History of the Concept of Mind: Volume 1: Speculations About Soul, Mind and Spirit from Homer to Hume [1° ed.] 0754613658, 9780754613657

Table of contents :
Cover
Title
Copyright
Contents
Acknowledgements
Abbreviations
Chapter 1 Ancient Hebrew and Homeric Greek Life-Force
1. Hebrew Old Testament ideas about life and breath
2. Homeric Greek ideas about life and breath
3. The pre-Socratic soul as property-like thing
Chapter 2 Plato, Aristotle and Hellenistic Thought
1. Plato's twofold and threefold account of soul
2. Aristotle on soul as form and body as matter
3. The Stoics, Epicurus and Lucretius on material spirit
Chapter 3 From the New Testament to St. Augustine
1. The New Testament and St. Paul's new vision
2. Neo-Platonic teachings and Plotinus' One-Mind-Soul
3. The Greek and Latin Church Fathers
4. Augustine's Christian-Platonist synthesis
Chapter 4 Medieval Islamic and Christian Ideas
1. Islamic concepts: Alfārābi, Avicenna and Averroes
2. Theological summation: Albert the Great and Thomas Aquinas
3. Dante's soul in the service of love
Chapter 5 Renaissance Platonism, Hermeticism and Other Heterodoxies
1. The centrality and dignity of human being
2. The rediscovery of Plato, Plotinus and the Hermetica
3. Magic and occultism in the service of science
Chapter 6 Mind and Soul in English from Chaucer to Shakespeare
1. The various senses of 'soul' from 1200 to 1500
2. The various senses of 'mind' from 1200 to 1500
3. The natural shape of 'soul' and 'mind' in Shakespeare
Chapter 7 The Triumph of Rationalist Concepts of Mind and Intellect
1. Descartes: mind as simple, immaterial thinking thing
2. Spinoza: mind as the idea the body has of itself
3. Leibniz: soul as an infinitely small incorporeal automaton
Chapter 8 The Empiricists' Advocacy of Matter Designed for Thought
1. Early attempts at a mechanical account of matter in motion
2. Locke, Berkeley and Hume for and against the materialist thesis
3. Summary overview and general conclusions
Bibliography
Index of Names
Index of Subjects

Citation preview

HISTORY OF THE CONCEPT OF M IND

'This book is essential reading for those who want to know how our current understanding of the human psyche evolved. Why does it now sound quaint, pious or ironic to speak, not of a person’s mind, but of their soul and spirit? Paul MacDonald’s magisterial history of these concepts helps to provide answers. The reader is guided on a journey from ancient Hebrew and Greek visions through all the main landmarks in the history of philosophical psychology, as well as less familiar territory from literature and theology. The sweep o f his book is immense; [it undertakes] a monumental task whose results are very impressive ’. David E. Cooper, Professor of Philosophy, University of Durham, UK ‘The wide differences between the ways in which people of the past have understood themselves and our own ways show that the content of so-called folk psychology is utterly contingent, and this might bear on widely discussed issues in contemporary philosophy of mind. In this book, MacDonald shows himself to be a learned and acute scholar who provides an original and illuminating perspective even on previously familiar material ’. Stewart Candlish, Professor of Philosophy, University of Western Australia In the twentieth century theorists were almost exclusively concerned with various versions of the materialist thesis, but prior to the current debates accounts of soul and mind reveal an extraordinary richness and complexity which bear careful and impartial investigation. This book is the first comprehensive, single-authored work to examine the historical, linguistic and conceptual issues involved in exploring the basic features of the human mind - from its most remote origins, to the beginning of the modern period. Paul MacDonald traces the development of an armature of psychical concepts from the Old Testament and Homer’s works to the eighteenthcentury advocacy of an empirical science of the mind. Students and readers of philosophy, psychology, literature and theology will find this accessible, comprehensive text an invaluable resource.

History o f the Concept o f Mind Speculations about Soul, Mind and Spirit from Homer to Hume

PAUL S. MACDONALD

First published 2003 by Ashgate Publishing Published 2017 by Routledge 2 Park Square, Milton Park, Abingdon, Oxon OX14 4RN 711 Third A venue, New York, NY 10017, USA Routledge is an imprint of the Taylor & Francis Group, an informa business

Copyright © Paul S. MacDonald 2003 All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reprinted or reproduced or utilised in any form or by any electronic, mechanical, or other means, now known or hereafter invented, including photocopying and recording, or in any information storage or retrieval system, without permission in writing from the publishers. Notice: Product or corporate names may be trademarks or registered trademarks, and are used only for identification and explanation without intent to infringe.

British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data MacDonald, Paul S., 1951History of the concept of mind: speculations about soul, mind and spirit from Homer to Hume 1. Philosophy of mind - History 2. Mind and body I. Title 128.2' 09 Library of Congress Control Number: 2002100873 Typeset in Times by Manton Typesetters, Louth, Lincolnshire, UK. ISBN 13: 978-0-7546-1365-7 (pbk) ISBN 13: 978-0-7546-1364-0 (hbk)

Contents

Acknowledgements

vii

Abbreviations

ix 1

Chapter 1

Ancient Hebrew and Homeric Greek Life-Force 1. Hebrew Old Testament ideas about life and breath 2. Homeric Greek ideas about life and breath 3. The pre-Socratic soul as property-like thing

Chapter 2

Plato, Aristotle and Hellenistic Thought 1. Plato’s twofold and threefold account of soul 2. Aristotle on soul as form and body as matter 3. The Stoics, Epicurus and Lucretius on material spirit

37

Chapter 3

From the New Testament to St. Augustine 1. The New Testament and St. Paul’s new vision 2. Neo-Platonic teachings and Plotinus’ One-Mind-Soul 3. The Greek and Latin Church Fathers 4. Augustine’s Christian-Platonist synthesis

89

Chapter 4

Medieval Islamic and Christian Ideas 1. Islamic concepts: AlfarabI, Avicenna and Averroes 2. Theological summation: Albert the Great and Thomas Aquinas 3. Dante’s soul in the service of love

161

Chapter 5

Renaissance Platonism, Hermeticism and Other Heterodoxies 1. The centrality and dignity of human being 2. The rediscovery of Plato, Plotinus and the Hermetica 3. Magic and occultism in the service of science

Chapter 6

Mind and Soul in English from Chaucer to Shakespeare 1. The various senses of ‘soul’ from 1200 to 1500 2. The various senses of ‘mind’ from 1200 to 1500 3. The natural shape of ‘soul’ and ‘mind’ in Shakespeare

v

205

245

vi

Chapter 7

Chapter 8

History of the Concept of Mind

The Triumph of Rationalist Concepts of Mind and Intellect 1. Descartes: mind as simple, immaterial thinking thing 2. Spinoza: mind as the idea the body has of itself 3. Leibniz: soul as an infinitely small incorporeal automaton The Empiricists’ Advocacy of Matter Designed for Thought 1. Early attempts at a mechanical account of matter in motion 2. Locke, Berkeley and Hume for and against the materialist thesis 3. Summary overview and general conclusions

279

315

Bibliography

363

Index of Names

387

Index of Subjects

391

Acknowledgements

For comments and suggestions on particular sections my thanks to: Dr. Loren Stuckenbruck, Theology Department, University of Durham, for reading the section on the Old Testament; Prof. C. J. Rowe, Classics Department, University of Durham, for reading the section on Plato; Dr. Nicholas Southgate for reading the section on Locke, Berkeley and Hume, and Dr. Nancy Victorin-Vangerud, Theology Department, Murdoch University (Australia) for reading the section on St. Augustine. My special thanks also to Robert Victorin-Vangerud for many insightful comments and suggestions on the first thirteen sections. My gratitude also to Sarah Lloyd, Philosophy Editor at Ashgate Publishers, who, right from the start, made an unswerving commitment to a large and wide-ranging undertaking such as this book. My copy-editor, Jeanne Brady, did an excellent job in helping me to sort out hundreds of small but significant inconsistencies in the text, notes and bibliography. To Duquesne University Press for permission to use the diagram by Robert Wood from the Introduction to Stephan Strasser’s The Phenomenology of Feeling, Pittsburgh: Duquesne University Press, 1977, reproduced in Chapter 8, section 3. My greatest thanks are attended with love, as always, for my wife, Fiona. For patience and good humor in listening to endless unsolicited remarks about nepesh for three years, this book is dedicated to her.

V ll

Abbreviations

ANRW BICS Bremmer

CCL CHB CHHP CHLGEMP CHLMP CHRP CH17CP CTC DMA EER EEP EHPhR EI2 ERE

Aufstieg und Niedergang der Romischen Welt. Berlin: de Gruyter, 1972-date. Bulletin of the Institute of Classical Studies. J. M. Bremmer & others (eds) Hidden Futures: Death and Immortality in Ancient Egypt, Anatolia, the Classical, Biblical and Arabic-Islamic World. Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press, 1994. Corpus Christianorum, Series Latina. Cambridge History of the Bible. P. R. Ackroyd, G. W. Lampe & S. L. Greenslade (eds) 3 vols. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1963-70. Cambridge History of Hellenistic Philosophy. Keimpe Alga et al. (eds) Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999. Cambridge History o f Later Greek and Early Medieval Philosophy. A. H. Armstrong (ed.) Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1970. Cambridge History of Later Medieval Philosophy. Norman Kretzmann & others (eds) Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1982. Cambridge History of Renaissance Philosophy. Charles Schmitt et al. (eds) Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988. Cambridge History of Seventeenth Century Philosophy. Daniel Garber & Michael Ayers (eds) Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998. Catalogus Translationum et Commentariorum. P. O. Kristeller (ed.) 7 vols. Washington, D.C.: Catholic University of America, 1960-92. Dictionary of the Middle Ages. J. R. Strayer (ed.) 13 vols. New York: Scribner, 1982-89. Encyclopedia of Religion. Mircea Eliade (ed.) 16 vols. New York: Macmillan, 1987. Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Paul Edwards (ed.) 8 vols. London: Macmillan, 1967. Etudes de VHistoire de Philosophie et Religion (journal). Encyclopedia of Islam. New edn. H. A. R. Gibb (gen. ed.) 7 vols. Leiden: E. J. Brill. Encyclopedia of Religion and Ethics. James Hastings (ed.) 12 vols. Edinburgh: T & T Clark, 1913. IX

X

Hist Rel JHI JHP JTS Lampe PGL LSJ LXX LCL MED NIDNT NCBS NCE NEJ Nov Test NRSV NRT NTS OCB OCD ODCC OED OLD Onians PL PG RAC REP RE RHPR RTAM

History of the Concept of Mind History o f Religions (journal). Journal o f the History of Ideas. Journal of the History of Philosophy. Journal of Theological Studies. Patristic Greek Lexicon. G. W. H. Lampe (ed.) Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1976. Liddel, Scott & Jones (eds) Greek-English Lexicon. 9th ed. rev. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1968. Septuagint (Greek Old Testament). Loeb Classical Library. Middle English Dictionary. 15 vols. Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press, 1970-85. New International Dictionary of the New Testament. 3 vols. Colin Brown (ed.) Exeter, UK: Paternoster Press, 1975-78. Novae Concordantiae Bibliorum Sacrorum. 5 vols. Stuttgart: Frommann, 1977. New Catholic Encyclopedia. 16 vols. New York: McGraw-Hill, 1967-74. Encyclopedia of Judaism. Jacob Neusner et al. (eds) Leiden: E. J. Brill, 2000. Novum Testamentum (journal). New Revised Standard Version. Nouvelle Revue Theologique (journal). New Testament Studies (journal). Oxford Companion to the Bible. Bruce Metzger & Michael Coogan (eds) Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1993. Oxford Classical Dictionary. 3rd edn. Simon Homblower & Anthony Spawforth (eds) Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996. Oxford Dictionary of the Christian Church. 2nd edn. F. L. Cross & E. A. Livingstone (eds) Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1990. Oxford English Dictionary. New edn. 13 vols. New York & Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1985. P. G. W. Glare (ed.) Oxford Latin Dictionary. New York & Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1968-72. R. B. Onians. The Origins of European Thought. 2nd edn. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1951. Patrologiae Latina, cursus completus. J. P. Migne (ed.). Patrologiae Graeca, cursus completus. J. P. Migne (ed.). Reallexikon fur Antike und Christentum. 18 vols. Stuttgart: Hiersemann, 1950-98. Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Edward Craig (gen. ed.) 10 vols. New York: Routledge, 1998. Real-Encyclopdie der Classischen Altertumwissenschaft. Paulys, Wissowa & Kroll (eds). Revue d ’Histoire et de Philosophie Religieuses. Recherches de theologie ancienne et medievale.

Abbreviations

TDOT TLOT TLNT TDNT Thorndyke TRE Vulgate Wright & Potter ZAW ZNW Note:

xi

Theological Dictionary of the Old Testament. G. J. Botterweck & H. Ringgren (eds) 10 vols. Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 1974-90. Theological Lexicon of the Old Testament. Ernst Jenni & Claus Westermann (eds) 3 vols. Peabody, MA: Hendrickson, 1997. Theological Lexicon of the New Testament. Cselas Spicq (ed.) 3 vols. Peabody, MA: Hendrickson, 1994. Theological Dictionary of the New Testament. G. Kittel & G. Friedrich (eds) 10 vols. Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 1964-76. Lynn Thorndyke. History of Magic and Experimental Science. 8 vols. New York: Macmillan, 1923-58. Theologische Realenzyklopadie. 30 vols. Berlin: de Gruyter, 1984-date. Latin Old and New Testament. John Wright & Paul Potter (eds) Psyche and Soma: Physicians and Metaphysicians on the Mind-Body Problem from Antiquity to the Enlightenment. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2000. Zeitschrift fur die Alttestamentliche Wissenschaft (journal). Zeitschrift fur die Neutestamentliche Wissenschaft (journal). Greek and Latin texts are cited according to the standard abbreviations in OCD, 3rd edn.

What then did I formerly think I was? A human; but what is a human? Shall I say a rational animal? No, for then I should have to inquire what an animal is, what rationality is, and in this way one question would lead me down the slope to other harder ones ... Instead I propose to concentrate on what came into my thoughts spontaneously and quite naturally whenever I used to consider what I was ... As to the nature of this soul, either I did not think about this, or else I imagined it to be something tenuous, like a wind or fire or ether, which permeated my more solid parts. But what shall I now say that I am ...? I am then in the strict sense only a thing that thinks; that is, I am a mind or intelligence or intellect or reason - words whose meaning I have been ignorant of until now. Descartes, Second Meditation

Chapter 1

Ancient Hebrew and Homeric Greek Life-Force

The history of the concepts of mind and soul is a complex and twisted network of many paths, each path strewn with obstacles, dead ends, false or hidden beginnings, relapses into old ways of thinking and forward leaps of imaginative projection. One of the principal problems is to sort out exactly which issue is being addressed when one holds up for scrutiny any one of the numerous terms involved in the ancestry of the modem concept of mind or soul. The obverse side of this same problem is to think that, in starting one’s inquiry with the concept of mind, for example, instead of soul or spirit, and then making an effort to discern its earliest lineaments, one has a sure grasp of a clearly defined, well-marked out concept. In other words, if there is no consensus on what the concept of mind picks out or what it makes reference to, if the historian cannot appeal to a readily identifiable conceptual item, then how can any effort to trace its ancestry ever be confident that discussions of an earlier version are indeed versions of the same thing? One can imagine an aptitude test in which the subject is asked to match each of three or four original geometrical shapes with a plethora of target shapes, each of which is blurred or even vague. One then discovers that in the process of shifting one’s attention from the source shape to its potential targets, the original shape has changed, and more than that, its shape is continually fluid. The enormous number of books and articles on the mind-body problem (as one facet of this issue has come to be called) give the overwhelming impression that every aspect of human nature falls under one or the other concept. Although there is serious disagreement over the boundaries, whatever aspect is physical or material falls under ‘body’ and whatever aspect is non-physical or immaterial falls under ‘mind’; though this bipartisan picture does not take account of those disputants who think that every aspect of human nature, including conscious episodes and intentions, is physical or material. Those who maintain some version of dualism are sometimes stuck with difficult cases, but these are resolved by assigning them to an admixture or permixture of mind and body. Thus one question posed by this debate for the historian of ideas concerns the fact that only one concept (mind) in the rich and complex ancestry of discussions of human nature has come to dominate the field. One would be hard pressed to make a coherent statement about the relative positions of the concepts of ‘mind’, ‘soul’, ‘spirit’ and ‘psyche’ in the framework of an all-inclusive understanding of human being. And it does not serve to clarify the issue by peremptorily claiming that ‘soul’, ‘spirit’ and ‘psyche’ have all been subsumed under, or eliminated in favor of, the concept of mind. It is very common, even routine, for example, to hear a scholar of Descartes’ works remark that ‘soul’

1

2

History of the Concept of Mind

and ‘mind’ mean the same thing, that these concepts can be interchanged without loss of meaning - but that is patently false. Descartes was well aware of the difference between ‘soul’ and ‘mind’ and was the first philosopher to explicitly abandon all of the conceptual baggage associated with the word ‘soul’ in favor of a radically new term, ‘mind’ and its principal attributes. (1)

Hebrew Old Testament ideas about life and breath

The present chapter begins the task of tracing the ancestry of the many ideas that composed our earliest understanding of those aspects of human ‘nature’ which escaped description in terms of outward appearance and physical attributes. The Hebrew authors of the Old Testament and the Homeric author of the Iliad and the Odyssey repeatedly call attention to cognitive and affective aspects of human nature which indicate an inner, personal dimension, something which is hidden from others but open to one’s own awareness. The English word ‘mind’ is from the Latin root mens, itself an evolved form of the Greek word menos, ‘life-force’, whose verbal form is menomai, ‘to desire or crave’; the word mens served the earliest Latin translators of Homer, Plato and Aristotle for the Greek word nous. But the word mens also did service for the Greek word kardia, ‘heart’, and the Hebrew word leb (plural lebab), ‘heart or bosom’. The English word ‘spirit’ is from the Latin root spiritus, ‘breath’, whose original connotations survive in words like re-spiration, inspiration, per spiration, and so forth. The word spiritus served to translate the Greek word pneuma in the Vulgate or Latin Bible (St. Jerome, c. 400 ce) and editions of Plato and Aristotle (though not Homer); the original connotations of pneuma survive in words like pneumatic drill, pneumatic trough and pneumonia, that is, about the in and out cycle of air. The Greek Version of the Old Testament, the Septuagint or LXX (c. 250 bce), uses pneuma in 75 per cent of the cases to translate the Hebrew word ruach, ‘breath or force’. The English word ‘soul’ does not have a Latin or Greek root, but instead derives from an Old English and Old High German root (for example, sawol, seel, seol); ‘soul’ was used in the Geneva Bible (1560-1650) and the King James Version (1611 onward) to translate the Latin anima and the Greek psyche. In the LXX the Greek psyche is used in almost 90 per cent of the cases to translate the Hebrew nepesh, which means either ‘desire’ or ‘vitality’ or ‘life-force’. In Ancient Hebrew, each of these words has many nuances which subtly alter its meaning, nuances that depend on whether the word is the subject or object of an action, whether it is predicated of an animal or a human or God, and with which verbs of action it is linked. In addition, each word has undergone an evolution, or at least an attenuation in its total reference field. The most primitive meaning of nepesh is concrete and site-specific, the ‘throat or gullet’; a further meaning is ‘desire or longing’, that is, to satisfy the need for food, drink and air taken in through the throat. The more abstract meaning ‘life or vital force’ refers to that which sustains or supports desire and longing; it can also refer to one who is alive, an individual; and finally in the later OT books, it can refer to the self, such that ‘my nepesh’ can be translated ‘me’ or T . The most primitive meaning of ruach is also concrete and site-specific, it is the ‘wind’; in so far as each living thing has God’s wind within, it is the ‘breath’ or the organ of breathing. But, like nepesh, it

Ancient Hebrew and Homeric Greek Life-Force

3

can also refer to one who breathes, the individual; and further in the later OT books, ‘my ruach>can be translated ‘me’ or ‘I’. The Hebrew word leb follows a similar pattern, so that first it means ‘heart’, then ‘will’ or ‘intention’, next ‘conscious’ or ‘conscience’, and finally the self in the sense of ‘me’ or T . In an approximate and tentative manner we could outline the evolution or progression of these various meanings according to the following scheme: (concrete + outward) —> (concrete + inward) —>(abstract + inward) —> (self-referring or reflexive) This is only one vector of development, however, since it will become apparent that various ambiguous meanings of both (concrete + inward) and (abstract + inward) can reciprocally influence each other: (concrete + inward){ (abstract + inward)! —> (concrete + inward)2 (abstract + inward)2 And hence each antecedent meaning can become detached from its initial consequent meaning and destabilize the process in several different directions, becoming more closely associated with other lines: (concrete + inward)! —> (abstract + inward)2 (concrete + inward)2 —> (abstract + inward)3 It is important, however, to consider the details hidden within the various shadings of these key Hebrew terms, since the details provide a framework into which much later conceptual precipitates will fit. Aubrey Johnson offers a succinct statement of his meticulous analyses of the OT use of the word nepesh: At one extreme [nepesh] may be used to denote that common vital principle in man or beast which reveals itself in the form of conscious life ... It is the thought of a common life vouchsafed by Yahweh and identifiable with the blood (for the blood is said to be or contain the nepesh) which requires that all blood shall be sacred to Yahweh and taboo for man, and so is made the basis for the grim ritual of sacrifice. From this standpoint, therefore, the nepesh may be distinguished from its bodily vehicle, the basar or ‘flesh’. Accordingly at death it is described as being breathed or poured out; so that normally man is then like water which has been spilt on the ground and cannot be gathered up again. In other words, when a person dies, the nepesh is said to ‘depart’; and if in special circumstances life should be restored to the corpse, it is then said to ‘return’. Nevertheless, as we proceed, we shall note the recognition of a strong ebb and flow between these two poles, corresponding to the degree of vitality manifested by the nepesh at any given time; and ... this corresponds to the fact that the Israelite did not always think in terms of a clear-cut distinction between ‘life’ and ‘death’.1

The concrete and specific meaning of nepesh is clear in several passages: ‘the underworld wrenches wide its nepesh and opens its mouth beyond measure’ (Isa. 1 Johnson, 1964, p. 9; see Wolff, 1974, pp. 10-25.

4

History of the Concept of Mind

5:14), one speaker says of the greedy person that ‘he opens his nepesh wide as the underworld and is like death and never has enough’ (Hab. 2:5); thus nepesh is the throat or gullet which takes in food or drink. The poet of Psalms says, ‘the hungry and thirsty whose nepesh fainted within them’ (Ps. 107:5) and further that one ought to thank Yahweh, ‘for he satisfies the thirsty nepesh and the hungry nepesh he fills with good things.’ The context in which nepesh is used mentions hunger and thirst, being faint or satisfied, its dryness and the sense of being filled, and this shows quite unambiguously that in these passages nepesh should not be translated ‘soul’, but ‘throat’: ‘All the toil of man is for his mouth, and yet his nepesh is not satisfied’ (Eccles. 6:7). Although these contexts show that the throat is meant, at the same time it shows that the needy person as such is indicated. But the nepesh is not just the organ for taking in food and drink, it is also the organ or the site of breathing. In some of these cases it is also quite evident that animals have their nepesh, thus in the case of the female camel, ‘in the lust of her nepesh she pants for breath’ (Jer. 2:24). The action of the nepesh, especially in its outward manifestation, is to blow or breathe out. For example, the throat of the fainting mother pants heavily (Jer. 15:9); the hope of the godless is to breathe out their nepesh (Job 11:20); and the crocodile’s nepesh can kindle coals into fire (Job 41:21). When the flood-waters rise to the level of the nepesh one is in danger of drowning (Jonah 2:5; and Ps. 69:1). Although neshama in ancient Hebrew also signifies ‘breath’, the chronicler in Kings understands some sort of conceptual separation between the two terms when he says that the child’s nepesh returns to the widow of Zarephath although there had been no neshama left in him (I Kings 17:21). In addition, although Hebrew also uses another word for neck, in the Psalms it is clear that the throat as the organ of life is designated: ‘they forced his feet into fetters, his nepesh was put into iron’ (Ps. 105:18); the witch of Endor asks King Saul, ‘why do you want to lay a noose for my nepesh to bring about my death?’ (I Sam. 28:9). The part-for-whole shift from concrete and outward to concrete and inward, and from concrete and inward to abstract and inward is common in most languages. One readily understands the remark that someone ‘has a big mouth’ means that soand-so talks too much, that someone ‘has a big head’ means that so-and-so has an overly large picture of their own importance. In similar fashion, ‘to fill his shoes’ means to take his place, to act in his role, and to ‘feel the long arm of the law’ is to find no escape from lawful punishment. The Latin phrase per capita is most often used in statistics or enumeration to indicate a single individual, much as journalists used to report that so many ‘souls’ were lost at sea; the poll tax (in its many nasty forms) uses the medieval English term for the top of a person’s head. The isomorphism with per capita is evident when nepesh is used as a count-noun, for example, in lists of numbers of slaves, descendants, or inhabitants (Ex. 12:24; Ezek. 18:4; Gen. 46:15; Num. 31:28; Josh. 10:28).2 The part-for-whole meaning of nepesh is evident in statements like the proverb which reads ‘a worker’s nepesh works for him, his mouth urges him on’ (Prov. 16:26), or ‘when you go into your neighbor’s vineyard, you may eat your fill of grapes according to your nepesh’ 2 Seabass, in TDOT, vol. IX, p. 515; Westermann, in TLOT, p. 755.

Ancient Hebrew and Homeric Greek Life-Force

5

(Deut. 23:24). In these contexts, nepesh indicates ‘desire’ or ‘longing’ in a straightforward manner, though it can also signify more than the physical desire for food and drink; the desire to remain free or to follow one’s free will. For example, when a man wants to leave a woman who has once been his prisoner, he is only allowed to dismiss her in accordance with her nepesh (Deut. 21:14); in the same way, slaves should be set free according to their nepesh,that is, their freely chosen desire (Jer. 34:16). The further part-for-whole conceptual shift is profound since it signifies not just a greater whole of which an organ or power is a lesser whole but the kind of being that has (or more properly is) the control or investment of this vital power. Thus the shift to the abstract and inward moves the concept of nepesh beyond the outwardly observable, into the individual’s inner depths, and here the Hebrew word approaches the meaning of anima or soul. The prophet exhorts the nation of Israel, ‘you shall not oppress a stranger; you know the nepesh of a stranger, for you were strangers in the land of Egypt’ (Ex. 23:9). Here the writer is thinking not only of the stranger’s needs and desires, but of the whole range of his feelings, feelings that arise from leaving his own land and the threat of slavery. Many passages can be attested in which nepesh is used as a bridging concept between the desire or longing of a living being and a living being’s soul as the ‘seat’ or ‘inward place’ of such desire or longing. Westermann concludes one portion of his analysis with the remark that ‘only the group of passages that speak of the misery and sorrow (less often the joy and comfort) of the nepesh may be unequivocally and always appropriately translated “soul” in accord with English] usage.’ There are about 15 passages in which the fixed pair nepesh and merr (‘bitter’) occur; thus ‘the healthy and whole nepesh can be altered when God makes it bitter. The person has become bitter at the center, at the core’, and so forth. The bitter soul ‘indicates a typical element of the OT understanding of nepesh: melancholy, desperation, and bitterness demonstrate the humanity of the individual with particular clarity; these very elements constitute the “uniqueness” (M. Heidegger) of humanity.’3 The large and varied group of passages that depict the nepesh as bitter and troubled has no comparable counterpart that depicts the nepesh as joyful or delighted. However, the desire or longing of the nepesh can be oriented towards something less concrete than the thing which would satisfy its physical craving. Thus, an individual’s nepesh can be turned towards Yahweh or deliverance from bondage or an individual whom one loves: ‘Jonathan’s nepesh was bound to David’s nepesh, and Jonathan loved him like his own nepesh’ (1 Sam. 18:1). On several occasions the Song of Songs employs nepesh as the subject of love between man and woman: ‘This category is especially characteristic of nepesh. The translation “soul (or heart)” is entirely appropriate here; but it is also clear at the same time that nepesh in these passages is not something existent [or] present, but a movement towards some thing; nepesh here corresponds totally to the meaning “desire”.’4 However, the few fixed pairs in which nepesh is coupled with leb (‘heart’) are later, secondary

3 Westermann, in TLOT, pp. 748-9. 4 Westermann, in TLOT, p. 750.

6

History of the Concept of Mind

constructions; when the OT writer speaks of loving ‘with one’s whole soul and whole heart’, it is the nepesh, not the leb, which is the proper subject of this affection. OT scholars point out that passages such as these are purely formulaic; ‘and I (God) will plant them in this land with the whole heart and the whole soul’ (Jer. 32:41); or ‘write these my words in the heart and soul’ (Deut. 11:18). The most common English usage of this pair actually inverts the Hebrew usage: the heart is the subject of thought, memory and reflection, and the soul is the subject of love and emotional bonding. The association of blood (dam) with nepesh is an additional secondary accretion which derives from another, non-Hebrew tradition. These same scholars astutely point out that the apparent identification of blood and soul occurs only in priestly prohibitions and edicts; ‘for the blood is the nepesh’ (Deut. 12:23); ‘for the nepesh of all flesh is its blood’ (Lev. 17:14). The correct interpretation of these and other passages is that the life of a living being is manifest or evident through its containing or pouring out blood. Hence, the figure of speech, ‘the soul (as blood) poured out’ means that the life-force drains away when the breath expires or the blood runs out. With our current medical techniques for monitoring and intervening in basic life functions, the terms that now describe the end of an animal being’s life make reference to other manifest indications. Profuse bleeding, serious trauma, and even the cessation of heartbeat are no longer sufficient conditions for death; thus the doctor now might say that the person is dead when the EEG monitor has ‘flat-lined’. One recent heated debate in medical ethics concerns the relative weight that should be assigned to the termination of either heart functions or brain functions; to further complicate matters, artificial techniques and devices can be used to temporarily circumvent even these terminal states. Westermann’s extraordinary exegetical precision allows him to tease out ‘a surprising circumstance’ with regard to the latter use of nepesh; it does not mean ‘life’ as such, nor is it used in the general, very broad sense in which we might now say ‘city life’, ‘course of life’, ‘lifestyle’, or ‘alien life-forms’ and so forth: ‘Instead usage is strictly confined to the limits of life; nepesh is life in contrast to death. Consequently, occurrences of nepesh in this meaning divide naturally into two major categories: one concerns deliverance or preservation, the other, threat or destruction of life.’5 An individual does not have a nepesh in the sense of a separate or separable possession, rather, an individual is a nepesh; the human life is coterminous and coextensive with its nepesh: ‘Just as nepesh does not mean simply “life”, but rather the individuation of life, as which it effectively appears, so too nepesh does not denote the soul as one nuance among others - it refers rather to psychic power, abounding personality, energy that exorcises all gloominess.’6 According to the holistic Hebrew concept of the person, the nepesh is not a distinct aspect or part of human being; instead it refers to the distinct human being, or perhaps, the human being in its distinctness. One can readily understand how nepesh can be translated ‘living being’ in several texts, but then also ‘person’, ‘individual’, or ‘self’ in a more general and abstract fashion. It can even have a clearly pronominal sense and thus refer to one’s self or ego.

5 Westermann, in TLOT, p. 754. 6 Seabass, in TDOT, vol. IX, p. 510.

Ancient Hebrew and Homeric Greek Life-Force

1

Although the phrase nepesh yahweh does not occur in the OT, a number of passages associate nepesh with God and with events that transpire through God and his people. Yahweh cannot be said to have desire, longing or craving, since these are uniquely human characteristics. The principal relations in which God stands to humans’ nepesh is to save their life, to bless them, or to punish them. Due to constant threats and dangers to human life in the Biblical epoch, one turns to God and beseeches him ‘to redeem my nepesh from every distress’ (2 Sam. 4:9). Where the human nepesh is the subject and God is the object, several texts speak of the nepesh's hope, yearning and prayer for God’s saving presence. Westermann comments on a remarkable and suggestive circumstance: in reference to God’s activity with the human nepesh [it] refers exclusively to ‘life’; the behavior of the human nepesh directed toward God, always in the sense of ‘soul’ ... The life that God saves and protects, as well as the desire of the soul for God, is life in intentionality. The soul desires life. Both groups occur in the language of the Psalms. God’s inclination corresponds to human devotion; nepesh is human selfhood in its reciprocal event.7

Another important Hebrew term connected with human being is ruach, translated in 75 per cent of the cases in the LXX by pneuma and in Latin by spiritus. Its concrete outward meaning is ‘wind’; variants of ruach occur at least 420 times in the OT. Although nepesh sometimes refers to breathing as an indicator of life, and neshama means the breath of an animal being, ruach refers to the power or force behind the wind or breath: In this sense it may denote at one extreme no more than what we should call a ‘whiff’ (or ‘breath’) of air, in particular a gentle, refreshing breeze of the kind which sometimes springs up in the East toward sundown, and so encourages one to walk abroad after the oppressive heat of mid-day. On the other hand, of course, it may be far more vigorous and much less gentle, blowing hot from the East to scorch one’s vineyards, driving before it the straw and chaff, the dust and leaves, which lie in its path, or bending to its will (as it were) the very trees of the forest which stand in its way, or even darkening the sky with a portentous cloud of locusts. Indeed, it may reach such a pitch of violence as to sweep down upon one’s dwelling and bring the walls about one’s ears or lash the waves of the sea into a fury of storm and ship wreck.8

The wind not only itself moves across the land and sea, it also sets other things in motion. The mysterious power at work behind the scenes (so to speak) becomes visible and tangible only in this fashion. No human can control the wind, only the divine force of Yahweh can do so; thus, by analogy, it is the breath of God which instills or inspires the life-force in living things, though this breath (not the animal’s breathing) is only observable through its effects. The wind is God’s creation and a sign of his majesty as creator of the world: God created the wind (Amos 4:13), he has free access to it (Jer. 10:13), they are his messengers (Ps. 104:4), the wind performs God’s word in creation (Ps. 148:8), and God’s breath exercises dominion 7 Westermann, in TLOT, pp. 758-9; see Childs, 1992, pp. 571-3. 8 Johnson, 1964, p. 24.

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History of the Concept of Mind

over all things (Ps. 147:18). In several passages ruach signifies an intermediate stage between wind and breath, especially when connected with the rapture and transport of a prophet (1 Kings 18:12; Ezek. 3:12, 8:3, 11:1, 43:5). The second basic meaning of ruach as breath does not refer to a constant phenomenon, but to the force or power expressed through respiration. This force, or rather the play of this force, occurs both within and without, inside and outside, the person, that is, it proceeds from the inside and its effects occur outside. According to Westermann, ‘ruach does not indicate “normal” breathing, a component of human life (neshama) ... but the particular process of breathing that expresses the human being’s dynamic vitality.’ Its tempo increases in fear or anger, and decreases in weakness or illness; ‘it is the elan, the psychic tension, the will to live, which can be revived ... by good news or diminished ... by “fatal” anger.’9 Ruth Padel makes the same point about Greek medical ideas: they did not think that perpetual motion within was normal; inner surges and violent flux caused the soul itself to move.10 Walter Eichrodt makes a confident assertion regarding the relation between nepesh and ruach: If nepesh is the individual life in association with a body, ruach is the life-force present everywhere and existing independently over against the single individual. We might say that the same force is considered from different points of view. The vital element considered as principium, effective power, is called ruach, the same thing as realized in the creature and active, that is as principatum, is called nepesh. If nepesh is individual, and comes to an end with the death of the individual, ruach is universal, and independent of the death of the creature; it does not die.11

But this does not mean that there is any kind of life after death; rather, as Ezekiel says, God has the power to restore life to a dead person: ‘in his lament the prophet cries that the breath of life blows over the dead and enlivens them.’ The concept of ruach is often closely associated with that of leb (or lebab), ‘heart’; along with the concept of nepesh, these three terms divide the inward work of describing the human being as God’s special creation. The word leb or lebab occurs about 850 times in the OT, especially prevalent in Psalms, Proverbs, and several of the prophetic books. Its earliest concrete and external meaning is ‘breast’ or ‘chest’; it denotes a part of the body that can be seriously injured, even pierced by arrows (2 Sam. 18:14), without causing death. Thus, in the strict sense, it refers to the walls of the heart or the thoracic cage, rather than the heart as an internal organ. References to a non-human animal’s heart are almost completely unknown; though there are a rare few uses in connection with animals, they are entirely metaphorical. The OT authors’ use of leb and lebab for humans alone is in stark contrast to nepesh and ruach, both of which are used about animals’ life-force and behavior. The heart functions in all aspects of human existence and brings to the fore emotional, cognitive and volitional elements. The early teachings of Proverbs show the central importance of the heart: ‘keep your leb with all vigilance, for from 9 Westermann, in TLOT, pp. 1207-8. 10 Padel, 1992, pp. 67-8, 88-98. n Eichrodt, 1967, II, p. 136.

Ancient Hebrew and Homeric Greek Life-Force

9

it flows the springs of life’ (Prov. 4:23, 25:13). The vital physical nature of an individual is concentrated in the heart; if one wants to continue living, the heart must be refreshed and nourished, especially with bread and wine. The notion of the heart as the seat or focus of human emotions emerged gradually from that of the heart as the chest or bosom, the container or enclosure of breath and vitality; as we will see, this is closely paralleled in the Homeric usage of phrenes and kardia. The transition to concrete and internal meaning is evident in some of the standard imagery of the Biblical laments which often employ the vital bodily functions to describe emotional reactions; when the heart pounds, flutters or convulses it conveys the ideas of excitement, worry and fear. The basic emotional states are rooted in the heart: despair, grief and sadness are mentioned more than eighty times; this usage outweighs the positive emotions of joy and delight which are mentioned about fifty times.12 The negative emotions or moods (as one might now refer to them) are especially destructive for the heart which is most vulnerable when it feels fear. The heart’s frailty shows the creature’s weakness and finitude in contrast with God’s omnipotence and infinitude. Nevertheless, the positive emotions, in the main love and sympathy, also have their source in the heart. The deep emotional bond between husband and wife, parent and child, and Yahweh and his creatures is ‘vested’ in the heart. (Notice that the word ‘vest’ and ‘invest’ refer to the garment worn over the chest or bosom.) In the locus classicus about Yahweh’s love for Israel (Hos. 2:16), Yahweh will entice Israel, bring her back, and there speak to her heart: ‘This approach, aiming to restore the unbroken bond between Israel and Yahweh, demonstrates that Yahweh’s unconditional love is the only requirement for the healing of faithlessness and shows his punishment to be an act of love.’13 In terms of the earliest historical documents concerning the concept of mind, the most important Hebrew usage of ‘heart’ is in passages that clearly indicate intellectual, cognitive and reflective operations.14 While the sense organs engage in sense perception, it is within the heart that thought, memory, understanding, attention and reflection take place. The heart’s cognitive activity is prior to seeing with the eyes or hearing with the ears, since it initiates the sensory operations. Following this internal activity, the heart internalizes and preserves the content of sensory percepts for the purpose of making judgements and decisions. The opposite of the heart’s cognitive action is not sensory failure but lack of attention and confusion in making judgements. Perceptive and cognitive operations are initially directed at concrete, particular things, but then, as the main OT texts advance this concept, the heart can be directed toward instructions, signs and wonders. In prophetic contexts, the object may be an individual’s vision, the word of God, or his grace and mercy. In the Wisdom Literature, the heart knows wisdom, love, faith and human fate. In addition, the heart is the seat or storehouse of memory, used to recall a previous situation in order to find a motive for a certain action. Remembrance in the heart can be construed as internal advice, one’s own rule of thumb, or the ethical ‘call’ of 12 Fabry, in TDOT, vol. VII, p. 414; see also Eichrodt, 1967, II, pp. 142-4. 13 Fabry, in TDOT, vol. VII, p. 418. 14 Wolff, 1974, pp. 40-58; Fabry, in TDOT, vol. VII, pp. 419-25; Johnson, 1964, pp. 7 5 87.

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History of the Concept of Mind

conscience, where the context indicates moral precepts or rules. The concept of ‘wisdom’ (Greek sophia) is especially characteristic of the heart’s nature and action. The books of Job, Sirach and Proverbs refer to the wisdom and sage counsel of those who know best. On the other hand, if the heart lacks wisdom it is subject to a kind of folly which can show itself as heedlessness, willfulness and failure to see the larger picture. The heart can be deluded by wine, sex, worldly goods, material gain, temptations, idolatry, wicked words and corruption. The boundary between the cognitive functions of the heart and the activity of the will is often blurred; perhaps this is due to a conceptual (and hence semantic) oscillation between referents that are concrete and internal and those that are abstract and internal. In any case, the heart functions as the driving force behind an individual’s voluntary actions, and engages in conceiving and planning.15 One of the most important gradations in the later abstract meaning of leb for mind occurs in its use for inner-directed thought (reflection), for example, in the phrase ‘speak within one’s heart’, or ‘words written on the heart’. There are perhaps thirty or forty passages in the OT, many in Zephaniah, which employ the phrase ‘speaking to (or in) one’s heart’. An entire strategy or course of action can be thought through when a person speaks to his/her heart (Gen. 24:45, 27:41; 1 Kings 12:26f); for example, according to Genesis, ‘Abraham fell on his face and laughed, for he said in his heart, “Shall a child be bom to a man who is one hundred years old?”’ (Gen. 17:17). It is possible - and this is a highly tentative and unverifiable hypothesis - that the speech which occurs in speaking to one’s heart indicates some sort of reflection or meditation because it is an internalized form of the word. There is one passage that might provide a clue to this hypothesis: when Hannah was praying silently near the temple, ‘only her lips moved, but her voice was not heard.’ The priest thought she was drunk and demanded that Hannah put away her wine, to which she replied that she was not drunk but had been pouring out her heart before the Lord (1 Sam. 1:13-15). Wolff concludes his analysis of the notion of leb as inner-directed thought with these words: ‘The “heart” in Hebrew describes the seat and function of the reason. It includes everything that we ascribe to the head and the brain - power of perception, reason, understanding, insight, consciousness, memory, knowledge, reflection, judgment, sense of direction [and] discernment.’16 Westermann astutely remarks that leb is sometimes assimilated to ruach to refer to the center of human thought and planned action due to the fact that the entire OT picture of human being is dynamic. Thus, although each of the three key terms - nepesh, ruach and leb originate in separate and distinct concrete parts of the human body, they all signify, at an intermediate level, the vital desire of humans as living beings. This occurs before each term precipitates further into more abstract meanings which refer, not to concrete independent parts (pieces) of the human body (as flesh and bone do), but to dependent parts (aspects) of the interior, hidden dimension. A. R. Johnson summarizes his study of the Hebrew concept of heart in these words:

15 Fabry, in TDOT, vol. VII, pp. 419-24. Wolff, 1974, p. 51.

Ancient Hebrew and Homeric Greek Life-Force

11

However, for all that the heart is thus brought so often into relation with man’s psychical life at the emotional level ... it is as the seat or instrument of his intellectual and volitional activity that it figures most prominently in Israelite thinking. Thus the term for ‘heart’, besides being used with a force which approximates to what we should call ‘mind’ or ‘intellect’, is frequently employed by metonymy to denote one’s thought and therefore, on occasion, one’s wish, purpose, or resolve; for one’s thought or wish is essentially ‘that which is in the heart’, or, as we should say, ‘what one has in mind’.17

Granted that the numerous semantic forms and qualifiers directly connected with leb or lebab clearly indicate the product of comparison and association of sense percepts and memories, it is still the case that the use of ‘heart’ as part-for-whole with the meaning ‘intellect’ or ‘mind’ obscures the distinction between cognitive agent and cognitive content. As we will see in Homer’s archaic use of psychical terms for heart, desire and will, an ambiguity remains at the ‘heart’ (center) of the Hebrew concept of heart; where one’s thoughts can mean either the power or agency of thought, on one hand, or the content of an occurrent thought, on the other. With great unanimity, OT scholars ... regard the translation of nepesh with psyche insufficient or even misleading because it introduces the ‘Greek doctrine of the soul’ or Greek spiritualism or dualism. If one begins with the pre-Platonic usage of psyche, however, this judgment does not hold, as Bratsiotis demonstrates. The basic meaning of psyche is ‘breath’; it often occurs in the meaning ‘life’ and can indicate the seat of desire, of emotions, and the ‘center of religious expression’; it can also stand for ‘person’ or in place of a pronoun. Bratsiotis reaches the conclusion ‘that there is an astonishing correspondence between the Hebrew term nepesh and the Greek term p sy ch e\ls

When Daniel Lys investigated the Greek translations of nepesh in the LXX he discovered that for 754 passages in the OT that use nepesh, the Greek text used psyche in 680 cases. Despite the fact that various divergences in translation result from the LXX writers’ use of ‘person’ or ‘self’ more often than the Hebrew writers, Lys remarked that ‘the LXX never goes in the direction in which “soul” would be understood as opposite to “body” (as in Platonic dualism).’19 Let us attempt to capture some of our more important findings in the table below. object term meaning degree* taking no yes nepesh throat yes yes nepesh desire nepesh life-force no no yes ruach wind yes ruach breath yes no leb heart no no yes leb mind yes * degree: yes = occurs in degrees; no = e 17 Johnson, 1964, pp. 77-8. 18 Westermann, in TLOT, p. 759. 19 Lys, 1959, p. 227.

said of said of action God animals often never consumes often intends rarely often sustains rarely blows/moves ruled by never often inspires sometimes never rarely beats never intends rarely fully present or fully absent.

History of the Concept of Mind

12

The transition in meaning from (concrete + internal) to (abstract + internal) for all three central Hebrew psychical terms is paralleled by an equivalent triform transition in archaic pre-Platonic Greek usage (as we shall see below). Remnants of this threefold concept formation survive in contemporary English (and cognate Romance) language expression, though the ‘seat’ or internal location has sometimes shifted. Thus, one says of a deeply held conviction, ‘with heart and mind and soul’ and this conveys more than just three words standing for one thing. Thus, Hebrew leb is both the thoracic cage that holds the heart and the organ that ‘holds’ thoughts and memories, the ruach is the breath that fills the lungs and carries the life-force through the whole body, the nepesh is the desire manifest in an animal being whose life-force is instilled by God’s creative action. The human being as an animal is a living thing (hayyim) composed of flesh (basar) or soft tissue, and bones and sinews; like an animal, a human has (or is) nepesh, a vital force responsible for self-moved action, whose essential properties are characterized by breath and blood flow, which can increase or decrease (in sleep or anger). Although Yahweh has instilled ruach in all animals including humans, ruach assumes a different function and brings about distinctive effects in humans alone due to the presence of the leb, heart. Human as an animal has a heart as an inner fleshy organ, but only humans have a heart as the seat of memory and intellect; through the loss of nepesh in his animal being humans also lose both ruach and leb, and thus in no sense is the OT soul immortal. (2)

Homeric Greek ideas about life and breath

Scholarly study of the early Greek idea of the soul really begins with Erwin Rohde, Nietzsche’s close friend, in his groundbreaking work Psyche: The Cult of Souls and Belief in Immortality Among the Greeks (1890-94). Rohde’s intention was to show that the Platonic description of the psyche could be derived for the most part from the introduction of ascetic religious values into Greece in the period after Homer’s epics. This religious infiltration took place through the expansion of the Orphic cult and the alleged philosophical speculations of the Pythagoreans. These religious beliefs Rohde derived in turn from an earlier practice of ecstatic Dionysian rituals; in this he may have been influenced by Nietzsche’s comments on Apollonian and Dionysian polarities in The Birth of Tragedy. ‘But Rohde never successfully explained how the one truly indispensable piece of evidence for any theory of change in the idea of the soul in Greece, namely the surviving occurrences of the word psyche, could be made to support his thesis.’20 In the mid-twentieth century, another great step forward was made by Bruno Snell in his classic work The Discovery of the Mind\ still much discussed, it is a turning-point in the interdisciplinary approach to archaic mentalities. In addition, valuable comparative linguistic studies were done by R. B. Onians in The Origins o f European Thought; though Claus later questioned Onians’ determination to find an organic and concrete source for each ‘soul’ word. An approach which integrated 20 Claus, 1981, p. 2, see also p. 92, note 1.

Ancient Hebrew and Homeric Greek Life-Force

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linguistic analysis, classical philology and archaeology was first undertaken by the Swedish Sanskrit scholar Ernst Arbman, one of the touch-stones for Jan Bremmer’s recent work, The Early Greek Concept of Soul Arbman found that the IndoEuropean concept of soul (atman or purusa) was preceded by some sort of dualistic picture where the eschatological and psychological attributes of the soul had not yet merged. He distinguishes between ‘body-souls’ which endow the body with life and sentience, and the ‘free-souf, an unencumbered soul which represents the individual at the personal level. The free-soul is active during periods of unconsciousness, and passive during periods of consciousness when the conscious individual replaces it. It is not exactly clear where the passive free-soul resides in the person’s body. On the other hand, the body-souls are active during the waking life of the individual; in contrast with the free-soul, the body-soul is often divided into several components. According to Arbman’s analysis, the components of the body-soul fall into two categories: one is the ‘life-soul’, usually identified with the breath or vital agency; the other is the ‘ego-soul’. The body-soul, or several of its parts, represents the individual’s inner self or person. In an early stage in the development of the Archaic and Vedic belief in the soul, the free-soul and the bodysoul did not yet constitute a unity. Later the Vedic concept of the free-soul (atman) subsumed the psychological attributes of the body-soul, and this concept is shared amongst many primitive mentalities. Bremmer’s study applies the model of ‘primitive’ soul belief with the distinction between a free-soul which represents a person’s individuality, and the body-soul which endows a person with life and sentience. The Homeric idea of psyche is identified with the free-soul, whereas terms connected with a person’s inner life, such as thymos, nous and menos, are seen as aspects of the body-soul. Although the concept of psyche developed into the modem idea of the unitary soul, its ‘primitive’ character can be discerned in so-called shamanistic traditions and the archaic descriptions of dreams. For the Archaic Greeks of Homer’s time, the free-soul of the living continued as the soul of the dead, although other manifestations of the dead were also thought to exist. There was no uniform picture of the dead in an afterlife and neither did all of the dead have the same status. The use of the idea of psyche in Homer can be best identified with the loose concept of free-soul; it is only used in contexts where the living person is in crisis. Passages in the Iliad and the Odyssey reveal that without psyche the person cannot survive. When the embassy of the Greek army implores Achilles to suppress his anger and resume fighting, he complains that he continues to risk losing his psyche (II. ix.322); when Agenor summons up his courage to face Achilles who is routing the Trojans, he reflects that his opponent has only one psyche (II. xxi.569); and when Achilles pursues Hector around Troy, the poet comments that the prize will be Hector’s psyche (II. xxii.161). When someone swoons or passes out their psyche leaves the body; one of the inexplicable features of Homer’s stories is that psyche's return is never mentioned, though presumably if the person lives on, it must have returned. The later post-Platonic myth of Eros and Psyche, which includes an important motif of return (or recession), draws its narrative power from an entirely new concept of psyche. But for Homer, when someone dies their psyche leaves forever and departs for Hades, the land of the dead. In these cases, psyche is sometimes closely associated with the aion or vital force; but unlike psyche, in

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History of the Concept of Mind

Homer one does not find aion ascribed to older persons, it is only the young which possess its full power. It has been argued that for Homer the psyche was located in the head, since the terms psyche and head are sometimes used in an interchangeable manner.21 This might explain the ancient Greek custom of holding the head of the deceased during mourning (II. xxiv.712, 724), the primal offering (II. iii.273) and the importance attached to sneezing which expels the breath. But the fact that psyche and head are used in an interchangeable manner may only mean that they both represent the same thing, that is, the whole person. The little that is known about Homer’s references to the location of the psyche is that it flew away from the limbs (II. xvi.856; xxii.362), or left the body through the mouth (II. ix.409), the chest (II. xvi.505), or through a wound in the flank (II. xiv.518). According to Bremmer, this picture of Homeric psyche shows that it is very similar to Arbman’s notion of free-soul, which is always active outside the body and is not bound to it like the body-soul. However, because the free-soul functions outside the body, its place inside the body is rather obscure, for when its owner is conscious the person’s body represents the individual and only its activities are of any interest. In this state the free-soul is only present in a passive sense and is rarely mentioned. Arbman found that in North Eurasian belief systems, the freesoul was thought to be located either in the whole body, or in the heart, the lungs or the kidneys. In any case, the free-soul does not seem to have any identifiable attributes aside from its representation of the individual. In addition, it is impossible for the free-soul to continue its worldly existence when its body is dead, even though it is only active outside the body. This soul cannot remain behind in the dead body but must go in search of an afterlife. But this is a mutual dependence since when the free-soul disappears the body dies through illness or injury. Nevertheless, one feature of the free-soul is clearly absent from the Homeric psyche, for the psyche does not represent the individual person in dreams or any other dimension of the unconscious. But this conclusion cannot be final because Homer employs dream stories almost exclusively to advance the narrative action. In this sense, they cannot be relied upon to provide a complete picture of actual dream experience for the Archaic Greeks. Homer’s dream stories follow a very strict pattern in four stages: the circumstance before the dream; the dream image moves towards the sleeper and stands over his head; the dream image’s speech, and the dream’s aftermath. Bremmer concludes that, although we do not find in Homer any of the activities of the dream soul, its absence does not necessarily presuppose its non existence. In sum, the comparison of Arbman’s concept of free-soul and Homer’s actual usage of psyche reveals several parallels: both (1) are located in an unspecified part of the body; (2) are inactive when the body is active; (3) leave the body during a swoon; (4) have no physical or psychological connections; (5) are preconditions for life’s continuation, and (6) represent the individual after death. In Arbman’s more complex analysis of the twofold concept of body-soul, he used the idea of ego-soul to denote individual living humans, in contrast with the free-soul and the life-soul, but did not describe the various psychological aspects of the soul linked to the individual. 21 Onians, pp. 107-17, 123-31, 141-50; esp. p. 115, note 7.

Ancient Hebrew and Homeric Greek Life-Force

15

One of Arbman’s pupils, Hultkrantz, was more aware of these multiple aspects and offered his definition of ego-souls as ‘potencies behind the various acts and phases of the life of consciousness’. Yet Bremmer comments that this sort of analysis still fails to suggest the psychological richness of the Archaic Greek concepts. In the Homeric and Epic Greek traditions, there is a cluster of words closely associated with the beliefs and actions of human beings, a cluster that falls unequally into two groups: on one hand, psyche, thymos, nous and menos; on the other, her (in Epic form, kradie), phrenes and hepar. (The two groups’ criteria of distinction will be discussed later.) The most common Homeric term connected with the behavior of ensouled beings is thymos which, unlike psyche, is only active when the body is awake. When Achilles is wreaking havoc among the Trojans and he confronts Aeneas, ‘his brave thymos roused him’ (II. xx.174). Sometimes thymos expresses hope, but always hope toward action, not to receive some thing. After Patroclus had been killed, the poet said of the Trojans that, ‘their thymos strongly hoped to pull away Patroclus’ body from under Ajax’ (II. xvii.234). In the Homeric texts, thymos is the pre-eminent source of the emotions; friendship and revenge, grief and joy, anger and fear all spring from the thymos. Homer’s use of this term is comparable to the Hebrew use of nepesh when it signifies desire or longing, especially in its vigorous externalization. Other examples extend our comprehension of Homer’s sometimes ambiguous and often under-determined use of psychical terms. Deiphobus ‘feared in his thymos the spear of the fiery Meriones’ (II. xiii.163); Hector reproaches Paris when he does not join the battle, ‘fool, wrongly you stored up bitter anger in your thymos’ (II. vi.326). However, the action of thymos is not always restricted to emotional outbursts, for it sometimes serves an intellectual purpose. But the ruminations and deliberations of the Greek heroes are not those of a detached spectator, rather their intellectual reflections always take place in an atmosphere charged with emotions. When Odysseus is left alone by the Greeks during one of the battles, ‘he spoke to his proud thymos’ (II. xi.403), and having realized there were only two options open to him, he ends his reflection by asking himself, ‘but why does my thymos consider that?’ (II. xi.407). This Homeric usage is in contrast to its parallel in Hebrew where it is the leb or heart to which one speaks in reflection. It seems fairly clear from a number of passages that the thymos was thought to reside in the chest, which was the main seat of the phrenes (or lungs). The thymos normally stays in its proper place and does not move around, but it is affected by a swoon. In some cases, thymos seems to be closely linked with psyche in the sense of ‘breath’, so that the breath can leave the chest but without really going anywhere else. Claus’ detailed analysis shows that in many cases the Homeric use of thymos obviously implies ‘strength’, a value contiguous with that of other words connected with eating and drinking, as well as recovery after a swoon. When described as a concrete physical entity thymos is breath-like, blood-like, or even heart-like. The majority of uses either directly support a concept of life-force or indirectly substitute for this concept by means of an archaic tendency to explain every human activity as a personified exchange of some kind.22 Several Indo-European linguists, such as R. B. Onians and Georges 22 Claus, 1981, pp. 21-3, 37-41; Padel, 1992, pp. 27-30.

16

History of the Concept of Mind

Dumezil, have suggested that thymos must once have been thought of as some kind of substance that could be brought into movement. One hypothesis is that thymos is connected with the root term which in Latin became fumus or smoke; thus thymos was conceived as a thin or diffuse vapor.23 Of the three terms used by Homer in descriptions of individual souls, the term most closely associated with what we now think of as higher-order cognitive functions was nous (in Homeric Greek, noos), which we might perhaps render as ‘intellect’. ‘It is the mind or an act of mind, a thought or a purpose’, remarks Bremmer; but that is a grand assumption which imbues far greater unity to the concept than is warranted by any of the passages which he cites. Whatever action Patroclus may carry out, ‘the nous of Zeus is always more powerful than that of men’ (II. xvi.688). The OT parallel for this sense of mind is found in the use of ruach in connection with Yahweh’s power. The nous is always located in the chest (II. iv.309) but it is never thought of as something material the way thymos is often conceived. It cannot be struck or pierced or blown out of the body and there is nothing that even hints at its origin in the body. Bremmer thinks that nous is ambiguous in some uses, since he claims that it signifies an emotional state when Agamemnon rejoiced in his nous at Achilles’ and Odysseus’ quarrel as to which was the best man. But Snell’s interpretation is far more consistent: ‘Agamemnon’s delight does not spring from the altercation of the two most valiant heroes - that would be absurd - but from his recollection of Apollo’s prophecy that Troy would fall when the best heroes contended with one another. The basis of his joy, therefore, is reflection.’24 Snell goes on to consider other passages which support this concept of nous: Nestor says, ‘let us take counsel ... if the nous may accomplish anything’ (II. xiv.61). In this context thymos would have been inaccurate since Nestor asks them to consider whether ‘counsel’, that is, expert reflection on the circumstances, may achieve anything. Snell suggests that nous is probably connected with the verb noein which means ‘to know’ or ‘to realize’. The verb noein is often conjoined with idein ‘to see clearly’, and here it means not just visual perception but also the mental act which goes along with that vision, and this puts noein close to gignoskein, ‘to recognize’. Thus, at the same passage cited by Bremmer above, Snell comments, ‘it is the mind as a recipient of clear images, or more briefly, the organ of clear images.’ However, this summary identification occludes a crucial distinction of which Bremmer was aware, though he makes the same imputation for different reasons, namely that the mind can be equated with a bodily organ, the brain. Again, Claus’ linguistic analysis shows that noos, like phren or phrenes, can regularly be considered as that in which a thought is conceived or even the thought itself, that is, its occurrence. It can be a distinct plan or intention, but diverges from other psychical terms in that, as a pure function devoid of all ambiguity, it undergoes specialization into something like ‘reason’ and can occupy the subject position, like thymos or psyche. The word noos must be treated as an agent noun of the same type as logos ‘and cannot

23 Dodds, 1951, pp. 16-18; see Caswell, 1990, for further speculation on meanings of thymos. 24 Snell, 1953, p. 12.

Ancient Hebrew and Homeric Greek Life-Force

17

possibly have its Homeric character accounted for by reference to some original physical identity’.25 The third Homeric term menos does not refer to a bodily organ but signifies the momentary impulse of one or several mental and/or physical activities mainly directed toward a specific action. The character may be intellectually aware of this impulse but can only influence its expression to a limited extent. When Odysseus’ father rejoiced in the fight against the suitors, ‘Pallas Athena breathed a great menos into him ... and whirling back he swung his long-shafted spear’ (Od. xxiv.520); after the wounded Glaucus has prayed to Apollo, the god ‘immediately eased his pains ... and put menos into his thymos’ (II. xvi.529); when Nestor tries to resolve the dispute between Achilles and Agamemnon, Nestor appeals to the king, ‘son of Atreus, stop your menos’ (II. i.282). The general sense concerns the warrior’s fury or ardor, but menos can be located either in the chest (II. xix.202), the thymos (II. xvi.529), or even in the phrenes (Od. i.89). Onians suggested that menos was conceived as something gaseous, since the Abantes are described as ‘breathing forth menos’ (II. ii.536), and during a night raid, ‘the owl-eyed Athena breathed menos into Diomedes’ (II. x.482), but Bremmer comments that this may be a strictly poetic expression; ‘just as one breathes into the fire and fans it, so one breathes into persons spiritual powers and fans them.’26 But if menos as breath is merely a metaphor for some actual relation which holds between the person’s soul and divine ‘inspiration’ then we want to know (or at least have an educated guess) about what this relation was. Onians goes further than Bremmer gives him credit for: ‘At the stage of thought when those beliefs emerged there was difficulty in conceiving anything except material entities, menos is apparently not an abstraction or a mere state of something else, but conceived as itself something, fluid or gaseous, which for convenience we may translate “energy”, and which was felt inwardly much as we feel what we so name.’27 Let us resist the temptation to render menos with the English word ‘energy’, since this word has its own history in Aristotelian energeia (in contrast with dynamis). Onians has struck on an important point, however, the salience of which does not have to do with whether menos is gaseous or not, but with the notion that such concepts make reference not to a state or mode of some thing, but to some thing itself, whatever that thing may be. Claus argues that menos is the easiest of all Homeric words to identify as life-force; unique among all soul words it is routinely used of non-human, even inanimate items. Thus menos conveys an impersonal characteristic that explains why it is not described in personalized terms like ‘love’ or ‘desire’. When Ares speaks of himself as lucky to escape being one of the zos amenenos, it cannot mean ‘life without life’, but rather ‘living without life-force’. Occurrences of menos compatible with this interpretation show that this concept 25 Claus, 1981, pp. 19-21; see Padel, 1992, pp. 32-3; Claus’ catalog of passages in note 40, with the various connotations of noos specified in these contexts, is remarkably similar to Fabry’s catalogue of connotations for leb, see Fabry, in TDOT, vol. VII, pp. 419-23. 26 Bremmer, 1983, p. 60. 27 Onians, pp. 51-2.

18

History of the Concept of Mind

was ‘in Homeric speech a self-contained category of thought about the person, able to unify inherently all physical, psychical and “life” uses of these words’.28 This substance-based conception of the soul is one of the undercurrents in Descartes’ radical new vision of the soul and mind, one which carefully (and perhaps permanently) separates the essential features of soul from the essential features of mind. With respect to the Homeric use of phrenes, von Fritz observed the strong tendency to refer to this feature when the results of the mental activity in question are immediately discernible.29 Claus says that this means that it is often impossible to decide whether either phrenes or noos denotes an autonomous psychical agent, that which thinks, or the function of such an agent, the thought: ‘This strong ambiguity between agent and function must be seen, therefore, as decisively weakening the ability of phren [or] phrenes to be perceived as an autonomous source of thought and emotion, and thus as something denoting the self of man as a whole.’ In contrast with noos, which regularly takes the subject position, phrenes does not usually do so, and unlike noos, which can usually be construed as a longlasting disposition, phrenes does not have this dimension. Claus argues against the view that Homer’s usage of noos and phrenes in certain contexts commits him to thinking of them as physical and autonomous entities; instead ‘it can be suggested that they are so treated because something not originally concrete in nature has undergone personification.’30 The best candidate for organic location is the lungs (or diaphragm), which enclosed or contained (on the current anatomical understanding) the heart and source of breath. Ruth Padel summarizes some of the key ideas: Phrenes contain emotion, practical ideas and knowledge ... Phrenes are containers; they fill with menos, ‘anger’, or thumos, ‘passion’. They are essentially mobile, too, and they ‘tremble within’. They are the holding center, holding the heart, holding the liver. A thunderbolt striking ‘in the very phrenes’ is an image of annihilation. You are struck, you know, understand, tremble, feel, or ponder in that responsive, compact, containing center.31

The last key term is her (Epic form, kradie), usually translated ‘heart’, and clearly in all cases referring to the heart as an organ in the animal body. Claus’ careful analysis shows that in the great majority of instances ... the uses of her conform to the thesis that it can be one of two things: (1) a man’s ‘life-force’ itself, directly acting in contexts where palpable waxing and waning of physical strength, consciousness, energy, endurance, and the like replace what we would call emotions in such contexts as grief for the dead, syncope, excitement in battle, and the like; (2) the ‘life-force’ personified ... but still generally restricted to contexts appropriate to the ‘life-force’.32

28 Claus, 1981, p. 26; see Padel, 1992, pp. 24-6. 29 Quoted in Claus, 1981, p. 16. 30 Claus, 1981, p. 21; against Onians’ ingenious speculations, 1951, pp. 23-31. 31 Padel, 1992, p. 21. 32 Claus, 1981, p. 32.

Ancient Hebrew and Homeric Greek Life-Force

19

Ruth Padel agrees with the emotional elements in this synopsis, though balking at the equation with life-force; the heart suffers, endures, and is full of hope and love. In some sense, it is ‘moved’ in that it rejoices, grieves, fears and becomes angry.33 There is some consensus amongst Bremmer, Onians and Snell in that they agree that there is no unified concept of the soul in Homeric thought; the notions of psyche, thymos, menos, and other subsidiary terms are aspects or dimensions of something unknown. It may be the case that Homer simply could not decide between competing ‘pictures’ of nous', his texts reflect the partly incongruous usage of this term amongst the Greek heroes. On the other hand, there may be a systematic ambiguity in the concept of nous, such that different uses reflect overlapping ‘pictures’. One way to characterize this entire view of Homer’s pictures of human nature is ‘unity in multiplicity’; no cohesive emotional and personal identity; the human in its psychical being is as disjointed and fragmented as the human body is in its physical (organic) being. Ruth Padel objects to this view: ‘If we add multiple innard-words to internal dialogue, we reach, not the absence of any consistent idea of self, but something far more positive: Homeric “insight into the disunity” of mental and emotional experience; a unified vision of an inconsistent thing.’ In favor of this view, she instances Homer’s careful descriptions of Achilles’ and Hector’s internal and external struggles, about which she says, ‘the narrative shows us one man over a short time, not as a bunch of separate voices, but as someone experiencing disorientation, self-conflict. Disunity and multiplicity are part of the coherence with which Homer presents a human being. They are essential to Homer’s concretely multiple vision of persons and life, of body and its innards.’34 The principal orientation of Claus’ superb linguistic analyses of the Homeric and Early Classical usage of soul-words has been to demonstrate their tendency to coalesce around the concept of life-force, its various intrinsic properties, and the manifold ways in which the life-force is exhibited by human agents. He resolutely opposes the arguments made famous by Snell, Onians and Burnet to discern the original notion of psyche in breath, the power or internal seat of breathing, the organic functions involved with respiration, inspiration, and so forth. Against this predominant interpretation, Claus argues that, whatever its origins, psyche has already been largely absorbed in the archaic period into the life-force category of words, such as thymos, menos and phrenes, and thus shares with these other words ‘a natural ability to act as a psychical agent of the life-force type’. In favor of this he advances five main points: (1) it seems an inherent ability of such words other than psyche to function as psychical agents, that is, used in expressions where emotion is treated as a function of life-force. (2) In lyric poetry of the same period psyche has a similar semantic role, but restricted to pleasurable and erotic contexts. (3) In other contexts that employ life-force words, psyche becomes comparable to heart and blood, that is, it can assume all vital functions except strength. (4) Aside from its use for ‘shade’ or ‘double’, psyche clearly indicates life-force in death contexts, since it is what is destroyed, lost, or poured out; it is breath-like, bloodlike, but only in so far as breath and blood carry or transmit the life-force. (5) After

33 Padel, 1992, pp. 18-19. 34 Padel, 1992, pp. 46, 47.

20

History of the Concept of Mind

the Homeric texts, psyche appears in contexts conjoined with philos, that is, ‘to love life’, one who loves his soul is one who holds life dear. ‘From these comparisons there can be no doubt that psyche has a relatively consistent “life-force” identity from Homer on in popular usage and that this identity cannot readily be explained by post-Homeric analogy to any one of the related words.’35 Clause extends this linguistic schema to the tragic texts, especially Euripides as its most mature exponent, and feels confident in asserting that, ‘all words that do not have a connection with “life” or “life-force” expand in some way, and all words except for psyche that do have such a connection ... are eliminated or diminished in importance.’ Behind the tragic and poetic expressions lies ‘the gradual adoption into popular speech of psyche as the word of choice to designate the natural animator of the body’. All of the evidence that he has advanced underscores the emphasis placed on ‘life-force’ in explanation of the various soul-words; ‘if the success of psyche as the archaic “life-force” is what accounts for its expansion of usages in the fifth century, it is very likely the same meaning, unaffected by afterlife speculation, that accounts for its development into a psychological agent after Homer’.36 There is one facet of the Homeric picture of psyche that does not fit well with this view of soul as life-force, inextricably linked with the individual’s bodily existence and hence mortal or death-bound - and that is the idea of the ‘shade’ or ‘double’ of the dead person. Filled with regret at the death of his friend Patroklos, Achilles stays awake all night, recalling the brave warrior’s appearance and deeds, his heart choked with loss. Just as he is about to fall asleep the eidolon (image or simulacrum) of Patroklos comes to stand above Achilles’ head: ‘And here is the psyche of the unhappy Patroklos who comes to him, totally like the hero in his stature, his beautiful eyes, his voice, and his body clothed with the same garments’ (II. xxiii.65); ‘his psyche resembled him very much’ (II. xxiii.107). When Achilles attempts to touch the eidolon there is nothing to grasp; it is no more than a thin vapor that vanishes beneath the earth with a tiny cry like a bat (II. xxiii.100). The same scenario is played out when Odysseus confronts the psyche of his dead mother Antikleia who has returned from Hades to drink blood from the victim Odysseus has just sacrificed; in doing so she hopes to recover some of the knowledge death made her lose. Odysseus converses with his mother’s psyche, but when he attempts to embrace her, she flits away like a shadow or a dream. When he asks her if this is a trick played on him by the infernal deities, she says, ‘It is the law of our mortal nature when we come to die. We no longer have sinews keeping the bones and flesh together; once life has departed from our white bones, all is consumed by the fierce heat of the blazing fire, and the soul slips away like a dream and goes flitting on its way’ (Od. xi.205-22). Granted that Homer uses the same word psyche to denominate the mortal lifeforce of each individual human and the appearance of the dead human, there seem to be basically incompatible beliefs at work here, or at least an unresolved tension. How can the soul cease to exist with the person’s bodily death and then reappear 35 Claus, 1981, p. 97. 36 Claus, 1981, pp. 101, 102; Ruth Padel has mixed feelings about Claus’ findings; she says ‘he identifies a core meaning “life-force” in most “soul-words”, which in my view weakens his clear-headed, skeptical approach’ an identity achieved at the expense of discounting ‘anomalous instances’, 1992, p. 29, note 66.

Ancient Hebrew and Homeric Greek Life-Force

21

from the depths of the underworld? The answer to this dilemma lies with Homer’s archaic use of eidolon (image) and phasma (phantom); the dead Patroklos’ psyche and the dead Antikleia’s psyche are exact replicas or simulacra of the living person’s corporeal appearance. Homer says that Apollo fabricated a phasma of Aeneas in his armor, placing him in the thick of battle, although the real Aeneas is sheltered in the citadel (II. v.450-3); it is an eoikon (semblance) of Nestor who comes as Zeus’ messenger in a dream to Agamemnon (II. ii.56), and an eidolon (image) fabricated by Athena of the daughter of Ikarios made to stand guard over the sleeping Penelope (Od. iv.796-8). Thus the psyche of the dead share the same characteristics as these phantoms, replicas and simulacra - they are not the actual psychai of living beings, but the mere similitude of the being who is now or has been ensouled. There is no survival of the human soul after the individual’s bodily death, no other form of human life beyond or after the extinction of humans’ life-force. It is not true that the Homeric texts betray an internal inconsistency or that they depict some sort of conflict between different sets of beliefs; rather, the ‘double’ or ‘shade’ does not have the ontological status of an autonomous, self-founding being, the human individual’s soul minus its host’s body. Jean-Pierre Vernant makes this crucial point in a forceful and persuasive fashion: [The doubles’] unity comes from the fact that in the cultural context of archaic Greece, they are all perceived by the mind in the same way and all bear an analogous meaning. It is also correct to understand them all as a true psychological category - the category of the double - that presumes a different mental organization than our own. A double is a wholly different thing from an image. It is not a ‘natural’ object, but it is also not a product of the imagination: neither an imitation of a real object, not an illusion of the mind, nor a creation of thought. The double is a reality external to the subject and is inscribed in the visible world. Yet even in its conformity with what it simulates, its unusual character ensures its substantial difference from familiar objects and the ordinary setting of daily life. The double plays on two contrasting levels at the same time: at the moment when it shows itself to be present, it also reveals itself as not being of this world but rather as belonging to an inaccessible elsewhere.3738

Let us attempt to draw together all of the strands in the fabric of Homer’s concept of human nature by marking the criteria of distinction between two sets of central psychical terms. One group is comprised of psyche, thymos, menos and nous, each of which is a soul-related (psychical) function necessarily dependent on an animal body (its host), though its ‘seat’ or internal site is indefinite and underdetermined, and as a component of the whole being (an ensouled animal) has a complex array of properties. The other group comprises ker (or kradie), phrenes, sometimes hepar, and later kephale3S, each of which is an organic internal component of the 37 Vernant, 1991, p. 187; see Redfield, 1985; Onians, pp. 39-40; Claus, 1981, pp. 98-9; Padel offers similar premises in her analysis of the double but draws rather confused implications from this, Padel, 1992, pp. 31-2. Burkert, 1985, pp. 194-9, points out that even in Homer there are ‘certain motifs which contain the germs of a radical transformation in beliefs concerning the afterlife.’ Helen herself had been replicated, as Calasso reminds the modern reader, 1993, pp. 130, 133. 38 The noblest part, LSJ 9th rev., p. 945, sec. 2.

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History of the Concept of Mind

animal body, occupies a definite, determinate internal site, and upon which the first set of psychical functions has a necessarily dependent relation, but whose properties are ambiguous and over-determined. Regarding the question of the inherent (or intrinsic) unity of the kind of being that can most properly be described with this exact cluster of terms, perhaps a more cautious statement would be that our modem post-Cartesian concept of mind has its closest ancestor in Archaic Greek thought in Homer’s nous. But where Descartes and his descendants will equate the mind with the faculty of reason, Homer characterizes noos (mind or intellect) as one dimension of the human being. The closest ancestor in Archaic Greek to the medieval and preCartesian concept of soul or anima is psyche, but only in so far as Homeric psyche characterizes the uniquely human life-force or vitality which does not survive bodily death. The inescapable conclusion that one must draw with regard to the Hebrew psychical terms, such as nepesh, ruach and leb, is the consequence of a cumulative elimination of feasible candidates to explain the distinctive ‘nature’ of living beings with soul. Due to the superbly detailed linguistic excavations of OT scholars in recent years, it is possible to identify the best candidate for nepesh as ‘life-force’ or vitality. This concept does not mean the condition of being alive, or the status of living thing, for which the Hebrew writers used the word hayyim (much as Greek writers used zoon); nor for the breath as such, for which the Hebrews used neshama (much as the Greeks used pnoe or pneuma), which is the overt manifestation or exteriorization of the life-force. This core concept helps to make sense of the numerous passages in the OT where nepesh can increase or decrease, where it is present in degree, and especially in cases where nepesh is poured out or breathed out, though the individual is not yet dead. However, when the living human dies the nepesh is gone forever; only the living have the power to bring back - restore or augment - life-force or vitality. This is virtually the same conclusion that Homeric scholars have reached regarding the archaic concept of psyche (though Onians is more tempted to organicize the life-force in one of several internal organs) - the best candidate for psyche is ‘life-force’ or vitality. Neither psyche nor nous is ever properly applied to non-human animals, with the exception of the snake, whose ascription of psyche may reflect a unique encoding of Orphic ritual doctrine.39 Other Homeric soul-words are routinely used of animals, for example, thymos, menos, phrenes, etor and her, but not that which distinctively individuates humans’ life-force from the mere animal status of living being. The part-for-whole expressive force of other soul-words used in conjunction with psyche can also work in reverse, that is, whole-for-part, where the individual is said to be ‘full of life’ when he is vibrant or passionate, or ‘to have a great soul’ when he is generous or expansive. It is thus psyche that uniquely differentiates human beings from other living, animate beings, through or by means of vital attributes such as self-moved action, desire for what is absent, and the noetic powers, those attributable to nous, of imagination, memory and reflection.

39 On the snake-psyche, see Bremmer, 1983, pp. 126-8; Claus, 1981, pp. 61-3; Onians, pp. 206-8.

Ancient Hebrew and Homeric Greek Life-Force

(3)

23

The pre-Socratic soul as property-like thing

The centuries from the Homeric age to the Classical age of Greek thought are a transitional period in the development of philosophical speculation and, more specifically, of overt thematic concern with the nature, source and functions of the soul. There are many ways in which priority is assigned to one or another figure between the eighth and the fourth centuries bce ; different criteria are used to assert that someone is the first in saying something. Thus, Pherecydes and Pythagoras (who lived at about the same time) were the first to import into popular culture the ‘foreign’, shamanistic ideas about an immortal soul, going-under, ecstatic foresight, and so forth.40 But Pherecydes, like Hesiod, is also assigned a secondary, lesser status in philosophical genealogy41 (or perhaps, the birth of ideas) since he took part in speculation about the birth of the cosmos (cosmogony) and the birth of the gods (theogony), that is, regarding the origin and powers of divine agents. Aristotle referred to Pherecydes and the Magi (Near-Eastern mystics)42 as ‘mixed theologians, those who do not say everything in mythical form’, as did Homer and Hesiod, for example, and who claimed that ‘the first generator is the best’ (Meta. 1091b8). Kirk and Raven, in the opening lines of the First Chapter on ‘Forerunners’, said that these transitional ideas were not concerned with pure mythology, ‘but with concepts which, although expressed in the language and through the personages of myth, are not mythopoeic in kind but are the result of direct, empirical, non-symbolical ways of thinking.’ To claim that the concepts of Birth, Night, Chaos, and so forth, and the four roots or elements of all things are the result of ‘direct, empirical’ thought is strange indeed, though Thales and his successors’ attention to water and fire could be said to be non-symbolic: ‘These quasi-rationalistic views of the world are most frequently concerned with its earliest history, starting from its actual birth or creation; for this way of thinking was incidental to the attempt ... to systematize the manifold deities of legend by deriving them from a common ancestor or pair of ancestors at the beginning of the world.’43 Centuries later, however, Pherecydes was routinely recognized by Latin writers as the first author to hold that the human soul was immortal.44 The one almost certain historical link between Greek speculative thinking and the remote lands of the Magi and shamans is the first-hand account made by Aristeas of Proconnesus (c. 630-20 bce ) of his travels to the land at the Back of the North Wind (Hyperborea), beyond the Black Sea, where he encountered the Scythians, the Arimaspi and other extraordinary peoples, returning many years 40 On Pherecydes’ views about the soul, or at least views which can be derived from the testimonia, the fullest account is in Schibli, 1990, pp. 104-27. 41 See Kirk & Raven, 1960, pp. 48-72; West, 1971, Chaps 1 & 2; and Schibli, 1990, pp. 11-13, 132-4. 42 The gifts of the Magi are interpreted along cosmological lines by West, 1971, pp. 21342. 43 Kirk & Raven, 1960, p. 8; on Thales’ connection with Eastern thought, see West, 1971, pp. 208-14. 44 See esp. Cicero, Tusc. Disp. 1.38; Lactantius, Div. Inst. 7.7.12; Augustine, Contra Acad. 3.37, and Letters 137.12; all testimonia and fragments excerpted by Schibli, 1990, Appendix 2, pp. 140-75.

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History of the Concept of Mind

later with an astonishing narrative,45 rehearsed by Herodotus (Hist. iv. 12-16). Bolton argued quite convincingly that many features of Aristeas’ account, filtered through Heraclides Ponticus’ reworkings, show up again in Empedocles’ writings and stories about his life. Aristeas clearly reported the results of shamanistic extrasomatic experience, as well as preaching some version of the immortal soul doctrine.46 On the other hand, Thales is usually ascribed the status of first person to speculate about principles and first causes in a distinctively philosophical manner. Aristotle granted Thales this primordial role more than once, in one case separating Thales’ attitude from that of his predecessors: ‘the very ancient and indeed first speculators about the gods, long before the present age, made the same supposition about nature’ (Meta. 983b27). In Simplicius’ commentary on Aristotle he said that ‘Thales is traditionally the first to have revealed the investigation of nature (peri phuseds historian) to the Greeks’ (KRS fr.81). However, given the very small number of Thalean documents, the evidence is under-determined and the priority claim itself is highly contentious. Pythagoras’ ‘giant shadow’ falls on many thinkers after him, but his sayings and deeds are devoted almost exclusively to ritual actions about personal preparation and purification. It is not feasible in this section to enter fully into the complex (even torturous) discussion about Pythagoras’ contribution to Greek thinking about the soul; his influence on Platonic doctrines will become more apparent in the next section. Heraclitus is unanimously accorded the position of the first to make psyche a thematic issue in his logos-inspired discourse; but the riddling, ambiguous character of his extant fragments leaves irresolvable the general framework into which his claims could be fitted. And in the final priority assignment, Socrates is (almost) always said to be the first to self-consciously articulate the basic scheme of dialectic, a theory of knowledge, an ethical theory, and an account of the nature and functions of the soul. So many firsts, so many ways to make a beginning; it will be our task in much of what follows to keep track of which way an idea is said to start. Thales of Miletus lived in the first part of the sixth century bce and is commonly accorded the title of the first Greek philosopher, that is, an inquirer who made explicit some questions that later came to be associated with a distinctly philosophical attitude. As with many other early thinkers, some of our knowledge of his teachings is derived from Aristotle’s summary of his predecessors’ opinions about the nature of the soul. Amongst the few sayings attributed to him (beyond various anecdotal comments about his life) are the following: ‘Thales too supposed the soul (psyche) was a mover (,kinetikon), given that he said that the [magnetic] stone has a soul because it moves iron’ (Aristotle, de An. 405a 19; KRS fr. 89). This report from Aristotle is restated by Diogenes Laertius when he says that Thales ‘gave a share of soul even to soulless objects, taking his evidence from the magnetic stone and from 45 Bolton’s meticulous and ingenious reconstruction, 1962, pp. 74-118, has been confirmed at many points by recent archaeological investigations in Central Asia; see esp. J. P. Mallory & Victor Mair, The Tarim Mummies, London: Thames & Hudson, 2000, Chapter 1, retracing Aristeas’ route. 46 On indications in Aristeas about the ‘flight of the soul’ and his influence on Pythagorean doctrines, see Bolton, 1962, pp. 146-57, 164-5; summary statement, pp. 172-5.

Ancient Hebrew and Homeric Greek Life-Force

25

amber’ (Lives 1.24; KRS fr. 90). Aristotle adds to his picture of Thales’ view of soul a claim regarding the more general context in which Thales might have made this remark: ‘And some say that it [soul] is intermingled in the universe, which is perhaps the reason why Thales also thought that all things are full of gods’ (Aristotle, de An. 411a7; KRS fr. 91). The Aetius source, following Theophrastus’ summary, appears to add further detail to this claim: ‘Thales said that the mind of the world is god (noun tou kosmou ton theon), and that the sum of things is ensouled and full of daemons; through the elemental moisture there penetrates a divine power that moves it’ (KRS fr. 95). But this paraphrase interpolates the idea of mind (nous) into Thales’ original claim, and despite Thales’ obvious preference for moistness or moisture (hugros) as the principle of all things, shows later Stoic interpretation in assigning divine power to the source of this movement.47 It is true that for Aristotle the ‘cause’ of movement, especially of self-directed movement, is the linchpin in his physical explanation of the ensouled status of living beings. He also devotes a great deal of attention in his psychical explanation of the integration and coordination of cognitive and perceptual powers to the kind of soul that must be responsible for these operations. Although Thales apparently thought there was something significant about the magnet’s ‘power’ to move pieces of iron, significant in that it indicated the presence of some kind of soul, this does not imply that Thales thought that this took place because the soul was some kind of mover. When Aristotle reviews his predecessors’ efforts to establish the material principles of all things coming-into-being and passing-away in Metaphysics Book Alpha, he reports Thales’ precedent-setting supposition as follows: ‘Thales, the founder of this type of philosophy, says that it [the principle] is water (hudor) ... perhaps making this supposition from seeing the nurture of all things to be moist (hugran) ... Both from this and from the seeds of all things having a moist nature (spermata ten phusin hugran), water being the natural principle of moist things’ (Meta. 983b6). The third clause could be construed as saying either that all things have naturally moist seeds and their (the seeds’) principle is water (an element), or that some things have moist seeds as their nature, and their (those things’) principle is water. The second clause claims that Thales observed that (presumably) living things depend for their growth (and movement) on the presence of moist seeds, whose principle of action is derived from water. This point is reinforced by other attributed statements where Thales thought that there were indeed four elements (KRS fr.88); the other three (air, fire and earth) did not contribute to an explanation of the living (that is, ensouled) nature of certain kinds of things. Perhaps it is an unwarranted inference to claim that Thales thought that magnet or amber (which exhibits magnetic properties when rubbed) was ensouled because its principal element was water; rather it exhibited some features of an ensouled thing in so far as it had the power to move things other than itself. Despite this, Schofield says that one may infer that ‘Thales was well on the way to conceiving of psuche ... as the central essence which connects our various faculties. In animals the power of movement is intimately related to cognitive powers, to the extent that is hard to imagine Thales

47 West, 1971, pp. 208-13 for an attempted reconstruction.

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History of the Concept of Mind

not ascribing cognition also to psuche, had the question occurred to him. Unfortunately we have no information as to whether he considered it or not.’48 It seems that Aristotle thought that Thales’ statement that all things are full of gods and the statement that soul pervades the whole world are connected. The purported link then is between the souls of moist things and the presence of gods, perhaps along the lines that the gods’ divine power institutes the generative and nutritive properties of moist things through the material presence of water, and that one outstanding instance of this is the magnet’s perceived action on external objects. McKirahan offers this summary of Thales’ contribution: Water is primary since it is prominent in the physical makeup of the world ... and it is needed for the generation and maintenance of living things and of some apparently non living things. Thales conceives of water not as a chemically pure substance, but as the moist element quite generally - in the sea, in rain, in sperm ... If everything is made of water or ultimately arises from water, the life force of water pervades the whole world, showing up in some things more than others (just as some things are wetter than others). Moreover, as a living thing with no beginning in time (everything else owes its beginning to it), and apparently no end in time either, water is divine (since for the Greeks the primary characteristics of the divine are immortality and power independent of human will). Hence all things, being composed of or arising from water, are full of the divine.49

Anaximander, also from Miletus, was called the pupil and successor of Thales: his most notable achievements, according to the earliest historians, were the discovery of the gnomon (set-square) and sundial, the first written treatise ‘On Nature’, the first world map, and the central cosmological concept of the boundless (apeiron).50 It does not seem likely that he actually invented these instruments, but rather that he introduced them from Babylon where astronomical measurements had been conducted for some time. There is an immense scholarly debate about the meaning of his key principle, to apeiron, either the boundless, the indefinite, or the infinite, from which all things are derived. He said that it was neither water nor any of the other elements, but some other boundless nature, which is eternal and unchanging and surrounds the world (KRS fr. 101). The four elements were separated out from this substratum and differentiated into the various opposites, such as hot and cold, wet and dry (KRS fr.l 18-20). His doctrine of cosmic creation is that a fiery sphere formed around the air (or dark mist) about the earth, like bark round a tree, and when broken off and enclosed in circles, formed the heavenly bodies (KRS fr.121). This appears to be paralleled at the level of organic things: ‘the first living things were bom in moisture, enclosed in thorny barks (phloios),51 and as their age increased they came out onto the drier part, their bark broke off, and they lived a different kind of life a short time’ (KRS fr. 133). But it is with the sixth-century Milesian writer Anaximenes, himself probably the pupil of Anaximander, that the concept of soul (psyche) makes its first definite appearance. The most important document is the reconstructed argument from the 48 Schofield, in Everson, 1991, p. 23. 49 McKirahan, 1994, p. 31. 50 Kirk & Raven, 1960, pp. 102-5. 51 On the bark-image, see West, 1971, pp. 95-6.

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Aetius source (KRS fr. 160): Anaximenes declared that ‘air is the principle of existing things; for from it all things come-to-be and into it they are dissolved. As our soul, he says, being air (aer) holds-together-and controls (sugkratei) us, so does wind (or breath, pneuma) and air enclose the whole world - air and wind are synonymous - But [added Aetius] he is in error to think that living things consist of simple and single-form air and wind’ (KRS fr.160). The unusual word sugkratien is composed of two more standard archaic words, sunechein (‘holds together’) and kratein (‘controls’), perhaps interpolated backwards from a much later redaction.52 Kirk and Raven commented that the comparison between one and the other is not very clear, since it seems to say that breath and air enclose the whole world in the way that our soul, being air and breath, holds together and controls us (or our bodies). They proposed four possible versions of this statement: (i) ‘air holds us together, from inside, and the world together, from outside, , or ’; (ii) ‘as our soul holds the body together and so controls it, so the originative substance ... holds the world together and so controls it’; (iii) ‘the soul, which is breath, holds together and controls man; therefore, what holds together and controls the world must also be breath or air, because the world is like a large-scale man or animal’; (iv) ‘the life-principle and motive force of man is, traditionally, pneuma or the breath-soul; ; therefore, the life-principle of the outside world is pneuma; therefore, wind, breath, or air is the life and substance of all thingsx’ Kirk and Raven remarked that the idea of the soul holding together the body has no other parallel in pre-socratic thought; that Anaximenes could have meant by sugkratein that the soul possesses the body, that is, it permeates the whole body, and thus controls it; and that this is the first extant use of the world pneuma, ‘breath’, which would later become such a pivotal psychical term. The analogy drawn between the world-whole (kosmos) and the soul is also very early; it only became common later in the fifth century, under the influence of medical theories, to compare the human microcosm to the world macrocosm: ‘The mention of soul is important itself apart from [Thales’ dictum] it is the first Presocratic psychological statement to survive - though the actual structure of the soul envisaged, as breath, belonged to an age-old popular tradition.’53 But, against this view, there is no mention in the text of the body; it is just as sensible to read this to mean that soul as air holds together an individual being, one which is embodied. Claus agrees about the signal importance of this document: first, that ‘it would allow the analogy of nature and man to be focused specifically in the psyche so that the nature and activity of the psyche could be explored through the nature and activity of the arche, and vice versa.’ Second, ‘the use of sugkratein in the fragment could imply extension of the functions of soul already at the outset of Presocratic thought beyond those of simple animation.’54 One might also add that Anaximenes’ claim shows a clear connection with Homeric usage of soul as the breath of life, since it makes a comparable equation of external air as wind with internal air as breath. The 52 Kirk & Raven, p. 159, note 1. 53 Kirk & Raven, pp. 160-61. 54 Claus, 1981, p. 123.

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History of the Concept of Mind

importance of this extension of the concrete reference of soul-related ideas, only marginally differentiated along the external-internal axis, will be seen again in Heraclitus and Empedocles. However, the fullest credit must surely be given to Heraclitus of Ephesus (c.540480 bce ) for making the human soul a theme (though not a theory) in his reflections. There are just enough instances in the surviving fragments (ten explicit uses and three or four implicit uses) to make scholarly investigation worthwhile, but not enough to resolve some of the more perplexing problems. Claus helpfully summarizes some of the central points, first made by Zeller more than a century ago: First, that the psyche is itself fire and undergoes changes of state analogous to those of fire in the cosmic system. Second, it is distributed throughout the body and is unmeasurable. Third, its changes of state are manifested by waking, sleeping, and death. These conditions depend on the ratio of moisture to fire in the soul ... Fourth, like cosmic fire, soul fire is in some ways nourished by moisture, although how this happens is not explicitly described. Finally, ... it seems likely that Heraclitus envisions two kinds of ‘death’ for the psyche: one by fire for those cut down by violence in the prime of life [whose psychai are fiery] ... the other by water for those whose psychai gradually become moist through disease and degeneration.55

Heraclitus was known as the riddler, the obscure, and other epithets that signified the puzzling character of his philosophical reflections. It is not possible to circumvent his deliberate obfuscation and puzzle-setting, since he thought this mode of discourse most suitable to the kind of issues he was addressing, as well as being most in accord with his personal relation to the logos. Nor is it feasible in this section to enter into the complex and heavily contested arena of Heraclitean exegesis. It will be sufficient for our purposes to elucidate some of the important conceptual innovations that he made in his thematic attention to the subject of the human soul. One outstanding example of this riddling format (‘a marvelous specimen’, as Schofield says) asks the reader (or hearer) to consider the way in which sleep and dreams are connected to the soul: ‘A man in the night kindles a light for himself when his vision is extinguished; living he is in contact with the dead when asleep, and in contact with the sleeper when awake’ (KRS fr.233) - the word haptetai means both ‘kindle’ and ‘touch’ or ‘contact’. Numerous interpretations of this statement have been offered,56 not counting those who throw up their hands in frustration, when dealing with either the overt or the hidden level. Schofield offers the most intelligent and ingenious explanation by making good sense of this statement on three different levels of meaning. He says that on the superficial, riddle-solving level the metaphor of lamp-lighting (taken up again in Empedocles’ poem) describes an ordinary phenomenon. Although his eyes are closed in sleep, the dreamer creates an illuminated scene where the departed ‘appear’, and at the same time the waking man is in contact with the sleeper in as much as he remembers his dreams. At the second level the universal logos is disclosed: through kindling the light of his dream, the living man kindles himself, 55 Claus, 1981, p. 126; see another comparable summary in McKirahan, 1994, pp. 146-7. 56 Kirk & Raven, pp. 208-9; Kahn, 1979, pp. 214-17; Robinson, 1987, pp. 93-100.

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even though he is ‘dead to the world’ in his dreams; and the waking self kindles the sleeping self, for dreams are a sort of wakeful sleep. The third level is the level of physical truth, supported by another fragment regarding ever-living fire, kindling and going out in measures (KRS fr.217). And thus the fragment as a whole means that although the fire of the sleeper’s soul is quenched in some measure, he rekindles it in another measure in his dreams. Since Heraclitus identified the arche of soul with fire, when the soul sleeps the internal fire is diminished; this also confirms his belief that when a man is drunk his soul becomes moist, and thus falls away toward death.57 The latter claim is most strikingly made in another fragment (KRS fr.229): ‘for souls it is death to become water, for water it is death to become earth; from earth water comes-to-be, and from water, soul’, such that ‘a dry soul is wisest and best’ (KRS fr.230). An interpretation which supports the notion of a spectrum of physical states of the soul between the extremes of wateriness and fieriness fits well with his further assertion that ‘a man when he is drunk is led by an unfledged boy, stumbling and not knowing where he goes, having his soul moist’ (KRS fr.231). Being drunk deprives a human of the use of his active powers, such that he is led about (that is, controlled) as if by a child whose powers are not fully mature but equal to the task of getting the drunken adult home. Again, this remark makes more than just the trivial and obvious claim that a drunken man has doused himself with liquid. The highly pertinent word hugros (‘moist’) also means supple and loose, and was used in conjunction with sarx and other words to indicate soft tissue, but also to signify the slackness shown when someone stumbles.58 Onians reminds us that for the early Greeks the young were said to abound in liquid, their limbs’ looseness and suppleness was explained by an abundance of moistness, thus setting this physical feature in contrast to hard or rigid (skleros). The analogical relations between moist and dry, young and old, hard bones and soft flesh shows through in such common expressions as ‘drying up’ or ‘withering’ in old age.59 This traditional, common sense of opposition between hard bones and gristle, on one hand, and soft tissue or flesh on the other derives form an archaic view about psyche as life-force in Homer, as well as the ancient Hebrew basar in contrast with nepesh. The most puzzling saying about soul, the one that reaches the deepest into the mysterious logos, is the following: ‘immortals mortals, mortals immortals, living their death and dying their life’ (KRS fr.239). Charles Kahn said of this fragment (from Hippolytus’ Refutation o f All Heresies) that ‘this is in point of form Heraclitus’ masterpiece, the most perfectly symmetrical of all the fragments.’60 There have been many, many attempts to make sense of this profound riddle; again let us follow Schofield’s analysis for one plausible and coherent interpretation: Our life as mortals depends on the temporary extinction of the physical elements from which it comes to be and into which it is destroyed. And the processes of living and 57 Schofield, 1991, pp. 27-9. 58 Schofield, in Everson, 1991, p. 21; see LSJ, 9th Edn,1968, s.v. ‘hugros’, p. 1843. 59 Onians, pp. 213-5; Claus, 1981, pp. 129-31. 60 Kahn, 1979, p. 218; for several different ways to render this in English, see Kirk & Raven, 1960, p. 210 and Nussbaum, 1972, p. 163-4.

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History of the Concept of Mind dying will be not only ... the same in form but numerically identical: the birth of the soul is the death of water, and vice versa ... The very concepts of mortality and immortality, life and death, collapse into each other. The resonances of this implication reach further than the confines of an interpretation in terms of physical truth. It threatens both traditional religion, with its confident separation of mortals and immortals, and Pythagoreanism, with its consoling promise that there is really no such thing as mortality - it is merely a form of immortality.61

It remains to make some determination with regard to the vexed question about whether Heraclitus thought the human soul to be itself immortal, whatever its metaphorical connection to the immortal souls of gods. Claus concludes his very cautious exegesis of the Heraclitean soul fragments with these words: they ‘unquestionably constitute the most complicated and elusive body of material that must be dealt with in this study, and the one least amenable to a semantic investigation ... [These] in some sense discover the psychological value of psyche for Greek thought. At the least, psyche is, as all commentators have seen, an entity responsive to a systematic scheme of changes, and on these changes intelligence and the emotional life depend.’62 Perhaps it is wise not to make a definitive claim about Heraclitus’ view of the soul’s mortal or immortal status. However, such abstention from judgment makes it more difficult to understand how Heraclitus’ thought is transitional between the influx of mystical, non-Greek ideas and the more explicit (albeit agnostic) thesis of Socrates in the early dialogues. Martha Nussbaum attempted to strike a highly nuanced balance between two equally tenable inferences: [T]he Heraclitean doctrine of psyche amounts to a radical and profoundly creative critique of traditional ideas about man’s faculties, his language, and his death. For the first time, apparently, in the history of Greek thought, man is seen explicitly as having a central ‘self’: a single, vital faculty in terms of which sense-perception, language, ethical behavior, and ultimately death, must be understood. As the cosmos, articulated into a plurality of species, is, nonetheless, one through the all-connecting logos of fire, so a man, though he has many faculties, is one by virtue of the central, connecting faculty of psyche.

Nussbaum concludes that, ‘Heraclitus’psyche theory recognizes death as necessary and denies posthumous survival. And yet it accords to man the possibility of the kinetic immortality of kleos [glory], which even the immortal gods cannot attain.’63 McKirihan is less cautious and opts for a more decisive conclusion: ‘Heraclitus believed in an afterlife depending on the soul’s state at the moment of death.’ Although he tempers this claim by pointing out that Heraclitus seems to offer hope for only some, more noble souls, the sense of everlasting glory pertains not just to the memory of their deeds, but to their post-mortem souls absorbed into the cosmic fire.64 61 Schofield, in Everson, 1991, p. 32. 62 Claus, 1981, p. 138. 63 Nussbaum, 1972, p. 169. 64 McKirihan, 1994, p. 146.

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Anaxagoras of Clazomenae (c. 500-428 bce ) made mind {nous) as important a theme in his cosmic speculation as Heraclitus had made psyche. Large portions of Anaxagoras’ verses survive, partly due to the high regard accorded them by Simplicius in his commentary on Aristotle’s Physics. One of Anaxagoras’ main concerns had been to refute the views of Pythagoras and Heraclitus that the world was the scene of incessant warfare between opposites. He asserted that physical matter was infinitely divisible, that it composed all sensible bodies, and that the principles of all things were infinite in number. But Mind, he said, is itself infinite in extent, self-ruled, and mixed with nothing, alone by itself. It is the finest and purest of all things, it has knowledge about and power over all things, and its power is manifest through its control of movement in living things (KRS fr.476). Kirk and Raven comment that in these and other passages, Anaxagoras struggles to imagine and describe an infinite incorporeal entity, but whose infinite extent must mean occupation of space like other finite bodies. In doing so he sets up a vast cosmic dualism, between mind unmixed with anything else, and all other bodies in which mind is absent: ‘But both members of this dualism are peculiar. Mind, like matter, is corporeal and owes its power over matter to its fineness and purity. Matter itself, so far from being pure, is originally at least an infinitely divisible mixture of every form of substance that the world is ultimately to contain.’ In the original mixture all things were together, including the seeds of all things that would come to be, but now everything contains some portion of every other thing except Mind itself: ‘If there are some things in which Mind is present, there are obviously other things in which it is not. Mind is presumably therefore to be imagined as discontinuously distributed throughout the world in living things.’65 In Empedocles of Acragas (in Sicily), in the early to mid-fifth century, several other principal features of the pre-Socratic account of soul began to take shape. In his one long poem in two parts (or, his two poems),66 Empedocles makes unambiguous references to an immortal soul, some of its basic functions, its physical composition, and ritual operations to purify its bodily host. Near the start he refers to himself as ‘an immortal god, no longer mortal, honored among all’; an unusual assertion, to say the least, for no other figure ever claims to be a god in addition to being immortal. He was reputed to have been a skilled medical doctor, an ardent democrat, and to have leapt to his death (or fiery life) in the Mt. Etna volcano.67 There are many details in both his life-story and his sayings that have clear parallels with the sorts of shamanistic beliefs and rituals evident in Pherecydes, Pythagoras, Aristeas and others. His extra-somatic travel and prophetic utterances, legends of rebirth and bilocation - all point toward the magically inspired idea of an immortal soul.68 In addition to this, he made several significant contributions to philosophical speculation. First, he argued against Parmenides’ assertion that there was no real 65 Kirk & Raven, 1960, pp. 374-6. 66 On this point see inter alia, Kirk & Raven, 1960, pp. 321-3; Kingsley, 1995, pp. 36370; Kahn, 1973, pp. 428-34; reconstructed in its most likely proper order by McKirihan, 1994, pp. 232-54. 67 On the significance of his leap into fire, see Kingsley, 1995, pp. 250-55. 68 For more details on these topics, see Kingsley, 1995, pp. 233-8, 251-9.

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change or movement in things by putting forth the notion that there were four roots (stoikheia), which moved under the influence of Love (Philia) and Strife (Neikeos). Second, the influence of Love and Strife alternated over time such that the world went through innumerable cycles. Third, he argued that there were four basic material forms, the elements, from which all particular things were composed. Fourth, he made an early effort at establishing the mechanisms of respiration through the postulation of very fine pores and hidden tubules69 (repeated in some detail in Aristotle, KRS fr.471). And finally, he made an explicit statement that the human soul is immortal, that it can be trained through discipline, and that (at least some) souls can move between individual animal bodies after their hosts’ death. With regard to the last theme, he appears to have made an innovation in attempting to explain how some souls can both survive their hosts’ bodily death and move between separate host-bodies in terms of a double birth and death: ‘Double is the coming-to-be of mortal things, and double is their failing; for the coming together of all things produces one birth and destruction, and the other is nurtured and flies apart when they grow apart again’ (KRS fr.348). This story is twofold since it follows accounts of two births and two deaths: in terms of the particular material thing, its birth and death coincide with the initial mixture and terminal decomposition; but in terms of the divine, immortal element, its birth is the formation of those elements and its ‘death’ is just the name for its dispersal into the original matrix. The concept of double birth and double death is taken up much later in an astonishing synthesis of Christian and Neo-Platonist doctrines by St. Augustine. Where Epicurus will later conclude that the material composition of the living individual is sufficient evidence to demonstrate that the soul is in fact mortal, Empedocles uses similar premises to show that the soul must be immortal: ‘There is coming-to-be of not one single thing of mortal things, nor is there any end of deadly death, but only mixture, and separation of what is mixed, and nature (phusis) is the name given to them by humans’ (Plutarch Adv. Col. 111 If). The nature specific to human beings, in virtue of which they are living, thinking beings, is manifest in (or explained by) the presence of blood; an idea that relates thought (noema) to the vital-force conveyed by blood as fluid.70 ‘The heart nurtured in the sea of blood surging back and forth, where most especially is what is called thought by humans, for the blood around the heart in humans is called thought’ (KRS fr.394). Theophrastus reported that Empedocles, in asserting the thesis that like is known by like, and that wisdom is perception of something identical or equivalent, offered this account: ‘out of these things are all things fitted together and constructed, and by these do they think (phroneousi) and feel pleasure or pain. So it is especially with the blood that they think (phronein), for in the blood above all other parts the elements are blended (stoikheia ton meronf (KRS fr.392). Nevertheless, the fluid blood is not identical with the human soul, but rather its temporary vehicle, and the body its dwelling or ‘garb’. The source of the human soul is ‘outside’ its carrier, the soul visits or sojourns in the body, 69 On the verbal imagery surrounding the soul’s connection with pores, channels and tubes, see Padel, 1992, pp. 41-2. 70 On the imagery of surging, liquid forces of soul, see Padel, 1992, pp. 88-91; Onians relates this concept to the Latin terms sapiens, sapere, etc.: Onians, pp. 61-3.

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and, as a wanderer or traveler in the material realm, it can indeed visit within other bodies, after death: ‘It is not our blood, he says, nor the blending of our breath that produced the essential principle of the soul; rather from these [things] the body is molded, earth-born and mortal. Since the soul has come hither from elsewhere (hekouses deuro) he calls birth a sojourn abroad - the most comforting of all names - but in truth the soul is a fugitive and a wanderer, banished by the decrees and laws of the gods’ (KRS fr.401). And thus he can utter what is perhaps his best-known saying regarding the transmigration of his own soul from one bodily ‘garb’ to another: ‘For already I have once been a boy and a girl, a bush and a bird and a [dumb] fish from the sea’ (KRS fr.417). E. R. Dodds argued that the non-Greek belief about the soul’s transmigration from body to body, the belief that some dreams are ‘psychic excursions’, and the special technique of extra-somatic projection probably derived about the same time, from the same exogenous source.71 The seemingly incongruous juxtaposition of Empedocles’ poem on nature and the ‘mystical’ poem on purification led Jaeger to describe him as ‘a philosophical centaur, so to speak - a prodigious union of Ionian elemental physics and Orphic theology’. Vlastos remarked that ‘prodigy’ (that is, monstrous offspring) is indeed the right word to use here for ‘the union of physics and theology, as it is for the junction of immortal god and mortal flesh. The one is as much of a miracle as the other, and Empedocles doubtless devoutly believed it to be such. He left us no explanation of either, and it would be futile to try to supply it by rationalizing the theology of the mystic or mystifying the logic of the cosmologist.’72 One important dimension in Empedocles’ thought about the immortal soul is the different weight he attaches to daimon in distinction from psyche when he attempts to account for the ‘fallen state’ of some human souls. Kahn is surely right in calling attention to this when he synopsizes Empedocles’ contribution to the pre-Socratic, transitional understanding of the nature and destiny of the soul: The terms he uses suggest the continued, harmonious coexistence of discrete individuals, very much like the celestial cavalcade of gods and spirits in the Phaedrus ... [He] expresses] the inner conviction of all mystics, that there dwells within us a fallen spirit or portion of deity whose rightful place is elsewhere, in a realm of pure harmony and peace. Empedocles’ physical doctrine of Love is an attempt to integrate this conviction within a systematic explanation of the natural world ... What real connection there was between this unity [of the sphere] and the company of the blessed daimons, we simply do not know.73

Claus draws together his own tracing of life-force uses of psyche with respect to Pythagoras and Empedocles in these terms: ‘Although the new ideas of survival and of occult existence undoubtedly helped to create an environment in which the connotations of psyche could be greatly enriched as against earlier beliefs, deeply ingrained traditional attitudes had first to be overcome for such influences to be 71 Dodds, 1951, p. 172 note 97 72 Jaeger and Vlastos quoted in Kahn, 1973, pp. 428-9 note 4. 73 Kahn, 1973, pp. 449-50; agreed to by Claus, 1981, pp. 114, 119.

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felt, and this process may simply not have occurred in the century after Pythagoras.’74 It is difficult to form a coherent picture of what the pre-Socratic thinkers understood the soul to be and that is (at least in part) because it was difficult for those thinkers to understand what the soul could be - perhaps we now are in no better position. Sometimes, in their fragmentary texts, the soul is referred to as a thing or a substance with a nature or essence, whose functions are explained in terms of the predominance of one element, or the outgrowth of a mixture of elements with a predominant ‘profile’. At other times, psychical powers seem to be the properties of one specific element which, when combined in a highly determinate manner, produces a living thing manifesting such underlying functions (or properties). Granger argues that when the soul is said to be the same as, or made out of, the hot or the cold, it is an ambiguous kind of entity which perhaps one could refer to as ‘quality-thing’. In other words: [T]hey are entities in their own right, and they are not the qualities or properties of an object that provides them with a subject and the basis of their existence. Nonetheless, they were not typically thought to exist independently or in isolation from other contrary qualities and the objects they compose. Quality-things in their thing-like nature also exercise causal agency upon one another. They act directly upon their contraries after their own nature, the hot heating and the cold cooling, unless they are impeded in their own action by the qualities contrary to them, and cooled or heated in turn. The ‘qualitything’ of these presocratic natural philosophers perhaps provides an ancestor of the ‘property-thing’ that is Aristotle’s soul or form of organisms.75

Explanation on this issue moves in two or more directions: (1) the principle (arche) of soul is the presence of life-forces in the material composition of a living body; (2) the principle of all things is one or more primordial entity (including the boundless) which bestows or informs part of itself on particular kinds of things, making them living, ensouled entities. Positing the principle as the conceptual first stage in an explanation of the nature of anything, however, can follow more than one explanatory scheme: (3) it is a definite kind of underlying substance or element; (4) it is a quasi-substance, like a higher-order property or relation, for example, hot and cold, love and strife; (5) it persists into Socratic schemes, since he makes equal and unequal, opposite and the same into ideal forms. These different forces or vectors in explanation converge (or at least appear to converge) in the early seventh or sixth century under the impact of strange and alien ideas from eastern sources. The so-called ‘Orientalizing Influence’ has long been recognized by Classical scholars, especially after the publication of ancient Near Eastern texts in the 1950s, and the dissemination of the Russian research on shamanism about the time of Karl Meuli’s ground-breaking 1935 paper.76 The idea that the human soul is immortal was initially deeply interlinked with ecstatic foresight and magical practices. The

74 Claus, 1981, p. 120. 75 Granger, 1996, pp. 149-50. 76 Karl Meuli, ‘Scythica’, in Hermes, vol. 70, 1935, pp. 121-76; E. R. Dodds lucidly and succinctly expressed this insight some time ago, 1951, pp. 146-7.

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problem for these transitional thinkers was to map the non-Greek concept onto the popular, accepted usage of psyche, linguistic usage embedded in the long-standing Homeric framework which understood the soul to be a cluster of life-forces and thus, in its nature, mortal and death-bound.

Chapter 2

Plato, Aristotle and Hellenistic Thought

(1)

Plato’s twofold and threefold account of soul

Although there is some general consensus about the development of Platonic doctrines from the Early Socratic dialogues to Plato’s late work in the Laws, there is some disagreement about where to draw the lines between early, middle and late works. There is even more controversy about the development, or at least internal modification, of the Platonic doctrine of the soul (psyche). Whether the soul is mortal or immortal, material or immaterial, bipartite or tripartite, and so forth, depends to some degree on which dialogue is under examination. T. M. Robinson chooses to interpret the very idea of Plato’s multiform doctrines in a uniform manner: ‘As far as the doctrine of “personal” psyche is concerned, the dialogues ... suggest no particular development on Plato’s part. On the contrary, he appears to use particular “models” of psyche to suit particular contexts, and seems to be peculiarly unbound by dogmatism in this regard till the end of his life.’1As we will discover, however, although Plato’s mature view of the concept of soul may leave unresolved some crucial issues about the ‘nature’ of psyche, it was surely one of his main dialectical concerns to adjudicate between competing models, and attempt to account for one overall concept in which, or under which, these other models would find their place. One might well pause in some concern (if not incredulity) when considering what Robinson says about discussion appropriate to the nature and function of the soul: ‘For the term “soul” to most people (including those who reject it as nonsense) suggests an “inner person” or “ghost in the machine” (to use Ryle’s phrase), that is, in my opinion, very close to Plato’s usual view on the matter.’2 This certainly advocates an eccentric, contentious philosophical point of view by the same author who has only just castigated previous Platonic scholars for allowing their own philosophical prejudices to color their interpretation of Plato’s concept of soul. I. M. Crombie once argued that Plato’s doctrine of psyche is unstable due to strains exerted on some of the key terms by divergent, incompatible pictures of life, soul, immortality and other issues, especially where Socrates sometimes seems to be under the influence of the ‘mystics’ (about which more later). According to many scholars the Platonic doctrine of reincarnation and transmigration of souls enters at some stage of his development through the Orphic and Pythagorean secret teachings. Through this mystical infiltration, the concept of soul comes into conflict with the more common, popular understanding, one which appears to have retained many of the characteristics of Homeric psyche. Crombie asserted: 1 Robinson, 1970, pp. vii-viii. 2 Robinson, 1970, p. viii, emphasis added. 37

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History of the Concept of Mind There are at least four forces which pull upon the word psuche as Plato employs it. The one force draws it towards the meaning ‘life’, so that it is possible to speak of the psuche of a plant. The next force draws it towards the meaning ‘rationality’ and this perhaps makes it easier to attribute psuche to so orderly and punctual an object as a heavenly body; the third force tries to keep the word anchored to what Plato deems to be immortal in a human person ... the fourth force finally tries to make the word psuche serve as a name for everything mortal.3

Nearly one hundred years ago, the great Oxford classics scholar John Burnet held that the core doctrine of Socrates’ view of the soul could be found in the Apology, where Socrates’ argument before the tribunal lays great stress on the care of the soul, and how to make the soul as good as possible.4 Socrates repeatedly gives voice to an injunction about care of the soul and considers this care of one’s own soul to be the goal of wisdom and truth. He considered it his moral duty to pursue the love of truth, to examine himself and others in the hope of removing ignorance. When he enjoined someone to not care more for one’s possessions than for one’s self in order that one may become as good and wise as possible, he seems to equate the soul with the self. He appears to argue that the soul is that upon which everything else depends. Over and above the unavoidable desire for life, there is a further desire for the moral good. On one hand, the physical good is the best for one’s body, but on the other, the moral good is best for one’s soul. In the Apology, the soul is not conceived as a principle sufficient for life in the Homeric sense, but it is thought to be a necessary condition for the body’s life. Faced with the prospect of death himself, Socrates is composed, confident and agnostic about the outcome. He poses an intellectual dilemma to the tribunal in an attempt to convince them that either of only two alternative outcomes is welcome: ‘Death is one of two things: either it is annihilation and the dead have no sensation (aisthesis) of anything, or as we are told, it is really a change, a migration of the soul from this place to another. Now if there is no sensation, but only a dreamless sleep, death must be a marvelous gain’ (40b). If the whole of time after one’s death were like a dreamless sleep in an endless night, then there is nothing to fear. ‘If, on the other hand, death is a removal from here to some other place, and if what we are told is true, that all the dead are there [including the true judges], what greater blessing could there be than this?’ (40c-e). At least in the Apology, it is not Socrates’ concern to argue for the soul’s immortality, nor whether its putative immortal status is the result of its ‘nature’. Rather, he is quite explicit about one belief that he holds to be certain: ‘that nothing can harm a good person either in life or after death, and his fortunes are not a matter of indifference to the gods.’ He says that his trial has not come about by accident, and since his ‘inner voice’ (,daimon) has not counseled him against the event, it is quite clear that his time to die has come. He asserts that Socrates must go to die and the judges to live, ‘but which of us has the happier prospect is unknown to anyone but the gods’ (42a). Although the Crito does not overtly mention the soul, Socrates questions his friends about that part of a person that can be harmed by wrong actions and 3 Crombie, 1962,1, p. 301. 4 Burnet, 1916, pp. 237-40.

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benefited by good ones. Life is not worth living if that part has been damaged beyond repair; surely one cannot think that part is less important than the body (47e). The Charmides, in contrast, contains an important though obscure story about one of the sources that Socrates considers in his scrutiny of the nature of soul. From an unnamed Thracian physician Socrates heard a story about their king Zalmoxis, who said that, ‘as you ought not to attempt to cure the eyes without the head, or the head without the body, so neither ought you to attempt to cure the body without the soul.’ Those medical doctors who disregard the whole can never cure the person, since the part can never be well unless the whole of which it is a part is well: ‘For all good and evil, whether in the body or in the whole person, originates in the soul and overflows from there as if from the head into the eyes’ (156e). The whole person, therefore, consists of a body and a soul, but the two are not equal in nature or value. The analogy at work in this passage is that soul is to body as head is to eyes or body is to head. This is a strange and baffling notion, since the lesson should be that the soul is the whole of which its body is a part. Now it is true that the eye and the head can be considered two substances, but the eye has a meaning or function only in terms of the head, and the same can be said of the two substances, head and body. An eye cannot exist as a proper eye except in a head, and the body cannot exist as a proper (animal) body unless it is animated, that is, brought to life, by a soul. But in each case, the whole of which the items are parts is not a summative or aggregate whole; one cannot add up a head and an eye, a head and a body, and so forth, and then arrive at a whole person. This would be to commit a category mistake (as it came to be called); each item may indeed be a thing or a substance with identity conditions, but they are things of different kinds. Robinson says that, ‘We seem to be precluded from taking the soul as some sort of ghost or duplicate enjoying substantial existence in addition to the body; one cannot cut away the body, it seems, and find oneself left with a complete psychic substance qualifying for the name of the person or the “real self’.’5 Ostenfeld argues in almost the opposite direction when he infers from these passages that Socrates thinks that both body and soul are material substances, even though the relation of the soul to the body is rather unlike the relation of the body to its parts. To some extent the body qua body is logically and causally dependent on its parts in a way that the soul is not casually dependent on the body. He concludes that disembodiment would be logically and causally possible, whereas the body would be causally and logically dependent on the soul.6 However, there is simply no textual evidence in the Charmides, a dialogue devoted to the virtue of temperance, to support either a substance dualist interpretation or the doctrine of an immortal soul. The lesson that Socrates does derive from the report about King Zalmoxis is that the cure of the soul, harmed by immoral and dishonorable deeds, is prior to the cure of the body. The psychical cure is brought about by certain charms or incantations; Charmides wants to make a charm or amulet to ward off headaches. Socrates refers to these charms as ‘noble words’ (kaloi logoi); through the use of these words,

5 Robinson, 1970, p. 6. 6 Ostenfeld, 1982, pp. 161-2.

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‘temperance is implanted in the soul, and where temperance comes and stays, there health is more easily imparted, not only to the head, but to the whole body’ (157a). Ordinary Greeks of this era did commonly employ magical amulets or charms (epode), which often contained written incantations. But Socrates stresses that the ‘noble words’ are addressed to the soul, words which the soul then learns; it is thus an intellectual, rational process of persuasion towards the good. Robinson thinks the introduction of Zalmoxis’ message is highly significant; regarding earlier ideas of psyche, he says: Nowhere had it been affirmed that the soul is both the principle of cognition and the ‘total self’, a being entailed in any affirmation that such-and-such is a living body ... This is clear from the fact that that no one had ever said that the body was an integral part of the self. For the Homeric warrior on the one hand, the body was the self; for the Orphic the self was the incarnated soul. [Here] the self is apparently the whole man, of which body is an integral and inalienable part.7

The Zalmoxis tradition has been re-examined in great detail by Walter Burkert who showed its intimate connection with shamanism and its confusion with the Pythagorean legends.8 Claus relies on these findings when he claims that Socrates’ transformation of this figure into a physician of souls shows as much as any Platonic text the deliberate use to which historical antecedents of psuche can be put. For the Greek of the Fourth Century this passage entails contextual associations with both the immortal psuche of Pythagorean legend and the psuche as an object of medical therapy. When these have in effect canceled each other, Socrates introduces the notion of psuche as the moral self.9

Claus considers the Zalmoxis passages to be the most important text in the early dialogues for an understanding of the Socratic idea of the soul: Whatever else Plato may intend, the passage as it stands offers a profound rebuttal of any naive psycho-somaticism centering on the psuche ... The soul matters primarily because it is the locus of generalized good and evil. To such physicians, therefore, the health of the body cannot really be the object of soul therapy but merely an epiphenomenon, accompanying the health of the soul, which is a good in its own right, and since all else depends upon it, the only good with which we need concern ourselves.10

Since Burkert and Claus build very strong arguments in favor of the signal importance of the Zalmoxis story for an understanding of both the early Platonic position and evidence of an incursion of non-Greek soul-belief, let us look more closely at some details of this story. The Zalmoxis legend is derived from Hellanicus’ Barbarian Customs, itself the source of the widely known account in Herodotus (Hist. iv. 94-6). 7 Robinson, 1970, p. 8. 8 Burkert, 1972, pp. 157-65; on the state of Pythagorean studies after Burkert’s work, see Huffman, in Long 1999, pp. 66-87. 9 Claus, 1981, p. 170, note 44. 10 Claus, 1981, p. 171.

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Zalmoxis was the deified king of the Getae tribe, ‘those who live without death’, and he may have been a disciple of Pythagoras. Every four years the Getae send their god a messenger by means of a human sacrifice. Zalmoxis the King had built a banquet hall where he entertained his guests, and promised them that they and their descendants would not die, but would live forever enjoying all good things. He also built an underground chamber where he withdrew for three years and was mourned as dead; but in the fourth year he returned to the surface and was acclaimed for his conquest of death. Burkert considers it doubtful that this underground chamber really belongs to the Zalmoxis tradition; it is more likely that Zalmoxis dwelt in high places, where religious beliefs normally accord the holiest setting.11 Other features of the story also support the view that it has become amalgamated with the Pythagorean legends, especially his ‘going-under’ (katabasis). Both Zalmoxis and Pythagoras exhibit ritual techniques and issue sayings (acusmata) that pertain to shamanistic practices, ecstatic travel to other places, overcoming death, bringing back health to the sick, and conducting souls of the dead to their new home: ‘The significance of the idea of shamanism for the history of philosophy lies in the conjecture that the new conception of the soul, which was to become the dominant one through the influence of Plato, is to be traced to this source. The independence of the soul from the body is immediately experienced and depicted in the shaman’s ecstasy.’12 In the Protagoras, Socrates advises Hippocrates, an aspirant to the study of wisdom, when the young man demands to see Protagoras, the famous sophistteacher, about the greater importance of soul over body. Socrates poses the hypothesis that if you were to entrust your body (soma) to a stranger for treatment then you would ponder deeply about whether this was a good or a bad thing, whether you had good reason to trust the stranger with your body. But if you were to entrust your soul to a stranger, as Hippocrates seems to want now, then you have consulted with your friends about whether it is a good thing to put your soul in the care of a stranger. Socrates shows some surprise and annoyance that the young man has not discussed whether or not to entrust ‘your self’ to Protagoras (313b). Having carefully segregated soul from body, Socrates now clearly identifies soul and self; entrusting the soul (psyche) is the same thing as entrusting oneself. To reinforce his point about the folly of eagerly trusting in a sophist as trainer of the soul, he draws an analogy between merchants who supply food for the body and the sophists who supply food for the soul. Unlike bodily foods which the buyer can take away to examine before consuming, pieces of knowledge cannot be taken away without being already taken in, that is, in the process of learning knowledge is received in the soul. Socrates draws the further lesson that the soul can be either righteous (khreston) or depraved (poneron) as the result of the benefit or harm it receives from such knowledge. However, the nature of the relation between soul and body is left unexplored till another dialogue that features another great teacher, Gorgias.

11 Burkert 1972, pp. 100-102. 12 Burkert, 1972, p. 163; see also Comford, 1965, pp. 88-106; Dodds, 1951, pp. 135-78; and Mircea Eliade, Shamanism: Archaic Techniques of Ecstasy, trans. by W. R. Trask. New York: Pantheon Press, 1964, pp. 103-10.

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In the Gorgias, Socrates argues that there is a specific art or technique for the maintenance of health in the body and another for health (or well-being) in the soul. For the body the appropriate techniques are gymnastics and medicine; with regard to the soul, it is politics, including knowledge of the law and justice. He refers to ‘the pair, body and soul’ (duoi pragmatoin) which suggests that here he considers body and soul to be on an equal footing, though the soul is in charge of (epistatein) the body. In the extended analogy between medicine and cookery, Socrates argues that the former is concerned with the good of the soul (and thus the whole person), whereas the latter has only the goal of pleasure for the body. Claus claims that in this passage the relation of soul and body is ‘decisively transformed’ from the earlier crude analogy of therapy for body and therapy for soul. In the prior analogy, ‘those things that were once regarded as practical treatments for the psycho-somatic soul are relegated to the role of cookery in treating the body. The various extended analogies in the Gorgias finish any practical or technical interest in the body-soul analogy and exploit the comparison with medicine as a means for inquiry into more abstract ideas of soul ... [This is] the first unmistakable antithesis in Plato of soul as master and body as subject.’13 With regard to Socrates’ alleged acceptance or rejection of common, everyday Greek notions of psyche, Claus argues that, ‘the main point of interest is that the antithesis has come about not by separating soul and body on religious or ontological grounds ... but by constructing an extended discussion which assumes, in contrast to earlier ideas, that body and soul are served by utterly different therapies, not by a common, or nearly common, therapy addressed to a psycho-somatic mixture of body and soul.’ The Socratic or early Platonic view of the nature of human being is clearly some sort of dualism, but what sort of dualism is not yet decided; whether the soul is mortal or immortal, material or immaterial, is left in the air. The distinctive stand Socrates takes in the Gorgias shows ‘the soul’s capacity for selfregulation, through its own achievement of internal regularity and order, that gives it the capacity to achieve sophrosyne, and this self-regulation is compared at once to the regularity supposed for the body’s constituent parts by scientific medicine.’14 The Gorgias dialogue seems to occupy a crucial place in Plato’s constantly elaborated description of the soul, for it decisively establishes the essential congruity of the soul with the individual human person. Claus concludes his examination of this text with these words: ‘The chief accomplishment of the Gorgias then is to establish unequivocally ... the identity of soul as a comprehensive personal self and to use that doctrine as a way of clearing the air of what are by comparison the shallow and morally unacceptable versions of both the animative [life-force] and afterlife soul that Plato had inherited from others.’15 In an effort to persuade Callicles of his rather uncommon point of view about the nature of soul Socrates makes use of a mythical story whose seriousness and literalness have been the subject of much controversy. It concerns an alleged comment made by the tragic writer Euripides, ‘who knows then if life be death and death be life?’ To which Socrates responds with these reflections: 13 Claus, 1981, pp. 176-80; see Robinson, 2000, pp. 40^1-5. 14 Claus, 1981, p. 179. 13 Claus, 1981, p. 180.

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And perhaps we are actually dead, for I once heard one of our wise men say that we are now dead, and that our body is a tomb, and that that part of the soul in which dwell the desires is of a nature to be swayed and to shift to and fro. And so some clever fellow, an Italian or Sicilian, writing in an allegory, by a slight perversion of language named this part of the soul a ‘jar’, because it can be swayed and easily persuaded; the foolish he called the uninitiated, and that part of the soul in foolish people where the desires reside, the uncontrolled and unretentive part, he likened to a leaky jar, because it can never be filled ... He shows that some of those in Hades, by which he means the unseen world, the uninitiated, must be the most unhappy, for they will carry water to pour into a perforated jar in a similar perforated sieve. And by the sieve, my informant told me, he means the soul, and the soul of the foolish he compared to a sieve, because it is perforated and through lack of belief and forgetfulness is unable to hold anything. These ideas may naturally seem somewhat absurd, but they reveal what I want to put before you ... (493a-c)

Walter Burkert reports that an early scholiast on this text named the Pythagoreans, particularly Empedocles, as the ‘wise ones’ who held this view, but also remarks that Socrates is prone to call several others by the name sophos.16 In addition, he says that the sophist must be distinguished from the mythologer, either Sicilian or Italian, who recounts the myth of the water-carrier, an image known in the Delphic mysteries and which may have been an element in an Orphic katabasis,17 In his use of this myth, for whatever didactic purposes, Socrates refers to two important motifs: the image of the soul as a vessel and its contents as liquid, and the image of the body as a tomb or prison. On his use of these pivotal ideas in such an early dialogue, E. R. Dodds comments that Plato makes continual efforts ‘to transpose his religious beliefs from the mythical to the philosophical level, thus transforming them into truths of reason. This has the curious result that his conclusions often emerge earlier than the philosophical arguments by which they are established; thus his doctrine of the soul appears in mythical guise in the Gorgias before it is presented as a truth of reason in the Phaedo.’18 In the Phaedo, Plato presents a reconstruction of the last days of his beloved master Socrates. Condemned to death by the Athenian tribunal, Socrates spends his final days in prison with his close friends, discussing the nature of death, the soul and wisdom. Here he declares that the soul and the body are two separate and separable things, that the soul survives bodily death, and moreover that the soul is immortal. Here he asserts that the core property of the soul is intellect (nous), and the body is a tomb or prison. His two principal disputants are Simmias and Kebes, two Pythagoreans from Thebes, who belonged to the school of Philolaus, one of Pythagoras’ chief exponents and interpreters.19 With regard to the vexed question of Pythagorean influence on Platonic doctrines, Burkert comments: The true problem of the Pythagorean tradition lies in Platonism, for Platonizing interpretation took the place of historical reality. One can only guess at the reason why

!6 Burkert, 1972, p. 78, note 157. 17 Burkert, 1972, p. 248, note 48. !8 Dodds, 1945, p. 24. 19 Crombie, 1962, vol. I, p. 305.

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History of the Concept of Mind Plato and his pupils saw themselves as continuators of Pythagoreanism. Personal contacts were certainly important; they were already present in the Socratic circle. Simmias and Cebes of Thebes, ‘hearers’ of Philolaus, appear even in Xenophon as pupils of Socrates and we may believe that, as the Phaedo has it, the Pythagorean Echecrates of Philius had some connection with Socrates.

He also adduces the connected point that Timaeus claimed to have received from him some information about the Locrians: ‘Plato’s friendship with Archytas is attested by the Seventh Letter, and the later biographers of Plato agree that a principal motive of his first journey to Magna Graecia was to establish contact with the Pythagoreans there.’20 The correct view of philosophy is to conduct one’s life as a preparation for dying and death, Socrates tells his distraught friends, and thus there is no reason for the lover of wisdom to fear death (64a). A proper understanding of the nature of soul will lead to a better grasp of what death means. If you think that the soul is like smoke or vapor dissipated on the wind when the body dies, then you would have a childish fear of death (70a, 77d). But if you come to understand that the soul is incorporeal, intellectual and immortal then death is seen as a release (or return) to its original, pure state. Death, he says, is ‘the separate condition of the body by itself when it is released from the soul, and the separate condition by itself of the soul when released from the body’ (64c). Socrates advances arguments to demonstrate the immortality of the soul, arguments that are of interest for our purposes only in so far as they show what he takes the soul to be.21 He also adduces various ‘stories’ (or myths) to illustrate either incorrect accounts of the soul or to further support some specific feature of his own account of the soul. Sometimes it is difficult for his readers to determine which alternative the illustration is meant to support.22 The soul, he says, ‘can best reflect when it is free of all distractions, such as hearing or seeing or pain or pleasure of any kind, that is, when it ignores the body and becomes as far as possible independent ... in its search for reality’ (65c). He refers to the function or power of the soul as ‘unaided intellect’ and ‘pure and unadulterated thought’ (66a). The use of the term ‘intellect’ (nous) indicates one key aspect of the soul, and the use of ‘purity of soul’ another. The influence of Orphic-style conceptions on Socrates’ account in the Phaedo is clearly evidenced in his remarks about the body as a nuisance, a positive evil and a hindrance to the soul’s grasp of the truth. Much of the first half of the dialogue employs ascetic language in keeping with Orphic mystery rituals: inner purification, cultic initiation and despising one’s body. The concept of sin or moral evil as pollution is itself derived from the archaic notion, in both Hebrew and Greek thought, that the soul as an internal and concrete thing can be stained.23 Socrates summarizes his main line of argument thus: ‘No soul which has not practiced philosophy and is not absolutely 20 Burkert, 1972, p. 92; Kingsley, 1995, pp. 110-15. 21 Several scholars have pointed out the fallacies in these arguments, see for example, Crombie, 1962, vol. I, pp. 307, 318-20; these need not concern us here. 22 Robinson, 2000, pp. 45-8. 23 For the archaic idea of sin as an inner stain, see Paul Ricoeur, The Symbolism of Evil. Boston: Beacon Press, 1970, Chapter One.

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pure when it leaves the body may attain to the divine nature; that is for the lover of wisdom’ (82b). There is an old story that the souls of the dead exist in another world, Socrates continues, that they return again to this world, and come into being from the dead (70c). The argument that follows attempts to show that everything comes to be from its opposite, the living from the dead, the dead from the living; that a living being has soul, and that the dead are without life but not without soul. Socrates imports the doctrine of recollection (anamnesis) from the Meno to show that truths of reason, grasped by the intellect alone (nous) could only be achieved if the person’s soul had once been in contact with the Forms, before its birth (that is, entrapment or imprisonment) in the body, whose sense organs provide diminished images of these forms: ‘Our souls had a previous existence, Simmias, before they took on this human shape. They were independent of our bodies and they possessed intelligence’ (76c). Another argument proceeds from the liability of composite or compound objects to dissipate or break up into their component parts, and of simple pure things to remain as they are. Since the person’s sense organs convey images of composite things and since percepts are prone to error, confusion and obscurity, the body qua composite of organic natural parts is liable to decompose and break apart; but since the soul has existed in a prior state and can be trained to grasp the timeless and unchanging forms, it too must be timeless and unchanging. When the soul reflects ‘it passes into the realm of the pure and everlasting and immortal and changeless, and since it is of a kindred nature, when it is once independent and free from interference, it consorts with it always and strays no longer, but remains ... and this condition of the soul we call wisdom’ (79d). In response to one of Cebes’ objections, Socrates refers to the Egyptian practice of embalming dead bodies (80c), where the physical parts remain for some time after death. However, Socrates continues, the soul as an invisible part goes away to an unseen world (Hades), ‘into the presence of the good and wise god’. Those humans whose souls are pure upon their arrival are rewarded with happiness, release from uncertainty and folly, fears and uncontrolled desires and all other human evils, and where, ‘as they say of the initiates in the mysteries, it really spends the rest of the time with god’ (81a). It is no accident that this doctrine appears in the context of the Orphic mysteries and Egyptian mortuary practices. One of the most contentious scholarly hypotheses concerns the so-called Orientalizing Influence24 on Classical Greek thinking, and here this might take the shape of Oriental beliefs about the soul’s immortality. Pythagoras’ two pupils, Philolaus and Echechrates, clearly demonstrate the connection between Plato’s philosophical ancestry and Oriental mystery religions. One of the mystery’s main tenets concerns the idea of reincarnation, in this context, the belief that impure souls are compelled to wander the earth until imprisoned in another body. But it is Cebes who says that the soul ‘has such natural vitality that it persists through 24 See M. L. West, 1971, Introduction; Walter Burkert, The Orientalizing Influence, Harvard University Press, 1992, Chapter 1; Dodds, 1951, pp. 146-7; the influence in this period is clearly evident in plastic arts and ceramics, see R. M. Cook, Greek Art, Penguin Books (1972) 1991, pp. 37-41.

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successive incarnations’ (88a), and this is not possible on Crombie’s interpretation that Socrates argues for the idea of psyche as an animating or life-force principle. One version of the mature Platonic account of the soul emerges in the Phaedrus; in this famous text (245ff) Plato presents one of his great ‘myths’, using its archetypal imagery to arrive at truths of reason about the nature and powers of soul.25 He opens the myth by saying that his story applies to ‘soul in all its forms’, that is, to the very Form (eidos) of the human soul itself. His story revolves around the principal image of the human being as a chariot ensemble: the chariot, its driver, and two horses, one noble and one base. Like all other animals, the human has (a) a chariot (the body) which is dragged along with the whole, inanimate and not selfmoving; (b) a noble horse, that which inspires to higher emotions, and (c) a base horse, that which craves desirable things.26 But unlike other animals, a human alone has a driver, that which thinks and reasons; the driver or driving force provides the whole with direction. In one of the passages describing the whole soul Plato asserts that it is eternally moving (aeikinetos) and self-moving (autokinetos) (245c). Robinson comments that ‘this view of soul as a principle of movement is a milestone in Plato’s thought, and the direct ancestor of the cosmological argument from motion first outlined by Aristotle and followed by Aquinas.’27 Robinson goes on to assert that the driver and the noble horse always act in union, that together the pair comprise the good, moral and just form of the soul, whereas the base horse, wanton and lustful, is in conflict with the human-noble horse pair, and that this segregation indicates bipartition, that is, the soul has two parts. But, as we shall see below, this is an unwarranted conclusion which rests on a confusion between real division into parts and conceptual distinction between powers. Socrates carefully unpacks the details of this story: ‘Any body that has an external source of motion is soulless, but a body deriving its motion from a source within itself is animate or ensouled’ (245e). He concludes that souls of all kinds are immortal, and since psyche is the principle (arche) and cause (aitia) of life, this is an accurate indication of the nature (ousia) of psyche. However, the complete nature of soul would require a long story that only a god could tell. Thus he proposes an analogy with a winged chariot, driver and two horses. ‘The composite structure of soul and body is called a living being and is further called mortal’ (246c); though it is true that an individual living being is composed of two things, body and soul, the soul itself is composite. The ontological status of the soul’s constituents is non-determinate according to the Phaedrus account: ‘All soul [or every form of soul] has the care of all that is inanimate and traverses the whole universe though in ever-changing forms.’ The further imagery of the soul’s ascent 25 See Cornford, 1952, pp. 67-70. 26 My grasp of these Phaedrean ‘powers’ was greatly clarified by C. J. Rowe, who remarked to me that ‘the white horse seems to represent the higher emotions, i.e. those not associated with food, drink, and sex; esp. emotions connected with power, ambition, and self-esteem. Not without reason, as they say, is thumos in this context translated as “spirit” (but not “vital spirit”), [rather] as in “a spirited horse”.’ 27 Robinson, 1970, p. 116; he also argues that the later Timaeus account endorses a basic bipartition into mortal and immortal parts, although he admits that the soul is further subdivided, pp. 122—4.

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and traversal of the eternal unchanging heavens is taken up and adumbrated more fully in the Timaeus and, centuries later, by Plotinus in the Enneads. In other dialogues Plato uses the word ‘chariot’ for star (Timaeus 41e, Laws 899a, Epinomis 986b), by which he may have meant that the gods move through their orbits like chariots round a circuit in fixed patterns forever. But humans are confined to this mutable world; a living being is compounded or blended from soul and body, though the soul itself is not a composite or compound, even though it has three functions or forms. The driver possesses reason, insight and foresight, and directs the two horses (247c); one horse is basically good, loves glory, and is temperate and modest (253d); the other horse is crooked, hot-blooded, wanton and lustful (253e).28 As we shall see later, this threefold structure is entirely compatible with the three forms of the soul in the Republic: logistikon, thumoeides and epithumetikon. In the Phaedrus account, according to Ostenfeld, ‘the soul is viewed as desire for knowledge, but has other bodily interests as well, and this applies to gods no less than to men. Tripartition, therefore, seems to involve three tendencies of an organism rather than three parts of an immaterial substance ... The innovation in Plato’s psychology, if we are right, is therefore better stated by saying that from now on the soul is essentially embodied and therefore tripartite.’29 The use of ‘wings’ in ‘winged chariot’ and ‘winged soul’ relies on a commonly accepted psychical picture, itself reaching back into archaic thought. Homer said that the thumos could fly (II. xvi.469, xxiii.880), speeches that issue from the thumos are winged like birds (epea pteroenta), unspoken thoughts kept in the phrenes are not winged (Od. xvii.57). These archaic, ordinary figures of speech might have suggested Plato’s image of the soul as a cage full of birds,30 though it does not employ the chariot-horse analogy (Thaetetus 197c). Homer also uses horse imagery when he talks about the winds (II. xvi.149; xx.223) and the winds are manifestations of the god’s ruling breath, itself closely associated with psyche as breath.31 The well-known doctrine of the so-called tripartition or three-part soul occurs in Republic Books Four and Ten; some traces of this doctrine also appear in the Timaeus and the Laws. Socrates’ exposition of the nature and function of the individual soul follows after and is designed to support his elaborate and multi faceted argument about the three classes or kinds of citizen in the ideal polis. One of the very first problems which any student of Plato’s teachings on the soul has to deal with is the heavy emphasis on parts in the innumerable commentaries on the Republic. It is difficult to find a translation or exegesis which does not use part-terms, for example, ruling part, spirited part, desiring part, and tripartite, bipartite, and so forth. An explicit instance of this presumption about the validity of part-terms in the middle Platonic concept of soul is found in a recent work on St. Paul: ‘While Greek thought tended to regard the human being as made up of distinct parts, Hebrew thought saw the human being more as a whole person existing on different dimensions. As we might say, it was more characteristically 28 For which see Ostenfeld, 1982, p. 324, note 132. 29 Ostenfeld, 1982, p. 232. 30 For the use of birds in soul imagery, see Onians, p. 67, note 4. 31 Onians, p. 120, note 6.

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Greek to conceive of the human person “partitively”, whereas it was more characteristically Hebrew to conceive of the human person “aspectively”’32 - but this claim is simply not supported by textual evidence. Julia Annas judiciously comments on this issue: Talk of “parts” of the soul has also been found a problem. But Plato never says that they are spatial or temporal parts, and in fact does not use the language of “parts” himself very much. Plato keeps his vocabulary here perhaps deliberately vague; he is insisting that there is complexity in a single person without saying too much about how that complexity might be realized.’33 It is crucial that one understands the reasons for our reluctance here to use part-terms to interpret and reconcile Plato’s elaborate description of the nature of human being, especially with respect to its soul. This long and intricate argument (from 436a to 448e) is devoted to the dialectical discovery of three distinct ‘items’ in the human psyche (though animals share two of the same ‘items’). He refers to these three ‘items’ in these terms: (a) logos - reason, or logistikon = the reasoning, or that-which-reasons; (b) thumos = spirit, or thumoeides = the spirited, or that-which-inspires; and (c) epithumos = desire or appetite, or epithumetikon = the desiring, or that-which-desires. Although Plato refers to these three items, either together or one by one, at least one hundred times, he only uses the word meros (‘part’) twice - this hardly licenses the regular translation of each instance in part-terms. The most common word by which he refers to the three groups of citizens is gene (kinds or classes), and the most common word by which he refers to the three soul ‘items’ is eide (plural of eidos), usually translated in other Platonic texts as ‘form’, in fact, it is the suffix for the second item - thumo-eides. There are several occasions when he uses the term onta (‘entity’ - very neutral) or ousia (‘nature’ or ‘essence’); sometimes he simply says, ‘the first’, ‘the second’ or ‘the third’. The most important lesson to be drawn from this philological examination is that no conclusion can be made about the part-like or tripartite division of the soul. As we shall see in the third section below, it is largely due to Cicero’s rather haphazard translation and exposition four centuries later that the term pars (plural, partes) is imposed on the Platonic texts, and from these Latin versions the part-vocabulary enters the philosophical canon. In his meticulous examination of the various ways in which later Platonists, Neo-Platonists, and Patristic writers used Plato’s so-called ‘tripartite’ schema, David Bell remarked on the uncritical adoption of part-like terms to explain Plato’s position: ‘Much of the problem ... devolves upon the meaning of the word “part”, for if it is taken in a crude and obvious sense (which Plato never intended), it is clearly at variance with any idea of an indivisible soul.’ To which he adds in an attached note, quoting an article by J. L. Stocks: ‘Plato himself clearly means “trifunctional”, and uses a series of terms, not just mere, to describe the three modes of the soul’s operation: eide, gene, tropoi, ethe. But “in English the word part suggests a crudity of which Plato was incapable.” The continual agitation of later writers over the term is 32 James Dunn, Theology of Paul the Apostle, Eerdmans, 1998, p. 54; emphasis added. 33 Annas, 1981, p. 124; ‘Plato uses ... most often the term eidos, only occasionally the more committing term meros. This shows that Plato is understandably cautious in speaking of the parts of something non-bodily.’ Ostenfeld, 1982, pp. 215-16. In their commentary on the Republic, Cross and Woozley clearly indicate that the translation ‘part’ is inadequate

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therefore less a reflection of a real difficulty in Plato’s teaching than the power of the slogan [three-part].’34 The ‘power’ of reason is also referred to as that which loves wisdom (philosophon) and learning (philomathes)\ its two functions are first, searching for the truth and increase in knowledge; in addition, it derives pleasure from this pursuit. Its second function is to rule the whole soul, since it is the only soul-form that cares for the interests of the whole soul and not just itself, whereas the other two soul-forms care only for their own interests; to logistikon corresponds closely to the driver in the Phaedrus myth. The second form, thumos (‘spirit’) is also referred to as that which loves honor (philotimon) and victory (philonikon). Thumos had been a prominent soul-term in Homer, but then declined in importance in poetic and tragic literature until the fourth century, where it recurs in more specific psychic contexts.35 Perhaps ‘spirited force’ might be a more accurate rendition of thumos, since ‘spirit’ in the NT and later Hellenistic texts translates pneuma. The term to thumoeides means that which shows aggressive, assertive and forceful tendencies, more overtly seen in children and animals; it can be rough and harsh unless properly trained, and corresponds closely to the noble horse. The third ‘power’ is desire or appetite, epithumetikon’y it loves money (philochrematon) and gain (philokerdes); it corresponds most closely to the base horse. Socrates is hard pressed to make the same correlation as in the other two cases: ‘because of its manifold aspects we had no special name to give it, but we have named it after the biggest and strongest thing in it, and have called it the appetitive because of the violence of the appetites for food, drink, sex and other things which follow from these.’ In Book Ten of the Republic, Plato returns to his teaching about the psyche in order to draw further insights about reason and desire. Reason, he says, enables humans to correct visual impressions by appeal to the objective procedures of counting, weighing and measuring (602c-603b); it also enables humans to achieve some distance from immediate misfortunes by situating them in a wider context. Desire appears as the psychic form that accepts visual appearances without reflection and indulges or gives way to emotional discharges. The whole soul when turned toward objects illuminated by truth and reality appears to have reason; as the sun ‘causes’ vision and light, so the Good ‘causes’ knowledge and truth. Ostenfeld comments that, ‘The soul is viewed as an organ possessing dynamis [power] for knowledge, just as its objects have dynamis for being known; both are activated or triggered off by the Good ... So ergon [function] is related to dynamis, not exactly as effect to cause, but rather as actualization to disposition. Hence it would seem that ergon may be viewed either as actualization of a disposition or ... as a function of a thing.’36 The passage in Book Ten which introduces the argument regarding the immortality of the soul carries forward the sight-seeing-sun metaphor in its treatment of the natural good and its opposite in terms of the eye as an organ of sight; this extension brings out the force of disposition versus function. The soul, he says in this later text, has only one natural evil (injustice), and misleading in most cases, but then fall back on metaphorical, as opposed to literal, use of part-whole terminology, Cross & Woozley, 1964, p. 127. 34 David Bell, 1980, p. 18 and note 8 (from sec. 3 below). 35 Claus, 1981, pp. 49-50. 36 Ostenfeld, 1982, p. 212.

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but it is not destroyed by injustice, rather the soul is provoked to overcome it and become good; from this, Plato is willing to conclude that the soul must be immortal (608d-61 la). Book Ten seems to ignore the threefold division of the soul advanced in Book Four, and instead focuses exclusively on various dualities: the good (or highest) versus the base (or lowest), rational versus irrational, mortal versus immortal, body versus soul. However, it is difficult, if not impossible, to reconcile Plato’s threefold division in the Phaedrus and Republic Book Four with the twofold division in Republic Book Ten. The myth of Er in Book Ten confuses the issue even further. According to this story, a warrior caught between life and death is permitted to view the workings of the cosmic spheres and the movement of human souls from the underworld to the heavens, their selection of lots in earthly lives, and the punishments and rewards they receive in their various after-lives.37 However, three important cautions should be registered here. First, the twofold analysis in Book Ten concerns the substances involved in human ‘nature’: soul qua substance is incorporeal and immortal, subject to rebirth in many forms, basically good though corruptible, basically rational though susceptible to irrational desires. Whereas body qua substance, on the other hand, is corporeal and mortal, the temporary prison of the soul, the seat of irrational and immoral desires, and basically bad (aschron, perhaps better translated ‘shameful’), though it can be trained. The threefold division of the soul in terms of the living being whose body is its vehicle is generally compatible with the substance dualist account. Although it is true that some implications of Plato’s separate analyses of connections between reason, ‘spirit’ and desire are in conflict with wisdom, justice and temperance. Moreover, Plato admits that our poor, frail human intellect cannot grasp the real nature of the soul; its condition, he says ... resembles that of the sea god Glaucus J38l His first nature can hardly be made out by those who catch glimpses of him, because the original members of his body are broken off and mutilated and crushed and in every way marred by the waves; other parts have attached themselves to him, accretions of shells and seaweed and rocks, so that he is more like any wild creature than what he was by nature - even such is our vision of the soul marred by countless evils (61 Id).

In other words, given Plato’s clear commitment to a divinely crafted, immortal soul, temporarily housed in an organic body, an individual’s intuition (insight into pure forms) will be dimmed and confused by sensible appearances. In this case, the sensible aspects of a living being obscure the hidden, inner power (dynamis) that animates the whole organism. It is also generally agreed that Book Ten is something like a set of appendices or supplements added to the previous nine books, in response to specific requirements made by the Socratic characters and later students in the Academy. 37 Annas carefully teases out a number of serious problems and errors in the Er account, 1981, pp. 345-53. 38 Glaucus from glaukos, ‘gray’ or ‘sea-gray’ color, a deified mortal with prophetic powers, according to Aeschylus’ Glaucus Pontius, TGF 3. 142-8, and Euripides’ Oresteia, 362-5.

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The late dialogue Timaeus presents one of the most influential and monumental Platonic systems. It involves the cosmogony of the Demiurge and the World Soul; the cosmology and astronomy of the celestial spheres; the psychogony of the creation of all souls; the cycles of birth, death and rebirth, and many other themes. It is difficult to situate the historical character Timaeus, and equally difficult to situate the Timaeus-doctnnts within the Platonic corpus. Exegetes in the next few centuries, such as Xenocrates, Speusippus and Posidonius, interpreted Plato’s Timaeus as Pythagorean, and this particular exegesis is partly responsible for the dialogue being considered a source of genuine Pythagorean teaching. Plato’s pupils, especially Aristotle, considered the Timaeus’ exposition of ideal numbers to be distinctively Pythagorean.39 However, Plato clearly wanted to characterize Timaeus as one of the Pythagoreans, and indicated this affiliation in several ways: by saying that he was from Italy, that he studied the nature of all things (peri phuseds tou pantos), that he was politically active, and so forth.40 It is not feasible, nor strictly relevant to our purposes, to delve into the many fascinating aspects of this dialogue; let us focus our attention on its account of the human soul.41 The cosmos was created by a divine craftsman (demiourgos) using the model of a compound form, described as the perfect and eternal living being. The sensible world is thus a living being (30d), which receives a soul through its composition in a celestial mixing bowl. The craftsman also creates the divine portion of human souls, though this portion has an inferior nature. In addition, he is the creator of the gods themselves and to these he delegates the formation of non-human animal souls, and the non-divine portions of human souls. It is the gods’ task to complete the making of the world, filled with living beings, an imperfect imitation of the archetypal living being. Human souls have an intermediate status (meson) between the eternal and indivisible, and the limited and divisible. The soul is a double mixture (krasis) of the divisible and indivisible (in three versions), and a mixture of being, difference and sameness. Part of the being, sameness and difference that comprises the soul is characterized as constant and indivisible (ameristos), and thus is similar to the timeless and perfect Forms or Ideas. The other part is variable (gignomene) and divisible (meriste) and is in these respects similar to copies (mimemata) of the Forms which enter and leave parts of space (51b). According to Ostenfeld’s synopsis of these main points: [T]he soul’s affinity to matter means: first, it is in time ...; second, it is in space, i.e. it inhabits an individual body; third, it moves in some sense, i.e. it can act and be acted on; fourth, it is generated in terms of its intermediate status. The soul’s affinity to the Forms means that: (1) it is everlasting; (2) invisible; (3) bound together by proportion; (4) moves in uniform circles; (5) it is the best of generated things. In sum, the soul is a harmonious compound which is only dissoluble in theory, i.e. its parts (or forms) are not normally separable.42

39 See Physics 209b, De Anima 404b; Burkert, 1972, p. 65. 40 Burkert, 1972, pp. 84-6; Cornford, 1965, pp. 117-20. 41 On the concepts of soul, mind and reason in the Timaeus, see esp. Frede 1996, pp. 3458. 42 Ostenfeld, 1982, p. 245.

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Stripped of its mythical overtones, the Timaeus account says that the soul is by nature similar to, not the same as, the conjunction of both form (eidos) and matter (hule). On first glance, the soul seems an improbable and monstrous compound made up from an incorporeal, indivisible portion, and a corporeal, divisible portion - but not in light of Plato’s theory of opposites and composites: ‘White and notwhite, for instance, are logically uncombinable, but factually they combine well. Only, white is no longer white when blended with not-white. Soul is like gray [glaukos], a genuine third entity with qualities of its own. It is neither absolutely self-consistent and indivisible, nor ever changing and divisible, but it is ever thinking the same about the same and it is a harmonic mixture.’43 The soul stuff is divided into as many souls as there are stars and each soul receives a star from whose position it learns the nature and laws of the cosmos and its own destiny. When the gods fabricated the human body, they fastened the orbits of the immortal soul to that living being’s vehicle. The organism’s dependence on food, sensation and other external things upsets the orbits, bringing the same to a halt, robbing it of power and motion, while difference is disordered. The harmoniously divided circles are indissoluble except by their maker, but they are twisted in all directions so that their movements are irregular (43d). Sensations and bodily needs impinge on the soul so that it cannot tell, that is, give an account, of the same and the different (4Id). In addition to the form of sensation (aisthesis), humans have desire mixed with pleasure and pain, and fear and anger (42a). While ‘spirit’ (thumos) is located in the chest (70a), bodily desire (epithumos) is bound like a wild beast to the stomach (70d); reason (logos) is located in the head, because it is spherical and thus an imitation of the perfect cosmos. Onians claimed that Alcmaeon of Croton was the first thinker to suggest the importance of the brain (enkephalos) in an account of the soul: ‘He held that the seed came from the brain; but against an existing view that this came exclusively from the marrow, he tried to show that the flesh, more particularly the fat, was also drawn upon. But even this was not new. He discovered passages leading from the eyes to the brain and urged that the latter received the perceptions of sight, sound and smell, and was the seat of thought. This is a very real advance.’44 Timaeus, then, had something like an Alcmaeon-style empirical view when he described the internal movements (kineseis) that pass through the body to the soul (45d). In a later passage, the marrow45 (muelos) is considered to be the life bearing substance at the root or basis of the soul (75b); some marrow has more soul and genius than other varieties, even the bones are ensouled. The soul is planted or fastened in the marrow; it is the seed (sperma) or in the seed, and the seed is stored in the skull and spine; it is further transmitted through the genitals for procreation (91b). But beyond this organic picture, reason in the Timaeus is closely allied to the principle of self-motion and thus to the life-giving force of organisms. It is in control and directs the lower psychic forms, desire and appetite, tied to both the body through the blood, marrow and breath, and towards food, 43 Ostenfeld, 1982, p. 245. 44 Onians, p. 115; on various medical studies of the brain as seat of thought, see Gundert, in Wright & Potter, 2000, pp. 13-36. 45 On the importance of marrow, see Onians, pp. 110, 119-20, 149-50.

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drink and sustenance, but still taking part in the divine through its affinity with the Forms. In summary, whatever the merits of the general argument about different, sometimes incompatible stages in the maturation of Plato’s thought from early to middle to late period, it is clearly evident that Plato’s account of soul undergoes profound modifications. When Plato turns toward questions about the soul it is almost always in an ethical context, or with an ethical point of view, either with regard to the good of an individual or the good of society, according to Claus. He is rarely concerned with strictly metaphysical questions about the nature, composition and functions of the soul, unless such abstract issues touch upon the ethically prior question of the soul’s good in this life, care for the soul, justice amongst ensouled agents, the immortal soul’s rewards and punishments, and so forth. In the early dialogues Socrates is decidedly agnostic about both the nature of the soul and its immortality; to some degree his attitude and arguments reflect the carry-over of Homeric ideas into common usage. In this sense the Socratic picture of the human soul is an ambiguous substance monism; that is, psyche is the life-force, the principle of self-motion, the bodily endowment of an animal being, manifest in its breath, blood and desire. As such the psyche is more noble in humans than in other animals, with greater aspirations for the good (worthy) and greater temptations for the crass (unworthy). It is this moralization and revaluation of the distinctively human dimension of the human soul that sets Socrates’ analyses apart from more traditional conceptions; the soul set over against the body is a strictly pedagogical division which permits the notion of a psychical therapy.46 At some later date Plato’s dialogues reveal some knowledge (perhaps personal experience) of so-called ‘m ystical’ doctrines, whether they are Orphic, Pythagorean, or derived from some other shamanistic set of beliefs. The exposition of Plato’s views, whether voiced by Socrates or by one of his visitors, is either under the influence of, or attempts to take account of, various teachings about the immortality and immateriality of the human soul. It becomes an important, even necessary concern for him to demonstrate that the soul is a separate and separable substance, intimately linked with the animal body and dependent for some of its functions on the whole being, an ensouled body. But with regard to its highest (most noble) functions, rational insight into the Forms, pursuit of the good, and return to its divine source, the soul can exist on its own, independently of the existence of its host. The Phaedrus, Parmenides and especially the Timaeus show Plato grappling with the difficulties attendant on the merger of the previous Socratic picture and this new mystical vision. Conceptual schemata that superimpose on these texts either part-like terms, such as bipartition or tripartition, or section-like terms, such as bisection or trisection, are unwarranted later accretions that obscure Plato’s significant achievement. Other awkward efforts to determine whether or not some stage of Plato’s account, or even an allegedly uniform Platonic account, is either dualist or monist or pluralist often fail to discriminate what it is there are said to be two or more of. It is one thing to assert that Plato said that there are two separate things, soul and body, or two ‘parts’ of

46 See Claus, 1981, pp. 181-3.

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one whole, the individual; it is another thing to claim that he said that the soul has two (or three) things as ‘parts’ of the whole soul. And it is still another thing to claim that each part qua part has relative dependence or independence as a psychical, in contrast to a physical, constituent of a greater whole of which it is a part. In his efforts to blend the best of both pictures, and provide an account of an immortal soul attuned to the good, Plato presents various arguments about the composition of the whole being in terms of soul as an entity and body as an entity. He also presents arguments about the composition of the soul itself as a whole entity whose formal aspects are either two or three discriminable functions or powers. In one version of the latter psychical account, in both the Phaedrus and the Republic, the soul has three powers: reason, ‘spirit’ and desire. Reason is the only one cognitively dependent on sensory reports supplied by the bodily organs and vitally dependent on the other two powers for the continuance of its host qua whole individual. But reason is not dependent in its own nature, that is, for the exercise of the power itself, on any bodily organic entity. In another version, the soul has two kinds of power, where ‘kind’ (eide or gene) itself is differentiated with respect to the criterion of reason (logos). The relevant difference is between rational and nonrational, though the rational power or faculty of the whole human has to ‘take account of’ the needs and desires made known to it through the human non-rational power. Nevertheless, the rational power of the soul (nous) is itself an autonomous whole in so far as it is taken account of in terms of the cosmic plan of an order of beings. In this order that-which-reasons is not a power or function of some thing, but an agent or entity whose basic nature (phusis) is expressed through human beings’ rational governance of their beliefs and actions, especially actions directed towards moral goods.2 (2)

Aristotle on soul as form and body as matter

Aristotle’s conception of the physical or the natural is much different than our contemporary understanding informed by scientific advances since the seventeenth century. Aristotle thinks that it is true of natural objects and their behavior that they cannot be fully understood in terms of their material constituents and their properties, but have to be explained in terms of their essence or nature. Aristotle’s introduction of essences or natures reflects the fact that he takes an anti-reductionist view; he insists that natural objects, including human beings, are not just configurations of more basic material constituents and hence should not be conceived of just in this way, since essences or natures enter in a non-causal way into an explanation of their status and behavior. His understanding of the ‘causal’, principled character of soul is pivotal in making sense of his sometimes incongruous statements regarding soul as substance and soul as property. Ancient and modern interpreters have placed greater or lesser weight on textual evidence for one position at the expense of the other; recently, several radical interpreters have held forth a tentative third way, that the soul is a ‘property-thing’, a hybrid of the two standard views. In the last resort, Miles Burnyeat has argued that Aristotle’s view of the nature of soul, that is, its ontological status in terms of the

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categorical template, is ‘totally alien’ to our way of thinking and ‘deeply mysterious’.4748 Aristotle’s account (logos) of soul (psyche) makes excellent use of several conceptual templates: substance and attribute, matter and form, and explanatory factors (aitia).4S He uses the apparatus of matter (hule) and form (eidos or morphe) to explain the nature of every kind of object, whether living or non-living, natural or artificial. The matter of an object is the stuff that either it or its parts are made out of; in the simple case of an artifact, for example, a bronze sphere or a house, its matter would be the bronze stuff or the bricks and timber. The form of an object is its specific shape or profile; the form of a bronze sphere is its spherical shape, the form of a house is a complex arrangement of its material parts. Aristotle has a unified theory of living things, and hence the human soul, since his account of soul is another variation on his matter-form analysis, and since every living thing is explicable in terms of matter and form qua material and formal ‘causes’ (aitia). In his distinction between matter and form Aristotle intends the notion of form to be immaterial (in some sense yet to be specified) when, for example, he says that natural objects may be defined through the definition of their form alone, without the inclusion of matter in that definition (Meta. Z.l 1, 1037a). The immaterial status of form is further indicated when he maintains that not everything has matter, but only those objects that are generated or destroyed. These perishable things are distinct from other things, including the form of an object, which ‘are or are not’ without undergoing any change (Meta. H. 1044b). Matter is physical in an ordinary sense in most contexts within his matter-form analysis of objects. It is often the case that his idea of materiality may be roughly equated with our contemporary idea of physicality, yet one should be cautious, especially with regard to his strange doctrine of ‘intelligible matter’. It is fairly clear what he means by ‘perceptible matter’, such as bronze or wood, since their material constituent parts are graspable by the sense organs. But intelligible matter belongs to intelligible objects alone, such as an abstract circle or triangle; it follows that such ‘objects’ can be grasped by the intellect (nous) alone. Perceptible matter is always changeable and allows for the full range of possible types of change (generation and destruction, alteration, movement, and so forth) which an object composed of such matter can suffer. On the other hand, intelligible matter constitutes imperceptible, changeless ‘objects’. Still another use of the idea of matter appears in his analysis of the ‘subject’ which underlies and persists through substantial changes, that is, the coming to be and passing away of composite substances (Phys. 192a); it is whatever provides the subject for any of the other sorts of changes (GC 320a). According to H. Granger, there are two main lines of interpretation regarding the ontological status of soul (psyche) as the form of living things: one that considers the soul to be the property or attribute of some thing, and the other that considers the soul to be a substance, a thing that has properties or attributes. According to Aristotle’s logical template, things or objects are the types of entities that provide the values of variables in first-order predicate logic; they comprise the reference 47 Burnyeat, in Nussbaum & Rorty, 1992, pp. 15-26. 48 On his matter-form and substance-attribute accounts, see Barnes, in Barnes, 1995, pp. 90-101.

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division of count nouns or sortal expressions, and can serve as the ‘subject’ of firstorder properties. They are usually characterized as independent entities that can exist in their own right. As the subjects of properties ‘things’ exemplify properties; they are the things that can be white or bronze or wooden. The nature of properties is harder to pin down, but basically properties cannot exist on their own, without some thing they are the property of, they are common to all the instances of things that exemplify them. Properties are dependent entities that rely for their existence upon the things that provide them with their subject.49 Aristotle also speaks in general terms about matter as ‘subject’ and form as ‘predicate’; form is a predicate in that it is predicated or ‘said-of’ its subject or underlying thing which is its matter. Properties and kinds (genus and species) provide paradigm examples of predicates that are ‘said-of’ things; the subject stands for what properties and kinds are ‘said-of’. Thus Aristotle’s application of predicate and similar expressions to form and his application of subject to matter are good evidence for the view that form as a predicate of matter is a property of matter.50 In more modem terms, the word ‘sub-stance’ does good service for hypo stasis as that-which-stands-under, the ‘subject-matter’ of some discourse indicates that the independent thing that bears properties is its matter, and of course (most enigmatic of all) that any kind of object can be the ‘subject’ of inquiry or investigation. There is also some indication that Aristotle views form as universal,51 that is, that property or feature which is common to a number of different things. In other words, properties are common to many different things, each of which exemplifies that property, though perhaps in different ways and through different relations. He associates the universal with what he calls a common predicate, which he describes as ‘such’ (toionde), in contrast with what he calls ‘this’ (tode ti), an expression that he often uses to describe concrete particular things. In one passage Aristotle seems to say that form is ‘this’ and not ‘such’ (Meta. Z.8, 1033b); but he maintains that things of the same kind differ through the difference in their matter, and that they are the same in their form, since it is indivisible (Meta. Z .ll, 1036a). In the opening of the second book of De Anima, Aristotle draws the distinction between body and soul in matter-form terms, and situates this distinction in his prior distinction of subject and predicate: ‘Since it [the body] is also a body of a certain sort, for it possesses life, the soul would not be body; for the body is not some thing predicated of a subject, rather it exists as subject and matter. Therefore, it is necessary that the soul be substance as the form of a natural body possessed of life potentially’ (DA 412a). The body serves as a subject or thing that has a soul, but the soul is not another thing in addition to its body, or some part of the body, but a property the body possesses as a living thing. Later he says that the soul is not without a body, yet it is not ‘a certain kind of body’; rather, it is something that belongs to a body. Still another formulation is that the soul is something about the body, which would appear to be a property of the body through its dependence on 49 Granger, 1996, pp. 8-14; see also van der Eijk, 2000, pp. 57-60. 50 On this topic, see Barnes, in Barnes, 1995, pp. 86-90. 51 On the relevance of universals to his account of soul, see Granger, 1996, p. 9, note 16, and pp. 60-62.

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the body’s existence. The soul is not a thing that can exist in its own right. He contrasted his view with the Pythagorean notion that the human soul was independent of an individual’s body. He complained that the mystics expound only upon the nature of the soul itself and not on the nature of the body that is needed to receive or house the soul. For the mystics, the body might be anything, and thus it would really be irrelevant to its having a soul; in principle the soul might be taken into or housed in any kind of body. Aristotle thinks this view is absurd, since inter alia it ignores the account-force of explanatory factors, that is, it makes nonsense of the connections between substance (ousia) and ‘causes’ (aitia). The mystics treated the soul as an independent entity that might be attached at random to any sort of body. In contrast, since Aristotle’s idea of the soul is property-like, the soul is dependent upon its body, but not as another bodily part upon the whole body, since the soul is not any kind of body at all. Aristotle stresses the difference between matter and form in order to reinforce the notion that they are different in type; they cannot be compared because they do not share any thing. It would be a category mistake to employ terms from one type to explain anything about another type. He argues that things compounded out of material parts, in so far as they form a whole and not a heap, must possess some aspect (but not a thing) other than their material parts to account for the unification of their material parts into just that whole.52 If this were not the case, its parts would comprise some other whole, and make it a different particular thing. If one attempts to explain the unity of the parts through an appeal to another material part (that is, an item of the same sort) no account has been achieved, since something else must be appealed to in order to explain the unification of both the original parts and the new part. If an appeal is made only to further material parts, then an infinite regress enters the account. Thus something entirely other than the material parts, namely the form of the object, must be resorted to in order to account for the unity of all the parts in the one whole. Aristotle calls the parts that compose the whole its elements and the form of the whole its principle: ‘When this observation on the difference between matter and form is added to the observations already made about the difference between them as “subject” and “predicate”, and about the nature of the dependence of form or soul upon matter, the evidence mounts up significantly in favor of the view that the difference between matter and form, or body and soul, amounts to an asymmetry that is different in type ... the form or soul as an attribute of matter or of the body.’53 Sometimes it seems that Aristotle does indeed refer to the soul qua form as a substance, but this should be taken under advisement, since he clearly says that the word ‘substance’ is ambiguous (DA 412a); that it can signify ‘primary substance’, ‘matter’, ‘form’ or the ‘composite’ of matter and form. Perhaps one can disambiguate this remark by thinking that ‘substance’ in the broadest sense means no more than an entity of an as yet unspecified categorical type. He clearly indicates that in his analysis of the principal properties of soul the term ‘substance’ can be taken three ways: as its constituent matter, as its proper form, and as the composite of its matter

52 For a detailed analysis of this argument, see Granger, 1996, pp. 116-18. 53 Granger, 1996, p. 18-19; see also Irwin, 1988, pp. 280-95.

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History of the Concept of Mind

and form: ‘Now we speak of one particular kind of existent thing as substance, and under this heading we thus speak of one thing qua matter, which in itself is not a particular; another qua shape and form, in virtue of which it is then spoken of as a particular; and a third qua the product of these two’ (DA 412a6-8).54 The other main feature of his discussion of soul in matter-form terms regards the soul as the ‘first actuality’ (entelecheia) of the natural body in its living state. He goes on to say that ‘actuality’ has two senses, only one of which is appropriate to the idea of soul: [0]n the one hand, it is the possession of knowledge, on the other hand, it is the exercise of knowledge. Hence it is evident that the soul is like the possession of knowledge, for both sleep and waking exist in the presence of soul, and waking is analogous to the exercise of knowledge, and sleep to the possession and not the exercise of knowledge. Now the possession of knowledge is prior in being in the same individual. On which account, soul is the first actuality of a natural body having life in potentiality. [DA 412a]

Here he indicates that the first ‘actuality’ is what one would now think of as a disposition or dispositional property; the capacity that something has for exercising or manifesting a certain activity in certain circumstances. For example, solubility in water is a paradigm case of a dispositional property of sugar; it dissolves when placed in an adequate amount of water. The dissolution of sugar is the manifestation of its disposition towards solubility and sugar possesses this property even when it is not manifesting it through active dissolution. Aristotle’s own example of first actuality as disposition involves the condition of someone who has undergone instruction in some subject-matter. After instruction, the person has mastered the knowledge of the subject-matter, because he has the capacity for exercising that knowledge under appropriate circumstances. This capacity is comparable to the dormant condition of sleep, in contrast with the active state of being awake, in which an animal exercises its various faculties. This capacity is a disposition as a property of the particular thing, and is the first actuality of the soul. He also compares the actuality of the soul to that of an axe or an eye. If an axe were a natural body (but it is not), then its soul would be axe-like insofar as it cuts things; if the eye were an animal, then its soul would be sight, insofar as it sees things. The activity of the axe’s cutting and the eye’s seeing are actualities, comparable to the state of being awake, but not the first actuality. Rather, the first actuality is the disposition that makes sight possible in the eye; this is what Aristotle calls power or potentiality (