followed natural boundaries and had otherwise met the requirements was entitled to the land. Although Archer was fairly liberal in granting the settlers their patents to the land, many were deprived of their claims for a variety of reasons, including abandonment. In addition, those who had settled upon the keys and islands along the shores of the state were often not allowed to keep their claims, since those areas had been reserved for military purposes. The 10 settlers upon Key Largo, for instance, were not allowed to remain on the island.26 Congressional Delegate David Levy wrote to the editors of the Washington, D.C. Daily National Intelligencer on the benefits of the Armed Occupation Act to the settlement of Florida:  … [as] there is already evidence of much intended emigration, it behooves those who contemplate removal to lose no time in reaching there … No condition can be more independent and happy than that of the Florida farmer … In short, he will need to buy nothing but his coffee and salt; and the last of these can be produced cheaply and in any quantity upon the coast. I need add no more than an assurance to immigrants of every hospitable attention and assistance from those who have preceded them in this land of promise, and a cordial invitation to all who would better their condition, the poor not less than the rich, to come and cast their lot with us.27

The war wasn’t over, but the unrestrained selling of Florida real estate (much of it swampland) was about to begin. Negotiations to end the war began to move rapidly. On 5 August 1842 Worth met with Holata Micco, who agreed to the terms that had been given to Fuse Hadjo. The offer of money, a rifle, and rations in exchange for emigration may have been tempting, but Holata turned it down; he and his people chose to remain in Florida. The biggest concern for both sides was that not all the Florida Indians were party to the agreement. The Mikasuki, led by Abiaki, were not at the talks, nor were any representatives of the Creeks. Indeed, everyone’s biggest concern was the Red Stick Creeks. Holata did not want them living among the Seminole. Fuse Hadjo

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had earlier said, “They cannot agree & should they occupy the same country there will be frequent difficulties amongst them owing to their bad conduct towards the whites.”28 Still, Worth felt that if Holata was satisfied the others would follow suit.29 Five days later Worth and Holata were at Cedar Key, making the same offer to the group of Creeks who lived along the Suwannee River. Their leaders, Octiarche and Tiger Tail, expressed a willingness to abide by the agreement, but pointed out that it would take time to get word to the several small bands that were hiding out in the northern part of the peninsula. It would also take time for them to gather their belongings and move south to the reservation. Until all this was accomplished, a lot could go wrong.30 On 11 August, Worth announced the coming peace and laid out the boundaries of the reservation: By arrangement with the few Indians remaining in the Southern portion of Florida, between whom and the whites hostilities no longer exist, they are permitted for a while to plant and hunt on the lands included within the following boundaries, to wit: from the mouth of the Talakchopko or Pease Creek [Peace River] up the left bank of that stream to the fork of Southern branch, and following that branch to the head or northern edge of Lake Istokpoga; thence down the Eastern margin of that Lake to the Stream which empties from it into the Kissimmee river, following the left bank of said stream and river to where the latter empties into Lake Okeechobee; thence due South through said Lake and the everglades to Shark River, following the right bank of that river to the Gulf; thence along the Gulf shore to the place of beginning, excluding all islands lying between Punta Rassa and the head of Charlotte Harbor.31

The words “permitted for a while” showed that the United States did not consider this a permanent arrangement. In case that wasn’t clear enough, Worth added, “The foregoing temporary arrangement being in conformity with the instructions of the President of the United States, is communicated for the information of all whom it may concern.” The order also contained a message for any whites who might be thinking the land was open for settlement. “Within the boundaries herein described no settlement can with safety or propriety be formed, and any persons making settlements within those limits will be subjected to removal in conformity with the laws in reference to Indians and their places of residence.” Worth knew that white encroachment was more of a threat to peace than the mere presence of the Indians.32 It was important that word of the agreement get out as soon as possible, for on the same day Worth issued his order, a band of 10 Indians attacked the settlement of San Pedro (about midway between Jacksonville and Tallahassee), killing two whites. A party of 20 volunteers took off in pursuit of the raiders and caught up with them, killing two and wounding five. Floridians, refusing to believe the Indians would abide by the agreement, called for a renewal of hostilities until every last Seminole was removed.33 Three days later, on the 14th, Worth made the official announcement that peace had come to the Territory of Florida. “It is hereby announced that hostilities with the Indians within this territory, have ceased. Measures are taken to pass the few

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remaining, within certain limits—those in the far south, immediately; those west of the Suwannee, in a few days; who, meantime, there is every reasonable assurance, will conduct inoffensively if unmolested in their haunts.” He once again defined the boundaries of the reservation, prefacing it with, “The lands thus temporarily assigned as their planting and hunting grounds …” The final fate of the Florida Seminole was postponed, not decided.34 There was one last task to be taken care of. During the conflict soldiers were buried near the place where they perished, be it a battlefield, fort, or alongside the road. Worth had previously ordered that all officers who had died in the war, whether from wounds or disease, be disinterred and brought to St. Augustine. Added to that were any enlisted men who had been killed in action. On 15 August, an honor guard and seven wagons containing those remains marched in a solemn procession from the north end of the old city to the cemetery adjacent to the St. Francis Barracks at the south end of town. To the sound of salute guns, the bones were placed in three vaults and then covered by a trio of coquina pyramids. A marble obelisk was later placed in front of the memorial.35 Mission accomplished, Worth temporarily turned command over to Col. Josiah Vose and proceeded to Washington, where he met with the president and received a brevet promotion to brigadier general.36

Figure 3. Military cemetery adjacent to St. Francis Barracks, St. Augustine. Hundreds of dead from the Second Seminole War are buried under the three pyramids.

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Peace may have been declared, but would it hold? Would the few hundred Seminole who had refused to emigrate continue to avoid the whites and remain hidden in the Everglades? Would they confine their travels to visits to the trading post or would they go looking for cattle to steal or opportunities to take revenge upon the whites? Would white settlers continually push the frontier south, thus encroaching on Indian land? Could they encounter a Seminole with recourse to insults or violence? After nearly seven years of bitter warfare, could both sides possibly live in peace? It would take time for normalcy to return to Florida. The army still had almost 1,900 men stationed at various posts along the frontier, and no one expected the transition to be perfectly peaceful. Many young warriors, brought up in a culture where the only way to advance in society was by acts of bravery against an enemy, would be reluctant to lay down their arms. Backwoods whites, on the other hand, might take revenge upon small parties of Indians travelling south toward the reservation. Trust would take time to build, and there were a lot of people who could neither forgive nor forget. It wasn’t until the end of September that the army began to remove troops, sending 420 men of the Fourth Infantry to new quarters in St. Louis.37 In the meantime, the attack at San Pedro had put Floridians on edge and had gotten the attention of the War Department. Orders were sent to Colonel Vose to resume active operations against the Indians. In the meantime, volunteers and militia forces went looking for stray bands of Indians. To the Seminole, it appeared as if the army had offered them peace but was once again on the offensive. Vose knew the majority of the Indians were doing the best they could to reach the southern reservation and that sending his forces out to hunt them down would only make matters worse. In an attempt to buy time, Vose delayed the implementation of the War Department’s orders and kept the soldiers at their forts. He also sent officers to talk to the Indian leaders and reassure them of the government’s good intentions.38 Matters became complicated when the Creeks in the northern parts of the peninsula became sullen and refused to cooperate. Staying in their camps near the Suwannee River, they began to make unreasonable demands for food and drink from the army depot at Cedar Key. On the other hand, Colonel Vose began to express concerns about settlers harassing those Indians who were making their way toward the reservation. For once, the War Department took the side of the Native Americans: The Secretary hears with much regret that any portion of the citizens of Florida … manifest and express a disposition to renew, of themselves, hostilities against the few remaining Indians … The Secretary hopes this will soon pass off, and that they will remain quiet at their homes and throw no obstacles in the way of the Government in carrying out the peaceable plans now in due course of execution. If however the reverse unhappily be the case, our first duty is to fulfil [sic] the engagements which have been made with the Indians and to protect them in their efforts to comply with the obligations on their part. The Secretary of War, after consultation with the President, therefore directs that at all hazards you must defend and protect the Indians who are preparing to emigrate or to go within the lines, south, assigned to them, and

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who have not committed any hostilities since the amnesty was proclaimed: If any citizens of Florida, or others attack such unoffending Indians, you must repel such attack force by force; and it is the further direction of the Secretary, that you will cause it to be known that such will be your course.39

The situation with the Creek bands near Cedar Key continued to deteriorate. Distrusting the whites, they refused to make preparations to move south and continued to make demands for food and drink. The officers at Cedar Key, not wanting to do anything that would force the Indians to become openly hostile, reluctantly met those demands, and as long as supplies were available, the Indians saw little reason to move south. In the end, Nature provided the needed impetus in the form of a hurricane that struck Cedar Key on 4 October. The low-lying island was devastated, its warehouses and wharfs washed away, and its residents forced to flee to the one small spot of high ground that wasn’t under water. If the Indians wanted supplies they would now have to move south, at least as far as Fort Brooke at Tampa Bay.40 On 1 November General Worth returned to Florida and resumed command. Although belligerent whites were a concern, he also had to deal with internal hostilities among the various Indian factions. The two leaders from the northern bands, Tiger Tail and Octiarche, were beginning to cause trouble. Tiger Tail had expressed a desire to emigrate to the West, but was doing nothing toward that end. Instead, he had fallen into drunkenness and ill health and was threatening to move south and cause further trouble. Octiarche was proving even more dangerous. Some animosity had existed between the Seminole and Creeks for generations, and now that the war was over, old feuds began to resurface. The Creeks were going to have to live on the same reservation, but they were refusing to be ruled by Holata or Abiaki. It even got to the point where Octiarche began to make threats against Holata’s life and the Seminole in general. If the Indians couldn’t find peace among themselves, they certainly couldn’t find it with the whites.41 Worth needed to resolve the situation quickly. An army surgeon went to the Indian camp and found Tiger Tail incapacitated, his face beaten and scratched to the point where his eyes were swollen shut. A party of soldiers soon returned and took him into custody, as much for his own protection as anything. Tiger Tail and his followers were quickly shipped west, but the leader died in New Orleans, midway between the home he’d left and the new one that awaited him.42 Octiarche was a bigger problem. Fearful of being captured and sent west, he was forever on his guard, yet his dependence on the army for supplies proved his undoing. On 20 December he and his followers came to Fort Brooke to hear a talk from Maj. Washington Seawell, the commanding officer. While Seawell was speaking, a prearranged signal was given and a company of soldiers, supposedly on drill, suddenly surrounded the band. Before long, Octiarche and his followers were also headed west.43 Worth didn’t like resorting to such tactics, but saw little option.

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A few troublemakers could ruin the whole attempt at peace, something Worth was not going to let happen. He also knew that he had the support of Seminole leadership. With Tiger Tail and Octiarche gone, Holata and Abiaki were the indisputable rulers of the Seminole. True, the two men had their differences, but neither one wanted hostilities to resume. Peace now had a chance.44 The Seminole, 5,000 strong before the war, were now reduced to fewer than 400 individuals. Worth, in what he felt was an accurate count, listed 95 warriors: “Seminoles [Alachua], forty-two; Mickasukies, thirty-three; Creeks, ten; Tallahassees, ten.” The rest were elders, women, and children. He also reported that they were doing their part to keep the peace:45 Since the pacification of August 14th, 1842, these people have observed perfect good faith, and strictly fulfilled their engagements; not an instance of rudeness towards the whites has yet occurred. They plant and hunt diligently; and take their game and skins to the trading establishment or Fort Brooke, procure the necessaries they desire, and return quietly to their grounds.46

Worth’s biggest concern continued to be the remaining Red Stick Creeks. They were collecting north of Lake Okeechobee and were causing no trouble, yet he knew their hatred of the whites was greater than that of the Seminole and Mikasuki, and that they might become a magnet for discontented warriors from the other groups. Unfortunately, there was little he could do about it. The year 1843 opened with optimism. Now that the fear of Indian attack had been removed, people seemed willing to give Florida a try. The St. Augustine Republican reported: The tide of emigration is fast flowing into Florida. Already it is supposed that nearly all the grant of two hundred thousand acres of land made by government is taken up. The following settlements are already established in the southern section of the Territory: “Chucachatta,” [sic] which is within thirty miles of Old Tampa; “Homesassie,” [sic] distant from Cedar Keys about fifteen miles; “Allafia,” [sic] seven miles below Tampa, on the eastern shore; and the “Manatee,” at the mouth of Tampa. On this last settlement they have orange trees, lime trees, a great variety of grapes, the olive, and most kinds of tropical fruits in a state of cultivation. Several other settlements have been commenced along the coast, south of St. Augustine. Emigrants are likewise flowing in and settling in the vicinity of the St. Johns. A private letter from Jacksonville says, “Our neighborhood is brisk with settlers. If the tide of emigration, with the inducements extended by Government and the serenity of climate and exuberance of our soil, could be turned hitherward, Florida, in a few fleeting years, would eclipse the Far West in population and commerce.”47

Yet people were still wary of the Seminole, their ferocious reputation being hard to forget. The Indians also provided a good “cover” for crimes committed by someone else, as one newspaper reported: “The Indians have been blamed for depredations committed near Micanopy or in the vicinity of Newnansville, about the 28th ult. [ultimo: previous month]. A lady was the sufferer, but it was hoped she would

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recover; subsequent discoveries turn the suspicion in a different direction.” General Worth took pains to point out the Seminole were not at fault:48 The recent attempt to murder a woman in the immediate neighborhood of Newnansville in the midst of a thick population and at noon day was clearly, from the attendant circumstances, not the work of Indians and such was the opinion of the community in which she resided, on the contrary, subsequent developments leave no doubt that it was the act of several desperate runaway negroes. For eleven months, indeed since my announcement of August 14th, 1842, became known to the straggling bands, not an outrage or offensive act has been committed by Indians—unlooked for good fortune considering the utterly wild state in which the cessation of hostilities left these people.49

The promised prosperity associated with peace seemed to be proving true. A new settler to the territory reported some of the stories he’d heard: This is the finest farming country I have ever seen … The production are Sea Island cotton, sugar, corn, oats, potatoes, &c., but the most valuable staple will be sugar  … Raising stock is very profitable;—I heard of one man who had 8,000 head. We can ship them to Mobile, Pensacola, New Orleans, Havana, Charleston or Savannah, by driving forty or fifty miles to a shipping port … Corn is now worth one dollar per bushel, and will be for two or three years, as there will be many moving in.50

The good news was spreading throughout the nation, and Florida boosters were doing their best to allay any lingering fears in people’s minds. A year after the war ended, the Daily National Intelligencer reported: There remains in the Territory now only a small party, of whom Apiaca is chief. He and his people evince every disposition to be quiet and peaceable. Having had time to discover that their companions in arms were gone, and that the tide of settlement, sweeping over their once cultivated and widely extended fields, is now fast hurrying them within the narrow limits temporarily assigned them, they seek only peace, and endeavor to cultivate the best understanding with those already their neighbors. Their limited numbers and their narrow territory will force them to be quiet. They now lie at the mercy of the whites. As an evidence of their sincerity, we may mention that their visits to the post at Tampa Bay for the purpose of trade are constant, and their intercourse with the settlers, whether at the post or in the woods, is most friendly. We hesitate not to say that ‘the Florida war’ is not only ended, but that it will ‘stay ended.’ Emigrants may now seek a residence here with as much safety as in any part of the country.51

Perhaps Florida’s biggest booster was the Territorial Delegate to Congress, David Levy. No one did more to tout Florida’s advantages in the national press, while at the same time minimizing lingering fears about the Seminole. Although as a delegate he had no vote in Congress, he was effective in getting the Territory’s message across to other Congressmen. In a letter to the Daily National Intelligencer he sounded more like a 20th-century land huckster than a 19th-century politician: To the wealthy planter, Florida is eminently inviting … But to the poor and the moderate in circumstance, it is, beyond comparison, the paradise of earth. There are no freezing winters

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to be provided against by closed houses, magazines of supplies for embargoes and shivering families … The means of subsistence are obtained with less labor, and labor is more productive, and industry more quickly blessed with accumulation and plenty than is conceivable to the inhabitants of a less fortunate region.52

A Sephardic Jew born in the Virgin Islands, Levy truly believed in the promise of his adopted home. During the Second Seminole War he had served as a lieutenant in the Florida Mounted Militia and took part in several patrols. His untiring efforts on behalf of Florida would be rewarded in 1845 when he was made the State of Florida’s first senator, the first Jewish-American to be elected to that body. Nine days later he changed his name by an act of the Florida legislature, taking the name of his mother’s family, Yulee, and became David Levy Yulee. A trained lawyer who practiced in St. Augustine, his investments led to large land holdings and prestige within the community. A forward-looking individual, he saw the coming importance of railroads and spearheaded the building of the state’s first successful rail line, running from Amelia Island on the Atlantic coast to Cedar Key on the Gulf coast. Levy also led the fight to correct some of the problems associated with the Armed Occupation Act, including the annulment of permits on certain Florida keys, most importantly Cedar Key, where he helped clear title for his political associate, Augustus Steele.53 On the face of things, the Armed Occupation Act seemed to be fulfilling its promise to entice settlers to Florida. Various reports from different sources made it sound as if the free land would soon run out: The settlement of this territory, under the provisions of the late act of congress, appears to be going forward steadily. At the land office in St. Augustine, up to the 1st instant, there had been granted eighty-eight permits, to settlers on public lands under the armed occupation law, and there were eight or ten applications pending. These settlers have established themselves at Indian River, St. Lucia, and Lake Worth.54 Settlers are still crowding the Florida. Almost every arrival from that quarter brings accounts of the influx of emigrants. The St. Augustine News (of the 10th ult.) states that there had been five hundred and fifteen permits granted to settlers at the land office in Newnansville, and at the

Figure 4. David Levy Yulee, Florida’s first senator and the first Jew to serve in the Senate. Originally named David Levy, he added his mother’s maiden name of Yulee soon after joining the Senate.

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same office there were two hundred applications pending. At the land office in St. Augustine one hundred and twenty-one permits had been issued, and several applications were pending. The quantity of land granted amount to 101,760 acres. The applications pending are for 3,200 acres more.55 The settlers are “armed occupants,” so called, receiving from Government a certain quantity of land as a grant. They are very sanguine of establishing eventually a flourishing settlement & have laid out a town &c yet to be built. I have no idea however that the Miami will ever be much more than it is for there are but few facilities and no capital either at present or in prospect.56

The Armed Occupation Act did bring a number of new settlers into Florida, but its biggest impact was in the movement of settlers already in Florida further southward. Many established families used the act to increase their holdings by acquiring land for their sons, sons-in-law, or daughters, who often settled on contiguous parcels of land. The act also increased the number of inhabitants along the southeast coast, from the Indian River to the Miami River. General Worth had established several military colonies at the end of the war, but the War Department did not want to carry the expense, so many of those settlers converted their improved lands into permits under the act. Most who did so remained on the land the required five years and received their patents.57 General Worth and his superiors in Washington may have regarded the arrangement with the Seminole as temporary, but the Indians showed no inclination to abandon their homeland. In February 1844, the Bureau of Indian Affairs recommended that the War Department give up on the idea of emigration, at least for the time being. The cost of keeping a civilian emigration agent in Florida was simply not worth the expense, and if a Seminole actually did want to head west, an army officer could handle the details.58 The agent the department was suggesting be let go was LeGrand G. Capers, and even he had to admit that his efforts in convincing the remaining Seminole to leave Florida had not been very successful. His biggest problem was in opening communications with the ever-wary Indians: The greater portion of the Warriors now remaining here are Young, & have grown up since hostilities commenced in this country, consequently, the difficulty of treating or even communicating with them was great, from the fact that they have been taught to engraft on their nature a deadly hatred to the whites, and to treat every overture we made to them as a designing plot, to entrap & remove them without their consent.59

Still, Capers had a job to protect, so he added, “That this feeling has in a great degree subsided & will very soon be overcome I have no doubt, and it gives me the pleasure to state also my conviction that the plans are steadily & successfully progressing to effect their removal.”60 The Seminole may have been peaceable and General Worth may have been confident of their good intentions, but the people of Florida, always fearful of an Indian outbreak, could not stop looking over their shoulders. Delegate Levy was

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hearing from his jittery constituents and passed those fears on to the War Department. On 19 August 1844, the secretary of war responded to Levy, sending him affidavits from some of his officers in Florida. He also let Levy know that he felt much of the settlers’ anxiety was self-induced: I trust these documents will allay your anxiety and remove from your mind all apprehension of danger to your constituents in Florida. I may further add that my recent conversations with General Worth give me further assurance of the safety of the people of Florida from all mischievous intentions on the part of the Indians. I feel assured you will agree with me that individuals on the frontier should be very cautious in avoiding, upon all occasions, the error of raising false alarms and exciting unnecessarily apprehensions of danger and thereby creating a feeling on the part of our frontier citizens calculated to lead to hostilities.61

General Worth and the War Department were trying to keep everyone calm and reasonable, but their efforts were failing. By October the administration began to give in to the pressure. In a very apologetic, carefully worded letter, Secretary of War William Wilkins instructed Worth to try to convince the Seminole it was in their best interests to vacate the Territory: Notwithstanding the President of the United States places firm reliance upon your official reports in reference to the present condition of the Seminoles in Florida, and is fully impressed with the belief that under your command a safe and pacific disposition has been established and manifested amongst those Indians, yet, it is thought that the safer policy requires their removal from the Territory. Their emigration would be an act of humanity towards the Indians—would be safety to him from any wanton or provoked outbreak, and would save the inhabitants of Florida from all uneasiness, whether real or groundless. You will, therefore, resort, without delay, to the adoption of all peaceful means to induce the remnant of Indians in Florida to emigrate to the country West of the Mississippi river. Military force will be avoided, and the arts of persuasion be alone resorted to—and then, presuming your influence and persuasion thus exercised, will be successful, the emigration will be conducted with gentleness and humanity. Those Indians, if they have any reflection or sagacity, must be convinced that their present residence is only temporary, and that their safety and ultimate happiness must depend upon their removal and joining their brethren in the West. No one can be responsible for the continuance of perfect tranquility—one mischievous white man, or one revengeful Indian, may disturb the whole country and produce much disaster.62

Like so many of his predecessors and others that would follow him, Secretary Wilkins insisted it was all in the Indians’ best interests and that they should be happy to comply. He didn’t mention that no white people were being asked to give up their homes. Whatever the problems in Florida, Secretary Wilkins wouldn’t have to worry about them for long. The 1844 election of James K. Polk assured Americans that the administration of John Tyler would soon be replaced. In Florida, even greater

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political changes were taking place. On 3 March 1845, on his last day in office, President Tyler signed the law admitting Florida as the 27th state of the Union, along with Iowa, a free state to counterbalance the slave state. In the meantime the army’s commanding general, Winfield Scott, wanted to know the true situation in Florida, so he dispatched his Inspector General, Col. Sylvester Churchill, to find out. As far as Churchill could tell, if the Indians were a problem, no one had seen it: Within the last month I have traveled, on the old military road, from fort King to Tampa Bay, and from the latter, on the west side of the We-thloc-co-chee [Withlacoochee] coves, crossing the river at Gaines’ pen [Camp Izard], to this place. On this route I saw and conversed with nearly all of the local inhabitants settled directly on the road, and many others, as most of them had business with me, and they all expressed their full confidence in the pacific disposition of the Indians and that the inhabitants are, and will be, entirely safe from any molestation if they will let them alone and not go among them; but that any attempt to remove the Indians by force, will involve the country in a repetition of all the dangers and sufferings of the late war. So far as I could learn no Indians have been seen on any of these roads since last October or November, when three men, hunting, came to a house, or near it, nine miles south of fort Dade, but did nothing to molest the family by hostile manner, or the slightest theft. The woman of that place has since become a widow, but still prefers remaining there, with half a dozen small children and considerable property in stock (cattle) rather than return to her friends and relations in the older settlements.63

Churchill didn’t expect trouble from the Indians, but he did expect it from the whites. Frontier citizens never seemed to be content living where they were and were always looking for some new place to make their fortune. Unoccupied land was tempting, and the fact that it was set aside for the Indians meant little to these people. Churchill warned, “Not satisfied with what they can find out of the Ever Glades, some, no doubt, will be disposed, for no commendable object, to establish themselves in or contiguous to the Indian district. Already such an attempt has been made south of Tampa Bay. If they are allowed to fix themselves on the Indian line, apprehended dangers and war will soon be realized.” He then offered a possible solution:64 To guard against this I think the United States government should preserve a neutral border, of twenty five miles in width, between the white people and Indians, across, or into, which no white man or Indian should pass except at stipulated places, with permits. This will occasion but very little, if any, loss to the national wealth, or State population, for that part of the country is so unsuitable for the abode of industrious, honest, white people that it is not likely the whole border would sell for twenty five thousand dollars or support one hundred families.65

President Polk agreed, and a twenty-mile buffer was established around the reservation and placed off-limits to settlements.66 Army Capt. John T. Sprague, who had been placed in charge of Indian Affairs in Florida, tried to explain the situation in a letter written to the St. Augustine

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Florida Herald. In it, he warned of dangers from both the Seminole and their white neighbors: Upon this, as upon all Indian borders, there is a class of men destitute of property and employment, who for excitement and gain, would recklessly provoke the Indian to aggressions, and in the midst of which, escape detection and punishment, leaving the burden to fall upon the honest and industrious  … The Indians within the boundary are remnants of the Seminole, Mickasukie, Creek, and Uchee tribes, driven there by military force, and continued there in peace through the instrumentality of the officers of the government. A number of them have risen from boyhood to manhood since the commencement of the Florida contest—bred to war; and nothing but the zealous and judicious policy adopted, has deterred them from the committal of atrocious acts, familiar from childhood. The advice and example of the chiefs and sub-chiefs, more advanced in life, has been salutary; and will continue so, if unprovoked, until the time arrives when the measures now in progress will induce them to leave the country.67

Sprague noted that a trading house had been opened at Charlotte Harbor, thereby allowing the Indians to conduct business without having to pass through white

Figure 5. General (then captain) John T. Sprague. General Worth’s son-in-law, he wrote the only contemporary history of the Second Seminole War and served as agent to the Seminole after the war.

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settlements on the way to Tampa. He was also optimistic that they could be convinced to emigrate: The subject is now discussed among them; time and circumstances will remove the objections urged by the younger class, and many will be induced to emigrate. To carry this out successfully, the co-operation of public sentiment is necessary: if peace and emigration is urged in one quarter, aggression and bloodshed enacted in another, Florida will involve her destiny in that of the Indian. Peace with these bands of Indians now costs but little, without the sacrifice of blood, property, or homes; but hostilities will be at a higher price, without ameliorating the condition of the savage, or accomplishing the desired end.68

Sprague provided a census of the Indians, stating their number to be 360, with about 120 of them capable of bearing arms. Most of their villages were located near the Caloosahatchee River and extended from Charlotte Harbor to Lake Okeechobee. He also gave his opinion of their leaders:69 Holatter Micco, or Billy Bowlegs, is thirty-three years of age. He speaks English fluently, and exercises supreme control. He being the nephew of Micanopy, Old Bowlegs, and King Paine, his royal blood is regarded, thus enabling him to exert his authority in such a manner as to govern the reckless and wayward spirits around him. By judicious laws and periodical councils, he has instituted a system of government, salutary and efficient. Arpeika, or Sam Jones, is a subchief. This dignity is accorded to him in consideration of his age, more than for his opinions or assistance. He has become childish, and so feeble that he is dependent upon the young men and women for subsistence and care. Assinwar, another sub-chief, is a smart, active man. He gives a cordial support to the chief in his exertions to introduce wholesome laws, and to continue upon amicable terms with the inhabitants.70

Sprague, who had never met Sam Jones (Abiaki), may have been wrong in his interpretation of Seminole leadership. According to Ethnohistorian Patsy West, who has done extensive research on Abiaki, he was more alert and active than rumor had it, and was the real power behind Holata. The Mikasuki leader had always been wary and secretive, and giving people the impression he had reached some stage of incapacity may have been intentional. Sprague, and all the other officers who dealt with the Seminole, wanted a negotiating partner they could communicate with, and it was Holata, not Sam Jones, who filled that position and was accepted by whites as the Seminole’s primary leader.71 General Worth hoped the trading post at Charlotte Harbor would serve to maintain the peace by keeping the Indians within the boundaries of the reservation. He notified them that beginning in November they would, with few exceptions, no longer be allowed to come to Tampa.72 To operate the store Worth selected Thomas P. Kennedy, who had been a post sutler (storekeeper) during the Second Seminole War, and John Darling, a former soldier who had risen though the ranks to become an officer before resigning his commission in 1839.73

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It was important that peaceful relations be maintained, because for the foreseeable future the army was going to be busy elsewhere. American expansionists had two goals, and if either one came to pass, there was a good chance military action would take place. Far to the northwest there was wrangling with Great Britain over who would control the Oregon Country. To the south tensions were rising with Mexico over the annexation of Texas. Floridians feared that if troops were withdrawn from the state, there would be no one to protect them from Indian aggression. Oddly enough, the Seminole felt quite the same. It was the presence of the army that kept white settlers and troublemakers away from the reservation. The controversy over Oregon was peacefully settled, but Texas would be another matter. On 29 December 1845 it was admitted as the 28th state of the Union, and the stage was set for war with Mexico. On 25 April 1846 Mexican cavalry attacked an American patrol in the disputed territory between the Rio Grande and Nueces River. For the Polk administration, it was the signal that negotiations were over, and Congress declared war on 13 May. Among those on their way to the war was General Worth, leaving his son-in-law, Captain Sprague, in charge of Indian relations. Fortunately for Floridians of both races, peace between the Seminole and their white neighbors held for nearly all of 1846 and 1847. Both sides were wary of each other, and authorities (Indian and white) kept troublemakers under control. It was not an easy task. On 8 January 1847 Captain Sprague met with the principal Seminole leaders at the Kennedy-Darling store at Charlotte Harbor to discuss reports of an Indian raid on a white farm. Present were Holata Micco, Assinwar, Chipco (leader of the Tallahassee Creeks), along with several sub-chiefs and 34 young, well-armed warriors. Abiaki sent a messenger stating that he was indisposed and unable to travel because of the cold weather. A few days later, Sprague wrote to the Adjutant General and tried to explain the situation:74 These chiefs and their followers express the strongest friendship, and have adopted vigorous laws to punish those who violate the relation existing between the whites and red men, but the young men, long accustomed to hunt the whites as they now do deer and turkeys, are ruthless, vicious and vengeful. To counteract this, I have enjoined the necessity of prompt and severe punishment, and shall see that they are executed. The Indians are timid and cautious. They came into my camp prepared to receive kindness and extend it, evidently determined to avenge on the spot, any manifestation of a contrary feeling.75

Years of bitter experience had made the young warriors cautious, and they voiced their concerns to their leaders. As Sprague pointed out: Ten days elapsed before I succeeded in obtaining an interview with the chiefs, who were deterred from coming by the young warriors who, less credulous than the older ones, induced them to procrastinate until they reconnoitered the country, as well as the coast … Their scouts were extended ten miles around to announce the approach of soldiers, believing it to be my

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determination to surround them, as they had been informed vessels were on the coast for that purpose with troops.76

Maintaining the peace was important, but Sprague knew the government’s ultimate goal was still the removal of all Indians from Florida. He also knew the Seminole weren’t ready to talk about it: However friendly disposed, the difficulties can at once be perceived of in enforcing upon such minds the necessity or policy of immediate emigration. To satisfy them of the integrity and sincerity of the Government in improving their condition, and the necessity on their part of acting in good faith, and cherishing a proper spirit towards the whites, was all important. The chiefs being treated with distinction, and others with kindness and forbearance, has this tendency, lulling their fears, when at the proper time emigration may be effected with promptness, without renewal of hostilities.77

Sprague’s efforts seemed to be having the desired effect, and he felt he was on the right path. He was also aware that he could not let his guard down: Two years ago emigration could not be alluded to privately or publicly, without general dissatisfaction. Now it becomes a subject of conversation. One hostile act, or that which remotely has the appearance of it, destroys all confidence, peace or the hope of emigration, bidding fair to renew a Florida War more obstinate and enduring than the contest already terminated … Peace is the first consideration, emigration the second; to effect the latter the first must be second. This can be done by authority over the Chiefs, requiring them to make and execute severely all laws with justice and promptness. The [white] borderers must at the same time be reminded by vigilance and attention that encroachment will be punished, whether in crossing the boundary or in fabricating malicious and idle tales.78

As Sprague well knew, the entire process could be derailed by one hostile act. The editor of the Tallahassee Floridian commented on an incident in late February 1846 in which a detachment of troops was sent to apprehend a party of Indians who had killed a Mr. Pitts and severely wounded his brother while they were hunting near Escambia Bay. He warned: This attack is evidence of the continued hostility of the Indians, and ominous of the commencement of what we may anticipate from our old enemy now residing in the South, by permission of the Government. We have the opinions of many of our citizens, whose opportunities of information are of the best kind, and who state that the number of warriors are entirely underrated by the officers of the army in command of Florida. That the Indians are very careless in observing the limits allotted to them, and are frequently found hunting and prowling about many miles beyond. The large amount of emigration in the vicinity of the reservation, and the defenceless [sic] situation of the settlers, will, in case of an outbreak in the South, lead to the most disastrous consequences to the people, and greatly retard the present rapid settlement of that section of our new State. The authorities here and at Washington should look to this matter in time to prevent further bloodshed and difficulty. We have no doubt that there are Indians sufficient in Florida at present, to give us great trouble, if there should be an outbreak from any cause whatever.79

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Escambia Bay, however, was near Pensacola, at the opposite end of the state from the Everglades. In the south, the situation appeared peaceful. Even the newspapers, usually the first to stir up excitement, showed restraint, as an editorial in the Apalachicola Commercial Advertiser would seem to indicate: The cattle of Capt. Jernigan, reported to have been driven off by Indians, have all been found as we learn from Dr. Spier, who is recently from that neighborhood; and the fires that occurred in the woods at the time they strayed away is ascertained to have been caused by white persons. We are satisfied that there is no just ground for any alarm about the Indians at this time, and we trust that the State motto “Let us alone” will be considered as having reference to them as well as ourselves until the period arrives when they may be peaceably removed.80

In July 1847, while companies of regulars and volunteers from Florida were being recruited for the Mexican War, Lieutenant Fisher of the Florida Volunteers reported that at Tampa, “Indians almost daily visit the post, and appear entirely peaceable, and no apprehensions are entertained at any difficulty at present.” In September of that year Mr. A. H. Jones, after returning from surveying near the Indian boundary line for several months, reported the Indians were very friendly and visited his camps frequently.81 In all his negotiations and plans, Sprague saw Holata Micco as the key to success. He even suggested that Holata be brought to Washington to view the power and population of the American nation, and to Indian Territory to solidify his position among the western Seminole should he choose to emigrate. The question was, could both men build the trust necessary to keep the peace and work toward a permanent settlement, either in Florida or Indian Territory?82

chapter two

By This Shot Capt. Payne and Dempsey Whidden Were Killed

Florida remained at peace throughout 1847, but many white Floridians were still uncomfortable with the Indian presence. The memories of the long, bitter war were not easily forgotten by either side. Although intelligent leaders among the Seminole and white populations were doing their best to build trust, there would always be those who sought revenge or wanted to cause trouble. Seeing conflict as inevitable, many whites believed the only solution was to finish the job of Indian removal. In January 1848 John Darling, proprietor of the trading post at Charlotte Harbor, wrote to Florida Governor William Moseley with a suggestion on how to induce the Indians to emigrate. He believed the Seminole were becoming too well adapted to life in the Everglades and Big Cypress, thus making them less inclined to consider emigration. Like most whites, he wasn’t aware that many Seminole had been living in the southern part of the peninsula for decades and knew quite well how to survive there. To counter this misconception, he wanted to make them more dependent on the government: I have been some time at this station as agent for the Seminole Trader, trading with the Indians, and I have seen enough of them to induce me to think that the policy at present pursued by the General Government, if the purpose is removal, ought to be changed … I have suggested to the Agent to make gratuitous distributions of flour, and that only, or add whiskey if he will, although I do not think the latter commodity will aid the cause much, except on occasions. The reason I think that the distribution should be confined to flour, is this—I learn that some of the Indians are already engaged in planting and raise corn in considerable quantities. This course will of course confirm their attachment to the soil, as they make improvements and find they can subsist without the aid of the United States. A liberal distribution of flour will have a tendency to stop cultivation and give them more leisure to talk and drink. Meat seems to be plenty among them, and they say they have plenty of hogs and some cattle, but not many horses. If the old are supplied with flour, they can exchange it with the young for the products of the chase, and thus produce a greater equality of condition among them.1

The War Department was in agreement that emigration was the ultimate solution to the citizens’ fears but knew better than to press the matter on the Seminole. The government was of the opinion that patient, subtle persuasion would be a more

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effective course of action than overt military pressure, and they believed they had just the man to do the job. Captain John Charles Casey, an 1829 graduate of the Military Academy, had served in Florida during the Second Seminole War and had been in charge of transferring captured or surrendered Seminole to Indian Territory. During that period he had become friendly with his charges and even learned their language. He also gained their trust. As one officer put it, “He never deceived them; never told them a lie; and never made a promise he did not fulfill if within his power  … By this simple means he gained the confidence of the whole [Indian] nation.” If anyone could convince the Seminole to move to Indian Territory, Casey could.2 Captain Casey was anxious to return to Florida, primarily for health reasons. Suffering from tuberculosis (then called consumption) he felt the mild Florida climate was necessary to his survival. As American troops were being sent home at the end of the Mexican War, Casey requested assignment to Fort Brooke as Commissary Officer, and the army was willing to oblige. Arriving at Tampa on 3 August 1848, Casey settled into his duties and hoped his health would improve. It did to an extent, but Casey’s diary is filled with comments about coughing up blood, exhaustion, and the inability to travel far. The diary also shows that he rarely let his sickness prevent him from carrying out his duties.3 The officers and men at Fort Brooke may have had their minds on the Seminole, but Nature soon gave them something else to think about. On 25 September 1848

Figure 6. Fort Brooke, Tampa Bay, ca 1837. Nucleus of the future city of Tampa, it served as headquarters for the army in Florida during the Third Seminole War period.

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a major hurricane struck Florida’s west coast. Juliet Axtell, daughter of post chaplain Henry Axtell, wrote to her sister Harriet, describing the devastation: What a scene of destruction Tampa is, there are but five habitable houses left & these more or less injured. The water rose twelve feet higher than it ever has been known to rise before; at one time it rose five feet in fifteen minutes. The row on which we lived, the Chapel, the Commissary building, the Sutler’s store, Mr. Allen’s house—all gone! … Everywhere may be seen the same destruction and could you see it you might well say, “Tampa is no more.”4

Casey’s Commissary storehouse and his office were gone, as was the depot that served Kennedy and Darling’s trading post. Faced with having to rebuild Fort Brooke, the War Department began to consider placing it farther south, closer to the Indian settlements. Kennedy and Darling, along with many other Tampa citizens, wanted the army to remain in Tampa and feared their homes and herds of cattle would be more vulnerable to Indian depredations if troops weren’t stationed close by. Major General Edmund P. Gaines, who had been embarrassed by the Seminole in the previous war and was now in charge of the army’s Western Department, concurred, and added, “Let us make an effort to prepare these miserable Indians for their removal to the west, the sooner the better.” In the end the army decided to retain Fort Brooke and allow the merchants to keep their warehouse there.5 As 1848 neared its end, reports began to come in to Governor Moseley complaining of Indian trouble around Fort Gatlin (Orlando). Petitions were received from 20 Orange County residents complaining of Seminole roaming outside their boundaries, burning fields, and stealing hogs and cattle. Whether these reports were true or false is hard to know. Settlers tended to blame any loss of livestock on the Indians and were quick to imagine Native war parties lurking behind every dense thicket. On the other hand, many Seminole resented the boundaries forced upon them and felt no compunction against violating them. They also felt justified in replacing livestock that had been lost to white rustlers.6 Justifiably or not, Floridians were nervous, and when the army decided to remove ordnance stores and small arms from St. Augustine, the people complained and the State Legislature passed a resolution condemning the move, stating, “Inasmuch as by such proceeding the inhabitants of said city of St. Augustine, as well as the surrounding country, who are still in the vicinity of the remaining bands of Seminole Indians, would be left without the means of defence, either from foreign enemies, or internal foes.”7 On 1 January 1849, Captain Casey met with Assinwar, one of the principal Seminole leaders, at the Kennedy-Darling store at Charlotte Harbor. It was a short talk, and the two agreed to meet the following day, hoping Holata Micco and Abiaki would show up. The two men didn’t come, so Casey spoke with Assinwar and the others who accompanied him. He assured them of the government’s friendly feelings and spoke to them of the army’s possible desire to erect a new post closer

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Figure 7. Governor William D. Moseley. Florida’s first governor after statehood, he served from 25 June 1845 until 1 October 1849.

to the reservation. Assinwar didn’t like the idea and stated that if the post was built, he wouldn’t visit it. He didn’t even like visiting Fort Brooke, fearing he would be seized and sent west.8 Both sides were wary of each other, but there was little the Seminole could do about it other than keep to the Big Cypress and Everglades. The state, on the other hand, could at least pass laws. In mid-January the legislature passed “An ACT for the purpose of keeping the Indians within their proper boundary.” One stipulation made the federal government and its agents responsible for keeping the Seminole confined to the reservation: That from and after the passage of this act, it shall not be lawful for any Indian agent or agents, person or persons having charge of Indian affairs in this State, to give permission or order, either verbal or written, to any Indian or Indians to cross their boundary line established by Col. Worth, and travel within the settlements of the whites, without it is for the purpose of collecting and bringing marauding Indians within their boundary.9

Adding teeth to the law, the act imposed upon any offending agent a fine of, “not less than one hundred nor more than five hundred dollars, at the discretion of the jury.” Five-hundred dollars is a painful fine even today; back then it might have

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been the agent’s entire annual salary. The law also made it illegal for the government agents to sell or give liquor to any Indian who violated the boundary. From the federal government’s perspective, imposition of state laws over the Indians released it from some of its obligations relative to the defense of the Florida frontier. The state’s actions also had the effect of negating the 20-mile buffer zone that was supposed to separate settlers and Indians. By the middle of 1849 it was reported that the land was being surveyed and that 40 families had settled there.10 In addition, the legislature decided to apply pressure through Congress, passing a “Resolution asking Congress to take some action to keep the Indians of Florida within their prescribed boundary.” Although no homesteads had been burned or settlers killed, the Preamble to the resolution made it sound as if the frontier was in flames and all-out war was imminent: WHEREAS our Indian relations have assumed an appalling character that it is very important that the present General Assembly respectfully call the attention of Congress to this vast and important subject, and request that immediate and prompt action be had to prevent (if possible) the impending danger that greatly threatens that portion of citizens who occupy the Peninsula and frontier part of the State of Florida, against the fearful consequences of another destructive and bloody war with the Indians occupying the Southern portion of this State: And whereas, also, the forbearance of our citizens seems only to encourage that miscreant and savage tribe to commit greater deeds of atrocity, by entering the houses, attacking the persons, destroying the property, and driving off and killing the stock of our citizens, who are living at a great distance from their boundary prescribed for them by Col. Worth: And whereas, also, notwithstanding all these repeated injuries have been sustained by them; and their petitions, setting forth their grievances have been silently passed over, without any relief having been granted to them; and notwithstanding, also, they have tamely submitted to seeing the laws of our State trampled upon, by marauding Indians crossing their boundary, and prowling about at will in the settlement of the whites, they have yet refrained upon their part from committing an act that would be conducive to create another destructive and expensive war, both to themselves and government, which, judging from their conduct and the Indian character, is so imminently threatened.11

Meanwhile, in Washington, the quadrennial shakeup in leadership was taking place. Zachary Taylor, who had been in command of the Second Seminole War 10 years earlier, was sworn in as the nation’s 12th president. One of the changes taking place in the new administration was the addition of a Department of the Interior. As part of the reorganization, the Bureau of Indian Affairs moved from the War Department to the Interior Department. Although Captain Casey dealt closely with the Seminole, he was not their official agent. That duty belonged to Maj. William Morris, who was also commanding officer at Fort Brooke. It is hard to tell from the existing documents how active Morris was in the position, and he may have relied heavily on Casey’s expertise. Casey rarely mentions him in his diary, though he seems to have been on very good social terms with Morris and his wife. One of Morris’s responsibilities was the selection of a site for a new trading post. Although the store at Charlotte Harbor had survived the hurricane, the merchants decided it would be best to move the facility inland. On

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2 March 1849 Morris granted Kennedy and Darling permission to erect their new store alongside the banks of a small, unnamed tributary of the Peace River (then known as Pease Creek).12 While the site was closer to Fort Brooke and would be easier to keep supplied once the necessary roads were in place, its location at the northern boundary of the Seminole Reservation was problematic. The old store, on Pine Island at the southern end of Charlotte Harbor, had been convenient to the Seminole, most of whom lived near the Caloosahatchee River. The new store, on the other hand, was about a hundred miles away by canoe. Walking there would take days and was impractical if someone was carrying a large load of trade goods. Instead of keeping the antagonistic parties separated, the store would serve to bring them in close proximity, which could lead to disastrous results. For some reason, having two army officers to deal with the Florida Seminole wasn’t deemed sufficient, because the new Interior Department soon appointed a sub-agent, Florida lawyer Samuel C. Spencer. Perhaps it had something to do with the Bureau of Indian Affairs being transferred from the War Department; Interior may have felt they would have more control over their own employee. Unfortunately, Spencer and the Bureau had different ideas of how the job was to be performed. Spencer proposed that he run the agency from Jacksonville. The Interior Department responded that the sub-agent must reside near his charges and could not leave the reservation without permission. Spencer in turn explained that he hadn’t yet moved to Fort Brooke because of the health of his family and his inability to find a suitable residence. He also stated that in the meantime he could run the agency with occasional visits to Tallahassee, the reservation, and Washington. Perhaps feeling he should show some initiative, in June he went to Fort Brooke and met with Major Morris and Thomas Kennedy, the storekeeper.13 While the sub-agent was trying to get situated, Captain Casey, who had no official standing as an agent, was actually meeting with the Indians. On 30 June he left Fort Brooke by boat, heading for Charlotte Harbor and the Caloosahatchee River. On 5 July the ship entered Charlotte Harbor, and Casey landed and left a white flag and a present of tobacco. On the following day a group of about 14 Indians (men, women, and children) appeared in canoes. Casey tried to give them presents, but they would only take tobacco and whiskey, saying Abiaki had forbidden his people to accept anything else and “would kill them if he heard of it.”14 Casey waited a few more days, then sailed south to the Caloosahatchee. He had hoped to meet Holata Micco near the mouth of the river, but when the Seminole leader didn’t show up Casey assumed the messenger, a black man called Stuttering Simon, hadn’t delivered the message. Sailing upriver, Casey stopped at Harney’s Point, but after waiting a few days with no sign of Holata or Simon, he worked his way back downriver and returned to Tampa. Harney’s Point was where an attack 10 years earlier on Col. William S. Harney’s command had broken a truce and

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reignited the Second Seminole War. Little did Casey know that on the other side of the peninsula, another Indian attack would shatter the peace that had held for almost seven years.15 By the summer of 1849 a small settlement consisting of four or five families and their slaves had grown up along the Indian River a few miles north of Fort Pierce, an abandoned Second Seminole War post on the Atlantic Coast. On 12 July four young Indian warriors visited the settlement, calling on William Russell, a farmer and merchant who also served as Customs Inspector. By all accounts the visit was friendly, and the Indians departed about noon. Although the settlement was outside the boundaries of the reservation, such visitations were not uncommon, and no one thought much of it.16 Several hours later, Russell and neighbor James Barker were conversing in a field about a quarter-mile from Russell’s home when the Indians approached and suddenly opened fire, wounding both men. Barker, unable to run away, was quickly overtaken and killed by his assailants. Russell, suffering a serious wound in the arm, ran back to the settlement and spread the alarm. The community’s residents quickly took to small boats and rowed out to the safety of a larger vessel anchored in the Indian River Lagoon. They cautiously returned the next morning to find one house burned and two others looted and vandalized. The Indians were gone.17 The attack came as a complete surprise, and a neighbor reported how kindly Russell had treated the Indians and how friendly he was toward them: The friendliness with which they were received by every member of the family, on the morning of their visit, and the pleasure they manifested while eating several fine melons, which the Colonel himself presented them, as well as the numerous small presents of beads, rings, &c., made by the children for them during the day, impressed me with the belief that they [the Indians] entertained the most kindly feelings towards himself and family. So sanguine was he that they were friendly disposed, and so great his aversion to their being disturbed, that on one occasion being told by a neighbor of his, who felt aggrieved by a slight depredation, supposed to have been committed by them, (but without evidence), that he intended to shoot them the first opportunity, I recollect Col. R. said most emphatically, that the first one who interfered with the Indians, should receive the same punishment that he inflicted on them, as any act of violence towards them would only incense them, and not only endanger the safety of his family, but that of the whole community.18

Panic spread along the entire east coast of Florida, and though it seems at a snail’s pace by today’s standards, the distances covered in a relatively short amount of time are impressive. Four black women and two children made their way along the beach from Indian River to Cape Canaveral (a distance of about 75 miles), where they took refuge with the lighthouse keeper. He, in turn, sent a runner to Capt. Douglas Dummett, the Customs Inspector at New Smyrna, about 50 miles further up the coast, writing, “For God’s sake come with your boat as soon as possible and help us to get away. The Indians have broken out at Indian river, and I am obliged to take to the light house.” Dummett, who received the letter on the 15th (three days after

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the attack), immediately dispatched a runner with a letter to Col. Charles F. Smith, the army commander at St. Augustine (another 70 miles north), who received it on the 17th. The following day the refugees from Indian River, 27 persons, arrived at St. Augustine in a small boat.19 Unfortunately, there was little Colonel Smith could do. In a letter to a plantation owner near New Smyrna, he explained: If the Indians have taken the field, and are in force, my command is too small from which to make a detachment against them at such a distance as Indian river … If the settlement at Smyrna is threatened by a force the inhabitants cannot cope with, I will aid them to the extent of a dozen men and an officer … I have a large boat in good condition, capable of carrying many men, but she is heavy and wants both mast and sail; as soon as I can have it properly rigged, I will send an officer and some men to Indian River to make inquiries, provided the information I may receive from you meantime is not conclusive.

Unlike the settlers, Smith was at a safe location and not prone to panic. “I do not regard the burning of a few houses at Indian River, as indicative of a determination on the part of the Indians for war, but rather as an act of retaliation for some injury fancied or real—with which they will remain satisfied.” In the end it was up to the settlers to take care of themselves. “If it becomes necessary, I can furnish muskets and cartridge. I need scarcely add that the best reliance of the inhabitants ought to be upon their own efforts.”20 Senator Yulee, at home in St. Augustine at the time, quickly sent a letter to Secretary of War George Crawford, asking that small posts be set up near the southern settlements to reassure the settlers, who might otherwise abandon their homes. Knowing the number of soldiers in Florida was totally inadequate for the task, he asked if troops from the large coastal fortifications at Savannah, Charleston, or other points along the east coast could be sent to Florida. Farther south, news had also reached the small settlement at the Miami River, where the population appealed to the officer in charge at Key West for help. The officer, Lt. Darius Couch, replied that he would send 20 men to investigate, provided he could get a boat.21 Seventy-five miles to the west of Indian River was the new Kennedy-Darling trading post on the Peace River. The store was a substantial building, a two-story cabin with a detached kitchen and several outbuildings. Manager of the store was a former Florida Militia officer, Capt. George S. Payne, who was assisted by Dempsey Whidden, son of a local settler. Employed as a clerk was William McCullough, accompanied by his 19-year-old wife Nancy (Whidden’s sister) and their infant daughter Elisabeth.22 On the morning of Tuesday, 17 July, the store was visited by Chipco, one of the leaders of the Creek band who lived separate from the majority of the Seminole. Chipco’s presence was certainly not unusual, and he and the three women who accompanied him stayed at the store for several hours, socializing and conducting business. Chipco had brought a large variety of goods to trade. Payne bought a few

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watermelons, but didn’t think he could get a good price for them on the New York market. He was more receptive of Chipco’s other offerings, which included venison, sweet potatoes, various skins, and beeswax. All in all, it was a pleasant exchange, although William McCullough later mentioned he thought the Indians were more friendly than usual.23 Chipco and the women departed between three and four in the afternoon, and the storekeepers settled back into their daily routine. About a half-hour before sunset, four warriors approached the store. This group did not seem as carefree as Chipco’s, and McCullough thought they acted more boldly than Indians normally would. His wife Nancy noticed that they “looked about a good deal,” and one, whom she later identified as a Mikasuki named Yoholochee, appeared angry. It also seemed odd that they had no trade goods with them. As William McCullough later stated:24 They told Captain Payne they had a large pack of skins on the east side of Peas creek, and wanted his boat to get it across. Payne told them that after supper he would assist them in getting the pack over. The Indians then desired permission of Captain Payne to sleep in the store and were refused, Captain Payne stating to them that Indians were never allowed to sleep in the store; the Indians then went out of the store, and Captain Payne closed the store doors and windows; and he and Dempsey Whidden went out at the end of the store and sat talking with them until supper-time. It was now early twilight. We all sat down to supper—the Indians were sitting at the end of the store next to the eating-room quietly smoking their pipes. We had scarcely got seated at the supper-table when they fired in at the door from the outside, one Indian standing on either side of the door and two in front, one behind the other. By this shot Captain Payne and Dempsey Whidden were killed dead, and I received a bullet in my left shoulder.25

The only thing that saved the McCulloughs was the fact that the Indians were using muzzle-loading rifles, which could take about a half a minute to reload. Instead of charging in the room and attacking the couple with knives and tomahawks, the Indians took time to reload their weapons. McCullough quickly grabbed a loaded rifle that was nearby. Nancy swiftly took up the baby, and the couple fled out the back door and made for a small bridge that crossed the creek, about a quarter-mile away. The Seminole pursued, firing twice, but missed their targets. Nancy tripped and fell, and as William stopped to help her to her feet, the assailants fired again. The same ball passed through both William’s and Nancy’s legs, but the wounds weren’t serious and the couple ran on, crossing the bridge and taking refuge in the dense foliage.26 Three of the attackers followed them across the bridge but couldn’t find the couple. Two returned to the store while one remained to continue the search, but the McCulloughs remained hidden. They were fortunate indeed that the infant didn’t cry out. As nightfall came, the couple kept to the woods, moving away from the scene of destruction. Early the next morning they saw a bright light coming from the direction of the store and assumed it was the building going up in flames.

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William recalled, “On the following Friday, about noon, without food and almost naked, we reached the settlements on the Big Alafia, a distance of 20 or 30 miles, having lost my way and wandered a good deal in the woods.”27 Having burned and looted the store, the Indians moved about 6 miles north, and on Thursday, the 19th, they attacked the homestead of James Whidden, father of the slain Dempsey Whidden, firing into the house and wounding another of Whidden’s children. Rightfully terrified, the Whiddens also fled to Alafia, where they caught up with William and Nancy. In a way, the elder Whidden shouldn’t have been surprised. He had built his homestead within the 20-mile buffer zone that was supposed to be closed to settlement.28 If it had been a single attack, the residents of Florida would have clamored for retribution and once again demanded the Seminole be removed from the state, but there probably wouldn’t have been widespread panic. Multiple assaults, so far in distance but so close in time, convinced the frontier populace that an all-out Indian uprising had been unleashed. Isolated homesteads were abandoned as fearful residents fled to Fort Brooke or to hastily erected fortifications around their small towns. Deputy Surveyor John Jackson, while surveying in Hillsborough County, reported the panic, saying, “The Indians have set the whole county in an uproar—the people are getting together in every neighborhood building Forts & Blockhouses in order to protect themselves. This County never will be settled whilst the Indians are allowed to remain.”29 While the citizens certainly had a right to be worried, the flames of panic were being fanned by those who actually welcomed an Indian war. Captain Casey, upon returning to Tampa after his trip to the Caloosahatchee, had a good idea who was doing the most to stir things up. Kennedy and Darling may have lost their store, but there would be much more money to be made supplying the army if war broke out. To make matters worse, express rider James White, going between Tampa and Palatka, was telling everyone that a force of 100 Seminole had forced the army to retreat at the Peace River.30 Major Daniel Whiting, an officer brought in to help protect the populace, recorded what he saw: We found on our arrival that great terror prevailed among the inhabitants, in anticipation of an attack by the savages. Farms were deserted, stock left to roam at large, and property in the scattered settlements abandoned. Families left their homes and sought refuge in small forts or stockades, where they collected together for common defense and protection, keeping watch and guard against the dreaded foe.31

Frontier Floridians were in a state of panic, but was there really any cause to be? For the settlers, there was certainly good reason to be afraid, they being unaware of the true circumstances. No one wanted to assume that these were isolated incidents and not take precautions, only to pay for the mistake with their lives. As for the true cause of the attacks, we may never know. Were the assailants reacting to some wrong they had suffered, real or imagined, or were they simply hot-headed young

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men trying to prove something? Today we want to know what people’s motives were. People at the time were much less concerned with such matters. Survival was more important. As soon as news of the attack reached Fort Brooke, Major Morris dispatched Lt. John Gibbon with four men and an interpreter to the Alafia settlement. There the lieutenant met with the McCulloughs and Whiddens and heard their stories. He returned to Fort Brooke, after which Morris sent Lt. Robert Garland and a force of infantrymen to the Peace River. There they found the charred remains of Payne, Whidden, and their store. The small tributary was subsequently named Paynes Creek, and the site of the attack is now part of Paynes Creek Historic State Park.32 Excited officials sprang into action. Hillsborough County Assemblyman James T. Magbee was dispatched to Tallahassee to request immediate action by Governor Moseley, who in turn called out six companies of volunteers from several counties. Moseley sent a pair of officials to Washington to urge that federal troops be sent quickly to the state, and he also arranged for a loan of 20,000 dollars to pay for

Figure 8. Memorial Marker for George Payne and Dempsey Whidden at Payne’s Creek Historic State Park.

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troops and supplies. The troops were certainly needed. The only two posts still active in the area were Fort Brooke at Tampa and Fort Marion at St. Augustine, and both were severely undermanned and poorly equipped. Local militias were also formed, but were limited in what they could accomplish. Casey noted that few of the settlers who had taken advantage of the Armed Occupation Act actually owned serviceable weapons. Two months after the attacks the entire southeastern coast was almost completely abandoned.33 So where were all the settlers who were supposed to valiantly defend their homes, as promised in the Armed Occupation Act? As a tool to spread settlement in Florida, the act could be seen as moderately successful, but as a protection against conflict with the Seminole, it must be regarded as a failure. If nothing else, it helped bring settlers into closer contact with the Indians, which was bound to lead to trouble, and when the panic over the attacks at Fort Pierce and Paynes Creek struck, many of those settlers fled the area and never returned. Later, when war eventually broke out, the initial Indian raids took place well north of the reservation boundary, indicating that the Seminole were not at all intimidated by the presence of the scattered settlements, but instead viewed them as inviting targets. As Florida Governor Thomas Brown would later write to President Taylor, “If ten of these warriors remained maddened to a spirit of hostility, they would suffice to break up and scatter the entire line of new settlements although tenfold their number, which although composed of occupants under the armed occupancy bill, have neither weapons, nor the disposition to use them; not one in ten appearing with arms of any description.”34 Research by Julius Wilm has shed even more light on the actual failure of the Armed Occupation Act to accomplish the goal of providing large numbers of armed settlers for the defense of the Florida frontier. The main target group of settlers, poor whites, did not get a large percentage of the available land. One of the many problems cited by Wilm is the withdrawal of the government rations that were originally intended to provide enough food for the first year of settlement. Without those provisions, many of the applicants would have had to outlay considerable sums for initial subsistence, which meant the goal of attracting the poor to settle the land was less likely to be met. Indeed, according to the 1850 census, over 31 percent of the successful applicants were slave owners, people who were generally not from the poorer classes. Even though the requirements of the act seemed easy to meet, many applicants were unsuccessful in their attempts to obtain the free land. Unpredictable factors such as violent storms, wildfires, or disease sometimes played a role in delaying or preventing applicants from securing their final patents to the land. As Wilm’s research shows, nearly a third of those who obtained permits in Alachua, Levy, and Putnam counties did not come in to secure their claims, and over 18 percent of those in Marion County also never completed the process. On the other hand, in Hillsborough and Benton counties (today’s Citrus, Pasco, and Hernando counties),

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less than 1 percent failed to make good their claims. In the end, only a third of the original 1,372 claimants received final title to their lands. This low figure, coupled with the fact that a large majority of the claims were at the northern edge of the area open for settlement, would not have been a serious deterrent to the Creek, Alachua, and Mikasuki still living in the southern portion of the peninsula.35 Captain Casey, knowing the panic would bring on an unnecessary full-scale war against the Seminole, did everything he could to avert it. Going out on a limb, he wrote directly to Lt. Col. William Bliss, President Taylor’s private secretary (and son-in-law), explaining the situation and arguing against forced removal. Bliss replied that the president was in agreement and encouraged Casey to keep them informed. With so much misinformation coming in, it would be helpful to have reliable intelligence from someone who understood the Seminole and the situation.36 Casey, who already suspected who the culprits were, wasn’t the only one trying to stem the tide of panic and rumor-mongering. Secretary of War Crawford, believing there was no general Indian uprising in Florida, wrote to Senator Yulee, telling him, “The imperfect proof collected under circumstances of great excitement can scarcely lead to any satisfactory conclusion, whether the act was committed by the remnant of the tribe, (less than four hundred in number) or only a sudden outbreak by the four Indians.” Five days later, Lieutenant Couch reported to Crawford that he had seen no sign of Indians and was convinced panicked settlers were responding to rumors, not facts. After reading exaggerated and inflammatory accounts in the Jacksonville News, Jesse Carter provided the editor with an authentic account of the “Pease Creek Tragedy” and remarked, “The report of having seen Indians and heard the warwhoop is false … and we are amazed at the unprincipled wantonness of those who would, by raising such false reports, risk the retarding of defensive measures, and expose their fellow citizens still longer to be pillaged or murdered.”37 No matter what the true state of affairs in Florida, Secretary Crawford Figure 9. George W. Crawford, Secretary of War under wasted no time in responding. Five President Zachary Taylor.

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companies of troops from southern posts were ordered to the area, along with much of the Seventh Infantry, stationed at Jefferson Barracks in St. Louis, Missouri. The force was placed under the command of Maj. Gen. David Twiggs, a veteran of both the First and Second Seminole Wars. War, however, was not what Crawford wanted. Sober minds remembered the fiasco of the Second Seminole War. Crawford wanted Twiggs to use his troops to separate the antagonistic parties, not go after four or five renegade Seminole. The general was to construct a line of posts to hem the Indians in and keep settlers out of the reservation. Intimidation, negotiation, and simple bribery were to be used to convince the Seminole to leave Florida and join their brethren out West. Crawford told Twiggs that Figure 10. General David E. Twiggs, a veteran of both only when peaceful means failed the First and Second Seminole Wars, he became the South’s oldest general after surrendering all federal would “forcible removal from Florida, military installations in Texas to the Confederacy at or what may be more disagreeable, the beginning of the Civil War. their partial or entire extermination” be resorted to.38 In another office in Washington, Commissioner of Indian Affairs Orlando Brown was not happy with his man in Florida. Sub-Agent Spencer, still living in Jacksonville, was bypassing him and writing directly to the secretary of the interior. Brown informed the agent of the proper chain of command and told him that if he wanted to keep his job, he’d have to move closer to the action. His position became more precarious in September, when the War and Interior Departments agreed that John Casey was the best man for the job and appointed him commissioner for the removal of the Seminole.39 A month had passed since the attacks, and forces were beginning to gather at Fort Brooke. Then, on 19 August, Felipe Bermudez, a friend of Casey’s who had a fishing rancho at the south end of Sarasota Bay, found a peace token made up of white feathers, tobacco, and white beads posted at a conspicuous place near his property. Bermudez left a sign indicating the token would be answered at the next full moon (2 September) and sent word to Casey at Fort Brooke.40

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General Twiggs and his staff arrived at Tampa on 24 August. Two days later, Twiggs and Casey sat down to discuss the upcoming meeting with the Indians. The following day more reports came in of peace tokens found in the Manatee River area. It was obvious the Seminole were anxious to talk.41 Casey didn’t want to miss the opportunity, so he arrived at Bermudez’s rancho two days before the full moon, even though there was little he could do but wait. As he noted in his diary, “I land with Felipe & William, no sign [of Indians], put up white flags & ‘token’—tomatoes, pumpkins &c, Therm 94° in shade AM—cloudy evg [evening]—brilliant sunset—sleep on deck—rains a little.” He kept waiting. On 2 September he noted, “Thunder & lightning early & rain—Full moon at 11h. 48m. Sea breeze SW comes in at 11 after hot morning—day comfortable—mullet delicious—oyster good—cloudy & thunder & light’g a little this evg, cool night.” Finally, on the morning of the 3rd, an Indian messenger approached the ship in a canoe. After conversing with the man, Casey sent Bermudez ashore to build a signal fire. Later that day, some Indians appeared on shore, and they agreed to meet in the morning.42 On the morning of 4 September, Casey, Bermudez, and Sampson, a black interpreter well known to the Seminole, went ashore. Casey no doubt hoped to see Holata Micco, but diplomacy is never that simple. Even in today’s sophisticated diplomatic negotiations, first contact is always made through underlings. Even the number of people at the meeting—three on each side, in this case—had to be equal. Holata may have been negotiating from a position of weakness, but he needed to maintain his dignity, both as a person and for his tribe. The three messengers told Casey that the murders had been committed by five young warriors “without the sanction or knowledge of the nation.” Holata wanted to reestablish friendly relations and proposed a meeting at the site of the old Kennedy-Darling store at Charlotte Harbor for 18 September. Casey agreed, and pointed out that the government wanted peace, but was prepared for war if necessary, and that the decision rested with General Twiggs. To show good faith, one of the messengers, Fuse Eneha, accompanied Casey back to Tampa as a hostage.43 Casey came away from the meeting with some important intelligence. As he suspected, the trouble had arisen because of internal dissension within the tribe. Kapiktsootsee, a sub-chief of the Mikasuki, desired to succeed Abiaki upon the old man’s passing, but Abiaki favored someone else. A disgruntled Kapiktsootsee and his followers left their homes on Lake Istokpoga and took up residence on the Kissimmee River. Kapiktsootsee then told his men they could hunt outside the reservation boundaries, in spite of the state law prohibiting such movements. His defiance of the white laws made him popular among the young warriors, but it inevitably led to trouble.44 Casey also shed some light on Chipco, who had visited the Kennedy-Darling store just prior to the attack. Was his presence a coincidence or had he actually

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participated? As it turned out, there were two Chipcos. Casey described them both: “Cotsa Fixico Chipko is a very fine strong Indian & may be of great use from his talents, energy & influence. His brother Echo Emathla Chipko is a bad subject—vicious & hostile.” Unfortunately, Casey didn’t say which one he thought was at the store.45 Most important, Fuse Eneha provided Casey with a list of the perpetrators of the crimes. Hoithle-Machta-Hajo was the eldest son of Chitto Tustennuggee, a one-time close associate of Abiaki. Yahola Hajo was Chitto’s younger son and was the same  person Nancy McCullough had identified. Casey listed them both as Seminole. He identified a third person, Sahataiyee, as a Creek, and indicated he had not taken part in the attack at Fort Pierce. Casey didn’t give the tribal identity of another pair of brothers, Panukee and Cotsa Elee Hajo.46 When Casey returned to Tampa on 7 September he found some interesting news in the mail. The War Department was authorizing Twiggs to pay $100 a head for Indians who wanted to emigrate. There was also news that a delegation of Seminole from the West would be coming to hopefully convince their fellow tribesmen to make the move. Casey appeared annoyed that sub-agent Spencer was going to be assisting with the delegation, but then noticed that all further correspondence referred to him only. He was even happier when Twiggs said he would recommend Casey as the sole commissioner. Neither man knew that the orders doing just that had already been written.47 From his office in Washington, Secretary Crawford assured Governor Moseley that action was being taken, but politely and firmly told the governor he did not want state troops interfering:48 Your letter of the 26th ultimo, addressed to the President, has been referred to this Department for reply, and I accordingly have the honor to say, that, assuming your estimate of the Indian warriors residing on the soil of Florida during the past year to be correct, and which is greater than that reported by Captain Sprague, who lately had the superintendency of this tribe, I think that the force which is in process of being placed on the southern settlement of the peninsula will be adequate to their full defence. That force, when ascribed, will, in numerical strength, be quadruple that of the Indians. You propose to raise a force which would be greater than the entire force of the Indians. I confess that I do not see the propriety or necessity of employing the volunteers of Florida, and without which I could not advise the President to muster them into the service of the United States. In addition to which, our latest despatches [sic] from Florida, on either side of the peninsula, and dated within the 28th and 30th ultimo, both inclusive, indicate that the violence and outrage exhibited in the vicinity of Fort Pearce [sic] and at the trading house on Pease creek were done by the same party of Indians, which did not exceed five. If right in this conjecture, founded on all the concurrent proofs which have reached the Department, I think it will be a subject of regret, at a period when the United States were about to attempt the peaceable removal of the Indians from Florida with the hope and probability of success, that the authorities of that State should seek to substitute another element, and place at hazard that which appears to be the object of deep concern to Florida and also a duty of the United States, the removal of the Indians from the soil of the former.49

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The secretary also met with the two commissioners sent by Governor Moseley. Although the meeting was no doubt held with all appropriate Victorian courtesy, it was not without tension. Crawford listed the number of troops being sent to Florida and the plans to build numerous forts to enforce the boundaries of the reservation. He also indicated that the government would consider hiring a contractor to persuade the Seminole to emigrate and reiterated his intention of using only federal troops and not state forces. He knew that unrestrained volunteers or militia could easily ignite a full-scale war. When Crawford showed them the letter he had sent Moseley, the commissioners replied that the letter would not defend the people of Florida and that state troops must be used until the army arrived. Crawford responded that, “Florida was not without blame in this matter, because, having extended her laws over the neutral ground, it became her duty rather than that of the General Government to keep the whites from intruding there, which he doubted not had been the great cause of the late disturbance.” With President Taylor out of town and having been rebuffed by the secretary of war, the commissioners informed the governor they would consult with other cabinet members to try to convince the administration to see things Florida’s way. Calling out volunteers was politically popular in Florida, but neither Tallahassee nor Washington wanted to be stuck with the bill.50 Troops and material may have been heading for Florida, but there were delays and mishaps. A steamship carrying much-needed horses, mules, and wagons blew up, killing 17 men and 120 animals. When Twiggs attempted to purchase replacement animals locally, the people of Florida turned greedy, and Twiggs refused to pay their exorbitant prices. He told Secretary Crawford, “It is astonishing to find, how many persons, in & out of Florida, are whetting up their appetites, expecting to share in the plunder of another ‘Florida’ affair. I will use every effort to disappoint them.”51 While waiting for the 18 September meeting, Casey, Twiggs, and Major Morris discussed their options. All agreed that emigration was the only way to bring permanent peace to Florida. Even Casey, who was close to the Seminole and a true friend, knew that settlers and Indians would never get along. Establishing the Indians in new homelands out west seemed the only alternative to a slow and violent extinction or extermination. Where the men differed was on how it should be accomplished. Morris thought the Indians would be easy to remove; Casey thought him a fool. Twiggs asked Casey to come up with a figure as to how much it would cost to simply buy the tribe’s compliance. Casey estimated $215,000, based on $4,500 paid to head chiefs (Holata and Abiaki), $2,000 to sub-chiefs, $500 to warriors, $100 to women and children, plus contingencies. He also suggested offering them subsistence for a year after their arrival at their new homes. “The above estimate may appear extravagant,” he explained to Twiggs, “but, I would consider it great economy to get the Indians out of Florida, for twice that amount. If they are ‘hunted’ out, one year will cost over half a million.”52

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Although Casey had reluctantly come to the conclusion that emigration was best for the Seminole, he knew it would be a hard sell. He favored a slow, measured approach, and for the moment he didn’t even want the subject mentioned. Tensions were high, and the Indians were wary. They knew there was a public clamor for their removal and feared some impatient government agent might try to take them prisoner during negotiations. Many Seminole were reluctant to enter forts, and even fewer would step aboard a ship. They all feared a one-way ticket to Indian Territory.53 As for the mostly absent sub-agent Spencer, it seemed he could do little right. On 5 September he informed Commissioner of Indian Affairs Brown that he had appointed an Indian trader. Brown informed him that since the state had seen fit to extend their laws over the Indian reservation, it was now the state’s responsibility to appoint a trader. Spencer then paid a visit to Fort Brooke, but no one welcomed him. He then decided to make an unauthorized trip to Washington. By the end of September, Spencer was out of a job.54 The time for the meeting with Holata Micco had come. The ship carrying Casey, Twiggs, and the others left Tampa on 15 September and arrived at the site of the old store two days later. Casey went ashore and met with some of Holata’s representatives, and a meeting between the chief and Twiggs was arranged for the next day. The following morning Casey went ashore to meet Holata, who was accompanied by 37 men. Holata and one of his sub-chiefs then accompanied Casey out to the steamer Colonel Clay, where they would meet with Twiggs.55 The meeting went well. Holata agreed to turn over the murderers after a consultation with Kapiktsootsee, the leader of the band to which they belonged. Internal Seminole politics were at play, and Holata had to act judiciously. The killers might have been under Kapiktsootsee’s control, but he couldn’t just turn them over to Holata without losing face among his followers. Because one of the killers was a Creek, it meant that they were involved and may even have taken part in the attack. In a way, Holata was faced with the same problem Twiggs was: He needed to appease certain elements of his own people in order to keep a wider conflict from erupting. Twiggs needed to keep the settlers and militia quiet; Holata needed to keep the Creeks happy. It was a difficult situation that required all the leadership skills he possessed. No one in the tribe wanted to turn any Seminole over to the whites for probable execution, but in order to prevent a war and forced emigration, it had to be done.56 The negotiations resumed the following day when Holata returned with Kapiktsootsee, who was supposedly representing Abiaki. They accompanied Casey out to the ship and again met with Twiggs. Kapiktsootsee assured the general that Abiaki would go along with whatever agreement Holata negotiated. He also agreed to turn over the murderers, but wanted 45 days to deliver them. Casey and Twiggs gave him 30. The next point to be discussed was the place the men would be surrendered. Three suggestions were put forth: Sarasota, the burned store on the Peace River, or

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their present location. The Indians didn’t like Sarasota, but at Casey’s suggestion, they accepted their present location at Charlotte Harbor.57 The Americans returned to Fort Brooke, hoping they had secured the peace. They also knew that the really difficult negotiations concerning emigration had yet to take place. Casey had warned Twiggs not to mention it, but the general disregarded the advice, having been told by Secretary Crawford, “I hope that you did not permit any occasion, rendered favorable by the temper of the Indians, to escape, so as to ascertain their views in respect to their removal.” Twiggs told Holata that real peace for his people could not be achieved as long as they remained in Florida, and that new homes were waiting for them out west. Casey was miffed, but the conversation didn’t go any further, and the negotiations for the murderers didn’t fall through.58 Casey was more upset when he learned he wouldn’t be the only one doing the negotiating on the part of the government: “Plan of commission of 3 to negotiate with the Seminoles! Spencer, Duval & me!!! Oh! E Gad & little fishes!—What next?” He knew he would have to tread carefully if he were to have any hope of talking the Seminole into removing peacefully. Having someone else say the wrong thing at the wrong time could ruin everything. Fortunately, Spencer was soon dismissed, and all responsibility was turned over to Casey.59 Twiggs no doubt hoped that war had been averted and that negotiations to peacefully remove the Seminole would be successful, but as a good military man, he knew there had to be a plan of action in place in case it was decided to use force. On 29 September he sent his plan to Adjutant General Roger Jones in Washington. The first step would be to build a line of forts across the peninsula, from the Manatee River just south of Tampa Bay, to the Indian River on the east coast. It would require about 20 forts, each manned by two 50-man companies. Another 13  companies would be needed to man supply depots at major rivers. Having learned in the previous war that the only way to defeat the Seminole would be to invade their watery Everglades homeland, he would need 500 sailors and marines. To scour the dryer areas where the Seminole might be hiding would require 300 mounted men. By the time he was done, the total came to 4,150 men. The whole United States Army contained only around 10,000 men.60 Twiggs and Casey discussed making the Seminole an offer that might save their comrades from the noose. Casey suggested returning the prisoners in exchange for the tribe’s promise to emigrate. Twiggs was less trusting. He would hold the men until the Indians were actually on the boat and then send the prisoners along. All this depended on what was more important to the Seminole: five murderers or their Florida homes.61 Casey once again took the opportunity to write to President Taylor, urging that emigration not be forced upon the Seminole, but to let negotiations take their course. The president was in full agreement and responded, “The question of removal is not to be forced upon their decision, that is they are not to have the alternative

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of removal or extermination.” Whether they knew it or not, the Seminole had a friend in the White House. Taylor had commanded the Second Seminole War for two years, but had never aggressively gone after the Indians, being more content to fortify the northern portion of the peninsula where settlers were likely to be. Like many other officers who had been sent to Florida to fight the Seminole, he had come away sympathetic to their cause.62 The day of the turnover was getting close. On 11 October Casey and Twiggs once again boarded Colonel Clay for the trip down to Charlotte Harbor. On the way they stopped at Manatee to pick up and confer with two representatives of the state, Captains Joseph Roberts and Robert Gamble. Casey was worried that something might go wrong. He had written a carefully worded speech for Twiggs, but was concerned that it be delivered properly. He knew how important the ceremony of such things was to the Natives. He was also worried about what would happen when they returned to Tampa with the prisoners. He knew there would be an outcry for the men to be hung immediately, but it was important that justice be conducted properly. He was trying to build trust, and the smallest thing could destroy it.63 Colonel Clay steamed south to Charlotte Harbor, and on 18 October Casey went ashore to meet the Seminole. It was a large Indian turnout; even Abiaki, who had been quick to urge Holata to do what was necessary to maintain the peace, was there.64 By turning over the prisoners, the Seminole were showing their determination to be good neighbors. It was the only hope they had of keeping their homes.65 Holata Micco surrendered the prisoners, but they weren’t precisely the people Casey expected. Instead of five, there were only three. Sahataiyee, the one Creek, had managed to escape, but had been wounded in the hand as he fled, dropping his rifle. The blood-stained rifle was presented as evidence. Casey didn’t record whether or not he believed the story, but accepted it nonetheless. Hoithle-Machta-Hajo had also tried to escape, but had been slain in the process. His severed hand was also presented as evidence. Two of the actual murderers, Yahola Hajo and Cotsa Elee Hajo, were there, but the fifth surrendered man hadn’t even been mentioned in the attacks. Instead of Panukee, one of the accused killers, the army was being handed a substitute, Pahay Hajo. Abiaki and other hard-liners had helped choose who would be turned over, and Panukee was probably someone’s favorite.66 Pahay Hajo, unfortunately, was not.67 Now that the prisoners had been handed over, the real negotiations could begin. Holata, Assinwar, and most of the other Seminole, 20 in all, took the boat out to Colonel Clay to hear Twiggs’ talk. Abiaki, never one to put himself in a dangerous situation, stayed ashore and had a separate interview with Casey. To show good faith, Holata again apologized for the incident and swore that if it happened again, he would emigrate of his own free will. He told Twiggs that he “had made severe laws to prevent the whites from being molested, and had now brought his young men that they might see how sternly he executed them.”68

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On board the ship, Twiggs gave his talk. Once again, the Seminole were told they needed to emigrate. No matter what preventive measures were taken by either side, clashes were inevitable. The government was not demanding immediate emigration, but sooner or later it had to come. Casey knew it wasn’t what the Indians wanted to hear, but it had to be said. Assinwar felt betrayed: We did not expect this talk. When you began this new (removal) matter, I felt as if you had shot me. I would rather be shot. I am old, and I will not leave my country. General Worth said he spoke for your President, too—that he was authorized to make peace and leave us quiet in our country, and that so long as our people preserved the treaty, yours would. For many years you have had no cause to complain, and lately, when a few bad young men broke the law, a thing that cannot be prevented among any people, did we not hasten to make atonement? We met you as soon as we could, and promised to give ample satisfaction, and from that day we have not rested. We have killed one of our people, and have brought three others to be killed by you, and we will bring the fifth. There has been much trouble and grief; but we have done justice, and we came here confident that you would be satisfied. Now, when you ask us to remove, I feel as though you had killed me, too. I will not go, nor will our people. I want no time to think or talk about it, for my mind is made up.69

The Seminole were unhappy, yet they did not walk out. Their people had committed the crimes, and talk of emigration was one of the prices they had to pay.70 Twiggs did not apply the threat of immediate military action, but instead presented what he hoped was a tempting offer. For those who would agree to emigrate, there would be a generous cash payment. Twiggs also mentioned that a delegation was coming from the West to set their minds at ease about conditions in Indian Territory. The Seminole sounded receptive, and by the end of the day, even Casey was optimistic that emigration was possible.71 With the exception of the prisoners, all sides could feel good about what happened that day. A war that would have been costly to both sides had been averted. A new understanding had been reached, and trust had been built. There was even the chance that peaceful emigration might actually take place. True, it wasn’t something the Seminole people wanted, but it was an alternative they seemed willing to consider. As for the murderers, they never faced white justice. Twiggs had told Casey that if the tribe emigrated, the prisoners would be spared and could go west with everyone else. Secretary Crawford instructed Twiggs to notify the governor that the prisoners were ready to be turned over to the state for trial, but that if for some reason the state didn’t want them, they were to be kept confined until arrangements could be made to send them to Indian Territory. In the meantime, Twiggs was beginning to have a different idea. A delegation of western Seminole had arrived on 10 November, and the general thought the prisoners might prove useful in helping convince the Florida Seminole to emigrate. There was also the problem that the fall session of the District Court was over, and it would be some time before the Indians could be brought to trial. The district judge decided he didn’t want the prisoners and

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suggested Twiggs keep them under military guard and perhaps use them as guides or inducements to emigration.72 Not sure what to do with the men, Twiggs asked the War Department for instructions. In response, the Adjutant General instructed him to use his best judgment in the matter. Seeing the local authorities had refused the prisoners, and it wasn’t within the jurisdiction of the military to try them, Twiggs simply kept them under lock and key. And so the matter languished until the end of February 1850, when the murderers were given $100 each and placed aboard the steamboat Fashion, along with 74 other Seminole who had agreed to go west.73 Holata and Abiaki may have thought they had secured the peace by surrendering the murderers, but the trust they had built was not enough to overcome the prejudice, suspicion, and anxiety felt by most Floridians. Militia General Benjamin Hopkins wrote to incoming Governor Thomas Brown, stating the opinion he shared with many of his fellow citizens: “The true policy of Florida is to remove the Indians, peaceably if we can, forcibly if we must.”74

chapter three

We Must Take Time Enough to Avert War

Peace had been preserved, but things could not go back to the way they were before the attacks at Fort Pierce and Paynes Creek. For their part, frontier Floridians were on edge and expected the government to remove the Seminole. The Indians, on the other hand, knew they had come close to bringing another disastrous war upon themselves and would have to be more watchful over their impulsive young warriors. Still, they felt they had lived up to their part of the bargain and expected to be allowed to remain where they were. Meeting everyone’s expectations would prove a difficult, if not impossible, task. As far as the government officials were concerned the only option was removal, but they didn’t want to force the issue. The previous war had proven that attempting to round up the Seminole by military means would be an expensive task in terms of money spent and lives lost, with no assurance of complete success. For the moment the best strategy was to use the military to separate whites and Indians while employing diplomatic means to convince Holata, Abiaki, and their people that it was in their best interests to move out west. As General Twiggs put it, “To remove these people with the least delay, we must take time enough to avert war, whether weeks, or months, or years be required.” If nothing else, the army simply didn’t have the means required to take on the Seminole. The war with Mexico had resulted in a large increase in the size of the United States, and the army was needed to explore, map, and defend all these newly acquired lands.1 On the diplomatic front the government had two strategies they felt might work. The first was to simply buy the Seminole’s compliance. To that end, the War Department set aside $100,000 for payments to emigrating Seminole and put it in the hands of Captain Casey. The other strategy the government felt would be effective was gentle persuasion from the Indians’ kinsmen. To bring that about, a delegation of Seminole from the West left Indian Territory in late October 1849.2 Just gathering the delegation had been a lesson in Seminole tribal politics for Marcellus Duval, who was their agent in Indian Territory. Some of the Indians were

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opposed to cooperating with the whites, while others hoped the effort might reunite the tribe. One of the most powerful chiefs, Coacoochee (Wildcat), appeared to be seeking to personally profit from the situation. As Duval related to Commissioner of Indian Affairs Orlando Brown: He desires the Indians in Florida to “hold on” that is, not remove until removal becomes so great an object to government, as to induce it to give him a large amount, or make a treaty by which he can either make money, or so great personal popularity as to have the ascendancy over his people in despite of his superiors. He intends that Indians in Florida should be peaceable, but not remove; that they should, in the spring, call for him and others, who jointly with the Florida chiefs will make a treaty for a country on the Rio Grande, thereby getting away from the neighborhood of the Creeks, or the control of the U.S. government, to assume a more important position among strangers, and possibly wield an influence over some of the Prairie tribes.3

To keep the whites and Indians in Florida separated, General Twiggs proposed building a line of forts that would encircle the Seminole Reservation. It would take time and require a significant amount of manpower to garrison the forts, but he felt it was worth the expense. Even the majority of Seminole would be pleased, provided the cordon kept white intruders out of the reservation. The Seminole preferred to have the army on its borders, as opposed to white squatters, unscrupulous traders, and the occasional slave catcher looking to steal one of the few remaining blacks that lived among the Indians.4 Twiggs also decided that army headquarters and Captain Casey’s Indian Agency at Tampa needed to be relocated. Fort Brooke was well outside the reservation, which meant that any Indian who needed to conduct business with the army had to pass through areas that were settled by the whites. This would eventually lead to trouble, no matter how innocent everyone’s intentions might be. To create a starting point for his cordon of forts, Twiggs dispatched Major Morris and three companies of the Fourth Artillery to two sites. One company went to the settlement at Manatee (Bradenton) to construct Fort Hamer at the head of steamboat navigation on the Manatee River. The other two companies went to the site of Kennedy and Darling’s burned-out store on what had now become known as Paynes Creek. Morris selected a site about a half-mile north of where the store had stood and put the men to work constructing Fort Chokonikla (Seminole for “Burnt House”) along with buildings to house Twiggs’s headquarters and Casey’s agency.5 On 10 November the 11-man delegation of western Seminole arrived at Tampa Bay, escorted by Sub-Agent Duval and two interpreters. The delegation was immediately taken to Fort Chokonikla, where they met with the three accused murderers, who were being held there in close confinement. Being at the edge of the reservation,

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Chokonikla was the place where the delegation was expected to meet with Holata or any other Indians that wanted to speak of emigration.6 Captain Casey and General Twiggs may have worked well together when dealing with the crisis earlier in 1849, but when it came to negotiating for removal, they held differing opinions as to how to deal with the Seminole. Casey understood the Indian character and was familiar with their customs. He knew what they expected and what would make them distrustful. He also knew they weren’t fools. For the past 30 years the government had been making promises it wouldn’t keep, and the moment either Holata or Abiaki felt they were being lied to, negotiations would end. Twiggs seemed to think the Seminole could be easily intimidated, however “unexpected or disagreeable” the subject of emigration was to them. He also suggested that the sale of gunpowder and lead be curtailed until the Indians agreed to emigrate, but Casey warned him that if there was no powder, there would be no peace. Twiggs then threatened to give up his command and leave Florida if the Indians failed to emigrate. All this led to Casey becoming infuriated with Twiggs’s “double dealing and talking.”7

Figure 11. General (then Lieutenant) George Gordon Meade gained fame as the commander of Union forces at the Battle of Gettysburg.

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The agent’s problems continued to mount. He was informed by a fellow officer, Lt. George Gordon Meade, that he’d somehow offended a number of Indians during the previous council. The prisoners being held at Fort Chokonikla were warning Casey to beware, because there was “much talk” among the Seminole about him and Twiggs. There was also repeated interference from someone Casey referred to as “Mr. J. A.,” and concerns about the fate of blacks who either lived with or were owned by the Indians. Slave catchers had always coveted the Seminole’s blacks and were once again causing trouble. Twiggs finally assured Casey that the government would settle the claims and allow the blacks to travel west with the Indians.8 The third negotiator, sub-agent Duval, was concerned that the delegation’s efforts were being undermined. He regretted that Twiggs’s “proposition for removal” had been made before the western delegation met with their Florida brethren. It “made the approach more difficult and dangerous to them—with fewer chances to a favorable termination.” Duval was also upset that he had no control of the negotiations and that Twiggs was completely in charge. He had even asked, without success, for the power to overrule the general. Such divisions among those negotiating with the Seminole did not bode well for the ultimate success of the mission.9 For every ray of hope, there seemed to be a cloud of disappointment. Kapiktsootsee, the disgruntled leader who had been instrumental in the July murders, was now willing to go west. He must have felt threatened by his fellow Indians who were opposed to removal, because he requested an armed escort to bring him and his followers in. Kapiktsootsee also relayed a message from Holata saying he would meet with Casey on 15 December, but both men had doubts that Holata would show. The 15th rolled around, and they were proven right. As a consequence Twiggs stopped all trade with the Indians until they communicated.10 In the meantime work continued on the line of forts. Twiggs was proposing perhaps 13 or 14 posts to hem the Seminole in, running from the Manatee River south of Tampa Bay, east to the Peace River, north as far as Fort Gatlin (Orlando), southeast to Fort Pierce, then south to Fort Dallas (Miami). Besides Fort Brooke at Tampa, there was also Fort Casey on Useppa Island in Charlotte Harbor. All told, there would be 150 officers and 1,591 enlisted men employed in guarding the Seminole frontier.11 Work was started on Fort Meade on 17 December, while Meade himself was assigned the arduous task of cutting a road from there to the east coast, a distance of at least 100 miles. It would be a tough trek, over hills covered with loose sand, around numerous lakes that were not well mapped, and across rivers and streams that would require the construction of bridges and causeways. Florida may have been relatively flat, but getting around was never easy.12

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Seminole Reservation at the end of the Second Seminole War.

Casey, Twiggs, and members of the delegation kept meeting with any Indians who were willing to talk, trying to convince them of the government’s good intentions and assure them it was safe to go to Indian Territory. On 19 December they had a long talk with Cotsa Fixico Chipco, who agreed to act as a guide for Lieutenant

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Meade. Kapiktsootsee returned, and Twiggs authorized Casey to make special arrangements for him. The efforts seemed to be paying off, because on the 24th a number of important leaders and their warriors came in to talk. Unfortunately, Twiggs had left Fort Chokonikla for Tampa and could not be found.13 After a Christmas Day that involved a lot of drinking and carousing by both Indians and whites, the negotiators got down to business. Although Holata and Abiaki were not present, Assinwar was, which meant anything he said carried the weight of the missing pair. Like all diplomatic negotiations, what was said wasn’t necessarily what was meant. One of Casey’s fears had been how the western delegation would be received by the Florida Seminole. Although these people were kinsmen, the Florida Seminole were skeptical of the westerners’ motives and felt they were simply tools of the white man. Yet the meeting was cordial, and both groups greeted each other warmly and exchanged presents. Assinwar said the delegation would be welcomed as friends. Casey wasn’t fooled, noting in his diary, “Lies on both sides.”14 For Casey, it seemed a frustrating time, and he was fast losing faith in General Twiggs. On 30 December he wrote, “Gen. T. has disgusted his staff—as foolish as cracked—is he in his dotage?” As 1849 ended, he also took time to reflect upon what might be a limited future. “Weight 114 ½ lb! Another year gone—shall I see one more? I think yes as far as lungs are concerned.”15 The negotiations continued on and off into January 1850. On the 17th Holata and Assinwar came in to Fort Chokonikla for a talk, along with a number of other leaders. A “Grand Council” was held on the 21st in which Twiggs offered Holata $5,000 to emigrate. Some of the officers present must have been shocked; that was close to four years’ base pay for a general, almost 17 years’ worth for a lowly second lieutenant. It was a princely sum to offer “King Billy Bowlegs,” as the whites often called him, but Holata would commit to nothing more than thinking it over and to meet with Casey in two or three weeks.16 Even though Holata hadn’t committed, Twiggs was sure of success and informed his superiors in Washington that the Seminole leader and his sub-chiefs were willing to emigrate and that they would try to persuade as many of their people as possible to go along. Whatever the truth, everyone hailed the achievement and held a celebration that night. As Casey noted the next morning, “All hands drunk.”17 As Emigration Agent, Casey needed cash to pay any Seminole who chose to relocate. The War Department had sent down drafts to obtain gold when the Indians reached New Orleans, but Casey sent the drafts back. He knew how little faith the Indians had in the promises of white men. The only way they would board ship was with gold in their hands. As Casey told the Adjutant General, “The drafts sent to me for funds are not available, and I have to return them. I have also requested that money, (gold) not drafts, be forwarded at once. It is unnecessary for me to add anything on the importance of being able promptly to comply with our promises to the first Indians coming in for emigration. Indeed not a step can be taken until

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the money is here.” As a measure of how important it was to the government that the negotiations be successful, $100,000 in gold was sent to Casey on 8 February.18 The date for the proposed meeting with Holata was set for 10 February at Charlotte Harbor. To keep track of the time, Casey gave one of Holata’s warriors 20 sticks, one for each day until the meeting would take place. The warrior then informed him that, “We will make a law (to go to Arkansas) & all who don’t comply shall be flogged.” Casey then began a circuitous voyage to the meeting place, first going by steamboat up river to Fort Meade, then overland to Fort Brooke. From there, he and others boarded another steamer and headed south, stopping to pick up other passengers at Fort Hamer on the Manatee River. They arrived at Fort Casey on Useppa Island on 6 February.19 On 7 February the boat proceeded to the meeting place, where they found a large number of Indians waiting and news that others, including Holata, would arrive that evening. On the following morning a council was held aboard the steamboat with about 20 Seminole. At the end of the meeting, Casey noted, “Matters look favorable.” He then went ashore to Holata’s camp for the afternoon, where other Indians showed up to talk. In the late afternoon most of the Seminole packed up to return to their villages, leaving only a few to continue the conversation with the agent. Although emigration seemed to have been decided upon, it was obvious that not all of the Indians were going to take the government up on its generous offer. One of the subjects Casey discussed with the remaining Indians was moving the northern boundary of the reservation south to the Caloosahatchee River the following year.20 Believing a fort was needed closer to the majority of Seminole, Twiggs ordered Maj. Samuel Ridgeley to take two companies of the Fourth Artillery and erect a post at a convenient location on the Caloosahatchee. The place Ridgeley chose was the site of Fort Harvie, an abandoned and burned-out post from the Second Seminole War. The new installation was named Fort Myers, in honor of Lt. Col. Abraham C. Myers, Chief Quartermaster for the Florida Department and Twiggs’s future son-in-law.21 The government’s inducements and the delegation’s talks seemed to be having the desired effect, and on 12 February Twiggs was able to inform Secretary of War Crawford that 60 Indians had turned themselves in at the newly constructed Fort Arbuckle near the Kissimmee River. By the time the emigrants had gathered at the embarkation point of Fort Hamer on the Manatee River, their numbers had increased to 74, including the three warriors implicated in the July murders. The party departed for their new homes on 28 February, and Twiggs was able to report, “Thus far, everything gives promise of good success.”22 Twiggs may have been optimistic, but events were about to prove him wrong. The first sign of trouble arose when Casey and Twiggs were told by the Indians that no more people would come in for emigration until the western delegation departed. Most of the delegation had, in fact, already departed with the émigrés, but word hadn’t gotten to the other Indians yet. As a result, Twiggs was forced to inform

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Crawford, “An indefinite postponement of peaceable emigration, if not destruction of all hope of attaining this desirable result.”23 Then, as if to signal that talks had ended, the Seminole abandoned their camps near the Caloosahatchee and relocated deeper into the Big Cypress and Everglades. Whether the majority of the Seminole had never actually intended to emigrate or were frightened by something is hard to determine. There were reports that two young warriors had come in to trade at Fort Hamer and had somehow gotten caught up with the 72 other emigrants and been unintentionally shipped west. Casey felt Holata’s Alachua Seminole had been intimidated by Abiaki’s Mikasuki band, which was still steadfastly opposed to emigration. Twiggs thought it might have been because a company of the Seventh Infantry had inadvertently entered the reservation. Whatever it was, any of those things could have convinced the skittish Seminole that the whole negotiation was little more than a trap.24 Casey traveled to Fort Myers and attempted to revive negotiations but met with little success. On 3 April he sent two messengers to Holata with an invitation to meet at Fort Myers. They returned four days later with a message from Holata that he desired peace, but that he and his people did not want to leave Florida. Holata also sent a piece of wampum containing red beads, a clear warning that it was not safe for Casey to enter the reservation. On 12 April, Casey and Holata met at Fort Casey, where the agent and other officers were informed that the Seminole would no longer talk of emigration. The Indians also proposed moving the boundary of the reservation farther south. The present boundary ran from about Fort Chokonikla to the northern side of Lake Istokpoga. They now wanted it to be from the mouth of the Peace River to the south end of Istokpoga. They knew the Peace River Valley would soon be populated by whites and wanted to maintain their isolation.25 Casey returned to Tampa and met with Twiggs, informing him that for the time being, all hopes of convincing the Seminole to emigrate peacefully were gone. Twiggs didn’t know what to do and suggested Casey go to Washington and explain why the mission had failed. Casey felt he was being set up, that it would look like he was the one who had caused the negotiations to fail. In his diary he wrote, “No, you don’t!” Twiggs, tired of Florida and of dealing with the Indians, requested to be relieved of command in Florida. His replacement would be Brig. Gen. Thomas Childs, another veteran of the Second Seminole War.26 The failure of the talks disappointed and angered many. Lieutenant Ambrose Hill thought of resigning his commission and wrote to his father: The rain has been pouring down here for sometime, and as a consequence every thing is damp, paper, clothes, tent, and I may well say, feelings also. We have already been in Florida eight months, wintering it in tents and the season for an active campaign allowed to pass in inactivity. The time which should have been devoted to forcing the Indians out, has been consumed in trying to talk them out, and the Indians as a matter of course out-talked us, lying being the chief ingredient in their diplomacy.—They have gained time, gathered in

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their crops, fortified their fastnesses, and now through the mouth of Billy Bowlegs, they tell “won’t go no how”, and snap their fingers at us in derision … For six months have I been in the woods, no society, clothes all worn, salt provisions, occasionally a deer, and at present no prospect of a termina[tion].27

Part of Hill’s frustration no doubt came from the nature of his posting. With only sporadic deliveries of mail and sometimes having no other officer for companionship while stationed at remote outposts, it was easy for a soldier to feel isolated and forgotten. Many officers, like Hill, were young and ready for action and had not experienced the frustration of trying to hunt the Seminole in their Everglades hideouts. Realizing the Indians were concentrating to the south of Lake Okeechobee, Twiggs ordered most of the forts that had been recently erected closed. Forts Crawford, Myakka, Clinch, and Arbuckle were all shut down by July, with only Forts Meade and Chokonikla on the Peace River remaining open. When disease broke out at Chokonikla, it too was abandoned and the soldiers transferred to Fort Meade, leaving it as the only fort in the interior of the peninsula.28 When disease struck a post like Fort Chokonikla, it was hard to ignore. Major Francis O. Wyse, in command of Company D, Third Artillery, compared the sick list for his company over a 12-day period at Fort Chokonikla to a similar company at Fort Meade. For his 46-man company, he averaged 15 men on the sick list. The company at Fort Meade averaged only two and a half. Another company, which had been at Fort Chokonikla longer, fared even worse.29 With the departure of Twiggs, Casey was more or less left on his own to deal with the Seminole. In late May he returned to Fort Myers and once again attempted to revive negotiations but made no real progress. The Seminole were wary, fearing they would be taken prisoner and sent west against their will. At a meeting on 21 May, a warrior named Tukosa came aboard Casey’s vessel, accompanied by another warrior to watch over him. Whether the guardian was there to stop the man from surrendering or to prevent him from being taken prisoner wasn’t revealed. Casey was also informed that news of possible troop movements had sent the Indians into hiding.30 The agent was beginning to lose heart. He told the Indians that he was changing his feelings towards them, and why: “Lies & incredulity.” No one on either side seemed to want to conduct serious business. The Indians appeared interested only in partying, and when he returned to his ship after a day of bargaining on shore, he found the entire crew of the vessel drunk. In his diary he wrote, “I think the prospect very bad for emigration.”31 At times it seemed like posturing was more important than negotiating. On 27 May Holata’s older sister was at Fort Myers, complaining that Casey had kept the chief waiting. In turn, Casey refused to meet with him, saying the chief knew he was on the boat, and if he wanted to talk, he could come out there. The agent also stopped the distribution of liquor until the talks were over. On the following day, Holata’s sister came out again to see Casey. This was important, because in a matrilineal society such as the Seminole’s, certain women often held considerable

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power. Unfortunately, by the end of the day Casey had to admit that she would never agree to emigration.32 Casey’s efforts weren’t all in vain. He did manage to convince the warrior named Tukosa to emigrate, but the Indian’s compatriots did their best to prevent it. Two days after Tukosa made his decision, his wife and children were spirited away. The warrior went out to look for them, but the family soon returned, aided by Tukosa’a brother-in-law. By 1 June, the family, eight in all, was aboard ship, and Casey headed back to Tampa the next day. It had been a lot of work for little pay-off.33 As news of the failed negotiations spread, frustrated Floridians began to call for forced removal. In Tampa, a political convention declared it to be the only solution, both to preserve the Indians “from certain destruction and our frontier relieved from perpetual terrors of Indian warfare.” The only people who seemed to disagree were the Seminole. To them, preserving their way of life meant preserving their Florida homes.34 Clearly, a new approach to the removal of the Indians would have to be taken, but that direction would have to come from Washington. In late June Twiggs met with President Taylor, who told him, “General Twiggs, tell Bowlegs whenever you see him, from me, that if his people remain within their limits—and behave themselves—they shall never be disturbed while I am in office.” Unfortunately for the Seminole, within a week Zachary Taylor was dead from an intestinal ailment, and his successor, Millard Fillmore, would see things differently.35 Beset by troubles over sectional politics and a lack of support from the people of Taylor’s administration, the problems of Florida were not high on Fillmore’s list of priorities.36 A year had passed since the slayings at Fort Pierce and Paynes Creek, and the state had been relatively quiet. Although nervous settlers still complained of roaming Indians and the occasional missing livestock, no one had been killed and no homesteads burned. The situation changed on 6 August 1850 when an eight-year-old orphan, Daniel Hubbard, went missing. The boy lived on the farm of Jesse Sumner, located well north of the reservation boundary in the area west of present-day Orlando. He had been sent to drive some cattle from a neighboring farm, and when his horse returned without him and minus its saddle, local residents began a search.37 Neither the boy nor his body were ever located, but suspicion quickly fell upon a group of Indians that had been seen in the area. They were members of one of the Creek bands living at the northern edge of the reservation and beyond the control of Holata or Abiaki, a technicality that was lost on the white population. As far as whites were concerned, all Indians in Florida were Seminole and therefore the tribe’s responsibility, just as any white criminal in Florida was theoretically the state’s responsibility. Holata and Abiaki may not have felt it was their problem, but in reality, it was.38 It was an isolated incident, and there was no real proof the Indians had committed any crime or had even seen the boy, but it didn’t make any difference. People were afraid and quick to place blame on the most convenient suspects. Jacob Summerlin, a prominent cattle rancher, wrote to Governor Thomas Brown and expressed the

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concerns of most of his neighbors. “You may imagine our state of anxiety when we cannot send our children on an errand or to school without the danger of having them captured by the Indians. We are getting tired of waiting to see what government will do, and shall be driven to the necessity of taking care of ourselves the best we can.”39 Unlike the murders in 1849, the killing of Daniel Hubbard took nearly a year to resolve. Without a body, or witnesses, or suspects that could be identified or located, the authorities were unable to close the case. Everyone just assumed it was the Indians. It wasn’t until October that Fillmore’s new Secretary of War, Charles Conrad, ordered Casey to apprehend the murderers. If the Indians refused to turn them over, the government would hold the entire tribe responsible. On Figure 12. Jacob Summerlin. Often called the “King 24 October Casey was in Fort Myers of the Crackers,” he was Florida’s leading cattle rancher after the Civil War and helped develop Orlando, holding talks with Holata, and the pair Bartow, and Fort Myers. Although he fought against discussed the subject.40 the Seminole in the Third Seminole War, he served as Casey was also doing his own invest- Confederate agent to them during the Civil War and igation. On 12 November he met with became friends with Abiaki (Sam Jones). Simeon Sparkman, who told him of an Indian camp he’d seen three weeks after Daniel’s disappearance, and a village near the Withlacoochee River that he’d come upon in October. On the 24th Casey showed a shirt sleeve that some thought might be Daniel’s to the child’s foster mother, Mrs. Sumner. She told him it wasn’t from the shirt Daniel was wearing that day.41 By the time January 1851 arrived, Casey was feeling the pressure. On the 11th he reported to Secretary Conrad that Daniel Hubbard had in fact been “taken by a party of the outside or outlaw Indians,” though he didn’t say how he had come by the information. He proposed to seize and hold the group accountable or, if unsuccessful, to demand the murderers from the Indians who were “desirous of peace.”42 He worried that if he did nothing, either the Indians or the state might do something to start a war. He confided to his diary: I am in great doubts as to my course in the affair of the murdered boy. The interests of the country & the administration & the Indians are one—Peace & justice are but secured by that

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measure and yet so little trust can be placed in Gen. Scott [head of the army] or Mr. Conrad [Sec. of War.] that by adopting it—I jeopardize my commission! What is to be done?  … I ought to hang 2 outsiders & keep the rest that I can get a hostage to be hung if their party commits any more murders.43

The frustrated agent had gotten to the point where he was ready to practice Indian justice, in which an innocent kinsman could be punished for a family member’s crime. By 27 January Casey believed taking hostages might be the only way to get the murderers turned over. He wrote in his diary: Suppose no evidence of outlaws is made before Council of Feb. 12 and that then the chiefs deny knowledge of it—which would be deliberate falsehood. What then? If I have Bowlegs—Jones or his wife Ismahter—Assenwah & a doz. others, I will secure them & make them responsible for the delivery of the murderers & the safety of the frontier.44

Despite his doubts and frustrations, Casey was making progress in the case. On 13 April he met with over 40 Indians, including Holata and Assinwar. Before the agent could ask about the murderers, Holata informed him that he’d ordered all Indians to relocate south of the Caloosahatchee, and to go north only for hunting or to gather crops that had already been planted. He also informed Casey that Chipco had been brought in along with another hostile leader, Oscen Tustennuggee. When Casey demanded he turn the killers over, Holata agreed to, but stated he couldn’t do it immediately. In private, Holata also confirmed the names of two of the murderers, but not a third.45 Weeks passed, and Casey waited for the murderers to be turned over. On 13 May he received word that they would be surrendered in seven days. Four days later they were turned in at the office of Lt. Truman Walbridge (Casey’s assistant) in Fort Myers, as Casey had instructed. By the 19th they were in Tampa and soon delivered to the Justice of the Peace.46 Three days after being turned over to the authorities, the trio was found hanging in their cell. The deaths were reported to be suicides, but most people thought otherwise. Among the jailers were two close relations of Dempsey Whidden, one of the victims of the raid at Paynes Creek in 1849. Frontier justice had been carried out.47 Justice, of course, was rarely given to the Indians. Never was a white murderer, cattle rustler, or other sort of criminal turned over to the Indians when crimes were committed against Native Americans. An Indian wasn’t even allowed to testify in court, unless it was on behalf of a white person. Every society has its outlaws, but the Indians were held to a double standard they could not overcome. If, for example, someone from Georgia entered Florida, committed a murder, and returned home, Floridians would expect his home state to extradite him to Florida for trial, not demand that everyone in Georgia vacate their homes and go elsewhere. Yet that is precisely what the government was asking of the Seminole. In Washington, Congress was working on a bill that would have a profound effect upon the Seminole and the State of Florida, not just in the near term, but well into the 21st century.

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On 28 September 1850 it passed the Swamp Land Act (commonly known as the Swamp and Overflowed Lands Act), a law that would eventually transfer millions of acres of specifically defined lands from federal to state control. The intention of the law was to give the states unproductive wetlands that could be drained, made useful for agriculture, and eventually sold to settlers. It was also hoped the sale of the land would help fund internal improvements within the states. Florida, with its countless swamps and the Everglades, stood to gain immensely from the law, and Senator Yulee was one of its principal authors. The wetlands could be chosen using either the field notes of the Deputy Surveyors or by hiring Selecting Agents to apply to the federal government for the transfer of proposed lands to the states. Florida chose the latter method and hired Arthur M. Randolph and Henry Wells to begin the process. In the end, the state received title to over 20 million acres of land under the act, much of it in South Florida. A Board of Internal Improvements was constituted and seven members were selected, including John Darling, a staunch supporter of Indian removal and an outspoken critic of the army’s handling of it. Darling submitted plans for Everglades drainage that reflected, in part, some of the recommendations of the 1848 Buckingham Smith report on the feasibility of draining such a large area.48 It would take over a hundred years for Floridians to realize how bad an idea widespread drainage was, and many of our present debates over Everglades Restoration are a consequence of the act.

Figure 13. John Darling, Tampa entrepreneur, one of the owners of the Kennedy-Darling store that was attacked in 1849.

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Although it would be decades before serious attempts were made to drain the Everglades and sell the land, the effect upon the Seminole and Mikasuki people was almost immediate. Drainage crews wouldn’t work, speculators and developers wouldn’t invest, and settlers wouldn’t buy as long as the potentially hostile Indians remained in the Everglades. Politicians and businessmen saw money to be made, but not until the task of Indian removal was complete. The Florida Indians, unaware there even was such a thing as a Swamp Land Act, would soon feel the pressure the law had inadvertently created. Captain Casey continued his efforts to convince the Seminole to emigrate, but it was a losing battle. He had numerous meetings with the Indians, but the Seminole were usually evasive, uncooperative, intoxicated, threatening, or simply unwilling to talk. He did manage to secure a group of 16 who wished to go west, but that was about all he could do. He was often ill, occasionally coughing up blood, and still under 115 pounds, but he continued to fulfill his duty. The fact that the Seminole didn’t want to talk made it more frustrating, but at least they were courteous enough to come in and hold the discussions.49 The agent believed a slow and steady approach was the only one that had any chance of success. By his best estimate, there were about 450 Indians and about 10 black Seminole in Florida, and nearly all were opposed to emigration. He warned Commissioner of Indian Affairs Luke Lea that a premature use of force would only serve to scatter the Indians in small parties, making it almost impossible to remove them. The use of force would also cause retaliatory raids, resulting in the loss of white life and property. He wanted to ease the pressure and build friendly relations so that both sides could better understand the other’s position. The problem was that neither side really cared what the other one wanted.50 The State of Florida also attempted to accomplish the task, though it was more in words than in deeds. On 20 January 1851 Governor Brown signed, “An ACT to provide for the removal of the Indians now remaining in Florida beyond the limits of the State.” The legislature complained that Congress had given Florida legal jurisdiction over the entire state, but Tallahassee couldn’t exercise that right because the Seminole were still present. “These Indians having repeatedly passed beyond their prescribed bounds, and in the most treacherous and unprovoked manner, murdered our peaceable citizens and destroyed their property, creating terror and insecurity throughout the whole line of our frontier settlements.”51 One of the provisions in the act gave the governor authority to urge the president to remove the Indians and demanded that until it was done, forts and manpower be returned to the level they were at the end of the Second Seminole War. The act also gave the governor power to raise two 800-man regiments of mounted volunteers and use them in conjunction with federal troops or as an independent force. He was also expected to ask the federal government to pay for the troops, but if it didn’t, the sum of $50,000 was authorized to supply and

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equip the force. If Washington declined to promptly remove the Indians, the state offered to do the job for not less than 2 million dollars, provided transportation was provided to take the Seminole west.52 While all this was going on in Florida, people in Washington were making their own plans. Interior Secretary Alexander Stuart and Commissioner of Indian Affairs Lea, feeling Captain Casey and the army were in no hurry to get the Indians out, began to think a civilian could do a better job. If nothing else, a civilian agent would be under their control and subject to their orders. On 19 April 1851 they hired Luther Blake, a self-confident Alabamian, to undertake the task. Blake had experienced some success in convincing Creeks from Alabama into migrating, and he assured the officials he could do the same Figure 14. Governor Thomas Brown, who served with the Seminole.53 from 1 October 1849 until 3 October 1853. Getting right to work, Blake and his assistant, a Mr. Bowman of Mississippi, arrived in Fort Myers on 8 May and met with Casey and the post’s commander, Col. John Winder. Casey was cordial and cooperative, but not impressed. Blake was confident he could convince the Seminole to leave starting in autumn, and that Paddy Carr, a prominent Creek leader, could help with the negotiations. Casey knew the mood of the Seminole and also knew that Carr was an enemy of the Florida Indians, having fought against them in the previous war. If the Seminole hadn’t been willing to talk to their kinsmen from the West, what chance did Carr have? Oblivious to the reality, Blake wrote an optimistic letter to his superiors in Washington, assuring them of his eventual success.54 Perhaps coming to the realization that Paddy Carr might not be the best person to help negotiate with Holata and Abiaki, Blake decided to head out to Indian Territory and procure some people who might be better received. He also decided that even though there were interpreters in Florida and Holata spoke tolerable English, he needed different interpreters. The trip got off to a bad start when Blake came down with a case of cholera and was confined to quarters for two months. Then he found a serious reluctance among the western Seminole for a trip to Florida. They believed their previous trip had been a waste, and some had yet to receive payment for the Indians they had convinced to emigrate. Looking for a way out of the impasse, Commissioner Lea offered a few incentives. He promised to look into giving them

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a reservation separate from the Creeks, an increase in their annuity, and a separate agent and blacksmith. The Seminole finally agreed to assist, and Blake was able to recruit one of Holata’s nieces and Abraham, a powerful black leader, as an interpreter. Blake had promised to have the Florida Indians removed by the spring of 1852. With all the delays, it wasn’t until February of that year that he was able to return to Florida and begin his work.55 In the meantime, Casey was back at Fort Brooke and having little contact with the Indians. Although still officially the Agent for Emigration, he was leaving everything in the hands of Luther Blake. Whether those were his orders or he had Figure 15. Abraham. Slave, interpreter, and advisor simply given up in disgust isn’t indicated. to Chief Micanopy. A former Spanish slave who Back in November he’d noted in his had worked as a shipwright in Pensacola, he grew diary that he’d heard through friends to be the most influential of the many blacks living among the Seminole. that Blake was only to use persuasion to entice the Seminole to leave, and no other inducements or threats. As far as Casey was concerned the whole process was nothing but fraud, considering that Blake would be paid a handsome sum even if he failed in his efforts. Writing to a friend, he criticized the plan, and predicted “bad results from bad Agents.”56 While people were waiting for Blake to return and work his magic, the normal routine of strained Indian relations continued. John Darling, the Tampa store owner, held a public meeting where he called on the state to remove the Seminole because the federal government wasn’t going to until either Blake failed or the Indians became hostile. An express rider, traveling from Fort Mellon on the St. Johns River to Tampa, claimed he’d been shot at by Indians, but it was later discovered that it was probably two deserters from Fort Meade that had done the shooting.57 Tired of waiting on Blake or Washington, Floridians began to take matters into their own hands. Captain Aaron Jernigan of the Florida Militia began to patrol the area near Fort Gatlin, looking for livestock he believed had been stolen by the Indians. He didn’t find any Indians, but he did come back with 120 hogs said to belong to the Seminole. When a citizen complained that it was nothing more than simple thievery, Governor Brown responded that if the Seminole had livestock, it must have been stolen.58 Pleased with the result, Jernigan made another patrol on 2 February 1852 with a dozen men including Florida Militia officers Captains Simeon Sparkman and Jacob Summerlin. This time, near Lake Tohopekaliga, the militiamen came upon the trail

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of a Seminole family and soon captured a warrior, his wife, one small child, and an old woman. According to Jernigan, the warrior told them of a group of Mikasukis camped nearby who killed “white man’s cows plenty—who drive off plenty cows.” Jernigan then reported what he did next:59 Forcing the warrior to pilot us, we had proceeded westwardly only a few miles, when we discovered them. It being then night, we agreed to wait until day-light, as the ground would not admit of night work. In the morning … I proceeded with three men cautiously to their camp, but found them absent, apparently hunting, as their things were laid up out of the reach of their hogs. Leaving four men at this place concealed, taking the three with me, I found it here necessary to dismount to trail them, and had gone but a short distance when we heard the war-whoop, and saw Capt. S. in full chase of an Indian, but lost him, owing to the multiplicity of bay-galls near us. Separating again, in about half an hour Capt. S. saw another, who evidently was hostile, as he would neither lay down his arms nor come up; Capt. S. presuming there were others near him in ambush from his conduct. On the arrival of Capt. Summerlin, the Indian ran, with a saddle on his back, and was fired upon by Capt. Sparkman, causing the saddle to fall with a ball hole in it, which evidently saved this Indian … Being now near the south end of Lake Topekelega, the signs of Indians were becoming thicker, together with hogs, cattle, and pony signs in abundance. Deeming it proper to separate my command again, I left the prisoners with Capt. S., with five men, just sufficient to drive the hogs and carry off the baggage of the prisoners, as I did not wish them to lose any thing, and had promised this to them.

Being watched over by only one man, who was also tasked with hunting down the evening meal, the warrior and his wife were able to make their escape, leaving the old woman and the child behind. Jernigan made pains to point out: The Indians were treated by us with kindness. I told them plainly that we would do them no harm, but would send them to their agent at Tampa—that they were out of their boundary, and killing our cattle, which made us take them prisoners. I was particular in explaining to them that we did this on our own individual responsibility, so as not to compromise the United States, or our State, in the matter.60

Jernigan took the old woman and toddler to his home, but later reported that she’d hung herself while he was away. News of Jernigan’s actions caused concern for Mellonville (Sanford) resident John Hughey, who feared the Indians might retaliate. He informed Gen. Benjamin Hopkins of the Florida Militia that “Jernigan has been with the Indians again.” Asking for immediate protection, he declared, “The war is opened—the war whoop has been heard in our land. We know not what to do, or may become of our families.” Hopkins forwarded Hughey’s and similar letters to Governor Brown and also offered to investigate Jernigan’s conduct and attempt to suppress any hostilities that might arise. Yet it was Hopkins who had originally selected Jernigan to lead the patrols and to capture Indians who had wandered outside the boundaries. Later reports by others confirmed that Jernigan did not embellish his report, but it was nonetheless used as leverage to remove him from command.61 After learning the fate of the Indian woman, Brown further instructed Hopkins to see that the captured child was “taken care of until it can be delivered up to some proper person” and ordered that any Indians taken prisoner or who surrendered be “treated with kindness and humanity” and delivered to a U.S. officer or agent.

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Finding the child to be sick, Hopkins had her taken to the post at New Smyrna, where a local woman was hired to attend the girl and nurse her back to health. Colonel Winder was subsequently instructed to inform Holata of the child’s safety and, being unable to send her to Fort Myers, her parents could be sent to bring her home.62 The episode highlighted the difficulty Floridians were having in deciding how to deal with the Seminole. Most wanted the federal government to remove them by peaceful means, even if it took some time, while a few felt the Seminole would remain peaceful if simply left alone. Others wanted to actively pursue the Indians, round them up, and send them west, but many feared such action would cause the Indians to retaliate, unleashing another costly, deadly war. They worried that the death of the old woman might be just such a trigger, and wanted to know who had authorized her capture. The fact that Jernigan stated that he had taken the action on his own responsibility shows how controversial the subject was. Jernigan’s methods and motives may have come into question, but his situation received a lot of sympathy from Floridians. The state was open rangeland and cattle were allowed to roam free. If Indians were outside the reservation and stealing cattle, what was a rancher supposed to do? The real question was whether or not the Indians were actually stealing cattle. Yes, they were definitely outside the reservation, but were they rustling cattle or hunting wild game? Whites decided they already knew the answer, but rarely looked for any proof. If there was trouble, both sides bore some responsibility. Luther Blake and the delegation from the West arrived in Florida on 14 February 1852. The delegation consisted of 16 Indians and four interpreters, three of whom were blacks. One delegate had died at sea on the way from New Orleans. John Darling, anxious to have the Indians removed, expressed confidence that the mission would be successful. In anticipation, he remarked to the governor, “Our section is rapidly filling up with new settlers this winter, and with the departure of the Indians, we hope to hail a new era in our life—the very beginning of our prosperity.”63 By late March Blake and the delegation were at Fort Myers and meeting with the Florida Indians. Early reports were optimistic and said the visitors were cordially received. Casey noted, “Blake reports Indians are coming & going quite freely & friendly &c.” He also quoted from a letter someone had written to Governor Brown, praising Blake and “his high qualifications & fitness & if he fails all must fail.” When two Seminole families came in for emigration, Blake must have felt he was off to a good start. General Thomas Childs, in command of all forces in Florida, wasn’t so optimistic, telling the Adjutant General, “This is an Uchee family & have barely been tolerated by the Seminole, in consequence of their worthless habits.” Blake may have impressed some white men, but it was the Indians he needed to convince, and in that department things weren’t going very well. True, there were a few takers, but he needed to remove the whole tribe, not just a few families.

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General Childs wrote, “Their coming in cannot be taken as an indication on the part of the nation to emigrate. A council is now being held in the nation, to which all the Delegates have gone but two. At this council it is supposed the Indians will decide what they will do.”64 Yes, the Seminole may have been friendly and welcoming, but that didn’t mean they were going to give up their homes. Casey noted, “S. Jones [Abiaki], Assanwah, Fuse Hadjo, Nakora Enethlo, Hoithly-uablachulee are opposed to Arkansas … Echo Emathla [Chipco] has taken his women into the Big Cypress for fear some might come in.” Part of the problem was that the Seminole, both eastern and western, didn’t always trust the people who were doing the negotiating. The delegation from the West was getting frustrated and was ready to go home. Casey heard that “They don’t know the terms offered & unlike all being left to Abram a negro.” The delegation had been brought out to help in negotiations, but it seemed as if the interpreter, Abraham, was bypassing them and making all the decisions. Could they be sure he was doing what was in the best interests of the Seminole and not the whites? Casey also noted that among the delegation, “Many express no confidence in Blake.”65 Another part of the problem may have been that the Seminole were getting mixed signals. While Blake was negotiating, the Florida Militia was out hunting Indians. On 25 March, General Hopkins reported to Governor Brown that he and a group of militiamen had captured a party of Seminole at their encampment while searching between Lakes Monroe and Kissimmee. Several Seminole, returning to camp as the captives were being led away, exchanged fire with the militiamen, accidentally wounding one of the captured women. Unable to free their families, the warriors retreated. Casey noted with dismay, “Gen. Hopkins & Jernigan had taken 1 man, 3 women, 27 children & had them at Palatka 28 March. He was going out again!” The Seminole couldn’t be blamed for wondering if they were dealing with peace or war.66 On 3 April, the governor told Hopkins that he hoped Blake would be successful, but if he failed, they would have to resort to force: If the General Government will not make the necessary appropriations, and will not co-operate, the State will have to undertake it alone, and you will have to remain in the field until it is accomplished. If you have good cause to believe that the body of the Indians are disposed to be hostile, you will embody such a force as you may deem necessary, not only for the protection of the frontier, but to meet and capture or defeat them.

Hopkins didn’t seem disposed to wait for the outcome of Blake’s initiatives. On 28 April Casey received news that Hopkins had taken a steamboat to Mellonville with 30 men for the purpose of attacking some Indians near Lake Poinsett.67 The regular army was also putting pressure on the Seminole. General Childs informed Hopkins that he’d ordered troops at Forts Capron and Kissimmee to patrol their neighborhoods in order to confine the main body of Seminole within the boundary and to capture those who strayed outside. Slowly but surely, the

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Seminole were learning that even though there were no whites living in most of the area just north of the boundary, it was a district now closed to them, even if it was their largest remaining hunting ground.68 By June it was becoming obvious to Casey that the talks weren’t going anywhere. The surgeon at Fort Myers, Dr. William Sloan, told Casey that Holata was going to pay the doctor a visit “confidentially during the night,” presumably to get the truth, and then listen to what Blake had to say the next day. Casey also noted that several Indians had come into Fort Myers to trade, but had refused to talk about emigration and had told Blake to take it up with their leaders. Whatever the reality, Blake and his assistant, Mr. Bowman, had yet to see it. Bowman came ashore at Fort Myers on 9 June, saying he was delaying his departure because more Indians were coming in to emigrate. In private, Dr. Sloan told Casey that none of them were coming in. In the meantime, Chipco declared that he would never emigrate and that he didn’t fear all the “Crackers” in Florida.69 There was obvious tension building between Casey and Blake. Throughout Casey’s diary from the period there are inferences that he thinks Blake’s mission is a farce, and at one point he calls it a “capital joke!” There are also indications that other officers had lost their respect for the negotiator. Rumors, innuendo, and gossip were circulating, some of it directed at Blake, some at Casey, some at other officers, especially Colonel Winder, the former commanding officer at Fort Myers. It was not the sort of atmosphere conducive to frank discussion and honest bargaining.70 During the week of 17–23 July, Blake met with Holata at Fort Myers. Holata told the negotiator that as far as he was concerned, General Worth’s agreement of 1842 had guaranteed the Seminole a permanent reservation in Southwest Florida as long as they remained peaceful. Blake told him that it wasn’t true, that the reservation was only temporary and that the Indians would have to leave Florida. Both were stretching the truth. Worth had considered the reservation as temporary, but told the Indians they could remain as long as they were peaceful. Worth probably believed that sooner or later, as the white population began to encroach upon the reservation, conflict would result, and the Indians would have to go west.71 On 25 July most of the delegation from the West began their long journey home. Blake had failed to sweet-talk the Seminole into emigrating, so he now turned to intimidation. First he wanted Holata to meet with General Hopkins of the Florida Militia, who would no doubt make it clear that force would be used to compel the Indians to leave. Then he decided Holata should travel to Washington, where the power and grandeur of the nation would surely impress upon the Seminole leader how futile it was to resist the will of the white man. As Casey put it, “The law of death or emigration—talk has been reenacted & enforced lately!”72 During this time General Childs of the regular army was trying to restrain the operations of Hopkin’s militia and wasn’t meeting with much success. Casey noted, “Childs received a pompous reply from Hopkins dated July 19th … H. tells C. that if we [the militia] succeed not only our country but the whole world will applaud.” On

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14 August Hopkins met with Holata and told him that he’d been sent by Governor Brown to inform the Indians that if they didn’t go with Blake, the state would compel them to by force. If the Seminole weren’t gone in 70 days, Hopkins said, he and his men would enter the reservation. He said he didn’t want war and wouldn’t fire the first shot, but like it or not, the land would be surveyed and sold, and white settlers would soon be there. If that weren’t enough, he threatened to hang the Indians if they did not leave. Hopkins went so far as to tell the commissioner of Indian affairs that he was prepared to raise 800–1,000 troops, and told Blake that he would cooperate in the removal of the Indians, but that he would resign if he wasn’t in command.73 Now that Blake had theoretically put the fear of Hopkins in the Indians, it was time to take them to Washington. On 31 August 1852 a delegation of five Seminole led by Holata, Blake, some members of the Western delegation, and several interpreters left Fort Myers on their way to meet with President Fillmore, the secretaries of war and navy, and the commissioner of Indian affairs.74 Casey, taking no part in the negotiations, recorded their departure but had other things on his mind. His health, precarious as it was from the tuberculosis, was failing, and he feared he was near death. On the 31st he reported two severe hemorrhages. The following day, 1 September, was even worse, with several hemorrhages in the morning. The attempted cures he tried sound as dangerous as the disease. On the first day he’d taken salt and turpentine. On the next day he took lead in pill form then in powder form. He wrote in his diary, “Vomit hard & burning stomach at 4 pm from the lead … Hemm. again at ¼ of 11 pm. If this continues I must settle up my affairs quickly.” Fortunately, the worst symptoms passed, and the captain slowly regained some of his strength.75 The ship carrying Holata and the rest of the delegation arrived in New York on 11 September. After being checked into a hotel as “Mr. William B. Legs,” Holata met with Maj. John T. Sprague, who had been the Seminole agent before the appointment of Captain Casey and was now stationed at Governors Island. Sprague reported that Holata assured him “in the most positive and angry manner of his determination not to leave Florida.” The group’s picture was taken, and articles appeared in all the newspapers. Holata Micco, always referred to as Billy Bowlegs, was the most famous Indian in America.76 The delegation then traveled to Washington, presumably by rail. Whether Holata and the others were frightened, thrilled, or amused by the power and speed of the train is not recorded. On 16 September Blake took them for an interview with Commissioner of Indian Affairs Luke Lea. It was a cordial meeting, with Lea assuring the Indians they were among friends and should feel free to speak their minds. Holata said that he’d come to Washington to learn the truth about the treaties, since General Worth, who had made the present arrangement with the Seminole, was now dead and could not be asked about it.77 The commissioner patiently explained the situation, though Holata and the others had no doubt heard the same message from Casey, Blake, and other white

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Figure 16. “Billy Bowlegs” and his retinue in New York, 1852.

officials many times before. Lea told them the difference between a treaty and a truce. A treaty was signed and official. It was the law and must be obeyed. Worth’s truce had been verbal and was temporary in nature. In the 1832 Treaty of Payne’s Landing, the Seminole had agreed to give up all claims to land in Florida and move to Indian Territory. General Worth had given them temporary permission to live on the land, but the land belonged to the State of Florida, and now the state wanted it. That was the law, Lea told them, and there was no way around it. The Seminole didn’t ask, and the government certainly wasn’t going to offer, to make a new treaty.78 Commissioner Lea went on to tell the delegation that white settlements were moving toward the reservation and that there would eventually be conflict. He could not prevent it, and there was no law to stop it. As their friend, he told them, he was advising them to emigrate before a war broke out, a war that would inevitably lead to their destruction. He promised to make the transition to the new homes as smooth as possible and to protect them when they arrived in Indian Territory. He didn’t threaten the Indians with military force and did his best to convince them he was looking out for their best interests.79 When asked to respond, Holata said he wasn’t ready to; he had a bad cold and needed time to think. Lea accepted this and mentioned that arrangements had been made to meet with the president the following day. Upon leaving the commissioner’s office, the delegation was taken to meet with Quartermaster General Thomas Jesup, who had been one of the commanders of the Second Seminole War and was familiar with Holata and others of the delegation. It was a friendly meeting between old

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acquaintances who engaged in some small talk until Jesup casually asked if Holata would be going to the country in the West. Holata, who had been conversing in English, decided it was the sort of answer that needed to go through the interpreter, Abraham. He responded, “I do not know yet.”80 The meeting with President Fillmore the following day was just as cordial, shorter, and carried the same familiar message. Also present were the secretaries of war and the navy. If Holata and his companions hoped for some change in policy that would allow them to stay in Florida, they weren’t going to get it. The biggest difference in the meeting with Fillmore was that Holata was now obliged to respond to the pleas to peacefully move west. Holata told Fillmore that he had come to Washington seeking truth and justice, and that he was a friend to the white man and had no ill-feelings toward them.81 It was a polite reply, but it didn’t answer the real question: Would Holata and his people leave Florida? When reminded again that Worth’s agreement wasn’t a permanent treaty, Holata responded that when he’d made it with Worth, the general insisted that he had the full authority of the president to do so. He quoted Worth as saying, “We have made a treaty; there is to be no more fighting between us; war is all over; you have now nothing to do but to go and raise your children.” When asked by the president if it had been in writing, Holata told him that Worth had been carrying a piece of paper when they spoke. When asked if he’d signed any treaty, he had to admit he hadn’t.82 Sidestepping the issue of whether the agreement with Worth was a valid treaty or not, the Indian leader attempted to show that whatever it was, he’d upheld his part of the bargain. Worth had told them to aid any whites who had been shipwrecked or wandered onto the reservation, and Holata gave several examples of when they had done just that, rescuing and caring for those who were castaway or lost. He even reminded Fillmore that he had turned over Seminole outlaws to white justice. His message was clear: Even if the agreement was temporary, his people were abiding by it, so why should it end? The president was sympathetic but firm. Worth’s agreement meant nothing. The law, the treaty, must be obeyed. Yet he did not demand an immediate answer. He would give the Indians time to think. When they were ready, they should meet again with the commissioner of Indian affairs.83 How were Holata and his people to respond? These meetings had not been negotiations. They had been polite ultimatums with no real room for discussion. There was the real fear that if they refused to emigrate or gave no answer, they might not be allowed to go home or that the president would immediately order forced removal. Faced with a no-win situation, on 20 September Holata and three other delegates placed their marks upon an agreement to personally remove and attempt to convince as many of their people as possible to join them.84 It’s impossible to say what Holata’s true feelings were. For what it was worth, he’d told General Hopkins that he personally was willing to emigrate, but that he would

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not go unless his people went with him. He also told Hopkins that his sister—a powerful woman within the tribe—and Assinwar would never leave Florida. It went without saying that Abiaki felt the same way. It was also an indication of Holata’s limited power. A leader is nothing without followers, and if he emigrated without his people, he would be powerless when he arrived in Indian Territory, a dangerous situation he would not want to be in. Even in Florida he was not an all-powerful monarch, as many whites believed. Although he was a hereditary leader, if the tribal council decided Holata no longer served the tribe’s interests, a brother, nephew, or uncle could be chosen as his replacement. He was also the head of only about half the Florida Indians. The Mikasuki followed Abiaki, not Holata. Reaction to the news in Florida was mixed. The Jacksonville News reported that “King Billy and cabinet” had agreed to emigrate the following March, but commented, “We feel disposed to believe that at last we may succeed in getting rid of our unwelcome neighbors, but shall not feel certain till they are gone.” Captain Casey was disgusted by it all. “Paper reports Bowleg’s speeches in Wash. Presd’t tells him that if Blake does not do right—he will remove him from office!!! What a joke! After B. has pocketed $200,000 he can snap his finger at the small officer.”85 Holata and his companions arrived back at Tampa on 9 October. Later that day, Holata sat down with Casey to give an account of the trip. During the meeting with Commissioner Lea, Holata insisted he would not go until his people did. Lea wanted a fixed date, but Holata resisted making one. After the meeting, Blake and the interpreter Abraham met with Lea and came back to Holata with news than the Seminole had to be gone by the following spring. It was then that one of the delegates, Passuk Ehela, urged him to sign an agreement or he’d never go home again. Holata expressed doubts about Blake’s promises and asked Casey’s opinion. By the end of the conversation, Holata had decided Blake was “a d—d rascal.”86 Tensions continued to rise between Casey and Blake. On 10 October Casey heard rumors that Blake had offered to buy a round of Champagne for anyone who brought news of Casey’s death. On the following day, angry correspondence went back and forth between the two, and Casey charged that Blake would swindle the Seminole out of everything they’d been promised. When Blake protested, Casey responded, “I have openly and freely expressed my opinions about the present plans for removing the Indians and shall continue to do so … I am not in the habit of mincing my words.” Now down to 105 pounds, Casey probably didn’t care about any repercussions.87 To some people, the March deadline for removal appeared to be nothing more than a political convenience for the Fillmore Administration. An unpopular president, Fillmore hadn’t even received the nomination of his own Whig Party for a second term. Instead, the nomination had gone to Gen. Winfield Scott, who lost the November election to Democrat Franklin Pierce. Shielded by his lame duck

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status, Fillmore could afford to be optimistic, and in his final annual message he told Congress: The removal of the remnant of the tribe of Seminole Indians from Florida has long been a cherished object of the Government, and it is one to which my attention has been steadily directed. Admonished by past experience of the difficulty and cost of the attempt to remove them by military force, resort has been had to conciliatory measures. By the invitation of the Commissioner of Indian Affairs, several of the principal chiefs recently visited Washington, and whilst here acknowledged in writing the obligation of their tribe to remove with the least possible delay. Late advices from the special agent of the Government represent that they adhere to their promise, and that a council of their people has been called to make their preliminary arrangements. A general emigration may therefore be confidently expected at an early day.88

Inauguration day would be 4 March 1853, and if the Seminole refused to emigrate, it would be Pierce’s problem. The dispute between Blake and Casey continued, and on 15 December Casey received word that his request for a Court of Inquiry had been denied, as it was deemed unnecessary. He was also ordered to leave Florida as soon as his health improved, so as to remove any indication of impropriety.89 In the meantime, Luther Blake finally was forced to inform Commissioner Lea that the Seminole had no intention of leaving Florida. Upon Holata’s return from Washington, the Indians retired deeper into the Everglades and refused any additional talks. Blake suggested sending in survey parties with the Florida Militia to protect them and “capture and bring into the nearest post all they can find.” News also began to accumulate that the Seminole delegation felt they had been cheated and underpaid.90 As Blake’s attempts at removal began to fall apart, the State Legislature began to pass more laws respecting Indian removal. The first was a law that made it illegal to remove any blacks along with the Indians. Slave owners believed there were still many runaways living among the Indians and were afraid that once they were in Indian Territory, it would be impossible for their owners to recover them. Another act outlawed any form of trade with the Indians, with the exception of mixed bloods living among the whites or people who were purchasing Indian goods prior to emigration. Another law declared the extension of all state laws into the territory presently occupied by the Seminole. If all that hadn’t made it clear that the state wanted the Indians out, they passed a law making it illegal for Indians to reside in Florida and included provisions for the raising of a volunteer army to accomplish it.91 Even President Fillmore had to admit that things hadn’t gone according to plan. In a special message to Congress he pointed out that while the number of Seminole in Florida was small, it would take a large number of troops to remove them or even protect the frontier settlements. Having less than two months left in office, he passed the problem off to Congress and the next administration. The Seminole had made it clear they had no intention of leaving Florida.92

chapter four

It is the Intention of the Government to Remove the Indians

As 1853 began, Luther Blake’s initiative to remove the Seminole from Florida had more or less fallen apart. Holata Micco, Abiaki, and their people had moved deeper into the Everglades and declined to discuss emigration. Blake had been reduced to offering large rewards for any captured Seminole, but there were few to be found. That didn’t mean people weren’t trying. Captain Casey noted several expeditions that had headed off to South Florida by boat, while Aaron Jernigan and others in the militia had hopes of making a small fortune off captured Indians.1 General Childs was concerned that such actions could ignite a war he wasn’t prepared for: It was reported that the Special Indian Agent General Blake had offered $600 or some other sum for every Indian caught and delivered to him or his Agent and that a Captain Nelson owner of a small vessel had taken on board whiskey and with two other men had started for Charlotte Harbour for the purpose of catching some Indians living on the coast, on the strength of the reward offered by General Blake … It is needless for me to say that the taking of an Indian under such circumstances will light up hostilities along the entire frontier, not to say anything of the dishonor of such conduct in time of profound peace, with the assurance of the Indians that they do not desire hostilities and will not be the first to commence.2

In Washington the administration of President Franklin Pierce was taking shape, and one of his first appointments was Jefferson Davis as Secretary of War. Davis was a West Point graduate who had served six years as a lieutenant in the U.S. Army before resigning his commission so that he might marry Sarah Taylor, daughter of his commanding officer, Col. Zachary Taylor. The colonel had adamantly refused to let his daughter marry an army officer, knowing the difficult life a soldier’s wife would face, having to endure low pay, homes at frontier outposts, and months of separation. Although now a civilian, Davis kept up his interest in military matters and served as a colonel in the First Regiment of Mississippi Volunteers during the War with Mexico, where he was severely wounded in the Battle of Buena Vista. As a senator from Mississippi (1847–1851), he served as Chairman of the Senate Committee on Military Affairs before resigning to take up the position at the War Department, a post he held throughout much of the Third Seminole War.3

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Figure 17. Secretary of War Jefferson Davis served under Franklin Pierce. West Point graduate, veteran of the Mexican/American War, senator, and former son-in-law of Zachary Taylor, he later served as president of the Confederacy.

Florida Senator Stephen Mallory hoped to secure federal funds to finance the removal of the Indians by attaching an amendment to the 1853 Army Appropriations Bill. He stated, “Florida considers their presence in her limits an intolerable evil, not to be endured, and depend upon it, these Indians must go out of the State, or they will be exterminated.” Other senators weren’t willing to go along, and the amendment was defeated. Sam Houston of Texas declared, “I am not in favor of calling out the militia for pay and for losses to an immense amount … Billy Bowlegs is not such a terrible scare-crow, or so anxious for war when he cannot be advantaged by it, that he is going to invade the formidable State of Florida.” Sam Borland of Missouri insisted that the whole Indian removal scheme was “an unjust, oppressive, and cruel disadvantage to impose upon the States West of the Mississippi.” As far as he was concerned, the West had more than enough Indians already.4 At Tampa, General Childs received Blake’s report that the Seminole were refusing to emigrate, and after Blake and the remaining delegation left Fort Myers, he proposed to the Adjutant General that a “suitable army officer” be appointed

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“as agent to reopen this communication with these Indians.” Childs explained the consequences of Blake’s failure: It is considered extremely unfortunate by all who know anything of the Florida Indians and their entire respect and confidence in Captain Casey that he should have been removed at the particular period he was … The Indians could not understand why an Agent in whom they had full confidence should be taken from them and another sent of whom they knew nothing for the purpose of accomplishing the same object. Hence it was five months after the arrival of Mr. Blake and the Delegation at Fort Myers, before Bowlegs or any other chief could be induced to visit him, hence the final failure to accomplish the object of his Agency.

The order instructing Casey to leave Florida when his health improved was rescinded.5 On 18 May, prior to Blake’s formal dismissal, President Pierce wrote to Davis indicating a shift in policy: The measures heretofore adopted to effect the removal of the Indians from the state of Florida, having failed of the object, I deem it proper and do hereby direct that the duty of removing those Indians be devolved upon the Secretary of War,—who will use his discretion in pursuing pacific and persuasion or forcible measures as he may deem proper to accomplish his purpose. And the Secretary of the Interior is directed to take the necessary steps for so doing at the earliest day practicable.6

Florida Surveyor General John Westcott was confident the government was ready to act and believed they might try to force the Indians out by encouraging settlement. Before settlers could move in, however, the land would have to be surveyed. As Westcott told one of his deputies, Louis Lanier: When I left Washington the President and Secretary of War had not determined the course to be taken with the Indians. Yet it was understood that they would have to go this winter. Therefore a great deal will depend in relation to surveying how the Indians act. Many are in favor of surveying them out but to do so would require an armed force to protect the Surveyors and if we are to have an armed force, why not send them in at once as soon as the weather gets cool enough. If the General Government do not act in the matter (as I certainly believe they will, and intend to) I have not the least doubt but the Governor will order the force of General Johnson [probably Allen G.] into the nation after the 1st November.7

As it turned out Westcott had little to fear from the Seminole. Even though escorts were not provided, no surveyors were attacked when they did take the field. Still, the constant presence of warriors shadowing the survey parties served to discourage most survey work. For the moment the government’s only tool for dealing with the Seminole was to regulate trade. Those who still hoped for a peaceful resolution to the problem believed that trade could lead to trust. It was, at best, a slim hope. As an officer at Fort Myers wrote, “Assinwah, sub-chief of the Seminoles, has formally requested that I would write to Head Quarters to obtain permission for them to be allowed to purchase a little whiskey for the green corn dance which is about to take place. He said that if the Indians were prevented from obtaining whiskey

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now and then, there would be no object for them to come here, as the trade was of no importance.”8 Of course the Indians weren’t the only people at Fort Myers seeking whiskey. The same officer informed his superiors: I have the honor to report that the men on the mail boat bring liquor to this post, and I am told by the 1st Sergeant of Comp. B that it is as regular a thing for the men to send for liquor by the boat as for tobacco. The A.A.G. [Assistant Adjutant General] Lt. Beckwith states that it is impossible to detect the men, that the two who are now on the boat are not to be depended on. Two jugs of liquor were found by the captain without owners, and the guardhouse is filled with men confined for being drunk.

The abundant availability of liquor was a continual problem the army faced at almost every frontier installation.9 As for the Seminole, they were trying to build good faith, hoping the whites would see they intended to be friendly. One of the ways they could accomplish this was to turn in any runaway slaves they encountered. The belief that the Indians welcomed runaways into their midst had been one of the primary causes of the first two Seminole Wars, and the Seminole had learned how troublesome the issue could be. When three suspected runaways were seen near Fort Myers, the Indian leader Chipco promised to spread the word and stated “most positively that the Indians will bring in the negroes at once.” True to their word, a young runaway by the name of Little Jerry was turned in about a week later.10 Yet the presence of runaway slaves was not so simple a matter to resolve. No one, not even the Seminole, knew the exact number of fugitives and other blacks living on the reservation, since they often lived apart from the main camps. Some were long-time slaves with the tribes, either taken in as runaways or purchased off the block in St. Augustine by the wealthy chiefs and their wives. In addition, Chipco was not part of the main leadership, so his spreading the word may not have carried much weight among the other groups. Now that he was back in charge of removal, Captain Casey went to work with the full backing of Secretary Davis. Near the end of July 1853 the captain asked that yet another delegation be sent from the West. Perhaps the individuals who had come with Blake had not been the right people or perhaps it was simply the presence of Blake. In mid-September he sent Davis a formal plan for the removal of the Seminole, and Davis responded by instructing Casey to secure the confidence of the Seminole and explain the liberal terms the government was prepared to offer them. Davis also received correspondence from Florida Militia General Benjamin Hopkins offering his troops’ services for the removal of the Indians, along with some advice. Davis politely declined the offer.11 In his inaugural address, incoming Governor James Broome sounded the same call that all his predecessors had: “They [the Indians] are here, a blight to our prosperity  … Their presence prevents the influx of population  … retards

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the sale of large bodies of State lands  … Their treachery renders insecure the lives and property of our frontier population—keeps them in a continual state of anxiety and alarm.” In summary, he added, “the State can never sanction, and I hope will never submit to that which looks to be anything short of their removal.”12 Secretary Davis was determined to gently push the Seminole out of Florida and was willing to follow Casey’s plan. He also approved hiring George Center of St. Augustine as Casey’s assistant in “preserving the confidence and good feeling of the public.” Center had considerable experience in Figure 18. Governor James E. Broome, Florida governor trading with the Seminole and was from 3 October 1853 until 5 October 1857. well known amongst them. As the man who was ultimately responsible for the removal of the Seminole, Davis had to put up with the constant offers of advice and assistance from those who knew nothing of the true situation in Florida. Reuben Grant of Mississippi volunteered to personally remove the Seminole by the offering of “liberal inducements.” After the Luther Blake fiasco, Davis knew the futility of such schemes.13 Davis was willing to take time to peacefully remove the Seminole because he lacked the manpower to wage war against them. On paper, the army had a total strength of almost 14,000 men, but the actual numbers were much lower (only 10,417), and the vast majority of those were stationed on the western frontier or on their way there. In 1848 there had been eight permanent forts between the Great Plains and the Pacific. The California Gold Rush had sparked a major migration westward, and by the end of 1853 there would be 52 forts in the West.14 Still, as Davis told Congress, he was willing to send men to Florida if he had to: The measures adopted by the Department of Interior under the last administration, for removal of the few Seminoles remaining in Florida, having failed, it was considered advisable to transfer control of these Indians to this Department, for the purpose of emigrating them to the country west of the Arkansas. An experienced officer of the army, who is well acquainted with their character, and possesses their confidence, has been entrusted with this duty; and, with a view to strengthen his efforts, and at the same time be prepared to use coercive measures, if such should be necessary, a force, consisting of nine companies of artillery, is posted in the peninsula of Florida. It is hoped that the measures thus taken will be attained with favorable results.15

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Near the end of December Casey met with Col. John Munroe, who had replaced General Childs as the commanding officer in Florida. By the end of the meeting they had decided where the limited number of soldiers at their disposal would be the most effective. Five companies would be stationed at Fort Myers, of which two would move further up the Caloosahatchee to Fort Deynaud in the winter months. One company was to be left at Fort Meade, and another was to be brought from Pensacola to Fort Dallas (Miami) for the winter. Both Deynaud and Dallas were considered uninhabitable in the summer. As for Fort Brooke, it and nearly all of Tampa had been temporarily abandoned due to an outbreak of Yellow Fever. This disease and others forced the closure of many fortifications at one time or another, and the constant threat of illness made Florida an undesirable assignment for those in the military.16 As 1853 drew to a close, Casey once again took stock of his failing health. He now weighed 108 pounds in his winter clothes, was coughing up about a tablespoonful of grayish, thick liquid every morning, and could not talk long or loud. In his diary he wrote, “I thank God for sparing my life so long & hope to do some good yet.”17 It was now January 1854 and little real effort was being made to remove the Seminole. Secretary Davis had plans to increase troop strength, but that was for later in the year, after the long, hot summer. Negotiations were held with those few Indians who wanted to emigrate, but Casey had to be careful that the meetings were held in secret. There were those in the tribe who would prevent people from leaving, even if it meant killing them to preserve solidarity. At present there were only 150 soldiers on the west side of Florida, so the army had to be careful not to ignite a war. For the moment, Casey’s strategy was to “Display force & make no threats—Seize certain bad fellows as early as possible.”18 On 7 January Casey met with Seminole leaders and explained the terms the government was offering. The large cash payments were still in place, but he informed them there would be no annuity, which they seemed to want. They complained that one of the major obstacles to removal was the stipulation that they would have to live under Creek control once they reached Indian Territory, a subject that had caused trouble since the Treaty of Payne’s Landing in 1832. Casey had to tell them there was nothing he could do about it, which they didn’t like hearing. They also indicated that a large bribe to Assinwar might remove one of the bigger obstacles to removal, and the agent agreed to look into it.19 On the following day the delegation of western Seminole arrived at Tampa. Among them were Abiaki’s son Toliss Hadjo and Jumper, one of the most powerful leaders in the tribe. By the 12th they were in Fort Myers and meeting with a delegation of Florida Seminole, but the major leaders weren’t there. The Florida Indians didn’t have much to say, other than the fact that Holata Micco, Assinwar, and Fuse Hadjo didn’t think there was much use for a meeting. Still, they returned the following day to listen to the talks from their western brethren, after which

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Casey offered $3,000 dollars for Assinwar to emigrate, $2,000 for Fuse Hadjo, and $500 for lesser individuals. He made no offer to Holata or Abiaki, knowing it was a waste of time.20 In a letter to Davis, Casey recommended that the legal settlement line established by General Worth in 1842 be moved further south, something the Seminole had already requested. Davis, concerned that the Indians might consider it as proof of their right to the land south of the boundary, turned down the proposal. By 12 March, Casey was forced to report that the Florida Indians were unwilling to emigrate, despite the inducements and encouragements from their western friends. He also recommended strict enforcement of trade laws. After reviewing the history and intent of the 1842 boundary, Davis changed his mind and told Casey to move the line of white settlement closer to the Indian lands and also to begin an organized reconnaissance of the Everglades.21 Ever so slowly, the government began to exert more pressure on the Seminole. In April about eight Indians agreed to make the trip, but that was all who seemed willing to leave Florida. In the meantime, Casey requested that Capt. Henry Pratt, commanding officer at Fort Myers, aid him in prohibiting trade with the Indians. Work also began on surveying areas that would soon be open for settlement. A group of soldiers under Lt. Henry Benson surveyed a wagon route from Fort Thompson on the Caloosahatchee (present-day Labelle) to a spot opposite Fort Myers, then on to Fort Meade. At the same time, the Government Land Office asked Florida Surveyor General John Westcott what lands would be the most attractive to settlers. Westcott responded that the lands around Lake Okeechobee and along the Kissimmee and Peace Rivers would be the most sought-after, but they were also the Seminole’s favorite hunting grounds and that a war might result if settlers moved into them.22 While most white Floridians were happy to have the army around, one land owner in St. Lucie County was determined to exercise some control over who might occupy Fort Capron. William F. Russell, the same person who had been wounded near Fort Pierce in 1849, had given the army permission to erect Fort Capron on his property in 1851, but was now saying the agreement wasn’t valid. In truth, he wasn’t trying to drive the army off, only the regimental sutler, a man who was no doubt in competition with Russell’s own store. Major Joseph Haskin, the post’s commanding officer, referred the matter to Washington.23 On 10 May 1854 Secretary Davis decided it was time for another change of course. The olive branch had been offered, but the Seminole’s refusal to accept it forced Davis to conclude that more economic and military pressure needed to be applied to the Florida Indians. He told Casey:24 Believing that the time for negotiating with the Florida Indians is past, and that coercive measures only will induce them to emigrate, I have to direct that you will hold no more “talks” with them, but give your attention to putting a stop to their trade and preventing them from obtaining supplies of any kind from the whites. In the mean time the Department of the Interior will

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be requested to take measures for the sale of the lands heretofore withheld from settlement, as rapidly as they may be demanded by settlers. The privations consequent upon the cessation of their trade with the whites, and the gradual contraction of their limits by the advance of the white settlements, may possibly induce some of the Indians to accept the terms heretofore offered, but in any event will place the Department in a better position to apply force whenever the season and other circumstances will permit of its so doing in order to effect their removal.25

In a letter to Senator Stephen Mallory and Representative Augustus Maxwell, Davis explained, “It is hoped that the pressure produced by a steady adherence to this policy will induce the Indians to surrender themselves for removal, but should this not be the case, the Department will not hesitate to adopt forcible means to effect the object whenever there is a prospect that it can be used with success.” Davis, who hadn’t served in Florida during the Second Seminole War, had no idea how difficult a task he was promising to accomplish.26 A contract had been let for the survey of lands to be sold to settlers, and Deputy Surveyor John Jackson was ready to begin work. Finding a crew was difficult, as many considered it a suicide mission. In a July letter to Surveyor General Westcott, Jackson wrote, “Unless the Indians get my scalp (which is the opinion of many in this part) you shall hear from me occasionally. You may rely on it that I shall carry out your instructions to the best of my ability.” Starting out in August, he suffered through high water, heavy rains, illness, incompetent helpers, and a lack of supplies. Working in remote areas, he didn’t report in until January of 1855, “I presume on account of my long silence that you begin to think by this time (with others of our neighbours) that King Billy has got hold of us but such is not the case as you will presently see on my reporting progress.”27 Congress had been listening to Davis’s pleas for an increased army and had expanded the force to over 17,000 men. They had also increased compensation, bringing a private’s pay from $7 a month to $11, with corresponding increases in all ranks. They also began to offer Figure 19. Stephen R. Mallory, Senator from longevity pay, giving raises to those Florida. He later served as Confederate Secretary who reenlisted. Yet it would take more of the Navy.

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than manpower to win a victory over the Seminole. The training of raw recruits, supplying them in the vastness of the Florida wilderness, and keeping them healthy in a dangerous climate would reduce the effectiveness of whatever number of troops that might be sent to subdue the wily and elusive Seminole.28 In September Casey recommended that troops once again be stationed in the Fort Dallas area to cut military roads into the Indian country. This would help keep the Seminole from the “koontee grounds” and prevent “contraband trade.” In agreement with Casey’s request, the War Department ordered Colonel Munroe to close several forts north of Lake Okeechobee and to open new ones south and west of the lake and south of the Caloosahatchee. Roads were also to be opened from Fort Myers and Tampa Bay to the proposed post on Lake Okeechobee and from there along the southern shore of the lake.29 Fort Myers was now becoming the base of operations in the effort to convince the Seminole to leave Florida. Twenty-one-year-old Francis A. Hendry, who would become one of Southwest Florida’s leading pioneers and is the namesake of Hendry County, was suitably impressed by his first visit to the post: The forest trees of shade and beauty were then most carefully selected … the walks of that day in and around the garrison, around the parade grounds, were shelled with carefully selected shell … The parade grounds were the most attractive. Except the shell borders, the most beautiful grass lawn, all kept immaculately clean … Their quarters within were the very personification of neatness and cleanliness. All well laid out and arranged. Special care was given to the rockrimmed river banks, and every tree, oak and palm, presenting the most tropical appearance, were most scrupulously preserved. The large commissary and sutler’s store were well filled and tastily stored. The wagon yard and stables, mules and milch [sic] cows were as fat and sleek as corn, oats and hay could make them and all were groomed to perfection. The garrison garden was cared for by expert detailed gardeners and supplied the wants of the garrison. My pen would fail to describe the hospital with its well filled drug store. This was said to have cost Uncle Sam the pretty little sum of thirty thousand dollars.30

Hendry was an intelligent, thoughtful person, two terms that weren’t usually applied to Florida frontiersmen, unfair as that may have been. In referring to one settler, Captain Casey remarked, “Tillis moving into Stafford’s old house & the Coleman’s moving out of doors—squalid poverty—many families near here in absolute want—no means & no credit—can’t or won’t work or both. The free negroes are rich when compared to poor white folks.”31 Both Davis and Casey wanted to avoid war, but they had to be ready in case one broke out. As forts were built and roads opened, the Seminole couldn’t help but feel a net closing in on them. The army hoped the increased presence of troops in the area would send the message that the Indians were no longer welcome in Florida and would have to leave. The Seminole, of course, already knew they weren’t wanted, but their strong sense of tradition would not allow them to simply pack up and leave. The ties to the land were too important. War may well have been inevitable and it might have been in their best interests to emigrate, but they were a proud people and determined not to be forced from their homes.

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Billy Motlo Panther Clan

ca. 1880

Billy Fewell Ho-Tal-Kee-Hadjo Wind Clan

Capt. Francis A. Hendry

Johnny Osceola Panther Clan

Water Turkey Bear Clan

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Jimmie Osceola Wac-Sha-Hadjo Panther Clan

Charlie Dixie (Mother a slave of Bird Clan)

Henry Clay Ki-Zow-Kee Otter Clan

Charley Billy Panther Clan

Figure 20. Captain Francis Asbury Hendry and Seminole friends. Hendry fought against the Seminole in the Third Seminole War but later helped found the Friends of the Florida Seminole. A pioneer in the Fort Myers area, he is the namesake of Hendry County.

Besides building forts and roads, the army was also gathering intelligence. A friendly Indian named Chai informed Casey of the terrain around the south side of Lake Okeechobee, an area that few white men were familiar with. Chai also told the agent that in the wet season it would only take three and a half days to cross the Everglades from east to west, but more than twice that in the dry season.32 As a sign that the army’s attentions were moving south, Colonel Munroe ordered the closing of Fort Meade, the last installation north of Lake Okeechobee, and the re-opening of Fort Thompson on the Caloosahatchee. Having learned its lessons from the previous war, the army was also ordering boats. Most of the vessels were shallow draft Mackinaw boats and canoes, but some were a new metallic design that could better handle the rigors of use in the Everglades.33 Munroe also ordered Capt. Bennett Hill to reoccupy Fort Dallas and keep watch over the coontie grounds in the area of the Miami River. The coontie plant is a

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Figure 21. Coontie plant. A cycad, the toxic root could be cleansed and ground into an edible flour. It was a staple of the Seminole diet.

fern-like cycad with a starchy root that the Seminole used for flour. Because the roots are toxic they require considerable processing, but it was one of the Indians’ staple foods and much in demand after the government cut off trade. In a way, the army was setting a trap for the Seminole. They needed the coontie, but the main coontie grounds were outside the reservation. Munroe told Hill, “All Indians found without their limits are liable to seizure and will be taken and sent to Fort Myers when practicable, but they will not be fired upon unless it becomes necessary for the safety of the Troops, or some act of hostility shall have been committed by them.”34 In January 1855 Colonel Munroe and Captain Casey traveled to Fort Myers in hopes of meeting with the Indians. Also showing up at Fort Myers was Col. Harvey Brown, the new commanding officer, with his wife and four children. They arrived in a 12-oared copper barge accompanied by three iron boats, six companies of new recruits, a supply of shoes, and maps showing the seat of war. Considering that no war was in progress at the time, it was a sure sign of what the government intended.35 On 13 January Assinwar and another Seminole came in to have a talk, but the Indians made it clear they had no intention of moving, no matter what the consequences. As Assinwar put it, “If you pull a little dog by the tail back & forth—to & fro—he will finally get mad & bite you and you have to knock him in the head.” The Seminole were tired of getting jerked around and were ready to bite. Taking the warning seriously, Munroe ordered Casey to write a letter to Washington, preparing the administration for an outbreak of hostilities.36

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War may have been coming, but no one at Fort Myers was eager to see it start. For one thing, the new recruits, including many German and Irish immigrants, were in need of training. As Casey remarked, they were “very bad material for Indian fighter.” After some discussion with Casey, Colonels Munroe and Brown decided it was best to recall a recently dispatched reconnaissance party for fear it would provoke hostilities.37 Colonel Munroe also decided to shift his manpower to more advantageous locations and construct installations that would be needed if war broke out. He ordered Fort Thompson abandoned, with the men and supplies brought further west along the Caloosahatchee to Fort Deynaud. He also ordered a bridge to be built and a blockhouse constructed on the Figure 22. General (then Colonel) Harvey Brown. north side of the river opposite Fort An 1818 graduate of West Point, he was a veteran Deynaud, another blockhouse at the of the Second Seminole War and Mexican/American site of old Fort Center on Fisheating War. He commanded at Ft. Pickens near Pensacola Creek, and the reactivation of Depot at the beginning of the Civil War and prevented its capture by the Confederacy. 1 south of Fort Deynaud. While doing all that, the troops would also have to cut new roads or improve the old ones. Two new storehouses were to be built at old Fort Dulaney, which was at Punta Rassa near the mouth of the Caloosahatchee, the point where most troops and supplies would be off-loaded from ocean-going vessels. He also ordered expansions at Fort Myers, including improvements to the hospital and the clearing of campgrounds for the soldiers to pitch their tents if Fort Deynaud or some other post had to be closed because of disease or flooding.38 Tools in hand, the soldiers got to work, and about 20 miles south of Fort Deynaud they erected Fort Simon Drum. Other old posts from the Second Seminole War proved impossible to find, due to poor maps that didn’t match the topography and the disappearance or obliteration of old trails long out of use.39 On the east coast, Major Haskin, at Fort Capron, was ordered to move his men to the site of old Fort Jupiter, then send some of them to erect and garrison Fort McRae on the east side of Lake Okeechobee.40 Not only were these wise moves if it came to war, but it was the dry season, the only time when such construction work could take place. The summer rains would start in May or June, and much of the territory south of the Caloosahatchee would

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be under water. Besides making it difficult to work, the standing water was believed to be the cause of many diseases, such as Yellow Fever and Malaria. In the absence of modern germ theory, such maladies were thought to be caused by “miasma” or “malignant vapors” arising out of the swamps.

Reduced Seminole Reservation after 1850 and forts built in and around the Big Cypress area.

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The Seminole were not unaware of what was happening around them. Deputy Surveyor John Jackson reported to Surveyor General Westcott, “The Indians were watching our movements, even after our crossing Charlipopka Creek and particularly about the Big Prairie and thence to Istockpoga lake. They set the woods on fire about us frequently; I presume they thought to frighten us from going further on their Boundaries … In the end I caught one of them reconnoitering our camp  … They have been complaining to Capt. Casey that we frequently crossed their lines.”41 Surveyor Jackson was operating at the northern extremity of the Seminole Reservation, while the army was working in the heart of it. Captain Arnold Elzey and Lt. George Hartsuff pushed further south from the newly erected Fort Simon Drum, stopping at a place known as Waxy Hadjo’s Landing and there constructed Fort Shackleford. Continuing the exploration, Lieutenant Hartsuff found the terrain south of Shackleford too difficult to traverse, so he checked out the surrounding area, mapping several villages, including those of Holata Micco, Assinwar, and Abiaki. Although the Seminole were friendly and visited with the troops, they also complained to Casey about the army’s presence in their territory.42 At the southeast corner of the peninsula, canoes were being delivered to troops at Fort Dallas. They were accompanied by orders from Secretary of War Davis to scout routes across the Everglades from the Miami and New Rivers on the east coast to the Shark River, which emptied into Florida Bay on the southern coast. They were ordered to seize any Indians found outside the limits of the reservation, but to not otherwise molest them unless the explorations were forcibly opposed. Unfortunately, the explorers had to return to Fort Dallas after traveling only 23 miles, having been prevented from proceeding because of low water levels.43 Lieutenant John Greble, part of the detachment exploring the Big Cypress area south of Fort Myers, often came into contact with Holata and became very friendly with him. He wrote to his parents: The Indians are perfectly peaceable, and are the best inhabitants of the State, according to my way of thinking. I will not conceal from you, however, that it is the intention of the government to have them out of Florida. A group of politicians have represented that the country occupied by the Indians is the most fruitful in the world—good land for coffee plantations, spice-groves, and all that—and the Indians, accordingly, have to vacate, unless they change their minds in Washington when they learn the true nature of the country.44

By May 1855, numerous expeditions had explored the area south of the Caloosahatchee, cutting roads and erecting depots and blockhouses. The few Indians they came across were friendly and said they believed the soldiers were conducting the surveys with the intention of reporting to the president how worthless the land was. The Indians may have been fooled by wishful thinking or may have simply

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been telling the soldiers what they wanted to hear, but if it kept the Seminole from attacking the troops, the army was quite happy to let the misunderstanding continue.45 It was a strange situation. The army was preparing to remove the Seminole, but there were few Seminole to be seen. No talks were being held, and little trade was being conducted. The Indians had tried to be good neighbors, but Floridians had refused to accept the offered friendship. The only recourse left to Holata and Abiaki was to withdraw their people deeper into the Everglades and hope their absence would cause the whites to leave them alone. They probably knew it was a forlorn hope. With summer approaching, most of the new posts would have to be abandoned, but that was expected. Sooner or later the army would have to enter the territory in force, and they needed good maps for when the time came. As Captain Pratt reported, “Between Fish Eating Creek and the Caloosa-Hatchee and South of that river, many Indian huts and small fields were found, but few Indians however were seen. They had generally abandoned their homes, and sought to avoid the Troops. The country examined south of the Caloosa-Hatchee is reported as entirely worthless for agricultural purposes with the exception of a few small scattered hammocks, and in the summer season, nearly the whole of it is under water.”46 Meanwhile, to the east of the Caloosahatchee, another expedition was taking place, but this one was on the water. Leaving Fort Center on the west side of Lake Okeechobee, Lt. Henry Benson traveled northeast across the lake to the Kissimmee River, then went up the river a few miles before turning back. He then headed east, circling the lake shore, then around the southern shore and back to Fort Center. Benson and his associates found few recent signs of Indian activity along the route.47 With the approach of summer, the anticipated hardships began to appear. Lieutenants Vincent and Hartsuff at Fort Deynaud were both suffering from a severe case of diarrhea, and Vincent was ordered to the hospital at Fort Myers. As conditions worsened, Fort Center was ordered closed and the garrison at Fort Deynaud reduced. Orders were also issued for the hospital at Fort Myers to obtain a large supply of anti-scorbutics to combat cases of dysentery and scurvy. One officer lamented, “The men and officers had chills and fever, and we lost many by what was called ‘Florida fever.’ That was the worst kind of ‘typhoid,’ or akin to it. We buried many at each post.”48 Colonel Brown dispatched a Board of Examiners to Fort Deynaud to find the cause of the increased sickness. Having no knowledge of the true cause of disease, the best the board could do was fall back on the usual old wives tales, prejudices, and generalizations: A large portion of the command is composed of Recruits who came from the North during the past winter, and are doubtless suffering from the debilitating effects of a Southern climate

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Figure 23. Sketch of Fort Deynaud, by Alexander Webb. Located just west of present-day Labelle on the Caloosahatchee River, it was at the farthest point a steamboat could travel upriver. on northern constitutions. Moreover a large proportion of these recruits are Germans, and these have been greater sufferers during the late campaigning in the woods, than the Irish or Americans, for it is notorious that the German Soldier is much better adapted to the quiet routine of garrison duty, than to the more arduous and active service of the field. The “Board” then is of the opinion that the predisposing cause or foundation of the present ill health of this Garrison may be attributed mainly to long continued and excessive fatigue and to the privations they have suffered from want of quarters during the past six months and to the want of proper diet.49

Now that the rainy season was commencing, an attempt was made to explore the Everglades by canoe. Sixty-five men under Capt. Samuel Dawson found the expedition “extremely laborious.” Very often, the canoes had to be dragged through a “wild and trackless wilderness of water and grass,” and “rank” vegetation. The water simply wasn’t high enough yet. On the other hand, Dawson reported that dry spots to make camp were difficult to find. “The men were compelled frequently to drag the boats through the mud, and at night had often no dry place in which to bivouac.” The Seminole’s greatest allies, the terrain and climate, were showing just how formidable they could be. To the north, in the Big Cypress, the rising water caused the abandonment of Forts Simon Drum and Shackleford, which were no longer accessible.50 Besides learning the lay of the land, the army was also learning what equipment was suitable to their needs. Canoes and boats built in Tampa were sent to Fort Center for use on Lake Okeechobee, but getting them there proved problematic. Some, constructed partially of copper, were found to be too heavy. While transporting copper boats overland to Fort Center, it was discovered that the cradles that supported the

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boats had worn through the hull, necessitating the dispatch of a coppersmith from Tampa to repair the boats. In addition, it was found that soldiers, inexperienced in boat handling, were having trouble controlling the vessels in the rough, storm-tossed waters of Lake Okeechobee.51 Lieutenant Hartsuff, as part of his duties as Topographical Engineer, submitted a 19-page report with maps to the War Department, and concluded: There is not a trail or road represented that I have not passed over … For agricultural purposes, I can conceive of no country not entirely a barren waste, more utterly & wholly worthless than this. The only portions that can be made at all productive are the hammocks which are small, few & scattered—for all other purposes it is in my opinion equally valueless to a civilized population. It can never be occupied except in the same manner as the Indians who occupy it. For them in consequence of their peculiar habits & wants it is habitable & considering its resources to them both for subsistence & concealment. And the smallest of their number, as a stronghold in case of hostilities, it is impregnable.52

Hartsuff’s maps, along with others made during this time period, were of very good quality. It is from these maps that the famed “Ives Map” of the Seat of War, done in 1856, was compiled. Captain Joseph Ives, the compiler of this map, never set foot in Florida, yet his map and “Memoir to Accompany the Map” were the most accurate of the day. Indeed, when James W. Abert, son of the founder of the Topographical Engineers, came to Florida to “correct” some of the alleged errors, he had to admit to his father that only the Ten Thousand Islands were inaccurate, and that there the topography often changed after violent storms.53 On 21 June Brown wrote a long letter to Colonel Munroe at Tampa, summing up the winter’s activities. He noted “the utter worthlessness of the country (particularly of that S. and E. of the Caloosa-hatchee) for agricultural purposes, or for a white population, and of its particular adaptation to the Indians.” He also pointed out the Seminole’s “determination, not to emigrate voluntarily, and of the almost insufferable difficulty arising from the nature of the country and the smallness of their numbers of forcing them out of it  … their earnest and sincere wish (if undisturbed, and permitted to remain) to cultivate the most friendly relations with the whites and to avoid all cause of collision or misunderstanding … they would receive thankfully as a great boon, the permission to remain in their present, or even narrower boundaries, if assured of its permanence … and that in such an event, not the slightest apprehension need be entertained of any future Indian aggressions or Indian outrage, if not provoked.” Like Hartsuff, Brown was warning his superiors that they were getting into a war that wasn’t worth fighting, yet both knew their advice would fall on deaf ears. “If however it is the intention of Government to remove the Indians by force, it becomes us as soldiers, whatever may be our opinion of its practicability, to use our best endeavors to effect it.”54 On 15 July Colonel Munroe wrote to the Adjutant General in Washington, informing him that active operations had been suspended for the summer. Disease

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and the rising water levels were making it impossible to carry out patrols or keep remote outposts manned. Most of the troops at Fort Deynaud had been withdrawn and had erected their tents at Camp Daniels near Fort Myers. At Fort Jupiter, 60 of the 68 men at the post were on the sick list.55 There were differing opinions as to whether or not a war was on the way. Captain Elzey, who had been to Washington and met with Secretary of War Davis, told Colonel Brown that the government was obligated to remove the Indians and that there would be a campaign the coming winter. Both Brown and Captain Casey were apprehensive about the news. Brown wondered why there weren’t more preparations taking place. He feared that by the time the necessary men and material were in place, the winter campaign season would be over. Casey pointed out the need for more exploration of the Big Cypress, the Everglades, and the Ten Thousand Islands area.56 To the people of Tampa, the idea of an Indian war seemed remote for the moment. As Captain Casey noted in his diary, it was politics and society as usual in the little town: The corporation of Tampa voted to extend their authority for 1 mile around & tax every body!!! Hence the vote of no corporation at all on Saturday. Rev’d Mr. Richardson’s sermon much talked about in town—He read out of the M. Church. Mr. Kelly, Kennedy, Miss Collar, Bennett & Magbee &c said that at the Ball drunken officers & lawyers & doctors stunk of liquor so that a turkey buzzard would not alight on them &c!!!57

As for Casey himself, there was little for him to do as Agent for Emigration. It was obvious the Indians had no intention of giving up their Florida homes, and the army had given up talking to them about it. Indeed, just staying alive was work enough. He was down to 106 pounds, and as he noted in his diary entry of 27 October, “In the 3d stage of consumption after nearly 9 years illness & suffering, altho never indulging in wine or women immoderately, always of regular habits—early to bed—& plenty exercise in open air every day. Luckily always able to do duty and good duty sick or well so far & aid my father’s family materially. Forty-six (46) Birthday. Old and infirm and poor but content.”58 Down in Fort Myers, Colonel Brown was having personnel problems. Fifteen men had deserted, but Casey didn’t expect them to get far. There were few routes they could travel, and troops had been deployed to Fort Meade to intercept them. Casey noted that a reward had been offered for their capture and quipped, “All crackerdom will be out in pursuit.” The other problem at Fort Myers was a lack of officers. Brown had six companies under his command, and each company should have had a captain, first lieutenant, and second lieutenant, for a total of 18 officers. In reality, he had only two captains, six first lieutenants, and two second lieutenants. Of those officers, Lieutenant Hartsuff was Adjutant, which meant his responsibilities made him unavailable for duty in the field, and Lieutenant Benson was under arrest and awaiting court martial. That left only eight officers, and considering

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that a company could not be sent on patrol with fewer than two officers, it posed a serious problem. The War Department was attempting to alleviate the situation by appointing officers directly from civilian life, but the board that was meant to review them wouldn’t meet until January. It was also ordered that Fort Jupiter be closed and the troops sent either to Fort Dallas or Fort Myers.59 Governor Broome reported to the State Legislature that there had been no report of Indian depredations since they had last adjourned, and that the number of troops on hand should be sufficient to undertake removal. Nonetheless, remote families still lived in fear of attack. Willoughby Tillis had settled his family some three and a half miles from Fort Meade, and people kept warning him to move closer to the fort. Surveyor W. S. Harris complained of Indians stealing his horses, but he had no proof they were the culprits. “I say the Indians stole them because it is evident someone done it, and there are no one else here to do it.” He later found the horses, hobbled and tied to posts on the Kissimmee Prairie.60 Summer passed into autumn and now that the weather had cooled and things were beginning to dry out, it was time to recommence patrols into the Big Cypress and Everglades. On 5 December 1855, Colonel Brown ordered Lieutenant Hartsuff to select two “intelligent” non-commissioned officers and a number of privates, all good horsemen, and proceed to the sites of Forts Simon Drum and Shackleford to determine their present condition. The posts had been abandoned for the summer, and Brown wanted to know what was left of them. He also instructed Hartsuff to make a general survey of the area, noting water levels, cultivation, and the number and location of any Indians. He was to take 40 days’ rations, which would be left at Fort Simon Drum under the guard of two men from Fort Myers. Brown felt there was no need to include orders telling Hartsuff to beware of the Natives, but he did remind him to “Treat the Indians with kindness, courtesy, Indians will not attack unless provoked.”61 Brown also dispatched Maj. Lewis Arnold to re-occupy Fort Deynaud, which had also been abandoned for the summer. When settled in there, Arnold was to send a 12-man detachment to re-open Fort Center on Fisheating Creek. All of Arnold’s men were in for a lot of work. Most of the buildings would have to be reconstructed or repaired, a blockhouse would have to be built across the river from Fort Deynaud, and large boats hauled overland to Fort Center. Once everything was in place, a company would be sent to Fort Center and dispatched on two coordinated missions. One group would go overland and scout the best path to Fort Basinger, a post from the Second Seminole War that was located on the Kissimmee River north of Lake Okeechobee. Another group would leave Fort Center by boat, explore the northwest shore of the lake, then come ashore at the site of Zachary Taylor’s 1837 Battle of Okeechobee. From there they would march north to Fort Basinger and hopefully meet up with the group that had come overland.62 The mission would not end at Fort Basinger, however. After gathering provisions, the boat party would return to their vessels and complete the full circle around the

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circumference of the lake, taking special note of the condition of Fort McRae on the eastern side of the lake. Both groups were to return to Fort Center, then back to Fort Deynaud, after which they would make a full report to Brown. While on their trips the soldiers were to take note of anything that might prove valuable, especially the number and location of any Seminole they might come across. They were instructed to treat the Indians kindly, but never to let them into their camps at night. If, indeed, the War Department was planning a winter campaign, Brown needed to know what he had to work with and what needed to be done to get things ready.63 On the morning of 7 December, Lieutenant Hartsuff, with two non-commissioned officers, six mounted privates and two privates serving as teamsters for two wagons drawn by six-mule teams, left Fort Myers and proceeded toward the Big Cypress Swamp. By the following afternoon they had gotten 30 miles southeast of the fort and set up camp for the night. On the 9th they scouted the area, found a deserted village, and met up with an Indian man and boy herding a large number of hogs, but other than that, no one else. On the following day they rode to Fort Simon Drum, which they discovered had been burned over the summer. On the 11th they started for Fort Shackleford, arriving there on the 12th, and found it had also been destroyed.64 Encamping at the ruined fort, Hartsuff and his men began a reconnaissance of the area. On the 13th they visited “Sam Jones’s Camp” and a few others, but found no sign of recent habitation. They visited a few other Seminole camps the following day, still without encountering any Indians. On the 15th they headed back to Fort Simon Drum, arriving there in the afternoon of the next day. The 17th found them on the trail again, heading in the direction of “Billy Bowlegs’s Camp.” After marching 18 miles they set up camp, still 6 miles from their destination. On the 18th they visited Bowlegs’s Camp and found it deserted. Before leaving, one or more of the soldiers helped themselves to a bunch of bananas hanging from a tree. The group went by Assinwar’s and several other Indian camps the next day, but those were also deserted. As far as Hartsuff could tell, the Seminole had moved out of the area. Feeling he’d gotten all the information he was going to, the lieutenant planned to begin the return trek to Fort Myers the next day.65 No matter where the Seminole were hiding, the army intended to keep the pressure on. Colonel Munroe, at Tampa, ordered Captain Bennett Hill at Fort Dallas to explore the area from there to the Kissimmee River. He was to determine the best route for a wagon road between Boca Raton and Fort Jupiter, which would eventually connect to Fort Basinger. Munroe’s aide told Hill, “The Colonel’s anxiety to have the Indians kept within their boundaries—and more particularly to exclude them from the Koontee Grounds—induces him to desire that you will keep parties in constant motion.”66 Meanwhile, back in the Big Cypress, Hartsuff was ready to return to Fort Myers. On the morning of 20 December 1855 the teamsters rose early to harness the mules,

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then woke the other men. Private Otto Hersch cooked breakfast, and after the meal was finished he cleaned up and began to pack the cooking equipment while the others took down their tents. Nearby, Private William Baker was preparing breakfast for Lieutenant Hartsuff, who was still in his tent, having just gotten up. Sergeant Holland was near one of the wagons, and Corporal Williams was about 60 yards away, saddling his horse. The remaining privates were either near the wagons or the campfire.67 Suddenly, shots rang out, accompanied by war whoops. Four of the privates—Borseht, Curren, Foster, and Horth—were standing out in the open and were all slain or wounded after firing a few defensive rounds [see endnote]. Upon seeing the attackers, Private Hanna fired his musket and finding three other weapons nearby, fired two of those. The Seminole returned fire, wounding Hanna with a rifle ball that entered his abdomen on the left side and exited on the right. Hanna then took the remaining musket and sought cover Figure 24. General (then Lieutenant) with Private Murtaugh by the wagons. In George L. Hartsuff. An 1852 graduate of the meantime, Baker had dropped Hartsuff’s West Point, he was seriously wounded at breakfast, seized his musket, fired, and then ran the commencement of the Third Seminole to the wagon to join Hanna and Murtaugh. War, but fully recovered within a few months. A general in the Civil War, he Hersch, packing the mess equipment, also fought at Antietam and in the final campaign fired at the Indians, then fell to the ground to against Robert E. Lee. make himself less of a target. After reloading his musket, he fled to a nearby hammock and concealed himself there until the battle was over. 68 Sergeant Holland later stated that when the shooting started he told the men to take cover, checked at Hartsuff’s tent, then fled to the hammock where the horses were tied up, avoiding an Indian along the way. There he came across Corporal Williams, who was without his weapon and felt he could not retrieve it without being killed. As Williams reported it, “Serg’t Holland ran by me saying that Murdaugh had just been shot down, and that all the rest of the men at the fire were killed, and told me to run for my life, which I did.” The pair then fled the scene, arriving at Fort Myers three days later. Colonel Brown, in command at Fort Myers, was not impressed with the non-commissioned officers’ performance: “There is great obscurity

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as to the conduct of part of these men which requires closer investigation … Sergt. Holland of ‘K’ & Corpl. Williams of ‘G’ abandoned the party, apparently without an attempt at defence.”69 Lieutenant Hartsuff was in his tent when the attack commenced. Colonel Brown later reported: He seized his revolver, & looking through the opening of the door of his tent, distinctly saw the Indians behind the trees, their attention directed to the wagons—three or four of them were within as many yards of him, the others at various distances scattered through the little pine island, in front of, & distant from thirteen to fifteen paces from the wagons, their flank to him; he fired twice at the Indians, and both times with effect, the Indians being almost within reach of his arm.

He then ran to the wagons to join Privates Baker, Hanna, and Murtaugh, passing the mortally wounded Foster and Horth along the way.70 The Seminole continued to shoot at the men taking cover behind the wagons. After firing a few rounds, Murtaugh fell with a severe wound in the abdomen and moved to the cover of a densely wooded hammock where he later died. Baker was momentarily disabled when a bullet struck his knife, broke it, and injured his thigh. Hanna, suffering from his own abdominal wound, continued to fight, while Baker took up the task of loading Hartsuff’s weapons. Facing what they estimated to be 25 to 30 warriors, the soldiers’ situation quickly deteriorated. Hartsuff received a ball in his left arm, which broke the bone. Then a bullet struck his revolver in its holster, which was around his chest, disabling him for a few moments. After suffering a third wound, a ball in the chest, Hartsuff realized the end was near and ordered Baker and Hanna to return to Fort Myers and report the outbreak of war to Colonel Brown. He then tried to reach concealment in a hammock some 20  yards away. Before departing, Baker loaded two rifles for the wounded Hanna and then ran off. Hanna fired the guns, ran, passed the badly wounded Hartsuff, and caught up with Baker.71 Baker and Hanna then began the long, arduous trek back to Fort Myers, keeping concealed as much as possible in case they were being pursued. They were lucky to be alive. Brown later reported that Hanna, “Besides a very severe wound in the belly, had a ball through his hat, two through his coat, and three through his pantaloons.” Both men pressed on, with little rest. Hanna arrived at Fort Myers on the evening of the day after the attack and reported, “ … having walked the whole distance 70 miles, about 50 of which was knee deep with water, carrying my rifle and without eating a mouthful of food. I left Baker (who had his rifle also) about fifteen miles from Fort Myers, he having become so exhausted as to be unable to travel further.” Jefferson Davis and the War Department had been using the soldiers to send a message to the Seminole that it was time to go west. The Seminole had received the message and had sent one of their own in return.72

chapter five

Our Citizens Are Now Compelled to Abandon Their Homes

The injured Private Hanna reached the safety of Fort Myers about 8:00 p.m. on the day after the attack. Upon hearing the news, Colonel Brown immediately dispatched an ambulance wagon to get Baker. He then instructed Captain Elzey to start at daybreak for Fort Simon Drum with two companies of soldiers and a small cannon. An express rider was sent to Fort Deynaud with orders for Major Arnold to withdraw the small garrison from Fort Center and to send a warning to Lt. Frank Larned, who was repairing the road to Fort Meade. Arnold was also ordered to lead two companies to Fort Simon Drum, join Captain Elzey, and search for survivors. Three men were sent to Fort McKenzie at Punta Rassa to warn the small command there.1 Brown’s orders to Elzey showed that lessons had been learned since the Seminole’s annihilation of Major Dade’s command of 108 men 20 years earlier: The greatest prudence and circumspection must be observed in your march and camp and every possible due caution against surprise in your marches—have both advance and rear guards and flankers—and keep your troops and wagons in the closest order—do not permit the slightest carelessness—have your wagons closely guarded and your camp in such a situation as to render a surprise impossible. You will use every possible endeavor to discover and to succor the men of Lieut. Hartsuff’s party.2

Brown then wrote to Colonel Munroe at Fort Brooke with an urgent request. “Twelve wagons—twenty-two mules, thirty riding horses and a large supply of forage should be sent without a moment’s delay. P.S. I have directed Capt. Montgomery to make a requisition—Send me a supply of ammunition.” He also enclosed another letter stating that due to the present emergency, he’d released Lieutenant Benson (who was scheduled for court martial) from confinement. Again he reminded Munroe how critically short of officers he was.3 With only two men from Hartsuff’s command having made it back to Fort Myers, Colonel Brown had good reason to fear the remainder of the party had been wiped out. He was no doubt surprised, and later unhappy, when Sergeant Holland and Corporal Williams arrived on the 22nd without their weapons and unwounded. No matter what the circumstances, soldiers were supposed to stand and fight and not desert the other members of the command. Later that day, Private Hersch also

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showed up, having gotten lost along the way. Another private, Ernest Borseht, was wounded and survived, but how and when he made it back to Fort Myers and what his precise condition was is not recorded.4 Upon receiving news of the attack, Colonel Munroe at Tampa immediately sent word to Captain Hill at Fort Dallas, with instructions to tell Major Haskin at Fort Capron to proceed at once with his command to Fort Myers. With a limited number of troops at his disposal, Munroe needed to concentrate them where they could do the most good.5

Forts in operation at the beginning of the Third Seminole War.

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On Sunday, 23 December, Major Arnold, Captain Elzey, and their four companies all arrived at the site of Fort Simon Drum. Around 8:00 p.m. a badly wounded Lieutenant Hartsuff found his way into their camp. He had fallen into a large lily pond while trying to reach the protection of a hammock and had remained there with his head out of the water, concealed by the foliage in the pond. An Indian, knowing Hartsuff had crawled into the water but unable to see him, repeatedly shouted, “Come out, come out.” After about two hours the shivering, bleeding lieutenant felt it was safe to exit the cold water. He managed to walk about 200 yards toward the road, but then fell amongst the palmettos and stayed there until nighttime. Suffering from exhaustion, wounds, thirst, and hunger, he alternately walked and rested until sunrise. Finding water, he rested until the afternoon, and then resumed his painful march, reaching Arnold’s camp that evening.6 Hartsuff was by far the most seriously wounded of the survivors. The surgeon with Arnold’s company probed about two and a half inches into Hartsuff’s chest for the bullet but was unable to find it. Hartsuff was then transported to Fort Myers, where the surgeon there advised against probing any deeper. The lieutenant soon regained his health and lived to serve as a Union general in the Civil War.7 Well aware of the value of sensationalism in selling papers and making a profit, the Tampa Florida Peninsular was quick to issue an Extra edition. In it, the editor reported the events and offered an opinion that most of his neighbors would have agreed with: It is but six years since our citizens were in a state of excitement, similar to the present, caused by the murder of Capt. Paine [Payne] and others, by these same savages, whose residence among us has been forfeited by treaty, and whose presence is a stigma on the history of their race that will visit upon it the white man’s distrust for centuries to come.8

One of his readers could see what was coming: You know extras always command attention, because the editor never sends one out, unless he is convinced the importance of the subject requires it. With this fact in mind, it is not at all surprising that every one who hears of it or sees the sheet will magnify its importance and become very much excited. Then, don’t be the least surprised at anything the good people do after being thus prepared for action by their superior, the Editor.9

In a telegram to Secretary of War Davis, Captain Casey relayed news of the attack and concluded, “A peaceful removal is impossible.” Although the age of steam transportation and the telegraph were firmly established, Tampa was still a remote place. It took almost 10 days for the message to reach Savannah, where it was immediately sent to Washington via telegraph.10 Casey also wrote to Governor Broome, advising him of the situation: The Seminoles finding no alternative left but emigration or hostilities, have chosen the latter. Although a different result was strongly hoped for, yet in anticipation of this decision, the

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Government has had, and has, a large force in the Indian country. I hope the troops will occupy the attention of the Indians near their homes, so as to leave them but few warriors to spare for depredations on our frontier, but in the mean time, and with the sanction of Colonel Munroe (commanding United States troops in Florida), I would respectfully suggest the propriety of promptly placing, say, two companies of volunteers in position on Peace river, to give confidence and protection to the extreme frontier settlers.11

As Casey had indicated, the most vulnerable settlements were along the Peace River, and the residents wasted no time in gathering for the common defense. Fort Meade had been closed in 1854 and its buildings sold to John Irving Hooker. Hooker offered them as a place of refuge, and the old fort was soon crowded with frightened women and children.12 In Tampa, a public meeting was held where it was decided not to wait on orders from the governor to call out the volunteer militia. The citizens of the city elected William B. Hooker, a prominent cattle rancher who had served as a Justice of the Peace and as a volunteer officer in the Second Seminole War, to lead a militia company to protect the Peace River frontier. Hooker wrote to Governor Broome, “I am engaged in raising a company of mounted volunteers, for immediate service on the frontier. I was advised to this course by a public meeting of citizens held yesterday, and I am now prepared to report that the company will be organized and on the frontier line in the course of this week. When organized a more complete report will be made.”13 Even to the north of Tampa Bay, far removed from the reservation, people were nervous. William H. Kendrick of Fort Dade on the Withlacoochee River organized his company of volunteers, marched them to Tampa, and offered their services to Colonel Munroe. Munroe was glad to have them, but because they were state troops, the authority would have to come from Tallahassee. Believing the settlements in the Withlacoochee area were vulnerable, Munroe instructed Kendrick to return home and commence his patrols while waiting to hear from the governor. Captain Casey noted there was no shortage of people in Tampa offering to raise volunteer companies. Munroe, reassessing the situation, modified his orders to Major Haskin at Fort Capron and told him to take his men to Fort Meade instead of Fort Myers.14 While there were all sorts of people volunteering to guard the frontier, Governor Broome had to be careful as to how many companies he authorized. Florida was a sparsely populated state without much of a tax base, which meant the state didn’t have the money to call out large numbers of volunteers. Broome was counting on the federal government to pay for them, but that meant going through the proper procedures. Colonel Munroe was authorized to accept volunteers, but only a limited number and only for a short time. After that, it was up to the War Department to decide how many state troops it wanted. Generally, the War Department had little use for volunteers or militia, except for short-term emergencies or major wars.

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They tended to be undisciplined, poorly equipped, and questionably led. Because most of them insisted on being mounted, they were also more expensive. If Broome called out troops Washington didn’t ask for, Florida would have to pay for them. At Fort Myers, Colonel Brown was also taking a second look at the original orders he had sent out. When news first arrived of the attack, Brown had ordered the closing of Fort Center and the return of its troops to Fort Deynaud. A few days later he changed his mind, and ordered Lt. Albert Molinard and Co. “I” of the Second Artillery to occupy the fort. Molinard’s orders were “the seeking, destroying and making prisoners of the enemy wherever Figure 25. Florida Volunteer Captain William B. found and making resistance and Hooker, prominent cattle rancher and Tampa civic punishing him for his attack on leader. our troops  … He will confine his operations to Lake Oke-cho-bee—its shores and the hammocks and country in its immediate vicinity.”15 Brown was doing the best he could with the limited manpower available. He planned on sending Major Arnold to scour the area around Fort Thompson and Oscen Tustennuggee’s village, and Lieutenant Benson with 17 men in boats to examine the shores of Charlotte Harbor. Benson was told to, “Capture, and destroy, if resistance is made, any Indian warriors, that may be found, in that neighborhood. Any prisoners, men, women or children, that may be made, will be brought to this Post, and all property of Indians destroyed.” Brown didn’t expect Benson to find much, but at least he was taking action.16 On 29 December Major Arnold returned from his rescue expedition. The bodies of the men slain in the attack had been found and buried. He also reported 11 mules and two horses had been killed. The one thing they hadn’t found was Indians, and the only thing of value they brought back were some Seminole hogs. After hearing Arnold’s report, Brown wrote to Casey. If nothing else, the colonel wasn’t very impressed with the Seminole’s fighting skills. As he told Casey, “The affair is not very creditable to the Indians—they ought to have killed every man at the first

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fire, and it is really wonderful that so many should have escaped.”17 The one unanswered question about the attack was why it happened in the first place. A legend grew that Holata Micco was angry because the soldiers had destroyed his banana plants, but there is little evidence to support it. The story was started many years later by Andrew Canova, a Florida Volunteer who wasn’t at the scene. True, the soldiers had taken some bananas, but there is no account of them having destroyed Holata’s grove, which would have been a difficult thing to do: Banana plants die after bearing fruit, and new ones continually pop out of the Figure 26. General (then Major) Lewis G. Arnold. An ground. The trunks are also very 1837 graduate of West Point, he was promoted twice soggy and notoriously hard to chop for gallantry in the Mexican/American War. down. Hartsuff’s sword would have been the only tool capable of accomplishing the task, and it is unlikely anyone would have taken the time and effort. Recent scholarship by John D. Settle has reexamined the Banana Patch Legend and he rightly points out that focusing on the myth tends to obscure the true complexity of the war’s causes. The tale makes the outbreak of the war seem more simplistic than it actually was, and thus it diverts our attention from looking at the true reasons for going to war, especially from the Seminole perspective.18 So why did the attack take place? We can never really know, given the lack of any first-hand accounts from the Seminole. There are several possibilities we can consider. The first is that the council had met and decided upon war and that Hartsuff and his party was simply the first target of opportunity to present itself. The Indians were being backed into a corner and were fully aware that the army would someday attempt to forcibly remove them. Like the victim of a school-yard bully, they were being forced to react to pressures from which there could be no good outcome. For the Seminole, going to war might have seemed like the only viable option. The problem with that scenario is that it seems contrary to the nature of the Seminole leadership. Both Holata and Abiaki had always been non-confrontational

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toward the whites, and the fact that it took two to three weeks for even a limited Seminole offensive to take place seems to support the idea that for them, war was a last resort. True, they may have decided to take up arms in defense of their homeland, but only when actually attacked. It would have been more in keeping with their characters. Most whites assumed that because the attack took place near “Billy Bowlegs’s Camp” that Holata must have led the attack, but it may be an erroneous assumption. Seminole bands had more than one camp, this one was deserted, and there is no record that Holata led the attack or was even in the immediate area. A more plausible possibility is that the ambush wasn’t planned, but the work of a small group of angry young men acting on their own, with little forethought. With all the bravado and inexperience of youth, they might not have considered the consequences. The survivors of the attack estimated between 25 and 40 assailants, but soldiers’ estimates tend to run high, even more so when suffering an embarrassing defeat. Considering the number of soldiers who survived, there may have been only a handful of attackers. It certainly wasn’t the well-planned ambush the Seminole were famous for, and that argues against it being premeditated. Even Colonel Brown was surprised at how poorly the Seminole performed. In the end, it didn’t matter why the attack was made, or even if the tribal leadership had sanctioned it. Once the shooting started, there was no going back. The Third Seminole War had begun, and this time handing over a few offenders would do nothing to satisfy the whites or prevent the army from attacking. The Seminole may not have wanted a war, but now that it was commenced, they had no choice but to fight. At Fort Myers Colonel Brown was doing what he felt was best, but knew it might not be exactly what his superior officer, Colonel Munroe, wanted. Caught off guard, neither Munroe nor Brown were fully prepared for the outbreak of hostilities, so no clear orders had been issued. To lessen the chance of any misunderstanding and to prevent the possibility of a reprimand or even a court martial for not following orders, Brown wrote to Munroe: I am afraid you will think I am hasty in the moves when you see by any report, I have ordered—but I have ordered them from a conviction that no time shall be lost in making what exhibition of force we can, particularly to the North, and that it is important to show a force there, so as to drive any of the enemy that now are there to the Big Cypress and to prevent them now in the Swamp from scattering—besides which Lieut. Molinard will not have left Fish Eating Creek, before your arrival here and if you disapprove the movements, you can countermand it … I have had to take the responsibility of acting on my own judgment and may have done what you disapprove—but if you get here early, no harm can arise as the order for the most important moves can be then countermanded—the others will have been made before your arrival—but they seem to me, so palpably necessary that I cannot suppose you will disapprove them.19

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Relations between officers could always be touchy, especially in a service where promotions were slow in coming and the postings were stressful. Besides Lieutenant Benson, Brown was also dissatisfied with the performance of Major Arnold. It seems Arnold had not followed instructions for the expedition to rescue Lieutenant Hartsuff’s party, and Brown felt his authority was being disrespected. Discipline had to be maintained, but these were men who had known each other for years and had to work together closely. In a letter asking Munroe to look into Arnold’s conduct, Brown expressed “the most friendly feelings” for the major and told Munroe, “I only wish you to carefully consider my instructions and then, his actions, as exhibited by his report—and to take such steps—and such only, as your own judgment shall think the enforcement of discipline requires—if you think the discretion exercised by him is proper, I shall cheerfully acquiesce.”20 In Tampa, the editor of the Florida Peninsular continued to do his best to fan the flames of war: Surely at this late day, after the repeated acts of injustice, and breach of trust which have desolated our frontier, held in check immigration to our State, stayed our march to prosperity, wealth and happiness, and stained the virgin land with the blood of Florida’s noblest sons, no one, however much of a philanthropist he may be, can urge one reason, backed by logical argument, for justification of longer delaying the inevitable extermination that awaits them, in case of their refusal to comply with the expressed wish of the General Government. Our citizens are now compelled to abandon their homes and their interests to find security for their families from the tomahawk or scalping knife of the remorseless and merciless savage. Shall these deprivations be submitted to without a struggle to eradicate the cause?21

Volunteer Capt. Simeon Sparkman wrote to Governor Broome with his concerns about the confusion among the frontier families. “I don’t know what will become of some of them if there should be a protracted war—they are generally very poor and some of them have not been living on their places long enough to make bread for their families, and must quit the country or starve without speedy relief (or at least suffer for bread, meat they have).” It was, after all, cattle country, and beef was in good supply.22 In a private letter to Casey, Colonel Brown expressed his opinion on how the war should be waged: I think the Gov’t and Floridians have acted very unwisely in not letting the Indians remain quietly; but now the die is cast and we have only to get out of the scrape as well as we can. Bowlegs and economy and humanity all demand in my judgment—energetic measures—and I trust this will be the policy—no mounted volunteers anywhere, no volunteers in the Indian country—and not more than two Regiments of Regulars—when full, in my humble opinion will be better than more. I don’t want to be broken down with our own weight, active operations simultaneously and with comparatively few men.23

Brown had gained enough experience on the frontier to know what would work and what wouldn’t. He also knew how the army operated, and that an overabundance of troops meant an overabundance of military bureaucracy.

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On the last day of 1855, Governor Broome wrote to Florida’s two senators and one representative and enclosed a copy of the Extra from the Florida Peninsular. He told them: A personal interview with Rev. Mr. Pratt, of that town, induces me to believe that the attack was premeditated, and without provocation, and that another Indian war, if not inevitable, is at least highly probable. I have addressed a communication to Gen. Davis, Secretary of War, a copy of which is here enclosed, and respectfully request you to use such efforts to procure proper action by the Department, and the necessary appropriation by Congress, as will secure the frontier and remove the Indians.24

Exactly why the Rev. Mr. Pratt had any special knowledge of the Seminole’s intentions wasn’t explained. In his letter to Davis, Broome’s opinion of how the war should be waged differed considerably from that of Colonel Brown: Trouble with the remnant of the Seminole Indians, I fear, is inevitable, and I respectfully suggest the propriety of prompt and efficient action for their removal. For this purpose, the present United States force stationed in Florida is inadequate, and experience has demonstrated the inefficacy of such a force, when compared with the volunteer militia. The State in 1853, elected a Brigadier General, and provided for enrolling a brigade (one half mounted), for the special service which seems now to be necessary. The mounted regiment was organized, and can be ready for the field in a few weeks, should you desire their service. In the mean time, I have authorized the organization, temporarily, of two companies, to aid in guarding the frontier, and, if possible, giving such security as will prevent a general abandonment of their homes by the frontier settlers.25

It would be but the first of many disagreements between Washington and Tallahassee over the relative merits of regulars and volunteers. The War Department, aware of the shortage of officers in Florida, had already begun steps to relieve the situation. Among those being sent south was Lt. Alexander S. Webb, a recent graduate of West Point who had been sent to join his company at Fort Deynaud. Webb would go on to serve as a general in the Civil War, perform heroically at Gettysburg, and make a career of the army. At the moment, however, he was understandably unhappy about leaving his newly wedded wife Annie in the north, and he even considered the option of resigning his commission. He had intended to bring Annie with him, but a stage ride from Palatka on the St. Johns River to Tampa convinced him the Florida frontier was no place for a “Lady”: I cannot imagine what you could have done some nights. And I know you could not have eaten anything offered us. We left Pilatka on Monday morning early (7 a.m.) with seven inside passengers & a negro runaway slave in irons in front with the driver. This negro afforded quite a diversion since he got away ten minutes before we reached the place he was to [be] given to his master … We reached Ocala at about 9 p.m. Monday & took a two horse wagon at 10 to go to the stopping place for the night. This we reached at 3 a.m. of Tuesday. We found a log

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cabin about 20 feet by 12 with two beds in the one room it could boast of. Such dirt you never saw. Had you been there you would have sat in the wagon. … At 7 a.m. we started for the next stand & took dinner at another hole. &c &c &c. for three days in nothing but a pine barren composed of that white sand you see used in New York. Three or four prairies occurred in the course of the three days. We passed through a good many hammocks of Palmetto cabbage palm (of which the fan is made) & other southern trees & bushes; but these were of little extent, say two hundred yards and hardly seemed worthy of notice after the first days travel. Wednesday evening at 5 p.m. we entered Tampa. Tampa!!! A collection of about 100 shanties. Say five respectable houses. And four pretty good country stores.26

Regardless of Webb’s first impression of the place, the people of Tampa were not about to let their homes or neighbors be destroyed. Captain William Hooker, the cattle rancher elected by the townspeople to protect the frontier, rode with 40 men to the Peace River, where they were joined by over a hundred others. Hooker divided his force into two companies, one commanded by himself and the other by Reverend Leroy Lesley. He distributed the majority of the men among four posts (Forts Meade, Hartsuff, Green, and Hardee) and sent the remainder, 64 men under Captain Lesley, to patrol the area near the mouth of the river.27 Hooker was taking on a large personal responsibility. The only authority he had was from the people of Hillsborough County, but they weren’t paying the bills. Unless the state or federal governments decided to reimburse him, the cost of provisions were coming out of his own pocket. As he told the governor: Your Excellency, I am getting old now, former wars begin to have their effect upon me; yet, while I can sit in my saddle, or find a penny in my purse, all, yes all, shall be devoted to rid our State of this curse. I feel that I want to see my beloved State free, before I close my eyes in an eternal sleep that my children, at least, may sit under their own vine and fig tree, unmolested, and none to make them afraid. This is my only wish. As I before stated, Col. Munroe has given me his countenance and support, although not yet authorized by the War Department to receive me in government service. My expenses are heavy for a single individual, yet believing that I am right, and have the good wishes of the citizens with me, my country will not desert me, in this hour of trial.28

Figure 27. General (then Lieutenant) Alexander Webb. An 1855 graduate of West Point, his first assignment was to Florida at the commencement of the Third Seminole War. He was awarded a Medal of Honor for his actions at Gettysburg.

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Hooker may have been exaggerating his own financial liability, but his desire to remove the Seminole cannot be doubted. As a cattleman, he knew the potential value of the rangeland then occupied by the Indians. It had now been over two weeks since the attack on Lieutenant Hartsuff, and Colonel Munroe’s official report had just reached the desk of Secretary Davis. In response, Davis informed Munroe that it would be “impracticable” to send regular reinforcements at that time, so he was authorizing Munroe to accept a limited number of state troops for a period of six months. Three companies, such as Hooker’s, were to operate independently of the regular army to protect the frontier, while two companies would be made up of hunters and trackers who would work with the regulars in hunting down the Seminole. Davis also mentioned the difference in cost between mounted volunteers and those who served on foot, but left it up to Munroe’s discretion as to when and where to use mounted men.29 As always, there were those armchair generals who foresaw no problem in rounding up the Seminole. An article in the Jacksonville Florida Republican stated, “Let a certain reward be offered for the capture of every Indian, dead or alive, set the cow-boys of Florida after them, and see how quickly the kingdom and power of Billy Bowlegs will crumble to the dust and be numbered with the things that are past.”30 Now that the war had started, the whites weren’t the only ones taking action. On 7 January 1856 a group of Seminole attacked a coontie mill south of Fort Dallas. Peter Johnson had learned how to process the toxic root into flour and was making a good living at the trade. He was a friend of Old Tiger Tail, a nephew of Abiaki, but the relationship did him little good. Johnson and a helper, Edward Farrell, were killed in the attack, although Old Tiger Tail later said that he had warned Johnson to leave three days earlier. Old Tiger Tail also did Johnson the favor of killing him quickly, instead of in the prolonged manner true enemies might receive.31 Another employee, John Mount, managed to escape by boat and take word to Fort Dallas. Captain Hill, the commanding officer, immediately sent boats up the Miami River and to nearby Little River, warning the few settlers in the area to take refuge in the fort. A detachment was sent to Johnson’s, where they found the two bodies and one of the houses plundered. Hill then sent a force of 77 men into the Everglades on an unsuccessful mission to catch the murderers.32 It was the sort of attack that kept Floridians awake at night. True, there were few Seminole warriors to carry out such raids, but on the thinly settled frontier, there were few targets for the raiders to choose from. The Seminole also had a reputation for being wide-ranging. Even people who lived far from the reservation kept an eye out when working their fields. The coppersmith from Tampa finally arrived at Fort Myers on 8 January, and Colonel Brown immediately sent the man to Fort Center to repair the copper boats that had been damaged while being transported to the fort. Along with him went a thousand rations for the soldiers, and orders for Lieutenant Molinard to begin

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aggressive patrols along the shores of Lake Okeechobee. A few days later Brown sent a requisition to Washington, and in it was a request that his men be armed with Colt revolvers in addition to their muskets. He explained, “I feel the most perfect assurance of its greatly increasing our real strength—equivalent in battle to doubling our numbers, and I therefore respectfully solicit for it the favorable consideration of the Gen’l Commanding.” Although Brown was correct on the increased efficiency of the revolvers, the request went unfulfilled.33 Secretary Davis, perhaps realizing that he was going to need a larger army in Florida and someone of higher rank and experience to command it, sent a telegram to General Twiggs asking him to take charge of the war, if his health permitted. The general declined.34 In Florida, Colonel Munroe and Governor Broome were attempting to coordinate the deployment of the volunteer forces and the war effort in general. For the moment, things seemed to be going fairly well. Munroe agreed that he would like to keep his men in motion during the summer months but cautioned that conditions on the ground might make it difficult. He praised the two companies of volunteers that had been working with the army south of the Caloosahatchee, but had less kind words for another group of volunteers operating independently to the north: The company of Capt. Jernigan has, I am sorry to say, been the subject of much serious complaint from the citizens in the vicinity of his posts, particularly the detachment stationed near Enterprize. They charge, and I have no doubt with truth, that the public duties of the company, particularly of that part of it, have been grossly neglected, and the individual conduct of many of the men as being extremely improper. I transmit herewith a copy of my order in reference to this subject which will explain my action in the matter.35

On the other hand, some of the charges may have been trumped up in an effort by locals to replace Jernigan with someone of their own choosing. Jernigan had served extensively during the Second Seminole War in and around the Okefenokee Swamp and had won the confidence of two governors of Georgia and Governor Thomas Brown of Florida. Governor Broome, having received word that Munroe was authorized to call for five companies of volunteers, offered the six that had already been deployed or were soon to be ready, letting Munroe pick the five he wanted. Captains Hooker and Lesley had been patrolling the Peace River area, and Captains Johnston and Kendrick were the ones who had been operating with Brown’s forces in the Big Cypress. In addition, there were new companies under Captains Sparkman and Durrance. All of these captains had earlier experience in the Second Seminole War and were, therefore, seasoned veterans.36 In an unofficial letter to Davis, Captain Casey tried to clear up any misunderstanding there might be in Washington as to his role in Florida. He pointed out that he was on good terms with Colonel Munroe and wrote, “I have taken no step

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without his cordial concurrence, nor has there been any clashing of duties between myself and my assistant with any commanding officer in the field.” He added: I desire to do any duty in my power to aid whoever may be in command, as far as my strength will permit. My health will not allow me to live—much less pretend to go on duty—out of Florida and I’m often confined to my home and occasionally to my bed here. But I have my mental faculties and wish to continue in such a position as will render available to the public service my knowledge of Indian affairs in Florida by aiding in getting information or guides from prisoners, or in securing any party of Indians that now or at any time prefer emigration to hostilities.37

Davis wisely and humanely let the intrepid Casey remain at his post, where the captain did what he could under trying circumstances and increasingly poor health. In mid-January, Colonel Brown ordered Major Arnold into the field to reestablish Fort Simon Drum and bring Fort Deynaud up to full strength. He ordered Arnold’s men to make causeways, build bridges, and repair roads, all while scouting the area of the Big Cypress, especially around Assinwar’s Town, Billy’s Town, and Billy’s Old Town. Before departing from Fort Deynaud, if possible, Arnold was to complete “the storehouse at the landing, the blockhouse, lookout at Ft. T. B. Adams [across the river from Fort Deynaud] and additional stable sheds for the protection and covering of seventy-five animals.” There were also orders for the supply and maintenance of Fort Center. As he told Arnold, “The season in which we can operate in the field is short—and the early completion of these works is deemed of great importance.”38 Brown may have been in a hurry to get the work done, but Nature wasn’t going to cooperate. On the following day, Arnold responded with a request to delay the deployment to Fort Simon Drum due to ill health among the troops at Fort Deynaud. Brown reluctantly concurred, noting that “Rain has been falling all day today and a very unusual quantity fallen during the past ten days.” And this was the dry season.39 The weather wasn’t the only thing making life difficult at Fort Deynaud. On 18 January the army suffered another defeat, losing more lives than it had in the Hartsuff attack. In this instance, a wood-cutting party consisting of a corporal and five privates were fired upon by a reported 15 to 20 Seminole about 4 miles east of the fort. Only one private escaped to return to the fort and raise the alarm. A rescue party was immediately sent out, but no sign of the other soldiers was found. Later search parties noticed that the dozen mules had been shot in the head, behind the ear. The Seminole knew how dependent the army was on its mules.40 Aware that allowing an ambush to take place under his command would not look good, Arnold immediately tried to explain what had happened: I was very much astonished when I heard of this attack, for all reports from Forts Center, Thompson and Myers were the same—“no Indian signs”—and the train that arrived here from Fort Center last evening reported no signs of Indians. I have had small parties at work across

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the river, on the block-house; at the shed at the landing and this same party cutting wood for the steamer Ranger, at a distance two or three miles from the fort, and have heard of no signs or indications of Indians about here until to-day. The corporal (Love) in charge of the party went farther than he was expected or ordered to go … I suppose he felt safe, as reports from all directions indicated there were no Indians about here, and that they had gone south.41

Arnold may have been “very much astonished” by the attack, but he shouldn’t have been. The sole survivor, Private Peterman, said he was “pursued by a large Indian, son of Okchon.” The large Indian’s father was Oscen Tustennuggee, primary war leader among the Creeks who lived near Lake Okeechobee. Oscen had reasons to be angry with the whites, as Arnold indicated in the same letter. “The attack it appears was headed by Okchon who doubtless was much incensed by the destruction of his village and property by a command sent out from this Post in compliance with orders.” Did Arnold not think the Indians would retaliate? He then went on to state that if the wood-cutting party had been two or three times larger, it still would have been wiped out.42 Brown tended to disagree, and in his report to Munroe offered this opinion: I cannot agree in opinion with Major Arnold that if the party had been twice or three its size, it would have been attacked and rendered perfectly helpless—such could only have been the result of gross carelessness—such a party with ordinary prudence of having the men marching on the rear and on the flanks, could not have been so surprised—and even in the present case, too small as the party was—had the precautions that should always be observed been taken, the party could not have been surprised & cut off without firing a gun.43

When Captain Casey heard the news, he couldn’t believe it. “Our men were on top of the 2 wagons! What asses!” Later patrols found the bodies of the corporal and two privates at separate locations among the bushes near the site of the attack. Weeks later another body was found, and it was assumed the other man had been taken prisoner and killed elsewhere. Brown reported, “Corporal Love evidently made a short resistance and was only killed after a severe conflict, the Privates also did not fall without defending themselves.”44 Brown was having other problems, and one of them concerned civilian laborers who were working on the buildings at Fort Myers. As he told Munroe, “The Citizen carpenters here made a general strike, two or three excepted, and I am told do not intend returning to work. Maj. McKinstry conducts the works with energy and industry, and not permitting these men to idle away their time as they have been accustomed to do has probably rendered them dissatisfied.” Another difficulty was the amount of rain. “The whole country is under water—at Fort Thompson the water inches to the block house—and on the road between Fort Deynaud and this place the water in several places reaches up to the horse’s belly.” A few days later, Brown gave in to the inevitable and cancelled operations in the Big Cypress until the water receded. He noted, “At the Swamp the water was up to a man’s neck, where last year in December it could hardly be found to drink.”45

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Sickness was a continual issue that cut deeply into the available manpower. Brown noted, “Our sick report is very heavy—and the men are much broken down … not more than two thirds are efficient for field service.” He asked for men to be transferred from the east coast posts and that 130 recruits be sent down. He promised that as soon as the water subsided he would dispatch Major Arnold to the Big Cypress, but he would have to limit the size of the force to leave sufficient men to guard the forts. He would also have to take men from other companies to bring Arnold’s force up to the desired strength.46 Arnold needed the men desperately. Besides all the work his men were doing to rebuild and improve Forts Deynaud and T. B. Adams, they were also needed to escort wagon trains to and from Fort Center, about 35 miles to the northeast. After the attack on the wood-cutting party, most construction work was stopped, and the troops used to look for survivors of the attack or escort more wood-cutting parties. Without more men, Arnold could do little to begin the process of re-opening Fort Simon Drum. All of this was taking a toll on the soldiers. Arnold told Brown: Every soldier of my command, in addition to the misfortune of being stationed at an unhealthy Post, has been employed without interruption when not on Guard, mostly with axe or spade in hand, performing active labor, and when the necessities of the services require that work should be suspended to perform the more legitimate duties of a soldier, long marches, scouting through mud and water and escorting wagons to Fort Center, Fort Myers, were the alternatives presented; till in many cases, exhausted nature calls aloud for relief and the obedient soldier sickened by a debilitating climate, added to recent fatigue & exposure seeks his best friend the Doctor, who breaks his fever or stops his diarrhea for a time, but the first extraordinary exposure or fatigue causes a relapse. In short, a large number of the men are completely broken down.47

Another issue Brown had to contend with was the lack of proper shipping. He had the steamboat Texas Ranger, which generally ran up and down the Caloosahatchee, but it was a bit too big for the shallow, winding parts of the river near Fort Deynaud. On the other hand, it occasionally had to go to Tampa, which was dangerous because the vessel was a river boat and not suited to open water. The trips to Tampa also left Brown without any dependable river conveyance, so he requested that a coastal steamer be obtained, one that would allow speedy communications between Tampa, Fort Myers, Key West, and even Miami.48 The request was initially turned down, although the steamer Fashion, which had been running between Tampa and New Orleans, was later ordered to perform coastal duties. Unfortunately, its deeper draft limited its effectiveness, so a shallow draft schooner, Libby Shepperd, was chartered to assist in coastal operations. Like all good soldiers throughout time, Brown made do with what he had.49 Considering the circumstances, the colonel and his men were doing all that was possible. On 27 January, Lt. Robert Thomas was sent to scout the nearby Twelve Mile Swamp. Leaving at 1:00 a.m. in order to arrive at dawn and surprise any Indians who might be there, Thomas returned later in the day with news that they

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had found no sign of the enemy, and that the water was still high, sometimes up to his saddle. Brown was dismayed, and reported to Munroe, “The only season for a campaign is rapidly running away—Summer will soon be on us—& then operations in the Swamp are out of the question.”50 By the beginning of February, Lt. Molinard from Fort Center had completed a “very boisterous” voyage around Lake Okeechobee and reported no sighting of Indians. Even abandoned Fort McRae on the eastern side of the lake had not been molested. These reports led Brown to conclude that there were no Indians east of the Lake or the Kissimmee River. Considering the Seminole’s penchant for mobility and avoiding the whites, it was no doubt an erroneous assumption. At any rate, it was no time to let one’s guard down. An express rider going between Forts Deynaud and Center reported being fired upon and seeing two warriors.51 Jefferson Davis had informed Senator Stephen Mallory that total troop strength in Florida was over 1,200 men (780 regulars and 435 volunteers), which should be a sufficient number to remove the Seminole. Governor Broome, anxious to get the job done, was quick to offer more volunteer companies. Broome told Davis, “One thousand efficient men can be raised … and with such a force the line of settlements will, I think, be sustained, and the Indians all removed in six months. If, however, a larger volunteer force is deemed necessary to secure promptly the removal, any number desired can be obtained at short notice.” Broome closed the letter by telling Davis of his hopes “that the Government will desire to close this long standing source of embarrassment to us by an early removal of the Indians,” and that his suggestion of employing a large volunteer force would be “favorably considered.”52 Even though Tallahassee was only a few days away from Tampa and the seat of war, Broome worried that he would be out of touch with the progress of the war. In an age when governors took an active role in the prosecution of Indian wars, he felt the need for a presence nearby the action. Important decisions would need to be made, and vital information might be circulating that he needed to know about. He couldn’t leave the capital, so he appointed Jesse Carter, a prominent Tampa citizen and former militia general, as Special Agent. Carter would be Broome’s eyes and ears in the war zone and serve as the governor’s liaison with the army in Florida.53 Carter would also be in charge of the volunteer forces that had been recruited to guard the frontier. This meant making arrangements for provisions and other supplies and keeping track of when the companies commenced service, who was in each company, who the officers were, and whether the men were mounted or not. It was also important to know which units had been accepted for service by the federal government and which were employed by the state. Broome wanted Washington to foot as much of the bill as possible and instructed Carter, “You will use your best exertions to procure from Col. Munroe the acceptance of all the Volunteers in the service of the State, and until such acceptance is procured you will if possible induce him to ration and forage the State troops.”54

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In informing Colonel Munroe of the appointment, Broome pointed out, “The desire of this department is to co-operate fully with you, and no order will be extended to the State volunteers designed to conflict with your plan for removing the Indians. But the State will steadily and anxiously look to removal as the object, and will not be satisfied with further compromise on this point.” Governor Broome and the volunteer leaders were all optimistic as to a quick conclusion to the war. To their minds, the Florida Crackers could just ride into the Big Cypress and march out with the entire Seminole tribe. Those who were familiar with the situation knew better. Captain Casey wrote, “Gen. Carter from Tallahassee calls—supports 8 co’s mtd. Vol. for a dash this winter! I say—“no use” in dashing—need hard work.”55 At Fort Myers, Colonel Brown was still having a hard time setting things in motion. In a letter to Colonel Munroe he stated, “I feel much embarrassed by this state of affairs.” The land was still under water, and the men were in poor physical condition. Lieutenant Hartsuff, who knew the land better than most, pointed out that “a foot of ground to camp on cannot at this time be found within miles of Fort Simon Drum,” and that the roads were impassable. Even river travel was proving troublesome. Due to heavy rains, the current on the Caloosahatchee was too swift for safe navigation, and the officer charged with clearing the river of obstructions had “most shamefully neglected his duty in clearing out the river—& the work will have to be done over again.” Brown also asked for more boats. He simply didn’t have enough to mount an expedition against the Seminole.56 Even if he’d had enough boats, there were things he needed to go along with them. In another letter to Munroe, he pointed out that requisitions had gone unfulfilled. Once again, he asked for “12 boat compasses three or four inches in diameter, 24 pocket compasses one or two inches in diameter, 50 patent hand cuffs, 25 patent shackles.”57 In addition to the usual lack of officers, Brown also took time to express the need for more surgeons. With so many men on the sick list, surgeons were very much in demand. At present, he only had two: one at Fort Myers and the other at Fort Deynaud. He was planning on sending commands out into the Big Cypress and along the southwest coast, and both of those detachments would need medical officers.58 With all the activity that was taking place on the part of the army, it would be easy for an outside observer to forget that there were two sides to the conflict. Although the Indians could not be completely aware of the army’s situation, they were keeping an eye on things, gathering intelligence, and making plans of their own. A company of mounted volunteers under Capt. Francis Durrance had come south from Fort Meade and reached Fort Deynaud on 5 February. Although they had seen no indication of the Indians on their trek, Durrance reported, “Saw fresh Indian signs in one-fourth of a mile of Ft Daynaud [sic]—pursued the trail, and saw one Indian within two miles of said Fort. Owing to the nature of the ground

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the Indian succeeded in making his escape. It is supposed that there were several Indians in the neighborhood, but they were invisible.”59 On 24 February, Lieutenant Webb was ordered to take 45 men and proceed to Fort Simon Drum to determine if the fort could be repaired and used as a supply depot. He later wrote: My men marched or struggled at times through water more than two feet deep, and for from fifteen to twenty miles of the road or track the water varied from six inches to twenty inches in depth. I recorded one stretch of four miles where it was from eight to twelve inches … It was hard to find a dry spot on which to camp for the night, and the men suffered not only from the weariness consequent upon the constant struggle through the water, but they were discouraged when worn out … It was a hard task to prevent the men from cutting off the bottoms of their trousers. These had become heavy from wet and sand.60

After reporting that at present it was impractical to reestablish the fort, Webb found that his sergeant had only brought four days’ rations for the men, instead of the six that had been intended. The troops were able to supplement their fare with “three full grown alligators, 2 possums, 2 coons and enough birds to supply my table,”61 but Webb had no choice but to return to Fort Deynaud. “I was over forty miles from Deynaud, and my men were already sick and exhausted. I started at once for the fort and took extra precautions to prevent surprise.”62 Brown was expecting more troops, and accommodations would be needed for them. He instructed the Fort Myers Quartermaster, Major Justus McKinstry: You will please have erected three mess rooms and kitchens with chimneys for furnaces at each end and so arranged as to afford in case of necessity suitable accommodations for the messing and cooking of six companies but that will habitually be used by only three, and also with those you have already, finished laundress quarters for the authorized number of laundresses for three companies. Let all these buildings be made with the greatest economy using as far as practicable the material of the old barracks and mess rooms for the new ones.63

This is one of the rare instances in which the females who normally accompanied the troops are mentioned in the official records. Many of these women were the wives of the enlisted men, usually the sergeants and corporals who had made the army their careers. The number and pay of the laundresses was set down in army regulations, and provision was made for their food and housing, which was no better than what was provided for their husbands. Given the low wages of the common soldier, the pay earned by the wives was a welcome supplement to the family income. One thing Brown needed to know was how to deal with Indians that came to the fort for various reasons. Colonel Munroe told him that if an Indian came in for the purpose of negotiating a new treaty to remain in Florida, he was to be taken prisoner and placed in irons. On the other hand, if someone came in to negotiate a surrender, they would be treated kindly and given fair terms for emigration. He then issued the following order: “Any captured men or boys will be made to guide under penalty of being hung, unless truth and willingness to perform this duty can

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be extorted by severe flogging—this painful resource is almost the only one we can adopt for shortening the work and will therefore be sternly enforced.” Indian women were also compelled to guide troops to village locations, though the nature of the threats put upon them are rarely mentioned.64 Other than the attacks on Lieutenant Hartsuff, the wood-cutting party from Fort Deynaud, and the killings at the coontie grounds near Fort Dallas, it had been a rather quiet war so far. The Seminole had been watching and would take the occasional shot at soldiers, but had otherwise done little damage. Still, when the opportunity arose, they could vent their anger on any vulnerable target. One of those targets was Indian Key in the Florida Keys. People remembered a surprise attack during the Second Seminole War that had destroyed much of the settlement and resulted in the death of several people, including well-known botanist Dr. Henry Perrine. In response to the perceived threat, many of the women and children were moved to Key West. It was a wise move. In late January the Indians attacked the abandoned settlement, burning two houses and looting others.65 In late February Brown began to worry about the safety of two local oystermen, Hudson and Martin, who hadn’t been seen for a couple of weeks. A patrol sent out to find them located their murdered bodies near the island of Matlacha in Charlotte Harbor. After hearing the news, Brown dispatched Lieutenant Hartsuff with a party of 15 men to bury the victims, then “thoroughly search the neighboring coast, bayous and creeks for Indians and canoes, both of which, if found, will be destroyed.” Throughout the war, the destruction of canoes forced the Seminole to either walk, steal horses, or build new canoes. Fashioning a cypress dugout was a time-consuming process that involved burning the interior of the logs, which caused smoke that could expose the location of a hidden camp.66 Further north, General Carter was positioning his volunteer forces to better protect the frontier settlements. Although there had been no attacks north of Tampa Bay, that didn’t stop people from being nervous and calling out for protection. The area around the Withlacoochee River had been one of the Seminole homelands in the years prior to the Second Seminole War, and they had fought fiercely to defend it. Whites who now lived in the area feared the original inhabitants would return to violently reclaim their homes.67 Brown could wait no longer to begin offensive operations. The ground was beginning to dry out, but within two or three months the summer rains would begin and campaigning would cease. He instructed Captain Pratt of the Second Artillery to take two companies of regulars and Capt. Richard Turner’s volunteer “boat company” for the purpose of penetrating the Big Cypress from the coast. In the meantime, Major Arnold would move south from Fort Deynaud and establish  the depot at Fort Simon Drum. Brown hoped the two units could converge upon the Seminole and round them up for emigration to the West. What he didn’t know was that the Seminole were preparing an offensive of their own.68

chapter six

The Bullets Whistled Over and Around Me Like Hail

On paper, it looked to be a very one-sided war. Against no more than 150 Seminole warriors the government had almost 800 soldiers in Florida, more were on the way, and the state had called out hundreds of volunteers. Yet in reality the government was at a real disadvantage. Soldiers may have been in place, but they lacked the transportation and supplies needed to take to the field in force or for prolonged periods. The state, cash-strapped before hostilities began, was scrambling to find funding. Governor Broome met initial expenses by dipping into the Contingent Fund and then had to rob the School and Seminary Funds.1 As for the troops, there were questions as to their quality. Most of the regulars were artillerymen that were doing the work of infantrymen, and many were raw recruits. Few had any experience fighting Indians in an inundated swampland, and none had been given any training in guerrilla warfare. The volunteers seemed little better, at least to one army observer: They were a sorry-looking set of ragamuffins alongside of Uncle Sam’s troops. The contrast was striking. Nearly all of them shook with the ague, were raw-boned, had yellow, emaciated faces and were clad in butternut suits. Their hair was long, thin and straight. Their head coverings were old, broad-brimmed hats. Mounted on wretched-looking beasts, both men and animals appeared as if they were in the last stages of consumption. The morning they came into Fort Centre they resembled a ragged funeral procession.2

To make matters worse, the whites were up against native fighting men who had been brought up as warriors and had little respect for the rules of “civilized” warfare. Neither side could be assured of total victory. The army’s biggest disadvantage was that they didn’t know where the Seminole were located. Yes, the Indians were in the Big Cypress and the Everglades, but it was a vast area to cover and extremely difficult to operate in, even as it is today, despite the aid of modern technology. In addition, the Indians tended to be very mobile, moving their villages when they felt threatened or going to parts of the Everglades the white men weren’t familiar with. Throughout the Second and now the Third Seminole War, armchair generals couldn’t understand why the army didn’t simply go in and round up the Indians. How difficult could it be? It’s always easy when someone else is doing the dirty work.

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Seminole offensive of early 1856.

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The Seminole, on the other hand, knew exactly where to find their targets. The army built forts, settlers lived in isolated homesteads, and many influential whites occupied large plantations employing numerous slaves. All of these places were vulnerable to unexpected attacks. Soldiers might be safe inside a fort, but there would be express riders, supply wagons, and wood-cutting parties that would have to venture outside the protective palisades. How could an isolated farmer or a plantation owner know that Indians were lurking in the nearby forest? Plantation work couldn’t be suspended just because there was a war going on in another part of the state. In a way, the small number of warriors gave the Indians a psychological advantage: If Indian war parties had been “everywhere,” people would have been constantly on their guard. The fact that the Indians were generally “nowhere in the neighborhood” made whites complacent and easier to attack. The knowledge that there were volunteer patrols out searching for the Indians didn’t do much to ease the anxiety of people at the Manatee River settlement. One of them wrote to Colonel Munroe: We most of us came invited by government—We have paid for our lands, we have paid our taxes, we have behaved ourselves as upright industrious citizens, and I maintain that every surveyor’s line, every Patent issued is a solemn pledge on the part of government to protect us in the peaceable possession of our improvements and honest occupations … Our families have been for many weeks in dread. Many have left homes and property and fled—Many more see plainly that they can not hold out destitute of means and cut off from all available employment—They too will go if they can. A small remnant if any at all will remain—Abandoned homes, improvements and stocks of cattle will soon mark this part of the land at the present rate—We hear of troops sent into the woods—for what? to guard the pines and palmettoes?  … We have ever been opposed to this stirring up of the Indians and if now the only ones to suffer we unhesitatingly admit the purity of the Divine government but not the human.3

In early March 1856 the Seminole proved just how vulnerable those targets could be. While the army was concentrating its efforts in the Big Cypress, an Indian war party of about a dozen warriors was moving well north of there, in the Sarasota area. On the afternoon of 3 March they attacked the home of State Senate President Hamlin V. Snell, killing one person, Owen Cunningham. One of the first white men on the scene described what he found: I have never seen nor do I ever wish to see such another one for I believe that the poor man was tortured to death in the most horrible manner—there was nothing left but the [page torn] and part of the back of the head. I found a corn sack and I prepared it to receive the remains and inter them in as respectable a manner as possible, the skull I found in pieces all round the remains of the body which make me think that the head was partly departed from the body—the sight is not easily described.4

The Indians also burned Snell’s home and the outlying kitchen. Snell was returning from the nearby Manatee settlement at the time, but saw the smoke and climbed a tall tree to watch the conflagration. He then hurried back to Manatee to sound

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the alarm. Most of the residents abandoned the town, taking refuge on a schooner anchored in the river.5 News of the attack reached Tampa the following day. Jesse Carter, the governor’s agent, immediately dispatched men from Captains Hooker’s and Turner’s companies and planned to go there personally to organize a small force to protect the settlements along the Manatee River. Without some sort of security the residents would flee the area, abandoning their homes and plantations. Among those homes was Robert Gamble’s sugar plantation, one of the largest on Florida’s west coast and now a State Historic Park. Meanwhile, at Tampa, citizens held a meeting to denounce the governments both in Washington and Tallahassee for not doing enough Figure 28. Judge Hamlin V. Snell, president of the to protect the settlements.6 Florida Senate at the time of the attack on his home In the eyes of some citizens, having in Sarasota. troops for protection and actually being protected were not the same thing. Richard D. Bradley of Hernando County wrote to Secretary Davis complaining of the way the volunteers were deployed: I am a citizen of this county and am as anxious as any man in this state for the speedy removal of the Seminole Indians now remaining in Florida, but I am opposed to the manner and mode which troops is mustered into service for the protection of the frontier. There is four companies of mounted men mustered into the state service to protect the frontier settlements. These troops are allowed to stay at home and work their farms. Some eight or ten men pretend to scout a day or two, then go home. … such protection against the Indians is equivalent to no protection at all, and it is just and right that if a man is in service and is fed and paid they ought to earn something. It would be better for the citizens if this class of troops was out of the way and let Col. Munroe defend the settlements.7

Complaints against the company led by Capt. Aaron Jernigan were even worse. One citizen from New Smyrna wrote to Colonel Munroe, stating, “I hear all the scouting they do is to the store for rum & all the duty they have performed is to destroy the neighbour’s property, & if this is our protection for God sake take them off & send the Indians.”8 An assistant quartermaster, delivering supplies at Mellonville (Sanford), had problems with the same group of volunteers:

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Figure 29. Gamble Mansion. The house has been restored and is now a state park in Ellenton. Since my arrival here I have had a great deal of difficulty, on account of the intemperance of Capt. Jernigan. I had to wait on him for three days before I could attend to any business with him. He is now on another spree, and no one can tell when he is likely to get over it, certainly, not until all the liquor is gone. I report this matter with much regret, but I am fearful of issuing Stores to a set of drunken men who are lying about the depot nearly all the time.9

While some people may have had reservations about the mounted volunteers, Colonel Munroe understood the value of those who would be working with the regulars in the southern portion of the state. In a letter to Governor Broome, he wrote: It may be proper for me to say to you in this place, that the present pay of footmen, expected to do good service in the everglades, hammocks, etc., of the southern portion of the State, should be at least doubled, taking into consideration the severity of the duties, and the dangers they will incur, when compared either with the mounted troops, and the prices of ordinary labor, which is always expected to form the basis of compensation.10

Munroe certainly had a point. Fighting in southern Florida was dangerous duty. Besides Seminole bullets, the soldiers also had to survive the harsh conditions and threat of disease, as Lieutenant Webb explained to his wife: I have just returned from burying a soldier who died last night of dysentery. The poor fellow had only been sick for 5 days but then he has had bad health ever since he came to Florida … We have suffered very much from the heat here & have tried every way to keep cool & warm alternately. One day the thermometer will be 34° the next 80°. Some might call this changeable, but then you must remind them that this is “Florida.”11

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In a subsequent letter to his wife, Webb was more specific about one of the major problems facing the soldiers in Florida: Fort Uneasy, Land of Fleas March 12th 1856 My Dearest Annie, You see how I head my letter! Well dear let me assure you I do not do out of joke. It is really the name that should be given this place. This one evil would really be sufficient to make me ask you not to come here. I actually shudder to think of my Annie suffering as I have from these little torments. You would not be able to scratch & undress as I do without regard to time or place. I think nothing of stopping at dinner to pull off my boots & roll up my drawers to drive them off. They are in my bed, in my trunk, on my floor, in the sand &c &c everywhere. Last night I found nine on one leg. I am scarred all over from scratching although I have been in the habit of saturating everything with camphor. When I dress I pour camphor in each boot and yet they bite & I scratch scra – a – a – a – t – c – h, all the time. You might put up with the feeling of insecurity or the want of luxuries but these little “varmints” would wear the flesh off you. And the old inhabitants tell me that the season for them will not be here for a month. Then they say you must keep a candle by your bed side & rise every half hour to shake your sheets. The soldiers do that now. The doctor complains bitterly of the way the sick men are tormented in the hospital. All this I have written you dearest to reconcile you to not being here with me & to let you see that your husband has every reason to try to get away from here before sending for you.12

The environment has often been the bane of a soldier’s existence, as it has been since the beginning of organized warfare. Most of the senior officers in the army had learned that lesson during the Second Seminole War. Younger soldiers were about to get educated. Unaware of the attack on the Snell Plantation, the army continued its work in the Big Cypress. On 6 March Major Arnold and about 100 men left Fort Deynaud for the purpose of reopening Fort Simon Drum and making it the primary base of operations in the Big Cypress. Arriving there three days later, they began the work of erecting a tall stockade and a pair of blockhouses. Just getting there was an ordeal. Saturated roads forced them to build a causeway to support their heavily loaded wagons. Facing increased sickness and with little knowledge of the countryside, Arnold sent an urgent message to Fort Myers requesting a medical officer, a guide, and mounted troops to escort them. Colonel Brown was annoyed at the request and declared as much to Colonel Munroe. Arnold knew there was only one surgeon available and that he was needed at Fort Deynaud. As for a guide, there simply wasn’t one, they were useless anyway, and Arnold’s mission was to explore the territory so they wouldn’t need guides. As for mounted escorts, there were a limited number of horses and men, and “Lieut. Hartsuff’s detachment will be employed on more important duties.” Arnold also reported discovering a recently abandoned camp and signs of a “good size party” of Indians going northwest. After completing the work

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Figure 30. Sketch of Fort Simon Drum, by Alexander Webb. A forward outpost in the Big Cypress Swamp near present day Immokolee.

at Fort Simon Drum in 10 days, they moved on to refurbish Depot 1 near the site of the attack on Lieutenant Hartsuff.13 While Arnold worked in the Big Cypress, a new company of volunteers under Captain Lesley had been formed to patrol the area west of the Peace River. Their job was to prevent Seminole warriors from returning to the coastal settlements and to interdict trade in arms and ammunition between the Indians and Cuban traders or fishermen. Although the volunteers were anxious to get to work, there was a problem in keeping them supplied. Provisions were simply unavailable in the sparsely populated interior, and General Carter was forced to turn to the merchants of Tampa for assistance. Although anxious to do their patriotic duty, the merchants weren’t willing to extend the state much in the way of credit, and with good reason. As Carter told the governor, “These merchants have not the ability to do a time business with the State, and most, or all of them, hold State scrip issued for military services and supplies furnished in 1849, which the State has failed to redeem or provide for, which greatly depreciates the credit of the State, not only in this community but throughout the country.” It was a problem that could not be easily overcome. Florida had defaulted on its debt after the financial panic of 1837 and had yet to establish a sound banking system that farmers and merchants could have faith in.14 Several days later Carter sent another letter to Broome, pointing out that it wasn’t just the Tampa merchants who needed funds from the state: Sir—While on the frontier encouraging the inhabitants to maintain their position and to cultivate provision crops, I have made myself familiar with their situation and circumstances, which I assure you demands indeed, not only commendation and sympathy, but prompt and

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immediate pecuniary relief. The supply of provisions on the frontier at the commencement of Indian hostilities was limited strictly to the demand for local consumption, and the sudden organization of several companies engaged in protecting the frontier, unaided by public supplies, has exhausted the resources of the country. This service has been wholly sustained by the contributions of the frontier people, many of whom have surrendered their entire supplies leaving their families wholly destitute, or on charity, and without any means of subsistence whatever; and very many have gone still further by making themselves individually liable for supplies for public use. You will endorse the remark, that this state of facts should not exist, and that there should be applied a speedy remedy … If there is no probability of an immediate assumption by the Federal Government for service, and supplies furnished, permit me to suggest the necessity of immediate effort on your part to raise from the resources of the State, sufficient means to meet the outlay for the first two months service. To disband the State troops without pay, would be to consume their subsistence, abuse their services, and turn them out upon public charity.15

Broome was getting the message, but the state’s empty coffers were preventing him from doing much about it. In several letters to various people, he tried to explain the realities. To Carter he pointed out that allowing the mounted volunteers to spend half their time at home tending their crops would not be acceptable to Washington. “We want the United States to pay these parties, and it is not likely that we shall get our accounts passed for a full company when only one-half are in service.” If the men couldn’t be spared from their domestic duties, the companies would have to be dismissed and a force raised from elsewhere in the state. Assistance from the federal government was essential, but not guaranteed. He told Carter, “Should my last appeal be unsuccessful, I fear I shall be left no alternative but to convene the General Assembly in extra session and ask for the means necessary to reduce the Indians.”16 A day later he again wrote to Carter, telling him, “My appeal to the War Department under date of the 15th is of the most urgent and decided character, and contains a request to be informed definitely what the Government intends doing … I shall to-morrow order 2000 bushels of corn, 30 bbls. of Pork, and 50 bbls. of flour or its equivalent in bread. This you must distribute to the most needy commands, keeping a proper account of it. It is all that I can raise the means to purchase at present.” With few financial resources to draw upon, the governor’s hands were tied.17 In response to a concerned citizen from Indian River who was worried that the area would be left unprotected if troops were withdrawn from Fort Capron, Broome responded, “If the order withdrawing the United States forces from Fort Capron has not been countermanded, you can proceed to raise a company for service in that part of the Peninsula lying between Miami and Jernigan’s command. This company to serve until mustered out. I have no money and no means left me of getting any except on State 6 per cent bonds at par, which is an impossibility.” Happily for

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Broome, the order was countermanded, and on 28 March Secretary of War Davis, as recommended by the Adjutant General, asked the House Committee of Ways and Means for $214,298 to meet volunteer expenses.18 Throughout the nation, Americans eagerly read reports of the war, wondering if the country was going to get caught up in another never-ending conflict, as it had in the Second Seminole War. Unfortunately, not all the reports they read were factual. The one man killed at the Snell Plantation exploded into eight casualties, as reported in a Savannah newspaper and repeated in Columbus, Georgia: “News had just arrived at that post of an attack, by the Indians, on the settlers on the Alafia, about thirty miles east of Tampa. Four men, one woman and three children were killed and scalped, their houses were burnt, and all the outrages and barbarities that savages could invent, were committed.” The same Columbus paper told of a report by a boat from Charlotte Harbor. “She brought news of the massacre of four men belonging to Key West.—They had gone across the bay for oysters, when they were surprised by the savages, ruthlessly murdered, and hung upon a tree by the beach.” As usual, truth was the first casualty of war.19 Supply problems notwithstanding, the state meant to take the offensive against the Seminole in the limited way it could. On 25 March, Carter wrote to Captains Durrance, Johnston, and Kendrick, ordering them to detail 20 men from each of their companies to serve under Captain Durrance for a reconnaissance of the Kissimmee River region and the west side of Lake Okeechobee as far as Fort Deynaud. The whole operation was to last 16 days, and included the instructions, “Should you meet with Indians while out, you will kill or capture them at your discretion, and you will destroy all property or growing crops belonging to them.”20 The regular army, believing containment was the best strategy, felt it necessary to maintain a line of forts, even if there were no settlers in the area and no reports of Indians nearby. The intention was that the soldiers of these posts would make occasional patrols to look for any signs of Indian movement and act accordingly. Lieutenant Webb had been transferred from Fort Deynaud to Fort Center on Fisheating Creek along the west side of Lake Okeechobee, but with a small command and few horses at his disposal, the only thing the men could do was patrol the creek using their copper boats. Boredom soon set in, as Webb noted in his journal: “Inspected my command at 9 a.m. Took a row up the river & shot three alligators. Read and loafed the rest of the day. (Began series on deep  & earnest thinking to day. First thought = I wonder who the d—l will ever read this journal through!!!)” Fortunately for historians, others saw more value in the work than Webb did.21 The War Department still hoped the Indians could be removed with as little bloodshed as possible and once again offered sizable rewards for captured or surrendered Indians. Knowing the volunteers considered the Seminole mortal

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enemies, the offer included one major condition.22 In a letter to General Carter, Captain Casey listed the rates: Sir—I have the honor to inform you that the War Department has authorized a per capita reward or premium for living Indians, who may be captured, or induced to come in for emigration. In obedience to this authority the following rates will be paid for hostile (living) Indians, delivered at Forts Brooke or Myers, viz: For each warrior, from $250 to $500; For each woman, from $150 to $300; For each boy over ten years, from $100 to $200. The highest rates (5, 3 and 2 hundred) will be paid for all except the inferior, bed-ridden, and helpless, in which cases the rate will be decided by the Agent or a Board.23

Although less generous than the sums offered by former agent Luther Blake, the concept of paying people to hunt the Indians remained the same and was generally met with the same lackluster results. Whatever offensive operations the regular army and state troops may have planned to take, it didn’t mean the Seminole couldn’t wage an offensive of their own. On 29 March they attacked a small party of soldiers near Cape Romano, south of Marco Island. The attack left two soldiers slain and one wounded.24 A newspaper report gave details of the attack: On Saturday, the 29th ult., a party, consisting of two non-commissioned officers and nine men in two boats, were sent by Capt. Pratt, up the Fa-Ka-Hatchee to obtain water for the command. After an absence of about three hours, rapid musket-firing was heard from the water party—Capt. Elzey and Lieut. Walbridge, with 25 men, in the two remaining barges, (the other boats and skiffs being away,) were immediately dispatched by Capt. Pratt, to the relief of the water party. … [The Indians had fired on the water party] killing Corporal O’Rourke and Private Winterling, and wounding Private Striewski, all of Co. E. The fire was immediately returned from both boats, when the Indians hastily retreated. Private Winterling was brought to the camp and interred. Corp’l O’Rourke fell from the boat into the water, and has not yet been recovered. Private Striewski was wounded badly in the knee, with an half-ounce ball. The Indians fired one volley and retreated without reloading. Blood was found on the grass where they lay concealed.25

As they had in the previous war, the Seminole hoped their hit-and-run tactics could wear down the determination of the United States and perhaps force peace talks that would result in their being allowed to remain in Florida. On the evening of 31 March, in spite of the patrols General Carter had put in position to protect the Manatee River region, the Seminole struck again, attacking Braden Castle, a 1,000-acre sugar plantation owned by Dr. Joseph Braden. The Indians, led by war leader Oscen Tustennuggee, fired on the house and called Dr.  Braden out. Braden, relatively safe behind coquina walls that

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Figure 31. Braden Castle, post-Civil War. The ruins of the building are the centerpiece of a mobile home park in today’s Bradenton.

were over a foot thick, dispatched a slave to the nearby settlement for help and returned the Indians’ fire. Repulsed, the attackers departed, doing little damage beyond taking seven slaves and a few mules. The ruins of Braden Castle can still be seen today.26 It took three days for the news to reach Tampa, and upon hearing of the attack, General Carter immediately sent word to the various volunteer groups in the Peace River area, warning them to be on the lookout. It appeared as if the attackers were going that way, and Carter feared they might raid homesteads along the Peace River valley. The following day, Carter and an army officer, Capt. Augustus Gibson, sailed to the Manatee settlement to organize a defense.27 The attack proved to be the Indians’ first real setback of the war. Not only had they been repulsed at Braden Castle, but the volunteers were hot on their trail. On 3 April, a force of about 20 Mounted Volunteers under Capt. John Addison found the raiders’ camp on Charley Apopka Creek, a tributary of the Peace River about 50 miles east of Braden Castle. A 30-minute skirmish ensued, resulting in the death of four Indians. Two of the victims were scalped and the trophies later shown in the nearby towns.28 A subsequent report gave details of the battle: When the Indians were discovered, a portion of these commands crossed the Creek and charged the Indians in the rear, while the remainder halted on the opposite side; thus completely

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surrounding the enemy. Three Indians did not escape; all, save two, threw themselves into the Creek, and are supposed to have drowned.—The water was reddened for some distance below the place of attack, by the blood oozing from the wounded Indians. One of the Indians who were scalped, was not instantly killed, but mortally wounded. He could talk very good English—desired to be taken to a Doctor—and said that Okchan [Oscen Tustennuggee] … met them there; that the Indian pony captured belonged to Okchan, and that he jumped into the Creek … After sounding the Creek, the bottom of which could not be reached with a “ten-foot pole,” and burying the Indian baggage, which would have loaded a wagon, the party started to Manatee with the negroes, mules, and wounded Indian. They had not proceeded many paces, however, when the Indian fell, and was unable to proceed any farther. He was then ordered to be shot, which order was obeyed.29

Knowing that the Seminole rarely took prisoners and often acquired bloody trophies, the volunteers had no reluctance to do the same. Feeling the financial pinch, Governor Broome decided to make a fund-raising excursion. As he told General Carter: From the Seminary and School funds, and the Contingent fund, I can yet supply probably four thousand dollars. That amount will have exhausted all the resources of the State as far as I have authority to command them. I shall leave to-night by way of Savannah and Charleston for Washington City. In the former cities I shall try to open such credits as will meet emergencies, and in the latter, I shall make an effort to produce proper action on the part of the Government.

Faced with bankers who had minimal faith in Florida’s ability to repay its debts, Broome had little success.30 Back at Fort Center, Lieutenant Webb was doing what little he could against the Seminole. Taking a boat and eight men, he scouted some islands several miles from the fort and suffered one casualty: “Dog was bitten by a rattlesnake or some water snake & came back to the boat howling dreadfully. The limb was twice its normal size. Dosed him with a tumblerful of raw brandy & ammonia & bled him freely. I expect he will either be dead or well in the morning.” The animal survived, only to be bitten again about a week later.31 Tired of shooting alligators and not the least bit put off by his dog’s experience, Webb took to collecting biological specimens. “Caught two snakes & a mocking bird. Bottled one snake. The other a water moccasin was too large to get in any bottle or jar to be found. 6 inches around the middle. Fangs ½ inch long. Cut off his head to obtain the skeleton.”32 Webb may have had little to do at Fort Center, but to his south, other soldiers were hard at work. On the east coast, at Fort Dallas, Lt. Richard Duryea departed on a 10-day patrol with 45 men, intent on examining every Seminole haunt they could find. While they did find one small camp that had been recently used, for the most part there was little indication of Indians in the area.33 On 7 April Major Arnold, with 113 men, was patrolling the Big Cypress near Holata Micco’s abandoned village (known as Bowlegs’s Old Town) when they were

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attacked by an estimated 80–100 Seminole. Lt. Loomis Langdon later wrote his father a hurried account of the battle: I am safe praise be God, perfectly unharmed, though the bullets whistled over and around me like hail. And now to tell you how the thing happened … We went down the road and reached the Cypress swamp about nine o’clock. The disposition of the troops was this: In front of the main body was the advance guard about fourteen strong—four of their number were on the flanks. We did not expect an attack as I had been down to Billy Bowlegs’ village a few days before with 60 men and this was our destination now—we apprehended nothing. The Major, Capt. Dawson, the Doctor and myself being rather tired with 4 hours walking had fallen to the rear having the rear guard behind us. We had passed through two patches of the Cypress and were then walking in the water up to our knees when I heard, or rather we all heard two crashes of a rifle. At first supposed that the Major’s servant was shooting birds, but then came a volley, the men began to fall back, and before many minutes I saw a man fall close by me. He had a ball clear through his stomach and resting under the skin of his back. Two or three men were limping around & the Indians whooping and yelling like devils in front of us all among the cypress trees. We formed and charged them but could see none, at least I have not seen an Indian yet. We rushed through that place and came to a clear space beyond. In front of us and about a quarter of a mile off was Bowlegs’ village, not an Indian to be seen. The village by the way has been deserted for months. We halted and I … took a party of men with me to bring up Sims, the poor fellow who died with a bullet through his body. We got him and brought him to the front, buried him, patched up the wounded, and then as Corporal Carson the man in command of the advance guard was wounded, I took command and led the way to Billy’s town. Before I got there … I was ordered back as Indians had been seen on the left. I led my little party about fourteen strong back to the main body and awaited orders. I saw there was some indecision and cut to the point by asking if I should not go on. Yes directly. I turned to my men and in presence of the whole battalion told them, “Come on we will bring up the fight.” I led them along a trail and soon came to where it branched off. I took the largest one and soon met another branch. Still keeping the largest I soon saw in front of me a smooth level place, (through which the trail led) and bounded by low bushes which edged the hammock. I was in front, two men about 5 yards behind me and the rest scattered in rear as I walked very fast. I expected a fire as the trail (very fresh led directly into the hammock) and sure enough it came, pop pop pop—not an Indian to be seen, and we were not a hundred yards from the hammock, my men ran back to the main body except two who threw themselves behind some cabbage palmetto trees 15 or twenty yards in my rear. As for me I pulled out my gun and fired one shot at the bushes whence the fire came, and as the bullets were flying pretty thick I concluded to throw myself on the grass. The rifles cracked and the balls went over me, huwisht, huwisht, wisht, while I was lying there in advance of all. I believe that the Indians thought I was hurt and wanted to make sure work of it. I then got up and went back to the trees. We turned this place, gave them a few volleys, and charged the hammock. And after that I led the advance again, coming to a cluster of palmettos, I told two of my men to fire from this into the hammock of live oak in front and if Indians were there we would draw their fire, and sure enough as soon as the balls reached there we got an answer. We charged this hammock and then came back to the place where we had buried Sims. We slept there that night and the Indians in the evening took the roofs off Bowlegs houses so that we could not fire, then fired a volley, whooped and left. The next morning we returned to this place, four wounded men were brought in. One had to be carried in a blanket for 8 miles.34

Later reports indicated the battle lasted from 9:00 a.m. to 4:00 p.m., and that for much of the time the soldiers were operating in waist-deep water. Militarily, it was

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a small skirmish, with one soldier dead, five wounded, and an unknown number of Indian casualties. Still, in terms of the number of troops engaged, it would be the largest battle of the war. The Indians simply did not have the manpower to take on a large force of soldiers. They were fighting a guerrilla war; the army was practicing “search and destroy” tactics they had learned in the previous war.35 If nothing else, the battle convinced Colonel Munroe that the vast majority of Seminole warriors were still concentrated in the Big Cypress and Everglades. The two or three Creek bands, including Oscen Tustennuggee’s, appeared to be the only ones operating north of Lake Okeechobee, and several of those warriors had been killed. Feeling the time was right to put extra pressure on the Seminole, Munroe asked General Carter to transfer a large portion of the troops patrolling the Peace River area to Fort Deynaud, where they would join the regulars in an offensive against the Indians.36 The Seminole may have suffered a loss at Charley Apopka Creek, but they were certainly not defeated. On 12 April, a war party burned an abandoned house and looted another, all within 2 miles of a volunteer post on the upper Manatee River. Three days later they shot and killed a settler named John Carney while he was tending his fields near the Alafia River, about 16 miles southeast of Tampa. Aware of the danger of an Indian attack, Carney had sent his family to Tampa but had remained behind to finish the spring planting of his crops.37 Although the army felt the majority of the Seminole were gathered in the Big Cypress and western Everglades, there was always the fear they would move east when threatened. In order to see if this was happening, Lt. George Bell led a detachment from Company M, First Artillery, into Figure 32. John Carney Tombstone. The grave sits by the Everglades northwest of Fort a rural roadside near Tampa. The original marker was Dallas starting on 12 April. They destroyed by vandals in 2004 and has been replaced by were looking for “islands,” small an official Veteran’s Administration marker.

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areas of land that were only a few feet higher than the surrounding terrain. During the rainy season, these islands would be the only dry spots in the flooded landscape, and were the places where the Seminole would build their villages and grow their crops. The islands were easy to spot, being the only places where trees would grow in the “River of Grass.”38 Seeing the islands was one thing; getting to them was another. This was the end of the dry season, but the soldiers were traveling by canoe. For a good part of the journey the canoes had to be dragged, the channels and ponds having dried up. Today, a lightweight aluminum or fiberglass canoe can be easily handled by two people. In contrast, a wooden canoe might weigh up to 200 pounds. The patrol took 11 days, all of it arduous. Numerous islands were found, all but a few looking like they hadn’t been used in months or years. Some of the islands were small, only an acre or two. On the second day, they came across one of the larger islands. “About noon struck an Island of from fifteen to twenty-five acres. On the west end found an old Indian encampment and a fire or rather an old fire place, and a number of utensils, among others a large mortar, about three months since used.”39 The third day out seemed fairly typical. “A fair channel for about one hour— dragged the canoes about two miles—struck a large channel varying in width from three to twenty feet, length about ten miles—but one large island visible in the E. in the morning large numbers of small ones, formed only of bushes—very wet—Dragged the canoes two miles for a place for wood, slept in the Boats—men exhausted, distance about 21 miles.”40 The next few days were easier, with enough water to float the boats, but that presented its own problems. “Ran in a S.W. direction in search of water,—but unable to find it—returned parallel to our course about five miles—unable to find place to make a fire—finally being unable to find wood, built one of saw grass—dry—slept in the boats—in the morning unable to make coffee—distance travelled in advance about 25 miles, returning about five miles.”41 Finally, after a week of searching, they found something worthwhile. “On the 18th visited an island containing a field of pumpkins and a number of papan trees—destroyed all—stakes for canoes were found in the western side, and traces of five canoes. From the tracks and a fire some days old, it was evident that Indians had been on the land within the last twelve days.”42 The next day started out good, but by noon, conditions turned bad: Found great difficulty in getting through some small channels—rained hard for about two hours—obliged about two o’clock, to put from 30 to 40 men to a canoe, to haul them over land about 400 yards to water—but little water afterwards—another haulover, of about 300 yards— to reach a channel to an island—rained in torrents during the time, reached the island about dark—dry and open interior—but no recent signs—men completely worn out—part of the command remained in the boats—distance travelled about 28 miles.

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The following day they rested and dried out their belongings.43 The detachment then headed southeast, back toward Fort Dallas, reaching the post on the 23rd. In his official report, Bell summed up the journey. “The entire distance passed over could not have been less than 240 miles.—The conduct of the non-com’d officers & privates of the Expedition, was unexceptionable—notwithstanding the arduous duties required of them.—They performed promptly and cheerfully, and their behavior could not have been more satisfactory.” In an age when the common soldier’s hard work was rarely recognized, officers were learning to appreciate the efforts of the men serving under them.44 There now came the first of many reports of Indians far north in the peninsula, west of the Gainesville area. As part of the effort to raise troops for duty elsewhere in the state, a company had been formed in Ocala, and the commander, Lt. George Rogers, wrote to the governor asking if they were going to be taken into service. He reported, “I have received urgent entreaties from many citizens of Levy County, to call out part of my regiment, and scour the Warcassassa hammock, in which there can be little doubt there is a large party of Indians.”45 Rogers wasn’t the only one writing the governor, and one of the petitioners, Enoch Daniels, must have rubbed Governor Broome the wrong way, eliciting the following response: Sir—On my return from Washington, a few days since, I received your letter of the 8th ultimo, and more recently one from various citizens detailing the same circumstance. I have instructed Captain [Adrian J.] Wright of Columbia to take a detachment of his company and thoroughly examine the Gulf Hammock, if there are any Indians there to capture them, and if none to report the fact that the county may be quieted. It is singular that Indians should have been in that Hammock, one hundred and fifty miles from the frontier, for nearly three months, and you profess to have a company scouting and have not caught them. If they are there I will have them caught, but the idea of raising a company and locating it to protect a county in the interior, with a dense population all around it, when I have not means to feed the troops protecting the frontier, is preposterous.—In conclusion I must tell you plainly that under no circumstances whatever could I give you a commission, and if you have men enrolled with any expectation of pay or subsistence from the State, you had better disband them. Should circumstances arise to require a company in Levy county, you cannot command it.46

Broome had good reason to doubt the presence of Indians in the area. He knew people’s propensity to exaggerate the need for protection, usually for reasons of personal profit, be it from pay as militia or merchandising to the troops. In a letter to one volunteer commander, General Carter wrote, “The guards for the family of Atzroth should have been furnished promptly. It is helpless females not the dram shop, which we wish to protect, and if Mr. Atzroth forfeits his right to protection by an improper traffic with the guard, then they must be recalled. At all events, let us do our duty.”47

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A few days later, Broome changed his mind about Indians in Levy County and the worthiness of Mr. Daniels. In a letter to Col. Whit Smith of Alligator (Lake City), he wrote: Sir—Your two communications of the 8th inst. [instant: this month], are this moment received. The letter of Capt. Wright which you enclose is full and reliable, and leaves no doubt of the fact that there are Indians in considerable force in Levy County. Your action in sending forward ten men to the aid of Capt. Wright in advance of special instructions is approved. You will immediately dispatch to Capt. Wright the residue of his command, or so much of it as can be concentrated, and if it cannot be filled up at once you will authorize him to fill it by incorporating a detachment under Mr. Enoch Daniels, should he have it raised, assigning him such command as he may deem advisable, not higher than Lieutenant.48

In his 25 April letter to Governor Broome about the Indians in Levy County, Lieutenant Rogers had mentioned, “The volunteers have a great repugnance to serving under United States officers, and I doubt if many companies can be had to serve on such terms.” The comment pointed to a growing problem: State troops frequently refused to fight under the regular army. These were independent, undisciplined men who didn’t like being told what to do by officers who often treated their men like indentured servants and were used to having their orders obeyed without question. The volunteers also didn’t like the routine work soldiers were expected to perform, such as building roads or bridges, or simply maintaining the grounds where they lived. The volunteers were there to fight Indians, and if there were no Indians to fight at the moment, they didn’t intend to perform menial tasks.49 As long as the volunteers were left on their own, they were happy to perform their duties and did their jobs reasonably well. But when General Carter ordered the companies stationed along the Peace River to gather at Fort Deynaud, he ran into trouble. In a letter to one of those commanders, Captain Durrance, Carter expressed his disappointment: I have to express surprise, regret and mortification, at the tardy action of the State troops … With much difficulty and effort, I procured supplies here, and forwarded for your command, and those of Capts. Kendrick and Johnson [Johnston], while on the march to Fort Deynaud, giving each command positive orders to march to that point, where arrangements had been made for supplies … You can readily imagine my mortification, and, I may add, my indignation, upon learning that these orders have been disobeyed, and those supplies exhausted in their violation, this, too, after having reported to the Governor the three commands on the March to the Cypress.50

Six days later, on 28 April, Carter sent another letter to Durrance that was more serious in its tone: Now, Captain, I sincerely regret that material cause of complaint against you should exist. My communications and orders are not acknowledged and vouchers not given for supplies furnished—reports of service, list of details, accounts of purchases, &c., not made I am, therefore, compelled to notify you, that until these duties are performed, no further delivery

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of supplies or communications can be made to you from this office, and I must pursue that course detailed by duty.51

Durrance’s refusal to go south with the other companies and the fact that many of the volunteers were still spending much of their time at home tending their crops forced Carter to send out orders reaffirming his earlier instructions: Sir—I am in receipt of your communication of the 26th inst., as also your report of purchases, team hire etc., from the 10th to the 29th March, and in reply have to repeat my disapproval of the evacuation of Fort Broome, and my order for its immediate occupancy. Orders were issued from this office on the 12th inst. to all commanders of companies in service of the State, to place their entire commands in actual service on the frontier. If that order has not been communicated to you by your captain, and if not already done, you will immediately, on receipt of this, warn every man of the company, not now with the Captain, on the expedition south, to report to you at your company station, without delay, properly prepared for actual and efficient service. Should any disobey, note the fact and time, and report the same to this office.52

Colonel Munroe was also aware of the problem, and in a letter to the Adjutant General in Washington he blamed the attacks in the Manatee River area in part on the inefficiency of the volunteers: It was expected that Captain Hooker would have been able to protect the settlements West of a line—from Fort Meade to the mouth of Pea river [Peace River]; but that was not realized, mainly owing to the domestic obligations and personal interests of many members of his company leaving them to attend to their own affairs at the expense of those of the public. These consequences naturally flow from the faulty principles on which Volunteer companies are organized, and the remark is intended to have a general application.53

Munroe was referring to the practice whereby the state soldiers elected their officers, which put the commanders under a certain amount of obligation to the men serving under them. This could lead to disciplinary problems or demands the commander would find difficult to refuse. A commanding officer needed to be above his men, not beholden to them. The other two volunteer companies that had been ordered to Fort Deynaud had arrived and were ready to join Major Arnold in the Big Cypress. The only thing they were waiting on was Durrance’s men, who eventually showed up. The volunteers were ready for a fight, but did not much impress Lieutenant Molinard, the officer in charge at Fort Deynaud. “The Crackers here are all going to eat the Indians without salt. They are as usual a noisy bragging set of Swabs and I hope their crowd will soon put out. What the major is to do with them after they report to him God knows.”54 As far as the War Department was concerned, the proper strategy was to concentrate on the Indians in the Big Cypress and not worry so much about the settlements farther north. Secretary Davis felt that if pressure was kept up, the warriors would have to stay in the south to protect their families and not venture

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north to attack the settlements. To that end, he issued the following instructions to Colonel Munroe: Should this plan of operations be adopted, and prosecuted with energy and determination, the Secretary does not doubt that the most favorable results will follow. To this end it is presumed, most of the volunteer force now posted, for the ostensible purpose of giving confidence and protection to interior settlements, might be more advantageously employed in operating with the troops south of the Colloosahatchee [sic].55

On 1 May the volunteer force of 84 men, accompanied by Lieutenant Hartsuff and 28 regulars, entered the Big Cypress. Whatever the animosities between volunteers and regulars, Hartsuff apparently found a way around it. Reaching Fort Simon Drum the following day, the volunteers received a rude reception from the Indians, as told by Capt. Abner Johnston to General Carter: Sir—We arrived at this place on the 2nd inst. Before we had time to dismount there were two men fired on by the Indians. I ordered a charge to the spot. The soldiers that were shot at saw six Indians. I dismounted the command and charged the hammock. We soon discovered a trail of 6 or 7 Indians. We pursued the trail about 3 miles, a great many of the men up to their waist in mud and water. I soon discovered we could not overtake them. We abandoned the pursuit, expecting to get a more favorable opportunity. Lieut. Hartsuff soon came up and found another trail. With his command he followed it some distance, but without success. We have been scouting by his guidance. He is an excellent man and a perfect gentleman. We have burned up one of Billy’s towns near to Fort Deneaud [sic]. We are to start in the morning to Fort Shackleford, and down by Billy’s place or town in the Big Cypress, and visit all the Indian towns in that direction, which we will accomplish in 5 or 6 days. Then we are ordered to report to Maj. Arnold and join his command in the Cypress … Our men are very anxious to get a fight. We have come a long distance, and they do not want to return without a fight.56

Two days later, Johnston wrote another report, this one to Colonel Brown. He was beginning to learn that the war consisted of a lot of “search and destroy” but little fighting. He also found how hard it was to operate in the Big Cypress, even during the dry season: After remaining one day at Fort Simon Drum, visited Fort Shackleford, examined and destroyed the following towns, to wit: Stuttering Billy’s, Ho-ith-le, Mah-lee-chee-bee, a small old town, and Assinwah’s, arriving at Maj. Arnold’s present depot on the fourth day.57 After leaving Simon Drum saw no Indians or signs. Since arriving at this place under command of Maj. Arnold, we traveled as far South as we could on horseback, and, sending back our horses, went on foot with the Major’s command seven or eight miles South of his present position; destroyed several gardens and town, but were unable to discover Indians or fresh signs or arrive at any definite conclusion concerning their whereabouts. The country at present is one in which there is no probability of operating successfully. Horses cannot penetrate the swamps, and the footmen not to such an extent as to overtake and capture Seminoles.58

At the beginning of May, Colonel Brown wrote a long letter to Gen. Sylvester Churchill, the Inspector General, detailing the disposition of his troops, the problems they’d encountered, recommendations he’d made in the past, and recommendations

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for the future. By his reckoning, he had about 650 men under his command, plus a number of volunteers. Besides those manning the forts, he had Major Arnold patrolling the Big Cypress, Captain Pratt with two companies operating out of boats and attempting to penetrate the Everglades from the west, and patrols into the eastern Everglades from Fort Dallas. The major difficulty he’d run into was the weather. As he told the Inspector General, “The difficulties encountered by the troops this season … can only be appreciated by those who have experienced that—the whole country until within the last three weeks having been literally under water—the quantity fallen having been unprecedented in the winter—when usually from 1 to 2 inches falls in a month—and this season within a space of less than 30 days, 13 inches fell.” Weather information was usually gathered by medical officers, who used the data to help predict when the “miasma” would supposedly rise from the swamp and spread diseases such as Yellow Fever and Malaria.59 Brown reminded Churchill of suggestions he’d made the previous year, that men and equipment should be gathered during the summer and preparations put in place for a winter campaign starting in December. For the most part, his recommendations had been ignored, the result being that, “The troops could not have been able to take the field before the 15 of February—and when they actually did take it—they were too few in numbers and without the means of efficient action.” He then added, “I respectfully suggest that every preparation for the next campaign should be made so early that the troops can take the field on the 15 of December.” Brown knew that Churchill’s recommendations would carry much more weight in Washington than would his own.60 Brown then went on to say that after 19 years in Florida, he was convinced that troops should not be kept in the field after mid-May. “A summer campaign is death to man and beast  … if men do not actually die under its operation, then health and constitutions are irretrievably gone.” He felt that no man should serve in Florida for more than two years, and pointed out that most of the men now on duty had been there three years. He acknowledged that some might interpret his remarks as simply an excuse to request a transfer to a more pleasant climate, but he considered it the duty “of an officer and a Christian” to make his opinions known. He then added, “The idea, entertained, of troops in such circumstances becoming acclimated is simply absurd. The acclimation is that of a worn out and broken down constitution.” While Brown’s comments were certainly humane and in the best interests of the soldiers’ health, he was also ignoring the lessons of the previous war, when summer campaigns had helped bring an end to the conflict.61 He concluded by saying, “If the Indians pursue their present policy of avoiding conflict & keeping … concealed in the swamps, the task of finding & of subduing them is almost hopeless.” In his opinion, the only way to end the war would be to have sufficient troops to penetrate the swamps from all directions, the men divided

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into small detachments of about 80 men each, so they could overtake and capture the enemy, “continually harassing & finally compelling him to surrender.”62 As to a summer campaign and the troops becoming acclimatized, Governor Broome was of a differing opinion. Always eager to push the use of state troops, Broome wrote to Colonel Munroe, telling him: I have always believed that to induce a surrender of the Indians, the capture of their women and children would be necessary. This is not likely to be effected without a vigorous and continued pursuit, and with such force as would induce them that you would succeed. For effective operations against them there is no time more propitious than the summer months, provided you have troops who can stand the climate. For such a purpose and for such a season I fear the unacclimatized regular forces, comprising so large a share of your command, will be found inefficient.63

Organizing the men and materiel for such a campaign would take time, if only because nothing would happen until the bureaucrats in Washington made a decision. Summer was fast approaching, the heat and amount of rain was climbing, and for the time being the offensive would be drawn to a close.

chapter seven

The Evils of a Savage Warfare

The war had been in progress for almost five months yet looked no closer to any sort of resolution than when it had begun. The Indians had made a few small raids and killed a handful of people, but the widespread destruction of the frontier that whites feared hadn’t materialized. On the other side of the equation, the army had killed a few Indians, searched the Big Cypress, and burned several villages in the process, but they were really no closer to capturing the Seminole than they had been at the commencement of the conflict. Something had to change, or the war would drag on for years. The Indians living in the Big Cypress may have been looking forward to a respite from the fighting, but the Creek group led by Oscen Tustennugge had no intention of stopping their vengeful raids on the whites. Oscen’s group was small, perhaps only one or two dozen warriors, but they were highly mobile. They had killed Mr. Carney at the Alafia and made the attacks at Sarasota and the Braden Plantation. It was this mobility, along with their knowledge of the terrain and pathways of communication, that spread so much fear among the settlers. Not that the fear was all on one side. As long as the war continued, neither Indian nor white could truly feel safe within their homes. Up to this point Oscen’s warriors had confined their operations to the area south of a line that ran east from Tampa. That situation changed on the evening of 14 May 1856, when the Indians attacked the home of Capt. Robert Bradley. In a letter to Inspector General Churchill written the following day, Bradley gave an account of what was no doubt a very harrowing experience: In compliance with a verbal message from you this morning (you fortunately being in the neighborhood) I proceed to give you a true statement of the melancholy and afflictive occurrence of the Indian attack upon my house and family last evening. I live about thirty-four (34) miles north of Tampa and about three (3) miles east of the stage road in a newly erected and yet unfinished double pen log house. All my small children were in the passage [open walkway between the two halves of the house]. The attack was made at about early candle light. The first intimation of the presence of the foe was a volley of eight or ten guns fired from not more than fifteen feet from my children—killing two of them almost instantly, being a son of about

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fifteen years of age and a daughter of about ten, each receiving a number of balls. My little son, though having his bowels shot out and otherwise mortally wounded, rose and seized his gun and died with it in his hand, vainly endeavoring to discharge it at the Indians. Being in feeble health myself I was lying on my bed. I rose, seized my gun and discharged it in the midst of several Indians who were in the act of stepping into the entry, upon which the Indians retreated. I can hardly doubt but that one at least was badly wounded—judging from his exclamation when I fired. Several shots were fired at my wife while endeavoring to snatch her children from the passage and one shot was fired at a young man with me as he retreated from the eating house where he happened to be without arms. Two of my daughters and a young man, a relative being some distance from the house attending my stock and hearing the attack, retreated to the house of a near neighbor and gave the alarm. My impression is that there were between twenty and thirty Indians. Such Sir is as true a statement of the occurrence of the attack as the naturally exciting and excited state of my recollection will permit.1

The letter was accompanied by an affidavit signed by 42 of Bradley’s neighbors, verifying the report’s veracity and requesting protection. When sending the letters to Washington, Churchill added: The messenger informs me that the party of men who had assembled at Capt. Bradley’s this morning did not succeed in finding the Indians and trailed them only a short distance in a

Figure 33. Bradley Massacre Marker, east of Dade City.

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southwestwardly direction through a small field and the search ended at about three o’clock p.m. And the opinion of the party confirmed the statement of Capt. B. that there were from twenty to thirty of the Indians. It appears also, what I did not know till now, that Capt. Bradley continued to fire, after the Indians retreated from his house, for about four hours, till the party arrived to protect him.

As evidenced by the number of guns the Bradleys had at the ready, rural Florida was a community already on edge. The attack by Oscen and his men succeeded in turning fear into panic. Reports of Indian “signs” now became widespread, and it seemed as if war parties were lurking behind every tree. People left their farms and homes to take refuge at hastily fortified positions, afraid to venture forth without a strong escort or guard. Ten citizens from Hernando County wrote to Secretary Davis asking for immediate assistance. They explained, “We have emigrated from different States of the Union … we are poor and our little funds exhausted … our wives and children is exposed to the tomahawk and scalping knife of the merciless savage.” It was no doubt a sincere plea for help, but with the American frontier rapidly expanding westward, it was a plea Davis heard all too often from every portion of the nation where Indian and white came into contact.2 Seminole families far to the south could have expressed similar sentiments. While Oscen’s band was making their way toward the Bradley home, Major Arnold was conducting his final foray of the season against the Indians in the Big Cypress. In a letter to Colonel Brown he reported that he would have to relocate his supply depot due to recent rains and the impossibility of transporting provisions through the flooded landscape. Notwithstanding, he was determined to complete his mission. He divided his force, taking approximately 75 regulars down one trail, and sending Lieutenant Hartsuff and 104 mounted volunteers down a different trail. As an indication that the volunteers were learning to cooperate with the regulars, Arnold was happy to report that the Floridians had exhibited “wondrous subordination” and “cheerfully” proceeded on foot when forced to dismount due to high water. Despite everyone’s best efforts no Indians were found, and Arnold had to conclude that the Seminole had retreated deep into the Everglades.3 Upon hearing the news of the Bradley attack General Carter ordered the volunteers in the region to be on the lookout. He believed the raiders were moving south and told the commanders to position their men in the places where they were most likely to intercept the marauders.4 Carter was correct in his assumption, but the instructions came too late. On 17 May, three days after the raid on the Bradley home, Oscen and his men struck again. This time they waylaid a small wagon train carrying provisions from Tampa to Fort Fraser on the Peace River. In a letter to Colonel Munroe, Captain Sparkman of the volunteers, the first officer on the scene, gave a report of what happened: On the 17th inst. a party of Indians supposed to be about 6 or 8 in number captured 3 wagons employed to transport supplies to Capt. Durrance’s Company escorted by three men, killing 2

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of the guard and one of the wagoners … on the east side the Indians had concealed themselves behind some large pines, palmettoes and low bushes within forty or fifty yards of the road and the waggons [sic] arriving there about noon halted and the lad that was killed (Mr. Starling’s son) saw one of them and said to his father look at that man behind that tree and immediately the firing commenced, the boy was wounded, his Father was near the wagon, he picked up his son and put him in the wagon in doing so he was mortally wounded … Shortly after Mr. Roach fell, the negro after firing once was sent off after help. Mr. Hinson being wounded left after firing three or four times. Mr. Hatfield was then left alone—unharnessed his lead mule, mounted her and left, he having loaded and shot twice, there was several balls and shot in the trees the Indians were behind, a little blood was found on the place. Hatfield came to this place in a few minutes being a little over two miles, five men mounted and went as quick as their horses could carry them, more than that could not be spared there being but few at the place. When they got there they saw no Indians, they had plundered the waggons taking off such things as they wanted such as clothes and what ammunition the men had with them, three guns, the wagon sheets, some 4 or 5 quarts of whiskey and a few pounds of coffee but did not attempt to burn the wagons or interfere with the teams, they came out of the Hammock from a N.W. direction and returned the same way. Mr. Starling, his son and Mr. Roach was killed on the ground. Mr. Starling’s son was not dead when the Indians got possession of the waggons, they shot him as he lay in the wagon through the head with a large ball.5

Captain Sparkman and his men soon discovered how difficult it could be to track down their quarry: We were on the ground next morning as early as we could well see signs—they with their usual cunning prevented our getting on the trail for some time and when we did it was on hard meadow ground and before getting in there there fell a heavy shower of rain which so obliterated the track that it prevented it being followed any further. We then divided and the Lieut. went to Alafia and I with the other party went to the Hillsborough, we have examined those places—the Hillsborough swamp we have examined from the cow house nearly up to the bridge on foot or horseback and can find no signs or trails of them whatever in that direction … I am totally at a loss to know how to proceed to capture or scourge those small parties of Indians that are among us. I have been in my saddle every day for eight days past and without any success whatever.6

As news of the attacks spread, people throughout central Florida demanded protection, and the governor’s desk began to fill with requests for mounted volunteer units to patrol the countryside. Governor Broome would have liked to oblige these people, but the money just wasn’t there. The state was going into debt as it was, and there was little hope of Washington picking up the tab for any additional troops. The War Department was questioning the efficacy of the volunteers, and Broome had to admit that they had a point. “We cannot base our claim for pay upon our ability to show that the mounted men have been, up to this time, of great value; for it is true, so far as I have been informed, that no marauding party has been detected and overtaken, until after the commission of their depredation—that the frontier has not been secured—and that, with the exception of the brilliant expedition of Capt. Addison and his associates, no Indians have been caught or killed.” It was a frank admission of a problem faced by both volunteers and regulars: No matter how much

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they patrolled and scouted, it seemed all they ever did was react to depredations after they had taken place. Effectively protecting rural Florida would have meant stationing a squad of soldiers outside every homestead in the peninsula, something both Broome and Davis knew to be an impossible task.7 The scarcity of cash in the state coffers was also making it difficult to keep the volunteers fed. Procuring supplies, having them shipped to Tampa, and then having them taken by escorted wagon trains out to the troops was proving very expensive. The problem was exacerbated by the fact that the local populace was refusing to sell provisions to the troops who were protecting them. Annoyed at this, General Carter was forced to tell one of the commanders, “As previously stated, I have no funds to pay for the purchase of corn, and if the people in whose protection you are employed will not sell on the credit of the State such supplies as they have to spare, and such as the volunteers must consume, it leaves the Governor no alternative, with the limited means within his control, but to disband the troops. This must be the result.”8 The words “as they have to spare” were telling: As subsistence farmers, most would have had little surplus to sell, even if they were inclined to extend credit to the state. The loudest cries for protection were coming from Levy County, where the supposed presence of a large number of warriors gave Governor Broome an opportunity to write to Secretary of War Davis and ask for authorization for more volunteers and an increase in pay for those who would be serving in the southern swamps. Broome freely admitted that at first he had been suspicious of the report, but told Davis: For the purpose of giving confidence to the inhabitants of that county, and of ferreting out the perpetrator of what I considered a wicked hoax, I ordered … Capt. Wright, of Columbia, to take a detachment of reliable men and proceed to the Gulf Hammock, and to scour that and other suspected places in Levy, to kill or capture Indians, if found, and to report fully at an early day … He discovered promptly Indian trails, so numerous and of such size as to satisfy him that they are there in force, and that it would be dangerous to follow them with his detachment, numbering only twenty men.9

The governor sounded very convinced of the Indian presence in his letter to Davis, but in another written on the same day to the officer in charge of the troops looking for those Indians, he sounded less sure of the matter, saying, “I have seen, within a day or two, letters from an intelligent gentleman of that county, who still believes that even Capt. Wright is mistaken, and will find no Indians there, and that all this evidence of Indians is manufactured to order by bad men, who want employment and subsistence.” Like any good politician, he could make the facts fit the agenda.10 Many others were skeptical of the reports, even those who felt they had something to fear. Inspector General Churchill reported, “The inhabitants are in a sad condition of fear all the way from Manatee to the Suwannee, where it is believed, or pretended by some, there are numerous Indians. But the report of Enoch Daniels of 100, 60,

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or even 50 Indians in Levy County the last of March, is not generally believed on the road I have traveled.”11 The press, eager to excite their readers, did their best to make a good story better. Captain Wright, having found signs indicating a large number of Indians, was naturally cautious and decided to wait on reinforcements. In one paper, he was said to be “blocked up,” as if he were under siege and in need of rescue. Another paper was somehow privy to the Indian’s strategy, yet didn’t know Wright’s correct rank. It reported that the native force “was pursued by Col. Wright’s command to a dense swamp, which it was thought imprudent to enter with so small a force, as the Indians had evidently taken a strong position, and only awaited the approach of their pursuers to give them a murderous fire, and then continue their retreat.” Although a complete fabrication, it was nonetheless a good description of Native American tactics.12 The panic was starting to spread, and on 26 May concerned citizens of Micanopy, just east of Levy County, held a meeting that called for the expulsion of the Seminole and complained of “the tardy and inefficient movements of the General Government in providing the requisite means for defending our State against the evils of a savage warfare and in expelling from her borders, a race of beings who are wholly devoid of every sense of moral obligations.” They also offered to raise a company of armed volunteers.13 There was only one problem in all this: Everyone had seen Indian “signs” in numerous places, but no one had actually seen an Indian. Captain Wright had stated, “The open and public manner in which they leave their trails, and the number and size of them, leads me to suppose that they are in sufficient strength to make them careless of discovery or pursuit.” If they were so careless and nonchalant, why had no one seen them? In addition, if they had been there for months, as it was claimed, why hadn’t they attacked anyone or stolen any cattle? Something didn’t seem right, as General Carter noted after giving Governor Broome a rundown of the movements of the hostiles in the rest of the state. “Under these facts it is to my mind remarkable that the Indians should be ‘in considerable force’ in the region of Suwannee.”14 Up in Washington, Secretary Davis was getting fed up with the constant pleading for more volunteer units. In response to Governor Broome’s request that the pay of the volunteers serving in the Everglades be increased, Davis replied: Complaints have been made by citizens of Florida to the military commander of the turbulent conduct of some of the Volunteers, particularly of Capt. Jernigan’s company, stationed for the protection of the settlements, and it has been said that they were dreaded more than the Indians. If Volunteers, when mustered into the service, take advantage of their organization to indulge in idleness, intoxication and lawless depredations on those whom they are employed to protect—or, if, as is also stated, and perhaps to be justified by the hazards of their frontier residence, they in some instances remain at their homes, entirely occupied with their private interests, and make

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their public engagements a mere matter of convenience—the first change required would seem to be in the character of the troops furnished by the State for the public service.15

Broome had already gotten the message and by the time Davis wrote, Captain Jernigan had been removed from duty.16 As weeks passed, the patrols in Levy County continued, but no Indians were ever spotted. Finally, as the signs faded, it was decided that the Indians had gone south, and the patrols were either disbanded or sent elsewhere. Then, on 21 June, General Carter received word from Captain Wright that two men, Jonathan Rhodes and David Gurgaines, had been arrested for impersonating Indians and leaving footprints. When questioned, the two men insisted they had been under the employ of Enoch Daniels, the man who had first made the reports and then raised a company of volunteers. Wright promptly arrested Daniels.17 Three days later a court martial was convened to try Daniels. The two Indian impersonators were thoroughly examined separately and not allowed to speak to each other. Their testimony proved contradictory to each other and to what they had told civil authorities the day before. By the end of the day, the court decided Daniels was innocent of any wrongdoing and that the two men had blamed him in an attempt to save themselves. The miscreants were turned over to the civil authorities to face charges of perjury and possibly treason. As for Daniels, Governor Broome had the final word, telling Carter, “I suggest that you notify him that there are to be no more Indian signs seen in his section.”18 Inspector General Churchill had been sent to Florida to examine the posts, the troops, and everything else connected to the war and report back to commanding general Winfield Scott. In his report, Churchill gave his opinion on the population of Florida Indians, and the numbers weren’t adding up. Major Arnold had reported being attacked by 80–100 warriors on 7 April, and Captain Pratt had reported about 25 Indians in the 29 March attack at the Fakahatchee that killed two soldiers. If that was true, there were a lot more Seminole warriors  than Captain Casey had estimated. Churchill tended to think the numbers were exaggerated, and told Scott: Col. Brown and others think the estimate by Major Arnold of the party “80 or 100” which attacked him was much too large. If Major Arnold found eighty Indians, his lowest estimate near the middle of the peninsula the 7th of April,

Figure 34. General Sylvester Churchill. A veteran of the War of 1812 and Mexican/ American War, he was Inspector General in the Third Seminole War.

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and those who had shown themselves on the western part were not among them, there must, I think, be considerably more than one hundred in all. Many people who profess to know, say there are more, yet I rely on Capt. Casey’s report as quite authentic. But it makes very little difference whether there are one hundred or one hundred and fifty: it will be as difficult to find the last ten as the first fifty.19

Churchill then waded into the argument concerning the comparative qualifications of regulars versus volunteers: With all the professed skill of the citizens to find and follow Indian trails, and they are or should be vastly superior in these to our enlisted foreigners, they have not of late been successful in pursuing any party save that which attacked Dr. Braden on the Manatee: that party, by Indians, negroes and mules all on the same track, made a trail as plain to be seen as if they had blazed it and wished to be followed.20

Another matter he took up was the government’s offer of cash payments for living Indians that were captured or surrendered. As far as he was concerned the bounty should extend to dead Indians as well, though at a lesser rate of payment. He felt that once the Indians were aware there was a price on their heads, they would be inclined to turn themselves in. If there was any moral conundrum, he didn’t see it. “I can not distinguish any difference between paying for an act done or hiring a person to do it, as all our soldiers are hired to kill as an important part of their duties; and the ingenuity of mechanics is applauded and patronized for clever improvements in weapons intended for killing men.”21 The conclusion to his report did not sound very hopeful: But with all the means that can be provided, the adoption of the most sagacious plans, vigilant attention and persevering labor, mental and bodily suffering, this service will be, as it has been, one for which no thanks will be awarded, unmeasured fault finding and censure will be applied; in almost every thing failure, not success, must be expected; and if, at the end of half a score of years—I hope in less—the Indians are entirely removed, the land and water from which they have been driven, will be found worthless for the use of honest, industrious white people; and in fifty years more the succeeding occupants will be more dangerous than the present savages.22

As had happened in the previous war, people in the military often felt they were being ill used, mere pawns in a war of questionable morality, driven by political demands, not necessity. The attacks on the Bradley home and the wagon train made everyone in central Florida nervous, including the mail carriers. Inspector General Churchill, who had been in the vicinity of the Bradley home when it was attacked, informed the Adjutant General that the mail between Palatka and Tampa (the route most used to get mail between the war zone and Washington) was being held at the post office, “The contractor not being willing to venture through without a guard, so long as it may be supposed the Indians who attacked Capt. Bradley’s house or others, are in that vicinity. Perhaps the mail might go through in safety, but I do not think it would be prudent to risk it.”23

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Wanting protection, the mail contractor, Hubbard L. Hart, wrote to Senator Yulee, who took his concerns to the Postmaster General, who in turn passed them on to the secretary of war. Davis, in turn, referred the whole matter back to Florida and offered little encouragement for any real assistance. Responding to the Postmaster General, he stated, “I … have the honor to inform you that the question will be referred to the commanding officer in Florida for such action as the means at his disposal and the interests of the service will authorize.” Everyone, from postal carriers to surveyors, wanted protection, but there simply weren’t enough soldiers to go around or the funds to pay for them.24 It took awhile, but in early July Colonel Munroe ordered an escort of volunteers for the mail carrier. Unfortunately, this took men away from the job of searching for Indians, so he asked that no more than 20 men be employed in the duty, and that the War or Post Office Department allow special funding for a detachment that would be hired by the contractor. In the meantime, eight postmasters along the route wrote to James Campbell, the Postmaster General, also requesting escorts that would be under the control of the contractor running the mail stage.25 The need for the Postmaster to have control of the escort became apparent the first time they were used. The volunteers were late in arriving at the starting point, and then decided they had to stop and rest after only 13 miles of the 75-mile trip. It took some time, but the driver convinced them to continue, insisting that the mail and passengers in the stage were on a schedule. The escort relented, but only went 6 additional miles. Exasperated, the stage driver went on without them.26 In Washington, Secretary Davis agreed with the arrangement, but ever-watchful of his budget, suggested the Postal Department pay for the men. The Post Office, in turn, informed Senator Yulee that the Postal Department was not authorized to make such expenditures. Everybody agreed the mail needed protection, but no one wanted to pay for it.27 It was now May, and the summer of 1856 was fast approaching. It was also time for the campaign in the Big Cypress to draw to a close. At the beginning of the month an expedition made up of regulars and volunteers left Fort Deynaud to join Major Arnold at Fort Simon Drum. Immediately after their arrival, two of the men were fired upon by a small party of Seminole hiding in a nearby swamp. The volunteers, still on their mounts, gave chase, but could not catch the Indians. The officer in charge noted that the conditions were as good as they could get for chasing the attackers, though he did not mention whether or not the Indians were mounted. He told Colonel Brown, “The result shows the perfect ease with which the Indians can escape when they desire to.”28 Munroe informed the Adjutant General, “The operations of the troops acting on the north side of the Big Cypress will necessarily be suspended during the

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rainy season which usually commences the latter end of this month, and they withdrawn to be employed elsewhere. The service then in that quarter will, during the Summer, necessarily be limited to boats acting from the Western Coast and Everglades.”29 Looking ahead to next winter’s campaign, Munroe reiterated the plea for higher pay for the volunteers who would be serving in the Big Cypress and Everglades. “The almost entire failure to procure foot volunteers, on my previous requisition, induces me to think that none can be obtained for the service indicated. Were pay offered which would put this description of troops on some measure of equality with mounted men, or if the rates of wages in civil life were made the standard, suitable persons might be procured, but not otherwise.” Even the higher pay may not have been a sufficient inducement. Serving in the volunteers was a matter of pride among the frontier citizenry, and being mounted added to the prestige. No horse, no status.30 At Fort Center Lieutenant Webb was impatiently awaiting orders telling him to abandon the post and return to Fort Deynaud. As far as he could tell, the only reason for his being there was to justify the expensive copper boats that were kept at the post. As he told his wife: Were it not for these confounded boats I do not think they would attach much importance to this post for I cannot for the life of me imagine how the Indians can ever be fools enough to seek Lake Okeechobee unless they are half alligators half mud-fish. Here they have boats enough to carry a company & they being worth about $3000.00 they have to be transported 30+ miles over bad roads to Fort Deynaud again. It took six days to bring them up here & I will warrant I will take them down in a day & a half when they order it to be done.31

Webb was certainly ready to get out of Florida. In his journal he noted, “Mosquitos awful! Fleas! Indescribable! Heat!! Don’t speak of it. This country should be preserved for the Indians of all the territories, and if the fleas and other vermin do not destroy them they might be left to live. I could not wish them all in a worse place.” General Carter was also ready to get his men out of the swamps, and on 25 May issued

Figure 35. Sketch of Fort Center, by Alexander Webb. The fort was located on Fisheating Creek on the northwest side of Lake Okeechobee.

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an order telling the volunteers who were operating with the regulars in the Big Cypress to return to their posts along the Peace River valley and take up defensive positions there.32 On 30 May, Webb finally got his wish. Five wagons and 22 soldiers arrived to help transport the men of Fort Center and their equipment back to Fort Deynaud. There would, however, be one delay: Lieutenant Garner, who was in charge of the relief party, was under orders to make one last reconnaissance of Lake Okeechobee. As Webb recorded in his journal, the trip did not go well: Started on expedition to circumnavigate Lake Okeechobee at 3 a.m. with two boats and twentythree enlisted men. Had to pole through the mouth of creek, it being perfectly chocked up with floating celery. Found the lake quite smooth and proceeded along the north shore very rapidly for about twenty miles. Here a storm arose, and, after pulling against it for three and one-half hours without gaining a foot, we tried to put in to a point which appeared to afford a landing. (All the lake shore is swampy and crowded with sedge.) After pulling a long time, we reached a point 200 yards from where we rested for one hour. A second attempt to move N.E. proved ineffectual, nor could we point to Fort McCrae. Finally, at 2 p.m., we rigged up a square sail and let drive before the wind, the men being too exhausted to row. But our mast broke and we were driven ashore and had to labor hard for two hours to get off. The wind drove the boats about as if they were as shells, and oars were ineffectual. The men here got into water up to their arm-pits. Driven along the coast for six hours, night overtook us, driving us ashore a second time nearly six miles from the creek. Here we lay, thumping on the bottom at each wave all night.33

Defeated by the weather and exhaustion, the party made its way back to Fort Center. The troops were no doubt happy the expedition was over, but Lieutenants Garner and Webb felt it their duty to give it one more try. As Webb reported: Although two nights without sleep, I jumped up and had the large boat (copper) again launched and set to work to rig three sails. This I had accomplished in a thorough manner before 2 a.m., and reported to Lieutenant Garner that I could furnish him with a boat for a second attempt. At 4 p.m. we started, with a staunch copper boat and fifteen picked men, with sails and oars in perfect condition, to make a faithful attempt to obey orders. I never felt more confident in my life of a successful termination. It began to rain about 5 p.m. and when we reached the mouth of the river it stormed dreadfully until 9 p.m. We worked as hard as we could without being able to get a mile from the starting point. Everyone was soaked, and the boat labored under a tough lake sea. We returned to Fort Center fully persuaded that Lake Okeechobee is not navigable at this time of the year.34

Lake Okeechobee was, and still is, a deceptive body of water. Big and shallow, it is particularly susceptible to large waves caused by strong winds. A storm surge created by a hurricane in 1928 resulted in the deaths of approximately 2,500 people living along the shores of the lake. The following day, 2 June, Fort Center was closed down. The expensive copper boats were loaded onto special wagons for the trip, and the group began its march, reaching Fort Deynaud the following day. The next day word was received that the campaign had ended for the summer and that Fort Simon Drum and other posts

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in the Big Cypress would be abandoned.35 In a letter to Colonel Munroe, Brown gave his reasons for suspending operations: Our available forces are too small, and too much broken down by disease to carry on any efficient operations this summer. The country in which the Indians are concealed is already flooded & will soon be all under water & impracticable to white man—therefore no decisive results can be hoped for this season. The Indians with the exception of some 12 or 15 are without doubt concentrated somewhere in the Big Cypress & if undisturbed will probably remain so but if now pursued & harassed may scatter and spread death & desolation over the frontier settlements.36

Although the overland campaign in the Big Cypress was over for the summer, patrols could still be conducted by boat and in the dryer portions of the state. To that end, General Carter ordered the volunteers to increase their patrols in the Hernando County area, in the vicinity of Tampa, and along the Peace River. Carter also intended to go farther afield after the Indians. In a letter to Governor Broome, he stated, “I design, in co-operation with Col. Munroe, to make a movement with about sixty men, in the region of Istapoga [Lake Istokpoga], Okeechobee and Kissimi [Kissimmee River], where we have reason to believe there are Indians, and from where, no doubt, the parties annoying the settlements proceed.” It may have been a commendable idea, but the land north of Lake Okeechobee was low and would be covered with water once the rains began.37 Not only had Webb’s men from Fort Center come in to Fort Deynaud, but soldiers from the Big Cypress campaign were also arriving. The post doctor had been tasked with writing a report as to whether or not the men were fit for another trip into the Big Cypress. Webb doubted it. “They are used up. Dysentery pretty bad here, and the command very much enfeebled by it. Peterfield, of my company, is very low indeed. I have visited him several times, and from his looks consider him as good as dead.” Later that day he wrote, “Peterfield died at 11:15. I was with him several times during the evening … The effect of a death in this way upon men sick of the same disease must be and is very, very bad. We will have to bury him very early in the morning.” The following day he noted, “The command from the swamp came in at 1:30. The men and animals perfectly used up. I never saw men so disheartened or officers so fagged out.”38 For officers like Webb it was hard to believe that someone was actually thinking of sending the men back out. He wrote to his wife, “If the selfishness of some fond of command could be put aside & the reports of the Doctors be sent to the War Department & not stuck in pigeon holes in Tampa I have no doubt the companies serving now in Florida would be taken North. I have seen these men suffer everything & I detest & abhor to execute the orders given me & force them to obey them.” The assistant surgeon tended to agree, and in his report to Colonel Brown, declared the men unfit for further service in the harsh Florida summer. Brown then forwarded the report to Washington.39

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As if the bugs, heat, and disease weren’t bad enough, things were about to get even worse at Fort Deynaud. On 8 June 1856, Webb reported: At 8:30 p.m., a terrible fire occurred at Fort Deynaud, and the barracks (palmetto sheds), Sutler’s store, guardhouse and two large stables. We could not save anything. The men lost their all, save two or three, who saved their coats. One-half rescued their arms and ammunition. Larned and myself were the only officers at the post at the time. A great many muskets and pistols having of necessity been left loaded in their racks, and becoming heated, the musket-balls flew around in every direction and rendered it rather dangerous for one to do his duty. However, no one was hurt, and we now remain with the men in tents pitched on the hot sand.40

It was estimated that the loss suffered by the sutler, a Mr. Louis Covacavitch, was between $2,000 and $3,500, a significant sum at the time. Debate continued as to whether the men who had been stationed in Florida for several years would become acclimated and build an immunity to disease, primarily Malaria or Dengue Fever. In a letter to the Surgeon General by two assistant surgeons in Florida, the doctors went to considerable length to scientifically prove the need for troop rotation. They first quoted a report by British medical officers who stated, “Troops are likely to gain but little immunity from either disease or mortality by a prolonged residence in the West Indies.” This was important because the tropical diseases the American surgeons were fighting were the same as those in the West Indies. They then turned to statistics for Fort Myers and showed that men who had been stationed there for several years were sick with fevers, on average, seven times a year. In contrast, newly deployed soldiers suffered from fevers less than an average of two times in their first year of duty at Fort Myers.41 In a letter to the Secretary of War, the Surgeon General concurred, pointing out that it usually wasn’t the Malaria that killed the soldiers, but some other malady the weakened body couldn’t fight off. “The mortality in a country like Southern Florida is not comparatively much greater than in other sections of our country; but the amount of invaliding is infinitely greater. A subject will languish for years, getting weaker and weaker each succeeding year from the effects of the climate, and is at last cut off by a new disease which readily prevails over the feeble energies of a broken down constitution.”42 In an age when the accomplishments of enlisted men were rarely noted, even on the battlefield, it is refreshing to see someone get credit for a job well done in a position that was usually not thought of as being important. Feeling the need for a special commendation, the assistant surgeon at Fort Myers wrote: This is to certify that Mr. George Gutherie has been acting in the capacity of Steward in the Hospital under my charge, at the post, since December 1st, 1853. During the greater portion of that time the Hospital has been crowded with sick for several weeks of this period and owing to my absence from the post, he has had to act both as Steward and Surgeon, and in both capacities, has at all times, given the brightest satisfaction.

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The official sick reports during his term of service show an aggregate of near three thousand cases with only two deaths. To those who know how much the success of the physician depends on faithful attendance and nursing in his absence, no higher communication can be given of duty efficiently performed by a steward than the above simple statement.43

Whatever the status of the soldiers’ health or the weather, it was obvious that further campaigns would be needed to end the war. The big question was who exactly was going to be doing the fighting. No one recognized it at the time, but the course of the war was about to change. On 8 June Captain Sparkman reported that several gentlemen, including a “Mr. Willoby Tulis,” informed him, “They saw distinctly and trailed some distance an Indian track, about one mile beyond Six Mile Creek on the road leading to Ft. Meade.” Six days later, near sunrise on the morning of 14 June, a party of Indians attacked Willoughby Tillis’s isolated homestead south of Fort Meade on the Peace River. As Tillis’s six-year-old son James Dallas related many years later: It was the custom of my father and my oldest brother to pen [the cattle] at night and turn them out in the morning, but one of the children became seriously sick one night and father was up all night. In order that he might get a little rest before going to work, my mother took a Negro girl with her to attend to the cattle next morning. As they approached the pens it was noted that the cattle were excited, milling about, sniffing and snorting; and on investigating mother discovered a number of Indians crouched under some rails leaning against the fence. The exciting discovery caused mother to scream to the Negro girl to run for her life and as they ran the cattle became more excited and began running in circles. Running in a crouched position and keeping the cattle between them caused the Indians to shoot above them when they fired.44

The two women made it safely into the house as the warriors began to circle the building. Awakened by the shooting, Tillis and a farm hand, Thomas Underhill, returned fire, and were able to hold off the attackers. The Indians, suffering several casualties, kept their distance, having accomplished little besides the wounding of a black woman and the killing of several horses.45 As Captain Durrance later reported to General Carter: Lieut. [Alderman] Carlton, who happened to be at Ft. Meade, on a visit to his family, heard the report of the guns, and, in company with six others, went to the relief of Tillis and his family. On the approach of those men, the Indians fled to a thicket near by. Lieut. Carlton, with his little band of brave men, charged them, and a desperate engagement ensued. Lieut. Carlton and Lott Whidden, of my Company, were killed, and Daniel Carlton wounded. William Parker, of Capt. Hooker’s Company was also killed, and J. H. Hollingsworth wounded. There were three Indians killed, and several wounded.46

It was close, desperate, hand-to-hand fighting, with men falling on both sides. Captain Hooker later reported, “One [Indian] charged on William McCullough, as in a fisty-cuff fight, they striking and fending off with their empty guns; had it round and round, till McCullough threw down his gun, clenched the Indian, and threw him down and caught and held his wrists until D. Carlton ran to his

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assistance and cut the Indian’s throat, leaving him for dead.” It was the same William McCullough who had narrowly escaped with his wife in the 1849 attack on the Kennedy-Darling Store. Due to the small frontier population many of the volunteers were related though marriage, and an attack on one was an attack on the whole community. For these people, war with the Seminole was a personal matter.47 Word of the attack was immediately sent to Captain Durrance at nearby Fort Fraser, who dispatched two sergeants and 15 men to aid Carlton’s little band. These men arrived at the Tillis home about half past noon, found the family safe, and Figure 36. Florida Volunteer Lieutenant Alderman proceeded on to the battleground. Carlton. Killed in close hand-to-hand fighting leading Eight to 10 other men from Captains a small force of volunteers against a larger band of Hooker’s and Lesley’s companies Seminole at the Tillis Battle, 14 June 1856. soon joined them. Taking up the trail, they pursued the Indians until they reached a dense hammock. With night falling, unsure of the enemy’s strength and in need of supplies, they returned to Fort Meade.48 Better organized and supplied, the soldiers returned to the trail on the morning of the 15th, intent on finding the marauders and exacting revenge for the friends they had lost. All day they tracked the Indians through the swampland until it grew dark, when they withdrew to dry ground to camp for the night.49 The next morning 19 volunteers under Lt. Streaty Parker re-entered the swamp and resumed the search. About 10 o’clock, near present-day Zolfo Springs, they found what they were looking for. In a report written several days later, Captain Hooker gave a rather romanticized account of the ensuing battle: We came upon their watch, who, judging from his surprised manner as he ran into camp, we think must have been asleep. 2 guns were fired at him which alarmed the red skins who had taken up their position for battle—it was an admirable selection, being under the bluff in the bend of the river, but the brave 19 heroes were on hand, and the order to charge was as promptly obeyed as though each had been going to a dance—on they went charging coolly & successfully, 5 or 6 savages were shot down at a log and lay there in a pile; several took to the river and were killed while swimming, but a large number got across and on the bluff behind the trees, whose fire at our party did more execution than those that were near, as they killed 2

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of our men, George Howell and Robert Prine, and wounded 3 more, James Whidden, Wm. P. Brooker & John S. Skipper. Thus being deprived of the assistance of 5 men … and seeing that the Indians were endeavoring to flank us now they had recovered from their surprise, it was thought best to retreat from our position, which we did in good order, taking with us our wounded. The Indians not caring or wishing for a repetition of the lesson we had given them, kept at respectful distance, and we carried our wounded to Brooker’s place, which was our rendezvous for the present.50

The following day a large force of volunteers gathered and went in pursuit of the surviving Indians, keeping up the search for two days. Knowing they were being hunted, the warriors made their escape to more secure hiding places. At the captured camp, the volunteers found goods that had been looted from the wagon train attacked a month earlier. The volunteers hailed it as a great victory, but that was stretching the truth. They had suffered heavily at the initial fight, and while they had killed a number of Seminole in the second battle, they had eventually been forced to withdraw.51 It may have been a draw, but the Tillis Battle would turn out to be the most important engagement of the war. In the number of men dead and wounded on both sides, it would be the deadliest and most hard fought. More significantly, one of the Indians killed was Oscen Tustennuggee, the band’s leader. The loss of Oscen and the killing of so many of his followers served to remove most of the threat to the homesteads north of Lake Okeechobee. From this point forward the war would be fought along the Kissimmee River, in the Big Cypress, and into the watery Everglades.52 Summer had arrived, and for the most part fighting had ceased. Oscen Tustennuggee’s band was effectively out of action and hiding from the numerous patrols that were scouring the area. There was a report of two volunteers being fired on (one wounded) near Fort Deynaud, and when the trail was followed the next day, a camp was found that some estimated would have accommodated 80–100 Indians.53 One common factor in all wars is Figure 37. Tillis Battle Monument, Fort Meade. loss by friendly fire. At Fort Myers,

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a Corporal Manning, for unknown reasons, attempted to crawl past a sentry one night on his hands and knees. The sentry issued a challenge, and when the corporal failed to answer the challenge, the sentry shot him dead.54 There were also people who could not face the future the war left them with. Near the end of May, not far from Punta Rassa at the mouth of the Caloosahatchee, a Seminole guide by the name of Chai killed himself. He had been captured by the army during the previous war, and he and his wife Polly had often served the army as guides and interpreters. Not accepted by white society and an outcast from his own people, he had apparently reached a point where there was no reason to go on.55 Although the volunteers had fought bravely and well against the Seminole at the Tillis Battle, the army was ready to replace them. They had been enlisted for six months, and the time was soon to run out. One of the problems Colonel Munroe had experienced with the men was that they had been recruited from the area that needed protection and seemed to spend more time at home than in the field. To alleviate the problem, Secretary Davis informed the governor that new companies should be recruited from elsewhere in the state, far from their homes and the accompanying temptations.56 Governor Broome was tired of hearing about the poor discipline among the volunteers, and in a letter to General Carter, he spelled out the enlistment criteria: Each man recruited will be required to arm himself with a good double-barreled or rifle gun, and must be well mounted. In your inspection you will be rigid. You will conform strictly to the army regulations and receive no man who is not able to render efficient service. You will receive no man as a commander who, in the late service, either as officer or private, was known to have been insubordinate, or who refused promptly to obey orders properly extended, or who failed to discharge his duty promptly and efficiently, whether such party was in the service of the State or of the United States.57

Ten days later, Broome added an additional qualification. “You will refuse peremptorily to receive any man into the service of the State, either as an officer or private, who is habitually intemperate in his habits, and you will require of each commander the prompt discharge of any man under his command who is guilty of drunkenness … You will regard the failure of any commander to carry out these instructions as good and sufficient cause for his discharge from the service of the State.”58 Colonel Munroe was also asking the governor for more un-mounted volunteers. Called boat companies, these men generally operated out of boats in the coastal Everglades, and Captain Turner’s company had proved especially useful on the previous campaign. If Munroe was going to mount a successful fall and winter campaign, he needed more men like that. Even though the companies had been difficult to recruit because of lower pay than mounted volunteers, Munroe asked for two additional companies and replacements for the one already in service.59

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One of the most chilling aspects of a guerrilla war is that no place is safe from attack and no warning is given. People couldn’t let their guard down, but on the other hand, they couldn’t stay on high alert all the time. On 2 August, the Seminole proved that fact by ambushing two soldiers who were collecting shells on the beach about 300 yards from the blockhouse at Punta Rassa. One of the soldiers was killed and the other severely wounded. Punta Rassa was an isolated spot at the mouth of the Caloosahatchee River on the Gulf of Mexico. As the depot where ocean-going ships off-loaded their cargo for Fort Myers, it had a small garrison, and was far from the Seminole villages in the Big Cypress or Everglades. A lovely spot by the beach, newspaper reports said the soldiers had gone to nearby Sanibel Island to gather sea shells. It was the sort of place where the soldiers probably felt safe. Not anymore.60 Over on the east coast, two companies under Lieutenants Langdon and Bell began an extended scout of the area south and west of Fort Dallas after Indians were sighted in the vicinity of the fort. Langdon, traveling by canoe, took the water routes, while Bell scouted by land. The two group’s paths occasionally crossed, and they eventually merged, going as far south as Key Largo. Several camps were found, some recent and others not having been used in some time, but no Indians were seen.61 At Fort Dallas it was reported that a civilian boat in the waters nearby was acting suspiciously. As the commanding officer noted, “I supposed that he either intended to introduce liquor on the Miami or to carry off men who might desire to desert, and, he was closely watched to prevent his accomplishing either of those objects.” The boat, known to be carrying whiskey and other commodities, was then seen to make occasional stops near places Indians were thought to frequent. Someone would go ashore for a short time, then return to the boat and move a bit further down the coast. When the boat stopped at Indian Key, the captain asked about the strength and readiness of the army detachment guarding the island. It was commonly believed that the Seminole were being supplied and aided by whites who hoped to profit from the conflict, and this appeared to be one of the culprits.62 The Seminole were not only fighting to maintain their homeland; they were also fighting for cultural survival. One of the primary reasons the Seminole had fought the seven-year Second Seminole War and were now resisting removal in this third war was that there appeared to be little future for them in Indian Territory. A stipulation in the 1832 Treaty of Payne’s Landing specified that they were to be given a portion of the land set aside for the Creek Nation and be amalgamated into the Creeks. As far as the Seminole were concerned, this was unacceptable. The predominant Lower Creeks were their enemies, and government annuities and other benefits would be distributed to the Seminole through the Creeks, who might keep more than their fair share. In addition, a sizable number of blacks lived among the Seminole, and the Creeks were slave owners, forever on the lookout to obtain more “property.” The Seminole rightly feared that their identity as a people would disappear once they reached Indian Territory.63

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The government, wanting to save thousands of dollars in the administrative costs associated with running a separate Seminole Agency, had refused to budge on the stipulation in the 1830s, resulting in a multi-million-dollar war. Now, faced with another expensive war, Washington decided a little flexibility might be a good thing. To that end, a treaty was negotiated with the western Seminole giving them their own 2-million-acre reservation, $100,000 for resettlement expenses, and $500,000 deposited in a trust fund. For the western Seminole it was a good deal, but there was one catch: Half the trust fund money would be withheld until the Florida Seminole surrendered and agreed to emigrate.64 In Washington, plans were being made for the coming winter campaign. The weather would start to cool in October, and the men and materiel needed would have to be gathered and sent south. In a letter to the secretary of war, the Adjutant General suggested a combined force of regulars and volunteers totaling approximately 2,200 men. Taking Inspector General Churchill’s advice, he called for a cordon of posts to be built around the Seminole territory with constant patrols between them, a tactic commonly used on the western frontier as well. Then, as the Indians were forced within their bounds, the patrols could be drawn closer together until the Seminole were hemmed in and had no chance of escape. Of course all of this depended upon passage of the pending Army Appropriations Bill before Congress.65 The pleas from Colonels Munroe and Brown that their men needed to be relieved from duty in Florida were finally being listened to. It was decided that most of the companies in Florida, which were part of the First and Second Artillery Regiments, would be sent to Texas. Replacing them would be units from the Fourth Artillery and the Fifth Infantry. The only thing needed was someone to command the war.66 On 31 August, Secretary Davis met with Brig. Gen. William S. Harney, a man with a reputation for forcefully handling Indian problems and who was familiar with campaigning in Florida from the previous war. Davis asked for Harney’s views on how to conduct the war. The general spelled out his recommendations, though he didn’t sound entirely confident of success: There should not be less than two full Regiments of Regular Troops in Florida. This number of Regular (foot) will make the same number of Volunteers (foot) very efficient if that number should be deemed necessary. These troops should act almost entirely in canoes and small boats. There must be a sufficient mounted force to prevent the Indians from escaping into the settlements, when they find themselves compelled to abandon their hiding places in the Cypress swamps of the southern part of the Peninsula. The number of mounted troops which will be required, I am unable to state precisely, but certainly not less than eight or ten full companies. These troops should be particularly active during the operations of the foot troops and boatmen … I would also suggest that one hundred of Colt’s Repeating Rifles be furnished the command for pursuing the Indians in Canoes—The difficulty of loading the ordinary weapon in a canoe

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being so great; as I have repeatedly witnessed myself; and the moral effect of this weapon of Colt’s upon the Indian being so sensibly felt. With a force not less than above stated, I believe I can drive the Indians from Florida during the coming season if it is possible to drive them out at all, which I consider very doubtful indeed.67

Satisfied with the man and the plan, Davis appointed Harney to the job. He then wrote to Governor Broome: I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of the 14th ult., in reference to a new campaign against the hostile Seminoles, and, in reply, to inform you that orders have been given by this department for the concentration in the Peninsula of Florida, early in November next, of fourteen companies of artillery and a regiment of infantry; in all amounting to about two thousand officers and men. Bt. [Brevet] Brig. Gen. Harney will be assigned to the command of the troops, and he will be authorized to call upon you for eight or ten companies of volunteers, having the same organization as the companies heretofore furnished by the State of Florida. The pay of the volunteers being fixed by law, the Department cannot comply with your suggestion for an increase of their compensation.68

The citizens of Florida felt they were finally getting the attention from the War Department they deserved. If anyone could defeat the Seminole, Harney was the man. As one Floridian wrote, “Gen. Harney was the friend and protégé of Andrew Jackson, and having had experience in Florida, there can be no doubt that within six weeks after his arrival in the land of ‘sun, sand and flowers,’ no more will be heard of Indian disturbances in that quarter.”69

chapter eight

This is a Mere Show of Doing Something

Brigadier General William S. Harney was going to be the savior of Florida, or so it was predicted. A native of Tennessee, he had first come to Florida as an aide to Andrew Jackson when Old Hickory served as the first Territorial Governor. A headstrong, opinionated, and quick-to-anger young man, Harney stood courts martial twice in 1824 for run-ins with his superior officer, Stephen Watts Kearny. Though judged guilty both times, the convictions did little harm to Harney’s career. Officers were forever having disputes over petty matters, and a court martial was a much better way to settle differences than a duel.1 Between 1825 and 1832, most of Harney’s time was spent on the western frontier fighting Indians and learning their habits. While serving in the Northwest Territory at Fort Winnebago he met both Jefferson Davis and Abraham Lincoln. Davis described Harney as “physically, the finest specimen of a man I ever saw.” Tall and muscular, the general could intimidate people simply by his presence. When he spoke, people listened, and when he moved, you had best not be in his way.2 As imposing a figure as he was, not everyone was impressed with him. One officer, Maj. Thomas R. Williams, thought it for the best when Harney didn’t receive a promotion to one of the army’s highest positions. “It is well as it is, for Harney is entirely unequal to the appointment. His thinking apparatus is strangely deficient. He is simply a large, active, brave man, & would probably be distinguished in the rank & file of most armies.” This was hardly high praise from a fellow officer who would soon be serving under Harney.3 Although considered one of the nation’s foremost Indian fighters, Harney was not an “Indian hater.” Indeed, throughout his career, he did his best to have Native Americans treated fairly and was friends with many of them. As long as the Indians were peaceful, he could be an influential ally. Let them attack whites, however, and he would be their worst enemy. Through it all, in peace or war, Harney was known as a man of his word, and the Indians had faith in what he said. If he promised them protection in peacetime, they could feel safe. If he promised them destruction in wartime, they had good reason to be afraid.

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It was during the Second Seminole War that Harney proved how vengeful an enemy he could be. Just before dawn on 23 July 1839 Harney and his men were attacked while establishing a trading post on the Caloosahatchee River, part of a peace agreement that was supposed to end the war. Harney and a few other soldiers were able to escape by dashing into the river, but most of the approximately two dozen soldiers and merchants were killed. Going after the hostile band he felt was responsible, Harney and his men hunted them down in the Everglades, traveling in Indian canoes and dressed in native clothing. If a warrior didn’t immediately surrender but tried to Figure 38. General William S. Harney. A veteran of all fight or flee he would be shot, or, if three Seminole Wars, he was well known for dealing captured, hung from the most suitable harshly with hostile Indians. tree. Harney was sending a message, and the Seminole knew exactly what he was saying.4 The general had gone on to serve with distinction in the war with Mexico, and then spent several years fighting Indians in West Texas. In 1854 Secretary Davis recalled him from a vacation in France to put an end to trouble with the Sioux Indians in Nebraska. Having dealt harshly with the Sioux, Harney was ready to get to work in Florida.5 As one writer noted: One old soldier I accidentally met with the other day said that the Indians did not fear any one of the officers who had ever been here but old Harney. When Col. Harney was here, he treated them with so much severity, that the Indian women to this day, scare their children by telling them that they will give them to old Harney … He has a way peculiarly his own of settling all Indian difficulties, and it is probably this fact which has led the Executive to confide to him the seemingly herculean task of “concluding” this “interminable Seminole war.” He will do it.6

This time the government was determined to put an end to its Seminole problems. Besides all the troops, they were also sending the equipment those men would need. The quartermaster at Fort Brooke wrote to his superiors in Washington, telling them what he thought would be needed for the coming campaign, in addition to what was already there: One low pressure, Sea Steamer side wheel, and drawing loaded not exceeding five and one half feet water … 438 mules; 35 horses; 60 wagons; 3 ambulances; 60 mule harnesses; 40 saddles

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and bridles (riding); 50 pack saddles & bridles … 33 Boats for Gulf and Everglades operation. Boats to be eighteen feet long, three feet beam, and so constructed as to combine a light draft with the greatest amount of storage. Strongly built, flat bottom, with friction battens on bottom, or some other contrivance to relieve the boat on taking the ground. 1 Schooner for the supply of Fort Capron or Jupiter, draft of water not exceeding five feet; six months supply of forage at Forts Brooke, Myers & Dallas. Camp and Garrison Equipage: 55 camp kettles; 50 mess pans; 25 camp hatchets; 100 camp hatchet handles; 35 wall tents and flies; 20 wall tent poles; 100 common tents; 500 common tent pins; 15 iron posts; 350 mosquito bars; 4 hospital tents and flies; 4 hospital tent poles; 25 dozen axes; 300 axe handles; 12 dozen spades; 2 dozen pick axes; 65 tarpaulins.7

These were all items the Quartermaster Department could provide, but if weapons and accoutrements were needed, they would have to come from the Ordnance Department, while food came from the Commissary General’s office. This fractured supply system created logistical nightmares for frontier commanders, especially in Florida. While everyone waited for Harney and his men to arrive, the volunteers kept up their patrols north of Lake Okeechobee. At the end of September Captain Lesley reported the discovery of a deserted Seminole village west of Lake Istokpoga that he said consisted of 10 large huts capable of accommodating 50–100 people. A month later General Carter of the state forces had his men on the move “for Istopoga and Kissimi [sic]; the other down Pease creek, along the coast, and up Caloosahatchee,” but for all the effort, no recent Indian presence was noted.8 The War Department expected Harney to vigorously prosecute the war, but they were also willing to be flexible. If the Seminole could be enticed to surrender, it would be preferable to waging a protracted war that would cost the nation dearly in terms of money and the health of the troops. The details of the agreement with the western Seminoles and the Creeks were still being worked out, a deal that everyone hoped would prove enticing to Holata Micco and his people. On the other hand, there were those who would never agree to leave their Florida homes. Foremost among them was Abiaki, the Mikasuki leader known as Sam Jones. Davis told Harney: Should you find that the old chief Sam Jones desires, with his family to sever his tribal connection, and to remain in Florida upon a home secured to him by reservation of sufficient extent for the purposes of cultivation and fishing, and that, in his manner, his good will and cooperation in the removal of the tribe can be secured, you are authorized to offer him such terms, and in the event of their being accepted, it will be necessary, in closing your operations, to make a treaty of such formal character that it may, if necessary, be submitted by the Executive to the Senate for ratification.9

Davis also realized that there were some Indians, such as guides who had worked for the army, who would be in mortal danger should they emigrate. If need be,

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Harney could also allow those people to remain in Florida, but the total number could not exceed 25 men, women, and children.10 Harney was at Key West by the first week of November, awaiting a steamer to take him to Fort Myers. On 18 November he arrived at Fort Myers and relieved Colonel Brown, who was being transferred north. Colonel Munroe would remain at Tampa, but would henceforth play a lesser role in managing the war. Hoping to give the Indians a chance to surrender before the campaign began, Harney ordered white flags displayed at prominent places.11 Figure 39. General (then Major) Thomas Williams. An Along with General Harney, hun- 1837 graduate of West Point, he was killed at Baton dreds of other soldiers were coming Rouge during the Civil War. to Florida. Among them was 42-yearold Maj. Thomas R. Williams, a career army officer from a prominent Michigan family. Like many northerners, he was not impressed with the land he saw. After reaching Fort Myers by boat, he and his men had to march the 18 miles to Fort Deynaud because the river steamer was undergoing repairs. He wrote, “The road was in many places ankle deep in water, in others ankle deep in sand … Oh, how hot it was today.—Such a burning sun, & what a place of fleas & sand this is. The houses, commodious enough, are thatched with palmetto.”12 Placed in command of Fort Deynaud, Williams began a diary that he envisioned as more of a long-distance conversation with his wife Mary, whom he called “Moddie.” In the first entry, he described the accommodations at the fort: My sleeping apartment is one of two pens & a passage, & my office a large tent under a roof of palmetto thatch. Imagine a platform 60 feet long by 20 wide resting on pine posts about 2 ½ feet high, our tents on this platform, & a thatched roof over all. With the exception of the log structure—the two pens & a passage of which I have one pen—such are our quarters for officers & men. They are well adapted to the climate & tho’ rude have a certain look of rustic architecture not displeasing. A look quite in harmony with the late pines & the palmettos around us. By moonlight our rude sheds look like temples … I am now sleeping on an iron bedstead, & bedding from the Hospital. Over the bed on a frame, is a clean mosquito bar. I wish some one would invent a bar that would also exclude fleas. But one gets accustomed to every thing, & so shall I to fleas.13

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Having spent time in Florida during the Second Seminole War, Williams had already decided the whole affair was a wasted effort. As he told Moddie: The true policy for Government to adopt, would be to concentrate the Indians here, & remove the whites. Give Florida to the Indians & the west to the whites. Why, because much of Florida is unfit for cultivation, & the climate is besides innervating & unfit for the white race, whereas it is native to the Indian & altogether adapted to his insolent & improvident habits. But, this will not be done; the Indians already removed have cost 30 millions & 20 years; &, for ought we know, the removal of the remainder may involve 30 millions & 20 years more. The fact is, the difficulties in catching them increase as their numbers diminish. The problem is now become, the finding of a needle in a haystack. Money may buy them out, but, if they choose to keep out of the way, catching them is impossible.14

Two weeks later, he further explained to Moddie the difficulties he saw in bringing the war to a close: The truth is, this country is an Indian paradise, & they are less sensible than I take them to be if they consent to emigrate. Money is no object to the Indians here; the country abounds in game & fish & fruit; in 20 minutes he can build himself a shelter from rain & dew with the leaves of palmetto, & a cotton shirt is sufficient clothing. His fuel for cooking, he hasn’t even to cut, he can pick it up. Fallen pine trees abound, affording a fuel which lights like tinder. I repeat, this country is the Indian’s paradise, & if I were an Indian I’d stay, & defy Uncle Sam to get me out. There are about 150 warriors in the whole of Florida, & every man, woman & child is as expert at hiding as a fox. Suppose there were 150 foxes in Florida, how long do you suppose it would take a thousand or two people who know nothing about hunting, trapping or shooting to catch or kill them! This, is the problem we’re required to solve—for our men are chiefly green recruits, who have no knowledge of woodcraft … & not one in 30 who has any skill in fire arms.15

The longer he stayed at Fort Deynaud, the less he liked it. It was an unhealthy place, but when Williams surveyed the area for a better location, he couldn’t find one. In an effort to cut down on the constant afflictions of dysentery and diarrhea, he took the unusual step of ordering all drinking water to be boiled, which provided almost immediate benefit. As for the war, he was getting more pessimistic day by day. He didn’t have much faith in the Indian delegation Harney was trying to bring from the West, and assumed they were just as likely to join Holata as talk him into leaving Florida. He also knew that for the Indians emigration would accomplish nothing, and that history would repeat itself: Then, why emigrate the Indians from a district of country where nobody but Indians & alligators can live? where a white man cannot live: Why remove the Indians from such a country, to a country with a fine climate & soil, which the covetousness of the pale-faces, will soon seek either to expel the Indians from or compel the Government to do so. Such was the fate of the Cherokees, & is indeed the history of all our dealings with the Indians. The faith of solemn treaties has not deterred us from expelling the Indians, by force, from lands granted them in perpetuity.16

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Williams also wondered why the army was even in Florida. Now that it was a state, Florida should be able to take care of itself. On paper, but certainly not in reality, the State Militia numbered over 12,000 officers and men. Williams complained, “If Florida’s 12,000 warriors cannot protect her from Billy-bow-legs’ 150, it is time she ceased to dishonor the name of an independent state!—a sovereign state, indeed! Does the picture appeal to our humanity or our contempt? Does it affect the honor of the country, or serve to deplete the national treasury into the pockets of contractors, jobbers, grog-shop & lobby partisans?”17 In line with the policy of trying to negotiate its way out of the conflict, the War Department and the Bureau of Indian Affairs went forward with their plan to bring a delegation of western Seminole to Florida. The first hurdle was just deciding who should be in the delegation. Davis suggested no more than 15 delegates, carefully chosen, with $1,500 set aside for travel expenses. Ten were to be Seminole; five were to be Creek.18 Unfortunately, no one had made provision to pay the delegates for their time, as the officer in charge of their transport informed Washington: In compliance with those instructions I today conferred with the Agents for those tribes and am sorry to say, that they express some doubt, as to the possibility of prevailing on the Indians to go, in consequence of nothing being said in the instructions to me, or the Superintendent of Indian Affairs for this district, about remunerating them for going … If it is possible to overcome this difficulty, I will do so. I am satisfied that should this difficulty be overcome the delegation will not be ready to start before the 20th of January, and perhaps not till the 1st of February.19

Whatever Davis’s plans for the war, it was doubtful he would be in office to see the conclusion. President Franklin Pierce, unpopular even within his own Democratic Party, had failed to win the party’s nomination for a second term. Instead, the nomination went to James Buchanan. Facing Buchanan was the new Republican Party’s first presidential candidate, John C. Fremont, and former President Millard Fillmore, the candidate of the American, or Know-Nothing, Party. Buchanan won the 1856 election and could be expected to appoint a new secretary of war when he took office in March the following year. General Harney had ordered the posting of the white flags, but it was impossible to tell if the Indians had noticed. In Sumter County, well north of Tampa, there were reports of a party of five warriors firing on George and William Mills. A detachment of volunteers was sent to check it out and report any traces of an Indian presence. More troops were dispatched and some reported flushing a pair of Indians out of a wooded hammock and exchanging shots with them. General Carter sent out more patrols, but no Indians were ever captured or killed. Were they remnants of Oscen Tustennuggee’s band, or were they nothing more than the inventions of volunteers hoping to stay on the government payroll? It was hard to tell.20

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At Fort Dallas on the southeast coast 53 men and two guides began an expedition into the “hunting grounds” about 15 miles south of the fort. No Indians were sighted, only the remnants of an abandoned hunting camp, and the only casualties were the men’s shoes: The track through the pine woods very bad and rough, composed of coral rocks, the edges of which are very sharp, making it not only fatiguing but destructive on shoes  … I found the shoes of some ten men entirely worn out so as to prevent them marching any further. I would respectfully recommend & think it nothing but justice to the soldier that an extra pair of shoes be allowed when marches are to be made through pine woods & over the coral rocks. A march of 4 or 5 days destroys a pair of shoes.21

Considering that soldiers had to pay for shoes if they went over their annual allotment, it was a reasonable request. U. S. Deputy Surveyor John Jackson, in his surveys along the southeast coast in 1847, reported going through many pairs of shoes during just one survey.22 The Indians had long since learned to use moccasins made out of alligator hide when walking over the same terrain. Wanting to give the peace initiative its best chance, Harney ordered a cessation of hostilities on 22 November. The official order read: The General commanding desires to communicate to the Seminoles before proceeding to extreme measures, the intentions of the Government respecting themselves with which he has been charged. He therefore commands all hostilities against the Seminoles to cease, except on the defensive until further orders. Every commander will endeavor by the use of white flags, and other friendly tokens, to induce the Indians to an intercourse. Should they manifest a disposition to council with the General, they will be treated with every consideration and kindness, the fact being immediately reported to these Head Quarters.23

At Fort Deynaud Major Williams reported the sightings of what was thought to be signal fires, but no one could be sure. Were the fires in response to the white flags, or were they simply Seminole campfires? No Indians came forward, so it remained a mystery.24 Harney reached Fort Brooke on 25 November and announced he would be taking seven companies of volunteers into service, in addition to the three he already had. These troops would occupy a line of posts stretching across the peninsula, from the Alafia River near Tampa to Fort Vinton near what is now Vero Beach. Another company would set up a post on the Peace River at the point of highest navigation, and another would occupy Fort Center. The final company of volunteers would be at his disposal for use in the Everglades if needed. In addition, he was placing three companies of regulars along the line of Forts Brooke, Kissimmee, and Capron. The remaining regulars would be stationed around South Florida, ready to invade the Everglades if the Seminole continued to resist.25

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Florida forts, winter campaign of 1856–1857.

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Harney had ordered white flags to be displayed, but they were not just simple swatches of old bed sheets. In a letter to his wife, Major Williams went into the details: Near the Post, a white-flag on a short staff 3 or 4 feet long is to be nailed to a pine tree, previously “blazed.” You know what “blazed” means. Attached to the staff & suspended under the flag is to be placed a package containing two plugs of tobacco & a string of wampum (beads). In front of the flag & on the ground the grass is to be removed, the space leveled smooth, & thereon a circle described two feet in diameter & in the center a white pine stick about 2 feet long planted, & inclined towards the sun—at the hour of planting it. To this white stick is tied a white string with 3 or 4 knots in it. Now for the explanation,—the white-flag, tobacco & wampum are emblems of peace & good will. The stick in the center of the circle on the ground, inclined towards the sun at the hour of planting it, indicates to Indians who may chance to see it, that the person planting it will return there the next & succeeding days at the same hour; & the 3 or 4 knots in the white string tied to the stick indicates the number of men (3 or 4) that will accompany him.26

Winter may have been approaching, but Williams and the men at Fort Deynaud couldn’t tell. As he told Moddie, “The thermometer ranges from 75° to 85°—it was 85° at 12 o’clock m. & is now at 4 o’clock p.m. 80° … The heat is oppressive—strong men faint at drill when kept standing more than 10 minutes at one time in the sun.” On a positive note, the soldiers who had previously occupied the post had planted a garden, and the new residents were harvesting the benefits: We’re just sitting down to dinner, to soup, rice-pudding, potatoes & egg-plant. We generally have ockre [sic] in the soup. In a day or two we’ll have tomatoes. The vines are filled with them just ripening. In a week or two our sweet potatoes will be ready to dig. With a little care, in planting, one need never be out of garden vegetables in this climate. They are never out of season. The earth produces as well in winter as in spring or summer.27

The biggest complaint about food was the meat. All they had was army salt pork and tough or nearly inedible beef from scrawny local cattle. Williams wanted peace with the Indians for no other reason than to purchase fresh venison and turkey from them. Peace, however, didn’t seem on the horizon. The elaborate white flag had been posted for over a week, but the only visitor they were aware of was a stray dog.28 Even though the white flags were being ignored, Harney was still anxious to try negotiations. To that end, he wrote to the War Department requesting Jumper, one of the foremost leaders of the western Seminole, be sent to Florida to assist in the negotiations. Harney also requested one hundred warriors accompany Jumper. He reasoned that many Florida Seminole were willing to emigrate, but the die-hards would not let them leave. With such a sizable force of western Seminole backing Jumper, such intimidation could hopefully be eliminated. Knowing time was of the essence, Harney asked for immediate action on the request. Davis responded that they were trying to form a delegation, but not to hold up offensive operations waiting on them.29

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In the meantime, Major Williams was preparing for a transfer. Two other officers were taking over at Fort Deynaud, and with them came two unexpected guests: Arriving at the Boat, we found the wives of Lt. Best & Lt. Anderson … Poor ladies, what a place to come to! A trying place for rough men, I cannot imagine what it must be for delicate women. The two occupy my late quarters—a very little pen for each & the passage in common. No comforts, hardly the—no, not the decencies. What a dilemma for ladies to be in! They should not have been permitted to come to this place of desolation & discomfort, but ought to have been sent by their husbands to Tampa—or home.30

The arrival of these women served to show that not only men were suffering in the war. As noted earlier, the wives of some of the common soldiers, usually acting as laundresses, faced the same hardships. On the other side of the conflict, Seminole women and children were in hiding, fearing the approach of the soldiers and volunteers. Even families that considered themselves in safe areas were in danger. On 17 December Indians attacked the home of Peter Shives, 8 miles south of New Smyrna, further north and east of any place the Indians had been reported. A New York paper reported, “Sheves [sic] was found in the field some sixty yards from the house, with two bullet holes through his head, and badly cut with an axe; his wife and little girl shot at the water’s edge, in front of the house, and the remains of their boy, ten years of age, was found among the burning ruins of the house.” An acquaintance remarked, “This climate is delightful, and fruits very fine, but there is not much pleasure in eating oranges out of one hand and holding your rifle in the other.”31 Harney had reason to doubt Indians were responsible, but called out four companies of volunteer foot soldiers anyway. A captured Indian woman later confirmed that it was indeed her people who had carried out the attack, and years later an Indian named Charlie Tiger admitted that he had been a member of the party that had carried out the killings. He also insisted that it was in retaliation for the killing of an Indian by a former resident of the Shives’s home, and that the Indians didn’t know the family wasn’t the responsible party.32 Reports also came from Adamsville, in Sumter County, of two men being fired at by a party of about 15 Indians. A camp and other signs were supposedly discovered, but no actual Indians were found. The whole situation pointed to a problem no one cared to mention: The lush Florida wilderness that was such a wonderful hiding place for Indians was also a good hiding place for white outlaws. Either group was capable of violent acts, but if there was no real evidence either way, it was assumed Indians were the culprits.33 Troops were on the move or preparing to be, but the one person who wouldn’t be assisting them was the Emigration Agent, Captain John C. Casey. The tuberculosis had worsened, leaving him weak and often bedridden. Down to around 100 pounds, there was little physical work he could do. Despite that, he tried to perform his duties the best he could. On 17 November he sent a letter to Davis,

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but he didn’t actually write it. A fellow officer explained that Casey was simply too weak to write.34 On Christmas Day, 1856, the end finally came. Assistant Adjutant General Francis Page at Fort Brooke remarked, “In one word Captain Casey died as he had lived, calmly & methodically, leaving none but friend to regret that so large a soul had not been encased in a stronger form.” A true friend of the Seminole, he had done all he could for them, but as an army officer, his options were limited. He truly felt it was in their best interest to emigrate, if only to save them the pain and suffering of the upcoming war. Whatever their differences, the Seminole continued to hold him in high regard, and when the last Seminole to leave Florida boarded ship, Casey’s body accompanied them on the voyage to Louisiana. It was probably not something they had requested. A corpse on the ship would have been “bad medicine.”35 In Washington, Secretary Davis wasn’t at all happy that Harney had suspended offensive operations while putting out the white flags. In a 10 December letter the Adjutant General informed Harney, “In answer to your circular of 22d ultimo, directing the suspension of hostilities with the Seminole Indians … the Department was not prepared for this suspension, considering the limited time which is allowed for a vigorous prosecution of operations, on account of the character of the country and its climate.”36 That wasn’t the only disagreement between the secretary and the general. When Harney had arrived at Fort Myers, he countermanded the orders of three companies of the Second Artillery that were being relieved from Florida duty. One can imagine the groans from the soldiers and the letters of complaint the officers sent to Washington. Harney’s reasoning was simple: All the incoming troops were new to the war zone, and he needed some men who were familiar with the terrain and the enemy. To send every experienced soldier away would cause expensive delays as the new men learned their surroundings. It’s a problem that persists to the present day, as veteran units complete their tours of duty in places like Iraq or Afghanistan and are replaced by units unfamiliar with the local situation.37 In his response to the Adjutant General, Harney expressed surprise. In an October meeting with Secretary Davis, the two men had discussed retaining some of those men, and the names of the company commanders had even been mentioned. Harney diplomatically added, “In the pressure of many other matters of more important public necessity, I can readily conceive how the conversation with the Secretary escaped his attention.”38 As to the matter of delaying the offensive, the general responded: The Department is mistaken in supposing that the suspension of hostilities declared for the present in the circular of the 22nd ultimo induced by a change of opinion as regards the necessity for a vigorous prosecution of operations—Partial operations have never succeeded against these Indians and my arrangements are not yet completed to move against them in the manner I deem most effective. All my troops are not ready for the field—four companies of Mounted Volunteers are yet to be mustered in.

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In the meantime the display of white flags and suspension of partial and unimportant offensive measures in connection with the placing in judicious positions of a large force of attack will prepare the minds of the Indians for the coming delegation from the West and give them an excuse which I think they will gladly accept to listen to the reasonable propositions of the Government. Should this not be the case, I shall then be fully prepared to enter the campaign with greater advantages than at any earlier period.39

Besides troops, Harney was also gathering boats, many of them made of sheet metal. Most of the boats were the invention of New Englander Joseph Francis, who pioneered the process of stamping the thin iron plates with corrugated ribs to give them extra strength. Fort Myers had 16 metal whaleboats and barges, 23 metal bateaux, and 24 wooden skiffs. Fort Dallas had three metal barges, one iron whaleboat, 10 iron bateaux, and seven wooden skiffs. In addition, an order for 50 more metal boats had been placed.40 The technology of warfare was changing, and not only on the water. In the Second Seminole War, the army’s primary weapon had been the 200-year-old flintlock muzzle-loading musket. By the time of the Third Seminole War the flintlocks had been replaced by the more reliable percussion cap, and although easier to use, they were still single-shot weapons. Because his troops would often be operating from small boats where reloading a muzzle-loader would be awkward, General Harney asked for Colt repeating rifles. He had experimented with the first Colts in 1840 and was a believer, even though they were still considered dangerous and unreliable. On the other hand, the Colt pistol was commonly carried by most officers. Other major advances were in the area of communications, always important in wartime. During the Second Seminole War, mail had been a haphazard affair. If you dropped a letter off at the post office, you could never be sure who was going to carry it and how much it would cost. That unpredictability meant that the recipient paid the postage, and no one could be sure when a letter would arrive. By the 1850s all that had changed. The post office now issued stamps and carried letters for a set amount, just as they do today. Instead of being transported by whoever happened to be going in a certain direction, contracts were given for specific routes. The contractor who had earlier demanded protection from Seminole raiders was running Route Number 6,804 from Tampa to Camp Izard on the Withlacoochee River.41 This meant that Major Williams could know approximately how long it would take for a letter to reach his wife in Detroit, what route it would take, and even who would deliver it: The Ranger (steamer) will take it down the river to Fort Myers tomorrow, thence it will be dispatched, about Sunday next to Tampa-Bay, thence by stage-coach to Pilatka, Florida; thence, by steamer to Charleston, South Carolina, & thence by sea steamer to New York; & thence by rail to Windsor opposite Detroit, & thence by ferry-boat to Detroit to the post office, & thence by the hands of Devereux to Moddie. All these journeyings will take from 10 to 15 days.42

As Williams’s observation points out, steam transportation was now the norm, both on land and at sea. During the previous war, railroads were still in their infancy and steamboats, while available, were slow and unreliable. For this war, Fort Myers

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had its own shallow-draft steamboat to run from the mouth of the Caloosahatchee all the way to Fort Deynaud. In the 1830s, if the war’s commander wanted to communicate to Washington, it would take a minimum of two weeks for a letter to get there, and another two weeks for the answer to find its way back. By 1856, the time was reliably cut in half, and if the message was urgent, there was telegraph service between Savannah and Washington. By the beginning of January 1857, General Harney was ready to begin offensive operations. The news of the murder of the family at New Smyrna had prompted him to issue an order calling for the withdrawal of the white flags and commencement of active operations. By 6 January, troops were being dispatched from Fort Myers into the Big Cypress and Everglades. The time for negotiating was over.43 Major Williams and his company were initially told they were headed for Fort Lauderdale, “reported to be a healthy & pleasant station” on the edge of the Everglades. Orders were soon changed, however, and he was told to return and travel across Lake Okeechobee to Fort McRae on the east side of the lake.44 In the area of the old Fort Lauderdale, one officer would have disputed the idea of it being a “pleasant station.” Captain J. M. Brannan had been charged with constructing a road from Fort Dallas to Arch Creek, about 9 miles to the north. Taking 48 men, he first had to build an 81-foot bridge across Little River then construct a 400-foot corduroy road across a bog north of the river. It was not an easy process, and the only earth-moving equipment Brannan had were soldiers and shovels:

Figure 40. General (then Captain) John M. Brannan. An 1841 graduate of West Point, he served in both the Mexican/American and Civil Wars.

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A ditch was dug, 4 feet wide & 3 deep, on either side, the earth being thrown in the centre of the road & mixed in with sawgrass & branches from small bushes, making the road about 16 feet in width. Sleepers were laid in the road, about 240 feet from the bridge, where the soil was found to be most yielding, between which earth was again thrown mixed with brushes. Logs were then laid across the Sleepers & secured at the ends by about a foot of earth. This work carried on while the bridge was being built.45

Moving on toward Arch Creek, they were forced to bridge a smaller tributary, Webber Creek. Although the stream was smaller than Little River, the bog around it was much larger, which meant constructing another long corduroy road. Now, with the bridges and causeways finished, the men turned back toward Fort Dallas and began construction of the road itself. Again, it was hard work: I commenced to make the road to Little River, over the worst ridge I have ever seen. It was filled with large rocks & palmetto roots of immense size, all of which had to be removed to make the road passable for teams. The work was very difficult and although the men worked with great spirit & energy, we, in one day made but 400 yards with 32 men employed with crowbars, picks, axes, &c.46

The men continued on, having to bridge another small stream on the way south. Finally, 25 days after they departed, the exhausted soldiers returned to Fort Dallas, having constructed 9½ miles of road and three bridges. To his north, Capt. Abner Doubleday (the mythical inventor of baseball) was on a similar mission, constructing the road from Fort Lauderdale south to Arch Creek. Like Brannan’s men, Doubleday’s soldiers had a hard time of it, as the captain reported: I wish to say however in general terms that the company have had much severe and arduous labor to encounter, in building bridges, lifting heavy pieces of timber, fitting abutments together in the water, during the cold of the Northers, wading through swamps, and bivouacing in the rain. Many of these hardships it is true are incident to ordinary service in the field but others are not so. They have also suffered great pecuniary loss nearly all of them having returned with clothes entirely worn out. Their clothes have been torn by the thorny vines of the thickets through which they have had to struggle, and soiled and stained by the swamps and their shoes rendered worthless by the sharp points of the rocks on which they have had to travel.47

Both officers put in for extra pay for their men, and with the completion of the two sections of road, the army could now move swiftly into the entire eastern Everglades. On 14 January General Harney reported to the Adjutant General that everything was in place to begin the offensive. To better organize his large force Harney divided the state into three military districts. The First District, north of Lake Okeechobee, had three companies of mounted volunteers that were to scour the area from Tampa Bay to the Caloosahatchee River, while two companies of regulars and two companies of volunteers would search the area between the Peace and Kissimmee Rivers, with special emphasis on the Lake Istokpoga region. In the Second District, besides the troops at Forts Myers and Deynaud, two companies were in the Big Cypress, four companies were operating out of boats along the Southwest Florida coast, and another boat company was patrolling Charlotte Harbor. In the Third District there were the troops at Fort Dallas, several companies of regulars

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and volunteers from Forts Vinton and Drum who would cover the area east of the Kissimmee, and boats from Forts Center and McRae that would patrol Lake Okeechobee. Harney didn’t know exactly where the Indians were hiding, but he was determined to find out.48 For the soldiers serving in the open prairies and thinly wooded pine forests of Florida, the search for the Seminole seemed very similar to the hunting of wild game. Accordingly, they began to employ the same tactics they would use when hunting deer, wild hog, or turkey. One of those tactics was the use of fire to flush out their quarry.49 January through April was the height of the dry season, and much of the land was tinder dry and easy to set on fire. Harney gave the order that as the volunteers and regulars scouted along their assigned routes they were to systematically set fire to the surrounding landscape. Frequent lightning-sparked fires were common in the summer, and the vegetation was adapted to it. Small, hidden Seminole villages and fields were another matter. An officer operating far to the south, near Cape Sable, reported: Back of these mangroves is an open Prairie extending to the North-North West & East farther than the eye could perceive, and covered with saw grass from three to seven feet high, and a thickly matted grass resembling the “Bermuda” and interspersed with small wet and dry hammocks. This Prairie was fired on the 27th inst. and the country beyond continues burning at the date of this report.50

A medical officer stationed along the Kissimmee River wrote home, telling of the magnificent sight the fires made: “We had another most brilliant burning prairie and fire scene at night on the 24th. General Harney ordered to Fort Capron a company of Volunteers, directing them to fire the long grass as they went … The other side of the river gave a splendid field for the devouring element and at sunset a long glowing belt of flame encircled the horizon for miles away.”51 Of course the practice also presented some danger to the soldiers, as one volunteer officer scouring the area near the Peace River noted: I crossed Horse Creek 1 or 2 miles from its mouth near the junction of P. Creek—Found banks 12 or 15 feet high 30 to 40 ft. across & 2 ft. deep, yet with little trouble could I have crossed a wagon, and proceeded to explore this desolate or despicable strip of rough land—Fires had not touched it for years, and as I had plenty of time, examined it carefully, firing as we went … The wind blew fresh from the South, our fires were raging violently and seemed to cover the entire peninsula, our course due West, and the fires making immense strides towards us. Faster we went, until about exhausted, when we fortunately reached a small clump of swamp not more than an acre in all, where we plunged our horses in and let the enraged fire go on its way rejoicing, feeling thankful for our retreat, although almost stifled with smoke.52

It was a close call, yet there are no reports of losses to the troops from such intentionally set fires. Overall, the fires served to clear the land, making it easier to travel and spot any retreating Seminole, but few fresh indications of Indians were seen, and most of the camps and fields they discovered had been abandoned for some time. One of the exceptions was a discovery near Lake Istokpoga, made by a group of volunteers under Lt. Morgan Mizell. The commanding officer at Fort Center reported:

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The Volunteers came to an Indian camp composed of thirteen palmetto huts. The camp had the appearance of having been occupied about ten days & from its arrangement & other indications seemed to have been intended for permanent occupation. Mortars had been made for pounding Koontee, each tent being provided with one of these … About thirty Indians are supposed to have inhabited this camp, twenty of whom are warriors, and it is evident they left their homes in such haste that they could have carried away but little besides their arms. On the arrival of the Volunteers the fires were burning, and deer skins, bear skins, cooking utensils & baskets were found.53

For the Indians living north of Lake Okeechobee, it must have been a major loss. Their total population in the area may not have numbered more than about 50 people, and this might have been the place they considered “home.” Among the soldiers taking up position was Assistant Surgeon Thomas McParlin, who was with the force of regulars sent to occupy Fort Kissimmee on the river of the same name, located in the center of the peninsula about 60 miles north of Lake Okeechobee. Upon arriving at the fort, which had been abandoned in 1851, he was captivated by the beauty. “The river flows along in a clear current by a succession of wooded knolls thickly overgrown with a luxuriant underwood among the stately oaks rising 150 feet in height … All along, the landscape was diversified by wooded knolls, some so thick they looked like mountains of fir, others fantastically shaped like animals or objects, while far away was a succession of tall palmettos in the distance solitary and towering giving a touch of the oriental to the scene.”54 At the end of January, after a visit from General Harney, troops from Fort Kissimmee prepared to scout the area from the fort down to Fort McRae on Lake Okeechobee. McParlin wrote home, telling his family, “I have been quite busy for several days preparing for crossing the Kissimmee River with the command on the 1st of February … 50 of the volunteers went with Genl. Harney to Fort Deynaud, lately, and it is not certain whether those that remain here go with us or not. If they do, they will help find beef Figure 41. Surgeon Thomas A. McParlin. He later was cattle for subsistence en route as well Medical Director of the Army of the Potomac during the Civil War. as scout.”55

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Major Williams, having recently arrived at Fort McRae, was not optimistic and predicted little success from all the troop movements. “But I do not expect any results from scouting anywhere. The Indians cannot be caught—the only chance is negotiate them out … This is a mere show of doing something. Every thing is expected from Jumper & 100 of his people expected by Gen. H. early in March.” Knowing it was a war brought on by politics, he expected politics to end it. “But, garrison or scout, here or there, I believe the war in Florida will receive its quietus from the incoming Administration.”56 Williams was pessimistic about the war effort, but then he often seemed pessimistic about nearly everything, and while some of the things he complained about were specific to the time period, others still ring true today: Our troubles, verily, are endless; it is poverty or disease: Indians or alligators, mud or water, the follies of the day, fluctuations of stock, villanies of Wall Street; a broken winded, glandered or foundered horse; vagaries of nigger-dom or Yankee-dom: why the tariff on sugar is not repealed; corruption of officials in general & city governments; the one buying votes out of the Treasury by sending a part of the money into Florida & calling into service 10 comps. of a miserable population on the pretence there is war in Florida; the other putting the money into their pockets that ought to be applied to cleansing streets, protecting persons & property, providing against epidemics, & doing all things that become a well ordered city.57

For Dr. McParlin, the trek from Fort Kissimmee to Fort McRae had been uneventful, marching over recently burned prairie and numerous small ponds and bogs. The only thing of note on the trip was when a sentry fired at what he claimed were Indians approaching the camp. McParlin noted, “The sentinel reported that he had seen several figures in the dark approach cautiously, one stooping, & leaning his hand against a tree peeped at us: that he challenged three times and fired. We concluded the man had peopled the darkness and bodied them forth in imagination.” McParlin might have thought that arriving at Fort McRae was the end to his traveling, but it was not to be. Orders had been received for five companies [three regular and two volunteer] to examine the lands south and east of Lake Okeechobee. The units all left Fort McRae on 16 February and soon split up, all heading in different directions.58 The two companies of volunteers moved northeast, one company of regulars headed toward Fort Jupiter, one toward the northern Everglades, and the one Dr. McParlin was with made for old Fort Lauderdale. After two weeks of slogging through the wilderness, McParlin’s group finally reached their destination, only to find Fort Lauderdale had not been reactivated, and there were no supplies waiting for them. Already low on food, McParlin killed his horse to feed the men. Their stomachs at least partially full, the troops headed south for Fort Dallas. On the way they encountered the wagons that were supposed to have met them at Fort Lauderdale, so they stopped and encamped to enjoy a good meal. They then marched on to Fort Dallas, and were happy they did.59 As McParlin wrote to his family:

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I have the pleasure of commencing this [letter] from one of the healthiest and pleasantest posts in the state … The Fort is situated on a grassy slope of a triangular form—one side washed by the Atlantic spreading out grandly to the East, the other wound about by the Miami River, the green trees fringing its borders and shading the calm depths only active when the fish break the still surface. A line of beautiful cocoanut trees extend along the river border. Orange, citron, lime and Guayaba [guava] trees are all along the walks of shell that divide here & there the grassy sward in front of the officers’ quarters.60

Now the only question was how they would get back to Fort Kissimmee. One rumor had it they would board a steamer that would return them to Fort Myers, after which they would march to Fort Center, take rowboats across Lake Okeechobee, and then row up the river back to Fort Kissimmee. The other option was a return march along the path they had just taken.61 The Florida war may have been important, but it was not the only issue facing incoming President James Buchanan and his new secretary of war, John Floyd. Foremost among those problems was “Bleeding Kansas,” a violent dispute over whether Kansas would be admitted as a slave or free state. The Kansas-Nebraska Act of 1854 had left the issue up to “popular sovereignty,” meaning the voters in the Territories would decide the matter. Congress may have envisioned a peaceful, lawful vote, but what they got was voter fraud and competing constitutions. Whatever the outcome of any election or legislative decision, people from the losing side were willing to dispute it, and not just with words. Armed groups attacked opposition towns, and outside firebrands like John Brown and his sons entered the Territory, intent on imposing their will upon the people of Kansas. On more than one occasion, the army was called in to restore order and keep the peace. Farther west a disagreement had arisen with the Mormons, who had fled to Utah in order to escape persecution in the East. Concerned that the Mormons might be setting up their own little theocracy, President Buchanan appointed a new governor and dispatched a large force of soldiers to see that he was safely installed. Fearing the army was being sent to destroy them, the Mormons prepared for war. America’s miniscule army, already stretched thin, didn’t have the manpower to conduct three campaigns across such a large expanse of territory. The pressure was bound to have an effect on the conduct of the Seminole War. Perhaps in response to these pressures, the War Department authorized the enlistment of 10 additional companies of volunteers. Three of these companies would be organized into 45-man “boat companies” and serve along the rivers of South Florida and in the flooded Everglades. Equipped with long, flat-bottomed boats, the companies were made up of men who were familiar with living and working in the wilderness. Governor Broome, who had been asking for such a force since the beginning of the war, must have been elated.62 Additional pressure was exerted on the Indians when four companies of the Fifth Infantry under Col. Gustavus Loomis were moved to Fort Keais near the Big Cypress

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Swamp and tasked with maintaining constant patrols in the area. Preliminary orders included a thorough search of the Big Cypress in boats, examination of the Everglades to Harney River, and patrols along the Peace River. Loomis was ready to get to work, but was not overly optimistic. “I arrived at this point about 8 a.m. There is not much appearance of old Fort Keais. I shall try to accomplish the wish of the Genl. to get in the Indians, but how it is to be done, I can’t imagine, as I can neither find them or any signs of them.”63 Soldiers were also at work along the southwest coast. Captain John McCown’s company of the Fourth Artillery, operating in boats, scouted the shoreline of Florida Bay between Cape Sable and Indian Key. It was an area filled with mud flats that were exposed at low tide, but there was no sign of Indian activity. Indeed, there was little to report except the defects in the earlier mapping. McCown wrote, “I find the chart furnished by the War Dept. so defective, that it is useless.” Violent storms often caused dramatic changes to the coastline, and any map soon became obsolete.64 The Seminole may have been in hiding, but they were also watching, waiting for an opportunity to strike. The chance came on 5 March, as General Harney later reported to Washington: This morning a report of an engagement with the Seminoles in the Big Cypress Swamp, near Bowleg’s Town, was received from Captain C. L. Stevenson, of the 5th infantry, commanding four companies of the 5th, and a mounted detachment of forty men. It appears that Lieutenant Freeman, of the 5th, in command of “G” company, was in advance, near Bowleg’s Town, and was reconnoitering a spot called the “Garden Hammock,” with a small party, when he was attacked by the Indians, and lost one man killed, besides being himself, with three men, severely wounded. He immediately sent an express to Captain Stevenson, who was with the main body at Fort Keais, some 20 miles off. Captain Stevenson started at once, joined Lieutenant Freeman at sunrise the next morning, (the 6th instant,) made his disposition to attack the enemy, and after a gallant skirmish of fifteen or twenty minutes, drove them from the “hammock,” and put them to flight. The loss of the Indians is not known; they were seen to take off some dead and wounded; but the density of the “hammock” rendered the exact number uncertain to ascertain.65

In all, the army lost four men killed and five severely wounded. In addition, four musicians had wandered off from Fort Keais a few days earlier and were never seen again, presumably having been captured by the Indians. Although Harney described it as a “gallant skirmish,” it was certainly not a victory for the army.66 North of Lake Okeechobee the constant patrols continued but were yielding meager results. On 6 March Major Williams wrote: We learn from Ft. Centre today, that day before yesterday, an Indian was killed & scalped about 12 miles from there by volunteers, & a squaw & child captured. It is probable the Indian was coming in on a friendly mission when encountered & killed. At any rate, it’s a pity he was not taken alive as he might have been of great service as a guide or as the medium of conveying to his countrymen the liberal offers of the Government, inviting emigration. A great pity he was killed & a scandal that he was scalped. If I had the authority, the man who perpetrated the outrage should be driven from the service with disgrace.67

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Although the captured Indian woman had just lost her husband, she remained defiant. Harney later reported what she told him. “The Indians are not disposed to leave Florida, and have decided to die in defending themselves, rather than emigrate … She represents the Indians as scattered in small parties endeavoring to avoid any contact with the whites.” Another Indian woman and child were soon captured after the killing of her husband (a black Seminole) and both were sent to Fort Myers.68 The wife of Capt. Winfield Scott Hancock witnessed the interrogation of such captives first-hand: General Harney ordered the captured Indian women to appear before him for the purpose of extorting from these frightened creatures the secret abode in the Everglades of Billy Bowlegs and his followers; information, by the way, that he was never able to obtain from those faithful squaws, though harsh measures were resorted to. Our little son Russell, then four years of age, was … listening with bated breath to General Harney’s threat, given through an interpreter, of hanging the pappooses, who were playing at the feet of their mothers unconscious of any danger. Unable longer to endure the suspense, especially when the General brought forth a formidable looking rope … he sprang from his seat and commenced pleading piteously for the lives of the little Indian babies.69

There is no indication that Harney ever carried out such threats, and he later remarked, “That boy spoilt all our fun, and we had to give it up until another time.” Despite the rough treatment, the army felt responsible for the welfare of the women and sent the pair “17 yds. bedtick, 33 ¼ yds. calico, 32 yds. blue quilling, 4 blankets, 6 pieces binding, 6 spools thread, 2 papers needles, 2 looking glasses, 4 combs.”70 Like many other officers, Major Williams disliked what was happening to the Indians and was sympathetic to their plight, even while doing what he could to drive them from their homeland. For career soldiers, it was simply a matter of duty. Somehow, while performing these distasteful tasks, he could lament the little injustices, as when he reported what another officer had found at Zachary Taylor’s 1837 battleground near Lake Okeechobee: In the hollow of a Cypress tree, seated, found the skeleton of an Indian woman, supposed to be a woman from the ornaments (strings of beads) & from the shape of the head … The woman was evidently young, & from the profusion of ornaments in silver & beads, must have been a person of distinction, or greatly beloved by her kindred, happily for whom long years must have passed since the decease of their friend, & they, probably, will never know that the white man has desecrated her grave.71

Williams, in command at Fort McRae, received orders on 10 March to prepare his men for a patrol of the Kissimmee River and Lake Istokpoga regions. Traveling by boat, Williams estimated the excursion would take about a month and cover perhaps 100 miles. Before he could leave, he would have to wait for relief companies to arrive, which would delay his departure until around 1 April. By his reckoning, he and the two companies of soldiers would end up at Fort Center about 1 May.72

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Harney was not letting anyone rest, Indian or soldier. On 12 March, four companies headed for Fort McRae from Fort Dallas, one of them (Co. E, First Artillery) commanded by Captain Doubleday. Also in the party was Surgeon McParlin, who hoped to return to his post at Fort Kissimmee.73 As with most treks through southern Florida, it was no walk in the park, as Doubleday noted: Left the column with orders to scout on the East side of the road and cross the large marsh on that side if practicable. This had previously been reported as impassible. In about a mile came upon and waded the cypress bordering the march and then commenced the passage. This proved by far the most wearisome toil I had ever undertaken. The men soon sank up to the middle in slimy mud and their progress became slow and laborious. I was on the point of returning but observing some small islands scattered here and there, with a ridge of pines in the distance I was induced to persevere. The saw grass assisted somewhat in obtaining a footing, but the islands even when reached afforded no firm ground, the roots of the trees being imbedded in soft mud. The men were often obliged to cross floating islands which could hardly bear their weight. In some cases they fell through and would have been drowned were it not for the prompt assistance of their comrades.74

The march took nine grueling days to reach Fort McRae, with no sign of Indians along the way.75 On 21 March Harney was able to report to the Adjutant General’s office that he had just returned from 10 days of directing operations in the Big Cypress. He had been with Captain Stevenson’s force of 375 men, which had been joined by Captain Pratt’s company, having worked their way inland from the coast. Unfortunately, although the Indians hovered around them, keeping to the dense foliage and taking the occasional shot at the soldiers, they could never be brought to battle. The end result was two of Stevenson’s men being wounded, but no Indian casualties.76 There were, however, indications that the Seminole had suffered during the battle with Lieutenant Freeman on 5 March. As Harney reported, “A newly made grave was found, also a camp in which the Indians Figure 42. General (then Captain) Abner Doubleday. had mended their wounded of the He fired the first shot in the defense of Fort Sumter at first engagement, from appearances, the commencement of the Civil War and was initially in some eight or ten in number. Some command of Union forces at the Battle of Gettysburg.

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fifteen or twenty abandoned villages & fields were also found, all of which were destroyed.”77 Even though the Indians couldn’t be brought to a fight, the army’s presence was certainly having an effect upon them. Harney reported that Captains John Robinson and John McCown, scouting from Cape Sable to Palm Hammock, had discovered recently abandoned camps. At one camp, wild potatoes were left baking on the fire, with alligator meat and palm cabbage nearby. At another site, the fleeing Indians left “packs of bear skin, otter skin, wooden spoons & ladles, pipes, fish lines, spears, garden seeds, bottles of salt, knives, etc.” The army gave chase for 5 miles, but was forced to abandon the pursuit because of a shortage of rations.78 Despite the fact that none of his enemy had been killed or captured, Harney was optimistic. The Seminole were now aware of the fact that their women and children were vulnerable to capture. Although the Seminole had adapted to life in the southern swampland, they could not live permanently on the run. Harney once again asked that a delegation be sent from the western reservation, sensing that the Florida Seminole might now be willing to listen to the government’s offer.79 Back on the eastern half of the peninsula, Captain Doubleday and his men, having re-provisioned and rested at Fort McRae for a few days, began the return trek to Fort Dallas on 25 March. The expedition took a week, and even with numerous scouts by small groups of men, no recent signs of Indians were seen. In the meantime, Surgeon McParlin, who had already traveled from Fort Kissimmee to Fort McRae, then to Fort Dallas and back again, had moved on to Fort Center, where he joined Major Williams’s expedition crossing Lake Okeechobee for a patrol of the Kissimmee River and Lake Istokpoga. This was no small undertaking. The flotilla consisted of 19 boats with 120 men and expected to be gone for 20 days.80 It may have been a search-and-destroy mission, but as it is today, a voyage up a wild Florida river in springtime could also be a very enjoyable excursion. As McParlin noted, “The trip will be a pleasant one, I think. The scenery on the river has been beautiful throughout, and at some points grand. The fine live oaks are green—covered … with the trailing moss—and the willow, palmetto gum and green bay give the winding shores the variety that is enough to delight the eye.”81 Major Williams tended to see less of the beauty and more of the hard work. Just finding the mouth of the Kissimmee proved difficult. Unlike today, where there is a dike around the lake, flood control gates, and a well-marked channel, the shoreline of Lake Okeechobee in 1857 was a thick mass of water plants and shallow lagoons. The maps were vague, so canoes were sent into the various lagoons until one was found with sufficient current to indicate it would lead to the main channel of the river. While moving upriver they completely missed the entrance to Istokpoga Creek but couldn’t be sure until they reached Fort Kissimmee, well north of the creek.82 Unlike the expeditions on the east coast, this time they actually saw Indians. While searching for the mouth of the Kissimmee, one of the boats had come upon

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a pair of Natives fishing from a canoe. To avoid capture, the Indians abandoned the vessel and disappeared into the thick foliage. Left behind were spears, fishing tackle, caught fish, and a turtle, items the Indians were in desperate need of to feed their families. While the majority of the Seminole had the vast area of the Everglades and Big Cypress to conceal themselves in, the Creek bands living north of the lake were more hemmed in and finding it difficult to stay hidden. Unable to reach the coast to trade with smugglers, they were also having a hard time procuring weapons and ammunition. Not that there was much opportunity to hunt. Game might be plentiful, but the sound of a rifle could be heard for miles, and with so many soldiers on patrol, the risk was too great.83 When the expedition finally did get to Lake Istokpoga, it didn’t find any recent sign of Indian activity. The army, in their boats, crisscrossed the lake, while mounted volunteers patrolled its shoreline. Yet even though none of the enemy was encountered, the force still suffered one fatality, as Surgeon McParlin mentioned in a letter home. “One poor fellow shot himself through the lungs by accident and died in ½ an hour after. He was pulling his musket out of a boat—muzzle toward him, when the cap was exploded by a fall. We lined him on the lake shore under the heavy cypress trees—covered with long pendant trailing moss. Carved his initials and a cross on a tree near the spot.”84 East of Lake Okeechobee, one group of volunteers had some limited success, finding a number of camps that had recently been abandoned. Following the trails, they came upon a small hammock where some of the Indians were encamped. Charging the hammock, two nervous young volunteers saw a pair of Indians and opened fire, killing them both. One of those slain was a boy of about 11 or 12 and the other a young warrior between 16 and 18, fully armed. Not far away, a girl of about 12 was captured. Near Lake Istokpoga, another group of volunteers was even more successful. In a running pursuit that covered five days and perhaps 50 miles, Capt. Abner Johnston’s company killed one warrior and two women, along with capturing five women and children. The Seminole, with such a small population, could ill afford to lose so much of the next generation.85 On 8 April General Harney issued orders for an increase in patrols throughout the war zone. Believing he had the Seminole on the run, Harney wanted to exert maximum pressure before the summer brought an end to the campaign. Large expeditions were ended. Instead, he wanted companies to operate individually, and, if possible, divide into separate detachments looking in different directions. If he could capture a few principal leaders or a large group of women and children, he might be able to end the war. Short of that, the constant pressure might demoralize the Indians to the point of surrendering.86 All this movement did more than simply keep the Seminole on the run. It was providing topographical data that would be used to produce more accurate maps of the southern portion of the peninsula and show the positions of Indian hideouts.

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Even if the Seminole weren’t rounded up this season, the army would know where to start looking the following autumn. As Topographical Engineer James W. Abert told the War Department, “It will require some time to combine the various reconnaissances & maps I have obtained, and when it is done we shall obtain much more accurate knowledge of the Everglades, Big Cypress and the coast from the mouth of the Caloosa Hatchee to Cape Sable. The present maps of the last region mentioned are quite erroneous.”87 Hoping all these efforts would have the desired effect, Harney was once again willing to try diplomacy. A civilian from Fort Myers, Lewis Daugherty, expressed a willingness to attempt a communication with the Seminole. Harney accepted the offer and issued orders allowing the man safe passage through the area controlled by the army and instructed his men to welcome any Indian bearing a white flag. For Daugherty and a companion, Edward Beezly, just going into Indian territory was risky. Daugherty no doubt felt the risk was worth the payoff. If he succeeded, he would receive 50 dollars for each man, woman, or child that emigrated due to his efforts. If he succeeded in talking to the Seminole but could not convince any of them to surrender, he would receive 300 dollars. The general was willing to make war on the Indians, but he never forgot that his main mission was to remove the Seminole, not destroy them.88 It was one of the last acts Harney performed as the war’s commander. On 22 April he received orders to turn over command to the next senior officer, Col. Gustavus Loomis, and depart immediately for Fort Leavenworth in the Kansas Territory. War with the Mormons appeared imminent, and the War Department wanted an aggressive officer to take command. As it was, by the time he reached Kansas the threat of violence between the pro- and anti-slavery forces had grown to where the administration decided Harney was needed there to keep the peace. The general wasn’t happy with the orders and wanted to see the Florida war to its conclusion, but he had laid a groundwork for others to follow, and was confident the war would soon end.89

chapter nine

The Indians Cannot Hold Out Much Longer

Colonel Gustavus Loomis, the new commanding officer of the Florida war, was nothing like his predecessor. General Harney was a fit and active man, an officer who commanded attention through his mere presence. Loomis, on the other hand, was 68 years old, somewhat frail in appearance, and sported a long white beard that made him look even older. As Lt. Oliver Otis Howard put it, “Colonel Loomis is very old, in his dotage really, and totally unfit to have the direction of an active campaign. He is, however a very good man & pleasant gentleman.” With no forced retirement or generous pension system, officers often held their positions until death forced them out. Room at the top could seem decades away for junior officers hoping for advancement, and none of them could know that in a few short years many of them would be generals in opposing armies.1 Loomis assumed command on 27 April 1857, though his thoughts may have been elsewhere. On 16 April he had written to General Harney on a very urgent but unspecified personal matter. “In consequence of a distressing domestic affliction, and an urgent necessity for my presence with my family at this time, I have the honor to apply to the General Commanding the Department, for a leave of absence for sixty days, with permission to apply at General Head Quarters for an extension of six months.” With command of the war falling on his shoulders, any chance of Loomis leaving Florida was gone, no matter how urgent the reason. A soldier’s duty always came first.2 Along with the departure of General Harney, there was a persistent rumor that the administration intended to abandon the war and withdraw all the troops. On the other hand, there were reports that a delegation of western Seminole was headed to Florida to convince their Florida brethren that everything would be fine out west. In the meantime, Loomis informed the Adjutant General that he would continue Harney’s offensive as long as the weather permitted and the troops remained healthy.3 Worried that the administration was going to let the Florida war fade away without a favorable outcome, Senator Yulee paid a visit to the White House. While there, he received assurances from the secretary of war, secretary of the interior, and Lt. Gen.

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Winfield Scott that they intended to continue the war, even into the summer months. With renewed confidence, Yulee remarked, “The settled and resolute policy of all who are connected with the execution and military action of the Government, is to remove the Indians from Florida in the shortest possible time.”4 Colonel Loomis may have been an old man, but he was certainly not yet in his dotage. He also had little use for the rivalry between the regulars and volunteers. He no doubt realized that if federal troops were withdrawn to serve elsewhere, volunteers would be all he would have left to fight the Seminole. Setting the tone for those under his command, Loomis worked toward cooperation, and his actions helped ease the normally tense relations. In his first report to Figure 43. General (then Colonel) Gustavus Loomis. the War Department, Loomis praised An 1811 graduate of West Point, he served from the Captain Johnston of the volunteers beginning of the War of 1812 until the middle of the for his action against the party of Civil War. 15 Indians discovered near Lake Istokpoga on 12 April.5 Loomis also had praise for Captain Sparkman of the volunteers, who had discovered a party of Indians near Fort Gardiner on the Kissimmee River on 18 April. Sparkman had made a valiant effort to pursue the enemy but had been unable to overtake them because of a lack of boats. Aware that a force of regulars under Major Williams was ascending the river, Sparkman left a note requesting the two groups cooperate. Williams saw the note but chose to ignore it, feeling it had only been a half-hearted attempt at communication. He reported to Loomis, “I cannot but regard the note of Captain Sparkman as a flimsy subterfuge, adding to my conviction that these persons will not act under the orders of Army officers when they can shuffle out of it.” Loomis wasn’t pleased with the unprofessional attitude, especially after he learned that Sparkman had kept up the pursuit and had eventually captured a woman and child. As he told the Adjutant General, “Williams returned to Fort Kissimmee without communicating with Sparkman and his conduct is as reprehensible as the language reporting it.” If Loomis were to have any chance of ending the war, such

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attitudes would have to change. Harney’s original plan had called for the expanded use of volunteer forces. Long range thrusts into the Everglades and Big Cypress would require men with some knowledge of the area and a familiarity with the landscape, assets only the volunteers could offer.6 That didn’t mean everyone was pleased with the performance of the civilian soldiers. At Fort Gatlin (Orlando), the regular army officer in charge wrote back to headquarters with complaints about Capt. Robert Bullock’s lack of enthusiasm for the war effort. Fort Gatlin was a comfortable posting, far removed from the action, where the volunteers could relax and draw their pay with little interruption: Your order requiring the company to move to Fort Deynaud, via Fort Meade has also been received and given him; since which time he has received another which he thinks excuses him from complying with the first order; I informed him to the contrary. I have no doubt but Indian signs will now be found in great abundance, and not far from Fort Gatlin either, since this order has been received. I repeat again that it is time that this company were required to move; were it not that it might look that I took delight in ferreting out things outrageous, I could perhaps tell a tale.7

The Florida press seemed willing to give Loomis the benefit of the doubt. After lamenting the departure of Harney, “the star of hope to Florida,” the Tampa Florida Peninsular offered, “Col. Loomis, who succeeds in command is an elderly gentleman, of much military tact, who enjoys the greatest confidence of those who know him best.” The editor felt confident that if Harney’s policies were carried through, the war would soon come to an end, either with the present campaign or the next.8 To justify such confidence, the editor pointed to several facts. First, there had been but one attack outside the reservation since the commencement of Harney’s offensive. Second, several warriors had been killed or captured, along with a number of women and children. Finally, many Indians were ready to give up. The paper reported: One of the squaws saw the Volunteers approaching and sat down in the road until they came up, when she commenced laughing and talking. She expressed herself perfectly willing to be taken to Ft. Myers, stating, in substance, that she would rather be under the protection of the whites than to remain with her tribe, half-starved, and be continually harassed by the army. Indeed, the two squaws captured by Capt. Johnson [Johnston] are allowed to run at large; they have a small shanty in the vicinity of Ft. Myers.9

Despite Major Williams’s reluctance, the regulars and volunteers did cooperate, and for the most part they seemed to work well together. Both groups had now been serving long enough to know the hardships they would have to endure and what it would take to conquer the Seminole. At the beginning of the war, the regular soldiers knew nothing of guerrilla fighting, while the volunteers had suffered from poor leadership and organization. Time had helped eliminate some of those problems. Soldiers had learned what it took to survive in the Florida wilderness, and incompetency among the volunteers had lessened considerably. Although there

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would always be a certain amount of rivalry and suspicion between professional and volunteer soldiers, they were beginning to learn common respect.10 One of those who had gained some respect for the volunteers was Lieutenant Howard, who was more impressed with the fighting spirit of the volunteers than the regulars. “The regulars had little faith in the war itself … Of course, however, they did their duty, but without much ardor or enthusiasm. It was not the case with the volunteers. They usually had well-selected officers, but the majority of the companies were made up of the roughest element. Very often they would involve in their attacks Indian men, women, and children and take very few prisoners.”11 Another officer, Lt. William Terrill of the Fourth Artillery, wrote, “It is not my province to speak of Mr. Mickler’s acts, but I cannot let this opportunity to do justice to a brave and energetic man pass without saying that too much credit cannot be awarded to him for what he did.”12 Earlier, Captain Sparkman had described Terrill as “  … a young man of great endurance, perseverance and energy and is well acquainted with the country down there having been last winter with Major Williams in the boat service—besides, he is anxious to be sent and also the Doctor [McParlin] at Kissimmee.” Shared experiences had taught both sides that a uniform (or lack of one) did not make a man suited or unsuited for war.13 The Seminole were certainly feeling the pressure, some no doubt more than others. Most of the volunteers were concentrated in the Kissimmee and Peace River areas, simply because these places were closer to white settlements where the people were demanding protection. Farther south, in the Everglades and Big Cypress, things were a bit different. True, there were probably as many soldiers working the area, but it was a much larger territory to cover and more difficult in which to operate. In the south, Holata, Abiaki, and their people could spend a little less time running and more time fighting. The fact that the Seminole fighting spirit was still alive and well was demonstrated on 23 April when a group of Indians attacked 10 soldiers Figure 44. Gen. (then Lieutenant) Oliver O. Howard. An 1854 graduate of West Point, he earned the Medal filling water barrels from a well at of Honor after losing his right arm at the Battle of Seven Palm Grove in the coastal Everglades. Pines in 1862. He continued to serve after the war, both The initial attack killed two soldiers in Reconstruction and in the Indian Wars in the West.

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and wounded two more. The situation then became confusing and did not reflect well upon the fighting spirit of the regulars: The party thus reduced by the first fire to seven effectives, was further reduced to three by four of the men in throwing away their arms and running into camp. The remaining three retreated to the edge of the prairie and there stood their ground, challenging the Indians to come out and fight  … A large negro came out from the edge of the thicket, and some other Indians showed themselves at the edge of the thicket. The party immediately fired at the negro who disappeared just as they fired at him. Corporal Reynold’s Co. B, 5th Inf. then came out and withdrew the party after being refused a party of seven men which he asked of the Sergeant in charge to go out to fight the Indians.14

A messenger was sent to Pavilion Key, some 30 miles distant, requesting relief. Also sent back to the main force were the wounded and those who had thrown away their weapons. The remaining soldiers dug in and fortified their position for the night. The Indians taunted them and fired a couple of shots at the soldiers, but did not attack. Relief arrived the next morning in the form of a company led by Lt. Robert Hill. As Hill’s men advanced, they found the remains of the two men who had been killed the previous day: “The bodies were mutilated in the most revolting manner. The eyes were gouged out. They were maimed, scalped, and had been whipped with switches from head to foot. Pvt. Springer’s mouth was crushed by the butt of a rifle and Pvt. Seiler’s finger had been cut off for the sake of a ring.”15 In the Kissimmee River area, where the Indians were supposedly on the run, they proved ready to fight when forced to. A group of seven mounted volunteers attacked what they thought was a party of mostly women carrying large packs on their backs. They were wrong. Most of the Indians were warriors, and as the volunteers drew close:  … they ran together, throwing off their packs, brandished their guns & raised the war whoop— We dismounted & commenced firing across the bay at them about one hundred yards—We endeavoured to gain the bay first, but they were too fast for us, we exchanged 4 rounds & retreated to draw them out of the bay—As we were mounting our horses, Swicord was shot, before which he shot an Indian & said to me I have peppered him well. I asked him if he was badly wounded, he replied, I am a dead man—I told him to ride off as fast as he could & we would fight them off. He rode about 150 yards & fell one of his feet caught fast in the stirrup. I dismounted and released it. I saw the number was too great for my small party & attempted to express Lieut. Weeks at Ft. Bassinger. The Indians seeing the express starting, ran & fired on him, which compelled him to return to save himself … The Indians had by this time flanked us on the right & left, on the former they were crawling in the grass & palmettos. We did not discover them until they were within 60 yards of us, they then commenced firing from all sides & was fast approaching. We kept up the firing until Swicord was dead, determined to die over him. After he was dead we retreated, knowing if we remained one moment longer we would have shared his fate.16

It was one of the few victories the northern bands could celebrate. Farther north, at Lake Marion east of today’s Lakeland, Captain Mosely of the volunteers further added to the Indians’ suffering. “On this lake about one hundred yards from its western shore I discovered an island … I took a Lieut. and six men, and crossed over

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by a small raft, the water being running. Finding the houses and crops undisturbed, I burnt the former and destroyed the latter. The island is some fifteen or twenty acres in area all good hammock land. There was about five acres in cultivation, planted in corn, peas, pumpkins, ground peas, potatoes, and some tobacco.” It was the second such loss for this same group, the Tallahassee Creeks.17 In the area west of the Peace River, Captain Lesley of the volunteers returned from a patrol and filed a very detailed report, concluding with, “Being absent 20 days, and travelled not less than 250 miles Figure 45. Florida Volunteer Captain Reverend Leroy on horseback & 40 miles on foot G. Lesley. A newspaper photo includes the caption: “Religious leader and church builder, officer in Indian without discovering any recent sign and Civil Wars, six-feet three-inches, wild flaming red of Indians & I have no hesitation in hair and dominating temperament.” making the assertion that there are no Indians within the district assigned me.” What his report also showed was that there were no whites in the area either. He mentioned passing numerous abandoned homesteads but did not come into contact with any settlers. The war had forced everyone on both sides to abandon some of the best land in central Florida.18 The war was taking its toll on everyone, including the horses and mules. Many reports contained words like “jaded,” “broken down,” “exhausted,” and “succumbed” to describe the condition of the animals. People, of course, were also dying, and both Seminole and soldier observed funeral rites as best they could under the circumstances. Doctor McParlin and the boat company he was with found an ancient Indian mound not far from their camp on the Kissimmee. McParlin noted: The present race use these as burial places, tho in the field, or when away from their neighborhood they bury their dead sitting upright in the hollow  … or leaning against the trunks of trees. They are dressed as in life. In this instance they had built on the top or side of the mound a crib of pine wood in which the body was placed sitting facing the East. A few beads, cloths, etc. were about the skeleton and a small iron pot & a few utensils, tin cups, etc. such as the deceased might need in the happy hunting ground placed beside the body. Before we left the vicinity some curious vandal more barbarous than the Savage took up the body to look for—I can’t think what. It is strange how little reverence even the most educated feels when curiosity or vain pride in relics of travel come upon them.19

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Not only soldiers and Indians were being killed. One officer reported, “A woman of my compy. whose husband was at Fort Center was sitting in the boat Genl. Harney intending to join her husband when one of the men observed that a musket at whose very muzzle she was sitting was capped. He requested another soldier to take the cap off. As he was attempting to do so another musket fell on it & exploded the cap, the whole charge took effect upon the woman. I have since ascertained that she died on the following day.”20 Summer was fast approaching, and with it the heat and insects. At Fort Cross on Cape Sable, Assistant Surgeon J. Frazier Head informed the commanding officer at Fort Myers that conditions had become intolerable. “The musquitos [sic] became so numerous that for two nights the whole command were almost entirely deprived of sleep, though all were supplied with [mosquito] bars. Tattoo and reveille were humanely dispensed with, and the men permitted to sleep under their bars in the open air, generally on the beach.”21 As conditions worsened, Doctor Head felt obliged to offer further evidence of the post’s uninhabitable environment. Writing from a cabin purposely filled with smoke to ward off the insects, he reported, “I counted in it 117 musquitos [sic] gorged with blood, on a space of wall 2 ft. by 6, at a time when we considered ourselves quite comfortable.” Private Jasper Devlin complained, “I can’t sleep at night, for if I close the sand-fly-bar, it is too warm—and if I open it to get a little air, the musquitos flock in so that I can’t sleep the rest of the night. In the day, it is the same. In the sun, it is too hot to sleep, and in the shade, the musquitos swarm.” Finding it impossible to eat, he told the doctor, “They fill my cup, & light on my meat. I have been obliged to throw away much of my food from this cause.”22 Finally, on 20 June, the fort was ordered abandoned.23 On the Kissimmee, Major Williams had been ordered to prepare a new camp for the summer, some 2 miles from the river and the disease-causing “miasma” that supposedly hung in the air. Making camp, however, meant more than pitching tents. As Williams wrote to his wife: For our summer’s encampment it is proposed to erect platforms on posts about 2 ft. above the ground & roof these with palmetto thatch or canvas Paulins. On these platforms, protected from rain & sun & flood & fleas, we can then pitch our tents. The arrangement will be a comfortable one, but some weeks must elapse before we can cut the timber for joists, posts, rafters &c … I have sent to Tampa for 28 Paulins 30 by 20 feet for the roofs & 7000 square feet of inch boards to floor the platforms. Whether the requisition will be honored it is difficult to say; otherwise we will have to saw out the lumber from the pitch pine trees around us, & if we cannot split out shingles for the roofs will be obliged to resort to palmetto thatching. Both of the latter proceedings will involve much labor, but chiefly time; for, time in this season of drenching rains is the element most to be considered in erecting shelters for men & stores.24

The move from the main fortification to the inland site had been necessitated by the flooding of the Kissimmee River during the rainy season. The work of relocation was

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made more arduous by having to construct a causeway across the swamp between the two locations. Loomis received orders on 7 June 1857 that would have a profound effect on the conduct of the war. The administration felt the situation in Kansas and with the Mormons was deteriorating, and more troops were needed in the western part of the country. With the army stretched so thin, the only place to get them was from Florida. As a result, the entire Fifth Infantry, composed of seven companies scattered throughout the state, was ordered to immediately depart for Jefferson Barracks at St. Louis.25 With almost half his troops being ordered out of the area, how was Loomis supposed to fight the war? Washington’s answer was to call up additional volunteers. The colonel wasn’t sure that would work: I anticipate much embarrassment and great delay in raising a Volunteer force either mounted or foot—I do not believe that for Infantry pay, foot troops can be raised in the State—and from present appearances, I anticipate great difficulty in replacing the mounted companies whose terms of service expire during the months of June, July and August. If these companies cannot be replaced promptly, active operations cannot be continued during the summer and without them, I cannot expect to retain the Indians south of the Caloosa-hatchee.26

Even the volunteer officers knew it might be difficult to raise the required troops. One captain asked if he might be allowed to bend the rules as far as the moral quality of the recruits was concerned. After naming a few that he would not consider, he added, “The other men have been raised upon the frontier and are fine guides and trailers and some of them have considerable experience in Indian hunting—and it is upon this ground alone that I ask to be allowed to take them in service, they make much better soldiers than citizens.”27 The readjustment also brought a change in the command structure of the war. Up until now, the volunteer companies had all operated independently, taking orders from whichever officer of the regular army was in command or from General Carter if the orders came from Tallahassee. The 10 new companies would now be organized as a regiment under a volunteer colonel, Samuel St. George Rogers, who would work with Loomis to coordinate the efforts of the volunteers. The change was an indication of how much reliance the Buchanan Administration was willing to put on the state troops. Of course, along with a colonel came a lieutenant colonel, a major, an adjutant, a quartermaster, and up to three medical officers. It was a considerable expense and not the sort of thing the War Department was usually inclined to do, but there was little choice, given the needs elsewhere in the nation.28 The removal of the Fifth Infantry left only seven companies of the Fourth Artillery and four of the First Artillery in Florida, and Loomis was obliged to reposition them as needed. Fort McRae on the eastern shore of Lake Okeechobee was abandoned, and its troops moved to Fort Myers. A company stationed at the Manatee River

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was also sent to Fort Myers, along with one of the companies from the Kissimmee River. There was even fear that Colonel Loomis, as head of the Fifth Infantry, would be sent west with his regiment. For the moment, however, it seemed as if the War Department was content to keep him in Florida.29 The departure of so many troops was disheartening, if only for the missed opportunities. While making his way to Fort Myers from Lake Istokpoga, one of the departing officers saw an Indian who simply stood by and watched the camp from a distance. Both the officer and the two captured Indian women who were with him felt the man might have been willing to talk or perhaps lead them to one of his chiefs. Unfortunately, orders had been received to report immediately to Fort Myers, so there was no time to investigate the matter further.30 Rumors, as usual, were flying as to who would be transferred where. Major Williams of the Fourth Artillery, at Fort Kissimmee, thought his Company “L” might be going to Fort Dallas to relieve units of the First Artillery that some said were going to Texas. Williams was pleased with the idea. “Fort Dallas, is reputed to be a delightful & most desirable station—sea-breezes, fish, oysters; oranges, cocoa-nuts; bananas; (sweet potatoes, too, I suppose)—fine, & roomy quarters.” Still, he knew it was only a rumor. “My private opinion is, that if the 4th Arty, are relieved by volunteers, their destination is Utah!”31 The removal of troops and the mustering-out of volunteer companies whose enlistments had run out caused Loomis to reevaluate his situation. When he had assumed command he’d intended to continue with General Harney’s plan of actively harassing the Seminole living north of the Caloosahatchee while keeping pressure on the perimeter of the Big Cypress and Everglades. He was now beginning to see a fault in his predecessor’s plan. Harney had assumed Holata Micco and the other Indians living south of the river were willing to negotiate. In April he had dispatched the two civilians, Daugherty and Beezly, to open a line of communication, but it was now June, and the pair had accomplished nothing. Harney had been wrong: The Seminole were not as frightened of him as he believed and were certainly not ready to talk. On the other hand, those Indians to the north of the reservation now seemed more amenable to negotiation. Of all the women and children captured since the offensive had begun, the vast majority had come from those bands. Holata and Abiaki’s bands, living in the Big Cypress and Everglades, had suffered few such losses and were still feeling secure. Loomis decided it was time for a change in strategy. He would attempt to open a line of communication with the northern bands while increasing pressure on the Indians to the south.32 Harney had also been operating under the assumption that a delegation of western Seminole would soon be arriving to assist in negotiations with the Florida Indians. Unfortunately, the western Seminole were not enthusiastic about coming to Florida. The first stumbling block was money. The government was appropriating $50,000

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for the trip, which seemed like quite a bit, but the Seminole didn’t see it that way. By the time all the travel expenses were paid there would be little left for the people who had made the trip. Another problem was that they considered it a very risky endeavor. The last delegation to visit Florida had been threatened and treated rudely by their Florida cousins. Now that a shooting war had commenced, they felt they might become targets, not negotiators. If nothing else there was a general mistrust by both groups for anything the government proposed.33 For the present, however, disease was much more of a problem for the army than the Seminole. Sanitary reports from various posts painted a dismal picture. The new camp at Fort Kissimmee had been built with the intention of moving it away from the “unhealthy” river. Having no idea that mosquitoes were spreading disease, Doctor McParlin didn’t realize it was a foolish move. Instead, he chose to blame the resulting sickness on a nearby swamp, “making this spot so unhealthy that the Indians are formerly accustomed to abandon it.” A subsequent 10-day march to Fort Dallas proved grueling. “On arrival the men were in worse plight than I have ever seen troops on service … Abrasions, bruises, ulcers, scorbutic sores; blotches, and swellings disfigured many.” By the time they finished the return trip to Fort Kissimmee, the men were in even worse shape. “Since we have occupied this position, I have been engaged in the treatment of malarious fevers, dysenteries, and diarrheas, rheumatic disorders, diseases of the eye, scorbutic pains and disease, wounds, and injuries.” We can only imagine the destructiveness of these diseases before the advent of modern medicine.34 Assistant Surgeon William H. Babcock at Fort McRae had done what little he could to preserve the troops’ health: The diet of the men was, in the main, poor. The only vegetables received at the post, during the five months it was occupied, were three barrels of potatoes (of which only a barrel and half were edible) and a few cabbages … The water was excessively bad. It was obtained, in turn, from the lake, the swamp, and from holes dug in the sand; that from each source being used for a time exclusively. It was found that the lake water, if boiled, or allowed to stand in barrels before being used, was the best, both as regards taste and its effect upon the health; but this was still poor, and in the months of May and June it was almost putrid in smell and taste.35

Assistant Surgeon Richard Lynde at Fort Center had a similar complaint. “The water used by all is that of the river, which is by no means healthy, being the drainings of swamp lands entirely, almost stagnant, and filled with the result of vegetable decomposition.” At Fort Deynaud, Surgeon B. A. Clements reported 62 out of 71 men had cases of intermittent or remittent fevers. He concluded there was “no reason to hope for a more favorable state of their health until removed from this region.” Even a large, supposedly healthy post such as Fort Brooke at Tampa was not immune. Lieutenant Howard noted, “Great sickness came upon the garrison during that summer and fall, and several officers were helpful in the care of the poor fellows who were prostrated with malarial fever. Many died and were buried in the

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little cemetery close at hand.” The graves were later discovered during construction of a parking garage in downtown Tampa and reinterred in a cemetery nearby.36 Loomis had been worried that the state would not be able to supply a sufficient number of volunteers, but Florida proved him wrong. Floridians were anxious to be rid of the Seminole and were willing to do the job themselves if Washington would let them. Both the regular officers and the volunteers had learned that the most effective way to reach the Seminole haunts was by boat, and Loomis had been authorized to employ up to 150 civilians for that purpose or to act as guides or trackers. In late June, two “boat companies,” one led by Capt. Richard Turner and the other by Capt. Jacob Mickler, were mustered into service. Although Loomis didn’t know it at the time, these units would prove to be some of the most effective of his command.37 On 10 July, Mickler and his men were at Fort Kissimmee, repairing the post’s boats and getting ready for a trip that would take them down the Kissimmee and into Lake Okeechobee. Major Williams knew what they were in for. “A dry time to them, I say!, but, if each man is not encased in water-proof, they will get drenched from over-head, once a day at least, besides having all the chances of getting wet & stuck in the mud, when obliged to get overboard to haul the boats along.”38 On 12 July, Mickler and his boatmen left Fort Kissimmee and began the trip down the Kissimmee River. For some of the volunteers, it was their first trip into the wetlands of southern Florida. Andrew Canova (creator of the Banana Plant Legend) wrote, “I had heard of alligators—of rusty old monsters, equal to trees in size, and vicious as wolves—but I was not prepared for the sight that met my gaze, as our boats passed down the Kissimmee. To say that they were lying on the banks as thick as leaves in an autumn forest, would be scarcely an exaggeration.”39 There were 30 men in six boats, and the going wasn’t always easy. Thick mats of vegetation known as “water-lettuce” slowed their progress. Just finding solid ground to walk on was not an easy thing. Canova reported, “The saw-grass was much higher than our heads, and the ground very boggy; we had to step from one fern ‘tussock’ to another in order to keep above water; and any one failing to gain foothold, was precipitated up to his waist in the mud.” Even today, sawgrass in the area has been known to reach over 10 feet in height.40 By 15 July the expedition had reached the mouth of the river and set up camp on the shore of Lake Okeechobee. Two days later Mickler and his men began an examination of the lake’s shoreline east of the river’s outlet. After traveling about three-quarters of a mile they spotted a pair of Indian canoes and quietly followed the trail to a small island, where they heard the sound of wood being chopped. The captain divided his men into two groups and surrounded the island. When all was in place, he ordered a charge, taking the camp by complete surprise. The warriors made their escape, but six women and nine children (some reports said 20 children) were not so lucky and were taken prisoner. Hearing a shot in the direction of where

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they had left their boats, the volunteers took their prisoners (one woman required four men to subdue her) and started back to the vessels. A few shots were exchanged but the only casualty was a volunteer shot in the thigh by one of his fellows.41 After destroying the village’s dwellings, Mickler and his men headed west, eventually turning the prisoners in at Fort Myers on 23 July. From one of the women, the wife of Oscen Tustennuggee’s son, the officers at Fort Myers were able to get a fairly accurate census of the remaining Creek bands north of Lake Okeechobee. The captured women and children were the families of 12 warriors who had escaped. There was another small group in the same area made up of two men, three young women, and three children, and another four camps with four warriors and their families. On the St. Johns River there were two families totaling 13 people, and all but two of them were women and children. She had heard of another band, but knew nothing of their numbers. For such a vast territory it was a small number of Indians, but the government was determined to hunt down every last one. For the most part the Indian women and children were treated well, given the freedom of the fort in the daytime, and confined to an unlocked building at night. A sentinel was posted, but a month later a woman and child made an escape.42 Captain Sparkman’s company later came upon the same group but were unable to catch them, with the exception of one old woman who had fallen behind. The woman told them that Mickler had captured all the children of the group but one, and an examination of several abandoned camps by Sparkman’s men showed that the fleeing Indians had lost most of their possessions. Deciding that the old woman would be more of a burden than a benefit, Sparkman let her go.43 To make sure none of the captive Indians could return to the wilds, Loomis ordered a detention camp built on Egmont Key, at the entrance to Tampa Bay. Surrounded by miles of Gulf of Mexico waters, there was simply nowhere for the prisoners to go. No boats were kept on the island, and none were allowed to land without permission. For newly arriving captives, it was often a time of joyous reunions. John Bethell, a pioneer of the Pinellas peninsula and a mate on the boat ferrying the prisoners out to the island, wrote, “All the prisoners were well guarded while on  the boat, and on arrival at Egmont they were turned over to the commandant of the post for safekeeping … The Indians were very quiet and orderly while prisoners on the boat, but just as soon as they landed and met their relatives all order and quiet was turned into war whoops, weeping, dancing and yelling like wild beasts.”44 While the majority of Floridians were anxious to have the Seminole removed, there were those who had sympathy for their plight. Maria Taylor Baker, a wife and mother who lived near one of the volunteer mustering points, made friends with some of the officers and wrote in her diary, “Ten or twelve companies have passed to fight only a handful of Indians who are brave, resolute & determined to die on the soil rather than yield.” Many people were conflicted. They didn’t hate the Indians, didn’t like what was being done to them, but also believed that as long

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as the Seminole remained in Florida, people on both sides would suffer. Removing them seemed the most humane option,though many would argue it was deeply inhumane.45 Even though much of the war effort was being turned over to the state forces, the regulars were still in action. Captain Doubleday, at Fort Dallas, was ordered to lead a patrol of 80 men and three officers to examine the hammocks between the fort and the area north of old Fort Lauderdale. To Doubleday, the order to examine the area near Fort Dallas seemed a waste of time. “It was scarcely necessary to scout this part of the route, as it is gone over nearly every day by parties from the Fort in search of stray cattle.” Leaving Fort Dallas on 28 July, the expedition worked its way north to New River, to the site of the old Fort Lauderdale. Suspicious hammocks along the way were thoroughly examined, but no recent sign of Indian activity was noticed.46 Upon reaching New River, Doubleday and his men were faced with a problem: New River being about 200 feet wide and 30 feet deep presented a formidable obstacle to the passage of the train, more especially as the large raft made of empty barrels, used on a previous occasion, had become utterly useless. A large rope being stretched across the stream, the wagon loads were carried over in one of the metallic bodies used as a boat. By tying a long rope to the halter of one of the animals and pulling him over, all the mules followed and swam to the landing place. I then passed the running gear of a wagon by fastening a rope to the tongue and another behind in order that it might be pulled back in case any obstruction in the bottom of the stream should prevent it from going forward. It was then allowed to sink to the bottom and was hauled across without difficulty. All the other wagons bodies, bows & all were taken over in the same way. The train then continued its march as far as Snook Creek where it encamped for the night.47

The column worked its way north until 4 August, thoroughly examining the area but finding nothing. Doubleday’s orders seemed to indicate they were supposed to meet up with another force moving south, but not knowing when the other group had left their post and faced with a growing number of cases of dysentery, he decided to return to Fort Dallas. After reaching New River, he split his force, taking part of it down the west side of Biscayne Bay, and sending the other down the beach route. A shallow stretch of water had to be crossed to reach the beach, and a certain amount of risk was involved. “The sharks however were very large and numerous and one man was knocked down by one, but not otherwise injured.” The troops returned safely to Fort Dallas on 7 August.48 While Doubleday’s men were enjoying their walk on the beach, Captain Mickler’s volunteer boat company was again on Lake Okeechobee, this time departing from Fort Center. Traveling northeast, he returned to the place where he had captured the six women and nine children, but found only dogs and hogs. After killing as many of the hogs as possible, the men and their little fleet continued on to Fort McRae. The fort had been abandoned, but there were indications that Indians had been there, they having dug the lead out of trees that the soldiers had used for target practice. It was also a sign that the Indians were running out of ammunition. A bit

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north of there the soldiers found the trail of a single Indian on the beach. Following the shoreline, they discovered several places where the individual had camped. Finally, they came upon the warrior’s camp, where he, his wife, and a child were busy cooking. Surprised, the Indian didn’t try to flee, but approached Mickler with a friendly “How d’yo do, Sir?” He was an old man called Tommy, and his health was so poor that he saw little use in fighting. Within a few weeks he was dead.49 Captives in hand, Mickler and his men turned south, looking for the point where the waters of Lake Okeechobee entered the Everglades. Little did they know that a single outlet did not exist. The lake simply overflowed its banks along much of the southern shore, and the immense sheet of water moved slowly toward the Gulf of Mexico along the great “River of Grass.” Continuing on, the party arrived back at Fort Center on 21 August.50 On the previous day, another party of volunteers, accompanied by some regulars and Doctor McParlin, had started another trip down the Kissimmee toward Lake Okeechobee. They soon ran into a thick patch of water-lettuce that required all hands to work for two and half hours to clear a path through. Entering the lake, they looked for the small inlet they felt would lead to the camp Captain Mickler had surprised a month earlier. They found it, and McParlin said he could smell an Indian camp. Climbing a tree, one of the men spotted an Indian trail. Slogging off through a sawgrass swamp, the soldiers took up the trail, but found no Indians. Disappointed, they returned to camp and then made their way back up the Kissimmee, paddling against a strong current. With so few Seminoles left to find, it took as much luck as skill to locate them.51 On 24 August, near Lake Istokpoga, a group of volunteers under Capt. William Kendrick came upon a small party of Indians running through the swamp. Kendrick and his men gave chase, and the warriors turned to fight. A few of them took to the trees to gain a better position from which to fire and got off a few rounds, hoping to scare the pursuers off. Undeterred, the volunteers kept coming, so the Indians once again took flight. Kendrick later reported, “We fired at them as they ran through the thickest swamp I ever saw; killed one, a young warrior about twenty-five years old, and captured one child between three and four years old. We got their plunder, which consisted in cooking utensils, axes, hoes, bear skins, knives, clothing etc., etc., etc.” The Indians had escaped, but were now without nearly everything they needed to survive.52 It was the end of August 1857, and Colonel Loomis was gathering his troops and preparing to send them out against the southern Indians. Of the 10 companies of volunteers, some were stationed at posts north of Lake Okeechobee, but the majority had been sent to Fort Myers with the intention of ordering them into the Big Cypress or Everglades. Loomis was optimistic and told the Assistant Adjutant General, “I have strong hopes that if I am enabled to carry out my present plans of active operations, the Indians cannot hold out much longer—and I hope for a

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speedy termination of the war. We have now in the Volunteer Service some of the best material of the state—the best guides and trailers, and each company emulating another in the active pursuit of the campaign.”53 Because the rainy season was just coming to a conclusion, there was little for the mounted troops to do until the ground began to dry. In the meantime, Loomis put his boatmen to work. Captains Mickler and Turner were sent to the Shark River to penetrate the southwest Everglades and establish a supply depot. Major William Walton Morris and units of the Fourth Artillery were sent to the upper keys to examine the southern Everglades, and the troops at Fort Dallas were to penetrate the Everglades from the east. The three commands were to use as much stealth as possible, communicate any location of Indian activity, and coordinate their efforts whenever practical. Loomis meant to give the Seminole as little opportunity to rest as possible.54 No sooner had Loomis put his plan in motion than Washington decided to throw a wrench into it. The violence in Kansas appeared to be worsening, and more troops were needed to keep the peace. Orders were issued for the Fourth Artillery to leave Florida immediately and proceed to Fort Leavenworth. Among those leaving would be Colonel Munroe, Major Williams, and Doctor McParlin. These seven companies were the bulk of the regulars in Florida and left Loomis with only four companies of the First Artillery still in the state, mostly at Fort Dallas and Key West. Whether the volunteers were ready or not, it was now their war.55

chapter ten

Everything Was Destroyed That Could Be

In spite of the removal of nearly all his regulars, Colonel Loomis was ready to get on with the war. The weather was cooling, the ground was drying, and time was of the essence. It was now September and the entire volunteer force was due to be mustered out between the end of December and the end of March. All leaves of absence were cancelled, assignments were handed out, and the troops prepared for battle. In all, there were now 20 companies of volunteers in action. Ten of them were the “Independent” companies, scouting the areas east and west of Lake Okeechobee and points north. The other 10 were part of the regiment commanded by Colonel St. George Rogers. To keep all his men fed and supplied Rogers requested “a train of from seventy five to one hundred wagons, that supplies may be transported to some suitable points to be selected in the vicinity of the Cypress, from which the troops may operate either on foot or on horseback as the condition of the country may permit.” Rogers took care in his site selection, knowing that placement of the depot was critical if the troops were to maintain a presence in Big Cypress.1 Although the full campaign was yet to begin, the limited patrols that had been going on for the summer continued. At Fort Dallas Captain Doubleday led a force of 80 men into the eastern Everglades, the volunteers were entering the western Everglades by boat, and both volunteers and regulars were continuing their scouts in the Kissimmee and Peace River valleys. For the most part none of the patrols found anything particularly noteworthy. Doubleday had to return to Fort Dallas because the water was too low to navigate, and on the way back he met up with Captain Mickler’s volunteers, who had experienced the same problem. In the meantime, a Yellow Fever outbreak had forced the army to flee Key West and take up quarters at Indian Key.2 With all the preparation in the south, some areas in the northern district were feeling neglected. Supplies, including feed for the horses and mules, simply weren’t getting through. Captain William Kendrick, operating near the Kissimmee, was forced to call off a seven-day patrol for lack of provisions. He complained, “I regret to say to you that there is not one pound of grain in my camp, we have been out for several days, the grass in the country has become so very old and harsh that our horses will not graze on it. Consequently they are bound to suffer very much …

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I have sent an express to Fort Center to ascertain whether I can be supplied from that post or not.” Even if they had gone out, there wasn’t much for them to find. Nearly every report from the region during the month of October stated that there was no hint of recent Indian activity.3 In the Big Cypress it was a different matter. As an indication of how little the troops of the regular army were contributing to the war effort, volunteer Colonel Rogers was now the senior officer at Fort Myers, where there was only one company of regulars, compared with up to 10 companies of state troops operating in the area. With the departure of Colonel Munroe from Tampa, Loomis had moved his headquarters there. The volunteers were still dependent upon the army for supplies and transportation, which caused some friction when Loomis denied Rogers the use of the steamer Texas Ranger for an expedition down the coast to penetrate the Everglades.4

Everglades/Ten Thousand Islands area.

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Undeterred, Rogers left Fort Myers on 18 November in eight open boats with a force of 110 men and supplies for 40 days, intending to penetrate the Everglades from the southwest coast. Without the steamer it was a risky trip, and his men were not sailors. “My Regiment was raised in the interior and consists almost entirely of men wholly unfamiliar with the use of oars or sails, very many of them never having even been upon the water until the present term of service.” Besides the loss of life that might result from some mishap on the water, Rogers worried that the whole mission might be jeopardized if one or more of the boats capsized or water got into the supplies.5 Other volunteers were already in the Big Cypress and looking for the Seminole. On 21 November Capt. William Cone and 115 men found them. South of Fort Doane they surprised a small group of Indians, killing two, wounding one, and capturing five women and 13 children. Their success continued the following day, when they discovered several nearby villages containing 40 structures and stores of corn, rice, and pumpkins. After the buildings were looted, everything of value to the Indians was put to the torch. Loomis was pleased. As he reported, there was a good chance Cone and his men had discovered Holata Micco’s home: A great many trinkets were found, among them two daguerreotypes, one of Billy’s group, which was taken in Washington. There is convincing proof that the hiding place of Billy Bowlegs has been found at last, and that he has received a severe blow in the capture of his women and children. The town where the Indians were captured was newly built, and the depots of supplies were found in three different towns.6

The Seminole had suffered a major loss and were intent on revenge. They trailed Cone’s force for four days before the opportunity arrived. Near Depot 1 they found the army safely encamped for the night with sentinels posted. Unable to attack the soldiers the Indians turned on the horses, which were grazing about a mile and a half from the camp. By the time the warriors were finished, 36 horses were dead. For the volunteers, it was a stunning, painful loss. Most of the mounts were not army-issued animals, but their own personal property. Upon hearing the news, Maj. J. L. Dozier ordered 120 men from three units to pursue the Indians.7 On 22 November Colonel Rogers’s boats reached Chokoloskee Island at the southern edge of the Everglades. Two days later, Capt. John Parkhill and 75 men went up a nearby river, traveling 9 miles before reaching the end of the navigable portion, then wading through 3 miles of marshland before finding solid ground. For three days the men searched for some sign of the Indians. At last they came upon a trail, which led to a still larger trail. Finally, they came upon a village. In a later report, Colonel Rogers told what they found: There were about thirty lodges and about 40 acres of lands cleared and in cultivation. Large quantities of pumpkin, potatoes, peas, corn and rice was found. The corn, peas, & rice, hid away carefully in houses built off in the swamp, the trails leading to which were carefully concealed. The pumpkins were in the fields, and the ground was literally covered with them of all ages and sizes. Even the trees were full, the vines having run over them. The ground was full of potatoes. Everything was destroyed that could be.8

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On the following morning, 28 November, Parkhill led his men farther along the trail and soon came across a succession of Seminole fields and houses, each one about two hours’ march apart. Early in the afternoon the troops stopped for dinner, no doubt dining well on Seminole provisions. After the meal was concluded, 25–30 men started back to the nearest village to begin the work of destroying what they had found. Before getting there, they came across another trail with fresh moccasin tracks. Following it for a distance, they came to a deep stream about 20 yards wide with thick cypress growth on either side. Parkhill and five or six men entered the stream and waded right Figure 46. Chief Holata Micco (Billy Bowlegs). One into an ambush. Gunfire rang out of the pictures reportedly taken from Holata’s camp by Captain Cone. from the opposite bank, and the captain fell mortally wounded, while five others were injured. The remainder of the soldiers returned fire, but it was too late. The Seminole warriors disappeared into the swamp after the first volley. Parkhill had been a well-respected and popular man in Tallahassee and Leon County, and a monument to his memory was erected in front of the state capitol building in 1861. He would be the highest ranking officer killed in the Third Seminole War.9 The survivors brought the wounded men and their commander’s body back to camp, and then the whole group started back to Chokoloskee to rejoin Colonel Rogers. Along the way they buried the captain’s body by the side of a lake. Two days later they reached their destination. Running low on water and with disease and injuries having reduced his effective force to 48 men, Rogers was forced to leave Chokoloskee. Although all were saddened at the loss of their comrade, the colonel could report that much of their mission had been accomplished: We have unquestionably discovered the hiding place of the whole of them. The fields discovered amounted to 80 to 100 acres of land and the houses destroyed to sixty or seventy, and nothing like a thorough examination has yet been made, and indeed cannot be with the force I have here. I am of the impression that their families are concealed upon the Keys between this and Chokoliska, and that they only occupied the settlement destroyed during the

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cropping season. The corn, rice, peas we destroyed seemed to be what they had hidden away for seed another planting season. The bulk of these articles raised in these fields has doubtless been carried off to where they live which cannot be far from that place. The boat companies I think could be well employed now in these Keys, penetrating the interior by every inlet. That the whole nation is here I have not the least manner of doubt.10

A bit north, in the Big Cypress, Capt. Winston Stephens of the Mounted Volunteers was leading a combined force of 93 regulars and volunteers in search of Seminole villages. On 2 December, near the site of the abandoned Fort Shackleford, someone thought he heard children playing. Taking up the trail the next morning, Figure 47. Historic Capitol Museum and Captain John they came upon a small pumpkin Parkhill Monument, Tallahassee. patch and continued on until they discovered a large village of about 50 houses, 10 acres of corn, and extensive fields that had been cleared for future planting. Finding a crib filled with corn, rice, and peas, Stephens ordered the contents thrown out, but lit no fires, fearing it would alert the Indians to his presence.11 After dinner, Stephens ordered out a scouting party, which soon sent a runner back saying they had spotted a party of about eight Indians. Following the trail for several hundred yards, Stephens realized it was leading nowhere and changed course, but before long was forced to make camp for the night. While the men made camp, another scouting party went ahead to see if there was any sight of the Seminole families. What they found instead was another ambush. The Seminole opened fire, killing one of the soldiers. Stephens ordered the remainder of the company to give chase, but the warriors kept out of gunshot range, continuing to fire at the whites and taunting them with their yells.12 Realizing pursuit would be fruitless, Stephens ordered a return to camp. As the soldiers retreated, the Seminole shadowed them, their numbers steadily increasing. Feeling his campsite was in too vulnerable a position, Stephens moved toward a more defensible location. Coming to a cypress head, Stephen’s men entered it as if they were simply passing through, but as they reached the opposite side, they turned and retraced their steps, taking up hidden positions to create an ambush of their

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own. In about half an hour the Indians that had been trailing them approached. Stephens’s men opened fire, killing two and severely wounding one.13 At this point Stephens could have charged after the Indians or used the time to reach a safer location. Instead, he had his men hold their positions. As he surmised, about two hours later some warriors approached with the intention of removing the bodies of their fallen comrades. Once again the soldiers opened fire, this time killing three warriors and badly wounding another. Imagining he might soon be surrounded by a large number of Indians, Stephens left the cypress head and marched his men all night, reaching Camp Rogers in the morning. No longer were the Seminole the only experts in guerrilla warfare.14 No one knew it at the time, but the last battle of the war had been fought. The volunteers had located three major Seminole towns and destroyed everything they could lay their hands on. Much of the food that Holata and his people needed for their survival was now gone. Their homes and many of the possessions required for daily living had been turned to ash. They were suffering. Even Colonel Loomis, up at Tampa Bay, could sense the end was near. In a 6 December letter to the War Department he wrote, “I learn from the captured squaws that Bow-Legs has held councils and at the risk of his life has entreated the Indians to come in, and that he only saves his life by striking a blow whenever an opportunity offers. The Micasukies [Abiaki’s group] are said to be as hostile as ever and will not permit any of the Indians to talk about peace.”15 The success of the volunteers even led a Virginia newspaper to print a rather cruel remark that caught the eye of the Tampa Florida Peninsular’s editor. “The Richmond Dispatch suggests that the Florida Legislature pass a law for the preservation of the Indians in that State, allowing no more to be shot until they propagate in sufficient numbers to give all the volunteers a chance. The proposed law is similar to other ‘game laws.’”16 The war may have been ending, but the government was not about to ease up on the Seminole. Loomis wrote, “I design increasing the force where the Indians are most likely to be found with the least delay practicable.” On 5 December, the Florida Secretary of State wrote to Secretary of War Floyd, asking how many companies of volunteers would be needed to replace those whose enlistments were about to run out. At the same time, Colonel Loomis was recommending fewer mounted volunteers but more boat companies. When the summer rains started and the land began to flood, horse soldiers would be much less useful.17 As Loomis had indicated, there was serious division among the Seminole bands as to whether it was better to give up and head west or continue the fight for their homeland. Seminole leaders could make their decisions and followers could do their duty, but in the end it was often a personal decision. As a newspaper report indicated, the Seminole spirit of defiance had not yet been extinguished:

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The Indian warrior captured by Capt. Cone’s command, killed himself, at Punta Rassa, on Friday, the 4th inst., by eating pieces of glass. He had expressed a determination never to leave Florida, and all weapons were removed from his reach to prevent self-destruction. He however, procured a glass bottle, broke it into small pieces, and succeeded in swallowing enough to kill him before the trick was discovered. This Indian was about 75 years of age, and his conduct seems to indicate that the Seminole warriors will sacrifice life before they will give up the land of their nativity.18

Colonel Rogers, at Cape Romano and hoping to follow up on the successes of November, wanted to once again send out the boat companies to scour the western Everglades, but ran into a problem: “I was extremely anxious to continue my operations on the coast being assured that in the next attempt I would be able to penetrate the country in which Captain Parkhill discovered Indians. But the boat companies were determined not to obey the order which they had received, but to return to Fort Myers upon the expiration of their term of service.” The two boat companies had three to eight days left on their enlistments, they were exhausted, and were ready to go home. Wanting to make the best of a bad situation, Rogers convinced them to return to Fort Myers via an overland route instead of going by sea. For the next week the troops slogged through the coastal marshes and swamps, then into the more open country of the Big Cypress, finally arriving at Camp Rogers, east of Fort Keais, on 26 December. Four days later they were back at Fort Myers. During the trek they had seen numerous abandoned camps and a number of trails, but not the first Indian. The Seminole were truly on the run.19 As it was, the volunteer army was in no shape to pursue them. Upon his return to Fort Myers, Rogers began to realize how sick and run down his men were. The main Seminole hideouts had been found, and if a large force could be thrown into the Big Cypress and Everglades, Rogers felt he had a good chance of forcing the Indians to surrender or stand and fight. With enough troops in the field, the Seminole wouldn’t be able to tend their fields, which would cause their food supplies to gradually diminish. Time was of the essence, but with so many of his men incapacitated and their enlistments soon to run out, he was unable to go on the offensive. He needed to talk to Colonel Loomis at Tampa, but the steamer Grey Cloud had just left Punta Rassa. He boarded the Ranger in hopes of catching the Grey Cloud, but the smaller steamer just couldn’t close the distance. Having no other choice, he wrote Loomis a long letter explaining the situation and sent it by express rider to Fort Brooke. In it he wrote: Out of five whole companies and detachments from three others, I could raise but one hundred and fifteen men able to do foot service, or reported able by their company officers and by the Surgeon of the post, and of these, had I desired to select able bodied healthy men, I should unquestionably have rejected nearly one half. This constitutes the whole effective force of my Regiment stationed on the cypress and when the present scout returns, I much doubt if more than sixty or seventy men can be raised for foot service from the whole command. This

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disability for service is not confined to the privates. Their officers are prostrated by sickness and are unable to lead their men … Under existing circumstances, I know not what to do for the short period left of the term of service of my Regiment. In the present condition of the troops I can do nothing. Service cannot be obtained from men scarcely able to walk, much less carry heavy packs upon their backs. The service required here cannot be performed by men who under ordinary circumstances might be able to do foot service. I have tried it and I know that it requires men of more than ordinary powers of endurance … I may therefore safely say that so far as my Regiment is concerned, this campaign is at an end … I would be the last to suggest the withdrawal of the troops while there was a hope of accomplishing anything from the field of actual operation. With one thousand efficient men able to do foot service, I am satisfied this war may be ended in three months at farthest, certainly before another rainy season. How these men are to be raised is a question for the Colonel Commanding the Dept. and the authorities at Washington.20

The only fresh men Rogers had were from several of the independent companies that had recently arrived from farther north. Along with 125 healthy men from Roger’s regiment, the total force came to 323. On 28 December these men headed deep into the Big Cypress and up to the edge of the Everglades. What they found was more proof that the Seminole were abandoning their homes and scattering deep into the Everglades. Roger’s report listing the amount of destruction showed that in this war of attrition, the Seminole were truly suffering:   … a large hammock was discovered in which were three fields of considerable size with abundance of pumpkins, potatoes and beans. Also two corn cribs with about 50 bushels of corn part of it of the crop of 1856, also quantities of dried pumpkin, peas in deer skins & pumpkin and melon seed. Everything was destroyed. January 2nd the course was East, about one mile from the field discovered the previous day another was found with seven houses. A mile further another with eight houses in one of which was eight or ten bushels of corn, all destroyed, cow hides were also found. Three miles further another field with 12 houses, destroyed. One mile further another field with six houses, destroyed. A short distance from the last another field with three houses, destroyed. One mile to the Southward of the last Captain Carter discovered and destroyed another field with five houses, in which was some corn. About three miles further in a large town but lately burnt down was discovered. This was the town found by Captain Stephens on his scout, but which he had left untouched, his men being fired on near it. It had contained 40 or 50 houses. The Indians had evidently burnt it themselves, as the grass and straw around it had been raked up to prevent the fire getting into the woods. They then took the trail to the other town through which Captain Stephens had passed. This they found burnt also. The number of houses here was about 50.21

After returning to Camp Rogers the men of the independent companies rested for a few days then gathered supplies and went back out. After taking the horses as far as they could, they dismounted and proceeded on foot. They now began to feel as if they might be closing in on their quarry. After discovering some newly abandoned fields, they followed a set of fresh moccasin tracks until they came upon the Indian who was making them. The man tried to run but was felled by wounds in both

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thighs. The captured Indian told them Abiaki, Assinwar, and about 35 warriors were encamped about 10 miles away. Pushing on, the volunteers found the camp the next day but were spotted by an Indian sentry, who fired on the soldiers, thereby alerting the others to make their escape. For the rest of the day the volunteers chased the fleeing Seminole, who would occasionally turn and fire at their pursuers. The chase lasted until nightfall, but in the morning the volunteers were forced to give up the hunt, being out of food and 40 miles from the supply depot. Still, the patrol had not been a total waste, as Captain Sparkman reported: On our way back next day we found a sick woman on a small Island from where they had fled the day before. We got some 26 of the warriors packs and considerable other plunder and several cow hide boats in which they had their children and sick dragging them in the shallow water … On our way out we found near where the first Indian was captured a field of 20 or 25 acres covered nearly all over with potatoes and beans and round in the hammock we discovered & destroyed 4 corn and rice houses containing near 100 bush. of corn and 10 or 12 of rice, and we must have scratched nearly 40 or 50 bush. of potatoes without beginning to exhaust them. We discovered on this route 9 fields not seen before, and 6 cribs … I believe that if this party of Indians was now hotly pursued they would soon be brought to terms, as they are certainly almost destitute of supplies, only what potatoes they get from those fields and a few hogs.22

The volunteers were being thorough, and by the end of the month there was little left for them to find in the way of villages or fields. The Seminole could not sustain such losses for long, and without food all would suffer or die, be it warrior, woman, or child. On 1 February, Volunteer Capt. Isaac Carter reported the results of a disappointing patrol, having found nothing more than villages and fields that appeared to have been deserted for two or three years. Another group led by Captain Sparkman fared no better, and the only hostility he reported was a personality conflict with Captain Carter. Captain Lesley, operating closer to the coast, found an abandoned village and a small farm, but no sign of Indians. Farther south, along the southwest margins of the Everglades, a group of 50 boatmen under Capt. H. H. Booley wasn’t faring much better. Taking to the woods, they followed numerous trails and found several deserted villages, but the only Indians they saw were a few shadowy figures that were keeping an eye on them. With their enlistments running out, the volunteers returned to their bases, ready to go home.23 Out in the deepest reaches of the Everglades, the Seminole were waiting, wondering what would happen next. Their farms had been torn up, their villages burned, and their stored provisions stolen, scattered, or consumed by flames. They had once thought they could hide forever in the trackless swamps of South Florida, but the relentless pursuit by the military had proven them wrong. It was the Seminole’s darkest hour. After a year’s delay the long-awaited delegation of western Seminole was headed to Florida. Arriving at Tampa on 19 January 1858 were six Creeks and 40 Seminole

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led by John Jumper. Accompanying them was Elias Rector, the Superintendant of Indian Affairs in the South, along with both the Creek and Seminole agents. It was a large delegation, with almost as many delegates as there were hostile warriors in Florida. No one knew what kind of reception the delegation would receive from their Florida cousins, so it was best to be prepared.24 Upon arriving at Tampa, the delegation’s leaders went out to the detention camp at Egmont Key to confer with the Seminole awaiting deportation to the West. It would have been an emotional meeting. Some people were seeing close relations they hadn’t looked upon in years, while some detainees may have been hostile to the westerners, considering them traitors for cooperating with the enemy. When the delegation left Egmont, with them was a niece of Holata who had agreed to serve as a guide.25 Although the people of Florida were happy for the delegation’s help, the editor of the Florida Peninsular feared some unthinking citizen would ruin everything by making some unfortunate remark to the delegates while they were in Tampa. He warned his readers, “It is to be hoped that the prejudices of the masses which often lead to disastrous results, will be guarded, and that nothing will be done to interfere, in the slightest degree, with the liberties or duties of the Indians who have undertaken to do us a favor.” The message appears to have been heeded, as no incidents were reported in the papers or official correspondence.26 On 27 January Loomis and the delegation headed for Fort Myers, and on the 29th he issued orders for hostilities to cease and white flags to be displayed. He also ordered several volunteer companies called in from the field and sent to Tampa to be mustered out. On 6 February the delegates were escorted to Fort Loomis (formerly Camp Rogers) in the Big Cypress in hopes of encountering someone who would take a message to Holata or Abiaki. Because the Florida Indians had gone into deep hiding, just finding someone to talk to might prove difficult.27 For everyone concerned it was a tense waiting game. The army couldn’t let its guard down, no matter how strong the indications were that Holata was ready to give up the fight. From the time of the signing of the Treaty of Moultrie Creek in 1823, relations between the Seminole and whites had been a long string of unrealized expectations. No one could be sure the war was truly over until the last ship bearing deported Indians passed over the horizon. One officer at Fort Dallas told how the men anxiously awaited the arrival of the mail. Although they were primarily looking forward to letters from home, they were also longing for news about the end of the war and what their futures would be: We can only reasonably expect the regular mail arrivals, but as the precise days are not fixed we make the most of this circumstance in a conjectural way & frequent visits to the wharf and straining our eyes in the direction of the entrance of the harbor for day’s before we know the mail ought to arrive and then wondering what has detained it, what news it will bring, &c &c. Each one in turn usually goes through this stereotyped formula of wondering, while the rest chime in various surmises of this, that, or the other, all entering into the discussion with as much zeal as if the subject was being broached for the first instead of the ninety ninth

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time.—When a strange sail really does appear in sight, the excitement becomes intense, the whole garrison flock out to such points as command a view of the approaching vessel and await its coming as eagerly as might so many shipwrecked sailors cast away on the shores of some desert island.28

At Fort Loomis the wait lasted two weeks, but on 21 February the delegation finally received a response to their white flags. Capt. J. M. Brannan, in command at Fort Loomis, reported: I have the Satisfaction of reporting that two of the hostiles, one a Negro and the other an Indian, belonging to Bowleg’s tribe came into this post yesterday Evening under a white flag. They went out last night, and returned this morning with another Indian, Bowleg’s brother-in-law. The hostiles were not found by the friendly Indians but seeing the White flag near Bowleg’s Garden, about 3 miles from this point, they came in without Solicitation. They left again to day having made an arrangement with Jumper to meet Bowlegs in four days, some twenty miles from here. Major Rector desires and I would recommend that Captain Kendrick’s Company and all other Volunteers (except Booly’s men) be sent from Fort Myers to Fort Deynaud as soon as practicable. The Major proposes to move the delegation on Saturday next, to some point about 13 to 15 miles from Fort Myers and thinks it advisable to remove all volunteers from the vicinity, so that an uninterrupted “talk” can be had with the hostiles, which he will have at that point. I shall increase my force by 40 regulars from Fort Myers.29

The comment about moving the volunteers to Fort Deynaud was a telling one. The Seminole feared and distrusted the state troops. If volunteers were in the area, the Indians might not come in to parley. It would be a show of good faith on the part of the government to move them a safe distance away. A week later Brannan had even better news to relate. “I have the honor to report that the prospects of a peaceable termination of the Florida War is very favorable. Bowlegs & two of Sam Jones’ party are now here & having a ‘talk’ with Col. Rector. From present appearances emigration is almost certain.” In the meantime, Luther Blake, the agent the government had hired in 1852 in a fruitless attempt to entice the Seminole to leave Florida, was in the area, trying to find a way to cash in on the negotiations. Superintendant Rector, in charge of the talks, wrote to the Acting Commissioner of Indian Affairs, “I am informed both by the friendly and hostile Indians and by Officers of the Army here, that the presence of Genl. Blake at this time would be very detrimental to the success of negotiations in consequence of his course in 1852.”30 Holata seemed willing to come to terms, but the negotiating was far from over. On 2 March, Superintendant Rector met with Holata and five delegates from Assinwar’s band at a spot 35 miles from Fort Myers. In a letter to the secretary of the interior he wrote: They are to hold a council commencing on the 14th inst. for the purpose of deciding whether they will all emigrate and at what time so that I may have transportation and supplies in readiness.—I left Bowlegs with the delegation at camp and furnished him with horses to bring his family out of the Cypress and shall furnish sufficient provisions for feeding all that come in and remain during the council. Bowlegs expresses the opinion that most or all of the Indians

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will emigrate.—I have agreed to give Bowlegs as a further inducement than the Treaty furnishes seven thousand five hundred dollars, $2,500 of which is for sundry claims which he has against the Government, and to each warrior $500, and each woman and child $100, which amount Bowlegs requires shall be paid upon Egmont Key or the vessel before leaving Florida.31

Holata claimed that the money was nothing more than what Captain Casey had promised in the past, and Rector was in no position to argue the matter. It was cheaper than continuing the war. Holata was also making sure he got the funds before leaving Florida. He had long ago learned not to trust the word of a white man.32 The date of 27 March had been set for Holata to deliver his answer, and on that day he returned and voiced his approval of the agreement. The Seminole War, all 40 years of it, was finally over. As news spread throughout the state, people rejoiced. A paper in Columbia County wrote, “Reliable information has reached us that Gen. Billy Bowlegs, commander in chief of the Seminole Indians in South Florida, has agreed to [western emigration] … All honor is due our noble Regiment of Florida Volunteers for this result. But for the untiring energy of this Regiment in penetrating the Everglades, and discovering the hiding places of the Indians, Florida would have been cursed a long while yet with the presence of these red depredators.”33 The surrendering Seminole had no reason to rejoice. In losing the war they had lost their homeland, many lives, and for some, the will to live. The cash payments, annuities, and other compensations were but a feeble consolation, something to make a bitter pill easier to swallow. All that would be left now were memories and the bones of loved ones and ancestors. It would take time for Holata to gather his people, especially those that had scattered throughout the most remote areas of South Florida. Rector gave him until 1 May, and sent wagons to help bring the Indians in. Everyone was aware that there were a number of bands that would never surrender. Abiaki would continue to hide out, as would Chipco’s Creeks north of Lake Okeechobee. Rector tried to locate these bands and open negotiations, but it was a fruitless endeavor. He also declared that troops would be sent to find them, but with the war ending, neither Washington nor Tallahassee would be willing to fund the endeavor for any length of time.34 With a reluctant willingness that had never been seen during any of the Seminole Wars, Holata’s people came in to Fort Myers. By 1 May, the Florida Peninsular was able to give the following sad tally: On the arrival of the U. S. Steamer Grey Cloud from Fort Myers, we have through the kindness of Maj. McKinstry, been furnished with the following gratifying intelligence. Gen. Billy Bowlegs and Staff, consisting of the principal War Chiefs, viz: Assinwar. Assinwah, son of the above.

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Ole-wah-tle-tuste-nugee. Fooshadjo, Billys’ father-in-law Nokushadjo, Inspector, and Generalissimo of the Indian Army, with 33 warriors and 60 women and children, are now in at Fort Myers, willing to emigrate. A party consisting of a portion of the Indian delegation, with a few of Billys’ warriors, left on the 24th in St’mr. Ranger, down the southern coast in pursuit of Billys’ boat party.—It is presumed they are ere this, at Ft. Myers. On the same day a party of sixteen under Halleck Tuskenuggee, left for Cypress, accompanied by Col. Rutherford for a final interview with Old Sam Jones. On the return of these two parties to Ft. Myers, about the 5th May next, Col. Rector will depart for the West. This party of Indians, including 46 women and children of Egmont Key, without enumerating any that may arrive with the delegations now out, will number 157; including Maj. Rector’s will count 206, a very good cargo of Redskins for the Grey Cloud.35

Not all of the Indians could be found. Some may have been willing to emigrate with the rest of their bands but had secreted themselves so well that even their friends couldn’t locate them. One came into Fort Deynaud and was treated kindly, but when no one came from Fort Myers to talk with him, he simply walked out of the fort and returned to the wilds. Others had no intention of being found. Two men of Abiaki’s band came into Fort Deynaud to sell game but refused to emigrate, “ … and speak very hard against Bowlegs.” On 3 May, Captain Brannan reported that the detachment sent down the coast to locate Holata’s “boat party” had been unsuccessful, as had two warriors Holata had sent overland. On the other hand, another delegation returned with nine people of Abiaki’s band who were willing to emigrate, but the rest of the group (12 warriors, five old men, and families) had scattered, refusing to come in. A day later, Brannan reported that Superintendant Rector and the emigrating party had left Fort Myers on board the Grey Cloud. It was an appropriate name for the ship, no doubt matching the mood of the people on board. With Rector were Holata, Assinwar, 34 warriors, and 86 women and children. Before boarding, the Indians were paid the cash they were promised, sealing the deal.36 On 5 May, the leading citizens of Tampa and the officers of Fort Brooke, accompanied by their ladies, boarded the steamer Ranger and went out to Egmont Key to greet the ship coming from Fort Myers. When the Grey Cloud failed to appear they made the most of the situation, taking an excursion south and coming ashore at the Manatee settlement for an afternoon’s entertainment at the home of “Madame Joe” Atzeroth and her daughter Elizabeth. The Ranger returned to Tampa for the night, but everyone was back on board in the morning, and the boat once again made its way out to Egmont Key. The citizens and officers went ashore, visited with the waiting Seminole, and toured the newly constructed lighthouse.

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Then someone noticed a bit of smoke on the southern horizon. The Ranger’s captain ordered the boilers fired up and before long she was underway, steaming out to meet the Grey Cloud.37 For the people of Tampa and the military men on the ships, it was a moment of joyous triumph. Cannon were fired, bells were rung, and the ships blew their steam whistles. As the Grey Cloud came to rest at the wharf, Ranger tied up alongside, and the passengers began to mingle. For them, it was a time to celebrate.38 For many of the Seminole it was also a time of joy, as those who had been captured were reunited with their loved ones. Colonel Loomis remarked, “The joy of the captive women and children, upon being restored to their friends on board the steamer ‘Grey Cloud,’ was deeply affecting and overpowering to many among them, even Billy Bowlegs himself.” For others, it was a time of disappointment and tears as they learned their relations had either been killed or were not among those who had agreed to emigrate. Some of the Indians may have felt relief that the war was finally over. All of them were no doubt sad or angry at being forced from their homes, yet perhaps there were a few who were looking forward to their new lives in the West. The Seminole spirit had gotten them through years of bitter warfare. That same spirit would get them through the difficult times ahead.39 The Grey Cloud left Egmont Key the next day, 7 May, carrying 165 emigrating Seminole (including two black warriors) and the western delegation. Not all of the Indians made it to their new homes. When the ship docked at St. Marks to take on fuel several women escaped and eventually made their way back to their people in the Everglades. Among them was Polly Parker, who would later become an important Seminole matriarch.40 The emigrating Seminole had been promised a peaceful, permanent home among the other tribes in Indian Territory, and even President Buchanan had said, “We may indulge the agreeable anticipation that at no very distant day they will be incorporated into the Union as one of the sovereign States.” It was not to be. Any chance of peace was lost with the outbreak of the Civil War a few years later. It may not have been the Indians’ war, but they could not avoid being caught up in it. For their own personal reasons, many Native Americans took sides, often fighting each other. Holata Micco served as a captain in the Union army.41 Peace and prosperity in the West were also denied the Seminole as land-hungry whites moved into areas surrounding the reservations. By the Dawes Act of 1887 and the Curtis Act of 1898, reservations throughout Indian Territory were broken up and individual Indian families given allotments of privately owned land. Tribal members were made American citizens and tribal governments were abolished, thereby removing the cultural backbone of their society. Surplus lands were then sold to whites, and many of the allotments were lost through sale or fraud, which left many Seminole homeless. The admission of Oklahoma as the 46th state of the union in 1907 ended forever the hope of a permanent Indian homeland.

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With Holata Micco and his people gone from Florida, Colonel Loomis could now declare the war officially over, and did so on 8 May 1858: The delegation of friendly Indians under the charge of Colonel Elias Rector, superintendent of Indian affairs, having succeeded in removing the hostile chief Billy Bowlegs and most of his band, with some of the band of Sam Jones, leaving only about thirty warriors, all told, in the State of Florida, and these being very widely scattered upon the islands in the swamps of the country, and no trace of them having been discovered for some months back, no depredations having been committed, and no hostile gun fired by them for some months, except in defence of their fastnesses and hiding places, I now consider it unnecessary and unwise, in view of the rapid settlement of the country, to prosecute scouting the swamps and everglades to hunt up the few remaining Indian families. I therefore hereby declare the Florida war closed, and the people can now return to their homes and usual avocations without fear of further molestation.42

It was a simple statement of fact. The few Indians remaining in Florida were doing their best to avoid the whites and would bother no one if left alone. There were, of course, some whites who could not accept the facts and would not be happy until there was not a single Indian living in Florida. Among them was Governor Madison Starke Perry, who told Loomis: In my humble judgment, the presence of the Indians known to have remained will as effectually retard the settlement of the Peninsula, and render the lives and property of our citizens as insecure, as though Billy and his tribe had not been removed. Besides, from the well known character of the Indians, it is evident that if permitted to remain, and they should, from prudential motives, suspend hostilities for a time, another war, costing a heavy outlay of money and perhaps valuable life, will be the consequence.43

Another individual beating the drum for total removal was the editor of the Florida Peninsular. Five months after the war was declared over, he expressed his disappointment in the fact that so few settlers had rushed into southern Florida. As far as he was concerned, it was all because of a handful of Indians. “A few, and only a few, of the most daring of our frontier settlers have ventured across Peas Creek and the hopes of the thousands who have looked on our rich lands and salubrious climate with covetous eyes, are crushed, and they compelled to forego the pleasure of a residence in the Land of Flowers or become neighbors to the treacherous savage.” Fortunately for the Seminole, these people, as influential as they were, were powerless to do anything about the situation. The federal government would have had to foot the bill, and it was finished fighting the Florida Indians. Besides, in another three years, Floridians would have a much more powerful and dangerous enemy to fight, and the handful of Indians would be forgotten.44 So how many Seminole remained in Florida? Various estimates put the count at 35–40 warriors and their families. Some put the numbers much higher, but had little evidence to back up those figures. Abiaki supposedly had 17 warriors, but five were old men, and Holata’s “boat party” numbered about 13 warriors. The Creeks were thought to have no more than eight warriors. Counting women, children, and infirm elders, the entire population was probably fewer than 200.45

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In truth, the government had not given up on the idea of further emigration, but had no intention of using military means to accomplish it. Superintendant Rector returned late in the year in an attempt to convince the remaining Seminole to move west, but accomplished little. Several Indians heard of his visit and indicated they would listen to what Rector had to say, but insisted they would never leave their homes.46 Among those who would not be leaving Florida was Abiaki, the only major Seminole leader to survive all three Seminole Wars and not be driven from his home. On 1 January 1859, the Florida Peninsular reported rumors that the “celebrated Seminole Indian Chief, Sam Jones, is dead.” The paper went on to say, “So the old Chief has at last carried out his resolve, to deposit his bones in the land of his fathers, from which no bribe or persecution with fire and sword could swerve him … We all wish to get rid of the Indians, but who can fail to admire the sentiment!”47 The rumor turned out to be false. Abiaki was still going strong, even fathering a child in 1864, when he was about 83. His death was finally reported to Col. John T. Sprague, military commander of the District of Florida during Reconstruction, at Fort Dallas in January 1867.48 With the war concluded, the dismantling of the military presence in Florida could finally take place. The volunteers were quickly mustered out of service and returned to their normal occupations. Troops and materiel were sent to other posts throughout the nation, and with the exception of the major coastal fortifications, Fort Brooke was the only post not closed down. Around a few of those abandoned posts, towns sprang up, most notably at Fort Dallas (Miami) and Fort Myers. The people of those towns frequently came into contact with the Seminole, traded with them, and learned they had nothing to fear from them. Still, many on both sides remained cautious. One visitor to Miami commented, “A young Indian called Billy, in the employ of Mr. Fletcher at the time, as soon as he caught sight of Lieut. Randolph’s uniform gave a spring and was over the fence and far away in double quick time.” He also mentioned, “The settlers at the Miami bear testimony of the strict honesty and good faith of these Indians so far.” Another visitor noted, “The people of Miami may be slumbering upon a volcano, but, if so, they give themselves no trouble about it.” Finally, after more than 40 years of hostility, Seminole and Floridian were beginning to learn how to get along.49 So what lessons can we learn from the Seminole Wars and the Third War in particular? The root causes of the wars were the same ones that are behind most all conflicts: intolerance, fear, and greed. And, just as humans have always done—and still do—the people of the time either didn’t recognize the injustices they were committing or didn’t care. White intolerance for the needs of the Native Americans forced the Seminole into situations where violence seemed the only way they could maintain their culture or keep their families safe. Of course there was not much understanding of white needs on the part of the Indians, but white society, being

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the larger and more aggressive of the two, was the only party that could do much to bring about an equitable solution. Unfortunately, the only solution seriously considered was forced removal. A little education could have lessened the intolerance, but greed is almost unstoppable. Plantation owners and speculators all saw fortunes to be made in unsettled Florida. It didn’t matter if the land was nearly impossible to live on. Americans firmly believed that hard work and engineering could fix all that, and that if they could drain the wetlands and build roads into it, people would be lining up to buy Florida swampland. The millions of people who bought Florida real estate in the 20th century proved them right. In the early 19th century, whites also bought into the dream that if they could somehow acquire a large piece of land and bring in slaves to clear and work it, they would become prosperous plantation owners, the cream of Southern society. It all sounds rather harsh and simplistic, and it was. The fact is that the majority of the people clamoring for Florida land were poor farmers hoping for a small patch of good ground where they could grow sufficient crops and raise enough livestock to keep their families fed. There is very little evil in that, but there could be a generous portion of fear and intolerance when it came to protecting what little they had. It was that fear on the part of the frontier inhabitants, at least as much as greed on the part of land speculators, that served to bring on the Third Seminole War. The chances of an isolated homestead close to the reservation boundary being attacked was relatively high, and settlers had good reason to be afraid. Today Americans demand that their local, state, and federal authorities provide protection from violent individuals who would do them harm, no matter how impossible the task might be. Nervous Floridians in the 1850s did precisely the same, and their elected leaders acted accordingly. Perhaps what is most troubling from today’s perspective is that there seems little need for the measures taken by whites and their various government agencies. The Seminole of 1850 were not looking for trouble. Had they been treated with reasonable respect, they would probably have posed little threat to anyone. No one in an official capacity said, “The Seminole could be useful friends. They could watch over our coastlines and rescue shipwrecked sailors or inform us of foreign agents or smugglers landing on our shores. They could serve as guides through an inhospitable land and show us how to survive there. They are few in number and their needs are small. What can we do to make them friends?” Prejudice, greed, and fear prevented it. A look at modern attitudes show that little has changed. Today, when we feel threatened or our livelihoods are at risk, we still point fingers and level accusations at other ethnic groups, the vast majority of whose members have committed no other crime than being “not like us.” It’s a very human thing to do, and none of us, no matter what our background, are immune from acting on those same sorts of emotions. It only takes the right situation. Through it all, we must

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remember that it isn’t just what white Americans did to the Native Americans; it’s what people do to people. And what of the Seminole’s motivations and actions? It was, after all, their decision to attack Lieutenant Hartsuff and commence open hostilities, so we can’t say they were totally passive victims of white aggression. In truth, they had but three options in responding to government pressure: surrender for emigration, make war, or do nothing, and to some extent, all three were used. Their culture, in which the ties to the land are so important, made the thought of emigration especially abhorrent. The fact that many of them did choose to go west shows how intense the pressure was and how difficult life became for the Indians. Making war was the path that was eventually chosen, and considering theirs was a warrior culture, it is not surprising. Still, the decision to go to war appears to have been taken with great reluctance, and except for the one small band led by Oscen Tustennuggee, the Seminole rarely took the war to the whites. For the most part, they only fought when their homes were threatened. Whether it was a conscious decision or simply an obvious default strategy, the Seminole appear to have chosen the third option: do nothing, or more properly, do what was necessary to avoid capture. True, they didn’t completely avoid battle; their warrior ethos wouldn’t have allowed them to remain totally passive. Yet most of their efforts seem to have gone into building up stores of supplies and finding places that were difficult for the army to locate. In this they were only partially successful. The white resolve to drive them out was simply too great to overcome, and many of the hiding places and the provisions stored at them were discovered and destroyed. Still, if staying in Florida was their goal, we can’t see any better course of action to achieve it. The fact that there are still Seminole in Florida shows that it was probably the correct one. As with any history, there are specific insights to be gained from studying the war. What of the much-argued-over differences between regular soldiers and volunteers? Regulars considered the volunteers undisciplined and worthless. Volunteers considered the regulars unsuited to the climate and worthless. In a sense, both were right and both were wrong. The volunteers were undisciplined, at least at the beginning of the war, and it led to problems. Believing in the myth of the Minutemen, the nation placed an unrealistic reliance on citizen soldiers. Right up until World War II, every time the nation went to war it took a year or two for the former civilians to become effective. What else could be expected of men with little or no military experience? By the second year of the war, effective leaders had been found, discipline had been imposed, and the volunteers proved their worth. On the other side of the coin, many of the regulars were unprepared to fight a war in Florida. A large number of them were immigrants, straight off the boat, and with a limited command of English. Most were from colder climates and/or large urban centers. It took time to learn the language and how to deal with the

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environment. The army’s tendency to gather in forts, the perfect place for the spread of disease, didn’t help matters. Volunteers, employed for a limited time, were more likely to be kept in motion and therefore less likely to fall prey to infectious disease. Still, once the volunteers began to operate in the Big Cypress and Everglades in a manner similar to the regulars, they fell victim to the same diseases.50 The idea that the Floridians were better acclimated proved to be a myth. Yes, they often possessed the skills for tracking, guiding, and living off the land, but their bodies were no better suited to the rigors of the campaign than anyone else’s. On average, the volunteer private was no better (or worse) a man than his counterpart in the regular army. Both were usually from the lower classes of their respective societies, and both could fight with a will when necessary. Yet in the Third Seminole War it was the volunteers who by far inflicted the most damage on the Seminole. It was they who turned the tide of war at the Tillis Battle in June 1856. It was the boat companies who put the first real pressure on the Indians, and it was volunteer units that discovered the Seminole hideouts and brought an end to the war. There were also differences in the objectives the two forces were trying to accomplish. The army was under orders to remove the Indians and see them safely to their new homes in the West. The volunteers just wanted to be rid of them and were less concerned about how they accomplished the task. We should, however, be careful not to visualize all the volunteers as ragged, uneducated drunkards bent on exterminating the Seminole. Most of their officers were also some of the state’s most influential civic leaders, either during the war or after. These were intelligent, thoughtful men, and we see signs that many of them learned to respect their enemies. Francis A. Hendry, who served as a volunteer officer during the war, would later help found the Friends of the Florida Seminole and work toward obtaining them a permanent reservation.51 Jacob Summerlin, who had once threatened to take matters into his own hands if the government didn’t act against the Seminole, served as an agent to them during the Civil War, and became friends with Abiaki.52 Chipco was so well respected that the Daughters of the American Revolution erected a roadside marker to him in 1957, near his old home at Lake Hamilton. In truth, both the Florida Volunteers and the regular army had important roles to play. The volunteers may have been more familiar with the terrain and more determined to protect their homes, but they lacked the organization and infrastructure to carry on a prolonged war. Regular soldiers built the forts and roads necessary for campaigning in an undeveloped country. Volunteers considered it beneath their dignity to perform such tasks. The army’s Quartermaster, Ordinance, and Commissary Departments understood transportation, weapons procurement, and supply. Without horses, mules, wagons, guns, boats, and food, the volunteers would have accomplished little.

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The army also supplied the leadership and military expertise. Volunteer officers were civilians who were elected to their positions by the men under their command or appointed by the governor. Most were upright, dedicated citizens, but few had any real military training or experience. Although many had served in the Second Seminole War, few had been in positions of senior leadership. It takes experience to plan and carry out a military campaign, and there were countless questions that needed answers. How long will it take to gather men and supplies? How many men will you need, and how do you pay them? Where do you get the needed materials from? How do you build a fort or a road? What are the strengths and weaknesses of yours and the enemy’s men and materials? How much gunpowder, lead, and food do you need? Where will you find suitable doctors and medicines to take care of the troops? The questions were endless, and the answers took time to learn. A civilian suddenly thrust into command couldn’t know all these things, and might not even know where to begin to learn. So how did the leaders do? As human beings who know and respect the Seminole people, we certainly don’t believe the policy of Indian Removal was wise or just, but as historians we have to analyze these participants’ performance. Governor Broome comes across as a man dedicated to getting the job done and willing to cooperate with the federal authorities. Today, of course, we look upon the removal of the native peoples as a terrible thing, but in his society, most people, but certainly not all, looked upon it as a necessity. Broome also seems quite intent on having as many Floridians employed in the war effort as possible, but that’s what his constituents expected of him. Then again, subsequent accomplishments by the Florida Volunteers partially vindicate his insistence that state troops could win the war. Jesse Carter, the governor’s agent in Tampa, also appears to be a dedicated individual doing the best he could with the limited resources and powers at his disposal. His organizational skills were superior to most, and he was not afraid to dismiss those deemed unworthy of command. As for the individual volunteer commanders, they were a mixed bag, as one would expect. Early in the war there were problems with poor leadership and lackadaisical performance, but by the end of the conflict most of those problems seem to have faded or were at least not getting in the way. Volunteer commanders such as Colonel Rogers and Captains Mickler, Turner, and Johnston certainly proved to be capable leaders. Much of the blame for the war can be laid at the feet of President Franklin Pierce and his Secretary of War, Jefferson Davis. It was they who succumbed to political pressure, brought more troops into the state, and ordered the building of forts in and around Seminole territory. It was this pressure that drove the Indians to the point where war seemed a viable option. Yet Pierce and Davis were simply doing what the people of Florida and other Southern interests wanted, with little or no regard for the rights or interests of the Seminole people or the welfare of the army.

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The war’s first commanders, Colonels John Munroe and Harvey Brown, didn’t accomplish much, but under the circumstances, they did as well as could be expected. Jefferson Davis and the people of Florida had pushed for war, but had failed to adequately prepare for it. There were insufficient troops in Florida, not enough material (especially boats), and the volunteers were not organized or trained. Brown put what men he had into motion, but an unusually wet winter in the early stages of the war prevented them from making any inroads against the Seminole. By the time the ground dried out, the campaign season had ended. Continuing the war into the summer months was a tactic that had proven effective in the Second Seminole War, but without sufficient troops and boats, Brown and Munroe were unable to employ it to any large degree. General Harney seemed a good choice to lead the war, and his tactics were sound. The only way the Seminole were going to be defeated was to put constant pressure on them where they lived, a tactic General Worth had nearly perfected at the end of the previous war. With a sufficient number of men and boats Harney was able to make headway in the effort to remove the Seminole, but the army needed him elsewhere, and he was not allowed to see the job through. His one major fault seems to have been in believing his own reputation. He and many others were of the opinion that the Seminole lived in mortal fear of him. True, they probably feared Harney more than most other officers, but not to the point where they were ready to throw down their arms, raise the white flag, and board the boat for the new land in the West. Like all intelligent people, the Seminole reassessed the situation and altered their response. Colonel Loomis is perhaps the most surprising of the commanders. Most descriptions of him portray an amiable old man who was quite the opposite of the energetic, powerful Harney. Yet energy and forcefulness were not necessarily the foremost prerequisites for command of the war. Experience, imagination, and the ability to work with others were more important attributes, especially when you were running the war from far-away Tampa and using large numbers of volunteers. He knew what it would take to win the war, had the presence of mind to change tactics when necessary, and knew how to delegate and cooperate. He got the job done, and probably just as fast as Harney would have. Out of all the men in the military, regular or volunteer, the one we admire and respect the most is John C. Casey. Caught between his love of the Seminole and dedication to the army, none of his choices could have been easy. The fact that he was slowly dying only makes his perseverance and cool commitment to duty all the more remarkable. His journals present us with a man who never stopped trying to do what he thought was right under the most trying circumstances, while somehow maintaining his sense of humor and honor. If the army had a hero in this tragic war, Casey was the man.

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The Indian leaders are much more difficult to assess. Oscen Tustennuggee was the one who took the war to the whites, leading the attacks in the areas surrounding Tampa Bay in the early months of the war. The initial success of his raids may have gratified him personally, increased his stature within the tribe, and provided an inspiration to his people, but if the ultimate goal was to remain in Florida, his efforts were counterproductive. The attacks caused widespread panic among the whites, which led to increased patrols, and resulted in the capture or killing of a large number of his people. From today’s perspective, he would have served the cause much better by simply keeping out of sight. Of course he and his people didn’t see the world with our eyes, nor should they have. They saw land-hungry, merciless whites attempting to steal everything the Indian had. For Native Americans, violent retaliation was part of their legal system and culture. Such a reaction may not seem logical, but it is perfectly understandable. Study current events, and you’ll see that humanity hasn’t changed in the least. On the other side of the coin we have Abiaki, the mysterious Sam Jones. His strategy was to stay hidden and avoid the whites whenever possible, and in this he proved successful. A wise man, he knew the whites would sooner or later tire of the war, especially if the Indians remained completely on the defensive. A survivor of three wars against the Americans, he knew they could occasionally be beaten, but never truly defeated. They could, however, be outlasted. Today’s Seminole and Miccosukee rightly revere Abiaki as the man who led them through their darkest days and gave them the opportunity to remain in Florida. Perhaps the most intriguing Indian leader of the war is Holata Micco (Billy Bowlegs). Between the end of the Second Seminole War in 1842 and the outbreak of open hostilities in 1855, we see a man determined to keep the peace, knowing it was the only way to ensure that his people would remain in Florida. Considering the animosity between his people and the whites, it was truly an accomplishment that peace was maintained for 13 years. Figure 48. Statue representative of Abiaki (Sam Jones) As for his abilities as a war leader, we at Tree Tops Park, Broward County. An identical statue have little record of him during the stands in front of the Seminole Tribe’s Ah-Tah-Thi-Ki conflict, and if he was actually out Museum at the Big Cypress Reservation.

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there, leading his warriors into battle, no one mentions it with any certainty. That doesn’t mean he wasn’t, just that there were few opportunities for him to be identified. Like Osceola in the Second Seminole War, Holata was the face of the Seminole people, the person everyone assumed was calling the shots, whether he actually was or not. Few whites understood, or cared to understand, the dynamic between him and Abiaki and the power of the tribal council. If nothing else, Holata is one of the war’s tragic heroes and the Seminole’s unintentional sacrificial lamb. The whites kept saying that “all” Indians had to be removed, but in reality only Holata and a significant number of his followers had to go. If the majority of the Indians had been removed but Holata and a determined band of warriors were still at large, the war would have continued. He was the prize, and once the prize was obtained, few people cared about the remainder of the tribe. Because Holata was willing to give up his homeland, we still have Seminole in Florida today. And that is a wonderful thing. The Seminole people are an inspiration. They fought tenaciously for their homes and their identities. Some of them couldn’t see it through to the end, but it was usually because of circumstances beyond their control. They’ve proven to be the most adaptable people, learning to live in a land most of us would consider uninhabitable. When the 20th century brought drainage projects and roads to the Everglades, they adapted again by entering the tourist trade. When faced with poverty and the loss of government protection, they built their proud tribal sovereignty into a multi-million dollar business enterprise. Their story is truly a remarkable tale.

Appendix

U.S. Military Killed in Action (Regulars and Volunteers) Third Seminole War The following list was compiled from various sources, primarily battlefield reports, the register of enlistments, volunteer muster rolls, and post returns. While we believe the list is complete as far as the number of fatal engagements in the war, there may be people who succumbed to their injuries some weeks after a battle and were therefore not listed as killed in action in the original reports. We also regret that a comparable list could not be compiled for Seminole warriors killed in action, but the numbers would be derived from body counts that are often inflated by soldiers, and rarely is a slain warrior identified by name. 12/20/1856 Attack on Lt. Hartsuff’s Party

1/18/1856

3/29/1856 4/7/1856 5/17/1856 6/14/1856

Curren, Pvt. Michael Foster, Pvt. William Horth, Pvt. William Murtaugh, Pvt. Patrick Attack on woodcutters, Fort Deynaud Love, Cpl. William Busby, Pvt. John Fanning, Pvt. James Fermenagh, Pvt. James Williams, Pvt. Tyrone Ambush near Cape Romano O’Rourke, Cpl. George Winterling, Pvt. Frank Battle in the Big Cypress, Maj. Simms, Pvt. John Arnold Starling Wagon Train (Volunteers) Starling, James Roach (first name unknown) Tillis Battle #1 (Volunteers) Carlton, Lt. Alderman Parker, William Whidden, Lott

u.s. military killed in action (regulars and volunteers) 6/16/1856

Tillis Battle #2 (Volunteers)

8/2/1856 3/5/1857

Punta Rassa ambush Garden Hammock, Capt. Stevenson

4/23/1857

Palm Grove, ambush of water party

5/1/1857

Kissimmee River area, volunteer attack Ambush in Everglades, near Chokoloskee Ambush in Big Cypress, Capt. Stephens (Vols.)

11/28/57 12/2/1857

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Howell, George Prine, Robert Haug, Pvt. John Chillon, Pvt. Lewis McClosky, Pvt. Philip McKim, Pvt. William One possible unknown Seiler, Pvt. Bernhard Springer, Pvt. Edward Swicord, William Parkhill, Capt. John (Vols.) Tavell, John

Although not officially killed in action, there were four musicians who wandered away from the camp of Captain Stevenson’s units on 4 March 1857 (the day before the battle at Garden Hammock) and were either captured or attacked by the Indians. Stevenson’s report of the battle the following day lists four killed in the battle. In neither case were names given. One of the musicians (Bohmer) made it back to the camp but died of his wounds on 6 March. Because we don’t know if he was included as one of the day’s fatalities, we cannot be sure of the count for those killed during the battle. 3/4/1857

Musicians taken by the Indians, near Bohmer, Pvt. Gerlack Garden Hammock Borderieux, Pvt. Joseph Cook, Pvt. Henry One possible unknown

Picture Credits Figure 1 Figure 2 Figure 3 Figure 4 Figure 5

Figure 6

Figure 7 Figure 8 Figure 9 Figure 10 Figure 11 Map 1 Figure 12 Figure 13 Figure 14 Figure 15

Seminole Chief Billy Bowlegs (Holata Micco). Courtesy of State Archives of Florida, https://www.floridamemory.com/items/show/27148. Gen. William Jenkins Worth, by Mathew Brady, c. 1860–1865. Courtesy of National Archives, File: 528455.jpg. Military cemetery adjacent to St. Francis Barracks, St. Augustine. Photo by John Missall. David Levy Yulee, Senator from Florida, c. 1859. Courtesy of Library of Congress, http://www.loc.gov/pictures/item/brh2003004192/PP/. Captain John T. Sprague, c. 1861–1865. Courtesy of John Titcomb Sprague Collection, Julia Tutwiler Library, University of West Alabama, http://library.uwa.edu/images/J_T_S_Coll._0001.jpg. Tampa Bay on the Gulf of Mexico, c. 1837; view of barracks and tents at Fort Brooke. Courtesy of Library of Congress, http://www.loc.gov/ pictures/item/96507236/. Governor William D. Moseley. Courtesy of State Archives of Florida, https://www.floridamemory.com/items/show/128378. Memorial Marker for George Payne and Dempsey Whidden at Paynes Creek Historic State Park. Photo by John Missall. Secretary of War George W. Crawford, c. 1844–1849. Courtesy of Library of Congress, http://www.loc.gov/pictures/item/2004663916/. General David E. Twiggs, c. 1860–1862. Courtesy of Library of Congress, http://www.loc.gov/pictures/item/cwp2003004476/PP/. General George Gordon Meade, c. 1860–1855. Courtesy of Library of Congress. http://www.loc.gov/pictures/item/cwp2003000351/PP/. Florida, 1850. Map drawn by John Missall. Jacob Summerlin. Courtesy of State Archives of Florida, https://www. floridamemory.com/items/show/26245. John Darling. Courtesy of the Tampa Bay History Center. Governor Thomas Brown. Courtesy of State Archives of Florida, https:// www.floridamemory.com/items/show/48925. Abraham. Slave, interpreter, and advisor to Chief Micanopy. Courtesy of State Archives of Florida, https://www.floridamemory.com/items/ show/31651.

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Figure 16 “Billy Bowlegs” and his retinue, in New York, 1852. Courtesy of State Archives of Florida, https://www.floridamemory.com/items/show/4363. Figure 17 Secretary of War Jefferson Davis, c. 1858–1860. Courtesy of Library of Congress, http://www.loc.gov/pictures/item/2004673617/. Figure 18 Governor James E. Broome, c. 1853–1857. Courtesy of State Archives of Florida, https://www.floridamemory.com/items/show/128233. Figure 19 Stephen R. Mallory, Senator from Florida. Courtesy of Library of Congress, http://www.loc.gov/pictures/item/brh2003004452/PP/. Figure 20 Francis Asbury Hendry, 1870. Courtesy of Harry Hendry. Figure 21 Coontie plant. Photo by John Missall. Figure 22 Colonel Harvey Brown. Courtesy of Houghton Library, Harvard University, Cambridge, MA, Frederick Hill Meserve Collection, MS Am 2242, vol. 9. Map 2 Florida, 1855. Map drawn by John Missall. Figure 23 Sketch of Ft. Deynaud by Alexander Webb. Courtesy of Yale University Library Manuscripts and Archives, New Haven, CT, Alexander Stewart Webb Papers, MS 694, box 9. Figure 24 General George L. Hartsuff, c. 1860–1870. Courtesy of Library of Congress, http://www.loc.gov/pictures/item/cwp2003002071/PP/. Map 3 Fortifications, early 1856. Map drawn by John Missall. Figure 25 Captain William B. Hooker. Courtesy of Kyle S. VanLandingham. Figure 26 Major Lewis G. Arnold. Courtesy of National Archives, https://research. archives.gov/id/530159. Figure 27 General Alexander Webb. Courtesy of National Archives, https://research. archives.gov/id/529686. Map 4 Seminole offensive, March–June 1856. Map drawn by John Missall. Figure 28 Judge Hamlin Valentine Snell. Courtesy of Manatee County Public Library Historical Image Digital Collection, Identifier: M01-01659-A. Figure 29 Gamble Mansion. Courtesy of Manatee County Public Library Historical Image Digital Collection, Identifier: M01-07196-A. Figure 30 Sketch of Fort Simon Drum by Alexander Webb. Courtesy of Yale University Library Manuscripts and Archives, New Haven, CT, Alexander Stewart Webb Papers, MS 694, box 9. Figure 31 Braden Castle, post-Civil War. Courtesy of Manatee County Public Library Historical Image Digital Collection, Identifier: M01-00029-A-R1. Figure 32 John Carney Tombstone. Photo Courtesy John McGuire. Figure 33 Bradley Massacre Marker. Photo by John Missall. Figure 34 General Sylvester Churchill, ca 1860–1862. Courtesy of Library of Congress, http://www.loc.gov/pictures/search/?q=Sylvester%20 Churchill.

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Figure 35 Sketch of Fort Center by Alexander Webb. Courtesy of Yale University Library Manuscripts and Archives, New Haven, CT. Alexander Stewart Webb Papers, MS 694, box 9. Figure 36 Lieutenant Alderman Carlton. Courtesy of State Archives of Florida, https://www.floridamemory.com/items/show/117973. Figure 37 Tillis Battle Monument, Fort Meade. Photo by John Missall. Figure 38 General William S. Harney. Courtesy of National Archives, https:// research.archives.gov/id/528814. Figure 39 Major Thomas Williams. Courtesy of Library of Congress, c. 1860–1870, http://www.loc.gov/pictures/item/cwp2012000003/PP/. Map 5 Fortifications, early 1857. Map drawn by John Missall. Figure 40 General John Milton Brannan, c. 1861–1865. Courtesy of Library of Congress, http://www.loc.gov/pictures/item/2016652120/. Figure 41 Surgeon Thomas A. McParlin. Courtesy of the U.S. National Library of Medicine. Digital Collections, https://collections.nlm.nih.gov/catalog/ nlm:nlmuid-101416206-img. Figure 42 General Abner Doubleday, c. 1855–1865. Courtesy of Library of Congress, http://www.loc.gov/pictures/item/brh2003003795/PP/. Figure 43 General Gustavus Loomis. Courtesy of Houghton Library, Harvard University, Cambridge, MA, Frederick Hill Meserve Collection, MS Am 2242, vol. 13. Figure 44 General Oliver O. Howard, c. 1860–1865. Courtesy of Library of Congress, http://www.loc.gov/pictures/item/cwp2003000330/PP/. Figure 45 Captain Rev. Leroy G. Lesley. Courtesy of the Tampa Bay History Center. Map 6 Everglades and 10,000 islands area, late 1857. Map drawn by John Missall. Figure 46 Seminole Chief Billy Bowlegs (Holata Micco), c. 1852. One of the pictures reportedly taken from Bowlegs’ camp by Capt. Lesley. Courtesy of State Archives of Florida, https://www.floridamemory.com/items/ show/24913. Figure 47 Historical Capitol Museum and Captain John Parkhill Monument. Photo by John Missall. Figure 48 Statue to Abiaki (Sam Jones) at Tree Tops Park, Broward County. Photo by John Missall.

Abbreviations AGO AGOLR AGOPR A&NC ASPMA DPL HQFLS

LC MSA NA NYPL OIA RG SAF SWLR SWLS TGI TP USACC USHD USHED USHR USMA USSED USSJ

Adjutant General’s Office Adjutant General’s Office, Letters Received Adjutant General’s Office, Post Returns Army and Navy Chronicle American State Papers, Military Affairs Detroit Public Library Letters Sent, Register of Letters Received, and Letters Received by Headquarters, Troops of Florida, and Headquarters, Department of Florida Library of Congress Maryland State Archives National Archives New York Public Library Office of Indian Affairs Record Group State Archives of Florida Secretary of War, Letters Received Secretary of War, Letters Sent Thomas Gilcrease Institute Territorial Papers of the United States U.S. Army Continental Commands United States House Document United States House Executive Document United States House Report United States Military Academy United States Senate Executive Document United States Senate Journal

Bibliography Manuscripts Brown, Harvey. Letterbooks (1855–1856), MssCol 414. Department of Manuscripts and Archives, Stephen A. Schwarzman Building, New York Public Library, New York, New York. Casey, John Charles. Diaries (1848–1856), CU 551. Special Collections, United States Military Academy Library, West Point, New York. Casey, John Charles. Papers. Thomas Gilcrease Institute of American History and Art, Tulsa, Oklahoma. Hill, Ambrose Powell. Papers (1843–1864), Mss1H5503a. Virginia Historical Society, Richmond, Virginia. Howard, Oliver Otis. Papers, M91. George J. Mitchell Department of Special Collections and Archives, Bowdoin College Library, Brunswick, Maine. Jesup, Thomas Sidney. Diary, October 1, 1836–May 30, 1837. State Archives of Florida, Tallahassee, Florida. McParlin, Thomas A. Papers. Guy Weatherly Collection of McParlin Family Papers, SC 595. Special Collections, Maryland State Archives, Annapolis, Maryland. Talbot, Theodore. Papers (1837–1867), mm80042242. Miscellaneous Manuscript Collections, Library of Congress, Washington, D.C. Twiggs, David Emanuel. Correspondence, mm79002005. Miscellaneous Manuscript Collection, Library of Congress, Washington, D.C. Webb, Alexander Stewart. Papers, MS 684. Manuscripts and Archives, Yale University Library, New Haven, Connecticut. Webb, Alexander Stewart. Papers. Collection of Michael Huxley, Loudonville, New York. Williams, Thomas. Papers. Williams Family Papers, Burton Historical Collection, Detroit Public Library, Detroit, Michigan. Wills, William Henry. Papers (1712–1993), Collection #00792. Series 4: Diaries and Misc. Volumes, 1833–1856, Folder 66: Diaries (Unidentified), 1855–1856, Southern Historical Collection, Louis Round Wilson Special Collections Library, University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill, North Carolina.

Public Documents and Public Records Adjutant General’s Office. Letters Received, Main Series, 1822–1860. RG 94, NA. Microcopy No.  M-567, rolls 3, 410, 425, 426, 439, 443, 494, 533, 534, 535, 536, 537, 538, 539, 542, 549, 558, 559. —. Official Army Register for 1850. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1850. —. Returns from U.S. Military Posts, 1800–1916. RG 94, NA. Microcopy No. M-617. American State Papers: Military Affairs. 7 vols. Washington, D.C.: Gales and Seaton, 1832–1861. Carter, Clarence Edward, ed. Territorial Papers of the United States. 28 vols. Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1934–.

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Cullum, George Washington. Biographical Register of the Officers and Graduates of the U.S. Military Academy. 3 vols. New York: Houghton, Mifflin, 1891. Florida. The Acts and Resolutions of the General Assembly of the State of Florida, Passed at Its Fourth Session. Tallahassee: Office of the Florida Sentinel, 1849. —. The Acts and Resolutions of the General Assembly of Florida, Passed at Its Fifth Session. Tallahassee: Office of the Floridian and Journal, 1851. —. The Acts and Resolutions of the General Assembly of the State of Florida, Passed at Its Sixth Session. Tallahassee: Floridian and Journal Office, 1853. —. House Journal, 6th Sess. (1852), “Journal of the Proceedings of the House of Representatives of the General Assembly of the State of Florida, at its Sixth Session.” Tallahassee: Office of the Floridian & Journal, 1852. —. House Journal, 7th Sess. (1855), “Journal of the Proceedings of the House of Representatives of the General Assembly of the State of Florida, at an Adjoined Session.” Tallahassee: Office of the Floridian and Journal, 1855. —. House Journal, 8th Session. (1856), “Journal of the Proceedings of the House of Representatives of the General Assembly of the State of Florida.” Tallahassee: Office of the Floridian & Journal, 1856. —. House Journal, 9th Sess. (1858), “Journal of the Proceedings of the House of Representatives of the General Assembly of the State of Florida.” Tallahassee: Office of the Floridian & Journal, 1858. Heitman, Francis B., Historical Register and Dictionary of the United States Army, from Its Organization, September 29, 1789 to March 2, 1903. 2 vols. Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1903. Kappler, Charles J., ed. and comp. Indian Affairs: Laws & Treaties. 7 vols. Washington: Government Printing Office, 1904. Letters and Reports to Surveyor General, 3 vols. Tallahassee, Florida: Land Records and Title Section, Division of State Lands, Florida Department of Environmental Protection. Letters of Surveyor General, Vol. 9: 1853–1860. Tallahassee, Florida: Land Records and Title Section, Division of State Lands, Department of Environmental Protection. Manatee County Public Library System Historic Image Digital Collection. Letter from President Franklin Pierce to Secretary of War Jefferson Davis, May 18, 1853, Digital ID: M-01-00748.A. Office of the Chief of Engineers. Letters Received by the Topographical Bureau of the War Department, 1824–1865 (Jan. 1856–Dec. 1859). RG 77, NA. Microcopy No. M-506, roll 2. Office of Indian Affairs. Letters Received, Florida Superintendency, 1824–1850 (1838–1850). RG 75, NA. Microcopy No. M-234, roll 289. —. Letters Received, Seminole Agency, 1824–1876 (1846–1855) (1856–1858). RG 75, NA. Microcopy No. M-234, rolls 801 and 802. —. Letters Received, Seminole Agency Emigration, 1848–1859, RG 75, NA. Microcopy No. M-234, rolls 801 and 807. Peters, Richard, ed., The Public Statutes at Large of the United States of America, from the Organization of the Government in 1789, to March 3, 1845. 18 vols. Boston: Little, Brown, 1856. Secretary of War. Letters Received, Registered Series, 1801–1870, RG 107, NA. Microcopy No. M-221, rolls 164, 166, 168, 173, and 175. —. Letters Sent, Relating to Military Affairs, 1800–1889, RG 107, NA. Microcopy No. M-6, rolls 34, 35, 36, and 37. State Archives of Florida. Letters (1856), RG 900000, Series M-74-6, Loomis L. Langdon to G. W. Langdon, April 9, 1856, M74-6, Box 1, File 1. —. Langdon, Loomis L. Papers (1856–1906), “Campaigning in the Everglades,” The Helping Hand 31 (July 1899): 62–63, RG 900000, Series M74-6.

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—. Territorial and State Governors (1820–1929) RG 101. Series S-577 State governors’ incoming correspondence, 1857–1888. Florida Governor James E. Broome Correspondence, 1849–1853, Box 2, Folders 3 and 4. United States Army Continental Commands, 1821–1920. Letters Sent, Register of Letters Received, and Letters Received by Headquarters, Troops in Florida, and Headquarters, Department of Florida, 1850–1858. RG 393, NA. Microcopy No. M-1084, rolls 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, and 10. United States Congress. House. Executive Document No. 5, 31st Cong., 1st sess. (1849), “Message from the President of the United States.” —. House. Executive Document No. 1, 31st Cong., 2d sess. (1850), “Message from the President of the United States.” —. House. Executive Document No. 1, 34th Cong., 3d sess. (1856), “Message from the President of the United States.” —. House. Miscellaneous Document No. 76, 34th Cong., 1st sess. (1856), “Letter from the Secretary of War, addressed to the Chairman of Ways and Means, accompanied by estimates of appropriation for defraying expenses of volunteers lately called into service in Florida.” —. House. Report No. 4, 53rd Cong., 1st sess. (1893), “The Reports of Committees of the House of Representatives.” 2 vols. Washington: Government Printing Office, 1893. United States Congress. Senate. Executive Document No. 39, 30th Cong., 1st sess. (1848), “Report of the Commissioner of the General Land Office on the Armed Occupation Act.” —. Executive Document No. 1, 31st Cong., 1st sess. (1849), “Message from the President of the United States.” —. Senate. Executive Document No. 49, 31st Cong., 1st sess. (1849–1850), “Message from the President of the United States, communicating further information relative to hostilities committed by the Seminole Indians in Florida during the past year, their removal, &c.” —. Senate. Executive Document No. 5, 34th Cong., 3rd sess. (1856), “Message from the President of the United States.” —. Senate. Executive Document No. 11, 35th Cong., 1st sess. (1858), “Message from the President of the United States.” —. Senate. Executive Document No. 1, 35th Cong., 2nd sess. (1858), “Message from the President of the United States.” —. Senate. Executive Document No. 52, 36th Cong., 1st sess. (1860), “Statistical Report on the Sickness and Mortality in the Army of the United States, January 1855 to January 1860.” United States Statutes at Large, 1789–1875. 18 vols. Boston: Little, Brown, 1845. Woolley, John T. and Gerhard Peters. The American Presidency Project. Accessed August 2016, http:// www.presidency,ucsb.edu. Santa Barbara, CA: University of California (hosted), Gerhard Peters (database).

Newspapers and Periodicals Alligator [FL] Columbia Democrat, 1858. Apalachicola Commercial Advertiser, 1847. Army and Navy Chronicle. [Washington, D.C.], 1836, 1837. Columbus [Ga.] Daily Sun, 1856. Jacksonville News, 1847, 1849, 1852. Jacksonville Florida News, 1853. Jacksonville Florida Republican, 1856. Jacksonville Times-Union, 1899. Manufacturers’ and Farmers’ Journal [Providence, RI], 1836. Mobile Daily Register, 1856.

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National Intelligencer [Washington, D.C.], 1836. New York Times, 1856–1857. New York Daily Times, 1857. New York Weekly Tribune, 1856. Niles’ Weekly Register (Baltimore), 1836. Philadelphia Family Messenger and National Gleaner, 1849. Philadelphia Times, 1886. St. Augustine Florida Herald, 1836, 1845. St. Augustine Republican, 1843. Tallahassee, Floridian, 1846. Tallahassee, Floridian & Journal, 1854, 1856. Tampa, Florida Peninsular, 1855–1859. Tampa Tribune, 1956. Washington, [D.C.] Daily National Intelligencer, 1842–1843, 1849, 1852. Washington, [D.C.] Globe, 1842. Washington, [D.C.] Niles’ National Register, 1843.

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Endnotes Chapter 1 1

2 3 4

5

Calhoun to Jackson, December 26, 1817; Jackson to Calhoun, March 25, April 8 and 20, May 5, and June 2, 1818; Robert Butler to Daniel Parker, May 3, 1818; Nathaniel Frye to Hon. Abner Lacock, February 20, 1829, American State Papers, Military Affairs (hereafter ASPMA), 1: 690, 698–702, 708–709, 746; Heidler and Heidler, Old Hickory’s War, 135–158, 169–176, 220–221, 228. Treaty with the Florida Tribes of Indians, 1823, Kappler, ed., Indian Affairs: Laws & Treaties, 2: 203–207; Mahon, Second Seminole War, 29–50. Indian Removal Act, May 28, 1830, United States Statutes at Large, 4: 411–412; Treaty of Payne’s Landing in Sprague, Florida War, 74–75; Mahon, Second Seminole War, 69–86. The foremost work concerned with the Dade Battle is Laumer, Dade’s Last Command. Accounts of the battle by Ransom Clark, the only white survivor to tell about it, can be found in Potter, War in Florida, 102–107; McCall, Letters from the Frontiers, 300–306; Niles’ Weekly Register, August 20, 1836, 50: 419–420 and January 30, 1836, 49: 367–368; A&NC, January 28 and February 11, 1836, 2: 55–56, 87 and June 15, 1837, IV: 369–70; Lt. Joseph Harris, Disbursing Agent of Florida Indians to Commissary General of Subsistence, January 17, 1836, ASPMA, 6: 564–565. For the Seminole account of the battle, see Sprague, Florida War, 90. For several different accounts of the Battle of the Withlacoochee, refer to Bemrose, Reminiscences, 38–55, and Potter, The War in Florida, 111–116; Clinch to Adj. Gen. Roger Jones, January 4, 1836, published in Niles’ Weekly Register, January 30, 1836, 49: 366, 369 and Cohen, Notices of Florida and the Campaigns, 83–86; Clinch’s defense of his actions in Niles’ Weekly Register, July 15, 1837, 52: 315–318; Call’s response to Clinch in Niles’ Weekly Register, August 19, 1837, 52: 395–397; Clinch to Adj. Gen. Jones, December 29, 1835, Carter, ed., Territorial Papers (hereafter TP), Florida, 25: 218–219; A&NC, January 21, 1836, 2: 42; Manufacturers’ and Farmers’ Journal [Providence, RI], January 28, 1836; Joseph Harris to Commissary General of Subsistence, January 27, 1836, ASPMA, 6: 565. For reports on the sugar raids see Gadsden to Jackson, January 14, 1836, Carter, ed., TP, Florida, 25: 224–226; Sprague, Florida War, 106; St. Augustine Florida Herald, January 6, 1836; A&NC, February 25, 1836, 2: 124; Motte, Journey into Wilderness, 117–119; Boyd, “Florida Aflame,” 58–69. For reports on Gaines’s campaign, see Sprague, Florida War, 110–113; A&NC, April 14, 1836, 2: 225–227; Potter, War in Florida, 139–164; McCall, Letters from the Frontiers, 314–322; Laumer, Amidst a Storm of Bullets, 15–16. For various reports on Scott’s campaign, see Sprague, Florida War, 114–158; A&NC, April  21 and May 12, 1836, 2: 253, 293–294; Cohen, Notices of Florida, 158–231; Potter, War in Florida, 166–184; Laumer, Amidst a Storm of Bullets, 34–43; Missall and Missall, Miserable Pride of a Soldier, 25–37. National Intelligencer, December 12, 1836; A&NC, October 20, November 3, December 15, 1836, 3: 254, 286, 372 and January 5, 1837, 4: 8; Thomas Sidney Jesup Diary entries of October 12, 15,

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9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16

17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24

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16 and 25, 31, 1836, Thomas Sidney Jesup Diary (October 1, 1836–May 30, 1837), RG 900000, M86-12, State Archives of Florida, available digitally at Florida Memory, accessed April 2016, https:// www.floridamemory.com/items/show/252864; Jesup to Commodore Dallas, October 25, 1836; Jesup to Butler, December 9, 1836, ASPMA, 7: 817, 820; Buker, Swamp Sailors, 46–68; Missall and Missall, Seminole Wars: America’s Longest Indian Conflict, 146. Jesup to Poinsett, February 11, 1838; Poinsett to Jesup, March 1, 1838; Taylor to Jones, July 20, 1839, in Sprague, Florida War, 199–202, 221–227, also 234–235, 316–319; Jesup to Poinsett, March 14, 1838; Poinsett to Macomb, January 23, 1839, Carter, ed., TP, Florida, 25: 494–495, 568–569; ASPMA, 7: 986–989; White, “Macomb’s Mission,” 145, 163, 167–171, 176–186; A&NC, August 22, 1839, 9: 121. John Bell to Thomas Metcalfe, nd, 1822, Carter, ed., TP, Florida, 22: 463–465; Wright, Creeks and Seminoles, 4; Calloway, American Revolution in Indian Country, 248–249; Frank, “Creating a Seminole Enemy,” 277–279; Wickman, The Tree That Bends, 192–198. Milanich, Florida Indians and the Invasion from Europe, 1–2, 37–97, 105–136, 207–209, 222–227; Wickman, The Tree That Bends, 113; Stojanowski, Bioarchaeology of Ethnogenesis, 128–153; Weisman, Unconquered People, 6–9. Weisman, Unconquered People, 30–42; Wright, Creeks and Seminoles, 18–20; Frank, Creeks and Southerners, 2–22; Braund, Deerskins and Duffels, 3–25. Ibid. Wright, Creeks and Seminoles, 30–31; Covington, Seminoles of Florida, 6–7. Wright, Creeks and Seminoles, 22, 27–28, 37–40; Braund, Deerskins and Duffels, 24. Wright, Creeks and Seminoles, 22, 27–28, 37–40; Frank, Creeks and Southerners, 23. Weisman, Unconquered People, 8–16, 43; Covington, Seminoles of Florida, 5, 10–12, 19. Wright, Creeks and Seminoles, 162, 166–167; Braund, Deerskins & Duffels, 6–8, 187; Weisman, Unconquered People, 12–13, 43–45; Covington, Seminoles of Florida, 33. Wright, Creeks and Seminoles, 86–87; Rivers, Slavery in Florida, 4–6, 193; Brent R. Weisman, “The Plantation System of the Florida Seminole Indians and Black Seminoles during the Colonial Period,” in Landers, ed., Colonial Plantations, 136–149; Porter, Black Seminoles, 5–7. Spencer to Scott, May 10, 1842, Sprague, Florida War, 477. Memorial to Congress by Inhabitants of Leon County, July 1, 1842, Carter, ed., TP, Florida, 26: 493. Sprague, Florida War, 507–508, 512. West, “Abiaki, or Sam Jones,” 367–368, 376–377, 387, 393, 395. Minutes of a Talk Held at Fort Brooke, July 22, 1842, Carter, ed., TP, Florida, 26: 517. Minutes of a Talk, July 22, 1842, Carter, ed., TP, Florida, 26: 517–519. Spencer to Scott, May 10, 1842, Sprague, Florida War, 478. Knetsch, “Colonel Sam Reid,” 29–34; Peters, ed., Statutes at Large, 5: 502–504, 671–672; United States Congress. Senate. Executive Document No. 39 (USSED 39), 30th Cong., 1st sess. (1848), “Report of the Commissioner of the General Land Office on the Armed Occupation Act,” 8–10; Benton, Thirty Years’ View, 2: 167–169; Medill to Spencer, May 8, 1849, United States Congress. Senate. Executive Document No. 49 (USSED 49), 31st Cong., 1st sess. (1849–50), “Message from the President of the United States … relative to hostilities committed by the Seminole Indians,” 102–104. Peters, ed., Statutes at Large, 5: 502–504; USSED 39, 2–3, 13, 29, 31–32, 34–37. USSED 39, 24–25. Levy to the Editors Messrs. Gales & Seaton, September 27, 1842, Washington [D.C.] Daily National Intelligencer, October 1, 1842. Minutes of a Talk Held at Fort Brooke, July 22, 1842, Carter, ed., TP, Florida, 26: 517. Worth to Adj. Gen. Roger Jones, August 12, 1842, Carter, ed., TP, Florida, 26: 524–525; Sprague, Florida War, 485. Sprague, Florida War, 485. “Order No. 27,” August 11, 1842, Carter, ed., TP, Florida, 26: 519.

endnotes 32 33 34 35

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Ibid. Sprague, Florida War, 494–495. “Order No. 28,” August 14, 1842, Sprague, Florida War, 486. Sprague, Florida War, 521–525; Washington [D.C.] Daily National Intelligencer, September 2, 1842; Washington [D.C.] Globe, September 3, 1842. 36 Sprague, Florida War, 488. 37 Sprague, Florida War, 486–487, 496. 38 Sprague, Florida War, 494–497. 39 Adj. Gen. R. Jones to Vose, October 15, 1842, Carter, ed., TP, Florida, 26: 557–558. 40 Sprague, Florida War, 496–497. 41 Sprague, Florida War, 498–499. 42 Sprague, Florida War, 499–500. 43 Sprague, Florida War, 500–501. 44 Sprague, Florida War, 498, 500–501, 507; Minutes of a Talk, July 22, 1842, Carter, ed., TP, Florida, 26: 517–518. 45 Worth to Jones, November 17, 1843, Sprague, Florida War, 507–508. 46 Ibid. 47 St. Augustine Republican as reported in Washington, [D.C.] Niles’ National Register, May 6, 1843. 48 Washington, [D.C.] Niles’ National Register, June 17, 1843. 49 Worth to Jones, June 19, 1843, Carter, ed., TP, Florida, 26: 665–666. 50 Dodd, “Letters from East Florida,” 59–61. 51 Washington, [D.C.] Daily National Intelligencer, August 8, 1843. 52 Washington, [D.C.] Daily National Intelligencer, October 1, 1842. 53 Maurice I. Wiseman, “Railroad Baron, Fire-Eater, and the ‘Alien Jew’: The Life and Memory of David Levy Yulee” (Ph.D. diss., University of Florida, 2011), 40–41, 56–60, 63, 65, 156–158; Rebecca I. Roberts, “From Boom to Bust: Ghost Towns of Selected Florida Gulf Coast Communities” (Master’s thesis, Florida State University, 2005), 68–70; USSED 39, 26. 54 Washington, [D.C.] Niles’ National Register, May 20, 1843. 55 Washington, [D.C.] Niles’ National Register, July 8, 1843. 56 Anderson, Florida Territory in 1844: Diary of Master Edward C. Anderson, 37. 57 Covington, “Armed Occupation Act,” 46. 58 Thomas H. Crawford to James M. Porter, February 2, 1844, Carter, ed., TP, Florida, 26: 849–850. 59 Capers to Crawford, March 23, 1844, Carter, ed., TP, Florida, 26: 884. 60 Ibid. 61 William Wilkins to Levy, August 19, 1844, Carter, ed., TP, Florida, 26: 946–947. 62 Wilkins to Worth, October 18, 1844, Carter, ed., TP, Florida, 26: 967–968. 63 Churchill to Worth, March 31, 1845, Carter, ed., TP, Florida, 26: 1039–1040. 64 Churchill to Worth, March 31, 1845, Carter, ed., TP, Florida, 26: 1039–1040; Knetsch and George, “A Problematical Law: The Armed Occupation Act of 1842 and Its Impact on Southeast Florida,” 63–79. 65 Churchill to Worth, March 31, 1845, Carter, ed., TP, Florida, 26: 1039–1040. 66 Worth to Valentine Conway, Surveyor General of Florida, June 3, 1845, Carter, ed., TP, Florida, 26: 1080–1081. 67 Sprague to Editor of St. Augustine Florida Herald, September 16, 1845, as quoted in Sprague, Florida War, 509–510. 68 Sprague to Editor of St. Augustine Florida Herald, September 16, 1845, as quoted in Sprague, Florida War, 508–512. 69 Sprague, Florida War, 512. 70 Ibid. 71 West, “Abiaki, or Sam Jones,” 379; Sprague, Florida War, 512.

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Special Order No. 17, September 1, 1845, Office of Indian Affairs (OIA), Letters Received, Florida Superintendency, 1824–1850 (1838–1850), M-234, roll 289, National Archives (NA). Covington, “Thomas P. Kennedy,” 57, 59; John Darling, 2nd Lt., 5th Inf. (1838), resigned (1839), Heitman, Historical Register, 1: 353. Sprague to Jones, January 11, 1847, OIA, Letters Received, Seminole Agency, 1824–1876 (1846–1855), M-234, roll 801, NA. Ibid. Ibid. Ibid. Ibid. Tallahassee Floridian, February 28, 1846. Apalachicola Commercial Advertiser, February 23, 1847. Jacksonville News, July 23 and September 10, 1847. Sprague to Jones, January 11, 1847, OIA, Letters Received, Seminole Agency, 1824–1876 (1846–1855), M-234, roll 801, NA.

Chapter 2 1 2 3 4 5

6 7 8 9 10 11 12

13 14

Darling to Moseley, January 6, 1848, OIA, Letters Received, Seminole Agency, 1824–1876 (1846–1855), M-234, roll 801, NA. Cullum, Biographical Register, 1: 426–427; McKay, ed., Pioneer Florida, 2: 560. John Charles Casey Diary, 1848, entries of August 3 and 12, Casey Diaries, United States Military Academy (USMA). Juliet Axtell to Harriet T. Axtell, October 24, 1848, Rumsey, ed., “Letters to Harriet Tracy Axtell,” 123–124. Juliet Axtell to Harriet T. Axtell, November 13, 1848, Rumsey, ed., “Letters to Harriet Tracy Axtell,” 125; Darling to Moseley, January 6, 1848, OIA, Letters Received, Seminole Agency, 1824–1876 (1846–1855), M-234, roll 801, NA; Order to create a Board of Officers to examine a suitable site for a new post, October 18, 1848, Board of Officers’ Report, January 20, 1849, Gen. George Brooke’s remarks on Board of Officer’s Report, February 8, 1849, and Gaines to Brooke, February 10, 1849, Adjutant General’s Office, Letters Received (AGOLR), M-567, roll 410, NA. “Resolution No. 4,” Florida. Acts and Resolutions (1849), 113. “Resolution No. 5,” Florida. Acts and Resolutions, (1849), 114–115. Casey Diary, 1849, entry of January 2, Casey Diaries, USMA; Casey to Maj. W. W. Morris, January 15, 1849, AGOLR, M-567, roll 410, NA. Florida. Acts and Resolutions (1849), 71–72. Florida. Acts and Resolutions, (1849) 71–72; Samuel Spencer to Thomas Ewing, June 25, 1849, USSED 49, 111–112. “Resolution No. 4,” Florida. Acts and Resolutions (1849), 113. Casey Diaries, 1848 and 1849, entries of November 5 and 7, 1848, January 9, 20, 24, 27, February 22, April 10, 12, 14, 15, June 21 (agency business) June 27, 1849 (social engagements), Casey Diaries, USMA; Morris to Kennedy & Darling, March 2, 1849, United States Army Continental Commands (USACC), 1820–1920, RG 393, 5th Military Dept., 1848–52, Letters, Reports, and Orders Received and Other Records, NA, as quoted in Brown, Jr., Florida’s Peace River Frontier,” 79, 381. Spencer to Ewing, June [n.d.] 1849, W. Medill to Spencer, June 7, 1849, and Spencer to Ewing, June 25 and 29, 1849, USSED 49, 107–108, 109, 111–112. Casey Diary, 1849, entries of June 30 and July 5, Casey Diaries, USMA; Casey to Jones, July 23, 1849, United States Congress. Senate. Executive Document No. 1 (USSED 1), 31st Cong., 1st sess. (1849), “Message from the President,” 116; also in United States Congress. House. Executive Document No. 5 (USSED 5), 31st Cong., 1st sess. (1849), “Message from the President,” 116.

endnotes 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28

29 30 31 32 33

34

35 36

37 38

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Casey Diary, 1849, entries of July 6, 7, 11–12, 14, 16, Casey Diaries, USMA; Casey to Gibson, July 29, 1849, USSED 49, 38–39; Casey to Jones, July 23, 1849, USSED 1, 116 and USHED 5, 116. C. F. Smith to Adj. Gen. R. Jones, July 18, 1849, USSED 49, 27–28. Smith to Jones, July 18, 1849, USSED 49, 27–28. Philadelphia Family Messenger and National Gleaner, August 8, 1849. N. C. Icobie to D. Dummett [n.d.], and Smith to Jones, July 18, 1849, USSED 49, 26–28. Smith to John J. Marshall, July 17, 1849, USSED 49, 26–27. Yulee to Crawford, July 19, 1849, and Couch to Jones, July 22, 1849, USSED 49, 28–29, 32–33. William and Nancy McCullough Affidavits, August 11, 1849, USSED 49, 161–163. Affidavits of William and Nancy McCullough, August 11, 1849, USSED 49, 161. Ibid. Affidavits of William and Nancy McCullough, August 11, 1849, USSED 49, 161–162. Affidavits of William and Nancy McCullough, August 11, 1849, USSED 49, 162. Ibid. Casey Diary, 1849, entry of July 21, Casey Diaries, USMA; Secretary of War W. L. Marcy to Secretary of Treasury Robert J. Walker, May 10, 1845 and Commissioner of Genl. Land Office James Shields to Walker, May 14, 1845, Carter, ed., TP, Florida, 26: 1072, 1074–1075; W. W. Morris to R. Jones, August 13, 1849, USSED 49, 120–121. Jackson to Surveyor Genl. B. A. Putnam, July 30, 1849, Letters and Reports to Surveyor General, 2: 119–120. Casey Diary, 1849, entry of July 24, Casey Diaries, USMA; Smith to Jones, July 31, 1849, USSED 49, 40. Whiting, A Soldier’s Life, 129. “Orders No. 105” from Morris, July 20, 1849 and Morris to Jones, July 21, 1849, USSED 49, 29–30. Casey Diary, 1849, entry of July 24, Casey Diaries, USMA; Moseley to Captain of mounted volunteers, July 30, 1849, Moseley to Capt. William Fisher, July 30, 1849, Moseley to C. F. Smith, August 4, 1849, and Gov. Thomas Brown to President Taylor, November 29, 1849, USSED 49, 45–46, 52–53, 67–73; Moseley to Senate and House, September 29, 1849, Florida. Senate Journal, 5th sess. (1850), 19–21; Casey to George Gibson, July 29, 1849, J. F. Roland to R. Jones, August 23, 1849, and Meeting Report and Resolutions by St. John’s Co. residents, August 25, 1849, USSED 49, 38–39, 60, 130–135. J. H. Bronson, B. A. Putnam and Joseph Hernandez to Crawford, July 2, 1849, Yulee to Crawford, July 30, 1849, and Gov. Thomas Brown to President Taylor, November 29, 1849, USSED 49, 30–33, 39–40, 67–73. Julius Wilm, “Free Land for Settlers: An American Dream and its Realities in the Antebellum Era” (Ph.D. diss., University of Koln, Cologne, Germany, 2016). Casey to Bliss, July 23, 1849, and Bliss to Casey, August 6, October 16, 1849, John Charles Casey Papers, Thomas Gilcrease Institute (TGI), as quoted in Brown, Jr. “George Meade,” 8–9, Brown, Jr., Florida’s Peace River Frontier, 86. Casey Diary, 1849, entry of July 21, Casey Diaries, USMA; Crawford to Yulee, July 26, 1849, and Couch to Jones, July 31, 1849, USSED 49, 3, 41; Jacksonville News, August 11, 1849. Crawford to Messrs. Gale and others, August 14, 1849, USSED 49, 5; Crawford to Moseley, August 7, 1849, in Washington, [D.C.] Daily National Intelligencer, September 8, 1849; Crawford to Twiggs, August 21, 1849, and Crawford to Twiggs, September 21 and 24, 1849, USSED 1, 117–118, 130–131. Brown to Spencer, July 25, 1849, Brown to Ewing, September 19, 1849, and Crawford to Twiggs and Ewing, September 26, 1849, USSED 49, 113–114, 139, 62–63, 7; Ewing to Crawford, September 24, 1849, and Crawford to Twiggs, September 24, 1849, USSED 1, 131 and USHED 5, 131; Casey Diary, 1849, entry of October 13, Casey Diaries, USMA. Casey to Jones, August 20, 1849, USSED 1, 116–117 and USHED 5, 116–117; Morris to Jones, August 20, 1849, USSED 49, 59–60.

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Casey Diary, 1849, entries of August 24–27, Casey Diaries, USMA; Twiggs to Freeman, August 25 and 27, 1849, USSED 1, 118–119 and USHED 5, 118–119. 42 Casey Diary, 1849, entries of August 31, September 2 and 3, Casey Diaries, USMA. 43 Casey Diary, 1849, entry of September 4, Casey Diaries, USMA and Casey Papers, TGI; Twiggs to Crawford, September 6, 1849, and Casey to Mackall, September 6, 1849, USSED 49, 61, 121; Casey to Jones, September 9, 1849, USSED 1, 122–124 and USHED 5, 122–124. 44 Entry of September 4, 1849, Casey Papers, TGI. 45 Ibid. 46 Entry of September 4, 1849, Casey Papers, TGI; Affidavits of William and Nancy McCullough, August 11, 1849, USSED 49, 161–163. 47 Casey Diary, 1849, entry of September 7, Casey Diaries, USMA; Crawford to Twiggs, August  21, 1849, USSED 1, 117–118 and USHED 5, 117–118. 48 Crawford to Moseley, August 7, 1849, in Washington [D.C.] Daily National Intelligencer, September 8, 1849. 49 Ibid. 50 Washington [D.C.] Daily National Intelligencer, September 8, 1849. 51 Twiggs to W. G. Freeman, September 1, 1849, USSED 1, 119–110; Twiggs to Crawford, September 8, 1849, David Emanuel Twiggs Correspondence, Miscellaneous Manuscript Collection, mm79002005, Library of Congress (LC). 52 Casey Diary, 1849, entries of September 8 and 9, Casey Diaries, USMA; Casey’s Estimate of United States Expense [September 8, 1849], Twiggs Correspondence, Miscellaneous Manuscript Collection, LC; Crawford to Twiggs, September 24, 1849, USSED 1, 131 and USHED 5, 131. 53 Twiggs to Freeman, September 10, 1849, USSED 1, 124 and USHED 5, 124. 54 Spencer to Brown, September 15 [5], 1849, Brown to Spencer, September 13, 1849, Brown to Ewing, September 19, 1849, and Ewing to Loughery, September 27, 1849, USSED 49, 138–140. 55 Casey Diary, 1849, entries of September 17–19, Casey Diaries, USMA; John L. Gardner to R. Jones, September 17, 1849, and Twiggs to Crawford, September 23, 1849, USSED 49, 62. 56 Casey Diary, 1849, entry of September 18, Casey Diaries, USMA; Casey to R. Jones, September 23, 1849, USSED 1, 125–126 and USHED 5, 125–126. 57 Casey Diary, 1849, entry of September 19, Casey Diaries, USMA; Casey to Jones, September 23, 1849, and Twiggs to Crawford, October 19, 1849, USSED 1, 125–126, 133–134 and USHED 5, 125–126, 133–134. 58 Crawford to Twiggs, September 21, 1849, USSED 1, 130–131 and USHED 5, 130–131; Casey Diary 1849, entry of October 14, 1849, Casey Diaries, USMA; Twiggs to Crawford, October  19, 1849, USSED 49, 64, USSED 1, 133–134. 59 Casey Diary, 1849, entry of September 22, Casey Diaries, USMA. 60 Twiggs to Freeman, October 3, 1849, USSED 1, 126–128 and USHED 5, 126–128. 61 Casey Diary, 1849, entries of October 10 and 14, Casey Diaries, USMA. 62 Casey to Bliss, September 29, 1849, Bliss to Casey, October 16, 1849, Casey Papers, TGI, as quoted in Brown, Jr., “George Meade,” 9 and Brown, Jr., Florida’s Peace River Frontier, 86. 63 Casey Diary, 1849, entries of October 11–14, Casey Diaries, USMA. 64 Casey to Maj. W. W. Mackall, Asst. Adj. Gen., September 6, 1849, AGOLR, M-567, roll 418, T279, NA, accessed September 14, 2016, https://www.fold3.com. 65 Casey Diary, 1849, entry of October 18, Casey Diaries, USMA; Twiggs to Crawford, October  19, 1849, USSED 49, 64. 66 Covington, “Billy Bowlegs, Sam Jones, and the Crisis of 1849,” 306. 67 Entry of October 17, 1849, Casey Papers, TGI; Casey Diary, 1849, entry of October 18, Casey Diaries, USMA. 68 Casey Diary, 1849, entry of October 18, Casey Diaries, USMA; Twiggs to Crawford, October  19, 1849, USSED 1, 133–134 and USHED 5, 133–134.

endnotes 69 70 71

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Jacksonville News, December 1, 1849 from the Washington Union. Casey Diary, 1849, entry of October 18, Casey Diaries, USMA; Twiggs to Crawford, October  19, 1849, USSED 1, 133–134 and USHED 5, 133–134. Crawford to Ewing and to Twiggs, December 24, 1849, USSED 49, 10–11; Twiggs to Crawford, October 19, 1849, USSED 1, 133–134 and USHED 5, 133–134; Casey Diary, 1849, entry of October 18, Casey Diaries, USMA. Casey Diary, 1849, entry of October 10, Casey Diaries, USMA; Crawford to Twiggs, October 30, 1849, Twiggs to Crawford, November 10, 1849, USSED 1, 135–136 and USHED 5, 135–136. Twiggs to Jones, November 21, 1849, Jones to Twiggs, December 4, 1849, and Twiggs to Crawford, March 1, 1850, USSED 49, 66, 9, 84–85; Casey Diaries, 1849 and 1850, entries of December 14, 1849 and February 28, 1850, Casey Diaries, USMA. Hopkins to Brown, August 21, 1849, USSED 49, 168.

Chapter 3 Twiggs to Crawford, October 6, 1849, USSED 1, 132 and USHED 5, 132. Orlando Brown to Casey, December 28, 1849, and Duval to Brown, November 5, 1849, USSED 49, 152, 143–145. 3 Duval to Brown, November 5, 1849, USSED 49, 143–145. 4 Twiggs to Freeman, October 3, 1849, USSED 1, 126–128 and USHED 5, 126–128. 5 Twiggs to Freeman, October 3, 1849, USSED 1, 126–128 and USHED 5, 126–128; AGOLR, Returns from U.S. Military Posts, 1800–1916, Fort Brooke, October 1849, M-617, NA; Casey Diary, entries of October 19 and 21, Casey Diaries, USMA. 6 Duval to Brown, November 5 and 12, 1849, USSED 49, 143–146; entry of November 10, 1849, Casey Papers, TGI. 7 Casey Diary, 1849, entries of October 10, 13, 14, 18, November 30, December 1, Casey Diaries, USMA; Twiggs to Crawford, October 19, 1849, USSED 1, 133–134 and USHED 5, 133–134. 8 Casey Diary, 1849, entries of December 1 and 2, Casey Diaries, USMA. 9 Duval to Brown, November 19, 1849, USSED 49, 146–147. 10 Entry of December 8, 1849, Casey Papers, TGI; Casey Diary, 1849, entries of December 8 and 15, Casey Diaries, USMA; Twiggs to Crawford, December 10, 15 and 29, 1849, USSED 49, 73–77. 11 Twiggs to Jones, November 26, 1849, USSED 49, 66–67; Munroe to Bliss, January 14, 1850, USACC, Letters Sent, Register of Letters Received, and Letters Received by Headquarters, Troops of Florida, and Headquarters, Department of Florida (HQFLS), M-1084, roll 1, NA; Casey Diary, 1850, entry of February 6, Casey Diaries, USMA; “Return of the troops employed in suppressing Indian hostilities in Florida under the command of Brevet Major General David E. Twiggs, November 28, 1849, USSED 1, 189. 12 AGOLR, Returns from U.S. Military Posts, 1800–1916, Fort Meade, December 1849, M-617, NA. 13 Casey Diary, 1849, entries of December 19–24, Casey Diaries, USMA. 14 Casey Diary, 1849, entries of December 25 and 26, Casey Diaries, USMA. 15 Casey Diary, 1849, entries of December 29–31, Casey Diaries, USMA. 16 Casey Diary, 1850, entries of January 17, 19–21, Casey Diaries, USMA; Twiggs to Crawford, January 19 and 22, 1850, USSED 49, 79–80. A brigadier general’s base pay was $104/mo. (excluding allowances for rations, horses, and servants). A 2nd Lieutenant of Artillery or Infantry was paid $25/mo. (excluding allowances). AGO. Army Register for 1850, 40, 42. 17 Twiggs to Crawford, January 22, 1850, USSED 49, 79–80; Casey Diary, 1850, entries of January 21 and 22, Casey Diaries, USMA. 18 Casey to Jones and to Crawford, January 27, 1850, Brown to Casey, February 8, 1850, USSED 49, 48–49, 81, 155.

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history of the third seminole war 1849–1858

Casey Diary, 1850, entries of January 23–February 6, Casey Diaries, USMA. Casey Diary, 1850, entries of February 7 and 8, Casey Diaries, USMA. Jennings, “Military Operations in Southwest Florida in the Third Seminole War, 1855–58” (Master’s thesis, California State University-Dominquez Hills, 2000), 15–16; Grismer, The Story of Fort Myers, 60–62; Heitman, Historical Register, 1: 739, 830; Cullum, Biographical Register, 1: 562. Twiggs to Crawford, February 12, March 1, 1850, and M. Duval to Orlando Brown, February 18, 1850, USSED 49, 83–85, 155–157. Casey Diary, 1850, entry of March 3, Casey Diaries, USMA; Casey to Twiggs, March 26, 1850, and Twiggs to Crawford, March 1 and 27, 1850, USSED 49, 84–85, 91–92. Casey to Twiggs, March 26, 1850, Twiggs to Crawford, March 27, 1850, Casey to Twiggs, April 9, 1850, and Twiggs to Crawford, April 14, 1850, USSED 49, 91–92, 94–95. Casey Diary, 1850, entries of April 2, 11, and 12, Casey Diaries, USMA; Twiggs to Crawford, April 3, 1850, and Casey to Twiggs, April 9, 1850, USSED 49, 92, 94–95. Casey Diary, 1850, entry of April 15, November 13, Casey Diaries, USMA; Casey to Twiggs and Twiggs to Crawford, April 15, 1850, USSED 49, 95–96; Crawford to Twiggs, May 24, 1850, USACC, HQFLS, M-1084, roll 2, NA. A. P. Hill to Thomas Hill, May 5, 1850, Mss1H5503a, Ambrose Powell Hill Papers, Virginia Historical Society. Twiggs to Crawford, April 15, 1850, USSED 49, 95–96; W. W. Markall to Twiggs, June 6, and F. O. Wyse to J. Dimick, July 18, 1850, USACC, HQFLS, M-1084, roll 2, NA; Wyse to Jones, July 18, 1850, AGOLR, M-567, roll 439, NA. Wyse to Beckman DuBarry, July 30, 1850, USACC, HQFLS, M-1084, roll 2, NA. Casey Diary, 1850, entries of May 20 and 21, Casey Diaries, USMA. Casey Diary, 1850, entries of May 24 and 25, Casey Diaries, USMA. Casey Diary, 1850, entries of May 27 and 28, Casey Diaries, USMA; Casey to Twiggs, June 2, 1850, AGOLR, M-567, roll 425, NA. Casey Diary, 1850, entries of May 27–June 2, Casey Diaries, USMA; Casey to Twiggs, June 2, 1850, AGOLR, M-567, roll 425, NA. St. Augustine, Ancient City, June 29, 1850. “W.L.B.(?)” [W. W. Bliss] to Casey, June 21 [1850], Casey Papers, TGI, as quoted in Brown, Jr., Florida’s Peace River Frontier, 90. Rayback, J., Millard Fillmore, 238–292. Jacob Summerlin to Gov. Thomas Brown, October 2, 1850, United States Congress. House. Executive Document No. 1 (USHED 1), 31st Cong., 2nd sess. (1850), “Message from the President,” 89–90. Casey to Maj. H. L. Scott, October 2, 1850, AGOLR, M-567, roll 426, NA. Summerlin to Brown, October 2, 1850, USHED 1, 89–90. Casey to Secretary of War C. M. Conrad, January 11, 1851, AGOLR, M-567, roll 443, NA; Casey Diary, 1850, entry of October 24, Casey Diaries, USMA. Casey Diary, 1850, entries of November 12 and 24, Casey Diaries, USMA. Casey to Conrad, January 11, 1851, AGOLR, M-567, roll 443, NA. Casey Diary, 1851, entry of January 13, Casey Diaries, USMA. Casey Diary, 1851, entry of January 27, Casey Diaries, USMA. Casey Diary, 1851, entry of April 13, Casey Diaries, USMA. Casey Diary, 1851, entries of May 13 and 19, Casey Diaries, USMA. Casey Diary, 1851, entry of May 23, Casey Diaries, USMA. Knetsch, Joe. “John Darling,” 6, 11, 14. Entry of October 23, 1850, Casey Papers, TGI; Casey Diaries, 1850 and 1851, entries of August 1850 through May 1851, Casey Diaries, USMA. Casey to Lea, February 9, 1851, OIA, Letters Received, Seminole Agency Emigration, 1848–1859, M-234, roll 807, NA.

endnotes 51 52 53

54 55

56 57

58 59 60 61

62

63

64 65 66 67

68 69 70 71 72 73 74 75

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Florida. Acts and Resolutions (1851), 149–151. Ibid. Casey to Luke Lea, February 9, 1851, Sec. of War Conrad to Sec. of Interior Alex Stuart, April 15, 1851, and Stuart to Lea, April 19, 1851, OIA, Letters Received, Seminole Agency Emigration, 1848–1859, M-234, roll 807, NA. Casey Diary, 1851, entry of May 7, Casey Diaries, USMA; Blake to Lea, May 15, 1851, OIA, Letters Received, Seminole Agency Emigration, 1848–1859, M-234, roll 807, NA. Blake to Lea, June 1, 1851, Lea to Blake, September 23, 1851, and Blake to Lea, February 15, 1852, OIA, Letters Received, Seminole Agency Emigration, 1848–1859, M-234, roll 807, NA; Darling to Brown, February 14, 1852, Territorial and State Governors, RG 101, S-577, Governor James E. Broome Correspondence (1849–1853), Box 2, Folder 4, State Archives of Florida. Casey Diary 1851, entry of November 12, Casey Diaries, USMA. Casey Diary, 1851 and 1852, entries of December 8 and 12, 1851, January 10, 1852, Casey Diaries, USMA; Darling to Brown, February 14, 1852, Territorial and State Governors, S-577, Governor James E. Broome Correspondence (1849–1853), Box 2, Folder 4, State Archives of Florida. Osteen to Brown, January 19, 1852 and Brown to Osteen, February 10, 1852, Florida. House Journal (1852), Appendix: 55–57. Extract of letter from Jernigan to Brown, February 9, 1852, Florida. House Journal (1852), Appendix: 59–61. Washington [D.C.] Daily National Intelligencer, March 3, 1852. H. E. Osteen to Brown, January 19, 1852, Hughey to Hopkins, February 10, 1852, Hopkins to Brown, February 14, 1852, and Jernigan to Brown, February 16, 1852, Florida. House Journal (1852), Appendix: 55, 57–58, 61; Casey Diary, 1852, entry of February 21, Casey Diary, USMA. Brown to Hopkins, February 29, 1852, Hopkins to Brown, March 27, 1852, Florida. House Journal (1852), Appendix: 69–70, 63–64; A. Lowd to Childs, March 14, 1852, and A. Lowd to J. M. Brannan, March 28, 1852, USACC, HQFLS, M-1084, roll 2, NA; Brannan to J. H. Winder, March 22, 1852, USACC, HQFLS, M-1084, roll 1, NA. Casey Diary, 1852, entry of February 14, Casey Diaries, USMA; entry of February 14, 1852, Casey Papers, TGI; Darling to Brown, February 14, 1852, Territorial and State Governors, S-577, Governor James E. Broome Correspondence (1849–1853), Box 2, Folder 4, State Archives of Florida. Childs to Jones, April 21, 1852, USACC, HQFLS, M-1084, roll 1, NA. Casey Diary, 1852, entry of April 20, Casey Diaries, USMA. Hopkins to Brown, March 25 and 27, 1852, Florida. House Journal (1852), Appendix: 66–70; Casey Diary, 1852, entry of April 7, Casey Diaries, USMA. Brown to Hopkins, April 3, 1852, Florida. House Journal (1852), Appendix: 70–71; Casey Diary, 1852, entry of April 28, Casey Diaries, USMA; Hopkins to Childs, May 4, 1852, USACC, HQFLS, M-1084, roll 2, NA. Childs to Hopkins, May 10, 1852, USACC, HQFLS, M-1084, roll 1, NA and in OIA, Letters Received, Seminole Agency Emigration, 1848–1859, M-234, roll 807, NA. Casey Diary, 1852, entries of June 9 and 24, Casey Diaries, USMA. Casey Diaries, 1852 and 1853, entries of June 24, 25, 30, August 5, September 30, October 13, November 23, December 11, 1852, February 13, 1853, Casey Diaries, USMA. Blake to Lea, July 27, 1852, OIA, Letters Received, Seminole Agency Emigration, 1848–1859, M-234, roll 807, NA. Casey Diary, 1852, entry of July 25, Casey Diaries, USMA. Casey Diary, 1852, entries of July 24 and August 18, Casey Diaries, USMA; Hopkins to Lea, August 29, 1852, OIA, Letters Received, Seminole Agency Emigration, 1848–1859, M-234, roll 807, NA. Casey Diary, 1852, entry of September 1, Casey Diaries, USMA; Washington, [D.C.] Daily National Intelligencer, September 17, 1852. Casey Diary, 1852, entries of August 31 and September 1, Casey Diaries, USMA.

238 76 77 78 79 80 81 82 83 84 85 86 87

88 89 90

91 92

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Porter, “Billy Bowlegs in the Seminole Wars,” 234–235. Washington, [D.C.] Daily National Intelligencer, September 17, 1852. Ibid. Ibid. Ibid. Washington, [D.C.] Daily National Intelligencer, September 18, 1852. Ibid. Ibid. “Memorandum of an Agreement,” September 20, 1852, OIA, Letters Received, Seminole Agency Emigration, 1848–1859, M-234, roll 807, NA. Jacksonville News, October 2, 1852; Casey Diary, 1852, entry of September 30, Casey Diaries, USMA. Casey Diary, 1852, entry of October 9, Casey Diaries, USMA. Casey Diary, 1852, entries of October 10 and 11, Casey Diaries, USMA; Blake to Lea, October 10, 1852, Casey to Blake, October 11, 1852, OIA, Letters Received, Seminole Agency Emigration, 1848–1859, M-234, roll 807, NA. President Millard Fillmore’s 3rd Annual Message, December 6, 1852, Woolley and Peters, The American Presidency Project, accessed August 13, 2016, http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=29493. Casey Diary, 1852, entry of December 15, Casey Diaries, USMA. Blake to Lea, December 15, 1852, OIA, Letters Received, Seminole Agency Emigration, 1848–1859, M-234, roll 807, NA; Casey Diaries, 1852 and 1853, entries of December 31 and January 2, Casey Diaries, USMA. Florida. Acts and Resolutions (1853), 113–115, 133–136. President Millard Fillmore’s Special Message, January 18, 1853, Woolley and Peters, The American Presidency Project, accessed August 13, 2016, http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index. php?pid=68256&st=Fillmore&st1=.

Chapter 4 1

2 3 4 5

6

7 8 9 10 11

Charles Killinyer to Childs, February 12, 1853, USACC, HQFLS, M-1084, roll 3; Childs to S. Cooper, February 12, 1853, ibid., roll 1, NA; Casey Diary, 1853, entries of January 31, February 4, 13, 14,16, 27 and 28, Casey Diaries, USMA. Childs to Cooper, February 12, 1853, USACC, HQFLS, M-1084, roll 1, NA. Heitman, Historical Register, 1: 358; Cullum, Biographical Register, 1: 416. Jacksonville, Florida News, April 9, 1853. Childs to Jones, February 11, 1853, USACC, HQFLS, M-1084, roll 1, NA; Casey Diary, 1853, entry of April 23, Casey Diaries, USMA; Cooper to Casey, May 4, 1853, USACC, HQFLS, M-1084, roll 3, NA. Franklin Pierce to Jefferson Davis, May 18, 1853, Manatee County [FL] Public Library System Historic Image Digital Collection, Identifier No. M-01-00748-A, accessed August 14, 2016, http://cdm16681. contentdm.oclc.org/cdm/singleitem/collection/p16681coll1/id/801/rec/1. Knetsch, “John Westcott and the Coming of the Third Seminole War,” 13; Westcott to Lanier, Letters of Surveyor General, 9: 36. William A. Adrich to A. J. Cook, May 23, 1853, USACC, HQFLS, M-1084, roll 3, NA. Adrich to Cook, June 17, 1853, USACC, HQFLS, M-1084, roll 3, NA. William H. French to Cook, June 17, 1853, and Adrich to Cook, June 27, 1853, USACC, HQFLS, M-1084, roll 3, NA. Cooper to Scott, July 27, 1853, USACC, HQFLA, M-1084, roll 3, NA; Davis to Casey and to Hopkins, September 21, 1853, Secretary of War, Letters Sent (SWLS), Military Affairs, 1800–1889, M-6, roll 34, NA; Casey to Davis, July 23, 1853, and Hopkins to Davis, September 17, 1853, Secretary of War,

endnotes

12 13

14 15 16

17 18 19 20

21

22

23 24 25 26 27

28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37

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239

Letters Received (SWLR), Registered Series, 1801–1870, M-221, rolls 164 and 166, NA, as quoted in Crist and Dix, eds., Papers of Jefferson Davis, 5: 233, 252; Casey to Davis, September 15, 1853, SWLR, Registered Series, M-221, roll 166, NA, as quoted in Crist and Dix, eds., Papers of Jefferson Davis, 5: 23. Jacksonville Florida News, October 15, 1853. Davis to Casey, September 28, 1853, SWLS, Military Affairs, M-6, roll 34, NA; Casey to Davis, September 26, 1853, and Davis to Grant, October 17, 1853, SWLR, Registered Series, M-221, roll 166, NA, as quoted in Crist and Dix, eds., Papers of Jefferson Davis, 5: 223, 252. Utley, Frontiersmen in Blue, 108; Report of the Secretary of War, December 1, 1853, Congressional Globe, 33rd Cong., 1st sess. (December 6, 1853), Appendix: 29. Report of Secretary of War, December 1, 1853, Washington [D.C.] Congressional Globe, 33rd Cong., 1st sess. (December 6, 1853), Appendix: 29. William H. French to G. W. Lay, October 24, 1853, R. B. Thomas to Lay, October 26, 1853, and Munroe to Adj. Gen. S. Cooper, November 27, 1853, AGOLR, M-567, roll 3, NA; Casey Diary, 1853, entries of December 2 and 20, 1853, Casey Diaries. Casey Diary, 1853, entry of December 31, Casey Diaries, USMA. Casey Diary, 1854, entry of January 2, Casey Diaries, USMA. Casey Diary, 1854, entry of January 7, Casey Diaries, USMA. Casey to Davis, January 8, 1854, SWLR, Registered Series, M-221, roll 168, NA, as quoted in Crist and Dix, eds., Papers of Jefferson Davis, 5: 233; Casey Diary, 1854, entries of January 12 and 13, Casey Diaries, USMA. Casey to Davis, January 24 and March 12, 1854, SWLR, Registered Series, M-221, roll 168, NA, as quoted in Crist and Dix, eds., Papers of Jefferson Davis, 5: 233; Davis to Casey, February 23, April 19, March 24, 1854, and Davis to McClelland, March 23, 1854, SWLS, Military Affairs, M-6, roll 35, NA. Casey Diary, 1854, entries of April 8 and 10, Casey Diaries, USMA; Casey to H. Pratt, April 11, 1854, and H. Benson to Mathew Blunt, May 14, 1854, USACC, HQFLS, M-1084, roll 3, NA; Davis to Casey, April 19, 1854, SWLS, Military Affairs, M-6, roll 35, NA; Wilson to Westcott, April 27, 1854, Letters of Surveyor General, 9: 115. Joseph A. Haskin to Cooper, February 23, 1854, AGOLR, M-567, roll 539, NA. Davis to R. McClelland, May 9, 1854, SWLS, Military Affairs, M-6, roll 35, NA. Davis to Casey, May 10, 1854, USACC, HQFLS, M-1084, roll 3, NA. Davis to Mallory and Maxwell, August 5, 1854, in Tallahassee Floridian & Journal, September 9, 1854. Jackson to Westcott, July 1, August 14, September 10, 16, October 1, 1854, January 12, 1855, Letters and Reports to Surveyor General, 2: 139, 143, 147–148, 150–151, [n.p.]; Casey Diary, 1854, entry of August 1, 1854, Casey Diaries, USMA. Urwin, United States Infantry, 80. Casey to Davis, September 10, 1854, AGOLR, Main Series, M-567, roll 494, NA; Cooper to Munroe, September 21, 1854, USACC, HQFLS, M-1084, roll 3, NA. Hendry, Early Days in Fort Myers, 9–10. Casey Diary, 1854, entry of September 27, Casey Diaries, USMA. Casey Diary, 1854, entry of October 10, Casey Diaries, USMA. Munroe to Cooper, July 15, 1855, USACC, HQFLS, M-1084, roll 1, NA; Jesup to Munroe, December 7, 1854, ibid., roll 3. Thomas J. Haines to Bennett Hill, December 11, 1854, USACC, HQFLS, M-1084, roll 1, NA. Casey Diary, 1855, entries of January 9 and 10, Casey Diaries, USMA; Mallory to Davis, January 12, 1855, SWLR, Registered Series, M-221, roll 173, NA. Casey Diary, 1855, entry of January 13, Casey Diaries, USMA. Brown to L. Hayes, January 12, 1855, USACC, HQFLS, M-1084, roll 4, NA; Casey Diary, 1855, entries of January 14 and 15, Casey Diaries, USMA.

240 38 39 40 41 42

43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50

51 52 53 54 55 56

57 58 59

60 61 62 63 64

65 66 67

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history of the third seminole war 1849–1858

Munroe to Cooper, July 15, 1855, USACC, HQFLS, M-1084, roll 1, NA. Munroe to Cooper, July 15, 1855, USACC, HQFLS, M-1084, roll 1, NA; H. C. Pratt to Brown, February 5, 1855, Ibid., roll 4. Haines to Haskin, February 2, 1855, USACC, HQFLS, M-1084, roll 1, NA. Jackson to Westcott, February 7, 1855, Letters and Reports to Surveyor General, 2: 153–154. Pratt to Brown, February 22, 1855, Elzey to Brown, February 26, 1855, Hartsuff to Brown, June 18, 1855, USACC, HQFLS, M-1084, roll 4, NA; Munroe to Cooper, July 15 1855, Ibid., roll 1; Davis to Casey, July 27, 1854, SWLS, Military Affairs, M-6, roll 36, NA. Munroe to S. Cooper, February 11, 1855, T. T. Haines to Bennett Hill, February 19, 1855, and Munroe to Cooper, July 15, 1855, USACC, HQFLS, M-1084, roll 1, NA. Lossing, Memoir of Lieut.-Col. John T. Greble, 38–39. William Hays to Harvey Brown, March 30, 1855, USACC, HQFLS, M-1084, roll 4, NA. Munroe to Cooper, July 15, 1855, USACC, HQFLS, M-1084, roll 1, NA. Benson to Brown, June 7, 1855, USACC, HQFLS, M-1084, roll 4, NA; Munroe to Cooper, July 15, 1855, ibid., roll 1. Brown to Munroe, May 10, 1855, Brown to Haines, May 11 and 19, 1855, USACC, HQFLS, M-1084, roll 4, NA; Haines to Brown, May 15, 1855, ibid., roll 1; Webb, “Campaigning in Florida,” 407. Brown to Munroe, May 10, 1855, USACC, HQFLS, M-1084, roll 4, NA. Samuel K. Dawson to Thomas Haines, May 28, 1855, George Hartsuff to Brown, June 18, 1855, and Hill to Haines, July 3, 1855, USACC, HQFLS, M-1084, roll 4, NA; Haskin, comp., History of the First Regiment of Artillery, 389; Langdon, “Campaigning in the Everglades,” 62, available State Archives of Florida. H. A. Allen to Brown, March 3, 1855, and Brown to Haines, June 11, 1855, USACC, HQFLS, M-1084, roll 4, NA. Hartsuff to Brown, June 18, 1855, USACC, HQFLS, M-1084, roll 4, NA. Joe Knetsch. “Filling in the Skeleton,” 26–28. Brown to Haines, June 21, 1855, USACC, HQFLS, M-1084, roll 4, NA. Munroe to Cooper, July 15, 1855, USACC, HQFLS, M-1084, roll 1, NA; Haskins to Haines, September 15, 1855, ibid., roll 4. Harvey Brown Letterbook, entry of August 25, 1855, Harvey Brown Letterbooks, New York Public Library (NYPL); Casey to Davis, July 29, 1855, SWLR, Registered Series, M-221, roll 175, NA, as quoted in Crist and Dix, eds., Papers of Jefferson Davis, 5: 234. Casey Diary, 1855, entry of September 17, Casey Diaries, USMA. Casey Diary, 1855, entry of October 27, Casey Diaries, USMA. Casey Diary, 1855, entry of November 15, Casey Diaries, USMA; Brown Letterbook, entry of November 19, 1855, Harvey Brown Letterbooks, NYPL; “Orders No. 77” by Lt. Col. Ervin, November 24, 1855, AGOLR, Main Series, M-567, roll 536, NA; Cooper to Munroe, November 27, 1855 and Munroe to Cooper, December 8, 1855, USACC, HQFLS, M-1084, roll 4, NA. Florida. House Journal (1855), 13; Tillis, “An Indian Attack of 1856 on the Home of Willoughby Tillis, 179–180; W. S. Harris to Westcott, January 6, 1856, Letters and Reports to Surveyor General, 2: 1016. Brown to Hartsuff, December 5, 1855, USACC, HQFLS, M-1084, roll 4, NA. Brown to Arnold, December 5, 1855, USACC, HQFLS, M-1084, roll 4, NA. Ibid. Brown to Vincent, December 24 and 27, 1855, including statements of Privates John Hanna, William Baker, and Otto Hersch, Sgt. Daniel Holland and Corp. Williams, USACC, HQFLS, M-1084, roll 4, NA. Ibid. Vincent to Hill, December 15, 1855, USACC, HQFLS, M-1084, roll 4, NA. Brown to Vincent, December 24 and 27, 1855, including statements of Privates John Hanna, William Baker, and Otto Hersch, Sgt. Daniel Holland and Corp. Williams, USACC, HQFLS, M-1084, roll 4, NA.

endnotes 68

69

70 71 72

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241

This account of the Hartsuff Battle is derived from the official statements of five enlisted survivors and Hartsuff’s verbal report as related to Col. Harvey Brown. The statements of Hartsuff, Baker, and Hanna are generally corroborative, with little added by Hersch, Holland, and Williams, who quickly fled the scene. In his final report, Brown lists four killed, four wounded, and three uninjured, making 11 total, but gives no names. Hartsuff departed on the patrol with a sergeant, a corporal, and eight privates, so the total is correct. The four who were killed we can be reasonably confident of. Nearly all the survivors mention Private Murtaugh (with various spellings) being severely wounded in the abdomen and left at the scene, and there is no account of him being rescued or returning to camp. Major Arnold, who was present when the bodies were later discovered, thought the remains were those of “Foster, Carran [Curren], Muller [Murtaugh] & Hough [Horth].” At first we weren’t sure if Horth might not be a misspelling, but the Register of Enlistments shows a William H. Horth being killed in action on 20 December 1855 near “Billy Bowlegs’s Camp.” We also found similar entries for Patrick Murtaugh, William Foster, and Michael Curren (spellings are those in the register). The three uninjured are Holland and Williams (who fled), and Hersch (who concealed himself soon after the attack commenced). We know three of the injured: Hartsuff (a broken arm and a ball lodged deeply in the chest), Hanna (abdominal wound), and Baker (thigh wound). So who is the other wounded soldier? A Private Bo—th (the spelling is questionable, the handwritten name being difficult to read in the original) is mentioned once by Hanna before the attack took place, but is not mentioned in any of the subsequent reports of the battle itself. A detailed examination of the Register of Enlistments and Post Returns shows a Pvt. Ernest Borseht in Hartsuff’s company at the time of the attack, but there is no indication he was detailed to that mission. Having no better candidate, we have to assume it was he who was mentioned by Hanna, that he was wounded in the attack, and subsequently made it back to Fort Myers. As to why he didn’t give a statement that was included with the others that Brown sent in, we can only speculate that he hadn’t made it back to Fort Myers yet or that his wounds somehow prevented him from making a statement. Brown to Vincent, December 24 and 27, 1855, including statements of Privates John Hanna, William Baker, and Otto Hersch, Sgt. Daniel Holland and Corp. Williams, and Arnold to Brown, December 28, 1855, USACC, HQFLS, M-1084, roll 4, NA; AGO, Register of Enlistments, M-617, NA. Brown to Vincent, December 24 and 27, 1855, including statements of Privates John Hanna, William Baker, and Otto Hersch, Sgt. Daniel Holland and Corp. Williams, USACC, HQFLS, M-1084, roll 4, NA. Ibid. Ibid. Ibid.

Chapter 5 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10

Brown to Elzey, December 21, 1855; Brown to Arnold, December 21, 1855; Brown to Vincent, December 21, 1855, USACC, HQFLS, M-1084, roll 4, NA. Brown to Elzey, December 21, 1855, USACC, HQFLS, M-1084, roll 4, NA; Brown Letterbook, entry of December 21, 1855, Harvey Brown Letterbooks, NYPL. Brown Letterbook, entry of December 21, 1855, Harvey Brown Letterbooks, NYPL. Brown to Vincent, December 24, 1855; Statement of Private Otto Hersch, December 26, 1855, USACC, HQFLS, M-1084, roll 4, NA. Vincent to Hill, December 22, 1855, USACC, HQFLS, M-1084, roll 1, NA. Brown to Vincent, December 17, 1855, USACC, HQFLS, M-1084, roll 4, NA. Brown to Vincent, December 27, 1855, USACC, HQFLS, M-1084, roll 4, NA. Tampa Florida Peninsular, December 29, 1855. Unidentified Diary, entry December 24, 1855, William Henry Wills Papers, University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill. Casey to Davis, December 23, 1855, United States Congress. House Report No. 4, 53rd Cong., 1st sess. (1893), 2: 19.

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11 Casey to Broome, December 23, 1855, Florida. House Journal (1856), 1–2. 12 Casey Diary, 1854, entry of December 4, Casey Diaries, USMA; Brown, Jr., Fort Meade, 20–21, 24, 178. 13 Hooker to Broome, December 25, 1855, Florida. House Journal (1856), 2. 14 Kendrick to Broome, December 25, 1855, Florida. House Journal (1856), 2–3; Casey Diary, 1855, entry of December 25, Casey Diaries, USMA; Munroe to Cooper, December 26, 1855, USACC, HQFLS, M-1084, roll 1, NA. 15 Brown to Arnold, December 27, 1855, USACC, HQFLS, M-1084, roll 4, NA. 16 Brown to Vincent, December 28, 1855, and Brown to Benson, December 29, 1855, USACC, HQFLS, M-1084, roll 4, NA. 17 Brown to Vincent, December 29, 1855, USACC, HQFLS, M-1084, roll 4, NA; Brown Letterbook, entries of December 29 and 31, 1855, Harvey Brown Letterbooks, NYPL. 18 Canova, Life and Adventures in South Florida, 6; Statement of Private William Baker, December 26, 1855, USACC, HQFLS, M-1084, roll 4, NA; John D. Settle, “Chief Bowlegs and the Banana Garden: A Reassessment of the Beginning of the Third Seminole War” (Master’s thesis, University of Central Florida, 2015). 19 Brown Letterbook, entry of December 29, 1855, Harvey Brown Letterbooks, NYPL. 20 Ibid. 21 Tampa Florida Peninsular, December 29, 1855. 22 Sparkman to Broome, January 10, 1856, Territorial and State Governors, 1820–1906, RG 101, Series S-577, Governor James E. Broome Correspondence (1849–1853), Box 2, Folder 3, State Archives of Florida. 23 Brown Letterbook, entry of December 31, 1855, Harvey Brown Letterbooks, NYPL. 24 Broome to Yulee, Mallory and Maxwell, December 31, 1855, Florida. House Journal (1856), 34–35. 25 Broome to Davis, December 31, 1855, Florida. House Journal (1856), 35–36. 26 Webb to Wife Annie, January 3, 1856, Alexander Stewart Webb Papers, MS 684, Manuscripts and Archives, Yale University Library. 27 Hooker to Broome, January 3, 1856, Florida. House Journal (1856), 4–5. 28 Ibid. 29 Cooper to Munroe, January 7, 1856, USACC, HQFLS, M-1084, roll 5, NA; Florida. House Journal (1856), 6–7. 30 Jacksonville Florida Republican, January 17, 1856. 31 West, “The Seminole Old Tiger Tail,” 365. 32 Hill to Vincent, January 8 and 12, 1856, USACC, HQFLS, M-1084, roll 4, NA; Tampa Florida Peninsular, February 2, 1856. 33 Brown Letterbook, entries of January 8 and 12, Harvey Brown Letterbooks, NYPL. 34 Davis to Twiggs, January 12, 1856, SWLS, Military Affairs, M-6, roll 37, NA; Twiggs to Davis, January 18, 1856, AGOLR, Main Series, M-567, roll 549, NA. 35 Munroe to Broome, January 12, 1856, Florida. House Journal (1856), 24-25. 36 Broome to Munroe, January 12, 1856, Florida. House Journal (1856), 38. 37 Casey to Davis, January 13, 1856 (unofficial), AGOLR, Main Series, M-567, roll 534, NA. 38 Brown to Arnold, January 14, 1856, USACC, HQFLS, M-1084, roll 4, NA. 39 Brown to Vincent, January 15, 1856, USACC, HQFLS, M-1084, roll 4, NA. 40 Arnold to Brown, January 18, 1856, quoted in Webb, “Campaigning in Florida,” 410–412. The names of those killed in the attack were Cpl. William Love, Pvt. John Busby, Pvt. James Fanning, Pvt. James Fermenaugh, and Pvt. Tyrone Williams (source: Register of Enlistments). 41 Arnold to Brown, January 18, 1856, quoted in Webb, “Campaigning in Florida,” 410–412. 42 Ibid. 43 Brown to Vincent, January 19, 1856, USACC, HQFLS, M-1084, roll 4, NA.

endnotes 44 45 46 47 48 49 50 51 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 60 61 62 63 64 65 66 67 68

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243

Casey Diary, 1856, entry of January 26, Casey Diaries, USMA; Brown to Vincent, February 3, 1856, USACC, HQFLS, M-1084, roll 4, NA. Brown to Vincent, January 19, 21, and 29, 1856, USACC, HQFLS, M-1084, roll 4, NA. Brown to Munroe, January 24, 1856, USACC, HQFLS, M-1084, roll 4, NA. Arnold to Brown, January 24, 1856, USACC, HQFLS, M-1084, roll 4, NA. Brown Letterbook, entry of January 26, 1856, Harvey Brown Letterbooks, NYPL; Brown to Vincent, January 27, 1856, USACC, HQFLS, M-1084, roll 4, NA. Charles Thomas to Munroe, January 23 and February 18, 1856, and B. H. Hill to S. M. Vincent, February 18, 1856, USACC, HQFLS, M-1084, roll 4, NA. Brown to Vincent, January 27, 1856, USACC, HQFLS, M-1084, roll 4, NA. Brown to Vincent, February 3, 1856, USACC, HQFLS, M-1084, roll 4, NA; Munroe to Cooper, February 10, 1856, AGOLR, Main Series, M-567, roll 541, NA. Davis to Mallory, January 19, 1856, SWLS, Military Affairs, M-6, roll #37, NA; Broome to Davis, January 23, 1856, Florida. House Journal (1856), 39–40. Munroe to Broome, January 12, 1856, Florida. House Journal (1856), 25. Smith to Broome, June 26, 1856, Florida. House Journal (1856), 25–27. Broome to Munroe, February 4, 1856, Florida. House Journal (1856), 40–41; Casey Diary, 1856, entry of February 14, Casey Diaries, USMA. Brown to Vincent, February 14, 1856, USACC, HQFLS, M-1084, roll 4, NA. Brown Letterbook, entry of February 19, 1856, Harvey Brown Letterbooks, NYPL. Brown Letterbook, entry of February 20, 1856, Harvey Brown Letterbooks, NYPL. Tampa Florida Peninsular, February 16, 1856. Webb, “Campaigning in Florida,” 413. Webb to wife Annie, March 1, 1856, Alexander Stewart Webb Papers, Yale University Library. Webb, “Campaigning in Florida,” 413–414. Brown Letterbook, entry of February 25, 1856, Harvey Brown Letterbooks, NYPL. Munroe to Brown, February 2, 1856, HQFLS, M-1084, roll 1, NA. Residents at Key West to Munroe, January 30, 1856, AGOLR, Main Series, M-567, roll 535, NA. Brown Letterbook, entry of February 25, 1856, Harvey Brown Letterbooks, NYPL. Carter to Kendrick and Johnston, February 27, 1856, Florida. House Journal (1856), 67–69. Brown to Pratt, February 28, 1856, and Brown to Vincent, February 29, 1856, USACC, HQFLS, M-1084, roll 4, NA.

Chapter 6 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11

Broome to Carter, March 31, 1856, Florida. House Journal (1856), 48–49. Capt. James Murphy’s reminiscences of his Florida experience in the Philadelphia Times, March 13, 1886. Edward Lee to Munroe, March 3, 1856, USACC, HQFLS, M-1084, roll 4, NA. Archie McNeill to Munroe, March 7, 1856, USACC, HQFLS, M-1084, roll 4, NA. Carter to Broome, March 4, 1856, Florida. House Journal (1856), 71–72; Tampa Florida Peninsular, March 8, 1856. Carter to Broome, March 4, 1856, Florida. House Journal (1856), 71–72; Casey Diary, 1856, entry of March 6, Casey Diaries, USMA. Bradley to Davis, March 22, 1856, AGOLR, Main Series, M-567, roll 533, NA. J. D. Shelton to Munroe, May 11, 1856, USACC, HQFLS, M-1084, roll 6, NA. H. W. G. Clements to J. McKinstry, April 4, 1856, AGOLR, Main Series, M-567, roll 542, NA. Munroe to Broome, March 4, 1856, Florida. House Journal (1856), 11–12. Webb to Wife Annie, March 8, 1856, Alexander Stewart Webb Papers, Collection of Michael Huxley, Loudonville, New York.

244

•

history of the third seminole war 1849–1858

12 Webb to Wife Annie, March 12, 1856, Alexander Stewart Webb Papers, Yale University Library. 13 Webb, “Campaigning in Florida,” 414, 416; Webb to Wife Annie, March 6, 1856, Alexander Stewart Webb Papers, Yale University Library; AGO, Returns from U.S. Military Posts, 1800–1916, Post Returns from Fort Deynaud, April 1856, M-617, NA; Haskin, History of the First Regiment of Artillery, 392; Arnold to Brown, March 8, 1856, Brown to Vincent, March 9 and April 4, 1856, USACC, HQFLS, M-1084, roll 4, NA. 14 Carter to Broome, March 10 and 14, 1856, Florida. House Journal (1856), 72–73, 75; Knetsch, “Fort Hamer,” 15. 15 Carter to Broome, March 15, 1856, Florida. House Journal (1856), 75–76. 16 Broome to Carter, March 18, 1856, Florida. House Journal (1856), 44–45. 17 Broome to Carter, March 19, 1856, Florida. House Journal (1856), 45–46. 18 Broome to Perry, March 18, 1856, Florida. House Journal (1856), 45; Davis to Campbell, March 28, 1856 and Cooper to Jefferson, March 25, 1856, United States Congress. House Miscellaneous Document 76, 34th Congress, 1st sess. (1856), “Letter from the Secretary of War … estimates of appropriation for defraying expenses of volunteers,” 1–2. 19 Columbus [Ga.] Daily Sun, March 21, 1856; Casey to Davis, March 29, 1856, AGOLR, Main Series, M-567, roll 534, NA. 20 Carter to Durrance, March 25, 1856, Florida. House Journal (1856), 80–81. 21 Webb Journal entry of March 26, 1856, Alexander Stewart Webb Papers. Yale University Library; Webb, “Campaigning in Florida,” 418. 22 Casey to Munroe, March 28, 1856, USACC, HQFLS, M-1084, roll 4, NA. 23 Casey to Carter, March 28, 1856, Florida. House Journal (1856), 12–13; Davis to Stephen Mallory, March 21, 1856, AGOLR, Main Series, M-567, roll 542, NA, as quoted in Crist and Dix, eds., Papers of Jefferson Davis, 6: 381. 24 Pratt to Brown, March 31, 1856, and Brown to Vincent, April 3, 1856, USACC, HQFLS, M-1084, roll 4, NA; Webb to Father, April 9, 1856, Alexander Stewart Webb Papers, Yale University Library. 25 Tampa Florida Peninsular, April 12, 1856. 26 Casey Dairy, 1856, entry of March 31, 1856, Casey Diaries, USMA; Tampa Florida Peninsular, April 5, 1856; Carter to Durrance, April 5, 1856, Florida. House Journal (1856), 82–83. 27 Carter to Broome, April 5, 1856, Florida, House Journal (1856), 84. 28 Joseph Moore to W. B. Hooker, April 6, 1856, USACC, HQFLS, M-1084, roll 4, NA; Tampa Florida Peninsular, April 12, 1856. 29 Tallahassee Floridian & Journal, April 19, 1856. 30 Broome to Carter, March 31, 1856, Florida. House Journal (1856), 48–49. 31 Webb Journal, entries of April 1 and 2, 1856, Alexander Stewart Webb Papers, Yale University Library. 32 Webb Journal, entry of April 3, 1856, Alexander Stewart Webb Papers, Yale University Library. 33 R. C. Duryea to B. H. Hill, April 5, 1856, USACC, HQFLS, M-1084, roll 5, NA. 34 Loomis Langdon to George W. Langdon, April 9, 1856, M74-06, Box 1, File 1, State Archives of Florida. 35 Webb, “Campaigning in Florida,” 421. 36 Munroe to Carter, April 16, 1856, Carter to Munroe, April 16, 1856, Florida. House Journal (1856), 13, 92–93. 37 Carter to Broome, April 16 and 19, 1856, Florida. House Journal (1856), 96; Casey Diary, 1856, entries of April 17 and 18, 1856, Casey Diaries, USMA; Tallahassee Floridian & Journal, April 26, 1856. 38 George Bell to Hill, April 25, 1856, USACC, HQFLS, M-1084, roll 5, NA. 39 Ibid. 40 Ibid. 41 Ibid. 42 Ibid.

endnotes 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50 51 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 60 61 62 63

•

245

Ibid. Ibid. Rogers to Broome, April 25, 1856, Florida. House Journal (1856), 13–14. Broome to Daniels, May 2, 1856, Florida. House Journal (1856), 49–50. Carter to Lesley, May 6, 1856, Florida. House Journal (1856), 102. Broome to Smith, May 10, 1856, Florida. House Journal (1856), 52–53. Rogers to Broome, April 25, 1856, Florida. House Journal (1856), 13–14. Carter to Durrance, April 22, 1856, Florida. House Journal (1856), 96. Carter to Durrance, April 28, 1856, Florida. House Journal (1856), 99–100. Carter to Durrance, April 28, 1856, Florida. House Journal (1856), 97–98. Munroe to Cooper, April 27, 1856, AGOLR, Main Series, M-567, roll 535, NA. Moly [Molinard] to Webb, April 29, 1856, Alexander Stewart Webb Papers, Collection of Michael Huxley, Loudonville, NY. Cooper to Munroe, May 1, 1856, Florida. House Journal (1856), 14–15. Johnston to Carter, May 6, 1856, Florida. House Journal (1856), 15–16. Stuttering Billy was the paternal grandfather of the well-known 20th-century medicine men Josie and Ingraham Billie. Johnston to Brown, May 8, 1856, Florida. House Journal (1856), 17–18. Brown to Churchill, May 3, 1856, AGOLR, Main Series, M-567, roll 535, NA. Ibid. Ibid. Ibid. Broome to Munroe, May 8, 1856, Florida. House Journal (1856), 51–52.

Chapter 7 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20

Churchill to Cooper, May 15, 1856, and Bradley to Churchill, May 15, 1856, AGOLR, Main Series, M-567, roll 534, NA; Tallahassee, Floridian & Journal, May 31, 1856; New York Times, June 4, 1856. John E. Turkett to Davis, June 2, 1856, USACC: Florida, Letters Received, box 24, as quoted in Adams, William S. Harney, 147. Arnold to Brown, May 16, 1856, USACC, HQFLS, M-1084, roll 5, NA. Carter to Lesley, May 16, 1856, Florida. House Journal (1856), 105. Sparkman to Munroe, May 21, 1856, USACC, HQFLS, M-1084, roll 6, NA. Ibid. Broome to Carter, June 3, 1856, Florida. House Journal (1856), 56–57. Carter to B. W. Crews, June 3, 1856, Florida. House Journal (1856), 117. Broome to Davis, May 16, 1856, Florida. House Journal (1856), 50–51. Broome to Smith, May 16, 1856, Florida. House Journal (1856), 54. Churchill to Cooper, May 19, 1856, AGOLR, Main Series, M-567, roll 536, NA. Columbus [Ga.] Daily Sun, May 19, 1856; Mobile Daily Register, May 25, 1856. Tallahassee Floridian & Journal, April 26, 1856. Mobile Daily Register, May 27, 1856; Carter to Broome, May 27, 1856, Florida. House Journal (1856), 110. Davis to Broome, June 11, 1856, Florida. House Journal (1856), 22–23. Munroe to Broome, June 12, 1856, AGOLR, Main Series, M-567, roll 542, NA. M. Whit Smith to Broome, June 26, 1856, Florida. House Journal (1856), 25–27. Smith to Broome, June 26, 1856, and Broome to Smith, July 12, 1856, Florida. House Journal (1856), 25–28. Churchill to Winfield Scott, May 31, 1856, AGOLR, Main Series, M-567, roll 535, NA. Churchill to Scott, May 31, 1856, AGOLR, Main Series, M-567, roll 535, NA.

246 21 22 23 24 25

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history of the third seminole war 1849–1858

Ibid. Ibid. Churchill to Cooper, May 19, 1856, AGOLR, Main Series, M-567, roll 536, NA. Davis to James Campbell, May 20, 1856, Florida. House Journal (1856), 28. Munroe to Cooper, July 3, 1856, Florida Post Masters to Campbell, July 6, 1856, Florida. House Journal (1856), 29, 31–32. 26 Hart to Campbell, July 19, 1856, Florida. House Journal (1856), 29–31. 27 Davis to Campbell, July 16, 1856, and William H. Dudas to Yulee, August 1, 1856, Florida. House Journal (1856), 28, Florida. House Journal (1856), 28, 32. 28 Carter to Broome, May 17, 1856, Florida. House Journal (1856), 107; Johnston to Brown, May 23, 1856, USACC, HQFLS, M-1084, roll 5, NA. 29 Munroe to Cooper, May 18, 1856, AGOLR, Main Series, M-567, roll 537, NA. 30 Ibid. 31 Webb to wife Annie, May 27, 1856, Alexander Stewart Webb Papers, Yale University Library. 32 Webb Journal entry of May 25, 1856 in Webb, “Campaigning in Florida,” 423; Carter to Johnston, May 25, 1856, Florida. House Journal (1856), 108. 33 Webb Journal entry of May 31, 1856 in Webb, “Campaigning in Florida,” 424. 34 Webb Journal entry of June 1, 1856 in Webb, “Campaigning in Florida,” 424–425. 35 Webb Journal entries of June 2–4, 1856 in Webb, “Campaigning in Florida,” 425. 36 Brown to Vincent, May 22, 1856, USACC, HQFLS, M-1084, roll 5, NA. 37 Carter to Broome, June 6, 1856, Florida. House Journal (1856), 119–120. 38 Webb Journal entries of June 8 and 9, 1856 in Webb, “Campaigning in Florida,” 426–427. 39 Webb to Wife Annie, June 10, 1856, Alexander Stewart Webb Papers, Yale University Library; William F. Edgar to Brown, June 12, 1856, and Brown to Page, June 14, 1856, USACC, HQFLS, M-1084, roll 5, NA. 40 Webb Journal entry of June 8, 1856 in Webb, “Campaigning in Florida,” 427; New York Weekly Tribune, July 12, 1856. 41 Lewis Edwards and George Woods to H. Lawson, July 17, 1856, AGOLR, Main Series, M-567, roll 533, NA. 42 Lawson to Davis, July 19, 1856, AGOLR, Main Series, M-567, roll 533, NA. 43 Moore to Cooper, June 7, 1856, AGOLR, Main Series, M-567, roll 538, NA. 44 James Dallas Tillis to Calvert Hamilton, “The Battle of Fort Meade” by Col. D. B. McKay, in DeVane, DeVane’s Early Florida History, 2: 184. 45 Sparkman to Munroe, June 8, 1856, USACC, HQFLS, M-1084, roll 6, NA; Tillis, “Indian Attack of 1856 on the Home of Willoughby Tillis,”180–182; Munroe to Cooper, July 1, 1856, AGOLR, Main Series, M-567, roll 542, NA; Tampa Florida Peninsular, July 5, 1856. 46 Durrance to Carter, June 14, 1856, Florida. House Journal (1856), 20–21. 47 Hooker to Munroe, June 19, 1856, AGOLR, Main Series, M-567, roll 542, NA. 48 Hooker to Munroe, June 19, 1856, AGOLR, Main Series, M-567, roll 542, NA; Durrance to Carter, June 14, 1856, Florida. House Journal (1856), 20–21. 49 Hooker to Munroe, June 19, 1856, AGOLR, Main Series, M-567, roll 542, NA; Durrance to Carter, June 14, 1856, Florida. House Journal (1856), 20–21; Tampa Florida Peninsular, June 21, 1856. 50 Hooker to Munroe, June 19, 1856, AGOLR, Main Series, M-567, roll 542, NA; Durrance to Carter, June 14, 1856, Florida. House Journal (1856), 20–21. 51 Ibid. 52 Covington, Billy Bowlegs War, 51–52; Brown, Jr., Fort Meade, 25–30. 53 Columbus (Ga.) Daily Sun, June 19, 1856. 54 New York Times, June 21, 1856. 55 Casey Diary, 1856, entry of June 4, Casey Diaries, USMA; Munroe to Cooper, June 7, 1856, AGOLR, Main Series, M-567, roll 542, NA; New York Times, June 21, 1856.

endnotes

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247

Davis to Munroe, July 21, 1845, Florida. House Journal (1856), 28–29. Broome to Carter, August 16, 1856, Florida. House Journal (1856), 27. Broome to Carter, August 26, 1856, Florida. House Journal (1856), 27–28. Munroe to Broome, August 1, 1856, Florida. House Journal (1856), 30–31. Brown to Page, August 2, 1856, USACC, HQFLS, M-1084, roll 5, NA; Casey Diary, 1856, entry of August 5, Casey Diaries, USMA; Mobile Daily Register, August 22, 1856. 61 Langdon and Bell to Hill, September 23, 1856, USACC, HQFLA, M-1084, roll 5, NA. 62 Abner Smead to William M. Graham, August 14, 1856, Hill to Page, August 18, 1856, USACC, HQFLS, M-1084, roll 5, NA. 63 United States Congress. House Executive Document 1 (USHED 1), 34th Cong., 3rd sess. (1856), 564–565. 64 Kappler, ed., Indian Affairs: Laws & Treaties, 2: 756–763. 65 Cooper to Davis, August 28, 1856, AGOLR, Main Series, M-567, roll 537, NA. 66 United States. Congress. Senate Executive Document No. 5 [USSED 5],” Message from the President,” 34th Cong., 3rd sess. (1856), 5. 67 Harney to Davis, August 31, 1856, USACC, HQFLS, M-1084, roll 5, NA. 68 Davis to Broome, September 13, 1856, Florida. House Journal (1856), 33. 69 Tallahassee Floridian & Journal, November 8, 1856.

56 57 58 59 60

Chapter 8 Adams, William S. Harney, 2, 15–16, 19–21. Adams, William S. Harney, 8, 40. Thomas Williams Diary, entry of January 15, 1857, Thomas Williams Papers, Detroit Public Library (DPL). 4 Adams, William S. Harney, 71–73. 5 Adams, William S. Harney, 105–145. 6 Columbus (Ga.) Daily Sun, September 22, 1856. 7 M. McKinstry to Thomas Jesup, September 13, 1856, USACC, HQFLS, M-1084, roll 6, NA. 8 Leroy Lesley to F. N. Page, September 30, 1856, USACC, HQFLS, M-1084, roll 6, NA; Carter to Broome, October 25 and November 11, 1856, Florida. House Journal (1856), 133–135. 9 Davis to Harney, November 4, 1856, USACC, HQFLS, M-1084, roll 5, NA. 10 Ibid. 11 Brown to Cooper, November 19, 1856, AGOLR, Main Series, M-567, roll 534, NA. 12 Williams to wife Mary, November 11, 1856, Thomas Williams Papers, DPL. 13 Williams Diary, entry of November 12, 1856, Thomas Williams Papers, DPL. 14 Williams Diary, entry of November 14, 1856, Thomas Williams Papers, DPL. 15 Williams Diary, entry of November 5, 1856, Thomas Williams Papers, DPL. 16 Williams Diary, entry of December 19, 1856, Thomas Williams Papers, DPL. 17 Williams Diary, entry of December 19, 1856, Thomas Williams Papers, DPL. 18 Davis to R. McClelland, November 22, 1856, USACC, HQFLS, M-1084, roll 5, NA. 19 E. O’Connor to S. Cooper, December 23, 1856, USACC, HQFLS, M-1084, roll 7, NA. 20. Tampa Florida Peninsular, November 22, 1856. 21 M. Brannan to P. T. Wyman, November 25, 1856, USACC, HQFLS, M-1084, roll 5, NA. 22 John Jackson to Robert Butler, April 5, 1847, Letters and Reports to Surveyor General, 1: 819–820. 23 Circular by order of Harney, November 22, 1856, AGOLR, Main Series, M-567, roll 539, NA. 24 Williams Diary, entry of November 23, 1856, Thomas Williams Papers, DPL. 25 Harney to Thomas, November 25, 1856, AGOLR, Main Series, M-567, roll 539, NA. 26 Williams Diary, entry of November 26, 1856, Thomas Williams Papers, DPL.

1 2 3

248 27 28 29 30 31

32

33 34 35 36 37 38

39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50 51 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 60 61 62

•

history of the third seminole war 1849–1858

Williams Diary, entry of November 27, 1856, Thomas Williams Papers, DPL. Williams Diary, entries of December 9, 12, and 4, 1856, Thomas Williams Papers, DPL. Harney to Cooper, December 5, 1856, AGOLR, Main Series, M-567, roll 539, NA. Williams Diary, entry of December 26, 1856, Thomas Williams Papers, DPL. New York Daily Times, January 7, 1857; Harney to Thomas, January 14 and 19, 1857, AGOLR, Main Series, M-567, roll 558, NA; Harney to Thomas, March 8, 1857, AGOLR, Main Series, M-567, roll 559, NA. New York Daily Times, January 7, 1857; Harney to Thomas, January 14 and 19, 1857, AGOLR, Main Series, M-567, roll 558, NA; Harney to Thomas, March 8, 1857, AGOLR, Main Series, M-567, roll 559, NA; West, “The Bitter(s) Truth,” The Seminole Tribune, XVIII, No. 9 (September 29, 1995). Columbus (Ga.) Daily Sun, December 22, 1856. C. L. Kilburn to Davis, November 17, 1856, USACC, HQFLS, M-1084, roll 6, NA. W. W. Morris to Cooper, December 25, 1856, Page to Cooper, December 28, 1856, AGOLR, Main Series, M-567, roll 535, NA; Tampa Florida Peninsular, May 8, 1858. Cooper to Harney, December 10, 1856, USACC, HQFLS, M-1084, roll 5, NA. Harney to Cooper, December 26, 1856, AGOLR, Main Series, M-567, roll 539, NA. Harney to Cooper, December 26, 1856, AGOLR, Main Series, M-567, roll 539, NA; Andrew P. Aswell, “Calming the Churn: Resolving the Dilemma of Rotational Warfare in Counterinsurgency” (Master’s thesis, Naval Post-Graduate School, Monterey, California, 2013). Harney to Cooper, December 26, 1856, AGOLR, Main Series, M-567, roll 539, NA. Buker, The Metal Life Car, 3–5, 67–68; Page to Pleasonton, December 14, 1856, USACC, HQFLS, M-1084, roll 5, NA. Hubbard L. Hart to Campbell, July 19, 1856, Florida. House Journal (1856), 29–31. Williams Diary, entry of November 23, 1856, Thomas Williams Papers, DPL. Williams Diary, entry of January 6, 1857, Thomas Williams Papers, DPL. Williams Diary, entries of December 30, 1856 and January 17, 1857, Thomas Williams Papers, DPL. Brannan to Wyman, January 10, 1857, USACC, HQFLS, M-1084, roll 7, NA; Knetsch, ed., “Southeast Florida in the Third Seminole War,” Part I, 41. Ibid. Doubleday to Dimick, January 12, 1857, USACC, HQFLS, M-1084, roll 7, NA; Knetsch, ed., “Southeast Florida in the Third Seminole War,” Part I, 42–43. Harney to Thomas, January 14, 1857, AGOLR, Main Series, M-567, roll 558, NA. Knetsch, “Fort Cross on Cape Sable,” 21–24. L. H. Pelouze to W. S. Abert, January 30, 1857, USACC, HQFLS, M-1084, roll 8, NA. McParlin to Mother and Brother, January 30, 1857, Thomas A. McParlin Papers, Maryland State Archives (MSA). H. A. Crane to Lesley, February 4, 1857, USACC, HQFLS, M-1084, roll 7, NA. G. A. DuRussy to W. H. Lewis, February 7, 1857, USACC, HQFLS, M-1084, roll 9, NA. McParlin to Mother and Brother, January 7, 1857, Thomas A. McParlin Papers, MSA. McParlin to Mother and Brother, January 30, 1857, Thomas A. McParlin Papers, MSA. Williams Diary, entries of February 8, 11–12, 1857, Thomas Williams Papers, DPL. Williams Diary, entry of February 24, 1857, Thomas Williams Papers, DPL. McParlin to Mother and Brother, February 12, 1857, Thomas A. McParlin Papers, MSA; Joseph Roberts to Pleasonton, February 16, 1857, USACC, HQFLS, M-1084, roll 9, NA. McParlin to Mother and Brother, March 1, 1857, Thomas A. McParlin Papers, MSA; Williams Diary, entry of March 1, 1857, Thomas Williams Papers, DPL. McParlin to Mother and Brother, March 1, 1857, Thomas A. McParlin Papers, MSA. Ibid. New York Times, July 10, 1857; United States. Congress. Senate Executive Document No. 11 (USSED 11), “Message from the President,” 35th Cong., 1st sess. (1858), 142–143.

endnotes 63 64 65 66

67 68 69 70 71 72 73

74 75 76 77 78 79 80 81 82 83 84 85

86 87

88 89

•

Loomis to Pleasonton, February 7, 1857, USACC, HQFLS, M-1084, roll 8, NA; Memorandum of Harney’s Plan of Operations, May 6, 1857, USACC, HQFLS, M-1084, roll 7, NA. McCown to Lewis, March 1, 1857, USACC, HQFLS, M-1084, roll 8, NA; Knetsch, “Fort Cross on Cape Sable,” 22–23. Harney to L. Thomas, March 8, 1857, AGOLR, Main Series, M-567, roll 559, NA. Harney to L. Thomas, March 8, 1857, AGOLR, Main Series, M-567, roll 559, NA; C. L. Stevenson to Pleasonton, March 6, 1857, USACC, HQFLS, M-1084, roll 9, NA; Howard to Wife, March 11, 1857, Oliver Otis Howard Papers, Bowdoin College Library. Williams Diary, entry of March 6, 1857, Thomas Williams Papers, DPL. Harney to L. Thomas, March 8, 1857, AGOLR, Main Series, M-567, roll 559, NA; Tampa Florida Peninsular, April 11, 1857. Hancock, Reminiscences of Winfield Scott Hancock, 26–35. C. L. Kilburn to Pleasonton, March 25, 1857, USACC, HQFLS, M-1804, roll 8, NA. Williams Diary, entry of February 17, 1857, Thomas Williams Papers, DPL. Williams Diary, entry of March 10, 1857, Thomas Williams Papers, DPL. Doubleday to Dimick, April 2, 1857, USACC, HQFLS, M-1084, roll 7, NA; McParlin to Mother and Brother, March 10 and 22, 1857, Thomas A. McParlin Papers, MSA; Knetsch, ed., “Southeast Florida in the Third Seminole War,” Part II, 28. Doubleday to Dimick, April 2, 1857, USACC, HQFLS, M-1084, roll 7, NA; Knetsch, ed., “Southeast Florida in the Third Seminole War,” Part II, 29. Williams Diary, entry of March 21, 1857, Thomas Williams Papers, DPL. Harney to Thomas, March 21, 1857, AGOLR, Main Series, M-567, roll 558, NA. Ibid. Harney to Thomas, April 10, 1857, AGOLR, Main Series, M-567, roll 558, NA. Ibid. Doubleday to Dimick, April 2, 1857, USACC, HQFLS, M-1084, roll 7, NA; McParlin to Mother and Brother, March 30, 1857, Thomas A. McParlin Papers, MSA. McParlin to Mother and Brother, April 6, 1857, Thomas A. McParlin Papers, MSA. Williams Diary, entry of April 6, 1857, Thomas Williams Papers, DPL. Ibid. McParlin to Mother and Brother, April 18, 1857, Thomas A. McParlin Papers, MSA. John McNeill to Munroe, April 3, 1857, James Weeks to A. Johnston, April 20, 1857, and Johnston to Harney, April 21, 1857, USACC, HQFLS, M-1084, roll 8, NA; Francis M. Durrance to Munroe, April 4, 1857, USACC, HQFLS, M-1084, roll 7, NA. “General Order No. 9,” April 8, 1857, AGO, Returns from U.S. Military Posts, Fort Myers, April 1857; Harney to Thomas, April 11, 1857, AGOLR, Main Series, M-567, roll 558, NA. Knetsch, “Filling in the Skeleton,” 27–28; James Abert to the Topographical Bureau, April 25, 1857, Office of the Chief of Engineers, Letters Received by the Topographical Bureau of the War Department, 1824–1865, M-506, roll #2: January 1856–December 1859, NA. Circular by order of Harney to Cooper, April 19, 1857, and Agreement between Daugherty and Harney, April 21, 1857, AGOLR, Main Series, M-567, roll 558, 94, NA. Harney to Cooper, April 22, 1857, AGOLR, Main Series, M-567, roll 558, NA.

Chapter 9 1 2 3 4 5

249

Howard to Wife, April 29, 1857, Oliver Otis Howard Papers, Bowdoin College Library. Loomis to Capt. Alfred Pleasonton, April 16, 1867, USACC, HQFLS, M-1084, roll 8, NA. Loomis to Thomas, May 1, 1857, AGOLR, Main Series, M-567, roll 558, NA. Yulee to Editor of Tampa Florida Peninsular, May 22, 1857. Loomis to Thomas, May 1, 1857, AGOLR, Main Series, M-567, roll 558, NA.

250 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42

43 44 45

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history of the third seminole war 1849–1858

Ibid. A. L. Magilton to F. N. Page, April 22, 1857, USACC, HQFLS, M-1084, roll 8, NA. Tampa Florida Peninsular, May 2, 1857. Ibid. McParlin to Mother and Brother, May 6, 1857, Thomas A. McParlin Papers, MSA. Howard, Autobiography of Oliver Otis Howard, 1: 83–84. William R. Terrill to C. F. Weed, August 28, 1857, USACC, HQFLS, M-1084, roll 9, NA. S. L. Sparkman to F. N. Page, August 11, 1857, USACC, HQFLS, M-1084, roll 9, NA. Robert C. Hill to W. H. Lewis, April 29, 1857, USACC, HQFLS, M-1084, roll 8, NA; Tampa Florida Peninsular, May 9, 1857. Robert C. Hill to W. H. Lewis, April 29, 1857, USACC, HQFLS, M-1084, roll 8, NA J. F. P. Johnston to F. N. Page, May 10, 1857, USACC, HQFLS, M-1084, roll 8, NA. Mosely to J. B. Scott, May 20, 1857, USACC, HQFLS, M-1084, roll 8, NA. Leroy G. Lesley to Lt. G. W. Hazzard, April 29, 1857, USACC, HQFLS, M-1084, roll 8, NA. McParlin to Mother and Brother, May 22, 1857, Thomas A. McParlin Papers, MSA. J. C. Pemberton to A. Pleasonton, May 20, 1857, USACC, HQFLS, M-1084, roll 8, NA. Head to Lewis, May 21, 1857, USACC, HQFLS, M-1084, roll 8, NA; Knetsch, “Fort Cross on Cape Sable,” 25. Head to McCown, June 10, 1857, USACC, HQFLS, M-1084, roll 8, NA; Knetsch, “Fort Cross on Cape Sable,” 25–27. Tampa Florida Peninsular, June 20, 1857; Loomis to Cooper, June 23, 1857, AGOLR, Main Series, M-567, roll 558, NA. Williams to Wife, June 7, 1857, Thomas Williams Papers, DPL. Loomis to Cooper, June 7, 1857, AGOLR, Main Series, M-567, roll 558, NA. Ibid. Robert Bullock to F. N. Page, July 30, 1857, USACC, HQFLS, M-1084, roll 7, NA. Secretary of War J. B. Floyd to Gov. James E. Broome, May 28, 1857, and Broome to S. St. George Rogers, June 5, 1857, USACC, HQFLS, M-1084, roll 7, NA. Williams Diary, entry of June 11, 1857, Thomas Williams Papers, DPL. Marcy to Page, June 13, 1857, AGOLR, Main Series, M-567, roll 558, NA. Williams Diary, entry of June 23, 1857, Thomas Williams Papers, DPL. Loomis to Cooper, June 23, 1857, AGOLR, Main Series, M-567, roll 558, NA. Williams Diary, entry of June 22, 1857, Thomas Williams Papers, DPL. United States Congress. Senate Executive Document No. 52 [USSED 52], “Statistical Report of the Sickness and Mortality in the Army … January 1855 to January 1860,” 36th Cong., 1st sess. (1860), 156–157. USSED 52, 158–159. USSED 52, 160–162; Howard, “Autobiography of Oliver Otis Howard,” 1: 83. Loomis to Cooper, June 23 and July 26, 1857, AGOLR, M-567, roll 558, NA; Tampa Florida Peninsular, June 27, 1857. Mickler to Loomis, August 28, 1857, USSED 11, 143–144; Williams Diary, entry of July 9, 1857, Thomas Williams Papers, DPL. Mickler to Loomis, August 28, 1857, USSED 11, 143–144; Canova, Adventures in South Florida, 8. Canova, Adventures in South Florida, 10. Mickler to Loomis, August 28, 1857, USSED 11, 143–144; S. L. Sparkman to Munroe, July 21, 1857, USACC, HQFLS, M-1084, roll 9, NA. Mickler to Loomis, August 28, 1857, USSED 11, 143–144; W. W. Morris to F. N. Page, July 26, 1857, USACC, HQFLS, M-1084, roll 8, NA; F. L. Belton to Page, August 26, 1857, AGOLR, Main Series, M-567, roll 558, NA. S. L. Sparkman to Munroe, July 21, 1857, USACC, HQFLS, M-1084, roll 9, NA. Bethell, Pinellas, 66–68. Schwartz, Writings of Maria Baker Taylor, 114.

endnotes

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251

46

Doubleday to Dimick, August 10, 1857, USACC, HQFLS, M-1084, roll 7, NA; Knetsch, ed., “Southeast Florida in the Third Seminole War,” Part II, 33. 47 Ibid. 48 Doubleday to Dimick, August 10, 1857, USACC, HQFLS, M-1084, roll 7, NA; Knetsch, ed., “Southeast Florida in the Third Seminole War,” Part II, 33–34. 49 Tampa Florida Peninsular, August 29 and September 12, 1857. 50 Tampa Florida Peninsular, August 29, 1857. 51 McParlin to Mother and Brother, August 28, 1857, Thomas A. McParlin Papers, MSA. 52 W. H. Kendrick to G. W. Hazzard, August 26, 1857, AGOLR, Main Series, M-567, roll 558, NA. 53 Loomis to Thomas, August 30, 1857, AGOLR, Main Series, M-567, roll 558, NA. 54 Tampa Florida Peninsular, September 5 and 12, 1857. 55 McParlin to Mother and Brother, September 13, 1857, Thomas A. McParlin Papers, MSA.

Chapter 10 1

2

3

4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24

Loomis to Irvin McDowell including statement of volunteer companies, December 2, 1857, Floyd to Perry, December 23, 1857, AGOLR, Main Series, M-567, roll 558, NA; S. St. George Rogers to Page, October 2 and November 17, 1857, USACC, HQFLS, M-1084, roll 9, NA. Dimick to Acting Asst. Adj. Gen. William S. Harris, September 15, 1857, USACC, HQFLS, M-1084, roll 7, NA; F. L. Belton to Page, September 15, 1857, USACC, HQFLS, M-1084, roll 7, NA; Munroe to Page, September 27, 1857, USACC, HQFLS, M-1084, roll 8, NA. William H. Kendrick to Page, November 7, 1857, USACC, HQFLS, M-1084, roll 8, NA; Harris to Page, October 16, 1857, Ibid., roll 9; I. J. Carter to Page, October 17 and 31, 1857, and Abner Doubleday to Page, October 22, 1857, Ibid., roll 7; Jacob E. Mickler to Munroe, October 30, 1857, Edward T. Kendrick to Page, October 31, 1857, and A. Pacetty to Page, October 31 1857, Ibid., roll 8. S. St. George Rogers to Page, November 17, 1857, USACC, HQFLS, M-1084, roll 9, NA. S. St. George Rogers to Page, November 17 and December 2, 1857, USACC, HQFLS, M-1084, roll 9, NA. Loomis to McDowell, December 6, 1857, AGOLR, Main Series, M-567, roll 558, NA. Loomis to McDowell, December 6, 1857, AGOLR, Main Series, M-567, roll 558, NA; W. Stephens to Harris, December 4, 1857, USACC, HQFLS, M-1084, roll 9, NA. Rogers to Page, December 2, 1857, USACC, HQFLS, M-1084, roll 9, NA. Ibid. Ibid. Stephens to Harris, December 4, 1857, USACC, HQFLS, M-1084, roll 9, NA. Ibid. Ibid. Ibid. Loomis to McDowell, December 6, 1857, AGOLR, Main Series, M-567, roll 558, NA. Tampa Florida Peninsular, January 9, 1858. Loomis to McDowell, December 2 and 6, 1857, AGOLR, Main Series, M-567, roll 558, NA; Secretary of State F. L. Vellepique to Floyd, December 5, 1857, AGOLR, Main Series, M-567, roll 558, NA. Tampa Florida Peninsular, December 12, 1857. Rogers to Page, December 26, 1857, USACC, HQFLS, M-1084, roll 9, NA. Rogers to Page, December 31, 1857, USACC, HQFLS, M-1084, roll 9, NA. Rogers to Page, January 9, 1858, USACC, HQFLS, M-1084, roll 10, NA. L. S. Sparkman to Rogers, January 20, 1858, USACC, HQFLS, M-1084, roll 10, NA. Carter to Brannan, February 1, 1857, Sparkman to Brannan, February 2, 1858, Lesley to Brannan, February 4, 1858, Booley to Brannan, February 8, 1858, USACC, HQFLS, M-1084, roll 10, NA. Tampa Florida Peninsular, January 23, 1858; Loomis to Brannon, January 29, 1858, USACC, HQFLS, M-1084, roll 10, NA.

252 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40

41 42

43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50 51 52

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history of the third seminole war 1849–1858

Tampa Florida Peninsular, January 23, 1858; E. Rector to Charles E. Mix, February 10, 1858, OIA, Letters Received, Seminole Agency, 1856–1858, M-234, roll 802, NA. Tampa Florida Peninsular, January 23, 1858. Rector to Mix, February 10, 1858, OIA, Letters Received, Seminole Agency, 1856–1858, M-234, roll 802, NA. Talbot to Sister, November 29, 1857, Theodore Talbot Papers, LC. Brannan to Page, February 21, 1858, USACC, HQFLS, M-1084, roll 10, NA. Brannan to Page, February 27, 1858, USACC, HQFLS, M-1084, roll 10, NA; Rector to Mix, February 27, 1858, OIA, Letters Received, Seminole Agency, 1856–1858, M-234, roll 802, NA. Rector to Thompson, March 6, 1858, OIA, Letters Received, Seminole Agency, 1856–1858, M-234, roll 802, NA. Ibid. Alligator [Lake City, FL] Columbia Democrat, March 27, 1858. Tampa Florida Peninsular, April 10, 1858; Rector to Mix, April 13, 1858, OIA, Letters Received, Seminole Agency, 1856–1858, M-234, roll 802, NA. Tampa Florida Peninsular, May 1, 1858. T. Seymour to Brannan, April 12, 1858, Brannan to Page, April 13, 1858, Brannan to Talbot, May 4, 1858, USACC, HQFLS, M-1084, roll 10, NA; Tampa Florida Peninsular, May 8, 1858. Tampa Florida Peninsular, May 8, 1858. Ibid. Ibid. Rector to Mix, May 9, 1858, OIA, Letters Received, Seminole Agency, 1856–1858, M-234, roll 802, NA; Tampa Florida Peninsular, May 8, 1858; Rector to Loomis, May 6, 1858, USACC, HQFLS, M-1084, roll 10, NA. USSED 11, 32; Porter, “Billy Bowlegs in the Civil War,” 397. “General Orders No. 4” and “Proclamation” by Col. Gustavus Loomis, May 8, 1858, United States. Congress. Senate Executive Document No. 1 [USSED 1] “Message from the President,” 35th Cong., 2d sess. (1858), 244. Florida. House Journal (1858), 29–39. Tampa Florida Peninsular, January 22, 1859. Tampa Florida Peninsular, May 8 and November 20, 1858. Tampa Florida Peninsular, September 18, 1858 and March 19, 1859. Knetsch, “Peace Comes to Florida,” 16. West, “Abiaki, or Sam Jones,” 408. Tampa Florida Peninsular, November 20, 1858 and March 19, 1859. Belton to Page, September 15, 1857, USACC, HQFLS, M-1084, roll 7, NA; Rogers to Page, November 17, 1857, USACC, HQFLS, M-1084, roll 9, NA. Jacksonville Florida Times-Union, July 12, 1899. Akerman and Akerman, Jacob Summerlin: King of the Crackers, 58.

Index Abert, James W., 88, 177 Abiaki (Sam Jones), 6–7, 9, 13, 15, 21–22, 27, 30, 52, 56, 61, 65, 70, 72, 78, 86, 99, 104, 156, 181, 186, 205, 207–208, 211, 214–215 Abraham, 62, 65, 69 Adams, John Quincy, 1 Adams-Onis Treaty, 1 Adamsville, FL, 163 Addison, Capt. John, 123, 137 Alachua (band of Seminole), 3, 7, 14, 20, 37, 54 Alachua County, 36 Alafia River, 121, 126, 134, 160 Alafia (settlement), 14, 34, 137 Alligator (Lake City), FL, 129 Amelia Island, 16 American (Know-Nothing) Party, 159 Anderson, Lt. Charles, 163 Apalachee (band of Seminole), 3 Arch Creek, 166 Archer, James, 9 Armed Occupation Act, 8, 16–17, 36 Army, U.S., 3, 5, 19, 22, 27, 34, 47, 59, 65, 91, 102, 105, 112, 115, 118, 121–122, 126, 129, 134, 150–151, 156, 159, 165, 167, 171, 177, 180, 194, 202, 213 foreign recruits, 83, 87, 141, 210 killed in action (incl. Vols.), 93, 106, 122, 125, 136, 147–148, 151, 172, 176, 181–182, 196–197 sickness, 55, 86, 89, 108, 110, 117, 132, 147, 158, 184, 187, 193, 199, 211 troop strength, 12, 43, 76, 79, 89, 109, 113, 132, 152, 185, 192, 194, 200 Arnold, Maj. Lewis, 90, 94, 96, 98, 101, 106, 108, 112, 118, 124, 130–132, 136, 140, 142

Assinwah, son of Assinwar, 204 Assinwar, 22, 27, 44, 52, 58, 65, 70, 74, 77, 82, 85, 201, 205 Assinwar’s Camp, 91, 106, 131 Atzeroth family, 128, 205 Axtell family, 27 Babcock, Dr. William H., 187 Baker, Maria Taylor, 189 Baker, Pvt. William, 94 Barker, James, 31 Battle of Okeechobee, 90 Beckwith, Lt. Amos or Edward, 75 Beezly, Edward, 177, 186 Bell, Lt. George, 128, 151 Benson, Lt. Henry, 78, 86, 89, 101, 227, 239–240, 242 Benton County, 36 Bermudez, Felipe, 38 Best, Lt. Clermont, 163 Bethell, John, 189 Big Cypress, 7, 25, 28, 54, 65, 92, 100, 119, 124, 126, 136, 145, 151, 166–167, 171–172, 177, 180–181, 186, 202, 211 Billy Bowlegs. See Holata Micco Billy Bowlegs’s Camp, 91, 106, 172 Black Seminole, 5, 48, 50, 60, 71, 75, 151, 173, 206 Blake, Luther, 75, 122, 203 Bliss, Lt. Col. William, 37 Boca Raton, 91 Booley, Capt. H. H., 201 Borland, Sen. Samuel, 73 Borseht, Pvt. Ernest, 92, 95 Boundaries of the reservation, 10, 19, 29, 53–54, 78 Bounties for captured Indians, 72, 121, 141, 177

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Bowlegs’s Old Town, 124 Bowman, Mr., 61, 66 Braden Castle and Plantation, attack on, 122, 134 Braden, Dr. Joseph, 122, 141 Bradley, Capt. Robert, 134 Bradley home, attack on, 136, 141 Bradley, Richard D., 116 Brannan, Capt. J. M., 166, 203, 205 Brooker, William, 149 Broome, Gov. James, 75, 90, 98, 101–102, 105, 109–110, 113, 117, 121, 124, 129, 133, 140, 145, 150, 153, 171, 212, 219, 224, 237, 242–247, 250 Brown, Col. Harvey, 82, 102, 113, 118, 133, 136, 145, 152, 157, 213 Brown, Gov. Thomas, 36, 46, 56, 60, 67, 105 Brown, John, 171 Brown, Orlando, 38, 42, 48 Buchanan, James, 159, 171, 185, 206 Buena Vista, Battle of, 72 Bullock, Capt. Robert, 180 Bureau of Indian Affairs, 17, 29, 159 Call, Gov. Richard K., 2 Caloosahatchee River, 3, 21, 30, 34, 53–54, 58, 77, 78, 86, 105, 108, 110, 131, 150–151, 155–156, 166–167, 177, 185–186, 226 Campbell, Post. Gen. James, 142 Camp Daniels, 89 Camp Izard, 19, 165 Camp Rogers, 202 Canova, Andrew, 99, 188 Cape Canaveral, 31 Cape Romano, 122, 199 Capers, LeGrand G., 17 Cape Sable, 168, 172, 175, 177, 184, 226, 249–250 Carlton, Daniel, 147 Carlton, Lt. Alderman, 147 Carney, John, 126, 134 Carson, Cpl. Joseph, 125 Carter, Capt. Isaac, 200–201 Carter, Gen. Jesse, 37, 109, 112, 116, 124, 126, 128–129, 131, 140, 143, 145, 150, 156, 159, 185, 212 Casey, Capt. John C., 31, 34, 62, 68, 85, 89, 96, 101, 105, 107, 110, 122, 141, 204, 213

death of, 163 health, 26, 52, 60, 67, 70, 77, 89 in negotiations, 27, 30, 54, 57, 77 Cedar Key, 10, 12–14, 16 Center, George, 76 Chai, 81, 150 Charleston, SC, 15, 124, 165 Charley Apopka Creek, 85, 123, 126 Charlie Tiger, 163 Charlotte Harbor, 10, 20–21, 30, 44, 50, 53, 72, 98, 112, 121, 167 Cherokee Indians, 158 Childs, Gen. Thomas, 54, 64–66, 72–73, 77 Chipco, 7, 32, 51, 58, 65–66, 75, 204, 211 two Chipcos, 39 Chitto Tustennuggee, 40 Chocochatti (Chucachatta), 14 Chokoloskee Island, 195–196 Churchill, Gen. Sylvester, 19, 135, 138, 141, 152, 219, 231, 246 Citrus County, 36 Clements, Dr. B. A., 187 Coacoochee (Wildcat), 7, 48 Colonel Clay (ship), 42, 44 Colt firearms, 105, 152, 165 Columbus, GA, 121 Commercial Advertiser (Apalachicola newspaper), 24 Communications, advances in, 96, 165 Cone, Capt. William, 195, 199 Congress, U.S., 6, 8, 22, 29, 58, 71, 79, 102, 171 Conrad, Sec. of War Charles, 57 Coontie plant, 81, 104 Cotsa Elee Hajo, 40, 44 Couch, Lt. Darius, 32, 37 Covacavitch, Louis, 146 Crawford, Sec. of War George, 32, 37, 40–41, 43, 45, 53–54 Creek (band of Seminole), 7, 9, 12–14, 20, 32, 37, 42, 56, 126, 176, 189, 204 Creek Indians (non-Florida), 5, 61, 77, 151, 156 Cunningham, Owen, 115 Curren, Pvt. Michael, 92 Curtis Act, 206 Dade, Maj. Francis, 2, 94 Daniels, Enoch, 129, 140

index Darling, John, 21, 25, 30, 34, 59, 62, 64 Daugherty, Lewis, 177, 186 Daughters of the American Revolution, 211 Davis, Sec. of War Jefferson, 85, 89, 93, 96, 102, 104–105, 109, 116, 121, 130, 136, 142, 150, 152, 154, 156, 159, 162–164, 212 Dawes Act, 206 Dawson, Capt. Samuel, 87, 125 Democratic Party, 70, 159 Depot 1, 83, 195 Detroit, MI, 165 Devlin, Pvt. Jasper, 184 Dispatch (Richmond VA newspaper), 198 Doubleday, Capt. Abner, 167, 174–175, 190–191, 193, 220, 248–251 Dozier, Maj. J. L., 195 Dummett, Douglas, 31 Durrance, Capt. Francis, 105, 110, 121, 130, 136, 147–148, 244–246, 249 Duryea, Lt. Richard, 124 Duval, Agent Marcellus, 43, 50 Egmont Key, 189, 202, 204–206 Elzey, Capt. Arnold, 85, 89, 94, 96, 122, 240–241 Escambia Bay, 23 Everglades, 2–3, 5, 7, 12, 24–25, 28, 43, 54–55, 59–60, 71–72, 78, 85, 90, 104, 113, 126, 132, 136, 139, 143, 149–151, 155–156, 160, 166–167, 173, 176–177, 180–181, 186, 199–201, 204, 206, 211, 215, 220, 223, 240 Fakahatchee, 122, 140 Farrell, Edward, 104 Fashion (ship), 46, 108 Fifth Infantry, 152, 171, 185 Fillmore, Millard, 56, 67, 69–71, 159 Fires, intentionally set, 168 First Artillery, 126, 152, 185, 192 First Seminole War, 1, 6 Fisheating Creek, 83, 86, 90, 100, 121 Fisher, Lt. (Fla. Vols.), 24 Florida admitted to Union, 19 conditions in, 3, 5, 17, 77, 86, 88, 102, 110–111, 117, 132, 143, 145, 156, 158, 162–163, 166, 170, 174–175, 184, 188

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financial problems, 97, 113, 119–120, 124, 137 Florida Bay, 85, 172 Florida Herald (St. Augustine newspaper), 20 Florida Legislature, 27, 28, 60, 71, 90, 120, 198 Florida Militia, 65, 71 Florida Peninsular (Tampa newspaper), 96, 101, 180, 198, 202, 204, 207–208 Florida Republican (Jacksonville newspaper), 104 Florida Volunteers, 104, 109–110, 119, 124, 136, 140, 144–145, 148–150, 156, 167–169, 176, 183, 191, 193, 201, 203, 208, 213 called out, 35, 113, 163–164, 171 disciplinary problems, 41, 62, 72, 105, 116, 120, 130, 139, 142, 180 disputes with regular army, 101, 129–131 recruiting problems, 143, 185, 188 relations with regular army, 136, 141, 179–181, 210 urged on Washington, 40, 60, 97, 109, 133, 139 victories, 123, 148, 168, 176, 191, 197, 204, 212 Floridians, 59, 80 attitude toward Indians, 10, 12, 17, 19, 22–23, 25, 27, 56, 64, 86, 90, 101, 189, 202, 208–209 attitude toward war, 8, 104, 136–137, 188–189 Floridian (Tallahassee newspaper), 23 Floyd, Sec. of War John, 171, 198 Fort Arbuckle, 53, 55 Fort Basinger, 90–91, 182 Fort Brooke, 2, 7–8, 13–14, 30, 34–36, 38, 42–43, 53, 62, 77, 94, 122, 155, 160, 164, 187, 199, 205, 208, 218, 230, 235 Fort Broome, 130 Fort Capron, 65, 78, 83, 95, 97, 120, 156, 160, 168 Fort Casey, 50, 53, 54 Fort Center, 88, 90–91, 94, 98, 109, 121, 124, 145, 160, 168, 171–173, 175, 184, 187, 190–191, 194, 220 Fort Chokonikla, 48, 52, 54–55

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Fort Clinch, 55 Fort Crawford, 55 Fort Cross, 184 Fort Dade, 19 Fort Dallas, 50, 77, 85, 90–91, 95, 104, 112, 124, 126, 128, 132, 151, 160, 168, 170, 174–175, 186–187, 193, 202, 208 Fort Deynaud, 77, 91, 94, 98, 102, 113, 118, 121, 126, 131, 146, 149, 158, 163, 166–167, 169, 180, 187, 203, 205, 244 attack on wood-cutting party, 106 fire at, 146 Fort Doane, 195 Fort Drum, 168 Fort Dulaney, 83 Fort Fraser, 136, 148 Fort Gardiner, 179 Fort Gatlin, 27, 50, 62, 180 Fort Green, 103 Fort Hamer, 48, 53–54 Fort Hardee, 103 Fort Hartsuff, 103 Fort Harvie, 53 Fort Jupiter, 83, 89–91, 170 Fort Keais, 171–172, 199 Fort King, 2, 19 Fort Kissimmee, 65, 160, 171, 175, 179, 188 Fort Lauderdale, 166–167, 170, 190 Fort Leavenworth, 177, 192 Fort Loomis, 202–203 Fort Marion, 36 Fort McKenzie, 94 Fort McRae, 83, 91, 109, 166, 168–170, 173–175, 185, 187, 190 Fort Meade, 50, 53, 55, 62, 77–78, 81, 89–90, 97, 103, 110, 130, 147–148, 180, 220, 225, 235, 242, 246 Fort Mellon, 62 Fort Myakka, 55 Fort Myers, x, 58, 61, 67, 78, 100, 104, 110–111, 118, 122, 146, 149, 151, 157, 166–167, 171, 173, 177, 180, 184–186, 189, 195, 199, 206, 208, 226, 236, 239, 249 Fort Pierce, 7, 36, 40, 47, 50, 56, 78 1849 attack, 31 Fort Shackleford, 85, 87, 90–91, 131, 197

Fort Simon Drum, 83, 85, 87, 90–91, 94, 96, 106, 108, 110–112, 118, 131, 142, 144, 219 Fort T. B. Adams, 106, 108 Fort Thompson, 78, 81, 83, 98, 106–107 Fort Vinton, 160, 168 Fort Winnebago, 154 Foster, Pvt. William, 92 Fourth Artillery, 48, 53, 152, 172, 181, 185, 192 Fourth Infantry, 12 Francis, Joseph, 165 Freeman, Lt. Edmund, 172, 174 Fremont, John C., 159 Friends of the Florida Seminole, 211 Fuse Eneha, 39 Fuse Hadjo, 7, 9, 65, 77, 205 Gaines, Gen. Edmund P., 27 Gainesville, 8, 128 Gamble Plantation, 116 Gamble, Robert, 44, 116 Garden Hammock, 172 Garland, Lt. Robert, 35 Garner, Lt. George, 144 General Land Office, 9, 78 Genl. Harney (ship), 184 Gettysburg, Battle of, 102 Gibbon, Lt. John, 35 Gibson, Capt. Augustus, 123 Governors Island, 67 Grant, Reuben, 76 Greble, Lt. John, 85 Green Corn Dance, 4 Grey Cloud (ship), 199, 204–206 Gulf Hammock, 128 Gulf of Mexico, 10, 151, 191 Gurgaines, David, 140 Gutherie, George, 146 Halleck Tustenuggee, 205 Hancock, Mrs. W.S., 173 Hanna, Pvt. John, 92–94 Harney, Gen. William S., 30, 168, 169, 174, 176–178, 180, 186, 213 military districts, 167 Harney River, 172 Harney’s Point, 30

index Harris, W.S., 90 Hart, Hubbard L., 142 Hartsuff, Lt. George, 96, 99, 101, 104, 106, 110, 112, 118–119, 131, 136, 210, 219, 240 attack on, 91 Haskin, Maj. Joseph, 78, 83, 95, 97 Havana, Cuba, 15 Head, Dr. J. Frazier, 184 Hendry County, 80 Hendry, Francis A., 80, 211 Hernando County, 36, 136, 145 Hersch, Pvt. Otto, 92, 94 Hill, Capt. Bennett, 81, 91, 95, 104 Hill, Lt. Ambrose, 54 Hill, Lt. Robert, 182 Hillsborough County, 34, 36, 103 Hillsborough River, 137 Hoithle-Machta-Hajo, 40, 44 Hoithly-uablachulee, 65 Holata Micco (Billy Bowlegs), 6–7, 21, 24, 27, 30, 41, 50, 56, 61, 66–67, 72–73, 77, 85, 99, 124, 156, 158, 173, 181, 186, 195, 198, 202, 207, 214–215 banana plant legend, 99 dealings with Creeks, 13 in negotiations, 7, 9, 22, 39, 42, 44, 50, 52–53, 57, 66, 203–204 Holland, Sgt. Daniel, 92, 94 Hollingsworth, J.H., 147 Homasassa (Homesassie), 14 Homestead Act, 9 Hooker, Capt. William B., 97, 103, 105, 116, 130, 147–148 Hooker, John Irving, 97 Hopkins, Gen. Benjamin, 46, 63, 65–66, 69, 75 Horse Creek, 168 Horseshoe Bend, Battle of, 5 Horth, Pvt. Willaim, 92 Hospetarke, 7 Houston, Sen. Sam, 73 Howard, Lt. Oliver O., 178, 181, 187 Howell, George, 149 Hubbard, Daniel, 56 Hughey, John, 63 Hurricane of 1842 (Cedar Key), 13 Hurricane of 1848 (Tampa), 27 Hurricane of 1928 (Lake Okeechobee), 144

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Indian Key, 112, 151, 172, 193 Indian River, 16–17, 31, 43 Indian Territory, 2, 8, 24, 26, 42, 45, 47, 51, 61, 68, 70–71, 77, 206 Interior Department, 29, 30, 38, 76 Iowa, 19 Ismahter, 58 Istokpoga Creek, 175 Ives, Capt. Joseph, 88 Jackson, Andrew, 1–2, 5, 153, 154 Jackson, Dep. Surv. John, 34, 79, 85, 160 Jacksonville, 10, 30, 38 Jefferson Barracks, 38, 185 Jernigan, Capt. Aaron, 24, 65, 72, 105, 116, 117, 120, 139–140, 237 Jesup, Gen. Thomas, 2, 68 John Jumper, 77, 162, 170, 202–203 Johnson, Peter, 104 Johnston, Capt. Abner, 105, 121, 129, 131, 176, 179–180, 212 Jones, Gen. Roger, 43 Kansas, 171, 177, 185, 192 Kansas-Nebraska Act, 171 Kapiktsootsee, 39, 42, 50, 52 Kearny, Gen. Stephen W., 154 Kendrick, Capt. William, 97, 105, 121, 129, 191, 193, 203 Kennedy-Darling Store, 42, 148 1849 attack, 32 Kennedy, Thomas P., 21, 30, 34, 89 Key Largo, 9, 151 Key West, 32, 108, 112, 121, 157, 192–193, 243 King Payne, 21 Kissimmee River, 7, 10, 39, 53, 78, 86, 90–91, 109, 121, 145, 149, 156, 167–169, 173, 175, 179, 181, 188, 191, 193 Lake Hamilton, 211 Lake Istokpoga, 10, 39, 54, 85, 145, 156, 167–168, 173, 175–176, 179, 186, 191 Lake Kissimmee, 65 Lakeland, FL, 182 Lake Marion, 182 Lake Miccosukee, 6 Lake Monroe, 65

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history of the third seminole war 1849–1858

Lake Okeechobee, 7, 10, 14, 21, 55, 78, 88, 90, 98, 105, 107, 109, 121, 126, 145, 149, 156, 166, 171–173, 175–176, 185, 188–189, 193, 204 Lake Poinsett, 65 Lake Tohopekaliga, 62 Lake Worth, 16 Langdon, Lt. Loomis, 125, 151, 223, 240, 244, 247 Lanier, Louis, 74 Larned, Lt. Frank, 94 Lea, Luke, 60–61, 67, 70–71 Leon County, 6, 196, 230 Lesley, Capt. Rev. Leroy, 103, 105, 119, 148, 156, 183, 201 Levy County, 36, 129, 140 Levy, David. See Yulee, Sen. David Levy Libby Shepperd (ship), 108 Lincoln, Abraham, 154 Little River, 104, 166–167 Loomis, Col. Gustavus, 171, 180, 188–189, 194, 198–199, 202, 206–207, 213 Louisiana, 164 Love, Cpl. William, 107 Lynde, Dr. Richard, 187 Macomb, Gen. Alexander, 3 Magbee, James T., 35, 89 Mail carriers, 141 Mallory, Sen. Stephen, 73, 79, 109 Manatee River, 8, 39, 43, 53, 116, 122, 126, 130, 141, 185, 226 Manatee (settlement), 14, 48, 115, 123–124, 138 Manning, Cpl. Jeremiah, 150 Marco Island, 122 Marion County, 36 Matlacha Island, 112 Maxwell, Rep. Augustus, 79 McCown, Capt. John, 172, 175, 249–250 McCullough, Nancy, 32, 34, 40 McCullough, William, 32, 34, 147 McKinstry, Maj. Justus, 107, 111, 204, 243, 247 McParlin, Dr. Thomas, 171, 176, 181, 183, 187, 191–192, 220, 222, 248–251 Meade, Lt. George Gordon, 50 Mellonville (Sanford), FL, 63, 65, 116

Metallic boats, 82, 87, 143, 165 Mexico, war with, 22, 24, 26, 72, 155 Miami River, 17, 81, 85, 104, 171 Miami (settlement), 17, 32, 108, 120, 208 Micanopy (Indian), 7, 21 Micanopy (town), 14, 139 Mickler, Capt. Jacob, 181, 188, 193, 212 Mikasuki (band of Seminole), 3, 6, 9, 14, 20–21, 33, 37, 39, 63, 70, 156, 198 Military Academy (West Point), 26, 72, 102 Mills, George and William, 159 Mississippi Volunteers, 72 Mizell, Lt. Morgan, 168 Mobile, AL, 15 Molinard, Lt. Albert, 98, 100, 104, 109, 130, 245 Mormons, 171, 177, 185 Morris, Maj. William, 29–30, 35, 41, 48, 192 Moseley, Gov. William, 25, 27, 35, 40 Mosely, Capt. (Vols.), 182 Mount, John, 104 Munroe, Col. John, 77, 83, 88, 91, 98, 100–101, 112, 119, 126, 130–131, 133, 136, 145, 150, 152, 157, 192, 194, 213, 235, 240, 242–247, 249–251 Murtaugh, Pvt. Patrick, 92–93 Myers, Lt. Col. Abraham C., 53 Nakora Enethlo, 65 National Intelligencer (newspaper), 9, 15 Newnansville, FL, 14, 16 New Orleans, LA, 13, 15, 52, 64, 108 New River, 85, 190 News (Jacksonville newspaper), 37, 70 New Smyrna, FL, 31, 64, 116, 163, 166 News (St. Augustine newspaper), 16 New York City, 67, 165 Nokushadjo, 205 Northwest Territory, 154 Nueces River, 22 Ocala, FL, 102, 128 Octiarche, 7, 10, 13–14 Okefenokee Swamp, 105 Oklahoma, 2, 206 Old Bowlegs, 21 Old Tiger Tail, 104 Ole-wah-tle-tuste-nugee, 205

index Orange County, 27 Orlando, FL, 56 O’Rourke, Cpl. George, 122 Oscen Tustennuggee, 7, 58, 98, 107, 122, 124, 126, 136, 149, 159, 189, 210, 214 Osceola, 8, 215 Paddy Carr, 61 Page, Maj. Francis, 164 Pahay Hajo, 44 Palatka, FL, 34, 65, 102, 141, 165 Palm Grove, 181 Palm Hammock, 175 Panukee, 40, 44 Parker, Lt. Streaty, 148 Parker, William, 147 Parkhill, Capt. John, 195–196, 199 Pasco County, 36 Passuk Ehela, 70 Pavilion Key, 182 Payne, Capt. George S., 32, 96 Paynes Creek, 35–36, 47–48, 56 Peace River, 10, 30, 35, 42, 50, 54–55, 78, 97, 103, 105, 119, 123, 126, 129–130, 136, 144–145, 147, 156, 160, 167–168, 172, 181, 183, 193, 207, 225, 232–234, 236 Pensacola, FL, 1, 15, 24, 77 Perrine, Dr. Henry, 112 Perry, Gov. Madison Starke, 207 Peterfield, Pvt. Joseph, 145 Peterman, Pvt. Andrew, 107 Pierce, Franklin, 70, 72, 74, 159, 212 Pine Island, 30 Pitts, Mr. (murder victim), 23 Polk, James K., 18–19 Polly Parker, 206 Postal Department, 142, 165 Postmaster General, 142 Pratt, Capt. Henry, 78, 86, 112, 122, 140, 174 Prine, Robert, 149 Punta Rassa, 10, 83, 94, 150–151, 199 Putnam County, 36 Randolph, Arthur M., 59 Rector, Elias, 208 Red Stick Creeks, 4 Reid, Col. Sam, 8 Republican Party, 159

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Republican (St. Augustine newspaper), 14 Rhodes, Jonathan, 140 Ridgeley, Maj. Samuel, 53 Rio Grande, 22, 48 Roach, Mr., 137 Roberts, Joseph, 44 Robinson, Capt. John, 175 Rogers, Col. Samuel St. George, 185, 193–196, 199, 212 Rogers, Lt. George, 128–129 Russell, William, 31, 78 Sahataiyee, 40, 44 Sam Jones. See Abiaki Sam Jones’s Camp, 91 Sampson (interpreter), 39 Sanibel Island, 151 San Pedro, FL, 10, 12 Sarasota Bay, 38 Sarasota, FL, 42, 115, 134 Savannah, GA, 15, 32, 96, 121, 124, 166 Scott, Gen. Winfield, 5, 19, 58, 70, 140, 179 Seawell, Maj. Washington, 13 Second Artillery, 112, 152, 164 Second Seminole War, 1, 5–6, 16, 21, 26, 31, 38, 44, 53, 60, 68, 79, 83, 90, 105, 112, 118, 151, 155, 158, 165, 212–213, 215 Seiler, Pvt. Bernhard, 182 Seminole delegations from Indian Territory, 40, 45, 52, 64, 66, 71, 77, 158–159, 162, 165, 175, 178, 186, 201, 207 Seminole Indians, 8, 10, 14, 25, 37, 53, 55, 60, 71, 72, 75, 77–78, 91, 104, 110, 118, 130, 155–156, 160, 164, 179, 212, 215 attacks on whites, 92, 104, 106, 115, 125–126, 131, 134, 136, 142, 147, 149, 151, 159, 163, 172, 174, 180–182, 198 diplomacy, 38, 162 distrust of whites, 8, 17, 21–22, 27, 42, 55, 61, 65, 75, 86, 136, 187, 202–204, 208 history and culture, 3–4, 20, 42, 44, 47, 55, 74, 80, 151, 173, 183, 210 killed in action, 123, 147, 174, 176, 191, 195, 198 population, 5, 14, 21, 60, 140, 169, 176, 189, 205–207 suffering of, 1–3, 5, 163, 169, 173–174, 176, 180, 182, 189–190, 201

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tactics and strategy, 1–3, 5–6, 12, 27, 36, 98, 104, 109–110, 115, 122, 126, 132, 139, 173, 197 Settle, John D., 99 Seventh Infantry, 38, 54 Shark River, 10, 85, 192 Shives, Peter, 163 Sims (Simms), Pvt. John, 125 Sioux Indians, 155 Skipper, John, 149 Sloan, Dr. William, 66 Smith, Buckingham, 59 Smith, Col. Charles F., 32 Smith, Col. Whit, 129 Snell Plantation, attack on, 115, 118, 121 Snell, Sen. Hamlin V., 115 Sparkman, Capt. Simeon, 57, 62, 101, 105, 136–137, 147, 179, 181, 189, 201 Spencer, Agent Samuel C., 30, 38, 40, 42–43 Spencer, Sec. of War John, 5, 8 Sprague, Capt. John T., 19, 22–24, 40, 67, 208 Springer (Sprenger), Pvt. Edward, 182 Starling, James, 137 Starling wagon train attack, 137, 141 St. Augustine, FL, 11, 14, 16, 27, 32, 36 Steele, Augustus, 16 Stephens, Capt. Winston, 197, 200 Stevenson, Capt. C. L., 172, 174 St. Francis Barracks, 11 St. Johns River, 14, 62, 102, 189 St. Louis, MO, 12, 38, 185 St. Lucie County, 78 St. Lucie (settlement), 16 Striewski, Pvt. Leopold, 122 Stuart, Sec. of Interior Alexander, 61 Stuttering Simon, 30 Summerlin, Capt. Jacob, 56, 62, 211 Sumner, Jesse, 56 Sumter County, 159, 163 Suwannee River, 7, 10, 12 Swamp Land Act, 59 Tallahassee (authorities in), 41, 60, 97, 102, 116, 185, 204 Tallahassee (band of Seminole), 3, 7, 14, 22, 183 Tallahassee, FL, 6, 10, 30, 35, 109, 196

Tampa Bay, x, 8, 13, 15, 19, 43, 48, 50, 80, 97, 112, 165, 167, 189, 198, 214, 218, 220, 225–226 Tampa, FL, 7, 21, 24, 26–27, 30, 34, 36, 39, 40, 42, 44, 48, 52, 54, 56, 62–63, 70, 77, 87, 88–89, 97, 102–104, 108–109, 116, 119, 121, 123, 126, 134, 136, 138, 141, 145, 157, 159–160, 163, 165, 184, 188, 194, 199, 201–202, 205, 213 Taylor, Sarah, 72 Taylor, Zachary, 3, 29, 36–37, 41, 43, 56, 72, 90, 173 Tecumseh, 4 Ten Thousand Islands, 88–89 Terrill, Lt. William, 181 Texas, 22, 152, 155, 186 Texas Ranger (ship), 107–108, 165, 194, 199, 205 Third Artillery, 55 Thomas, Lt. Robert, 108 Tiger Tail, 7, 10, 13, 14 Tillis Battle, 147, 150, 211 Tillis, James Dallas, 147 Tillis, Willoughby, 80, 90, 147 Toliss Hadjo, 77 Tommy (old Indian), 191 Topographical Engineers, 88, 177 Trading post at Charlotte Harbor, 20, 22, 25, 27, 29, 39, 43 Treaty of Moultrie Creek, 1, 202 Treaty of Payne’s Landing, 2, 68, 77, 151 Tukosa, 55 Turner, Capt. Richard, 112, 116, 150, 188, 192, 212 Twelve Mile Swamp, 108 Twiggs, Gen. David E., 56, 105 Tyler, John, 5, 18 Uchee (band of Seminole), 3, 20, 64 Underhill, Thomas, 147 Useppa Island, 50, 53 Utah, 171, 186 Vero Beach, FL, 160 Vincent, Lt. Thomas, 86 Vose, Col. Josiah, 11–12 Wahoo Swamp, Battle of, 2 Walbridge, Lt. Truman, 58, 122

index Warcassassa, 128 War Department, 12, 17, 25, 29, 38, 40, 47, 52, 80, 88, 90–91, 93, 97, 102–103, 120–121, 130, 137, 145, 159, 162, 171, 177, 179, 185, 198 War of 1812, 4 Washington (authorities in), 3, 17, 23, 41, 52, 56, 61–62, 78, 82, 85, 98, 102, 105, 109, 116, 120, 132–133, 135, 137, 145, 152, 155, 159, 164, 166, 172, 185, 188, 192, 200, 204 Washington, DC, 9, 11, 24, 29–30, 35, 38, 40, 42–43, 54, 67, 69, 74, 88–89, 96, 124, 128, 130, 139, 141, 195, 222–225, 230–231, 233–235, 237–239 Seminole trip to, 66–67 Waxy Hadjo’s Landing, 85 Webber Creek, 167 Webb, Lt. Alexander S., 102–103, 111, 117, 121, 124, 143–145 Weeks, Lt. George H., 182 Wells, Henry, 59 Westcott, Surv. Gen. John, 74, 78–79, 85 West, Patsy, 21 Whidden, Dempsey, 32, 58 Whidden, James, 34, 149

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Whidden, Lott, 147 Whig Party, 70 White, James, 34 Whiting, Maj. Daniel, 34 Wilkins, William, 18 Williams, Cpl. Lewis, 92, 94 Williams, Maj. Thomas R., 154, 157–158, 160, 162–163, 165, 170, 172–173, 175, 179, 181, 184, 186, 188, 192 Williams, Mary (Moddie), 157, 162, 165 Wilm, Julius, 36 Winder, Col. John, 61, 64, 66 Windsor, Ont., 165 Winterling, Pvt. Frank, 122 Withlacoochee River, 2, 19, 57, 97, 112, 165, 229 Worth, Gen. William J., 15, 17, 21–22, 28, 78, 213 Wright, Capt. Adrian, 128–129, 140 Wyse, Maj. Francis O., 55 Yahola Hajo (Yoholochee), 33, 40, 44 Yulee, Sen. David Levy, 9, 15, 17, 32, 37, 59, 142, 178 Zolfo Springs, FL, 148